Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05232/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05232-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 7, 2002 June 14, 2002

No. 01-5231

Tax Analysts,

Appellant

v.

Internal Revenue Service,

Appellee

Consolidated with

No. 01-5232

---------

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv02285)

William A. Dobrovir argued the cause for appellant/crossappellee. With him on the briefs was Cornish F. Hitchcock.

Jonathan S. Cohen, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellee/cross-appellant. With

him on the briefs were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., United States

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Attorney, and Karen D. Utiger, Attorney, United States

Department of Justice.

Before: Edwards, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Circuit Judge: Several cases over the last two

decades have required this court to consider whether records

and documents of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or

"the Service") are exempt from public disclosure under the

Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. s 552 (2000).

In this case, the District Court determined that the IRS'

Legal Memoranda ("LMs") and the Office of Chief Counsel's

("OCC") intradivisional Technical Assistance memoranda

("TAs") are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the deliberative process privilege encompassed in FOIA Exemption 5, 5

U.S.C. s 552(b)(5). The District Court further held that IRS

need not segregate and release agency working law from TAs

withheld pursuant to Exemption 5's attorney work product

privilege. We affirm the District Court's judgment and adopt

its reasoning and conclusions on these points.

The District Court also ordered IRS to release eight TAs,

finding the information not exempt from disclosure under

FOIA Exemption 7(E), because the information did not concern "investigations which focus directly on specifically alleged illegal acts, illegal acts of particular identified officials,

acts which could, if proved, result in civil or criminal sanctions." Tax Analysts v. IRS, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14, Mem.

Op., (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2001) [hereinafter "Mem. Op. II"].

This was error. We therefore reverse and remand on this

point so that the District Court may reassess this material

pursuant to the correct legal standard.

Finally, the District Court ruled that IRS properly withheld five TAs issued to program managers pursuant to Exemption 5's deliberative process privilege, but held that IRS

must release five other such TAs. IRS appeals the latter

determination as to three of the five documents that were

ordered released. After reviewing the TAs in camera, we

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hold that the District Court correctly distinguished between

TAs that are part of an internal give-and-take discussion and

TAs that reflect OCC's considered legal conclusions. We

therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court on these

issues.

I. Background

Tax Analysts is a non-profit organization that publishes

news and other material on taxation. In 1995, Tax Analysts

made a FOIA request for several categories of unpublished

IRS internal memoranda. In response, the Service released

certain documents but withheld others. Tax Analysts

brought an action in the District Court for the District of

Columbia. Pursuant to intervening legislation and a partial

settlement by the parties, most of the categories of memoranda were eventually released. The two categories still at issue

are LMs and certain sub-categories of TAs.

On the basis of a largely undisputed factual record, the

District Court described LMs as follows:

LMs are prepared by so-called "docket attorneys" in the

Office of Chief Counsel to assist in the preparation and

review of proposed revenue rulings. Revenue rulings

are official interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code

and other tax materials. Before a proposed revenue

ruling is published and achieves the status of precedent,

it must pass through a multi-faceted review process that

is not complete until the Office of the Assistant Secretary

(Tax Policy) at the Department of Treasury grants its

final approval. As a proposed revenue ruling works its

way through this process, it is accompanied by a "publication package." Sometimes, but not always, the publication package includes a LM. According to the Chief

Counsel Publications handbook, LMs may include a restatement of the proposed revenue ruling's issue and

holding; justification, arguments, and lines of research

that are not reflected fully in the proposed revenue

ruling; and the principal arguments for reaching a contrary position. The LM serves as briefing material for

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the reviewers, providing a comprehensive summary of

the drafter's legal research as well as the drafter's

evaluation of the proposed ruling's strengths and weaknesses. At various points in the approval process the

publication package may be returned to the drafter for

revisions. Once approved by Treasury, revenue rulings

are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin for the

information and guidance of taxpayers. There is no

formal process, however, whereby the LM is conformed

to reflect the final published revenue ruling.

After a proposed revenue ruling is definitively approved or rejected, the publication package is archived

and can be retrieved by reference to the number of the

proposed revenue ruling. The accompanying LM, if any,

is archived with the rest of the publication package, but

there is no indexing or retrieval system by which one can

identify those files that contain an LM. IRS attorneys

sometimes keep copies of LMs for their own reference,

and may retrieve the revenue ruling file if they wish to

probe the history behind a certain revenue ruling. Attorneys may exchange LMs informally, but they are not

distributed through official channels.

