Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02993/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02993-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Any statements of fact contained in this section are taken from the complaint and,

for purposes of the instant motion only, are presumed true. See NL Industries, Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL SALISBURY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DETECTIVE MICHAEL WARD, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C-06-2993 MMC

ORDER GRANTING BERKELEY

OFFICERS’ MOTION TO DISMISS;

VACATING HEARING

(Docket No. 51)

Before the Court is the motion filed November 8, 2006 by defendants Sgt. Michael

Dougherty (“Dougherty”) and Officer Samantha Speelman (“Speelman”) (jointly, “Berkeley

officers”) to dismiss the claims asserted against them, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the doctrine of qualified immunity. Plaintiff Michael

Salisbury (“Salisbury”) has filed an opposition to the motion; the Berkeley officers have filed

a joint reply. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in response to the

motion, the Court finds the matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument, see

Civil L.R. 7-1(b), hereby VACATES the December 22, 2006 hearing, and rules as follows.

BACKGROUND1

On November 1, 2004, Salisbury was walking in a crosswalk across San Pablo

Avenue in Berkeley when he jumped out of the way to avoid being hit by a vehicle driven by

off-duty Detective Michael Ward (“Ward”) of the Union City Police Department. (See First

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Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 7.) The passenger side mirror of Ward’s vehicle struck

Salisbury’s hand as the vehicle passed. (See id.) When Ward yelled at Salisbury,

Salisbury fled. (See id.) Ward pursued Salisbury first in his vehicle and then on foot, and

eventually tackled Salisbury. (See id.) According to Salisbury, Ward began punching

Salisbury in the head while accusing him of vandalizing Ward’s vehicle. (See id. ¶ 8.)

Ward asked an onlooker to call the police, then took the phone and told the operator

that he had arrested a suspect and required urgent backup. (See id. ¶ 9.) Shortly

thereafter, the Berkeley officers arrived on the scene. (See id. ¶ 11.) When Ward identified

himself as a Union City police officer, Dougherty offered his handcuffs to Ward, who then

handcuffed Salisbury and turned Salisbury over to Speelman. (See id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Ward

then told Dougherty and Speelman that Salisbury had vandalized his vehicle. (See id. ¶

12.)

Rita Duarte (“Duarte”), who had been driving the car directly behind Ward at the time

of the incident, told Dougherty that she saw Salisbury jump out of the way to avoid being hit

by Ward’s vehicle and that Salisbury did not vandalize Ward’s vehicle. (See id.) Duarte

additionally told Dougherty that she wanted to file a complaint against Ward. (See id.) 

Dougherty responded that she needed to call the Union City Police Department, and noted

that the Berkeley officers were “making the arrest” because the incident had happened in

Berkeley. (See id.) Salisbury alleges that Dougherty “failed to adequately investigate what

Duarte told him.” (See id.) Duarte asked Dougherty why he was arresting Salisbury and

stated that if Dougherty was arresting Salisbury, he should also arrest Ward. (See id. ¶¶

13.) In response, Dougherty stated he was not arresting anyone. (See id. ¶ 13.) 

Dougherty told Duarte that he would take a statement from Ward, and that she could follow

up with the Union City Police Department. (See id. ¶ 15.)

Speelman drove Salisbury a block from the scene, out of Ward’s sight, then “cited

and released” Salisbury. (See id. ¶ 16.) Salisbury alleges that Speelman “had Ward sign a

citizen’s arrest form.” (See id.)

Shortly after Duarte returned home, she telephoned the Berkeley Police Department

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and told Dougherty she wanted to give a statement. (See id. ¶ 17.) Speelman went to

Duarte’s home with Officer Stanley Libed, and took statements from both Duarte and her

husband, Dr. Maurice Rotbart, who had been with Duarte in Duarte’s car at the time of the

incident. (See id.) Salisbury alleges that Speelman wrote and submitted to the District

Attorney’s office “a deliberately misleading summary of Duarte’s observations.” (See id.

¶ 18.)

