Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00994/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00994-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMUEL WEBSTER,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 14-CV-994 DMS (NLS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER 

DENYING THE FIRST AMENDED 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

(Dkt. No. 22)

Before the Court is Petitioner Samuel Webster’s (“Webster”) First Amended 

Petition (“Petition”) for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. (Dkt. 

No. 22.) He asserts claims of instructional error, improper juror excusal, and ineffective 

assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Respondent Daniel Paramo, Warden 

(“Respondent”) filed an answer to the Petition, and Webster filed a traverse. (Dkt. Nos. 

25 and 31.) The Court has reviewed the filings and lodgments submitted in this matter. 

For the following reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

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I. FACTUAL SUMMARY1

a. The People’s Case

On December 10, 2009, at around noon, Janet McNeely and her boyfriend Devin 

Johnson went to Maddox Liquor Store, which was located at the corner of Fairmount 

Avenue and Thorn Street in the City Heights area of San Diego. McNeely went into the 

store to get change for the bus. When she came out, she and Johnson walked across the 

street to the bus stop. McNeely testified that a Black man, wearing dark clothing and a 

baseball cap, came out of the store and stared at them. Johnson stared back at him. The 

man angrily yelled, “What?” Johnson took his gloves from his back pocket, shook them 

over his shoulder toward the man, and said, “Do I know you?” to McNeely, as though 

asking himself that question. McNeely asked Johnson whether he knew the man, and 

Johnson replied he did not. Johnson put the gloves back in his rear pocket when McNeely 

asked him to do so. McNeely testified that the man got into a “grayish” car with tinted 

windows that drove away eastbound on Thorn Street.

Shortly thereafter, Brady Manning and his wife Marlene Barrales were in their car 

on Thorn Street, waiting to turn onto Fairmount Avenue, when the gray car, which 

Manning thought was a silver 1999 Honda Accord, pulled up near them. A Black female 

was driving the car, and the passenger was a Black male. Manning indicated he saw the 

passenger reach his arm outside the silver Honda, point a black semiautomatic handgun at 

Johnson, and fire two shots. Barrales heard the shots. Johnson fell to the ground. The 

Honda went past Manning and Barrales as it drove away.

Van Trieu, a Honda mechanic, testified he was about 200 feet away from the 

 

1 The Court quotes verbatim the factual background from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion. 

(Lodg. 6.) See 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(e)(1) (“a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be 

presumed to be correct;” the petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by 

clear and convincing evidence.”); see e.g., Garvin v. Farmon, 258 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(paraphrasing facts from the state court opinion). 

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shooting when it happened. He heard two pops, turned around, and saw a silver Honda 

Accord sedan driving away and the victim lying on the ground. Trieu heard someone say, 

“I smoked you.” 

Dr. Craig Nelson, a deputy medical examiner for the County of San Diego 

performed an autopsy on Johnson and signed Johnson’s death certificate. Johnson had 

been shot once and died as a result. The manner of death was homicide. 

Detective John Howard of the San Diego Police Department responded to the 

scene at around 2:45 p.m., a couple of hours after the shooting. He found two ninemillimeter shell casings. The gun was never recovered. Detective Howard received 

information that led him to believe that Webster might be a suspect. Through a computer 

search, he learned that Rachael Battle was Webster’s girlfriend and that she owned a 

silver Honda similar to the one used in the shooting. Detective Howard contacted Battle 

at around 9:30 that night. With Battle’s consent, Detective Howard interviewed her at 

police headquarters and Battle detailed Webster’s involvement in the murder. Battle told 

Detective Howard that she picked Webster up near her home earlier that day and later 

drove him to Maddox Liquor Store, where Webster bought a pint of Hennessy. She 

indicated that they then drove around the block, ended up at a stoplight on eastbound 

Thorn Street, she heard a gunshot, Johnson fell to the ground, and Webster put a gun on 

the floorboard of her car.

Homicide Detective Jana Beard testified that she interviewed Battle at police 

headquarters a couple of days later. Battle said she was driving her car when the shooting 

occurred. She said that although she did not see a gun, she believed Webster had a gun in 

his waistband because of the way he “postured” and “adjusted” himself when he got in 

her car. She said she believed it was a semiautomatic gun with a black handle that he had 

carried on prior occasions. Battle also said that Webster was wearing a black T-shirt, a 

pair of blue jeans, and a black and red ball cap. She related that before he shot Johnson, 

Webster said, “I'm going to scare him.” Battle also told Detective Beard that immediately 

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after the shooting, Webster said, “Did you see my aim? Did you see my aim?” Battle said 

that she saw the victim (Johnson) go down, she saw Webster put a gun on the floorboard, 

she “freaked out,” and she “floor[ed] it” as she drove away.

Video surveillance cameras in and around Maddox Liquor recorded both Johnson 

and Webster inside the store, Battle’s car pulling into the parking lot, and the shooting.

Detective Beard interviewed Webster following his arrest. Webster waived his 

Miranda2rights and agreed to make a statement. He told Detective Beard that he and 

Battle went to Maddox Liquor after arguing all morning, and pulled into the parking lot. 

Webster said he went inside, bought some Hennessey, returned to the car, and they left. 

Battle drove the wrong way and went back to the store. Webster said he heard the sound 

of gunfire and thought someone was shooting at their car. He told Detective Beard, “I 

didn’t kill nobody.”

Detective Beard advised Webster that the shooting incident was captured on video. 

