Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00894/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00894-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Wesley W. Harris, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Arizona Independent Redistricting 

Commission, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-00894-PHX-ROS-NVW-RRC

NEIL V. WAKE, District Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 

dissenting from the judgment: 

In this action voters challenge the final map of Arizona legislative districts 

approved by the Independent Redistricting Commission on January 17, 2012. They 

allege that the districts violate the one person, one vote requirement of the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by 

systematically overpopulating Republican plurality districts and underpopulating 

Democratic plurality districts with no lawful justification for deviating from numerical 

equality. Arizona’s final legislative district map violates the Equal Protection Clause 

unless the divergence from equal population is “based on legitimate considerations 

incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy,” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 

579 (1964), “that are free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.” Roman v. 

Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964). 

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Partisan advantage is not itself a justification for systematic population inequality 

in districting. No authority says it is, and neither does the Commission or any judge of 

this Court. So the Commission must point to something else to justify its deviation. 

Without something else, there is nothing to weigh against the force of equality, and this 

inequality must fall under constitutional doctrine settled for half a century. 

The Commission contends the systematic population deviation for Democratic 

Party benefit was permissible to increase the likelihood of obtaining preclearance 

required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. So this case turns on whether systematic 

population inequality is a lawful and reasonable means of pursuing preclearance. 

But after the trial, the United States Supreme Court held Section 5 preclearance 

unenforceable, extinguishing that sole basis for this deviation. We must apply current 

law in pending cases, especially cases to authorize future conduct. So even if Section 5 

saved the inequality when adopted, it cannot save the inequality for future elections. The 

Court exceeds its power in reanimating Section 5 to deny the Plaintiffs equal voting 

rights for the remaining election cycles of this decade. 

If we do look back at Section 5, it never had the force the Commission hopes. The 

Court further errs when it holds, for the first time anywhere, that systematic population 

inequality is a reasonable means of pursuing Voting Rights Act preclearance. That is 

contrary to the text, purpose, case law, and constitutional basis for Section 5 

preclearance. Until struck down, Voting Rights Act preclearance was a legitimate and 

mandatory purpose in redistricting for covered jurisdictions. But its legitimacy in general 

has no connection to the principled bases for compromising population equality. 

Compliance with the Voting Rights Act requires line-drawing with an eye to expected 

voting behavior, but only within equal population. Section 5 does not require or permit 

systematic inequality of population that would otherwise violate the Equal Protection 

Clause. It does not authorize the federal executive branch to exact such inequality for 

preclearance, a power the Attorney General disclaims. Nor does it license redistricting 

authorities to volunteer inequality to the Attorney General for which he never asks. The 

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Commission’s reliance on the Voting Rights Act for systematic malapportionment is 

precluded by the plain language of Section 17 that nothing in the Act “shall be construed 

to deny, impair, or otherwise adversely affect the right to vote of any person.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1973n. 

Judge Clifton correctly finds that the Commission was actually motivated by both 

party advantage and hope for Voting Rights Act preclearance. So we have a majority for 

that finding of fact. And while that fact is obvious on this record, the finding of partisan 

motive is not needed to make the case. No precedent would require proof and a finding 

of subjective purpose of party advantage when it is already proven that the systematic 

numerical inequality has no justification that is legal and reasonable. It is enough to 

strike down this systematic overpopulation of Republican plurality districts and 

underpopulation of Democratic plurality districts that neither the Commission’s stated 

reason to get preclearance nor its other actual motive of party advantage is a valid reason 

for population inequality. So even if one could believe that the aggressive party 

advantage was just a side effect and no part of the wellsprings of conduct, the 

Commission’s only offered justification still falls. With no valid counterweight, the 

population-skewed map falls to the force of equal voting rights under the Constitution. 

When voting districts were set without standards and behind closed doors, true 

reasons for systematic population deviation were easily disguised. But in states that have 

made the redistricting process transparent and accountable with limited grounds to 

deviate, it is now sometimes possible to prove that systematic population inequality for 

party advantage has no other reason, or none that passes under equal protection doctrine. 

No better example could be found than this. Of 30 legislative districts, the 18 with 

population deviation greater than ±2% from ideal population correlate perfectly with 

Democratic Party advantage. The Commission majority showed other partisan bias, but 

even without that, the statistics of their plan are conclusive. Because this population 

deviation range of 8.8% is under 10%, the Plaintiffs have the burden of showing it is not 

“incident to effectuation of a rational state policy.” The Commission offers no 

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justification except Voting Rights Act preclearance, which is insufficient as a matter of 

law. The Commission knew the legal risk they were taking in grounding systematic 

numerical inequality on the Voting Rights Act. The circumstance that the Commission 

took that risk with advice of counsel does not make losing the gamble as good as 

winning, not when they are gambling with other people’s rights. The Plaintiffs have 

carried their burden. This numerical dilution or inflation of all the votes in 60% of 

Arizona’s legislative districts for nearly two million voters cannot be squared with our 

fundamental law of equal voting rights. 

The Commission has been coin-clipping the currency of our democracy—

everyone’s equal vote—and giving all the shavings to one party, for no valid reason. The 

novel and extraordinary claim of Voting Rights Act license to dilute votes systematically 

and statewide should be rejected. That should decide this case and end our inquiry. This 

plan must be sent back and done again. 

I. THE ARIZONA REDISTRICTING PROCESS 

By an initiative measure in 2000, Arizona voters removed legislative and 

congressional redistricting from the legislature and entrusted them to an Independent 

Redistricting Commission under mandatory processes with substantive standards. See

Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1. Four party commissioners are appointed, one each by the 

highest-ranking majority and minority members of the Senate and the House of 

Representatives. They choose an independent fifth member. All appointments are from 

25 nominations made by another commission. 

