Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01257/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01257-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

L.A. TAXI COOPERATIVE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01257-JST 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE COMPLAINT-ININTERVENTION

Re: ECF No. 32

Before the Court is a Motion for Order Granting Leave to File Complaint-in-Intervention, 

filed by A White and Yellow Cab, Inc. (“A TAXI”). ECF No. 32. Plaintiffs oppose motion. ECF 

No. 36. Defendants have filed a statement of nonopposition. ECF No. 37. The Court will deny 

the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are nineteen California corporations and limited liability companies that provide 

taxi services throughout California, including San Francisco County, Los Angeles County, and 

San Diego County. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 4, 11-29, 34. Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. 

(“Uber”) is a transportation network company that uses a smart phone application (“app”) to 

connect passengers looking for rides with drivers willing to provide rides. Id. ¶¶ 5, 30. 

Defendants Rasier, LLC and Rasier-CA, LLC are subsidiaries of Uber.1 Id. ¶¶ 31-32. The parties 

operate in the same cities and counties, and vie for the same customers. Id. ¶¶ 36-37. 

Plaintiffs allege that Uber’s advertising campaign “puts forth false and misleading 

advertisements regarding the safety of rides on Uber’s ‘UberX’ platform, and disparaging the 

safety of taxi rides offered by taxi cab companies.” Id. ¶ 1. They state that Uber’s 

 

1

This Order refers to Defendants collectively as “Uber.” 

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misrepresentations about safety cause Plaintiffs to lose significant revenue and suffer reputational 

injury because customers choose to use Uber rather than taking a taxi. Id. ¶¶ 102-06. Plaintiffs’ 

complaint, filed on March 18, 2015, alleges violations of (1) the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1125(a); (2) California’s False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 (“FAL”); and 

(3) California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (“UCL”). Id. ¶¶ 110-

39. On July 17, 2015, in an order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss, the Court dismissed the Lanham Act claim only to the extent it was based on protected 

speech in the media; dismissed the UCL claim; and struck Plaintiffs’ claim for restitution pursuant 

to the FAL. ECF No. 44 at 18. 

Proposed Complainant-in-Intervention A TAXI is a taxi cab company based in Orange 

County. Proposed Complaint-in-Intervention (“Proposed Compl.”), ECF No. 32-2, ¶ 1. A TAXI 

seeks an order granting it leave to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 24(a) or, in the alternative, through permissive intervention pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 24(b). ECF No. 32. The proposed complaint-in-intervention alleges that Uber’s 

“unfair business, trade practices, and false advertising acts” cause direct harm and damage to A 

TAXI. Proposed Compl. ¶ 1. It also alleges that the California Public Utilities Commission 

(“CPUC”) allows Uber to operate a de facto taxi service in direct competition with A TAXI,

without requiring Uber to comply with taxi cab regulations, effectively depriving A TAXI of its 

right to engage in business. Id. ¶ 2. The proposed complaint-in-intervention alleges claims: 

(1) against Uber, for violation of the UCL by means of unfair pricing competition, unfair cost 

expenditure requirements, disregard of numerical limits for licensed taxi cabs, and unfair and 

deceptive advertising; (2) against Uber, for violation of the Unfair Practices Act by operating as a 

de facto taxi company without complying with taxi cab regulations and ordinances; (3) against 

Uber, for violation of the Lanham Act by making false or misleading statements concerning safety 

and pricing in its commercial advertisements; (4) against Uber, for violation of the FAL by 

making false statements concerning safety; (5) against the CPUC, for a declaratory judgment 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2201 invalidating CPUC Decision 13-09-045 (creating a new class 

of licensing for “Transportation Network Companies”), and declaring it void as unconstitutional 

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and unconstitutionally vague; (6) against the CPUC, for denial of A TAXI’s equal protection and 

due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Id. ¶¶ 49-105. A TAXI seeks damages; 

temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief; declaratory relief; and attorney’s fees and 

costs. 

II. INTERVENTION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides for intervention as a matter of right 

where the potential intervenor “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the 

subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter 

impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately 

represent that interest.” The Ninth Circuit has summarized the requirements for intervention as of 

right under Rule 24(a)(2) as follows:

(1) [T]he [applicant’s] motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must 

have a ‘significantly protectable’ interest relating to the property or 

transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must 

be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical 

matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) the 

applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the parties 

to the action. 

Freedom from Religion Found. v. Geithner, 644 F.3d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting California 

ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2006)). Proposed intervenors must 

satisfy all four criteria; “[f]ailure to satisfy any one of the requirements is fatal to the application.” 

Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2009). In evaluating 

motions to intervene, “courts are guided primarily by practical and equitable considerations, and 

the requirements for intervention are broadly interpreted in favor of intervention.” United States 

v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004). “Courts are to take all well-pleaded, 

nonconclusory allegations in the motion to intervene, the proposed complaint or answer in 

intervention, and declarations supporting the motion as true absent sham, frivolity or other 

objections.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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B. Discussion 

1. Timeliness

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the timing of A TAXI’s motion to intervene, which was filed 

three months after the complaint and before discovery had commenced, has not prejudiced the 

existing parties to this litigation. ECF No. 36. The Court concludes that that the motion is timely. 

