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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3831

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Richard S. Belde, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

Ferguson Enterprises, Inc., * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Defendant - Appellee. *

*

Minnesota Transport Services *

Association, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 19, 2006

Filed: August 18, 2006

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN and BYE, Circuit Judges.

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LOKEN, Chief Judge.

The Federal Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991

(“FOTETA”), Pub. L. No. 102-143, tit. V, 105 Stat. 917, directed the Secretary of

Transportation to promulgate regulations requiring random drug and alcohol testing

of commercial vehicle drivers. See 49 U.S.C. § 31306(b)(1)(A); 49 C.F.R.

§ 382.305(a). Ferguson Enterprises, Inc., terminated Richard Belde in April 2004

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The Honorable ANN D. MONTGOMERY, United States District Judge for

the District of Minnesota.

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when he refused to submit to a federally mandated random drug test for commercial

vehicle drivers. Belde filed this suit in state court. Ferguson removed the case to

federal court. Belde now appeals the district court’s1

 grant of summary judgment in

favor of Ferguson. Belde argues that FOTETA mandated his removal from the

safety-sensitive driver position, but not his termination, and therefore termination

violated his rights under the Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace

Act (“DATWA”), Minn. Stat. §§ 181.950 et seq. Reviewing the grant of summary

judgment de novo, we affirm. See Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 308 F.3d 840, 843

(8th Cir. 2002) (standard of review). 

Ferguson’s predecessor hired Belde in 1990 as a full-time commercial driver.

In June 2001, Ferguson transferred Belde to the night shift at a Minnesota warehouse

where his primary responsibilities were operating forklifts and cranes to load and

unload delivery trucks. Belde continued to be a “back-up” driver, and he maintained

his commercial driver’s license and his driver eligibility under federal law. See 49

C.F.R. Parts 383, 391. His back-up driver assignments diminished in late 2003, but

he drove for three days during the Christmas 2003 season.

In April 2004, Ferguson’s headquarters notified the Minnesota warehouse that

Belde and a full-time driver were randomly selected for mandatory federal testing.

Belde refused to be tested because “I had a day of vacation, and I was out partying.”

After consulting counsel, Ferguson’s manager informed Belde that his refusal would

be treated as a positive test result mandating his suspension under federal law. See

49 C.F.R. §§ 382.211, 382.501. Belde nonetheless refused to be tested. Ferguson

suspended and then terminated him. This lawsuit followed.

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In the district court, Belde argued that he was a full-time warehouse clerk in

April 2004 and therefore not subject to mandatory random testing under FOTETA.

He further argued that Ferguson’s testing procedures, though consistent with federal

law, violated DATWA provisions that are not preempted by FOTETA’s express

preemption provisions. See 49 U.S.C. § 31306(g); 49 C.F.R. § 382.109(a).

Therefore, Belde concluded, he is entitled to damages for Ferguson’s violations of

DATWA. The district court rejected these contentions, concluding that Belde was

a “casual, intermittent or occasional” driver subject to mandatory testing as a matter

of federal law under 49 C.F.R. § 382.107, and that the inconsistent DATWA testing

requirements are expressly preempted because they would otherwise be an “obstacle”

to accomplishing the federal safety-testing regime. 49 C.F.R. § 382.109(a)(2).

Belde’s limited contention on appeal does not require us to revisit the issues

decided by the district court. He now concedes that he was an occasional driver

subject to mandatory random testing under FOTETA and that Ferguson complied

with federal law in treating his refusal to be tested as a positive test result requiring

his immediate suspension from all safety-sensitive positions. Belde now argues that

he is entitled to relief under DATWA because (1) FOTETA required Ferguson to

remove him from the safety-sensitive driver position but not from his full-time

warehouse clerk position; (2) DATWA prohibited Ferguson from terminating Belde

“on the basis of a positive test result from an initial screening test,” Minn. Stat.

§ 181.953, subd. 10(a); and (3) this prohibition is not an obstacle to the federal testing

regime and therefore is not preempted. 

We are inclined to agree that FOTETA did not require that Ferguson fire Belde

rather than reassign him to a non-safety-sensitive position. But in any event, Belde’s

wrongful termination claim was properly dismissed because two provisions of the

Minnesota statutes regulating interstate, intrastate, and private motor carriers provide

that an employer who is required to comply with the mandatory federal testing

requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 382, and who does comply, “is exempt” from

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DATWA. Minn. Stat. §§ 221.031, subd. 10; 221.605, subd. 1(b). As it is undisputed

that Ferguson terminated Belde for refusing to take a test mandated by these federal

regulations, Minnesota law expressly exempts that action from a DATWA claim.

In the alternative, even assuming that DATWA applied to the termination, the

statute prohibits termination on the basis of an initial “positive test result,” which

DATWA defines as a finding of the presence of an excessive level of drugs or alcohol

“in the sample tested.” Minn. Stat. § 181.950, subd. 10. The Minnesota Court of

Appeals has twice held that DATWA “does not bar the discharge of an employee for

reasons independent of the test result.” Matter of Copeland, 455 N.W.2d 503, 506

(Minn. App. 1990); accord City of Minneapolis v. Johnson, 450 N.W.2d 156, 160

(Minn. App. 1990). Ferguson terminated Belde for refusing to submit to a test

mandated by federal law. Termination on this ground is not prohibited by DATWA.

For these reasons, we need not decide whether FOTETA would preempt a

Minnesota statute requiring that an employer transfer an employee who violates the

mandatory federal drug and alcohol testing regulations to a non-safety-sensitive

position, rather than terminating the employee. The Minnesota Legislature has not

made that policy decision.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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