Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-02246/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-02246-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

SHARON WALKER and THE )

ROSE OF SHARON, INC., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. 5:14-cv-2246-CLS

)

CITY OF NEW HOPE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, Sharon Walker and The Rose of Sharon, Inc., assert claims for

violations of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., against

defendants City of New Hope, Alabama; Butch Taylor, the Mayor of New Hope; and

Wonnie Fisher, Wade Grider, Leon Hornbuckle, Jr., Shirley McKerley, and Danny

Baker, all of whom were members of the Board of Zoning Adjustment for the City of

New Hope.1 Plaintiffs sought to convert an existing single-family home within the

City of New Hope into a halfway house for recovering drug and alcohol addicts, but

the Zoning Board denied plaintiffs’ application to use the property in that manner. 

Plaintiffs assert that the denial decision was the result of unlawful discrimination

based upon disability. 

1

See doc. no. 19 (Amended Complaint). 

FILED

 2016 Dec-05 AM 09:31

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:14-cv-02246-CLS Document 43 Filed 12/05/16 Page 1 of 6
The case currently is before the court on defendants’ motion for summary

judgment

2

and plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.

3 Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56 providesthat a court “shall grantsummary judgment if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In other words,

summary judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,

against a party who failsto make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “In making this

determination, the court must review all evidence and make all reasonable inferences

in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229

F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d

918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)). Inferences in favor of the non-moving party are not

unqualified, however. “[A]n inference is not reasonable if it is only a guess or a

possibility, for such an inference is not based on the evidence, but is pure conjecture

and speculation.” Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th

2

 Doc. no. 24. 

3

 Doc. no. 27. Plaintiffs’ motion is “partial” because they seek summary judgment in their

favor only on the issue of liability, and wish to “reserv[e] for trial Plaintiffs’[] claims for

compensatory damages and attorneys fees.” Doc. no. 28 (Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment), at 23 (alterations supplied). 

2

Case 5:14-cv-02246-CLS Document 43 Filed 12/05/16 Page 2 of 6
Cir. 1983) (alteration supplied). Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary

judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the

outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the

materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not

exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party

for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921) (emphasis and alteration

supplied). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)

(asking “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law”).

“Cross motions for summary judgment do not change the

standard.” Latin Am. Music Co. v. Archdiocese of San Juan of the

Roman Catholic & Apostolic Church, 499 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2007).

“‘Cross motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately; the

denial of one does not require the grant of another.’” Christian Heritage

Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1030

(10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Buell Cabinet Co. v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431,

433 (10th Cir. 1979)). “Even where the parties file cross motions

pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment is inappropriate if disputes

remain as to material facts.” Id.; accord Monumental Paving &

Excavating, Inc. v. Pa. Mfrs.’ Ass’n Ins. Co., 176 F.3d 794, 797 (4th Cir.

1999) (“When considering motions from both parties for summary

judgment, the court applies the same standard of review and so may not

resolve genuine issues of material fact. Instead, [the court must]

consider and rule upon each party’s motion separately and determine

whether summary judgment is appropriate as to each under the Rule 56

standard.”) (citations omitted).

3

Case 5:14-cv-02246-CLS Document 43 Filed 12/05/16 Page 3 of 6
Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 541 F. Supp. 2d

1295, 1297-98 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (alteration in original). See also American Bankers

Insurance Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005) (“This court

reviews the district court’s disposition of cross-motions for summary judgment de

novo, applying the same legal standards used by the district court, viewing the

evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the

non-movant, and resolving all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the

non-moving party.”).

As an initial matter, plaintiffs agree that summary judgment is due to be

granted in favor of individual defendantsButch Taylor, Wonnie Fisher, Wade Grider,

Leon Hornbuckle, Shirley McKerley, and Danny Baker.4 Even without plaintiffs’

agreement, the claims against those defendants would be due to be dismissed. Asthe

United States Supreme Court has held, official-capacity suits

“generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. New York City Dept.

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98 S .Ct. 2018, 2035, n. 55,

56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). As long as the government entity receives

notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.

4 Plaintiffs acknowledge that the “individual Defendants are named solely in their capacities

as members of the New Hope Zoning Board of Adjustment and as the Mayor of New Hope.” Doc.

no. 38 (Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment), at 5. See also id. at

6 (“So long as the Plaintiffs’ claims against the City remain, Plaintiffs will agree to dismiss the

individual board members and Mayor Taylor as Defendants in this case.”). 

4

Case 5:14-cv-02246-CLS Document 43 Filed 12/05/16 Page 4 of 6
Brandon[ v. Holt], 469 U.S. [464], 471-472 [(1985)].

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (alterations supplied). 

Moreover, plaintiffs have effectivelyconceded their claims for disparate impact

discrimination under the Fair Housing Act by failing to respond to defendants’ wellfounded arguments that summary judgment should be granted on those claims. See,

e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995)

(holding that “grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary

judgment are deemed abandoned”). 

With regard to plaintiffs’ claims for disparate treatment discrimination and

failure to accommodate under the Fair Housing Act, however, the court concludes

that there are genuine disputes of material fact that preclude the entry of summary

judgment in favor of any party. Those claims will proceed to a jury trial. 

In summary, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part, and plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. All

of plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Butch Taylor, Wonnie Fisher, Wade Grider,

Leon Hornbuckle, Shirley McKerley, and Danny Baker are DISMISSED with

prejudice. Plaintiffs’ claim for disparate impact discrimination under the Fair

Housing Act also is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ remaining claims — for

disparate discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Fair Housing Act

5

Case 5:14-cv-02246-CLS Document 43 Filed 12/05/16 Page 5 of 6
against the City of New Hope — will be set by separate order for pre-trial conference

and trial.

DONE this 5th day of December, 2016.

______________________________

United States District Judge

6

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