Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00819/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00819-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE H GOMEZ,

Petitioner,

v

D L RUNNELS, Warden

Respondent. /

No C 04-0819 VRW (pr)

ORDER

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court

of the State of California in and for the County of Santa Clara of

attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon and various

enhancements. On or about February 22, 2000, he was sentenced to

23 years in state prison.

Petitioner appealed, but the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment of conviction and the Supreme Court of

California denied review. He also unsuccessfully sought collateral

relief from the state courts. On February 4, 2004, the Supreme

Court of California denied his final petition for state habeas

relief.

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Petitioner then filed the instant federal petition for a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254. Per order filed on July 21,

2004, the court found that the petition, liberally construed,

stated cognizable claims under § 2254 and ordered respondent to

show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. 

Respondent filed an answer to the order to show cause and

petitioner filed a traverse.

 

 I

The California Court of Appeal summarized the factual

background of the case as follows:

On March 5, 1999, Mary Varela and defendant went

to a bar called The Place. There they met an

acquaintance, Richard Aguilar. After drinking and

dancing, Varela and defendant decided to go to another

bar called The Green Parrot. As they were leaving The

Place, Aguilar asked if he could join them. They

arrived at The Green Parrot between 10:00 and 10:30 pm,

and they continued drinking and dancing. While he was

in the men's room, Aguilar assaulted codefendant Danny

Rizo.

At about 1:30 am, Varela decided to go to a party. 

Defendant, Aguilar and “Johnny” planned to go with her. 

Varela was the driver, defendant was the front

passenger, Aguilar sat behind Varela and Johnny sat

behind defendant. While they were waiting for some

friends, defendant began honking impatiently on the

horn. Varela asked him to stop and Aguilar asked him

to “chill out.” After defendant and Aguilar began

shouting profanities at each other, Varela asked them

to get out of her car. Defendant and Aguilar exited

the vehicle and began fighting each other with their

fists. According to Aguilar, Aguilar “was getting the

better of” defendant. Varela said that it was more of

a wrestling match, and the two fell to the ground

almost immediately. Mestaz testified that they were

standing and engaged in a fistfight, but she testified

at the preliminary hearing that it was more of a

wrestling match on the ground. Varela and Johnny left

the scene.

As defendant and Aguilar were fighting, Rizo

attacked Aguilar. According to Aguilar, Rizo was
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punching him when he and defendant were still standing

and before he was stabbed. [Bystander Tina] Mestaz

testified that Rizo was kicking and punching Aguilar

after Aguilar was bloodied and had fallen to the

ground.

No one saw a weapon. Mestaz testified that she

saw defendant reach towards his belt and then hold

something that looked shiny. Aguilar did not see

anything in defendant’s hands, but he felt defendant

stabbing him with a sharp object in his face and neck. 

When Aguilar tried to protect himself, he was stabbed

in the hand. He did not realize until later that he

had also been stabbed in the back. Aguilar attempted

to continue the fight as defendant and Rizo tried to

walk away, but he collapsed. A woman pinched the stab

wound on his neck to reduce the bleeding. Aguilar

suffered five stab wounds, one of which punctured his

lung.

[Martha Adames, a patron at The Green Parrot,

testified that Aguilar told her a month after the

incident that defendant was the one who stabbed him.]

Officer Hofstein arrived at the scene at 1:47 am. 

He found Aguilar near the car and called for medical

assistance. Mestaz told him that there were three

people involved. She gave a description of defendant

and the car he entered, and the direction in which they

were traveling. The information was transmitted to

Sergeant Wall, who then stopped the vehicle fitting

that description. Sergeant Wall spoke with defendant,

who matched the description given by Mestaz. He

noticed that defendant was bleeding from the mouth, and

asked him what had happened. Defendant stated that he

did not know what the sergeant was talking about. 

Defendant denied being at The Green Parrot. Sergeant

Wall detained defendant for a field lineup. Mestaz

then identified defendant as one of the men that

attacked Aguilar. Sergeant Wall placed defendant under

arrest.

