Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00631/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00631-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL E. RUFF, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

COUNTY OF KINGS, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-631 OWW/GSA

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY'S FEES (Doc. 211)

AND AWARDING COSTS 

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for an award of

attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1998, Plaintiff’s bill of

costs, and Defendants County of Kings and Mark Sherman’s opposing

bill of costs.

A. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES.

Plaintiff Daniel Ruff moves for an award of attorney’s fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amount of $217,365.00.

1. Governing Standards. 

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a

provision of sections ... 1983 [or] 1985 ...

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of this title, ... the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party

... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of

the costs ....

 “‘In determining what a reasonable attorneys’ fee entails,

the district court must apply the hybrid approach adopted in

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 423 ... (1983).’ ... ‘The

most useful starting point for determining the amount of a

reasonable fee is (1) the number of hours reasonably expended on

the litigation (2) multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’ ...

The resulting figure is known as the ‘Lodestar.’” Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1040

(E.D.Cal.2007). Although there is a strong presumption that the

lodestar represents a reasonable fee, Burlington v. Dague, 505

U.S. 557, 562 (1992), the district court has the discretion to

exclude from the initial fee calculation hours that were not

reasonably expended, for example, cases that are overstaffed. 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Hensley held:

Counsel for the prevailing party should make

a good faith effort to exclude from a fee

request hours that are excessive, redundant,

or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in

private practice ethically is obligated to

exclude such hours from his fee submission. 

'In the private sector, "billing judgment" is

an important component in fee setting. It is

no less important here. Hours that are not

properly billed to one's client also are not

properly billed to one's adversary pursuant

to statutory authority.' ....

Id. at 434. As explained in Wood v. Sunn, 865 F.2d 982, 991 (9th

Cir.1988):

Many factors previously identified by courts

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as probative on the issue of ‘reasonableness’

of a fee award, see e.g., Kerr v. Screen

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th

Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 ...

(1976), are now subsumed within the initial

calculation of the lodestar amount. Blum v.

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900 ...

(1984)(‘the novelty and complexity of the

issues,’ ‘the special skill and experience of

counsel,’ the ‘quality of the

representation,’ and the ‘results obtained’

are subsumed within the lodestar);

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen’s

Council, 478 U.S. 546 ... (1986), rev’d after

rehearing on other grounds, 483 U.S. 711 ...

(1987)(an attorney’s ‘superior performance’

is subsumed).

See also Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 990 & n.3

(9 Cir.1986). As the Clark court explained: th

[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that

adjustments, both upward and downward to the

lodestar amount are sometimes appropriate,

albeit in ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ cases ...

Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-901 ... The possibility

of adjustments to the lodestar amount

necessitates an analysis of various factors

that could justify an adjustment. In this

circuit, the relevant factors were identified

in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526

F.2d 67, 70 (9 Cir.1975). Although several th

of these factors are now considered to be

subsumed within the calculation of the

lodestar figure ..., review of the Kerr

factors remains the appropriate procedure for

considering a request for a fee-award

adjustment.

Id. The Kerr factors, as modified by Stewart v. Gates, 987 F.2d

1450, 1453 (9 Cir.1993), are: th

(1) the time and labor required of the

attorney(s);

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the

questions presented;

(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal

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service properly;

(4) the preclusion of other employment by the

attorney(s) because of the acceptance of the

action;

(5) the customary fee charged in matters of

the type involved;

(6) any time limitations imposed by the

client or the circumstances;

(7) the amount of money, or the value of the

rights involved, and the results obtained;

(8) the experience, reputation and ability of

the attorney(s);

(9) the ‘undesireability of the action;

(10) the nature and length of the

professional relationship between the

attorney and the client;

(12) awards in similar actions.

Id.; see also Rule 54-293(c), Local Rules of Practice. 

The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the

appropriate hours expended in the litigation and must submit

evidence in support of those hours worked. Hensley, supra at

433, 437. The party opposing the fee application has a burden of

rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district

court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours

charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its

submitted affidavits. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892 n.5

(1984); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 826 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1987).

2. Partial or Limited Success.

Defendants argue that the award of attorney’s fees should

not include time incurred on issues not presented to the jury or

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incurred on issues as to which Plaintiff did not prevail. 

“The extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial factor in

determining the proper amount of an award of attorney’s fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Hensley, id., 461 U.S. at 440. Hensley

prescribed a two-step process for calculating attorney’s fees in

a case of partial or limited success. A Court must consider (1)

whether “the plaintiff fail[ed] to prevail on claims that were

unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded,” and (2) whether

“the plaintiff achiev[ed] a level of success that makes the hours

reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award.” 

Hensley, id. at 434. Deductions based on limited success are

within the discretion of the district court. Watson v. County of

Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9 Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 th

U.S. 1574 (2003). As explained in Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800,

813 (9 Cir.2005): th

The first step requires the district court to

determine whether the successful and

unsuccessful claims were unrelated ...

‘[C]laims are unrelated if the successful and

unsuccessful claims are “distinctly

different” both legally and factually,” ...;

claims are related, however, if they ‘involve

a common core of facts or are based on

related legal theories.’ ... At bottom, ‘the

focus is on whether the unsuccessful and

successful claims arose out of the same

“course of conduct.”’ ... If they did not,

the hours expended on the unsuccessful claims

should not be included in the fee award ....

If, however, ‘the unsuccessful and successful

claims are related, then the court must apply

the second part of the analysis, in which the

court evaluates the significance of the

overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in

relation to the hours reasonably expended on

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the litigation.’ ... ‘Where a plaintiff has

obtained excellent results, his attorney

should recover a fully compensatory fee.’ ...

When ‘a plaintiff has achieved only partial

or limited success, [however,] the product of

hours reasonably expended on the litigation

as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may

be an excessive amount.’ ... Nonetheless, a

plaintiff does not need to receive all the

relief requested in order to show excellent

results warranting the fully compensatory

fee. 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleged causes of action

for violation of Section 1983, 1985(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 15,

and for declaratory judgment. By Memorandum Decision filed on

September 17, 2008, (Doc. 92), the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s

Fifth Amendment takings claim on the ground of ripeness and

alleged delay in processing Plaintiff’s application and dismissed

Plaintiff’s antitrust claim because controlling Supreme Court and

Ninth Circuit authority establish as a matter of law that

Defendants are entitled to immunity from antitrust liability

alleged in the FAC.

The Court granted summary judgment for Defendants with

regard to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants intentionally

discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his race by

amending the General Plan and granted summary judgment for

Defendants to the extent Plaintiff’s claim of denial of

procedural due process was based on the failure to mail notice

specifically to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff proceeded to trial on his claims of violation of

his rights to procedural and substantive due process and of

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denial of equal protection of the laws. The jury found that

Plaintiff “proved by a preponderance of the evidence” that

Defendants William Zumwalt and Sandy Roper “violated

[Plaintiff’s] right to procedural due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment” and that Plaintiff “proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that the violation of his right to

procedural due process by any defendant was a cause of harm or

damage” to Plaintiff. The jury found that Plaintiff had not

proved that any of the individual defendants violated Plaintiff’s

right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment

or violated Plaintiff’s right to equal protection of the law

under the Fourteenth Amendment and found that the violation of

procedural due process was not the result of a custom, policy or

practice of the County of Kings. The jury awarded monetary

damages against Defendant Zumwalt in the amount of $140,000 and

against Defendant Roper in the amount of $60,000 but did not

award punitive damages. 

Post trial, Plaintiff filed motions for declaratory relief

and for prejudgment interest. Plaintiff’s motion for declaratory

relief was denied, (Doc. 236), as was Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration of that denial. (Doc. 248). Plaintiff’s motion

for prejudgment interest was granted in part and denied in part. 

(Docs. 226 & 235). Defendants filed a renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law or for new trial, which was denied. 

(Doc. 225). 

a. Issues Not Presented to the Jury.