See Alisal, 370 F.3d at 921 (timeliness determination is based on the stage of the proceeding at 

which an applicant seeks to intervene, prejudice to the other parties, and the reason for and length 

of the delay). 

2. A TAXI’s Interest

An applicant generally has a “significantly protectable interest” when its interest is 

“protectable under some law,” and “there is a relationship between the legally protected interest 

and the claims at issue.” Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003). “An 

applicant generally satisfies the ‘relationship’ requirement only if the resolution of the plaintiff’s 

claims actually will affect the applicant.” Donnelly v Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 410 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

Here, A TAXI has a “significantly protectable” interest in the false advertising claims that 

are the subject matter of this litigation because its interests are protected by law, and because there 

is a relationship between A TAXI’s interest and the Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs and A TAXI 

similarly allege that Uber’s false advertising statements mislead their potential customers about 

the relative safety of Uber and taxi rides, causing customers to choose Uber instead of a taxi. 

Compare Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 34-106, with Proposed Compl. ¶¶ 47, 53(d), 69-71, 78-81. 

A TAXI asserts an array of additional claims, including claims relating to Uber’s allegedly 

unfair pricing and expenditures, as well as its failure to comply with taxi cab regulations and 

ordinances. See Proposed Compl. ¶¶ 53(a-c), 61. A TAXI also asserts civil rights claims against 

the CPUC and seeks a declaratory judgment invalidating a CPUC decision concerning Uber as 

unconstitutional. Id. ¶¶ 83-105. A TAXI’s interest in these proposed claims is unrelated to the 

false advertising claims asserted in Plaintiffs’ suit. While A TAXI is correct that, in Sierra Club v. 

EPA, the Ninth Circuit stated that a proposed intervenor ordinarily need not “show that the interest 

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he asserts is one that is protected by the statute under which the litigation is brought,” Sierra Club

also “reaffirmed the requirement that some relationship exist between the legally protected interest 

and the claims at issue.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated on 

other grounds by Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011); Arakaki, 

324 F.3d at 1085; see ECF No. 40 at 6-7. An intervenor “is not permitted to inject new, unrelated 

issues into the pending litigation.” Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086. Thus A TAXI does not have a 

significantly protectable interest beyond Plaintiffs’ false advertising claims. 

3. Whether Disposition May Impair or Impede Ability to Protect Interest

An applicant to intervene must be “so situated that disposing of the action may as a 

practical matter impair or impede” its ability to protect its interest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). A 

possible stare decisis effect in the event that factual and legal determinations are reviewed on 

appeal “is an important consideration in determining the extent to which an applicant’s interest 

may be impaired.” United States v. State of Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, if 

Plaintiffs do not prevail, the case may “have a persuasive stare decisis effect in any parallel or 

subsequent litigation” involving taxi companies’ false advertising claims against Uber. Id. As to 

its false advertising claims, therefore, A TAXI has demonstrated that disposing of this action may, 

as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect its interest. 

4. Adequacy of Representation 

In determining the adequacy of the existing parties’ representation, the Court considers 

three factors: (1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of 

a proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make 

such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the 

proceeding that other parties would neglect. Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086. The most important 

factor is “how the interest compares with the interests of existing parties.” Id. Although the 

applicant’s burden of showing inadequacy of representation is generally “minimal,” when the 

applicant and an existing party “have the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of 

representation arises.” Id. (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 

1305 (9th Cir. 1997)). “If the applicant’s interest is identical to that of one of the present parties, a 

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compelling showing should be required to demonstrate inadequate representation.” Id. For 

example, “[t]he presumption may be overcome by evidence of collusion, adversity of interest, 

nonfeasance, incompetence, or lack of financial resources.” Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., 

No. 12-cv-04936-LB, 2013 WL 6776191, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013) (collecting cases). 

A TAXI has not overcome the presumption that the existing Plaintiffs, similarly situated 

taxi companies with identical objectives as to the false advertising claims against Uber, will 

adequately represent its interest. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 34-106, with Proposed Compl. ¶¶ 47, 

53(d), 69-71, 78-81; see also ECF No. 40 at 6 (“A TAXI and Plaintiff CABCO, INC.’s significant 

protectable interests “are virtually indistinguishable.”), 9 (“in this case the interests of the 

plaintiffs in the lead case are aligned with those of A TAXI”), 13 (“all twenty of these taxi 

company plaintiffs have the same interests in mind”). A TAXI does not claim that the existing 

Plaintiffs are incompetent, have interests adverse to its own, or will fail to advance any specific 

argument related to false advertising. Instead, A TAXI argues that its interests are inadequately 

represented because Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts relating to Orange County’s operating 

rules, CPUC regulations, and compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act; and because 

Plaintiffs have failed to challenge the constitutionality of the CPUC’s actions. ECF No. 32 at 5-6. 

