Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-04116/USCOURTS-ca2-14-04116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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14‐4116‐cv

Figueroa v. Mazza et al.  

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Second Circuit ________

AUGUST TERM 2015

No. 14‐4116‐cv

ELI SAMUEL FIGUEROA, A/K/A ELI SAMUEL,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

DONNA MARIE MAZZA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A DETECTIVE WITH THE

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHRISTOPHER KAROLKOWSKI,

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A DETECTIVE WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE

DEPARTMENT, TODD NAGROWSKI, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A DETECTIVE

WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, JOSEPH FAILLA,

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A DETECTIVE WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE

DEPARTMENT, AND DETECTIVE DENNIS CHAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A

DETECTIVE WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendants‐Appellees.*

________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of New York

________

 

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform

with the caption above.

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ARGUED: OCTOBER 22, 2015

DECIDED: JUNE 3, 2016

________

Before: KEARSE, WALKER, and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

________

We consider here whether defendants‐appellees are, as the

District Court determined, entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on plaintiff‐appellant’s claims for false arrest, excessive force,

assault, failure to intervene, and unlawful entry.  We conclude that

defendants‐appellees are entitled to the protection of qualified

immunity with respect to the false arrest claims and that they did

not use excessive force or commit an assault in arresting plaintiff‐

appellant.  We also conclude, however, that the claims of failure to

intervene and unlawful entry present issues of fact that must be

resolved by a jury.

Plaintiff‐appellant Eli Samuel Figueroa appeals a September

30, 2014 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (Jack B. Weinstein, Judge) entering judgment as

a matter of law in favor of defendants‐appellees Donna Marie

Mazza, Christopher Karolkowski, Todd Nagrowski, Joseph Failla,

and Dennis Chan, each a detective with the New York City Police

Department.

In the proceeding below, plaintiff asserted claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for false arrest, excessive force, assault,

failure to intervene, and unlawful entry, all arising out of his arrest

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on June 30, 2010.  The District Court granted summary judgment as

to the claims of unlawful entry.    The other claims were tried to a

jury.  Following a verdict in plaintiff’s favor on the counts of false

arrest, excessive force, and assault, and a mistrial on the count of

failure to intervene, the District Court granted judgment to

defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).    Plaintiff

appeals the judgment as to each claim and further asserts that the

District Court “abused its discretion” in dismissing unnamed

defendants from the case and closing discovery.

We agree with the District Court’s disposition of plaintiff’s

false arrest claims.  The trial record establishes that a reasonable law

enforcement officer could have concluded that there existed

probable cause to arrest plaintiff on the evening of June 30, 2010;

accordingly, defendants can claim the protection of qualified

immunity.  We also conclude, as did the District Court, that the force

used in effecting plaintiff’s arrest was reasonable as a matter of law,

and we find no error in the District Court’s dismissal of unnamed

defendants or discovery rulings.    We thus AFFIRM the judgment

insofar as it disposed of plaintiff’s claims for false arrest, excessive

force, and assault, dismissed unnamed defendants, and refused to

permit further discovery.

We do not agree, however, with the District Court’s

disposition of plaintiff’s claims for failure to intervene and unlawful

entry.   The District Court erred in concluding, as a matter of law,

that defendants had no realistic opportunity to intervene in an

alleged assault on plaintiff by an unidentified police officer and that

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plaintiff lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother’s

apartment.  Accordingly, we VACATE so much of the judgment as

rejected plaintiff’s failure‐to‐intervene and unlawful‐entry claims as

a matter of law and REMAND for such further pretrial proceedings

as may be appropriate in the circumstances, or for trial.

Judge KEARSE concurs in part and dissents in part in a

separate opinion.

________

ROBERT MILTON RAMBADADT (Rosa Barreca, on the

brief), The Rambadadt Law Office, New York, NY,

for Plaintiff‐Appellant.

ELIZABETH S. NATRELLA (Pamela Seider Dolgow,

on the brief), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation

Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY,

for Defendants‐Appellees.

________

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

We consider here whether defendants‐appellees are, as the

District Court determined, entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on plaintiff‐appellant’s claims for false arrest, excessive force,

assault, failure to intervene, and unlawful entry.  We conclude that

defendants‐appellees are entitled to the protection of qualified

immunity with respect to the false arrest claims and that they did

not use excessive force or commit an assault in arresting plaintiff‐

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appellant.  We also conclude, however, that the claims of failure to

intervene and unlawful entry present issues of fact that must be

resolved by a jury.  

Plaintiff‐appellant Eli Samuel Figueroa (“Samuel”) appeals a

September 30, 2014 judgment of the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of New York (Jack B. Weinstein, Judge) entering

judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants‐appellees Donna

Marie Mazza (“Mazza”), Christopher Karolkowski (“Karolkowski”),

Todd Nagrowski (“Nagrowski”), Joseph Failla (“Failla”), and

Dennis Chan (“Chan”) (jointly, “defendants”), each a detective with

the New York City Police Department.

In the proceeding below, Samuel asserted claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for false arrest, excessive force, assault,

failure to intervene, and unlawful entry, all arising out of his arrest

on June 30, 2010.  The District Court granted summary judgment as

to the claims of unlawful entry.    The other claims were tried to a

jury.    Following a verdict in Samuel’s favor on the counts of false

arrest, excessive force, and assault, and a mistrial on the count of

failure to intervene, the District Court granted judgment to

defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).    Samuel

appeals the judgment as to each claim and further asserts that the

District Court “abused its discretion” in dismissing unnamed

defendants from the case and closing discovery.

We agree with the District Court’s disposition of Samuel’s

false arrest claims.  The trial record establishes that a reasonable law

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enforcement officer could have concluded that there existed

probable cause to arrest Samuel on the evening of June 30, 2010;

accordingly, defendants can claim the protection of qualified

immunity.  We also conclude, as did the District Court, that the force

used in effecting Samuel’s arrest was reasonable as a matter of law,

and we find no error in the District Court’s dismissal of unnamed

defendants or discovery rulings.    We thus AFFIRM the judgment

insofar as it disposed of Samuel’s claims for false arrest, excessive

force, and assault, dismissed unnamed defendants, and refused to

permit further discovery.

We do not agree, however, with the District Court’s

disposition of Samuel’s claims for failure to intervene and unlawful

entry.   The District Court erred in concluding, as a matter of law,

that defendants had no realistic opportunity to intervene in an

alleged assault on Samuel by an unidentified police officer and that

Samuel lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother’s

apartment.  Accordingly, we VACATE so much of the judgment as

granted judgment to defendants on Samuel’s failure‐to‐intervene

and unlawful‐entry claims and REMAND for such further pretrial

proceedings as may be appropriate in the circumstances, or for trial.

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BACKGROUND

I. The Facts1

On June 29, 2010, a Duane Reade pharmacy in Brooklyn

received eleven phone calls from an unidentified woman.  App. 222,

679‐81; SPA 8.2    The calls, which were fielded by an employee

named Esteban Arias, concerned an order for photographs that had

been placed at the pharmacy.    App. 222, 230‐33.    The caller

“plead[ed]” that Arias locate the order in Duane Reade’s system and

delete it without developing the photos.  App. 222.

Arias tracked down the photos, which apparently had already

been developed.  He intended to throw them away, as the caller had

directed, but hesitated when he discerned their subject matter.  App.

