Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04360/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04360-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carnell Lamont Dargen, Jr.,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, Attorney General of the State 

of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV 18-04360 PHX SRB (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

Petitioner Carnell Dargen, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a 

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 3, 

2018, challenging his conviction for possession of methamphetamine. Respondents

docketed their answer to the petition for habeas corpus relief on May 6, 2019 (ECF 

No. 8), and Dargen did not file a reply to the answer to his petition. 

I Background

The following facts and procedural history are taken from the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision denying Dargen’s direct appeal:

Dargen was charged with knowingly possessing or using 

methamphetamine. The state also alleged that Dargen committed the 

offense while on probation in two other felony matters. Dargen pled not 

guilty and the matter proceeded to a jury trial.

At trial, the state presented evidence of the following facts. [On 

March 27, 2014,] Phoenix Police Officer Plumb and his partner responded 

to a radio call about voices coming from inside a vacant house. Plumb and 

his partner approached the house and, finding it empty, went to the back of 

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the house where they found a shed. Plumb saw the light from a flashlight 

moving around inside the shed and heard the shuffling of tools. Plumb 

looked inside the shed and saw Dargen crouched down and digging through 

a plastic bin. Plumb said Dargen seemed frantic, as though he was 

searching for something. Plumb then announced his presence and told 

Dargen to walk towards him with his hands up.

Plumb detained Dargen,1then entered the shed and conducted a 

search of the area. Plumb testified that when he looked inside the bin that 

Dargen had been searching through, he observed a plastic bag of 

methamphetamine.

Plumb testified that after he found the methamphetamine, he asked 

Dargen about the plastic bin. Dargen stated that it was his bin and he used it 

to store his tools. Then Plumb confronted Dargen about the 

methamphetamine and Dargen stated that the drugs were his and that he 

was a methamphetamine user.

Plumb then placed Dargen under arrest and seated him in the back of 

his patrol car. Dargen was given Miranda warnings at the precinct but 

Plumb testified that he was not able to get a productive interview with 

Dargen because Dargen was being uncooperative.

At the conclusion of the state’s case in chief, Dargen rested without 

presenting any evidence.2

 

1 When asked to elaborate on what he meant by “detained,” Plumb testified:

“‘Detained him’ meaning he had no right to—we had reason to believe that he 

was possibly inside of a structure that he wasn’t supposed to be in. And I was 

going to ask [my partner] Officer Cornwell if he could do a records check on the 

home to see who the actual homeowner is or the property owner was.” He also 

stated, “[W]e had him come out to us, detained him. Officer Cornwell stood by 

him.” 

State v. Dargen, 2015 WL 5309396, at *1 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2015). The state appellate 

court concluded:

Dargen was not in custody during this initial detention for purposes of Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Dargen’s freedom of movement was not restrained 

to the degree associated with formal arrest[]. And given the totality of the 

circumstances, a reasonable person would likely not have felt that he or she was 

not at liberty to terminate the encounter. []. Additionally, [p]olice officers have 

authority to detain and question persons . . . without providing Miranda warnings 

when they have a reasonably articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

Id.

2 During his cross-examination of Officer Plumb defense counsel noted, inter alia, that

the alleged confession was not recorded although Officer Plumb had a tape-recorder in his patrol 

vehicle. (ECF No. 1 at 22-28). Counsel also elicited Officer Plumb’s statement that he made an 

inaccurate representation regarding when Dargen was booked into jail. (ECF No. 1 at 27). 

Defense counsel argued in closing: 

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After considering the evidence and hearing closing arguments, the 

jury found Dargen guilty of possession of dangerous drugs. Dargen stated 

that he was on probation in two different felony matters at the time of the 

offense. . . .

Dargen was sentenced to the presumptive term of 10 years’ 

imprisonment [in CR2014-122849, the instant matter] for possession of 

dangerous drugs and was given credit for 217 days of presentence 

incarceration.

State v. Dargen, 2015 WL 5309396, at *1-2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2015).3

Dargen was appointed appellate counsel, who filed an Anders brief. Id. at *1. 

“Dargen was given the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona but did 

not do so.” Id. The state appellate court “searched the record for fundamental error and [] 

found none.” Id.

Dargen applied for a state writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 32 of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (ECF No. 8-1 at 28). Dargen’s post-conviction 

counsel filed a Notice of Completion, stating he had reviewed the record and discussed 

the matter with Dargen, and counsel could find no legitimate claim to raise on Dargen’s 

behalf. (ECF No. 8-1 at 32). Dargen filed a pro per petition for Rule 32 relief, (ECF No. 

