Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00783/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00783-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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“Doc.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. “Tr.” refers to the administrative

transcript. A certified copy of the administrative transcript was provided to this Court by the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on September 21, 2012. (See Doc. 10.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Merri M. Wait, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-12-0783-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

AND ORDER

Merri M. Wait seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), which denied her application for

disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1.)

1

 Wait asks the Court

to vacate the Commissioner’s denial. (Doc. 17.) The Commissioner filed her Opposition

Brief (Doc. 21), and Wait filed her Reply (Doc. 25). Because the decision of the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on

harmful legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Wait was born in 1955 and has a high school education. (Tr. 33.) From 1988 to

2005, Wait was employed as an administrative manager in a human resources department,

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retiring in 2005 and moving from Illinois to Arizona. (Tr. 53-54, 153-54, 278.) Wait’s

application for disability insurance is based on an alleged physical impairment due to

degenerative disc disease post 2 back surgeries (1992 and 2008) and a depression-related

mental impairment. (Tr. 15-17.) 

On July 2, 2009, Wait applied for social security disability insurance benefits

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33. (Tr. 13.) Wait alleged that she became disabled as of

September 1, 2005 (otherwise referred to as “disability onset date”). (Tr. 13.) The ALJ

found that the Wait’s date last insured was December 31, 2010. (Tr. 13); see Vincent v.

Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that only disability

existing before date last insured establishes entitlement to disability insurance benefits). On

October 16, 2009, Wait’s disability application was denied initially, and upon

reconsideration on April 21, 2010. (Tr. 13, 62-63.) Wait sought further review before an

ALJ. (Tr. 73-76.) On November 9, 2011, the ALJ held a hearing at which Wait and

Vocational Expert Mark J. Kelman appeared and testified. (Tr. 13.) At the hearing, Wait

amended her alleged disability onset date to March 1, 2008. (Tr. 31, 35.) On November 16,

2011, the ALJ found that Wait was not disabled. (Tr. 10-21.) This decision became the

Commissioner’s final decision when the Social Security Appeals Council denied review.

(Tr. 1-5.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To qualify for Social Security disability benefits, Wait must show that she suffers

from a “medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that prevents her from

performing her prior work activities and any other substantial gainful employment that exists

in the national economy, and that the impairment “can be expected to result in death or [] has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s

decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). When reviewing a

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Social Security appeal, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed if it is supported by

substantial evidence and she applied the correct legal standards. See Batson v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030,

1035 (9th Cir. 2003). When reviewing the Commissioner’s factual determinations, acting

through the ALJ, this Court will affirm if there is substantial evidence supporting those

determinations. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater,

94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less

than a preponderance. See Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir.

2003); Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is

relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion based on the entire record. Howard, 341 F.3d at 1011; Morgan v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If the evidence can reasonably support

either affirming or reversing the Commissioner’s conclusion, the Court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; McCartey v.

Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical

testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 1040; Edlund v.

Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s legal determinations are

reviewed de novo, although deference is owed to a reasonable construction of the applicable

statutes. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156; McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir.

2000).

COMMISSIONER’S DISABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS

Social Security regulations prescribe a five-step evaluation process for an ALJ to

determine if a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1190, 1194; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ determines if

the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(b). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then she is not

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disabled. If not, the ALJ moves to step two to determine if the claimant has impairments or

combinations of impairments that significantly limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability

to do basic work activities and are thus “severe” within the meaning of the regulation. See

id. § 404.1520(c). At the third step, the ALJ evaluates if the claimant’s impairment meets

or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment found in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of

Regulation No. 404. If yes, and the impairment meets the requirements for duration under

20 C.F.R. § 404.1509, the claimant is disabled. If the claimant fails to meet or equal the

criteria or fails the duration requirement, the ALJ’s analysis moves to step four. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Under step four, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual

functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the continued ability of the claimant to perform

physical or mental work activities despite her impairment or combination of impairments.

