Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01423/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01423-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Karen J. Clitso,

Plaintiff,

v.

Michael J. Astrue,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

NO. CIV-06-1423-PCT-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 13),

and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 17). After consideration of the

arguments advanced by the parties, the Court makes the following rulings.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income with the Social

Security Administration ("SSA") on March 23, 2001, alleging an onset date of disability

of September 21, 1992. (Administrative Record ("AR") 95). Plaintiff asserted disability

on the basis of severe pain in her abdomen, lower back, and legs. (AR at 105). The SSA

denied Plaintiff's claim initially and on reconsideration. (AR at 47-59). Plaintiff 

appealed and had a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, who again denied her

claims by decision dated September 16, 2003. Plaintiff again appealed and the Appeals

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Council granted Plaintiff's request for review. (AR at 28). A supplemental hearing was

held before Administrative Law Judge Barbara Licha Perkins (the "ALJ") on March 1,

2005, where Plaintiff, with the assistance of council, appeared and testified. (AR at 28). 

In a decision dated May 23, 2005, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not eligible for

Supplemental Security Income. (AR at 38).

In the five-step evaluation process the SSA uses to determine eligibility for

benefits, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, the ALJ found, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that: (1)

Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since filing her petition; (2)

Plaintiff has a medically determinable impairment which is “severe” within the meaning

of the Social Security Act; (3) Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or equal the

impairment listings; and (4) that Plaintiff is unable to return to her past relevant work.

(AR at 36-37). At step five, which Plaintiff disputes, the ALJ found that Plaintiff,

though severely impaired, had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") for a wide range

of sedentary work. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's RFC rendered her able to perform

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as that of an

order clerk or jewelry bench hand. (AR at 36). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the

ALJ's determination from this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by

substantial evidence and the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. See

Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); Benton v.

Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). When reviewing factual determinations

by the Commissioner, acting through the ALJ, this Court affirms if substantial evidence

supports the determinations. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003);

Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is more than a

mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341

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F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003); Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Substantial evidence, considering the entire record, is relevant evidence which a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Howard, 341 F.3d

at 1011; Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the

Commissioner's conclusion, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072,

1075 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving

conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at

1040; Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ's

determinations of law are reviewed de novo, although deference is owed to a reasonable

construction of the applicable statutes. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156; McNatt v. Apfel,

201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). At all times, the claimant carries the burden of

proving disability and failure to prove disability justifies a denial of benefits. See Ukolov

v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005).

DISCUSSION

The ALJ found that Plaintiff, though severely impaired, had sufficient RFC for a

wide range of sedentary work. (AR at 37). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in her

assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC because she failed: (1) to give controlling weight to the

opinion of the treating physician; (2) to provide a proper analysis of the opinions of

physician’s assistant Benjamin Henderson; (3) to give a proper assessment of Plaintiff's

testimony; and (4) to consider all of plaintiffs limitations in the determination of her RFC.

(Dkt. 14 at 2-3). The Court will address each of Plaintiff’s arguments in turn.

1. Treating Physician's Opinion

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to follow or properly analyze the opinion of

treating physician Dr. Knott, and failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting his

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1

 42 U.S.C. § 423 defines disability, in part, as "medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months." 

2

 Plaintiff claims that there were no other examining doctors besides Dr. Knott

upon which the ALJ could base her opinion (Dkt. 14 at 6); however, Plaintiff overlooked

Dr. Barnwell. Earlier, Plaintiff suggested that the ALJ’s report was contradictory since

the ALJ stated that there was no indication of signs or findings in Dr. Knott’s reports

which could support a diagnosis, yet still found that Plaintiff had myofacial pain

syndrome. Id. Similarly, that diagnosis was made by Dr. Barnwell, not Dr. Knott. 

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opinion. (Dkt. 14 at 3). The ALJ is only required to determine if a Plaintiff meets the

statutory definition of a disability. "A statement by a medical source that [Plaintiff is]

'disabled' or 'unable to work' does not mean that [the ALJ] will determine that [Plaintiff is]

disabled." 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(1) (2006). Plaintiff's brief cites frequent instances where

Dr. Knott stated that Plaintiff suffered from chronic pain, and that she would be limited in

what work she could do, if any, (Dkt. 14 at 4-5) but no instances where Dr. Knott described

"any anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(3).

In fact the only source cited by either party which identifies a diagnosis of a condition which

could cause pain for a period exceeding 12 months1

 is Dr. Jane Barnwell, whose opinion the

ALJ gave extensive consideration, and with whom she generally agreed in her finding. (AR

at 30).2

 With regard to Dr. Knott, the ALJ explained that his functional capacity assessment

(AR at 194-198) contained "no medical diagnosis" and "no indication of signs or findings

that might support a diagnosis." The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for not giving

Dr. Knott's opinion controlling weight, and those reasons were supported by substantial

evidence. Therefore, the ALJ did not commit legal error in not giving Dr. Knott's opinion

controlling weight.

2. Mr. Henderson's Opinion

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion of Physician's

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Assistant Benjamin Henderson, and failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting his

opinion. Plaintiff's own pleading notes that the Social Security Administration has ruled that

information from Physician's Assistants "cannot establish the existence of a medically

determinable impairment" though they may provide some "insight" into an individual's

condition. SSR No. 06-03p (C.E. 2006), 2006 SSR LEXIS 4. Furthermore, Plaintiffs

correctly note that lay testimony must either be considered or reasons must be given as to

why it was disregarded. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915,919 (9th Cir. 1993). In this case,

however, Mr. Henderson did not testify, instead his reports were part of the record. Far

more importantly, the ALJ addressed Mr. Henderson's reports at length, stating specifically

why she afforded them little weight. (AR at 34). The ALJ fully evaluated Mr. Henderson's

reports, gave germane reasons why she gave them little weight, and those reasons were

supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the ALJ did not commit legal error in giving

Mr. Henderson's opinion little weight.

