Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00380/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00380-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 490
Nature of Suit: Cable/ Satellite TV
Cause of Action: 47:0605 Communications Act of 1934

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

J&J Sports Productions, Inc.,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Margarita R. Molina, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV15-0380 PHX DGC

ORDER AND DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion for default judgment against all Defendants. Doc. 18. 

The Court will grant the motion. 

I. Background.

 Plaintiff owned the exclusive nationwide commercial distribution rights to a 

program entitled “Toe to Toe”: Saul Alvarez v. Alfredo Angulo Light Middleweight 

Championship Fight Program. Id., ¶ 16. The program aired on March 8, 2014. Id. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants intercepted the program and displayed it to the public at 

La Rubia Y La Morena, a bar or restaurant. Plaintiff filed suit on March 3, 2015, seeking 

relief for Defendants’ violations of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 605 et 

seq.) and the Cable and Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 

(47 U.S.C. § 553 et seq.). Doc. 1 at 1-2. Plaintiff served Defendants, who have not 

answered or otherwise responded to the complaint. On May 8, 2015, the Clerk entered 

default against Defendants. Doc. 16. Plaintiff filed the motion for default judgment on 

June 8, 2015. Doc. 18. No response to the motion has been filed. 

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II. The Motion for Default Judgment.

 Once a party’s default has been entered, the district court has discretion to grant 

default judgment against that party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 

F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Factors the court may consider in deciding whether to 

grant default judgment include (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the 

merits of the claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount of money at 

stake, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether default was 

due to excusable neglect, and (7) the policy favoring a decision on the merits. Eitel v. 

McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72. In applying the Eitel factors, “the factual allegations 

of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” 

Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). 

A. Possible Prejudice to Plaintiff.

 The first Eitel factor weighs in favor of granting Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff 

served process on Defendants on April 14, 2015. Docs. 13, 14. Defendants have not 

answered the complaint or otherwise appeared in this action. If Plaintiff’s motion for 

default judgment is not granted, Plaintiff “will likely be without other recourse for 

recovery.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Security Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 

2002). 

 B. The Merits of Plaintiff’s Claims and the Sufficiency of the Complaint.

 The second and third Eitel factors favor a default judgment where the complaint 

sufficiently states a claim for relief. See PepsioCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 

Plaintiff seeks relief under 47 U.S.C. § 605.1

 “[T]o be held liable for a violation of 

section 605, a defendant must be shown to have (1) intercepted or aided the interception 

of, and (2) divulged or published, or aided the divulging or publishing of, a 

communication transmitted by the plaintiff.” Nat’l Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 

 

1

 In the complaint, Plaintiff also sought relief under 47 U.S.C. § 553. In the 

motion, however, Plaintiff clarifies that it is now seeking relief only under section 605. Doc. 18-1 at 7. 

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644 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1981). Section 605 applies to satellite television signals. 

DirecTV, Inc. v. Webb, 545 F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff has alleged that 

Defendants willfully intercepted and displayed the licensed program on March 8, 2014. 

Doc. 1, ¶¶ 15-21. Plaintiff’s allegations are supported by the affidavits of two 

investigators who visited La Rubia y La Morena and saw the program being displayed on 

television screens. Doc. 18-3. One of these investigators noted that approximately forty 

patrons were watching the program on four television screens. Id. at 7. Plaintiff has 

stated a claim for a willful violation of section 605.2

 The second and third factors favor a 

default judgment. 

C. The Amount of Money at Stake. 

 Under the fourth Eitel factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake in 

relation to the seriousness of the defendants’ conduct. Plaintiff seeks damages of 

$23,000. Doc. 18 at 3. . 

 D. Possible Dispute Concerning Material Facts.

 Given the sufficiency of the complaint and Defendant’s default, “no genuine 

dispute of material facts would preclude granting [Plaintiff’s] motion.” PepsiCo, Inc., 

238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 

E. Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect.

 Plaintiff properly served Defendants with the summons and complaint. Docs. 13, 

14. It therefore is “unlikely that [Defendants’] failure to answer and the resulting default 

[were] the result of excusable neglect.” Gemmel v. Systemhouse, Inc., No. CIV 04-187-

TUC-CKJ, 2008 WL 65604, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2008).

 F. The Policy Favoring a Decision on the Merits.

 “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 

 

2

 Although Plaintiff does not allege the precise means of transmission, this does 

not preclude recovery. See, e.g., J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Barrio Fiesta of Manila 

Rest. LLC, No. CV 11-2216-PHX-JAT, 2012 WL 2919599, at *1 n.2 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2012); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Aguilera, No. 09-CV-4719, 2010 WL 2362189, at *2 

(N.D. Ill. June 11, 2010). 

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782 F.2d at 1472. But the mere existence of Rule 55(b) “indicates that this preference, 

standing alone, is not dispositive.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Moreover, Defendants’ failure to answer or otherwise 

respond to the complaint “makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible.” 

Id. The Court therefore is not precluded from entering default judgment against 

Defendants. See id.; Gemmel, 2008 WL 65604, at *5. 

G. Conclusion 

Six of the seven Eitel factors favor default judgment, and one factor is neutral. 

The Court concludes that default judgment is appropriate. 

III. Damages. 

 “The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the 

complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” 

Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. “A default judgment may be entered without a hearing on 

damages when the amount claimed is capable of ascertainment from definite figures 

contained in the documentary evidence or in detailed affidavits.” Taylor Made Golf Co. 

v. Carsten Sports, Ltd., 175 F.R.D. 658, 661 (S.D. Cal. 1997). 

 Plaintiff does not seek actual damages, but rather statutory damages under 47 

U.S.C. § 605. Under this statute, “the party aggrieved may recover an award of statutory 

damages for each violation of subsection (a) of this section involved in the action in a 

sum of not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000, as the court considers just[.]” Id.

§ 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). The statute further states that when a violation “was committed 

willfully and for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial 

gain, the court in its discretion may increase the award of damages, whether actual or 

statutory, by an amount of not more than $100,000 for each violation.” Id.

§ 605(e)(3)(C)(ii). In assessing statutory damages, the Court is mindful of the need to 

deter piracy of licensed shows, as well as the importance of not putting restaurants or bars 

out of business for a single violation. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake Alice 

Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1999) 

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 Plaintiff requests $5,000 in statutory damages, as well as $18,000 in enhanced 

statutory damages. The requested damages are reasonable. Defendants pirated the 

program and displayed it to approximately forty patrons. Doc. 18-3 at 8. Courts have 

awarded comparable amounts in similar circumstances. See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. 

v. Wing Spot Chicken & Waffles, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667-69 (E.D. Va. 2013) 

(awarding $4,000 in statutory damages and $27,000 in enhanced damages for displaying 

a pirated show for approximately 40 patrons); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. McCausland, 

No. 1:10-CV-01564-TWP, 2012 WL 113786, at *3-4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 13, 2012) (awarding 

$10,000 in statutory damages and $30,000 in enhanced damages for displaying a pirated 

show for approximately 15 patrons). The Court will grant default judgment in the 

amount of $23,000. 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (Doc. 18) is granted. 

2. Default judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants 

Margarita R. Molina, individually and d/b/a La Rubia Y La Morena, as well 

as Grupo Molna, LLC, an unknown business entity d/b/a La Rubia Y La 

Morena. The default judgment is granted against Defendants for a violation 

of 47 U.S.C. § 605 in the amount of $23,000. 

Dated this 17th day of July, 2015. 

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