See id. The ALJ also determines if the claimant’s RFC allows her to perform past relevant

work. See id. § 404.1520(f). If yes, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the analysis

proceeds to a fifth step where the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the

claimant is not disabled by presenting evidence that the claimant retains sufficient RFC to

adjust to perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers either in the region where the

claimant lives or in several regions of the country. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(g). 

DISCUSSION

A. ALJ Rationale

The ALJ found that Wait had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

September 1, 2005, the original disability onset date, and therefore also Wait’s amended

disability onset date of March 1, 2008. (Tr. 15.) At step two, the ALJ determined that

Wait’s alleged depression-related mental impairment was not severe. (Tr. 15-17.) At step

two, the ALJ found that Wait did establish the following “severe” impairment: degenerative

disc disease post 2 back surgeries (1992 and 2008). (Tr. 15.) Wait had the following RFC:

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“Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally

lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary

job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is

often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are

required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).

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sedentary work2

 “with the following exceptions: no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can

occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; should avoid

concentrated exposure to machinery and unprotected heights.” (Tr. 17.) Based upon Wait’s

RFC, the ALJ determined at step four that she was able to perform her past relevant work

as an administrative manager, which was a sedentary job. (Tr. 20-21.) The ALJ rejected

Wait’s subjective symptom testimony that she could not work. (Tr. 17-19.) The ALJ

credited the vocational expert’s testimony that Wait was able perform her past relevant work

as an administrative manager. (Tr. 20-21.) Therefore, the ALJ found that Wait was not

disabled from her amended disability onset date, March 1, 2008, through the date she was

last insured, December 31, 2010. (Tr. 21, 31, 35.)

B. Opinion Evidence

The ALJ found conflicting medical opinion evidence in this case. (Tr. 19-20.) In

addition to reviewing the evidence from treating physician Drs. Doerr, Grove, Allred and

Trost, the ALJ reviewed the medical evaluations of numerous examining and non-examining

agency physicians. (Id.) The opinions of the treating physicians were contradicted by the

opinions of Drs. Broky (Tr. 380-84) and McPhee (Tr. 387-91) as well as other state agency

physicians (Tr. 363-70, 413, 420-21). The ALJ rejected the opinions of Drs. Doerr, Grove

and Allred, favoring the opinions of the examining and non-examining state agency doctors.

Wait argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly weigh the reports submitted by

her treating physicians, Drs. Todd Doerr, Julian Grove and Dee Allred. (Doc. 17 at 14-18.)

Subsequent to Wait’s last insured date and shortly before the ALJ hearing in November

2011, in September and October 2011, Drs. Doerr, Grove and Allred submitted their opinion

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that Wait can sit for less than two hours in an eight-hour work day, and stand/walk less than

two hours in an eight-hour work day. (Tr. 439, 482, 484.) Dr. Doerr opined that Wait

suffers pain and leg numbness to a severe degree. (Tr. 440.) Dr. Grove opined that Wait

suffers chronic pain and weakness to a moderately severe degree, and that a lumbar revision

surgery for Wait was being tentatively scheduled. (Tr. 483.) Dr. Allred opined that Wait

suffers fatigue and drowsiness to a moderately severe degree. (Tr. 485.) Based upon the

exertional limitations opined to by these physicians, at the hearing Vocational Expert Mark

Kelman testified that such limitations would preclude Wait from sustaining full-time work.

(Tr. 58.)

The Commissioner gives more weight to opinions from treating doctors since these

doctors are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed,

longitudinal picture of a claimant’s medical impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). So

long as the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the

record, the opinion will be given controlling weight. Id.; see Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,

830-31 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the opinion of a treating doctor, even if contradicted by

another doctor, can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons). 

