Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01632/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01632-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leanna Smith, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Barrow Neurological Institute, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 10-01632-PHX-FJM

ORDER

On February 12, 2013, we entered an order granting defendants Banner Health System

and Scott Elton, M.D.’s motion for sanctions and instructing them to file an application for

reasonable attorneys’ fees caused by (1) plaintiff’s failure to promptly obtain records from

the juvenile court and to comply with Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. P., and (2) plaintiff’s motion for

leave to file a third amended complaint (doc. 334). We now have before us defendants’

application for attorneys’ fees re: order granting sanctions (doc. 338), plaintiff’s motion to

stay or in the alternative response to defendants’ application (doc. 346), plaintiff’s

supplement to the motion to stay (doc. 350), defendants’ response to the motion to stay and

reply in support of the application (doc. 353), and plaintiff’s reply in support of the motion

to stay (doc. 358). 

Plaintiff’s motion to stay is based on the contention that we do not have jurisdiction

over the application for attorneys’ fees because on March 3, 2013 plaintiff filed a notice of

appeal incorporating the order granting sanctions. Generally, the filing of a notice of appeal

divests the district court of jurisdiction over the matters appealed. Natural Res. Def. Council

Case 2:10-cv-01632-FJM Document 373 Filed 05/29/13 Page 1 of 6
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v. Southwest Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the “rule of

exclusive appellate jurisdiction” resulting from an appeal “is a creature of judicial prudence

[. . .] and is not absolute.” Masalosalo by Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955,

956 (9th Cir. 1983)(citations omitted). An appeal from the merits does not foreclose an

award of attorneys' fees by the district court. Id. Allowing the district court to retain the

power to award attorneys’ fees after the notice of appeal had been filed, “may prevent delay

and duplication at the appellate level” because, “[i]f a district court decides a fee issue early

in the course of a pending appeal on the merits, and the fee order is appealed, the appeals

may be consolidated.” Id.

Deciding defendants’ application for attorneys’ fees at this time would conserve

appellate resources because, assuming plaintiff files a notice of appeal from this order, that

appeal can be consolidated with the pending appeal. Therefore, we deny plaintiff’s motion

to stay and consider defendants’ application for attorneys’ fees. 

Plaintiff next requests reconsideration of our order granting defendants’ motion for

sanctions (doc. 334). A court “will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order

absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not

have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1).

Plaintiff has not met her burden. Plaintiff largely restates facts and arguments that were

presented when we considered defendants’ motion for sanctions, and fails to explain why she

could not have raised new arguments earlier with reasonable diligence. Therefore, we deny

plaintiff’s request for reconsideration. We consider only the reasonableness of the attorneys’

fees requested pursuant to our order granting sanctions. 

Defendants seek an award of attorneys fees for: (1) $19,571.00 spent in connection

with plaintiff’s failure to promptly obtain records from the juvenile court and comply with

Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. P.; (2) $15,154.00 spent responding to plaintiff’s filing of the third

amended complaint; (3) $23,080.00 incurred in connection with the motion for sanctions; and

(4) $5,908.50 expended on this application for attorneys’ fees. Defendants have submitted

a supporting declaration and an itemization and description of the work performed by their

Case 2:10-cv-01632-FJM Document 373 Filed 05/29/13 Page 2 of 6
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1

 See Doc. 338-2 entries dated 10/7/2011, 3/5/2012, 3/22/2012, 3/29/2012, 5/23/2012,

and 5/25/2012.

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counsel. Plaintiff's counsel did not object to the reasonableness of defense counsel's hourly

billing rate, which ranges between $160.00 per hour to $285.00 per hour. Based on the

billing information provided and our familiarity with the legal market, we conclude that the

hourly rates are reasonable. 

I

Plaintiff objects on several grounds to defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees resulting

from plaintiff’s failure to promptly obtain records from the juvenile court. First, plaintiff

argues that defendants are not entitled to $6,894 in fees for work between July 20, 2011 and

March 29, 2012 because that activity was not caused by plaintiff’s violation of any court

order. We disagree. The record reflects that Judge Campbell first ordered plaintiff to initiate

an action in juvenile court to obtain access to records of the juvenile court proceeding on

April 22, 2011. See Doc. 57. Judge Campbell ordered plaintiff to obtain the juvenile court

records again on June 30, 2011 and November 2, 2011. See Docs. 70, 85. Therefore, the

fees defendants incurred in connection with obtaining access to the juvenile records between

July 2011 and April 2012 are recoverable. Second, plaintiff objects to specific time entries

reflecting communication between the parties concerning access to juvenile records.

Plaintiff’s objection is without merit because the time entries specifically reference accessing

the juvenile court records. Third, plaintiff objects to the redaction of certain time entries.

Because the redactions preclude us from determining whether the time entries are related to

gaining access to juvenile records, we reduce the fees requested by the dollar amounts of

those entries ($96.00+$48.00+$72.00+$72.00+$84+$672 = $1,044).1

 Fourth, plaintiff

contends that defendants inappropriately seek attorneys’ fees for drafting and filing a motion

to stay in October 2011 because it was denied and not related to violation of any court order.

