Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01354/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01354-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE ALLEN SMEDLEY,

Petitioner,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD,

Respondent.

 /

1: 05 CV 01354 WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[Doc. 17]

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to the

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 12, 1988, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder with an arming

enhancement. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve a term of 25 years to life plus two

additional years for the firearm use. Petitioner filed a direct appeal and on December 28, 1990, the

California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s petition for review on March 13, 1991.

Petitioner subsequently filed four pro se state habeas corpus petitions as follows:

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First Petition

May 4, 1992: petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in Court of Appeal

May 7, 1992: petition denied

Second Petition

August 5, 2004: petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in Superior Court

August 12, 2004: petition denied

Third Petition

October 1, 2004: petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in Court of Appeal

October 7, 2004: petition denied

Fourth Petition

November 8, 2004: petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in California Supreme Court

September 21, 2005: Petition denied.

Petitioner filed the present petition on October 5, 2005.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Calaveras 

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

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to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

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1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that it is barred by the statute of

limitations. Petitioner has not responded to the motion.

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. The AEDPA, however, is silent on how the one year limitation period affects

cases where direct review concluded before the enactment of the AEDPA. The Ninth Circuit has

held that if a petitioner whose review ended before the enactment of the AEDPA filed a habeas

corpus petition within one year of the AEDPA’s enactment, the Court should not dismiss the petition

pursuant to § 2244(d)(1). Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1286 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 899 (1998); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 127 F.3d

782, 784 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1395 (1998). In such circumstances, the limitations th

period would begin to run on April 25, 1996. See, Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9

th

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Cir. 2001).

In this case, Respondent correctly contends that because Petitioner’s conviction was entered

before April 24, 1996, the effective date of the statute of limitations, the limitations period began

running on April 25, 1996. Without either statutory or equitable tolling, the statute would expire one

year later in April of 1997. Respondent also correct contends that because Petitioner’s first state

petition was resolved on May 7, 1992, before the statute of limitations began running, it had no

tolling effect. 

Further, Respondent argues that “Petitioner’s second through fourth state petitions were filed 

after the expiration of the limitations period. Consequently, they do not toll the limitations period.” 

As set forth in Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner’s second state petition was filed on

August 5, 2004, and his fourth petition was denied on September 21, 2005. Respondent is therefore

correct in arguing that the second, third and fourth petitions were filed and resolved after the statute

of limitations expired in April of 1997 and therefore had no tolling effect. 

In light of the above, the court must conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling

of the statute of limitations and that, absent equitable tolling, the statute of limitations expired in

April of 1997, long before the present petition was filed on October 5, 2005.

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 th

F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60, 139 (1997); Calderon v. th

United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1288 (9 Cir.), overruled in part on other grounds th

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9 Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that th

"[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if

'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time"). 

In this case, Petitioner has not responded to Respondent’s motion and so has not thereby

presented a claim for equitable tolling. The court’s review of the petition similarly reveals no basis

for such tolling. Accordingly, the court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling

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of the statute of limitations in this case.

ORDER

In light of the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2) This petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations;

3) The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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