Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-03074/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-03074-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLENN EDWIN CLAY Civil No. 3:12-cv-3074-GPC-RBB

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AND SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND

vs.

DENISE LANGFORD, LT. SAVALA,

CARLOS RAMOS, MARK GOMES, M.

HAWTHORNE, SILVIA GARCIA,

Defendants.

On December 28, 2012, plaintiff Glenn Clay (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed

a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against defendants D. Langford, G. Savala, C.

Ramos, M. Gomes, M. Hawthorne, and S. Garcia (“Defendants”). Plaintiff also filed a

motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Having reviewed

Plaintiff’s Complaint and Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, and for the reasons that

follow, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis but,

because Plaintiff’s claims are time barred, the Court sua sponte DISMISSES Plaintiff’s

claims WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

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PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff filed suit following events he alleges occurred while incarcerated at R.J.

Donovan Correctional Facility (“Donovan”) in San Diego, California. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants, correctional officers at Donovan, violated his rights to due

process, conspired against him, committed racial discrimination, violated his freedomof

association, freedom of speech, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, deprived

him of his rights, violated his right to equal protection, violated federal civil procedure,

committed negligence, and discriminated him. (Id. at 4, 10, 16, 28, 41, 54.) Plaintiff

contends these violations occurred when the Defendants improperly terminated him as

the “Lead Man” forklift operator at the Donovan “Minimum Support Warehouse” and

by refusing to reinstate him. (Id. 4-8.)

Plaintiff was employed as a forklift “Lead Man” and worked under the direct

supervision of defendant Lankford. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff argues that before Lankford

became the supervisor of the support warehouse, the previous supervisor advised

Plaintiff that Lankford was looking to terminate Plaintiff at the first opportunity. (Id. at

94.) On March 27, 2007, while lowering a pallet in the warehouse with his forklift,

Plaintiff struck a water pipe which subsequently caused it to break and leak. (Id. at 103,

129.) Plaintiff claims that, following the accident, Lankford prepared a Rules Violation

Report for the destruction of state property pursuant to Section 3011 of the California

Cod of Regulations, due to unsafe operation of equipment. (Id. at 4, 103.) In the Rules

Violation Report, Lankford recommended that Plaintiff be “immediately removed from

his present job assignment.” (Id. at 75.) Having been terminated from his job at the

support warehouse, Plaintiff took another job as a forklift operator in another section of

the warehouse. (Id. at 21.)

Plaintiff proceeded to submit an inmate grievance against Lankford on April 3,

2007, for improperly terminating Plaintiff as a forklift operator. (Id. at 69.) The

grievance was denied at the informal level on May 15, 2007. (Id.) Plaintiff contendsthat

while his grievances were proceeding, he accepted employment in a different section of

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the support warehouse to maintain his grade as a forklift worker and to gain work

experience. (Id. at 56.)

A rules violation hearing commenced on April 19, 2007, before the Senior Hearing

Officer, defendant Savala. (Id. at 75.) This hearing took place while Plaintiff’s inmate

grievance against Lankford was still under review. (Id. at 69.) Plaintiff argues he

appeared at the hearing but it was postponed due to witness unavailability. (Id. at 10.) 

When the hearing finally occurred, Plaintiff maintains that his witnesses appeared

telephonically and that Savala relayed Plaintiff’s questions to the witnesses. (Id.)

Defendant Gomes, the warehouse manager, and “Mr. Manning,” a Material and

Store Supervisor II in the laundry department, testified on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Id. at 11,

75.) Plaintiff asked Gomes, through the hearing officer, if Gomes had ever informed the

inmates and staff in the warehouse about a department policy that workers would not be

fired for accidents if they informed the staff of the accident. (Id. at 11.) Gomes replied,

“No.” (Id.) Gomes further testified that he had no knowledge of prior complaints or

incidents involving the Plaintiff operating the forklift unsafely. (Id. at 75-76.) Finally,

Gomes stated that the rules violation did not warrant Clay’s termination as a forklift

operator. (Id.).

Plaintiff next states that his supervisor, Manning, confirmed he was supervising

Plaintiff at the time of the accident, that it was indeed an accident, and that Manning had

never heard of Plaintiff operating the forklift unsafely. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that, in

light of the testimony by Manning and Gomes, and in “accordance with progressive

discipline,” the senior hearing officer reduced Plaintiff’s offense from a CDCR-115

Rules Violation Report to a less-serious CDCR-128A general chrono report. (Id.) 

