Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00807/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00807-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERONICA PIERCE,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 17cv0807-LAB (JLB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE RE: DENYING PETITION 

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Veronica Pierce (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a state probationer proceeding by and 

through counsel with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

(ECF No. 1.) Petitioner was convicted in the San Diego Superior Court of transportation

of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale, and sentenced to 120 days in jail and 

three years formal probation. (Pet. at 1-2.) She claims here, as she did in state court, that 

she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial counsel failed to renew at 

trial a motion brought at the preliminary hearing to suppress the marijuana based on an

illegal search and seizure, which resulted in forfeiture of that claim on appeal (claim one), 

and that her statement to the police that the parcel she was in the process of shipping when 

arrested contained “a little bit of weed” was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 

384 U.S. 436 (1966), and should have been suppressed (claim two). (Id. at 12-20.) 

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Respondent has filed an Answer and lodged the state court record. (ECF Nos. 7-8.) 

Respondent contends claim one is unexhausted because the superior court is the only state 

court to which it has been presented. (Memo. of P&A in Supp. of Answer [“Ans. Mem.”] 

at 5.) Respondent argues claim one should be denied notwithstanding the failure to exhaust 

because the superior court’s rejection of the claim is neither contrary to, nor involves an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Id. at 6-9.) Respondent 

contends claim two does not provide a basis for relief because the state court determination 

that Petitioner was not in custody when she made the statement and therefore her Miranda

rights were not violated, is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established federal law. (Id. at 10-14.) Petitioner has not filed a Traverse.

For the following reasons, the Court finds that although Petitioner failed to present 

claim one to the state supreme court, the exhaustion requirement is technically satisfied 

because state court remedies no longer remain available as to that claim, and, alternately, 

that the Court has discretion to deny the claim notwithstanding a failure to exhaust. The 

Court finds that habeas relief is unavailable because the state court adjudication of both 

claims is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. The Court also finds that 

any alleged error in the admission of Petitioner’s statement is harmless. The Court 

therefore recommends the Petition be denied.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a two-count Complaint filed in the San Diego County Superior Court on October 

10, 2014, deemed to be an Information on January 26, 2015, Petitioner and her codefendant Tyrone White were charged with transportation of more than 28.5 grams of 

marijuana in violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11360(a) (count one), and 

possession for sale of a usable amount of marijuana in violation of California Health and 

Safety Code § 11359 (count two). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Transcript [“CT”] at 1-3.) 

/ / / 

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Prior to the preliminary hearing, Petitioner’s counsel, who represented her at the 

preliminary hearing and at trial, filed a motion to suppress the marijuana on the basis that 

because the search and seizure occurred without a warrant it presumptively violated the

Fourth Amendment. (CT 4-10.) An evidentiary hearing, at which the arresting officers 

testified, was held prior to the preliminary hearing. (Lodgment No. 1, Preliminary Hearing 

Tr. at 5-97.) The motion was denied on the basis that Petitioner was lawfully detained at 

the time she was asked by an officer if he could open the parcel in her possession which 

was eventually found to contain marijuana, but was not under arrest, and voluntarily gave 

consent to open the parcel. (Id. at 97-101.) Defense counsel did not renew that motion at 

trial, but filed a motion in limine to suppress Petitioner’s statement to the arresting officer

that there was “a little bit of weed” in the parcel, which she made in response to the officer’s 

comment that he had been watching her and based on his thirty years of experience there 

was either marijuana or cocaine in the parcel, claiming it was obtained as a result of 

custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. (Lodgment No. 2, Reporter’s Tr. 

[“RT”] at 18.) The trial judge conducted a pre-trial evidentiary hearing at which the

arresting officers again testified, and denied the motion on the basis that Petitioner’s 

statement was not made in response to custodial interrogation because she was not in 

custody at the time, and because she volunteered the statement in response to the officer’s

observation, not as a result of questioning. (RT 25-39.) On April 16, 2015, a jury found 

her guilty on both counts. (CT 175-76.) On May 15, 2015, she was sentenced to 120 days 

in custody and three years formal probation. (CT 178.) 

Petitioner appealed, challenging the denial of her motions to suppress the marijuana

and to suppress her statement. (Lodgment Nos. 3-5.) The appellate court affirmed, finding

that Petitioner had forfeited a challenge to the motion to suppress the marijuana by failing 

to re-raise it at trial, and that the trial court had properly denied the motion to suppress her

statement because she was not in custody when she made the statement. (Lodgment No. 

6, People v. Pierce, No. D068218, slip op. (Cal.App.Ct. May 10, 2016).) She raised the 

same claims in a petition for review in the state supreme court. (Lodgment No. 7.) That

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court denied the petition in an order which stated, “The petition for review is denied.” 

(Lodgment No. 8, People v. Pierce, No. S235161, order at 1 (July 20, 2016).)

On August 10, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state superior court in 

which she raised claim one here, arguing that she received ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel due to counsel’s failure to re-raise the preliminary hearing marijuana suppression 

motion at trial, which resulted in forfeiture of the challenge to the denial of that motion on 

appeal. (Lodgment No. 8.) The superior court denied the petition on September 23, 2016, 

finding that Petitioner had not received ineffective assistance of counsel because had trial 

counsel renewed the motion to suppress in the trial court it would have been denied for the 

same reason it was denied at the preliminary hearing. (Lodgment No. 9, In re Pierce, No. 

HC22587, order (Cal.Sup.Ct. Sept. 28, 2016).) 

II. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Don Clark, a Chula Vista Police Detective, testified that he is assigned to the Parcel 

Interdiction Team of the Regional Narcotics Task Force for the United States Drug 

Enforcement Administration, whose primary responsibility is to investigate people who 

ship narcotics across the country in parcels through carriers such as UPS, FedEx, DHL and 

the United States Post Office. (RT 67-69.) He testified that narcotics are shipped from 

San Diego to other parts of the country every day, and that the value increases 

proportionately to the distance from San Diego, so that a pound of marijuana worth about 

$400 in San Diego is worth about $1200 in New York. (RT 69-71.) 

