Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02512/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02512-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTIAN BRACAMONTES, 

CDCR #P-70316, 

Civil No. 10-2512 H (NLS)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

1) DENYING MOTION TO ACCEPT

COMPLAINT IN FORMAT

SUBMITTED AS MOOT

[Doc. No. 3];

2) DENYING EX PARTE MOTION

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE

RELIEF PURSUANT TO 

FED.R.CIV.P. 65

[Doc. No. 4];

3) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[Doc. No. 2]; AND

4) DIRECTING UNITED STATES

MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

AND FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3)

 vs.

MOYA, Correctional Sergeant;

LOPEZ, Correctional Officer, ISU; 

LIZARRAGA, Correctional Officer; 

JOHN DOE, Associate Warden;

JOHN and JANE DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

 

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at California State Prison - Los Angeles (CSPLAC) in Lancaster, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

/ / / 

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Plaintiff alleges prison officials at Centinela State Prison (CEN) violated his Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him on June 3, 2009, and by

failing to provide medical attention, conspiring and retaliating against him afterward. See

Compl. at 7-15, ¶¶ 11-34. Plaintiff also alleges a pendent state law claim for “intentional and

unnecessary infliction ... of extreme emotional distress.” Id. at 15 ¶¶ 35-47.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead,

he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

[Doc. No. 2], accompanied by a Motion for the Court to Accept his Complaint [Doc. No. 3] and

a Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief [Doc. No. 4].

I.

MOTION TO ACCEPT COMPLAINT

Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff submitted a Motion “Containing Information and

Requesting the Court accept his Complaint in Format Submitted.” [Doc. No. 3] Plaintiff asks

the Court to accept his Complaint “until such time [he] has [the] opportunity to amend any

anomalies contained therein.” See Pl.’s Mot. at 1. 

“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” See FED.R.CIV.P.

3. 

Because Plaintiff’s Complaint was accepted, filed and docketed as soon as it was received by

the Clerk of Court, and no formal motion requesting leave to initiate a civil action or particular

form is required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or this Court’s Local Rules, Plaintiff’s

Motion is DENIED as moot.

II.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 

However, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of

the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire

fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez

v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP

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remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847

(9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119.

Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows he has insufficient funds with which to pay any initial

partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the

reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial partial filing

fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve”

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack

of funds available.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2], and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

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/ / /

III. 

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, courts “have an obligation where the petitioner

is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 4673711 at *3 & n.7

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court may

not, however, “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to

withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges to have been beaten “in excess of 100-blows” on June

3, 2009 at CEN and “deliberately assault[ed]” in the face, head, neck and shoulders by

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 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of,

and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12[] motion that [any defendant] may choose to bring.”

Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

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Defendants even though he was “secured in restraints” after a personal alarm was activated in

the work shop area. See Compl. at 9. Plaintiff further alleges he suffered “profuse bleeding to

the face, laceration, slash, cuts, abrasions, swelling of tissue, bruises and lasting physical and

psychological injuries,” as a result, but was “willful[ly] deni[ed] ... medical care, for more than

five hours” after he was beaten. Id. at 14-15.

 As currently pleaded, the Court finds the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficient

to survive the initial sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).1

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to U.S.

Marshal service on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue

and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court

may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff

is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

IV.

MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiff has also submitted an ex parte Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. 65 [Doc. No. 4]. Procedurally, Plaintiff acknowledges that Rule 65(a)(1)

permits issuance of a preliminary injunction “only upon notice to the adverse party,” and that

neither his Complaint nor summonses have yet to be served. Nevertheless, Plaintiff asks that

the Court be “swayed” by the contents of his filing and “elect” to issue an injunction “without

notice to Defendant(s)” due to the limits inherent to his incarceration. See Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. No.

4] at 1-2. Substantively, Plaintiff claims that ever since he was “seriously injured by CDCR

prison personnel” on June 3, 2009, he has been “subjected to various adverse acts committed by

CDCR personnel but which have not physically harmed him.” Id. at 4. Specifically, Plaintiff

claims he was threatened by unspecified Defendants five hours after he alleges to have been the

victim of excessive force on June 3, 2009, id. at 3, denied lunches, clean laundry, access to the

prison canteen and subject to various acts of discrimination at CEN after he was placed in

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Administrative Segregation pending investigation of the incident. Id. at 3-4. Since his transfer

to CSP-LAC, Plaintiff also claims to have been asked by unidentified guards whether he was

trying to get their “friends fired.” Id. at 4.

A. Legal Standard

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008) (citation omitted). “A

plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,

that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance

of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 374 (citations

omitted). An injunction “may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled

to relief.” See id. at 376 (quotation omitted).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, an injunction “binds only the following

who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise: (A) the parties; (B) the parties’

officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active

concert or participation with [them].” FED.R.CIV.P. 65(d)(2). In general, “[a] federal court may

issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction

over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.”

Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985).

One “becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon

service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party

served must appear to defend.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S.

344, 350 (1999). The court may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before it.

See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1916); Zepeda, 753

F.2d at 727-28.

