Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01044/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01044-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anthony Gregrory LaPointe,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-01044-PHX-DJH (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Anthony Gregory LaPointe, through counsel, has filed a Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents argue that 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because he has not shown that the state 

court’s resolution of his claims was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, 

or that it was contrary to, or based on an unreasonable determination of federal law. 

(Doc. 13.) Petitioner has filed a reply in support of his Petition. (Doc. 14.) For the 

reasons below, the Court recommends that the Petition be denied.1

 

/ / / 

 

1

 Petitioner requests “an order directing the state to file a complete record.” (Doc. 1 at 29.) Rule 5(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases does not require the government to produce “a complete record.” Rather, Rule 5(c) requires the government to provide relevant transcripts and to identify other available transcripts. Respondents complied with Rule 5. (See Doc. 13, Exs. A-Z, AA-UU.) Respondents also provided a copy of the docket sheets from the trial and appellate courts and offered to provide any items from the record that Petitioner deemed necessary to resolve his claims. (Doc. 13; 

Exs. TT, UU; Doc. 13 at 24, n.16.) There is no evidence that Petitioner made any requests for documents from Respondents. Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s request for an order directing Respondents to file the complete record. 

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I. Procedural Background 

 A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 On May 29, 2009, Petitioner was charged in the Maricopa County Superior Court 

with two counts of aggravated assault against Johnny Y. (Count One), and Rachel B. 

(Count Two). (Doc. 13, Ex. A.) A jury later convicted Petitioner of both counts. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. V.) The jury also found the offenses dangerous. (Id.) The trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to fourteen years’ imprisonment for the conviction related to Johnny 

Y., and to ten years’ imprisonment for the conviction related to Rachel B., with the 

sentences to run consecutively. (Doc. 13, Ex. V.) 

B. Direct Review 

 Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id.) On May 12, 2011, 

the appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id.) Petitioner 

sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on November 30, 2011. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. AA.) 

 C. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On April 21, 2010, while his direct appeal was still pending, Petitioner filed a 

notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. (Doc. 13, Ex. Q.) The trial court appointed counsel. (Doc. 13, Ex. R.) The 

court subsequently dismissed the notice of post-conviction relief without prejudice 

because Petitioner’s direct appeal was still pending. (Doc. 13, Ex. U.) 

 On May 31, 2011, Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. W.) Petitioner then retained private counsel, who filed a petition for postconviction relief on February 6, 2012. (Doc. 13, Exs. Y, Z, BB.) The petition asserted 

three grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Willits

instruction; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting crime-prevention and 

defense-of-property instructions; and (3) newly discovered evidence that Johnny Y. had 

“reversed his story” probably would have changed the outcome of trial or sentencing. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. BB at 4-6.) Two days later, Petitioner submitted an addendum supporting 

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his newly discovered evidence claim. (Doc. 13, Ex. CC.) On February 13, 2012, the 

trial court struck the petition because it failed to certify that it included every ground for 

relief known to Petitioner and thus did not comply with Rule 32.5. (Doc. 13, Ex. DD.) 

 On April 4, 2012 Petitioner refiled his petition and raised the same claims. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. EE.) The trial court found that the petition still did not comply with Rule 

32.5 and allowed Petitioner another opportunity to file a compliant petition. (Doc. 13, 

Ex. FF.) On April 30, 2012, Petitioner filed another petition raising the three claims that 

he had previously raised, and adding a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not 

conveying a plea offer that included a sentencing range of five-to-fifteen years’ 

imprisonment. (Doc. 13, Ex. GG.) The State filed a response that included an affidavit 

from Petitioner’s trial counsel indicating that Petitioner was aware of the plea offer and 

had rejected it. (Doc. 13, Ex. HH.) Petitioner filed a reply.2

 (Doc. 13, Ex. II.) Before 

the court ruled on the petition, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Correct Clerical Error,” 

requesting to substitute his reply with a version he intended to file. (Doc. 13, Ex. JJ.) 

Two days later, Petitioner re-filed his reply and argued that trial counsel failed to convey 

a plea offer of five-years’ imprisonment, and advised him to reject a plea offer that 

included a sentence of close to fifteen years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 13, Ex. KK at 2.) 

 On July 30, 2012, the trial court denied post-conviction relief. (Doc. 13, Ex. LL.) 

The court stated that: 

Regarding the ineffective . . . assistance claim, the court reviewed the 

submitted letter written by the Defendant where he stated “there is no way that I will sign that piece of paper for 7.5 that is not even a plea offer!” Pg.l, 2nd sentence; Defendant’s letter dated November 17, 2009. This 

clearly indicates the Defendant had considered a plea offer made by the State and rejected it. Moreover, in Mr. Shepherd’s affidavit, he states the Defendant was made aware of a plea offer, and he rejected it. He (the Defendant) was also afforded an opportunity for a settlement conference on 

January 2, 2010 and the Defendant specifically declined opting instead to proceed to trial. 

(Id.) 

 

2

 This document is mistitled “Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” (Doc. 13, 

Ex. II.) 

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 On January 23, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his 

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not conveying a plea offer. (Doc. 13, 

Ex. MM.) In April 2013, Petitioner’s retained counsel filed a notice of appearance in the 

court of appeals, and a motion to consolidate the two then-pending petitions for review.3

 

(Doc. 13, Exs. NN, OO.) The court of appeals denied the motion to consolidate, but 

allowed counsel until May 21, 2013, to file a “compliant petition for review . . . .” 

(Doc. 13, Ex. QQ.) 

 On May 7, 2013, counsel filed a petition for review arguing that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to advise Petitioner of the benefits of accepting the plea offers of 

five-year’s imprisonment and five-to-fifteen years’ imprisonment compared to the risks 

of trial. (Doc. 13, Ex. RR.) On February 12, 2014, the court of appeals granted review, 

but denied relief. (Doc. 1-2, Ex. B.) The appellate court found that the trial court had not 

abused its discretion in rejecting Petitioner’s “unsupported claim [of ineffective 

assistance of counsel], as raised in his petition for post-conviction relief, that counsel did 

not inform him of a plea offer.” (Doc. 1-2, Ex. B at 5.) 

 The appellate court further found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that Petitioner “had not stated a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel . . . .” (Doc. 1-2, Ex. B at 5.) The appellate court explained that Petitioner did 

not provide the trial court with any affidavits on that issue, and the pretrial statement 

attached to his reply, which was only evidence he submitted, “sheds little light on the 

events before the trial.” (Id.) The appellate court concluded that “in the absence of a 

clear sworn statement from [Petitioner] about the plea offers he believed had been made 

and not communicated to him, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in 

concluding that [Petitioner] had failed to show counsel’s performance was deficient.” 

