Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-00208/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-00208-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Motor Vehicle Product Liability

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

RICHARD BANKHEAD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 3:07cv208-MHT

) (WO) 

AMERICAN SUZUKI MOTOR )

CORPORATION, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This lawsuit, which was removed from state court to

federal court based on diversity-of-citizenship

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, is now before the

court on plaintiff Richard Bankhead’s motion to remand.

Bankhead contends that removal is improper because the

amount in controversy is insufficient to confer federal

jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, the court

concludes that Bankhead’s motion should be denied. 

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I. BACKGROUND

In August 2006, Bankhead was injured while driving a

2006 Suzuki GSX 750 motorcycle when it allegedly caught

fire causing him to leave the roadway. 

On January 30, 2007, Bankhead sued defendant American

Suzuki Motor Corporation in an Alabama state court. He

charged American Suzuki with violation of the Alabama

Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine and with

negligence, wantonness, and breach of warranty. American

Suzuki removed this case to federal court on March 8,

2007, and Bankhead moved to remand on November 30, 2007.

II. GENERAL REMOVAL-AND-REMAND STANDARDS

A civil action brought in state court may be removed

by a defendant to federal court if it could have been

brought in federal court in the first instance. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a). Typically, removal is premised either on

federal-question jurisdiction or diversity-of-citizenship

jurisdiction. Federal-question jurisdiction exists when

the civil action arises under the Constitution, laws, or

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1. Section 1446 provides, in relevant part:

“(a) A defendant or defendants desiring

to remove any civil action ... from a

State court shall file in the district

court ... a notice of removal signed

pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure and containing a

short and plain statement of the grounds

for removal, together with a copy of all

process, pleadings, and orders served

upon such defendant or defendants in

such action.

“(b) The notice of removal of a civil

action or proceeding shall be filed

within thirty days after the receipt by

the defendant, through service or

otherwise, of a copy of the initial

pleading setting forth the claim for

relief upon which such action or

proceeding is based, or within thirty

days after the service of summons upon

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treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction exist when the

amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000, exclusive of

interest and costs, and the parties are citizens of

different States. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

The party seeking removal has, under 28 U.S.C. § 1446,

the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Williams v. Best

Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).1 After

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the defendant if such initial pleading

has then been filed in court and is not

required to be served on the defendant,

whichever period is shorter.

“If the case stated by the initial

pleading is not removable, a notice of

removal may be filed within thirty days

after receipt by the defendant, through

service or otherwise, of a copy of an

amended pleading, motion, order or other

paper from which it may first be

ascertained that the case is one which

is or has become removable ....”

2. Section 1447(c) provides, in relevant part:

“A motion to remand the case on the

basis of any defect other than lack of

subject matter jurisdiction must be made

within 30 days after the filing of the

notice of removal under section 1446(a).

If at any time before final judgment it

appears that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, the case

shall be remanded.”

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removal, a party can move to remand to state court on the

basis of any defect in the removal including lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).2

 A

motion based on a removal defect must be made within 30

days after the filing of the notice of removal. Id.

However, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it

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appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” Id. Thus,

there is no time limitation on a motion to remand for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction. Lowery v. Alabama Power

Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1214 n.64 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The

existence of subject matter jurisdiction, on the other

hand, may be challenged at any time, including within the

first thirty days after the notice of removal.”).

Finally, “[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises

significant federalism concerns, federal courts are

directed to construe removal statutes strictly. Indeed,

all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor

of remand to state court.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

In his motion to remand, Bankhead argues that

diversity jurisdiction is improper because the more-thanCase 3:07-cv-00208-MHT-SRW Document 26 Filed 01/07/08 Page 5 of 15
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$ 75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement has not been

met. This court disagrees. 

Where, as in this case, the plaintiff does not

specifically allege an amount in controversy or the total

amount in damages demanded in its complaint, the removing

defendant must prove the amount in controversy by a

preponderance of the evidence. Leonard v. Enterprise Rent

A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002). Removal is

proper if it is “facially apparent from the complaint that

the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional

requirement.” Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319. If the amount

in controversy is not facially apparent from the

complaint, the court looks to the notice of removal and

any evidence submitted by the parties “relevant to the

amount in controversy at the time the case was removed.”

