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Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 

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Uflittd States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci::cuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT NOV 211990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk THE BURGGRAF CORPORATION, an Oklahoma ) 

corporation; DISCOUNT TIRES OF OKLAHOMA,) 

INC., an Oklahoma corporation, by and 

through LOLA BURGGRAF, JERRY BURGGRAF, 

AND LARRY BURGGRAF, shareholders; LOLA 

BURGGRAF, JERRY BURGGRAF, and LARRY 

BURGGRAF, individually, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER, INC., a ) 

corporation; LEE TIRE & RUBBER CO., a ) 

corporation; KELLY-SPRINGFIELD COMPANY, ) 

a corporation; CLARENCE E. BURGGRAF, ) 

SR.; SHIRLEY BURGGRAF; L. K. NEWELL; ) 

and GEORGE UTTERBACK, ) 

Defendants-Appel lees. • . ) ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-5091 

(D.C. No. 82-C-1177-B) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5091 Document: 010110051343 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 1 
cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellants (Plaintiffs) appeal the denial by the district 

court of their motion to vacate the district court's discovery 

orders, order granting partial summary judgment and order 

dismissing the balance of the action with prejudice. We affirm 

the actions of the district court and grant Appellees' 

(Defendants) motion for sanctions. 

Procedural History 

This case has a long and tortuous history. The original 

complaint, which was filed in December 1982, was commenced as a 

stockholders derivative suit.· It set forth three basic claims for 

relief: (1) violations of the Robinson-Patman Act; (2) common law 

claims of fraud; and (3) common law claims of breach of fiduciary 

duty. 

One year later, the case being set 

district court ordered a discovery 

for jury trial, the 

conference following 

Plaintiffs' motion for continuance. The district court continued 

the trial until April 1984 based upon Plaintiffs' representations 

that the case would be ready for trial in April or the case would 

be dismissed. The trial court then ordered Plaintiffs to respond 

to Defendants' discovery requests by furnishing "all alleged 

instances of contemporaneous sales of products which violate the 

Robinson-Patman Act." In February 1984, Plaintiffs filed a motion 

asking for a delay in discovery and an additional continuance of 

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Appellate Case: 90-5091 Document: 010110051343 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 2 
the trial and Defendants requested the case be dismissed due to 

Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the discovery conference order. 

The district court granted the Plaintiffs additional time to 

comply with discovery and left the trial setting intact. In March 

1984, the trial court granted partial summary judgment. At this 

time Plaintiffs appealed to this court, requesting mandamus and 

alleging abuses of discretion by the trial court in the scheduling 

of discovery and trial and in the granting of partial summary 

judgment. This court denied the requested relief in Appeal No. 

84-1877, holding, in essence, that the appeal was premature. 

Following this appeal, the trial court called the case for 

trial; Plaintiffs then announced they did not wish to proceed to 

trial, and the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice for 

failure to prosecute, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4l(b). Plaintiffs 

appealed this decision to this court where we affirmed the 

dismissal in Appeal No. 84-1991. We specifically affirmed the 

action of the district court in dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint 

with prejudice. Following this decision we denied rehearing and 

remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of 

sanctions against Plaintiffs' counsel. This action was followed 

by an unsuccessful petition for rehearing en bane and by a 

petition for certiorari that was denied. Upon remand and 

following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted 

sanctions against Plaintiffs' counsel. Upon appeal we affirmed 

the action of the trial court in granting sanctions holding the 

conduct of counsel warranted such action. This order was entered 

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... 

in October 1987 in Appeal No. 86-2462. 

It should be noted that throughout these proceedings 

Plaintiffs argued that fraud and deception were perpetrated on the 

district court and upon this court. See No. 86-2462. Despite 

Plaintiffs' rambling and repetitious assertions in sixty-four 

pages of briefs, no such fraud or deception has been made evident 

to this court. 

