Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02615/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02615-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (referred to herein as the

"Complaint" or "Compl.").

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE PODESTA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF SAN LEANDRO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-2615 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 9]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants City of San Leandro, Troy Young, and Ron

Clark's("Defendants") Motionto Dismiss or, alternatively, Motionfor a More Definite Statement [Docket

No. 9]. Having read and considered the arguments presented bythe partiesinthe paperssubmitted to the

Court, the Court findsthismatterappropriateforresolutionwithout a hearing. The Court hereby GRANTS

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and DENIES AS MOOT Defendants' Motion for a More Definite

Statement. 

BACKGROUND1

On or about May 14, 2004, Plaintiff Lawrence Podesta was shopping at a Wal-Mart in San

Leandro, California. Compl. at ¶ 7(a). Plaintiff exited the store and walked toward his motorcycle, which

was located inthe Wal-Mart parking lot. Id. While walking toward his motorcycle, Plaintiff was accosted

by defendants Troy Young ("Young") and RonClark ("Clark"), officers and members ofthe San Leandro

Police Department. Id. Young and Clark kicked Plaintiff, beat him, forced him to lie face down on the

parking lot pavement, and placed him under arrest. Id. Plaintiff was also photographed by Young and

Clark. Id. at ¶ 7(b). Additionally, Young and/orClark drafted a police report indicating that Plaintiff had

engaged in criminal activity. Id. at ¶ 7(c). After one hour, Plaintiff was released but was provided no

explanation for his arrest. Id. at ¶ 7(b). 

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2The Constitutional rights asserted in third cause of action include the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments.

2

OnNovember 15, 2004, Plaintifffiled a claimwiththe CityofSanLeandro. Id. at ¶ 7. The claim

was subsequently rejected. Id. 

 On June 19, 2005, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint in the Superior Court of the State

ofCalifornia, Alameda County. The First Amended Complaint asserts the following causes of action:(1)

violation of Plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, brought under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986; (2) assault and battery; (3) "custom, usage and policy"violations of42 U.S.C.

§ 19832; (4) negligence; (5) defamation/invasion of privacy; (6) supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. §§

1983 and 1986; and (7) "property damage." 

On June 27, 2005, Defendants filed a Notice ofRemoval, thereby removing the action to federal

court.

On July 8, 2005, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for

a More Definite Statement.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss should be granted only if it

appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff "can prove no set offactsinsupport ofhis claimwhich

would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). For purposes of such a

motion, the complaint is construed in a light mostfavorable to the plaintiff and all properly pleaded factual

allegations are taken as true. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Everest & Jennings,

Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994). All reasonable inferences are

to be drawn infavor ofthe plaintiff. Jacobson v. Hughes Aircraft, 105 F.3d 1288, 1296 (9thCir. 1997).

The court does not accept astrue unreasonable inferencesor conclusoryallegations castinthe form

of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); see also

Miranda v. Clark County, Nev., 279 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[C]onclusoryallegations oflaw

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and unwarranted inferences will not defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."); Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 1187 (9thCir. 2001); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem Co., 845 F.2d 802,

810 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[C]onclusory allegations without more are insufficient to defeat a motionto dismiss

for failure to state a claim.").

Whena complaint is dismissed forfailureto state a claim, "leave to amend should be granted unless

the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not

possibly cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401

(9thCir. 1986). The Court should consider factors suchas "the presence or absence ofundue delay, bad

faith, dilatorymotive,repeated failure to cure deficiencies byprevious amendments, undue prejudice to the

opposing partyand futilityofthe proposedamendment." Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d

531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). Of these factors, prejudice to the opposing party is the most important. See

Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v.

Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1971)). Leave to amend is properly denied "where the

amendment would be futile." DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e)

Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]f a pleading is so vague or

ambiguous that a partycannotreasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move

for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Motions

for a more definite statement are "proper onlywhere the complaint isso indefinite that the defendant cannot

ascertain the nature of the claim being asserted." Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072,

1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994). A plaintiff need only "set forth enough details so asto provide the defendant and

the court with a fair idea of the basis of the complaint and the legal grounds claimed for recovery." Self

Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir. 1990). Rule 12(e)

motions are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted. Id.; see also Rapp v. Contra Costa County,

1999 WL 78362, * 2 (N.D.Cal.) ("Rule 12(e) is designed to correct only unintelligibility in a pleading not

merely a claimed lack of detail").