(Id.) 

 

3

 There were two proceedings pending at one point in the court of appeals, 1CA– CR 12–0653 PRPC, and 1 CA–CR 13–0047 PRPC. (Doc. 1–2, Ex. B at ¶ 4, n.2.) 

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 The court further stated that Petitioner had not shown prejudice because he had 

“not avowed he would have accepted a five-year plea offer, even had it been offered, 

particularly in light of his rejection of a 7.5-year offer.” (Id.) The court also rejected 

Petitioner’s newly discovered evidence claim. (Id. at 6.) The Arizona Supreme Court 

denied review on July 7, 2014. (Doc. 1-2, Ex. C.) 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

On June 8, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition in this Court asserting the following 

grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to convey the State’s plea 

offer that stipulated to a sentence of five-to-fifteen years’ imprisonment (Ground One); 

(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to convey a plea offer that stipulated to a 

sentence of five years’ imprisonment (Ground Two); and (3) trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to explain the risks of proceeding to trial compared to the benefits of “any 

other plea offer made by the State” (Ground Three). (Doc. 1 at 15.) Respondents argue 

that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision rejecting Petitioner claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was not 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, and was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. (Doc. 13 at 2.) 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner.4

 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

 

4

 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

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present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas 

petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is 

precluded if the state court opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both 

‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s 

decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Although a procedurally barred 

claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court will decline to consider 

the merits of that claim. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

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“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

III. Petitioner’s Claims Are Not Procedurally Barred 

 The parties agree that Petitioner exhausted Ground One by presenting it to the 

state courts on post-conviction review and that the appellate court resolved that claim on 

the merits. (Doc. 1 at 12, 15, 18; Doc. 14 at 3-4.) However, the parties dispute whether 

Petitioner exhausted Grounds Two and Three on post-conviction review. Respondents 

argue that Grounds Two and Three are “part of the IAC plea-based claim Petitioner 

submitted to the Arizona Courts” because those allegations were presented in Petitioner’s 

reply in support of his Rule 32 petition, and in his petition for review to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, and the appellate court decided Grounds Two and Three on the merits. 

(Doc. 13 at 11 n.8, 21.) 

 Petitioner, on the other hand, asserts that Grounds Two and Three were not 

properly exhausted in the state courts, that habeas corpus review of these claims is 

procedurally barred, that the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel constitutes 

cause to overcome the procedural bar to review of these claims under Martinez v. Ryan, 

___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and that he is entitled to a hearing to establish 

cause and prejudice. (Doc. 1 at 12-13, 20-24.) As set forth below, the Court finds that 

Grounds Two and Three were exhausted and decided on the merits. 

A. Ground Two 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to convey a plea offer 

that stipulated to a sentence of five years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 1 at 15.) In his petition 

for post-conviction relief, Petitioner argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

convey a plea offer with a sentencing range of five-to-fifteen years’ imprisonment. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. GG.) In his reply in support of that petition, Petitioner argued that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to timely convey a plea offer that included a sentence 

of five years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 13, Ex. KK.) 

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 It appears, however, that Petitioner failed to follow Arizona’s procedural rules 

when he raised an additional argument regarding the five-year plea offer in his reply. See 

State v. Lopez, 221 P.3d 1052, 1053 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that issues raised for 

the first time in a reply in a Rule 32 proceeding are waived because a petition must 

include every ground known to the petitioner and Rule 32.6(d) requires the court’s 

permission to amend a petition); see also State v. Pena, 2015 WL 5516416, at *1 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2015 (trial court is not required to address claims raised for the first 

time in a reply in support of a Rule 32 petition). However, a petitioner’s mere failure to 

follow a state rule does not prevent review of the federal habeas claim. See Poland v. 

Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (1998). Rather, “[t]he state court must have actually relied on 

the procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1989). 

 Here, the trial court denied post-conviction relief on the ground that Petitioner 

failed to raise a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and did not cite a 

procedural rule in support of its ruling. (Doc. 13, Ex. LL.) Because the trial court did not 

clearly express its reliance on an adequate and independent state procedural bar to deny 

relief on the claim based on counsel’s alleged failure to convey the plea offer of five 

years’ imprisonment, asserted in Ground Two, Petitioner’s apparent failure to comply 

with a state rule does not bar federal habeas corpus review of that claim. See Johnson v. 

Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013) (“When a state court rejects a 

federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas court must 

presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits — but that presumption can 

in some limited circumstances be rebutted.”). 

 Moreover, in his petition for review, Petitioner specifically challenged the trial 

court’s rejection of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of 

a plea offer of five-years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 13, Ex. RR at 1, 3, 6, 7, 10.) The 

Arizona Court of Appeals noted that the trial court was not required to consider a claim 

raised for the first time in a reply. (Doc. 1-2, Ex. B at 5.) However, the appellate court 

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did not invoke a procedural bar to deny review of that claim. (Id.) Rather, the appellate 

court denied that claim on the merits because it was not supported by the record. (Id.) 

The appellate court explained that the record did not include a sworn statement from 

Petitioner about the plea offers he believed were made, but not communicated to him. 

(Id.) The appellate court further found that Petitioner had not established prejudice based 

on counsel’s alleged failure to convey a five-year plea offer because he had “not avowed 

that he would have accepted five-year plea offer, even had it been offered, particularly in 

light of his rejection of a 7.5-year offer.” (Doc. 1-2, Ex. B at 5.) Therefore, the Court 

concludes that Ground Two was exhausted on post-conviction review and resolved on the 

merits. 

B. Ground Three 

 In his list of “Claims for Relief,” Petitioner describes Ground Three (the 

inadequate advice claim) as follows: trial counsel failed “to competently explain the risks 

of proceeding to trial versus the benefits of any other plea offer.” (Doc. 1 at 15.) 

Because Ground Three refers to “other” plea offers, it is unclear whether this claim is 

based on counsel’s performance related to the plea offers mentioned in Grounds One and 

Two, or to other unidentified plea offers. However, when considered with the rest of the 

Petition, it is clear that Ground Three challenges trial counsel’s alleged failure to explain 

the risks of trial compared to the benefits of accepting the plea offers for sentences of five 

years’ imprisonment and for five-to-fifteen years’ imprisonment.5

 

 Respondents argue that Ground Three was exhausted and resolved on the merits as 

part of the “IAC plea-based claim that Petitioner submitted to the Arizona courts” and 

 5

 The Petition states that Petitioner’s affidavit “explains that none of the risks of trial and the benefits of the plea offer were reviewed with him any time prior to the expiration of the 5 to 15 year plea offer . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 20.) He also characterizes the 

Petition as asserting that “trial counsel failed to explain the risks of trial and the benefits of the first plea offer prior to his purported rejection of it,” and states that counsel’s advice was deficient because he did not explain Petitioner’s sentencing exposure if he proceeded to trial. (Doc. 1 at 21, 26.) Petitioner claims that if counsel had explained the risks of trial, he would have accepted the five-year or the five-to-fifteen year offer. (Doc. 1 at 8.) The Petition does not discuss counsel’s advice in relation to “any other” plea offer. 

