Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-99007/USCOURTS-ca9-13-99007-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DEAN PHILLIP CARTER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

RON DAVIS, Warden, San

Quentin State Prison,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 13-99003

D.C. No.

2:06-cv-04532-RGK

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

DEAN PHILLIP CARTER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

RON DAVIS, Warden, San

Quentin State Prison,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 13-99007

D.C. No.

3:06-cv-01343-BENKSC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding

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2 CARTER V. DAVIS

Argued and Submitted March 28, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed December 26, 2019

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Richard R. Clifton,

and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty

In appeals arising from Dean Phillip Carter’s habeas

corpus petitions challenging his convictions and death

sentences in separate cases in Los Angeles and San Diego

Counties, the panel (1) affirmed district court judgments in

the Central and Southern Districts of California denying his

petitions; (2) granted, as to one claim in the Central District,

Carter’s supplemental motion to expand the certificate of

appealability; and (3) otherwise denied the supplemental

motion to expand the certificate of appealability.

The Central District certified two claims for review: 

(1) that an irreconcilable conflict between Carter and trial

counsel resulted in a denial of his Sixth Amendment rights,

and (2) that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CARTER V. DAVIS 3

because they refused to allow Carter to testify in his own

defense.

• The panel held that even if Carter were able to

demonstrate a complete breakdown in communication or

prove that an irreconcilable conflict with trial counsel

existed under this circuit’s precedent, his irreconcilableconflict claim would fail because the U.S. Supreme Court

has never held that an irreconcilable conflict with one’s

attorney constitutes a per se denial of the right to effective

counsel. The panel explained that this proves fatal to

Carter’s claim because AEDPA conditions habeas relief

on a determination that the state-court decision

unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law” as

pronounced by the U.S. Supreme Court.

• The panel held that the California Supreme Court

reasonably determined that counsel did not perform

deficiently by refusing to let Carter testify, and that even

if counsel performed deficiently by refusing to do so, the

California Supreme Court’s determination that Carter

cannot show prejudice was not an unreasonable

application of law.

The Southern District certified two claims for review: 

(1) that Carter’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

at the penalty phase, and (2) that Carter was deprived of his

right to the competent assistance of a psychiatric expert.

• The panel held that Carter failed to establish that the

California Supreme Court was unreasonable in denying

relief on his contentions that counsel performed

deficiently (a) by focusing on the positive aspects of

Carter’s career and family life as a result, rather than

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4 CARTER V. DAVIS

giving greater emphasis to his traumatic childhood; and

(b) by failing to conduct an adequate investigation into

Carter’s mental health, including the possibility that he

suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome.

• The panel held that Carter failed to establish that Ake v.

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), or any other U.S.

Supreme Court decision would cause jurists of reason to

disagree with the reasonable arguments in support of the

California Supreme Court’s denial of his claim that he

was deprived of the right to competent assistance of a

psychiatric expert at trial. The panel wrote that, as Carter

conceded, the U.S. Supreme Court has never interpreted

Ake to guarantee a due process right to effective expert

assistance at trial.

The panel issued a certificate of appealability on one

claim, not certified by the Central District, alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. The

panel affirmed the denial of relief on that claim because the

California Supreme Court’s determination that counsel

satisfied the deferential standard set forth in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law. The panel wrote that

the California Supreme Court may reasonably have

concluded that the investigation supporting counsel’s decision

not to introduce more mitigating evidence was reasonable,

and that even if Carter’s defense team performed deficiently,

the California Supreme Court could reasonably have

concluded that Carter was not prejudiced by their

performance. 

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CARTER V. DAVIS 5

The panel denied a certificate of appealability as to the

rest of the claims not certified by the Southern and Central

District Courts.

COUNSEL

Michael D. Weinstein (argued) and Mark Yim, Deputy

Federal Public Defenders; Hilary Potashner, Federal Public

Defender; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Los

Angeles, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.

Annie Featherman Fraser (argued), DeputyAttorneyGeneral;

Holly D. Wilkens, Supervising Deputy Attorney General;

Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Gerald

A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Xavier Becerra,

AttorneyGeneral; Office of the AttorneyGeneral, San Diego,

California; for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In separate proceedings in Los Angeles and San Diego,

Dean Phillip Carter (Carter) was convicted of murder, rape,

robbery, and burglary and sentenced to death. Carter filed

petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the United States

District Courts for the Central District of California and for

the Southern District of California. The district courts denied

Carter’s petitions.

In appeal No. 13-99003, we affirm the judgment of the

Central District and deny Carter’s motion to expand the

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6 CARTER V. DAVIS

certificate of appealability (COA) as to all claims except 

claim 6, regarding ineffective assistance of counsel at the

penalty phase.

In appeal No. 13-99007, we affirm the judgment of the

Southern District and deny Carter’s motion to expand the

COA.

I. BACKGROUND

Carter stood trial in Los Angeles County and San Diego

County for charges stemming from a crime spree throughout

California in Spring 1984. In the Los Angeles proceedings,

Carter was accused of the rape and murder of Bonnie Guthrie

and the burglary of her residence; and of the murder of Susan

Knoll, rape and murder of Jillette Mills, and the burglary of

their shared residence. In San Diego County, Carter was

accused of the murder and robbery of Janette Cullins and the

burglary of her residence; and of the rape, forcible oral

copulation, and robbery of B.S.1and the burglary of her

residence. In both the Los Angeles and San Diego

proceedings, prosecutors also introduced evidence of Carter’s

prior convictions for rape, robbery, and assault of J.S. in

Ventura County, and of his connection to the murder of Tok

Kim in Alameda County. The crimes occurred over four

California counties over a period of about three weeks. We

describe them briefly and chronologically.

2

1 We identify living victims of sex crimes only by their initials in this

opinion.

2 The facts set forth in this opinion are taken directly from the most

recent reasoned state-court decisions issued in the challenged proceedings: 

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CARTER V. DAVIS 7

A. The Crimes

On March 25, 1984, Carter broke into the San Diego

home of B.S. wielding a knife and demanded money. After

taking B.S.’s cash, he raped her, hog-tied her, and stole her

car.

On March 27, Carter raped J.S. at knifepoint in her

Ventura County apartment, cut her face, strangled her twice

to the point at which she lost consciousness, and stole cash

from her.3

On April 1, Carter met Tok Kim at a bar in Lafayette,

California, and offered to help her with car trouble. Over the

next two days, a service station manager named David Hogan

observed Carter and Kim at his station together. Hogan

observed that Carter was wearing sunglasses and a black

“Members Only” style jacket. On the night of April 10,

Kim’s neighbor heard Kim arguing in her Oakland apartment

with an unidentified man who was not her boyfriend. Kim’s

co-workers notified her apartment manager after Kim did not

appear for work on two consecutive days. On April 13, the

apartment manager found Kim’s body on her bedroom floor. 

The pathologist who performed the autopsy could not

determine the cause of death because of the body’s advanced

People v. Carter, 117 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2005) (Los Angeles) and People v.

Carter, 117 P.3d 544 (Cal. 2005) (San Diego).

3 A Ventura County jury convicted Carter of the rape, robbery, and

assault of J.S. He does not seek relief from these convictions here. 

However, prosecutors introduced evidence of these convictions in both of

Carter’s death penalty trials.

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8 CARTER V. DAVIS

stage of decomposition but testified that a curtain tie found

beneath her neck could have been used to strangle her.4

On April 11, Culver City,California resident Susan Knoll

went absent from her job at a bank. Knoll’s co-worker took

a call from an unidentified man who informed her that Knoll

had been in a traffic accident and was being treated for minor

injuries at a hospital. The same day, after Knoll’s roommate

Jillette Mills failed to respond to her brother’s attempts to

contact her, the brother and a friend searched for Mills at her

apartment, place of employment, and college but were unable

to find Mills or her car. The two men then climbed a fence to

enter Mills’s and Knoll’s unlocked apartment and found the

bodies of both women stacked in the closet.

Investigators discovered Kim’s vehicle outside of Mills’s

and Knoll’s apartment. Inside the vehicle was a pair of

sunglasses, which Hogan identified as matching a pair he

observed Carter wearing at his station while with Kim. 

Mills’s white Datsun was missing. Inside the apartment,

investigators retrieved a palm print matching Carter’s from

the bathroom sink. An autopsy determined that Knoll died of

manual strangulation and Mills died of ligature strangulation. 

Both women also suffered injuries consistent with having

struggled against an assailant and had seminal fluid on their

genital areas. Mills additionally suffered injuries to her

genital area consistent with traumatic sexual assault.

Also on April 11, the manager of Bonnie Guthrie’s

apartment building in Los Angeles entered Guthrie’s

4 Carter has never faced charges relating to Kim’s death. Prosecutors

introduced evidence ofthe circumstances surrounding her death, however,

in both of Carter’s death penalty trials.

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CARTER V. DAVIS 9

apartment with a repairman. Guthrie was Knoll’s best friend. 

The manager observed Guthrie lying on her bedroom floor

and remarked to the repairman that she was sleeping. The

next day, the manager noticed Guthrie’s vehicle in the garage

and wondered why she had not gone to work. He entered the

apartment, observed Guthrie lying in the same position, and

notified police. An autopsy determined that Guthrie died of

ligature strangulation and that she had suffered injuries to her

genital area consistent with traumatic sexual assault. Two

days after the discovery of Guthrie’s body, a witness found

Guthrie’s wallet in a San Diego shipyard, approximately fifty

feet from a white Datsun matching the description of Mills’s

missing vehicle.

On April 12, Carter visited the San Diego apartment of

Janette Cullins and her roommate Cheri Phinney. Carter and

Cullins knew one another socially, and had met for drinks and

dinner with other friends on two occasions in February and

March 1984. On March 24, Carter had attempted to contact

Cullins through her friend Cathleen Tiner. When Tiner told

Cullins that Carter had called for her, Cullins became upset. 

Cullins had also told her former roommate, Nancy

McEachern, that if Carter called for her she did not want to

speak with him. When Carter visited Cullins on April 12,

Cullins asked Phinney to come through the living room so

that Carter would be aware that someone else was in the

apartment. Carter left the apartment after an hour.

That evening, Cullins and Tiner attended the symphony

together. Cullins informed Tiner that Carter was back in

town. At 11:00 p.m., Cullins left Tiner’s apartment and was

never seen alive again. Between 11:15 and 11:30 p.m.,

Cullins’s neighbor observed a white Datsun matching the

description of Mills’s missing vehicle outside of Cullins’s

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10 CARTER V. DAVIS

apartment. The neighbor observed the vehicle drive away at

11:30, nearly hitting another vehicle while making a U-turn

and running through a stop sign.

On April 13, Phinney and McEachern each attempted to

contact Cullins without success. At midday, McEachern

drove to Cullins’s apartment and encountered Carter, who

was driving a white Datsun. Carter asked McEachern if

Cullins was home. That evening, Carter unexpectedly visited

Tiner at her home and commented that Cullins had “stood

[him] up” that day. Tiner then unsuccessfully attempted to

contact Cullins.

The following day, Phinney and McEachern searched

Cullins’s apartment and found her partially clothed body in

her bedroom closet. A police investigation found damage to

the front door consistent with a forced entry. An autopsy

determined that Cullins died of ligature strangulation and that

she had sustained a wound consistent with the use of a sharp

knife either while she was dying or after she had died.

