Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02774/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02774-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

PRASAD MEDEPALLI, an

individual,

NO. CIV. S-06-2774 FCD EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MAXIMUS, INC., an entity of

unknown origin; DOES 1 through

25, inclusive,

Defendants.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary

judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, filed

by defendant Maximus, Inc. (“Maximus”).1 Plaintiff Prasad

Medepalli (“Medepalli”) opposes the motion. For the reasons set

for below, defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

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2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts herein are

undisputed. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. of Undisputed

Facts, filed Mar. 18, 2008 (“PRUF”).)

2

BACKGROUND2

A. Parties

Maximus is in the business of providing program management

and consulting services to federal, state, and local governments. 

(PRUF ¶ 1.) Part of its business includes contracting with state

governments to provide various public services, including

assistance in delivery of Temporary Assistance for Needy

Families, Medicare/Medicaid, food stamps, and other government

benefits and plans. (PRUF ¶ 1.) 

Medepalli was hired by Maximus on or about April 23, 2001,

as a Senior Developer with a starting salary of $82,250 per year. 

(PRUF ¶ 5.) The prerequisites for the position included, at a

minimum, a bachelor’s degree in computer science, or a related

computer degree at a university, and three to five years of

business application development, including the ability to

program with Oracle Designer, PL/SQL, and other Oracle

development tools. (PRUF ¶ 5.) Medepalli was hired based on his

education and experience. (PRUF ¶ 5.) He held three degrees (a

bachelor’s degree in chemistry, a master’s degree in management

studies; and a master’s degree in computer information systems)

and had received certification from Oracle Corporation on PL/SQL

programming languages. (PRUF ¶¶ 2-3.) Medepalli also had eight

years of experience in computer code development work, as well as

two years of experience teaching college computer programming

courses. (PRUF ¶ 4.) 

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3

B. Job Description

Ninety percent of Medepalli’s work was developing computer

code for business applications used by Maximus or Maximus’

clients. (PRUF ¶ 28.) Code development is intricate work that

required Medepalli to use his intellectual skills to develop

computer code so that the software program would operate as

contracted for by Maximus’ clients. (PRUF ¶ 9.) How the code

was written and put together by Medepalli was critical in the

performance of business applications. (PRUF ¶ 24.) 

As a Senior Developer, Medepalli wrote computer code that

used large, complex social services formulas to work with

millions of lines of data and volumes of information. (PRUF ¶

24.) After writing the code, Medepalli would then test and

analyze the code to ensure that it was working properly. (PRUF ¶

26.) Medepalli believes he was one of the top developers at

Maximus, and other developers came to him for help. (PRUF ¶ 27.)

Medepalli received his assignments from supervisors, who

gave him instructions on the specific tasks he was to complete. 

(Pl.’s Stmt. Additional Disputed Facts (“PADF”), filed Mar. 18,

2008, ¶ 7.) Although Medepalli was required to follow Maximus’

established standards and templates as to appearance and

operation of the final product, (PADF ¶¶ 4, 6), he had a degree

of independence in determining how to develop the code, (PRUF ¶

23). While with Maximus, Medepalli worked on three main

projects: the Utah Medicaid Managed Care System (“MMCS”), the

Utah Drug Rebate Program, and California Healthy Families. (PRUF

¶ 6.) 

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4

1. MMCS

The MMCS program manages the care of Medicaid clients,

enrolls clients in managed care plans, and calculates the monthly

capitation amounts for each enrollee based on enrolled client

information and rate cell information maintained by the state of

Utah. (PRUF ¶ 7.) Medepalli worked on the MMCS project to

develop applications that would be used to support the MMCS

program. (PRUF ¶ 8.) Medepalli’s work on the MMCS project was

“complex” and included working on a computer application that

would compute the amount payable to healthcare providers based on

the numerous rules, regulations, and various contracts with

different healthcare providers. (PRUF ¶ 11.) Medepalli was also

required to work with social experts to understand the

requirements of social services. (PRUF ¶ 10.) 

2. Utah Drug Rebate Program

The Drug Rebate Program was a system used by Utah to

calculate and invoice rebates from various pharmaceutical

companies. (PRUF ¶ 14.) Maximus was contracted to develop a

web-based system for Utah’s Medicaid agencies to calculate and

invoice rebates earned from various pharmaceutical companies. 

(PRUF ¶ 15.) Plaintiff’s work on the Drug Rebate Program was to

do data modeling, user interface work, and work on the business

requirements document. (PRUF ¶ 16.) 

