Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00960/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00960-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 18:241 Conspiracy Against Citizen Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NABIL SAMAAN, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 v. 

KURT SAUER and DOES 1-10, 

 Defendants. 

_________________________/ 

Case No. 2:07-CV-00960 JAM GGH

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 

COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff Nabil Samaan (“Samaan”) brought an action against 

defendant Kurt Sauer (“Sauer”) alleging discrimination on the 

basis of race in violation of various federal and state laws. 

Sauer filed a counterclaim alleging defamation. Sauer now moves 

for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary 

adjudication, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Samaan opposes the motion. For the reasons 

set forth below, Sauer’s motion is GRANTED.1 

 

1

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. 

L.R. 78-230(h). 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Samaan is an attorney of Egyptian descent with a home and 

business in Sacramento. Sauer is a juvenile probation officer 

for Shasta County. He currently resides in Redding. Sauer was 

formerly married to Shannon Wilde (“Wilde”). Sauer and Wilde 

have a son named Aidan. Wilde and Aidan currently reside in 

Redding. In or around March 2006, Wilde became romantically 

involved with Samaan. She recently gave birth to a child 

fathered by Samaan. In late 2006, Wilde filed for a divorce 

from Sauer. The marriage was dissolved on March 28, 2007. 

Since June 2007, Sauer and Wilde have been involved in a custody 

dispute. Wilde seeks to modify the terms of her custody so that 

she and Aidan can move to Sacramento and live with Samaan. 

On or about March 7, 2007, Samaan alleges that Sauer made 

or received phone calls wherein he used the word “nigger” in 

reference to Samaan. According to Samaan, Sauer allegedly 

stated that he did not want the “nigger” (Samaan) around his exwife, and that his ex-wife “got herself a nigger.” From March 8 

to April 3, 2007, Sauer allegedly called or e-mailed threats 

about Samaan. On April 19, 2007, Sauer allegedly made threats 

against Samaan to a fellow probation officer, including 

commenting that he would “like to kick that nigger’s ass.” On 

May 22, 2007, Samaan filed the instant action against Sauer 

alleging discrimination on the basis of race in violation of 

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various federal and state laws. Specifically, the complaint 

alleges two federal claims, including violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

241, 245 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The complaint also alleges two 

state law claims, including violations of the Unruh Civil Rights 

Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 51, the Ralph Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 51.7, 

and the Bane Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 52.1. 

On July 21, 2007, Samaan sent an e-mail to Brian Richart 

(“Richart”), Sauer’s supervisor at the Shasta County Probation 

Department, and to Don Yost (“Yost”), the Vice President of 

Shasta County Citizens Against Racism (“SCCAR”). In these emails, Samaan identified himself as an attorney of Egyptian 

descent from Sacramento. He claimed that he had “filed a 

Federal case against a Juvenile probation officer in Redding” 

predicated on racist comments made by this individual. Samaan 

further claimed that he had hired a private investigator that 

allegedly followed this probation officer for several days 

documenting his use of the “N” word.2 The e-mail also stated 

that another probation officer was present at the time some of 

the racist comments were made. The e-mails, however, did not 

specifically identify the probation officer by name. At the 

2

 Specifically, the e-mail states, “Not only do I have an email that confirms [the probation officer’s] racist comments, 

but I also have a declaration under oath by this person that 

states, he has no idea that calling someone a ‘greasy foreigner’ 

is bad. In addition, I hired a p.i. to follow this person for 

several days that has documented his use of the ‘N’ word.” 

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time the e-mails were sent, Samaan had only commenced one 

federal lawsuit against a Shasta County juvenile probation 

officer. 

