Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01726/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01726-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD EUGENE MADSEN,

Petitioner,

v.

JOE MCGRATH, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 04cv1726-IEG (BLM)

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR

JUDICIAL NOTICE; AND 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and

Local Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California.

On August 24, 2004, Petitioner Richard Eugene Madsen

(“Petitioner” or “Madsen”), a state prisoner appearing in pro se,

and in forma pauperis, commenced these habeas corpus proceedings

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1.] He challenges his San

Diego Superior Court convictions in case number SF 118015 and

requests the Court take judicial notice of his original petition.

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28 1All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless

otherwise specified. 

-2- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

This Court has considered the Petition (“Pet.”), Respondents’

Answer, Madsen’s Traverse, and all moving papers and supporting

documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth

below, this Court DENIES Madsen’s request for judicial notice and

RECOMMENDS that Madsen’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Madsen’s Conviction and Sentence

On January 21, 1998, Madsen was convicted of aggravated

mayhem (California Penal Code1 § 205), assault by means of force

likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245(a)(1)), possession by

a prisoner of a sharp instrument (§ 4502) and making a terrorist

threat (§ 422). (Lodgment No. 1.)

The following facts are taken from the California Court of

Appeal’s opinion on direct review in People v. Madsen, No. D033707,

slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. November 28, 2000). (Lodgment No. 3.) This

Court presumes the state court’s factual determinations to be

correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding

findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn

from such facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of

correctness).

On April 24, 1997, Madsen was a prisoner in

Module 5B, the administrative segregation unit of

George Bailey Detention Center in San Diego housing

prisoners separated from the general prison population

because they are dangerous or need special protection.

Dangerous or “high-powered” prisoners are housed in 18

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28 2 Inmates often flush their toilets when they do not want their

conversations to be overheard.

-3- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

cells on the lower level of Module 5B and protective

custody prisoners are housed in 18 cells on the upper

level of Module 5B; the two levels are connected by

stairways. Prisoners are allowed out of their cells

and into the dayroom in small groups for one hour each

day. Madsen was a dangerous prisoner who was housed

in the lower level of Module 5B.

On the morning of April 24 Madsen was in the

dayroom with inmates Edward Bergman, Gilberto Espinoza

and Joseph Cornejo. Toward the end of their hour, a

correctional officer observed Cornejo standing by the

telephones in the dayroom, bleeding profusely from his

face. At that time the officer saw Madsen and the

other two inmates in the upstairs shower area. The

officer thought that was unusual because there were

only two shower heads and inmates in Module 5B rarely

shower together.

The officer sounded a lockdown order. Madsen,

Bergman and Espinoza were slow in returning to their

cells, continuing with their showers for several

minutes despite repeated lockdown commands. The

officer took Cornejo to the medical station and he was

thereafter flown to a hospital. Cornejo suffered

three slashing wounds to his face; two on his right

side went from his ear to his mouth and the one on his

left side went from his cheekbone to his nose.

Madsen had a scratch and bruise on his upper left

thigh; Espinoza had a cut on his ring finger; and

Bergman had no injuries. After all three had returned

to their respective cells, another correctional

officer attempted to monitor their conversations by

using cell intercoms, but he could not hear anything

because of noise caused by toilets flushing.2

Two unaltered razors were found hidden in

Madsen’s mattress and a set of wet jail clothing was

hanging on a makeshift drying line. Inmates were not

permitted to have extra sets of clothing, rope, or

razors except when shaving.

On April 24 Victor Solano, a protective custody

inmate in Module 5B, requested to go to the dispensary

for medical treatment for a sports injury. Solano was

taken to the dispensary by a correctional officer.

Solano then handed the officer a “kite”, or jailhouse

letter, together with a newspaper article on the

Cornejo incident, and told the officer to read the

letter. The letter was written by Madsen. The letter

stated:

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3 Before trial the razor blade was lost and another one was substituted for

illustration purposes. 

4 Effective as of January 1, 2000, former section 1192.7, subdivision

(c)(23) was renumbered as section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(24). (Stats. 1999. ch.

298, § 1, p. 2039.)

-4- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

“MARK, DESTROY THIS AFTER READING. FIRE IS

COMING. HANG ON - - THIS PIECE OF SHIT GOT WHACKED

UP- - FOR - - WELL, NEVER MIND THAT. (IT’S BIZ.)

ANYWAY- - THEY TOOK ALL MY SHIT DAGO DAWG! I NEED

SOME SHOES BROTHER. YES I DID HIM - - FUCKEN PUNK

PIECE OF SHIT! SEND BACK ARTICAL [sic]. IT’S OUT OF

TODAY[‘]S PAPER - - I WANT IT[.] DO NOT MENTION THIS

TO ANYONE MARK - - THAT’S AN ORDER DAWG - - CAUSE NO

ONE KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED. GET ME SOME SHOES DAWG.

NICE ONES. I GOT IT COMING - - W/R[.]”

On June 2 a razor blade, apparently removed from

a disposable razor, was found hidden in the spine of

a legal pad in Madsen’s cell. The legal pad bore

Madsen’s handwriting and was inside an accordion

folder with other legal pads and papers that belonged

to Madsen.3

On June 23 Madsen was housed in the downtown San

Diego jail in tank 4B, which holds “high-powered”

prisoners. San Diego County Sheriff Michael Bradburn

was working as a guard that day and at about 7 a.m.

Madsen became angry when Bradburn refused his request

to postpone Madsen’s shower time until later in the

day. Madsen threatened to kill Bradburn and said he

could get Bradburn when he was released or he could

have someone else “whack” him. Another deputy

relieved Bradburn later that day and told Madsen that

Bradburn filed a felony report on the incident.

Madsen told the other deputy he wanted to apologize to

Bradburn and “squash” the matter, and that the

incident was his mistake.

An information charged Madsen with four offenses

listed ante, and alleged that in committing the

charged assault he caused great bodily injury (§§

12022.7 subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and

personally used a deadly weapon (§ 1192.7, subd.

(c)(23)).4

 It also alleged Madsen had five noprobation prior convictions (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)),

two prison prior convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), two

serious felony prior convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)),

and two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-

(I), 1170.12).

At Madsen’s trial, Solano testified that a few

days before the Cornejo incident he took a jailhouse

shank, consisting of a razor blade melted into a pen

shaft, from Espinoza’s cell and delivered it to

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-5- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

Madsen’s cell. Two days before the incident, he heard

Madsen tell Espinoza that he was going to “get that

piece of shit,” referring to Cornejo. At the time of

the Cornejo incident, Solano was locked in his

upstairs cell in Module 5B. Solano looked out through

the food tray slot in his door and had a limited view

of Module 5B, but could not see Cornejo’s cell

downstairs. He saw Madsen, Bergman, Espinoza and

Cornejo in the dayroom. Madsen and Bergman were

playing chess and Espinoza was sitting at a table.

Cornejo was talking on the telephone. Cornejo hung up

the telephone and walked toward his cell, out of

Solano’s view. Madsen and Bergman then walked toward

Cornejo’s cell, followed by Espinoza. About ten

minutes later, Solano saw Bergman walk up the stairs

to the shower area. Madsen walked up another set of

stairs to the shower area. Madsen was not wearing a

shirt and had red marks on his chest as if someone had

pushed him. Madsen appeared agitated. Madsen removed

his clothes as he approached the shower area. Madsen

and Bergman started showering. A few minutes later,

Solano saw Cornejo reappear by the telephone area,

bleeding heavily from his face. Espinoza then arrived

at the shower area and told the others he wanted to

shower. Bergman got out and Espinoza began showering.

Madsen and Espinoza whispered to each other. 

Solano testified that two days after the incident

Madsen came to his cell and asked him if he remembered

how he and Solano were watching television when

Cornejo attempted suicide. Madsen told Solano he

wanted him to testify how he and Solano saw Cornejo

come out bleeding. Madsen stated that Cornejo was a

“piece of shit” and got what he had coming. Madsen

gave Solano the “kite” with the newspaper article and

asked him to give it to an inmate named Mark, who was

in Module 5A.

Investigator Efrain Garcia testified that when

inmates want to shave, they are issued disposable

razors in their cells. Inmates are required to return

them and a log is maintained showing the issuance and

return of razors to inmates. However, sometimes

inmates will claim the razors were accidentally

flushed down toilets and resulting searches of their

cells fail to produce the missing razors. Inmates

transfer razors or their blades to other cells pending

completion of searches and then they are returned to

the inmates’ cells.

Bradburn testified that Madsen’s threat to kill

him frightened him because Madsen was a “high-powered”

inmate who was housed in the unit with the most

violent inmates. Bradburn knew Madsen previously had

been in the special housing unit of the Pelican Bay

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28 5 The gang was not identified for the jury at trial, but apparently was the

Aryan Brotherhood.

-6- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

prison in which its most dangerous inmates are housed,

kept in solitary confinement, and escorted in chains

by guards who wear protective gear. Bradburn also

knew that Madsen was in a violent prison gang, from

which he inferred Madsen could have someone else in

the gang kill him.5

In his defense, Madsen presented the testimony of

San Diego County Sheriff Department’s criminalist that

a very small amount of blood was found on Espinoza’s

and Bergman’s clothing, and none was found on Madsen’s

clothing. On cross-examination, the criminalist

admitted fresh blood can be washed off clothing in a

shower. 

Bergman testified that on April 24, 1997, he and

Madsen played chess in the dayroom and then went to

take showers. While they were in the shower area,

they saw Cornejo bleeding, then saw Espinoza walk up

the stairs. On cross-examination, Bergman admitted it

would be to his advantage in prison if other prisoners

learned he had testified favorably for Madsen.

Prison inmate Dennis Sukon testified that he

loaned Madsen his legal pad, forgetting he had hidden

a razor blade in it. On cross-examination, Sukon

admitted he was serving a term of life without the

possibility for parole and could suffer no further

punishment were he prosecuted for possessing the razor

blade. He also admitted that during his own criminal

trial he sent his codefendent notes instructing her to

lie when testifying. 

Prison inmates James Speck and Richard Riddle

testified that they heard the June 23, 1997,

discussion between Madsen and Bradburn. They

testified that Madsen never threatened Bradburn.

The jury found Madsen guilty of the four charged

offenses and found the enhancement allegations true.

A bifurcated trial was then conducted on the

allegations of Madsen’s prior convictions and the jury

found the allegations true.

Madsen filed a motion for a new trial on various

grounds, including juror misconduct and ineffective

assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the

motion.

The trial court sentenced Madsen pursuant to the

three strikes law to consecutive terms of 25 years to

life for each of counts two, three and four (§§ 245,

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6For purposes of clarity, Counts 1 and 2 concern the April 24, 1997 attack

on Cornejo; Count 3 concerns the June 2, 1997 discovery of a razor blade in a

legal pad in Madsen’s cell; and Count 4 concerns the June 23, 1997 threat against

Deputy Michael Bradburn. 

-7- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

subd.(a)(1), 4502, 422) and stayed pursuant to section

654 a term of 25 years to life for count one (§ 205).

The court imposed enhancements of three years for

infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd.

(a)) and five years for each of the two serious felony

prior convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The trial

court therefore imposed an aggregate term of 88 years

to life.

(Lodgment No. 3.6) 

B. Direct Appeal

Madsen appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment No. 2.) In an

unpublished opinion filed on November 28, 2000, the California Court

of Appeal affirmed the conviction in all respects except for a juror

misconduct issue, which it remanded to the trial court for factual

findings. (Lodgment No. 3.) Madsen then filed two successive

petitions for review raising different issues in the California

Supreme Court (Lodgment Nos. 6, 8), which were summarily denied

without citation of authority on January 17, 2001 and March 14, 2001

respectively (Lodgment Nos. 7, 9). 

 On remand, the trial court made the requested findings and on

March 21, 2002, reinstated the earlier judgment. (Lodgment No. 4.)

Madsen appealed this decision to the California Court of Appeal,

which denied the petition on November 7, 2003. (Lodgment No. 5.)

Madsen did not seek California Supreme Court review. 

///

///

///

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-8- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

C. Collateral Review

On August 26, 2004, Madsen filed the instant Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1.]

Respondent moved to dismiss the federal habeas petition on November

3, 2004. [Doc. No. 12.] 

On December 2, 2004, Madsen filed a habeas corpus petition in

the California Supreme Court (Lodgment No. 11), which was denied

without citation of authority on January 4, 2006 (Lodgment No. 16).

On June 29, 2005, this Court dismissed the petition with

leave to amend stating that the petition did not comply with Rule

8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it did not

present a short and plain statement of the case. [Doc. No. 36.] On

September 2, 2005, Madsen filed a First Amended Petition which

purported to incorporate the original Petition by a request for

judicial notice. [Doc. No. 46.] On March 21, 2006, Respondent filed

a motion to dismiss, which was denied on August 8, 2006, at which

time Respondent was ordered to file an Answer. [Doc. No. 80, 88.] 

On December 29, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss

for failure to exhaust which was summarily stricken on February 6,

2007 because the Court already had ordered Respondent to answer the

Petition. [Doc. No. 93.] On March 16, 2007, Respondent filed an

Answer. [Doc. No. 97.] On June 26, 2007, Madsen filed his Traverse

and the Court took the matter under submission.

///

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///

///

///

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-9- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254(a), sets

forth the following scope of review for federal habeas corpus

claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by

AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Summary denials do constitute adjudications on

the merits. See Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court,

the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established

federal law if the state court: (1) “arrives at a conclusion

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-10- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

opposite to that reached” by the Supreme Court on a question of law;

or (2) “confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from

a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite

to [the Supreme Court’s].” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405

(2000).

A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established federal law where the state court “identifies

the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003).

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue a writ simply because the

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly . . . . Rather, that application must be objectively

unreasonable.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76 (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Clearly

established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the

dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 412.

Finally, habeas relief is also available if the state court’s

adjudication of a claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in state court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s

decision will not be overturned on factual grounds unless this Court

finds that the state court’s factual determinations were objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This Court will

presume that the state court’s factual findings are correct, and

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7The Court notes that Madsen did not number the pages of his Petition

consecutively. For ease of reference, the Court has inserted numerical page

numbers in the Petition to which it will refer.

-11- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

Madsen may overcome that presumption only by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

DISCUSSION

Madsen presents fourteen grounds for habeas relief including

ineffective assistance of counsel, due process, and violations of

his right to a fair trial.7 (Pet. at 1-97.)

Respondent counters that the Petition should be dismissed

because Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies with respect

to all of the claims contained in the First Amended Petition, and in

any event, the state court’s decision rejecting his claims on the

merits was not objectively unreasonable. (Answer at 10-13.) 

A. Judicial Notice

Madsen requests the Court take judicial notice of his

original petition and lodgments. (Pet. at 31.) 

Under Federal Rules of Evidence 201, the Court may take

judicial notice only of an adjudicative fact, i.e. a “fact which is

not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or

(2)capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(b). Further, an amended pleading must be complete in itself

without reference to the superseded pleading and shall contain

copies of all exhibits referred to in such amended pleading. S.D.

Cal. Civ. R. 15.1.

 Here, Madsen wants to incorporate his original petition into

his amended petition via his request for judicial notice. The Court

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-12- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

dismissed the original petition because it was over 600 pages long,

presented approximately 246 claims, and was largely unintelligible.

[Doc. No. 36.] By its very nature, the original petition cannot be

considered an adjudicative fact as contemplated by Rule 201(b)

because it is a pleading advocating Madsen’s position, and therefore

is subject to dispute. The Court cannot appropriately take judicial

notice of it for this reason. See F.R.Ev. 201(b). Morever,

incorporating the original petition into the amended petition would

violate Local Rule 15.1's prohibition requiring an amended pleading

be complete in itself. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Madsen’s

request for judicial notice. 

B. Exhaustion

Respondent argues that the Court should dismiss the Petition

because Madsen has “raised a number of claims in federal court that

he did not raise in state court.” (Answer at 11.) Petitioner

counters that he has fully exhausted all his claims. (Pet. at 7, 13,

22, 31, 44, 50, 57, 62, 70, 74, 77, 89, 93.)

The exhaustion of available state judicial remedies is a

prerequisite to a federal court’s granting of claims presented in

habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833

(9th Cir. 1991). For exhaustion purposes, Petitioner must have

“fairly presented” his federal claims to the highest state court

with jurisdiction to consider them. See Rose v. Lundy, 518-21

(1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). However, the

Court may deny the petition even if it contains unexhausted claims

if it is “perfectly clear” that the claims are meritless. Granberry

v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d

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-13- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

614, 623-624 (9th Cir. 2005). 

A thorough comparison of the current Petition and the

Petition for Habeas Corpus submitted to the California Supreme Court

indicates that Petitioner has exhausted many of the claims

Respondent asserts are unexhausted. For example, Respondent

contends that within Claim 3, Madsen asserts a due process violation

based upon an improper joinder of counts which he failed to present

to a state court. (Answer at 11.) However, on page 131 of Madsen’s

California Supreme Court habeas corpus petition, he claims that “the

impermissible joinder denied him due process and a fundamentally

fair trial in violation of his 14th Amendment Right as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution.” (Lodgment No. 11 at 131.) 

Similarly, Respondent argues that in Claim 9, Madsen asserted

a due process violation claiming the prosecutor went beyond the

allowable limits imposed by the court on gang evidence when he

“elicited testimony that in prison it’s a game in the gang, and that

‘Mainline is out there play [sic] gang games’”(Pet. at 16i.) which

he also failed to present to a state court. (Answer at 11.) On the

contrary, at page 19 of his California Supreme Court habeas corpus

petition, Madsen claims that the prosecutor improperly elicited

testimony from witness Solano who stated that “it is a game in the

gang that you’ve got to follow orders or you are weak and if you are

weak you pay the price. . Mainline is out there playing gang games.

. .” (Lodgment No. 11 at 19.) 

However, even if Petitioner has presented some unexhausted

claims in his Petition, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas

corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of

the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the

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-14- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). For the reasons discussed below,

the Court RECOMMENDS DENIAL of Madsen’s claims on the merits, and

therefore it is immaterial whether he has demonstrated complete

exhaustion of all claims. Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623-624. 

C. Right to Counsel

Madsen makes multiple claims that his Sixth Amendment right

to counsel was violated by the trial court. In Ground 1, Madsen

argues his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the

trial court denied his motion to appoint new counsel. (Pet. at 7.)

In Ground 5, Madsen contends that his right to counsel was violated

when the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry regarding

his complaints about his attorney in his Marsden and other hearings

during trial. (Id. at 41.)

Respondent counters that Ground 1 should be denied because

Madsen waited until the eve of trial to request substitution of

counsel which would have required a continuance of the trial to

allow new counsel to prepare. (Answer at 14.) The continuance would

have inconvenienced witnesses and prejudiced the prosecution. (Id.

at 14.) Respondent contends that both the United States Supreme

Court and the Ninth Circuit give broad discretion to trial courts to

deny continuances. (Id.) Respondent argues that Ground 5 should be

denied because the court did conduct a Marsden hearing and Madsen

did not demonstrate that he and counsel had suffered a fatal

breakdown in communication. (Id. at 29-31.) Therefore Respondent

argues the state court’s denial of these claims was not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States

Supreme Court law.

///

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-15- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

Appointment of Counsel

In evaluating the merits of Ground 1, this Court must look

through to the last reasoned state court decision. See Ylst, 501

U.S. at 801-806. Here, because the California Supreme Court

summarily denied Madsen’s petition (Lodgment No. 16), the last

reasoned state court decision came from the California Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment No. 3.)

