Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01797/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01797-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

PCT International Incorporated,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Holland Electronics LLC, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-01797-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant Holland Electronics, LLC’s (“Holland”) 

Application for Attorneys’ Fees Re: Sanctions Awarded in Conjunction with Defendant’s 

Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Trial Subpoenas (“Application”). (Doc. 356). The Court now 

rules on the Application. 

I. Background 

 On April 13, 2015, Plaintiff PCT International, Inc. (“PCT”) issued and 

subsequently served subpoenas on various witnesses residing outside of Arizona. (Doc. 

328 at 12). Holland filed a motion to quash, arguing that the subpoenas were invalid 

because the witnesses did not reside in Arizona and were located over 100 miles from the 

Court. (Id. at 24). Additionally, Holland requested that the Court sanction PCT pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 45(d)(1). (Id. at 3). 

 On April 27, 2015, the Court considered whether it would quash the subpoenas 

and impose sanctions on PCT. (Tr. 4/27/15 at 3738). At this hearing, PCT argued that it 

had served the subpoenas because Holland would not reveal whether the “witnesses were 

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unavailable.” (Id.) Additionally, PCT claimed that it did not withdraw the subpoenas, 

even after it was aware of the unavailability of the witnesses, because Holland did not 

“provide . . . [PCT] with some authority that . . . [PCT] had an obligation to withdraw 

them.” (Id. at 39). 

 The Court quashed the subpoenas and imposed sanctions on PCT in accordance 

with Rule 45. (Id. at 4445). The sanctions were to “take the form of an application for 

attorney’s fees by . . . [Holland], all in accordance with the local rule.” (Id.) The Court 

stated that it would: 

grant reasonable attorney’s fees for that which . . . [Holland has] had to 

expend to basically seek to get these subpoenas quashed upon notifying . . . 

[PCT] that the witnesses were neither residing in, employed in or regularly 

transacting business in the state of Arizona or within 100 miles of the court. 

(Id.) 

 Holland seeks $18,992.00 in attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 402 at 3). PCT objects to the 

fees listed for preparing the fee application and for having multiple attorneys prepare and 

attend the April 27 hearing. (Doc. 397 at 2). Additionally, PCT argues that Holland is 

only entitled to the fees incurred after Holland affirmed that the witnesses were 

unavailable. (Id. at 4 n.1). PCT has not had an opportunity to object to Holland’s request 

for fees associated with producing Defendant’s Reply in Support of Application for 

Attorneys’ Fees Re: Sanctions Awarded in Conjunction with Defendant’s Motion to 

Quash Plaintiff’s Trial Subpoenas (“Reply”). (Doc. 402). 

II. Legal Standard 

Attorneys, as officers of the court, have the capacity to issue subpoenas. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment. Accordingly, attorneys are 

liable and responsible for “misuse of this power.” Id. To regulate attorneys’ subpoena 

power, the Court can award “reasonable attorney’s fees” where a party fails to “avoid 

imposing undue burden or expense on” a subpoenaed individual. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). 

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III. Analysis 

A. Preparing the Fee Application and the Reply 

 PCT objects to Holland’s request for $4,632.50 for preparing the Application. 

(Doc. 397 at 23). PCT argues that Holland improperly relies upon Anderson v. Director, 

Office of Workers Compensation Programs to justify its entitlement to fees for preparing 

its Application. (Id. at 3) (citing Anderson v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Programs, 91 

F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)). PCT claims that this Court has held that Anderson is 

limited to cases involving fee applications under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Id.) (citing R. Prasad 

Indus. v. Flat Irons Envtl. Sols. Corp., No. CV128261PCTJAT, 2014 WL 4722487, 

at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2014)). 

 Holland counters that although Prasad did hold that Anderson is specific to fee 

applications under § 1988, it did not hold that “fees incurred in preparing a fee 

application are only recoverable in § 1988 actions.” (Doc. 402 at 1). Additionally, 

Holland claims that this Court, in Cooke v. Town of Colorado City, “cited § 1988 

precedent as supporting an award of fees incurred to prepare a fee application in a case 

not involving § 1988.” (Id.) (citing Cooke v. Town of Colo. City, No. 

CV108105PCTJAT, 2015 WL 1806751, at *6 (D. Ariz. Apr. 21, 2015)). 

 Finally, Holland argues that Prasad did not address Rule 45, “which provides that 

the Court must ‘impose an appropriate sanction . . . which may include . . . reasonable 

attorney’s fees.’” (Id.) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1)). Holland notes that it could not 

find specific case law supporting the proposition that a party is entitled to fees for 

preparing a fee application after a Rule 45 violation. (Id.) However, Holland claims that 

the Court can infer that allowing attorneys’ fees in this situation is appropriate because 

courts have granted such fees for violations of other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

(Id. at 12). 

 First, Holland’s reliance on Cooke is misplaced. Although Cooke was not a § 1988 

case, it involved a claim under the Arizona Fair Housing Act. Cooke, 2015 WL 1806751 

at *1. “Congress’ purpose in authorizing fee awards [under § 1988] was to encourage 

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compliance with and enforcement of the civil rights laws.” Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 

1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980). This policy is furthered by allowing an award of attorneys’ 

fees in an Arizona Fair Housing Act case. The same cannot be said for awarding such 

fees in the present patent case. 

