Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02365/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02365-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GILDARDO RAMIREZ-MORALES, No. CIV S-04-2365-DFL-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DAVID L. RUNNELS,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), filed on October 18, 2004, respondent’s answer (Doc. 12), filed

on June 22, 2005, and petitioner’s reply (Doc. 16), filed on July 7, 2005.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 1

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts1

The state court recited the following facts, and petitioner has not offered any clear

and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

During the early morning hours of May 24, 2000, defendant, who

had been drinking, got into an argument with his wife Olga. Olga told

defendant to leave and he attempted to hit her, but was prevented from

doing so by their 13-year-old son Alberto. After arguing further with

Olga, defendant attempted to again strike her, and again was prevented

from doing so by Alberto. Olga gathered defendant’s clothes from the

bedroom and put them in a bag. Defendant obtained a knife from the

kitchen and attempted to stab Olga in the stomach; however, defendant

ended up stabbing Alberto in the arm when the latter stepped in front of

his mother. The knife penetrated both sides of Alberto’s arm.

Defendant made no further attempts at physical violence

and left the home. He was arrested later the same morning by

police at a bus bench.

* * *

Defendant did not testify and presented no witnesses. 

B. Procedural History

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with a

deadly weapon and one count of child endangerment. As to the assault counts, the jury found

that petitioner inflicted great bodily injury. The jury also found true the allegation that petitioner

had three prior convictions which are “strikes” under California sentencing law. Petitioner was

sentenced to 64 years to life. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal

in a reasoned opinion. The California Supreme Court denied direct review and also denied

habeas corpus relief. 

///

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to

reach petitioner’s claim under its “relitigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204,

1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where the AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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4

Under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision

is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. In

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a majority of the

Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A state court

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently than

the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refused to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an

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erroneous or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot

necessarily be found even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision

is clearly erroneous. See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear

error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id. As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal

law, where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn,

283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that the state court applied the correct law and analyzes

whether the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application

of that law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

In his petition, petitioner raises eight grounds for relief. Petitioner claims: 

(1) there was no evidence to establish that he stabbed his son; (2) the trial judge was not

impartial; (3) his prior conviction for attempted robbery was based on a plea that was not

knowing and voluntary; (4) his prior conviction for making terrorist threats was based on a plea

that was not knowing and voluntary; (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (6) ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel; (7) the trial court erred in denying his motion to substitute

appointed counsel; and (8) Proposition 21, which made his prior convictions “strikes,” is invalid

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because it violates the California single-subject rule for initiative measures. 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner argues that “no evidence proves that petitioner stabbed his son.”

Petitioner’s argument, in its entirety, is as follows:

Is true that Petitioner was calling his wife a whore. When Alberto

Ramirez heard Petitioner saying to his mother whore, Petitioner and

Alberto Ramirez wrestled and both of them went to the floor. Petitioner

was trying to take the knife off from Alberto Ramirez, and on the

wrestling, Alberto Ramirez cut himself in the arm. Ms. Melissa Masters

affirmed that above. She testified that Alberto Ramirez and Petitioner

were on the floor. (RT 147, 154-55). Ms. Master[s] indicated that Alberto

jumped him. (RT 149). However, Alberto Ramirez testified that he was

stabbed when he was hugging his mother to prevent her from being

stabbed. (RT 15). Ms. Master[s] indicated on cross-examination that she

did not see Petitioner grabbing a knife. (RT 159). Petitioner’s right under

the 14th Amend. have bee[n] violated. 

When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus

relief is available if it is found that, upon the record of evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Under Jackson,

the court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on

habeas. See id. It is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. “The

question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether

rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d

303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in the

context of the substantive elements of the criminal offense, as defined by state law. See Jackson,

443 U.S. at 324 n.16.

Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim was raised in his state habeas

petition, which was denied without comment. Because the state court denied the claim without

providing any reasoning, this court will presume it applied the law summarized above and

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review to determine whether the denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of

that law. Here, the gravamen of petitioner’s claim is that Ms. Masters’ testimony does not

support the prosecution theory that petitioner stabbed his son, as opposed to the stabbing being

an accident. A review of the trial transcript reveals that Ms. Masters offered the following

relevant testimony concerning the incident:

[Olga] and [petitioner] were fighting and the youngest one came

and woke me up and they were in there fighting and everything, and then

he tried to stab their mom.

* * *

Yeah. The youngest son, Nico, Nicholas, he came and knocked on

my door and then came – told me that they are fighting. 

