Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04540/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04540-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMMY VASQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

 v

MICHAEL J ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No C 06-4540 VRW

 ORDER

Plaintiff Sammy Vasquez appeals from a decision by the

Social Security Administration (SSA) Office of Hearings and Appeals

denying his applications for disability benefits. The

administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that plaintiff did not

satisfy the definition of “disabled” under Titles II and XVI of the

Social Security Act. Before the court are cross-motions for

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summary judgment on whether the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff

is not disabled should stand. Based on a careful review of the

administrative record and the applicable law, the court DENIES

plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS defendant’s motion.

I

A

Plaintiff is a forty-six-year-old male with a history of

diabetes mellitus and hypertension. AR 288. Plaintiff has a highschool education, AR 18, but, according to his attorney, is “barely

literate.” AR 442. Plaintiff worked as a window installer from

1974 to 2001. AR 149. 

In January 2001, plaintiff sustained an injury from a

fall which resulted in a fracture of his right shoulder. AR 370. 

A computed tomography (CT) scan of plaintiff’s shoulder in April

2001 showed a fracture of his shoulder bone into small fragments. 

AR 385. Subsequent examination revealed delayed healing; plaintiff

underwent surgery to repair his shoulder in August 2001. AR 380-

84. Plaintiff was later examined by two consulting physicians: Dr

Calvin Pon, an orthopedic specialist, in April 2002 and Dr Jaskaran

Momi, an internal medicine specialist, in November 2003. Both

doctors reported decreased range of motion in plaintiff’s right

shoulder, but noted that the injuries should not affect plaintiff’s

ability to perform fine and gross manipulative tasks with both

hands. AR 241, 291.

In addition to the shoulder injury, plaintiff also

suffered a spider bite on his left foot, leading to a serious

infection requiring multiple surgeries, called debridements, to

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remove infected material from the wound, AR 207, 211, 213, followed

by a skin graft. AR 202-04. In his April 2002 examination, Dr Pon

noted that while the left calf had atrophied due to the injury,

plaintiff should be able “to stand and/or walk for a total of six

hours during an eight-hour work day.” AR 241.

In 2003, plaintiff suffered a fracture to the first digit

of his right foot. The fracture did not heal, and because of a

preexisting ulcer and gangrene on the sole of the right foot,

plaintiff underwent amputation of the first, fourth and fifth toes

in June 2003. AR 271, 288. Plaintiff testified that the ulcer and

gangrene formed when he cut his foot helping his landlord fill a

swimming pool. AR 480. Slow healing, infections and ulcers

leading to amputation commonly result from injuries suffered by

diabetics, especially from injuries of the foot. Plaintiff’s

diabetes may have complicated the foot injuries. 

Unfortunately, the list of plaintiff’s injuries continues. 

In July 2003, an x-ray revealed another fracture of his right foot

caused, according to plaintiff, by a taxicab running over his foot. 

AR 331. This fracture healed fully. AR 318, 328.

In November 2003, plaintiff saw consulting psychiatrist

Dr Jasdeep Aulakh in connection with his application for benefits. 

AR 283. Dr Aulakh found that plaintiff suffered from depression,

but his mental examination “revealed no evidence of cognitive

deficits, perceptual disturbances or delusional disorders at this

time.” AR 287. It must be noted that Dr Aulakh’s report refers to

plaintiff throughout as a female. See, for example, AR 283 (“The

claimant is a 43 year-old-divorced female”); AR 284 (“She stated

that she continues to have trouble focusing and feels she has

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problems with her memory and is easily forgetful”). This error may

be clerical, but it raises questions concerning the accuracy of the

examination.

Plaintiff was unemployed from 2001 forward. AR 466. 

Plaintiff lived for a period with his former girlfriend, Sharon

Bailey, who wrote in a third-party function report that plaintiff

was depressed because he “can’t work anymore, [h]e can’t go

fishing, can’t run or jog, can’t throw a ball.” AR 163. Bailey’s

report further stated that plaintiff “can’t walk very far” and “has

severe pain in feet and legs they jerk and spasm most of the

night,” AR 159, but he was capable of performing “a little

cleaning, cooking, laundry.” AR 160.

At one point in the relationship, a restraining order was

filed against plaintiff to stay away from Bailey. AR 475. 

Plaintiff testified at his hearing that he was arrested for

violating the restraining order and served four months in prison. 

