Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05335/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05335-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 13, 2015 Decided August 25, 2015

No. 13-5335

CAUSE OF ACTION,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-00850)

Aram A. Gavoor argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were Patrick J. Massari, Allan L. Blutstein, R.

James Valvo III, and Marie Allison Connelly. Daniel Z. Epstein

and Reed D. Rubinstein entered appearances.

Katie Townsend argued the cause for amici curiae Reporters

Committee for Freedom of the Press, et al. On the brief were

Bruce D. Brown, Gregg P. Leslie, Peter E. Scheer, and Greg

Lewis.

Victoria Toensing, Joseph E. diGenova, and Brady

Toensing were on the brief for amicus curiae The Daily Caller

News Foundation in support of appellant.

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Peter R. Maier, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. On the brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S.

Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence and Alan Burch, Assistant

U.S. Attorneys. Mitchell P. Zeff, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, BROWN, Circuit Judge, and

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Chief Judge: Cause of Action (“Action”), a

nonprofit organization, filed a series of three Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA) requests with the Federal Trade

Commission. The question presented is who should pay the

costs of satisfying those requests. Action contends that FOIA

entitles it to a complete waiver of the customary fees because

“disclosure of the information is in the public interest,” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). In the alternative, Action contends that it is

entitled to a waiver of all but duplication costs because it is “a

representative of the news media,” id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II).

The Commission and the district court rejected Action’s

claims for fee waivers regarding its first and second FOIA

requests, and then concluded that Action’s claims regarding its

third request were moot. We conclude that Action’s claims

regarding its third request were not moot, and that the case must

be remanded for reconsideration in light of the entire

administrative record and our clarification of the standards for

FOIA fee waivers.

I

FOIA permits an agency to exact a reasonable charge for

“document search, duplication, and review, when records are

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requested for commercial use.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I). 

Certain categories of requests and requesters, however, are

entitled to more favorable treatment. Two such categories are

at issue in this case. First, an agency must furnish records

without any charge or at a reduced charge “if disclosure of the

information is in the public interest because it is likely to

contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations

or activities of the government and is not primarily in the

commercial interest of the requester.” Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii)

(emphasis added). Second, an agency may charge only for

duplication costs “when records are not sought for commercial

use and the request is made by . . . a representative of the news

media.” Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II) (emphasis added). Action

asked the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for fee waivers

under both categories.

A

Action is a nonprofit organization that “advocates for

economic freedom and opportunity by educating the public

about the threat posed by improvident federal regulations,

spending, and cronyism.” Action Br. 6. It began operations on

August 15, 2011. Two weeks later, Action submitted its first

FOIA request to the FTC, seeking all records relating to the

Commission’s guides for the use of product endorsements in

advertising. The request covered, inter alia, records relating to

the drafting of the guides and to investigations of alleged

violations of the guides. Action later agreed to limit its request

to records relating to “changes to the Guides concerning social

media authors,” FTC Letter of 9/22/2011 (App. 24), and said

that it was interested in using the requested information to

inform the public about a threat to the First Amendment rights

of such authors. Action also asserted that, as a nonprofit

educational organization with no commercial purpose, it was

entitled to a public-interest fee waiver.

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The FTC denied Action’s public-interest waiver application,

stating that the statute provides for such a waiver only if

disclosure is “‘likely to contribute significantly to public

understanding of the operations or activities of the

government.’” FTC Letter of 9/22/2011 (App. 25) (quoting 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii)). Action responded by asserting that

disclosure of the records was in fact likely to make such a

contribution. Action also asserted, in the alternative, that it was

entitled to a fee waiver as a representative of the news media. 

Action Letter of 9/26/2011 at 1 (App. 26) (citing 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II)). In reply, the FTC said that Action was

not entitled to either form of relief because, inter alia, “you have

not demonstrated your ability [to] disseminate information.” 

FTC Letter of 10/7/2011 (App. 28). Pursuant to its rules for

“general public” requesters, the Commission provided Action

with 100 pages of records free of charge. See 16 C.F.R.

§ 4.8(b)(3); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(II). It retained

the additional responsive pages pending receipt of payment from

Action. Action then filed an administrative appeal within the

agency, which the agency denied, reiterating that “you have

failed to provide adequate information about your dissemination

plans.” FTC Letter of 11/29/2011 at 1 (App. 35).

In tandem with the administrative appeal of its fee-waiver

applications regarding its first request, Action made a second

FOIA request, this time for all records concerning prior cases in

which the FTC granted public-interest fee waivers and the

process by which the Commission made those determinations. 

Action applied for public-interest and news-media fee waivers

for this second request as well. Once again, the FTC denied the

fee-waiver applications, designated Action as a “general public”

requester, provided it with 100 pages without charge, and

retained the remaining responsive pages pending payment. The

Commission also withheld portions of eight documents under

various statutory exemptions to FOIA. Action again filed an

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administrative appeal of the denial of its applications for fee

waivers, which the FTC again denied, stating that Action had

“failed to provide any meaningful level of detail regarding [its]

dissemination efforts or ability,” FTC Letter of 2/27/2012 at 1

(App. 161), and failed to provide “sufficient information to

establish [its] status as a news media representative,” id. at 3. 

On January 27, 2012, Action made its third and final FOIA

request. This request “perfected,” repeated, and expanded the

subject matter of Action’s earlier requests. Action Letter of

1/27/2012 at 8 (App. 159). It also made an entirely new request: 

for all records relating to the process by which the FTC had

determined that Action, in particular, was not entitled to a fee

waiver for its earlier requests. The FTC disregarded the part of

Action’s submission that merely renewed its prior requests on

the ground that it was a “duplicate” of those requests. FTC

Letter of 3/19/2012 at 1 n.1 (App. 174). The Commission

identified 95 pages of records responsive to the other parts. It

withheld 16 of those pages under a FOIA exemption and

released the remaining pages without charge under its 100-freepages rule. Having done so, the FTC declined to decide whether

Action qualified for a public-interest or news-media waiver for

the third request. Action filed another administrative appeal,

which the FTC again denied, stating that the fee-waiver question

was now moot.

