Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00003/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00003-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

On March 1, 2003, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was abolished

and its functions transferred to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a division of the

newly constituted Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ORNAN NWANSI, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CONDOLEEZZA RICE, Secretary of

State of the United States, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C 06-0003 TEH 

 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter came before the Court on June 12, 2006 on Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Initially, the motion was

based on either of two grounds: the doctrine of consular nonreviewability or, alternatively, 

Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. On April 27, 2006, just one day before

filing of this motion to dismiss, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)

reaffirmed Mr. Nwansi’s I-130 Petition for Alien Relative (“I-130 petition”).1

 Accordingly,

Defendants’ motion for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion is moot. Having carefully

considered the Parties’ arguments and the record, the motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED

pursuant to the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

On December 4, 2002, Plaintiff Ornan Nwansi (“Mr. Nwansi”), a naturalized citizen of the

United States, married Plaintiff Gloria Nwansi (“Mrs. Nwansi”), a citizen of Nigeria. Approximately

Case 3:06-cv-00003-TEH Document 17 Filed 07/18/06 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

seven months later, on July 21, 2003, Mr. Nwansi filed an I-130 petition with USCIS to classify

Mrs. Nwansi as his spouse. On September 16, 2004, USCIS approved the petition and forwarded it

to the U.S. Consulate in Lagos, Nigeria (“the Consulate”). Mrs. Nwansi then applied to the

Consulate for an immigrant visa based on the approved petition. 

This sequence of events follows the standard process for bringing an alien spouse to live in

the United States: first, the U.S. legal resident or citizen spouse must petition USCIS for recognition

of the marital relationship. If USCIS approves the petition, it is forwarded to the consulate in the

alien spouse’s respective region. The alien spouse must then apply to the consulate for an immigrant

visa to enter the United States. 

It is at this point that Plaintiffs’ efforts to have Mrs. Nwansi admitted to the United States hit

a snag. Pursuant to State Department guidelines advising consular “review,” the Consulate

interviewed Mrs. Nwansi and, as a result, decided not to issue her an immigrant visa and to return

Mr. Nwansi’s I-130 petition to the USCIS for review and possible revocation. In an unsigned letter

to Mrs. Nwansi dated May 6, 2005 (“the OF-194”), the Chief of the Immigrant Visa Unit at the

Consulate offered the following explanation:

The reason for our action is: Based on poverty guidelines, neither sponsor nor co-sponsor can

support their own families. Furthermore, applicant could not demonstrate that she had a

sincere and lasting relationship with her husband since 2001. 

On August 19, 2005, USCIS issued a notice to Mr. Nwansi indicating it had received his

returned I-130 petition. On January 27, 2006, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke the

approved I-130 petition (“Notice”) and provided Mr. Nwansi thirty days to respond. The Notice

contained additional evidence and specific findings by the Consulate in support of its earlier

decision not to issue Mrs. Nwansi a visa and to return the I-130 petition to USCIS. The evidence and

findings in this Notice had not been previously provided to Plaintiffs. Mr. Nwansi filed a timely

response. On April 27, 2006, one day before Defendants filed the instant motion, USCIS reaffirmed

its initial decision to grant Mr. Nwansi’s I-130 petition and again forwarded it to the Consulate for a

decision as to whether to grant or deny Mrs. Nwansi’s visa application. The Consulate has not yet

acted on the visa application. 

Case 3:06-cv-00003-TEH Document 17 Filed 07/18/06 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Plaintiffs allege causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, and for mandamus.

Defendants argue that all of Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because they fall within the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Dismissal is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over the claim. Federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist at the time the

action is commenced. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Calif. State Board of Equalization, 858

F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1988). However, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time,

and if the parties do not identify a potential problem, it is the court’s duty to address the issue sua

sponte whenever it is perceived. See Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d 799, 803 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)).

A 12(b)(1) motion may either attack the sufficiency of the pleadings to establish federal

jurisdiction, or allege an actual lack of jurisdiction which exists despite the formal sufficiency of the

complaint. Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Electronics, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.

1979); Mendez v. Gearan, 947 F. Supp. 1364, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Although lack of subject

matter jurisdiction is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof in a 12(b)(1) motion is on the party

asserting jurisdiction. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Therefore, although the complaint is to be construed liberally, argumentative inferences favorable to

the pleader will not be drawn, and the court will presume a lack of jurisdiction until the pleader

proves otherwise. Id. An action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction only if it

is clear that the jurisdictional deficiency cannot be cured by amendment. DCD Programs, Ltd. v.

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION 

As noted above, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because all of the claims asserted fall within the doctrine

Case 3:06-cv-00003-TEH Document 17 Filed 07/18/06 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

of consular nonreviewability. In general, that doctrine prohibits judicial review of consular officers’

decisions to grant or deny visas. Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir.

