Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-03116/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-03116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JORGE ARTURO GONZALES,

Petitioner,

 v.

D.L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 03-3116 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. In response to the court’s order to show cause, respondent has filed an answer and

a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and has lodged supporting

exhibits. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. The case is ready for decision. 

BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the underlying facts as follows:

The People’s principal witness was firearm assault victim Rene

Morales, who described the Mission District encounter between appellant and

murder victim Nelson Espinoza. Morales testified that he met Espinoza, his

friend of eight or nine years, after work on December 5, 1997. It was a Friday

and Espinoza had just got paid. The two men met by Espinoza’s house near

Shotwell and Army Streets in San Francisco, to “go out like we did every

Friday.”

Morales and Espinoza first went to an El Farolito taqueria at 24th and

Alabama Streets. At approximately 7:45 p.m., they went to the El Trebol bar

at 22d and Capp Streets, where they drank beer. They left the bar and met

their friend Wilbur Vasquez. The trio returned to the El Trebol, where they

“drank another beer.” A fourth man, Oscar Aranda, joined them at the bar. 

Shortly after midnight the quartet went to another bar, the El Zarape, where

they drank “for quite awhile.”

They left the El Zarape at almost 2:00 a.m. on December 6, and went

to buy more beer at the Cala Foods market between 23rd and 24th Streets on

South Van Ness. Espinoza and Vasquez went into Cala Foods and came out

with two 12-packs of beer. The four men stood for a while in the store’s

parking lot facing Shotwell Street. Espinoza and Vasquez separated from the

group to go smoke cigarettes; Morales and Aranda, who did not smoke,

started to walk towards 23d Street.

A van passed in front of Morales and Aranda and stopped in front of

Espinoza and Vasquez. Appellant and two other men got out of the van. 

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 1 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Appellant asked Espinoza and Vasquez where they were from and what they

were doing on 24th Street. Appellant also told the two men “that they were

like Surenos,” in reference to a street gang. Morales saw Espinoza walk

toward appellant, who in turn walked two or three steps toward Espinoza.

As appellant and Espinoza “g[o]t close to each other,” appellant pulled

a black automatic pistol and pointed it at Espinoza, holding the gun straight

out in front of him. Espinoza had not said anything to appellant nor moved his

hands in a threatening manner; he approached appellant holding a bottle of

beer at chest level. When appellant pulled the gun, Espinoza moved back

and raised his arms, and swung at appellant’s gun hand in an effort to knock

the gun out of appellant’s hand. According to Morales, Espinoza did not

swing the beer bottle at appellant or raise the bottle over his head.

Appellant lowered his gun arm, straightened it out again, and shot

Espinoza in the chest, killing him. Morales told appellant to stop shooting,

whereupon appellant pointed the pistol at Morales and Vasquez.

Vasquez essentially corroborated Morales’ testimony, although he

couldn’t identify appellant as the shooter. Vasquez testified that he met

Espinoza, Morales and Aranda after work on Friday, December 5, 1997, and

joined them at the El Zarape bar. Late that evening the four went to Cala

Foods to buy more beer. Vasquez walked out of the store with Espinoza

toward Shotwell Street, with Morales and Aranda about six feet behind. A

van pulled up in front of Vasquez and Espinoza; one of the passengers got

out and urinated in the parking lot.

Espinoza walked toward another passenger of the van, who got out

and pulled a black automatic pistol. The passenger pointed the gun at

Espinoza, who made two motions with his arms as if to grab the gun or knock

it away. The passenger shot Espinoza in the chest, and then ran off down

Shotwell Street. Vasquez could not identify the shooter because it was too

dark.

An autopsy revealed that Espinoza died from a gunshot wound to the

chest which perforated his pulmonary artery and caused massive internal

bleeding. Espinoza had a blood alcohol level of .23 or .24, and traces of

metabolized cocaine in his system.

Appellant was apprehended after a traffic stop on February 4, 1999,

and consented to a search of his house. That search revealed a 9mm Smith

& Wesson automatic pistol which Morales identified as being “similar” to the

one he saw in appellant’s hands the night of the shooting.

Appellant did not testify. Rather, he presented the testimony of

Abraham Guerra, a retired airport security guard who lived on Shotwell Street

across from the Cala Foods parking lot. Early in the morning of December 6,

1997, Guerra was awakened by the loud talking of four men drinking beer in

the parking lot. He sprang to the window to see what was the matter, and

saw a van pull into the parking lot and stop about 25 feet from the four

revelers. Three men got out of the van. At least two of them urinated in the

parking lot.