On October 8, 2014, Detective Clark was conducting surveillance at the Postal 

Annex in Lemon Grove, California, which his team calls the “fishing hole” because the 

shipping of narcotics is so prevalent there. (RT 72-74.) Detective Clark’s attention was 

drawn to a man, later identified as Petitioner’s co-defendant Tyrone White, leaving the 

Postal Annex with flattened cardboard boxes and packing peanuts, which he placed in the 

truck of his car while Petitioner stood outside the passenger side of the car. (RT 74-75, 

80.) Detective Clark’s team decided to follow the car, which drove to a United States Post 

Office where White was seen leaving with a flattened cardboard box. (RT 77-79.) White 

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then drove to his residence, arriving about 2:50 p.m., and the team set up surveillance 

parked on a street across a canyon from the house.1 (RT 79-82.) 

White parked in his garage, which is detached from his house, and during the ensuing 

two hours made five to ten trips between his home and the garage, including carrying a 

large ball of cellophane. (RT 79-85, 107.) Petitioner never entered the garage, but stayed

inside the house until, about 4:40 p.m., White drove them both to a FedEx store on 47th 

Street. (RT 86, 117-18.) Detective Clark explained that cellophane is used to wrap 

narcotics to prevent the smell from escaping, and that the 47th Street FedEx store is a 

shipping hub which sends its parcels directly to the airport in the late afternoon. (RT 86-

87.) He said that narcotics traffickers typically wait to bring parcels to the shipping center 

near the time of the last shipment so the parcels do not sit in the store all day, because the 

smell of narcotics can eventually permeate the packaging. (Id.)

When Petitioner and White arrived at the 47th Street FedEx store, Petitioner exited

the passenger side of the vehicle carrying a parcel, with White following her at a short 

distance carrying his own parcel. (RT 88-89.) White appeared to become suspicious and

looked at the officers, so Detective Clark approached him, identified himself as a police 

officer, said he was a member of the Parcel Interdiction Team, and asked if he would mind 

talking about the package he was about to ship. (RT 90.) While Detective Clark was 

speaking to White, he observed other officers from his team exit the store with Petitioner 

and open her parcel, which contained 11.3 pounds of marijuana. (RT 91-92.) Petitioner’s 

purse contained $13,500 in cash and a stub from an airline ticket from New York to San 

Diego the previous day. (RT 95-97.) The value of the marijuana in her parcel was about 

$4000 in San Diego and about $12,000 in New York. (RT 97-98.) Detective Clark said

the team went to White’s house where he gave consent to search his house and his parcel. 

(RT 98.) They found 11.7 pounds of marijuana in his parcel, and 13.7 pounds of marijuana 

 

1

 At the preliminary hearing motion to suppress, Detective Clark testified that he was parked about 100 

yards from White’s house using binoculars and a long-lens camera to watch the house, although he was 

able see it with his naked eye. (Lodgment No. 1, Preliminary Hearing Tr. at 31.)

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in his garage, along with materials used in packaging narcotics for mailing. (RT 99-102.) 

The total marijuana recovered, 36.7 pounds, is worth about $12,845 in San Diego, very 

close to the amount of cash recovered from Petitioner, and worth about $36,700 in New 

York. (RT 99-101.) Petitioner consented to a search of her hotel room, but no evidence 

was found. (RT 111-13.)

John McGill, a San Diego Police Narcotics Detective, testified that he is a member 

of the Commercial Interdiction Team of the Drug Enforcement Administration assigned to 

identify individuals who ship narcotics through the mail or postal services. (RT 121.) On 

October 8, 2014, about 2:30 p.m., he was on duty at the Postal Annex in Lemon Grove 

where he observed Petitioner and her co-defendant White standing next to White’s car. 

(RT 122-24, 127.) His team followed them to a residence, and then to a FedEx store on 

47th Street. (RT 125-26.) It appeared to Detective McGill that as White was walking into 

the FedEx store he become aware of the police presence, so the team decided to make 

contact with White and Petitioner. (RT 127.) 

Detective McGill went inside the store where he observed Petitioner at the counter 

“appear[ing] to be filling out a shipping label.” (RT 127-28.) He identified himself as a 

police officer, showed her his badge but not his gun, said, “Let’s go outside and talk to 

your friend,” and took the parcel and walked outside. (RT 128, 137-38.) Petitioner 

followed him outside where he asked what her relationship to White was, and she replied 

they were friends, but when asked his name, “she couldn’t provide the name.” (RT 128-

29.) Detective McGill said she looked extremely nervous, much more so than an average 

person approached by the police, and that she kept looking at White and was vague with 

her answers when asked what she had been doing that day. (RT 129, 143.) After Petitioner 

produced a New York identification card, Detective McGill told her he had years of 

experience, that he had been watching her, and that he suspected her parcel contained 

marijuana. (RT 130.) Petitioner “really didn’t say anything. She kind of shook her head 

in the ‘no’ fashion.” (Id.) Detective McGill then said to her, “Well, whatever is in here, if 

it’s not marijuana, then it’s cocaine.” (Id.) Petitioner replied, “No. It’s a little bit of weed.” 

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(Id.) He asked for her consent to open the parcel, which she gave, and he opened it and 

found two or three heat-sealed packages containing 10 or 11 pounds of marijuana. (RT 

130-31, 133.) He then arrested Petitioner and searched her person and personal belongings. 

(RT 131.) In her purse he found an airline ticket stub from the previous day from New 

York to San Diego, an envelope containing $13,500 in brand new crisp $100 bills, and a 

key from a hotel in San Ysidro. (RT 131-32.) A forensic chemist with the Drug 

Enforcement Administration testified that the material in the parcels was marijuana. (RT 

144-53.) The People rested. (RT 156.)

Petitioner testified that she is a registered nurse and a former real estate agent who 

owns and lives in a multi-unit residence in the Bronx, New York. (RT 158.) She has six 

tenants in her building who pay her their rent in cash, about $4000 per month total, and a 

rental house in Florida which generates $950 per month by check. (RT 159.) She also 

receives a paycheck from her nursing job, which she cashes rather than deposits in a bank, 

and carries her money around with her in cash rather than putting it in a bank, because her 

parents never had a bank account and “that’s just how I was brought up.” (RT 160-61.) 

