Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00881/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00881-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NANCI WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-00881-JCS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 67

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Nanci Williams brought this action against her former employer Defendant United 

Airlines, Inc. (“United”) asserting claims including wrongful termination based on age and 

disability. United moves for the summary judgment. The Court held a hearing on June 21, 2019. 

For the reasons discussed below, United’s motion is GRANTED.1

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Williams, who is currently fifty-two years old, began working as a flight attendant for 

United in 1990. Williams Decl. (dkt. 73-1) ¶¶ 3, 5. At all times relevant to this case she was in 

the highest salary tier for United flight attendants based on her seniority. Id. ¶ 16.

Williams suffered an injury when an airplane she was working on rapidly and 

unexpectedly descended in 2003, slamming Williams against both the ceiling and the floor of the 

airplane and resulting in diagnoses of a concussion, cervical spine sprain, chronic myofascial pain 

syndrome, fibromyalgia, and an auto-immune disease. Id. ¶ 6. Williams has experienced a wide 

range of symptoms in the years since the injury, and a worker’s compensation decision attributed 

all of her symptoms to that incident. Id. Williams attempted to return to work, but took medical 

 

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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leave due to severe pain from 2003 to January of 2007. Id. ¶ 7. “When [Williams] returned to 

work in late 2008 or early 2009,”2 United offered employees a voluntary furlough, and Williams 

accepted a furlough through March of 2013. Id. ¶ 8. Williams worked until September of 2013, 

but returned to medical leave at that time, which was classified as a “nonoccupational medical 

leave of absence” under United’s policies. Id. ¶ 10; Khoury Decl. (dkt. 67-1) Ex. E (Williams 

Dep.) at 300:6–9. 

Williams’s treating physician Dr. Teitelbaum provided United with “Absence Certificates” 

that United required Williams to submit monthly even though Dr. Teitelbaum informed United 

that Williams’s condition was permanent and did not require such frequent reevaluation. Williams 

Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11–14. Williams found United’s conduct while she was on leave to be difficult and 

harassing, including United’s repeated requests for Absence Certificates, failure to provide its 

policy on medical leave to Dr. Teitelbaum, unresponsiveness to Williams’s calls and faxes, and 

apparent failure to keep notes regarding Williams’s leave and medical condition. Id. ¶¶ 12–15. 

Williams testified, however, that United never failed to provide assistance that she requested and 

granted each of her requests for medical leave. Khoury Decl. Ex. E (Williams Dep.) at 164:14–25, 

192:5–7. Williams also testified that she never attempted to engage in an interactive process with 

United regarding accommodation of any disability, because her union had told her that United’s 

program for such a process is not effective, and Williams therefore did not trust United to engage 

with her. Id. at 305:4–307:5.

In December of 2015, Williams’s work restrictions based on her medical condition 

included prohibitions against standing for extended periods of time, assisting passengers with 

physical tasks, managing crew and passengers, and resolving conflicts between passengers, among 

other limitations. Williams Decl. ¶ 17. The restriction perhaps most relevant to this case is as 

follows: “No exposure to varying climate conditions and air pressures.” Id.; see also

Haralabopoulos Decl. (dkt. 68) Ex. 8 (United document summarizing Williams’s medical 

restrictions).

 

2

It is not clear whether Williams was working or what if any sort of leave she was on from 

January of 2007 until this date approximately two years later. 

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That month, Williams, her husband, and her parents boarded a United flight from San 

Francisco to Cancun, Mexico, using Williams’s privilege as an employee to fly for free or a 

significant discount so long as space was available on the flight. See Williams Decl. ¶ 23; Khoury 

Decl. Ex. E (Williams Dep.) at 155:21–156:3. Under United’s rules for such travel, Williams was 

responsible for the behavior of her family members, and Williams understood that at the time of 

the incident. Khoury Decl. Ex. E (Williams Dep.) at 156:4–7, 245:12–22, 286:24–287:9. 

Williams also understood that her employment could (but not necessarily would) be terminated for 

a violation of the discounted travel rules. Id. at 264:4–8.

As the airplane started to taxi from the gate, Williams and her husband began to argue 

about a cup of coffee, and the dispute became physical. Id. at 151:5–18, 152:1–16. According to 

Williams, her husband began to choke her, and Williams scratched his face in self-defense, 

drawing blood.3 Id. at 151:19–22; Williams Decl. ¶ 23. Williams, her husband, and her father all 

left their seats despite the “Fasten Seat Belt” sign being lit at the time. See Khoury Decl. Ex. E 

(Williams Dep.) at 151:23–25, 152:20–25, 154:23–25. Williams’s husband and father went to the 

first class area near the flight deck in the front of the plane, Williams’s husband asked to be let off 

the plane, and a flight attendant reported that Williams’s father called her husband a “pussy.” See

id. at 155:1–12, 245:9–11, 261:19–262:4. The plane returned to the gate as a result of the 

altercation. Id. at 154:12–13, 169:9–19. 