On the same day Cullins’s body was discovered, a

pedestrian found a wallet containingCullins’s driver’s license

and credit cards in bushes next to a sidewalk on North Harbor

Drive in San Diego. The pedestrian testified that he had seen

a white Datsun matching the description of Mills’s missing

vehicle parked within one block of where he had found the

wallet during the same week. Later that day, police recovered

Guthrie’s purse from the same area of North Harbor Drive.

On April 17, an Arizona Highway Patrol officer observed

Mills’s white Datsun driving erratically on Interstate 40 in

Yavapai County, Arizona. The officer initiated a traffic stop

and discovered Carter alone in the vehicle with what

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CARTER V. DAVIS 11

appeared to be a burnt marijuana cigarette and placed Carter

under arrest on suspicion of driving under the influence. 

While searching the vehicle for marijuana, the officer

discovered Cullins’s bank identification card between the

driver’s seat and center console.

A full search of the vehicle recovered the following items: 

a suitcase, Korean-made wood-handled knife, yellow rubber

gloves, and a gold chain, all belonging to Kim; a supermarket

card belonging to Knoll; towels, athletic wear, and

photographic equipment, all belonging to Mills; three handwoven sweaters belonging to Guthrie; a key ring belonging to

Cullins; a piece of paper with Cullins’s bank password

written on it; and a black “Members Only” jacket matching

the description of the jacket Hogan had seen Carter wearing

while with Kim. The jacket contained a butcher knife, a

knee-high nylon sock, and a business card from Hogan’s

service station.

Bank records revealed that all but $4.06 of Cullins’s bank

account balance had been withdrawn from an ATM on April

13, the day after she was last seen alive. A video of the

transaction showed a man wearing one of Guthrie’s sweaters

and a black jacket withdrawing the funds. A handwriting

expert testified that there were “very strong indications” that

Cullins had written the password on the slip of paper

recovered from the Datsun but also could neither eliminate

nor identify Carter as the writer.

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12 CARTER V. DAVIS

B. Criminal Proceedings

1. Los Angeles County

The Los Angeles trial regarding the crimes against Knoll,

Mills, and Guthrie was bifurcated into guilt and penalty

proceedings. At the guilt phase, Carter’s counsel rested

without calling any witnesses or putting on a defense. Carter

was convicted on all counts. At the penalty phase, Carter’s

counsel presented an extensive mitigation case detailed

below. Carter was sentenced to death.

2. San Diego County

The San Diego trial, which followed his conviction in Los

Angeles County, was also bifurcated into guilt and penalty

proceedings regarding the murder of Cullins and the rape of

B.S. Carter stipulated before trial that he had been convicted

of the murders of Knoll, Mills, and Guthrie.

At the guilt phase, counsel put on a defense by calling

several witnesses. But the jury found Carter guilty of the

murder of Cullins, and found true the special circumstances

that the murder was committed while lying in wait, during the

commission of both a robbery and a burglary, and that Carter

had previously been convicted of the murders of Knoll, Mills,

and Guthrie. It further found Carter guilty of the robbery of

Cullins and the burglary of her residence and found that he

had inflicted great bodily injury during the course of these

crimes. The jury also found Carter guilty of the forcible rape,

forcible oral copulation, and robbery of B.S. and the burglary

of her residence, and determined that Carter had used a

deadly weapon (a knife) in the commission of each of his

crimes against B.S.

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CARTER V. DAVIS 13

At the penalty phase, counsel presented a mitigation case

similar to that presented in the Los Angeles trial. The jury

returned a recommendation of the death penalty. The court

imposed a death sentence.

C. California Supreme Court Proceedings

Carter’s convictions and sentences were appealed to the

California Supreme Court. While those appeals were

pending, Carter filed his first round of state habeas petitions

in that court. In 2005, the California Supreme Court affirmed

the convictions and death sentences in two separate, reasoned

opinions. People v. Carter, 117 P.3d 476 (Cal. 2005) (Los

Angeles); People v. Carter, 117 P.3d 544 (Cal. 2005) (San

Diego). The court affirmed both judgments in their entirety

with the exception of the San Diego court’s finding of the

special circumstance of lying in wait on the Cullins murder

charge, which it set aside. Carter sought review of these

decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States, which

denied his petitions for writ of certiorari in 2006. Carter v.

California, 547 U.S. 1099 (2006) (mem.) (Los Angeles);

Carter v. California, 547 U.S. 1043 (2006) (mem.) (San

Diego).

In 2006, the California Supreme Court summarily denied

Carter’s habeas petitions on the merits. Carter filed two

subsequent rounds of state habeas petitions in 2007 and 2010. 

The California Supreme Court summarily denied each of

those petitions on the merits in 2010.

D. Federal Habeas Proceedings

Carter initiated the instant proceedings in 2007. In a

petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the United States

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14 CARTER V. DAVIS

District Court for the Southern District of California, he

asserted seventeen claims for relief related to his San Diego

County trial. Two days later, he filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the

Central District of California, asserting seventeen additional

claims for relief related to his Los Angeles County trial. 

Carter filed amended petitions in both federal district courts

in 2010, reducing the number of claims in his Southern

District petition to sixteen.

In 2013, the Central District of California published a

146-page order dismissing two of Carter’s claims without

prejudice and denying the rest of his claims on the merits. 

The district court granted a COA on two of Carter’s claims:

that an irreconcilable conflict between Carter and trial

counsel resulted in a denial of his Sixth Amendment rights

(Certified Claim 1, and Claim 1 of the First Amended

Petition); and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

because they refused to allow Carter to testify in his own

defense (Certified Claim 2, and Claim 5(D) of the First

Amended Petition). It denied a COA on the remaining

claims.

Later in 2013, the Southern District of California

published a 318-page order denying all claims on the merits. 

The district court granted a COA on two claims: that trial

counsel had rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty

phase (Certified Claim 1, and Claim 3 of the Second

Amended Petition); and that Carter was deprived of his right

to the competent assistance of a psychiatric expert (Certified

Claim 2, and Claim 4 of the Second Amended Petition). It

denied a COA on the remaining claims. Carter filed a motion

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b) to

vacate the order denying his petition and allow him to return

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CARTER V. DAVIS 15

to state court to further develop the evidentiary record. The

Southern District denied this motion in a reasoned decision.

Carter timely appealed both district court orders.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review the district court[s’] denial of a habeas

petition de novo.” Jones v. Harrington, 829 F.3d 1128, 1135

(9th Cir. 2016). Carter’s habeas petitions are subject to the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA), which forecloses federal habeas relief for “any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court”

unless the state court’s decision was (1) “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States”; or (2) “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

These standards are “intentionally ‘difficult to meet.’” 

Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam)

(quoting White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014)). 

“‘[C]learly established Federal law’ for purposes of

§ 2254(d)(1) includes only ‘the holdings’” of Supreme Court

decisions; it does not include Supreme Court dicta or circuit

precedent. Woodall, 572 U.S. at 419–20 & n.2; see Parker v.

Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48–49 (2012) (per curiam). A statecourt decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme

Court precedent “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases’ or if

it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless

arrives at a [different] result.’” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S.

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16 CARTER V. DAVIS

634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405–06 (2000)). A state-court decision “involve[s] an

unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme

Court precedent if “it correctly identifies the governing legal

rule” but then applies that rule to the facts of a particular case

in an “objectively unreasonable” way, such that the state

court’s ruling rested on “an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Woodall, 572 U.S. at 421, 426–27

(citations omitted). Finally, a state-court decision is “based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts” if “we are

convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude

that the finding is supported by the record.” Murray v.

Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and

internal alteration omitted).

These deferential standards apply to each claim

adjudicated on the merits in state court, regardless of whether

the state court disposed of the claim in a reasoned opinion or

a summary ruling. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99

(2011). We generally “look to the last reasoned state court

decision to address the claim” on the merits. White v. Ryan,

895 F.3d 641, 665 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Wilson v. Sellers,

138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018)). If there is no reasoned statecourt decision, we must “determine what arguments or

theories . . . could have supported[] the state court’s

decision.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.

Finally, even if a habeas petitioner satisfies one of the

§ 2254(d) prongs for relief, he must show that the claimed

trial error “resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Davis v. Ayala,

135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). “Under this test, relief is proper

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CARTER V. DAVIS 17

only if the federal court has grave doubt about whether a trial

error of federal law had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 2197–98

(internal quotation marks omitted).

III. CERTIFIED CLAIMS

We begin with the claims certified by the district courts. 

For three of the four claims, the “clearly established Federal

law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), is the Supreme Court’s

decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),

which held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal

defendant the “right to the effective assistance of counsel” at

both the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial. Id. at

685–87. Under Strickland, a defendant claiming denial of

effective assistance of counsel “bears the burden to meet two

standards.” Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910

(2017).

First, the defendant “must show deficient

performance—that the attorney’s error was ‘so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’” Id. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Under Strickland, our inquiry

is highly deferential, and we “must apply a ‘strong

presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the

‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.” Richter,

562 U.S. at 104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “To

overcome that presumption, a defendant must show that

counsel failed to act ‘reasonably considering all the

circumstances.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189

(2011) (alteration omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

688). The relevant inquiry is “whether an attorney’s

representation amounted to incompetence under ‘prevailing

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18 CARTER V. DAVIS

professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from best

practices or most common custom.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). And given the

“temp[tation] for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s

assistance after conviction or adverse sentence,” the Supreme

Court has strongly cautioned us against drawing the

conclusion “that a particular act or omission of counsel was

unreasonable” just because it “proved unsuccessful.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Second, the defendant must “demonstrate prejudice—‘a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.’” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776 (2017)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In the context of a

death sentence, “[t]he question is whether there is a

reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer

would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Pinholster,

563 U.S. at 198 (alteration omitted) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 695).

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy

task,” and “[e]stablishing that a state court’s application of

Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more

difficult.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted). Our

review under AEDPA is “doubly deferential,” as we must

“afford ‘both the state court and the defense attorney the

benefit of the doubt.’” Donald, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (quoting

Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013)).

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CARTER V. DAVIS 19

A. Claims Certified by the Central District: Claims 1 and

5(D)(1), Carter’s Conflict with Counsel

The Central District issued a COA for two largely

overlapping claims, which it addressed together. The

certified claims effectively present two questions on appeal: 

whether the California Supreme Court’s decisions that

(1) Carter was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel because of an “irreconcilable conflict” with his trial

counsel and (2) counsel’s performance in refusing to let

Carter testify was not deficient, and even if it was, Carter was

not prejudiced, were contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. For the reasons

stated below, we hold that the California Supreme Court did

not violate clearly established federal law in denying Carter

relief.