Id. Plaintiff offered the improbable explanation that the

restraining order had been lifted prior to the violation, but that

it was not processed, resulting in his prison term. Id.

At the hearing plaintiff told the ALJ he was living with

friends and was no longer in a relationship with Bailey. AR 465,

476. Per his testimony, plaintiff’s social life consisted of going

to the movies and seeing friends and he spent most of his time

working on crossword puzzles and building model cars. Id. AR 483.

B

In May 2003, plaintiff filed an application for

supplemental security income benefits (SSI). AR 89. In August of

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that same year, plaintiff also filed an application for disability

insurance benefits (DIB), alleging disability beginning January 25,

2001. AR 155. Both applications were denied initially and on

reconsideration. AR 32, 41.

Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an

administrative law judge (ALJ). AR 46. The initial hearing was

held August 25, 2005, but plaintiff was not present because he was

unable to obtain transportation. AR 440-41. The hearing proceeded

without him, and the ALJ heard testimony from vocational expert

(VE) Malcolm Brodzinsky. AR 447-9. The ALJ posed the following

hypothetical to the VE:

Assume an individual who would have difficulty

doing any work that would require balancing. No

walking on uneven ground. No standing more than

an hour at a time or more than six hours in a

work day. No walking more than ten to 15 minutes

at a time, two hours in a work day. No lifting

over 20 pounds maximum and ten pounds

repetitively, and no lifting over 10 pounds with

the right arm.

AR 446. The VE then testified that there were a number of sedentary

occupations which were suitable for plaintiff. AR 447-49. These

occupations included ticket seller, small parts assembler, counter

clerk in photography finishing, order clerk in the food and beverage

industry and telephone price quotation clerk. Id.

The ALJ observed that plaintiff was not taking his

prescribed medication and questioned how much one can “believe from

somebody who’s not complying with his medications anyway.” AR 459. 

Plaintiff’s attorney responded that plaintiff received his

medication while in prison, but that he had problems getting his

medication while out of prison. Id. The attorney noted that

plaintiff had a “chaotic family life.” AR 440. 

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The ALJ informed plaintiff’s attorney that it “would be

hard to find in his favor without his testimony.” AR 442. 

Plaintiff’s attorney requested a second hearing and the ALJ agreed. 

AR 459-60. On September 15, 2005, the ALJ granted plaintiff a

further hearing, which was held on October 17, 2005. Plaintiff

appeared and testified. AR 74, 461.

At the hearing, plaintiff testified that: he could only

walk three blocks before he had to stop to rest and elevate his feet

due to pain and numbness (AR 468); a doctor-prescribed metal cane

assisted his walking (AR 478); he could only stand for about a halfhour at a time (id); and after sitting for ninety minutes he

experienced numbing and tingling in his feet and “jerking” of his

legs and to stop it he had to stand or elevate his feet. AR 469,

476. Plaintiff also testified that he experienced numbness in his

hands and fingers affecting his ability to grip objects, explaining

that he could use a knife to cut objects for nearly twenty minutes,

at which point he had to stop to rub his hands, typically regaining

feeling after thirty minutes. AR 484-86. Further, plaintiff stated

that upon awakening his hands felt numb and cramped into a “claw

like” grip, which his doctor had attributed to either diabetes or

arthritis, and that the numbness sometimes affected his ability to

use a pen, but not his ability to hold a telephone AR 486-87. 

Plaintiff testified that his doctor prescribed him pain medication

for pain in his shoulder and legs and that he also took medication

for diabetes, blood pressure and pain. AR 471. 

On January 27, 2006, the ALJ issued an eight-page ruling

denying plaintiff’s applications for both SSI and DIB. AR 17-24. 

To determine whether plaintiff was entitled to benefits, the ALJ

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conducted a five-step sequential evaluation of plaintiff’s

disability, which considered the following: (1) whether plaintiff

was currently engaged in substantial gainful activity (SGA); (2)

whether plaintiff had a “severe” impairment or a combination of

impairments; (3) if plaintiff had a severe impairment, whether

plaintiff had a condition which met or equaled the conditions

outlined in the listing of impairments at 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 1; (4) if plaintiff did not have such a condition,

whether plaintiff was capable of performing his past work; and (5)

whether plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to

perform any other work that exists in substantial numbers in the

economy. 20 CFR § 404.1520; 20 CFR § 416.920. Plaintiff bears the

burden to prove disability in steps one through four. At step five,

the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that plaintiff “can

perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy.” 