Petitioner testified that she came to San Diego on a one-way ticket on October 7, 

2015, hoping to relocate here to avoid the cold winters in New York. (RT 163.) She met 

her co-defendant White in Georgia a couple of years earlier, and although they had 

remained friends she did not “know the intricate details of his life.” (RT 164-65.) She got 

in touch with him hoping he would show her around San Diego and help her find an 

apartment. (RT 165.) White picked her up at her hotel about noon on October 8, and said 

he had some errands to run before he could show her around. (RT 165-66.) He drove to a 

Postal Annex store and then to a post office before driving to his house, and she stayed in 

the car each time he went inside the stores. (RT 166-68.) When they arrived at his house, 

he went into the garage and she went directly into the house, where she sat in the living 

room watching television while he remained in the garage. (RT 168-69.) The garage is 

separate from the house, and although he came and went occasionally she did not know 

what he was doing and did not smell anything. (RT 169-70.) 

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Eventually, he told her he had one more errand to run and they left in his car. (RT 

170.) White then drove them to a FedEx store where he gave her a parcel which “he said 

had books or something that he was going to ship to some friend,” and asked her, “Can you 

please help me bring this inside.” (RT 171, 174.) She was standing inside the store with 

the parcel waiting for White, and was not filling out a shipping label, when a police officer 

approached her and lifted his shirt revealing his gun and badge. (RT 171-73.) She did not 

know what was going on, and when the officer asked her what was in the box, she said, “I 

don’t know.” (Id.) She was frightened because she had never been in such a situation 

before, and denied telling the officer that the box contained a little bit of weed. (RT 173-

74.) She said Detective McGill told her, “I’ve been doing this my whole life, and if it’s 

not weed in there, it’s cocaine,” and asked if he could open the box. (RT 174.) She told 

him, “Sure. It’s your job.” (Id.) 

Petitioner testified that she brought the $13,000 in cash with her from New York, 

which she intended to use to pay the $2200 mortgage on her New York building, the $850 

mortgage on her Florida house, purchase an airline ticket to visit her grandchildren in 

Nevada or return to New York, and to possibly put a down payment on an apartment in 

San Diego and buy furniture. (RT 176-77, 180.) She said she has been working two jobs 

most of her life and makes a fairly good income as a nurse, that she is in the habit of 

carrying her money on her rather than keeping it in a bank, that she changes her cash into 

new $100 bills whenever she has a chance, and that she did not come to San Diego for the 

purpose of shipping marijuana back to New York. (RT 178-80.) The defense rested and 

there was no rebuttal evidence offered. (RT 189-90.)

After deliberating about a day and a half, during which Petitioner’s testimony was 

read back, the jury found her guilty of transporting more than 28.5 grams of marijuana, and 

guilty of possession for sale of a usable amount of marijuana. (RT 171-76.) Petitioner was 

sentenced to 120 days in custody and three years formal probation. (RT 276.) 

/ / /

/ / /

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III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that her federal constitutional rights were violated because she 

received ineffective assistance of counsel when her trial counsel failed to renew at trial the 

preliminary hearing motion to suppress the marijuana, which resulted in forfeiture of a 

challenge to the denial of that motion on appeal (claim one), and that her statement to the 

police that her parcel contained “a little bit of weed” was erroneously admitted at trial 

because it was obtained as a result of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings 

(claim two). (Pet. at 12-20.)

Respondent contends that claim one is unexhausted because it was presented only to

the superior court in a habeas petition, never to the state supreme court, but argues it should 

be denied notwithstanding the failure to exhaust because the superior court’s rejection of 

the claim is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. (Ans. Mem. at 6-9.) Respondent argues that the state court 

determination that Petitioner was not in custody when she made her statement and therefore 

her Miranda rights were not violated, is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. (Id. at 10-14.)

A. Standard of Review

In order to obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim which was adjudicated 

on the merits in state court, a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the state court 

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). Even if § 2254(d) is satisfied, a petitioner must show

a federal constitutional violation occurred in order to obtain relief. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 

112, 119-22 (2007); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth 

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in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state 

court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal 

law, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases 

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. 

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and only 

if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there 

could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ___, 

134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07 (2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). 

In order to satisfy § 2254(d)(2), the petitioner must show that the factual findings upon 

which the state court’s adjudication of his claims rest are objectively unreasonable. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

B. Claim One

Petitioner first claims that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her 

trial counsel (Petitioner was represented by the same attorney at the preliminary hearing 

and at trial), failed to renew at trial the preliminary hearing motion to suppress the 

marijuana. (Pet. at 12-15.) Petitioner claims here, as she did at the preliminary hearing 

motion, that the actions of the officers in watching her with binoculars and a long-lens 

camera violated her Fourth Amendment rights because the use of such optical enhancement 

techniques was unreasonable, and therefore did not support the finding of reasonable 

suspicion needed for a lawful detention. (Id.) The only state court to which this claim was

presented is the state superior court, in a habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 9.) The superior 

court denied the petition, stating:

Petitioner claims her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve 

the legality of the detention as an issue on appeal by not raising the issue 

concerning the surveillance with the trial court. “When a defendant claims 

ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel’s failure to bring a 

motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, the defendant is 

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required to show that the Fourth Amendment claim had merit.” (People v. 

Frye (1989) 18 Cal.4th 894, 989, disapproved on other grounds by People v. 

Doolin (2009) 45 Cal. 4th 390.) “Counsel does not render ineffective 

assistance by failing to make motions or objections that counsel reasonably 

determines would be futile.” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 287.) 

Additionally, “(t)he Sixth Amendment does not require counsel ‘to waste the 

court’s time with futile or frivolous motions.’ (Citation.)” (People v. Memro

(1996) 11 Cal.4th 786, 834, internal quotations omitted.) Although the Court 

of Appeal concluded that petitioner failed to preserve the issue of legality of 

her detention for appeal, “(l)ike pouring alkali on acid, raising the issue of 

ineffective assistance of counsel neutralizes Lilienthal waiver” and requires a 

review of the lawfulness of the search or detention. (Hart, supra, 74 

Cal.App.4th at 486.) That being the case, this court reviewed the legality of 

the detention based on petitioner’s argument that the surveillance conducted 

by Officer Clark was unlawful thereby rendering the detention illegal.

Petitioner argues that her detention was unlawful because the 

surveillance conducted by Officer Clark, which formed the reasonable 

suspicion to detain her, violated her reasonable expectation of privacy. She 

takes issue with Officer Clark’s use of binoculars and a long-lens camera 

when he was conducting surveillance of petitioner prior to the detention. 

