Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00630/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00630-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN D. SCHEMA,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

AGRICULTURE, et. al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-0630 MCE CKD PS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

On March 7, 2014, Plaintiff John D. Schema filed the instant action against 

numerous Defendants seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to quiet title. Compl., 

ECF No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges claims arising out of the alleged impairment by 

Forest Service personnel of an easement to which Plaintiff claims a right. See generally

id. Plaintiff seeks compensation in the amount of $500,000 for alleged wrongful 

interference with Plaintiff’s property right. See id. at 31. Plaintiff also seeks a judgment 

“quieting plaintiffs’ title” and a declaration that “defendants have no right, title or interest 

superseding plaintiffs’ title to the easement . . . .” Id. The parties agree that the Court 

lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim, but dispute whether 

Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleged a claim under the Quiet Title Act, and if so, whether that 

claim is barred by the statute of limitations. On May 27, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion 

to Dismiss (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ Motion. ECF Nos. 18, 24. 

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The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local 

Rule 302(c)(21).1 On July 30, 2014, the Magistrate Judge filed Findings and 

Recommendations herein (ECF No. 23) which were served on the parties and which 

notified the parties that any objections to the findings and recommendations were to be 

filed within fourteen days. In the Findings and Recommendations, the Magistrate Judge 

recommended granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Court 

lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim. See ECF No. 23. Plaintiff 

filed timely Objections to the Findings and Recommendations. See ECF No. 24. The 

Defendants filed a Response. See ECF No. 26. In accordance with the provisions of 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, this Court has conducted a de novo review 

of this case. For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 9) is granted in 

part and denied in part. As set forth below, the Findings and Recommendation (ECF 

No. 23) is adopted to the extent it addresses Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim and 

rejected to extent it does not address Plaintiff’s quiet title claim.

ANALYSIS

A. Takings Claim

Pursuant to the Tucker Act, the United States Court of Federal Claims has 

exclusive jurisdiction of any claim based solely on the Constitution and which exceeds 

 1 Plaintiff filed this action in propria persona. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff remained without counsel 

until the filing of Objections to the Findings and Recommendation which were filed jointly by “Plaintiff pro 

per” and by an attorney who represents Plaintiff in an ongoing criminal matter. See ECF No. 24 at 1, 15. 

As discussed below, Plaintiff and his appointed counsel “in the criminal matter [request] that [the] court 

appoint civil counsel to represent [Plaintiff] in the civil matter.” Id. at 15. Based on this representation, it 

appears that Plaintiff’s criminal counsel does not intend to represent Plaintiff in this matter on an ongoing 

basis. Therefore, at this time, the referral of this matter to the assigned Magistrate Judge remains in effect 

pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21) pending a determination of whether Plaintiff already has (or should be 

appointed) civil counsel. Nonetheless, to the extent that Plaintiff’s appointed criminal counsel has already 

appeared in this civil action, the Court cautions him that he may be subject to Local Rule 182(d) regarding 

withdrawal if he does not intend to continue to represent Plaintiff in this matter going forward. See E.D. 

Cal. Local R. 182(a)(2) (explaining that “[a]ppearance as an attorney of record is made [among other 

methods] . . . by signing and filing an initial document” or “by causing the attorney's name to be listed in 

the upper left hand corner of the first page of the initial document”).

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$10,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491. Here, Plaintiff seeks an award of $500,000. 

Therefore, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s 

inverse condemnation claim be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff also agrees with this finding. See Opp’n, ECF No. 18 at 2.

B. Quiet Title Claim

In his Objections, however, Plaintiff argues that his Complaint also asserted a

Quiet Title Act (“QTA”) claim which was not addressed in the Findings and 

Recommendation and over which this Court maintains jurisdiction. See ECF No. 24. 

Defendants contend that “the fact that the Findings and Recommendations do not 

separately address the Quiet Title Act [is] immaterial” because the gravamen of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint was for inverse condemnation. ECF No. 26. Defendants further argue that 

while it is unclear whether Plaintiff pled a separate QTA claim, that even if he did, any 

such claim should be dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations based 

on Plaintiff’s own Complaint. The Court first turns to whether Plaintiff alleged a QTA 

claim.

