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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 28, 2004 Decided November 23, 2004

No. 03-7095

MICHAEL H. PRICE AND ROGER K. FREY,

APPELLEES

v.

SOCIALIST PEOPLE’S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00975)

Arman Dabiri argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Andrew C. Hall argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the brief were James Cooper–Hill and Nelson M. Jones.

Stuart H. Newberger argued the cause for amicus curiae

Blake Kilburn, et al. in support of appellees. With him on

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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the brief were Clifton S. Elgarten, Michael L. Martinez, and

F. Ryan Keith. Laurel P. Malson entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and ROBERTS,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Michael Price and Roger Frey sued

the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, better known

as Libya, pursuant to the terrorism exception to the Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7),

alleging various causes of action arising from their detention

in that country in 1980. The district court denied Libya’s

motion to dismiss and Libya appeals, arguing that (1) sovereign immunity protects it from suit because the plaintiffs, in

depositions in another case, contradicted key allegations in

their complaint here, and in any event (2) Price and Frey

have not stated a cause of action.

We conclude the facts recited in the amended complaint

are, notwithstanding possible tension between them and the

story told in the depositions, sufficient under the terrorism

exception to the FSIA to divest Libya of its immunity from

suit. We do not reach the question whether the complaint

states a cause of action because doing so would require us to

exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction, for which there is no

basis in this case.

I. Background

In 1997 Price and Frey sued Libya, seeking $40 million in

damages for hostage taking and torture, which acts they

argued divested Libya of its immunity pursuant to the terrorism exception to the FSIA. Neither party disputes that in

March, 1980 Price and Frey, American citizens working in

Libya for a Libyan company, were arrested in Libya and

charged with taking photographs for an illegal purpose.

Price and Frey were eventually tried and acquitted of the

charge of taking illegal photographs and later were permitted

to leave Libya. Beyond these basic facts, however, it seems

the plaintiffs and Libya, which has not yet had an opportunity

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fully to tell its side of the story, differ as to many important

details of the plaintiffs’ detention and trial.

Price and Frey maintained in their original complaint that

they were ‘‘incarcerated in prison in Tripoli for TTT 105 days,’’

during which time they were subject to ‘‘physical, mental and

verbal abuse,’’ including being ‘‘[p]rovided inadequate food,’’

‘‘denied any dental care,’’ ‘‘given a urine soaked mattress on

which to sleep,’’ and ‘‘kicked, clubbed and beaten by the

prison guards.’’ The complaint also stated Libyan officials

informed the plaintiffs their incarceration ‘‘was the for the

purpose of demonstrating [Libya’s] support for the government of Iran which held hostages in the U.S. embassy in

Teheran.’’

Libya moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint, contending: (1) the FSIA is unconstitutional insofar as it delegates to

the Executive Branch legislative authority to determine which

countries are amenable to suit under § 1605(a)(7); (2) the

court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Libya would

violate that nation’s right to due process; and (3) the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The district court denied Libya’s motion, see Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 110 F. Supp. 2d 10

(D.D.C. 2000), and Libya pursued an interlocutory appeal,

which we decided in 2002. See Price v. Socialist People’s

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (Price II).

After analyzing the ‘‘stringent definition’’ of ‘‘torture’’ in the

terrorism exception to the FSIA, we observed that the plaintiffs’ complaint ‘‘offer[ed] no useful details about the nature of

the TTT beatings [they] allegedly suffered’’ and said ‘‘virtually

nothing about the purpose of the alleged torture.’’ Id. at 93–

94. Accordingly, we remanded the matter to the district

court ‘‘to allow plaintiffs to attempt to amend their complaint’’

so as to bring their claim within the terrorism exception. Id.

at 94. We also held the claim for ‘‘hostage taking’’ should

have been dismissed because ‘‘even when read most favorably

to [the plaintiffs] TTT [the] complaint point[ed] to no nexus

between what happened to [the plaintiffs] in Libya and any

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concrete concession that Libya may have hoped to extract

from the outside world.’’ Id. at 94.

