Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01907/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01907-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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1

 Also presently before the Court are The Hartford’s evidentiary objections to the declaration

of Regina Stoll. [Doc. No. 20.] In deciding this motion, the Court has taken into account only

admissible evidence. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINA STOLL,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05CV1907 IEG (LSP)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 19]

vs.

THE HARTFORD,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court is The Hartford’s motion for summary judgment. For the

following reasons, the Court denies this motion.1

BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

Regina Stoll previously worked for The Hartford as an underwriter. [First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 6.] Stoll’s job required her to keyboard as much as seven or eight hours a

day, five days a week. [Stoll Depo., p. 46; Caligiuri Depo. p. 8, & Exhibit 4, p. 1.] On June 4,

2004, Stoll filed a workers’ compensation claim for pain and tightness in her hands and inner

wrists. [Stoll Depo., Exhibit 1, p. 1.] Stoll was eventually diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome,

which she had contracted as a result of the frequent keyboarding. [Stoll. Depo., Exhibit 3, p. 1.] 

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2

 In the opinion of her treating physicians, Stoll also needs to have surgery on her left elbow,

but the industrial carrier refuses to pay for it. [Caligiuri Depo., p. 5.] 

3

 According to Dr. Caligiuri, total disability means “100 percent disabled, incapable of any

type of gainful employment[.]” [Caligiuri Depo., p. 6.] Indeed, Stoll herself admits that, even today,

she could not perform any job that requires her to keyboard with her left hand. [Stoll Depo., p. 53.]

4

 Stoll also discussed her possible return to work with Christine M. Speir, a claims

administrator in The Hartford’s employee benefits division. [Stoll Depo., p. 33 & Exhibit 13.]

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Stoll had surgery on her right arm in January of 2005.2 [Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of Defendant’s Motion (“Memo. ISO Motion”), at 3.] 

From June 4 to June 18, 2004, Stoll attempted to work a part-time schedule. [Id., p. 40.] 

Because even the part-time work involved frequent keyboarding, however, Stoll did not get any

better. [Id.] On June 18, a physician declared Stoll unable to work because of her impairment. 

[Id., Exhibit 2, p. 2.] 

Dr. Alexander L. Caligiuri treated Stoll from July 13, 2004 until June 9, 2006. [Caligiuri

Depo., p. 11.] During that entire period, Dr. Caligiuri considered Stoll to be “temporarily totally

disabled.”3 [Id.] Dr. Caligiuiri “specifically precluded” Stoll from keyboarding. [Id., p. 8.] Stoll

understood her doctors’ orders to mean she could not keyboard repetitively, but could possibly do

other aspects of her job, including the training of new employees. [Stoll Depo., p. 19.] 

In October or November of 2004, Stoll called her supervisor, Susan Casteneda, to discuss

the possibility of going back to work. [Stoll Depo., pp. 30, 44.] In these conversations, Casteneda

indicated that The Hartford could not use Stoll if she was unable to type.4

 [Id.]

On November 16, 2004, The Hartford mailed a letter to Stoll explaining its policy on

unpaid leave and job protection, pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act. [Id., Exhibit 8, p.

1.] The letter explained Stoll had used more than sixteen of the twenty-six weeks of available

leave. [Id.] If Stoll did not return to work by December 3, 2004, The Hartford could terminate

her. [Id.]

On December 6, 2004, The Hartford mailed another letter to Stoll explaining that her

twenty-six weeks of FMLA time had expired. [Id., Exhibit 10, p. 1.] The letter reiterated that

Stoll could be terminated. [Id.]

On March 15, 2005, The Hartford’s human resources director, Kathleen Sheridan, mailed a

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letter to Stoll stating that Stoll would be terminated. [Id., Exhibit 12, p. 1.] At this time, Stoll was

still undergoing rehabilitative therapy from the surgery on her right arm. [Id., p. 32.] 

Sheridan’s letter also provided Stoll with a phone number to call if Stoll believed she was

eligible “for a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act.” [Id,

Exhibit 12, p. 1.] Sheridan also provided the name and phone number of someone whom plaintiff

could call regarding employment opportunities “when [plaintiff was] able to return to work, if

[plaintiff was] interested in being rehired by The Hartford.” [Id.] Plaintiff did not call any of the

numbers provided in Sheridan’s letter because Stoll “was actually surprised that there was no more

. . . work towards doing anything about getting [her] in a different position” and, therefore, “had

just given up” the prospect of employment at The Hartford after her conversation with Casteneda. 

[Id., p. 36.]

Stoll is unaware of any other job opportunities with The Hartford besides the underwriter

position she filled. [Id., p. 41.]

From the time period when Stoll left The Hartford until May 2006, Stoll supported herself

with workers’ compensation payments. [Id., p. 11.] Since May 2006, Stoll has supported herself

with long-term disability benefits from The Hartford. [Id., pp. 10-11.

B. Procedural History

On May 3, 2005, Stoll received a right-to-sue letter from the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing. [FAC Exhibit A.] On August 23, 2005, Stoll filed a complaint in San

Diego Superior Court, alleging The Hartford’s “failure to make reasonable accommodation for

plaintiff’s disability,” seeking front and back pay, emotional distress damages, and punitive

damages. [Compl. ¶ 8 & p. 2.] Stoll claims The Hartford “has a number of jobs which plaintiff

could perform satisfactorily notwithstanding her disability,” but did not offer or even discuss these

jobs with her. [Id. ¶ 7.] 

