Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02975/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02975-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGONALD D. PHILLIPS,

Petitioner,

 v.

JOE MCGRATH, Warden, 

Respondent. ____________________________

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No. C 04-2975 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION 

Petitioner Regonald D. Phillips, a state prisoner incarcerated

at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed this pro se petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the

execution of his sentence. After denying Respondent's motion to

dismiss the petition, the Court ordered Respondent to show cause

why the petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed an

answer to the petition and a memorandum of points and authorities

and exhibits in support thereof. Petitioner has filed a traverse

to the answer and exhibits in support thereof.

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the

Court DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on all

claims.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural Background

Petitioner was convicted of robbery and false imprisonment on

March 26, 1992. He was sentenced to twenty years and four months

in state prison. On appeal, the convictions were affirmed,

but the abstract of judgment was corrected to reflect a sentence of 

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1

 Respondent's answer re-alleges the following assertions:

(1) the petition is time-barred under the one-year statute of

limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions and (2) the petition

fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. These allegations have already been addressed in the

Court's Order Denying Motion to Dismiss dated August 24, 2005 (docket

no. 11).

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seventeen years and eight months. (Resp't Ex. A, Abstract of

Judgment - Prison Commitment.) Petitioner does not challenge the

validity of his underlying conviction or sentence. Rather, he

challenges the execution of his sentence, alleging that prison

officials have miscalculated his Earliest Possible Release Date

(EPRD) (docket no. 1). 

In an Order dated November 22, 2004, the Court liberally

construed Petitioner's federal claim as one "that state prison

officials have computed the time credits to which he is entitled

improperly, resulting in the miscalculation of his release date and

him being held beyond the expiration of his sentence" (docket no.

6). The Court directed Respondent to show cause why relief should

not be granted.

On December 12, 2004, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the

petition on the grounds that: (1) Petitioner had failed to exhaust

his state remedies; (2) the petition was barred by the statute of

limitations; and (3) the petition failed to allege sufficient facts

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (docket no. 7).1

On January 10, 2005, Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion

to dismiss (docket no. 10). On August 24, 2005, the Court denied

Respondent's motion to dismiss (docket no. 11). The Court found

that Petitioner stated cognizable claims for relief based on: 

(1) his allegations that he did not receive accurate

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2

 The record shows that the correct date Petitioner's appeal was

denied by the Director's level is May 17, 1996 and not May 15, 1996.

(Pet'r Ex. F, Director's Level Appeal Decision, log no. 95-5507, dated

May 17, 1996.)

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credits for a twenty-eight month period during which he

worked and during his periods of SHU confinement from

1992-1995, in 1996 and in 2001; (2) the facts addressed

by the Director's Level Review decisions issued on May

15, 1996,2

 February 21, 1997, and June 27, 2002; and

(3) the Computation Review Hearings of January 13, 1998,

and March 15, 2002, and any subsequent related

administrative appeals and State habeas petitions. 

(Aug. 24, 2005 Order at 6-7 [footnote added].) The Court ordered

Respondent to respond to the petition and requested Respondent's

"assistance in providing a clear and concise summary of the

relevant facts and calculations for all concerned." (Id. at 7.) 

On December 13, 2005, Respondent filed an answer (docket no. 18). 

On January 11, 2006, Petitioner filed a traverse to the answer

(docket no. 20).

II. Applicable Sections of the California Penal Code and 

Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations

A. California Penal Code § 2933

"It is the intent of the legislature that persons convicted of

a crime and sentenced to the state prison under [California Penal

Code] § 1170 serve the entire sentence imposed by the court, except

for a reduction in the time served in the custody of the Director

of Corrections for performance in work, training or education

programs established by the Director of Corrections." (Id.)

Pursuant to California Penal Code § 2933, inmates may participate

in qualifying work, training and educational programs for the

privilege of earning "worktime credit" against their sentences. 

Cal. Penal Code § 2933(a). "For every six months of full-time

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 While the CDCR was previously known as the California

Department of Corrections (CDC), the Court will refer to it as the

CDCR in addressing the merits of this petition.

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performance in a credit qualifying program, as designated by the

director, a prisoner shall be awarded worktime credit reduction

from his or her term of confinement of six months." Id. Every

prisoner who refuses to accept a full-time, credit-qualifying

assignment or who is denied the opportunity to earn worktime

credits pursuant to California Penal Code § 2932(a) shall be

awarded no worktime credit reduction. Id. Prisoners cannot

receive more than six months' credit reduction for any six-month

period. Id. With exceptions for the commission of certain

violations, inmates who commit disciplinary violations may forfeit

earned credits under California Penal Code § 2932 and may seek

restoration of credits pursuant to California Penal Code § 2933(c). 

This section provides that upon application and following

completion of the required time period free of disciplinary

offenses, an inmate's "forfeited credits eligible for restoration

under the regulations for disciplinary offenses . . . shall be

restored unless, at a hearing," it is determined that the inmate

refused or failed to perform in a credit-qualifying assignment, or

"extraordinary circumstances are present that require that credits

not be restored." Cal. Penal Code § 2933(c). Extraordinary

circumstances are defined in the regulations adopted by the

Director of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR).3

 Id. Although inmates may appeal the

findings through the CDCR review procedure, restoration of credit

shall be at the discretion of the director. Id.

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In essence, a qualifying inmate can earn one day of credit for

each day of service. Id. However, California Penal Code § 2933

provides that prisoners have no right to earn worktime credits. 

"Worktime credit is a privilege, not a right." Cal. Penal Code

§ 2933(b). Furthermore, California has not created a protected

liberty interest in earning credits pursuant to § 2933. See id.;

Kalka v. Vasquez, 867 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir. 1989) ("§ 2933 does

not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest").

California Penal Code § 2933 specifically contemplates that not all

inmates will be assigned to a credit-qualifying program. Toussaint

v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[e]xamination

of § 2933 leads to the conclusion that prisoners have no right to

earn the one-for-one worktime credits provided by that section"). 

In fact, prisoners are not entitled automatically to participate in

worktime credit programs, People v. Rosaia, 157 Cal. App. 3d 832,

848(1984), and there is no guarantee that work programs will be

available. People v. Caruso, 161 Cal. App. 3d 13 (1984). 

B. Title 15, California Code of Regulations §§ 3040, 3044

Title 15, of the California Code of Regulations section 3040

obliges all "able-bodied" prisoners to work and/or obtain an

education. California Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3040(a). Thus, all

prisoners are placed in a work/training group, designated A-1, A-2,

B-1, B-2, and so on. Id. § 3044. 

