Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05660/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05660-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CECIL JEROME HATCHETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUE HUBBARD CARTER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-CV-05660-REC-SMS-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION,

WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF

MAY BE GRANTED

(Doc. 16)

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Second Amended Complaint

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Cecil Jerome Hatchett (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on May

3, 2004. On November 24, 2004, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend for

failure to state any claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. Plaintiff filed an

amended complaint on December 3, 2004, and on March 3, 2005, the court dismissed plaintiff’s

amended complaint for failure to state any claims upon which relief may be granted. Now pending

before the court is plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed March 9, 2005. 

B. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395

U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at Folsom State Prison and

Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff names Carter, Vella, Fischer, and Yamoto as defendants. Plaintiff

is seeking money damages and declaratory relief, and alleges claims for relief for violation of the

Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause stemming from his retention in administrative

segregation for fifty-five months.

1. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff alleges that defendants refused to release him from administrative segregation on

his scheduled release date, and refused to show him any documentation. The Due Process Clause

protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action for deprivation of procedural due

process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is

sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a

liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population instead of administrative

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segregation. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68. With respect to liberty interests arising from state law,

the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the

nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created

by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

Plaintiff has alleged no facts that establish the existence of a liberty interest in remaining free

from administrative segregation. Id.; see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997)

(convicted inmate’s due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state

action taken within sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of

confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213

F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the SHU was within range of

confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life and,

therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free from confinement in the SHU)

(quotations omitted). Because plaintiff has not established the existence of a liberty interest in

remaining free from administrative segregation, plaintiff may not pursue a claim for relief under

section 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process. 

Further, even if plaintiff had a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative

segregation, plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that he was denied the procedural

process he was due under federal law. The conclusory assertion that he was not provided with

documentation upon his arrival at Corcoran is insufficient to support a claim that he was denied due

process.

Finally, the Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

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Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In

order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with

some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights. Plaintiff

has not done so, and therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against

defendants Carter, Vella, Fischer, and Yamoto.

2. Conditions-of-Confinement Claim

Plaintiff alleges that his administrative segregation cell was so cold, his lips cracked and bled,

leaving several scars; that for fifty-five months, he had nothing to do twenty-four hours a day but

sleep or sit around; and that he had only five minutes to shower and shave. Plaintiff alleges that the

allotted time was insufficient to soap up, rinse off, and shave, and that as a result, he developed a

cracking, bleeding rash from the soap residue and deep, cracking cuts which scarred from shaving

too fast. 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must

provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.;

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246

(9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement,

prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk

of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must

“know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Thus, “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

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conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.

Prison officials may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk,

or by presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 844-45. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability,

but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Frost v. Agnos,

152 F.3d at 1128; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-32 (1986). 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis

of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

Assuming that plaintiff’s allegations support the existence of deprivations “sufficientlygrave

to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation,” id., plaintiff has not alleged any facts that

support a claim that the named defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to

[plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted againstdefendants Carter, Vella, Fischer, and Yamoto for violation

of the Eighth Amendment.

D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not contain any claims upon

which relief may be granted under section 1983. Plaintiff has been notified of the deficiencies in his

claims and provided with the opportunity to amend on two previous occasions, but has not been able

to cure the deficiencies. Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be 

///

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dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state any claims upon which relief may be granted under

section 1983. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 8, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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