Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01680/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01680-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NATHAN HILL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GAVIN NEWSOM, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:19-cv-1680 DAD AC P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion to remove the magistrate judge and court clerk from this 

action. ECF No. 67. The motion is addressed to the district judge assigned to this case. Id. at 2. 

The court construes the motion as one seeking recusal. For the reasons stated below, the motion 

will be denied. 

 I. MOTION TO RECUSE 

 In support of plaintiff’s motion to recuse, he argues that the undersigned and the court 

clerk improperly refused to update his current address and are not following law regarding 

sending legal mail to prisons. See generally ECF No. 67 at 2. Plaintiff cites to prison regulations, 

a prison operations manual, California case law, and federal law, arguing that they support his 

allegations and thus his recusal request. Id. at 3-4. He asks the court to make certain that the new 

magistrate judge and court clerk assigned to this case update his address to the current one every 

time he moves. Id. at 2. 

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 Plaintiff states that the court and the court clerk are “either haters or incompetent,” and 

contends that they have “refused to follow well established rules.” ECF No. 67 at 3. He further 

contends that the court’s failure to follow its own rules when dealing with different races and/or 

vulnerable populations “is a sign of someone that’s willingly part of systemic racism” and that the 

court’s actions constitute “treason and/or sedition” against the United States. Id. at 3-4. 

 II. DISCUSSION 

 A. Applicable Law 

 The Ninth Circuit has “held repeatedly that the challenged judge h[er]self should rule on 

the legal sufficiency of a recusal motion in the first instance.” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 

934, 940 (9th Cir. 1986) (brackets added) (citing United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 738 

(9th Cir. 1978) (collecting cases)). “Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes 

and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a 

personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall 

proceed no further therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the 

United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Under both recusal statutes, the substantive 

standard is “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the 

judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Studley, 783 F.2d at 939 (quoting Mayes v. 

Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted)). A judge’s previous 

adverse ruling alone is not sufficient for recusal. See Mayes, 729 F.2d at 607 (citing United 

States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

 B. Analysis 

 Plaintiff’s motion for recusal must be denied. Plaintiff does not allege – via affidavit or 

within the filing itself – any facts demonstrating that the undersigned has shown any sort of 

favoritism or antagonism, nor does it provide any facts indicating that the undersigned has 

demonstrated any prejudice towards plaintiff. On the contrary, at the core of plaintiff’s motion is 

his dissatisfaction with: (1) the fact that the court has required him to follow federal and local 

rules regarding how to properly inform the court when his address changes (ECF No. 67 at 2), 

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and (2) how prison authorities are handling mail that is sent to him by this court (see generally id. 

at 2-5). These are insufficient grounds to support recusal. 

 1. Based on Change of Address Policy Does Not Support Recusal 

 Rules are rules. Everyone, regardless of economic status, race, gender, or any other group 

demographic or life station, is required to follow them in this court. Local Rule 182, of which 

plaintiff was informed at the beginning of this case (see ECF No. 4 at 2) (list of important Local 

Rules), clearly states that a party who is representing himself is to keep both the court and 

opposing parties advised as to his current address. L.R. 182(f). Local Rule 183 reiterates this 

requirement, and it also cautions that failure to do so runs the risk of case dismissal. See L.R. 

183(b). Neither rule says anything about the court undertaking this responsibility on behalf of a 

litigant who is representing himself. See generally L.R. 182, 183. 

 Plaintiff is aware of these rules. See ECF No. 67 at 2 (“[The] [c]ourt has rule[s] to notify 

it [as] soon as I move...”). As a result, he has filed change of address notices on several 

occasions throughout these proceedings. See ECF Nos. 18, 22, 37, 42, 47 (notices of change of 

address filed by plaintiff). The address change request at issue is one docketed in December 

2022. See ECF No. 59. In that request, plaintiff moves for the court to update his address on file 

every time he is moved to a new location in order to avoid the delay, rerouting, and opening of his 

mail by multiple mailrooms. Id. The request itself provided no new, updated address. Id. As a 

result, the Clerk of Court informed plaintiff that it would not update his address simply based on 

the return address on his envelope, as plaintiff’s letter appeared to impliedly request. See ECF 

No. 65 (docket entry indicating content of bluesheet sent to plaintiff). 

 To reiterate, it is plaintiff’s responsibility to keep the court apprised of any new address. 

L.R. 182(f); L.R. 183(b). The new address should be clearly stated within the notice that is filed. 

If no address is stated within the notice, a party should not assume the court will automatically 

update the docket with the return address that is on the envelope that contains the deficient 

notice.1 The court is not obligated to do so, and it does not do so for any party before it. 

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 If plaintiff did not provide his new address within the body of the change of address notices he 

has previously filed with the court (see generally ECF Nos. 18, 22, 37, 42, 47), in all likelihood, 

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Therefore, plaintiff is not being treated any differently than any other litigant, and his allegations 

of “systematic racism,” bias based on indigence, and “treason and/or sedition” are wholly 

unfounded and unsupported. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion asking the undersigned to recuse 

herself2 from this case will be denied. 

 2. Handling of Mail Does Not Support Recusal 

 Plaintiff also appears to assert that the court is refusing to follow “well-established” rules 

regarding the sealing of mail that is sent to prisons. See ECF No. 67 at 1-3. Plaintiff argues that 

prison regulations require that his mail going to and coming from courts be covered and only 

opened in his presence in order to check for contraband. Id. at 1. Plaintiff does not provide 

specific examples, but the court infers from the filing that where plaintiff is housed, prison 

officials have not been following prison rules and regulations and/or California law as it relates to 

the handling of litigation-related mail. It appears plaintiff believes that this court is obligated to 

intervene in the situation. 

 Prison officials’ failure to follow their own rules and regulations and/or its violations of 

state law, without more, are not actionable in this court. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also 

Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (no Section 1983 liability for violation 

of prison policy). Furthermore, as the court has previously explained to plaintiff (see ECF No. 61 

at 2) (court order denying plaintiff’s motion to seal mail), mail from the court is not “legal mail” 

that is protected by the First Amendment. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996); 

Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017). To the extent plaintiff contends 

that the undersigned demonstrated bias against him by denying his request to have the Clerk of 

Court tape and seal court mail, there is no basis for recusal. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 

540, 555 (1994) (“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or 

//// 

updated address changes to the docket did not take place. If this is what has occurred, these were 

plaintiff’s errors, and the court was not obligated to fix them.

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 Plaintiff also moves for the Clerk of Court to be “removed” from his case. ECF No. 67 at 1-3. 

The Clerk of Court’s involvement in this matter is wholly administrative in nature. Therefore, 

any sort of removal of the Clerk of Court from this case cannot be done. 

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partiality motion”). For these reasons, the motion to recuse based on the court’s handling of its 

outgoing mail to prisoners is also denied. 

 3. The Clerk of Court is Not Subject to Recusal 

 Plaintiff also moves for the Clerk of Court to be “removed” from his case. ECF No. 67 at 

1-3. The Clerk’s involvement in pending cases is wholly administrative in nature. Court 

administrators and their deputies are not subject to the recusal statute, and there is no legal 

grounds for the Clerk’s removal. 

CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, for all the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 

plaintiff’s motion to remove magistrate judge and court clerk (ECF No. 67) is DENIED. 

DATED: February 27, 2023 

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