In June 1989, Plaintiffs filed with the trial court a motion 

to vacate. In this document Plaintiffs demanded that the trial 

court vacate all of its orders issued on and after December 2, 

1983. Specifically, this wo"uld have included the order requiring 

Plaintiffs to respond to discovery, the order granting partial 

summary judgment, and the order of dismissal with prejudice. 

Plaintiffs assert these orders to be null and void as being 

induced by the Defendants' successful scheme of fraud upon the 

court. Plaintiffs argue that the discovery request granted by the 

trial court was an "unauthorized attempt to amend the Complaint," 

which showed bias. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants and their 

counsel deceptively permitted the trial court to amend the 

complaint by granting the discovery request. Plaintiffs also 

contend this "scheme displayed a cunning exercise of [Defendants'] 

sophisticated understanding of the law ••• to subvert and defile 

the impartial processes of this Court •••• " The argument advanced 

in this motion is unique. Plaintiffs argue that the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure contemplate notice pleading. Thus when 

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Appellate Case: 90-5091 Document: 010110051343 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 4 
De_fendants filed discovery requests seeking evidentiary 

information, the court had no authority to order Plaintiffs to 

produce that information as doing so violated the concept of 

notice pleading and therefore Plaintiffs' complaint was improperly 

"amended." 

The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion, saying in part: 

Plaintiff asserts this Court's Order dismissing the 

case was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The genesis of Plaintiff's argument is this Court lacked 

the authority to require Plaintiffs to provide detail 

facts regarding contemporaneous sales of products which 

violated the Robinson-Patman Act because the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit pleadings of detailed 

evidentiary facts. Plaintiff theorizes that because the 

Court did not have. the authority to require such 

specified pleadings, all subsequent Orders were void. 

The language from the December 5, 1983 Order 

states: "(2) Plaintiffs are to provide defendants with 

all alleged instances of contemporaneous sales of 

products which violate the Robinson-Patman Act by 

January 23, 1984." It is evident that Plaintiff 

confuses Rule 8 notice pleading with a Court's inherent 

authority to govern and limit discovery pursuant to Rule 

26. As this Court determines it had both the authority 

to limit discovery and subject matter jurisdiction in 

which to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 41(b), 

Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate is DENIED. 

Order, dated March 19, 1990. 

Plaintiffs now appeal this decision of the district court. 

In their brief, Plaintiffs raise three issues, which we quote 

verbatim: 

1) Whether an unconscionable scheme of fraud induced 

plain usurpations of power operating to dismiss the 

Robinson-Patman case and claims and oust Article III 

jurisdiction and subvert the Plaintiff's due process and 

appeal rights, masked by judicial fiats substituting 

void and moot detail sales fact allegations provided by 

Defendants for the void Rule 4l(b) dismissal and 

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Appellate Case: 90-5091 Document: 010110051343 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 5 
fraudulent appearance of the 

prosecute "their" uneconomic 

perpetuated upon this Court. 

Plaintiffs' failure to 

claims, the fraud scheme 

2) Whether the Trial Court erred and showed bias and 

clear abuses of discretion and duty by failing to vacate 

the wholly void decisions and plain usurpations of power 

induced by the Defendants' unconscionable scheme of 

fraud? 

3) Whether, because of the unconscionable scheme of 

fraud designed to improperly influence and subvert 

judicial decisions operated to indirectly contravene and 

violate the Federal Rules and Clayton Act and the 

Plaintiffs' case and appeal rights and due process 

protections, the Defendants may present any opposition 

to this appeal without perpetuating their former, 

essential and underlying scheme of fraud upon this 

Court? 

Plaintiffs' arguments do not merit substantial discussion. 

All of the matters raised by Plaintiffs in this appeal either were 

raised or should have been raised following the trial court's 

final order of July 3, 1984, dismissing the entire action with 

prejudice. Following the trial court's dismissal of the action 

the litigation was ended and left nothing further for the trial 

court to do except execute judgment. 

definition of a final order. 

