Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04031/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04031-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:704 Labor Litigation

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael R. Turney, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Elaine Chao, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-04031-PHX-SRB

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao's Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 9) and Motion to Strike (Doc. 24) as well as Plaintiff Michael Turney's

Motion to Amend (Doc. 16). 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Stress Condition

Pro se Plaintiff Michael R. Turney worked for the United States Department of

Energy, Western Area Power Administration ("WAPA") as an electrician from March 1992

until his resignation on February 20, 1993. Plaintiff filed a claim with the Department of

Labor ("DOL"), Office of Workers' Compensation Programs ("OWCP") for a work-related

illness in February 1993, pursuant to the Federal Employees' Compensation Act ("FECA").

He received compensation from OWCP for the period from February 21 to September 15,

1993.

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On November 17, 1995, Plaintiff filed a claim for continuing compensation for an

indefinite period beginning on November 26, 1995. Deeming it a "new injury" because the

medical records did not establish a causal connection between his current condition and his

prior condition, OWCP denied Plaintiff's claim on February 2, 1996, informing him that he

could file a claim for a new injury. Plaintiff requested review of the denial order on March

1, 1996 and filed a claim for the new injury on March 19, 1996. The claim was denied on

January 23, 1997 for a lack of evidence that the condition resulted from work. Plaintiff

requested reconsideration but OWCP denied this request on April 23, 1997. OWCP did not

address the March 1, 1996 request for review until February 4, 1998 when it reopened his

claim. When OWCP sent Plaintiff for a medical evaluation, the doctor determined that he

was totally disabled by severe depression and post traumatic stress disorder.

B. Leg Injury

Beginning in July 1995, Plaintiff worked for the Department of the Army Corps of

Engineers. While working, Plaintiff injured his left leg on September 15, 1995. He filed for

worker's compensation with OWCP. Plaintiff ceased working on October 31, 1995 and was

terminated on January 6, 1996.

OWCP accepted his claim as work related and compensated Plaintiff for the period

of January 7, 1996 through June 14, 1996. On September 25, 1996, OWCP denied Plaintiff's

request for additional compensation but indicated that he might be eligible for medical care

for residuals of his injury. Plaintiff did not appeal this order but did request compensation

for residuals on January 13, 1997. OWCP denied his claim on November 6, 1998,

concluding that Plaintiff did not have any disability after September 16, 1996.

Plaintiff states that "the claim was awarded in December of 1999" but provides no

additional details. (Compl. at 10.) Plaintiff also states that the claim for the leg injury was

closed "sometime in 2002 for 'inactivity.'" (Compl. at 14.) Plaintiff alleges that he did not

receive any notice that his claim was closed until he submitted a bill for medical care,

relating to the leg injury, in late 2004. (Compl. at 22.) Although the Complaint is unclear

on this point, Plaintiff may have filed for an appeal of this closure in 2005. (Compl. at 22.)

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 The documents all purport to be notices of evidence regarding Plaintiff's 

claims. Although Defendant's Motion to Strike does not address these documents 

(as they were filed after the motion), all of the additional filings will be addressed 

in this Order.

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed a Complaint, on August 14, 2001, in the U.S. District Court alleging a

violation of his due process rights, bad faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

violation of the Privacy Act. The Defendant in that action was also Secretary of Labor

Elaine Chao. The court dismissed each claim: the due process claim because there were no

allegations that Plaintiff did not have notice or an opportunity to be heard, the bad faith claim

based on the discretion granted to OWCP by FECA, the claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress because there was no extreme or outrageous conduct, and the Privacy Act

claim because OWCP's disclosure of medical records from one physician to another was

within the routine use exception permitted by FECA.

On December 12, 2005, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to the Tucker Act, the

Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), the Privacy

Act, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal

Protection Clause, claiming that OWCP violated his rights when it terminated his workers'

compensation claims. Plaintiff seeks money damages. 

