Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00079/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00079-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-320(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JUDI JACKSON,

NO. 2:05-cv-0079 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PLACER COUNTY, a political

subdivision of the State of

California, et al., 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration of the court’s May 15, 2007 order granting in

part and denying in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(the “Order”).1

 Specifically, plaintiff seeks reconsideration of

the court’s decision dismissing her Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process and failure to train/supervise claims and

Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure claim based on the

Case 2:05-cv-00079-FCD-KJM Document 135 Filed 09/24/07 Page 1 of 6
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2 Plaintiff raised this argument for the first time in

moving for an interlocutory appeal of the court’s Order. The

court denied plaintiff’s motion for such an appeal on July 24,

2007. In that order, the court noted that the appropriate

procedural motion to raise plaintiff’s argument regarding the

statute of limitations was via a motion for reconsideration, not

a motion for interlocutory appeal. (Order, filed July 24, 2007,

7-9.) However, the court cautioned plaintiff that “while the

court cannot preclude plaintiff from bringing such a motion [for

reconsideration], it does not invite plaintiff to do so. Based

on plaintiff’s factual showing on the motion for summary

judgment, it is not apparent that she could demonstrate Section

945.3's applicability.” (Id. at 8:28-9:4.) 

Notwithstanding the court’s warning, plaintiff now brings a

motion for reconsideration; while the instant motion appears at

times to be directed to the court’s May 15, 2007 summary judgment

order, the motion also discusses application of the requirements

for interlocutory appeal, as if the motion seeks reconsideration

of the court’s latter July 24 order denying appeal. The instant

motion is properly directed to the court’s May 15 Order, and as

such, the court considers the motion only as directed to that

order.

3 Section 945.3 provides, in pertinent part: “Any

applicable statute of limitations for filing and prosecuting [an

action against a peace officer or the public entity employing a

peace officer based upon conduct of the peace officer relating to

the offense for which the accused is charged] shall be tolled

during the period that the charges are pending before a superior

court.”

2

statute of limitations. (Order at 15-17.) Despite failing to

raise the argument in opposition to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, plaintiff now contends that the statute of

limitations for these dismissed claims should have been tolled

during the pendency of the related criminal proceedings against

her, pursuant to California Government Code section 945.3.2

Plaintiff argues that by application of the tolling provision in

Section 945.3,3 she meets the one-year statute of limitations for

these claims.

To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, the moving party

must show: (1) the availability of new evidence; (2) a clear

error of law resulting in manifest injustice; or (3) an

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3

intervening change in the controlling law. See School District

No. 1J, Multnomah County, Oregon v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,

1263 (9th Cir. 1993). In the absence of new evidence or a change

in the law, as is the case here, a party may not use a motion for

reconsideration to present new arguments or claims not raised in

a summary judgment motion. 389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold,

179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999); Kona Enterprises, Inc. v.

Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing

that a motion for reconsideration may not be used to raise

arguments that could have reasonably been raised earlier in the

litigation). 

In opposing defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the

issue of the statute of limitations, “plaintiff [failed to] cite

to any legal precedent.” (Order at 16:17.) Instead, the

entirety of plaintiff’s argument in response to defendants’

assertion of a statute of limitations defense was as follows:

Plaintiff does not dispute defendants [sic] statement

of the statute of limitations in this action. 

Plaintiff further agrees that federal law determines

when a civil rights claim accrues. [Citation omitted.]

As a general rule claims for deprivation of procedural

due process rights accrue when plaintiff would have

notice of the allegedly wrongful acts being challenged.

[Citation omitted.] However, each of the cases cited by

defendants address the issue of statute of limitations

and the accrual of a due process claim in cases which

did not also involve an ongoing criminal prosecution

which in this case, would in and of itself give rise to

additional issues regarding the process which was due

the plaintiff at the time of the alleged wrongdoing by

the defendants. 

Defendants have presented no facts, or evidence, which

definitively support the statement, “Therefore, this

claim accrued on November 6, 2000 and the failure to

file suit on or before November 7, 2001 bars the

claim.” [Citation omitted.]

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4 Discovery in this matter closed in January 2007, and

the dispositive motion deadline has long since passed (in March

2007). (Sch. Order, filed Aug. 18, 2005.) Indeed, this nearly

three year old case is set for final pretrial conference on

November 11, 2007.

4

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MSJ, filed March 9, 2007, at 12-13). 

Plaintiff’s argument (such as it is) does not proffer any legal

authority to support application of a tolling provision. Indeed,

plaintiff made no mention whatsoever of Section 945.3 nor any of

the cases she seeks to rely upon only now (i.e., Torres v. City

of Santa Ana, 108 F.3d 224 (9th Cir. 1997); Harding v. Galceron,

889 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1989); Harned v. Landahl, 88 F. Supp. 2d

1118 (E.D. Cal. 2000)). In ruling on defendants’ motion, it was

not incumbent on the court to find the law for plaintiff, and

plaintiff offers no reason why she could not have raised her

tolling argument previously. While this statute and case law may

support plaintiff’s present argument for application of tolling,

at this juncture in the case the court declines to consider

plaintiff’s belated argument.4 Accord 389 Orange Street

Partners, 179 F.3d at 665 (holding that the defendant’s argument

that the cross-claims should have been redesignated as

affirmative defenses in his motion for reconsideration was

“simply too little, too late”). 

Reconsideration is granted only in exceptional

circumstances, and here, where plaintiff offers no explanation

for the failure to raise her arguments earlier in response to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, there are no “highly

unusual circumstances” justifying reconsideration. School

District No. 1J, Multnomah County, Oregon, 5 F.3d at 1263. 

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Moreover, the court notes that even were it to reconsider

its Order and permit plaintiff to assert application of Section

945.3's tolling provision, plaintiff has wholly failed on the

instant motion to demonstrate its applicability. Plaintiff

simply argues because the criminal charges against her were

pending from December 15, 2000 (the date the felony complaint

against her was filed) to March 15, 2004 (the date she pled no

contest to two misdemeanors), her federal complaint filed January

13, 2005 was timely filed within one year from the date her

claims accrued (November 6, 2000). (Mem. of P. & A., filed Aug.

3, 2007, 5:9-18.) However, even assuming said dates are correct,

plaintiff fails to describe how the evidence she proffered on the

motion for summary judgment demonstrated that the subject

constitutional claims related to her criminal charges and any

particular named defendant. Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.3 (permitting

tolling of the statute of limitations for a claim against a peace

officer or the public entity employing a peace officer based upon

conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense for which

the accused is charged). Absent this showing, plaintiff cannot

demonstrate entitlement to tolling of the statute of limitations. 

Thus, even were the court to consider the merits of plaintiff’s

argument, it would find that plaintiff has not demonstrated

Section 945.3's applicability. 

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Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the 

court’s May 15, 2007 Order is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 24, 2007 

Case 2:05-cv-00079-FCD-KJM Document 135 Filed 09/24/07 Page 6 of 6