Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00042/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00042-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ANTOINETTE DJONRET, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

 v. ) Civil Action No. 2:14cv42-MHT

) (WO)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is before the court on a pro se motion by Antoinette Djonret (“Djonret”) to vacate, 

set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Doc. Nos. 4 & 11.

1

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 31, 2012, Djonret pled guilty under a plea agreement to three counts in two 

indictments: (1) aiding the filing of a false tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2); (2) 

conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286; and (3) aggravated identity 

theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.2 The plea agreement contained a waiver provision 

whereby Djonret waived her right to appeal or attack collaterally her convictions and sentence 

except on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Doc. No. 

22-4 at 9-10. Following a sentencing hearing on February 8, 2013, the district court sentenced 

Djonret to 144 months in prison, comprising concurrent terms of 36 months for aiding the filing 

 1 References to document numbers (“Doc. No.”) are to those assigned by the Clerk of Court to 

pleadings docketed in this civil action. All page references are to those assigned by CM/ECF.

2 The two indictments were returned in Case Nos. 2:12cr57-MHT & 2:12cr59-MHT. Djonret’s 

guilty plea was entered in a single proceeding (Doc. No. 22-9), and the universal plea agreement 

covered both cases. She was sentenced in a consolidated proceeding.

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of a false tax return and 120 months for conspiracy to defraud the United States and a consecutive 

term of 24 months for aggravated identity theft. See Doc. Nos. 22-6 & 22-7. Djonret did not 

appeal.

On February 6, 2014, Djonret filed this § 2255 motion presenting claims that her trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

1) failing to object to the loss amount attributed to her at sentencing;

2) failing to object to the six-level victim enhancement at sentencing;

3) failing to object to the four-level leadership enhancement at sentencing; 

4) failing to negotiate the terms of her plea agreement effectively;

5) failing to investigate and research the case adequately, resulting in 

counsel’s (a) giving her erroneous advice about her sentencing exposure 

and (b) failing to secure an expert witness to challenge the loss amount 

attributed to her; and

6) failing to object to her sentence as “substantively unreasonable.”

Doc. No. 4 at 4-13; Doc. No. 11 at 3-16.

The Government maintains that all of Djonret’s claims lack merit and should therefore be 

denied. Doc. No. 22. After consideration of the parties’ submissions, the record, and the relevant 

law, the court finds that the § 2255 motion should be denied without an evidentiary hearing. Rule 

8(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts.

II. DISCUSSION

A. General Standard of Review

Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral 

attack on final judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief under 

§ 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United 

States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is 

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otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 

1198, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 198 F.3d 811, 813 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999). 

“Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ‘is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that 

narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if 

condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 

1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

B. Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be evaluated against the two-part test 

announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that 

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 689. Second, 

the petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. See 

Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000).

Scrutiny of counsel’s performance is “highly deferential,” and the court indulges a “strong 

presumption” that counsel’s performance was reasonable. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The court will “avoid second-guessing counsel’s performance: It does 

not follow that any counsel who takes an approach [the court] would not have chosen is guilty of 

rendering ineffective assistance.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “Given the 

strong presumption in favor of competence, the petitioner’s burden of persuasion – though the 

presumption is not insurmountable – is a heavy one.” Id.

As noted, under the prejudice component of Strickland, a petitioner must show that “there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability is a probability

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sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The prejudice prong does not focus only 

on the outcome; rather, to establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient 

representation rendered the result of the trial fundamentally unfair or unreliable. See Lockhart v. 

Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) (“[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome 

determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair 

or unreliable, is defective.”). “Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of 

counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law 

entitles him.” Id. at 372.

Unless a petitioner satisfies the showings required on both parts of the Strickland inquiry, 

relief should be denied. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Once a court decides that one of the requisite 

showings has not been made, it need not decide whether the other one has been. Id. at 697; Duren 

v. Hopper, 161 F.3d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1998).

1. Counsel’s Failure to Object to Attributed Loss

Djonret contends that her trial counsel, Susan G. James, rendered her ineffective assistance

of counsel by failing to object to the methodology used by the Government to calculate the loss 

amount attributed to her at sentencing. Doc. No. 4 at 4; Doc. No. 11 at 6-11.

