Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01506/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01506-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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06cv1506

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LYN PATRICK,

Plaintiff,

v.

HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY

EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ORGANIZATION

INCOME PROTECTION PLAN, etc.;

et al.,

Defendants. 

 

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Case No. 06-CV-1506-JMA (LSP)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION RE THE PROPER

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR A

CONTINUANCE PURSUANT TO

F.R.CIV.P. 56(f)

I. Introduction.

On July 26, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Complaint to Recover

Benefits, Costs and Attorneys’ Fees Under [the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)]; and for

Recovery of Statutory Penalties Under ERISA. [Doc. No. 1] The

parties filed a Consent to Exercise of Jurisdiction by a United

States Magistrate Judge on May 4, 2007. [Doc. No. 19] On June

6, 2007, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Adjudication Re

the Proper Standard of Review (“the Motion”). [Doc. No. 26] 

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion (“Oppo.”) on July 17,

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1

Amendment Four to the Hewlett-Packard Company Employee Benefits

Organization Income Protection Plan, effective December 16, 2001, 

changed the name of the Plan to the “Hewlett-Packard Company

Disability Plan.” (Declaration of Matthew E. Lilly filed in support

of the Motion [Doc. No. 26-3](“Lilly Decl.”), exh. A at H00585.)

2 06cv1506

2007, and Defendants filed a Reply on July 26, 2007. [Doc. Nos.

31-34, 38] On July 30, 2007, Judge Adler found the Motion to be

suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. and vacated

the August 2, 2007 hearing date. [Doc. No. 39]

II. Factual Background.

Plaintiff Lyn Patrick was a 20-year employee of Defendant

Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”). (Declaration of Lyn Patrick

filed in support of Oppo. [Doc. No. 31], “Patrick Decl.,” ¶ 2.) 

Between April 2001 and November 2001, Plaintiff had right

shoulder impingement release therapy followed by cervical spine

surgery to repair a degenerative disc and a second neck surgery

to repair vocal chord damage from the cervical disc fusion

surgery. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.) By late August 2002, Plaintiff could

no longer work due to painful orthopaedic conditions in her right

upper extremity, attributed by her doctors to repetitive use

injuries, and Plaintiff’s doctors certified her as totally

disabled. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-12.) She began receiving workers’

compensation benefits and applied for long term disability

(“LTD”) under the Hewlett-Packard Company Disability Plan (“the

Plan”)1

. (Id. at ¶ 4.) 

Plaintiff was paid LTD benefits under the Plan for a period

of one year. (Patrick Decl. ¶ 6.) On August 11, 2003, Defendant

Voluntary Plan Administrators, Inc. (“VPA”), acting on behalf of

HP, terminated Plaintiff’s LTD benefits. (Id. at ¶ 14-17.) 

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3 06cv1506

Plaintiff participated in vocational rehabilitation training

without success, and VPA and HP did not reinstate her LTD

benefits. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff filed a “Request for Appeal”

on February 4, 2004, and VPA responded in a letter dated February

12, 2004 that Plaintiff had not “presented any evidence or

documentation to substantiate [her] disability beyond August 24,

2003.” (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) In a letter dated July 9, 2004, VPA

upheld as “final” the original denial of Plaintiff’s LTD claim. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 22-26.)

Plaintiff subsequently retained counsel and, on November 24,

2004, counsel requested that VPA and HP reopen Plaintiff’s claim. 

VPA and HP did not respond to counsel’s letter. (Patrick Decl.

at ¶¶ 31-33.) Counsel then sent to VPA and HP a letter dated

February 9, 2006 entitled “Perfection of Internal Appeal of

Denial of Long-Term Disability Benefits,” which included

supplemental medical and vocational reports and other exhibits. 

VPA and HP did not respond to counsel’s letter. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-

42.) Plaintiff filed this action on July 26, 2006. 

III. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication Re the Proper

Standard of Review

The sole issue presented by the Motion is whether the Court

should review VPA’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s LTD benefits

claim de novo or under the more deferential “arbitrary and

capricious” standard described by the U.S. Supreme Court in

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).

Defendants contend that the arbitrary and capricious standard

should apply, while Plaintiff contends that VPA’s denial should

be subject to de novo review by this Court. Plaintiff

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alternatively contends that the Motion is premature and should be

continued pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 56(f) to allow Plaintiff to

conduct discovery pertaining to HP’s alleged conflict of

interest.