Tax Analysts v. IRS, 97 F. Supp. 2d 13, 16, Mem. Op.,

(D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2000) [hereinafter "Mem. Op. I"] (internal

citations omitted).

As for TAs, the District Court offered the following description:

TAs are prepared by the four technical divisions within

the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Domestic): the

Office of Assistant Chief Counsel (Passthroughs & Special Industries), the Office of Assistant Chief Counsel

(Income Tax & Accounting), the Office of Assistant Chief

Counsel (Corporate), and the Office of Assistant Chief

Counsel (Financial Institutions & Products). These technical divisions prepare TAs in response to requests from

many different offices for many different purposes. The

IRS has attempted to categorize the TAs by requester.

One such category, TAs to the district or regional offices

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of the IRS or Office of Chief Counsel, or Service Centers

("the field") were dismissed from the case in the context

of the IRS's motion to dismiss. Four categories remain:

TAs to program managers in the national office, TAs to

component offices of the national Office of Chief Counsel

(intra-national office TAs), TAs to specific taxpayers, and

TAs to federal and state government agencies. Within

each of these four categories, the TAs can be further

categorized by their purpose. For example, TAs to

program managers fall into eight different categories,

and intra-national office TAs fall into four different categories.

Id. at 20 (internal citations omitted).

The District Court reviewed sample documents in camera,

along with a Vaughn index prepared by IRS. Both parties

moved for summary judgment. The court granted IRS'

motion as to LMs, which IRS had claimed were exempt under

FOIA Exemption 5's deliberative process privilege. Id. at 16-

18. The District Court held that the withheld portions of

LMs did not constitute IRS working law and were therefore

exempt under the privilege. Id. The District Court reasoned that, like the Background Information Notes in Arthur

Andersen & Co. v. IRS, 679 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1982), LMs

were written by lower-level attorneys for use by senior

decisionmakers. Id. at 16-17. The District Court found that

LMs are not officially approved by the senior decisionmakers

and do not "emanate from [OCC] with any appearance of

authority." Id. at 17.

The District Court distinguished LMs from the General

Counsel's Memoranda at issue in Taxation With Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1981) [hereinafter "TWRF"], which were used to promote uniformity in

IRS policy. Mem. Op. I at 17. The court found that, unlike

General Counsel's Memoranda, LMs are not updated to reflect the national office's current position, widely distributed

within IRS, or officially reconciled to reflect uniform policy.

Id. The District Court also distinguished LMs from the

Field Service Advice memoranda ("FSAs") at issue in Tax

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Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1997), because LMs

flow "upward" from staffers to reviewers, while FSAs flow

"outward" from OCC to field personnel. Id. (citing Tax

Analysts, 117 F.3d at 617). Thus, the District Court upheld

IRS' policy of redacting the portions of LMs reflecting the

authors' opinions and analysis. Id. at 17-18.

With regard to TAs, the District Court ordered further

briefing. Id. at 21-23. The court then rejected Tax Analysts'

argument that IRS was required to demonstrate that it had

complied with the so-called "harm rule," a policy set forth in

the Internal Revenue Manual ("Manual"). Id. at 15 n.3. The

"harm rule" stated that IRS would grant FOIA requests

unless the record is exempt and disclosure would significantly

impede IRS actions in carrying out a responsibility or function. Id. The District Court found that the rule is nonbinding. Id. Tax Analysts moved for reconsideration of this

ruling. In Mem. Op. II, the District Court denied Tax

Analysts' motion as untimely. The District Court also revisited the merits and found that the Manual's harm rule, which

had been revised, was still not binding because it lacked

mandatory language and did not demonstrate that IRS intended to be bound by the policy. Id. at 7-8.

The District Court then turned to TAs. With respect to

TAs withheld pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(E), the court

held that eight of the TAs were not exempt because they did

not focus on "a specifically alleged illegal act of any particular

identified case or individual," and therefore were not compiled

for law enforcement purposes as the exemption requires. Id.

at 15. With respect to TAs withheld in their entirety pursuant to the attorney work product privilege encompassed by

Exemption 5, the court held that IRS was not required to

segregate and release the portions of the TAs that constituted

agency working law. Id. at 18-19.

