Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01230/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01230-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 After respondents filed their motion to dismiss, petitioner requested two extensions of 1

time to file his opposition. First, on March 18, 2010, the court granted petitioner a 60-day

extension of time to file his opposition to the pending motion. On June 7, 2010, the court

granted petitioner another 30-day extension of time to oppose the motion to dismiss. 

Nonetheless, no opposition has been filed by petitioner. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HERBERT M. VAUGHN,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-08-1230 MCE DAD P

vs.

D.K. SISTO, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an amended petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the court is respondents’ motion to

dismiss the petition as untimely. Petitioner has not filed an opposition to the motion.1

MOTION TO DISMISS

In moving to dismiss the pending petition, respondent provides the following

background concerning petitioner’s appeals and collateral challenges in state court.

On March 19, 2001, Petitioner pled no contest to manufacturing

methamphetamine and admitted two prior strike convictions. On

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 Unless otherwise noted, all petitions listed in this motion were given the benefit of the 2

mailbox rule. See Rule 3(d) of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

2

September 26, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate

state prison term of 25 years to life. (Lod. Docs. 1-2.)

On May 29, 2003, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate

District, affirmed the judgment. (Lod. Doc. 2.) Petitioner sought

review in the California Supreme Court which was denied on

August 13, 2003. (Lod. Docs. 3-4.)

Petitioner subsequently filed eight pro se state post-conviction

collateral challenges with respect to the pertinent judgment:2

The First Petition:

March 27, 2003: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District (Lod. Doc. 5);

May 8, 2003: Petition denied (Lod. Doc. 6);

The Second Petition:

May 27, 2003: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

California Supreme Court (Lod. Doc. 7);

March 3, 2004: Petition denied (Lod. Doc. 8);

The Third Petition:

June 28, 2004: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Sutter

County Superior Court (Lod. Doc. 9);

July 13, 2004: Petition denied (Lod. Doc. 10);

The Fourth Petition:

September 15, 2005: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District (Lod. Doc.

11);

September 30, 2005: Petition denied (Lod. Doc. 12);

The Fifth Petition:

August 14, 2006: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

California Supreme Court (Lod. Doc. 13);

March 14, 2007: Petition denied, citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th

770, 780 (1998); In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993) (Lod. Doc. 14);

The Sixth Petition:

July 15, 2007: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Sutter

County Superior Court (Lod. Doc. 15);

July 20, 2007: Petition denied, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750,

764 (1993) (Lod. Doc. 16);

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 On March 11, 2009, this court granted petitioner’s request for leave to file an amended 3

petition. (Doc. No. 7.) On April 8, 2009, petitioner filed his amended petition which is now

before the court. (Doc. No. 8.) 

3

The Seventh Petition:

August 12, 2007: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District (Lod. Doc.

17);

September 6, 2007: Petition denied (Lod. Doc. 18);

The Eighth Petition:

October 15, 2007: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the

California Supreme Court (Lod. Doc. 19);

April 23, 2008: Petition denied, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750

(1993); In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998) (Lod. Doc. 20).

(Mot. to Dismiss (MTD) at 2-3.) Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was signed by him on May

28, 2008 and filed with this court on June 3, 2008.3

Respondents assert that the statute of limitations for the filing of a federal habeas

petition in this case began to run when petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final on

November 11, 2003, when the ninety-days for seeking a writ of certiorari with the United States

Supreme Court expired. (Id. at 4.) Thus, the statute of limitations for the filing of a federal

habeas application began to run on November 12, 2003, and expired on November 11, 2004, plus

any time for tolling. (Id.)

Respondents argues that there was no tolling of the federal statute of limitations

based on the first state habeas petition filed by petitioner because it was filed and denied before

his judgement of conviction became final and the statute of limitations commenced running. (Id.

at 5.)

As to petitioner’s second state habeas petition filed with the California Supreme

Court, respondents argue that it resulted in the tolling of the statute of limitations for filing a

federal petition only for the period from November 12, 2003, when the statute of limitations

commenced running, to March 3, 2004, when that second state habeas petition was denied. (Id.) 