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is

“genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable

fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). “In

considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not

weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, and is

required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the

non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th

Cir. 1997).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery,

and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24

(1986). Once the moving party meets this initial burden, the

non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own

evidence “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). When the proper

standard of review to be applied to a claims administrator’s

denial of benefits is in dispute, the defendant may move for

summary adjudication of that issue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. 

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5 06cv1506

See Vercher v. Alexander & Alexander Inc., 379 F.3d 222, 224 (5th

Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff argues that she should be allowed to conduct

discovery to show “HP’s inherently-conflicted status as both plan

administrator and payor of the disability benefits” before the

Court decides what standard of review should apply. (Oppo. at

14.) As the following discussion illustrates, the issue of HP’s

alleged conflict of interest is a separate issue entirely from a

determination of the appropriate standard of review. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the arbitrary and

capricious standard of review is applicable and that a

continuance of the Motion is neither appropriate nor necessary

under Rule 56(f).

A. Grant of discretionary authority

In Firestone, Petitioner Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

maintained, and was the plan administrator and fiduciary of, a

termination pay plan and two other employee benefit plans

governed by ERISA. Respondents in Firestone contended that

benefits denials under the plan should be subject to de novo

review (rather than review under the arbitrary and capricious

standard) because Firestone itself was the administrator and

fiduciary of the plan. The Supreme Court held:

Consistent with established principles of trust law, we

hold that a denial of benefits challenged under

§ 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo

standard unless the benefit plan gives the

administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to

determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the

terms of the plan. ... Of course, if a benefit plan

gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who

is operating under a conflict of interest, that

conflict must be weighed as a “facto[r] in determining

whether there is an abuse of discretion.” Restatement

(Second) of Trusts § 187, Comment d (1959).

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2

The terms “arbitrary and capricious” and “abuse of discretion”

are used interchangeably by the courts and refer to the same standard

of review. Abnathya v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir.

1993); Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1336 (3d Cir. 1991). These

terms are also used interchangeably in this Order.

3

The Plan defines the “Claims Administrator” as VPA. Id., § 2(a)

at H00545.

6 06cv1506

Firestone, supra, 489 U.S. at 115 (emphasis supplied). In other

words, “if the plan does confer discretionary authority [to the

plan administrator] as a matter of contractual agreement, then

the standard of review shifts to abuse of discretion.”2 Abatie

v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir.

2006)(en banc), citing Firestone. As the Abatie court stated in

summarizing the law governing whether an administrator has been

granted discretionary authority,

There are no “magic” words that conjure up discretion

on the part of the plan administrator. [citation

omitted.] The Supreme Court has suggested that a plan

grants discretion if the administrator has the “power

to construe disputed or doubtful terms” in the plan. 

Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111 [], see also id. at 115 []

(noting that if a plan grants an administrator the

right to determine eligibility for benefits or to

“construe the terms of the plan,” it has discretionary

authority), and id. at 111 [], (stating that Firestone

cannot take advantage of the principles of discretion

“for there is no evidence that under Firestone’s

termination pay plan the administrator has the power to

construe uncertain terms or that eligibility

determinations are to be given deference”).

Abatie, supra, 458 F.3d at 963.

The Plan in this case provides that “[t]he determination of

Total Disability [a defined term under the Plan] shall be made by

the Claims Administrator on the basis of objective medical

evidence.” (Lilly Decl., Ex. A, § 2(o) at H00549.)3

 In

addition, “[t]he Claims Administrator will be responsible for the

processing of claims” and is vested with the authority to approve

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7 06cv1506

or deny claims. (Id., § 4(f) at H00556 and § 7 at H00586-

H00589.) In the specified “Review of Denied Claims” section,

amended and restated as of December 16, 1998 to take effect

January 1, 2002, the Plan states “[t]he Claims Administrator

shall administer the review of denied claims on [HP’s] behalf and

make the decision on review.” (Id., § 8(a) at H00589.) The Plan

further provides that “[t]he Claims Administrator shall have the

discretionary power to construe the language of the Plan and make

the decision on review on behalf of [HP].” (Id., § 8(e) at

H00592.)

The Hewlett-Packard Company Income Protection Plan

Administrative Services Agreement (“ASA”) between VPA and HP

reaffirms the grant of discretionary authority to VPA by HP. 