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As to issues not presented to the jury and other

miscellaneous non-recoverable time, Defendants refer to the time

log for April 18-19, 2006, attached to Plaintiff’s opening brief, 

for “Research re Motion in Limine (1.0) and E-File Motion in

Limine (1.5). The docket does not show that any such motion was

filed at that time.

Plaintiff responds that the time log attached to his opening

brief “resulted from an input error on the original spreadsheet

document” and that the subject hours were incurred in 2009, not

2006. 

Defendants object to inclusion of time incurred (18.8 hours)

in connection with Plaintiff’s expert, John Bettancourt, CPA. 

Plaintiff retained Mr. Bettancourt to testify as to Plaintiff’s

lost business opportunities or loss of income. However, Mr.

Bettancourt was not called as a witness at trial. 

Plaintiff responds that it would have been malpractice not

to retain an expert to investigate whether Plaintiff’s economic

damages were the proper subject of expert testimony, and to

preserve such potential testimony by designating Mr. Bettancourt

as a potential trial witness. Plaintiff asserts that the

decision not to call Mr. Bettancourt at trial is of no moment for

attorney’s fees, since the retention and solicitation of his

opinion was reasonable. Plaintiff asserts that it was also

reasonable for Plaintiff’s counsel to modify the presentation of

his case based on the composition of the jury, the development of

evidence at trial, and the cost-benefit analysis of calling the

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expert witness. Plaintiff cites Moreno v. City of Sacramento,

534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9 Cir.2008): th

It must also be kept in mind that lawyers are

not likely to spend unnecessary time on

contingency fee cases in the hope of

inflating their fees. The payoff is too

uncertain, as to both the result and the

amount of the fee. It would therefore be the

highly atypical civil rights case where

plaintiff’s lawyer engages in churning. By

and large, the court should defer to the

winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to

how much time he was required to spend on the

case; after all, he won, and might not have,

had be been more of a slacker. 

Plaintiff argues that an attorney is not required to be

clairvoyant as to how litigation will develop in order for the

time incurred to be reasonable. 

Defendants assert that “[i]n or around April of 2009,

plaintiff’s counsel brought a motion to preclude the defendants

from calling certain witnesses or presenting certain evidence.” 

From the docket, Defendants are referring to Plaintiff’s motions

in limine filed on April 19, 2009 as Doc. 116). Defendants

assert that the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion provided that

Defendants complied with certain enumerated conditions. 

Defendants contend that, because Plaintiff did not prevail on the

motion, attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the motion

(7.9 hours), should be stricken.

Plaintiff responds that the Court “only denied the

plaintiff’s requested relief because it decided to be lenient and

not strike what would have been the majority of the defense case,

which for still unknown reasons was not disclosed by predecessor

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defense counsel in discovery.” Plaintiff asserts that it was

only because of Plaintiff’s motion that reasonable time for

discovery was granted by the Court and the trial date continued

to September, 2009: “The defendants’ argument that the

plaintiff’s motion was unsuccessful and not deserving of

compensation ignores what actually occurred as a result thereof

and how it changed the case.” 

Defendants assert that the time incurred on issues that were

not tried to the jury, anti-trust issues -1.4 hours, or on issues

on which Plaintiff did not prevail, i.e., LAFCO issues,

substantive due process violation claim (5.5 hours), Kings County

Planning Minutes/Guidelines (3.9 hours), publication Government

Code issues - effective date of amended General Plan (7.25

hours), and land use planning issues (5.5 hours), should be

stricken. 

Defendants’ objection lacks merit because all of Plaintiff’s

claims were inextricably interrelated factually and in terms of

the relief requested. As Plaintiff asserts:

[A]ll of the plaintiff’s claims arose from

the events surrounding the August 25, 2004

denial of his application for site plan

review on the basis that his application was

untimely under Kings County General Plan,

Land Use Policy 3.4a ... [T]he First Amended

Complaint demonstrates that the plaintiff’s

claims are requests for relief are based on

the same factual allegations: the facts

related to the August 25, 2004 denial gave

rise to overlapping legal theories against

four individuals and one municipal defendant:

(1) a section 1983 claim alleging procedural

due process, substantive due process, equal

protection, and taking clause violations; (2)

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a section 1985(3) claim; (3) an antitrust

claim; and (4) a declaratory relief claim

....

Additionally, the proof at trial was

similarly overlapping as to the then-existing

claims. All of the evidence at trial can

fairly be placed in one of the following six

categories: (1) background evidence

establishing the underlying factual context,

i.e., plaintiff’s purchase of the land, the

nature of the property, and his intentions as

to the development of the property into a

recycling center; (2) evidence pertaining to

the origin and promulgation of Kings County

General Land Use Policy 3.4a between October

2003 and January 2004; (3) evidence

pertaining to plaintiff’s trips to the Kings

County Planning Office, either in connection

with his purchase of the subject property or

the subsequent application process; (4)

evidence pertaining to the denial of

plaintiff’s application and the purported

reasons therefor; (5) land use expert

evidence from Dr. Bernard Kays and, to a

lesser extent, the individual defendants; and

(6) damages evidence from plaintiff and Kings

Waste and Recycling Authority Administrator

Jeff Monaco. While these six categories of

evidence had different applications and

importance to the plaintiff’s respective

claims, they all were pertinent and had to be

presented in relation to the procedural due

process claim upon which the plaintiff

prevailed, as well as his ... declaratory

relief claim. To wit: (1) was obviously

necessary for the jury to understand the

factual context of the case and to evaluate

whether the plaintiff sustained any damages;

(2) was important for the jury to understand

why plaintiff was not permitted to proceed

with the proposed recycling center and what

the time line was vis á vis his initial

proposal, the promulgation of the policy, and

his accepted application; (3) was important

for the jury for the same reasons as item 2,

and in addition was necessary for damages

purposes, i.e., to show the jury that the

plaintiff truly intended on operating a

recycling center, actually applied for a

permit, and was thus damaged by the denial;

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(4) was obviously necessary to prove that the

plaintiff’s denial related to the alleged

wrongful conduct, and the jury obviously

found a causal link; (5) was necessary to

establish the unreasonableness of the notice

language and the basis for the denial of

plaintiff’s application; and (5) was equally

necessary as to all of the plaintiff’s

claims. Thus, there was no category of

evidence at trial that pertained solely to

one claim, thus establishing beyond

reasonable argument that the plaintiff’s

claims were all highly interrelated to the

procedural due process claim on which he

prevailed, as well as the ... claim for

declaratory relief.

Plaintiff asserts that “only one damages verdict inquiry was

necessary at trial as to all of the plaintiff’s claims, thus

confirming the overlapping nature of the relief sought.” 

Finally, Plaintiff contends, Plaintiff’s counsel’s time records

demonstrate that “almost all of his time was related to multiple

asserted claims or requests for relief, or issues that overlapped

two or more of these claims/requests.” Plaintiff asserts that

there is “no way to go back ... to separate the time spent and

apportion it among various claims.” 

b. Unsuccessful Claims.

Defendants argue that the fee award should be reduced

because Plaintiff prevailed on only one of his claims. 

Defendants acknowledge that, in reviewing counsel’s time logs, it

cannot be determined to which of Plaintiff’s various claims the

time relates and that Plaintiff will argue that all of his claims

were interrelated. Defendants assert:

In looking at the degree of success obtained

by the plaintiff at the trial in this matter

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the following is noted: plaintiff purchased

the subject property for $170,000; he

allegedly attempted on numerous occasions

prior to December of 2003 to submit an

application for a site plan review but was

stalled or put off by Mark Sherman; he

anticipated that his planned recycling center

would earn him $500,000 per year thereby

resulting in a past economic loss at the time

of trial in the approximate amount of $2.5 to

$3 million; the plaintiff claimed that the

County, through its employees, branded him as

a difficult person to deal with and set out

to prevent him from developing his proposed

recycling center; that the County failed to

following [sic] the statutory requirements in

the process of amending its General Plan. 