1986); Ventura-Escamilla v. INS, 647 F.2d 28, 30 (9th Cir. 1981). It is further understood to apply to

all discretionary decisions of consular officers. See Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 1997)

(emphasizing that plaintiffs were not challenging a decision within the discretion of the consular

officer and implying that otherwise jurisdiction would not exist). Indeed, the doctrine of consular

nonreviewability has been heavily criticized for the almost absolute power it affords consular

officers over visa issuance. See e.g. Sam Bernsen, Consular Absolutism in Visa Cases, 63 Interpreter

Releases 388 (1986). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks review of discretionary

decisions by the Consulate and therefore is nonreviewable under the doctrine. 

Plaintiffs respond that the doctrine is inapplicable here because the consular decisions in this

case constituted an impermissible “suspension.” Plaintiffs read the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Patel

as carving out an exception to the doctrine which allows for review of impermissible suspensions.

See Patel, 134 F.3d 929 (granting mandamus where the Consulate’s “suspension” of a visa was

impermissible). Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ characterization of the Consulate’s action as a

“suspension,” arguing that the Consulate did not suspend but in fact refused Mrs. Nwansi’s

application. However, even if Plaintiffs are correct in asserting that the action was a suspension and

not a refusal as Defendants argue, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Patel is misguided. 

In Patel, the United States Consulate in Bombay, India had failed to resolve the pending

immigrant visa applications for eight years, and indeed, affirmatively “refused to act” on the

pending applications. Government counsel in the case expressly conceded that the relevant officials

were “holding the visa applications in abeyance.” Patel, 134 F.3d. at 932. In reaching the

defendants’ action, the Court held that the consulate’s “holding in abeyance” violated a mandatory

duty under 22 C.F.R. § 42.81 to “issue or refuse” a properly completed and submitted visa

application. 

Normally a consular official’s discretionary decision to grant or deny a visa petition is not

subject to judicial review. Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir.

1986); Ventura-Escamilla v. INS, 647 F.2d 28, 30 (9th Cir. 1981). However, when the suit

Case 3:06-cv-00003-TEH Document 17 Filed 07/18/06 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 See infra n.5 and accompanying text. 

5

challenges the authority of the consul to take or fail to take an action as opposed to a decision

within the consul’s discretion, jurisdiction exists. Patel, 134 F.3d at 931-932. 

Thus, Patel simply holds that where a consular officer has a nondiscretionary duty to act but refuses

to do so, the court can grant mandamus relief and force the consulate to issue a decision (though

importantly, in issuing the writ, the court may not direct the agency how to act). It does not alter the

scope of the doctrine with respect to discretionary consular visa decisions. 

Plaintiffs mistakenly equate the Bombay Consulate’s “holding in abeyance” (an

impermissible suspension) with the Consulate’s permissible actions in this case, actions which are

expressly within the discretion of consular officers as evidenced by the applicable regulations. See

22 C.F.R. § 42.43. Crucially, the Patel Court explicitly recognized that not all “suspensions” are

impermissible. Suspension is authorized, the Court held, so long as “the consulate also returns the

petition to the INS [now USCIS] for a final disposition,” i.e., acts within its discretion. Patel, 134

F.3d at 932. That is precisely what happened in this case: the Consulate decided not to issue Mrs.

Nwansi an immigrant visa and returned Mr. Nwansi’s I-130 petition to the USCIS. 

Also, significantly, Defendants have not unreasonably delayed Mrs. Nwansi’s visa

application nor have they placed it in a state of limbo similar to the one that motivated the Patel

Court, though Plaintiffs suggest that potentiality.2 See also Raduga USA Corp. v United States Dep’t

of State, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22941 (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2005) (granting mandamus based on the

Consulate’s “unreasonable” four year delay in processing plaintiffs’ visa applications). By returning

Mr. Nwansi’s I-130 petition to USCIS, the Consulate acted within its discretion. In short, because

the Consulate has not failed to perform a mandatory duty, this case does not qualify under Patel’s

“impermissible” suspension exception.

Plaintiffs appear to be under the mistaken impression that Patel’s very narrow conception of

“impermissible” suspension extends to include instances where a consular officer’s discretionary

action allegedly violates State Department guidelines. Such a misunderstanding would explain

Plaintiffs’ extensive discussion of how the consular actions here violate State Department

Case 3:06-cv-00003-TEH Document 17 Filed 07/18/06 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) guides the State Department in performing its duties. It

is a compilation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1181, et seq., and of

Departmental regulations, interpretations and procedural notes. 4 See generally Anderson & Gifford, Consular Discretion in the Immigrant Visa-Issuing

Process, 16 San Diego L. Rev. 87, 152 (1978) (finding that “[FAM] guidelines are often vague and

ill-defined.”).

6

guidelines. However, because the actions are discretionary and not mandatory as in Patel, the

doctrine prohibits judicial review. Moreover, even if the Court were inclined to accept Plaintiffs’

overbroad reading of Patel, Plaintiffs have failed to convince the Court that there are sufficient

grounds on which to find that the Consulate violated State Department guidelines pertaining to

suspension of a visa application. 

