Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01554/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01554-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carlos Adrian Morley, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Yolanda Elliot, et al. 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-09-1554-PHX-NVW (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. (Doc. 1) Respondents have filed an Answer, Doc. 21, to which Petitioner has replied.

(Docs. 33, 36) On July 7, 2010, the undersigned found that an evidentiary hearing is

warranted on Petitioner’s claim in Ground One that counsel in CR2003-021342 was

ineffective because she advised and permitted him to enter into a plea agreement in CR2003-

012342 that includes an admission to a historical prior conviction and exposed him to an

enhanced sentence under A.R.S. § 13-604 when in fact, Petitioner did not have a prior

conviction. (Doc. 38) An evidentiary hearing was initially scheduled for September 22,

2010 and, after several request for continuances by both sides, was ultimately rescheduled to

January 21, 2011. (Docs. 38, 50)

On December 21, 2010, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Grounds One and

Two for Lack of Jurisdiction, doc. 66. Petitioner, through counsel David Eisenberg who was

appointed for purposes of the evidentiary hearing, opposes the motion, doc. 70. 

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 1 Citations to “Respondent’s Exh.___” are to exhibits attached to Respondents’ Answert ot

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, doc 21.

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Respondents have filed a Reply. (Doc. 74) In the Reply, Respondents narrow their motion

to dismiss to seek dismissal of “Petitioner’s Ground I claims to the extent they challenge the

sentence in the 2003 matter,” and to dismiss Ground II in its entirety. (Doc. 74) For the

reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be granted.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Pleas, and Sentencing 

On August 15, 2002, the State of Arizona filed an indictment in Maricopa County

Superior Court, CR2002-014160 (the “2002 case”), charging Petitioner with two counts of

fraudulent schemes and artifices, class 2 felonies (Counts 1 and 4); three counts of theft,

class two felonies (Counts 2, 3, and 5); and two counts of trafficking in stolen property, class

3 felonies (Counts 6-7). (Respondents’ Exh. C1

) On May 12, 2003, Petitioner pled guilty,

pursuant to a written plea agreement, to Counts 1 and 6 in CR2002-014160. (Respondents’

Exh. E) Before Petitioner was sentenced in CR2002-014160, on September 9, 2003, the

State of Arizona filed an indictment in Maricopa Superior Court CR2003-021342 (the “2003 

case”), charging Petitioner with one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a

class 1 felony based on events that allegedly occurred on or between July 10 and July 28,

2003. (Respondents’ Exh. F) The indictment in CR2003-021342 alleged that Petitioner

contracted with Detective Cameron Scadden, who was acting undercover, to murder one of

the victims in CR2002-014160. (Respondents’ Exh. F) On October 5, 2003, the State filed

an allegation that Petitioner committed the offense charged in CR2003-021342 while

released on bond in CR2002-014160. (Respondents’ Exh. H) 

In view of the 2003 indictment, on October 20, 2003, the State moved to withdraw

from the May 12, 2003 plea agreement in CR2002-014160. (Respondents’ Exh. I; Exh. E) 

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28 2

 The Honorable Warren J. Granville presided.

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On October 22, 2003, the court granted the State’s motion to withdraw from the May

12, 2003 plea agreement. (Respondents’ Exh. J) Pursuant to the terms of that agreement,

the charges in CR2002–014160 were reinstated. (Respondents’ Exhs. C, E, J)

On October 30, 2003, Petitioner’s counsel in CR2003-021342, Shelley Davis, moved

for pre-screening of Petitioner pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 11 because, according to

Petitioner’s cellmate, Petitioner was “exhibiting bizarre behavior including talking to people

who are not there, whimpering and hardly sleeping or eating.” (Respondents’ Exh. K) 

Defense counsel in CR2002-014160, Bruce Blumberg, joined in the Rule 11 motion. 