But the question is whether existing parties adequately represent A TAXI’s “significantly 

protectable” interest in the false advertising claims in this lawsuit, and none of these allegations 

relate to those claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086. While A TAXI

believes that Plaintiffs “would do better to include the additional claims,” ECF No. 40 at 10, this 

does not mean that Plaintiffs will provide inadequate representation as to the claims at issue in the 

current suit, and differences in litigation strategy “are not enough to justify intervention as a matter 

of right.” Perry, 587 F.3d at 954 (quoting United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 

402-03 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Because A TAXI has not demonstrated that its interest relating to the subject matter of this 

action is inadequately represented by the existing parties, the motion to intervene as of right is 

denied. Id. at 950 (“Failure to satisfy any one of the requirements is fatal to the application”). 

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III. PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1), “[o]n timely motion, the court may 

permit anyone to intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a 

common question of law or fact.” Permissive intervention “requires (1) an independent ground for 

jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a common question of law and fact between the movant’s 

claim or defense and the main action.” Freedom from Religion Found., 644 F.3d at 843 (quoting 

Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Even if an applicant 

satisfies those threshold requirements,” however, “the district court has discretion to deny 

permissive intervention.” Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 412. “In exercising its discretion, the court must 

consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original 

parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). “[T]he court may also consider other factors in the 

exercise of its discretion, including ‘the nature and extent of the intervenors’ interest’ and 

‘whether the intervenors’ interests are adequately represented by other parties.” Perry, 587 F.3d at 

955 (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977)). 

B. Discussion 

Plaintiffs do not dispute that A TAXI meets the three threshold requirements for 

permissive intervention. They argue, however, that the Court should deny permissive intervention 

because A TAXI’s “case revolves around challenging the regulatory authority that allows Uber to 

operate in California — a complex topic not at issue in Plaintiffs’ false advertising case against 

Uber.” ECF No. 36 at 7. They contend that “intervention will dramatically impede the progress 

and resolution of this case, and will prejudice the 19 Plaintiffs looking to move forward with their 

case.” Id.

The Court agrees that intervention will unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the 

original parties’ case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). The inclusion of A TAXI’s additional claims 

would “necessitate the consideration of extraneous legal and factual issues that [Plaintiffs’] lawsuit 

would not otherwise invoke,” including questions relating to fare calculations, Orange County’s 

taxi regulations, and the constitutionality of CPUC decision-making concerning Uber. UMG 

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Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408, 414 (N.D. Cal 2004). “Such allegations 

would divert time and resources from the principal thrust of [Plaintiffs’] lawsuit and entangle the 

legal and factual issues involved therein within a web that is not of the original parties’ making.” 

Id. at 415; see also Hanni v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 08-cv-00732-CW, 2010 WL 289297, at *7 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010) (concluding that judicial economy would suffer with the addition of a 

proposed intervenor’s new claims and issues because intervention would require additional 

discovery, push back deadlines, and delay the resolution of the existing case); United States v. 

Ballantyne, No. 13-cv-53-BTM (BLM), 2013 WL 4716234, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013) 

(denying motion for permissive intervention where the Court suspected that intervention would 

unduly complicate and potentially prolong the lawsuit, as the prospective intervenor “would 

attempt to shift the focus of the litigation” and “overshadow[]” the issues in the original suit). 

The Court also notes that A TAXI has the option to bring a separate action against Uber, 

and has declared its intention “to present its claim one way or another.” ECF No. 32 at 10. 

“While hardly dispositive, [a prospective intervenor’s] ability to pursue its claims through an 

alternative mechanism without any prejudice to its own rights is significant in the context of a 

motion to intervene brought by that party.” UMG Recordings, 222 F.R.D. at 415. As for the false 

advertising claims that may be affected by the existing litigation, as discussed above, A TAXI has 

not demonstrated that its interests are inadequately represented by Plaintiffs. See Perry, 587 F.3d 

at 955 (in deciding a motion for permissive intervention, a court may consider the nature and 

extent of the intervenor’s interest and whether that interest is adequately represented by other 

parties). 

In these circumstances, the Court concludes that intervention would “unnecessarily delay 

and complicate the case,” Montgomery v. Rumsfeld, 572 F.2d 250, 255 (9th Cir. 1978), and would 

prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights. See Fed R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). The Court 

therefore denies A TAXI’s request for permissive intervention. 

IV. ALTERNATIVE RELIEF REQUESTED ON REPLY

On reply, A TAXI requests that the Court grant its motion and deem the proposed 

complaint-in-intervention filed and served upon Uber or, in the alternative, “allow A TAXI to 

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intervene on the false advertising claims only and file the balance of its Complaint as a case 

‘Related’ to the instant one, and/or consolidate the two cases for trial.” ECF No. 40 at 14. As a 

preliminary matter, the Court does not consider new arguments and requests for relief made on 

reply, and the original motion did not propose partial intervention or consolidation for trial. See, 

e.g., TPK Touch Solutions, Inc. v. Wintek Electro-Optics Corp., No. 13-cv-02218-JST, 2013 WL 

5289015, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2013). In any event, A TAXI does not explain the case 

management rationale for splitting its false advertising claims from the remainder of the claims in 

its own not-yet-filed case, and its request for relation and/or consolidation for trial is premature 

until it has filed a separate complaint in this district. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to intervene is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 27, 2015

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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