Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01527/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01527-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW P. PAXTON, KRIS MILLER No. CIV.S-02-1527 DAD

PAXTON,

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

SQUAW VALLEY SKI CORPORATION, 

Defendant.

_____________________________/

This matter came before the court on July 15, 2005, for

hearing on defendant’s motion for new trial, or in the alternative

remittitur. Bruce S. Osterman and David E. May appeared on behalf of

plaintiffs. John E. Fagan and Michael L. Reitzell appeared on behalf

of defendant. Having considered all written materials submitted in

connection with the motion, and after hearing oral argument,

defendant’s motion will be denied.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Where, as here, there has been a trial by jury, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides that a new trial may be

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granted “for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore

been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States[.]” 

Thus, the granting of a new trial is discretionary with the court and

has been said to be subject to no fixed rule except a consideration

of what is just. Murphy v. United States District Court, 145 F.2d

1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1945). The burden of persuasion on a motion for

new trial is on the movant, and the court should not lightly disturb

a plausible jury verdict. Anglo-Am. Gen. v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins.,

83 F.R.D. 41, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1979). Of course, “[a] district court

may not grant a new trial simply because it would have arrived at a

different verdict.” Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot

Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v.

4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999)).

If the motion is based upon insufficiency of the evidence, 

a stringent standard applies. E.E.O.C. v. Pape Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d

676, 680 (9th Cir. 1997). In such an instance the court may grant

the motion only if the verdict is against the clear weight of the

evidence and the verdict results in the miscarriage of justice or it

is quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous

result. City Solutions, Inc. v. Clear Channel, 365 F.3d 835, 843

(9th Cir. 2004); Pape Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d at 680; Digidyne Corp. v.

Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1347 (9th Cir. 1984). 

While a motion for new trial may also be based on grounds

of excessive damages, the court must allow substantial deference to a

jury's finding of the appropriate amount of damages. Del Monte Dunes

at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1435 (9th Cir.

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1996). Generally, a new trial will not be granted unless the verdict

is so excessive that it could only have been the result of passion or

prejudice, or is grossly excessive, monstrous or shocking to the

conscience. Id.; Zhang v. American Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d

1020, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 541 U.S. 902 (2004); Havens

v. F/T Polar Mist, 996 F.2d 215, 219 (9th Cir. 1993); Hasbrouck v.

Texaco, 842 F.2d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Story

Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563

(1931) ("Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the

ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a

perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to

the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any

amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may not be

determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the

evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and

reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate.");

Silver Sage Partners, Ltd., 251 F.3d at 820 n.6 (the mere fact that

different assessments of damages are possible is not a reason for

finding a particular assessment to be “too speculative”). In

considering a request for remittitur, a jury's award of damages

should remain undisturbed unless that award is based on speculation

or guesswork. See City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955

F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir. 1992).

 If the motion is based on the misconduct of counsel, a new

trial should only be granted where the flavor of misconduct

sufficiently permeated the entire proceeding to provide conviction

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that the jury was influenced by passion and prejudice in reaching its

verdict. Settlegoode v. Portland Pub. Schs., 371 F.3d 503, 516-17

(9th Cir.), cert. denied ___U.S.___, 125 S. Ct. 478 (2004); AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 346 (9th Cir.

1995).

Finally, if a motion for new trial is based upon an alleged

evidentiary error, a new trial is warranted only if the party was

"substantially prejudiced" by an erroneous admission of the evidence. 

Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir. 1995);

United States v. 99.66 Acres of Land, 970 F.2d 651, 658 (9th Cir.

1992).

ANALYSIS

This personal injury action arises from a skiing accident

that occurred on April 30, 2002, at Squaw Valley Ski Area. 

Plaintiffs Matthew Paxton and his wife, Kris Paxton, alleged that Mr.

Paxton was injured after he inadvertently skied into a man-made

terrain feature called a half-pipe, located within a terrain park on

the premises of the defendant Squaw Valley Ski Corporation. 

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant was negligent in maintaining and

marking the terrain park and half-pipe. Defendant denied such

negligence and maintained that the terrain park and half-pipe were

properly marked with signs and enclosed with a rope-line. Defendant

also disputed the amount of the damages and the extent of the

injuries claimed by plaintiffs.

After an eleven-day jury trial conducted between May 9 and

May 25, 2005, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of

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1 No damages were awarded on Mrs. Paxton’s loss of consortium

claim, which the jury rejected.

5

plaintiff Matthew Paxton. Specifically, the jury found defendant

Squaw Valley Ski Corporation ninety-four (94) percent at fault and

plaintiff Mr. Paxton six (6) percent at fault for the accident. The

jury award Mr. Paxton $84,326 for past medical expenses; $198,304.00

for past lost wages; and $1,413,150.00 in general damages. The total

gross award was $1,695,780.00. The total net award was

$1.594,033.20.1

Defendant has moved for a new trial on grounds that the

jury verdict is not supported by the evidence, is excessive, and is

the result of plaintiffs’ counsel’s misconduct during the trial. 

Defendant also challenges one of the court’s in limine rulings. The

court addresses defendant’s arguments below.