(Respondents’ Exh. L) Competency evaluations were completed by Dr. Joseph Franzetti and

Dr. Steven Gray. (Respondents’ Exh. M) After considering the doctors’ reports, the court

found that Petitioner understood the proceedings and was able to assist counsel with his

defense. The court found Petitioner competent pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4510(B). 

(Respondents’ Exh. M) 

During a single plea hearing, on July 2, 2004, Petitioner pled guilty in CR2002-

014160 to Count 1, fraudulent schemes and artifices, a class 2 felony; and Count 6,

trafficking in stolen property, a class 3 felony, as charged (Respondents’ Exhs. N, P); and in

CR2003-021342 to amended Count 1, solicitation to commit first degree murder, a class 3

felony, with one historical prior felony conviction. (Respondents’ Exhs. O, P) 

During the July 2, 2004 change of plea hearing2

, the court first discussed the charges

and plea agreement in CR2002-014160. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 5) The court verified that

Petitioner intended to plead guilty to Count 1, fraudulent schemes and artifices - a class 2

felony, and to Count 6, trafficking in stolen property - a class 3 felony. (Respondents’ Exh.

P at 5) Petitioner acknowledged that he had initialed the provisions in the plea agreement,

signed the agreement, and that his initials and signature indicated that he read and

understood the plea. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 5-6) Petitioner agreed that he was pleading to

probation on both counts in CR2002-014160 to run consecutively to his sentence in the 2003

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case. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 7-8) Petitioner also acknowledged that he entered and

signed the plea agreement voluntarily. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 7-8) 

The court next discussed the charges and plea agreement in CR2003-021342. The

court verified that Petitioner was “going to plead guilty to amended Count 1, solicitation to

commit first degree murder, a class 3 felony with one prior felony . . . .” (Respondents’ Exh.

P at 8) Petitioner acknowledged that he had initialed the provisions of the plea agreement,

signed the agreement, and that his initials and signature indicated that he read and

understood the plea. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 8-9) Petitioner acknowledged that defense

counsel Davis had “explain[ed] the plea” to him, and that he understood the plea agreement. 

(Respondents’ Exh. N at 9) The court also confirmed that the plea agreement provided that

Petitioner would be “sentenced to the Department of Corrections for the term up to the

Court, not less than 6 and a half years, which is the presumptive term, and not greater than

13 years, which is the maximum term or the aggravated term. You will have to pay

restitution up to $5,000.” (Respondents’ Exh. P at 9) Petitioner acknowledged that he

understood his sentencing exposure. (Id.) 

In response to the court’s questions, Petitioner acknowledged that there was nothing

in the plea agreement he did not agree with or did not understand, and that no force or

threats were used to induce him to plead guilty. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 9-10) Petitioner

confirmed that he understood that the plea agreement stipulated to a prison term of 6.5 to 13

years. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 10) The court then asked Petitioner, “[y]ou understand that

in order for the Court to give you a sentence greater than 6 and a half years, that means you

have the right to a jury determination of aggravating factors that you are waiving; do you

understand that.” (Respondents’ Exh. P at 10-11) Petitioner responded, “Yes.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. P at 11) 

After explaining the possible sentences, restitution, and fines, the court asked

Petitioner if he understood that if the court accepted the plea, Petitioner could not withdraw

from the plea agreement unless he demonstrated manifest injustice. (Respondents’ Exh. P at

13) Petitioner responded that he understood. (Id.) 

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The court again asked Petitioner if he understood that “in the 2003 case, you are also

giving up the right for the jury to determine aggravating factors?” and if he wished to waive

those rights. Petitioner responded, “Yes.” (Respondents’ Exh. P at 14) Petitioner then

entered a plea of guilty to Counts 1 and 6 in CR2002-014160, fraudulent schemes and

artifices. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 14-17) Petitioner next pled guilty in CR2003-021342 to

solicitation to commit first degree murder with a historical prior. (Respondents’ Exh. P at

17-18) The Court found that Petitioner’s pleas were “knowingly and intelligently and

voluntarily made” and accepted each of Petitioner’s guilty pleas. (Respondents’ Exh. P at

21) 

The sentencing hearing was held on September 17, 2004. Before sentencing

Petitioner in CR2003-021342, the court noted that the plea agreement stipulated to prison,

and made the following findings:

[T]he Court finds as aggravating circumstances, the fact that the offense 

was committed while on release, which you admitted in the plea agreement.

