Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02269/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02269-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEAN A. DOGLIETTO, individually

and on behalf of all other 

similarly situated,

NO. CIV. S-05-2269 LKK/DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

AT SYSTEMS WEST, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Pending before the court is plaintiffs’ motion to remand and

request for sanctions. As I explain below, plaintiffs’ motion to

remand must be granted, as must the request for sanctions. 

On July 12, 2004, plaintiff, Dean A. Doglietto (“Doglietto”),

brought suit individually and on behalf of all others similarly

situated against defendant, AT Systems West, Inc. (“ATS,” formerly

known as “Armored Transported, Inc.”) for overtime wages due,

compensation for meal periods, compensation for rest periods, and

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1 Defendant is an armored car company engaged in the business

of transporting, processing and warehousing cash, coins, checks and

other valuables for banks and other businesses in its Sacramento

branch. Plaintiff and each member of the class were employed as

guards with various titles and job duties. Pl.’s Compl. at 3. 

2 Plaintiff tendered an NLRB decision which held that

defendant engaged in unlawful practices by displacing the bona fide

union with a “shell labor organization,” and thus, during

plaintiff’s employment with defendant, no lawful collective

bargaining agreement was ever reached with a certified union. See

339 NLRB No. 50 (2003), attached as Ex. 11 to Plaintiff’s Request

for Judicial Notice. 

2

Labor Code § 203 penalties.1 Plaintiff also alleges causes of

action under the Unfair Competition Act and requests declaratory

relief, accounting, injunctive relief, and wages, overtime,

penalties and other compensation. 

A. DEFENDANT’S FIRST REMOVAL PETITION

On August 12, 2004, defendant removed the case to this court,

arguing that plaintiff’s claims are subject to Section 301 of the

Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185.

Shortly thereafter, plaintiff moved to remand. 

Defendant argued in opposition that removal was proper because

plaintiff’s causes of action are preempted by the Labor Management

Relations Act (“LMRA”). It contended that resolution of

plaintiff’s claim that he and the other class members were denied

meal and rest breaks required interpretation of a collective

bargaining agreement. This court explicitly rejected that argument

in an order dated November 5, 2004 because there was no valid

collective bargaining agreement governing plaintiff.2 Moreover,

the court’s order predicated a second ground requiring remand

Case 2:05-cv-02269-LKK -DAD Document 21 Filed 01/24/06 Page 2 of 9
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3 The court engaged in a lengthy analysis as to each of

plaintiff’s three causes of action, and explained in detail why it

was not necessary to interpret the terms the collective bargaining

agreement to adjudicate each cause of action. See Order at 13-16.

And see Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 403

(1988)(Section 301 [of the Labor Management Relations Act] has been

construed to cover state law actions requiring interpretation of

labor agreements). In particular, the court stated that

plaintiff’s first cause of action, brought under California Labor

Codes and wage orders, does not necessarily require interpretation

of the CBA. The second cause of action, brought under various

sections of the California Labor Code, also does not require

interpretation of any CBA. Finally, the court noted that

plaintiff’s third cause of action, brought under the California

Business and Professions Code, rests on a non-negotiable right

under state law. See Order at 13-16. 

4 The matter was given a new case number and first assigned

to another judge, but pursuant to the Local Rules, on November 21,

2005, the court issued an order relating CIV. S-04-1639 and CIV.

S-05-2269. 

3

explaining that even if the collective bargaining agreement were

valid and enforceable, plaintiff’s claims would not be preempted

by the LMRA because the rights at issue either did not require

consideration of an agreement or were state created and nonnegotiable.3 On November 4, 2004, this court granted plaintiff’s

motion to remand.

B. DEFENDANT’S SECOND REMOVAL PETITION

Since the court’s November 2004 order remanding the suit

plaintiff has neither amended his complaint, nor added additional

parties or facts. Pl.’s Mot. for Remand at 7. Nevertheless, on

November 8, 2005, defendant removed to this court for the second

time.4 Defendant claims that removal is appropriate because on

October 7, 2005 the Sacramento County Superior Court granted class

certification to all California driver-messenger guards. Defendant

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5 Defendant refers the court to an appendix of thirty-four

collective bargaining agreements which it claims contains all the

California CBAs which govern the employment of the class members

in the case at bar. See Appendix of CBAs, filed November 8, 2005.