Inmates in work group A-1 are eligible for full-time

educational and work assignments, while those in work group A-2 are

deemed "willing but unable to perform" a full-time assignment, and

either are put on a waiting list for a full-time assignment or are

waiting for an adverse transfer to a different institution. Id.

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§ 3044(b)(2), (3). Inmates in work group A-1 are eligible to earn

California Penal Code § 2933 worktime credits, i.e., one day credit

for each day assigned to this work group. Id. § 3044(b)(2). 

Inmates in work group A-2 are eligible to receive half-time credit,

i.e., one day credit for every two days the inmate is "willing but

unable to perform" a full-time assignment. Id. § 3044(b)(3).

Inmates in work group C are more commonly referred to as Cstatus" inmates. C-status is the CDCR's classification for inmates

who fail to comply with or whose conduct interferes with prison

program requirements. Id. § 3044(b)(5)(A), 3044(f). C-status

classification is determined by a classification committee. Id. 

§ 3044(b)(4). C-status inmates do not earn work credits. Id.

§ 3044(b)(5)(A). The inmate remains in a zero-credit-earning status

until classified for placement in a credit-qualifying work group.

Id. § 3044(b)(5)(B). After being placed on C-status, the inmate can

submit a written request to be removed from C-status. Id.

§ 3044(b)(5)(B).

Inmates in work groups D-1 and D-2 include those who are

assigned to a Security Housing Unit (SHU). An inmate on D-1 status

receives three months credit for each six months served or one day

credit for two days served. Id. § 3044(b)(6). An inmate on D-2

status who is deemed a program failure while on indeterminate or

determinate lockup status, earns zero credit. Id. § 3044(b)(7). 

Inmates assigned to a determinate SHU term which includes a

forfeiture of credits under California Penal Code § 2933 shall not

be placed in a credit-earning assignment during the period of credit

forfeiture or 180 days, whichever is less, starting from the date of

change in custodial classification. Id. § 3044(b)(7)(A).

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C. California Penal Code § 2933.6

Included among the documents submitted by Petitioner is an

exhibit relating to the calculation of his release date. The

documents show that Petitioner's misconduct comes within the

provision of California Penal Code § 2933.6 for the following

offenses: assault or battery causing serious bodily injury,

California Penal Code § 2933.6(b)(3), and/or assault or battery on

a peace officer or other non-prisoner which results in physical

injury, id. § 2933.6 (b)(4).

1. Applicable Subsections

The California Legislature, pursuant to California Penal Code 

§ 2933.6, provides that all inmates who commit certain misconduct

listed in subsection(b) are ineligible to earn work credits or good

behavior credits while housed in a SHU or an Administrative

Security Unit (Ad Seg) for that misconduct. Cal. Penal Code 

§ 2933.6(a).

This section does not apply if the administrative finding of

the misconduct is overturned or if the inmate is criminally

prosecuted for the misconduct and is found not guilty. Prosecution

and conviction are not required; rather, an administrative finding

will suffice. Id. § 2933.6(a), (c).

2. Key Terms from the Calculation Worksheet For

California Penal Code § 2933

In response the Court's requests for "assistance in providing

a clear and concise summary of the relevant facts and

calculations," Respondent has submitted exhibits in the form of

samples of Petitioner's credit calculation on a form entitled

"Calculation Worksheet For PC Section 2933 (Work Incentive),"

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showing Pelican Bay State Prison's Correctional Case Records

Manager's analysis of Petitioner's EPRD from the date of his

incarceration. (Resp't Ex. B, Samples of Calculation Worksheets

for California Penal Code § 2933.6.) 

A California inmate's EPRD and maximum adjusted release date

(MARD) are calculated when he enters prison. The MARD generally is

determined by figuring the starting date in the CDCR prison system

plus the total prison term imposed minus any pre-prison credits. 

The MARD remains the same throughout the inmate's incarceration as

long as he is not convicted of additional crimes resulting in

additional sentences. From this date, the CDCR subtracts worktime

credits the inmate has earned or is expected to earn in his current

credit-earning status, adds back any worktime credits that have

been denied or lost through disciplinary actions, and subtracts any

denied or lost credits that have been restored. The result is the

EPRD.

The EPRD is adjusted throughout the inmate's stay in prison

when various events occur, e.g., when he moves from one creditearning level to another, when he loses credits due to a

disciplinary decision, and when lost credits are restored. The

EPRD does not reflect the exact date that a prisoner is going to be

released. The EPRD is only a predicted release date because the

EPRD is based on the assumption that the circumstances which

determine term length or credit earning status will not change. 

If, however, after the date an EPRD is computed, a prisoner's

credit-earning status changes, credits are lost or restored, or a

new term is received, the EPRD will change. (See Pet'r Ex. A,

Prison Law Office, Release Date Calculations and Challenging Error

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 The record shows that Petitioner violated Title 15 of the

California Code of Regulations § 3005(c) (attempted battery on a peace

officer) and § 3005(a) (leading a disturbance and/or behavior which

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in Release Date dated March, 2001.)

Unlike the EPRD, an inmate's Current Release Date (CRD) does

not take into consideration the probability of earning future

credits. (Id.) The CRD is obtained by subtracting from the MARD

the net total of credits earned in prison up to the day that

credits were applied. Because the CRD takes into account only

credits earned to the present and does not consider the probability

of an inmate earning credits in the future, it is also not a true

release date.

III. Factual Background

The factual background of each section has been taken from the

petition, Respondent's answer, Petitioner's traverse and all

attached exhibits. Petitioner has provided the Court with numerous

documents pertaining to the administrative appeals showing that he

sought to have his credits restored after his periods of SHU

confinement from 1992 through 1995 and in 1996 as well as after his

SHU confinement during various periods from 2001 to 2005. The

facts include those addressed by the final level of review of each

of his administrative appeals, i.e., the Director's Level Appeal

Decision, as well as the results of his Computation Review Hearings

and his state habeas petitions.

A. May 17, 1996 Director's Level Appeal Decision

A number of the exhibits submitted by Petitioner pertain to a

loss of worktime credits from April 8, 1992 to October 9, 1995,

when Petitioner was housed in the SHU at High Desert State Prison.4

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could lead to violence) in 1993, and he also violated Title 15 of the

California Code of Regulations § 3014 (delaying lockup) and § 3005(c)

(threat to assault staff) in 1994. (Pet'r Ex. F, Director's Level

Decision, log no. 95-5507, dated May 17, 1996.)

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 A 602 appeal form is used by inmates and parolees to protest

the conduct and/or decisions of correctional employees or officials.