On remand the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion

to amend the complaint. As amended, the complaint makes

several new factual allegations pertinent to this appeal, including that during ‘‘months of incarceration’’ the plaintiffs

experienced repeated ‘‘extrajudicial acts of torture,’’ including

‘‘continuous[ ] and intentional[ ]’’ beatings and threats of ‘‘severe physical pain’’ and of ‘‘imminent death.’’ The amended

complaint further alleges the plaintiffs were ‘‘forced to watch

either a beating or a killing of a fellow prisoner for the

purposes of forcing [them] to confess to being spies,’’ and that

they were visited by an attorney who told them ‘‘they would

likely receive the death penalty for spying if they did not

confess.’’ Once again Libya moved to dismiss, this time

arguing: (1) our decision in Price II had foreclosed consideration of the claim for hostage taking; (2) the district court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because key allegations in

the amended complaint were contradicted by depositions the

plaintiffs filed in the case they had brought in New York

against the company that had employed them in Libya; and

(3) the Flatow Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (note), a source

of substantive law invoked in the amended complaint, does

not create a cause of action against a foreign state.

After a hearing the district court granted Libya’s motion to

dismiss the claim for hostage taking. Price v. Socialist

People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 274 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22–23

(D.D.C. 2003) (Price III). With regard to subject matter

jurisdiction, however, the court — applying our instruction in

Phoenix Consulting v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36

(2000), to go beyond the pleadings insofar as necessary to

resolve disputed facts bearing upon a foreign sovereign’s

immunity — held the amended complaint stated a cause of

action for mental torture within the terrorism exception to

the FSIA. Price III, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 25–26. Finally, the

district court ruled that the Flatow Amendment, in conjunction with the terrorism exception, created a cause of action

against a foreign state. Id. at 27–29. Again, Libya filed an

interlocutory appeal.

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II. Analysis

Libya makes two alternative arguments. First, Libya contends the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

because the factual allegations of the amended complaint

were discredited by inconsistent statements in the plaintiffs’

New York depositions. Second, Libya argues the plaintiffs

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

because, after the district court issued its decision, we held in

Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024

(2004), that the Flatow Amendment does not create a cause of

action against a foreign state.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Before considering Libya’s contention that the district

court lacks jurisdiction, we begin with a word about our own.

Although 28 U.S.C. § 1291 limits this court’s review to ‘‘final

decisions of the district court,’’ under the collateral order

doctrine a decision of the district court is deemed ‘‘final,’’ and

therefore reviewable, if it: ‘‘(1) conclusively determine[s] the

disputed question, (2) resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’’ Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506

U.S. 139, 144 (1993). Further, ‘‘[i]t is well-established that an

appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint on the

ground of sovereign immunity under the FSIA satisfies the

three requirements of the collateral order doctrine.’’

Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d

1020, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see Kilburn v. Socialist People’s

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1126 (D.C. Cir.

2004). Thus do we have jurisdiction over Libya’s appeal

contending that sovereign immunity shields it from this suit.

The jurisdiction of the district court, in contrast, is governed by the FSIA itself: A foreign state is immune from suit

in both federal and state courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1604, unless the

case comes within an express exception in the FSIA, id.

§ 1605. ‘‘If no exception applies, a foreign sovereign’s immunity under the FSIA is complete: The district court lacks

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subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s case.’’ Phoenix

Consulting, 216 F.3d at 39.

The Congress, by § 221(a) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat.

1214, 1241–42 (Apr. 24, 1996), added to the FSIA a ‘‘terrorism

exception,’’ which denies sovereign immunity in any case

in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was

caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing,

aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of

material support or resources TTT for such an act if

such act or provision of material support is engaged

in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign

state while acting within the scope of his or her

office, employment, or agency.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). As in Kilburn, the question in this

case is whether the plaintiffs’ claims ‘‘fall within TTT the

exception, upon which the jurisdiction of the district court

depends.’’ 376 F.3d at 1127.

Application of this exception entails the reconciliation of

two rival propositions. On the one hand, because a foreign

sovereign ‘‘has immunity from trial and the attendant burdens of litigation,’’ its claim of immunity from suit should be

resolved ‘‘as early in the litigation as possible,’’ Phoenix

Consulting, 216 F.3d at 39, lest the purpose to be served by

sovereign immunity be unduly compromised. On the other

hand, a court is poorly equipped to resolve factual disputes at

an early stage in a litigation — as reflected in the ordinary

rules of procedure. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines,

Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (when judging a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) a court should ‘‘accept the allegations contained in [the] complaint as true for purposes of [the]

case’’).

In Phoenix Consulting we explained how we reconcile

these propositions: When a foreign sovereign disputes the

fact(s) upon which the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction depend(s), the court ‘‘must go beyond the pleadings and

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resolve any disputed issues of fact the resolution of which is

necessary to a ruling upon the motion to dismiss.’’ 216 F.3d

at 40. This resolution, of course, is ‘‘not a conclusive determination’’ but is ‘‘instead subject to change in light of further

development of the facts.’’ I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Republic

of Pakistan, 351 F.3d 1184, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 2003). And, as we

later observed, the district court ‘‘retains considerable latitude in devising the procedures it will follow to ferret out the

facts pertinent to jurisdiction.’’ Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1131.

