Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01187/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01187-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Counsel was appointed before the filing of the Third Amended Petition. The current

petition on which this matter is proceeding is the Fourth Amended Petition.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,

TIMOTHY HUGH HALL,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-02-1187 DFL KJM P 

vs.

D. G. ADAMS,

 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with counsel1 with an application for writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of

Sacramento County of two counts of arson of an inhabited structure with the use of an accelerant,

one count of presenting a false insurance claim, and one count of presenting a false writing in

support of that claim. Petitioner is serving a sentence of fourteen years and eight months

imprisonment in the California Department of Corrections. He challenges his conviction on

grounds of due process deprivation, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of

counsel. Respondent has filed an answer. Petitioner has not filed a traverse. 

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I. Background

Following sentencing, petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the

California Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal summarized the facts supporting petitioner’s

convictions and sentences as follows:

This case arose from two fires at defendant’s condominium, which

occurred about four hours apart. . .

On July 20, 1995, at 10:12 p.m., one of the defendant’s neighbors

reported a fire at defendant’s townhouse condominium in

Sacramento. The condominium was attached to another unit;

defendant and his live-in cohabitant (now wife), Evelyn Haqq, and

her three children lived in the condominium; Francisco Muñoz and

his family lived in the adjoining condominium.

When the firefighters arrived, defendant’s condominium was

completely secured–the windows were barred and the doors were

locked. Defendant approached and unlocked the front door with a

key.

The firefighters found a small fire in the dishwasher cabinet and

quickly extinguished it. They turned off the electrical circuit to the

dishwasher and notified defendant they had done so. A fire

department captain requested that defendant not spend the night at

the condominium, given the odor, the dampness, the power

availability, and the rare possibility of a “rekindle” (a reignition of

the fire). Defendant agreed to spend the night elsewhere.

At the scene, defendant stated he had been out for the evening, and

the children were staying with relatives. Fire Investigator Frank

Romo concluded the dishwasher was the only potential source of

accidental ignition, but he did not determine the cause of the fire

on the night of July 20. Because he had never seen a dishwasher

fire, Romo intended to return the next day with his supervisor to

further consider the origin of the blaze.

Defendant’s neighbor, Francisco Muñoz, arrived home just after

the fire had been extinguished. In an interview with Investigator

Romo on July 21, Muñoz said that he saw defendant return to his

own condominium on July 21 (after the fire) and leave around 1:25

a.m. About 15 minutes after defendant left, Muñoz told Romo, an

unidentified person banged on Muñoz’s door and alerted him of a

second fire. Haqq testified that on the night of the fire defendant

left their hotel about 12:25 a.m. to obtain some personal items for

her at the condominium; she said defendant returned to the hotel

within 30 minutes of leaving. 

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About 1:50 a.m., the fire department received a call about the

second fire. When the firefighters arrived, defendant’s

condominium was almost fully engulfed in flame. Again, the

residence was entirely secured, with the doors locked and the

windows barred. The firefighters forced in the front door and put

out the fire.

Investigator Romo concluded, based on extensive evidence, that

the second fire had been deliberately set with a liquid accelerant. 

An insurance investigator, Edward Smith, agreed.

Romo also concluded, and Smith agreed, that the first fire was

arson with use of a liquid accelerant. A dog trained to identify

accelerant residue found residue in two areas, one in the area of the

first fire (in the under-sink kitchen cabinet) and the other in the

hallway between the kitchen and the living room. Romo

concluded the second fire was not the product of the first fire.

The prosecution presented the following circumstantial evidence

that defendant had perpetrated both arsons.

Defendant had insurance coverage through Civil Service

Employees Insurance Company (CSE) for the contents of the

condominium up to $50,000. He made a claim in that amount

shortly after the fires.

To substantiate his claim, defendant submitted photographs of his

personal property; the photos were “fairly pristine”–in fact, in

“perfect condition”–in contrast to the heavily burned file cabinet in

which they had been stored. CSE could not verify much of this

claim, and paid defendant about $8,700; defendant submitted to

CSE receipts of about $15,000 for replacement property he had

purchased.

Defendant had incurred considerable debt in the year preceding the

fires. This included three mortgages on the condominium (totaling

nearly its entire value, as stated by defendant) to go along with an

existing mortgage. In addition, defendant obtained four personal

finance loans totaling about $5,000. In obtaining many of these

mortgages and loans, defendant overstated his monthly income by

about $1,000 ($2700 per month instead of $1700 per month).