Duarte also telephoned the Union City Police Department to make a complaint about

Ward. (See id. ¶ 28.) Duarte’s call was put through to Sgt. Ray Munoz (“Munoz”), who told

Duarte that she should speak with Ward’s supervisor, Commander Lance Sandri (“Sandri”). 

(See id.) According to Salisbury, Sandri is an officer of the Bureau of Narcotics

Enforcement, not an officer of the Union City Police Department. (See id.) Salisbury

alleges Munoz deliberately misdirected Duarte. (See id.) When Duarte attempted to tell

Sandri what she’d seen, Sandri assertedly told her that other witnesses saw the event a

different way, and that an investigation had begun with respect to the vandalism of Ward’s

vehicle. (See id.) Sandri did not ask for Duarte’s name or contact information, and when

Duarte commented that he did not seem interested in what she had to say and that she

might contact the Oakland Tribune, Sandri reportedly stated: “You shouldn’t try and

intimidate the police.” (See id.)

Salisbury asserts various causes of action against Ward, the Union City Police

Department, Sandri, Speelman and Dougherty. With respect to Speelman and Dougherty,

Salisbury asserts the following causes of action: (1) violation of the Fourth Amendment to

the United States Constitution as a result of their “assisting in the false arrest and failing to

reasonably investigate other information that might tend to demonstrate the innocence” of

Salisbury; and (2) “concerted action to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights,” in violation of the

Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) cannot be granted unless “it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

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entitle him to relief.” See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Dismissal can be

based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699

(9th Cir. 1990).

Generally, a district court, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, may not consider any

material beyond the pleadings. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner And Co.,

Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990). Material that is properly submitted as part

of the complaint, however, may be considered. See id. Documents whose contents are

alleged in the complaint, and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not

physically attached to the pleading, also may be considered. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14

F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, the Court may consider any document “the

authenticity of which is not contested, and upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily

relies,” regardless of whether the document is referred to in the complaint. See Parrino v.

FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). Finally, the Court may consider matters that

are subject to judicial notice. See Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d

1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).

In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, and construe them in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The Court may disregard factual allegations if such allegations are contradicted by the facts

established by reference to exhibits attached to the complaint. See Durning v. First Boston

Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). Conclusory allegations, unsupported by the

facts alleged, need not be accepted as true. See Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115,

1121 (9th Cir. 1992). 

DISCUSSION

A. Fourth Amendment

As noted, Salisbury’s first claim against the Berkeley officers is that they violated the

Fourth Amendment by “assisting in the false arrest [by Ward] and failing to reasonably

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investigate other information that might tend to demonstrate the innocence of the Plaintiff.” 

(See FAC ¶ 32.) Salisbury alleges that Ward physically restrained and arrested him prior to

the arrival of the Berkeley officers, (see FAC ¶ 7-9), that Ward handcuffed him after the

arrival of the Berkeley officers, (see id. ¶ 11), and that the arrest was documented as a

citizen’s arrest, (see id. ¶ 16). The Berkeley officers argue that Salisbury’s Fourth

Amendment claim is subject to dismissal because police officers are not liable under

§ 1983 for taking into custody a person who has been arrested pursuant to a citizen’s

arrest. For the reasons set forth below, although the Berkeley officers would be entitled to

dismissal under California law, federal law is to the contrary.

“Under the California code, private persons may arrest another for offenses

committed or attempted in their presence.” Meyers v. Redwood City, 400 F.3d 765, 772

(9th Cir. 2005). “A private person making a citizen’s arrest need not physically take the

suspect into custody, but may delegate that responsibility to an officer, and the act of arrest

may be implied from the citizen’s act of summoning an officer, reporting the offense, and

pointing out the suspect.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). Although “California

law gives the officer the choice of making the citizen’s arrest or not,” there are “powerful

incentives to make the arrest.” See id. In particular, although “an officer who makes an

arrest pursuant to a citizen’s complaint is not subject to liability for false arrest or false

imprisonment,” and “cannot be sued civilly if he makes the arrest and, it turns out, there

were no grounds for the citizen’s arrest,” if “there were grounds for the complaint and the

officer failed to take the suspect into custody, the officer is subject to fines or

imprisonment.” See id. at 772-73. Consequently, under California law, “California courts

have held that . . . officers may choose the safe course and simply make the citizen’s

arrest.” See id. at 773.