232.  The photos appeared to have been taken in a public restroom.  

They depicted a young boy, perhaps two years old, naked and

apparently distressed.    Some showed close‐up images of the boy’s

genitals and anus.    App. 124‐30, 222, 1040‐57.    In each, a date‐

stamped money order and a copy of the June 25, 2010 New York

Daily News appeared in the background.  App. 124‐25, 222.

Arias called the police.    Officers responded and viewed the

photos themselves.  Some, noting the presence of the date‐stamped

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to Samuel.  See Runner v.

N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 568 F.3d 383, 386 (2d Cir. 2009).   

2 References to “App.” are to plaintiff‐appellant’s appendix.  References to

“SPA” are to the special appendix.

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money order and newspaper, suspected that they were so‐called

“proof‐of‐life” photos—that is, photos taken to establish that a

missing child is still alive, with the aim of securing a ransom.  App.

510.    Others thought that the photos might be related to sex

trafficking, App. 261, or child pornography, App. 222.  Concluding

that “urgent[ ]” action was needed to locate the child and ensure his

safety, App. 260‐61, 275, a number of officers (including the five

named defendants) from numerous divisions began investigating.  

By the next day police had viewed security footage from the

pharmacy showing that a young woman had ordered the photos on

June 26, 2010.3  App. 244‐45.

In the meantime, other officers tried to determine who owned

the phone that had been used to call the pharmacy.   They learned

that on June 28, 2010, a complaint had been lodged with the

department under the same phone number.  App. 271, 303, 620.  The

complainant had identified himself as “Eli Samuel.”

Samuel had filed the complaint on behalf of a woman named

Shirley Saenz (“Saenz”) on the ground that Saenz had recently

reported to the police suspected child abuse, but her claim had not

been taken seriously.    App. 595‐96.    More particularly, Saenz had

told police that she thought her son’s father was abusing the boy

during weekend visits.  App. 105, 111‐12.  Suspecting abuse, she had

documented her son’s pre‐visitation physical condition by taking

 

3 Police had also ascertained that the photos had been taken in the

restroom of a McDonald’s restaurant.  App. 264‐65.

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photos of him while he was unclothed.4   App. 104.   But the police

had been of little help, prompting Samuel—a rabbi and spiritual

advisor who was providing financial aid and guidance to Saenz,

App. 102‐03, 536‐40—to complain.  Samuel’s complaint also accused

Saenz’s mother, Beatrice Saenz (“Beatrice”), of harassment.5    App.

304, 596.   

Although this information might have suggested that the

Duane Reade photos had not been taken for a nefarious purpose,

police continued to investigate the case as a potential kidnapping.  

App. 416.    Detective Nagrowski used the information in Samuel’s

complaint to locate Beatrice.6    Along with six members of the

Brooklyn South Homicide Task Force (the “Task Force”), he

interviewed her at her residence around 8:00 p.m. on June 30, 2010.  

App. 270‐71, 311.    Beatrice told Nagrowski that Saenz was her

daughter and, having been shown the photos from Duane Reade,

 

4 In April 2010, a judge of the Kings County Family Court, having learned

that Saenz was taking explicit photographs of her son for this purpose, had

directed that she stop the practice lest she be “prosecuted for child pornography”

and lose custody of the child.    App. 150‐54.    But this was not known to the

officers at the time of Samuel’s arrest and was not relied on by the District Court

in ruling on defendants’ Rule 50 motion.  Figueroa v. Mazza, 59 F. Supp. 3d 481,

491 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).

5 With one exception, discussed below in note 6, defendants do not

contest that all relevant officers had knowledge of Samuel’s complaint and

Saenz’s report at all relevant times.  See Defs.’ Br. 33.  

6 Though defendants suggest otherwise, see Defs.’ Br. 15; App. 309, it

appears that, at the time Nagrowski interviewed Beatrice, he was aware that

Samuel had lodged a complaint against her, see App. 998.

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that the child was her grandson.  App. 272‐74.  She went on to say

that she had recently kicked Saenz out of her home and that Saenz

had joined a cult led by someone named “Eli Samuel.”   App. 274.  

According to Beatrice, she had noticed one day that her daughter

had sustained a number of bruises. Confronted about her injuries,

Saenz had said that Samuel had inflicted them while exorcising

demons from her.   Id.   Beatrice also informed Nagrowski that she

and Saenz were engaged in a legal battle for visitation rights

concerning her grandson, App. 307, and that Saenz was currently

living with a friend named Isabel Romero, App. 311‐12.

Nagrowski and the other officers proceeded to Romero’s

apartment.    There they found Romero, who told them that Saenz

and her child had been in the apartment that morning; at the time,

however, she did not know where they were.  App. 280, 999.

While Nagrowski and the members of the Task Force were

interviewing Beatrice and Romero, other officers were trying to

locate Samuel.    They tracked the location of his phone to an

apartment in Manhattan (which turned out to be Samuel’s

mother’s).  App. 417, 619.  Officers headed to the apartment around

10:00 p.m. At the same time—having not yet discounted the

possibility that Saenz’s child had been kidnapped—a hostage

negotiator called Samuel’s phone.  App. 416‐18, 620‐22.

Samuel answered, and the negotiator asked him about the

complaint he had filed with the department.   Samuel stated, as he

had in the complaint, that Saenz’s child was being abused and the

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police were failing to appropriately respond.    App. 621.    The

negotiator told Samuel that Saenz and her child had been kidnapped

and asked him to come to the 72nd Precinct; Samuel responded that

they had not been kidnapped and that he would not come to the

precinct willingly.  He then hung up.  App. 621‐24.

A short time later, officers knocked on the door of Samuel’s

mother’s apartment.   According to Samuel, his mother opened the

door a foot or two; Samuel, seeing Detectives Karolkowski and

Failla, stepped in front of her and tried to shut it, but Karolkowski

forced it open.    App. 627‐28.    According to defendants, Samuel

invited them in.  App. 428.

Karolkowski and Failla, along with Detective Mazza, entered

the apartment, and Karolkowski and Failla approached Samuel.  

App. 629.  Karolkowski “gripped” Samuel’s shoulder.  Id.  Without

placing him in handcuffs, officers led Samuel out of the apartment

and down a flight of stairs to the street.  App. 636.  Samuel did not

fight back, but by his own admission he “resist[ed],” App. 640, by

stiffening his legs as the officers “pushed” him along, App. 633.  

This use of light force caused Samuel no injury.  App. 726.

Once outside, the officers placed Samuel in the backseat of an

unmarked police car.    Failla and Detective Chan were sitting in

front.    App. 640‐41.    According to Samuel’s trial testimony, an

unidentified officer suddenly opened the cruiser’s back door,

grabbed Samuel, and punched him a number of times.  App. 643‐44.  

Samuel reenacted this event during trial.    Based on his

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demonstration, Judge Weinstein stated on the record that the assault

lasted between ten and twenty seconds, nearer to ten than twenty.  

App. 931.    But another witness testified that the assault lasted at

least one minute and as many as two.  App. 562.  Neither Failla nor

Chan, sitting in front, tried to intercede.  App. 643‐44.

Shortly after Samuel’s arrest, police located the child in the

Duane Reade photos.    He had not been kidnapped or, indeed,

harmed at all; he had been with his mother.   The two were found

safe late at night on June 30, 2010.   App. 505‐06.   The lone charge

against Samuel—endangering the welfare of a child, in violation of

N.Y. Penal Law § 260.10—was eventually dropped.    Figueroa v.