(Lilly Decl., exh. B at H00611-615.) For example, the ASA states

that “VPA shall have the discretionary authority to determine the

extent and amount of benefits that any beneficiary may be

entitled to under the Plan” and that “VPA shall have the

discretionary authority to construe the language of the Plan and

make the decision on review on behalf of the Organization.” 

(Id., §§ IV.A and IV.D at H00613-614.)

The language of the Plan and ASA sufficiently confers

discretionary authority to VPA as a matter of contractual

agreement to shift the standard of review to abuse of discretion.

Abatie, supra, 458 F.3d at 963. Under the Plan and the ASA, VPA

is authorized to process claims, determine eligibility for and

the amount of any benefits, and render decisions on appeals of

denied claims. Furthermore, VPA is unambiguously granted the

discretion to construe Plan language and make decisions on review

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8 06cv1506

on behalf of HP.

Other courts, reviewing the same plan as the Plan in this

action, have found a sufficient grant of discretion to invoke the

abuse of discretion standard. For example, in LaMantia v. VPA,

401 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit stated

“[a]s a threshold matter, the Plan does give VPA ‘the

discretionary power to construe the language of the Plan and make

the decision on review,’ so the abuse of discretion standard

would normally apply.” In Riffey v. Hewlett-Packard Co.

Disability Plan, No. 05-1331, slip op., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

21847, *28 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2007), the district court (again,

analyzing the same language as contained in the Plan in this

action) found that an abuse of discretion standard should apply

to a review of VPA’s denial of benefits determination and stated:

“[i]n this case, numerous Plan provisions ... vest sufficient

discretionary power to VPA to invoke the abuse of discretion

standard as defined in Firestone and Abatie.” See also Carter v.

Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 04-3307, slip op., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

3249 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2007)(upholding VPA’s denial of

plaintiff’s claim for LTD benefits under abuse of discretion

standard); Tabatabai v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Disability Plan, No.

06-0695, slip op., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66110 (N.D. Cal. Sept.

1, 2006)(granting defendant’s motion for clarification and

determining that the denial of benefits would be reviewed for

abuse of discretion based on the record before the plan

administrator).

Because the Plan grants VPA unambiguous discretion to

construe Plan language, process claims, and decide claims on

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appeal, the applicable standard of review in this case is the

abuse of discretion standard. Further, as discussed below, that

standard applies irrespective of whether, as Plaintiff contends,

HP has a conflict of interest.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations of Conflict of Interest and

Request for a Continuance to Conduct Discovery

Plaintiff states that a material portion of her argument

that a de novo standard of review should apply is that the denial

of her claim for LTD benefits under the Plan, and the affirmance

of that denial on appeal, was the result of an actual conflict of

interest by HP due to its alleged “inherently-conflicted status

as both administrator and insurer/payor of benefits.” (Oppo. at

12.) She contends that “the decision to cut off benefits was

indicative of HP’s economic self-interest as both the funder of

the benefits and the administrator in charge of interpreting the

provisions of the Plan and determining disability claims” and

that evidence of such conflict of interest should inform the

Court’s determination of the proper standard of review. (Oppo.

at 10-11.) Plaintiff insists that she should receive responses

to her previously-propounded discovery requests prior to a

determination of the applicable standard of review because the

responses to those discovery requests will provide evidence that

an actual conflict existed and that, directly as a result of the

existence of an actual conflict, the Court will find that the de

novo standard of review, and not abuse of discretion, applies. 

(Oppo. at 11-16.) Plaintiff is mistaken as to the effect any

evidence of a conflict of interest would have on determination of

the standard of review.

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10 06cv1506

In Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955 (9th

Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “took [the] case

en banc to reconsider [its] approach to ERISA cases in which a

plan administrator denies benefits and (1) the wording of the

plan confers discretion on the plan administrator and (2) the

plan administrator has a conflict of interest.” Id., 458 F.3d at

959. Thus, Abatie is the controlling law on this subject in the

Ninth Circuit. With regard to the application of an abuse of

discretion standard in the face of a conflict of interest, the

Abatie court stated:

Firestone appears to provide for only two alternatives. 

When a plan confers discretion, abuse of discretion

review applies; when it does not, de novo review

applies [citations omitted]. Abuse of discretion

review applies to a discretion-granting plan even if

the administrator has a conflict of interest. But

Firestone also makes clear that the existence of a

conflict of interest is relevant to how a court

conducts abuse of discretion review. In discussing

abuse of discretion review, the Supreme court cautioned

that, “if a benefit plan gives discretion to an

administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a

conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighted as

a ‘facto[r]’ in determining whether there is an abuse

of discretion.