Regardless of the procedures the court follows, however, the

sovereign ‘‘defendant bears the burden of proving that the

plaintiff’s allegations do not bring its case within a statutory

exception to immunity.’’ Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40.

The parties to this case agree upon these basic principles

but they skirmish over the standard of review that guides our

inquiry. Libya points to Price II, where we explained that

we review de novo a district court’s determination whether

alleged facts ‘‘[bring] the case within any of the exceptions to

immunity invoked by the plaintiff.’’ 294 F.3d at 91. The

plaintiffs, in turn, direct us to decisions in which we said we

‘‘review de novo the district court’s determination that a

[foreign sovereign] is not entitled to immunity’’ while we

‘‘review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error.’’

Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica De Venezuela,

200 F.3d 843, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see, e.g., Jungquist, 115

F.3d at 1028. There is no inconsistency, however, in our

precedents: The cases cited by the plaintiffs announce the

unsurprising proposition that we review the district court’s

findings of fact — including facts that bear upon immunity

and therefore upon jurisdiction — for clear error; hence, we

went on in Price II to state that, once the facts have been

settled, we decide de novo whether those facts are sufficient

to divest the foreign sovereign of its immunity. 294 F.3d at

91. In this case, the legal issue we review de novo is whether

the allegations in the amended complaint, viewed in light of

the contradictions to which Libya points, are still sufficient to

divest Libya of immunity from suit. See, e.g., Kilburn, 376

F.3d at 1131–33 (reviewing de novo whether contradictions

between allegations in complaint and facts recited in CIA and

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State Department documents sufficed to carry Libya’s burden

of proving conduct fell outside terrorism exception to FSIA).

Libya points to three areas of arguable incongruity between the amended complaint and the New York depositions;

none persuades us the district court erred. First, the claim

in the amended complaint that Hassan Ben Younis interrogated Price and Frey ‘‘on or about March 20’’ and accused them

of being spies is not inconsistent with Frey’s testimony in his

New York deposition that the prosecutor who interrogated

him on March 20 ‘‘was not Ben Younis’’ and, whoever it was,

charged him only with taking illegal photographs. The two

accounts are reconciled if Price and Frey were interrogated

by Ben Younis ‘‘about’’ but not ‘‘on’’ March 20.

Second, Libya contends Price and Frey have given two

irreconcilable accounts of their meeting with Mr. Duabi, the

Libyan lawyer assigned to advise them. In his New York

deposition Frey testified that Mr. Duabi smuggled a note

from the imprisoned plaintiffs to their employer. In the

amended complaint the plaintiffs allege Mr. Duabi told them

they would receive the death penalty if they did not confess.

Libya claims that both accounts cannot be true: ‘‘It is absurd

to assert that Mr. Duabi was an agent of Libya trying to

force Price and Frey to sign a false confession while at the

same time smuggling papers out to their employers.’’ We

agree with the plaintiffs, however, it is entirely possible both

accounts are correct — that is, the lawyer smuggled the note

but warned the plaintiffs of dire consequences if they did not

confess.

Finally, Libya suggests the amended complaint and the

New York depositions contain contradictory accounts of the

events of April 30. Specifically, Libya argues Frey’s deposition testimony that he was not charged with espionage or

spying activities while being interrogated on April 30 ‘‘directly contradicts and proves false’’ the allegation in the amended

complaint that ‘‘[o]n or about’’ April 30 both plaintiffs were

threatened with beatings if they did not confess to being

spies. Although the plaintiffs may encounter difficulty at

trial reconciling these accounts, the two versions are not

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hopelessly inconsistent. It is possible the interrogation ‘‘on

or about’’ April 30 described in the amended complaint is not

the same as the interrogation described in the New York

depositions. Libya has not pointed to anything in the New

York depositions that would preclude this possibility. Further, as the plaintiffs point out, the questions put to Frey at

his deposition, upon the answers to which Libya relies, related only to the formal process of arraignment, and at the

arraignment he was not charged with spying.

In all three respects Libya has done little more than

highlight small variations between the facts as described in

the plaintiffs’ action of more than two decades ago against a

non-sovereign defendant and the facts as described in the

amended complaint against Libya. Such slight support cannot carry the defendant’s ‘‘burden of proving that the plaintiff’s allegations do not bring its case within a statutory

exception to immunity.’’ Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40.