Guerra saw one of the beer drinkers approach the two urinating men

and yell at them to stop. Two more beer drinkers joined the first in cajoling

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 2 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 All exhibits referenced in this order are those lodged by respondent in support of the

answer to the petition, unless otherwise noted.

2

Neither petitioner nor respondent has provided a copy of the state court order denying

the petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, it is undisputed that petitioner exhausted

all of the claims raised in the instant petition by presenting them to the California Supreme

Court.

3

the two van passengers against the outdoor micturition. The fourth beer

drinker approached the third van passenger with a bottle of beer held in his

closed right fist. It looked to Guerra like the fourth drinker was trying to grab

the third van passenger with his left hand; Guerra though the drinker was

going to hit the third passenger with the beer bottle. But Guerra admitted the

fourth drinker did not raise the bottle over his head.

Guerra saw the third van passenger step back four steps and pull a

gun on the fourth beer drinker. The gunman may have said, “Go, go.” The

beer drinker stepped toward the gunman and tried, unsuccessfully, to push

away his gun hand; he used his left hand, not the hand holding the bottle. As

the beer drinker approached the gunman holding the beer bottle at his side,

the gunman shot him.

On rebuttal, the parties stipulated that appellant told a police inspector

that Espinoza twice tried to push away his gun hand, and that after he fired

the shot he picked up the shell casing and ran to his mother’s house.

The defense theory was that appellant acted in self-defense, imperfect

self-defense, or in the heat of passion or sudden quarrel. The jury was

instructed, inter alia, on first and second degree murder, voluntary and

involuntary manslaughter, self-defense, imperfect self-defense, and assault

with a firearm.

Appellant was acquitted of the first degree murder, but convicted of the

second degree murder, of Espinoza. He was also convicted of the firearm

assault on Morales. The jury found that appellant personally used a firearm in

the commission of both offenses. Appellant was sentenced to 27 years and 4

months to life: 15 years to life for the murder plus the aggravated 10-year

consecutive term for the personal use of a firearm, plus a 1-year consecutive

sentence for the firearm assault and an additional 16-month consecutive

sentence for the personal use of a firearm.

Respondent's Ex. A (Unpublished Opinion of the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate

District, People v. Gonzales, No. A092988 (Jan. 18, 2002) at 1-4.1

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed

the judgment in a reasoned opinion. Petitioner did not seek direct appellate review in the

California Supreme Court. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court which, apparently, was summarily denied.2

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 3 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2001),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340;

see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Section 2254(d)(2) applies

to intrinsic review of a state court’s process, or situations in which the petitioner challenges

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 4 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

the state court’s findings based entirely on the state court record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366

F.3d 992, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004). The relevant question under § 2254(d)(2) is whether

an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could reasonably

conclude that the state court findings are supported by the record. Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The state court decision to which 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of

the state court, see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming,

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). 

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted only if the error had a

“‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.’” Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638

(1993)).

DISCUSSION

A. Exclusion of Evidence

1. Background

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s exclusion of evidence that prosecution witness

Rene Morales had a prior arrest for burglary and may have made false statements under

oath concerning the incident violated due process and his right to confrontation. 

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts relevant to this claim as

follows:

During a break in Morales’ cross-examination, and outside the

presence of the jury, defense counsel told the court he had requested, but not

received, a copy of a police report showing that Morales “was arrested for a

petty theft” in 1992 – eight years prior to appellant’s trial. Counsel stated he

wanted to impeach Morales with that misdemeanor arrest pursuant to People

v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284 (Wheeler). Counsel also suggested the theft

incident included a burglary charge of some kind. The People responded that

they had not yet been able to locate the police report. The court suggested

impeachment would not be proper: “Sounds too remote and too minor to me,

[a] petty theft eight years ago . . . .”

The court permitted cross-examination of Morales regarding the prior

incident, outside the jury’s presence, while the People were searching for the

report. Morales recalled “having been arrested for a burglary”; he thought the

arrest “was maybe about eight or nine years ago.” He said he was arrested

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 5 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

“on the street” in San Francisco, because “the police said that somebody had

broken a car window and that witnesses had said that two Latino men had

done it.” He denied breaking into the car. When asked, “Had you taken

something out of the car?” He replied, “No. No.” He was also asked, “Have

you ever been arrested for taking something that did not belong to you?” HE

answered, “No, never.”

The court ruled “[b]ased on what I’ve heard there is not enough to

cross-examine this witness . . . to impeach him” under Wheeler. The court

withheld a final ruling until the police report could be located.

