Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00680/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00680-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

NEIL MCHUGH,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

 THE TOWN OF MARANA, a municipal

corporation, and the MARANA TOWN

COUNCIL, duly elected officials of the

Town of Marana, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 04-680–TUC-DCB (BPV

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendant Town of Marana, brings this motion for summary judgment, pursuant

to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for the entry of summary judgment in

favor of Defendants. 

On March 30, 2005, this case was referred to Magistrate Judge Velasco for all

pretrial proceedings and report and recommendation. On August 11, 2005, the

Magistrate Judge heard argument on Defendant Town of Marana's Motion for Summary

Judgment (Document #14). For reasons which follow, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court, after its independent review, grant Defendant Town

of Marana's Motion for Summary Judgment. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Neil McHugh filed the Complaint in this case, alleging that Defendants'

actions violated his due process rights granted by the United States Constitution and the

Constitution of the State of Arizona, and were in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

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1 Some of the facts in this case are in dispute. Where there is no

dispute as to the facts, no citation will be made. Where the facts

are in dispute, they will be so noted, and reference to the

appropriate party’s statement of facts will be made. 

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On April 6, 2005, Defendant Town of Marana ("Marana") filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment supported by a separate statement of facts. McHugh filed an

opposition to the motion supported by a separate statement of facts. Marana filed no

reply, but did file a supplemental statement of facts. On July 6, 2005, Marana filed a

notice of new case citation supplementing its motion. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In late fall of 2003, Plaintiff, and other persons who own property in the area of

Cortaro Farms Road, began to be contacted by representatives of a private developer

regarding the proposed annexation of their property into the Town of Marana. 

Plaintiff soon learned that the annexation was being done in connection with the

rezoning and development of portions of this property for single family residences and

commercial developments. Plaintiff was opposed to the proposed annexation. 

The annexation process began when the Town of Marana filed their blank

annexation petitions with the Pima County Recorders Office on November 26, 2003.

On December 8, 2003, Plaintiff McHugh received a letter from the Town of

Marana stating that his property was to be included in what had come to be known as

the Camino de Oeste Annexation. Two days later, Plaintiff McHugh received a letter

from Dick Gear, of the Town of Marana, stating that his inclusion in the proposed

annexation area was incorrect.

On March 16, 2004, the Mayor and Council of the Town of Marana, Arizona,

passed and adopted Marana Ordinance 2004.5 pertaining to the annexation of

approximately three hundred and nineteen (319) acres of land adjacent to Marana's

boundaries.1

 Simultaneously, through Ordinance 2004.5, Marana changed the zoning

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classification (Pima County Zones Suburban Ranch and Suburban Homestead) of the

property prior to annexation to the equivalent zoning classification within Marana. 

On March 31, 2004, the Town of Marana Planning and Zoning Commission held

a hearing on the proposed rezoning of the area that was included in the annexation

process. During the course of this hearing it became known that the private developer

who was pursuing the annexation was offering financial incentives, including $700,000

towards the redevelopment of Cortaro Farms Road. Also during that hearing, one of

the private developers asked the panel to overlook deficiencies in their redevelopment

application in light of the fact that they would be contributing over two million dollars

to the town during the course of the annexation and redevelopment. One member of the

Planning and Zoning Council indicated that it was his perception that private developers

were "leading the planning effort," and that "the planning, the vision of the Town is

coming more from the developers than it is from the Town." The proposal to rezone

the area to be annexed was approved.

Plaintiff, present at the March 31, 2004 hearing, was of the clear belief that the

financial contributions to be made by the private developers insured that their proposal

was going to be approved despite public opposition. 

On April 15, 2004, Plaintiff McHugh and others filed a complaint in the Pima

County Superior Court in and for the State of Arizona against Marana to have

invalidated what has been called the "Camino de Oeste Annexation," which was

adopted by Ordinance No. 2004.5.

In the face of opposition from numerous speakers, Marana passed and adopted

Resolution No. 2004.7 on April 20, 2004, which allowed the Mayor to execute the

Willow Ridge Development Agreement, pertaining to the rezoning of 104.6 acres

within the area previously annexed by Ordinance 2004.5. 

On or about April 26, 2004, more than one month after the date the annexation

was approved, the Mayor and certain landowners with property located within the

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annexation area executed the Development Agreement. The only testimony which was

presented to the Council in support of the rezoning was by the Marana Town Attorney

and primarily involved the amount of money that the redevelopment would bring to the

Town. Plaintiff McHugh was present during this presentation, and clearly got the sense

that the money that was offered to the Town was the factor that brought on the quick

approval of the redevelopment of the annexed area. 