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3Plaintiff's section 1986 claim appears to be brought against all of the defendants and is asserted in

Plaintiff's first and sixth causes of action.

4

ANALYSIS

A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

1. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1986 Claim

Intheir Motion to Dismiss, Defendants first move to dismiss Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claimon

the groundsthat Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the existence of a conspiracy.3 Section 1986 provides

in relevant part:

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be

done, and mentioned insection1985 of thistitle, are about to be committed, and

having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same,

neglects or refuses so to do, ifsuchwrongful act be committed,shall be liable to

the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such

wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented.

42 U.S.C. § 1986. Section 1985 establishes liability for any person who, with at least one other person,

"conspire[s] . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons

ofthe equalprotectionofthe laws, or of equal privileges and immunities underthe laws; or forthe purpose

ofpreventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all

persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 

To establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the plaintiff must show that the defendants were

"motivated bya 'class-based, invidiously discriminatoryanimus.'"Schultzv.Sundberg,759F.2d 714, 718

(9thCir.1985) (quotingGriffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Plaintiff's Complaint is utterly

devoid of any facts sufficient to make this showing. Further, Plaintiff has completely failed to plead any

facts establishing that any of the named defendants were part of a conspiracy or that, if such a conspiracy

existed, the defendants had knowledge of it. Accordingly, Plaintiff's section 1986 claim, which is alleged

in both his first and sixth causes of action, is hereby DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

2. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

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4Plaintiff's section 1983 claim is asserted in both his first and third causes of action. 

5

Defendants also move to dismiss portions of Plaintiff's section1983 claim.4 To state a claimunder

42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a federal right bya person acting under

color ofstate law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Here, Plaintiff asserts that his 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 claim is premised on alleged violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Plaintiff's section 1983 claim is only

cognizable under the Fourth Amendment, and that Plaintiff has not stated a claim under the First, Fifth,

Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 

InGraham v. Connor,490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989), the United States Supreme Court emphasized

that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "is not a source of substantive rights." Id. Rather, section 1983 "merely provides

a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Id. Accordingly, an analysis of a claim

brought under section1983 must first begin by identifying the specific constitutional right that has been

allegedly violated. Id. Onlyafteridentifyingthe specific constitutionalright allegedly infringed canthe Court

assess the validity of the claim by analyzing it in reference to the respective constitutional standard. Id.

In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 5 (1985), the Supreme Court addressed an"unreasonable

search and seizure" claim that, like Plaintiff's claim in this case, alleged both Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment violations. Id. The Court "analyzed the constitutionality of the challenged application of force

solely by reference to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person .

. . ." Id. Similarly, in Graham, the United States Supreme Court determined that whena claim"arisesin

the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one

invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment." Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. The Court further held

that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest,

investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen should be analyzed under the FourthAmendment and

its reasonableness standard, rather than under a substantive due process approach." Id. at 395. This

holding was based on the recognition that "the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct." Id.; see also

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Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994).

Here, to the extent that Plaintiff has stated a claim under section 1983, the gravamen of his

Complaint is that he was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure and possibly excessive force.

"Where a particular amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a

particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive

due process, must be the guide for analyzing the[] claims.'" Albright, 510 U.S. at 273 . Accordingly, since

the FourthAmendment isthe specific constitutional protectionagainst unreasonable searches and seizures,

Plaintiff's claimis properly asserted under the FourthAmendment. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Allen v. City

of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1995); Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 875 (9th Cir.

1994). 

While Plaintiff arguesin his opposition that he is also asserting a violationofthe due process clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment, he fails to explain howany of the facts alleged in the Complaint support a

due process clause claim. In fact, the sole authority that Plaintiff citesinhis opposition, Pink v. Lester, 52

F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 1995), is completely inapposite. Pink is a Fourth Circuit case that addresses the

question of whether a prisoner may state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a prison official when

that prison official has negligently interfered with the prisoner's access to the courts. See id. at 74. Pink

does not stand for the proposition that an incident arising out of an unreasonable search and seizure

conducted bya police officershould be brought underthe Fourteenth, ratherthanthe Fourth, Amendment.

 

For the same reasons, Plaintiff's Fifth and Ninth Amendment claims are also defective. The Fifth

Amendment provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,

unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in

the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War

or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled inany criminal case

to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation.

