Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01976/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01976-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAWANTA J. LAMBERT,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRANK SOTO, et al.,

Defendants. 

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Case No. 10cv1976-AJB (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION TO

DISMISS

[ECF No. 32] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Anthony

J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 20, 2010, Plaintiff Jawanta J. Lambert, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights suit against Licensed Vocational Nurse Shady M.

Villalobos, Correctional Officer Frank Soto, and an unidentified Medical Physician under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. ECF No. 1. Defendants Shady Villalobos and Frank Soto (“Defendants”) filed a motion

to dismiss the complaint on May 3, 2011 for failure to state a claim.1

 ECF No. 17. Plaintiff

opposed the motion on June 30, 2011 [ECF No. 22] and Defendants filed a reply on July 14,

1Plaintiff did not name or serve the unidentified medical physician in this matter. ECF. 1 at 4 & 17-1 at 3. 

As such, the first motion to dismiss was only brought on behalf of the Defendants who were properly named and

served. Id.

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2011 [ECF No. 23]. On October 12, 2011, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation for

an Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 24. The Report and Recommendation was adopted by District Court Judge Anthony J. Battaglia in an Order dated March 19, 2012. 

ECF No. 30. In that same Order, Judge Battaglia granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. 

Id. at 10. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on May 24, 2012 [ECF No. 31, (“FAC”)] and

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint on June 13, 20122 [ECF No.

32-1, (“MTD”)]. Plaintiff opposed the motion on July 30, 2012 [ECF No. 35, (“Oppo.”)] and

Defendants filed a reply on August 6, 2012 [ECF No. 36, (“Reply”)]. 

This Court finds the issue appropriate for decision on the papers and without oral

argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1 (d)(1). See ECF No. 33. The Court has considered 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition,

Defendants’ Reply and all supporting documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set

forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) be

GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept

as true all material allegations in the FAC, and must construe the FAC and all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Thompson v. Davis, 295

F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). According to the FAC, Plaintiff was involved in an “incident” at

Centinela State Prison on April 21, 2009 where he was “attacked and beaten about the head and

body.” FAC at 3. As a result of the incident, Plaintiff alleges that he “sustained serious injuries

to his back that included sharp pain during mobility and breathing; a dislocated shoulder;

swelling and bruises to the head; [a]ctive bleeding, swelling, pain, and weakness to the right

knee; and other minor abrasions.” Id. After the incident, Plaintiff sought medical treatment

from a licensed vocational nurse, Defendant Villalobos. Id. During the evaluation, Plaintiff

informed Defendant Villalobos of his various injuries by “showing her the affected areas and

2The First Amended Complaint does not include the physician as a Defendant. FAC at 2. As such, the instant

motion is brought on behalf of the only defendants, Frank Soto and Shady M. Villalobos. Id. & MTD.

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describing his symptoms.” Id. According to Plaintiff, he told Defendant Villalobos that his back

hurt while breathing, that he could not place any weight onto his right leg, and that he had a

dislocated left shoulder. Id. Plaintiff then alleges that despite being trained on how to document

inmate-patient injuries or unusual occurrences, Defendant Villalobos falsely completed a medical

report of injury form by intentionally minimizing Plaintiff’s injuries to only include soreness of

the back, shoulder pain, abrasions, and scratches with dried blood, leaving out “[P]laintiff’s

swelling, active bleeding, trouble breathing, dislocated shoulder, and damaged knee.” Id. at 3-5. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Villalobos refused to treat his injuries and responded to

Plaintiff’s request for first aid by stating that “she did not care about [] [P]laintff’s pain” and that

“[Plaintiff] shouldn’t have been fighting with staff” before walking away and not returning. Id.

at 3. After Defendant Villalobos left, Plaintiff claims that he was forced to reset his dislocated

shoulder himself to “lessen the pain” which he did by placing his left wrist between his thighs and

pulling on his arm until his shoulder was properly set. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Villalobos was not competent to examine and treat Plaintiff, that she should have referred him

to “other medical staff,” and that by not referring him, Defendant Villalobos denied him medical

treatment. Id. at 5. Plaintiff further alleges that due to his neglected injuries, the pain in his

shoulder and knee became “intense and unbearable” and his daily activities were altered such

that he could no longer climb into his bunk bed and “was reduced to sleepind [sic] on a dirty

prison concrete floor.” Id.