On August 4, 2004, the Hon. Richard S. Fields entered judgment for Marana and

upheld the validity of Ordinance 2004.5. Plaintiff McHugh filed a Notice of Appeal

with the Court of Appeals, Division Two, in and for the State of Arizona on August 17,

2004.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is available “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c). The party seeking

summary judgment carries the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material

fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986), cert denied, 484 U.S.

1066 (1988). Once the moving party has met that burden by presenting evidence

which, if uncontradicted, would entitle it to a directed verdict at trial, the burden shifts

to the nonmoving party to present specific facts showing that such contradiction is

possible. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946,

950-52 (9th. Cir 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).

When judging the evidence at the summary judgment state, a court is not to

make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence but is required to view

all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Musick v. Burke,

913 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990). The ultimate question is whether the evidence

“presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so

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one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence

supporting the non-movant’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence from

which the jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. See id., at 252. 

With these standards firmly in mind, the Magistrate Judge turns to the merits of

Plaintiff’s claims.

Defendant's Position

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's takings claim fails because Plaintiff has not

alleged a legitimate claim of entitlement to County zoning instead of the Town zoning

that he became subject to once the property was annexed. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff may not assert a due process claim against the

Town because a plaintiff is precluded from asserting a due process claim instead of, or

in addition to, a takings claim. 

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is barred from bringing an action for a taking in

federal court because he has not alleged any facts that indicate he has been denied the

use of his property, and, additionally, because he has not first sought relief in state court

through in inverse eminent domain action.

Finally, Defendant argues that allegations as to the motivations of the Town

council members in adopting the annexation ordinance are not proper matters for this

court.

Plaintiff’s Position

Plaintiff asserts that he has presented evidence that supports his contention that

the decision to approve the annexation and rezoning was influenced by financial

contributions from private developers, and that this influence denied him his procedural

due process rights to meaningfully participate in the process leading up to the

annexation. 

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Plaintiff also asserts that he challenged the validity of the annexation in the only

manner permitted him by law. Further, Plaintiff asserts that the two prong test set for

setting forth a taking's claim has been satisfied. First, the Town Council's vote in favor

of the annexation and rezoning of the property is a final decision, satisfying the first

prong. Second, Plaintiff asserts that while an inverse eminent domain action may

satisfy the second prong, it is not the only state procedure that would satisfy the test.

Plaintiff claim that his attempt to challenge the validity of the annexation also satisfies

the test. 

Legal Analysis

Procedural Due Process Claim

Ordinarily, due process of law requires notice and an opportunity for some kind

of hearing prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest, however, in some

situations, due process is satisfied when the legislative body performs its

responsibilities in the normal manner prescribed by law. Halverson v. Skagit County,

42 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 1994). In this instance, as there is no issue Plaintiff received

notice of the hearing and a chance to be heard, this Court need not decide what notice

and hearing requirements were due in this instance. 

Property rights must be based on legitimate claims of entitlement. Kerley

Industries, Inc. v. Pima County, 785 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Board of Regents

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972). Defendants having raised this

issue of entitlement, Plaintiffs have not countered with evidence or argument that they

have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a particular form of zoning. This distinction

seems especially critical in this instance when Plaintiff has not shown an economical

devaluation of his property. 

In Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d 1127, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the

plaintiff's procedural due process claim because it was lacking in two respects. First,

the plaintiffs did not submit any evidence that supported the plaintiff's conclusory

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assertion of partiality. Second, the plaintiff did not show that they had a "legitimate

claim of entitlement" to the zoning they desired created by "an independent source such

as state law." 

Plaintiff argues that the instant matter is unlike Buckles because the Plaintiff in

this case has submitted evidence that supports his contention that the decision to

approve the annexation and rezoning was influenced by financial contributions from

private developers. 

In this case, the basis of Plaintiff's claims that the town council is acting

impartially is that the town council met with developers prior to the public hearings and

took the towns financial interests into consideration in its decision making. Plaintiff has

not made any claim that council members themselves benefitted personally or

improperly from any of the financial arrangements, or that the town council members

stood to benefit from the annexation or zoning developments. Presumably, the town

council would be remiss in not taking such a pecuniary interest in the town's

development. The fact that the town council also receives input outside of hearings or

that the council was predisposed, prior to the hearing, to recommend approval of the

annexation is also irrelevant to Plaintiff's claim. A town cannot conduct the details and

entirety of its business through public meetings. In sum, there is absolutely no evidence

of impartiality here. 

