Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02572/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02572-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KORY DARTY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

J. SOTO, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:13-cv-02572 TLN AC P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Petitioner is a California state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an 

application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The action proceeds on the 

petition filed on December 5, 2013, ECF No. 1, which challenges petitioner’s 2010 conviction for 

one count of attempted murder with use of a firearm resulting in great bodily injury, and three 

counts of attempted murder with use of a firearm. Respondent has answered, ECF No. 13, and 

petitioner has filed a traverse, ECF No. 21. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Trial Court Proceedings 

The following statement of the case is taken from the unpublished opinion of the 

California Court of Appeal on direct review:1

 

1

 The undersigned has independently reviewed the trial record, and confirms the accuracy of the 

state court’s recitation of the evidence presented at trial. 

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A. Procedural and Factual Background 

A jury convicted Darty of four counts of attempted murder (Pen. 

Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)—counts one through four).2 As to 

count one, the jury found Darty personally discharged a firearm 

causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and as to counts 

two, three, and four that he personally discharged and used a 

firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)). 

Sentenced to state prison for 50 years to life, defendant appeals 

contending (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the attempted 

murder convictions in counts two, three, and four; (2) the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress his identification from a 

photo lineup; (3) the court erred when it failed, sua sponte, to 

instruct the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter as an 

included offense of the attempted murders charged in all counts; 

and (4) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct. We 

reject the contentions and affirm the judgment. 

Facts3

In November 2008, defendant was living at the Azure Park 

Apartments (Azure Apartments) on Sky Parkway in Sacramento. 

Defendant sold marijuana and was known as “D,” “KD,” and “the 

Weed Man.” Charles W., Donnell A., Sidney W., and Jonathan F. 

(all teenagers) hung around the Azure Apartments and also sold 

marijuana. 

In the early evening on November 18, 2008, Charles, Donnell, 

Jonathan, and Sidney were at a market across the street from the 

Azure Apartments when, based upon a prior problem, Donnell 

slapped and/or punched Syra Drones, a young female who was 

involved with defendant. Drones was angry, crying, and threatened 

to tell defendant what had happened. She also threatened to return 

with a gun and then walked off into the Azure Apartments. 

About 30 minutes after the fight with Drones, Charles and his group 

were standing in front of the Azure Apartments when two men 

walked toward them asking for some “tree” or “weed,” meaning 

marijuana. Jonathan gave Charles a bag of marijuana to sell to 

them and Charles walked away toward the two. Charles recognized 

one of the men as defendant, having met him in Charles’s aunt’s 

apartment in the complex, but Charles did not know the other man. 

Charles gave defendant’s companion a bag of marijuana and as that 

man was handing Charles the money, defendant started shooting at 

Charles. Defendant’s companion joined in the shooting and Charles 

was shot five to six times and fell to the ground. Charles had 

gunshot wounds to his abdomen, lower back, left arm, left leg, and 

bottom of his left foot. 

 

2

 [Fn. 1 in original excerpted text]. Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code. 

3

 [Fn. 2 in original excerpted text]. The facts are further developed as required by the issues. 

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Devon Washington, who knew defendant, Charles, Sidney, and 

Jonathan, testified that he came out of the market and saw Charles, 

Sidney, and Jonathan across the street in front of the Azure 

Apartments. Charles was talking to two men. Washington watched 

as the two men started backing away from Charles as they were 

shooting him with handguns. From the light generated by the 

muzzle flashes of the guns, Washington identified defendant, who 

was wearing a black sweatshirt with the hood up, as one of the 

shooters. Washington thought he heard “at least 20” gunshots. 

Sidney, Jonathan, and Donnell testified that after the shooting 

started, they ran and heard the bullets striking the metal gate near 

them. Donnell testified that for a shooter to have shot at them after 

shooting at Charles, “[h]e would have had to turn the gun to be 

facing towards us.” Neither Sidney, Jonathan nor Donnell was 

shot, and they escaped by running into the apartment complex. 

Jason Lyle knew defendant from having purchased marijuana from 

him. The night of the shooting, Lyle called defendant and arranged 

to buy marijuana from him. Lyle arrived at the Azure Apartments, 

parked his car and walked over to defendant and bought marijuana 

from him. As the two were talking, defendant told Lyle to “hold on 

real quick” and walked away. As Lyle waited he heard gunshots. 

Defendant returned with a man in a wheelchair, and the two got into 

Lyle’s car. Defendant was wearing gloves and had a gun, and Lyle 

thought he was wearing dark clothing. Defendant told Lyle, “Let’s 

go.” When Lyle just sat there, defendant and the other man got out 

of the car and left. 

At trial, Donnell claimed he was unable to identify defendant as one 

of the shooters, but admitted that he had told a police officer that he 

“saw the people who were shooting.” Detective Robert Stewart 

testified that in audio/video recorded statements, Donnell identified 

defendant as one of the shooters and said that he was wearing a 

“black hoodie” and gloves. 

Emergency personnel transported Charles to a hospital where he 

remained for approximately two months.4

 As a result of his 

injuries, Charles is paralyzed from the waist down. Crime scene 

investigators found 17 expended shell casings, seven of which were 

.380–caliber and were fired from the same gun, the other 10 were 

.25–caliber and were fired from two guns. No fingerprints were 

found on the casings. 

Lodged Doc. 4, Exhibit A to Answer to Petition, pp. 1-2, People v. Darty, No. C065494, 2012 

WL 4056249, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2012) (unpub.), People v. Darty, No. C065494, 

2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 6728, at *1-5 (Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2012) (unpub). 

During the trial, petitioner’s girlfriend testified for the defense that petitioner was in her 

 

4

 A review of the record indicates Charles was in the hospital for approximately three months. 1 

RT at 123. 

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apartment when the shots were fired. 4 RT 914-916.5 Petitioner did not testify at his trial. 

II. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

Petitioner timely appealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of 

conviction on September 17, 2012. Lodged Doc. 4. The California Supreme Court summarily 

denied review on December 19, 2012. Lodged Doc. 6. Petitioner did not seek collateral review 

in state court. 

 By operation of the prison mailbox rule, the instant federal petition was filed December 5, 

2013. 6 ECF No. 1. Respondent answered on May 22, 2014. ECF No. 13. Petitioner’s traverse 

was docketed on September 29, 2014. ECF No. 21. 

STANDARDS GOVERNING HABEAS RELIEF UNDER THE AEDPA 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”), provides in relevant part as follows: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 The statute applies whenever the state court has denied a federal claim on its merits, 

whether or not the state court explained its reasons. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 

(2011). State court rejection of a federal claim will be presumed to have been on the merits 

absent any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary. Id. at 784-85 (citing 

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989) (presumption of a merits determination when it is 

unclear whether a decision appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another basis)). 