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that the state court rejected on the merits. (Doc. 13 at 21.) The Court agrees with 

Respondents’ characterization of Ground Three, but finds that the inadequate-advice 

component of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was presented for the 

first time in the petition for review filed in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (See Doc. 13, 

Ex. RR.) As discussed below, Petitioner apparently initially considered trial counsel’s 

alleged failure to convey plea offers as distinct from his failure to give adequate advice 

about plea offers. However, he later combined those allegations in his petition for 

review. 

 In his petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserted that trial “counsel did 

not give ineffective advice. He never advised [Petitioner] that there was a plea offer 

[with a sentencing range of five-to-fifteen years’ imprisonment] until it was too late to 

accept the offer.” (Doc. 13, Ex. GG at 5.) In his reply, Petitioner stated that trial counsel 

advised him that the most he would face at trial would be fifteen years’ imprisonment, 

that he would likely get the presumptive sentence of 7.5 years’ imprisonment, and that he 

should reject any offer that included a prison sentence that was close to fifteen years. 

Petitioner, however, did not argue that trial counsel gave inadequate advice related to the 

plea offers. (Doc. 13, Ex. KK. at 2.) 

 In his petition for review, Petitioner specifically asserted that trial counsel did not 

convey to him the plea offers of five years’ imprisonment or five-to-fifteen years’ 

imprisonment “in the context of the probable outcome of the plea or conversely a trial,” 

and did not discuss the aspects of those plea offers compared to the strengths and 

weaknesses of the State’s case. (Doc. 13, Ex. RR at 6, 10, 12-13.) In its order denying 

relief, the appellate court found that the trial court did not “abuse[] its discretion in 

determining that [Petitioner] had not raised a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel,” and found that Petitioner had not shown prejudice related to the “rejection of a 

plea offer” because he had not “avowed that he would have accepted a five-year plea 

offer, even had it been offered, particularly in light of his rejection of a 7.5-year offer.” 

(Doc. 1-2, Ex. B at 5.) 

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 The Arizona Court of Appeals will not address claims raised for the first time in a 

petition for review. See State v. Ramirez, 616 P.2d 924, 928 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) 

(stating that issues may not be raised for first time in a petition for review); Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii) (stating that a petition for review shall contain “[t]he issues 

which were decided by the trial court and which the defendant wishes to present to the 

appellate court for review.”). Because the appellate court did not specifically refer to the 

inadequate advice allegations when it denied relief, it is not clear whether it concluded 

that those allegations were procedurally barred or that they lacked merit. 

 In Chambers v. McDaniel, 549 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit 

held that “unless a court expressly (not implicitly) states that it is relying upon a 

procedural bar, [the federal habeas court] must construe an ambiguous state court 

response as acting on the merits of a claim, if such a construction is plausible.” Here, a 

conclusion that the appellate court rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim asserted in Ground Three on the merits is plausible. The appellate court rejected 

Petitioner’s assertion that trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations because 

Petitioner had not presented sufficient evidence about the plea offers that were made, but 

allegedly not communicated to him, and that even assuming a plea offer of five years’ 

imprisonment was offered, he failed to establish prejudice. (Doc.1-2, Ex. B.) Without 

distinguishing between counsel’s alleged failure to convey plea offers and his alleged 

failure to give adequate advice related to those offers, the court rejected on the merits 

Plaintiff’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which encompassed both issues. 

 Because the appellate court rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel claims on 

the merits without separating out the different aspects of counsel’s alleged deficient 

performance, the Court concludes that all of the allegations in the petition for review 

pertaining to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel during plea negotiations were 

rejected on the merits. See Johnson, 133 S. Ct. at 1096; Harris, 489 U.S. at 261-62 (a 

petitioner’s failure to follow a state rule does not prevent review of the federal habeas 

claim, unless “[t]he state court . . . actually relied on the procedural bar as an independent 

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basis for its disposition of the case.”). Accordingly, Ground Three was exhausted on 

post-conviction review and was resolved on the merits. 

C. The Petition does not Assert New Claims 

 In his reply, Petitioner argues that the claims in Grounds Two and Three are new 

claims because “new factual allegations either ‘fundamentally alter the legal claim 

already considered by the state court’ [] or ‘place the case in a significantly different and 

stronger evidentiary posture than it was when the state courts decided it.” (Doc. 14 at 1-

13) (citing Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1320 (9th Cir. 2014).)6

 He argues that 

because the Petition includes new claims that were not adjudicated on the merits by the 

state courts for purposes of 2254(d), they are procedurally defaulted and he is entitled to 

an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he can show cause under Martinez to excuse 

the procedural bar. (Doc. 14 at 3-16.) As set forth below, the Court rejects Petitioner’s 

arguments. 

 Relying on Dickens, Petitioner argues that his affidavit, the affidavit of postconviction counsel, and citations to the trial court record provided in support of his 

Petition and reply, but not presented on post-conviction review, “strengthen the 

evidentiary postures of any actual IAC claims made in state court.” (Doc. 14 at 11.) In 

Dickens, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

asserted in a § 2254 petition was a new claim that was procedurally defaulted because the 

petitioner had not presented it to the state court. Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1317-18. The 

court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the procedural bar was 

excused by Martinez. Id. at 1318-20. 

 On post-conviction review, the petitioner in Dickens argued that his sentencing 

counsel was ineffective for failing “to direct the work of the court-appointed psychologist 

and did not adequately investigate [his] background.” Id. at 1317. In his § 2254 petition, 

Dickens “changed his claim to include extensive factual allegations [and evidence] 

 

6

 As discussed in Section IV.A, when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court, § 2254(d) imposes limits on the federal habeas courts review of such a 

claim. 

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suggesting [he] suffered from FAS [fetal alcohol syndrome] and organic brain damage.” 

Id. He asserted that “sentencing counsel’s failure to uncover and present these specific 

mitigating conditions amounted to constitutionally deficient performance.” Id. at 1316-

17. The Ninth Circuit found that the new allegations and evidence “fundamentally 

altered” the petitioner’s previously exhausted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Id. at 1319. The court stated that the “new evidence create[d] a mitigation case that 

[bore] little resemblance to the naked Strickland claim raised before the state courts,” 

which did not allege that the petitioner suffered any specific conditions. Id. The court 

found that allegations and evidence that the petitioner suffered from specific conditions, 

like FAS and organic brain damage, “clearly placed [the petitioner’s] Strickland claim in 

a ‘significantly different’ and ‘substantially improved’ evidentiary posture.” Id. 

