Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15737/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15737-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL E. DAVIS, AKA Tony

Davis; VINCE FERRAGAMO; BILLY

JOE DUPREE; SAMUEL MICHAEL

KELLER,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

ELECTRONIC ARTS INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-15737

D.C. No.

3:10-cv-03328-

RS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 11, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed January 6, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Raymond C. Fisher

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

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2 DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS

SUMMARY*

First Amendment / California Anti-SLAPP Statute

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Electronic

Arts Inc.’s motion to strike a complaint, brought by former

professional football players alleging unauthorized use of

their likenesses in the video game series Madden NFL, as a

strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under

California’s anti-SLAPP statute.

The panel rejected Electronic Arts’s argument that its use

of former players’ likenesses was protected under the First

Amendment as “incidental use.” The panel held that

Electronic Arts’s use of the former players’ likenesses was

not incidental because it was central to Electronic Arts’s main

commercial purpose: to create a realistic virtual simulation of

football games involving current and former National

Football League teams.

The panel held that the district court properly denied

Electronic Arts’s motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP

statute because it had not shown a probability of prevailing on

its incidental use defense, and its other defenses (the

transformative use defense, the public interest defense, and

the test formulated by Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d

Cir. 1989)) were effectively precluded by the court’s prior

decision in Keller v. Elec. Arts (In re NCAA Student-Athlete

Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir.

2013).

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS 3

COUNSEL

Alonzo Wickers IV (argued), Kelli L. Sager, Karen Henry,

Kathleen Cullinan and Brendan Charney, Davis Wright

Tremaine LLP, Los Angeles, California; Robert Van Nest, R.

James Slaughter and Adam Lauridsen, Keker & Van Nest

LLP, San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Brian D. Henri (argued), Henri Law Group, Palo Alto,

California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Duncan W. Crabtree-Ireland and Danielle S. Van Lier, Screen

Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio

Artists, Los Angeles, California, for Amicus Curiae Screen

Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio

Artists.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

We are called upon to balance the right of publicity of

former professional football players against Electronic Arts’

(EA) First Amendment right to use their likenesses in its

Madden NFL series of video games. We previously held

EA’s unauthorized use of a former college football player’s

likeness in the NCAA Football series of video games was not,

as a matter of law, protected by the First Amendment. See

Keller v. Elec. Arts (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &

Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). In

Keller, we rejected several of the First Amendment defenses

EA raises here on materially indistinguishable grounds. EA

advances one additional argument in this appeal – its use of

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4 DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS

former players’ likenesses is protected under the First

Amendment as “incidental use.” We disagree. We hold EA’s

use of the former players’ likenesses is not incidental,

because it is central to EA’s main commercial purpose – to

create a realistic virtual simulation of football games

involving current and former NFL teams.

I. Background

EA is a developer and publisher of video games,

including Madden NFL, which EA publishes annually. 

Madden NFL allows users to play virtual football games

between National Football League (NFL) teams by

controlling virtual players, or avatars. EA’s graphic artists

and programmers create the avatars, as well as virtual

stadiums, coaches, referees, fans and other audio and visual

elements that allow users to experience a realistic simulation

of an NFL game. Users control the movements of the avatars

and the outcome of the game through the users’ inputs to the

game system.

Each annual version of Madden NFL includes all current

players for all 32 NFL teams, along with accurate player

names, team logos, colors and uniforms. EA has paid

National Football Players Inc. – the licensing arm of the

National Football League Players Association – annual

licensing fees in the millions of dollars to use current players’

likenesses.

From 2001 through 2009, Madden NFL also included

certain particularly successful or popular “historic teams.” 

EA did not obtain a license to use the likenesses of the former

players on these historic teams. Although the players on the

historic teams are not identified by name or photograph, each

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DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS 5

is described by his position, years in the NFL, height, weight,

skin tone and relative skill level in different aspects of the

sport.1 For example, Madden NFL includes as a historic team

the 1979 Los Angeles Rams that played in that year’s Super

Bowl. Vince Ferragamo, a plaintiff in this action, was a

quarterback on the 1979 Rams. He is Caucasian and was

listed in the 1979 Rams media guide as a 26 year-old, six-foot

three-inch, 207-pound third-year NFL player. Madden NFL

depicts an avatar who is a quarterback for the 1979 Rams and

has identical physical characteristics. Madden NFL also

includes the 1984 Los Angeles Rams, for which Ferragamo

was again a quarterback. The 1984 Rams media guide lists

Ferragamo as a 30-year-old, six-foot three-inch, 212-pound

seventh-year NFL player. Madden NFL depicts an avatar on

the 1984 Rams with identical physical characteristics.