 

5

 “RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal, Volume One (“1 RT”) through Volume 

Four (“4 RT”). 

6

 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (establishing rule that a prisoner’s court document is 

deemed filed on the date the prisoner delivered the document to prison officials for mailing). 

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“The presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the 

state court's decision is more likely.” Id. at 785. 

 The phrase “clearly established Federal law” in § 2254(d)(1) refers to the “governing legal 

principle or principles” previously articulated by the Supreme Court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Only Supreme Court precedent may constitute “clearly established 

Federal law,” but courts may look to circuit law “to ascertain whether...the particular point in 

issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 

1450 (2013). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the decision 

“contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court decision “unreasonably applies” federal law “if the state 

court identifies the correct rule from [the Supreme Court’s] cases but unreasonably applies it to 

the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407-08. It is not enough that the state court 

was incorrect in the view of the federal habeas court; the state court decision must be objectively 

unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). 

Review under § 2254(d) is limited to the record that was before the state court. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). The question at this stage is whether the state court 

reasonably applied clearly established federal law to the facts before it. Id. In other words, the 

focus of the § 2254(d) inquiry is “on what a state court knew and did.” Id. at 1399. Where the 

state court’s adjudication is set forth in a reasoned opinion, §2254(d)(1) review is confined to “the 

state court’s actual reasoning” and “actual analysis.” Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 738 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (en banc). A different rule applies where the state court rejects claims summarily, 

without a reasoned opinion. In Richter, supra, the Supreme Court held that when a state court 

denies a claim on the merits but without a reasoned opinion, the federal habeas court must 

determine what arguments or theories may have supported the state court’s decision, and subject 

those arguments or theories to § 2254(d) scrutiny. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 

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DISCUSSION 

I. Claim One: Sufficiency of the Evidence for Counts Two through Four of Attempted 

Murder 

A. Petitioner’s Allegations and Pertinent State Court Record 

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the 

attempted murder of Sidney W., Donnell A., and Jonathan F., under both a “kill zone” theory and 

a direct intent theory of attempted murder, ECF No. 1 at 4 and ECF No. 21 at 17-18. 7 Petitioner 

asserts that he is an “outsider” without a motive to kill the victims, and that because Sidney, 

Donnell, and Jonathan were not hurt, the “kill zone” theory is “exaggerated.” ECF No. 21 at 18. 

Petitioner further asserts that none of these three victims identified him in court as the shooter; 

Donnell testified he lied to police when he originally identified petitioner as the shooter; and there 

is no physical evidence tying petitioner to the shooting, ECF No. 21 at 16-18. 

At trial, the prosecution theorized that petitioner attempted to kill Charles Walker and his 

friends either in retaliation for an earlier attack on Syra Drones, with whom petitioner had a 

relationship, or because Charles and his friends were selling marijuana at the apartment complex, 

thus infringing on petitioner’s “territory.” 4 RT 1035, 1115. The prosecution presented witness 

testimony in support of these possible motives. See 1 RT 97; 2 RT 341, 446-447; 2 RT 563-569. 

The trial transcript reflects that after firing on Charles, petitioner and his companion turned their 

guns and fired 11 to 12 more times in the direction of the three other victims, 2 RT 335, 3 RT 

646; investigators found 17 expended gun casings at the scene, 2 RT 485-488; and the victims 

heard metal strike the gate behind them as they ran, 1 RT 259, 2 RT 354, 461. 

B. The Clearly Established Federal Law 

Due process requires that each essential element of a criminal offense be proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. United States v. Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In reviewing the 

sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, the question is “whether, viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

 

7

 The referenced pagination is to the court’s electronic copy of the parties’ pleadings. 

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elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1974) 

(emphasis in original). If the evidence supports conflicting inferences, the reviewing court must 

presume “that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution,” and the 

court must “defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326; see also Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-

75 (9th Cir. 2005) (reviewing Jackson claim under AEDPA standards). A jury’s credibility 

determination is not subject to review during post-conviction proceedings. Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 330 (1995) (“under Jackson, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally 

beyond the scope of review.”). The federal habeas court determines the sufficiency of the 

evidence in reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. 

In order to grant a writ of habeas corpus under the AEDPA, the court must find that the 

decision of the state court was an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to 

the facts of the case. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. Because the Jackson standard is itself 

deferential, the AEDPA creates a “double dose of deference.” Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 

964 (9th Cir. 2011). The question is not whether this court finds the evidence insufficient, or 

whether the state court made a mistake, but whether the state court’s determination that a rational 

jury could have found sufficient evidence to find each element of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 965. 

C. The State Court’s Ruling 

Petitioner raised his sufficiency of the evidence claim on direct appeal. Because the 

California Supreme Court denied discretionary review, the opinion of the California Court of 

Appeal for the Third Appellate District constitutes the last reasoned decision on the merits and is 

the subject of habeas review in this court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991); Ortiz v. 

Yates, 704 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2012). The California Court of Appeal ruled as follows: 

Defendant contends the convictions for attempted murder of Sidney 

(count two), Donnell (count three), and Jonathan (count four) must 

be reversed because the evidence is insufficient to establish either 

an intent to kill each of them or that they were in a “kill zone,” 

which is a group of persons into which shots are intentionally being 

fired. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to establish a direct 

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intent to kill each victim and, therefore, we need not address the kill 

zone theory. 

“‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

judgment of conviction, we examine the entire record in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, presuming in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably 

deduce from the evidence, to determine whether a rational trier of 

fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’” (People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 1, 87.) 

In People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 131, the court explained the 

two theories of attempted murder—the intent to kill a specific 

person and the kill zone theory. “‘Someone who in truth does not 

intend to kill a person is not guilty of that person’s attempted 

murder even if the crime would have been murder ... if the person 

were killed. To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must 

intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else. The defendant's 

mental state must be examined as to each alleged attempted murder 

victim. Someone who intends to kill only one person and attempts 

unsuccessfully to do so, is guilty of attempted murder of the victim, 

but not of others.’”8

 (Id. at p. 136.). 

Although defendant claims the prosecution “[i]n the instant case 

relied on the kill zone theory to establish the attempted murder of 

[Charles's] three companions,” the record shows the prosecutor also 

argued that defendant specifically attempted to kill each victim, i.e., 

a direct kill theory. The prosecutor posited two potential motives 

for the shootings—defendant's anger at Charles and his companions 

for the assault on Syra Drones (with whom he had been sexually 

involved), and his displeasure with Charles's group for selling 

marijuana on defendant's territory. The prosecutor then argued that 

for either of these reasons the shooters not only intended to kill 

Charles, but after shooting him “they turn [their] guns and shoot at 

the other kids that are there,” which is a direct 

 

8

 [Fn. 3 in original excerpted text]. Stone went on to explain, “[H]owever, ... if a person targets 

one particular person, under some facts a jury could find the person also, concurrently, intended 

to kill—and thus was guilty of attempted murder of—other, nontargeted persons. [In] Ford v. 