3. Plaintiff's Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously found Plaintiff’s testimony not credible

because she did not sufficiently address the reasons for the credibility finding. In

determining the credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ was required to give “specific

reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record,” and to

be “sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the

weight [she] gave to [Plaintiff’s] statements and the reasons for that weight.” SSR No.

96-7p (C.E. 1996), 1996 SSR LEXIS 4. The SSA has set out certain factors to consider in

determining the credibility of Plaintiff’s statements: (1) the consistency, both internally and

with the case record, of such statements; (2) whether such statements are substantiated by

objective medical evidence; (3) whether the medical record demonstrates that Plaintiff

attempted to seek treatment and followed it once prescribed; (4) other sources of

information; (5) observations of the Plaintiff by the ALJ and others; and (6) findings by

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State agency physicians and consultants. Id. If the ALJ gave specific reasons for her

credibility finding, and they are supported by substantial evidence, this Court may not

substitute its judgment for hers. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1075.

In her decision, the ALJ made certain findings within the rubric discussed above.

First, she found that there were inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s statements and the

record. For example, the ALJ noted that there were two instances of activity in 2002,

digging and lake swimming, which were inconsistent with what Plaintiff stated she was able

to do. (AR at 31). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s claims that her pain was related to

her cesarean delivery were inconsistent with the lack of complaints accompanying her third

pregnancy beginning in 1997. (AR at 31). Second, the ALJ noted that there were several

instances where Plaintiff’s statements did not appear to be supported by evidence in the

record, such as where Plaintiff appeared for the hearing using a cane and noted that she had

been told to use a back brace, despite the fact that neither of these aids had been prescribed

to her by a doctor since 1992. (AR at 32). Third, while the ALJ found that Plaintiff sought

medical treatment, she noted that Plaintiff did not always follow her doctor’s

recommendations. Significantly, following examination by the pain specialist Dr. Barnwell,

Plaintiff was given recommendations which included injections and physical therapy, yet

there was no indication in the record that she followed these recommendations. (AR at 30).

Plaintiff mentions that the record notes a plan to discuss Dr. Barnwell’s report, but presents

no evidence that she did ever follow through on those recommendations. (Dkt. 14 at 14).

Fourth, the ALJ extensively reviewed the reports of Mr. Henderson, as described above at

2. Finally, the ALJ noted that agency consultants believed that Plaintiffs claims were “out

of proportion with the medical problems that could be identified from the objective

evidence.” (AR at 34). The ALJ gave clear, specific reasons why she found Plaintiff’s

testimony not credible, and those reasons were supported by substantial evidence.

Therefore, the ALJ did not commit legal error. 

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3

 The case in question, Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450,1454 (9th Cir. 1984),

states: 

. . . the medical evidence and claimant's testimony depict an individual

who cannot sit, stand or walk for any length of time without severe pain,

and who must alternate periods of sitting, standing and walking

throughout the course of each day. "A man who cannot walk, stand or

sit for over one hour without pain does not have the capacity to do

most jobs available in the national economy." Delgado v. Heckler, 722

F.2d 570, 574 (9th Cir.1983).

Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1454 (emphasis added). Plaintiff omitted the bolded portions of this

passage in his motion. Plaintiff’s counsel should be aware that such an omission does

not comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

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4. Assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC

First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ incorrectly assessed Ms. Clitso’s RFC because

she did not properly take into account the opinions of Dr. Knott, Mr. Henderson, and

Plaintiff’s own testimony. (Dkt. 14 at 15). For the reasons explained above, the ALJ was

not in error in her assessment of the weight and credibility of those sources, and thus she

could properly exclude their assessments. Second, Plaintiff’s motion states:

The Court [sic] has held that a claimant ‘[sic]who must alternate periods

of sitting, standing and walking throughout the course of each day . . [sic]

“does not have the capacity to do most jobs available in the national

economy,” including sedentary occupations. 

(Dkt. 14 at 16) (citations omitted). This is a misrepresentation of the authority and is

unpersuasive.3

 Third, Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ did not properly pose her hypothetical

question to the vocational expert at the March 1, 2005 hearing. The SSA bears the burden

to show that Plaintiff can do substantive, gainful work that exists in the national economy.

Magellanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756 (9th Cir. 1989). The SSA may use a vocational

expert to meet this burden. Id. In this process, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question

to a vocational expert which includes all of a claimant’s limitations and restrictions. Id.

Such limitations and restrictions must be supported by the record, and a “vocational expert's

opinion about a claimant's residual functional capacity has no evidentiary value if the

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assumptions in the hypothetical are not supported by the record.” Id. (citing Embrey v.

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). This Court rejects Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ

improperly excluded the limitation described in a report of Dr. Knott that Plaintiff would

have to walk around for five minutes each hour. (Dkt. 14 at 16, AR at 195). As described

above, the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for not giving Dr. Knott's opinion

controlling weight, and those reasons were supported by substantial evidence. Therefore,

the ALJ did not commit legal error in not giving Dr. Knott's testimony controlling weight,

and thus she was not required include all of his opinions in the hypothetical question to the

vocational expert.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial

evidence. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater, 94

F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendant is

appropriate as a matter of law.

Accordingly, 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. 13), is hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Dkt. 17), is hereby GRANTED.

DATED this 12th day of July, 2007.

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