Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35631/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35631-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

COTTONWOOD ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW CENTER,

Plaintiff-Appellee

/Cross-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE;

FAYE KRUEGER, in her official

capacity as Regional Forester for the

U.S. Forest Service, Region One,

Defendants-Appellants

/Cross-Appellees.

Nos. 13-35624

13-35631

D.C. No.

9:12-cv-00045-

DLC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Dana L. Christensen, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 7, 2014—Portland, Oregon

Filed June 17, 2015

Before: Harry Pregerson, Richard A. Paez,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Pregerson

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SUMMARY*

Environmental Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that the

United States Forest Service violated Section 7 of the

Endangered Species Act when it failed to reinitiate

consultation after the United States Fish and Wildlife Service

designated critical habitat for the Canada lynx on National

Forest land; affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive

relief to Cottonwood Environmental Law Center; and

remanded to provide Cottonwood an opportunity to make an

evidentiary showing that specific projects would likely cause

irreparable damage to its members’ interests.

In 2000, the Fish and Wildlife Service listed the Canada

lynx as a threatened species under the Endangered Species

Act, and in 2006 designated critical habitat that did not

include any National Forest lands. In 2007, the Forest

Service adopted the Lynx Amendments, which set specific

guidelines and standards for permitting activities that were

determined likely to have an adverse effect on the Canada

lynx. The Forest Service initiated Section 7 consultation with

the Fish and Wildlife Service, which determined that the

Forest Service’s standards and guidelines did not jeopardize

the Canada lynx. Subsequently, the Fish and Wildlife Service

discovered that its decisions relating to the designation of

critical habitat were flawed, and after reevaluating the data

the Fish and Wildlife Service designated extensive National

Forest land as critical habitat. The district court determined

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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COTTONWOOD ENVTL. LAW CTR. V. USFS 3

that the Forest Service violated the Endangered Species Act

when it decided not to reinitiate consultation after the Fish

and Wildlife Service revised its critical habitat designation to

include National Forest land.

The panel held that Cottonwood had Article III standing

to challenge the Lynx Amendments. The panel also held that

Cottonwood’s lawsuit was ripe for adjudication. The panel

further held that pursuant to the Endangered Species Act’s

implementing regulations, the Forest Service was required to

reinitiate consultation on the Lynx Amendments when the

Fish and Wildlife Service designated critical habitat in

National Forests.

Addressing Cottonwood’s cross-appeal challenging the

district court’s denial of its request for injunctive relief, the

panel held that there is no presumption of irreparable injury

where there has been a procedural violation in Endangered

Species Act cases. The panel held that a plaintiff must show

irreparable injury to justify injunctive relief. The panel

recognized that the presumption of irreparable harm in

Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985), was

no longer good law following Supreme Court cases

addressing injunctive relief in Winter v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), and Monsanto Co.

v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010). The panel

further held that Cottonwood should not be faulted for relying

on Thomas as a basis for injunctive relief, and remanded on

an open record to allow Cottonwood an opportunity to make

a showing of irreparable injury.

Judge Pregerson concurred in part and dissented in part.

Dissenting from Section VI of the majority opinion

concerning injunctive relief, Judge Pregerson would not read

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Winter and Monsanto as overruling Thomas. He would apply

Thomas and grant Cottonwood’s request for an injunction

pending compliance with the Endangered Species Act’s

Section 7 consultation requirements.

COUNSEL

Allen M. Brabender (argued), Attorney; Robert G. Dreher,

ActingAssistant AttorneyGeneral; John H. Martin, Attorney,

United States Department of Justice, Environmental and

Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C.; Andrew R.

Varcoe, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of

the General Counsel, Washington, D.C., for PlaintiffsAppellants and Cross-Appellees.

Matt Kenna (argued), Attorney, Durango, Colorado; John

Meyer, Attorney, Cottonwood Environmental Law Center,

Sandpoint,Idaho,for Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

Robert Molinelli and Scott W. Horngren, American Forest

Resource Council, Portland, Oregon, for Amici Curiae

American Forest Resource Council, Public Lands Council,

Montana Wood Products Association, Inc., Montana Logging

Association, Associated Logging Contractors, Inc.—Idaho,

California Forestry Association, and Douglas Timber

Operators.

Douglas A. Ruley, Vermont Law School, Environmental &

Natural Resources Law Clinic, South Royalton, Vermont, for

Amici Curiae Big Wild Adventures and Natural Exposures.

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OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

In 2000, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service

(“FWS”) listed the Canada lynx, a snow-sturdy cousin to the

bobcat, as a threatened species under the Endangered Species

Act of 1973 (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. FWS

designated critical habitat for the Canada lynx in 2006, but

did not include any National Forest System land. 

Subsequently, the United States Forest Service (“Forest

Service”) issued standards and guidelines for land

management activities on National Forest land that responded

to FWS’s listing and designation decisions. The Forest

Service then initiated consultation with FWS under Section

7 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). FWS determined that

the Forest Service’s standards and guidelines did not

jeopardize the Canada lynx. Shortly after completing the

consultation process, FWS discovered that its decisions

relating to the designation of critical habitat for the Canada

lynx were flawed. After re-evaluating the data, FWS

designated extensive National Forest land as critical habitat.

In this case, we must decide whether the district court

properly determined that the Forest Service violated the ESA

when it decided not to reinitiate consultation after the FWS

revised its critical habitat designation to include National

Forest land. Before doing so, however, we address the Forest

Service’s arguments that Cottonwood lacks standing to bring

its claim and that the claim is not ripe for review. Because

we conclude that Cottonwood’s claim is justiciable, and that

the Forest Service violated the ESA, we proceed to consider

whether the district court erred in denying injunctive relief to

Cottonwood. Although we affirm the district court’s ruling,

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we remand for further proceedings to allow Cottonwood an

opportunity to make the necessary showing in support of

injunctive relief.

I. Background

In 2000, after eight years of litigation by conservation

groups, FWS listed the distinct population segment of Canada

lynx in the contiguous forty-eight states as a threatened

species. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;

Determination of Threatened Status for the Contiguous U.S.

Distinct Population Segment of the Canada Lynx and Related

Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 16052-01, 16052, 16061 (Mar. 24, 2000). 

Six years later, FWS designated 1,841 square miles of land as

critical habitat for the Canada lynx. Endangered and

Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical

Habitat for the Contiguous United States Distinct Population

Segment of the Canada Lynx, 71 Fed. Reg. 66008-01, 66030

(Nov. 9, 2006). The designation included 1,389 square miles

in the Northern Rocky Mountains “critical habitat unit.”1

FWS did not, however, designate any National Forest land as

critical habitat.

In March 2007, the Forest Service adopted the Northern

Rocky Mountains Lynx Management Direction, which is

commonly referred to as the “Lynx Amendments.” The Lynx

Amendments were designed to “incorporate management

1 FWS divides critical habitat for the Canada lynx into five units,

including: Maine (“Unit 1”), Minnesota (“Unit 2”), Northern Rocky

Mountains (“Unit 3”), North Cascades (“Unit 4”), and Greater

Yellowstone Area (“Unit 5”). Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and

Plants; Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the ContiguousUnited

States Distinct Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 74 Fed. Reg.

8616-01 (Feb. 25, 2009).