Defendant’s first argument in support of its motion for a

new trial is that the jury verdict is not supported by the evidence. 

Specifically, defendant asserts that the clear weight of the evidence

favored a finding that a perimeter rope-line was properly in place

around the terrain park at the time of Mr. Paxton’s accident. In

this regard defendant relies, as it did at trial, on the testimony of

ski patrollers, terrain park personnel and a lift operator which,

according to defendant, clearly demonstrated that the terrain park

was properly marked and maintained before, during and after the

accident. Defendant also relies on the various photographs taken

after the accident had occurred depicting the properly marked and

maintained park. Defendant’s arguments are unavailing.

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During the pretrial proceedings and throughout the trial,

defendant, plaintiffs and the court generally shared the view that

this case came down to the following central question: Did plaintiff

Matthew Paxton see, or should he have seen, signs, ropes or other

barriers that would have warned or prevented him from entering the

half-pipe? Defendant argued to the jury that the evidence presented

at trial compelled them to conclude that Mr. Paxton did encounter

ropes, signs and other barriers in his path but that he chose to

disregard the warnings by ducking under the rope-line and proceeding

on his path of travel. Plaintiffs argued that the evidence,

including Mr. Paxton’s testimony and the defendant’s own photographs

of the scene after the fact, overwhelmingly established that the

rope-line and warnings were not present and/or not visible at Mr.

Paxton’s point of entry into the area due to defendant’s negligence. 

In considering the testimony and the other evidence admitted at

trial, the jury obviously made various credibility determinations

consistent with the instructions they were given and found in favor

of plaintiff Matthew Paxton. As observed by the court during the

hearing on the instant motion, the verdict suggests that the jury

found Mr. Paxton’s testimony credible and compelling while at the

same time finding the deposition and trial testimony of the many

defense witnesses to be compromised by numerous inconsistencies. It

would appear that in addition to the testimony of witnesses the jury

considered the defendant’s own photographs, some taken within hours

of the accident and some taken the following morning, depicting the

ski run that Mr. Paxton traversed which led him into the half-pipe

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thereby causing his injuries. As plaintiff’s counsel persuasively

argued to the jury, those photographs and their clear depiction of

innumerable uninterrupted ski tracks passing straight through the

area that defendant claimed was blocked off with ropes was strong

circumstantial evidence that the ropes, barriers and signs were not

present or visible at the time of plaintiff’s accident. In light of

such evidence, the court cannot conclude that the jury’s verdict is

against the great weight of the evidence.

The court recognizes that in all nine defense witnesses

testified regarding the presence of a properly maintained rope-line

whereas only plaintiff Matthew Paxton testified to the absence of any

such barrier. However, this nine-to-one ratio does not persuade the

court that defendant should be granted a new trial. The jury did not

err even if it based its verdict on the finding of one witness more

credible than all of the others. Indeed, in relevant part, the jury

was instructed as follows:

The weight of the evidence is not necessarily

determined by the number of witnesses testifying

to the existence or nonexistence of any fact. 

You may find that the testimony of a small number

of witnesses as to any fact is more credible than

the testimony of a larger number of witnesses to

the contrary.

(Jury Instruction No. 8.)

In sum, the court sees no reason to disturb the jury’s

verdict as to liability. The court rejects defendant’s argument that

the jury verdict is unsupported by the evidence introduced at trial. 

/////

/////

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2 The court recognizes that the jury found Mr. Paxton’s

negligence a factor in causing his own harm and assigned six (6)

percent of responsibility to plaintiff in this regard. However, the

court does not agree with defendant that this finding evinces a

belief on the part of the jury that Mr. Paxton ducked under any ropeline around the terrain park. The jury’s finding of comparative

fault could have been based on any number of reasons. The court

notes that the jury was instructed that, “[i]n determining the

parties’ comparative fault, you should consider Matthew Paxton's

voluntary decision to encounter the risks of skiing. Whether Matthew

Paxton acted reasonably or not in choosing to take those risks, you

may reduce his recovery to account for his assumption of risk by

whatever amount you find proper in light of all the evidence.” (Jury

Instruction No. 27.) It appears that the jury diligently followed

the court’s instruction in this regard. 

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The verdict is not against the great weight of the evidence nor is it

clear that the jury reached a seriously erroneous result.2

Defendant’s next argument is that a new trial should be

granted because the jury’s damages award is excessive. As defendant

points out, the jury awarded slightly higher general damages than

counsel for plaintiffs suggested in his closing argument. Also,

there was evidence that plaintiff Matthew Paxton has returned to work

following his accident and, to a certain extent, has begun to engage

in many of the activities he enjoyed prior to the accident. Although

a jury could have properly awarded less, the court cannot find the

jury’s verdict to be “grossly excessive,” “monstrous,” “shocking to

the conscience,” or the result of “passion or prejudice.” Del Monte

Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 95 F.3d at 1435. 

While the jury may have been generous with its award, there

is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be awarded for

general damages. (See Jury Instruction No. 27.) In closing

argument, counsel for plaintiffs argued for general damages in an

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amount three to five times greater than special damages. This is not

inconsistent with how cases are often evaluated in the personal

injury arena. The jury appears to have been persuaded by the

argument in that Mr. Paxton’s special damages totaled $282,630,

exactly one-fifth of the $1,413,150.00 in general damages awarded.