* * * 

I went in there and they were trying to keep [petitioner] on the

floor so he did – and Alberto was trying to keep him down so he couldn’t

hit his mom and he was saying something about Alberto not being his son

or something like that. And then they just started fighting and they went

in the room, got his stuff together and told him to leave and he didn’t do it. 

He grabbed the knife and tried to stab her.

* * *

Alberto kept putting him back down on the floor. 

* * *

[Petitioner] got really mad and started yelling. And then he

grabbed the knife off the counter and he went to stab Alberto’s mom. And

instead of stabbing her, Alberto got in the way and he stabbed Alberto. 

* * *

[Petitioner] like went forward like a big step and thrust the knife

out at [Olga].

* * *

[Alberto] was standing like directly beside her by the wall. And

when he seen what his father was doing, he jumped in front of [Olga].

/ / /

/ / /

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Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this testimony is completely consistent with the

prosecution’s theory of the case – that petitioner attempted to stab Olga but Alberto got in the

way and was stabbed through the arm. Ms. Masters’ testimony that petitioner and Alberto were

on the floor is not inconsistent with this theory. Petitioner seems to assert that Alberto had the

knife and then the two went to the floor in a wrestling match over the knife. While Ms. Masters

did testify that petitioner and Alberto were on the floor, she made it clear that this was before

petitioner grabbed the knife. As to petitioner’s assertion that Ms. Masters testified that Alberto

jumped him, this was not her testimony. Rather, she testified that Alberto “jumped in front of

[Olga].” Again, this is not inconsistent with the prosecution theory of the case. 

Clearly, to the extent there were any conflicts in the testimony, the jury resolved

those conflicts against petitioner and in favor of the prosecution. It is not for this court to

second-guess the jury’s factual determinations. Instead, this court reviews to determine whether

a reasonable jury could have reached the conclusion that the jury in petitioner’s case reached,

given the same evidence. In light of the entire record, the court finds that a reasonable jury could

have reached the same conclusion – that petitioner attempted to stab Olga but instead stabbed

Alberto through the arm when he jumped in front of his mother. This conclusion is consistent

with Ms. Masters’ testimony as well as the testimony of the other witnesses, particularly Alberto.

B. Trial Judge Bias

Petitioner claims:

The trial judge stated: “Let me take a look at the terrorist threats.” 

“As it turns out, I was the judge on the terrorist threat case. On the

terrorist threat case, I asked you what is your plead to a felony violation of

422 of the Penal Code, terrorist threats, Count 1. Then I asked you what

your plea was to Count 2, a felony violation of terrorist threats. So it was

very clear at that time, that that [sic] was two felonies right there. And

that was in – what was that? 1997. So that was two serious strikes right

there.” (RT 50). Petitioner claimed that the judge did not strike any prior

conviction because he was biased against him. Petitioner’s conviction

violated the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Also

Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective because Petitioner told trial

/ / /

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The ineffective assistance counsel aspect of this claim is discussed below in 2

section III.D.

9

counsel to move to exclude the judge from the case. 

2

This claim was raised in petitioner’s state habeas petition, which was denied on the merits

without comment or citation. Therefore, as with petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim,

this court assumes the state court applied the correct federal law and will review to determine

whether the decision resulted in an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

Due process requires a fair trial before a fair judge. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421

U.S. 35, 46 (1975). To prevail on a claim of judicial bias, the petitioner must overcome a

presumption of honesty and integrity and demonstrate an actual bias against the defendant or an

interest in the outcome of the case. See id. at 47. Under this standard, a judge’s ruling alone

does not show bias or an interest in the outcome. See Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1103

(9th Cir. 1997). 

Petitioner appears to conclude judicial bias from the fact that the trial judge

presided over one of petitioner’s priors. Petitioner states that the trial judge refused to strike the

terrorist threat prior due to his connection with the prior case and that this demonstrates bias. 

The court disagrees. The state court record reflects that the trial court properly considered

petitioner’s motion to strike the terrorist threat prior conviction. Specifically, the judge noted:

(1) arguments submitted by counsel; (2) the probation report; (3) doctors’ reports and the history

of petitioner’s organic brain problems; (4) petitioner’s minimal remorse; and (5) the terrorist

threat prior involved a knife and a threat to kill the same victim. Moreover, petitioner has failed

to point to any evidence that the trial judge was personally biased against him or had an interest

in the outcome of the case. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the record does not support the

conclusion that the trial judge denied the motion to strike on the basis of his having presided

over the prior case. Without more, the trial judge’s denial of petitioner’s motion to strike, does

not reflect actual bias. See id.