6 Notably, defendant’s arguments regarding LMRA preemption

in its opposition brief appear to be “cut and pasted” in verbatim

from its first opposition brief, which last year this court

considered and rejected. 

4

asserts that this “new fact” allows for removal because the court

must now consider “all California Collective bargaining agreements

(CBAs),” not just the one set aside by the NLRB, which governed

only drivers in Sacramento.5 According to defendant, plaintiff’s

motion to remand “fails because CBAS at issue across the state are

valid” (emphasis in original). Opp’n at 1. Defendant then goes

on to make the very same arguments regarding preemption under the

LMRA that it did when it removed the suit the first time.6

Although the court found defendant’s preemption theory under

the LMRA untenable, in part because the CBA at issue in the first

removal had been held invalid by the NLRB, this court made clear

why even if the April 2000 agreement were valid and enforceable

plaintiff’s claims would not be preempted. Defendant simply

ignores this portion of the order and makes the very same LMRA

preemption arguments in its second removal petition and opposition

brief that the court previously rejected. 

Indeed, the court agrees with plaintiff that defendant’s most

recent attempt to remove demonstrates a willful disregard for the

court’s previous order and appropriate removal procedures, and

appears to be no more than an effort to delay and unreasonably

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7 Plaintiff also argues that the court may not consider the

merits of defendant’s removal because the matter is barred by

second removals and because it is untimely. Pl.’s Mot. to Remand

at 8-12. See Gravit v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723

(1977)(court not permitted to review an order remanding a case to

state court). That may very well be the case, but the court need

not engage in further analysis given the law of the case doctrine.

8 The district court imposed the sanctions required by

plaintiff, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the fees incurred

as a result of the improper removal, and suspended him from the

practice of law for a period not more than six months, pending the

report of an ad hoc Committee on Discipline. See 892 F.2d at 774.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed these sanctions.

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multiply the proceedings. As plaintiff maintains, the court’s

November 4, 2004 order is the law of the case, “and this court, as

well as the litigants, are bound thereby.” See Rio Grande Western

Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44 (1915).7 Plaintiff’s motion to

remand must therefore be GRANTED. 

C. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiff requests that sanctions be imposed because

defendant’s “second removal of this case on the same grounds and

on the same facts is the functional equivalent of asking this Court

to reconsider its prior decision, which is improper.” Mot. for

Remand at 17. Plaintiff’s assertion is well-taken.

In Peabody v. Maud Van Cortland Hill Schroll Trust, 892 F.2d

772, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit explained that a

sanctions award was proper where defendant could not show some

relevant change subsequent to the first remand.8 The court

compared both petitions for removal and explained that where

defendant removed based upon a theory that had been previously

rejected by the district court, such petition was frivolous. Id.

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at 777. In the case at bar, both petitions for removal allege that

a federal question exists because plaintiff’s claims, particularly

allegations concerning overtime compensation or meal/rest periods,

require the interpretation of the governing CBA. Again defendant

argues, the resolution of these state law claims is governed by the

LMRA. This argument was unambiguously rejected by the court in its

previous order. Defendant claims that the relevant change is the

class certification order issued by the state court judge. 

Directly put, class certification does nothing to change

plaintiff’s three causes of action, none of which require

interpretation of a CBA. The court concludes that defendant’s

second removal petition is frivolous.

The Ninth Circuit has explained that the district court may

impose sanctions under its inherent power to promote the orderly

and just administration of its caseload but must follow its own

rules, make a finding of bad faith, and afford due process. 

Peabody, 892 F.2d at 777 (citations omitted). The Eastern District

of California’s Local Rule 83-184 provides in part:

In the event any attorney subject to these Rules engages

in conduct that may warrant discipline or other

sanctions, any Judge or Magistrate Judge may initiate

proceedings for contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 or Fed.

R. Crim. P. 42, or may, after reasonable notice and

opportunity to show cause to the contrary, take any

other appropriate disciplinary action against the

attorney. In addition to or in lieu of the foregoing,

the Judge or Magistrate Judge may refer the matter to

the disciplinary body of any Court before which the

attorney has been admitted to practice.