Savala determined that Plaintiff should be reinstated to his former position. (Id. at 5.) 

Despite this ruling, Plaintiff argues that Lankford prevented Plaintiff from resuming his

duties as “Lead Man” forklift operator. (Id. at 6.)

On June 18, 2007, Lankford submitted a general chrono report requesting that

Plaintiff be removed from his job assignment in the clothing department at the minimum

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support facility and reassigned elsewhere. (Id. at 100.) Lankford indicated thatshe filed

the report out of concern for her safety because Clay frequently entered her area since

his reassignment, glared at her, and made inflammatory comments. (Id.) According to

Lankford, Plaintiff’s conduct created a hostile and inappropriate work environment for

her. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Lankford’s chrono resulted in his “permanent removal

from the support warehouse.” (Id. at 6.) After submitting the chrono, Lankford hired a

Caucasian inmate to accupy Plaintiff’s former position. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that

Lankford discriminated on the basis of race because she ultimately hired an “all White”

work crew. (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff appealed his grievance to the first formal level of review on June 19,

2007. (Id. at 69.) Plaintiff’s first level response appeal was denied on August 15, 2007,

and, on August 20, 2007, defendant Hawthorne explained that the appeal was denied

because of concerns regarding staff safety. (Id. at 69, 86.) On October 12, 2007,

defendant Garcia denied Plaintiff’s appeal at the second level. (Id. at 103-104.) Garcia

emphasized the monetary loss to the state that was caused by Plaintiff’s accident and his

unsafe operation of the forklift despite prior counseling. (Id.) On December 5, 2007,

Plaintiff’s subsequent appeal to the director’s level of review was screened out and

returned to Plaintiff. (Id. at 120.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Plaintiff movesto proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915(a) allows

a court to authorize a lawsuit’s commencement without payment of the filing fee if the

plaintiff submits an affidavit demonstrating his or her inability to pay the filing fee. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Such affidavit must include a complete statement of the plaintiff’s

assets. Id. 

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit in support of his IFP motion indicating that he

is currently unemployed and receives $234.00 per month from her sister. Plaintiff

declares that he has no checking, savings, IRA, or money market accounts. Plaintiff

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declares he does not own a vehicle, real estate, stocks, bonds, securities, or other

valuable property. Plaintiff declares he has no dependents nor any outstanding debts. 

Plaintiff does not, however, state whether he currently pays rent or not. Based on the

information Plaintiff has provided, this Court concludes Plaintiff has sufficiently

demonstrated he is unable to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis.

II. Sua Sponte Review

A. Legal Standards

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

Notwithstanding the payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaintfiled

by any person seeking to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is

subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it

is “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Section 1915 mandates that a court reviewing

a complaint filed pursuant to the in forma pauperis provisions of section 1915 make and

rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the

U.S. Marshal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedures, Rule 4(c)(2). Lopez, 203

F.3d at 1127.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint.

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule

12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a

dispositive issue of law.”). Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it

presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. 

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Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual

allegations,” he must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).

To meet the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). 

A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In

other words, “the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the court must

assume the truth of the facts presented and construe all inferences from them in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party when reviewing a motion to dismiss under

Rule12(b)(6). Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court must

construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt.

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro

se civil rights complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that were

not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v.

Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9thCir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations

unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in

that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint

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“unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of

other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Doe v.

United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before a pro se civil rights

complaint may be dismissed, the court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the

complaint’s deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where amendment of

a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is appropriate. See

James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), a plaintiff must allege

facts sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law” committed the

conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. §

1983; Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986).

Section 1983 does not explicitly contain a statute of limitations. Wallace v. Kato,

549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Federal courts typically apply the personal injury limitation

period and applicable tolling statutes of the state in which they sit. Hardin v. Straub, 490

U.S. 536, 539 (1989); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Nonetheless, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law

that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. “Under federal

law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that is the

basis of the cause of action.” Douglas, 567 F.3d at 1109 (citing Johnson v. California,

207 F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 2000)). This occurs “when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and

present cause of action.’” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry

Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)).

Where a plaintiff “alleges a number of discrete acts . . . , each of which allegedly

violated [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights[,]” claims based on acts that occurred

beyond the statute of limitations period are time-barred. Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd.

v. County of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of

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plaintiff’s time-barred claims that were related to his timely-filed claims in a § 1983

action); see also Rivas v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 619 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1002 (E.D. Cal.