On August 29, 2005, Stoll filed a first amended complaint requesting attorneys’ fees and

costs of suit. [FAC.] On October 6, 2005, The Hartford filed a notice to remove the action to this

Court. [Doc. No. 1.] On January 5, 2006, this Court issued an Order denying Stoll’s motion to

remand. [Doc. No. 16.]

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On August 31, 2006, The Hartford moved for summary judgment on Stoll’s single cause of

action. [Doc. No. 19.] On October 2, 2006, Stoll filed her opposition. [Doc. No. 26.] On October

5, 2006, The Hartford filed its reply. [Doc. No. 27.] After hearing oral argument on October 16,

2006, the Court took the matter under submission.

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

“Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and discovery, read in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Armstrong

v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 139 F.3d 1277, 1278 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting 20th Century Ins. Co.

v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” when “the evidence presented is such that

a jury applying [the appropriate] evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff

or the defendant.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Once the moving party meets the requirement of Rule 56, the burden shifts to the party

resisting the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. It is not enough for the party opposing a properly supported

motion for summary judgment to “rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Id.

Genuine factual issues must exist that “can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. To make such a showing, the

nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings to designate specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 

B. Fair Employment and Housing Act

The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) governs plaintiff’s cause of

action for failure to make reasonable accommodation. According to FEHA, “[i]t shall be an

unlawful employment practice, unless based on a bona fide occupational qualification . . . : (m)

For an employer or other entity covered by this part to fail to make reasonable accommodation for

the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee.” Cal. Govt. Code §

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5

 FEHA does not “require an accommodation that is demonstrated by the employer . . . to

produce undue hardship to its operation.” Cal. Govt. Code § 12940(m). An accommodation produces

undue hardship if it “requir[es] significant difficulty or expense,” in light of a multi-factor test. Id.

§ 12926(s); Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 2, § 7293.9(b). The Hartford has presented no evidence on undue

hardship in this case. 

6

 FEHA also provides a separate cause of action for an employer’s “fail[ure] to engage in a

timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine effective

reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an

employee or applicant with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.” Cal.

Govt. Code § 12940(n). Although Stoll does not plead a separate cause of action for failure to engage

in the interactive process, the Court considers the law under this separate provision to the extent that

such law is relevant to determining whether the Court should grant summary judgment to The Hartford

on the cause of action Stoll does raise: failure to make reasonable accommodation. 

7

 Jensen provides a third way for the employer to prevail on summary judgment: the employer

provides that the employee rejected the reasonable accommodation the employer offered. 85 Cal.

App. 4th at 263. The Hartford provides no evidence of a reasonable accommodation that Stoll

rejected. 

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12940(m) (2005). A “reasonable accommodation” includes “[j]ob restructuring, part-time or

modified work schedules, reasssignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of

equipment or devices, adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies,

the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals

with disabilities.”5 Id. § 12926(n)(2); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 7293.9(a)(2) (2006). 

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a reasonable accommodation case, the

employer must prove with undisputed facts “the employer did everything in its power to find a

reasonable accommodation, but the informal interactive process broke down because the employee

failed to engage in discussions in good faith.”6

 Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 4th 245,

263 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). Or, the employer must prove “there simply was no vacant position

within the employer’s organization for which the disabled employee was qualified and which the

disabled employee was capable of performing with or without accommodation[.]”7

 Id.

Cases interpreting analogous provisions in federal law (e.g., Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”), Rehabilitation Act) are persuasive authority for courts interpreting corresponding

FEHA provisions. Hastings v. Dep’t of Corr., 110 Cal. App. 4th 963, 973 n.12 (Cal. Ct. App.

2003). However, FEHA is not a carbon copy of its federal counterparts. “Although the [ADA]

provides a floor of protection, [FEHA] has always, even prior to passage of the [ADA], afforded

additional protections.” Cal. Govt. Code § 12926.1(a); Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877,

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8

 At oral argument, counsel for The Hartford repeatedly asserted that Stoll was not a “qualified

disabled individual.” As a totally disabled individual from the time of her injury until The Hartford

terminated her, Stoll “can’t work.” Defense counsel emphasized this issue in replying to all the

Court’s questions, no matter the topic of the question.

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895 (9th Cir. 2001); Bagatti v. Dep’t of Rehab., 97 Cal. App. 4th, 344, 360-62 (Cal. Ct. App.

2002) (refusing to apply EEOC regulations limiting the categories of reasonable accommodations

available to plaintiffs because the FEHA duty of reasonable accommodation “is broader” than the

ADA). 

C. Whether Plaintiff Must Be “Qualified Individual with a Disability”

The Hartford insists FEHA does not protect Stoll because she was not an “otherwise

qualified disabled individual” able to perform the “essential functions” of her job.8

 [Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion (“Memo. ISO Motion”), at 2.] Because Stoll was

temporarily totally disabled until June 9, 2006, and thus could not work, The Hartford believes it

has established there was no vacant position within The Hartford that Stoll was capable of

performing. [Id., at 7-8.] See Jensen, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 263; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 7293.8(b)

(establishing an employer defense where, “after reasonable accommodation has been made, the . . .

employee cannot perform the essential functions of the position in question because of [the]

disability”). 