I agree with Ms. Davis (defense counsel), criminal history has been 

taken into account with the plea to the substantive charge with the 

enhancement. 

Also, as an aggravating factor, the nature of the offense. This is a 

crime that was committed against a victim of a pending case which you

admitted to in the factual basis. 

With respect to mitigating circumstances, I do find as mitigating 

circumstances your deteriorating physical and mental health, also the 

fact that there will be a probation tail.

(Respondents’ Exh. Q at 21; Exh. S) The court then sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated

term of 7.5 years’ imprisonment in CR2003-021342. (Respondents’ Exh. Q at 21; Exh. S) 

The court’s order of imprisonment specified that “Community Supervision” was “[w]aived

pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-603(K) and 41-1604.07(D) due to the term of probation in CR 2002-

014160.” (Respondents’ Exh. S at 2) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court dismissed

the allegation that the offense was committed while on release. (Respondents’ Exh. Q at 22)

In CR2002-014160, the court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed

Petitioner on concurrent terms of 7 years probation on Count 1 and 5 years probation on

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Count 6 to commence “[u]pon absolute discharge from prison for a separate offense” in

CR2003-021342. (Respondents’ Exh. Q at 22-23; Exh. R) 

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings/(Rule 32 of-right)

By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal, but retained the

right to seek review in a petition for post-conviction relief under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, a socalled Rule 32 of-right proceeding. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. On December 4, 2006,

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32 in both CR2002-014160 and CR2003-021342. (Respondents’ Exh. V) 

Petitioner was appointed counsel for post conviction proceedings. (Respondents’ Exh. W) 

On April 8, 2005, counsel filed a notice of completion of post-conviction review, notifying

the court that he was unable to find any claims to raise, and requesting that Petitioner be

given additional time to file a pro per petition. (Respondents’ Exh. X) The court granted

Petitioner additional time to file a pro per petition. (Id.) 

On July 5, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro per petition for post-conviction relief, raising

the following claims:

1. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed because the

indictments in CR2002-014160 and CR2003-021342 were fatally defective

in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because they did not 

charge an offense.

2. Counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment for failing to:

(a) request a mental evaluation and to assert an insanity defense; (b) failing to

challenge the defective indictments; (c) failing to challenge the lack of probable cause

to support the indictments; (d) failing to adequately confer with Petitioner 

regarding the charges, his defenses, and the consequences of pleading guilty;

(e) failing to challenge the historical prior allegation from CR2002-014160

in the plea agreement in CR2003-021342; (f) for failing to object to the trial 

court’s aggravating circumstance finding that Petitioner committed the offense

in CR2003-021342 while on release in CR2002-014160; and (g) for failing to

object to improper aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court at 

sentencing;

3. Rule-32 counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the foregoing claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the petition for post-conviction relief; and

4. Petitioner’s sentences were illegal because the aggravating factors were not

found by a jury in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 

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(Respondents’ Exh. Y) 

In view of the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court permitted

appointed counsel to withdraw and appointed Petitioner new counsel. (Respondents’ Exh.

