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Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 

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FILED Ulllld States Court of Appeals Tnnth Clrr.uit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S, LONDON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

NORTH AMERICAN VAN LINES, 

Defendant-Appellee . 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

MAY 14 19~~ 

ROBiRT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-7033 

(D.C. No. 86-235-C) 

(E.D. Okla.) 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App . P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34 . 1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument . 

Appellant Underwriters at Lloyd's, London (Underwriters) 

appeals a decision of the district court awarding appellee North 

American Van Lines (NAVL) attorneys' fees and costs. On appeal, 

Underwrite rs raises three arguments. First, they contend that the 

district court erred in granting NAVL costs and fees as the 

"prevailing party" under Oklahoma Stat . tit. 12, § 940A. Second, 

they argue that the district court erred in awarding attorneys' 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not b e cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except f o r purpose s of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collate ral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-7033 Document: 010110249169 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 1
fees and costs under Fed . R. Civ. P . 68 . Third, Underwriters 

asserts that the district court erred in granting the costs of 

appeal in favor of NAVL pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 39. We 

exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm in part 

and rev erse in part. 

To resolve this appeal, we certified the fol lowing question 

to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: 

Is a defendant, such as North American Van Lines, 

for whom judgment is not rendered but who reduces its 

liability by successfully asserting the Carmack 

Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S.C. 

11707, 10730, as its sole defense throughout the 

litigation a "prevailing party" entitled to costs under 

Okla. Stat . tit. 12 § 940? 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. 

The opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, a copy of which is 

attached to this opinion, answers the first two contentions on 

appeal in favor of the appellant . The opinion explicitly provides 

that NAVL is not entitled to the district court's award under 

Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 940 . NAVL also cannot-prevail on its claim 

under Fed . R. Civ. P . 68 because the Oklahoma statute's provisions 

govern this award as well. Thus, we REVERSE the district court's 

award made pursuant to Okla . Stat . tit. 12, § 940 and Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 68. We AFFIRM the district court's award of costs pursuant t o 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 39. Each party will bear its own costs on this 

appeal. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

-2-

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-7033 Document: 010110249169 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 2
s11r·1,u :1 ,·u,t,l, 

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IN THE SUPREME coURT OF THE sT A TE OF o ~om• lAHOt.'. ~ 

Al ·11 1 I 1•!'-, 

UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S OF 

LONDON, 

Plaintiff/ Appellant, 

V. 

NORTH AMERICAN VAN LINES, 

Defendant/ Appellee. 

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I .!~MF., w l'AI ilk;;,,'., J: 

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) FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION ) 

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NO. 77,195 

FEDERAL CERTIFIED QUESTION 

Federal Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 

Circuit: Is a defendant . .. for whom judgment is not rendered but who reduces 

its liability by successfully asserting the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate 

Commerce Act . . . as its sole defense throughout the litigation a "prevailing 

party" entitled to costs under Okla.Stat. tit. 12, §940? We answer in the negative. 

CERTIF1ED QUESTION ANSWERED 

Linda G. Alexander 

Patricia A. Kirch 

Niemeyer, Noland & Alexander 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

David A. Cheek 

Victor F. Albert 

McKinney, Stringer, & Webster, P.C. 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

For Plaintiff/ Appellant 

For Defendant/ Appellee 

RECEIVED 

Ullited Stat,,, Court ot A ,_ - ' , .. p,._,. 1 

APR Ir, 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKt: " 

!":IP.rl< 

Appellate Case: 90-7033 Document: 010110249169 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 3
HARGRAVE, J. 

This matter comes before us on a question of law certified to this Court 

from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to 20 O.S. 1981 § 1602: 

Is a defendant, such as North American Van Lines, for whom 

judgment is not rendered but who reduces its liability by successfully 

asserting the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act 

49 U .S.C. 11707, 10730, as its sole defense throughout the litigatio~ 

a "prevailing party" entitled to costs under Okla.Stat. tit. 12 §940? 

We answer in the negative. 

Title 12 O.S. 1981 § 940 provides: 

"A. In any civil action to recover damages for the negligent or 

willful injury to property and any other incidental costs related to such 

action, the prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable attorney's 

fees, court costs and interest to be set by the court and to be taxed 

and collected as other costs of the action." 

North American Van Lines was transporting the household goods of Robert 

and Lucinda Chapman when the goods were destroyed by a fire that completely 

destroyed the transport vehicle. Lloyd's reimbursed the Chapmans in excess of 

$100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Dollars) pursuant to their insurance contract 

and sued North American for subrogation. At one point, North American 

apparently offered to confess judgment for $8,000.00 (Eight Thousand Dollars) 

under Rule 68, Federal Rules Civil Procedure. At trial, the jury returned a verdict 

in favor of Lloyd's for $70,000.00 (Seventy Thousand Dollars) based on a 

common law negligence theory. North American had answered asserting, among 

other things, that plaintiff had contractually limited its recovery to $.60 per pound 

of damaged goods, as set forth in the written agreement of the parties. 