According to Sergeant Wall, defendant appeared as

if he had been drinking, but he did not appear

intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. In

Officer John Moutzouridis’s opinion, defendant

displayed some symptoms consistent with being under the

influence of PCP, but the officer never conducted an

examination of defendant. Officer Baugh booked

defendant and did not notice symptoms of defendant

being under the influence of drugs.

Defendant had a blood alcohol level of .10 percent

at 3:50 am and PCP was “detected.” Rizo had a blood

alcohol level of .17 percent at 4:05 am. Aguilar had a
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blood alcohol level of .219 percent at 2:30 am. 

According to Anne Imobersteg, a toxicologist, Aguilar's 

blood alcohol level during the incident was .236

percent. Aguilar reported that he drank eight or nine

beers at The Place and a few more at The Green Parrot. 

Officer Hofstein described him as incoherent. Aguilar

told Dominick Ha, an investigator with the district

attorney’s office, that he had problems remembering the

incident because he was so drunk.

Mestaz and a friend shared a 12-pack of beer

before arriving at The Green Parrot around 12:30 am,

where she had another six or seven beers and two shots

of tequila. Imobersteg estimated Mestaz’s blood

alcohol level during the incident was between .22 and

.29 percent. Officer Hofstein described Mestaz as

lucid and coherent. Mestaz told a defense investigator

that she did not remember much of the incident, because

she was too drunk and she had personal problems.

Adames testified that she drank eight to ten beers

between 8:00 pm and 1:30 am. Imobersteg estimated that

her blood alcohol level was between .18 and .24

percent. Varela testified that she had six drinks at

The Place and The Green Parrot.

Imobersteg testified that when the blood alcohol

level reaches .06 or .09 percent, a person starts to

lose cognitive functions, such as accurate memory,

perception and comprehension. When blood alcohol

levels reach about .25 percent, the person becomes

disoriented and confused. She did concede, however,

that heavy drinkers have a higher tolerance. 

Imobersteg also testified that PCP could create mood

swings and irrational behavior. When test results show

that PCP was “detected,” there is no indication of the

concentration of PCP or whether it would affect the

person.

People v Gomez, 2002 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 4997 at **2-8 (Cal Ct App

2002) (footnotes omitted).

II

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: (1)

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2)

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the]

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under 28 USC § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the

dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Id at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir

2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for
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purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only

those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Clark, 331 F3d at

1069.

 

III

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief on the

grounds that his constitutional rights were violated when (i) trial

counsel failed to challenge Mestaz’s testimony effectively and

diligently, (ii) the trial court refused to give petitioner’s

requested jury instruction and (iii) the trial court refused to

overrule the jury’s verdict because of insufficient evidence.

A

The court first addresses petitioner’s contention that

his constitutional rights were violated when trial counsel failed

to challenge Mestaz’s testimony effectively and diligently. 

Petitioner first made this argument in a habeas petition to the

California Court of Appeal; both the California Court of Appeal and

the California Supreme Court denied the habeas petition without

comment.

Petitioner has the burden of showing that trial counsel’s

performance fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms and “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v

Washington, 466 US 668, 687-88, 694 (1984).
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Mestaz’s statements were inconsistent in three instances. 

First, Mestaz told Officer Hofstein on the night of the incident

that petitioner pulled Aguilar from the car at the beginning of the

fight. At trial, however, Mestaz, testified that petitioner

stepped out of the car, walked around to the other side and opened

the door for Aguilar to get out, which Aguilar did hesitantly. 

Second, Mestaz told Officer Hofstein that she did not know whether

petitioner had a weapon, but she testified at trial that she saw

petitioner reach towards his belt and then hold something “shiny.” 

Third, Mestaz testified at the preliminary hearing that petitioner

and Aguilar were standing and engaged in a fist fight, while at

trial Mestaz testified that they were wrestling on the ground.