Following his receipt of the e-mail, Richart discussed the 

matter with the Assistant Chief Probation Officer, Sherri Leitem 

(“Leitem”). Yost, for his part, contacted Tom O’Mara, in public 

relations at SCCAR, and Francine Brady, President of SCCAR, to 

relay the information in the message. On July 23, 2007, Leitem 

initiated an e-mail exchange with Samaan in response to his 

complaint. In this exchange, Samaan claimed that he would be 

forwarding additional information to the Shasta County Probation 

Department, including, a copy of the federal complaint, a 

declaration by the juvenile probation officer filed in another 

matter wherein he used the word “greasy foreigner, and the names 

of the two juvenile probation officers referenced in his July 

21, 2007 e-mail. Samaan claimed that this information would 

provide “a basis to initiate an inquiry into the matter.” 

Although she was unable to recall whether she received any 

materials from Samaan, Leitem obtained a copy of the underlying 

complaint. 

On August 2, 2007, Leitem assigned Tyler Wilson (“Wilson”) 

to conduct an internal affairs investigation into Samaan’s 

complaint. When the assignment was made, Leitem informed Wilson 

that the complaint was made against Sauer. On December 4, 2007, 

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the internal affairs investigation issued a report concluding 

that Sauer did not use the word “nigger” in reference to Samaan, 

nor did he make any similar statements or threaten him in any 

way. The report stated that both Creighton Darling (the other 

probation officer referenced by Samaan in his e-mails) and Sauer 

denied ever being a part of a conversation where Sauer made 

threats or racially derogatory comments about Samaan. The 

investigation further concluded that Sauer used the term “greasy 

foreigner” in reference to Samaan during a conversation with his 

ex-wife Wilde. The investigation also concluded that there was 

no evidence that Sauer made comments or took action intended to 

coerce, intimidate or harass Samaan for the purpose of 

preventing him from moving to or visiting Redding. Finally, the 

investigation concluded that while Samaan had requested in his 

federal complaint that Sauer’s probation files be reviewed to 

ensure he had not harmed those under his control, there was no 

basis for doing so given that there was no evidence supporting 

Samaan’s allegations.3

On August 7, 2007, Sauer filed a counterclaim against 

Samaan alleging that he made false and defamatory statements 

3

 The evidence before the Court indicates that Samaan 

refused to cooperate with the internal affairs investigation 

insofar as he refused to be interviewed, submit a Citizen 

Complaint form, or turn over various documents related to his 

complaint against Sauer. 

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about Sauer to the “Anti-Racial League of the City of Redding”4

and the County of Shasta. Specifically, Sauer alleges that 

Samaan sent correspondence to his employer falsely accusing him 

of being a racist and discriminatory to minorities. Sauer 

contends that this correspondence is libelous on its face 

insofar as it exposed him to hatred, contempt, ridicule and 

obloquy as well as cast doubt on his impartiality as a juvenile 

probation officer by attributing to him negative characteristics 

and traits which are generally looked down upon by society. 

Samaan’s motion for summary judgment on Sauer’s counterclaim was 

denied by this Court on September 11, 2008. Sauer filed his 

motion herein for summary judgment on August 6, 2008. On August 

15, 2008, Samaan filed his opposition. 

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II. OPINION 

A. Legal Standard

 Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, the 

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden 

of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material 

 

4

 The Court notes that Samaan did not have any 

communications with the “Anti-Racial League of the City of 

Redding.” Rather, the evidence in the record reveals that he 

communicated with the Shasta County Probation Office and SCCAR. 

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fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

Where the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof on an 

issue at trial, the movant’s burden may be discharged by 

pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of 

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id. at 325. 

“Summary judgment for a defendant is appropriate when the 

plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to [his] case, and on which 

[he] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Miller v. Glenn 

Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

If the moving party sustains its burden, the burden then 

shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by 

his or her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce 

enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the 

moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire 

& Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 

(9th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing 

the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of 

material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to 

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judgment as a matter of law. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 

F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1989). 

B. First Claim: Violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 245

 Samman’s first claim for relief alleges a violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 241 and 245. However, because these criminal 

provisions provide no basis for civil liability, the Court 

grants summary judgment in favor of Sauer on this claim. See

Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding 

that criminal provisions such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 

“provide no basis for civil liability”); Cooley v. Keisling, 45 

F.Supp.2d 818, 820 (D.Or. 1999) (18 U.S.C. § 245 is a criminal 

statute and does not grant a private right of action to 

individuals and that enforcement of the statute rests in the 

discretion of the Attorney General of the United States). 