2008) (refusing to apply continuing violation theory because defendants’ discrete acts

during an ongoing investigation gave rise to independent, actionable claims). A plaintiff

may use the time-barred acts, however, “as evidence to establish motive and to put his

timely-filed claims in context.” Carpinteria Valley Farms, 344 F.3d at 829; Rivas, 619

F. Supp. 2d at 1002. This principle applies to alleged acts of racial discrimination “even

when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete

discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” AMTRAK v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002).

3. Statute of Limitations

In California, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years,

which can be tolled for up to two years during a prisoner’s incarceration. Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. §§ 335.1, 352.1(a). The Ninth Circuit has held that “‘actual, uninterrupted

incarceration is the touchstone’ for applying California’s tolling provision for the

disability of imprisonment.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also King v. Fresno

Police Officers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27035, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2008)

(concluding plaintiff was not entitled to tolling because he was not continuously

incarcerated for the entire two-year period after the accrual of his cause of action). “It

isthe defendant’s burden to prove that plaintiff filed his claims after the expiration of the

statute of limitations, but it is the plaintiff’s burden to show he is entitled to equitable

tolling.” Sumahit v. Parker, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78973, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3,

2009) (discussing the defendant’s burden in the section 352.1 context).

B. Analysis

1. Lankford

Plaintiff alleges Lankford violated his rights to due process, freedom of

association, free speech, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection,

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and federal civil procedure. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff further states Lankford

committed the following: conspiracy, racial discrimination, deprivation of rights,

negligence, and discrimination. (Id.) Plaintiff insists that Lankford engaged in racial

discrimination by causing Plaintiff’s termination and by hiring a Caucasian inmate to

replace him to create an “all White” workforce. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also asserts

Lankford’s general chrono was submitted in retaliation for Plaintiff’s grievance against

her. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff further alleges Lankford’s chrono was racially motivated. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s alleges his removal from the support warehouse resulted from the

forklift accident which occurred on March 27, 2007. (Id. at 4, 103). Sometime after the

Rule Violation Hearing that took place on April 20, 2007 – where Savala decided that

Plaintiff should be reinstated as “Lead Man” forklift operator but before Lankford

submitted a general chrono report against Plaintiff on June 18, 2007 – Lankford refused

to reinstate Plaintiff as “Lead Man” forklift operator. (Id. at 7.)

The allegations in Count 1 have all arisen as a result of the above events, the last

event occurring on June 18, 2007. It is unclear when Plaintiff was released from prison. 

It is also unclear whether the two-year tolling provisions applies. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927

(holding that tolling based on imprisonment does not apply to a civil detainee). 

Nonetheless, because Plaintiff filed his complaint on December 28, 2012, even if tolling

applies, more than four years would have passed after any of the events that gave rise to

Plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff’s claims are thus time-barred. This Court therefore

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims in Count One to the extent that they originated from

events occurring on December 28, 2008, or before that date.

2. Savala

Plaintiff claims Savala violated his rights to due process, freedom of association,

free speech, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection, and federal

civil procedure. (Dkt. No. 1 at 10.) Plaintiff further asserts that Savala committed the

following: conspiracy, racial discrimination, deprivation of rights, negligence, and

discrimination. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that, on April 19, 2007, Savala unnecessarily

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postponed the rules violation hearing, failed to stop the hearing at the required intervals,

and prevented Plaintiff from interviewing witnesses in person. (Id. at 10-14.)

Because Plaintiff filed his complaint on December 28, 2012, more than four years

after any of the eventsthat gave rise to Plaintiff’s allegations occurred, Plaintiff’s claims

are time-barred from any relief. This Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims in

Count Two to the extent that they originated from events occurring on December 28,

2008, or before that date.

3. Ramos

Plaintiff alleges Ramos violated his rights to due process, freedom from cruel and

unusual punishment, equal protection, and federal civil procedure. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff

further states that Ramos committed the following: conspiracy, racial discrimination,

deprivation of rights, and negligence. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Ramos is responsible for

such transgressions because he failed to use his authority to reinstate Plaintiff to his job

in the warehouse. (Id.).

