Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00557/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00557-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

NELLIE RUTH GUNN, individually ) 

and as Administratrix of the Estate of ) 

GREGORY GUNN, deceased, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CASE NO.: 2:16-cv-557-WKW-WC 

 ) 

CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ) 

ALABAMA, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Before the court is the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) and supporting memorandum 

(Doc. 21) filed by Defendants City of Montgomery and Ernest N. Finley, Jr., the 

Montgomery Chief of Police. Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. 30) in opposition to the 

motion, and Defendants have filed a reply (Doc. 35). On August 10, 2016, the District 

Judge entered an Order (Doc. 19) referring this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

“for consideration and disposition or recommendation on all pretrial matters as may be 

appropriate.” The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for recommendation to the District 

Judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS 

that Defendants’ motion be granted-in-part and denied-in-part. 

I. BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff, suing in her individual capacity and in her capacity as the Administratrix 

of the Estate of Gregory Gunn, filed suit against Defendants on July 8, 2016. See Compl. 

(Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint concerns the shooting death of her adult son, Gregory Gunn, 

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by Officer Aaron Cody Smith of the Montgomery Police Department. The Complaint 

alleges, in exacting detail, the events and circumstances leading up to Smith’s shooting of 

Mr. Gunn. See Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 12-82. Because Smith is not one of the instant 

movants, however, these allegations need not be recounted here with the level of detail set 

forth in the Complaint. It is sufficed for present purposes to offer only a brief summary of 

the “Facts” section of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that Smith, on patrol alone in 

his vehicle in the very early morning hours of February 25, 2016, confronted Mr. Gunn 

during Mr. Gunn’s walk home from a friend’s house. Smith approached Mr. Gunn and 

initiated a “stop and frisk” of Mr. Gunn without any reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gunn 

was involved in criminal activity. Mr. Gunn was not armed and Smith had no reason to 

believe he was armed. During Smith’s pat down of Mr. Gunn, Mr. Gunn fled in the 

direction of his home. Smith, still lacking any reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gunn was 

involved in criminal activity, pursued Mr. Gunn on foot. During his pursuit, Smith 

deployed a taser on Mr. Gunn at least three times even though Mr. Gunn had not threatened 

Smith and Smith had no reason to fear for his own safety. Because Smith’s tasing of Mr. 

Gunn did not cause Mr. Gunn to stop fleeing, Smith next struck Mr. Gunn several times 

with an expandable metal baton. By the time Mr. Gunn reached his next-door neighbor’s 

house, Smith brandished his service firearm and fired seven shots at Mr. Gunn, striking 

him five times, and killing him. Mr. Gunn died in his next-door neighbor’s front yard. 

Plaintiff alleges several federal constitutional and state law causes of action against 

Smith and the instant Defendants, Chief Finley and the City. Summarizing Plaintiff’s 

claims, the Complaint alleges as follows: a) that Chief Finley and the City adopted and 

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implemented and/or ratified policies and procedures concerning citizen-police encounters 

and the use of force that violated the constitutional rights of citizens, or allowed a persistent 

and widespread practice or standard operating procedure in these regards that violated 

citizens’ constitutional rights, and that Defendants’ actions caused the deprivation of Mr. 

Gunn’s Fourth Amendment rights resulting in injuries and, ultimately, his death (Count 

Four); b) that Chief Finley and the City of Montgomery failed to train Smith as to proper 

policies and/or procedures with respect to citizen-police encounters and the use of force, 

resulting in deprivations of his Fourth Amendment rights and, ultimately, his death (Count 

Five); (c) that Chief Finley is liable for Mr. Gunn’s wrongful death under Alabama law 

because Chief Finley breached his duty owed to Mr. Gunn to establish and implement 

proper and constitutional policies and/or procedures with respect to citizen-police 

encounters and the use of force and to adequately train Smith and other police officers 

under his charge in the application of such policies and procedures (Count Seven); and (d) 

that the City is vicariously liable for Mr. Gunn’s wrongful death under Alabama law 

because of the actions of Smith and Chief Finley which, it is alleged, proximately caused 

the death of Mr. Gunn (Count Eight). 

II. DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENT

 Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims against them are due to be dismissed. 

In particular, Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring any claims in her 

individual capacity against Defendants for the actions described in the Complaint, and that 

such individual capacity claims thus “fail to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court and are a 

nullity.” Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 20) at 2. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has failed to 

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state any claim upon which relief could be granted in her representative capacity against 

both Chief Finley and the City. Id.

III. PLAINTIFF’S INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY CLAIMS

 The undersigned first addresses Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff lacks standing 

to sue them in her individual capacity, and that such claims fail to invoke this court’s 

jurisdiction. Plaintiff explicitly “brings claims in her individual capacity for damages she 

sustained resulting from the death of her son, Gregory Z. Gunn[.]” Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 6. 

In support, Plaintiff alleges as follows: 

As a direct and proximate result of the actions and omissions of Defendants 

Finley and the City of Montgomery causing the violation of decedent 

Gregory Gunn’s Fourth Amendment rights, Plaintiff Nellie Ruth Gunn 

individually has suffered severe emotional distress and mental anguish and 

other pain and suffering; lost regular financial support that the decedent, 

Gregory Gunn, had provided her; and lost the society and companionship of 

her son, with whom she had resumed a close family unit for multiple years 

before his murder, all of which suffering injuries, and damages will in 

reasonable probability continue into the future and for the remainder of 

Plaintiff Gunn’s life. 

Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 206; see also id. at ¶ 227. Plaintiff limits her individual capacity 

claims to her claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.; See also Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 30) 

at 14. Defendants argue that Plaintiff may not recover damages in her individual capacity 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 21) at 3-4 (§ 1983 “does not provide a remedy 

for persons because of the injury to others who have allegedly been deprived of their 

constitutional rights.”); Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 4-5. Thus, they conclude, Plaintiff lacks 

standing to bring the claims alleged in the Complaint in her individual capacity. Id.

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 In Alabama, “when a constitutional violation actually causes the injured party’s 

death, a § 1983 claim can be asserted through the Alabama wrongful death statute.” Estate 

of Gilliam ex rel. Waldrop v. City of Prattville, 639 F.3d 1041, 1047 (11th Cir. 2011). As 

Plaintiff no doubt understands, given her express concession that the Complaint’s state law 

wrongful death tort claim is not brought in her individual capacity, that statute, Ala. Code 

§ 6-5-410, unambiguously confers the ability to bring a suit for wrongful death only in the 

“personal representative” of the decedent. See § 6-5-410(a). It is for this reason that this 

court very recently found that a plaintiff—decedent’s minor child—lacked standing to 

pursue federal § 1983 claims related to the decedent’s death, but that the decedent’s 

personal representative could maintain such claims. See Burns v. City of Alexander City, 

110 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (“As to the § 1983 claims, Gilliam provides 

authority that Alabama’s wrongful death statute applies by virtue of [42 U.S.C.] § 1988. 

Therefore, Plaintiff G.C. does not have standing to assert those claims under Alabama law 

as she is not the personal representative of [decedent’s] estate.”). See also James v. City of 

Huntsville, No. 5:14-cv-2267, 2015 WL 3397054, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ala. May 26, 2015); 

Estate of Rowell v. Walker Baptist Med. Ctr., No. 5:11-cv-3439-RRA, 2012 WL 2479626, 

at *4-*5 (N.D. Ala. June 25, 2012) (recognizing that plaintiffs, none of whom were 

appointed as decedent’s personal representative at the time federal suit was filed, lacked 

standing to assert § 1983 claims at the time the complaint was filed); Christie v. Lee Cty. 

Sheriff’s Office, No. 2:10-cv-420-FtM-36DNF, 2011 WL 4501953, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 

28, 2011) (finding, pursuant to similar provisions of Florida law, “no separate cause of 

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action exists under § 1983 for emotional distress, loss of a loved one, or any other collateral 

injuries allegedly suffered personally by the decedent’s family members”). 