C. Fourth Claim: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 

 Samaan’s fourth claim for relief alleges a violation of 42 

U.S.C. § 1981. Sauer maintains that summary judgment is 

appropriate with respect to this claim because Samaan cannot 

make a prima facie case under § 1981; specifically, Samaan 

cannot demonstrate that Sauer purposefully discriminated against 

him, nor can he demonstrate that he has suffered an impairment 

of his right to make and enforce contracts. 

 “In order to establish a claim under section 1981, a 

plaintiff must establish that (1) he or she is a member of a 

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racial minority; (2) the defendant intended to discriminate 

against plaintiff on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) 

the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities 

enumerated in the statute (i.e., the right to make and enforce 

contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence, etc.).” Peterson v. 

State of California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 451 

F.Supp.2d 1092, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Mian v. Donaldson, 

Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 

1993)). “Section 1981 is not ‘a general proscription of racial 

discrimination . . . it expressly prohibits discrimination only 

in the making and enforcement of contracts.’ ” Peterson, 451 

F.Supp.2d at 1101 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 

U.S. 164, 176 (1989)) (emphasis omitted). Any claim brought 

under § 1981 must initially identify an impaired “contractual 

relationship,” under which the plaintiff has rights. Domino’s 

Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). Section 1981 

offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of 

a contractual relationship, as well as when racial 

discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so 

long as the plaintiff has or would have rights under the 

existing or proposed contractual relationship. Id.

 In the present case, Samaan’s complaint does not identify a 

contractual relationship. Rather, his complaint simply alleges 

that Sauer’s comments and actions were intended to coerce, 

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intimidate and harass him for the purpose of preventing him from 

visiting the Redding area. Samaan, for the first time, now 

argues that Sauer’s discriminatory conduct impeded, restricted 

and harmed his right to enter into a lease arrangement for his 

new law office, hire employees and conduct business freely in 

Shasta County. Even assuming that Sauer’s complaint can be 

fairly read to state a cognizable claim under § 1981, the Court 

nonetheless finds that it does not survive summary judgment. 

Samaan did not present persuasive evidence or authority 

demonstrating that Sauer engaged in racial discrimination that 

blocked the creation of a contractual relationship. 

Specifically, Samaan failed to point to evidence in the record 

creating a genuine issue of fact on the question of whether 

Sauer’s alleged conduct amounted to discriminatory interference 

preventing or impeding him from entering into a contractual 

relationship. In fact, Samaan did not produce persuasive 

evidence contradicting the finding by the internal affairs 

investigator that there was no evidence supporting his 

contention that Sauer made comments or took action intended to 

coerce, intimidate or harass him for the purpose of preventing 

him from moving to or visiting Redding. Indeed, Samaan concedes 

that he has never met or spoken with Sauer. Accordingly, 

because Samaan failed to make a showing sufficient to create a 

genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether Sauer 

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engaged in discriminatory conduct blocking the creation of a 

contractual relationship, the Court grants summary judgment in 

favor of Sauer on this claim. 

D. Supplemental Jurisdiction

 Because summary judgment is appropriate on all of Samaan’s 

federal claims, only claims based on state law remain. Thus, 

the question becomes whether this Court should exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Samaan’s state law claims. The 

Ninth Circuit uses a two-part analysis to determine whether it 

is appropriate for a court to exercise its discretion to decline 

supplemental jurisdiction. See Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc.,

114 F.3d 999, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, a court 

must look to whether the case falls under one of the four 

enumerated circumstances under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c). Id. at 1001. 

Second, the court must consider whether the values of economy, 

convenience, fairness, and comity are served by retention of 

supplemental jurisdiction. Id. “ ‘[I]n the usual case in which 

all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance 

of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise 

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.’ ” Id.

(quoting Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 

n. 7 (1998)). 