This is the classic 

Plaintiffs in this case are now seeking a second and 

prohibited bite of the apple by claiming the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to enter the orders that Plaintiffs have already 

appealed without success. The basis of Plaintiffs' jurisdiction 

claim--that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not require the 

complaint to set forth a detailed statement of the facts, and 

therefore, the court does not have jurisdiction to require 

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• 

Plaintiffs to set forth the evidence when discovery is requested--

is patently frivolous. 

This court has endured Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, filed 

seventy-three days beyond the deadline established by court rules. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 3l(a) and 10th Cir. R. 31.2.1. Despite that 

passage of time, Plaintiffs' Reply Brief is in all respects as 

frivolous and as poorly taken as is their Brief-in-Chief. 

Plaintiffs persist in their refusal to recognize the distinction 

between adequate notice pleading and subsequent, deficient 

compliance with valid discovery orders. (See District Court Order 

dated March 19, 1990, quoted supra, p. S.) Their attempt to 

relitigate the validity of those orders before this court is 

unavailing. 

Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees, and the imposition 

of sanctions against Defendants is totally unsupported by the 

record, and frivolous and therefore denied. 

We now turn our attention to Defendants' motion for 

sanctions. We note that Plaintiffs have failed to precede the 

discussion of each issue with a statement of this Court's 

applicable standard of review. See 10th Cir. R. 28.2(c). 

Plaintiffs' attempted restatement of the standard of review is 

wholly inaccurate and mistaken: 

The records facts and case authorities in support 

of the issues present the appeal standard of whether the 

Trial Court's decision of March 19, 1990 is wrong and 

erroneous, as a matter of law, and/or shows a clear 

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Appellate Case: 90-5091 Document: 010110051343 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 7 
abuse of discretion and/or showed the failure of 

affirmative duty to vacate the underlying and challenged 

decisions as being null and void, even before being so 

declared by the Courts. 

The correct standard of review is found in the case law. In 

reviewing the district court's determination that its underlying 

orders are not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this 

court reviews de novo. King Fisher Marine Service, Inc. v. 21st 

Phoenix Corp., 893 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 

110 S. Ct. 2603 (1990). We review the district court's ruling on 

a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate under an abuse of discretion 

standard. Republic Resources Corp. v. ISI Petroleum West Caddo 

Drilling Program 1981, 836 F.2d 462, 465 (10th Cir. 1987). 

We note that Plaintiffs have cited no authority whatsoever to 

support their theory that Plaintiffs have no obligation to answer 

discovery requests because a complaint need not set forth the 

facts in detail. We next note that Plaintiffs have cited no 

authority concerning their second and third propositions. We also 

note that Plaintiffs have misrepresented to this court certain 

case holdings or, at the least, have not stated the entire holding 

of such cases. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) 

("simplified 'notice pleading' is made possible by the liberal 

opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures 

established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of 

both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed 

facts and issues" (footnote omitted): New Horne Appliance Center, 

Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881, 883-84 (10th Cir. 1957) 

("Particularization of the issues is indeed the first order of 

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Appellate Case: 90-5091 Document: 010110051343 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 8 
business •••• They are to be ascertained and articulated by the 

free use of controlled pre-trial discovery under the guiding hand 

of the judge"); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326 (2d 

Cir. 1957). Plaintiffs misrepresented the holding of J. Truett 

Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981), by 

quoting passages, which the J. Truett Payne Court distinguished 

and declined to follow, and offering them as that case's holding. 

Such selective and misleading citation to precedent is 

intolerable. Plaintiffs have also failed to cite controlling 

authority. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), 

which requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and 

designate specific facts showing there to be a genuine issue for 

trial. We mention these defe·cts, not as a comprehensive listing, 

but only as being illustrative of the nature of Plaintiffs' 

arguments and brief to this court. 

The appeal in the instant case is frivolous in every respect. 

This is the sixth appeal concerning this case and the· second that 

has been found to be frivolous. It is apparent to this court that 

Plaintiffs' actions in filing six appeals and making patently 

frivolous appeals establishes a pattern that cannot be tolerated. 

