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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-14041

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:12-cv-00457-RH-CAS

MATTHEW JOHNSON, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

 versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

 Respondent-Appellee,

KENNETH TUCKER, et al.,

 Respondents.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(February 27, 2017)

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Before HULL, WILSON, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Proceeding pro se, Matthew Johnson, a Florida prisoner serving a 30-year

sentence for lewd or lascivious molestation of a child less than 12 years of age, 

appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus. The district court granted a certificate of appealability on two 

issues: (1) whether Johnson’s trial attorneys “rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to present testimony of the alleged victim’s [brother] (who the alleged 

victim said was in the room at the time of the offense) that he did not see the 

offense”; and (2) whether his attorneys “rendered ineffective assistance by failing 

to present documentary evidence supporting the argument that the petitioner was in 

custody at the time of the offense.” After a careful review of the record and 

consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.

I.

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a § 2254 habeas corpus 

petition. Bester v. Warden, 836 F.3d 1331, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016). We liberally 

construe the filings of pro se litigants. Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 

1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), federal courts cannot grant habeas relief on a claim adjudicated on the 

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merits in state court unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Johnson does not contend that the state court’s decision was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Rather, his argument is that the state court 

unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, specifically Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under the “unreasonable application” prong, 

relief is appropriate only if the state court’s application of clearly established 

federal law is “objectively unreasonable,” not simply incorrect. Bell v. Cone, 535 

U.S. 685, 694 (2002). 

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, 

Johnson must show both that “counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Bester, 836 F.3d at 1337; see 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. “Because the failure to demonstrate either 

deficient performance or prejudice is dispositive of the claim against the 

petitioner,” we may consider the prongs in either order and need not address both. 

Windom v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 578 F.3d 1227, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009). 

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For counsel’s performance to be constitutionally deficient, it must fall 

“below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 

86, 104 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Review of counsel’s 

performance is highly deferential, and it is presumed that counsel’s conduct fell 

within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Johnson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of 

Corr., 643 F.3d 907, 928 (11th Cir. 2011). To overcome that presumption, the 

petitioner “must show that no competent counsel would have taken the action that 

his counsel did take.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

To establish prejudice, “a challenger must demonstrate ‘a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). The likelihood of a different result must be 

substantial, not just conceivable. Id.

When the deferential standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) apply in 

tandem, our review is “doubly” deferential as to the performance prong. Id. at 105. 

When both apply, “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. 

The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied 

Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. Because of this double deference, it will be 

a rare case in which an ineffective-assistance claim denied on the merits in state 

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court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding. Gissendaner v. 

Seaboldt, 735 F.3d 1311, 1323 (11th Cir. 2013).

II.

Johnson first alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate and present at trial mitigating testimony from the victim’s brother.1

 

During trial, the victim testified that her brother and her cousin were also in the 

room when Johnson pulled out his penis and had the victim rub it. After Johnson 

was convicted, the victim’s brother prepared an affidavit stating that he had never 

seen any inappropriate touching occur between Johnson and the victim. Johnson 

contends that trial counsel could have used the brother’s testimony to impeach the 

victim’s credibility, which he asserts was already in some doubt due to other 

inconsistencies in her testimony.

Here, the state court’s determination that Johnson was not prejudiced by 

counsel’s performance is not an unreasonable application of Strickland. As the 

state court explained, the brother’s testimony that he did not witness the alleged 

offense would not have refuted the victim’s trial testimony because she indicated 

only that her brother was in the room, not that he witnessed the offense. “Just 

because [the brother] did not see anything, as he avers,” the state court reasoned, 

 1 We decline to address the state’s contention that both of Johnson’s claims are 

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. The district court addressed the claims on the merits, 

and Johnson has not shown that he is entitled to relief on the merits, in any event. 

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“does not mean that nothing happened.” Because the brother’s testimony did not 

actually contradict the victim’s testimony, the state court reasonably determined 

that the testimony likely would have had no effect on the result. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694. Since the state court’s prejudice determination requires us to deny 

habeas relief, we do not address whether counsel’s performance was deficient. See 

Windom, 578 F.3d at 1248. Accordingly, the district court properly denied relief 

on this claim. 

III.

