Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03620/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03620-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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1

The HONORABLE ROBERT T. DAWSON, United States District Judge for

the Western District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3620

___________

Jerry Langley, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Hot Spring County, Arkansas, *

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 13, 2004

Filed: January 5, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

In November 2002, C.T. “Jim” Homan was elected County Judge of Hot Spring

County, Arkansas, defeating the incumbent. In December, Homan discharged Jerry

Langley from his position as west end Road Foreman. Homan died in March 2003.

The following month, Langley commenced this § 1983 action against the County,

alleging that he was discharged because of “politics” in violation of his First

Amendment rights of free speech and association. The district court1

 granted the

County’s motion for summary judgment, and Langley appeals. We affirm.

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The County hired Langley in 1998 and promoted him to west end Road

Foreman in May 1999. Following his discharge, Langley asked Judge Homan for a

written statement of reasons. Judge Homan responded with a Notice of Reasons

dated January 8, 2003, in which he explained: 

Jerry, I told you that I did not keep you because [you] were a liability to

me. . . . I have been through a county-wide election that has brought me

face to face with the citizens of the county. . . . The perception of the

citizens in the west end of the County is that the workers are not

working hard enough . . . . I have come to the conclusion that there is a

supervisory problem -- that you have not provided the kind of leadership

I want. I was told repeatedly that your workers were observed NOT

working, and NOT working on so many occasions that it appeared to the

citizens in the area that the workers were not being told to work. I was

asked repeatedly if I was going to make the changes necessary to get the

workers working . . . I told them I would, and I have -- by choosing to

hire someone in your stead.

The County also submitted an affidavit from County Judge James Bailey, Judge

Homan’s successor. Judge Bailey outlined the duties of Road Foreman and averred

that the Foreman is a “policy-maker” who meets with the County Judge frequently,

who “[s]erves as the eyes and ears for the County Judge throughout the County,” and

whose loyalty is necessary for the County Judge to effectively maintain county roads.

Judge Bailey further averred that, during the 2002 campaign, many citizens

complained about Langley’s performance as Road Foreman: “I was with Judge

Homan and personally heard numerous complaints.” 

In response to the motion for summary judgment, Langley submitted a fourparagraph affidavit. Without addressing the County’s evidence of citizen complaints

or Judge Homan’s Notice of Reasons, Langley averred, “I was fired by Judge Jim

Homan before he took office, when he advised me that I was being fired in order [to]

replace me with a person who had campaigned for his election.” Langley further

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averred that he was not a policy-maker, that he did not have a confidential

relationship with the County Judge, and that “there is a genuine issue of material fact

as to whether I was doing an effective job.” 

The district court granted the County summary judgment because Langley

failed to refute the County’s evidence that he was fired for poor job performance, and

because, even if Langley could prove “that his political affiliations motivated Judge

Homan’s decision, the position of road foreman is of such a nature that the county

judge is entitled to have someone in that position that he believes to be politically

loyal to him.” We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, “affirming only

when no genuine issue of material fact remains and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Hammond v. Northland Counseling Ctr., Inc., 218 F.3d

886, 891 (8th Cir. 2000). 

The First Amendment issue in this case stems from the Supreme Court’s

decision in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), as modified in Branti v. Finkel, 445

U.S. 507 (1980). Concluding that political patronage dismissals impinge upon public

employees’ First Amendment rights of speech and association, the Court held that a

dismissal solely on account of an employee’s political affiliation violates the First

Amendment unless “the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an

appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.”

Branti, 445 U.S. at 518. The question whether party affiliation or political loyalty is

an appropriate requirement often turns on the extent to which the position involves

policy-making or a confidential relationship with an elected official.

Like many circuits, we have extended the Elrod-Branti principle to include

cases in which political affiliation was a motivating factor in the dismissal, rather

than the sole factor. Barnes v. Bosley, 745 F.2d 501, 507 (8th Cir. 1984). Therefore,

to resolve a claim under Elrod and Branti at the summary judgment stage, the district

court first determines whether the plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence that

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political affiliation or loyalty was a motivating factor in the dismissal. If the plaintiff

meets this burden, summary judgment must be denied unless the defendant

establishes either that the political motive is an appropriate requirement for the job,

or that the dismissal was made for mixed motives and the plaintiff would have been

discharged in any event. See Horton v. Taylor, 767 F.2d 471, 481 (8th Cir. 1985);

Wagner v. Hawkins, 634 F. Supp. 751, 757 (W.D. Ark. 1986). The fact that a newlyelected hiring official discharges one or more at-will employees does not without

more prove bad motive. If an official “lacks confidence in the assistants he has

inherited from the prior administration for some reason other than their political

affiliation, he is, of course, free to discharge them.” Branti, 445 U.S. at 520 n.14.

1. Looking first at the question of motive, the County presented strong

evidence that Judge Homan discharged Langley on account of citizen complaints of

poor job performance. In response, Langley submitted an affidavit stating that Judge

Homan “advised me that I was being fired in order [to] replace me with a person who

had campaigned for his election.” Langley submitted no evidence supporting this

recollection, such as evidence that his successor as Road Foreman had campaigned

for Judge Homan. Indeed, the successor is not even identified in the record.

Langley’s conclusory assertion that “there is a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether I was doing an effective job” does not refute the County’s evidence that poor

performance was the bona fide reason for the discharge. On this sparse record, we

agree with the district court that summary judgment was appropriate because Langley

did not submit sufficient evidence supporting an essential element of his First

Amendment claim under Elrod and Branti, that “politics” was a motivating factor for

his discharge. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

2. Alternatively, we agree with the district court that, even if Judge Homan

dismissed Langley because of his political affiliation, summary judgment is proper

because of the uncontradicted evidence that political loyalty is an appropriate

requirement for the job of Road Foreman in Hot Spring County. In Arkansas, the

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County Judge is the chief executive officer and is responsible for the construction and

maintenance of county roads. See Ark. Const. amend. 55, § 3; Ark. Code Ann. §§ 14-

14-502(a)(2)(A)(i), -810(a)(1). In Hot Spring County, the Road Department is the

largest executive department for which the County Judge is responsible. The Road

Foreman reports directly to the County Judge as chief executive and has significant

contact with the public. In general, personal loyalty is “an appropriate requirement”

where the individual “reports directly to the [chief executive] and his duties include

public relations and responsibility for . . . long-range planning.” Johnson v. City of

West Memphis, 113 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 1997). 

In Wagner v. Hawkins, a district court familiar with Arkansas government

observed that “the foreman of the road crew in a rural county . . . is in many ways the

Deputy County Judge.” 634 F. Supp. at 753. After surveying the evidence, the court

concluded, “The influence on important policy decisions exerted by the road foreman,

as established by the testimony in this case, puts it beyond serious question that his

is a policy job and that political loyalty to the County Judge is necessary for the

effective performance of his job.” Id. at 754. Citing Wagner v. Hawkins favorably,

the Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion about the position of a county road

foreman in Kentucky. Hoard v. Sizemore, 198 F.3d 205, 213-14 (6th Cir. 1999). 

In this case, Judge Bailey’s affidavit was strong evidence that the position of

Road Foreman in Hot Spring County involves the same responsibilities and the same

need for political loyalty to the County Judge as the road foreman position at issue

in Wagner v. Hawkins. In response, Langley submitted an affidavit asserting that he

was not a policy-maker and did not have a confidential relationship with the County

Judge. We agree with the district court that these conclusory assertions were

insufficient to defeat summary judgment on this ground.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

______________________________

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