1. ALJ’s Reasons for Rejecting Doerr, Grove and Allred Evidence

The Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly gave the opinions of Drs. Doerr,

Grove and Allred less weight because they were submitted well after the Wait’s date last

insured, December 31, 2010. (Doc. 21 at 14-15.) In order to establish the context for

resolving this argument, the Court will review the relevant medical evaluations submitted

subsequent to Wait’s March 1, 2008 amended disability onset date.

After Wait retired in 2005 and moved to Arizona, the record shows that Dr. Trost

regularly treated her from 2006 until he closed his practice in late 2010. (Tr. 278, 486.) In

early 2008, due to chronic back pain, Dr. Trost referred Wait to a specialist for a surgery

consultation. (Tr. 307-12.) Wait consulted with Dr. Curtis Dickman and ultimately had

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back surgery in July 2008. (Tr. 247-57.) Wait continued post-operation treatment from Dr.

Dickman and also returned to treatment with Dr. Trost. (Tr. 326-31.) Dr. Dickman opined

that Wait was making a satisfactory recovery and had normal strength in her legs. (Tr. 241-

44.) 

In April and May 2009, Wait reported to Dr. Trost that she was improving, moving

around better, getting exercise, felt great, and had less neuropathic pain. (Tr. 319, 335-36.)

In June 2009, Wait reported to Dr. Trost worse than usual right hip pain and continued back

pain. (Tr. 323.) Ten days later, Wait had a lumbosacral spine x-ray which showed no change

when compared to her November 2008 x-rays. (Tr. 582.) She also underwent a pelvic and

right hip x-ray, which were normal. (Tr. 583.) 

On July 2, 2009, Wait filed her application for disability. (Tr. 13.) Following Wait’s

application, Dr. Trost wrote a letter to the Commissioner stating that Wait’s medical

problems incapacitated her and rendered her unable to work. (Tr. 275.) Specifically, Wait

had localized back pain and spasm secondary to disc disease. (Tr. 277.) Dr. Trost stated that

Wait’s back pain and her medications prevent her from holding a job. (Tr. 275.) Dr. Trost

acknowledged some improvement in Wait’s condition since surgery but also noted right

lateral foot numbness. (Id.) However, Dr. Trost also specifically requested that the

Commissioner obtain an independent unbiased assessment of Wait’s condition due to his

close relationship with his patients, especially Wait, whom he saw frequently. (Tr. 277.)

On August 26, 2009, Wayne Broky, M.D., a board certified specialist in physical

medicine and rehabilitation, performed a complete physical examination of Wait at the

request of the state agency. Dr. Broky diagnosed multilevel lumbar degenerative disc

disease and other back-related issues. (Tr. 378-80.) Based on Wait’s physical examination,

Dr. Broky found that Wait could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently,

stand/walk for at least two hours but less than six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for

six to eight hours in an eight-hour day. (Tr. 380-84.)

On September 26, 2009, Mikhail Bargan, M.D., a state agency physician, reviewed

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the evidence and found that Wait could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds

frequently, stand and/or walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for about six

hours in an eight-hour day. (Tr. 363-70.) According to Dr. Bargan, Wait could perform the

exertional demands of light work that did not require climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,

or more than occasional crouching and crawling. (Id.)

On January 29, 2010, Wait returned to Dr. Trost with complaints of knee pain from

exercising. She reported climbing Pinnacle Peak “quite frequently” and her knee pain was

“more severe when she was climbing.” (Tr. 523.) She felt her “overall combination for pain

management [was] working.” She was “pushing herself with exercise” and “jogging a bit.”

(Id.)

On March 2, 2010, Lucia McPhee, M.D., a second board certified specialist in

physical medicine and rehabilitation, examined Wait at the request of the state agency. Wait

complained of worsening pain and degenerative disc disease. In addition to her own

examination of Wait, Dr. McPhee reviewed Wait’s medical records, including the report of

Dr. Broky and the letter of Dr. Trost. (Tr. 385-87.) Dr. McPhee diagnosed history of

decompression and fusion from the back surgery, chronic low back pain, and other back

related issues. (Id.) Dr. McPhee found that Wait could lift 20 pounds occasionally and less

than 10 pounds frequently. In an eight-hour workday, Dr. McPhee found Wait could stand/

walk for about four hours, sit for an “estimated” four to five hours, and occasionally climb,

stoop, crouch, and crawl. (Tr. 387-91.)