The constitutional amendment requires the Commission to follow a four-step 

process. Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 

220 Ariz. 587, 597, 208 P.3d 676, 686 (2009). First, the Commission must create 

“districts of equal population in a grid-like pattern across the state.” Ariz. Const. art. IV, 

pt. 2, § 1(14). Second, the Commission must adjust the equally populated grid map “as 

necessary to accommodate” compliance with the United States Constitution and the 

United States Voting Rights Act and then to accommodate the remaining five goals “to 

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the extent practicable”: (1) equal population; (2) geographically compact and contiguous 

districts; (3) respect for communities of interest; (4) use of visible geographic features, 

city, town, and county boundaries, and undivided census tracts; and (5) competitive 

districts, where such districts would create no significant detriment to the other factors. 

Id. § 1(14)(A)–(F). Third, the Commission must advertise their adjusted draft map for at 

least 30 days and consider public comments and recommendations made by the Arizona 

legislature. Id. § 1(16). Lastly, the Commission must establish final district boundaries 

and certify the new districts to the Arizona Secretary of State. Id. § 1(16)–(17). 

Other states have also “adopted standards for redistricting, and measures designed 

to insulate the process from politics.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 n.4 (2004) 

(identifying Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, and Washington). In 

2009, 13 states gave a redistricting commission primary responsibility for drawing the 

plan for legislative districts, five states required a backup commission to draw the plan if 

the legislature failed to do so, two states had an advisory commission, and Iowa required 

nonpartisan legislative staff to develop maps without any political data to be voted upon 

by the legislature. National Conference of State Legislatures, Redistricting Commissions, 

http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/2009-redistricting-commissions-table.aspx (last 

visited April 23, 2014). 

In Arizona, the Commission is required to comply with the state public meetings 

law and constitutional procedural and substantive requirements. Transcripts of their 

meetings are available to the public. The Commission’s weighing of considerations, 

including the advice they received from counsel and consultants, is laid bare for public 

and judicial scrutiny. The voters “imposed a specific process that the Commission must 

follow,” and judicial review “must include an inquiry into whether the Commission 

followed the mandated procedure.” Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting, 220 Ariz.

at 596, 208 P.3d at 685. Limited substantive judicial review addresses only whether “the 

record demonstrates that the Commission took [the] goal[s] into account during its 

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deliberative process” and whether “the plan lacks a reasonable basis.” Id. at 597–98, 600, 

208 P.3d at 686–87, 689. 

On January 17, 2012, the Commission approved the 2012 final legislative map by 

a vote of three to two, the independent chair and the two Democratic Party appointees 

against the two Republican Party appointees. In the prior decade the first redistricting 

commission drew no district with a population deviation greater than ±2.42%, not for any 

reason, including Voting Rights Act preclearance, which was eventually received. In 

contrast, the 2012 map establishes 30 legislative districts with a maximum population 

deviation of 8.8%. Nine districts have populations that exceed the ideal population by 

more than 2%. All of those districts have more registered Republicans than registered 

Democrats. Nine other districts are underpopulated by more than 2%. All of those 

districts have more registered Democrats than registered Republicans. Therefore, of the 

18 districts that deviate more than ±2% from ideal population, all are underpopulated 

Democratic-leaning districts or overpopulated Republican-leaning districts. Here is the 

array of districts from most underpopulated to most overpopulated, showing predominant 

party registration: 

(Trial Ex. 40.) 

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Districts 7, 4, 27, 3, 2, 24, 19, 30, and 8 are all underpopulated by more than 2% and 

contain more registered Democrats than Republicans (Democratic registration plurality). 

Districts 14, 20, 18, 28, 5, 16, 25, 17, and 12 are all overpopulated by more than 2% and 

contain more registered Republicans than Democrats (Republican registration plurality). 

The following table isolates the 18 districts with population deviations exceeding 2%. 

(Doc. 35-1 at 101.) 

District Population 

Deviation from Ideal Population 

# % 

Democratic registration plurality 

7 203,026 -10,041 -4.7 

4 204,143 -8924 -4.2 

27 204,195 -8872 -4.2 

3 204,613 -8454 -4.0 

2 204,615 -8452 -4.0 

24 206,659 -6408 -3.0 

19 207,088 -5979 -2.8 

30 207,763 -5304 -2.5 

8 208,422 -4645 -2.2 

Republican registration plurality 

14 217,693 +4625 +2.2 

20 218,167 +5099 +2.4 

18 218,677 +5609 +2.6 

28 218,713 +5645 +2.6 

5 219,040 +5972 +2.8 

16 220,157 +7089 +3.3 

25 220,795 +7727 +3.6 

17 221,174 +8106 +3.8 

12 221,735 +8667 +4.1 

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II. PARTISAN ADVANTAGE ALONE DOES NOT JUSTIFY SYSTEMATIC 

UNEQUAL POPULATION 

A. Unequal Population Under the Equal Protection Clause 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “guarantees the 

opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators.” Reynolds 

v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964). The right to vote is personal, and impairment of the 

constitutional right to vote touches a sensitive and important area of human rights: 

Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and 

democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a 

free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political 

rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be 

carefully and meticulously scrutinized. 

Id. at 561–62. “Overweighting and overvaluation of the votes of those living here has the 

certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of the votes of those living there.” Id. at 

563. “Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic 

constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious 

discriminations based upon factors such as race or economic status.” Id. at 566 (citations 

omitted). A person’s place of residence “is not a legitimate reason for overweighting or 

diluting the efficacy of his vote.” Id. at 567. 

Each state is required to “make an honest and good faith effort to construct 

districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” 

Id. at 577. Although “it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that 

each one has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters,” divergences from a 

strict population standard must be “based on legitimate considerations incident to the 

effectuation of a rational state policy.” Id. at 577, 579. To satisfy the Equal Protection 

Clause, legislative apportionment must result from “faithful adherence to a plan of 

population-based representation, with such minor deviations only as may occur in 

recognizing certain factors that are free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.” 

Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964). Deviation even for a permitted purpose is 

discriminatory and unconstitutional if applied only where it benefits one party. Larios v. 