1. Carter’s Attorneys and the Marsden Hearings

Ezekiel Perlo was initially appointed lead counsel and

represented Carter, along with Marcia Morrisey, for over two

years during 1986–1988. About a year prior to trial, in March

1988, the court appointed Rowan Klein to assist Carter in his

motion to substitute counsel, which under California law is

referred to as a Marsden motion. See People v. Marsden,

465 P.2d 44 (Cal. 1970). The trial court held a Marsden

hearing in which Klein notified the court that conflicts

between Perlo and Carter had “led to a total breakdown of the

attorney-client relationship” and that Carter wanted a new

attorney to be appointed in place of Perlo. The trial court was

troubled by this “easily made,” “blanket statement” that

would further delay a trial already “long overdue.” It

nevertheless agreed that the conflict between Perlo and Carter

did not give it “much choice” but to grant the motion. The

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20 CARTER V. DAVIS

court appointed Howard Gillingham lead counsel a week

later, and he and Morrissey represented Carter throughout the

duration of the trial.

a. July 5 (First Marsden Hearing)

On July 5, 1989, just after the prosecution rested during

the guilt phase, Gillingham requested an ex parte hearing to

apprise the trial court of a disagreement between him and

Carter. Gillingham invoked Marsden in requesting the

hearing but did not say anything that would suggest Carter

had requested new counsel. Gillingham stated he wanted to

“spread something on the record regarding the defense

strategy and position.” He informed the court that it was his

and Morrissey’s “firm belief that [they] should rest” and not

put on a defense at the guilt stage. He noted that there were

a number of potential witnesses he could call but that they

made the “tactical decision not to call those witnesses.” He

did not mention Carter as one of those witnesses. Gillingham

acknowledged Carter emphatically disagreed with the

decision not to call any witnesses and that Carter wanted the

disagreement preserved in the record. Gillingham argued that

this was a situation where the appointed lawyers “should call

the shots.” The trial court agreed, noting “the record is clear”

and that “in these matters the decisions should be with the

counsel.” Carter did not speak during the hearing and

Gillingham subsequently testified that, based on his belief

that the “lawyer ought to do the talking,” he had instructed

Carter not to speak unless the court directly addressed him.

b. July 10 (Second Marsden Hearing)

Carter later testified that after the first Marsden hearing,

he complained to Gillingham for leaving out “a couple of

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CARTER V. DAVIS 21

things,” including telling the court about his desire to testify,

and for not “ma[king] it as clear as [Carter] would have

liked.” Thus, on July 10, after both parties had rested but

prior to closing arguments, Gillingham requested another

hearing, which he noted “probably should be done in a sealed

basis again under People versus Marsden.” The hearing was

brief and Gillingham stated:

Your honor, one further thing, in all modesty,

I think I neglected to do it the other day, and,

that is, in addition, by not putting on the

witnesses, it also precluded the potential of

Mr. Carter testifying based on . . . what those

witnesses would have testified to and the

effect of their testimony.

The court responded: “You just wanted to add that?” 

Gillingham said he had nothing further and the court ordered

the exchange sealed.

That same day, after closing arguments, the court held

another ex parte hearing, which did not appear to invoke

Marsden. It was also very brief and Gillingham added:

Your Honor, Mr. Carter asked me to spread

upon the record that he does not agree with

the closing argument that counsel made, that

he had asked me what it was, and that he was

not informed of the type of argument. And he

certainly does not feel that it was adequate,

and this just compounds the problem of the

lack of defense by the argument that counsel

made.

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22 CARTER V. DAVIS

The court responded by noting the “record is clear” and again

sealed the record. Carter did not speak during either of these

exchanges.

c. July 17 (Third Marsden Hearing)

On July 17, while the jury was deliberating, Gillingham

again requested a hearing “under the ambit of Marsden.”

Gillingham informed the court:

Mr. Carter continues to express

disappointment . . . [with] the manner in

which to this point the case has been handled

by counsel. He specifically would ask me to,

as I understand it, ask you to appoint Mr.

Rowen Klein . . . [to] prepare and file a new

trial motion or some motion pre-penalty

phase. This is part of the reason for the

Marsden.

I will say that counsel opposes that

motion. . . . We have discussed Mr. Carter’s

now constitutional rights under the ultimately

famous case of Feretta. . . . He is not making

that request today.

The court denied the request as untimely and noted that while

Klein may ultimately be able to help Carter file a motion for

new trial, it was not the appropriate time to consider such a

motion.

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CARTER V. DAVIS 23

d. September 5 (Fourth Marsden Hearing)

On September 5, after the jury returned a death verdict

but prior to sentencing, Gillingham once again requested an

ex parte hearing under Marsden. The following colloquy

took place:

Gillingham: Your Honor, as you know,

throughout the case there have been various

instances where Mr. Carter’s feelings,

opinions, et cetera, as to how the case was

being run surfaced. That has happened again,

and my own personal opinion, for what it’s

worth, is, it’s probably well taken. We asked

to be here under People versus Marsden, and

it’s my impression and belief that Mr. Carter

does not have confidence in the ability of

Miss Morrissey to proceed with his defense. 

This is not a knee jerk reaction. We’ve

discussed it.

Court: So without your opinion on the merits

of his displeasure, you feel there are righteous

differences of opinion here?

Gillingham: Yes, I do, your honor.

Court: And possibly is. You would be unable

ethically or intellectually to pursue the types

of claims that Mr. Carter would be making on

a motion for new trial and other issues?

Gillingham: Absolutely, and I do feel

strongly about it, that assuming new counsel

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24 CARTER V. DAVIS

were available, the most expeditious judicial

and most fair way to proceed, Miss Morrissey

and I should be relieved. That is Mr. Carter’s

request, which I understand it is.

. . .

Court: And Mr. Carter, is that your desire to

have Mr. Klein appointed to represent you in

this proceedings from now on?

Carter: Yes, it is.

Court: And do you agree with Mr.

Gillingham’s statement that there is a

difference–

Carter: Definitely.

Court: I don’t really see I have much choice

in this matter. At this point I don’t want to

pry, and I certainly respect the tremendous

amount, not only Mr. Gillingham and Miss

Morrissey’s legal abilities, but their ethical

standards as well, a[nd] if they feel that this is

the correct thing to do, I certainly would

agree.

The trial court then appointed Klein to represent Carter on his

motion for a new trial.

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CARTER V. DAVIS 25

e. Hearing on Motion for a New Trial

Klein moved for a new trial based, in part, on the conflict

between Gillingham and Carter. The court held a hearing on

the motion and Gillingham was called to testify about his

representation. Gillingham testified that he and Morrissey

recognized it was a “potential death case” and that they had

made the “tentative decision” to try it as a penalty case. He

admitted that the cases pending in Oakland and San Diego

“had to be some factor” in that decision. As an example of

how this decision affected the trial strategy, Gillingham noted

that “the voir dire of the jurors was almost entirely death

focused.” Gillingham testified that Carter “wanted to put on

at all times a full-blown defense” and “contest [] guilt” which

included the “possibility” of Carter testifying. Gillingham

observed that Carter’s comments were at times “framed in the

negative,” such as: “Aren’t you going to do something?”;

“Where are the witnesses?”; and “What are you going to do?” 

Gillingham further testified that in each of the hearings

discussed above he had always intended to accurately convey

Carter’s desires but that he likely did not do so very well.

Carter also testified during the hearing on the motion for

new trial. Carter said he told his attorneys he “wanted to

present a defense” and that he “was more concerned about the

guilt phase and that [he] felt it was necessary for [him] to

testify.” They did not settle on a defense strategy before trial

because Gillingham told him they could not fully plan their

strategy until they saw the prosecution’s case. He said the

first serious discussion with his counsel about the defense

case, including him testifying, was the day before the

prosecution rested. At that time, Gillingham told him that he

was not planning on putting on a defense, and if they were

not going to put on a defense, Carter would not testify. Carter

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26 CARTER V. DAVIS

was “upset,” and told Gillingham that he “wanted to call

witnesses, put on a defense and testify.” Carter noted he had

discussed trial strategy with Gillingham “around” ten times

prior to trial.

One time after voicing his disagreement to Gillingham,

Carter stated that Gillingham responded by telling him, “[a]s

hard as it is sometimes a lawyer has to play god.” Carter

testified he was particularly upset that he would not be able

to testify as a result of Gillingham’s decision not to call

witnesses and that he had requested the Marsden hearings to

“indicate to the court that I was not happy with what

[Gillingham] was doing and I wanted to make sure it was

clear that it was over my objection that he was doing it.” On

cross-examination, Carter conceded that he had not thought

about how his decision to testify could affect the other

pending cases. And when asked whether Gillingham stated

Carter’s view “completely and accurately,” Carter responded,

“As far as I recall.”

Klein argued that as soon as the court learned Carter

wanted to testify, it was constitutionally obligated to seek a

waiver of Carter’s right to testify. The court orally denied the

motion for a new trial without expressing its reasoning.

f. California Supreme Court Proceedings

On direct appeal to the California Supreme Court, Carter

argued the trial court erred by failing to adequately inquire

into the conflict with his counsel and by failing to appoint

new counsel once the conflict was disclosed. Carter,

117 P.3d at 530. The California Supreme Court denied this

claim on its merits. Id. at 530–34. It rejected Carter’s claim

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CARTER V. DAVIS 27

that his conflict with Gillingham denied Carter his right to

conflict-free, effective representation and held:

Here, the record supports the People’s

position that defendant, a person with a

sophisticated view of the criminal justice

system from the inside, complained

sufficiently during proceedings conducted in

the trial court so as to create a colorable

appellate issue, but not sufficiently to obligate

the trial court to relieve his counsel.

Id. at 532–33 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court

agreed with the prosecutor who argued the motion for a new

trial that “Mr. Carter was a defendant who wanted things his

way. . . . Mr. Gillingham did not do them his way for valid

legally sufficient reasons, and Mr. Gillingham indicated this

. . . displeasure of Mr. Carter, but in the end, Mr. Carter

acceded to Mr. Gillingham’s trial strategy.” Id. at 533 n.40

(second alteration in original).

The court also denied Carter’s claim that the trial court

failed to sufficiently inquire into the conflict, concluding:

[W]e are satisfied from the record before us

that in the course of conducting three

Marsden hearings, the trial court adequately

inquired as to the issues raised by the defense,

and that counsel fairly characterized the

nature of the conflict for the trial court. . . .

[D]efendant fails to persuade us that his

conflict with defense counsel over trial tactics

and strategy (including the decision whether

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28 CARTER V. DAVIS

defendant should testify), the trial court’s

inquiries into that conflict, or the court’s

refusal to appoint new counsel prior to the

conclusion of the penalty phase, either

singularly or in the aggregate, deprived

defendant of his state or federal constitutional

rights.

Id. at 534.

2. Irreconcilable Conflict

In his federal habeas petition, Carter argued he was

denied his constitutional right to “conflict-free, effective

counsel” because of “an irreconcilable conflict with his courtappointed attorneys” and that the California Supreme Court’s

opinion to the contrary was an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established federal law and “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts.”

The SixthAmendment guarantees criminal defendants the

right to effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of

the proceeding. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). 

It ensures defendants “an effective advocate,” but does not

guarantee the defendant “will inexorably be represented by

the lawyer whom he prefers.” Wheat v. United States,

486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).

