Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04945/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04945-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Robinson,

Petitioner,

v.

Carla Hacker-Agnew, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-04945-PHX-ROS (DMF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter is on referral to the undersigned pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings and a report and recommendation. 

(Doc. 4) James Robinson (“Petitioner” or “Robinson”) timely filed his Petition Under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death 

Penalty) (“Petition”) on December 24, 2018, when he placed it in the prison mailing 

system. (Doc. 1 at 11)1 Respondents filed their Answer on February 19, 2019. (Doc. 7) 

Petitioner filed his Reply on March 6, 2019. (Doc. 8) As is explained below, undersigned 

recommends the Petition be denied and that a certificate of appealability also be denied.

. . .

 

1 Citationsto the record indicate documents as displayed in the official electronic document 

filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case Number CV-18-04945-

PHX-ROS (DMF).

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s Arrest, Indictment, Conviction and Sentence

The Arizona Court of Appeals provided a description of the events underlying 

Petitioner’s arrest, indictment, conviction and sentence in its September 2018

memorandum decision affirming his conviction and sentence.2(Doc. 7-3 at 126-131) The 

court of appeals explained that:

In the afternoon of October 14, 2015, an undercover detective with the 

Phoenix Police Department stopped his unmarked vehicle at the corner of 

13th Avenue and Pima Street in Phoenix and waved to a group of males 

standing nearby. An older African-American man wearing black-and-white 

checkered shorts approached the vehicle. The detective stated he “was 

looking for some rock,” or crack cocaine. When the man asked how much, 

the detective said he “wanted a dub,” or $20 worth. The man in the checkered 

shorts walked over to an individual, retrieved an item, and returned to the 

vehicle with an off-white-colored rock the detective recognized as crack 

cocaine. The detective paid the man $20, denied the man's request for “a 

hit,” and left the area. A second detective passing by shortly thereafter also 

saw an older African-American man wearing black-and-white plaid or 

checkered shorts on the corner.

Fifteen minutes later, a uniformed officer canvassed the area attempting to 

locate and identify the man who completed the drug transaction. The officer 

contacted an older African-American man in black-and-white plaid shorts 

walking in the street nearby. The man gave his name as James Robinson. 

Both the officer and the undercover detective confirmed the man they 

contacted was the same man depicted in Robinson's driver's license photo.

Robinson was indicted on one count of sale or transportation of narcotic 

drugs. At trial, a forensic scientist confirmed the substance the detective 

purchased was 191.6 milligrams of cocaine base, or crack cocaine, which the 

parties stipulated is a narcotic drug.

 

2 The appellate court’s stated facts are entitled to the presumption of correctness. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam) (“In habeas 

proceedings in federal court, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be 

correct.”); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763, n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument 

that the statement of facts in an Arizona Supreme Court opinion should not be afforded the 

presumption of correctness).

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Following an unsuccessful motion for judgment of acquittal, the jury 

convicted Robinson as charged. At a separate trial on prior convictions, the 

State presented certified records and fingerprint evidence to verify 

Robinson's prior felony convictions. The superior court then sentenced 

Robinson as a non-dangerous, repetitive offender to the minimum sentence 

of 10.5 years’ imprisonment and credited him with 239 days of presentence 

incarceration.

(Id. at 127-128)

B. Petitioner’s Direct Appeal

In June 2018, Petitioner filed a supplemental brief pro per on direct appeal after his 

appointed appellate counsel had filed an Anders brief in which counsel avowed he had 

searched the record and was unable to identify any nonfrivolous arguable question of law.

(Id. at 127, ¶ 1) Petitioner argued that he had not been identified beyond a reasonable 

doubt, his charge was not “properly expressed,” the drug he sold to the uncover police 

officer was “not properly identified,” the Arizona statutes defining crack cocaine were 

“unnecessarily vague,” and he was “not tried before a properly constituted jury.” (Id. at 

94-98) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Id. 

at 126-131) Petitioner did not seek to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence.

