Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01574/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01574-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 A telephonic case management conference was held on July 21, 2006. During the conference

With Judge Battaglia, Plaintiff stated that he had submitted a request for additional time in which to file

his opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. However, due to the fact that the Motion

was filed nine (9) months ago, that Plaintiff was notified over two (2) months ago of his obligations in

responding to Defendants’ Motion, and the overall untimeliness of the request, which the Court has not

yet received as of the date of this Order, the Court will decide the instant motion on papers submitted to

1 03cv1574 BEN (AJB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KHACHIK MARJANIAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDWARD ALMEIDA, et. al.,

Defendants. 

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03CV1574 BEN (AJB)

Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment as to Defendants Smith,

Raupe, Hernandez and Alameida

 [Doc. No. 29 ]

Plaintiff, Khachik Marjanian, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel

and unusual punishment by exhibiting deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 

Plaintiff further contends that denial of his 602 Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form requesting “immediate and

proper medical attention” amounts to a denial of his Substantive and Procedural Due Process rights.

Defendants Smith, Raupe, Hernandez and Alameida filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October

17, 2005. The Court issued a Notice pursuant to Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988)

and Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) on May 10, 2006, informing Plaintiff of

his obligation to respond to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. As of the date of this Order,

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.1

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date. 

2

 The record is unclear as to whether Dr. Duke was a psychiatrist or psychologist.

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This motion is appropriate for submission on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to

Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons explained herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED as to defendants Smith, Raupe, Hernandez, and Almeida.

Factual History

Plaintiff was received as an inmate at the Calipatria State Prison for men on or about September

16, 1997. (Def. Ex. C., Marjanian Dep. at 39). There, he began experiencing a skin irritation on his

body which would come and go. (Id. at 38). Plaintiff described his skin as “sand-papery”. (Id. at 36). 

He also described feeling a prickly sensation, like bugs crawling over, and biting into, his skin. (Id. at

35, 37). Plaintiff states that he did not seek medical attention at Calipatria because he was told by

another inmate that the cause of his skin irritation was the water. (Id. at 40-41). 

Plaintiff was transferred to Centinela State Prison in approximately January of 2000. (Id. at 39). 

There, he was referred to CDCR contract dermatologist, Dr. Peterson, for evaluation and treatment.

(Id.). Dr. Peterson treated Plaintiff for three months, prescribing creams, special soaps, and shampoos

for him. (Id. at 44). Various medications were prescribed as Plaintiff’s symptoms changed and

persisted. (Id. at 44 and 49). He was also referred to Dr. Duke, a psychiatrist or psychologist,2 and was

given a prescription for Prozac. (Id. at 40, 44-48). Plaintiff was transferred to Donovan State Prison in

January or February of 2001. (Id. at 46). Plaintiff was referred to a staff physician and then referred

again to Dr. Peterson. (Id.). He began to see Dr. Peterson at the Donovan Dermatology Clinic every

two to four weeks. (Id. at 50). He was last seen at the clinic on May 15, 2002. (Id.). 

Approximately one month later, on June 13, 2002, Plaintiff submitted a 602 Inmate/Parolee

Appeal Form requesting “immediate and proper medical attention” (hereafter inmate appeal) for his skin

condition. (Id.). He claimed that Dr. Peterson had failed, despite several attempted remedies, to cure

his skin condition. (Def. Ex. D, Raupe Dec. at ¶ 5). Lori Raupe, the Health Care Appeals Coordinator

(HCAC) at Donovan, assigned Plaintiff’s inmate appeal for investigation to Clayton Smith, a Medical

Technical Assistant (MTA) at Donovan. (Id. at ¶ 6). MTA Smith was already acquainted with

Plaintiff’s condition and was aware that his condition was being treated by Dr. Peterson. (Def. Ex. E,

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Smith Dec. at ¶ 7). MTA Smith’s review of Plaintiff’s appeal revealed several past instances of

treatment by Dr. Peterson. (Id. at ¶ 8). It also revealed that Plaintiff was still under Dr. Peterson’s care. 