We have stated that “to compel one charged with [a]

grievous crime to undergo a trial with the assistance of an

attorney with whom he has become embroiled in

irreconcilable conflict is to deprive him of the effective

assistance of any counsel whatsoever.” Brown v. Craven,

424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970); see Stenson v. Lambert,

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CARTER V. DAVIS 29

504 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2007). Concluding that such

conflicts are tantamount to a denial of counsel altogether, we

have held a defendant “need not show prejudice” as would

ordinarily be required under a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th

Cir. 1998); see also id. (“[I]f the relationship between lawyer

and client completely collapses, the refusal to substitute new

counsel violates [defendant’s] Sixth Amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel.”). Carter argues that if he can

establish an “irreconcilable conflict” existed between him and

Gillingham under the three-step inquiry we set forth in

Moore, he need not demonstrate the conflict prejudiced his

defense. See 159 F.3d at 1158–59.5

Even under our circuit’s precedent, the conclusion that an

irreconcilable conflict did not exist based on the disagreement

between Carter and Gillingham was reasonable. Carter,

117 P.3d at 533. “[O]nly where there is a complete

breakdown in communication,” have we recognized an

irreconcilable conflict claim. Stenson, 504 F.3d at 886. At

the hearing on the motion for a new trial, both Carter and

Gillingham testified that they spoke many times before and

throughout the trial about tactical decisions. The evidence

simply does not demonstrate “a total lack of communication”

between Carter and Gillingam. Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d

1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[d]isagreements over

strategical or tactical decision do not rise to level [sic] of a

5 We fashioned a three-part test in Moore to determine whether a

conflict rises to the level of “irreconcilable.” See Moore, 159 F.3d at

1158–59. Specifically, we consider “(1) the extent of the conflict; (2) the

adequacy of the inquiry [by the trial court]; and (3) the timeliness of the

motion [for substitution of counsel].” Id.

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30 CARTER V. DAVIS

complete breakdown in communication.” Stenson, 504 F.3d

at 886 (citing Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026).

Even if Carter were successfully able to demonstrate a

complete breakdown in communication or prove that an

irreconcilable conflict existed under the Moore factors,

Carter’s irreconcilable-conflict claim would still fail. This is

because the Supreme Court has never endorsed this line of

precedent from our court. It has never held that an

irreconcilable conflict with one’s attorney constitutes a per se

denial of the right to effective counsel. This proves fatal to

Carter’s claim because AEDPA conditions habeas relief on a

determination that the state-court decision unreasonably

applied “clearly established Federal law” as pronounced by

the U.S. Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams,

529 U.S. at 365. Although we may look to our circuit’s

precedent to see if we have already held a rule is clearly

established, our decisions may not “be used to refine or

sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence

into a specific legal rule that [the] Court has not announced.” 

Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013) (per curiam);

see Parker, 567 U.S. at 49 (holding the Sixth Circuit erred in

applying its circuit’s “multistep test” that bore scant

resemblance to the general rules announced by the Supreme

Court). Carter does not cite to any Supreme Court case

holding that an irreconcilable conflict between a lawyer and

his client constitutes a constructive denial of his right to

counsel, with no showing of prejudice required. Nor has he

pointed to Supreme Court precedent that resembles our test

in Moore.

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CARTER V. DAVIS 31

The Supreme Court cases Carter cites are inapposite, as

they all deal with conflicts of interest between other clients

the counsel represented. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163–64

(holding in multiple-representation cases, a district court must

help protect criminal defendants against counsel’s conflict of

interest); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271–72 (1981)

(discussing potential conflicts arising from counsel hired by

defendants’ employer); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,

482 (1978) (holding joint representation of codefendants is

not per se unconstitutional). The type of conflict Carter has

alleged, however, is one over defense strategy. The term

“conflict” can refer to different forms of conflict, and care

must be taken not to mix them up. We have expressly

declined to extend the conflict-of-interest analysis in Wheat,

Wood, and Holloway to the type of conflict Carter alleges. 

We rejected arguments similar to Carter’s in another capital

habeas case:

[Petitioner’s] disagreement with [his counsel]

is better characterized as one over trial

strategy . . . . We can find no clearly

established Supreme Court precedent holding

that this kind of disagreement amounts to an

actual conflict of interest. The Washington

Supreme Court correctly determined that no

clearly established federal law supports

[Petitioner’s] construction of “conflict of

interest” as describing a disagreement

between attorney and client over trial strategy.

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32 CARTER V. DAVIS

Stenson, 504 F.3d at 886.6 We are “not aware” of any

Supreme Court case suggesting the Sixth Amendment is

violated because the defendant “dislike[s] or distrust[s]” his

counsel. Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir.

2008); see also Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1067

(9th Cir. 2008).

Carter similarly fails to cite to any Supreme Court

precedent establishing that a trial court’s failure to inquire

into the nature of the attorney-client relationship is a per se

violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Carter

admits that the Supreme Court cases he relies on “do not

explicitly hold that a trial court must ask the defense attorney

and defendant about a conflict” but contends that the

“requirement is implicit in the holdings.” AEDPA requires

more than pointing to implicit holdings or dicta; it requires

that the law be clearly established. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

In arguing the California Supreme Court’s opinion

contains an unreasonable determination of the facts, Carter

mischaracterizes the opinion as holding there was no conflict

between Carter and Gillingham. The court, however,

recognized the conflict and accurately described it as

6 Admittedly, we relied on our own precedent in Stenson, as Carter

urges this panel to do, but that decision was rendered before the Supreme

Court’s more recent admonitions against relying on circuit precedent. 

That opinion involved a habeas petition in a capital case where the court

held that an “irreconcilable conflict” with counsel was a constructive

denial of the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. Significantly,

our opinion in that case did not hold that the right to “conflict-free”

counsel, as Carter uses that term, was clearly established by any Supreme

Court case law. Rather, it simply analyzed the claim under the Moore test

without citing any similar Supreme Court case. See Stenson, 504 F.3d

at 886–88.

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CARTER V. DAVIS 33

“dissatisfaction with counsel’s trial strategy and tactics.” 

Carter, 117 P.3d at 534.

In sum, Carter’s attempt to avoid the Supreme Court’s

established framework for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claims by looking to this circuit’s articulation of the right to

effective counsel is unavailing and we review Carter’s claim

under Strickland, which is the clearly established federal law

for claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, as

determined by the Supreme Court. See Ayala v. Chappell,

829 F.3d 1081, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016).

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel by Refusing to Let

Carter Testify

a. Prior Rulings

As described above, during the first Marsden hearing,

Gillingham told the court he and Morrissey “firm[ly]

belie[ved] that [they] should rest” and not put on a defense at

the guilt stage. He explained theymade the “tactical decision

not to call [potential] witnesses,” despite Carter’s

disagreement. The trial court agreed with Gillingham that “in

these matters the decisions should be with the counsel.” 

During the secondMarsden hearing, Gillingham clarified that

“by not putting on the witnesses, it also precluded the

potential of Mr. Carter testifying.”

The California Supreme Court determined that Carter

“had ample opportunity during the course of [these] Marsden

hearings to inform the court that he wished to testify, against

the advice and over the objection of defense counsel, even if

defense counsel were permitted to decline to present any

other defense witnesses who would support defendant’s own

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34 CARTER V. DAVIS

testimony,” but he did not. Carter, 117 P.3d at 533 (emphasis

in original). The court reasoned that since Gillingham

repeatedly informed the court of conflicts that arose with

Carter, it could assume that if Carter “told his counsel that

[he] insisted upon testifying despite the absence of any other

defense witnesses, his counsel would have conveyed that

demand to the trial court.” Id. Since there was no such

evidence, the court concluded that “on this record we may not

assume that defendant in fact had insisted upon testifying

even where no other defense witnesses would be presented to

support his testimony.” Id. at 533–34. “[I]n the end,” the

court found, “Mr. Carter acceded to Mr. Gillingham’s trial

strategy.” Id. at 533 n.40.

The district court agreed that Carter never insisted on

testifying even if no other defense witnesses would be

presented. It found that: the California Supreme Court’s

determination that Carter “acceded through his conduct to

Gillingham’s trial strategy, as a factual matter, was not

unreasonable” in light of the facts that “[a] defendant is

‘presumed to assent to his attorney’s tactical decision not to

have him testify,’” United States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d

1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Joelson,

7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993)); Carter’s and Gillingham’s

testimony that Carter wanted to put on a full-blown defense

and testify after the presentation of defense witnesses was

consistent; and Carter failed to move for new counsel when

Gillingham intended to rest.

b. Performance

Carter argues that it was deficient performance not to

allow him to testify because (1) doing so against Carter’s

wishes conflicted with an objective standard of

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CARTER V. DAVIS 35

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and

(2) Gillingham did not have an informed basis for making the

decision, as he did not go over “in detail” what Carter’s

testimony might be. We conclude the California Supreme

Court reasonably determined that counsel did not perform

deficiently. See Carter, 117 P.3d at 526.

As to professional norms, Carter argues that at the time of

trial, the Supreme Court had established that a criminal

defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to testify in

his own defense, citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49, 51,

53 (1987). But the California Supreme Court did not

conclude that Carter lacked a right to testify in his own

defense if he had asserted that right. Indeed, it expressly

acknowledged that “[a]lthough tactical decisions at trial are

generally counsel’s responsibility, the decision whether to

testify, a question of fundamental importance, is made by the

defendant after consultation with counsel.” Carter, 117 P.3d

at 533. Rather, the court concluded that although Carter

repeatedly told counsel that he preferred to call witnesses

(including himself) and present a defense case, he never

insisted that he wanted to testify even if counsel made the

tactical choice not to call witnesses—“in the end, Mr. Carter

acceded to Mr. Gillingham’s trial strategy.” Id. at 533 &

n.40. This was not an unreasonable determination of fact.

Carter argues that it was, in part, because he was unable

to speak during the Marsden hearings because Gillingham

told him not to. He also complains that the court did not ask

him about whether he wanted his attorneys to present a

defense or to testify. However, the transcripts reveal that

Carter at least felt comfortable talking to Gillingham during

these hearings to urge him to add things to his presentations

at these hearings. When the court asked Gillingham at the

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36 CARTER V. DAVIS

first Marsden hearing whether there was anything further,

Gillingham initially replied there was not, but then said

“[w]hoops, just a moment” while Carter told him about other

possible witnesses, which Gillingham immediately relayed to

the court.

Moreover, Carter’s own descriptions of what he told

Gillingham included both his desire to present a defense by

calling other witnesses and his desire to testify himself: he

“wanted to call witnesses, put on a defense and testify;” he

“wanted them to subpoena the witnesses [he] wanted to call,

and . . . to put on a defense; and [he] wanted to testify,” he

was “unhappy” because he “wanted to present a defense and

[he] wanted to testify.” Similarly, Carter stated he was

dissatisfied with Gillingham’s presentation to the court in the

first Marsden hearing because he thought Gillingham “left

out a couple of things” by not “mention[ing] all the witnesses

that [Carter] wanted to call, and he also didn’t tell the court

that [Carter] wanted to testify on [his] own behalf.” 

Additionally, Carter conceded that as far as he could recall,

Gillingham accurately conveyed his objections. This lends

further support to the California Supreme Court’s finding that

“Mr. Carter acceded to Mr. Gillingham’s trial strategy.” Id.

at 533 n.40. And Carter points to no Supreme Court case

establishing that a client has a right to testify under these

circumstances.