Libya has failed to carry its burden of proof not only

because it has not identified any true contradictions to undermine the credibility of the amended complaint but also because it does not dispute some of the most serious allegations

in that complaint. See Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1132 (Libya

satisfied neither burden of proof nor burden of production by

pointing to alleged contradictions between complaint and

government documents but proffering no ‘‘affirmative evidence’’ conduct was not within terrorism exception to FSIA).

As the district court noted, Libya did nothing to contest the

allegations that

on three separate occasions, plaintiffs were bound

and forced to watch as another prisoner was beaten

[and] on each of these occasions, the head of the

prison informed them that if they did not sign a

confession that they were American spies, they

would receive the same treatment that they were

witnessing.

Price III, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 25. Having failed to impugn the

plaintiffs’ credibility based upon irreconcilable differences

between their amended complaint and their prior testimony,

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Libya cannot remain silent in the face of these allegations and

still be said to have carried its burden of showing this case

does not come within the subject matter jurisdiction of the

district court via the terrorism exception to the FSIA. See

Price II, 294 F.3d at 93 (‘‘When reviewing a plaintiff’s unchallenged factual allegations to determine whether they are

sufficient to deprive a foreign state defendant of sovereign

immunity, we assume those allegations to be true’’).

In short Libya has not exposed any contradiction that

renders the facts stated in the amended complaint insufficient

to deprive the defendant of its immunity from suit. The

district court therefore correctly denied Libya’s motion to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

B. Motion to Dismiss

Libya next argues the district court erred in denying its

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the amended complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

because this circuit recently held, contrary to the district

court, see Price III, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 27, that the Flatow

Amendment does not ‘‘creat[e] a private right of action

against a foreign government.’’ Cicippio-Puelo, 353 F.3d at

1033. Although Libya advances an uncontroversial reading of

our decision, it does not follow apodictically that this court

should grant Libya the relief it requests: ‘‘Denial of a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is

not ordinarily subject to interlocutory appeal. It is neither a

final decision nor a proper subject for appeal under the

collateral order doctrine.’’ Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1133.

Libya does not appear to disagree; rather, as in Kilburn,

Libya ‘‘urges us to assume jurisdiction over the non-immunity

issues as ‘pendent’ to the sovereign immunity decision over

which we have interlocutory jurisdiction.’’ Id. Libya also

relies upon Acree v. Republic of Iraq 370 F.3d 41, 59 (D.C.

Cir. 2004), in which we held ‘‘generic common law cannot be

the source of a federal cause of action.’’ Acree, however, was

not a case in which we exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction, so it has no bearing upon the issue now before us.

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‘‘A circuit court exercises pendent jurisdiction when, in the

course of reviewing an order from which an appeal is within

its jurisdiction, it hears an appeal from another order that,

while part of the same case or controversy, would not otherwise be within its statutory jurisdiction.’’ Gilda Marx, Inc. v.

Wildwood Exercise, Inc., 85 F.3d 675, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

The exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction is often suggested, occasionally tempting, but only rarely appropriate.

Because ‘‘a rule loosely allowing pendent appellate jurisdiction would encourage parties to parlay TTT collateral orders

into multi-issue interlocutory appeal tickets,’’ Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 49–50 (1995), ‘‘[t]his court

exercises pendent appellate jurisdiction sparingly,’’ Gilda

Marx, 85 F.3d at 678–79, indeed only when review of the

pendent matter is necessary ‘‘to ensure meaningful review’’ of

or ‘‘inextricably intertwined with’’ the order properly before

the court. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Expresstrak, L.L.C.,

330 F.3d 523, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Neither of these considerations favors the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in this case. The amended complaint advances many theories of liability, including claims under not

only the Flatow Amendment but also under state common

law, some general and several specific sources of international

law, the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, and § 1003

of the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 (codified at

18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)). In Kilburn, we explained ‘‘whether

state tort law properly provides the plaintiff with a cause of

action TTT is not inextricably linked with, or necessary for

meaningful review of, the proper scope of jurisdictional causation under § 1605(a)(7)’’ of the FSIA. Kilburn, 376 F.3d at

1134. Likewise, the question whether any of the sources of

law invoked in the amended complaint provides the plaintiffs

with a cause of action is not inextricably linked with, or

necessary for meaningful review of, the only question before

us as of right, namely, the sufficiency of the facts to support

the court’s jurisdiction under the terrorism exception to the

FSIA, § 1605(a)(7).

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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of

Libya’s motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction is

Affirmed.

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