(Id.). MTA Smith also noted the numerous medications prescribed to treat Plaintiff’s skin condition

over the previous two years, and that he had called Plaintiff’s housing unit to inform him that his

prescriptions were available, but that on three separate occasions, Plaintiff failed to pick-up his

prescriptions. (Id.). Finally, MTA Smith noted that Plaintiff was currently medicated and had a followup appointment scheduled with Dr. Peterson in three months. (Id.). 

Based on these findings and a review of Plaintiff’s medical charts, MTA Smith concluded that

Plaintiff’s medical condition was receiving proper attention from Donovan’s medical staff. (Id. at ¶ 9). 

MTA Smith submitted a written report to HCAC Raupe on July 6, 2002, denying the appeal for lack of

merit at the first informal level. (Id. at ¶ 10). This concluded MTA Smith’s contact with Plaintiff

regarding his skin condition. HCAC Raupe reviewed the inmate appeal and MTA Smith’s report and

returned it to Plaintiff, informing him that he could appeal the decision within fifteen days if he was

dissatisfied. (Def. Ex. D, Raupe Dec. at ¶ 7).

Plaintiff appealed MTA Smith’s decision to the next level. (Id. at ¶ 8). HCAC Raupe was then

assigned to investigate the inmate appeal at the second formal level. (Id.). She personally confirmed

MTA Smith’s findings. (Id. at ¶ 10). She also reviewed the CDRC unit health records for the Plaintiff

and interviewed Plaintiff in the Triage Treatment Area in the Central Infirmary. (Id.). After her

investigation, HCAC Raupe partially granted Plaintiff’s appeal at the second formal level. (Id. at ¶ 11). 

HCAC Raupe specified that Plaintiff should continue to receive treatment on an “as needed” basis and

confirmed that Plaintiff was on the list to be seen by the dermatologist. (Id.). HCAC Raupe again

advised Plaintiff that he could appeal the decision to the Director’s level of review. (Id. at ¶ 12). HCAC

Raupe had no further contact with Plaintiff regarding his skin condition. (Id. at ¶ 13). 

Plaintiff appealed HCAC Raupe’s decision to the Director’s level for review. (Compl., Ex. A;

Defs. Ex. A, p. 22). The appeal was denied at the Directors level due in part to Plaintiff’s failure to

provide any evidence substantiating his deliberate denial of medical treatment claim. (Id.). Moreover, it

was determined at the Director’s level that Plaintiff’s medical condition was being actively treated. 

(Id.). This decision exhausted the administrative remedies available to Plaintiff within the CDC. 

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Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the granting of summary judgment is appropriate “if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The standard for granting a motion for summary

judgment requires judgment be entered “if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable

conclusion as to the verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986). However,

“[i]f reasonable minds could differ,” judgment should not be entered in favor of the moving party. Id. 

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof as would apply at a trial on the merits,

including plaintiff’s burden to establish any element essential to his case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252;

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the elements of the claim in the pleadings, or

other evidence, which the moving party “believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970);

Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). “A material issue of fact is one that

affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the

truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). More than a “metaphysical

doubt” is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a

genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. The court must examine all of the evidence in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962). However, to successfully rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the

nonmoving party “must point to some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material

fact and, with all reasonable inferences made in the plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury

to find for the plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249); see also Paine v. City of

Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f a plaintiff cannot in its summary judgment motion

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28 3 Forsberg v. Pac. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1988); Nilsson v.

Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988).

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factual submissions connect any particular defendant to the incidents giving rise to liability, that

defendant is entitled to summary judgment and may not be required to go to trial.”). Production of a

mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. City of Vernon v.

Southern California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1992). 

While the district court is “not required to comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion

for summary judgment,”3 the court may nevertheless exercise its discretion “in appropriate circumstances,” to consider materials in the record which are on file, but not “specifically referred to.” Carmen

v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the court need not

“examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set

forth in the moving papers with adequate references so that it could be conveniently found.” Id.; see

also Zoslaw, 693 F.2d at 883 (“A party may not prevail in opposing a motion for summary judgment by

simply overwhelming the district court with a miscellany of unorganized documentation.”).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in

the form of factual allegations.” W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). “No

valid interest is served by withholding summary judgment on a complaint that wraps nonactionable

conduct in a jacket woven of legal conclusions and hyperbole.” Vigliotto v. Terry, 873 F.2d 1201, 1203

(9th Cir. 1989); see also Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that

“mere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment”). 

