Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-01789/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-01789-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Edward Rabago Baca,

Petitioner,

v. 

Ryan Thornell, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV- 23-01789-PHX-DJH (JZB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Petitioner Edward Rabago Baca has filed a pro se Petition for the Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.)

I. Summary of Conclusion.

On April 21, 2017, the trial court sentenced Petitioner. Petitioner had 90 days, or 

until July 20, 2017, to properly file a notice of post-conviction relief. Because he did not 

file a notice within that time period, the one-year statute of limitations to file a habeas 

petition began running on July 20, 2018, and expired one year later. Petitioner mailed his 

habeas petition on August 18, 2023. The petition is untimely by several years. The Court 

finds that statutory and equitable tolling are not merited, and Petitioner fails to demonstrate 

actual innocence. The Court concludes the Petition is untimely. Therefore, the Court will 

recommend the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

//

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II. Background. 

A. Facts.

On April 1, 2016, a Maricopa County grand jury returned a 59-count indictment in 

CR 2016-1751 against Petitioner charging him with numerous offenses to include Theft, 

Fraudulent Schemes, Trafficking in Stolen Property, Forgery, and Conducting a Chop 

Shop. (Doc. 6-1, Ex. A, at 4.) The trial court summarized the facts as follows: 

Defendant was arrested in Maricopa County for possession of 

15 stolen trailers, among other charges. The arrest followed the 

theft of six trailers from the yard of a Tucson business. 

Ultimately, Defendant entered into a plea agreement1and pled 

guilty to six counts of theft of means of transportation, all class 

3 felonies; three counts of first-degree trafficking in stolen 

property, all class 3 felonies; and two counts of fraudulent 

schemes and artifices, both class 2 felonies, in Maricopa 

County. This Court found he had two prior felony convictions. 

On April 21, 2017, the Court entered judgment and sentenced 

him to eleven concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest of 

which is 15.75 years. The sentences also run concurrently with 

Defendant’s sentence in CR2014-140939-001.

(Id. at 18-19.)2 Petitioner was sentenced on April 21, 2017. (Doc. 6-1, Ex. D, at 34.)

B. First Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings.

On June 2, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate judgment, which the court 

treated as notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Doc. 6-1, Ex. E, at 38.) On November 

20, 2020, the court found the petition was “untimely by almost three years” and dismissed 

the petition because “Defendant has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted 

in an untimely Rule 33 proceeding.” (Doc. 6-1, Ex. F, at 59.) 

C. Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings.

On July 19, 2021, Petitioner filed a PCR notice asserting Maricopa County lacked 

“subject-matter” jurisdiction and was the improper venue for his case. (Doc. 6-2, Ex. I, at 

1 The plea agreement stipulated to concurrent terms of imprisonment between 10 and 15.75 

years of imprisonment. (Doc. 6-1, Ex. B, at 25.)

2 The Court notes that a Pima County case, based in part on similar facts, was filed and 

dismissed without prejudice on April 17, 2018, in CR 2015-2596-001. (Doc. 6-4 at 49.)

Petitioner argued that the filing of this Pima County case proved there was no “jurisdiction” 

for the Maricopa County charges.

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1). On July 21, 2021, the court dismissed the petition finding “[h]is newest filings are 

untimely and, in any event, he raises no issues that form a cognizable basis for relief.” 

(Doc. 6-2, Ex. J, at 20.) 

D. Third Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings.

On July 27, 2021, Petitioner filed a third PCR petition alleging “ineffective 

assistance, due process, and improper venue arguments” and that Maricopa County lacked 

jurisdiction because the case could only be brought in Pima County. (Doc. 6-3, Ex. K, at 

2.) On September 7, 2021, the court dismissed the petition because “Defendant has failed 

to state a claim for which relief can be granted in a successive Rule 33 proceeding.” (Doc. 

6-3, Ex. L, at 61.)

E. Fourth Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings.

On September 8, 2021, Petitioner filed an amended PCR petition alleging “the court 

[in Maricopa County] did not have subject matter jurisdiction to render a judgment” 

because the case could only be brought in Pima County. (Doc. 6-4, Ex. M, at 2.) On the 

same date, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend the petition. (Doc. 6-5, Ex. N, at 2.) On 

October 19, 2021, the court “reviewed the new filings and finds that Defendant has stated 

no colorable claims or arguments that warrant further briefing or hearing.” (Doc. 6-6, Ex. 

P, at 29.)

F. Fifth Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings.

On February 16, 2022, Petitioner filed a “notice” of post-conviction relief arguing 

a “newly discovered material fact” was found “5 weeks and 8 months after sentence in 

Pima County Superior Court.” (Doc. 6-7, Ex. Q, at 2.) Petitioner argued he learned of the 

lack of venue/jurisdiction issue when he learned “the case began in Pima County.” (Doc. 

6-8 at 13.) On March 17, 2022, the court dismissed the notice. (Doc. 6-8, Ex. S, at 61.) The 

court found Petitioner was aware of the venue issue when Petitioner’s counsel requested 

the Pima County charges be transferred to Maricopa County on October 10, 2016. (Id. at 

63.)