Z) Petitioner’s new counsel filed a supplemental petition for post-conviction relief asserting

that the trial court improperly enhanced Petitioner’s sentence pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604

based on a contemporaneous conviction and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to the court’s reliance on a contemporaneous conviction to establish a historical prior

conviction. (Respondents’ Exh. AA) The State filed a response, to which Petitioner

replied. (Respondents’ Exhs. BB, CC) 

On December 22, 2005, the court denied relief and dismissed the petition for postconviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. DD) The court found that: (1) the indictment in the

2002 case was not fatally defective because it complied with Ariz.R.Crim.P. 13.2, moreover,

Petitioner waived that claim by his plea agreement; (2) by pleading guilty, Petitioner waived

his claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present an insanity defense and

for failing to challenge the grand jury’s probable cause determination. Petitioner’s claim

that defense counsel failed to advise him of his rights was contradicted by the plea colloquy

where Petitioner told the court that he read the plea agreement and understood the rights he

was waiving; (3) Petitioner’s aggravated sentences did not violate the Sixth Amendment, as

discussed in Blakely, because Petitioner admitted facts related to the nature of the offense -

hiring a hit-man to kill a witness in the 2002 case - which made him eligible to receive an

aggravated sentenced in the 2003 case; and (4) Petitioner’s assertion that he did not have a

prior conviction in the 2003 case lacked merit because the fraudulent scheme occurred prior

to the solicitation to commit first degree murder, which Petitioner admitted during his

change of plea colloquy. (Respondents’ Exh. DD)

On January 5, 2006, Petitioner’s counsel moved for rehearing. (Respondents’ Exh.

EE) Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro per motion for rehearing. (Respondents’ Exh. FF) 

The court summarily denied the motions for rehearing. (Respondents’ Exh. GG) 

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On July 11, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro per petition for review in the Arizona Court

of Appeals. (Respondents’ Exh. HH) Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in denying

post-conviction review because: (1) the trial court proceeded on two fatally defective

indictments in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the trial court proceeded

although Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment; (3) the trial court relied on the 2002 plea agreement knowing that Petitioner’s

counsel failed to discuss this case with him and failed to appear at the change of plea

hearing; (4) the trial court relied on the CR2003-021342 plea agreement even though

defense counsel was ineffective and even though Petitioner did not have a prior felony

conviction; (5) the trial court tricked Petitioner into signing the plea agreement in CR2003-

021342 by stating that the court would dismiss the allegation that the offense was committed

while on felony release, but the court still used this allegation to enhance his sentence, which

allegedly violated the double jeopardy clause; (6) Petitioner was not convicted of the crimes

in the plea agreement until September 17, 2004, when he was sentenced; (7) the terms of

contained in paragraph 7 of the plea agreement is “against the law under Blakely;” and (8)

Petitioner could not have knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered into the two plea

agreements because he had been diagnosed as “seriously mentally ill” by Maricopa Count

Jail doctors. (Respondents’ Exh. HH) On June 19, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals

summarily denied review. (Respondents’ Exh. II)

After receiving several extensions, on May 15, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for

review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Respondents’ Exh. JJ) Petitioner raised the same

issues he had raised in his petition for post-conviction relief and in his petition for review. 

(Respondents’ Exh. JJ) On July 28, 2008, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied

review. (Respondents’ Exh. KK) 

C. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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 3 Respondents concede that the Petition is timely in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

(docket # 21 at 16-18)

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On July 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a timely3 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court, raising the following claims: 

Ground One: Ineffective assistance of counsel/invalid sentence.

Ground Two: Illegal sentence, the court improperly relied on a

contemporaneous conviction to enhance his sentence pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 13-604.

Ground Three: Petitioner’s sentence in CR2002-014160 was excessive

in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment.

Ground Four: The trial court breached the terms of the plea agreement.

Ground Five: The trial court failed to establish that subject matter jurisdiction

and venue were proper.

Ground Six: At all stages of the criminal proceedings, Petitioner was under 

such duress that his mental capacity was diminished. 

Ground Seven: Petitioner’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were

violated.

Ground Eight: The trial court did not establish a sufficient factual basis

to support Petitioner’s conviction in CR2003-021342.

Ground Nine: Petitioner did knowingly and voluntarily waive his Sixth

Amendment rights articulated in Blakely. 