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Cox, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (three-judge court) (deviation to 

protect incumbents, but only Democrats), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 

Because some legitimate districting goals compete with numerical equality, states 

may weigh them against each other up to a point. There is a burden-shifting framework 

for population deviation claims. Generally, a legislative apportionment plan with a 

maximum population deviation greater than 10% creates a prima facie case of 

discrimination and therefore must be justified by the state.1

 Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 

835, 842–43 (1983). The plan may include “minor deviations,” which is a technical term 

meaning less than 10%, free from arbitrariness or discrimination. But there is no safe 

harbor for population deviations of less than 10%. There is a rebuttable presumption that 

a population deviation less than 10% is the result of an “honest and good faith effort to 

construct districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” Daly v. Hunt, 93 

F.3d 1212, 1220 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577). The burden shifts to 

the plaintiff to prove that the apportionment was “an arbitrary or discriminatory policy.” 

Larios, 305 F. Supp. at 1338–39 (citing Roman, 377 U.S. at 710); Daly, 93 F.3d at 1220. 

In sum, arbitrariness and discrimination disqualify even “minor” population 

inequality within 10%. The flexibility accorded to states for those minor deviations, 

without the initial burden of justifying them, accommodates legitimate interests that are 

reasonably served by some population inequality. But it is tautologically true that 

legitimate state goals that harmonize with population equality can carry no weight against 

the constitutional value of equality. Those goals legitimately may be pursued, but not by 

population inequality. 

 1

 In contrast, congressional districts must be drawn with equal population “as 

nearly as is practicable.” Tennant v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 3, 5 

(2012) (total population variance of 0.79% was justified by the state’s legitimate 

objectives). “[T]he ‘as nearly as is practicable’ standard does not require that 

congressional districts be drawn with ‘precise mathematical equality,’ but instead that the 

State justify population differences between districts that could have been avoided by ‘a 

good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality.’” Id. (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 

U.S. 725, 730 (1983)). 

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B. Partisan Advantage 

The Supreme Court has not decided whether partisan advantage itself is a 

permissible reason for population inequality, that is, whether it carries any weight or no 

weight against equality in the analysis.2

 See, e.g., Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 951 

(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from summary affirmance) (“No party here contends that 

. . . this Court has addressed the question” of whether a redistricting plan with less than 

10% population deviation may be invalidated on the basis of evidence of partisan 

political motivation.); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423 

(2006) (“Even in addressing political motivation as a justification for an equal-population 

violation . . . Larios does not give clear guidance.”). 

The Supreme Court precedents discussed above readily yield the conclusion that 

partisan advantage is not itself a legitimate, reasonable, and non-discriminatory purpose 

for systematic population deviation. Again, the Commission does not argue that it is. 

General principles of voting rights capture the issue, and there is no contrary gravitational 

pull from any competing constitutional principle. Party discrimination in population 

punishes or favors people on account of their political views. It is discriminatory and 

invidious. It serves an unfair purpose at the price of a constitutional right that all voters 

have, regardless of how they plan to vote. 

Bare party advantage in systematic population deviation carries no weight against 

the baseline constitutional imperative of equality of population. Under settled 

constitutional analysis, unless the Commission has some other legitimate, actual, and 

honest reason for the inequality, the force of equality must win out. 

Federal law would have this force even if state law purported to legitimate 

population deviation for partisan advantage. Imagine a state statute that required 

Democratic-leaning districts to be overpopulated up to +5% and Republican-leaning 

districts to be underpopulated down to -5%. Such a statute would add no weight to the 

 

2

 Nor has the Supreme Court addressed whether party advantage carries any weight against equality in the federal constitutional calculus if state law itself bars it, as 

Arizona does. 

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weightless purpose of party advantage and could not change the federal equal protection 

balance from what it would be without the statute. Arizona law makes our task even 

easier by excluding partisan advantage as a purpose for unequal population or anything 

else in redistricting. The Arizona Constitution twice mandates equal population, subject 

only to adjustments for four other permitted goals and compliance with federal law. Ariz. 

Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14). None of those permitted goals encompasses partisan 

political advantage. 

C. Systematic Inequality of Population for Partisan Advantage Is 

Sometimes Provable and Is Subject to Judicially Manageable 

Standards 

Systematic inequality of population for partisan advantage is sometimes provable 

from the statistics alone and exclusion of other justifications. Where that demanding test 

is met, as it is here, the equal protection violation is proven and remediable. 

Before the reform of redistricting procedures and substantive standards in Arizona 

and other states, it was usually possible to mask actual partisan purposes by overlaying 

some other arguable reason for the population deviation. In the absence of statemandated standards and transparent processes, any standard permissible under federal 

law could be invoked after the fact and without regard to true motives. No doubt that will 

remain the case for specific instances of partisan population inequality. But Arizona now 

prohibits the secrecy of process and the indeterminacy of standards that previously put 

even systematic partisan deviation beyond judicial remedy because of the inability to 

exclude other explanations. In the states with redistricting reform, it can sometimes be 

proven that partisan advantage was a real and substantial cause of the deviation, with no 

additional reason, or none that is valid. 

To be sure, when political actors are charged with applying even neutral criteria of 

districting, they will know and enjoy the political benefits of using that wide discretion 

one way and not another. Political motivations will remain, resulting in population 

inequality here and there in innumerable line-drawing choices that are overlain with 

defensible neutral purposes even though they may not be the real purposes. Limitations 

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of judicial competence weigh against inquiry as extensive as that of the redistricting 

authority itself to find and remedy specific abuses of equality. 

But this case is not about a district here or there that is out of balance for partisan 

benefit. This is about systematic population inequality for party advantage that is not 

only provable but entirely obvious as a matter of statistics alone. A bright line 

requirement of statistical proof, not just anecdotal evidence, is well within judicial 

competence. By the expert evidence here, the neutral principles of districting are 

politically random, and it is statistically impossible for them to yield this perfect 

correlation of population inequality with one party advantage in 18 of 18 districts. But it 

does not take a Ph.D. to see this stark fact of intended party benefit. It would be 

reversible error to find the facts otherwise, even if the Commission did not admit it was 

consciously drawing party advantage. As thus narrowly defined, the test for proof of 

intended systematic party advantage—statistical proof and exclusion of other justifying 

reasons—will exclude all but the obvious cases, easily proven, as this one is. The lowhanging fruit is within the reach of the Equal Protection Clause even if the rest is not. 

