Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00536/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00536-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE RAUL JAQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18cv536-GPC(BGS)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[Dkt. Nos. 14, 15.]

On March 14, 2018, Plaintiff Jose Raul Jaquez (“Plaintiff”), proceeding in forma 

pauperis and with counsel, filed this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner 

of Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s applications for disability insurance 

benefits and supplemental security income. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff filed a motion for 

summary judgment and Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (Dkt.

Nos. 14, 15.) On July 2, 2019, Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied and 

that Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment be granted. (Dkt. No. 20.) 

Plaintiff filed an objection on July 16, 2019. (Dkt. No. 21.) After careful consideration 

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of the R&R, the objections, the pleadings, the supporting documents, and the applicable 

law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and GRANTS

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

Background

On October 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act and supplemental security income (“SSI”) 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”) alleging a disability date of April 24, 

2013. (Dkt. No. 12, Administrative Record (“AR”) 328-35; 336-41.) Plaintiff alleged 

disability based on diabetes, diabetic retinopathy, high blood pressure, blood clot on both 

eyes and surgery on both eyes. (AR 356.) Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied on 

December 12, 2013, (AR 228), and again upon reconsideration on February 20, 2014. (AR

235.)

On May 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed a written request for an administrative hearing. (AR 

243.) On April 1, 2016, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified before Administrative 

Law Judge Peter J. Valentino. (AR 122-61.) On May 9, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision 

finding that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined under Title II and Title VI of the Act. 

(AR 17-31.) On January 24, 2018, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-3.) 

On March 14, 2018, Plaintiff commenced the instant action seeking judicial review 

of the Commissioner’s decision. (Dkt. No. 1.) On June 8, 2018, Defendant answered and 

lodged the administrative record with the Court. (Dkt. Nos. 10, 12.) On July 13, 2018,

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 14.) On August 15, 2018, the 

Commissioner cross-moved for summary judgment and responded in opposition to 

Plaintiff’s motion. (Dkt. Nos. 15, 16.) On September 10, 2018, Plaintiff filed an opposition 

to Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment and a reply to his motion for summary 

judgment. (Dkt. No. 18.) On October 1, 2018, the Commissioner filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 

19.) On July 2, 2019, the Magistrate Judge issued its R&R and Plaintiff filed an objection 

on July 16, 2019. (Dkt. No. 21.) 

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The ALJ Decision

ALJ Peter J. Valentino applied the five-step sequential framework to determine 

that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 53-64.) He began the analysis finding Plaintiff met 

the insured status requirement through March 31, 2018. (AR 55.) At step one, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial, gainful activity since April 24, 2013. 

(AR 55.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has had the following severe 

impairments: diabetic retinopathy secondary to insulin dependent diabetes mellitus. (AR 

55.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the 

listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 57.) 

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to perform light work except he is limited to “single eye vision; sans depth 

perception’ sans hazards (such as heights and dangerous machinery); sans concentrated 

exposure to chemicals or fumes; requires dark glasses for vision protection against bright 

light; is limited to occasional reaching, handling, and fingering; and occasional fine 

visual acuity.” (AR 58.) Based on the RFC, it was concluded that Plaintiff is unable to 

perform any past relevant work. (AR 61.) Plaintiff is a younger individual, 29 years old, 

with limited education and the ability to communicate in English. (AR 61.) At step five,

the ALJ determined that considering Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work

experience, the jobs of usher and counter clerk exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that he can perform. (AR 62.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has 

not been under a disability from April 23, 2013 through the date of the decision. (AR 

63.)

Discussion

A. Standard of Review of Magistrate Judge’s R&R

The district court’s duties in connection with an R&R of a magistrate judge are set 

forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district judge 

must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which 

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objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings 

or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district court 

need not review de novo those portions of an R&R to which neither party objects. See

Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 114, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). When no objections are filed, 

the Court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and 

decide the motion on the applicable law. Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 

196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 

2001). Because Plaintiff filed an objection, the Court conducts a de novo review of the 

portions of the R&R to which he opposes and assumes the correctness of the Magistrate 

Judge’s findings of fact of the portions of the R&R to which he does not oppose. 

