Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00246/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00246-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALVARADO ORTHOPEDIC RESEARCH,

L.P., a California limited

partnership; and KENNETH H.

HOLKO, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

LINVATEC CORPORATION, a Florida

corporation; and DOES 1 through

50, inclusive,

Defendants. _______________________________

LINVATEC CORPORATION, a Florida

corporation,

Counter-claimant,

v.

ALVARADO ORTHOPEDIC RESEARCH,

L.P., a California limited

partnership; KENNETH H. HOLKO,

an individual,

Counter-defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 11cv0246 IEG(RBB)

ORDER DENYING EX PARTE

APPLICATION TO REVISE CERTAIN

DATES IN THE SCHEDULING ORDER

[ECF NO. 70]

On November 29, 2012, Defendant and Counterclaimant, Linvatec

Corporation, filed an Ex Parte Application to Revise Certain Dates

in the Scheduling Order [ECF No. 70]. Linvatec requests that the

1 11cv0246 IEG(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-00246-JM-RBB Document 83 Filed 12/12/12 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court extend (1) the discovery cutoff from January 7, 2013, to

March 1, 2013; (2) the deadline to serve written discovery from

November 5, 2012, to January 11, 2013; (3) the deadline for filing

motions from January 28, 2013, to April 1, 2013; (4) initial expert

designations from November 5, 2012, to December 14, 2012; (5) the

next expert designation from December 3, 2012, to January 18, 2013;

(6) the supplemental expert designation deadline from December 17,

2012, to February 1, 2013; and (7) continue the settlement

conference scheduled for December 3, 2012, to April 1, 2013. (Ex

Parte Appl. Revise 1, ECF No. 70.)

The next day, November 30, 2012, Plaintiff and Counterclaim

Defendant, Alvarado Orthopedic Research, L.P., filed its Opposition

to the Ex Parte Application. (Pl. Alvarado Orthopedic Resarch,

L.P.'s Opp'n Ex-Parte Appl., ECF No. 71.) On the same date, the

Court denied Linvatec's request to continue the December 3, 2012

settlement conference and indicated that the remaining items

addressed in the Ex Parte Application would be considered in a

subsequent order. (Mins., Nov. 30, 2012, ECF No. 72.)

The Court held the scheduled settlement conference on December

3, 2012, and issued an order allowing Alvarado to file a

supplemental opposition to Linvatec's Ex Parte Application by

December 10, 2012; Linvatec was authorized to file a reply

memorandum by the same date. On December 10, 2012, Linvatec filed

a Reply in support of its Ex Parte Application [ECF No. 79]. 

Alvarado filed the Declaration of A. Kipp Williams in Response on

December 11, 2012 [ECF No. 81].

2 11cv0246 IEG(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-00246-JM-RBB Document 83 Filed 12/12/12 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I.

 THE SHOWING NEEDED TO MODIFY THE CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER

A. The Parties' Positions

Linvatec has new counsel. It's new lawyers substituted into

this case on October 26, 2012. (Ex Parte Appl. Revise 1, ECF No.

70.) They seek to extend dates "so that new counsel can assess the

facts and legal issues of the case, and prepare the case for

settlement or trial." (Id.)

In Alvarado's Opposition to the Ex Parte Application, it

argues that new counsel for Linvatec came into the case on October

25, 2012, knowing that a scheduling order was in place. (Pl.

Alvarado Orthopedic Research, L.P.'s Opp'n to Ex-Parte Appl. 3, ECF

No. 71.) Alvarado observes that "several key dates have already

come and gone. For example, the deadline to serve written

discovery was November 5, 2012, and the initial expert designation

was November 5, 2012." (Id.)

In its Reply, Linvatec supplements its earlier showing by

adding that an extension of pretrial dates is needed to "finish up

remaining discovery, some of which has been delayed by Plaintiff's

refusal to enter into a Protective Order." (Reply Further Supp.

Linvatec Corp.'s Ex Parte Appl. 1, ECF No. 79.) The Defendant

states that the "Plaintiff's refusal to agree to a Protective Order

has stalled document production, and thus completion of discovery." 

(Id. at 3.) It was required to file a motion to compel discovery,

and Linvatec repeats that it has new counsel. (Id.)