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 California prison regulations provide administrative procedures

in the form of one informal and three formal levels of review to

address a prisoner's claim. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§§ 3084.1-3084.7. Administrative procedures generally are exhausted

once the prisoner has received a Director's Level Appeal Decision,

which is the decision at the third and final level of review. Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5.

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(Pet'r Ex. F, Director's Level Decision, log no. 95-5507, dated May

17, 1996; Resp't Ex. B, Samples of Calculation Worksheets for

California Penal Code § 2933.6.) Before Petitioner entered the SHU

on April 8, 1992, his EPRD was projected at 2002. After his

release from the SHU on October 9, 1995, his EPRD was recalculated

and projected at 2004. 

On December 10, 1995, Petitioner filed a CDCR 602 Inmate/

Parolee Appeals Form (602 appeal),5

 alleging the miscalculation of

his 2004 EPRD. He pursued the appeal through the various levels of

administrative review.6 

On February 2, 1996, the CDCR provided Petitioner with a

Second Level Appeal Response to his 602 appeal. Petitioner's

appeal was denied on the ground that he was assessed D-2 status at

zero-earning-credit and "the credit earned from 4/8/92 to 10/9/95

was only 118 days versus approximately 915 days had [Petitioner]

not entered into the SHU at D2 status." (Pet'r Ex. F, Second Level

Appeal Response, log no. 95-5507, dated Feb. 21, 1996.) Petitioner

appealed this decision to the Director's level. 

On May 17, 1996, Petitioner's appeal was denied at the

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Director's level (Pet'r Ex. F, Director's Level Appeal Decision,

log no. 95-5507, dated May 17, 1996.) The issue addressed was

whether Petitioner's 2004 EPRD was "incorrectly calculated" because

he claimed "the credit losses [were] too high." (Id.) The

decision, which was consistent with the Second Level Appeal

Response to Petitioner's 602 appeal, stated:

The institution takes the position that appellant stated

to the records manager that he did not understand why his

release date prior to his entering Secure Housing Unit

(SHU) was in 2002 and it is now in 2004. It was

explained to the appellant that his SHU term was

approximately four years with D-2 or zero earning status. 

The pre-SHU calculation took into consideration the

projected earnings that appellant could have made prior

to his entering the SHU. Because of the long D-2/zero

earning status, appellant earned only 118 days from April

8, 1992 to October 9, 1995, rather than the approximately

915 days he could have earned had he not been placed into

the SHU. Appellant lost approximately 797 days off of

his pre-SHU EPRD calculation, resulting in a release year

of 2004. Appellant's current EPRD, on 1/3 earning

status, is April 19, 2004. This date will change once

the appellant is assigned to a job. Credits lost based

upon SHU term cannot be restored. 

(Id.) Appeals Examiner C. Dahlberg denied the appeal concluding:

The documentation and arguments presented are persuasive

that appellant's four year SHU term has affected his

release date, as calculated by records staff, by

approximately 797 days. The time not credited due to

appellant's placement in SHU cannot be restored pursuant

to PC 2933.6. When appellant receives an assignment,

his EPRD will be recalculated; that release date will be

correct so long as appellant remains in Work Group A-1

and is not sentenced to another SHU term.

(Id.)

B. February 21, 1997 Director's Level Appeal Decision

In 1996, Petitioner was housed in the SHU for committing a

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 A CDC-115 Rule Violation Report is the form used by the CDCR

to record a prisoner's rule violation, to serve notice of the

violation upon the prisoner, and to record the findings of any

subsequent disciplinary hearing. However, the record does not contain

the report pertaining to Petitioner's 1996 CDC-115 rule violation.

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CDC-115 rule violation.7 He filed a 602 appeal alleging

miscalculation of his goodtime/worktime credits after his 1996 SHU

confinement. 

On November 22, 1996, CDCR officials provided Petitioner with

a Second Level Appeal Response to his allegation of miscalculation,

which referred to Petitioner's requests for an Olsen Review, which

is an administrative procedure to review his central file, and for

a computation review hearing in accordance with Haygood v. Younger,

769 F.2d 1350, 1354-58 (9th Cir. 1985). (Pet'r Ex. F, Second Level

Appeal Response, log no. 96-07054, dated November 22, 1996.) 

According to the response, Petitioner's request for an Olsen Review

was granted on September 13, 1996. (Id.) Petitioner was therefore

provided an opportunity to review his central file with

Correctional Counselor S. Cook. However, Petitioner's request for

a Haygood hearing was denied because he failed to "specifically

cite the area where [his] time computation [was] in error." (Id.) 

His appeal was denied at the second level because he "failed to

provide any evidence of miscalculation of [his] time." (Id.)

On February 21, 1997, Petitioner was provided with a

Director's Level Appeal Decision. (Pet'r Ex. F, Director's Level

Appeal Decision, log no. 96-07054, dated Feb. 21, 1997.) The issue

addressed was whether to grant Petitioner's request to recalculate

his EPRD and/or his request for a Haygood hearing. (Id.) 

Petitioner was granted a Haygood hearing based on findings that:

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 The ICC establishes a prisoner in an institution by making sure

he understands what is expected of him, what programs are available,

assigning a custody designation and placing the prisoner in a

work/privilege group. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3376(d). The Unit

Classification Committee (UCC) reviews a prisoner's situation annually

and makes adjustments where necessary. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3376(d)(2). The Institution and Facility Classification Committee

(IFCC) is more specialized, accepting referrals from other committees,

reviewing prisoners' requests and changing a prisoner's work/privilege

group if there are circumstances warranting such change. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3376(d)(3).

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Inmate/parolees who are subject to the jurisdiction of

the Department of Corrections have a right to a

Computation Review Hearing when they believe there is an

error in the computation of a term of confinement or

period of parole based upon documentation in the record

and that such error or calculation adversely affects

their term of confinement or period of parole.

(Id.)

Petitioner's file was audited on April 9, 1997. (Pet'r Ex. I,

Memorandum from Associate Warden V. W. Woods dated Dec. 18, 1997.)

On July 29, 1997, Petitioner appeared before the Institutional

Classification Committee (ICC).8 The ICC nullified several of his

SHU terms and restored a total of 180 days. The ICC memorandum

stated: 

Inmate Phillips appeared before B-FAC ICC this date for a

WG Review Clarification. Committee notes S [Petitioner]

received CDC 115 dated 1/22/93, which was a Div. A1

offense for Assault on Staff. Zero Credit loss was

assessed due to time constraints not being met. 

