Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-56101/USCOURTS-ca9-14-56101-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT RADCLIFFE; CHESTER

CARTER; MARIA FALCON; CLIFTON

C. SEALE, III; ARNOLD LOVELL, JR.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

JOSE HERNANDEZ; ROBERT

RANDALL; BERTRAM ROBISON;

KATHRYN PIKE,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS

INC.; EQUIFAX INFORMATION

SERVICES LLC; TRANSUNION, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-56101

D.C. No.

8:05-cv-01070-

DOC-MLG

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 5, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed March 28, 2016

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2 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit

Judges and Jon S. Tigar,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Tigar

SUMMARY**

Counsel / Class Actions

The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying a

motion to disqualify counsel from representing a plaintiffs’

class in a consumer class action.

The court of appeals previously held that certain named

plaintiffs and their counsel (appellees) created a conflict of

interest by conditioning incentive awards for the class

representatives on their approval of a proposed settlement

agreement. On remand, other named plaintiffs and their

counsel (appellants) moved the district court to disqualify

appellees’ counsel from representing the class based on that

conflict.

Affirming the denial of the disqualification motion, the

panel agreed with the district court that California does not

apply a rule of automatic disqualification for conflicts of

simultaneous representation in a class action context. The

* The Honorable Jon S. Tigar, District Judge for the U.S. District Court

for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS. 3

panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that appellees’ counsel would adequately

represent the class.

COUNSEL

George F. Carpinello (argued) and Adam R. Shaw, Boies,

Schiller & Flexner LLP, Albany, New York; Daniel Wolf,

Law Offices of Daniel Wolf, Washington D.C.; Charles W.

Juntikka, Charles Juntikka & Associates LLP, New York,

New York, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

F. Paul Bland, Jr. (argued), Public Justice, P.C., Washington,

D.C.; James A. Francis and David A. Searles, Francis &

Mailman, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Michael W. Sobol,

Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, San Francisco,

California; Michael A. Caddell and Cynthia B. Chapman,

Caddell & Chapman, Houston, Texas; Arthur H. Bryant,

Public Justice, P.C., Oakland, California; Stuart T. Rossman

and Charles M. Delbaum, National Consumer Law Center,

Boston, Massachusetts; Leonard A. Bennet and Matthew

Erausquin, Consumer Litigation Associates, P.C., Newport

News, Virginia; Lee A. Sherman, Callahan, Thompson,

Sherman & Caudill, Irvine, California, for PlaintiffsAppellees Jose Hernandez,Robert Randall,BertramRobison,

and Kathryn Pike.

Daniel John McLoon, Jones Day, Los Angeles, California, for

Defendant-Appellee Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

Stephen J. Newman, Stroock, Stroock & Lavan LLP, Los

Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee Transunion,

LLC.

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4 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

OPINION

TIGAR, District Judge:

For the second time in this case, we are asked to resolve

questions regarding conflicts of interest and the adequacy of

counsel in class actions. Appellants and appellees are two

teams of named plaintiffs and their respective lawyers who

disagree over the proper direction for a consumer class action

settlement. In Radcliffe v. Experian Information Solutions,

Inc., 715 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Radcliffe I”), we held

that appellees created a conflict of interest by conditioning

incentive awards for the class representatives on their

approval of the proposed settlement agreement. On remand,

appellants moved the district court to disqualify appellees’

counsel from representing the class based on that conflict. 

They contended that under California law, attorneys with

simultaneous conflicts of interest in a case must be

automatically disqualified. The district court rejected this

argument and denied the motion.

We agree with the district court that California does not

apply a rule of automatic disqualification for conflicts of

simultaneous representation in the class action context, and

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that appellees’ counsel will adequately represent

the class. We affirm.

I.

We previously described the underlying facts in our

earlier opinion in this case. Radcliffe I, 715 F.3d at 1161–62. 

