Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06055/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06055-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s answer to the petition, and 1

Petitioner’s traverse to Respondent’s answer.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 RONNIE LUCKETT, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

EDWARD S. ALAMEIDA, JR., Director, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:03-CV-6055 OWW LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, following his conviction by

jury trial on September 9, 1998, of kidnaping with a firearm during the commission of a carjacking

and robbery. See Exhibit A, Respondent’s Answer (hereinafter “Answer”). On November 4, 1998,

Petitioner was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of life with the possibility of parole, plus ten

years. Id.

With this petition, Petitioner does not challenge his underlying conviction and sentence.

Case 1:03-cv-06055-OWW -LJO Document 28 Filed 06/06/06 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

According to Respondent, “[a] CDC Form 128-A, also known as a ‘custodial counseling chrono,’ simply documents 2

the conduct and activities of inmates and does not represent a disciplinary charge.” See Answer at 2.

Respondent states that serious disciplinary actions range from Division A, the most serious, to Division F, the least 3

serious. Commission of a Division F offense may result in credit losses up to thirty (30) days.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

Rather, he challenges a prison disciplinary hearing held on October 19, 2001, in which Petitioner

was found guilty of violating the grooming policy. 

During the period of April 12, 2001, to September 5, 2003, Petitioner was housed at the

Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility (“SATF”) located at Corcoran, California. See Exhibit B,

Answer. According to the Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) dated October 9, 2001, Petitioner had

been counseled for violating grooming standards on July 3, 2001, July 5, 2001, July 16, 2001, July

26, 2001, and September 8, 2001. See Exhibit C, Answer. The counseling conducted on July 5,

2001, was documented on a CDC Form 128-A and placed in Petitioner’s central file. See Exhibit D, 2

Answer. On September 12, 2001, Petitioner was observed to be in violation of Cal. Code of

Regulations Title 15, section 3062(h), which prohibits facial hair except under limited

circumstances. See Exhibit E, Answer. On September 13, 2001, Petitioner was given the opportunity

to come into compliance by shaving in the shower, but he refused. Id. The violation was classified as

an administrative rules violation, and Petitioner was issued an RVR. Id. A disciplinary hearing was

conducted on September 29, 2001, and Petitioner was found guilty, counseled, and reprimanded. Id.

Because it was an administrative rules violation, Petitioner was not punished with time credit losses.

On October 9, 2001, Petitioner was observed with hair length out of compliance with inmate

grooming standards as set forth in Cal. Code of Regulations Title 15, section 3062(e). See Exhibit C,

Answer. Petitioner was again given an opportunity to come into compliance with grooming

standards, but he refused. Id. Due to Petitioner’s history of violating the grooming standards and the

apparent ineffectiveness of verbal and written counseling, Petitioner was issued an RVR and the

violation was classified as an “F Division” serious offense pursuant to Cal. Code of Regulations

Title 15, section 3315(3)(K). Id. A copy of the RVR was provided to Petitioner on October 18, 3

2001, at 8:08 p.m. Id.

On October 19, 2001, at 8:09 p.m., a disciplinary hearing was held with respect to the

Case 1:03-cv-06055-OWW -LJO Document 28 Filed 06/06/06 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

October 9, 2001, violation. The senior hearing officer found Petitioner guilty and assessed Petitioner

a thirty (30) day loss of credit and ninety (90) day loss of privileges. Id. Petitioner was advised he

could appeal the decision. Petitioner was given a final copy of the RVR on November 2, 2001. Id. 

On December 26, 2001, Petitioner submitted an inmate appeal requesting re-hearing of the

October 19, 2001, disciplinary hearing. See Exhibit B, Petition. On January 3, 2002, prison officials

denied the appeal as untimely pursuant to Cal. Code of Regulations Title 15, section 3084.6(c),

which requires an inmate to submit an appeal within fifteen (15) working days of the decision being

appealed. See Exhibit F, Answer. 

On June 24, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kings County

Superior Court. The petition was denied on June 27, 2002, for failure to state a cognizable claim. See

Exhibit G, Answer. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court

of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (hereinafter “5 DCA”). The petition was summarily denied on th

September 26, 2002. See Exhibit H, Answer. Petitioner next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the California Supreme Court. The petition was denied on April 30, 2003, with citation to In re

Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921 (1979). See Exhibit I, Answer.