Mazza, 59 F. Supp. 3d 481, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Pl.’s Br. 19.

II. The District Court Proceeding

Samuel filed suit against the City of New York and a number

of individual officers, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

New York law for Fourth Amendment and state‐law violations.7  As

 

7 Title 42 of the United States Code, section 1983, creates a private right of

action for damages against a person who, acting under color of state law,

deprives another of a right secured by the laws of the United States.  Rehberg v.

Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012).  It provides, in relevant part:  

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

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relevant here, he sought relief on four theories: that (1) Mazza,

Nagrowski, Karolkowski, Failla, and Chan arrested him without

probable cause; (2) Karolkowski and Failla used excessive force (and

committed an assault under state law) while arresting him; (3) Failla

and Chan failed to intervene when an unidentified officer assaulted

him following his arrest; and (4) Mazza, Karolkowski, Failla, and

Chan unlawfully entered his mother’s apartment without a warrant.  

See Figueroa, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 485; Third Am. Compl. at 22‐25,

Figueroa v. Mazza, No. 11 Civ. 3160 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2014),

ECF No. 107.

Defendants moved for summary judgment.  See Mem. Supp.

Mot. Summ. J., Figueroa v. Mazza, No. 11 Civ. 3160 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y.

July 31, 2014), ECF No. 146.    The District Court granted their

motions as to the § 1983 unlawful‐entry claims on the ground that

Samuel did not reside in his mother’s apartment and consequently

lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property.  Tr. Oral

Ruling at 9, Figueroa v. Mazza, No. 11 Civ. 3160 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y.

Aug. 21, 2014), ECF No. 220.  The remaining claims were tried to a

jury, which returned verdicts against all defendants on the § 1983

false arrest claims and against Karolkowski and Failla on the § 1983

excessive force and state‐law assault claims.  Figueroa, 59 F. Supp. 3d

at 487.    The jury failed to reach a verdict on the § 1983 failure‐to‐

 

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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intervene claims against Failla and Chan, and a mistrial was

declared with respect to those claims only.  Id.

Following the verdict, defendants moved for relief under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).  Concluding that the evidence

submitted to the jury was insufficient to support a verdict as to any

of the claims, including the failure‐to‐intervene claims on which the

jury could not reach a verdict, the District Court granted defendants’

motions and entered judgment in their favor.

III. Samuel’s Appeal

Samuel timely appealed the District Court’s September 30,

2014 judgment.    He contends that the District Court erred in

entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants on his

claims for (1) false arrest, (2) excessive force and assault, (3) failure

to intervene, and (4) unlawful entry.    He also challenges a May 1,

2014 order of the District Court denying his request for further

discovery.

We find no error in the District Court’s decision to deny

Samuel further discovery, and we agree with the District Court that

defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Samuel’s

false arrest, excessive force, and assault claims.    We conclude,

however, that the District Court erred in (1) granting summary

judgment in defendants’ favor on Samuel’s unlawful‐entry claims,

and (2) granting Rule 50(b) relief in defendants’ favor on Samuel’s

failure‐to‐intervene claims.    As to these claims, we vacate the

judgment and remand for further proceedings.

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DISCUSSION

We review de novo both the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment and its grant of relief under Rule 50(b), “construing all

facts in favor of the nonmoving party.”  Runner v. N.Y. Stock Exch.,

Inc., 568 F.3d 383, 386 (2d Cir. 2009).    Summary judgment may be

granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.”    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).    A “material” fact is one

capable of influencing the case’s outcome under governing

substantive law, and a “genuine” dispute is one as to which the

evidence would permit a reasonable juror to find for the party

opposing the motion.    Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986).  “The standard for post‐verdict judgment as a matter of

law is the same as for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.”8  

 

8 We pause to note that, although the standard applied is the same in each

case, Rule 50 motions and summary‐judgment motions are decided on different

evidentiary records.    Because “summary judgment motions are usually made

before trial,” they are “decided on documentary evidence.”  Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (internal quotation marks omitted).    It follows from the purpose of the

summary‐judgment device—to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of

material fact for trial—that any evidence considered on summary judgment must

be reducible to admissible form.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Santos v. Murdock,

243 F.3d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 2001).   By examining such documentary evidence as

could be admitted at trial, a court adjudicating a summary‐judgment motion

determines whether any reasonable juror could, if presented with that evidence

at trial, find for the nonmovant.

The Rule 50 inquiry differs.    Because “[Rule 50] motions are made at

trial,” they are decided not on what evidence could have been admitted, but on

“the evidence that has been admitted.”    Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (emphasis

supplied) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rothstein v. Carriere, 373 F.3d

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Runner, 568 F.3d at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed.

R. Civ. P. 50(a)‐(b).

The District Court’s discovery order is reviewed with a lighter

touch.  District courts have “wide latitude to determine the scope of

discovery”; a discovery ruling will warrant relief on appeal only if it

constitutes an “abuse of discretion.”  In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab.

Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 103 (2d Cir. 2008).  

I. False Arrest

The District Court granted Rule 50(b) relief on Samuel’s false

arrest claims on the ground that defendants had probable cause to

 

275, 284 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[O]nce a trial has occurred, the focus is on the evidence

that was actually admitted at trial, not on the earlier summary judgment

record.”).  What we care about at the Rule 50 stage is not whether the nonmovant

has managed to collect evidence sufficient to support his cause, but whether he

has actually put that evidence before the jury charged with deciding the dispute.  

Evidence kept hidden under a bushel, never brought out to enlighten the

factfinder, does not figure in the calculus.  

For that reason, we are unable to endorse our dissenting colleague’s view

that “[the record that] should properly be considered on the issue of arguable

probable cause [as to Samuel’s false arrest claims] . . . includes all relevant

evidence in the district court’s record, not just the evidence admitted at trial.”  

Dissenting Op. at 2.  Samuel brought his false arrest claims to trial and, at trial,

offered evidence to support them.  In considering defendants’ Rule 50 motion as

to those claims, the District Court properly confined its review to the trial record,

see Figueroa, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 486‐87, and we must do the same in considering the

claims on appeal.  Accordingly, our analysis of Samuel’s false arrest claims does

not take account of evidence—such as a series of written reports from a Detective

Hawkins concerning Saenz’s mid‐June complaint to police—that was never put

before the jury, but on which our dissenting colleague thinks it appropriate to

rely.  See Dissenting Op. at 3.

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arrest him.    We need not determine whether probable cause was

indeed present.  See Sudler v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 159, 168 (2d

Cir. 2012) (“We may affirm on any ground supported by the

record.”).  Even if it was not, defendants are entitled to judgment as

a matter of law on the basis of qualified immunity because, in light

of the facts known to police at the time of Samuel’s arrest, an officer

“of reasonable competence” could have concluded that the arrest

was justified by probable cause.  See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

341 (1986).   

The existence of probable cause to arrest—even for a crime

other than the one identified by the arresting officer—will defeat a

claim of false arrest under the Fourth Amendment.    Devenpeck v.

Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152‐54 (2004).  “Probable cause to arrest exists

when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy

information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant

a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be

arrested has committed or is committing a crime.”  Escalera v. Lunn,

361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  

Probable cause is a “fluid” standard that “does not demand hard

certainties or mechanistic inquiries”; nor does it “demand that an

officer’s good‐faith belief that a suspect has committed or is

committing a crime be correct or more likely true than false.”  Zalaski

v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 389, 390 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).    Rather, it requires only facts

establishing “the kind of fair probability” on which a “reasonable

and prudent” person, as opposed to a “legal technician[ ],” would

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rely.  Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Even if we determine that an officer made an arrest without

probable cause, our inquiry concerning that officer’s individual

liability is not at an end.  The defense of qualified immunity “shields

law enforcement officers from § 1983 claims for money damages

provided that their conduct does not violate clearly established

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have been

aware.”  Zalaski, 723 F.3d at 388.  The doctrine aims to give officials

room to act with confidence in gray areas by absolving from

personal liability “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.”    Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308

(2015) (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341).

In the context of § 1983 actions predicated on allegations of

false arrest, we have held that an arresting officer is entitled to

qualified immunity so long as “arguable probable cause” was

present when the arrest was made.  Zalaski, 723 F.3d at 390 (internal

quotation marks omitted).    A police offer had arguable probable

cause “if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to

believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable

competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was

met.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Put another way, an

arresting officer will find protection under the defense of qualified

immunity unless “no reasonably competent officer” could have

concluded, based on the facts known at the time of arrest, that

probable cause existed.  See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.

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This point merits emphasis.    When a plaintiff alleges that a

law enforcement officer’s official conduct renders him personally

liable in damages, our inquiry is not whether the officer should have

acted as he did.    Nor is it whether a singular, hypothetical entity

exemplifying the “reasonable officer”—a creature akin to the

“reasonable man” of the law of torts, see Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 283 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1975)—would have acted in the

same way.   It is instead whether any reasonable officer, out of the

wide range of reasonable people who enforce the laws in this

country, could have determined that the challenged action was

lawful.  See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341; compare Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d

139, 154 n.16 (2d Cir. 2007), with id. at 169‐70 (Sotomayor, J.,

concurring).   

Applying this standard, we hold that defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity on Samuel’s claims of false arrest.    We

address, first, why it was reasonable for the arresting officers to have

concluded that a crime had been committed; and, second, why it

was reasonable for them to have concluded that Samuel committed

it.

A. Defendants’ Belief that a Crime Had Been Committed

Samuel does not appear to contest—and at all events, we have

no trouble concluding—that, early in their investigation, defendants

developed evidence sufficient to warrant a reasonable officer in the

belief that the child in the Duane Reade photos had been the victim

of a crime.  Karolkowski testified that he had believed the pictures to

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be proof‐of‐life photos—that is, photos taken to establish that a

kidnapped person is still alive and can be saved through payment of

a ransom.  See App. 510.  Absent some competing explanation for the

presence of the newspaper and date‐stamped money order—and

taking into account the photos’ disturbing content—the officers had

probable cause to believe that the boy had been kidnapped.  We do

not understand Samuel to argue otherwise.

Other officers, in the early going, formed the conclusion that

the Duane Reade photos were examples of child pornography.  See

App. 222‐23.  That view was also justified.  Though Samuel does not

appear to argue to the contrary, we pause to explain why.

Under New York law in effect at the time of the arrest, a

person would commit the offense of “promoting a sexual

performance by a child” if, “knowing the character and content

thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which

includes sexual conduct by a child less than seventeen years of age,”

N.Y. Penal Law § 263.15 (McKinney 2001); a person would commit

the offense of “possessing a sexual performance by a child” if,

“knowing the character and content thereof, he knowingly has in his

possession or control any performance which includes sexual

conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age,” id. § 263.16

(McKinney 1996).  As used in each statute, the term “performance”

includes photographs, id. § 263.00(4) (McKinney 2003), and the term

“sexual conduct” includes “lewd exhibition of the genitals,” id. §

263.00(3).    The statute does not define “lewd exhibition of the

genitals,” but the New York courts have used a six‐factor test to

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determine whether a given exhibition qualifies as “lewd”:

(1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on

the child’s genitalia or pubic area;  

(2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is

sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or a pose generally

associated with sexual activity;  

(3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose,

or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the

child;  

(4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or

nude;

(5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness

or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; [and]

(6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed

to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.

People v. Horner, 752 N.Y.S.2d 147, 149‐50 (3d Dep’t 2002) (quoting

United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d sub

nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987)).  Not all

of the elements described in the foregoing factors need be present

for a depiction to qualify.   Id. at 150.   A court must consider “the

combined effect of the setting, attire, pose and emphasis on the

genitals and whether it is designed to elicit a sexual response in the

viewer, albeit perhaps not the average viewer, but perhaps in the

pedophile viewer.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   

Applying this standard to the Duane Reade photos, we

conclude that the officers who viewed them at the outset of the

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investigation had probable cause to believe that they constituted

child pornography (or, in the language of the New York statute, a

“sexual performance by a child”).   In a number of the photos, the

child’s genitals are the primary object of focus; indeed, some photos

show nothing else save the child’s lower torso and upper thighs.  

See, e.g., App. 1039, 1047; cf. United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 249‐

50 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying the Dost factors and observing that the

photographic subject was depicted with “his genitals prominent at

or about the center of the frame”).  In some, the child appears to be

unnaturally posed and the shot taken to capture only his genitalia,

perineum, and anus.    See App. 1048‐50; cf. People v. Bimonte, 726

N.Y.S.2d 830, 836 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2001).  In each photo, the child is

nude.    The suggestion vel non of sexual “coyness” is, of course,

inapplicable in the case of a subject so young, see Wiegand, 812 F.2d

at 1244 (“The district court noted the unlikelihood of the 10‐year‐old

girl intending any sexual invitation by her pose.”), and though

officers had no direct way to divine whether the photographer

intended the photos to elicit a sexual response in the viewer, the

photos’ content permitted an inference of such intent.   

Thus, when officers first viewed the Duane Reade photos,

they were justified in concluding that the photos qualified as

unlawful child pornography and that a violation of § 263.15,

§ 263.16, or both had been committed.  Moreover, the determination

that an unknown person had produced child pornography would

easily have supported a reasonable conclusion that that person had

committed a separate offense, that of endangering the welfare of a

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child, by “knowingly act[ing] in a manner likely to be injurious to

the physical, mental or welfare of” the boy in the photographs.  N.Y.

Penal Law § 260.10(1); see People v. Pinkoski, 752 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425 (3d

Dep’t 2002).     

Samuel’s principal argument is that, irrespective of what

defendants might reasonably have thought at the beginning of their

investigation, they had, by the time of his arrest, uncovered new

information that vitiated probable cause.  More particularly, Samuel

argues that when the officers learned from Isabel Romero that Saenz

and her child had been together at Romero’s apartment on the

morning of June 30, it fatally undermined the hypothesis that the

child had been kidnapped (and proof‐of‐life photos taken) days

earlier.  He also argues that, when officers came to realize that Saenz

had taken similar photos in the past for the avowed purpose of

demonstrating that the child’s father was abusing him, it should

have negated any reasonable belief that the images were

pornographic.  See Pl.’s Br. 26‐27.

Samuel is correct in noting that an officer making a probable‐

cause determination is not at liberty to ignore evidence tending to

exculpate the suspect, see Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d

Cir. 2006), and that the officers were accordingly not entitled to

disregard the information from Romero or their knowledge of

Saenz’s earlier photos.  But we nevertheless conclude that, even after

learning that Saenz had recently told police that she took nude

photos of her son to show that the boy’s father was abusing him,

officers of reasonable competence could have (1) disbelieved Saenz’s

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explanation and concluded that there was probable cause to think

that the photos constituted child pornography, or (2) accepted

Saenz’s explanation but nevertheless concluded that those

responsible for the photos had endangered the welfare of a child.9   

We turn first to whether the officers who arrested Samuel

could reasonably have doubted the truth of Saenz’s description of

the photos’ purpose.  Her explanation plainly bears to some degree

on the reasonableness of the conclusion that the photos were

pornographic in nature.  The question is whether that explanation so

thoroughly and reliably accounted for the officers’ earlier suspicions

that it negated any reasonable belief that probable cause existed.   