Under the ADA, but not FEHA, “the term ‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an

individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the

essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. §

12111(8) (2006). The ADA, but not FEHA, further prohibits “not making reasonable

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual

with a disability who is an applicant or employee[.]” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Therefore, The

Hartford believes that a FEHA plaintiff suing for failure to make reasonable accommodation must

be a “qualified individual with a disability,” as defined by the ADA.

The incorporation of the “qualified individual with a disability” definition into FEHA is

disputed among various districts of the California Court of Appeal. Jensen indeed stated that

FEHA plaintiffs must prove their status as “a qualified individual by establishing that [they] can

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9

 The Court is aware of the Central District of California’s contrary conclusion in Diaz v. Fed.

Express Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2005). In Diaz, the district court followed Jensen

instead of Bagatti and found that the plaintiff in a FEHA accommodation case must be “qualified.”

Id. at 1054 & n.16. The district court relied on the reference to “bona fide occupational qualification”

at the beginning of the statute listing unlawful employment practices. See Cal. Govt. Code § 12940.

While the correct interpretation of FEHA is properly a matter for the California courts, this

Court does find good arguments to support the more recent conclusion in Bagatti that FEHA

reasonable accommodation plaintiffs need not satisfy the ADA’s definition of “qualified individual

with a disability.” As Bagatti itself said, FEHA’s reasonable accommodation provision protects “an

applicant or employee,” whereas the corresponding ADA provision protects “a job applicant or

employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability[.]” 97 Cal. App. 4th at 360. 

Furthermore, in FEHA’s prohibition on terminating employees on the basis of disability, the

statute includes a defense when a disabled employee “is unable to perform his or her essential duties

even with reasonable accommodations[.]” Cal. Govt. Code § 12940(a)(1). No such defense excuses

the failure to make reasonable accommodation. This selective application of an “essential duties”

defense to employee termination only is particularly significant in contrast to the undue hardship

defense, which applies both to employee termination and failure to make reasonable accommodation.

Id. § 12940(m). 

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perform the essential functions of the position to which reassignment is sought[.]” 85 Cal. App.

4th at 256 (2d Dist.). However, the Third District “respectfully disagree[d] with Jensen to the

extent it holds that, in order to assert a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that

he or she is ‘a qualified individual’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12111.” Bagatti, 97 Cal.

App. 4th at 361 n.4. Even more recently, the Third District held that the plaintiff’s inability to

perform essential duties with or without accommodation was an insufficient grounds for granting

summary adjudication to the employer in a reasonable accommodation case. Claudio v. Regents,

134 Cal. App. 4th 224, 244-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 

The California Supreme Court is currently deciding the question whether plaintiffs in

FEHA accommodation cases must show they are “qualified individuals,” capable of performing

the essential duties of their job with accommodation. See Raine v. City of Burbank, 135 Cal. App.

4th 1215, 1227 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing appeal of Green v. State, 132 Cal. App. 4th 97

(2005)). Without the assistance of that forthcoming decision, this Court follows the Court of

Appeal’s more recent reasoning in Bagatti and Claudio.

9

 Therefore, this Court finds The Hartford

cannot prevail merely by showing that Stoll does not satisfy the ADA’s definition of “qualified

individual with a disability.” 

Where the employer asserts a defense based on an employee’s inability to perform a job,

“this issue logically arises only after it has been established or assumed that [the employer]

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10 The employee does not have to use the magic words “reasonable accommodation” when

communicating with the employer. Norris, 948 F. Supp. at 1437; Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4th 34, 62 n.22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 

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violated the FEHA or breached its duty of reasonable accommodation[.]” Prilliman v. United Air

Lines, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 4th at 962 n.6. If the employer breached its duty of reasonable

accommodation, the employee’s inability to perform a position even with accommodation

nonetheless proves “any violation of the FEHA would not have caused [the employee] any

damage.” Id. Therefore, the Court will return to the issue of Stoll’s total disability once the Court

has completed its analysis of whether The Hartford fulfilled its obligations under FEHA. 

D. Informal, Interactive Process

1. Legal Standard

The employee generally bears the burden of initiating the informal, interactive process. 

Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). The employee must

communicate, “in a manner that would be understood by a reasonable employer, that the employee

has a disability that requires some sort of accommodation in order for the employee to be able to

perform [her] work duties.”10 Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food Services, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1418, 1437

(N.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1999). However,

the employee does not bear the burden of initiating the interactive process where the employer is

aware of or recognizes the employee’s need for accommodation, or if the need for accommodation

is “obvious.” Humphrey v. Mem’l Hospitals Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001)

(awareness); Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds

sub nom. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (recognition); Norris, 948 F. Supp. at

1436 (obviousness). 