Committee Action: Per AB 93-7 page 11, Section 10 and

page 13 Section 18, committee elects to Administratively

grant D1 WG from 1/22/93 to 10/22/93. CDC 115, for

threatening staff was dismissed per 2nd level appeal log

#96-07361. Inmate was placed in AD/SEG on 5/26/94

pending adjudication of this RVR. Committee elects to

administratively grant A2 WG from 5/26/94 to 8/11/94. S

was placed in AD/SEG on 6/19/96 and released to GP on

6/20/1996. The CDC referenced in this placement is dated

6/19/96 for Threatening Staff, which was dismissed. 

Inmate was A1-A at the time of AD SEG placement,

therefore committee elects to administratively grant 'S'

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time from 6/19/96 through 6/20/96. Committee notes that

when 'S' was released from AD/SEG on 6/20/96, inmate was

made A2-B when the WG should have been restored back to

A1. Inmate remained at D2 until reassigned on 7/12/96,

therefore, committee elects to restore WG A1 effective

6/21/96 to 7/11/96. 

(Pet'r Ex. H, CDC 128-G dated July 29, 1997.) 

Petitioner's central file was audited again on December 8,

1997, and his EPRD was adjusted to May 11, 2002. (Pet'r Ex. I,

Memorandum from Associate Warden V. W. Woods dated Dec. 18, 1997.)

C. January 13, 1998 Computation Review Hearing

On January 13, 1998, Petitioner's Computation Review Hearing

took place, and his revised EPRD of May 11, 2002 was found to be

correct based on credits applied through November 25, 1997. (Pet'r

Ex. I, Computation Review Hearing dated January 13, 1998.)

D. State Habeas Corpus Petitions

Petitioner then pursued state habeas corpus relief. A review

of his state habeas petitions shows allegations almost identical to

those in the present petition, including assertions that over a

period of almost twelve years Petitioner had worked for twentyeight months but did not receive adequate credits for that period,

that his periods of SHU confinement from 1992 through 1995 and in

1996 resulted in erroneous credit loss, and that over time he has

lost more than 1,500 credits which should have been restored. On

March 5, 2003, the California Court of Appeal denied his petition

summarily without citation, and on January 22, 2004, the California

Supreme Court denied his petition summarily, citing In re Swain, 34

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9

 Under California law, a denial of a habeas petition with a

citation to In re Swain indicates that a petitioner has failed to

state his claim with sufficient particularity for the state court to

examine the merits of the claim and has failed to explain the reasons

for any delay in filing his petition. See In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d at

304. The Ninth Circuit treats a citation to In re Swain as standing

for a denial on procedural grounds which can be cured in a renewed

state petition. See Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir.

1986). However, the state court's citation to In re Swain may not

establish that a petitioner has failed to exhaust if the petitioner

can show that the claims cannot be alleged with any greater

particularity, see id. at 1319-20, as is the case here. 

It is not clear whether a citation to In re Clark indicates here

that the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's claim on the

merits, as untimely, or for substantial delay without good cause. In

Ranieri v. Terhune, 366 F. Supp. 2d 934 (C.D. Cal. 2005), the

California state court found that a citation to In re Clark

constituted an adequate state procedural bar when the petitioner

raised his claims in a state habeas petition two years and nine months

after sentencing. If the petitioner cannot justify the delay, then

a court may reach the merits only if the petitioner asserts facts

demonstrating that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred as

a result of the proceedings leading to conviction and/or sentence."

In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 797. Here, Respondent's allegation that

the petition is untimely has already been addressed in the Court's

Order Denying Motion to Dismiss dated August 24, 2005 (docket no. 11).

Because the Court determined that the petition is not time-barred,

Petitioner's claims will not be dismissed based on the state court's

citation to In re Clark.

15

Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949), and In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993).9

Phillips [Regonald D.] on H.C., No. S115313, (Cal. Jan. 22, 2004). 

E. March 15, 2002 Commutation Review Hearing and June 27,

2002 Director's Level Appeal Decision

In a letter dated June 1, 2001, the CDCR responded to

Petitioner's allegation that he is "being retained past [his]

EPRD," and other alleged "discrepancies and errors of calculation"

for 1997 to 2001. (Pet'r, Ex. I, Letter from Correctional

Administrator Mark Shepherd dated June 1, 2001.) The letter

appears to correspond to Petitioner's allegations that he did not

receive accurate credits for the periods of SHU confinement from

1992 through 1995, in 1996 and in 2001. Petitioner's EPRD was

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recalculated and assessed at September 3, 2006. (Id.) 

On January 3, 2002 Petitioner sought relief through

administrative channels by filing another 602 appeal. In an

informal level decision dated February 4, 2002, the reviewing

officer noted that Petitioner "recently had 316 days restored," and

that certain disciplinary charges had been dismissed. The First

Formal Level of Review was waived. (Pet'r Ex. K, Second Level

Appeal Response, log no. 02-00396, dated Mar. 20, 2002.) 

On March 15, 2002, Petitioner received a Computation Review

Hearing conducted by D. Sackett, Case Records Manager. (Pet'r Ex.

K, Director's Level Appeal Decision, log no. 02-00396, dated June

27, 2002.) During that hearing, it was "determined that his

calculation was computed correctly and there was no error in his

calculated EPRD." (Id.)

On March 20, 2002, Petitioner received a Second Level Appeal

Response to the claim that he did not receive accurate credits. 

(Pet'r Ex. K, Second Level Appeal Response, log no. D-02-00396,

dated March 20, 2002.) According to the response, Petitioner had

received 1,627 days credit losses, a total of 586 days of credit

restorations, and was assessed a D-2, zero earning status. It

appears from the record that Petitioner was assigned to SHU in 2001

for violating California Code of Regulation § 3005(c) (attempted

battery on a peace officer). (Pet'r Ex. K, Classification Credit

Restoration dated October 11, 2001.) As a result, Petitioner was

assessed at D-2 zero earning status and scheduled to complete his

SHU/D-2 status on December 24, 2002. (Id.) This SHU confinement

established a projected release date of December 2, 2005. (Pet'r

Ex. K, Second Level Appeal Decision, log no. 02-00396, dated Mar.

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10 There is nothing in the record that indicates whether

Petitioner appealed to the Director's level, and neither party has

informed the Court if there exists a Director's Level Appeal Decision

for Petitioner's 602 appeal, log no. 05-02301.

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20, 2002.) 

