Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00943/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00943-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND A. GENTILE,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. FEDERAL MARSHAL, et al., 

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-00943-DLB

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

SIXTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Raymond A. Gentile (“Plaintiff”), a former federal inmate at the Lerdo Pre-Trial 

Facility, is proceeding in forma pauperis in this action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which provides a remedy for 

violation of civil rights by federal actors.1Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 23, 2015.2 

The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint on October 28, 2015, and found that it stated a 

denial of medical care claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 However, as Plaintiff had not 

named a proper individual Defendant, the action could not proceed. Plaintiff was given leave to 

amend to name a Defendant responsible for the denial of medical treatment.

 

1

 By separate order, the Court has appointed counsel for the limited purpose of filing an amended complaint.

2

 Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on July 10, 2015.

3 The order inadvertently cited the Eighth Amendment as the source of Plaintiff’s claim. However, while the 

standards are the same, Plaintiff’s claim arises out of the Fourteenth Amendment because he was a pretrial detainee at 

the time in question.

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Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on November 24, 2015. He names the United 

States Federal Marshal, Deputy Director David Harlow, Assistant Director of Prisoner Operations 

Eben Morales and United States Marshal Albert Najera as Defendants.

A. SCREENING STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

B. ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT

The events at issue occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Lerdo Pre-Trial Facility

(“Lerdo”) in Lerdo, California.

Plaintiff alleges that on or about July 1, 2013, while an inmate at Lerdo, he underwent a 

CT scan performed by Dr. Shumaila. Dr. Shumaila determined that Plaintiff needed a hernia 

repair operation, which he performed. 

Following the operation, Plaintiff was examined at Lerdo by Dr. Mostofi, who discovered 

a mass on Plaintiff’s left kidney. Dr. Mostofi immediately requested approval to perform a biopsy 

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of the mass “from Defendant U.S. Federal Marshal, by and through Defendant Deputy Director 

David Harlow and Defendant, Assistant Director of Prisoner Operations, Eben Morales.” ECF 

No. 8, at 4. The request was denied without reason.

Dr. Mostofi submitted several more requests over the course of approximately four 

months, stating that the need for a biopsy was urgent. Defendants denied each request without 

reason.

Due to Plaintiff’s worsening condition, his attorney petitioned for his immediate release 

from prison to permit Plaintiff to seek his own medical treatment. The Court granted the petition 

for release.

Immediately following his release, Plaintiff was examined by his primary care physician, 

Dr. Prabhu, who determined that Plaintiff was in urgent need of examination by a kidney 

specialist. Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Leo, a kidney specialist, and underwent a biopsy on May 

16, 2014.

The biopsy revealed a rapidly growing mass diagnosed as Cystic Renal Cell Carcinoma. 

The doctor told Plaintiff that due to the delay in treatment, the mass had grown significantly and 

his only option was to have the kidney removed. Plaintiff agreed to do so.

Plaintiff alleges that he was subsequently informed by medical experts that if the biopsy 

had been performed when the mass was first detected by Dr. Mostofi on or about July 1, 2013, he 

would have had additional treatment options available. Other options would have reduced the 

probability of “facing the present dire prognosis of imminent death.” ECF No. 8, at 5. 

Dr. Prabhu prepared a letter and issued a report stating that Plaintiff’s prognosis is 

terminal, “as a direct result” of Defendants’ repeated refusals to approve Dr. Mostofi’s medical 

requests. ECF No. 8, at 5.

Plaintiff believes that the repeated refusals of Defendants United States Marshal, David 

Harlow and Eben Morales to approve Dr. Mostofi’s requests for an urgent biopsy were acts of bad 

faith, in violation of Plaintiff’s right to receive proper medical care. He requests monetary 

damages.

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C. DISCUSSION

1. Denial of Medical Care

As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff is protected from conditions of confinement which amount 

to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Simmons v. Navajo 

County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2010); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 

F.3d 1232, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010). While pretrial detainees’ rights are protected under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard for claims brought under the Eighth 

Amendment has long been used to analyze pretrial detainees’ conditions of confinement claims. 

Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1017-18; Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1242; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 

(9th Cir. 1998).

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 

2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 

2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that 

failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective 

recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

In the prior order, the Court found that at the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations were 

sufficient to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. He had not identified a proper 

Defendant, however, and the case could not proceed. Plaintiff was offered an opportunity to 

amend, and the Court explained that Plaintiff had to link each named defendant to a violation of 

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his constitutional rights, as there is no respondeat superior liability under Bivens. Starr v. Baca, 

652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012); Serra v. Lappin, 600 

F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Plaintiff now names three individual Defendants- Deputy Director David Harlow, 

Assistant Director of Prisoner Operations Eben Morales and United States Marshal Albert Najera. 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not include any factual allegations against Defendant 

Najera, and Plaintiff has therefore failed to link him to any alleged violations.

As to Defendants Harlow and Morales, Plaintiff contends that his physician requested 

approval of the biopsy “from Defendant U.S. Federal Marshal, by and through Defendant Deputy 

Director David Harlow and Defendant, Assistant Director of Prisoner Operations, Eben Morales.” 

ECF No. 8, at 4. He further states, that “Defendants, and each of them, denied each request 

without reason.” ECF No. 8, at 4.

Although Plaintiff has now named Defendants Harlow and Morales, it is not clear from his 

complaint that they were actually responsible for the denials. Plaintiff does not include any 

specific facts relating to the denials, and it appears that he may have named them simply because 

of their supervisory positions. His failure to provide additional facts prevents the Court from 

determining whether Defendants Harlow and Morales (1) are actually linked to the denials; and (2) 

whether they acted with deliberate indifference. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

2. United States Federal Marshal

To the extent that Plaintiff names the United States Federal Marshal Service as a 

Defendant, the Court previously explained that a Bivens claim is not available against a federal 

agency. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). Rather, a Bivens claim can only be stated 

against a federal officer in his or her individual capacity. Vaccaro v. Dobre, 81 F.3d 854, 857 (9th 

Cir. 1996). 

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3. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend to name the individuals responsible for the denial 

of medical treatment. Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that (1) the named Defendants 

were actually linked to the denial, and are not named in their supervisory roles; and (2) the 

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference, i.e., that they “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an 

excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Simply stating that the 

requests were denied without reason is insufficient to meet this standard.

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state any cognizable claims against any Defendants, and it is 

dismissed with leave to amend.

If Plaintiff amends, he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 

claims in his amended complaint. George, 507 F.3d at 607.

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but under 

section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of 

respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-07. Although accepted as 

true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Within sixty (60) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must

file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in 

this order, or file a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

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2. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed, without

prejudice, for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 20, 2016 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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