 Thus, a plain reading of the statute and relevant case law forecloses Plaintiff’s 

individual capacity § 1983 claims. The cases cited in Plaintiff’s complaint in support of 

her individual right to recover her damages for the alleged violations of her son’s 

constitutional rights, see, e.g., Compl. at ¶ 206, are inapposite. Carringer v. Rodgers, 331 

F.3d 844, 849 (11th Cir. 2003), and Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir. 1961), 

both dealt with and turned upon the unique characteristics of Georgia’s wrongful death 

statute, which, it was determined, permits persons other than a personal representative of 

the decedent to seek and obtain damages for the wrongful death of the decedent. See 

Brazier, 293 F.2d at 409; Carringer, 331 F.3d at 847 (recognizing Georgia Supreme 

Court’s affirmative answer to certified question about whether the plaintiff—decedent’s 

mother—had standing to bring a wrongful death action where decedent was murdered by 

surviving spouse). Because the same cannot be said for Alabama’s wrongful death statute, 

Brazier and Carringer do not advance Plaintiff’s cause. 

 Nor do the additional cases cited by Plaintiff in her response brief demonstrate that 

she is entitled to bring § 1983 claims in her individual capacity and recover for her damages 

flowing from the alleged violation of the decedent’s constitutional rights. Rhyne v. 

Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1992), is cited as affirming Brazier. Pl.’s 

Resp. (Doc. 30) at 16. However, as Plaintiff recognizes, Rhyne simply applied Texas law 

in the same manner as Brazier applied Georgia law. Texas law is not the same as Alabama 

law. See Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 391 (“There is no dispute that Rhyne is within the class of 

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people entitled to recover under Texas law for the wrongful death of a child.”). Plaintiff 

cites two additional district court cases in Alabama in support of her position. See Pl.’s Br. 

(Doc. 30) at 17. However, these cases are distinguishable because neither addresses the 

standing of a plaintiff to bring individual capacity claims for damages flowing from the 

deprivation of the decedent’s constitutional rights. In Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297 

(N.D. Ala. 1986), the action, including all federal claims, was “brought by Lois Weeks as 

administratrix of the decedent’s estate.” Id. at 1298. 

Likewise, in Lewis v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:04-cv-858-WKW, 2006 WL 

1761673, at *4 (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2006), the complaint consisted of a mix of federal § 

1983 claims and state law tort claims brought by the decedent’s wife in both her individual 

capacity and in her representative capacity as the administratrix of the decedent’s estate. 

And, true enough, the court in Lewis did allow § 1983 claims seeking “recovery of 

compensatory damages from City,” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 30) at 17, to survive a motion to dismiss. 

See 2006 WL 1761673, at *4. However, unlike in the instant case, in Lewis, the plaintiff 

did not allege that she was entitled to damages in her individual capacity due to the 

constitutional injuries inflicted on the decedent. Rather, the complaint alleged such injuries 

“caused damage to Decedent in that it caused him to suffer pain, embarrassment, 

humiliation, extreme mental anguish and severe emotional distress and ultimately causing 

his death.” See Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 61, 64, & 72, No. 2:04-cv-858-WKW (filed Sept. 

10, 2004) (alleging injuries in specific federal law claims). Where the plaintiff in Lewis

brought claims in her individual capacity for her own damages, she was expressly 

proceeding under state tort law and, insofar as she did bring any such claims, they were not 

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premised on Alabama’s wrongful death statute. See id. at ¶ 80 (alleging plaintiff’s own 

injuries in negligence claim) and ¶¶ 99-100 (alleging plaintiff’s loss of consortium). 

Accordingly, it is of no great significance on the narrow question of the instant Plaintiff’s 

standing to bring her individual capacity claims that the court in Lewis permitted that 

plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the municipal defendant to survive a motion to dismiss, 

or that the court permitted the plaintiff’s own loss of consortium claim to stand. There is 

no indication that the Lewis plaintiff brought any § 1983 claims in her individual capacity, 

and there was no dispute that she lacked standing to bring certain state tort claims in her 

individual capacity because those claims were not brought pursuant to Alabama’s wrongful 

death statute. 

Plaintiff lacks standing to assert any individual capacity claims under § 1983 for 

any injuries she suffered due to the alleged violation of the decedent’s constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, such claims—namely, Counts IV and V of the Complaint—are due to be 

dismissed with prejudice to the extent they are brought in Plaintiff’s individual capacity. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY CLAIMS

 As set forth above, Plaintiff has filed claims in her representative capacity under 

both § 1983 and Alabama’s wrongful death statute. Defendants move to dismiss all such 

claims levied against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to state any claim upon which relief could 

be granted. Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 20) at 2. Following a brief discussion of the standard of 

review applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court will examine each of 

Plaintiff’s claims in turn. 

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When ruling on a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “the Court accepts the factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.” Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control 

and Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). In order to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted, a complaint must satisfy the pleading standard of Rule 8 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Rule 8 requires that a plaintiff submit a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading 

standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands 

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). In general, then, a pleading is insufficient if it offers only mere “labels and 

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (a 

complaint does not suffice under Rule 8(a) “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of 

‘further factual enhancement.’”). Thus, in order to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss, 

Plaintiff’s complaint “‘must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim for relief which is plausible on its face.’” Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 

1039, 1051 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “A claim is factually 

plausible where the facts alleged permit the court to reasonably infer that the defendant’s 

alleged misconduct was unlawful. Factual allegations that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 

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defendant’s liability, however, are not facially plausible.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678). 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If there are “enough fact[s] to raise a 

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that supports the claims alleged 

in the complaint, then the claim is “plausible” and the motion to dismiss should be denied 

and discovery in support of the claims should commence. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. But, 

“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more 

than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Ultimately, in assessing the plausibility of 

a plaintiff’s claims, the court is to avoid conflating the sufficiency analysis with a 

premature assessment of a plaintiff’s likelihood of success because a well-pleaded claim 

shall proceed “even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, 

and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting 

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 

A. Count IV of the Complaint.

Relying upon Plaintiff’s summary of her claims, in Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that 

Chief Finley, as a “final policymaker for the City, established and implemented 

unconstitutional policies and procedures regarding citizen-police encounters and the use of 

force that were the “moving force” behind the death of Mr. Gunn. Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 30) at 

8-9. Plaintiff alleges that Chief Finley is thus liable individually for his actions in 

establishing and implementing these alleged policies and procedures, and that the City is 

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liable “for having such policies and procedures that themselves violate federal law.” Id. at 

9. Alternatively, Plaintiff alleges in Count Four that, even if the policies and procedures 

established and implemented by Chief Finley do not violate the Constitution, there was a 

“widespread practice” among Chief Finley’s subordinates in the MPD of conducting 

“illegal stops, frisks, and uses of force that became informal City policy,” that Chief Finley 

“refused or failed to take steps reasonably necessary to prevent such violations,” and that 

this “practice” caused Mr. Gunn’s death. Id. Thus, Plaintiff alleges that Chief Finley is 

individually liable for his “deliberate indifference” to this unconstitutional practice, and 

the City is liable for its “custom or practice of constitutional violations that proximately 

resulted in the violation of Mr. Gunn’s rights.” Id. 

 Defendants maintain that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the applicable pleading 

requirements with respect to her claims against both Chief Finley and the City. The court 

will discuss Defendants’ arguments, and the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings as to each 

Defendant, separately. 

 1. Supervisory Liability as to Chief Finley. 

 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently restated how a plaintiff may go 

about establishing supervisory liability under § 1983. 

“[I]t is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable 

under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis 

of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 

1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, to 

hold a supervisor liable a plaintiff must show that the supervisor either 

directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal 

connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged 

constitutional violation. Id. 

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 The necessary causal connection can be established when a 

history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on 

notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to 

do so. Alternatively, the causal connection may be established when 

a supervisor’s custom or policy ... result[s] in deliberate indifference 

to constitutional rights or when facts support an inference that the 

supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that 

the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from 

doing so. 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). “The deprivations 

that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official 

must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than 

isolated occurrences.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th 

Cir.1999) (internal quotation mark omitted). In short, “the standard by which 

a supervisor is held liable in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a 

subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Keith v. DeKalb Cty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047-48 (11th Cir. 2014). 

 Plaintiff maintains that she has adequately alleged Chief Finley’s supervisory 

liability in Count Four because she has “alleged facts showing a causal connection between 

defendant Finley’s actions and the constitutional violations . . . based on (1) his failure to 

correct the constitutional violations following a history of widespread abuse of such rights, 

and (2) his formal policies or informal customs or policies resulting in deliberate 

indifference to constitutional rights.” Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 30) at 20. In support of this 

argument, Plaintiff points to many of the allegations set forth in the Complaint. The court 

will review these allegations to assess their sufficiency. 