While the plaintiff opted not to call his

retained economic expert to testify on the

value of the lost business opportunity

suffered by the plaintiff, Mr. Ruff, himself,

was allowed to testify in that regard. It

was clear from his testimony as to what he

valued his past economic loss to be. And

applying the $500,000, plus, per year to the

future, the jury could have rendered a ‘seven

figure’ award to the plaintiff had they

determined that he had met his burden of

proof.

Because the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on only one of

his five separate theories of liability and, rather than

returning a multi-million dollar verdict to award Plaintiff his

past, present and future lost business opportunity, awarded him

$200,000, Defendants assert that the verdict and the award is

“minimal at best.” Therefore, Defendants argue, the Court should

reduce the fee award “to at least one-half, if not more, of the

items allowed.” 

Plaintiff obtained far more than nominal damages. Referring

to what was then his pending motion for declaratory relief, since

denied by the Court, Plaintiff asserts:

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[T]he $200,000 in damages awarded by the jury

likely represented compensation for

plaintiff’s out-of-pocket expenditures, as

well as an award of general damages for being

inconvenienced and mistreated. Clearly, a

$200,000 award is substantial, especially

given the uncertain nature of the evidence of

future damages presented at trial. The

record should also reflect that this is not a

case in which the plaintiff requested any

specific sum of damages, either in his

pleadings, during the opening or closing

arguments, or through expert testimony at

trial; that question was left to the sole

discretion of the jury.

Plaintiff refers to an email communication from Plaintiff’s

counsel to Defendants’ counsel on September 3, 2009, attached to

Plaintiff’s reply. Mr. Little had inquired of Defendant’s

counsel concerning any possible settlement. Ms. Dillahunty

inquired asking for a “range or something” that Plaintiff was

looking for. Mr. Little replied:

Leslie, my view is that the most important

issue in a potential settlement would not be

monetary but rather the parties’ willingness

to stipulate to some declaratory relief that

would permit plaintiff to proceed with the

development of a recycling center consistent

with the zoning provisions and restrictions

that existed prior to January 2004. 

Plaintiff would also request a monetary

settlement sufficient to reimburse him for

his out-of-pocket expenditures, plus whatever

your economist opines to be plaintiff’s lost

profits. The issue of attorney’s fees could

be left to the Court by way of a section 1988

motion.

Plaintiff asserts that, “[g]iven the relief obtained by plaintiff

or still pending mirrors that which he sought to resolve this

matter before trial, it can hardly be found that he achieved only

minimal or insubstantial success at trial.”

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Although Plaintiff’s motion for declaratory relief was

denied on all grounds, the Court concurs with Plaintiff that a

reduction of the fee award based on a finding of limited success

would ignore the record and disregard the crucial importance of

federal civil rights litigation generally. In City of Riverside

v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574-578 (1986), the Supreme Court

stated:

We reject the proposition that fee awards

under § 1988 should necessarily be

proportionate to the amount of damages a

civil rights plaintiff actually recovers.

As an initial matter, we reject the notion

that a civil rights action for damages

constitutes nothing more than a private tort

suit benefitting only the individual

plaintiffs whose rights were violated. Unlike

most private tort litigants, a civil rights

plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil

and constitutional rights that cannot be

valued solely in monetary terms ... And,

Congress has determined that “the public as a

whole has an interest in the vindication of

the rights conferred by the statutes

enumerated in § 1988, over and above the

value of a civil rights remedy to a

particular plaintiff....” ... Regardless of

the form of relief he actually obtains, a

successful civil rights plaintiff often

secures important social benefits that are

not reflected in nominal or relatively small

damages awards.

...

In addition, the damages a plaintiff recovers

contributes significantly to the deterrence

of civil rights violations in the future ...

Congress expressly recognized that a

plaintiff who obtains relief in a civil

rights lawsuit “ ‘does so not for himself

alone but also as a ‘private attorney

general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress

considered of the highest importance.'” ...

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“If the citizen does not have the resources,

his day in court is denied him; the

congressional policy which he seeks to assert

and vindicate goes unvindicated; and the

entire Nation, not just the individual

citizen, suffers.” ...

Because damages awards do not reflect fully

the public benefit advanced by civil rights

litigation, Congress did not intend for fees

in civil rights cases, unlike most private

law cases, to depend on obtaining substantial

monetary relief. Rather, Congress made clear

that it “intended that the amount of fees

awarded under [§ 1988] be governed by the

same standards which prevail in other types

of equally complex Federal litigation, such

as antitrust cases and not be reduced because

the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in

nature.” ... “[C]ounsel for prevailing

parties should be paid, as is traditional

with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying

client, ‘for all time reasonably expended on

a matter.’” ... Thus, Congress recognized

that reasonable attorney's fees under § 1988

are not conditioned upon and need not be

proportionate to an award of money damages.

The lower courts have generally eschewed such

a requirement. 

A rule that limits attorney's fees in civil

rights cases to a proportion of the damages

awarded would seriously undermine Congress'

purpose in enacting § 1988. Congress enacted

§ 1988 specifically because it found that the

private market for legal services failed to

provide many victims of civil rights

violations with effective access to the

judicial process. See House Report, at 3.

These victims ordinarily cannot afford to

purchase legal services at the rates set by

the private market.

...

A rule of proportionality would make it

difficult, if not impossible, for individuals

with meritorious civil rights claims but

relatively small potential damages to obtain

redress from the courts. This is totally

inconsistent with Congress' purpose in

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enacting § 1988. Congress recognized that

private-sector fee arrangements were

inadequate to ensure sufficiently vigorous

enforcement of civil rights. In order to

ensure that lawyers would be willing to

represent persons with legitimate civil

rights grievances, Congress determined that

it would be necessary to compensate lawyers

for all time reasonably expended4 on a case.

The Court rejects Defendants’ arguments that the amount of

the fee award should be reduced because of Plaintiff’s partial or

limited success. The facts and legal theories upon which

Plaintiff litigated this action were inextricably inter-related. 

Although Plaintiff did not obtain all of the monetary and

equitable relief he sought in this action, his recovery was by no

means nominal. 

3. Lodestar.

a. Hours Reasonably Expended.

In support of the motion for attorney’s fees is filed the

declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel, Kevin Little. Mr. Little

details his professional background as well as his background in

civil rights litigation. Mr. Little avers:

5. I took this case on a contingency basis

back in 2005. Given plaintiff’s poor

representation, lack of pursuit of

administrative appeals, and the nature of the

allegations against the defendants, i.e.,

intentional misconduct, it was in my

estimation quite unlikely that a settlement

would result. My impression in this regard

was confirmed as this case progressed through

litigation without anything substantial every

offered by the defense. It was also clear

early on that a considerable amount of

investigation and document gathering would be

required. In short, it appeared from the

outset that this was case [sic] that would

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likely proceed through years of litigation

and to trial. My impressions in this regard

were confirmed by the course of this action,

which is reflected in the time and billing

record submitted herewith as Exhibit 1. 

Those records show that I reasonably expended

a great number of hours in this action and

that a contingency fee of one-third the

plaintiff’s $200,000 verdict, the amount to

which I would be contractually obligated,

would not provide fair compensation.

6. The reason why I took this case on that

basis was because I perceived it as an

important case not only for the plaintiff but

for the public as a whole. Plaintiff is a

lifelong resident of Kings County, a disabled

veteran, and a respectable businessman, yet

he was unfairly denied the opportunity to

start a recycling center on the property he

purchased for that sole reason. Moreover,

Kings County is the county arguably with the

most need for recycling services of any in

the state, if not the country. This is

documented by exhibits presented to the Court

at the summary judgment stage showing the

historically low waste diversion rates in

Kings County. This evidence was also

confirmed by the trial testimony of Kings

Waste Management Coordinator Jeff Monaco. It

was therefore important to both the plaintiff

and the public that he prevail in this

action.

7. Despite the factors that made this case a

challenging and extended one, plaintiff

prevailed, with the jury finding that

defendants Zumwalt and Roper denied him his

procedural due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Handling plaintiff’s

case successfully required skill and

experience. As a review of the docket sheet

... confirms, this was a case which has

lasted more than four years. Also, this was

a case in which there was considerable

pretrial motion, discovery motion, and in

limine motion practice. This was also a case

in which expert and technical evidence was

involved, in addition to percipient evidence. 

