Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02440/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02440-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Lee Williams, a.k.a. Robert Lee

Green, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. Civ. 05-2440-PHX-ROS (MS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

While confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex in Goodyear, Arizona,

Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State

Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents Answer was filed on

November 10, 2005. [Doc. 8]. Petitioner's Reply was received on December 14,

2005. [Doc. 10]. The Court now Reports and Recommends as follows:

I. Background

Petitioner was arrested for car theft. [Doc. 8, Exh. A at 1]. A search incident to

Petitioner's arrest revealed a rock of cocaine in Petitioner's pocket. [Id. at 1-2].

Petitioner was charged with theft of a vehicle and possession of narcotic drugs. [Id.

at 2]. 

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1 State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964).

2 State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964).

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The State listed "3.2 mg Cocaine Base" as evidence in its Notice of Discovery.

[Id.]. During the course of the trial, however, the cocaine itself was not introduced

into evidence. [Id.]. Instead, the State introduced the testimony of the officer who

seized the cocaine. [Id.]. The officer testified that he conducted a field test verifying

that the substance was cocaine. He further testified that he submitted the seized

substance to the police crime lab in an evidence envelope. [Id.]. The State also

introduced the testimony of a criminalist who received the cocaine in a sealed

evidence envelope bearing the same invoice number as the envelope submitted by

the arresting officer. [Id.]. The criminalist testified that laboratory tests confirmed

that the substance was a usable quantity of cocaine. [Id.].

After the State rested its case, the defense moved for a directed verdict on

grounds that the State did not introduce the cocaine into evidence. [Id. at 3]. The

defense also requested an instruction pursuant to State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393

P.2d 274 (1964)(permitting jurors to infer that potentially exculpatory evidence

unpreserved by the State would have been exculpatory). [Id.; Exh B at 4-5]. The

Court denied the motion for directed verdict and declined to give the Willits1

instruction. The jury returned a guilty verdict. [Id.].

 After the case was submitted to the jury, the State informed the Court that the

cocaine had been destroyed the previous year. [Id.]. Defense counsel filed a motion

for a new trial and motion to vacate the judgment, arguing that: (1) the State's

disclosure that the cocaine was destroyed constituted newly discovered evidence;

(2) the destruction of evidence resulted in due process violations; and (3) the Court

erred in denying the request for a Willits2

 instruction. [Doc. 8, Exh. B] The Court

granted the motion, and the State appealed. [Doc. 8, Exh. A].

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28 3 State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964).

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The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to

reinstate the jury's verdict. The Court held that the trial court erred by vacating the

verdict on the basis of newly discovered evidence. [Doc. 8, Exh. A at 4]. The Court

ruled that there was no evidence of bad faith or misconduct and no indication that

the cocaine would have been exculpatory. [Id. at 4-7]. In addition, the Court found

no evidence of an unfair trial and concluded that the trial court appropriately denied

defense counsel's request for a Willits3

 instruction. [Id.]. 

Petitioner was sentenced on September 13, 2001. [Doc. 8, Exh. D]. His

conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Arizona Court of Appeals. [Doc. 8,

Exh. E]. Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

On January 2, 2003, Petitioner commenced post-conviction relief proceedings in

state court. In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner argued that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge his arrest for lack of probable cause

and for failing to independently examine or test the cocaine seized incident to

Petitioner's arrest. [Exh. G]. Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was

denied on July 24, 2003. [Doc. 8, Exh. H]. Petitioner reiterated his ineffective

assistance of counsel arguments in his Petitions for Review to the Arizona Court of

Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court, but both Courts denied review. [Exhs. I, J,

K, L]. 

Petitioner's federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was received by this Court

on August 12, 2005. [Doc. 1]. Petitioner raises two grounds for relief. In ground

one, he alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the

cocaine be "brought to court." [Id.]. In ground two, he alleges that the Arizona Court

of Appeals violated his due process rights by reversing the trial court. [Id.].

