Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01109/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01109-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY L. TAYLOR,

Petitioner,

v.

TERI GONZALEZ, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 11cv1109 WQH (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR STAY AND

ABEYANCE [ECF NO. 7]

Petitioner Anthony L. Taylor, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on May 19, 2011 [ECF Nos. 1, 5].1 Taylor argues that

although he entered into a plea agreement ensuring that he would

receive a twenty-year sentence, the trial court improperly

sentenced him to twenty-four years and denied his motion to

withdraw the plea. (Pet. 12-13, ECF No. 1.) The Petitioner

maintains that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was

violated as a result. (Id. at 13, 15-16.) Taylor also argues

1 Because Taylor's Petition is not consecutively paginated,

the Court will cite to it using the page numbers assigned by the

electronic case filing system.

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that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel

was violated by both trial attorneys in connection with plea

negotiations, the motion to withdraw the plea, and sentencing. 

(Id. at 13, 16-17.) Petitioner filed a "Petition for Stay and

Abeyance" on October 31, 2011 [ECF No. 7], which the Court

construes as a Motion to Stay.2 There, he argues that this case

should be stayed while he raises and attempts to exhaust a new

claim that was never presented to the state courts: that he also

received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Pet. Stay

Abeyance 4-6, ECF No. 7.) 

Respondent Terri Gonzalez, the warden, filed her Answer to

Taylor's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus along with a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities [ECF No. 8] and a Notice of

Lodgment [ECF No. 9]. Gonzalez filed an Opposition to the Motion

for Stay and Abeyance [ECF No. 11]. Respondent argues that Taylor

is not entitled to a stay because he did not submit a mixed

petition; the statute of limitations has run; and the new claim

does not "relate back" to timely claims in the pending Petition. 

(Opp'n Pet'r's Pet. Stay Abeyance 6, ECF No. 11.)

Taylor was to file any reply memorandum in support of his

Petition for Stay and Abeyance by December 19, 2011 [ECF No. 10]. 

None was filed.

The Court finds Taylor's Motion to Stay suitable for

resolution on the papers. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). The

Court has reviewed the Petition, Taylor's Motion to Stay,

Gonzalez's Opposition, and the lodgments. For the reasons

2

 The Court will also cite to the Motion to Stay using the

page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.

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discussed below, Taylor's Motion to Stay [ECF No. 7] should be

DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May, 1, 2008, in the Superior Court of California, County

of San Diego, Taylor, on advice from his counsel Tom Carnessale,

pleaded guilty to attempted murder and admitted two felony strike

priors. (Lodgment No. 12, Rep's [Appeal] Tr. vol. 2, 1-3, 5, May

1, 2008.) During a May 1, 2008 chambers conference with

Carnessale, the assigned judge stated that she was considering

"striking the strike and putting [the sentence] in the 20, 22-year

category." (Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 5, 37 Sept.

29, 2008.)

On July 28, 2008, the trial court held a Marsden hearing to

determine whether Carnessale would be relieved, and new counsel

was appointed. (See Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr 143, July 28, 2008

(mins.); (Pet. Stay Abeyance 4-5, ECF No. 7.)3

 The record was

"sealed to trial counsel." (Pet. Stay Abeyance 5, ECF No. 7.) 

The trial court had appointed George Cretton as Taylor's new

counsel, but because of a conflict, it relieved Cretton, and

appointed Daniel Cohen as Taylor's new trial attorney. (See

Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s [Appeal] Tr. [] vol. 4, 32, Aug. 12,

2008). Cohen filed a motion to withdraw Petitioner's plea on

September 15, 2008; Taylor claimed that at the time of the May 1,

2008 plea, he was under stress, taking an incorrect dose of

3

 Taylor refers to the Marsden hearing as "the event," "the

motion," and "hearing." See generally People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.

3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970) (discussing

procedure required for an indigent defendant to receive new

appointed counsel.