Although Action’s initial FOIA request simply asserted that

Action was entitled to a fee waiver because it was a nonprofit

organization, the agency record expanded significantly over the

course of Action’s dialogue with the FTC. All told, Action sent

seven letters to the Commission in support of its fee-waiver

applications. By the time of its appeal from the agency’s denial

of the fee-waiver applications for its third request, a much fuller

picture of Action’s activities and intentions had come into view. 

Action said that it planned to analyze the responsive records, use

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its editorial skills to create distinct works, and share the resulting

analysis with the public through a variety of channels, including

its “regularly published online newsletter,” its “regular

periodicals” (“Agency Check” and “Cause of Action News”), its

“frequently visited” website, and its Twitter and Facebook

followings. Action Letter of 4/4/2012 at 6-7 (App. 181-82). 

Action also stated its intention to write two specific reports

within two weeks of receiving the documents: one entitled

“How the FTC Denies Fee Waivers to Organizations That Seek

Information About FTC Operations,” and the other entitled “The

FTC and the Guides Concerning Endorsements: Why the

Change?” Id. at 6. Finally, Action pointed the Commission to

its history of “extensive publication activities,” id. at 7,

including examples of nearly twenty online articles published by

other media outlets that “feature [Action’s] work,” Action Letter

of 1/27/2012 at 3-4 & n.7 (App. 154-55); see Action Letter of

4/4/2012 at 7-8 & n.25 (App. 182-83).

B

On May 25, 2012, Action filed suit in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging both the

Commission’s decision to withhold some of the responsive

records as exempt from disclosure and its denial of Action’s

applications for fee waivers. With respect to the withheld

documents, the district court granted summary judgment for the

Commission regarding most of the documents. Neither party

has appealed that decision. With respect to the fee-waiver

applications, the district court also granted summary judgment

for the Commission. The court concluded that Action was not

entitled to either category of fee waiver for the first two FOIA

requests. And like the FTC, it declared the fee-waiver issues for

the third request moot. Cause of Action v. Federal Trade

Comm’n, 961 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.D.C. 2013).

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Action appeals the district court’s adverse decisions with

respect to its public-interest and news-media waiver applications

and with respect to mootness. We review de novo both the

district court’s grant of summary judgment and the agency’s

denial of the fee-waiver applications. See Judicial Watch, Inc.

v. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(A)(vii) (providing that, “[i]n any action by a

requester regarding the waiver of fees[,] . . . the court shall

determine the matter de novo”). The same is true for the court’s

conclusion that the fee-waiver applications for the third FOIA

request were moot. We address the mootness issue in Part II

and the fee-waiver issues in Parts III and IV.

II

The FTC and the district court declared the fee-waiver

issues moot for Action’s third FOIA request on the ground that

the Commission had already given Action the requested

documents free of charge.1

 But in fact, the FTC had not -- and

still has not -- produced all of those documents without charge. 

Indeed, as far as the record before us reflects, it has not

produced all of those documents at all -- because Action has not

paid for them. 

1

Following the parties’ usage, we use the term “moot” in the

colloquial sense to refer to an issue that is no longer of practical

significance. Because the allegedly mooting event -- the FTC’s

asserted release of the documents without charge -- occurred before

the district court litigation began, the question may be one of standing

rather than mootness. See generally Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189-92 (2000). 

Alternatively, if it were truly seeking fee waivers for documents that

were released without fees, Cause of Action would have no cause of

action. In the end, none of these distinctions matter because, as we

discuss in the text, the FTC did not produce all of the requested

documents without charge.

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The Commission did produce without charge all nonexempt documents responsive to the new parts of the third

request, because those documents numbered fewer than 100

pages. Accordingly, the fee issue is moot for those parts of the

request. But a part of the third FOIA request also renewed

Action’s two earlier requests and sought to “perfect[]” them by

providing supplemental information about Action’s

qualifications and recent activities. Action Letter of 1/27/2012

at 8-9 (App. 159-60).2

 The FTC had previously provided 100

pages free of charge in response to each of the first two requests,

but it declined to produce the remaining pages until Action paid

for them. See, e.g., Gray Decl. ¶¶ 20-22 (App. 244-45)

(declaring that the FTC provided 100 out of 156 pages in

response to the second request). Nor did it provide the

remainder in response to the third FOIA request’s demand for

them.

The Commission declined to process the part of the third

request that sought previously requested documents on the

ground that it was a “duplicate” of the earlier requests. FTC

Letter of 3/19/2012 at 1 n.1 (App. 174). The government now

grants that the agency “may have made a mistake.” Oral Arg.

Recording 52:37-53:43. It did. The third request sought

documents that the FTC still had not produced because Action

had not paid for them, and the Commission and the court were

obliged to consider whether the continued denial of fee waivers

with respect to those documents was warranted.

2

See Action Letter of 1/27/2012 at 2 (App. 153) (“[I]n order to

avoid litigation over a fee waiver denial, Cause of Action would like

to provide additional information as part of an appeal of your fee

waiver denial [for the second FOIA request], and hope that this

information will prove helpful in reconsidering the original denial of

a fee waiver [for the first request].” (emphasis omitted)).

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Of course, if the third request had provided no new

evidence in support of Action’s applications for fee waivers, it

would have been perfectly appropriate for the FTC and the court

to rest their denials on their previous determinations that the

evidence submitted with the first two requests was insufficient. 