8-1 at 39-48), asserting the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, inter alia

 

My client need not testify nor present any evidence that can’t be held 

against him. It can’t be. Why didn’t he do that? As the Judge instructs you, that’s 

on advice of counsel and in this case, quite honestly, there is no need to. The State 

did not prove their case. They did not even start by proving their case. You know, 

if we look at a chart and we don’t have to come forward and prove my client is 

not guilty. Again, we don’t have to establish that evidence. You may find it is 

unlikely he did that this offense or perhaps he did it. We just don’t have enough 

evidence. We suspect he did it. He’s possibly guilty or probably guilty. Likely all 

of those assumptions fall short and require a verdict of not guilty. The State must 

convince you beyond a reasonable doubt and the way to do that, quite honestly, 

print the bag. There you have it. You have corroborating evidence. But they lack 

corroborating evidence in this case. And, unfortunately, the problems with the 

testimony of the officer and the facts that he didn’t do those simple things that 

need to be done make this case fall short of beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

(ECF No. 8-1 at 48).

3 The jury deliberated less than one hour before reaching a verdict. (ECF No. 8-1 at 8). 

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because the State had not processed the toolbox containing the methamphetamine for 

fingerprints or introduced evidence of his fingerprints on the toolbox. (ECF No. 8-1 

at 41-42). Dargen also maintained the jury was improperly instructed regarding whether

“mere presence” was sufficient to establish possession. (Id.). 

In his Rule 32 action Dargen also asserted he should be granted post-conviction 

relief because there was insufficient evidence of his “criminal intent” to support his 

conviction for possession of danger drugs in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-

3407.” (ECF No. 8-1 at 39). Dargen argued:

. . . [D]uring cross examination legal defense counsel for the 

defendant, disclosed that alleged voluntary confession by Defendant [] 

should have been deemed involuntary and as a matter of law should have 

been suppressed due to deviation of standard police procedure regarding a 

criminal investigation.

Officer Plumb of Phoenix Police Department neglected to 

forensically process the clear bag of methamphetamine or [paraphernalia]

for defendant latent prints, thereby Officer Plumb on one hand excluded the 

alleged evidence from have any evidentiary value and on the other hand 

denied the defendant [] his constitutional [fundamental] right to challenge 

alleged possession . . . 

Said neglect of processing evidence for fingerprints is prejudicial on 

the grounds that, although defendant may or may not [have] stated to 

Officer Plumb that the tool box was his, however Officer Plumb stated 

under oath that many people had access to the shed where defendant tool 

box was kept. . . . without the clear baggy and [paraphernalia] being 

[procedurally] processed for Defendant[’s] prints [it is] safe to state that 

reasonable doubt exist to support lack of possession. [sic]

(ECF No. 8-1 at 40-41). Dargen alleged there were “insufficient” articulable facts “to 

support reasonable suspicion, no statement was provided by the owner of the property,” 

and that he had an “expectation of privacy,” presumably in the shed or the contents of the 

tool box. (ECF No. 8-1 at 41). He further asserted that, because Officer Plumb “deviated 

from standard police procedure by his own admission,” “legal defense counsel is 

prejudice from establishing rather the alleged confession by the Defendant was voluntary 

or involuntary due to negligence with malice intent. See Miranda . . . [sic]” (ECF No. 8-1 

at 42). Notably, Dargen did not mention ineffective assistance of counsel or Strickland in 

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his Rule 32 pleading, and the only constitutional violations he asserted in that pleading 

were a violation of his right to due process and, broadly construing his reference to the 

Sixth Amendment without referring to ineffective assistance of counsel, his right to a fair 

trial.

The state trial habeas court summarily denied relief, concluding Dargen “failed to 

provide adequate grounds for relief pursuant to Rule 32;” “that his claims are not such 

that they are grounds under Rule 32;” and that he had “demonstrated no colorable claim” 

for relief “pursuant to Rule 32.” (ECF No. 8-1 at 50). Dargen sought review by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. In his petition for review Dargen asserted, inter alia: 

Because of the ineffectiveness of the defendants trial counsel before as well 

as during trial, the defendant was violated several constitutional rights. 

Although the defendant was going to trial for 2 charges the attorney never 

contacted the defendant during the pre-trial process to prepare the 

defendant for a trial. There was no contact with the defendant to have any 

investigation done. . . . The attorney made decisions such as filing for and 

be granted a request to vacate a Settlement Conference on September 26, 

2014 without the defendants knowledge. . . . [sic]4

(ECF No. 8-1 at 53). Dargen also clearly asserted a violation of his Miranda rights, 

alleging: “When the alleged confession was made the defendant was already detained and 

handcuffed for trespassing.” (ECF No. 8-1 at 54). Broadly construing his pleadings he 

further asserted his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the 

evidence of his confession:

Because of the ineffectiveness of the defendant’s trial counsel before as 

well as during trial, the defendant was violated several constitutional rights. 