Counsel for Alvarado responded to Linvatec's assertions as

follows:

3 11cv0246 IEG(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-00246-JM-RBB Document 83 Filed 12/12/12 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

After being in this case for almost two years, Linvatec

proposes to extend the expert witness dates so it can

designate two experts: the first to provide testimony for

the trier of fact on how the patent law process works,

including for the payment of maintenance fees; and

second, a technical expert to provide testimony on the

blades and blade technology at issue.

. . . Linvatec has offered no showing of good cause

as to why it did not participate in the first expert

exchange on November 5, 2012. Linvatec has offered no

viable explanation as [to] why its former patent lawyers

did not determine that patent experts were needed at

trial.

(Decl. A. Kipp Williams Resp. 2, ECF No. 81.) Alvarado maintains

that the motion to compel brought by Linvatec dealt with deposition

topics that have little to do with the proposed expert

designations. (Id.) Also, Linvatec raised the need for a

protective order "over a year ago." (Id. at 3.) Williams

responded that it was "not necessary," and "the issue was dropped." 

(Id.)

B. Good Cause and Diligence

Rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states

that "[a] [case management] schedule may be modified only for good

cause and with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). 

Ostensibly, Linvatec acknowledges that the touchstone for modifying

a scheduling order is that the deadlines "cannot reasonably be met

despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." (Ex

Parte Appl. Revise 2, ECF No. 70 (quoting Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992)).) "If the

party seeking the modification 'was not diligent, the inquiry

should end' . . . ." Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.

"Allowing parties to disregard the instructions of a

scheduling order would undermine the court's ability to control its

4 11cv0246 IEG(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-00246-JM-RBB Document 83 Filed 12/12/12 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the litigation, and

reward the indolent and cavalier. Rule 16 was drafted to prevent

this situation." Sokol Holdings, Inc. v BMB Munai, Inc., 05-cv3749 (KMW) (DCF), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100478, at *17 (S.D.N.Y.

Oct. 28, 2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The Defendant and Counterlclaimant also relies on Woodard v.

City of Menlo Park, No. C 09-3331 SBA, 2012 WL 2119278, at *1 (N.D.

Cal. June 11, 2012), as authority for the proposition that

providing additional time for new counsel to properly prepare for

trial constitutes good cause to modify a scheduling order. (See Ex

Parte Appl. Revise 2, ECF No. 70.) In Woodard, plaintiff was

alleging an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, at

the request of the Federal Pro Bono Project, counsel was appointed

to represent him. Woodard, 2012 WL 2119278, at *1. The court

found that "Plaintiff's failure to conduct discovery was due to his

pro se status, mental disability and lack of legal expertise, and

not as a result of bad faith or carelessness." Id. It granted the

motion to modify the scheduling order and gave new counsel thirty

days to designate a use-of-force expert and medical expert, and

sixty days to depose defendant's three trial witnesses and to serve

no more than ten requests for production. Id. Linvatec is

situated differently from Robert Woodard.

"This court adheres to the widely followed principle that

'[t]he arrival of new counsel . . . does not entitle parties to

conduct additional discovery or otherwise set aside valid and

binding orders of the court, regardless of the efficacy of any new

strategy counsel seeks to follow.'" Harshaw v. Bethany Christian

5 11cv0246 IEG(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-00246-JM-RBB Document 83 Filed 12/12/12 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Servs., No. 1:08-cv-104, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79454, at *24 (W.D.

Mich. Aug. 5, 2010) (quoting Adams v. Sch. Bd. of Hanover Cty.,

Va., No. 3:05CV310, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96296, at *10 (E.D. Va.

Nov. 26, 2008)).

Before entering this case, Linvatec's new counsel presumably

understood that some case deadlines had passed and others were

pending. It entered the case on October 26th; the deadline for

interrogatories and document requests was November 5, 2012, and the

discovery cutoff was January 7, 2013. (See Case Management Conf.

Order 2, ECF No. 49.) As a counterclaimant, Linvatec was to

designate experts by November 5, 2012; it was authorized to

designate a defense expert in response to Plaintiff's expert by

December 3, 2012. With eyes wide open, counsel entered the fray. 

"That new counsel is dissatisfied with the state of the case it

inherited is not grounds . . . for reopening discovery long after

the court-ordered deadlines have passed." Marcin Eng'g, LLC v.

Founders at Grizzly Ranch, LLC, 219 F.R.D. 516, 521 (D. Colo.

2003).

In this matter, certain expert and other discovery deadlines

have already lapsed. The retention of new counsel does not

constitute good cause to reopen discovery under Rule 16. See

Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., No. Civ. S-00-978 FCD/JFM, 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 368, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2006).