After his appointment with Defendant Villalobos, Plaintiff was escorted to a holding cell

via golf cart by Correctional Officer A. Gonzales and Defendant Soto. During the ride, Plaintiff

told Defendant Soto that “he suffered from serious injuries and that he was not sure if he could

walk on his leg.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff then directed Defendant Soto’s attention to his “severely

sprained and bleeding knee” to which Defendant Soto stated that “[Defendant Villalobos] should

have taken care of it.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendant Soto that he was in too much

pain to walk, but Defendant Soto ordered him to try with his assistance. Id. Defendant Soto

then escorted Plaintiff to the holding cell as he limped “in a great deal of pain.” Id. When

Plaintiff again told Defendant Soto that he needed medical attention, Defendant Soto merely

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stated that “the medics will take care of it dude.” Id. Plaintiff was then taken to his holding cell

and left to suffer “the pain of his exacerbated injuries.” Id. at 8.

In May 2009, Plaintiff, complained to the medical staff about his ongoing pain from the

April 21, 2009 incident. Id. at 6. In response, the medical staff referred Plaintiff to a Registered

Nurse who provided him with medications and referred him to a doctor. Id. Plaintiff states he

continued to suffer from pain “[a]s a direct result of [D]efendant Villalobos’ attitudes and actions”

and denial of medical treatment. Id. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of his untreated injuries

from April 21, 2009, he sustained further injury on May 14, 2009, when he fell to the ground

from his upper bunk bed. Id. According to Plaintiff, the untreated shoulder and knee injuries

were “aggrevated [sic] by the daily activity of climbing to his upper bunk bed.” Id. After the fall,

Plaintiff was treated at a local emergency room and housed in the facility’s correctional treatment

center for five days on bed rest. Id. Plaintiff alleges that his “injuries were so exacerbated by 

[D]ef[endant’s] action that his knee has never healed correctly, and neither has his back.” Id.

He continues to take medications for his pain and suffers from “chronic pain, shame, emotional

distress, degradation, mental distressand [sic] shame.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs

and, therefore, violated his constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment of the

United States Constitution. Id. at 3 & 7. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of

$750,000. Id. at 10.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FAC should be dismissed because he has failed to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. MTD at 4. Specifically, Defendants explain that

Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendants disregarded Plaintiff’s serious medical

needs or excessive risk of injury. Id. at 4-6. Defendants also assert that they are protected by

qualified immunity. Id. at 6. Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ arguments. Oppo. 

A. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. MTD at 4. Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules

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of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief ..." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he pleading standard Rule

8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129

S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but

whether he has properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff must set

forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’" 

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). If the facts alleged in the

complaint are "merely consistent with" the defendant’s liability, the plaintiff has not satisfied the

plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, "[a] claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556).

When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must be careful to construe the pleadings

liberally and to afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007); Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895. This rule of liberal construction is “particularly

important” in civil rights cases. Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (S.D. Cal. Dec.

28, 2007) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Hebbe v.

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that because “Iqbal incorporated the Twombly

pleading standard and Twombly did not alter the Court’s treatment of pro se filings; accordingly

we continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” This is particularly important where the

Petitioner is a pro se prisoner litigant in a civil rights matter). When giving liberal construction

to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court is not permitted to “supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Easter v. CDC, 694 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183

(S.D. Cal. March 9, 2010) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266,

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268 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Ivey, 673 F.2d at

268).

The court should allow a pro se plaintiff leave to amend his or her complaint "unless the

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, "before dismissing a pro

se complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his

complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively." Wayne

v. Leal, 2009 WL 2406299, *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (quoting Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261).