Discussion

I. Legal Standard for § 1983 Claims

In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff is required to show (1) a

violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute; (2) proximately caused by

defendants acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991);

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (stating that § 1983 “creates a

private right of action against individuals who, acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.”).

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4

 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-371 (1976)

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The Plaintiff must show that the defendants had personal involvement with the incidents which

caused the constitutional injury. Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 1975). In other words,

“supervisory personnel whose personal involvement is not alleged may not be held responsible for the

acts of their subordinates.” Id. Moreover, a vicarious liability theory is unavailable in 1983 actions.

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, a supervisor may only be liable for the

actions of his subordinates if there exists either: “(1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation; or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and

the constitutional violation.” Id. Since supervisor liability requires the supervisor’s own action to serve

as an “affirmative link” to the illegal conduct though personal involvement or “authorization or

approval”4, supervisor liability must be based on more than the mere right to control one’s employees.

Monell v. Dept. of Social Service of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, n. 58 (1978). 

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

In the instant case, Plaintiff claims that he sustained injuries from a chronic skin condition that

was not adequately treated by prison medical staff. (Compl. pp. 2 & 3). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges

that MTA Smith and HCAC Raupe acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition

when they denied his Inmate/Parolee Appeal for “immediate and proper medical attention”. (Compl. p.

3). He alleges that his skin condition was worsening and that MTA Smith and HCAC Raupe failed to

recommend prompt medical treatment. (Compl. p. 3 & 4). Plaintiff also contends that Defendant

Warden Hernandez, failed to train, supervise, and take action against his subordinates, MTA Smith and

HCAC Raupe. (Compl. p. 4). Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Alameida, former Director of CDCR,

knew or should have known about Plaintiff’s medical condition and failed to take action against, train,

and supervise his subordinates, MTA Smith and HCAC Raupe. (Compl. p. 4).

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment by their deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. In order to demonstrate that the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to

prove that Defendants’ acts or omission deprived him of the minimal civilized measures of life’s

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necessities and that the Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. 

The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that involves the “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153, 173 (1976)). This principle “establish[ed] the government’s obligation to provide medical care for

those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Id. The Supreme Court has noted that “[a]n inmate must

rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not

be met.” Id.; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-55 (1988). To assert an Eighth Amendment claim, a

prisoner must allege facts sufficient to fulfill two requirements: one objective and one subjective. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 514 U.S. 1065 (1995). 

1. Objective Component for Eighth Amendment Claim

Under the objective requirement, the prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show that the prison

official’s acts or omissions deprived him of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” 

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Prison officials can avoid the

objective appearance of cruel or unusual treatment so long as the institution “furnishes sentenced

prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit

v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129,

1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981). To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be

punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoners’ interest or safety.” 

Whitely, 475 U.S. at 319. Prison conditions do not violate the Eighth Amendment unless they amount to

“unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs” or of “minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 347 (1981); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300

(1991).

2. Subjective Component for Eighth Amendment Claim 

Under the subjective requirement, the prisoner must allege facts that show that the defendant

acted with “deliberate indifference.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. “Deliberate

indifference” exists when a prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health

and safety; the official must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

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5 See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d

404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985); Hunt, 865 F.2d at 200 (“[D]elay in providing a prisoner with dental treatment,

standing alone, does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.”); Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d

1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Certainly, not every twinge of pain suffered as the result of delay in

medical care is actionable.”). 

6 See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d at 1336, 1339-40; McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 & n.2. 

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substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837;

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303. In other words, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to indicate that

prison officials acted with a “culpable state of mind.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302. Proof of this state of

mind does not require a demonstration of express intent to cause harm, by either action or inaction, on

the part of the official. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. However, proof of an official’s deliberate indifference

to the health or safety of an inmate requires more than proof of mere negligence. Id.; Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). 

“Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury

states a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). “This is true

whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs, or by

prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering

with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted). 