Petitioner claims that Officer Clark’s “use of enhanced techniques” to observe 

her violated her right to be free from unreasonable search, “because her 

movements were not readily visible to the naked eye of the observer.” (See 

Petition at 17:9-18.) Petitioner admits that although she “did not seek to hide 

herself from public view when she traveled on public highways and entered 

buildings open to the public, she did not relinquish her right to be free from 

unreasonable search and seizure simply because she was visible to the public.” 

(See Petition at 16:20-24.) Thus, she claims Officer Clark’s use of binoculars 

and a camera while conducting his surveillance violated her Fourth 

Amendment right because it was beyond the scope of permissible and 

reasonable surveillance and cannot be used to form the reasonable suspicion 

needed to lawfully detain her.

Petitioner’s argument is without merit and a motion to suppress or a 

renewed suppression motion would have been denied in the trial court. “[T]he 

Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly 

exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject of Fourth 

Amendment protection.” (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 351.) 

“But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 

public, may be constitutionally protected.” (Ibid.) The test to determine the 

validity of surveillance depends on “whether that which is perceived or heard 

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is that which is conducted with a reasonable expectation of privacy and not 

upon the means used to view it or hear it.” (People v. Arno (1979) 90 

Cal.App.3d 505, 511.) “So long as that which is viewed or heard is perceptible 

to the naked eye or unaided ear, the person seen or heard has no reasonable 

expectation of privacy in what occurs. Because he has no reasonable 

expectation of privacy, governmental authority may use technological aids to 

visual or aural enhancement of whatever type available.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, 

it has long been established that “if the purpose of the optically aided view is 

to permit clandestine police surveillance of that which could be seen from a 

more obvious vantage point without the optical aid, there is no 

unconstitutional intrusion.” (Burkholder v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal. 

App.3d 421, 426.)

The observations of petitioner and her co-defendant which Officer 

Clark testified to at the preliminary hearing were made while the two were in 

public and were visible to the naked eye. Initially, Officer Clark and his team 

were conducting surveillance at the Postal Annex located at 7107 Broadway 

in Lemon Grove, which is a known location for narcotic shipments. Prior to 

petitioner and her co-defendant’s arrival at the subject Postal Annex, Officer 

Clark had been conducting surveillance at that location for approximately an 

hour. He was parked in the strip mall across the street from the Postal Annex, 

which he testified was approximately 150 away. Officer Clark testified that 

he believed he took a photograph of petitioner as she was standing outside the 

passenger side of co-defendant’s vehicle in the Postal Annex parking lot. 

According to Officer Clark, it was co-defendant’s action of leaving this 

particular Postal Annex with shipping equipment which caught his attention 

and which caused him to decide to follow the two to their next location.

Consistent with Officer Clark’s experience with narcotic shipments, 

petitioner and co-defendant were observed traveling to another postal service

location; the U.S. Post Office at 5505 Stevens Way. There, Officer Clark 

parked in the same parking lot as petitioner and co-defendant. Office Clark 

testified that he took photographs of the co-defendant as he went inside the 

post office, when the co-defendant exited the post office with additional 

packaging material, and when the co-defendant loaded the packaging material 

into his car. Officer Clark testified that he parked one block over, on 69th 

Street in San Diego, where he was elevated above co-defendant’s residence 

and had an unobstructed view of the house. He estimated he was parked 

approximately 100 feet away from the residence. He conducted surveillance 

at the residence for over an hour and a half and observed, with the aid of his 

binoculars and camera, co-defendant come in and out of the house and 

opening and closing the garage door. He also observed the co-defendant come 

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out of the residence or garage with cellophane, one of the most common items 

used to wrap large commercial quantities of narcotics. Officer Clark testified 

that petitioner was inside the house the entire time he conducted surveillance 

of the co-defendant’s residence.

Then, around 4:30 p.m., Officer Clark observed petitioner and her codefendant leave the residence. He followed them to their next destination, 

which was to the FedEx store on 47th Street in San Diego. There, Officer 

Clark observed petitioner enter into the store while he was “out on the road.” 

He then entered the FedEx parking lot and parked a couple of stalls away from 

co-defendant’s car. Officer Clark testified that based on Officer Clark’s 

extensive experience with narcotic shipments and his observations of codefendant and petitioner, he formed a reasonable suspicion that co-defendant 

and petitioner were going to ship a narcotic parcel. Contact was made with 

petitioner by Officer McGill inside the FedEx store while Officer Clark made 

contact with co-defendant in the parking lot of the store.

Based on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, it was clear 

that Officer Clark’s use of an optical aid by way of the binoculars and/or 

camera did not violate petitioner’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This is 

because, under the circumstances, no privacy rights could have reasonably 

existed while petitioner was out in the public and viewable to the naked eye. 

Additionally, there was no evidence that the binoculars and/or camera were 

used to see what petitioner or her co-defendant were doing inside his house. 

Officer Clark did not provide any testimony regarding any actions petitioner 

may or may not have done while in co-defendant’s residence. Without any 

evidence that officer Clark used the binoculars and/or camera to see 

Petitioner’s movements and actions while inside co-defendant’s home, 

petitioner has merely asserted an assumption that the devices were used to 

infringe on her privacy rights, which is unsupported by the evidence. Nor was 

there any evidence that Officer Clark used the binoculars and/or the camera 

to see what petitioner or her co-defendant were doing while inside codefendant’s car. Thus, to the extent petitioner had a reasonable expectation 

of privacy while inside co-defendant’s house or in his car, there was no 

evidence of any Fourth Amendment violation through Officer Clark’s use of 

the binoculars and/or camera.

Instead, the evidence established that the binoculars and camera were 

used to simply aid what Officer Clark was already witnessing with his naked 

eye while petitioner and her co-defendant were in the public. Based on 

evidence at the preliminary hearing, it appeared that at most, Officer Clark 

was only 150 feet away from petitioner when he used the optical aids to assist 

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his surveillance. Other times he was either 100 feet away, in the same parking 

lot, or parked in a few parking stalls away from petitioner. The fact that 

Officer Clark’s observations were aided by the use of binoculars or a camera 

at certain points during the surveillance does not in and of itself equate to a 

Fourth Amendment violation as petitioner suggests. The activity that Officer 

Clark testified he observed through the binoculars and camera were 

observable to people not using an optical aid.

Thus, a motion to suppress or renewed motion based on petitioner’s 

argument, had one been brought before the trial court, would have lacked 

merit and would have been denied. Because petitioner would not have 

prevailed on a motion to suppress or a renewed suppression motion, she has 

not established that her counsel was ineffective and that she was deprived of 

her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

(Lodgment No. 10, In re Pierce, No. HC22587, order at 4-8.)