Djonret was charged in two separate cases, one stemming from her role as a tax preparer 

for the Montgomery branch of Bruce King’s Premier Tax (“the King Case,” Case No 2:12cr57-

MHT), and the other stemming from her scheme to defraud the United States, which she engaged 

in after leaving employment with Premier Tax, by filing false refund claims using stolen identities 

(“the Identity Theft Scheme,” Case No. 2:12cr59-MHT). Djonret’s specific arguments in her § 

2255 motion go only to the methodology used to calculate loss in the King Case and to her claim 

that James was ineffective for failing to object to that methodology. See Doc. No. 11 at 6-11.

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Under § 2B1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines, the offense level for a defendant 

convicted of certain economic fraud offenses is subject to a specific-offense-characteristic 

enhancement if the loss from the criminal conduct exceeded $5,000, with the extent of the 

enhancement determined by the amount of the loss. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). Application notes 

clarify that the “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss.”3 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(A). 

In the context of fraud offenses, sentencing based on intended loss is appropriate even where no 

actual loss occurred. United States v. Menichino, 989 F.2d 438, 442 (11th Cir. 1993); see, e.g., 

United States v. Willis, 560 F.3d 1246, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that intended loss 

included defendant’s fraudulent claims to FEMA not paid).

Here, consistent with the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) and the “Government’s 

Provisions” section of the written plea agreement, the district court found that the cumulative loss 

attributable to Djonret for her criminal conduct − i.e., combining the loss in the King Case with 

the loss in the Identify Theft Scheme − was between $1,000,000 and $2,500,000.4 See PSI at 9, ¶

31; Doc. No. 22-4 at 6; Doc. No. 22-6 at 82-83. Based on this finding, and applying § 2B1.1(b)(1), 

the court imposed a 16-level enhancement to Djonret’s offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 

2B1.1(b)(1)(I), (J) (providing for specific-offense-characteristic enhancement of 16 levels where 

the loss was more than $1,000,000 but less than $2,500,000).

 3 “Actual loss” is defined as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the 

offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(A)(i). “Intended loss,” on the other hand, means “the 

pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense,” including pecuniary harm “that 

would have been impossible or unlikely to occur.” Id., cmt. n.3(A)(ii).

4 As indicated below in this Recommendation, the plea agreement contained a stipulation that the 

loss amount attributable to Djonret for her criminal conduct in the Identity Theft Scheme alone

was between $1,000,000 and $2,500,000. Doc. No. 22-4 at 5.

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Attributed Loss in the King Case

In reaching the figure accepted by the court regarding the King Case, and as set out in the 

PSI, the Government identified approximately 97 “highly suspicious” tax returns among the 120 

filed by Djonret for the 2007 tax year. See PSI at 5-6, ¶¶ 10-11. The Government then added the 

values of these returns, calculating the loss that would have resulted had the offense been 

successfully completed. Id. For the relevant period, 51 highly suspicious returns involving “HSH” 

income (household income) were filed, claiming a total of $218,108 in refunds. Id. Two highly 

suspicious Schedule C returns without W-2s were filed, claiming a total of $5,858 in refunds. Id. 

Forty-four highly suspicious Schedule C income returns with W-2s also were filed, claiming a 

total of $244,0640 in refunds. Id. These amounts were added to derive a total of $468,026 in 

refunds. Then, applying the “ultra conservative approach” to calculating tax loss, see United States 

v. Jordan, 374 Fed. App’x 3, 6-7 (11th Cir. 2010), by estimating that only half of the highly 

suspicious tax returns filed by Djonret were indeed fraudulent, the Government calculated 

Djonret’s attributable loss in the King Case to be $243,013 (half of $468,026). See PSI at 6, ¶ 11.

