Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00073/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00073-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

NATHAN L. ROBINSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CON-WAY FREIGHT, INC.,

Defendant.

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}

}

}

}

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Case No.: 2:13-cv-73-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Nathan L. Robinson filed this lawsuit against his former employer Con-way

Freight, Inc. (“Con-way”), alleging that Con-way discriminated against him in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.

(“Title VII”), and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (“§ 1981”) when it 

discharged him in response to an alleged threat Robinson made against a coworker. Doc. 1. Before the court is Con-way’s motion for summary judgment, 

which is fully briefed and ripe for review. Docs. 15–17, 19–21. For the reasons set 

out fully below, Con-way’s motion is due to be granted.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper 

“if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits 

FILED

 2014 Sep-25 AM 08:32

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-00073-AKK Document 23 Filed 09/25/14 Page 1 of 14
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show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “Rule 56(c) 

mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and 

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will 

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving 

party, who is required to “go beyond the pleadings” to establish that there is a 

“genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court must construe the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party. Id. However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are 

legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 

F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. 

Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989)).

Case 2:13-cv-00073-AKK Document 23 Filed 09/25/14 Page 2 of 14
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Con-way’s Policies

Con-way has various policies that address work place conduct. Relevant to 

this case, under the conduct policy, fighting or horseplay, including “physically or 

verbally attacking another person; or engaging in other disorderly conduct or 

verbal abuse which, although innocently done, may result in injury or insult to 

another; or causing or contributing to disruption of the workplace,” is 

“unacceptable” and may subject an employee to discipline including termination.

Doc. 17-2 at 22. Con-way is “committed to providing a safe, violence-free 

workplace,” and has “adopted a No Threats or Violence in the Workplace Policy” 

that “strictly prohibits employees . . . on Company property . . . from behaving in a 

violent or threatening manner.” Id. at 28. With respect to discipline, Con-way does 

not follow a rigid disciplinary system, noting that

[i]t is impossible to predict or list every situation that will require 

some form of corrective action or even termination. Each case involves its 

own particular facts and circumstances, and in every case the company must 

take the action that it considers appropriate. Such actions might include oral 

warnings, incident reports, written letters of instruction, disqualification 

from assignment, suspension or termination of employment.

Id. at 24. Importantly, “the disciplinary process may be initiated at any step 

depending on the seriousness of the offense and the appropriateness of the imposed 

disciplinary action.” Id.

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B. Robinson’s employment history

Con-way re-hired Robinson as a supplemental driver/sales representative in 

May 2002, and subsequently promoted him to a regular position.

1 Doc. 17-1 at 4-5; 

17-5 at 4. During his employment, Robinson received multiple disciplinary actions, 

including two verbal counseling sessions and twenty-five letters of instruction.

Doc. 17-2 at 35–77. Six of the letters of instruction were for performance 

violations, and the rest were for conduct or policy infractions. Id. at 45, 47, 48, 49, 

54, 68, 73. The only performance evaluation in the record is from 2007. In it, 

Robinson received a satisfactory evaluation, which described him as “a good 

worker,” and awarded him scores of 4 (higher range) or 5 (outstanding) in all seven

categories except dependability, in which he received a 2 (lower range). Doc. 20-4 

at 2–5. The 2007 evaluation also indicated that Robinson’s evaluations from the 

previous three years had ranged from average to satisfactory. Id. The next year, in 

2008, Robinson was involved in “horseplay” with another employee that escalated 

to insults about each other’s wives, but ended “before it became more than 

word[s].” Doc. 17-4 at 18. Apparently, Con-way took no corrective action.

 1 Robinson worked for Con-way in 1999 in the same position, but resigned after sixteen days for 

personal reasons. Docs. 17-1 at 4; 17-5 at 4.

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C. The incident leading to Robinson’s discharge

In September 2011, an employee reported to Timothy Grant, Service Center 

Manager, that Michael Thomas verbally assaulted him, and that Thomas was also 

involved in an altercation with Robinson in April 2011. Docs. 17-3 at 6; 17-1 at 64.