Carter’s argument that counsel did not have an informed

basis for making the decision not to present a defense because

he did not go over “in detail” what Carter’s testimony might

be also fails. The California Supreme Court could reasonably

have determined that counsel’s decision to focus on the

penalty phase in the hope that the jury would spare Carter’s

life was a reasonable tactical decision, made after discussions

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CARTER V. DAVIS 37

with Carter about what he would say if he testified. Such a

decision is not altogether uncommon in capital trials,

especially where the attorney believes the defendant’s guilt is

clear, the evidence overwhelming, and the crime heinous. 

Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190–91 (2004). Counsel

explained to Carter that their decision not to present a

defense, including to not have Carter testify, was this sort of

“tactical decision.”

c. Prejudice

Even if counsel performed deficiently by refusing to let

Carter testify, the California Supreme Court’s determination

that Carter cannot show prejudice was not an unreasonable

application of law. See Carter, 117 P.3d at 526. Carter

argues that there is a reasonable probability the result would

have been different if he had testified because (1) he would

have explained the strongest evidence against him, and (2) he

would have created a reasonable doubt that he had the

required level of intent for first-degree murder. We disagree.

Carter never describes what explanation he would have

given for driving a car belonging to one of the victims at the

time he was arrested or for having the belongings of several

of the victims in the car. Carter admits that his possession of

those belongings was “[p]erhaps the strongest evidence

against” him, without indicating how he might have

explained that away. Nor does he explain how he would have

undercut the physical evidence connectingCarter to the crime

scenes—the palm print and semen. We cannot conceive of an

explanation which would have created a reasonable

probability that he would not have been found guilty. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

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38 CARTER V. DAVIS

Carter also contends he would have testified that he

“effectively ‘blacked out’ during each of the crimes,” and

thus “been able to successfully assert a ‘diminished actuality’

defense.” But such testimony would necessarily have

admitted guilt and thus undercut any innocent explanation for

having the victims’ belongings in his car.

Moreover, even if Carter testified, there is no reasonable

probability—one sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694—that the jury would

have found him not guilty. To begin, the jury heard this type

of evidence and still convicted him. For example, the jury

heard that Carter told a store employee while he was with

Tok Kim, “I don’t even know what I’m doing here, I don’t

even know her.” Carter, 117 P.3d at 486.

Similarly, there was so much evidence that Carter

possessed sufficient mental capacity and intent to commit the

crimes that it was highly unlikely that the jury would have

been persuaded otherwise by his testimony. For example,

Carter asked Cullins and Tiner if they lived alone or with a

roommate. Carter told Tiner he instructed Cullins not to tell

Tiner that he was in town. He arrived at Tiner’s house

despite Tiner’s testimony that she had never given him her

address. Carter withdrew $60 from Cullins’ bank account,

leaving a nearly $0 balance. Carter’s numerous crimes were

performed throughout northern, central, and southern

California over twenty-three days, and he made it to Arizona

before he was arrested. The California Supreme Court could

reasonably have concluded that even if Carter had testified he

blacked out during each crime, there is no reasonable

probability the jury would have acquitted him.

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CARTER V. DAVIS 39

Carter concedes “the prosecution’s case was strong” on

this point. To show the result may have been different, he

points to a juror declaration that the jury vote was mixed for

guilty and not guilty when deliberations started. He also

highlights how the jury took nearly five days to reach a guilty

verdict.

Although the length of deliberation can be an objective

sign that the jury struggled with the verdict, all of the cases

Carter cites to this effect are distinguishable. They all

involve cases where the length of deliberation was

disproportionate to the length of the trial, or cases where there

was only one charge for the jury to deliberate. See Thomas v.

Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086, 1103 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The jury

deliberated for almost five full days, even though it heard

argument and evidence for only about six days.”); Daniels v.

Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1193 (9th Cir. 2005) (“After two

days of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict imposing

death [based on one murder].”); Dyas v. Poole, 317 F.3d 934,

936 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“[T]he jury took 3-1/2 days

to deliberate following Dyas’s 5-day trial [on only one

murder and robbery].”). Here, on the other hand, the trial

lasted multiple weeks but the jury deliberated only between

3 1/2 and 4 days, and had over a dozen issues to decide,

including threemurders, two rapes, two residential burglaries,

and concurrent findings (including whether the murders were

in the course of rape and burglary). The length of

deliberation here is not so persuasive a sign that the jury

struggled with the verdict, and the California Supreme Court

could reasonably have concluded that it did not create a

reasonable probability that the result would have been

different had Carter testified.

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40 CARTER V. DAVIS

B. Claims Certified by the Southern District

The Southern District issued a COA for two separate

claims. We discuss each in turn and conclude that Carter was

not deprived of constitutionally adequate representation.

1. Certified Claim 1 (Claim 3 of Second Amended

Petition): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at

Penalty Phase

In the first claim certified for our review, Carter alleged

that his trial counsel “failed to provide reasonably competent

assistance at the penalty phase of his trial,” and if not for

counsel’s “unprofessional actions and omissions,” the

sentence imposed would have been different. Carter raised

five specific arguments about his counsel’s performance: 

(1) they “failed to adequately investigate mitigating and

aggravating evidence”; (2) they employed the same penalty

phase strategy that had been used in the Los Angeles trial, a

strategy that had resulted in a death verdict; (3) they were

“ineffective in developing and presenting Carter’s

background to the jury”; (4) they failed to develop evidence

of Carter’s mental impairments; and (5) they were “deficient

in penalty phase closing arguments.” The district court

rejected each of these arguments.

On appeal, Carter asks us to find constitutional deficiency

in the San Diego counsel’s strategy of focusing on the

positive aspects of his career and family life as an adult,

rather than giving greater emphasis to his traumatic childhood

and mental illness. He attributes counsel’s decision to pursue

this strategy—despite having seen it fail during his Los

Angeles trial—to their failure to conduct a satisfactory

investigation of his childhood in Nome. Had counsel’s

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CARTER V. DAVIS 41

investigation been sufficient, he alleges, they would have

instead called additional witnesses who knew of his

childhood in Nome, and would have elicited more testimony

from the twenty-one witnesses whom they did call about

particular forms of abuse Carter had suffered, including that

his parents chained him up at home and locked him in a

makeshift jail cell. Additionally, Carter charges that counsel

did not fully investigate the extent of his mother’s alcohol

consumption during his gestation and alleges that a sufficient

investigation would have compelled counsel to present

evidence that Carter suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome

(FAS).

a. Prior Rulings

Carter did not allege ineffective assistance of counsel

during the penalty phase of trial on direct appeal to the

California Supreme Court. He raised this claim for the first

time in his state habeas petitions, which the California

Supreme Court summarily denied. The state does not argue

that this claim was procedurally defaulted, and we treat the

state court’s decision as a denial of relief on the merits. 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. Because there was no reasoned

explanation accompanying this decision, Carter must show

there was “no reasonable basis for the state court to deny

relief.” Id. at 98. Our task is to determine what arguments or

theories could have supported the California Supreme Court’s

decision, and whether it is possible that fairminded jurists

could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with a prior holding of the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Id. at 102. We conclude that Carter has failed to demonstrate

that the California Supreme Court lacked a reasonable basis

for denying relief.

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42 CARTER V. DAVIS

b. Performance in InvestigatingCarter’sBackground

Carter’s first argument is that counsel performed

deficiently in their investigation of his background in Nome. 

Under Strickland, “counsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes

particular investigations unnecessary” during the penalty

phase of a trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (emphasis

added); see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526–28 (2003). 

“In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to

investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all

the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to

counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.

Five years before trial, the state appointed Charles Ted

Bumer to serve as Carter’s lead trial counsel and Josephine

Dedina to serve as co-counsel. Bumer and Dedina were

assisted by paralegal Kathleen Gilberd and private

investigators Marion Pasas and Chuck Hile. The trial team

traveled to Alaska to gather evidence, and Pasas visited

Carter’s hometown of Nome to interview residents who had

known the Carter family during his childhood.

Based on Pasas’s investigation, during the penalty phase

the defense team called six witnesses, out of a total of twentyone, who knew Carter as a child in Nome. Each of the six

witnesses testified about the relationship between Carter and

his parents, and several also gave general testimony about the

conditions Native Alaskans in Nome faced.

Carter’s brother Jerry Carter (Jerry) testified that their

mother Esther and stepfather Jim drank heavily, argued, and

were often physically violent with one another. He also

testified that Esther corporally punished the children with

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CARTER V. DAVIS 43

branches, a belt, and a razor strap, and that Carter ran away,

often for several days at a time. Jerry further testified to two

instances of abuse from Carter’s childhood: an incident

where a five- or six-year-old Carter was dragged by the

bumper of Esther’s car while attempting to prevent her from

going to a bar, and an incident where Jim and Esther chained

Carter to his bed for a day or two to prevent him from

running away. Jerry stated that sometime after these

incidents, Jim and Esther sent Carter away to a home for

unwanted children.

Carter’s sister Polly Reaser (Polly) testified that Jim and

Esther often drank in bars until 4:00 in the morning and were

violent with one another, and that Carter would have

witnessed these incidents of drunken violence.

Local elder Bertha Adsuna had lived in Nome for over

fifty years at the time of trial. She testified that alcohol was

a societal problem in the town, that Esther frequented the

bars, that Carter spent much of his childhood alone, and that

Esther dressed and treated Carter worse than she did Jerry. 

After Esther married Jim, Adsuna observed that the couple

often went to bars together.

Harriet Brown served from 1947 to 1967 as a missionary

pastor at a Nome church attended mostly by Alaska Natives

and was Carter’s childhood Sunday-school teacher for two to

three years. She testified that the largest problem among the

Native population was alcoholism. She also frequently saw

child neglect in the community. Brown further testified that

Jerry and Polly were always dressed well as children, but that

Carter was not, and that Esther did not treat him nicely.

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44 CARTER V. DAVIS

Beth Farley was a childhood classmate of Carter’s. She

testified that he was often alone, ignored by his family, and

spent more time with the Farley family than his own. She

also testified that she left Nome because of pervasive alcohol

abuse, stating that even the children drank and many died of

either exposure or suicide. Farley testified that her son was

part Alaska Native and that she had witnessed and

experienced prejudice against people of mixed race in Nome.

Ruth Butts was also a childhood classmate of Carter’s. 

She testified that an incident had led many people to search

for Carter as a child and that it was common knowledge that

Jim was not the biological father of either of his stepsons,

which led children to tease Carter and Jerry. She also

testified to seeing Jim drunk in bars after church on Sundays.

Carter argues that this testimony was insufficiently

compelling to the jury because his counsel had failed to

further investigate his abusive childhood. A more complete

investigation, he alleges, would have prompted counselto call

additional witnesses to the stand who could have testified to

more specific instances of abuse.

Carter first points to counsel’s failure to secure the

testimony of his mother Esther. Pasas interviewed Esther in

Nome, but Esther cut the interview short after Pasas asked a

question about her alcohol consumption. After this aborted

interview, Esther refused to provide any further assistance to

her son’s trial defense. However, in support of Carter’s

habeas petition, Esther submitted a sworn declaration stating

that had she been “approached differently,” she would have

“talked to [counsel] and answered all of their questions” and

“probably would have testified.” Esther declared that her

testimony would have included recollection of Jim using a

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CARTER V. DAVIS 45

belt to discipline Carter, Jim chaining Carter to his bed, and

she and Jim drinking heavily.