Djonret maintains that her counsel James should have objected to the methodology used 

by the Government to calculate the loss amount attributed to her in the King Case. She contends

that James should have argued that the Government was obligated to offer into evidence at 

sentencing each of the 97 “highly suspicious” tax returns she filed in the King Case, and also had 

to present statements from each of the 97 clients averring that each highly suspicious tax return

was in fact fraudulent. Doc. No. 11 at 8. However, relevant conduct under the Sentencing 

Guidelines − such as attributed loss − needs only to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence 

at sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Moreover, the method of loss calculation used by the Government to estimate loss in the King 

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Case − the “ultra conservative approach” − was endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit in Jordan, supra, 

374 Fed. App’x at 6-7. In Jordan, an IRS special agent testified that most of the tax returns filed 

by the defendant’s tax preparation business were suspected of containing fraudulent refund claims. 

See 374 Fed. App’x at 6. The agent stated that he took an “ultra conservative approach” and 

counted only half of those tax returns in estimating the intended loss of the fraudulent tax refund 

scheme. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly credited the agent’s testimony 

in determining loss. Id. at 7. See also United States v. Moss, 543 Fed. App’x 959, 963 (11th Cir. 

2013) (approving similar approach to estimating loss). Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit has 

repeatedly recognized that the Sentencing Guidelines do not require the Government to establish 

the amount of loss with precision; the Government’s estimate of loss need only be reasonable. See, 

e.g., United States v. Renick, 273 F.3d 1009, 1025 (11th Cir. 2011); Jordan, 374 Fed. App’x at 7. 

Djonret does not demonstrate that the Government’s calculation of loss in the King Case was 

unreasonable, nor does she identify a plausible argument or evidence that James might have 

presented with a reasonable likelihood of changing the loss amount attributed to her.

Attributed Loss in the Identity Theft Scheme

In addition, the calculation of loss in the King Case did not affect Djonret’s sentence. In 

presenting this claim in her § 2255 motion, Djonret does not dispute that the Identity Theft Scheme

she led from October 2009 to February 2012 involved the use of stolen identities to file 1,314 

fraudulent tax returns claiming $1,732,774 in tax refunds. See PSI at 7-8, ¶ 23; Doc. No. 22-4 at 

5-6. The fraudulence of those 1,314 tax returns − and the total dollar amount of the fraudulently 

claimed refunds − in the Identity Theft Scheme is not seriously in question. In her plea agreement, 

Djonret stipulated that the loss amount attributable to her for her criminal conduct in the Identity 

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Theft Scheme alone was between $1,000,000 and $2,500,000.5 Doc. No. 22-4 at 5; see also id. at 

14. Even excluding all loss associated with the King Case, the $1,732,774 in loss attributable to 

Djonret in the Identity Theft Scheme was sufficient to support the 16-level enhancement applied 

to her under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1), as that amount was still more than $1,000,000 but less than 

$2,500,000.

6

Djonret proves no deficient performance in James’s failure to object to the method used to 

calculate the loss amount attributed to her in the King Case, nor does she demonstrate any prejudice 

resulting from James’s failure to object. Consequently, she is not entitled to relief based on this 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2. Failure to Object to Six-Level Victim Enhancement

 5 To the extent that Djonret, in presenting this claim, may arguably also be challenging the loss 

amount attributed to her for the Identity Theft Scheme, the Government correctly observes that her 

arguments are simply too conclusory in nature to warrant relief or a hearing. Doc. No. 22 at 9-10. 

Further, the Government correctly notes that any claim by Djonret challenging the loss amount 

attributed to her for the Identity Theft Scheme would be flatly contradictory to her admissions in 

the plea agreement and at the change of plea hearing. Id.

6 In an affidavit filed with the court, James notes:

 As relates to Djonret’s argument over methodology, it should be noted this 

method was used in the Premier [“the King Case”] calculations. It was not used in 

her own tax case [“the Identity Theft Scheme”] because the Government knew the 

number of fraudulent returns. If the [“ultra conservative”] methodology approach 

had been used (using half of the loss amount of $1,966,787), the amount would 

have been slightly below the floor amount. This would have produced guidelines 

of 32 minus 3-level, 29: 87 to 108 months. Absent the negotiated plea she would 

have been exposed to 18 additional years on the aggravated identity theft cases and 

no three-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. [Djonret] received far 

more from the benefit of her plea agreement than she would have received from the 

two-level drop on the contested amount.

Doc. No. 20-1 at 6.

