Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02799/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02799-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Fair Credit Reporting Act

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANA DUBON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

HBSC BANK NEVADA, N.A.; ESKANOS &

ADLER; EXPERIAN INFORMATION

SOLUTIONS, INC.; TRANS UNION, LLC;

and DOES I to X,

Defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 05-2799 SC

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO REMAND 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ana Dubon ("Plaintiff") filed this action in San

Mateo County Superior Court on May 31, 2005. On July 5, 2005,

Defendant Trans Union LLC ("Trans Union") removed the action to

this Court. Plaintiff now moves for remand to state court and for

costs and expenses incurred in bringing the motion. For the

reasons contained herein, this Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's

motion and REMANDS the matter to San Mateo County Superior Court. 

Plaintiff's motion for costs and expenses is DENIED.

//

//
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ana Dubon filed this action on May 31, 2005,

seeking damages from four Defendants as a result of their attempts

to collect on a consumer credit card debt incurred by Plaintiff in

May and June of 2004. Complaint ¶¶ 11-16. Plaintiff's claims are

based upon the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692

et. seq.; the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681 a-x; and

several state law causes of action. Complaint ¶¶ 16-37. 

Defendant Trans Union received a summons and copy of the

complaint on June 27, 2005. Notice of Removal ¶2. Defendant HSBC

Bank Nevada ("HSBC") was served with the complaint on June 30,

2005. Id. ¶3. Defendant Eskanos & Adler ("Eskanos & Adler") was

served with the complaint on June 6, 2005, and Defendant Experian

Information Solutions ("Experian") received a copy of the

complaint on June 24, 2005. Id. ¶¶4-5. On July 8, 2005, Trans

Union removed the action to Federal Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(b). Significantly, Trans Union was joined in its removal

of the case by only one Defendant, Experian, who filed a notice

with the Court evidencing its consent to removal. See Notice of

Removal, Exhibit C. As for the remaining defendants, Trans

Union's Notice of Removal stated merely that "[they]

have...indicated they will not oppose the removal of this action." 

Notice of Removal ¶9.

The parties agree that this action is one over which this

Court would properly have federal question jurisdiction, because

Plaintiff's first and second causes of action arise under federal

laws. See Notice of Removal ¶8; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

of Motion to Remand, at 4 n.1 ("Pl. Mem."). The parties dispute,

however, whether Trans Union's Notice of Removal was procedurally

defective, and therefore inadequate to properly remove this action

to Federal Court. That dispute is the focus of the instant

motion. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Suits filed in state court may be removed to Federal Court

where the Federal Court would have had original jurisdiction over

the action in the first instance. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal

Courts have original jurisdiction over cases that arise under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. A party seeking to remove a case to Federal Court must do

so within 30 days from the date on which he is served with a copy

of the complaint. 28 U.S.C § 1446(b). 

In a multi-defendant case, all defendants must join in the

removal petition or otherwise consent to removal. Gableman v.

Peoria, D. & E. Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 335, 337 (1900); Parrino v. FHP,

Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1998). Although each defendant

is not required to sign the removal notice, they must express

their consent to removal to the court in order to achieve complete

unanimity of defendants. See Hernandez v. Six Flags Magic

Mountain, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 560, 562 (C.D. Cal. 1988). The

removal statute is strictly construed against removal, see Boggs

v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988), and defects in

removal may only be cured within the 30-day period. See Prize

Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir.

1999). 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

IV. DISCUSSION

Because the parties agree that Plaintiff's complaint states

at least one claim for relief that arises under federal law,

Plaintiff has focused her motion to remand on several procedural

defects she claims render Trans Union's notice of removal

ineffective. First, Plaintiff argues that the removal notice was

defective because it failed to comport with the rule requiring

unanimity of defendants. Pl. Mem. at 3-5. Second, Plaintiff

argues that the removal notice was invalid because it was filed

more than 30 days after one of the Defendants was served with the

complaint. Id. at 5-6. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant

Eskanos & Adler waived its ability to properly consent to removal

when it answered the complaint in state court. Id. at 6. Because

it is clear to this Court that Trans Union's notice of removal did

not comport with the rule requiring unanimity of defendants,

consideration of Plaintiff's second and third bases for remand in

unnecessary, and the Court will instead focus the following

discussion on Plaintiff's argument advocating remand for lack of

unanimity.