With respect to TAs withheld pursuant to Exemption 5's

deliberative process privilege, the District Court made two

rulings that Tax Analysts now appeals. First, the court

addressed certain TAs to program managers. These TAs

contain OCC's answers to questions submitted by program

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managers in IRS' national office, sometimes concerning individual taxpayers. The District Court ordered IRS to release

five of these TAs and rejected the request for disclosure of

another five. Id. at 22-24. The court found that the five TAs

that were held subject to disclosure are treated as final

documents that represent the considered position of OCC,

while those held to be exempt are merely part of a deliberative process involving OCC and IRS' program managers. Id.

at 22-23. The court likened the TAs it ordered released to

the FSAs at issue in Tax Analysts. Id. at 22.

Second, the District Court addressed intra-divisional TAs,

which are issued when one component of OCC advises another component that has been assigned to create a private letter

ruling or other official document. Id. at 24. The District

Court found that these TAs are "predecisional and deliberative," because they are solicited from a component of the

agency that lacks the authority to issue a final legal decision.

Id. at 24. The content of these TAs is "subject to modification or rejection prior to the finalization into the final work

product." Id. The District Court thus found that these TAs

are exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process

privilege. Id. at 25.

Both parties moved for reconsideration. In Tax Analysts

v. IRS, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1, 27, Mem. Op. (Motion for Reconsideration), (D.D.C. May 21, 2001) [hereinafter "Mem. Op. III"],

the District Court denied both parties' motions in relevant

part. The court rejected Tax Analysts' argument that TAs

withheld pursuant to the attorney work product privilege

should not be protected in their entirety. Id. at 29. The

court also restated its holding that TAs not focusing on an

individual investigation were not records compiled for law

enforcement purposes as required by Exemption 7(E). Id. at

30-31.

II. Discussion

A. LMs, Intra-divisional TAs, the Attorney Work Product

Privilege, and the IRS Manual

FOIA Exemption 5 protects "inter-agency or intra-agency

memorandums or letters which would not be available by law

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to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency."

5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(5). The exemption allows an agency to

withhold those materials that would be privileged from discovery in civil litigation. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421

U.S. 132, 149 (1975). As such, it is interpreted to encompass,

inter alia, three evidentiary privileges: the deliberative process privilege, the attorney-client privilege, and the attorney

work product privilege. Burka v. HHS, 87 F.3d 508, 516

(D.C. Cir. 1996).

The District Court correctly found that LMs and intradivisional TAs do not constitute agency working law and are

exempt pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. The

District Court also correctly determined that the harm rule

articulated in the Manual does not bind IRS or create rights

in Tax Analysts. Finally, the District Court correctly determined that IRS need not segregate and release agency

working law from TAs withheld in their entirety pursuant to

the attorney work product privilege. Because the District

Court's analysis and conclusions on these points are eminently sound, no further elaboration is necessary. We therefore

affirm the District Court's judgment on these issues and

adopt its reasoning and conclusions.

B. Exemption 7(E)

The Service withheld portions of 16 TAs pursuant to Exemption 7(E). This exemption allows an agency to withhold:

records or information compiled for law enforcement

purposes, but only to the extent that the production of

such law enforcement records or information ... (E)

would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or

prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law....

5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7). The dispute in this case turns on

whether IRS has shown that the disputed records or information were compiled for "law enforcement purposes."

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There are several overarching principles that the courts

follow in assessing whether records or information satisfy the

threshold requirement of s 552(b)(7). First, "law enforcement purposes" under Exemption 7 includes both civil and

criminal matters within its scope. Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d

408, 420 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Second, the FOIA makes no

distinction between agencies whose principal function is criminal law enforcement and agencies with both law enforcement

and administrative functions. Id. at 416. Therefore, agencies like IRS, that combine administrative and law enforcement functions, as well as agencies like the Federal Bureau of

Investigation ("FBI"), whose principal function is criminal law

enforcement, may seek to avoid disclosure of records or

information pursuant to Exemption 7. Finally, "courts can

usually assume that government agencies act within the scope

of their legislated authority." Id. at 418. However, courts

apply a more deferential standard to a claim that information

was compiled for law enforcement purposes when the claim is

made by an agency whose primary function involves law

enforcement. Id. This point was amplified in Pratt v. Webster:

On the one hand, the assumption that a mixed-function

agency is acting within the scope of its authority tells a

court nothing about whether it has met the Exemption 7

threshold requirement of a "law enforcement purpose."

Law enforcement, indeed, is often one of such an agency's proper functions, but other functions are also a

major part of the agency's day-to-day business. Thus, a

court must scrutinize with some skepticism the particular

purpose claimed for disputed documents redacted under

FOIA Exemption 7.... If courts accept a mixedfunction agency's claims of "law enforcement purpose"

without thoughtful consideration, the excessive withholding of agency records which Congress denounced and

sought to avoid ... might well result.