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Djonret contends that James rendered her ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 

object to the six-level victim enhancement at sentencing. Doc. No. 4 at 5; Doc. No. 11 at 11-13.

Section 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) of the Sentencing Guidelines calls for a six-level specific offense 

characteristic enhancement for certain economic fraud offenses involving 250 or more victims. 

See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C). Application Note 4(E) to § 2B1.1(b)(2), which became effective 

in November 2009, broadens the definition of “victim” for economic fraud crimes involving 

identify theft to provide that, in such cases, “‘victim’ means (i) [‘any person who sustained any 

part of the actual loss,’ U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1]; or (ii) any individual whose means of 

identification was used unlawfully or without authority.” U.S.S.G. § 2B 1.1 cmt. n.4(E) (emphasis 

added). Prior to implementation of Application Note 4(E), a “victim” for purposes of § 2B1.1(b)(2) 

must have sustained an economic loss or bodily injury. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1(A) & (B) 

(2008).

Here, the district court applied the six-level § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) enhancement to Djonret, 

adopting the PSI’s finding that Djonret’s criminal conduct in the Identity Theft Scheme involved 

250 or more victims because she used stolen identities to file 1,314 fraudulent tax returns in that 

scheme. See PSI at 9, ¶33; Doc. No. 22-4 at 5.

In her § 2255 motion, Djonret seems to contend that James should have argued that the 

Government had to present testimony at sentencing from each of the 1,314 individuals whose 

identity she stole or else obtain 1,314 certified statements from those individuals. Doc. No. 11 at 

11-12. However, as the Government notes (Doc. 22 at 11), there is no reason the Government 

would be required to obtain statements or testimony from all 1,314 identity-theft victims, 

especially given Djonret’s stipulation in her plea agreement. As noted above, relevant conduct 

under the Sentencing Guidelines (here, the number of victims) need only be proven by a 

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preponderance of the evidence at sentencing. Hamaker, 455 F.3d at 1336. Nor does it matter, as 

the Government correctly observes, that the indictment does not list each of the more than 1,000 

victims. Relevant conduct may include uncharged conduct, and even acquitted conduct may serve 

as a basis for a sentencing enhancement. Id.

Moreover, Djonret’s instant challenge to the number of her victims under § 2B1.1(b)(2) 

runs counter to her stipulations in her plea agreement and her conduct admissions when pleading 

guilty. Her counsel may reasonably have believed that the plea agreement and the Government’s 

willingness to recommend a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) & (b) depended on 

Djonret’s full acceptance of responsibility for her actions and her expressions of contrition. A 

challenge to the victim total which put the Government to the task of presenting additional 

evidence regarding the number of Djonret’s victims would have conflicted with the notion that 

Djonret had accepted such responsibility. James recognizes this in her affidavit filed with the court:

 Counsel understood it was possible that the objections Djonret had insisted 

upon could have been viewed as a refusal to accept responsibility for her criminal 

conduct, particularly as related to the objections which were contrary to the factual 

basis in her knowing and voluntary plea of guilty.

Doc. No. 20-1 at 6.

Strategy choices by counsel are entitled to considerable deference. Chandler v. United 

States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 n.14 (11th Cir. 2000). Djonret establishes neither deficient 

performance by James nor resulting prejudice. Therefore, she is not entitled to relief on this claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

3. Failure to Object to Four-Level Leadership Enhancement 

Djonret next claims that James rendered her ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 

object to the four-level enhancement she received under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for her leadership 

role in the Identity Theft Scheme. Doc. No. 11 at 12-13. This claim is baseless, as the record 

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shows James objected to this enhancement. See PSI at 18; Doc. No. 22-6 at 12-13; Doc. No. 22-

7 at 3-39. The district court overruled James’s objection. Doc. No. 22-7 at 39-40.

