Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02023/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02023-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Petitioner was also sentenced on that same day in another case to a consecutive term

of intensive probation for four years to follow his prison sentence in this case. Although

Petitioner lists that case number in his habeas petition, he is not challenging that conviction

or sentence and therefore the court will not address it.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Larry Orchard Smith, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 08-2023-PHX-JWS (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Doc. #1. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty on April 19, 2006, in

the Maricopa County Superior Court to one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices, a class

2 felony under Arizona law, with one prior felony conviction. Doc. #12, Exh. D. Among

the terms of the plea agreement, Petitioner was required to serve no more than the

presumptive term of imprisonment, 9.25 years. Id. On August 25, 2006, Petitioner was

sentenced to a slightly mitigated term of 7.25 years in prison. Doc. #12, Exh. J at 28.1

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On October 18, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief under Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Doc. #12, Exh. K. On April 3, 2007,

Petitioner’s counsel, who was appointed after Petitioner filed the notice, filed a Notice of

Completion of Post-Conviction Review by Counsel; Request for 45 Day Extension of Time

to Allow Defendant to File Pro Per Petition. Doc. #12, Exh. L. Counsel explained in the

notice that after searching the record she was unable to find any claims for relief to raise in

a petition for post-conviction relief. Id. After receiving extensions of time from the court,

Petitioner filed a Pro-Per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on June 28, 2007. Doc. #12,

Exh. O, P. In a Minute Entry filed on August 27, 2007, the trial court summarily dismissed

the petition. Doc. #12, Exh. T. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court

of Appeals on September 12, 2007. Doc. #12, Exh. U. The Court of Appeals summarily

denied the petition on May 9, 2008. Doc. #12, Exh. X. Petitioner’s subsequent Petition for

Review to the Arizona Supreme Court was denied on September 4, 2008. Doc. #12, Exh.

Z.

Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court on November 3,

2008. Doc. #1. Petitioner alleges two grounds for relief in the petition. First, he alleges that

the trial court violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when it failed to provide his

lawyer and mitigation specialist sufficient time to collect mitigating evidence for the

sentencing. Second, he alleges that the trial court caused his lawyer to provide ineffective

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to grant

the attorney enough time to prepare for sentencing. Respondent filed an Answer to Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #12) on February 19, 2009. On March 10, 2009, Petitioner

filed a Response to Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #13).

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend in their answer that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally

defaulted because Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his state court remedies.

Alternatively, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims fail on the merits. 

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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In a § 2254 habeas case, the court may decide a case on the merits even if a petitioner

has not properly exhausted his state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Because

the facts do not clearly establish procedural default here, the court will address the merits of

Petitioner’s claims.

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

Under the AEDPA2

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the State court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or (2)

"if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent."

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an 'unreasonable

application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then

applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the

“unreasonable application” clause requires the state court’s application of Supreme Court law

to be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). "When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

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2. Ground One

Petitioner claims in ground one that the court did not allow sufficient time for his

lawyer and the mitigation specialist to obtain the records and transcripts that would have

given the court the information it needed to make a more informed decision regarding

mitigation. He argues that the court allowed his lawyer and mitigation specialist one week

to prepare for a sentencing hearing that involved mitigating factors. Petitioner contends that

the court’s actions violated the Sixth Amendment right to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the assistance of counsel.

Petitioner presents nothing whatsoever to show that he was denied the right to have

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. He argues only that the court failed to provide

enough time for his lawyer and mitigation specialist to gather and present mitigating

evidence. But he fails to explain how that factual allegation constitutes a denial of the right

to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.

Moreover, even Petitioner’s factual allegations are unsupported by the record. On

June 9, 2006, a new attorney was appointed to represent Petitioner. Doc. #12, Exh. E. At

that time, counsel requested, and the judge granted, a continuance of the sentencing hearing

from June 9, 2006, to July 14, 2006, so mitigating evidence could be presented. Id. On July

14, Petitioner’s counsel again requested a continuance and the sentencing/mitigation hearing

was reset to August 25, 2006. Doc. #12, Exh. F. On July 17 and August 17, Petitioner’s

counsel filed a Notice of Filing Mitigation in which he submitted documents for the purpose

of mitigation. Doc. #12, Exh. G, H. On August 25, 2006, counsel filed a Mitigation Report

prepared by a private mitigation specialist. Doc. #12, Exh. I. The 12-page report provided

extensive mitigating information to the sentencing judge including family, mental health and

substance abuse history. Id.

The sentencing/mitigation hearing was held on August 25, 2006, more than two and

a half months after Petitioner’s counsel first requested a continuance to present mitigating

evidence. Doc. #12, Exh. J. Petitioner was allowed to present several witnesses to make

statements on his behalf at the hearing. Id. at 11-25. The court clearly took into account

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mitigating factors and imposed a mitigated sentence despite recommendations from the

prosecution and the investigating officer for the maximum allowed under the plea agreement.

Id. at 26-27.

Although the state courts all summarily dismissed Petitioner’s request for postconviction relief without a discussion of the claims, Petitioner cannot establish that any of

the state court decisions was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court

law, or that the decisions were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The

state court record provides no support for his factual allegations and Petitioner points to no

Supreme Court legal authority that the state courts went against when dismissing his postconviction claims. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the claim in ground one be

denied. 

3. Ground Two

Although Petitioner identifies his second ground for relief as an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim, his petition fails to describe any wrongdoing by his lawyer. Instead,

Petitioner claims that the court caused his lawyer to provide ineffective assistance by failing

to provide him with sufficient time to properly prepare for the sentencing/mitigation hearing.

Thus, the claim in ground two essentially repeats the allegations in ground one. 

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show: (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

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Petitioner fails to present any factual evidence to show that his counsel’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Although he claims that the court failed

to provide his lawyer enough time to adequately prepare for the sentencing, he says nothing

about how his lawyer was unprepared or what specifically his lawyer should have done to

be prepared for the hearing. Thus, Petitioner cannot even establish the first prong of the

Strickland standard. As such, he has not demonstrated that the state courts’ decisions

summarily denying this claim (to the extent he raised it in state court) was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law, or that the decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the

claim be denied. 

To the extent the claim in ground two raises the same allegations as ground one, it is

recommended that ground two be denied for the same reasons as ground one. 

4. Conclusion

Having determined that Petitioner’s two grounds for relief fail on the merits, the court

will recommend that the petition be denied and dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

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Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 29th day of May, 2009.

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