C. Petitioner’s Habeas Claims

Petitioner raises four grounds for relief in the Petition. (Doc. 1 at 6-9) In Ground 

One, Petitioner alleges his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 

were violated because the evidence against him was insufficient to: (1) “identify him 

beyond a reasonable doubt”; (2) “clearly and concisely charg[e] him”; and (3) “sufficiently 

identify the subject substance alleged to have been sold.” (Id. at 6) Petitioner argues in 

Ground Two that his constitutional due process rights were violated because his indictment 

was not sufficiently specific in defining his drug charge. (Id. at 7) Petitioner’s Ground 

Three alleges his jury was not “properly constituted” pursuant to the Sixth Amendment.

(Id. at 8) Petitioner’s Ground Four claim alleges his sentence was excessive in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 9)

. . .

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Petition – Merits Standard of Review

On habeas review, this Court may grant relief if Petitioner demonstrates prejudice 

because the adjudication of a claim on the merits in state court either: “(1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) 

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This is a 

“‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings’ which demands that state 

court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)).

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court 

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the 

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... case” or 

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context 

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context 

where it should apply.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). For a federal court 

to find a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable” under § 

2254(d)(1), the petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was not merely incorrect 

or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

To make a determination pursuant to § 2254(d)(1), the Court first identifies the 

“clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on 

habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists of the holdings of the United 

States Supreme Court which existed at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction 

became final. Id. at 412. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “an unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Id. at 

410 (emphasis in original). Under AEDPA, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim 

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on 

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the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 

(2011). Accordingly, to obtain habeas relief from this Court, Petitioner “must show that 

the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.

With respect to § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination 

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the 

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

340 (2003). A “state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the 

federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood 

v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, to find that a factual 

determination is unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2), the court must be “convinced that an 

appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably 

conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 

1000 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1000 

(9th Cir. 2014). “This is a daunting standard—one that will be satisfied in relatively few 

cases.” Id.

In making a determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court “looks 

to the last reasoned state court decision to address the claim,” White v. Ryan, 895 F.3d 641, 

665 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Wilson v. Sellers, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018)).

In this case, the last reasoned state court decision was that of the Arizona Court of Appeals 

deciding Petitioner’s direct appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

Respondents do not argue that any of Petitioner’s grounds for relief are subject to 

procedural bar. Accordingly, Respondents have addressed the merits of each of 

Petitioner’s four grounds for relief. Each ground for relief is addressed in turn below.

. . .

. . .

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A. Ground One – Insufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner argues the evidence against him was insufficient in three regards, 

violating his constitutional due process rights. He contends the evidence was inadequate 

to “identify him beyond a reasonable doubt,” that his charging documents were not 

sufficiently clear and concise, and that the evidence of testing the substance sold to the 

undercover police officer described in his indictment as “crack cocaine” was insufficient.

Petitioner’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307 (1979), must surmount “a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because 

they are subject to two layers of judicial deference.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 

651 (2012). The first layer of deference involves review on direct appeal where the 

appellate court must consider that “‘it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to 

decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing

court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no 

rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.’” Id. (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 

U.S. 1, 2 (2011) (per curiam)). The second layer of deference is inherent to federal habeas 

review of a state court decision where “a federal court may not overturn a state court 

decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court 

disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court 

decision was objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

1. Petitioner’s identification

Petitioner notes that undercover Phoenix Police Detective Richard Lamberto was 

the officer who purchased the packet of crack cocaine and who broadcast a description of 

the individual who sold the drugs as a “bald, Black male, sunglasses, black and white 

shorts, approximately five-ten, five-eleven.” (Doc. 8 at 2) Petitioner states that 

approximately 30 minutes after the drug deal, Phoenix Police Officer Aaron Lentz stopped 

a pedestrian who generally met the broadcast description a few blocks from the site of the 

drug deal. (Id.) Petitioner asserts this individual was described by Officer Lentz as wearing 

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plaid shorts and having a salt-and-pepper beard. (Id.) Officer Lentz asked the person for 

his identification. (Id.) The individual was not carrying identification, but said his name 

was James Robinson. (Id.)