Thomas v Barnhart, 278 F3d 947, 955 (9th Cir 2002).

At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged

in substantial gainful activity after August 25, 2001. AR 18. 

At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s diabetes, foot

injuries, amputation of the right foot and right shoulder fracture

“significantly limit his abilities to perform basic work activities,

as set forth at 20 CFR 404.1521 and 416.921, and must be deemed to

be ‘severe.’” AR 19. The ALJ found plaintiff’s high blood pressure

and depression “not severe.” AR 19. 

At step three, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff’s “severe”

impairments did not equal “in severity and duration to any Listed

findings.” AR 20. The ALJ found that plaintiff did not meet

Listing 1.02 because plaintiff’s impairments “do not describe gross

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anatomical deformity in a joint with chronic pain * * * resulting in

an inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively or

resulting in inability to ambulate effectively * * *.” Id. The

reports by both Dr Momi and Dr Pon indicated that plaintiff could

perform fine and gross movements with both hands effectively. AR

21. The ALJ also found the partial amputation of plaintiff’s right

foot did not meet Listing 1.05 because that listing requires

amputation of “both hands or one or both lower extremities.” Id. 

The ALJ then proceeded to step four. Through

consideration of medical evidence, plaintiff’s testimony and

evidence from Bailey, the ALJ found plaintiff able to perform

sedentary work because he was capable of “standing for thirty

minutes at a time, walking three blocks at a time, lifting ten

pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally, lifting no more

than ten pounds with the right arm and no overhead lifting with the

right arm.” AR 22. On this basis, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s

RFC made it impossible for him to perform his past jobs and

proceeded to step five. Id.

At step five, the ALJ found, based on the testimony of the

VE, that plaintiff could perform the job of order clerk or telephone

quote clerk, both of which exist in large numbers in the national

economy. AR 23. For this reason, the ALJ found that plaintiff was

not disabled. AR 23-24.

Plaintiff unsuccessfully requested review of the ALJ’s

decision from the SSA’s Appeals Council. AR 7. On July 26, 2006,

plaintiff timely filed his complaint seeking judicial review of the

ALJ decision under 42 USC § 405(g). 

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II

A district court may only overturn a decision to deny

benefits only if the decision is not supported by substantial

evidence or if the decision is based on legal error. 42 USC §

405(g); Andrews v Shalala, 53 F3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir 1995). Id. 

The Ninth Circuit defines substantial evidence as more than “a mere

scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which,

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Thomas v Barnhart, 278 F3d at

954. The decision of the ALJ should be upheld if the evidence is

“susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Andrews, 53

F3d at 1040. The determination whether substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s decision is based on the administrative record as

a whole. Andrews, 53 F3d at 1040. Determinations of credibility,

resolution of conflicts in medical testimony and all other

ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ. Magallanes v Bowen, 881

F2d 747, 750 (9th Cir 1989). 

III

Plaintiff presents five issues on this appeal. Plaintiff

contends that: (1) the ALJ erred by not finding that his

impairments equaled Listing 1.02 in the Listing of Impairments; (2)

the ALJ improperly discounted the subjective symptoms of pain and

numbness that plaintiff reported; (3) the ALJ’s determination that

plaintiff was not impaired for a continuous twelve-month period was

not supported by substantial evidence; (4) the ALJ’s findings on

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plaintiff’s RFC were not supported by substantial evidence; and (5)

the SSA did not establish the existence of other jobs plaintiff

could perform because the ALJ posed an incorrect hypothetical to the

VE. Doc #10 at 5-10.

A

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not make specific

findings as to whether plaintiff’s impairments equaled Listing 1.02,

Disorders of the Musculoskeletal System, as required by 20 CFR §

404.1520. Doc #10 at 5. To determine medical equivalence, the ALJ

compares the medical findings to the Listing of Impairments to

determine if the combination of medical impairments is “at least of

medical equivalence to those of a listed impairment.” 20 CFR §

404.1526. If there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s

determination that plaintiff’s impairments do not equal a listed

impairment, the ALJ is not required to “state why a claimant failed

to satisfy every different section of the listing of impairments.” 

Gonzalez v Sullivan, 914 F2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir 1990).