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

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No writ may be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the

remedies available in state courts. 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A). Under the exhaustion

doctrine, a petitioner must present his claims to the state courts on direct appeal or

through collateral proceedings before a federal court will consider a habeas corpus

petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Lindquist v. Gardner, 770 F.2d 876,

877 (9th Cir. 1985). Specifically, exhaustion requires that a petitioner either fairly

present his or her claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Swoopes v. Sublett, 196

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)(stating that “except in habeas petitions in capital

cases, claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal

habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”), or show that no

state remedies remain available. Kellotat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir.

1983) (citing Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982). To satisfy the fair

presentation requirement, a petitioner must fairly present the “substance of federal

claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and

to correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). See also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004);

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278

(1971); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir. 2004).

To fairly present a claim, a federal habeas petitioner must provide the state courts

with a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon

the federal constitutional claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-

66 (1995). The state prisoner must describe in the state proceedings both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Kelly v.

Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6 ("It

is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before

the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made"); Picard, 404

U.S. at 276 ("we have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the

same claim he urges upon the federal courts"); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

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670 (9th Cir. 2000), amended at 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001)(holding that a petitioner

must characterize the claims raised in state proceedings "specifically as federal

claims"). Generally, the petitioner must reference specific provisions of the federal

constitution, federal statute, or federal case law. Lyons, 232 F.3d at 670, amended

at 247 F.3d 904. General appeals to broad constitutional principles such as due

process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial are insufficient to establish

exhaustion. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996); see also Hiivala v.

Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999). 

A habeas court will not review a question of federal law if that question has been

decided by a state court and the court’s decision "rests on a state law ground that

is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146,

1150-51 (9th Cir. 2000). The state law ground may be substantive or procedural.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30 (recognizing that the independent and adequate state

ground doctrine bars federal habeas corpus review where a state court “declined to

address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state

procedural requirement”). To be independent, "the state law basis for the decision

must not be interwoven with federal law." LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704

(9th Cir. 2001). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002)(stating that "[I]f

the state court's decision rested primarily on a ruling on the merits . . ., its decision

would not be independent of federal law."). "To be deemed adequate, the state law

ground for decision must be well-established and consistently applied." Bennett v.

Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573,

577 (9th Cir. 1999)("A state procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to federal

court review if it was 'firmly established and regularly followed' at the time it was

applied by the state court")(quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)). 

When a petitioner procedurally defaults his federal claims in state court, either

because he failed to comply with a state procedural rule or because he would be

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4 In most cases, victims of a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" will

meet the standard for cause and prejudice. Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-

96.

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unable to return to state court to present his claims, federal habeas review of the

claims is barred unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the default and actual

prejudice or shows that failing to review the claims “will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. "'Cause' is a legitimate excuse

for the default; 'prejudice' is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional

violation." Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). If the petitioner

fails to establish cause for his procedural default, the court need not consider

whether the petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional

violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). To show a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must make the extraordinary showing that the

alleged constitutional violation probably resulted in the conviction of an innocent

person.4

 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

496, (1986). The circumstances constituting a fundamental miscarriage of justice

apply in only a "narrow class of cases." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. To establish

actual innocence, the Petitioner must show that considering all the evidence, "it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." Id. at 327-

28.

Here, Respondents contend that Petitioner properly exhausted his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim in state court but failed to fairly present his due process

claim to either the Arizona Court of Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court. The

Court agrees. 

Petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was presented to the state

courts in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and in his Petitions for Review to the

Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court. [Exhs. G, I, K]. Therefore,

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5 In his Motion to Vacate Judgment and Motion for New Trial [Doc. 8,

Exh. B], Petitioner argued to the state trial court that the destruction of

the cocaine violated his due process rights. Petitioner's federal habeas

petition raises a distinct due process claim: whether the Arizona Court

of Appeals violated due process by reversing the trial court despite

recognizing trial counsel's failure to examine the cocaine. [Doc. 1]. 

6 An exception to this rule may exist under Rule 32.2(b) for a defendant

who raises claims under Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h). None of the

claims at issue here were raised under those subsections of Rule 32.1.

7 Petitioner's claims would also likely be precluded pursuant to Rule

32.2(a)(3). See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) (stating that "[A] defendant

shall be precluded from relief under this rule based upon any ground....

(3) that has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral

proceeding"). But see Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Respondents properly concede that Petitioner's first ground for relief may properly

be considered by this Court. 