Authorities met the plane at the gate, and Williams was escorted off the plane and taken 

into custody by San Francisco police at an airport substation, where she was told she would be

charged with felony domestic violence. Id. at 178:17–19, 179:2–7, 182:2–11, 262:5–12. 

Photographs taken by the police showed scratches on Williams’s husband’s face. Id. at 310:16–

 

3

In the context of United’s motion for summary judgment, the Court takes as true Williams’s 

testimony that her husband, rather than Williams herself, was the aggressor in their fight on the 

airplane. The Court’s task here is narrow: to determine whether Williams has presented evidence 

from which a finder of fact could find that United discriminated or retaliated against her based on 

the theories asserted in her complaint. Although the Court holds that Williams has not made the 

necessary showing to prevail on any of those theories, this order should not be taken as excusing 

domestic violence or minimizing the trauma that Williams undoubtedly experienced as a result of 

this incident, or as endorsing the decision to fire an employee on account of an incident involving 

domestic violence without regard for whether the employee was a victim.

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20. Williams agreed at her deposition that her family members violated United’s rules for conduct 

when traveling on an employee’s pass. Id. at 264:10–13. The incident caused a delay of 

approximately twenty-six minutes for the other passengers on the flight. Id. at 170:25–171:9.

The day of the incident, Lisa Lujan (a representative of United’s “Corporate Security –

Compliance” department) sent an email to several other United employees advising them that 

Williams was taken into custody on a felony charge by police as a result of the fight. 

Haralabopoulos Decl. Ex. 4. Carol Bertacchi, a manager of United’s “Inflight Services” 

department, responded to that email the next day, noting that Lujan had inquired as to Williams’s 

status. Id. Bertacchi reported that Williams 

has been out on a leave of absence but will need to meet with her 

supervisor to discuss several issues without regard to what happens 

with her criminal case:

- her conduct and arrest on the flight

- regardless of the fact that it is her husband she violated her actions 

on the aircraft falls into violence in the workplace

- her conduct also violates our pass policies for conduct while 

traveling, and resulted in the plane having to return to the gate

Id.

On December 8, 2015, Williams met with her supervisor Lee Ann Butler-Owens and other 

United employees to discuss the incident. Gutierrez Decl. (dkt. 73-2) Ex. D (meeting notes taken 

by another employee). Butler-Owens told Williams that United was more concerned about the 

flight delay that the incident caused than about Williams’s arrest, that Williams needed to write a 

report, and that the incident could lead to termination of her employment. Id. Williams met again 

with the same group of employees on December 10, 2015. Gutierrez Decl. Ex. E (meeting notes 

taken by another employee). Most of that discussion focused on the circumstances of the 

disturbance on the plane, although Butler-Owens also informed Williams that, despite the 

generally applicable policy that employees did not have to ask permission to travel, she would 

need to submit something from her doctor to show that she was able to fly, and Butler-Owens also 

briefly asked Williams if she was traveling for vacation. Id.

Williams sent a letter to United dated December 26, 2015 “apologiz[ing] for causing a 

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disturbance with [her] husband that led to the plane returning to the gate and having the crew and 

passengers delayed from taking off,” and “for getting out of [her] seat while the seatbelt sign was 

on.” Haralabopoulos Decl. Ex. 6. Williams’s husband submitted a similar letter apologizing for 

the disturbance, for leaving his seat and walking towards the cockpit while the plane was moving, 

for asking to leave the plane, and for causing the delay. Haralabopoulos Decl. Ex. 7.

Williams focuses on evidence that, in the aftermath of the December 2015 incident, 

various United employees (including but not limited to Butler-Owens, labor strategy specialist 

Elizabeth Cavanagh, and Employee Service Center Operations manager Carlos Rivera) 

investigated whether Williams was in fact subject to the medical restrictions that she had claimed, 

beginning with suspicion that she would not have been able to fly as a passenger with such 

restrictions, and including a review of social media posts that United employees apparently 

believed suggested that Williams was healthier than she had indicated. See, e.g., Gutierrez Decl. 

Exs. I, J, O, P. A registered nurse employed by United sent Rivera an email on December 8, 2015 

stating that, based on Williams’s medical restrictions, he “would assume [she] is severely disabled 

and not appropriate to fly SA [apparently meaning ‘space available’] anywhere.” Gutierrez Decl. 

Ex. J. Rivera sent an email to multiple United nurses on January 28, 2016 asking them to create a 

document indicating that air travel would not be recommended for Williams and would exacerbate 

her condition, but a different nurse responded that she was “unable to write that [Williams’s] 

condition(s) would be exacerbated by her pass travel” because it “would be considered diagnosing 

the employee and out of scope of practice as an RN.” Gutierrez Decl. Ex. I.4

Butler-Owens sent Williams a “Performance Letter of Charge” on January 19, 2016. 

