Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02631/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02631-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN A. TROIE,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOTTLING GROUP, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-2631-MCE-KJN PS 

ORDER and FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this action plaintiff, who proceeds without counsel and in forma pauperis, essentially 

alleges that he was unlawfully terminated by defendant while on medical leave from his position 

as a maintenance mechanic in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. (ECF Nos. 1, 3, 

20.) After conducting a scheduling conference on April 28, 2016, the court issued a pretrial 

scheduling order on April 29, 2016. (ECF Nos. 18, 20.) The pretrial scheduling order required, 

inter alia, that initial disclosures pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) be made no 

later than May 16, 2016, and that discovery be completed by December 16, 2016. (ECF No. 20.) 

The order specifically cautioned that “[f]ailure to comply with the terms of this order may result 

in the imposition of monetary and all other appropriate sanctions, including dismissal or an order 

of judgment.” (Id.)

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Presently pending before the court is a motion to dismiss the action for discovery abuses 

and failure to prosecute, accompanied by various alternative motions to compel discovery 

responses, filed by defendant. (ECF Nos. 22-26.) According to the motions, plaintiff has failed 

to provide any initial disclosures, failed to respond to defendant’s June 2016 written discovery 

requests, and failed to cooperate with respect to plaintiff’s appearance for his anticipated July 

2016 deposition, despite numerous attempts to meet and confer by defendant’s counsel. In fact, 

the motions claim that plaintiff has ceased communicating with defendant’s counsel altogether

since June 2016. The motions were initially noticed pursuant to Local Rule 251 (pertaining to 

discovery motions) for a hearing on November 10, 2016.

On October 27, 2016, the court, in light of plaintiff’s pro se status and the potentially 

dispositive effect of at least one of the motions, issued an order providing plaintiff with additional 

time to respond to defendant’s motions. (ECF No. 27.) The order required plaintiff to file an 

opposition or statement of non-opposition to defendant’s motions no later than November 10, 

2016, and required defendant’s reply brief to be filed no later than November 17, 2016. Plaintiff 

was expressly cautioned that failure to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the 

motions by the required deadline would be construed as a statement of non-opposition to the 

pending motions and as plaintiff’s consent to dismissal of the action with prejudice. (Id.)

Although the applicable deadline has now long passed, plaintiff entirely failed to respond 

to defendant’s motions or the court’s order. On November 17, 2016, defendant filed a timely

reply brief, noting plaintiff’s failure to respond to the motions, and emphasizing that plaintiff has 

yet to provide any initial disclosures or responses to the written discovery, nor has plaintiff made 

any contact with defendant’s counsel. (ECF No. 30.) In light of the above, and for the reasons 

discussed below, the court finds that dismissal is warranted at this juncture based on plaintiff’s 

failure to comply with court orders and failure to prosecute the action. 

Eastern District Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply 

with these Rules or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of 

any and all sanctions authorized by statute or Rule or within the inherent power of the Court.” 

Moreover, Eastern District Local Rule 183(a) provides, in part:

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Any individual representing himself or herself without an attorney 

is bound by the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure, these 

Rules, and all other applicable law. All obligations placed on 

“counsel” by these Rules apply to individuals appearing in propria 

persona. Failure to comply therewith may be ground for dismissal, 

judgment by default, or any other sanction appropriate under these 

Rules.

See also King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Pro se litigants must follow the 

same rules of procedure that govern other litigants”) (overruled on other grounds). A district 

court may impose sanctions, including involuntary dismissal of a plaintiff’s case pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), where that plaintiff fails to prosecute his or her case or 

fails to comply with the court’s orders, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the court’s local 

rules. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (recognizing that a court “may act 

sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute”); Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. 

Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that courts may dismiss an action 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute 

or comply with the rules of civil procedure or the court’s orders); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 

53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“Failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground 

for dismissal”); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), the district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with 

any order of the court”); Thompson v. Housing Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 

1986) (per curiam) (stating that district courts have inherent power to control their dockets and 

may impose sanctions including dismissal or default). 

A court must weigh five factors in determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to 

prosecute, failure to comply with a court order, or failure to comply with a district court’s local 

rules. See, e.g., Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260. Specifically, the court must consider:

(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) 

the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to 

the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases 

on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.