The Court of Appeal rejected Madsen’s claim on the following

grounds:

B

“The right to the effective assistance of

counsel ‘encompasses the right to retain counsel of

one’s own choosing.[Citations]’[Citation.] (People v.

Courts, (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784, 789.) However, the

right to appear and defend with retained counsel “is

not absolute, and the court may exercise discretion

to ensure orderly and expeditious judicial

administration if the defendant is ‘unjustifiably

dilatory or . . . arbitrarily desires to substitute

counsel at the time of trial.’ [Citation.] (People v.

Leonard, (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 776, 784.) “Generally

the trial court has discretion whether to grant a

continuance to permit a defendant to be represented

by retained counsel. [Citation.]” (People v. Jeffers

(1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 840, 850.) “Where a

continuance is requested on the day of the trial, the

lateness of the request may be a significant factor

justifying denial absent compelling circumstances to

the contrary. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) It is the

defendant’s burden on appeal to show that the trial

court abused its discretion by denying a motion to

substitute counsel and continue the trial. (Ibid.)

C

In this case counsel was appointed for Madsen on

or before his arraignment on August 12, 1997. He was

represented by his appointed counsel, Thomas Ulovec,

at the preliminary examination on September 10.

Madsen’s original trial date was set for November 13.

That trial date was later continued until January 12,

1998. It was not until the last court day before the

continued trial date that Madsen moved to substitute

counsel and continue the trial. Madsen’s delay in

moving to substitute counsel until that late date

apparently was caused by his parents’ delay in

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-16- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

agreeing to pay for retained counsel.

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by denying Madsen’s substitution motion in

the circumstances of this case. Madsen had at least

four months during which he could have retained

counsel before the continued January 12, 1998, trial

date. He provides no explanation for that delay

except that his parents apparently did not agree to

pay for retained counsel until a few days before the

trial date. Madsen was dilatory in obtaining

retained counsel and his parents’ apparent delay in

assisting him to do so is an insufficient ground to

excuse his dilatory conduct. Furthermore, the trial

court acted within its discretion by finding the

prosecution would be prejudiced by the 90-day or more

continuance required for Madsen’s retained counsel to

prepare for trial. The record shows the prosecution

had concerns regarding witness safety as shown by

threats by Madsen and others against prosecution

witnesses. Special arrangements were made to house

one prosecution witness in protective custody. Other

witnesses had been or were being transferred from

other prisons to local facilities to testify at

Madsen’s trial. The trial court could reasonably

find that it might prejudice the prosecution and

interfere with orderly and expeditious administration

of justice to continue the trial for at least 90 days

so that Madsen’s proposed substitute counsel could

prepare for trial.

(Lodgment No. 3 at 10-11.) 

As Respondent notes, there is no controlling United States

Supreme Court authority on the discretion of a trial court to deny

substitution of counsel where the substitution would require a

delay, but the Supreme Court has held that trial courts generally

have broad discretion in matters of continuances. U.S. v. GonzalezLopez, U.S. , 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2566 (2006). “We have

recognized a trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to

counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, Wheat v. U.S., 486

U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988), and against the demands of its calendar,

Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12,(1983).” Id.

/// 

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-17- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that trial courts

have wide discretion to deny substitution of counsel where the

substitution would require a delay. U.S. v. Prime, 431 F.3d 1147,

1155 (9th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Garcia, 924 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir.

1991)(motion for appointment of counsel made six days before trial

was scheduled to begin was not timely because the quantity and

complexity of discovery would require a continuance). 

Here, as the Court of Appeal stated, Madsen had at least four

months to retain counsel prior to his trial date and his proffered

reason for failing to procure representation is insufficient to

justify his dilatory conduct. The attorney Madsen wanted to

substitute, Nick De Pento, stated during the hearing that he was

hired by Mr. Madsen’s father on the Tuesday before the case was set

to go to trial. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 1.) After hearing from

the defense and prosecution regarding De Pento’s need for time to

prepare, the date of the offenses, and the availability of

witnesses, the court determined that it was “clear that at this time

to grant [the] motion for 90 days would prejudice the people.”

(Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 3.) In light of the above, the Court of

Appeal’s affirmance of the trial court’s denial of substitution of

counsel was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established United States Supreme Court law and therefore

the Court RECOMMENDS this claim be DENIED. See Prime, 431 F.3d at

1156 (denial of substitution of counsel on eve of trial not an abuse

of discretion).

///

///

///

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28 8People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970)

-18- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

Failure to Conduct Adequate Marsden Hearings

Madsen claims in Ground 5 that he was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel because the trial court failed to

sufficiently inquire about a breakdown in communication between

Madsen and his attorney. (Pet. at 41.) In addition, Madsen claims

the trial court failed to research charges that defense counsel had

a conflict of interest arising from counsel’s prior representation

of percipient witness D.J. Bratton. (Id.) Madsen contends the

court failed to conduct an adequate Marsden8 hearing regarding these

claims. (Id.) 

Respondent counters that the claim should be denied because

Madsen had ample opportunity during trial to demonstrate that he and

trial counsel had experienced a breakdown in communication, or that

counsel had a conflict which impeded his representation, but Madsen

failed to show substitution of counsel was warranted despite these

opportunities. (Answer at 29-31.) 

Madsen did not raise these issues on direct appeal, but

raised them in his habeas petition in the California Supreme Court,

which was silently denied. (Lodgment Nos. 9, 16.) Because the

state court did not furnish a basis for its reasoning, this Court

must conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the denial is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Himes v. Thompson, 336

F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

A state court’s “summary denial of a defendant’s motion for

new counsel without further inquiry violate[s] the Sixth Amendment.”

Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982); Schell v.

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-19- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2000). An appropriate

inquiry into the grounds for a defendant’s motion for new counsel is

required before the case can go forward. Hudson, 686 F.2d at 829.

Here, Madsen had repeated opportunities to present concrete

evidence of the purported breakdown in communication between he and

Ulovec during trial but he failed to demonstrate that any

communication difficulty was sufficiently serious to warrant

substitution of new counsel. 

The trial court held a Marsden hearing on January 12, 1998

during which Madsen requested a new attorney because, despite

Madsen’s directions, his counsel (1) had not interviewed certain

witnesses including inmates Speck, Hall, Provencio, Sukon and

Bergman; (2) had failed to research Bradburn’s background; and (3)

had not taken photographs of the segregation unit where the Cornejo

incident occurred. (Lodgment No. 13 at 7-21.) During the hearing,

Ulovec methodically addressed each of Madsen’s complaints explaining

that he had hired an investigator, interviewed witnesses where

available, made tactical decisions as to the effectiveness of each

witness, and considered trial strategies concerning background

checks and photographs. (Id.) At the conclusion of the hearing,

the court denied Madsen’s motion stating that he had not met his

burden and Ulovec would remain his counsel. (Id. at 21.) Madsen

never alleged during the hearing that he was unable to communicate

with his attorney; he just argued that Ulovec did not follow

Madsen’s suggestions. (Id.) 

///

///

///

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9The hearings were held during trial on January 18, 20, and 22, 1998.

(Supp. Lodgment No. 13.)

-20- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

At the next three hearings9, Madsen again challenged Ulovec’s

performance, stating that there had been a breakdown in

communication because Ulovec insufficiently investigated whether

Bradburn had filed previous terrorist threat reports, and did not

check Bradburn’s high school records. (Lodgment No. 13 at 333-341.)

Madsen further challenged Ulovec’s questioning of witness Solano,

and Ulovec’s failure to file a motion to exclude the substituted

razor blade, or put in a jury instruction regarding third party

culpability as to the razor blade. (Id. at 648.) 

After hearing Ulovec explain his trial strategy yet again,

the court determined that there was no reason to hold another

Marsden hearing because there had simply been some “general

disagreement” about tactical decisions, but nothing rising to the

level requiring substitution of counsel. (Id. at 341.) 

The record establishes that the trial court conducted

appropriate inquiries into Madsen’s complaints but that Madsen

failed to sufficiently demonstrate that he and Ulovec had an

insurmountable communication breakdown. Ulovec’s failure to follow

all of Madsen’s suggestions in the manner Madsen instructed did not

deny him his right to counsel as a lawyer may make tactical

decisions even in the face of his client’s explicit disapproval.

Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966); Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026.

Accordingly, the state court’s refusal to substitute appointed

counsel for Madsen did not result in a violation of Madsen’s Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, and the California Supreme Court’s

denial of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

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-21- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

application of clearly established United States Supreme Court law.

Attorney Conflict of Interest

Madsen has failed to explain how Ulovec’s alleged prior

representation of potential defense witness Bratton constituted a

conflict, nor did he raise this issue during any of the numerous

opportunities he had during trial. 

Included in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a

“correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of

interest.” Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). Upon

notification prior to or during trial that an actual or potential

conflict of interest exists, a trial court is obliged to take

adequate steps to ascertain whether a conflict warrants substitution

of counsel. See Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.

2005); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978). Where a

conflict of interest claim is raised after the conclusion of trial,

petitioner must show that trial counsel actively represented

conflicting interests, and that an actual conflict adversely

affected his performance. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783

(1987). To demonstrate an actual conflict of interest, “[t]he

client must demonstrate that his attorney made a choice between

possible alternative courses of action that impermissibly favored an

interest in competition with those of the client.” Washington v.

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting McClure v.

Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1248 (9th Cir. 2003)). In conducting its

inquiry, a court is cautioned that the mere possibility of a

conflict is not sufficient. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350

(1980). 

///

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10The declaration states it is that of “D.J. Barton”, instead of D.J.

Bratton, however the substance of the declaration comports with Madsen’s claim,

therefore as the Court of Appeal before it, this Court deems this to be the

declaration of D.J. Bratton.

-22- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

Madsen argues that Ulovec represented Bratton in a case that

was tried during the pre-trial stages of Madsen’s case. Therefore,

Madsen contends, Ulovec decided not to call Bratton to testify for

the defense because “it could violate attorney-client privilege.”

(Pet. at 43.) However, there is no indication that Ulovec knew

about Bratton or his proffered testimony at any time during trial.

During the Marsden hearing, Madsen methodically listed his

grievances with Ulovec’s representation, including the names of

certain essential witnesses for the defense that Ulovec had not

researched, but did not mention Bratton. (Supp. Lodgment No. 13 at

9-17.) Had Bratton been a necessary witness, it is highly unlikely

Madsen would have forgotten to mention Bratton’s name during the

Marsden hearing.

 The only evidence supporting Madsen’s claim that Bratton

could have been a potential witness is found in Bratton’s

declaration filed in support of Madsen’s new trial motion, in which

he stated that Cornejo told Bratton that Madsen did not attack him.10

(Supp. Lodgment No. 17 at 689.) However the declaration was offered

after the trial and therefore, Ulovec’s failure to call Bratton was

not a decision he could have made based on any real or perceived

conflict. Washington, 422 F.3d at 872. Accordingly, Madsen has not

met his burden to demonstrate that there was an actual conflict of

interest. Burger, 483 U.S. at 783. In light of the above, it is

“perfectly clear” that Madsen’s claim that he was denied his

constitutional right to counsel due to Ulovec’s alleged conflict of

interest has no merit. See Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623-624.

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28 11Respondent does not address Madsen’s claim that his federal due process

rights were violated.

-23- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Ground

5 be DENIED.

D. Peremptory Challenge to Trial Judge

In Ground 2, Madsen claims that the trial court violated his

federal due process rights and his rights under California Code of

Civil Procedure 170.6(1) because he was improperly deprived of his

right to challenge the trial judge. (Pet. at 13.) Furthermore, in

Ground 4, Madsen claims his Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel was violated because Ulovec failed to timely

file a writ contesting the trial court’s denial of his peremptory

challenge. (Id. at 31.) 

Respondent counters that there is no controlling United

States Supreme Court authority for the proposition that a defendant

has the right to compel his trial attorney to file a writ.11 (Answer

at 15.) Even if there were, Respondent contends that Madsen would

not prevail under the standard ineffectiveness analysis because his

attorney had valid tactical reasons for not pursuing a writ. (Id.)

Trial Court’s Denial of Peremptory Challenge

Madsen raised his challenge to the trial court’s denial of

his peremptory writ under California law and his ineffective

assistance claim in his direct appeal to the California Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment No. 2.) However, he did not raise his federal due

process claim in the state courts so the claim is unexhausted.

Because, as illustrated below, it is “perfectly clear” that this

claim is without merit, it can be denied notwithstanding the

exhaustion issue. See Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623-624.

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-24- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

To the extent Madsen argues the trial court erred by denying

his writ pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 170.6 he

fails to state a federal claim. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68

(1991) (federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of

state law, and federal courts may not reexamine state court

determinations on state law issues). 

To the extent that Madsen is making a general assertion that

his due process right to an impartial judge was violated because the

trial judge was biased, the claim fails because he has pointed to no

evidence in the record showing that Judge Vargas was biased. In

fact, Madsen’s trial counsel filed an affidavit which stated that he

did not seek a section 170.6(1) writ challenging Judge Vargas

because in previous experience, he found the judge to be “evenhanded, fair and thorough”. (Lodgment No. 17 at 812.) Madsen does

nothing more than make vague and conclusory allegations that Vargas

was biased, which are insufficient to demonstrate a violation of his

federal due process rights. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.

1994).

In light of the above, the Court finds that Madsen does not

sufficiently allege a violation of his federal due process rights

vis a vis the denial of his peremptory writ challenging Judge

Vargas. The Court RECOMMENDS that Madsen’s federal due process

claim in Ground 2 be DENIED. 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In evaluating the merits of Madsen’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim, this Court must look through to the last reasoned

state court decision. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. Because the

California Supreme Court summarily denied Madsen’s petition

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-25- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

(Lodgment No. 9), the last reasoned state court decision came from

the California Court of Appeal (Lodgment No. 3). The Court

reasoned:

Madsen contends he was denied effective

assistance of counsel when his trial counsel did not

file a timely Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3,

subdivision (d) writ petition contesting the trial

court’s denial of his Code of Civil Procedure section

170.6 peremptory challenge of the trial judge,

thereby causing his wavier of that issue on appeal.

However, Madsen does not show that his counsel’s

decision not to seek writ relief was not a rational

tactical decision, and, if not, that such writ

petition would have been granted and that he would

have received a more favorable result at trial. In

response to Madsen’s new trial motion, his trial

counsel filed an affidavit that stated in part:

“4. I did not seek a writ on the [Code Civ.

Pros., §] 170.6 challenge to JUDGE VARGAS

because in my prior appearances before

JUDGE VARGAS, which had included trial and

preliminary hearings, I had found him to be

even-handed, fair, and thorough in his

evidentiary rulings. It was my belief that

we would receive a fair trial before JUDGE

VARGAS.”

Madsen’s trial counsel made an express tactical

decision not to file a writ petition contesting the

trial court’s denial of Madsen’s peremptory challenge

of the trial judge. His tactical decision was based

on his belief, based on his prior appearances before

Judge Vargas, that Madsen would receive a fair trial

before Judge Vargas. Madsen does not show that his

trial counsel’s tactical decision fell below the

objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing

professional norms for defense attorneys.

Furthermore, he does not show that his peremptory

challenge would have been granted had a writ petition

been filed or that he would have received a more

favorable result at trial before a judge other than

Judge Vargas. Madsen has not carried his appellate

burden to show that he was denied effective

assistance on this ground.

(Lodgment No. 3 at 13-14, 21-22.) 

///

///

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“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must

be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of

the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having

produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

686 (1984). To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must show: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. The

proper measure of attorney performance is “simply reasonableness

under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. In reviewing the

reasonableness of counsel’s performance, courts “must indulge a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance. . . .” Id. at 689.

Finally, to determine whether counsel’s errors prejudiced the

defense, courts “must consider the totality of the evidence before

the judge or jury” and whether “the defendant has met the burden of

showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been

different absent the errors.” Id. at 696.

Ulovec’s decision not to file a writ petition was based on

his stated belief that Madsen would get a fair trial before Judge

Vargas. (Lodgment No. 17 at 812.) This is a tactical decision

properly made by the attorney. See Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, it was a reasonable decision based

on the facts set forth in counsel’s affidavit. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 686. Accordingly, Madsen fails to meet Strickland’s first prong.

Id. at 691-692. 

As to Strickland’s second prong, Madsen has not demonstrated

that he suffered prejudice as a result of Ulovec’s decision because

he has not shown that he would have received a more favorable result

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-27- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

at trial before a different judge, nor has he shown that Judge

Vargas was prejudiced against him. (Lodgment No. 3 at 21-22.)

Accordingly, Madsen fails to show that he suffered any prejudice as

a result of Ulovec’s decision to refrain from filing the peremptory

writ. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-692. 

Because Madsen failed to meet the standard for ineffective

assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland, the California Court

of Appeal’s denial of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established United States

Supreme Court law. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that the portion

of Ground 4 concerning the peremptory writ be DENIED. 

E. Joinder of Counts

In Ground 3, Madsen argues that the trial court violated his

Fourteenth Amendment rights when it improperly joined Counts 1 and

2, concerning the attack on Cornejo, with Count 3, possession of a

sharp object, and Count 4, the terrorist threat against Deputy

Michael Bradburn (“Bradburn”). (Pet. at 22.) Respondent argues that

the California Court of Appeal found that Madsen suffered no

prejudice from the joinder of counts, therefore it is immaterial

whether or not the joinder was proper. (Answer at 17.) Further,

Respondent claims there is no federal Constitutional protection

against improper joinder, and the only U.S. Supreme Court precedent

relies on the common law, therefore this claim does not present a

federal question and the claim should be denied. (Id. at 17-18.)

Again, this Court must look through to the last reasoned

state court decision which was issued by the California Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment No. 3.) 

///

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The Court explained:

B

[California Penal Code] Section 954 provides in part:

“An accusatory pleading may charge two or

more different offenses connected together

in their commission, or different

statements of the same offense or two or

more different offenses of the same class

of crimes or offenses, under separate

counts, and if two or more accusatory

pleadings are filed in such cases in the

same court, the court may order them to be

consolidated. . . [T]he court in which a

case is triable, in the interests of

justice and for good cause shown, may in

its discretion order that the different

offenses or counts set forth in the

accusatory pleading be tried separately or

divided into two or more groups and each of

said groups tried separately.” 

If the statutory requirements for section 954 joinder

are met, a defendant must show that the trial court

abused its discretion by denying a motion to sever

the trial of the charged offenses into separate

trials. (People v. Mayfield (1997)14 Cal.4th 668,

720; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 508.)

“Refusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion

where: (1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried

would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2)

certain of the charges are unusually likely to

inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a ‘weak’

case has been joined with a ‘strong’ case, or with

another ‘weak’ case, so that the ‘spillover’ effect

of aggregate evidence on several charges might well

alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and

(4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty

or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital

case. [Citations.]” (People v. Sandoval (1992) 4

Cal.4th 155, 172-173.) However, even if the charged

offenses do not qualify for section 954 joinder, a

defendant must show prejudice from an erroneous

joinder. (People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 105-

106.) To do so, the defendant must show that it is

reasonably probable the defendant would have received

a more favorable result had the charged offenses been

separately tried. (Ibid.; People v. Watson (1956) 46

Cal.2d 818,836.) Alternatively, the defendant must

show the erroneous joinder resulted in a miscarriage

of justice in violation of article VI, section 13 of

the California Constitution. (6 Witkin & Epstein,

Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Reversible Error, §

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3276, pp 4041-4043; People v. Saldana (1965) 233

Cal.App.2d 24, 30-31; People v. Fox (1958) 157

Cal.App.2d 426, 430; People v. Renier (1957) 148

Cal.App.2d 516,520.) Finally, “[e]ven if the

[joinder] ruling was correct when made, we must

reverse if defendant shows that joinder actually

resulted in ‘gross unfairness,’ amounting to a denial

of due process.” (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th

92, 127.) 

