Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04367/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04367-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

EDWARD THOMAS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

R.T.C. GROUNDS, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 13-cv-04367-CW (PR) 

ORDER REVOKING PLAINTIFF'S IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS AND 

DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

On September 20, 2013, Plaintiff Edward Thomas, a state 

prisoner currently incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison, filed a 

pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 

the violation of his constitutional rights by correctional 

officers at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP), where he was 

formerly incarcerated. On December 3, 2013, the Court granted 

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). In 

reviewing Plaintiff’s complaint and amended complaint, the Court 

found that, liberally construed, the complaints alleged 

cognizable claims for excessive force, retaliation, dangerous 

prison conditions and due process violations against SVSP 

officers. All other claims were dismissed. Subsequently, 

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. 

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On October 29, 2014, the Court issued an order directing 

Defendants to address whether Plaintiff’s IFP status should be 

revoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) based on its ruling in 

another case filed by Plaintiff, Thomas v. Sepulveda, 2014 WL 

5409064, *2-4 (N.D. Cal.), that he had three previous cases that 

counted as strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In their 

responsive brief, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s IFP status 

should be revoked because he is a three-strikes litigant under 

§ 1915(g) and his complaint does not allege that he is in 

imminent danger. Plaintiff has filed an “objection” to 

Defendants’ response and a “rebuttal opposition.” 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 A prisoner may not bring a civil action IFP under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 "if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is 

under imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). 

 For purposes of a dismissal that may count under § 1915(g), 

the phrase "fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted" parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same interpretation; the word 

"frivolous" refers to a case that is "'of little weight or 

importance: having no basis in law or fact,'" and the word 

"malicious" refers to a case "filed with the 'intention or desire 

to harm another.'" Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

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Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Only cases within one of these 

three categories can be counted as strikes for § 1915(g) 

purposes, so the mere fact that a plaintiff has filed many cases 

does not alone warrant dismissal under § 1915(g). Id. Rather, 

dismissal of an action under § 1915(g) should only occur when, 

"after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an [earlier] 

action, and other relevant information, the district court 

determines that the action was dismissed because it was 

frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim." Id. A 

dismissal under § 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed 

with his action IFP under § 1915(g), but he still may pursue his 

claims if he pays the full filing fee at the outset of the 

action. Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Plaintiff’s Strikes 

 Based on the Court’s finding in Thomas v. Sepulveda, 2014 WL 

5409064 (N.D. Cal.), that Plaintiff is a three strikes litigant 

under § 1915(g), Defendants argue that he is collaterally 

estopped from arguing that he does not have three strikes. In 

Sepulveda, the Court found the following cases qualified as 

strikes under § 1915(g): (1) Thomas v. Terhune, case no. 03-cv5467 (E.D. Cal.) (complaint dismissed for failure to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted); (2) dismissal of the 

appeal in Thomas v. Terhune, case no. 06-1501 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(Ninth Circuit determined Plaintiff not entitled to IFP on 

appeal, Plaintiff did not pay filing fee and appeal dismissed for 

failure to prosecute); and (3) denial of the appeal in Thomas v. 

Lamarque, case no. 07-16437 (9th Cir. 2007) (Ninth Circuit 

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determined appeal not taken in good faith, revoked Plaintiff’s 

IFP status and dismissed appeal for failure to prosecute after 

Plaintiff failed to pay filing fee). 

 For collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of an issue, the 

following elements must be satisfied: (1) the issue at stake must 

be identical to the one alleged in the previous litigation; (2) 

the issue must have been actually litigated by the party against 

whom preclusion is asserted; and (3) the determination of the 

issue in the previous case must have been a critical and 

necessary part of the judgment. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 

923 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 A comparison of this case with Thomas v. Sepulveda shows 

that all of the collateral estoppel requirements are satisfied. 

Plaintiff was the adverse party in Sepulveda, and the parties in 

that case litigated the same issue that is currently before this 

Court, that is, whether Plaintiff brought at least three actions 

or appeals that were dismissed on the ground that they were 

frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim for relief. 

Sepulveda, 2014 WL 5409064, at *1-2. That determination was a 

critical and necessary part of the judgment because it directly 

resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s action. Id. at *5. The 

judgment in Sepulveda is final; on January 14, 2015, Plaintiff’s 

appeal was dismissed because it was “so insubstantial as to not 

warrant further review.” In re Edward Thomas, No. 09-80085 (9th 

Cir. 2015). 

 Furthermore, in Sepulveda, the Court determined that 

Plaintiff was collaterally estopped from challenging his threestrike status based on the findings in two other previous 

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district court cases, Thomas v. Felker, No. 09-cv-2486 FEC-CKD-P 

(E.D. Cal.), and Thomas v. Beutler, No. 10-cv-1300 MCE-CKD (E.D. 

Cal.). Sepulveda, 2014 WL 5409064, at *3-4. Consequently, 

Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from arguing the three cases 

addressed in Sepulveda are not strikes under § 1915(g). 

 Defendants also submit that Plaintiff has five other appeals 

that qualify as strikes based on the fact that a pre-filing order 

was entered by the Ninth Circuit regarding Plaintiff’s appeals 

and, subsequent to its entry, Plaintiff filed five separate 

appeals that the Ninth Circuit rejected as “so insubstantial as 

to not warrant further review.” See Defs. Request for Judicial 

Notice, Ex. B at 2-3 (In re Edward Thomas, 09-80085, Ninth 

Circuit docket showing the dismissals, pursuant to the pre-filing 

order, of Plaintiff’s appeals on January 12, 2011, September 6, 

2012, December 13, 2012, March 28, 2012, and May 29, 2013).1 In 

dismissing these appeals, the Ninth Circuit cited In re Keith 

Thomas, 508 F.3d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 2007), in which it held 

that it may preclude an appeal from proceeding under a pre-filing 

order only “when it is clear from the face of the appellant’s 

pleadings that: (i) the appeal is patently insubstantial or 

clearly controlled by well settled precedent; or (ii) the facts 

presented are fanciful or in conflict with facts of which the 

court may take judicial notice.” 