A. Unanimity of Defendants

In over a century of litigation that has occurred since the

Supreme Court decided in Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Martin that

all defendants must join in or consent to the removal of a case

from state to federal court, no court has seriously questioned the

continuing validity or applicability of the rule. 178 U.S. 245

(1900). Thus, the issue before this Court for purposes of the

instant motion is to determine what constitutes proper evidence of
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

consent to removal of an action to Federal Court.

Trans Union adopts a two-tiered argument on this point. 

First, Trans Union argues that the Ninth Circuit has not

specifically ruled on the precise form a co-defendant's consent to

removal should assume. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of

Opposition to Motion to Remand at 9-10 ("Def. Mem."). Trans Union

asserts that its notice of removal should therefore be found to

have complied with the unanimity requirement because it attested

to the consent or non-opposition to removal by all defendants. 

Id. In the alternative, Trans Union argues that even if the

declaration of its attorney with respect to his understanding of

the co-defendants' positions on removal was insufficient to

properly demonstrate unanimity of defendants, this shortcoming was

ministerial in nature and was therefore cured when, on August 10

and 11, 2005, Trans Union received written consent to removal from

Defendants HSBC and Eskanos, respectively. Id. 

As for Trans Union's first argument on this point, it is true

that the Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed the question of the

precise form a co-defendant's consent to join in removal must

assume. However, while courts in this and other jurisdictions

differ on the question of what constitutes evidence of consent,

all courts require, at a minimum, that consent to removal be

expressed directly to the court by the parties themselves. See

Roe v. O'Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that a

notice of removal stating that "[a]ll other defendants...have

stated that they do not object to the removal" was "deficient");

Getty Oil, a Div. of Texaco, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

America, 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 n.11 (5th Cir. 1988)("there must be

some timely filed written indication from each served

defendant...that it has actually consented to such action.");

Knutson v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 983, 991 (D. Nev.

2005) ("the rule...is that all defendants who are properly joined

and served in the action must join in the removal or consent to it

in writing..."); Anne Arundel County, Md. v. United Pacific

Insurance Co., 905 F. Supp. 277, 278 (D. Md. 1995) (statement by

one defendant that the other defendant "does not object to

[removal]" was insufficient to satisfy § 1446); Ford v. New United

Motors Manufacturing, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 707, 708 n.3 (N.D. Cal.

1994); Ogletree v. Barnes, 851 F. Supp. 184, 187-89 (E.D. Pa.

1994); Knickerbocker v. Chrysler Corp., 728 F. Supp. 460, 461

(E.D. Mich. 1990); see also Saeilo Machinery Inc. v. Hirdes

Freight, Ltd., No. C-00-00777 2000 WL 1205338 at *1-2 (C.D. Cal.

Mar. 8. 2000). 

In this case, Trans Union procured timely written consent to

removal from Defendant Experian, but for reasons unknown to this

Court did not succeed in obtaining similar consent from the

remaining two defendants. Those defendants did not express their

consent to removal directly to the court via oral or written

communication, and did not grant Trans Union's attorney the

authority to speak on their behalf with respect to this issue. 

Cf. Sansone v. Morton Machine Works, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d. 182,

185 (D.R.I. 2002). Accordingly, this Court finds that Trans

Union's removal notice was procedurally defective because it

failed to secure unanimity of all defendants. See Emrich v.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1192 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988). The

Court will now address Trans Union's argument that affidavits

submitted after the 30-day window by Defendants HSBC and Eskanos &

Adler cured the procedural defect in the original notice of

removal. 

In support of the proposition that § 1446 allows a party to

cure ministerial defects in removal notices after the 30-day

window, Defendant relies entirely on an unpublished order in the

case of Innovacom, Inc. v. Haynes, where the court granted

plaintiff's motion to remand on the grounds that the notice of

removal was untimely filed. No. C-98-0068, 1998 WL 164933 (N.D.

Cal. Mar. 17, 1998). After ruling that the action would be

remanded because defendants had not filed their removal notice

within the 30-day window, the court in Innovacom briefly addressed

the plaintiff's alternative argument that the defendant had failed

to properly establish unanimity of all defendants. Id. at *2. 