The case is a consolidation of multiple class actions initiated

in 2005 and 2006 alleging that the Defendants in the case,

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RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS. 5

Experian Information Systems, Inc., TransUnion LLC, and

Equifax Information Services LLC (“Defendants”), violated

the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FRCA) and corresponding

California state law by misreporting debts discharged in

bankruptcy on consumer credit reports. Id. at 1161. 

Appellants are a group of plaintiffs who became lead

plaintiffs in one case known as the White lawsuit: Maria

Falcon, Chester Carter, Arnold Lovell, Jr., Clifton C. Seale,

III, and Robert Radcliffe (“White Plaintiffs”). They are

represented by Charles Juntikka, Daniel Wolf, and the law

firm of Boies, Schiller, and Flexner. (“White Counsel”). 

Appellees are a group of plaintiffs from a different case, the

Hernandez lawsuit: Jose Hernandez, Kathryn Pike, Robert

Randall, and Bertram Robison (“Hernandez Plaintiffs”). 

They are represented by the firms of Lieff, Cabraser,

Heimann, & Bernstein (“Lieff Cabraser”); Caddell &

Chapman; and Francis & Mailman (“Hernandez Counsel”).1

After the cases were consolidated, the district court appointed

Hernandez Counsel as lead counsel.

Following mediation, the parties reached a settlement

agreement for injunctive relief, which was approved in

August 2008 and was not disputed by any party. Radcliffe I,

715 F.3d at 1162. In February of 2009, the parties then

reached a monetary settlement for a total amount of $45

million. Id. The settlement included incentive awards for

each named plaintiff not to exceed $5,000, which were

awardable to any “Named Plaintiff[] serving as class

1 Though this factual discussion will refer to the White Counsel and

Hernandez Counsel teams generally in summarizing the settlement

negotiations, the firms of Boies Schiller and Francis & Mailman did not

join their respective legal teams until partway through the litigation.

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6 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

representatives” who was “in support of the Settlement.” Id.

The agreement was preliminarily approved in May 2009. Id.

The district court held a series of fairness hearings on the

monetary settlement. White Plaintiffs and White Counsel

objected to it, in part due to the discrepancy between the

settlement and the potential recoverable damages. See id. at

1162, 1167 n.4. They also argued that conditioning the

incentive awards on named plaintiffs’ agreement with the

settlement created a conflict of interest between the class

representatives and the absent class. Id. at 1162.

In Radcliffe I, we agreed with White Plaintiffs that the

conditional incentive award created a conflict of interest. We

noted that incentive awards for serving as class

representatives are often appropriate, but cautioned that they

should be scrutinized carefully, because “if ‘such members of

the class are provided with special incentives in the

settlement agreement, they may be more concerned with

maximizing those incentives than with judging the adequacy

of the settlement as it applies to the class members at large.’” 

Radcliffe I, 715 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Staton v. Boeing Co.,

327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir. 2003)). We then held that, in this

case, conditioning the incentive awards for the named

plaintiffs on their support of the settlement “changed the

motivations for the class representatives.” Id. at 1165. 

“Instead of being solely concerned about the adequacy of the

settlement for the absent class members, the class

representatives now had a $5,000 incentive to support the

settlement regardless of its fairness and a promise of no

reward if they opposed the settlement.” Id. Moreover, “[a]s

soon as the conditional-incentive awards provision divorced

the interests of the class representatives from those of the

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RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS. 7

absent class members, class counsel was simultaneously

representing clients with conflicting interests.” Id. at 1167.

Accordingly, we reversed the settlement as well as awards

of attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 1167–68. On remand, we

instructed the district court to “determine when the conflict

arose and if the conflict continues under any future settlement

agreement. Should the district court approve such an

agreement, it may then exercise its discretion in deciding

whether, and to what extent, class counsel are entitled to fees

under the common-fund doctrine.” Id.

On remand, White Counsel filed a motion to disqualify

Hernandez Counsel and to serve as interim class counsel on

June 19, 2013. They argued that disqualification was

mandatory under California law because any counsel’s

simultaneous conflict of interest in its representation of

multiple clients must result in automatic disqualification. 