State (1993) 330 Md. 682, we explained that ‘the fact the person desires to kill a particular target 

does not preclude finding that the person also, concurrently, intended to kill others within what 

[the Ford court] termed the “kill zone.”’ For example, if a person placed a bomb on a commercial 

airplane intending to kill a primary target, but also ensuring the death of all the passengers, the 

person could be convicted of the attempted murder of all the passengers, and not only the primary 

target. Likewise, in [People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 313], ‘[e]ven if the jury found that 

defendant primarily wanted to kill [a driver] rather than [the] passengers, it could reasonably also 

have found a concurrent intent to kill those passengers when defendant and his cohort fired a 

flurry of bullets at the fleeing car and thereby created a kill zone. Such a finding fully supports 

attempted murder convictions as to the passengers.’” (People v. Stone, supra, 46 Cal. 4th at p. 

137, original italics.). 

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attempt to kill theory.9 The jury was instructed pursuant to 

CALCRIM No. 600, on both theories of attempted murder.10 

The evidence is sufficient that the shooters were specifically 

attempting to kill Charles, Donnell, Sidney, and Jonathan. After 

having shot Charles five to six times at close range, a clear 

indication of their intent to kill him, the shooters then turned their 

fire and shot at least 11 to 12 more times in the direction Donnell, 

Sidney, and Jonathan were running. The 17 expended casings 

found at the scene and the trio of victims hearing the bullets striking 

the metal gate as they ran adequately established the shooters' intent 

to kill each victim. Consequently, we conclude the evidence is 

sufficient to support attempted murder convictions in counts two, 

three, and four on the theory of a specific intent to kill each victim. 

Our conclusion renders it unnecessary for us to address defendant's 

contention the evidence is insufficient to support the attempted 

murders in counts two, three, and four on a kill zone theory. (See 

People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal. 4th 1116, 1129 [“If the inadequacy 

of proof is purely factual, of a kind the jury is fully equipped to 

detect, reversal is not required whenever a valid ground for the 

 

9

 [Fn. 4 in original excerpted text]. The prosecutor also argued that it did not matter whether the 

shooters intended to kill any specific companion of Charles's who were grouped nearby if the 

evidence showed that the shooters, or anyone of them, fired several shots into the group, which 

was a kill zone theory. 

10 [Fn. 5 in original excerpted text]. The court instructed the jury on attempted murder pursuant 

CALCRIM No. 600: 

“The defendant is charged in Counts 1–4 with attempted murder. To prove that 

the defendant is guilty of attempted murder, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The 

defendant took direct but ineffective steps toward killing another person; and [¶] 2. 

The defendant intended to kill that person. [¶] A direct step requires more than 

merely planning or preparing to commit murder or obtaining or arranging for 

something needed to commit murder. A direct step is one that goes beyond 

planning or preparation and shows that a person is putting his or her plan into 

action. A direct step indicates a definite and unambiguous intent to kill. It is a 

direct movement toward the commission of the crime after preparations are made. 

It is an immediate step that puts the plan in motion so that the plan would have 

been completed if some circumstance outside the plan had not interrupted the 

attempt. [¶] A person may intend to kill a specific victim or victims and at the 

same time intend to kill everyone in a particular zone of harm or ‘kill zone.’ In 

order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of a charged victim, the 

People must prove that the defendant not only intended to kill the charged victim 

but also either intended to kill the charged victim, or intended to kill everyone 

within the kill zone. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant 

intended to kill the charged victim or intended to kill the charged victim by killing 

everyone in the kill zone, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the 

attempted murder of the charged victim.” (Original italics.) 

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verdict remains, absent an affirmative indication in the record that 

the verdict did not rest on the inadequate ground”].) 

Lodged Doc. 4 at 2-3. 

D. Objective Reasonableness Under § 2254(d) 

The California Court of Appeal applied the correct standard of review to petitioner’s 

sufficiency of the evidence claim and did so reasonably. Although the court did not cite federal 

authority in its analysis, the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction is the same under California and federal law. See People v. Coffman, 34 Cal. 4th 1, 

87, as modified (Oct. 27, 2004). Specifically, the court found that the evidence, viewed in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find petitioner 

guilty of the attempted murder of Sidney, Donnell, and Jonathan (counts two through four). 

 Under California law, attempted murder requires the intent to kill and the commission of a 

direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing that goal. People v. Stone, 46 Cal. 4th 131, 136 

(2009). The “intent” element usually requires an examination of the defendant’s mental state for 

the specific intent to kill the alleged victim. Id. at 136-37. However, as the California Court of 

Appeal explained, a jury may also infer “concurrent intent” under a “kill zone” theory of 

attempted murder. Id. at 137. 

The court reasonably found sufficient evidence to support a “direct kill” (or direct intent) 

theory of attempted murder and therefore did not need to reach the sufficiency of the evidence on 

a “kill zone” theory. As found by the court, the physical and testimonial evidence, viewed in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, provided a rational basis for the jury to find that petitioner 

intended to kill victims Sidney, Donnell, and Jonathan. The number of bullets fired after Charles 

was shot, in combination with petitioner’s possible motives and the victims’ testimony that they 

heard metal strike the gate behind them as they ran, is enough for a rational jury to conclude that 

petitioner harbored the requisite intent. The prosecution presented evidence of two different 

possible motives for petitioner’s direct intent to kill the three victims, and it is for the jury to 

weigh those theories against any evidence that petitioner was an “outsider” without a motive, or 

that the “kill zone” theory was “exaggerated.” See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Concluding that the 

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evidence was sufficient to support petitioner’s attempted murder convictions in counts two, three, 

and four on the theory of a specific intent to kill each victim, it was unnecessary for the court of 

appeal to reach petitioner’s alternate challenge to the evidence under the “kill zone” theory.11 

Petitioner asks this court to revisit the credibility of the witnesses and make its own 

determination of the evidence. This is beyond the scope of this court’s authority. See Schlup, 

513 U.S. at 330; see also United States v. Kranovich, 401 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(credibility of witnesses falls within the exclusive province of the jury and may not be revisited 

by reviewing court). Petitioner’s argument that alternate conclusions could be drawn from the 

evidence is without consequence. A mere possibility of a different conclusion does not render the 

court’s analysis unreasonable. See Long v. Johnson, 736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(“Although the evidence presented at trial could yield an alternative inference, we ‘must respect 

the exclusive province of the [jury] to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary 

conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts.’” (internal citations omitted)). 