"Defendants' desire to change their litigation strategy,

perhaps attributable to their new counsel, accounts for their

requested case schedule modification. Such a shift in litigation

strategy does not set forth good cause under Rule 16." Thomas v.

McDowell, No. 2:10-cv-0152, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163261, at *4

6 11cv0246 IEG(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-00246-JM-RBB Document 83 Filed 12/12/12 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2012). Similarly, in Nourison Rug Corp. v.

Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 298-99 (4th Cir. 2008), amended by

Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, No. 07-1973, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS

17820 (4th Cir. July 28, 2008), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the

trial court's summary judgment and refusal to find good cause to

amend pleadings after deadlines have passed based on new counsel's

discovery of a new defense that previous defense counsel had not

raised. Accord Kovaleski v. Johnson & Johnson Co., No. 2:09-cv473, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19234, at *9-11 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 28,

2011). "[C]arelessness and/or change in litigation strategy do not

amount to diligence." Onyx Pharms., Inc. v. Bayer Corp., No. C-09-

2145 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107114, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Sept.

21, 2011).

Linvatec's new lawyers suggest that they have acted promptly

in seeking to extend dates. (Ex Parte Appl. Revise 1-3, ECF No.

70.) In the Ex Parte Application, however, Linvatec does not

detail what its original attorneys have accomplished since the

Court held an early neutral evaluation conference on November 16,

2011, or issued the Case Management Conference Order Regulating

Discovery and Other Pretrial Proceedings on March 12, 2012 [ECF

Nos. 32, 29]. Instead, in its Reply, Linvatec argues that after

substituting into the case on October 26, 2012, new counsel

communicated with counsel for Alvarado about extending dates. 

(Reply Further Supp. Linvatec Corp.'s Ex Parte Appl. 4, ECF No.

79.) On November 14, 2012, counsel for the parties agreed to an

extension of deadlines for depositions and motions to compel

related to the depositions. (Id.) They did not, however, agree to

an extension of remaining dates, so on November 29, 2012, Linvatec

7 11cv0246 IEG(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-00246-JM-RBB Document 83 Filed 12/12/12 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

filed its Ex Parte Application to extend remaining dates [ECF No.

70].

In neither its Ex Parte Application nor Reply does Linvatec

describe the diligence of its prior counsel. "The defendant[] may

not simply ignore the lack of diligence of [its] former counsel on

this score and shift the focus to the diligence of [its] new

counsel." Harshaw v. Bethany Christian Servs., 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 794545, at *24. "Incoming counsel is bound by the actions of

his or her predecessor, and to hold otherwise would allow parties

to create good cause simply by switching counsel." Kenny v. Cnty.

of Suffolk, No. CV 05-6112 (ADS) (WDW), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

93120, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (internal quotations omitted)

(citation omitted).

Notably, "[d]uring the summer of 2012, [counsel for Alvarado]

had a conversation with Ellen Eagen, counsel for Linvatec, and

[they] agreed this was not an expert witness case and that neither

party would be designating experts." (Decl. A. Kipp Williams Resp.

3, ECF No. 81.) Under these circumstances, new counsel is hard

pressed to complain that it did not designate experts.

Linvatec states that Alvarado is urging a "new theory of the

case." (Reply 5, ECF No. 79.) Defendant Linvatec does not

identify when this theory was first articulated. Furthermore, it

has not provided information from which the Court can conclude

that, despite the Defendant's diligence, the recent discovery of

new facts or introduction of a new theory of liability was

unforeseen. "If the party seeking the modification 'was not

diligent, the inquiry should end' . . . ." Zivkovic v. S. Cal.

8 11cv0246 IEG(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-00246-JM-RBB Document 83 Filed 12/12/12 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Edison, 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

Linvatec's showing is insufficient.

II.

CONCLUSION

The appearance of new counsel does not reset the start clock. 

Linvatec has failed to establish that it acted diligently. 

Accordingly, the Ex Parte Application to Revise Certain Dates in

the Scheduling Order is DENIED [ECF No. 70].

DATED: December 12, 2012 ________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc:

Judge Gonzalez

All Parties of Record

I:\Chambers Brooks\CASES\ALVARADO-ORTHO246\OrderReDef'sExParte.wpd 9 11cv0246 IEG(RBB)

Case 3:11-cv-00246-JM-RBB Document 83 Filed 12/12/12 Page 9 of 9