Plaintiff relies upon Marcia v Sullivan, 900 F2d 172 (9th

Cir 1990) to support his contention. In Marcia, the court found 

insufficient ALJ’s findings on medical equivalence because the ALJ

only wrote: “The claimant has failed to provide evidence of

medically determinable impairments that meet or equal the Listings *

* *.” Id at 176. The court held that the ALJ “must explain

adequately his evaluation of alternative tests and the combined

effects of the impairments.” Id.

In this case, plaintiff points to the ALJ’s finding that

plaintiff’s medical findings in the record are “not equal in

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severity and duration to any Listed findings” (AR 20), asserting

that it does not meet Marcia’s requirement that the ALJ make

specific findings on medical equivalence. Doc #10 at 5. This

argument fails for three reasons. 

First, in order to establish that his impairments equal a

listed impairment, plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence

that offers a theory —— plausible or otherwise —— as to how his

impairments equal a listed impairment. Lewis v Apfel, 236 F3d 503,

514 (9th Cir 2001). Unlike the claimant in Marcia, plaintiff has

not advanced a theory as to how or why his impairments equal a

listed impairment. Merely providing some medical evidence does not

shift the burden to the ALJ to determine medical equivalence. 

Second, the ALJ’s decision indicates a careful and

complete consideration of the evidence before him. The ALJ made

findings throughout the decision that would support the conclusion

that plaintiff’s impairments did not equal a listed impairment. 

While Marcia requires that the ALJ make specific findings on the

evidence, it does not require that the findings appear under any

specific heading, but simply guards against summary conclusions. 

See, e g, Lewis, 236 F3d at 513 (holding that Marcia “simply

requires an ALJ to discuss and evaluate the evidence that supports

his or her conclusion; it does not specify that the ALJ must do so

under the heading ‘Findings’”). 

Finally, plaintiff’s medical records offer substantial

evidence to support the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff’s

impairments are not equivalent to Listing 1.02. To equal Listing

1.02, the claimant must be unable to ambulate effectively or perform

fine and gross movements. 20 CFR § 404, Pt 404, Subpt P, App 1, §

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1.00(B)(2)(a). The Listing defines “ineffective ambulation” as:

* * * extreme limitation of the ability to walk

* * *. Ineffective ambulation is defined

generally as having insufficient lower extremity

functioning (see 1.00J) to permit independent

ambulation without the use of a hand-held

assistive device(s) that limits the function of

both upper extremities.

20 CFR Pt 404, Subpt P, App 1, § 1.00(B)(2)(b)(1). Examples of

ineffective ambulation in the Listing include: inability to walk on

uneven or rough surfaces, walk at least one block or walk without a

walker, two crutches or two canes. 20 CFR § 404, Pt 404, Subpt P,

App 1, § 1.00(B)(2)(b)(2). Dr Pon’s uncontradicted report concluded

that plaintiff could sit or stand for six hours per day, lift ten

pounds with his right upper extremity and could perform unlimited

fine and gross manipulations. AR 239-41. Plaintiff’s doctor

prescribed a metal cane to assist his walking. AR 478. By

plaintiff’s own testimony, he can walk three blocks before needing

to rest and uses only one cane. AR 468. These facts do not support

a finding that plaintiff cannot ambulate effectively. 

The Listing offers as examples of inability to perform

fine and gross movements “the inability to prepare a simple meal and

feed oneself, the inability to take care of personal hygiene, the

inability to sort and handle papers or files, and the inability to

place files in a file cabinet at or above waist level.” 20 CFR §

404, Pt 404, Subpt P, App 1, § 1.00(B)(2)(c). Both examining

physicians reported that plaintiff can perform fine and gross

movements. AR 241, 291. Plaintiff built model cars, completed

crossword puzzles, did laundry and dishes and prepared meals, AR 

168, 483——all activities requiring the ability to perform a variety

of fine and gross movements.

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Based on the above facts, the ALJ’s determination that

plaintiff’s impairments do not equal Listing 1.02 is supported by

substantial evidence.

B

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discounted

plaintiff’s testimony regarding pain and numbness. Doc #10 at 6. 

In order to reject plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ must

provide “specific, cogent reasons for the disbelief.” Rashad v

Sullivan, 903 F2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir 1990). Unless there is

affirmative evidence showing that plaintiff is malingering, the

ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the testimony must be “clear and

convincing.” Swenson v Sullivan, 876 F2d 683, 687 (9th Cir 1986). 