U.S Const. Amend. V. The Ninth Amendment states in its entirety that: "The enumeration in the

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5Further, although the White court does discuss due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment, its discussionislimited to a prisoner's claim for deliberate indifference to personal safety. Id. at

1504. 

7

Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage othersretained by the people."

U.S. Const. Amend. IX. Again, since the only cognizable legal theory asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint is

anunreasonable searchand seizure claim, Plaintiff'ssection 1983 claim must be analyzed underthe Fourth

Amendment, not the Fifth or Ninth Amendments. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Plaintiff's citation to

White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501 (9thCir. 1990) does not compela different conclusion. In fact, the White

opinion does not evendiscussthe FifthAmendment.5 Id. With respect to the Ninth Amendment, Plaintiff

does not identify a single case that supports his position that the Ninth Amendment is applicable here. In

fact, the one case that Plaintiff does cite, Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), makes

clear that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is grounded in the

Fourth Amendment. See id. at 485. 

Since there are no facts in the Complaint thatsupport analleged violationof eitherthe due process

clause or the equal protectionclause ofthe FourteenthAmendment, or any violations of the Fifth or Ninth

Amendment, Defendants' motion to dismiss the portions of Plaintiff's first and third causes of action that

refer to the Fifth, Ninth, and FourteenthAmendmentsis GRANTED. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff's

Fifth,Ninth, and FourteenthAmendment violationclaims are grounded solely onhis unlawfuldetention, they

are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

 Additionally, Plaintiff's claims under the First and Eighth Amendments are patently frivolous and

therefore must be dismissed. As Defendants correctly point out in their Motion to Dismiss, there are no

facts in Plaintiff's Complaint that establish that any of his First Amendment rights were violated by

Defendants. The First Amendment providesthat "Congressshallmake no lawrespecting anestablishment

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or

the right ofthe people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress ofgrievances."

U.S. Const. Amend.I. In Plaintiff's opposition, he admits that his entire First Amendment claim is premised

on his belief that officers Young and Clark violated his First Amendment rights by preventing him from

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6Plaintiff'sEight Amendment claimisDISMISSEDWITHPREJUDICE. However, because the events

leading up to the alleged unlawful detentionare notfullyalleged inthe Complaint, it is not clear whether Plaintiff

could possibly amend his Complaint to state a claim under the First Amendment. Therefore, this claim is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court explicitly warns Plaintiff, however, that he may only

include this claiminhis amended complaint ifhe is able to allege – in good faith – facts sufficient to show that

a cognizable First Amendment right was violated. 

8

generally "looking all around" the Wal-Mart parking lot. However, the authority upon which Plaintiff's

relies, Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Ill. 1982), does not

support his misguided belief that the allegation that he was "looking all around" is sufficient to state a

cognizable First Amendment claim. In fact, the Alliance to End Repression opinionmerely concerns the

United States District Court of the Northern District of Illinois' approval of a class action settlement

agreement. Id. at 539. Moreover, the underlying allegations set forth in the Alliance to End Repression

complaint are not analogous to the instant case. For example, in Alliance to End Repression, the plaintiff

specifically alleged that they were subjected to "infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, photographic,

electronic, [and] physical surveillance" as a direct result of their participation in lawful "political, religious,

educational, [and] social activities." Id. at 541. Plaintiff has made no such showing here. 

Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim is also groundless. The Eighth Amendment provides that

"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments

inflicted." U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It is beyond dispute that the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners

from cruel and unusual punishment and applies only after "conviction and sentence." Graham, 490 U.S.

at 393 n. 6. Although Plaintiff attempts to argue that his detention was tantamount to an "imprisonment,"

Plaintiff does not cite any case law in support of this assertion and his argument is wholly without merit. 

 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims are DISMISSED.6

3. Plaintiff's Defamation Claim

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff's claim for defamation and invasion of privacy, asserted in

hisfifthcause of action, should bedismissedwithprejudice because the alleged communicationis privileged

under California Civil Code § 47.

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Pursuant to California CivilCode § 47, a privileged publicationor broadcast is one made:"[i]nany

(1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other officialproceeding authorized by law .