Id., 458 F.3d at 965 (emphasis supplied). The Abatie court

specifically overruled the “back-and-forth burden shifting” of

its previous holding in Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317

(9th Cir. 1995), as a misinterpretation of Firestone, stating

that Atwood “does not adhere to the dichotomy explicitly laid out

in Firestone,” and reiterating “that a court weigh as a ‘factor’

in abuse of discretion review the conflict of interest that

inheres when a plan administrator also acts as its fiduciary.” 

Id., 458 F.3d at 966-967 (emphasis supplied).

//

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4

See also Coleman-Lea v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 05-4049,

slip op., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89352 *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11,

2006)(abuse of discretion standard applied despite “an apparent

conflict of interest because MetLife acted as both the funding source

and the administrator of the Plan, thereby evidencing a financial

conflict”); Shemano-Krupp v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., No. 05-4693,

slip op., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84352 *23 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20,

2006)(abuse of discretion standard applied where there was an apparent

conflict of interest because United [of Omaha Life Ins. Co.] acted as

both the funding source and the administrator of the Plan, thereby

evidencing a financial conflict”); Schofield v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co., No. 06-117, slip op., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89167 *4 (E.D. Cal.

Nov. 17, 2006)(application of abuse of discretion standard despite a

“structural conflict of interest”); Riffey, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

21847, * 32 n.7(“[U]nder Abatie, a conflict of interest finding would

not dictate application of de novo review but rather requires a less

deferential review under abuse of discretion...”).

While Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ authorities are

inapposite (Oppo. at 18-21), it is Plaintiff who has erroneously

relied on pre-Abatie decisions to support application of the de novo

standard of review (including Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of

Sponsor Applied Remote Technology, 125 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1997) and

Tremain v. Bell Industries, Inc., 196 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999)) that

utilized the “back and forth burden shifting” Atwood test that was

expressly overruled by Abatie.

5

The Court need not, for purposes of determining the applicable

standard of review, decide whether HP had a conflict of interest. The

Court agrees with Defendants, however, that the critical issue under

Abatie in deciding whether an inherent or structural conflict of

interest of the type alleged by Plaintiff exists is whether the same

entity is responsible for both administering and funding the plan. 

Abatie, supra, 458 F.3d at 965, citing Tremain v. Bell Indus., Inc., 196 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 1999).

11 06cv1506

Thus, Abatie makes clear that this Court must apply an abuse

of discretion standard to its review of the denial of Plaintiff’s

LTD benefits under the Plan, even if Plaintiff is ultimately able

to demonstrate the existence of a conflict of interest.4 If

Plaintiff is able to do so, the Court’s review under the abuse of

discretion standard will be “informed by the nature, extent, and

effect on the decision-making process of any conflict of interest

that may appear in the record.” Abatie, 458 F.3d at 967.5

Accordingly, any discovery to which Plaintiff claims she is

entitled concerning the nature, extent, and effect on the

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The parties’ dispute over whether Plaintiff is entitled to

conduct discovery concerning HP’s alleged conflict of interest shall

be submitted to Magistrate Judge Papas following the issuance of this

Order.

12 06cv1506

decision-making process of any alleged conflict of interest on

the part of HP is irrelevant to a determination of the proper

standard of review in this action. Plaintiff’s application for a

continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f) is therefore denied.6

C. Plaintiff’s Allegations of Procedural Irregularities

Plaintiff appears to argue that Defendants’ alleged

violations of procedural requirements and fiduciary obligations

(under ERISA, plan administrators must comply with various

procedures for giving notice, reporting, and claims processing)

should result in a de novo review in this case. She contends,

for example, that Defendants:

1. “set forth only a few sentences that even approached

any rational basis, medical or vocational, for the

denial” (Patrick Decl. ¶ 15);

2. “did not provide [her] with any clear notice as to the

procedural requirements for an internal appeal” (Id.

¶ 16);

3. “in the denial letter, [provided] no specific

vocational evidence ... as to how Defendants concluded

that [she] could perform any of the ‘other occupations’

listed by it in its denial” (Id. ¶ 17); and

4. “[n]ever informed [her] of [her] right to

representation of counsel, or of most of [her]

procedural rights, including [her] right to a complete

copy of the claims file and copies of any and all

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medical and vocational reports upon which the denial

was based.” (Id. ¶ 20.)

