Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00113/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00113-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Frank Ted Johnson, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-113 PHX MHM (VAM)

)

Dora Schriro, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Frank Ted Johnson ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner

raises three grounds for relief in the petition. (Doc. 1 at pp.

5, 7-8). Respondents filed an answer opposing the granting of

habeas relief. (Doc. 8).

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault in Maricopa

County Superior Court on August 17, 2000. (Doc. 8 at Exhibit C). 

On September 18, 2000, the trial court sentenced petitioner to 7.5

years in prison with credit for 358 days already served. (Id. at

Exhibit E). Petitioner filed a direct appeal. Appointed counsel

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1969). Although counsel "found no arguable question of law that

is not frivolous," counsel noted petitioner requested that he

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raise the following issues:

1. The prosecutor was guilty of misconduct for A)

failing to provide the pre-sentence report two days

prior to sentencing; B) failing to provide a 911 tape

transcript; and, C) presenting witnesses without

personal knowledge;

2. Constitutional rights were violated including A)

speedy trail; B) unreasonable bond; C) malicious

prosecution; D) deliberate-indifference-injuries while

in custody; and [E]) ineffective assistance of counsel;

3. Ineffective assistance of counsel: [petitioner] has

listed eleven suggested claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel, however, undersigned counsel has informed

[petitioner] by telephone that these claims must first

be raised in Rule 32, post-conviction relief

proceedings.

(Doc. 8, Exhibit I at p. 10) (emphasis added). The Arizona Court

of Appeals issued a memorandum order affirming petitioner's

conviction and sentence on April 19, 2001. (Id. at Exhibit K). 

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review and the state Court of

Appeals issued its order and mandate on September 5, 2001. (Id.

at Exhibit P).

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief prior to

sentencing which was dismissed. (Doc. 8 at Exhibits D and G). 

Petitioner later filed three separate post-conviction relief

proceedings in state court. Petitioner filed his first Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief on September 29, 2000, while his direct

appeal was still pending. (Doc. 8 at Exhibit F). On May 22,

2001, petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief

and an actual petition. (Id. at Exhibits N and O). The trial

court denied the petition on September 10, 2001. (Id. at Exhibit

Q). Although there is nothing in the record which would support

this claim, petitioner states he filed a petition for review in

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the Arizona Court of Appeals but the court denied the petition on

February 26, 2002. (Doc. 1 at p. 2).

On January 10, 2002, petitioner initiated a second Rule 32 by

filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and an accompanying

petition in the trial court. (Doc. 8 at Exhibits S and T). The

trial court summarily denied the petition on the basis that all

claims raised were precluded because petitioner could have raised

the claims on direct appeal or in his first Rule 32. (Id. at

Exhibit U). Petitioner filed for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals but the court denied review without comment on March 4,

2003. (Id. at Exhibits V, X).

On December 31, 2003, petitioner filed a "PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS" in the trial court. (Doc. 8 at Exhibit Y). The

trial court treated this filing as a third Rule 32 petition and

summarily dismissed because all claims raised were precluded

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). (Id. at Exhibit Z). The

Arizona Court of Appeals denied a petition for review without

comment on May 19, 2005. (Id. at Exhibits AA and EE). The

Arizona Supreme Court also denied review on December 8, 2005. 

(Id. at Exhibits BB and EE). 

On January 9, 2006, petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus

petition raising the following grounds:

GROUND I: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - SIXTH

AMENDMENT.

JOSEPH STAZZONE, ATTY, TOLD JUDGE DOUGHERTY 1 WEEK

BEFORE TRIAL HE COULD NOT PREPARE A PROPER DEFENSE IN

ONE WEEK'S TIME AND HE PLANNED A VACATION IN ONE WEEK. 

STAZZONE DID NOT INVESTIGATE ANYTHING MORE THAN POLICE

REPORTS WHICH STATED VICTIM ARNOLD STATING A BLACK MAN

DID THE ATTACK BEFORE TALKING TO POLICE AND OTHERS TO

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COME UP WITH WHAT HAPPENED. ARNOLD TESTIFIED TO THIS

FABRICATION AT TRIAL AND STAZZONE DID NOT OBJECT FOR

FABRICATION INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS, HEARSAY, CREATING A

PROCEDURAL DEFAULT THAT WAS SO OBVIOUS THAT THE

INTEGRITY OF THE COURT WAS COMPROMISED. THE JUDGE AND

PROSECUTOR WERE DERELICT IN NOT RULING AGAINST IT. 

