Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00721/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00721-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PATRICK STANLEY PAWLICKI, 

Petitioner,

v. 

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 16-cv-0721-AJB-MDD 

ORDER: 

(1) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; 

(2) OVERRULING PETITIONER'S 

OBJECTIONS; 

(3) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

(4) DECLINING TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY; AND 

(4) DISMISSING AS MOOT 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO EXHAUST CLAIMS 

(Doc. Nos. 34, 60, 61, 63) 

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Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Dembin’s Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R”) on Petitioner Patrick Stanley Pawlicki’s (“Pawlicki”) second amended petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. Nos. 34, 60.) The R&R recommends that this Court deny 

Pawlicki’s habeas petition for two main reasons: (1) the state court adjudication of claims 

one, six, and seven is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts; and (2) the remaining claims fail under de novo review. (Doc. No. 60 at 3.) Pawlicki 

filed a fifty-nine page objection in response. (Doc. No. 61.) For the reasons discussed 

herein, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, (Doc. No. 60), OVERRULES

Pawlicki’s objections, (Doc. No. 61), DISMISSES Pawlicki’s habeas petition, (Doc. No. 

34), and DENIES AS MOOT Pawlicki’s motion for leave to exhaust claims, (Doc. No. 

63). 

I. BACKGROUND 

The factual and procedural background of the instant matter is not only lengthy, but 

also incredibly intricate. Thus, instead of restating the exhaustive factual summary from 

the appellate court opinion affirming Pawlicki’s conviction on direct review, the Court will 

only provide a narrow background of the vital facts pertaining to this Order. 

On October 28, 2009, a complaint was filed in the San Diego County Superior Court 

charging Pawlicki with nine counts of committing a lewd act on a child under fourteen 

years of age in violation of California Penal Code § 288(a). (Doc. No. 51-1 at 17–23.) 

Shortly thereafter, Pawlicki appeared with retained counsel Kerry Armstrong and was 

released on a one million dollar bail bond. (Doc. No. 51-7 at 5.) Pawlicki was then 

arraigned on December 10, 2009, and a trial date was set for June 15, 2010. (Id. at 11, 13.) 

On April 1, 2010, the court granted Pawlicki’s request to substitute newly retained 

counsel Thomas Matthews for Armstrong and a second trial date was set for October 5, 

2010. (Id. at 14.) A couple of months later, Matthews moved to be relieved of counsel on 

the basis that Pawlicki said he had hired a new attorney. (Doc. No. 51-12 at 12–13.) In 

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addition, Matthews informed the court that Pawlicki had tried to extort him by claiming 

that he had secretly recorded conversations with his legal assistant that contained 

“potentially serious charges of misconduct,” and would refrain from contacting authorities 

if Matthews refunded his retainer. (Id. at 8.) 

On August 20, 2010, counsel Demosthenes Lorandos was allowed to replace 

Matthews as retained counsel. (Doc. No. 51-16 at 11–21.) However, after granting this 

motion, the court stated that it had gotten the “slightest sense that this matter [was] being 

delayed by substituting attorneys any time [Pawlicki was] unhappy with whatever his 

attorneys [were] telling him.” (Id. at 8.) Pawlicki denied changing counsel to obtain delays, 

however, the court responded with: 

Frankly, I don’t believe you. I think you are manipulating the 

system. You are trying to obtain a delay in the trial of charges 

that could land you in prison for life. The understanding is going 

to be that you are going to have a new lawyer here on that next

date or you’re going to represent yourself. 

 (Id. at 13.) 

On September 8, 2010, Lorandos appeared as retained counsel of record, asked for 

and was granted a continuance, and a third “firm” trial date was set for February 22, 2011. 

(Doc. No. 51-7 at 17.) On January 18, 2011, a discovery hearing was held before the 

Honorable Louis R. Hanoian and Lorandos’ request for a continuance of the trial date due 

to the large amount of discovery and the need for investigation was granted. (Id. at 23–24.) 

A fourth trial date was then set for September 27, 2011. (Id. at 23, 31.) 