It is likewise obvious that Defendants have been put to 

unnecessary costs, fees and expenses as a result of this appeal. 

It is therefore ordered that this matter is remanded to the 

district court for the sole purpose of determining the · amount of 

sanctions to be imposed for the prosecution of this frivolous 

appeal and determining who should pay the sanctions, i.e., counsel 

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Appellate Case: 90-5091 Document: 010110051343 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 9 
for Plaintiffs, or Plaintiffs, or both. 

The judgment and the actions of the district court are 

therefore AFFIRMED and this matter is REMANDED to the district 

court for the purpose of determining the amount of sanctions, 

including attorney fees and costs, and the liability therefor. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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-

THE BURGGRAF 

vs. 

THE GOODYEAR 

et al, 

( 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

CORPORATION, et al., ) 

) 

"T 

f .., I .. ED 

..}i:~ c:. (~ . Sfl ·,;::r, c:erk 

i...:.5 CC~; C COURT 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

) No. 82-C-1177-B _/ , 

) 

TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, ) 

) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

0 RD ER 

currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate 

this Court's Orders dated December 2, 1983, January 23, 1984, 

February 28, 1984, April 18, 1984, June 25, 1984, July 5, 1984 and 

July 17, 1986 pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h) (3) and 60(b). 

Plaintiff asserts this Court's Order dismissing the case was 

void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The genesis of 

Plaintiff's argument is this Court lacked the authority to require 

Plaintiffs to provide detail facts regarding contemporaneous sales 

of products which violated the Robinson-Patman Act because the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit pleadings of detailed 

evidentiary facts. Plaintiff theorizes that because the court did 

not have the authority to require such specified pleadings, all 

subsequent Orders were void. 

The language from the December 5, 1983 Order ·states: " ( 2) 

Plaintiffs are to provide defendants with all alleged instances of 

contemporaneous sales of products which violate the Robinson-Patman 

Act by January 23, 1984." It is evident that Plaintiff confuses 

( 

\ 

Appellate Case: 90-5091 Document: 010110051343 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 11 
• 

/ - _., 

..... ... \." ~- -. t . 

-·• ...... 

notice pleading with a Court's inherent authority to govern 

and limit discovery pursuant to Rule 26. As this court determines 

it had both the' .authority to -limit discovery and subject matter 

.•.: 

'• ~ .' 

jurisdiction in which to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 41 (b), :. .. .... . . .. , .. Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate is DENIED. 1 -~'.-~;~\~,<-(~~~ / .. · ·'·}, i . . .... . · .. ",.. • ... 

I

ll~ . .- ~ -_ .. . :i ... , . IT IS so ORDERED, this ~ ~ay of March, 1990. ~.-i·•, ·:··~;~:.= .-._ .: .. :· •. 

/ ~ : ~· . _,_ .. .:;~_-:_;~·-_"'":\.,.\·.::~ 

... . . -i 

• · "- # •• 

... . ' ' ,I' ••• : • • • •• 

__ _..._=~.....:-=-.11=....,=:;~-==-----~:;;_.~----- ~ ~ ' . ,; ·· .. _ . . · .. ,\_ ::. 

THOMAS R. BRETT . . ·, ·' 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE ·-• , 

J;, 

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. ,· -~ 

,. . . 

... .. ... 

. : ~-

-~;·_,. 

1

Def endants have moved for sanctions to be imposed under Rule -.. -· , . -... · ~- 11 against Plaintiff's counsel, Craig Tweedy. At this .time,. the _. ,:_~ .' . ~--: 

Court does not think imposing sanctions would be appropriate; •··· r ~, 

however, Defendants are free to re-urge the motion if Plaintiff's 

counsel pursues the Motion to Vacate. 

2 _- -.~ l ", 

Appellate Case: 90-5091 Document: 010110051343 Date Filed: 11/21/1990 Page: 12