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direction in land management plans that conserves and

promotes recovery of Canada lynx . . . while preserving the

overall multiple-use direction in existing plans.” The Lynx

Amendments set specific guidelines and standards for

permitting activities that are determined likely to have an

adverse effect on Canada lynx. These activities include overthe-snow recreational activity, wildland fire management,

pre-commercial forest thinning, and other projects that might

affect the Canada lynx. The Forest Service amended the

Forest Plans2for eighteen National Forests to include the

Lynx Amendments.

The Forest Service initiated Section 7 consultation with

FWS, the consulting agency. FWS issued a biological

opinion (“BiOp”) in March 2007, which determined that the

management direction in the Lynx Amendments did not

jeopardize the Canada lynx. The BiOp concluded that “[n]o

critical habitat has been designated for this species on Federal

lands within the [areas governed by the Lynx Amendments],

therefore none will be affected.” Just four months later,

however, FWS announced that its critical habitat designation

had been “improperly influenced by then deputy assistant

secretary of the Interior Julie MacDonald and, as a result,

may not be supported by the record, may not be adequately

explained, or may not comport with the best available

scientific and commercial information.” Endangered and

Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Designation of

2 Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et

seq., the Forest Service must promulgate Forest Plans, also known as Land

Resource Management Plans, to “guide sustainable, integrated resource

management of the resources within the plan area in the context of the

broader landscape, giving due consideration to the relative values of the

various resources in particular areas.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b).

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Critical Habitat for the Contiguous United States Distinct

Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 74 Fed. Reg.

8616-01, 8618 (Feb. 25, 2009). In 2009, FWS revised its

critical habitat designation upward from 1,841 square miles

to 39,000 square miles. Id. at 8642. The revised designation

included more than 10,000 square miles in the Northern

Rocky Mountains critical habitat unit. Id. Unlike the 2006

designation, the 2009 revised designation identified critical

habitat in eleven National Forests. Despite this significant

addition of critical habitat in the National Forests, the Forest

Service declined to reinitiate Section 7 consultation with

FWS on the Lynx Amendments. Thereafter, FWS issued

BiOps determining that two projects within the Gallatin

Forest, considered occupied by the Canada lynx, were

unlikely to modify or adversely affect the lynx’s critical

habitat.3

In 2012, the Cottonwood Environmental Law Center

(“Cottonwood”) filed this action in district court alleging that

the Forest Service violated the ESA by failing to reinitiate

consultation. The parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. The court ruled that the revised designation of

critical habitat for the Canada lynx required reinitiation of

Section 7 consultation on the Lynx Amendments. Salix v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 944 F. Supp. 2d 984, 986 (D. Mont. 2013). 

Although the court granted summary judgment to

Cottonwood and ordered reinitiation of consultation, it

declined to enjoin any specific project. Salix, 944 F. Supp. 2d

at 1000–02.

 

3

See infra notes 6 and 8.

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The parties filed timely cross-appeals.4

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s decisions on crossmotions for summary judgment. Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe

v. Ryan, 415 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2005). We also review

de novo a district court’s rulings on questions of standing and

ripeness. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161,

1176 (9th Cir. 2011). We review the denial of injunctive

relief for abuse of discretion. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation

for State of Cal. v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118,

1123 (9th Cir. 2006).

III. Standing

The Forest Service first argues that Cottonwood lacks

Article III standing to challenge the Lynx Amendments

because it brought a programmatic challenge, rather than a

challenge to a specific implementing project that poses an

imminent risk of harm to its members. As discussed below,

we conclude otherwise.

A.

To establish Article III standing, “a plaintiff must show

(1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as

opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc.

 

4

 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81

(2000). An association or organization has standing when

“(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in

their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are

germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the

claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the

participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v.

Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 

An organization can satisfy the concrete harm requirement by

alleging “an injury to the recreational or even the mere

esthetic interests” of its members. Jayne v. Sherman, 706

F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The Forest Service argues that the declarations

Cottonwood filed in the district court on behalf of its

members do not satisfy Article III standing requirements, as

articulated in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488

(2009). In particular, the Forest Service argues that

Cottonwood does not have standing because Cottonwood

only challenges the failure to reinitiate consultation, rather

than particular actions that would more directly injure

Cottonwood’s members. In Summers, a group of

environmental organizations sought a nationwide injunction

against the enforcement of regulations issued by the Forest

Service that exempted small-scale fire-control and timbersalvage projects from the notice, comment, and appeal

process that applied to more substantial land management

decisions. Id. at 490. Plaintiffs also specifically challenged

a 238-acre salvage sale of timber, called the Burnt Ridge

Project, in the Sequoia National Forest. Id. at 491. During

the course of litigation, the parties settled their dispute over

the Burnt Ridge Project. Id. After the settlement was in

place, the district court proceeded to invalidate five

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regulations and grant a nationwide injunction enjoining their

enforcement. Id. at 492. We affirmed. Id.

Reversing, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs

failed to establish injury in fact necessary to satisfy Article III

standing requirements. Id. at 494–97. The plaintiffs filed

only one affidavit—from Jim Bensman, a member of one of

the plaintiff organizations—that purported to relate a

threatened interest beyond the Burnt Ridge Project. Id. at

495. The Court held that Bensman’s representation of

general plans to visit “several unnamed National Forests in

the future” was insufficient to establish standing because

Bensman “fail[ed] to allege that any particular timber sale or

other project claimed to be unlawfully subject to the

regulations will impede a specific and concrete plan . . . to

enjoy the National Forests.” Id. The Court emphasized that,

although Bensman referred to a series of projects in the

Allegheny National Forest, Bensman did not “assert . . . any

firm intention to visit their locations, saying only that [he]

‘wants to’ go there . . . . Such ‘some day’ intentions—

without any description of concrete plans, or indeed any

specification of when the some day will be—do not support

a finding of . . . ‘actual or imminent’ injury . . . .” Id. at 496

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the

Court concluded that there was “a chance, but . . . hardly a

likelihood, that Bensman’s wanderings w[ould] bring him to

a parcel about to be affected by a project unlawfully subject

to the regulations.” Id. at 495.

There is a clear contrast between the specificity of

Cottonwood’s declarations and Bensman’s affidavit. 

Cottonwood’s declarations establish that its members

extensively utilize specific National Forests where the Lynx

Amendments apply and demonstrate their date-certain plans

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to visit the forests for the express purpose of viewing,

enjoying, and studying Canada lynx.

5

For instance, the declaration of Sara Jane Johnson

describes a twenty-year history of lynx-related recreational

activityin the Gallatin, Flathead, and Helena National Forests

with plans to return in “spring and summer of 2013.” 