The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial. Inadequate treatment due to

malpractice or even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at

106; Hallett v. Morgan, 287 F.3d 1193, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332,

1334 (9th Cir. 1990). Even if an inmate demonstrates that prison officials actually knew of a substantial

risk to inmate health or safety, these officials are not deliberately indifferent if they responded

reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding appropriate medical

diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891

F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Additionally, a mere delay in treatment does not constitute a violation of

the Eighth Amendment, unless the delay or denial was harmful.5

 While the harm caused by delay need

not necessarily be “substantial,”6

 the Eighth Amendment is violated if “delays occurred to patients with

problems so severe that delays would cause significant harm and that Defendants should have known

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7 Hallett, 287 F.3d at 1206.

8 McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 

9 Wood, 900 F.2d at 1334.

10 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986).

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this to be the case,”7 and “a finding that the inmate was seriously harmed by the defendant’s action or

inaction tends to provide additional support to a claim that the defendant was ‘deliberately indifferent’

to the prisoner’s medical needs.”8

 

Regarding inaction or delay of treatment, “the fact that an individual sat idly by as another

human being was seriously injured despite the defendant’s ability to prevent the injury is a strong

indicium of callousness and deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s suffering.” Id. (citing Estelle, 429

U.S. at 106). However, a finding that the defendants’ neglect of a prisoner’s condition was an “isolated

occurrence,”9

 or an “isolated exception,”10 to the defendants’ overall course of treatment of the prisoner

ordinarily weighs against a finding of deliberate indifference. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Further,

prison officials who ignore the instructions of a prisoner’s treating physician create grounds for a claim

of deliberate indifference. Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1165; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; Hamilton v. Endell,

981 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1992).

A prison inmate has no independent constitutional right to outside medical care in addition to the

medical care provided by the prison staff within the institution. See Roberts v. Spalding, 783 F.2d 867,

870 (9th Cir. 1986).

B. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims Against Defendants Smith and Raupe

Plaintiff claims that MTA Smith and HCAC Raupe deliberately ignored his worsening medical

condition by denying his appeals. (Compl. p. 4). Plaintiff argues that this constitutes deliberate

indifference as his condition was obvious to even a lay person. (Compl. pp. 3 & 4). Yet, despite

Plaintiff’s contentions, Plaintiff was receiving adequate medical care. (Defs. Ex. B, Physician’s

Progress Notes). His Department of Corrections medical record shows that he was seen by Dr. Peterson

in the Donovan Dermatology Clinic multiple times over a period of two years and was receiving

medical care when the appeals were filed. (Id.; Defs. Ex. C, Plaintiff Dep. at 24-25; Defs. Ex. E, Smith

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Dec. at ¶ 8; Defs. Ex. D, Raupe Dec. at ¶¶ 9-10). Between January and July of 2002, Plaintiff was seen

by Dr. Peterson seven times and had another follow-up appointment scheduled. (Defs. Ex. C, Plaintiff

Dep. at 29; Raupe Dec. at ¶ 10). This prescription was just one of several medications Plaintiff had been

prescribed over the two year period of his incarceration. (Defs. Ex. E, Smith Dec. at ¶ 8). According to

the notes in Plaintiff’s medical files, his skin seemed to be improving and softening with the continual

use of baby oil. (Defs. Ex. B, Physician’s Progress Notes p. 28).

Both MTA Smith and HCAC Raupe looked into Plaintiff’s appeals and complaints. (Defs. Ex.

E, Smith Dec. at ¶ 8; Defs. Ex. D, Raupe Dec. ¶ 9 ). In light of the information above, they concluded

that Plaintiff was indeed receiving medical care for his condition. Neither MTA Smith nor HCAC

Raupe acted with deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff. Each throughly investigated his appeals and

followed all required procedures.