 Accordingly, the court concluded that the claim asserted in the § 2254 petition was 

unexhausted and procedurally barred. Id. The court remanded the matter to the district 

court to determine whether the petitioner could establish cause and prejudice under 

Martinez based on the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Id. at 

1319-20. The court stated that the district court could conduct an evidentiary hearing to 

determine whether the petitioner could show cause and prejudice. Id. at 1320-22. 

 Unlike Dickens, the allegations in the Petition and the new evidence that Petitioner 

submits do not fundamentally alter Petitioner’s previously exhausted allegations of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As he did on post-conviction review, Petitioner 

argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to convey plea offers that included 

sentences for five years’ imprisonment and five-to-fifteen years’ imprisonment. 

Additionally, as he did on post-conviction review, Petitioner continues to argue that trial 

counsel gave inadequate advice regarding the risks of proceeding to trial compared to the 

benefits of accepting a plea offer. Petitioner’s affidavit supports his allegations and 

alleges that he would have accepted a plea offer. (Doc. 1, Ex. D.) The affidavit of postconviction counsel discusses his representation during post-conviction proceedings and 

states that he was not aware that he was required to file an affidavit to support the 

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allegations in the Petition. (Doc. 1, Ex. F.) These affidavits do not fundamentally change 

the nature of Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations. 

 In his reply, Petitioner cites portions of the trial court record in which trial counsel 

made statements related to plea negotiations. Specifically, Petitioner cites to the 

following statements of trial counsel that appear in the trial record: (1) a statement during 

a September 2, 2009 status conference, “there’s been no offer on the case” (Doc. 13, 

Ex. C at 3); (2) statements during an October 7, 2009 status conference, “we don’t have 

an actual offer on the table,” and “I think [Petitioner] at least wants to talk about settling 

the case and see if we can” (Doc. 13, Ex. D at 4); and (3) a statement during a November 

16, 2009 status conference, “we’re still trying to resolve the case.” (Doc. 13, Ex. E at 3.) 

These portions of the record do not fundamentally change Petitioner’s claim that trial 

counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations. The September 2009 statement 

indicating that there was no plea offer does not support Petitioner’s claim that trial 

counsel failed to convey plea offers from the State.7

 The October and November 2009 

statements indicating that Petitioner may have been interested in settling the case are 

similar to a statement in Petitioner’s November 17, 2009 letter that he wanted to meet 

with counsel before the settlement conference. (Doc. 13-5 at 59.) That letter was part of 

the record on post-conviction relief. Thus, the citations to the trial record do not 

fundamentally change Petitioner’s exhausted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 The Court concludes that the allegations in Grounds Two and Three, and the new 

evidence Petitioner presents to the Court, do not fundamentally change his exhausted 

 

7

 Defense counsel’s statements at the September 2, 2009 and October 7, 2009 status conferences, that “there’s been no offers on the case” and “we don't have an actual 

offer on the table,” were made over one month before Petitioner’s November 17, 2009 

letter rejecting a plea offer of 7.5 years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 13, Ex.C at 5; Ex. D at 4). 

Indeed, Petitioner does not argue that the State made plea offers before the September 2, 2009 status conference, or even before the October 7, 2009 and November 16, 2009 

status conferences. Instead, he argues that he did not reject a plea offer of five years’ imprisonment in his November 17, 2009 letter because, he asserts, “the state did not 

tender that offer until early January, 2010 . . . .” (Doc. 13, Ex. KK at 2-3.) Therefore, 

defense counsel’s statements at the September 2009 and October 7, 2009 status hearings, do not establish that counsel failed to convey plea offers, and do not change Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or substantially improve the evidentiary posture of those claims. See Dickens, 740 F.2d at 1319. 

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claim that trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations for failing to convey plea 

offers and for failing to adequately advise Petitioner of the risks of going to trial 

compared to the benefits of accepting a plea offer and, therefore, they are not new claims. 

See Schad v. Ryan, 732 F.3d 963, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting a petitioner’s claim 

that his § 2254 petition presented a new claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

because his claim that trial counsel was ineffective with respect to the effect of childhood 

abuse could not be easily separated from the petitioner’s earlier claim of ineffectiveness 

based on a failure to investigate childhood abuse). 

D. Conclusion 

 Because Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, asserted in 

Grounds One, Two, and Three of his Petition, were exhausted and rejected on the merits 

on post-conviction review in state court, the AEPDA applies and limits the Court’s 

review of Petitioner’s claims. Additionally, the Martinez decision does not apply and, 

therefore, the Court does not consider Petitioner’s discussion of Martinez.

8

 (Doc. 1 at 22-

24; Doc. 14 at 13-15.) 

IV. Applicable Standards of Review 

A. Review of Claims Adjudicated on the Merits 

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). As discussed in Section 

III, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims were adjudicated on the merits in state 

court. Accordingly, § 2254(d) applies. 

 8

 In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court held that, under limited circumstances, ineffective post-conviction counsel could constitute cause to excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 

Martinez does not apply because the Court has concluded that Petitioner’s claims are not 

procedurally defaulted. Specifically, Martinez does not apply when, as in this case, claims were considered and denied on the merits by the state court, and it does not “function as an exception to Pinholster’s rule that bars a federal habeas court from 

considering evidence not presented to the state habeas court.” Escamilla v. Stephens, 749 

F.3d 380, 395 (5th Cir. 2014); see Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (plurality) (Martinez does not apply to claims that were not procedurally defaulted, but were, rather, adjudicated on the merits in state court.”). 

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 Under § 2254(d), a federal court cannot grant habeas corpus relief unless the 

petitioner shows: (1) that the state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as 

clearly established in the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of the state court 

decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an 

unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts” based on the record before the state court. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This standard is “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 102 (2011). It is a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, 

which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). When evaluating state court decisions on habeas review, federal courts look 

through summary or unexplained higher state court opinion to the last reasoned decision 

on the claim. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

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Federal courts may also grant habeas corpus relief when the state-court decision 

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “Or, to put it 

conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process 

unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not 

merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th 

Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds, Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1000 (9th 

Cir. 2014); see Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002) (the 

statutory presumption of correctness applies to findings by both trial courts and appellate 

courts). Additionally, state court findings of fact are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with “clear and convincing 

evidence.” Id. 