Similarly, the declaration of Jennifer Pulchinski describes

several past trips she took to the Gallatin and Custer National

Forests to look for Canada lynx, and her plans to take a

similar trip in “mid-July of 2013.” Further, several

declarations state that Cottonwood’s members engage in

lynx-related recreation within specific project areas that have

applied, or will apply, the management direction in the Lynx

Amendments. For example, Joe Milbrath states that he has

“already recreated in the Bozeman Watershed Project area,

and ha[s] definitive plans to ski in the area next spring and to

look for signs of Canada lynx.”6 Cottonwood’s members

assert that the Forest Service’s failure to reinitiate

consultation will cause aesthetic, recreational, scientific, and

5 As specified in the 2007 BiOp, the following National Forests are

considered occupied by the Canada lynx: Bridger-Teton, Clearwater,

Custer, Flathead, Gallatin, Helena, Idaho Panhandle, Kootenai, Lewis and

Clark, Lolo, Shoshone, and the Targhee. The following six National

Forests contain lynx habitat, but are not occupied by the Canada lynx: 

Ashley, Beaverhead-Deerlodge, Bighorn, Bitterroot, Nez Perce, and

Salmon-Challis.

6 The Bozeman Municipal Watershed Fuel Reduction Project area is

located in the Gallatin National Forest in Montana. The purpose of the

project is to treat vegetation and fuel conditions to diminish the impact of

wildland fires in the area. The project includes thinning of mature stands

and smaller diameter trees, among other strategies. In November 2009,

FWS issued a BiOp concluding that the project was “not likely to result

in the destruction or adverse modification of lynx critical habitat.”

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spiritual injury, in the specific forests and project areas

covered by the Lynx Amendments. Unlike Bensman’s

affidavit in Summers, these declarations sufficiently establish

“a geographic nexus between the individual asserting the

claim and the location suffering an environmental impact.” 

See W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472,

485 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

also Wilderness Soc., Inc. v. Rey, 622 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th

Cir. 2010).

B.

This is not the first time we have held that a plaintiff has

standing to challenge programmatic management direction

without also challenging an implementing project that will

cause discrete injury. In Sierra Forest Legacy, a postSummers case, we explained that “a procedural injury is

complete after [a Forest Plan] has been adopted, so long as []

it is fairly traceable to some action that will affect the

plaintiff’s interests.”7646 F.3d at 1179. As in Sierra Forest

7 The Forest Service argues that this is not a procedural rights case. The

Forest Service relies on a misreading of Lujan to support its argument. 

Although Lujan explained that there can be no standing for the assertion

of procedural rights where plaintiffs raise “only a generally available

grievance” about the government’s failure to comply with a statutory

requirement, the Court recognized that procedural rights exist where the

violation is connected to a concrete injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 & n.8. 

Here, Cottonwood does not allege the “deprivation of a procedural right

without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation . . . ,” 

Summers, 555 U.S. at 496, but rather “a procedural requirement the

disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs,” 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572. Accordingly, along with other circuits, we have

recognized a procedural rights theory ofstanding in the context of alleged

Section 7 violations. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Jewell,

749 F.3d 776, 782–83 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Salmon Spawning &

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Legacy, Cottonwood properly alleges procedural injury

stemming from the Forest Service’s decision not to reinitiate

consultation on the Lynx Amendments. The declarations

connect that procedural injury to imminent harm in specific

forests and project areas. Cottonwood was not required to

challenge directly any specific project because, as in Sierra

Forest Legacy, the “procedural injury [was] complete.” See

id.; see also Jayne, 706 F.3d at 999–1000 (holding that

plaintiffs had standing to challenge a programmatic rule

without challenging a specific implementing project).

Although the Forest Service acknowledges that

Cottonwood’s members have a relationship to the areas

affected by the Bozeman Municipal Watershed Project and

the East Boulder Fuels Reduction Project,8it argues that

Cottonwood “failed to link these projects, or the absence of

the reinitiation of programmatic consultation, to any specific

injury to its members’ interests.” The Forest Service argues

that, because there was Section 7 consultation on these

individual projects after the revised critical habitat

designation, and because there was a determination that the

projects would not have an adverse impact on lynx critical

Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1229 (9th Cir. 2008); In

re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig.–MDL No. 2165,

704 F.3d 972, 977 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d

606, 613 (5th Cir. 1998).

8 The East Boulder Fuels Reduction Project area is located in the

Gallatin National Forest in Montana. The purpose of this project is to

reduce hazardous fuel loading in the Wildland Urban Interface along the

East Boulder River drainage by thinning and clearing vegetation across

872 acres. In March 2009, FWS issued a BiOp concluding that this

project was “not likely to result in the destruction or adverse modification

of lynx critical habitat.”

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habitat, no injury resulted from the failure to reinitiate

consultation on the Lynx Amendments.

The Forest Service’s argument is not persuasive as it

overlooks a significant aspect of the consultation process. 

Although the Forest Service may initiate Section 7

consultation with FWS on individual projects, FWS bases its

analysis of those projects largely on the Lynx Amendments

and corresponding 2007 BiOp.9 For instance, the BiOp for

the Bozeman Municipal Watershed Fuel Reduction Project

(“Bozeman BiOp”) cites to the Lynx Amendments and the

2007 BiOp as primary sources of information, and states that

individual projects will be evaluated against the standards and

guidelines in the Lynx Amendments. In fact, the Bozeman

BiOp frames its ultimate conclusion in terms of those

standards: “[w]e have determined that the proposed action is

in compliance with the [Lynx Amendments], and that its

effects on lynx were included in those anticipated and

analyzed in the 2007 biological opinion on the [Lynx

Amendments].” Thus, even though individual projects may

trigger additional Section 7 scrutiny, that scrutiny is

dependent, in large part, on the Lynx Amendments and the

2007 BiOp that were completed before critical habitat was

designated on National Forest land. Further, project-specific

consultations do not include a unit-wide analysis comparable

in scope and scale to consultation at the programmatic level.

9 This is consistent with FWS’s own explanation of how a programmatic

Section 7 consultation will affect consultation on implementing projects:

“In issuing its biological opinion on an action, [FWS’s] finding under

section 7(a)(2) entails an assessment of the degree of impact that action

will have on a listed species. Once evaluated, that degree of impact is

factored into all future section 7 consultations conducted in the area.” 

Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973 as Amended;

Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926-01, 19,932 (June 3, 1986).

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C.

The Forest Service’s insistence that Cottonwood must

establish how the failure to reinitiate consultation on the Lynx

Amendments would lead to different, injurious results at the

project-specific level places an inappropriate burden on

Cottonwood. That is, Cottonwood is not required to establish

what a Section 7 consultation would reveal, or what standards

would be set, if the Forest Service were to reinitiate

consultation. Ideally, that is the objective and purpose of the

consultation process. See Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Thus,

where a procedural violation is at issue, a plaintiff need not

“meet[] all the normal standards for redressability and

immediacy.”

10 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

572 n.7 (1992). In such a case, we have explained that “a

litigant need only demonstrate that he has a procedural right

that, if exercised, could protect his concrete interests and that

those interests fall within the zone of interests protected by

the statute at issue.” Jewell, 749 F.3d at 783 (internal

alterations and quotations omitted). Cottonwood has properly

alleged that the reinitiation of consultation could result in the

protection of its members’ interests in specific National

Forests and project areas where those members recreate. See

id. Those interests are clearly within the “zone of interests

protected by the [ESA].” See id.

10 As the D.C. Circuit has explained, the doctrine of procedural rights

“relieves the plaintiff of the need to demonstrate that (1) the agency action

would have been different but for the procedural violation, and (2) courtordered compliance with the procedure would alter the final result.” In re

Endangered Species Act, 704 F.3d at 977 (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted).