Plaintiff contends that the Defendants should have granted his appeals for “immediate and proper

medical attention”. He argues that the failure to do so amounted to deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs. However, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel

regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not sufficient to establish a deliberate

indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, even if Plaintiff

could establish that these Defendants knew of a substantial risk to his health, the Defendants will not be

found to be deliberately indifferent if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately

was not averted. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. While Dr. Peterson had not yet “cured” Plaintiff’s condition,

he was providing Plaintiff with ongoing medical care. Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that the

treatments were at least easing some of the symptoms associated with Plaintiff’s condition. Moreover,

both Smith and Raupe denied Plaintiff’s appeals only after they throughly investigated Plaintiff’s

claims, verified Plaintiff’s ongoing treatment, and noted that Plaintiff was scheduled to see the doctor

again in the near future. Plaintiff was not deprived of the basic human need for medical care, either

intentionally or negligently, and has failed to demonstrate that either of these Defendants acted with

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. As such, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Eighth Amendment claim against MTA Smith and HCAC

Raupe.

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11 Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)

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 C. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims Against Defendants Hernandez and Alameida

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Warden Hernandez and Former Director of the CDCR

Alamedia failed to properly train, supervise, and take action against MTA Smith and HCAC Raupe and

as a result of this failure, Plaintiff was caused serious injury. (Compl. p. 4). Neither Hernandez nor

Alameida was aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition and neither made any decisions related to his care.

(Defs. Ex. F, Hernandez Dec. at ¶¶ 5-12; Defs. Ex. G, Alameida Dec. at ¶¶ 5-12). Plaintiff has not

shown the necessary causal connection between decisions or actions taken by Hernandez or Alameida,

and his medical care. Therefore, his claim amounts to nothing more than a vicarious liability claim,

which is unavailable in § 1983 actions.11 This Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

as to the Eighth Amendment claim against Hernandez and Alameida. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that even when the facts are construed in a light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Defendants failed to treat his medical needs. The evidence

indicates that Plaintiff had been receiving treatment for his condition continually since he began to

complain about it. Moreover, his medical records seem to indicate that his skin condition was showing

some improvement over time. 

The evidence does not support a conclusion of deliberate indifference on the part of any of the

Defendants. Plaintiff’s medical needs were not purposely ignored by the Defendants, nor did any of the

Defendants fail to reasonably respond to Plaintiff’s medical condition. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d at

1060. As such, the evidence does not support the conclusion that the Defendants acted with a culpable

state of mind. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that there is a triable

issue of material fact as to whether Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious

medical needs in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff has failed to state a cause

of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

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D. Due Process Claims

Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated because he did not receive a fair hearing

regarding his inmate appeals for medical care. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This Clause guarantees individuals the right to both substantive and

procedural due process. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (analyzing the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment). Substantive due process “prevents the government from engaging in

conduct that shocks the conscience . . . or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty

. . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Procedural due process requires that the

government’s deprivation of life, liberty, or property, even if consistent with substantive due process,

“be implemented in a fair manner.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1. Procedural Due Process

To plead procedural due process violations, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a life, liberty or property

interest exists and has been subject to interference by the state; and (2) the procedures attendant upon

the deprivation of an existing interest were constitutionally insufficient. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections

v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1990). 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). The

requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the

Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,

569 (1972). In addition to liberty interests that arise directly from the Constitution, courts have long

recognized that state prison regulations may give rise to liberty interests that are protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-227 (1976); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557-58. 

Nonetheless, the interest created by the regulation must be something more than freedom from the

restrictions ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). 

The interests created by state prison regulations are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which,

while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due

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Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless impose atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 2300 (citations omitted).

The basic requirements of Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are the right to notice and

the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Logan v. Zimmerman

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982). The California prison system allows inmates to appeal any

departmental decision, action, condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse

affect upon their welfare by filing an inmate appeal Form CDC 602. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.1 (2006)

After the appeal is filed, it is subject to four levels of review: (1) an informal level; (2) a first formal

level; (3) a second formal level; and (4) the Director's level review. Id. at § 3084.5 (2006). If an inmate

is dissatisfied with the prison's decision, he can appeal to the next level of review. Id. An inmate is

required to appeal until all available administrative remedies are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.; see

Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct 2378, 2382-83 (2006). 