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medication, and prior counsel inadequately discussed the plea

bargain and was overbearing. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 32, 36-

37; Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 5, 81.) The court

held a hearing on September 29, 2008, and denied Taylor's motion

to withdraw his plea; the court also sentenced Taylor to twentyfour years, despite his understanding that he would receive no

more than twenty-years under the plea agreement. (Lodgment No.

12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 5, 81, 86-87.) At the hearing, Cohen

did not object to the twenty-four-year sentence. (Id. at 85-87.) 

On October 27, 2008, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr., 118.) Taylor was assigned appellate

counsel, Patrick DuNah, who appealed the court's ruling on the

motion to withdraw Taylor's guilty plea and his sentencing, but

counsel did not mention the Marsden hearing in his brief. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Appellate Opening Brief, People v. Taylor, No.

D054023 (Cal. Ct. App. filed July 8, 2009).) Taylor's counsel

also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the court of

appeal, but again did not mention the Marsden hearing in the

petition. (Lodgment No. 5, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

People v. Taylor, No. D054023 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Aug. 19,

2009).) The appellate court, however, did receive a transcript of

the Marsden hearing on December 23, 2008. (See Lodgment No. 9,

California Appellate Courts: Case Information, [http://

appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov (select "Appellate District,

Fourth Appellate District Div 1," search using the court of appeal

case number, then click Docket)] (visited Nov. 9, 2011).)

The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One,

consolidated the direct appeal and the petition on August 5, 2009. 

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(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Taylor, No. D055495 (Cal. Ct. App.

filed Aug. 5, 2009) (order consolidating direct appeal and habeas

petition).) In its consolidated opinion, the court denied both

Taylor's petition and appeal, but made no mention of the Marsden

hearing. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Taylor, No. D054023, slip op.

at 12, 16, 18 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009).) Taylor petitioned

the California Supreme Court on February 2, 2010; the petition for

review does not mention Taylor's Marsden hearing. (Lodgment No.

10, Petition for Review, People v. Taylor, No. S179938 (Cal. filed

Feb. 2, 2010).) The California Supreme Court denied the petition

without opinion on April 14, 2010. (Lodgment 11, California

Appellate Courts: Case Information, [http://appellatecases.

courtinfo.ca.gov (select "Supreme Court," search using the supreme

court case number, then select Docket)] (visited Oct. 25, 2011).)

On May 19, 2011, Taylor filed this federal Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1]. He only raises due process and

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims arising from the

trial court's imposition of the twenty-four-year sentence and the

denial of the request to withdraw his guilty plea. (See Pet. 12-

13, 16-17, ECF No. 1.) Now, Taylor seeks an order staying this

case while he raises for the first time, and exhausts in the state

courts, a new claim for the ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. (Pet. Stay Abeyance 5-6, ECF No. 7.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR EXHAUSTION

Before a federal court may grant habeas relief on a claim, a

petitioner must exhaust all available state judicial remedies. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (West 2006); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.

269, 273-74 (2005) (referring to total exhaustion requirement of

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Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982), abrogated on other

grounds by Rhines, 544 U.S. 269). A claim is exhausted only when

a petitioner has fairly presented it to the state courts. Duncan

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404

U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). To meet the fair presentation requirement,

the petitioner must "alert the state courts to the fact that he

[is] asserting a claim under the United States Constitution.” 

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66). The petitioner must "provide the

state courts with a 'fair opportunity' to apply controlling legal

principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.” 

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citing Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. at 276-77). By giving state courts the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its

prisoners' federal rights,” comity is promoted, and disruption of

state judicial proceedings is prevented. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365

(quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 275); see also Rose, 455 U.S. at 518;

Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Constitutional claims raised in federal proceedings must be

presented to the state courts first. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.

27, 31-32 (2004). A petitioner must provide the highest state

court with a fair opportunity to consider the factual and legal

bases of his claims before presenting them to the federal court. 

Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Picard, 404 U.S. at 276; Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th

Cir. 1996)); see also Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365; Scott v. Schriro,

567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005,

1008 (9th Cir. 2008). A claim is not exhausted if it is pending

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before the state's highest court. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 515

("[A]s a matter of comity, federal courts should not consider a

claim in a habeas corpus petition until after the state courts

have had an opportunity to act . . . .”); Anderson v. Morrow, 371

F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004) ("AEDPA's exhaustion requirement

entitles a state to pass on a prisoner's federal claims before the

federal courts do so.”). "It follows, of course, that once the

federal claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” Picard, 404 U.S. at 275.

Courts may deny an application for habeas relief on the

merits even if the petitioner has not yet exhausted his state

judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2). But courts have no

authority to grant relief on unexhausted claims. Id. §

2254(b)(1)(A).

A. Whether the Petition is a Mixed Petition

Taylor argues that he submitted a mixed petition; therefore

Rhines, 544 U.S. 269, applies. (See Pet. Stay Abeyance 3, ECF No.

7.) He contends that he has satisfied the two-prong analysis set

forth in Rhines. (Id. at 1.) Petitioner alleges that the first

requirement, that the claim is not plainly meritless, is satisfied

because his appellate attorney failed to mention or provide the

transcript of the Marsden hearing to the appellate court, which

deprived the court of crucial facts. (Id. at 1-3.) Taylor avers

that the trial court had made substantial errors during the

Marsden hearing because it relitigated Petitioner's plea agreement

and acknowledged that Taylor needed "psychiatric treatment" or an

increase in his "mental control medications." (Id. at 3-4.) 

Taylor asserts that his appellate counsel's ineffective assistance

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satisfies the second Rhines prong requiring good cause for failing

to exhaust the unexhausted claim. (Id. at 4-5.) 

Petitioner alleges that after the Marsden hearing, he was

appointed an attorney to represent him and file a motion to

withdraw Taylor's guilty plea. (Id. at 4.) After the trial court

denied the motion, Taylor appealed the ruling and was appointed

appellate counsel. (Id.) Petitioner argues that his appointed

appellate counsel failed to mention the Marsden hearing, or

provide the transcript of the hearing, to the appellate court. 

(Id. at 4-5.) Taylor asserts this deprived him of his right to

effective assistance of appellate counsel and clarifies that, to

date, he has not raised this claim in state court. (Id.)

Respondent, however, argues that Rhines does not apply

because Petitioner did not submit a mixed petition; the claims in

the Petition have all been exhausted, and Taylor is attempting to

add entirely new claims. (Opp'n Pet'r's Mot. Stay Abeyance 6, ECF

No. 11.) The Respondent also maintains that Taylor cannot request

a stay under Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003),

overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143,

1149 (9th Cir. 2007), because Kelly requires that the Petitioner

delete unexhausted claims from the petition. (Id.) Respondent

argues that even under Kelly, there is no basis for a stay. (Id.)

A mixed petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted

claims. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510. In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.

269, the Supreme Court held that district courts have the

discretion to stay a mixed habeas petition and hold it in abeyance

to allow a petitioner to present unexhausted claims to state

courts. "Once the petitioner exhausts his state remedies, the

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district court will lift the stay and allow the petitioner to

proceed in federal court.” Id. at 275-76. 

In his pending Petition, Taylor argues that he is entitled to

relief because the trial court imposed a sentence greater than the

agreed-upon term in the plea agreement, in violation of due

process. (Pet. 13, ECF No. 1.) Further, he maintains that both

of his trial attorneys provided ineffective assistance, one in

communicating the plea bargain to Taylor and the other in moving

to withdraw Taylor's plea. (Id. at 13, 17-18.) The due process

and the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were raised

before, and rejected by, the California Supreme Court. (See

Lodgment 10, Petition for Review, People v. Taylor, No. S179938;

Lodgment 11, California Appellate Courts: Case Information,

[http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov (select "Supreme Court,"

search using the supreme court case number, then select Docket)].) 

