Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02033/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02033-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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07cv2033

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIMITRI VALLERVEICH

TATARINOV,

Petitioner,

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN

DIEGO, et al.

Respondents.

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Civil No. 07cv2033-L(NLS)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

HABEAS CORPUS AND VACATING

ORDER FOR STAY OF REMOVAL

Petitioner Dimitri Vallerveich Tatarinov, represented by counsel, filed a Consolidated

Petition seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). Petitioner is in

custody of the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”) Detention and Removal Center in this District pending his removal to Russia. He filed a

motion for stay pending removal. Respondents Superior Court of the State of California, County

of San Diego (“State”) and Office of the Chief Counsel, Dept. of Homeland Security; U.S.

Attorney, Southern District; and ICE Detention and Removal Unit (collectively “Federal

Respondents”) opposed the motion. The motion for stay pending removal was granted on May

9, 2008. 

/ / / / /

Case 3:07-cv-02033-L-NLS Document 64 Filed 07/10/08 Page 1 of 16
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The parties have fully briefed the Petition and filed supplemental briefing pursuant to the

order filed May 22, 2008. The State filed a motion to dismiss, which Petitioner opposed. On

June 1, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion for release pending the conclusion of this proceeding,

which is opposed by all Respondents. 

Petitioner challenges two expired state court sentences on which the removal order is

based. He is no longer in custody for purposes of the convictions he is challenging. In addition,

no exceptions to the rule precluding collateral challenges to state court convictions in

immigration proceedings apply in this case. Therefore, despite the unfortunate circumstances

which led to Petitioner’s current situation, the Petition is DENIED. The State’s motion to

dismiss and Petitioner’s motion for release are DENIED as moot. The May 9, 2008 order

staying removal is VACATED.

The underlying facts, contained in the Petition, Petitioner’s motion to stay, Petitioner’s

Excerpt of Record (“ER”), Declaration of Samuel W. Bettwy filed in opposition to the Petition

(“Bettwy Decl.”), and the State’s Notice of Lodgment (“Lodgment”), are not disputed. 

Petitioner, a native of Russia and citizen of the former Soviet Union, came to the United States

as a non-immigrant student in May 1992. The same year, he applied for asylum based on the

threats he had received in the former Soviet Union. He married a United States citizen in 1994. 

In 1995, he was granted Conditional Permanent Resident Status based on marriage. In 1996, he

filed a petition to remove this status; however, the petition was not adjudicated until June 9,

2000. (Bettwy Decl. Ex. at 54.)

In August 1995, Petitioner was convicted of misdemeanor petty theft and was sentenced

to one year probation. In August 1996, Petitioner was caught taking a jacket from a department

store. Because of allegations of use of force against a store security guard, Petitioner was

charged with robbery. At trial, he was represented by Vladimir Verhovskoy. Petitioner and his

subsequent counsel, Jerome Wallingford, believe Petitioner had a valid defense to the charge of

robbery, however, due to Mr. Verhovskoy’s negligence, the jury was not instructed on the

defense. (Mtn. to Stay Ex. C.) In Mr. Wallingford’s opinion, the case was a shoplifting incident

and should have been resolved as a misdemeanor. However, Petitioner was found guilty of

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1 On March 1, 2003, the detention and removal duties of the INS were transferred to

the newly-formed ICE. Resendiz v. Kovensky, 416 F.3d 952, 954 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 

2 Starting in 1998, Petitioner began therapy with a psychiatrist to address the

shoplifting incidents, which were allegedly not caused by financial need but by psychological

problems. (ER at 122; Mtn to Stay Ex. D.) 

3 07cv2033

robbery (“1996 Conviction”). (Id.) He was sentenced to 270 days in custody. The custodial

sentence was suspended and Petitioner was granted three years of probation. 

Represented by Mr. Verhovskoy, Petitioner timely appealed the 1996 Conviction.

However, Mr. Verhovskoy failed to file the appellant’s opening brief and the appeal was

dismissed on April 28, 1997. When Petitioner inquired about the status of the appeal, Mr.

Verhovskoy did not tell him that the appeal was dismissed, but gave vague and misleading

explanations why a decision had not yet been issued. (ER at 130.) 