B. EIGHTH AMENDMENT - DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 

FAC at 3-8. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Villalobos “ignored [P]laintiff’s known

medical [n]eeds” and failed to act in accordance with her training, which she knew “would create

an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on Plaintiff. Id. at 4. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Soto “was aware of [P]laintiff’s injuries and disregarded the excessive risk to

[P]laintiff’s health and safety.” Id. at 8. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendant

Villalobos’s conduct, he “has suffered/is suffering injuries in the form of chronic pain, shame,

emotional distress, degradation, mental distressand [sic] shame” and that as a result of

Defendant Soto’s conduct, he has “endured substantial pain and emotional distress.” Id. at 6

& 8. Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for deliberate

indifference. MTD at 4.

A prison official’s “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury” violates

the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Clement v.

Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). There is both an objective and a subjective

component to an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. The objective component generally is

satisfied so long as the prisoner alleges facts to show that his medical need is sufficiently

“serious” such that the “failure to treat [the] condition could result in further significant injury

or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id.; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32

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(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The subjective component requires the prisoner to allege facts showing a culpable mental

state, specifically, “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). “Deliberate indifference” is evidenced only when “the official

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be

aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “Deliberate indifference” requires

allegations of “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical

need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.

2006) (citations omitted). The indifference must be substantial, and inadequate treatment due

to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th

Cir. 2004). Indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere

with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide

medical care.” Tracey v. Sacramento County Sheriff, 2008 WL 154607, *2 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 15,

2008) (quoting Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

“Mere delay of medical treatment, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of

deliberate medical indifference.” Robinson v. Catlett, 725 F. Supp.2d 1203, 1208 (S.D. Cal. July

19, 2012) (quoting Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th

Cir.1985)). To state a claim for deliberate indifference arising from a delay in treatment, a

prisoner must allege that the delay was harmful, although an allegation of substantial harm is

not required. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other

grounds by, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997). Factual allegations

indicating that the official “sat idly by as [the prisoner] was seriously injured despite the

defendant’s ability to prevent the injury” or that the official “repeatedly failed to treat an inmate

properly ... strongly suggests that the defendant’s actions were motivated by ‘deliberate

indifference’ to the prisoner’s medical needs.” Id. at 1060-61. “In sum, the more serious the

medical needs of the prisoner, and the more unwarranted the defendant’s actions in light of

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those needs, the more likely it is that a plaintiff has established “deliberate indifference” on the

part of the defendant.” Id. at 1061. Isolated incidents relative to a plaintiff's overall treatment

suggest no deliberate indifference. Id. at 1060.

The Objective Prong

Plaintiff satisfies the objective prong of the test for an Eighth Amendment violation. A

"serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further

significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Nawabi v. Wyatt, 2009 WL

3514849, *7 (C.D.Cal., Oct. 26, 2009) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 at 104). In considering the

seriousness of an alleged medical need, courts should consider whether (1) a reasonable doctor

would think that the condition is worthy of comment or treatment; (2) the condition significantly

affects the prisoner's daily activities; and (3) the condition is chronic and accompanied by

substantial pain. Id. (citing Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540 at 546 n. 3) (9th Cir. 1994). 

Here, the Court must accept as true that as a result of the “incident” Plaintiff experienced 

swelling and bleeding, suffered serious injuries to his back, had difficulty breathing, was unable

to bear any weight on his leg due to a severe knee sprain, and had a dislocated shoulder. FAC

at 3. And, that because Plaintiff was denied medical treatment by Defendant Villalobos, he was

forced to choose between enduring the pain from the dislocated shoulder or resetting the

shoulder himself to its proper position, which he did.3 Id. at 4. A reasonable doctor is likely to

think that difficulty breathing and bearing weight on a knee along with a dislocated shoulder are

worthy of comment or treatment. Additionally, Plaintiff has alleged that his daily activities were

significantly affected by his injuries because he could no longer walk without pain, bend his leg,

apply pressure to his leg, or climb into the bunk bed where he was supposed to sleep. Id. at 5. 