On March 18, 2010, Dr. William Backlund, a non-examining state agency expert

reviewed the RFC findings made by Drs. Broky and McPhee regarding Wait, noted the lack

of significant changes in Wait’s condition between the two exams, and agreed with the RFC

assessment. (Tr. 413.) On April 6, 2010, Dr. Jack Kundin, a second non-examining state

agency expert also reviewed and concurred with Dr. Broky’s and Dr. McPhee’s RFC

findings for Wait. (Tr. 420-21.) 

On April 28, 2010, Wait told Dr. Trost she “recently returned from Chicago” and she

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was “doing well” overall. She was “tolerating her medications” and would be “traveling to

Chicago about every 3 months.” (Tr. 509.) On May 6, 2010, Wait told Dr. Trost that she

“increased her exercise and [was] doing more yard work.” She “fe[lt] very comfortable

where she [was] currently.” Dr. Trost told Wait to decrease her physical activity and “not

to overdo it as this [was] contributing to her pain.” (Tr. 508.) On May 26, 2010, Wait told

Dr. Trost her “pain [was] manageable.” (Tr. 500.) On June 7, 2010, Dr. Trost noted Wait

had a “[large] amount going on in life” and was “doing ok[ay].” (Tr. 498.) On October 7,

2010, Dr. Trost found Wait had “grossly intact” sensation, moved all extremities

symmetrically, and had normal reflexes. (Tr. 486-87.)

After Dr. Trost closed his practice, on October 27, 2010, Wait went to Dr. Dee Allred

complaining of low back pain. (Tr. 449-50.) Dr. Allred found Wait had pain with extension

and flexion in her low back. The following month, Wait informed Dr. Allred that she was

going to Chicago to see her mother. 

Wait’s date last insured expired on December 31, 2010. Subsequently, in early 2011,

she began pain treatment with Dr. Grove. Wait indicated that she wanted to wean off the

narcotic drugs she was taking because she did not believe they were helping. (Tr. 475.) On

August 4, 2011, she began treatment with Dr. Doerr, a surgeon. On August 22, 2011, Dr.

Doerr recommended additional surgery. (Tr. 430.)

In September and October 2011, Drs. Doerr, Grove and Allred submitted their RFC

assessments finding that Wait could not work eight hours per day, five days per week on a

regular and consistent basis. (Tr. 439-40, 482-85.) They stated Wait could lift and carry less

than 10 pounds and sit and stand/walk for less than two hours each in an eight-hour

workday. Wait could not bend, crawl, climb, stoop, balance, crouch, or kneel, but

occasionally use her feet and reach. (Id.)

Analysis

Relying on Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1996), the Commissioner

argues that the ALJ properly found that the medical assessment of a doctor who examines

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and physically assesses a claimant after the expiration of her disability insured status is

entitled to less weight than the assessment of a doctor who completed a contemporaneous

exam. (Doc. 21 at 15.)

The record establishes that Drs. Broky and McPhee, both board certified specialists,

completed contemporaneous RFC assessments, while the assessments submitted by Drs.

Doerr, Grove and Allred were all submitted after the expiration of Wait’s disability insured

status. In this case, Macri supports the Commissioner’s argument that the ALJ properly

discounted the assessments made by Drs. Doerr, Grove and Allred. 