On April 13, 1998, Petitioner was apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization

Service (“INS”)1

 and placed in removal proceedings. (Bettwy Decl. Ex. at 1, 3-6, 10.) Pending

processing of Petitioner’s request for a hearing to determine whether he could remain in the

United States, Petitioner was released from INS custody on bond.

On October 19, 1998, on Mr. Verhovskoy’s advice, Petitioner pled guilty to petty theft –

another shoplifting charge. Based on the prior robbery conviction, he was convicted of a felony

(“1998 Conviction”). He was sentenced to 364 days in custody, but the sentence was suspended

and Petitioner was placed on probation. This offense was added to the charges and factual

allegations in Petitioner’s removal proceedings. (See Bettwy Decl. Ex. at 11, 13.) Petitioner

successfully completed probation and has no further criminal record.2

Due to counsel’s failure to inform Petitioner that the appeal of the 1996 Conviction was

dismissed, Petitioner did not learn of this fact until the summer of 1998, when his wife inquired

directly with the court. (ER at 130.) After being confronted in September 1999, Mr.

Verhovskoy filed a motion to set aside the dismissal and reopen the appeal as well as a habeas

corpus petition.

On September 9, 1999, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in this District (case no.

99cv1911-IEG(LSP)) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the constitutionality of the use

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3 The January 28, 2000 date shown on The State Bar of California Complaint Form

(ER at 128) appears to be an error, because the complaint refers to events taking place after that

date. (Cf. ER 128 & 130 (referring to events in September 2000 and thereafter.)

4 07cv2033

of his underlying criminal judgments as the basis for removal. The petition was dismissed

without prejudice as premature. (See order filed Jan. 19, 2000 in case no. 99cv1911.) The court

held it was premature to consider Petitioner’s constitutional challenge before the INS had a

chance to finally rule on whether he was removable based on the prior convictions.

In the meantime, in state court proceedings, Mr. Verhovskoy filed a motion to reopen the

appeal of the 1996 Conviction. The motion included only a vague explanation for failure to file

the opening brief (“financial and medical catastrophes”) and did not explain the two-year delay

between the dismissal and motion to reopen. (ER at 14-22.) It was denied on September 24,

1999. (ER at 24.) Mr. Verhovskoy advised Petitioner that nothing could be done to revive the

appeal. He advised filing a motion in the Superior Court to expunge the conviction. On April

13, 2000, Petitioner’s motion to set aside the 1996 Conviction was denied. (ER at 26.) On

November 3, 2000, the court denied Petitioner’s motion to terminate probation associated with

the 1996 Conviction.

On December 22, 2000, during the pendency of immigration proceedings, Mr.

Verhovskoy informed Petitioner he was withdrawing from representation. (ER at 30.) On

January 19, 2001, Petitioner received a copy of the State Bar of California’s Stipulation Form -

Actual Suspension, indicating Mr. Verhovskoy had been suspended by the State Bar of

California in September 2000. (ER at 130.) On January 28, 2001,3

 Petitioner filed a complaint

against Mr. Verhovskoy with the State Bar. (ER at 128-30.) Petitioner had been represented by

Mr. Verhovskoy since 1996, and had paid him over $20,000 in fees for representation in

immigration proceedings and criminal defense. Based on Petitioner’s complaint and State Bar

investigation, Mr. Verhovskoy admitted to some violations. On February 5, 2003 he was again

suspended from the practice of law. (ER at 131-34.) In 2001, following Mr. Verhovskoy’s

withdrawal, Petitioner retained new criminal defense and immigration counsel. (ER at 115.)

/ / / / /

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4 Although the motions were styled as “Nonstatutory Motion to Vacate a Judgment

Entered After Court Trial on Grounds of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” and “Nonstatutory

Motion to Vacate a Plea Entered on Grounds of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” (Lodgment

Ex. 1 at 17 et seq. & 78 et seq.), the only relief requested was a new trial (id. at 23 & 83). 