My trial experience enabled me to present

this case in a simple yet persuasive manner

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that convinced the jury as to liability. In

my estimation, only experienced and capable

counsel could have handled this matter

successfully.

8. In light of the time consuming and

difficult nature of plaintiff’s case, along

with the defendants’ intransigent approach to

a possible settlement, I submit that it is

extremely unlikely that another attorney: (a)

would have undertaken the case on a

contingency basis; (b) would have, even

assuming one had accepted the case on a

contingency basis, invested the tremendous

time and resources crucial for success; (c)

even if one had accepted the case and made

the initial investment of time and resources,

would have had sufficient skill and

experience to have prevailed in the case.

At the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that he is not

entitled to an award of attorney’s fees from the District Court

for those fees incurred in connection with Plaintiff’s decision

to file an appeal with the Ninth Circuit. Plaintiff’s Notice of

Appeal was filed on January 7, 2010. (Doc. 253). In Plaintiff’s

Submission of Updated Time Records filed on February 20, 2010,

(Doc. 263), Mr. Little incurred time in connection with

Plaintiff’s appeal starting on December 30, 2009 through February

19, 2010, totaling 31.40 hours. Plaintiff’s fee award will be

reduced by these hours.

In addition, the duration of this was caused in large part

by Mr. Little’s failure to timely prosecute the action. The

Complaint was filed on May 10, 2005. At the time, Plaintiff was

represented by Rafael Pio Fonseca. Defendants’ Answer was filed

on June 6, 2005. On December 2, 2005, Kevin Little, present

counsel for Plaintiff, made a special appearance and requested

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leave to file an amended complaint. A Minute Order ordered that

an amended complaint be filed by January 15, 2006. Plaintiff did

not file an amended complaint as required by the Court’s Order. 

On March 31, 2006, Mr. Little filed a Notice of Substitution of

Attorneys, listing himself as counsel for Plaintiff and

substituting Mr. Little as counsel of record (Doc. 25). On April

25, 2006, Mr. Little, listing himself as attorney for Plaintiff,

filed a Stipulation and Proposed Order substituting Mr. Little as

counsel for Plaintiff (Doc. 27). Mr. Little was substituted as

counsel for Plaintiff by docket entry issued on April 7, 2006. 

On October 19, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the dates

set forth in the Scheduling Order (Doc. 31), stating as grounds

that the current pretrial schedule “was rendered infeasible by

unforeseen delays in the finalization of the undersigned

counsel’s retention in this matter”; that “[t]he finalization of

this retention, which has now occurred, was necessary before

counsel began substantial work in this matter”; that “as a result

of counsel’s extended illness in the latter part of 2005 many

maters [sic] were delayed, and he has had to ‘make up for lost

time’ in 2006 and has been in a trial or evidentiary-type

proceeding virtually the entire year, in addition to handling

complex briefing issues on several cases.” Plaintiff’s motion to

vacate the schedule was granted and new dates set by Minute Order

filed on November 20, 2006 (Doc. 35) and formal written Order

filed on March 13, 2007 (Doc. 40). By Stipulation and Order

filed on July 5, 2007, a new schedule was entered “[d]ue to a

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confluence of circumstances affecting the schedule of plaintiff’s

counsel and certain key witnesses, as well as the unintended

failure to file a prior duly executed stipulation” (Doc. 43). 

The July 5, 2007 scheduling order required that non-dispositive

motions be filed by November 5, 2007 and that dispositive motions

be filed by December 3, 2007. The Pretrial Conference was set

for March 28, 2008 and jury trial was set for May 6, 2008.

On December 3, 2007, Defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment or summary adjudication, noticing the motion for hearing

on January 14, 2008 (Doc. 47). On January 2, 2008, the day

Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment was

due, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for a 90 day 

continuance of the due date for Plaintiff’s opposition to the

motion for summary judgment and for continuance of the hearing

date of the motion (Doc. 49). In support of this requested

continuance, Plaintiff’s counsel asserted:

1. Due to a variety of scheduling issues,

plaintiff’s counsel’s subsequent medical

problems and related restriction of his

ability to practice, and other personal and

financial difficulties of plaintiff’s

counsel, none of the defense witnesses have

been deposed in this action, including those

who have submitted declarations in support of

the pending motion. Moreover, plaintiff’s

counsel has not followed through with his

long-intended plan to amend the complaint in

this action for the same reasons. Therefore,

the state of the record, discovery, and the

underlying pleadings make the consideration

of the pending summary judgment motion in

appropriate at this time. Plaintiff requests

permission to perform the requisite

discovery, to amend the current complaint and

perform other reasonably necessary

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preliminary tasks prior to opposing the

pending motion.

2. This is a relatively complex civil rights

case, and the motion [for summary judgment]

filed attacks numerous claims, based on

numerous legal and factual arguments. The

motion also was filed along with voluminous

evidentiary materials.

3. The initial review of the defense motion

suggests that it is not based upon the record

construed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party ... but, rather, are founded

upon selective snippets of documents and

testimony that disregard th greater import of

the record. While this may be considered

effective advocacy, it now places an enormous

burden on the plaintiff, who has to carefully

review and fully summarize the depositions

and other documents so that the Court can get

a true sense of the contours of the record in

this case. This alone will take plaintiff,

who once again is a sole practitioner

operating with limited time and resources,

significant time [sic].

4. Plaintiff’s counsel’s six year old son

arrived to California for the Christmas

holiday on December 18, 2007 and departs on

January 3, 2008. While parental obligations

may be considered typical and perhaps not

compelling for these purposes, plaintiff’s

counsel’s son is residing out of the country

temporarily, and only gets to spend time with

his father for a week to ten days every two

to three months. Indeed, this is plaintiff’s

counsel’s son’s first trip back to California

since his September departure, and during

this visit, plaintiff’s counsel is the sole

custodial parent. Plaintiff’s counsel made

what he feels is a reasonable personal

decision to defer doing any substantial work

on the subject motion until after his son’s

visit. This work was also delayed because,

for the above-stated reasons, the current

state of discovery and the pleadings in this

case do not permit plaintiff to prepare a

reasonable opposition.

5. Plaintiff’s counsel recently, in November

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2007, moved from his prior office and is

temporarily practicing from home, with the

majority of his files and equipment being

kept at an off-site storage facility. 

Plaintiff’s counsel does not have ready

access to his case files currently, and this

logistical obstacle also is a basis for

requesting additional time to oppose the

subject motion.

6. In addition to the above-stated factors,

plaintiff’s counsel has three other summary

judgment motions that he may have to oppose

during relatively the same time period, in

Fenters v. Yosemite Chevrolet, No. CV-F-05-

1630 OWW DLB, Byrd v. Teater, No. CV-F-06-

00900 OWW GSA, and Hoffman v. Memorial

Medical Center, No. CV-F-04-5714 AWI DLB, as

well as this action.

(Doc. 49, ¶ 1). Plaintiff’s ex parte application was heard on

January 4, 2008. By Minute Order filed on January 4, 2008,

Plaintiff’s request for a 90 day continuance was granted;

Plaintiff’s response to the motion for summary judgment was due

by April 4, 2008; reply briefs due by April 18, 2008; and the

hearing on the motion for summary judgment was set for May 5,

2008. The pretrial conference and trial dates were vacated and a

further scheduling conference to revise the trial schedule was 

set for May 30, 2008. Defendants’ counsel was instructed to

prepare a written Order reflecting the Court’s rulings. A

proposed Order was lodged by Defendants’ counsel on January 29,

2008 (Doc. 53). Plaintiff objected to the proposed Order,

contending that the Court had ruled on January 4, 2008 that

Plaintiff could file the amended complaint and objecting that the

proposed Order limits permissible additional depositions to those

witnesses whose affidavits were submitted by Defendants in

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support of their motion for summary judgment (Doc. 54). On

January 31, 2008, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (Doc.