Hernandez Counsel opposed the motion and filed a crossmotion to be re-appointed as interim class counsel. On May

1, 2014, the district court denied White Counsel’s motion and

granted Hernandez Counsel’s motion. This appeal by White

Counsel followed.

II.

In its May 1 order, the district court opined that its order

denying the motion to disqualify Hernandez Counsel

involved “controlling questions of law about which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate

appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of

this litigation,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We then

granted permission to appeal the district court’s order on July

9, 2014, and therefore have jurisdiction over the case.

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8 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

This Court reviews motions for disqualification of an

attorney for abuse of discretion. Paul E. Iacono Structural

Eng’r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983). 

“Since the district court has primary responsibility for

controlling the conduct of attorneys practicing before it, an

order disqualifying counsel will not be disturbed if the record

reveals any sound basis for the court’s action,” and reversal

is warranted only if the district court “either misperceives the

relevant rule of law or abuses its discretion.” Id. (citation

omitted).

III.

In this appeal, as they did in the district court, White

Counsel contend that under California law, any conflict of

interest in the representation of a class mandates automatic

disqualification. Generally, California requires per se

disqualification when an attorney has been shown to possess

a simultaneous conflict of interest in her representation of

multiple clients, regardless of that attorney’s motives or the

actual impact of the conflict. The central question is whether

this remains true in class actions. For the reasons set forth

below, we conclude that California law does not require

automatic disqualification in class action cases, and affirm.

A.

The main question to be resolved in this appeal results

from three other points. First, California law governs

questions of conflicts of interest and disqualification. As we

noted in Radcliffe I, the Ninth Circuit refers to the local rules

of each district when deciding which standards govern an

ethical violation, and the Central District of California’s local

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RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS. 9

rules instruct courts to look to California law and California’s

Rules of Professional Conduct. Radcliffe I, 715 F.3d at 1167.

Second, the parties agree on the existence of a rule in

California case law that a concurrent or simultaneous conflict

of interest under California Rule of Professional Conduct

3-310(C) generally leads to automatic disqualification. In

Flatt v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 4th 275 (1994), the California

Supreme Court distinguished between two different types of

conflicts of interest that may arise. “Where the potential

conflict is one that arises from the successive representation

of clients with potentially adverse interests, the courts have

recognized that the chief fiduciary value jeopardized is that

of client confidentiality.” Flatt, 9 Cal 4th at 283. “Thus,

where a former client seeks to have a previous attorney

disqualified from serving as counsel to a successive client in

litigation adverse to the interests of the first client, the

governing test requires that the client demonstrate a

‘substantial relationship’ between the subjects of the

antecedent and current representations.” Id.

“Both the interest implicated and the governing test are

different, however, where an attorney’s potentiallyconflicting

representations are simultaneous.” Id. at 284. Such

situations, with “perhaps the classic case involving an

attorney’s interests in conflict with those of the client,” do not

primarily implicate the duty of confidentiality but rather “the

attorney’s duty—and the client’s legitimate expectation—of

loyalty.” Id. at 284. “And because the substantial

relationship test is founded on the need to protect against the

improper use of client secrets,” that test “does not set a

sufficiently high standard.” Id. (citation omitted).

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10 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

Instead, Flatt held that the appropriate response to a

simultaneous conflict of interest is generally automatic

disqualification: “[I]n all but a few instances, the rule of

disqualification in simultaneous representation is a per se or

‘automatic’ one.” The California Supreme Court has

continued to adhere to this formulation. See People ex rel.

Dep’t of Corps v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th

1135, 1147 (1999) (“[I]f an attorney—or more likely a law

firm—simultaneouslyrepresents clients who have conflicting

interests, a more stringent per se rule of disqualification

applies.” (citing to Flatt, 9 Cal 4th at 284)); In re Charlisse

C., 45 Cal. 4th 145, 160 (2008) (“[W]ith few exceptions,

disqualification [in a case of simultaneous representation]

follows automatically, regardless ofwhether the simultaneous

representations have anything in common or present any risk

that confidences obtained in one matter would be used in the

other.” (quoting SpeeDee, 20 Cal. 4th at 1147)).