The next day, again outside the presence of the jury, the People

produced the police report. According to the report, Morales had been

arrested for burglary (probably in the second degree) after he was found

searching through a large duffle bag on the back seat of the victim’s car. 

Defense counsel renewed his request to impeach, but the court indicated 

“. . . I still think it falls short of substantial enough impeachment. . . . [¶] The

problem I have is that we’re going to have a whole side issue as to whether

the car was locked, whether he broke in, whether somebody else broke in

and then he got into the back. It’s exactly the same kind of side issues that

[Wheeler] says must be avoided in order to keep the focus on the trial,

especially if the probative [e]ffect of whatever it was the person’s accused of

doing falls short of the type of moral turpitude that I think is more geared

towards credibility issues, but I’ll take a look at the police report.”

Later that day, outside the jury’s presence, the court indicated it had

reviewed the police report and had not changed its view on denying the

impeachment request. “. . . I think it is of marginal impeachment [e]ffect. It

raises too many issues. It’s not clear from the report how it was that Mr.

Morales was caught. It doesn’t look like he was caught right on the scene but

it looks like he was brought back to the scene and was identified by the

victim, I think, I can’t tell that for sure. And it was consistent with what Mr.

Morales said. He said he was brought in because there were two Latin males

who were accused of being in the car. But I think that as I said earlier this is

of marginal impeachment value and . . . therefore[,] exercising my discretion,

we’ll not bring the witness back to be cross-examined on this.”

Defense counsel then noted it was “an interesting point” whether

Morales “in answering the questions that were posed to him regarding this

incident would subject himself to a claim of perjury or a misstatement of facts,

and I certainly argue that it appears to be the case that he was not in fact

forthright and truthful when he testified regarding this incident.” Counsel did

not make a request that he be allowed to impeach Morales for purportedly

committing perjury in his cross-examination when he denied taking anything

in the car burglary.

Ex. A at 5-6.

On appeal, petitioner argued that under state law the trial court should have allowed

Morales to be impeached with his prior arrest and his statements to the court about the

arrest, because they evidenced moral turpitude and dishonesty. Petitioner also argued that

the trial court’s ruling deprived him of his right to present a defense and to impeach and

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 6 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

cross-examine the principal prosecution witness against him, in violation of due process

and the Sixth Amendment. 

Rejecting petitioner’s contentions, the court of appeal found that the trial court had

properly exercised its discretion under state law when excluding the evidence: 

Here the admission of the impeachment evidence would have required

locating the victim of an eight-year-old minor car burglary and producing her

in court. The parties would have then had to wrestle with issues surrounding

the definition of burglary, such as whether Morales formed an intent to steal

before he purportedly broke into the car – eight years after the fact, when it

may well be that Morales did nothing more than come across a vandalized

car and rummage in a duffel bag inside. The evidence would have quickly

degenerated into just the sort of “nitpicking war[ ] of attrition condemned by

the Wheeler court. The trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding

the incident was too minor, too remote, and too tenuous of probative

character to warrant admission for impeachment. [Footnote omitted.]

Appellant in his brief also argues that he should have been able to

impeach Morales with evidence that he made false statements when

questioned outside the presence of the jury about the prior car incident. This

misstates the trial court record because defense counsel did not make that

argument to the court. 

In any case appellant had numerous ways to cast doubt on Morales’

credibility. The jury knew he was a friend of Espinoza of long standing, and

thus the jury was free to infer a pro-prosecution bias in the trial of his friend’s

killer. The jury knew Morales had been drinking fairly heavily on the night of

the shooting. The jury knew that Morales testified under oath that he did not

see Espinoza use cocaine that night – but cocaine metabolite was found in

Espinoza’s blood. Appellant’s multiple avenues of impeachment simply did

not lead the jury to reject the core of Morales’ testimony.

Ex. A at 7-8. 

The court also concluded that no constitutional violation had occurred, because “not

every restriction on cross-examination violates the confrontation clause, and this one did

not.” Id. at 7 n.1 (internal citation omitted).

In his federal habeas corpus petition, petitioner argues that the exclusion of the

impeachment evidence and the limitation on his right to cross-examination violated due

process and his right to confrontation. 

2. Applicable Federal Law

A state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review unless the

ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 7 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed

by due process. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). “State and federal

rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence

from criminal trials.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731 (2006) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). This latitude is limited, however, by a defendant’s

constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense, rights originating in the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments. See id.; see also Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2004) (the Supreme Court has made clear that the erroneous exclusion of critical,

corroborative defense evidence may violate both the due process right to a fair trial and the

Sixth Amendment right to present a defense). The due process and Sixth Amendment

limitations on the exclusion of critical corroborative defense evidence are clearly

established federal law for purposes of federal habeas corpus review. See id. at 1003.