The plaintiffs alleged that Madden NFL similarly

includes, without authorization, accurate likenesses of

plaintiffs Michael Davis and Billy Joe Dupree, as well as

roughly 6,000 other former NFL players who appear on more

than 100 historic teams in various editions of Madden NFL. 

The plaintiffs asserted claims for right of publicity under

California Civil Code § 3344 and California common law,

conversion, trespass to chattels and unjust enrichment on

behalf of themselves and all former NFL players depicted in

Madden NFL. EA moved to strike the complaint as a

strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under

California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil

Procedure § 425.16. The district court denied the motion. 

We have jurisdiction over EA’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We affirm.

1 For purposes of this appeal, EA concedes the Madden NFL series uses

the plaintiffs’ likenesses.

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6 DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo the denial of a motion to strike under

California’s anti-SLAPP statute. See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1272

n.3.

III. Discussion

A. Anti-SLAPP motion

California’s anti-SLAPP statute is “designed to allow

courts ‘to promptly expose and dismiss meritless and

harassing claims seeking to chill protected expression.’” 

Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 595 (9th Cir.

2010) (quoting Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d

672, 682 (9th Cir. 2005)). Under the statute, “a partymay file

a motion to strike a cause of action against it if the complaint

‘aris[es] from any act of that person in furtherance of the

person’s right of petition or free speech under the United

States Constitution or the California Constitution in

connection with a public issue.’” Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1)). To defeat a

motion to strike, a plaintiff must “establish[] that there is a

probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Cal.

Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1).

The plaintiffs concede that their suit arises from an act by

EA in furtherance of its right of free speech under the First

Amendment. Indeed, “[v]ideo games are entitled to the full

protections of the First Amendment, because ‘[l]ike the

protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video

games communicate ideas – and even social messages.’” 

Keller, 724 F.3d at 1270–71 (quoting Brown v. Entm’t

Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011)).

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DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS 7

The district court denied EA’s motion, however,

concluding that the plaintiffs established a reasonable

probability they will prevail on their claims. “‘Reasonable

probability’ . . . requires only a ‘minimum level of legal

sufficiency and triability.’” Mindys Cosmetics, 611 F.3d at

598 (quoting Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 2 P.3d 27, 33 n.5 (Cal.

2000)). A plaintiff must “state and substantiate a legally

sufficient claim,” id. at 598–99, based on “the pleadings, and

supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon

which the liability or defense is based,” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§ 425.16(b)(2). “‘Put another way, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and

supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to

sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the

plaintiff is credited.’” Mindys Cosmetics, 611 F.3d at 599

(quoting Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 50 P.3d 733,

739 (Cal. 2002)). “[T]he required probability that [the

plaintiffs] will prevail need not be high.” Hilton v. Hallmark

Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2010).

EA does not challenge the plaintiffs’ ability to state or

support any substantive element of their claims. Instead, EA

argues it is not reasonably probable the plaintiffs will prevail,

because their claims are barred by five affirmative defenses

under the First Amendment – the transformative use defense,

the public interest defense, the public affairs exemption of

California Civil Code § 3344(d), the Rogers test and the

incidental use defense. Although the anti-SLAPP statute

“places on the plaintiff the burden of substantiating its claims,

a defendant that advances an affirmative defense to such

claims properly bears the burden of proof on the defense.” 

Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter &

Hampton LLP, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 44 (Ct. App. 2005). EA

has the burden of establishing the transformative use defense

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8 DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS

as a matter of law. See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1274. On its other

affirmative defenses, EA has the burden of establishing “a

probability of prevailing.” Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v.

Cal. Ins. Guarantee Ass’n, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 43, 53 (Ct. App.

2006). For the reasons set forth below, EA has not shown a

probability of prevailing on its incidental use defense, and its

other defenses are effectively precluded by our decision in

Keller.