Third and finally, the parties in this case agree S as they

must, based on our holding in Radcliffe I S that the

conditional incentive award created a simultaneous conflict

of interest for Hernandez Counsel between the named

plaintiffs they represent and the rest of the class. Thus, the

operative question, as noted above, is whether the automatic

disqualification rule described in Flatt and its progeny

required the district court to grant White Counsel’s motion to

disqualify Hernandez Counsel.

Hernandez Counsel argued below that the automatic

disqualification rule should not apply in class action cases. 

The district court agreed, concluding that there are

“compelling reasons to interpret California’s disqualification

rule flexibly in light of California case law,” for two reasons. 

“First and foremost, this conflict was brief and caused by a

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RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS. 11

specific provision in a now-defunct settlement.” “[T]he class

representatives did not have inherently opposing interests

from absent class plaintiffs,” but rather “the conflict was

manufactured by the faulty settlement terms.” “Second,” the

district court held that “even if California case law on

conflicts in class actions does not wholly abandon the

automatic disqualification rule, the analysis shows a

willingness to use the disqualification rule flexibly.”

White Counsel now offer several arguments as to why the

district court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. Their

primary contention is that the district court erred in holding

that the automatic disqualification rule does not apply to class

actions.

B.

“Because we apply state law in determining matters of

disqualification, we must follow the reasoned view of the

state supreme court when it has spoken on the issue.” In re

Cty. of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citation omitted). If the state supreme court has not spoken

on the issue, we look to intermediate appellate courts for

guidance, although we are not bound by them if we believe

that the state supreme court would decide otherwise. In re

KF Diaries, Inc. & Affiliates, 224 F.3d 922, 924 (9th Cir.

2000).

Though California regularly applies Flatt’s automatic

disqualification rule to lawsuits involving individual clients,

neither the parties nor the district court have found any case

in the California Supreme Court, or in any of the California

Courts of Appeal, that apply the rule to class actions. We,

too, have been unable to find any such case.

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12 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

On the other hand, there is also no case that explicitly

rejects the application of the automatic disqualification rule

to class actions. As the district court notes, however, two

intermediate appellate courts have directly adjudicated

questions of counsel’s disqualification in a class action due to

a simultaneous conflict of interest without mentioning the

automatic disqualification rule.

In Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v. United States Parcel Service,

Inc., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1, 12–13 (1997), the appellate court

affirmed the disqualification of a class counsel who had

contacted the defendant and offered to dismiss the claim in

exchange for a payment of eight to ten million dollars directly

to counsel. Rather than apply an automatic disqualification

rule, the trial court had used the “balancing of interests” test

that California courts generally otherwise use for

disqualification motions. Id. at 10. Similarly, the appellate

court affirmed by focusing exclusively on whether the trial

court erred in its application of the balancing of interests test. 

Id.

In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court, 126 Cal App.

4th 1253, 1265 (2005), the appellate court reversed the denial

of a motion to disqualify counsel for attempting to both

represent the class and serve as its named representative. 

That case, much like this one, involved the concern that class

counsel might seek to obtain a settlement that would benefit

themselves but not the rest of the class. Id. at 1273. On the

strength of that concern, the appellate court concluded that

counsel had “placed themselves in a position of divided

loyalties,” and that doing so was grounds for disqualification. 

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RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS. 13

Id. (emphasis omitted). As in Cal Pak, the Apple Computer

court made no mention of the automatic disqualification rule.2

Lacking any case authority that is directly on point, White

Counsel fall back on the hortatory language of automatic

disqualification cases such as Flatt and SpeeDee. In essence,

appellants’ position is that because those decisions describe

the automatic disqualification rule in per se terms, and make

no mention of excluding class actions, the rule must therefore

apply to class actions.