Haralabopoulos Decl. Ex. 5. The letter included a relatively long paragraph describing the 

altercation on the flight, and asserted more briefly that Williams was “also in violation of the 

 

4 Williams’s opposition brief characterizes these documents as showing that Rivera sought and 

obtained the opinion that Williams was unable to travel after being told that United’s nurses were 

not qualified to provide such an opinion. Opp’n at 13 (“This was not enough to dissuade 

Defendant and eventually another medical specialist created the requested document. (Exhibit 

I).”). The document attached to the emails included as Exhibit I merely lists Williams’s 

restrictions; it does not include the opinion that the nurse stated would be improper, i.e., whether 

travel would exacerbate Williams’s conditions. See Gutierrez Decl. Ex. I.

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Working Together Guidelines with respect to Honesty in that this occurred while you were on a 

medical leave of absence, purporting to be too ill to work as a flight attendant.” Id. The letter 

informed Williams that a conference would occur on February 1, 20165to determine what if any 

action would be taken. Id. Williams asserts in her declaration that this letter stated that her 

employment was terminated, but no such statement appears in the letter, and the sentence she 

quotes in her declaration in fact appears in an April 2016 letter from Peter Haralabopoulos, the 

director of the Inflight Services department (i.e., United’s flight attendants) in San Francisco and 

the hearing officer responsible for determining what discipline should be imposed. See Williams 

Decl. ¶ 26; Gutierrez Decl. Exs. F, G.

Rivera sent Cavanagh and other United employees an email on January 27, 2016 with the 

subject line “SFOSW Nancy [sic] Williams u140114 - Possible Fraud,” stating that Rivera was not 

sure if they were aware of Williams’s travel to Cancun while on leave, listing her restrictions, and 

concluding that “there is NO WAY she would be able to travel anywhere” and that her restrictions 

might be fraudulent. Gutierrez Decl. Ex. O. Cavanagh responded three minutes later that she 

“brought it up and we are terminating her.” Id.

On April 4, 2016, Williams attended a conference with Peter Haralabopoulos, ButlerOwens, and union representative Chris Black. Khoury Decl. Ex. E (Williams Dep.) at 247:12–23. 

Haralabopoulos served as the hearing officer, and because he expected that he would serve in that 

role for any discipline that might be imposed, he states that he had not played any part in the 

investigation leading up to the hearing. Haralabopoulos Decl. ¶ 14. The union had an opportunity 

to present information on Williams’s behalf, but the two letters it offered (from Dr. Teitelbaum 

and Williams’s husband) were not submitted until the date of the hearing, and Haralabopoulos 

rejected them as untimely. See Khoury Decl. Ex. E (Williams Dep.) at 248:13–23, 251:11–16. 

Williams also had an opportunity to speak on her own behalf, and made a “short statement,” 

although she was not limited in how long she could speak. Id. at 251:17–23. 

Haralabopoulos states in his declaration that, after the hearing, he determined that 

 

5

It appears that the date of the conference was later changed to April 4, 2016; there is no 

indication in the record that a conference in fact occurred on February 1, 2016.

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Williams’s employment should be terminated “based on the egregious conduct of both Ms. 

Williams and her family members while on board the aircraft on December 3, 2015, the resulting 

delay and inconvenience caused to United’s customers, and the admissions of both Ms. Williams 

and her husband as set forth in the [December 2015] letters of apology.” Haralabopoulos Decl. 

¶ 29. According to Haralabopoulos, those letters were relevant “because they admitted critical 

facts about the incident and offered no mitigating circumstances,” and it was not relevant whether 

Williams or her husband started the fight. Id. ¶¶ 21, 29. Haralabopoulos sent Williams a letter 

dated April 19, 2019 informing her of his decision. Gutierrez Decl. Ex. G. Most of the letter 

discusses the December 2015 fight and related disturbance on the airplane, and Haralabopoulos 

presents Williams’s conduct and that of her family members as the reason for his decision, 

although he also notes that Williams “provided medical information to [United] which appears to 

be false,” and states that “[t]his would provide a separate and independent justification for your 

discharge.” Id. In a subsequent email to Williams’s union representative, Haralabopoulos stated 

that although he disregarded as untimely the letters from Williams’s husband and doctor, “a fair 

and reasonable consideration of these documents does not change [his] decision to terminate her 

employment,” because “nothing in these documents changes the fact that Ms. Williams’s conduct, 

and that of her family members, was grossly inappropriate.” Haralabopoulos Decl. Ex. 16.

Williams’s union declined to appeal the decision to the System Board of Adjustment. 

Khoury Decl. Ex. F.

B. Williams’s Complaint

Williams’s complaint asserts the following claims: (1) discrimination based on disability or 

medical condition, in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), 1st 

Am. Compl. (dkt. 26) ¶¶ 24–32; (2) discrimination based on age, in violation of FEHA, id. ¶¶ 33–

38; (3) failure to engage in the interactive process to determine whether a disability can be 

accommodated as required by FEHA, id. ¶¶ 39–45; (4) failure to accommodate a disability as 

required by FEHA, id. ¶¶ 46–52; (5) retaliation “for taking leave, for requesting that [United] 

respect and honor [Williams’s] rights and requests for accommodation, as well as the nature of her 

medical conditions and disability,” in violation of FEHA, id. ¶¶ 53–59; (6) failure to prevent 

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discrimination and retaliation as required by FEHA, id. ¶¶ 60–65; (7) wrongful termination in 

violation of public policy, id. ¶¶ 66–73; and (8) “medical leave discrimination and retaliation in 

violation of the California Family Rights Act,” id. ¶¶ 74–79 (capitalization altered).6 The 

complaint as a whole suggests that United’s stated reason for terminating her employment based 

on the December 2015 incident was pretext for terminating her because she had taken medical 

leave or because she was an older flight attendant earning the maximum salary for that position

based on her seniority. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or to a defense on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of 

persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

Once the movant has made this showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing 

summary judgment to designate “‘specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. 

(citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely 

disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record 

. . . .”). “[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . implicates the 

substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). The non-moving party has the burden of 

identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Keenan 

v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, it is not the task of the court to scour the 

record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Id.; see Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 

 

6 Williams’s first amended complaint also included a claim for unlawful business practices under 

California Business and Professions Code § 17200, but Williams has since voluntarily dismissed 

that claim, and the Court disregards the portions of Williams’s opposition brief addressing it. See 

Order on Stipulation (dkt. 42); Opp’n at 24–25. 

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F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 

A party need not present evidence to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment in 

a form that would be admissible at trial, but the contents of the parties’ evidence must be amenable 

to presentation in an admissible form. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036−37 (9th Cir. 

2003). Neither conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits nor arguments in moving papers 

are sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., 

Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). On summary judgment, the court draws all 

reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 

(2007), but where a rational trier of fact could not find for the non-moving party based on the 

record as a whole, there is no “genuine issue for trial” and summary judgment is appropriate. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

B. Disability Discrimination

FEHA makes it unlawful to discriminate against a person “in compensation or in terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment” on the basis of, among other things, physical disability 

and medical condition. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). There are two types of disability 

discrimination under FEHA: “(1) discrimination arising from an employer’s intentionally 

discriminatory act against an employee because of his or her disability (referred to as disparate 

treatment discrimination), and (2) discrimination resulting from an employer’s facially neutral 

practice or policy that has a disproportionate effect on employees suffering from a disability 

(referred to as disparate impact discrimination).” Avila v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 4th 

1237, 1246 (2008). Williams has not provided the sort of statistical evidence from which 

disparate impact could be determined. See Fuqua v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 16-cv-01193-

JCS, 2017 WL 4516843, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2017); Gardner v. Fed. Express Corp., 114 F. 

Supp. 3d 889, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

7

 The Court therefore construes her claim as based on a 

 

7 Williams briefly argues that she “can demonstrate disparate impact by establishing that an 

employment practice was taken against [her] where in other similarly situation [sic] employees 

where [sic] treated differently.” Opp’n at 15. That is not the test for disparate impact. The Court 

addresses Williams’s similarly-situated-employees argument below in the context of her disparate 

treatment claim.

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theory of disparate treatment. 

In the absence of “direct evidence” of discrimination, California courts analyze disparate 

treatment disability discrimination claims under the three-stage burden-shifting framework set 

forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04, 807 (1973). Guz v. Bechtel 

Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354–55; Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie 

case of discrimination. Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010). The 

elements of a prima facie case of disability discrimination in violation of FEHA are: (1) the 

plaintiff is disabled; (2) the plaintiff can, with or without reasonable accommodation, perform the 

essential functions of his position; and (3) the defendant subjected the plaintiff to an adverse 

employment action because of the disability. Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal. App. 4th 228, 236 

(1997). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production, but not persuasion, 

shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged 

actions. Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155. If this burden is met, the plaintiff “must then raise a triable 

issue of material fact as to whether the defendant’s proffered reasons for [the challenged conduct] 

are mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id.

Where there is evidence that an employer had more than one reason for taking adverse 

action—including both legitimate and discriminatory reasons—a plaintiff must show that 

discrimination was a “substantial factor” in in an adverse employment action. Harris v. City of 

Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 211, 215 (2013). If the employee makes such a showing, but the 

employer shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision for 

legitimate reasons even absent the discriminatory motive, the employer cannot be liable for 

monetary damages, although the employee may still be able to obtain declaratory or injunctive 

relief, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 203.

Assuming for the sake of argument that Williams has presented evidence sufficient to meet 

the first two elements of a prima facie case of discrimination,8 United is nevertheless entitled to 

 

8 The Court does not reach United’s arguments as to whether Williams can establish these 

elements. Although Williams fails to address this issue and there is no dispute that Williams could 

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summary judgment because Williams has not presented evidence that she was terminated “because 

of [her] disability,” Brundage, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 236, and because United has articulated a 

legitimate reason for terminating her employment, see Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155. Williams faults 

United for not conducting a more thorough investigation of the altercation on the aircraft, but as 

Haralabopoulos noted in his decision letter, a subsequent email to Williams’s union representative, 

and his declaration here, his decision was based on the admissions of Williams and her husband in 

their December 2015 apology letters, and on United’s policy that employees are responsible for 

the conduct of their guests traveling with them on discounted passes, such that he did not consider 

it relevant whether Williams or her husband was the aggressor.9 Williams acknowledged at her 

deposition that, under United’s rules, she was responsible for her family members’ conduct, that 

she and her family members violated various rules, and that violations of the travel pass rules 

could result in termination. See, e.g., Khoury Decl. Ex. E (Williams Dep.) at 264:4–16.