In the present case, because the Court has dismissed all 

the federal claims that served as a basis for jurisdiction, this 

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Court has discretion under § 1367(c)(3) to decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). As such, 

the question is whether the values of economy, convenience, 

fairness, and comity are served by retention of supplemental 

jurisdiction. As to economy, the Court finds that it has not 

invested so much judicial energy in this case to justify 

retention of jurisdiction. Substantial resources have not been 

committed to this case such that sending it to another court 

will cause a substantial duplication of effort. Moreover, 

because this Court did not invest any work or time in the state 

claims, dismissal of these claims will not result in duplication 

of any work by the undersigned. As to convenience, the Court is 

unaware of any reason why it would be more convenient to have 

this case proceed in this Court rather than in state court. As 

to fairness, the Court finds that a state forum will provide 

just as fair a proceeding as a federal one. Finally, as to 

comity, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of 

remand insofar as the remaining claims all arise under state 

law. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)

(needless decisions of state law should be avoided as a matter 

of comity). 

 In sum, this Court declines to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over Samaan’s remaining state law claims. The 

Court has dismissed all the federal claims that served as a 

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basis for jurisdiction and the values of judicial economy, 

convenience, fairness, and comity, on balance, indicate that 

this case properly belongs in state court. The Court therefore 

will dismiss Samaan’s state law claims. These claims are 

dismissed without prejudice; Samaan may proceed with these 

claims in state court. See Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 

F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissal of pendent state 

claims following dismissal of related federal claims must be 

without prejudice), overruled on other grounds by Acri, 114 F.3d 

at 1000.

E. Attorneys’ Fees

 Sauer requests an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1988 on the basis that Samaan’s suit was vexatious, 

frivolous, and brought to harass or embarrass him. 

Section 1988(b) provides, in relevant part: “In any action 

or proceeding to enforce . . . [42 U.S.C. § 1981] . . . the 

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a 

reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” The 

authorization of an award of attorneys’ fees under § 1988 

applies differently to prevailing defendants than to prevailing 

plaintiffs. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1402

(9th Cir. 1994). A prevailing defendant should not routinely be 

awarded attorneys’ fees simply because he has succeeded. Id. A 

prevailing civil rights defendant may be awarded attorneys’ fees 

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under § 1988 only if the plaintiff’s claim was unreasonable, 

frivolous, meritless, or without foundation, or when the 

plaintiff continues to litigate after it clearly becomes so. 

Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash, 169 F.3d 636, 645 (9th 

Cir. 1999); see also Sherman v. Babbitt, 772 F.2d 1476, 1478 

(9th Cir.1985) (a court has discretion to award attorneys’ fees 

in a civil rights suit if the action is “groundless” or “without 

foundation”). An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable 

basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 

(1989); Peters v. Winco Foods, Inc., 320 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1037

(E.D. Cal. 2004).

 In the present case, the Court finds that Sauer is entitled 

to an award of attorneys’ fees. Samaan’s federal claims against 

Sauer were frivolous insofar as they lacked an arguable basis in 

law or in fact. It is clear from the record that Samaan 

unreasonably pursued these claims for the purpose of 

embarrassing and harassing Sauer and not for the redress of his 

civil rights. This is evidenced by Samaan’s failure to cite to 

persuasive evidence or any legal authority in support of these 

claims. It is further evidenced by the fact that Samaan’s brief 

in opposition to Sauer’s summary judgment motion herein 

references sensitive information that is materially irrelevant 

and includes disparaging personal accusations against Sauer. As 

a licensed attorney, Samaan certainly has no excuse for filing 

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such obviously frivolous federal claims and should have known 

better. Accordingly, an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is 

warranted in this case. 

/// 

III. ORDER 

 For the reasons set forth above, Sauer’s motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED with respect to Samaan’s federal claims. 

Samaan’s remaining state law claims are DISMISSED without 

prejudice. Sauer is entitled to file a motion for attorneys’ 

fees in accordance with Local Rule 54-293. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 18, 2008 

 

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