5 07cv2033

In the removal proceedings, the Immigration Judge found Petitioner removable as an alien

convicted of crime of moral turpitude within five years of admission and as an alien convicted of

two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner sought relief, including adjustment of

status, asylum and relief under the convention against torture, but he was unsuccessful due to his

criminal record. On December 13, 2001 Petitioner was ordered deported to Russia. (ER at 116;

Bettwy Decl. Ex. at 9-34.) On January 14, 2003, the removal order was affirmed by the Board

of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Bettwy Decl. Ex. at 35-36.) Challenging the Immigration

Judge’s decision to deny asylum and adjust his status, Petitioner appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 

The Ninth Circuit construed the appeal as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241, and transferred the case to this District (case no. 04cv2595-W(BLM)). The

petition was denied on May 2, 2005. (Bettwy Decl. Ex. at 53 et seq.) On February 9, 2007, the

Ninth Circuit denied review. Petitioner has been in ICE custody since June 28, 2007. 

In state court proceedings, on August 30, 2001, Petitioner filed a motion to reinstate the

appeal of his 1996 Conviction with the California Court of Appeal. The motion was denied (ER

at 34) and the California Supreme Court denied review (ER at 36). On February 15, 2002,

Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition with the California Court of Appeal, which was denied. 

(ER at 38.) Again, the California Supreme Court denied review. (ER at 40.) 

On October 11, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 in this District (case no. 02cv2029-W(BEN)) based on ineffective assistance of counsel

on appeal of the 1996 Conviction. The petition was dismissed based on the statute of

limitations. (ER at 76-86.) On February 9, 2007, the dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth

Circuit (ER at 96-98) and petition for a rehearing was denied on September 28, 2004 (ER at

106).

 On September 25, 2006, Petitioner filed in the San Diego County Superior Court motions

for new trial4

 of the 1996 and 1998 Convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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(Lodgment Ex. 1 at 17 et seq. & 78 et seq.) The motions were denied (Lodgment Ex. 1 at 57,

117) and the appeal to the California Court of Appeal was unsuccessful (ER at 136). On

September 12, 2007, the California Supreme Court denied petition for review. (ER at 137.) 

On October 19, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

Although Petition states that Petitioner “moves that the court grant his U.S.C. § 2241 writ and

vacate the judgments based upon the violation of his constitutional rights” (Pet. at 2), it also

suggests that it is not directed toward the state court judgments but rather the state court’s order

denying his motions for new trial, and that Petitioner’s purpose is to avoid removal from the

United States – the only remaining consequence of the state court criminal judgments. The

Petition could therefore be viewed as a challenge to the state court convictions, state court’s

denial of his motions, or the present confinement by the immigration authorities. Petitioner was

ordered to clarify this ambiguity. (See order filed May 22, 2008 at 1-2.) According to his

supplemental briefing, he “is not directly challenging his criminal convictions, [but] is

challenging the State’s dismissal of his non-statutory motions in violation of the Due Process

Clause . . ..” (Pet’r’s Supp. Brief filed Jun. 8, 2008 at 4.) 

Federal Respondents contend that district court jurisdiction is foreclosed by 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252, as amended by the REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Stat. 231, Div. B (May 11, 2005). 

The Act “eliminated district court habeas corpus jurisdiction over orders of removal and vested

jurisdiction to review such orders exclusively in the courts of appeals.” Puri v. Gonzalez, 464

F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Petitioner has unequivocally stated he is not challenging his final order of removal. 

(Pet’r’s Traverse filed Jan. 3, 2008 at 2-4.) However, Federal Respondents argue that his only

real purpose is to indirectly challenge that order. (Resp. Supp. Brief filed Jun. 3, 2008 at 1, 2.) 

“Post-REAL ID Act cases considering the applicability of § 1252 have . . . distinguished

between challenges to orders of removal and challenges that arise independently.” Singh v.

Gonzalez, 499 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2007). The jurisdictional bar of the REAL ID Act does

not apply to indirect challenges to orders of removal. Id., citing Puri, 464 F.3d at 1041. For

example, the Ninth Circuit held in Singh v. Gonzalez that the REAL ID Act did not bar district

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5 Federal Respondents also argue that the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), strips

this court of jurisdiction to issue an order to stay Petitioner’s removal. (Resp. Supp. Brief filed

Jun. 3, 2008 at 1, 3.) This argument is contradicted by Ali v. Gonzalez, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir.