2 Because EA has not met its burden as to any of its

affirmative defenses, the district court properly denied EA’s

motion to strike.

B. Transformative use

EA contends the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the

transformative use defense formulated by the California

Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary

Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). “The defense is ‘a

balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of

publicity based on whether the work in question adds

significant creative elements so as to be transformed into

something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.’”

Keller, 724 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at

799).

In Keller, we rejected EA’s transformative use defense. 

We held the use of college athletes’ likenesses in the NCAA

Football video game series was not, as a matter of law,

transformative use. See id. at 1277–79. We relied primarily

on No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d.

397, 411 (Ct. App. 2011), in which the California Court of

2 EA does not seek to distinguish this case from Keller. Instead, EA

states it “raises these arguments here to preserve them for en banc review

in this Circuit and/or United States Supreme Court review.”

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DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS 9

Appeal rejected a video game maker’s transformative use

defense because its video game contained “literal recreations”

of members of the band “No Doubt” doing “the same activity

by which the band achieved and maintains its fame.” In No

Doubt, the court of appeal held, “that the avatars appear in the

context of a videogame that contains many other creative

elements[] does not transform the avatars into anything other

than exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing exactly

what they do as celebrities.” Id. The court concluded the

“graphics and other background content of the game are

secondary, and the expressive elements of the game remain

manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a

conventional portrait of No Doubt so as to commercially

exploit its fame.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation

marks omitted).

Keller concluded No Doubt “offers a persuasive precedent

that cannot be materially distinguished from Keller’s case.” 

724 F.3d at 1277. As in No Doubt, the NCAA Football game

“replicated Keller’s physical characteristics” and allowed

“users [to] manipulate [him] in the performance of the same

activity for which [he is] known in real life” in “[t]he context

in which the activity occurs.” Id. at 1276. Consequently,

“[g]iven that NCAA Football realistically portrays college

football players in the context of college football games, the

district court was correct in concluding that EA cannot

prevail as a matter of law based on the transformative use

defense at the anti-SLAPP stage.” Id. at 1279.

The same is true here. Like NCAA Football, Madden

NFL replicates players’ physical characteristics and allows

users to manipulate them in the performance of the same

activity for which they are known in real life – playing

football for an NFL team. Neither the individual players’

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10 DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS

likenesses nor the graphics and other background content are

transformed more in Madden NFL than they were in NCAA

Football. Indeed, EA does not attempt to distinguish Madden

NFL from NCAA Football. Instead, EA contends the court

erred in Keller by focusing on whether the individual avatars

were transformed, rather than whether the work as a whole

was transformative. Absent “intervening higher authority,”

however, we are bound by the factually indistinguishable

holding in Keller. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc).3 Thus, EA has not shown that the

transformative use defense applies to the plaintiffs’ claims.4

C. The public interest defense

EA next contends the plaintiffs’ common law right of

publicity claim is barred by the public interest defense, and

their statutory right of publicity claim is barred by the “public

affairs” exemption of California Civil Code § 3344(d). Under

the common law public interest defense, “no cause of action

will lie for the publication of matters in the public interest,

which rests on the right of the public to know and the

freedom of the press to tell it.” Hilton, 599 F.3d at 912

(quoting Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 639, 640 (Ct. App. 1995)). Under the statutory

“public affairs” exemption, the right of publicity recognized

in California Civil Code § 3344(a) does not apply to the “use

3 Further, the court expressly stated in Keller that, like the Third Circuit

in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013), it

“considered the potentially transformative nature of the game as a whole.” 

724 F.3d at 1278.

4 Because we are bound by Keller, we do not reach EA’s argument that

Keller improperly failed to apply strict constitutional scrutiny to the

plaintiffs’ right-of-publicity claims.

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DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS 11

of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in

connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast

or account.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d).

Although California courts typically analyze the statutory

and common law defenses separately, both defenses “protect

only the act of publishing or reporting.” Keller, 724 F.3d at

1282. In Keller, we rejected EA’s reliance on these defenses,

explaining that, unlike the cases on which EA relied,

involving a documentary, a newspaper photograph and a

game program, EA was “not publishing or reporting factual

data.” Id. at 1283. See Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 790, 791–92 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding a documentary

on surfing featuring a well-known surfer was “a fair comment

on real life events”); Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640–41

(holding posters containing previously published newspaper

images portraying Joe Montana’s football victories were “a

form of public interest presentation to which [First

Amendment] protection must be extended”); Gionfriddo v.

Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 314–15 (Ct.

App. 2001) (holding “factual data concerning the players,

their performance statistics . . . and video depictions” were a

“recitation and discussion of factual data” protected by the

First Amendment). “Put simply, EA’s interactive game is not

a publication of facts about college football; it is a game, not

a reference source.” Keller, 724 F.3d at 1283. It “is a means

by which users can play their own virtual football games, not

a means for obtaining information about real-world football

games.” Id.

Madden NFL is indistinguishable in this regard from

NCAA Football. Like NCAA Football, although Madden

NFL contains some factual data about current and former

NFL teams and players, it is “a game, not a reference source”

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12 DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS

or a “publication of facts” about professional football. Id. 

Again, in the absence of intervening higher authority, our

holding in Keller controls. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 899. 

Thus, EA has not established a probability of prevailing on

either the common law public interest defense or the “public

affairs” exemption of California Civil Code § 3344(d).

D. The Rogers test

EA next contends Madden NFL is entitled to First

Amendment protection under the test formulated by the

Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.

1989). Rogers held that a literary title does not violate the

Lanham Act “unless the title has no artistic relevance to the

underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic

relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source

or the content of the work.” Id. at 999. In Keller, we rejected

EA’s argument that the Rogers test should be extended to

right-of-publicity claims. See 724 F.3d at 1279–82. We

explained that the Rogers test “was designed to protect

consumers from the risk of consumer confusion – the

hallmark element of a Lanham Act claim.” Id. at 1280. In

contrast, the right of publicity “does not primarily seek to

prevent consumer confusion.” Id. “Rather, it primarily

‘protects a form of intellectual property [in one’s person] that

society deems to have some social utility.’” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 804). Thus, the

Rogers test does not apply to the plaintiffs’ right-of-publicity

claims.

E. The incidental use defense

Finally, EA contends the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by

the incidental use defense. EA did not assert this defense in

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DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS 13

the district court. “We apply a general rule against

entertaining arguments on appeal that were not presented or

developed before the district court.” In re Mercury

Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir.

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). That rule,

however, is “discretionary, not jurisdictional.” Id. We have

recognized three circumstances in which we have discretion

to reach waived issues, including “‘when the issue presented

is purely one of law and either does not depend on the factual

record developed below, or the pertinent record has been fully

developed.’” Id. (quoting Bolker v. Comm’r, 760 F.2d 1039,

1042 (9th Cir. 1985)). Under the circumstances of this case,

whether EA has established a probability of prevailing on its

incidental use defense is a question of law that we can

address on the existing record. We therefore exercise our

discretion to address the issue.

The parties agree that the incidental use defense exists

under California law. We therefore assume, for purposes of

this opinion, that it does.

5 The parties also rely on the same

cases and treatises to define the scope of the defense. Under

5 Although California courts have not yet held that the incidental use

defense applies to right-of-publicity claims, the defense is widely

recognized. See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, Rights of Publicity and Privacy

§ 6:31 (2d ed. 2014) (citing “the general rule that an insignificant or

fleeting use of plaintiff’s identity is not an infringement”); Stayart v.

Google Inc., 710 F.3d 719, 723 (7thCir. 2013) (recognizing the incidental

use as a defense to right-of-publicity claims under Wisconsin common law

and statute); Lohan v. Perez, 924 F. Supp. 2d 447, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)

(applying the incidental use defense to a right-of-publicity claim under

New York law); Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 648

n.6 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (citing favorably the Restatement Second of

Torts for the proposition that “mere incidental use [is] not actionable” as

“appropriation of [the] commercial or other value of [a] name or

likeness”).

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14 DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS

those authorities, “[a] number of factors are relevant,” such

as “(1) whether the use has a unique quality or value that

would result in commercial profit to the defendant;

(2) whether the use contributes something of significance;

(3) the relationship between the reference to the plaintiff and

the purpose and subject of the work; and (4) the duration,

prominence or repetition of the name or likeness relative to

the rest of the publication.” Aligo v. Time-Life Books, Inc.,

No. C 94-20707 JW, 1994 WL 715605, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec.