 All the claims contained in Taylor's Petition are fully

exhausted, and the Petition is not mixed. See Rose, 455 U.S. at

510 (stating that mixed petitions contain both exhausted and

unexhausted claims). Rhines does not address Taylor's situation.

B. Whether a Stay is Otherwise Warranted

To date, the Ninth Circuit has only applied the Kelly

procedure to requests to stay mixed petitions. See King v. Ryan,

564 F.3d 1113, 1140 (9th Cir. 2009). In King, the Ninth Circuit

stated that courts have the discretion "to stay and hold in

abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, providing the

petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust

the deleted claims . . ." King, 564 F.3d at 1139. Recently,

however, district courts have applied the Kelly procedure to

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requests to stay fully exhausted petitions, even when the petition

was never a mixed petition. See Sims v. Calipatria State Prison,

No. CV 10-715-DSF (AGR), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69931, at *4-5

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2012) (finding Kelly procedure is the

appropriate standard to stay a fully exhausted petition while a

petitioner attempts to exhaust additional claims); Hughes v.

Walker, No. 2:10-cv-3024 WBS TJB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11844 *12-

13 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2012) (finding Kelly is the "relevant

procedure" when a petitioner seeks to stay original claims in a

fully exhausted petition, while he seeks to exhaust new claims);

Conriquez v. Uribe, No. 1:09-cv-01003-SKO-HC, 2012 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 607, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012) (applying Kelly); Knox

v. Martel, No. CIV S-08-0494-MCE-CMK-P, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

30967, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010) (citing Jackson v. Roe, 425

F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005)). Therefore, Taylor can request a

stay under Kelly while he attempts to exhaust his new claim for

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

In Jackson, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the three-step

procedure outlined in Kelly. Jackson, 425 F.3d at 659.

The procedure include[s] (1) allowing a petitioner to

amend his petition to remove the unexhausted claims --

as Rose indicated; (2) staying and holding in abeyance

the amended, fully exhausted petition to allow a

petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to

exhaust the deleted claims; and (3) permitting the

petitioner after completing exhaustion to amend his

petition once more to reinsert the newly exhausted

claims back into the original petition.

Id. at 658-59 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has

determined that the Kelly procedure does not undermine AEDPA

because a petitioner may amend his petition only if the claims are

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still timely or relate back to the original pleading. See King,

564 F.3d at 1140-41. 

A Kelly stay is appropriate when an outright dismissal will

make it difficult for the petitioner to return to district court

within AEDPA's one-year statute of limitation period. Sims, 2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69931, at *3-5 (discussing the applicability of

the Kelly procedure to requests to stay a fully exhausted petition

to raise and exhaust new claims). "A petitioner seeking to use

the Kelly procedure will be able to amend his unexhausted claims

back into his federal petition once he has exhausted them only if

those claims are determined to be timely. And demonstrating

timeliness will often be problematic under the now-applicable

legal principles." King, 564 F.3d at 1140-41. Therefore, Taylor

will only be entitled to a stay of his fully exhausted Petition if

his new ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is not

otherwise time barred by AEDPA.

1. Statute of limitations

Respondent argues that the claim Taylor is seeking to exhaust

is untimely. (Opp'n Pet'r's Mot. Stay Abeyance. 6, ECF No. 11.) 

Gonzalez asserts that AEDPA's statute of limitations expired on

July 13, 2011, because the one-year statute of limitations began

on July 13, 2010 - ninety days after the April 14, 2010 California

Supreme Court decision. (Id.) Petitioner filed his Motion on

October 31, 2011, 111 days past the deadline of July 13, 2011. 

(Id.) Respondent also claims that filing a habeas claim in

federal court does not toll AEDPA's statute of limitations. (Id.) 

Gonzalez notes that Petitioner has not returned to state court to

attempt to exhaust his claim. (Id.)

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Taylor does not address the statute of limitations in his

Motion, and he did not file a reply to Respondent's Opposition. 

(See Pet. Stay Abeyance 1-4, ECF No. 7.) 

