Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00636/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00636-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1 08cv636 BTM(NLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSICA P. ESQUER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08cv636 BTM(AJB)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

Plaintiff and Defendant have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the

reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED and Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2003 and December 10, 2003, respectively, Plaintiff filed an application

for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income, alleging a disability onset

date of April 30, 2003. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on August 23, 2004, and upon

reconsideration on March 25, 2005. 

On July 12, 2006, Plaintiff’s claim was heard by Administrative Law Judge Bernard

A. Trembly (the “ALJ”). On July 27, 2006, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits.

Plaintiff filed a request for review with the Appeals Council, which was denied. The ALJ’s

decision then became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Plaintiff

Case 3:08-cv-00636-BTM-AJB Document 20 Filed 12/31/09 Page 1 of 9
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1

 Under the Social Security Regulations, the determination of whether a claimant is

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is a five step process. The five steps

are as follows: (1) Is the claimant presently working in any substantially gainful activity? If

so, then the claimant is not disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step two. (2) Is

the claimant’s impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is not disabled. If so, then the

evaluation proceeds to step three. (3) Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of

specific impairments set forth in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404? If so, then the

claimant is disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step four. (4) Is the claimant

able to do any work that she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is not disabled.

If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step five. (5) Is the claimant able to do any other

work? If not, then the claimant is disabled. If, on the other hand, the Commissioner can

establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant

can do, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. See also Tackett v. Apfel, 180

F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999). At step five, the ALJ may rely on the decisional grids

listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, or alternatively, the ALJ can pose a

hypothetical question that describes the claimant’s limitations to a vocational expert. Id. at

1101. The ALJ may rely on the grids alone to show the availability of jobs for the claimant

only when the grids accurately and completely represent the claimant’s abilities and

limitations. Id. at 1101-02. 

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seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. ALJ’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: chronic left ankle

strain with ligamentous laxity; cervical spine sprain and strain; bilateral patellofemoral

chondromalacia and moderate early degenerative arthritis of both knees; and Hepatitis C.

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments do not meet or

equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to do light

exertional work with occasional climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and

crawling. However, the ALJ restricted Plaintiff to sedentary level work in light of her

complaints of instability, giving out of the left ankle, and knee pain. 

Applying Medical-Vocational Rule 201.21 based on her age of 46 on the disability

onset date, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. 1

 

 III. STANDARD

The Commissioner’s denial of benefits may be set aside if it is based on legal error

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or is not supported by substantial evidence. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th

Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Id.

Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Flaten v. Secretary

of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was erroneous because (1) the ALJ

mechanically applied the grids without considering whether to apply the grid rules for the

Closely Approaching Advanced Age (50-54) category; (2) the ALJ failed to explain conflicting

evidence regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairment; (3) the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s

credibility was based on errors of law and was not supported by substantial evidence; and

(4) the ALJ disregarded the testimony of Plaintiff’s daughter-in-law regarding Plaintiff’s daily

activities in violation of the regulations. As discussed below, the Court finds that a remand

is appropriate because the ALJ failed to consider whether to use the Closely Approaching

Advanced Age Category in applying the grids. Plaintiff’s other arguments do not support a

reversal or remand.

A. Applying the Grids in Borderline Age Situations

The ALJ applied Grid Rule 201.21 based on Plaintiff’s age of 46 on the disability onset

date. At the time of the ALJ’s denial, Plaintiff was 16 days away from her 50th birthday.

With respect to the application of the grids in borderline age situations, the regulations

state:

We will use each of the age categories that applies to you during the period for

which we must determine if you are disabled. We will not apply the age

categories mechanically in a borderline situation. If you are within a few days

to a few months of reaching an older age category, and using the older age

category would result in a determination or decision that you are disabled, we

will consider whether to use the older age category after evaluating the overall

impact of all the factors of your case.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1563. (Emphasis added.)

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Here, the ALJ only used the Younger Individual (18-49) age category in applying the

grids. The ALJ did not mention anything about the fact that Plaintiff was only 16 days away

from turning 50 and did not discuss whether it would be proper to utilize the Closely

Approaching Advanced Age category. 

