Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_15-cv-00195/USCOURTS-akd-3_15-cv-00195-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Tort Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ALASKA

Ralph Angasan, Sr., et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 3:15-cv-00195 JWS

)

vs. )

) ORDER AND OPINION

United States of America, Department)

of the Interior, National Park Service ) [Re: Motion at Docket 21]

)

Defendant. )

)

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 21 defendant United States of America, Department of the Interior,

National Park Service (“the Park Service”) moves to dismiss the complaint of plaintiffs

Ralph Angasan, Sr.; Vera Angasan; Fred T. Angasan, Sr.; Mary Jane Nielsen; Trefon

Angasan, Jr.; Lydia Emory; Viola Savo; Val Angasan, Sr.; Martin Angasan, Sr.; Steven

Angasan, Sr.; and Anishia Elbie (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) pursuant to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). Plaintiffs oppose at docket 28; the Park Service

replies at docket 32. Oral argument was heard on May 2, 2016.

II. BACKGROUND

This case presents a dispute concerning the construction of a road at Brooks

Camp in the Katmai National Park and Preserve. Plaintiffs are the heirs of Palagia

Case 3:15-cv-00195-JWS Document 39 Filed 05/04/16 Page 1 of 13
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Melgenak, who established first use of land in the vicinity of Brooks Camp in the late

1800s.1 Following litigation with the United States, Plaintiffs were granted the land

identified as United States Survey No. 7623 as a Native allotment under the Alaska

Native Allotment Act.2 Pursuant to a sales agreement (“Sales Agreement”), Plaintiffs

then sold a portion of their allotment back to the United States (Lot 1) and granted the

United States a conservation easement (“Conservation Easement” or “Easement”) over

the remaining land (Lots 2 and 3).3

 The land subject to the Conservation Easement is

referred to as the “Protected Property.”4 A portion of the Protected Property (Lot 2) is

designated as the “Exclusive Use Area,” over which Plaintiffs have retained the right of

“exclusive, non-commercial use.”5

The Conservation Easement has three stated purposes: (1) “to preserve and

protect the predominantly natural landscape and the wildlife and other park resources

and values on the Protected Property;” (2) “to limit the impacts on the surrounding park

lands and resources as a result of the use of the Protected Property;” and (3) “to

increase opportunities for access by park visitors.”6 Section 2 of the Easement outlines

the specific rights that Plaintiffs conveyed to the United States.7 

1Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 7.

2Alaska Native Allotment Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 197, ch. 2469 (1906) (codified as

amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 270-1 to -3 (1970)). “Although the Allotment Act was repealed in

1971 by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (‘ANCSA’), 43 U.S.C. § 1617, ANCSA

contained a savings clause for applications pending on the date of the repeal of the Allotment

Act. Id. § 1617(a).” Akootchook v. U.S., Dep’t of the Interior, 747 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir.

1984).

3Doc. 1-1 at 1-17.

4Doc. 1-2 at 2.

5

Id. at 4. 

6

Id.

7

Id. at 2-3.

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The United States’ ability to develop the land is restricted under the parties’

agreements. With regard to Lot 1, Section (2)(a)(iv) of the Sales Agreement provides

that the Park Service must “first consult with [Plaintiffs] concerning all proposed

developments [and] improvements.”8 This restriction resembles the Lot 3 restriction

found in Section 2(D)(2) of the Easement, which states that “new development” in Lot 3

shall not occur without the Park Service “first consulting and obtaining and considering

the views of the” Plaintiffs.9

Plaintiffs allege that the Park Service violated the two above restrictions when it

built a road that commences on Lot 1 “and passes through [Lot 3] to a barge loading

zone directly adjacent to Lot 3”10

 without first contacting or consulting with Plaintiffs.11

Their three causes of action seek the following relief: (1) a declaratory judgment stating

that the Park Service’s conduct is wrongful;12 (2) an injunction prohibiting the Park

Service from “using or entering upon the road” and requiring it to “promptly comply in all

respects [with] the Conservation Easement;”13 and (3) restitution damages.14

Additionally, the complaint’s prayer for relief seeks an injunction requiring the Park

Service to restore the Protected Property at its own expense.15 

8Doc. 1-1 at 6.

9

Id. at 27. The Park Service’s ability to develop Lot 2, the Exclusive Use Area, is more

restricted. Section 2(D)(1) of the Easement provides that the Park Service may not develop

Lot 2 “without the express written permission of the [Plaintiffs], which permission may be

withheld for any reason or no reason whatsoever.” Id.