Carter also submitted several other declarations from

Nome residents who were not called as defense witnesses

during the penalty phase and who largely allege that they

were not contacted or interviewed at the time of trial. As the

district court noted, these declarations “largely outline, in

greater detail than presented at trial, the mistreatment [Carter]

suffered . . . at the hands of his mother and step-father and the

alcoholism of his parents.”

Most notably, Carter submitted a declaration from Arthur

(“Guy”) Martin, a colleague of Jim’s on the Nome police

force. Martin declared that when responding to a call from

one of the Carter family’s neighbors reporting child abuse, he

had observed both Carter and Jerry chained to the floor of the

family home. He suspected that Jim and Esther frequently

chained the boys so that they could go out drinking. Martin

declared that he had confronted Jim about the incident but

that he had never reported it. Defense counsel had contacted

and attempted to interview Martin prior to trial, but Martin

had refused. Martin declared that he had declined to

participate in the defense only because Esther had asked him

not to speak to investigators or tell anyone about the abuse.

Additionally, Vaughn Johnson, a neighbor of the Carters,

declared that he once saw Carter handcuffed and chained to

the outside of his house, and that Carter had told Johnson that

Jim had chained him. Cheryl Stavish, a childhood friend of

Polly, declared that she recalled the same chaining incident,

and had also observed a hidden room in the Carter home that

resembled a jail cell, in which she “had a feeling” Carter was

held.

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46 CARTER V. DAVIS

Carter attributes Esther’s refusal to testify to counsel’s

inadequate preparation of Pasas, and argues that a competent

penalty defense would have featured his mother as the central

witness. And had counsel not alienated Esther, Carter argues,

Martin would have been willing to testify about the chaining

incident he observed. He further argues that counsel was

constitutionally deficient in failing to call both Johnson and

Stavish, who would have corroborated each other’s separate

accounts of an incident of Carter being chained. Together, he

argues, these witnesses could have established that Jim and

Esther treated Carter more like a dog than a child.

The state argues that the testimony of Martin, Johnson,

and Stavish would have been cumulative to that of Jerry, who

testified that Carter had been chained to his bed for a day or

two to prevent him from running away. We agree that much

of their testimony would have been cumulative. But we

disagree that their testimony would have been so entirely

cumulative that it would certainly have been excluded as

irrelevant. These three uncalled witnesses may reasonably

have provided credible firsthand accounts of two additional

instances in which Carter’s parents chained him, supporting

the inference that this was less an aberration than a routine

practice. Had counsel’s strategy been to present the young

Carter as a metaphorical feral dog kenneled by his alcoholic

parents, the eyewitness testimony of Martin, Johnson, and

Stavish would have been relevant.

But that was never counsel’s strategy. Rather than

portray him as a feral child—a strategy which may have

backfired by leading the jury to infer that the adult Carter was

beyond rehabilitation—counsel’s choice of witnesses during

the penalty phase suggests that their intended narrative was

one of Carter overcoming an abusive childhood home to find

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CARTER V. DAVIS 47

personal and professional success before a divorce sent him

spiraling into a life of violence. Indeed, the majority of

witnesses counsel called gave testimony recounting how

Carter had successfullyrehabilitated himself as a young adult,

allowing counsel to argue to the jury that Carter could again

be capable of growth and redemption. The fifteen penaltyphase witnesses who came to know Carter after he left Nome

included the house parent at the home for unwanted children

Carter’s parents sent him to, a youth counselor, a probation

officer, a prison educator, and eleven professionals from the

media industry who worked with Carter during his career as

a television cameraman.

We cannot pass judgment on counsel’s wisdom in

choosing this narrative strategy over the one Carter argues

they should have pursued. Rather, our duty is to determine

what arguments or theories could have supported the state

court’s decision to deny Carter’s claim that this strategic

decision amounted to constitutionally deficient assistance,

and whether fairminded jurists would disagree that those

arguments or theories are inconsistent with a prior holding of

the Supreme Court. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.

The state court could have relied on Strickland’s “highly

deferential” standard. Id. at 105. We “must indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance” and presume that

“under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be

considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689

(citation omitted). “Strickland does not guarantee perfect

representation, only a ‘reasonably competent attorney.’” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 110 (citation omitted). “There is a

‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s attention to certain issues

to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than

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48 CARTER V. DAVIS

‘sheer neglect.’” Id. at 109 (quoting Yarborough v. Gentry,

540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per curiam)). Here, the state court may

have reasonably determined that Carter’s trial counsel made

a legitimate tactical decision to present Carter’s childhood

trauma as they did rather than pursuing the child abuse angle

more aggressively. It would have been able to support this

determination with facts in the record: specifically, that

counsel hired a professional investigator five years before

trial began, that the investigator traveled to Carter’s

hometown and interviewed many people who knew him and

his parents, and that counsel procured the testimony of

twenty-one witnesses whose testimony formed a cohesive

narrative of abuse, perseverance, success, and unraveling.

Carter argues that this theory conflicts with the holdings

of two Supreme Court decisions, Williams and Wiggins, in

which the Court granted habeas relief upon finding that

counsel had been constitutionally deficient in its investigation

of the petitioner’s background. However, we are not

persuaded that fairminded jurists would find that the holding

of either case is in conflict with the Strickland analysis that

could support the state court’s denial of habeas relief.

In Williams, the Court granted relief where counsel failed

to conduct an investigation into the defendant’s “nightmarish

childhood” because they incorrectly interpreted Virginia law

to deny them access to records that were legally available to

them. 529 U.S. at 395. Had Williams’s counsel accessed all

available records,

the jury would have learned that Williams’

parents had been imprisoned for the criminal

neglect of Williams and his siblings, that

Williams had been severely and repeatedly

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CARTER V. DAVIS 49

beaten by his father, that he had been

committed to the custody of the social

services bureau for two years during his

parents’ incarceration (including one stint in

an abusive foster home), and then, after his

parents were released from prison, had been

returned to his parents’ custody.

Id. (footnote omitted). Carter argues that the facts of his

childhood compare strongly to those of Williams.

We disagree. The holding of Williams is that counsel

renders constitutionally ineffective assistance if it fails to

investigate and pursue a reasonable defense because it

incompetently interpreted the law. Id. Here, Carter makes no

argument that his counsel misinterpreted Alaska law in a way

that caused them to bypass an investigation of available

records. More importantly, nothing in Williams tells us that

counsel is incompetent unless it pursues a defense based

entirely on the defendant’s neglect as a child. After an

extensive investigation of Carter’s background, counsel

implemented a sound defense strategy: to show that Carter

had suffered under abusive, negligent parents but had risen

above this poor upbringing. This contrasts with Williams,

where the “weight of defense counsel’s closing . . . was

devoted to explaining that it was difficult to find a reason

why the jury should spare Williams’ life.” Id. at 369. Thus,

Williams does not provide any relevant point of “clearly

established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), on which a

fairminded jurist could find disagreement with the theories

supporting the California Supreme Court’s decision. Richter,

562 U.S. at 102.

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50 CARTER V. DAVIS

In Wiggins, trial counsel conducted no investigation into

the defendant’s background beyond reviewing a Presentence

Investigation Report and social services records. 539 U.S. at

523. Counsel did not take advantage of public defense funds

for commissioning a forensic social worker, which the record

indicated was standard practice in the Maryland legal

community at the time of the trial. Id. at 524. Further,

counsel did not follow up on any of the red flags apparent in

Wiggins’s social services records, including his mother’s

history of alcoholism and child neglect. Id. at 525. Again,

Carter analogizes his case to the underlying facts of Wiggins. 

However, the Sixth Amendment violations that the Court

clearly identified in Wiggins were counsel’s failure to take

advantage of funds to commission a social worker and their

failure to take any action upon discovering red flags

indicating that Wiggins may have experienced child abuse. 

Carter does not plausibly allege that counsel failed to follow

up on reports that Carter was abused as a child. In fact,

counsel traveled to Alaska, hired a professional investigator

to interview his relatives and neighbors, and put six of them

on the witness stand to testify about his abusive childhood,

his parents’ alcoholism, and the conditions of discrimination

he faced as an Alaska Native. Carter’s counsel, unlike

Wiggins’s counsel, thus competently followed up on their

investigation into Carter’s social history. Wiggins, like

Williams, provides no support for Carter’s habeas claim.

Likewise, Carter cites no relevant support for his

argument that counsel performed deficiently by failing to

procure the testimony of Esther or Martin. We are aware of

no Supreme Court case requiring counsel to secure the

cooperation of reluctant witnesses. And for good reason. A

witness asked to testify in support of a friend or family

member convicted of capital murder faces an intensely

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CARTER V. DAVIS 51

difficult, personal decision that belongs to the witness alone,

and counsel’s duty cannot reasonably be extended to compel

a witness to participate in the defense. Carter’s counsel had

a duty to “make reasonable investigations,” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 691, which the state court could have found that

counsel satisfied by interviewing Esther and attempting to

interview Martin.

Carter also argues that counsel’s choice of strategy was

constitutionally deficient because his Los Angeles County

trial counsel had employed a similar narrative, without

success, during the penalty phase of those proceedings. That

begs the questions of whether there was another approach that

was clearly more likely to have produced a better outcome. 

Counsel in this case was dealt a difficult hand. We have not

been persuaded that there was an alterative argument so

attractive that the failure of counsel to take that other path

amounted to ineffective assistance.

Moreover, the state court’s rejection of this argument

could reasonably be supported by Strickland. There, the

Court held that courts should not conclude that a “particular

act or omission of counsel was unreasonable” merely because

it “proved unsuccessful.” Id. at 689. Rather, it must presume

that counsel’s decision fell “within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance.” Id. In this light, because

we presume both the Los Angeles and San Diego attorneys

were professionally competent, the fact that both teams

decided to pursue the same strategy after considering all the

evidence they had available to them only supports the state

court’s position that neither defense team was unreasonable

in its choice. Because Carter cites no Supreme Court holding

that fairminded jurists could disagree was consistent with this

plausible theory, this argument also fails.

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52 CARTER V. DAVIS

c. Performance in Investigating Carter’s Mental

Health

Carter argues that counsel failed to conduct an adequate

investigation into his mental health, including the possibility

that he suffered from FAS. But as we have explained,

“counsel’s decision not to pursue a mental health defense is

a reasonable strategic decision under Strickland ” when

“adopting a mental health defense would open the door to

[unfavorable] rebuttal testimony.” Atwood v. Ryan, 870 F.3d

1033, 1063 (9th Cir. 2017).

Here, the record indicates that, at counsel’s request, a

Dr. Lottenberg performed a PET scan of Carter’s brain

approximately one week before the penalty phase of trial

began. Counsel consulted with several experts, who

recommended that the results be sent to Dr. Monte

Buchsbaum for analysis. The court held an in-chambers

teleconference with counsel and Dr. Buchsbaum, during

which Dr. Buchsbaum identified an unusually high number of

abnormalities in Carter’s brain. He then stated that he would

need additional information to render a more detailed and

substantive opinion about Carter. After this hearing, Carter’s

counsel spoke to Dr. Buchsbaum alone and off the record. 