In its memorandum decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals explained that an 

undercover detective from the Phoenix Police Department purchased $20 worth of crack 

cocaine from a person later identified as Petitioner, whom the court described as “an older 

African-American man wearing black-and-white checkered shorts.” (Doc. 7-3 at 127) The

court noted that shortly after the drug deal, a second undercover detective passed by and 

saw “an older African-American man wearing black-and-white plaid or checkered shorts” 

at the location where the drug deal occurred. (Id.) The court of appeals further detailed 

that “fifteen minutes later,” a uniformed officer drove through the area where the drug deal 

occurred and “contacted an older African-American man in black-and-white plaid shorts 

walking in the street nearby.” (Id. at 128) The court explained that both the uniformed 

“officer and the undercover detective confirmed the man they contacted was the same man 

depicted in [Petitioner’s] driver’s license photo.” (Doc. 7-3 at 128) The court of appeals 

concluded that “[t]he record contains sufficient evidence upon which the jury could 

determine beyond a reasonable doubt that [Petitioner] knowingly sold the undercover 

detective $20 worth of crack cocaine and was therefore guilty of sale or transport of a 

narcotic drug.” (Id. at 129)

The three Phoenix Police officers identified in the court of appeals’ memorandum 

decision as described above each testified at Petitioner’s trial. As Petitioner notes, the 

undercover police detective who purchased the crack cocaine was Detective Richard 

Lamberto. (Doc. 7-2 at 8-44 (RT 9/20/17)) The second undercover officer who drove past

the scene of the drug deal shortly afterwards was Detective Ryan Moskop. (Id. at 45-56, 

64-77) As Petitioner also notes (Doc. 8 at 2), Officer Aaron Lentz was the uniformed 

officer who encountered Petitioner a short distance from the site of the drug deal and 

questioned him. (Doc. 7-2 at 95-109)

. . .

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Detective Lamberto testified about the drug deal, which he confirmed occurred on 

the afternoon of October 14, 2015. (Id. at 14) He said he was working undercover when 

he pulled up to an intersection where there were several men congregated. (Id. at 15) The 

detective stated he waved at the group and a person he later identified as Petitioner came 

over to his car. (Id.) The detective declared he told Petitioner he was looking for some 

“rock” (crack cocaine). (Id.) During this exchange, Lamberto recalled he noticed 

Petitioner’s black-and-white checkered shorts, that he was African-American, bald, about 

five feet ten or eleven inches tall, and that he wore sunglasses and a black, short-sleeved 

T-shirt. (Id. at 16) Detective Lamberto said that after the deal was completed, he began to 

drive away and telephoned Detective Moskop to give Moskop a physical description of 

Petitioner and what he wore. (Id. at 17) Lamberto also testified that at some point in his 

investigation, he was contacted by Officer Lentz, who provided information about the 

person from whom he had purchased the crack cocaine. (Id. at 17-18) Detective Lamberto 

reported he returned to his office about two hours after the drug deal (Id. at 40) and “ran 

the name and date of birth through one of our law enforcement databases, [and] obtained 

the photograph. Once . . . I got the photograph, I immediately recognized the individual as 

James Robinson, the person who just sold me the crack cocaine.” (Id. at 18) The detective 

stated that Petitioner was neither searched nor arrested that day. (Id. at 41)

Detective Moskop testified that at the time of the drug deal, he was serving as a 

cover officer for Detective Lamberto. (Id. at 50) After the drug purchase, Detective 

Moskop said that Detective Lamberto called him and Moskop drove his unmarked car past 

the corner where the purchase had occurred. (Id. at 51) The detective reported he saw a 

group of men there and that one of them was a Black male wearing a black shirt with blackand-white plaid shorts. (Id.) He said the shorts could have been checkered and were a 

black-and-white square print. (Id. at 52) He explained that “he was also putting out the 

information to the marked unit that Detective Lamberto had relayed.” (Id.) He stated that 

the marked unit was Officer Lentz. (Id.)

. . .