If the federal court determines, considering only the evidence before the state 

court, that the adjudication of a claim on the merits resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or 

that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, 

the court evaluates the claim de novo, and may consider evidence properly presented for 

the first time in federal court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 536 U.S. 179, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401 

(2011). 

 Additionally, when a state court decision is deemed to be contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief unless the 

erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n.6 

(9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 631. 

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 When the petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Strickland prejudice standard applies and the court 

does not engage in a separate analysis applying the Brecht standard. See Avila v. Galaza, 

297 F.3d 911, 918 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1154 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the court “need not conduct harmless error review of 

Strickland violations under Brecht . . . because ‘[t]he Strickland prejudice analysis is 

complete in itself; there is no place for additional harmless-error review.’”)). 

B. Evidentiary Hearing and New Evidence 

 Petitioner requests that the Court hold an evidentiary hearing and expand the 

record to include evidence he submitted in support of his Petition, but that he did not 

present to the state courts on post-conviction review. (Doc. 1 at 20, 29.) As set forth 

below, the Court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not required and will not 

expand the record to include evidence that was not presented to the state courts on postconviction review. 

 When a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, a federal court may not 

consider new evidence unless the state court’s legal conclusions were contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or its determination of the 

facts was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented to the state court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d), Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1399 (holding that review under 2254(d)(1) is 

limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the 

merits); Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005). If a petitioner 

overcomes one of the hurdles imposed in § 2254(d), a district court may review the 

merits of the claim de novo. See Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d at 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(stating that when “the analysis on habeas corpus . . . results in the conclusion that 

§ 2254(d)(1) is satisfied, then federal habeas courts must review the substantive 

constitutionality of the state custody de novo.”). When the court conducts de novo 

review, the petitioner must meet the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) by showing that 

he has not “failed to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings,” 

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and by meeting the federal case law standards for the presentation of evidence in a 

federal habeas proceeding. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1399-1401. 

 As discussed below in Section IV.C, the Court rejects Petitioner’s assertion that 

the state court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing rendered its determination of the facts 

unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Additionally, as discussed below in Section 

IV.D, Petitioner has not shown that it was unreasonable or contrary to clearly established 

federal law for the state court to conclude that Petitioner was not entitled to relief based 

on his allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Accordingly, the Court will 

not hold an evidentiary hearing and will not expand the record. Rather, the Court’s 

review is limited to the record that was before the state courts. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 

at 1401. 

 Petitioner argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) because the failure to develop the record on post-conviction review 

is attributable to post-conviction counsel, not Petitioner. (Doc. 1 at 13; Doc. 14 at 9-11.) 

Section 2254(e)(2), however, places a “limitation on the discretion of federal habeas 

courts to take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400-01. 

Section 2254(e)(2) applies when “§ 2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas corpus 

relief.” Id. at 1401. Because Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were 

adjudicated on the merits in state court, see Section III, and Petitioner has not satisfied 

§ 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2), see Section IV.B and C, this Court’s review is limited to the 

record that was before the state court, and § 2254(e)(2) does not apply. Therefore, the 

Court does not discuss the parties’ discussions related to § 2254(e)(2). 

C. Review Under § 2254(d)(2) and Application of § 2254(e)(1) 

 A petitioner may be entitled to habeas corpus relief if the state court’s adjudication 

of his claims is based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). If the state 

court’s fact-finding process survives review under § 2254(d)(2), its factual findings are 

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entitled to a presumption of correctness.9 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Taylor v. Maddox, 

366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[o]nce the state court’s fact-finding 

process survives” review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), or when a petitioner does not 

challenge the state court’s fact finding, “the state court’s findings are dressed in a 

presumption of correctness . . . .”). 

 Petitioner argues that the state court’s fact-finding process was unreasonable and, 

therefore, the presumption of correctness does not apply. (Doc. 1 at 13-14; Doc. 14 at 8-

10.) He further argues that because the fact-finding process was unreasonable, the state 

court’s rejection of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in Ground One 

rests on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). (Doc. 1 

at 18.) Respondents argue that the trial court did not make factual determinations, but 

merely applied the law to the evidence that was before it. (Doc. 13 at 15.) Respondents 

alternatively argue that if the trial court made factual determinations, they were 

reasonable and are entitled to the presumption of correctness. (Doc. 13 at 16.) As set 

forth below, assuming the state court made factual determinations, they are reasonable 

and entitled to a presumption of correctness. 

 When the trial court denied post-conviction relief, it considered the parties’ 

briefing and exhibits, including a November 17, 2009 letter from Petitioner, an affidavit 

of trial counsel, and a joint pretrial statement. (Doc. 13-5 at 58-60, 77-79.) The trial 

court pointed to Petitioner’s November 17, 2009 letter, which included the statement that 

“there is no way that I will sign that piece of paper for 7.5 that is not even a plea 

offer!’ . . . ,” and found this statement “clearly indicated that [Petitioner] considered a 

plea offer made by the State and rejected it.” (Doc. 13, Ex. LL at 2.) The court noted 

that trial counsel’s affidavit stated that Petitioner was made aware of a plea offer and 

rejected it. (Id.) The court also noted that trial counsel’s affidavit attested that Petitioner 

 

9

 Section 2254(e)(1) provides that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

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was “afforded an opportunity for a settlement conference on January 2, 2010 and [he] 

specifically declined opting instead to proceed to trial.” (Id.) The Court assumes, 

without deciding, that these are factual determinations for purposes of the AEDPA. See 

28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

 Petitioner cites Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 790-91 (9th Cir. 2014), to support 

his argument that the trial court’s determination of the facts was unreasonable and its 

factual determinations are not entitled to deference because the court did not hold an 

evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 1 at 14-15); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). He further 

argues that the appellate court relied on the trial court’s unreasonable factual findings, 

and denied Petitioner’s motion to supplement to the record “with a transcript where the 

subject of a settlement conference was purportedly discussed.” (Id.) 

 In Hurles, the petitioner brought a post-conviction action alleging that the trial 

judge who presided over his trial was biased against him. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 791. The 

allegedly biased trial judge also presided over the post-conviction proceeding and denied 

relief. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the trial court’s denial of the judicial bias claim 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts because its fact-finding process 

included several “flaws.” Id. The flaws in the fact-finding process included the trial 

court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing, its failure to “provide another mechanism 

for [the petitioner] to develop evidence in support of his claim,” and the fact that the trial 

judge, whose bias was alleged, made factual findings about her own conduct based “on 

her untested memory and understanding of the events.” Id. 

 The Court rejects Petitioner’s assertion that, under Hurles, a trial court’s fact 

finding is automatically unreasonable when it fails to hold a hearing. (Doc. 1 at 14-15.) 