But Action did provide more evidence of its qualifications. See

supra Part I.A. Likewise, if Action had been peppering the FTC

with repeated requests supported by only marginally relevant

additional evidence, it might have been reasonable for the

agency to decline to undertake repeated reconsideration. But

this was only Action’s third request, and it provided

considerably more supportive evidence. Moreover, Action was

a newly formed and quickly evolving organization trying to

supplement the record with new evidence of its track record and

intentions as they developed. There is no dispute about its good

faith in doing so.

At oral argument, the FTC acknowledged that Action would

be “entitled to present all this information” regarding its feewaiver claims if it filed yet a fourth FOIA request seeking the

very same records. See Oral Arg. Recording 1:10:40-1:11:05. 

The Commission is right about that. See Spannaus v. Dep’t of

Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that, although

the statute of limitations barred the requester’s challenge to the

agency’s denial of his FOIA request, he could “simply refile his

FOIA request tomorrow and restart the process”). But we see no

material difference between such a new fourth request and the

third request that Action actually did file prior to bringing suit

in the district court. 

Because the FTC has not produced without charge all the

non-exempt documents Action sought in its third request,

Action’s applications for fee waivers are not moot. FOIA

requires the district court to review the denial of a fee waiver

based on “the record before the agency.” 5 U.S.C.

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§ 552(a)(4)(A)(vii). Because that record encompasses all of

Action’s submissions, including those in connection with its

third request, the district court must review those submissions to

determine whether Action qualified for the fee waivers it sought. 

Because that has not yet happened, we will remand the case to

give the court an opportunity to conduct the required review.

III

In a number of particulars, Action challenges the ways in

which the district court analyzed FOIA’s public-interest and

news-media provisions in connection with its fee-waiver

applications for the first and second FOIA requests. We agree

that there are problems in that analysis. Some of those problems

can be laid at the feet of this court, which has provided relatively

little guidance regarding the complexities of those two

provisions. Some problems can be attributed to amendments to

FOIA that have not yet been captured in judicial opinions. And

some can be attributed to the FTC, which pressed erroneous

interpretations of FOIA contained in its own regulations. In

order to facilitate the district court’s consideration on remand,

we address Action’s challenges below. We address the publicinterest waiver provision in this Part and the news-media

provision in Part IV.

The text of the public-interest waiver provision indicates

that such a fee-waiver application must satisfy three criteria. 

Disclosure of the requested information must: (1) shed light on

“the operations or activities of the government”; (2) be “likely

to contribute significantly to public understanding” of those

operations or activities; and (3) not be “primarily in the

commercial interest of the requester.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). The FTC has issued a regulation

interpreting this statutory provision, see 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(e)(2),

and both the Commission and the district court applied that

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regulation in evaluating Action’s fee-waiver applications. 

FOIA, however, requires the court “to determine the matter de

novo,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii), and courts “owe no

particular deference to [an agency’s] interpretation of FOIA,” 

Rossotti, 326 F.3d at 1313; see Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300,

307 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause FOIA’s terms apply

government-wide[,] . . . we generally decline to accord

deference to agency interpretations of the statute, as we would

otherwise do under Chevron.”).

The district court concluded that Action’s first and second

FOIA requests failed to qualify for public-interest waivers. We

consider below the law the court applied in reaching those

conclusions.

A

The district court found that Action’s first request -- for

documents regarding the Commission’s product-endorsement

guides -- satisfied all of the elements it thought were required

for a public-interest waiver, except one: Action had “not

demonstrated that the requested information would increase

understanding of the public at large.” Cause of Action, 961 F.

Supp. 2d at 156 (citing the FTC’s fee-waiver regulation, 16

C.F.R. § 4.8(e)(2)(i)(C) (2012)). To do so, the court said,

Action must demonstrate it has “the intent and ability to

effectively convey the information to a broad segment of the

public.” Id. at 157.3

 According to the court, a FOIA requester

“must identify several methods of disseminating the information

and provide some concrete basis upon which the agency can

3

Action’s intent to convey the information was not at issue. The

court doubted only that Action “has the ability” to reach a wide

audience. Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 158.

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conclude that those methods are adequate to convey the

requested information to a wide audience.” Id.

The FTC regulation cited by the district court does require

a requester to show that the information it seeks would increase

the understanding of the public “at large.” 16 C.F.R.

§ 4.8(e)(2)(i)(C). But FOIA itself does not. The statute requires

only that the disclosure be likely to contribute significantly to

“public” understanding. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). Nor does

the statute require a requester to show an ability to convey the

information to a “broad segment” of the public or to a “wide

audience.” To the contrary, we have held that “proof of the

ability to disseminate the released information to a broad

cross-section of the public is not required.” Judicial Watch, Inc.

v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see

Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 814-15 (2d Cir.

1994) (rejecting the assertion that, because a scholar’s proposed

articles would not “reach a broad cross-section of the public” or

“a general audience,” his request did not come within the publicinterest provision).

We recognize that the requirement that disclosure of the

requested information be “likely to contribute significantly to

public understanding” defies easy explication. Application of

this criterion may well require assessment along two

dimensions: the degree to which “understanding” of

government activities will be advanced by seeing the

information; and the extent of the “public” that the information

is likely to reach.4

 The district court’s focus was on the second

4

See Carney, 19 F.3d at 814 (“In determining whether disclosure

of records will contribute significantly to the public’s understanding

of the operation or activities of the government, it is relevant to

consider the subject matter of the requests and the ability of the

requester to disseminate the information.”); Larson v. CIA, 843 F.2d

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dimension.5

 But as we have said, FOIA does not require that a

requester be able to reach a “wide audience.” Rather, as the

Second Circuit has held, “the relevant inquiry . . . is whether the

requester will disseminate the disclosed records to a reasonably

broad audience of persons interested in the subject.” Carney, 19

F.3d at 815. That standard is consistent with our precedent, see

Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1126; Larson v. CIA, 843 F.2d 1481,

1482 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and with the limited legislative history.6

1481, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming denial of a fee waiver because,

while “the subject matter of [the] request is of public interest,” the

requester failed to demonstrate an “[]ability to disseminate the

information to the public”).