B. Standard of Review of the Commissioner’s Decision 

A court “will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision contains legal error 

or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 

(9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as reasonable to support a conclusion.” Id. The “evidence 

must be more than a mere scintilla but not necessarily a preponderance.” Connett v. 

Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The court will uphold the 

ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “When evidence 

reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ's decision, we may not 

substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.” Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 

F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that 

supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). When the evidence is 

inconclusive, “questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are 

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functions solely for the Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 

1982). 

C. Analysis 

In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s determination 

at step five arguing that the ALJ erred by relying on the vocational expert’s (“VE”)

testimony that Plaintiff could work as an usher and that determination was not supported 

by substantial evidence.

1

 First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly failed to resolve 

an apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles2(“DOT”)/Selected Characteristics of Occupations3(“SCO”). Second, he contends

the ALJ accepted the VE’s testimony without addressing the description of the job of 

usher by the Occupational Information Network (“O*NET”) as requiring near vision at 

close range, finger dexterity and provides less than full-time work activity. In response, 

the Commissioner maintains that there was no conflict between the VE’s testimony and 

the DOT, and any alleged conflicts based on other sources were waived because they 

were not raised before the ALJ. Furthermore, the Commissioner argues, even if 

challenges to the other sources were not waived, the ALJ did not err by not addressing 

these sources because he was not required to. 

On the first issue, the Magistrate Judge concluded that there was no apparent or 

obvious conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT regarding the usher position

and the ALJ did not err in failing to resolve a non-existent conflict. (Dkt. No. 20 at 7-8.) 

 

1 The Commissioner does not oppose and concedes Plaintiff’s additional argument that the ALJ erred by 

relying on the VE’s testimony that he could perform the work of a counter clerk. (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 7.) 

However, any error is harmless because the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err as the

determination that Plaintiff could work as an usher. See Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 

885 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)

(the court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision for harmless error, which exists when it is clear from the 

record that “an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’”)). 

2 The DOT is a “resource compiled by the Department of Labor that details the specific requirements for 

different occupations.” Gutierrez v. Colvin, 844 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 2016).

3 The SCO is a companion publication to the DOT that is published by the Department of Labor. 

Quesada v. Berryhill, 16cv2716-CAB-KSC, 2017 WL 4518490, at *5 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2017). 

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On the second issue, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the ALJ did not err in 

relying on the VE testimony without addressing possible conflicts between the testimony 

and information in the O*NET because Plaintiff waived the issue by not raising it before 

the ALJ. (Id. at 17.) Alternatively, even if the issue was not waived, the ALJ’s decision 

was supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 19-21.) 

In his Objection, Plaintiff challenges the Magistrate Judge’s ruling on part of the

second issue contending that the R&R failed to consider the Commissioner’s burden of 

producing evidence at step five demonstrating that the job of usher constitutes substantial 

gainful activity for a significant number of jobs.4 

Plaintiff does not object to the R&R’s ruling on the first issue and on part of the 

second issue of whether the ALJ failed to address a conflict between the VE testimony 

and the description of the job of usher by the Occupational Information Network 

(“O*NET”) concerning near vision at close range and finger dexterity. Accordingly, 

because no objection has been filed as to these issues, the Court accepts the Magistrate 

Judge’s findings of fact and concludes that the applicable law supports the Magistrate 

Judge’s decision. See Campbell, 501 F.2d at 206. 

1. Step Five 

At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that based on 

the RFC assessment, as well as the vocational factors of age, education and work 

experience, Plaintiff can adjust to do “other work” and the Commissioner must provide 

evidence demonstrating that “other work” exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c); 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 

676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (at step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to determine

“whether the claimant has the capacity (“RFC”) to perform any other substantial gainful 

 

4 Relatedly, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff waived the right to 

challenge the ALJ’s decision based on O*NET because he failed to raise it before the ALJ. Because the 

Court, alternatively, considered the O*NET evidence presented to the Appeal Council, the Court need 

not address the waiver issue as the alternative argument fails. 