Assuming that Djonret’s argument here is that James, in objecting, did not adequately 

oppose the four-level enhancement, Djonret’s claim still fails. Under § 3B1.1(a), the sentencing 

court must apply a four-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a 

criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 

3B1.1(a). There was ample evidence that Djonret had a leadership role in the Identity Theft 

Scheme. She led an extensive operation involving more than five participants, recruiting and 

overseeing the criminal activities of several individuals. See, e.g., PSI at 6-7, ¶¶ 13-22. Over the 

course of three years, she provided money to those individuals to purchase debit cards to use in 

the scheme and viewed the individuals as “employees” on her payroll. PSI at 6, ¶ 15. See United 

States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th Cir. 2005); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. Djonret 

identifies no particular argument or evidence that James could have, but did not, present in 

opposition to application of the four-level leadership enhancement. Having proved neither 

deficient performance by James nor resulting prejudice under the standard in Strickland, she is 

entitled to no relief on this claim.

4. Failure to Negotiate Terms of Plea Agreement Effectively

Djonret asserts, in a cursory manner, that James rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 

during plea negotiations by “fail[ing] to provide any real benefits to the defendant because any 

benefit gained by pleading [was] subsequently negated by relevant conduct enhancements.” Doc. 

No. 4 at 7; Doc. No. 11 at 13.

In her affidavit filed with the court, James states:

 Djonret, being astute and practical, realized her chance of winning her tax case 

was unlikely and agreed to try to help herself by doing a proffer with the 

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Government. This was her best solution to a bad situation. Unfortunately, the 

Government felt that she withheld information and was misleading. The 

Government did not deem her cooperation credible or substantial and refused to file 

a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure from the guidelines.

This left her with the hope of a downward variance from the guidelines by 

the Sentencing Judge. He refused and gave her a guideline sentence. The Judge 

indicated that he was troubled by her involvement in a separate tax fraud of her own 

(2:12cr59) [“the Identify Theft Scheme”] after having been questioned years earlier 

about the investigation of Bruce King and his employees in a tax fraud (2:12cr57)

[“the King Case”].

Despite the lengthy guideline sentence she received, she did receive three 

levels for acceptance of responsibility. Further, she was charged in 2:12cr59 among 

other things with seven separate counts of aggravat[ed] identify theft and in 

2:12cr57 with two counts of aggravated identity theft. If convicted on all, she faced 

an additional 18 years which could have been imposed consecutively to the 

recommended guideline sentence. The benefit of her plea on this point was a plea 

to two rather than nine counts of aggravated identity theft.

....

Djonret received substantial benefits pursuant to her plea as noted 

previously. She was guilty and the evidence was overwhelming. She told the 

Government she was guilty during her proffer sessions which she requested and 

participated in. Counsel was not ineffective in this regard or any others as relates 

to the representation of Djonret.

Doc. No. 20-1 at 5-8.

As James’s affidavit reflects, Djonret’s assertion that the benefits of pleading guilty were 

negated by the relevant conduct enhancements is not supported by the record. Had she gone to 

trial and been convicted, Djonret almost certainly would have received a longer sentence than the 

one imposed pursuant to her guilty plea.7 Moreover, she makes no showing of any better plea deal 

 7 As the Government observes in addressing Djonret’s claim:

Djonret ... ignores the fact that her attorney secured a valuable concession from the 

government when it agreed to dismiss the remaining charges against her, including 

aggravated identity theft charges that carried the threat of an additional 16 years in 

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which James might reasonably have been expected to negotiate on her behalf. Djonret 

demonstrates neither deficient performance by James nor resulting prejudice. Therefore, she is 

entitled to no relief on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

5. Failure to Investigate and Research Case Adequately

Djonret contends that James did not adequately investigate and research her case, resulting 

in James’ (a) giving her erroneous advice about her sentencing exposure and (b) failing to secure 

an expert witness to challenge the loss amount attributed to her. Doc. No. 4 at 8; Doc. No. 11 at 

13-14.

a. Erroneous Advice Regarding Sentencing Exposure

According to Djonret, James told her that if she pled guilty, her maximum time served 

would be 60 months, plus an additional 24 months if the Government refused to drop the identitytheft charge. Doc. No. 11 at 13-14. Djonret maintains that if James had correctly informed her of 

the maximum penalty she faced, she would not have pled guilty and would instead have insisted 

on going to trial. Id. at 14.