If other employees accused of similar misconduct experienced less severe punishment, that 

could perhaps support an inference that something other than the December 2015 incident 

contributed to the decision to terminate Williams’s employment, and that Haralabopoulos’s stated 

reason for doing so was pretext. Williams cites union chapter president Christine Black’s 

deposition testimony that an employee who abused travel privileges by allowing their domestic 

partner to travel under their name was not terminated. Opp’n (dkt.73) at 15; Gutierrez Decl. Ex. X 

(Black Dep.) at 71:17–72:9. Williams mischaracterizes Black’s testimony, asserting that the 

employee “received the lowest level of discipline,” Opp’n at 15, when Black in fact testified that 

 

not actually work as a flight attendant at any relevant time (i.e., from the time of the December 

2015 incident through the termination of her employment), it is not obvious that an employee 

unable to work for a period of time is necessarily unable to fulfill the “essential functions” of a 

position that, pursuant to an applicable collective bargaining agreement, allows for extended 

periods of medical leave. The Court also declines to reach United’s arguments that Williams 

cannot proceed on certain of her claims because her leave of absence was governed by her 

collective bargaining agreement rather than the protections of California law. Williams has not 

meaningfully addressed those arguments, and there is sufficient reason to grant United’s motion 

on other grounds.

9

In the context of a disability discrimination claim, it is not this Court’s role to determine whether 

a policy holding Williams responsible for her husband’s conduct while traveling is fair or 

advisable. Even if it were not, the enforcement of such a policy would not constitute disability 

discrimination in violation of California law.

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the employee received the highest level of discipline short of termination, Gutierrez Decl. Ex. X 

(Black Dep.) at 72:5–9.10 Black also testified that she was aware of employees who were not 

terminated for using drugs and alcohol. Id. at 73:5–24. Neither of those examples of misconduct 

involved a public disturbance or a flight delay. Haralabopoulos states in his declaration that in his 

sixteen years of managing flight attendants he “never heard of any Flight Attendant engaging in 

conduct comparable to that of Ms. Williams and her family members on December 3, 2015,” but

the most similar scenario of which he is aware was an off-duty flight attendant who physically 

pushed past a gate agent and set off an alarm after being told that a flight was closed and she could 

not board, and Haralabopoulos made the decision to terminate that flight attendant’s employment. 

Haralabopoulos Decl. ¶ 37. Haralabopoulos’s example of a comparable scenario is more similar 

to the facts here than the examples offered by Williams, in that it involved physical force and a 

violation of safety and security rules that would have been conspicuous to other travelers and 

caused a public disturbance. The treatment of these other flight attendants therefore does not 

support an inference that Williams’s termination was based on her disability.

Williams also cites case law holding that the timing of an adverse employment action in 

relation to protected activity11 can constitute circumstantial evidence of pretext. Opp’n at 10 

(citing, e.g., Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69 (2000) (“The retaliatory 

motive is ‘proved by showing that plaintiff engaged in protected activities, that his employer was 

aware of the protected activities, and that the adverse action followed within a relatively short time 

thereafter.’” (citation omitted))). Although Williams had been on medical leave continuously 

since 2013—and sporadically before then—and United had been aware of her disability 

throughout that time period, United did not commence the disciplinary proceedings that led to 

termination of her employment until immediately after the altercation on December 3, 2015. The 

 

10 “I believe they were issued a level 4. . . . [S]o a level 1 is the lowest level discipline, then goes 

higher, 2, 3. 4 would be right before you would get terminated.” Gutierrez Decl. Ex. X (Black 

Dep.) at 72:5–9.

11 These cases address retaliation theories, where the concept of “protected activity” fits better 

than in the context of disability discrimination, but Williams addresses them in her argument 

regarding discrimination based on disability. Regardless, the timing of Williams’s termination 

does not support an inference that it was based on anything except her and her family’s conduct on 

the flight to Cancun.

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timing of that action does not create an inference that it was based on Williams’s disability.

Williams also cites United’s investigation of whether she truthfully represented her 

medical restrictions. FEHA’s prohibition of discrimination based on disability does not bar an 

employer from investigating whether an employee misrepresented such restrictions, or from taking 

disciplinary action if it determines that such misrepresentation occurred. There is evidence that 

Williams’s vacation travel was inconsistent with at least one of her restrictions: “No exposure to 

varying climate conditions and air pressures.” See Williams Decl. ¶ 17; Gutierrez Decl. Ex. N. 