. . . [or] (c) [i]n a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also

interested . . . . " Cal. Civil Code. § 47(b)–(c). In the instant case, Defendants argue that the allegedly

defamatory communication falls within the first part ofCivilCode § 47 because it was a police report that

was prepared as part of an "official proceeding authorized by law." In support of this, Defendants cite to

Johnson v. Symantec Corp, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 1999). InJohnson, after noting that

the California Supreme Court had yet to decide the issue, the district court thoroughly examined the

relevant California Court of Appeals decisions and held that communications made in connection with

police reports are entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 1113. Since Johnson was decided, the California

Supreme Court has expressly held that such communications are entitled to an absolute, rather than a

qualified privilege. See Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB, 32 Cal.4th 350, 355 (2004). 

While Plaintiff concedes in his opposition that the allegedly defamatory communication

described in the Complaint is a police report, and further concedes that police reports may be

privileged, he nevertheless arguesthat he hasstated a viable claimbecause a "qualified or conditional

privilege"only appliesifthe police officers "disclose informationto proper recipients without malice."

See Opp. at 10. Not only is Plaintiff's argument contraryto the California Supreme Court's holding

inHagberg, but his argument also overlooks the fact that his fifth cause of action does notstate that

the police reports were published with malice to "improper recipients." Indeed, the Complaint fails

to identify the recipients of the report and fails to explain, in any way, how the report was false. 

In sum, Plaintiff has not stated – and cannot state – a claim for defamation or "invasion of

privacy" because the allegedly defamatorycommunication, a police report, is entitled to an absolute

privilege underCalifornia CivilCode § 47. Plaintiff's fifth cause of action is therefore DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

4. Plaintiff's Claims forAssaultandBattery,Negligence,andPropertyDamage

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff'sstate lawcauses of actionfor assault and battery,

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negligence, and property damage on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to plead his claims withthe

requisite specificity under the California Tort Claims Act. 

California Government Code § 815, which is part of the California Tort Claims Act,

provides: "A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or

omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." Cal. Gov't Code § 815(a).

It further provides that "[t]he liability of a public entity established by this part (commencing with

Section 814) is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute, including this part,

and is subject to any defensesthat would be available to the public entityifit were a private person."

Cal. Gov't Code § 815(b). Under California Government Code § 815.2:

(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or

omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his

employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have

given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal

representative. 

(b) Except as otherwise provided bystatute, a public entityis not liable for

any injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public

entity where the employee is immune from liability. 

Cal. Gov't Code § 815.2.

The intent ofthe California TortClaims Act is "not to expand the rights ofthe plaintiffsinsuits

against the government entities, but to confine potential government liability to rigidly delineated

circumstances[.]" Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 128 Cal.App.3d 882, 886 (1969)

(internal citations omitted). "Since all California governmental tort liabilityflows from the California

TortClaims Act . . . [a] plaintiffmust plead facts sufficient to show his cause of action lies outside of

the breadth of any applicable statutory immunity." Id. at 885-86. Further, the plaintiff must plead

with particularity "everyfact essential to the existence of statutory liability." Id. at 886. Immunity

is waived only if the various requirements of the Act are satisfied. Id.

Here, Defendants argue that there are two schemes of statutory immunity that Plaintiff has

not clearly shown are inapplicable. First, under California Government Code § 802.2, "a public

employee is not liable for any injuryresulting fromhis act or omission where the act or omission was

the result ofthe exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused."

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7Notwithstanding the provision for immunity, California Government Code § 820.4 also providesthat

a public employee is not exonerated from liability for false arrest or false imprisonment. Cal. Gov't Code §

820.4. Here, however, Plaintiff has not asserted a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment. 

8Moreover, while Plaintiff vaguely alleges in the second, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action that

the City of San Leandro engaged in numerous acts, such as the failure "to discipline or prosecute . . . known

incidents of wrongful conduct by peace officers" or the refusal to "investigate complaints ofprevious incidents

ofwrongful conduct by peace officers," Plaintiff does not actually set forthany factsinthe Complaint sufficient

to establish the basis for his allegations against the City. While the Court must construe the Complaint in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, and accept allproperly pleaded factual allegations as true, the Court need not

accept astrue conclusoryallegations cast inthe formoffactualallegations. See Western Mining Council, 643

F.2d at 624. Accordingly, if Plaintiff chooses to amend his Complaint, he must set forth in the amended

complaint allrelevant facts known to him that pertain to the City of San Leandro and support allofthe causes

of action alleged against the City. 