Thus, like Buckles, Plaintiff has failed to come forth with genuine issues of

material fact in support of a claim of entitlement or a claim of impartial decision

making. Either claim is fatal to Plaintiff's procedural due process claim. Accordingly,

the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, grant the Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Procedural Due Process claim. 

Takings Claim

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part

that "`private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.'"

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First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 307,

314 (1987). The United States Supreme Court has held that this provision does not

prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the

government's exercise of that power. Id. Therefore, "government action that works a

taking of property rights necessarily implicates the `constitutional obligation to pay just

compensation.'" Id. at 315 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49

(1960)). 

The typical taking occurs when the government undertakes to condemn property

pursuant to its power of eminent domain. Id. at 316. However, where the government

takes property without invoking formal eminent domain procedures, the property owner

may bring an inverse condemnation action against the government to seek just

compensation for the taking. Id. In the instant case, Plaintiffs' claim alleging an

unlawful taking without due process of law under the 5th Amendment amounts to an

inverse condemnation action.

To prevail in an inverse condemnation action, the plaintiff "must establish that

the regulation or state action effects a taking, that it `goes too far,' and that he or she has

not received just compensation." Austin v. City and County of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678,

679 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S.

340 (1986)). To establish that the state failed to offer just compensation, the plaintiff

"must seek and be denied compensation through state procedures, including an inverse

condemnation action in state court, provided those procedures are adequate." Id. at 680

(citing Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.

172, 195 (1985)). 

Based upon the requirement that Plaintiff must seek and be denied compensation

through state procedures before bringing a Fifth Amendment takings action in federal

court, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's failure to file an inverse condemnation action

in state court renders the federal action premature. In response, Plaintiff argues that he

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has sought relief in State court in the form of challenging the validity of the annexation.

Plaintiff asserts that the Daniel's case cited by Defendant does not specify what type of

state procedure Plaintiff must pursue, only that they must attempt to use state

procedures, and they have satisfied this requirement. 

Plaintiffs' argument is contrary to Ninth Circuit case law applying the Supreme

Court's decision in Williamson. See Jones Intercable, 80 F.3d 320 (affirming dismissal

of takings claim on ripeness grounds because state inverse condemnation was still

pending); Austin, 840 F.2d at 680 (affirming dismissal of takings claim because plaintiff

failed to bring inverse condemnation action in state court); Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d

1300, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds, Armendariz v. Penman, 75

F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996)(holding same). Moreover, Plaintiff offers no authority to

support his contention that he need not bring an inverse condemnation action in state

court prior to filing the federal action. 

Although Plaintiff could argue that state procedures in this instance are

inadequate, he has not done so. If Plaintiff did make such an argument, Plaintiff bears

the burden of establishing that the state procedures are inadequate. Austin, 840 F.2d at

680. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has stated that "state procedures are considered

inadequate only when state law provides no post-deprivation remedy for a taking."

Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852, 861 (9th Cir. 1995)(citations omitted).

"Williamson does not require the plaintiff to bring a state court action where it would

be futile under existing state law." Levald, 998 F.2d at 686. In Levald, the court

determined that the plaintiff's federal takings claims was ripe even though he did not

file a state inverse condemnation action. Id. However, the court so held because at that

time, the forum state did not recognize actions for inverse condemnation based on

regulatory takings. Id. 

Arizona, on the other hand, recognizes inverse condemnation actions and has

done so for many years. See City of Yuma v. Lattie, 117 Ariz. 280, 572 P.2d 108 (App.

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1977); County of Mohave v. Chamberlin, 78 Ariz. 422, 281 P.2d 128 (1955). Indeed,

in 1955 the Arizona Supreme Court held that the just compensation provision in the

Arizona Constitution is self-executing to enable landowners to bring inverse

condemnation actions under that constitutional provision. County of Mohave, 78 Ariz.

at 430, 281 P.2d at 133. See also City of Yuma, 117 Ariz. at 283, 572 P.2d at 111 ("If

the city fails to institute an eminent domain action and private property is taken or

damaged for public use, [the takings clause] of the [Arizona] Constitution is

self-executing and the right to bring an inverse eminent domain action vests in the

property owner."); Calmat v. State of Arizona, 176 Ariz. 190, 859 P.2d 1323 (1993)

(holding that while the constitutional provision governing takings is self-executing,

certain statutes governing eminent domain actions also govern inverse condemnation

actions).