Although the defendant was going to trial for 2 charges the attorney never 

 

4 The state court docket indicates settlement conferences were conducted in CR-2014-

122849 (the instant matter) on September 26, 2014, and on November 3, 2014, the day before the 

trial began on November 4, 2014. (ECF No. 8-1 at 71-72). The state court docket in CR-2014-

0872 indicates a settlement conference was conducted on June 23, 2014, and the trial in that 

matter (regarding the violation of probation) began on November 4, 2014. (ECF No. 8-1 at 75-

76). Dargen presents an order of the state trial court dated September 26, 2014, granting defense 

counsel’s request to vacate the “request for a Settlement Conference CR2014-122224-001 and 

CR2014-122849-001, and Non-Witness Violation Hearing in CR2012-117804-001 and CR2013-

459776-001 set before the Master Calendar Assignment Judge.” 

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contacted the defendant during the pretrial process to prepare the defendant 

for a trial. . . . The attorney made decisions such as filing for and be[ing] 

granted a request to vacate a Settlement Conference on September 26, 

2014, without the defendant’s knowledge. . . . Because of the actions of the 

attorney the defendant did not have a fair trial.

(ECF No. 8-1 at 53). He further alleged counsel should have moved to suppress the 

evidence of his confession based on the purported violation of his Miranda rights, and 

that “trial counsel refused or failed to have the baggie tested for fingerprints or DNA 

belonging to the defendant.” (ECF No. 8-1 at 55-56). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but summarily denied Rule 32 relief 

on November 28, 2017. See State v. Dargen, 2017 WL 5709598 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). 

Dargen asserts he is entitled to federal habeas relief because he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel; he contends counsel failed to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation, failed to adequately consult with him prior to trial, and failed to 

present mitigating evidence at sentencing.5(ECF No. 1 at 6). Dargen further argues the 

evidence introduced at his trial was legally insufficient to support his conviction because 

“the conviction was based on the testimony of the officer and that alone,” and the 

“baggie” containing the methamphetamine was never subjected to DNA testing or 

fingerprinted. (ECF No. 1 at 7-8). Dargen also alleges the prosecutor used perjured 

testimony to obtain a conviction. (ECF No. 1 at 9).6 Respondents contend Dargen’s 

claims are procedurally barred and without merit.

 

5 At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and before closing argument, and 

outside the presence of the jury, Dargen waived his right to a jury trial regarding the aggravation 

phase of the trial and stipulated that he was on probation at the time of the instant offense on 

convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia occurring in 2012 and possession or use of 

dangerous drugs occurring in 2013. (ECF No. 8-1 at 8). 

6 Dargen asserts:

The officer stated on record that the petitioner admitted to owning the baggie 

containing drugs. In his testimony he admited to not being truthful in his report. I 

was said that the petitioner was placed in county jail in the report that was written 

the day after the arrest. But he then admitted that was not true that the petitioner 

was dropped off at the emergency room then left there. The officer made false 

statements about questioning the plaintiff. Saying that after admitting to owning 

the drugs that the petitioner he could no longer understand what the petitioner was 

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II. Exhaustion and procedural default

Absent specific circumstances, the Court may only grant federal habeas relief on 

the merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. See 

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

729-30 (1991). To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim the petitioner must afford the 

state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the 

claim to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. E.g., Castille v. 

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2005). In non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test is satisfied if the 

habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. 

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762-

63 (D. Ariz. 2008). To fairly present a claim in the state courts, thereby exhausting the 

claim, the petitioner must present to the state courts the “substantial equivalent” of the 

claim presented in federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Libberton 

v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair presentation requires a 

petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the state courts, including a reference to 

the operative federal constitutional guarantee relied on by the petitioner and a statement 

the facts supporting the claim. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). 

A petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has the right to 

raise the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally 

barred from pursuing a previously un-presented claim in the state’s “highest” court. See 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2006). 

 

saying because of him being incoherent. He stated he only found the drugs, got a 

confession then never got to follow-up on a confession. In truth once he found the 

drugs I became upset and told him that I don’t know anything about it, I made it 

clear that they were setting me up and wanted a lawyer as was my right. After 

being denied I would not answer any more questions. [sic]

(ECF No. 1 at 9). 

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[The federal courts] recognize two types of procedural bars: express and 

implied. An express procedural bar occurs when the petitioner has 

presented his claim to the state courts and the state courts have relied on a 

state procedural rule to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied procedural 

bar, on the other hand, occurs when the petitioner has failed to fairly 

present his claims to the highest state court and would now be barred by a 

state procedural rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, 

and the preclusion of claims bar Dargen from returning to the state courts to exhaust any 

unexhausted federal habeas claim, he has exhausted but procedurally defaulted any claim 

not previously properly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, but the appellate court did not address the merits of the claim because 

it found the claim precluded by a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Atwood v. Ryan, 870 

F.3d 1033, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017). 