On August 5, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition in this Court. Petitioner

complains that he was not given an opportunity to present a defense. He states his requests for

witnesses, an investigative employee, a staff assistant, reports relied upon in the RVR, and additional

time to prepare were all denied. He claims he was denied twenty-four hours notice to prepare. He

claims he given a serious “Division F” violation classification, even though the grooming standard is

only an administrative offense. He further claims he was given the RVR in retaliation for filing a

citizen’s complaint against Correctional Officer Patton. Finally, he claims he was not given a fair

hearing because Senior Hearing Officer (“SHO”) Hooker was not an impartial trier of fact and held a

predisposition of Petitioner’s guilt. 

On December 3, 2003, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. Respondent contends that

Petitioner is procedurally barred from bringing his claims. He further claims the petition is without

merit as Petitioner was afforded all due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner

filed a traverse to Respondent’s answer on June 24, 2004. 

Case 1:03-cv-06055-OWW -LJO Document 28 Filed 06/06/06 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to a judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. Petitioner’s claims for relief arise out of a disciplinary hearing at Corcoran State

Prison, California, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a),

2241(d). If a constitutional violation has resulted in the loss of time credits, such violation affects the

duration of a sentence, and the violation may be remedied by way of a petition for writ of habeas

corpus. Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 876-78 (9 Cir. 1990). th

II. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner’s claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for writ of habeas corpus will not be

granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (2003), disapproving the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran

v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000); Williams, 529 U.S. 362. “A federal habeas court may not th

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state

court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, 123 S.Ct.

at 1175 (citations omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations

omitted). 

Case 1:03-cv-06055-OWW -LJO Document 28 Filed 06/06/06 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.

286, 290 (1969), direct review of a criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to

challenge that conviction. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993). In addition, the state

court’s factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by

clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995);

Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

III. Procedural Default

Respondent argues that this Court is barred from reviewing the instant petition. Respondent

reasons that the California Supreme Court’s citation to the decision of In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921

(1979) suggests a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and that finding constitutes state

grounds independent of any federal question which are sufficient to support the judgment. Therefore,

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted the claims he raises in the instant petition and cannot proceed

in this Court.

Federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the

decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and

adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); LaCrosse v.

Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9 Cir. 2001). If the court finds an independent and adequate state th

procedural ground, “federal habeas review is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for

the procedural default and actual prejudice, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 804-05 (9 Cir. 1993); th

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9 Cir. 2000). th

“For a state procedural rule to be ‘independent,’ the state law basis for the decision must not

be interwoven with federal law.” LaCrosse, 244 F.3d at 704, citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.

1032, 1040-41 (1983); Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1393 (9 Cir. 1996), quoting Coleman, th

501 U.S. at 735 (“Federal habeas review is not barred if the state decision ‘fairly appears to rest

primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law.’”). “A state law is so interwoven if

Case 1:03-cv-06055-OWW -LJO Document 28 Filed 06/06/06 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 6

‘the state has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law

[such as] the determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed.” Park, 202

F.3d at 1152, quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). 

To be deemed adequate, the state law ground for the decision must be well-established and

consistently applied. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9 Cir. 1999), quoting Ford v. Georgia, th

498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991) (“A state procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to federal court

review if it was ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ at the time it was applied by the state

court.”). Although a state court’s exercise of judicial discretion will not necessarily render a rule

inadequate, the discretion must entail “the exercise of judgment according to standards that, at least

over time, can become known and understood within reasonable operating limits.” Id. at 377,

quoting Morales, 85 F.3d at 1392.

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9 Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that although th

the California untimeliness rule as expressed in In re Robbins was an independent state procedural

ground, the Court could not conclude that it was an adequate state procedural ground on the basis of

the record before it. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine the issue

of adequacy (whether the timeliness bar was sufficiently well-established and consistently applied at

the time the default occurred). Id. While the ultimate burden of proving adequacy rests with the

respondent, the petitioner must place the state’s affirmative defense of independent and adequate

state procedural grounds at issue “by asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate the

inadequacy of the state procedure.” Id.

Here, the California Supreme Court declined to review the merits of the petition and rejected

it by citing In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921 (1979). In Dexter, the California Supreme Court held in

relevant part that an inmate will not be afforded judicial relief unless he has exhausted available

administrative remedies. Id. Here, it is apparent that Petitioner did not exhaust the available

administrative remedies.

The California Department of Corrections has an administrative grievance system for

prisoner complaints. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084 et seq. (2004). “Any inmate or parolee under the

department’s jurisdiction may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy which

Case 1:03-cv-06055-OWW -LJO Document 28 Filed 06/06/06 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 7

they can reasonably demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Id. at § 3084.1(a).

