Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01559/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01559-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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The Court will deny the request for oral argument because the parties have submitted

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence and the Court concludes that oral

argument will not aid its decisional process. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County,

Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cinnamon Rose Prowell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Kennedy Restaurant & Bar Management,

Inc; and Seven Vines, Inc., dba Vine

Tavern & Eatery, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-04-1559-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. Doc. #43. Plaintiff has filed

a response to the motion and Defendants have filed a reply. Docs. ##47-48. For the reasons

set forth below, the Court will grant the motion in part.1

I. Background

Defendants own and operate several Vine Tavern and Eatery (“Vine”) restaurants in

Arizona and Iowa. Plaintiff was employed by Defendants from November 2000 until she

was terminated in November 2002. Plaintiff worked as a server at the Vine restaurant

located in Tempe, Arizona.

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Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint against Defendants on July 7,

2004. Doc. #1. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 12, 2005. Doc. #35. The

amended complaint asserts sexual harassment and retaliation claims under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Id.

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The disputed evidence must be

“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.

III. Plaintiff’s Sexual Harassment Claim.

Plaintiff alleges that her former manager, John Quintanares, sexually harassed her in

violation of Title VII. Doc. #35 ¶¶ 7-9. Defendants argue that they are not vicariously liable

for the alleged conduct of Quintanares because they can establish the “reasonable care”

affirmative defense set forth in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Doc. #43 at 6. “The affirmative

defense has two prongs: (1) ‘that [Defendants] exercised reasonable care to prevent and

correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior’; and (2) ‘that [Plaintiff] unreasonably

failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities provided by

[Defendants] or to avoid harm otherwise.’” Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.2d 864,

877 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765); see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.

Generally, the defense is available “only if the alleged harassment has not culminated

in a tangible employment action.” EEOC v. Dinuba Med. Clinic, 222 F.3d 580, 587 (9th Cir.

2000); see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (“When no tangible employment action is taken, a

defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages[.]”); Ellerth, 524

U.S. at 765 (same). “A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in

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Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s argument that her reassignment to less desirable

shifts constitutes a tangible employment action. 

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employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly

different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Ellerth, 524

U.S. at 761. “[I]f a tangible employment action occurred, [Defendants] may still assert the

affirmative defense if the tangible employment action ‘was unrelated to any harassment or

complaint thereof.’” Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Nichols, 256 F.3d at 877).

Defendants contend that no tangible employment action occurred because Quintanares

never “attempted to extort sexual favors from [Plaintiff] by conditioning her continued

employment on her participation in such activity.” Doc. #43 at 7. Plaintiff argues that she

has presented sufficient evidence of tangible employment actions in the form of undesirable

reassignment and termination. Doc. #47 at 5, ¶¶ 22-24. Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s

termination does not constitute a tangible employment action as contemplated by Faragher

and Ellerth because the termination occurred after the alleged harassment took place and

Quintanares was not involved in the termination decision. Doc. #48 at 4 (citing Holly D. v.

Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003)).2

Construed in Plaintiff’s favor, the evidence shows the following: Plaintiff delivered

a sexual harassment complaint to Defendants on October 14, 2002. Docs. ##44 ¶ 24 &

Ex. H, 47 ¶ 47. The complaint alleged that Quintanares had sexually harassed Plaintiff and

some of her co-workers on numerous occasions. Doc. #44 Ex. H. The same day,

Quintanares drafted a letter recommending to Steve Wells, the restaurant’s general manager,

that Plaintiff be terminated in part because of her “constant whining and complaining[.]”

Docs. ##44 Ex. G, 47 Ex. 4. On October 15, 2002, Quintanares gathered and faxed to Mark

Pompeo, Defendants’ operations manager, all documentation Defendants had on Plaintiff.

Doc. #47 Ex. 3. 

On October 25, 2002, Plaintiff met with Wells and Pompeo regarding her complaint

of sexual harassment. Docs. ##44 ¶ 35, 47 ¶ 21. Plaintiff was told that Vine management

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wanted to resolve her complaint by transferring her to another Vine restaurant. Docs. ##44

¶ 36, 47 ¶ 21. Plaintiff declined the transfer because she would have made less money at a

different restaurant. Docs. ##44 ¶¶ 37-38, 47 Ex. 2 at 181, 228-29. Wells and Pompeo

concluded that the only other way to resolve Plaintiff’s complaint was to have Plaintiff and

Quintanares work different shifts. Doc. #44 ¶ 38. Plaintiff was reassigned to work shifts that

were less lucrative than the shifts she had been working prior to the October 25 meeting.

Docs. ##44 Ex. L, 47 Ex. 2 at 184, 238-39. Wells and Pompeo told Plaintiff that she was

permitted to patronize the restaurant as a customer when Quintanares was working. Doc. #47

Ex. 2 at 230. 

On October 31, 2002, Plaintiff went to the restaurant with some friends and coworkers. Id. at 234-37. Quintanares refused to let Plaintiff enter the restaurant. Id. Plaintiff

informed Quintanares that she had the right to patronize the restaurant as a customer and an

off-duty employee. Id. Quintanares responded by telling Plaintiff to “just keep talking” and

she might just talk her way off the schedule or out of a job. Doc. #44 Exs. J-K. Quintanares

threatened to get Wells so that they could “all have a talk.” Id. Ex. K. Wells terminated

Plaintiff three days later on November 3, 2002. Doc. #47 Ex. 2 at 238-39, 260. 

