Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01803/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01803-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENT CLARK,

Petitioner,

v.

J. GASTELO, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16CV1803-AJB(JMA)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO 

GRANT RESPONDENT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Petitioner Brent Clark is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with 

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

[Doc. No. 1.] Petitioner challenges his 2004 conviction for kidnapping for robbery, 

Cal. Pen. Code § 209(b)(1); forcible copulation, Cal. Pen. Code § 288a(c)(2); 

robbery, Cal. Penal Code § 211; and burglary, Cal. Penal Code § 459. [Id.] 

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the Petition must be dismissed 

because Petitioner’s claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations. 

[Doc. No. 10.] On January 17, 2017, Petitioner filed a brief in opposition to the 

motion to dismiss, contending that his Petition should be considered timely 

because he is entitled to equitable tolling, and on March 20, 2017, he filed 

supplemental exhibits in support of his equitable tolling argument. [Doc. Nos. 15 

& 16.] After careful consideration, the undersigned determined the Court’s record

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was insufficient and allowed Petitioner the opportunity to further develop the 

record. [Doc. No. 17.] 

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a supplemental brief and lodged some additional 

medical records, but not his compete file for the relevant time period. [Doc. Nos. 

27 & 31.] In a separately filed motion he explained that although he was in 

possession of his complete CDCR mental health file, due to the large number of 

documents (estimated to be 800-1200 pages), he could not provide the Court 

and Respondent with a full and complete set without an order directing California 

Men’s Colony State Prison to make the copies. [Doc. No. 37.] In the interim,

counsel for Respondent independently obtained a full and complete copy of 

Petitioner’s mental health records from CDCR. The Court ordered, therefore, 

Respondent to file under seal and serve on Petitioner a complete copy of 

Petitioner’s CDCR mental health records and, to avoid a duplication of efforts, 

denied Petitioner’s motion for copies without prejudice. [Doc. No. 38.] Once the 

medical records were filed, the Court allowed Petitioner the time and opportunity 

to review the records provided by Respondent and further supplement the record 

if he determined the Court’s record was still not complete. [Doc. Nos. 41, 42.] 

Petitioner did not file any further briefing or medical records. On December 6, 

2017, Respondent filed a supplemental reply brief. [Doc. No. 43.] Having 

considered the parties’ briefing and Petitioner’s CDCR mental health records for 

the relevant time period, the Court RECOMMENDS Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss be GRANTED, as explained below. 

I. Introduction and Procedural Background

Petitioner’s efforts to challenge his conviction commenced with an appeal 

to the California Court of Appeal, in which he argued the trial court erred by: (1) 

failing to conduct a fifth hearing on his competency to stand trial; and (2) granting 

his request for self-representation despite his incompetence. [Doc. No. 11-1, Lod. 

No. 1.] The Court of Appeal rejected these claims on the merits and affirmed the 

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judgment on January 25, 2008. Petitioner then petitioned the California Court of 

Appeal for review of both claims. [Id.] The California Supreme Court denied 

review on May 14, 2008. [Doc. No. 11-2, Lod. No. 2.]

The record indicates Petitioner did not take any further action to challenge 

his conviction for more than six years, until June 16, 2015, when he filed a 

motion in the San Diego Superior Court to modify his sentence by striking his 

restitution fine and reducing it to $200. [Doc. No. 11-3, Lod. No. 3.] The motion 

was denied on July 20, 2015. [Id.] Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal on 

August 4, 2015. [Doc. No. 11-4, Lod. No. 4.] The California Court of Appeal 

dismissed the appeal on September 3, 2015, finding the Superior Court’s order 

was not appealable because it did not affect Petitioner’s substantial rights, and 

noting the Superior Court lost jurisdiction to resentence Petitioner once the 

execution of his sentence commenced. [Doc. No. 11-5, Lod. No. 5.] 