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4

As to the period between the denial of the second state petition by the California

Supreme Court and the filing of petitioner’s third state habeas petition in the Sutter County

Superior Court, respondents argue that there is no tolling of the federal statute of limitations for

that period because petitioner did not ascend up the state court hierarchy when he filed his third

state habeas petition in the Superior Court. (Id.) In addition, respondent argues that petitioner

delayed 119 days between the denial of the second state habeas petition and the filing of his third

state habeas third petition. (Id. at 6.) Respondent contends that absent any justification, the

delay in filing his next state habeas petition was unreasonable and therefore petitioner does not

qualify for interval tolling for that period of time. (Id.)

Respondents concede that petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for the period

that petitioner’s third state habeas petition was pending before the Sutter County Superior Court

from June 28, 2004 when petitioner signed the petition through July 13, 2004, when relief was

denied. (Id. at 6-7.)

Respondents argue that even with the benefit of statutory tolling for 113 days in

connection with petitioner’s second state habeas petition and 15 days of statutory tolling during

the pendency of the third state habeas petition, the statute of limitations for the filing of a federal

habeas petition expired on March 19, 2005. (Id. at 7.) Respondents note that petitioner did not

file his federal habeas petition with this court until May 28, 2008, over three years after the

statute of limitations for doing so had expired. (Id.) Accordingly, respondents argue that the

petition before this court should be dismissed as time-barred. (Id.)

As to the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth state habeas petitions filed by

petitioner, respondents argue that each were filed after the statute of limitations for the filing of a

federal habeas petition had expired and therefore cannot revive or extend the AEDPA statute of

limitations . (Id.) Respondents also note that petitioner’s fifth, sixth and eighth state habeas

petitions were explicitly found untimely by the California courts. (Id.) Respondents argue that

there can be no interval tolling between the denial of petitioner’s third state habeas petition on

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July 13, 2004, and the filing of his fourth state habeas petition on September 15, 2005, because

petitioner delayed 429 days after the denial of the third petition before filing the fourth petition. 

(Id. at 7-8.) Also, respondents assert, there can be no interval tolling between the denial of

petitioner’s fifth state habeas petition by the California Supreme Court and his filing of the sixth

state habeas petition in the Sutter County Superior Court, because once again petitioner did not

ascend up the state court hierarchy in connection with those petitions. (Id. at 8.)

Lastly, respondents argue that the federal habeas petition filed by petitioner in this

court in the case of Vaughn v. Haviland, Case No. CIV S-08-1749 LKK KJM, challenged a

separate judgment of conviction and sentence and does not extend the statute of limitations for

the filing of a federal habeas petition attacking the conviction at issue in this action. (Id. at 8.) 

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER THE AEDPA

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a

one-year period of limitation applies to a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in federal court

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The

period of limitation applies to all federal habeas petitions filed after the statute was enacted. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). Because this action was commenced in 2008,

the AEDPA period of limitation is applicable to the amended petition before the court.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), the one-year statute of limitations shall run

from the latest of:

(A) date on which judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or that time period; 

(B) date on which the impediment to filing an application is removed;

(C) date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court; or

(D) date on which the factual predicate of the claim(s) could have been

discovered

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 When a state post-conviction petition is determined to be untimely by a state court,

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there is no tolling of the statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2). Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d

1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005)). See also

Carey, 536 U.S. at 226. However, in the absence of a clear indication that a state habeas

petitions were denied as untimely, the federal courts are charged with the duty of independently

determining whether petitioner filed his state habeas petitions within what California would

consider a reasonable time. Chavis, 546 U.S. at 198. Thus, the California Supreme Court’s

denial of a petition on the merits no longer means that the petition before that court was

necessarily timely for federal statute of limitations purposes .

6

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”

The statute of limitations is not tolled during the interval between the date on

which a decision becomes final and the date on which the petitioner files his first state collateral

challenge. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Once state collateral

proceedings are commenced, a state habeas petition is “pending” during a full round of review in

the state courts, including the time between a lower court decision and the filing of a new petition

in a higher court, as long as the intervals between petitions are “reasonable.” See Evans v.