Finally, Plaintiff has alleged that he continues to suffer from pain in his knee and back which

have not healed correctly and still require pain medication. Id. at 6. Under these facts, Plaintiff

states a plausible allegation of a “serious illness or injury.” Clement, 298 F.3d at 904; see also

3In making this statement, the Court does not comment on the plausibility of the scenario described in the

First Amended Complaint. When adjudicating a motion to dismiss, a court is required to accept as true even

"unrealistic or nonsensical" allegations. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. At this stage, the question is whether the facts as

plead plausibly suggest a claim, rather than whether the facts themselves are plausible. Id.

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McCoy v. Spidle, 2009 WL 3233819, *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2009) (finding that the medical record

construed in favor of the Plaintiff supported a serious medical need with respect to his dislocated

shoulder and denying summary judgment); Mahoney v. Schweitzer, 2010 WL 1707734, *1 (D.

Mont. Jan. 26, 2012)(dismissing Plaintiff's complaint while noting that "a knee injury affecting

Plaintiff's ability to walk maybe a serious need”); Bolter v. Jacques, 2010 WL 2228514, *3 (N.D.

Cal. June 1, 2010) (finding that Plaintiff stated "a cognizable deliberate indifference claim against

Defendants" when he alleged injuries including “red welts/both legs & waist area/ankles & wrists,

rash under both armpits, swollen right knee,” and that “his medical condition in his right knee

[] deteriorated.”); Manson v. Smith, 2010 WL 2736878, *8 (July 12, 2012) (stating that a

dislocated shoulder could be "considered a serious medical need, such that ‘failure to treat [the]

condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain,’" but finding otherwise based on lack of admissible evidence for purposes of summary

judgment); and Luna v. California Health Care Services, 2011 WL 6936399, *4 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 29,

2011) (finding that Plaintiff alleged a serious medical need to satisfy the first prong of deliberate

indifference where Plaintiff alleged that a fall after recent shoulder surgery caused trauma to his

shoulder).

The Subjective Prong

Defendant Villalobos

Plaintiff fails to satisfy the subjective portion of the deliberate indifference test with

respect to Defendant Villalobos as he has not alleged that Defendant Villalobos was aware of and

disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Plaintiff fails to adequately plead facts demonstrating an actual connection or link between

Defendant Villalobos’s action or inaction and the deprivation of his constitutional right. FAC; see

also Wilson v. Woodford, 2009 WL 839921, *26 (E.D.Cal. March 30, 2009) (stating that “if there

is no affirmative link between a defendant's conduct and the alleged injury, there is no

deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights”) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S., 370 (1976)). 

Defendant Villalobos was not involved in the original incident that injured Plaintiff. FAC at 3. 

Although Plaintiff does claim that Defendant Villalobos’s failure to treat his injuries caused him

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to fall out of his bunk bed and injure himself further, that his knee and shoulder have not healed

correctly, and that he suffers from “chronic pain, shame, emotional distress, degradation, mental

distressand [sic] shame,” he fails to allege any facts connecting his injuries to defendant

Villalobos’s conduct.4 Id. at 6; see also Smedley v. Reid, 2010 WL 391831, *11 (S.D.Cal., Jan.

27, 2010) (to survive Rule 12(b)(6) motion, complaint must directly connect defendants’ actions

with alleged harm) (citing Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2009)). 

Plaintiff states that he was denied treatment by Defendant Villalobos which left him with

injuries that were made worse by the “daily activity of climbing to his upper bunk bed,” and

eventually caused him to seize up in pain and fall from the top bunk resulting in a trip to the

emergency room and five days of bed rest. Id. While these facts alone would likely be sufficient

to establish a link between Defendant Villalobos’s actions and Plaintiff’s alleged injuries for

purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss, there are other facts that must be considered. Most

importantly, according to Plaintiff, he was examined by other medical personnel on May 7, 2009,

just sixteen days after his appointment with Defendant Villalobos and a week before he fell from

his top bunk. Id. at 3-6. Plaintiff acknowledges that he was examined by a nurse on May 7,

2009 for the same injures presented to Defendant Villalobos, and that the nurse provided

medication and referred him to a physician. Id. at 6. Plaintiff does not allege that this treatment

was constitutionally inadequate. Id.