On the other hand, the generally accurate assumption

that federal agencies act within their legislated purposes

implies that an agency whose principal mission is criminal law enforcement will more often than not satisfy the

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Exemption 7 threshold criterion. Thus, a court can

accept less exacting proof from such an agency that the

purpose underlying disputed documents is law enforcement. This less exacting judicial scrutiny of a criminal

law enforcement agency's purpose in the context of the

FOIA Exemption 7 threshold is further bolstered by

Congress' concern that inadvertent disclosure of criminal

investigations, information sources, or enforcement techniques might cause serious harm to the legitimate interests of law enforcement agencies.

Id. (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

In the instant case, the District Court correctly identified

IRS as a mixed-function agency, subject to an exacting standard when it comes to the threshold requirement of Exemption 7. The District Court, however, relied on Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture, 498

F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974), in holding that a mixed-function

agency may only withhold information pursuant to Exemption

7 when the information concerns "investigations which focus

directly on specifically alleged illegal acts, illegal acts of

particular identified officials, acts which could, if proved,

result in civil or criminal sanctions." Mem. Op. II at 14

(quoting). This was error.

Rural Housing and its progeny apply only when an agency

seeks to invoke Exemption 7 in a situation in which there is

an ongoing law enforcement "investigation." The court recently explained the development of this line of authority in

Jefferson v. Department of Justice, 284 F.3d 172 (D.C. Cir.

2002):

In assessing whether records are compiled for law

enforcement purposes, this circuit has long emphasized

that the focus is on how and under what circumstances

the requested files were compiled, ... and "whether the

files sought relate to anything that can fairly be characterized as an enforcement proceeding." ... In Rural

Housing Alliance v. Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73

(D.C. Cir. 1974), the court identified two types of investigatory files that government agencies compile: (1) files

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in connection with government oversight of the performance of duties by its employees, and (2) files in connection with investigations that focus directly on specific

alleged illegal acts which could result in civil or criminal

sanctions. Id. at 81. Again, the court emphasized that

the purpose of the investigatory files "is the critical

factor." Id. at 82. Thus, if the investigation is for a

possible violation of law, then the inquiry is for law

enforcement purposes, as distinct from customary surveillance of the performance of duties by government

employees. Id. Then, in Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408

(D.C. Cir. 1982), the court set forth a two-part test

whereby the government can show that its records are

law enforcement records: the investigatory activity that

gave rise to the documents is "related to the enforcement

of federal laws," and there is a rational nexus between

the investigation at issue and the agency's law enforcement duties. Id. at 420, 421. The court again distinguished the need "to establish that the agency acted

within its principal function of law enforcement, rather

than merely engaging in a general monitoring of private

individuals' activities." Id. at 420.

The court applied these principles in Kimberlin v.

Dep't of Justice, 139 F.3d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In that

case, the requester asked for "all papers, documents and

things pertaining to the OPR investigation" of another

AUSA. Id. at 947. Applying the distinction between law

enforcement records and internal agency investigations

set forth in Rural Housing, 498 F.2d at 81, the court

stated that "[m]aterial compiled in the course of ...

internal agency monitoring does not come within Exemption 7(C) even though it 'might reveal evidence that later

could give rise to a law enforcement investigation.' "

Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 947. Concluding, however, that

"the OPR investigation here at issue was conducted in

response to and focused upon a specific, potentially illegal release of information by a particular, identified

official," id. at 947, the court held that the information in

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the OPR files was compiled for law enforcement purposes. Id.

Id. at 176-77.

Appellant Tax Analysts argues that, under the Rural

Housing test, the scope of Exemption 7 is limited to situations in which the agency can show that the disputed material

relates to an investigation focusing directly on specific alleged illegal acts which could result in civil or criminal

sanctions. We disagree. The Rural Housing standard is

still good law, but it has no bearing on the issue in this case.

The information here at issue does not relate to any ongoing

"investigation" by IRS. Rather, IRS seeks to avoid disclosure of internal agency material relating to guidelines, techniques, and procedures for law enforcement investigations

and prosecutions outside of the context of a specific investigation. Such materials clearly satisfy the "law enforcement

purposes" threshold of Exemption 7. The District Court's

holding to the contrary failed to take adequate account of

1986 amendments to Exemption 7.