C

Assuming arguendo the trial court erred by

denying Madsen’s motion to sever the trial of counts

1 and 2 from the trial of counts 3 and 4, [We do not

decide whether, as the People assert, all four counts

were of the same class, shared common elements of

substantial importance, or were connected in their

commission, making their section 954 joinder proper.

(Cf. People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306,320;

People v. Leney (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 265,269.)] we

nevertheless conclude he does not show the assumed

error was prejudicial or that his convictions should

otherwise be reversed for gross unfairness in his

trial that denied him due process. It is not

reasonably probable that Madsen would have received

a more favorable result had the severance motion been

granted. First, some of the evidence on counts 1 and

2 was cross-admissible on count 3 or 4. Madsen’s

attack on Cornejo (counts 1 and 2) was admissible to

show Bradburn’s fear when Madsen threatened him

(count 4). Furthermore, Madsen’s possession and use

of a sharp object during his attack on Cornejo

(counts 1 and 2) was admissible to show he knowingly

possessed a razor blade or other sharp instrument on

another occasion (count 3). Conversely, Madsen’s

possession of the razor blade or sharp instrument

(count 3) was admissible to show that he had access

to and possessed the sharp object used in his attack

on Cornejo (counts 1 and 2).

Furthermore, although counts 1 and 2 presumably

were more inflammatory offenses than counts 3 and 4,

the evidence on all four counts was strong, thereby

eliminating the likelihood that the jury convicted

Madsen on counts 3 and 4 because of his commission of

counts 1 and 2. The prosecution’s evidence on counts

3 and 4 was not weak and there was no spillover

effect from evidence on counts 1 and 2 that might

have affected the jury’s verdict. On count 3 the

evidence showed that a razor blade from a disposable

razor was found in Madsen’s cell hidden in the spine

of a legal pad bearing Madsen’s writing. The legal

pad was found with other legal pads and papers

belonging to Madsen inside an accordion file in

Madsen’s cell. Additional evidence showed that on

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-30- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

another occasion a razor was found hidden in Madsen’s

personal mattress in his cell. On another occasion

a razor was found inside a rolled-up newspaper in

Madsen’s cell and a sharp, bent metal piece was found

wrapped in tissue in an envelope inside his cell.

The evidence on count 3 that Madsen knowingly

possessed the razor blade therefore was strong.

Similarly, the evidence on count 4 was also strong.

Bradburn testified that Madsen threatened to kill him

or have someone else kill him. Bradburn testified

that he was especially frightened by Madsen’s threat

because he knew Madsen was a “high-powered” inmate,

had been housed in solitary confinement as one of the

worst inmates in Pelican Bay prison, had recently

stabbed another inmate, and belonged to a prison

gang. Bradburn wrote a report on the threat and told

a fellow guard about the threat. After another guard

told Madsen that Bradburn had filed a report on the

incident, Madsen told the guard that the incident was

his (Madsen’s) mistake and that he wanted to

apologize to Bradburn and “squash” the matter.

Therefore, the evidence on count 4 was strong.

Conversely, it is unlikely the jury convicted Madsen

on counts 1 and 2 because of evidence admitted to

show his commission of counts 3 and 4. The evidence

on counts 1 and 2 was strong. Before the incident,

a guard saw Madsen in the common area with Cornejo

and two other inmates. The guard later saw Cornejo

bleeding profusely from the face and Madsen was

showering together with the other two inmates.

Madsen and the other two inmates continued to shower

for minutes after a lockdown was ordered. Solano

gave a guard a letter written by Madsen that

effectively admitted he attacked Cornejo, stating in

part: “YES I DID HIM.” Madsen attached a newspaper

article on the Cornejo attack to his letter. Solano

testified that he transferred a razor blade shank to

Madsen’s cell a few days before the attack and that

two days before the attack he overheard Madsen tell

Espinoza that he was going to “get” Cornejo. At the

time of the incident, Solano saw Madsen, Bergam and

Espinoza follow Cornejo to his cell. He later saw

Madsen removing his clothes as he walked toward the

showers. Madsen had red marks on his chest and

appeared agitated. Later, guards searched Madsen’s

cell and found two unaltered razors and wet jailhouse

clothing hanging on an unauthorized line. The

evidence supporting Madsen’s convictions on counts 1

and 2 was strong. Therefore, it is unlikely the gang

evidence or other evidence admitted to show Madsen’s

commission of counts 3 and 4 had an inflammatory

spillover effect, causing the jury to convict him of

counts 1 and 2.

///

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-31- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

We conclude it is not reasonably probable Madsen

would have received a more favorable result had the

trial of counts 1 and 2 been severed from the trial

of counts 3 and 4. (People v. McLain, supra, 46

Cal.3d at pp. 105-106; People v. Watson, supra, 46

Cal.2d at p.836.) Furthermore, Madsen does not show

that on the record in this case there was a

miscarriage of justice because all four counts were

jointly tried. (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 13; People v.

Saldana, supra, 233 Cal.App.2d at pp. 30-31; People

v. Fox, supra, 157 Cal.App.2d at p. 430; People v.

Renier, supra, 148 Cal.App.2d at p.520.) Finally,

Madsen does not show that the joinder of all four

counts actually resulted in gross unfairness or

otherwise denied him due process. (People v. Arias,

supra, 13 Cal.4th at p.127.) Therefore, any error by

the trial court in denying Madsen’s severance motion

was not prejudicial and does not require reversal for

any of his convictions. 

(Lodgment No. 3 at 15-19.)

Clearly established United States Supreme Court law states

that: “[i]mproper joinder does not, in itself, violate the

Constitution. Rather, misjoinder ‘rise[s] to the level of a

constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice so great as

to deny a defendant his [constitutional] right to a fair trial’.”

United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)(citing Kotteakos v.

U.S., 328 U.S. 728, 776 (1946). 

In U.S. v. Akana, 210 Fed.Appx. 681, 682 (9th Cir. 2006), the

court held that joinder of four counts was not prejudicial where

“evidence of Counts 1, 2 and 3 would be admissible in a trial for

Count 4, and vice versa, to show intent, knowledge, or lack of

mistake or accident.” Id. at 682-83; see also, Davis v. Butler, 210

Fed.Appx. 584, 586 (9th Cir. 2006)(no prejudice where two robbery

counts joined for trial because evidence as to each count would have

been cross-admissible in separate trials).

Madsen argues that “the Cornejo assault an[sic] the

allegation of the deliberate mutilation of a human being as

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28 12CALJIC 17.02 states in pertinent part: “Each Count charges a distinct

crime. You must decide each Count separately.”

-32- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

aggravated mayhem was clearly more inflammatory than the possessory

and verbal offenses tried with it. Moreover, the prejudicial

‘spillover’ effect was plainly at work. . .” (Pet. at 28.) The

Court of Appeal did not determine whether joinder of Counts 1 and 2,

with Count 3 and Count 4 was proper, however it thoroughly reviewed

the record and determined that Madsen suffered no prejudice as a

result of the joinder. (Lodgment No. 3 at 19.) As the Court of

Appeal properly noted, evidence from Counts 1 and 2 (the assault on

Cornjeo) was cross-admissible on Count 3 to show that Madsen

knowingly possessed a razor blade, and on Count 4 to show that

Bradburn’s fear was reasonable because Madsen was a high-powered,

dangerous inmate who previously had attacked another inmate. See

Akana, 210 Fed.Appx. 682. Moreover, the jury was instructed that

they were to decide each count separately because each charged a

distinct crime.12 Jurors are presumed to follow such instructions,

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72, therefore Madsen fails to show that

joinder was so manifestly prejudicial that it outweighed the

dominant concern with judicial economy and required the court to

sever the counts for trial. United States v. Kinslow, 860 F.2d 963,

966 (9th Cir. 1988). Madsen offers nothing more than speculation as

to the purported “spillover” effect of evidence from Counts 1 and 2

to Counts 3 and 4, which is insufficient to carry his burden. 

In light of the above, the Court of Appeal decision denying

Madsen’s joinder claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law.

Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that Claim 2 be DENIED. 

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13For ease of analysis, the Court will address the independent ineffective

assistance of counsel claims in this section. Madsen’s remaining ineffective

assistance of counsel claims will be addressed in the section examining the

related substantive claim. 

-33- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

F. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Ground 4, Madsen asserts multiple claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel including failure to call certain

witnesses, failure to impeach Victor Solano (“Solano”)(a witness for

the prosecution), and failure to cross-examine the document

examiners regarding a handwriting exemplar.13 (Pet. at 36.)

Failure to Call Certain Witnesses

Madsen argues that Ulovec failed to investigate and call

eight witnesses who were essential to the effective presentation of

his case. (Pet. at 36.) In particular, Madsen asserts that Ulovec

should have called William Berger, “Mr. Viezaga”, Dennis “DJ”

Bratton, Greg Jennings, Jesse Provencio, Juan Gonzales, Linda

Provencio and Leslie Bowers. (Id.) 

Respondent contends that Madsen did not suffer ineffective

assistance of counsel for Ulovec’s failure to call these witnesses,

and therefore the Court should deny the claims. (Answer at 25.)

Respondent further argues that this claim is unexhausted as to Linda

Provencio and Leslie Bowers because Madsen did not mention either of

these witnesses in his appeals to the state courts, therefore this

Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim, unless it

finds it is “perfectly clear” that it has no merit. (Id.) In

addition, Respondent contends that Madsen did not raise any claim as

to “Mr. Viezaga” in his Court of Appeal filings, but only mentioned

him in his California Supreme Court habeas petition, suggesting that

Madsen himself did not know about Viezaga at trial. (Id. at 27.)

Therefore, Madsen failed to show that Ulovec knew of Viezaga or

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could have with reasonable diligence learned about him during trial,

and his failure to call Viezaga did not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel. (Id.) 

Witnesses Berger, Bratton, Jennings, Jesse Provencio, and Gonzalez

As before, this Court must look through to the last reasoned

state court decision issued by the California Court of Appeal.

(Lodgment No. 3.) The court found no ineffective assistance of

counsel:

Madsen contends that because his trial counsel

did not call certain witnesses to testify in his

defense he was denied effective assistance of

counsel. He asserts that William Berger was an

inmate who witnessed the Cornejo incident and could

have testified favorably for Madsen’s defense had

trial counsel called him. He argues that Berger

would have testified that Madsen did not enter

Cornejo’s cell and that Espinoza did. However, in

his declaration submitted in support of Madsen’s new

trial motion, Berger stated that he did not see

Madsen enter Cornejo’s cell. That proffered

testimony is not an affirmative statement that Madsen

did not enter Cornejo’s cell. Furthermore, Madsen

does not show that his trial counsel’s decision not

to call Berger as a witness was not a rational

tactical decision based [on] the lack of probative

value of Berger’s testimony or the possibility that

he would be impeached and discredited by the

prosecutor, reflecting poorly on the defense. 

Madsen asserts that “D.J.” Bratton (misspelled

as Barton on his declaration) was another inmate who

witnessed the Cornejo incident and could have

provided testimony favorable to his defense. In his

declaration in support of Madsen’s new trial motion,

Bratton stated that Cornejo told him after the

assault that Madsen did not participate in the

assault on him and that he named Madsen as a

participant to bolster his civil suit for damages

against San Diego County. However, Madsen does not

show that he told his trial counsel about Bratton’s

proffered testimony or that with reasonable diligence

his counsel could have learned about it.

Furthermore, Madsen does not show that Bratton’s

proffered testimony would not have been excluded by

the trial court as inadmissible hearsay; that Bratton

would not have been successfully impeached by the

prosecutor; and that his trial counsel could not have

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-35- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

made a rational tactical decision not to call Bratton

as a witness. 

Madsen asserts that Greg Jennings was another

inmate who could have provided favorable testimony

for his defense. In his declaration in support of

Madsen’s new trial motion, Jennings stated that he

knew Madsen and Solano had a fistfight before the

Cornejo incident and that in his presence Solano

expressed hatred and animosity toward Madsen. Madsen

apparently argues that Jenning’s proffered testimony

would have impeached Solano’s credibility. However,

Madsen does not show that he told his trial counsel

about Jennings’s proffered testimony or that with

reasonable diligence his counsel could have

discovered it. Furthermore, Madsen does not show

that Jennings would not have been successfully

impeached by the prosecutor and that his trial

counsel could not have made a rational tactical

decision not to call Jennings as a witness. On the

contrary, it appears that Madsen’s trial counsel made

an express tactical decision not to directly attack

Solano’s credibility because he believed Solano’s

version of the Cornejo incident could be used to

Madsen’s advantage by allowing him to argue that

Espinoza, not Madsen, was Cornejo’s actual attacker.

Therefore, his trial counsel could have made a

tactical decision not to call Jennings to impeach

Solano’s credibility. Madsen does not show that his

trial counsel’s tactical decision was not rational

and fell below the objective standard of reasonable

performance of defense attorneys.

Madsen asserts that Jesse Provencio was another

inmate who could have provided favorable testimony

for his defense. In his declaration in support of

Madsen’s new trial motion, Provencio stated that

after the Bradburn incident Bradburn approached

Madsen and told him he was going to “get” him.

Madsen’s trial counsel was aware of Provencio’s

proffered testimony but made a tactical decision not

to call him as a witness because he did not believe

Provencio would be a credible witness. During the

Marsden hearing, Madsen’s trial counsel explained

that he had spoken with Provencio’s former attorney,

who indicated that Provencio would not be a reliable

witness. Madsen’s trial counsel also believed that

Provencio’s proffered testimony would support, rather

than disprove, the prosecution’s charge that Madsen

had threatened Bradburn. Madsen does not show that

his trial counsel’s decision not to call Provencio

was not a rational tactical decision or was otherwise

below the objective standard of reasonable

performance of defense attorneys. 

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Madsen asserts that Juan Carlos Gonzalez was

another inmate who could have provided favorable

testimony for his defense. In his declaration in

support of Madsen’s new trial motion, Gonzalez stated

that after the incident between Bradburn and Madsen

when Gonzalez did not terminate a telephone call

quickly enough, Bradburn told Gonzalez: “You three

strikers think you’re running the place around here.

If you’re not careful, I’ll set you up just like I

did Madsen.” However, Madsen does not show that his

trial counsel was aware of Gonzalez’s proffered

testimony or that with reasonable diligence he could

have learned about it. Furthermore, Madsen does not

show that Gonzalez would have been a credible witness

or that his trial counsel could not have made a

rational tactical decision that Gonzalez’s proffered

testimony would support, rather than disprove, the

prosecutor’s claim that Madsen had threatened

Bradburn. 

Therefore, we conclude Madsen has not shown that

his trial counsel’s failure to call these five

witnesses to testify in his defense was below the

objective standard or reasonable performance of

defense attorneys. His counsel could have made

rational tactical decisions not to call them as

witnesses based on their lack of credibility or a

belief that their testimonies might support the

prosecution’s case, rather than Madsen’s defense

case. Furthermore, Madsen does not show that he was

prejudiced by the omission of the testimonies of

these five witnesses. He does not show it is

reasonably probable that he would have received a

more favorable result had any or all of the five

witnesses testified at trial. On the contrary, the

evidence in support of his convictions was convincing

and it is unlikely that their proffered testimonies

would have changed the jury’s verdicts.

(Lodgment No. 3 at 25.) 

In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court stated that

“counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not

to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all

the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to

counsel's judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691. Similarly,

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clearly established Ninth Circuit law holds that “a lawyer who fails

adequately to investigate, and to introduce into evidence,

[information] that demonstrate[s] his client's factual innocence, or

that raise[s] sufficient doubt as to that question to undermine

confidence in the verdict, renders deficient performance.” Hart v.

Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999). Failure to take steps

necessary to produce key witnesses at trial can result in a finding

of ineffectiveness. Lord, 184 F.3d at 1093. However, an attorney

is not required to present trial testimony from every witness

suggested by defendant. United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500,

1509 (9th Cir. 1987)(trial tactics are clearly within the realm of

powers committed to the discretion of defense counsel).

A review of the record confirms the facts supporting the

appellate court’s conclusions. For example, William Berger stated

in his declaration in support of Madsen’s new trial motion that

“[a]t no time prior to Mr. Cornejo’s appearance in the day room

showing evidence of facial wounds, did I see Richard Madsen enter

Cornejo’s cell.” (Supp. Lodgment No. 17 at 680.) As the appellate

court correctly determined, Berger’s statement does not

affirmatively conclude that Madsen never entered Cornejo’s cell.

Similarly, Jesse Provencio’s declaration in support of Madsen’s new

trial motion states that sometime after Madsen’s threat to Bradburn,

Provencio was “in the company of Richard Madsen at the Central Jail

Facility when Deputy Bradburn came up to Mr. Madsen and told him he

[the Deputy] was going to “get” Madsen.” (Supp. Lodgment No. 17 at

683.) Ulovec stated during the Marsden hearing that “far from

helping Mr. Madsen, Mr. Provencio’s testimony would aid in

confirming Deputy Bradburn’s position he was indeed threatened by

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Mr. Madsen” and therefore he made a tactical decision not to call

Provencio. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 645.) 

Accordingly, trial counsel’s failure to call Bratton,

Jennings, Provencio, and Gonzalez was not unreasonable because the

proffered testimony had little probative value, could potentially

derail the defense case, would subject the witness to crossexamination and or impeachment that could detrimentally affect

Madsen’s case, or was unknown to trial counsel prior to trial.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691. 

Mr. Viezaga

Madsen did not make any claim as to witness “Mr. Viezaga” in

the Court of Appeal, however he raised this issue in his habeas

corpus petition filed with the California Supreme Court which was

silently denied. (Lodgment No. 16.) Because the state court did not

furnish a basis for its reasoning, this Court must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the denial is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

 Madsen alleges that inmate Viezaga would have testified that

Bergman, not Madsen, entered Cornejo’s cell, after which Cornejo

emerged bleeding. (Lodgment No. 11 at 170.) Madsen claims that

Viezaga gave a statement to authorities with this information.

(Id.) However, Madsen provides no evidence to support this

allegation and the trial record contains no mention of Viezaga or

Viezaga’s purported statement to authorities. Accordingly, Madsen

has not demonstrated that trial counsel knew about Viezaga or with

reasonable diligence could have learned about him. Therefore, trial

counsel’s failure to investigate and present Viezaga at trial was

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reasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. 690-91. 

Linda Provencio and Leslie Bowers

Madsen did not raise his claims concerning Linda Provencio

and Leslie Bowers in any state court, thus the claims appear to be

unexhausted. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-21; Picard, 404 U.S. at 275.

However, under Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623-624, this Court can deny the

claims if it is perfectly clear that they are without merit. 

In his petition, Madsen simply states that he suffered

ineffective assistance of counsel for “Ulovec’s failure to

investigate, interview, subpoena a number of witnesses essential to

the effective presentation of Petitioner’s case, defense witnesses

. . .Linda Provencio, Leslie Bowers.” (Pet at 36.) He fails to

state to what facts Linda Provencio and Leslie Bowers would testify,

whether he told Ulovec about these potential witnesses before trial,

and why trial counsel should have called them. (Id.) Without any

indication as to how their testimony would have helped the defense

case, Madsen has not established that Ulovec’s performance was

unreasonable or that he was prejudiced. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697; see also Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir.