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The standing analysis in this case is strikingly similar to

our analysis in Salmon Spawning, 545 F.3d 1220. In Salmon

Spawning, an alliance of environmental organizations filed

suit against several agencies for failing to reinitiate Section 7

consultation after new information emerged about protected

salmon. Id. at 1224. Citing Lujan, we determined that,

because the plaintiffs had properly alleged a procedural harm,

the standards for causation and redressability were relaxed. 

Id. at 1229 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7). We said that

“uncertain[ty about] whether reinitiation will ultimately

benefit the groups (for example, by resulting in a ‘jeopardy’

determination) does not undermine [the plaintiffs’]standing.” 

Salmon Spawning, 545 F.3d at 1229. Thus, we concluded

that the alleged injury—“scientific, educational, aesthetic,

recreational, spiritual, conservation, economic, and business

interests” in the ongoing survival of the salmon, id. at 1225

(internal quotation marks omitted)—was “not too tenuously

connected to the agencies’ failure to reinitiate consultation,”

id. at 1229. Further, we determined that “a court order

requiring the agencies to reinitiate consultation would remedy

the harm asserted.” Id.

As in Salmon Spawning, Cottonwood’s allegation of a

procedural injury relaxes its burden of showing causation and

redressability. See id. Cottonwood need not show that

reinitiation of Section 7 consultation would lead to a different

result at either the programmatic or project-specific level. 

See id. Cottonwood’s declarations alleging aesthetic,

recreational, scientific, and spiritual injury are “not too

tenuously connected to [the Forest Service’s] failure to

reinitiate consultation” to establish standing. See id. A court

order reinitiating consultation on the Lynx Amendments

would adequately redress the alleged harm. See id.

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In sum, we hold that the district court properlydetermined

that Cottonwood has standing to pursue its claim.

IV. Ripeness

Rehashing many of its standing arguments, the Forest

Service argues that Cottonwood’s lawsuit is not ripe for

review until, and unless, Cottonwood challenges a particular

project that implements the Lynx Amendments. Further, the

Forest Service suggests that adjudication of Cottonwood’s

programmatic challenge at this point is improper because

future project-specific consultations might resultinmitigation

or elimination of any potential harm to Cottonwood’s

members, thus rendering adjudication unnecessary. We

conclude, however, that Cottonwood’s lawsuit is ripe for

adjudication.

A.

“The doctrine of ripeness prevents courts from becoming

involved in abstract questions which have not affected the

parties in a concrete way.” S. Cal. Edison Co. v. F.E.R.C.,

770 F.2d 779, 785 (9th Cir. 1985). To determine ripeness in

an agency context, we must consider:

(1) whether delayed review would cause

hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial

intervention would inappropriately interfere

with further administrative action; and

(3) whether the courts would benefit from

further factual development of the issues

presented.

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Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733

(1998); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife

Serv., 450 F.3d 930, 940 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying this test to

an ESA claim involving FWS). Judicial intervention does not

interfere with further administrative action when an agency’s

decision is “at an administrative resting place.” Citizens for

Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 977

(9th Cir. 2003). Further, no additional factual development

is necessary after a procedural injury has occurred. See Ohio

Forestry Ass’n, 523 U.S. at 737 (holding that a procedural

dispute is ripe “at the time the [procedural] failure takes

place”).

B.

The Forest Service’s arguments rest on the false premise

that Cottonwood is pursuing a substantive ESA claim. As

explained above, Cottonwood does not argue for a particular

substantive result, but rather alleges that the Forest Service

failed to complywith the procedural requirements of the ESA

when it declined to reinitiate consultation. When a party such

as Cottonwood suffers a procedural injury, it “may complain

of that failure at the time the failure takes place, for the claim

can never get riper.” Id. at 737. The imminence of projectspecific implementation “is irrelevant to the ripeness of an

action raising a procedural injury.” Citizens for Better

Forestry, 341 F.3d at 977; see also Seattle Audubon Soc’y v.

Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1993). Because the alleged

procedural violation—failure to reinitiate consultation—is

complete, so too is the factual development necessary to

adjudicate the case. See Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d at 486. 

Further, because the Forest Service is actively applying the

Lynx Amendments at the project-specific level, delayed

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review would cause hardship to Cottonwood and its

members.

The Forest Service’s argument that judicial intervention

would preclude it from refining its policies and “adopting

additional protective measures” after conducting site-specific

analysis misses the point. The Forest Service has completed

the Lynx Amendments and refused to reinitiate Section 7

consultation after the 2009 revised critical habitat

designation. That decision is ripe for review because it is “at

an administrative resting place.” Citizens for Better Forestry,

341 F.3d at 977; see also Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S.

Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining

that a claim is ripe for review when it is not “merely tentative

or interlocutory,” but rather the agency “has rendered its last

word on the matter”) quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n,

531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001). Any “additional protective

measures” would apply only at the project-specific level, not

the programmatic level in dispute. There is thus no improper

interference with administrative action.

Delayed review would cause Cottonwood and its

members further hardship. This dispute requires no

additional factual development because the procedural injury

has already occurred. Further, judicial intervention will not

interfere with further agency action because the agency’s

decision is at an administrative resting place. We therefore

hold that Cottonwood’s claim is ripe for review.

V. Reinitiation of Section 7 consultation

We turn to the merits of Cottonwood’s argument that the

Forest Service violated Section 7 of the ESA by failing to

reinitiate consultation on the Lynx Amendments when FWS

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designated critical habitat on National Forest land. The

Forest Service asserts that it had no remaining Section 7

obligations related to the Lynx Amendments “because the

Forest Service completed its action in 2007 when it made a

final decision to amend the [Forest Plans].” We disagree and

hold that the Forest Service must reinitiate consultation on the

Lynx Amendments.

A.

Under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA,

[e]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation

with and with the assistance of the Secretary

[of Commerce or the Interior] insure that any

action authorized, funded, or carried out by

such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the

continued existence of any endangered

species or threatened species or result in the

destruction or adverse modification of [the

critical] habitat of such species . . . .

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). If it appears that an action may affect

an endangered or threatened species, the consulting agency

must provide a biological opinion to the action agency

explaining how the action “affects the species or its critical

habitat.” Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A). When a biological opinion

concludes that the action is likely to jeopardize an endangered

or threatened species, or adverselymodify its habitat, then the

consulting agency must suggest “reasonable and prudent

alternatives.” Id. If the biological opinion concludes

otherwise, then the action is permitted to proceed.

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The implementing regulations for the ESA define

“action” as “all activities or programs of any kind authorized,

funded, or carried out . . . by Federal agencies.” 50 C.F.R.

§ 402.02. The regulation lists, as examples, “actions intended

to conserve listed species or their habitat,” id. § 402.02(a),

and “actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to

the land, water, or air,” id. § 402.02(d). There is no dispute

that the adoption of the Lynx Amendments was an action that

required consultation and that the 2007 BiOp satisfied the

Forest Service’s initial Section 7 obligations. However, as

noted above, because FWS had decided not to designate any

National Forest land as critical habitat, the initial BiOp did

not address, or respond to, the impact of the Lynx

Amendments on designated critical habitat. The parties

disagree about whether the 2009 revised critical habitat

designation required reinitiation of Section 7 consultation on

the Lynx Amendments.