On June 27, 2002, the Director's Level Appeal Decision

addressed Petitioner's claim that his EPRD date had been

miscalculated. The Chief Inmate Appeals Officer noted that the

Case Records Manager reviewed all the documentation from

Petitioner's central file and determined that the calculation of

his EPRD was computed correctly. (Id.) The reviewing officer

denied the appeal based on findings that:

[T]he appellant had the opportunity to present further

documentation and verbal presentation at the Hearing. 

The appellant was provided with copies of the appellant's

time calculation upon which the EPRD is based. The final

determination at the Hearing was the appellant's time

calculation was correct and did not require the changes

he is seeking. Based upon the documentation, it is

determined that the institution's actions in this mater

were proper and in compliance with California Code of

Regulations Title 15, Section (CCR) 3084.7(h).

(Id.) Petitioner was informed that his release date calculation

was correct, and that the administrative remedies available to him

within the CDCR had been exhausted. (Id.)

F. October 4, 2005 Computation Review Hearing and October

13, 2005 Second Level Appeal Decision10

On January 18, 2005, Petitioner requested a Computation

Hearing to be conducted by the Chief of Classification Services in

Sacramento. (Pet'r Ex. L, Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form dated January

18, 2005.) On February 9, 2005, Petitioner's appeal was screened

out. (Pet'r Ex. L, Inmate/Parolee Disciplinary Appeals Screening

Form dated February 9, 2005.) The reviewing officer, D. W.

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Bradbury, stated:

Your date was most recently updated 11/24/04, and you were

notified via Legal Summary Sheet. The other issues you

raise regarding credits from your initial incarceration

was reviewed in your prior Computation Review. You've not

provided a credible explanation for exceeding time limits.

(Id.)

On March 15, 2005, Petitioner filed a new 602 appeal

requesting a "prompt Haygood Hearing" to address "continuous,

intentional, miscalculation and miscomputation of his sentence." 

(Pet'r Ex. L, 602 appeal, log no. 05-02301, dated March 15, 2005.) 

It appears from the record that Petitioner's 602 appeal relates to

two separate CDC-115 disciplinary violations on May 5, 2004 and May

25, 2004 for staff assaults. Petitioner was confined in the SHU at

D-2 status for purposes of worktime credits. (Id.) Additional

rule violations caused credit losses of thirty days each on August

4, 2004, January 27, 2005, and July 27, 2005. As a result of these

violations, Petitioner suffered a total credit loss of 1,927 days. 

(Id.) His EPRD was calculated at August 12, 2007. (Id.)

On March 22, 2005, an informal review was conducted. Case

Record Administrator, C. Hodge wrote:

After a thorough review of your file, I have found that

your sentence by the court and the calculations to be

correct. You received a Haygood Hearing on March 1,

2002. 

. . . It is unclear to us what you think is incorrect

about your term. You have included so much additional

verbiage that it is difficult to decipher what you are

appealing. If you will submit a simple question stating

what you believe has been incorrectly calculated we will

be a happy to answer it.

Look at the attached copy of your calculation. Look at

the print-out of your losses and restorations. You will

see that CDC has appropriately applied the information we

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11 "Chronos" in this context appears to refer to "Chronological

History," which is a document "prepared for each inmate, upon which

significant dates and commitment information affecting the inmate are

logged." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3000.

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received on 128-g chronos11 and CDC-115s. There has been

no attempt to apply losses that have not been earned. If

you need to see your file to check these losses or

chronos, please contact your counselor and ask to review

your file.

(Pet'r Ex. L, Informal Review by C. Hodge dated Mar. 22, 2005.)

On October 4, 2005, Petitioner appealed to the CDCR for a

computation of his EPRD. (Pet'r Ex. M, Computation Review Hearing

Decision, log no. 05-02301, dated Oct. 4, 2005.) Finding no

evidence to support the allegation that his release date had been

miscalculated, the reviewing officer denied the appeal and issued

his Computation Review Hearing Decision, which is equivalent to the

decision at the first level of review. (Id.) Petitioner's CRD was

set at September 28, 2007. (Id.) 

On October 13, 2005, Petitioner received a Second Level Appeal

Response to his appeal. The warden of Pelican Bay State Prison

stated:

The inmate believes his EPRD has been calculated

incorrectly because he has never been given any of the

credit he is due, from being given more time than the

court ordered and not giving him all of the pre-sentence

credit ordered by the court to deliberately and

maliciously miscalculating his time to a point where he

has already served five and one-half years more than that

which was sentenced by the court. He wants an immediate

release and an end to this absurd, blatant malign, and

intentional miscarriage of justice. 

(Pet'r Ex. M, Second Level Appeal Response, log no. 05-02301, dated

Oct. 13, 2005.) According to the response, Petitioner's

Computation Review Hearing on March 15, 2002 was not appealed. 

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12 The parties have not submitted any further exhibits that

reflect that Petitioner's EPRD has changed.

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(Id.) Because this prior decision was not appealed to the next

level, the review began with the last credit calculation, at which

time, Petitioner's EPRD was assessed at December 2, 2005. (Id.)

Petitioner stated that he did not want to continue the interview if

they were "not going to go all the way back to the beginning of his

term." (Id.) Finding no evidence to support Petitioner's

allegations that his release date had been miscalculated or that he

was five and one-half years overdue for release, the appeal was

denied. (Id.) The CRD was reviewed and verified as September 28,

2007. (Id.)

The record shows that Petitioner's EPRD is currently set at

August 12, 2007.12 (Resp't Ex. B, Sample no. 55, Calculation

Worksheet for California Penal Code § 2933.6, dated Nov. 23. 2005.)

DISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion

It is well settled that "federal habeas relief is not

available unless the [petitioner] has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1)(A)). Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge

collaterally in federal habeas proceedings either the fact or

length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral

proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a

fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they

seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c);

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Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). The exhaustion

requirement is not jurisdictional, but rather a matter of comity to

the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity

to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. See

id.; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). A federal court will find that the

highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a

claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with

the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1

(1992) (factual basis). 

The Court finds that Petitioner properly exhausted his due

process claim based on his allegations that he did not receive

accurate credits during his periods of SHU confinement from 1992

through 1995 and in 1996. See Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365. However

the record does not show that Petitioner presented the highest

state court with the factual and legal basis for his due process

claim based on his allegations that he did not receive accurate

credits for his SHU confinement during various periods from 2001 to

2005. 