The court in Hurles did not base its decision solely on the trial court’s failure to hold an 

evidentiary hearing. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 790-91. Rather, the court noted several flaws in 

the trial court’s fact-finding process that made the process unreasonable, the failure to 

hold an evidentiary hearing was one of those flaws. Additionally, in Hibbler, 693 F.3d 

1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit had previously concluded that a state 

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court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing does not automatically render its factfinding process unreasonable. The Hurles majority opinion does not cite Hibbler. 

Furthermore, to the extent that Hurles is inconsistent with Hibbler, that decision is not 

binding because one panel of the Ninth Circuit may not overrule another prior panel’s 

opinion. See United States v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc);

Leon v. Barnes, 2015 WL 3993108, at 17 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 29, 2015) (noting that “[t]o 

the extent that Hurles imposes a per se bar to a state court’s credibility finding without an 

evidentiary hearing, it is inconsistent with Hibbler (not cited in the Hurles majority 

opinion),” and deciding to “follow the earlier Ninth Circuit case”). 

 As set forth below, the Court finds that the state court’s determination of the facts 

was not unreasonable and, therefore, the appellate court’s resolution of Petitioner’s 

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Thus, the state court’s factual 

determinations are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); 

Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. 

 The AEDPA does not offer guidance on what renders a state court’s factual 

determinations unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Therefore, courts may 

consider whether a federal district court considering a habeas petition de novo would 

have discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing. See Earp, 431 F.3d at 1166-67, 1169-70. 

The Supreme Court has clarified that, “[i]n deciding whether to grant an evidentiary 

hearing [on de novo review], a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could 

enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle 

the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). 

 In his petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner alleged that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to convey a plea offer “with a sentencing range of 5 to 15 years in 

prison.” (Doc. 13, Ex. GG at 4.) Petitioner claimed that he did not learn “of the plea 

offer” until “a pretrial hearing after the offer had already expired.” (Id.) To state a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance 

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fell below an objectively reasonable standard and that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defendant. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. When a plea offer has lapsed 

or been rejected because of counsel’s deficient performance, a petitioner establishes 

prejudice by showing: (1) a “reasonable probability” that he would have accepted the 

plea offer; (2) that the plea offer would have been entered without the prosecutor 

cancelling it or the trial court refusing to accept it; and (3) that the plea offer was more 

favorable than the sentence actually imposed. See Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S.___, 132 

S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385-86 

(2012). 

 In his petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner did not allege that there was a 

reasonable probability that he would have accepted a plea offer generally, or the plea 

offer of five-to-fifteen-years’ imprisonment that trial counsel allegedly failed to convey. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. GG.) Similarly, Petitioner’s reply did not allege that there was a reasonable 

probability that he would have accepted the plea offer of five-to-fifteen-years’ 

imprisonment or the plea offer of five years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 13, Ex. KK.) Thus, 

even if the allegations in the petition for post-conviction relief and the reply were 

accepted as true, Petitioner would not have been entitled to relief because those 

allegations did not establish prejudice. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 

1385-86. Accordingly, this Court would not have been required to hold an evidentiary 

hearing. Because this Court would have the discretion to deny an evidentiary hearing on 

the petition for post-conviction relief that was filed in the state court, the state court’s 

decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing was reasonable. 

 To the extent that the state court made factual determinations without holding an 

evidentiary hearing, its fact-finding procedure was not unreasonable because Petitioner 

had another opportunity to provide evidence in support of his claims but failed to do so. 

See Hurles, 752 F.3d at 790-91 (noting that a fact-finding process is deficient when the 

state court “makes factual findings without an evidentiary hearing or other opportunity 

for the petitioner to present evidence . . . .”) At the time of the post-conviction 

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proceeding, Rule 32.5 provided that “[a]ffidavits, records, or other evidence currently 

available to the defendant supporting the allegations of the petition shall be attached to 

it.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5 (2012). Thus, Petitioner had the opportunity to present 

evidence related to the allegations in his petition. All of the evidence that might have 

supported Petitioner’s allegations may not have been “available to [him]” at the time he 

filed his petition for post-conviction relief. See Rule 32.5. However, Petitioner had 

personal knowledge of whether trial counsel presented any plea offers to him, and he 

could have attested whether he would have accepted a plea offer. Petitioner, however, 

did not provide an affidavit or other evidence to support the allegations of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel in his petition for post-conviction relief.10 

 Additionally, the State submitted with its response an affidavit of defense counsel 

and a letter written by Petitioner, which refuted Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel failed 

to convey a plea offer. (Doc. 13, Ex. HH.) Petitioner’s November 17, 2009 letter stated 

that “[t]here is no way I will sign that piece of paper for 7.5 . . . .” (Doc. 13-5 at 58.) 

Defense counsel’s affidavit attested that Petitioner had rejected “the plea offer” in a letter 

dated November 17, 2009. (Id. at 60.) Although Petitioner’s November 17, 2009 letter 

stated that he wanted to “see counsel before the settlement conference” to “look into his 

options,” defense counsel attested that when the trial court offered Petitioner the 

opportunity for a settlement conference several months later on January 2, 2010, 

Petitioner “opted instead to proceed to trial.” (Doc. 13-5 at 60.) 

 In his reply in support of his petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner argued 

that trial counsel did not convey “a specific plea offer to him,” and advised him to reject 

any plea offer “that was close to 15 years,” because he would most likely be sentenced to 

the presumptive term of fifteen years’ imprisonment if he proceeded to trial. (Doc. 13, 

 

10 Petitioner, however, presented an affidavit regarding his claim of newly discovered evidence. (Doc. 13, Ex. CC.) This affidavit was submitted with a petition for post-conviction relief that the trial court “return[ed]” to Petitioner. (Doc. 13, Ex. DD.) It 

is unclear whether the trial court considered it when denying post-conviction relief. (Doc. 13, Ex. LL.) This affidavit, however, did not pertain to Plaintiff’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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Ex. KK at 2.) Petitioner also stated that he “never rejected the plea offer to five years 

DOC on November 17, 2009 because the state did not tender that offer until early January 

2010, . . . [a]nd that offer was not conveyed by defense counsel until six days later.” (Id.

at 2-3.) The only evidence to support these assertions was a January 5, 2010 joint pretrial 

statement summarizing “[s]ettlement status” by stating “initial offer [] Aggravated 

Assault, class 3 dangerous felony, stipulation to 5.0 years.” (Doc. 13-5 at 78.) The 

allegations in the reply were not supported by an affidavit, and Petitioner did not allege 

that there was a reasonable probability he would have accepted a plea offer of five years’ 

imprisonment if he had been aware of it. (Doc. 13, Ex. KK.) 