In addition to trial counsel’s failure to attack the

inconsistencies in Mestaz’s statements aggressively, petitioner

also contends that trial counsel failed to make an issue out of

Mestaz’s inebriation. Mestaz’s blood alcohol level was estimated

to be between .22 and .29 percent during the incident.

Petitioner fails to show that trial counsel’s performance

fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under

prevailing professional norms because counsel did present the

inconsistencies in Mestaz’s statements and her inebriation. See

Doc #14, Ex B at 388 (counsel arguing to jury that Mestaz was

drunk), 394-98 (counsel reciting the inconsistencies and memory

lapses in Mestaz’s testimony). While petitioner may wish that

trial counsel had been more effective in persuading the jury,

petitioner has provided no grounds for a determination that his

counsel’s efforts were anything short of exemplary. Accordingly,

the performance of petitioner’s trial counsel cannot be said to
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fall below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under

prevailing professional norms. See Strickland, 466 US at 687-88.

Even if trial counsel should have attacked Mestaz’s

inconsistencies and inebriation more aggressively and diligently,

petitioner’s claim fails for lack of prejudice. Mestaz’s testimony

that petitioner had a “shiny” object was redundant with, and

certainly less effective than, Aguilar’s testimony and wounds, and

Mestaz’s testimony placing petitioner at the scene of the crime was

redundant with the testimony of Varela and Aguilar. Thus, the two

essential elements of petitioner’s conviction supported by Mestaz’s

testimony — the fight between petitioner and Aguilar, and

petitioner’s possession of a knife — were substantially

corroborated by other evidence. Besides, counsel for codefendant

Rizo also presented Mestaz’s inconsistencies to the jury, so the

jury would of been presented with the inconsistencies separate of

any effort by trial counsel. Doc #14, Ex B at 402-406. More

aggressive and diligent argument concerning Mestaz’s

inconsistencies almost certainly would not have affected the

outcome of the trial. Strickland, 466 US at 694.

An expert witness testified that Mestaz's blood alcohol

level was between .22 and .29 during the incident, and that people

with blood alcohol levels above .25 percent often are disoriented

and confused. Trial counsel argued to the members of the jury that

they should disregard Mestaz’s testimony since she was drunk. Doc

#14, Ex B at 388. Because, in addition to trial counsel’s pleas

that Mestaz’s testimony was unreliable, the jury heard from an

expert witness the degree and likely effect of Mestaz’s

inebriation, it cannot be said that there is a reasonable
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probability that “the result of the proceeding would have been

different” had trial counsel been more aggressive and diligent in

presenting Mestaz’s inebriation.

The California Court of Appeal and California Supreme

Court did not unreasonably apply federal law when they denied

petitioner’s claim. As discussed above, the record supports the

findings that trial counsel performed at or above an “objective

standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms and

that to the degree trial counsel’s performance could have been

better, there is not a reasonable probability that “the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 US at

687-88, 694. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief

on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See 28 USC §

2254(d).

B

The court next addresses petitioner’s contention that his

constitutional rights were violated when the trial court refused to

give petitioner’s requested jury instruction. Petitioner raised

this claim on appeal, and the California Court of Appeal discussed

it at length. See People v Gomez, 2002 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 4997 at

**8-19.

Under California law, “a trial court must instruct on the

general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the

evidence. The general principles of law governing the case are

those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before

the facts before the courts * * *.” People v Breverman, 19 Cal 4th

142, 154 (Cal 1988) (citing People v St Martin, 1 Cal 3d 524, 531
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(Cal 1970)). “A criminal defendant is entitled, on request, to an

instruction ‘pinpointing’ the theory of his defense.” People v

Wharton, 53 Cal 3d 522, 570 (Cal 1991). A trial court errs when it

refuses to give requested instructions that are supported by the

evidence, are not argumentative and are not duplicative of other

instructions. Id at 571. A requested instruction is

“argumentative” if it is based on a theory of defense that arises

only when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the

criminal defendant. People v Wright, 45 Cal 3d 1126, 1135 (Cal

1988).