57). The Court ordered a hearing on the dispute concerning

Defendants’ proposed Order for February 1, 2008 (Doc. 58). 

Because the conference call was not successfully coordinated, the

hearing on the proposed Order was continued to February 4, 2008

(Doc. 59). The Order Granting Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application

for Continuance of Hearing Date for Pending Summary Judgment

Motion and For Related Necessary Relief was filed on February 25,

2008 (Doc. 67). After reciting the dates for completion of

briefing and hearing of the summary judgment motion, the First

Amended Complaint filed on January 31, 2008 was stricken;

Plaintiff was ordered to file a motion for leave to amend by

February 11, 2008; Defendants opposition was ordered to be filed

by February 22, 2008, and no reply brief was allowed. The Court

expressly stated at the February 4, 2008 hearing: “Then from the

time that your motion is filed, the defendants will have ten days

to respond and then we’ll hear that motion, no reply.” (Doc. 64,

CT, 14:20-22). Notwithstanding this explicit order, on February

26, 2008 at 3:35 p.m., Mr. Little filed “Plaintiff’s Supplemental

Brief in Further Support of Motion for Leave to File Amended

Complaint” (Doc. 68). By Minute Order filed on March 3, 2008,

Plaintiff’s motion to file the Amended Complaint was granted. 

Given this delay, attributable to Mr. Little, the Court reduced

the amount of prejudgment interest to which Plaintiff was

entitled, ruling that the periods from December 2, 2005 through

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July 5, 2007 and from December 17, 2007 through August 4, 2008,

would not be included in the time for calculation of prejudgment

interest because of Plaintiff’s inexcusable delay in the

prosecution of this action. 

At the hearing, Mr. Little conceded that a reduction in the

fee award for tasks performed as a result of his unavailability

which would not otherwise have been necessary was appropriate. 

In his supplemental brief filed on February 23, 2010, (Doc. 265),

Plaintiff redacted the following time from his fee request:

A. Time related to solely counsel’s

unavailability in late 2006 and the related

need to request vacatur of the then scheduled

dates: 10/13/06 (0.4), 10/18/06 (2.4),

10/19/06 (0.1), 11/1/06 (0.4), 11/20/06

(2.4), 2/23/07 (0.5), 3/5/07 (0.2), 3/13/07

(0.1) - TOTAL OF 6.5 HOURS

B. Time related solely to counsel’s

unavailability in 2007 due to his sister’s

passing and the related stipulation and order

to continue the then scheduled dates: 4/17/07

(0.5), 4/18/07 (0.5) 7/5/07 (0.15) - TOTAL OF

1.15 HOURS

C. Time related solely to counsel’s failing

to timely oppose the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment/adjudication and failure to

timely move to file a First Amended

Complaint:1/1/08 (0.5), 1/2/08 (0.8), 1/3/08

(0.4), 1/4/08 (1.15), 1/13/08 (0.3), 1/15/08

(0.4), 1/29/08 (1.25), 1/30/08 (0.3), 1/31/08

(0.5) - TOTAL OF 5.6 HOURS 

D. Time related solely to counsel’s having to

respond to the Court’s August 4, 2008 Order

to Show Cause, which was based on counsel’s

unavailability and related issues in several

of his then pending matters: 8/4/08 (0.1),

8/13/08 (0.2), 8/21/08 (0.25), 8/25/08

(1.00), 8/25/08 (0.1) - TOTAL 1.65 HOURS

The Court also concludes that the time incurred by Mr.

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Little in connection with his motion to amend will be redacted. 

The motion to amend would have been totally unnecessary had Mr.

Little timely with the Court’s Order granting him leave to amend

by January 15, 2006. From the Court’s review of the time

records, this includes the time incurred February 4, 2008 through

March 3, 2008, for a total of 16.2 hours. 

Consequently, the requested fee award is reduced by a total

of 31.10 hours for the unnecessary time incurred by Plaintiff’s

counsel due to his failure to timely prosecute this action.

The total number of hours redacted from Plaintiff’s fee

request is 62.50 hours. 

Defendants complain that the billing records submitted by

Mr. Little with his opening brief are vague and general and refer

to specific entries in the time records submitted with

Plaintiff’s opening brief. Defendants also asserts that there

are numerous emails to Plaintiff’s retained experts which fail to

provide information as to the nature of the emails, vague entries

pertaining to emails to Defendants’ attorneys, and vague entries

of “T.C. With D. Ruff re: update.” 

“Plaintiff’s counsel ... is not required to record in great

detail how each minute of his time was expended. But at least

counsel should identify the general subject matter of his time

expenditures.” Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12. Even

minimal descriptions will pass muster if they establish that the

time was spent on matters for which the district court awarded

attorney’s fees. See Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 989 (9th

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Cir.2004). However, “[w]here the documentation of the hours is

inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.” 

Hensley, id. at 432.

In his reply brief, Plaintiff amended all of the time

entries cited by Defendants as inadequate and amplified them with

more detail. The Court concludes that the revised time sheets

are specific and detailed enough to pass muster. 

Plaintiff asserts that his attorney has complied with his

duty to exercise billing judgment to “exclude from a fee request

hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” 

Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 434. Plaintiff contends:

[A]lthough the plaintiff could have, he has

not sought compensation for the time spent on

this case by his former staff, Gloria

Coronado and Jill Hoffman, or the time spent

on this case by his current assistant,

Michelle Tostenrude. This is a case that was

handled in all important respects by the

undersigned counsel individually, and only

those hours are being sought for

compensation. 

Plaintiff argues that, where counsel has already to some degree

discounted the hours to which he would be entitled to claim, the

Court should consider that reduction in assessing the

reasonableness of the fee request. As authority, Plaintiff cites

Moreno v. City of Sacramento, supra, 534 F.3d at 1113:

The district court has a greater familiarity

with the case than we do, but even the

district court cannot tell by a cursory

examination which hours are unnecessarily

duplicative. Nevertheless, the district

court can impose a small reduction, no

greater that 10 percent - a ‘haircut’ - based

on its exercise of discretion and without a

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more specific explanation. Here, however,

the district court cut the number of hours by

25 percent, and gave no specific explanation

as to which fees it thought were duplicative,

or why. While we don’t require the

explanation to be elaborate, it must be

clear, and this one isn’t. Plaintiff’s

counsel had already cut her fees by 9

percent, so an additional 25 percent cut

would amount to almost one third. The court

has discretion to make such an adjustment,

but we cannot sustain a cut that substantial

unless the district court articulates its

reasoning with more specificity. We

therefore conclude that the district court’s

explanation is insufficient to sustain a 25

percent cut based on duplication.

Mr. Little provides no evidence of the amount of time

incurred by his assistants or what those assistants did. 

Consequently, there is no evidence of the amount of time that

Plaintiff asserts has been redacted from the fee request. 

Moreover, Mr. Little provides no evidence by way of declaration

that he redacted anything from his billing statements pursuant to

the Hensley standard, i.e., excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary. However, given the redactions ordered above, the

Court concludes that the award is reasonable. 

b. Reasonable Hourly Rate.

Reasonable fees under Section 1988 are calculated according

to the prevailing market rates in the relevant legal community. 

Blum v. Stenson, supra, 465 U.S. at 895. The general rule is

that the rates of attorneys practicing in the forum district are

used. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9 Cir. 1992); th

Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9 Cir.), cert. th

denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991). The reasonable hourly rate “is not

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made by reference to rates actually charged by the prevailing

party.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th

Cir.1986). The Court should use the prevailing market rate in

the community for similar services of lawyers “of reasonably

comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Id. 

Plaintiff asserts that $300/hour is a reasonable hourly rate

for the Eastern District of California. Mr. Little avers:

9. My hourly fee when I began my practice in

Fresno in 1995 was $150. From January 1,

1998 to January 1, 2000, my hourly fee was

$175. From January 1, 2000 to January 1,

2002, my hourly fee was $200. From January

1, 2002 to January 1, 2003, my hourly rate

was $225. From January 1, 2003 to January 1,

2004, my hourly rate was $250. From January

1, 2004 to January 1, 2005, my hourly rate

was $275. Since January 1, 2005, my hourly

rate has been $300. The increase in my

hourly fee has been due not only to my now

having considerable experience as a sole

practitioner, but also due to the increased

overhead costs associated with my practice.