Claim one was not presented to any other state court. Petitioner raised a claim in the 

appellate and supreme courts on direct appeal arguing that the motion to suppress the 

marijuana was erroneously denied because the use of binoculars and a long-lens camera 

constituted an illegal search. (Lodgment Nos. 5, 7.) The state supreme court summarily 

denied the claim, and the appellate court found it had been forfeited due to trial counsel’s 

failure to re-raise it at trial, explaining that an order denying a preliminary hearing 

suppression motion is not appealable unless it is renewed at trial because a magistrate 

conducting a preliminary hearing does not sit as a superior court judge. (Lodgment No. 6, 

People v. Pierce, No. D068218, slip op. at 5-7.)

In order to exhaust state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present 

the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue 

raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 

481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). The petitioner must have raised the very same federal claims 

brought in the federal petition before the state supreme court. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971) (in order to 

exhaust state judicial remedies, a claim must be “fairly presented” to the highest state court, 

that is, in a manner which allows that court to have “the first opportunity to hear the claim 

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sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding.”) Accordingly, Petitioner did not 

satisfy the exhaustion requirement by presenting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

only to the state superior court. 

Nevertheless, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied “if it is clear that (the habeas 

petitioner’s) claims are now procedurally barred under (state) law.” Gray v. Netherland, 

518 U.S. 152, 161 (1996); Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2001) (“the 

district court correctly concluded that [the] claims were nonetheless exhausted because a 

return to state court for exhaustion would be futile.”) Petitioner filed her habeas petition

in the state superior court on August 10, 2016, over a year ago, and has never presented 

her claim to the state supreme court. California law required her to present the claim to the 

state supreme court without substantial delay. See Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 312-

21 (2011) (holding that California’s timeliness rule requiring that a petitioner must seek 

relief without “substantial delay” as “measured from the time the petitioner or counsel 

knew, or should reasonably have known, of the information offered in support of the claim 

and the legal basis for the claim,” is clearly established and consistently applied); Evans v. 

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006) (noting that substantial delay under California law does not 

differ significantly from the rule in other states which use 30 to 60 day rules, and that a sixmonth unexplained delay was presumptively unreasonable); In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 

797-98 (1993) (“the general rule is still that, absent justification for the failure to present 

all known claims in a single, timely petition for writ of habeas corpus, successive and/or 

untimely petitions will be summarily denied.”) 

Because it is clear that Petitioner no longer has state court remedies available to her, 

the claim is considered to be technically exhausted. Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 

n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court 

meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer 

‘available’ to him.”), quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991); Phillips, 

267 F.3d at 974 (“the district court correctly concluded that [the] claims were nonetheless 

exhausted because ‘a return to state court for exhaustion would be futile.’”) Such a 

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technically exhausted claim is procedurally defaulted in this Court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

735 n.1 (holding that “there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas” when 

“the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet 

the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.”); see id. at 

729-30 (holding that a procedural default arises from a violation of a state procedural rule 

which is independent of federal law and is clearly established and consistently applied.) 

The Supreme Court has held that California’s timeliness rule is clearly established and 

consistently applied. Walker, 562 U.S. at 312-21. It is also independent of federal law. 

See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581 (“We conclude that because the California untimeliness rule 

is not interwoven with federal law, it is an independent state procedural ground.”) 

The Court may reach the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if Petitioner can 

demonstrate cause for her failure to satisfy the state timeliness rule and prejudice arising 

from the default, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from the Court 

not reaching the merits of the defaulted claim. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Petitioner has 

not attempted to meet those requirements, and has not addressed Respondent’s contention 

that claim one is unexhausted. Nevertheless, the Court need not address whether Petitioner 

could make a showing sufficient to excuse the default because claim one is clearly without 

merit. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that “[p]rocedural bar issues are not infrequently 

more complex than the merits issues presented by the appeal, so it may well make sense in 

some instances to proceed to the merits if the result will be the same.” Franklin v. Johnson, 

290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002), citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 

(1997) (“We do not mean to suggest that the procedural-bar issue must invariably be 

resolved first; only that it ordinarily should be.”) Because claim one clearly fails on the 

merits, the Court finds that the interests of judicial economy support denying claim one on 

the merits without addressing whether Petitioner can overcome the procedural default. 

Alternately, even assuming state court remedies remain available to Petitioner 

regarding claim, in which case Petitioner’s claims would be unexhausted, the Court has 

discretion to deny the claim notwithstanding any failure to exhaust. See 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts 

of the State.”) Because claim one clearly fails on the merits, the outcome is the same 

whether the claim is unexhausted or technically exhausted. 

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide relief, Petitioner must show that counsel’s 

performance was deficient. Id. at 687. “This requires showing that counsel made errors 

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by 

the Sixth Amendment.” Id. She must also show that counsel’s deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense, which requires showing that “counsel’s errors were so serious as 

to deprive [Petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. To show prejudice, 

Petitioner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different absent the error. Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Petitioner must 

establish both deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Id. at 687. “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy 

task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). “The standards created by Strickland

and section 2254(d) are both highly deferential and when the two apply in tandem, review 

is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. These standards are “difficult to meet” and 

“demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 

563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). 

Prior to the preliminary hearing, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the 

marijuana, which was joined by Petitioner’s co-defendant, arguing that the seizure of 

Petitioner and the search of her parcel were presumptively unreasonable because they 

occurred without a warrant, and that the burden was on the prosecution to justify the search 

and seizure. (CT 4-10.) A hearing was held at which Detectives McGill and Clark testified

consistently with their trial testimony. (Lodgment No. 1, Preliminary Hearing Tr. at 2-

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101.) Defense counsel argued that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave 

after Detective McGill identified himself as an officer, told Petitioner he had been watching 

her and that based on his experience he thought there was cocaine in her parcel, and said, 

“Let’s go outside.” (Id. at 86-89.) The preliminary hearing judge stated:

With regard to Ms. Pierce, Officer McGill’s testimony that his contact 

with Pierce was inside the FedEx and he said, “let’s go outside,” I’m giving 

the defendant the benefit of the doubt. As I indicated, that sounds more like 

a command than a question, and so I believe she was detained at that point. 