 In relevant part, Plaintiff alleges, “[u]pon information and belief,” that Chief Finley 

“established and implemented policies and procedures, and/or ratified pre-existing policies 

and procedures, regarding field interviews, investigative stops, searches, frisks or patCase 2:16-cv-00557-WKW-WC Document 41 Filed 03/02/17 Page 12 of 43
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downs, other police-citizen encounters, arrests, and the use of force by police against 

citizens[,]” and that these policies and procedures authorized police “to exercise authority 

beyond the constitutional limits of such activities” in a number of ways that effect 

violations of constitutional rights up to and including “use [of] deadly force on a subject 

when it is excessive, unnecessary, and objectively unreasonable as a matter of law to do 

so.” Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 196-197. Plaintiff then alleges that Smith acted pursuant to 

such policies and procedures when he confronted Mr. Gunn. Id. at ¶ 198. Plaintiff further 

alleges that, even if the formal policies and procedures allegedly established and 

implemented by Chief Finley do not themselves violate the Constitution, Chief Finley 

knew of or had constructive knowledge of the “widespread practice” among police officers 

of violating citizens’ constitutional rights during police-citizen encounters, including 

“using deadly force on a subject when it is excessive, unnecessary, and objectively 

unreasonable as a matter of law to do so[.]” Id. at ¶¶ 200-202. 

 The sufficiency of these allegations turns, of course, on whether Plaintiff has alleged 

sufficient factual detail to render Plaintiff’s claims plausible. Upon careful review of the 

Complaint and the parties’ submissions respecting the motion to dismiss, the undersigned 

concludes that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count Four as to Chief Finley is due to be 

denied. Although the undersigned does not arrive at this conclusion lightly or without 

some trepidation about the nature of Plaintiff’s claim, the undersigned concludes that 

Defendants simply have not shown that Plaintiff’s allegations are actually insufficient 

under the prevailing standard. 

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 Because Plaintiff can establish Chief Finley’s liability through distinct avenues of 

proving deliberate indifference, and because the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has 

adequately met her pleading burden with respect to at least one of those avenues, the 

undersigned addresses only the allegations and related argument concerning Plaintiff’s 

claim that there was a history of widespread abuse that put Chief Finley on notice of the 

need to correct the alleged deprivations, but that Chief Finley failed to do so. In her 

Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, even if the policies and customs adopted or implemented 

by Chief Finley did not themselves violate the Constitution, there was “a widespread and 

persistent practice over many years, of City of Montgomery police officers violating 

citizens federally protected rights[.]” Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 201. This “widespread and 

persistent practice” is alleged to have included several components, including the 

following: a) “making investigative stops for pretextual reasons,” including to determine 

whether an “individual owes unpaid traffic fines or costs to the Defendant City,” without 

the support of reasonable suspicion; b) “making investigative stops based on an unlawful 

racial profile;” (c) “frisking or patting down persons detained without reasonable 

suspicion” supporting such actions; (d) “using less-lethal force, including tasing or striking 

a subject, when it is excessive, unnecessary, and objectively unreasonable to do so;” and 

(e) “using deadly force on a subject when it is excessive, unnecessary, and objectively 

unreasonable as a matter of law to do so.” Id. at ¶ 200. Plaintiff alleges that this 

“widespread and persistent practice” will be shown by “citizen lawsuits charging police 

misconduct; citizen complaints to the Police Department, the City of Montgomery, and 

elected officials regarding such misconduct; and the Police Department’s limited internal 

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records of individual instances of application of these policies and procedures, such as 

investigative stops and incidents involving the use of force. Id. at ¶ 201. Plaintiff further 

alleges that Chief Finley has known or “had constructive knowledge of this widespread 

and persistent practice of violations, but [has] refused or failed to take measures reasonably 

necessary to prevent or minimize such violations.” Id. at ¶ 202. Finally, in further support 

of this avenue of showing deliberate indifference, Plaintiff alleges that Chief Finley’s 

response to the widespread practice described in the Complaint has been inadequate in 

several ways set out in the Complaint, including inadequate measures to identify and 

document unconstitutional uses of force, inadequate investigation of complaints of 

unconstitutional actions by police officers, and inadequate discipline of officers found to 

have committed violations. Id. at ¶ 203. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to meet her pleading burden with respect 

to any claim of supervisory liability as to Chief Finley in Count Four. Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 21) 

at 5-6. As to the particular avenue of showing deliberate indifference discussed in the 

previous paragraph, Defendants argue, without citation to authority, that Plaintiff must 

plead factual allegations that “directly and specifically describe” “[a] history of obvious 

widespread, rampant, flagrant and continuing deprivations of constitutional rights rather 

than singular events attributed to Officer Smith[.]” Id. 

 As set forth above, Plaintiff’s Complaint describes in detail the contours of the 

alleged widespread history of abuse necessary to place Chief Finley on notice of his need 

to correct the sort of deprivations described in the Complaint. The Complaint also alleges 

that Chief Finley failed to correct the alleged deprivations, and that his response to them 

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was inadequate in all of several ways specifically detailed in the Complaint. Nevertheless, 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff is required to plead specific allegations about some 

unspecified number of constitutional deprivations in order to sufficiently state a claim and 

proceed to discovery. In particular, Defendants demand that Plaintiff be made to 

specifically plead allegations about who filed the lawsuits or citizen complaints referenced 

in the Complaint, when they were filed, and what were the outcomes of any such filings or 

proceedings. Id. Defendants do not suggest how many such instances should be alleged 

and how specific Plaintiff’s allegations must be. Rather, Defendants simply maintain that 

Plaintiff’s “vague” reference to “citizen lawsuits” and “complaints” and the like that will 

demonstrate such incidents is insufficient to carry her pleading burden. Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 

35) at 11. Notably, Defendants cite to no cases imposing such a pleading burden on a 

plaintiff, and some courts have specifically rejected such a burden. See, e.g., Threats v. 

City of Bessemer, No. 2:13-cv-486-JEO, 2013 WL 2338701, at *5 (N.D. Ala. April 29, 

2013) (Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation), adopted, 2013 WL 2355341 (N.D. Ala. May 

23, 2013) (finding widespread “pattern of misconduct” adequately alleged, despite fact that 

complaint “does not provide details of the prior alleged incidents or exactly how City 

policymakers became aware of them[,]” because specific details about prior incidents 

“would be largely within the knowledge of the City rather than Plaintiff, and both sides are 

entitled to utilize the liberal discovery of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 

to flesh out the specifics” of Plaintiff’s claims). And, to be sure, courts have affirmed that 

a plaintiff’s reference to the sort of records identified by Plaintiff in this matter can be 

sufficient to put a supervisor on notice of a need to correct a problem and, therefore, at 

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least plausibly allege a history of widespread abuse for purposes of supervisor liability. 

See, e.g., Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008), overruled on other 

grounds as recognized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that 

complaint’s allegation that supervisors were aware of widespread abuse through “‘force 

reports and similar documents, inmate complaints, jailer complaints, attorney complaints, 

judicial officer complaints, and personal observation’” sufficiently stated causal 

connection to supervisor for purposes of motion to dismiss); see also Harris v. City of 

Boynton Beach, No. 9:16-cv-80148, 2016 WL 3971409, at *5-*6 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2016) 

(finding complaint sufficient where plaintiff alleged that “public records requests, media 

reports, legal documents and reports and statements made by the police department” 

established that subordinate officers were reckless); id. (relying upon allegation that 

municipality “has repeatedly been the subject of numerous civilian complaints and 

investigations into police misconduct” in finding complaint sufficiently pleaded). 