Defendant filed for bankruptcy on September 7, 1995, listing

liabilities of $146,975.

Unless the arsonist went through an unbarred second story

window, he or she would had to have had a key to the

condominium, as the doors were deadbolt-locked from the outside

at both fires and the first floor windows were barred securely. 

Defendant told Investigator Romo that only he and Evelyn Haqq

had keys to the condominium before the first fire; he told a CSE

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2

 The appellate court’s opinion, and other state court opinions cited herein, have been

lodged with this court. 

3

 Copies of the Supreme Court’s denial of review on direct appeal, petitioner’s habeas

corpus petition filed in the state trial court and the state Supreme Court’s denial of habeas are

attached as exhibits to respondent’s motion to dismiss filed October 25, 2002. See Docket No.

12; see also Docket No. 13 (lodging of habeas petition submitted to Supreme Court).

4

investigator, Michael Kinnison, that his 13-year-old son had a key

as well; and he told a private investigator hired by the

homeowners’ association that after the first fire, he had left a key

with Francisco Muñoz --Muñoz denied this.

Defendant told insurance investigators that he and Haqq were

bowling in their regular league at the time of the first fire. An

employee of the bowling alley testified that this league should have

ended no later than 9:30 p.m.; the bowling alley was about 10

minutes from defendant’s residence. Haqq testified that she and

defendant were at the bowling alley until about 9:45 p.m.

Defendant had been employed as a firefighter from 1977 to 1983.

Defendant told an insurance investigator that he had turned the

dishwasher electrical circuit back on because it was connected to

the refrigerator and he wanted to avoid spoilage. 

There was also evidence that defendant had obtained

approximately $20,000 from his insurer for a 1983 fire to his

Walnut Creek residence, and approximately an $80,000 settlement

from his insurer for a 1986 arson fire to his Oakland residence. 

The trial court instructed the jury that this evidence could be used

only to show intent, motive or knowledge with respect to arson or

insurance fraud, and could not be used to show a criminal

disposition. . . .

People v. Hall, No. C033658, slip op. at 2-6 (3d App. Dist. Cal. Nov. 8, 2001) (“Op.”).2 

The Court of Appeal upheld petitioner’s convictions, but did modify petitioner’s

sentence. Id. at 19. The modification, staying a five-year concurrent sentence, did not affect the

total length of petitioner’s prison term. Petitioner sought review of the Court of Appeal’s

decision in the California Supreme Court. That request was denied without comment. Answer at

3. Following direct appeal, petitioner filed requests for collateral relief at all three levels of

California courts. All of those requests were denied. Id.

3

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4

 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

5

II. Standards For Granting Habeas Relief

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief also is not available for any

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore did

not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim).4 Courts are not required to

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

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§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief

by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). 

A state court does not apply a rule different from the law set forth in Supreme

Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply fails to cite or fails to

indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other

words, the court assumes the state court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

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It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). 

III. Arguments And Analysis 

A. Admission Of Prior Insurance Claims (Claim 1)

Petitioner claims he was denied due process when the trial court allowed the

prosecution to present evidence of petitioner’s prior residential fire insurance claims, as well as

personal injury and property damage insurance claims. Petitioner argues that such evidence was

“unduly prejudicial” and denied him of his right to a fair trial. Fourth Am. Pet. (Pet.) at 5-8. 

Generally, state law determines the admissibility of evidence, and an evidentiary

determination by a state court is not reviewable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). However, the issue before this court is whether

admission of evidence rendered the trial so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated

federal due process. See Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986). 

On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal addressed this claim and related

claims arising under state law as follows:

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion under

Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 and violated due process by

admitting evidence of his prior residential fires and prior fire and

non-fire insurance claims. We find no prejudicial error.

As for the prior residential fires and their accompanying insurance

claims, the trial court admitted evidence that defendant had

obtained approximately $20,000 from his insurer for a 1983 fire to

his Walnut Creek residence, and an approximately $80,000

settlement from his insurer for a 1986 arson fire to his Oakland

residence. 

As for non-fire insurance claims, the trial court admitted the

following evidence. Under an auto insurance policy with CSE,

defendant made claims for vandalism in February 1994 and for

collision losses in October 1994 and March 1995. In 1997,

defendant, along with Haqq and the children, obtained a $4,500

personal injury settlement from a painting company due to

“painting . . . of fixtures in the apartment they were renting.” 