1995)(affirming district court’s denial of habeas relief where

petitioner’s conclusory allegations failed to meet the habeas rules’

specificity requirement). 

For the foregoing reasons, the California Court of Appeal’s

denial of Madsen’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims

concerning Ulovec’s failure to call William Berger, Dennis Bratton,

Greg Jennings, Jesse Provencio, and Juan Gonzales was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, controlling United States

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Supreme Court authority. See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038. Furthermore,

the California Supreme Court’s silent denial of his claim as to

Viezaga was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

controlling United States Supreme Court law. Id. Finally, despite

being unexhausted, it is “perfectly clear” that his claims as to

Linda Provencio and Leslie are without merit, and can be denied.

Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623-24. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that

the portion of Ground 4 concerning failure to call witnesses be

DENIED. 

Failure to Impeach Solano

Madsen argues that Ulovec also was ineffective for failing to

impeach “the prosecution’s star witness, informant ‘Victor Solano.’”

(Pet. at 36.) Madsen contends there is no merit to Ulovec’s

explanation that he chose not to impeach Solano because Solano’s

testimony could be helpful to the defense. (Id.) Respondent

counters that the Court of Appeal correctly determined that Ulovec’s

decision to refrain from impeaching Solano was a sound tactical

decision because his testimony suggested that someone else may have

committed the assault on Cornejo. (Answer at 20-21.)

As before, this Court must look through to the last reasoned

state court decision which was issued by the California Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment No. 3.) The Court of Appeal stated:

Madsen contends that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel when his trial counsel made the

tactical decision not to impeach Solano, a witness

for the prosecution. During the Marsden hearing,

Madsen’s trial counsel stated that he made a tactical

decision not to impeach Solano because he believed

Solano could provide favorable testimony for the

defense. He believed Solano’s version of the Cornejo

incident would support the defense theory that

Espinoza, not Madsen, committed the assault on

Cornejo. He believed Solano would testify that he

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did not see Madsen enter Cornejo’s cell and that when

he first saw Cornejo bleeding, Madsen was in the

shower area and Espinoza was just then walking up the

stairs to the shower area.

Madsen argues that his trial counsel’s decision

not to impeach Solano was not a rational tactical

decision and fell below the objective standard of

reasonable performance of defense attorneys.

However, we cannot conclude that his counsel’s trial

strategy was irrational and fell below the applicable

standard. Madsen’s counsel was faced with very

incriminating facts tending to show Madsen was

involved in the Cornejo assault. On the record in

this case, it was not an irrational tactical decision

to attempt to use Solano’s testimony on the incident

to show that Espinoza, and not Madsen, committed the

assault. Although Solano testified on other events

that did not support the defense theory, Madsen’s

trial counsel attempted to make the best of a

difficult case by not impeaching Solano.

Furthermore, Madsen does not show that Solano could

have been successfully impeached and, even were he

impeached, that the other evidence, including

Madsen’s letter admitting his attack on Cornejo,

would have been deemed insufficient by the jury to

prove Madsen’s guilt of counts 1 and 2. The trial

strategy of Madsen’s counsel, although ultimately

unsuccessful, cannot be considered irrational. 

(Lodgment No. 3 at 26-27.)

Madsen does not show that Ulovec’s decision to refrain from

impeaching Solano fell below the objective standard of performance

of defense attorneys, especially in light of the possibility that

Solano’s testimony could in fact be beneficial to the defense. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. On direct examination, the prosecution

asked Solano to describe what he saw at the time of the attack:

Q: When did you first see Mr. Madsen after he

disappeared in the area of the stairwell headed

in the direction of Mr. Cornejo’s cell?

A: About ten minutes later.

Q: And where was he when you first saw him at that

time?

A: He was coming out from underneath the stairwell.

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Q: Which stairwell?

A: The one that is closest to Mr. Cornejo’s cell.

Q: And you described seeing red marks around his

neck; is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you notice anything else about his physical

condition when you saw him?

A: He was kind of agitated.

(Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 198-199.)

On cross examination, Ulovec effectively questioned Solano

who revealed that Madsen was already in the shower area when Solano

first saw the injured Cornejo and Espinoza was just heading up the

stairs at that time. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 213.) During one of

Madsen’s many challenges to Ulovec’s representation during trial,

Ulovec stated “I decided I really didn’t particularly want to

impeach Mr. Solano to make him look like he was being untruthful

because I feel that I may have been able to in essence ‘go through

the back door’ through the prosecution’s own witness and establish

that Mr. Madsen is innocent of the offense.” (Supp. Lodgment No. 13

at 16.) Ulovec made a sound tactical decision to refrain from

impeaching Solano so that he could use the testimony to support the

inference that Espinoza committed the assault, and therefore his

performance was not unreasonable. Lord, 184 F.3d at 1093. For the

foregoing reasons, Ulovec’s decision not to impeach Solano does not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, and the California

Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established United States

Supreme Court law. 

/// 

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Failure to Cross-Examine Document Examiners 

 Madsen further contends Ulovec provided ineffective

assistance by failing to object to the method by which Marjorie Ann

Fair (“Fair”) obtained a handwriting exemplar from Madsen, and by

failing to question both Fair, and William Leaver, the document

examiner who established that the legal pad containing the razor

blade had Madsen’s writing on it. (Pet. at 36-37.) Madsen argues

that Ulovec should have cross-examined Leaver about the photocopied

note, or “kite”, and Leaver’s receipt of the razor blade in the

legal pad and his return of the pad without the blade to Garcia.

(Id. at 37.) Madsen further complains that Ulovec was ineffective

for failing to hire a document examiner to rebut Leaver’s

conclusions, and testify that the photocopy of the “kite” could not

be proven to be written by Madsen. (Id.)

Respondent counters that Madsen has not demonstrated that a

photocopied handwriting sample cannot be meaningfully compared to an

original document, nor has he shown that it was not his handwriting

in the “kite”; and, therefore counsel was not unreasonable for

failing to challenge the handwriting evidence. (Answer at 28.) 

Madsen did not raise this issue on direct appeal, but did

raise it in his habeas petition in the California Supreme Court,

which was silently denied. (Lodgment No. 16.) Because the state

court did not furnish a basis for its reasoning, this Court must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the

denial is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

///

///

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Marjorie Ann Fair

 Madsen does not state the error he alleges existed in Fair’s

method of obtaining his handwriting exemplar, nor can this Court

find such an error. It is clearly established law that a suspect

can be compelled to provide a handwriting exemplar, as it is an

“identifying physical characteristic” and is therefore outside the

Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.

Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 591 (1990). Here, Fair

testified about her training and experience as a fingerprint and

evidence technician for the San Diego County District Attorney’s

office. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 228-29.) She also explained the

method by which she obtained the exemplar stating that she dictated

a passage to Madsen while in a courthouse holding cell which Madsen

then wrote on a white piece of paper. (Id.) Madsen has not

identified what advantage he could have gained by his counsel crossexamining Fair about the method she used to obtain the exemplar nor

what prejudice he suffered as a result of counsel’s decision not to

conduct such a cross examination. This conclusory allegation is not

sufficient. Rule 2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; see also Boehme v.

Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1970) (trial court’s

dismissal of federal habeas proceeding affirmed where petitioner

made conclusory allegations instead of factual allegations showing

that he was entitled to relief). 

Moreover, Madsen’s contention that Ulovec did not crossexamine Fair is incorrect; Ulovec did cross-examine Fair. (Supp.

Lodgment No. 12 at 230.) However, Ulovec limited his crossexamination to asking the date Fair obtained the sample. (Id.) It

was reasonable for Ulovec to limit his cross-examination of Fair

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because Fair’s qualifications and the process by which she took the

sample were discussed in detail on direct examination, and there was

nothing out of the ordinary to challenge. See Woodson, 526 F.2d at

551. Similarly, it was reasonable for Ulovec to refrain from

objecting to the handwriting exemplar as it was a standard method

for establishing ownership of the legal pad, and there was no Fifth

Amendment protected right. See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 591. Finally,

Madsen fails to demonstrate how Ulovec’s decision not to further

cross-examine Fair or object to the handwriting exemplar in any way

prejudiced him other than to make conclusory allegations which

cannot support habeas relief under Rule 2. See Rule 2(c)(1)-(3), 28

U.S.C. foll. §2254. 

William Leaver

Similarly, document examiner Leaver testified that he

compared the handwriting exemplar to the handwriting on the legal

pad containing the razor blade recovered from Madsen’s cell and

determined the handwriting was “the writing of a common author; in

other words, they are written by the same person.” (Supp. Lodgment

No. 12 at 234.) Leaver also compared a copy of the “kite” to the

exemplar and determined they were authored by the same person. (Id.

at 234-34.) 

 Madsen initially contends that the handwriting in the

photocopied “kite” cannot be compared to a handwriting exemplar and

that Ulovec should have questioned Leaver regarding the validity of

such comparisons. (Pet. at 36.) However, Madsen presents no

evidence to support his bald assertion that a handwriting analysis

cannot be performed on photocopied documents. Madsen also has not

presented any evidence indicating that cross-examining Leaver on

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this topic would have benefitted Madsen’s defense. In fact, crossexamining Leaver on this topic may have reinforced to the jury the

validity of Leaver’s analysis and conclusion. Accordingly, Madsen

has not established that his attorney provided inadequate

representation when he failed to examine Leaver on the topic of

analyzing photocopies nor that Madsen was prejudiced by the

decision. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. 

Madsen argues that Ulovec also was ineffective because he did

not cross-examine Leaver regarding the loss of the razor blade while

the legal pad was in Leaver’s possession. (Pet. at 36-37.)

However, the loss of the razor blade was ancillary to the expertise

provided by Leaver in determining that the pad belonged to Madsen.

Whether the blade was lost in the chain of custody does not change

the fact that Leaver determined the pad belonged to Madsen through

a handwriting comparison. See Woodson, 526 F.2d at 551.

Furthermore, Ulovec cross-examined Deputy Efrain Garcia, the

investigator who testified as to the razor blade’s chain of custody,

and questioned him specifically about the loss of the blade, and

whether it was tested for fingerprints prior to its loss. (Supp.

Lodgment No. 12 at 272.) Accordingly, it was reasonable for Ulovec

to conclude that cross-examination of Leaver on this same point was

redundant and unnecessary.

Madsen fails to show that Ulovec made unreasonable tactical

decisions when he chose not to cross-examine Leaver or to object to

the handwriting exemplar, and that he suffered prejudice due to

Ulovec’s actions. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Therefore, the

California Supreme Court’s denial of Madsen’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claims was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

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application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court

authority. 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Ground

4 be DENIED as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging Ulovec’s failure to call certain witnesses, impeach

Solano, and challenge the handwriting experts.

G. Convictions Tainted by Juror Misconduct

In Ground 6 Madsen contends that he was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to an impartial jury and fair trial due to juror

bias and misconduct. (Pet. at 45.) In particular, Madsen contends

that juror Gary Darr (“Darr”) withheld information about a prior

conviction because he wanted to serve on the jury in order to ‘get

back’ at Madsen for an alleged incident years before. (Id.) Madsen

argues that despite the Court of Appeal granting his appeal on this

ground and remanding for an evidentiary hearing, the trial court and

prosecution violated his due process rights because they caused

witness Robert Crowley to be unavailable, denied Madsen a public

hearing, made it impossible for witness James Crowley to gain access

to the hearing, and denied Madsen adequate access to an attorney on

remand. (Id. at 50.) 

In response, Respondent argues that Madsen has not shown that

the Court of Appeal’s decision was unreasonable, nor has he shown

why the trial court was not entitled to believe Darr when he

testified at the first hearing. (Answer at 37.) Madsen never

presented proof in state court that he actually contacted Crowley,

or that Crowley was ever on his way to San Diego, therefore the

state court cannot be faulted for choosing to believe Darr who

testified credibly and in person at the first new trial hearing.

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(Id. at 38.)

First New Trial Hearing

 On November 9, 1998, Madsen filed a motion for a new trial

alleging juror misconduct claiming that juror Gary Darr knew Madsen

before trial, had fired a weapon at Madsen on one occasion, and

intentionally failed to disclose a previous felony conviction during

voir dire. (Lodgment No. 3 at 8.) On December 11, 1998, Darr

submitted a declaration which stated:

In January 1998, I was a juror in the trial of a

defendant who was charged with an attack on another

inmate at the George Bailey Jail; having a razor blade

in jail; and threatening a deputy.

I was contacted by telephone on November 23,

1998, by Deputy District Attorney Paul Azevedo. Mr.

Azevedo told me he wanted to talk to me about my

service as a juror. Mr. Azevedo told me I did not

have to talk to him and if I did, it would be at a

place and time of my convenience. I agreed to talk to

Mr. Azevedo.

During the jury selection process, I do not

recall the judge asking me if I had ever been

arrested. I never intentionally concealed that

information or any other information from the court.

At the time I sat as a juror, I did not know who

the defendant was nor do I currently have any

recollection of knowing who he was. I was not even

aware he was from Bonita until after the trial was

over and I read about him in the newspaper.

If, years ago, I had some previous contact with

the defendant, I do not recall it and therefore it

could not have been considered and was not considered

by me and had absolutely no affect on me as a juror.

Likewise, the fact that I was arrested many years ago

was not considered by me in performing my duties as a

juror nor did it affect me in performing my duties as

a juror in this case. 

My decision as a juror in this case was based on

the evidence presented in court and nothing else. 

(Lodgment No. 4 at 740-41.)

///

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On February 19, April 8, and April 21, 1999, the trial court

conducted hearings on the new trial motion and issue of possible

juror misconduct. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 653.) Darr testified

at the hearing, stating that he was convicted of a felony in 1986,

but because the conviction was later changed to a misdemeanor and

then expunged, he believed it had been taken off his record and that

he “didn’t have to talk about it anymore”. (Id. at 705-06.) 

During the hearing, defense counsel stated that a key

witness, Robert Scott Crowley (“Crowley”), was on an airplane on his

way to testify at the hearing and requested that the trial court

continue the hearing until later that afternoon or the following day

to allow Crowley to testify. (Id. at 689.) Defense counsel

represented that Crowley would testify that Darr recognized Madsen

at trial, and that by voting to convict him, Darr was going to get

“the little bastard” for stealing Darr’s marijuana plants many years

before. (Id. at 695.) Crowley did not appear at the hearing, and the

trial court declined to continue the hearing for Crowley’s arrival,

finding after Darr testified that he was credible and denying

Madsen’s new trial motion. (Id.)

Madsen raised this issue in his direct appeal, and the Court

of Appeal reversed and remanded on the juror misconduct issue,

directing the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

(Lodgment No. 3 at 44.) In particular, the Court of Appeal found

that the trial court abused its discretion by not continuing the

hearing until Robert Crowley arrived, and directed the trial court

to allow Madsen to present Crowley’s testimony and further crossexamine Darr regarding his alleged bias against Madsen. Id. 

///

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Second New Trial Hearing

On remand, the trial court scheduled a hearing for August 8,

2001, which was continued to November to allow the defense to locate

Crowley. However, Crowley proved impossible to find, despite

several months of effort by both the prosecution and the defense.

(Lodgment No. 4 at 5.) Furthermore, juror Darr was not present for

the second hearing because the prosecution erroneously believed that

Darr was only to testify after Robert Crowley testified. (Id.)

Efforts to locate Darr at the time of the hearing were unsuccessful

so the trial court invited both parties to recite the questions they

would have asked Darr. (Id.) After hearing the proposed questions,

the trial court determined it could rule without Darr’s testimony,

because he had testified during the first new trial hearing. (Id. at

9.) The trial court again denied Madsen’s new trial motion, finding

Darr to have been a credible witness, who did not knowingly conceal

his prior conviction from the court during voir dire and who

harbored no bias toward Madsen. (Id. at 8-10.)

Impartial Jury and Fair Trial Claim

Madsen again appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the

trial court’s findings holding there was no juror misconduct, and

even if Darr had committed misconduct, there was no evidence of

prejudice affecting Madsen’s case. (Lodgment No. 5 at 13.) 

In adjudicating this claim, the Court once again must “look

through” to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion (Lodgment No.

5) because the California Supreme Court summarily denied Madsen’s

petitions. (Lodgment No. 16.) See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

///

///

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The Court of Appeal stated:

Initially, we note the record does not contain

any evidence establishing that Crowley’s failure to

testify in 1999 was solely the result of the trial

court’s denial of a continuance. The record contains

only defense counsel’s statement at the 1999 hearing

that Crowley was then “in the air” on his way to San

Diego from Oregon. There was no declaration submitted

at the 1999 or 2001 hearings to support this

assertion. Nor were any records (such as airplane

tickets or reservations) presented to show that

Crowley had, in fact, been on his way to San Diego at

the time the trial court denied the continuance in

1999.

Moreover, Crowley’s unavailability at the 2001

hearing was not the result of any “government action.”

The trial court did not prevent Madsen from calling

Crowley as a witness at the 2001 hearing. The

prosecutor did not prevent Madsen from calling Crowley

at the 2001 hearing. Indeed, the prosecutor made

diligent efforts to locate Crowley. Crowley’s

unavailability for the 2001 hearing was the result of

Crowley’s own actions in having moved his residence,

using different names, and/or his unwillingness to be

a witness.

Finally, we find no merit to Madsen’s last

argument that we should reject the trial court’s

finding that Darr was credible because it “was made in

a vacuum of its own creation and cannot stand.”

Madsen points out the finding was “made without the

benefit of hearing from Crowley and [that] this Court

specifically intended that the trial court consider

Crowley’s testimony before making any findings of

credibility.” He further states that “[a] witness,

even after vigorous cross-examination, may seem

credible; however, his/her credibility can be

destroyed by the testimony of a contrary witness.”

To the extent Madsen may be suggesting that we

mandated Crowley testify prior to any ruling by the

trial court on remand, he is in error. In our opinion

we held only that “the trial court should conduct a

more complete evidentiary hearing, including allowing

Madsen to present the testimony of Crowley on his

posttrial conversation with Darr and to further crossexamine Darr after Crowley’s testimony.” (People v.

Madsen, supra, D03707, italics added.) The trial

court gave Madsen that opportunity. When Crowley did

not testify, the trial court’s credibility

determination was necessarily limited to the record it

had before it. Based on that record, the court was

entitled to (and indeed was directed by our prior

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opinion) to make credibility findings. The court was

entitled to find Darr was a credible witness. There

was no error here. 

(Lodgment No. 5 at 11-13.)

Clearly established United States Supreme Court law holds

that “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in

which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.”

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982). The determination of

whether an individual juror was biased against the defendant is a

factual determination that we presume correct in habeas corpus

proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S.

1025, 1038 (1984); Hart v. Stagner, 935 F.2d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir.

1991). The federal court has no license under Section 2254(d) “to

redetermine the credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been

observed by the state trial court, but not by them.” Marshall v.

Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). The trial court’s resolution

of credibility questions is entitled to special deference. See

Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038.

Gary Darr was Credible

Madsen’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and

impartial jury was violated by juror Darr’s conduct is without

merit. Viewing the trial court’s credibility determination with

special deference, as the court must, the trial court did not err in

finding Darr credible at the first new trial hearing or the new

trial hearing on remand. See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038. When Darr

testified at the first new trial hearing, he repeatedly stated that

he did not recognize Madsen at trial:

Q: And at that time, while you were asked questions

before serving as a juror, did you recognize the

defendant?

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A: No, I didn’t.

Q: Did he seem familiar to you in any way?

A: No.

Q: Did you recognize the name when the court read

it. “Richard Eugene Madsen”?