As discussed previously, a petitioner seeking to use the

Kelly procedure and amend his petition must demonstrate that the

unexhausted claims are timely. King, 564 F.3d at 1140-41. 

Taylor's Petition is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 because it was filed after April

24, 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2012); Woodford v. Garceau,

538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,

326 (1997)). All federal habeas petitions are subject to AEDPA's

one-year statute of limitations. As amended, § 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1). 

On December 29, 2010, the California Court of Appeal issued

its opinion addressing Taylor's consolidated appeal from the

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judgment of conviction and petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Taylor, No. D054023, slip op. at 1.) 

The court affirmed the superior court judgment and denied the

petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at 18.) Taylor filed a

petition for review, which the California Supreme Court denied on

April 14, 2010. (See Lodgment 11, California Appellate Courts: 

Case Information, [http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov (select

"Supreme Court," search using the supreme court case number, then

select Docket)].) Taylor did not petition for a writ of

certiorari with the United Stated Supreme Court. 

United States Supreme Court Rule 13 provides that a petition

for certiorari must be filed within ninety days of the entry of an

order denying discretionary review by the state supreme court. 

See S. Ct. R. 13. When a habeas petitioner seeks discretionary

review by the state's highest court but does not file a petition

with the United States Supreme Court, the judgment becomes final

when the prisoner's time to petition the Supreme Court expires. 

Gonzalez v. Thaler, __ U.S. __, __, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012).

Taylor's judgment became final for the purposes of AEDPA on

July 13, 2010, ninety days after the California Supreme Court

denied his petition for review. See id.; see also S. Ct. R. 13. 

Pursuant to § 2244(d), the statute of limitations for federal

habeas corpus began to run on April 15, 2010, the day after the

judgment became final. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see Corjasso

v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the

one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA begins to run the day

after the conviction becomes final). The statute of limitations

period would therefore have expired on July 13, 2011. See

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Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)) ("In computing any amount of time

prescribed or allowed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of

the act, event, or default from which the designated period of

time runs shall not be included.”) Taylor filed his Motion for

Stay and Abeyance over three months later, on October 31, 2011

[ECF No. 7], seeking to stay the Petition so he can raise his new

claim in state court.

A federal petition for writ of habeas corpus may be dismissed

with prejudice when it was not filed within the AEDPA's one-year

statute of limitations. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 483 (9th

Cir. 2001). The statute of limitations is a threshold issue that

must be resolved before the merits of individual claims. White v.

Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, an

otherwise late petition may be timely if Taylor can show he is

entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, or that an amended

petition that includes a newly exhausted ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim will relate back to his original claims

for habeas relief.

a. Statutory tolling

Respondent contends that Taylor is not entitled to tolling

because the time in federal court does not toll AEDPA's statutory

clock. (Opp'n Pet'r's Mot. Stay Abeyance 6, ECF No. 11.) 

Therefore, Gonzalez claims that Petitioner's new ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim is time barred because

AEDPA's statute of limitations expired on "July 13, 2011." (Id.) 

Respondent maintains that this issue should have been raised on

direct appeal. (Id. at 6-7.)

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The statute of limitations under AEDPA is tolled during

periods in which a "properly filed” habeas corpus petition is

"pending” in the state court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2). The

statute specifically provides, "The time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.” Id.; see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410

(2005). "[A]n application is 'properly filed' when its delivery

and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and

rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000)

(explaining that typical filing requirements include all relevant

time limits). 

The interval between the disposition of one state petition

and the filing of another may be tolled under "interval tolling.” 

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). "[T]he AEDPA statute

of limitations is tolled for 'all of the time during which a state

prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a

particular post-conviction application.'” Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. Lamaster, 167

F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Carey, 536 U.S. at

219-22. The statute of limitations is tolled from the time the

first state habeas petition is filed until state collateral review

is concluded, but it is not tolled before the first state

collateral challenge is filed. Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643,

646 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006). 