The requirements of this district are subsumed in the due process

requirement. Id. In the case at bar, defendant had ample notice

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that its removal notice was frivolous. On October 27, 2005 and

November 3,2005, upon defendant’s threat of second removal to this

court, plaintiff warned defendant in two letters that he believed

a second removal would be frivolous and demonstrates “a willingness

to employ delaying tactics and to increase litigation expenses at

every turn.” See Cagney Dec., Ex. 1 and 2. 

In sanctioning defendant, the Ninth Circuit in Peabody also

explained that the court must make a separate finding of bad faith.

Id. at 777. Plaintiff has tendered evidence suggesting that

defendant has improperly removed other similar suits brought

against defendant for wage and hour violations. For instance, in

Amaya v. ATI Systems International, Inc., CV-04-9243 (C.D. Cal

March 2005)(Matz, J.), defendant premised its removal of the suit

on a CBA that was not applicable to plaintiff and attached this

irrelevant CBA to its removal petition. Defendant later made

arguments in its opposition to a motion to remand based on a

completely different CBA which did control plaintiff’s employment

terms with defendant. In remanding the suit to state court, Judge

Matz declined to award attorney’s fees or costs, but stated that:

Judge Karlton appears to have been “on the money” in

finding that the defendant before him, AT Systems West,

Inc., was making a “nonsense” argument based on a CBA

found to have been void ab initio. The facts in this

case appear a wee bit murkier, but could also be

construed to give rise to the inference that Defendants

and their counsel acted in bad faith. The court intends

to be extremely vigilant in assessing any further

comparable filings . . . .

Defendant’s conduct in the previous removal which was premised on

a CBA found to have been void ab initio, apparently improper

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9 In Martin, the Supreme Court articulated that:

the appropriate test for awarding fees under § 1447(c)

should recognize Congress' desire to deter removals

intended to prolong litigation and impose costs on the

opposing party, while not undermining Congress' basic

decision to afford defendants a right to remove as a

general matter, when the statutory criteria are

satisfied. In light of these “large objectives,” the

standard for awarding fees should turn on the

reasonableness of the removal. In applying the general

rule of reasonableness, district courts retain

discretion to consider whether unusual circumstances

warrant a departure in a given case. A court's reasons

for departing, however, should be “faithful to the

purposes” of awarding fees under § 1447(c)(citation

omitted). 

126 S.Ct. at 707.

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conduct in similar suits, as well as in the instant case where

defendant removed the same suit based on a previously-rejected

argument, warrants a conclusion that defendant has engaged in bad

faith intended to delay adjudication of the merits of plaintiffs’

claims. 

In its opposition brief, defendant argues for denial of the

request for sanctions because there was an “objectively reasonable”

basis upon which they were entitled to remove the matter. Opp’n

at 15 (citing Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 126 S.Ct. 704, 707

(2005)).9 Defendant’s only defense is that it had a reasonable

basis for removal because other judges, including Judge Matz of the

Central District of California, have analyzed other CBAs which

govern class members in this suit and have found such CBAs to be

valid. Opp’n at 15-16. This argument, as previously noted,

completely ignores the court’s analysis that no LMRA preemption

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10 Plaintiff’s counsel claims his office will have spent a

total of $10,775 in researching, writing, and traveling to and

attending the hearing on the motion to remand. See Cagney Decl.

at 4. The declaration states that 6.5 partner hours and 12

associate attorney hours were spent on research, and 8 associate

and 4 partner hours were spent on drafting the motion. The court

determined that $5,000 would be appropriate for attorney’s fees

considering, inter alia, defendant’s counsel stated that he charged

his client approximately $3,000 for the removal petition. 

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exists notwithstanding the validity of any CBA. 

 The court finds it appropriate to award plaintiff’s

attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 1447(c) of the

removal statute. Defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff’s counsel

the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) within thirty (30)

days of this order.10 Defendant shall also file a declaration with

this court concurrently with payment stating that this amount has

been paid to plaintiff’s counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 23, 2006.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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