Consequently, unlike the plaintiff in Levald, the present Plaintiff has state

procedures available to him to seek compensation. Plaintiff has sought to invalidate the

ordinance, but this is not the equivalent of seeking just compensation. Because Plaintiff

has failed to file an inverse condemnation action in state court, his Fifth Amendment

takings claim is not ripe for this Court's consideration.

 The purpose of the law is to compensate for a taking, so, unless an attempt to

receive compensation has been sought and denied by the state, no takings claim can be

sought in federal court. Thus, an attempt to invalidate the annexation, without seeking

just compensation, does not exhaust the claim. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, grant the

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's taking's claim. 

§ 1983 Claim

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that "Congress enacted section 1983 pursuant

to its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to adopt `appropriate

legislation' to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418,

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1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 351 n.3, 355 (1979)

(Brennan, J., concurring); Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (1990)). Accordingly,

"[t]he Ninth Circuit has clearly stated that `a litigant complaining of a violation of a

constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983'" when suing state actors. Jacobsen

v. Marin Gen. Hosp., 963 F.Supp 866, 870 (N.D.Cal. 1997)(quoting Azul-Pacifico, Inc.

v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied., 506 U.S. 1081

(1993)). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961)(recognizing that section

1983 makes available enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment against state actors)

overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv. 436 U.S. 658 (1978);

Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981) (public employee alleging

employment discrimination as well as violations of his constitutional rights under the

First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments cannot sue directly under the Constitution

where defendants are amenable to suit under section 1983) abrogated on other grounds

by Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); 1A

M.Schwartz and J.Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses, and Fees, at 13

(Section 1983 "is essentially a procedural or remedial device through which a party may

seek relief for the deprivation of a constitutional... right...Thus, in order to state a claim

under section 1983, the pleader must allege an independent substantive basis, whether

grounded in a federal constitutional or statutory right"(citation omitted)). 

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has specifically rejected the contention that a plaintiff

may state a takings claim against state actors directly under the Fifth Amendment.

Azul-Pacifico, 973 F.2d at 705. Instead, the plaintiff must utilize section 1983. Id. See

also, Golden Gate Hotel Assoc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482,

1486 (9th Cir. 1994)(Azul-Pacifico "established that all claims of unjust taking had to

be brought pursuant to section 1983"). Accordingly, Count One, which alleges a

violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause directly under the Constitution must

be dismissed. Not only is the claim premature, but Plaintiffs have "no cause of action

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directly under the Constitution" for their takings claim. Azul-Pacifico, 973 F.2d at 705.

Likewise, although a takings claim is properly brought pursuant to section 1983,

Plaintiffs' claim is not ripe for review and for this reason Count Two should be

dismissed. Therefore, regardless of whether Plaintiffs are able to state a claim under

section 1983 or directly under the Constitution, the takings claim is not ripe for this

Court's consideration and summary judgment should be granted on both Counts One

and Two.

Substantive Due Process Claim

In Buckles, supra, the Ninth Circuit dismissed a substantive due process claim

finding that a plaintiff is precluded from asserting a substantive due process claim

instead of, or in addition to, a takings claim, finding that they were required to "analyze

the Buckles land use claim under the "explicit textual source of constitutional

protection," the Takings Clause, "not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due

process." 

As to Defendant's argument that Plaintiff has no cause of action under the

substantive due process clause, Defendant is correct that the law bars Plaintiff from

couching his takings claim as a substantive due process claim. See Macri v. King

County, 126 F.3d. 1125 (9th Cir. 1997)); Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1320-1326. The Ninth

Circuit has recognized that "permitting a plaintiff to bring a substantive due process

claim whenever his claims under other constitutional provisions [such as the Takings

Clause] are unsuccessful, ... gives the plaintiff, under substantive due process analysis,

protection which the [C]onstitution does not afford." Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1325. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, grant the

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's substantive due process

claim

. 

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CONCLUSION

This Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(Document #14) be GRANTED. 

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written

objections within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CIV 04-680-

TUC-DCB.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Report and

Recommendation to the attorneys for the Plaintiff and for the Defendants.

DATED this 26th day of January, 2006.

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