In any event, coupled with the omission of relevant authority in support of 

Defendants’ argument about Plaintiff’s supposed “heightened” (and apparently hyperspecific) pleading burden, Defendants’ motion is especially problematic because 

Defendants appear to conflate Plaintiff’s burden of proving her claim with her burden of 

merely sufficiently alleging her claim. For example, Defendants argue that the “mere 

existence of past grievances or complaints cannot serve as evidence of any actual 

wrongdoing by the City of Montgomery, its Police Department, Chief Finley, or any other 

individual police officer.” Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 11. The undersigned accepts this 

precept as generally true, but also irrelevant at this time because, of course, Plaintiff is not 

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18 

required to bring “evidence” in support of her claims at the pleading stage. Defendants’ 

improper conflation of Plaintiff’s pleading burden with her proving burden is confirmed 

by Defendants’ citation of, and extensive reliance upon, Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 

1346 (11th Cir. 1998), which is the only case cited in support of Defendants’ argument that 

Plaintiff has insufficiently pleaded a history of widespread abuse.1

 See Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 

35) at 11-13. Gold appears to be cited for the proposition that “even if the Plaintiff argues 

that a substantially higher number of complaints have been filed against Montgomery 

officers and officials, this does nothing to show factual support for a widespread practice 

of which the City should have known.” Id. at 12. However, Gold is inapposite. Gold

concerned a district court’s failure to grant judgment as a matter of law that was made by 

a municipal defendant “at the close of Gold’s evidence, renewed at the close of all 

evidence, and made again post-trial.” 151 F.3d at 1349. Gold thus says nothing about a 

plaintiff’s burden to sufficiently plead a claim of supervisory (or municipal) liability. The 

Gold court faulted the plaintiff for failing to present—at trial—“evidence of prior 

constitutional violations or false arrests involving Florida’s disorderly conduct statute.” Id.

at 1351. As recognized by Defendants, the Eleventh Circuit further found that Gold’s 

reliance on mere complaints of misconduct, or raw data showing a significant number of 

 

1

 Defendants also cite to Harper v. Lawrence County, Alabama, 592 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2010), 

in their reply brief for the proposition that Plaintiff’s “vague references” to civilian complaints and 

the like “do not come close to the heightened pleading standard of specific allegations of prior 

misconduct needed to sufficiently plead the existence of a custom or policy illustrated in Harper.” 

Def.’s Reply (Doc. 35) at 11. This is ground thoroughly plowed earlier in Defendants’ Reply, see

Doc. 35 at 6-9, and it is well-taken in the context of that earlier (and appropriate) discussion about 

Plaintiff’s failure to fully relate the basis for the Circuit’s holding in that case. 

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disorderly conduct arrests were dismissed, was insufficient as a manner of proving his 

claims at trial. Id. At no point did the Circuit Court indicate that relying on such materials 

was improper at the pleading stage. 

In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff “has pled significantly 

less than the plaintiff in Gold, who was held to have provided insufficient support of a 

practice that could give rise to municipal liability[,]” Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 12, is both 

misleading and irrelevant because the Eleventh Circuit did not say, and we do not know, 

what the plaintiff in Gold actually pled in support of her claims and, in any event, the 

sufficiency of Gold’s pleadings was not relevant in the Circuit’s decision. While Gold may 

portend difficulties for Plaintiff’s proof of her claims at a later stage in this litigation, it has 

no bearing upon Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

 Ultimately, where Defendants argue that “Plaintiff in the instant case does not come 

remotely close to pleading the factual support required for a claim of widespread 

practice[,]” Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 12, the court reasonably expects citation to judicial 

opinions demonstrating that, indeed, Plaintiff has not “come remotely close” to meeting 

her burden. Defendants have not provided any such authority. In the absence of any 

controlling authority provided by Defendants, the undersigned finds the Eleventh Circuit’s 

decision in Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016), instructive as 

to where the court should discern the point at which Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to 

“nudge[ her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570. In Hoefling, the plaintiff, a boat owner whose boat was confiscated and destroyed 

by the City of Miami, “alleged that the City had a ‘policy, custom, and/or practice’ of 

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‘failing to abide by’ the state laws, regulations, and procedures governing the ‘investigation 

and . . . removal of derelict vessels located in state waters[,]” and that, pursuant to this 

“policy, custom, and/or practice, [the defendants] ignored [his] fundamental rights, as well 

as the fundamental rights of other vessel owners.” 811 F.3d at 1280. Apart from his 

specific allegations “concerning the seizure and destruction of his own sailboat,” 

Hoefling’s factual allegations in support of these claims were as follows: 

First, on August 20, 2010, while out of town, Mr. Hoefling received a call 

from a friend “notifying him that the police were taking boats.” And, in fact, 

on his return, he discovered that his own sailboat had been “unlawfully 

seized.” Second, Mr. Hoefling alleged that “local mariners” told him, and 

that he was “independently aware, that others have fallen victim to similar 

conduct as a result of the City[’s] and [the marine patrol officers’] failure to 

adhere to law and appropriate procedures regarding the investigation and 

destruction of potentially derelict vessels.” Third, Mr. Hoefling alleged that 

the City refers to this “systematic roundup and destruction of ugly boats in 

its waters” as a “cleanup” program. 

Id. So, in essence, Hoefling’s allegations respecting the defendants’ alleged deliberate 

indifference were sufficient because he alleged that he was advised by a friend that the 

police were “taking boats,” that he had “independent” knowledge, as well as unspecified 

anecdotal accounts from other “mariners,” regarding similar supposedly unlawful seizures 

by the defendants, and because all of the defendants’ activities were allegedly under the 

auspices of some “‘cleanup program.’” There were no specific allegations about other 

seizures, and no reference to prior judicial or other determinations that any such seizures 

were contrary to law. Hoefling’s claims surely would have failed under the pleading 

standard imagined by Defendants in this case. 

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 At bottom, applying ordinary “judicial experience and common sense,” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 679, in the specific context of this case—where, as in Threats, supra, much of the 

information referenced by Plaintiff is in the possession of the City, and where Defendants 

have largely failed to support their argument with citation to cogent authority—the 

undersigned finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable 

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that supports Plaintiff’s claims. Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 556. This is all that Rule 8 requires of Plaintiff at this stage. Id. Accordingly, 

the undersigned concludes that Defendants have failed to show that Plaintiff’s claim of 

supervisory liability in Count Four is insufficiently pleaded, and their motion to dismiss 

Count Four as to Chief Finley is due to be denied. 

 2. Municipal Liability as to the City.

 The Eleventh Circuit very recently restated the method for establishing municipal 

liability under § 1983: 

As a municipality, the City cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 

for constitutional violations committed by its officers. See Monell v. Dep’t of 

Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693–94, 98 (1978). [A plaintiff] must ultimately 

prove that the City had a policy, custom, or practice that caused the 

deprivation. See e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); 

Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1328 (11th 

Cir.2015); McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.2004). 

. . . 

Monell, the Supreme Court has explained, is a “case about responsibility,” 

and is meant to limit § 1983 liability to “acts which the municipality has 

officially sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 

469, 478, 480 (1986). There are, however, several different ways of 

establishing municipal liability under § 1983. A municipality can be liable 

for an official policy enacted by its legislative body (e.g., an ordinance or 

resolution passed by a city council). See Monell, 436 U.S. at 661, 694–95; 

McKusick v. City of Melbourne, 96 F.3d 478, 483 (11th Cir.1996). Municipal 

liability may also attach if final policymakers have acquiesced in a 

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longstanding practice that constitutes the entity’s standard operating 

procedure. See Bd. of Cty. Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 

(1997); Brown v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 n.11 (11th 

Cir.1991). And a municipality can be held liable “on the basis of ratification 

when a subordinate public official makes an unconstitutional decision and 

when that decision is then adopted by someone who does have final 

policymaking authority.” Matthews v. Columbia County, 294 F.3d 1294, 

1297 (11th Cir.2002). 

Hoefling, 811 F.3d at 1279. 

 As described in this Recommendation’s earlier discussion of Plaintiff’s allegations 

with respect to Chief Finley, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the City is liable because of 

its final policymaker’s establishment and implementation of unconstitutional policies and 

procedures, or the policymaker’s failure to take steps reasonably necessary to prevent 

violations comprising a widespread practice among City police officers. See supra; Compl. 

(Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 194-202. Because the undersigned finds, as with Plaintiff’s claim against 

Chief Finley, that Plaintiff has met her burden of sufficiently pleading a claim of municipal 

liability in Count Four with respect to at least one of the methods described in Hoefling—

i.e., acquiescence in the history of widespread abuse discussed previously—the 

undersigned addresses only those allegations and arguments related to that avenue of 

establishing municipal liability. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff “fails to meet the pleading standard imposed upon 

the plaintiff” with respect to this claim because Plaintiff has offered only “labels and legal 

conclusions” regarding her claim of a widespread practice of abuse among Montgomery 

police officers and she has failed to “comply with the ‘threshold identification’ of a specific 

custom or policy[.]” Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 210 at 7-8. As recognized by Plaintiff, Pl.’s Resp. 