A: No.

Q: As you sit here today, I’d ask you to take a

look at the gentleman in the green jail

jumpsuit, for the record, Mr. Madsen. Do you

recognize him other than from your jury service?

A: No.

(Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 702.)

In response to the prosecution’s questioning, Darr explained

why he did not disclose his prior conviction:

Q: Also during your questions, before you were

actually sworn in as a juror, as one of the

twelve jurors, do you remember the court asking

you anything about prior criminal convictions?

A: No, I don’t.

Q: And if the court had asked you, as a member of a

group or you as an individual, if you had any

prior criminal convictions, do you know how you

would have answered that question?

A: If I was asked individually, I don’t really

remember.

Q: And is that because you took some action to

remedy the event, a criminal conviction from

about ten years ago?

A: Yes, I did. I believe it was like 1985 or 1986.

I had a conviction and I went through the whole

thing, did the time or whatever, paid the debt

back to society, and then went to my attorney

and got it changed to a misdemeanor.

Q: And after it was changed into a misdemeanor, did

you go through a process known to you as

“expungement”? 

A: Yes, sir. I heard through my attorney that it

was taken care of.

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Q: What is your understanding?

A: I thought it was taken off your record and, you

know, it’s basically a misdemeanor and therefore

you didn’t really have to talk about it anymore.

(Id. at 705-06.)

The record reveals that Darr answered the prosecution’s

questions in a straightforward and consistent manner, giving the

trier of fact no reason to doubt his credibility. Darr testified

that he did not recognize Madsen at trial and did not intentionally

fail to disclose his prior conviction, and he explained why he did

not disclose his prior conviction, if he was asked. 

In support of his motion for a new trial, Madsen presented a

declaration from James Crowley who stated he and Madsen grew up

together in Bonita, and that he remembered Darr as a neighbor who

shot at Madsen “for his belief that Mr. Madsen had stolen marijuana

from his back yard”, and that Darr stated he would “get even” with

Madsen if he ever had the opportunity. (Supp. Lodgment No. 17 at

704.) Madsen also provided a declaration from John Dillon who

stated he had known Madsen since 1969, lived in the same

neighborhood and attended the same junior high school. (Id. at 706.)

Dillon stated that Darr was known as “Fat Dog” in the neighborhood

and that Dillon assumed it was Darr who shot at Madsen when Madsen

stole the marijuana plants from Darr’s yard. (Id.) Madsen did not

present a declaration from Robert Scott Crowley as to his purported

testimony. 

The court stated that it “thought long and hard about the

declarations attached to the moving papers and chose instead to

limit an inquiry of Mr. Darr to add additional information to the

declaration that he submitted to the court.” (Supp. Lodgment No. 12

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at 721) The court went on to state that it had “considered the

totality of the circumstances of this case including the trial,

keeping in mind [defense counsel’s] proffer of Mr. Crowley’s

testimony”, and determined that it was not necessary to bring Mr.

Crowley before the court to testify. (Id. at 722-23) After

observing Darr’s demeanor on the stand, the trial court found Darr

to be credible and denied Madsen’s new trial motion. On remand the

trial court affirmed its holding. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 723.)

Madsen has not presented evidence undermining the trial court’s

determination that even if it were to find Darr’s conduct as a juror

was willful, there was no reasonable probability of actual harm to

Madsen. Smith, 455 U.S. at 215; Patton, 467 U.S. 1038. Furthermore,

the trial court found Darr to be credible after observing Darr’s

demeanor on the stand, something this Court cannot do. Marshall,

459 U.S. at 434; Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. , 466

U.S. 485, 500 (1984). Therefore, this Court defers to the trial

court’s credibility determination. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038. 

Witnesses Were Not Made Unavailable by Court or Prosecution

Furthermore, there is no merit to Madsen’s claim that Robert

Crowley was unavailable due to the trial court’s denial of a

continuance in the first new trial hearing, as there was never any

evidence produced that Crowley was in fact “in the air” on his way

to that hearing. Had the trial court continued the hearing until

Robert Crowley appeared, the hearing may never have happened, as

Robert Crowley could not be located. The trial court noted, “The

People filed declarations detailing their efforts in locating Robert

Crowley and submitted the declaration of John Buttitto, an

investigator with the District Attorney’s Office, detailing his

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fruitless search for Mr. Crowley. Defense counsel represented that

his efforts were similarly unsuccessful.” (Lodgment No. 4 at 5.)

The Court of Appeal properly found that Crowley’s absence from both

hearings was not due to any action taken by the court or government.

In addition, Darr was not made unavailable by the prosecution

for the second hearing as Madsen contends. Rather, Darr was not

called to the second hearing because the prosecution wrongly

believed that Darr’s testimony would only be required if Robert

Crowley testified, and because Crowley could not be located, the

prosecution did not call Darr. The Court further finds there is no

merit to Madsen’s argument that witness James Crowley was denied

admission to the R.J. Donovan facility where the second hearing was

held, because James Crowley (Robert’s brother) was not called as a

witness for the second new trial hearing, and no other evidence was

presented requiring his presence. 

Because the trial court properly determined juror Darr was

credible and had no bias toward Madsen, the Court of Appeal’s denial

of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established Supreme Court law. See Patton, 467 U.S. at

1038; Hart, 935 F.2d at 1014. For the foregoing reasons, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Ground 6 be DENIED.

H. Violation of Miranda Warning

In Ground 7, Madsen argues that his Fifth Amendment rights

were violated because inmate Solano, an alleged government

informant, initiated discussions with him about the Cornejo assault

which led to Madsen making incriminating statements after Madsen had

invoked his right to counsel. (Pet. at 54.) Madsen further argues

that Deputies Burke and Reynolds did not read him his Miranda

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14The government may not “deliberately elicit” incriminating statements

from an accused after the right to counsel has attached. Massiah v. U.S., 377

U.S. 201 (1964).

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warning after the alleged terrorist threat against Bradburn, and

therefore their testimony is “fruit of the poisonous tree.” (Id. at

55.) Because his attorney failed to move to suppress the testimony

of these witnesses, Madsen further claims he suffered ineffective

assistance of counsel. (Id. at 32.) 

Respondent counters that Madsen’s claim concerning Solano is

more properly construed as a Massiah14 claim, and should be denied

because the record fails to show that the government did anything

“designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks” citing

Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 457 (1986). (Answer at 38.)

Respondent further contends that Madsen’s right against selfincrimination was not violated when Bradburn, Burke and Reynolds

failed to give him Miranda warnings after the terrorist threat

incident because Madsen was not in custody, nor subject to

interrogation, as required under Miranda. (Id. at 39.)

Madsen did not raise this claim in his direct appeal, but

raised it in his habeas corpus petition to the California Supreme

Court which was silently denied. [Lodgment No. 16.] Therefore, this

Court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the denial is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

Massiah

Respondent correctly contends that Madsen makes a Massiah

claim when he contends that the government asked Solano to elicit

statements from Madsen to be used against him at trial. Under

Massiah and its progeny, to establish a Sixth Amendment violation of

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the right to counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that the

government took some action which was designed deliberately to

elicit incriminating remarks. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 72-73;

Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459; McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 474

(1991)(applying Massiah to 28 U.S.C. §2254 habeas corpus claim);

U.S. v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273 (1980)(Massiah applies to jailhouse

informant). The defendant must do more than show that an informant

voluntarily reported the incriminating statements. See Kuhlman, 477

U.S. at 459. 

In the present action, inmate Solano testified that Madsen

(1) came to his cell and asked Solano to testify falsely that Madsen was

with Solano during the Cornejo assault (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at

200), (2) asked Solano to pass an inculpatory jailhouse “kite” to

another inmate (id. at 202-203), and (3) threatened Solano (id. at

209). Solano also testified that he asked Madsen “Why Cornejo?” and

Madsen replied that Cornejo was “a piece of shit” and “got what he

had coming.” (Id. at 204-205.) 

 Solano’s first contact with law enforcement regarding the

Cornjeo incident was on April 24, 1994, the evening of the assault,

when Solano was asked to give a statement about what he witnessed.

(Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 200.) A few days later, Solano was asked

to provide Deputy Contreras with a written statement about the

incident, which he did. (Id.) On April 26, 1997, Madsen came to

Solano’s cell and asked Solano to testify on his behalf that Madsen

was watching TV with Solano at the time of the attack. (Id.)

Solano’s next contact with law enforcement came when Deputy

Contreras escorted him to the infirmary and Contreras asked Solano

if he knew anything more about the incident. (Id. at 201.) The

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prosecutor asked:

Q: Can you describe how you came into contact with

the deputy?

A: . . . I asked Mr. Contreras if he could take me

to the infirmary because I thought I had a

broken bone and he said, “Yes, I’ll take you

immediately”. And on my way down, he asked me if

I knew anything about the Cornejo incident and I

told him, “Yes, I know more than I told I knew.”

And he said, “Do you want to talk about it? And

I told him, “Yes, I would like to talk about

it.”

(Id. at 201-202.)

When Solano returned to the Module, Madsen approached Solano

and asked him to pass the incriminatory “kite”. (Id.) When asked

by the prosecutor what he did with the “kite” Solano stated “Well,

I thought I should call Deputy Contreras and show him this kite

since we’d just got done talking about this incident, and he told me

he would like to see it.” (Id. at 204.) 

The prosecutor did not ask Solano if he had any contact with

law enforcement prior to the attack, however it is clear from the

record that Solano’s only contact with law enforcement during this

time period was to voluntarily report his knowledge of the attack

when asked and show the “kite” to Deputy Contreras. (Id. at 201-

202.) Madsen has not presented any facts or evidence indicating

that law enforcement directed or otherwise encouraged Solano to

interact with Madsen in an effort to elicit incriminating

statements. Madsen also has not established that Solano

deliberately elicited the incriminating statements. Rather, the

evidence established that law enforcement did not direct Solano to

take any action and that Madsen voluntarily approached Solano and

initiated the incriminating conversation. Therefore, Madsen has not

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proven a Massiah violation. 377 U.S. at 72-73. 

Miranda

A suspect who is subject to custodial interrogation must be

advised of his federal constitutional right to remain silent and his

right to have an attorney present during questioning. Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). “[T]he term “interrogation” under

Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any

words or actions on the part of the police (other than those

normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should

know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from

the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).

A prisoner is in “custody” if there is an additional

restriction on his freedom beyond what is normally experienced. See

U.S. v. Turner, 28 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 1994); Cervantes v.

Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428-429 (9th Cir. 1978). To determine whether

a prison interrogation is custodial, the Court must consider four

factors focusing on additional restrictions on the prisoner: (1) the

language used to summon the prisoner; (2) the physical surroundings

of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which he is confronted with

the evidence of guilt; and (4) the additional pressure exerted to

detain the prisoner. Turner, 28 F.3d at 983. 

Here, the deputies never summoned Madsen, the conversations

between Madsen and the deputies took place while Madsen was in his

cell, no evidence was presented other than the discussion of the

threat made to Bradburn, and no pressure was exerted on Madsen in

any way. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 315-324.) In particular, Deputy

Burke testified that he was working with Bradburn on the day

Bradburn was threatened. (Id. at 318-19.) According to Burke,

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Madsen stopped him while he was making rounds and said he wanted to

apologize to Bradburn. (Id.) As the record reflects, Burke did not

instigate the conversation, remove Madsen from his cell, or exert

any pressure on Madsen to make a statement. Turner, 28 F.3d at 983.

Similarly, Deputy Reynolds testified that he was briefed

about the threat Madsen made to Bradburn. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at

322-23.) While walking the floor, Reynolds and Madsen spoke.

Reynolds did not ask Madsen any questions, and described the

conversation as follows: 

Q. After you [and Deputy Burke] briefed, did you

ever walk the floor in Floor B, the AD/SEG unit

of the Central Detention Facility?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you have some contact with Mr. Madsen?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did he ask you some questions?

A. We basically had a conversation. We talked

about an incident that occurred with him and

Deputy Bradburn.

Q. Did you tell Mr. Madsen anything about a report

being written?

A. Yes, I did. I told him that a crime report was

being written. You know, I explained to him that

he had threatened Deputy Bradburn and that he

was writing a crime report.

(Lodgment No. 12 at 323.) 

The record reflects that neither Deputy Burke nor Deputy

Reynolds asked any questions or engaged in any conduct which they

knew or should have known was reasonably likely to elicit an

inculpatory response from Madsen. Shedelbower v. Estelle, 885 F.2d

570, 573 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 & n. 5).

Morever, the record does not demonstrate that Madsen experienced any

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further imposition on his freedom after he threatened Bradburn, and

therefore, he was not in “custody” as contemplated by Turner. See

Turner 28 F.3d at 984; Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428-429. Because

Madsen was not in “custody” and was not “interrogated” there was no

Miranda violation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 

In light of the above, the California Supreme Court’s silent

denial of Madsen’s Massiah and Miranda claims were not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States

Supreme Court law. Because the Court finds there is no merit to

Madsen’s Massiah and Miranda claims, his trial counsel’s

performance did not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness and he did not suffer any prejudice as a result of

his trial counsel’s failure to move for suppression of this

testimony. Accordingly, his right to effective assistance of

counsel was not violated. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. The

Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Ground 7 be DENIED. 

I. Prosecution’s Failure to Disclose

In Ground 8, Madsen argues that his due process rights were

violated by the prosecutor’s failure to disclose (1) that inmate

Solano would testify that Madsen threatened him in October 1997

instead of August 1997 as allowed by the in limine ruling; and (2)

that the razor blade extracted from the legal pad in Madsen’s cell

had been lost. (Pet. at 59-60.)

Respondent counters that the prosecutor simply misstated that

the threat to Solano occurred in August 1997, and this was

insufficient to render Madsen’s trial fundamentally unfair. (Answer

at 42.) Furthermore, Madsen does not show how the absence of the

actual razor blade found in his legal pad demonstrates his

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innocence, or how counsel could have capitalized on the loss to

change the result of the trial. (Id. at 43.) 

Madsen did not raise this claim on direct appeal, but raised

it in his petition for habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court

which silently denied the claim. (Lodgment No. 16.) Therefore,

this Court must conduct an independent review of the record to

determine whether the denial is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336

F.3d at 853. 

“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable

to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence

is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The duty to disclose such evidence is

applicable even though there has been no request by the accused,

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and the duty

encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence,

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Such evidence is

material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 682; see also Kyles v. Whitley,

514 U.S. 419, 433-434 (1995). 

Solano’s Testimony

Contrary to Madsen’s contention, the prosecutor did not fail

to disclose anything regarding Solano’s testimony; rather, he simply

made a misstatement concerning the date upon which Madsen allegedly

threatened Solano. Prior to trial, the prosecution made an in

limine motion to include evidence of Madsen’s threat to Solano

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explaining that the evidence was relevant to Solano’s state of mind,

and to show that Madsen made attempts to fabricate and/or suppress

evidence. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 126.) The crux of Madsen’s

complaint rests on a misstatement by the prosecutor and trial court

during the in limine hearing concerning Solano’s testimony, in which

the prosecutor and court repeatedly referred to an “August 1997"

threat, when in fact the threat was made in October 1997. (Supp.

Lodgment No. 12 at 127, 133, 135.) 

Madsen does not argue that the evidence regarding the date of

the alleged threat was to be used for impeachment purposes, nor does

he state how the outcome of the trial would have been different had

the prosecutor not misstated the date. See Bagley, 476 U.S. at 676;

Kyles, 514 U.S. 433-434. It was the content of the threat as it

related to Solano’s state of mind and Madsen’s attempt to suppress

evidence, not the date of the threat, that was pertinent.

Therefore, Madsen has failed to show that there was any failure to

disclose.

Razor Blade

Madsen also claims that the prosecution’s failure to notify

him in a timely manner about the loss of the razor blade related to

Count 3 was prejudicial. (Pet at 59-60.) Madsen states that he did

not learn about the loss of the blade until the deputies testified

at trial on January 15 and 16, 1998. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at

263, 291.) Although not clearly stated, Madsen apparently

speculates that the razor blade may have had fingerprints belonging

to someone else on it and that he somehow may have capitalized on

that theory if he had been notified of the loss sooner. However,

Madsen’s speculation is insufficient to support his legal theory. 

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The jury found Madsen guilty of possessing a sharp object in

violation of Penal Code section 4502 after hearing testimony from

the deputy who discovered the razor blade in the legal pad, the

investigator who handled the legal pad, and the handwriting expert

who determined the writing on the pad was Madsen’s. (Supp. Lodgment

No. 12. at 231, 254, 281, 288.) Evidence is material only if “there

is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to

the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Bagley, 476 U.S. at 676; see also Kyles, 514 U.S at

433-434. Madsen has not established materiality here because even

if the razor blade had someone else’s fingerprints on it (and

therefore someone else had touched it at some point in time), there

still was overwhelming evidence that Madsen was the last person to

possess the razor blade.

Because the Court finds that the testimony of multiple

witnesses was more than sufficient to establish the fact that Madsen

knowingly possessed a razor blade, Madsen has not established that

the prosecutor suppressed material evidence. Moreover, Madsen has

not established any prejudice resulting from the timing of the

government’s notification of the loss of the razor blade.

For the foregoing reasons, the California Supreme Court’s

denial of Madsen’s claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law.

The Court accordingly RECOMMENDS that Claim 8 be DENIED. 

J. Insufficient Evidence of Razor Blade in Count 3

In Ground 9, Madsen argues that his due process rights were

violated because there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction for Cal. Penal Code section 4502. Specifically, he

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argues that since the government lost the razor blade, they could

not and did not prove that he knowingly possessed a sharp

instrument. (Pet. at 61.) Madsen further argues that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to research and argue the

nonexistence of the razor blade as a defense. (Id. at 34.)

Respondent counters that although the sheriff lost the razor

blade when the notepad was sent from investigator Gonzalez to

handwriting examiner Leaver for handwriting analysis, the claim

should be rejected because a reasonable jury could conclude, based

on testimony alone, that Madsen possessed a “sharp instrument” as

required under California Penal Code section 4502. (Answer at 44.)

Madsen did not raise this issue on direct appeal, but raised

it in his habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court

which was silently denied. (Lodgment No. 16.) Because the state

court did not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” this Court must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the

denial is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

When reviewing a due process claim of insufficient evidence,

clearly established law requires that the court determine whether

“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 324 (1979); Mikes v. Borg, 947 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir.

1991). The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution and must presume the trier of fact resolved

conflicting evidence in favor of the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 319, 326; Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005).

///

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Sufficiency of the Evidence

At trial, Deputy Casillas testified that during a search of

Madsen’s cell on June 2, 1997, he discovered an accordion file

containing papers belonging to Madsen and a legal pad. (Supp.

Lodgment No. 12 at 281-84.) He stated that there was handwriting on

the legal pad and that he found a razor blade hidden in the spine of

the pad. (Id. at 283.) Casillas explained that when he found the

razor blade he notified Deputy Golling and handed him the pad with

the razor blade inside. (Id. at 284.) Casillas stated that the

razor blade presented at trial as Exhibit 16 was the same size and

shape as the one he found in the legal pad. (Id.) On crossexamination, Casillas acknowledged that the razor blade presented at

trial was not the same razor blade he found, that the razor blade he

found was not to his knowledge tested for fingerprints, and that

there was no record that Madsen had been given, but had not

returned, a disposable razor. (Id. at 284-286.) 