5

Regarding the first dimension, the court did not question the

“informative value of the information” requested, see Rossotti, 326

F.3d at 1313, and did not disagree that a sufficient amount of this

information was not yet in the public domain, Cause of Action, 961 F.

Supp. 2d at 156; see Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20,

36 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

6

Compare 132 CONG. REC. 27,191 (1986) (statement of Sen.

Leahy) (“A request can qualify for a fee waiver even if the issue is not

of interest to the public-at-large” because “[p]ublic understanding is

enhanced when information is disclosed to the subset of the public

most interested, concerned, or affected by a particular action or

matter.”), with id. at 31,424 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“It is intended

that the word ‘significantly’ . . . [and] the qualifying word ‘public’ be

applied so as to require a breadth of benefit beyond any particularly

narrow interests that might be presented.”). Senators Leahy and Hatch

were two of the three cosponsors of the amendment that created the

current version of the public-interest provision. See id. at 26,763; see

also Nat’l Sec. Archive v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 880 F.2d 1381, 1384-85

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining that, because this legislation was not

referred to committee, “the statements of the sponsors of the bill”

comprise the only relevant legislative history). 

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Nor must a requester “identify several methods of

disseminating the information” it seeks, a requirement the

district court found Action failed to meet because it “identified

only two methods[,] . . . its website and articles published by

news media that have relied upon [its] past work on other

issues.” Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 157. It is true, as

the court noted, that in Judicial Watch v. Rossotti we found the

requester had demonstrated its ability to disseminate the

requested information by identifying “nine ways it

communicates information to the public.” Id. (citing Rossotti,

326 F.3d at 1314). But we did not suggest that number

represented a necessary minimum. See Rossotti, 326 F.3d at

1314. There is nothing in the statute that specifies the number

of outlets a requester must have, and surely a newspaper is not

disqualified if it forsakes newsprint for (or never had anything

but) a website. 

We do agree with the district court that Action’s initial

submissions offered little information about whom the specific

disclosures it sought could reasonably be expected to reach. 

Fee-waiver applicants must support their claims with

“‘reasonable specificity.’” Rossotti, 326 F.3d at 1312 (quoting

Larson, 843 F.2d at 1483).7

 But whether Action cleared that bar

with the substantial additional evidence it submitted with its

third request -- evidence regarding its newsletter, periodicals,

website, social media presence, planned reports, and press

releases to media contacts -- must be addressed on remand. As

7

Cf. Larson, 843 F.2d at 1483 (“Larson’s allegations, as presented

in the administrative record, failed to identify the newspaper company

to which he intended to release the requested information, his purpose

for seeking the requested material, or his professional or personal

contacts with any major newspaper companies. The absence of this

information demonstrates an inability to disseminate the information

to the public.”).

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government counsel acknowledged at oral argument, even the

FTC is “not in a position to say” that the complete agency record

“isn’t enough” for a fee waiver or reduction, “because it is a

substantially greater showing than [Action] made with requests

one and two.” Oral Arg. Recording 54:30-42.

B

The district court found that Action’s second FOIA request

-- for documents concerning the FTC’s history of granting

public-interest fee waivers -- also failed to qualify for a publicinterest waiver. It did so for several reasons.

1. First, the court again found that Action failed to show it

had the ability to disseminate the requested information to a

broad segment of the public. We need say no more about this

“broad segment” requirement than we have just said in Part

III.A.

2. The court further held that Action failed to qualify for a

waiver “[b]ecause the primary beneficiary of the requested

information is [Action].” Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at

159 (emphasis added). The court acknowledged that Action

planned to write a report about how the FTC grants publicinterest waivers, and that the planned report “may well benefit

the public.” Id. But it agreed with the FTC that Action did not

“primarily ma[k]e this second request in order to . . . benefit the

public.” Id. Rather, Action’s “primary interest in the second

request was . . . to better prepare itself for an appeal of its fee

waiver denial of its first request.” Id.

In applying a “primary beneficiary” test, the court relied on

this circuit’s decision in National Treasury Employees Union v.

Griffin, which held that requesters must “indicate that a fee

waiver or reduction will primarily benefit the public.” 811 F.2d

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644, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Griffin was decided under the pre1986 statute, which expressly authorized fee waivers only when

“‘furnishing the information can be considered as primarily

benefitting the general public.’” Id. at 646-47 (quoting 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(A) (1982)); see id. at 647 n.2. In 1986, however, 

amendments to FOIA eliminated that requirement. See Freedom

of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1803,

100 Stat. 3207-48, 3207-50 (codified at 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (2012)). Now the text requires only that the

disclosure be “likely to contribute significantly to public

understanding.” Id.

It is still the case, of course, that a requester is ineligible for

a waiver if the requested information will be to its benefit alone. 

The statute requires, after all, that the information contribute to

public understanding. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii); see Forest

Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 416 F.3d 1173, 1179 (10th

Cir. 2005) (“FOIA fee waivers are limited to disclosures that

enlighten more than just the individual requester . . . .”). But

since the 1986 amendments, it no longer matters whether the

information will also (or even primarily) benefit the requester. 

Nor does it matter whether the requester made the request for

the purpose of benefiting itself. The statutory criterion focuses

only on the likely effect of the information disclosure.

3. In light of its conclusion that the second request failed to

satisfy the public-interest provision in the above two ways, the

district court found it unnecessary to resolve the FTC’s

contention that the request also failed because disclosure of the

information was “‘primarily in the commercial interest of the

requester.’” Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 159 n.4

(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii)). The court indicated,

however, that if it “were to consider the commercial interest

prong of the test, . . . it would likely find [Action’s] second

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17

request fails that as well, because of its nexus with the lawsuit

[Action] filed against the agency.” Id.