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(Doc. 30) at 37, rather than citing to specific cases applying the relevant pleading burden 

that Defendants would have this court apply, Defendants appear to simply denounce all of 

Plaintiff’s allegations as “mere labels and legal conclusions,” and, the undersigned 

supposes, leave it to the court to put meat on the bones of their arguments. In essence, 

therefore, Defendants are guilty of the very offense they charge against Plaintiff. This is 

simply insufficient to sustain Defendants’ burden in seeking the drastic remedy of 

dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Stephens v. City of Tarrant, No. 2:16-cv-274-KDB, 

2017 WL 34829, at *9 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 4, 2017) (“As movant, the City must establish that 

the Complaint does not sufficiently allege facts [in support of the plaintiff’s claims], and it 

failed to meet its burden to do so.”). 

In any event, Defendants’ argument concerning this issue in its reply brief largely 

tracks the argument that was made with respect to Chief Finley. See Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 

35) at 15-18. Defendants’ Gold argument is revived, id. at 18, but it is just as immaterial 

in defense of the City as it was Chief Finley. Defendants once again fail to cite any salient 

case dealing with the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleadings in the context of alleging 

municipal liability due to the alleged acquiescence to a widespread history of abuse by 

municipal officers.2

 Rather, Defendants simply maintain that Plaintiff has failed to plead 

 

2

 Defendants devote a healthy portion of their limited briefing in this area to a discussion of Brown 

v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1991). See Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 17-18. 

The plaintiff in that case was a police officer who sued his municipal employer “claiming that he 

was fired from his job as a police officer for the City of Fort Lauderdale because he is black.” 923 

F.2d at 1475. The Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to sustain his 

claim that the municipality employed a custom of racial discrimination in employment. Id. at 

1481. However, as Plaintiff observes, “the allegations the Eleventh Circuit cites as reflecting a 

municipal custom appear instead to be a series of racially discriminatory actions targeting plaintiff 

himself, as opposed to a custom of discriminating against persons of plaintiff’s race generally.” 

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specific examples in support of her claim of widespread history of abuse, and that, 

therefore, she has failed to state a claim. For the reasons already stated supra, the 

undersigned finds that argument unpersuasive. 

 Thus, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim of municipal 

liability with respect to the City in Count Four, and that, accordingly, Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss Count Four as to the City is due to be denied. 

B. Count V of the Complaint.

 Relying upon Plaintiff’s summary of her claims, in Count Five of the Complaint 

Plaintiff alleges that Chief Finley, “with final authority to train police officers employed 

by the Montgomery Police Department, . . . failed to establish and implement proper City 

policies and procedures with respect to stops, frisks, searches, and use of force,” or, 

alternatively, having “established proper policies” in that area, “tolerated without halting 

widespread informal City police practices that violated citizens’ rights,” and “failed to 

adequately train defendant Smith in proper policies and procedures in those areas[.]” Pl.’s 

Resp. (Doc. 30) at 10. Plaintiff maintains that the City is also liable “based on its policy, 

custom, or practice of providing inadequate training that proximately resulted in the 

violation of Mr. Gunn’s rights.” Id.

 Defendants once again argue that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the applicable 

pleading standard with respect to her claims against both Chief Finley and the City. The 

 

Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 30) at 37 n.9. Considering the accuracy of this observation and the legal context 

of Brown, the undersigned fails to see how that decision is entitled to any significant weight in the 

analysis of the instant motion to dismiss. 

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undersigned has already set out the standards for assessing claims of supervisory and 

municipal liability under § 1983. The undersigned will next describe the tests for those 

types of liability based upon an alleged failure to train municipal employees and will then 

merge discussion of Plaintiff’s claim as it relates to both Defendants. 

 The Eleventh Circuit has clarified how the test for supervisory liability is applied in 

the context of a failure-to-train claim. 

[U]nder § 1983, a supervisor can be held liable for failing to train his or her 

employees “only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference 

to the rights of persons with whom the [officers] come into contact.” City of 

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see also Belcher v. City 

of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1397 (11th Cir. 1994) (“A supervisory official

is not liable under section 1983 for an injury resulting from his failure to train 

subordinates unless his failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to 

the rights of persons with whom the subordinates come into contact and the 

failure has actually caused the injury of which the plaintiff complains.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, a plaintiff alleging a constitutional 

violation premised on a failure to train must demonstrate that the supervisor 

had “actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training 

program causes [his or her] employees to violate citizens’ constitutional 

rights,” and that armed with that knowledge the supervisor chose to retain 

that training program. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). 

Keith, 749 F.3d at 1052. Similarly, with respect to a municipality, the Circuit Court has 

explained as follows: 

A municipality may also be liable under § 1983 when its employees cause a 

constitutional injury as a result of the municipality’s failure to adequately 

train or supervise its employees. Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. 

v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1188 (11th Cir. 2011). But, as with a 

municipality’s customs or policies, “the inadequacy of . . . training may serve 

as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [municipal 

employees] come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 

(1989). To make such a showing, “a plaintiff must put forward some 

evidence that the municipality was aware of the need to train or supervise its 

employees in a particular area.” Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 

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637 F.3d at 1189. “[I]t must have been obvious that the municipality’s failure 

to train or supervise its employees would result in a constitutional violation” 

and that “the city made a deliberate choice not to train its employees.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Martin v. Wood, 648 F. App’x 911, 914-15 (11th Cir. 2016). 

A plaintiff may establish “deliberate indifference” in the failure-to-train context in 

two ways: by showing a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained 

employees[,]” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62, commonly referred to as “prior pattern liability,” 

or by showing, in a more narrow set of circumstances, that there is such an “obvious need” 

for training because of the highly predictable consequences of failing to train in a given 

area, id. at 63-64, commonly referred to as “single incident” or “obvious need” liability. 

 Plaintiff contends that she has adequately stated claims of supervisory and 

municipal liability for failure-to-train under both the “prior pattern” and “single incident” 

theories of deliberate indifference. See Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 30) at 40-43, 60-61. Defendants 

contend, “as a threshold matter,” that Plaintiff’s claim must fail because she “has not pled 

any specifics of any training program—municipal or otherwise—that she now attacks.” 

Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 19-21. Specifically, they argue that “Plaintiff fails to 

acknowledge the clearly established law requiring her to plead the existence of a particular 

course of conduct sanctioned by the City such that it can be said to have proximately caused 

the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. at 21-22. However, the only authority 

cited by Defendants as representing such “clearly established law,” City of Oklahoma City 

v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), has no bearing on the motion to dismiss. In essence, with 

Tuttle, Defendants repeat their error discussed with respect to their reliance on Gold. 

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In Tuttle, the Supreme Court reviewed jury instructions that were utilized by the 

trial court in a jury trial involving municipal liability for inadequate training. Id. at 823-

24. Nothing in the opinion relates to assessing the sufficiency of that or any other plaintiff’s 

allegations of municipal or supervisory liability for failure to train. Defendants appear to 

recognize this, variously citing the opinion as precluding, for instance, “one’s ability to 

succeed on a claim of municipal liability based on the inadequate training of subordinates 

when he or she fails to assert the specific failures or malfeasance inherent within the 

training program he or she is attacking.” Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 22. But, of course, in 

deciding whether a plaintiff has adequately stated a claim, a court is not determining the 

plaintiff’s “ability to succeed,” or “‘allowing a 1983 plaintiff to establish municipal 

liability,’” or “‘impos[ing] liability.’” Id. (quoting Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 821). While Tuttle

may certainly have some relevance in assessing the sufficiency of evidence that Plaintiff 

submits in support of her claims, it has no bearing upon the court’s review of the sufficiency 

of her pleadings. Thus, Defendants have failed to provide any viable authority for their 

argument that Plaintiff is required to plead specific allegations with respect to the training 

program she challenges as inadequate. 