General findings are insufficient; the ALJ must identify which

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the

subjective complaints. Lester v Chater, 81 F3d 821, 834 (9th Cir

1995). The ALJ may consider the following non-exhaustive list of

factors when weighing plaintiff’s credibility: “[plaintiff’s]

reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [plaintiff’s]

testimony or between his testimony and his conduct, his daily

activities, his work record, and testimony from physicians and third

parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms

of which [plaintiff] complains.” Light v Social Security

Administration, 119 F3d 789, 792 (9th Cir 1997). 

The ALJ found plaintiff’s testimony regarding the ability

to use his hands, and numbness and tingling in his hands and feet

not credible. The ALJ relied upon physicians’ reports in

discounting this testimony. AR 21. Both doctors found that

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plaintiff could perform gross and fine manipulations with both

hands. Id. This determination is supported by substantial evidence

in the record, including the doctors’ reports and plaintiff’s own

testimony regarding his daily activities. The ALJ found that there

was no evidence in the record separate from plaintiff’s own reports

to support plaintiff’s claim of tingling feet. Id. In any event,

it is immaterial whether the claimed numbness or tingling of the

feet was deemed credible, because the ALJ believed plaintiff could

only walk three blocks before requiring rest anyway. Id.

The ALJ also properly discounted plaintiff’s assertions of

pain. In reaching his conclusion, the ALJ considered medical

findings along with “claimant’s daily activities, the location,

duration, frequency and intensity of the claimant’s pain,

precipitating and aggravating factors * * *.” AR 22. The ALJ also

considered reports from the doctors, plaintiff’s own testimony, and

evidence provided by Bailey. Id. The ALJ made specific findings as

to why he found plaintiff’s testimony not credible, noting that

plaintiff was comfortable sitting and going out socially with

friends, working on crossword puzzles, building models and helping

with housework. AR 22. The ALJ’s decision to discount plaintiff’s

pain testimony was supported by substantial evidence.

C

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly failed to

consider a closed period of disability in 2001-02. Doc #10 at 8. 

The law requires that the claimant be unable “to do [their] past

relevant work or any other substantial gainful work that exists in

the national economy” for a period of twelve months. 20 CFR §

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404.1505(a). Contrary to the ALJ’s findings, plaintiff claims that

during this period his injuries and the resulting complications made

it impossible to work. Plaintiff misreads the ALJ’s decision. The

ALJ did not find that plaintiff’s injuries did not last for a

twelve-month period, but rather that, although plaintiff could not

perform his past work during the relevant period, his injuries did

not preclude all employment; plaintiff was only limited to sedentary

work. AR 21-22. In actuality, the ALJ found that plaintiff had met

his burden at step four and proceeded to step five. 

D

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was “not

based on all the evidence” and should not withstand review because

the ALJ discounted plaintiff’s subjective testimony. Doc #10 at 9. 

But the critical determination is whether the ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence, not all of the evidence. 

Jamerson v Chater, 112 F3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir 1997). The RFC

finding is supported by a long discussion of the available evidence

in which the ALJ considered not only medical evidence but also

plaintiff’s own subjective testimony. AR 20-21. The ALJ found,

consistent with the medical evidence and doctors’ reports, that

plaintiff could stand for “30 minutes at a time, [walk] 3 blocks at

a time, [lift] 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally * *

*.” AR 21. Substantial evidence supports this determination.

E

Plaintiff contends that because the ALJ’s RFC assessment

and the hypothetical posed to the VE were not exactly the same, the

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SSA failed to meet its burden of proving that there were other types

of work available to plaintiff in the national economy. The ALJ’s

hypothetical asked the VE to identify jobs that required no more

than an hour of standing at a time, whereas the ALJ found that

plaintiff could stand for no more than thirty minutes. AR 22. Due

to this apparent mismatch, plaintiff contends that the SSA failed to

meet its burden at step five. Doc #10 at 10.

Even though the limitations set forth by the ALJ were not

identical to the RFC finding, however, the jobs identified by the VE

were unaffected by the discrepancy and the error, if any, was

harmless. The VE’s testimony identified many types of sedentary

work that did not require standing for longer than thirty minutes at

a time. AR 447-49. The sedentary work that the VE described

allowed for the employee to sit or stand at will, with no

requirements as to how long the employee must do either. AR 447. 

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment and GRANTS defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. The clerk is directed to close the file and

terminate all pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:06-cv-04540-VRW Document 17 Filed 08/29/07 Page 16 of 16