Again finding for the plaintiff, the court ruled that affidavits

by co-defendants purporting to join in removing the action but

submitted after the removal notice was filed were insufficient to

establish unanimity, because one defendant's affidavit did not

unambiguously establish their consent to removal. Id. This

decision, Trans Union argues, establishes a party's right to cure

a mere ministerial defect in its notice of removal, because if no

such right existed, the court in Innovacom would have had no

reason to consider whether the later-submitted affidavits were

effective in establishing unanimity among defendants. See Def.

Mem. at 10-11.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Trans Union has argued that the later-served defendant rule

should apply in this case. This Court does not find it necessary

to address the question, still open in this Circuit, of whether the

30-day window begins to run on the date the first defendant is

served with notice of the action, or whether it does not begin to

run until all defendants have been served. 

8

The Court finds this argument wholly unpersuasive, and

declines to read a "ministerial error" exception into a law that

admits of no such exception. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Emrich v.

Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988)(noting

exceptions to requirements of § 1446). As an initial matter, it

is not clear that the implications of the Innovacom dicta are as

supportive of Trans Union's position as it claims. For example,

the Innovacom court had already determined that it would remand

the matter based on the plaintiff's argument that defendant's

removal notice was untimely. Innovacom, 1998 WL 164933 at *1-2. 

Furthermore, it is not clear from the order whether the

affidavits, though filed subsequent to the notice of removal,

might nonetheless have been filed within 30 days from the date on

which the last defendant was served. If this were the case, Trans

Union's argument would be completely undermined because the

filings would have been timely under the later-served defendant

rule, a rule the Innovacom defendants advocated but the court

rejected, creating the basis for the court's holding.1 Id. 

In any event, even without engaging in legal gymnastics over what

propositions the Innovacom court's decision might possibly support

if extrapolated out far enough, the Court is confident in its

decision to refrain from recognizing a "ministerial function"

exception to the 30-day rule created by § 1446(b). No case has
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

ever recognized such an exception, and numerous cases counsel that

removal jurisdiction should be strictly construed against removal. 

See, e.g., Prize Frize, Inc., 167 F.3d at 1265; Emrich, 846 F.2d

at 1195. More importantly, the drafters of the statute did not

see fit to include any such exception in the text of the law. 

Thus, this Court finds that no such exception exists, and

therefore holds that Trans Union's Notice of Removal was

procedurally defective. Accordingly, the Court will not address

Plaintiff's remaining arguments because the discussion above

provides a sufficient basis on which to remand this matter. 

B. Plaintiff's Motion for Costs and Expenses

Plaintiff has also moved for an award of costs and fees

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). That section provides that an

order of remand "may require payment of just costs and any actual

expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the

removal." The court has "wide discretion" in deciding whether to

award attorney's fees under this provision. See Moore v.

Permanente Med. Group, 981 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Although this Court ultimately rejects Trans Union's arguments,

the Court declines to grant Plaintiff an award of costs and

expenses under § 1447(c) because Defendant did have a colorable

basis for removing the action. While Defendant's arguments

enjoyed only slim support, they were not totally unfounded, and

this Court therefore denies Plaintiff's motion for costs and

expenses.

//

//
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

V. CONCLUSION

 Trans Union, a sophisticated business entity represented by

competent counsel, failed to satisfy the procedural requirements

imposed by § 1446(b) on litigants removing an action to Federal

Court. Although Trans Union now makes a creative argument in

support of its position that it should be allowed to cure any

defect in its original removal notice, that position enjoys no

support in either the language of the statute or in the entire

body of federal case law on this topic. Furthermore, the fact

that Trans Union obtained written consent to removal from one of

the three other Defendants demonstrates that it was well aware of

the procedural requirements imposed by § 1446(b), yet for reasons

unknown was unable to cause the two remaining Defendants to

express their consent to removal directly to the Court, the

minimum required by all Federal Courts. Accordingly, the Notice

of Removal was defective, and this Court is duty-bound to remand

this matter to state court. For the foregoing reasons,

Plaintiff's motion to remand is hereby GRANTED, and this matter is

REMANDED to the Superior Court for the County of San Mateo. 

Plaintiff's motion for costs and expenses is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2005

_____________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE