Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-01043/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-01043-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES C. MCCURDY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RIVERO, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 17-01043 BLF (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS; 

GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE 

SUR-REPLY; DENYING MOTION 

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AS 

MOOT; SCREENING 

SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT; 

DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE 

NOTICE TO PROCEED WITH 

EXHAUSTED CLAIM 

(Docket Nos. 67, 100 & 102) 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 against officials at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”) and Pelican Bay State Prison 

(“PBSP”).1

 The Court found the amended complaint, (Docket No. 11), stated cognizable 

claims under the Eighth Amendment. (Docket No. 13 at 2-3.) SQSP Defendants Alvarez, 

Deal, Devers, Leighton, Pratt, Tootell, and Wu, along with PBSP Defendants Jacobsen, 

McLean, and Thomas, filed a motion to dismiss the action for failure to comply with Rules 

18(a) and 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; to dismiss all claims against 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants at other state institutions were severed and 

transferred to the Eastern District of California. (Docket No. 13 at 2, 4.) 

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certain SQSP Defendants for failure to allege any claims against them; to dismiss request 

for injunctive relief as moot; and for summary judgment for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies before filing suit on all his claims, except for claims against 

Defendants Deal and Thomas. (Docket No. 67, hereafter “Mot.”) SQSP Defendants Lee 

and Rivero filed notice of joinder to Defendants’ motion. (Docket No. 80.) Plaintiff filed 

an opposition, (Docket No. 92), and Defendants filed a reply, (Docket No. 96). 

Plaintiff then filed a “response” to Defendants’ reply, (Docket No. 99), which 

Defendants move to strike under Local Rule 7-3(d). (Docket No. 100.) Plaintiff has filed 

a motion for an extension of time to file an opposition to Defendants’ motion to strike. 

(Docket No. 102.) The motion for an extension of time is DENIED because no further 

briefing is necessary on this issue. In the order of service, the Court stated that any 

dispositive motion filed by Defendants would be deemed submitted as of the date the reply 

brief is due. (Docket No. 13 at 6.) Nor did Plaintiff obtain court approval prior to filing 

the additional papers as required under Local Rule 7-3(d). Accordingly, Defendants’ 

motion to strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply is GRANTED. 

The Court granted Plaintiff an opportunity to file a supplemental complaint, which 

he did. (Docket No. 97.) Defendants filed an opposition to the filing of the supplemental 

complaint. (Docket No. 98.) The Court will screen the supplemental complaint below. 

For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and 

motion to dismiss are GRANTED. 

 

DISCUSSION 

I. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at California State Prison – Sacramento. (Docket 

No. 30.) The underlying incidents relevant to this action took place while Plaintiff was 

incarcerated at SQSP from June 24, 2014 to January 22, 2015, and PBSP from April 18, 

2016 to February 7, 2017. (Am. Compl. at 6, 26, 41, 53.) Defendants Alvarez, Deal, 

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Devers, Lee, Leighton, Pratt, Rivero, Tootell, and Wu were medical staff at SQSP. (Id. at 

2-3; Docket No. 54 at 15-16.) Defendants Jacobsen, Mclean, and Thomas were medical 

staff at PBSP. (Am. Compl. at 2-3.) 

A. Claims against SQSP Defendants 

Plaintiff claims that when he arrived at SQSP on June 24, 2014, the medical staff 

improperly discontinued all his medications, including Tramadol and Gabapentin, because 

they were missing his medical records from the previous institution (Napa County Jail). 

(Am. Compl. at 6, 21-23.) Even after he signed a release form, the medical staff tapered 

him off Tramadol and Gabapentin after two weeks and ordered a less effective Ultram to 

manage his pain. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that on June 26, 2014, Defendant Dr. Deal 

improperly tapered his gabapentin. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff claims he filed an inmate 

grievance regarding the tapering of the gabapentin, but Defendant Dr. Pratt improperly 

denied his grievance at the first level, told him that she would not give him narcotics for 

scar tissue, and refused to give him a copy of his medical records. (Id. at 23.) 

Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Dr. Leighton improperly prescribed him 

Ibuprofen, Acetaminophen, and Elavil, which caused him to suffer side effects including 

vomiting, nausea, cramping, pain, loss of appetite, and trouble sleeping. (Id. at 6, 23.) 

Plaintiff claims that in December 2014, he was in pain, unable to sleep and eat, vomiting, 

and had diarrhea, but the “doctors” refused to see him. (Id. at 24.) Defendant Dr. Alvarez 

also refused to treat him on January 8, 2015. (Id. at 25.) Plaintiff also claims that he was 

forced to participate in the mental health delivery system at SQSP, and later improperly 

transferred to California Medical Facility (“CMF”) without a hearing. (Id. at 6-7, 8, 26.) 

Plaintiff was incarcerated at SQSP until January 22, 2015. (Id. at 6, 26.) 

B. Claims Against PBSP Defendants 

Plaintiff arrived at PBSP on April 18, 2016. (Am. Compl. at 41, 53.) Plaintiff 

claims that Defendant Thomas improperly discontinued his medications, (Id. at 41-42, 51-

52), denied him a medical diet and referral to a dietician, (id. at 42, 53), and refused to 

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present his case to PBSP’s pain management committee, (id. at 42). Plaintiff also claims 

that he filed an inmate grievance regarding the denial of pain medication, referral to a 

dietician, and referral to pain committee, but Defendant Dr. Jacobsen improperly denied it 

and failed to present his case to the pain committee. (Id. at 45.) Plaintiff claims that he 

was improperly denied special medical transportation when he was transferred to CMF for 

court appearance, and all his medications were improperly discontinued when he returned 

to PBSP. (Id. at 50.) Plaintiff claims he filed an inmate grievance regarding the denial of 

special transport and lower bunk chrono, but Defendant Mclean improperly denied it. (Id.

at 52.) Plaintiff remained at PBSP until February 7, 2017. (Id. at 41, 53.) 

C. Conditions of Confinement Claims Against All Defendants 

Plaintiff claims generally that “certain officials” discriminated against him and 

treated him harshly because of his drug use history. (Am. Compl. at 15.) He claims that 

these officials violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him adequate medical 

care, failing to treat his pain and other symptoms, ignoring his medical needs, endangering 

his personal safety, failing to order a medical diet or other accommodations, malnourishing 

him, causing him to lose weight, putting him in a general population setting without a 

lower bunk assignment, forcing him to participate in the mental health delivery system, 

transferring him to a sensitive needs yard without a hearing, and forcing him to take 

psychotropic medication. (Id. at 15-16.) 

D. Claims Regarding Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

Plaintiff claims that he exhausted available administrative remedies for his claims in 

this action. (Am. Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff claims that his inmate grievance log No. SQ-HC14039462, which he filed on August 20, 2014, in the SQSP appeals office, exhausted all 

his claims against SQSP Defendants Alvarez, Deal, Devers, Leighton, Pratt, Tootell, and 

Wu. (Id., Ex. D (Docket No. 11-4 at 1-9).) Plaintiff also claims that inmate grievance log 

Nos. PBSP-HC-16029784, PBSP-HC-16030006, PBSP-HC-16030048, and PBSP-S-16-

02272, which he filed with the PBSP appeals office, exhausted all claims against PBSP 

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Defendants. (Id. at 3.) 

II. Summary Judgment 

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show 

that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment 

“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof 

at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of 

the lawsuit under governing law, and a dispute about such a material fact is genuine “if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Generally, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of 

the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex 

Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue 

at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other 

than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the 

burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of 

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. If the evidence in opposition 

to the motion is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may 

be granted. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50. 

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by 

her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file,’ designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex 

Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted). If the nonmoving party fails to make this 

showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 323. 

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The Court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a material fact. See T.W. 

Elec. Serv., Inc. V. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the 

inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. See id. at 631. It is not the task of the district court to scour the record 

in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 

1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying with reasonable particularity 

the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, 

the district court may properly grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. See 

id.; see, e.g., Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 

(9th Cir. 2001). 

A. Statement of Facts 

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. While incarcerated 

at SQSP and PBPS, Plaintiff submitted fifteen healthcare grievances about various issues. 

(Lewis Decl. ¶ 9; Voong Decl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff also initiated over 20 non-healthcare related 

grievances. (Sheldon Decl. ¶ 14.) However, only eight of the health care grievances and 

five of the regular grievances were exhausted to the final levels of review. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 

9; Voong Decl. ¶ 9.) None of the five regular grievances that were exhausted are related to 

the claims in the instant action. (Voong Decl. ¶¶ 9-14.) The only inmate grievances 

discussed below are the ones specifically identified by Plaintiff as exhausting his claims, 

see supra at 4, and those which Defendants identify as reaching a third level review 

decision but still failing to satisfy the exhaustion requirement for the claims in this action. 

1. No. SQ-HC-14039462 

Plaintiff identified health care grievance No. SQ-HC-14039462 as exhausting his 

claims against SQSP Defendants. (Am. Compl. at 2, Ex. D.) In this grievance, Plaintiff 

complained that a SQSP physician improperly discontinued his previously prescribed pain 

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medication Tramadol on July 25, 2014. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. B.) For relief, Plaintiff 

requested that the doctor continue prescribing him Tramadol. (Id.) Plaintiff later, in the 

amended complaint, identified Dr. Deal as the physician who allegedly discontinued his 

pain medication. (Am. Compl. at 22; Docket No. 11-4 at 1-9, Ex. D.) The first level 

review denied the grievance. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff submitted the matter to the 

second level review but added two new issues: (1) his differences with Defendant Dr. Pratt 

concerning her approach and attention to his medical complaints; and (2) his request for a 

bottom bunk accommodation. (Id. at ¶ 11, Ex. C.) The second level review denied the 

grievance regarding the discontinuation of Tramadol and notified Plaintiff that the 

grievance process did not allow him to add new issues at the second level review. (Id.); 

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(b), 3084.2(b)(2). Dissatisfied with the second level 

review response, Plaintiff submitted the grievance to the third level review. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 

12, Ex. D.) In the third level review submission, Plaintiff limited his grievance to the 

original issue – discontinuation of his medication (Tramadol). The third level review 

denied the grievance on January 6, 2015. (Id.) 

2. No. PBSP-HC-16029784 

Plaintiff identified health care appeal No. PBSP-HC-16029784 as one of the 

grievances that exhausted his claims against PBSP Defendants. (Am. Compl. at 3.) 

Plaintiff complained that a doctor improperly discontinued his pain, cramping, diarrhea, 

and indigestion medications. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. E.) Plaintiff requested that the 

medications be reissued, and that he receive a medical diet of some kind. (Id.) Defendant 

Jacobsen partially granted the appeal at the first level review. (Id.) At the second level 

review, McCurdy identified the “doctor” as Defendant Thomas; the appeal was partially 

granted at the second level review by Defendant McLean. (Id. at ¶ 14, Ex. F.) The third 

level review denied the grievance on December 16, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 15, Ex. G.) 

3. No. PBSP-HC-16029757 

In health care appeal No. PBSP-HC-16029757, Plaintiff complained that 

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Psychiatrist Kahn, a non-party to this action, refused to treat his mental health issues with 

medication, and requested medication to treat his attention deficit disorder. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 

16, Ex. H.) The third level review denied the grievance on December 13, 2016. (Id.) 

4. No. PBSP-HC-16030006 

Plaintiff identified health care appeal No. PBSP-HC-16030006 as one of the 

grievances that exhausted his claims against PBSP Defendants. (Am. Compl. at 3.) In this 

grievance, Plaintiff complained that he had an abdomen condition “with IBS like 

symptoms,” and sought special transport when he is transferred between institutions and to 

court. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. I.) Defendant McLean denied the request for 

accommodations at the second level of review. (Id.) The third level review denied the 

appeal on March 10, 2017. (Id. at ¶ 18, Ex. J.) This was ten days after Plaintiff filed this 

lawsuit on February 28, 2017. (Mot. at 8; Docket No. 1.) 

5. No. PBSP-HC-16030048 

Plaintiff identified health care appeal No. PBSP-HC-16030048 as one of the 

grievances that exhausted his claims against PBSP Defendants. (Am. Compl. at 3.) In this 

grievance, Plaintiff complained that his requests for a lower bunk chrono and more time to 

eat his meals were improperly denied. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. K.) Defendant McLean 

denied the appeal at the second level review. (Id.) The third level review denied the 

grievance on April 12, 2017, because Plaintiff had no medical indication requiring a lower 

bunk chrono and more time to consume his meals. (Id. at ¶ 20, Ex. L.) This was more 

than a month after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 28, 2017. (Mot. at 8; Docket No. 

1.) 

6. No. PBSP-HC-16030018 

In health care appeal No. PBSP-HC-16030018, Plaintiff complained that 

Psychiatrist Peterson, a non-party to this action, refused to prescribe him Gabapentin and 

other anxiety medications to treat his pain and mood disorder, and requested Gabapentin 

and other non-formulary anxiety medications. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 21, Ex. M.) Defendant 

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McLean partially granted the appeal at the second level review. (Id.) The third level 

review denied the grievance on April 12, 2017, because Plaintiff had no current condition 

that met the criteria for non-formulary use of Gabapentin. (Id.) This was more than a 

month after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 28, 2017. (Mot. at 8; Docket No. 1.) 

7. No. PBSP-HC-17030102 

In health care appeal No. PBSP-HC-17030102, Plaintiff complained of the 

cancellation of his other grievance log No. PBSP-HC-17030085, which involved a request 

for a $5 refund for medical copayment. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. N.) The third level review 

denied the grievance on May 11, 2017, because it determined that the cancellation was 

proper. (Id.) 

8. No. PBSP-HC-17030116 

In health care appeal No. PBSP-HC-17030116, Plaintiff complained that he was 

improperly placed on razor restriction and requested the following remedies: removal of 

the restriction, emergency processing of his appeal, monetary compensation, interview in a 

private setting, and to be seen and treated by a different psychiatrist and physician. (Lewis 

Decl. ¶ 23, Ex. O.) The first and second reviews partially granted Plaintiff’s requests 

regarding treatment by a different psychiatrist and physician and interview in a private 

setting but denied the remaining requests. (Id.) On July 28, 2017, the third level review 

denied the grievance. (Id.) This was five months after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on 

February 28, 2017. (Mot. at 9; Docket No. 1.) 

9. No. PBSP-S-16-02272 

Plaintiff identified inmate appeal No. PBSP-S-16-02272 as one of the grievances 

that exhausted his claims against PBSP Defendants. (Am. Compl. at 3.) In this grievance, 

Plaintiff complained that Officer Hurley, a non-party, refused to give him a morning meal 

on September 29, 2016, and that she inappropriately spread his confidential medical 

information. (Sheldon Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. B.) For relief, Plaintiff requested that Officer 

Hurley not be assigned to escort him in the future. (Id.) The first level review denied the 

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grievance. (Id.) However, Plaintiff did not submit and exhaust this grievance to the 

second and third level reviews. (Id.) Plaintiff did not make any claims against Defendant 

Jacobsen, McLean, or Thomas in this grievance. (Id.)

B. Exhaustion 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to 

provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 

U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or 

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the 

discretion of the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (citing Booth v. 

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). “Prisoners must now exhaust all ‘available’ 

remedies, not just those that meet federal standards.” Id. Even when the relief sought 

cannot be granted by the administrative process, i.e., monetary damages, a prisoner must 

still exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 85-86 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 734). The 

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion” of available administrative 

remedies. Id. at 93. An action must be dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his 

available administrative remedies before he or she filed suit, even if the prisoner fully 

exhausts while the suit is pending. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 

2002); see Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (where 

administrative remedies are not exhausted before the prisoner sends his complaint to the 

court it will be dismissed even if exhaustion is completed by the time the complaint is 

actually filed). But a prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement as long as he exhausted 

his administrative remedies prior to filing an amended complaint. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 

621 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2010) (amended complaint raised new claims which arose 

after the original complaint was filed); Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 

2014) (amended complaint raised new claims which arose before the original complaint 

was filed). 

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 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) provides 

its inmates and parolees the right to appeal administratively “any departmental decision, 

action, condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon 

their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It also provides its inmates the right 

to file administrative appeals alleging misconduct by correctional officers. See id. Under 

the current regulations, in order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this 

system, a prisoner must submit his complaint on CDCR Form 602 (referred to as a “602”) 

and proceed through three levels of appeal: (1) first formal level appeal filed with one of 

the institution’s appeal coordinators, (2) second formal level appeal filed with the 

institution head or designee, and (3) third formal level appeal filed with the CDCR director 

or designee. Id. § 3084.7. 

 Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required by the PLRA to 

“properly exhaust.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217-18 (2007). The level of detail 

necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to 

system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that 

define the boundaries of proper exhaustion. Id. at 218. In California, the regulation 

requires the prisoner “to lodge his administrative complaint on CDC form 602 and ‘to 

describe the problem and action requested.’” Morton v. Hall, 599 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.2(a)); Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

839 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). California regulations also require that the appeal name “all 

staff member(s) involved” and “describe their involvement in the issue.” Cal. Code Regs. 

tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). 

The grievance need not include legal terminology or legal theories unless they are 

needed to provide notice of the harm being grieved. Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 

1120 (9th Cir. 2009). Nor must a grievance include every fact necessary to prove each 

element of an eventual legal claim. Id. The purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison to 

a problem and facilitate its resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation. Id. The 

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grievance should include sufficient information “to allow prison officials to take 

appropriate responsive measures.” Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted) (no 

exhaustion where grievance complaining of upper bunk assignment failed to allege, as the 

complaint had, that nurse had ordered lower bunk but officials disregarded that order); see 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d at 840 (claim properly exhausted where inmate described nature of the 

wrong and identified defendant as a responding officer who applied pressure to inmate’s 

ankle deliberately to inflict pain). 

 Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. 

Defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion, and inmates 

are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints. Id. at 

215-17. In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, a 

defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Otherwise, 

defendants must produce evidence proving failure to exhaust in a motion for summary 

judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. If undisputed 

evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a 

defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. at 1166. But if material 

facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied and the district judge rather than a 

jury should determine the facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id. 

 The defendant’s burden is to prove that there was an available administrative 

remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available administrative remedy. Id. at 

1172; see id. at 1176 (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants 

on issue of exhaustion because defendants did not carry their initial burden of proving their 

affirmative defense that there was an available administrative remedy that prisoner 

plaintiff failed to exhaust); see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(as there can be no absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains available, movant 

claiming lack of exhaustion must demonstrate that pertinent relief remained available, 

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whether at unexhausted levels or through awaiting results of relief already granted as result 

of that process). Once the defendant has carried that burden, the prisoner has the burden of 

production. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. That is, the burden shifts to the prisoner to come 

forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the 

existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. 

Id. But as required by Jones, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant. Id. 

1. Exhaustion of Claims Against SQSP Defendants 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with 

respect to his claims against SQSP Defendants except for one claim. (Mot. at 16-18.) In 

the amended complaint, Plaintiff identified health care appeal No. SQ-HC-14039462 as 

exhausting his claims against SQSP Defendants. (Am. Compl. at 2, Ex. D.) Defendants 

submit evidence showing that this grievance was the only health care appeal that Plaintiff 

exhausted during the relevant time of this lawsuit. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff stated the 

subject of the appeal as “[t]he doctor has discontinued my medication.” (Id., Ex. B at 1.) 

Plaintiff then described the issue as follows: “I have been in constant pain since the doctor 

discontinued the medication I was previously prescribed. This occurred on 7/25/14, the 

medication was Tramadol 2, 50 mg. tablets a day.” (Id.; Am. Compl., Ex. D at 1-3.) The 

only relief Plaintiff sought was “for the doctor to continue me on Tramadol.” (Id.) 

Although he fails to name “the doctor” in the appeal, Plaintiff identified in the amended 

complaint that Dr. Deal was the doctor who tapered his pain medication and against whom 

he filed appeal No. SQ-HC-14039462. (Am. Compl. at 22, Ex. D at 1-9.) Dr. Deal is a 

defendant in this action. As such, Defendants concede that Plaintiff has exhausted his 

claim regarding the discontinuation of Tramadol against Defendant Deal. However, 

Defendants assert that health care appeal No. SQ-HC-14039462 did not exhaust any of the 

other 13 medical claims Plaintiff alleged against the other SQSP Defendants in this action, 

nor his claim that he was subjected to bad living conditions at SQSP. (Mot. at 17-18.) 

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot rely on appeal No. SQ-HC-14039462 to demonstrate 

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exhaustion because it did not give the prison fair notice of Plaintiff’s other claims against 

SQSP Defendants Alvarez, Deal, Devers, Lee, Leighton, Pratt, Rivero, Tootell, and Wu. 

(Id. at 18.) 

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that appeal No. SQ-HC-14039462 exhausted other 

claims, including claims against Dr. Alvarez for discontinuing his medication on 

December 4, 2014 and for refusing to treat him a month later, (Opp. at 9), his claim against 

Dr. Deal for discontinuing Gabapentin, (id. at 9-10), Dr. Leighton for improper 

prescription of Ibuprofen, Acetaminophen, and Elavil, (id. at 10), and Dr. Pratt for 

improperly denying his grievance, improperly considering his medical records from county 

jail, and denying narcotics, (id.). Plaintiff also asserts that he named Defendant Pratt in his 

602 appeal, which was granted in part by RN Paley, not a party to this action. (Id.) With 

regards to the remaining claims, he asserts his “belief that [he] exhausted remedies in 

regards to claims 6-13,” and that “most of [the] claims mentioned in [his] complaint were a 

direct result of medical officials [discontinuing his] medications.” (Id.) In support, 

Plaintiff relies on Griffin, 557 F.2d at 1120, asserting that “if policy doesn’t have specific 

requirements[,] a 602 suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which 

redress is sought as in a notice pleading system,” and that a grievance “need not include 

legal terminology or theories unless they are in some way needed to provide notice of the 

harm being grieved.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that the grievance system at SQSP was 

unavailable to him because an emergency grievance he submitted, alleging officials 

refused to see him or care for him and provide him medical records, was not answered; he 

alleges that officials lost or destroyed the appeal. (Opp. at 8.) 

In reply, Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to produce any evidence raising a 

triable issue of fact that he exhausted any of the remaining claims in his complaint. (Reply 

at 4.) With respect to Plaintiff’s argument that he exhausted his claims against Dr. 

Alvarez, Defendants point out that he could not have included such claims in health care 

appeal No. SQ-HC-14039462, because the alleged misconduct by Dr. Alvarez occurred on 

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December 4, 2014, which was approximately four months after Plaintiff had already 

submitted the appeal on August 8, 2014. (Reply at 4.) Defendants also argue that appeal 

No. SQ-HC-14039462 could not have exhausted any other claims because the only claim it 

raised was the discontinuation of Tramadol 2, 50 mg tablet, and nothing else. (Id. at 5.) 

Furthermore, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s argument that he added and exhausted more 

issues at the second level review does not raise triable issues of fact because the grievance 

process does not allow him to add new issues at the second level review. (Reply at 5); Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(b). Plaintiff was advised of this prohibition in the second 

level review decision. (Lewis Decl., Ex. C.) Then when Plaintiff submitted the grievance 

to the third level review, he limited the grievance to the original issue – discontinuation of 

his pain medication, Tramadol. (Id., Ex. D.) Plaintiff never filed a separate grievance 

addressing the new issues he raised at the second level review for appeal No. SQ-HC14039462. Lastly, with respect to Plaintiff’s assertion that administrative remedies were 

unavailable, Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to provide evidence to support his 

argument, e.g., a copy of the alleged emergency grievance, or allege that he attempted to 

follow up with the appeals office or the person to whom he submitted the grievance. 

(Reply at 5.) As such, Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not take advantage of all the 

procedures available to him. (Id. at 6.) 

Viewing the undisputed evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies for all claims 

against SQSP Defendants through inmate appeal No. SQ-HC-14039462, except for the 

discontinuation of Tramadol claim against Defendant Deal. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 

First of all, Plaintiff makes no mention of any other Defendant in appeal No. SQ-HC14039462 or identify any issue other than the discontinuation of Tramadol on July 24, 

2015, by a doctor whom he later identified as Dr. Deal. Although Plaintiff is correct that 

generally, an inmate appeal is sufficient if it provides the prison with sufficient notice of 

the harm being complained of, Griffin also requires that the grievance include sufficient 

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information “to allow prison officials to take appropriate responsive measures.” 557 F.3d 

at 1120. Based on the information provided in the appeal, it cannot be said that the prison 

had notice of any claim other than the discontinuation of Tramadol which required 

“appropriate responsive measures.” Id. Furthermore, the regulations specifically require 

that the appeal name “all staff member(s) involved” and “describe their involvement in the 

issue.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). Appeal No. SQ-HC-14039462 clearly did 

not satisfy these requirements with respect to any of the other claims against SQSP 

Defendants in this action. The only action Plaintiff specifically requested in the appeal 

was that his Tramadol medication be continued. With respect to the allegations added to 

the second level review, Plaintiff does not dispute that he removed the additional claims 

when he submitted the appeal to the third level review, which means he could not have 

exhausted any other claim except the discontinuation of Tramadol through the third and 

final level of review for appeal No. SQ-HC-14039462. 

Lastly, with respect to the allegation that Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance 

which went unanswered, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving 

that there was something in his particular case that made the existing and generally 

available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. Albino, 747 F.3d at 

1172. Even if we assume that Plaintiff did file such an appeal, there is no evidence that he 

exhausted all available remedies with respect to that appeal. As Defendants point out, the 

regulation requires emergency grievances to be reviewed and responded to within five 

working days. (Reply at 6); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.9(a)(4). Defendants assert that 

when Plaintiff received no response within five days, Plaintiff could have inquired about 

the status of his alleged grievance, filed a new grievance, or submitted the purported 

grievance to the Appeals Office. (Id.) He did not. 

“Considerable deference is owed to those who administer prison systems.” Fuqua 

v. Ryan, 890 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2018). “When an administrative process is 

susceptible of multiple reasonable interpretations, Congress has determined that the inmate 

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should err on the side of exhaustion.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1859 (2016). Courts 

may not create their own “special circumstances” exceptions to the exhaustion 

requirement. Id. at 1856 (reversing Fourth Circuit’s ruling that failure to exhaust was 

justified where prisoner reasonably—even though mistakenly—believed he had exhausted 

remedies). Nevertheless, there are “three kinds of circumstances in which an 

administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain 

relief.” Id. First, “an administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what 

regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with 

officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.” Id. 

Second, “an administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically 

speaking, incapable of use.” Id. Third, an administrative remedy is not available “when 

prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through 

machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 1863. Plaintiff has failed to 

submit evidence showing that any of these exceptions apply to his case. With respect to 

the first and second circumstances under Ross, there is no evidence that inmate grievance 

system at SQSP was a “simple dead end” or “incapable of use.” 136 S. Ct. at 1859. On 

the contrary, as Defendants point out, Plaintiff’s history of grievances shows that he 

routinely used the grievance process at SQSP, submitted five health care appeals, and 

received relief from prison officials on multiple occasions. (Lewis Decl. ¶¶ 8-10.) Lastly, 

as discussed above, see supra at 16, Plaintiff could have followed-up regarding his 

emergency grievance with either the appeals office or the person to whom he submitted the 

matter, but there is no evidence or allegation that he ever did so. He provides no evidence 

to support his otherwise conclusory allegation that prison officials “purposely lost or 

destroyed this appeal,” thereby “thwarting” him from taking advantage of the grievance 

process through “machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 

1863. 

Based on the foregoing, Defendants have shown that Plaintiff failed to properly 

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exhaust all available administrative remedies with respect to his claims against all SQSP 

Defendants, except for the single claim against Defendant Deal for discontinuing his 

Tramadol medication. Plaintiff has failed in opposition to show that there was something 

in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative 

remedies effectively unavailable to him or that he was incapable of filing a timely appeal. 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. Accordingly, inmate appeal No. SQ-HC-14039462 does not 

constitute proper exhaustion of Plaintiff’s claims against all the other SQSP Defendants or 

any other claim against Defendant Deal. Accordingly, SQSP Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment under Rule 56 based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies of all the claims against them except for the sole claim against Defendant Deal 

discussed above. Id. at 1166. 

2. Exhaustion of Claims Against PBPS Defendants

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with 

respect to his claims against PBSP Defendants Jacobsen, McLean, and Thomas except for 

one claim. (Mot. at 18-20.) In the amended complaint, Plaintiff identified appeal Nos. 

PBSP-HC-16029784, PBSP-HC-16030006, PBSP-HC-16030048, and PBSP-S-16-02272 

as exhausting his claims against PBSP Defendants. (Am. Compl. at 3, Ex. D.) Defendants 

assert that the only claim that was exhausted was against Defendant Thomas for 

improperly discontinuing Plaintiff’s pain, cramping, diarrhea, and indigestion medications 

in appeal No. PBSP-HC-16029784. (Mot. at 18.) 

With respect to the other appeals identified by Plaintiff, Defendants assert that No. 

PBSP-HC-16030006 does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement because it was exhausted 

on March 10, 2017, which was after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 28, 2017. (Mot. 

at 19.) Plaintiff asserts in opposition that he is permitted to file an amended complaint to 

add newly exhausted issues. (Opp. at 12.) Plaintiff is correct since the Ninth Circuit found 

that a prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement as long as he exhausted his 

administrative remedies prior to filing an amended complaint. See Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 

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1006. In reply, Defendants rely on Akhtar v. J. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012), to 

oppose this argument. (Reply at 7.) In Akhtar, the Ninth Circuit was following its 

decision in Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1007, which permitted a plaintiff to file an amended 

complaint adding new claims based on conduct that occurred after the filing of the initial 

complaint as long as he exhausted the new claims before filing the amended complaint. Id. 

However, two years later the Ninth Circuit decided Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, which 

expanded the rule to adding claims in an amended complaint that occurred before the 

initial complaint as long as they were exhausted before the amendment. Id. at 1220. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff was permitted to file an amended complaint adding new claims as 

long as he exhausted them before June 9, 2017, when he filed the amendment. (Docket 

No. 11.) However, relying on appeal No. PBSP-HC-16030006 to establish exhaustion of 

his claim regarding the denial of special transport accommodations is problematic because 

he made the initial request for travel accommodations in the appeal itself, see supra at 8, 

and there is no evidence that Plaintiff ever filed a separate appeal thereafter challenging the 

denial of the request for accommodations that he made in appeal No. PBSP-HC-16030006. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff did not specifically name PBSP Defendants Jacobsen, McLean, or 

Thomas in the appeal or describe their actions in connection with his request for 

transportation accommodations. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). Lastly, with 

respect to appeal No. PBSP-HC-16030048, it was also denied by the third level review on 

April 12, 2017, see supra at 8, which was before Plaintiff filed the amended complaint. 

Therefore, it appears that Plaintiff properly exhausted the claim that his requests for a 

lower bunk chrono and more time to eat meals were improperly denied. However, 

Plaintiff again failed to specifically name PBSP Defendants Jacobsen, McLean, or Thomas 

in the appeal or describe their actions in connection with the denial of his requests. See

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). Furthermore, with respect to his claim that 

Defendants Jacobsen and McLean wrongfully denied his appeals at the first and second 

level reviews for these appeals, Plaintiff should have filed a separate appeal challenging 

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their decision to exhaust these claims against them. He did not. Accordingly, although 

appeal Nos. PBSP-HC-16030006 and PBSP-HC-16030048 were exhausted before the 

amended complaint was filed, it cannot be said that Plaintiff properly exhausted any claim 

against PBSP Defendants through those appeals. 

With respect to appeal No. PBSP-S-16-02272, Plaintiff did not submit the matter to 

the second and third level reviews after the first level review denied it on October 25, 

2016. See supra at 9-10. Furthermore, the appeal only involves Officer Hurley, who is not 

a party to this action, and no PBSP Defendant or their actions are mentioned in the appeal. 

Accordingly, appeal No. PBSP-S-16-02272 did not exhaust any of the claims in this action 

against any PBSP Defendant. 

Defendants identify three other appeals which were completed through the third 

level review, but which they contend do not exhaust any claims against PBSP Defendants. 

First, Appeal No. PBSP-HC-16030018 involved only claims against a non-party to this 

action, Psychiatrist Peterson. (Mot. at 19.) Defendants also assert that this appeal was not 

completed until April 12, 2017, which was over a month after Plaintiff filed this action. 

(Id.) But as the Court explained above, a prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement as 

long as he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing an amended complaint. 

See Cano, 739 F.3d at 1220. However, the appeal only involves Psychiatrist Peterson, 

who is not a party to this action, and no PBSP Defendant and his actions are mentioned in 

the appeal. See supra at 14. Accordingly, appeal No. PBSP-HC-16030018 did not exhaust 

any of the claims in this action against any PBSP Defendant. 

Defendants also identify appeal No. PBSP-HC-17030102, which sought a $5 refund 

for a medical copayment. See supra at 9. The Court agrees that this appeal did not 

exhaust any claims in this action because it also did not involve any PBSP Defendant or 

claim against them. Id. Lastly, appeal No. PBSP-HC-17030116 is also not relevant to this 

action because it does not involve any of the named PBSP Defendants or any claim in this 

action. Id. Even if it did, the third level review denied the appeal on July 28, 2017, see 

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supra at 9, which was after Plaintiff filed the amended complaint on June 9, 2017, and 

therefore cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement. 

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that appeal No. PBSP-HC-16029784 also exhausted 

claims against Defendants Jacobsen and McLean because he included them as “the rest of 

medical staff” and because they are Defendant Thomas’s supervisors. (Opp. at 11.) 

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants Jacobsen and McLean are liable because they are 

“named” in his 602 response, and they denied his 602 “for meds and tx. and 

accommodations [sic].” (Id.) However, Plaintiff failed to comply with the regulations that 

require the appeal name “all staff member(s) involved” and to “describe their 

involvement” since he did not specifically name Defendants Jacobsen and McLean or 

describe their actions. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). Nor can it be said that the 

vague reference to “the rest of medical staff” in appeal No. PBSP-HC-16029784 was 

sufficient to alert the prison that Plaintiff specifically sought relief against Defendants 

Jacobsen and McLean, especially since the action he requested was that Defendant 

Thomas reissue the medications that were discontinued and that adjustments be made to 

his diet to alleviate his symptoms. (Lewis Decl., Ex. E.) Plaintiff also asserts that 

Defendants Jacobsen and McLean are liable because they became aware of his complaints 

and failed to act. (Opp. at 11.) However, their liability is not at issue. Rather, the issue is 

whether Plaintiff administratively exhausted any claim against them through appeal No. 

PBSP-HC-16029784. He did not. 

Based on the foregoing, Defendants have shown that Plaintiff failed to properly 

exhaust all available administrative remedies with respect to his claims against PBSP 

Defendants except for the claim against Defendant Thomas for improperly discontinuing 

his pain, cramping, diarrhea, and indigestion medications. See supra at 18. Plaintiff has 

failed in opposition to show that there was something in his particular case that made the 

existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him or 

that he was incapable of filing a timely appeal with respect to the other claims. Albino, 

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747 F.3d at 1172. Accordingly, PBSP Defendants are entitled to summary judgment under 

Rule 56 based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies of all the claims 

against them except for the claim against Defendant Thomas discussed above. Id. at 1166. 

III. Motion to Dismiss 

A. Improper Joinder of Claims and Parties 

Defendants also move to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with Rule 

18(a) and Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Mot. at 10-14.) 

Rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff to properly join 

as many claims as he has against an opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). But parties 

may be joined as defendants in one action only “if any right to relief is asserted against 

them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same 

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any question of law or 

fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Put 

simply, claims against different parties may be joined together in one complaint only if the 

claims have similar factual backgrounds and have common issues of law or fact. Coughlin 

v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Defendants assert that the amended complaint raises unrelated claims against 

numerous defendants based on events that allegedly occurred at two different institutions 

over a course of three years. (Mot. at 11; Am. Compl. at 6-8, 13-15, 21-26, 41-53.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims concerning deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 

against SQSP Defendants Alvarez, Deal, Devers, Lee, Leighton, Pratt, Rivero, Tootell, and 

Wu for the alleged denial of proper medical care from June 24, 2014 to January 22, 2015, 

are wholly unrelated to his claims against PBSP Defendants Jacobsen, McLean, and 

Thomas for alleged denial of proper medical care from May 10, 2016, to February 7, 2017. 

(Id.) With respect to the claims against SQSP Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that the nurses, 

doctors, and psychiatrists improperly discontinued all his medications, including Tramadol 

and Gabapentin upon his arrival on June 24, 2014. (Id. at 6, 21-22.) Plaintiff alleges that 

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Defendant Dr. Deal improperly tapered his Gabapentin, (id. at 22), Defendant Dr. Pratt 

improperly denied his grievance, (id. at 23), Defendant Dr. Leighton improperly prescribed 

him medication to which he had side effects, (id. at 6, 23), Defendant Dr. Alvarez refused 

to treat him on January 8, 2015, (id. at 25), that he was forced to participate in the mental 

health delivery system at SQSP, and that he was improperly transferred to CMF, (id. at 6-

7, 8, 26). Defendants assert that these allegations are distinct from Plaintiff’s claims 

against PBSP Defendants Thomas, Jacobsen, and McLean for denial of pain medication, 

medical diet, and referral to a dietician, (id. at 41-42), denial of inmate grievances, (id. at 

45, 52), denial of special medical transportation, (id. at 50), and for failure to present his 

case before PBSP’s pain committee, (id.), in 2016 and January 2017. (Mot. at 11.) 