2005) (“Ali II”). It held that the REAL ID Act did not apply to a habeas petition claiming that

the petitioners should not be removed to a country without a functioning government, “because

petitioners d[id] not challenge or seek review of any removal order.” Ali II, 421 F.3d at 797 n.1

(order denying reh’g) (for factual background see Ali v. Gonzalez, 346 F.3d 873 (2003) (“Ali

I”)). The court also affirmed a district court order temporarily releasing the petitioners from

immigration custody. Ali II, 421 F.3d at 797; see also Ali I, 346 F.3d at 875-76, 891-92. Federal

Respondents’ argument therefore appears without merit. However, because the order staying

Petitioner’s removal is vacated on other grounds, the court need not resolve this issue here. 

7 07cv2033

court review under § 2241 of an ineffective assistance claim arising out of the immigration

counsel’s failure to timely appeal the BIA decision affirming the order of removal. 499 F.3d

969. Because Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims in this case arise from state court

proceedings, which are even less related to the order of removal than the claims made in Singh,

the REAL ID Act does not bar habeas review in this case.5

Finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252 does not preclude district court jurisdiction in this case, the

court considers Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner maintains that the state court’s denial in 2006 of

his motions for new trial triggered a right to pursue habeas relief in federal court. In 2006,

Petitioner filed in state court motions styled as “Nonstatutory Motion to Vacate a Judgment

Entered After Court Trial on Grounds of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” and “Nonstatutory

Motion to Vacate a Plea Entered on Grounds of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” respectively. 

(Lodgment Ex. 1 at 17 et seq. & 78 et seq.) The only relief requested in each motion was a new

trial pursuant to California Penal Code § 1181. (Id. at 23 & 83.) The motions were denied

because they were filed after the judgment in each case had been entered. (Id. at 57 & 117;

Lodgment Ex. 2 at 5-10.) The court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction under California law to

grant a motion for new trial brought after the entry of judgment. (Lodgment Ex. 2 at 5-10, citing

Cal. Penal Code §§ 1181,1182 & People v. Smyers, 2 Cal. App. 3d 666 (1969).) 

Petitioner has not cited any authority to show that the state court’s denial of his motions

violated his constitutional rights. “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state

law. . . . [I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations

/ / / / /

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6 Petitioner requested the court to disregard this argument, contending that the State

had waived it by not raising it in its motion to dismiss. (Pet’r’s Supp. Brief filed Jun. 8, 2008 at

3-4.) The State raised this issue in opposition to Petitioner’s motion for stay of removal. (See

Opp’n to Mtn for Stay of Removal filed Dec. 3, 2007 at 2.) The issue of Petitioner’s custody

and exceptions to this requirement were addressed in the Order Granting Petitioner’s Motion for

Stay of Removal because they are relevant to the resolution of this case. Petitioner’s request to

disregard the State’s argument is therefore denied.

8 07cv2033

of state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Accordingly, the denial of

Petitioner’s motions does not provide a basis for habeas relief. 

What remains of the Petition are the underlying constitutional claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel arising from representation related to the 1996 and 1998 Convictions.

Petitioner’s theory of ineffective assistance as to the 1996 Conviction is that Mr. Verhovskoy

failed to file the opening brief on appeal and misled Petitioner about the status of his appeal, thus

depriving him of his first appeal as of right. (Pet. at 9-12.) The theory as to the 1998 Conviction

is that Mr. Verhovskoy represented Petitioner notwithstanding a conflict of interest. (Id. at 12-

15.) Petitioner argues that the conflict arose from Mr. Verhovskoy’s previous representation

which resulted in the 1996 Conviction. “In criminal cases, an attorney’s representation of a

former client may preclude renewed representation of that client in a new matter if the prior

representation resulted in a client’s conviction[, because] the client may want to attack the prior

conviction on the ground of incompetent representation.” Paul W. Vapnek et al., Cal. Practice

Guide: Professional Responsibility (2008) (citing People v. Bailey, 9 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1254-

55 (1992) & San Diego County Bar Association Ethics Opinion 1995-1), cited in Pet. at 13. 

The State argues that the court lacks jurisdiction to consider these claims because

Petitioner is not in custody.6

 (State Resp’s Response filed Jun. 4, 2008 at 4-5.) The state court

sentences imposed for the convictions Petitioner is attacking have expired. The “in custody”

element requires “that the habeas petitioner be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence

under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). 