Because the petition contains additional factual allegations

not raised in the state court, it is arguably unexhausted. The

Court, however, will consider the time credit calculations

resulting from the new violations. The new factual allegations are

not wholly different from Petitioner's original allegations that

the CDCR incorrectly calculated his EPRD from the date of his

incarceration. Even if the claim were unexhausted due to the new

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factual allegations, the Court will not dismiss the petition

without prejudice pending exhaustion of the claim. The Court may

deny a petition on the merits even if it is unexhausted. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Therefore, judicial efficiency and the

administration of justice will be best served by the Court

addressing the merits of Petitioner's due process claim that he did

not receive accurate credits for his SHU confinement during various

periods from 2001 to 2005. 

II. Legal Standard 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), a federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claims: 

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." William v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the 'unreasonable

application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

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from the [the Supreme] Court's decision but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of

the time of the relevant state court decision. Id. at 412.

In determining whether the state court's decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a

reasoned decision. Lajoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). It also looks to any lower court decision examined or

adopted by the highest state court to address the merits. See

Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (because

state appellate court examined and adopted some of the trial

court's reasoning, the trial court's ruling is also relevant).

Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its

decision on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no reasoned

lower court decision on the claim, a review of the record is the

only means of deciding whether the state court's decision was

objectively reasonable. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir.

2002). When confronted with such a decision, a federal court

should conduct "an independent review of the record" to determine

whether the state court's decision was an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; accord

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004).

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III. Due Process Claim

A. Applicable Legal Standard

In order to state a due process claim, a petition must show

that a constitutionally protected liberty interest is implicated. 

Baumann v. Arizona Dep't of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 844 (9th

Cir. 1985). If a state prisoner's time credits have been

improperly computed, he may have a claim for denial of due process. 

See Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc),

cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). Any deprivation of time

credits allegedly impacting a prisoner's sentence generally may be

remedied only by way of habeas corpus. See Young v. Kenny, 907

F.2d 874, 876-78 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126

(1991); Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1096 n.14. Prisoners retain their

right to due process subject to the restrictions imposed by the

nature of the penal system. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

556 (1974). The Due Process Clause requires certain minimum

procedural protections if (1) state statutes or regulations

narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the

deprivation, and (2) the liberty in question is one of "real

substance." See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-87 (1995);

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556-572. 

A state may create a constitutionally protected liberty

interest if it establishes regulatory measures that impose

substantive limitations on the exercise of official discretion. 

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1983). "[A] State creates a

protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on

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official discretion." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249

(1983). In Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454

(1989), for example, the Court noted that a state most commonly

fetters official discretion by a two-step process. First, the

state establishes "substantive predicates" to govern official

decisionmaking. These are "particularized standards or criteria to

guide the [s]tate's decisionmakers " Id. at 461. Next, the state

requires, "in explicitly mandatory language," that if the

substantive predicates are met, a particular outcome must follow. 

See id. at 461-64. Procedural guidelines alone are not sufficient

to create a protected interest. See Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987,

989 (9th Cir. 1993) (provision that merely raises procedural

requirements without substantive predicates, even if mandatory, not

enough). Only where they are combined with "substantive

predicates" will an interest entitled to protection by the Due

Process Clause be found. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472-33. 

B. Analysis

1. Miscalculation of EPRD Claim

When Petitioner filed the present petition, he argued that he

did not understand why he was still being held after serving

"thirteen years and five months on a seventeen years and eight

month sentence" because he should have earned worktime/goodtime

credits pursuant to California Penal Code § 2933. (Pet. at 2.) It

is evident that Petitioner does not understand the correct manner

to calculate his EPRD. Therefore, his due process claim based on

the allegations that prison officials have miscalculated his EPRD

fails as outlined below. 

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a. EPRD After SHU Confinement from 1992 through

1995

(1) Background 

Petitioner contends that calculation of his goodtime/worktime

credits after his SHU confinement from 1992 through 1995 was

improper because it resulted in an EPRD that causes him to be held

beyond the termination of his sentence. (Pet. at 8.) In support

of the petition, he cites Title 15 of the California Code of

Regulations § 3044(a), (b) for the proposition that he earned

day-for-day worktime credits under California Penal Code § 2933 and

should be awarded two days credit for each day of qualifying

performance. (Id.) 

(2) Analysis

Instead of specifying miscalculations relating to his EPRD

after his SHU confinement from 1992 through 1995, Petitioner offers

a calculation entitled, "Simplified Version of Time Computation,"

which concludes that "10 years and 2 months" is the time that he

"would have had to serve in C.D.C.R." (Traverse at 13-14.) He

argues that, as of January 5, 2006, the date he signed his

traverse, he had served fourteen years and five months; therefore,

he "should have been released many years ago." (Id.) However,

Petitioner's attempt to distort the CDCR's method of calculating

his EPRD is unavailing. His method of computation fails to take

into consideration the general proposition that disciplinary credit

losses (e.g., credits lost after his SHU confinement from 1992

through 1995) can be applied against future credit that will be

earned as well as credit that has already been earned. See Cal.

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Penal Code §§ 2932, 2933.

Unlike Petitioner's "simplified version," the CDCR Calculation

Worksheets use a fourteen-step formula to calculate the new EPRD

pursuant to California Penal Code § 2933.6. The CDCR's formula

takes into account the credits earned, lost and restored, by

putting them into the equation before projecting the credits the

inmate might receive in the future if he remains at his current

credit-earning level. (See Resp't Ex. B, Calculation Worksheets 

¶¶ 6-11; Pet'r Ex. A, Prison Law Office, Release Date Calculations

and Challenging Errors in Release Date dated March, 2001.) When a

particular number of time credits is forfeited, the EPRD does not

increase day-for-day by the same number. Similarly, when a

particular number of time credits is restored, the EPRD does not

decrease day-for-day by the same number. (Id.) This is because

the days of credits are put in the formula before the projection

for future credit-earning is made. That is, the CDCR subtracts the

net number of credits earned from the MARD to reach a CRD and the

EPRD by projecting how many days of credit will be earned in the

future if the inmate's status does not change. (See id. ¶¶ 12-14.) 

In other words, from the MARD date, the CDCR subtracts worktime

credits the inmate has earned or is expected to earn in his current

credit-earning status, adds back any worktime credits that have

been denied or lost through disciplinary actions, and subtracts any

denied or lost credits that have been restored. 

Here, the Court finds that Petitioner fails to show that he

did not receive accurate credits during his SHU confinement from

1992 through 1995. Based on a careful examination of the record,

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13 When a prisoner arrives in the CDCR system, a CDCR case records

specialist reviews his abstract of judgment as well as other

sentencing documents and enters the information into the CDCR computer

system. A computer print-out called the "Legal Status Summary" is

generated. In the present case, Petitioner's LSS form had a

computer-generated message on it that his sentence was "discrepant."

