Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01868/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01868-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TUANJA EDWARD ANDERSON,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1868 FCD CMK P

vs.

JACQUES C. HIRSCHLER, et al., 

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, without counsel, prosecuting this civil rights action

against defendant Hischler, defendant Fox, and defendant Palagummi. The case is before the

undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c) for findings and recommendations on defendants’

motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c). Plaintiff has not filed a response to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

I. Standard of Review

On a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), the court must 

accept the evidence of the non-moving party as true and draw all reasonable inferences of fact in

favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there exists no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex

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Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c)). If the moving party

meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine issue

as to any material fact does actually exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. V. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment may not rest on

conclusory allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of

material fact. See Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 422 (9th Cir. 1978)(involving a pro se

litigant); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 586 n. 11. When the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material

fact for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

On October 21, 2005, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

I. Background

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was incarcerated at Deuel Vocational

Institute (DVI). Taken in a light most favorable to plaintiff the facts are as follows. Plaintiff’s

vision is impaired. He alleges that he is blind in his left eye. He states that defendants denied

him medical care by denying his requests to be classified as vision impaired under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA). He alleges that he has not received “eye care” that was promised

him. He states that defendant Hischler denied his appeals regarding his vision problem at the

second level. He also appears to allege that defendants violated his rights by failing to

recommend transferring him to another institution where he would be safer. 

Defendants have presented evidence showing that plaintiff first mentioned his

visual impairment in his left eye in July 2004, approximately four months after arriving at DVI. 

(Defs.’ Undisputed Facts (doc. 38) at ¶ 4 & 5.) After being seen by two other doctors, plaintiff

was referred to an ophthalmologist. (Id. at 6 & 7.) On August 18, 2004, defendant Fox requested

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that plaintiff be granted an ophthalmologist consultation; that request was approved on September

1, 2004. (Id. at ¶ 8.) 

Plaintiff was examined by defendant Fox on August 27, 2004 because he fell while

playing basketball and hurt his back. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff’s basketball injury had nothing to do

with his vision problem. Defendant Fox ordered that plaintiff be given a ducat for a series of

spinal x-rays and ordered a follow-up visit for a week later. (Id. ¶ 10.) On September 27, 2004,

defendant Fox completed a Disability Placement Program Verification Form, which noted

plaintiff’s mobility restrictions stemming from back problems. Plaintiff was able to walk 100

yards without pause or assistance, so he had no housing restrictions. Dr. Fox ordered a cane for

plaintiff, but noted that plaintiff had no housing restrictions. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff filed a

grievance on October 3, 2004, alleging visual impairment, scoliosis, and mental health problems.

Plaintiff alleged that he was in pain, was not receiving proper medical care, and requested a

transfer to a medical facility. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Dr. Fox denied plaintiff’s appeal, confirming that

plaintiff’s ADA status was granted, but noting that his disability did not affect his housing

placement. (Id. at ¶14.)

Plaintiff submitted another grievance December 4, 2004 complaining that he had

not received his ADA paperwork. Plaintiff was notified of his classification as mobility impaired. 

(Id. at ¶ 18.) Plaintiff submitted a grievance on December 22, 2004 claiming that he did not see

well because his eyes were “damaged.” He requested A-1-A privileges, a vision impaired vest,

and placement in a facility for inmates who qualify under the ADA. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff’s

requests were partially granted; he was referred for evaluation by an ophthalmologist and given a

white cane. The requests for A-1-A status and transfer were denied. (Id. at ¶ 20.) 

Plaintiff submitted a grievance on January 4, 2005 claiming that he should be

allowed A-1-A privileges based on his disability. The grievance was denied on the grounds that

plaintiff’s disability did not affect his housing placement. (Id. at ¶ 22.)

Defendant Hischler referred plaintiff to an ophthalmologist on February 1, 2005. 

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Defendant Hischler completed a disability placement on February 17, 2005, noting that plaintiff’s

vision was being evaluated for characterization as a disability under the ADA. (Id. at ¶ 23.) 

Medical records from the evaluation note that plaintiff’s corneas were clear, but he had minimal

improvement after cataract extraction. Plaintiff was ordered to return in 4 months, but, the

evaluating physician ordered him to be seen prior to that for glasses. (Id. at ¶ 25.) 

Plaintiff filed a reasonable modification request on April 16, 2005, stating that

blindness in his left eye had been verified by an outside physician. He also requested A-1-A

status and wanted a pair of glasses to protect his right eye. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Defendant Fox ordered

glasses for plaintiff on May 3, 2005. Plaintiff was notified in a response to his grievance that

glasses had been ordered and the state would pay for them. (Id. at ¶ 27.)

Plaintiff filed a reasonable modification request on May 24, 2005, noting blindness

in his left eye and requesting extended stay credits and a yellow vision impaired vest. Defendant

Palagummi interviewed plaintiff on June 27, 2005, and she noted that his left eye was good and

that he did not meet the ADA’s visual impairment requirements. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Dr. Hischler

denied plaintiff’s request at the second level, noting that plaintiff did not qualify for ADA status. 