“Generally, a takings claim brought under § 1346(a)(2) is an inverse 

condemnation suit, and it is filed by the landowner after the government enters into 

physical possession of his property without the authority of a court order.” LaFargue v. 

United States, 4 F. Supp. 2d 580, 586 (E.D. La. 1998); see San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. 

v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1981). “There is a clear distinction between 

a claim brought under the QTA and one based upon the Tucker Act: a takings claim 

under the Tucker Act concedes the government's ownership and seeks to obtain just 

compensation for the landowner, while a quiet title claim under the QTA disputes 

ownership and provides the landowner with a declaration of title and recovery of the 

land.” LaFargue, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 586. To determine whether the Court has jurisdiction 

over a claim under the QTA or under the Tucker Act, it “must examine the nature of the 

rights plaintiffs assert in their complaint to determine which statute the plaintiffs' case 

falls under.” Id. (emphasis added); see United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 850-51 

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(1986) (examining jurisdictional grounds of case involving disputed title and reaffirming 

that “the plaintiff is absolute master of what jurisdiction he will appeal to,” and that 

“[j]urisdiction generally depends upon the case made and relief demanded by the 

plaintiff”) (internal citation omitted). 

As to whether Plaintiff pled a QTA claim, Defendants argue that merely “labeling 

something a Quiet Title Act claim does not make it so” and that because the gravamen 

of Plaintiff’s claim is for inverse condemnation, Plaintiff’s sole remedy is an inverse 

condemnation action in the Court of Federal Claims. ECF No. 26. Although inartfully 

pled, it appears Plaintiff seeks to vindicate his rights and seeks corresponding relief 

under both the Tucker Act and the QTA. Compare ECF No. 1 at 31 (requesting a 

“[j]udgment providing just compensation and punitive damages for said wrongful taking” 

and “pray[ing] for an amount of $500,000”) with id. (seeking a “[j]udgment quieting 

plaintiffs’ title to the easement, and [declaring that] defendants have no right, title or 

interest superseding plaintiffs’ title to the easement”); see also ECF No. 1 at 3 (“Plaintiff 

respectfully appears before this court in order to seek redress for the Forest Service’s 

unlawful acts and omissions, and [to] quiet Plaintiff’s title to subject land.”) (emphasis 

added). Moreover, Defendants have not cited any authority for the proposition that a 

Plaintiff may not simultaneously pursue both Tucker Act and Quiet Title Act claims in this 

instance at this stage in the proceeding. Cf. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 848 

(1986) (expressing "no opinion on the question whether . . . an appeal in a case raising 

both Tucker Act and Quiet Title Act claims would have to be bifurcated and sent in part 

to the regional circuit and in part to the Federal Circuit”); Bourgeois v. U. S., 545 F.2d 

727, 732-35 (Ct. Cl. 1976).2

 2

 There does not appear to be a clear answer to this question. While “[i]t is now well-established 

that the [United States Court of Federal Claims] has jurisdiction to make independent factual 

determinations of a claimant's specific property interest as a matter of course in adjudicating takings 

claims,” Dwen v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 76, 81 (Fed. Cl. 2004), any awarded “equitable relief must be 

incidental to and collateral to a claim for money damages.” Bobula v. United States Dep't of Justice, 970 

F.2d 854, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1992). On the record before it, the Court cannot conclude that the equitable relief 

sought by Plaintiff through his QTA claim is merely “incidental to and collateral to” his inverse 

condemnation claim. Thus, at this time the Court rejects without prejudice Defendants’ request that it 

dismiss Plaintiff’s QTA claim for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that it must be alleged before the Court of 

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Therefore, the Court finds that, although inartfully pled, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains

causes of action under the Tucker Act and under the QTA.

3

According to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, however, even if this Court finds 

Plaintiff adequately set forth a QTA cause of action, any such claim as set forth in the

Complaint is nonetheless barred by the statute of limitations. Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 3. “A 

district court may dismiss a claim if the running of the statute is apparent on the face of 

the complaint. However, a district court may do so only if the assertions of the 

complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the 

statute was tolled.” Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1045 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) 

(noting that if “the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint, the 

defense may be raised by a motion to dismiss”)).