Prior to 1986, Exemption 7 required a threshold showing

that the materials in question were "investigatory records

compiled for law enforcement purposes." 5 U.S.C.

s 552(b)(7) (1982). However, in 1986, Congress amended the

exemption to protect "records or information compiled for law

enforcement purposes," deleting any requirement that the

information be "investigatory." Anti-Drug Abuse Act of

1986, s 1802(a), Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-48

(1986) (amending 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)). See North v. Walsh,

881 F.2d 1088, 1098 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that the

1986 amendment "changed the threshold requirement for

withholding information under exemption 7: the exemption

formerly covered 'investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes'; it now applies more broadly to 'records

or information compiled for law enforcement purposes' ");

Keys v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 340

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (same). And the legislative history makes it

clear that Congress intended the amended exemption to

protect both investigatory and non-investigatory materials,

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including law enforcement manuals and the like. See S. Rep.

No. 98-221, at 23 (1983) (expressing intent to protect "sensitive non-investigative law enforcement materials" and to

broaden the exemption to include records "regardless of

whether they may be investigatory or noninvestigatory").

Congress also amended Exemption 7(E) to permit withholding of "guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to

risk circumvention of the law," thus giving further indication

that the statutory threshold was not limited to records or

information addressing only individual violations of the law.

See 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(E) (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 98-

221, at 24 (1983).

It is clear that, under the amended threshold of Exemption

7, an agency may seek to block the disclosure of internal

agency materials relating to guidelines, techniques, sources,

and procedures for law enforcement investigations and prosecutions, even when the materials have not been compiled in

the course of a specific investigation. See, e.g., PHE, Inc. v.

Dep't of Justice, 983 F.2d 248, 250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding

that portions of a FBI manual describing patterns of violations, investigative techniques, and sources of information

available to investigators were protected by Exemption 7(E)).

The amended threshold to Exemption 7 "resolve[s] any doubt

that law enforcement manuals and other non-investigatory

materials can be withheld under (b)(7) if they were compiled

for law enforcement purposes and their disclosure would

result in one of the six recognized harms to law enforcement

interests set forth in the subparagraphs of the exemption."

S. Rep. No. 98-221, at 23 (1983). Accordingly, we reverse and

remand the District Court's judgment on this point.

It will be up to the District Court in the first instance to

apply the correct threshold and then to determine, as Exemption 7(E) requires, whether release of the disputed agency

materials "would disclose techniques and procedures for law

enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose

guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions

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cumvention of the law." The District Court may conclude

that some or all of the disputed TAs must be released, but

this conclusion cannot be based on the fact that they do not

relate to the investigation of a particular act of wrongdoing.

C. TAs to Program Managers

IRS appeals the District Court's decision with regard to

three of the five TAs to program managers that the court

ordered released. IRS argues that these three TAs should

have been withheld pursuant to the deliberative process

privilege of Exemption 5. IRS does not appeal the release of

the other two TAs to program managers. Br. for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 57 n.5 (stating that IRS does not

appeal the District Court's ruling with respect to TAs numbered TR-45-1383-93 and TR-45-1974-93). The three TAs on

appeal are issued to program managers within the national

office of IRS.

The deliberative process privilege protects "confidential

intra-agency advisory opinions ... disclosure of which would

be injurious to the consultative functions of government."

Sears, 421 U.S. at 149 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). It encompasses "documents reflecting advisory

opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part

of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are

formulated, as well as other subjective documents that reflect

the personal opinions of the writer prior to the agency's

adoption of a policy." TWRF, 646 F.2d at 677 (citing Sears,

421 U.S. at 150). It does not, however, apply to final statements of agency policy or to statements that explain actions

that an agency has taken. Id. In other words, it protects

"predecisional communications" reflecting an agency's internal deliberations, but not communications that explain a

decision that has already been made. Sears, 421 U.S. at 151-

52. In order to determine whether the District Court applied

these principles correctly, we have reviewed the three disputed TAs in camera, along with the five that the court ordered

withheld and the two not appealed, for comparative purposes.

The District Court grouped the five TAs it ordered released into two categories. First, the court ordered the IRS

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to release TAs that concerned specific taxpayers or classes of

taxpayers. These included the following TAs: TR-45-2233-93

(presenting OCC's legal analysis regarding a particular class

of taxpayers engaged in specified activities); TR-45-1383-93

(not appealed) (presenting OCC's legal analysis and computations regarding certain transactions of a particular taxpayer);

TR-45-1974-93 (not appealed) (presenting OCC's legal analysis and conclusion regarding how the program manager

should apply a certain statutory provision to a particular

taxpayer); and TR-45-2473-93 (presenting OCC's conclusion

as to whether a particular taxpayer qualified for a specified

exemption). Second, the District Court ordered the IRS to

release a TA that addressed the interpretation of the internal

revenue laws generally: TR-45-2820-92 (answering a question

concerning whether taxpayers at large may use a particular

procedure).