On January 21, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Superior 

Court, claiming (1) his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to 

raise and investigate issues relating to sentencing; (2) the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to dismiss one or more strike allegations; (3) the trial court 

should not have permitted him to waive counsel because he was mentally 

incompetent; and (4) the trial court should not have permitted him to represent 

himself because of his mental incompetence. [Doc. No. 11-6, Lod. No. 6.] On 

March 3, 2016, the Superior Court found the habeas petition was “procedurally 

barred for being untimely.” [Doc. No. 11-7, Lod. No. 7, at 3-4.] The court also 

rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims as conclusory and 

ruled Petitioner’s sentencing error claim was “fatally flawed” because Petitioner 

was sentenced as a violent sex offender under California’s One Strike law, Cal 

Pen. Code § 667.61, not as a recidivist under California’s Three Strikes law, Cal. 

Pen. Code § 667(b)-(i). [Id. at 3-5.] Finally, the court found Petitioner’s 

competency-related claims were not cognizable on habeas corpus because 

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those claims were raised and rejected on direct appeal. [Id. at 5.] The next day, 

March 4, 2016, the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s second motion to modify 

his sentence by reducing the restitution fine, ruling it did not have jurisdiction to 

modify the sentence because more than 120 days had passed since sentencing, 

and that Petitioner waived his right to challenge the restitution fine by failing to 

object at sentencing. [Doc. No. 11-8, Lod. No. 8.] 

On March 28, 2016, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the California 

Court of Appeal, challenging the Superior Court’s denial of his motion to modify 

his sentence. [Doc. No. 11-9, Lod. No. 9 at 2.] Two days later, on March 30, 

2016, he also filed a notice of appeal of the Superior Court’s denial of his habeas 

petition. [Doc. No. 11-10, Lod. No. 10.] On April 7, 2016, the Court of Appeal 

addressed Petitioner’s notice of appeal relating to the habeas petition, construing 

the filing as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and denying habeas relief on the 

basis his petition was untimely filed. [Doc. No. 11-11, Lod. No. 11.] The following 

day, April 8, 2016, the Court of Appeal addressed Petitioner’s attempt to appeal 

the Superior Court’s denial of his second motion to modify his sentence, 

upholding the trial court’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence. 

[Doc. No. 11-12. Lod. No. 12.]

On April 25, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California 

Supreme Court, raising the same claims that he raised in the habeas petitions 

filed in the lower state courts. [Doc. No. 11-13, Lod. No. 13.] Thereafter, on May 

10, 2016, Petitioner also filed a petition for review with the California Supreme 

Court, raising identical claims. [Doc. No. 11-14, Lod. No. 14.] The California 

Supreme Court denied the petition for review on June 15, 2016, and on June 22, 

2016, it denied the habeas petition. In both cases, the Supreme Court’s denial 

was made without comment or citation to authority. [Id.]

/ /

/ /

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On July 6, 2016, Petitioner constructively filed the present Petition, raising 

the same claims that he raised in his state habeas petitions.1 As discussed 

below, the Petition should be dismissed with prejudice because it is time-barred.

II. The Petition is Time-Barred under the AEDPA

The AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations applies to Petitioner’s federal 

habeas corpus claims. Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 

1286-87 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended on denial of rhg. and rhg. en banc, cert. 

denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998), overruled on other grounds in Calderon v. U.S. 

District Court, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1063 (1999). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1): 

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or 

laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented 

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable 

to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence.

 

1

 See Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying “mailbox rule” which 

provides for the constructive filing of court documents as of the date they are submitted to 

prison authorities for mailing to the court).

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Here, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the 

conclusion of direct review of Petitioner’s conviction occurred on August 12, 

2008, ninety (90) days after the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s 

petition for review on May 14, 2008. See Rule 13(1), U.S. Sup. Ct. Rules; Bowen 

v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, absent any 

applicable tolling, Petitioner had until August 13, 2009 to file his federal habeas 

petition. Id.; Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Petitioner, however, did not constructively file his federal habeas petition until 

July 6, 2016, 7 years, 10 months and 23 days after his judgment became final. 

Thus, it is untimely unless Petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling for 

at least 6 years, 10 months and 23 days of this time period. 