But Action’s interest in information regarding the FTC’s

treatment of fee-waiver applications (including Action’s own)

is not rendered “commercial” merely because the information

could help it obtain a fee waiver. See McClellan Ecological

Seepage Situation v. Carlucci, 835 F.2d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir.

1987) (holding that FOIA “[i]nformation helpful to a tort claim

furthers a requester’s interest in compensation or retribution, but

not an interest in commerce, trade, or profit”); McClain v. U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, 13 F.3d 220, 220 (7th Cir. 1993) (“McClain

sought the documents primarily to facilitate a challenge to his

conviction; this is not a ‘commercial’ interest.”).8

 Of course, if

a requester’s only interest in a particular request is to further its

own litigation, it may be difficult or impossible to show that

disclosure of the information is likely to contribute significantly

to public understanding. See Carney, 19 F.3d at 816; McClain,

13 F.3d at 221. But in that situation, the fee-waiver application

runs aground on a different element of the public-interest test.

IV

Action contends that, even if it does not qualify for a

public-interest fee waiver, it is entitled to a waiver of all but the

FTC’s copying costs because it is a “representative of the news

media.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). Although Congress

added this fee-waiver category to FOIA in the Freedom of

Information Reform Act of 1986 (FIRA), Pub. L. No. 99-570,

8

See also Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Uniform FOIA Fee

Schedule & Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,012, 10,017-18 (Mar. 27,

1987) (interpreting “commercial use” in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)

as a use that “furthers the commercial, trade or profit interests of the

requester”).

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18

§ 1803, 100 Stat. 3207-48, 3207-50, we have issued only one

opinion that has addressed its meaning in any detail, Nat’l Sec.

Archive v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 880 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1989),

and none since Congress expressly defined the category in 2007,

see OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 3,

121 Stat. 2524, 2525 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)).

A

In 1986, FIRA added the “representative of the news

media” fee-waiver category to FOIA, but did not define which

entities would qualify. FIRA § 1803, 100 Stat. at 3207-48

(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II)). It did, however,

instruct the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to

promulgate “guidelines[,] . . . which shall provide for a uniform

schedule of fees” to which individual agencies’ fee guidelines

had to conform. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i); see Media Access

Project v. FCC, 883 F.2d 1063, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 

Thereafter, OMB promulgated guidelines that defined a

“representative of the news media” as “any person actively

gathering news for an entity that is organized and operated to

publish or broadcast news to the public.” Uniform FOIA Fee

Schedule & Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,012, 10,018 (Mar. 27,

1987) [hereinafter OMB Guidelines]. The OMB Guidelines

offered some textbook examples of news-media entities

(“television or radio stations” and “publishers of periodicals”),

but noted that those examples were “not intended to be allinclusive.” Id. The Guidelines also stated that, “as traditional

methods of news delivery evolve (e.g., electronic dissemination

of newspapers through telecommunications services), such

alternative media would be included in this category.” Id.

Two years later, in 1989, this court decided its principal

case concerning the criteria for qualifying as a “representative

of the news media.” In National Security Archive v. Department

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19

of Defense, we concluded that the Archive, a nonprofit

institution, qualified. 880 F.2d at 1386. In reaching that

conclusion, we first explained that several of the Archive’s

activities were insufficient to establish news-media status

because they were merely ways of “making information

available to the public.” Id. We nonetheless found the Archive

qualified because it also had “firm” plans to “publish a number

of . . . ‘document sets’” concerning United States foreign and

national security policy. Id. at 1386. The Archive intended “to

obtain the raw materials for its document sets” from FOIA

requests and other sources, “cull those of particular interest,”

and “then supplement the chosen documents with detailed crossreferenced indices, other finding aids, and a sophisticated

computerized retrieval system.” Id. It would then sell the

document sets to support its work. Id. In this way, we

explained, the Archive would “act, in essence, as a publisher.” 

Id. That qualified the Archive as a “representative of the news

media,” we said, in light of our understanding both that

Congress intended us to interpret the term “broadly” and that the

legislature saw an important distinction between “merely . . .

making information available and publishing or otherwise

disseminating that information.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and alterations omitted).

“Without suggesting that any one of [the Archive’s]

activities [was] either necessary or sufficient for a[n] . . .

organization to be a ‘representative of the news media,’” we

concluded that the Archive was “well within” that category

because it “gathers information from a variety of sources;

exercises a significant degree of editorial discretion in deciding

what documents to use and how to organize them; devises

indices and finding aids; and distributes the resulting work to the

public.” Id. at 1387. We then summarized our view as follows:

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A representative of the news media is, in essence, a

person or entity that gathers information of potential

interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial

skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and

distributes that work to an audience.

Id.

In 2007, Congress again amended FOIA, this time to

provide an express statutory definition of the news-media

category. See OPEN Government Act § 3, 121 Stat. at 2525

(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)). Striving for a

compromise that would “protect[] internet publications and

freelance journalists” but still “preserve commonsense limits,”

Senator Kyl proposed, and Congress ultimately adopted, an

amendment that incorporated “the definition of media requester

that was announced by the DC Circuit in National Security

Archive,” 153 CONG. REC. 22,945 (2007) (statement of Sen.