Constitutional doctrine must mark out systematic population inequality, proven by 

statistics, as unreasonable, discriminatory, and actionable, provided no other legal reason 

saves it. 

Limitations of judicial competence that weigh against remedy of partisan 

gerrymandering even within equal population are no barrier to proof or remedy for 

systematic inequality of population for partisan advantage. Line-drawing within equal 

population can be done with an eye to expected voting behavior to serve some legitimate 

purposes. Line-drawing within equal population for unworthy purposes, like party 

advantage, escapes judicial remedy for lack of judicially manageable standards. Vieth v. 

Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281, 305 (2004). But the narrow and bright line test stated 

above for proving discrimination in numerical inequality has no such infirmity. The 

sound reasons for judicial hesitation to remedy partisan gerrymandering within equal 

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population do not fit the different wrong of systematic population inequality for partisan 

advantage with no other justification. 

The systematic inequality for partisan purposes does not end the case if the 

inequality has other justification. Those unworthy partisan motives should not trump 

parallel valid motives. The equal protection analysis requires further inquiry whether 

those other justifications are legally sufficient and actual, honest motives. The Arizona 

Constitution’s exclusion of all but a few permitted reasons to deviate from equal 

population leaves the Commission with only Section 5 preclearance to explain its 

pervasive party preference. 

The Commission has not made and cannot make any general invocation of 

theoretically valid reasons for the unequal population. There is only the Voting Rights 

Act, on which the case now hangs. 

III. PRECLEARANCE UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT DOES NOT 

REQUIRE OR PERMIT SYSTEMATIC POPULATION INEQUALITY 

A. The Voting Rights Act and Section 5 Preclearance 

The Voting Rights Act, enacted in 1965 to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, 

“employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem.” Shelby Cnty. v. 

Holder, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013). Section 4 suspended literacy, 

education, character, and reference qualifications to vote in certain jurisdictions as 

defined in that section. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b. Under Section 5, no change in voting 

standard, practice, or procedure could take effect in those jurisdictions without obtaining 

administrative “preclearance” through the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment 

from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that the voting change 

comports with Section 5. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620. 

Section 5 of the Act required States to obtain federal permission before 

enacting any law related to voting—a drastic departure from basic 

principles of federalism. And § 4 of the Act applied that requirement only 

to some States—an equally dramatic departure from the principle that all 

States enjoy equal sovereignty. This was strong medicine, but Congress 

determined it was needed to address entrenched racism in voting, “an 

insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of 

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our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the 

Constitution.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966). 

As we explained in upholding the law, “exceptional conditions can justify 

legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.” Id. at 334. Reflecting the 

unprecedented nature of these measures, they were scheduled to expire after 

five years. 

Id. at 2618. 

This “extraordinary measure” and “strong medicine” was an appropriate remedy 

for the century of racially discriminatory voting practices and procedures in the six states 

originally targeted for preclearance. Successful but time-consuming and costly litigation 

against state and local practices was routinely evaded by bad faith enactment of new 

discriminatory laws. The repetitive new laws blunted the Constitution’s stated measure 

for protecting federal rights—the Supremacy Clause and case-by-case adjudication. That 

history justified freezing voting practices in those jurisdictions, absent advance 

determination that the changes do not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging 

the right to vote on account of race or color. Id. at 2618–19, 2624. 

The 1975 amendment created new rights for four language minority groups in 

certain jurisdictions and extended Section 5 preclearance to those jurisdictions, including 

Arizona. The 1975 amendment also added the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for the Act. 

Any voting change that had the purpose or effect of diminishing the ability of any 

citizens of the United States “on account of race or color or in contravention of the 

[language] guarantees” to elect their preferred candidates of choice, i.e., “retrogression,” 

would not receive preclearance. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b). Retrogression requires a 

comparison of a jurisdiction’s new voting plan with its existing plan; the existing plan is 

the benchmark against which the effect of voting changes is measured. Reno v. Bossier 

Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 478 (1997). 

Notwithstanding “the unprecedented nature of these measures,” originally 

intended for only five years, they were extended repeatedly. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 

2618. On June 25, 2013, after the trial in this case, the Supreme Court held Section 5’s 

coverage formulas in Section 4(b) no longer constitutional because they had lost rational 

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connection to the circumstances and criteria originally justifying that extraordinary 

remedy. Id. at 2631. But Congress may restore Section 5 by giving Section 4(b) a 

reasonable application. 

B. This Case Must Be Decided in Accordance With Current Law, Under 

Which Section 5 Is Now Unenforceable 

Pending civil cases must be decided in accordance with current law. The 

Commission relied on maximizing Voting Rights Act Section 5 preclearance as a 

legitimate state interest to justify systematic partisan population deviation. Because of 

Shelby County, Section 5 preclearance now cannot be applied in any jurisdiction because 

the formulas in Section 4 are unconstitutional. Thus, even if Section 5 could justify 

population inequality before Shelby County, it cannot now. To allow the current map to 

govern successive election cycles until 2020 would give continuing force to Section 5 

despite the unconstitutionality of applying it anywhere. 

“When [the Supreme Court] applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, 

that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive 

effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether 

such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.” Harper v. Virginia Dep’t 

of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). The circumstance that Arizona could and did 

comply with the law at the time—seeking and getting preclearance—does not release it 

from the rule of law that governs everyone else for future events. If it did, retroactivity 

would rarely apply. 

In some circumstances, however, “a well-established general legal rule that trumps 

the new rule of law, which general rule reflects both reliance interests and other 

significant policy justifications,” may prevent the new rule from applying retroactively. 

Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 759 (1995). Reliance alone—even 

reasonable reliance—is generally insufficient to avoid retroactivity. Id. at 758–59. For 

example, qualified immunity sometimes shields state officers from personal liability 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other statutes based on the state of the law at the time of the 

conduct, even if the law has changed by the time of the adjudication. This exception to 

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retroactivity is animated by “special federal policy concerns related to the imposition of 

damages liability upon persons holding public office.” Id. at 758. Those policy concerns 

are not present here, where the Plaintiffs seek prevention of future government injuries 

rather than personal money damages for past harm. Qualified immunity has nothing to 

do with injunction against violating federal rights in the future, even newly announced 

rights that could not have been anticipated. 

There are no “significant policy justifications” or “special circumstance[s],” id. at 

759, or other reasons to think “the importance of the reliance interests that are disturbed” 

makes this an “exceptional case[],” id. at 761 (Kennedy, J., concurring), dispensing with 

the general rule of retroactivity. The party urging an exception to retroactivity bears the 

burden, and here the case for retroactivity is easy. Applying Shelby County to this case 

cannot change the outcomes of elections conducted under the current map. Instead, the 

only things at stake are future elections. After Shelby County, Section 5 has ceased to be 

a valid justification for unequal population, even if, by hypothesis, it was a valid 

justification before. The Commission’s “reliance” interest here is only the trivial one of 

not wanting to spend a few weeks finishing the job for which they volunteered. They can 

shave their boundaries into equality for nothing compared to the years and millions they 

are spending to resist doing so. If Shelby County is not applied, then Section 5 will 

continue to dilute votes in Arizona for the next four election cycles of this decade, in 

disregard of the law that binds us and the rights of hundreds of thousands of voters. For 

this reason alone, the Commission must revise the current map. 

The Court would avoid these clear principles by splitting fine hairs between being 

constitutional, but nowhere, and being unconstitutional anywhere. The Court bases the 

difference on invalidation of Section 4(b) coverage formulas in general rather than 

invalidation of Section 5 as a substantive remedy for any particular jurisdiction. It has 

long been settled that the extraordinary remedy of preclearance is not intrinsically 

unconstitutional if extraordinary circumstances justify it. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 

383 U.S. 301, 334–35 (1966). Because Shelby County made Section 5 inapplicable 

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everywhere by invalidating the coverage formulas in general, the Supreme Court did not 

reach as-applied challenges to Section 5 for specific jurisdictions, including Arizona. 

It does not distinguish the retroactivity doctrine to say that “the preclearance 

process” was not invalidated though the coercion to do it was. Slip Op. at 47. 

Retroactivity does not make it misconduct for a jurisdiction to have complied with 

Section 5, it just prevents that past conduct from reverberating into the future to the 

detriment of other people’s rights as we now know them to be. 

Retroactively stripping the Voting Rights Act cover from the Commission’s 

systematic partisan malapportionment, assuming it was cover before, would not mean all 

the 2010 maps done in covered jurisdictions “are now invalid.” Slip Op. at 48–49. 

Hopefully few or no other jurisdictions conscripted Section 5 preclearance to work 

statewide partisan malapportionment. But if any others did, their maps most assuredly 

“are now invalid” and need to be remedied. That does not cut against the general 

principle of retroactivity; it is the very reason for it. 

C. Voting Rights Act Preclearance Does Not and Could Not Authorize 

Systematic Population Inequality 

If we had power to give continuing effect to Section 5 in deciding this case, on the 

merits it is further error to give it effect that changes the outcome of this case. 

Complying with Section 5 and obtaining preclearance under the Voting Rights Act was a 

legitimate objective in redistricting; indeed, at the time it was mandatory. But the 

legitimacy of the goal in general has no relation in logic or principle to the validity of 

using population inequality to get there. A state must “show with some specificity that a 

particular objective required the specific deviations in its plan, rather than simply relying 

on general assertions.” Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 741 (1983) (congressional 

districting). The reasoning from general validity of complying with the Voting Rights 

Act to using systematic population inequality to do so is entirely circular. All Section 5 

compliance must be by means that are legal under federal law, and there is nothing but 

assertion behind the conclusion that the one person, one vote principle is excepted from 

that. 

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The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether systematic population 

inequality is a legal means of pursuing preclearance. But there is no basis in statutory 

text, administrative interpretation, or precedent to conclude that Congress purported to 

authorize state redistricting authorities or the federal executive branch to systematically 

dilute people’s equal voting rights for any reason, least of all as a protection of equal 

voting rights. 

 1. At the highest level of generality and within limits, the Constitution “defers 

to state legislative policies, so long as they are consistent with constitutional norms”: 

Any number of consistently applied legislative polices might justify some 

variance, including, for instance, making districts compact, respecting 

municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding 

contests between incumbent[s] . . . . As long as the criteria are 

nondiscriminatory . . . these are all legitimate objectives that on a proper 

showing could justify minor population deviations. 

Id. at 740 (congressional districting). This deference respects the state’s autonomy of 

policies where they require accommodation from numerical equality, provided the other 

conditions are met of nondiscrimination, consistent application, and consistency with 

constitutional norms. 

 But there is no state policy in this case, except ironically the equal population 

policy that prohibits what the Commission has done unless federal law mandates it. 

There is only the state’s duty to federal law under the Supremacy Clause. The Arizona 

Constitution restates what it need not have said, that Arizona districting must comply 

with federal law, including the Voting Rights Act. Arizona has made a firm policy 

choice that does merit federal deference, but it is the choice to forbid inequality except 

for four reasons not relevant in this case. If Arizona’s restatement of its duty to federal 

law can be called a state policy, it is a state policy that takes its entire content from the 

substance of the federal law and policy to which it yields. It has no independence from 

federal policy that could change federal policy to accommodate it. 

 So we must look to federal law to find what obtaining preclearance requires, 

permits, and does not permit. The critical question then is whether Congress did and 

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could authorize systematic population inequality to comply with Section 5 preclearance. 