The informal, interactive process “should identify the precise limitations resulting from the

disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). Both sides “must participate in good faith, undertake reasonable efforts to

communicate [their] concerns, and make available to the other information which is available, or

more accessible, to one party.” Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4th 34, 62 n.22

(2006). The purpose of the process is “to determine the extent of the individual’s limitations,

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11 Gelco’s reversal of the trial court was predicated on a separate legal error regarding the

scope of employees owed a duty under FEHA. Defense counsel did argue in the alternative that the

employer has discharged its duties in the informal, interactive process, but the appellate court found

“conflicting” evidence and credited the jury’s findings. 140 Cal. App. 4th at 62 n.23. 

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before an individual may be deemed unable to work” and perhaps terminated. Id. at 61.

When the process breaks down, liability is assigned to the party responsible for the

breakdown, based on the surrounding objective circumstances. Id. at 62 n.22; Jensen, 85 Cal.

App. 4th at 261. The employer is responsible for the breakdown when the employer rejects the

employee’s proposed accommodation and provides no alternative accommodations of its own. 

Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1138; Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1117. 

Similarly, an employer’s human resources personnel must do more than provide the

employee with minimal “informal assistance”; for example, they must help the employee identify

vacancies suitable for her qualifications and limitations, rather than expecting her to evaluate the

employer’s job listings independently. Jensen, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 265. The Jensen court denied

the employer’s motion for summary judgment even though certain facts suggested the employee

had not been fully cooperative (e.g., by refusing to talk to departmental managers about her skills

and qualifications, and by adding her own “preferences” to doctors’ lists of medical restrictions). 

Id. at 266. 

Finally, the court of appeal reversed a directed verdict in favor of the employer where the

EEO Manager had written a letter to plaintiff, stating the job description could not accommodate

some of plaintiff’s physical limitations, and inviting further communication if the employee

became aware of a reasonable accommodation that would enable the employee to perform his

job.11 Gelfo, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 43. 

2. Analysis

Applying the case law, The Hartford cannot prove by undisputed facts that the informal,

interactive process broke down because Stoll failed to engage in good-faith discussions. The facts

show that Stoll initiated the process when she called Casteneda regarding a desire to come back to

work. In this conversation, Stoll communicated a disability (i.e., an inability to type) which

required accommodation. At this point, The Hartford became aware of Stoll’s need for

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12 At oral argument, defense counsel suggested that The Hartford did not want to “hound” Stoll

by having its human resources personnel call her to discuss accommodations and other available jobs.

The reality is that the law did require Hartford not only to contact Stoll affirmatively to discuss

accommodations, but also to propose its own accommodations for Stoll’s consideration. 

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accommodation. The need for accommodation was also obvious because Stoll’s disability kept

her from performing her current job as an underwriter.

The party responsible for the breakdown of the process is a genuine issue of material fact. 

The evidence submitted for this motion suggests the process broke down because The Hartford

refused to participate in good faith. Stoll contacted The Hartford to propose the accommodation of

no typing at her job. The Hartford rejected this accommodation. However, The Hartford did not

propose any accommodations of its own. Instead, in March 2005, some four months after Stoll’s

conversations with Casteneda, Sheridan finally invited Stoll to call if Stoll believed she was

eligible for a reasonable accommodation or if Stoll wanted to discuss available employment

opportunities. In the same letter, Sheridan informed Stoll of her pending termination. The

Hartford submits no evidence that, anytime during the intervening period, its agents contacted

Stoll with the specific purpose of discussing reasonable accommodations or other available

positions.12

The Hartford claims Stoll is responsible for the breakdown in the informal, interactive

process because Stoll “gave up.” A more careful review of Stoll’s deposition indicates that she

was surprised at The Hartford’s lack of effort to find an alternative position for her. [Stoll Depo.,

p. 36.] As plaintiff’s counsel explained at oral argument, The Hartford was not “stepping up to bat

in a timely manner.” Stoll’s surprise is appropriate, because the law affirmatively obligated The

Hartford to contact Stoll once she had initiated the process by informing The Hartford of her

disability and The Hartford had rejected the accommodations Stoll proposed. 

E. Reasonable Accommodation

The California Court of Appeal has held that, where a genuine issue of material fact exists

as to which party is responsible for the process’ breakdown, the employer cannot prevail on

summary judgment by showing that no alternative jobs were available, because, if the employer

had properly engaged in the process, the employer might have found alternative job(s) for the

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employee. Claudio, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 245, 248. Interpreting the comparable ADA provision,

the Ninth Circuit held, where the employer “did not engage in any such process, summary

judgment is available only if a reasonable finder of fact must conclude that ‘there would in any

event have been no reasonable accommodation available.’” Dark v. Curry County, 451 F.3d at

1088 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Morton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir.

2001)). 

An accommodation is reasonable if it “could plausibly have enabled [the employee]

adequately to perform her job.” Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136. Here, the Court considers the

accommodation actually provided by defendant (i.e., the leave of absence), the accommodation

plaintiff proposed during this litigation (i.e., the creation of a temporary underwriter position

devoted exclusively to training and coaching), and the accommodation most frequently discussed

in the case law (i.e., reassignment to another position within the company).

1. Leave of Absence

a. Legal Standard

A finite leave of absence is a reasonable accommodation under FEHA, “provided it is

likely that at the end of the leave, the employee would be able to perform his or her duties.” 

Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 215, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). In Hanson, the

employer reasonably accommodated the employee by granting sixteen months of leave, seven

more than the employee was entitled to receive under the applicable collective bargaining

agreement. Id. at 226-27. Even though the employee had not fully recuperated from his on-thejob injury by the end of his leave, the ongoing restrictions “d[id] not render the leave

accommodation itself unreasonable.” Id. at 227. The court further noted that the employer also

reasonably accommodated the employee by evaluating the employee’s medical restrictions and

offering the only available position within the company for which the employee qualified. Id.

 Similarly, in another FEHA case, the Ninth Circuit found that the employer reasonably

accommodated the employee by allowing the employee to perform limited job functions for two

months before surgery at the employee’s former salary; offering the employee the only vacant

position in the company for which the employee qualified; and, after the employee rejected this

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offer, granting the employee a full year of leave to recover from surgery. Watkins v. Ameripride

Services, 375 F.3d 821, 828-29 (9th Cir. 2004). 

While unpaid leave is a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the employer does not

have to grant a lengthy, indefinite period of leave if the employer does not know when the

employee will be able to return to work. Norris, 948 F. Supp. at 1438. The district court did opine

that a lengthy, indefinite period of leave (even up to one year) could be a reasonable

accommodation for a large employer with high employee turnover “if the leave would enable an

easily replaceable employee to eventually perform the essential functions of the employee’s

position.” Id. at 1438-39. 

Even where the employer believes it has reasonably accommodated the employee by

offering a period of disability leave, the employer is not exempt from investigating other

accommodations (including other job vacancies), although the employee has not specifically

requested those alternative accommodations. Prilliman, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 954.

b. Analysis

The Hartford asserts that it reasonably accommodated Stoll by offering her twelve weeks

of medical leave, in addition to the twenty-six weeks required by the Family and Medical Leave

Act (FMLA). [Memo. ISO Motion, at 8.] Applying the law to these facts, the Court finds this

accommodation is not independently sufficient to warrant a grant of summary judgment in The

Hartford’s favor. First, unlike the accommodations found reasonable in Hanson and Watkins, The

Hartford did not couple this leave of absence with any other reasonable accommodations. 

Specifically, The Hartford did not offer Stoll another vacant job for which she was qualified. 

Second, the leave was not structured in such a way as to make it “likely that at the end of the

leave, [Stoll] would be able to perform . . . her duties.” See Hanson, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 226. 

Instead, Stoll’s medical leave ended when she was still in rehabilitative therapy from her arm

surgery and could not work at all. Third, the Court notes that Stoll received less than three-fourths

of a year of leave, while the reasonable leaves of absence in Hanson and Watkins lasted a year or

more. Finally, by granting Stoll a leave of absence, The Hartford did not become exempt from its

obligation to search for other jobs that Stoll could perform. In light of Jensen’s instruction that the

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employer ought not prevail on summary judgment unless the employer shows there were no vacant

positions which the disabled employee could perform, the Court finds that The Hartford did not

satisfy its duty to reasonably accommodate Stoll by merely offering her an extended leave of

absence.

2. Temporary Training-Coaching Position

a. Legal standard

Under FEHA, “[t]he employer is not obligated to choose the best accommodation or the

accommodation the employee seeks.” Hanson, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 228. Under the comparable

ADA provision, the employer is also not required “to reallocate essential functions to other

employees.” Dark, 451 F.3d at 1089. 

The law specifically and emphatically does not require the employer to create a new

position for an employee, Watkins, 375 F.3d at 828, or a temporary light-duty assignment, Raine,

135 Cal. App. 4th at 1227, where no such position existed previously. In Raine, where a patrol

officer had been “temporarily” assigned to a front-desk position for six years, the court held that

the police department was neither obligated to restructure the front-desk position as a civilian

position with an officer’s salary and benefits, nor had it been originally required to put injured

officers in temporary front-desk positions at their previous level of salary and benefits. Id. at

1218, 1226-27. 

b. Analysis

In opposing the motion for summary judgment, Stoll asserts The Hartford should have

assigned to her all the training and coaching duties of an underwriter, allowing Stoll to work fulltime without creating higher costs or a need for additional personnel. [See Opp., at 2; Stoll Decla.

in Opp. to Motion, at 2.] The Court finds that this proposed accommodation fails, as a matter of

law. Despite any other obligations to accommodate Stoll reasonably, The Hartford was not

required to create the new position of a never-typing, training-and-coaching-only underwriter. 

While Stoll insists that such an arrangement would be a temporary fix as she resolved her medical

limitations, Raine makes clear that employers are not required to create even temporary light-duty

positions to accommodate disabled employees. 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1226-27. 

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13 On summary judgment, courts hold employers to especially rigorous standards for showing

the absence of suitable alternative positions for disabled employees. In Jensen itself, evidence that

the employee lacked the skills and qualifications of the positions for which she applied was

insufficient because it “beg[ged] the question” of whether the employer had other vacancies the

employee could have filled. 85 Cal. App. 4th at 264. In another California case, where the evidence

suggested the existence of vacancies the employee was qualified to fill but was never told about, the

employer could avoid liability only if it showed that those vacancies were filled by equally or betterqualified candidates. Spitzer, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1390. A federal district court denied an employer’s

motion for summary judgment where the employer submitted declarations of managerial personnel

that the company had no vacancies which the employee could have filled, given his medical

restrictions. Smith v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1035-36 (N.D. Cal. 2002). The

declarations were flawed because they did not consider whether there was a vacancy the disabled

employee could have filled with accommodation. Id. And, in the ADA context, the Ninth Circuit

recently held, “in considering reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, an employer must

consider not only those contemporaneously available positions but also those that will become

available within a reasonable period [after the employee’s termination].” Dark, 451 F.3d at 1089-90.