“[O]nce the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral

consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual ‘in

custody’ for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it.” Id. at 492. Immigration consequences, the

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7 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). [Gideon held that a defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to counsel applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The court

reversed a denial of a habeas petition brought by an indigent criminal defendant where the state

court denied his motion for appointment of counsel at trial.]

9 07cv2033

only consequences of the 1996 and 1998 Convictions remaining in this case, are considered

collateral, and therefore insufficient, for purposes of the “in custody” requirement. See Resendiz

v. Kovensky, 416 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2005).

Petitioner admits that he is no longer in state custody. (Pet’r’s Reply re: Stay of Removal

filed Dec. 10, 2007 at 2.) He argues that his immigration custody is sufficient for the habeas

relief he seeks. The Petition, however, is expressly not challenging the immigration custody or

the underlying order of removal. It is challenging the 1996 and 1998 Convictions. The validity

of these convictions “can only be tested in an action against the state, which has the greatest

interest in preserving its judgment[s] and the best ability to either correct or defend [them]. ”

Contreras v. Schlitgen, 122 F.3d 30, 33 (9th Cir. 1997), aff’d on add’l grounds in Contreras v.

Schlitgen, 151 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Contreras II”). In the absence of an applicable

exception, federal habeas relief against the State is foreclosed because Petitioner is no longer in

custody under the convictions he is challenging.

“The Supreme Court has identified two possible exceptions to the ‘in custody’

requirement . . .. The first is a Gideon7

 violation, or a complete failure of counsel. . . . The

second . . . is a possible ‘rare’ exception, not yet defined, where ‘no channel of review was

actually available to a defendant with respect to a prior conviction.’” Resendiz, 416 F.3d at 959

(internal citations omitted). 

The Gideon exception was established in Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994). It

held that a federal defendant could not at the sentencing stage attack a prior conviction used to

enhance the federal sentence. Id. at 487. The only exception was the right to appointment of

counsel recognized in Gideon. Id. at 496. The defendant in Custis, who claimed that his

underlying convictions were obtained in violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel,

sought to extend his right to collaterally attack a prior conviction beyond the right to

appointment of counsel to ineffective assistance claims. Custis, 511 U.S. at 496. The court held

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that the Gideon exception did not apply to ineffective assistance claims and drew a line between

ineffective assistance and failure to appoint counsel. Id. The Gideon exception and the rationale

of Custis were adopted in the habeas context by Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001)

(§2255) and Lackawanna County Dist. Atty v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001) (§ 2254). 

Petitioner argues that the Gideon exception applies in this case because his counsel’s

failure to perfect the appeal denied him the opportunity to present the merits of his appeal, which

was more than a mere attorney error. (Pet’r’s Resp. filed May 28, 2008 at 10.) He relies on

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), which were

decided before Custis. 

Evitts addressed facts similar to Petitioner’s appeal of his 1996 Conviction. The

petitioner was convicted in state court after a jury trial. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 389. Although his

retained counsel filed a timely notice of appeal, he failed to perfect it and the appeal was

dismissed. Id. at 389-90. The subsequent efforts to reinstate the appeal and vacate the

underlying judgment were unsuccessful. Id. at 390. The petitioner then sought habeas relief in

federal court. Id. Unlike Petitioner here, when he filed his habeas petition, the petitioner in

Evitts was still in custody under the conviction he was challenging. See id. at 391 & n.4. The

court addressed the issue whether the right to effective assistance of counsel applied on the first

appeal as of right, and found that it did. Id. at 392, 397. It reasoned that “the promise . . . that a

criminal defendant has a right to counsel on appeal – like the promise of Gideon that a criminal

defendant has a right to counsel at trial – would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the

right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 397. 

Unlike Custis, Evitts did not consider the distinction between the right to appointment of

counsel and the right to effective representation. In discussing the facts of the case, the court

commented: 

Our cases dealing with the right to counsel – whether at trial or on appeal – have

often focused on the defendant’s need for an attorney to meet the adversary

presentation of the prosecutor. . . . Such cases emphasize the defendant’s need for

counsel in order to obtain a favorable decision. The facts of this case emphasize a

different, albeit related, aspect of a counsel’s role, that of expert professional

whose assistance is necessary in a legal system governed by complex rules and

procedures for the defendant to obtain a decision at all – much less a favorable

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decision – on the merits of the case. In a situation like that here, counsel’s failure

was particularly egregious in that it essentially waived a respondent’s opportunity

to make a case on the merits; in this sense, it is difficult to distinguish respondent’s

situation from that of someone who had no counsel at all. 