4

A quiet title action is “barred unless . . . commenced within twelve years of the 

date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date 

 Federal Claims as a claim incidental to and collateral to his inverse condemnation claim. See ECF No. 26 

at 2-4; cf. Oak Forest, Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 90, 98 (1991) (explaining that the district court would 

determine the present title to the subject land while the claims court would hear the Tucker Act claim and 

also noting that because “Congress has clearly stated its instructions that the remedy of a declaration of 

present title as against the United States should be litigated in the district court,” the claims court would 

suspend the action before it until the district court issued its rulings in the quiet title action). Defendants, of 

course, may raise this point again upon further development of the record. Cf. Chittenden v. United 

States, 2013 WL 6199195, *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2013) (dismissing plaintiffs’ tort claims because the 

“gravamen” of the complaint was for inverse condemnation in a case that did not raise a QTA claim) (citing 

Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir.1963)). Similarly, the Court also rejects without 

prejudice Defendants contention that Plaintiff’s QTA claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) “because the 

Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to a claim that was or could have been brought under 

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)” because the Court finds that Plaintiff seeks remedies under the Tucker Act and the 

QTA making it unclear whether both of Plaintiff’s claims could have been brought under 

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) and because Defendants first raised this issue in their Response to Plaintiff’s 

Objections. See ECF No. 26 at 3.

3

 This conclusion is further supported by the fact that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally 

construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

4

 As to whether the statute of limitations was tolled, the Court notes that “[t]he Supreme Court has 

. . . held that Congress intended the QTA's limitations period to serve interests of finality, and therefore it 

may not be tolled.” Kingman Reef Atoll Investments, L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th 

Cir. 2008). In any event, Plaintiff did not argue that the relevant limitation was tolled. See ECF Nos. 18, 

24.

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the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). Courts “treat the statute of limitations in the QTA 

as jurisdictional.” Fid. Exploration & Prod. Co. v. United States, 506 F.3d 1182, 1186 

(9th Cir. 2007). Courts “must strictly construe the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations in 

favor of the government.” Shultz v. Dep't of Army, U.S., 886 F.2d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 

1989). The Ninth Circuit “has rejected explicitly [the] contention that the cause of action 

accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run only when the United States acts in a 

manner openly hostile and adverse to a landowner's interest. . . . The statute of 

limitations is not triggered, however, when the United States' claim is ambiguous or 

vague.” Id. at 1160 (internal citation omitted). “The statutory term ‘should have known’ 

imparts a test of reasonableness.” Id. Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative 

defense, the burden is on Defendants to show that the applicable time period has 

passed.

Here, Defendants contend that “[Plaintiff’s] Complaint alleges that the Forest 

Service made his easement impassable more than 12 years before filing this lawsuit in 

August of 2013.” ECF No. 26 at 4; see also ECF No. 9-1 at 4. In support of this 

argument, Defendants point to several passages in Plaintiff’s Complaint. For instance, 

Defendants aver that “[t]he Complaint also alleges that the ‘old recorded easement’ had 

been ‘washed out’ since 2000, meaning that it was totally impassable.” Mot., ECF 

No. 9-1 at 4 (citing ECF No. 1 at 21). However, an examination of the Complaint reveals 

that Plaintiff’s reference to an “old recorded easement” that had been “washed out” since 

2000 appears to be a reference to an easement over a neighbor’s land rather than the 

easement claimed by Plaintiff. See ECF No. 1 at 21, ¶ 106 (referring to Lacey 

McFarland’s land east of Plaintiff’s land and noting that “an old recorded easement that 

passes her land has been washed out since date of purchase”) (emphasis added). 

Thus, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s easement was also washed out at that time.5 

 5 The Court notes that the claimed easement over Plaintiff’s land may have also been become 

impassable in or before 2000 for the same reasons, but Defendants’ have not met their burden on this 

point. Defendants may, of course, raise the issue of whether the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s claim 

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Defendants also argue that “Plaintiff alleges, for example, that a map from the 1960s 

refers to, but no longer shows, the unused former road.” Mot., ECF No. 9-1 at 4. With 

respect to this contention, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the map “contains [the]

subject properties; and [the] documented right-of-way, or the easement. Albeit not 

shown in its’ [sic] ‘precise’ location.” ECF No. 1 at 20, ¶ 103. However, this statement 

does not establish that the United States' claim was unambiguous or that Plaintiff (or, if 

applicable, his predecessor in interest) knew or should have known of the adverse 

actions of the United States at that time – particularly where “[t]he statutory term ‘should 

have known’ imparts a test of reasonableness.” Shultz, 886 F.2d at 1159. Thus, the 

Court cannot conclude that the statute of limitations bars this claim on the basis of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alone as argued by Defendants.