The Due Process Clause does not guarantee a defendant the right to present all

relevant evidence, see Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996), and due process is not

violated unless the exclusion of evidence “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” see id. at 43

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, the right to cross-examination is

not without limit, and the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense is not violated unless

the erroneous restriction on cross-examination had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict. See Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2001) (discussing standard on federal habeas corpus review). 

In assessing whether the exclusion of evidence has resulted in a violation of due

process or the Sixth Amendment, the court considers the following factors: (1) the probative

value of the excluded evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is

capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or

merely cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. 

Chia, 360 F.3d at 1004. “[F]ederal habeas courts must ‘determine what weight the various

interests will carry when placed on the scales,’ and ultimately determine whether the

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 8 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

decision of the state court to exclude the evidence in question was reasonable or

unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted).

3. Analysis

Here, the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence of Morales’s prior arrest was

reasonable. The potential probative value of the evidence was contingent upon the

prosecution’s ability to persuade the jury that Morales had committed the burglary for which

he had been arrested. Because Morales denied this fact, however, in order to do so the

prosecution would have had to present the complaining witness to the eight year-old

offense or overcome hearsay problems to admissibility of the relevant police report, and

also would have had to convince the jury that Morales had committed a burglary by proving

the requisite element of intent. Even then, however, the absence of criminal charges

having been brought against Morales and the disputed significance of the underlying facts

would have diminished the probative weight of the evidence with respect to the jury’s

assessment of Morales’ credibility regarding the night of the shooting. The trial court and

the court of appeal reasonably concluded that the collateral issues that would be raised by

the prosecution’s endeavor, and their impact on the jury’s ability to focus on the central

issue of the charged offenses, outweighed any probative value the evidence might have

had. See Holmes, 126 S. Ct. at 1732 (“While the Constitution [ ] prohibits the exclusion of

defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate

to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial

judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such

as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.”). 

Moreover, even if the evidence was erroneously excluded, the error was harmless. 

Morales was a crucial prosecution witness and he was extensively cross-examined by the

defense. Notably, petitioner was able to impeach Morales’ credibility by calling into

question his ability to observe and recall the events on the night of the shooting because of

his level of intoxication, RT 457-58; emphasizing his long-term friendship with the victim, a

possible source of bias, RT 458; pointing out that Morales’ testimony in court that he heard

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 9 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

petitioner say something about gangs was inconsistent with his taped statement to police

that he heard no such statement, RT 156-60; 464-65; and eliciting testimony from Morales

that he did not see the victim ingest cocaine that night, RT 168, which contrasted with the

autopsy evidence that the victim had cocaine in his system when he died. In addition, the

prosecution’s case was strong. It was undisputed that petitioner had shot the victim, and

Morales’ testimony that the victim had not swung at petitioner with a beer bottle was

corroborated by another prosecution witness (Vasquez), as well as petitioner’s defense

witness (Guerra). In sum, the excluded evidence did not have a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Cf. United States v. Miguel, 111 F.3d 

666, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1997) (when cross-examination on a proper subject is denied, the

court should assume that the damaging potential of the cross-examination would be fully

realized and then determine whether the error is harmless in light of the importance of the

witness' testimony in the entire case, the extent of the cross-examination otherwise

permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case). 

The state court’s rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceedings, id. § 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, this claim for habeas corpus

relief is denied.

B. Instructional Error

1. Background

The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.51, the standard instruction on

motive, as follows:

Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown. 

However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this

case. Presence of motive may tend to establish the defendant is guilty. 

Absence of motive may tend to show the defendant is not guilty.

RT 497, CT 110. 

On appeal, petitioner argued that the instruction was erroneous on two grounds.

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 10 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

First, he argued that the instruction was unsupported by the evidence because, while the

prosecution contended that there was evidence that the shooting was a premeditated

murder motivated by gang rivalry, RT 447-48, the trial court expressly found that “there is

no evidence that the defendant is a gang member out to shoot a rival.” RT 448. He also

argued that the instruction was legally insufficient because it permitted the jury to conclude

that evidence of motive alone may be sufficient to establish guilt, thereby diluting the

prosecution’s burden of proof by permitting the jury to convict upon less than proof beyond

a reasonable doubt. 

The court of appeal rejected both contentions, finding as follows:

Appellant claims there was no factual basis for the instruction, because

the trial court specifically found – despite appellant’s reference to “Surenos” –

that there was no evidence the shooting was motivated by gang rivalry. This

is beside the point: as the People argued below, there was ample evidence

the true motive for the killing was that Espinoza “dissed” appellant by twice

trying to push his gun hand away. There was an ample evidentiary basis for

the motive instruction.