We conclude that it did not.    Probable cause does not

necessarily disappear simply because “an innocent explanation may

be consistent with” facts that an officer views as suspicious.10  

Panetta, 460 F.3d at 395.    The officers were not required to accept

Saenz’s account on faith.   Rather, they were entitled to weigh her

explanation (along with its context: that Saenz included it in a report

to police doubtless lent it some credibility) against the facts on the

other side of the ledger.

 

9 In light of these conclusions, we need not determine whether a

reasonable officer could have determined that, notwithstanding Romero’s

statement that she had seen Saenz and her child on June 30, 2010, there was

probable cause to believe that the boy had been kidnapped.

10 We discuss below whether Saenz’s explanation was indeed “innocent”

or must necessarily have been viewed as such by a reasonable officer.

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Those facts were unsettling.  As discussed above, the photos,

considered by themselves, appeared to be examples of child

pornography.    A person had called Duane Reade—eleven times—

“pleading” that the photographic order be deleted and the photos

not developed.    SPA 8.    From this, a police officer could have

inferred that the caller was desperate to ensure that nobody viewed

the photos—an inference consistent with the hypothesis that they

were contraband.

Of course, such agitation might also have resulted from

Saenz’s fear that the explicit photos of her son would not remain

private, and to that extent her calls to the pharmacy arguably

comported with her explanation of the photos’ purpose.  But other

facts known to the officers did not.    An officer might have

questioned, for instance, why a person legitimately concerned with

the child’s welfare would have forced him to submit to a series of

elaborately staged nude photos when the child was obviously in

some distress.  See App. 1036‐57.  So too might an officer have asked

why a person looking after the child’s interests would have stripped

him naked in the restroom of a McDonald’s, of all places, to

participate in the photo session.  See App. 264‐65.  Indeed, an officer

might well have hesitated to believe that a concerned mother would

have delivered such explicit photos of her child to be developed at a

pharmacy, where they were likely to be viewed by third parties

during processing.    All in all, the photos of the child were so

disturbing, and the circumstances so bizarre, that it cannot be said

that no reasonable officer could have rejected Saenz’s explanation

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notwithstanding its arguable consistency with the known facts.

Furthermore, even if defendants had been constrained to

accept Saenz’s account of the photos’ purpose—and thus could not

have concluded that they constituted child pornography11—a

reasonable officer could nonetheless have determined that those

responsible for the photos had endangered the child’s welfare in

violation of § 260.10(1).    Viewed without knowledge of the

circumstances surrounding their creation, the photos appear to be

examples of child pornography.  Even if Saenz’s subjective intent in

creating the photos took them outside the ambit of New York’s child

pornography statutes (and any and all reasonable officers would

have to so conclude), the fact remains that Saenz not only produced,

but took to a pharmacy for development, photos of her child that

were by all appearances pornographic.   

An officer could have concluded that in so doing, Saenz

(along with anyone who had aided her) created a serious risk to the

child’s welfare in violation of § 260.10(1)—even if she did not intend

to do so, see People v. Fernandez, 5 N.Y.S.3d 436, 436 (1st Dep’t 2015)

(specific intent to cause injury is not an element of endangering the

 

11 We will assume that if a reasonable officer were to view these photos

knowing why they were produced, he would be forced to conclude that they are

not pornographic, see Horner, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 149 (reviewing court must consider

“whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response

in the viewer” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and that, accordingly, an

officer required to accept Saenz’s explanation of the photos’ provenance could

not reasonably have determined that § 263.15 or § 263.16 had been violated.

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welfare of a child); People v. Vega, 712 N.Y.S.2d 283, 286 n.3 (N.Y.

Crim. Ct. 2000) (same), and even if the risk did not materialize into

actual harm, People v. Simmons, 699 N.E.2d 417, 418 (N.Y. 1998)

(“Actual harm to the child need not result for liability under

[§ 260.10(1)] to attach . . . .”).  It should have been clear to Saenz that

Duane Reade employees would likely see the photos in the normal

course of developing them and that, in taking the photos to the

pharmacy, she was sharing with perfect strangers a series of images

of her son that bore the objective indicia of child pornography.  We

cannot say that no reasonable officer could have concluded that

these facts, viewed in the light of governing law, provided probable

cause to believe that Saenz had “knowingly act[ed] in a manner

likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of” her

son.    See N.Y. Penal Law § 260.10(1); Pinkoski, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 422,

425 (reversing trial court’s dismissal of indictment and reinstating

count of endangering the welfare of a child where the defendant

took explicit photographs of her five‐year‐old daughter and brought

them to be developed at a Wal‐Mart); cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal.,

535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) (observing that the circulation of images that

constitute child pornography causes continuing harm to the children

portrayed).   

In sum, we conclude that prior to arresting Samuel,

defendants could reasonably have concluded that they possessed

probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed.

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B. Defendants’ Belief That Samuel Committed the Crime

Samuel argues that, even if defendants could reasonably have

concluded that Saenz’s child had been the victim of a crime, they

had no basis on which to conclude that Samuel had committed it.  

We disagree.   

At the time of Samuel’s arrest, officers possessed several

independent items of evidence linking him to the Duane Reade

photos and the suspected crime (or crimes).  First, on the morning of

June 29, 2010, someone used Samuel’s phone to call Duane Reade—

eleven times—to request that the photos of Saenz’s son be deleted.  

App. 222, 679‐81.    It is true, as the District Court noted, that

defendants did not know that Samuel was present when these calls

were made (although he was).  Figueroa, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 490.  But

“for the purpose of qualified immunity and probable cause,” we do

not deny officers the benefit of “reasonable inferences [drawn] from

the facts they possess at the time of a seizure.”  Cerrone v. Brown, 246

F.3d 194, 203 (2d Cir. 2001).  Defendants, knowing that someone had

used Samuel’s phone to place a number of calls to the pharmacy,

could reasonably have concluded that Samuel was in some way

connected with the photos and probably had knowledge of the order

the caller was attempting to cancel.

The particulars of Samuel’s complaint to the police on June 28,

2010—particulars which, as he emphasizes, were known to the

officers, Pl.’s Br. 14, 24‐25—fortified this conclusion.    Samuel had

lodged the complaint on behalf of Saenz, the mother of the child in

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the Duane Reade photos.  App. 272‐74, 596.  Samuel had referred to

the police report made by Saenz in which she had disclosed to

officers her practice of photographing her son nude; he had also

revealed his awareness that explicit photographs of the boy had

been taken in the recent past.    App. 596—597.    This information

strengthened the link between Samuel and the photos.

Finally, during an interview with Detective Nagrowski,

Saenz’s mother Beatrice confirmed the connections between Samuel,

Saenz, and the child.   Beatrice told Nagrowski that Saenz was the

mother of the boy in the photos and that Samuel not only knew

Saenz, but was a strong source of malign influence in her life.  She

claimed that Saenz had become a member of his cult, and Samuel

had physically harmed her during the course of an exorcism.  App.