An investigation ensued that involved Grant meeting with Thomas and Robinson 

to obtain statements about the incident. Doc. 17-3 at 7. For his part, Robinson said 

the incident started when Thomas jokingly asked Robinson where his “girl” was,

and that when Robinson quipped back that she was “probably with the same person 

that’s with [Thomas’s],” Thomas became upset and approached Robinson with a 

Leatherman tool, which prompted Tim White to intervene and instruct them to 

return to work. Doc. 17-1 at 65, 66. According to Thomas and White, Robinson 

and Thomas made threatening gestures when they jumped off of their forklifts and 

approached each other, causing Thomas to feel threatened and pull out the 

Leatherman tool. Id. at 7-8, 9; docs. 17-2 at 78; 17-4 at 12–13; 17-5 at 15–16, 18.

Grant forwarded the results of his investigation to Jerry McGlown, a Human 

Resources Generalist, who instructed Grant to place Robinson and Thomas out of 

service. Docs. 17-3 at 11; 17-4 at 5. Thereafter, McGlown forwarded Grant’s notes

to the Human Resources Department with a recommendation that Con-way

discharge Robinson and Thomas. Doc. 17-5 at 6. Human Resources accepted the

recommendation and discharged both men. Id.at 4, 6; doc. 17-1 at 69.

Case 2:13-cv-00073-AKK Document 23 Filed 09/25/14 Page 5 of 14
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Robinson appealed the decision to the Employee Termination Review Board 

(“ETRB”), which consists of three members of executive management. Docs. 17-2 

at 79; 17-5 at 7. According to McGlown, who listened in to the telephone hearing, 

Robinson “refused to admit that he engaged in any wrongdoing,” “attempted to 

minimize the altercation between him[self] and Mr. Thomas,” and “failed to 

express any remorse for his actions.” Id. at 7–8. The failure to admit fault or to 

express remorse, as well as an employee’s disciplinary history, are factors the 

ETRB considers in deciding whether to overturn a discharge: “In determining 

whether to uphold a termination decision, the ETRB considers several factors, 

including the circumstances surrounding the termination, the employee’s 

disciplinary record, the employee’s admission of misconduct and the employee’s 

remorsefulness for his actions.” Id. at 7. In Robinson’s case, the ETRB upheld the 

discharge decision. Id. at 8. This lawsuit ensued.

III. ANALYSIS

Title VII and § 1981 claims “have the same requirements of proof and use 

the same analytical framework.” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 

1330 (11th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the court “explicitly address[es] the Title VII 

claim with the understanding that the analysis applies to the § 1981 claim as well.” 

Id. Generally, “[a] plaintiff may prove a claim of intentional discrimination 

through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or through statistical proof.”

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Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008). Where, as here, a 

plaintiff offers only circumstantial evidence, the court evaluates the sufficiency of 

his claim through the burden shifting framework established in McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). Under this framework, the 

plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. McDonnell 

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. “The successful assertion of a prima facie case then 

creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated 

against the plaintiff.” Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1275 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). The burden then shifts to the employer to produce evidence that 

it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. If the 

employer satisfies its burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “show that 

the proffered reason really is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Con-way contends that Robinson’s prima facie case fails because Robinson 

cannot establish that he was qualified for his position or that Con-way treated him

less favorably than similarly situated employees outside of his protected class.

Alternatively, Con-way asserts that it is due to prevail because Robinson cannot 

establish that Con-way’s articulated reason for the discharge is pretextual. The 

court will discuss Con-way’s contentions below.

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A. Robinson was qualified for his position

To establish that he was qualified for his position, Robinson must present 

evidence that he “satisfied [Con-way’s] objective qualifications.” Vessells v. 

Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 769 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). A 

Title VII “‘plaintiff’s burden in proving a prima facie case is light.’” Davis v. Town 

of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1246 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Turlington v. 

Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (11th Cir. 1998)). The only evidence 

in the record that speaks to Robinson’s job performance is his 2007 employee 

review, which describes him as “a good worker,” awarded him largely aboveaverage scores, and indicated that his three previous annual evaluations classified 

him as an average to above-average worker. Doc. 20-4 at 2–5. In the absence of 

any evidence to the contrary concerning Robinson’s performance, the 2007 review 

is sufficient to present a prima facie case that Robinson was qualified for his 

position.

Con-way contends that Robinson was not qualified for his position because 

of his extensive disciplinary record.2 Doc. 16 at 18–19. Robinson was certainly not 

an outstanding employee. In fact, his record is replete with disciplinary actions. 