This case does not turn on whether the Commission had a bad motive of partisan 

preferment, though it did, or on which motive predominated, though the preclearance 

motive fell short of covering all the depopulation here. It turns on whether the valid 

motive of preclearance changes the equal protection calculus for using the means of 

systematic population inequality to get there. There is no independent state policy of 

preclearance malapportionment to defer to. 

 The Commission and the Court would start and end with the fact that wanting to 

get Section 5 preclearance is valid. But again, there must be “some specificity that a 

particular objective required the specific deviations in its plan, rather than simply relying 

on general assertions.” Id. at 741. They would have federal policy deferring to state 

policy, state policy deferring to federal policy, and the buck stopping nowhere. We 

proceed to address whether Section 5 preclearance authorizes systematic population 

inequality. 

2. Nothing in the text of the Voting Rights Act purports to require or authorize 

population inequality in legislative districting, directly or by implication. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1973c(a). Section 17 of the Voting Rights Act forbids it in sweeping terms: 

Nothing in subchapters I-A to I-C of this chapter shall be construed to deny, 

impair, or otherwise adversely affect the right to vote of any person 

registered to vote under the law of any State or political subdivision. 

42 U.S.C. § 1973n. Distorting the weight of all the votes in 60% of the legislative 

districts in Arizona would plainly “impair, or otherwise adversely affect” half of the 

voters in those districts. It is hard to think of more comprehensive language to exclude 

systematic vote dilution as a required or permitted means to comply with the Voting 

Rights Act. The Act must be honored, but with the other available tools that do not steal 

from some voters to give to others. 

3. There is conclusive proof that Section 5 non-retrogression and preclearance 

yield to population equality. We have in real life what would be a perfect experiment if 

designed for a laboratory. In covered states, preclearance is also required for 

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congressional redistricting and is given despite near perfect equality of population in 

every instance. The Department of Justice knows how to accommodate nonretrogression goals for protected minorities with population equality. 

4. The blunt fact is that the Department of Justice has never required unequal 

population for preclearance in the 48 years of administering Section 5. Although the 

Attorney General must state the reasons for interposing an objection, 28 C.F.R. 

§ 51.44(a), the Commission’s expert witness had no knowledge of the Department of 

Justice ever denying preclearance for lack of population deviation or otherwise 

communicating that it would be required to obtain preclearance. If the Attorney General 

had ever done so, it is unbelievable that it would be unknown in the intensely scrutinized 

world of Voting Rights Act compliance. The Commission does not contend the Attorney 

General ever did so. 

5. Nor does the Constitution grant Congress power to enact legislation 

requiring or permitting population inequality among voting districts. The Fourteenth and 

Fifteenth Amendments grant Congress power to enforce by “appropriate legislation,” 

which must be “plainly adapted” to the end of enforcing equal protection of the laws or 

preventing abridgement of the right to vote on account of race, consistent with “the letter 

and spirit of the constitution.” Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650–51 (1966). 

“Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified 

citizens to vote, in state as well as federal elections.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 

554 (1964). The right to vote “includes the right to have the vote counted at full value 

without dilution or discount.” Id. at 555 n.29 (quoting with approval South v. Peters, 339 

U.S. 276, 279 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Further, 

The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence 

to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and 

Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote. 

Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). If Section 5 permits otherwise 

unconstitutional numerical vote dilution, it exceeds Congress’s power to enforce the 

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments’ commands of equal voting rights. 

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Congress’s inability to mandate systematic population inequality would not 

invalidate every preclearance effort with any population deviation. That would not arise 

because other legitimate purposes for deviation will always come into play. This case is 

in court precisely because the extent of the preclearance/malapportionment deviation 

outruns all others and must be defended on its own. 

Statutory text, constitutional boundaries, and a half-century of administration 

without exception are all the same. They take all seriousness out of the Commission’s 

wild speculation that it can race to the bottom of population inequality to get 

preclearance. Sources that lack the effect of law could not count against this, but even 

those sources confirm this conclusion. 

6. In its Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting 

Rights Act, which explicitly “is not legally binding,” the Department of Justice stated: 

Preventing retrogression under Section 5 does not require 

jurisdictions to violate the one-person, one-vote principle. 

76 Fed. Reg. 7470, 7472 (Feb. 9, 2011). The Department has also acknowledged the 

obvious, that compliance with constitutional equal population requirements could result 

in unavoidable retrogression. Long ago the Department stated: 

Similarly, in the redistricting context, there may be instances 

occasioned by demographic changes in which reductions of minority 

percentages in single-member districts are unavoidable, even though 

“retrogressive,” i.e., districts where compliance with the one person, one 

vote standard necessitates the reduction of minority voting strength. 

Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 

1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 488 (Jan. 6, 1987). The current Guidance is to the same effect. 

76 Fed. Reg. at 7472. This concession to demographic change, where it happens, is 

dictated by the text of Section 5 itself, which does not forbid all retrogression in the 

minority’s “ability to elect their preferred candidates of choice” as some of the 

Commissioners and their advisors unqualifiedly and repeatedly said. Rather, to deny 

preclearance the text also requires that the retrogression be “on account of race or color 

or in contravention of the [language] guarantees.” The “on account of” language was 

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necessary to keep Section 5 validly within Congress’s enforcement power. But whether 

or not it is constitutionally necessary, it is there. Retrogression because of relative 

population changes is not on account of race or language. 

7. The Court puts some weight on an “implication” in the Guidance that the 

Attorney General “might” require “slightly greater population deviation” to avoid 

retrogression. Slip Op. at 46. The Guidance notes that an alternative congressional plan 

with any increase in population deviation “is not considered a reasonable alternative” to a 

submitted plan. The Guidance continues: 

For state legislative and local redistricting, a plan that would require 

significantly greater overall population deviations is not considered a 

reasonable alternative. 

76 Fed. Reg. at 7472. 

From this statement that a “significant” additional deviation would not be 

required, the Court infers that a deviation that is not “significant” “might” be required. 