Later that year, on October 28, 2011, Pawlicki failed to appear at a status conference 

and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. (Id. at 56–57.) In November, Pawlicki 

appeared in court following his extradition in Georgia and he was ordered held without bail 

after the prosecutor informed the court that Pawlicki had been apprehended by bounty 

hunters while he was attempting to obtain false identification and board a cargo ship to 

China. (Id. at 59; Doc. No. 51-21 at 6–7.) A sixth trial date was then set for January 9, 

2012. (Id. at 14.) 

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 On November 18, 2011, the court held a hearing on Lorandos’ motion to withdraw. 

(Doc. No. 51-22 at 8–11.) However, the motion was never argued as Pawlicki fired 

Lorandos at the hearing and informed the court that he was in the process of retaining 

attorney Vikas Bajaj. (Id. at 3–4, 8.) The Office of the Public Defender was appointed 

pending the retention of Bajaj, who was never retained, and a status conference was then 

set to give Pawlicki time to retain counsel. (Id. at 12.) 

 On December 15, 2011, Dante Pride substituted in for the public defender and the 

January 9, 2012 trial date was converted into a status conference so that a “firm” trial date 

could be set. (Doc. No. 51-23 at 4–10.) A seventh trial date was then set for June 18, 2012, 

with the court informing Pride that no further continuances would be given. (Doc. No. 51-

7 at 69; Doc. No. 51-8 at 26.) 

 On March 22, 2012, Pride moved to withdraw as counsel on the basis that Pawlicki’s 

conduct had made it unreasonably difficult for him to proceed and that Pawlicki had 

breached his fee obligation with him. (Doc. No. 51-12 at 21.) Pride’s motion was granted 

on April 2, 2012, and a public defender was appointed. (Doc. No. 51-8 at 26.) Thereafter, 

Attorney Mel Epley appeared for Pawlicki, but on May 4, 2012, the public defender’s 

office conflicted out because they represented the jailhouse informants who eventually 

testified at trial that Pawlicki solicited them to destroy evidence and kill witnesses. (Doc. 

No. 51-7 at 75–76.) 

 On May 14, 2012, the trial date was vacated and an alternate public defender Zaki 

Zehawi was appointed. (Id. at 77.) As Zehawi indicated that he had not reviewed all the 

discovery, an eighth trial date was set for October 29, 2012. (Id. at 78.) Thereafter, two 

months before trial, retained attorney Raymundo Pacello appeared and requested to be 

substituted in for Zehawi. (Doc. No. 51-26 at 4.) Pacello indicated that he had met with 

Pawlicki multiple times, was familiar with the details of the case, was an experienced trial 

attorney with an “enormous staff,” and was “ready, willing and able to proceed” to trial as 

scheduled. (Id. at 14.) The court then questioned Pacello about the number of cases he had 

tried in terms of felony trials to a verdict and affirmed that he was familiar with the history 

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of the attorneys in the case and that Pawlicki wanted Pacello as his counsel. (Id. at 16–17.) 

 Four weeks before trial was set to begin, Pacello sought a 60-day continuance stating 

that despite having hired multiple people and having spent hundreds of hours preparing, it 

would be difficult for him to proceed to trial. (Doc. No. 51-34 at 5–36.) The motion was 

ultimately denied, though the trial date was continued for a week to accommodate the 

judge’s trial schedule. (Id. at 36, 51.) 

 Around two weeks before trial, attorney Pam Lacher moved to substitute in for 

Pacello and Pacello moved to withdraw as counsel of record. (Doc. No. 51-7 at 83–84.) 

Lacher informed the court that Pawlicki had contacted her five weeks earlier, but that she 

was not ready to go to trial and asked for a six-month continuance. (Doc. No. 51-35 at 10–

46.) Pacello then informed the trial judge, in camera, apparently while crying, that his 

motion was based on the fact that he is a father to “two beautiful daughters” and that he 

could not “get up in front of [the] court and basically misstate what [he] believe[d] for the 

benefit of a defense of a man” whom he no longer trusted. (Doc. No. 58-3 at 5, 7.) 