Defendants’ motion to stay was related both to the proceedings pending in the Superior Court

of Arizona in Maricopa County and plaintiff’s failure to obtain an order from the Superior

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2

 See Doc. 338-2 entries dated 10/3/2011, 10/27/2011, 12/1/2011, 12/16/2011, and

1/25/2012.

3

 See Doc. 338-2 entries dated 2/2/2012.

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Court releasing the juvenile records. Therefore, we reduce by half the fees requested in

connection with the motion to stay ($2,073/2 = $1,036.50). Next, plaintiff argues that

defendants’ counsel is not entitled to seek fees for reviewing and accessing the juvenile court

rulings. This argument is without merit. The specific entries plaintiff objects to are related

to plaintiff’s failure to obtain the juvenile court records.2

 However, defendants are not

entitled to fees for reviewing juvenile court rulings that plaintiff promptly disclosed ($681).3

Plaintiff also objects to a series of time entries by generally stating that they are not justified.

See Doc. 346 at 7. However, our review of the record reveals that they are related to

accessing the juvenile records. Finally, plaintiff argues that she should not be sanctioned for

records she allegedly did not possess. But plaintiff, a party to the juvenile proceeding, had

access to all records. Defendants did not.

Plaintiff also objects to defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees in connection with

plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. P. Plaintiff challenges a series of

billing entries referencing communications about expert disclosures between defendants’

counsel and plaintiff’s counsel, without stating why these are inappropriate. The fees related

to the entries are recoverable because they are related to plaintiff’s failure to meet the Rule

26 expert disclosure requirements. Plaintiff also argues that defendants are inappropriately

seeking attorneys’ fees for preparation of the motion to compel filed on July 24, 2012. Even

though the motion became moot after we granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment

on July 31, 2012, the effort that went into the motion resulted from plaintiff’s failure to

comply with Rule 26. Therefore, the fees associated with preparation of the motion are

recoverable. However, we agree that the $670 in fees associated with entries in August 2012

relating to the motion to compel are not recoverable because the summary judgment order

mooted any further work on the motion to compel. Accordingly, we award defendants fees

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 See Doc. 338-2 entries dated 11/4/11, 11/11/11, 12/6/11, and 1/20/12.

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in the amount of $16,139.50 ($19,571.00 less $3,431.50 in inappropriate fees) in connection

with plaintiff’s failure to promptly obtain records from the juvenile court and to comply with

Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. P.

II

Next, plaintiff challenges the $15,154.00 in fees defendants request in connection with

 plaintiff’s motion to file a third amended complaint. Plaintiff argues that any fees incurred

before she filed her third amended complaint on November 11, 2011 are inappropriate. We

disagree. Plaintiff informed defendants of her intention to file a third amended complaint

before November 2011. Therefore, the fees defendants incurred before November 2011 in

preparing to oppose the frivolous filing are reasonable. Plaintiff also objects to several

entries that have been partially redacted, but it is clear that those entries are related to the

third amended complaint.4

 Finally, plaintiff objects to numerous entries on the bases that the

fees are unreasonable and excessive. However, she has failed to meet her burden to provide

evidence demonstrating the excessive or unreasonable nature of the fees. See McGrath v.

County of Nevada, 67 F.3d 248, 255 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the fees defendants seek

in connection with the third amended complaint are reasonable. These fees are recoverable

against plaintiff’s attorney. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“Any attorney . . . thereof who so

multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the

court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred

because of such conduct.”).

III

Finally, plaintiff argues that defendants are not entitled to attorneys’ fees for preparing

the motion for sanctions and this application for attorneys’ fees. Attorneys’ fees for

preparing the motion for sanctions are recoverable under our order because the fees related

to the preparation of the motion for sanctions resulted from plaintiff’s discovery failures and

frivolous filing. However, we agree with plaintiff that fees in the amount of $23,080.00 are

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excessive. A significant amount of the factual research required for the motion for sanctions

should have been readily available from other discovery motions. Moreover, the legal issues

presented were not overly complex. Therefore, we believe an award of half of the fees

sought, in the amount of $11,540 is appropriate. Defendants are also entitled to recover fees

for their work in seeking attorneys’ fees. Time spent preparing the fees application “must be

included in calculating a reasonable fee because uncompensated time spent on petitioning

for a fee automatically diminishes the value of the fee eventually received.” Anderson v.

Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs, 91 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996).

Based on our experience with attorneys’ fees motions, we believe the amount of $5,908.50

is reasonable. 

IT IS ORDERED DENYING plaintiff’s motion to stay (doc. 346). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING defendants’ application for attorneys’

fees (doc. 338). IT IS ORDERED that defendants are awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount

of $15,154.00 against Keith Knowlton and Keith M. Knowlton LLC, jointly and severally.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants are awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount

of $16,139.50, $11,540.00, and $5,908.50 for a total amount of $33,588.00 against plaintiff,

Keith Knowlton, and Keith M. Knowlton LLC, jointly and severally.

DATED this 28th day of May, 2013.

Case 2:10-cv-01632-FJM Document 373 Filed 05/29/13 Page 6 of 6