Evitts, 469 U.S. at 394 n.6 (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original). This comment

suggests that a counsel’s failure to perfect the appeal, depriving the defendant of presenting the

merits of his appeal, essentially rises to the level of no representation at all. Rather than

distinguishing between the appointment of counsel and effective representation, Evitts

highlighted the importance of effective representation by reasoning that “a party whose counsel

is unable to provide effective representation is in no better position than one who has no counsel

at all.” Id. at 396.

Extending this reasoning to conclude that a failure to file the first appeal as of right

amounts to a Gideon violation would collapse the distinction between appointment of counsel

and counsel’s effectiveness which was drawn in Custis. In carving out the Gideon exception,

Custis noted that a Gideon violation was unique. Custis, 511 U.S. at 494 (“historical basis in our

jurisprudence of collateral attacks for treating the right to have counsel appointed as unique”);

496 (“failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant was a unique constitutional defect”). 

It was not merely a constitutional violation but a jurisdictional defect. Id. at 494 (“jurisdictional

significance to the failure to appoint counsel); see also Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 404 (“failure to

appoint counsel for an indigent is a unique constitutional defect rising to the level of a

jurisdictional defect, which therefore warrants special treatment among alleged constitutional

violations”). The court was careful to distinguish the Gideon exception from ineffective

assistance and narrowly defined it as a violation of an indigent defendant’s right to appointment

of counsel:

[T]here has been a theme [in the Supreme Court case law] that failure to appoint

counsel for an indigent defendant was a unique constitutional defect. [Defendant]

attacks his previous convictions claiming the denial of the effective assistance of

counsel, that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent, and that he had not

been adequately advised of his rights in opting for a “stipulated facts” trial. None

of these alleged constitutional violations rises to the level of a jurisdictional defect

resulting from the failure to appoint counsel at all.

Custis, 511 U.S. at 496 (citation omitted). Accordingly, an ineffective assistance claim does not

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8 Petitioner himself characterized his claim as ineffective assistance. (See Pet. at 9-

12; see also id. at 16 (“Verhovskoy’s failure to submit a brief for the direct appeal constitutes

ineffective assistance of counsel.”).)

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constitute a Gideon violation. Evitts, which addressed ineffective assistance on appeal, does not

support Petitioner’s argument that his counsel’s failure to perfect the appeal amounted to a

Gideon violation.

Petitioner also relies on Anders, which involved an appointed counsel who failed to file a

brief on first appeal as of right because he did not believe the appeal had any merit. Id. at 739. 

The counsel so informed the court, which then denied the defendant’s motion for appointment of

new counsel and affirmed the conviction. Id. at 739-40. The California Supreme Court’s denial

of the defendant’s habeas petition was reversed. Id. at 740-41. Anders has been characterized as

finding that the defendant was deprived of his right to appointed counsel guaranteed by Gideon. 

Foote v. Del Papa, 492 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing Anders). Like Evitts,

Anders suggests that failure to perfect the first appeal as of right amounts to more than

ineffective assistance. However, like Evitts, Anders did not consider the distinction between

failure to appoint counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel, which was subsequently

delineated in Custis. Anders therefore does not support Petitioner’s argument any more than

Evitts does.

Notwithstanding the egregiousness of Mr. Verhovskoy’s error in failing to perfect the

appeal and concealing the fact from Petitioner, Petitioner states an ineffective assistance claim

rather than a Gideon claim.8

 Custis holds that the Gideon exception does not apply to ineffective

assistance claims but only to violations of an indigent defendant’s right to appointment counsel. 

Custis, 511 U.S. at 496. Petitioner’s attack on the 1996 Conviction therefore does not warrant

the Gideon exception.

The same reasons apply to Petitioner’s attack on the 1998 Conviction. He argues that his

1998 Conviction was unconstitutional because it was obtained in violation of his right to

effective assistance of counsel when Mr. Verhovskoy represented him notwithstanding a conflict

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9 See Pet. at 12-15; see also id. at 16 (“Verhovskoy’s conflict of interest constitutes

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . ..”). 