The District Court correctly likened these five TAs to the

FSAs at issue in Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d 607. Like FSAs,

TAs are issued by OCC and sent to IRS personnel in

response to official queries. FSAs were issued to field attorneys, revenue agents, and appeals officers, while TAs are

issued to program managers. Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 609.

FSAs usually dealt with particular taxpayers, as do four of

the TAs in this case. Id. The TA concerning general

procedures reflects OCC's considered position on a precise

issue. FSAs and these TAs both contain legal analysis,

conclusions, and advice. Id. It is therefore unsurprising

that, as the District Court found, IRS conceded that taxpayer-specific TAs to program managers are all but identical to

FSAs. Mem. Op. II at 22; Def. Statement of Genuine Issues

in Opp. to Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts p 3.12 (stating

that IRS did not object to Tax Analysts' statement that, in

many cases, the only difference between FSAs and taxpayerspecific TAs is the originating office), reprinted at Joint

Appendix 383, 344.

The five TAs that the District Court ordered withheld,

while not before us on appeal, nevertheless provide a useful

contrast and an illustration of the kinds of documents that

truly reflect a debate among equally-positioned decisionmakers. For example, in TR-955-93, OCC comments on a draft

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tax form and instructions for filling out another form. The

TA uses markedly different language from that found in the

TAs that the District Court ordered released, repeatedly

prefacing comments with such phrases as "We believe" and

"We suggest" and advising the recipient that the form

"should" reflect a certain principle. Similarly, in TR-45-2164-

93, OCC proposed solutions to a potential legal problem. In

TR-45-307-93, OCC commented on a legislative proposal,

expressing legal "concern[s]" about some of its language.

The tone of these TAs suggest that they were prepared

merely to "discuss the wisdom or merits of a particular

agency policy, or recommend new agency policy, raising the

possibility that their disclosure would mislead the public."

Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,

869 (D.C. Cir. 1980). By contrast, the TAs that the District

Court ordered released use such language as "It is the

position of the Treasury Department that ..." (TR-45-2233-

93) and "We conclude" (TR-45-2473-93). The tone of these

TAs indicates that they "simply explain and apply established

policy." Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 869.

IRS argues that while the disputed TAs to program managers may be the final word of OCC, they are issued to program

officers who make the final decisions about their programs.

IRS characterizes the TAs as part of a dialogue among

equals, rather than pronouncements from senior officials to

junior field agents. These arguments are unpersuasive. It is

not necessary that the TAs reflect the final programmatic

decisions of the program officers who request them. It is

enough that they represent OCC's final legal position concerning the Internal Revenue Code, tax exemptions, and

proper procedures. We reach this conclusion in reliance on

the fact that the disputed TAs travel horizontally, from the

OCC to program officers. By contrast, documents that represent the final legal position of the OCC and travel upward -

for example, memoranda to the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue advising him on legal issues - may still be part of

the agency's deliberative process and thus fall within Exemption 5. See Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 868 (noting that "a

document from a subordinate to a superior official is more

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likely to be predecisional," and that "this court recently

identified as 'a classic case of the deliberative process at

work' a series of memoranda to the Assistant Secretary of the

Army from the General Counsel in his department, recommending legal strategy in light of a particular controversy")

(quoting Murphy v. Dep't of the Army, 613 F.2d 1151, 1154

(1979)).

Under the FOIA, "working law" must be disclosed whether

or not those who use the working law make the final decisions

about program implementation. See id. (holding that the

disputed documents, "whatever the formal powers of [the

issuing officials] to issue binding interpretations of the regulations, in practice represent interpretations of established

policy on which the agency relies in discharging its regulatory

responsibilities" and that they must be disclosed). Thus, the

District Court correctly ordered the disputed three TAs

released.

The distinction between deliberative TAs and TAs that

represent the OCC's considered legal conclusions is not amenable to a categorical formula. It can turn on the subject

matter of the TA, on its recipient, on its place in the decisionmaking process, and even on its tone. Nonetheless, after

reviewing the ten TAs in camera, we are satisfied that the

District Court committed no error in its judgment regarding

these materials

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand the case to the District Court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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