This position is not implausible, but neither is it

persuasive. For one thing, Cal Pak and Apple Computer

suggest that California courts have not assumed that the

automatic disqualification rule applies in class action cases. 

White Counsel argue that these two cases involve conflicts of

interest created by “ethical breaches” committed by the

attorneys rather than simultaneous representation of clients,

and that this explains why the automatic disqualification rule

was never discussed. But the California Supreme Court in

2

In addition to these two decisions, the district court also referenced

three other cases: Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., 191 Cal. App. 4th

1201, 1207 (2011); Sharp v. Next Entertainment, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 4th

410, 434 (2008); Koo v. Rubio’s Restaurants, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th 719,

735 (2003). These cases are not directly on point, as they concern the

determination of when a conflict arises in the class action context rather

than how a court should treat a conflict of interest for disqualification

purposes. Nevertheless, the language of these decisions also suggests that

their authors did not believe an automatic disqualification rule would

apply. See, e.g., Koo, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 735 (“It is worth repeating that

‘the traditional rules that have been developed in the course of attorneys’

representation of the interests of clients outside of the class action context

should not be mechanically applied to the problems that arise in . . . class

action litigation.’”) (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability

Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 19 (2d. Cir. 1986)).

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14 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

Flatt defined the “classic case” of a simultaneous conflict of

interest as “involving an attorney’s interests in conflict with

those of the client,” Flatt, 9 Cal 4th at 284, a description that

could certainly be applied to the situations in both of these

cases. In the absence of California Supreme Court precedent

on the issue, we look to the intermediate state courts for

guidance, and Cal Pak and Apple Computer both indicate that

automatic disqualification is not required in class actions.

Moreover, the policy justifications that the California

Supreme Court advanced for the automatic disqualification

rule are not fully transferrable to class action cases. Indeed,

the language of their opinions makes clear that they

envisioned simultaneous conflicts of interest as theygenerally

occurred in individual litigant suits rather than in class

actions. In Flatt, the California Supreme Court explained the

reasoning behind the automatic disqualification rule as

follows:

The reason for such a rule is evident, even (or

perhaps especially) to the nonattorney. A

client who learns that his or her lawyer is also

representing a litigation adversary, even with

respect to a matter wholly unrelated to the one

for which counsel was retained, cannot long

be expected to sustain the level of confidence

and trust in counsel that is one of the

foundations of the professional relationship.

Flatt, 9 Cal 4th at 285 (emphasis in original). Similarly, the

court in SpeeDee stated that “[t]he most egregious conflict of

interest is representation of clients whose interests are

directly adverse in the same litigation.” SpeeDee, 20 Cal. 4th

at 1147.

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RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS. 15

Neither of these pronouncements fits the circumstances of

the lawyer who represents a class of plaintiffs whose interests

may in some ways be adverse to each other, but all of whose

interests are adverse to the defendant. In a class action,

conflicts often arise not because an attorney simultaneously

represents litigation adversaries but because they

simultaneously represent different members of the same class

who develop divergent interests regarding how to prevail on

their shared claims. Thus, in Radcliffe I, we explained that

the conditional incentive award was improper because it

“undermined [the named plaintiffs’] ability to ‘fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.” Radcliffe I,

715 F.3d at 1165 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(a)(4)). “This

requirement is rooted in due-process concerns—‘absent class

members must be afforded adequate representation before

entry of a judgment which binds them.’” Id. (quoting Hanlon

v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

These concerns with adequate representation and due process

for absent partymembers are simply not present in individual

plaintiff suits. And because the California Supreme Court has

never discussed the automatic disqualification rule in the

context of class actions, it also has never been required to

confront the ethical issues and conflicts of interest that are

unique to class action cases. Given this vacuum, we are not

willing to assume that California courts would applythe same

disqualification rules to a class action case as they do in

individual plaintiff cases.

Nor would such a conclusion comport with federal law

regarding the requirements for adequate class counsel under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See, e.g., Rodriguez v.