...

11. As confirmed by the several declarations

of attorneys submitted to this Court in

connection with a 1998 fee motion in Caton v.

London, No. CV-F-96-6108 AWI SMS, those of

Patience Milrod, Melvin M. Richtel, William

J. Smith, Jacob Weisberg, Mary Louise

Frampton, Glenn Holder, and Scott Williams,

all of whom are themselves experienced in

civil rights and/or employment cases as

plaintiff or defense counsel, an hourly rate

within the $170-$285 range was then (more

than a decade ago) deemed as the minimum

reasonable fee for experienced and qualified

counsel in civil rights actions. Copies of

the declarations submitted to the Court in

that action, albeit unexecuted copies, are

attached hereto as Exhibit 5. Furthermore,

the declarations of those counsel establish

that the hourly rate charged is reasonable,

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due to the difficulties inherent in civil

rights litigation, the hesitancy of counsel

to undertake such litigation absent the

payment of a reasonable fee, and the risk of

loss usually personally assumed by counsel in

such cases. 

Defendants pose no objection to the $300 hourly rate sought

by Plaintiff. 

The $300 hourly rate is reasonable. Despite his medical

troubles, Mr. Little is an experienced and competent civil rights

trial lawyer. In Beauford v. E.W.H. Group Inc., 2009 WL 3162249

(E.D.Cal., Sept. 29, 2009), Judge Ishii ruled that a $350 hourly

rate was reasonable for the Eastern District. See also Wells

Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n v. PACCAR Financial Corp., 2009 WL 211386

(E.D.Cal., Jan. 28, 2009)(Judge Ishii ruled that $315 is a

reasonable hourly rate). Judge Ishii’s rulings were supported by

current affidavits from other counsel. Although Mr. Little would 

have done better to submit more recent affidavits establishing

the current hourly rate being charged by civil rights attorneys

of comparable skill and experience, the absence of any objection

from Defendants coupled with Judge Ishii’s rulings establishes 

that the $300.00 hourly rate is reasonable.

4. Interim Award.

In his reply brief, Plaintiff requested that attorney’s fees

be paid as part of an interim fee award as permitted under

Section 1988. 

Defendants objected to this request as prejudicial to them

because they were unable to respond to it. Courts generally

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decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a

reply brief. See United States v. Bohn, 956 F.2d 208, 209 (9th

Cir.1992); United States v. Boyce, 148 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1085

(S.D.Cal.2001). Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for an interim

award of attorney’s fees is denied. 

B. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR BILL OF COSTS.

On October 6, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Bill of Costs, seeking

costs in the total amount of $16,887.19.

Defendants object that Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs was

untimely filed. 

Judgment for Plaintiff was entered on September 24, 2009. 

Rule 54-292(b), Local Rules of Practice, in effect on October 2,

2009, provided:

Within ten (10) days after entry of judgment

or order under which costs may be claimed,

the prevailing party may served on all other

parties and file with the Clerk a bill of

costs conforming to 28 U.S.C. § 1924. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d).

Effective March 3, 2010, the Local Rules for the Eastern District

of California were amended. Rule 292(a), Local Rules of Practice

now provides:

Within fourteen (14) days after entry of

judgment or order under which costs may be

claimed, the prevailing party may serve on

all other parties and file a bill of costs

conforming to 28 U.S.C. § 1924.

Rule 6(a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective

December 1, 2009, provides:

(a) Computing Time. The following rules

apply in computing any time period specified

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in these rules, in any local rule or court

order, or in any statute that does not

specify a method of computing time.

(1) Period Stated in Days or a Longer Unit.

When the period is stated in days or a longer

unit of time:

(A) exclude the day of the event that

triggers the period;

(B) count every day, including intermediate

Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and

(C) include the last day of the period, but

if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or

legal holiday, the period continues to run

until the end of the next day that is not a

Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. 

Pursuant to Rule 6(a)(2), the ten day period in which to file the

Bill of Costs expired on Monday, October 5, 2009. 

Plaintiff argues that, when an applicable time period is

less than ten days, intermediate weekend days and holidays are

excluded, referring to Rule 6 prior to its amendment and to Rule

6-136, Local Rules of Practice. At the time Plaintiff filed his

bill of costs, the amendment to Rule 6 had become effective. 

Local Rule 6-136 merely refers the party to Rule 6. Plaintiff is

charged to know the law. Although the Local Rules of Practice

for the Eastern District as amended were not issued until March

3, 2010, Rule 54-292(b) specifically referred the party to Rule

6(a). Rule 6(b)(1), effective December 1, 2009, provides:

When an act may or must be done within a

specified time, the court may, for good

cause, extend the time:

(A) with or without motion or notice if the

court acts, or if a request is made, before

the original time or its extension expires;

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or

(B) on motion made after the time has expired

if the party failed to act because of

excusable neglect.

Defendants’ objection that Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs was

untimely filed is well-taken. Although Plaintiff did not seek an

extension of time within the original time period and has not

filed a motion seeking relief from the time requirement because

of excusable neglect, the Court nonetheless concludes that

Plaintiff’s failure was due to excusable neglect. Plaintiff’s

counsel clearly was not aware that a long-standing rule of

federal procedure had been amended and Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs

was filed only one day late under the new calculation procedure

set forth in Rule 6(a)(2). If the Local Rules as amended on

March 3, 2010 had been in effect, Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs would

have been timely. Defendants’ objection to Plaintiff’s Bill of

Costs on the ground of untimeliness is rejected.

Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs seeks reimbursement for items

beyond those allowed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 (pertaining to per diem

and milage generally) and 1920. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks

reimbursement for “compensation of court-appointed experts” in

the amount of $13,370.48, and for “other costs” in the amount of

$1,802.85. In Plaintiff’s itemization, the expert fees are

$13,000.00 for Barrett Kays and $370.48 for John Bettancourt. In

Plaintiff’s itemization, the “other costs” are:

Kings Waste and Recycling Authority - Public

Records Fee - $43.05;

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Postal Annex - Mailing Fees - $32.20;

Motel 6 - room for H. Ruff, first week of

trial - $201.57;

Parking - $31.00;

La Quinta - room for H. Ruff, second week of

trial - $176.96;

El Torito - dinner with Barrett Kays -

$50.37;

Airfare - H. Ruff - $480.40;

Airfare - Barrett Kays - $787.30.

Section 1821(a)(1) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise

provided by law, a witness in attendance at any court of the

United States ... or before any person authorized to take his

deposition pursuant to any rule or order of a court of the United

States, shall be paid the fees and allowances provided by this

section.” A witness “shall be paid an attendance fee of $40 per

day for each day’s attendance” and shall be paid “the attendance

fee for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning

from the place of attendance at the beginning and end of such

attendance or at any time during such attendance.” Section

1821(b). Section 1821(c)(1) provides:

A witness who travels by common carrier shall

be paid for the actual expenses of travel on

the basis of the means of transportation

reasonably utilized and the distance

necessarily traveled to and from such

witness’s residence by the shortest practical

route in going to and returning from the

place of attendance. Such a witness shall

utilize a common carrier at the most

economical rate reasonably available. A

receipt or other evidence of actual cost

shall be furnished.

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“[P]arking fees (upon presentation of a valid parking receipt),

shall be paid in full to the witness incurring such expenses,” 

Section 1821(c)(3), and “[a]ll normal travel expenses within and

outside the judicial district shall be taxable as costs pursuant

to section 1920.” Section 1821(c)(4). “A subsistence allowance

shall be paid to a witness when an overnight stay is required at

the place of attendance” which shall be “paid in an amount not to

exceed the maximum per diem allowance prescribed by the

Administrator of General Services, pursuant to Section 5702(a) of

title 5, for official travel in the area of attendance by

employees of the Federal Government.” Section 1821(d)(1) & (2). 