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//

3. Reassignment

a. Legal Standard

Although the law protects The Hartford from creating the new job Stoll requested, it

simultaneously imposes a duty on The Hartford to look for other existing, vacant jobs which Stoll

would have been qualified to perform. Under FEHA, if a disabled employee cannot be reasonably

accommodated in her current job, the employer must reassign this employee unless “there is no

vacant position for which the employee is qualified.” Spitzer v. The Good Guys, Inc., 80 Cal.

App. 4th 1376, 1389 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). More broadly, whenever the employer knows of an

employee’s disability, the employer “has an affirmative duty to make known to the employee other

suitable job opportunities with the employer and to determine whether the employee is interested

in, and qualified for, those positions[.]” Prilliman, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 950-51. To terminate an

employee without meaningfully exploring other options offends “[t]he hallmark of FEHA [which]

is the flexibility it requires of employers to work with its [sic] disabled employees to accommodate

their needs.” Sargent v. Litton Sys., Inc., 841 F. Supp. 956, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 

Therefore, to prevail on summary judgment, the employer must “definitively establish that

there were no positions within its organization which met [the employee’s] qualifications and

restrictions.”13 Jensen, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 68. The employee can never bear the entire burden of

identifying an alternative position because the employer’s “superior knowledge of the workplace”

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14 While the law does not impose any burden on Stoll to identify an existing, vacant position

within The Hartford’s organization, the failure of plaintiff’s counsel to conduct any discovery on this

issue is not without consequence. If plaintiff’s counsel had directed the Court’s attention to some

vacant position which Stoll could have performed, the Court would not have to include the next

section on the issue of whether a “totally disabled” employee would nonetheless be able to work. 

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makes the employer better able to canvass the spectrum of available positions. Barnett, 228 F.3d

at 1113. In short, “the task of proving . . . no reasonable accommodation was available [] rests with

an offending employer throughout the litigation, and . . . it is not likely that an employer will be

able to establish on summary judgment the absence of a disputed fact as to that question.” 

Morton, 272 F.3d at 1256 n.7. 

b. Analysis

In spite of the importance of reassignment in a reasonable accommodation case and the

formidable legal burden articulated by the Ninth Circuit and California courts, the parties agree

that the record is “entirely silent” on whether The Hartford could have reassigned Stoll to a vacant

position. [Opp., at 5; Reply, at 3.] The Hartford blames Stoll for this silence, repeatedly pointing

out that plaintiff’s counsel has not conducted any discovery in the entire case. [Memo. ISO

Motion, at 4 n.2; Reply, at 3 n.1.] However, on this issue at this stage of the litigation, the

responsibility squarely lies with defendant to “establish[] through undisputed facts that . . . there

simply was no vacant position within the employer’s organization for which the disabled

employee was qualified and which the disabled employee was capable of performing with or

without accommodation[.]”14 Jensen, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 263. 

Despite its high burden of proof, The Hartford has provided the Court with nothing

regarding job vacancies between the initial on-the-job injury and Stoll’s termination.

F. Temporary Total Disability

1. Background

The Court now (re)turns to the question of whether plaintiff, though temporarily totally

disabled, could nonetheless have performed, with accommodations, the essential functions of any

other job at The Hartford. The undisputed facts show that, “[s]ince leaving active employment

with The Hartford in the Summer of 2004 Ms. Stoll has been on various forms of disability and

workers’ compensation leave[.]” [Memo. ISO Motion, at 2.] To obtain those benefits, Stoll and

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her physicians represented that Stoll was temporarily totally disabled and thus unable to work. 

The Hartford argues, “Stoll’s status as totally disabled . . . belies any testimony that she could

perform 

. . . any job at The Hartford[.]” [Memo. ISO Motion, at 7.] If The Hartford is correct, “the

employer cannot be required to find a job for an employee when no such position could be created

even hypothetically.” Swonke v. Sprint, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 

Therefore, this Court must now consider whether Stoll, who was temporarily totally disabled for

purposes of collecting disability and workers’ compensation benefits, can nonetheless pursue a

cause of action against The Hartford for failure to make reasonable accommodation(s) that would

have enabled her to work. 

An employee is totally disabled “if [s]he is unable to earn any income during the period

when [s]he is recovering from the effects of the injury.” Herrera v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals

Bd., 71 Cal. 2d 254, 257 (Cal. 1969) (interpreting Cal. Labor Code § 4653). A temporary

disability “is an impairment reasonably expected to be cured or materially improved with proper

medical treatment.” Signature Fruit Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 142 Cal. App. 4th 790,

795 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). Temporary disability benefits are “intended as a substitute for lost

wages during a period of transitory incapacity to work.” Id. 