Moreover, to further support his motion, Pacello stated that he was in charge of Pawlicki’s 

entire estate, that he was aware of “people doing all kinds of different things,” that he didn’t 

know what Pawlicki’s next move was, and that Pawlicki “fooled” him into believing he 

was innocent. (Id. at 7.) 

 After holding a hearing on both matters, the court denied Lacher’s motion to 

substitute into the case and denied Pacello’s motion to withdraw because the reasons he 

provided were more akin to personal issues and did not amount to a breakdown of the 

attorney-client relationship. (Doc. No. 51-35 at 46–49.) The trial judge then warned 

Pawlicki that he could fire Pacello, but then he would have to represent himself or retain 

someone who was ready to go to trial. (Id. at 47–48, 59.) Further, Pawlicki was cautioned 

that if his conduct of hiring and firing attorneys were to rise to the level of misconduct, he 

risked forfeiting his right to counsel under King v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 4th 929, 

944–49 (2003). (Id. at 50–51.) 

 Jury selection began on November 8, 2012, with trial lasting fourteen court days. 

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(Doc. No. 51-7 at 96–130.) On December 10, 2012, after deliberating for two days, the jury 

found Pawlicki guilty of touching the breasts (count one) and vagina (count two) of his 12-

year old stepdaughter Christina C. with his hand, forcing her to touch his penis with her 

hand (count three), and touching her vagina with his penis (count 4), touching the vagina 

of his 9-year old daughter Bonnie P. who suffers from Down Syndrome with his penis 

(count 6), and touching her crotch with his hand (count 8), and touching his penis to the 

anus of Michael S., his 11-year old stepson (count 7). (Doc. No. 51-8 at 9–22.) Pawlicki 

was found not guilty on count five, touching Bonnie P. with his hand in bed. (Id. at 18.) 

 On January 9, 2013, the date set for sentencing, Pawlicki fired Pacello and Lacher 

substituted in as retained counsel. (Id. at 23.) Lacher requested a six-month continuance in 

order to file a new trial motion, which was denied. (Id. at 24.) Thereafter, Lacher filed 

another motion for reconsideration of her request for a continuance, which was also denied. 

(Id. at 24–31.) 

 Lacher then filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge based on allegations that (1) 

she previously appeared in the trial judge’s court numerous times, but had never been 

treated the way she had in this case; (2) the trial judge had formed an opinion that Pawlicki 

had hired and fired attorneys as a ploy to delay the proceedings without an adequate inquiry 

into the reasons for substitution of counsel; (3) by denying Lacher’s pretrial motion for 

substitution of counsel, the trial judge forced Pawlicki to go to trial with Pacello—a 

conflicted, inexperienced, and unprepared attorney; and (4) the trial judge refused to give 

Lacher sufficient time to prepare a motion for new trial. (Doc. No. 51-5 at 162–291.) All 

of these matters led Lacher to believe that the judge had violated three cannons of judicial 

ethics (integrity, impartiality, and competency) and had lost the ability to remain impartial. 

(Id.) On March 26, 2013, finding no basis for disqualification, the motion was denied. 

(Doc. No. 51-6 at 2–6.) 

 On March 29, 2013, Lacher filed a new trial motion alleging that: (1) Pacello had a 

conflict of interest; (2) Pacello was essentially absent from trial as he spent the majority of 

his time during trial sleeping or using his cellphone to update his Facebook page, check 

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emails, or read messages; (3) the trial court erred when it refused to relieve Pacello prior 

to trial; and (4) each of the foregoing resulted from a lack of impartiality of the trial judge. 

(Id. at 48–77.) The motion was denied on April 2, 2013. (Doc. No. 51-8 at 36–37.) Pawlicki 

then appealed. (Doc. No. 51-63.) The appellate court affirmed. (Id. at 43.) On March 16, 

2015, Pawlicki filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court presenting a 

single claim: that he was denied his right to counsel under Cronic. (Doc. No. 51-64.) That 

petition was denied. (Doc. No. 51-65.) On June 3, 2016, Pawlicki filed a habeas petition in 

the Supreme Court of California, (Doc. No. 51-66), which was also denied, (Doc. No. 51-

67). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE R&R 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

judge’s duties in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R. The district judge must “make 

a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made[,]” 

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. 

Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“The statute [§ 636(b)(1)(C)] makes it clear that the district judge must review the 

magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not 

otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis 

in original). Hence, in the absence of objection(s), the court “need only satisfy itself that 

there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee note to 1983. As to portions of the report to which 

no objection is made, the Court “may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s 

findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law.” Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. 

Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

A petitioner in state custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court may challenge 

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his detention only on the grounds that his custody is in violation of the United States 

Constitution or the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); accord Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”) (codified as amended as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)), applies to § 2254 habeas corpus 

petitions filed after 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322 (1997). Federal habeas 

relief is available only if the result reached by the state court on the merits is “contrary to” 

or “an unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent, or if the adjudication is “an 

unreasonable determination” based on the facts and evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). 

To be an unreasonable application of federal law, the state court decision must be more 

than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Pawlicki’s second amended petition brings the following claims: 

1. Pawlicki’s trial counsel was so ineffective it amounted to a complete denial of his 

right to counsel because Pacello: (a) misled Pawlicki and the trial judge regarding 

his experience; (b) failed to hire a second expert witness; (c) lacked experience with 

the rules of evidence; (d) failed to prepare for trial; (e) had a conflict of interest; and 

(f) failed to pay attention during trial because he was sleeping and using his cell 

phone. 

2. The trial judge’s decision to refuse to permit Pawlicki to replace Pacello with Lacher 

prior to trial was based on actual or apparent judicial bias. 

3. Prosecutorial misconduct occurred when: (a) the prosecutor presented irrelevant and 

inflammatory testimony; (b) the police seized the hard drive from Pawlicki’s 

computer without a warrant; and (c) the prosecutor withheld statements by Dr. 

Marilyn Kaufhold that Bonnie was never sexually abused, medical and criminal 

records purportedly demonstrating that Christina C. and Michael S. “were of bad 

character and should not be believed,” and “evidence that Christina C had recanted 

her allegations.” 

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4. Pawlicki is actually innocent. 

5. To the extent the allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in claim one 

did not rise to the level of complete denial of counsel under Cronic, they amount to 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland. 

6. Pawlicki was denied his right to his choice of counsel through the denial of his 

pretrial motion to substitute attorney Lacher for Pacello. 

7. Pawlicki was denied his rights to due process and equal protection by the admission 

of uncharged sexual misconduct with minors, introduced for the sole purpose of 

showing he had a propensity to commit the charged crimes. 

(See generally Doc. No. 34.) 

A. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO DE NOVO REVIEW BECAUSE HIS 

OBJECTION IS AN OPPOSITION 

Rule 72(b)(2) requires an objecting party to file “specific written objections” and 

Rule 72(b)(3) requires the district judge to review decisions of the magistrate judge that 

have been “properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), (3). Specifically, though 

objections of pro se litigants are generally accorded leniency and “construed to raise the 

strongest arguments that they suggest[,]” these objections “must be specific and clearly 

aimed at particular findings in the magistrate’s proposal, such that no party be allowed a 

second bite at the apple by simply relitigating a prior argument.” DiPilato v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 

662 F. Supp. 2d 333, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 

Presently, although Pawlicki filed a document entitled “Objection to Report and 

Recommendation,” the document does not contain specific objections. (See generally Doc. 

No. 61.) Rather, Pawlicki re-argues his belief that the trial judge engaged in outrageous 

conduct, the trial judge was unreasonable, that Pacello misled the court regarding his 

experience, that Pawlicki was found guilty on “mere accusations,” and that he was denied 

his choice of counsel. (Id.) Regrettably, all of these contentions are simply re-statements 

of the claims in the Petition. (See generally Doc. No. 34.)

The Court notes that it appreciates the time that Pawlicki took to craft his objection. 