Nevertheless, appellant argues the instruction is unconstitutional

because it impermissibly lowers the People’s burden of proof by failing to

state explicitly that motive alone is insufficient by itself to establish guilt. 

Similar challenges to CALJIC No. 2.51 have been emphatically rejected. 

(See People v. Estep (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 733, 738-739 (Estep); People v.

Wade (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497.) The motive instruction does not

deal with the burden of proof, but only “one circumstance in the proof puzzle –

motive.” (Estep, supra, at p. 738.) It does not dilute the burden of proof,

especially where – as here – the jury is properly instructed on reasonable

doubt.

Ex. A at 13.

In the instant petition, petitioner challenges the jury instruction on the same grounds

he raised in state court.

2. Applicable Federal Law

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a

claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 71-72 (1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner

must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process. See id. at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 11 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

(1973); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (“[I]t must be

established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally

condemned,’ but that it violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the

Fourteenth Amendment.”) (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146). The instruction “may not be

judged in artificial isolation,” but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a

whole and the trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147). 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he or she is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970). This constitutional principle prohibits the state from using evidentiary presumptions

in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the state of its burden of persuasion beyond

a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S.

391, 400-03 (1991). 

3. Analysis

Petitioner argues that the instruction on motive should not have been given because

the only evidence tending to show motive was the testimony which suggested he was a

gang member but, because the trial court ruled that it was impermissible for the prosecutor

to argue that petitioner was a gang member “out to shoot a rival,” there was insufficient

evidence to support a motive instruction. The court of appeal rejected this contention,

noting that the prosecutor had also argued that the true motive for the shooting was that the

victim had disrespected petitioner, and that ample evidence supported this argument. The

record supports the court of appeal’s determination. Prosecution witnesses Morales and

Vasquez and defense witness Guerra all testified that the victim approached petitioner,

making motions as if he was attempting to push aside the gun petitioner was pointing at

him. Based on this evidence the prosecutor made the following argument to the jury: 

The real motive for this case, ladies and gentlemen, the real reason

the defendant murdered Nelson Espinoza is that he got disrespected. 

Somebody is pushing a gun away from you and he does it twice you shoot

him, you know that victim should have been afraid, he should have run away,

based on the defendant’s, the victim’s actions by pushing that gun away that’s

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 12 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

the reason he shot him, that’s the reason he murdered him.

RT 450.

The motive instruction was amply supported by the evidence. 

The instruction also did not relieve the state of its burden of proof. On its face, the

instruction does not state that evidence of motive may establish guilt. Rather, it clearly

states that while motive may ”tend” to establish guilt (and, conversely, the absence of

motive may tend to show innocence), motive is not an element of the crime charged. The

California courts have consistently found that this language does not diminish the burden of

proof. See People v. Snow, 30 Cal.4th 43, 98 (2003) (“[I]n fact the instruction tells the jury

that motive is not an element of the crime charged (murder) and need not be shown, which

leaves little conceptual room for the idea that motive could establish all the elements of

murder.”); People v. Estep, 42 Cal. App. 4th 733, 738 (1996) (CALJIC No. 2.51 does not

concern the standard of proof, but “merely one circumstance in the proof puzzle – motive.”);

People v. Wade, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1496 (1995) (“[T]he instruction merely uses

innocence as a direction signal or compass. It does not tell the jurors they must find

innocence, nor does it lighten the prosecution's burden of proof . . .”). 

Importantly, the jury here also was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.01, the instruction

on circumstantial evidence, which explains that each fact or circumstance (such as motive)

essential to establish guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. RT 492-93. The

jury also was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.90, which defines reasonable doubt, RT 500-01,

and was instructed on the specific intent requirements for each of the charged offenses, RT

501-11. The jury also was told to consider the instructions as a whole. RT 490. 

As a whole, the instructions clearly informed the jury that, irrespective of whether it

found motive, it still had to be convinced that all of the elements of the crimes were proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. The motive instruction did not lessen the state’s burden of

proof, and it is not reasonably likely that the jury applied the motive instruction in a way that

violates the Constitution. 

The state court’s rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 13 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceedings, id. § 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, this claim for habeas corpus

relief is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk of the court shall enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/12/07 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.03\Gonzales3116.HabeasOrder.ECK

Case 4:03-cv-03116-PJH Document 12 Filed 07/12/07 Page 14 of 14