 2 Con-way cites Baker v. Sears Roebuck & Co. for the proposition that “where a [p]laintiff repeatedly fails to meet 

the employer’s performance expectations over an extended period of time, she [is] not qualified for her job and 

therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” Doc. 16 at 18 (citing 903 F.2d 1515, 1520–21). 

Baker is distinguishable from the present matter for two reasons. First, in Baker, the defendant was dissatisfied with 

the plaintiff’s ability to perform her job duties; here, Con-way largely took issue which what it characterizes as 

misconduct on Robinson’s part. Second, in Baker, the plaintiff’s long-established failure to meet performance 

expectations was the direct cause of the defendant’s decision to take adverse employment action against her; Conway initiated discharge proceedings against Robinson because of the altercation between Robinson and Thomas.

Case 2:13-cv-00073-AKK Document 23 Filed 09/25/14 Page 8 of 14
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However, despite this extensive record, there is no evidence that Con-way ever 

initiated any action to discharge Robinson prior to the incident at issue here. Put 

simply, Robinson’s continued employment belies Con-way’s contention that 

Robinson was not qualified for the position he held. See Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 

609 F.3d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Owens v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 934 

F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that “there is a distinction between 

unsatisfactory job performance and misconduct . . . ‘misconduct may certainly 

provide a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason to terminate an employee,’ but 

that issue is distinct from ‘the issue of minimal qualifications to perform a job’”).

B. Con-way did not treat Robinson less favorably than similarly situated 

employees

Con-way challenges Robinson’s prima facie case next by asserting that 

Robinson cannot establish that it treated him less favorably than similarly situated 

employees. Doc. 16 at 23. When, as here, a plaintiff relies on circumstantial 

evidence to prove his discrimination claims, the comparators the plaintiff cites 

“must be nearly identical to the plaintiff to prevent courts from second-guessing a 

reasonable decision by the employer.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 

1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004). 

As alleged comparators, Robinson identifies David Brassfield, Bernie 

Brown, Shawn Skellet, Erica Davis, Kim Thompson, and Mike Blevins. Doc. 19 at 

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10–14. However, only one of these individuals—Brassfield—engaged in any 

conduct remotely similar to Robinson’s. The rest of the individuals engaged in 

infractions that are simply not “nearly identical” to Robinson’s. Specifically,

Robinson contends that Con-way (1) failed to discharge Brown for stating he was 

not going to be “worked like one of these push button [niggers],”3 doc. 17-1 at 57;

(2) failed to discharge Skellet for allowing his six-year old son to sit in a fork lift in 

violation of company policy4

, doc. 17-1 at 90–91; (3) failed to discharge Davis and 

Thompson for stealing time, docs. 17-1 at 80; 17-3 at 16-17; and (4) failed to 

discharge Blevins for testing positive for alcohol, docs. 17-1; 17-3 at 21.

Unfortunately for Robinson, although this alleged conduct constitutes serious 

infractions and should be addressed by employers, these individuals are not proper 

comparators because their infractions are not “nearly identical” to Robinson’s 

threats of violence, and consequently, the court cannot consider them as examples 

of disparate treatment. As the case law has instructed repeatedly, the infractions 

must be “nearly identical” to prevent the court from “second-guess[ing Con-way’s] 

 3 Robinson admits that he did not hear Brown make the purported comment and that he is relying on hearsay relayed 

to him by Drayton Davis, a Con-way driver. Id. Unfortunately for Robinson, “Rule [56(c)(4)] of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure requires that ‘affidavits’ that support or oppose summary judgment motions ‘shall be made on 

personal knowledge, [and] shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.’ This rule also applies to 

testimony given on deposition.” Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999). The absence of direct 

knowledge on Robinson’s part or evidence to show that his account of Davis’ statements will fall under one of the 

hearsay exceptions precludes the court from considering it—even if the alleged conduct were “nearly identical” to 

Robinson’s threat of violence.

4 Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Robinson, the record fails to support Robinson’s claim because 

he admits that he does not know if Con-way disciplined Skellet in response to Robinson’s allegations. Doc. 17-1 at 

91. Without more, this conjecture and speculation is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Ellis, 432 F.3d at 

1326.

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reasonable decisions and confus[ing] apples and oranges.” Burke-Fowler v. 