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Here, Taylor has not filed his new ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim in state court. (See Pet. Stay Abeyance

3, ECF No. 7.) This claim is not statutorily tolled while his

Petition asserting entirely different, exhausted causes of action

is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 182

(2001) (stating that AEDPA's statute of limitations is not tolled

"during the pendency of [a] . . . federal habeas petition."). 

Therefore, Taylor should not be allowed to avail himself to

statutory tolling while he exhausts his additional state claim

because Petitioner did not file his claim in state court; AEDPA's

statute of limitations was not tolled before it expired. See

Pace, 544 U.S. at 410 (holding that untimely state post-conviction

petition is not "properly filed" within the meaning of §

2244(d)(2)).

b. Equitable tolling

Neither the Petitioner nor the Respondent address whether

equitable tolling applies. Equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations is appropriate when the petitioner can show "(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida,

__ U.S. __, __, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010); Pace, 544 U.S. at

418; see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 335 (2007); Rouse

v. U.S. Dep't of State, 548 F.3d 871, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2008). The

petitioner bears the burden of establishing the elements. Roberts

v. Mashall, 627 F.3d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 2010). A petitioner is

entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA's one-year statute of

limitations where "'extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner's control made it impossible'” to file a timely petition. 

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Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)).

"'[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the

rule.'” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.

2000). The failure to file a timely petition must be the result

of external forces, not the result of the petitioner's lack of

diligence. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

"Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted is a

'fact-specific inquiry.'" Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (quoting Frye

v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)). If a petitioner

makes a "good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to

equitable tolling[,]" then the petitioner should receive an

evidentiary hearing. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir.

2006).

Taylor does not allege that he is entitled to equitable

tolling. (See Pet. Stay Abeyance 1-4, ECF No. 7.) He also has

not diligently pursued the ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel claim, which arose during direct appeal and prior to

filing his federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See

Holland, __ U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2554; (see also Lodgment No.

2, Appellant's Opening Brief, People v. Taylor, No. D054023;

Lodgment No. 5, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, People v.

Taylor, No. D054023; Lodgment No. 10, Petition for Review, People

v. Taylor, No. S179938.)

Taylor also has not filed the claim in state court, even

though eleven months have elapsed since AEDPA's one-year statute

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of limitations expired on July 13, 2011. See Waldron-Ramsey v.

Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding a prisoner

who filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus eleven months late

did not diligently pursue his claim). Although Petitioner would

not be expected to question his attorney's actions while he was

represented, Taylor failed to consider the issue after the

California Supreme Court denied his petition for review and prior

to filing his federal habeas Petition. See Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d

1001, 1012-15 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing what is reasonable

diligence when faced with attorney misconduct and when a

petitioner should seek new counsel). Taylor has not demonstrated

that he was reasonably diligent in pursuing his new ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at

2554.

Additionally, mental incompetence can be an "extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner's control." Roberts, 627 F.3d at

772 (quoting Bryant v. Ariz. Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061

(9th Cir. 2007)). Taylor, however, has not alleged that he

suffers from a mental illness that would constitute an

"extraordinary circumstance." See id. He merely asserts that he

"is now as he were [sic] then . . . mentally challenged." (Pet.

Stay Abeyance 2, ECF No. 7.) To show that mental incompetence is

an "extraordinary circumstance," a petitioner must provide some

evidence of the mental illness's severity. See Laws v. Lamarque,

351 F.3d 919, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding unrebutted

allegations in a verified complaint were insufficient to warrant

equitable tolling based on mental incompetence). The lodgments

indicate that Petitioner was taking Seroquel and Remeron for

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stress and anxiety, but the record is void of any indication of an

extraordinary circumstance that prevented Taylor from timely

filing his additional claim. (See Lodgment 1, Clerk's Tr., 36;

see also Lodgment 12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 5, 42-43.) 