Plaintiff has failed to allege how he was harmed by this sixteen day delay. See McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060 (stating that to state a claim for deliberate indifference arising from a delay in

treatment, a prisoner must allege that the delay was harmful). At most, Plaintiff was forced to

wait sixteen days with a sore back and shoulder, some swelling, and a suspected sprained knee

before receiving medical treatment. See Thompson v. Shutt, 2011 WL 674049, *3-5 (Feb. 16,

2011) (finding that a twenty-two day delay between a recommendation for surgery and an

appointment with the surgeon for a broken finger did not constitute deliberate indifference); see

4Plaintiff also alleges that if his dislocated shoulder was not reset correctly, it could result in "perminent [sic]

muscle-skelital [sic] injury," however, Plaintiff does not allege his shoulder was reset incorrectly or that he has

suffered from any muscle skeletal injury or irregularities. Id. at 5. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a harm that

was caused by Defendant Villalobos's alleged indifference with respect to an improperly set shoulder. 

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also Smrz v. Corr. Med. Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 2591678, *5 (D. Idaho, Aug. 20, 2009) (finding that

a three month delay in scheduling surgery did not establish deliberate indifference). A slight

delay in the treatment of non-emergency injuries does not support a finding of deliberate

indifference. See Heilman v. Lyons, 2012 WL 371600, *13 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2012) (citing Wood

v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334-1335 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming finding that 11–day delay

in treatment for broken orthopedic pin in inmate's shoulder did not cause sufficient harm in part

because “the only remedy immediately available was a prescription for painkillers.” and Mayfield

v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (11–day delay in treating inmate's

“serious facial bone fractures” did not violate Eighth Amendment); see also Esposito v. D. Khatri,

2009 WL 702218, *10 (S.D. Cal. March 16, 2009) (citing Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205,

1210 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Certainly, not every twinge of pain suffered as the result of delay in

medical care is actionable.").

Plaintiff’s primary complaints against Defendant Villalobos and the alleged cause of his

continued pain and suffering are that Defendant Villalobos did not treat his injuries, properly fill

out his medical report form, or refer him to other medical staff. However, even without

Defendant Villalobos’s assistance, these things did occur and Plaintiff was examined and treated

by a Registered Nurse who “provided him with medications and referred him to see an M.D.” 

FAC at 6. Despite receiving the desired care that Defendant Villalobos allegedly denied, Plaintiff

still fell from the top bunk of his bed and further injured himself. Id. Given the fact that he

received appropriate medical care before falling and injuring himself, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate

how he was harmed by Defendant Villalobos’s alleged indifference or how her alleged failure to

treat him, refer him to a doctor, or fill out the required medical forms to his specifications lead

to his injuries. Plaintiff has to show an actual connection between Defendant Villalobos’s actions

or lack there of and his deprivation of constitutional rights and he has not done so. Additionally,

after falling from the top bunk, Plaintiff was seen by medical personnel in both the emergency

room and the correctional facility’s treatment center. Id. Plaintiff fails to show that even with

all of the intervening medical treatment he has received, the reason he has not healed properly

and is still in pain, is due to Defendant Villalobos’s deliberate indifference. At most, Defendant

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Villalobos's decision not to treat Plaintiff differently or refer him to a doctor was an isolated

incident in his overall treatment which included care from other medical personnel and which 

suggests that there was no deliberate indifference. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (Isolated

incidents relative to a plaintiff's overall treatment suggest no deliberate indifference).

Plaintiff’s next claim is that Defendant Villalobos “disregarded . . . and abandoned

departmental policy and procedures” by “minimiz[ing] [] [P]laintiff’s injuries to only include

soreness in back, shoulder pain, abrasions and scratches with dried blood” and “deliberately

witholding [sic] the physical findings of her report . . . from [P]laintiff’s primary care provider.” 