A. Statutory Tolling 

The AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the “time during which a 

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is 

pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). “An application for post-conviction review is 

pending while a California petitioner completes a full round of state collateral 

review, including during the period between (1) a lower court’s adverse 

determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal, provided that the 

filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.” Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 

729, 724 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotations omitted, emphasis in 

original). In California, “[a]s long as the prisoner filed a petition for appellate 

review within a ‘reasonable time,’ he could count as ‘pending’ (and add to the 1-

year time limit) the days between (1) the time the lower state court reached an 

adverse decision, and (2) the day he filed a petition in the higher state court.” 

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 

222-23 (2002)). In the absence of a “clear indication that a particular request for 

appellate review [in state collateral review proceedings] was timely or untimely, 

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the [court] must itself examine the delay in each case and determine what the 

state courts would have held with respect to timeliness.” Chavis, 546 U.S. at 

197. It cannot be inferred from a decision on the merits, or a decision without 

explanation, that the California court concluded the petition was timely. Banjo v. 

Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Chavis, 546 U.S. at 194). “A 

California court’s determination that a filing was untimely, however, is 

dispositive.” Id. (citing Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226). 

Here, no statutory tolling is available to Petitioner. His conviction became 

final on August 12, 2008, but he did not take measures to seek any postconviction relief until June 16, 2015, more than six years and ten months later.

Statutory tolling is unavailable where a petitioner files his first application for postconviction review after the one-year statute of limitations has expired. See 

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Statutory tolling may only 

pause, not revive the statute of limitations. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 

823 (9th Cir. 2003).

Furthermore, the post-conviction filings were not “properly filed,” so as to 

warrant tolling. Petitioner’s state habeas petitions were denied by the California 

courts as being untimely.

2

 An application rejected by a state court as untimely is 

not “properly filed” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408, 417 (2005). This is true even where, as here, the state courts also deny 

 

2

 Petitioner’s state habeas petitions were expressly denied by the Superior Court and Court of 

Appeal as being untimely. [Doc. No. 11-7, Lod No. 7 at 3-4; Doc. No. 11-11, Lod. No. 11 at 2, 

Thereafter, the California Supreme Court adopted the lower court’s ruling and issued summary 

denials of the habeas petition and petition for review from the Court of Appeal’s denial of the 

habeas petition. [Doc. No. 11-15, Lod. No. 15 & Doc. No. 11-16, Lod. No. 16.] See, e.g., Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-96, 115 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1991) (“look 

through” applies where a silent state appellate court order follows lower court’s imposition of 

procedural default); Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 2009) (looking 

though silent denials of California Supreme and court of appeal to trial court’s untimeliness

denial), abrogated on another ground by Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307 (2011).

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relief on other grounds, including the merits. Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 

1148-49 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2005).

Petitioner’s motion for resentencing and subsequent appeal were also not 

“properly filed” for purposes of statutory tolling because the state courts lacked 

jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 11-5; Lodgment 5.] “If . . . an application is erroneously

accepted by the clerk of a court lacking jurisdiction . . . it will be pending, but not

properly filed.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9 (2000); See also Stone v. Martel, 

No. CIV S-10-3454 KJM, 2011 WL 5828019, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2011) 

(motion for modification not properly filed where court lacked jurisdiction to 

provide requested relief.) (cf. Doc. Nos. 11-3 & 11-8, Lod. Nos 3 & 8 and Doc. 

Nos. 11-5 & 11-12, Lod. Nos. 5 & 12.) Petitioner is not, therefore, entitled to any

statutory tolling and his federal habeas petition is time-barred unless he can 

show he is entitled to equitable tolling for at least 6 years, 10 months, and 23 

days of the time that lapsed between when his judgment became final and the 

filing of his Petition.

B. Equitable Tolling

The one year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition may 

be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control 

prevent the prisoner from filing on time. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

645 (2010). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two elements: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408, 418 (2005). The diligence required is “reasonable diligence,” not “maximum 

feasible diligence.” See Holland, 560 U.S. at 653; see also Bills v. Clark, 628 

F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010).

The Ninth Circuit has articulated a specific, two-part test for an equitable 

tolling claim based on a petitioner’s mental impairment:

/ /

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(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an 

“extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control by demonstrating 

the impairment was so severe that either

(a) petitioner was unable to rationally or factually to personally 

understand the need to timely file, or

(b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally to 

prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims 

to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental 

impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under 

the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available 

access to assistance.

Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100; see also Orthel v. Yates, 795 F.3d 935, 938 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (“A petitioner seeking equitable tolling on the grounds of mental 

incompetence must show extraordinary circumstances, such as an inability to 

rationally or factually personally understand the need to timely file, or a mental 

state rendering an inability personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate 

its filing.”).

A petitioner alleging a severe mental impairment during the filing period is 

not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless he or she makes “a good faith 

allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.” Laws v. Lamarque, 

351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding for consideration of whether the 

petitioner's delayed filing was “attributable to psychiatric medication which 

deprived Petitioner of any kind of consciousness” where the petitioner had 

demonstrated “evidence of serious mental illness” by attaching prison psychiatric 

and medical records); Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-100 (remanding where the 

petitioner was in the lowest percentile for verbal IQ, verbal comprehension and 

working memory, and, according to clinical psychologists, was incapable of 

inferential thinking necessary to complete a federal habeas form); see also 

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Orthel, 795 F.3d at 939-40 (“Where the record is amply developed, and where it 

indicates that the petitioner’s mental incompetence was not so severe as to 

cause the untimely filing of his habeas petition, a district court is not obligated to 

hold evidentiary hearings to further develop the factual record, notwithstanding a 

petitioner's allegations of mental incompetence.”) (quoting Roberts v. Marshall, 

627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010).)

Here, Petitioner alleges he has been under the care of the prison mental 

health system for a “major mental illness” since November 2004. [Doc. No. 15, 

pp. 1-2.] He reports his diagnosis is Bipolar/Mood Disorder and Major 

Depression and during this time he has taken Zyprexa 15 mg, Depakote 1500 

mg, Buspar 30 mg, Cogentin 2 mg, Lamictal 50 mg, Vistaril 100 mg, and 

Propranolon 10 mg. [Id. at 2.] He states his “mental illness coupled with the 

medications and there affects” created an “extraordinary circumstance” that 

made it “physically impossible” for Petitioner to pursue his claims in the judicial 

system. [Id.] He further represents his medications “have changed throughout the 

years causing at times “additional obstructions” due to side effects that “at times” 

have been suicidal thoughts and a deeper depression causing crisis bed 

observations and mental health transfers.” [Id.] He also contends his medication 

has caused him to suffer from tremors of the hand and other parts of the body 

that, while physical in nature, have taken a mental and emotional toll that 

affected his concentration, reading and writing. [Doc. No. 27, pp. 5 of 12.] 

Petitioner’s claims are supported by the declaration of Christopher Griffith, a selfdescribed “jailhouse lawyer,” who states he believes Petitioner’s mental health 

circumstances prevented him from filing a federal habeas petition. [Id. Doc. No. 

15, pp. 6-7.] Petitioner has also provided a declaration, in which he represents 

his medications have played a “major part” in preventing him from pursuing 

federal habeas relief. [Doc. No. 20.] 

/ /

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As explained above, the statute of limitations started running on August 13, 

2008 and, absent any applicable tolling, Petitioner had until August 13, 2009 to 

file his federal habeas petition. During this time, Petitioner received regular 

psychiatric treatment; however, with one exception and for a period of only eight 

days, neither Petitioner’s mental health, nor the side effects of his medication 

were so debilitating they could have prevented Petitioner from filing his Petition in 

a timely manner.

Petitioner is not Entitled to Equitable Tolling from August 13 to 

November 12, 2008

A progress note made on August 12, 2008, the day before the limitations 

period began to run, indicates Petitioner was alert, fully oriented and had fair 

insight. [Doc. No. 41, Lod. No. 17, Mental Health Records (“MHR”) at 14993.] The 

psychiatrists he saw between August 13, 2009 and November 12, 2009, regularly 

observed Petitioner’s thought processes were linear and goal directed [MHR 

1498, 1489, 1478, 1476, 1477] and that he was stable on medication [MHR 

1486-87, 1477, 1471-72]. He also participated in Social Skills/Communications 

Skills and Substance Abuse Medication Management Groups during this time, 

during which the group facilitators consistently observed Petitioner’s cognition to 

be appropriate. [MHR 1492, 1494, 1496, 1482-85, 1473-75, 1471-72.] On 

October 10, 2008, Petitioner reported he was not having any overt psychological 

distress and his psychologist noted Petitioner demonstrated integration of 

positive coping skills. [MHR 1479.] 