 

1

 Defendants request judicial notice, under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 201, of proceedings in this Court, another district 

court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. This request is 

granted. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 

2007) (court may take judicial notice of proceedings in other 

courts if they have a direct relation to the matters at issue); 

United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (court 

may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases). 

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 Plaintiff argues that the dismissals of his appeals do not 

count as strikes because they were not heard or adjudicated, 

which violates his right to appeal. Plaintiff is mistaken. As 

indicated on the Ninth Circuit’s docket, from reviewing the face 

of each of Plaintiff’s appeals it determined that each one was so 

insubstantial it warranted no further review. These dismissals 

are equivalent to dismissals for frivolousness or for failure to 

state a claim for relief and, thus, they count as strikes under 

§ 1915(g). Therefore, Plaintiff has filed four cases and five 

appeals that qualify as strikes under § 1915(g). He may proceed 

under IFP status only if he was in imminent danger at the time he 

filed his complaint. 

II. Imminent Danger 

 A plaintiff who has three strikes under § 1915(g) may still 

proceed IFP by showing that he or she “is under imminent danger 

of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This 

exception only “applies if the complaint makes a plausible 

allegation that the prisoner faced imminent physical danger at 

the time of filing” the complaint. Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 

F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007). The complaint is the focus of 

the inquiry. Id.; Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d 

Cir. 2001) (en banc). The plaintiff must show a nexus between 

the imminent danger alleged in the complaint and the claims it 

asserts. Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 299 (2nd Cir. 

2009). This means that the plaintiff must show that (1) the 

imminent danger of serious physical injury is fairly traceable to 

the unlawful conduct asserted in the complaint and (2) a 

favorable judicial outcome would redress that injury. Id. 

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 Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on September 20, 2013 and 

his amended complaint was filed on December 27, 2013. Doc. Nos. 

1 and 7. The allegations in the complaints assert claims against 

SVSP correctional staff for actions that occurred in 2012 and the 

beginning of 2013. In other filings, Plaintiff indicates that he 

was transferred to the California Substance Abuse Treatment 

Facility on July 3, 2013 and to Corcoran State Prison in February 

2014. See RJN, Ex. C at 1 (Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction in Case No. 14-1157 CW (PR)). Neither the complaint 

nor the amended complaint alleges imminent danger of serious 

physical injury at the California Substance Abuse Treatment 

Facility, where he was housed when he filed the complaint, or at 

Corcoran State Prison, where he was transferred in February 2014 

and where he is now incarcerated. Even liberally construed, 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that he was in imminent 

danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed the 

complaint on September 20, 2013, from Defendants’ actions which 

occurred in 2012 and early 2013 at a different prison. 

 In response, Plaintiff argues that he filed his complaint on 

April 23, 2013 and the Court screened it on April 11, 2014. If 

this were true, he would have filed his complaint when he was 

still housed at SVSP. However, the Court’s docket of his case 

establishes that his complaint was filed on September 20, 2013 

and the Court screened it on December 6, 2013. See Doc. Nos. 1 

and 6.2 

 

2

 In his opposition, Plaintiff also argues he is in imminent 

danger based upon his lack of medical treatment. This complaint 

does not assert any medical claims; therefore, Plaintiff must be 

confusing this case with another case he has filed. 

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 In his sur-reply, Plaintiff argues that he was prevented 

from filing his complaint at the time he experienced imminent 

danger because he was required to exhaust administrative remedies 

before filing it and he filed it as soon as he could. Under 

Ninth Circuit authority, this Court may only consider whether 

Plaintiff was in imminent danger at the time he filed his 

complaint, not at the time he filed his administrative 

grievances. Plaintiff also argues that he is still in imminent 

danger because “the State of California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation’s institutional facilities continue to subject 

Plaintiff to being placed in a cell with gang members, affiliates 

and associates.” However, the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is not a defendant in this 

action and Plaintiff cannot show that he was in imminent danger 

from the staff at the California Substance Abuse Treatment 

Facility or Corcoran State Prison merely because these 

institutions are under the auspices of the CDCR. Furthermore, as 

explained in the Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for a 

preliminary injunction, the Court lacks jurisdiction over 

individuals at Plaintiff’s present prison who are not parties to 

this action and, thus, a favorable judicial ruling on his claims 

would not redress his alleged present imminent danger. See Doc. 

No. 27 at 2-3. 

 Therefore, the imminent danger exception under § 1915(g) 

does not apply. 

 Accordingly, under § 1915(g), Plaintiff’s IFP status is 

revoked and he is barred from proceeding IFP in this action. 

When IFP status is revoked pursuant to § 1915(g), the district 

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court may dismiss the action without prejudice to re-filing with 

payment of fees at the time the action is re-filed. See Tierney, 

128 F.3d at 1311 (under § 1915(g), case was properly dismissed 

without prejudice to re-filing with payment of filing fees). 

CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows: 

 1. The Order entered on December 3, 2013 (Doc. No. 5), 

granting Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, is VACATED and 

Plaintiff's IFP status is REVOKED. 

 2. This case is dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff's 

re-filing it with payment of the $400 filing fee. 

 3. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all motions, enter 

a separate judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 26, 2015 

__________________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge 

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