Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00266/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00266-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEX RAY CHARFAUROS,

Petitioner,

v.

UNKNOWN,

Respondent.

Case No. 17-cv-00266-BAS-KSC

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has submitted a document this Court 

liberally construes as a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and 

has paid the requisite filing fee. 

FAILURE TO NAME A PROPER RESPONDENT

Review of the Petition reveals that Petitioner has failed to name a proper respondent. 

On federal habeas, a state prisoner must name the state officer having custody of him as 

the respondent. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Rule 

2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254). Federal courts lack personal jurisdiction when a habeas 

petition fails to name a proper respondent. See id.

The warden is the typical respondent. However, “the rules following section 2254 

do not specify the warden.” Id. “[T]he ‘state officer having custody’ may be ‘either the 

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warden of the institution in which the petitioner is incarcerated . . . or the chief officer in 

charge of state penal institutions.’” Id. (quoting Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 advisory 

committee’s note). If “a petitioner is in custody due to the state action he is challenging, 

‘[t]he named respondent shall be the state officer who has official custody of the petitioner 

(for example, the warden of the prison).’” Id. (quoting Rule 2, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 

advisory committee’s note).

Here, Petitioner has failed to name a Respondent. In order for this Court to entertain 

the Petition filed in this action, Petitioner must name the warden in charge of the state 

correctional facility in which Petitioner is presently confined or the Secretary of the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Brittingham v. United States, 

982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). 

FAILURE TO STATE GROUNDS FOR RELIEF IN PETITION

In addition, Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states that the 

petition “shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds . . . 

specified [in the petition].” Rule 2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. See also Boehme v. Maxwell, 

423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1970) (trial court’s dismissal of federal habeas proceeding 

affirmed where petitioner made conclusory allegations instead of factual allegations 

showing that he was entitled to relief). Here, Petitioner has violated Rule 2(c). He fails to 

state constitutional grounds for relief and also fails to provide specific factual allegations 

in support of such grounds.

While courts should liberally interpret pro se pleadings with leniency and 

understanding, this should not place on the reviewing court the entire onus of ferreting out 

grounds for relief. Cf. Burkey v. Deeds, 824 F. Supp. 190, 193 (D. Nev. 1993) (finding that 

courts do not have entire onus of creating federal claim for petitioner). The Court finds 

that the Petition contains conclusory allegations without any specific facts in support of 

relief. A federal court may not entertain a petition that contains allegations which are 

conclusory. 

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In order to satisfy Rule 2(c), Petitioner must point to a “real possibility of 

constitutional error.” Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Facts must be stated, in the petition, with sufficient detail to 

enable the Court to determine, from the face of the petition, whether further habeas corpus 

review is warranted. Adams v. Armontrout, 897 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1990). Moreover, 

the allegations should be sufficiently specific to permit the respondent to assert appropriate 

objections and defenses. Harris v. Allen, 739 F. Supp. 564, 565 (W.D. Okla. 1989). Here, 

the lack of grounds for relief in the Petition prevents the Respondent from being able to 

assert appropriate objections and defenses.

FAILURE TO ALLEGE EXHAUSTION OF STATE JUDICIAL REMEDIES

Further, habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction 

or the length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). To exhaust 

state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present the California Supreme 

Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal 

habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34. Moreover, to 

properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or 

more of his or her federal rights have been violated. The Supreme Court in Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) reasoned: “If state courts are to be given the opportunity to 

correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact 

that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.” Id. at 365–

66 (emphasis added). For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an 

evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due process of law guaranteed 

by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only in federal court, but in 

state court.” Id. at 366.

If Petitioner has raised his claims in the California Supreme Court he must so 

specify. “The burden of proving that a claim has been exhausted lies with the petitioner.” 

Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997); see Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 

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619 (4th Cir. 1998); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); Oyler v. 

Allenbrand, 23 F.3d 292, 300 (10th Cir. 1994); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 

1994).

Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006).

The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus 

petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 

Cir. 1999). But see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an application is 

‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for 

placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing 

filings.”). However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations does run 

while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82 

(2001).

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Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary dismissal 

of a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits 

annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . .” Rule 4, 28 

U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Here, it appears plain from the Petition that Petitioner is not presently 

entitled to federal habeas relief because he has not alleged exhaustion of state court 

remedies.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court DISMISSES the Petition without 

prejudice. In order to have this case reopened, Petitioner must, no later than April 15, 2017, 

file a First Amended Petition which cures the pleading deficiencies outlined above. For 

Petitioner’s convenience, the Clerk of Court shall attach to this Order a blank First 

Amended Petition form. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 16, 2017

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