Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02434/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02434-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAROL A. LEVINE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA, JOSEPH DUGGAN

Defendants. /

No. C 03-02434 WHA

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO

FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL

INTRODUCTION

In December 2004, after summary judgment was entered in favor of defendants, plaintiff

Carol A. Levine belatedly filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file a

notice of appeal. This Court denied the motion, but did not reach the merits of her claim. The

Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration on the merits. This order addresses the

merits of plaintiff’s motion, and for the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

STATEMENT

On November 24, 2004, this Court granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of

defendants. Judgment was entered accordingly on the same day. Pursuant to Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A), any notice of appeal by plaintiff was due within thirty days. 

Plaintiff did not file a notice of appeal within the thirty-day period, but did file a late notice of

appeal on December 29, 2004. On the same day, she also filed a letter explaining why she

missed the filing deadline. According to the letter, she had been represented by counsel, Kelly

Case 3:03-cv-02434-WHA Document 141 Filed 10/26/06 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Armstrong, during the proceedings before this Court. Plaintiff had apparently instructed

Armstrong numerous times to preserve her appeal rights, but Armstrong did not file any notice

of appeal. Because plaintiff was unrepresented, she claimed that her “lack of expertise” and

inability to find counsel during the holiday season warranted an extension of time to file her

notice of appeal (Levine Exh. A). According to the docket, Armstrong was also terminated as

counsel on December 29 (Civil Docket 12/29/2004). 

On January 24, 2005, still proceeding pro se, plaintiff filed a formal motion for an

extension of time. In the declaration supporting the motion, she reiterated the assertions in her

letter from December 29. She explained that she received a letter from Armstrong on January 3

informing plaintiff that Armstrong would not represent plaintiff on any appeal. Plaintiff

“desperately” tried to retain other counsel but no attorney would represent her, as Armstrong

was still listed as plaintiff’s attorney of record (Levine Decl. ¶¶ 1-7).

On February 3, 2005, this Court denied the motion for an extension of time. The

February 3 order held that the relief requested by plaintiff would constitute an advisory finding

that the notice was timely. Plaintiff appealed the denial of her motion for an extension of time

to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of the merits of

plaintiff’s extension motion.

ANALYSIS

Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) provides that a district court may extend the time to file a notice of

appeal if, “regardless of whether its motion is filed before or during the 30 days after the time

prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires, that party shows excusable neglect or good cause.” The

Supreme Court has stated:

The ordinary meaning of “neglect” is “to give little attention or

respect” to a matter, or, closer to the point for our purposes, “to

leave undone or unattended to esp[ecially] through carelessness.” 

Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 791 (1983) (emphasis

added). The word therefore encompasses both simple, faultless

omissions to act and, more commonly, omissions caused by

carelessness. . . . Congress plainly contemplated that the courts

would be permitted, where appropriate to accept late filings caused

by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening

circumstances beyond the party’s control. . . . .

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*

 Technically, thirty days from entry of judgment would have been Friday, December 24, 2004. That

day, however, was a court holiday in observance of Christmas. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) provides

“[i]n computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, . . . [t]he last day of the period so

computed shall be included unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday, . . . in which event the period

runs until the end of the next day which is not one of the aforementioned days.” The first business day after the

holiday weekend was Monday, December 27. 

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Although inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes

construing the rules do not usually constitute “excusable” neglect,

it is clear that “excusable neglect” . . . is a somewhat “elastic

concept” and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by

circumstances beyond the control of the movant. . . . 

Because Congress has provided no other guideposts for

determining what sorts of neglect will be considered “excusable,”

we conclude that the determination is at bottom an equitable one,

taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the

party’s omission. These include . . . the danger of prejudice to the

[nonmovant], the length of the delay and its potential impact on

judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it

was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the

movant acted in good faith.

Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388, 392, 395 (1993);

see also Marx v. Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049, 1044 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying Pioneer to Rule

4(a)(5)). 