 

prison. See PSR ¶ 70. While some of the sentences may have run concurrently, 

Djonret faced aggravated identity theft charges in two separate cases and was able 

to plead to such charges in only one case. See Plea Agmt. ¶ 4. If she had not 

resolved the two cases at once, she probably would have faced two sentencing 

hearings and the law would have required that the different § 1028A [aggravated 

identity theft] counts in each case be consecutive to any other counts, including 

each other, as they would be imposed at different times. See 18 U.S.C. § 

1028A(b)(4). In other words, under her plea agreement Djonret received a 

mandatory 2-year, consecutive, sentence on top of the 10-year sentence the judge 

imposed for non-§ 1028A counts. Without the plea agreement, after a conviction, 

Djonret would have faced a mandatory 4 years of consecutive sentences, on top of 

whatever sentence the judge imposed on other counts, as well as losing the 

acceptance of responsibility reduction.

Doc. No. 22 at 13.

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In her affidavit filed with this court, James states:

 Counsel never told Djonret that the maximum sentence would be 60 months, 

plus an additional 24 for the aggravated identity theft. That statement is belied by 

the terms of the plea agreement that Djonret signed and acknowledged under oath 

that she understood.

 Contrary to Djonret’s assertion that she would have insisted on a trial, she 

repeatedly said she wanted to get this behind her, get her sister a good deal, and 

take responsibility for what she had done.

Doc. No. 20-1 at 8.

The Strickland standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was held 

applicable to guilty pleas in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). A petitioner alleging 

ineffective assistance in this context must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient (i.e., 

professionally unreasonable) and that counsel’s deficient performance “affected the outcome of 

the plea process.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. To establish prejudice, a petitioner “must show that there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would ... have pleaded [not] guilty and 

would ... have insisted on going to trial.” Id. A mere allegation by a defendant that he would have 

insisted on going to trial but for counsel’s errors is insufficient to establish prejudice; rather, the 

court will look to the factual circumstances surrounding the plea to determine whether the 

defendant would have proceeded to trial. See Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1072 (10th Cir. 

2001); United States v. Arvantis, 902 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Holmes v. United 

States, 876 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1989) (Hill does not require a hearing merely because a defendant 

asserts a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel when the record affirmatively contradicts the 

allegations).

The record does not support a claim that Djonret was induced to plead guilty by erroneous 

assurances from James regarding her sentence. The transcript of the change of plea hearing reflects 

that the magistrate judge correctly advised Djonret of the statutory maximum sentences applicable 

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to her offenses and advised her that an identity theft conviction carries a mandatory term of two 

years to run consecutive to any other term of imprisonment. Doc. No. 22-9 at 6-7. The written plea 

agreement correctly set forth this same information. Doc. No. 22-4 at 2-3. The plea agreement 

contained no provision indicating a specific sentence to be recommended or imposed. Djonret 

stated under oath at the change of plea hearing that she and her counsel had reviewed and discussed 

the plea agreement and that she understood its terms. Doc. No. 22-9 at 4-5. Djonret also affirmed 

during the change of plea hearing that, other than the terms of the plea agreement, no one had made 

any promises or assurances to her to get her to plead guilty. Id. at 5-6. She further affirmed that 

she and her attorney had discussed how the advisory sentencing guidelines would apply in her 

case. Id. at 8. She acknowledged that she understood that the terms of the plea agreement were 

merely recommendations, and that the court could reject the recommendations without permitting 

her to withdraw her guilty plea and impose a sentence more severe than she might anticipate. Id. 

at 5. Djonret also acknowledged that she understood her sentence would be determined by a 

combination of advisory sentencing guidelines, possible authorized departures from those 

guidelines, and other statutory factors and that the sentence ultimately imposed might differ from 

any estimate made by her counsel. Id. at 8-9. Finally, the written plea agreement signed by Djonret 

contained a provision whereby Djonret affirmed that she understood that her offense level and 

criminal history category, as calculated by the probation officer and determined by the court, might 

differ from any estimate made by her counsel. Id. at 18-19.

An inaccurate prediction about sentencing alone will generally not be sufficient to sustain 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 940-41 

(11th Cir. 2001) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the court warned the 

defendant during the plea colloquy that he may face a sentence higher than anticipated and 

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informed defendant of statutory minimum and maximum). “[A] defendant [who] pleads guilty 

relying upon his counsel’s best professional judgment ... cannot later argue that his plea was due 

to coercion by counsel.” United States v. Lagrone, 727 F.2d 1037, 1038 (11th Cir. 1984).