Petitioner is Entitled to Equitable Tolling from November 13 – 20, 2008

On November 13, 2008, about three months after the limitations period 

 

3

 Lodgment No. 17 is referred to hereafter as “MHR” and the page numbers cited by the 

Court in reference to this submission are the Bates numbers that appear on the lower right 

hand corner of this filing. 

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began, Petitioner experienced a mental health crisis. That day he was assigned a 

GAF score of 29 and referred to a crisis bed.

4

[MHR 1469-1470.] Fortunately, 

Petitioner’s condition improved thereafter. On November 20, 2008, he was 

assigned a GAF score of 45 and discharged.

5

[Doc. No. 31 at 5; MHR 1468.] The 

mental health progress notes from the Substance Abuse/Medication 

Management group he attended on November 21, 2008, indicate his cognition 

was appropriate and his insight was good. [MHR 1462.] He participated in other 

groups on November 24 and 25, 2008, at which time he was again observed to 

have appropriate cognition and good insight. [MHR 1465, 1467.] On November 

26, 2008, he was seen by E.V. Roth, PhD, a psychologist, to whom he reported 

that he was “doing better now” and had “no further (mental health) complaints.” 

[MHR 1463.] Dr. Roth opined that Petitioner was stable on medication and had 

appropriate cognition. [Id.] He was also seen by a staff psychiatrist that day, who 

observed his thought process to be linear and goal directed and assigned him a 

GAF score of 50. [MHR 1464.] The period during which Petitioner was 

incapacitated and unable to pursue federal habeas relief was fairly short-lived, 

and limited to the eight day period (November 13 - 20, 2008) he was housed in 

the mental crisis bed.

/ /

/ /

 

4

 A GAF score in the 21 – 30 range indicates behavior is considerably influenced by delusions 

or hallucinations or serious impairment, in communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes 

incoherent, acts grossly inappropriately, suicidal preoccupation) or inability to function in 

almost all areas (e.g., stays in bed all day, no job, home, or friends) Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Michael B. First ed., 4th ed. 2000) 

(DSM) at 32.

5 A GAF score in the 41 – 50 range indicates serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe 

obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or 

school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job, cannot work). DSM at 34.

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Petitioner is not Entitled to Equitable Tolling for the Remainder of the 

Statute of Limitations Period (November 21, 2008 to August 21, 2009)

The records for the remainder of the statute of limitations period, which, 

allowing for eight days of equitable tolling, was extended to August 21, 2009, do 

not indicate Petitioner was prevented from filing his federal habeas petition due 

to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control. As explained above, 

Petitioner’s mental health crisis ended on November 20, 2008, and Petitioner 

was stable for the remainder of that month. Petitioner’s mental health continued 

to be strong in December 2008, when he was observed to be “quite stable.” 

[MHR 1461.] Notes his psychologists made throughout the month indicate his 

orientation, thought processes and content were within normal limits. [MHR 1456, 

1459, 1460.] On December 24, 2008, Petitioner expressed concern that his V.A. 

benefits would be cancelled and reported he was in the process of addressing 

the situation. [MHR 1459.] At that time he appeared to be psychiatrically stable 

and had no involuntary movements. [Id.] On December 30, 2008, Petitioner 

reported he was “doing well,” was not experiencing any side effects from the 

medication, but felt his thinking was slow. [MHR 1455.] The psychiatrist who saw 

him that day noted Petitioner was not experiencing any side effects from 

medication, was alert and oriented and his thought process was reasonably 

clear. [Id.] Petitioner was assigned a GAF score of 50. [Id.] Petitioner attended 

multiple groups throughout the month where his cognition was consistently 

observed to be at an appropriate level. [MHR 1454, 1457-58.]