Federal law is to the contrary, however. The Fourth Amendment requires that a

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 Salisbury was charged with a violation of § 10852 of the California Vehicle Code, a

misdemeanor. See Cal. Veh. Code §§ 10852, 40000.9 (defining violation of § 10852 as

misdemeanor). Section 10852 provides, in relevant part: “No person shall . . . willfully

injure or tamper with any vehicle or the contents thereof or break or remove any part of a

vehicle without the consent of the owner.” See Cal. Veh. Code § 10852.

3

 The Ninth Circuit opinions upon which the Berkeley officers rely, Meyers and

Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1989), are distinguishable. In Meyers, a

repossession agent sought to make a citizen’s arrest of an automobile owner who resisted

repossession, but stated that he would not press charges if the automobile owner

relinquished the vehicle. See Meyers, 400 F.3d at 768-69. The Ninth Circuit held the

police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment merely by informing the automobile

owner that she could choose between relinquishing the vehicle and arrest; no arrest

ultimately was made, and the Ninth Circuit did not opine as to whether the officers might

have been liable under the Fourth Amendment for making an arrest. See id. at 773. In

Collins, the issue was whether a private citizen who makes a citizen’s arrest is engaged in

state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Collins, 878 F.2d at 1149-56; no police

officer was a defendant in Collins and the Ninth Circuit did not opine as to the

circumstances under which a police officer could be liable under the Fourth Amendment for

taking a person into custody pursuant to a citizen’s arrest.

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warrantless arrest based on a misdemeanor2 “be supported by probable cause to believe

that the arrestee has committed a crime.” See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation

Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 924 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Such

requirement applies even when the arrestee is taken into custody pursuant to a citizen’s

arrest; “[i]n establishing probable cause, officers may not solely rely on the claim of a

citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate the basis

of the witness’ knowledge or interview other witnesses.” Id. Where an officer does not

“independently investigate” the violation underlying a citizen’s arrest, the officer does not

have probable cause to arrest. See id. at 920-21, 924-25 (reversing dismissal of Fourth

Amendment false arrest claim against police officers based on citizen’s arrest where

allegations raised inference that officers did not independently investigate asserted

violation of law); see also Kuba v. Marine World Joint Powers Authority, 2006 WL 3041234

at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2006) (denying police officers’ motion for summary judgment of

qualified immunity on Fourth Amendment claim; holding, relying on Arpin, that a “police

officer . . . is not entitled to hide behind a citizen’s arrest in place of making a determination

of whether probable cause exists”).3

The Berkeley officers argue that even if they were required to have probable cause

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 The police report cited in the complaint states Salisbury refused to give a

statement, (see Motion Ex. A), and there is no allegation in the complaint to the contrary. 

Cf. Arpin, 261 F.3d at 925 (relying, inter alia, on plaintiff’s allegation that officer “did not

allow [plaintiff] to explain her side of the story”). 

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before taking Salisbury into custody pursuant to a citizen’s arrest, the facts as alleged

demonstrate that probable cause existed. The Court agrees.

Salisbury alleges that the Berkeley officers “ignored readily available evidence

that exonerated [him] from any liability,” and “ignored the evidence that placed liability

squarely on . . . Ward.” (See FAC ¶ 6). In particular, Salisbury alleges that after Speelman

escorted Salisbury to her squad car, Duarte told Dougherty that Salisbury did not vandalize

Ward’s vehicle but, rather, “jumped out of the way to avoid being hit,” and Dougherty “failed

to adequately investigate what Duarte told him.”4 (See id. ¶ 12.) There is no allegation,

however, that Salisbury’s hand did not strike and damage the mirror on Ward’s vehicle;

Ward and Duarte disagreed only with respect to whether such conduct was intentional. 