 Considering the evidence that was submitted to the trial court, Petitioner’s failure 

to provide an affidavit to support his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

despite having the opportunity to do so under Rule 32.5, and the absence of allegations or 

evidence that there was a reasonable probability that Petitioner would have accepted a 

plea offer, the Court concludes that the trial court reasonably determined that an 

evidentiary hearing was not necessary. See Bemore v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1177 

(9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the petitioner’s “argument that the state court’s denial of an 

evidentiary hearing rendered its determination of the facts unreasonable.”). 

 To further support his claim that the state court’s fact finding was unreasonable, 

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court denied his motion to supplement the record with 

a transcript “where the subject of a settlement conference was purportedly discussed.” 

(Doc. 1 at 14.) The appellate court’s denial of this motion did not render the state court’s 

fact finding unreasonable. Petitioner filed the motion to supplement while his postconviction proceeding was pending before the appellate court. (Doc. 13, Exs. PP, SS.) 

The appellate court appropriately denied the motion because Arizona law provides that 

the “[a]ppellate courts will only review those matters which appear in the records of the 

trial court.” See State v. Caldwell, 573 P.2d 863, 870-71 (Ariz. 1977). Therefore, the 

appellate court’s denial of the motion to supplement the record does not render the factual 

determinations unreasonable for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

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 Therefore, the Court concludes that state court’s fact finding was reasonable and 

Petitioner has not shown that the appellate court’s resolution of his allegations of 

ineffective assistance of counsel was “based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, to the extent the state court made factual determinations, they 

are entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).11 

 D. Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 

Because the Court concludes that Petitioner does not satisfy § 2254(d)(2), it 

considers whether Petitioner satisfies § 2254(d)(1). Under § 2254(d)(1), a petitioner may 

be entitled to habeas corpus relief if the state court’s adjudication of his claim was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 43. 

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

 1. Standards to Establish Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 Under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was 

objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. 

Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s 

performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate 

assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of 

 

11 Petitioner also argues that § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness does not 

apply because claims of ineffective assistance are reviewed de novo. (Doc. 1 at 13-14.) 

Petitioner cites Volkova v. Reno, 232 F.3d 1042, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2000), to support this assertion. In that case, the Ninth Circuit stated that it would conduct de novo review of 

the district court’s ruling that a habeas corpus petitioner, proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, had not shown that counsel during deportation proceeding was ineffective under the Due Process Clause. Id. Volkova did not address the standard of review that the 

district court applies to claims raised in a § 2254 petition, and does not state that the district court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in a § 2254 

petition under a de novo standard. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has stated that under the 

AEDPA, the Strickland standard is not applied de novo. See Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 

F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that “[u]nder AEDPA, we do not apply the Strickland standard de novo.”). 

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attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects 

of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of 

counsel’s performance is extremely limited. Id. Acts or omissions that “might be 

considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 

 To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must also establish that he 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show 

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694.

The court need not address both Strickland requirements if the petitioner makes an 

insufficient showing on one. See id. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of 

an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course 

should be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that 

“[f]ailure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the 

other”) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

 In Frye and Lafler, the Supreme Court explained the Sixth Amendment right to 

effective assistance of counsel as it applies in the context of plea negotiations. Frye, 132 

S. Ct. at 1404-08, Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384. In both cases, the Court addressed the 

prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test set forth in Strickland and 

concluded that, to show prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability 

that: (1) he would have accepted a plea offer but for counsel’s deficient performance; 

(2) the plea would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial 

court refusing to accept it; and (3) the plea would have resulted in a lesser charge or a 

lower sentence. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384-85. 

 2. The State Court Decision is not Contrary to Strickland 

 Petitioner generally argues that the state court’s decision was contrary to clearly 

established federal law. (Doc. 1 at 18); see 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The clearly 

established federal law governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is 

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Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (holding that it is “past question 

that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’”). As discussed in Section 

IV.D.1, the Supreme Court has clarified the application of Strickland in the context plea 

negotiations. The record reflects that, although the appellate court did not cite Strickland, 

Lafler, or Frye, it applied the principles of those cases to Petitioner’s claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (Doc. 1-2, Ex. B); see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) 

(holding that the AEDPA does not require a state court to cite relevant Supreme Court 

decisions in resolving constitutional claims and, it “does not even require awareness of 

[them], so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision 

contradicts them.”). Thus, the state court’s decision was not contrary to clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

 3. The State Court Reasonably Applied Federal Law 

Under Section 2254(d)(1), a petitioner may be entitled to habeas corpus relief if 

the state court unreasonably applied controlling Supreme Court precedent. Review under 

§2254(d)(1) “focuses on what a state court knew and did[,]” and the record under review 

is limited to “the record before the state court.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398-99. As 

discussed below, Petitioner has not shown that the state courts’ resolution of his claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel was an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

convey a plea offer that stipulated to a sentence of five-to-fifteen years’ imprisonment, 

failing to convey a plea offer that stipulated to a sentence of five years’ imprisonment, 

and failing to adequately explain the risks of proceeding to trial compared to the benefits 

of accepting those plea offers. (Doc. 1 at 15.) The appellate court rejected these claims, 

and the Arizona Supreme Court summarily affirmed the appellate court’s decision. 

(Doc. 1-2, Exs. B, C.) Accordingly, the appellate court’s decision is the last reasoned 

state court decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991) (stating that on 

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habeas corpus review, the district court considers that “last reasoned state court opinion” 

of the state court). 

 However, to the extent that the appellate court adopted the trial court’s decision, 

the Court may also consider that ruling. See Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2014) (“When the last reasoned decision is a state appellate court decision 

which adopts or substantially incorporates lower state court decisions, we may review 

those lower state court decisions as part of our review of the state appellate court’s 

decision.”) (internal quotation marks and modifications omitted). As set forth below, 

Petitioner has not shown that the state courts’ resolution of these claims was based on an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

 As previously noted, when the trial and appellate courts denied post-conviction 

relief, the record contained the parties’ briefing and exhibits, including a November 17, 

2009 letter from Petitioner, an affidavit of trial counsel, and a joint pretrial statement. 

(Doc. 13-5 at 58-60, 77-79.) Petitioner did not provide an affidavit to support the 

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in his petition for post-conviction relief or 

his reply. Additionally, with its response, the State submitted an affidavit of defense 

counsel and a letter written by Petitioner, which refuted Petitioner’s claim that trial 

counsel failed to convey a plea offer. (Doc. 13, Ex. HH.) Furthermore, Petitioner did not 

allege that there was a reasonable probability he would have accepted a plea offer of fiveyears’ imprisonment if he had been aware of it. (Doc. 13, Ex. KK.) 