In light of these definitions, the Court considers two legal theories which may bar Stoll’s

suit because of her prior representations of temporary total disability: (1) judicial estoppel, and (2)

traditional summary judgment grounds. 

2. Judicial Estoppel

a. Legal Standard 

The “essential function and justification of judicial estoppel is to prevent the use of

intentional self-contradiction as a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided for

suitors seeking justice.” Drain v. Batz Laboratories, Inc., 69 Cal. App. 4th 950, 956 (Cal. Ct. App.

1999) (quoting Billmeyer v. Plaza Bank of Commerce, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1086, 1097 (Cal. Ct. App.

1995)) (other internal citations omitted). “The gravamen of this doctrine . . . precludes a party

from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking

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15 Even without the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cleveland, a district court was able to

distinguish factually a cause of action for ADA discrimination from Rissetto’s estoppel of an age

discrimination claim. Norris, 948 F. Supp. at 1447. The district court explained the ADA litigant’s

claim that she can work with reasonable accommodation is perfectly consistent with her claim for

disability benefits because she cannot work without reasonable accommodation. Id. Therefore, based

on both the different facts and the changed legal standard, Rissetto is not binding precedent on the

interrelationship of “temporary total disability” under California’s workers’ compensation law and

the reasonable accommodation provisions of FEHA. 

16 Even before Cleveland was decided, the Ninth Circuit had backed away from judicial

estoppel as an automatic bar to an ADA or FEHA claim whenever the plaintiff had claimed total

disability to receive benefits. See Lujan v. Pac. Mar. Associates, 165 F.3d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1999)

(reversing a grant of summary judgment for defendants where trial court based its ruling on judicial

estoppel of ADA/FEHA plaintiff who received disability benefits by representing that he could not

work). 

17 The Social Security Act required plaintiff to prove a disability “of such severity that [she]

is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Much like the

definition of “total disability” in California law, this definition would appear to bar any subsequent

litigation alleging the plaintiff could have worked during the period of disability, though, in fact, there

is no such automatic bar.

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an incompatible position.” Prilliman, 53 Cal. App. 4th at 957. Judicial estoppel is an equitable

doctrine which a court invokes at its discretion, and is a matter of federal law in federal court. 

Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 601, 603 (9th Cir. 1996). In Rissetto,

because the employee had claimed to be temporarily totally disabled in workers’ compensation

proceedings and had settled those proceedings favorably, the Ninth Circuit judicially estopped the

employee from claiming, in a FEHA age discrimination suit, that she had performed her job

adequately. Id. at 605-06. 

Although the conclusion of Rissetto (i.e., that a recipient of California disability benefits is

estopped from bringing a FEHA claim) would seem, at first glance, to bind this Court and

vindicate The Hartford,15 the Rissetto analysis did not survive the strict curtailment of judicial

estoppel in Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999)16. Where the plaintiff had

received Social Security benefits,17 the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erroneously

applied a presumption to judicially estop the employee from claiming in ADA litigation that she

could have performed the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation. Id. at

802. The Supreme Court reasoned the Social Security Administration did not consider the

possibility of a reasonable accommodation in determining eligibility for benefits, nor did the

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Social Security application ask about reasonable accommodations. Id. at 803. The reasonable

accommodation issue “may turn on highly disputed workplace-specific matters” that the Social

Security Administration would be ill-equipped to assess, in light of all the benefits applications it

must process. Id.

However, the Supreme Court did not allow ADA plaintiffs to ignore their past

representations of disability. Instead, plaintiffs “must proffer a sufficient explanation” for the

apparent contradiction arising from the earlier claim of disability. Id. at 807. To overcome a

motion for summary judgment, “that explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror’s

concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff’s good-faith belief in the earlier statement,

the plaintiff could nonetheless perform the essential functions of her job, with or without

reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 807 (internal quotations omitted). 

After Cleveland, the Ninth Circuit applies judicial estoppel in disability cases much more

narrowly. Only where a plaintiff “is playing fast and loose with the courts” or takes a position

“tantamount to a knowing misrepresentation to or even fraud on the court” will the plaintiff be at

risk of estoppel. Johnson v. Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998). 

b. Analysis

The Court has no reason to judicially estop Stoll from pursuing her FEHA claim simply

because she claimed to be temporarily totally disabled on her applications for workers’

compensation and disability benefits. There is no evidence that Stoll “is playing fast and loose” or

defrauding the Court. Even if Rissetto remains good law, Stoll’s facts are distinguishable because

her claim for reasonable accommodation can be reconciled with a benefits application stating that

she cannot work without accommodation. 

