Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-07318/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-07318-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH EVANS,

Plaintiff,

v.

IMEM Q. KAWSAR HOSSAIN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-07318-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

On December 23, 2016, Plaintiff, a practicing Muslim and state prisoner, filed a pro se

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials at San Quentin 

State Prison (“SQSP”) have denied him the opportunity to participate in the prison’s “Ramadan 

Meal Program,” in accordance with his Muslim religious beliefs and in violation of his 

constitutional rights and those guaranteed under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 

Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Dkt. 1 at 4.1 Plaintiff named the following Defendants: 

Governor of the State of California Edmund G. Brown, Jr.; California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation Secretary Scott Kernan; SQSP Muslim Chaplain Q. Kawsar Hossain; SQSP 

Appeals Coordinator L. Rangel; and SQSP Correctional Officer C. Koenig. Id. at 5. Plaintiff 

sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary and punitive damages. Id. at 8-10.

On July 24, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. 15. On July 26, 2017, the Court issued an Order of Partial Dismissal and 

Service. Dkt. 16. 

On July 2, 2018, because Plaintiff had “on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted,” see Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2005), and because he 

had failed to show he was entitled to the imminent danger of serious physical injury exception 

 

1 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by the parties.

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 80 Filed 03/14/19 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Court granted Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status

and to dismiss the action without prejudice to bringing in a paid complaint. Dkt. 75. The Court 

then revoked Plaintiff’s IFP status, and vacated its July 24, 2017 Order granting IFP. See id. 

On July 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. Dkt. 76. 

Where the Court’s ruling has resulted in a final judgment or order, as here, a motion for 

reconsideration may be based either on Rule 59(e) (motion to alter or amend judgment) or Rule 

60(b) (motion for relief from judgment) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because 

Plaintiff’s motion was not filed within ten days of entry of judgment, as is required for a Rule 

59(e) motion, it will be treated as a Rule 60(b) motion.

Rule 60(b) provides for reconsideration where one or more of the following is shown: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 

due diligence could not have been discovered before the Court’s decision; (3) fraud by the adverse 

party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; (6) any other reason justifying 

relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); School Dist. 1J v. ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.1993). 

“Rule 60(b) [] provides a mechanism for parties to seek relief from a judgment when ‘it is no 

longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application,’ or when there is any other 

reason justifying relief from judgment.” Jeff D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844, 853-54 (9th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).

Subparagraph (6) requires a showing that the grounds justifying relief are extraordinary. 

Mere dissatisfaction with the Court’s order, or belief that the Court is wrong in its decision, are not 

grounds for relief under subparagraph (6) or any other provision of Rule 60(b). “‘[T]he major 

grounds that justify reconsideration involve an intervening change of controlling law, the 

availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’” 

Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting 

United States v. Desert Gold Mining Co., 433 F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir. 1970)). 

The Court finds nothing in Plaintiff’s allegations in his motion for reconsideration that 

merits reconsideration. In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff seems to be challenging the 

Court’s section 1915(g) dismissal by alleging that he meets the imminent danger exception 

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 80 Filed 03/14/19 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

because he was diagnosed with “Chronic hepatitis C virus genotype 1a, stage I [based on a] liver 

biopsy in 2012.” Dkt. 76 at 2. However, the plain language of the imminent danger clause in 

section 1915(g) indicates that “imminent danger” is to be assessed at the time of filing of the 

complaint. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Andrews II”). The 

conditions that existed at some earlier or later time are not relevant. See id. at 1053 n.5 (postfiling transfer of prisoner out of the prison at which danger allegedly existed may have made moot 

his request for injunctive relief against the alleged danger, but it does not affect the section

1915(g) analysis). Furthermore, the Court previously rejected this very issue prior to granting 

Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status, stating as follows:

The Court notes that Plaintiff fails to make reference to any hepatitis 

C infection or bunion deformity in his complaint. See Dkt. 1. Such 

allegations of Plaintiff’s long-standing health problems do not show 

he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of 

filing.” See Andrews II, 493 F.3d at 1055. Said differently, 

Plaintiff’s argument that he suffered from certain health problems 

two years prior is of no consequence because imminent danger for 

purposes of the section 1915(g) exception is assessed at the time the 

action at issue was filed, “not at some earlier or later time.” Id. at 

1053. 

“[A] prisoner who alleges that prison officials continue with a 

practice that has injured him or others similarly situated in the past 

will satisfy the “ongoing danger” standard and meet the imminence 

prong of the three strikes exception.” See id. at 1056-57. In 

Andrews II, the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the ongoing 

practice of not screening and segregating inmates with HIV and 

hepatitis C threatened his health, in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. See id. at 1050. The Ninth Circuit determined that 

plausible allegations by the plaintiff in Andrews II that prison 

conditions may cause or worsen a chronic condition such as HIV or 

hepatitis C was sufficient to bring the complaint within the 

imminent danger exception. See id. at 1056-57. In contrast, in the 

present action, Plaintiff’s allegations of his hepatitis C condition and 

bunion deformity do not trigger the imminent danger exception 

because they are completely unconnected to Plaintiff’s religious 

practices claims. Cf. id. (an ongoing danger, such as prison officials 

continuing with a practice that had caused injury to plaintiff or other 

similarly situated inmates will satisfy the imminent danger 

exception). 

Dkt. 75 at 10-11. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations present no grounds that warrant 

reconsideration. Therefore, the Court reaffirms its dismissal of his action pursuant to section

1915(g). 

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 80 Filed 03/14/19 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

This Order terminates Docket No. 76.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

March 14, 2019

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 80 Filed 03/14/19 Page 4 of 4