Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00099/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00099-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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JDN 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Craig Murray Jones, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Jeff Alvarez, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-0099-PHX-DGC (LOA) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Craig Murray Jones brought this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against three Maricopa County Jail medical providers: Physician’s Assistants 

(PAs) Matt Barker and Barry Johnson and Dr. Monica Gaskins (Doc. 1). Before the 

Court are Jones’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

(Docs. 15, 25). The Court will deny both motions. 

I. Background 

A detailed factual background is set forth in the Court’s Screening Order (Doc. 12 

at 3-12). In summary, before his confinement, Jones was involved in a car accident that 

resulted, among other injuries, in cervical and lumbar sprains, disc displacement, 

neuralgia, and intervertebral disc disorder. He received physical therapy and narcotic 

pain relievers, which substantially alleviated pain caused by his injuries. 

 Shortly after he arrived at the Fourth Avenue Jail in June 2011, Jones repeatedly 

informed staff of his back injuries and his severe and worsening pain. On October 3, 

2011, he finally saw a doctor, who referred Jones to an outside orthopedic specialist. On 

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October 12, 2011, Jones saw the specialist, who ordered Ultram, a non-narcotic analgesic 

for moderate to moderately severe pain; Flexeril, a muscle relaxant; Baclofen, which acts 

on the spinal cord and relieves pain; and epidural injections. 

 Jones alleges that in February 2012, PA Barker discontinued Ultram and Baclofen 

and denied renewal of another prescribed pain reliever, Soma, which had been very 

effective, without providing or addressing alternative medications or treatment for Jones’ 

pain. Murray alleges that Dr. Gaskins denied him medically appropriate treatment for his 

pain by failing to prescribe effective medications. Jones alleges that PA Johnson rejected 

Jones’ request for Vicodin, even though it had been suggested by Dr. Gaskins, and PA 

Johnson suggested that Jones purchase over-the-counter pain relievers at the commissary. 

 The Court determined that Jones’ allegations were sufficient to state claims that 

these Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need (id. at 

20). In August 2013, Jones filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, in which he seeks 

an order directing Defendants to renew the Soma prescription and to issue him a thermal 

undershirt (Doc. 15). In September 2013, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Jones fails to state a claim (Doc. 25). 

II. Motion to Dismiss 

 A. Legal Standard 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged 

in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within it, may be based on either a “‘lack of a 

cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable 

legal theory.’” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990)). In determining whether a complaint states a claim under this standard, the 

allegations in the complaint are taken as true and the pleadings are construed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmovant. Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 

F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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 A complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). A pleading must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). But “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only 

give the defendant fair notice of what . . . the claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation omitted). 

B. Discussion 

 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is almost never an appropriate response when 

the Court has already screened a prisoner complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 

and directed the defendants to respond. The standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 

identical to the standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (“fail[ure] to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted”). After the Court has screened a prisoner complaint 

pursuant to § 1915A(b), a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted only if the 

defendants can convince the Court that reconsideration is appropriate. Reconsideration is 

appropriate only if the district court “(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, 

(2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an 

intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. 

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 In their motion, Defendants argue that Jones did not allege any actions by them 

that demonstrate they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need (Doc. 25 

at 4). Defendants assert that in his pleading, Jones concedes that alternative medications 

were offered to him and that he was seen numerous times by medical providers and 

outside specialists (id. at 5). They submit that, at best, Jones alleges a difference of 

opinion regarding how his pain should be treated (id. at 4). According to Defendants, 

such allegations fail to state a claim for deliberate indifference (id. at 5-6). Jones opposes 

the motion and argues that his allegations are more than sufficient to establish a claim for 

deliberate indifference by Defendants (Doc. 33). 

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 The Court already screened Jones’ Complaint under a standard identical to that 

found in Rule 12(b)(6) and determined that his allegations sufficiently state a plausible 

claim for relief (Doc. 12). To the extent that Defendants seek reconsideration of the 

Screening Order, their motion is untimely. See LRCiv 7.2(g)(2) (motion for 

reconsideration must be filed no later than 14 days from date of the Order that is subject 

of the motion). Moreover, Defendants present nothing that warrants reconsideration of 

the Screening Order. See School Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263. Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss will therefore be denied.

III. Preliminary Injunction 

 A. Legal Standard 

A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” that may be granted only 

where the movant shows that “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities 

tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. 

Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 

F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). The movant has the burden of proof on each element of 

the test. Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 

2000). Under the “serious questions” version of the sliding-scale test, the elements of the 

preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may 

offset a weaker showing of another. See Alliance of the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 

F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Regardless of which test is applied, there is a 

heightened burden where a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction, which 

should not be granted “unless the facts and law clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of 

Cent. Am. Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes additional requirements on prisoner 

litigants who seek preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials and requires that 

any injunctive relief be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to correct 

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the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see Gilmore v. People of the State of Cal., 220 F.3d 

987, 999 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 With respect to the likelihood-of-success element, a prisoner can establish an 

Eighth Amendment violation arising from deficient medical care if he can show that 

prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). This requires two showings: (1) a “serious medical 

need” and (2) that the defendant’s response to that need was deliberately indifferent. Jett 

v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). To show deliberate 

indifference, the prisoner “must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was 

medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and that the defendant “chose this 

course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v. 

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 

B. Discussion 

 Jones relies on the allegations in his Complaint to support his request for an order 

directing Defendants to prescribe Soma and issue a thermal undershirt, and he asks that 

the Court “consider his pain and suffering” (Doc. 15 at 1-2). 

 The Court finds that Jones cannot satisfy the necessary elements for injunctive 

relief. At the least, Jones must demonstrate that absent an injunction, he will be exposed 

to irreparable harm. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th 

1988). “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant 

granting preliminary relief. A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm 

sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury 

as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In his 

motion, Jones does not provide any specific allegations or facts regarding his current 

medical situation, such as the medications he is taking and his present condition and pain 

levels. To the extent the Court relies on the allegations in Jones’ Complaint, it was filed 

in January 2013—more than one year ago—and thus does not serve to demonstrate what, 

if any, harm Jones may presently be facing. In short, there is no evidence of an emergent 

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need or immediate risk of harm, and Jones has not established a likelihood of irreparable 

harm. 

 Jones fails to address any of the other Winter factors. Therefore, even absent any 

opposition from Defendants, Jones’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction must be denied. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge with withdrawn as to Jones’ Motion 

for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 15) and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25). 

 (2) Jones’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 15) is denied. 

 (3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25) is denied. 

 (4) Defendants must file a responsive pleading within 14 days from the date of 

this order. 

. Dated this 18th day of February, 2014. 

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