Petitioner’s mental health continued to remain stable through January 

2009. [MHR 1444-52.] Clinician progress notes made throughout the month 

indicate his orientation, memory, thought process and thought content were 

within normal limits. [MHR 1449-50, 1452.] On January 15, 2009, he reported 

he’d had difficulty sleeping and was having panic attacks but his new 

antidepressant prescription seemed to be helping. [MHR 1451.] He expressed 

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concern about transferring to a different prison and was experiencing involuntary 

movement in his hands and arms. [MHR 1450.] Later in the month, on January 

22, 2009, Petitioner reported some depression, but said the depression subsided 

when he learned that he would remain in the EOP building. [Doc. No. 31 at 13; 

MHR 1449.] His psychologist noted Petitioner displayed no “symptoms of a major 

mental illness,” appeared to by “psychiatrically stable” and had “good insight” into

his mental illness. [MHR 1449.] On January 27, 2009, Petitioner reported

increased anxiety, paranoia and frustration with his neighbor, who kicked the wall 

throughout the day. [Doc. No. 31 at 12; MHR 1446.] His psychologist observed 

Petitioner was in “some psychiatric distress,” referring to an increase in paranoid

delusional material. [Id.] Petitioner’s thought content was positive for paranoid

ideation; however, his attention, concentration and thought process were normal.

[Id.] Petitioner requested an increase in his medication dosage and was referred 

to a psychiatrist, who met with him the same day. [Id.] The psychiatrist observed 

Petitioner’s thought process to be linear and goal-directed and assigned him a 

GAF score of 55.6[Doc. No. 31 at 11; MHR 1445.] Petitioner displayed no 

abnormal involuntary movements that day. [MHR 1453.] He participated in 

multiple groups in January 2009, where his cognition was consistently rated as

appropriate. [MHR 1444, 1447-48.]

Throughout the spring and summer of 2009, Petitioner continued to be 

mentally stable, did not exhibit any significant side effects from his medications 

and demonstrated he was capable of handling his personal matters. During the 

month of February, his treating clinicians regularly assessed his orientation, 

attention, memory, concentration, thought process and content to be normal. 

[MHR 1436-37, 1441-42.] On February 3, 2009, he reported he had moved to a 

 

6

 “A GAF score between 51 and 60 indicates ‘[m]oderate symptoms [or] ... moderate difficulty 

in social, occupational, or school functioning.’” DSM at 34.

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different cell, was not depressed, and was happy that he would remain in the 

EOP building. [Doc. No. 31 at 11; MHR 1443.] He told his psychologist

“something” was found during his recent colonoscopy and he would sign a DNR 

request if the news were bad. [Id.] The psychologist noted Petitioner continued 

to progress in a positive fashion. [Id.] The following week Petitioner reported a 

decrease in involuntary movements and displayed improvement in psychiatric 

functioning. [Doc. No. 31 at 10; MHR 1442.] Throughout the month he was 

observed to be functioning within normal limits [MHR 1437, 1440-41] and on

February 27, 2009, he was assigned a GAF score of 60 [MHR 1436]. Petitioner’s 

cognition was to be deemed appropriate by the facilitators for all the groups he 

participated in that month. [MHR 1435, 1438-39.]

On March 5, 2009, Petitioner told the psychologist, “‘Everything is fine. I got

things situated.’” [MHR 1434.] During that meeting he was observed to be alert, 

oriented, with linear thought process, rational thought content, and normal 

attention, cognition and memory. [Id.] On March 17, 2009, he acted 

appropriately, talked freely and exhibited no incoherent thoughts, but displayed 

some paranoia about his medication. [MHR 1432.] Progress notes from two days 

later indicate Petitioner was calm and cooperative and exhibited no bizarre 

ideation except for his fear that someone was tampering with his medication. 

[MHR 1431.] On March 23, 2009, Petitioner reported that he was

having panic attacks and wanting to isolate. [MHR 1430.] The following day he

reported he was doing fairly well, discussed advanced directives with his 

psychiatrist, and agreed to consider leaving his body to science. [MHR

1429.] The psychiatrist noted Petitioner’s tremors had stopped with the

discontinuation of Depakote and assigned a GAF score of 65.7[Id.] Throughout 

 

7

 A GAF score between in the 61 – 70 range indicates “some mild symptoms (e.g. depressed 

mood and mild insomnia) or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., 

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the month Petitioner’s cognition was rated as appropriate or oriented by group 

facilitators. [MHR 1423 – 27.]