(See id. ¶¶ 7, 8, 12, 17.) 

For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause “exists when, under the

totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have

concluded that there was a fair probability that the suspect had committed a crime.” See

Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation, alteration,

and citation omitted). “The presence of a factual dispute regarding a victim’s complaint . . .

does not defeat probable cause if: 1) the victim’s statements are sufficiently definite to

establish that a crime has been committed; and 2) the victim’s complaint has been

corroborated by either the surrounding circumstances or other witnesses.” Id. (emphasis

added.) Here, as both Ward and Duarte agreed Salisbury’s hand made contact with

Ward’s vehicle, resulting in damage to the vehicle, and disagreed only with respect to

Salisbury’s intent, the Court finds, based on the facts as alleged, the Berkeley officers had

probable cause to arrest Salisbury. See id.; cf., e.g. Kuba, 2006 WL 3041234, at *5

(“[D]efendants’ counsel was unable to identify a single provision of the California Penal

Code which [the officers] had reason to believe was violated by plaintiff’s conduct.”) 

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 As discussed below, however, even if the Berkeley officers lacked probable cause

to take Salisbury into custody, they are entitled to qualified immunity on Salisbury’s Fourth

Amendment claim.

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Accordingly, the Berkeley officers’ motion to dismiss Salisbury’s claim of false arrest

in violation of the Fourth Amendment, for failure to state a claim, will be GRANTED.5

B. Conspiracy To Deprive Plaintiff of Civil Rights

Salisbury additionally alleges the Berkeley officers, Ward, and Sandri ”are liable for

concerted action designed to falsely arrest and/or cause the malicious prosecution of

Plaintiff, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution . . . , as well as

violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution . . . , pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.” (See FAC ¶ 34.) Salisbury alleges “[t]here was a meeting of the minds among the

defendants to ensure that the plaintiff was arrested and subjected to prosecution, despite

the lack of evidence against him, because they desired to insulate Det. Ward from liability.” 

(See id.) With respect to the Berkeley officers, Salisbury alleges they participated in the

asserted conspiracy by “fabricating the basis of the unlawful detention, arrest and

prosecution” of Salisbury, “making defamatory statements” about him, and “[i]gnoring

crucial evidence and deliberately failing to take statements from material witnesses (and

only belatedly taking statements from Duarte and Rotbart upon their insistence).” (See id.)

The Berkeley officers move to dismiss the conspiracy claim on the grounds that

Salisbury has failed to allege specific facts suggesting the existence of a conspiracy, and

that the complaint lacks any nonconclusory allegations that the Berkeley officers committed

any overt acts in furtherance of the asserted conspiracy.

To establish liability for a conspiracy to violate civil rights, “a plaintiff must

demonstrate the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional

rights.” See Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301

(9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “The defendants must have, by

some concerted action, intended to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of

harming another which results in damage.” Id. (internal quotation, alteration, and citation

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omitted). “Such an agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of

circumstantial evidence such as the actions of the defendants.” Id. Nonetheless, a plaintiff

fails to state a claim for such a conspiracy unless he alleges “specific facts” from which an

agreement among the defendants may be inferred; “conclusory allegations that [the

defendants] conspired” are insufficient. See Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d

1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 conspiracy claim); cf. Fobbs v.

Holy Cross Health System Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1448-50 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other

grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001)

(reversing dismissal of § 1985(3) conspiracy claim; finding allegation of racially motivated

conspiracy plus allegation of specific “allegedly discriminatorily motivated overt acts” gave

defendants “fair notice as to the specific acts which [plaintiff] contend[ed] demonstrate a

conspiracy.”

In the instant action, as defendants point out, the allegation of an agreement among

the defendants to deprive Salisbury of his constitutional rights is conclusory and

unsupported by the facts alleged. There is no allegation that the Berkeley officers ever had

any interaction with Ward before or after the incident in question, nor is there any allegation

that the Berkeley officers ever had any interaction with Sandri. Salisbury sets forth no

basis for inferring a conspiracy merely from the fact that the Berkeley officers arrived at the

scene, spoke with Ward and Duarte about the incident, and then cited and released

Salisbury. 