Petitioner’s further arguments challenge the evidence establishing that he was one of the 

shooters. See ECF No. 21 at 15-18. In support of this contention, petitioner notes that victims 

Sidney, Donnell, and Jonathan did not identify him in court, that Donnell testified that he lied to 

police when he identified petitioner as one of the shooters, and that none of the bullet casings 

found at the scene contained fingerprints and none were linked to any weapon belonging to 

petitioner. Id. However, the California Court of Appeal was not objectively unreasonable in 

finding that a rational jury could have reached the conclusion that petitioner was guilty of counts 

two through four even in light of these facts. As discussed further below in addressing 

petitioner’s second claim, at trial both Charles Walker and Devon Washington identified 

petitioner as the shooter. 1RT 96-97, 1 RT 200-201. Jason Lyle testified that after he heard the 

gunshots, he observed petitioner wearing gloves and holding a gun. 3 RT 611-612. It was for the 

jury to weigh and resolve conflicts in the testimony and to draw reasonable inferences from the 

 

11 The California Court of Appeal noted that the trial court gave the jury instruction CALCRIM 

No. 600, which includes both theories of attempted murder. CALCRIM No. 600 states: “...the 

People must prove that the defendant not only intended to kill the charged victim but also either 

intended to kill the charged victim, or intended to kill everyone within the kill zone.” 

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evidence. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Viewing the evidence as a whole in the light most favorable 

to the verdict, McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1994), the court’s determination 

that the identification evidence was sufficient was not unreasonable. 

The California Court of Appeal’s determination that the evidence was sufficient for a 

rational jury to find the requisite intent for a conviction for attempted murder on counts two 

through four was an objectively reasonable application of clearly established law, based on a 

reasonable construction of the evidence. Accordingly, Section 2254(d) bars relief. 

II. Claim Two: Impermissibly Suggestive Photographic Line-Up 

A. Petitioner’s Allegations and Pertinent State Court Record 

Petitioner claims his due process right to a fair trial was violated by the admission of 

identifications based on an impermissibly suggestive photographic line-up. ECF No. 1 at 4, ECF 

No. 21 at 18. Petitioner alleges that the appearances of the “fillers” for the photographic line-up 

caused him to “unduly stand out.” ECF No. 21 at 23. Petitioner also asserts various pretrial 

identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive. See ECF No. 21 at 22-23. Petitioner 

does not discuss the reliability of the in-court identifications, instead limiting his argument to the 

allegedly impermissible suggestibility of the photographic line-up. 

At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the photographic line up was 

not impermissibly suggestive. 1 RT 44. The line-up consisted of six photographs, commonly 

called a “six pack” in police parlance. 1 RT 18-26. Petitioner, featured in picture three, was 

described as a black male, five feet six inches tall, weighing 160 pounds, with his hair in corn row 

braids. 1 RT 18. Kevin Howland, a former Sacramento County police officer with experience 

creating photographic line-ups, testified on behalf of petitioner that the “most steadfast rule” in 

designing photographic line-ups is to make sure the suspect does not “unduly stand out.” 1 RT 6. 

Mr. Howland testified that in his opinion there were “numerous problems” with the six-pack lineup shown to victims in this case. 1 RT 20. For example, while petitioner is a black male, the man 

in picture number one was a “very, very light-skinned Hispanic male.” 1 RT 21. And while 

petitioner had corn row braids and was described by some witnesses as having dreadlocks, the 

men in pictures number four and five both had very short hair. 1 RT 23-24. According to Mr. 

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Howland, the different appearances of these fillers transformed the “six pack” into a “three pack.” 

1 RT 25. 

The court found that whatever shortcomings the six-person line-up presented were issues 

to be considered by the jury, not issues preventing the line-up’s admissibility. 1 RT 43-45; 1 CT 

260-261.12 The court noted that defense counsel only challenged the appearance of the line-up, 

not its administration. 1 RT 39. 

During the trial, petitioner was identified in court as the shooter by victim Charles Walker 

and witness Devon Washington. 1RT 96-97, 1 RT 200-201. Charles testified he knew petitioner 

prior to the shooting because he met him in his aunt’s apartment, had seen him “a couple times in 

the neighborhood,” and bought marijuana from him in the past. 1 RT 111, 97, 108. Devon also 

knew petitioner for roughly a year prior to the shooting because he purchased marijuana from 

him. 1 RT 200-201. Jason Lyle testified that he was at the Azure Park Apartments the night of 

the shooting to buy marijuana from petitioner. 3 RT 608-609. Although he did not witness the 

shooting, he testified that after he bought the marijuana, petitioner left and Lyle then heard 

gunshots. 3 RT 611. Minutes later, petitioner returned, wearing gloves and holding a gun. 3 RT 

612. Mr. Howland also testified for the jury on his opinion regarding the line-up’s shortcomings, 

repeating much of his pretrial testimony. 4 RT 966. The jury was given standard jury 

instructions regarding witness identifications and how to evaluate them. 4 RT 1015-1016, 1020-

1024; 2 CT 321-322, 323-324. 

B. The Clearly Established Federal Law 

An identification based on a photographic line-up violates a defendant’s due process 

rights when “the identification procedure [is] so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 

384 (1968). An unduly suggestive line-up alone does not necessarily violate due process; it is the 

likelihood of misidentification, under the “totality of the circumstances,” that constitutes a 

violation. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1972). A line-up only violates due process if it 

 

12 “CT” refers to the Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal, Volume One (“1 CT”) and Volume Two (“2 

CT”). 

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is both impermissibly suggestive, and the resulting identification lacks reliability. Manson v. 

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106, 114 (1977). 

To determine the reliability of identification testimony, courts must examine the totality of 

the circumstances. Id. at 114. Among the factors to consider are: 1) the witness’ opportunity to 

view the criminal at the scene of the crime, 2) the witness’ degree of attention, 3) the accuracy of 

the witness’ prior description of the criminal, 4) the witness’ level of certainty at the pretrial 

identification, and 5) the time between the crime and the pretrial identification. Biggers, 409 U.S. 

at 199-200. 

C. The State Court’s Ruling 

Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. The California Court of Appeal ruled as 

follows: 

Defendant contends reversal of all counts is necessary because his 

due process right to a fair trial was abridged when the trial court 

denied his motion to exclude his in-court and photo lineup 

identifications, which were shown to the witnesses, as 

impermissibly suggestive. We find the motion was properly 

denied. 

“[A]n eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial 

identification from a photo lineup is not precluded unless the 

photographic identification procedure is so impermissibly 

suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of 

misidentification.” (People v. Ingle, (1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 505, 

511–512.) 

Assuming for the sake of argument that the photo lineup used 

herein was suggestive, there was no substantial likelihood that the 

suggestiveness gave rise to defendant's having been misidentified as 

one of the shooters. Charles Charles [sic] had personally met 

defendant at his aunt’s apartment at the Azure Apartments, he was 

familiar with defendant as a seller of marijuana at the apartment 

complex, and he was within a few feet of defendant when defendant 

shot him. 