The Forest Service argues that reinitiation was not

required because it had already promulgated the Lynx

Amendments and incorporated them into the Forest Plans

when the FWS released its revised critical habitat

designation. For support, the Forest Service relies on Norton

v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004)

(“SUWA”). In SUWA, the Supreme Court considered whether

the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”),

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370, required the U.S. Bureau of Land

Management (“BLM”) to supplement its environmental

review of a land use plan if significant new information

emerged after the plan was approved. Applying NEPA, the

Court explained that “supplementation is necessary only if

there remains ‘major Federal action’ to occur.” Id. at 73

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332 and 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6) (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted). The Court

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concluded that, because the land use plan was complete upon

approval, the BLM had no obligation to supplement its

environmental analysis.

In analogizing to SUWA, the Forest Service ignores a key

difference between NEPA and the regulations governing

reinitiation of consultation under the ESA. The governing

ESA regulation states, in relevant part,

[r]einitiation of formal consultation is

required and shall be requested by the Federal

agency or by the Service, where discretionary

Federal involvement or control over the action

has been retained or is authorized by law and:

. . .

(b) If new information reveals effects of

the action that may affect listed species or

critical habitat in a manner or to an extent not

previously considered;

. . . , or

(d) If a new species is listed or critical

habitat designated that may be affected by the

identified action.

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50 C.F.R. § 402.16.11 Unlike the supplementation of

environmental review at issue in SUWA, an agency’s

responsibility to reinitiate consultation does not terminate

when the underlying action is complete. Stated another way,

there is nothing in the ESA or its implementing regulations

that limits reinitiation to situations where there is “ongoing

agency action.”12 The 2009 revised critical habitat

designation clearlymeets the requirements of subsections (b)

and (d) above. See id. The determinative question, therefore,

is whether “discretionaryFederal involvement or control over

the [Lynx Amendments] has been retained or is authorized by

law.” See id.

B.

In National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of

Wildlife, the Supreme Court clarified that the regulatory

language limiting agencies’ Section 7 obligations to actions

11 The regulation governing reinitiation of consultation corresponds with

the regulation governing consultation, generally. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03

(“Section 7 and the requirements of this part apply to all actions in which

there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.”).

 

12 The parties vigorously debate whether our opinion in Pacific Rivers

Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) is still good law after

SUWA. In Pacific Rivers, we held that the Forest Service was required to

reinitiate consultation because Forest Plans are “ongoing agency action.” 

Id. at 1053. We do not address the viability of Pacific Rivers’ reasoning

after SUWA because it is not determinative of whether the Forest Service

was required to reinitiate consultation. We certainly agree that where

there is “ongoing agency action,” an agency may be required to reinitiate

consultation. However, even if the agency action is complete and not

“ongoing,” the agency still may be required to reinitiate consultation if

there is “discretionaryFederal involvement or control” over the completed

action.

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over which theymaintain “discretionaryFederal involvement

or control” is designed to avoid “impliedly repealing

nondiscretionary statutory mandates.” 551 U.S. 644, 665

(2007). Section 7 does not “attach to actions . . . that an

agency is required by statute to undertake,” because it could

lead to an “override” of other statutory authority. Id. at 669. 

Similarly, “[i]n the case where a permit or license ha[s] been

granted, reinitiation would not be appropriate unless the

permitting or licensing agency retained jurisdiction over the

matter under the terms of the permit or license or as otherwise

authorized by law.” Interagency Cooperation—Endangered

Species Act of 1973, as Amended; Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg.

19926-01, 19956 (June 3, 1986); see also Sierra Club v.

Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that

there is not sufficient discretion to warrant Section 7

consultation where an agency lacks the ability to influence a

private action). In other words, if an agency has no discretion

to take any action that might benefit the threatened species,

Section 7 consultation would be “a meaningless exercise.” 

Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073,

1085 (9th Cir. 2001) (“EPIC”) (Nelson, J. dissenting) (citing

Sierra Club, 65 F.3d at 1509); see also Jewell, 749 F.3d at

784 (“The agency lacks discretion only if another legal

obligation makes it impossible for the agency to exercise

discretion for the protected species’ benefit.”).

Here, there is no “nondiscretionary statutory mandate[],”

see Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 665, nor “legal obligation,”

see Jewell, 749 F.3d at 784, at issue that is beyond the Forest

Service’s authority. Reinitiation of Section 7 consultation,

therefore, could yield important actionable information. The

Forest Service remains “involve[d]” in the Forest Plans, 50

C.F.R. § 402.16, because, as SUWA itself explained, agencies

make additional decisions after approval that implement land

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use plans at the site-specific level, see 542 U.S. at 69–70. 

Further, the Forest Service retains exclusive “control,” 50

C.F.R. § 402.16, over its own Forest Plans throughout their

implementation. Indeed, we have repeatedly explained that

Forest Plans fall squarely within the “discretionary”

parameters of 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.03 and 402.16 because,

through the Forest Plans, the Forest Service retains a

“continuing ability . . . to control forest management projects

. . . .” Sierra Club, 65 F.3d at 1509; see also W. Watersheds

Project v. Matejko, 468 F.3d 1099, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006)

(explaining our holding in Pacific Rivers Council, 30 F.3d at

1053–54, that Section 7 applies to Forest Plans, because the

Forest Service “maintain[s] continuing authority”); EPIC,

255 F.3d at 1080.

C.

This is not the first time since SUWA that we have

decided that an agency has obligations under Section 7 even

after the underlying action is complete. In Washington Toxics

Coalition v. Environmental ProtectionAgency, 413 F.3d 1024

(9th Cir. 2005), the Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA”) argued that, because it had completed registration of

fifty-four pesticides pursuant to the Federal Insecticide,

Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq., it

was not required to comply with Section 7. 413 F.3d at

1030–33. Rejecting that argument, we clarified that the

appropriate test is not whether the agency has completed its

action, but whether it retains regulatory authority over the

action. Id. at 1033. We concluded that “[b]ecause EPA has

continuing authority over pesticide regulation, it has a

continuing obligation to follow the requirements of the ESA.” 

Id. We explained that it was EPA’s discretion to take actions

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that “inure to the benefit” of protected species that placed the

registrations within the ambit of Section 7. Id.

As in Washington Toxics, it is irrelevant here whether the

process of incorporating the Lynx Amendments into the

Forest Plans was complete when FWS designated lynx

critical habitat on National Forest land. “Because [the Forest

Service] has continuing authority over [the Lynx

Amendments to the Forest Plans], it has a continuing

obligation to follow the requirements of the ESA.” See id. 

The Forest Service’s “ongoing regulatory authority” provides

it “discretionary control to inure to the benefit of [the Canada

lynx].” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed,

the Forest Service’s decision to voluntarily reinitiate

consultation in some forests, but not in others, demonstrates

that it retains discretion and authority over the Lynx

Amendments, and that it does not view reinitiation of

consultation as a meaningless exercise.

