Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-01483/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-01483-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUSAN MAE POLK,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JAMES CAVIN, Deputy; MATT

CHERTKOW, Lt.; CONTRA COSTA

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 

Defendants. _______________________________ 

 

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No. C 08-1483 MMC (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

On March 17, 2008, plaintiff, a California prisoner incarcerated at the Central

California Women’s Facility in Chowchilla, California (“CCWF”), and proceeding pro se,

filed the above-titled civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By separate order filed

concurrently herewith, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and

dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v.

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Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

48 (1988).

B. Background

Plaintiff alleges the following: On August 29, 2003, when plaintiff was on her way to

court to submit a “Faretta” motion, Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Deputy James Cavin

(“Cavin”) asked plaintiff if she was going to represent herself and told her she “better not talk

in court.” (Compl. at 3:19.) When Cavin escorted plaintiff out of the courtroom, he hit her

on the chest and hit her elbow with a “blackjack,” breaking her elbow. Cavin was supervised

by Lt. Matt Chertkow, who previously told plaintiff to keep her mouth shut and not talk to

reporters. Plaintiff names as defendants Cavin, Chertkow and the Contra Costa County

Sheriff’s Department. She seeks monetary damages and protection from retribution and

harsh treatment should she again return to court in Contra Costa County.

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff’s allegations, when liberally construed, state a cognizable claim against

Cavin for the use of excessive force. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)

(holding Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment protects post-arraignment pretrial

detainee from use of excessive force that amounts to punishment). 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a cognizable claim for relief against Chertkow,

however, as plaintiff alleges only that Chertkow was Cavin’s supervisor, and does not allege

that Cherkow engaged in any unlawful conduct as to plaintiff. A supervisor may be liable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only upon a showing of personal involvement in the constitutional

deprivation, or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and

the constitutional violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.

1991) (en banc). Consequently, a supervisor generally “is only liable for constitutional

violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or

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knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under no circumstances is there respondeat superior liability under

§ 1983. See id. Here, plaintiff has not alleged facts showing either Chertkow’s personal

involvement in the use of force against plaintiff on August 29, 2003, or a sufficient causal

connection between wrongful conduct by Cherkow and Cavin’s use of excessive force. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against Chertkow are subject to dismissal from this action. 

Plaintiff will be given leave to amend her complaint to allege, if she can do so, facts that

adequately set forth a basis for liability on the part of Chertkow.

Plaintiff’s allegations likewise do not state a cognizable claim for relief against the

Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department. Although local governmental entities are

“persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official policy or custom causes a

constitutional tort, see Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), in order

to impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff

must show: (1) that she possessed a constitutional right of which she was deprived; (2) that

the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the

constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432,

438 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that the Contra Costa

County Sheriff’s Department had a policy that was deliberately indifferent to her

constitutional rights and that such policy was the moving force behind Cavin’s use of

excessive force. Consequently, plaintiff’s claims against the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s

Department are subject to dismissal from this action. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend

her complaint to allege, if she can do so, facts that adequately set forth a basis for municipal

liability on the part of the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department. 

D. Statute of Limitations

In addition to the pleading deficiencies discussed above, the allegations in plaintiff’s

complaint present a further pleading problem that must be resolved before plaintiff’s claims

can go forward. Specifically, it appears from the face of the complaint that plaintiff’s claims

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Prior to January 1, 2003, the limitations period was one year. See Maldonado, 370

F.3d at 954 (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3)).

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are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Although the statute of limitations is an

affirmative defense that normally may not be raised by the court sua sponte, it may be

grounds for sua sponte dismissal of an in forma pauperis complaint where the defense is

complete and obvious from the face of the pleadings or the court’s own records. See

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-30 (9th Cir. 1984). Here, plaintiff has been

granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and, for the reasons discussed below, the statute

of limitations appears, from the face of plaintiff’s complaint and the declaration attached

thereto, to be a complete and obvious defense to the claims raised herein. 

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period, see Elliott v. City of Union

City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994); the appropriate period is that of the forum state’s

statute of limitations for personal injury torts, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276

(1985). In the event the state has multiple statutes of limitations for different torts, federal

courts considering claims brought pursuant to § 1983 borrow the general or residual statute

for personal injury actions. See Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999). Effective

January 1, 2003, California’s general residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions

is two years. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Cal. Code

Civ. Proc. § 335.1).1

 Additionally, a federal court must give effect to a state’s tolling

provisions. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989). In California, incarceration

of the plaintiff is a disability that tolls the statute for a maximum of two years. See Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 352.1. 