The doctrine of procedural default provides that a federal habeas court may 

not review constitutional claims when a state court has declined to consider 

their merits on the basis of an adequate and independent state procedural 

rule. A state procedural rule is adequate if it is regularly or consistently 

applied by the state courts and it is independent if it does not depend on a 

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state procedural rule is both adequate 

and independent, it will bar consideration of the merits of claims on habeas 

review unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the default and 

prejudice resulting therefrom or that a failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

If a prisoner has procedurally defaulted a claim in the state courts he is not entitled 

to a review of the merits of the claim in a federal habeas action absent a showing of both 

cause and prejudice. E.g., Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000). The 

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Court may also consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the failure to 

consider the merits of the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Atwood, 870 F.3d at 1059; Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 

327 (9th Cir. 2011). “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default 

of the claim, i.e., an objective factor outside of his control, and “prejudice” is actual harm 

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. To establish 

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” Id. It is the petitioner’s burden to establish both cause and prejudice with 

regard to their procedural default of a federal habeas claim in the state courts. Correll v. 

Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415 (9th Cir. 1998).

A petitioner meets the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception by 

“establish[ing] that under the probative evidence he has a colorable claim of factual 

innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333. 339 (1992) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have 

found him guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004); 

Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

Dargen did not raise any claims for relief in his direct appeal. In his Rule 32 action 

he asserted his insufficiency of the evidence claim in his petition to the state trial court, 

which summarily concluded he failed to state a colorable claim for relief. In his petition 

for review Dargen asserted both his insufficiency of the evidence claim and an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, and the state appellate court summarily concluded the trial 

court had not abused its discretion in denying relief. 

Dargen did not properly exhaust his insufficiency of the evidence claim in the 

state courts; such a claim was required to be presented in his direct appeal. See Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) (precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior 

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post-conviction relief petitions). The state trial court impliedly found the claim 

procedurally barred by concluding the claim not “grounds” for relief pursuant to Rule 32.

Nor Dargen did properly exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the 

state courts because it was not properly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals; 

Dargen failed to raise the claim in the state habeas trial court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.9(c)(1)(ii) (stating a petition for review shall contain “[t]he issues which were decided 

by the trial court and which the defendant wishes to present” for review); State v. Weiber, 

2013 WL 268696, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2013), citing State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 

464, 468 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (holding a reviewing court will not consider on review 

issues not presented to the trial court). See also Pinzon v. Ryan, 2015 WL 11071468, at 

*5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2015) (“The [state] appellate court found that Petitioner did not 

raise these issues in the petition for post-conviction relief that he filed in the trial court, 

and under Rule 32.9(c) he was precluded from presenting those issues on appeal.”);

Hershfeldt v. Schriro, 2007 WL 951965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2007) (“Under state law 

a claim may not be raised for the first time in a petition for review from the denial of 

post-conviction relief . . .”). Therefore, Dargen did not properly exhaust the ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims presented in his federal habeas petition because he did not 

properly present them to the Arizona Court of Appeals; the appellate court impliedly 

found review of these two claims precluded by an adequate and independent state rule.7

Furthermore, Dargen never presented a prosecutorial misconduct claim to the state 

courts, either on appeal or in his Rule 32 action. 

It would be futile for Dargen to return to the state courts to try to exhaust his 

claims because a successive petition for post-conviction relief would be untimely and his 

claims would be precluded from review because they could have been properly raised on 

direct appeal or in his prior post-conviction proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3); 

 

7

“Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes an independent 

and adequate state ground justifying a procedural default.” Lacy v. Diaz, 2007 WL 2949010, 

at *8 (D. Ariz. Oct. 9, 2007), citing Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002). See also, e.g.,

Gallegos v. Schriro, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1056-57 (D. Ariz. 2008). 

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see also State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 566 (2006) (“As a general rule, when [claims] 

are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding, 

subsequent claims [] will be deemed waived and precluded.”) (internal quotation 

omitted).

Dargen has not responded to Respondents’ contention that he failed to properly 

exhaust his claims in the state courts and, therefore, he fails to establish cause for or 

prejudice arising from his procedural default of his claims. Similarly, he fails to make an 

adequate showing that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent the 

consideration of his defaulted claims for relief.

III. Conclusion

Dargen procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claims in the state courts, and he 

has not made any showing of cause or prejudice, or actual innocence, sufficient to 

overcome his procedural default of these claims. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Dargen’s petition seeking a 

federal writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length.

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Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Dargen seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should be 

denied because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.

Dated this 27th day of January, 2020.

Case 2:18-cv-04360-SRB Document 9 Filed 01/28/20 Page 12 of 12