Requiring reinitiation in these circumstances comports

with the ESA’s statutory command that agencies consult to

ensure the “continued existence” of listed species. 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(a)(2), (4) (emphasis added). The Forest Service’s

position in this case would relegate the ESA—“the most

comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered

species ever enacted by any nation,” Tennessee Valley

Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978)—to a static law

that evaluates and responds to the impact of an action before

that action takes place, but does not provide for any further

evaluation or response when new information emerges that is

critical to the evaluation. Here, FWS discovered that its

decision on critical habitat had been tainted by an ethical

lapse in its own administrative ranks. Re-evaluation of the

data generated a drastically different result that justified vast

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designation of previously unprotected critical habitat. These

new protections triggered new obligations. The Forest

Service cannot evade its obligations by relying on an analysis

it completed before the protections were put in place.

We hold that, pursuant to the ESA’s implementing

regulations, the Forest Service was required to reinitiate

consultation when the FWS designated critical habitat in

National Forests. We therefore affirm the district court ruling

on this issue.

VI. Injunctive relief

In its cross-appeal, Cottonwood argues that the district

court erred when it declined to enjoin “those projects that

‘may affect’ critical habitat” until the agency has completed

the required Section 7 consultation. Cottonwood contends

that the court improperly required that it present evidence

showing a likelihood of irreparable injury. Cottonwood urges

the court to follow our nearly thirty-year-old precedent that

relieves plaintiffs of the traditional burden of establishing

irreparable harm when seeking injunctive relief to remedy a

procedural violation of the ESA. We affirm the district

court’s denial of injunctive relief but remand for further

proceedings.

A.

Under “well-established principles of equity,” a plaintiff

seeking permanent injunctive relief must satisfy a four-factor

test by showing:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;

(2) that remedies available at law, such as

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monetary damages, are inadequate to

compensate for that injury; (3) that,

considering the balance of hardships between

the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity

is warranted; and (4) that the public interest

would not be disserved by a permanent

injunction.

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391

(2006).

Starting with Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th

Cir. 1985), we have long recognized an exception to the

traditional test for injunctive relief when addressing

procedural violations under the ESA. See also Wash. Toxics,

413 F.3d at 1035; Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1384

(9th Cir. 1987). In Thomas, after holding that plaintiffs

established a procedural violation of the ESA, we addressed

the appropriate remedy. We looked to our case law under

NEPA, noting that “[t]he procedural requirements of the ESA

are analogous to those of NEPA. . . .” 753 F.2d at 764. We

then acknowledged in the NEPA context, we had held that

because “[i]rreparable damage is presumed to flow from a

failure properly to evaluate” environmental impacts of an

agency action, an injunction is typically the appropriate

remedy for a Section 7 violation.13Id. (citing Save Our

13 In a subsequent case involving a Section 9 illegal take claim, National

Wildlife Federation v. Burlington Northern Railroad, we held that,

although the traditional test for injunctive relief does not apply in ESA

cases, “[t]he plaintiff must make a showing that a violation of the ESA is

at least likely in the future.” 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994). In that

case, it was undisputed that there had been a take of animals within an

endangered species, grizzly bears, but we affirmed the denial ofinjunctive

relief because there was insufficient evidence in the record that the

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Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 1984);

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 330 (9th

Cir. 1975)). Critical to our discussion here was our holding

that “[w]e see no reason that the same principle should not

apply to procedural violations of the ESA.” Id. In so

holding, we explained that “[i]t is not the responsibility of the

plaintiffs to prove, nor the function of the courts to judge, the

effect of a proposed action on an endangered species when

proper procedures have not been followed.” Id. at 765.

In 2005, we reiterated that “the appropriate remedy for

violations of the ESA consultation requirements is an

injunction pending compliance with the ESA.” Wash. Toxics,

413 F.3d at 1035. We acknowledged that some “nonjeopardizing agency actions [may] continue during the

consultation process,” but stated that “the burden should be

on the agency [as] the entity that has violated its statutory

duty” to establish that the agency action is non-jeopardizing. 

Id.

The Forest Service argues that the Thomas presumption

of irreparable harm has been effectively overruled by two

recent Supreme Court cases addressing injunctive relief in the

context of NEPA: Winter v. Natural Resources Defense

defendant’s operations would result in a future take of bears. On the

surface, there is some tension between Burlington and Thomas, but there

is a fundamental difference between the two cases. Burlington involved

a discrete incident that resulted in a substantive violation of the ESA,

whereas Thomas involved a procedural violation. Addressing the

procedural aspects of the ESA, we stressed in Thomas that there is a

presumption of irreparable harm because “there can be no assurance that

a violation of the ESA’s substantive provisions will not result” from a

procedural failure under Section 7. 753 F.2d at 764. Notably, there was

no procedural violation at issue in Burlington.

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Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), and Monsanto Co. v.

Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010). In Winter, the

Court rejected our test for preliminary injunctive relief in

NEPA cases as “too lenient.” 555 U.S. at 22. Our precedent

had allowed for granting a preliminary injunction upon a

showing that irreparable harm was a “possibility.” Id. The

Winter Court held that, even in NEPA cases, “plaintiffs

seeking preliminaryrelief [must] demonstrate that irreparable

injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Id. In

Monsanto, this time addressing permanent injunctive relief in

the context of NEPA, the Court disapproved of cases which

do not apply the traditional four-factor test and instead

“presume that an injunction is the proper remedy for a NEPA

violation except in unusual circumstances.” 561 U.S. at 157. 

The Court explained that there is nothing in NEPA that

allows courts considering injunctive relief to put their “thumb

on the scales.” Id.

B.

The central question here is whether Winter and

Monsanto’s analysis of injunctive relief under NEPA extends

to the ESA, or whether the differences between the two

statutes warrant a different test. The Supreme Court has

explained that

Congress may intervene and guide or control

the exercise of the courts’ discretion, but we

do not lightly assume that Congress has

intended to depart from established principles. 

Unless a statute in so many words, or by a

necessary and inescapable inference, restricts

the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full

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scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized

and applied.

Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531,

542 (1987) (“Amoco”) (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted); see also eBay, 547 U.S. at 391–92

(rejecting a presumption in favor of injunctive relief because

“[n]othing in the Patent Act indicates that Congress intended

such a departure [from the traditional four-factor test]. To the

contrary, the Patent Act expressly provides that injunctions

‘may’ issue ‘in accordance with the principles of equity’”

(citing 35 U.S.C. § 283)). Therefore, we must look to the

underlying statute to determine whether the traditional test for

injunctive relief applies, or whether courts must apply a

different test.

There is no question, as firmly recognized by the Supreme

Court, that the ESA strips courts of at least some of their

equitable discretion in determining whether injunctive relief

is warranted. Amoco, 480 U.S. at 543 n.9 (explaining that the

ESA “foreclose[s] the traditional discretion possessed by an

equity court”). Hill held that courts do not have discretion to

balance the parties’ competing interests in ESA cases because

Congress “afford[ed] first priority to the declared national

policy of saving endangered species.” 437 U.S. at 185. Hill

also held that Congress established an unparalleled public

interest in the “incalculable” value of preserving endangered

species. Id. at 187–88. It is the incalculability of the injury

that renders the “remedies available at law, such as monetary

damages . . . inadequate.” See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391; see also

Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545 (“Environmental injury, by its nature,

can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages

. . . .”); Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d

999 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). But, although Hill clarified that

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the “language, history, and structure” of the ESA, 437 U.S. at

174, remove several factors in the four-factor test from a

court’s equitable jurisdiction, Hill did not resolve whether

plaintiffs must establish irreparable injury. That factor was

not an issue in Hill because there was uncontroverted

scientific evidence that completion and operation of the

disputed project would “either eradicate the known

population of [the listed species] or destroy their critical

habitat.” Id. at 171.