Id. However, a mere “conclusory allegation in the notice

of removal that the jurisdictional amount is satisfied,

without setting forth the underlying facts supporting such

an assertion, is insufficient to meet the defendant’s

burden.” Id. at 1319-20.

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In this case, Bankhead did not specify in his

complaint an amount in controversy or how much he was

seeking in damages. However, American Suzuki argues that

it is facially apparent from Bankhead’s complaint that the

jurisdictional requirement of $ 75,000 is satisfied.

Bankhead has alleged four common-law claims, but his

complaint is nowhere near specific enough as to the

duration, extent, severity, or kinds of harms alleged such

that this court could determine by a preponderance of the

evidence the value of such claims, were he to prevail.

Therefore, the amount in controversy is not facially

apparent from the complaint. 

This court therefore looks to the notice of removal

and any evidence submitted by the parties to determine

whether American Suzuki has met its burden of proving

jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence.

First, in its notice of removal, American Suzuki cites

several “similar cases” involving product manufacturers

where Alabama courts authorized damage awards greater than

the jurisdictional minimum. Defendant’s Notice of Removal

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(doc. no. 1), at 3-4. It is questionable “whether such

general evidence is ever of much use in establishing the

value of claims in any one particular suit,” Lowery, 483

F.3d at 1221, for “the facts regarding other cases tell us

nothing about the value of the claims in this lawsuit.”

Id. In any event, the court has reviewed those cases and

concludes that they are so factually and legally

distinguishable from this case that it is impossible to

draw any reasonable conclusions from them. See Moore v.

CNA Foundation, 472 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2007)

(Thompson, J.) (“[Defendant] cites several ‘representative

cases’ where Alabama courts authorized a damage award

greater than $ 75,000. The court has reviewed those cases

and concludes that they are so factually and legally

distinguishable from this case that it is impossible to

draw any reasonable conclusions from them.”).

Second, American Suzuki notes in its removal notice

that the complaint “contains no disclaimer that plaintiff

seeks less than $ 75,000 exclusive of interests and

costs.” Defendant’s Notice of Removal (doc. no. 1), at 4.

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As noted above, the burden of proving federal jurisdiction

is American Suzuki’s, not Bankhead’s; therefore the

failure of Bankhead to include such a disclaimer is not

sufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence that the jurisdictional minimum has been met. 

Finally, as evidence that the amount in controversy

had been met at the time of removal, American Suzuki has

attached, to his response in opposition to the remand

motion, Bankhead’s initial settlement demand letter,

seeking $ 150,000.00 to settle the matter. This court

agrees with American Suzuki that a settlement letter is

admissible evidence of the amount in controversy at the

time of removal. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

has stated that “numerous types of documents have been

held to qualify” as “other paper,” which under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446(b) can serve as a basis for removal. Lowery, 483

F.3d at 1212 n.62. “They include ... settlement offers.”

Id.

However, the Eleventh Circuit has also stated that

“the removal-remand scheme set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§

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1446(b) and 1447(c) requires that a court review the

propriety of removal on the basis of the removing

documents.” Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1211. “If the

jurisdictional amount is either stated clearly on the face

of the documents before the court, or readily deducible

from them, then the court has jurisdiction,” id., and,

“[i]f not, the court must remand.” Id. The appellate

court concluded that, “Under this approach, jurisdiction

is either evident from the removing documents or remand is

appropriate.” Id. Here, Bankhead’s settlement demand

letter was sent to American Suzuki in October 2007, seven

months after the removal of the litigation to federal

court. Therefore, the settlement letter was not part of

the removal documents. 

The Eleventh Circuit has gone on to clarify that

“there are some exceptions to the rule that the court is

limited to considering the removing documents.” Lowery,

483 F.3d at 1214 n.66. The court explained that, “in some

limited circumstances, a defendant may effectively amend

a defective notice of removal upon receipt of additional

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evidence.” Id. “For example,” the court continued, “such

a situation might arise where, after filing an

insufficient notice of removal but before remand is

ordered, the defendant receives a paper from the plaintiff

that would itself provide sufficient grounds for removal.”

Id. 