She placed the box on the ground, she appeared nervous, and, of course, police 

are allowed to consider nervousness and vague responses to answers. He told 

her he’d been observing her, believed she was shipping drugs, asked if he 

could open the box two times, and she said yes two times.

So she was asked a question at a time where I believe she was lawfully 

detained based on all the activity that occurred earlier in the day, and, 

therefore, I believe the consent was voluntarily given and that there was no 

violation of either defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights, so the motions are 

respectfully denied at this time.

(Id. at 101.)

In order to show that defense counsel was deficient in failing to renew that motion 

at trial, Petitioner must show the error was “so serious that counsel was not functioning as 

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687. Defense counsel, who represented Petitioner at the preliminary hearing and at trial,

filed an in limine motion to suppress her statement in the trial court but did not renew the 

motion to suppress the marijuana. (CT 28-30.) Petitioner is required to overcome a strong 

presumption that counsel’s failure to seek suppression of the marijuana in her trial court 

motion to suppress the statement was a reasonable tactical decision. See Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (recognizing a strong presumption that counsel took actions 

“for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.”), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 

(holding that counsel is “strongly presumed” to make decisions in the exercise of 

professional judgment); and Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003) (noting 

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that the presumption of competence has particular force where a claim is based solely on 

the trial record). Petitioner has not overcome that presumption. As defense counsel 

observed in her written motion papers: “The defense is entitled to await a justification(s) 

put forth by the prosecution [for not procuring a warrant] . . . [and] is then entitled to submit 

a response, either orally, in writing, or both, detailing why that justification may be 

inadequate.” (CT 8.) The motion to suppress the marijuana was then litigated at the 

preliminary hearing, where both detectives testified and were cross-examined by defense 

counsel. As discussed below, that testimony established that the surveillance by the 

officers occurred in public areas without intrusion into any area where Petitioner might be 

considered to have had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and that her consent to search 

her parcel, as with her statement that it contained “a little bit of weed,” were given 

voluntarily and not in response to custodial interrogation. Thus, the motion to suppress the 

marijuana, although perhaps of uncertain merit prior to the preliminary hearing and the 

testimony of the officers due to a presumption that a warrantless search and seizure violates 

the Fourth Amendment, turned out to be unavailing. However, Petitioner has failed to

overcome the presumption that once counsel litigated the motion to suppress the marijuana

at the preliminary hearing, which included cross-examination of the officers, counsel made 

a reasoned professional judgment not to renew it at trial. As discussed below, that 

presumption is buttressed by the finding that there is no reasonable probability that counsel

would have prevailed on a renewed motion in the trial court. Accordingly, the state court 

finding that Petitioner failed to show deficient performance is not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, and is neither contrary to, nor does it involve an unreasonable 

application of, Strickland. In addition, assuming Petitioner could demonstrate defense 

counsel was deficient in failing to preserve the claim for appeal, the Court also finds that 

it was objectively reasonable for the state court to find she did not establish prejudice. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (a petitioner must establish both deficient performance and 

prejudice in order to establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel). As the 

state superior court noted, Detective Clark’s observations, although aided by the use of 

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binoculars and a long-lens camera, could have been made without the use of optical aids, 

and therefore did not intrude on any area in which Petitioner had a reasonable expectation 

of privacy. The Supreme Court has observed: The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant 

part that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” The Amendment 

establishes a simple baseline, one that for much of our history formed the exclusive basis 

for its protections: When “the Government obtains information by physically intruding” 

on persons, houses, papers, or effects, “a ‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment” has “undoubtedly occurred.” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 

(2012). By reason of our decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), property 

rights “are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,” Soldal v. Cook County, 

506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992) – but though Katz may add to the baseline, it does not subtract 

anything from the Amendment’s protections “when the Government does engage in (a) 

physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area,” United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 

276, 286 (1983) (Brenan, J., concurring in the judgment). Florida v. Jardins, 569 U.S. 1, 

___, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly 

exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 

protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 

public, may be constitutionally protected.”) (citations omitted). The uncontroverted 

evidence showed that the officers were parked across the street from the Postal Annex 

when they first observed Petitioner standing next to White’s car in the Postal Annex 

parking lot, that they followed White’s car to a post office and then to his house along 

public roads, they parked on a public street 100 yards away, waited and watched as White 

came and went between his house and garage while Petitioner was out of sight inside the 

house, and then followed them to the FedEx store and observed Petitioner enter the store 

carrying a parcel. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the police officers intruded into 

any area in which she might have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See California 

v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is 

whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’”), 

quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360. “Private commercial property is not one of the enumerated 

items that the Fourth Amendment protects.” Patel v. City of Montclair, 798 F.3d 895, 898 

(9th Cir. 2015) (holding that no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 

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occurs when police officers enter commercial areas open to the public). Thus, it was 

objectively reasonable for the state court to find that Petitioner had failed to show how the 

officers’ observations of her movements out in public intruded upon a reasonable 

expectation of privacy. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to 

the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 

protection.”) For those reasons, and for the reasons discussed below in claim two 

why Petitioner’s statement was not obtained as a result of custodial interrogation, the Court 

finds that even assuming Petitioner could demonstrate deficient performance from trial 

counsel’s failure to preserve the issue for appeal, she has not shown “a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” and has therefore failed to satisfy the 

prejudice prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. It was therefore objectively reasonable for 

the state superior court to deny Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the 

basis that: “Because petitioner would not have prevailed on a motion to suppress or a 

renewed suppression motion, she has not established that her counsel was ineffective and 

that she was deprived of her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” 

(Lodgment No. 10, In re Pierce, No. HC22587, order at 7-8.)

In sum, the Court finds that the state court adjudication of claim one is neither 

contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 

and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceedings. The Court recommends denying habeas relief as 

to claim one on that basis because the interests of judicial economy counsel in favor of 

reaching the merits of the claim irrespective of whether the claim is unexhausted or is

technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted.

D. Claim Two

Petitioner contends in claim two that her statement to the police that the box she 

carried into the FedEx store contained “a little bit of weed” was obtained in violation of 

Miranda, and was therefore erroneously admitted at trial. (Pet. at 15-20.) Respondent 

answers that the determination by the state court that Petitioner’s Miranda rights were not 

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violated because she was not in custody when she made her statement, is neither contrary 

to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Ans. 

Mem. at 10-14.)