Webster replied, “If it is then you have no reason talking to me.” Detective Beard told 

Webster he was going to be booked on a murder charge, and Webster responded that he 

did not kill anybody and he did not own a gun.

Battle testified under a grant of immunity. She stated that on December 10, 2009, 

she picked Webster up in her silver 2001 Honda Accord. Webster was wearing a dark 

shirt, jeans, and a hat. He told Battle he wanted to go to a liquor store. When Webster got 

into the car, Battle thought he might have a gun because of the way he maneuvered 

himself. Battle testified that Webster often carried a black semiautomatic handgun. At 

Webster’s request, they drove to Maddox Liquor. Battle parked in the parking lot, and 

Webster got out of the car and entered the store. Battle testified that when Webster came 

back out, he nodded his head toward someone. He was agitated when he got back in the 

car. Webster explained that he tried to say “hi” to a guy, but the guy did not respond. 

 

2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

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Webster may have said he “had a problem” with that person. Webster directed her to 

drive and circle around a school back toward Fairmount Avenue. When they got to the 

red light at Fairmount Avenue, Webster, who was still agitated, said, “I'm just going to 

scare him.” Webster fired two shots at Johnson, who was standing on the corner on 

Battle’s right-hand side. Battle saw Johnson lying on the ground. She also saw Webster 

put the gun on the floorboard. Webster told her to drive. Battle testified she was 

frightened and “slammed on the gas,” causing the front wheels to come off the ground. 

Webster asked her, “Did you see my aim?” Later that day, Webster told Battle that she 

should talk to the police but not say anything about their involvement in the shooting.

b. The Defense Case

Kristen Beyers, who works in the forensic biology unit of the San Diego Police 

Department crime laboratory, testified that she analyzed DNA swabs taken from the 

passenger’s and driver’s sides of Battle’s Honda Accord. Webster and Battle were 

excluded as possible contributors to the passenger’s side samples. Regarding the driver’s 

side sample, Battle was excluded and the results were inconclusive as to Webster.

The parties stipulated that the Honda Accord was processed for gunshot residue, 

and no particles of gunshot residue were found. 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

a. The Trial

On January 14, 2011, a jury convicted Webster of second degree murder under 

California Penal Code Section 187(a), and found true the fire-arm use allegation under 

California Penal Code Section 12022.53(b). (Lodg.1 at 120, 200.) The trial court found 

true the no-bail and prior conviction allegations in a bifurcated proceeding. (Id. at 206-

207.) Webster was sentenced to a total of 47 years to life in state prison. (Id. at 156-57, 

207-209.)

b. The Direct Appeal and Habeas Petitions

Webster filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the California Court of 

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Appeal. (Lodg. 3 (Case No. D060193).) He also filed a direct appeal that raised claims 

similar to those raised in his federal petition. (Lodg. 4 (Case No. D059430).) 

On November 30, 2012, the California Court of Appeal consolidated the habeas 

petition and the appeal. (Lodg. 6.) The court denied the habeas petition and affirmed 

Webster’s conviction. (Id.)

Webster then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review. (Lodg. 7 (Case 

No. S207927).) On February 13, 2013, the California Supreme Court denied without 

prejudice the petition as to any relief Webster might be entitled to after it decided People 

v. Bryant, 56 Cal. 4th 959 (2013), which was pending before the court at that time. 

(Lodg. 8.) 

On April 14, 2014, Webster constructively filed his federal petition before this 

Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Court granted Webster’s request to stay the proceedings so that 

he could exhaust two additional claims. (Dkt. No.15.) Webster filed a habeas petition 

before the California Supreme Court as to claims for ineffective assistance of trial and 

appellate counsel. (Lodg. 9.) On February 25, 2015, the California Supreme Court 

denied the petition without comment. (Lodg. 10.) On May 6, 2015, Webster filed his 

First Amended Petition. (Dkt. No. 22.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs this 

Petition. Under the AEDPA, a federal court will not grant habeas relief with respect to 

any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the decision was (1) contrary to 

or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined 

by the Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). 

That standard under AEDPA is difficult to meet and “demands that state-court decisions 

be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) 

(internal quotations omitted). A federal habeas petition must allege a deprivation of one 

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or more federal rights; the federal court will not “reexamine state-court determinations on 

state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

A federal habeas court may grant relief where the state court decides a case 

“contrary to” federal law by applying a rule different from the governing law set forth in 

Supreme Court cases or decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of 

indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A federal court 

may also grant habeas relief where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application” 

of clearly established federal law, such as where the state court correctly identifies the 

governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applies those 

decisions to the facts at issue. Id. at 407.

The state court decision must be more than incorrect; to warrant habeas relief the 

state court’s application of “clearly established federal law” must be “objectively 

unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “Objectively unreasonable” 

differs from “clear error” in that a federal court cannot grant relief only because it 

believes the state court erroneously applied “clearly established federal law;” rather, the 

application must be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 75-76 (internal citation omitted). 

If a state supreme court silently denies a petitioner’s appeal with a summary 

dismissal, the reviewing federal habeas court must review the last reasoned state court 

opinion in making a decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 806 

(1991). Where the state courts supply no reasoned decision on the claims presented for 

review, this Court must perform an “‘independent review of the record’ to ascertain 

whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 

F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

IV. DISCUSSION

a. Instructional Error Claim (Grounds One and Two)

In interrelated claims, Webster contends the trial court erred by failing to sua 

sponte instruct the jury on lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary 

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manslaughter (Ground One), and that the trial court’s error was not harmless (Ground 

Two). (Dkt. No. 22 at 26-39, 40-45.) He contends these errors violated his Fourteenth 

Amendment right to due process and to present a defense, and his Sixth Amendment right 

to have the jury determine substantial issues material to his guilt. (Id. at 44-45.) 

