Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02110/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02110-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 740
Nature of Suit: Railway Labor Act
Cause of Action: 45:151 Railway Labor Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LEWIS WARE,

NO. CIV. S-05-2110 WBS DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE

RAILWAY, a corporation,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Lewis Ware brought this action in state court

against his former employer, defendant Burlington Northern Santa

Fe Railway (“Burlington”), alleging that Burlington breached an

oral agreement to settle outstanding claims between them. The

case was removed by defendant based on diversity and federal

question jurisdiction, and defendant now moves for summary

judgment.

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Formerly the “Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway 1

Company.” (Ringstad Decl. Ex. 1 at 1.)

2

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Ware was hired in 1990 to work as a switchman

and yard foreman for Burlington , a corporation which operates 1

railway services throughout the United States. (Ringstad Decl.

Ex. 1 at 1; Statement of Undisputed Facts 1.) Plaintiff is a

member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen

Union (“BLET”), and at all times his employment was governed by a

collective bargaining agreement between the BLET and Burlington. 

(Id. 2; Compl. ¶ 1.)

On March 13, 2002, plaintiff was injured on the job. 

(Compl. ¶ 2.) Subsequently, on April 29, 2002, defendant

terminated plaintiff’s employment, based on allegations that he

misrepresented facts concerning his injury and that he failed to

timely and appropriately report the injury to defendant. 

(Statement of Undisputed Facts 4.) On July 8, 2002, the BLET

union appealed plaintiff’s dismissal (“labor case”), requesting

that plaintiff be returned to his previous position with all

seniority rights, and be compensated for all wages and benefits

lost subsequent to dismissal. (Compl. 3.) Pursuant to the

Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), the labor case went to arbitration in

front of the Public Law Board. (Compl. ¶ 8.) On July 19, 2002,

in a separate action in federal court, plaintiff brought suit

under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for damages stemming

from his bodily injuries (“FELA case”). (Compl. 4.)

Approximately a year after plaintiff’s injury, in April

of 2003, plaintiff and defendant entered into settlement

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negotiations regarding the FELA case. (Compl. 6.) On April 11,

2003, the parties reached a verbal accord, and on April 18, 2003,

plaintiff signed a “Release and Settlement Agreement.” (Wunker

Decl. Ex. 1 (“settlement agreement”).) For consideration of

$47,976.00, plaintiff agreed to “release and forever discharge”

Burlington from “all claims and liabilities of every kind of

nature . . . arising out of an accident on or about March 13,

2002 . . . .” (Id.) The settlement agreement also contained a

provision that “[f]or Railroad Retirement Act purposes,

[plaintiff] agree[s] that the entire amount of this payment is

apportioned to factors other than for time lost; nevertheless

[plaintiff] understand[s] this is a final payment and complete

Release, and includes any claim [plaintiff] may have for time

lost.” (Id.) 

On December 31, 2003, Public Law Board No. 6041

(“Board”) of the National Mediation Board, which had held an

arbitration hearing on the labor case, found that Burlington was

not justified in terminating plaintiff’s employment. (Ringstad

Decl. Ex. 1 (“December 31, 2003 Board Order”).) As such, the

Board issued an award rescinding plaintiff’s dismissal, ordering

plaintiff’s reinstatement with seniority rights unimpaired, and

granting back pay and benefits. (Id.) Defendant, however,

subsequently asked the Board for a clarification of its award in

light of the settlement agreement, arguing that the language

releasing any claim for “time lost” precluded an award of back

pay and benefits. (Compl. 9.) Upon reconsideration, the Board

found that plaintiff’s claims for back pay and benefits clearly

fell within the scope of “all claims” released by the settlement

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agreement, and thus such an award would not be granted. 

(Ringstad Decl. Ex. 2 (“August 31, 2004 Board Order”).)

Plaintiff thereafter filed this action in state court,

alleging a single cause of action for breach of an oral agreement

that plaintiff believes was created on April 11, 2003. (Compl.

