Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00492/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00492-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KENNEDY MINNIFIELD, : 

Petitioner, : 

v. : CIVIL ACTION 07-00492-WS-B

GRANTT CULLIVER, : 

Respondent. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an

Alabama prison inmate, which has been referred for report and

recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule

72.2(c)(4), and Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

This action is now ready for consideration. The record is adequate

to determine Petitioner’s claim; thus, no federal evidentiary

hearing is required. Kelley v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections,

377 F.3d 1317, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1149

(2005). Upon careful consideration, it is recommended that the

petition be dismissed as a successive petition under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(3)(A) because the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it.

I. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS.

Petitioner was convicted of one count of attempted murder and

two counts of first-degree robbery in the Circuit Court of

Jefferson County, Alabama, in April 1986, for which he received the

sentences of life, thirty years, and forty years, respectively, in

the state penitentiary. (Doc. 1, p. 2; Doc. 12, p. 1).

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The date Petitioner filed his direct appeal and the date his

conviction and sentence were confirmed by the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals is unclear from the record. Additionally, whether

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama

Supreme Court is not evident from the documents submitted by

Respondent nor from Petitioner’s petition.

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Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal by

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals.1 (Doc. 12, Ex. A).

Subsequently, Petitioner filed an unsuccessful Rule 32 petition on

June 17, 1996; however, he did not appeal the denial of his

petition. (Doc. 12, p. 2). 

On March 25, 1998, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, namely

Minnifield v. Dees, CV No. 97-N-158-S. (Doc. 12, Ex. A) Petitioner

raised the following claims in his 1998 petition:

(1) the lineup procedure whereby he was placed in a

lineup with men of considerably different phsycial

characteristics tainted the subsequent in-court

identification depriving him of due process; (2) the

trial court’s refusal to grant his motion for a

continuance to enable him to adequately prepare a defense

of not guilty by reason of insanity violated his die

process rights; (3) the trial court erred in denying his

motion to sever the trial; and (4) he was incompetent to

stand trial.

(Doc. 12, Ex. B, p. 3). By Order dated September 30, 1999, the

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District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation, which determined that Petitioner’s incompetency

claim was procedurally defaulted and that Petitioner’s remaining

claims did not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Accordingly, Petitioner’s 1998 habeas petition was dismissed.

(Doc. 12, Exs. B & C).

Petitioner raises one claim in the instant habeas petition.

(Doc. 1, p. 7). He claims that newly discovered evidence,

specifically a psychiatric evaluation from Taylor Hardin Secure

Medical Facility, has been obtained which bolsters his claim that

he was mentally incompetent to stand trial. (Id.) According to

Petitioner, the claim of mental incompetence was raised in his Rule

32 petition but not on direct appeal. (Id.) 

Respondent contends that the instant habeas petition should be

dismissed because, having previously filed a petition for habeas

relief, Petitioner was required to apply to the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals for leave in order to pursue the instant

successive habeas petition. According to Respondent, this Court

lacks jurisdiction to review this petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(3)(A) without authorization from the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals. (Doc. 12).

II. ANALYSIS.

As a threshold matter, the undersigned notes that Petitioner

has pending a request for appointment of counsel (Doc. 13). The

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appointment of counsel is not mandatory except in exceptional

circumstances where the complexity of the case or the competence of

the plaintiff makes pro se prosecution of the claim fundamentally

unfair. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 1992).

Having reviewed Petitioner’s petition, the undersigned observes

that Petitioner’s claims are clearly set forth such that there are

no extraordinary circumstances which necessitate the appointment of

counsel in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for

appointment of counsel is due to be DENIED.

The undersigned further finds that Petitioner’s habeas

petition is due to be denied because it is successive, and

Petitioner did not obtain permission from the Eleventh Circuit

before filing his petition. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“ADEPA”) added the provision under 28 U.S.C.

§2244(b)(3)(A) which requires that “‘[b]efore a second or

successive application [for a writ of habeas corpus] is filed in

the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate

court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to

consider the application.’” Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1330

(11th Cir. 1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)), cert. denied,

528 U.S. 1085 (2000).

Petitioner’s first habeas petition, as noted supra, was filed

on March 25, 1998. His current petition, filed on July 9, 2007, is

clearly a successive petition. As such, this Court lacks

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Also pending before this Court is Petitioner’s “Request to Rule

in the Behalf of the Petitioner Kennedy Minnifield: Record Been

Destroy - Discovery” [sic] (Doc. 14) and Motion to Return Pleadings

(Doc. 16). These motions are DENIED in light of the instant Report

and Recommendation. Petitioner’s Motion for Issuance of a Certificate

of Appealability for Appeal (Doc. 17) and Notice of Appeal (Doc. 18)

are DENIED as premature.

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jurisdiction to entertain the current petition absent evidence that

Petitioner has obtained permission from the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals. Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied, 520 U.S. 1203 (1997). The record in this case does not

reflect that Petitioner obtained an order from the Eleventh Circuit

authorizing this Court to consider the instant petition. U.S. v.

Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005); Farris v. U.S., 333

F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). Because Petitioner has not

applied to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for permission to

file a second habeas petition, this Court lacks jurisdiction to

consider Petitioner's request for relief. Id.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that

the present habeas corpus petition be dismissed due to Petitioner's

failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).2

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge.

Case 1:07-cv-00492-WS-B Document 19 Filed 02/01/08 Page 5 of 7
DONE this the 1st day of February, 2008.

 /S/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this

document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court.

Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on

appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B,

1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail

in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a

“Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is

established by order. The statement of objection shall

specify those portions of the recommendation to which

objection is made and the basis for the objection. The

objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at

the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth

the party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different

disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a

copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate

judge, although a copy of the original brief may be

submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief

in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief

in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment

of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate

judge finds that the tapes and original records in this action are

adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to

this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is

advised that a judicial determination that transcription is

necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost of

the transcript.

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