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure on March 13, 2006 (Doc. 9). On April 19, 2006, Plaintiff filed a

document entitled "Complaint Additional Evidence" (Doc. 23) that included numerous

attachments. On April 21, 2006, Defendant moved to strike Doc. 23 and its attachments

because of Plaintiff's failure to comply with Local Rule 7.2. Additionally, Plaintiff filed a

"Notice of Additional Evidence" with attachments on May 3, 2006 and another "Notice of

Additional Evidence" on May 10, 2006.1

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III. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Strike

The Court may consider material outside the pleadings when considering a 12(b)(1)

motion to dismiss. Farr v. United States, 990 F.2d 451, 454 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[I]t is proper

for the district court to consider evidence outside of the pleadings for the purpose of deciding

a jurisdictional issue."). Additionally, "[c]ourts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings

liberally, including pro se motions as well as complaints." Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339

F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988). Despite Plaintiff's violation of Local Rule 7.2, the Court will exercise

its discretion and consider, for purposes of Defendant's 12(b)(1) Motion, all documents

submitted by Plaintiff. The Motion to Strike is denied.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions,

courts consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the

merits. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (holding that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

"must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the

controversy"). Dismissing a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not then prevent

the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in the proper court. Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d

606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977). 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and it is presumed that the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction unless the party asserting the claim satisfies its burden of

establishing jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994); Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001).

Sovereign immunity protects the United States and its agencies from lawsuits unless

Congress has expressly waived sovereign immunity. Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S.

417, 422 (1996); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994); N. Star Alaska v. United States,

9 F.3d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir.1993) (en banc) (per curiam). Although Plaintiff brought his suit

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 Plaintiff's Motion to Amend requests that the Complaint be amended 

such that the Defendant is the United States Government in place of Elaine Chao, 

Secretary of Labor. This is a moot point as sovereign immunity precludes suit 

against either the United States government or a United States government official,

absent an express Congressional waiver. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is denied.

3

 Section 1346(b)(1) provides district courts with:

exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against

the United States, for money damages, accruing on and

after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or

personal injury or death caused by the negligent or

wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

Government while acting within the scope of his office

or employment, under circumstances where the United

States, if a private person, would be liable to the

claimant in accordance with the law of the place where

the act or omission occurred.

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against a government official2

, "any lawsuit against . . . an officer of the United States in his

or her official capacity is considered an action against the United States." Balser v. Dep't of

Justice, 327 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2003). If the United States has not waived sovereign

immunity with respect to a particular type of suit, federal courts are without subject matter

jurisdiction to entertain that suit.

1. Federal Tort Claims Act

Plaintiff asserts that the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), constitutes a waiver of

sovereign immunity.3

 However, the FTCA allows civil actions against the United States only

if a private person would be liable under like circumstances. Westbay Steel, Inc. v. United

States, 970 F.2d 648, 650 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he FTCA applies only if there is a 'persuasive

analogy with private conduct.'"). In this case, Plaintiff identifies no cause of action under

which a private person would be liable. In fact, "the United States simply has not rendered

itself liable under § 1346(b)" for constitutional violations. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478.

See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the FTCA does not

serve as a waiver of sovereign immunity.

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 The Tucker Act provides, in relevant part:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have

jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against

the United States founded either upon the Constitution,

or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an

executive department, or upon any express or implied

contract with the United States, or for liquidated or

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). 

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2. Tucker Act

Plaintiff also asserts jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, which waives sovereign

immunity for damages actions against the government. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2001).

However, the Tucker Act does not confer jurisdiction on the district courts but rather

provides for jurisdiction only in the Court of Federal Claims.4

 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)

(2001). See also Transohio Savs. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598,

606 (D.C. Cir.1992) (noting that, while the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for

damages actions against the government, it provides for jurisdiction in the Claims Court).

Thus, although the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity, it does not confer jurisdiction on

this Court.