In addition, the ALJ found that the opinions of Drs. Doerr, Grove and Allred were

inconsistent with the overall medical record as a whole. The ALJ summarized his findings

as follows: 

[T]he objective medical evidence does not support the alleged severity of

symptoms. The claimant had good recovery from her back surgeries and has

continuously engaged in relatively normal activities of daily living. She also

indicated that she retired from her previous work as a manager after she and

her husband moved to Arizona when he retired. She did not quit because of

her impairments and the medical evidence does not support a significant

worsening in her condition since she worked. Therefore, I find the claimant

has not been deprived of the ability to perform work subject to the residual

functional capacity assessed by this decision for any 12-month period since

the alleged onset date.

(Tr. 20.) The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings rejecting the

opinions of Drs. Doerr, Grove and Allred as being inconsistent with Wait’s overall medical

record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (stating that an ALJ must consider whether an

opinion is consistent with the record as a whole); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (stating that an

ALJ may discredit treating physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported

by the record as a whole, or by objective medical findings). For instance, the

contemporaneous progress reports submitted by Dr. Trost are inconsistent with the findings

reached by Drs. Doerr, Grove and Allred. On May 26, 2010, Wait told Dr. Trost her “pain

[was] manageable.” (Tr. 500.) On June 7, 2010, Dr. Trost noted Wait had a “[large] amount

going on in life” and was “doing ok[ay].” (Tr. 498.) On October 7, 2010, Dr. Trost found

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Wait had “grossly intact” sensation, moved all extremities symmetrically, and had normal

reflexes. (Tr. 486-87.) 

Further, the overall medical record supports the ALJ’s RFC findings and the weight

he gave to the reports of Drs. Broky and McPhee. (Tr. 19; see Tr. 378-84, 363-70, 385-91,

413, 420-21.) Dr. Broky found that Wait had a normal gait and could tandem walk, walk

on her tiptoes and heels, and do a full squat and rise again. Wait had “some” weakness when

rising on her toes, had normal reflexes, and no paravertebral muscle spasms. Wait had

normal ranges of motion in her cervical spine, shoulder, elbows, wrists, and fingers, full

rotation in each hip, full flexion and extension of each knee, and full ranges of motion in her

ankles. (Tr. 378-80.) Dr. Broky found Wait had full strength throughout and negative

straight leg raising tests. (Id.) As previously summarized, Dr. Broky assessed that Wait

could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for at least

two hours but less than six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for six to eight hours in

an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 380-84.) 

Dr. McPhee found that Wait walked with an unremarkable gait. She could walk on

her heels and toes and perform tandem walking. She could crouch independently and had

normal reflexes (except for absent right and trace left Achilles’ reflexes). Wait had normal

extremity ranges of motion. She had negative straight leg raising tests, normal extremity

strength, and intact sensation (except for decreased sensation to the right calf and foot). Wait

also had only “minimal” tenderness across her lumbar paraspinal regions on her right side.

(Tr. 385-87.) As previously summarized, Dr. McPhee assessed that Wait could lift 20

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and stand/walk and sit for an “estimated”

four to five hours each in an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 387-91.) Thus, the ALJ properly

considered and rejected the opinions of Drs. Doerr, Grove and Allred in light of the

substantial medical evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC assessment. 

2. Dr. Trost

Wait also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss the opinion of her first

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The Court takes judicial notice that Pinnacle Peak is a granite summit located in

Scottsdale, Arizona, rising to an elevation of 3,171 feet.

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treating physician, Dr. Evan Trost. (Doc. 17 at 18-19.) Citing SSR 96-8p, Wait argues that

the ALJ was required to explain his disposition regarding the opinions stated by Dr. Trost.

(Id.)