272‐74.   To be sure, defendants were not at liberty to accept these

assertions uncritically.    Beatrice was, by her own admission,

involved in a custody fight with her daughter, App. 307, and

Nagrowski was aware that Samuel had filed a complaint with police

concerning Beatrice, App. 998.  Accordingly, Beatrice had reason to

speak ill of Saenz and Samuel, and a reasonable officer might have

recognized that this bore on her credibility.    But, at a minimum,

Nagrowski’s interview with Beatrice provided further confirmation

that Samuel was closely linked with Saenz and with the child in the

Duane Reade photos.

We need not decide whether this information, taken as a

whole, provided probable cause to conclude that Samuel had

committed the crimes discussed above by participating in the

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creation of the photos or the attempt to have them developed.  We

decide only that, at the time of his arrest, reasonable police officers

could have disagreed on the point.    In view of Samuel’s close

association with Saenz, his knowledge of the explicit photos, and the

repeated use of his phone in the attempt to cancel the order at

Duane Reade, we cannot say that the officers who participated in his

arrest were either “plainly incompetent” or “knowingly violat[ing]

the law.”  Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341).  

Those officers are therefore entitled to the protection of qualified

immunity.

II. Excessive Force and Assault

The District Court granted Rule 50(b) relief in favor of

Karolkowski and Failla on Samuel’s excessive force and state‐law

assault claims,12 concluding that the force applied by the officers was

reasonable as a matter of law.13  Samuel argues that the Court erred

in so concluding.  We disagree.

Whether the force used to effect an arrest is “reasonable” or

“excessive” turns on “a careful balancing of the nature and quality

 

12 These claims pertain to the conduct of defendants in apprehending

Samuel within his mother’s apartment and escorting him outside.  They do not

relate to the incident during which Samuel allegedly was punched while sitting

in the police cruiser; the officer who is said to have perpetrated that assault has

never been identified.

13 A lawful arrest is not an assault or battery under New York law,

provided the force used is reasonable.    See Cunningham v. United States, 472 F.

Supp. 2d 366, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (collecting New York cases).

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of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests

against the countervailing government interests at stake.”  Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).  

In conducting this balancing, we look to a number of factors,

including “the need for the application of force, the relationship

between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent

of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”    Johnson v.

Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251‐52 (2d Cir. 2001)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, defendants did nothing more than “grip[ ]” Samuel’s

shoulders, App. 629, and “push[ ]” him out of his mother’s

apartment to the waiting police car, App. 633.  The officers had need

to push Samuel along because he lightly resisted by stiffening his

legs, App. 639‐40, and their pushing caused him no injury, App. 726.  

There is no suggestion in the record that this application of light

force was actuated by malice or a desire to cause harm.  

Accordingly, every factor enumerated in Johnson weighs against

Samuel, who complains basically of the kind of de minimis physical

contact common to virtually every custodial arrest.  See Graham, 490

U.S. at 396 (“[T]he right to make an arrest or investigatory stop

necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical

coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”).  The District Court did not

err in overriding the jury’s verdict and entering judgment for

defendants on these claims.

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III. Failure to Intervene

On Samuel’s failure‐to‐intervene claim, on which the jury

failed to reach a verdict, the District Court entered judgment for

Failla and Chan.  Samuel argues that this was error, and we agree.

A police officer is under a duty to intercede and prevent

fellow officers from subjecting a citizen to excessive force, and may

be held liable for his failure to do so if he observes the use of force

and has sufficient time to act to prevent it.  O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839

F.2d 9, 11‐12 (2d Cir. 1988).  Liability attaches on the theory that the

officer, by failing to intervene, becomes a “tacit collaborator” in the

illegality.  See id.

The District Court concluded that, as a matter of law,

defendants did not have sufficient time to intercede when an

unidentified officer allegedly assaulted Samuel in the back of the

police cruiser.    In support, it pointed to Samuel’s testimony

describing the attack.    On the stand, Samuel made hand gestures

while stating, “boom boom boom boom boom.”    App. 644.    The

Court timed this description at roughly ten seconds (perhaps a bit

longer, but at all events “well under” twenty seconds).   App. 931.  

When an assault “take[s] place in ‘less than thirty seconds,’” wrote

the Court, officers who are present lack “sufficient time to intercede

in order to prevent the assault.”    Figueroa, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 490

(quoting Sash v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 531, 545 (S.D.N.Y.

2009)).   

For three reasons, we conclude that this was error.    First,

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Samuel never claimed that he was reenacting the duration of the

attack.  He was asked to describe what happened after the officers

placed him in a police car.  App. 642.  In construing the evidence in

the light most favorable to Samuel, the District Court should not

have interpreted his hand gestures as a formal demonstration or

reenactment of the total time frame of the punches.  

Second, although Samuel’s gestures at trial apparently lasted

less than twenty seconds, a separate witness present during the

event testified that the assault went on for at least one minute and as

many as two.  See App. 562.  Defendants do not argue that Samuel’s

demonstration qualifies as a judicial admission that conclusively

establishes the duration of the alleged assault.  See Hoodho v. Holder,

558 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2009) (defining judicial admissions as

“formal concessions in the pleadings in the case or stipulations by a

party or counsel that have the effect of withdrawing a fact from

issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact”

(quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence § 254 (6th ed. 2006))).    Nor is

there any basis for treating it as such.   A party that admits on the

witness stand a fact damaging to his case is ordinarily free to

contradict that fact through the testimony of other witnesses and

argue that their testimony should be believed over his own.  Such an

argument might cut no ice with the finder of fact, but the matter lies

squarely in the jury’s province.  Lee v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 760 F.3d

523, 528 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a plaintiff’s testimony did not

qualify as a judicial admission and observing that a party “should be

able to testify honestly to his memory of what happened and still

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have his lawyer argue that on the evidence as a whole it is more

probable than not that the memory was faulty”); Keller v. United

States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1198 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995) (“When a party testifying

at trial or during a deposition admits a fact which is adverse to his

claim or defense, it is generally preferable to treat that testimony as

solely an evidentiary admission [rather than a conclusive judicial

admission].”); cf. Keepers, Inc. v. City of Milford, 807 F.3d 24, 34‐35 (2d

Cir. 2015) (stating that deposition testimony given pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) does not “bind a corporate

party irrevocably to whatever its designee happens to recollect

during her testimony”).    Here, in holding Samuel to his own

testimony, construing that testimony unfavorably, and disregarding

more favorable evidence given by a different witness, the District

Court strayed into the realm of improper fact‐finding.

The District Court again strayed into that realm when stating

that the assault consisted of only five punches.    See Figueroa, 59 F.

Supp. 3d at 487.  Samuel presented eyewitness testimony at trial that

the assault involved between six and twelve punches, App. 555, and

that it included not only the period of punching but an additional

period during which the unidentified officer screamed obscenities at

him, grabbed him by the neck, choked him, and shook him, App.

647.  To consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Samuel,

the District Court should have analyzed the attack as a one‐to‐two‐

minute incident, consisting of as many as twelve punches following

a period of choking and shaking.

These conclusions require us to vacate so much of the

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judgment as dismissed Samuel’s failure‐to‐intervene claims and

remand to the District Court.14    We pause, however, to address a

third error in the District Court’s analysis, on the theory that it may

prove instructive should Samuel’s claims be retried.