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Officer Aaron Lentz testified at trial that on the afternoon of the drug deal at issue, 

he was informed by Detective Lamberto that the detective had purchased drugs in Officer 

Lentz’s patrol area. (Doc. 7-2 at 98) Lentz stated he was provided with a description of 

the drug seller, and that he drove through the area of the drug deal looking for an individual 

matching the description he had been given. (Id.) Officer Lentz said he located an 

individual matching the description provided and that the individual was “wearing blackand-white shorts and a shirt. He matched the physical description in terms of height and 

weight, and then he also had a salt-and-pepper beard, which is part of the description that 

was provided, too.” (Id. at 99) Officer Lentz explained that the individual did not have 

identification, but on request provided his name, date of birth, and social security number.

(Id. at 100) Using this information, Officer Lentz testified he made a records check from 

his police car and obtained a motor vehicle photo associated with the information the 

individual gave him. (Id. at 100-101) The officer said the identity associated with the 

personal information was that for a person named James Robinson. (Id. at 101) Officer 

Lentz also confirmed he was certain at the time he encountered Petitioner that the motor 

vehicle photograph associated with James Robinson’s personal information matched the 

individual he was speaking to. (Id. at 102) The officer identified Petitioner in the 

courtroom as the same individual he had encountered and identified from the motor vehicle 

photograph. (Id. at 98-99)

The evidence supporting Petitioner’s identification was not insufficient such that no 

rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury. The evidence was sufficient such that

any rational trial of fact could agree with the jury. Further, the decision of the Arizona 

Court of Appeals holding the identification sufficient was not objectively unreasonable.

The holding by the court of appeals was objectively reasonable.

2. Evidence to support the drug charge and drug testing results

Petitioner complains that he was charged with “the sale of ‘crack cocaine’ as a Class 

2 felony, but that only a ‘consistent with’ level of classification was provided, which also 

showed the presence of other isomers.” (Doc. 1 at 6)

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The Arizona Court of Appeals indicated that Petitioner was indicted on one count 

of sale or transportation of narcotic drugs. (Doc. 7-3 at 128) The court quoted A.R.S. §

13-3408(A)(7) and stated that “[a] person is guilty of sale or transport of a narcotic drug if 

he ‘knowingly . . . [t]ransport[s] for sale, . . . offer[s] to transport for sale . . ., sell[s], 

transfer[s], or offer[s] to sell or transfer a narcotic drug.’” (Id.) The court of appeals 

declared that “[c]rack cocaine is a narcotic drug. A.R.S. § 3401(20)(bb) (defining ‘narcotic 

drug’ to include ‘any substance neither chemically nor physically distinguishable from . . . 

coca leaves,’ whether ‘of natural or synthetic origin’).” (Id. at 128-129) The court of 

appeals concluded the record “contains sufficient evidence upon which the jury could 

determine beyond a reasonable doubt that [Petitioner] knowingly sold the undercover 

detective $20 worth of crack cocaine and was therefore guilty of sale or transport of a 

narcotic drug.” (Id. at 129) Further, the court stated that “[a]t trial, a forensic scientist 

confirmed the substance the detective purchased was 191.6 milligrams of cocaine base, or 

crack cocaine, which the parties stipulated is a narcotic drug.” (Doc. 7-3 at 128).

Petitioner argues that the Arizona criminal statutes on which he was indicted lack 

the specificity of their federal law counterparts. (Doc. 8 at 3) This argument is unavailing

because claims of insufficient evidence on federal habeas “are reviewed by looking at the 

elements of the offense under state law.” Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 

2011) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16).

Petitioner was indicted under A.R.S. §§ 13-3401 and 13-3408. As the Arizona 

Court of Appeals noted, A.R.S. § 13-3408(A) provides that a “person shall not knowingly: 

. . . sell, transfer or offer to sell or transfer a narcotic drug.” A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(7). As 

the court of appeals further recognized, A.R.S. § 13-3401 defines “narcotic drugs” as 

including coca leaves, “whether of natural or synthetic origin and any substance neither 

chemically nor physically distinguishable from them[.]” A.R.S. § 13-3401(20)(bb). In 

addition, A.R.S. § 13-3401 defines “coca leaves” as “cocaine, its optical isomers and any

compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture or preparation of coca leaves . . . .” 