Kyl). In relevant part, the amended statute provides:

In this clause, the term “a representative of the news

media” means any person or entity that gathers

information of potential interest to a segment of the

public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials

into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an

audience. . . . Examples of news-media entities are

television or radio stations broadcasting to the public

at large and publishers of periodicals (but only if such

entities qualify as disseminators of “news”) who make

their products available for purchase by or subscription

by or free distribution to the general public. These

examples are not all-inclusive. Moreover, as methods

of news delivery evolve (for example, the adoption of

the electronic dissemination of newspapers through

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telecommunications services), such alternative media

shall be considered to be news-media entities.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).9

The first, operative sentence of the statutory definition,

taken directly from National Security Archive, is readily

severable into five criteria that a requester must satisfy to

qualify as a “representative of the news media.” A requester

must: (1) gather information of potential interest (2) to a

segment of the public; (3) use its editorial skills to turn the raw

materials into a distinct work; and (4) distribute that work (5) to

an audience. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii). In addition, the

news-media fee waiver applies only to records that “are not

sought for commercial use.” Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). 

B

The district court found that Action satisfied the first two

criteria because its first and second requests sought to gather

information of potential interest to segments of the public: the

first request, regarding the FTC’s product-endorsement guides,

would be of interest to “social media authors” and bloggers; and

the second request, regarding fee-waiver denials, would be of

interest to those who apply for such waivers. Cause of Action,

961 F. Supp. 2d at 162. The FTC does not dispute that finding. 

9

The portion of the statutory text that is not italicized derives

from the 1987 OMB Guidelines. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,015. OMB

has not issued any new guidelines since the 2007 OPEN Government

Act. The portion of the text omitted by the ellipsis states: “In this

clause, the term ‘news’ means information that is about current events

or that would be of current interest to the public.” Neither the FTC

nor the court relied on this sentence in denying Action “representative

of the news media” status.

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Nor do we. We do, however, want to sound a note of caution

regarding an assumption underlying the court’s analysis.

That analysis appears to require that each FOIA request be

for information that is of potential interest to a segment of the

public. Such a case-by-case approach is correct for the publicinterest waiver test, which requires that the “disclosure of the

[requested] information” be in the public interest. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). But the news-media waiver, by contrast,

focuses on the nature of the requester, not its request. The

provision requires that the request be “made by” a representative

of the news media. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). A newspaper

reporter, for example, is a representative of the news media

regardless of how much interest there is in the story for which

he or she is requesting information.10

So, too, for Action. If it satisfies the five criteria as a

general matter, it does not matter whether any of the individual

FOIA requests does so. This does not mean that the specific

requests are irrelevant. For example, showing that those

requests are of potential interest to a segment of the public is one

way of showing that the entity satisfies the first two criteria for

news-media status. Indeed, it may be the best way to satisfy

those criteria for a new entity that lacks a track record or that

employs FOIA requests as its principal means of gathering

information -- both of which appear to describe the appellant in

this case. But the statute’s focus on requesters, rather than

requests, does mean that evidence of Action’s news-media status

10There is a caveat: If a news-media entity makes the request in

its corporate rather than journalistic capacity, the request does not

qualify for a fee waiver because it founders on the additional

requirement that the records not be “sought for commercial use.” Id.

§ 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II); see Nat’l Sec. Archive, 880 F.2d at 1387.

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is not limited to what it establishes about the three FOIA

requests that are the subject of this litigation.

C

The district court found that Action did not satisfy the third

news-media criterion -- that it uses its editorial skills to turn raw

material into a distinct work -- because it did not “demonstrate

that it would use information from a range of sources to

independently produce a unique product.” Cause of Action, 961

F. Supp. 2d at 162. The court noted that, in National Security

Archive, the requester “was gathering raw material from a wide

variety of sources in addition to the FOIA requests at issue in

order to create ‘document sets’ on specific topics.” Id. (citing

Nat’l Sec. Archive, 880 F.3d at 1386). Action is not like the

Archive, the court said, because it “did not indicate [1] any

distinct work it planned to create based on the requested

information or [2] that it would use any information beyond that

obtained in the FOIA requests to create any unique product.” Id.

1. We are not sure that we understand the first point in the

preceding sentence because, as noted in Part III.B.2 above, the

district court acknowledged that Action did in fact indicate at

least one distinct work that it planned to create: “a report

describing how the FTC grants public interest fee waivers.”

Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 159; see Action Letter of

4/4/2012 at 6 (App. 181). It may be that the court disregarded

that report (and a second planned report concerning the FTC’s

product-endorsement guides) because Action did not specify it

until it filed supplemental materials in support of its third FOIA

request. As we said in Part II, however, those supplemental

materials are part of the administrative record and must be

examined on remand.

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24

We also note that the district court did not consider the

possibility, which the FTC resisted, that a news-media entity

could create a “distinct work” by commenting to other outlets

about documents it obtains under FOIA. At oral argument,

however, the FTC conceded that editorial skill could be

manifested in a distinct work of that kind. Indeed, it recognized

that, if an entity (such as Action) issues substantive press

releases concerning the documents it uncovers, or even if it

simply provides editorial comments on those documents in

interviews with newspapers, such a gloss on the underlying

materials could satisfy this element of the definition. See Oral

Arg. Recording 56:57-57:28.

We agree. A substantive press release or editorial comment

can be a distinct work based on the underlying material, just as

a newspaper article about the same documents would be -- and

its composition can involve “a significant degree of editorial

discretion,” Nat’l Sec. Archive, 880 F.2d at 1387. Although we

agree with the district court that Action’s first application for

news-media status was too conclusory in explaining the kind of

works it would produce and disseminate, see Action Letter of

9/26/2011 at 1 (App. 26); Rossotti, 326 F.3d at 1312 (holding

that fee-waiver applications must be “based on more than

conclusory allegations” (internal quotation marks omitted)), the

materials supporting Action’s third request cite a large number

of articles and releases. And as we have said, they also include

descriptions of particular public reports that Action planned to

write. See Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 162 n.6. Those

materials are part of the administrative record and will be before

the district court on remand.