Four levels of appeal are involved, including the informal level, first formal level, second formal

level, and third formal level - also known as the “Director’s Level.” Id. at § 3084.5. The Director’s

Level is the final administrative level of review. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9 Cir. th

2003). 

In this case, Petitioner appealed his claims to the second level requesting a re-hearing of the

October 19, 2001, disciplinary hearing. However, Petitioner did not timely submit his appeal and it

was denied for that reason pursuant to § 3084.6(c). Petitioner did not seek any further levels of

administrative appeals. As Respondent correctly argues, the rule in California that an inmate must

exhaust his administrative appeals is well-established and has been applied since 1941. See Abelleira

v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 292 (Cal. 1941). The rule was firmly established at the

time of Petitioner’s default in 2001 and has been consistently applied since Abelleira. Dexter, 25

Cal.3d at 925; In re Muszalski, 52 Cal.App.3d 500, 503 (1975); In re Serna, 76 Cal.App.3d 1010,

1014 (1978); In re Arias, 42 Cal.3d 667, 678 (1986), Wright v. State, 122 Cal.App.4th 659 (Cal.App.

2004). In addition, Dexter is solely based on state law and is therefore independent of federal law.

See Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1197-98 (9 Cir.2004) (state rule independent where “[n]o th

federal analysis enters into the [rule’s] equation”). Thus, the rule in Dexter is an adequate and

independent state ground that bars this Court from reaching the merits of Petitioner’s claims.

Furthermore, Petitioner has failed to establish cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse the default.

IV. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner contends he was unjustly issued a serious rules violation report. Notwithstanding

the fact that the petition should be dismissed based on Petitioner’s procedural default, the petition is

also without merit as it is clear all due process requirements were met.

Prisoners cannot be entirely deprived of their constitutional rights, but their rights may be

diminished by the needs and objectives of the institutional environment. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 555 (1974). Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, so a

prisoner is not afforded the full panoply of rights in such proceedings. Id. at 556. Thus, a prisoner’s

due process rights are moderated by the “legitimate institutional needs” of a prison. Bostic v.

Case 1:03-cv-06055-OWW -LJO Document 28 Filed 06/06/06 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 8

Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Superintendent, etc. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-

455 (1984).

However, when a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of good time credits,

due process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) advance written notice of at least 24 hours of the

disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional

goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement

by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Hill, 472 U.S.

at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-567. In addition, due process requires that the decision be supported

by “some evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, citing United States ex rel. Vatauer v. Commissioner of

Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) 

Petitioner first alleges he was denied the minimum due process right of twenty-four hours

advance written notice of the disciplinary charges. The RVR shows, however, that Petitioner

received a copy of the RVR on October 18, 2001, at 8:08 p.m. See Exhibit C, Answer. The hearing

was held on October 19, 2001, at 8:09 p.m. Id. Thus, Petitioner’s due process right was met.

Petitioner next claims his requests for witnesses, an investigative employee, a staff assistant,

reports relied upon in the Rules Violation Report (“RVR”), and additional time to prepare were all

denied. The RVR shows Petitioner was given all copies of reports used as evidence at least twentyfour hours before the hearing. Id. No confidential reports were considered by the hearing officer. Id.

The RVR further shows that Petitioner did not request witnesses prior to the hearing. Petitioner did

request witnesses thereafter, but his requests were denied because they were made during the course

of the hearing. Id. Petitioner’s requests for a staff assistant and investigative employee were

considered and denied. The hearing officer determined a staff assistant was not needed because

Petitioner was literate, did not require a confidential relationship, and could conduct his defense

without assistance. Id. The hearing officer determined an investigative employee was not necessary

because the case was not complex and Petitioner could conduct his own investigation. Id. 

With respect to Petitioner’s challenge to the classification of the offense as a “Division F”

serious rules violation, this classification is supported by Petitioner’s history of continuously

violating grooming standards. Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 3315(a)(3)(K). 

Case 1:03-cv-06055-OWW -LJO Document 28 Filed 06/06/06 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 9

In sum, all due process requirements were satisfied and the guilty finding was supported by

“some evidence.” Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims are without merit and the petition should be

denied.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus

be DENIED. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter

judgment.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, pursuant to

the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty days after being served with the

Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendation." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within ten

days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

23ehd0 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-06055-OWW -LJO Document 28 Filed 06/06/06 Page 9 of 9