North American appealed, asserting that the Carmack Amendment to the 

Interstate Commerce clause preempted the common law negligence cause of action. 

The Carmack Amendment is a codification of the common law rule of liability for 

negligent damage to goods in interstate transport. The Tenth Circuit Court of 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-7033 Document: 010110249169 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 4
Appeals, in Underwriters al LJoyd's, London v. North American Van Lines, 8!XJ 

F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1989), held that the Carmack Amendment preempted the 

common law cause of action for negligent destruction of property and vacated the 

trial court's decision, limited plaintiffs damages to the released value of $.60 per 

pound per article as established by the bill of lading, and instructed the trial court 

to enter judgment in conformity with the opinion. On January 31, 1990 the trial 

court entered an order for the parties to show cause why judgment should not be 

entered in favor of Lloyd's, London for $7,500.00 (Seven Thousand, Five 

Hundred Dollars) as per the Tenth Circuit's mandate. On March 28, 1990 the trial 

court entered judgment for Lloyd's in the amount of $7,500.00 (Seven Thousand, 

Five Hundred Dollars) against North American. No award of costs or attorneys 

fees was made in that order. 

On April 1, 1990 North American filed an application for attorney's fees. 

The trial court ruled that North American was the prevailing party on its defense 

and was entitled to attorney's fees both under Clayton v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas 

RR. · Co. 1 and pursuant to Rule 68, Federal Rules Civil Procedure offer of 

judgment. Lloyd's appealed and this federal certified question followed. We are 

not asked to address the effect of the defendant's offer of judgment. 

The only question presented for our consideration is whether under the stated 

facts, North American is the prevailing party within the meaning of 12 O.S. 1981 

§ 940A. We look to other cases that have considered the "prevailing party" 

question. In Carter v. Rubrecht, 188 Okla. 325, 108 P.2d 546 (1940), we held, 

in construing then-effective 15 O.S. §268, that defendant was not a prevai!ing 

1

Clayton v . Missouri-Kansas-Texas RR . co . , 901 F.2d 833 (10th 

Cir. 1990), held that the Carmack Amendment, although preempting 

state common law negligence claims against common carriers for 

negligent loss or damage to goods shipped in interstate commerce, 

did not preempt Oklahoma's statute providing attorney fees for 

negligent or willful injury to property, 12 o.s. S940A. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-7033 Document: 010110249169 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 5
party where plaintiff had sued to recover a usury penalty, defendant had answered 

by general and specific denial and did not ask for affirmative relief, and plaintiff 

dismissed the action without prejudice. By way of distinction, we cited cases 

where plaintiff had sued on a promissory note and defendant by answer sought to 

recover the usury penalty and prevailed on the usury claim and thus defendant was 

the prevailing party entitled to attorney fee to be taxed as costs against the losing 

party on the merits. We went on to say, at p. 548: 

"... And it is also apparent that the court has regarded as the 

prevailing party, the party who prevailed on the merits, and has 

regarded as the losing party, and the party subject to additional 

penalty of an attorney's fee for his adversary, the party who lost upon 

the merits. That is, it appears to have been the policy to tax the 

attorney's fee only in those cases where the other party was 

determined by final judgment to be the losing party on the issue of the 

usury penalty." 

We went on in that case to say that plaintiffs dismissal of the case without 

prejudice did not mean that plaintiff was the loser. "While a defendant might be 

said to prevail on the pleadings or in the action when plaintiff dismisses without 

prejudice, yet he has not finally prevailed upon the issue tendered in plaintiffs 

petition." See also, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Carpenter, 576 P. 2d 

1166 (Okla. 1978), and Swan-Sigler, Inc. v. Black, 414 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1966). 

In Swan-Sigler, we interpreted "prevailing party" as used in Keaton v. Branch, 104 

Okla. 287, 231 P. 289 (1924), pursuant to 42 O.S. §176, as meaning the party for 

whom judgment is rendered, meaning in that instance a judgment upon the validity 

or invalidity of the lien. 

Later, in Wieland v. Danner Auto Su;ply, !t:c., 695 P.2d 1332, 1334 

(Okla. 1984), we said that when judgment by confession is entered against a 

defendant, the plaintiff, as recipient of the award is clearly the successful party. 