On May 20, 2022, Petitioner filed for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 

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6-9, Ex. T, at 2.) On November 8, 2022, the court denied relief finding Petitioner failed to 

establish the trial court abused its discretion. (Doc. 6-9, Ex. U, at 53.)

III. Petitioner’s Habeas Petition.

On August 18, 2023, Petitioner mailed the instant habeas petition. (Doc. 1 at 80.) 

On August 28, 2023, the Court filed the instant Petition. The Court summarized Petitioner’s

claims as follows: 

Petitioner raises five grounds for relief, alleging violations of his Fifth, Sixth, 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on a lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction (Ground One); a “lack of information” (Ground Two), 

ineffective assistance of counsel (Ground Three), “newly discovered 

evidence/nondisclosure by a prosecutor” (Ground Four), and a jurisdictional 

defect in his plea agreement (Ground Five).

(Doc. 3 at 1-2.)

On November 29, 2023, Respondents filed a Response. (Doc. 6.) On January 30, 

2024, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. 9.)

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

A. Time Calculation.

The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

Petitioner was sentenced on April 21, 2017. (Doc. 6-1, Ex. D, at 34.) Petitioner had 

90 days, or until July 20, 2017, to properly file a notice of post-conviction relief. Because 

he did not file a notice within that time period, the one-year statute of limitations to file a 

habeas petition began running on July 21, 2017, and expired one year later unless tolling 

applies. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-47 (9th Cir. 2001) (the AEDPA 

limitations period begins to run on the day after the triggering event pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 6(a)). Here, the habeas petition was due by July 20, 2018, but Petitioner did not 

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mail a petition until August 18, 2023. (Doc. 1 at 80.) The habeas petition is untimely absent 

statutory tolling.

B. Statutory Tolling.

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. On June 2, 2020, Petitioner filed a 

motion to vacate judgment, which the trial court treated as Petitioner’s first notice of postconviction relief. (Doc. 6-1, Ex. E, at 38.) Petitioner filed his post-conviction relief notice 

more than two years and ten months after his deadline. The trial court dismissed the matter

as untimely. Petitioner thus never “properly filed” an application for post-conviction 

review. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (“When a postconviction 

petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for purposes of § 

2244(d)(2).”) (cleaned up); Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (“An 

untimely state petition is not ‘properly filed’ and does not trigger statutory tolling under 

AEDPA.”); Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An untimely petition . . . 

is not ‘properly filed’ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), and so it does not toll the statute 

of limitations.”). As noted above, the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations expired on 

July 20, 2018.

3

Petitioner’s subsequent PCR proceedings did not toll or reset the statute of 

limitations because they were filed after the limitations period had already expired. See 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not 

permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was 

filed.”); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (where petitioner filed his state 

post-conviction relief proceeding “after the AEDPA statute of limitations ended . . . [t]hat 

delay resulted in an absolute time bar . . . .”).

C. Newly-Discovered Evidence.

3

In the petition, Petitioner asserts his claims are not time barred because “defense by lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at ‘any’ time including on appeal. Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. R. 16.1(8), State v. Buckley, 153 Ariz. 91, 93, 734 P.2d 1047 (App. 1987). 

Appell[ant] did not waive his objection to a lack of information for not moving for a 

dismissal in trial court. State v. Buckley, 153 Ariz. 91.93, 734 P.2d 1047 (App. 1987).” 

(Doc. 1 at 80.) Petitioner’s matter here is governed by his AEDPA deadlines.

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Petitioner also fails to present newly-discovered evidence sufficient to make his 

petition timely. AEDPA’s one-year limitations period starts from “the date on which the 

factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Here, any “newly-discovered fact” 

was found by Petitioner years before he filed his first PCR proceeding. On November 28, 

2017, Petitioner’s counsel filed a Settlement Conference Memorandum noting that 

Petitioner opposed the Pima County prosecution on double jeopardy grounds because 

Count 2-7 of the Pima County case matched similar counts in the Maricopa County case. 

(Doc. 6-8 at 37.) Petitioner was certainly aware of the charges in both counties at the time. 

The PCR court found Petitioner was aware of the venue issue as early as October 10, 2016,

when Petitioner requested the Pima County charges be transferred to Maricopa County. 

(See Doc. 6-8, Ex. S, at 49.) Petitioner referred to other new evidence in other proceedings, 

but that evidence was also discovered in 2017 or 2018. In a pro se Petition for Review to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner advised the court “newly-discovered evidence” 

was disclosed on “May 30, 2017, July 18, 2017, July 28, 2017 and Jan 30, 2018.” (Doc. 6-

9 at 8.) On February 16, 2022, Petitioner filed a “notice” of post-conviction relief arguing 

a “newly discovered material fact” was found “5 weeks and 8 months after sentence in 

Pima County Superior Court.” (Doc. 6-7, Ex. Q, at 2.)4

Petitioner fails to provide new evidence to justify why he waited until June 2, 2020, 

to begin his first post-conviction relief proceedings. (Doc. 6-1, Ex. E, at 38.) As such, 

Petitioner fails to establish the factual predicate of any claims presented could not “have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

Considering the foregoing, this Court finds that there are no grounds upon which 

this Court can recommend that the district court find the petition timely based on statutory 

4 There is no record before the Court of a sentencing date in a Pima County criminal case.

Instead, Petitioner avowed he had only one other open case—a Maricopa County case—

when he pleaded guilty in the instant case. He avowed in his plea agreement that his only 

other pending case was “Maricopa County CR 2014-140939.” (Doc. 6-2 at 12-13.) 