There is a presumption that “[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment 

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the 

same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991)

(emphasis added). The Court will look through the silent denial of Petitioner’s petition for 

review by the state supreme court to the last reasoned decision regarding this claim, the 

state appellate court opinion on direct appeal, which stated:

The principal issue on appeal is whether Pierce was “in custody” at the 

time of her incriminating statement regarding the weed. If so, then McGill’s 

failure to have given Pierce Miranda warnings requires a reversal of the order 

denying the motion to suppress; if not, then the trial court properly denied the 

motion.

1. Law

In Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 444, the United States Supreme Court 

imposed constitutional limitations—which the Court described as “procedural 

safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination”—on 

police authority to conduct a custodial interrogation of a suspect. Our state 

high court summarized these safeguards as follows: “‘“(B)efore being 

subjected to ‘custodial interrogation,’ a suspect ‘must be warned he has a right 

to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence 

against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either 

retained or appointed.’”’” (People v. Kopatz (2015) 61 Cal.4th 62, 80 

(Kopatz), quoting from Miranda, at p. 444.) Evidence obtained in violation 

of these safeguards is “constitutionally inadmissible.” (Miranda, at p. 440.) 

Stated differently, “(a)bsent ‘custodial interrogation,’ Miranda simply does 

not come into play.” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648.)

To determine whether Pierce was “in custody” at the time of her 

incriminating statement, the test is “whether a reasonable person would have 

felt he or she was at liberty to leave (either the FedEx store or the parking lot) 

or to decline (McGill’s) request( ) to go (outside) and be interviewed there.” 

(Kopatz, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 80; see Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) 541 

U.S. 652, 663 (“‘would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at 

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liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave’”).) If a reasonable person in 

Pierce’s position would not have felt she was at liberty to leave, then the 

evidence from Pierce’s interview in the parking lot is inadmissible, because it 

was obtained from a person who was unlawfully “seized in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment”—i.e., in custody without the benefit of the safeguards 

that result from not being told her rights against self-incrimination under 

Miranda. (Kopatz, at p. 80.)

In ruling on a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on a 

Fourth Amendment claim, the trial court finds the historical facts, selects the 

appropriate law and applies it to the facts to determine whether there has been 

a violation of law. (Kopatz, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 79.) On appeal, we review 

the factual findings for substantial evidence and the application of the law to 

those facts de novo. [Footnote: Without authority, Pierce contends that the 

standard of review is abuse of discretion. The People do not suggest a 

standard of review.] (Ibid.) Under the substantial evidence test, we review 

the whole record in a light most favorable to the order denying suppression 

(Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 969) to determine whether it discloses 

“evidence ‘“reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually 

be ‘substantial’ proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular 

case”’” (People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 505).

2. Analysis

The trial court found that up to and including the time at which Pierce 

made the statement in the parking lot regarding weed she was merely detained, 

not in custody. That finding is supported by substantial evidence: McGill was 

not in uniform; McGill did not display a weapon or handcuffs; the events took 

place in a public commercial establishment; McGill was the only officer who 

approached Pierce [Footnote: Although we recognize that the evidence on this 

point is conflicting, in our review of the record we consider only the 

substantiality of the evidence in support of the ruling actually made, not 

whether other evidence in the record “‘might also be reasonably reconciled 

with a contrary finding.’” (People v. Snead (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 380, 384 

(sufficiency of evidence in support of ruling on motion to suppress).)]; Pierce 

was not placed under arrest; and the entire event from McGill’s initial contact 

inside the FedEx store to Pierce’s incriminating statement in the parking lot 

took less than five minutes.

Citing People v. Manis (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 653, Pierce suggests that 

once McGill “accused (Pierce) of trafficking in cocaine,” the stop “went from 

mere detention to custody.” We disagree. We do not consider McGill’s 

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question “‘If (the box) doesn’t have marijuana, is there cocaine in it?’” to be 

accusing Pierce of trafficking in cocaine. Indeed, the authority on which 

Pierce relies, Manis, fully supports our conclusion: “Only when suspicion 

focuses sharply enough to provide reasonable cause for arrest or charge does 

the relationship between the police and the person detained become that of 

accuser and accused.” (Id. at p. 667, italics added.) Here, when Pierce and 

McGill were in the parking lot, there is nothing to suggest that McGill had 

reasonable cause to arrest Pierce at the time of his question; thus, there is

nothing to suggest that McGill’s question was an accusation sufficient for a 

reasonable person in Pierce’s situation to believe she was then in custody. 

Indeed, as Manis reaffirms, the requirement to provide Miranda warnings 

does not affect “‘(g)eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a 

crime.’” (Id. at p. 669, quoting from Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 477.)

The trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, and our 

independent review does not disclose any error in the court’s application of 

the appropriate law to the facts.

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Pierce, No. D068218, slip op. at 7-10.)

The Fifth Amendment provides that “no person . . . shall be compelled in any 

criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. It has been clearly 

established for over 50 years that the “Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of 

criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their 

freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate 

themselves.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding 

that “the Fifth Amendment’s exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.”)

The “privilege against self-incrimination prohibits admitting statements given by a 

suspect during ‘custodial interrogation’ without a prior warning.” Illinois v. Perkins, 496 

U.S. 292, 295 (1990). “Custodial interrogation means ‘questioning initiated by law 

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody . . . .’” Id., quoting 

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Custodial interrogation occurs when “there is a ‘formal arrest 

or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 

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492, 495 (1977). “Absent such interrogation, there [is] no infringement of the right . . . and 

there [is] no occasion to determine whether there ha[s] been a valid waiver.” Edwards v. 

Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 (1981). 

Detective McGill testified that he told Petitioner that he had been watching her and 

that based on his many years of experience he suspected her parcel contained marijuana. 

(RT 130.) He said that Petitioner “really didn’t say anything. She kind of shook her head 

in the ‘no’ fashion.” (Id.) Detective McGill then said to her, “Well, whatever is in here, if 

it’s not marijuana, then it’s cocaine.” (Id.) Petitioner replied, “No. It’s a little bit of weed.” 