Devon Washington knew defendant because he had purchased 

marijuana from him. Washington was just across the street from 

where the shooting took place and he recognized defendant when 

the muzzle flashes produced by the multiple shots that were fired 

illuminated defendant's face. 

Although Donnell did not, or would not, identify defendant in 

court, in an audio-video recording he told Detective Stewart that it 

was defendant who did the shooting and described defendant as 

wearing a black hoodie and gloves. 

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Just before the shooting, Jason Lyle (who knew defendant) had 

driven to the Azure Apartments to buy marijuana from him. As 

Lyle got out of his car defendant walked over and sold Lyle some 

marijuana. Lyle thought defendant was wearing “maybe darkcolored clothing.” Defendant told Lyle to “hold on real quick” and 

left. A few minutes later, as Lyle waited, he heard gunshots. 

Defendant returned along with a man in a wheelchair. Defendant 

was wearing gloves and carrying a gun. Defendant and his 

companion got into Lyle's car, and defendant said, “Let's go.” 

When Lyle did not respond, defendant and his companion got out 

of the car and left. 

Given the foregoing, overwhelming evidence, there is no 

substantial likelihood that any suggestiveness in the photo lineup 

gave rise to a substantial likelihood of mistaken identity of the incourt identifications. 

Lodged Doc. 4 at 3. 

D. Objective Reasonableness Under § 2254(d) 

The California Court of Appeal applied the correct standard of review and did so 

reasonably. The court reasoned that even assuming, arguendo, that the photographic line-up was 

impermissibly suggestive, it did not result in an unreliable identification of petitioner at trial. In 

support of its conclusion, the court emphasized that both Charles Walker and Devon Washington, 

who identified petitioner in court as the shooter, personally knew petitioner prior to the shooting; 

that Charles was only a few feet away from the shooter; and that Devon was across the street at 

the time of the shooting and saw the shooter’s face illuminated by the muzzle flashes. These 

factors touch on the witness’s opportunity to observe the suspect at the scene of the crime, and the 

fact that both Charles Walker and Devon Washington knew petitioner weighs against the 

possibility of an “irreparable misidentification.” See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 

n.33 (1967) (factors such as how well the witness knows the suspect “have an important bearing 

upon the true basis of the witness’ in-court identification.”). In addition, although not mentioned 

by the California Court of Appeal, the day after the shooting Devon Washington told the building 

manager he was “100 percent” sure he saw petitioner commit the shooting, later telling police his 

level of certainty was 65 percent. 2 RT 394; 3 RT 845. Other factors weigh against reliability: 

the scene of the crime was dark due to the lack of illuminating street lights, 1 RT 184; the day 

after the shooting, while still in the hospital, Charles identified two different photographs in the 

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line-up, neither of whom was petitioner, 3 RT 849; when Charles did identify petitioner, it was 

more than two months after the shooting, 3 RT 854; and Devon stated petitioner was wearing a 

black hooded sweatshirt during the shooting, 1 RT 205. 

A court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine the reliability of 

identification testimony. United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 1980). The court 

must then weigh the factors of reliability against the “corrupting effect of the suggestive pretrial 

identification procedure.” United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 

Manson, 432 U.S. at 114). Here, even though the California Court of Appeal did not expressly 

examine each factor outlined in Biggers, its conclusion -- that there was “no substantial likelihood 

that any suggestiveness in the photo lineup gave rise to a substantial likelihood of mistaken 

identity of the in-court identifications,” Lodged Doc. 4 at 3 -- is not objectively unreasonable 

given the totality of the circumstances and the evidence presented at trial, particularly the fact that 

Devon and Charles knew petitioner prior to the shooting. The court’s conclusion is further 

supported by the fact that Mr. Howland was able to testify about the potential risks of the 

photograph line-up. See Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384 (the danger of misidentification “may be 

substantially lessened by...expos[ing] to the jury the method's potential for error.”). Further, 

petitioner offers no argument that the in-court identifications were unreliable under the standards 

set forth in Manson and Biggers. 

The court of appeal’s determination that there was no substantial likelihood of 

misidentification was an objectively reasonable application of clearly established law, based on a 

reasonable interpretation of the evidence. Accordingly, Section 2254(d) bars relief. 

III. Claim Three: Failure to Instruct the Jury on the Lesser Charge of Attempted 

Voluntary Manslaughter 

A. Petitioner’s Allegations and Pertinent State Court Record 

Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser 

included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter violated his due process rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 1 at 5, ECF No. 21 at 27. Petitioner asserts that evidence at 

trial supported either a “heat of passion” or “imperfect self-defense” theory of attempted 

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voluntary manslaughter. ECF No. 21 at 28-29. Petitioner, citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 

684 (1975), argues that the failure to instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter relieved the 

prosecution of its “burden of persuasion on [the] essential element of malice.” Id. at 30. 

In California, an attempted murder charge may be reduced to attempted voluntary 

manslaughter when a “defendant acts upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion on sufficient 

provocation, or kills in the unreasonable, but good faith, belief that deadly force is necessary in 

self-defense.” People v. Lee, 20 Cal. 4th 47, 59 (1999) (citations omitted). In both instances, the 

malice usually required for manslaughter is presumptively absent. Id. The jury instruction for 

“heat of passion” requires that the defendant acted under provocation that is neither “slight” nor 

“remote” and must be judged according to how a “person of average disposition” would react in 

the same situation. See CALCRIM 603.13 “Imperfect self-defense” requires that a defendant 

acted in the belief that he was in immediate danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury 

and that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend himself, but at least one of 

these beliefs was unreasonable. See CALCRIM 604. Per this instruction, “belief in future harm 

is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be.” Id. 

The main defense strategy at trial was that petitioner was not the shooter. Defense 

counsel sought to establish reasonable doubt by pointing to the lack of physical evidence linking 

petitioner to the scene, 4 RT 1079, by questioning the reliability of the witnesses, 4 RT 1080-

1081, and by suggesting petitioner had an alibi during the time of the shooting, 4 RT 1078. 

During the trial, petitioner did not take the stand and the only evidence of his state of mind the 

night of the shooting was introduced through Syra Drones’s testimony. See 2 RT 572 (petitioner 

allegedly told Ms. Drones “to shut up, calm down and quit lying” after she was assaulted by one 

of the victims). 

To establish possible motives, the prosecution introduced evidence that petitioner may 

have been angered when one of the victims assaulted Ms. Drones, 3 RT 759, and that Ms. Drones 

told petitioner that the victims were planning to rob him sometime in the future, 2 RT 565. 

 

13 CALCRIM refers to the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions. 

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Petitioner now cites this evidence in support of his claim that there was sufficient evidence to 

support a “heat of passion” or “imperfect self-defense” jury instruction. ECF No. 12 at 28-29. 