Next, Johnson argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

introduce records showing that he had been sentenced to six months in county jail 

on July 14, 2004. These records, according to Johnson, would have demonstrated 

that he “was in jail for a substantial portion of the timeframe that the victim 

testified that the acts occurred and limited them to occurring in January 2005, if 

they occurred at all.” 

Johnson contends that we may review this claim de novo because the state 

court did not address this claim on the merits. A review of the record shows that 

this particular claim was not addressed.2

 “When a state court rejects a federal 

claim without expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas court must presume 

 2

 That may be because Johnson framed his allegations on this matter as a claim of

prosecutorial misconduct, which the state court addressed, and not ineffective assistance. The 

state also notes that Johnson’s theory of why he is entitled to relief based on the records has 

shifted over the course of his post-conviction proceedings. Regardless, Johnson has not shown 

that he is entitled to relief based on the arguments he presents on appeal.

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that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits—but that presumption can in 

some limited circumstances be rebutted.” Bester, 836 F.3d at 1336 (quoting 

Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013)); see Harrington, 562 U.S. at 

99–100 (holding that a state court’s summary, unexplained rejection of a 

constitutional issue generally qualifies as an adjudication that is entitled to 

deference). The presumption is rebutted when the evidence clearly shows that the 

federal claim was “inadvertently overlooked” in state court. Bester, 836 F.3d at 

1336. In such a case, federal courts may review the claim de novo. Id. at 1337.

Here, even assuming without deciding that de novo review applies, Johnson 

has not shown that he is entitled to relief. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 

370, 390 (2010) (stating that courts can “deny writs of habeas corpus under § 2254 

by engaging in de novo review when it is unclear whether AEDPA deference 

applies”). Johnson has not shown that “counsel’s performance was deficient [or] 

that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Bester, 836 F.3d at 1337.

First, Johnson’s trial counsel was not deficient under Strickland because 

counsel’s performance fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance. 

Trial counsel presented to the jury the substance of Johnson’s allegations regarding 

his time in jail. Specifically, counsel called as a trial witness Johnson’s father, who 

testified that Johnson was in jail from January 2003 to September 2003 and then 

from July 2004 to November 2004. These periods are consistent with Johnson’s

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own allegations in his state court post-conviction proceedings.3 Then, in closing 

arguments, counsel used that testimony to argue that doubt existed as to whether 

Johnson even could have committed the offense against the victim because he was 

in jail for substantial portions of the timeframe in which the offense allegedly 

occurred.4 Accordingly, the record shows that trial counsel knew of Johnson’s jail 

time, brought it out at trial, and argued that it supported the defense. 

Johnson argues that it was unreasonable for counsel to elicit testimony from 

his father instead of introducing the court records because the jury would have 

been more likely to disbelieve a relative of the defendant. But that is the kind of 

second-guessing of counsel’s actions that we must avoid when conducting our 

highly deferential review of counsel’s performance. Chandler v. United States, 

218 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). And “[e]ven if many reasonable 

lawyers would not have done as defense counsel did at trial, no relief can be 

granted on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is shown that no reasonable lawyer, in 

the circumstances, would have done so.” Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th 

Cir. 1994). Johnson has not made that showing here.

 3

 For example, in Johnson’s April 2009 Rule 3.850 motion in state court, he alleged that 

he was released from county jail on November 10, 2004.

4 The indictment broadly alleged that the offenses—against multiple victims, not just the 

single victim relevant to this appeal—were committed on various occasions between January 

2002 and January 2005. Of the four counts charged in the indictment, the district court granted a 

judgment of acquittal as to one, and a state appellate court held that judgment of acquittal should 

have been granted as to two others. The remaining conviction, which gave rise to these 

proceedings, was affirmed.

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Moreover, Johnson has not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

failure to introduce the court records. Even Johnson does not go so far as to assert 

that the records could have proved that he simply did not commit the offense as the 

victim testified. Rather, his position is that the records would have narrowed the 

timeframe in which the offense could have occurred. But that does little to cast 

doubt on whether the crime in fact occurred during the narrower timeframe. In 

these circumstances, we do not think that the likelihood of a different result is 

“substantial.” See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104. Accordingly, the district court 

properly denied relief on this claim, even under de novo review.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court properly denied Johnson’s 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

AFFIRMED.

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