Considering the balancing test created by Pioneer, this order finds that plaintiff has

demonstrated that her notice of appeal was untimely due to excusable neglect. As recounted

above, plaintiff was represented by counsel when she opposed defendants’ summary judgment

motion before this Court. According to plaintiff, she believed that Ms. Armstrong would

represent plaintiff on appeal. After judgment was entered, plaintiff told Ms. Armstrong “to

either seek reconsideration of the court’s order or to appeal it” and “asked [Ms. Armstrong] to

file the notices which would be necessary to protect [plaintiff’s] appeal rights.” Plaintiff’s

notice of appeal was due by December 27, 2004.*

 No notice was filed by that date. Plaintiff,

proceeding pro se, filed a late notice of appeal on December 29. Plaintiff did not learn that Ms.

Armstrong would not represent her on appeal until January 3, 2005.

A lawyer’s miscalculation of time in which to file a notice of appeal does not constitute

“excusable neglect.” Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1994). Here,

however, it is not clear that plaintiff was effectively represented by counsel following the grant

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of summary judgment. Indeed, Ms. Armstrong did not file the untimely notice of appeal;

plaintiff filed the notice by herself. Plaintiff should not be penalized for an omission by

counsel, especially in light of the uncertainty of the attorney-client relationship immediately

before the notice of appeal was due. Excusable neglect is not “limited strictly to omissions

caused by circumstances beyond the control of the movant.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S.

at 392. Here, Ms. Armstrong was at least partly to blame for the late-filed notice.

Moreover, plaintiff diligently tried to preserve her appellate rights. She contacted other

attorneys, but was unable to find alternate representation. She was provided assistance, albeit

incorrect, in calculating the filing deadline for the notice of appeal (Levine Decl. ¶ 5). The facts

do not suggest that the late filing was purely the result of plaintiff’s negligence or circumstances

completely within plaintiff’s control. As the Ninth Circuit has held, “[w]hile pro se litigants are

not excused from following court rules, it is not apparent that [plaintiff’s] failure to respond to

the motion to dismiss resulted only from a failure to read and attempt to follow court rules.” 

Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1997). This order finds that

plaintiff acted in good faith when, possibly without the effective assistance of counsel, she filed

her notice of appeal late. 

Considering the other Pioneer factors supports a finding of excusable neglect. The

delay was not significant — the notice of appeal was only two days late. Accordingly, there

would not have been a substantial impact on the judicial proceedings. Moreover, there was no

significant danger of prejudice to defendants by permitting a late-filed notice of appeal. Under

Pioneer’s “flexible understanding” of excusable neglect, this order finds that plaintiff must be

excused from her failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Marx, 87 F.3d at 1054. 

At the hearing on this motion, defendants relied on Springer v. Windham, 382 F. Supp.

2d 158 (D. Me. 2005). In that case, the plaintiff filed a late notice of appeal pro se, even though

he had been represented in the case. The plaintiff made numerous attempts to contact his

lawyer, but was unable to obtain information about his case from the lawyer. The court found

that while the lawyer may have been negligent, there was no excusable neglect because the

plaintiff had been represented. 

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Although the facts of Springer appear to be similar to those in the instant case, this order

declines to follow that decision. The Springer court did not apply the “flexible” understanding

of excusable neglect that the Ninth Circuit has applied in similar situations. According to the

docket, plaintiff, like the plaintiff in Springer, was represented at the time the notice of appeal

was due. But plaintiff’s omission must be excused where, as here, the unrebutted record

establishes that the attorney’s representation was deficient and plaintiff was herself diligent in

trying to preserve her appeal rights.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time is GRANTED. The

notice of appeal filed on December 29, 2004 shall be construed as timely. Plaintiff may now

pursue an appeal of her substantive claims. The responsibility is on plaintiff to docket and to

pursue her appeal in a timely way.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 26, 2006 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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