Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-16982/USCOURTS-ca9-08-16982-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES ALLEN THOMPSON, 

No. 08-16982 Petitioner-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  1:08-cv-00218-

CLAYTON FRANK, Dir. Dept. Public SOM-LEK

Safety, State of HI; et al., OPINION Respondents-Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Susan Oki Mollway, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 9, 2010*

San Francisco, California

Filed March 30, 2010

Before: Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Michael Daly Hawkins and

Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

*The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

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COUNSEL

James M. Anderson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and

County of Honolulu, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the respondentappellant.

Peter C. Wolff, Jr., Federal Public Defender, District of

Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the petitioner-appellee.

5056 THOMPSON v. FRANK

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

The State of Hawaii and other respondents appeal the district court’s order staying a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus

petition filed by James Thompson, a Hawaii state prisoner,

who is serving a sentence of life with possibility of parole and

other concurrent sentences after his conviction of several

counts of sexual assault, attempt, and kidnapping. The district

court stayed proceedings in the case pending exhaustion of his

unexhausted claims in state court. We conclude we lack

appellate jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal and dismiss it.

By statute, Courts of Appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals

from all final decisions of the district courts of the United

States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision is typically

one “by which a district court disassociates itself from a

case.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42

(1995). The Supreme Court “has long given § 1291 a practical

rather than a technical construction.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.

Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009) (citing Cohen v. Benefit Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 

[1] Under the collateral order doctrine, the Courts of

Appeals have jurisdiction over a “narrow class of decisions

that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the interest of

achieving a healthy legal system, nonetheless be treated as

final.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S.

863, 867 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the collateral order doctrine “must never be allowed to swallow the

general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be

deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Mohawk, 130

S. Ct. at 605 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

[2] In order to satisfy the collateral order rule’s exacting

standard, “an order must (1) conclusively determine the disTHOMPSON v. FRANK 5057

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puted question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” In re Copley

Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). All three requirements must be

met for us to exercise appellate jurisdiction. 

[3] In this case, the third requirement is not satisfied. A

district court order staying proceedings to allow a state habeas

petition to exhaust claims in state court is reviewable on

appeal after final judgment. Valdovinos v. McGrath, __ F.3d

__, No. 08-15918, 2010 WL 789536, at *4 (9th Cir. Mar. 10,

2010); Olvera v. Giurbino, 371 F.3d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 2004).

Similarly, any error that the district court made in determining

whether certain claims had been exhausted can be remedied

fully on appeal from the final judgment. See, e.g., Johnson v.

Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996) (addressing on the

merits the state’s argument regarding exhaustion on appeal

after final judgment); Taylor v. Cain, 545 F.3d 327, 333 (5th

Cir. 2008) (same). 

[4] In sum, because a district court’s conclusion about

whether a habeas claim has been exhausted is addressable on

appeal after final judgment, the requirements of the collateral

order doctrine are not satisfied. We lack appellate jurisdiction

over this appeal and must dismiss it.1

DISMISSED.

1The procedural posture of Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), does

not compel a contrary conclusion, as the state contends. The question of

appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine was not raised or

discussed in Rhines, which pre-dated the Supreme Court’s specific discussion in Mohawk. When the Supreme Court does not address a jurisdictional issue directly, any sub silentio assumption of jurisdiction in a case

“does not constitute binding authority” on the jurisdictional question.

Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d

1360, 1363 (9th Cir.1998); see also Marley v. United States, 567 F.3d

1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). 

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