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 192 (2006); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222-24 (2002).

4

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the statute of limitations for the filing of

an application for federal habeas relief by petitioner began to run when his judgment of

conviction became final on November 11, 2003. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th

Cir. 1999) (holding that the period of direct review includes the 90-days a petition for a writ of

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court could be filed). Respondents are correct that

because petitioner filed his first state habeas petition before the statute of limitations for the filing

of federal petition even began to run, it has no tolling effect on the AEDPA statute of limitations. 

In addition, because petitioner’s second state habeas petition was filed with the California

Supreme Court on May 27, 2003, before the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on

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 Respondents assert that the statute of limitations was tolled for 113 days. See MTD at

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7. This is a minor discrepancy which has no impact on the resolution of the pending motion.

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November 12, 2003, tolling of the federal statute of limitations based on that filing did not

commence until November 12, 2003, and continued until the second state habeas petition was

denied by the California Supreme Court on March 3, 2004. Thus, the AEDPA statute of

limitations for the filing of petitioner’s federal habeas application was tolled for 112 days during

the time his second state habeas petition was pending before the California Supreme Court. 

5

Petitioner is not entitle to statutory tolling for the interval between the denial of

his second state habeas petition by the California Supreme Court and the filing of his third state

habeas petition with the Sutter County Superior Court because in pursuing his third state habeas

petition, petitioner did not go from a lower state court to a higher state court. See Banjo v.

Ayers, ___F.3d ___,___, 2010 WL 2403751, at *3 (9th Cir. June 17, 2010) (“Only the time

period during which a round of habeas review is pending tolls the statute of limitations; periods

between different rounds of collateral attack are not tolled.”); Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d

817, 820-21 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A round of collateral review may begin at any level or even skip

levels, but if there is any gap between the completion of one round of review and the

commencement of another round of state habeas review, the petitioner is not entitled to tolling

during the gap.”); Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that petitioner

“kicked off a new round of collateral review” when he filed a non-ascending petition in the

Superior Court and was “no longer pursuing his application for habeas relief up the ladder of the

state court system”); see also Carey v. Staffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002) (holding that an

application for post conviction relief is pending during the “intervals between a lower court

decision and a filing of a new petition in a higher court”).

For purposes of argument, the court will accept respondents’ concession that

petitioner is nonetheless entitled to statutory tolling for the period during which his third state 

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 But see Banjo v. Ayers, ___F.3d ___,___, 2010 WL 2403751, at *3 (9th Cir. June 17, 6

2010) 

8

habeas petition was pending before the Sutter County Superior Court. Given that concession, 6

petitioner was entitled at most to an additional 15 days of tolling of the AEDPA statute of

limitations.

When the court adds the two interval periods for which petitioner is entitled to

statutory tolling (112-days and 15-days) to the one year statute of limitations, petitioner had 492

days to file his federal habeas petition (365 days + 112 days + 15 days = 492) from the date his

judgment and conviction became final. As noted above, the statute of limitations for petitioner to

seek federal habeas relief with respect to the challenged judgment of conviction began to run on

November 12, 2003, and expired 492 days later on March 18, 2005. However, petitioner did not

file his federal habeas petition in this action until May 28, 2008, more than three years after the

statute of limitations for doing so had expired. The state habeas petitions filed by petitioner after

the expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations cannot revive the statute of limitations and

have no tolling effect. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.) (“[W]e hold that

section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that where

petitioner filed his state post-conviction relief proceeding “after the AEDPA statute of limitations

ended . . . [t]hat delay resulted in an absolute time bar . . . .”) Finally, petitioner has made no

argument for equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations.

Therefore, petitioner’s federal habeas petition is untimely and respondents’ 

motion to dismiss that petition should be granted. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondents’ January 11, 2010 motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 15) be granted;

and

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2. This action be dismissed as untimely.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 31, 2010.

DAD:4

vaug1230.mtd

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