However, the defense did not request a jury instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter and 

never referred to a possible “heat of passion” or self-defense theory. Although defense counsel 

requested jury instructions on a lesser-related offense of assault with a firearm (California Penal 

Code § 245 (a)(2)), 4 RT 1006, the trial court denied the request and instructed the jury on 

attempted murder according to CALCRIM No. 600,14 in addition to other standard jury 

instructions, see 4 RT 1006-1007; 2 CT 319-331. The defense did not object to the attempted 

murder instruction. 4 RT 1006. 

B. The Clearly Established Federal Law 

There is no clearly established federal law requiring that a state trial court instruct a jury 

on a lesser included offense in a non-capital case. It is clearly established that a defendant in a 

capital case has a constitutional right to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense if there was 

evidence to support the instruction. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). The Supreme Court, 

however, expressly declined to decide whether this right extends to defendants charged with noncapital offenses. Id. at 638 n.14. Since Beck, the Supreme Court has not addressed the question, 

and the Ninth Circuit has held that “the failure of a state court to instruct on a lesser offense [in a 

non-capital case] fails to present a federal constitutional question and will not be considered in a 

federal habeas corpus proceeding.” Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (per 

curiam).15 

 

14 See footnote 10, supra, for text of CALCRIM 600. 

15 Prior to the passage of the AEDPA, the Ninth Circuit left open the possibility of relief when a 

state court denies a lesser included offense instruction when it clearly constitutes a theory of the 

defense. In Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit held that a 

trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense may interfere with due process 

rights when “the criminal defendant is...entitled to adequate instructions on his or her theory of 

defense.” Id. However, in Bashor, the court found no fundamental unfairness because the 

defendant did not request the lesser included offense instruction, and the instruction was 

inconsistent with the defense strategy. Id. Moreover, “circuit precedent does not constitute 

‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’...[and] therefore cannot 

form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.” Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012). 

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Errors in instructing the jury can only support federal habeas relief if they “so infect[] the 

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

71 (1991). Allegedly erroneous instructions “must be considered in the context of the instructions 

as a whole and the trial record.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Additionally, “it is the rare case in 

which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has 

been made in the trial court.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). In challenging the 

failure to give an instruction, a habeas petitioner faces an “especially heavy” burden because 

“[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of 

the law.” Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155. 

C. The State Court’s Ruling 

Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. The California Court of Appeal ruled as 

follows: 

Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error when 

it failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the included offense of 

attempted voluntary manslaughter based upon heat of passion. We 

disagree. 

“Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder. 

One form of the offense is defined as the unlawful killing of a 

human being without malice aforethought ‘upon a sudden quarrel or 

heat of passion.’ (§ 192, subd. (a).) ‘The heat of passion 

requirement for manslaughter has both an objective and a subjective 

component. The defendant must actually, subjectively, kill under 

the heat of passion. But the circumstances giving rise to the heat of 

passion are also viewed objectively. As we explained long ago in 

interpreting the same language of section 192, ‘this heat of passion 

must be such passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of 

an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and 

circumstances....’” (People v. Cole, (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 1158, 1215–

1216.) 

Defendant argues that Donnell's assault on Drones about which she 

immediately told him, angered defendant and he left the apartment 

within minutes of her telling him. Additionally, Drones testified 

she had been assaulted by Donnell because she purportedly told 

defendant that “these guys were going to rob him.” 

The argument is unpersuasive. A reasonable person, upon hearing 

that his girlfriend has been slapped or punched, does not arm 

himself with a firearm, find a companion who is similarly armed, 

and seek out and attempt to kill the assailant and those associated 

with him. And even assuming, at some undisclosed point in the 

past, Drones told defendant that Charles and his companions were 

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planning on robbing him, a lethal preemptive strike against them is 

not a legal or reasonable response. Simply put, there was no 

evidentiary basis for a heat of passion instruction, and hence there 

was no error in not giving one. “It is error to give an instruction 

which, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application 

to the facts of the case.” (People v. Guiton, supra, 4 Cal. 4th at p. 

1129.) Because the evidence was insufficient to give rise to a 

reasonable heat of passion instruction, there was no basis for the 

giving of an instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter and 

the court cannot be faulted for not giving such an instruction. 

Lodged Doc. 4 at 3-4. 

D. Objective Reasonableness Under § 2254(d) 

First, to the extent petitioner’s claim relies on state law, see ECF No. 21 at 28, his claim is 

not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (in conducting federal 

habeas review, federal courts may not “reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions”). The right to a lesser included offense instruction turns on state law. See People v. 

Breverman, 19 Cal. 4th 142, 165 (1998) (the right to a sua sponte instruction on lesser included 

offenses arises exclusively from state law). Therefore, even if the trial and appellate courts erred, 

petitioner could not prevail because errors of state law are not reviewable in a Section 2254 

proceeding. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. 

Second, the California Court of Appeal’s analysis cannot be considered objectively 

unreasonable because the Supreme Court has not clearly established any constitutional right to a 

lesser included offense in a non-capital case. Where the Supreme Court has not clearly 

established the right asserted, Section 2254(d) precludes relief. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 

70, 77 (2006). It has long been established in the Ninth Circuit that the failure of a state court to 

instruct on a lesser included offense does not present a federal constitutional question and 

therefore cannot provide a basis for habeas relief. Solis, 219 F.3d at 929; see also Tolbert v. 

Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding application of Beck to non-capital cases is barred by 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). 

 Third, even if clearly established federal law entitled a state criminal defendant to 

instructions on his or her theory of defense, as suggested by the Ninth Circuit, petitioner is not 

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entitled to relief. Like the defendant in Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1984),16

petitioner did not request an instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter and the trial record 

does not suggest either a “heat of passion” or “imperfect self-defense” strategy. The defense 

pursued an all-or-nothing strategy, maintaining that petitioner was not the shooter and attacking 

the credibility of the witness identifications and testimony. A review of the record reveals no 

mention of either ground for attempted voluntary manslaughter. The failure of the trial court to 

sua sponte instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter under either theory cannot be considered 

a violation of the petitioner’s right to present a defense. 

 For the same reason, petitioner’s reliance on Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, is misplaced. 

Due process requires the prosecution to prove the absence of heat of passion “when the issue is 

properly presented.” Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704. In Mullaney, the defendant claimed he attacked 

the victim in a heat of passion. Id. at 685. Here, petitioner did not present evidence of either 

“heat of passion” or “imperfect self-defense,” and thus the prosecution was not required to prove 

their absence. 

Finally, petitioner has not met the high burden of proving that the failure to give the lesser 

included instructions “so infected the entire trial” as to deprive him of his federal due process 

rights. As found by the California Court of Appeal, the record reveals no evidentiary basis that 

would support either instruction. Further, “a state trial court’s finding that the evidence does not 

support a claim of imperfect self-defense is entitled to a presumption of correctness on federal 

habeas review.” Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner has not 

provided evidence to rebut that presumption. 