Therefore, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims against SQSP Defendants are unrelated 

to his claims against PBSP Defendants, and no one Defendant is allegedly involved in each 

of Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.) Furthermore, there is at least a-year-and-three-month time gap 

between the alleged events at SQSP and PBSP, during which time Plaintiff was 

incarcerated at CMF and Corcoran State Prison. (Id. at 12.) As such, Defendants assert 

the amended complaint does not comply with Rule 18(a) and should be dismissed based 

thereon. (Id.) 

In addition, Defendants assert that the complaint fails to satisfy Rule 20(a) as 

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants participated in the same transaction or series of 

transactions because his claims involve specific conduct by Defendants that allegedly 

occurred at two different institutions one year and three months apart from each other, with 

no connecting facts. (Mot. at 13.) Defendants assert that nothing in the amended 

complaint links the alleged violations at SQSP and PBSP. (Id.) For example, Plaintiff’s 

claims that SQSP Defendants improperly discontinued his medications upon his arrival on 

June 24, 2014, (Am. Compl. at 6, 21-22), has nothing to do with his claims that PBSP 

Defendants denied his request for pain medication, medical diet, referral to a dietician, or 

special medical transportation, (id. at 41-42, 50), more than a year later (from April 18, 

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2016 to February 7, 2017) at PBSP. (Mot. at 13.) 

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that SQSP Defendants “acted in one accord” and in 

“all the same transaction or series of transactions” when they were deliberately indifferent 

to his medical needs and created bad living conditions. (Opp. at 2.) In the same way, 

Plaintiff asserts that PBSP Defendants also “acted in one accord and all of the same 

transaction or series of transactions when they were deliberately indifferent” to his medical 

needs and created bad living conditions. (Id.) Plaintiff then admits that his complaint 

includes unrelated claims against Defendants from other prisons. (Opp. at 2.) In reply, 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s opposition confirms that his amended complaint fails to 

comply with Rules 18(a) and 20(a). (Reply at 2-3.) 

After carefully reviewing the briefs, the Court finds that the amended complaint 

does violate Rules 18(a) and 20(a) for the reasons described by Defendants. Furthermore, 

although the claims against Defendants at SQSP may possibly be joined under Rule 20(a), 

and likewise the claims against Defendants at PBSP may also be joined in a separate 

action under Rule 20(a), it is clear the claims against these two different groups of 

Defendants at two different institutions are separate from and unrelated to each other 

because there are no allegations linking the actions of SQSP Defendants to PBSP 

Defendants. 

Normally, Plaintiff would be afforded at least one opportunity to file a second 

amended complaint that complies with the FRCP. However, the Court has determined that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust all but the following claims: (1) against Defendant Deal at SQSP 

for discontinuing his Tramadol medication; and (2) against Defendant Thomas at PBSP for 

improperly discontinuing his pain, cramping, diarrhea, and indigestion medications. See 

supra at 15, 18. Accordingly, Plaintiff may proceed on only one of these claims in this 

lawsuit since they are improperly joined in this action. Plaintiff shall be given an 

opportunity to file notice identifying which of these two exhausted claims he wishes to 

pursue in this action. Plaintiff shall also file notice whether he wishes to pursue the other 

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claim in a separate action and be subject to the filing fees. 

B. Failure to State A Claim 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not 

necessary; the statement need only ‘“give the defendant fair notice of what the.... claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests.”’” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93(citations omitted). 

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-56 (2007) (citations omitted). To state 

a claim that is plausible on its face, a plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[] the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Defendants assert that although Plaintiff asserts a claim for deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs, he alleges nothing against Defendants Devers, Lee, Rivero, 

Tootell, and Wu. (Mot. at 14.) Defendants assert that there is no allegation that any of 

these Defendants knew that Plaintiff had a serious medical need, that he saw any of these 

Defendants for medical care, that they were somehow made aware of Plaintiff’s serious 

medical needs, or that they denied him medical care. (Id. at 14-15.) Defendants also assert 

that Plaintiff’s general allegations that “the nurses, doctors and psychiatrists” at SQSP 

discontinued all his medications, (Am. Compl. at 6, 22-23), failed to treat his Hepatitis C 

condition, (id. at 21), refused to see him for his multiple complaints in December 2014, (id.

at 24), forced him to participate in the mental health delivery system, and transferred him 

to CMF without a hearing, (id. at 6-7, 8, 26), are not sufficient to state claims against these 

Defendants. (Mot. at 15.) Therefore, Defendants move for dismissal of his claims for 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Defendants Devers, Lee, Rivero, 

Tootell, and Wu. (Id.) 

In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute his failure to include any specific 

allegations against these Defendants. Rather, he makes new, more specific allegations 

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against them to support a deliberate indifference claim and provides exhibits in support of 

the allegations. (Opp. at 3-5.) In reply, Defendants assert that neither the allegations nor 

the exhibits in Plaintiff’s opposition supplement the operative complaint to state claims 

against these Defendants. (Reply at 3.) 

After reviewing the briefs and the first amended complaint, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff did not allege any specific claims against Defendants Devers, Lee, Rivero, 

Tootell, and Wu in the amended complaint. Furthermore, although Plaintiff’s new 

allegations in his opposition demonstrate that he is capable of stating sufficient facts to 

support an Eighth Amendment medical claim against them if granted an opportunity to 

amend, he would not be able to proceed on the new claims because the evidence shows 

that during the relevant time period of this lawsuit, Plaintiff only exhausted one health care 

appeal, i.e., No. SQ-HC-14039462, , and that appeal did not include any claims against 

these Defendants. See supra at 13. As discussed above, appeal No. SQ-HC-14039462 

involved only a claim against Defendant Deal for the discontinuation of his Tramadol 

medication. Id. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss medical claims against Defendants 

Devers, Lee, Rivero, Tootell, and Wu is GRANTED, without leave to amend. 