A.R.S. § 13-3401(5).

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In addressing Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals determined whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Doc. 7-3 at 128 (emphasis in original)) This test properly 

comports with the standard discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Coleman v. 

Johnson, 566 U.S. at 651, cited above. The court of appeals concluded that the record 

“contain[ed] sufficient evidence” to support the jury’s determination beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Petitioner was guilty of the charge on which he was tried. (Id. at 129)

As discussed above, three police officers testified as to the identification of 

Petitioner as the person who sold Detective Lamberto the drug. Detective Lamberto 

identified trial Exhibit 4 as the drug he purchased from Petitioner. (Doc. 7-2 at 23-24) He

testified that before the laboratory tested the drug, at the police station he put the substance 

he had purchased from Petitioner in a plastic vial, which he then placed in a plastic bag and 

wrote “the date, incident, barcode number . . . [and his] name and serial number” on the 

plastic bag. (Id. at 26) He stated that he impounded the bag at his office to go to the testing 

laboratory and in his report requested that the contents of the vial in the plastic bag be 

tested for crack cocaine. (Id.) A forensic scientist with the Phoenix Police Department 

Crime Laboratory, Erica Bell, testified at Petitioner’s trial. (Doc. 7-2 at 79-94) Ms. Bell 

attested she had analyzed the drug obtained by Detective Lamberto in the drug deal using 

an instrument known as a gas chromatograph mass spectrometer. (Id. at 84-85) She 

declared her testing showed the material to be 191.6 milligrams of cocaine base, which she 

confirmed is another name for crack cocaine. (Id. at 85)

For these reasons, undersigned concludes that the evidence adduced at trial to 

support the drug charge and drug testing results was not insufficient such that no rational 

trier of fact could have agreed with the jury and that the decision of the Arizona Court of 

Appeals was not objectively unreasonable. The evidence was sufficient such that a rational 

trier of fact could agree with the jury. The Arizona court of appeals’ decision was 

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objectively reasonable. Petitioner has not established that the Arizona court of appeals’ 

decision on the merits of this claim was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

B. Ground Two – Deficient Indictment

Petitioner contends that his indictment was unconstitutional because “the necessary 

and statutory description of a particular and distinct substance was not defined with 

sufficient specificity within the generic class of narcotic drugs.” (Doc. 1 at 7) He argues 

that section 13-3401 fails to “specifically proscribe ‘hydrolyzed’ ‘crack’ or ‘cocaine base’, 

as each of these variances require consideration of the geometric, as distinct from, the 

optical isomers.” (Id.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claim that his indictment was 

inadequate, explaining:

[Petitioner] argues the indictment was insufficient to apprise him of the 

nature and cause of the accusations against him. An indictment is “a plain, 

concise statement of the facts sufficiently definite to inform the defendant of 

a charged offense.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.1(a); accord State v. Schwartz, 188 

Ariz. 313, 319 (App. 1996). “Each count of an indictment or information 

must state the official or customary citation of the statute ... the defendant 

allegedly violated.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.1(d). The purpose of the indictment 

is simply to provide notice of the charges, however, and it need not detail the 

prosecution's theory of the case. Schwartz, 188 Ariz. at 319-20. The 

indictment here accuses [Petitioner] of knowingly selling or transporting the 

narcotic drug crack cocaine in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3408 on or about 

October 14, 2015. Nothing more was required, and we find no error.

[Petitioner] argues the statutory definition of “narcotic drug” is 

unconstitutionally vague and does not include crack cocaine. We disagree. 

Coca leaves are a narcotic drug and include “cocaine, its optical isomers and 

any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture or preparation of coca 

leaves.” A.R.S. § 13-3401(5), (20)(bb). This definition plainly includes 

crack cocaine, see United States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669, 676 (5th Cir. 1990)

(“Cocaine base is merely an isomer of cocaine.”)—a fact [Petitioner]

stipulated to at trial.

(Doc. 7-3 at 129)

. . .