Discrepant cases are those cases in which errors in sentencing are

detected from the data entered into the OBIS (prison database) or some

needed information is missing or unclear. (Pet'r Ex. A, Prison Law

Office, Release Date Calculations and Challenging Errors in Release

Date dated March, 2001.) Petitioner's LSS forms also include a

handwritten notation stating that the discrepancy means that his LSS

forms contained errors in his sentencing. 

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the Court has gleaned the reason for the change in Petitioner's

EPRD from 2002 to 2004 after his SHU confinement from 1992 through

1995. Petitioner's Legal Status Summary (LSS)13 form for September

16, 1992 indicates that his EPRD was set at January 24, 2002 based

on credits applied through September, 1992. (Pet'r Ex. D.) The

Calculation Worksheets also show that Petitioner suffered a

projected credit lost of 259 days between May 31, 1992 and May 31,

1994 due to changes in his classification status from work group A1 to D-2. (Resp't Ex. B.) Additionally, the Chronological History

worksheets submitted by Petitioner further illustrate that by

February 10, 1995, he was classified as a D-2 status inmate with an

EPRD of 2004. (Pet'r Ex. C, Chronological History: 1992 to 2004.) 

Petitioner's exhibits, specifically the relevant LSS forms, do not

show that his EPRD of 2004 was incorrect. 

Petitioner was also provided with a hearing at which he was

afforded an opportunity to prove his allegations regarding the

CDCR's improper computation of his credits after his SHU

confinement from 1992 through 1995. A review of the record

indicates that Petitioner had no evidence to support his

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allegations or to counter the evidence that his projected EPRD of

2004 was based on the 118 days of credits earned, rather than the

approximately 915 days he would have earned had he not entered the

SHU at D-2 status from 1992 through 1995. Rather, he merely

reiterated his position that the CDCR had "erroneously

miscalculated" his credits. 

Petitioner's argument that his EPRD was miscalculated

ultimately fails because his credit calculation process did not

include the recalculation of his EPRD subsequent to the rules

violations, re-classification of his work group status and imposed

SHU terms from 1992 through 1995. Cal. Penal Code § 2932(e); Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3043(c)(5)(B). California Penal Code 

§ 2932 provides that credit "may be denied or lost." (Id.) This

language clearly indicates the CDCR's discretion to refuse to

consider credits that have not yet been earned. (Id.) Because

Petitioner's rule violations fell within the provision of

California Penal Code § 2933.6, he was barred from earning credits

during his time in the SHU. 

Upon examining the calculation of the time credits after

Petitioner's SHU confinement from 1992 through 1995, the Court

DENIES Petitioner's claim for relief, based on the facts explained

in the Director's Level Appeal Decision dated May 17, 1996, which

concluded that his EPRD was April 10, 2004. 

Given the absence of any support for his allegations, it

cannot be said that the denial of Petitioner's claim "resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

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proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Moreover, the state court's

summary rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)(2). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to the writ on his due

process claim based on a miscalculation of his EPRD after his SHU

confinement from 1992 through 1995.

b. EPRD After SHU Confinement in 1996

(1) Background

Petitioner next claims that his due process rights were

violated when the CDCR miscalculated his EPRD after his SHU

confinement in 1996. Petitioner submits documentation from High

Desert Prison to support his allegations. (Pet'r Ex. G.) 

A review of Petitioner's exhibits indicates that he used the

prison appeal process to challenge the recalculation of his EPRD

after his SHU confinement in 1996. Petitioner alleged that his

EPRD calculation was improperly computed because prison officials

neglected to take into account certain good time credits allegedly

forfeited, in violation of his constitutional rights. (Pet'r Ex.

G, Memorandum, appeal log no. HDSP-A-96-05581, dated September 15,

1996.) 

In the February 21, 1997 Director's Level Appeal Decision, the

reviewing officer granted Petitioner a Computation Review Hearing. 

(Pet'r Ex. G, Director's Level Appeal Decision, log no. 96-07054,

dated Feb. 21, 1997.) On July 29, 1997, Petitioner appeared before

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14 The record also indicates that a thirty day credit restoration

was made for January 30, 1998; a sixty one day credit restoration was

made for January 30, 1999; a fifteen day credit restoration was made

for August 8, 1999; and a ninety day credit restoration was made for

March 7, 2001. (Pet'r Ex. K, Classification - Credit Restoration,

dated October 11, 2001.) 

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the ICC for review of his placement in SHU and credit restoration

pursuant to the Director's Level Appeal Decision. On December 23,

1997, a second committee hearing was held. The ICC memorandum

stated:

Phillips appeared before C-FAC UCC for Program Review. 

Case factors were reviewed this date during personal Unit

Classification Committee for consideration of restoration

of forfeited credits. Upon review this Committee acts to

restore a total of 90 days credit for CDC-115, Log #FD97-03-0064 dated 3/17/97.

(Id. CDC-128G dated December 23, 1997.)14 Petitioner was successful

insofar as 180 days of credits were restored. 

The Computation Review Hearing was held on January 13, 1998. 

Petitioner's main concern at this hearing was that the mandates for

the 1996 credit restoration were not applied by the case record

manager, rendering his EPRD incorrect. (Pet'r Ex. I, Computation

Review Hearing, B.D. Chastain, Corr. Case Rec. Manager, dated

January 13, 1998.) 

(2) Analysis

The Court has undertaken an independent examination of the

entire record for 1996 and has found that Petitioner provides no

factual support for his conclusory allegations that the CDCR failed

to comply with the mandates of his 1996 credit restoration. 

Contrary to Petitioner's contention, the record shows that his file

was audited on April 9, 1997 and December 8, 1997 to determine why

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his EPRD changed from 2002 to 2004. The Computation Review Hearing

on January 13, 1998, indicates that Petitioner was indeed granted

credit restoration after his file was audited and after the

committee hearings because his EPRD changed from June 22, 2004 to

May 11, 2002. 

Moreover, Petitioner earned no custody credit and was later

deprived of conduct credits as punishment for subsequent behavior

and confinement to the SHU. In addition, the LSS forms submitted

by Petitioner, purportedly to establish CDCR's "errors of

miscalculations of sentence and confirmation of discrepancies," do

not conflict with the calculations displayed in the exhibits

submitted by Respondent. (Pet'r Ex. J, 1996 LSS Forms.) Both the

CDCR's Calculation Worksheets and the LSS forms reflect an EPRD of

2002 based on credits applied through July, 1996. These documents

simply do not support Petitioner's claim that his EPRD was

miscalculated. 

As noted, Petitioner's EPRD was estimated at May 11, 2002. 

