Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02888/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02888-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ALVARADO, 

Petitioner,

v.

California Department of Corrections,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-2888 JSW (PR)

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, 

REQUIRING ELECTION BY

PETITIONER ON MIXED PETITION

AND INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERK

INTRODUCTION

Jose Alvarado, California prisoner, filed this action for a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner has paid the filing fee. This matter comes before the Court on

initial review of the petition, but the Court is unable to issue an order to show cause because

of a threshold problem: Petitioner has stated in the petition that one of the claims therein was

not presented to the California Supreme Court for its consideration. In other words, state

judicial remedies as to that claim has not been exhausted. The Court now requires Petitioner

to make an election as to how he wants to resolve the problem of his unexhausted claims in

this Court.

Moreover, Petitioner has named as respondent the California Department of

Correction and the California Attorney General. The proper respondent in a federal habeas

corpus petition is the petitioner's immediate custodian. Brittingham v. United States, 982

F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992). A custodian "'is the person having a day-to-day control over

the prisoner. That person is the only one who can produce 'the body' of the petitioner.'" Id.

(quoting Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). “This person typically is the

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Because Petitioner may face collateral consequences as a result of the conviction, the petition

is not rendered moot by Petitioner’s release. See Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997),

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1129 (1998). 

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warden of the facility in which the petitioner is incarcerated.” Stanley v. California Supreme

Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). Failure to name Petitioner's custodian as a

Respondent deprives federal courts of personal jurisdiction. Id. However, a petitioner

ordinarily should be given leave to amend his petition to name the correct party as

respondent. See id. Petitioner is granted leave to amend to name the proper respondent in

this matter. For this and the below reasons, the petition will be dismissed with leave to

amend.

BACKGROUND

According to the petition, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Santa Clara County

Superior Court and ultimately sentenced to a term of one year in state prison. According to

the petition, Petitioner has been released and remains on parole.1

 Petitioner appealed his

conviction to the California Court of Appeal which affirmed the conviction and the Supreme

Court of California denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Petitioner filed the instant

petition on April 27, 2006. In his petition, Petitioner notifies the Court that one of the six

claims raised has not been presented to the California Supreme Court. Therefore, as

Petitioner now has a mixed petition (containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims)

pending before this Court, the petition must be dismissed and Petitioner must notify the

Court of how he would like to proceed.

DISCUSSION

The exhaustion requirement requires that prisoners in state custody who wish to

challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings either the fact or length of their

confinement first exhaust state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral

proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on

the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b),(c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1,

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3 (1981). The exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine reflects a policy of federal-state comity

to give the state "'the initial "opportunity to pass upon and correct" alleged violations of its

prisoners' federal rights.'" Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (citations omitted). A

federal district court must dismiss a habeas petition containing any claim as to which state

remedies have not been exhausted. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 522. However, the

dismissal must be with leave to amend to delete the unexhausted claims; if they are deleted,

the court can then consider those which remain. See Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574

(9th Cir. 2000). Also, in some circumstances, the court has the power to grant a stay of the

federal proceeding while petitioner goes back to state court to exhaust additional claims. 

Rhines v. Webber, 125 S. Ct. 1528, 1535 (2005). 

The evidence before the Court indicates that Petitioner did not exhaust his state court

remedies as to one of his claims now pending before this Court. Based on Petitioner’s

assertion that his federal petition contains both exhausted claims and an unexhausted claim, 

the Court finds that it is a mixed petition. Petitioner cannot go forward in federal court with

a mixed petition. See id.; Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Due to a critical one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas

petitions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the Court is reluctant to dismiss a mixed petition (and

possibly cause a later-filed petition to be time-barred) without giving Petitioner the

opportunity to elect whether to proceed with just his exhausted claims, or to try to exhaust

the unexhausted claims before having this Court consider the petition. Accordingly, before

this action will be dismissed, Petitioner will be given an opportunity to choose whether he

wants to: 

(1) dismiss the unexhausted claims and go forward in this action with only the

exhausted claims, or 

(2) terminate this action and complete the exhaustion of his state court claims

before filing a new federal petition presenting all of his claims.

This case will be dismissed with leave to make a choice among the two listed above,

that is, whether to amend to delete the unexhausted claim or to voluntarily dismiss the entire

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petition. If Petitioner does not amend, the case will be dismissed without prejudice. If the

case is dismissed for failure to amend, or if Petitioner voluntarily dismisses the petition, he

should note that any new federal petition he might attempt to file thereafter would probably

be barred by the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner is warned that if he chooses option (1), to delete the unexhausted issue and

proceed now with the five claims which are exhausted, a subsequent petition directed to the

same conviction (for instance, attempting to raise the now-unexhausted claim) may be barred

as second or successive or abusive. See 28 U.S.C. § 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1); Lundy, 455 U.S.

at 521. He also would have to obtain permission from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in

order to file such a second petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 

If he chooses option (2), to dismiss this case and return later with a completely

exhausted petition, that petition will likely be barred by the one-year statute of limitations

contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during which a properly filed application for

collateral review (such as a state habeas petition) is pending is excluded from the one-year

time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2). Depending on when direct review was completed; possible

application of another starting date for the statute of limitations; when any applications for

collateral review, such as state habeas petitions, were filed; and when a new federal petition

is filed, a new petition might be barred. The time a federal petition, such as this one, is

pending is not excluded from the one-year limit. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2129

(2001). It appears that the statute of limitations may have already expired here. Petitioner

should exercise caution in exercising this option.

 In some circumstances, a third alternative involving the issuance of a stay of the

federal proceedings while a petitioner exhausts additional claims in state court may be

available. Rhines, 125 S. Ct. at 1535. The Supreme Court has recently specified the

circumstances under which a petitioner may be granted a stay of the federal petition in order

to exhaust additional claims in the state courts. In Rhines, the Supreme Court noted that

before the district court may grant a stay for that purpose, the district court must first

determine that Petitioner has (1) shown good cause for his failure to exhaust these issues

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earlier; and (2) shown that the issues are “potentially meritorious.” Rhines, 125 S. Ct. at

1535. In this case, no such stay of the federal proceeding is available to Petitioner. In the

petition, Petitioner has stated that his reason for failing to exhaust his additional claim was

“because I failed to mention this to my Appellate attorney and my trial counsel did not

pursue this issue further.” Petition at 6. While this Court finds that Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim may be “potentially meritorious” as required under Rhines,

Petitioner has not shown good cause for his failure to exhaust, as Petitioner’s statement

reflects that he knew of this claim as recently as when his trial counsel failed to take action at

trial. Failing to mention a claim to one’s appellate attorney and not taking any further action

with regard to the claim until it is filed in federal court years later does not constitute good

cause for the delay. As such, no such option is available to Petitioner here.

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court now dismisses the petition with leave to amend to

either delete the unexhausted claim or to dismiss the petition in its entirety and to name the

proper Respondent. Petitioner must respond to this Court’s order no later than thirty days

from the date of this order. If Petitioner fails to timely comply with this order, this action

will be dismissed without further leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:October 16, 2006 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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