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Petitioner fails to argue that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision on the adequacy 

of his claim involved an unreasonable application of or was contrary to clearly established 

federal law as announced by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Sixth 

Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to be informed of the nature of the 

charges against them in order to permit adequate preparation of a defense. In re Oliver, 

333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948). The Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes this guarantee applicable to the states. Gautt 

v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1245 (2008); see 

also Cole, 333 U.S. at 201 (“No principle of procedural due process is more clearly 

established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the 

issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused 

in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal.”). To determine whether a defendant 

has received constitutionally adequate notice, a reviewing court looks primarily to the 

charging document. See Gautt, 489 F.3d at 1003.

In the indictment, Petitioner was charged with violating Arizona Revised Statutes 

sections: 13-3401 (which includes the definition of “narcotic drugs” in section 13-

3401(20)(bb) and of “coca leaves” in section 13-3401(5)); 13-3408 (under which Petitioner 

was charged for selling, transferring or offering to sell or transfer a narcotic drug in section 

13-3408(A)); 13-3418 (providing a person is ineligible to receive public benefits on 

conviction of drug offenses); 13-701 and 13-702 (sentencing and imprisonment); and 13-

801 (fines for felonies). (Doc. 7-1 at 3-4) The single count charged that Petitioner “on or 

about October 14, 2015, knowingly did transport for sale, import into this state, offer to 

transport for sale or import into this state, sell, transfer, or offer to sell or transfer cocaine 

base or hydrolyzed (crack) cocaine, a narcotic drug[.]” (Id.) The jury found Petitioner 

guilty of sale or transportation of narcotic drugs. (Doc. 7-3 at 60) Because the State both 

charged and proved that the substance possessed by Petitioner was crack cocaine, a narcotic 

drug, there was no variance between the charged offense and the proof offered to convict.

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Petitioner has not shown that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision on the 

adequacy of his claim involved an unreasonable application of or was contrary to clearly 

established federal law as announced by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Petitioner does not argue that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was founded on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence presented at trial. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2), and the record does not support such an argument.

C. Ground Three – Jury Selection

Petitioner argues the racial mix of his jury was unconstitutional, stating that the 

initial venire panel included only 2.8% African-Americans, only one of whom survived 

voir dire. (Doc. 1 at 8) Petitioner is African-American. (Id.) He complains that the jury 

panel did not represent a representative demographic cross-section of the community in 

which he was tried. (Id.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s argument, explaining that:

[Petitioner] argues he was not tried before “a properly constituted jury” 

because the pool of seventy potential jurors contained only two AfricanAmerican individuals and did not accurately represent the racial makeup of 

his community. We will not reverse a conviction based upon irregularities 

in the selection of a jury, however, if a fair and impartial jury was ultimately 

secured. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(a) (noting “[a] party may challenge the 

panel on the ground that its selection involved a material departure from the 

requirements of law,” but “must be in writing, specify the factual basis for 

the challenge, and make a showing of prejudice to the party”); State v. 

Thomas, 133 Ariz. 533, 537 (1982) (“[A]bsent some showing of abuse and 

resulting prejudice, Rule 18.4(a) does not require reversal so long as a party's 

right to an impartial jury is not impaired.”). [Petitioner] does not allege, let 

alone demonstrate, that the jurors ultimately selected could not or did not 

render a fair and impartial verdict, and we find no error.

(Doc. 7-3 at 129-130)

Although Petitioner argued federal law supported his argument that he had not been 

tried before a properly constituted jury (Doc. 1 at 28), the Arizona Court of Appeals relied 

on state law grounds to decide Petitioner’s claim (Doc. 129-130). The question before this 

Court is whether Petitioner has established the state court of appeals’ decision was contrary 

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to federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

As Respondents point out (Doc. 7 at 6), the United States Supreme Court has instructed 

that “[a] state court’s decision is not ‘contrary to ... clearly established Federal law’ simply 

because the court did not cite our opinions. [Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)]. We 

have held that a state court need not even be aware of our precedents, ‘so long as neither

the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.’ Ibid.” Mitchell v. 

Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).

The Supreme Court stated in Taylor v. Louisiana that its precedents had 

“unambiguously declared that the American concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury 

drawn from a fair cross section of the community.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 

(1975). The Supreme Court explained that “[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any 

particular composition,” but cautioned that “jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires 

from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the 

community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.” Id. at 538. The 

Supreme Court established a three-prong test required for a litigant to prevail on a fair

cross-section claim in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Under this test, to 

“establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement,” a litigant must 

prove: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; 

(2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair

and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that 

this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection 

process.”

Respondents concede that Petitioner has met the first Duren test prong: that is, as 

an African-American, Petitioner is a member of a distinctive group. (Doc. 7 at 10; see 

United States v. Cannady, 54 F.3d 544, 547 (9th Cir. 1995) (“This court and the Supreme 

Court have repeatedly recognized [African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians] to be 

‘distinctive groups in the community.’”)) Petitioner, however, fails to address, let alone 

establish, either the second or third prong of the Duren test. “The second prong ‘requires 

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proof, typically statistical data, that the jury pool does not adequately represent the 

distinctive group in relation to the number of such persons in the community.” United

States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014). Petitioner advises the 

Court that of the initial venire pool of 70 people, 2 were African-American, which he states 

is a percentage of 2.8 %. (Doc. 1 at 8) Aside from not providing any support for this 

observation, Petitioner further does not proffer any statistical analysis to establish 

underrepresentation. Id. at 1165. Petitioner does not address or offer any proof of the 

prong three element concerning systematic exclusion.

Having failed to establish a prima facie case under the Duren test, Petitioner has not 

shown the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of this argument on the merits provides 

grounds for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

D. Ground Four – Excessive Punishment

Petitioner asserts his sentence was excessive in violation of Eighth Amendment 

protections against cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 1 at 9) He argues the sentencing 

court applied the improper sentencing statute, and that if the proper statute had been 

applied, his sentence of imprisonment would have been only 3 years, as opposed to the 

10.5-year sentence he was given. (Id., Doc. 8 at 3)

In his supplemental brief filed with the Arizona Court of Appeals on his direct

appeal, Petitioner recognized that he received less than a presumptive sentence. (Doc. 1 at 

27) He argued in the brief that his sentence was excessive because his actions “constituted 

that of a facilitator” and he should have been “subject to a Class 6” sentence. (Id.) He 

further contended that the jury improperly found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Id.) The court of appeals noted that Petitioner claimed his conviction was based on 

insufficient evidence and that his sentence was illegal and excessive. (Doc. 7-3 at 128)

The court, however, found no fundamental error and stated that at Petitioner’s sentencing 

hearing the sentencing court had “stated on the record the evidence and materials it had 

considered and the factors it found in imposing the sentences.” (Id. at 130) The court of 

appeals also found that Petitioner’s sentence was within the statutory range, citing Arizona 

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Revised Statutes section 13-703(C) and (J). (Id. at 129)

“The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains a 

narrow proportionality principle that applies to noncapital sentences.” Ewing v. California, 

538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But “[t]he Eighth 

Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it 

forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate to the crime.’” Id. at 23

(citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 

(1991)); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that respecting a finding of gross 

disproportionality, it has “not established a clear or consistent path for courts to follow.” 

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. For purposes of federal habeas corpus review, the gross

disproportionality principle is “the only relevant clearly established law amenable to the 

‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’ framework” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Id. at 73 (state court decision affirming two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison 

for third “strike” conviction was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the 

gross disproportionality principle set forth in prior Supreme Court decisions). In Andrade, 

the Supreme Court explained that “the precise contours of [the gross disproportionality 

principle] are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Id. at 

73. “Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority 

that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for 

crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted 

criminals.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). The Supreme Court has noted that 

a proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should consider the following 

criteria, including: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the 

sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences 

imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. at 292. The Supreme 

Court, however, has not uniformly applied this three-step analysis. See, e.g., Harmelin,

501 U.S. at 1005; Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980). A court generally will not 

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overturn a sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds provided it does not exceed statutory 

limits. United States v. Zavala-Serra, 853 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding 

sentence of ten years' imprisonment for conspiracy to possess and distribute 2,000 grams 

of cocaine where sentence was within statutory range).