A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that

forms the basis of the action. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991-92 (9th Cir.

1999); Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802. Here, plaintiff alleges she was injured by Cavin on August 29,

2003, but that she did not discover the extent of her injury until she learned, on or about

August 29, 2004, that she will be never be able to fully straighten her arm. (Compl. at 3-4.) 

The injury that is the basis of this action is Cavin’s use of excessive force against plaintiff;

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Additionally, plaintiff was aware on or about that date that her elbow had been

injured.

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because plaintiff knew of said injury on August 29, 2003,2 such date is the date on which her

claim accrued. As plaintiff had four years from the date on which her claim accrued in which

to file her complaint against defendants (two years under Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 335.1 and an

additional two years under Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 352.1), she was required to do so by

August 29, 2007. Plaintiff did not file her complaint until March 17, 2008; accordingly, her

claims appear to be time-barred. 

Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she tried to bring her complaint earlier but “was

prevented from doing so by custodial officials.” (Compl. at 4.) In support of her allegation,

plaintiff has attached a declaration to her complaint in which she states she was subjected to

intimidation by Cavin and Chertkow after her criminal case was assigned in August 2005 to

Judge Laurel Lindebaum Brady, for whom Chertkow’s wife, Nancy, is a clerk. (Compl. Ex.

bb at 2.) Plaintiff states that once the case was assigned to Judge Brady, Cavin and Chertkow

told plaintiff to keep quiet about what they had done to plaintiff. (Id.) Additionally, plaintiff

states, she was “repeatedly harassed and threatened by a group of officers” after her case was

assigned to Judge Brady, and she was denied access to legal materials. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff

states the problem continued even after she was transported to CCWF on February 27, 2007, 

where, she states, she was denied access to legal materials and the law library when she

arrived, and has been repeatedly told to stop her legal efforts. (Id. at 3-4.) 

The doctrine of equitable estoppel may serve to bar application of the statute of

limitations as a defense where a plaintiff who knows of her cause of action reasonably relies

on the defendant’s statements or conduct in failing to bring suit. Sitt v. Williams, 919 F.2d

516, 522 (9th Cir. 1990). In California, a defendant may be equitably estopped from

asserting the statute of limitations defense if the plaintiff was prevented from timely filing a

claim as the result of duress caused by the defendant during the applicable limitations period. 

See Ateeq v. Najar, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 1357 (1993) (finding defendant equitably

estopped from asserting statute of limitations defense where defendant’s repeated threats of

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Actions allegedly taken by CCWF prison employees after plaintiff arrived at CCWF

would not equitably estop application of the statute of limitations defense as to plaintiff’s

claims against Cavin, Chertkow and the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department, because

no CCWF employee is a defendant to those claims. 

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deportation caused plaintiff to delay filing suit). Here, however, application of the equitable

estoppel doctrine does not appear to be warranted because the period during which plaintiff

was allegedly subjected to duress by Cavin and Chertkow ended when she was transferred to

state prison on February 27, 2007, approximately six months before the statute of limitations

expired on August 29, 2007. Once plaintiff was transferred out of the custody of the Contra

Costa County Sheriff’s Department to CCWF, she no longer was in danger from Cavin and

Chertkow’s threats of harm should she file a civil action against them and, thus, she could

have timely filed her complaint.3

In sum, it appears from the face of the complaint and the declaration attached thereto

that plaintiff’s claims have been brought outside of the applicable statute of limitations

period and must be dismissed. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend to allege facts

showing why her claims are not time-barred.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. The complaint is hereby DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within thirty (30)

days of the date this order is filed, plaintiff may file an AMENDED COMPLAINT, using

the court’s form civil rights complaint, in order to cure the deficiencies noted above. A

copy of the form is provided herewith. Plaintiff shall complete the form, a copy of which is

provided herewith, and include in the caption both the case number of this action, No. C 08-

1483 MMC (PR), and the phrase “AMENDED COMPLAINT.” 

An amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and may not incorporate by

reference any parts of the original complaint. London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811,

814 (9th Cir. 1981). Defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer

defendants to the action. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.1992). These

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rules govern actions filed by pro se litigants as well as litigants represented by counsel. See

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

If plaintiff fails to timely file an amended complaint in conformity with this

order, the action will be dismissed.

2. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action, pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 41(b), for failure to prosecute.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 28, 2008 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge 

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