There is nothing in the ESA that explicitly, “or by a

necessary and inescapable inference,” restricts a court’s

discretion to decide whether a plaintiff has suffered

irreparable injury. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 542 (internal

quotation marks omitted); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A). 

Although Congress altered the third and fourth prongs of the

traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief in ESA cases,

Hill, 437 U.S. at 185, 187, and the second is generally not at

issue in environmental cases, Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545, the

ESA does not allow courts to put their “thumb on the scales”

in evaluating the first prong, Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 157. 

Thus, even though Winter and Monsanto address NEPA, not

the ESA, they nonetheless undermine the theoretical

foundation for our prior rulings on injunctive relief in Thomas

and its progeny. Indeed, Thomas’s reasoning explicitly relied

on the presumption of irreparable injury that we had

previously recognized in the NEPA context.14 Where

14 Cottonwood argues that since Winter and Monsanto we have

continued to apply Thomas’s presumption of irreparable harm, citing

Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d at 500, and Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar,

628 F.3d 513, 533 (9th Cir. 2010). Although we determined in both cases

that the ESA procedural violation warranted injunctive relief pending

compliance with the ESA, we did so without discussing Winter and

Monsanto’s impact on Thomas’s presumption of irreparable harm.

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Supreme Court precedent “undercut[s] the theory or

reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way

that the cases are clearly irreconcilable,” the prior circuit

precedent is no longer binding. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d

889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). We must therefore

conclude that there is no presumption of irreparable injury

where there has been a procedural violation in ESA cases. A

plaintiff must show irreparable injury to justify injunctive

relief. In light of the stated purposes of the ESA in

conserving endangered and threatened species and the

ecosystems that support them, establishing irreparable injury

should not be an onerous task for plaintiffs. 16 U.S.C.

§ 1531.

C.

The dissent worries that our opinion today will cause

“uncertainty” “as a global storm of extinction rages.” Dissent

at 40. The dissent overstates the significance of our holding. 

First, our opinion does nothing to disturb the Supreme

Court’s holding in Hill that when evaluating a request for

injunctive relief to remedy an ESA procedural violation, the

equities and public interest factors always tip in favor of the

protected species. As the Court made unmistakably clear:

“Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it

abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of

affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby

adopting a policy which it described as ‘institutionalized

caution.’” Hill, 437 U.S. at 194. That fundamental principle

remains intact and will continue to guide district courts when

confronted with requests for injunctive relief in ESA cases.

Second, we do not dispute that the Thomas presumption

of irreparable harm virtually assures the grant of injunctive

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relief to remedy an ESA procedural violation. But that does

not mean that without the aid of such a presumption the

district courts will be at a disadvantage in remedying

procedural violations pending compliance with the ESA. 

Indeed, as exemplified by several of the cases the dissent

cites, district courts are quite capable of identifying harm to

protected species, and in crafting an injunction to remedy the

precise harm. For instance, in South Yuba River Citizens

League v. National Marine Fisheries Service, the district

court, although acknowledging Thomas’s holding,

nonetheless held that the plaintiff “must show that irreparable

harm to the listed species will result from defendants’

violation of the ESA in the absence of each [protective]

measure plaintiffs request.” 804 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1054

(E.D. Cal. 2011). The court proceeded to address the

evidence of harm and the relief requested, and granted an

injunction to address the harm established by the evidence.

Similarly, in National Wildlife Federation v. National

Marine Fisheries Service, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1131 (D. Or.

2011), the plaintiffs moved the district court to order the

operators of the Federal Columbia River Power System to

maintain previously established spring and summer dam

spills along the Columbia River for the protection of

endangered salmon species. In ruling on the motion, the

court recognized our holding in Thomas, but did not stop

there. Instead, it proceeded to review the record and found

that without certain protective measures sought by the

plaintiffs, including the spills, the protected fish would suffer

irreparable harm. The court then granted injunctive relief to

address the specific harm.

As these cases demonstrate, district courts will not be left

adrift without the benefit of Thomas’s presumption of

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irreparable harm. The purposes and objectives of the ESA, as

recognized in Hill, will continue to provide fundamental

direction to the district courts when confronted with a request

for injunctive relief to remedy a procedural violation of the

ESA. The presumption of irreparable harm, however, as

explained above, cannot survive the Court’s recent opinions

in Winter and Monsanto.

D.

Although we acknowledge today that Thomas’s ruling on

injunctive relief is no longer good law, we recognize that it

has been the law of the circuit since 1985. Cottonwood

should not be faulted for relying on Thomas and its progeny

as a basis for injunctive relief. We therefore vacate the

district court’s denial of injunctive relief and remand on an

open record to allow Cottonwood an opportunity to make a

showing of irreparable injury.

VII. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s ruling that the Forest

Service violated Section 7 of the ESA when it failed to

reinitiate consultation afterFWS designated critical habitat on

National Forest land. We also affirm the district court’s

denial of injunctive relief to Cottonwood. We remand,

however, to provide Cottonwood an opportunity to make an

evidentiary showing that specific projects will likely cause

irreparable damage to its members’ interests.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

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PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

Respectfully, I dissent from Section VI of the majority

opinion which makes it harder to protect the threatened

Canada Lynx and its critical habitat, and puts the species at

increased risk. I do not agree with the majority that Thomas

v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Thomas”), should

be put into the shredder by inferring that Winter v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), and

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010),

implicitly “undermine the theoretical foundation for our prior

rulings on injunctive relief in Thomas and its progeny.” Maj.

op. at 33. I do not read Winter and Monsanto as casting a

dark shadow on the ESA’s legislative purpose and our Ninth

Circuit precedent. Winter and Monsanto are not “clearly

irreconcilable” with Thomas as required for a three-judge

panel to overturn settled Ninth Circuit case law. Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003).

Winter and Monsanto focus on NEPA’s—not the

ESA’s—standard for injunctive relief. Winter and Monsanto

do not address the ESA, which has a unique purpose and

history, and still shines as the “most comprehensive

legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever

enacted by any nation.” Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of

Cmtys for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995).

The Supreme Court has carefully considered the ESA’s

purpose and text in terms of a court’s equitable powers when

faced with an ESA violation. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,

173, 193–95 (1978) (finding that it was the plain intent of

Congress in enacting the ESA to halt and reverse the trend

towards species extinction, whatever the cost, and that an

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injunction was the appropriate remedy when a nearlycompleted, multimillion-dollar damthreatened an endangered

snail darter and its critical habitat).

The Supreme Court examined congressional intent to

understand how Section 7 of the ESA affected the courts’

equitable powers. Id. at 183–84. Although the courts ensure

compliance with the ESA, as the Supreme Court noted,

“Congress had foreclosed the exercise of the usual discretion

possessed by a court of equity.” Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982). Discussing Hill, the

Ninth Circuit has observed that “[courts] have no expert

knowledge on the subject of endangered species, much less

do [they] have a mandate from the people to strike a balance

of equities [against the interests of an endangered species].” 

Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987)

(internal citations omitted).

The majority asserts that “the ESA does not allow courts

to put their thumb on the scales,” Maj. op. at 33. But, I

remain firmly convinced that “Congress has spoken in the

plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance

has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the

highest of priorities . . . .” Sierra Club, 816 F.2d at 1383. I

agree with the Supreme Court that “[o]ne would be hard

pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any

plainer than [those of the ESA].” Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S

at 313 (citing Hill, U.S. 437 at 173).

The ESA commands federal agencies to “insure that any

action authorized, funded, or carried out by [them] is not

likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any

endangered species or threatened species or result in the

destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species

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. . . .” 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536. “The purpose and language of the

statute under consideration in Hill, not the bare fact of a

statutory violation, compel[ an injunction in the face of an

ESA violation that threatens critical habitat].” RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. at 314. “In Congress’s view, projects that

jeopardized the continued existence of endangered species

threatened incalculable harm: accordingly, it decided that the

balance of hardships and the public interest tip heavily in

favor of endangered species.” Sierra Club, 816 F.2d at 1383. 

Contrary to the majority, I agree with Ninth Circuit precedent

holding that “[w]e may not use equity’s scales to strike a

different balance.” Id.

The majority’s analogy between NEPA and the ESA fails

to appreciate the critical difference between these statutes. 

The ESA’s statutory goal is to substantively provide for the

conservation of endangered and threatened species and their

ecosystems, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b); whereas NEPA’s

statutory goals are fundamentally procedural, and designed to

create an environmental policy process that promotes the

nation’s general welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 4331; see Winter,

555 U.S. at 23 (remarking that “NEPA itself does not

mandate particular results. Instead, NEPA imposes only

procedural requirements to ensure that the agency, in

reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully

consider, detailed information concerning significant

environmental impacts.” (internal citation and quotation

marks omitted)).

The substantive purpose of the ESA, conserving

endangered and threatened species and their ecosystems,

justifies more protective processes than NEPA’s purpose,

ensuring decision-makers have and consider all important

information on environmental impacts. See Thomas,

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753 F.2d at 764 (“If anything, the strict substantive provisions

of the ESA justify more stringent enforcement of its

proceduralrequirements, because the procedural requirements

are designed to ensure compliance with the substantive

provisions.”).

It is important to note that the majority opinion eliminates

Thomas’s procedural protections as a global storm of

extinction rages. See S.L Pimms et al., The Biodiversity of

Species and Their Rates of Extinction, Distribution, and

Protection, 344 Science 1246752 (2014) (concluding that

rates of extinction today are approximately 1,000 times the

rate of extinction absent human action); Elizabeth Kolbert,

The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History (2014). The

uncertainty resulting from the majority opinion bodes ill for

endangered species and the public.

A number of species at risk of extinction have been

protected by Thomas’s holding, both in the Ninth Circuit and

elsewhere. See, e.g., S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat’l

Marine Fisheries Serv., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1055 (E.D.

Cal. 2011) (protecting Chinook salmon, Central Valley

Steelhead, and green sturgeon); Ctr. for Biological Diversity

v. U.S. Forest Serv., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1038 (D. Ariz.

2011) (protecting the Mexican spotted owl and New Mexico

ridge-nosed rattlesnake);Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine

Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1131 (D. Or. 2011)

(protecting several endangered species of salmon, including

Chum, Chinook, Sockeye, and Coho salmon); Ctr. for

Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. C 03-

05509 SI, 2004 WL 3030209, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2004)

(protecting the Mojave desert tortoise); Pac. Coast Fed’n of

Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F.

Supp. 2d 1228, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (protecting the

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shortnose sucker and the Lost River sucker); Greenpeace v.

Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073

(W.D. Wash. 2000) (protecting the Stellar sea lion);

Greenpeace Found. v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1137

(D. Haw. 2000) (protecting the Hawaiian monk seal); Florida

Key Deer v. Brown, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1291 (S.D. Fla.

2005), aff’d sub nom. Florida Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d

1133 (11th Cir. 2008) (protecting the Key Largo cotton

mouse, Key Deer, Key Largo woodrat, Lower Keys marsh

rabbit, Schaus’ swallowtail butterfly, silver rice rat, Stock

Island tree snail, and Key tree-cactus).

Section VI of the majority opinion states that “[i]n light

of the stated purposes of the ESA . . .[,] establishing

irreparable injury should not be an onerous task for

plaintiffs.” Maj. op. at 34. This may prove more difficult in

practice than the majority assumes.

The majority opinion points to Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v.

Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Or.

2011), where a district court seemingly easily identified

irreparable harm to endangered salmon species, to

demonstrate that district courts will have no difficulty

determining the existence of irreparable harm to a species and

tailoring injunctions accordingly. Maj. op. at 35–36. 

Notably, the majority opinion fails to discuss the decades of

scientific analysis needed for the district court to identify that

harm, beginning with the 1991 listing of the Snake River

sockeye salmon as an endangered species under the ESA. 

See, e.g.,Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,

2005 WL 1278878, at *22–32 (D. Or. May 26, 2005) (listing

some of the scientific sources considered by the District

Court of Oregon during National Wildlife Federation’s years

of protracted litigation)). A full review of the “Columbia

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basin salmon saga” demonstrates that the district court’s

decades-long efforts to analyze the evidence of irreparable

harm has resulted in judicial frustration and “status quo dam

operations [that] largely continue to inflict high salmon

mortalities” even “over two decades after a determination that

more than a dozen species of Pacific salmonids require ESA

protection.” Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role

of the Judge in ESA Implementation: District Judge James

Redden and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32 Stan. Envtl.

L.J. 87, 148 (2013) (examining a “paradigmatic example of

the limits of judicial review to effectuate real improvements

in complex natural resources cases” despite active managerial

efforts by the district court).

The outcome of National Wildlife Federation is a good

example justifying Thomas’s holding that an injunction to

protect endangered species and their critical habitat must

come first.1 Thomas’s holding remains one of the best

1 The majority opinion also discusses South Yuba River Citizens League,

804 F. Supp. 2d 1045, another ESA case involving the effect of dams on

endangered salmon and other fish species, to demonstrate the ability of a

district court to “address the evidence of harm and the relief requested,

and grant[] an injunction to address the harmestablished by the evidence.” 

Maj. op. at 35.

But a careful reading of South Yuba Riverfinds that Thomas provided

a critical function in that case, offering the district court a solid foundation

for an injunction even when the “data and analysis necessary to determine

what measures, precisely, are needed in order to avoid jeopardizing the

listed species [were not provided by the government.]” 804 F. Supp. 2d

at 1055. Lacking this necessary information, the district court was able to

“err on the side of a more protective injunction,” relying, in part, on

Thomas’s holding that, had plaintiffs sought such a remedy, the court

could “enjoin the new project entirely.” Id.

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guarantors of positive outcomes for threatened and

endangered species.

Because I would follow settled precedent and protect the

Canada Lynx and its critical habitat first, I would apply

Thomas v. Peterson rather than finding it to be implicitly

overturned as the majority does. Thus, I would grant

Appellant’s request for an injunction pending compliance

with the ESA’s Section 7 consultation requirements.

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