10 Unlike in Petitioner’s case, the alleged conflict in Jamison preceded and possibly

motivated the counsel’s failure to file the appeal. In addition, unlike Petitioner, at the time of

filing his petition, the petitioner in Jamison was apparently still in custody under the conviction

he was challenging. See Jamison, 975 F.2d at 1378 (thirty year prison sentence).

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of interest.9 Relying on Jamison v. Lockhart, 975 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1992), Petitioner argues

that the conflict of interest amounted to a Gideon violation. (Pet’r’s Resp. filed May 28, 2008 at

13.) The trial counsel in Jamison represented the defendant despite a conflict of interest. 

Jamison, 975 F.2d at 1379. After the defendant was convicted, he requested the counsel to file

an appeal. The counsel agreed, but then took no steps to file it. Id. The defendant subsequently

filed a federal habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of

interest.10 Id. at 1378. The court noted, in the context of deciding whether the petitioner should

be excused from procedural default, that sufficient cause could potentially “exist when the error

of the attorney was so bad that the lawyer ceases to be an agent of the petitioner.” Id. at 1380

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Jamison does not support the proposition that a

conflict of interest amounts to a Gideon exception. Under Custis, the Gideon exception does not

include ineffective assistance claims and is limited to the failure to appoint counsel. 

Accordingly, the Gideon exception does not apply in this case.

The second exception to the custody requirement was recognized in Daniels. 532 U.S. at

383-84; see also Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 405-06. This exception may apply “in rare cases in

which no channel of review was actually available to a defendant with respect to a prior

conviction, due to no fault of his own.” Daniels, 532 U.S. at 383. “For example, a state court

may, without justification, refuse to rule on a constitutional claim that has been properly

presented to it. Alternatively, after the time for direct or collateral review has expired, a

defendant may obtain compelling evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime of which he

was convicted, and which he could not have uncovered in a timely manner.” Lackawanna, 532

U.S. at 405. This exception is extremely narrow because “a defendant properly bears the

consequences of either foregoing otherwise available review of a conviction or failing to

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successfully demonstrate the constitutional error.” Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 405. Petitioner

argues that the exception applies in his case because his constitutional claims were not heard on

the merits. 

Petitioner cites Jamison, where an ineffective assistance claim was procedurally barred

because the petitioner had not raised it in state court and the time to do so had expired by the

time he filed a federal habeas petition. Jamison, 975 F.2d at 1378. The petitioner argued that

“his continued reliance on counsel whose loyalty was tainted by conflict of interest prevented

him from discovering the conflict of interest problem until it was too late to pursue an appeal in

state courts.” Id. at 1379. The court remanded the case for development of the record and

consideration whether the delay in presenting the claim was attributable to the petitioner or to

the counsel’s divided loyalties. Id. at 1380. 

Unlike the petitioner in Jamison, Petitioner here pursued post-conviction relief in state

and federal court after the dismissal of his appeal of the 1996 Conviction. In 1999, he filed a

motion to reopen the appeal (ER at 24); in 2000, he filed a motion to expunge the underlying

conviction (ER at 26); in 2001, he filed a motion to reinstate the appeal (id. at 34); in February

2002, he filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal (id. at 38); in October 2002, he

filed a § 2254 habeas petition in this District (id. at 76-86); and in 2006, he filed a motion for

new trial in state court (Lodgment Ex. 1 at 17 et seq. & 78 et seq.). All of these efforts and

related appeals were unsuccessful.

Petitioner’s failure to secure timely review of the 1996 Conviction could initially be

blamed on Mr. Verhovskoy’s anemic efforts to reopen the appeal and expunge the conviction. 

However, this can not be said for Petitioner’s subsequent efforts. His § 2254 petition was time

barred. The court considered Petitioner’s arguments for equitable tolling, which were based on

the same facts as his present challenge to the 1996 Conviction. He argued then, as he does now,

that Mr. Verhovskoy’s failure to file the appellate brief and subsequent concealment of the

dismissal caused the delay which robbed him of the opportunity to present the merits of his

claim. Upon consideration of these arguments, the court found that equitable tolling did not save

his § 2254 petition. (Lodgment Ex. 9 at 8-10.) Specifically, after Petitioner discovered in 1998

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that his appeal had been dismissed, after his motion to reinstate the appeal had been denied and

the denial affirmed in the fall of 1999, and after he had learned in December 2000 of Mr.