West Publishing Corp. (“Rodriguez I”), 563 F.3d 948, 961

(9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that “the adequacy requirement

for class counsel is satisfied” under Rule 23 despite “the

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16 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

presence of conflicted representatives.”). For these reasons,

we conclude that an automatic disqualification rule does not

apply.

C.

This conclusion is also consistent with our own case law

and the broader policy issues at play in class representation. 

Indeed, although we did not address or consider the issue of

disqualification in our first decision in this case, it is clear we

did not believe the district court would be required to

disqualify Hernandez Counsel as a result of our holding. In

Radcliffe I, we instructed the district court on remand to

“determine when the conflict arose and if the conflict

continues under any future settlement agreement. Should the

district court approve such an agreement, it may exercise its

discretion in deciding whether, and to what extent, class

counsel are entitled to fees under the common-fund doctrine.” 

Radcliffe I, 715 F.3d at 1168 (emphasis added). Had we

believed that Hernandez Counsel were automatically

disqualified following their creation of a conflict of interest

in the prior settlement agreement, it is unclear how the district

court would have had discretion to decide whether and to

what extent they were entitled to fees.

Further support for this conclusion can be found in our

decisions in the Rodriguez cases: Rodriguez I, 563 F.3d 948,

and Rodriguez v. Disner (“Rodriguez II”), 688 F.3d 645 (9th

Cir. 2012). Though these cases were concerned with awards

of attorney’s fees rather than disqualification, the analysis is

similar and we cited extensively to both cases in our first

Radcliffe decision. In Rodriguez I, we held that the retainer

agreement for the attorneys for five named plaintiffs in a

class action created an improper conflict of interest between

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RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS. 17

the named plaintiffs and the class because it required the

attorneys to seek incentive awards for each of the named

plaintiffs after settlement. Rodriguez I, 563 F.3d at 957. On

remand, the district court denied attorney’s fees to those class

counsel “for the period this conflict was in effect,” but

awarded fees for their services “after the court’s rejection of

the incentive awards.” Rodriguez II, 688 F.3d at 652. On

appeal, we agreed with this reasoning, holding that the latter

award was proper because the “rejection of the incentive

awards cured any conflict of interest.” Id. at 660 n.12.

Similarly, in this case the district court could reasonably

conclude that the conflict of interest was appropriately cured

when we rejected the settlement agreement that contained the

improper conditional incentive award. This conflict was not

inherent to the relationship between Hernandez Counsel and

the rest of the class but rather, as in Rodriguez, resulted from

a particular provision in an agreement that was later held

invalid.

Finally, we note that numerous other circuit courts have

declined to apply the same disqualification rules to class

actions as to non-class actions specifically because of the

different concerns at issue for attorney representation in class

action lawsuits. In In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability

Litigation, 800 F.2d 14, 18 (2d. Cir. 1986), the Second Circuit

held that “although automatic disqualification might promote

the salutary ends of confidentiality and loyalty” in traditional

cases, “it would have a serious adverse effect on class

actions.” It noted that class actions are often “the only

practical means” for plaintiffs with small individual claims to

protect their rights, and that “often only the attorneys who

have represented the class, rather than any of the class

members themselves, have substantial familiarity with the

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18 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

prior proceedings.” Id. at 18–19. In turn, “the prospect of

having those most familiar [with the case] be automatically

disqualified whenever class members have conflicting

interests would substantially diminish the efficacy of class

actions as a method of dispute resolution.” Id. at 19. The

Second Circuit concluded that “the traditional rules that have

been developed in the course of attorneys’ representation of

the interests of clients outside of the class action context

should not be mechanically applied to the problems that arise

in the settlement of class action litigation.” Id.

In Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 589 (3d Cir.

1999), the Third Circuit also rejected the notion that a conflict

of interest should automatically disqualify class counsel even

though such a result would be required in a non-class action. 