(Id.) Petitioner testified that Detective McGill told her, “I’ve been doing this my whole 

life, and if it’s not weed in there, it’s cocaine,” but denied making any statement other than 

giving consent to open the parcel. (RT 174.) As quoted above, the appellate court found

“there is nothing to suggest that McGill’s question was an accusation sufficient for a 

reasonable person in Pierce’s situation to believe she was then in custody.” (Lodgment 

No. 6, People v. Pierce, No. D068218, slip op. at 10.) Although Petitioner denied she said

there was “a little bit of weed” in the parcel, and disagreed with Detective McGill whether 

he displayed his firearm, there is no material dispute regarding what Detective McGill 

said.2

“Interrogation” includes not only direct custodial questioning by law enforcement 

officers, but its “functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 

(1980). “A functional equivalent of questioning is any statement or conduct which the 

police should know is ‘reasonably likely to elicit an [inculpatory or exculpatory] response 

from the suspect.’” Shedelbower v Estelle, 885 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Innis, 

446 U.S. at 301 & n. 5. “This is not to say, however, that all statements obtained by the 

 

2

 Detective McGill testified at the preliminary hearing motion that it was not a question but a statement: 

“Well, then if it’s not marijuana, it’s cocaine.” (Lodgment No. 1, Preliminary Hearing Tr. at 69.) But at 

the pre-trial motion in limine hearing he testified, “I said, ‘if it doesn’t have marijuana, is there cocaine in 

it?’” (RT 30.) He and Petitioner both testified at trial that it was a statement and not a question. (RT 130, 

184.) Any dispute regarding whether it was a statement or a question is immaterial because, as discussed 

below, the reference to cocaine, although somewhat accusatory, did not convert the conversation into a 

custodial interrogation.

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police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of 

interrogation.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 299. “Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred 

by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by [the holding of 

Miranda].” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (“The fundamental import of the privilege while an 

individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit 

of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated.”)

Even assuming Detective McGill’s statement is the “functional equivalent” of 

interrogation because it is the type of statement that he should have known was reasonably 

likely to elicit an inculpatory or exculpatory response from Petitioner, the state appellate 

court reasonably found Petitioner was not in custody at the time. Custodial interrogation 

occurs when “there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree 

associated with a formal arrest.” Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. 

at 495. The Supreme Court in Mathiason stated:

Such a noncustodial situation [where there was no indication the 

questioning took place in a context where the defendant’s freedom to depart 

was restricted in any way] is not converted to one in which Miranda applies 

simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any 

formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place 

in a ‘coercive environment.’ Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a 

police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that 

the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately 

cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not 

required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.

Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495.

/ / /

The evidence showed that Petitioner followed Detective McGill outside the FedEx 

store after McGill identified himself as a police officer and said to Petitioner, “Let’s go 

outside and talk to your friend,” took the parcel and walked outside. (RT 128.) Although 

Detective McGill said Petitioner never saw his gun (RT 138), Petitioner testified that he 

displayed his gun when he lifted his shirt to show her his badge. (RT 171.) Outside the 

store Detective McGill told her he had thirty years of experience, that he had been watching 

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her, and he had reason to believe that her parcel contained marijuana. (RT 130.) Petitioner 

“really didn’t say anything. She kind of shook her head in the ‘no’ fashion,” and Detective 

McGill told her, “Well, whatever is in here, if it’s not marijuana, then it’s cocaine,” to 

which Petitioner replied, “No. It’s a little bit of weed.” (Id.) Detective McGill testified 

that he asked for her consent to open the parcel, which she gave. (RT 130-31.) He opened 

the package, found marijuana and arrested her, and the entire encounter took less than five 

minutes. (Id.) Thus, the only factual disputes were whether Detective McGill displayed 

his firearm, whether his statement about cocaine was in the form of a statement or a 

question, and whether Petitioner made her statement. However, the state court correctly 

found, and it is undisputed, that there were no formal restraints of Petitioner’s freedom of 

movement of any kind, much less to the degree associated with a formal arrest, and that 

the entire encounter was brief. Further, as the state court also correctly found, to the extent 

the officer’s reference to cocaine had an accusatory message, the officer’s suspicion had 

not ripened into probable cause, the relationship had not become that of accuser and 

accused, and “thus, there is nothing to suggest that McGill’s question [regarding cocaine] 

was an accusation sufficient for a reasonable person in Pierce’s situation to believe she was 

then in custody.” In sum, it was objectively reasonable for the state court to find that “a 

reasonable person in Pierce’s situation [would not] believe she was then in custody.” 

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Pierce, No. D068218, slip op. at 10.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to satisfy the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) because she has failed to demonstrate that the state court adjudication 

of claim two is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law. The Court also finds that Petitioner has failed to satisfy the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) because she has not shown that the factual findings upon which the 

state court’s adjudication of her claim rests are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El, 537 

U.S. at 340.

Finally, even if Petitioner could demonstrate an error in admitting her statement, and 

assuming she could satisfy the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or (2), habeas relief is 

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not available if the error is harmless. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) 

(holding that Miranda errors are subject to harmless error review). Under that standard, 

habeas relief is not available “unless the error resulted in ‘substantial and injurious effect 

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,’ . . . or unless the judge ‘is in grave doubt’ 

about the harmlessness of the error.” Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 

2004), quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) and O’Neal v. McAninch, 

513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). “There must be more than a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the 

error was harmful.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct 2187, 2198 (2015), quoting 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Although Petitioner’s statement presented direct evidence that she was aware her 

parcel contained marijuana, the other evidence against her, even without that statement, 

was strong. She flew to San Diego from New York the previous day carrying about 

$13,000 in crisp new $100 bills, approximately the same amount as the value of the 

marijuana in San Diego. Her explanation regarding why she was carrying so much cash

was implausible and was apparently rejected by the jury. In addition, her actions when 

confronted by the police showed a consciousness of guilt. She appeared very nervous and 

kept glancing at White, and even though she testified she and White were friends and she

contacted him in order to have him show her around San Diego and help her find an 

apartment, she was unable to tell the officer his name. She told the officer she did not 

know what was in her parcel, despite testifying at trial that White had told her it contained 

books. The Court is not left with a “grave doubt” that, assuming the statement was obtained 

in violation of Miranda, itsintroduction at trial resulted in a “substantial and injurious effect 

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; O’Neal, 513 U.S.

at 436; see also Ayala, 135 S.Ct at 2198 (“There must be more than a ‘reasonable 

possibility’ that the error was harmful.”), quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

The Court finds that the state court adjudication of claim two is neither contrary to, 

nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not 

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, and that any error is harmless. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends denying habeas relief as to claim two. IV.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and 

(2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 30, 2017, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than November 6, 2017. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: October 16, 2017

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