(Docs. 1, 4) Respondents now move to dismiss Petitioner’s challenge to his 2003 sentence

asserted in Grounds One and Two for lack of jurisdiction, mootness. (Doc. 66) 

Respondents argue that Grounds One and Two challenge solely the validity of Petitioner

sentence in Maricopa Cause Number CR2003-021342 and Petitioner has served his sentence

in the 2003 case. (Doc. 66) In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner argues that he

has not completed his sentence in CR2002-014160, and at least one ground in his Petition,

Ground Six, challenges his underlying conviction. (Doc. 70) 

As discussed below, the motion to dismiss should be granted. Before further

discussion, the Court clarifies that this Report and Recommendation only addresses the

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 4 In Ground One, Petitioner also argues that counsel in CR2002-04160 was ineffective for

failing to appear that the change of plea hearing. (Doc. 4 at 11) Because this claim is not at

issue in the Motion to Dismiss, doc. 66, the Court does not address this claim in this Report and

Recommendation. 

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arguments related to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and does not address any other issues

- including any other procedural or substantive issues pertaining to Grounds One and Two. 

II. Grounds One and Two

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that counsel in CR2003-021342 was ineffective for

advising him to enter a plea agreement pursuant to which he admitted to a prior conviction

when he did not have such a conviction.4

 (Doc. 4 at 11) He also argues that defense counsel

in CR2003-021342 was ineffective for failing to object at sentencing to the court’s

enhancement of his sentence under A.R.S. § 13-604 when counsel should have known that

the court was precluded from using his conviction in CR2002-014160 as a prior felony

conviction to enhance his sentence in CR2003-021342 under A.R.S. § 13-604 because it was

a contemporaneous conviction, not a prior conviction, under State v. Thompson, 200 Ariz.

439, 441, 27 P.3d 796, 798 (Ariz. 2001). Petitioner further argues that he was prejudiced

because he exposed to a greater sentencing range available under A.R.S. § 13-604, rather

than the more lenient sentencing range of A.R.S. § 13-702.02. (Doc. 4 at 9-12) He requests

that this Court declare that his “counsel in the CR-2003-021342-001 DT matter was

ineffective which resulted in” a sentence that was “constitutionally void.” (Doc. 4 at 12)

In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that the trial court’s reliance on a contemporaneous

conviction to enhance his sentence in the 2003 case is improper and illegal. (Doc. 4 at 13-

15) In response to the pending motion to dismiss, Petitioner explains that “as a result of the

sentence’s improperly extended term in CR2003, the probationary terms that he has to serve

for both counts in CR2002, which were to run after sentence was completed in the CR2003

case, started too late.” (Doc. 70 at 3-4) As such, Petitioner argues, Grounds One and Two

raise a viable issue concerning Petitioner’s sentences in the CR2002 case. 

III. Probationary Term in CR2002-014160

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As Petitioner argues, the record reflects that Petitioner’s concurrent terms of

probation in CR2002-014160 were to commence “[u]pon absolute discharge from prison for

a separate offense” - specifically, the 7.5-year prison sentence in CR2003-021342. 

(Respondents’ Exhs. Q, R, S) In opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner states that

he was released from prison in CR2003-021342 on February 1, 2010 and had his first

meeting at the Adult Probation Office on February 24, 2010. (Doc. 70 at 5) Probation

Officer Sierra Flores began to supervise Petitioner in May, 2010 and he must report once a

month in person. According to Petitioner, Probation Officer Flores has indicated that

Petitioner’s probationary term will end on February 25, 2017. (Doc. 70 at 5) In addition,

each month, Petitioner makes a payment of $100.00 in restitution and $50.00 in probation

fees. (Doc. 70 at 5) 

IV. Analysis of Motion to Dismiss - Mootness

“Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,’ that is, federal-court

jurisdiction, to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.

388, 395 (1980). “This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of

federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate . . . the parties must continue to have a

personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S.

472, 477-78 (1990). In other words, “throughout the litigation, the plaintiff must have

suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at 477. This limitation restricts the

jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases where there is a possible judicial resolution. Id. A

habeas corpus petition is moot where the petitioner “seeks relief [that] cannot be redressed

by a favorable decision of the court issuing a writ of habeas corpus.” Burnett v. Lampert,

432 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2005). The test for mootness is whether the court can give a

party any effective relief in the event that it decides the matter on the merits in his favor. 

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (“[T]hroughout the litigation, the plaintiff must have

suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”). 

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In the context of a prison sentence, a challenge to a prison sentence becomes moot

once the sentence has been served, unless the petitioner continues to suffer collateral

consequences. See Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982); Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015,

1019 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Palomba, 182 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1999). The

doctrine of collateral consequences is a narrow exception to the general mootness rule. The

exception arises where a former prisoner can show that he will suffer some collateral legal

consequences if the conviction is allowed to stand. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234

(1968). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that collateral consequences exist to

avoid having a case dismissed as moot. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). 

A. Challenge to Underlying Conviction in Ground Six 

In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner argues that because he challenges

his conviction in the 2003 case in Ground Six, his Petition is not moot. The Court agrees

with the argument in Respondents’ Reply that the claims raised in Grounds other than One

and Two, which are the only Grounds at issue in the Motion to Dismiss, are not relevant to

determining the mootness issue before the Court. (Doc. 3-6) Accordingly, the Court rejects 

Petitioner’s argument that a single ground challenging his conviction can satisfy the case or

controversy requirement for his entire Petition. 

B. Probationary Term

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s challenge to his sentence in the 2003 case

asserted in Grounds One and Two are moot because Petitioner has completed the sentence

imposed in that case. (Doc. 66) As Respondents note, the general rule of mootness has long

been that a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot when a prisoner completes his sentence

before the court has addressed the merits of his petition. Lane, 455 U.S. at 632; see

Picrin-Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 1991) (“By his petition for habeas

corpus, Picrin-Peron has requested only release from custody. Because he has been released,

there is no further relief we can provide.”). There has been an exception, however, for those

petitioners who would suffer collateral legal consequences if their convictions were allowed

to stand. Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1992); White v. White, 925 F.2d 287, 290

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(9th Cir. 1991). If a habeas petition seeking the petitioner’s release from confinement is

adjudicated after the petitioner has been released “some concrete and continuing injury” or

“collateral consequence” of the challenged decision must exist for the habeas action to be

maintained. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds One and Two which

pertain to his sentence in CR2003 are moot because Petitioner claims that his sentence is

void and that sentence expired on February 1, 2010. (Doc. 66, Exh. 1) Thus, he is currently

on probation due to the sentence and conviction in the 2002 case. Moreover, Respondents

assert that because the claims at issue in the Motion to Dismiss challenge only the

calculation of his 2003 sentence, a favorable habeas ruling would have no impact. 

The Court agrees with Respondents that, because Petitioner has completed the prison

sentence, which was the entire sentence, imposed in CR2003-021342, this Court can grant

no further redress and Petitioner’s challenge to his CR2003-021342 sentence asserted in

Grounds One and Two of Petition is moot. In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner

cites United States v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001). In Verdin, 243 F.3d at

1177, the Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioner’s claims were not moot where petitioner

who was challenging his sentence had not completed his entire sentence, but was serving his

first year of a three-year term of supervised release. The Ninth Circuit noted that if 

petitioner prevailed, he could be sentenced to a shorter period of supervised release. Id. at

1178-79. Unlike this case, the sentence at issue in Verdin was a single sentence that included

a prison term to be followed by a term of supervised release. Here, Petitioner was sentenced

to a term of imprisonment in the 2003 which he has served in its entirety. In a separate

criminal case, the 2002 case, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of probation

which he is currently serving. 

