Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01782/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01782-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles Robert Adams, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-01782 PHX ROS (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about

August 29, 2013. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to First

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 14)

on January 29, 2014. Any reply to the answer to the petition was

due on or about March 1, 2014. The matter was reassigned to the

undersigned magistrate judge on June 30, 2014.

I Procedural History

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned May 3,

2005, charged Petitioner with two counts of sexual conduct with

a minor, class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children

(Counts 1 and 2), and one count of child abuse, a class 2 felony

and dangerous crime against children (Count 3). See Answer,

Exh. B. The indictment alleged that, on or between January 1,

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2004, and November 18, 2004, Petitioner sexually abused and

endangered the person or health of A.M., a male child under the

age of 15 years old, while A.M. was in Petitioner’s care or

custody. Id., Exh. B & Exh. M.

Counsel was appointed to represent Petitioner and the

case proceeded to trial. See id., Exh. C. At the conclusion of

the state’s case, the trial court granted Petitioner’s motion

for a directed verdict as to Count 1 and dismissed this charge.

Id., Exh. D. At the conclusion of the five-day trial, the jury

convicted Petitioner of Counts 2 and 3, which had been

renumbered as Counts 1 and 2. Id., Exh. E. On June 27, 2006,

pursuant to these convictions, Petitioner was sentenced to a

term of life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for

thirty-five years (Petitioner was forty years old at the time of

sentencing) pursuant to his conviction on Count 1 and to a

consecutive term of seventeen years imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction on Count 2. Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. H. On August 24, 2007,

Petitioner’s appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating

that he had thoroughly reviewed the record and found no

appealable question of law. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner’s counsel

filed a motion for leave to allow Petitioner to file a

supplemental brief on his own behalf. Id., Exh. J. On August

29, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted the motion and

provided a deadline of October 15, 2007, for Petitioner to file

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a supplemental brief. Id., Exh. K. On August 31, 2007,

Petitioner’s counsel sent Petitioner a copy of all records on

appeal. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner did not file a supplemental

brief. Id., Exh. M. 

On March 25, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued

a memorandum decision affirming Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh M. On March 26, 2008, Petitioner’s

appointed appellate counsel sent Petitioner a letter informing

Petitioner that counsel had reviewed the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision and he concluded that there was no reasonable

probability that the Arizona Supreme Court would review his

case. Id., Exh. N. Counsel advised Petitioner that, if

Petitioner wished to seek review on his own he was required to

file a petition for review within thirty days of March 25, 2008.

Id., Exh. N. Petitioner did not file a petition for review and

on May 12, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued an order

and mandate. Id., Exh. O.

On May 29, 2008, Petitioner initiated an action for

state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. P. On June 11, 2008, the state

trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in his

Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. Q. On September 4, 2008, counsel

filed a notice of completion of post-conviction review, finding

no colorable claims to be raised on Petitioner’s behalf, and

requesting an extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro per

Rule 32 petition. Id., Exh. R. On December 12, 2008, Petitioner

filed a pro per PCR petition, arguing that:

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(1) the trial court violated Arizona Rules of

Evidence, Rule 403 by granting the State’s

motion pursuant to Rule 404(c) and denying

the motion pursuant to 404(b);

(2) the court should provide some type of

case law that would allow the trial court to

dismiss the charges against Petitioner when

the victim fails to make an in-court

identification of Petitioner; 

(3) the judge was biased or erred for not

allowing an answer to a question of whether

there was a confession from Petitioner, and

instead sustaining the hearsay objection to

the question; and 

(4) his trial counsel was ineffective when he

failed to “see the special action, [regarding

the 404(b) and 404(c) motion filed by the

prosecutor,] through to the court of appeal

for them to make a ruling” and when he failed

to file a motion in limine “to resolve the

issue of hearsay evidence being admissible at

trial.” (Exh. S.) 

Id. at 4-5.

On June 30, 2009, the state trial court denied relief,

finding Petitioner’s first three claims precluded by Rule

32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and

finding Plaintiff had failed to raise a colorable claim for

relief on his fourth claim, ineffective assistance of counsel.

Id., Exh. W. Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona

Court of Appeals.

On September 2, 2009, Petitioner filed a second postconviction petition, docketing the same petition he had filed on

December 12, 2008, but changing the date to August 24, 2009, and

adding two documents to the end of the exhibits. Id., Exh. X.