Plaintiff claims that the procedures attendant to protecting his right to receive medical care were

constitutionally insufficient, as he did not receive “a fair hearing and fair medical judgment as to his

complaints about medical problems.” (Compl. p. 5). To the contrary, the record shows that both his

original claim and his appeal from that decision were thoroughly investigated. (Pl. Ex. A, Inmate Appeal

Form ;Defs. Ex. E, Smith Dec.; Defs. Ex. D, Raupe Dec.). Smith and Raupe denied (or denied in part)

Plaintiff’s inmate appeal only after a complete review of Plaintiff’s medical records, receiving

verification that he was receiving ongoing medical treatment, and confirming that he had a future

appointment with the doctor. Importantly, Plaintiff was informed of his right to appeal the decision to a

higher authority each time his appeal was denied. (Id.). In fact, Plaintiff exercised his right to appeal

Smith’s and Raupe’s decisions to several higher levels of authority. Thus, the CDC 602 inmate appeals

process provided Plaintiff with procedural due process sufficient to protect his liberty interest in

receiving medical treatment. 

2. Substantive Due Process

To plead a substantive due process violation, a plaintiff must allege governmental action which

deprives plaintiff of a life, liberty or property interest which may not be deprived regardless of the

procedure employed. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-

50 (1992); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326-27

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(1986). State action that “do[es] more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism,” but rather, “shocks the conscience” to the point that it “is bound to offend even hardened

sensibilities” can be said to violate due process. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 

Under this standard, substantive due process violations have been limited to a small number of

issues. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1994). In Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115

(1992), the Supreme Court noted “[a]s a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand

the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decision making in this

unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Id. at 124. Accordingly, the protections of substantive due

process have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and

the right to bodily integrity. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. at 846-50

(1992) (describing cases in which substantive due process rights have been recognized); Johnson v.

Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1397 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Whatever grammarians may think of the anomalous

expression, ‘substantive due process,’ it is well established that a person’s liberty interest in bodily

integrity is one of the personal rights accorded substantive protection under the Due Process Clause.”).

Plaintiff claims that he has been denied his right to receive proper medical care for his skin

condition. This is simply not the type of claim to which the process of substantive due process has been

extended.

a. Smith and Raupe

Plaintiff claims that Smith and Raupe violated his Due Process rights by denying his CDC 602

appeals without a fair hearing and a fair medical judgment, thus denying him access to adequate medical

care. (Compl. p. 5). As discussed above in relation to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, the evidence

indicates that Plaintiff was receiving continual medical attention for his skin condition. Plaintiff’s

appeals were thoroughly investigated by two different prison officials and no inadequacies in his

treatment were discovered by either official. (Defs. Ex. E, Smith Dec.; Defs. Ex. D, Raupe Dec.).

Moreover, all CDC 602 appeal administrative procedures were followed by both Smith and Raupe. (Id.;

Defs. Ex. A, Inmate Appeal Form.). Nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff was subject to an

arbitrary exercise of government power. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Nor does

Plaintiff’s treatment by any of the Defendants shock the conscience. County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at

846. As such, neither Smith nor Raupe violated Plaintiff’s Due Process rights. For the reasons stated

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above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendants Smith and

Raupe. 

b. Hernandez and Alameida

Plaintiff claims that Hernandez and Alameida failed to property train, supervise, and take action

against their subordinates, Smith and Raupe. (Compl. p. 5). In this way, they failed to procedurally

protect his right to access adequate medical care. (Compl. p. 5). While Hernandez and Alameida have

supervisory positions over Raupe and Smith, they did not make any decisions or participate directly in

any part of Plaintiff’s 602 appeal. (Def. Ex. F, Hernandez Dec. at ¶ ¶ 5-12; Def. Ex. G, Alameida Dec.

at ¶ ¶ 5-12). Neither had any direct influence over Plaintiff’s 602 appeal. (Id.). In fact, neither was

aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition and made no decisions relating to his treatment. (Id.). As such,

neither Hernandez nor Alameida violated Plaintiff’s Due Process rights. For the reasons stated above,

the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendants Hernandez and

Alameida. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and Due Process claims against Defendants Smith,

Raupe, Hernandez, and Almeida only. Plaintiff’s claims as to Defendants Peterson and Menkes remain.

Defendants shall file a Motion for Summary Judgment or Answer as to the remaining claims and

Defendants on or before October 23, 2006. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 19, 2006

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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