C. Moot

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as 

moot because he is no longer incarcerated at SQSP or PBSP, having been transferred to the 

California State Prison – Sacramento. (Mot. at 15.) Specifically, Plaintiff seeks injunctive 

relief in the form of “ordering defendants to prescribe non-formulary medications for 

Plaintiff.” (Am. Compl. at 56.) As Defendants assert, they are no longer in control of 

Plaintiff’s medical treatment as is not incarcerated at either SQSP or PBSP, where they 

work. (Mot. at 16.) 

Where injunctive relief is involved, questions of mootness are determined in light of 

the present circumstances. See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 528 (9th Cir. 1996). 

When an inmate is released from prison or transferred to another prison and there is no 

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reasonable expectation nor demonstrated probability that he will again be subjected to the 

prison conditions from which he seeks injunctive relief, the claims for injunctive should be 

dismissed as moot. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 

Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (same for claims for declaratory 

relief); cf. Sadorski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of 

class claim for injunctive relief because inmate was no longer incarcerated pursuant to an 

unlawfully modified sentence and therefore had no personal stake in the outcome of this 

litigation) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968)). 

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that his request for injunctive relief is not moot 

because other medical officials at his present place of incarceration are still violating his 

rights. (Opp. at 6.) But as Defendants point out, Plaintiff does not show how Defendants 

are responsible for the alleged acts of other medical officials at his current institution. 

(Reply at 3.) Nor did Plaintiff allege that Defendants are still in charge of his medical 

care, or that their actions presented any sort of ongoing violation of his rights. (Id.) As 

such, Plaintiff has failed to establish that there is any reasonable expectation or 

demonstrate probability that he will again be subjected to deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs by Defendants. See Dilley, 64 F.3d at 1368-69. Accordingly, the motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief as moot must be granted. Id. 

IV. Screening of Supplemental Complaint 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Pro se pleadings must be 

liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1988). 

Plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint, with leave of Court, to attempt to allege 

sufficient facts to join Mr. J. Clark Kelso to this action under Rule 20(a)(2). (Docket No. 

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97.) Plaintiff was advised that he must show that the claims against Mr. Kelso “aris[e] out 

of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any 

question of law or fact common to all defendants” arise in this action. (Docket No. 69 at 

5); Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). In response to being served by Plaintiff with a “motion for 

leave to file supplemental complaint,” (Desta Decl. ¶ 2, Docket No. 98-1), Defendants 

filed an opposition to the motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint, asserting that 

it contains no specific factual allegation against Mr. Kelso and fails to state a claim against 

him and because it violates the Court’s previous order, contains new Defendants and 

claims that are unrelated to this lawsuit, and contains previously severed and transferred 

claims. (Docket No. 98.) 

The Court has reviewed the supplemental complaint, which is mostly an identical 

copy of the amended complaint except for the list of defendants, (Docket No. 97 at 1-4), 

and the new allegations against newly named defendants from the California Health Care 

Facility and California State Prison – Sacramento, (id. at 32-35). The only allegation 

Plaintiff makes against Mr. Kelso is that he “is responsible for all medical officials and 

care in all California institution.” (Id. at 35.) If the underlying claim is for deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs, this general allegation against Mr. Kelso is not 

sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim against him, even under supervisor liability. 

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal 

involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between 

the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 

678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing 

either of these prongs: (1) there is no allegation that Mr. Kelso was personally involved in 

deficient medical care; and (2) there is no allegation of wrongful conduct by Mr. Kelso or 

an explanation of the causal connection to deficient medical care. Id. Furthermore, under 

no circumstances is there respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Or, in layman’s 

terms, under no circumstances is there liability under section 1983 solely because one is 

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responsible for the actions or omissions of another. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 

1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 

680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim 

against Mr. Kelso. 

With respect to Plaintiff’s inclusion of new claims and defendants in the 

supplemental complaint, the Court specifically granted leave to file a supplemental 

complaint only to attempt to state a claim against Mr. Kelso. (Docket No. 69 at 5.) In the 

same order, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended 

complaint. (Id. at 3.) Therefore, Plaintiff should not be permitted to circumvent that order 

and include additional claims and defendants through this supplemental complaint. 

Accordingly, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court denies leave to file additional 

claims because it is sought in bad faith. See Wagh v. Metris Direct, Inc., 363 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 2003); Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1944). 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Defendants Alvarez, Deal, Devers, Jacobsen, Lee, 

Leighton, McLean, Pratt, Rivero, Thomas, Tootell, and Wu’s motion for summary 

judgment, (Docket No. 67), is GRANTED IN PART. The only claims that were 

exhausted are as follows: (1) claim against Defendant Deal at SQSP for discontinuing his 

Tramadol medication; and (2) claim against Defendant Thomas at PBSP for improperly 

discontinuing his pain, cramping, diarrhea, and indigestion medications. See supra at 15, 

18. All the other claims against Defendants are DISMISSED for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. Accordingly, the Clerk shall terminate all Defendants from this 

action except for Defendants Deal and Thomas. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for improper joinder of claims and 

parties is GRANTED. See supra at 23-24. No later than twenty-eight (28) days from 

the date this order is filed, Plaintiff shall notify the Court which of the two exhausted 

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claims against Defendant Deal and Defendant Thomas he wishes to pursue in this action, 

and whether he wishes to have the other claim severed and opened as a separate action and 

be subject to the $350 filing fee. Failure to file a response in accordance with this 

order in the time provided shall result in the dismissal of this action for violating 

pleading requirements under Rules 18(a) and 20(a). 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss medical claims against Defendants Devers, Lee, 

Rivero, Tootell, and Wu for failure to state a claim is GRANTED. Id. at 25-26. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is GRANTED. 

Id. at 26-27. 

Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s sur-reply is GRANTED. (Docket No. 100.) 

Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file an opposition is DENIED. (Docket NO. 

102.) 

Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim 

against Mr. Kelso. See supra at 28-29. 

This order terminates Docket No. 67, 100, and 102. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: _____________________ ________________________ 

BETH LABSON FREEMAN 

United States District Judge 

Order Granting MSJ&MTD; Other Pending Motions 

PRO-SE\BLF\CR.17\01043McCurdy_grant-msj(exh)&mtd 

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