Supposing that is persuasive, the “slightly greater population deviation” that is not 

“significant” could not possibly support the Commission’s stampede to the limits of 

population deviation. “Significant” population deviation that “is not considered a 

reasonable alternative” certainly would include any deviation that would change a plan 

from what is otherwise legal to otherwise illegal. That is the meaning of “significant” in 

usual legal discourse. 

The Court next equates “not significant” with “minor population deviations,” the 

technical term meaning below the 10% burden-shifting boundary. Falling below 10% 

does not make population deviations constitutionally insignificant. It just changes who 

has the burden of proof. 

8. There is much confusion in this case over whether the Commission tried to 

make too many Voting Rights Act districts. Federal law does not limit a jurisdiction to 

creating only the number of such districts needed to avoid retrogression. A jurisdiction 

may seek a margin of safety or go entirely beyond the Voting Rights Act if it thinks it 

good policy and complies with state and federal law. A court does not second guess how 

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many such districts are needed or permitted because any number is permitted if legal 

means are used to create them. But choosing to create such districts gives no absolution 

to use any districting practice that is otherwise illegal. No matter how many or few 

majority-minority, minority-influence, or cross-over districts a jurisdiction tries to create, 

systematic population inequality is an illegal means to get there. 

 9. This part of the discussion returns to where it began. The Commission’s 

assertion that preclearance was a legitimate redistricting goal at the time is correct and 

undisputed. But that proves nothing. What needs to be proved is that systematic 

population inequality that is otherwise irrational and discriminatory is a reasonable means 

to obtain preclearance, so as to count against the baseline force of equality under the 

Equal Protection Clause. 

 It begs the question to say population inequality is “compliance with a federal law 

concerning voting rights” without demonstrating that the meaning and effect of that 

federal law is to permit systematic population inequality. Slip Op. at 44. The Court 

circles its reasoning twice in finding the importance of preclearance in general 

comparable to that of some valid state purposes for deviation, but sliding past what 

means are legal and what effect the Act has. It is no answer to say, “The question is not 

whether the Voting Rights Act specifically authorizes population deviations . . . .” Slip 

Op. at 45 (emphasis added). A statute does not have to “specifically” prohibit something 

if it generally prohibits it or it does not as a whole have the effect of legalizing what is 

otherwise illegal. 

 Federal equal protection doctrine is the gatekeeper for what are permissible state 

purposes for deviation. Those state purposes need not be codified in state statutes. But 

there is no independent state purpose here, only respect for federal law and the 

Supremacy Clause. This is a case of first impression in another way, as it is the first time 

systematic malapportionment has been defended from the effect of a federal statute. The 

dispensing effect must come from that federal statute, expressly, generally, or by 

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implication, or the defense fails. It has nothing to do with whether truly independent 

state purposes are codified in statutes. 

IV. MIXED VALID AND INVALID PURPOSES 

Because the majority finds the Voting Rights Act a legitimate reason for 

population inequality, they must decide what to make of one permitted and one possibly 

forbidden purpose. They propose different tests. For Judge Clifton the case turns on 

which consideration predominated. For Judge Silver the impermissible motive has no 

legal consequence unless it was the only motive. Both tests are trying to grapple with the 

problems of not diminishing other actual and valid purposes and not yielding to 

theoretically valid purposes that are only pretext. 

Both tests would need to be refined to work. Mixed motives often have no 

predominance. Some motives are from different domains and incapable of quantitative 

comparison. A test of predominance of motives is subjective and unreviewable. It 

disguises judicial choice. Literally, a test of single motive can never be met, not in this 

kind of case, as covered jurisdictions must be motivated by Section 5 compliance. 

There is a better statement of the test for cases of concurrent valid and invalid 

purposes. The law should defer to state districting authorities’ actual, substantial, and 

honest pursuit of a legitimate means for a legitimate purpose with systematic population 

inequality, notwithstanding the actual and additional motive of party preferment. But the 

valid motive must fairly cover the entirety of the otherwise wrongful inequality. Even a 

valid means may not pass from reasonable application to pretext in any part. Here the 

Commission continued adjusting the map with an eye to depopulation for party advantage 

even after the cover of the Voting Rights Act played out. If the Commission’s first acts 

of depopulation had the cover, the last acts did not. In light of the intervening 

invalidation of Section 5 preclearance, if sent back for any reason to be redone in any 

part, the Commission could not do again what it did here. 

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The difficulty of forming and applying any test for mixed motives shows why it 

should be left for a case in which it would matter. It is not needed to decide this case, 

where neither motive justifies systematic partisan malapportionment. 

V. OTHER MATTERS 

The other opinions run in directions that cannot be responded to in every respect 

without prolonging this dissent. The matters already addressed are enough to decide this 

case. Brief additional comments follow. 

1. The Court says that “Counsel’s advice does not insulate the Commission 

from liability, but it is probative of the Commission’s intent.” Slip Op. at 52. To that 

end, the Court concludes that the systematic population deviation was the result of 

“reasonable, good-faith efforts to comply with the Voting Rights Act” and that “the 

Commission’s attorneys gave reasonable advice as to how to pursue what they identified 

as a legitimate objective, and the Commission appeared to act in accordance with that 

advice.” Slip Op. at 1, 52. Counsel did not give advice that underpopulation for 

preclearance would thereby escape liability under the one person, one vote principle. If 

their advice could be stretched to have said that, it would not be reasonable. 

The Attorney General does not—and indeed, under his statutory authority could 

not—deny preclearance for any illegality except Section 5 retrogression. The Guidance says: 

The Attorney General may not interpose an objection to a 

redistricting plan on the grounds that it violates the one-person, one-vote 

principle, on the grounds that it violates Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 

(1983), or on the grounds that it violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights 

Act. . . . Therefore, jurisdictions should not regard a determination of 

compliance with Section 5 as preventing subsequent legal challenges to that 

plan under other statutes by the Department of Justice or by private 

plaintiffs. 42 U.S.C. 1973c(a); 28 CFR 51.49. 

Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed. 

Reg. 7470, 7470 (Feb. 9, 2011). In the teeth of this explicit disclaimer that the Attorney 

General does not examine inequality of population and gives no protection against future 

challenge for it, any advice that unequal population is immunized from later challenge if 

it might help persuade the Attorney General to preclear would be unreasonable. 