Therefore, he failed to show that either his mental state or his

medication presented an extraordinary circumstance that prevented

him from timely filing his new claim in state court. See Roberts,

627 F.3d at 722.

2. Relation back

Gonzalez contends that Taylor's untimely claim does not

"relate back to the original claims in the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus because the new claim does not arise out of the same

common core of operative facts. (Opp'n Pet'r's Mot. Stay Abeyance

6, ECF No. 11.) A claim, Respondent alleges, does not relate back

merely because it arises from the same trial. (Id.) Gonzalez

also maintains that if the amendment is futile, a stay is

inappropriate. (Id.)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to federal habeas

cases through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(4), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2242, and Habeas Corpus Rule 12. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West

2006); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 12, 28 U.S.C. foll. §

2254; Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4). "Amendments made after the

statute of limitations has run relate back to the date of the

original pleading if the original and amended pleadings 'ar[i]se

out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence." Mayle v. Felix,

545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2)). The

applicable test is whether the claim "arises out of a common 'core

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of operative facts' uniting the original and newly asserted

claims." Id. at 659 (citations omitted).

A claim does not arise out of a common core of operative

facts when the claim is "'supported by facts that differ in both

time and type from those the original pleading set forth.'" 

Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing

Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650). "If the newly exhausted claim is not

timely under AEDPA or the relation-back doctrine does not apply,

it may not be added to the existing petition and a stay is

inappropriate." Garcia v. Evans, No. 1:08-cv-1819-AWI (DLB), 2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3620, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2012).

Taylor's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

does not relate back to either his due process allegation or his

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. See Preston v.

Harris, 216 F. App'x 677, 678 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing how

petitioner's new Boykin claim did not relate back because the

errors "involve[d] different actors at different times"). 

Petitioner's current claim is that both his trial attorneys were

ineffective. Taylor asserts that the first trial counsel, Tom

Carnessale, failed to properly inform him of the potential

consequences of the plea deal. (See Pet. 13, 16-17, ECF No. 1.) 

The second trial counsel, Daniel Cohen, failed to object that the

twenty-four-year sentence exceeded the plea bargain and failed to

renew Taylor's motion to withdraw his plea. (See Lodgment No. 10,

Petition for Review at 29, People v. Taylor, No. [S179938].)

The ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims differ

both in time and facts from the ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim. See Schneider, 674 F.3d at 1151

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(rejecting the motion that appellate counsel's failure to raise an

issue on direct appeal "supports the relation back of any and

every claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that

petitioner thereafter may decide to raise[]"). Carnessale

allegedly failed to inform Petitioner of the consequences of his

plea deal. (See Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 5, 55-

57.) DuNah, Taylor's appellate counsel, allegedly failed to

provide the court of appeal with a proper record and did not argue

any error relating to the Marsden hearing. (See generally

Lodgment No. 2, Appellant's Opening Brief at i, People v. Taylor,

No. D054023; Lodgment No. 5, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at

i-v, People v. Taylor, No. D054023.) Trial counsel's failure to

inform Taylor of a plea bargain's potential consequences is

insufficiently related to appellate counsel's failure to raise one

or more particular claims on appeal. See Schneider, 674 F.3d at

1151. United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337-38 (3d Cir.

1999) (holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

in failure to suppress evidence did not relate back to a claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to argue

insufficiency of evidence on appeal).

Carnessale's alleged error occurred on May 1, 2008, during

the change of plea hearing, while DuNah's alleged error did not

occur until Petitioner's appeal on July 7, 2009 - two entirely

different proceedings. (See Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr.

vol. 5, 36-37, 62; Lodgment No. 2, Appellant's Opening Brief at i,

People v. Taylor, No. D054023.) While Carnessale's alleged

conduct gave rise to a motion for substitution of counsel pursuant

to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d

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44, the hearing is unrelated to whether DuNah provided a proper

record to the appellate court and raised potential arguments. See

Schneider, 674 F.3d at 1150. The ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claim against Carnessale and the ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim against DuNah do not arise out of the same

"common core of operative facts." Mayle, 545 U.S. at 659. 