In April 2009, Petitioner’s cognition and behavior was reported to be normal 

[MHR 1422], his thinking was clear and rational and he displayed no psychiatric 

symptoms [MHR 1417-18]. On April 9, 2009, Petitioner reported “I am feeling 

good... and (am) not really having any mental health issues.” [MHR 1422.]

Three days later, on April 12, 2009, his psychologist observed Petitioner 

appeared somber and tense and reported he was having a problem getting his 

money, but remarked that he had it better than most. [MHR 1421.] On April 17, 

2009, Petitioner again reported he was “doing very well” and that he wanted to 

donate his body to science, but was not sure if his wife would allow that. [MHR 

1419.] He expressed a desire to execute a DNR and be an organ donor, to 

which the psychiatrist opined, “All of these are reasonable and the inmate is fully 

competent to make these decisions at this time.” [Id.] Petitioner was assigned a 

GAF score of 70. [MHR 1420.] On April 27, 2009, his psychologist reported 

Petitioner appeared to be depressed, but his thinking was linear and logical. 

[MHR 1415.] His cognition was rated as appropriate or oriented in the groups he 

attended in April 2009. [MHR 1411-12, 1414, 1416.]

May 2009 progressed much in the same fashion. On May 6, 2009, 

Petitioner appeared to have improved since the prior meeting [MHR 1410] and 

on May 11, 2009, he was observed to be stable [MHR 1408]. Later in the month, 

on May 20, 2009, Petitioner reported he was continuing “to do well,” but was 

concerned that he had not been able to get an advanced directive or a DNR in 

his chart. [Doc. No. 31 at 20; MHR 1406.] The psychiatrist noted he had 

previously written and approved Petitioner for this twice. [Id.] Petitioner also

 

occasional truancy, or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well.

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reported his tremors were “completely gone” and he was “much more 

comfortable.” [Id.] He was assigned a GAF score of 70. [Doc. No. 31 at 21; MHR 

1407.] At the end of the month, on May 26, 2009, Petitioner complained he was 

having trouble tracking; however, his psychologist observed Petitioner’s thinking 

to be logical. [MHR 1404.] Petitioner’s cognition during the groups he attended 

that month was rated as oriented or appropriate. [MHR 1400-01, 1403.]

In early June 2009, Petitioner informed his psychologist that he wanted to 

die, as opposed to spending another twenty-one years in prison, where he was 

likely to die anyway. [Doc. No. 31 at 16-17; MHR 1398-99.] On both occasions, 

his psychologist opined there was no discernable change in Petitioner’s mental 

status. [Id.] On June 11, 2009, the psychiatrist noted Petitioner had refused his 

lithium for the past ten days because his current dosage caused him to sweat 

miserably in the hot weather, and he wanted the dosage lowered. [Doc. No. 31 at 

14; MHR 1396.] He was assigned a GAF score of 70. [Doc. No. 31 at 15; MHR 

1397.] Petitioner’s medications were adjusted on June 13, 2009, at which time 

his psychiatrist felt Petitioner was in a hypomanic phase. [MHR 1384, 1394-95.]

The remainder of the month was unremarkable. Petitioner was observed to be 

coherent and in touch with reality [MHR 1393], stable [MHR 1392], and on June 

29, 2009, his psychologist reported the medication adjustment seemed to have 

improved Petitioner’s condition [MHR 1389]. Petitioner’s cognition during groups 

he participated in during June 2009 was rated by the facilitators as appropriate or 

oriented. [MHR 1386-88, 1390-91.]

In July 2009, Petitioner was observed to be “cognitively intact,” “doing very 

well,” stable, not confused and had poor to fair insight and judgment. [MHR 1379, 

1381-85.] On July 10, 2009, Petitioner was not experiencing any involuntary 

psychomotor activity, his thought process was linear and goal-directed and his

thought content was rational. [MHR 1380.] On July 24, 2009, Petitioner was 

referred to a psychiatrist for a medication adjustment because he was anxious 

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and restless. [MHR 1378.] It was noted he had mild to moderate involuntary 

tremors and was obviously uncomfortable, but his thought content was rational 

and goal-oriented and his judgment and insight were poor to fair. [MHR 1376-78, 

1453.] He was assigned a GAF score of 65. [MHR 1376.] On July 29, 2009, 

reported the medication adjustment helped with his uncontrolled body 

movements. [MHR 1372.] His cognition during groups in July 2009 was rated as 

appropriate or oriented. [MHR 1370-71, 1373-75.]