Conversely, Petitioner's due process claim is raised for the first time in his federal

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.5

 Accordingly, this claim was not fairly presented

in state court. In Arizona, post-conviction proceedings must be initiated under Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure within ninety days of the entry of

judgment and sentence or within thirty days of the order and mandate on the

judgment and sentence on direct appeal.6

 See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a).7 Thus, were

Petitioner to attempt to return to state court, his claim would be time-barred. Id.

Because Petitioner would be precluded under Arizona law from returning to state

court to properly exhaust his claims, the claims are deemed "technically exhausted"

but procedurally defaulted. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002);

see also Cassett, 406 F.3d at 621, n. 5 (discussing the concepts of technical

exhaustion and procedural default). Federal habeas review of the merits of

Petitioner's procedurally defaulted claim is barred unless Petitioner can show cause

for the procedural default and actual prejudice, or that failure to consider his claims

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28 8 See State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964). 

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will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Petitioner has not done so. 

 In his Reply brief, Petitioner suggests: (1) that the Arizona Court of Appeals

implicitly recognized that his trial counsel was ineffective, and (2) that his appellate

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a due process claim in the Arizona

Supreme Court. [Doc. 10]. Neither argument establishes cause sufficient to excuse

Petitioner's procedural default.

First, the Court disagrees that the Arizona Court of Appeals implied that

Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective. Although the Arizona Court of Appeals

observed that Petitioner's trial counsel never sought to test or examine the cocaine,

the Court did so in the context of determining whether Petitioner was entitled to a

jury instruction permitting the jurors to infer that the cocaine was exculpatory.

8

 The

Court did not evaluate counsel's actions under the strictures of Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984)(holding that a Petitioner seeking to

establish ineffective assistance of counsel must show that counsel's performance

was unreasonably deficient and that he was prejudiced by counsel's unprofessional

errors). This Court is unsatisfied that statements made by the Arizona Court of

Appeals in connection with an unrelated issue constituted an acknowledgment that

counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Moreover, in light of the Court of Appeals'

conclusion that the cocaine was not exculpatory, it is unlikely that the Court would

have found the prejudice necessary to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (holding that to establish prejudice, a defendant must

show a reasonable probability that a different outcome would have resulted); see

also discussion, infra, at pages 10-12.

Second, cause is not established by appellate counsel's alleged ineffectiveness

in failing to raise a due process claim. Under the exhaustion doctrine, a claim of

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9 Petitioner raised only a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

10 Additionally, because Petitioner had no right to counsel in his postconviction proceedings, any error made by Petitioner's counsel during

post-conviction proceedings could not constitute cause to set aside the

procedural default. See, e.g., Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1215

(9th Cir. 1999).

11 No due process violation arises from the State's failure to introduce the

cocaine itself into evidence. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479

(1984); United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir.

1997).

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ineffective assistance must generally be "presented to the state courts as an

independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default."

Murray, 477 U.S. at 489. Here, Petitioner did not raise ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel as an independent claim for relief in state court.9

 Therefore, he

cannot use ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel to establish cause. Id.

Moreover, even had Petitioner raised ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in

state court, cause would not be established by counsel's failure to raise a due

process violation. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[I]n many

instances, appellate counsel will fail to raise an issue because she foresees little or

no likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is

widely recognized as one of the hall marks of effective appellate advocacy").10

This Court is further satisfied that any failure to consider Petitioner's federal due

process claim will not amount to a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Petitioner's

conviction was amply supported by the testimony of the arresting officer and the

criminalist who determined that the substance seized from Petitioner was cocaine.11

Petitioner has not made the extraordinary showing that his case falls within the

"narrow class of cases" in which an innocent person was probably convicted

because of an alleged constitutional violation. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321; Murray, 477

U.S. at 496. 

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Having found no basis to set aside the procedural default, federal habeas review

of Petitioner's procedurally defaulted claim is barred. Accordingly, it is

recommended that Petitioner's due process claim be dismissed with prejudice.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A. Standard of Review

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), this

Court shall not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless (1) the decision by the state court was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) the decision

by the state court was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is "contrary

to clearly established precedent" if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth by the Supreme Court or arrives at a different result than the

Supreme Court in a case involving facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003). "Under the

'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 75

(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406, 413 (2000)).

