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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 12, 2003 Decided August 15, 2003

No. 02-7040

OYIN AKINSEYE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv01769)

Robert I. Berlow argued the cause for the appellants.

Arthur H. Fawcett, Jr. and Myrna Lee Fawcett were on

brief.

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia, argued the cause for the appellee. Charles

L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, at the time the

brief was filed, was on brief.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Eileen L. Ordover was on brief for amici curiae Senators

Edward M. Kennedy et al. in support of the appellants.

Carl W. Hampe was on the brief for amici curiae Council

of Parent Attorneys and Advocates et al. in support of the

appellants.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The appellants,

minor children and the parents, guardians and courtappointed advocates of minor children, challenge the district

court’s order dismissing their complaint for failure to state a

claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The appellants

had initiated administrative proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400

et seq., to compel the District of Columbia (District) to

provide special education services to the disabled minor children in this action. The District settled with each of the

appellants and voluntarily agreed to pay attorney’s fees

which, the appellants contend, were paid late. They filed this

action to recover interest on the late-paid fees. The district

court granted the District’s motion to dismiss on the ground

that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon

Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of

Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), parties

who settle their claims at the administrative level are not

‘‘prevailing parties’’ entitled to attorney’s fees under the

IDEA. Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 193 F. Supp. 2d

134 (2002).

* * *

We do not reach the question of whether one may recover

attorney’s fees as a ‘‘prevailing party’’ under the IDEA if the

matter is settled at the administrative stage because we

conclude that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Although the District has not raised

USCA Case #02-7040 Document #766688 Filed: 08/15/2003 Page 2 of 6
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lack of jurisdiction in these proceedings, we may raise the

question of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Houston

Bus. Journal, Inc. v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 86 F.3d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Moreover, because

subject-matter jurisdiction is ‘‘an Art. III as well as a statutory requirement TTT no action of the parties can confer

subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.’’ Ins. Corp.

of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.

694, 702 (1982).

The only asserted basis for subject-matter jurisdiction is

section 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA, which provides that ‘‘[i]n

any action or proceeding brought under this section, the

court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees

as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability

who is the prevailing party.’’ 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Yet

in their complaint the appellants did not seek the recovery of

attorney’s fees under the IDEA, but rather the recovery of

some $17,000 in interest for the delayed payment of such fees.

In other words, they sought reimbursement for the loss of the

use of their money during the period between the date they

requested payment of their attorney’s fees and the date they

actually received payment from the District. The district

court believed that the right to interest, if any, flowed from

the right to attorney’s fees under the IDEA; upon determining that the appellants were not ‘‘prevailing parties’’ under

the IDEA, and thus not entitled to attorney’s fees, the district

court concluded that the appellants were ipso facto not entitled to interest. See Akinseye, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 136.

While the latter approach is unquestionably correct, the

former is not.

Unlike Bailey v. District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 888

(D.D.C. 1993), the case on which the appellents chiefly rely,

the question of ‘‘reasonable attorneys’ fees’’ recoverable under the IDEA is not before us. The District’s decision to pay

attorney’s fees voluntarily—and the appellants’ decisions to

accept these payments—rendered the question of statutory

entitlement moot. And neither the IDEA nor any other

federal statute cited to us, or of which we are aware, affords

the appellants an independent cause of action to recover

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interest on attorney’s fees paid voluntarily but late.* Accordingly, there is no federal question before us.

The appellants’ claim resembles instead a claim for postjudgment interest. Of course, there are no judgments to

speak of here because (1) the parties settled the IDEA claims

and (2) the District subsequently paid attorney’s fees voluntarily. But had the district court entered a judgment awarding ‘‘reasonable attorneys’ fees’’ under the IDEA, and had the

District subsequently delayed in paying those fees, the appellants would not have had a claim under the IDEA but rather

under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which provides that ‘‘[i]nterest

shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case

recovered in a district court.’’ See, e.g., Associated Gen.

Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 250 F.3d 482, 485 (6th

Cir. 2001) (concluding that phrase ‘‘any money judgment’’ in

§ 1961(a) includes judgment awarding attorney’s fees & collecting similar circuit court decisions). Unable to state a

claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) for lack of a ‘‘money judgment,’’ the appellants’ only recourse for the District’s delay in

payment lies, if at all, under District of Columbia law.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the decision of the district court is

reversed and the case is remanded with the instruction to

dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

It is so ordered.

* Our dissenting colleague cites cases that are not on point—they

involve setting the initial fee award, including an amount, if any, to

account for delay. See Dissent at 1 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491

U.S. 274, 284 (1989); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892–93

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)). No such claim is made here.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The district court

denied the plaintiffs’ claim to interest for late payment of

attorney’s fees on the ground that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., gave

them no right to such fees in the first place. That issue —

whether the plaintiffs had an underlying right to fees — was

the only issue briefed to this court.

My colleagues have instead presented a case for the proposition that, even if the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney’s

fees, they do not have a claim for interest under the IDEA.

But there is also a case to be made for the opposite proposition, that the IDEA itself provides a federal cause of action

for such interest as ‘‘part of the costs’’ of the litigation, 20

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274,

284 (1989) (holding that ‘‘[a]n adjustment for delay in payment is TTT an appropriate factor in the determination of

what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee under’’ 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892–93 (D.C.

Cir. 1980) (en banc) (holding that ‘‘in Title VII and similar

fee-setting cases,’’ a court may grant an ‘‘adjustment to

reflect the delay in receipt of payment’’ because such delay

‘‘deprives the eventual recipient of the value of the use of the

money in the meantime’’). Just how strong the plaintiffs’

claim for interest might be is hard to assess, since neither

side has submitted briefs on the question. ‘‘Dismissal for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,’’ however, ‘‘is proper only

when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by

prior decisions TTT, or otherwise completely devoid of merit

as not to involve a federal controversy.’’ Steel Co. v. Citizens

for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946).

Whether or not the plaintiffs’ claim would ultimately prevail,

it certainly does not fall into any of those categories.

Because the question of the validity of the plaintiffs’ claim

to interest therefore goes to the merits of the dispute and not

to our subject-matter jurisdiction, I would follow our usual

practice and decline to dispose of this appeal on a ground ‘‘not

raised in the parties’ briefs.’’ Time Warner Entm’t Co. v.

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FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see Carducci v.

Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Accordingly, I

respectfully dissent.

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