Webster raised these similar claims in his direct appeal. (Lodg. 4.) The state 

appellate court found the instructional error was harmless. (Lodg. 6 at 24.) Webster then 

filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was exhausted and 

summarily denied without prejudice to any relief he might be entitled to after that court 

decided People v. Bryant, 56 Cal. 4th 959 (2013), which was pending before the court at 

that time. (Lodgs. 7 and 8.) 

The California appellate court set forth the circumstances surrounding the 

instructions as follows:

During the jury instruction conference, the court said, “I don't see there’s been 

any evidence presented to support any theory of voluntary or involuntary 

[manslaughter], unless you want to point me to something.” Defense counsel 

replied, “Not at this time.” Seeking clarification, the court asked Webster’s 

counsel, “So you are not requesting an [lesser included offense] of either 

[voluntary or involuntary] manslaughter; correct?” Defense counsel 

responded, “Correct.”

With respect to the murder charge, the court instructed the jury under a

modified version of CALCRIM No. 521 that, if the jury decided Webster had

committed murder, it was required to decide whether the murder was of the

first or second degree; and that it could convict him of first degree murder

under any one of three theories: (1) the murder was willful, deliberate, and

premeditated; (2) the murder was committed by lying in wait; or (3) the

murder was committed by shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle. The court 

also instructed the jury on second degree murder, but did not instruct on the 

lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter or involuntary 

manslaughter.

(Lodg. 6 at 19-20.)

The California appellate court then analyzed the claim as follows:

Webster specifically contends the court committed reversible error in failing 

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to instruct the jury sua sponte on voluntary manslaughter premised on the 

theory that he committed an unintentional killing without malice during the 

course of an inherently dangerous assaultive felony. [FN 5] The Attorney

General disputes that Garcia articulated a new theory of voluntary

manslaughter. With respect to involuntary manslaughter, Webster contends

the court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte,

on involuntary manslaughter premised on the theory that he committed an

unintentional killing without malice during the course of the misdemeanor

offense of brandishing a firearm.

[FN 5] The Supreme Court has granted review on this issue in People v. 

Bryant (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 134, review granted November 16, 2011,

S196365. In Bryant, this court followed the Garcia court’s conclusion that

voluntary manslaughter may consist of an unlawful killing during the

commission of an inherently dangerous felony, even if unintentional.

In support of these contentions, Webster states “[t]here was evidence from 

which the jury could have reasonably concluded that [he] fired the gun without 

malice ... by accident or only with the intent to frighten [the victim, Johnson].” 

Specifically, he asserts “the only evidence bearing directly on [his] intent was 

his statement to Battle immediately before the shooting that he intended 

merely to ‘scare’ Johnson,” and “that statement was substantial evidence that 

he did not intend to inflict bodily injury.” Thus, Webster contends, “[if] the 

jury concluded that [he] merely intended to commit the misdemeanor of 

brandishing the firearm, then it would have been warranted in returning a 

verdict of involuntary manslaughter. If, on the other hand, the jury concluded 

that [he] intended to commit a felony by firing the gun, it would have been 

warranted in returning a verdict of voluntary manslaughter.”

We conclude Webster’s contentions are unavailing. “The trial court is 

obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the

issues raised by the evidence, whether or not the defendant makes a formal

request.” (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 744 (Blair).) “That

obligation encompasses instructions on lesser included offenses if there is

evidence that, if accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve the defendant of

guilt of the greater offense but not of the lesser.” (Id. at p. 745.) “To justify a

lesser included offense instruction, the evidence supporting the instruction

must be substantial—that is, it must be evidence from which a jury composed

of reasonable persons could conclude that the facts underlying the particular

instruction exist.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 

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162 (Breverman).) “‘In deciding whether evidence is “substantial” in this 

context, a court determines only its bare legal sufficiency, not its weight.’” 

(People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 556.)

Here, we shall assume, without deciding, that it was error for the court to fail 

sua sponte to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of voluntary 

manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. The People urge us to conclude 

that any such error was harmless under the Watson test for prejudice (People 

v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836), which the California Supreme Court in 

Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pages 177-178 made applicable to 

instructional errors of this sort in noncapital cases. (See Moye, supra, 47 

Cal.4th at p. 555.) 

Under the Watson test, an error in failing sua sponte to instruct on a lesser 

included offense requires reversal of the conviction for the greater offense “if, 

‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence’ [citation], it 

appears ‘reasonably probable’ the defendant would have obtained a more 

favorable outcome had the error not occurred.” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 

at p. 178.) Probability under Watson “does not mean more likely than not, but 

merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.” (People v. 

Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 918 (Ghilotti).) Breverman

explained that appellate review under Watson “focuses not on what a 

reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the 

absence of the error under consideration. In making that evaluation, an 

appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence 

supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence 

supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no 

reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the 

result.” (Breverman, at p. 177.)