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8

The trial court instructed in part regarding the evidence of prior

fires and insurance claims: 

“This evidence, if believed, may not be considered by you to prove

that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a

disposition to commit crimes. It may be considered by you only

for the limited purpose of determining that it tends to show the

following:

“Evidence of prior residential fires may be considered for the

limited purpose of [showing] the existence of the intent, which is a

necessary element of the crime charged, knowledge and motive for

the commission of the crime charged.

“Evidence of the insurance claims other than the prior residential

fires may be considered for the limited purpose of knowledge and

the existence of motive for the commission of the crime charged.

“ . . . You are not permitted to consider this evidence for any other

purpose.”

Defendant argues that “[i]n the present case, the evidence of intent,

motive, and knowledge deriving from the previous fires and [his]

insurance claims had little probative value because the issues of

intent, motive, and knowledge were not really what the prosecutor

needed to prove. Identity was key.” And, goes the argument, this

evidence did not show identity.

The trial court did not prejudicially err in admitting this evidence

for the limited purpose it stated. As noted in People v. Foster,

upon which the trial court relied:

“Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) allows for the

admission of prior crimes or acts when relevant to prove issues in

dispute other than the defendant’s disposition to commit such acts. 

Evidence of prior fires involving property of a defendant charged

with arson and insurance fraud is admissible to prove intent,

motive and knowledge. (People v. Maler (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d

973, 978-980 [other citations omitted].) 

“Evidence of the prior fire and insurance settlement [involving the

defendant Foster’s property, which the evidence showed was

destroyed by arson] was relevant in the case at bench to prove

[Foster’s] intent and motive to collect on insurance after its

arsonous destruction and his familiarity with recovery on an

insurance claim as a ready source of cash. . . . [Foster’s] contention

that the prior burning was admitted for the purposes of showing

identity lacks merit. The trial court clearly stated its reasons for

admitting the evidence of the . . . burning [of Foster’s property] and

identity was not a reason cited.” [Footnote omitted.]

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Defendant’s argument–that evidence of intent, motive and

knowledge was irrelevant here because identity of the arsonist was

the key–mistakenly assumes that if the prosecutor merely proved

that defendant set the fire, all else was proven. But defendant was

charged with arson and insurance fraud, and the evidence of prior

fires and insurance claims to show defendant’s intent, motive, and

knowledge was relevant in proving both those offenses, with one

exception noted below.[Fn1] An argument similar to defendant’s

was made and rejected in People v. Maler, which serves as the

foundation of the Foster decision.[Fn2]

The one exception we just referred to concerns the 1983 fire and

the issue of intent. Unlike the 1986 fire, the 1983 fire was not

shown to involve any illicit activity. As stated above, the trial

court instructed that “[e]vidence of prior residential fires [i.e., the

1983 fire and the 1986 arson fire] may be considered for the

limited purpose of [showing] the existence of the intent which is a

necessary element of the crime charged, knowledge and motive for

the commission of the crime charged.”

However, even if the trial court erred in admitting evidence

concerning the 1983 fire to show intent, any such error was

harmless in light of the evidence summarized in the previous

section of this opinion, and given the fact that the 1983 fire was

still relevant in showing fire insurance knowledge and arguably

motive. It is not reasonably probable that defendant would have

fared any better had the purpose of the 1983 fire evidence been

restricted to showing knowledge and motive. . .[Fn3]

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

For all these reasons, we also reject defendant’s claim that in

admitting this evidence the trial court prejudicially abused its

discretion under Evidence Code section 352 because the evidence

was more prejudicial than probative, and prejudicially violated due

process by allowing the jury to consider irrelevant evidence. 

 

[Fn1] People v. Maler (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 973, 978-980

(Maler).

[Fn2] Maler, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at pages 978-980; Foster,

supra, 114 Cal.App.3d at pages 433-434.

[Fn3] People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.

Op. at 8-13.

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With regard to this claim, petitioner has not met his burden under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). Rather, he merely states, in conclusory fashion, that “identity of the arsonist was key,

and the evidence of petitioner’s prior ‘bad acts’ simply was not probative or relevant to the

question of who set the fires at petitioner’s residence.” Pet. at 7:1-4. Petitioner has not shown

that the California Court of Appeal’s adjudication of petitioner’s denial of due process claim

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

Furthermore, petitioner has not shown he was denied due process such that the

evidence admitted rendered his a fundamentally arbitrary and unfair trial. As noted by the Court

of Appeal, the evidence of prior insurance claims was relevant to the question of petitioner’s

intent to commit arson and insurance fraud, his motive for doing so and/or petitioner’s

knowledge that committing insurance fraud would provide petitioner with cash. RT 54:3-60:10. 