10Doc. 1 at 7 ¶ 27.

11

Id. at 8 ¶ 29.

12

Id. ¶ 32.

13

Id. at 9 ¶¶ 37-38.

14

Id. at 11 ¶ 44.

15

Id. ¶ 3.

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III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal of an

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In order to survive a defendant’s motion to

dismiss, the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction.16

“Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or factual.”17 Where the

defendant brings a facial attack on the subject matter of the district court, the court

assumes the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are true and draws all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.18 The court does not, however, accept the

truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.19

“With a factual Rule 12(b)(1) attack, however, a court may look beyond the

complaint to matters of public record without having to convert the motion into one for

summary judgment. It also need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiffs’

allegations.”20

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claims. In reviewing such

a motion, “[a]ll allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”21 To be assumed true,

the allegations, “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must

contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the

16Tosco v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2000).

17White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).

18Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009).

19

Id.

20White, 227 F.3d at 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

21Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997).

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opposing party to defend itself effectively.”22 Dismissal for failure to state a claim can

be based on either “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”23

 “Conclusory allegations of law . . . are

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”24 

To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to “‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’”25 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”26 “The plausibility standard is not akin

to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.”27

 “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”28 “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to

dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”29

Ordinarily, if “matters out side the pleadings are “presented to and not excluded

by the court,” a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “must be treated as one for summary judgment

under Rule 56” and the parties “must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all

22Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

23Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

24Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001).

25Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

26

Id.

27

Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

28

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

29Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Starr, 652 F.3d

at 1216.

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the material that is pertinent to the motion.”30 There are two exceptions to this rule,

however. “First, a court may consider material which is properly submitted as part of

the complaint on a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to dismiss into a

motion for summary judgment.”31 Second, “a court may take judicial notice of ‘matters

of public record.’”32

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Park Service’s Jurisdictional Attacks

Paragraph four of Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts numerous potential bases for this

court’s jurisdiction.33 In response to the Park Service’s jurisdictional attacks, Plaintiffs

defend two of them: Public Law 105-277 and the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”).34

1. Public Law 105-277

On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed House Bill 4328 into law, which

became Public Law Number 105-277 (hereinafter “the Act”). Title I § 135 of the Act,

which was codified as a note to 16 U.S.C. § 410hh-1, “authorize[s], ratifie[s] and

confirm[s]” the Sales Agreement’s “terms, conditions, procedures, covenants,

reservations, and other provisions” and declares that its provisions “set forth the

obligations and commitments of the United States and all other signatories, as a matter

of [f]ederal law.”35 The Sales Agreement expressly incorporates the exhibits attached

thereto as part of the Agreement itself,

36

 including Exhibit II: the Conservation

30Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

31Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation

omitted).

32

Id. at 688-89 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201).

33Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 4.

3428 U.S.C. § 2409a.

35Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title I § 135(a)(1)(A), 112 Stat. 2681-264 (1998).

36Doc. 1-1 at 12.

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Easement Deed Form.

37

 Section 7 to this Exhibit, titled “Remedies and Enforcement,”

provides in pertinent part as follows: 

If either Party determines that an activity or event of noncompliance with

the terms and conditions herein set forth has occurred, the non-breaching

Party shall give notice to the party alleged in breach and demand

corrective action sufficient to abate such activity or event of

non-compliance and to restore the Protected Property to its condition prior

to such event or activity at the breaching Party’s own expense. Failure by

the Party then in breach to discontinue, abate or take such other

corrective action as may be demanded by the non-breaching Party, shall

entitle the non-breaching Party, at its discretion, to bring an action at law

or in equity in a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this

Easement, to obtain injunctive relief, to require restoration of the

Protected Property at the breaching Party’s own expense, and to recover

any damages arising from such non-compliance, including the reasonable

costs of enforcement.38

In sum, the Act bestows the characteristics of federal law upon the parties’ rights and

obligations under the Easement and unequivocally waives the United States’ sovereign

immunity with regard to civil actions brought to enforce those rights and obligations. 

The district courts have jurisdiction of such actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The Park Service’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. The Park

Service argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims because the Act

does not contain an effective sovereign immunity waiver. It correctly notes that

sovereign immunity waivers may not be implied;39

 they must be expressed

unequivocally to be effective and they must be construed strictly in favor of the

sovereign.40 But the Park Service misses the mark in arguing that the Act’s waiver is

implicit because it is found in the Easement and not the text of the Act itself.