3. Administrative Procedures Act

Plaintiff asserts that the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702, constitutes a waiver of sovereign

immunity. The APA waives sovereign immunity "only if three conditions are met: (1)

[plaintiff's] claims are not for money damages, (2) an adequate remedy for [his] claims is not

available elsewhere and (3) [his] claims do not seek relief expressly or impliedly forbidden

by another statute." Tucson Airport Auth. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 645 (9th

Cir. 1998). The Court need look no further than the first condition because Plaintiff

exclusively seeks monetary damages. Thus, the APA does not waive sovereign immunity

for this action.

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4. Due Process and Equal Protection

The Due Process Clause forbids the government from depriving individuals of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Equal Protection

Clause forbids any state from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Supreme Court has created a cause

of action against federal officials, in their individual capacities, for violating constitutional

rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395

(1971). Although Plaintiff does not delineate his lawsuit as a Bivens action, the Court will

construe it as such.

Under Bivens, a federal official can only be sued in her personal capacity for money

damages. Id. See Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir.1987) (“[A] Bivens

action can be maintained against a defendant in his or her individual capacity only, and not

in his or her official capacity.”). Suits against government officials in their personal capacity

seek to impose personal liability for the official's actions, while official-capacity suits are

merely another way of pleading an action against the government. Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).

The question is whether Plaintiff has filed this action against the Secretary in her

personal or official capacity. From Plaintiff's pleadings and from the Motion to Amend, it

is clear that he intended to sue the government rather than to impose personal liability on the

Secretary of Labor. Plaintiff makes no allegations that Elaine Chao personally took any

actions which violated his rights, but rather attributes his claims to "the Secretary of Labor's

designated employees," (Def.'s Compl. 28) indicating that this suit was brought against the

Secretary of Labor in an official capacity. This interpretation is further supported by the

Motion to Amend, which attempts to substitute the United States government as Defendant

in place of Elaine Chao. Because Plaintiff has brought suit against the Secretary of Labor

in her official capacity, there can be no Bivens cause of action for a violation of Plaintiff's

due process or equal protection rights. Absent any waiver of sovereign immunity, this Court

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lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear these claims against the Secretary of Labor in her

official capacity or against the United States government.

5. Privacy Act

The Privacy Act prohibits, with certain exceptions, the disclosure by an agency of

“any record which is contained within a system of records” without the prior written consent

of the individual. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). The Privacy Act also provides that if an agency

violates the Privacy Act, "the individual may bring a civil action against the agency, and the

district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction in the matters under the provisions

of this subsection." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g). Thus, sovereign immunity has been waived with

respect to violations of the Privacy Act and the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff's Privacy Act claim.

C. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Because Defendant's jurisdictional attack is dispositive as to his claims arising under

the Tucker Act, the FTCA, the APA, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection

Clause, the Court will not address those claims in this discussion. However, the Court will

address Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion in relation to Plaintiff's Privacy Act claim. A

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

Plaintiff claims that OWCP violated the Privacy Act by providing medical records

about his work-related stress condition to the physician selected to examine his leg injury.

This contention was litigated in the 2001 action, by Plaintiff against the same Defendant, in

which the court dismissed Plaintiff's claim because his allegations fell within the routine use

exception permitted in the handling of FECA claims. 

A court may properly look beyond the complaint to matters of public record, such as

Plaintiff's prior proceedings before the District Court, and doing so does not convert a Rule

12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment. Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798

F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the

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merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties . . . based on the same

cause of action.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, n.5 (1979). As Plaintiff

has already litigated this claim in the 2001 action against the same Defendant, the doctrine

of res judicata bars the re-litigation of this Privacy Act claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Sovereign immunity has not been waived under the FTCA, the Tucker Act, or the

APA. Plaintiff's due process and equal protection claims are not a valid Bivens action and

thus are also barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff's Privacy Act claims were previously

litigated and are thus barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

IT IS ORDERED denying the Motion to Strike (Doc. 24).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Motion to Amend (Doc. 16).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9).

DATED this 21st day of July, 2006.

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