Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01575/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01575-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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.. . . 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

WADE JENSEN, a minor, by his next 

friend JERRY JENSEN, 

Plaintiff-Counterclaim 

Defendant-Appellant, 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 1 21989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 87 - 1575 

TIMOTHY J. MASON, 

Defendant-Cross-Claimant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Cross Claim 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) (D.C. No. 86-1686) 

) ( D. Kan.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.8. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff-appellant appeals the district court's order of 

March 12, 1987 granting defendant-appellee's motion for summary 

judgment and dismissing the action for lack of subject matter 

Appellate Case: 87-1575 Document: 01019962033 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 1 
jurisdiction, as well as the district court's order of 

April 13, 1987 denying plaintiff's motion for "amendment of 

judgment or relief from summary judgment" brought under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 59 and 60. 

Plaintiff instituted this action in August 1986 to recover 

damages pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and§§ 2671-2680, for injuries he received on 

May 26, 1985 while riding his motorcycle on land owned by the 

United States. Plaintiff collided with a dune buggy driven by 

defendant Timothy Mason at the School Creek Off Road Vehicle 

("ORV") area at Milford Lake, Kansas, a multi-purpose water 

resource project constructed and maintained by the United States 

Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). Plaintiff originally sued the 

Corps and Mr. Mason, but subsequently amended his complaint to 

substitute the United States for the Corps as the proper party 

under the FTCA. 

Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendantappellee United States was negligent in carelessly maintaining the 

School Creek ORV area by allowing weeds to grow in excess of four 

feet high, which obstructed the view of those using the ORV area; 

in not properly posting speed limit and direction of travel signs 

for the recreational trails in the ORV area; and in failing to 

instruct properly law enforcement personnel who patrolled the area 

concerning the types of vehicles allowed in the area, the speed 

limits, and the direction of travel on the pathways. Plaintiff 

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Appellate Case: 87-1575 Document: 01019962033 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 2 
alleged that defendant Mr. Mason operated his vehicle in a 

negligent manner. 1 

The United States filed a motion for summary judgment, 

asserting that (1) the United States was not liable for any of the 

alleged acts or omissions because of the immunity afforded by the 

Kansas Recreational Use Statute ("RUS"), Kan. Stat. 

Ann. §§ 58-3201 through 58-3207, and (2) the court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction over the action because the alleged acts and 

omissions fell within the discretionary-function exception to the 

FTCA. Both plaintiff and Mr. Mason filed motions and briefs in 

opposition to the United States' motion. 

At the time he filed his opposition to the United States' 

motion for summary judgment, plaintiff also moved to amend his 

complaint to assert that the failure of the United States to guard 

or warn against the dangerous conditions at the School Creek ORV 

area constituted ''willful and malicious negligence" because the 

United States knew that serious accidents had occurred at the ORV 

area in the past. The district court granted plaintiff's motion 

to amend and considered the new allegations in ruling on the 

United States' motion. for summary judgment. 

Regarding the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion 

for relief from summary judgment brought pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60, we review the motion under an abuse of 

discretion standard. See Patty Precision Prods., Co. v. Brown & 

Sharpe Mfg., Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1988); Republic 

Resources Corp. v. ISI Petroleum West Caddo Drilling Program, 836 

1 Mr. Mason is not a party to this appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1575 Document: 01019962033 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 3 
F.2d 462, 465 (10th Cir. 1987). Based upon our review of the 

record on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff did 

not file an affidavit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) explaining his 

purported need for additional discovery. See Pasternak v. Lear 

Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 832-33 (10th Cir. 

1986). 

As for the district court's order of March 12, 1987, we 

review a grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same 

standard employed by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). See Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 

141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). Likewise, we review a dismissal for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Madsen v. United 

States ex rel. United States Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 841 F.2d 1011, 

1012 (10th Cir. 1987). Although the parties and the district 

court addressed the application of the Kansas RUS before they 

addressed the discretionary-function exception, we must address 

the jurisdiction issue first: "It is elementary that the court's 

first duty is to determine its jurisdiction to entertain and 

decide a case on its merits." Thompson v. United States, 291 F.2d 

67, 68 (10th Cir. 1961). 

Based upon our review of the record and the pertinent case 

law, we conclude that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of 

showing subject matter jurisdiction in this case. The application 

of the FTCA is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, and 

plaintiff bears the burden of proving it. Miller v. United 

States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 

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Appellate Case: 87-1575 Document: 01019962033 Date Filed: 01/12/1989 Page: 4 
(1983). Although a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction 

technically should be brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) 

rather than under Rule 56, the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating 

jurisdiction is analogous to the responsibility of a party 

opposing a summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court has made it 

clear that the party opposing a summary judgment motion bears the 

burden of showing that each essential element of the party's case 

is satisfied. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 

(1986). 

As the district court held, plaintiff did not come forward 

with sufficient evidence showing that the government's conduct in 

this case was ministerial and not discretionary. Plaintiff 

presented no facts demonstrating why the holding of Miller v. 

United States, 710 F.2d 656, 665 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 

U.S. 939 (1983), does not apply here. Plaintiff referred to 

section 327.2 of the Corps' regulations, but nothing in that 

section requires the Corps to promulgate safety regulations or 

relegates the task to a ministerial activity. 

Although it appears on the record before us that the Kansas 

RUS otherwise would likely afford immunity in this case, the 

district court had no jurisdiction to address that issue, and we 

do not either. As we held in Thompson v. United States, 291 F.2d 

67, 68 (10th Cir. 1961), the proper disposition when jurisdiction 

is lacking is not summary judgment, but rather dismissal: 

A motion for summary judgment lies whenever 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 

It is not a substitute for a motion to dismiss for 

want of jurisdiction. If the court lacks 

jurisdiction it cannot render a judgment but must 

enter an order dismissing the action. 

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, . 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is VACATED and the case REMANDED with 

directions to enter a judgment dismissing the action for want of 

jurisdiction. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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