Id. at 1260-61; accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002); Ghazali, 46 

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F.3d at 53. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “[t]hese factors are not a series of 

conditions precedent before the judge can do anything, but a way for a district judge to think 

about what to do.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 

(9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, the first two Ferdik factors strongly support dismissal. Plaintiff’s failure to respond 

to at least two court orders (the order to provide initial disclosures and the order to respond to 

defendant’s pending motions), failure to respond to written discovery, failure to cooperate with 

the scheduling of his deposition, and failure to respond to numerous communications from 

defendant’s counsel strongly suggest that plaintiff is not interested in seriously prosecuting the 

action, or at least does not take his obligations to the court and the opposing party seriously. 

Indeed, plaintiff has not even requested an extension of time on any articulated basis, let alone 

shown good cause for an extension of time to comply with the court’s orders or the propounded 

discovery.1 Any further time spent by the court on this case will consume scarce judicial 

resources and take away from other active cases.

The third Ferdik factor, prejudice to a defendant, also favors dismissal. Although the 

December 16, 2016 discovery completion deadline is imminent, defendant has yet to obtain any 

initial disclosures, responses to written discovery, or deposition testimony from plaintiff, placing 

defendant at a significant disadvantage in defending its interests in this case. 

 

1 According to defendant’s counsel, plaintiff represented in June 2016 that he was no longer 

living at the address on the court’s docket, but at a temporary address. Defendant’s counsel 

specifically requested plaintiff’s new address and advised plaintiff of his obligation to file a 

notice of change of address with the court. However, plaintiff did not file a notice of change of 

address until October 31, 2016. (ECF No. 28.) In any event, plaintiff cannot blame his address 

change for his numerous failures in this case. In addition to serving its discovery requests on 

plaintiff by mail and Federal Express, defendant also served plaintiff by e-mail, and plaintiff 

specifically responded to that e-mail, reasonably indicating that plaintiff received and had notice 

of the discovery requests. (ECF No. 22-2.) Additionally, at least to date, none of the court’s prior 

orders have been returned to the court as undeliverable. Moreover, even if they had been, it is 

plaintiff’s duty to keep the court informed of his current address, and service of the court’s orders 

at the address on record was effective absent the filing of a notice of change of address. In 

relevant part, Local Rule 182(f) provides: “Each appearing attorney and pro se party is under a 

continuing duty to notify the Clerk and all other parties of any change of address or telephone 

number of the attorney or the pro se party. Absent such notice, service of documents at the prior 

address of the attorney or pro se party shall be fully effective.” 

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The fifth Ferdik factor, which considers the availability of less drastic measures, also 

supports dismissal of this action. Cognizant of plaintiff’s pro se status, the court gave plaintiff 

significant admonitions at the pretrial scheduling conference regarding the need to diligently 

prosecute the case, communicate with defendant’s counsel, and comply with court orders and 

deadlines. The court also instructed plaintiff as to where he could obtain a copy of the court’s 

Local Rules. Furthermore, upon the filing of defendant’s motions, the court sua sponte granted 

plaintiff additional time to respond to the motions and clearly warned plaintiff about the potential 

consequences for failure to respond to the pending motions. See, e.g., Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262 

(“[O]ur decisions also suggest that a district court’s warning to a party that his failure to obey the 

court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy the ‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement”). 

Additionally, the court finds no suitable alternative to recommending dismissal of the action. 

Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, with virtually no cash in his bank account and 

no significant assets (ECF No. 2), it is highly unlikely that plaintiff would be able to pay any 

significant monetary sanctions. Also, based on the limited record before the court at this stage of 

the proceedings, the court cannot properly fashion any issue or evidentiary sanctions. 

The court recognizes the importance of giving due weight to the fourth Ferdik factor, 

which addresses the public policy favoring disposition of cases on the merits. However, the 

fourth Ferdik factor is outweighed by the other Ferdik factors. Were this a case where a pro se

litigant inadvertently violated procedural rules, but otherwise made a good faith effort to comply 

and move the case forward, the court would be inclined to provide greater leniency. However, in 

this case, plaintiff entirely abandoned his obligations to opposing counsel and the court for 

several months, without any communication. Even a person untrained in the law could foresee 

the consequences of such conduct. 

Therefore, after carefully evaluating and weighing the Ferdik factors, the court concludes 

that dismissal is appropriate. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing on the motion to dismiss set for 

December 1, 2016, is hereby VACATED;

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the action (ECF No. 26) be granted.

2. The action be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

41(b).

3. Defendant’s alternative motions to compel (ECF Nos. 22-25) be denied without 

prejudice as moot.

4. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. 

Dated: November 21, 2016

 

 

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