On October 27, 2017, the superior court conducted a trial addressing Petitioner’s 

prior convictions as they impacted his sentencing on his July 2016 drug charge. (Doc. 7-3 

at 76-77) The superior court found that Petitioner had two prior felony convictions, one in 

1993 for possession of narcotic drugs, a Class 4 felony, and the other for sale or 

transportation of narcotic drugs, a Class 2 felony, committed in 2007. (Id. at 77) The court

took under advisement the existence of other prior convictions. (Id.) On November 3, 

2017, the superior court ruled on the prior felony convictions for sentence enhancement 

purposes. (Id. at 79-81) The court found the prosecution had proven five additional prior 

felonies, including two drug charge convictions in 1982, a drug charge conviction in 1986, 

an aggravated assault and battery charge conviction in 1982, and a theft charge conviction 

in 1982. (Id. at 80-81) The court found that based on “all of the priors found” Petitioner 

“shall be in Category 3 for sentencing, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703(J).” (Id. at 81)

Respondents compare Petitioner’s circumstances to those considered by the United 

States Supreme Court in Andrade3and Ewing4and conclude that the sentences upheld by 

the Court in those cases as not grossly disproportionate were longer than Petitioner’s, even 

though the underlying offenses were petty property offenses that were less serious than 

 

3

In Andrade, the petitioner was convicted in state court to two consecutive terms of 25 

years to life in prison upon his conviction of two counts of petty theft with a prior 

conviction for three counts of first-degree residential burglary. 538 U.S. at 66-68.

4 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner’s sentence in Ewing, where the 

petitioner was convicted on a count of felony grand theft after stealing three golf clubs 

from the pro shop at a golf course. 538 U.S. at 17-18, 19. After finding that the petitioner 

had been convicted “previously of four serious or violent felonies for . . . three burglaries 

and [a] robbery,” the state court sentenced the petitioner to a sentence of 25 years to life. 

Id. at 19-20. The Supreme Court held the petitioner’s sentence was not grossly 

disproportionate and did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

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Petitioner’s offense of selling a narcotic drug. (Doc. 7 at 11)

Here, undersigned is unable to conclude that Petitioner’s sentence of 10.5 years, 

which was within the statutory range and was based in part on an extensive criminal history 

of felonies primarily on drug offenses, is an “exceedingly rare” and “extreme” case of gross 

disproportionality. Instead, the sentence “reflects a rational legislative judgment, entitled 

to deference, that offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who 

continue to commit felonies must be incapacitated.” Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30. Petitioner’s 

sentence pursuant to the repeat offender provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-

703 “supports the legislature's determination that repeat offenders should suffer harsher 

penalties than first-time offenders.” State v. Diaz, 224 Ariz. 322, 325, 230 P.3d 705, 708 

(2010) (citing State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 270, 693 P.2d 921, 925 (1985) (“[t]he aim of 

the legislature in enacting provisions for enhanced or mandatory sentences for repeat

offenders ... is to treat more severely those who have prior felony convictions.”)). Under 

these circumstances, Petitioner’s sentence does not raise an inference of gross 

disproportionality.

Petitioner has not established that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of his

Eighth Amendment claim is contrary to, or rests on an unreasonable application of, federal 

law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on Ground 

Four.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, undersigned recommends the Court deny the Petition. 

Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the District Judge’s judgment, the 

District Judge’s decision is justified because Petitioner has not “made a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and jurists of reason would 

not find the Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s constitutional claims “debatable or wrong,” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, to the extent the District Judge 

adopts this Report and Recommendation regarding the Petition, a certificate of 

appealability should be denied.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that James Robinson’s Petition Under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death 

Penalty) (Doc. 1) be denied.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be denied 

because Petitioner has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and jurists of reason would not find the Court’s assessment 

of Petitioner’s constitutional claims “debatable or wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which 

to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 26th day of November, 2019.

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