Because there were permissible inferences to be drawn by the jury from evidence concerning

petitioner’s other insurance claims, and jurors were instructed how to properly consider the

evidence, admission of such evidence did not violate due process. RT 1392:19-1393:16; see

Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Only if there are no permissible

inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. Even

then, the evidence must ‘be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’” (emphasis in

original)). 

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct (Claim 2)

Petitioner also claims the prosecution engaged in misconduct by “opining that

petitioner lied about his income on a loan application” in violation of the due process clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Pet. at 8:9-17. A due process violation based on prosecutorial 

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misconduct occurs if a comment made by the prosecution rendered the entire trial “fundamentally

unfair.” See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974). 

On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal addressed this claim as follows:

The alleged misconduct arose when the prosecutor was questioning

CSE’s fire investigator, Michael Kinnison. The questioning

concerned whether the monthly income defendant had reported to

CSE at the time of the fires was lower than the monthly income

defendant had reported on a loan application about a year earlier. 

Defendant objected to the relevance of this questioning. The

prosecutor explained the relevance as “being that the loan

application shows a far higher income.” The trial court pressed,

“And the relevance is?” The prosecutor responded, with the jury

present: “The relevance is he’s getting a loan that he wouldn’t

have otherwise qualified for unless he lied about his income.” 

Defendant objected and moved for a mistrial.

Outside the jury’s presence, the trial court noted that the prosecutor

had not listed during the pretrial motion phase anything about false

statements concerning a loan application. The prosecutor said the

evidence was to show, as stated in his opening statement,

defendant’s severe financial difficulties. Said the prosecutor: 

“What better example of being over-encumbered with a loan [than]

to put down on your loan application a far higher income than what

you have in order to get a loan.”

The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, and admonished the

jury:

“ . . . I’m going to order you at this time to disregard the last

statement by the prosecutor regarding the financial information on

the . . . loan [application]. That information is being presented in

this trial for one purpose, and that purpose is to show motive . . . .

[T]he People’s theory is that [defendant] gave an inflated income

[on the loan application] in order to qualify for this loan and that is

evidence indicating that [defendant’s] in dire financial straights,

and, therefore, his motive as to the crimes which he is charged

with.

“You may not consider that evidence . . . as evidence that

defendant has bad character. You may not consider it as evidence

that the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes. You may

not consider it–that the defendant has committed a crime by

making those statements. And, in fact, . . . the defendant has never

been charged with a crime in regards to those statements.

“I need to know, now, is there anybody who cannot follow that

Court order and put that out of your mind completely? Anybody 

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5

 While petitioner does cite to United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 520 (9th

Cir. 1998), which found the prosecutor engaged in impermissible vouching when he called the

defendant in a federal criminal trial a liar, petitioner’s counsel does not address distinguishing

aspects of that case, including the apparent lack of a curative instruction and, in context, the

Garcia prosecutor’s having gone beyond calling for a reasonable inference to be drawn. 

12

have problems with that? If so, please raise your hand.” No juror

or alternate raised a hand.

Kinnison then testified that defendant listed his monthly income at

the time of the fires as comprising approximately $1,570 in federal

workers’ compensation, $170 in veterans’ disability benefits, and

$400 from Haqq. Kinnison said that defendant explained the

monthly income listed on the loan application–$1,527 plus other

income of $1,165–as a mistake.

Subsequently, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the trustee for

defendant’s bankruptcy that defendant had reported his monthly

income in his September 1995 bankruptcy papers as $1,742.

Outside the jury’s presence, defendant again moved for mistrial. 

He contended that the trustee’s testimony about defendant’s

monthly income undoubtedly reminded the jury of Kinnison’s

earlier testimony that defendant had overstated his income on the

loan application.

The applicable federal . . . standard[] regarding prosecutorial

misconduct [is] well established. A prosecutor’s intemperate

behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a

pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects the trial with such

unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process. . . 

[Quotation marks and citations omitted.] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The prosecutor’s conduct here did not comprise a pattern so

egregious that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. The

federal Constitution was not violated. 

Op. 13-16.

