Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01082/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01082-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT GARDNER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 14-cv-01082-TEH 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

STRIKE COSTS 

 

 This matter came before the Court on March 28, 2016 for a hearing on Plaintiff 

Robert Gardner’s Motion to Strike Costs. Dkt. No. 127. Defendant Federal Express 

Corporation (“FedEx”) timely opposed the motion. Dkt. No. 130. After carefully 

considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART 

and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s motion, for the reasons set forth below. 

BACKGROUND 

Trial in this matter began on October 13, 2015. Dkt. No. 93. On October 22, 2015, 

the jury returned a unanimous verdict for Defendant FedEx on all six of Plaintiff Robert 

Gardner’s claims. Id. On December 15, 2015, the Clerk of Court taxed costs in the 

amount of $9,202.57 against Gardner, as FedEx was the “prevailing party.” Dkt. No. 123. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 “[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal 

procedural law.” Feldman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(d)(1) provides in relevant part: 

“Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or 

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in these rules, costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the 

prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs . . . .” 

DISCUSSION 

The basis for Gardner’s motion to strike costs is twofold: first, Gardner argues that 

California state law prohibits the award of any costs to FedEx as the prevailing party; and 

second, Gardner argues that even if costs are permitted, costs were incorrectly taxed by the 

Clerk and should be reduced. 

I. Federal law governs the award of costs in this matter. 

Gardner opposes the Clerk’s taxation of costs based on a recent California Supreme 

Court decision. Pl.’s Mot. to Strike Clerk’s Taxation of Costs (“Mot.”) at 2 (Dkt. No. 

127). In Williams v. Chino Valley Independent School District, the California Supreme 

Court held that a prevailing defendant in a Fair Employment and Housing Act suit – which 

this was – “should not be awarded fees and costs unless the court finds the action was 

objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it 

clearly became so.” 61 Cal. 4th 97, 115 (2015). Gardner argues that this state court 

decision controls, because “the general rule is that state law regarding the right to and 

calculation of . . . costs should be applied.” Mot. at 2. 

Gardner’s argument is flawed, however, because the award of costs is generally a 

procedural matter, which means that federal law applies. See Champion Produce, Inc. v. 

Ruby Robinson Co., Inc., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003) (“An award of standard 

costs in federal district court is normally governed by [Rule] 54(d), even in diversity 

cases.”); Kolb v. Turner, No. 1:07-cv-0262 OWW DLB, 2008 WL 5478575, at *13 (E.D. 

Cal. Dec. 31, 2008) (“Although federal jurisdiction in this case is based upon diversity, 

because the taxation of costs pursuant to [Rule] 54(d)(1) is a procedural matter, federal law 

applies.”); Garcia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Under 

the rules of Erie and Hanna, Rule 54(d)(1) will trump a state cost shifting provision.”). 

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There are limited circumstances in which costs become a substantive matter; 

namely, “a federal court sitting in diversity . . . will award costs in accordance with federal 

law unless a state provision allows for the awarding of costs as part of a substantive, 

compensatory damages scheme.” Kelly v. Echols, No. CIV F05118 AWI SMS, 2005 WL 

2105309, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2005). For example, in Clausen v. M/V New Clarissa, 

the Ninth Circuit held that expert witness fees were governed by Oregon law because the 

choice of law was “between a federal cost provision, and a state damages provision that 

permits prevailing plaintiffs . . . to recover ‘costs of any kind’ as one element of its 

compensatory damages.” 339 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). 

Gardner cannot and has not argued that FedEx’s costs were part of a compensatory 

damages scheme, which means they remain procedural in nature. Moreover, one district 

court has already noted, in dicta, that “Williams . . . held only that [California Government 

Code 12965(b)] is an exception to California Code of Civil Procedure 1032(b), not that it 

is substantive for Erie purposes or a ‘compensatory damages’ provision within the 

meaning of Clausen.” Andresen v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 2:13-cv-02079-CAS(AJWx), 2015 

WL 3648972, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2015). See also id. at *5 (holding “that [Rule] 

54(d)—not state law—governs defendant’s application and motion for costs”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the award of costs in this context is a procedural 

matter, and therefore governed by Rule 54(d). And Gardner does not contest that under 

Rule 54(d), FedEx would be entitled to costs as the prevailing party in this matter. 

II. Costs must be adjusted to correct the Clerk’s mistakes. 

 Gardner first argues that the Court should strike entirely the $1,075.01 in “fees for 

service of summons and subpoena” awarded for FedEx’s fees for service of subpoenas for 

records, deposition, and trial. Mot. at 3. Gardner is correct. Local Rule 54-3(a)(2) permits 

only: (1) fees of the marshal, under 28 U.S.C. § 1921(a)(1)(A); and (2) fees for service of 

process by someone other than the marshal, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c). Though FedEx 

seeks to combine these two categories to receive costs for service of something other than 

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process by someone other than the marshal, Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Strike Clerk’s 

Taxation of Costs (“Opp’n”) at 3 (Dkt. No. 130), this reading is inconsistent with the plain 

text of the Local Rule. Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Gardner’s motion to 

strike the $1,075.01 award of fees for service of summons and subpoena. 

Gardner next argues that the Court should strike some portion of the $1,036.00 in 

“fees for witnesses.” Mot. at 3. The parties agree that the Clerk erroneously inflated 

FedEx’s original request for witness fees, $596.06, and that at most FedEx should be 

awarded that amount. Id. The only disagreement is whether it was “reasonable” for one of 

the witnesses – Carlos Valdivia – to fly up from Orange County and spend a night in San 

Francisco, in order to guarantee that he was in court to testify on the specified day at 9:00 

a.m. Id. First, it was plainly reasonable for Mr. Valdivia to fly rather than make the nearly 

seven-hour drive from Orange County; the $346.06 for his flight is therefore properly 

taxed under 28 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1). Second, the $250 taxed for the one-night hotel stay 

necessitated by Mr. Valdivia’s early reporting time is consistent with the Administrator of 

General Services’ per diem rate for hotel expenses in San Francisco in October 2015. 

Opp’n at 4. Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 

Gardner’s motion to strike FedEx’s witness fees; the portion of the fee erroneously added 

by the Clerk – $439.94 – is stricken, but the remaining portion – $596.06 – is upheld. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 

IN PART. Federal law governs the award of costs in this matter, but costs must be 

reduced as follows: the $1,075.01 awarded in fees for service of summons and subpoena is 

stricken entirely, and $439.94 is stricken from the award for witness fees. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 04/18/16 _ ________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

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