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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NIGEL FOLLICK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

APR 2 9 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECK~!: 

Clerl: 

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No. 90-1377 

BRECKENRIDGE SKI CORPORATION, 

a Delaware corporation, also 

known as VICTORIA BRECKENRIDGE 

CORPORATION, a Delaware 

corporation, and VICTORIA 

VACATIONS, INC. , a Delaware 

corporation, 

(D.C. No. 90-M-1146) 

(D. Colo.) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN and MOORE, 

Judge**· 

Circuit Judges, and ALLEY, District 

The present action comes on before this Court on an appeal 

from a grant of summary judgment by the Honorable Richard P. 

Matsch, United States District Judge for the District of Colorado 

("district court" or "district judge"). 

undisputed facts are as follows. 

The material and 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, res 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-1377 Document: 010110246205 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 1
On December 9, 1988, the Plaintiff/Appellant Nigel P. Fullick 

("Fullick") participated in a speed skiing competition in 

Breckenridge, Colorado, sponsored by the Defendant/Appellee 

Breckenridge Ski Corporation ("Breckenridge") • 1 While nearing the 

completion of his fourth run in the competition, Fullick was skiing 

at over 76 miles per hour when he lost a ski, careened through 

control fencing and hit a tree. Fullick broke several bones, 

including his back and right leg, as a result of the accident. 

Before the competition began, Fullick, an experienced skier, 

executed a document entitled "Participation, Waiver and Release 

Agreement" ("Release") . This Release contains three subparts, 

after each of which appears a line for the competitor to initial 

to signify that he or she has read and understood the subpart. 

Fullick initialled each subpart and signed the Release at the 

bottom. 

The contents of the Release are as follows. First, the 

Release quotes Section 33-44-110 of the Colorado Ski Safety Act of 

1979 ("Ski Safety Act"), codified at 14 C.R.S. §§ 33-44-101, et 

seg. (1984). The first subpart also states, in bold print, that 

the competitor assumes and accepts "the risk of all course 

conditions for all speed skiing clinic and competition events, 

including, but not limited to, the course format and the course 

conditions II 

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Victoria Vacations, Inc. was also a Defendant/Appellee in the case until it was voluntarily dismissed 

as an improper party by Fullick. (Pltf./Applt.'s Reply Brf. at 8.) 

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Appellate Case: 90-1377 Document: 010110246205 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 2
Second, also in bold print, the competitors must certify that 

they are "voluntarily participating in this clinrc with knowledge 

of the dangers and risks involved and hereby agree to accept any 

and all risks of injury, paralysis or death." Third, the 

competitors must agree that they "knowingly and intentionally waive 

and release, indemnify and hold harmless [Breckenridge] . . . from 

and against any and all claims, actions, causes of action, 

liabilities, expenses (including reasonable attorney's fees) and 

negligence of any kind or nature ..•. " 

In addition to the three subparts described above, the top of 

the Release contains language, also in bold print, that warns: 

"Please read carefully before signing. This is a release of 

liability." Finally, at the bottom of the Release, just above the 

signature line, it states in bold type: "I have carefully read, 

clearly understand and voluntarily sign this participation, waiver 

and release agreement." 

The evidence is undisputed that Breckenridge required all of 

the competitors in the speed skiing competition to sign a Release 

identical to that signed by Fullick. Further, Fullick does not 

dispute that he was allowed to inspect the course just prior to the 

commencement of the competition, and that he did not express any 

concerns about the course to any Breckenridge official. 

On December 14, 1990, before discovery had begun on the case, 

the district court granted summary judgment, holding that the 

Release was valid and enforceable as an exculpatory agreement, and 

releasing Breckenridge from Fullick's negligence claims. (Tr. of 

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Appellate Case: 90-1377 Document: 010110246205 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 3
Hrng. on Mtn. for Summ. J. at 13-14.) The district court further 

found that Fullick's claim against Breckenridge for willful and 

wanton conduct should be dismissed on summary judgment, as Fullick 

failed to allege sufficient facts to establish the elements of that 

claim, even in view of the Affidavit of Fullick' s speed skiing 

expert, Guy Dalla Riva. (Id. at 14-15 . ) 

Judge Matsch based his decision with regard to Fullick's 

negligence claims on the Release alone, and not on the Ski Safety 

Act. (Id. at 13-14.) He stated that, in his opinion, the 

enactment of the Ski Safety Act did not preclude the existence of 

this type of release, and that such agreements were enforced in 

Colorado case law as well. (Id. at 9, 13-14). See, Heil Valley 

Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. 1989); Jones v. 

Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981). 

Fullick presents two basic issues for review by this Court: 

First, whether the Release he executed is contrary to public policy 

as expressed in the Ski Safety Act, and is therefore no bar to his 

claim for damages. Second, whether the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment on his claim for willful and wanton 

conduct because genuine issues of material fact existed with regard 

to that conduct. 

I. standard of Review 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides the trial court's test for the 

propriety of summary judgment, when it states: 

The judgment sought shall be rendered 

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

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Appellate Case: 90-1377 Document: 010110246205 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 4
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 

See, Martin v. Bd. of County Comm'rs., 909 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir. 

1990); Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 

(10th cir. 1988); Maughn v. SW Servicing. Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387 

(10th Cir. 1985). 

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment by a trial court, 

an appellate court applies the same standard used by the district 

court under Fed. R. civ. P. 56(c). Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 

1073, 1079 (10th Cir. 1985). The reviewing court must examine the 

record to determine if any genuine issue of material fact remains, 

and if not, whether the district court properly applied the 

substantive law. Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 

1986). This review of the record is done in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 

1432, 1437 (10th Cir. 1987). 