Verhovskoy’s withdrawal, Petitioner still waited an unreasonably long time to protect his federal

habeas rights. (Id. at 9.) The court’s finding that the petition was barred by the statute of

limitations and could not be saved by equitable tolling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in

August 2004. (Lodgment Ex. 10.) Petitioner waited for another two years, until September

2006, to file his motion for new trial and raise his ineffective assistance claims. 

Accordingly, channels of review were available to Petitioner and he pursued them but

was unsuccessful. To the extent Petitioner was unsuccessful because he was untimely, the

untimeliness was not entirely due to his counsel’s incompetence or disloyalty. After discovering

the facts underlying his ineffective assistance claim, Petitioner waited an unreasonably long time

to protect or pursue his rights to review. In Resendiz v. Kovensky, the court declined to apply

this exception because, like in this case, “channels for review not only existed, but also were

pursued.” 416 F.3d at 959. 

As to the 1998 Conviction, Petitioner did not pursue any channels of review until 2006. 

He neither appealed nor petitioned for habeas relief. (See Pet. at 6-7.) His first attempt at

collateral review was his motion for new trial in 2006. (Id.) Petitioner has presented no

evidence or argument why the failure to pursue the available channels of review of this

conviction is not attributable to him. In cases such as this, the second exception has been held

inapplicable. See Daniels, 532 U.S. at 384.

Based on the foregoing, neither exception to the “in custody” requirement applies in this

case. Therefore, to the extent the Petition is asserted against the State, it is precluded.

In the alternative and notwithstanding the “in custody” requirement, the same exceptions

apply to the rule precluding collateral attacks in federal proceedings on the validity of an

underlying state court conviction. See Custis, 511 U.S. at 497 (denying challenge to state

convictions used to enhance a subsequent federal sentence when the petitioner “was still ‘in

custody’ for purposes of his state convictions at the time of his federal sentencing”);

Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 401-02 (denying § 2254 challenge to a prior state sentence used to

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11 Federal Respondents assert that the REAL ID Act overruled Contreras, including

its application of the Gideon exception. (Resp. Supp. Brief filed Jun. 3, 2008 at 2.) They cite no

authority in support of this proposition and the court is aware of none. Based on the discussion

above regarding this court’s jurisdiction in light of the REAL ID Act, it appears that Contreras

remained intact. Furthermore, the position that Contreras was overruled is contrary to the

position previously taken by Federal Respondents in this case. (See Return in Opp’n to Pet. filed

Dec. 21, 2007 at 4 -5 (relying on Contreras); Resp. in Opp’n to Request for Stay of Removal

filed Dec. 3, 2007 at 2 (relying on Contreras).) However, because the court finds that the

Gideon exception is not applicable for other reasons, it need not resolve this issue here.

12 See Pet’r’s Resp. filed May 28, 2008 at 4 (“This habeas challenge is not attacking

the use of a prior conviction as a basis for INS custody . . ..”). The court notes, however, that

Petitioner’s assertions that he is not challenging his immigration custody appears inconsistent

with his motions for stay of removal and release pending the outcome of this Petition.

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enhance a subsequent state sentence when the petitioner “satisfie[d] § 2254 ‘in custody’

requirement”). Specifically, “when a habeas petition attacks the use of a prior conviction as a

basis for INS custody, . . . there can be no collateral review of the validity of the underlying

conviction except for Gideon claims.” Contreras II, 151 F.3d at 908.11 The second exception

was subsequently recognized in Daniels. If the court were to construe the Petition, contrary to

Petitioner’s own characterization, as a challenge to his immigration custody,12 the Petition would

nevertheless be denied because, as discussed above, neither exception applies in this case.

Although the court is sympathetic to Petitioner’s unfortunate situation, it is without

authority to grant relief. Accordingly, the Petition is DENIED. The State’s motion to dismiss

and Petitioner’s motion for release are DENIED as moot. Order Granting Petitioner’s Motion

for Stay of Removal, dated May 9, 2008, is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 10, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO:

HON. NITA L. STORMES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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