Petitioner argues that his challenge to his sentence in the 2003 case is not moot

because a determination that his 2003 sentence was improperly enhanced and was, therefore,

too long, would change the expiration date of the sentence he completed. In other words, a

favorable decision on Petitioner’s challenge to his 2003 sentence asserted in Counts One or

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Two could advance the end date of the probationary term he is currently serving in the 2002

case. The Court disagrees with Petitioner’s argument. Petitioner has completed the entire

sentence imposed in the 2003 case. The terms of probation he is currently serving were

imposed in a separate case. 

As set forth above, the Sentence of Imprisonment in CR2003-021342 specifically

provided that community supervision was waived pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-603(K) and 41-

1604.07(D) due to the term of probation in CR2002-014160. (Respondents’ Exh. S) And

the sentencing order in CR2002-014160 suspended the imposition of sentence and placed

Petitioner on concurrent terms of probation to commence “[u]pon absolute discharge from

prison for a separate offense” in the 2003 case. (Respondents’ Exh. R) Arizona Revised

Statutes § 13-603(K) provides that, “if the court sentences a person to serve a consecutive

term of probation immediate after the person serves a term of imprisonment, the court may

waive community supervision and order that the person begin serving the term of probation

upon the person’s release from confinement.” Id. Thus, pursuant to the applicable statutes,

Petitioner’s term of probation in the 2002 case commenced upon Petitioner’s actual release

from imprisonment. See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 60 (2000) (examining 18

U.S.C. § 3264(e) which provides that a term of supervised release does not commence until

an individual “is released from imprisonment,” and noting that “release” means free from

confinement. Thus, a term of supervised release cannot be reduced “by reason of excess

time served in prison.” Id. Even if Petitioner served excess time in prison in the 2003 case,

he was actually released from imprisonment on a specific date, February 1, 2010, a date

which cannot be changed by a decision of this Court. It is this actual release date that

established the commencement of Petitioner’s term of probation in the 2002 case.

(Respondents’ Exh R); ARS § 13-603(K). 

Even if Petitioner’s prison sentence in the 2003 case was too long, this Court lacks

the ability to redress Petitioner’s grievance and thus, his claims challenging his sentence in

the 2003 case asserted in Grounds One and Two are moot. Petitioner does not continue to

suffer any collateral consequences despite still serving the term of probation which was

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imposed in the 2002 case. See Caswell v. Calderon, 363 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2004). 

First, probation - imposed in this case in place of community supervision - is not equivalent

to imprisonment. See State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, 10, 82 P.3d 369, 371 (Ariz.Ct.App.

2004) (community supervision is a separate punishment that is consecutive to and cannot be

served during imprisonment.). Additionally, even if Petitioner should have been released

earlier from his prison term in the 2003 case, his excess prison time would not count towards

his term of probation which was imposed in a separate case. Id. Finally, even if Petitioner

were later found to be in violation of his current term of probation, his subsequent

incarceration would be a consequence of that new violation, not an earlier miscalculation of

his term of imprisonment in the 2003 case. See Mendez-Savage, CV-04-2904-PHX-JAT,

2006 WL 1541936, at * 6 (D.Ariz. 2006) (habeas claim rendered moot by release despite

ongoing community supervision because claim only challenged detention in prison past

expiration of sentence.).

In summary, Petitioner’s challenges to his 2003 sentence asserted in Grounds One

and Two are moot based upon his release from the custody of the Arizona Department of

Corrections. See United States v. Palomba, 182 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1999) (in the

context of a prison sentence, a challenge to the prison sentence becomes moot once the

sentence has been served, unless the petitioner continues to suffer collateral consequences.).

 In accordance with the foregoing,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Jurisdiction (Mootness), doc. 66, be GRANTED and that: (1) Ground One of the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be dismissed to the extent it challenges and seeks the

invalidation of Petitioner’s sentence in CR2003-021342; and (2) Ground Two of the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be dismissed in its entirety. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28

U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 14th day of January, 2011.

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