Here, the plea agreement did not mention a specific sentence, other than to note the 

statutory maximums and how the sentence for identity theft would be required to run 

consecutively. At the change of plea colloquy, the magistrate judge correctly informed Djonret of 

these matters. Djonret also affirmed under oath that she and her counsel had reviewed and 

discussed the plea agreement and that she understood its terms. Djonret’s sworn statements in 

open court that her guilty plea had not been induced by any promises or assurances outside the 

plea agreement – and her acknowledgment that she understood her sentence might differ from any 

estimates made by her counsel and could be more severe than she anticipated – undermine her 

present assertion that her guilty plea was induced by erroneous assurances from James. “[W]hen 

a defendant makes statements under oath at a plea colloquy, he bears a heavy burden to show his 

statements were false.” United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir. 1988). “There is a 

strong presumption that the statements made during the [guilty plea] colloquy are true.” United 

States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994). Djonret fails to overcome that presumption 

here. Consequently, she is not entitled to relief based on this claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.

b. Failure to Secure Expert Witness

Djonret contends that James was ineffective in failing to secure an expert witness to 

challenge the loss amount attributed to her. Doc. No. 11 at 14. However, Djonret stipulated to the 

loss amount in her plea agreement. Moreover, she wholly fails to demonstrate that an expert 

witness obtained by the defense would have succeeded in challenging the loss amount attributed 

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to her. Instead, she speculates that such an expert might have calculated a loss amount different 

from that calculated by the Government (and stipulated to in the plea agreement). See Earhart v. 

Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062, 1068 (5th Cir. 1998) (petitioner’s failure to identify an expert whose 

testimony would have altered the outcome of his trial was fatal to his habeas claim that counsel 

was ineffective for failing to request assistance of defense expert). Djonret shows neither deficient 

performance by James nor resulting prejudice. Therefore, she is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

6. Failure to Object to Sentence as Substantively Unreasonable

Lastly, Djonret contends that James rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to 

her sentence as “substantively unreasonable.” No. 11 at 14-16.

A defendant’s ultimate sentence is reviewed for reasonableness in light of the factors set 

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).8 See United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 

2005). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence 

is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and the factors in section 3553(a).” United States 

v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).

Djonret suggests there was an unwarranted disparity between her sentence and those of 

two of her codefendants, Bruce King and Lea’Tice Phillips, who received lesser sentences. Doc. 

No. 11 at 16. Under § 3553(a)(6), a district court should “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 

among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. 

 8 The § 3553(a) factors include (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of 

the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the 

need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) 

the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the 

kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy 

statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 

disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims.

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§ 3553(a)(6). In considering disproportionality, it is important to compare defendants who are 

similarly situated. See United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009). Here, 

King and Phillips were less culpable than Djonret, who was indisputably the leader of the Identity 

Theft Scheme. The sentencing transcript in Djonret’s case also reflects that the district court 

imposed a harsher sentence on Djonret because she continued to engage in extensive tax fraud 

(i.e., the Identity Theft Scheme) well after being interviewed about her involvement in the fraud 

by her former employer at Bruce King’s Premier Tax. See Doc. Nos. 22-6 & 22-7.

The district court correctly calculated Djonret’s advisory guideline range, heard the 

arguments of the parties, and indicated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors. Doc. No. 22-

6 at 83. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the undersigned cannot conclude that Djonret’s 

sentence of 144 months in prison is substantively unreasonable. Therefore, Djonret establishes 

neither deficient performance by James nor resulting prejudice from James’ failure to object to the 

sentence on this ground. Djonret is not entitled to relief on this claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.

III. CONCLUSION

It is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Djonret’s § 2255 motion be 

DENIED and this case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation 

or before May 6, 2016. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general 

objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 

findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar 

a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in 

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the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District Court’s 

order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District 

Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 

404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 

1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

DONE, this the 22nd day of April, 2016.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

Susan Russ Walker

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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