This petition was dismissed on February 22, 2010, “[b]ecause

[Petitioner] raised the claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel in his of-right PCR and that claim was adjudicated,

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Defendant’s repetitive claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is precluded.” Id., Exhs. Y & Z. The trial court

further found that Petitioner had “raised no other claim falling

within any of the exceptions for a successive PCR.” Id., Exh.

Z. Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exhs. HH, II, JJ.

On August 12, 2010, Petitioner docketed a third Rule 32

petition, arguing that the state engaged in vindictive

prosecution when it introduced unlawful testimony at trial.

Id., Exh. AA. The petition was dismissed on September 3, 2010,

the state court finding the petition was untimely and that “an

untimely notice may only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d),

(e), (f), (g) or (h). Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a),” and Petitioner

“fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted in an

untimely Rule 32 proceeding. Rule 32.4(a).” Id., Exh. BB & Exh.

CC. On October 12, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for review

with the Arizona Court of Appeals, which was dismissed as

untimely. Id., Exhs. DD & JJ.

On January 28, 2013, Petitioner filed a fourth state

post-conviction petition, arguing that his conviction and

sentence were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights

because he was coerced by the judge and that his prison sentence

exceeded the maximum authorized by law. Id., Exh. EE. The

petition was dismissed on February 13, 2013, as untimely and

successive. Id., Exhs. FF & GG. Petitioner did not file a

petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

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On August 29, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant habeas

petition in this Court.

(1) Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights were

violated by various rulings of the trial

court;

(2) Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights were

violated by consideration of a pending Pinal

County criminal case to enhance Petitioner’s

sentence;

(3) Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights were

violated by the admission of unreliable

evidence; and

(4) Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights were

violated where the court never ruled on his

motion to dismiss.

See Doc. 1 & Doc. 8.

II Analysis

Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The one-year statute of limitations on

habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the date on which

the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled

to tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of

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a “properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See also, e.g., Artuz v.

Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v.

Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 

At the conclusion of Petitioner’s direct appeal,

Petitioner filed a state action for Rule 32 post-conviction

relief, which tolled the running of the one-year statute of

limitations. The statute of limitations began to run on July

30, 2009, when the time expired for seeking review of the trial

court’s decision dismissing Petitioner’s Rule 32 action by the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the statute of

limitations expired on July 29, 2010, and Petitioner’s federal

habeas action, filed in 2013, is not timely. None of

Petitioner’s subsequent actions for state post-conviction relief

tolled the statute of limitations because none of these actions

were “properly filed”; the trial court dismissed the proceedings

because the petitions were each untimely and Arizona procedural

criminal law precluded the claims. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 414, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (2005); Allen v. Siebert,

552 U.S. 3, 5–7, 128 S. Ct. 2 (2007) (holding that the Pace rule

applies even where there are exceptions to the state-court

filing deadlines, and reaffirming that a state court’s rejection

of a petition as untimely is “the end of the matter”); Zepeda v.

Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting

contention that state must prove that rules concerning time bars

are “firmly established and regularly followed before

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noncompliance will render a petition improperly filed for AEDPA

tolling”).

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th

Cir. 2012); Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir.

2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th

Cir. 2009). In Holland the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical

rule” for determining extraordinary circumstances, while

endorsing a flexible, “case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon

decisions made in other similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628

F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir. 2008); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.

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2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.

2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling

is also available if the petitioner establishes their actual

innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653

F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

Petitioner has not filed a reply to Respondents’

assertion that his petition is time-barred.

Petitioner has not stated an adequate basis for

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Compare

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Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564; Porter, 620 F.3d at 961 (noting the

circumstances of cases determined before and after Holland). A

petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of

legal representation during the applicable filing period do not

constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling because

such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g., Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14;

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004). The

vicissitudes of prison life are not “extraordinary”

circumstances that make it impossible to file a timely habeas

petition. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th

Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

if they can establish that they are actually innocent of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934. The petitioner

must show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 938. Petitioner has not made a showing of any new evidence.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the

statute of limitations based on the theory of actual innocence.

Because the habeas action was not filed within the

statute of limitations and Petitioner has not stated a proper

basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the

Court need not consider the merits of his claims.

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III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file the habeas petition within one

year of the date his state conviction became final. Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Adams’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

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1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 1st day of July, 2014.

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