Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_19-cv-01427/USCOURTS-alnd-2_19-cv-01427-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

F.R. as parent and next friend of B.C., a 

minor.,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. WALTER B. GONSOULIN, JR.,

in his official capacity and as 

representative of Jefferson County 

Board of Education, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:19-cv-1427-LCB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On August 29, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that her son 

B.C., a 17-year-old high school student, had been denied enrollment at McAdory 

High School in Jefferson County, Alabama, in violation of the McKinney-Vento 

Homeless Assistance Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 11431-11435. Later that day, 

this Court conducted a telephone conference in which defense counsel stated that 

the Jefferson County Board of Education (“the Board”) had agreed to enroll B.C. at 

McAdory High School pending the outcome of this case. The Court thereafter 

entered an expedited scheduling order providing for an abbreviated discovery 

period.1

 

 1 On December 27, 2019, the Court entered an amended scheduling order extending the 

discovery period. (Doc. 43).

FILED

 2020 Jan-14 AM 11:20

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:19-cv-01427-LCB Document 48 Filed 01/14/20 Page 1 of 11
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On October 17, 2019, the Board filed a stipulation and motion to dismiss.2 

(Doc. 16). While declining to admit that it had violated the Act or any other 

provision of law, the Board, “in the interest of minimizing disruption to minor 

Plaintiff B.C.’s educational program, terminating counterproductive litigation, and 

conserving educational and judicial resources,” stipulated to the following course 

of action:

1. Minor Plaintiff B.C. (whose enrollment is the subject of the 

pending civil action) shall be permitted to complete the 2019-20 

school year at McAdory High School and to graduate therefrom 

subject to his continuing compliance with rules, regulations, and 

requirements that apply to all McAdory High School students.

2. B.C. shall continue to be provided transportation from his current

residence to and from McAdory High School in accordance with 

transportation arrangements already in effect.

3. If deemed appropriate, the Board consents to the Court retaining 

jurisdiction over this matter through the end of the 2019-20 school 

year in order to address any unforeseen circumstances or 

developments that could affect implementation of the foregoing 

commitment or, in the alternative, to a dismissal of the action 

without prejudice.

(Doc. 16, p. 1-2). In a footnote that was omitted from the above quotation, the 

Board stated that it “further agrees to provide reasonable advance notice to 

Plaintiff should [any unforeseen circumstances or developments] arise.” Id. at p. 2. 

Thus, it appears to the Court that the Plaintiff has obtained the relief she sought, 

 2 The Board amended its stipulation and motion to dismiss on October 18, 2019, to request that all pretrial deadlines 

be suspended. (Doc. 17).

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i.e., her son’s admission and continued enrollment at McAdory. Based on that 

stipulation, the Board asserted that the controversy was moot and moved to dismiss 

the case. 

In her response, the Plaintiff argued that the stipulation did not render the 

case moot because, she said, the stipulation did not provide all of the requested 

relief and “was at best an offer to settle.” (Doc. 19, p. 2). The Plaintiff further 

asserted that the Board’s decision to allow B.C. to enroll at McAdory and proceed 

towards graduation was, at this point, “in bad faith” and represented “nothing more 

than another attempt by the Defendant to ‘pull the wool over the Court’s eyes’ and 

designed to avoid the issuance of a final judgment for the Plaintiff on the merits, a 

determination that the Plaintiff is the prevailing party, and paying Plaintiff’s 

attorneys’ fees.” Id. Thus, despite the Board’s decision to give the Plaintiff the 

exact relief she sought in her complaint, Plaintiff’s counsel seeks to maintain this 

litigation, up to and including a bench trial on the merits, in order to establish 

“prevailing party” status that would entitle him to an award of attorneys’ fees 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1988. 

Discussion

The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar scenario in DeFunis v. 

Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). In DeFunis, the petitioner was denied admission 

to the University of Washington Law School and subsequently filed a lawsuit 

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claiming that the school discriminated against him in violation of the Equal 

Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The petitioner prevailed at 

trial, and the trial court ordered that he be admitted to the law school. By the time

the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the petitioner had completed 

most of his studies and had just registered for his final quarter in law school. Id. at 

315. The Court noted that “[c]ounsel for the respondents have made clear that the 

Law School will not in any way seek to abrogate this registration.” The Court 

clarified that “all parties agree that DeFunis is now entitled to complete his legal 

studies at the University of Washington and to receive his degree from that 

institution. A determination by this Court of the legal issues tendered by the 

parties is no longer necessary to compel that result, and could not serve to prevent 

it.” Id. at 317. 