 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts implicating 

the “prior pattern” method of establishing deliberate indifference for an alleged failure to 

train. Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 24-25. In support, they argue that “Plaintiff has failed to 

plead anything that allows this Court to properly infer there has a [sic] been a widespread 

practice of police officers or other officials violating the constitutional rights of citizens 

similarly to those of Gregory Gunn, such that [Defendants were] on actual notice that there 

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was a need to rectify the problem through alterations to its training of police officers.” Id.

at 25. 

 As set forth in the previous section of this Recommendation, the undersigned 

concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a widespread practice of MPD officers 

violating citizens’ constitutional rights in the manners described in the Complaint. For the 

same reasons, the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to implicate the “prior 

pattern” avenue of showing deliberate indifference to the need to train municipal 

employees. Nevertheless, the undersigned acknowledges that, in a recent decision that 

Defendants curiously do not cite, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, in order to 

sufficiently allege a “prior pattern” of similar constitutional violations by untrained 

employees, a complaint must provide some “‘factual enhancement’” of an allegation that 

prior incidents provide the requisite notice of a need to train. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 

1329 n.21 (finding factual allegation that merely referenced prior “police shootings of the 

mentally ill” occurring in Palm Beach County insufficient to sustain a claim of that the 

Sheriff’s Office maintained “a policy of not training its deputes in the appropriate use of 

force when seizing mentally ill citizens for transportation to mental health facilities”). To 

the extent Weiland arguably requires such allegations, and would therefore compel a 

finding that Plaintiff’s claim is insufficiently pleaded with respect to “prior pattern” 

liability, Defendants still are not entitled to have their motion to dismiss granted. 

 This is so because “[e]ven if the Complaint does not sufficiently allege a prior 

pattern, the court should consider whether it sufficiently states a claim against [Defendants] 

for single-incident liability.” Stephens, No. 2:16-cv-274-KDB, 2017 WL 34829, at *7. As 

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set forth above, Plaintiff argues that the Complaint sufficiently alleges Defendants’ liability 

under this alternate theory, and, as best the court can tell, Defendants have not directly, or 

at least adequately, challenged this argument. See, e.g., Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 24-25 

(proceeding from argument that Plaintiff “failed to plead anything that allows this Court to 

properly infer there has been a widespread practice” of similar constitutional violations 

“such that the City was on actual notice that there was a need” for training to argument 

that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead the existence of any error in the City’s training 

program).3

 

 This court has recently discussed the genesis and ongoing refinement of the “single 

incident” theory of liability. 

[T]he Supreme Court in City of Canton left open the possibility that “in a 

narrow range of circumstances” a plaintiff may proceed on a failure to train 

 

3

 It appears the closest that Defendants come to meeting Plaintiff’s arguments about the 

applicability of “single incident” liability in this case is when Defendants quote from a section of 

Plaintiff’s own response brief where she describes the circumstances when a defendant is charged 

with constructive notice of a need to train. See Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 24. In particular, 

Defendants emphasize Plaintiff’s concession that, where deliberate indifference is alleged 

“‘without an earlier violation or pattern of abuse, . . . it must have been a highly predictable 

consequence that the municipality’s training or supervision of its employees in that area would 

result in a constitutional violation.’” Id. (quoting Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 30) at 40) (emphasis placed by 

Defendants). However, despite perhaps recognizing Plaintiff’s argument in this regard, and 

perhaps even hinting at some dispute with any contention that the violations allegedly suffered by 

Mr. Gunn were “highly predictable,” Defendants leave that thread dangling. See id. Elsewhere, 

Defendants arguably return to this thread, but only to assert, without citation to relevant authority, 

that because of Plaintiff’s purported failure to allege any specific facts about deficiencies in 

whatever training program Smith supposedly completed, she has not pled any “deliberate conduct” 

on the part of Defendants pursuant to which it was “highly predictable” that Smith would act as he 

did. Id. at 28. If this argument is intended to rebut Plaintiff’s meticulous and coherent argument 

for why “single incident” liability is applicable, see Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 30) at 40-43, 60-61, it is too 

disjointed and ineffectual to assist the court. To the extent it was not intended to answer Plaintiff’s 

argument on this discrete issue, then Defendants have failed to do so at any point in their briefing, 

and that failure alone warrants denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Stephens, 2017 WL 

34829, at *9 (“As movant, the City must establish that the Complaint does not sufficiently allege 

facts showing notice of the need to train and supervise, and it failed to meet its burden to do so.”). 

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30 

claim based upon a single incident of misconduct. [Board of the County 

Commissioners of Bryan County v.] Brown, 520 U.S. [520 U.S. 397, 409 

(1997)]. The City of Canton Court posed the hypothetical of a municipality 

that failed to train its police officers on the use of deadly force. See City of 

Canton, 489 U.S. at 390, n.10. It reasoned that, given the fact that

policymakers know that police officers are required to shoulder deadly 

weapons and may be required to use them to protect the public from fleeing 

felons, the need to train police officers on the constitutional limitations of the 

use of deadly force would be so obvious that a failure to do so would amount 

to deliberate indifference. Id. 

Eight years later, the Supreme Court in Brown clarified that a plaintiff 

could succeed on a theory of so-called “single-incident” liability if he alleged 

“a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a 

municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations 

presenting an obvious potential for such a violation.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 409. 

The Brown Court reasoned further: 

 In leaving open in Canton the possibility that a plaintiff might 

succeed in carrying a failure-to-train claim without showing a 

pattern of constitutional violations, we simply hypothesized that, in 

a narrow range of circumstances a violation of federal rights may be 

a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law 

enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recurring 

situations. The likelihood that the situation will recur and the 

predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that 

situation will violate citizens’ rights could justify a finding that 

policymakers’ decision not to train the officer reflected “deliberate 

indifference” to the obvious consequence of the policymakers’ 

choice—namely, a violation of a specific constitutional or statutory 

right. The high degree of predictability may also support an 

inference of causation—that the municipality's indifference led

directly to the very consequence that was so predictable. 

Brown, 520 U.S. at 409. Accordingly, single-incident liability is predicated 

on (1) the likelihood that a police officer will be confronted with a specific 

situation and (2) the predictability that an officer, when confronted with that 

situation, will violate a person’s constitutional rights. See id.; see also Sewell 

v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 490 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299–300 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. 

denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993)) (“It is not enough to show that a situation will 

arise and that taking the wrong course in that situation will result in injuries 

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31 

to citizens . . . City of Canton also requires a likelihood that the failure to 

train or supervise will result in the officer making the wrong decision.”) 

 

Davis v. City of Montgomery, __ F. Supp. 3d __, __, 2016 WL 6661161, at *5-*6 (M.D. 

Ala. Nov. 10, 2016). 

 In addition to the well-pleaded allegations describing the killing of Mr. Gunn by 

Smith, Plaintiff alleges the following in support of her “single incident” theory of 

supervisory and municipal liability for Defendants’ failure to train Smith: 

[A]t all times material to this complaint Defendants Finley and City 

of Montgomery have known to a great degree of certainty that City of 

Montgomery police officers will be (a) required frequently to make 

investigative stops, to frisk or pat down persons so stopped, and to arrest 

persons for alleged criminal activity; (b) required regularly to determine 

whether use of force is needed to effect an arrest or otherwise, and if so, 

whether to sue less-lethal or instead deadly force; and (c) required on 

occasion to use deadly force, to protect themselves or others from serious 

risk of immediate physical harm. 

The Defendant City having armed its officers with firearms (for

deadly force) and also tools of less-lethal but still significantly harmful force 

(e.g., taser, metal baton), there is an obvious need for Defendants Finley and 

City of Montgomery to train officers in the constitutional limitations of the 

procedures—and especially on the use of deadly and less-lethal force—used 

in dealing with these recurring situations. 

Defendants Finley and City of Montgomery provided inadequate 

training to City of Montgomery police officers relating to the constitutional 

limitations relating to investigative stops, frisking or patting down persons 

so stopped, arrests, the permissible use of force, and the permissible use of 

deadly force, in at least the particular respects in which Defendant Smith 

violated Mr. Gunn’s federal constitutional rights[.] 

Compl. ¶¶ 221-223. 

 As has been noted previously, the “single incident” theory of failure-to-train liability 

is a narrow exception to the general requirement that a plaintiff show a “prior pattern” of 

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32 

similar constitutional violations in order to sustain a failure-to-train claim. Thus, courts 

are generally reluctant to impose “single incident” liability. See generally Whitaker v. 