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The Court is also cognizant that as a pro se litigant, the Court should give him considerable 

leeway. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 & n.7 (1980) (explaining that pro se pleadings 

are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” because pro 

se litigants are more prone to making errors in pleadings than litigants represented by 

counsel); see also Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that the 

Supreme Court has stated that federal courts should liberally construe the “‘inartful 

pleading’ of pro se litigants.”). This rule particularly applies to pro se prisoners. See Zichko 

v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). 

However, pro se plaintiffs are still expected to follow “the same rules of procedure 

that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled 

on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 

Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[W]hile pro se litigants may be 

entitled to some latitude when dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their 

lack of formal training, there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward 

procedural requirements that a layperson can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.”). 

Thus, regrettably, as Pawlicki’s objection simply repeats the arguments made in his 

Petition—arguments already analyzed by the magistrate judge in the R&R—the Court is 

relieved of any obligation to review the objection. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 

(1985) (holding that § 636(b)(1)(C) “does not on its face require any review at all, by either 

the district court or the court of appeals, of any issue that is not the subject of an 

objection.”); see also Sullivan v. Schriro, No. CV-04-1517-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 1516005, 

at *2 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2006) (“Reformatting the petition as an objection provides this 

Court with no guidance as to what portions of the R&R Petitioner considers to be 

incorrect.”). 

Nevertheless, the Court liberally construes and considers the discernable objections 

as presented by Pawlicki in his brief. 

i. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

The core issue presented in Pawlicki’s objection is his claim of ineffective assistance 

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of his trial counsel. (Doc. No. 61 at 7–11.) Specifically, Pawlicki argues that Pacello 

supposedly lacked a basic understanding of the rules of evidence, that Pacello had a conflict 

of interest, and that Pacello was absent from trial as he spent the majority of the time 

sleeping. (Id. at 10–11.) 

The Court does not deny that the record demonstrates that Pacello’s actions when 

requesting withdrawal from this case were peculiar. However, to adequately allege 

ineffective assistance of counsel, Pawlicki must show that his counsel’s deficient 

performance was prejudicial, which requires showing that his “counsel’s errors were so 

serious as to deprive [Pawlicki] of a fair trial[.]” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984). A petitioner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of 

the proceeding would have been different absent the errors. Id. at 694. A reasonable 

probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 

Applying this standard, though Pawlicki provides the Court with several arguments 

for why he believes Pacello’s representation was deficient, he has not identified any defects 

in the representation that would have altered or prejudiced the outcome of his jury trial. As 

the trial judge stated, the jury was entitled and did believe the testimony of Michael and 

Christina, two of Pawlicki’s victims, especially once they were corroborated by two other 

individuals. (Doc. No. 60 at 52–53.) Moreover, Pawlicki’s own statements during trial as 

well as his flight from prosecution, taken together, allowed for the inference of guilt.1

 (Id.) 

Thus, despite Pawlicki maintaining that he should be granted a new trial based on 

ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, his Petition as well as his objection fail to 

establish prejudice as a result of Pacello’s purported errors. 

                                                                

1

 The R&R puts into great detail various facts that highlight that even if Pacello was 

inexperienced or unprepared, there was more than enough evidence to support the 

conclusion that the outcome of trial would not be undermined by Pacello’s various 

purported inadequacies. (See Doc. No. 60 at 62 (highlighting that Pawlicki’s family and 

friends testified that he had admitted to sexually molesting Christina C, Pawlicki had a 

lifetime history of sexually inappropriate behavior, and that he had shown pornography to 

children and spoke to children about sex).) 

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ii. Actual Innocence 

Pawlicki argues that if his counsel had been effective at trial, it would have been 

more likely that he would have been found not guilty for the crimes he was charged with. 

(Doc. No. 61 at 17.) Pawlicki then claims that two of the witnesses for the prosecution 

admitted to making up the charges against him. (Id.) 

To establish actual innocence, a petitioner must demonstrate that, “in light of all the 

evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” 

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

327–28 (1995)). However, the United States Supreme Court has limited Schlup to 

petitioners who can show that a “constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (citation omitted). 