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C. Prior Convictions

The jury found true the allegations that petitioner had several prior convictions

which counted as “strikes” under California sentencing law. In particular, the jury found that

petitioner had been convicted in 1992 of attempted robbery and in 1997 of making terrorist

threats. Both convictions resulted from guilty pleas. Petitioner argues in claims 3 and 4 that

these convictions are invalid because the pleas were not knowing and voluntary. As to the 1992

conviction, petitioner contends that he was found to be under the influence of alcohol at the time

of the incident and that he does “not remember anything from the offense.” As to the 1997

conviction, petitioner asserts that he has an organic brain problem that made it “difficult for him

to enter a plea bargain.” 

Petitioner is attempting to use the instant federal habeas proceeding – which

challenges the current conviction – to challenge the 1992 and 1997 convictions. As respondent

correctly observes, however, once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral

attack in its own right, the petitioner may not challenge a subsequent sentencing enhancement

based on those convictions on the ground that the prior convictions were unconstitutionally

obtained. See Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403-04 (2001); Daniels

v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001). To allow such a challenge would undermine the policy

consideration of finality of the prior convictions. See id. An exception to this rule –

inapplicable here – exists where the petitioner was not afforded counsel in the prior proceedings. 

See id. Because the 1992 and1997 prior convictions are no longer open to direct or collateral

review, petitioner cannot challenge them in this case. 

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to seek the

recusal of the trial judge; and (2) failing to present the defense that the stabbing was an accident. 

Petitioner also argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these two

issues on direct appeal. 

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The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that, considering

all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

See id. at 688. To this end, petitioner must identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to

have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. See id. at 690. The federal court must

then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were

outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. See id. In making this

determination, however, there is a strong presumption “that counsel’s conduct was within the

wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised acceptable professional judgment in

all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 693. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.;

see also Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be

followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697).

The Strickland standards also apply to appellate counsel. See Smith v. Robbins,

528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882

F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). However, an indigent defendant “does not have a constitutional

right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel,

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as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463

U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. 

Otherwise, the ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional

evaluation would be “seriously undermined.” Id.; see also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274

n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (counsel not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary,

and is not even particularly good appellate advocacy.”) Further, there is, of course, no obligation

to raise meritless arguments on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Thus,

counsel is not deficient for failing to raise a weak issue. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to

demonstrate prejudice in this context, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors,

he probably would have prevailed on appeal. See id. at n.9. 

Without reaching the question of counsel’s performance, all of petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims lack merit because he cannot establish prejudice. As to

his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek the recusal of the trial judge based

on bias, as discussed above, the record does not support petitioner’s contention of actual bias. 

Certainly, the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to strike alone does not establish bias. 

Therefore, even had counsel moved to disqualify the trial judge, the motion would have been

properly denied. Therefore, petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice. 

Similarly, as to petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

argue at trial that the stabbing of Alberto was an accident, petitioner cannot show prejudice. 

Petitioner’s version of events is that Alberto had the knife first and that he wrestled Alberto to the

floor in order to take the knife away. Petitioner asserts that Alberto was accidently stabbed while

the two were wrestling for the knife. As discussed above, the evidence simply does not support

this version of events. All the witnesses consistently testified that it was petitioner who first had

the knife in hand, that he then moved toward Olga with the knife, and that Alberto jumped in the

way to protect his mother and was stabbed in the arm. While Alberto’s stabbing was “accidental”

in the sense that petitioner was attempting to stab Olga but Alberto got in the way, it was not the

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result of the “accident” described by petitioner. Therefore, the result would not have been any

different even if counsel had raised petitioner’s accident argument. 

Finally, as to petitioner’s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise the bias and accident arguments on direct appeal, petitioner cannot show prejudice. For the

reasons discussed above, this court cannot say that petitioner would have prevailed on appeal had

these issued been raised. 

E. Motion to Substitute Appointed Counsel

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for substitution of

counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970). Specifically, petitioner claims that

he was denied effective representation because of a conflict with counsel. “A State has a duty to

provide an indigent defendant with effective assistance of counsel through his first appeal.” 

Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.