APPEAL & POST CONVICTIONS LAWYERS THAT WERE COURT

APPOINTED DID NOT NOTICE THIS SO I WROTE IT IN MY

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS. PAGES 60 & 85 OF TRIAL 8-16-00,

ARNOLD TESTIFIES; I'VE PUT ALMOST ALL THAT TOGETHER; AND

THAT'S FROM APPOINTED ATTORNEY INFERS A LACK OF

DILIGENCE OR AVACATION [sic] ON STAZZONE'S MIND, APPEAL

& PCR ATTY'S SHOW A LACK OF VISION. ALTOGETHER THESE

COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEYS CAUSED UNREASONABLE

PROBABILITY, ABSENT ERRORS AND OMISSIONS, THAT THE

RATIONAL FACTFINDERS WOULD HAVE HAD A REASONABLE DOUBT

RESPECTING GUILT. IF ARNOLD'S TESTIMONY WAS IMPEACHED

FOR FABRICATION INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS, HEARSAY OR

OTHER REASONS, THE EVIDENCE AGAINST ME WOULD NOT BE

ENOUGH TO CONVICT. THE EXCITED UTTERANCE IMMEDIATELY

AFTER THE INCIDENT COULD LEAD A RATIONAL TRIER OF FACT

TO BELIEVE A BLACK MAN DID THE ATTACK. THE RESULTING

PREJUDICE FROM POOR PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL CAUSE A

GUILTY VERDICT. ARNOLD WAS TAPE RECORDED DISCUSSING A

PLAN TO SET ME UP FOR A FALSE ARREST PRIOR TO THE SETUP.

[NO GROUND II].

GROUND III: 14TH AMENDMENT - DUE PROCESS - DENIAL OF

UNREQUESTED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE BRADY RULE VIOLATION.

[PETITIONER] PLEADED NOT GUILTY IN COURT. [PETITIONER]

TESTIFIED TO HIS INNOCENCE DURING TRIAL. [PETITIONER]

STATED HIS INNOCENCE IN HIS POST CONVICTION PRO SE

SUPPLEMENT. [PETITIONER] STATED HIS INNOCENCE IN HIS

APPEAL PRO SE SUPPLEMENT. [PETITIONER] STATED HIS

INNOCENCE IN HIS SECOND POST CONVICTION RELIEF/STATE

HABEAS CORPUS. [PETITIONER] STATED HIS INNOCENCE IN THE

APPEALS COURT. [PETITIONER] STATED HIS INNOCENCE IN THE

ARIZONA SUPREME COURT. [PETITIONER] STATED IN HIS TRIAL

THAT VICTIM ARNOLD TOLD HIM OF A PLAN TO SET

[PETITIONER] UP TO BE ARRESTED 9-25-99, THE NIGHT BEFORE

THE ARREST. [PETITIONER] TAPE RECORDED VICTIM ARNOLD

TELLING HIM OF THE PLAN TO HAVE HIM SET UP ON A

MICROCASSETTE RECORDER THAT WAS ON THE LIVING ROOM

TABLE. IN [PETITIONER'S] APARTMENT. THIS TAPE RECORDING

IS EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE THAT WAS IN THE POSSESSION,

CUSTODY AND CONTROL AFTER THE SET-UP WAS COMPLETED. 

DENYING [PETITIONER] OF THIS EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

RESULTED IN THE CONVICTION OF AN INNOCENT COLLEGE

STUDENT WHO PLANNED TO ATTEND GRAND CANYON UNIVERSITY TO

BECOME A PHYSICIAN'S ASSISTANT. [PETITIONER] HAS NO

HISTORY OF VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT HIS LIFETIME. MOST

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PEOPLE WHO ARE VIOLENT SHOW THIS TENDENCY BETWEEN AGES

13 AND 25. FOR A COLLEGE STUDENT TO BECOME VIOLENT AT

AGE 44 IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

GROUND IV: PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT - VOUCHING - DUE

PROCESS VIOLATION 5TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS.

PROSECUTOR KERRY SIMPSON REPEATEDLY VOUCHED FOR HER

STATE WITNESS ARNOLD'S CREDIBILITY BY STATING

[PETITIONER] WAS GUILTY AND [PETITIONER] DID THE CRIME

WITHOUT PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. I TOOK A COMMUNICATION

CLASS WHICH STATED REPEATING ANYTHING THREE TIMES IS HOW

TO GET AN AUDIENCE TO REMEMBER THE STATEMENT. SINCE

PROSECUTOR KERRY SIMPSON EXCEEDED THE THREE REPETITIONS

RULE, THIS RESULTED IN THE JURORS REMEMBERING THE

STATEMENT AND BELIEVING THESE ILLEGALLY ADMITTED

STATEMENTS TO MAKE UP THE MINDS OF THE JURORS FOR THEM. 

A PROSECUTOR HAS NO BUSINESS TELLING THE JURY HER

INDIVIDUAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE EVIDENCE. BECAUSE SHE IS

THE SOVEREIGN'S REPRESENTATIVE, THE JURY MAY BE MISLED

INTO THINKING HER CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN VALIDATED BY THE

GOVERNMENT'S INVESTIGATORY APPARATUS. THE PROSECUTOR

MAY NOT VOUCH FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESS EITHER

BY PUTTING ITS OWN PRESTIGE BEHIND THE WITNESS, OR BY

EXPRESSING HER OPINION OF THE [PETITIONER'S] ALLEGED

GUILT. THIS ILLEGAL ACTIVITY MATERIALLY AFFECTED THE

VERDICT PREJUDICED [PETITIONER'S] TRIAL.

(Doc. 1 at pp. 5, 7-8).