The grievance was denied at the director’s level. (Id. at ¶ 29 & 30.)

Plaintiff was transferred to Mule Creek State Prison on July 15, 2005. He filed

another request for modification or accommodation requesting glasses, a vision impaired vest and

to be qualified as ADA vision impaired. Plaintiff was examined, found legally blind, and issued

a disability placement program verification for vision impairment qualified under the ADA. 

(Id. at ¶ 31-33.) 

III. Discussion

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff cannot

establish that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the

Eighth Amendment; that the denial of plaintiff’s grievance does not state a constitutional claim;

that defendant cannot establish a violation of the ADA and; that plaintiff is not entitled to the

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injunctive relief of being transferred to a medical facility. Defendants further assert that, even if

they are not entitled to summary judgment, they are shielded from liability by qualified

immunity.

A. Denial of Grievance

The Ninth Circuit has stated that inmates have no legitimate claim of entitlement

to a prison grievance procedure. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims that his civil

rights were violated when his grievances were denied. 

B. Transfer to Another Facility

Inmates do not have a constitutional right to be housed at a particular facility or

institution or to be transferred, or not transferred, from one facility or institution to another. See 

Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25

(1976); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Accordingly,

plaintiff’s civil rights were not violated when defendants denied his requests for a transfer, and

plaintiff’s request for a transfer to another facility must be denied. 

C. Denial of Medical Care

 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs can be demonstrated in two

ways: by prison officials denying, delaying or intentionally interfering with medical treatment or

by the manner in which prison physicians provide medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97

(1976); Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). Deliberate indifference

exists only when prison officials know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also, McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992) (overruled on other grounds) (stating that “a defendant must

purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need in order for

deliberate indifference to be established”). 

The indifference to a prisoner’s medical need must be substantial because

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inadequate treatment due to negligence, inadvertence or differences in judgment between an

inmate and medical personnel does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Franklin v.

Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). “Mere negligence... in treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right.” See Toguchi v.

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). A prisoner who makes a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical condition based on delay must show that the delay resulted in

substantial harm. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990).

The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint do not support a claim of deliberate

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment against defendants. Plaintiff alleges that

defendants disregarded his blindness in his left eye because he can see out of his right eye, and he

alleges that he did not receive eye care which was promised him. However, defendants have

produced evidence which shows that plaintiff was treated for his vision problems. Plaintiff was

examined several times in response to complaints about vision problems. He was referred to

outside ophthalmologists for evaluations and was granted reading glasses. This response shows

that plaintiff received medical treatment pertaining to his medical needs. See Wood, 900 F.2d at

1334. Plaintiff has not shown that defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his

health and safety. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057. Accordingly, the court finds that defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. 

D. Denial of Vision Problem as Qualifying Disability Under the ADA

At the onset, the court notes that individual defendants may not be sued in their

individual capacities under Title II of the ADA; they may be sued in their official capacities

because suing an individual in his official capacity is treated the same as suing the entity itself.

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also, e.g., Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d

344, 346 (7th Cir.2000) (“[A]s a rule there is no personal liability under Title II...”). Therefore, to

the extent that plaintiff sues any defendants in their individual capacity for ADA violations,

defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

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With respect to plaintiff’s ADA claims against defendants in their official

capacities, he appears to allege that defendants discriminated against him by failing to document

his vision problem as a qualifying disability under the ADA. Plaintiff does not allege that he

suffered any injury as the result of being denied disability status under the ADA nor does he

allege that defendants discriminated against him in any way based on his alleged disability. 

The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. Specifically, the

ADA provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall be excluded from participation

in or denied benefits or services of a public entity on the basis of their disability. See 29 U.S.C. §

794. The ADA applies to inmates in state prisons. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr. V. Yeskey,

524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). To establish an ADA violation, a plaintiff must show that he is a

qualified individual with a disability and that he was denied participation in or otherwise

discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services programs and activities and that the

exclusion or discrimination was based on his disability. See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039,

1052 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff has alleged no facts to support his contention that he was denied ADA

status or participation in any program based on a qualified disability. He has not alleged any facts

showing discrimination on the basis of his disability. The evidence presented by defendants

shows that none of the specialists who examined plaintiff found him to be legally blind. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57 (“once the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to

support a jury verdict). Instead, the evidence shows that plaintiff was given canes and glasses and

was able to engage in physical sports such as basketball. Even assuming that plaintiff was later

found to be legally blind, he does not assert any facts which support his assertion that he was

denied access to any programs or services based on his alleged disability. Accordingly, the court

finds that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim against them. 

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E. Qualified Immunity

As the court has found that defendants are entitled to summary judgment, it is not

necessary to address their qualified immunity claim. 

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted.

2. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief in the form of a transfer to a medical

facility be denied.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 19, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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