Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00434/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00434-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Debra Lee Johnson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 12-00434-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it plaintiff's opening brief (doc. 13), defendant's opposition to

plaintiff's opening brief (doc. 14), and plaintiff's reply (doc 15). Plaintiff filed an application

for Disability Insurance Benefits in 2009. Her application was denied initially and upon

reconsideration and she requested a hearing. An administrative law judge ("ALJ") with the

Social Security Administration held a hearing on March 7, 2011, and issued an unfavorable

decision. The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision when the Appeals

Council denied plaintiff's request for review. 

Plaintiff was born in 1953 and was 56 years old at the date of her alleged onset of

disability on July 15, 2009. She has a high school education and previously worked as an

office coordinator, switchboard operator, and internal customer service representative. She

was fired from her last job for yelling at another employee.

The ALJ followed the required five-step procedure in finding that petitioner was not

Case 2:12-cv-00434-FJM Document 16 Filed 10/11/12 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). At

step one, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has not performed substantial gainful activity

since July 15, 2009. The ALJ found at step two that plaintiff's morbid obesity, diabetes,

polymyalgia rheumatica, arthritis, pain in upper extremities, neck, back, and hips, and post

right knee replacement surgery were severe impairments. But at step three the ALJ found

that plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. Next, the ALJ assessed

plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and found that plaintiff could perform a

limited range of sedentary work. The ALJ found at step four that plaintiff is capable of

performing her past relevant work. As a result, the ALJ concluded that she is not disabled.

I

We "disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision 'contains legal error or is not

supported by substantial evidence.'" Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir.

2008) (citation omitted). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The "evidence must be more than a mere scintilla but not necessarily a

preponderance." Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003). "Where evidence

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion that must be

upheld." Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

II

"[W]here the record includes objective medical evidence establishing that the claimant

suffers from an impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms of which he

complains, an adverse credibility finding must be based on 'clear and convincing reasons.'"

Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ

found that plaintiff's impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms

alleged. However, he found her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects not credible. An ALJ's credibility determination is entitled to deference. Lingenfelter

v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007). We will not reverse a credibility

determination "based on contradictory or ambiguous evidence." Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d

Case 2:12-cv-00434-FJM Document 16 Filed 10/11/12 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). In weighing credibility, the ALJ may consider failures to seek

treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment, inconsistencies in testimony or between

testimony and conduct, and daily activities. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636 (9th Cir.

2007). 

An unexplained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment

may support a conclusion that plaintiff is not credible. Id. at 637. Despite testifying that she

is frequently in great pain, there is no indication that plaintiff has ever taken prescription

medicine for pain and no explanation for why she would not do so or seek other forms of

treatment for her pain. See, e.g., Tr. at 217, 239, 322. This diminishes plaintiff's credibility.

One of plaintiff's main activities is making greeting cards, a job which requires great

manual dexterity. The ALJ found inconsistencies between plaintiff's testimony and conduct.

She testified that she is losing strength in her arms and even answering the phone causes

pain, yet she also said that she makes greeting cards daily. The ALJ's determination that this

testimony is inconsistent is entitled to deference.

Plaintiff at first testified that she left her last job because she could not drive to work.

Upon questioning, though, she admitted that she was fired from that position for yelling at

a coworker. She did not lose her job or have to quit because of her impairments. She also

continued to look for work after her alleged onset date. While her long work history supports

her credibility, being fired and looking for work after the onset date offset this history. See

Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 1998).

Daily activities may be grounds for an adverse credibility determination if they

contradict plaintiff's other testimony or meet the threshold for transferable work skills. Orn,

495 F.3d at 639. The ALJ determined that plaintiff "lives alone and her ability to perform

activities of daily living are [sic] for the most part normal." Tr. at 26. She goes to a social

group regularly to make greeting cards for charity. She drives, goes grocery shopping, does

light housework, cares for her cats, reads, watches television, and makes greeting cards. Her

activity of making cards is not entirely consistent with her testimony about losing strength

in her arms, as noted above. On the other hand, the ALJ did not make specific findings that

Case 2:12-cv-00434-FJM Document 16 Filed 10/11/12 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

plaintiff's activities involve transferable skills or that she spends a "substantial" part of her

day engaged in such activities. Therefore, daily activities can form the basis of an adverse

credibility determination only to the extent they are inconsistent with plaintiff's other

testimony. If there was further reliance on daily activities to detract from her credibility it

would have been harmless because substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion on

credibility. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162-63.

Plaintiff received unemployment benefits in 2008 and 2009, which in some cases can

negatively impact credibility. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161-62. But here the benefits

were received before her alleged disability onset date. And her testimony was consistent –

she stated that her current source of income was savings, and later testified that she had

received unemployment benefits in the past. Tr. 39-40, 50-51. To the extent the ALJ relied

on her receipt of benefits or an apparent inconsistency about benefits in discounting her

credibility, the error is harmless. 

The ALJ mentioned that although no assistive device was prescribed, plaintiff

appeared at the hearing with a walker. Plaintiff truthfully told the ALJ that it had not been

prescribed. While her physicians were aware of it, there is no evidence they told her not to

use it or stated that it was unnecessary. Plaintiff testified that she uses her walker every time

she leaves her house but did not say that she was unable to walk without it. Cf. Verduzco

v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (claimant used cane, but two doctors

specifically noted that he did not need such a device, and at the hearing he was able to

quickly stand and retrieve his wallet from his back pocket without assistance or apparent

discomfort). Her use of a walker without a showing of medical necessity is suspicious. The

ALJ's determination of plaintiff's credibility is supported by substantial evidence. 