It noted that “[i]n many class actions, one or more class

representatives will object to a settlement and become

adverse parties” to the rest of the class. Id. “If, by applying

the usual rules on attorney-client relations, class counsel

could easily be disqualified in these cases, not only would the

objectors enjoy great ‘leverage,’ but many fair and reasonable

settlements would be undermined by the need to find

substitute counsel after months or even years of fruitful

settlement negotiations.” Id.

This analysis is compelling, and further supports our

conclusion that the California Supreme Court would not

require automatic disqualification in class actions. White

Counsel argue that, rather than lowering the bar for

disqualification in class actions, the standard should be

heightened due to the “unique due process concerns for

absent class members.” Unquestionably, the due process

rights of absent class members are important and, as we have

frequently observed, the district judges who preside over

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RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS. 19

class actions must ensure that those interests are fairly

protected. See, e.g., Allen v. Bedolla, 787 F.3d 1218, 1223

(9th Cir. 2015). But that premise does not support the

adoption of per se disqualification rules that were developed

outside the class action context. On the contrary, district

courts should have discretion to deal with the unique

complexities and ethical concerns involved in class action

lawsuits. See Rodriguez II, 688 F.3d at 655 (“[C]onflicts of

interest among class members are not uncommon and arise

for many different reasons, and a court may tolerate certain

technical conflicts in order to permit attorneys who are

familiar with the litigation to continue to represent the class.”

(citation omitted)). Unlike an automatic disqualification rule,

a pragmatic approach comports most closely with Rule 23’s

mandate that courts protect the best interests of absent class

members.

D.

In sum, we agree with the district court that California

law does not require automatic disqualification for

simultaneous conflicts of interest in class actions. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

declining to apply the automatic disqualification rule in this

case.

After reaching that conclusion, the district court next

considered the “balancing of interests” test, which California

courts use generally to decide whether, in their discretion,

disqualification is appropriate:

The court must weigh the combined effects of

a party’s right to counsel of choice, an

attorney’s interest in representing a client, the

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20 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

financial burden on a client of replacing

disqualified counsel and any tactical abuse

underlying a disqualification proceeding

against the fundamental principle that fair

resolution of disputes within our adversary

system requires vigorous representation of

parties byindependent counsel unencumbered

by conflicts of interest.

William H. Raley Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d

1042, 1048 (1983). White Counsel do not substantively

challenge the district court’s application of the balancing of

interests test. In any event, there was no error in the district

court’s analysis. The court concluded that the burden of

replacing Hernandez Counsel’s greater expertise and

experience outweighed any concerns of fairness or loyalty,

which was a decision well within its discretion.

IV.

WhiteCounsel’sremaining arguments arise under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g). They argue that the district

court abused its discretion in holding that HernandezCounsel

remained adequate class representatives, and that White

Counsel were not “best able” to represent the interests of the

class. We conclude that neither decision was in error.

A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(2) states that:

“When one applicant seeks appointment as class counsel, the

court may appoint that applicant only if the applicant is

adequate under Rule 23(g)(1) and (4). If more than one

adequate applicant seeks appointment, the court must appoint

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RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS. 21

the applicant best able to represent the interests of the class.” 

Rule 23(g)(1) requires the court to consider:

(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or

investigating potential claims in the action;

(ii) counsel’s experience in handling class

actions, other complex litigation, and the

types of claims asserted in the action;

(iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable

law; and

(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to

representing the class

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. In addition, the court “may consider any

other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and

adequately represent the interests of the class.” Rule 23(g)(4)

states that the duty of class counsel is to fairly and adequately

represent the interests of the class.

Under the four factors listed in Rule 23(g)(1), the district

court held that both Hernandez Counsel and White Counsel

were adequate to represent the class. It acknowledged that

the prior conflict of interest was a relevant and significant

concern, but concluded it did not render Hernandez Counsel

inadequate because it was temporary and had been cured. 

Finally, under Rule 23(g)(2), the court concluded that

Hernandez Counsel remained “best able” to represent the

class as class counsel based on its greater experience in

handling class actions and FRCA litigation and its greater

knowledge of the applicable law.