To obtain federal habeas relief for error in the jury

charge, petitioner must show that the error “so infected the entire

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle

v McGuire, 502 US 62, 72 (1991). The error may not be judged in

artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the

instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id.

Where potentially defective instructions are at issue,

the court must inquire whether there is a “reasonable likelihood”

that the jury has applied the instructions in a way that violates

the Constitution. See id at 72 & n4; Boyde v California, 494 US

370, 380 (1990). A determination that there is a reasonable

likelihood that the jury has applied the instructions in a way that

violates the Constitution, however, establishes only that a

constitutional error has occurred. Calderon v Coleman, 525 US 141,

146 (1998). If constitutional error is found, the court also must

determine that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict before granting habeas 

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relief. Id at 146-47 (citing Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 637

(1993)).

“An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less

likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” 

Henderson v Kibbe, 431 US 145, 155 (1977). Accordingly, “a habeas

petitioner whose claim involves a failure to give a particular

instruction bears an ‘especially heavy burden.’” Villafuerte v

Stewart, 111 F3d 616, 624 (9th Cir 1997) (quoting Henderson, 431 US

at 155). 

Petitioner requested the following instruction:

If you believe from the evidence, or if you entertain a

reasonable doubt therefrom, that decedent was the

aggressor in the affray, or that he assaulted the

person of the defendant, then the defendant was

entitled under the law to invoke the aid of

self-defense and in so doing she [sic] had the right to

lawfully resort to such means for force as to her [sic]

may have appeared necessary under the circumstances as

a reasonable person to repel or resist the same. If

after a careful consideration of all the evidence, you

should believe therefrom, or if you should entertain a

reasonable doubt therefrom, that the defendant herein

was the victim of an assault at the hands of decedent

or if you believe that the defendant at the time, as a

reasonably prudent person honestly and in good faith

believed herself [sic] to be the victim of such an

assault, although you might find that she [sic] was in

fact mistaken, then you are instructed that she [sic]

was entitled to act upon such appearances with safety

and defend herself [sic], although it may afterwards

have been shown that the appearances were not justified

by the facts.

The trial court modified petitioner’s requested

instruction and presented to the jury the following instruction:

It is a defense to the crimes charged that the

defendant was acting in self-defense. The burden is on

the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

defendant did not act in self-defense. In other words,

the defendant need not prove to you that he acted in

self-defense. He must only raise a reasonable doubt on

that issue. If you find that the prosecution has not
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proven the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable

doubt, the defendant is entitled to a verdict of not

guilty.

The trial court also gave many California Jury

Instructions (CALJIC) regarding the elements of self-defense:

The attempted killing of another person in self-defense

is justifiable and not unlawful when the person who

does the act actually and reasonably believes: One. 

That there is imminent danger that the other person

will either kill him or cause him great bodily injury;

and Two. That it was necessary under the circumstances

for him to use in self-defense such force or means as

might cause the death of the other person for the

purpose of avoiding death or great bodily injury to

himself. A bare fear of death or great bodily injury

is not sufficient to justify a homicide. To justify

taking the life of another in self-defense, the

circumstances must be such as to excite the fears of a

reasonable person placed in a similar situation, and

the party killing must act under the influence of such

fears alone. The danger must be apparent, present,

immediate and instantly dealt with, or must so appear

at the time to the slayer as a reasonable person, and

the killing must be done under a well-founded belief

that it is necessary to save one's self from death or

great bodily injury. [CALJIC No 5.12]

Actual danger is not necessary to justify self-defense. 