Bankhead’s settlement letter constitutes an effective

amendment of American Suzuki’s defective notice of

removal. In particular, because there is nothing in the

record to reflect, or even hint, that damages decreased

between the time of removal and the tendering of the

settlement letter, the letter provides post-removal

clarification of the removal notice showing that the

amount in controversy at the time of removal far exceeded

the jurisdictional requirement. See id. (citing Cohn v.

Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 839-40 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002)

(holding that the defendant effectively amended its

insufficient notice of removal by later alleging, in its

opposition to remand, that the plaintiff had offered

settlement for an amount greater than the jurisdictional

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minimum)); Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d

945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000) (allowing for the consideration

of post-removal evidence in assessing removal

jurisdiction); Fuller v. Exxon Corp., 78 F.Supp. 2d 1289,

1296 (S.D. Ala. 1999) (Vollmer, J.) (concluding that a

post-removal clarification “may be considered if the

amount in controversy is not apparent on the face of the

complaint at the time of removal”). 

In addition, in a footnote, the Lowery court appears

to draw an interesting distinction between jurisdictional

challenges made within § 1447(c)’s 30-day time limit and

those made later. The court states:

“There is only a thirty-day window,

therefore, for a plaintiff to challenge the

propriety of the removal itself, whether that

challenge be on the basis of a procedural

defect or a lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. ... Where the plaintiff does

not challenge the removal on jurisdictional

grounds until after judgment, or where the

plaintiff challenges removal before judgment

but after the thirty-day period has lapsed,

the court is no longer considering the

propriety of the removal, but instead,

whether subject matter jurisdiction exists

at all. ... In considering these later

challenges to jurisdiction, the court may

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look to any relevant information the parties

may present, up until the time of the

challenge to jurisdiction.”

Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1214 n.64 (citations omitted)

(emphasis in original). In Lowery, the jurisdictional

challenge was made within the 30-day time limit, and thus,

based on this fact and the above quote, Lowery’s

restrictive statement that “jurisdiction is either evident

from the removing documents or remand is appropriate,” id.

at 1211, applies to only challenges made within the 30-day

limit. Here, in contrast, because Bankhead made his

jurisdictional challenge after the 30-day limit, this

court is not generally limited to the removal documents

but instead “may look to any relevant information the

parties may present, up until the time of the challenge to

jurisdiction,” id. at 1214 n.64, including the settlement

letter. (Indeed, a lesson that perhaps can be drawn from

the Lowery distinction is that a plaintiff who wants to

restrict the court to the removal documents had better

make his challenge within the 30-day time limit.)

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In his motion to remand, filed approximately two

months after Bankhead sent the initial settlement demand

letter to American Suzuki, Bankhead stipulates that he is

not seeking an amount in excess of $ 75,000.00. As

evidence he attaches a second settlement demand letter,

sent approximately three days prior to his filing of the

motion to remand, that seeks $ 70,000.00 to settle the

matter. 

The court construes this second settlement demand

letter as a post-removal waiver of a certain amount of

damages in an effort to deprive this court of

jurisdiction. See Fuller, 78 F.Supp. 2d at 1296

(concluding that a post-removal waiver “cannot be used to

amend a complaint and thereby destroy federal jurisdiction

that has already attached”). Where, as here, “the

plaintiff after removal, by stipulation, by affidavit, or

by amendment of his pleadings, reduces the claim below the

requisite amount, this does not deprive the district court

of jurisdiction.” St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red

Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 292 (1938); see also Poore v.

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American-Amicable Life Ins. Co., 218 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th

Cir. 2000) (“events occurring after removal which may

reduce the damages recoverable below the amount in

controversy requirement do not oust the district court's

jurisdiction”), overruled on other grounds, Powerex Corp.

v. Reliant Energy Servs, Inc., ___ U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct.

2411 (2007). 

The court therefore concludes that, on the basis of

the initial settlement letter seeking $ 150,000.00,

American Suzuki has proven by a preponderance of the

evidence that, at the time of removal, the amount-incontroversy requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 was met and

that removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

*** 

Accordingly, it is the ORDERED that plaintiff Richard

Bankhead’s motion to remand (doc. no. 20) is denied. 

DONE, this the 7th day of January, 2008.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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