2. The court’s second point -- that Action failed to indicate

it would use any information beyond that obtained in the FOIA

requests -- does not bear on the statutory qualifications for a

news-media waiver. The statute does not require that a

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requester gathers information “from a range of sources” or a

“wide variety of sources,” Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at

162. It requires only that the requester “gathers information.” 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii). As we explained above, nothing in

principle prevents a journalist from producing “distinct work”

that is based exclusively on documents obtained through FOIA.

The district court was correct that, in National Security

Archive, we observed that the requester’s activities included

“gather[ing] information from a variety of sources.” 880 F.2d

at 1387. But we also said we were not “suggesting that any one

of [the Archive’s] activities is either necessary or sufficient” for

an entity to qualify as a representative of the news media. Id.

And our summary description of such an entity, which Congress

enacted as the statutory definition in 2007, made no mention of

that factor. See OPEN Government Act § 3, 121 Stat. at 2525

(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)). Accordingly, there are

no grounds for finding it necessary to news-media status.

D

The district court also found that Action failed to satisfy a

combination of the fourth and fifth criteria -- that it “distributes

[its] work to an audience.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii). To

satisfy those criteria, the court said, a requester must do two

things: It “[1] must demonstrate that it has the intent and ability

to disseminate the requested information to the public rather

than merely make it available; [and 2] must also demonstrate

that its operational activities are especially organized around

doing so.” Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 162. In context,

those two requirements impose a greater burden than the statute

demands.

1. Before considering the way in which the district court

applied its first requirement to Action, we note two concerns

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26

about its verbal formulation. First, by focusing on Action’s

intent and ability to disseminate “the requested information”

rather than information in general, this formulation again looks

to the nature of the request rather than of the requester. As we

noted above, however, the news-media provision focuses on the

latter.

Second, the parties and amici skirmish over the court’s

suggestion that a qualifying requester must disseminate

information “rather than merely make it available.” Their

disagreement appears to be more semantic than substantive. On

the one hand, the court is right that merely making information

available is not the same as distributing it. In National Security

Archive, for example, we suggested that it would not have been

enough for the Archive to collect its document sets in its

“private research institute and library,” 880 F.2d at 1386, even

though they would be “available for public use” there, id. at

1383. On the other hand, the amici are right that “The New York

Times [and] The Washington Post” are news media, even “when

publishing something only on their websites.” Br. of Amici

Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, et al. 15.

As the district court implicitly recognized, see generally

Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 163, posting content to a

public website can qualify as a means of distributing it --

notwithstanding that readers have to affirmatively access the

content, rather than have it delivered to their doorsteps or

beamed into their homes unbidden. National Security Archive

understood distribution in terms of “the kind of initiative we

associate with publishing or otherwise disseminating”

information. 880 F.2d at 1386 (internal quotation marks

omitted). But our understanding of that kind of initiative is

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27

naturally somewhat different today than it was in 1989,11 and the

statute requires us to take that into account. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (instructing that, “as methods of news

delivery evolve (for example, the adoption of the electronic

dissemination of newspapers through telecommunications

services), such alternative media shall be considered to be

news-media entities”).12

2. Even with the recognition that online dissemination can

qualify as a means of distribution, the district court found

Action’s submissions insufficient to show it distributes its work

to an audience because it “has not estimated how many people

11We decided National Security Archive only months after Tim

Berners-Lee submitted his grant proposal for what would become the

World Wide Web. See Larry Greenemeier, Remembering the Day the

World Wide Web Was Born, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Mar. 12, 2009,

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/day-the-web-was-born.

12See also 153 CONG. REC. 22,944 (2007) (statement of Sen.

Leahy, cosponsor of the OPEN Government Act) (stating that the “bill

ensures that federal agencies will not automatically exclude Internet

blogs and other Web-based forms of media”); id. at 22,947 (statement

of Sen. Cornyn, another cosponsor) (stating that the bill “grants the

same privileged FOIA fee status currently enjoyed by traditional

media outlets to bloggers and others who publish reports on the

Internet”).

In 2012, 46% of Americans reported that they obtained news

online or on a mobile device at least three days a week; that number

was 4% in 1996. Compare Pew Research Center for People and the

Press, In Changing News Landscape, Even Television Is Vulnerable

14-15 (2012), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/2012%

20News%20Consumption%20Report.pdf, with Pew Research Center

for People and the Press, One-in-Ten Voters Online for Campaign ‘96:

News Attracts Most Internet Users 15 (1996), http://www.peoplepress.org/files/legacy-pdf/117.pdf.

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view its website or social media, nor has it indicated whether its

media contacts would write about the requested information.” 

Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 163. In addition, the court

said, Action’s newsletter “did not even exist until after it made

its first FOIA request, and had only been published for a month

when it filed its second request” -- unlike a newsletter analyzed

in an earlier case, which had been published for eight years and

reached 15,000 readers. Id. (citing Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v.

Dep’t of Def., 241 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12-13 (D.D.C. 2003)).13

There is no doubt that the requirement that a requester

distribute its work to “an audience” contemplates that the work

is distributed to more than a single person.14 But beyond

requiring that a person or entity have readers (or listeners or

viewers), the statute does not specify what size the audience

must be. Indeed, in Tax Analysts v. Department of Justice, we

said that the publisher of a weekly tax magazine was “certainly”

a news media entity under National Security Archive, holding

that “[t]he fact that [its] readership is relatively small . . . is

irrelevant.” 965 F.2d 1092, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Nor is it disqualifying that Action’s newsletter did not exist

at the time it made its first FOIA request. It is true that the

statute uses present-tense verbs -- “gathers,” “uses,” and

“distributes” -- that characterize a present state of being, not just

13The court acknowledged that Action provided more information

in an April 2012 letter to the FTC, but declined to examine it because

it was submitted in reference to Action’s third FOIA request, which

the court had found to be moot. Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at

162 n.6.