FAC at 3-5. Defendant Villalobos did not falsify Plaintiff’s medical records. Although Plaintiff may

not agree with Defendant Villalobos’s characterization of his injuries, the description was not

false. As Plaintiff alleges, he did have a sore back and shoulder, abrasions, and scratches. Id.

at 3. The report did not discuss Plaintiff’s sprained knee, however, Plaintiff only “suspected” that

his knee was severely sprained and it is possible that Defendant Villalobos reached a different

conclusion. Id. at 3. Plaintiff’s opinion that he should have received additional treatment for his

injuries or had them memorialized in a different manner, does not support a finding of deliberate

indifference. See McMaster v. Thomas, 2010 WL 3785571, *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2010) (stating

that a “difference of opinion does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff's] serious

medical needs”) (quoting Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)). Even if Defendant

Villalobos should have recognized that Plaintiff’s shoulder was dislocated or his knee was

sprained, and failed to do so, inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross

negligence, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106. 

 Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Villalobos deliberately withheld information from

his primary care physician is a conclusory statement that is not sufficient to state a constitutional

violation. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In sum, Plaintiff presents no facts that allow the

Court to conclude that Defendant Villalobos knowingly mischaracterized Plaintiff’s injuries or

withheld the true extent of his injuries from his primary care provider. 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Villalobos was not competent to treat him, but he

fails to satisfy the plausibility standard and plead facts that permit the Court to draw this

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inference. Id. Plaintiff’s reasoning for this conclusion is that because Defendant Villalobos is a

licensed vocational nurse, she “was not competent to examine, diagnose and treat [his] medical

problems.” FAC at 5. Plaintiff does not explain why Defendant Villalobos’s status as a licensed

vocational nurse left her unqualified to examine him or why she was required to refer him to

another member of the medical staff. Id. “Vague and conclusory allegations” are not sufficient

to withstand a motion to dismiss. Easter, 694 F.Supp.2d at 1183 (quoting Ivey, 673 F.2d at

268).

Defendant Soto

Plaintiff also fails to satisfy the subjective portion of the deliberate indifference test with

respect to Defendant Soto. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant Soto was aware of

and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. Plaintiff alleges that he informed

Defendant Soto that he was suffering from “serious injuries” and “was not sure if he could walk

on his leg.” FAC at 7. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he directed Defendant Soto’s attention

to his “sprained and bleeding knee.” Id. Plaintiff does not allege that he informed Defendant

Soto of his allegedly dislocated shoulder, difficulty breathing, or swelling and bruising to the

head. Id. Instead, Plaintiff merely showed Defendant Soto his bloody knee, said that it was

sprained, and limped a lot when Defendant Soto helped him walk to the holding cell. Id. 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not support the conclusion that Defendant Soto knew or could or should

infer that an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety existed. A sore and scraped knee alone

does not equate to an excessive risk, and in Plaintiff’s own words, he merely “suspected” that

his knee was sprained and did not receive that diagnosis from a medical professional. FAC at

3; see also John v. Berry, 469 F. Supp. 2d 922, 939 (W.D. Wash., Dec. 18, 2006) (finding no

deliberate indifference where officers, who did not think Plaintiff's knee was badly hurt, made

Plaintiff walk to the patrol car even though it turned out that Plaintiff's knee was fractured where

the knee was grossly stable, could withstand weight bearing within a relatively short period of

time, and firefighters thought that the knee was not really hurt); Bjorlin v. Crow, 2009 WL

3782584, *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (stating that "a reasonable juror could not conclude that

plaintiff's skinned knee constitutes an objective, serious medical need"); and Johnson v. Runnels,

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2010 WL 3430369, *16 (E.D.Cal., Aug. 30, 2010) (stating that plaintiff submitted no evidence

that cuts, abrasions, contusions, and lacerations were the types of injuries that a failure to treat

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain).