Petitioner’s Pima County case was dismissed by the court on April 17, 2018. (Doc. 6-8 at 

55.) 

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tolling.

D. Equitable Tolling.

“A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s [one]-year filing deadline 

must show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, 

and (2) he has diligently pursued his rights.” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). The Petitioner bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 

432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external 

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely 

habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling 

is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 

(9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were the cause 

of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a 

petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotations and

citation omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under 

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Here, Petitioner fails to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances were the cause of 

the untimely filing of his Petition. Petitioner does not assert he was denied access to PCR 

proceedings or unable to pursue his rights. From June 2, 2020 (doc. 6-1, Ex. E, at 38) to 

February 16, 2022 (doc. 6-7, Ex. Q, at 2), Petitioner filed five separate PCR matters in the 

superior court.

5 Petitioner does not explain why he failed to file a timely habeas petition, 

but instead waited until August 18, 2023, to mail the instant habeas petition. (Doc. 1 at 80.) 

Petitioner fails to establish he is entitled to equitable tolling.

E. Actual Innocence.

5

In his Reply, Petitioner states that “IAC defendant’s counsel appointed by the State of 

Arizona in Maricopa County case #CR 2016-1751-001 failed to file Rule 32 or PCR 

request and assignment of new counsel as requested on April 21, 2017 by defendant.” (Doc. 

9 at 31.) Petitioner was aware counsel failed to filed PCR proceedings on his behalf in 

2017, but he fails to explain why he waited until June 2, 2020 to begin PCR proceedings.

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To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” To establish a “credible” claim of 

actual innocence, a petitioner must present “new reliable evidence” and “show that it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 

new evidence.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 327 (1995); see also Jones v. Taylor, 

763 F.3d 1242, 1247 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In order to pass through the Schlup actual innocence 

gateway, a petitioner must demonstrate that in light of new evidence, it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” (cleaned up)).

Petitioner fails to establish that he is actually innocent as required by Schlup. 

Petitioner admitted his guilt when he pleaded guilty. Petitioner’s avowals at a plea hearing, 

as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a “formidable 

barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–

74 (1977). Assuming arguendo that Petitioner may present evidence of actual innocence, 

Petitioner does not do so. Petitioner asserts he is “actually innocent of committing the 

charged crime.” (Doc. 9 at 37.) Petitioner does not explain which crime he is actually 

innocent of committing. Petitioner’s primary argument is that Maricopa County lacked 

venue over his case because his crimes occurred in Pima County. Petitioner asserts the 

“court did not have jurisdiction over the offenses to enter judgment or to impose a 

sentence.” (Doc. 9 at 42.)6 But Petitioner presents no evidence to prove that Maricopa 

County was an improper venue. During his change of plea proceedings, Petitioner advised 

the Maricopa County court that he wanted his Pima County prosecution to result in 

concurrent sentences because the cases had similar facts.7 He stated that the “trailers that 

6 Petitioner’s venue argument is also based on Arizona state law and typically unreviewable 

in habeas proceedings. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989) (federal courts 

generally may not review habeas claims decided by a state court on state grounds).

7 When Petitioner pleaded guilty in Maricopa County on October 7, 2016, his Pima County 

case was still pending. The Pima County prosecution was not dismissed until April 17, 

2018.

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are from Tucson, the case in Tucson, is the trailers that were stole from Tucson, they were 

brought to Phoenix and retagged and sold.” (Doc. 6-11 at 33.) As a factual basis for his 

Maricopa County theft offenses, Petitioner admitted he “knowingly controlled a means of 

transportation” in Maricopa County without victim consent with intent to permanently 

deprive the victims of the vehicles. (Id. at 54.) He admitted initiating the thefts and 

trafficking of the vehicles in Maricopa County and engaged in a scheme to defraud in 

Maricopa County. (Id. at 54-55.) Even if some of his conduct occurred in Pima County, 

Petitioner fails to prove he is actually innocent of any offense because he admitted his 

conduct also occurred in Maricopa County.

The Court notes that the trial court also found Petitioner did “not provide any newly 

discovered facts” during his PCR proceeding. (Doc. 12-1 at 46.) Petitioner fails to establish 

a credible claim of actual innocence.

IV. Conclusion.

Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that the Petition is untimely.

The record is sufficiently developed, and the Court does not find that an evidentiary 

hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

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within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 24th day of April, 2024.

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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