For these several reasons, petitioner’s challenge to the trial court’s failure to instruct sua 

sponte on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter cannot support habeas 

relief. 

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16 See footnote 15, supra. 

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IV. Claim Four: Prosecutorial Misconduct 

A. Petitioner’s Allegations and Pertinent State Court Record 

Petitioner claims the prosecutor made certain statements during his closing argument that 

violated his due process right to a fair trial. ECF No. 1 at 5, ECF No. 21 at 31. Petitioner asserts 

the prosecutor “made comments that were an emotional appeal to societal pressure that contained 

facts not supported by the record.” ECF No. 21 at 31. Additionally, petitioner argues that the 

prosecutor “suggested that witnesses had risked their lives by coming to testify, a fact not 

supported by any evidence implying [p]etitioner had threatened or posed a threat to those 

witnesses,” an implication that gave witnesses “unwarranted credibility.” ECF No. 21 at 31. 

During his closing argument, the prosecutor invited the jury to use common sense in 

evaluating the evidence. 4 RT 1124-1125. To illustrate how the jurors should go about this, he 

suggested they imagine themselves sitting in a coffee shop, explaining the case to a friend. 4 RT 

1123. Petitioner challenges the following portion of the prosecutor’s argument: 

“[Prosecutor]: You can tell your friend about all the motivations, 

all the witnesses. At the end your friend will say, what was your 

decision? What did you do? 

You can sit there and say, we acquitted him, we found him not 

guilty. Your friend will look at you sort of cross-eyed and say, well, 

you just told me about all this evidence, and talked to me about 

witnesses and explained why they were lying and the fact they could 

be killed if they identified someone and, yet, some came in and 

testified despite all of that.

The reason I tell this story is, when you are sitting down in a coffee 

shop explaining to a friend and you are using your common sense 

and laying out the picture the way you think about things and the 

way things interrelate. Don't change simply because you are a juror 

now. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I will object. It is improper. 

THE COURT: Overruled. 

[PROSECUTOR]: Your common sense that you apply in a coffee 

shop in terms of why would he have a motive to do this? This 

timing works out. All of those things apply equally here. Don't 

think differently in terms of applying your common sense just 

because you are a juror.” 

Lodged Doc. 1 at 58-59. (Italics added by petitioner.) 

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Respondent contends that petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is defaulted because 

the California Court of Appeal rejected it on procedural grounds, finding that defense counsel’s 

objection did not satisfy California’s “contemporaneous objection” rule. ECF No. 13 at 24. 

Respondent contends, alternately, that the court properly rejected petitioner’s claim on the merits. 

In response petitioner argues, for the first time, that his trial attorney’s failure to properly object 

constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewable under the standards of Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). ECF No. 21 at 32. 

B. The Clearly Established Federal Law 

A prosecutor’s improper statements violate the Constitution only where they “so infect[] 

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 

(1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is not enough that the remarks were “undesirable or 

even universally condemned.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. Fundamental fairness must be assessed 

in context of the trial as a whole, including the weight of the evidence, the defense opportunity to 

respond, and the instructions given to the jury. Id. at 181-82. 

C. The State Court’s Ruling 

Petitioner raised his prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct appeal. After recounting the 

pertinent trial court record, the California Court of Appeal ruled as follows: 

First, “‘[a]s a general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal 

of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the 

same ground—the defendant made an assignment of misconduct 

and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the 

impropriety.’” (People v. Hill, (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 800, 820.) 

Defense counsel's interjection, “I will object. It is improper,” falls 

far short of specifying any ground for the objection. Indeed, every 

objection is based upon something that the objector deems 

improper, otherwise there would be no basis whatsoever for the 

objection. Because the objection that whatever is being challenged 

is “improper” fails to specify any basis for the objection, the issue is 

forfeited for appeal. 

Second, even if the objection were not forfeited, we would find it 

meritless as it is argued by defendant. Noting that “[a] warning of 

probable consequences of failure to convict, and of the unfavorable 

reactions of neighbors is improper” (People v. Purvis, (1963) 60 

Cal. 2d 323, 342), defendant argues “the prosecutor's comment was 

a clear suggestion that the jury should consider the reaction from 

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their friends” in determining defendant's guilt. 

Contrary to defendant's interpretation of the prosecutor's comment, 

the comment was an attempt to explain to the jurors that they 

should use their common sense in determining the facts and the 

inferences to be drawn therefrom. Indeed, the prosecutor expressly 

disavowed defendant's interpretation of his argument when, prior to 

making the challenged argument, he told the jury: “I do not tell this 

story or give this analogy to make you think that you should worry 

about what your neighbor thinks about your decision or ultimately 

what you decide to do in this case....” Moreover, the court 

instructed the jury: “You must decide what the facts are. It is up to 

all of you, and you alone, to decide what happened, based only on 

the evidence that has been presented to you in this trial. [¶] Do not 

let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your 

decision.” (Italics added.) 

Defendant offers no reason to believe the jurors did not heed the 

admonitions and instructions. (See People v. Sanchez, (2001) 26 

Cal. 4th 834, 852 [in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 

appellate court presumes the jury understood and followed the 

court's instructions].) Consequently, defendant's contention is 

rejected. 

Lodge Doc. 4 at 4-5. 

D. Procedural Default 

As a general rule, “[a] federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a state 

court ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the 

federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” Walker v. Martin, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127 

(2011) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 55 (2009)); Calderon v. United States District 

Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

729 (1991)). The fact that the state court alternatively ruled on the merits does not erase the 

effect of a procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989). 

Procedural default is an affirmative defense and the burden of proving the adequacy of a 

state procedural bar rests with the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 

2003). To qualify as adequate, the rule must be well established and consistently applied. 

Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1128; Beard, 558 U.S. at 59; Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 

(9th Cir. 2011); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 575, 577 (9th Cir. 1999). A state procedural rule is 

“consistently applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in the ‘vast majority of 

cases.’” Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 1994). “Once the state has adequately pled 

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the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, 

the burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner.” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

“Under Section 353 of the California Evidence Code, also known as the 

‘contemporaneous objection rule,’ evidence is admissible unless there is an objection, the grounds 

for the objection are clearly expressed, and the objection is made at the time the evidence is 

introduced.” Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the rule, California 

courts construe broadly the sufficiency of objections that preserve issues for appellate review, 

focusing on whether the trial court had a reasonable opportunity to rule on the merits of the 

objection. Id. It has been the law of the Ninth Circuit for thirty-five years that California’s 

“contemporaneous objection” rule is both independent and, at least where a party has failed to 

make any objection at all, adequate to support default. Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 377 

(9th Cir. 1981). The rule will also act as a procedural bar when the objection at trial was not 

specific to the constitutional violation now claimed. See Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 654 

(9th Cir. 2004) (finding the petitioner’s constitutional claim procedurally barred because he 

“raised only an evidentiary, not a constitutional, objection at trial.”). 

