Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00216/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT W. VONHECK,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12-CV-216-MMA(DHB)

ORDER DENYING EMERGENCY

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER

[Doc. No. 13]

vs.

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC

REGISTRATION INC. et al.,

Defendant.

On May 2, 2012, Plaintiff Robert Vonheck filed an emergency motion for a temporary

restraining order, seeking to enjoin the sale of real property currently scheduled to take place on

May 4, 2012. The Court finds the motion suitable for decision without oral argument. S.D. Cal.

Civ. L. R. 7.1. Having fully considered Plaintiff’s emergency motion, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 17, 2011, Plaintiff initiated a state court action, alleging claims arising from the

alleged wrongful foreclosure of his home. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction pursuant to

California Code of Civil Procedure section 526 to enjoin the trustee sale of his home.

Also on June 17, 2011, the state court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction

on the basis that Plaintiff had “failed to establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits

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of his claims . . . .”1 [Tentative Rulings, Ex. F to Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in

Support of Motion to Dismiss (“RJN”), Doc. No. 10-3 at 36.]2

 On September 9, 2011, the state

court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of its June 17, 2011, order.

On December 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint after the state court

sustained Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. [See Second Amended

Complaint, Ex. H to RJN), Doc. No. 10-4; see also Minute Order, Exh. I to RJN, Doc. No. 10-5 at

3-4.]

On January 27, 2012, the state court sustained Defendants’ unopposed demurrer to the

second amended complaint. In a thorough order, the state court found that Plaintiff “once again

ha[d] failed to amend his complaint sufficiently to state a viable claim against these demurring

defendants.” [Minute Order, Ex. I to RJN, Doc. No. 10-5 at 6.]

On January 27, 2012–the same day the state court sustained Defendants’

demurrer–Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated the instant action. [Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiff’s

complaint included a request for immediate injunctive relief, which the Court denied as moot

based on Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants had wrongfully foreclosed on his property on

September 19, 2011. [Doc. No. 3.]

On February 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). [Doc. No. 4.] 

The FAC asserts the same eleven claims as, and appears nearly identical to, the second amended

complaint in the state action. In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have not yet foreclosed

on his property.

On April 12, 2012, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the FAC partly on the basis that

the instant action is barred by the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. [Doc.

1

 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), judicial notice may be taken of facts that are “not subject to

reasonable dispute” because they are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Applying Rule 201(b), federal courts routinely take judicial

notice of papers filed in state court and of state court orders. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 955 n.1 (9th Cir.

2010); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the documents filed in Plaintiff’s previous state court action.

2

 All citations to documents filed on the Court’s docket refer to the documents’ renumbered CM/ECF pages,

not to the documents’ native pagination.

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No. 10.]

On May 2, 2012, after 5:38 p.m., Plaintiff filed simultaneous motions for substitution of

attorney and for emergency temporary restraining order (“TRO”). The Court granted Plaintiff’s

motion for attorney substitution.3

II. DISCUSSION

The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo before a preliminary injunction hearing

may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed merely to prevent irreparable loss of rights

prior to judgment. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415

U.S. 423, 439 (1974) (noting that a TRO is restricted to its “underlying purpose of preserving the

status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no

longer”). As such, an applicant for a TRO is required to demonstrate “immediate and irreparable

injury, loss or damage.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b); see also Caribbean Marine Serv. Co., Inc. v.

Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

The standard for obtaining a temporary restraining order is generally the same as the

standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction. The party moving for a preliminary injunction

must show “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in

the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

Having reviewed the emergency motion, the first amended complaint in this action, the

nearly identical second amended complaint in the state court action, and the state court’s rulings

and orders, the Court finds Plaintiff has not established he is entitled to relief. Considering the

facts alleged in the FAC, it appears unlikely Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits at trial. Further,

while losing one’s primary residence constitutes irreparable harm, Hernandez v. Downey S&L

Ass’n, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21495, *26 (S.D. Cal. 2009), such irreparable harm cannot

completely displace a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits. Morever, the issuance of

3

 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s new counsel in this matter, Mr. Francisco Aldana, also represented Plaintiff

in the state action. [See Ex. H. to RJN, Doc. No. 10-4 at 1.]

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an unmeritorious TRO does not serve the public interest. Finally, the Court finds that the balance

of equities do not tip in Plaintiff’s favor.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s emergency motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 3, 2012

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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