II. DISCUSSION

Respondents first contend that petitioner's claims are barred

by the one-year statute of limitations provided at 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d). (Doc. 8 at pp. 4-6). Alternatively, respondents contend

all petitioner's claims are procedurally barred from consideration

on federal habeas review. (Id. at pp. 9-15). 

A. Statute of Limitations

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of

limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and

sentences rendered by state courts. This provision, codified at

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28 U.S.C. § 2244, states, in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State

action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.

In Calderon v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California ("Beeler")(en banc), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed the new limitations period

contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court noted that prior

to § 2244(d)’s enactment "state prisoners had almost unfettered

discretion in deciding when to file a federal habeas petition" and

that "delays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a

prisoner from seeking relief." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1286.

The Court noted, however, that the provisions of § 2244(d)

"dramatically changed this landscape" and a petitioner was now

"required to file his habeas petition within one year of the date

his process of direct review came to an end." Id. The Court,

following other circuits, also held that the period of limitations

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1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that, pursuant to the counting

provisions outlined in Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, the one-year limitations

period for all habeas petitioner's challenging convictions or

sentences finalized prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of

the AEDPA is April 24, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

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"did not begin to run against any state prisoner prior to the

statute’s date of enactment" of April 24, 1996. Beeler, 128 F.3d

at 1287. Thus, all federal habeas corpus claims concerning state

court judgments finalized prior to April 24, 1996, had to be filed

by April 23, 1997,1 or they were barred by the statute of

limitations absent a showing the circumstances surrounding the

filing of the petition fell into one of the categories listed in §

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

The Beeler Court also held § 2244(d) established a customary

statute of limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." Id.

at 1288-89. The statute itself provided for tolling the

limitations period when a "properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

However, the Court cautioned that equitable tolling of the

limitations period "will not be available in most cases but will

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time." 

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United

States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (3rd Cir. 1997)).

B. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

Respondents assert that a total of 456 days of untolled time

elapsed following the dismissal of petitioner's first Rule 32

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proceeding by the trial court on September 10, 2001 and his filing

of the federal habeas petition on January 9, 2006. (Doc. 8 at p.

6). Specifically, respondents contend that 122 days of untolled

time elapsed between denial of the first Rule 32 by the trial

court and the filing of the notice in the second Rule 32 on

January 10, 2002. Respondents contend an additional 302 days of

untolled time elapsed between denial of the second Rule 32 by the

Arizona Court of Appeals on March 4, 2003, and the filing of a

state habeas petition (treated as a third Rule 32 by the trial

court) on December 31, 2003. Finally, respondents assert an

additional 32 days of untolled time elapsed between the Arizona

Supreme Court's denial of review of the third Rule 32 on December

8, 2005, and the filing of petitioner's federal habeas petition on

January 9, 2006. (See Doc. 8 at p. 6).

To support their analysis, respondents have included printouts of state court docket sheets showing the filings in

petitioner's direct appeal and three post-conviction relief

proceedings. (Doc. 8 at Exhibits CC, DD and EE). Review of this

documentation supports the time-lines outlined by respondents. 

Conversely, petitioner's claim that the Arizona Court of Appeals

denied review of his first Rule 32 petition on February 26, 2002,

(see Doc. 1 at p. 2), is not supported by the state court docket

sheets. The docket sheets provide no indication that petitioner

sought review of the denial of his first Rule 32 petition by the

trial court on September 10, 2001. This is telling because the

petitions for review to the state appellate courts filed by

petitioner in his second and third Rule 32 proceedings are noted

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2

Petitioner's first Rule 32 was filed while his direct appeal

was still pending. (See Doc. 8 at Exhibit P and Exhibit F). As a

result, the limitations period did not commence until the

conclusion of petitioner's first Rule 32. 

3

The petitioner's signature on his federal habeas petition is

dated January 3, 2006. Even assuming he handed the petition to

prison officials for filing on that day, and thus should be

credited with filing the petition at that time, petitioner still

has 450 days of untolled time to account for. (See Doc. 1 at p.

9). 

9

in the docket. (See id.).

Based on the documentation of the state court procedural

history included in the record, more than 365 days of untolled

time elapsed between the denial of petitioner's first Rule 32

petition by the trial court on September 10, 2001,2 (see Doc. 8,

Exhibit Q and Exhibit CC at p. 3) and the filing of his federal

habeas petition on January 9, 2006.3

Approximately 450 days elapsed between September 10, 2001 and

January 9, 2006, during which petitioner had nothing pending in

state court. Because petitioner had no proceedings pending in

state court during that time to toll the limitations period, his

claims are now barred. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048

(9th Cir. 2003) (limitations period is not tolled during interval

between separate collateral review proceedings because no

proceeding is "pending" during this time); King v. Roe, 340 F.3d

821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (same). Petitioner has provided no

basis to justify equitable tolling during these 450 or so days and

none is apparent from the record.

Because the claims presented in the habeas petition are

barred by the statute of limitations, the Magistrate Judge will

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not address respondents' alternative argument that petitioner's

claims were procedurally defaulted in state court.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied as untimely. 

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties shall have ten (10) days

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to

timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation will be considered a waiver of a party's right to

de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a

waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 27th day of June, 2006.

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