Counsel then informed the court that it had made a “tactical

decision” not to introduce evidence of Carter’s mental health

during the penalty phase. Judge Lasater noted on the record

her agreement with counsel’s decision because

Dr. Buchsbaum’s testimony would have opened the door to

rebuttal evidence of Carter’s mental health from the state.

The trial record contains several mental health reports

unfavorable to Carter that the state could have introduced

during the penalty phase if the door had been opened. A

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CARTER V. DAVIS 53

1973 psychological evaluation found Carter to be a “fairly

classical sociopathic personality.” A probation report from

the same year noted that Carter’s personality gave him “little

chance at ever making acceptable social adjustment.” A 1975

psychiatrist’s evaluation found that, by Carter’s own

admission, “his irritability and destructively aggressive

conduct that emanates from it are willful, the result of

personal choice, and represent matters over which he could

exercise control if he chose to do so.” A 1977 psychological

evaluation found that Carter “tended to see things in a

concrete waywith little insight.” A 1977 Alaska pre-sentence

report described Carter’s behavior as “best explained [by]

focusing on his immaturity and lack of consideration of

consequences.” And a 1978 evaluation found that Carter had

some indicia of psychiatric problems but did not need mental

health assistance at the time, and described his behavior as

“self-punitive in that he feels guilt for his misbehavior, but is

not deterred by the guilt.”

We agree with both the trial judge’s observation and the

district court’s conclusion that Carter’s counsel would have

opened the door to introduction of this potentially damaging

evidence by putting forth a mental health defense at trial. 

Notably, the district court was careful to emphasize that “this

is not a case in which counsel failed to conduct any mental

health investigation.” Carter’s counsel ordered a PET scan of

Carter’s brain, conferred with an appropriate expert

recommended bymultiple other experts in the field, and made

a tactical decision not to present mental health evidence at

trial. Strickland directs us to presume that the challenged

actions of counsel were “sound trial strategy,” 466 U.S.

at 689, a presumption that is here supported by the

aggravating mental health evidence that would have been

made relevant for rebuttal purposes by Dr. Buchsbaum’s

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54 CARTER V. DAVIS

testimony.

7 Thus, we may conclude that the state court

properlydenied relief under Strickland’s deferential standard.

Carter also argues that counsel was deficient in failing to

investigate and present evidence that he suffered from FAS,

averring that competent attorneys would have pursued this

avenue after learning that Esther consumed alcohol while

pregnant. However, there is no evidence in the trial record

that would have put Carter’s counsel on notice that Esther

drank while pregnant. Carter cites counsel’s interviews with

Jerry and Adsuna, but these interviews only reference

Esther’s drinking in her later years, after she gave birth to her

children. Further, this argument fails for the tactical reasons

described above, as any argument by counsel that Carter’s

actions could be attributable to FAS would have opened the

door to the potentially damaging rebuttal evidence contained

in the record.

In sum, Carter has succeeded only in establishing that

counsel may have chosen to pursue other strategies during the

penalty phase of his trial. He has failed to establish that

counsel’s investigation was deficient. Rather, our review of

the state trial record shows that counsel acted with diligence

beginning five years before trial to investigate events that

took place thirty years prior in a remote town thousands of

7

Indeed, we granted habeas relief on an ineffective assistance

claim—albeit in a pre-AEDPA case—where trial defense counsel

presented an expert mental health witness whose testimony suggested that

the defendant “may be a sociopath.” Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181,

1210 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, even if Dr. Buchsbaum’s testimony had been

sympathetic to Carter, it may have directly led to the introduction of the

1973 psychological evaluation finding Carter to be a “fairly classic

sociopathic personality.” We have no basis for second-guessing counsel’s

tactical decision not to pursue this line of defense.

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CARTER V. DAVIS 55

miles away, and counsel succeeded in contacting a significant

number of Carter’s relatives, friends, neighbors, co-workers,

and correctional counselors. Counsel elicited trial testimony

from twenty-one of these individuals which tended to show

that Carter had been severely abused as a child but had, as an

adult, shown the capacity to be rehabilitated and function as

a productive member of society. Counsel also conducted a

PET scan of Carter’s brain, but after conferring with a

recognized expert, decided that the sum of the mental health

evidence would be more aggravating than mitigating. On this

record, Carter has failed to establish that the California

Supreme Court was unreasonable in denying his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim.

2. Certified Claim 2 (Claim 4 of Second Amended

Petition): Denial of Psychiatric Expert Assistance at

Trial

In the second claim certified by the Southern District for

our review, Carter alleged that “he was deprived of the right

to competent assistance of a psychiatric expert,” that “counsel

had an obligation to properly prepare the experts” who

evaluated him, and that their failure to do so constituted

ineffective assistance. Carter raised this claim in his first

state habeas petition, which the California Supreme Court

summarily denied. We treat that decision as a denial on the

merits. Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. Because the decision was

not accompanied by a reasoned explanation, Carter has the

burden to show that “there was no reasonable basis for the

state court to deny relief.” Id. at 98. Again, our task is to

determine what arguments or theories could have supported

the California Supreme Court’s decision, and “whether it is

possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those

arguments or theories are inconsistent” with a prior holding

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56 CARTER V. DAVIS

of the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 102. We conclude that no

such inconsistency exists here.

Carter bifurcated this claim into a charge that his

attorneys failed to render effective assistance in preparing

expert psychiatric witnesses, and a charge that his experts

themselves rendered ineffective assistance. The district court

construed the portion of the claim charging counsel as

ineffective as a mere repetition of the prior certified claim

regarding a FAS defense. We agree, and hold that Carter is

not entitled to relief for the reasons stated immediately above.

Carter argues that the state court’s denial of relief on his

claim that his expert witnesses were ineffective is in tension

with the Supreme Court’s holding in Ake v. Oklahoma,

470 U.S. 68 (1985). There, a state-supplied psychiatrist

repeatedly evaluated a mentally ill murder defendant before

trial, first deeming him not competent to stand trial but later

deeming him competent. Id. at 70–72. During trial, defense

counsel requested that the indigent defendant be provided

with a psychiatrist to examine him “with respect to his mental

condition at the time of the offense.” Id. at 72. The state trial

judge denied the request. Id. The Supreme Court granted

certiorari on direct appeal and held that “the participation of

a psychiatrist is important enough to preparation of a

defense” that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment may require a state to provide an indigent

defendant with psychiatric assistance under certain

circumstances. Id. at 77.

At no point did the Court in Ake place any obligation on

defense counsel to present psychiatric evidence at trial. 

Rather, that case’s holding is limited to imposing an

obligation on states to make a psychiatrist available to a

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CARTER V. DAVIS 57

murder defendant upon the satisfaction of the balancing test. 

An Ake claim is not a Sixth Amendment ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, but rather a Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim against the state. Id. at 76

(“This Court has long recognized that when a State brings its

judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal

proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has

a fair opportunity to present his defense. This elementary

principle [is] grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth

Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness

. . . .”).

We conclude that Carter has failed to establish that Ake or

any other Supreme Court decision would cause jurists of

reason to disagree with the reasonable arguments in support

of the state court’s decision. Carter conceded in his brief that

the Supreme Court has never interpreted Ake to guarantee a

due process right to effective expert assistance at trial. 

Rather, the Court has never extended the state’s obligation

beyond providing a psychiatric expert to an indigent

defendant, and Carter does not dispute that he had access to

such an expert. Because we may rely only on the holdings of

the Supreme Court in evaluating whether the state court’s

decision was reasonable, Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, our

analysis ends here. We do not address Carter’s arguments

that rely on “circuit precedent,” which “cannot form the basis

for habeas relief under AEDPA.” Parker, 567 U.S. at 48–49.

IV. UNCERTIFIED CLAIMS

Carter also raised several arguments relating to claims

that the district courts did not certify in a COA. As a state

prisoner seeking relief under § 2254, Carter has “no

automatic right to appeal” the denial or dismissal of his

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58 CARTER V. DAVIS

petition. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). 

We lack jurisdiction to review a district court’s denial of a

habeas claim “aris[ing] out of process issued by a State court”

until and unless a federal court has issued a COA. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. We accordingly

construe Carter’s arguments on these uncertified claims as a

motion to expand the COA. See 9th Cir. R. 22-1(e).

“A certificate of appealability may issue [in federal

habeas review of state proceedings] only if the applicant has

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (emphasis added); see Wilson

v. Belleque, 554 F.3d 816, 825–26 (9th Cir. 2009). This

statutory requirement “serves a gatekeeping function.” 

Payton v. Davis, 906 F.3d 812, 818 (9th Cir. 2018). In

enacting § 2253, “Congress confirmed the necessity and the

requirement of differential treatment for those appeals

deserving of attention from those that plainly do not.” MillerEl, 537 U.S. at 337. “It follows that issuance of a COA must

not be pro forma or a matter of course.” Id.

Nevertheless, the “standard for obtaining a COA is not a

particularly exacting one.” Wilson, 554 F.3d at 826. “[A]

court of appeals should not decline the application for a COA

merely because it believes the applicant will not demonstrate

an entitlement to relief.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 337. Rather,

“[a]t the COA stage, the only question is whether the

applicant has shown that ‘jurists of reason could disagree

with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims

or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” 

Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773 (2017) (quoting Miller-El,

537 U.S. at 327). But when a district court “denies a habeas

petition on procedural grounds without reaching the

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CARTER V. DAVIS 59

prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim,” a COA can issue

only if the prisoner shows that (1) “jurists of reason would

find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its

procedural ruling,” and (2) “jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000).

We ordered supplemental briefing on several of the

uncertified claims. Given the low bar for issuing a COA, see

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338, for the reasons discussed below,

we issue a COA on one claim not certified by the Central

District that alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at the

penalty phase. Although we issue a COA, we affirm the

denial of habeas relief on this claim because the California

Supreme Court’s determination that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law. Richter, 562 U.S.

at 105.

A. Claim 6 of the Central District Habeas Petition: 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty Phase

Similar to the claim certified by the Southern District that

Carter’s counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase,

claim six in Carter’s Central District habeas petition argued

that if his attorneys had conducted more than an “initial

attempt” at an investigation, theywould have uncovered more

evidence of child abuse and brain damage. Presentation of

this additional evidence, he contends, would have changed

the result at the penalty phase. We, however, can find no

grounds for believing that the California Supreme Court

unreasonably denied relief given the record of counsels’

collective efforts.

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60 CARTER V. DAVIS

1. Mitigation Evidence Presented at Penalty Phase

Counsel called twenty-onewitnesses to present mitigating

evidence. Carter’s siblings, Jerry and Polly, testified that

their parents were alcoholics who often came home late after

drinking with “extreme arguing” that included hitting,

throwing furniture, and throwing each other. Their mother

also sometimes “g[o]t carried away” administering discipline

with the children. Although Jerry denied that Carter was

treated “that much worse” than Jerry, other Nome residents

testified that Jerry was treated better than Carter. One

neighbor even testified that Carter was “more like an orphan”

when the boys were young.

Set against this background, the juryheard about dramatic

instances of abuse and Carter’s unusual family life. They

heard about a time when Carter was seven or eight that their

mother came home around 2:00 a.m. but started to leave

again to pick up their father, and Carter tried to get her to stay

home by “t[aking] off running after the car,” “holler[ing] at

[her] to stop,” and “h[anging] on to the bumper and tried to

stop the car for quite a ways,” being dragged over a gravel

road. They heard that Carter’s father chained him to a bed at

least once when he was only eight or nine years old.