If one is confronted by the appearance of danger which

arouses in his mind as a reasonable person an honest

conviction and fear that he’s about to suffer bodily

injury, and if a reasonable person in a like situation

seeing and knowing the same facts would be justified in

believing himself in like danger, and if that

individual so confronted acts in self-defense upon such

appearances and from such fear and honest convictions,

such person's right of self-defense is the same whether

such danger is real or merely apparent. [CALJIC No

5.51]

The right of self-defense exists only as long as the

real or apparent threatened danger continues to exist. 

When such danger ceases to appear to exist, the right

of self-defense ends. [CALJIC No 5.52]

The right of self-defense is not available to a person

who seeks a quarrel with the intent to create a real or

apparent necessity of exercising self-defense. [CALJIC

No 5.55]

A person who attempts to kill another person in the

actual but unreasonable belief in a necessity to defend
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against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury

attempts to kill unlawfully but does not harbor malice

aforethought and is not guilty of attempted murder. 

This would be so even if a reasonable person in the

same situation seeing and knowing the same facts would

not have had the same belief. Such an actual but

unreasonable belief is not a defense to the crime of

attempted voluntary manslaughter. However, this

principle is not available, and malice aforethought is

not negated, if the defendant by his unlawful act or

unlawful conduct created the circumstances which

legally justified his adversary's use [of] force or

attack. [CALJIC No 5.17]

The law of self-defense as it applies in this case is

as follows: It is lawful for a person who is being

assaulted to defend himself from attack if, as a

reasonable person, he has grounds for believing and

does believe that bodily injury is about to be

inflicted upon him. In doing so, such person may use

all force and means which he believes to be reasonably

necessary and which would appear to a reasonable person

in the same or similar circumstances to be necessary to

prevent the injury which appears to be imminent. 

[CALJIC No 5.30]

A person threatened with an attack that justifies the

exercise and the right of self-defense need not

retreat. In the exercise of his right of self-defense

such person may stand his ground and defend himself by

the use of all force and means which would appear to be

necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation

and with similar knowledge, and such person may pursue

such assailant until he has secured himself from

danger, if that course likewise appears reasonably

necessary. This law applies even though the assailed

person might more easily have gained safety by flight

or by withdrawing from the scene. [CALJIC No 5.50]

[CALJIC No 5.51 was repeated.]

The right of self-defense ends when there is no longer

any apparent danger of further violence on the part of

an assailant. Thus, where a person is attacked under

circumstances that justify the exercise of the right of

self-defense, and thereafter the person uses enough

force upon his attacker as to render the attacker

apparently incapable of inflicting further injuries,

the right to use force in self-defense ends. [CALJIC

No 5.53]

[CALJIC No 5.55 was repeated.]

An assault with the fists does not justify the person

being assaulted in using a deadly weapon in
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self-defense unless that person believes, and a

reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances

would believe, that the assault is likely to inflict

great bodily injury upon him. [CALJIC No 5.31]

The right of self-defense is only available to a person

who engages in mutual combat, if he has done all of the

following: One. He has actually tried in good faith

to refuse to continue fighting; Two. He has clearly

informed his opponent that he wants to stop fighting;

Three. He has clearly informed his opponent that he

has stopped fighting; and Four. He has given his

opponent the opportunity to stop fighting. After he

has done these four things, he has the right to

self-defense if his opponent continues to fight. 

[CALJIC No 5.56]

Petitioner claims that “the court below failed to decern

[sic] that the evidence [that he acted in self-defense] need not be

overwhelming; a modicum was sufficient.” Doc #1 (Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus) at 8. The court disagrees.

The trial court’s special instruction states that the

“burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that defendant did not act in self-defense. * * * [Defendant] must

only raise a reasonable doubt on that issue.” This special

instruction clearly informed the jury that petitioner needed to

raise only a reasonable doubt that he acted in self-defense; the

trial court in no way expressed that the evidence of self-defense

had to be overwhelming.