Section 1920 provides that the following costs may be taxed:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees for printed or electronically

recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for

use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and

witnesses;

(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of

making copies of any materials where the

copies are necessarily obtained for use in

the case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this

title;

(6) Compensation of court appointed experts

....

Plaintiff contends that costs and expert fees are explicitly

recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c).

In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437,

439 (1987), the Supreme Court held that expert witness fees are

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only recoverable pursuant to a contract or explicit statutory

authority. In West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey, 499

U.S. 83 (1991), the Supreme Court addressed whether expert fees

in civil rights litigation may be shifted to the losing party

pursuant to Section 1988. The Supreme Court found that where

Congress had intended to provide for the recovery of expert fees,

it specifically provided for such recovery and ruled that Section

1988's provision for a “reasonable attorney’s fee” did not allow

for the recovery of expert witness fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) was

enacted in 1991 to expressly provide:

In awarding an attorney’s fee under

subsection (b) of this section in any action

or proceeding to enforce a provision of

section 1981 or 1981a, the court, in its

discretion, may include expert fees as part

of the attorney’s fee. 

Here, Plaintiff’s action was based on Section 1983, not

Section 1981 or Section 1981a. Plaintiff cites no authority that

has permitted an award of expert witness fees in a Section 1983

action pursuant to Section 1988(c). The Court’s research

indicates that cases are uniform that Section 1988(c) does not

apply to a Section 1983 action, relying on the plain wording of

the statute and West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey,

supra. See e.g., Frevach Land Co. v. Multnomah County, Dept. of

Environmental Services, Land Use Planning Div., 2001 WL 34039133

at * 35-36 (D.Or.Dec.18, 2001). In fact, Plaintiff concedes in

his reply brief that he cannot seek reimbursement for expert

witness fees. Plaintiff’s bill of costs for $13,370.48 in expert

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witness fees is disallowed. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs should be

reduced to reflect his limited success in this action. For the

reasons stated supra, this contention is rejected.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs for

$1,252.56 in fees for exemplification and copies of papers

necessarily obtained for use in the case should be reduced by

$1,241.39. Defendants refer to the following itemization

attached to Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs:

4-15-09 Office Depot - Document Reproduction - $617.98;

9-11-09 Office Deport - Exhibit Binders, tabs, etc. -

$188.00;

9-11-09 Office Depot - Document Reproduction - $6.47;

9-11-09 Office Depot - Reproduction and binding of exhibits

- $424.12;

9-13-09 Office Depot - Document reproductions - $4.81.

As to April 15, 2009 copying costs, Defendants assert that

they received no production of documents from Plaintiff on or

about April 15, 2009, and that the receipt indicates “services”

in the amounts of $56.00 and $211.06, as well as burning or

scanning of a CD in the amount of $8.97, and a

“services/handplace” in the amount of $179.75. As to the

September 11, 2009 Office Depot receipts, the costs include PostIt tabs, a Sharpie pen, computer printer ink, costs, for

indexing, binding and labor, none of which, Defendants assert,

are taxable. 

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Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs for $151.30

for fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the

transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case should be

reduced by $129.80 paid to Al Cala and Associates for John

Bettancourt’s deposition transcript. Defendants note that the

deposition transcript was not ordered until one week prior to the

trial and Mr. Bettancourt was not called as a witness in this

action. 

As to Plaintiff’s “Other Costs,” Defendants that the Public

Records Fee to the Kings Waste and Recycling Authority and the

Postal Annex mailing fees are not recoverable costs under Section

1920. With regard to the parking fees, Defendants note that

Plaintiff fails to identify on whose behalf the parking fees were

incurred, i.e., for a specific witness or Plaintiff’s counsel. 

As to the lodging fees for Plaintiff’s son, Hannaniah Ruff, at

Motel 6 on September 14, 2009 and at La Quinta on September 21

and 22, 2009, Defendants note that Hannaniah Ruff testified as a

witness on the second day of the trial, September 16, 2009. 

Defendants assert:

In reviewing the documentation in support of

this claim, it appears that the charges

incurred were for two adults staying at the

Motel 6 on Monday, September 14; Tuesday,

September 15; and Wednesday, September 16;

and checked out on Thursday, September 17. 

Hannaniah Ruff did not arrive in Fresno until

Tuesday, September 15, 2009. As such, the

charges incurred for the night of Monday,

September 14, 2009, were not necessarily

incurred. According to the bill, the hotel

rate is $59.99 per night. While a one night

charge may be reasonable for lodging for

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Hannaniah Ruff, the balance of $141.58 should

be stricken.

Similarly, hotel charges were incurred at La

Quinta Inn on Monday, September 21, 2009; and

Tuesday, September 22, 2009. Again,

Hannaniah Ruff testified the week before, and

his presence during trial this second week

was not longer necessary. As such, this

charge in the amount of $176.96 should be

stricken. 

Plaintiff replies that Defendants’ contentions “conflate 28

U.S.C. § 1920 with 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Plaintiff concedes that

his Bill of Costs seeks reimbursement for items beyond those

allowed by Section 1821 and 1920, but, Plaintiff asserts, the

reason for this is that such costs are taxable in a civil rights

action pursuant to Section 1988. “Under § 1988, the prevailing

party ‘may recover as part of the award of attorney’s fees those

out-of-pocket expenses that “would normally be charged to a fee

paying client,”’” Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 814 (9 Cir.2005), th

even if the court cannot tax these expenses as “costs” under

Section 1920. Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19-20 (9th

Cir.1994). Such out-of-pocket expenses are recoverable when

reasonable. Dang, id.

Defendants do not contend that the “Other Costs” are not

ones that would normally be charged to a fee-paying client; they

only argue that the challenged costs were not necessary or were

not taxable under Section 1920. Nonetheless, an attorney would

not normally charge a fee paying client for hotel bills for a

witness and some unidentified person for a number of days when

that witness only testified on one day. Plaintiff’s bill of

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costs is reduced by the amount of $318.54. 

C. DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR BILL OF COSTS.

On October 2, 2010, Defendants County of Kings and Mark

Sherman timely filed a Bill of Costs, seeking costs in the total

amount of $2,210.49, representing one half of the costs incurred

by Defendants in the action.

Plaintiff, referring to his then pending motion for

declaratory relief against the County of Kings, (Doc. 199),

argued that the County’s liability for prospective relief

dictates that it is not a prevailing party in this action. 

However, Plaintiff’s motion for declaratory relief was denied by

Memorandum Decision and Order filed on December 18, 2009 (Doc.

236), as was Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 248).

As to Defendant Mark Sherman, Plaintiff objects that he has

failed to show that, despite indemnification rights under

California Government Code §§ 825 and 825.2, he is actually

personally liable for paying any defense costs. Plaintiff cites

Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1436 (9 Cir.1994) and Farmers Ins. th

Group v. County of Santa Clara, 36 Cal.App.4th 91 (1994). 

Plaintiff contends:

Since there is no indication that defendant

Sherman actually incurred or paid any costs,

his bill of costs should be altogether

denied. Plaintiff should not be required to

reimburse costs incurred by Kings County,

which [sic] itself is not entitled to seek

costs.

However, there is no such discussion in Chew v. Gates. And

as Defendants note, the lower court opinion in Farmers Ins. Group

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was reversed by the California Supreme Court in Farmers Ins.

Group v. County of Santa Clara, 11 Cal.4th 992 (1995). In the

lower court opinion, a deputy sheriff and his homeowner’s insurer

brought an action against the county seeking indemnity pursuant

to Government Code §§ 825.2 and 996 for attorney fees, costs, and

settlement payment in an action by female deputies alleging

sexual harassment. The Court of Appeal held that the deputy’s

conduct was within his “scope of employment” and, therefore the

county was required to indemnify the deputy sheriff. The Supreme

Court reversed, holding that sexual harassment was not within the

scope of employment even though it occurred during work hours in

a workplace that could be characterized as traditionally male

dominated. Moreover, the County is a prevailing party in this

action because the jury found for the County and the Court denied

Plaintiff’s motion for declaratory relief.