Furthermore, Defendant Soto is a correctional officer, not a doctor, nurse or other medical

professional. As such, he was entitled to rely on the judgment of Defendant Villalobos, a

licensed vocational nurse, not to further treat Plaintiff’s injuries. It was not Defendant Soto’s

responsibility to provide Plaintiff with whatever additional medical care he was seeking. See

Barber v. Santa Barbara County, 2011 WL 6951838, *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011) (stating that

“[i]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts ... a non-medical prison official will generally

be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands,” and therefore prison officials

cannot be considered deliberately indifferent “simply because they failed to respond directly to

the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by a prison doctor.”)

(quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3rd Cir. 2004)) (citing Daughtery v. Wilson, 2011 WL

3664799, *15 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2011) (stating that lay officers could rely on the determinations

of the nurses and doctors and had no independent duty to pursue additional treatments for

plaintiff)).

Finally, Plaintiff again fails to connect Defendant Soto’s action or inaction to the alleged

deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights. See Tracey, 2008 WL 154607 at *2 (stating that

plaintiff's "amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant was

involved in the deprivation of plaintiff's rights" and that “there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the

claimed deprivation”) (citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371). Here, Defendant Soto was not a part of

the incident that initially resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries and did not cause Plaintiff to fall from his

top bunk. FAC at 7-8. Plaintiff does allege that Defendant Soto was the direct cause of some

of his pain in that he forced Plaintiff to walk with his assistance which “painfully exacerbated”

Plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 7. However, this allegation is too conclusory to establish Plaintiff’s

claim. Plaintiff does not explain how walking from the golf cart to his holding cell while

Defendant Soto helped him, even if painful, actually aggravated his injuries or caused him

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serious harm. At most, Plaintiff may have alleged that Defendant Soto was negligent in ordering

him to walk to his holding cell while injured, however, “even gross negligence” does not rise to

the level of a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 

For the above reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion to dismiss

Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference against Defendants Villalobos and Soto be GRANTED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. See Moss, 572 F.3d at 972 (dismissing complaint but granting

plaintiffs leave to amend in accordance with new pleading standards); see also Ramirez, 334 F.3d

at 861 (court must grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend his complaint "unless the pleading

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts") (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

C. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Defendants argue that they “are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not

violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right when they allegedly refused to treat

Plaintiff’s minor pain and scratches.” MTD at 6. Plaintiff responds that Defendants are not

entitled to qualified immunity because his complaint “establishes the existence of factual

allegations of constitutional violations of which a reasonable person would have known.” Oppo.

at 11.

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from

liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1987). "Qualified immunity is 'an entitlement not to stand trial or face the

other burdens of litigation.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.

Ct. 808 (2009). This privilege is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability;

and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to

trial." Id. at 200-01 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). Thus, the Supreme Court "repeatedly

[has] stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in

litigation." Id. at 201 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). 

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In Saucier, the Supreme Court established a two-step inquiry for determining whether an

official is entitled to qualified immunity. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815-16; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

First, the court was directed to consider whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, [] the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If a constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations

established, the Saucier Court instructed lower courts to next examine whether the right was

clearly established such that "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 201-02. If an officer makes a reasonable mistake

as to what the law requires - i.e. the right is not clearly established - the officer is entitled to

immunity. Id. at 202-03. The Supreme Court subsequently determined that "while the sequence

set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory." 

Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818. Instead, lower courts may "exercise their sound discretion in

deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in

light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Id.

Because there are no viable claims alleged against Defendants Villalobos and Soto, the

Court is unable to evaluate whether they are entitled to qualified immunity for the alleged

conduct. Unless and until Plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation, there can be no determination regarding the applicability of qualified immunity. As stated by the Supreme Court, "if no

constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity" Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also

Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that a motion

to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds puts the court in the difficult position of deciding

“far-reaching constitutional questions on a non-existent factual record” and that while

“government officials have the right ... to raise ... qualified immunity defense on a motion to

dismiss, the exercise of that authority is not a wise choice in every case”).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendants Villalobos and Soto on qualified immunity grounds be DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

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CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) GRANTING 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than October 12, 2012. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than November 2, 2012. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DATED: September 12, 2012

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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