Here, Webster has failed to meet his burden of showing a reasonable 

probability under Watson that he would have obtained a more favorable

outcome had the court sua sponte instructed the jury on voluntary

manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. Stating that the “only evidence

bearing directly on [his] intent” was his statement to Battle immediately

before he fired the handgun that he was only going to scare Johnson, Webster

asserts in conclusory fashion that “[t]here was certainly more than ‘an abstract 

possibility’ that the jury would have returned convictions on only one of the 

lesser offenses had it been given the option to do so.” However, Webster 

disregards substantial evidence in the trial record when he claims the only 

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evidence bearing directly on his intent was the evidence of his statement to 

Battle that he was only going to scare Johnson. Homicide Detective Jana 

Beard testified that when she interviewed Battle at police headquarters after 

the shooting, Battle stated that Webster asked her (Battle) immediately after 

the shooting, “Did you see my aim? Did you see my aim?”. Battle testified at 

trial that after Webster fired shots at the person (Johnson) standing on the 

corner of Fairmount and 45th Street, Webster, asked her, “Did you see my 

aim?”. According to Battle, Webster was agitated before the shooting when 

he got back in the car after buying liquor at Maddox Liquor. Webster had 

explained to her that he tried to say “hi” to a guy, but the guy did not respond. 

Battle testified that Webster may have said he had a problem with that person. 

She also testified that Webster directed her to drive and circle around a school 

back toward Fairmount Avenue right before the shooting. Another 

prosecution witness, Van Trieu, testified he was about 200 feet away from the 

shooting when it happened. He heard two pops, turned around, and saw a 

silver Honda Accord sedan driving away and the victim lying on the ground. 

Trieu heard someone say, “I smoked you.” In light of the foregoing substantial 

evidence that Webster has chosen to disregard, we conclude the court’s 

assumed error in failing to instruct on the lesser included offenses of voluntary 

manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter was harmless.

(Lodg. 6 at 20-24.)

In his First Amended Petition, Webster contends the jury could have found he shot 

the victim by accident while brandishing a handgun or while committing an inherently 

dangerous felony without malice. (Id. at 26.) Webster argues the trial court erred by 

failing to sua sponte instruct on lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and 

involuntary manslaughter. (Dkt. No. 22 at 27-29.) Webster also contends his 

constitutional rights were violated by the failure to instruct on the lesser included 

offenses, and cites cases supporting the proposition that there is a constitutional 

obligation to instruct on the defense theory of the case.3 (Dkt. No. 22 at 28-29.) 

Respondent contends in its Answer that the failure of state courts to instruct on 

 

3 The Court only refers to Webster’s arguments and positions as stated in his First Amended Petition

because his traverse essentially reiterates his petition and does not substantively add to the analysis. 

(See Dkt. No. 31.)

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lesser included offenses in non-capital cases, such as this one, does not present a federal 

constitutional question. Respondent also contends the California Supreme Court’s 

decision in People v. Bryant makes clear that no lesser included offense instructions were 

required. Respondent also argues Webster failed to point to evidence supporting either 

instruction and there is no reasonable basis to assume the jury would have found him 

guilty of a less serious charge. (Dkt. No. 25-1 at 16.)

Here, Respondent’s contention is correct that a claim the state court failed to sua 

sponte instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses in a non-capital case is not cognizable 

in a federal habeas proceeding. Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses did not present a federal constitutional 

question). There is no “clearly established law” as determined by the Supreme Court that 

requires giving a lesser-included offense instruction in a non-capital case. See id, 219 

F.3d at 929. Therefore, the state court decision cannot be said to be contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, federal law as decided by the Supreme Court, nor an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law to the facts. See Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (where Supreme Court precedent gives no clear answer 

to question presented, “it cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonab[ly] appli[ed] 

clearly established Federal law’”). 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “the refusal by a court to instruct a jury on 

lesser included offenses, when those offenses are consistent with defendant’s theory of 

the case, may constitute a cognizable habeas claim” under clearly established United 

States Supreme Court precedent. Solis, 219 F.3d at 929. Circuit precedent, however,

does not constitute clearly established federal law under AEDPA. Renico v. Lett, 559 

U.S. 766, 778-79 (2010). Even if this exception was considered to be clearly established 

law, to obtain federal habeas relief on these grounds Webster would need to demonstrate 

both that the jury was precluded from considering a sound theory of the case supported 

by substantial evidence to warrant the instructions, and that the jury’s non-consideration 

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of that theory had a “substantial and injurious” effect on the verdict. Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993). As explained below, he has not done so.

To the extent Webster argues the lesser-included offense instructions should have 

been given to support a defense theory of the case that he killed without malice while 

committing an inherently dangerous assaultive felony, that argument is now foreclosed 

by the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Bryant, 56 Cal. 4th 959 (2013). 

In Bryant, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The Court of Appeal

reversed the conviction, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte

instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder on the 

theory that defendant killed without malice in the commission of an inherently dangerous 

assaultive felony. Id. at 964.

The California Supreme Court reversed, and concluded that a killing without 

malice during the commission of an inherently dangerous assaultive felony is not 

voluntary manslaughter. A defendant who killed without malice while committing an 

inherently dangerous assaultive felony must have committed the killing without an intent 

to kill or a conscious disregard for life. Id. at 970. Such a killing therefore cannot be 

voluntary manslaughter because voluntary manslaughter requires either an intent to kill 

or a conscious disregard for life. Id. Thus, the court ultimately concluded that because 

killing without malice in the commission of an inherently dangerous assaultive felony is 

not voluntary manslaughter, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on 

voluntary manslaughter. Id. In light of the Bryant decision, the manslaughter offenses 

were not consistent with Webster’s theory of the case, and therefore the trial court’s 

decision not to give a lesser included offense instruction did not violate Webster’s 

constitutional right or have a substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury’s 

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verdict.4 

For these reasons, the trial court’s decision not to sua sponte instruct on lesser 

included offenses did not violate Webster’s rights. Webster’s claim that at most he could 

only be guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter is not supported by the evidence. 