Plaintiff concedes that, as a general rule, a prevailing

party whose costs are paid by a third party is still entitled to

seek costs from a losing party. Plaintiff cites Manor Healthcare

Corp. v. Lomelo, 929 F.2d 633, 639 (11 Cir.1991)(costs under th

Rule 54(d) could be awarded to a prevailing city even though the

costs were incurred by the city’s insurer; to rule otherwise

would allow plaintiffs to bring lawsuits against insured

defendants without incurring litigation costs after losing on the

merits); see also Safeway Rental & Sales Co. v. Albina Engine &

Machine Works, Inc., 343 F.2d 129, 135 (10 Cir.1965). However, th

Plaintiff argues, the “role of defendant Sherman’s idemnitor,

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Kings County, is not merely one of an insurer but rather one of a

codefendant who is not entitled to seek costs.” Therefore,

Plaintiff contends, Kings County is more aptly characterized as a

party to a joint defense rather than Defendant Sherman’s insurer. 

Plaintiff argues that “[t]he third party insurer rule is

inapplicable in the joint defense context; typically, parties to

a joint defense or cost sharing arrangement are entitled to

recover only that portion of costs they actually paid

thereunder.” Unless Defendant Sherman can demonstrate that he

actually paid the joint defense costs for which he seeks

reimbursement, Plaintiff asserts the Bill of Costs should be

denied as to Defendant Sherman. Plaintiff cites Smith v. Hughes

Aircraft Co., 10 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9 Cir.1993) and Truck th

Components, Inc. v. Beatrice Co., 1996 WL 402520 (N.D.Ill, July

15, 1996), as authorizing reimbursement to a joint defense or

cost sharing defendant based on the amount of costs for which the

defendant was actually responsible.

There is no discussion of such a rule in either of these

cases. 

Defendants respond that there is no evidence that the County

and Defendant Sherman are co-insurers or entered into any cost

sharing agreement:

The fact that the County was also a named

defendant in this matter has no bearing on

whether Mr. Sherman, as a prevailing party,

may recover his costs. 

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sharing rule applies to preclude the taxing of costs as to

Defendant Sherman is without merit. First of all, the County is

a prevailing party and entitled to seek costs. Secondly, as a

public employee whose defense was provided by the County,

Defendant Sherman would not have been liable for any of these

costs.

Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ Bill of Costs for $737.50

in fees for service of summons and subpoena, itemized in Exhibit

A to the Bill of Costs. Plaintiff asserts:

Exhibit A shows that the stated expenses were

not merely for service but also for

investigative-type expenses. The latter

categories are not subject to reimbursement

under 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and 1920. Since the

defendants have failed to separate the

compensable and non-compensable expenses

under this item, it should be altogether

denied. Moreover, there is a $193.00 expense

for a trial subpoena serve [sic] on Jan

Reynolds, who did not even testify at trial.

Exhibit A to Defendants’ Bill of Costs includes two invoices

from Doug Stokes Investigations for the service of six presumably

trial subpoenas in late May-early June, 2009 and for the service

of a trial subpoena on Jan Reynolds. Fees for service of trial

subpoenas by private process servers are taxable as costs. See

Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 914 F.2d 175,

178 (9 Cir.1990). th

Defendants respond that Exhibit A to Defendants’ Bill of

Costs documents the steps that were necessarily taken in order to

effectuate service of the various subpoenas. The invoice for

service of the six trial subpoenas in late May-early June, 2009

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shows the following activity log:

5-29-09

• Dropped off old subpoenas and picked up new

• Drove to Armona and served Rita Brown (she

understands Ruff brothers are still living

out of state)

• Drove to 533 W. Ivy, Hanford and attempted

to serve Brieno

• Drove to 208 Scott St., Hanford and served

Tammy Sanders

• Drove to 9549 Eastview Dr., Hanford and

spoke with Mr. Ruff who refused to give

information regarding his wife’s whereabouts

3.5hr/124 mi

5-30-09

• Drove to Eastview Dr., Hanford - no answer,

spoke with neighbors who state they have not

seen Edith [Ruff] for a month or so 

• Drove to Ivy address and served Brieno (he

stated that D. Ruff is separated from his

wife and Edith is living in Fresno with her

mother)

3 hr/120 mi

6-1-09

• Spoke with Dillahunty regarding information

obtained

• Ran skip trace check for E. Ruff in Fresno

- no new addresses

• Created activity log

1 hr

6-3-09

• Returned proof of service and unserved

subpoenas

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5 mi

BILLING

7.5 hrs @ $70/hr = $525.00

254 mi @ .50/mi = $ 127.00 

 $652.00

Defendants assert that, just as defendants are entitled to

recover witness fees paid to a witness who was not called to

testify, Defendants should be entitled to recover costs incurred

in subpoenaing a trial witness who was not ultimately called to

testify.

Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ Bill of Costs for $3,326.95

for fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the

transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case. Defendants’

itemization of its Bill of Costs reflects deposition transcripts

of Plaintiff, John Bettancourt, Barrett L. Kays, Art Brieno,

Tammye Sanders, and Rita Brown. Plaintiff asserts that the

record shows that Defendants did not call any of the deponents as

witnesses at trial and deponents John Bettancourt and Rita Brown

did not testify at all. 

Deposition costs are taxable if they are reasonably

necessary for trial. Evanow v. M/V Neptune, 163 F.3d 1108, 1118

(9 Cir.1998). “‘Whether a transcript or deposition is th

“necessary” must be determined in light of the facts known at the

time the expense was incurred ....’” Sunstone Behavioral Health,

Inc. v. Alameda County ..., 646 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1219

(E.D.Cal.2009), citing Barber v. Ruth, 7 F.3d 636, 645 (7th

Cir.1993). Defendants assert:

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Each lay witness deposed was an individual

who had been identified by the plaintiff,

both in written discovery responses and in

his deposition testimony, as having

information pertinent to his lawsuit. Based

on those representations, it was determined

that each witness should be deposed. 

Plaintiff’s experts were also necessarily

deposed in order to determine the nature of

their opinions, the basis therefor, and in

order to prepare for trial. As each

deposition was reasonably necessary,

defendants are entitled to recover costs

therefor.

Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ Bill of Costs for $200 for

fees for witnesses. Defendants’ itemization of its Bill of Costs

indicates $40.00 for the depositions of John Bettancourt, Barrett

Kays, Art Brieno, Rita Brown, and Tammye Johnson [sic]. 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are not entitled to obtain

reimbursement for expert witness fees or fees for witnesses who

were not necessary for trial under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 or 1920. 

Plaintiff contends:

The defendants did not subpoena the

plaintiff’s experts, John Bettancourt and

Barrett Kays, and are instead trying to

obtain reimbursement for a portion of the

expert witness fees paid to them as if they

had been subpoenaed and paid witness fees. 

This is improper and should be denied. 

Further, as to witness Brown, she was not a

witness necessarily subpoenaed and paid

witness fees in this case, since she was not

even called as a witness at trial and did not

have her deposition used at trial. These

cost items should be denied. 

Plaintiff’s objections are without merit. Both Rule 54-292

and Rule 292, Local Rules of Practice, provide that items taxable

as costs include “[p]er diem, mileage and subsistence for

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witnesses (28 U.S.C. § 1821).” Section 1821(a)(1) and (b) 

provides for the payment of the statutory fee of $40.00 per day

for a witness’s attendance “before any person authorized to take

his deposition pursuant to any rule or order of a court of the

United States.” 

Plaintiff’s objections are without merit. Defendants’ bill

of costs is allowed as an offset to the costs allowed to

Plaintiff. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of

$198,615.00 (662.05 hrs. x $300.00 hr.);

3. Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs is taxed at the total amount

of $3,198.17, offset by $ $2,210.48 for Defendants County of

Kings and Mark Sherman’s Bill of Costs, for a total taxable cost

to Plaintiff of $967.68.

3. Plaintiff’s counsel shall prepare and lodge a form of

order consistent with this Memorandum Decision within five (5)

court days following service of this Memorandum Decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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