Moreover, at the trial plaintiffs offered testimony and

documentary evidence of Mr. Paxton’s multiple operations and the

permanent injuries which he suffered as a result of the accident in

question. That body of evidence demonstrated the gravity of those

injuries as well as the resulting pain and suffering for Mr. Paxton,

who is only 47 years of age with a life expectancy of another 31

years according to mortality tables. (See Jury Instruction No. 28.) 

Given the evidence introduced at trial, the jury’s award of general

damages should not be disturbed. Fox v. GMC, 247 F.3d 169, 180 (4th

Cir. 2001) ("Courts defer to a jury's award of damages for intangible

harms, such as emotional distress, because the harm is subjective and

evaluating it depends considerably on the demeanor of the

witnesses."); Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 909, 944

(N.D. Iowa 2003) ("[A]wards for pain and suffering are highly

subjective and should be committed to the sound discretion of the

jury, especially when the jury is being asked to determine injuries

not easily calculated in economic terms."), aff’d 382 F.3d 816 (8th

Cir. 2004).

The court is also not persuaded by defendant’s argument

that the amount of general damages awarded is substantially larger

than plaintiff Matthew Paxton’s special damages. In this regard,

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3 “In determining whether a jury award for compensatory

damages is excessive, a court may review awards made in similar cases

to determine whether or not an award is excessive and calls for an

order of remittitur.” Velez v. Roche, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1039

(N.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting Thornton v. Kaplan, 958 F. Supp. 502, 505

(D. Colo. 1996)). 

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defendant asserts that any award of general damages must be based

solely upon Mr. Paxton’s medical special damages ($84,326), and

should not take into account lost income. Thus, defendant asserts

that a more reasonable general damages award would be approximately

three to five times $84,326. While defendant advances policy

arguments in support of this damages calculation argument, it is

unsupported by any legal authority. Indeed, in the only case cited

by either party regarding the relationship between special and

general damages, plaintiffs have pointed out that the California

Court of Appeal upheld an award of general damages which was nearly

nineteen times the amount of combined special damages. See Westphal

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 4th 1071, 1078-80, 81 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 46, 50-52 (1998).3

The court also rejects defendant’s creative argument that

the jury’s award of pain and suffering damages was analogous to an

award of punitive damages which was constitutionally excessive under

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Supreme

Court has recognized:

Compensatory damages “are intended to redress the

concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by

reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct.” By

contrast, punitive damages serve a broader

function; they are aimed at deterrence and

retribution.

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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416

(2003)(holding that award of $145 million in punitive damages on $1

million compensatory judgment violated due process). Here, the jury

awarded only compensatory damages. The jury was instructed not to

include any sum for purposes of punishing the defendant or to serve

as an example or warning to others. (See Jury Instruction No. 27.) 

The jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instructions and

there is no reason to believe that they did not do so in returning

their verdict in this case. Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820

(9th Cir. 1997) ("Juries are presumed to follow the court's

instructions."); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948

F.2d 536, 545 (9th Cir. 1991). 

For all of these reasons, the court finds the jury’s award

of damages not to be excessive. Moreover, because the court finds

the damages award not to be excessive, the defendant’s alternative

motion for remittitur will also be denied. 

Defendant’s next argument is that the excessive verdict was

the result of plaintiffs’ counsel’s misconduct during the trial. 

That argument is also unpersuasive. Neither counsel for defendant

nor counsel for plaintiffs engaged in misconduct during the trial. 

While both sides employed strategies that may have approached areas

addressed by the court’s pretrial orders or other rulings, none of

counsels’ actions amounted to misconduct, much less misconduct that

“sufficiently permeated” the entire proceeding in such a way as to

lead to a conviction that the jury was influenced by passion and

/////

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prejudice in reaching its verdict. See Settlegoode, 371 F.3d at 516-

17; Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 69 F.3d at 346. 

Finally, defendant seeks a new trial by again challenging

the court’s pre-trial in limine ruling excluding reference to a

liability release Matthew Paxton signed in exchange for the voucher

he used to receive his lift ticket on the day of his accident. In

its motion for new trial, defendant raises no new arguments with

respect to this issue. For the reasons set forth on the record at

the hearing on the in limine motions, the court finds that the

exclusion of any evidence at trial with respect to the liability

release at issue was appropriate. Moreover, even if reference to the

release was erroneously excluded, there has been no showing by

defendant that it was "substantially prejudiced" by the exclusion of

such evidence. Accordingly, the court finds that there has been no

error of law requiring a new trial. See Ruvalcaba, 64 F.3d at 1328;

99.66 Acres of Land, 970 F.2d at 658.

CONCLUSION

Defendant has adduced nothing in the record to demonstrate

that the verdict is either excessive, unsupported by evidence, the

result of attorney misconduct or the result of an erroneous in limine

ruling. Accordingly, defendant's motion for a new trial, or in the

alternative remittitur, is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 18, 2005.

DAD:th

orders.consent\paxton1527.newtrial

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