 Second, the Court ordered that it would “grant reasonable attorney’s fees for that 

which . . . [Holland has] . . . had to expend to basically seek to get these subpoenas 

quashed.” (Tr. 4/27/15 at 4445). The language in the Court’s Order was restrictive, and 

designated as compensable only the specific tasks necessary to “get the[] subpoenas 

quashed.” (Id.) None of Holland’s cited cases indicate that there was such restrictive 

language used when sanctions were imposed. In fact, Nelson expressly awarded all 

“reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees, associated with the filing of . . . [the 

motion for attorneys’ fees] and reply.” Nelson v. Millennium Labs., Inc., No. 

CV121301PHXSLG, 2014 WL 1496623, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2014). Unlike 

Nelson, this Court did not expressly award fees for preparing the Application and the 

Reply. Therefore, such fees will not be awarded. 

 B. Preparing for and Attending the Hearing 

 PCT claims that it is unreasonable for three attorneys to bill for preparing for and 

attending the same hearing. (Doc. 397 at 3). The alleged redundancy comprises three 

entries in Holland’s itemized statement of attorneys’ fees. (Id.) On April 27: (1) Mr. 

Leach billed 0.40 hours ($262.00) to “[a]ttend hearing on motion to quash subpoenas and 

request for sanctions; argue motion to quash and motion for sanctions”; (2) Mr. Shaw 

billed 0.40 hours ($236.00) to “[p]repare for and attend pretrial conference and hearing re 

motion to quash trial subpoenas”; and (3) Mr. Parseghian billed 0.40 hours ($134.00) to 

“[p]repare for, travel to, and attend hearing regarding objections to evidence, witnesses, 

and other outstanding issues.” (Id.) 

 The Court should not award fees for work performed that was “unnecessarily 

duplicative.” See Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). 

However, attorneys can “attend hearing[s] without participating” and work “on the same 

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issues” without such work being unnecessarily duplicative. Cooke v. Town of Colo. City, 

No. CV1008105PCTJAT, 2015 WL 1806751, at *6 (D. Ariz. Apr. 21, 2015). This 

work may have required all three Snell & Wilmer (“Snell”) attorneys to work together to 

effectively represent their client. Accordingly, Holland’s counsel did not engage in work 

that was unnecessarily duplicative in having three attorneys prepare for and attend the 

hearing. 

 Additionally, the remaining billingwhich was not objected todescribes with 

sufficient particularity the tasks performed, and does not engage in block billing by 

grouping unrelated tasks. Moshir v. Automobili Lamborghini Am. LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 

789, 799 (D. Ariz. 2013). This billing was not duplicative and did not involve charging 

for an unreasonable amount of time given the tasks performed. (Doc. 356 Ex. D). 

Therefore, the fees accrued by Holland’s counsel are reasonable in terms of the time and 

labor expended. 

 C. Witness Unavailability 

 PCT contends that Holland should only recover those attorneys’ fees incurred after 

April 17, 2015the date on which Holland agreed that the witnesses were unavailable 

under Rule 32(a)(4)(B). (Doc. 397 at 4 n.1). PCT argues that it “initially had no choice 

but to serve the subpoenas at issue due to Holland’s insistence on reserving its rights to 

object to the playing of any deposition testimony at trial because it had not been proven 

that the witnesses were ‘unavailable.’” (Id.) Both Holland and PCT agree that Holland 

did not affirmatively agree that the “witnesses were unavailable” until April 17. (Id.; Doc. 

356 at 2 n.3). 

 Rule 32 allows a party to use the deposition of a witness at trial if, among other 

requirements, “the court finds . . . that a witness is more than 100 miles from the place of 

hearing or trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(B). 

 Because there was no agreement between the parties that the witnesses were 

unavailable for the purpose of Rule 32 until April 17, PCT was justified in its uncertainty 

regarding whether the witnesses were within the Court’s subpoena power. Rule 32 

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provides that unavailability is not officially determined until the Court rules on the 

matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(1)(4). Therefore, until Holland affirmatively agreed that the 

witnesses were unavailable, it still could have argued that the witnesses were available 

despite its correspondences with PCT indicating that the witnesses were outside of the 

Court’s subpoena power. As such, the Court finds that PCT’s position prior to April 17 

was reasonable, and thus not subject to sanctions. As a result, $1,672.00 should be 

subtracted from Holland’s fees.1

 D. Summary of Fees 

 Because the Court permitted Holland to recover only those attorneys’ fees 

incurred in getting the subpoenas quashed, (Tr. 4/27/15 at 4445), Holland is not entitled 

to the $10,856.50 it requests for preparing its Application and Reply. Additionally, 

Holland is not entitled to the $1,672.00 of fees it incurred before it affirmatively told PCT 

that the witnesses would be unavailable. 

 On the other handbecause the time and labor expended were reasonable, 

significant knowledge and skill were required, the fee charged was customary, and the 

Snell attorneys have significant experience, reputation, and abilitythe remaining fees 

incurred of $6,463.50 are reasonable. Therefore, Holland is entitled to $6,463.50 in 

attorneys’ fees from PCT. 

IV. Conclusion

 Accordingly, 

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1

 It is not clear from Holland’s itemized statement of attorneys’ fees at what point on April 17 Holland affirmatively told PCT that the witnesses were unavailable. (Doc. 

356 Ex. D). Therefore, given the ambiguity, the Court errs on the side of caution and 

abstains from awarding fees for work performed on April 17. 

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Application for Attorneys’ Fees Re: Sanctions 

Awarded in Conjunction with Defendant’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Trial Subpoenas 

(Doc. 356) is granted in part and denied in part. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding Holland Electronics, LLC $6,463.50 in 

attorneys’ fees. 

 Dated this 21st day of July, 2015. 

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