It was error for the ALJ not to discuss the letter Dr. Trost wrote to the Commissioner

on behalf of Wait. (Tr. 275-77.) However, the Court must consider whether such error was

harmful legal error. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (“the burden of

showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s

determination”) (further citation omitted); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115-16 (9th

Cir. 2012) (“[A]n ALJ’s error is harmless where it is inconsequential to the ultimate

nondisability determination” and courts must consider “the record as a whole to determine

whether the error alters the outcome of the case.”) (further citation omitted). The Court finds

that it was harmless error for the ALJ not to discuss Dr. Trost’s treatment of Wait because

Dr. Trost specifically requested that the Commissioner obtain an independent unbiased

assessment of Wait’s condition due to his close relationship with his patients, especially

Wait, whom he saw frequently. (Tr. 275-77.) Further, the context of Dr. Trost’s own

treatment record with Wait establishes that she was not disabled at the time he wrote the

letter. For instance, six months after stating that Wait was disabled and unable to work, Dr.

Trost reported that Wait was complaining of knee pain from exercising due to climbing

Pinnacle Peak “quite frequently.”3

 (Tr. 523.) Thus, in considering the record as a whole,

the ALJ’s failure to discuss Dr. Trost’s report was not an error that altered the outcome of

the case.

C. Subjective Pain Testimony

The ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis to evaluate the credibility of a claimant’s

subjective testimony. “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented

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objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be

expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d

1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)

(en banc)). If the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, then

the ALJ “can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by

offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Carmickle v. Comm. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d

1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that an ALJ may discount the claimant’s subjective

statements with clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence). An ALJ

may consider at least the following factors when weighing the claimant’s credibility:

claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in claimant’s testimony or

between her testimony and her conduct, claimant’s daily activities, her work record, and

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the

symptoms of which claimant complains. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–59 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789,792 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Here, the ALJ found that the medically determinable impairments could reasonably

be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. (Tr. 18.) However, the ALJ found that Wait’s

statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were

not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC assessment.

Specifically, the ALJ found as follows:

The credibility of the claimant’s allegations regarding the severity of her

symptoms and limitations is diminished because those allegations are greater

than expected in light of the objective evidence of record. The medical

evidence indicates the claimant received routine conservative treatment for her

impairments. The positive objective clinical and diagnostic findings since the

alleged onset date detailed below do not support more restrictive functional

limitations than those assessed herein.

(Tr. 18.) 

Wait argues that the ALJ erred because he did not have sufficient reasons to discount

her subjective pain testimony. (Doc. 17 at 21-26.)

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Given the ALJ’s detailed discussion of the evidence as summarily recounted here, the

Court concludes that the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting

the extent of Wait’s subjective pain testimony. The ALJ cited the opinions of multiple

physicians in support of the physical limitations assessed. (Tr. 18-20; Dr. Broky, Tr. 378-80;

Dr. McPhee, Tr. 385-87); Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th

Cir. 2009) (upholding adverse credibility finding where ALJ pointed out that claimant’s

statements at the hearing did not comport with the objective medical evidence in her medical

record). 

The ALJ also found that Wait’s activities of daily living undermined her subjective

complaints of totally debilitating symptoms. (Tr. 18, 20.) During the relevant period, Wait

regularly traveled to Chicago. (Tr. 325, 333-34, 447-49, 509, 530.) In November 2008, she

reported performing yard work. (Tr. 241-42.) In April 2009, Wait reported exercising three

to four times per week, including “30 minutes of cardio[vascular] and 30 minutes of weight

training.” (Tr. 335-36.) In July 2009, Wait’s husband stated that she created “yard art” and

painted small statues. (Tr. 177-84). Wait further indicated that she took care of her flowers

and cats and painted. (Tr. 343-46.) In January 2010, Wait reported climbing Pinnacle Peak

“quite frequently,” was “pushing herself with exercise,” and “jogging a bit.” (Tr. 523.) In

March 2010, she reported feeding her cats, sometimes cleaning the litter box, and painting

“little things” for four to five hours per day on a periodic basis. (Tr. 392-96.) The following

month, Wait reported she had “increased her exercise” and was “doing more yard work.”

(Tr. 508.) 