The Court then stated: “In light of DeFunis' recent registration for the last 

quarter of his final law school year, and the Law School's assurance that his 

registration is fully effective, the insistent question again arises whether this case is 

not moot, and to that question we now turn.” In discussing the issue of mootness, 

the Supreme Court held:

The starting point for analysis is the familiar proposition that 

‘federal courts are without power to decide questions that 

cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.’ 

North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404, 

30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971). The inability of the federal judiciary ‘to 

review moot cases derives from the requirement of Art. III of 

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the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power 

depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.’ Liner v. 

Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n. 3, 84 S.Ct. 391, 394, 11 

L.Ed.2d 347 (1964); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 

486, 496 n. 7, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1950, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); 

Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 50 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1896, 

20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). Although as a matter of Washington 

state law it appears that this case would be saved from 

mootness by ‘the great public interest in the continuing issues 

raised by this appeal,’ 82 Wash.2d 11, 23 n. 6, 507 P.2d 1169, 

1177 n. 6 (1973), the fact remains that under Art. III ‘(e)ven in 

cases arising in the state courts, the question of mootness is a 

federal one which a federal court must resolve before it assumes 

jurisdiction.’ North Carolina v. Rice, supra, 404 U.S., at 246, 

92 S.Ct., at 404.

Id. at 316. The Supreme Court noted that DeFunis did not file his suit as a class 

action, and the only remedy he sought was an injunction commanding his 

admission to the Law School. Because DeFunis was irrevocably admitted to the 

Law School, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he controversy between the parties 

has thus clearly ceased to be ‘definite and concrete’ and no longer ‘touch(es) the 

legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” Id. at 317 (internal 

citations omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the case was moot 

and dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court went further in its analysis and determined that neither 

of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine existed in the case, i.e., that the 

defendants voluntarily ceased the allegedly illegal conduct but could resume it at 

any point in the future, and that the alleged wrong was “capable of repetition, yet 

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evading review.” Id. 

The Supreme Court held that the “voluntary cessation” exception was 

inapplicable in that case because “mootness in the present case depends not at all 

upon a ‘voluntary cessation’ of the admissions practices that were the subject of 

this litigation. It depends, instead, upon the simple fact that DeFunis is now in the 

final quarter of the final year of his course of study, and the settled and 

unchallenged policy of the Law School to permit him to complete the term for 

which he is now enrolled.” In the present case, the Board has similarly committed 

to allowing B.C. to continue his enrollment at McAdory and graduate with his 

cohort. 

The Plaintiff is wary of the Board’s footnote in which it stated that it 

“further agrees to provide reasonable advance notice to Plaintiff should [any 

unforeseen circumstances or developments] arise.” According to the Plaintiff, this 

provision would allow the Board to terminate B.C.’s enrollment based on 

subjective factors in its sole discretion. However, that argument is not well taken. 

On the contrary, the footnote in question simply strengthens the Board’s 

commitment to keep B.C. enrolled at McAdory by providing that it will give the 

Plaintiff – and, by extension, Plaintiff’s counsel – advance notice should 

unforeseen circumstances arise thereby giving him an opportunity to preemptively 

challenge any such conduct and bring it to the Court’s attention. The Court notes 

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that, should such circumstances arise, the Plaintiff could bring this to the Court’s 

attention. Nevertheless, the Court is not convinced that this provision gives the 

Plaintiff a reasonable expectation that he will be subjected to the same action 

again. 

The Supreme Court also found that the issue in DeFunis was not “capable of 

repetition, yet evading review” because “DeFunis will never again be required to 

run the gantlet of the Law School's admission process....” Id. at 319. The Court 

concluded that “[b]ecause the petitioner will complete his law school studies at the 

end of the term for which he has now registered regardless of any decision this 

Court might reach on the merits of this litigation, we conclude that the Court 

cannot, consistently with the limitations of Art. III of the Constitution, consider the 

substantive constitutional issues tendered by the parties.” Similarly, B.C. is on 

track to graduate from McAdory in the spring of 2020. Once he graduates, he will 

never again be faced with the process of enrolling in a public high school.3

 Thus, 

it is highly improbable that the Board’s action, i.e., denying enrollment to B.C., is 

capable of repetition. This Court finds the facts of the present case to be nearly 

identical to those in DeFunis.

 3 In a footnote, the majority addressed the dissent’s concern that unpredictable events such as 

illness or even academic failure might prevent DeFunis from graduating at the end of the term. 