¶¶ 6, 18.) Plaintiff’s primary contention in support of this

action is that on April 11, 2003, the parties orally agreed that

plaintiff was releasing the claims in the FELA case, and only in

the FELA case. Therefore, plaintiff argues, the subsequent

written settlement agreement failed to represent the true

intention of the parties, and the release language was ambiguous,

uncertain and unconscionable. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-17.) Defendant

removed the case based on diversity and federal question

jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal.) Defendant Burlington now

moves for summary judgment, arguing that: 1) plaintiff’s claim is

preempted by the RLA and thus must be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction; and 2) even if jurisdiction is proper, plaintiff’s

contract claim fails as a matter of law.

II. Discussion

Congress’ purpose in passing the RLA was “to promote

stability in labor-management relations by providing a

comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes.” Haw.

Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994). To this end, the

act established a “mandatory arbitral mechanism for ‘prompt and

orderly settlement’ of two classes of disputes.” Id. (quoting 45

U.S.C. § 151a). “Major” disputes relate to the formation of

collective bargaining agreements, or efforts to obtain them,

while “minor” disputes are those involving “interpretation or

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This is not to say, however, that just because a 2

collective bargaining agreement is in place, any claim pertaining

to wrongful termination must automatically be preempted. In

Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, the Supreme Court distinguished

Andrews and failed to find preemption when the “only source” of

the right plaintiff asserted was based on a state law whistleblower protection statute. 512 U.S. 246, 258. 

5

application of existing labor agreements.” Id. at 256 (citing

Consol. Rail Corp. (Conrail) v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491

U.S. 299, 305 (1989)). The mandatory nature of the arbitration

mechanism for minor disputes under the RLA has thus created a

doctrine of preemption, requiring that claims which may purport

to be based on state common law or statutory grounds, but which

are in substance “minor disputes” under the RLA, must be

arbitrated. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S.

320 (1972). Preemption by the RLA in this context thus

eliminated federal district court jurisdiction, and mandates

arbitration of any state law claims which could be characterized

as “minor disputes.”

In Andrews, the court found that because the only

source of plaintiff’s right not to be discharged was rooted in

the collective bargaining agreement, his action for wrongful

discharge was subject to the Act’s arbitration requirement. Id.

at 324-25. The court established that it is the substance of the

claim, not its characterization, that determines whether it is

preempted. Id. Thus, whenever the conduct complained of is 2

“arguably governed by the collective bargaining agreement or has

a not obviously insubstantial relationship to the labor

contract,” then preemption applies and arbitration must occur. 

Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1367-70 (9th Cir.

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This court is cognizant of the fact that the court in 3

Lingle was discussing preemption under the Labor Management

Relations Act, not the LRA. However, as the court later stated

in Hawaiian Airlines, “[g]iven the convergence in the pre-emption

standards under the two statutes, we conclude that Lingle

provides an appropriate framework for addressing pre-emption

under the RLA, and we adopt the Lingle standard to resolve claims

of RLA pre-emption.” Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 263.

6

1978). 

The Supreme Court has articulated two general instances

when this may occur: 1) when the “claims [are] founded directly

on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements” and 2)

“where the right is created by state law . . . [but the

application of state law] requires the interpretation of a

collective bargaining agreement.” Hayden v. Reickerd, 957 F.2d

1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1992)(quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. Of Magic

Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1988)). Employing this 3

reasoning, the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit

have found a variety of seemingly unrelated state court actions

to be preempted under the RLA. Andrews, 406 U.S. 320 (finding a

state statutory claim for wrongful discharge to be preempted);

Grote v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 905 F.2d 1307, 1308 (9th

Cir. 1983) (finding preemption of state law claims for “wrongful

termination, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional

distress, defamation, and fraud”); Magnuson, 576 F.2d 1367

(finding a state common law claim for emotional distress to be

preempted); Dahl v. Rosenfeld, 316 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.

2003)(legal malpractice claim preempted), Beers v. S. Pac.

Transp. Co., 703 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1983)(intentional infliction

of emotional distress); see also John DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World

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Airways, Inc., 43 Cal.3d 517, 528 (1987)(summarizing federal and

state court decisions finding preemption in a variety of

contexts). Therefore, in order to assess the propriety of the

present action, this court must determine the source of the right

underlying plaintiff’s claim.

By framing the harm in the context of contract law,

plaintiff has attempted to artfully plead this action so as to

create a right to damages based on contract principles, distinct

from those rights to back pay and benefits afforded him by the

collective bargaining agreement. However, although plaintiff

asserts that the complaint is for “breach of the oral agreement

settling only the FELA case,” (Compl. ¶ 11), the only provisions

of California Civil code cited to in the complaint pertain to

alleged defects in the written release documents. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-

17.) 

Indeed, scrutiny of the substance of plaintiff’s

argument reveals that the ultimate harm actually complained of is

that, based on various state law contract principles, the written

settlement agreement did not properly constitute a release of

plaintiff’s ability to recover back pay and benefits in the labor

case. Notably, the only actual damages asserted in plaintiff’s

complaint are “plaintiff’s loss of back pay and benefits.” 

(Compl. ¶ 17.) Ultimately, plaintiff cannot avoid the fact that

the only entitlement he references is his right to back pay and

benefits--a right granted to him in, and only in, the collective

bargaining agreement between BLET and defendant Burlington. 

Because plaintiff’s complaint thus involves a “matrix

of facts . . . inextricably intertwined” with the rights

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The Board additionally noted that the settlement 4

agreement should have also precluded plaintiff’s claim for

reinstatement. (Ringstad Decl. Ex. 2 (“August 31, 2004 Board

Order”).) However, because Burlington had already proceeded with

plaintiff’s reinstatement, reconsideration of that aspect of the

award was moot. (Id.)

Section 153 provides that “[i]f any employee or group 5

of employees, or any carrier, is aggrieved by the failure of any

division of the Adjustment Board to make an award in a dispute

referred to it, or is aggrieved by any of the terms of an award

8

conferred by the collective bargaining agreement,” his state law

claims are clearly preempted by the RLA. See Grote 905 F.2d at

1309-10. In such a case, as discussed above, arbitration is

mandated under the RLA. Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1369. As

defendant’s motion aptly points out, however, this issue raised

by plaintiff regarding the potential applicability of the written

settlement to his claims in the labor case, is one which has

already been arbitrated. (August 31, 2004 Board Order.) In

fact, once the Board became aware of the written settlement

agreement (subsequent to the issuance of its original award) it

held an additional hearing to determine the effect of the release

on plaintiff’s right to back pay and benefits. (Id.) The Board

found it beyond dispute that plaintiff’s claims for back pay and

benefits were of the very “kind or nature” covered by the

settlement agreement, and thus the previous award was not

proper. (Id.) 4

Plaintiff, by this present action, has attempted to

make an end-run in state court around the Board’s order of August

31, 2004, and seek indirect review of their findings without

properly filing a petition for judicial review pursuant to 45

U.S.C. § 153. The improper nature of this action is made clear 5

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or by the failure of the division to include certain terms in

such award, then such employee or group of employees or carrier

may file in any United States district court in which a petition

under paragraph (p) could be filed, a petition for review of the

division's order.” 45 U.S.C. 153 First(q). Plaintiff’s

reluctance to file a petition for review is understandable, given

that the standard of review of arbitration awards under the RLA

is “among the narrowest known to the law.” United Transp. Union

v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 116 F.3d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1997). 

However, plaintiff’s failure to pursue that option cannot be

cured by the filing of related state law claims.

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by the fact that rewarding the relief requested would directly

disturb the findings of the Board, by granting back pay and

benefits when the Board has already determined that they were

inappropriate. 

The state law claims in this action are clearly

preempted by the RLA. Moreover, they involve an issue which has

already been adjudicated under the mandatory authority of the

Board under the RLA, and plaintiff cannot now seek to challenge

the Boards findings through related state court claims. See

generally Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959)

(finding that the employee’s “submission to the Board of his

grievances as to the validity of his discharge precludes him from

seeking damages in the instant common-law action”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

DATED: November 29, 2006

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