Miami-Dade Cty., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (“The “single-incident 

liability exception is a narrow one and guidance is limited as neither the Supreme Court 

nor Eleventh Circuit has ever applied it.”). This lack of “guidance” deprives the court of 

significant, definitive authority concerning a plaintiff’s burden in invoking this theory of 

liability at the pleading stage. Id. at 1327 (reviewing cases limiting application of “single 

incident” liability and remarking that “[w]hile these cases (and many others) establish that 

proving a single-incident deliberate indifference claim for municipal liability is difficult, 

they do not specifically speak to the burden of stating such a claim.”) (emphasis in 

original). To be sure, in some cases courts have found plaintiffs’ efforts to even plead 

single incident liability lacking. See, e.g., id. (finding single incident failure-to-train claim 

allegations “conclusory” where complaint’s only “well-pled” allegations described a high 

speed vehicle chase followed by police shooting of vehicle occupants); see also Davis, __ 

F. Supp. 3d at __, 2016 WL 6661161, at *6 (finding plaintiff “has not alleged facts to 

support an allegation that it is a highly predictable consequence of the City’s failure to train 

that police officers would violate the constitutional rights of [speech and hearing impaired 

persons]”). 

 But, considering all of the allegations in the Complaint, the undersigned is of the 

conviction that, at least with respect to Plaintiff’s pleadings, this case is different. To begin 

with, the allegations of the Complaint align neatly with the very hypothetical in which the 

Supreme Court first posited the “single incident” exception. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. 

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at 390 n.10 (“For example, city policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police 

officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons. The city has armed its officers with 

firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish this task. Thus, the need to train officers in 

the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force . . . can be said to be “so obvious,” 

that failure to do so could properly be characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’ to 

constitutional rights.”). And, as the Supreme Court remarked in later reinforcing the 

limited nature of the exception, 

[a]rmed police must sometimes make split-second decisions with life-ordeath consequences. There is no reason to assume that police academy 

applicants are familiar with the constitutional constraints on the use of deadly 

force. And in the absence of training, there is no way for novice officers to 

obtain the legal knowledge they require. Under those circumstances there is 

an obvious need for some form of training. 

Connick, 563 U.S. at 64. Thus, to the extent that Chief Finley, as is alleged by Plaintiff, 

made any decision not to adequately train Officer Smith in the “constitutional constraints 

on the use of deadly force,” then Defendants may be found deliberately indifferent. 

 In this case, the well-pled factual allegations plausibly describe a scenario in which 

single-incident liability might lie. Defendants armed Smith, a white male, with lethal and 

non-lethal weapons and deployed him, alone, for overnight patrol in a predominantly 

African-American neighborhood. There, in the dark, he confronted Mr. Gunn, who was 

simply walking home, without reasonable suspicion to believe that he was involved in 

criminal activity. Rather than simply questioning Mr. Gunn, Smith immediately ordered 

him to submit to a pat-down. Although Mr. Gunn initially complied, when he lawfully fled 

toward the safety of his home, Smith began a pursuit during which he sharply escalated 

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34 

through a continuum of force until he had shot and killed Mr. Gunn, all without ever having 

developed reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing or reasonably believing that Mr. 

Gunn was a threat to Smith or anyone else. While it is certainly one possible inference that 

Smith simply acted contrary to good training provided to him by Chief Finley and the City, 

that is not the only possible inference. It is at least a plausible inference that Smith did not 

receive adequate training, particularly in the circumstances where the use of lethal force is 

constitutionally permissible, and that his lack of training was the “moving force” behind 

the alleged violation of Mr. Gunn’s constitutional rights. It is likewise a plausible inference 

that, given the well-pled allegations discussed above, a failure to adequately train Smith, 

coupled with the circumstances under which he was armed and deployed by Defendants, 

and especially considering his alleged charge to make pretextual stops for the purpose of 

learning whether citizens owe money to the City, made the resulting alleged violations of 

Mr. Gunn’s rights predictable. 

Whether the claim proceeds under the “prior pattern” or “single-incident” theories 

of deliberate indifference, Plaintiff’s claim ultimately may well prove too difficult to 

establish. But that is not the court’s concern in judging the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s 

pleadings. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Accordingly, and considering Defendants’ failure 

to substantively and forthrightly challenge Plaintiff’s allegations concerning “single 

incident” liability, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim 

of supervisory and municipal liability based upon Chief Finley’s and the City’s alleged 

failure to adequately train Smith. See, e.g., Stephens, 2017 WL 34829, at *9 (finding, in a 

case where the plaintiff alleged municipality failed to train police in the use of tasers, that 

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35 

lack of published Eleventh Circuit authority on “whether on the use of Tasers fits within 

the ‘so obvious’ exception,” coupled with the municipality’s failure to “reply to this 

argument, “that the City has not met its burden on its motion to dismiss” the plaintiff’s 

failure-to-train claim).4

 As such, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s supervisory and 

municipal failure-to-train claim in Count Five is due to be denied. 

C. Count VII of the Complaint.

 Count VII of the Complaint alleges that Chief Finley is liable for Mr. Gunn’s 

wrongful death under Alabama law due to his conduct in establishing and implementing 

policies and procedures that violated federal and state law, and which led ultimately to Mr. 

Gunn’s death, as well as for his failure to adequately train Smith. Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 

243-61. Defendants argue that Chief Finley is shielded from liability under Alabama law 

pursuant to state-agent immunity. Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 21) at 14-15. They further assert that 

 

4

 The undersigned recognizes the potential for dissonance between this Recommendation’s 

findings that Plaintiff has adequately pled facts establishing a widespread history of abuse of 

constitutional rights, for purposes of her Fourth Amendment custom or policy claim, even if she 

has not alleged sufficient facts, pursuant to Weiland, to implicate “prior pattern” liability on her 

failure-to-train claim. To reiterate, the undersigned believes that Plaintiff has also pled sufficient 

facts to implicate “prior pattern” liability, even under Weiland. Plaintiff has alleged far more 

supporting facts than the passing reference to prior police shootings, which were not even alleged 

to constitute violations, at issue in Weiland. Nevertheless, any dissonance should not be treated 

as fatal to Plaintiff’s claim. Weiland concerned a municipality’s alleged failure to train, where, as

the Supreme Court has remarked, a “municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its 

most tenuous[.]” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. As such, it is no surprise that courts might impose a 

more rigorous pleading burden for claims premised on that form of “culpability,” as did the court 

in Weiland. In other domains of municipal liability, binding precedent suggests the pleading 

burden is more relaxed. See, e.g., Hoefling, 811 F.3d at 1280-81. Ultimately, though, the 

undersigned’s discussion of the adequacy of Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to single-incident 

liability is intended only to show that, even if Weiland, which was not cited by Defendants, is 

found to defeat Plaintiff’s “prior pattern” theory of deliberate indifference, the Complaint’s 

allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege a claim based on the alternative pathway for 

establishing liability for an alleged failure to train. 

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Plaintiff has not pled “any facts showing that Chief Finley acted willfully, maliciously[,] 

fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his authority, nor does she even imply any such acts 

or omissions occurred.” Id. at 16. In addition, they maintain that “Plaintiff fails to plead 

any facts showing that Chief Finley violated any provisions of the United States 

Constitution, the Alabama Constitution, or any other laws or rules” that would tend to 

defeat his claim of state-agent immunity. Id. 

 Defendants’ argument that Chief Finley is immune is based upon the Alabama 

Supreme Court’s decisions in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000), and Howard 

v. City of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201 (Ala. 2003). See Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 21) at 15. In Cranman, 

the Alabama Supreme Court provided the following restatement of the “rule governing 

State-agent immunity:” 

 A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity

when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent’s 

(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or 

(2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or 

agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as: 

(a) making administrative adjudications; 

(b) allocating resources; 

(c) negotiating contracts; 

(d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or 

(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or 

regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for 

performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; 

or 

(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, 

including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or 

attempting to arrest persons; or 

(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, 

or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of 

unsound mind, or educating students. 

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Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement 

of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her 

personal capacity 

(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of 

this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated 

for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency require 

otherwise; or 

(2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, 

beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. 