Here again, petitioner has not met his burden; he cites only to a series of cases,

including two recent Supreme Court decisions, without explaining how any of the cases support

this claim. See Pet. at 9:2-24 (closing with citation to Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 125 S.Ct. 847

(2005) and Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 124 S.Ct. 1830 (2004)).5

Moreover, the petitioner’s trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair by the

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actions of the prosecution, in light of the court’s stern admonition to the jury to disregard the

statement made by the prosecution in open court. RT 834:10-835:7. It is generally presumed

that jurors follow the court’s instructions regarding whether, and in what respect, something can

be considered evidence. See Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1997). Nothing

in the record suggests that jurors did not follow the court’s instructions. In any case, the jurors

were not presented with evidence so prejudicial that no instruction could cure it. Compare

United States v. Bland, 908 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1990) (court’s comments that defendant on

firearms charge was child molester and killer could not be cured by instruction); United States v.

Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 479 (9th Cir. 1988) (testimony that defendant on trial for child

molestation had homosexual relationship with adopted father could not be cured). 

Based on the forgoing, petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct is barred by

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Furthermore, petitioner has not shown that his constitutional right to due

process has been violated.

C. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel (Claims 3 And 4)

Petitioner asserts his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in

violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court has enunciated the standards for judging

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

First, a defendant must show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel's performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To this end, the

defendant must identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690. The court then must then determine whether in

light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of

professional competent assistance. Id. Second, a defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice. 

Id. at 693. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; 

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see also United States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.

Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717-18 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 

Petitioner alleges two instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, both of which

were presented to the California courts on collateral review. Pet. at 10-14. The Superior Court

of Sacramento County was the only court to issue a reasoned decision with respect to these

claims of petitioner’s.

1. Testimony of Neighbor 

Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure the testimony

of a Spanish-speaking neighbor who told petitioner before trial that she saw two young boys 

running from petitioner’s condominium just before the start of the second fire. Petitioner avers

he relayed this information to counsel well before trial. Pet. at 10. 

The Superior Court of Sacramento County rejected petitioner’s claim, observing

that petitioner had not stated facts warranting relief. Specifically, the court noted petitioner’s

trial counsel, in a new trial motion, had represented that petitioner had not provided him with

sufficient information to locate the neighbor, and that in moving for habeas relief, petitioner said

only that he had obtained a “possible name” and “possible location” for the neighbor. December

4, 2000 Superior Court Op. at 1-2. 

Before this court, petitioner still has not provided sufficiently concrete

information to show that even if failing to call the neighbor in question as a witness was

unreasonable, the omission had any effect on the outcome of his case. Standing alone, the fact

that two boys were running from petitioner’s condominium provides little evidence regarding the

origin of the fires for which petitioner was convicted. When considered in conjunction with the

fact that the evidence presented to jurors indicated the fire started inside petitioner’s locked

house, see, e.g., RT 274:22-276:4, 464:4-8, 466:5-19, 550:18-551:13, 565:13-567:19, the

evidence would have had little probative value. Petitioner’s first ineffective assistance of counsel

claim lacks merit and is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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2. Death Threats 

Petitioner asserts trial counsel also was ineffective for failing to introduce

evidence indicating petitioner had received threatening phone calls before the July 20, 1995 fires. 

Petitioner claims that these death threats may have originated from individuals related to a person

in Oakland who, with petitioner’s help, was convicted of murder. Pet. at 13 & n.6. 

Here again, the Superior Court found petitioner had not presented enough factual

support for his claim to warrant relief; rather, at the time, petitioner was still waiting for

information to confirm the death threats and the identity of those responsible. December 4, 2000

Superior Court Op. at 3. The court also found the evidence that petitioner received death threats

was insufficient to warrant granting petitioner relief without evidence indicating that someone

other than petitioner set the fires at his condominium. Id. 

Here as well, petitioner has not met his burden of showing the state court resolved

this claim improperly. The record reveals that petitioner’s trial counsel apparently attempted,

without success, to introduce evidence of disturbing phone calls through petitioner’s wife’s

testimony. See RT 1214:24-1218:13. Moreover, petitioner’s position, that evidence of the

threats, if admitted, would have changed his trial’s result, is mere speculation; he provides no

credible detail to support his conclusory position. Cf. Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1362 (5th

Cir. 1994). 

Petitioner’s second ineffective assistance of counsel also lacks merit and is barred

by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this court will recommend that petitioner’s application

for writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a writ of

habeas corpus be denied.

/////

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 28, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

hall1187.157(1)

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