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22 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

B.

White Counsel first challenge the district court’s

conclusion that Hernandez Counsel are adequate. They do

not dispute the district court’s treatment of the four required

factors under Rule 23(g)(1). Instead, their challenge is based

entirely on the district court’s treatment of the conflict of

interest created by Hernandez Counsel. To a large extent,

their argument is identical to the one they make under

California law – namely, that a conflict of interest should

require an automatic determination of inadequacy based on

the “breach of loyalty.” We reject this contention here for the

same reasons we rejected a per se disqualification rule in the

previous section.

They also argue that the conflict of interest renders

Hernandez Counsel inadequate because Hernandez Counsel

are now potentially civilly liable for the misconduct of

including the conditional incentive award. In turn, they

argue, Hernandez Counsel’s interests diverge from the class

because they may now seek a quicker settlement or pursue

different monetary relief in order to minimize their own

liability. We agree with the district court that neither

precedent nor policy supports the proposition that potential

civil liability renders attorneys inadequate to represent a

class. Nor could it, because the simple fact is that the

possibility of suit by an unhappy client inheres in any lawsuit,

class action or otherwise, and White Counsel proposes no

method by which to determine when that prospect becomes

relevant under Rule 23. There also will always be a concern

in class actions that counsel might accept a quick settlement,

and the fees that come with it, over a more favorable result

for the class. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th

Cir. 2003). The solution is not to prescribe an inflexible,

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RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS. 23

brightline rule but to give district courts discretion to manage

these issues in each case.

Finally, White Counsel argue that even if Hernandez

Counsel are adequate, the district court abused its discretion

in finding that White Counsel are not “best able” to represent

the class. They contend that the district court’s decision was

based exclusively on its belief, shared byHernandezCounsel,

that White Counsel had an unrealistic valuation of the

available damages for the class. In fact, the district court

carefully analyzed each factor under Rule 23(g)(1) in

reaching its decision. It held that the first and fourth factors

did not weigh in favor of either party, because both legal

teams had done extensive work for the class and both teams

possessed wide resources among the many firms comprising

each of them. It based its decision instead on the second and

third factors, finding that Hernandez Counsel – the “FCRAdedicated lawyers from Francis & Mailman” and the “classaction focused attorneys from Lieff Cabraser and Caddell &

Chapman” – possessed greater experience and knowledge

relevant to this case.

As for the conflict of interest, the district court again

found it was relevant but concluded it did not outweigh its

other concerns. It noted that Hernandez Counsel had “taken

extraordinary steps to neutralize the effect of the ethical

violation, including associating new counsel, disclaiming any

fees for the conflicted representation, and agreeing to accept

the costs of re-notice.” Lastly, White Counsel are correct that

the district court concluded that White Counsel had placed an

unreasonably high valuation on the case, and factored that

concern into its decision not to appoint White Counsel as lead

counsel. But this was not an abuse of discretion. District

courts are properly given discretion to decide matters of class

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24 RADCLIFFE V. EXPERIAN INFO. SOLS.

representation and class action administration both because

they are responsible for protecting absent class members’ due

process interests, and because they are far more familiar with

the case, the class, and the attorneys who may be vying for

control of the litigation. Here, the district court properly held

that Hernandez Counsel remained adequate and best able to

represent the consumer class.

V.

We previously found that Hernandez Counsel created a

significant conflict of interest between themselves, their

clients, and the rest of the class, and nothing in the present

order diminishes or qualifies that holding. We are not

convinced, however, that the conflict we found requires

automatic disqualification of class counsel. We believe that,

given the unique ethical and due process concerns involved

in class actions, district courts must have the discretion to

address attorney representation and disqualification issues

based on the details of each case, and we further believe the

California Supreme Court would agree. Accordingly, we

hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying White Counsel’s motion to disqualify Hernandez

Counsel and to be appointed as class counsel, and granting

Hernandez Counsel’s cross-motion to be appointed as class

counsel.

AFFIRMED.

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