The party moving for summary judgment must prove his 

entitlement thereto beyond a reasonable doubt. Norton v. Liddel, 

620 F.2d 1375, 1381 (10th Cir. 1980). If a specific, genuine issue 

of material fact - that is, a fact relevant under the applicable 

substantive law - remains, summary judgment is precluded. Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 s.ct. 2505, 2514, 

91 L. Ed. 2 d 2 0 2 ( 19 8 6) . When the opposing party presents a fact 

that he alleges to be material, however, he must make a specific 

showing on the essential elements of each claim to establish that 

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Appellate Case: 90-1377 Document: 010110246205 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 5
genuine dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 

s.ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 

II. Releases and Public Policy 

Under Colorado law, one must review four factors to determine 

the validity of a release of one's negligence claims, to wit: 1) 

the existence of a duty to the public; 2) the nature of the 

service/activity performed; 3) whether the contract was entered 

into fairly; and 4) whether the intention of the parties is 

expressed in clear and unambiguous language. Heil Valley Ranch, 

supra, at 784 (quoting Jones v. Dressel, supra, at 376). 

Here, Breckenridge had a duty to the competitors as members 

of the public, and speed skiing is an inherently dangerous 

activity. The last two factors weigh in Breckenridge's favor, 

however, in that the Release was entered into fairly, with no 

elements of an adhesion contract present, and the intention to 

release liability could not have been clearer. Additionally, 

Fullick was an experienced skier who had signed other similar 

releases in the past, and his initials appear after each subpart 

of the Release. 

Fullick contends in this appeal that, as construed by Judge 

Matsch, the Ski Safety Act affords protection to skiers that could 

have been invoked by Fullick but for his execution of the Release. 

Therefore, Fullick argues, the Release should be held to be in 

violation of Colorado public policy. 

The cases Fullick cites in support of his violation of public 

policy argument generally stand for the proposition that one cannot 

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Appellate Case: 90-1377 Document: 010110246205 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 6
avoid or modify an express statutory duty by private agreement if 

to do so would violate the public policy expressed in the statute. 

This is the precise holding articulated by the Colorado court of 

Appeals in Phillips v. Monarch Recreation Corp., 668 P. 2d 982 

(Colo. App. 1983), the case upon which Fullick principally relies. 

In Phillips, the court found that the operator of a ski area 

could not rely on assumption of the risk and release of liability 

language appearing on the back of an unsigned ski lift ticket, as 

such language was in violation of the public policy of allocating 

the parties' respective duties with regard to the safety of others, 

expressed by the Colorado General Assembly in the Ski Safety Act. 

Phillips, at 987 (citing, In Re Marriage of Johnson, 591 P.2d 1043 

{Colo. App. 1979)). See also, Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 

386, 392, 107 s.ct. 1187, 1192, 94 L.Ed.2d 405 {1987); People in 

Matter of K.M.K., 780 P.2d 43, 45 (Colo. App. 1989). 

We think that the Release in this case neither avoids nor 

modifies any statutory duty found in the Ski Safety Act. If one 

could never release liability to a greater degree than a release 

provided in a statute, then one would never need to draft a 

release, in any context. 

Additionally, other circuits have enforced similar releases 

to that signed by Fullick. In a factually similar case, the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals held that an amateur ski jumper who signed 

a release of liability before competing in a tournament where he 

was later injured waived his right to bring a negligence action 

against the tournament sponsors. Garretson v. United States, 456 

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Appellate Case: 90-1377 Document: 010110246205 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 7
F . 2 d 101 7 , 10 21 ( 9th Cir . 19 7 2 ) . Because Fullick initialed and 

signed the Release at issue here, the terms of which are neither 

unconscionable nor illegal, we find that the district court was 

correct in its conclusion that the Release was valid and did not 

conflict with public policy. 

III. Willful and Wanton Conduct 

This Court is cognizant of the offer of proof made by 

Fullick's counsel that the facts set forth in Dalla Riva's unsigned 

Affidavit could be demonstrated through Dalla Riva's testimony, if 

he had been called to testify. (Tr. of Hrng. on Mtn. for Summ. J. 

at 17.) Nevertheless, Dalla Riva's Affidavit fails to comply with 

the requirements of form provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

Specifically, Dalla Riva makes a number of statements about which 

he has no personal knowledge, or on which he is not competent to 

testify. The basic content of the Affidavit, in fact, is simply 

the legal conclusion that summary judgment is not appropriate in 

this case. 

The mere possibility that a factual dispute may exist, without 

more, is insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. 

The opposing party must demonstrate some affirmative indication 

that his version of relevant facts has some basis. 

Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Conaway v. 

Further, as provided by Fed. R. civ. P. 56(e), facts alleged 

in an affidavit must be made on personal knowledge. Stevens v. 

Barnard, 512 F.2d 876, 878-79 (10th Cir. 1975); Brown v. Ford Motor 

Co., 494 F.2d 418, 420 (10th Cir. 1974); Citizens Environmental 

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Appellate Case: 90-1377 Document: 010110246205 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 8
Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870, 873 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 

416 u.s. 936, 94 s.ct. 1935, 40 L.Ed.2d 286 (1974). An unsigned 

affidavit filled with purported legal conclusions about which Dalla 

Riva is not an expert will not suffice to defeat the district 

court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of willful and 

wanton conduct. 

IV. Conclusion 

The grant of summary judgment by the district judge was proper 

and is affirmed. Fullick may not recover from Breckenridge either 

for his negligence claims or for his willful and wanton conduct 

claim. 

9 

Entered for the Court 

Wayne E. Alley 

Appellate Case: 90-1377 Document: 010110246205 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 9