However, the Court held that “such speculative contingencies afford no basis for our passing on 

the substantive issues (the petitioner) would have us decide in the absence of evidence that this is 

a prospect of immediacy and reality.” DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 320 n. 5 (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). The parties have not identified any such contingencies in this case.

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Of course, there was no discussion in DeFunis of the issue of attorneys’ fees. 

However, the Supreme Court has addressed this situation as well. In Lewis v. 

Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990), the underlying controversy had been 

rendered moot by a change in the law while the litigation was in progress. The 

Supreme Court stated: 

An order vacating the judgment on grounds of mootness would 

deprive Continental of its claim for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 

1988 (assuming, arguendo, it would have such a claim), because such 

fees are available only to a party that “prevails” by winning the relief 

it seeks, see Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 

L.Ed.2d 1 (1988); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 

L.Ed.2d 654 (1987). This interest in attorney's fees is, of course, 

insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none 

exists on the merits of the underlying claim, see Diamond v. Charles, 

476 U.S. 54, 70–71, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 1707–08, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986).

Where on the face of the record it appears that the only concrete 

interest in the controversy has terminated, reasonable caution is 

needed to be sure that mooted litigation is not pressed forward, and 

unnecessary judicial pronouncements on even constitutional issues 

obtained, solely in order to obtain reimbursement of sunk costs.

494 U.S. at 480 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. at 

70-71, the Supreme Court held:

It is true that, were the Court to resolve the case on the merits against 

appellees, appellees would no longer be “prevailing parties” entitled 

to an award of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. But the mere fact that 

continued adjudication would provide a remedy for an injury that is 

only a byproduct of the suit itself does not mean that the injury is 

cognizable under Art. III.

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This Court recognizes that B.C. would likely not be enrolled at McAdory 

today were it not for the actions of Plaintiff’s counsel in filing the present lawsuit.4

 

However, the Supreme Court has rejected an entitlement to attorney’s fees under 

the “‘catalyst theory,’ which posits that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it 

achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in 

the defendant's conduct.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep't 

of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001). The Supreme Court 

thouroughly discussed the merits of such a theory and explained their reasoning for 

rejecting it. Id. at 608-610. However, the Court held that “‘[a] request for 

attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation[.]’” Id. at 609 quoting 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). 

Conclusion

Even assuming, arguendo, that the Board violated the McKinney-Vento Act 

when it initially denied enrollment to B.C., that violation is not ongoing and has 

been remedied by the Board’s actions and its continuing commitment to allow B.C. 

to continue his studies at McAdory. The Plaintiff obtained the relief she sought, 

and there is no longer a controversy between the parties. The trial of this matter 

would be a waste of judicial resources because, as noted, the outcome will not 

 4 As noted above, the Board denies that it violated the McKinney-Vento Act or any other 

provision of law and has maintained that it chose to admit B.C. only to avoid disrupting his 

education and preventing lengthy and expensive litigation.

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change anything with respect to the relationship between B.C. and the Board. 

Accordingly, this Court finds that the Board’s decision to allow B.C. to enroll and 

complete his final year of school at McAdory renders this case moot. Therefore, 

the Court no longer has jurisdiction over this matter, and the case must be 

dismissed. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1988.

For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) is due to 

be GRANTED and this case DISMISSED. As noted, the Board agreed to a 

dismissal of this action without prejudice subject to refiling should the Board fail 

to uphold its commitment regarding B.C.’s enrollment as described above. 

Accordingly, this action is due to be dismissed without prejudice.

Based on the foregoing, the Board’s amended stipulation and motion to 

dismiss (Doc. 17), is MOOT. Similarly, the Board’s motion for a protective order 

(Doc. 21) is MOOT. The Plaintiff also filed a motion for a declaratory judgment 

(Doc. 25) in which she sought a declaration that the Board violated the Act, along 

with other injunctive relief and an award of attorney’s fees. That motion is due to 

be DENIED. 

The Court notes that it is making no determination as to whether an award of

attorney’s fees would be appropriate in the present case. Similarly, the Court is not 

making a determination that a private right of action exists given the facts alleged 

Case 2:19-cv-01427-LCB Document 48 Filed 01/14/20 Page 10 of 11
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in the present case, or that the Plaintiff adequately plead facts that would entitle her 

to relief. Rather, as explained above, this Court has determined only that it lacks 

jurisdiction over the matter given the Board’s decision and continuing commitment 

to allow B.C. to enroll at the school and complete his studies. A separate order 

will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED January 14, 2020.

 _________________________________

 LILES C. BURKE

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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