Moreover, as the California Court of Appeal aptly noted

the instructions given on the burden of proof beyond a

reasonable doubt (CALJIC No 2.90), on self-defense and

the relationship between the two sets of instructions,

adequately informed the jury that the prosecution was

required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that

defendant did not act in self-defense. Since the

instructions required a determination beyond a

reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in

self-defense, they necessarily informed the jury that

it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that an

essential element of CALJIC No 5.12 (Attempted Killing
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in Self-defense) or CALJIC No 5.30 (Assault in

Self-defense) did not exist or ceased to exist [CALJIC

Nos 5.52, 5.53], that defendant had sought out a

quarrel to create a self-defense situation [CALJIC No

5.55] or that it was a mutual combat situation in which

one or more of the four required elements was not met

or the victim did not continue to fight [CALJIC No

5.56]. Thus, defendant's proposed instruction was

adequately covered by the instructions given by the

trial court.

People v Gomez, 2002 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 4997 at *16.

Nor can it be said that the trial court’s failure to give

petitioner’s proposed instruction, even if error, amounted to

actual prejudice. Petitioner’s proposed instruction utilizes

feminine pronouns and involves situations of self-defense in

response to assault. Not only is the instruction argumentative,

since only the petitioner’s version of the incident remotely

supports a finding that petitioner acted in self-defense following

an assault (Wright, 45 Cal 3d at 1135), but the minor differences

between the given instructions and the requested instruction

clearly could not have had a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v Abrahamson,

507 US 619, 637 (1993).

The California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply

federal law when it denied petitioner’s instructional error claim.

See 28 USC § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief on this claim.

C

The court next addresses petitioner’s final contention,

that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court 

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refused to overrule the jury’s verdict because of insufficient

evidence.

A state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support

of his conviction cannot fairly be characterized as sufficient to

have led a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt states a constitutional claim, which, if proven, entitles him

to federal habeas relief. Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 321, 324

(1979). A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court

conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the

evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v

Borg, 982 F2d 335, 338 (9th Cir 1992). The federal court

“determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Id (quoting Jackson, 443 US at 319). If confronted by a

record that supports conflicting inferences, a federal habeas court

“must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear on the

record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in

favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” 

Jackson, 443 US at 326. Only if no rational trier of fact could

have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt may a writ of habeas

corpus be granted. Id at 324.

California Penal Code sections 664 and 187 criminalize

attempted murder. The prosecution, in order to secure a conviction

for attempted murder, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 

(1) “[a] direct but ineffectual act was done by one person towards

killing another human being”; and (2) “the person committing the 

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act harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent

to kill unlawfully another human being.” CALJIC No 8.66.

Assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely

to produce great bodily injury is criminalized by California Penal

Code section 245(a)(1-2). In order to secure a conviction for

assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to

produce great bodily injury, the prosecution must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that: (1) “[a] person was assaulted”; and (2)

“[t]he assault was committed with a deadly weapon or instrument,

other than a firearm, by means of force likely to produce great

bodily injury.” CALJIC No 9.02. 

In the instant case, the prosecution presented the

testimony of Aguilar, Varela and Mestaz, the blood found on

petitioner and his subsequent denial of involvement in the fight. 

The evidence provides strong proof that petitioner fought Aguilar,

stabbed him in the neck and elsewhere and did so with the intent to

kill Aguilar. In short, the record contains sufficient evidence

for a rational trier of fact to find that petitioner satisfied all

of the elements required for attempted murder and assault with a

deadly weapon. The court must presume that the jury resolved any

conflicts, such as whether petitioner stabbed Aguilar, whether

petitioner was acting in self-defense and whether petitioner

intended to kill Aguilar, in favor of the prosecution. Jackson,

443 US at 321, 324.

It simply cannot be said that the trail court

unreasonably applied federal law when it refused to overturn the

jury’s verdict. Or, more importantly, that the state appellate and

supreme courts unreasonably applied federal law when they rejected
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petitioner’s claim. See 28 USC § 2254(d). A rational trier of

fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,

satisfying the rule established by the Supreme Court in Jackson.

IV 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and

close the file.

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge