Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00389/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00389-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEX LUKOVSKY, MUHAMMED KHAN,

LARRY MITCHELL, ANTONIO HUGGINS,

SAMSON ASRAT, ANATOLIY

ZOLOTAREV, YEVGENIY

SKURATOVSKY, and VLADIMIR

VASILEVSKI,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL

TRANSPORTATION AGENCY, JOHN

SADORRA, RENATO SOLOMON,

VERNON CRAWLEY, MICHAEL ELLIS,

PHILLIP GINSBURG, and DORIS LANIER,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-00389 WHA

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS AND VACATING

HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this employment-discrimination action, defendants move for judgment on the

pleadings on plaintiffs’ third claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1981 pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(c). This order finds that California public employees may maintain an

action for discrimination under Section 1981. Defendants’ motion is, therefore, DENIED.

Case 3:05-cv-00389-WHA Document 93 Filed 02/21/06 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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STATEMENT

Plaintiffs Alex Lukovsky, Muhammed Khan, Larry Mitchell, Antonio Huggins, and

Samson Asrat alleged that they were employees for defendant City of San Francisco, working in

the maintenance division of the City’s Municipal Transportation Agency (“MUNI”). Plaintiffs

Yevgeniy Skuratovsky and Vladimir Vasilevski claimed to be former job applicants of the City.

Plaintiff Anatoliy Zolotarev alleged that he was a potential job applicant.

On May 20, 2005, plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. In their third claim

for relief, plaintiffs alleged a deprivation of their civil rights under Section 1981 by defendants,

the City and County of San Francisco and five city employees. Underlying this claim, plaintiffs

alleged that defendants discriminated on the basis of race by giving preferential treatment to

Asian and Filipino applicants for the position of electrical-transit-system mechanic, or so-called

“7371” positions, with the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (“MUNI”). In

2001, defendants purportedly hired several Asian and Filipino applicants who did not meet the

minimum qualifications for the job. Plaintiffs also contended that defendants failed to make

information about 7371 openings available to potential candidates who were not Asian or

Filipino. According to plaintiffs, this failure included not only flawed information about

permanent openings in 2001, but also about provisional positions in 2000 that ultimately could

have led to permanent 7371 positions. Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings as

to this third claim.

ANALYSIS

FRCP 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to

delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” A motion for judgment on

the pleadings is evaluated according to virtually the same legal standard as a motion to dismiss

pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6), in that the pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly

establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and

that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner

and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Section 1981(a) provides that:

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have

the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce

contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and

equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of

persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be

subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and

exactions of every kind, and to no other.

Our circuit has made clear that a plaintiff “can recover under section 1981 only if the terms

detailed in his job description create contractual rights or constitute laws.” Judie v. Hamilton,

872 F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1989).

Relying on Judie, defendants here argue that plaintiffs cannot possibly obtain relief

under Section 1981 because public employment in California is conferred by statute, not

contract. As public employees (or applicants to be public employees), defendants contend that

plaintiffs lack the requisite contractual employment rights. Defendants’ argument would

effectively eliminate Section 1981 claims by public employees in California. This order holds

that defendants’ argument goes too far.

As a threshold matter, this order must determine what law to apply, federal or

California, when determining whether public employees in California have contractual rights

protected by Section 1981. The Judie opinion articulated a three-part test for answering this

threshold question:

First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States “so far as

such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights

statutes] into effect.” If no suitable federal rule exists, courts

undertake the second step by considering application of state

“common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and

statutes” of the forum State. A third step asserts the

predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply state law

only if it is not “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the

United States.”

Id. at 922 (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47–48 (1984)). In Judie, plaintiff was an

employee at a state run hospital in Washington. The plaintiff claimed to be the victim of racial

discrimination because he was not allowed to perform his supervisory duties and was

improperly suspended. In determining whether plaintiff had the requisite contractual

relationship with the hospital, the Judie court first noted that “we know of no federal common

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law of contracts for section 1981 claims. We therefore should borrow Washington state law,

provided it is not inconsistent with federal law.” Under Washington law “the terms of public

employment, other than pension rights, do not create contractual expectancies. Rather, they are

part of a system of personnel administration.” Id. at 923. “If the terms of public employment

affecting compensation, layoffs, and reemployment do not create contractual expectancies, then

we do not believe that Judie’s job description creates contractual expectancies either.” The

court found no inconsistency between Washington law and federal civil rights policies, so the

Section 1981 claim was, therefore, denied.