With respect to Salisbury’s contention that the Berkeley officers committed overt acts

in support of the conspiracy by “fabricating the basis of the unlawful detention, arrest and

prosecution” of Salisbury, making defamatory statements about him, and ignoring crucial

evidence, (see FAC ¶ 34), the only facts alleged in support of that allegation are that

Speelman assertedly prepared a misleading police report after taking a statement from

Duarte and Rotbart. (See id. ¶¶ 17-19.) The actual police report, however, contains a foursentence summary of Duarte’s statement and further provides that Duarte’s statement is

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 The Court may consider the police report in ruling on the instant motion to dismiss

because its contents are alleged in the complaint, (see FAC ¶ 7), and no party has disputed

its authenticity. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d at 454.

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attached thereto.6 (See Motion Ex. A.) Salisbury, in his opposition, concedes that Duarte’s

statement was attached to the police report, (see Opp. at 12:2); thus, any error in

Speelman’s summary would have been immaterial because Duarte’s complete statement

also was submitted with the police report. Moreover, having compared the police report

and Duarte’s statement, the Court finds Speelman’s brief summary of Duarte’s statement is

accurate. Because Salisbury concedes Speelman attached Duarte’s statement to

Speelman’s police report, and because there is nothing inaccurate about Speelman’s

summary of that statement, there is no basis for Salisbury’s allegation that Speelman

fabricated or ignored relevant evidence or that she defamed Salisbury in her police report.

Accordingly, the Court finds Salisbury has failed to state a claim against the

Berkeley officers for conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights, and will DISMISS the

conspiracy claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim.

C. Qualified Immunity

The Berkeley officers additionally move for dismissal on the ground they are entitled

to qualified immunity.

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” See Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity “‘provides ample

protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law’”;

defendants can have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the

law requires in any given situation and still be entitled to qualified immunity. See Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 

The first step in the qualified immunity analysis is to ask whether “[t]aken in the light

most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s

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conduct violated a constitutional right?” See id. at 201. “If no constitutional right would

have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further

inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id.

On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on the allegations, “the next,

sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id. This inquiry must

be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition. See id. at 202. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a

right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. Defendants “can have

reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts . . . , for example, and in those situations,

courts will not hold that they have violated the Constitution.” See id. at 206. In addition, “[i]t

is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will

apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” See id. at 205. If the defendant’s

“mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the

immunity defense.” Id.

1. Fourth Amendment claim

As discussed above, Salisbury has not stated a claim against the Berkeley officers

for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Assuming, arguendo, Salisbury has

pleaded a violation of his constitutional rights, however, the Court will proceed to the

second step of the qualified immunity analysis: “whether the right was clearly established,”

i.e., “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. 

The issue of “whether a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause . . .

existed to justify a search or an arrest is an essentially legal question that should be

determined by the district court at the earliest possible point in the litigation.” Peng, 335 F.

3d at 979 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, for all of the reasons set forth

above, it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful

under the circumstances presented. See id. (granting qualified immunity as matter of law

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with respect to Fourth Amendment false arrest claim; finding officers reasonably could have

believed they had probable cause to arrest for robbery where all witnesses agreed

defendant took documents from victim, but disputed whether defendant had permission to

do so). Salisbury cites no clearly established authority holding that an officer lacks

probable cause to arrest where all witnesses agree the suspect damaged the property in

question and disagree only with respect to whether the damage was intentional.

Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the Berkeley officers’ motion to dismiss the

Fourth Amendment claim on the additional ground that they are entitled to qualified

immunity.

2. Conspiracy

As discussed above, Salisbury has failed to state a claim against the Berkeley

officers for conspiracy to violate Salisbury’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, there is “no

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” See Saucier, 533 U.S. at

201.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Berkeley officers’ motion to dismiss is hereby

GRANTED, and the claims asserted against the Berkeley officers are hereby DISMISSED.

This order terminates Docket No. 51.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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