Next, attorney Cohen's alleged failure to object to the

sentence the trial court imposed also differs in time and facts

from Dunah's alleged errors on appeal. See Schneider, 674 F.3d at

1150. Cohen's alleged errors occurred on September 29, 2008,

during the hearing on Taylor's motion to withdraw his guilty plea

and his subsequent sentencing, while Dunah's alleged errors

occurred on July 7, 2009, on appeal - again, two different

proceedings. (See Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 5, 81-

82, 85-90; Lodgment No. 2, Appellant's Opening Brief, People v.

Taylor, No. D054023.) Cohen's involvement is after the Marsden

hearing and unrelated to appellate counsel's failure to address

the Marsden hearing on appeal, which is the gravamen of Taylor's

complaint that DuNah provided ineffective assistance. See Duffus,

174 F.3d at 337-38 (affirming denial of motion to amend his habeas

petition to raise an additional ineffective assistance of counsel

claim that was "completely new"). The new ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel claim is unrelated to the current ineffective

assistance of trial counsel causes of action; the claims do not

arise from the same "common core of operative facts." See

Preston, 216 F. App'x at 678. 

Petitioner's pending claim that his due process rights were

violated when the trial court imposed an increased prison term

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differs from Taylor's new ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel accusation. See United States v. Ciampi, 419 F.3d 20, 24

(1st Cir. 2005) (holding ineffective assistance of counsel claim

based on counsel's failure to explain plea consequences did not

relate back to claim alleging due process violation based on trial

court's failure to advise defendant of same consequences).

Whether the trial court was obligated to impose the prison

term Taylor believed he had agreed to in the plea bargain and

whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to provide

an adequate record for the appellate court are inquiries that are

unrelated as to both time and facts. See Schneider, 674 F.3d at

1150. Furthermore, Taylor's proposed new claim is refuted by the

record, which shows that two Marsden transcripts were part of the

record on appeal and were filed with the court of appeal on

December 23, 2008. (See Lodgment No. 9, California Appellate

Courts: Case Information, [http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov

(select "Appellate District, Fourth Appellate District Div. 1,"

search using the court of appeal case number, then click

Docket)].)

Although it is not a pending or proposed ground for habeas

relief, Petitioner states that the Marsden and sentencing hearings

show that the trial court recognized that he needed psychiatric

treatment and an increase in medication. (See Pet. Stay Abeyance

3-4, ECF No. 7.) Yet, the trial court and the court of appeal

were aware of Taylor's assertion that at the time of his guilty

plea, "he was taking an incorrect dosage of his medications

. . . ." (See Lodgment No. 7, People v. Taylor, D054023, slip op.

at 5.) Taylor has not presented the California Supreme Court with

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a claim that his guilty plea violates due process because of the

effects of his medication. (See Lodgment No. 10, Petition for

Review at 17, People v. Taylor, [No. S179938].) Taylor has failed

to demonstrate that the pending due process and new ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claims arise from a common core of

operative facts. See Schneider, 674 F.3d at 1150.

Petitioner's proposed ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel claim does not relate back to any of the claims currently

in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See Mayle, 545 U.S. at

659. Taylor's proposed new claim is time barred and does not

relate back to the grounds in the original Petition. See King,

564 F.3d at 1140-41.

III. CONCLUSION

Taylor's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is not a mixed

petition, and Rhines does not address whether he is entitled to

stay his fully exhausted Petition while he exhausts his new

claims. Additionally, AEDPA's statute of limitations has expired,

and Taylor has not sufficiently alleged that he is entitled to

statutory or equitable tolling, or that the relation back doctrine

applies to his new claim. As a result, he is not entitled to a

stay under Kelly. Therefore, the Motion, which he titled,

"Petition for Stay and Abeyance," [ECF No. 7] should be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to United

States District Court Judge William Q. Hayes, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before July 20, 2012. The document should be captioned,

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the

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objections shall be served and filed on or before August 3, 2012. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: June 28, 2012 ____________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Hayes

 All parties of record

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