 A jury reasonably could conclude from this evidence that Plaintiff’s termination was

related to the alleged harassment and that Quintanares was involved in the termination

decision. Accepting Plaintiff’s evidence as true, Quintanares recommended Plaintiff’s

termination when she complained about his harassment and personally threatened Plaintiff

with termination during their encounter on October 31, 2002. There is thus a genuine issue

of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s termination constitutes a tangible employment action

precluding Defendants from asserting the “reasonable care” affirmative defense. See

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (“No affirmative defense is available . . . when the supervisor’s

harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or

undesirable reassignment.”); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (same); Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1169 n.14

(stating that the harassing supervisor “need not be empowered to make the final

determination with respect to ultimate employment decisions” and that the “power to make

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Given this ruling, the Court need not address whether Defendants have proven the

two elements of the affirmative defense.

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an effective recommendation is enough”); Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 951, 956

(9th Cir. 1999) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant in part because fact issues

existed as to whether the plaintiff’s termination constituted a tangible employment action).3

The Court will deny Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim.

IV. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim.

Title VII “prohibits retaliation against an employee ‘because [she] has opposed any

practice made an unlawful employment practice’” by Title VII. Nelson v. Pima Cmty.

College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). Plaintiff can

make a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation by producing evidence that (1) she engaged

in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) Defendants subjected her to an adverse employment

action, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.

See Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2004). If Plaintiff makes a prima

facie case, the burden of production shifts to Defendants to present a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229

F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000). If Defendants carry this burden, Plaintiff “must demonstrate

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reason advanced by [Defendants] was a

pretext.” Id.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has presented no evidence that there was a causal

link between her complaint of harassment and her termination. Doc. #43 at 11. The Court

concludes that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case.

Plaintiff was terminated within three weeks of her complaint. The temporal proximity

between the complaint and termination is sufficient circumstantial evidence to satisfy the

causation element of the prima facie case of retaliation. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v.

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (stating that temporal proximity between protected

activity and an adverse employment action can constitute sufficient evidence of causality to

establish a prima facie case where the temporal proximity is “very close”); Yartzoff v.

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Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that sufficient evidence of causation

existed where the adverse employment action occurred less than three months after the

protected activity); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000) (“That an

employer’s actions were caused by an employee’s engagement in protected activities may

be inferred from ‘proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory

employment decision.’”) (quoting Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376); see also Villiarimo v. Aloha

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘[T]he requisite degree of proof

necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII on summary judgment is minimal and

does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.’”) (citation

omitted).

Defendants further contend that they have established legitimate, non-retaliatory

reasons for Plaintiff’s termination – that Plaintiff was terminated for poor work performance

and insubordination during her encounter with Quintanares on October 31, 2002. Docs. ##43

at 11, 44 ¶ 41. Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of fact as

to whether these stated reasons are pretexts for retaliation.

First, Plaintiff disputes that her work performance was inadequate. Doc. #47 at 15,

¶¶ 26-28. Six weeks before she complained about harassment, Plaintiff received an

employee evaluation that rated her an “[e]xcellent server” and stated that she was “one of

only a handful of employees that [Defendants] can trust with ANY task that needs to be

completed on time.” Doc. #47 Ex. 5 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff received mostly high

scores on her work-related traits, averaging a score of 8 on a scale of 1-10, with 10 being the

best. Id.

Second, Plaintiff disputes that she was insubordinate during her encounter with

Quintanares on October 31, 2002. Doc. #47 at 15. Plaintiff has testified that both Wells and

Pompeo gave her permission to patronize the restaurant when Quintanares was working.

Doc. #47 Ex. 2 at 229-30. Plaintiff has further testified that she explained this to Quintanares

during their encounter and that when he still refused to let her enter the restaurant, she simply

waited in the parking for her friends since she did not drive herself to the restaurant. Id. at

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236-37.

Third, shortly after Plaintiff complained about harassment, Quintanares recommended

Plaintiff’s termination and gathered all of the documents Defendants had on Plaintiff. Id.

Exs. 3-4.

Finally, Plaintiff was terminated less than three weeks after complaining about the

alleged harassment. Docs. ##44 Ex. G, 47 Ex. 2 at 238-39, 260.

This evidence, viewed in Plaintiff’s favor, raises genuine issues of material fact as to

whether Defendant’s stated reasons for terminating Plaintiff are pretexts for retaliation. See

Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062 (stating that a plaintiff can survive summary judgment by

presenting specific and substantial circumstantial evidence that the defendant’s stated reasons

are pretextual); Ray, 217 F.3d at 1244 (“We . . . hold that, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to Ray, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the

retaliation claim.”); see also Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124

(9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the question of whether the defendant’s stated reasons are

pretextual “is one that can only be resolved though a searching inquiry – one that is most

appropriately conducted by the factfinder, upon a full record’”) (citation omitted); Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (stating that “a plaintiff’s prima facie

case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is

false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully [retaliated]”).

The Court will deny Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

V. Damages.

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants’ conduct, she has been damaged in the

form of lost salary, benefits, and employment opportunities. Doc. #35 ¶ 17. Defendants

argue that there is no evidence that Plaintiff has suffered any economic damages and that her

2003 and 2004 tax returns show that she made more money in those years than she made

while working at the Vine. Docs. ##43 at 10-11, 44 Exs. M-R. Plaintiff agrees with

Defendants that she has fully mitigated her economic damages and is thus not entitled to an

award of back pay. Doc. #47 at 16-17 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)). The Court will

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accordingly grant Defendants’ motion with respect to this issue.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. #43) is granted in part and

denied in part as set forth in this order.

2. The Court will set a pretrial conference by separate order.

DATED this 3rd day of May, 2006.

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