792 So. 2d at 405. In Howard, the Court further clarified that the state-agent immunity 

provided for in paragraph two of the Cranman restatement included immunity against a 

claim that a police chief failed to adequately train his subordinate officers. 887 So. 2d at 

210. 

 Plaintiff asserts that Chief Finley is not entitled to immunity under Cranman. 

Plaintiff points to several allegations in the Complaint leveling allegations addressed to 

Chief Finley’s immunity defense. See, e.g., Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 249-250 (alleging that, 

in “establishing and implementing policies and procedures that authorize” police officers 

“to exercise authority beyond the legal limits” described in the Complaint, Chief Finley 

“acted beyond his discretionary authority or under a mistaken interpretation of the law” 

and contrary to “what is required by federal and state law); ¶¶ 258-259 (alleging that, in 

“providing inadequate training” to Smith, Chief Finley acted “beyond his discretionary 

authority or under a mistaken interpretation of the law” and “contrary to what is required” 

by federal and state law). Plaintiff argues that, insofar as Defendants do assert that all 

allegations against Chief Finley concern actions within his discretionary function, and are 

therefore subject to state-agent immunity, Defendants have failed to satisfy their initial 

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burden of proving that Chief Finley was in fact “engaged in performing a discretionary 

function.” Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 30) at 82. Furthermore, Plaintiff submits, Defendants do not 

“address or even mention two (2) of the three (3) immunity exceptions plaintiff did invoke” 

in her Complaint. Id. at 84. Namely, Plaintiff points to her allegations that Chief Finley’s 

conduct is not shielded from immunity because he was “acting under a mistaken 

interpretation of law, and acting contrary to what is required by law.” Id. at 84-85. In sum, 

she points to three ways in which it is sufficiently alleged that Chief Finley’s conduct—

just with respect to his failure to train Smith, since that is the only portion of Count VII 

that Defendants appeared to challenge in their motion—excepts him from state-agent 

immunity under Alabama law: 

Training City officers in policies and procedures that themselves violate the 

law, in that they authorize, permit, and do not prohibit several specified 

unconstitutional practices, is a paradigm example of “acting contrary to what 

is required by law,” and thus conduct on Finley’s part that is not protected 

by immunity. Alternatively, training that authorizes, permits, and does not 

prohibit specified unconstitutional practices a fortiori qualifies as “acting 

under a mistaken interpretation of law”—again conduct on Finley’s part that 

is not immune. And, training City officers that it is permissible to commit 

constitutional violations goes beyond Finley’s discretionary authority—

another ground for denying immunity. 

Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 30) at 87. 

 Although Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s argument that Chief Finley exceeded his 

discretionary authority, they do not challenge her separate arguments that other exceptions 

operate to deprive him of immunity, namely, that he acted “contrary to what is required by 

law” and “under a mistaken interpretation of law.” See Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 29-31; 

id. at 31 (“Because the Plaintiff has failed to make any adequate showing at the pleading 

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39 

stage that Chief Finley acted beyond his discretionary authority in his training of Officer 

Smith, she has failed to show this Court why any exceptions to Cranman apply that would 

preclude Chief Finley from the immunity that Cranman clearly affords him.”). However, 

Defendants provide no authority for their proposition that Chief Finley cannot be excepted 

from state-agent immunity based upon his alleged acting contrary to federal and state law 

or under a mistaken interpretation of law. That fact, alone, warrants denial of Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss at this time. 

In addition to the foregoing, prudential reasons warrant denying the motion at this 

time. As the Alabama Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, a “motion to dismiss is 

typically not the appropriate vehicle by which to assert . . . State-agent immunity and . . . 

normally the determination as to the exercise of such a defense should be reserved until the 

summary judgment stage, following appropriate discovery.” Ex parte Bitel, 45 So. 3d 

1252, 1255 (Ala. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). This is so because proving the 

applicability of state-agent immunity embraces a burden-shifting framework whereby a 

“State agent bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff’s claims arise from a 

function that would entitle the State agent to immunity.” Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 

So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006). If the State agent makes such a showing, the burden then 

shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of the exceptions recognized in Cranman applies. 

Id. This is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry that, in most cases, will require a reviewing 

court to go beyond the four corners of the complaint to properly resolve. Hence, Alabama 

law plainly contemplates that, except in the most obvious circumstances, an immunity 

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defense like the one Chief Finley raises in the instant matter is properly raised in summary 

judgment proceedings, after the parties have conducted discovery. 

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint at least plausibly alleges that Chief Finley, inter alia, 

acted beyond his authority or under a mistaken interpretation of the law in both his adoption 

and implementation of policies and customs relating to the constitutional parameters of 

citizen-police encounters, and in his training of Smith. Thus, even if “at first blush” it 

appeared that Cranman might operate to shield Chief Finley from liability, because “[i]t is 

conceivable that [Plaintiff] could prove facts that would show” her entitlement to relief, 

the motion to dismiss should be denied. See Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 

2000). 

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned concludes that Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Count VII of the Complaint should be denied at this time. 

D. Count VIII of the Complaint.

Count VIII of the Complaint alleges that the City is liable under theories of vicarious 

liability or respondeat superior for the actions of Smith and Chief Finley which, it is 

alleged, caused Mr. Gunn’s wrongful death. Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶¶ 262-266. Defendants 

argue that this claim should be dismissed because the Complaint’s allegations pertaining 

to Smith “rise beyond activity constituting simple ‘neglect, carelessness, or 

unskillfulness[,]’” in that they describe an intentional tort committed by Smith, for which 

the City may not be held vicariously liable. Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 21) at 17-18. Defendants 

further contend that the City is shielded from liability for the actions of Chief Finley 

because, they assert, Chief Finley “is immune from suit as a State-agent acting with 

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discretionary authority within the line and scope of his law enforcement duties pursuant to 

the Court’s restatement of § 6-5-338 in Cranman.” Id. at 19. 

With regard to the City’s alleged liability through Smith, Plaintiff argues that her 

wrongful death claim against Smith plainly alleges that Smith’s “neglect, carelessness, or 

unskillfulness” was the proximate cause of Mr. Gunn’s death. Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 30) at 89. 

As such, she maintains, she is not alleging that Smith committed an intentional tort for 

which the City could not be vicariously liable. Id. Instead, she is alleging a claim of 

negligence against Smith. Moreover, Plaintiff points to recent authority from this court 

rejecting a similar argument made by the instant Defendant in a different case. See Davis 

v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:16-cv-346-WHA, 2016 WL 3769755, at *4 (M.D. Ala. July 

14, 2016) (“Alabama law recognizes claims for negligence in excessive use of force, false 

arrest, and assault and battery. . . . Because claims can be pled in the alternative, Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(d)(2), the court cannot conclude that Davis is precluded from proceeding on 

claims of intentional conduct for purposes of state law claims, as well as his constitutional 

claims, and also alternatively on claims of negligence under state law[.]”). Defendants do 

not further challenge this conception of Plaintiff’s claim. See Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 

31-32. 

For the reasons argued by Plaintiff, including this court’s decision in Davis, the 

undersigned concludes that the City is not shielded from vicarious liability based merely 

upon Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to Smith. 

With respect to the City’s alleged liability through Chief Finley’s actions, Plaintiff 

argues that, because Chief Finley is not protected by immunity, neither is the City. Pl.’s 

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Resp. (Doc. 30) at 93. Defendants agree “that, in the context of the Plaintiff’s wrongful 

death claims, the City of Montgomery’s immunity is directly tied to that of Chief Finley.” 

Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 35) at 31. Because the undersigned has determined that, at this time, 

Chief Finley is not immune pursuant to Cranman, neither is the City entitled to immunity 

at this stage of the proceedings. 

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 

VIII of the Complaint is due to be denied. 

V. CONCLUSION

 For all of the foregoing reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge hereby 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) be GRANTED-IN-PART 

and DENIED-IN-PART. In particular, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in 

her individual capacity against Chief Finley and the City of Montgomery should be 

GRANTED and those claims should be DISMISSED with prejudice due to Plaintiff’s lack 

of standing in her individual capacity. In all other respects, Defendant’s motion should be 

DENIED. It is further 

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before March 15, 2017. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the 

court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

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 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon 

grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5thCir. 

1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. 

City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11thCir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent 

all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business 

on September 30, 1981). 

 DONE this 2nd day of March, 2017. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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