Here, respondent argues the “contemporaneous objection” rule is adequate by citing to 

cases where parties failed to make a timely objection.17 ECF No. 13 at 24. These cases are 

distinguishable from the case at hand, where petitioner’s counsel did object to the prosecutor’s 

statements and the trial court overruled the objection. Nevertheless, in his traverse, petitioner 

fails to address whether California’s “contemporaneous objection” rule is an adequate procedural 

bar under these circumstances. Because he fails to address the adequacy of the rule, petitioner’s 

claim is procedurally barred unless he can show either: (1) cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law; or (2) that failure to consider the 

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 

 

17 Respondent cites Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying procedural 

default where defense counsel did not contemporaneously object to a jury instruction); and 

Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding the “contemporaneous 

objection” rule adequate where defense counsel failed to contemporaneously object to the trial 

court’s denial of half the defendant’s statutory allotment of peremptory challenges). 

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451 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50. 

E. Cause and Prejudice 

“Cause” for procedural default “must be something external to the petitioner, something 

that cannot fairly be attributed to him.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. Trial counsel’s “ignorance or 

inadvertence” cannot constitute “cause” under this rule “because the attorney is the petitioner’s 

agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation.” Id. (citing Murray v. Carrier, 

477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). However, ineffective assistance of counsel can, if pleaded and 

proved, establish cause for default. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488 (1986). Counsel must be 

constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). Id. But, “an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause for the 

procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted.” Edwards, 529 U.S. at 

453. 

To establish “prejudice” the “habeas petitioner must show ‘not merely that the errors 

at...trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Carrier, 477 U.S. 

at 494 (omission and emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 

(1982)). “Prejudice [to excuse a procedural default] is actual harm resulting from the alleged 

error.” Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 

F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

Petitioner does not offer any evidence that he suffered actual prejudice, apart from the 

general allegation that the prosecutor’s statements “impacted petitioner’s due process right to a 

fair trial.” ECF No. 21 at 31. It is therefore unnecessary to address his unexhausted claim of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 168 (if the petitioner cannot 

demonstrate either “cause” or “prejudice,” it is unnecessary for the court to address the other 

requirement). Consequently, petitioner has failed to overcome the procedural bar, as he has not 

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argued alternatively that this court’s failure to consider his prosecutorial misconduct claim will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.18 

F. Objective Reasonableness Under § 2254(d) 

Because petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is procedurally defaulted, discussion 

of the state court’s decision is unnecessary. However, the undersigned notes that even if the 

prosecutorial misconduct claim were not defaulted, petitioner could not succeed on the merits 

because the California Court of Appeal’s alternate ruling was objectively reasonable and not 

contrary to clearly established federal law.19 

In its alternate ruling, the state court determined that petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct 

claim was meritless because the prosecutor’s statements were reasonably interpreted as “an 

attempt to explain to the jurors that they should use their common sense.” Lodged Doc. 4 at 5. In 

rejecting petitioner’s contention of misconduct, the court cited the prosecutor’s prior statement 

expressly cautioning the jury not to “worry about what your neighbor thinks about your decision,” 

and the fact that the jury was instructed not to let public opinion influence their decision. Id. 

Juries are presumed to follow the instructions given by the court. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 

225, 234 (2000). Additionally, “arguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than 

do instructions from the court.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990). It is thus 

 

18 To show that a failure to consider the merits of a claim would result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must establish factual innocence. See Smith v. Murray, 477 

U.S. 527, 537 (1986); Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2007); Gandarela v. 

Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2002); Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 

(9th Cir. 2001). “This standard is not easy to meet,” Gandarela, 286 F.3d at 1086, and is “very 

narrow,” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992). A review of petitioner’s traverse shows 

one mention of actual innocence, in the section on claim three. ECF No. 21 at 24. However, it 

reads in its entirety: “the foregoing is not a concession or deviation as to [p]etitioner’s claim of 

innocence....” This statement, absent any showing that it is “more likely than not that no 

reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner in the light of the new evidence,” Paradis v. 

Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 396 (9th Cir. 1997), is insufficient to overcome the procedural bar. 

19 District courts retain the discretion to determine a petition on its merits, bypassing an asserted 

procedural defense, where the underlying claims are clearly not meritorious. See Franklin v. 

Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 

(1997)). To the extent if any that further proceedings regarding procedural default might 

otherwise be appropriate, the undersigned would decline to pursue them in light of the analysis 

above. 

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appropriate to presume the jury heeded the trial court’s repeated admonitions to consider only the 

evidence, not public opinion. Further, defense counsel did in fact object, although in a very 

general manner, alerting the jury that he found the prosecutor’s statements “improper.” 4 RT 

1125. Given these considerations, in the context of the trial as a whole, the court reasonably 

determined that there was no fundamental unfairness. 

In its decision, the California Court of Appeal did not reference petitioner’s allegation that 

the prosecutor’s statements were “aggravated by the suggestion that one or more witnesses had 

risked their lives by coming in to testify, a fact not supported by any evidence.” Lodged Doc. 1 at 

61. State courts are not required to address every argument made by a petitioner, however, and 

absent any indication to the contrary, the state court’s adjudication is presumed to be “on the 

merits.” See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85; see also Lee v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 726 

F.3d 1172, 1211 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding the state court was not required to discuss every fact 

and argument raised in a habeas petitioner because it made implicit factual findings in rejecting 

the petitioner’s claim). It is not unreasonable, in light of the trial record here, to reject 

characterization of the cited prosecutorial statements as misconduct. The trial transcript implies 

that the prosecutor was commenting on the potential consequences of “snitching” in the 

witnesses’ neighborhoods, an issue that was raised by witness testimony. See 4 RT 1037; 1 RT 

217-18. Therefore, these statements did not involve “facts outside the record,” as petitioner 

contends. See ECF No. 21 at 31. 

In sum, even if the prosecutorial conduct claim were not defaulted, the California Court of 

Appeal reasonably rejected petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor improperly referenced societal 

pressure during his closing argument. The prosecutor’s statement about explaining the case to a 

friend in a coffee shop may have been poorly worded. When considered in context, however, it 

did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to constitute a denial of due process. Accordingly, 

petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct cannot support habeas relief. 

CONCLUSION 

For all the reasons explained above, the state courts’ denial of petitioner’s claims was not 

objectively unreasonable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Even without reference to 

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AEDPA standards, petitioner has not established any violation of his constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be 

denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” If petitioner files objections, 

he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to 

which issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 9, 2016 

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