Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00577/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00577-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEAN C. DRAKE,

Petitioner,

vs.

FELKER et al.,

Respondent.

Case No. 2:07-cv-00577 (JKS)

ORDER

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this application for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262. 

On April 5, 2007, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations herein, which

were served on all parties, and which contained notice to all parties that any objections to the

findings and recommendations were to be filed within fifteen days. Petitioner has filed objections

to the findings and recommendations.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 72-304, this

Court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire

file, with particular attention to those portions relevant or pertinent to the objections raised, the

Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to consider Drake’s Petition under § 2254. Drake is not

seeking damages. He seeks expungement of a disciplinary decision. 

The magistrate judge recommends dismissal because Petitioner has not raised a claim

cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The magistrate judge understandably came to this conclusion

because the disciplinary proceeding resulted directly in a mere change in the conditions of

Case 2:07-cv-00577-JKS Document 11 Filed 12/13/07 Page 1 of 4
 Petitioner was found guilty of battery on a peace officer, resulting in an order placing 1

Petitioner in some type of administrative segregation for three years. See Docket No. 1 at 6.

ORDER

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confinement. Petitioner objects to the recommendation, arguing his claim should be cognizable 1

under § 2254 because the guilty finding in the disciplinary proceeding is permanently on his

disciplinary record. Docket No. 8 at 1. Although Petitioner fails to make this clear, the Court

believes he is attempting to argue that the disciplinary finding on his record might someday affect

his parole eligibility. The Court believes that the disciplinary finding will almost certainly affect

Petitioner’s parole eligibility in the future, and that habeas jurisdiction therefore lies in this action.

The Supreme Court has held that a writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate federal remedy

when “a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the

relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to an immediate or speedier release from that

imprisonment.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Preiser, and its Supreme Court

progeny, are focused on the availability of jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and have not

directly narrowed the limits of habeas jurisdiction. See Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1026-28

(9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit has addressed the intersection of §§ 1983 and 2254 and appears

to have concluded that courts may have jurisdiction over challenges to prison disciplinary decisions

under both § 1983 and § 2254 in appropriate cases. 

The Ninth Circuit first addressed the availability of federal habeas jurisdiction in this type of

situation in 1989, holding that such jurisdiction is available to a prisoner seeking “expungement of a

disciplinary finding from his record if expungement is likely to accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility

for parole.” Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). This

holding is arguably inconsistent with Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997). In Neal, two

prisoners filed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging their administrative placement in the

“Sex Offender Treatment Program,” which made them ineligible for parole. Neal, 131 F.3d at 821-

23. The government sought dismissal of the case under the “favorable termination rule” of Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Neal, 131 F.3d at 823-24. The court found that suit was

not barred under the favorable termination rule for § 1983 claims because success would not

Case 2:07-cv-00577-JKS Document 11 Filed 12/13/07 Page 2 of 4
 Docken dealt with Ramirez by distinguishing it on the ground that Ramirez’s suit “did not 2

deal with the fact or duration of his confinement,” because it “concerned a challenge to internal

disciplinary procedures and the administrative segregation that resulted.” Docken, 393 F.3d at 1030. 

In contrast, Docken involved a suit challenging an executive decision to lengthen the period between

parole hearings from one year to five. Id. at 1025-26. The court in Docken reasoned that the

frequency of parole hearings was more closely tied to the duration of the sentence than

administrative segregation. Id. at 1029-30. 

ORDER

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guarantee parole, but merely eligibility for parole. Id. at 824. The suit was thus allowed to proceed

under § 1983. 

In Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit interpreted this to

mean that “habeas jurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983 action proper, where a successful challenge to

a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s sentence.” Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859. 

The court thus implicitly reinterpreted Bostic to hold that the availability of habeas corpus

jurisdiction turned not on the effect on parole eligibility, but on the effect on the overall sentence. 

Id. at 858. This appears to be the implicit reasoning behind the magistrate judge’s recommendation

in this case.

Docken, decided the year after Ramirez, acknowledged that Bostic and Neal were potentially

at odds, but resolved the conflict differently than Ramirez. See Docken, 393 F.3d at 1029-30. The

court in Docken regarded Neal as “holding only that § 1983 was an appropriate remedy in that case,

without reaching the issue of whether it was the exclusive remedy.” Id. at 1030. The Court believes

that Docken has the better reading of Bostic and Neal, and that Ramirez’s reinterpretation of Bostic,

implying that §§ 1983 and 2254 are mutually exclusive, need not be followed as it was dicta.

Despite Docken’s careful choice to distinguish Ramirez, the Court believes Ramirez’s

reinterpretation was dicta. Ramirez involved a § 1983 case, and held “that the favorable 2

termination rule [did] not apply to § 1983 suits challenging a disciplinary hearing or administrative

sanction that does not affect the overall length of the prisoner’s confinement.” Ramirez, 334 F.3d at

858. The court in Ramirez merely went on to discuss the availability of habeas jurisdiction in light

of this holding. Id. This was based on the assumption that jurisdiction under §§ 1983 and 2254 are

Case 2:07-cv-00577-JKS Document 11 Filed 12/13/07 Page 3 of 4
ORDER

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mutually exclusive. As discussed in Docken, this assumption was not well-founded. Docken, 393

F.3d 1024, 1030-31. 

The Court also believes that a negative disciplinary finding, at least in California, necessarily

affects potential eligibility for parole. In California, a prisoner’s negative disciplinary record is one

of the factors upon which the State may find a prisoner unsuitable for parole. See 15 Cal. Code of

Regs. § 2402(b). The circumstances tending to show unsuitability include whether “[t]he prisoner

has engaged in serious misconduct in prison or jail.” Id. § 2402(c)(6). A negative disciplinary

finding is precisely the sort of evidence that would carry the day under the “some evidence”

standard applied to state parole denials under Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985). 

Thus, it seems clear to this Court that the finding in Drake’s disciplinary file that he battered a peace

officer will almost certainly come back to haunt him when the parole board reviews his suitability

for parole. If Drake prevails on the merits, the adverse decision will be expunged and will cease to

provide an obstacle to a favorable parole decision. 

The Court finds that Petitioner’s application is cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to the

extent it raises concern that the disciplinary finding will one day affect Petitioner’s eligibility for

parole. At this time, the Court does not express any opinion on any other issue pertaining to

jurisdiction or the merits. Petitioner’s application should be referred to a magistrate judge for

further development consistent with this Order. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 2254; and

2. Petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus shall be referred to a United States

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262 for further

proceedings consistent with this Order, including a report and recommendations.

Dated this the 12th day of December 2007.

 /s/ James K. Singleton, Jr. 

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR. 

United States District Judge 

Case 2:07-cv-00577-JKS Document 11 Filed 12/13/07 Page 4 of 4