State court rulings and factual findings are presumed to be correct where they are

supported by the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioners “have the burden

of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

Where the state court summarily denies relief without providing rationale, this court

"review[s] the record to determine whether the state court's decision contravened,

or unreasonably applied, clearly established law." Wilson v. Czerniak, 355 F.3d

1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2004)(citing Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir.

2000)). See also Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002), amended at

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311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002). In such cases, this Court does not independently

decide the contested legal question, but instead determines whether §2254(d)

mandates reversal of the state court decision. Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081,

1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982.

B. Petitioner's Claim

In this case, Petitioner challenges the state court's rejection of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. A federal Petitioner must satisfy a two-pronged test to

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge. He must show both that

counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, and that the deficiency was

prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. To establish that counsel's

performance was deficient, a petitioner is required to show that, "counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687-688. To establish prejudice, a "defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. Under the prejudice

prong, the question is whether "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687.

A failure to investigate a meritorious defense may constitute ineffective assistance

of counsel. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Jennings v. Woodford, 290

F.3d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002); Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1036-37 (9th

Cir. 1995); United States v. Rogers, 769 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985). However,

a habeas corpus petition must state facts which point to a real possibility of

constitutional error. Id. The determination whether a failure to investigate prejudiced

the petitioner depends on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have

changed the outcome of a trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Defense counsel is not

ineffective for failing to make futile objections or meritless motions. Jones v. Smith,

231 F.3d 1227, 1239, n. 8. (2000); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.

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1984). Moreover, counsel's tactical decisions about how to present a defense are

not subject to an ineffective assistance of counsel attack. Wildman v. Johnson, 261

F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-90 (recognizing

that mere criticism of trial tactics is not sufficient to support a charge of ineffective

assistance of counsel); Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980)

("Mere criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge of

inadequate representation").

Petitioner maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that

the cocaine he was charged with possessing be brought to court. In state court,

Petitioner argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to test or examine

the cocaine before trial. A review of the record reveals that, under either theory,

Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails because he cannot establish

that he was prejudiced by counsel's failures. Accordingly, reversal of the state court

decision is unwarranted.

In California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), the United States Supreme Court

addressed whether the introduction of data obtained from specimen testing, but not

the specimen itself, is sufficient to satisfy due process. There, the defendants

alleged that their due process rights were violated when California law enforcement

officials failed to preserve samples of the defendants' breath obtained in connection

with assessing their blood alcohol levels. The Court disagreed, holding that the

critical evidence to be presented at trial was the data gathered from the breath test,

not the defendants' actual breath. As such, due process was not violated as a result

of the failure to introduce the breath samples. 

In this case, the State similarly introduced incriminating testimony from the officer

who seized the cocaine and from the criminalist who verified through laboratory

testing that the seized substance was in fact cocaine. Under Trombetta, Petitioner's

conviction is supportable notwithstanding the destruction of the cocaine itself.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 487-88; see also United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d

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1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1997)("The mere failure to preserve evidence which could have

been subjected to tests which might have exonerated the defendant does not

constitute a due process violation"). Although the introduction of the cocaine into

evidence might have strengthened the case against Petitioner, its introduction was

not necessary to support Petitioner's conviction. As the Arizona Court of Appeals

observed, "the record contains no evidence or argument that anything about the

cocaine itself would have been exculpatory." [Doc. 8, Exh. A at 4]. Thus, it is

unlikely that the outcome of the trial would have been different if Petitioner's trial

counsel had sought to examine and test the cocaine or sought its introduction at trial.

Petitioner has not shown a likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have

been different had counsel demanded the production of the cocaine before or during

trial rather than attempting to avoid a conviction by seeking a directed verdict and

moving to set aside the verdict. Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that he

suffered the prejudice necessary to support a finding of ineffective assistance of

counsel. The Court therefore recommends that the State Court decision be upheld

and Petitioner's habeas corpus claim be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus [Doc. 1] be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s

judgment. The parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy

of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court.

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to

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the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.

DATED this 9th day of May, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-02440-ROS Document 14 Filed 05/09/06 Page 14 of 14