19, 1994) (internal citations omitted). See also 5 J. Thomas

McCarthy,McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition

§ 28:7.50 (4th ed. 2014) (“The mere trivial or fleeting use of

a person’s name or image in an advertisement will not trigger

liability when such a usage will have only a de minimis

commercial implication.”); Stayart, 710 F.3d at 723 (“For

use of a person’s name for advertising or trade purposes to be

actionable . . . there must be a substantial rather than an

incidental connection between the use and the defendant’s

commercial purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted));

Yeager v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1089,

1100 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“The rationale underlying this

doctrine is that an incidental use has no commercial value.”);

Preston v. Martin Bregman Prods., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 116,

119 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Whether a use falls within this

exception to liability is determined by the role that the use of

the plaintiff’s name or likeness plays in the main purpose and

subject of the work at issue.”). These factors support the

plaintiffs’ position here.

Under the first and second factors, the former players’

likenesses have unique value and contribute to the

commercial value of Madden NFL. EA goes to substantial

lengths to incorporate accurate likenesses of current and

former players, including payingmillions of dollars to license

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DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS 15

the likenesses of current players. EA has acknowledged,

“[t]he Madden titles are successful in part because they allow

consumers to simulate play involving any of the 32 NFL

teams, using real NFL players.”

Having acknowledged the likenesses of current NFL

players carry substantial commercial value, EA does not offer

a persuasive reason to conclude otherwise as to the former

players. EA argues that, because there are several thousand

players depicted in Madden NFL, any individual player’s

likeness has only a de minimis commercial value. There is no

basis for such a sweeping statement. EA includes only a

small number of particularly successful or popular historic

teams. EA also advertises the inclusion of those historic

teams in its promotional materials.6Indeed, we rejected EA’s

similar reasoning in Keller: “If EA did not think there was

value in having an avatar designed to mimic each individual

player, it would not go to the lengths it does to achieve

realism in this regard. Having chosen to use the players’

likenesses, EA cannot now hide behind the numerosity of its

potential offenses or the alleged unimportance of any one

individual player.” 724 F.3d at 1276 n.7.

Under the third and fourth factors, the former players’

likenesses are featured prominently in a manner that is

substantially related to the main purpose and subject of

Madden NFL – to create an accurate virtual simulation of an

6 For example, the Official Game Guide for the 2006 edition of Madden

NFL states: “Historic Rosters are back again. They allow you to play

‘what if’-type games. For instance, you can replay the ’78 Dallas

Cowboys vsthe ’78 Steelers in Super Bowl XIII. Just select the teams and

away you go back in time to play the game. The players do not have their

actual names, but you can edit them if you want optimum realism.”

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16 DAVIS V. ELECTRONIC ARTS

NFL game. See Preston, 765 F. Supp. at 119; Ladany v.

William Morrow & Co., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 870, 881

(S.D.N.Y. 1978). EA has stated publicly it is dedicated to

“creating the most true-to life NFL simulation experience as

possible . . . We want to accurately deliver an amazing NFL

experience in our game.” Accurate depictions of the players

on the field are central to the creation of an accurate virtual

simulation of an NFL game. Cf. Lohan, 924 F. Supp. 2d at

455–56 (holding the incidental use defense applied when the

plaintiff’s name was mentioned once in 104 lines of a song

and the mention was “entirely incidental to the theme of the

Song”). Therefore, EA has not established a probability of

prevailing on its incidental use defense.

IV. Conclusion

EA has not shown that its unauthorized use of former

players’ likenesses in the Madden NFL video game series

qualifies for First Amendment protection under the

transformative use defense, the public interest defense, the

Rogers test or the incidental use defense. Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s denial of EA’s motion to strike.7

AFFIRMED.

7 Because EA may preserve issues for en banc or Supreme Court review,

see Singh v. Gonzalez, 502 F.3d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 2007), its appeal of

issues foreclosed by Keller was not frivolous, and we deny the plaintiffs’

request for costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP

statute and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.

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