It is therefore not objectively unreasonable for the state appellate court to conclude that 

Webster has no valid claim based on the omission of a state law voluntary or involuntary 

manslaughter instruction. Even assuming Webster could satisfy section 2254(d), habeas 

relief is unavailable because the failure to instruct on the lesser-included offenses cannot 

be said to have had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38. This Court, therefore, RECOMMENDS that Webster be 

DENIED habeas relief on his claim that the trial court failed to instruct on lesser

included offenses and his claim that such instruction was not harmless.

b. Improper Juror Excusal Claim (Ground Three)

In his First Amended Petition, Webster claims the trial court erred when it 

discharged Juror 10 and replaced him with an alternate juror. He contends the Court of 

Appeal’s failure to reverse the trial court judgment on grounds that the trial court failed to 

conduct an adequate inquiry into whether the juror was property discharged violated his

Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict and his Fourteenth Amendment right 

to due process of law. (Dkt. No. 22 at 47.)

Webster raised a similar claim on his direct appeal. (Lodg. 4.) The state appellate 

court found the claim procedurally barred, and that in any event, the trial court did not 

 

4 Webster’s argument that the trial court’s decision not to give a lesser included offense instruction of 

involuntary manslaughter likewise is unavailing. “[W]hen, as here, the defendant indisputably has 

deliberately engaged in a type of aggravated assault the natural consequences of which are dangerous to 

human life ... and no material issue is presented as to whether the defendant subjectively appreciated the 

danger to human life his or her conduct posed, there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on involuntary 

manslaughter.” People v. Brothers, 236 Cal. App. 4th 24, 35 (2015). There is no substantial evidence in 

the record to support an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction here. (See Lodg. 6 at 24.)

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abuse its discretion or violate Webster’s constitutional rights in discharging the juror. 

(Lodg. 6 at 14.) Webster then exhausted this claim in the petition for review filed with 

the state supreme court. (Lodgs. 7, 8.) 

The California appellate court set forth the legal principles governing a sitting 

juror’s discharge under Penal Code Section 1089. (Lodg. 6 at 13.) Section 1089 states in 

pertinent part: “If at any time... a juror ... becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown 

to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty ... the court may order him to be 

discharged and draw the name of an alternate....”

The appellate court set forth the circumstances regarding Juror 10 as follows:

During deliberations, juror No. 10 sent the court a note that stated: “Can I 

speak w[ith] you?” The court clerk informed the court she had asked juror No. 

10 why he wanted to speak with the court, and the juror told her he was feeling 

pressured by the other jurors.

The court summoned juror No. 10 into the courtroom and asked him what he

wanted to talk to the court about. Juror No. 10 replied, “I feel different about

it than the rest of the people. I don’t want to be pressured into making the

same decision that other people make, so I’d rather just walk away from it, if

I could.” When the court asked what he meant, juror No. 10 indicated he no

longer wanted to serve on the jury.

The court asked the juror whether he had a full opportunity to share his views 

with the other jurors. Juror No. 10 replied that he had, but said, “[I]t’s like I’m 

talking to myself.” He complained that they were “making up stuff.” The court 

asked juror No. 10 whether he would be willing to remain on the jury and keep 

an open mind if the court directed the whole jury to continue to deliberate and 

work together. Juror No. 10 responded, “I can try,” adding that the jury had 

taken a vote, one other person felt the way he did, and he could not “make a 

decision on someone else’s life ... just because you feel this way.” He told the 

court he thought jury service “would be easier, but it’s not.”

The court directed juror No. 10 to wait outside and then asked counsel what 

they wanted to do. The prosecutor indicated that, from the juror’s comments, 

it appeared he might not be willing to sit in judgment of another person or 

follow the law, and it was difficult to know without “getting into what the jury 

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is deliberating on, which we obviously can't do.” The prosecutor suggested 

that the court replace juror No. 10 with an alternate juror because he did not 

want to be on the jury. Defense counsel disagreed, arguing that wanting to 

serve as a juror was not a requirement. Counsel suggested that the court 

instruct the jurors to work together and listen to one another.

Following a break, the court told both counsel that juror No. 10’s stated desire 

to walk away from jury service was based on his statement that he was feeling 

pressured into making the same decision that other jurors were making, and it 

appeared he was advising the court that the jury might be hung, not requesting 

to walk away from jury service due to inability to fulfill his duties as a juror. 

The court stated it was appropriate to reinstruct the jury on its duty to 

deliberate. After suggesting a specific modified instruction, the court asked 

for input.