Plaintiff attempts to establish Ramos’ liability by arguing that Ramos supported

his subordinate, Lankford, during Plaintiff’s initial removal on March 27, 2007, and

failed to reinstate him after the disciplinary hearing on April 20, 2007. (Id.) The

allegations in Count Three have all arisen as a result of the above events, the last event

occurring on April 20, 2007. Because Plaintiff filed his complaint on December 28,

2012, more than four years after any of the events that gave rise to Plaintiff’s allegations

occurred, Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred from any relief. This Court therefore

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims in Count Three to the extent that they originated from

events occurring on December 28, 2008, or before that date.

4. Gomes 

Plaintiff alleges Gomes violated his rights to due process, freedom of association,

free speech, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection, and federal

civil procedure. (Id. at 28.) Plaintiff further statesthat Gomes committed the following:

conspiracy, racial discrimination, negligence, and discrimination. (Id.) Plaintiff bases

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these allegations on the theory that Gomes should have overruled his subordinates and

reinstated Plaintiff to his position as “Lead Man” forklift operator at the support

warehouse. (Id. at 30.) Plaintiff also maintains that Gomes lied while testifying at

Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing. (Id. at 32.) Additionally, Plaintiff urges an investigation

into the prison policy which allegedly enables a staff member to displace an inmate from

his job assignment by submitting a chrono alleging safety concerns because it constitutes

racial discrimination. (Id. at 35.)

The allegations in Count Four have all arisen as a result of the above events, the

last event occurring on June 18, 2007, when Lankford submitted the general chrono

report. Because Plaintiff filed his complaint on December 28, 2012, more than four

years after any of the events that gave rise to Plaintiff’s allegations occurred, Plaintiff’s

claims are time-barred from any relief. This Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff’s

claims in Count Four to the extent that they originated from events occurring on

December 28, 2008, or before that date.

5. Hawthorne

Plaintiff alleges Hawthorne violated his rights to due process, freedom of

association, free speech, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection,

and federal civil procedure. (Id. at 41.) Plaintiff further states that Hawthorne

committed the following: conspiracy, negligence, and discrimination. (Id.) Plaintiff

bases these allegations on Hawthorne’s failure to exercise her supervisory authority. 

(Id.) In addition, Plaintiff contendsthat Hawthorne should have conducted the interview

with Plaintiff in person rather than telephonically, as not doing so constituted a violation

of his due process. (Id. at 42.) Plaintiff further contends that Hawthorne should have

been aware of the racial discrimination occurring among staff within Donovan. (Id. at

45-46.)

Because Plaintiff filed his complaint on December 28, 2012, more than four years

after any of the eventsthat gave rise to Plaintiff’s allegations occurred, Plaintiff’s claims

are time-barred from any relief. This Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims in

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Count Five to the extent that they originated from events occurring on December 28,

2008, or before that date.

6. Garcia

Plaintiff alleges Garcia violated his rights to due process, freedom of association,

free speech, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection, and federal

civil procedure. (Id. at 54.) Plaintiff further statesthat Garcia committed the following:

conspiracy, racial discrimination, deprivation of rights, negligence, and discrimination. 

(Id.) Plaintiff argues Garcia was aware that his subordinates’ acts were motivated by a

discriminatory intent, and is thus responsible for any and all of the transgressions that

they committed under his supervision. (Id.) 

Because Plaintiff filed his complaint on December 28, 2012, more than four years

after any of the eventsthat gave rise to Plaintiff’s allegations occurred, Plaintiff’s claims

are time-barred from any relief. This Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims in

Count Six to the extent that they originated from events occurring on December 28,

2008, or before that date.

CONCLUSION

Having concluded Plaintiff’s claims are time barred, theCourt findsit unnecessary

to address the specifics of each and every claim. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY 1

ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is GRANTED;

2. All of Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED;

3. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint to address the statute

/ / /

/ / /

The Court notes this is the second time Plaintiff has filed these claims. Plaintiff’s prior 1

complaint was dismissed and Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his prior complaint. Plaintiff failed

to do so within the time prescribed, which resulted in the dismissal of the prior case. See Clay v.

Lankford, 2012 WL 947805 (S.D. Cal. March 20, 2012).

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of limitations issues noted herein and must file any such an amended complaint on or

before April 26, 2013.

DATED: March 13, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

13 12cv3074 GPC (RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-03074-GPC-RBB Document 3 Filed 03/13/13 Page 13 of 13