Orange Cnty., Fla, 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). To 

find fault with Con-way’s purported failure to discipline these employees would 

result in the court acting as a super-personnel board and imposing its views on 

purported best human resources practices on Con-way—in direct contravention of 

the case law. See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000))

(“[Courts] do not sit as a ‘super-personnel department,’ and it is not [their] role to 

second-guess the wisdom of an employer’s business decisions—indeed the wisdom 

of them is irrelevant—as long as those decisions were not made with a 

discriminatory motive.”); Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1543 (11th 

Cir. 1997) (“[F]ederal courts do not sit to second-guess the business judgment of 

employers.”).

The court turns its attention now to Brassfield, who is the only comparator 

Robinsons cites that made a threat of violence. Con-way discharged Brassfield 

“[o]n March 1, 2008 . . . for violat[ing] . . . company policy. Specifically, Mr. 

Brassfield told another employee, who was his relative, that if he had a gun and did 

not believe in God, he would kill management.” Doc. 17-5 at 8. Brassfield

successfully appealed his discharge to the ETRB, docs. 17-1 at 73; 17-3 at 15, and 

his reinstatement is the basis for Robinson’s contention of disparate treatment.

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Unfortunately for Robinson, Brassfield is not a proper comparator because, unlike 

Robinson, Brassfield admitted during his ETRB hearing that he made the threat

and apologized. Doc. 17-5 at 9. In light of his admission and apology, and based 

also on Brassfield’s employment history—he had received only one letter of 

instruction during his nineteen years of employment— the ETRB reinstated 

Brassfield. Id. at 8. In contrast, Robinson never acknowledged his conduct or 

expressed remorse, id. at 7, and had at least twenty-five letters of instruction during 

his nine-year tenure, see doc. 17-2 at 35–77. Because the ETRB considers “the 

employee’s disciplinary record, the employee’s admission of misconduct and the 

employee’s remorsefulness for his actions,” doc. 17-5 at 7, “in determining 

whether to uphold a termination decision,” id.,—all of which weigh against 

Robinson, the court simply cannot find that Robinson is similarly situated to

Brassfield, or that Con-way treated him less favorably than Brassfield when it 

denied his appeal. See Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1092 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lee v. 

GTE Fla., Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000)) (“The role of [courts] ‘is to 

prevent unlawful hiring practices, not to act as a super personnel department and 

second-guess employers’ business judgments.’”)

In short, Robinson has failed to establish a prima facie case because he 

cannot show that Con-way treated him less favorably than similarly situated 

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employees outside of his protected class. Therefore, Con-way’s motion for 

summary judgment is due to be granted.

C . Robinson points to no evidence from which a fact-finder could determine that 

he was discriminated against due to his race.

Alternatively, even if Robinson can make a prima facie case, summary 

judgment is still warranted because Con-way proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for it’s the discharge, i.e. Robinson’s perceived threat of 

violence, which Robinson failed to rebut. Robinson “must meet the reason head on 

and rebut it, and [ ] cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of [Conway’s proffered] reason.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030 (citations omitted). Because 

the evidence establishes that Con-way acted reasonably in concluding after its 

investigation that Robinson threatened Thomas and because the individuals 

Robinson identified are not proper comparators, Robinson cannot show that Conway’s articulated reason for his discharge is pretextual. Ultimately, “an employer 

can fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous 

facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory 

reason.” See Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Comm’s, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 

1984); Wallace v. SMC Pnuematics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1399 (7th Cir. 1997) 

(listing perceived threats of violence as a non-actionable reason under Title VII).

While Robinson may think his discharge was unfair, under the circumstances here, 

Con-way acted as a prudent employer by addressing a threat in the workplace,

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immediately taking Robinson (and Thomas) out of service, and conducting an 

investigation to provide the necessary measures to protect employees. See Kelley v. 

Worley, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1313 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (“Under the common law, an 

employer has a duty to supply the employee with a reasonably safe place to 

work.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, the court cannot draw an inference of 

discriminatory animus, and, Robinson’s discrimination claim must fail.

IV. CONCLUSION

Con-way’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted in light of 

Robinson’s failure to establish a prima facie case or to rebut Con-way’s articulated 

reason for discharging him. The court will dismiss this case by separate order.

DONE the 25th day of September, 2014.

 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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