The prosecutor suggested that the court instruct the jury to evaluate only the 

evidence presented to them in court. Defense counsel agreed. The court 

indicated it would include this in the supplemental instruction. The court 

brought the jury back in and gave the following instructions:

“[A]s I explained to you before, it is your duty to deliberate. It is your duty to

talk with one another in the jury room. You should try to agree on a verdict if

you can. Each of you must decide the case for yourself but only after you have 

discussed the evidence with all the other jurors. [¶] Do not hesitate to change 

your mind if you become convinced that you are wrong, but do not change 

your mind just because other jurors disagree with you. [¶] Now, deliberation, 

what does that mean? Deliberation means careful consideration of all the 

evidence and discussion about it. It involves expressing your opinions as well 

as the reasons for them and listening carefully to the views of all of the other 

jurors. I would encourage each of you to be as specific as possible when 

explaining why you hold a certain view about the evidence and to give as 

much time as necessary for everyone to understand and thoroughly evaluate 

each person's point of view. [¶] No one should feel rushed or pressured in any 

way during these discussions, but each of you should be open to the views of 

others before making up your mind. [¶] Remember that your role is to be 

impartial judges of the facts and not to act as an advocate for one side or the 

other. Remember also your decision should be based only on the evidence 

presented in this court.”

A couple of hours later, juror No. 10 sent the court another note which stated, 

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“If I feel like I can’t come to the same conclusion as everyone else what is the 

next step?” The court brought the jury into the courtroom, told the jurors that 

the note suggested the jury was deadlocked, and asked the foreperson, “Is it 

your opinion the jury is hopelessly deadlocked at this point?” The foreperson 

replied, “I don't know. I can’t say for sure. The person that couldn't come to a 

decision was saying that he didn't find it in his opinion.”

The court told the jury that a verdict required a unanimous decision, and the 

question was whether there was no possibility that, with further deliberations 

or instructions, “all 12 jurors will agree.” The jury foreperson responded he 

did not think everyone would agree. The court asked whether there was 

anything it could do to help, and the foreperson stated he had suggested that 

the jurors take another day and “let the person in question sleep on it before 

he makes his final decision.” The court asked for the numerical breakdown. 

The foreperson responded that the last vote was 11 to 1. When the court asked 

how many votes had been taken, the foreperson replied there had been three 

votes. The first was 11 to 1, the second was 10 to 2, and the last was 11 to 1.

The court again asked whether additional time would help. The foreperson 

answered, “It could.” The court then asked each of the jurors whether the jury 

was hopelessly deadlocked. Jurors Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 5 felt the jury was 

deadlocked. The remaining jurors thought they should resume deliberations 

the following day. Following a discussion with counsel off the record, the 

court told the jury to return in the morning, at which time the court would give 

additional instructions.

The next morning, during a recorded chambers conference, the court informed 

counsel that juror No. 10 had telephoned the clerk and left a message that he 

was ill, had been in urgent care the previous night, was on medication, and 

was not coming to the court that morning. The court called juror No. 10 from 

chambers, put him on the speaker phone, and directed the court reporter to 

transcribe the conversation. The court asked juror No. 10 for an update on his 

condition, stating that, although he did not have to give details, the court 

wanted to find out whether the illness was “relatively shortlived” and he could 

return the next day, or whether he felt he could not return in a reasonable 

period of time. Juror No. 10 replied that he did not know how long he would 

be ill, stating, “I think it’s my nerves. I don't know. My stomach, my head 

[are] all messed up right now.” The court asked him how long he was in urgent 

care the previous night, and he replied he was there until 9:00 p.m., but it took 

until 11:00 p.m. to get his medications.

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The court told the juror it needed to know how he was feeling, because it had 

to decide whether it would be appropriate to replace him with an alternate 

juror. Juror No. 10 replied, “I think it would be better to have an alternate take 

my place. I would hate to hold you guys up.” The court responded that it could 

wait a reasonable period of time and indicated it would be fine to wait a day, 

but he might need to be replaced with an alternate if “this may be something 

that will continue for quite a while.” Juror No. 10 told the court, “I think it’s 

going to be more than a day” and explained that the doctor in urgent care had 

told him to follow up with his primary care doctor, but he had not been able 

to reach his doctor. He added, “I don’t see that being anytime soon” and said 

he had not slept and was tired. The court told him it would call him back and 

ended the call.

The court then asked counsel for comments. The prosecutor submitted.

Defense counsel expressed the belief that juror No. 10 had gone to urgent care 

and may have been prescribed medication, but indicated the juror was looking 

for a way to be removed from the jury. The court stated that juror No. 10’s 

responses appeared to be credible and that the juror could not give a

commitment to return within a reasonable period of time. The court then found 

there was no reasonable option other than replacing juror No. 10 with an 

alternate. The court stated, “Otherwise, I think we’re left in a position of

simply waiting an indefinite period of time, which is obviously not fair to all

of the ... other jurors.” The court concluded, “So unless there’s any other

comment by either counsel, that[’s] what I intend to do.”

When neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel objected, the cou[r]t

replaced juror No. 10 with an alternate.

(Lodg. 6 at 8-12.)

The appellate court then analyzed claim as follows:

Although defense counsel initially expressed the view that juror No. 10 was 

looking for a way to be removed from the jury, counsel did not object when 

the court replaced that juror with an alternate, and, thus, failed to preserve the 

issue for appeal. (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 462 [“Defendant 

did not object and thus failed to preserve the issue for appeal.”]; People v. 

Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1029 [“It is apparent that defense counsel 

not only did not object to the substitution of the juror or move for a mistrial, 

but sought to have her excused. Therefore, the present claim of error is 

waived.”]; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 987, fn. 16 [“As a general 

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rule, a defendant may properly raise in this court a point involving a trial 

court’s allegedly improper discharge of a juror only if he made the same point 

below.”], abrogated on other grounds as recognized in People v. Yeoman

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117.) Were it necessary for this court to reach the merits 

of Webster’s claim, we would conclude the court did not abuse its discretion 

or violate Webster’s constitutional rights as there is substantial evidence 

supporting the court’s finding that juror No. 10 was ill and unable to perform 

the duties of a juror. (See § 1089.)

(Lodg. 6 at 14.)

In his First Amended Petition, Webster contends that the trial court erred in failing 

to conduct an adequate inquiry before discharging the juror. (Dkt. No. 22 at 47.) 

In support, he cites cases that stand for the proposition that a court may not discharge a 

juror based on the juror’s views on the strength of the government’s case, because to 

discharge a juror who indicates he or she may favor one side over the other would be 

prejudicial. (Id. at 55, 59-61.) Although Webster mentions the state appellate court 

rejected his claim because counsel failed to object, he does not appear to expressly refute 

the finding of procedural default. (See id. at 47.) Rather, he contends review should be 

granted to determine if the trial court erred in not holding an adequate hearing before 

discharging the juror. (Id.)

Respondent contends in its Answer that this claim should be summarily denied 

because the Ninth Circuit has found the state procedural rule an adequate and 

independent bar to federal habeas review. (Dkt. No. 25-1 at 21.) Respondent also 

contends the state court’s implied determination that there was no federal constitutional 

violation was reasonable. (Id.) 

The juror substitution procedure outlined in section 1089 of the state penal code 

protects a defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury, which is guaranteed by the 

Sixth Amendment. Bell v. Uribe, 748 F.3d 857, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2013). Thus, a state 

court’s ruling that a juror was properly removed under section 1089 is an adjudication of 

his federal claims and is entitled to AEDPA deference. See id. at 864. A trial court’s 

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finding that good cause exists to remove a juror is a factual finding entitled to deference 

on habeas review. Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, the appellate court’s decision to deny the improper juror excusal claim on 

grounds it was not preserved for appeal was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law, nor was it an unreasonable determination of 

the facts presented in the state court proceedings. A federal court normally cannot review 

a federal claim for post-conviction relief that has already been rejected by a state court on 

the basis of an independent and adequate state procedural rule. Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991); see also Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 

2004) (petitioner’s claim procedurally barred where defense counsel did not 

contemporaneously object). Additionally, Webster does not demonstrate that federal 

review of his procedurally barred claim can nonetheless be undertaken. To obtain federal 

review of a procedurally defaulted claim, a petitioner needs to demonstrate cause for the 

default and prejudice arising from the alleged constitutional violation. Id., citing 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977). Webster does not suggest there was cause 

for the procedural default or that it would result in a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice.” See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748. Regardless, even if Petitioner’s claim was not 

procedurally defaulted and because the state appellate court also briefly and impliedly

addressed the merits, so too does this Court here. 

To the extent the state appellate court addressed the merits and concluded

substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that Juror No. 10 was ill and unable to 

perform the duties of a juror, the decision did not violate Webster’s constitutional rights. 

Petitioner is correct that a trial judge may not dismiss a juror because that juror is a 

“holdout” who disagrees with his or her follow jurors as to what their verdict should be, 

and to do so would be a violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights. See Dkt. No. 22 

at 55, 58-59, citing United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But where, as 

here, there were two potential and possibly intertwined reasons for the juror’s excusal, 

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even the trial court’s knowledge that the excused juror was the sole holdout for acquittal 

does not in itself invalidate the decision to excuse the juror. See Perez v. Marshall, 119 

F.3d at 1427 (dismissal of holdout juror permissible because juror’s emotional instability 

that made her unable continue deliberating provided good cause for her dismissal). The 

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d at 1423, which addressed a 

similar situation to this case, is instructive. 

In Perez, the state trial judge dismissed a lone holdout juror on the grounds that 

“she was emotionally incapable of continuing to participate in the jury-deliberation 

process.” Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge did not violate the defendant’s

Sixth Amendments rights by excusing the holdout juror under these circumstances, and 

the trial court’s determination that good cause existed to remove the juror was wellsupported by the record. After considering cases in which jurors were properly replaced 

due to physical or mental health problems, the court recognized that the juror’s emotional

infirmity as a juror could have been triggered or exacerbated by her disagreement with 

the other jurors as to Perez’s guilt. Nevertheless, the trial judge properly excused the 

juror because the juror’s emotional instability prevented her from continuing to perform 

the essential functions of a juror in the same way that a hearing impairment, a mental 

illness, or a poor physical health condition would have. Id. at 1427. The Ninth Circuit 

found “[t]he fact that the trial judge knew that [the juror] was the sole juror holding out 

for an acquittal when he dismissed her does not invalidate his decision to excuse her from 

jury service.” The circuit court explained that the trial judge was “forced to act, not 

because of [the juror’s] status as a holdout juror, but because of [the juror’s] emotional 

inability to continue performing the essential function of a juror-deliberation.” Id. The 

court stressed that the trial judge “took great pains to preserve the originally empaneled 

jury, interviewed the juror at length, offered alternatives to ease the stress of 

deliberations, and encouraged her to continue deliberating.” Id. at 1427-28. 