As in Judie, this order recognizes that the civil rights statutes do not provide a body of

contract law. Preliminarily, at least, this order must determine what contractual rights

California law provides to applicants for public-employee positions and public employees

seeking promotions.

Like Washington law, under California law the public-employment relationship is not

contractual. “[I]t is well settled in California that public employment is not held by contract but

by statute and that, insofar as the duration of such employment is concerned, no employee has a

vested contractual right to continue in employment beyond the time or contrary to the terms and

conditions fixed by law.” Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d 1, 23–24 (1990) (citations omitted). 

But this does not mean that no contractual rights arise for California public employees:

[A] long line of California cases establishes that with regard to at

least certain terms or conditions of employment that are created

by statute, an employee who performs services while such a

statutory provision is in effect obtains a right, protected by the

contract clause, to require the public employer to comply with the

prescribed condition.

White v. Davis, 30 Cal.4th 528, 564–65 (2003). The cases imposing such contractual duties on

a public employer primarily include the right to remain in an office, the continuation of civil

service status, the right to the payment of salary which has been earned and the right to retain an

accrued pension. Id. at 565–66. Plaintiffs rely heavily on this language from White, contending

that their Section 1981 claims should survive under the second prong of the Judie test. It is a

close question of state-law whether promotion and hiring fall under the White exceptions.

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Even if this order agreed with defendants that no contractual rights exist for promotion

or hiring for public employment under California law, however, this order must hold that a

predominant federal interest mandates that California public employees have recourse to

Section 1981 for discrimination relating to such conduct.

“The right to dispose of one’s labor freely by contract is at the heart of the protections

afforded by § 1981.” Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 737 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Jones v.

Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n. 78 (1968)). The Supreme Court’s interpretation of

Section 1981 shows that it was a foregone conclusion that the protections of Section 1981

extend to governmental discrimination (while it was a more difficult question as to whether the

statute covered private discrimination). See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 421

U.S. 454, 459 (1975). There is thus a clear federal policy expressed in the civil rights statutes to

prevent employment discrimination by governmental entities.

The type of employment activity at issue here—promotion and application—falls within

the heart of this federal policy. “Prior to November 12, 1991, ‘[o]nly where the [denied]

promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the

employee and the employer is such a claim actionable under § 1981.’” Strother v. S. Cal.

Permanente Medical Group, 79 F.3d 859, 876 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Patterson v. McLean

Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989)). In 1991, however, Congress amended Section 1981

to include the provision that “the term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making,

performance, modification of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual

relationship.” 42 U.S.C. 1981(b). With this amendment, Congress swept in not only the

initiation of the employment relationship but also subsequent modifications during the course of

the employment relationship such as promotion. To deprive plaintiffs here recourse to these

protections would clash with clear federal policy. Under the three-part analysis from Judie, this

order must follow this predominant federal interest.

It is worth noting that this is a significant distinction between Judie and the instant case. 

Under the old version of Section 1981, the conduct in question in Judie, suspension and

performance of supervisory duties, was not a fundamental component of the contractual rights

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* As both parties recognize, the question at issue in this order, whether California public employees may

maintain actions under Section 1981 actually was resolved by the Ninth Circuit. In Ramirez v. Kroonen, Case

No. 01-55994, 44 Fed.Appx. 212, 217 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2002), the court held that disallowing plaintiff’s

Section 1981 claim would “improperly provide[] a blanket immunity for all California employers from § 1981

liability.” Because that opinion was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter, however, the instant

order may not cite to the Ramirez opinion pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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protected by Section 1981. The conduct at issue here, hiring and promotion, falls squarely

within the amended version of Section 1981. This order thus finds that plaintiffs may maintain

their Section 1981 claims.*

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. 

Finding further argument unnecessary, hearing on this motion is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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