41

 The

plain language of the Act does not merely imply that the provisions of the Sales

37

Id. at 25-40.

38

Id. at 32 (emphasis added).

39United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).

40See United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992).

41Doc. 32 at 5-6.

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Agreement, including the waiver of sovereign immunity, are adopted as federal law; it

directly and unambiguously expresses so.

The Park Service next argues that Plaintiffs waived this court’s federal question

jurisdiction by abandoning their complaint’s assertion of such jurisdiction42 in their

opposition. Plaintiffs do not abandon their federal question jurisdiction argument in their

opposition because Plaintiffs maintain that the Park Service has violated the Act, a

federal law. 

The Park Service is correct, however, that the Act’s sovereign immunity waiver

applies only to claims that relate to the Conservation Easement and not the land that

was conveyed in fee to the United States (Lot 1). It is necessary, therefore, to

determine whether this court has jurisdiction of Plaintiffs’ Lot 1 claims under the other

statutes upon which Plaintiffs rely.

2. The QTA does not apply because title to real property is not in

dispute 

Under the QTA, “the United States, subject to certain exceptions, has waived its

sovereign immunity and has permitted plaintiffs to name it as a party defendant in civil

actions to adjudicate title disputes involving real property in which the United States

claims an interest.”43

 “[T]wo conditions must exist before a district court can exercise

jurisdiction over an action under the [QTA]: (1) the United States must claim an interest

in the property at issue, and (2) there must be a disputed title to real property.”44 If

either condition is not met, the QTA does not apply and the district court lacks

42Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 4 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331).

43Block v. N. Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 275-76 (1983)

(citing Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-562, 86 Stat. 1176, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2409a,

28 U.S.C. § 1346(f), and 28 U.S.C. § 1402(d)).

44Leisnoi, Inc. v. United States, 170 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 1999).

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jurisdiction.45 Because the parties agree that the United States claims an interest in the

property at issue in this case, only the second condition is relevant here.

Plaintiffs argue that they are disputing title to Lot 1 because each party claims

“an interest in the Conservation Easement which conflicts with the other party’s

interest.”46

 This is not the same thing as a dispute regarding the title to Lot 1, which

Plaintiffs do not dispute is owned free and clear by the United States. Because

Plaintiffs do not allege that the title to Lot 1 is disputed, or that there is a current or

future cloud on that title, the QTA is inapplicable here.47 As the Ninth Circuit held in

Robinson, “a suit that does not challenge title but instead concerns the use of land as to

which title is not disputed can sound in tort or contract and not com e within the scope of

the QTA.”48

3. 25 U.S.C. § 345 does not give this court jurisdiction 

In addition to the statutes that Plaintiffs cite in their complaint, Plaintiffs also

argue that this court has jurisdiction of their Lot 1 claims under 25 U.S.C. § 345. This

argument lacks merit because § 345 waives the United States’ sovereign immunity only

with respect to claims seeking an original allotment, not post-acquisition claims

49 such

as those at issue here.

45

Id.

46Doc. 28 at 6-7.

47See Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Congress did not

intend to limit the waiver solely to the traditional ‘quiet title’ cause of action; instead Congress

was more generally concerned with interests that ‘cloud title,’ i.e., interests that raise questions

that may affect the claim of title and pose problems in the future.”).

48

Id. at 688.

49

Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 2011).

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B. The Park Service’s Rule 12(b)(6) Arguments

1. The court cannot decide fact questions in the Park Service’s favor

The Park Service argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Lot 3 fail to state a

claim because Section 2(D) of the Easement requires consultation with Plaintiffs only in

the event of “new development,”50

 which is defined to exclude the “replacement of a

similar size and character of improvements that exist[ed] on the Protected Property”

when the Easement was conveyed.51

 The road at issue here qualifies under this

exclusion, the Park Service argues, because “a road and barge facility already existed

on Lot 1 and along the shore line of Lot 3” when the Easement was granted.52

Relatedly, the Park Service argues that the road construction was permissible under

Section 2(E) of the Easement, which grants the Park Service the right to “replace the

existing road . . . on the Protected Property.”53

The court must reject the Park Service’s arguments at the motion to dismiss

stage. The complaint alleges that road is a new development,54 not a replacement of

the old road that is similar in size and character. Questions of fact preclude dismissal. 

