Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_04-cv-03041/USCOURTS-arwd-3_04-cv-03041-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

KAREN SHIPLEY PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 04-3041

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Karen Shipley appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

June 30, 2005, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner pursuant

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 6). Plaintiff now moves for an award of

$2,372.52 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 15.50 hours of work before the court at an

hourly rate of $140.00, and $202.52 in expenses. (Doc. # 7-10). Defendant has filed a response,

objecting to certain hours claimed by plaintiff’s counsel. (Doc.# 11).

§ 406 Fees:

Statutory provision for the award of attorney's fees is found in 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1).

We find this request is premature, in that there has been no submission of evidence indicating

plaintiff has been successful upon remand and has been awarded benefits from which an

appropriate fee may be paid. The fee awarded an attorney under 42 U.S.C. § 406 is paid out of

any past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), (b); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1720(b)(4). 

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EAJA Fees:

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). After

reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a prevailing party in this matter. Under Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four

judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

proceedings is a prevailing party. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

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In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

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The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

Plaintiff’s counsel requests attorney's fees under EAJA at a rate of $140.00 an hour based

on an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per

hour- themaximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)92)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase

in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys

justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not

automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074

(8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the

hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living

sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the

Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index

as an exhibit to his Memorandum of Law (Doc. # 8) and has presented evidence of an increase

in the cost of living. Therefore, the undersigned believes his argument for enhanced fees based

on a cost of living increase has merit. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to

an award at the rate of $140.00 per hour.

As to the number of hours plaintiff’s counsel seeks compensation, defendant objects to

the time submitted for duties generally completed by office staff. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted

0.25 our on June 18, 2004, (received and reviewed file-marked copy of Complaint. Review of

file), from which we deduct 0.25 hour; 0.75 hour on June 22, 2004, (letters to U.S. Attorney,

Attorney General, and Commissioner enclosing complaint. Review of file), from which we

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deduct 0.75 hour; 0.25 hour on June 23, 2004, (letter to Clerk enclosing exhibits A and B.

Review of file), from which we deduct 0.25 hour; 0.25 hour on June 24, 2004, (client letter

requesting another check for appeal to cover the last one she sent, which bounced. Review of

file), from which we deduct 0.25 hour; 0.25 hour on June 30, 2004, (received and reviewed

check from client for appeal. Review of file), from which we deduct 0.25 hour; 1.00 hour on July

13, 2004, (prepared Affidavit of Service and clerk letter to send the same. Review of file), from

which we deduct 0.90 hour; 0.25 hour on July 29, 2004, (received and reviewed file-marked copy

of Affidavit of Service. Review of file), from which we deduct 0.25 hour; 0.25 hour on February

23, 2005, (client letter enclosing copy of defendant’s appeal brief. Review of file), from which

we deduct 0.25 hour; and 0.75 hour on July 13, 2005, (preparation of Affidavit of plaintiff and

client letter enclosing the same. Review of file), from which we deduct 0.65 hour. Defendant

argues that this work is not compensable under the EAJA because it could have been performed

by support staff. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987)

(work which could have been completed by support staff is not compensable under the EAJA).

We agree. Accordingly, we deduct 3.80 hours from the total number of compensable hours

sought. 

Plaintiff’s counsel submitted 2.00 hours on June 12, 2004, for the preparation of the

Complaint, Summons and letter to the clerk. Defendant argues that the Complaint filed was a

general form that was not even modified to make it applicable to plaintiff’s case. We find the

time submitted for the preparation of the complaint to be excessive and deduct 1.50 hours from

the total number of compensable hours sought. 

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Plaintiff’s counsel submitted 0.25 hour on September 7, 2004, (received and reviewed

letter from SSA advising when brief is due. Review of file), from which we deduct 0.15 hour.

This court concludes that the time submitted on the above referenced dates, should not have

taken an attorney experienced in handling social security cases more than five or six minutes to

review these documents. Bowman v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898 (E.D.Ark. 1989).

Therefore we are reducing the 0.25 hour submitted to 0.10 hour. We also find the 0.75 hour

submitted on September 1, 2004, to read the two page Answer; and the 0.50 hour submitted on

July 1, 2005, to read the court’s one page Judgment to be excessive. Therefore we are reducing

the time submitted on the above dates by 0.50 hour and 0.45 hour, respectively. Accordingly,

we deduct 1.10 hours from the total number of compensable hours sought. 

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $202.52 in expenses incurred with regard to the

filing fee, postage and photocopying. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find

$202.52 to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 9.10 (15.50-6.4) attorney hours, at the rate of $140.00 per hour, and for $202.52 in expenses,

for a total attorney's fee award of $1,476.52 This amount should be paid in addition to, and not

out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The parties have ten

days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written objections

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver

of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be

both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

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The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

Dated this 28 day of March 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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