Having found that the alleged assault on Samuel lasted less

than twenty seconds, the District Court granted judgment for Failla

and Chan because “[a]ssaults that take place in ‘less than thirty

seconds’ do not offer police officers sufficient time to intercede in

order to prevent the assault.”    Figueroa, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 490

(quoting Sash, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 545).  We think this bright‐line rule

unsupportable.    Failure‐to‐intervene claims can arise out of a

limitless variety of factual circumstances.  In each case, the question

whether a defendant had a realistic chance to intercede will turn on

such factors as the number of officers present, their relative

placement, the environment in which they acted, the nature of the

assault, and a dozen other considerations.    Among these

considerations, of course, the assault’s duration will always be

relevant and will frequently assume great importance.    See, e.g.,

O’Neill, 839 F.2d at 11‐12 (holding that the defendant officer lacked

time to intervene because a different officer hit the plaintiff three

times in “rapid succession”).  But this does not permit distillation of

a hard‐and‐fast temporal cutoff of the kind relied on by the District

Court.    Instead, courts must evaluate each case on its own facts,

 

14 Failla and Chan do not argue that, if a constitutional violation indeed

occurred, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

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keeping in mind that circumstances other than an assault’s duration

might bear significantly on an officer’s ability to stop it from

happening.    The essential inquiry is whether, under the

circumstances actually presented, an officer’s failure to intervene

permits a reasonable conclusion that he became a “tacit

collaborator” in the unlawful conduct of another.  See id.

Turning to the facts before us, we conclude that Samuel’s

failure‐to‐intervene claims—even assuming that the assault lasted

less than twenty seconds—were for the jury to decide.  Taking into

account all the circumstances and viewing them favorably to

Samuel, as required in reviewing a trial court’s decision to override

the role assigned to the jury, we cannot hold that the assault

occurred so quickly that the defendant officers lacked time to

intercede as a matter of law.    Samuel testified that, at the time he

was assaulted, he was sitting in the back of a police cruiser and

Failla and Chan were sitting in front.  App. 643‐44.  Nothing in the

record suggests that they would have for any reason found it

difficult to reach into the backseat, exit the vehicle to assist Samuel,

or communicate with the officer who committed the assault.  Yet—

according to Samuel’s testimony—both officers sat passively

through the entire event.  App. 643‐44, 931.  In light of the officers’

placement relative to Samuel, the apparent absence of any obstacles

that might have hindered their ability to intercede, and the assault’s

stated duration, a reasonable juror could infer that defendants

became, by their inaction, “tacit collaborator[s]” in the unlawful

conduct alleged.

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In sum, in entering judgment for defendants on Samuel’s

failure‐to‐intervene claims, the District Court erred by engaging in

improper fact‐finding and by misapplying the relevant legal

standard.  As to those claims, the judgment will be vacated and the

cause remanded.

IV. Unlawful Entry into Samuel’s Mother’s Apartment

On Samuel’s claim of unlawful entry, the District Court

granted judgment for defendants on the ground that Samuel lacked

a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother’s apartment.   We

hold that this was error.

A person’s ability to assert a claim of unlawful entry under

the Fourth Amendment depends on whether he “has a legitimate

expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”   Rakas v. Illinois, 439

U.S. 128, 143 (1978).    Though a person might subjectively expect

privacy in a particular location, that “subjective expectation of

privacy is legitimate” only “if it is one that society is prepared to

recognize as reasonable.”    Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95‐96

(1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Fourth Amendment specifically provides that “the

people” shall be secure against “unreasonable searches” in “their”

houses, U.S. Const. amend. IV, but it has long been recognized that a

person may claim a legitimate expectation of privacy in a dwelling

other than his own.  The Supreme Court held in Minnesota v. Olson,

495 U.S. at 98, that an “overnight guest” can legitimately expect

privacy in his host’s home.    The Court has never extended this

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holding to embrace all social guests, but it is clear that “overnight”

status is not a precondition to a guest’s ability to contest a search of

his host’s dwelling.    See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)

(holding that a guest lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in his

host’s apartment because there was nothing “similar to the overnight

guest relationship in Olson to suggest a degree of acceptance into the

household” (emphasis supplied)); United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d

313, 321 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Although Olson establishes that status as an

overnight guest can give rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy, it

does not suggest that such status is required before a guest can have

privacy in the home.” (citation omitted)).   

In determining whether a guest who is not an “overnight

guest” may legitimately expect privacy in his host’s home, we look

to a number of different factors.  In Minnesota v. Carter, for example,

the Supreme Court focused on whether the guest’s visit was social

or commercial in nature, the length of time the guest spent on the

premises, and the presence or absence of a previous connection

between the guest and the householder.  525 U.S. at 90‐91.  Courts

have also considered whether the guest possesses a key to the

dwelling, is permitted to make use of the premises in the

householder’s absence, Fields, 113 F.3d at 320, or keeps belongings in

the host’s home, see United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1287 (10th

Cir. 2003).  These and related considerations shed useful light on our

ultimate inquiry: whether the host has so liberally shared his own

privacy interest with his guest that it shelters the guest against

unreasonable government intrusion.

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With these principles in mind, we turn to the particulars of

Samuel’s relationship with his mother’s apartment.    During his

deposition, Samuel stated that he was “visiting” his mother on the

evening of June 30, 2010 and did not live in her apartment (or,

indeed, in the same borough), but he would not say where he did

live.  Dep. Eli Samuel at 18‐20, Figueroa v. Mazza, No. 11 Civ. 3160

(JBW) (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2014), ECF No. 148‐1.  He also stated that he

was about to leave the apartment at the time the officers arrived, but

he did not say whether he intended to return that night.  Id. at 24.  

After defendants moved for summary judgment, Samuel submitted

an affidavit—which the District Court did not exclude—

supplementing this information.  In the affidavit, he stated that for

more than a year prior to his arrest, he had been staying at his

mother’s apartment three nights a week.15  Decl. Eli Samuel at 2 ¶ 11,

Figueroa v. Mazza, No. 11 Civ. 3160 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014),

ECF No. 157‐9.

The District Court concluded that this information, even

viewed in the light most favorable to Samuel, did not demonstrate

that he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother’s

apartment.    In an oral ruling granting defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, the Court observed that Samuel “was not a

 

15 A party may not create an issue of fact that will defeat summary

judgment by submitting an affidavit that contradicts the party’s prior deposition

testimony, but it is permissible to clarify by affidavit ambiguous or incomplete

deposition testimony.    Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir.

2004).    Nothing in Samuel’s affidavit contradicts the testimony he gave at his

deposition.

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resident” of the apartment, “temporarily or any other way,” and that

“he was about to leave the apartment” at the time of his arrest.  Tr.

Oral Ruling at 9, Figueroa v. Mazza, No. 11 Civ. 3160 (JBW)

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014), ECF No. 220.    For several reasons, we

cannot agree with the District Court’s analysis.16

First, the Court’s emphasis that Samuel did not “reside[ ]” in

his mother’s apartment was misplaced.  A person need not “reside”

in a particular dwelling, in the sense of living primarily at that

location, to enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy when he is on

the premises.    As we have already discussed, a social guest can,

under some circumstances, legitimately expect privacy in his host’s

home.  See Olson, 495 U.S. at 98.