The rules for calculating worktime credit provide that an inmate's

EPRD is projected each time there is a change in credit-earning

status. Cal. Penal Code § 2932(e); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3043

(c)(5). Thus, Petitioner's May 11, 2002 EPRD was only an estimated

or prospective date, which was subject to change should any

subsequent violation come within the provisions of California Penal

Code § 2933.6. (Resp' Ex. B, Calculation Worksheet, sample 24.) 

The Court finds that there is no merit to Petitioner's claim

that his right to due process was violated by the CDCR's alleged

miscalculation of his EPRD after his SHU confinement in 1996. The

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Court DENIES Petitioner's claim for relief, based on the facts

explained in the February 21, 1997 Director's Level Appeal Decision

and the January 13, 1998 Computation Review Hearing, during which

his revised EPRD of May 11, 2002 was found to be correct.

Given the absence of any support for his allegations, it

cannot be said that the denial of Petitioner's claim "resulted in

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Moreover, the state

court's summary rejection of this claims was not contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)(2). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to the writ on his

due process claim based on a miscalculation of credits during his

SHU confinement in 1996. 

c. EPRD After SHU Confinement During Various

Periods from 2001 to 2005

(1) Background

Petitioner alleges that his due process rights were violated

when the CDCR miscalculated his EPRD after his SHU confinement

during various periods from 2001 to 2005. He further alleges that

the Computation Review Hearings of March 15, 2002, and any

subsequent related administrative appeals and computation review

hearings violated his due process. 

To support his claim, Petitioner submits numerous exhibits to

demonstrate his "constant and continuous attempts at trying to get

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CDCR and its employees to correct their errors of miscalculation of

[his] sentence." (Pet'r Ex. L, Traverse at 1.) 

The Court examines Petitioner's claim by reviewing the facts

addressed by the March 15, 2002 Computation Review Hearing and the

June 27, 2002 Director's Level Appeal Decision and as well as his

subsequent related appeals and computation review hearings,

including the October 4, 2005 Computation Review Hearing and the

October 13, 2005 Second Level Review Decision.

(2) Analysis

Based on a review of the record, the Court finds that the flaw

in Petitioner's argument is that he has overlooked the CDCR's

recalculation of his EPRD upon the denial or loss of credit through

disciplinary action, and upon the restoration of previously denied

or lost credits at six-month intervals. Cal. Penal Code § 2932

(e); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3043 (c)(5)(B). 

Applying California Penal Code § 2933, California courts have

held that inmates who are serving their determinate prison

sentences may earn prison conduct credits to shorten the period of

incarceration. People v. Cooper, 27 Cal. 4th 38, 40 (2002); Cal.

Penal Code § 2933 (worktime credits). However, California courts

have also held that a disciplinary loss of credits may be applied

against credits that have been earned and those that have yet to be

earned. People v. Johnson, 120 Cal. App. 3d 808, 813-814, (1981);

People v. Zuniga, 108 Cal. App. 3d 739, 743-744, (1980); In re

Walrath, 106 Cal. App. 3d 426, 431 (1980); In re Cowen, 27 Cal.2d

637, 640 (1946). 

Here, Petitioner was found to have committed multiple CDC-115

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15 While the October 4, 2005 Computation Review Hearing does not

mention his EPRD, the record shows that Petitioner's EPRD was August

12, 2007. 

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violations from 2001 to 2005. Therefore, he was confined in the

SHU and classified as a D-2 status inmate for purposes of worktime

credits at different periods during that time frame. Petitioner's

suggested calculation pursuant to California Penal Code § 2933 is

unavailing because it does not take into consideration the CDCR's

administrative duties under California Penal Code § 2933 with

respect to inmates, like Petitioner, who come within the provision

of California Penal Code § 2933.6(b)(3)-(4). Because the EPRD acts

as an incentive for inmates to participate in work programs

pursuant to California Penal Code § 2933, any change in their

classification impacts the EPRD and their attempts to earn any

worktime/goodtime credits in the future.

The Court finds that there is no merit to Petitioner's claim

that his right to due process was violated by the CDCR's alleged

miscalculation of his EPRD after his SHU confinement during various

periods from 2001 to 2005. The Court DENIES Petitioner's claim for

relief, based on the facts explained in the June 27, 2002

Director's Level Appeal Decision, the October 13, 2005 Second Level

Appeal Response, as well as the March 15, 2002 and October 4, 2005

Computation Review Hearings, which verified that his CRD was

September 28, 2007.15 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to the writ on his due

process claim based on a miscalculation of his EPRD after his SHU

confinement during various periods from 2001 to 2005.

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2. Inaccurate Worktime Credit Claim

Petitioner alleges that he did not receive accurate worktime

credits for a period of almost twelve years when he had worked for

twenty-eight months. 

Contrary to Petitioner's assumption, as discussed above,

California has not created a protected liberty interest in earning

credits pursuant to California Penal Code § 2933. 

Petitioner's claim that the CDCR's denial of worktime credits

violated his state constitutional rights is not cognizable in a

federal habeas action, because generally, issues of state law are

not cognizable on federal habeas. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 ("We

have stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief does not

lie for errors of state law.'") (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.

764, 780 (1990)); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993)

(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("mere error of state law, one that does

not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be

corrected on federal habeas"). Nor does the Constitution guarantee

good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison. Wolff,

418 U.S. at 557. 

Further, the record shows that Petitioner was awarded

half-time work credits, i.e., one day of credit for each two days

served. (Resp't Ex. B, Calculation Worksheets; Traverse Ex. M,

Second Level Appeal Decision dated October 13, 2005.) Petitioner's

subsequent violations and re-assignments to D-1 and D-2 status

during the almost twelve-year period when he worked for twentyeight months left him subject to restrictions imposed by the

California penal system. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The record

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shows that the State followed the "minimum due process appropriate

to the circumstances to ensure that [Petitioner's] liberty [was]

not arbitrarily abrogated." Haygood, 769 F.2d at 1355.

The state court's rejection of Petitioner's claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2). Further, Petitioner has not demonstrated

that the state court's denial of this claim "resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings." 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to the writ on this

due process claim based on a denial of worktime credit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED. All pending motions are TERMINATED. The Clerk

of the Court shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 9/20/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIPS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MCGRATH et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV04-02975 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on September 20, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Brian G. Walsh

Office of the Attorney General

455 Golden Gate, 12th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Regonald D. Phillips E-40142

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95532

Dated: September 20, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:04-cv-02975-CW Document 27 Filed 09/20/07 Page 38 of 38