Thus, “a petitioner must show that, in light of all the evidence, including evidence not 

introduced at trial, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found 

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775–76 (9th 

Cir. 2002). “A petitioner need not show that he is ‘actually innocent’ of the crime he was 

convicted of committing; instead, he must show that ‘a court cannot have confidence in the 

outcome of the trial.’” Id. at 776. 

Unfortunately, Pawlicki repeats his belief that he is factually innocent while outright 

ignoring the R&R’s findings. (See Doc. No. 60 at 83.) The statement Pawlicki references 

was made by Christina C. during a preliminary hearing where she said “No. We just made 

up this thing[.]” (Doc. No. 61 at 31.) However, this statement was made in response to the 

question: “You felt like people were telling you what to say, right?” (Id.) 

As the R&R already illustrated, Pawlicki takes the foregoing testimony out of 

context. Instead, as the R&R delineates, it appears that Christina C. may have been 

indicating that she felt like her teachers as well as other individuals who were pressuring 

her to report the abuse may have thought that she was making up the allegations. (Id.; See 

Doc. No. 56 at 8.) The Court agrees with the R&R’s interpretation as well as finds that this 

statement falls far from constituting a clear admission that Christina made up the 

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allegations against Pawlicki. Accordingly, Pawlicki has not demonstrated his actual 

innocence. 

In sum, the Court finds that as a whole, Pawlicki’s various objections are simply 

broad and general re-statements of the arguments in his Petition. Moreover, the majority 

of the objections were already thoroughly and painstakingly addressed and analyzed in the 

R&R. Thus, without more, and even construing Pawlicki’s objections liberally, the Court 

finds that Pawlicki has made no specific objections to the R&R and those objections the 

Court has addressed above do not demonstrate that Pawlicki is entitled to federal habeas 

relief. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety and DENIES the Petition. 

B. PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO EXHAUST HIS CLAIMS 

On December 14, 2017, Pawlicki filed a motion for a stay in regards to claims two, 

three, and five. (Doc. No. 63.) There, he requested that the Court stay its ruling until he 

could “fully exhaust claims this Court deems are unexhausted[,]” (Id. at 2), “[b]ecause this 

Court and the respondent agree that the three claims have not been properly addressed and 

exhausted . . . ,” (Id. at 7). 

Unfortunately, Pawlicki must be mistaken about the Court’s position. In the R&R, 

Judge Dembin ruled in Pawlicki’s favor and recommended that Respondent’s contention 

that claims two, three, and five are procedurally defaulted be rejected. (Doc. No. 60 at 28.) 

Moreover, the R&R also recommended that this Court reject Respondent’s assertion that 

any claim is unexhausted. (Id. at 28–31.) Instead, the R&R found that Pawlicki had 

“satisfied the exhaustion requirement by presenting claims one through six to the state 

supreme court in a manner which permitted that court to reach the merits of the claims.” 

(Id. at 30.) 

Thus, finding that Pawlicki must have misread or misconstrued the R&R, and most 

importantly highlighting that the R&R agrees with Pawlicki that his claims are in fact 

exhausted, the Court DENIES Pawlicki’s motion for leave to exhaust claims AS MOOT. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

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No. 60), OVERRULES Pawlicki’s objections, (Doc. No. 61), DISMISSES Pawlicki’s 

habeas petition, (Doc. No. 34), and DENIES AS MOOT Pawlicki’s motion for leave to 

exhaust his claims, (Doc. No. 63). 

When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas corpus 

proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 

appeal a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate 

of appealability is appropriate only where Pawlicki makes a “substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 325 (2003) (quoting 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). Under this standard, Pawlicki must demonstrate that reasonable 

jurists could debate whether the petition should have been “resolved in a different manner 

or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Here, the Court finds that reasonable jurists could not debate the Court’s 

conclusion to dismiss Pawlicki’s habeas petition and therefore DECLINES to issue a 

certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 2, 2018 

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