11

Cal. Gov't Code § 820.2. Second, under California Government Code § 820.4, "[a] public

employee is not liable for his act or omission, exercising due care, in the execution or enforcement

of any law." Cal. Gov't Code 820.4.7 

Having reviewed the instant Complaint, the Court agrees withDefendants, and findsthat the

lack of specificity in the Complaint fallsshort of the required pleading standard under the California

Tort Claims Act. For example, under Plaintiff's causes of action for assault and battery and for

negligence, it is not clear whether Plaintiffis alleging that officers Young and Clark were acting within

or outside ofthe scope of their employment, whether Young and Clark's acts were the result of the

exercise of discretion vested in them, or whether Plaintiff is asserting that Young and Clark used

excessive or unreasonable force while placing Plaintiff under arrest. Further, to the extent that

Plaintiff is contending that Young and Clark were not acting within the scope of their employment,

it is not clear howthisisconsistent withPlaintiff's allegationthat the CityofSanLeandro promulgated

policies "encouraging, tolerating, permitting and ratifying a pattern of abuse, mistreatment and

concealment of abuse and mistreatment."8 See Compl. at ¶ 5. Accordingly, as currently plead,

Plaintiff's second cause of action for assault and batteryand hisfourthcause of actionfor negligence

do not comply with the California Tort Claims Act. 

Plaintiff'ssixthcause of action, for "propertydamage,"suffersfromthe same defect. Indeed,

Plaintiff's sixth cause of action does not clearly state a cognizable legal claim at all, and consists of

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a single allegationthat:"Defendants, and each of them, damaged plaintiff's motorcycle in an amount

that is not known to plaintiff and plaintiff prays leave to amend this Complaint when such amount if

[sic] finally ascertained." Compl. at ¶ 43. Significantly, even if the entirely vague tort claim of

"property damage" was a cognizable cause of action, Plaintiff's Complaint does not state any facts

pertaining to his motorcycle or how it was damaged by Defendants. 

Accordingly, for the reasons setforthherein, Plaintiff'sstate lawcauses of action for assault

and battery, negligence, and propertydamage are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff

is hereby granted leave to amend his Complaint so that it complies with the pleading requirements

of the California Tort Claims Act. 

5. Plaintiff's Request for Punitive Damages Against the City of San Leandro

Last, Defendants request that the Court strike the portion of Plaintiff's prayer for relief

requesting punitive damages from the City of San Leandro. As Defendants note, and as Plaintiff

concedes, California Government Code § 818 prohibits the recovery of punitive damages from a

public entity. See Cal. Gov't Code § 818. The Supreme Court has also held that, with respect to

federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipalities are immune from punitive damages.

See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Accordingly, to the

extent that Plaintiff is attempting to request punitive damages from the City of San Leandro,

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffis herebygranted leave to amend his prayer

for relief, but may not include in his amended complaint a request for punitive damages that is

directed at the City of San Leandro. 

B. Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement

BecausetheCourt is grantingDefendants' MotiontoDismiss,Defendants'alternativeMotion

for a More Definite Statement is hereby DENIED AS MOOT.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and

Defendants' alternative Motionfor a More DefiniteStatement is DENIED AS MOOT[Docket No.

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9]. Plaintiff's defamation claim is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The alleged First, Fifth,

Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, to the extent they are premised solely on the

factssupporting Plaintiff'sFourthAmendmentsearchand seizureclaim, are also DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THATPlaintiffis granted leave to file an amended complaint

that addresses the deficiencies identified in this Order no laterthanthirty(30) days ofthe date ofthis

Order. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he must clearly allege, ingood faith, additional

facts – not merely conclusions of law – that demonstrate that he is entitled to reliefunder eachofhis

causes of action. Plaintiff may not, for example, allege in summary fashion that his constitutional rights

were violated by officers Young and Clark; rather, he must allege factsshowing thatsuch violations

occurred, and also the facts underlying the nature of the alleged violations. Further, if Plaintiff's

amended complaint includes claims against the City of San Leandro under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983

or 42 U.S.C. § 1986, he must set forth facts supporting each element of each theory of liability.

Finally, if Plaintiff's amended complaint includes state law tort claims against any of the defendants,

Plaintiff must comply with the requirements of the California Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff is expressly

warned that failure to amend the Complaint incompliance withthis Order shall be construed by the

Court as evidence that further leave to amend would be futile. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

________________________________

Dated: 9-19-05 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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