 Based on this evidence, the trial court found that Petitioner did not state a 

colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal of that decision, 

Petitioner presented the allegations included in Grounds One, Two, and Three, and the 

appellate court denied relief. (Doc. 1-2, Ex. B.) As set forth in Section III.B, the 

appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting 

Petitioner’s unsupported claim that trial counsel did not inform him of a plea offer. The 

appellate court found that Petitioner had not shown that trial counsel’s performance was 

deficient or that he had suffered prejudice. (Id at 5.) 

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 Considering the evidence that was before the appellate court, see Pinholster, 131 

S. Ct at 1398, Petitioner’s failure to provide an affidavit to support his allegations of 

ineffective assistance despite having the opportunity to do so under Rule 32.5, and the 

absence of allegations that there was a reasonable probability that Petitioner would have 

accepted a plea offer, the Court concludes that the appellate court reasonably concluded 

that Petitioner did not establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Even 

assuming that trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to convey plea offers 

or explain the benefits of accepting those offers compared to proceeding to trial, because 

the record before the appellate court lacked evidence that Petitioner would have accepted 

the most favorable plea offer of five-years’ imprisonment, the appellate court reasonably 

concluded that Petitioner had not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

because he had not shown prejudice.12 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (there is no need 

to address the deficiency of counsel’s performance if prejudice is examined first and 

found lacking); Rios, 299 F.3d at 805 (“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland

test obviates the need to consider the other.”). 

 

12 Additionally, the state court’s conclusion that Petitioner did not establish 

prejudice is supported by the following: (1) Petitioner’s November 17, 2009 letter 

describing the victim’s story as “bogus,” stating that he “want[ed] to go to trial and Win!, and that he did not want to go to prison “for a crime he didn’t commit[].” (Doc. 13-5 at 

58-5); (2) evidence that Petitioner testified at trial, maintained his innocence, and claimed 

that he acted in self-defense, and that Johnny cut Rachel (Doc. 13, Ex. K. at 4-50); (3) the 

presentence report which indicates that Petitioner maintained his innocence and claims 

that Johnny lied at trial (Doc. 13, Ex. O at 1); and (4) the claim of actual innocence 

presented in his petition for post-conviction relief, which implies that the victim lied at 

trial Doc. 13, Ex. GG at 6). 

Petitioner’s protestations of innocence indicate that he was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged failure to convey a plea offer. See Hyles v. United States, 754 F.3d 

530, 535 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding habeas petitioner failed to show she was prejudiced by counsel’s plea advice where “[s]he maintained her innocence at trial” and “[n]othing in the record indicates she wanted to accept the plea offer and would have acknowledged her guilt even if properly advised about the risks of trial”); Osley v. United States, 751 

F.3d 1214, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 2014) (“While [the defendant’s] denial of guilt surely is not dispositive on the question of whether he would have accepted the government’s plea offer, it is nonetheless a relevant consideration.”); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1012 

(9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the petitioner failed to establish he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to convey the offer, in part, because of the petitioner’s “own steadfast and unmoving claims of innocence”). 

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 Moreover, even if Pinholster did not prohibit consideration of evidence that was 

not before state courts, Petitioner’s belated affidavit and the limited portions of the trial 

record he cites do not constitute “clear and convincing” evidence to rebut the state court’s 

conclusion that Petitioner rejected the state’s plea offer and rejected a settlement 

conference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner’s self-serving statements in an 

affidavit executed several years after Petitioner’s conviction do not constitute “clear and 

convincing” evidence to rebut the state courts’ findings that Petitioner rejected the state’s 

plea offer. See Lambert, 393 F.3d at 981-82 (concluding that habeas petitioner’s selfserving testimony did not satisfy § 2254(e)(1) “clear and convincing” standard in light of 

state court record). 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s affidavit is inconsistent with his reply in support of his 

petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner’s affidavit states that he did not become 

aware of the five-year plea offer until after trial. (Doc. 1, Ex. D.) The trial commenced 

on January 12, 2010 and concluded on January 21, 2010. (Doc. 13, Exs. H, M.) 

However, on post-conviction review, Petitioner stated that “the state did not tender [the 

five-year plea] offer until early January 2010 . . . [a]nd the offer was not conveyed by 

defense counsel until six days later.” (Doc. 13-5 at 73-74.) Thus, the assertions that 

Petitioner made on post-conviction review suggest that the plea offer was conveyed 

before or during, not after, trial. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s self-serving 

allegations and affidavit are not sufficient to establish entitlement to relief. See Womack 

v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel when, aside from petitioner’s self-serving statement, which was contrary to 

other evidence in the record, there was no evidence to support his claim); Dows v. Wood, 

211 F.3d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that there was no evidence in the record to 

support petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, other than the petitioner’s 

self-serving affidavit). 

 Finally, the portions of the trial record Petitioner cites in his reply, but that he did 

cite on post-conviction review, do not constitute clear and convincing evidence to rebut 

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the state courts’ conclusion that Petitioner rejected a settlement conference. (Doc. 14 at 

5.) Petitioner cites to trial counsel’s statements from Fall 2009 suggesting that Petitioner 

may have had some interest in resolving the matter without a trial at that point in the 

criminal proceedings. (Doc. 13, Ex. D at 4; Doc. 13, Ex. E at 3.) However, the affidavit 

of trial counsel that was submitted during post-conviction proceedings attests that 

Petitioner rejected a later opportunity for a settlement conference. (Doc. 13-5 at 60.) 

Specifically, trial counsel’s affidavit that was before the state courts on post-conviction 

review states that Petitioner “was offered the opportunity to conduct a settlement 

conference by Judge Gaines at the Pre-Trial Conference January 2, 2010. Judge Gaines 

specifically recommended a conference. [Petitioner] opted instead to proceed to trial.” 

(Doc. 13-5 at 60.) 

 Therefore, even if this Court could properly consider the evidence that Petitioner 

presents to this Court, but that he did not present to the state courts on post-conviction 

review, it does not constitute “clear and convincing” evidence to rebut the state court’s 

conclusions that Petitioner rejected that state’s plea offer or offers, and a January 2010 

opportunity for a settlement conference, and chose to proceed to trial. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

 For these reasons, Petitioner has not shown that the state courts’ resolution of his 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was an unreasonable application clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, he is not entitled to 

habeas corpus relief. 

V. Conclusion

 Because Petitioner has not shown that the state courts’ rejection of his claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, 

or that it contrary to or based on an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief and the Court recommends that the 

Petition, and the request for an evidentiary hearing and to expand the record, be denied. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. The parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 15th day of January, 2016. 

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