Plaintiffs argue that the Consulate failed to properly comply with Note 1 to Part 42.43 of

Chapter 9 of the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual,3 which states, “Consular officers

should bear in mind that the [State] Department considers the approval of a visa petition [by USCIS]

prima facie evidence of the [marital] relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary. ...

Therefore, it is the consular officer’s responsibility to review, not to readjudicate petitions.”

Essentially, Plaintiffs ask the Court to interpret the Consulate’s action here as constituting an

impermissible “readjudication” and, thereby, to find that the Consulate’s decision not to issue Mrs.

Nwansi an immigrant visa and to return her husband’s I-130 petition was unlawful on procedural

grounds. However, the line between permissible “review” and impermissible “readjudication” is far

from bright,4

 and Plaintiffs fail to offer any persuasive explanation or argument as to where the line

should fall or why the actions here constitute a “readjudication.” Plaintiffs merely point to a single

line in the OF-194 which states, “applicant could not demonstrate that she had a sincere and lasting

relationship with her husband.” From this, Plaintiffs would have the Court find that the Consulate

did not consider approval of the petition to be prima facie evidence, but rather impermissibly

readjudicated the I-130 petition. This is totally inadequate. 

Weaker still is Plaintiffs’ argument that the Consulate failed to meet the “minimum

evidentiary standards” indicated by Note 2.2 to Part 42.43. Here, Plaintiffs’ claim is again based on

the OF-194, but their reliance on that document is unjustified. Nowhere do Plaintiffs point to any

regulation requiring the Consulate to present all of its relevant evidence for a decision to “suspend

Case 3:06-cv-00003-TEH Document 17 Filed 07/18/06 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 The State Department appears to have contemplated the possibility of such a “cycle” and to

have drafted their guidelines to limit its effect. Not only do the guidelines advise consular officers to

limit “suspend and return” decisions to situations in which they become privy to substantial new

evidence not considered by USCIS, but Note 4.1 to Part 42.43 of Chapter 9 of the FAM further

provides, “In the rare case where the consular officer irreconcilably disagrees with the [USCIS]

decision to uphold the validity of the petition [i.e. reaffirmation]... the consular officer shall send the

entire case to the [State] Department for review and discussion with [USCIS]/HQ.” This mechanism

would seem to provide for those rare instances when consular officers are inclined to “suspend and

return” more than once. 

7

and return” in the related OF-194. Nor do Plaintiffs suggest any reason why the Consulate would

have done so here or why the Court should accept the OF-194 as an appropriate, let alone exclusive,

measure of the Consulate’s evidence in this case. Thus, it is impossible to conclude based on the OF194 alone that the Consulate’s evidence is insufficient. Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not challenge the

sufficiency of the Consulate’s evidence as set forth in the Notice of Intent to Revoke. Instead, they

argue that the Court should ignore this evidence in considering the sufficiency of the evidence in

toto because the Consulate’s failure to disclose it in the OF-194 denied Plaintiffs of notice and an

opportunity to be heard. However, the Consulate has no express duty to offer such notice and

opportunity to be heard. 

Plaintiffs also complain that, as a general matter, the applicable regulations governing

consular visa issuance violate due process because they do not require notice and an opportunity to

be heard in consular decisions to “suspend and return.” Plaintiffs argue that providing such due

process is especially important because the regulations allow for a single visa application and related

I-130 petition to be “suspended and returned” a potentially unlimited number of times. Plaintiffs

refer to this potentiality as a “vicious cycle of return [of petitions by consular officers] and

reaffirmation [by USCIS].”5

 In response, the Court simply notes that the doctrine of consular

nonreviewability was born out of the judiciary’s recognition of the virtually complete legislative

power of Congress over the admission of aliens. See Li Hing, 800 F.2d at 970. 

The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe

the terms and conditions upon which they may come into this country, and to have its

declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively though executive officers without judicial

intervention is settled by our previous adjudications. Id. at 971 (quoting Lem Moon Sing, 158

U.S. at 547). 

Case 3:06-cv-00003-TEH Document 17 Filed 07/18/06 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Regulations governing consular visa actions are certainly no more reviewable than consular visa

actions themselves. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (“[T]hat the formulation of [policies

pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here] is entrusted exclusively to Congress

has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as

any aspect of our government.”).

In sum, the consular actions at issue here are all well within the Consulate’s zone of

discretion, and thus nonreviewable pursuant to the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. Plaintiffs

cannot allege that the actions taken were per se outside the bounds of the authority granted consular

officers; it is clear that a consular officer may decide not to issue a visa and to return the underlying

petition to USCIS on the reasoned belief that the marriage between petitioner and beneficiary is a

sham. The Consulate appears to have acted within its discretion. Moreover, as discussed above, even

if the Court were willing to tread so far as to require strict compliance with State Department

guidelines governing the discretionary decisions of consular officers, it is not clear that the result in

this case would be any different or more favorable to Plaintiffs. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ case is hereby

granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2006 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:06-cv-00003-TEH Document 17 Filed 07/18/06 Page 8 of 8