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activity in the national economy. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is 

disabled.”); Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984) (at step five, the 

Commissioner must show that (1) plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful activity 

and (2) a “significant number of jobs exist in the national economy” that plaintiff can 

perform). “The Commissioner can meet this burden through the testimony of a 

vocational expert or by reference to the Medical Vocational Guidelines.” Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, the ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony. The ALJ can call upon a vocational 

expert to testify as to: “(1) what jobs the claimant, given his or her residual functional 

capacity, would be able to do; and (2) the availability of such jobs in the national 

economy.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999); Hill v. Astrue, 698 

F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (To aid in making this determination, the ALJ may rely 

on an impartial vocational expert to provide testimony about jobs the applicant can 

perform despite his or her limitations.). 

Here, the VE testified that based on Plaintiff’s RFC, education, age, and work 

experience, he would be able to do the job of usher with 90,200 jobs available in the 

national economy. (AR 158.) VE’s testimony, by itself, constitutes substantial evidence 

when responding to a complete hypothetical. Wright v. Colvin, No. CV 12-1893-SP, 

2014 WL 5456044, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014). Plaintiff’s counsel did not challenge 

the VE’s testimony at the hearing. 

Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council and

submitted additional evidence, including the O*NET OnLine Custom Report for Usher, 

Lobby Attendants, and Ticket Takers, which allegedly5states that 90% of the usher jobs 

 

5 Plaintiff does not cite or provide as a supporting document, and the Court was unable to locate the 

Duration of Typical Work Week on the O*NET Online Custom Report for Usher, Lobby Attendance, 

and Ticket Takers (39-3031.00). See https://www.onetonline.org/link/custom/39-3031.00. 

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work less than 40 hours a week, 7% work more than 40 hours a week and 3% work 40 

hours a week. (AR 5, 407.) The Appeal Councils denied his request for review. (AR 1.)

In his Objection, Plaintiff argues that the VE merely testified that Plaintiff could do 

the job of an usher but failed to testify that the job of usher constituted substantial gainful 

activity on a regular and continuing basis. (Dkt. No. 21.) Therefore, the ALJ failed to 

demonstrate that the usher job constitutes substantial gainful activity for a significant 

number of jobs in the national economy. 

In support, Plaintiff refers to O*NET indicating that the usher jobs are part-time 

positions and cannot constitute substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). Plaintiff also relies 

on Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”) DI 10501.015, Social Security’s 

internal agency document used by employees to process claims. That section includes

Tables of SGA Earning Guidelines and Effectives Dates Based on Year of Work Activity 

and show that for 2016, earnings of $1130/month constitute SGA. 

https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0410501015 Therefore, according to Plaintiff, in 

order to constitute substantial gainful activity, at a minimum, the Commissioner had to 

demonstrate, by evidence, that there exists at least 25,0006 usher jobs in the national 

economy making in excess of $1,130.00 per month or 30 hours per week based on $10 

per hour minimum wage in 2016. 

The Commissioner responds that Plaintiff cites no legal authority that requires the 

VE to address whether a job identified in the DOT is SGA. Moreover, the Commissioner 

contends that the SGA described in the POMS section is for purposes of assessing SGA 

for a claimant “filing for benefits, or by an individual already entitled to benefits” and not 

used to determine SGA under step five. See POMS DI 10501.001, Meaning of SGA and 

Scope of Subchapter. The Court agrees. Plaintiff does not provide any legal support that 

the VE has to testify that “other work” be substantial gainful activity. In addition, POM § 

 

6 Guitierrez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 528-29 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding 25,000 in the national 

economy to be a sufficiently significant number).

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DI 10501.015(B) has been used to determine whether claimants are currently engaged in 

SGA under step one, see Jessica J. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18cv5048-JTR, 2019 WL 

1560470, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 2019) (using POMS DI 10501.015 at step one), or 

whether a claimant’s past relevant work was SGA. See Neals v. Colvin, Case No. CV 

16-834 JC, 2016 WL 7388524, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2016) (using POMS on step 

four). Plaintiff has not presented any legal authority that POMS has been used at step 

five to determine whether “other work” constitutes SGA. Moreover, POMS does not 

impose any judicially enforceable duties on this Court or the ALJ. Lockwood v. Comm’r 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010). The POMS are only entitled to 

“respect” and only to the extent they have the “power to persuade.” Id.; see also Moore 

v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 868–69 (9th Cir. 2000) (declining to review allegations of 

noncompliance with internal agency manual because such a manual “does not carry the 

force and effect of law.”); Carillo-Years v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 2011)

(ALJ did not err by failing to make explicit findings of diligence as provided in POMS).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument that the Commissioner had to demonstrate that an usher 

position is SGA by showing that a claimant would earn at least $1,130 per month in 2016 

is not legally supported. 

Ninth Circuit authority and the regulations require that at step five, the ALJ can 

rely on the testimony of a vocational expert as to “(1) what jobs the claimant, given his or 

her residual functional capacity, would be able to do; and (2) the availability of such jobs 

in the national economy.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 11101; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c); 20 

C.F.R. § 416.960(c) (Commissioner has the burden to demonstrate that based on the RFC 

assessment, as well as vocational factors of age, education and work experience, Plaintiff 

can adjust to do other work and the Commissioner must provide evidence demonstrating 

that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy). Legal authority 

does not require that the VE testify that the “other work” that a claimant can do 

constitutes substantial gainful activity; however, the Court notes that at step five the 

Commissioner has the burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff is unable to engage in any 

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substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy considering the 

claimant’s age, education and work experience and RFC. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) 

(“[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or 

mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he . . . cannot, considering his 

age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work 

which exists in the national economy. . . .”). 

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether the ALJ can consider the availability 

of part-time work on step five. See Wright v. Colvin, No. CV 12-1893, SP, 2014 WL 

5456044, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014) (Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed issue 

of whether ALJ can consider part-time work on step five); De La Cruz v. Astrue, No. 

08cv782 DLB, 2009 WL 1530157, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2009) (“While it is not 

necessarily clear in the Ninth Circuit whether part-time work constitutes ‘other work’ at 

step five . . . .”) In Wright, the plaintiff argued that the VE impermissibly included part 

time work in the job numbers yet the VE did not testify to that fact and Plaintiff did not 

pose the question to the VE. Wright, 2014 WL 5456044, at *6. Alternatively, even if the 

VE considered part-time jobs, the court noted there is no legal authority stating that the 

ALJ cannot consider part-time work in step five. Id. The district court in Wright, relying 

on other circuits that have held that the ALJ may consider part-time jobs, concluded that 

the ALJ’s step five determination was supported by substantial evidence. Id. (citing 

Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 450, n. 6 (2d Cir. 2012) (“We decline 

to create a per se rule prohibiting an ALJ from considering part-time positions.”); 

Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 745 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] VE may . . . testify as to the 

number of jobs that a claimant can perform without specifically identifying the 

percentage of those jobs that are part-time” and explaining that the regulations do not 

state “that a VE may permissibly testify only as to the availability of full-time jobs”); and 

King v. Astrue, No. C 09-5322-MEJ, 2011 WL 1791553, at *19 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 

2011) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the VE had to distinguish between full-time and 

part-time jobs because the regulations only require that a significant number of jobs 

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exist)). Other district courts have also found that it was not improper for the ALJ to 

consider other work that is available on a part-time basis. See Angelica E. v. Saul, Case 

No. 18cv1025-MAA, 2019 WL 3531272, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2019) (rejecting 

argument that usher jobs, which are mostly part-time, do not involve substantial gainful 

activity because the regulations state that part time work can be substantial gainful 

activity); Pitts v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 16-434, 2016 WL 6217068, at *4 (W.D. Pa. 