Second—though the District Court’s oral ruling is not

perfectly clear on the point—it appears that the Court might have

concluded that because Samuel “was about to leave the apartment”

when he was arrested, he did not qualify as an “overnight guest”

and thus could not claim a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

property.  Tr. Oral Ruling at 9, Figueroa v. Mazza, No. 11 Civ. 3160

(JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014), ECF No. 220.  (The Court might have

reasoned that if Samuel was leaving the apartment at 10:00 p.m., the

time of his arrest, he was not likely to come back that night.)  Even if

the Court correctly concluded that Samuel was not an “overnight

 

16 As is true of Samuel’s failure‐to‐intervene claims, defendants do not

argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful‐entry claims if

their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.

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guest” as the case law uses the term—a question we need not

decide17—it nonetheless erred in determining that, as a matter of

law, he did not legitimately expect privacy in his mother’s

apartment.

The Fourth Amendment looks with favor on “overnight

guests” not because there is something talismanic about a person’s

intent to stay in a dwelling on a particular night, but because a host’s

willingness to take in a guest to sleep—slumber being a vulnerable

state during which privacy is cherished—indicates that the guest has

been accepted into the private sphere of the household.  Carter, 525

 

17 The cases do not define the phrase.  In Olson, for instance, the defendant

had slept in the searched dwelling the night prior to the search (which occurred

late in the afternoon).   Olson, 495 U.S. at 93‐94, 97 n.6.   But for “several days”

before that, he had been sleeping someplace else, id. at 97 n.6, and the Court did

not discuss whether he had ever slept in the relevant dwelling before or had

planned to sleep there the night after the search occurred.  (The facts suggested

that the defendant had not planned to sleep in the dwelling a second night: the

police had been told that he planned to “leave town.”  Id. at 93.)  The Supreme

Court nevertheless characterized the defendant as an “overnight guest” and held

that he was entitled to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in his

hosts’ home.   

We need not determine what this says about whether Samuel—who often

stayed in his mother’s apartment, but might not have stayed there the night

before his arrest and might not have planned to stay there the night of his

arrest—was an “overnight guest.”  Nor do we think such an exercise would be

particularly useful.    As discussed below, a person’s status as an “overnight

guest” matters because sleeping in a dwelling says much about one’s connection

with the property and one’s expectations while present there; the law can take

account of these considerations without drawing hard lines concerning what

kind of guest counts as an “overnight” one.

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U.S. at 90; Olson, 495 U.S. at 99‐100.    Construing the record in the

light most favorable to Samuel, we conclude that (“overnight guest”

or not) he enjoyed a degree of acceptance into his mother’s home

sufficient to trigger Fourth Amendment protection.    Indeed, each

factor mentioned in Carter weighs strongly in Samuel’s favor.   His

visit was social in nature.  He had, in the past, spent a great deal of

time at the apartment, sleeping there nearly as frequently as he slept

at his own dwelling.  He had a close relationship—indeed, a familial

one—with the apartment’s tenant.  We have found no case denying

Fourth Amendment standing on similar facts, and have found a

number of cases finding Fourth Amendment standing on less

convincing facts.  See, e.g., Fields, 113 F.3d at 321 (concluding that the

defendant possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in an

apartment to which he was invited by a guest of the tenant, and

where he spent “several hours before being interrupted by [a] police

intrusion”); Rhiger, 315 F.3d at 1285‐87 (finding Fourth Amendment

standing in the case of a guest who had known his host for “about

two weeks,” had slept at the host’s home two to four times, and had

once entered the home unannounced to take a nap).

Accordingly, we conclude that Samuel’s unlawful‐entry

claims should have survived a motion for summary judgment.18  We

 

18 Defendants also argue that, even if Samuel enjoyed a legitimate

expectation of privacy in his mother’s apartment, this portion of the judgment

can stand because the trial record shows that Samuel’s mother consented to

defendants’ entry.   We disagree.   The officers so testified, but Samuel testified

that his mother did nothing more than open the door a foot or two before Samuel

stepped in front of her.  App. 627‐28.  If Samuel is believed, his mother did not

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thus vacate so much of the judgment as dismissed those claims and

remand to the District Court for such further pretrial proceedings as

may be appropriate in the circumstances, or for trial.

V. Dismissing the Unnamed Defendants and Closing Discovery

In an order announced on May 1, 2014, the District Court

dismissed from the case all unnamed defendants, reasoning that the

case had been pending for several years and that Samuel still had

not identified the unnamed individuals.    Tr. Proceedings at 46‐47,

Figueroa v. Mazza, No. 11 Civ. 3160 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2014),

ECF No. 119.    Samuel states that in this same order, the District

Court closed discovery.  We are unable to locate any such language

in the order, but it is clear that on several occasions the District

Court refused Samuel’s requests for further discovery of documents.  

See, e.g., Order at 2, Figueroa v. Mazza, No. 11 Civ. 3160 (JBW)

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014), ECF No. 87.

Samuel asserts that the District Court erred or “abused its

discretion” in entering these orders.    He argues that the District

Court dismissed the unnamed defendants and closed discovery

because counsel for defendants represented that all relevant

documents had been produced.  See id.  After the May 1, 2014 order,

however, defendants supplemented discovery by producing 200

pages of new documents—most of it in the month before trial.  Pl.’s

 

consent to defendants’ entering her apartment.  See United States v. Vasquez, 638

F.2d 507, 527 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that merely opening a door when officers

knock is not consent).  

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Br. 39.    Samuel appears to argue that if he had received these

documents earlier, he could have used the information they

contained to depose new witnesses and uncover the identity of some

unnamed defendants.

This argument is unpersuasive.  Samuel does not explain why,

in his view, the District Court was wrong to rely on defense

counsel’s statements that all documents had been turned over.  He

does not argue, for instance, that at the time it made its rulings the

District Court had been made aware of information throwing doubt

on the accuracy of counsel’s representations.19  Rather, he appears to

suggest that the mere fact of defendants’ late production renders the

District Court’s order infirm.  But if the Court had no reason to think

that defendants possessed additional documents—and, indeed, had

excellent reason (counsel’s representations) to think they did not—it

cannot now be faulted for closing discovery and moving the case

toward a conclusion.  Accordingly, we find no error in the District

Court’s discovery rulings.

CONCLUSION

To summarize, we hold as follows:

(1) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect

to Samuel’s false arrest claims, because we cannot say that, in

the circumstances obtaining at the time of Samuel’s arrest, no

 

19 Samuel does not appear to have sought additional discovery after the

new documents were produced.  See Pl.’s Br. 39‐40; Pl.’s Reply Br. 47‐50.

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reasonable police officer could have concluded that probable

cause existed.

(2) The force employed by Detectives Karolkowski and Failla

in effecting Samuel’s arrest was reasonable as a matter of law.

(3) On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable

juror could have determined that Detectives Failla and Chan

had a realistic opportunity to intervene in the alleged assault

on Samuel but failed to do so.

(4) The facts in the summary‐judgment record would have

allowed a reasonable juror to conclude that Samuel enjoyed a

legitimate expectation of privacy in his mother’s apartment.

(5) The District Court did not err or “abuse its discretion”

when it entered rulings dismissing unnamed defendants from

the case and refusing Samuel’s requests for further discovery.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the District Court’s September 30,

2014 judgment insofar as it (1) granted judgment in defendants’

favor on Samuel’s claims for false arrest, excessive force, and assault,

(2) denied further discovery, and (3) dismissed unnamed defendants

from the case.   We VACATE so much of the judgment as granted

judgment in defendants’ favor on Samuel’s claims for failure to

intervene and unlawful entry and REMAND the cause to the

District Court for such further pretrial proceedings as may be

appropriate in the circumstances, or for trial.

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