Because Plaintiff fell squarely in a borderline situation, it was error for the ALJ not to

consider whether to use the older age category. In Russell v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 81, 84 (9th

Cir. 1988), a case upon which Defendant relies, the Ninth Circuit held that the claimant was

not in a borderline situation because he was 59 years and 5 months old and “was in fact

closer to age 59 than to age 60.” The Ninth Circuit explained: “Lines must be drawn at some

point, otherwise there would be no efficient way to utilize the Grid system.” Id. 

Although there may be cases where it is debatable whether the claimant is in a

borderline situation, this case is not one of them. If the claimant is within a month of the next

age category, the rules for borderline age situations clearly apply. For example, in Shumaker

v. Astrue, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2009 WL 3049263 (D. Mont. Sept. 15, 2009), the court ruled that

because the plaintiff was 22 days short of her fiftieth birthday when the ALJ issued his

decision, the ALJ erred in not considering whether to use the Closely Approaching Advanced

Age category. Similarly, in Nye-Richardson v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1687533 (W.D. Wash. June

12, 2009), the court remanded the case because the plaintiff was only one month shy of her

fiftieth birthday and the ALJ failed to consider whether to apply the older age category. See

also Schiel v. Commissioner of Social Security, 267 Fed. Appx. 660, 2008 WL 467773 (9th

Cir. Feb. 15, 2008) (holding that case should be remanded because plaintiff was one month

away from being 55, and the record did not reflect consideration of plaintiff’s borderline age

status).

Upon remand, the ALJ must consider Plaintiff in the Closely Approaching Advanced

Age category. See Bray v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 554 F.3d 1219,

1229 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that upon remand, the issue of which age category

plaintiff fell in would be moot because plaintiff was no longer a borderline case). Plaintiff

argues that upon utilization of the older age category, a finding of disability is mandated by

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2

 The Court notes that this decision may not affect the ALJ’s denial of disability

insurance benefits, because to qualify for disability insurance benefits, Plaintiff must establish

disability on or before December 31, 2007. (AR 23.)

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Rule 201.14. However, the ALJ made no findings regarding transferability of skills.

Therefore, it is unclear which Rule applies. Accordingly, the Court remands so that the ALJ

can make findings regarding transferability of skills and apply the appropriate Rule in the

Closely Approaching Advanced Age category. 2 

B. Conflicting Evidence Regarding Mental Impairment

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to explain conflicting evidence with respect to the

opinions of Dr. Mounir Soliman and Dr. Kenneth Galen. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that

these doctors’ global assessment of functioning (GAF) determinations were inconsistent with

their findings regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitations (or lack thereof). 

Dr. Soliman gave Plaintiff a GAF score of “about 60.” (AR 424.) With respect to

Plaintiff’s ability to adapt to work or work-like situations, Dr. Soliman concluded: “From a

psychiatric standpoint, the patient is able to understand, carry out and remember simple and

complex instructions. The patient is able to interact with co-workers, supervisors, and the

general public. The patient would have mild difficulty tolerating the stress related to work and

work-like situations.” (AR 424.)

Dr. Galen gave Plaintiff a GAF score of 50. (AR 454.) Dr. Galen also made specific

findings regarding Plaintiff’s ability to function in the workplace. (AR 455.) He found no

impairment in her ability to understand, remember or complete simple or complex

commands; no impairment in her ability to interact appropriately with supervisors, coworkers,

or the public; no impairment in her ability to maintain concentration and attention,

persistence, and pace; no impairment in her ability to accept instructions from supervisors;

no impairment in her ability to perform work activities without special or additional

supervision; mild impairment in her ability to associate with day to day work activity including

attendance and safety; and mild impairment in her ability to maintain regular attendance in

the work place and perform work activities on a consistent basis. (AR 455.) 

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A GAF score of 60 indicates that the individual suffers from moderate limitations in

social, occupational, or school functioning. A GAF score of 50 is indicative of serious

impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual

of Mental Disorders (4th Ed. 1994) (“DSM-IV”). 

Plaintiff argues that the GAF scores assigned by Dr. Soliman and Dr. Galen are

inconsistent with their findings regarding her abilities to function in the workplace. However,

a GAF score is a generalized description of the claimant’s level of psychological symptoms.

DSM-IV at 32. The Commissioner has determined that the GAF scale “does not have a

direct correlation to the severity requirements in [the Social Security Administration’s] mental

disorders listings.” 65 Fed. Reg. 50,746, 50,765 (Aug. 21, 2000). Therefore, the fact that

a doctor determined that a claimant has a GAF score of 50 or 60 does not preclude the ALJ

from relying on the same doctor’s findings that the claimant is not significantly limited in his

or her ability to work. See, e.g., Bruner v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2009 WL

3052291 *26 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2009); Purnell v. Astrue, 2009 WL 2616711 *9 (E.D. Pa.