Oct. 25, 2016) (not improper for ALJ to consider election clerk position even it can be 

performed on a part-time basis). 

However in De La Cruz, 2009 WL 1530157, at *9, relying on Bladow v. Apfel, 

No. 08cv782 DLB, 205 F.3d 356, 359-60 (8th Cir. 2000) and Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 

1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), the district court held that the inclusion of part-time position 

of school bus monitor as “other work” was not proper. However, the district court’s 

reliance on Bladow and Kelley is not supported because they concerned whether a 

claimant is disabled based on his ability to perform part time work, Bladow, 205 F.3d at 

359 (“Bladow argues that the ALJ improperly found him not disabled based on his ability 

to perform other work part-time.”); Kelley, 185 F.3d at 1214 (describing the 

Commissioner's stance as “only an ability to do full-time work will prevent a finding of 

disabled at step five.”), and not whether the VE may testify only as to the existence of 

full-time jobs on step five. See Liskowitz, 559 F.3d at 745 (distinguishing Kelley). 

In Liskowitz, the Seventh Circuit noted that “to say that the ALJ may deny benefits 

only if she finds the claimant capable of some form of full-time work is quite different 

from saying that only full-time jobs can constitute significant work in the national 

economy.” Liskowitz, 559 F.3d at 745 (“a person who is functionally capable of running 

professionally should not be deemed disabled simply because some of the jobs that are 

available for professional runners are part-time jobs.”). 

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Absent guidance from the Ninth Circuit, cases in other courts dictate that the ALJ 

may consider part-time jobs as long as they constitute SGA7 when determining whether 

Plaintiff can adjust to “other work” that exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy. In Liskowitz, the court provided guidance as to what a claimant may do to 

challenge a VE’s testimony that the “other jobs” the claimant may do does not constitute 

SGA.

a VE may. . . testify as to the numbers of jobs that a claimant can perform 

without specifically identifying the percentage of those jobs that are parttime. The claimant, of course, may respond to the VE's testimony by 

offering evidence of [his] own that the jobs the VE identified do not 

constitute ‘substantial gainful work’ within the meaning of Section 

423(d)(2)(A). There may even be circumstances in which a claimant can 

accomplish this by showing that a substantial percentage of the jobs that the 

VE has identified are part-time jobs. However . . . [w]here, as here, the VE 

identifies a significant number of jobs the claimant is capable of performing 

and this testimony is uncontradicted (and is otherwise proper), it is not error 

for the ALJ to rely on the VE's testimony.

Liskowitz, 559 F.3d at 745.

 

7 The concept of substantial gainful activity involves the amount of compensation and the substantiality 

and gainfulness of the activity itself. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1532(b); Chicager v. Califano, 574 F.2d 161, 163 

(3d Cir. 1978); Keyes v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A five-hour work day can 

constitute substantial activity.”). According to the regulations, 

Substantial gainful activity is work activity that is both substantial and gainful:

(a) Substantial work activity. Substantial work activity is work activity that involves 

doing significant physical or mental activities. Your work may be substantial even if it is 

done on a part-time basis or if you do less, get paid less, or have less responsibility than 

when you worked before.

(b) Gainful work activity. Gainful work activity is work activity that you do for pay or 

profit. Work activity is gainful if it is the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, 

whether or not a profit is realized.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (emphasis added). 

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Here, Plaintiff presents the O*NET figures as to the duration of a typical work 

week but the figures do not support his argument that the job of usher does not constitute 

SGA or does not typically offer a 30-hour work week. O*NET states that most usher

jobs typically offer less than 40 hours, not less than 30 hours. It is not clear based on this 

that the usher job would not constitute substantial gainful activity. Plaintiff has not met 

his burden challenging the VE’s testimony. 

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and denies Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and grants Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion 

for summary judgment and GRANTS Defendant’s motion for cross-motion for summary 

judgment. The Clerk of Court shall close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 13, 2019

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