Deputy Golling testified that after Deputy Casillas gave him

the legal pad containing the razor blade, he immediately took the

pad and razor blade and logged them into evidence, took Polaroid

photographs of them, and locked them in an evidence locker. (Id. at

289-290.) On cross-examination, he stated that he later heard the

razor blade was lost, and that as far as he knew, the razor blade

had not been tested for fingerprints prior to its loss. (Id. at

291.) 

Investigator Efrain Garcia testified that he retrieved the

razor blade and legal pad from the evidence locker and delivered the

pad to handwriting examiner Leaver for a handwriting analysis. (Id.

at 263.) When he got it back, Garcia could not find the blade.

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15The trial judge gave the jury CALJIC 2.11 which stated in pertinent part:

“Neither side is required to produce all objects or documents mentioned or

suggested by the evidence.” (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 452.) 

-68- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

However, he testified that the blade in the legal pad was from a

disposable razor and was similar to Court’s Exhibit 16, which also

was a blade taken from a disposable razor. (Id. at 263-64.) As

previously noted, Leaver testified that the writing on the pad was

Madsen’s. (Id. at 234-35.) 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, as the Court must, a rational trier of fact easily

could determine from the combined testimony of Casillas, Golling,

Garcia, and Leaver that a razor blade was discovered in the spine of

a legal pad belonging to Madsen proving that Madsen possessed a

“sharp instrument” as required under Penal Code section 4502. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907,

908-09 (9th Cir. 1994). Moreover, neither side is required to

produce all available evidence in a criminal trial and the jury was

so advised when the trial court gave them CALJIC 2.11.15

Madsen argues that even had a razor blade been found in his

possession, there is no evidence that it was in fact “sharp” as

required under Penal Code §4502. (Pet. at 61.) While there was no

evidence presented at trial regarding the particular sharpness of

the razor found in Madsen’s legal pad, or the blade produced at

trial, the deputies testified that they observed the blade and that

it came from a disposable razor and was found in the spine of a

writing tablet. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 263-64, 283.) Deputy

Garcia also testified that inmates regularly remove the metal blade

from disposable razors distributed to prisoners which they then bond

to toothbrush handles, or pens, to create weapons. (Id. at 263-65.)

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From this evidence and viewing it in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, a reasonable juror could easily determine that the

blade possessed by Madsen was “sharp” as required by section 4502.

For the foregoing reasons, the California Supreme Court’s

denial of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established United Stateas Supreme Court

law. 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 Madsen further argues that he suffered ineffective

assistance of counsel because Ulovec failed to move for sanctions

against the prosecution for losing the razor blade, and for failing

to have it tested for fingerprints. (Pet. at 34.) 

Madsen raised this claim in his California Supreme Court

habeas corpus petition, however, in adjudicating this claim, the

Court once again must “look through” to the California Court of

Appeal’s opinion (Lodgment No. 3) because the California Supreme

Court summarily denied Madsen’s petition (Lodgment No. 16). See

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. The Court of Appeal stated:

In response to Madsen’s new trial motion, his

trial counsel filed a declaration explaining his

decision not to move for sanctions:

“3. Regarding loss of the razor blade, in

my opinion, California v. Trombetta (1984)

467 U.S. 479 covers the issue. My

understanding of the law is that for

sanctions to apply, the exculpatory value

of the lost evidence must be apparent and

the defendant must make a showing of bad

faith on the part of law enforcement. There

was nothing in the facts, as I knew them,

to indicate this test could be met, and

that the loss was anything other than

negligence on the part of the Sheriff’s

Department.”

///

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-70- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

Madsen does not show that his trial counsel’s

decision not to move for sanctions was not a rational

tactical decision. On the contrary, it appears that

his trial counsel weighed the facts as he knew them

against applicable law and concluded that sanctions

would not have been granted by the trial court had a

motion been made. Therefore, his trial counsel could

rationally conclude that it would be a fruitless use

of time and effort to pursue a sanctions motion

against the prosecution for the loss of the razor

blade. Furthermore, Madsen does not show that the

razor blade would have borne fingerprints of other

persons and not his own fingerprints. Even had the

evidence been potentially exculpatory, Madsen does not

show that the loss of the evidence was the result of

bad faith rather than simple negligence or that the

trial court would have granted sanctions against the

prosecution. Furthermore, Madsen does not show that

it is reasonably probably he would have received a

more favorable result had his trial counsel moved for

sanctions. 

(Lodgment No. 3 at 25-26.) 

As set forth above, trial counsel correctly stated the

applicable law for lost evidence. Sanctions are not appropriate

where the government’s loss of evidence is not in bad faith.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488. Here, Madsen has not established

either prong. While he hypothesizes that the blade may have

contained the fingerprints of another person, no testing was done to

confirm or dispute Madsen’s theory. As a result, the exculpatory

nature of the blade was not readily apparent. Id. at 489. Even if

it were, Madsen has not shown any bad faith on the part of the

officers in losing the blade. Accordingly, counsel made a

reasonable tactical decision not to file a motion for sanctions and

his representation was not deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687. Even if the failure to file such a motion was deficient,

Madsen has not established prejudice. As explained above, there was

overwhelming evidence establishing that Madsen possessed a sharp

instrument as charged in Count 3.

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-71- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

Furthermore, prior to the substitute razor blade being

admitted into evidence, Ulovec argued that the razor blade should

not go to the jury because it was not the one allegedly found in

Madsen’s cell. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 327-328.) The trial judge

overruled Ulovec’s objection and admitted the razor blade into

evidence. (Id.) Accordingly, Madsen’s right to effective assistance

was not violated. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 

 In light of the above, the California Court of Appeal’s

denial of Madsen’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Count

3 was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established United States Supreme Court authority. For the

foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Ground 9 be DENIED.

K. In Limine Rulings

Madsen asserts multiple claims arising from the trial court’s

in limine rulings. In Ground 10 Madsen argues that he was denied

due process and a fair jury trial because the trial court

erroneously granted the government’s motion to permit Bradburn and

Solano to testify about subjects Madsen deems “highly prejudicial”

and to admit evidence about Madsen’s possession in 1997 of other

sharp instruments. (Pet. at 63.) In Grounds 11 and 12, Madsen

contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct because he

exceeded the scope of the in limine rulings during his examination

of Solano and Bradburn. (Id. at 71, 75.) Madsen also contends his

right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because Ulovec

failed to adequately investigate and cross examine Bradburn

regarding past inmate threats and his knowledge of gangs. (Id. at

34.)

///

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-72- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

Bradburn’s Testimony

 Madsen contends with regard to Count 4 (the terrorist threat

to Bradburn) that the trial court erred when it ruled that the

prosecution could introduce through Deputy Bradburn’s testimony

erroneous and prejudicial evidence that Madsen was associated with

a prison gang and previously assaulted a prison official. (Id. at

65-69.) Madsen asserts that Bradburn got his information through

confidential informants and therefore it was hearsay and violated

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). (Id.) 

Respondent counters that Madsen’s Crawford claim must be

rejected because Crawford is not retroactive to this case, and that

therefore Madsen must prove that the evidence denied him due

process, which he has not done. (Id. at 51.) Respondent contends

that the evidence was introduced to show Bradburn’s legitimate and

sustained fear, as required under California Penal Code section 422,

and that the trial court properly gave a limiting instruction to

ameliorate the potentially prejudicial nature of the evidence.

(Id.) Moreover, Respondent notes that the trial court specifically

allowed Bradburn to testify that he knew Madsen assaulted Cornejo,

had been housed in Pelican Bay State Prison Special Housing Unit,

and was housed in Module 4B which is reserved for dangerous inmates.

Therefore, even if Bradburn misstated facts about Madsen’s gang

affiliation or staff assaults while testifying, the misstatements

were minor and did not unduly prejudice Madsen. Id.

Madsen did not raise this claim in his direct appeal, but did

raise it in his habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme

Court, which was summarily denied. (Lodgment No. 16.) Because the

state court did not furnish a basis for its reasoning, this Court

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-73- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

must conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the denial is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

Gang Evidence

After lengthy debate between the parties and court at the in

limine hearing, the trial court held that to demonstrate Bradburn’s

‘sustained fear’ as required under California Penal Code section

422, Bradburn could testify “about his knowledge concerning where

Defendant had been housed and that he had been housed in 4B, that he

had previously been housed in the S.H.U. unit at Pelican Bay, that

he knew of assaultive conduct towards staff, that he knew that the

Defendant had stabbed an inmate” and “that he was aware that the

Defendant was associated with a particular gang.” (Supp. Lodgment

No. 12 at 56, 59.) Furthermore, the trial court insulated the

testimony by ruling that a limiting instruction proposed by the

prosecution would be given in light of the potentially prejudicial

effect of this testimony. (Id. at 79.) In accordance with the in

limine ruling, the court read CALJIC 2.50, which instructed the jury

to consider the evidence only for the purpose of determining if

Madsen had the specific intent to make a threat and to determine if

Bradburn experienced sustained fear as a result of the threat. (Id.

at 451.) 

Moreover, the trial court denied some of the prosecution’s

requested in limine motions, ruling that certain evidence the

prosecution sought to introduce was inadmissible because it was

highly prejudicial, including any reference to the Aryan Brotherhood

and any information about an alleged incident in which the Hells

Angels contracted Madsen to kill a police officer. (Supp. Lodgment

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-74- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

No. 12 at 59 and 70.) As a result, the in limine ruling was

carefully tailored to allow the prosecution to prove the “sustained

fear” element required in Count 4, while unduly prejudicial evidence

was excluded. Through the trial court’s considered efforts to limit

any gang reference in Bradburn’s testimony, the court ensured that

Madsen received a fair trial as guaranteed under the federal

constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 70; Spencer, 385 U.S. at 554. 

Staff Assaults

Madsen argues that the trial court’s in limine ruling

allowing Bradburn to testify as to his knowledge of Madsen’s prior

staff assaults deprived Madsen of a fair trial under the federal

constitution because he has no staff assaults in his record. (Pet.

at 66-67.) 

The trial court questioned the prosecution extensively during

the in limine hearing concerning this point. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12

at 49-52.) In particular, the court stated it was concerned that

Bradburn had apparently received knowledge of Madsen’s prior staff

assaults through hearsay. (Id. at 51.) However, the court also

noted that Bradburn’s testimony was relevant because it showed his

state of mind, and that his perception however gleaned, went

directly to a necessary element of Count 4. (Id. at 52.) As Madsen

argues, the court stated it wanted more information about the

subject before making a ruling. (Id.) However, the court

ultimately ruled that the evidence was more probative than

prejudicial despite no additional information being proffered on the

issue. 

The in limine ruling was properly limited to Bradburn’s

perception that Madsen had been assaultive to staff to show the

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-75- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

source of Bradburn’s sustained fear. The issue was not whether

Madsen had in fact assaulted staff, but whether Bradburn thought

Madsen had previous staff assaults to show that he legitimately

feared for his life after Madsen threatened him. Moreover, any

potentially prejudicial effect was ameliorated by the court giving

CALJIC 2.50 which, as previously noted, advised the jury that it

could only consider the evidence as it related to Bradburn’s state

of mind, and not as evidence of Madsen’s guilt or innocence. (Supp.

Lodgment No. 12 at 455.) Accordingly, the inclusion of this

evidence did not render Madsen’s trial fundamentally unfair and did

not violate his due process rights. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 70;

Spencer, 385 U.S. at 554. 

Because the in limine rulings concerning Bradburn’s testimony

did not violate Madsen’s due process rights, the California Supreme

Court’s summary denial of this claim is not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established United States

Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS this claim be

DENIED.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Madsen contends that the prosecutor exceeded the scope of the

trial court’s in limine ruling when he elicited testimony from

Bradburn that Madsen was wearing green clothing which indicated he

was dangerous, was housed with the “worst of the worst”, and that he

knew Madsen was “in” as opposed to “associated” with a certain

violent prison gang. (Pet. at 73.) 

Respondent counters that the prosecutor did not violate the

trial court’s in limine rulings, and that the prosecutor’s actions

did not render Madsen’s trial fundamentally unfair citing Darden v.

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Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180-81 (1986). 

To establish a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a

petitioner must show: (1) the prosecutor’s actions amounted to

constitutional error and (2) the error was not harmless. Greer v.

Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765-66 (1987). In determining whether there

was constitutional error, the Supreme Court has stated that the

misconduct must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)); see also Thompson v. Borg,

74 F.3d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 168).

The “touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the

culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,

219 (1982). The reviewing court must look at the trial as a whole

and place the prosecutor’s remarks in context. See Greer, 483 U.S.

at 765-66. 

Madsen did not raise this claim in his state petitions, and

therefore it has not been exhausted. However, as the following

analysis shows, it is “perfectly clear” that these claims are

meritless, and therefore the Court may reject them. 28 U.S.C.

2254(b)(2); Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623-24.

Madsen has not demonstrated that the prosecutor exceeded the

scope of permissible testimony when Bradburn testified. In order to

prove Count 4's terrorist threat charge the prosecution was required

to demonstrate Bradburn’s state of mind when Madsen threatened him.

Cal. Penal Code § 422. As noted above, the trial court allowed

Bradburn to testify that he was aware Madsen had been housed in unit

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4B, that Madsen previously had been housed in the S.H.U. unit at

Pelican Bay, that he knew of Madsen’s assaultive conduct towards

staff, that he knew that Madsen had stabbed an inmate and that

Madsen was “associated” with a particular prison gang. (Supp.

Lodgment No. 12 at 56, 59.) 

After Bradburn’s testimony detailing Madsen’s threat to kill

him, or have him killed by someone else, the prosecutor questioned

Bradburn about his state of mind at the time of the threat:

Q: [H]ow did the threats to kill you from Mr.

Madsen, accompanied with threats to have

somebody else do it if he couldn’t do it, how

did that make you feel?

A: With what I knew about his reputation in the

jails, I was nervous.

Q: Were you afraid?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You said with what you knew about Mr. Madsen.

You knew Mr. Madsen was in 4B; is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did that mean to you in the context of

being concerned or afraid regarding the threat?

What does that mean when a person’s in 4B?

A: In 4B are our most violent inmates. They lose a

lot of rights being there. If we bring them

out, they’re escorted in chains when normal

inmates just have their hands in their

waistband. Just the clothing he was wearing.

He had green clothing which is to tell staff

he’s assaultive and dangerous.

Q: Now, in addition to that, the fact he’s in 4B

and you believed all those factors to be part of

being in 4B, did you know anything about where

Mr. Madsen had done prison time?

A: Yes, sir, I knew he was down from Pelican Bay

S.H.U. unit.

Q: For those who aren’t familiar with the penal

system, in terms of your state of mind, what did

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that mean to you, that you knew or believed Mr.

Madsen had done time in the Pelican Bay S.H.U.

unit?

A: Pelican Bay S.H.U. is special housing unit where

with all the state prisons, the worst of the

worst inmates are housed at Pelican Bay.

They’re escorted everywhere in chains, they’re

kept in solitary. And if you’ve ever toured a

state prison, the guards there wear protective

gears at all times moving inmates because

they’re considered that dangerous.

. . .

Q: In addition to the fact that he was in 4B and

the fact that you knew he had done time in the

Pelican - - or believed that he had done Pelican

Bay S.H.U. time, had you heard anything about

assaults on inmates by Mr. Madsen?

A: I knew he was back from the George Bailey

Facility because he apparently stabbed another

inmate there.

Q: And were you aware or did you believe in

reference to your state of mind in perceiving

the threat, that Mr. Madsen had been assaultive

towards staff?

A: Yes, or we wouldn’t have him in the green

clothing. I knew that he was in a prison gang

which is a violent gang, and the way we had him

housed and moving him with chains, to keep them

all separate and protect us.

Q: You knew or believed that the defendant was

associated with a particular prison gang; is

that right?

A: Yes, sir.

(Lodgment No. 12 at 245-247.)

As clearly demonstrated by the preceding testimony, the

prosecutor carefully narrowed the scope of each question to the

parameters allowed by the trial court’s in limine ruling, focusing

the testimony on how each piece of evidence affected Bradburn’s

state of mind. The trial court specifically stated that “the deputy

will be allowed to testify as to what it meant to him, that [Madsen]

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16The court told the jury that “Certain evidence was admitted for a limited

purpose. Specifically, Deputy Bradburn testified about information he knew or

believed about the Defendant. Such evidence was offered for the purpose of

determining if the Defendant had the specific intent to make a threat and to

determine if Deputy Bradburn was in sustained fear as a result of the information

and threat. At the time this evidence was admitted, you were instructed it could

not be considered by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which

it was admitted. Do not consider this evidence for any purpose except the limited

purpose for which is was admitted.” (Lodgment No. 12 at 452.)

-79- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

was in a special housing unit.” (emphasis added) (Id. at 49.)

Bradburn’s testimony merely described in detail the basis of his

fear, conveying the significance of the housing information,

clothing, and previous assaults to him. When he slightly exceeded

the scope of the allowable testimony, making reference to Madsen

being “in” rather than “associated” with a gang, the prosecutor

immediately attempted to clarify Bradburn’s volunteered testimony by

asking “You knew or believed that the defendant was associated with

a particular prison gang; is that right?” Id. at 247 (emphasis

added). See Elliott v. Meyers, 691 F.Supp. 190, 192 (N.D. Cal.

1988)(no due process violation where witness volunteered information

about petitioner’s violent history when prosecution immediately cut

it short). As illustrated, the trial was not “infected” with

unfairness because the prosecutor did not exceed the scope of the

trial court’s in limine rulings and the witness’ misstatement, if

any, was minor. See Greer, 483 U.S. 756, 765.

 Moreover, the jury was given a limiting instruction which

noted that Bradburn’s testimony regarding Madsen’s association with

a prison gang was to be considered only for the purpose of

establishing whether Madsen had the specific intent to make a threat

and Bradburn was in sustained fear.16 The Court presumes jurors

follow jury instructions absent extraordinary situations; therefore,

the jury in this case did not consider Bradburn’s testimony other

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than to show his state of mind. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307,

324 n.9 (1985); Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 913 (9th Cir. 2006).

Accordingly, Madsen’s federal due process rights were not violated

by the prosecutor during Bradburn’s testimony.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Furthermore, Madsen’s right to effective assistance of

counsel was not violated by Ulovec’s failure to research Bradburn’s

background or block testimony regarding whether Madsen was “in” as

opposed to “associated” with a violent prison gang. 

During the pretrial in limine motion hearings, Ulovec

strenuously objected to the introduction of any gang evidence

arguing that it was highly prejudicial and there was sufficient

evidence of Bradburn’s ‘sustained fear’ as required under section

422 without gang evidence. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 58.) In its

ruling on the in limine motion, the trial court stated that in light

of Madsen’s threat that someone else would kill Bradburn if Madsen

couldn’t, a necessary “component of sustained fear is that someone

other than the defendant could carry it out, meaning that he had

some association, leading logically to what the officer knew about

the defendant’s association with gangs.” (Id.) When Bradburn

misstated that Madsen was “in” as opposed to “associated” with a

gang, the prosecutor quickly remedied the error, and it was

therefore reasonable for Ulovec to refrain from objecting. To do

otherwise may have highlighted the gang testimony for the jury,

which would not have benefitted Madsen. Accordingly, Ulovec’s

representation was not deficient and Madsen has not demonstrated any

resulting prejudice. 

///

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Ulovec also was not ineffective for failing to object to

Bradburn’s testimony on the grounds that Bradburn was not qualified

to describe gang affiliation. Madsen claims that Bradburn had no

specialized knowledge about gangs and therefore Ulovec should have

challenged his testimony that Madsen was in a “violent gang” because

was not an expert on gangs. However, Madsen fails to show that

Bradburns’ characterization of the Aryan Brotherhood was inaccurate,

nor how it would it have benefitted Madsen had Ulovec challenged

Bradburn’s qualifications, and a recognized gang expert had been

called to testify as to the nature of the gang. 