6

C. Related Case 7

Finally, the Court is in receipt of Plaintiff’s Notice of Related Cases (ECF No. 25) 

in which he seeks to have the same Magistrate Judge preside over his criminal matter 

and the instant civil action. In the criminal case, Plaintiff stands charged with three 

counts by way of a superseding information filed September 27, 2013. See United 

States v. John D. Schema, 2:13-mj-00087-DAD. Count One of the superseding 

information charges Plaintiff with damaging timber, trees, or other forest products on 

National Forest Service Land in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.6(a). Count Two charges 

Plaintiff with constructing, placing, or maintaining a road of National Forest Service 

Lands in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(a). Count Three charges Plaintiff with 

Damaging a Natural Feature or Other Property of the United States in violation of 

36 C.F.R. § 261.9(a). According to Plaintiff, “paramount to the civil case and the defense 

 at a later point in this proceeding.

6 In his Objections, Plaintiff also requests the appointment of civil counsel and that leave be 

granted to allow the filing of an amended complaint. The Court declines to address these requests as they 

are not properly before the Court. These requests must be made in a noticed motion on the calendar of 

the assigned Magistrate Judge. See E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(a), (k); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.

7 These facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Notice of Related Case, ECF No. 25, unless otherwise 

noted.

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of the criminal case is the existence of what has been known as a R.S.- 2477 easement 

for the benefit of [Plaintiff] across USFS land.”

An examination of the two actions, John D. Schema v. United States Department 

of Agriculture, et al. (2:14-cv-0630-MCE-CKD-PS) and United States v. John D. Schema

(2:13-mj-00087-DAD) reveals that these actions are related within the meaning of Local 

Rule 123(a) (E.D. Cal. 1997). The actions involve some of the same parties and involve 

some of the same or related claims, defenses, and property, as well as similar questions 

of fact and would therefore entail a substantial duplication of labor if heard by different 

magistrate judges. Accordingly, the assignment of the matters to the same magistrate 

judge is likely to effect a substantial savings of judicial effort and is also likely to be 

convenient for the parties. The parties should be aware that relating the cases under 

Local Rule 123 merely has the result that both actions are assigned to the same judge; 

no consolidation of the action is effected. Under the regular practice of this court, related 

cases are generally assigned to the magistrate judge to whom the first filed action was 

assigned, which is the criminal matter in this instance. Therefore, the instant civil action 

will be assigned to Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd for all further proceedings.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, having carefully reviewed the entire case file, the Court finds the 

Findings and Recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis 

with respect to Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim. However, as set forth above, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff’s Quiet Title Act claim is not barred by the applicable statute of 

limitations on the basis of Plaintiff’s Complaint alone. Finally, the Court finds that the 

assignment of the matters to the same magistrate judge is likely to effect a substantial 

savings of judicial effort and is also likely to be convenient for the parties. Accordingly,

1. The Findings and Recommendations filed July 30, 2014 (ECF No. 23) are 

ADOPTED as to Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim only;

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2. Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim is DISMISSED without prejudice to filing 

before the United States Court of Federal Claims; 

3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s 

inverse condemnation claim and DENIED without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s Quiet Title 

Act claim; 

4. As set forth above, it is ORDERED that the action denominated John D. 

Schema v. United States Department of Agriculture, et al., 2:14-cv-0630-MCE-CKD-PS, 

is REASSIGNED to Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. and Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd 

for all further proceedings, and any dates currently set in this reassigned case only are 

hereby VACATED. Henceforth, the caption on documents filed in the reassigned case 

shall be shown as, 2:14-cv-0630-MCE-DAD-PS. However, this order SHALL NOT 

AFFECT the related action, United States v. John D. Schema, 2:13-mj-00087-DAD, 

which SHALL REMAIN assigned only to Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd. See E.D. Cal. 

Local R. 302(b);

5. It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court make appropriate 

adjustment in the assignment of cases to compensate for this reassignment of this civil 

matter to a different Magistrate Judge; and

6. Pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21) and this Order, this matter is REFERRED to 

Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd for further proceedings. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

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