While Williams’s doctor stated in a March 2016 letter—after the incident, but before Williams’s 

termination—that the restriction would not bar her from vacation travel because she was “[n]ot 

exposed on a daily basis as a passenger,” Gutierrez Decl. Ex. N, all evidence in the record 

indicates that the restriction, as originally presented to and accepted by United, barred any

exposure to changing pressure or climate, which would necessarily implicate travel by airplane 

from San Francisco to Cancun. Accordingly, there is no basis on this record for a finder of fact to 

conclude that United lacked legitimate reasons to investigate whether Williams misrepresented her 

restrictions. Nor does Williams cite any evidence tending to contradict Haralabopoulos’s

declaration (and contemporaneous writings) that he based his decision on the December 2015 

incident, not on Williams’s medical documentation. See, e.g., Haralabopoulos Decl. ¶ 33.12 

There remains Elizabeth Cavanagh’s email to Carlos Rivera stating that “we are 

terminating” Williams, sent months before the hearing where Haralabopoulos formally reached 

that decision. Gutierrez Decl. Ex. P. Williams offers no other evidence suggesting that a decision 

had in fact been made before the hearing—as opposed to Cavanagh merely assuming that the 

disciplinary process would lead to termination based on the severity of the violations—or 

contradicting Haralabopoulos’s testimony that the decision was his to make, that he made it at the 

hearing, and that he was not aware of Cavanagh’s email. Haralabopoulos Decl. ¶ 39. Even if the 

 

12 At the hearing, Williams’s attorney argued that references to Williams’s medical leave in United 

employees’ discussions of disciplinary proceedings and potential termination supports an 

inference that her employment was terminated based on disability, but conceded that such 

references would be expected in the context of firing any employee who happened to be on 

medical leave, regardless of whether the decision was made for legitimate reasons.

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email alone could support such an inference, it does not indicate that Williams’s employment was 

terminated based on her disability rather than on Williams and her family’s conduct on the flight 

to Cancun or on United’s belief that she misrepresented her medical restrictions. 

“[T]he record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find” that 

Haralabopoulos’s stated reason for terminating Williams’s employment—the December 2015 

altercation, which included violations of multiple rules for United employees and led to a flight 

delay—was mere pretext for discrimination based on disability, or that such discrimination was a 

substantial factor in the decision. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Harris, 56 Cal. 4th at 211. 

United’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is GRANTED.

C. Age Discrimination

FEHA prohibits discrimination based on age for employees over the age of forty. The 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework discussed above applies to such claims. See, e.g., 

Hauprich v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 13-cv-01609-JCS, 2014 WL 3366736, at *19 (N.D. 

Cal. June 26, 2014) (discussing California and Ninth Circuit authority). The only evidence that 

Williams cites for the proposition that she was terminated because of her age is a news article 

describing the outcome of an age discrimination case brought by different flight attendants in 

Colorado, which Williams asserts is subject to judicial notice as a matter of public record. Opp’n 

at 16; Pl.’s Request for Judicial Notice (dkt. 74). Assuming for the sake of argument that news 

media reports can constitute “public records” for the purpose of judicial notice, a court may take 

judicial notice of public records “not to credit the truth of the allegations or facts set forth therein,” 

but only for the existence of such documents. Acasio v. San Mateo County, No. 14-cv-04689-JSC, 

2015 WL 5568345, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2015); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 

F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that although the district court could take judicial notice of 

“the fact that [a document] was signed,” it erred in taking “judicial notice of disputed facts stated 

in public records”). The request for judicial notice is DENIED. Regardless, even if the Court 

could take notice that United discriminated against two older flight attendants in Denver—which it 

cannot—that would not show that United discriminated against Williams. 

There is no evidence that any United employee involved with the decision to terminate 

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Williams’s employment took any note of Williams’s age—or, to the extent it could be a proxy for 

age, Williams’s seniority and commensurate salary13—much less that the decision was made on 

that basis. Nor, as discussed above in the context of disability discrimination, is there evidence to 

rebut United’s showing that Haralabopoulos made the decision to fire Williams for 

nondiscriminatory reasons. United’s motion is GRANTED as to this claim.

D. Retaliation Under FEHA and the CFRA

Williams asserts that United terminated her in retaliation for her use of medical leave, as 

protected by FEHA and the CFRA. “To assert a prima facie retaliation claim under FEHA, ‘the 

plaintiff must show that he engaged in a protected activity, his employer subjected him to adverse 

employment action, and there is a causal link between the protected activity and the employer’s 

action.’” Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 868 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Flait v. N. Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 476 (1992)). As with the 

discrimination claims discussed above, once a prima facie case has been established, the burden 

shifts to the employer to present legitimate reasons for the adverse employment action. Brooks v. 

City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000). If the employer does so, the burden shifts 

back to plaintiff to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reason advanced 

by the employer was a pretext. Id. (citing Flait, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 476). The requirements for a 

claim of retaliation under the CFRA are substantially similar, with the added elements that the 

defendant must be an employer covered by the statue, and the plaintiff must have been eligible to 

take leave under the CFRA, have exercised her right to do so, and have suffered adverse 

employment action on that basis. Bareno v. San Diego Cmty. Coll. Dist., 7 Cal. App. 5th 546, 560 

(2017).