III

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of her treating physician

and the state's examining physician and relying on the opinions of non-examining physicians.

When the opinion of a treating physician is contradicted, the ALJ may discount it with

specific, legitimate reasons that are based on substantial evidence. Bray v. Comm'r of Soc.

Case 2:12-cv-00434-FJM Document 16 Filed 10/11/12 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). However, "when evaluating conflicting

medical opinions, an ALJ need not accept the opinion of a doctor if that opinion is brief,

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings." Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d

1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). A treating physician's opinion may be rejected if it is based to

a large extent on plaintiff's subjective complaints and those complaints have been properly

discounted. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041.

Dr. Peairs, plaintiff's orthopedist, saw her in March 2009 for an annual follow-up visit

three years after total knee replacement surgery of her right knee. After she complained of

body aches, he suggested an evaluation with her primary care physician for polymyalgia

rheumatica. There is no indication that she did so or has ever been definitively diagnosed

with polymyalgia rheumatica. In January 2010, plaintiff returned to Dr. Peairs for a followup on her knee. She did not require pain medication for her knee. A history of methicillin

resistant staphylococcus aureus ("MRSA") was the main reason for her annual visit. Dr.

Peairs completed a pain functional capacity questionnaire in February 2011 in which he

concluded that plaintiff had moderately severe pain which frequently interfered with her

attention and concentration, and she often experienced deficiencies in concentration,

persistence, and pace. Tr. at 364. The ALJ accorded "[l]ittle weight" to this opinion. Tr. at

26.

The ALJ considers many factors when determining how much weight to give a

treating physician's opinion, including length of treatment relationship, frequency of

treatment, nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supporting evidence, consistency,

and specialization. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The ALJ noted that plaintiff's treatment

relationship was short and infrequent, as Dr. Peairs treated plaintiff only three times in the

year and a half before her hearing. Her visits were specifically to follow up on her knee

surgery. See Tr. at 26, 48, 54. There is no supporting evidence for some of the restrictions

listed in his opinion. "[T]he regulations give more weight to opinions that are explained than

to those that are not." Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ

may "permissibly reject[ ] . . . check-off reports that [do] not contain any explanation of the

Case 2:12-cv-00434-FJM Document 16 Filed 10/11/12 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

bases of their conclusions." Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996). Dr. Peairs's

opinion is a one-page form with no supporting evidence or explanation. Tr. at 364.

Moreover, the opinion was largely based on plaintiff's subjective complaints, which the ALJ

properly discounted. Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir.

1999); Tr. at 54-55. The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by

substantial evidence for giving little weight to Dr. Peairs's opinion.

An examining physician's opinion is given more weight than the opinion of a nonexamining physician but may be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons supported by

substantial evidence. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Dr. Prieve

examined plaintiff in November 2009. He determined that plaintiff could perform a limited

range of sedentary work. He opined that she could sit for less than 6 hours, but did not

provide a more specific estimate. The ALJ gave great weight to the opinion with the

exception of the limit on sitting, which he found was "not supported by the record or Dr.

Prieve's own findings." Tr. at 26. He also noted Dr. Prieve reported that plaintiff made a

"very poor effort" during the exam and refused to hop when asked. Id. The lack of

supporting evidence, inconsistency, and lack of explanation provide specific and legitimate

reasons to reject this portion of Dr. Prieve's opinion. 

Dr. Rowse and Dr. Goerss reviewed plaintiff's records and completed RFC

assessments in December 2009 and April 2010, respectively. They found that plaintiff was

capable of performing a range of light to sedentary work. The ALJ gave great weight to the

opinions because he found them consistent with the medical evidence. There is no medical

evidence supporting plaintiff's contention of disabling pain. She has not sought treatment for

generalized pain, nor does it appear that any physician has recommended treatment more

extensive than over-the-counter pain medication. The medical records are consistent with

the opinions of these physicians, and they are consistent with each other. Moreover, they

explained their opinions. Tr. at 227-29, 314-22. The ALJ provided specific and legitimate

reasons supported by substantial evidence for giving less weight to Dr. Peairs's opinion and

more weight to the findings of these physicians.

Case 2:12-cv-00434-FJM Document 16 Filed 10/11/12 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

IV

Plaintiff contends that a sit/stand option is inconsistent with sedentary work. The

vocational expert determined that plaintiff could perform her past jobs with the option of

sitting or standing at will. The expert testified that there would be some limit as to how often

an employee could alternate sitting and standing, but there was no definite limit. All

plaintiff's past relevant work could be performed with the option to sit or stand. Her

testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and her training,

education, and experience. The ALJ's RFC is supported by substantial evidence and his

reliance on the vocational expert and inclusion of a sit-stand option were not in error.

V

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff is not

disabled is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED

AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner denying disability benefits. The clerk shall

enter final judgment.

DATED this 11th day of October, 2012.

Case 2:12-cv-00434-FJM Document 16 Filed 10/11/12 Page 7 of 7