The jury heard that in the midst of all this misery, Carter

often ran away for several days at a time, including once to

Anchorage by plane. Around age eight or nine, Carter’s

parents sent him to the Jessie Lee Home, far from Nome,

which Carter’s sister Polly described as “a jail or something

for children.” Even when the family traveled near the Home,

they did not stop to visit him, which “shocked” Polly.

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CARTER V. DAVIS 61

On appeal, post-conviction counselsubmitted declarations

tending to show that Carter being held in chains was not a

one-time event. Childhood friends, classmates, and adults

wrote in post-conviction declarations that they saw Carter

handcuffed and chained to Carter’s cabin, or held in a

makeshift jail cell. One police officer who investigated

allegations of abuse at the Carter house said he saw Carter,

and possibly Jerry, chained to the floor with a bowl of water

next to them. Counsel also asserted that Carter suffered from

organic brain damage and FAS at the time of the crimes, and

that evidence to that effect should have been presented.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Carter argues that trial counsel were ineffective because

they failed to investigate and present more mitigating

evidence regarding child abuse and possible brain damage. 

Since there is no state-court reasoned decision on this issue,

Carter must show that “there was no reasonable basis for the

state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. He

cannot.

a. Performance

First, the California Supreme Court could reasonablyhave

concluded that counsel did not perform deficiently because

their presentation was based on strategic choices after a

reasonable investigation. A defense attorney has a duty to

make reasonable investigations that enable informed

decisions about how best to represent the client. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 691; Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1457 (9th

Cir. 1994). But “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance

must be highly deferential,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689—“doubly so” when § 2254(d) is also involved, Richter,

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62 CARTER V. DAVIS

562 U.S. at 105. Carter has the burden to “identify the acts or

omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690.

Gillingham testified in a post-conviction declaration that

his performance at sentencing could have been better in

various ways:

• He was “unable to build rapport or develop

[Carter’s] confidence,” which “contributed to

[his] inability [to] present a compelling case in

mitigation;”

• He was unable to secure Carter’s mother’s

cooperation, as “she was not willing to discuss her

life, petitioner’s birth father, circumstances

surrounding his birth, his childhood, or any other

subject related to her family;”

• He “failed and omitted to prepare a social

historian or cultural anthropologist” or “a

psychiatrist, psychologist or other mental health

professional,” even though he believed Carter’s

“childhood and adolescence were neglectful and

alienating, and [was] aware of his long-term drug

and alcohol abuse;”

• Although he “suspected the possibility of organic

brain damage,” and a mental health professional

he consulted suggested an MRI, he did not request

an MRI or PET scan; and

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CARTER V. DAVIS 63

• He generally “was unable to formulate any

coherent strategy or plan to defend petitioner in

guilt or penalty phases of trial.”

As the district court explained, however, Gillingham

falling on his sword “in retrospect” is “not dispositive.” 

Rather, to fairly assess attorney performance, a court “must

judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on

the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of

counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Viewed in

that light, and especially given that “counsel is strongly

presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment,” the California Supreme Court could

reasonably have concluded that Gillingham’s team did not

perform deficiently. See id.

Carter’s attorneys went to great lengths to investigate

Carter’s troubled childhood. Both Gillingham and Morrissey

traveled to Nome to interview family members and other

residents, and their investigator Casey Cohen made four

separate trips to Alaska and spoke with about forty different

people. Cohen tried very hard to speak with Carter’s mother

because he considered her “a very important” “primary

witness to his early childhood.” Although he spoke to her “at

least three times” in person, and “probably several times by

phone,” Carter’s mother refused to cooperate, including by

telling others not to communicate with Cohen.

While acknowledging the “resistance” his defense team

faced from “unhelpful” Nome residents, Carter claims that if

his counsel had done more than “an initial attempt” at an

investigation, they would have gotten more people to testify

and presented a fuller picture of the extent of the abuse Carter

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64 CARTER V. DAVIS

suffered as a child. But the problem is not that Carter’s

counsel made only an “initial attempt” at an investigation, but

rather that they diligently followed leads and were met with

dead ends. Cf. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523–25 (finding counsel

unreasonably abandoned their investigation even though

records in their possession put them on notice of possible

child abuse). For example, although Cohen “pressed her hard

to be honest with” investigators, Edna Buffas, whose father

worked with Jim Carter and had “always” known the Carters,

repeatedly called Dean “happy-go-lucky” and said “she

couldn’t think of anything that might have improved the

Carter family.”

Any “failure to investigate thoroughly” here resulted not

“from inattention,” but from thwarted attempts. See Wiggins,

539 U.S. at 526. Attorneys are expected to formulate

reasonable strategies that “balance limited resources in accord

with effective trial tactics and strategies.” Richter, 562 U.S.

at 107. Thus when they hit dead ends like this, they may

abandon those inquiries, especially if they determine they are

“distractive from more important duties.” Id. (quoting Bobby

v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 11 (2009) (per curiam)).

Moreover, Carter’s arguments downplay his own role in

what he claims to be a stunted investigation. See Strickland,

466 U.S. at 691 (“The reasonableness of counsel’s actions

may be determined or substantially influenced by the

defendant’s own statements or actions.”). Indeed, there was

evidence that Carter himself told Polly and Jerry not to talk

to defense investigators. As another example, Carter argued

that “if Gillingham and Carter did not have a conflict, then

Carter could have encouraged his mother and siblings to

cooperate with trial counsel, which then would have led to a

more fruitful mitigation investigation.” But if this alleged

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CARTER V. DAVIS 65

conflict prevented his mother and siblings from cooperating

in a way that Carter should benefit from, he has not explained

how. Moreover, Carter himself could have given the defense

team the details he claims people could have provided. See

id. (“[W]hen the facts that support a certain potential line of

defense are generally known to counsel because of what the

defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be

considerably diminished or eliminated altogether.”). The

California Supreme Court could reasonably have determined

that the investigation was not inadequate.

Carter also argues that it was “unreasonable” for trial

counsel to decide “to focus their investigative efforts on

developing evidence about Carter’smoderatelysuccessful life

as an adult.” But Carter has not “overcome the presumption

that, under the circumstances,” counsel’s investigation and

presentation “might be considered sound trial strategy”

developed after a thorough investigation. Id. at 689–91,

104 S. Ct. 2052 (citation omitted). Indeed, there is evidence

that this is so. In a memo written after interviewing Jerry

Carter, Cohen wrote, “As the interview progressed we felt

that there was no history of child abuse so significant that it

would tie in with a general theory as-to why Dean ends up

murdering anyone.” He expanded,

[A] penalty phase defense would be focused

as follows: To use Jerry only to tell the good

about Dean and to plead with the jury to spare

his life. To not try and construct a theory

around any kind of child abuse. To lay out

Dean’s life as it occurred. To recount how he

perceived some problem deeply enough to try

and run away from home from age 7 onward. 

To tell how he got into trouble, went to

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66 CARTER V. DAVIS

institutions, and eventually grew up. Then, as

an adult he rehabilitates himself, gets a good

job, marries, and settles down. But problems

in the marriage develop.

“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law

and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

unchallengeable.” Id. at 690. “There are countless ways to

provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best

criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular

client in the same way.” Id. at 689.

Carter again relies heavily on Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510. But

in Wiggins, defense counsel failed to present any evidence of

the defendant’s life history, justifying this as “a tactical

judgment not to present mitigating evidence at sentencing”

and instead dispute Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the

murder. 539 U.S. at 521. Here, the jury heard much about

the abuse, including how Carter was treated worse than Jerry,

chained at least once, and ran away multiple times because of

the misery. As the district court reasoned, the California

Supreme Court may reasonably have concluded that trial

counsel decided not to present this evidence because (a) the

jury would not have responded well to the insinuation that a

child abused this badly would inevitably go on to rape, kill,

and burglarize multiple women; (b) that the evidence of FAS

or brain damage would not have been well received because

of the evidence that Carter acted so rationally over such a

long period of time; and (c) that the evidence largely

duplicated what they already presented.

For example, declarations from Vaughn Johnson, Chuck

Reader, and Cheryl Stavish that Carter was chained—which

may or may not have been describing the same incident—are

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CARTER V. DAVIS 67

compelling, but the jury knew that Carter was chained as a

child. Moreover, some of the evidence Carter faults his

counsel for not presenting contradicted other evidence

presented. For example, Jerry testified he himself was never

chained, so the Officer’s possible testimony saying that Jerry

might have been chained would have been less helpful. Jerry

also denied that Carter was treated “that much worse” than he

was, so the value of additional evidence regarding the

disparity between the two was minimal.

Additionally, as the government points out, many of the

declarations Carter now submits rest on hearsay. For

example, Cheryl Stavish testified that Polly told her that she

used to hear Carter’s father beating or whipping him; Officer

Martin stated that Sophie Swanson told him the boys were

chained every time the Carter parents went out to drink,

which was frequently; and Chuck Reader declared that Ivan

Johnson told him Carter was chained and locked up “almost

all of the time.” Moreover, some witnesses are less than

confident in their claims. For example, Michael Ashmasuk

testified that he and his friends “assumed Jim Carter had

locked [Carter] in the closet,” (emphasis added); Officer

Martin stated that he “found Dean and JerryCarter chained to

the floor,” but clarified that he “could see the chain on Dean,

but [did not] remember seeing the chain on Jerry.” The state

court could reasonably have concluded that the investigation

was sufficient.

The question here is not whether Carter’s attorneys should

have introduced more mitigating evidence, but rather whether

the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to

introduce more mitigating evidence was reasonable. See id.

at 523. The California Supreme Court may reasonably have

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68 CARTER V. DAVIS

concluded that the answer to that question was yes, that

counsel’s decision was reasonable.

b. Prejudice

Even if Carter’s defense team performed deficiently, the

California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded

that Carter was not prejudiced by their performance. To

show prejudice, Carter must show that “there is a reasonable

probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would

have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 695. But here, there was no reasonable probability that the

outcome would have been different if a jury had heard more

evidence about the extent of the abuse Carter suffered,

especially given the hearsay, contradictory, and weak nature

of the additional evidence. Id. at 694.

A death verdict with overwhelming record support is less

likely to have been affected by errors than one only weakly

supported by the record. Id. at 696. As the California

Supreme Court noted and Carter concedes, there was “strong

evidence directly linking defendant to the charged murders.” 

Carter, 117 P.3d at 527.

B. Remaining Uncertified Claims

We conclude that no jurist of reason would find it

debatable that any of Carter’s remaining uncertified claims

states the denial of a constitutional right. See Wilson,

554 F.3d at 826. We therefore deny a COA as to the rest of

the claims not certified by the Southern and Central District

Courts.

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CARTER V. DAVIS 69

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, in Case No. 13-99003, the

judgment of the United States District Court for the Central

District of California is AFFIRMED.

For the foregoing reasons, in Case No. 13-99007, the

judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of California is AFFIRMED.

Carter’s supplemental motion to expand the certificate of

appealability, filed October 6, 2015, is GRANTED as to

Claim 6 in Case No. 13-99003, and otherwise DENIED.

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