Aug. 26, 2009). 

Plaintiff also complains that Dr. Soliman and Dr. Galen did not review her other

medical records. However, even assuming the doctors did not review her other medical

records, the ALJ may still rely on their findings based on their independent examinations of

Plaintiff. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). 

C. Rejection of Pain Testimony

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected her pain testimony because the ALJ

failed to identify what testimony was not credible. The Court is not persuaded by this

argument.

In deciding whether to accept a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ

must perform two stages of analysis. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.

1996). The first stage of analysis is a threshold test set forth in Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d

1403 (9th Cir. 1986). Under this test, the claimant must (1) produce objective medical

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evidence of an impairment or impairments; and (2) show that the impairment or combination

of impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptoms

described. Id. at 1407-08. “Once the claimant produces objective medical evidence of an

underlying impairment, an adjudicator may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints

based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity

of pain.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991). If the claimant satisfies the

Cotton test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s

testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing

reasons for doing so. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. The ALJ must state specifically which

symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in the record support that conclusion.

Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993).

The ALJ in this case found that “[Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely credible.” (AR 27.)

Apparently, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ was required to point to each specific statement

that was rejected in whole or in part. However, there does not appear to be a legal

requirement for this level of specificity. See, e.g., Gomez v. Astrue, 2009 WL 2390852 (C.D.

Cal. July 31, 2009) (holding that clear and convincing reasons supported the ALJ’s

determination that “plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of his subjective symptoms ‘were not entirely credible.’”); Bryant v. Astrue, 2009 WL

2355625 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2009) (rejecting argument that ALJ did not specifically identify

which testimony he found not credible). The Court finds that the ALJ sufficiently identified

which testimony he found not credible.

Although Plaintiff argues, and the Court agrees, that the ALJ erroneously failed to

consider Plaintiff’s daughter-in-law’s questionnaire answers regarding Plaintiff’s daily

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3

 The Ninth Circuit “has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has

carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited walking

for exercise does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability.” 

Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001). In order for a claimant’s daily

activities to be used to discredit her subjective pain and symptom testimony, the cited

activities must occupy a substantial part of the claimant’s day and utilize skills transferable

to the workplace. Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049. In a Daily Activities Questionnaire, Plaintiff’s

daughter-in-law indicated that Plaintiff did very little around the house, such as making

herself a quick sandwich, doing a few dishes or doing a little bit of laundry. (AR 127-31.)

The daughter-in-law stated that Plaintiff never finishes tasks or chores because she can’t

stand long enough or because Plaintiff experiences pain bending or attempting to carry

things. (AR 131.) This evidence was pertinent to the issue of whether Plaintiff’s daily

activities occupied a substantial portion of Plaintiff’s day. The ALJ actually made no findings

as to how much time Plaintiff’s daily activities occupy, or as to the transferability of the skills

to the workplace. Therefore, Plaintiff’s daily activities do not constitute a valid ground for

rejecting Plaintiff’s pain testimony.

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activities,3 Plaintiff does not challenge the other grounds given by the ALJ for rejecting

Plaintiff’s pain testimony. These grounds include: Plaintiff’s mental status exams were

unremarkable and Plaintiff has been cognitively intact; progress notes from Plaintiff’s

psychiatrist show that the prescribed medications stabilized Plaintiff’s mood and that no side

effects were reported; Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are disproportionate to the objective

findings of record; there is no evidence of loss of weight due to loss of appetite due to pain

or depression; there is no evidence of sleep deprivation due to pain or depression; there is

no evidence of disuse or muscle atrophy; Plaintiff does not regularly use any assistive

devices; Plaintiff’s gait was normal; Plaintiff’s treating course has been conservative -

surgical intervention for her ankle and knees was not warranted; there is no evidence of

chronic liver disease associated with Plaintiff’s Hepatitis C; and the evidence does not

establish that Plaintiff’s medications have caused disabling side effects. The Court finds that

these reasons are clear and convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff’s subjective symptom

testimony not credible.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Court

REMANDS this case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 30, 2009

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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