Moreover, “[s]peculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant

granting a preliminary injunction. A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm

sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a

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prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.” Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldridge, 84

F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

B. Application to Plaintiff’s Case

 Because Plaintiff’s action is so new, his Motion to Proceed IFP has just been granted and

the Court has just completed its preliminary screening of the Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A, United States Marshal service pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) has yet to be effected. Thus, because no Defendant has yet to be served

in this case, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over any party at this time. Rule 65 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “the court may issue a preliminary injunction

only on notice to the adverse party.” FED.R.CIV.P. 65(a). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that

his Complaint or his Motion have been served on any named Defendant. In fact, he admits they

have not. See Pl.’s Mot. at 1-2. 

Moreover, even if the adverse parties Plaintiff seeks to enjoin were properly served with

the appropriate notice, he has failed to establish the imminent irreparable injury required to

support a preliminary injunction. See Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.

2005). This is because where immediate injunctive relief is sought based on claims that

governmental actors or agencies have violated the law in the past, as is the case here, Plaintiff

must establish that the threat of future or repeated injury is both “real and immediate,” not just

“conjectural” or “hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). 

Plaintiff’s Motion alleges he was seriously injured by CDCR prison personnel at CEN

in June 2009, and that ever since, he has felt threatened and been subject to “adverse retaliatory

acts,” which he does not ascribe to any particular Defendant. See Pl.’s Mot. at 5. In addition,

while Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin Defendants–all prison officials at CEN–from ever “again

beat[ing] [him] for unprovoked reasons” “meddl[ing]” with his “personal and/or legal

correspondence,” or “threaten[ing]” him, id. at 6, he is no longer incarcerated at CEN and has

alleged no facts from which this Court could conclude that any prison official at CSP-LAC,

where he is currently incarcerated, has acted “in active concert or participation” with any CEN

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official. See FED.R.CIV.P. 65(d)(2) (providing that an injunction binds only the parties, their

agents or “other persons who are in active concert or participation” with them having “actual

notice of it by personal service or otherwise.”); see also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395,

402-03 (1975) (inmate’s release or transfer from one institution to another while his claims are

pending generally moots any claims for injunctive relief which relate to the transferring prison’s

policies or practices absent some evidence of an expectation of being transferred back); Dilley

v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Moreover, even if Plaintiff alleged facts suggesting an impending transfer back to CEN,

or facts supporting CSP-LAC officials’ “active concert or participation” with the CEN officials

named as Defendants, a generalized fear that he might be subject to future retaliation at CSPLAC, without more, is merely “[s]peculative injury [that] does not constitute irreparable injury

sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Caribbean Marine Services Co., 844

F.2d at 674. 

“[I]njunctive relief is ‘to be used sparingly, and only in a clear and plain case.’” Gomez

v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378

(1976)). Thus, for these reasons, the Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for

Injunctive Relief [Doc. No. 4] pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 65.

V.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Accept Complaint in Format Submitted [Doc. No. 3] is

DENIED as moot;

(2) Plaintiff’s ex parte Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 65 [Doc. No. 4] is DENIED without prejudice; and 

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]

is GRANTED.

(4) The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, is ordered to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing

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2

 Plaintiff must, of course, identify the parties currently described only as “John Doe, Associate

Warden” and “John and Jane Does 1-10” by their true names and substitute those individual persons by

amending his Complaint to identify each individual party before the United States Marshal will be able

to execute service upon him or her. See Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park, 160 F.R.D. 565, 567 (1995)

(Doe defendants must be identified and served within 120 days of the commencement of the action

against them); FED.R.CIV.P. 15(c)(1)(C) & 4(m). Generally, Doe pleading is disfavored. Gillespie v.

Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). And when the plaintiff proceeds IFP, it is in most instances

impossible for the United States Marshal to serve a summons and complaint upon a party identified only

as a Doe. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (in order to properly effect service

under Rule 4 in an IFP case, the plaintiff is required to “furnish the information necessary to identify

the defendant.”). However, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the Doe Defendants at

this time because where the identity of an alleged defendant is not known prior to filing of an action,

Ninth Circuit authority provides that the plaintiff be given an opportunity to pursue appropriate

discovery to identify the unknown Does, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover their

identities, or that the Complaint should be dismissed for other reasons. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177

F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642).

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fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the trust account in an amount equal

to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to the account and forward

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

(5) The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 942883,

Sacramento, California 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(6) The Clerk shall issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. No. 1] upon

Defendants and shall and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for

each Defendant. In addition, the Clerk shall provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order

and a certified copy of his Complaint and the summons so that he may serve Defendants.2

 Upon

receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff is directed to complete the Form 285s as completely and

accurately as possible, and to return them to the United States Marshal according to the

instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP package. Upon receipt,

the U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon Defendants as directed

by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3).

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(7) Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within the

time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to

reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based

on 

the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the

merits,” the defendant is required to respond). 

(8) Plaintiff shall serve upon the Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document

submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be

filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy

of any document was served on Defendants, or counsel for Defendants, and the date of service.

Any paper received by the Court which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to

include a Certificate of Service will be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 14, 2011

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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