As discussed above in the context of disability discrimination, Williams has not presented 

evidence from which a rational finder of fact could determine that her termination was based on 

wrongful motivations rather than the reason stated by Haralabopoulos: Williams and her family’s 

 

13 Williams quotes (without citation) a statement of legislative intent “that the use of salary as the 

basis for differentiating between employees when terminating employment may be found to 

constitute age discrimination if use of that criterion adversely impacts older workers as a group.” 

Opp’n at 15.

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conduct on the December 2015 flight to Cancun. United’s motion is GRANTED as to Williams’s 

CFRA claim and her FEHA retaliation claim. The Court does not reach United’s argument, not 

addressed by Williams, that extended medical leave taken pursuant to a collective bargaining 

agreement is not protected activity for the purposes of these statutes.

E. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Williams argues that this claim should proceed because United “violated [her] right when

they [sic] terminated her because she was exercising her right to medical leave.” Opp’n at 23. As 

discussed above, no reasonable jury could find on this record that Williams has met her burden to 

show that United terminated her because she was on medical leave, rather than for 

Haralabopoulos’s stated reason that Williams and her family members violated numerous United 

policies and caused a flight delay. See, e.g., City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 

1161 (1998) (holding that a common law wrongful termination claim based on discrimination 

“must be ‘carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated’ in the FEHA on which it 

is based” (citation omitted)). United’s motion for judgment on this claim is GRANTED.

F. Failure to Prevent Discrimination

FEHA makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to take all reasonable steps 

necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment . . . from occurring.” Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 12940(k). A plaintiff seeking to recover on a failure-to-prevent-discrimination claim under 

FEHA must show that: (1) the plaintiff was subjected to discrimination; (2) the defendant failed to 

take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination; and (3) that failure caused the plaintiff to suffer 

injury, damage, loss or harm. Lelaind v. City & County of San Francisco, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 

1103 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Because Williams has not shown that she was subjected to discrimination, 

United’s motion is GRANTED as to this claim.

G. Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

Under FEHA, an employer’s failure “to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process 

with the employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations” is a violation of the 

statute separate from any failure to make reasonable accommodations for a qualified employee’s 

disability. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n); Wilson v. County of Orange, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1185, 

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1993 (2009). FEHA imposes on employers a mandatory obligation to engage in the interactive 

process once an employee requests an accommodation for a disability, or when the employer itself 

recognizes the need for one. Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Once initiated, the employer has a continuous obligation to engage in the interactive process in 

good faith. Swanson v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 232 Cal. App. 4th 954, 971 (2014). The 

interactive process “requires communication and good-faith exploration of possible 

accommodations between employers and individual employees with the goal of identifying an 

accommodation that allows the employee to perform the job effectively.” Yeager v. Corr. Corp. 

of Am., 944 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (E.D. Cal. 2013). “Each party must participate in good faith, 

undertake reasonable efforts to communicate its concerns, and make available to the other 

information which is available, or more accessible, to one party,” and “responsibility for [a] 

breakdown [in communications] lies with the party who fails to participate in good faith.” Gelfo 

v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4th 34, 62 n.22 (2006). To prevail on a section 12940(n) 

claim, an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that would have been available at 

the time the interactive process should have occurred. Nealy v. City of Santa Monica, 234 Cal. 

App. 4th 359, 379 (2015).14

Williams testified at her deposition that she was aware of options at United for initiating an 

interactive process, but declined to take advantage of them:

Q. Okay. Maybe my questions are not being clear. When did you 

attempt to engage with United in an interactive process about your 

disability?

A. I didn’t.

Q. Did you ever ask United to engage in any kind of interactive 

process with you regarding your disability?

 

14 The parties have not addressed this issue, and the Court recognizes that there is some 

disagreement among the California appellate courts as to whether a plaintiff bringing an 

interactive process claim under § 12940(n) must show that a reasonable accommodation was in 

fact available. See, e.g., Claudio v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 134 Cal. App. 4th 224, 246 (2005) 

(“Because we shall conclude a triable issue exists as to whether the University failed to participate 

in the interactive process, it cannot be known whether an alternate job would have been found.”). 

The Court nevertheless concludes that the requirement for such a showing, as stated in Nealy, 

represents the more common view and more likely reflects how the California Supreme Court 

would address the issue.

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A. I was advised by the union not to --

MR. WATTS [Williams’s attorney]: That’s a yes-or-no question.

THE WITNESS: No.

Q. [by defense counsel] Now you said you were advised -- what were 

you advised by the union?

A. I was advised by the union that the reasonable accommodation 

process is basically like a trap. It’s not an actual process that would 

allow a disabled person to help themselves.

Q. All right. I understand that’s what the union old you. Did you ever 

have any conversations with anyone at United about a request by you 

to engage in any kind of interactive process?

A. No.

[. . .]

Q. Well, you understood that you could contact the employee service 

center or your supervisor if you wanted to discuss the reasonable 

accommodation process; right?

A. I wouldn’t trust them to contact them, no.

Q. No. I’m asking you. You understood that you could contact the 

employee service center or your supervisor if you wanted to discuss 

the reasonable accommodation process; right?