We went on to say that a judgment is the final determination of the rights of the 

parties in an action, and a judgment by confession taken against a defendant under 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-7033 Document: 010110249169 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 6
12 O.S. § 1101 is a final determination that a plaintiff has prevailed on his claim 

and plaintiff may recover his reasonable attorney fees accruing up to and including 

the date defendant's offer to confess judgment was received. 

In Evans v. Sitton, 735·P.2d 334 (Okla. 1987), we interpreted 12 O.S. 1981 

§ 940. We said that under § 940(A), if judgment is rendered for defendant, the 

defendant is entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party. We said that if 

plaintiff receives a verdict, plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees, subject to 

subsection B of§ 940. With respect to § 940(B), we said that if plaintiff prevails 

but receives a judgment for a lesser amount that the defendant offered, then the 

plaintiff is not entitled to recover attorney fees and costs, but, we said, "Nothing, 

however dictates that defendant should be awarded attorney fees. " We pointed out 

that paragraph B of § 940 is merely a bar to the recovery of fees and costs by a 

plaintiff who otherwise would be entitled to them. In that case we held that 

neither party should be awarded attorney's fees where plaintiffs recovery was for 

less than defendant had offered. 

North American cites Marino v. Otis Engineering Corp. , 839 F.2d 1404 

(10th Cir. 1988), for the proposition that a defendant who successfully defends 

against plaintiffs negligence action can be a prevailing party under 12 O.S. 1981 

§ 940A. However, in that case defendant received a defense verdict and plaintiff 

took nothing on its claim. Further, in that case the question was not whether 

defendant could be a prevailing party under the statute but whether the case was 

one involving injury to a property right within the meaning of the statute. In MidState Homes, Inc. v. Johnston, 547 P.2d 1302 (Okla. 1976), defendant was 

accorded prevailing party status under 42 O.S. § 176 where plaintiff was denied 

any judgment and defendant defeated plaintiffs mortgage foreclosure action. 

Defendant makes much of the fact that plaintiff proceeded throughout the 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-7033 Document: 010110249169 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 7
case on a common law negligence claim, implying that plaintiff was somehow 

remiss in doing so where the Tenth Circuit ultimately held that the Carmack 

Amendment preempted a common-law negligence claim. The law in the Tenth 

Circuit prior to this case, however, had been that the Carmack Amendment did not 

bar such common law actions by shippers against carriers. Reed v. Aaacon 

Transportation, Inc., 637 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1981), Lirvack Meat Co. v. Baker, 

446 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1971) and L.E. Whitlock Truck Service, Inc. v. Regal 

Drilling Co., 333 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1964). The aforecited cases were 

overruled, to the extent that they hold otherwise, in the Tenth Circuit's opinion in 

the case at bar, Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Norrh American Van Lines, 

supra. 

Our interpretation is that "prevailing party" as used in §940 of Title 12 is 

the party for whom judgment is rendered. In the case at bar, the plaintiff 

prevailed on its claim that its property had been damaged while in the defendant's 

care. The Tenth Circuit opinion in the case at bar noted at the outset that North 

American did not appeal the jury's finding of negligence; the court stated that 

North American only appealed the issue of damages, asking the Tenth Circuit to 

reconsider its position on the preemptive effect of the Carmack Amendment on 

common law negligence remedies. Although defendant in the case at bar argues 

that it has prevailed on its claim, in fact defendant was successful in its defense to 

limit the amount of plaintiffs recovery. The statute that entitles the prevailing 

party to reasonable attorney's fees as costs is one where the action is for negligent 

injury to property. Defendant was not the party who prevailed on the claim that 

statutorily entitled the prevailing party to attorney's fees. We are not faced here 

with a situation, as in Welling v. American Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. , Inc. 617 

P. 2d 206 (Okla. 1980), where both sides were entitled to reasonable attorney's 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-7033 Document: 010110249169 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 8
fees where each prevailed on a separate statute entitling them to attorney's fees. 

The question as posed to this Court recognizes that defendant is the party for 

whom judgment was not rendered. The essence of the question involves whether 

a defense, though successful in limiting plaintiff's damages, but not resulting in a 

judgment for the defendant, entitles the defendant to prevailing party status under 

12 O.S. 1981 § 940. Under the facts submitted, we answer in the negative. As 

stated above, we offer no opinion as to the effect of defendant's offer of judgment 

under Rule 68, Federal Rules Civil Procedure on the entitlement of either party to 

attorney's fees. 

FEDERAL CERTIFlEI> QUESTION ANSWERED. 

Opala, C.J., Hodges, V.C.J. , Lavender, S:ircms, Hargrave, Kauger, JJ. Con=; 

Wilson, J. con=s in judgment; SUrctrers, J. dissents. 

7 

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