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The Commission began with correct advice that any population deviation must be 

justified under federal constitutional standards and that no legal precedent said Section 5 

preclearance justified any inequality or how much. Their counsel informed them the 

question lacked a reliable answer and whatever they did must survive scrutiny if scrutiny 

came. (Trial Ex. 361 at 11–14; Trial Tr. at 826:6–15.) Later, the advisors offered 

pragmatic license but never circled back to actual legal analysis from sources and 

reasoning. (Trial Ex. 395 at 114–16, 118–20; Trial Ex. 405 at 10–11, 14–15, 19, 30, 32, 

36, 50.) They gave bare conclusions, no principled exposition, and no written opinion. 

At best this was advice to take a legal risk, which lawyers often counsel when 

there is possible benefit and no cost to their client from being wrong. It could be taken as 

advice that the course of action complied with one person, one vote principles only by not 

taking it as a whole, which would not be reasonable. 

2. Both opinions contend that the Republican commissioners really approved 

the partisan inequality in the final plan they voted against because they had voted for 

some earlier changes that moved in that direction. The Court leaves out the facts that 

refute it. The Republican commissioners explained their voting for iterations of the map. 

Commissioners Freeman and Stertz objected to map changes that promoted Democratic 

Party advantage without justification. (See, e.g., Trial Ex. 405 at 30:18–31:8; Trial Ex. 

406 at 240:21.) The minutes from the public hearings and the Republican 

commissioners’ trial testimony explain that Commissioner Stertz voted for the final 

tentative legislative map to stave off an attempt by Commissioner Herrera to introduce a 

“more extreme map” to favor Democratic Party interests that they thought was already 

prepared. (Trial Tr. at 261:10–15, 877:17–879:8; Trial Ex. 406 at 266:14–267:3.) The 

inference that, though voting against the final plan, the Republican commissioners 

actually accepted the plan because they did not protest at every opportunity throughout 

the meetings misses how people disagree in collective bodies if they hope for 

compromise later. Concurring Op. at 14. 

 3. In the Final Pretrial Order the Plaintiffs stated “unjustified population 

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deviations in legislative districting for the sole purpose of partisanship” as their claim, but 

they elaborated it and then summarized as follows: 

 Accordingly, Plaintiffs must prove (A) the legislative districts 

deviate from equality, (B) the adjustments the Arizona Constitution 

authorized did not cause the deviations from strict equality, (C) deviations 

from equality are not the incidental result of adjustments made to attain 

legitimate state interests, and (D) no legitimate State interests justify or 

warrant the IRC’s deviations from equality. 

Their Trial Brief said the same thing: “Thus, Plaintiffs are bound to prove only that no 

legitimate and constitutional policy drove the population deviations.” The Plaintiffs tried 

and proved that. This is the answer to the concurring Judge’s concern that she is “not 

aware of any clear request by plaintiffs that we adopt something other than the ‘actual 

and sole’ reason standard.” Concurring Op. at 10. It is in the quoted passages, and 

elsewhere. 

 4. I join in the sections of the Per Curiam Opinion concerning dismissal of the 

individual commissioners, dismissal of the state law claims, denial of abstention, and 

legislative privilege. On the merits, the facts and findings in this dissent are sufficient to 

dispose of this case. Though I accept most of the factual narrative in the Opinion, I 

disagree with some, including some that matters under the Court’s analysis. The facts 

that determine the outcome under the analysis in this dissent are few, simple, and, I 

believe, undisputed. Therefore, I join only in sections III.A, B, and C of the Opinion. 

VI. PERSPECTIVE 

This dissent applies voting rights equal protection doctrine as it has been settled 

for half a century. Deference to reasonable state policies begins the analysis, but 

deference stops where the state policy or its application is irrational or discriminatory. 

Systematic numerical inequality for partisan benefit is discriminatory and invidious 

viewpoint punishment or reward. 

The first thing novel about this case is that, thanks to the reform of redistricting 

processes and standards in Arizona, state law itself now excludes most of the traditional 

pretexts for partisan inequality. Of necessity, the Commission summons up only the 

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Voting Rights Act as redeeming what is otherwise old-fashioned partisan 

malapportionment. 

The second thing novel about this case is that, the Arizona voters having cast out 

that grossest of redistricting abuses, a federal law is now invoked to bless its return. No 

other instance is found in which Congress is said to have ordered or permitted systematic 

population inequality that otherwise violates the Equal Protection Clause. 

The third thing novel about this decision is the effect it has to give to the Voting 

Rights Act itself. Assuming we could give Section 5 preclearance continuing reach into 

the future, it would be extraordinary that Congress used a law protecting equality of 

voting rights to authorize systematic partisan malapportionment, even defeating state law 

that prohibits it. 

Systematic malapportionment is an affront to the rights and dignity of the 

individual. The essential empowerments for that abuse are unaccountable discretion and 

ready pretexts to cover true motives. Population equality is the most objective limitation 

on abusable discretion, and it cannot be used unfairly against anyone. “[T]he equalpopulation principle remains the only clear limitation on improper districting practices, 

and we must be careful not to dilute its strength.” Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949–50 

(2004) (Stevens, J., concurring in summary affirmance). 

Numeric equality yields to some other worthy goals, within limits. Arizona voters 

left little to weigh against equality, and none of what they did allow is invoked here 

except homage to the Supremacy Clause. With that wedge the Commission pries 

pervasive party malapportionment back into Arizona, in the name of Congress and 

federal statute. It is a misplaced sense of federalism that stands aside while officers of a 

state that repudiated partisan malapportionment return to it on federal command that 

Congress never gave. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

Based on these findings of fact and conclusions of law, I would enter judgment for 

the Plaintiffs declaring that the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission’s 

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legislative redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. I would enjoin the Commission to 

promptly prepare and promulgate a plan that is free of that error. 

Dated: April 29, 2014. 

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