Finally, Madsen argues that Bradburn’s personnel records

should have been inspected to see if he had a history of violent

propensities, citing Pitchess v. California, 11 Cal.3d 531, 534-538

(1974)(a defendant claiming self defense against a police officer

can request discovery of personnel records that might show violent

propensities). Madsen does not assert that he was assaulted by

Bradburn, nor that Madsen acted in self-defense, therefore the

protections provide by Pitchess and its progeny do not apply to

Madsen’s claim. Id. 

For the foregoing reasons, Madsen has not shown that Ulovec’s

decision not to challenge Bradburn’s testimony was unreasonable or

that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687. The California Court of Appeal’s decision denying this claim

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established United States Supreme Court authority. Himes, 336 F.3d

at 853. 

///

///

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Solano’s Testimony

As to Counts 1 and 2 (the Cornejo assault), Madsen argues

that the trial court erred by ruling that Solano could testify about

an alleged threat Madsen made to Solano. (Pet. at 63.) Madsen

contends that the trial court allowed testimony regarding an alleged

“August” 1997 threat but Solano testified about a threat that

occurred in October 1997. Madsen argues that he and Solano were not

in the same jail in August 1997, and that there is no evidence to

support Solano’s statement about the threat in October 1997 other

than Solano’s “bald assertion”. (Id. at 63.) Madsen further argues

that the trial court erred in allowing Solano to testify regarding

Madsen’s prison gang activity because Solano had no personal

knowledge or expertise which qualified him to testify that Madsen

was in a prison gang. (Id. at 63-64.) 

Respondent counters that the in limine ruling to which Madsen

refers was limited to the threat Madsen made to get Solano to recant

which showed evidence of Madsen’s guilty conscience. (Answer at

44.) Respondent acknowledges that the trial court and parties

repeatedly referred to the threat as occurring in August 1997, but

that it was subsequently clarified during Solano’s testimony that

the threat occurred in October 1997. Respondent states that “it is

unclear how the mistake as to date affected anything, much less made

the trial unfair.” (Id.) Respondent further argues that Solano’s

testimony about Madsen’s gang affiliation was not related to the

testimony covered by the in limine ruling. (Id. at 46.) In addition,

Solano was not offered as a gang expert, therefore Madsen’s

arguments are meritless. (Id.) 

///

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Madsen did not raise this issue on direct appeal, but raised

it in his habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which was

silently denied. (Lodgment No. 16.) Because the state court did

not furnish a basis for its reasoning, this Court must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the denial is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

Whether the improper admission of prosecution evidence

amounts to a due process violation is a question of fundamental

fairness. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 70; Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554

(1967). The question on federal habeas review is whether any error

in the admission of evidence had a “substantial and injurious affect

on the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993). 

At the in limine hearing, the trial court ruled that Solano

could testify that in August 1997, Madsen attempted to get Solano to

recant statements which implicated Madsen in Cornejo’s assault.

(Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 135.) The trial court held that the

evidence was “not substantially more prejudicial than probative” as

to a “very important issue in this case”, because it was evidence of

Madsen’s consciousness of guilt. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 135.)

During the trial, Solano testified in accordance with the in limine

ruling about Madsen’s attempt to get him to recant his statements

that implicated Madsen in Cornejo’s assault (Lodgment No. 12 at

207-208.) However, Solano also clarified that the threat occurred

in October 1997, not August as indicated during the in limine

hearing. (Id.) Accordingly, the prosecution and Solano complied

with the in limine rulings with merely a date correction. Madsen

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has not demonstrated that the date correction resulted in a

fundamentally unfair trial. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 70. Moreover,

even if Solano’s testimony was improperly admitted, the evidence and

testimony of numerous other witnesses provided sufficient support

for the jury to convict Madsen of Counts 1 and 2. 

Contrary to Madsen’s claim, Solano did not violate the courts

in limine ruling by testifying that Madsen was in a prison gang.

The in limine ruling related only to Madsen’s attempt to get Solano

to recant his incriminating statements. Solano did not mention

Madsen’s gang affiliation during his testimony about Madsen’s

efforts to get him to recant. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 209).

Accordingly Madsen suffered no substantial and injurious effect from

the admission of Solano’s testimony concerning the threat. Brecht,

507 U.S. at 637. 

The California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

United States Supreme Court law.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

In Ground 11, Madsen argues that the prosecutor committed

misconduct by exceeding the scope of the trial court’s in limine

rulings when he posed questions to Solano to elicit testimony

concerning Madsen’s gang association in violation of the trial

court’s in limine ruling. (Pet. at 71-77.) According to Madsen,

the trial court “ruled that the prosecution would be limited to

testimony on the terrorist threat” in Count 4 including specific

evidence about Madsen’s housing, and history of assaults. (Id.)

However, Madsen contends that the prosecutor asked Solano questions

which prompted Solano to testify that Madsen’s motivation for the

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-85- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

attack was because “it’s a game in the gang; mainline is out there

play[sic] gang games”; and that the prosecutor wrongly stated that

it was a fact that Madsen had threatened Solano in violation of the

in limine ruling, all of which created a spillover effect to Count

4. (Id. 71-72.)

Respondent counters that the testimony from Solano was not

related to the terrorist threat for which the trial court issued the

in limine ruling, and therefore the claim should be denied. (Answer

at 54.) 

Madsen did not raise this issue on direct appeal, but did

raise it in his habeas petition in the California Supreme Court,

which was silently denied. (Lodgment No. 16.) Because the state

court did not furnish a basis for its reasoning, this Court must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the

denial is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the trial

court’s in limine ruling concerning allowable references to Madsen’s

gang activity was limited to Count 4, permitting Bradburn to testify

as to the basis of his fear at Madsen’s threat. (Supp. Lodgment No.

12 at 56.) A thorough examination of the record shows that the

portion of Solano’s testimony to which Madsen refers concerned only

the Cornejo assault in Counts 1 and 2, not the terrorist threat in

Count 4. The prosecution asked Solano what Madsen said when Solano

asked him why he had assaulted Cornejo. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at

205.) Solano responded that Madsen said he tried to be peaceful but

it didn’t work, and that “it’s a game in the gang that you’ve got to

follow orders or you’re weak.” (Id.) The prosecutor also asked

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Solano to explain why he was testifying if he knew Madsen was in a

gang and dangerous, stating:

Q: . . . And based on [your] criminal background,

the fact you’ve been threatened, and the fact

that you told us what happens to a rat, why are

you testifying in court today?

A: That could have been me that got sliced up like

that and if nobody tells, then it just keeps

happening...

(Id. at 211.)(Italics added)

This testimony concerned only the attack on Cornejo in Counts

1 and 2, and the in limine ruling in question was limited to

Bradburn’s testimony regarding gang evidence as it related to his

sustained fear for purposes of Count 4. (Id. at 59, 74.)

Therefore, there is no merit to Madsen’s argument that the

prosecution’s questions to Solano exceeded the scope of the trial

court’s in limine ruling. Because this testimony was unrelated to

the in limine ruling made by the trial court, the prosecutor did not

commit misconduct. Moreover, the gang references were minimal with

limited prejudicial effect. The challenged testimony did not taint

the trial or render it fundamentally unfair in any respect. See

Darden, 477 U.S. 181. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court’s

silent denial of this claim was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established United States

Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

Other Razors and L-Shaped Metal Piece

In Ground 10 Madsen argues as to Count 3 that the trial court

erroneously allowed evidence of unaltered razors and an L-shape

piece of metal found in his possession to be introduced to show that

Madsen had knowledge of the razor blade hidden in his legal pad, and

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that this evidence was prejudicial and known to “inflame jurors

emotions”. (Pet. at 65.) 

Respondent counters that the trial court properly ruled that

the unaltered razors and sharp piece of bent metal found in Madsen’s

possession in 1997 could be admitted to show Madsen’s awareness of

the contraband nature of the razor blade hidden in his legal pad,

and there was nothing particularly inflammatory about the evidence.

(Id. at 48.) 

Madsen raised this claim in his direct appeal. Because the

California Supreme Court summarily denied Madsen’s petition

(Lodgment No. 16), this Court must look through to the last reasoned

state court decision which came from the California Court of Appeal

(Lodgment No. 3). 

The Court of Appeal held:

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by admitting the other acts evidence. A

reasonable trial judge could find that the probative

value of that evidence outweighed its potential

prejudicial effect. At trial Madsen contested the

issue whether he knowingly possessed the razor blade

found hidden in the spine of the legal pad bearing his

writing. Madsen’s other acts of possessing unaltered

razors and an L-shaped metal piece were probative

evidence that he knowingly possessed the altered razor

blade in count 3, and a reasonable trial judge could

conclude that its probative value outweighed any

potential prejudicial effect. Furthermore, the trial

court in this case minimized, if not eliminated, any

prejudicial effect of the evidence by giving a

limiting instruction on the proper use of the

evidence.

(Lodgment No. 3 at 46-47.)

“[I]t is well-established that the fundamental fairness

guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense.”

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 70, citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

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(1970). It also is well established that evidence of other crimes

is admissible to prove knowledge in certain circumstances provided

the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential

prejudicial effect. Fed.R.Ev. 404(b); U.S. v. Brown, 880 F.2d 1012,

1014 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Madsen was charged in Count 3 with possession of a sharp

instrument by a prisoner. (Supp. Lodgment No. 17 at 2.) During the

in limine hearing, the trial court determined that “the evidence is

offered to prove the issue of knowledge and that in this case, that

issue is in dispute.” (Id. at 75.) After hearing vigorous debate

on the probative versus prejudicial value of the evidence, the trial

court held that the evidence was material, relevant and more

probative than it was prejudicial. (Id. at 78.) The trial court

further held that any potentially prejudicial effect could be offset

by the limiting instruction proposed by the prosecution. (Id.) At

trial, the jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC 2.50 that it could

consider the razors and L-shaped piece of metal as evidence for the

limited purpose of determining if it tended to show that Madsen had

knowingly possessed a sharp instrument as charged in Count 3.

(Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 455.) 

The evidence of other razors and the L-shaped piece of metal

was offered by the prosecution to prove the necessary element of

knowledge in Count 3. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 70. Rather than

rendering the trial fundamentally unfair, the trial court’s in

limine ruling and resulting limiting instruction ensured that the

government could only use Madsen’s prior misconduct to prove his

knowing possession of the charged contraband and not for any other

purpose. It is presumed that the jury followed the limiting

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instruction, and determined through the presentation of all of the

evidence that Madsen knowingly possessed the altered razor blade in

Count 3, thereby allowing them to convict him. See Estelle, 502 U.S.

at 71-72. 

In light of the above, the California Court of Appeal’s

decision denying this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court

authority. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

L. Jury Instructions

In Ground 13, Madsen argues that the trial court violated his

due process rights by instructing the jury with incorrect and flawed

instructions. (Pet. at 78.) In conjunction with this claim, Madsen

contends in Ground 4 that he suffered ineffective assistance of

counsel when Ulovec failed to submit appropriate instructions. (Id.

at 37.)

Respondent first notes that Madsen raised no jury instruction

claims on direct appeal, and that he only raised a claim as to

CALJIC 7.38 in his habeas corpus petition to the California Supreme

Court; therefore, the remainder of his claims are unexhausted.

(Answer at 57.) Despite Madsen’s failure to exhaust, Respondent

claims the Court can deny the unexhausted claims on the merits

because it is “perfectly clear” that there is no merit to his claim

that the instructions rendered the trial unfair under Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. (Answer at 57-62.)

A thorough review of the record reveals that Madsen has

failed to exhaust his claims regarding CALJIC’s 2.50, 1.21, 1.24,

2.11, 2.09, and 17.02. However, for the reasons set forth below,

this Court finds that it is “perfectly clear” that there is no merit

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to the claims, and therefore the Court may address and deny these

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623-624.

Because Madsen did not raise these claims to any state court, there

is no state court decision to which this Court can defer.

Accordingly, this Court must conduct a de novo review of his claims.

Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003).

Federal habeas relief is warranted where a petitioner

establishes that the ailing instruction by itself “so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.”

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72; see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416

U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (explaining that the challenged instruction

cannot merely be “undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally

condemned’” — it must violate some constitutional right). The

instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, rather, it

must be considered in the context of both the instructions as a

whole and the trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Estelle

presupposes that the jury instruction was somehow faulty under state

law. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. 

 CALJIC 2.50

Madsen complains that instead of ameliorating the potentially

prejudicial effect of the razor blade and L-shaped piece of metal

found in Madsen’s Vista jail cell in 1997, the limiting instruction,

CALJIC 2.50, made the jury focus on that evidence. (Pet. at 80-81.)

Respondent contends that Madsen’s claims are meritless

because CALJIC 2.50 specifically directs the jury to consider the

evidence only to show whether Madsen had knowledge of the nature of

the items in his possession as charged in Count 3. (Answer at 59.)

///

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17The trial court accurately instructed the jury that “Evidence has been

introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant committed crimes other

than that for which he is on trial. Evidence was received pertaining to

possession of certain items by defendant in the Vista Detention Facility. This

evidence, if believed, may not be considered by you to prove the defendant is a

person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes. It may

be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to

show: The defendant had knowledge of the nature of things found in his possession

as charged in Count 3. For the limited purpose for which you may consider this

evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in

the case. You are not permitted to consider this evidence for any other

purpose.” (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 455.)

-91- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

The prosecution requested the trial court give CALJIC 2.50 as

a limiting instruction to offset any potentially prejudicial effect

the “other act” evidence might cause, which the court did.17 The

instruction was given during the trial immediately following the

testimony of the deputies who found and documented the items, and

was given again with all the jury instructions at the close of the

trial. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 410, 455.) The instruction

explicitly directs the jury to consider the evidence only to

determine whether Madsen had knowledge of the nature of the things

in his possession in Count 3. (Id. at 410.) The trial court also

told the jury that it had to weigh this evidence in the same manner

as all the other evidence. (Id.) The jury is presumed to follow its

instructions, and Madsen provides no evidence that the jury

misinterpreted the instruction. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. 

To sustain a habeas corpus petition, Rule 2(c)requires a

petitioner to point to a “real possibility of constitutional error.”

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977). Madsen has not

pointed to any real possibility of constitutional error, but merely

makes insufficient conclusory assertions that the instruction was

misinterpreted. Taken in the context of the trial as a whole,

CALJIC 2.50 appropriately limited the jury’s consideration of

certain evidence. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. Accordingly,

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18The trial court correctly read CALJIC 7.38 as follows: “Defendant is

accused in Count Three of the Information of having violated section 4502 of the

(continued...)

-92- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

Madsen has failed to show that CALJIC 2.50 was faulty under state

law or that its use so infected the trial that his due process

rights were violated. Id.

CALJIC 7.38

Madsen raised his claim regarding CALJIC 7.38 in the

California Supreme Court which issued a postcard denial. (Lodgment

No. 16.) Therefore, this Court must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the denial is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

Madsen contends that CALJIC 7.38, which states the elements

of Cal.Penal Code section 4502 as charged in Count 3 (possession of

sharp instrument), was ambiguous and allowed the jury to convict him

on count 3 for the possession of the items found at the Vista

Detention Facility rather than the razor blade found in his legal pad

at George Bailey Detention Center. (Pet. at 80-81.) Madsen further

argues that CALJIC 7.38 was separated by approximately thirty jury

instructions from the limiting instruction CALJIC 2.50 and was just

after CALJIC 3.30 regarding general criminal intent, and that

therefore CALJIC 2.50's ameliorating effect was lost. (Id. at 81.)

Respondent counters that the claim must fail because there is

no reasonable likelihood that the jury thought Count 3 involved any

allegations other than Madsen’s possession of the razor blade in the

legal pad. (Answer at 60.)

The Court agrees with Respondents contention that CALJIC

7.3818 was unambiguous and clearly defined the elements of Count 3.

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18(...continued)

Penal Code. Every person who, while being confined in, or being conveyed to or

from any penal institution, or while under the custody of officials, officers or

employees of any penal institution, possesses or carries upon his person or has

under her custody or control any sharp instrument or weapon, is guilty of a

violation of Penal Code section 4502(a)(b), a crime.” (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at

463.)

19The trial court accurately read CALJIC 3.30 to the jury as follows: “In

the crimes charged in Counts Two, Assault with a Deadly Weapon and Three,

Possession of a Sharp Instrument in a Penal Institution, there must exist a union

or joint operation of act or conduct and general criminal intent. General

criminal intent does not require an intent to violate the law. When a person

intentionally does that which the law declares to be a crime, he is acting with

general criminal intent, even though he may not know his act or conduct is

unlawful.” (Lodgment No. 12 at 459.)

-93- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

When reviewing an allegedly ambiguous instruction, courts are

required to inquire “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that

the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that

violates the Constitution. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380

(1990); Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998) (same). Here,

the jury received a limiting instruction at the close of the

testimony regarding the evidence collected at the Vista Detention

Facility which directed them to consider the evidence solely for the

limited purpose of determining if it tended to show that Madsen had

knowledge of the nature of things found in his possession as charged

in Count 3. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 455.) Because jurors are

presumed to follow all jury instructions, the Court can safely

conclude that the jury limited its consideration of the evidence in

his possession in Vista to determine whether Madsen understood the

contraband nature of the razor blade in his legal pad in Count 3. See

Francis, 471 U.S. at 324 n.9. 

Furthermore, there is no merit to Madsen’s contention that

the ameliorating effect of CALJIC 2.50 was lost because it was given

approximately 30 instructions prior to CALJIC 7.38, or that CALJIC

3.3019 regarding general criminal intent confused the jury into

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20The trial court accurately read CALJIC 1.01 as follows: “If any rule,

direction or idea has been repeated or stated in different ways in these

instructions, no emphasis was intended and you must not draw any inference

because of its repetition. Do not single out any particular sentence or any

individual point or instruction and ignore the others. Consider the instructions

as a whole and in light of all the others. The order in which the instructions

have been given has no significance to their relative importance.” (Supp.

Lodgment No. 12 at 447.) 

-94- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

believing that they could convict Madsen of Count 3 for his

possession of contraband found in his Vista Detention Facility cell.

First, the jury was instructed through CALJIC 2.50 that they

were to limit the use of the 1997 Vista jail evidence to evaluating

Madsen’s knowledge for Count 3. Second, they were instructed through

CALJIC 3.30 that they needed to find Madsen possessed general

criminal intent to convict him of Count 3. Finally, CALJIC 7.38

defined the elements of Count 3's crime. These three instructions,

in conjunction with CALJIC 1.0120 which states that the instructions

are to be considered as a whole, gave the jury a clear roadmap for

their determination of Count 3. There is no reasonable likelihood

that the jury convicted Madsen of Count 3 simply because he possessed

contraband at another time in another facility. As previously noted,

the Court presumes that jurors follow their instructions, and Madsen

has provided no support suggesting that the jury applied the

instructions in a way that violates the Constitution, other than to

make conclusory assertions. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Accordingly,

the California Supreme Court’s silent denial of this claim is not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

United States Supreme Court law. For the foregoing reasons, the Court

RECOMMENDS that this claim be DENIED. 

CALJIC 1.24 and 1.21

In regard to Count 3, Madsen states that the court gave

CALJIC 1.24 which defines “possession” and CALJIC 1.21 which defines

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21The trial court correctly instructed the jury regarding CALJIC 1.24 as

follows: “There are two kinds of possession: actual possession and constructive

possession. Actual possession requires that a person knowingly exercise direct

physical control over a thing. Constructive possession does not require actual

possession but does require that a person knowingly exercise control over or the

right to control a thing, either directly or through another person or persons.