In this case, adverse credibility findings are established when a claimant’s

self-reported activities undermined her credibility and suggest a “greater functional capacity”

than alleged. See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The ALJ further found that Wait’s subjective complaints were inconsistent with her

reports that her symptoms were improved with medications or other treatment. (Tr. 19.) The

record establishes that in July 2008, following her surgery, Wait reported to Dr. Trost that

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she was“doing well” overall. (Tr. 326.) The following month, her surgeon, Dr. Dickman,

noted that she had “relief of her lumbar radicular pain symptoms.” (Tr. 244.) In April 2009,

Dr. Trost noted that Wait’s chronic back pain was improving. (Tr. 335-36.) The following

month, Dr. Trost noted that she said she felt great. (Tr. 319.) In October 2009, Wait advised

Dr. Trost that her “pain [was] under good control.” (Tr. 530.) In January 2010, she reported

that she felt her “overall combination for pain management [was] working.” (Tr. 523.) The

following April, Wait told Dr. Trost that she was “doing well,” “tolerating her medications”

and “fe[lt] very comfortable where she [was] currently.” (Tr. 508.) Based on this record,

the ALJ correctly found inconsistency in Wait’s subjective pain testimony. See Warre v.

Comm. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[i]mpairments that can

be controlled effectively with mediation are not disabling”). Thus, the Court finds that the

ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting Wait’s subjective pain

testimony to the extent that it conflicted with his RFC assessment.

D. Mental Impairment Evidence

Finally, Wait argues that the ALJ erred by not finding that she had a severe mental

impairment, due to her depression-related issues. (Doc. 17 at 26-27.) Wait argues that the

severity of her mental impairment was supported by the consultative examination undertaken

by Dr. Niraja Patel, a psychiatrist. (Id.) 

An impairment is “severe” if it “significantly limits your physical or mental ability

to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). 

Here, the ALJ considered Wait’s mental impairments, “depression, anxiety, and

memory issues,” but found these impairments “did not cause more than minimal limitation

in the claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work activities and were therefore

nonsevere.” (Tr. 15.) The ALJ reviewed mental impairment consultative examinations

undertaken by Dr. Patel (Tr. 343-48) and Psychologist Eliott Salk (Tr. 392-96), and three

additional file reviews by Psychologist Stacy Koutrakos (Tr. 349-62), Dr. Jonathan Zeuss,

a state agency psychiatrist (Tr. 399-412), and Dr. James Derbin, also a state agency

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Global assessment of functioning (“GAF”) is a rating system used by the American

Psychiatric Association “for reporting the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall

level of functioning.” A score of 41 - 50 represents serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal

ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social,

occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job). 

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psychiatrist (Tr. 422-24). Overall, these doctors found that Wait’s mental limitations were

not severe, but rather mild. (Tr. 15-16.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that Wait did not suffer from a severe

mental impairment.

Specifically with regard to Dr. Patel, although Dr. Patel did assess a GAF4

 score of

49, an indication of serious symptoms, during his examination of Wait, the ALJ thoroughly

explained why he gave that subjective score little weight. 

This GAF score is inconsistent with the treatment notes from that same time

period. The claimant had relatively normal activities of daily living, had

received only conservative treatment, and had no psychiatric hospitalizations.

Moreover, this GAF score is inconsistent with Dr. Patel’s own findings, which

indicated there were essentially no issues manifested. [] For these reasons, the

undersigned gives little weight to the GAF score documented in the treatment

records.

(Tr. 16.) The Court finds that substantial medical evidence supports the ALJ determination

regarding the weight he gave to Dr. Patel’s GAF score. The ALJ is responsible for

determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving

ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 1040. 

CONCLUSION

After a thorough review of the record, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct

legal standards in his evaluation. The ALJ’s decision demonstrates that he carefully

considered Wait’s application and the supporting evidence. The ALJ identified substantial

evidence supporting each of his findings. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision denying Wait’s

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application for disability insurance benefits is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment in favor of Defendant

and terminate this action.

DATED this 30th day of April, 2013.

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