Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00052/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00052-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MAXINE BLEAKLY,

CASE NO. CIV. S-07-052 WBS DAD

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

SIERRA CINEMAS, INC., a

California Corporation;

LOKATE, LLC, a California

Limited Liability Company; and

DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Maxine Bleakly alleges that defendants Sierra

Cinemas, Inc. and Lokate, LLC violated the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and various

California statutes in the course of operating a movie theater. 

Having structurally modified the movie theater, defendants now

move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56.

When a defendant remedies the challenged conditions to

bring them within ADA compliance, a plaintiff’s ADA claim becomes

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moot and the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Grove v.

De La Cruz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130-31 (C.D. Cal. 2005); see

also Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 771

(D. Or. 1997) (“If plaintiffs already have received everything to

which they would be entitled, i.e., the challenged conditions

have been remedied, then these particular claims are moot absent

any basis for concluding that these plaintiffs will again be

subjected to the same alleged wrongful conduct by this

defendant.”).

In Plaintiff’s Opposition, at page 2, lines 7 through

16, she concedes that as a result of the modifications defendant

has made to the movie theater her ADA claim is now moot. The

parties do not dispute that summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA

claim in favor of defendants is warranted. Accordingly, the

court must grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment with

respect to plaintiff’s ADA claim.

Because plaintiff’s only federal claim – the request

for injunctive relief under the ADA – is no longer at issue, the

court is obligated to hear the remaining state law claims only if

it retains federal question jurisdiction. If such original

jurisdiction is lacking, the court must decide whether to decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining

state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

1. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts “have

original jurisdiction [over] all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331. Clear examples of such “federal question” cases include

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those in which federal law creates a cause of action. Merrell

Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). A case

may also arise under federal law where “it appears that some

substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary

element of one of the well-pleaded state claims.” Franchise Tax

Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal.,

463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983). 

Nonetheless, the “mere presence of a federal issue in a

state cause of action does not automatically confer

federal-question jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813.

Rather, courts should approach the issue of federal question

jurisdiction as one requiring “sensitive judgments about

congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal question.”

Id. at 810. Thus, courts look both to congressional intent and

the nature of the federal interest at stake when determining the

propriety of federal question jurisdiction. Id.

Here, plaintiff’s state law claims pertain to

California’s Unruh Civil Rights and Disabled Persons Acts, both

of which incorporate federal ADA law prohibiting discrimination

against disabled persons. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f) (“A

violation of the right of any individual under the [ADA] shall

also constitute a violation of this section.”); id. § 54(c) (“A

violation of the right of an individual under the [ADA] also

constitutes a violation of this section.”). However, even though

they are predicated on a violation of federal law, plaintiff’s

state law claims do not arise under federal law.

Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2002), is nearly

indistinguishable from the instant matter. In Wander, the

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1 Because the ADA specifically allows the Attorney

General to pursue civil penalties and nowhere provides private

plaintiffs with a similar right, it is evident that Congress

sought to limit the damages available under the statute. 42

U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(B) (monetary damages available only “when

requested by the Attorney General”). Further, under the ADA

“[t]he court does not have authority to award monetary damages in

situations where such relief is not requested by the Attorney

General.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (III), at 68 (1990), reprinted

in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 491. Thus, Congress not only failed to

provide a private right to recover damages in the ADA, but

explicitly rejected this right. Any judicial recognition of a

federal question based on state laws that provide a private right

of action would flout congressional intent.

2 In Merrell Dow, the alleged misbranding of a drug in

violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) was

expected to be relevant in an analysis of a plaintiff’s state law

negligence claim. 478 U.S. at 810-22. However, the United

States Supreme Court held that the fact that the federal

definition of misbranding would be at issue did not transform a

state law claim into a federal question, especially in light of

Congress’s decision to deny a private, federal right to sue for a

violation of the FDCA. Id. at 819.

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plaintiff alleged that certain structural barriers at defendants’

store discriminated against disabled persons in violation of the

ADA and various California statutes, including the Disabled

Persons Act. Id. at 857. The plaintiff’s request for injunctive

relief under the ADA became moot when the defendants sold the

property, leaving only the plaintiff’s state-law claims based on

alleged ADA violations. Id. After reviewing the congressional

history1 in combination with the United States Supreme Court’s

opinion in Merrell Dow,2 the Ninth Circuit held that Congress did

not intend the ADA to create a private right of action for its

violation. Id. at 859. Rather, Congress’s choice to foreclose a

private right of action in the ADA was “tantamount to a

congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation

of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is

insufficiently substantial to confer federal question

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jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813). The

Ninth Circuit accordingly affirmed the district court’s refusal

to recognize federal question jurisdiction and additional

decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, therein

dismissing the remaining state law claims.

Similarly, this court has twice recognized that while a

plaintiff whose rights are violated under the ADA may still seek

damages under state law claims, federal question jurisdiction is

not created just because the violations are an element of the

state law claims. See Martinez v. Del Taco, Inc., No. 05-1418,

2006 WL 355194, *4-*5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2006)(dismissing state

law claims predicated on ADA violations when defendants ceased

all business operations, thereby rendering plaintiff’s actual ADA

claim moot); Pickern v. Best Western Timber Cove Lodge, 194 F.

Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (E.D. Cal 2002) (dismissing state law claims

predicated on ADA violations after defendants mooted plaintiff’s

ADA claim by removing inaccessible bath tubs and installing prefabricated, roll-in showers). 

Accordingly, there remains “no federal-question

jurisdiction over a lawsuit for damages brought under

California’s [statutes], even though the California statute[s]

make[] a violation of the [ADA] a violation of state law.” 

Wander, 304 F.3d at 857. 

 2. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Because there is no federal question jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s remaining state law claims, the court is free to

consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Pickern,

194 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a

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district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over a state law claim if “the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .” 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114

F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] federal district court with

power to hear state law claims has discretion to keep, or decline

to keep, them under the conditions set out in § 1367(c).”). 

Factors for a court to consider in deciding whether to dismiss

supplemental state claims include judicial economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity. Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976

F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992). 

“[I]n the usual case in which federal law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining

state law claims.” Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d

1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1996) overruled on other grounds by Acri,

114 F.3d at 1000. Indeed, some circuits have gone even farther

and held that, absent extraordinary or unusual circumstances,

federal courts should not retain jurisdiction. See, e.g., Musson

Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1255 (6th

Cir. 1996); Wentzka v. Gellman, 991 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir.

1993).

While cognizant that litigation of a new suit in state

court may somewhat inconvenience the parties, the court notes

that neither party has made a showing of extraordinary or unusual

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3 Neither party opposes dismissal of the remaining state

law claims. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 1:26-28

(“Given that the ADA violation has been fixed . . . this case

should be dismissed and remaining issues dealt with in state

court.”); Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“[T]he

court should decline to exercise predent jurisdiction and dismiss

the remaining causes of action.”).) Thus, standard party

arguments often associated with such dismissals--e.g., the

inconvenience of refiling, litigating in remote state court

locations, etc.--are not readily apparent.

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circumstances.3 In fact, the only federal claim was settled well

before any substantial litigation ensued. Accordingly, the court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3) as to the remaining state law claims.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim be, and the same hereby

is, GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s remaining claims

be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and this action is hereby DISMISSED. 

DATED: January 7, 2008

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