A person may have possession alone, or two or more persons together may share

actual or constructive possession.” (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 464.)

22The trial court accurately read CALJIC 1.21 as follows: “The word

“knowingly” means with knowledge of the existence of the facts in question.

Knowledge of the unlawfulness of any act or omission is not required. A

requirement of knowledge does not mean that the act must be done with any

specific intent.” (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 464.)

-95- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

“knowledge”, but argues that neither of these instructions require

that Madsen had actual knowledge of the object in his possession as

required under section 4502. (Pet. at 83.) Therefore he concludes

that the jury was able to convict him of Count 3 based on his

constructive possession of the razor blade. (Id.) 

Respondent argues the claim must be denied because the court

instructed the jury that to convict Madsen of possessing a sharp

instrument, it had to find he “knowingly possessed” the instrument,

and a person cannot knowingly possess an instrument without being

aware of its presence. (Answer at 60-61.)

Madsen’s claim has no merit. As Respondent notes, CALJIC

1.2421 and 1.2122, taken together, require that a person knowingly

exercise control over the requisite object, which in this case was

the razor blade. A further instruction requiring the jury to find

that Madsen had actual knowledge of the razor blade would be

duplicative and unnecessary. Madsen fails to show that the failure

of the trial court to give such an instruction so infected the trial

with unfairness that it violated his due process. Estelle, 502 U.S

at 72. 

///

///

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23The trial court accurately gave CALJIC 2.11 as follows: “Neither side is

required to call as witnesses all persons who may have been present at any of the

events disclosed by the evidence or who may appear to have some knowledge of

these events. Neither side is required to produce all objects or documents

mentioned or suggested by the evidence. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 452.) 

-96- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

CALJIC 2.11

Madsen contends that CALJIC 2.11 effectively tells the jury

that the prosecution does not have to produce the alleged razor

blade discovered in his legal pad, and thereby relieves the

prosecution of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Pet.

at 83-84.) He argues that this instruction violated the

Constitution by allowing him to be convicted of possessing a sharp

object despite the loss of the razor blade. (Id.) 

Respondent argues that Madsen has failed to show that the

Constitution prohibits conviction of possessory offenses unless the

contraband itself is brought to court. (Answer at 61.) Further,

Madsen has failed to show that it was fundamentally unfair to base

his conviction for possessing a razor blade on testimony that he

possessed it. (Id.) 

CALJIC 2.11 states that “neither side is required to produce

all objects. . .mentioned or suggested by the evidence.” Despite

exhaustive research, this Court has found no case which challenges

the constitutionality of this instruction.23 Moreover, as the Court

discussed in Section I above, the trial testimony of numerous

individuals provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find Madsen

knowingly possessed a sharp instrument as charged in Count 3. See

Order, Section I, at 63. Madsen fails to show it was fundamentally

unfair to base his conviction for possessing the razor blade in

Count 3 on testimony that he possessed it. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72.

Furthermore, Madsen has not demonstrated that CALJIC 2.11 was faulty

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24The trial court accurately instructed the jury regarding Cal.Penal Code

section 422 as follows: “Every person who willfully threatens to commit a crime

which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the

specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is

no intent of actually carrying it out, which threat on its face and under

circumstances under which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional,

immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of

purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes

that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for

his or her immediate family’s safety, is guilty of a violation of penal code

section 422, a crime. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 464-465.) 

25The trial court correctly read CALJIC 2.09 to the jury as follows:

“Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. Specifically, Deputy

Bradburn testified about information he knew or believed about defendant. Such

evidence was offered for the purpose of determining if defendant had the specific

intent to make a threat and to determine if Deputy Bradburn was in sustained fear

as a result of the information and threat. At the time this evidence was

admitted you were instructed it could not be considered by you for any purpose

other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. Do not consider this

evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it was admitted.”

(Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 452.)

-97- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

under state law. Id. 

CALJIC 2.09

Madsen claims that CALJIC 2.09 impermissibly allowed the jury

to consider inadmissible hearsay statements concerning Madsen’s

character, alleged gang association, and past staff assaults in

determining whether Madsen had the specific intent required to put

Bradburn in sustained fear as required under California Penal Code

§ 42224. (Pet. at 86.)

Respondent argues that the claim must be denied because

CALJIC 2.09 limited the use to which the jury could put the evidence

regarding Madsen’s character for violence and his gang connections.

(Answer at 62.) As to Madsen’s allegations that the element of

sustained fear was not sufficiently demonstrated to support a

conviction, Respondent notes that Bradburn testified about his fear,

and that he continued to be fearful after the threat, so much so

that he wrote Madsen up for a felony. (Id.) 

Through CALJIC 2.0925 the jury was admonished to consider the

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potentially inflammatory testimony Bradburn provided regarding his

knowledge of Madsen’s history of violence and gang association only

to show that Bradburn was reasonably fearful of the seriousness of

Madsen’s threat, and that he continued to be in fear after the

threat occurred. 

Madsen argues that Bradburn’s testimony regarding Madsen’s

history of staff assaults is false, that Bradburn had no personal

knowledge about Madsen’s gang affiliation, or the assault on

Cornejo, therefore Bradburn’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay.

(Pet. at 85-86.) On the contrary, Bradburn testified about his

personal feelings and why he believed Madsen’s threat. Bradburn was

not testifying based on inadmissible hearsay; he was explaining what

facts and beliefs about Madsen made Bradburn feel afraid. (Supp.

Lodgment 12 at 247.) As the limiting instruction explained,

Bradburn’s testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter

asserted (and therefore was not inadmissible hearsay) but was

offered solely to explain and establish Bradburn’s sustained fear.

CALJIC 2.09 was not ambiguous or vague as to its purpose and

direction because it specifically addressed the substance of

Bradburn’s testimony and directed the jury to use it only for the

limited purpose to show Bradburn’s legitimate and sustained fear at

Madsen’s threat. Estelle, 502 U.S at 72. Judging the instruction in

the context of the trial record, Penal Code section § 422, and the

limiting instruction itself, there is no reasonable likelihood that

the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violated

the Constitution. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Boyde v. California,

494 U.S. at 380. 

///

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26The trial court correctly stated CALJIC 17.02 to the jury as follows:

“Each Count charges a distinct crime. You must decide each Count separately. The

defendant may be found guilty or not guilty as to any or all of the crimes

charged. Your finding as to each Count must be stated in a separate verdict.”

Lodgment No. 12 at 466.

-99- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

CALJIC 17.02, 3.30 and 3.31

Madsen argues that because Counts 1 and 2 (the Cornejo

attack) were joined with Count 3 (possession of razor blade) and

Count 4 (terrorist threat), jury instructions were given which

confused the jurors and created a spillover effect of evidence from

one crime to other crimes. Specifically, Madsen contends that

CALJIC 17.02 instructs the jury to decide each count separately, but

CALJIC 3.30, given regarding Counts 2 and 3, requires the jury find

“a union or joint operation of act” in addition to general criminal

intent, which confused the jury and allowed them to consider the

evidence of one set of offenses as evidence establishing the other.

(Pet. at 88-89.) Similarly, Madsen argues that the trial court gave

CALJIC 3.31 with respect to Counts 1 and 4, which required the jury

find “a union or joint operation of act or conduct” and specific

criminal intent, and allowed the jury to apply evidence from one

count to another. (Id.) 

Respondent counters that the claim must be denied because

“[n]o reasonable jury would interpret an instruction saying that for

any given offense intent must be joined with action to mean that

evidence of offense A applied to offense B.” (Answer at 63.)

The Court finds no ambiguity or potential confusion in the

trial court’s instructions. CALJIC 17.0226 clearly states that the

jury must “decide each Count separately”. The fact that the court

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27As noted above, the trial court accurately read CALJIC 3.30 to the jury

as follows: “In the crimes charged in Counts Two, Assault with a Deadly Weapon

and Three, Possession of a Sharp Instrument in a Penal Institution, there must

exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and general criminal intent.

General criminal intent does not require an intent to violate the law. When a

person intentionally does that which the law declares to be a crime, he is acting

with general criminal intent, even though he may not know his act or conduct is

unlawful.” (Lodgment No. 12 at 459.)

28The trial court accurately gave the jury CALJIC 3.31 as follows: “In the

crimes charged in Counts One and Four, there must exist a union or joint

operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the

perpetrator. Unless the specific intent exists the crime to which it relates is

not committed. The specific intent required is included in the definitions of

the crimes set forth elsewhere in these instructions.” (Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at

460.

-100- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

instructed the jury that CALJIC 3.3027 applied to Counts 2 and 3, and

that CALJIC 3.3128 applied to Counts 1 and 4 did not permit a

prejudicial “spillover” of evidence. Rather, when considered as a

whole, the instructions directed the jury to decide each crime

independently and provided the specific elements required for each

crime. Madsen may not arbitrarily select specific instructions,

while ignoring others, in an attempt to manufacture error. Estelle,

502 U.S. at 72 (instructions may not be judged in artificial

isolation but must be considered as a whole).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 Madsen’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding

Ulovec’s failure to submit appropriate jury instructions similarly

fails. Madsen specifically claims that Ulovec rendered deficient

performance for failing to submit an instruction on third party

culpability as to Counts 1, 2 and 3, and an imminent threat

instruction as to Count 4. (Pet. at 37.) However, Madsen does not

show the relevance of either of these instructions, nor does he

demonstrate any facts which would support their inclusion. Instead,

the record reflects that Ulovec requested numerous jury

instructions, including CALJIC 2.20 “Believability of Witnesses” and

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29The trial court rejected Ulovec’s proposed jury instruction concerning

suppression of evidence by the police or prosecution in regard to the lost razor

blade. (Lodgment No. 17 at 403-404.) 

-101- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

CALJIC 2.60 “Defendant Not Testifying- - No Inference of Guilt May

be Drawn”, which the court accepted. Of the instructions requested

by Ulovec, only one was rejected.29 Furthermore, because the jury

instructions as given were not prejudicial to Madsen’s case, Ulovec

was not unreasonable for failing to object to them. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim be DENIED.

Erroneous Denial of Defense Instruction

Madsen argues that the trial court erred in rejecting a jury

instruction favorable to the defense which directed the jury to

consider the “obvious ‘fact’ the authorities and the prosecution

were in collusion, willfully suppressing the evidence related to

Count Three.” (Pet at 84.) Respondent counters that the evidence

at trial was that the loss of the razor blade was accidental and

therefore Madsen fails to show how the court’s refusal to instruct

the jury that the prosecution had willfully suppressed the blade

rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. (Answer at 61.)

Madsen raised this claim in his habeas corpus petition to the

California Supreme Court which denied it without citation to

authority. (Lodgment No. 16.) Therefore, this Court must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the denial is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

The Court finds no merit to Madsen’s contention that the

trial court rejected a jury instruction favorable to the defense

concerning the “obvious” fact that the authorities and the

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-102- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

prosecution were in collusion and willfully suppressed the razor

blade in Count 3. The trial testimony of investigator Efrain Garcia

demonstrated that the loss was accidental. (Supp. Lodgment No. 12

at 263.) Madsen has not presented any evidence indicating that

Garcia’s testimony was false or that the government intentionally

lost the blade. Accordingly, Madsen fails to show how the jury

instructions violated his constitutional rights as required under

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. For the foregoing reasons, the Court

finds that there is no merit to Madsen’s multiple claims regarding

jury instructions, and the California Supreme Court’s denial of his

claim regarding CALJIC 7.38 was not contrary to clearly established

federal law, and RECOMMENDS that Madsen’s Petition be DENIED on

Ground 13.

M. Use of 1984 Prior as Strike

Madsen argues in Ground 14 that his Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated by the use of a 1984 assault prior as a strike

for purposes of the Three Strikes law. (Pet. at 90.) In

particular, Madsen contends that as a part of the plea agreement he

entered in 1984, the great bodily injury allegation would be

dropped, and that therefore the prior conviction cannot be

considered “serious” within the meaning of the Three Strikes Law.

(Id.) Madsen claims that the prosecution’s decision in the present

case to elevate the prior conviction to a serious felony is a

defacto violation of contract principles and collateral estoppel.

(Id. at 89-90.) In addition, in Ground 4 Madsen claims he suffered

ineffective assistance of counsel because Ulovec failed to raise the

fact that the 1984 plea agreement transcripts were destroyed, object

to the amended information regarding the 1984 prior, object to the

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-103- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

admission of the preliminary hearing transcripts, and object to jury

instructions elevating said prior to a serious felony for strike

purposes. (Id. at 38.)

Respondent counters that Ground 14 should be denied for

failure to present a federal question because the Court of Appeal

decision on this claim was a statement of the meaning of California

law and it is the state court’s role to determine state law. (Answer

at 65.) As to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

Respondent argues that the prior conviction was properly treated as

a strike, and Madsen has not clearly stated what the problem was

with the strike prior, nor what counsel’s actions should have been,

and therefore has failed to sustain his burden and the court should

deny his claim. (Id. at 28-29.) 

Violation of 1984 Plea Agreement

Ground 14 does not present a cognizable federal claim. To

present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim under § 2254, a

state prisoner must allege both that he is in custody pursuant to a

“judgment of a State court,” and that he is in custody in “violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas review is not available for an

alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law.

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

The sum of Madsen’s federal due process claim is as follows:

“The use of a 1984 prior as a strike was violative of due process,

contract, and equitable principles U.S.C. 14th.” (Pet. at 90.) This

cursory reference to the violation of his federal due process rights

is insufficient to maintain a federal due process claim. Rule 2(c),

28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. See also Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056,

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1058 (9th Cir. 1970) (trial court’s dismissal of federal habeas

proceeding affirmed where petitioner made conclusory allegations

instead of factual allegations showing that he was entitled to

relief). Moreover, the Court’s review of Madsen’s petition reveals

that he is arguing that California state law prohibited the trial

court from considering his prior conviction as a strike for

sentencing purposes. (Pet. at 90–91.) This is a state law claim

which was properly adjudicated by the state courts. Estelle, 502

U.S. at 67-68. 

Because Madsen has not articulated a specific federal

violation and his stated claim is based on an alleged violation of

California law which the Court of Appeal properly addressed, he is

not entitled to federal habeas relief and the Court RECOMMENDS

Ground 14 be DENIED. 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Furthermore, Madsen has failed to show that Ulovec’s

performance was deficient, and that his performance prejudiced the

defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Madsen raised this

ineffective assistance claim in the California Supreme Court which

issued a postcard denial. (Lodgment No. 16.) Therefore, this Court

must conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the denial is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

 Madsen’s 1984 assault offense involved both personal

infliction of great bodily injury and personal use of a dangerous

or deadly weapon. (Lodgment No. 3 at 52.) “The preliminary hearing

transcript shows the victim and two other witnesses testified that

Madsen used a baseball bat to beat the victim and inflict serious

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-105- 04cv1726 IEG (BLM) 

injuries on him, including a broken nose, lacerations on his nose

requiring five stitches, bruises to his body and forehead, and

numbness on parts of his face.” (Id.) Under the California Three

Strikes Law, a prior conviction counts as a strike if it is

“serious” or “violent” within the meaning of California Penal Code

section 1172.7(c). Cal. Penal Code. §§ 667(a)(4), 667(d)(1). At the

time of Madsen’s present offenses, California Penal Code section

1192.7 provided that serious or violent felonies include those where

the defendant inflicts great bodily injury (§1192.7(c)(8)) and where

the defendant personally uses a dangerous or deadly weapon

(§1192.7(c)(23)), both of which were alleged in the 1984 assault.

(Supp. Lodgment No. 12 at 49.) The 1984 plea agreement resulted in

the dismissal of the section 12022.7 allegation (personal infliction

of great bodily injury). (Id.)

 The 1984 assault properly could be considered a strike

whether the great bodily injury enhancement was incorporated at the

time of the plea agreement or not, because Madsen’s undisputed use

of a baseball bat in the assault provided an independent basis for

strike classification. People v. Reed, 13 Cal.4th 217, 221

(1996)(use of prior conviction as serious felony upheld where

preliminary hearing transcript showed defendant personally used a

deadly weapon in previous assault, despite plea agreement and no

information allegation or finding in the prior case that defendant

personally used a deadly weapon). The Court of Appeal held that

“Madsen’s 1984 conviction therefore was properly considered a strike

under the three strikes law and the trial court did not err by

refusing to strike that allegation.” (Lodgment No. 3 at 53.)

///

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Ulovec’s failure to object to the amended information which

classified the 1984 prior as a serious felony was not unreasonable

in light of the fact that the prior assault could be considered

serious whether the great bodily injury allegation was included or

not. See Reed, 13 Cal.4th at 221. Similarly, Ulovec’s failure to

object to the admission of the preliminary hearing transcripts and

the jury instructions regarding the 1984 prior was not unreasonable

and did not cause Madsen any prejudice as there existed sufficient

grounds to consider the prior assault a serious felony for purposes

of the Three Strikes law. As to Madsen’s contention that the 1984

change of plea and sentencing transcripts were destroyed, there is

no evidence in the record that these documents were in fact

destroyed, and Madsen does not elaborate. Therefore, Madsen has not

established that Ulovec’s failure to challenge the use of the 1984

conviction as a strike fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness or prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 

For the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of

Madsen’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the 1984

prior was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-

13. Accordingly this Court RECOMMENDS that the portion of Ground 4

concerning the strike effect of the 1984 assault conviction be

DENIED.

N. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Madsen argues that his first and second appellate attorneys

failed to argue all the issues raised in the current petition on

appeal. (Pet. at 38-39.)

///

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Respondent counters that the claim must be denied because

Madsen fails to state what harm resulted from his appellate

attorneys’ respective failures. (Answer at 29-30.)

Madsen did not raise this issue on direct appeal, however he

did raise it in his California Supreme Court habeas corpus petition

which was silently denied. (Lodgment No. 16.) Because the state

court did not furnish a basis for its reasoning, this Court must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the

denial is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

“The proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that appellate

counsel was ineffective . . . is that enunciated in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)].” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,

285 (2000) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986)).

A petitioner must first show that his appellate counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. He must then establish he was

prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Id. at 694. To establish

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that he would have

prevailed on appeal absent counsel’s errors. Smith, 528 U.S. at

285. 

Madsen has failed to satisfy this burden. As explained in

this Report and Recommendation, none of Madsen’s claims are

meritorious. Thus, even if appellate counsels’ failure to raise

them on appeal was objectively unreasonable, which this Court does

not find, Madsen has not established he was prejudiced by that

failure. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697)(the performance

component need not be addressed if it is easier to dispose of an

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ineffectiveness claim on the lack of sufficient prejudice.) Thus,

the state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established United States

Supreme Court law and this Court RECOMMENDS that these claims be

DENIED. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In sum, this Court finds that Madsen has failed to establish

that the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court

decisions were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor has

Madsen made any argument that further factual development is

necessary, such that an evidentiary hearing would be warranted. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (exceptions where an evidentiary hearing may

be appropriate). As such, this Court DENIES Madsen’s Request for

Judicial Notice of his original petition filed on August 24, 2004

and RECOMMENDS that Madsen’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

DENIED and the case dismissed with prejudice.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this

Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be

entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no

later than December 4, 2007. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

///

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

December 27, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 9, 2007

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

COPY TO:

HONORABLE IRMA E. GONZALEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL AND PARTIES

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