353, 358 (1963)). In California, a criminal defendant who is dissatisfied with court-appointed

counsel must be permitted to state the reasons why the defendant believes the attorney should be

replaced. See Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d at 123-24. When a defendant seeks to discharge counsel and

substitute another attorney on the ground of inadequate representation, the court is required to

allow the defendant to explain the basis for the motion and relate specific instances of the

attorney’s deficient performance. See id. Denial of a Marsden motion can only amount to a

constitutional violation where there was a conflict between the defendant and counsel which

prevented effective representation. See Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th cir. 2000) (en

banc). 

In addressing this claim on direct appeal, the state court first recited the factual

background as revealed at Marsden hearings held in the state court. At petitioner’s first hearing,

he complained that trial counsel had presented him with a plea offer which petitioner felt was “too

much time for the crime” that he committed. At this point, petitioner was facing up to 27 years

based on the complaint which only alleged one prior. Petitioner was offered 10 years in exchange

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for his guilty plea. At the second Marsden hearing, petitioner testified that he remained unhappy

with appointed counsel because he continued to present him with the same offer. By this time in

the proceedings, the government was alleging three strikes which meant that petitioner faced a

potential sentence longer than 27 years. At the third Marsden hearing, petitioner stated that

counsel continued to press him to accept the plea bargain and that counsel was upset that he

refused. At a fourth hearing, petitioner claimed that appointed counsel would use a “very

threatening tone” and would laugh at him and mock him. 

The state court addressed the merits of the claim and stated:

Defendant argues that “[b]y the time of the fourth [Marsden]

motion, the undisputed record showed that there was an irreconcilable

breakdown in communications.” While this may be true, the record also

indisputably shows that any such breakdown was occasioned by

defendant’s utterly unreasonable refusal to listen to counsel and the court. 

Indeed, the record shows extreme patience by both counsel and the court in

listening to defendant’s repetitive and meritless complaints during his

several Marsden motions. Simply put, the record shows that because

defendant did not like the People’s offer, he was blaming the messenger,

namely, counsel. Since any breakdown in communications was solely the

fault of defendant, the denial of all of his Marsden motions was proper. 

The court then distinguished petitioner’s case from Schell, where the defendant’s trial counsel

stated that she would not waste funds on a fingerprint expert and that the defendant should accept

a plea deal. In Schell, the Ninth Circuit observed that, “[i]f true, this explanation may have been

tantamount to [counsel] telling [the defendant] that she would neither investigate nor defend him

unless he pleaded guilty.” See Schell, 218 F.3d at 1027. The state court distinguished Schell as

follows:

. . . The record of [defendant’s] Marsden hearings shows that

defendant’s dissatisfaction with his counsel was based on the People’s offer

which counsel was conveying as well as a defense of intoxication which

defendant believed, and erroneously so, was available to him. Defendant

was urged to take the plea by counsel, and impliedly by the judges who

heard his Marsden motions, because he was facing life in prison in a case

where counsel rightfully concluded, as shown by the trial evidence that the

case against him was overwhelming. Indeed, counsel pointed out that he

had gone over the law and the medical records with defendant. On this

record, counsel’s alleged threatening tone or mockery was undoubtedly

based upon counsel’s exasperation with not being able to get defendant to

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understand that he had no defense and that the offer was his only chance to

escape a life sentence. Consequently, any threatening tone or mockery

could not reasonably be interpreted as a threat to not represent defendant

should he refuse the offer. 

Because the state court applied the correct law, this court will review under the

“unreasonable application of” standard. Under this standard, the court cannot say that the state

court’s decision was an unreasonable application of federal law. To prevail, petitioner must show

that the breakdown with appointed counsel deprived him of effective representation. As the state

court observed, counsel’s conduct in advising petitioner concerning the plea bargain and the

unavailability of an intoxication defense was the essence of effective representation. This court

agrees with the state court when it says that “defendant cannot . . . be the cause of a breakdown in

the attorney-client relationship, as he is here, and then on appeal cite the breakdown as a reason

for reversal.” 

F. Proposition 21

Petitioner contends that his strikes for making terrorist threats must be stricken

because Proposition 21, which added the crime of making a criminal threat to the list of serious

felonies which count as strikes, is a violation of California’s single-subject rule for initiative

measures. A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a

transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not available

for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see

also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378,

1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, petitioner’s challenge to Proposition 21 is purely a matter of state law

which has been conclusively resolved against petitioner by the California Supreme Court in

Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537 (2002). Therefore, federal habeas relief is not

available on petitioner’s Proposition 21 claim. 

/ / /

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter

judgment and close this file.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings

and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right

to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 4, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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