A. Could I? Yes. Would I? No.

Q. Okay. So I take it that even though you understood that you could 

contact the employee service center or your supervisor to discuss the 

reasonable accommodation process, you chose not to make any 

attempt to do so; true?

A. Yes.

Khoury Decl. Ex. A (Williams Dep.) at 305:3–307:5. There is no evidence that United’s process 

for discussing accommodation of disabilities was in fact ineffective or a “trap.” No reasonable 

jury could find on this record that blame for the failure to initiate an interactive process, or the 

breakdown of any such process, lies with United. 

Although not addressed by the parties with respect to this claim, United is also entitled to 

judgment because Williams has not identified any reasonable accommodation that United failed to 

provide. See Nealy, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 379.

 Williams argues that United was wrong to require frequent reports from her treating 

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physician in order to justify her continued medical leave. Opp’n at 17–18. She cites no authority 

that such a requirement—which arguably shows that United required William to participate in an 

overly thorough interactive process—can support a claim for failure to engage in the interactive 

process, and the Court declines to so hold. United’s motion for summary judgment on this claim 

is GRANTED.

H. Failure to Accommodate

FEHA makes it unlawful “for an employer . . . to fail to make reasonable accommodation 

for the known physical . . . disability of an applicant or employee.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m). 

The elements of a prima facie claim for failure to make reasonable accommodation claim are: 

(1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is qualified to perform the 

essential functions of the position; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the 

plaintiff’s disability. Scotch v. Art Inst. of Cal., 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 1010 (2009). “Reasonable 

accommodation” means a “modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables a disabled 

employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired.” Taylor v. Trees, Inc., 58 

F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1111 (E.D. Cal. 2014); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(p). The 

reasonableness of an accommodation is generally a question of fact, Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 

74 Cal. App. 4th 215, 228 n.11 (1999), but “FEHA does not obligate an employer to choose the 

best accommodation or the specific accommodation a disabled employee or applicant seeks,” 

Raine v. City of Burbank, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1215, 1222 (2006). A claim under section 12940(m) 

differs from a section 12940(a) discrimination claim in that a plaintiff need not prove any adverse 

employment action, nor is any showing of a causal nexus between one’s disability and an adverse 

employment action required. Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 4th 245, 255−56 (2000). 

In response to United’s motion to dismiss this claim, Williams argues that United’s 

requirement that she provide “monthly or even more frequent” reports from her doctor was 

unjustified, and that her physician’s office found United difficult to communicate with. Opp’n at 

19–20. Williams cites no authority that such procedural hurdles can support a failure-toaccommodate claim, much less where an employer in fact provided the accommodation sought by 

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the employee—here, a paid leave of absence.15 Williams acknowledges in her opposition brief 

that “[b]eing on leave because of a disability sustained at work was a reasonable accommodation.” 

Opp’n at 11. Even if Williams had identified a different accommodation that she would have 

preferred, which she does not, United was not obligated “to choose the best accommodation or the 

specific accommodation a disabled employee . . . seeks.” Raine, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1222.

Williams cites Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 4th 935 (1997), for the rule 

that an employer in at least some circumstances must consider whether alternative jobs are 

available for disabled employee, even if the employee has been placed on leave and has not 

requested such an alternative accommodation. Opp’n at 19. In that case, a pilot had been 

involuntarily placed on medical leave after he no longer met FAA medical standards as a result of 

an AIDS diagnosis. There is no indication that the plaintiff in Prilliman conceded that his medical 

leave was a reasonable accommodation, as Williams does here. See Opp’n at 11. Moreover, the 

Prilliman court identified as the “primary flaw in respondents’ motion for summary judgment . . .

that it fails to address the issue of what policies or resources United made or makes available for 

its employees,” 53 Cal. App. 4th at 953, while Williams conceded here that she understood she 

could have “contact[ed] the employee service center or [her] supervisor to discuss the reasonable 

accommodation process,” but declined to do so based on the advice of her union, with no evidence 

offered in the record that such processes were in fact ineffective or futile, Khoury Decl. Ex. E 

(Williams Dep.) at 305:4–307:5. Williams also does not suggest that she would have preferred an 

alternative position to medical leave, and there is no evidence that Williams would have been able 

to perform any other job at United with her restrictions, which included a need for assistance with 

dressing and grooming, inability to commute to work independently, inability “to communicate 

well 50% of the time,” “0-30% minimum maximum standing in aisles and galleys,” inability to 

manage others or resolve disputes, and inability to work variable hours, among other restrictions. 

See Williams Decl. ¶ 17. 

 

15 To the extent that Williams’s claim is based on the premise that United ceased accommodating 

her when it terminated her employment, the Court holds that Williams has not prevented evidence 

to support a conclusion that her termination was improper, as discussed above.

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Because there is no dispute that United provided Williams a reasonable accommodation 

until her termination, United’s motion is GRANTED as to this claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, United’s motion is GRANTED as to all of Williams’s 

claims. The Court does not reach United’s remaining arguments, including those based on 

exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Clerk is instructed to enter judgment in favor of 

United and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 25, 2019

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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