Petitioner’s mental health remained stable through August 2009. [MHR 

1359-69.] On August 3, 2009, he was stable, had clear and linear thinking, and

presented as bright and cheerful. [MHR 1369.] Petitioner was alert, oriented and 

coherent on August 10, 2009, as well as at a subsequent meeting on August 17, 

2009. [MHR 1366-67.] On August 12, 2009, Petitioner made a slightly 

inappropriate comment during a group meeting in an attempt to be humorous,

but quickly redirected when he noticed his comment had not been well received.

[MHR 1363.] On August 14, 2009, Clark’s cognition was appropriate in his anger 

management group. [MHR 1360-16.] On August 17, 2009, the psychologist wrote

that he was stable. [MHR 1366.] In the final days of the limitations period, 

Petitioner was oriented and displayed appropriate cognition during a journaling 

group on August 18, 2009 [MHR 1364], during a social issues through literature 

group on August 19, 2009 [MHR 1363], and at anger management and current 

events groups he attended on August 21, 2009, the final date of the limitations 

period [MHR 1360-61.]8

/ /

 

8 Plaintiff’s mental competency during the relevant time period is further evidenced by events 

that transpired, such as his efforts to obtain a DNR order; his psychiatrist’s opinion that 

Petitioner was competent to make end of life decisions; Petitioner’s refusal to take lithium 

because of the heat, indicating both his understanding of lithium’s side effects and his right to 

refuse medication; and Petitioner’s understanding as to he needed to take action with the VA 

in order not to lose his benefits. 

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Petitioner’s mental status continued to be stable until September 10, 2009, 

when he was referred to the emergency room after suffering an anxiety attack

and improved immediately thereafter. [MHR 1366, 1354-1362.] Even assuming 

Petitioner’s mental state during this event rendered him incapable of filing his 

Petition, he could not receive the benefit of equitable tolling for this episode 

because once the limitations period ends, it cannot be revived.

9

 See e.g. Green 

v. White, 223 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2000).

In sum, the complete mental health records establish Petitioner suffers

from mental illness and, at times, his medication has caused hand and arm 

tremors. With the exception of the eight days that passed during his mental 

health crisis (November 13 – 20, 2008), however, neither his mental illness nor 

medication side effects prevented him from understanding the need to timely file 

a federal petition or from taking steps to effectuate this filing.

Furthermore, although the Court’s discussion has primarily focused on the 

whether Plaintiff’s mental and physical impairments constitute an “extraordinary 

circumstance,” the test for an equitable tolling claim is two part. Under the 

second part, a petitioner must show he was diligent in trying to timely file his 

habeas petition. See e.g. Pace, 544 U.S 418. Here, Petitioner has made any 

showing that he was diligent in pursuing his federal habeas claims and, thus, 

also does not satisfy the second element of his equitable tolling claim. 

/ /

/ /

 

9

 Petitioner’s mental health records for the 6 years, 10 months, and 14 days that passed 

between when the limitations period ended and when the Petition was filed (August 22, 2009

to July 6, 2016) indicate Petitioner’s mental health was stable for significant periods of time 

and he had only a few short-lived episodes during which he was arguably not competent to file 

a federal habeas petition. As explained above, even if Petitioner suffered from episodes of 

impairment that prevented him from filing his Petition during this time period, they cannot toll 

the limitations period after it has ended. 

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III. RECOMMENDATION

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned 

magistrate judge finds Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to tolling of the 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations for a sufficient period of time to rending the filing of 

his Petition as timely. Accordingly, the undersigned magistrate judge hereby 

recommends Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony 

J. Battaglia, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later than March 

13, 2018, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy 

on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed not later than March 20, 2018. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise 

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 26, 2018

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