In addition to holding that the abuse of discretion standard

is applicable to a discretion-granting plan even where a conflict

of interest appears in the record, Abatie also addressed the

issue of the applicable standard of review when all statutory

procedural requirements have not been followed:

[W]hen a decision by an administrator utterly fails to

follow applicable procedures, the administrator is not,

in fact, exercising discretionary powers under the

plan, and its decision should be subject to de novo

review. Lesser irregularities, like [a plan

administrator exercising discretion but, in doing so,

making procedural errors], do not remove the decision

from abuse of discretion review, but rather should be

factored into the calculus of whether the administrator

abused its discretion.” 

Abatie, supra, 458 F.3d at 959 (emphasis supplied). The court

further explained:

When an administrator engages in wholesale and flagrant

violations of the procedural requirements of ERISA, and

thus acts in utter disregard of the underlying purpose

of the plan as well, we review de novo the

administrator’s decision to deny benefits. We do so

because, under Firestone, a plan administrator’s

decision is entitled to deference only when the

administrator exercises discretion that the plan grants

as a matter of contract.

Id., 458 F.3d at 971 (emphasis supplied)(citation omitted).

In illustrating the type of procedural non-compliance that

allows for more stringent judicial review, the Abatie court cited

Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), and

stated:

In Blau, the administrator had kept the policy details

secret from the employees, offered them no claims

procedure, and did not provide them in writing the

relevant plan information; in other words, the

administrator “failed to comply with virtually every

applicable mandate of ERISA.” 748 F.2d at 1353.

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Abatie, supra, 458 F.3d at 971. In Abatie, the administrator

“tack[ed] on a new reason for denying benefits in a final

decision, thereby precluding the plan participant from responding

to that rationale for denial at the administrative level, ...

violat[ing] ERISA’s procedures.” Id., 458 F.3d at 974. Even

this “contravention of the purpose of ERISA,” the court held,

will not mandate the application of the de novo standard, but

rather was to “be weighed by the district court in deciding

whether [the administrator] abused its discretion.” Id., 458

F.3d at 972.

The procedural irregularities alleged by Plaintiff do not

amount to an “utter failure” to follow ERISA procedures. VPA

detailed its reasons for denial of Plaintiff’s claim, including

consideration of medical records submitted by Plaintiff and

references to relevant Plan language. See Hellen Decl., Ex. B at

60-63. VPA informed Plaintiff of her right to appeal the denial

of benefits, provided specific instructions on how to initiate an

appeal, and offered Plaintiff the opportunity to “review (on

request and at no charge) documents and other evidence relevant

to [her] appeal.” Id. Plaintiff responded by filing an appeal

and demonstrated an understanding of her obligation to provide

supporting information to VPA. Hellen Decl., Ex. C at 64-72;

Patrick Decl. at ¶ 13. The record demonstrates that this is not

one of the “rare classes of cases” in which the administrator

engaged in “wholesale and flagrant violations of the procedural

requirements of ERISA” that requires an alteration of the

standard of review. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 971-972. Instead, the

alleged procedural irregularities are matters to be “factored

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into the calculus of whether the administrator abused its

discretion.” Id. at 959.

Cases decided since Abatie support the conclusion that

Plaintiff’s allegations in this case do not rise to the level of

“wholesale and flagrant violations of the procedural requirements

of ERISA.” In Riffey v. Hewlett-Packard Co., supra, Plaintiff

alleged that under Abatie the court must apply de novo review due

to “VPA’s untimely issuance of its denials of plaintiff’s

benefits claim.” 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21847 at *34. The court

found that the procedural violations of the Plan’s time limits

were insufficient to require application of de novo review. 

Likewise, in Chadwick v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 06-2245,

slip op., 2007 WL 2156078 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2007) and Schofield

v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 06-117, slip op., 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 89167 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2006), the district courts

applied an abuse of discretion standard despite alleged

procedural violations or irregularities.

Because Plaintiff does not allege “wholesale and flagrant

violations of the procedural requirements of ERISA” so as to

“fall into that rare class of cases” which require de novo

review, the abuse of discretion standard is applicable here. 

Abatie, supra, 458 F.3d at 971-972.

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the

proper standard of review of VPA’s denial of LTD benefits in this

action is abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Adjudication Re the Proper Standard of Review is

hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff’s application for a continuance of the

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Motion pursuant to Rule 56(f) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 7, 2007

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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