3. Traditional Summary Judgment Grounds

a. Legal Standard

Even though judicial estoppel is largely inapplicable, “plaintiff’s prior representations may

be so strong and definitive that they will defeat the plaintiff’s prima facie case on traditional

summary judgment grounds.” Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1369. Relying on EEOC Enforcement

Guidance documents, the Ninth Circuit has made clear, “neither application for nor receipt of

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disability benefits automatically bars a claimant[.]” Id. at 1367. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s

“clear preference [is] that inconsistent statements simply be considered along with other evidence

to see whether they [are] so damaging that no rational trier of fact could rule in the plaintiff’s

favor.” Fredenburg v. Contra Costa County Dep’t of Health Services, 172 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

This rule is considered good public policy because it does not force plaintiffs to choose

between the short-term receipt of disability benefits to relieve financial stress and the long-term

vindication of statutory rights. Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1368. If an application for disability benefits

precluded an employee’s subsequent lawsuit against the employer, the law would protect

discriminatory employers and leave employees “whip-sawed between the competing demands of

the different statutes.” Id.; Lujan v. Pac. Mar. Associates, 165 F.3d 738, 741 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Applying this reasoning even before Cleveland, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary

judgment for the employer, where the employee’s doctor testified in the deposition that the

employee was totally disabled on the date of termination, and where plaintiff’s sworn statements

on state disability and Social Security forms claimed a complete disability for work-related

purposes. Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 1996). The court

disregarded the employee’s “uncorroborated and self-serving” deposition testimony that she was a

“qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA, thus contradicting the other evidence. Id.

Similarly, a district court found that a series of physicians’ notes representing the plaintiff

as totally disabled effectively exempted the employer from FEHA’s informal, interactive process,

which was “guaranteed to be futile” until the employer had notice that physicians would release

plaintiff for work. Swonke, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. In dicta, the court opined that, even if a

doctor testified differently in a deposition or at trial, the employer would still win because such

after-the-fact testimony “would not alter the facts as they were plainly presented to [the employer]

at the time.” Id. at 1133. The court’s analysis was also influenced by plaintiff’s “gamesmanship”

in asking the court to disregard forms which the plaintiff had authorized his chiropractor to submit

to the employer, and by plaintiff’s personal written statements to human resources personnel that

plaintiff would have to obtain physician releases before he could legally return to work. Id. at

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1134-35. 

On the other hand, an employee survived summary judgment on his FEHA claim even

though he had represented himself as totally and permanently disabled in his Social Security

application, in a demand for arbitration with his health-care provider, and in an appeal for the

denial of long-term disability benefits. Smith, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 1035. The district court relied

on the absence of references to “accommodation” in, e.g., the disability benefits policy. Id. at

1035.

Again, a FEHA discrimination plaintiff could go forward once the plaintiff produced

declarations from his treating physicians that he could have continued working, had the employer

not removed an existing accommodation. Bell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1382,

1388-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). However, the employer’s contrary evidence was much less

conclusive and consisted merely of ambiguous statements on disability applications that plaintiff

was disabled as to “his regular and customary work.” Id. at 1387-88. 

b. Analysis

The Court has reviewed the record in this case for the “sufficient explanation” that would

prevent Stoll’s representations of temporary total disability from being “so damaging that no

rational trier of fact could rule in [her] favor.” Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807; Fredenburg, 172 F.3d

at 1179. The Court finds such an explanation in this deposition testimony of Dr. Caligiuri in

response to certain queries by plaintiff’s counsel:

Q: Well, let me ask you this: Do you recall Regina asking at any point in time if

you would clear her to go back to work at The Hartford?

A: I believe she did ask me that. And I believe that I had told her that she could

try that.

I never want to hold a patient back. And my philosophy is, I will give a

patient my best opinion with respect to treatment, with respect to work and

disability status, but I will always let that patient decide. There are usually

economic issues associated with disability.

And if my memory serves me correctly, I think she did ask and I think I did

state she could go back at least on a trial basis, if she was so inclined and if

the company would have her.

Q: Did you hedge your bet in terms of telling her that she should not, in any

event, do keyboarding if she went back?

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A: I told her that’s definitely not congenial to her condition. And probably

that’s going to provoke and flare up her symptoms. But if the employer’s

able to offer accommodations or alternative work, which is often the case

with many different types of jobs, then that would be in her best interest and

ensure the highest probability that she would be able to stay at modified

work.

Q: You would have cleared her if that accommodation had been provided?

A: Like I said, I would never preclude a patient. I would give them my opinion

and ultimately it’s their decision.

Certainly if the employer had furnished me with something saying that

modified work is definitely available–and many employers will actually

proactively write me letters and say “We have modified work.” “We have a

modified work policy.” And then, obviously, we would try to work

something out. 

[Caligiuri Depo., pp. 14-15.] 

The Court believes this portion of Dr. Caligiuri’s deposition testimony is sufficient to

create a genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff could have worked with accommodation at

The Hartford during the period when she collected benefits for being “temporarily totally

disabled.” This testimony establishes that, if The Hartford had proactively contacted Dr. Caligiuri

about work accommodations, Stoll possibly could have returned to employment at The Hartford in

an existing, vacant position. 

This Court’s finding is consistent with the statutory interpretation and policy explanation

other courts rely on in denying summary judgment to employers in disability cases. California’s

definition of “temporary total disability” makes no reference to the possibility of working with

accommodation. FEHA does make reference to such accommodations. Furthermore, the

definition of “temporary” disability anticipates Stoll’s eventual recovery. Had The Hartford tried

harder to reasonably accommodate Stoll, she might have been returned to the underwriter position

after her recovery. Also, Stoll has relied on disability benefits for income since her injury. If this

Court granted The Hartford’s motion, the Court essentially would have forced Stoll to choose

between her financial solvency and the exercise of her FEHA rights. 

//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES The Hartford’s motion for summary

judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 7, 2006

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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