Here, the state court’s determination that Juror No. 10 was properly discharged 

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was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law nor 

was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Like Perez, the court first 

called Juror No. 10 into the courtroom to conduct an inquiry as to whether he was able to 

participate in deliberations, encouraged him to continue deliberating, and to keep an open 

mind. The court also sought input from counsel and provided a supplemental instruction 

to the jury regarding deliberations. On the date Juror No. 10 called in sick, the court also 

conducted further inquiry to attempt to determine if he would be well enough to return to 

deliberate in a reasonable amount of time, and learned that Juror No. 10 stated he was ill, 

needed medical attention and was not certain when he would be able to return. The trial 

judge found good cause to excuse Juror No. 10, not because of his status as a holdout 

juror, but because of the juror’s health condition. Accordingly, the state appellate court’s 

conclusion is not unreasonable. It also is well-supported by the factual record and is a 

reasonable interpretation of the facts as they were presented in the state court proceeding. 

Even assuming Webster could satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), there was no constitutional 

error in excusing Juror No. 10. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Webster’s 

claim on this ground be DENIED.

c. Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel Claim 

(Ground Four)

In his First Amended Petition, Webster contends trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance because she failed to object to the trial court’s decision to discharge Juror No.

10. (Dkt. No. 22 at 78.) He further argues trial counsel failed to investigate whether 

Juror No. 10 actually suffered from a medical condition that would exclude him from 

further jury deliberation. (Id. at 81.) Webster also argues his state court appellate 

counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to raise the argument that trial 

counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the discharge of Juror No. 10. He contends 

appellate counsel knew trial counsel failed to preserve Webster’s appellate rights on that 

issue, and yet did not raise it in his appellate briefs. (Id. at 89.) 

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Respondent contends in its Answer that Webster failed to establish what grounds 

trial counsel should have objected on, and that such an objection would have been 

sustained. (Dkt. No. 25-1 at 23.) Respondent also contends Webster did not provide any 

evidence to indicate the discharged juror did not suffer a medical condition that prevented 

him from further deliberations. (Id.) In light of these things, Respondent argues, 

appellate counsel likewise cannot be faulted for failing to challenge the trial counsel’s 

conduct. (Id.)

Webster presented his ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims in 

the habeas petition he filed in the state supreme court. (Lodg. 9.) The state supreme

court summarily denied the petition without comment. (Lodg. 10.) 

Federal habeas courts “review ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the 

deferential light of Strickland.” Brown v. Ornoski, 503 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2007); 

see also Harrison v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (“The standards created by 

Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in tandem, 

review is ‘doubly’ so.” (citations omitted)). Under Strickland, to establish ineffective 

assistance by his trial counsel, Webster must demonstrate both that: (1) counsel’s 

performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Failure to establish either prong 

requires that an ineffective assistance claim be denied. See id. The Strickland standard 

for assessing the performance of counsel applies to both trial and appellate counsel. 

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). 

To satisfy the deficient performance requirement, “[t]he challenger’s burden is to 

show ‘that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 104, 

quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show 

that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,” there is a reasonable probability “the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “A 

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reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. at 694; see Richter, 562 U.S. at 112 (“The likelihood of a different result 

must be substantial, not just conceivable”). “Because failure to meet either [Strickland] 

prong is fatal to [an IAC] claim, there is no requirement that we ‘address both 

components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.’” 

Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 987 (9th Cir. 2011), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

697. 

Courts resolving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim do not inquire into what 

means and strategies defense counsel might have pursued, but rather they assess whether 

the choices counsel actually made were reasonable. Siriprongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 

732, 736 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. There is a “strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance,” and reviewing courts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Here, trial counsel’s performance was not deficient in electing not to object to the 

juror’s excusal because the record supports the trial court’s finding of good cause to 

excuse the juror due to his illness. See supra, § IV.b. Similarly, trial counsel’s decision 

not to object did not prejudice Webster’s defense because there is no reasonable 

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if trial counsel 

objected.

Webster’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating Juror 

No. 10’s claim of illness is also unavailing. “While a lawyer is under a duty to make 

reasonable investigations, a lawyer may make a reasonable decision that particular 

investigations are unnecessary. [] To determine the reasonableness of a decision not to 

investigate, the court must apply ‘a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’”

Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing and quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 691). Here, Webster’s counsel was aware of Juror No. 10’s representations to 

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the Court, and on the record, regarding his health condition, and so this Court cannot say 

Webster’s trial counsel’s decision not to investigate the juror’s health was unreasonable. 

Indeed, the record indicated counsel was informed that Juror No. 10 stated he was ill, had 

been in urgent care the previous night, and was on medication and not coming into court. 

Counsel also was aware the trial court judge asked Juror No. 10 for an update on his 

stated condition that he was ill, and that he would not be able to return to court for an 

undeterminable period of time. (Lodg. 6 at 8-12.) Webster has not come forward with 

any evidence indicating an investigation into Juror No. 10’s claim of illness would have 

revealed the juror was not medically incapacitated, and the record does not show that trial 

counsel acted ineffectively with respect to her decision not to investigate further. See 

Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (“[T]he absence of evidence cannot 

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Consequently, there is also no indication that the appellate counsel’s representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness by failing to include an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim in the direct appeal. 

In sum, the state supreme court’s denial of Webster’s ineffective assistance of trial 

and appellate counsel claims was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Webster’s be DENIED habeas relief on 

this claim.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that the district court issue 

an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) denying

the First Amended Petition and dismissing it with prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) No later than February 12, 2016, any party to this action may file written 

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objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

(2) Any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all 

parties no later than February 26, 2016. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2016

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