14But see MANFRED PFISTER, THE THEORY AND ANALYSIS OF

DRAMA 36 (1993) (noting that “Mad King” Ludwig II was known to

arrange “performances of Wagner operas with himself as an audience

of one”). 

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a set of aspirations. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii). But this does

not mean that a new news-media venture cannot qualify as a

“representative of the news media” until it has a track record. 

Although a bare statement of intent is not enough to qualify,

firm plans can be. In National Security Archive, for example,

we approved the Archive’s news-media status based on its “firm

intention,” reflected in a grant proposal and other submissions

to the agency, to produce and distribute the document sets it

described. 880 F.2d at 1386. The 1987 OMB Guidelines

likewise recognized that “a newly established newspaper” could

qualify for news-media status “by demonstrating that it had held

itself out for subscription and had in fact enrolled subscribers.” 

52 Fed. Reg. at 10,015. Against this backdrop, there is no

indication that Congress meant to make the lack of a prior

publication record disqualifying when it enacted the statutory

definition in 2007. 

The news-media provision requires a fact-based

determination of whether a particular requester’s description of

its past record, current operations, and future plans jointly

suffice to qualify it as a representative of the news media. For

a requester that serves (or plans to serve) the public through

multiple outlets -- here, newsletters, press releases, press

contacts, a website, and planned reports -- those must be

considered in combination. An entity with an extensive record

will ordinarily qualify with only a thin recital of its plans (or

perhaps none at all). Conversely, an entity with little or no

historical record of distributing its work (like the National

Security Archive) may make up for that absence by concretely

setting out its plans to do so.

3. Finally, the district court also found that Action failed to

qualify for a news-media waiver because it did not show that its

“activities are organized especially around dissemination” of its

work to an audience. Cause of Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 163. 

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A requester that “performs its activities to aid in government

accountability,” the court said, is “more like a middleman for

dissemination to the media” than a representative of the news

media. Id. at 164.

The district court’s embrace of the “organized especially

around dissemination” requirement reflected the FTC’s thenoperative regulation, which defined a “representative of the

news media” as “any person actively gathering news for an

entity that is organized and operated to publish or broadcast

news to the public.” 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(2) (2013). That

language, in turn, was derived from the definition in the 1987

OMB Guidelines. See OMB Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018

(limiting the news-media category to a “person actively

gathering news for an entity that is organized and operated to

publish or broadcast” news).

Congress, however, omitted the “organized and operated”

language when it enacted the statutory definition in 2007. 

Congress’ text instead tracked this court’s definition in National

Security Archive, which did not include such a requirement. 

Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii), with Nat’l Sec. Archive,

880 F.2d at 1387. Perhaps recognizing that difference -- albeit

after Action filed this lawsuit -- the FTC has recently revised its

regulation to omit the “organized and operated” requirement and

track the statutory language. See 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(b)(2)(iii)

(2014); see also 78 Fed. Reg. 13,570, 13,572 (2013)

(“propos[ing] to amend the definitions for ‘representative of the

news media’ to implement the definition codified . . . by the

2007 FOIA Amendments”); 79 Fed. Reg. 15,680 (2014)

(adopting the proposed amendment). Accordingly, there is no

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basis for adding an “organized and operated” requirement to the

statutory definition.15

We also disagree with the suggestion that a public interest

advocacy organization cannot satisfy the statute’s distribution

criterion because it is “more like a middleman for dissemination

to the media than a representative of the media itself,” Cause of

Action, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 164; see id. at 157. It is true that

“middlemen” that merely disseminate the documents they

receive to the media (or others) do not qualify. See Nat’l Sec.

Archive, 880 F.2d at 1387.16 That is because what is distributed

must independently qualify as “distinct work” produced through

the exercise of “editorial skills.” Id.; see supra Part IV.C. But

assuming that these other criteria are satisfied, there is no

indication that Congress meant to distinguish between those who

reach their ultimate audiences directly and those who partner

with others to do so, as some recognized journalistic enterprises

15Although we reject the “organized and operated” requirement,

we agree that a requester seeking news-media status generally must

demonstrate more than an intention to engage in an isolated episode

of journalistic activity. As we have explained, the news-media

provision covers a certain kind of person or entity, not a certain kind

of request, and we therefore doubt that a requester could qualify based

on even a firm plan to undertake journalistic activity on a purely oneoff basis. See Nat’l Sec. Archive, 880 F.2d at 1386 (citing Senator

Leahy’s statement that “any person or organization which regularly

publishes or disseminates information to the public . . . should qualify

for waivers as a ‘representative of the news media’” (emphasis

added)).

16Relying on floor statements by Senator Hatch, National Security

Archive described the disfavored “middlemen” category as comprising

“‘intermediar[ies]’ or ‘information vendors [or] data brokers’ [] that

request documents for use by others.” 880 F.2d at 1387 (quoting 132

CONG.REC. S14,040 (Sept 27. 1986); id. at S16,505 (Oct. 15, 1986)).

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do.17 Indeed, the government now accepts that an entity may

“distribute[] [its] work” by issuing press releases to media

outlets in order to reach the public indirectly. See Oral Arg.

Recording 1:00:10-1:02:43.

V

We conclude that Action’s applications for fee waivers in

connection with its outstanding FOIA requests are not moot, and

that its entitlement to a public-interest or news-media fee waiver

must be reconsidered in light of the full agency record and the

clarifications set out above. We therefore remand this case for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

17See, e.g., ProPublica: Journalism in the Public Interest, About

Us, http://www.propublica.org/about (“Many of our ‘deep dive’

stories are offered exclusively to a traditional news organization, free

of charge, for publication or broadcast.”).

USCA Case #13-5335 Document #1569545 Filed: 08/25/2015 Page 32 of 32