2. Plaintiffs’ first cause of action fails to state a claim for violations of

the Alaska Native Allotment Act

Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claim seeks a declaration that the Park Service’s

wrongful conduct, including but not limited to its misleading Final

Environmental Impact Statement and its failure to consult and obtain and

consider the views of the Grantors constitute a breach of trust obligations

owed to Plaintiffs under [The Alaska Native Allotment Act of 1906

(“Allotment Act”),] 43 U.S.C. § 270.1, et seq., further explicated in the

Sales Agreement, as authorized, approved and ratified by an Act of

50Doc. 24 at 16.

51Doc. 1-2 at 3.

52

Id. at 17.

53

Id. at 3.

54See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 19 (stating that the Park Service was planning to “construct”

the road).

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Congress and the terms and conditions of the Grant of Conservation

Easement, as well as in [sic] violation of 25 C.F.R. § 169.

The Park Service next argues that Plaintiffs’ “unclear” first cause of action fails to state

a claim that the Park Service’s actions violate its trust obligations under the Allotment

Act or violate 25 C.F.R. § 169.1, et seq.

55

With regard to the Allotment Act, the Park Service speculates that Plaintiffs

“must be referring . . . to the inalienable nature of allotments.”56

 The Allotment Act

prohibits alienation of allotments “until otherwise provided by Congress” and requires

the Secretary of Interior to approve all conveyances of title to land by deed.57 The Park

service argues that these obligations were satisfied when the Easement was authorized

by both Congress and the Secretary of Interior. Plaintiffs’ only response to this

argument is their assertion that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over their

Allotment Act claim.

58 Plaintiffs have abandoned this claim.59

The Park Service next challenges Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief under the

former 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(b), under which the Bureau of Indian Affairs required right-ofway applicants to obtain the landowners’ and the Secretary of Interior’s permission.60

Plaintiffs argue that the Park Service violated this requirement by not obtaining such

55Doc. 24 at 18-20.

56

Id. at 18-19.

5743 U.S.C. § 270-1 (1970). See also 43 C.F.R. § 2561.3(a) (“[A] native of Alaska who

received an allotment under the Act, or his heirs, may with the approval of the Secretary of the

Interior or his authorized representative, convey the complete title to the allotted land by

deed.”); Foster v. Foster, 883 P.2d 397, 400 (Alaska 1994); Heffle v. State, 633 P.2d 264, 268

(Alaska 1981).

58Doc. 28 at 13.

59See D.Ak. L.R. 7.1(e).

6025 C.F.R. § 169.3(b) (2015) (“Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, no

right-of-way shall be granted over and across any individually owned lands . . . without the prior

written consent of the owner or owners of such lands and the approval of the Secretary.”) (no

longer effective as of April 21, 2016).

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permission before it built the new road.61 The Park Service disagrees, arguing that

Plaintiffs’ and the Secretary’s permission to build the road is found in Section 2(E) of

the Easement. “[N]o further approval is required,” it argues, “in order for the Park

Service to use, maintain, restore, and replace the existing road and barge landing

facility.’”62

 

At its core, the Park Service’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ request for relief under 25

C.F.R. § 169.3(b) depends upon resolution of the same fact questions discussed

above: whether the road is either (1) a new right-of-way that requires new authorization

or (2) a mere replacement of an old right-of-way that is authorized under Section 2(E) of

the Easement. Questions of fact preclude dismissal at this stage of the litigation. 

3. The complaint does not state a claim regarding the barge landing

area

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion that the complaint states a claim that the Park

Service failed to consult them regarding the construction of a barge landing facility near

the Exclusive Use Area,63

 no such claim is found in the complaint. Although the

complaint states that the road “increases the likelihood of trespass onto the Exclusive

Use” Area,64

 this claim focuses on how the road affects their rights, not the barge

landing area. If Plaintiffs wish to assert a claim that challenges the barge landing area,

they will need to amend their complaint. 

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion, the Park Service’s motion to dismiss at

docket 21 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: Plaintiffs’ first

cause of action is DISMISSED to the extent it alleges a violation of the Alaska Native

61Doc. 28 at 13.

62Doc. 32 at 13 (quoting Doc. 1-2 at 3). 

63Doc. 28 at 4.

64Doc. 1 at 9 ¶ 35.

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Allotment Act (the alleged violations of the Conservation Easement and 25 C.F.R.

§ 169.3(b) remain); Plaintiffs’ complaint is DISMISSED to the extent it states claims that

arise out of the Park Service’s activities on Lot 1; the motion is DENIED in all other

respects. 

 DATED this 4th day of May 2016.

/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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