3. California Healthy Families

California contracted with Maximus to provide support for

its Healthy Families program. (PRUF ¶ 17.) The program

contracts with numerous healthcare providers to provide care for

children. (PRUF ¶ 18.) Medepalli developed various business

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5

applications and created computer code necessary to administer

and support the Healthy Families program. (PRUF ¶ 19.) His work

included reworking the computer code developed for the Utah

programs to conform with the different rules and regulations in

California, such as how eligibility and payment of healthcare

providers needed to be determined. (PRUF ¶ 20.) Medepalli also

worked on developing the code for user interface, the screens

that people use to enter information into the computer. (PRUF ¶

21.)

C. Present Action

Medepalli worked as a Senior Developer for Maximus between

April 23, 2001, and April 30, 2004. (PRUF ¶ 30.) During that

time, Medepalli’s monthly salary was at least two times the state

minimum wage based on a forty-hour work week, and he was paid as

an exempt employee. (PRUF ¶¶ 31-32.) Medepalli was laid off on

April 30, 2004. (PRUF ¶ 33.) Medepalli filed a complaint

against Maximus on October 3, 2006, alleging four causes of

action under the California Labor Code: (1) failure to pay

overtime compensation; (2) failure to provide accurate itemized

pay statements; (3) failure to provide meal periods; and (4)

failure to provide rest periods. The complaint also alleged a

fifth cause of action for conversion. Maximus now moves for

summary judgment.

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3 Plaintiff recites the California standard for summary

judgment in its responsive brief. However, the federal standard

for summary judgment governs. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. § 1.

6

STANDARD3

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment where “the pleading, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c); see California v.

Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). The evidence must

be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, “the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party only needs to show “that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 325.

Once the moving party has met its burden of proof, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier

of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in

light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. 

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4 Plaintiff did not address defendant’s statute of

limitation argument. This silence could be interpreted as a nonopposition to defendant’s argument. However, for the purpose of

completeness, the court will address the merits of this argument.

7

See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its

allegations without any significant probative evidence tending to

support the complaint. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at

1107. Instead, through admissible evidence the nonmoving party

“must set for specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e).

ANALYSIS

I. Statute of Limitations

Maximus first argues that Medepalli’s claims are barred in

whole or in part by the applicable statute of limitations.4

Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 338(a), a three-year

statute of limitations applies to claims for wages. A one-year

statute of limitations governs claims for penalties. Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 340(a); see also Murphy v. Kenneth Colde Prods., 40

Cal. 4th 1094, 1102 (2007) (discussing applicable statute of

limitations under wage and hour law).

A. First Cause of Action: Failure to Pay Overtime

Medepalli’s first cause of action alleges failure to pay

overtime and, therefore, is a claim for wages. See Cal. Labor

Code 204(b)(1). As such, it is subject to the three-year statute

of limitation in § 338(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 

Because the complaint was filed on October 3, 2006, the court

finds the first claim for relief is barred to the extent it seeks

to recover for violations prior to October 3, 2003. Therefore,

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8

plaintiff may only seek relief for the six month period between

October 3, 2003, and April 30, 2004.

B. Second Cause of Action: Failure to Provide Itemized Pay

Statements

Medepalli’s second cause of action for failure to provide

itemized pay statements is a claim for penalties. See Cal. Labor

Code § 226(e) (“An employee suffering injury [for failure to

provide itemized statements] is entitled to recover . . .

[damages] not exceeding an aggregate penalty of four thousand

dollars ($4,000), and is entitled to an award of costs and

reasonable attorney’s fees.”) (emphasis added); see also Murphy,

40 Cal. 4th at 1108 (“In section 226, the Legislature imposed a

penalty on employers who fail to provide itemized wage statements

that comply with the Labor Code.”) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, it is subject to the one-year statute of limitation

in Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a). Because the complaint was

filed more than a year after plaintiff was terminated, the court

finds Medepalli’s second cause of action is barred in its

entirety.

C. Third Cause of Action: Failure to Provide Meal Periods

Medepalli’s third cause of action alleges failure to provide

meal periods. This claim for wages is subject to a three-year

statute of limitation. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(a); Cal.

Labor Code § 226.7 (“If an employee fails to provide an employee

a meal period . . . the employer shall pay the employee one

additional hour of pay at the employer’s regular rate of

compensation . . .”); see also Murphy, 40 Cal. 4th at 1110-11

(holding § 226.7’s “additional hour of pay” constitutes a wage). 

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9

Thus, similar to the first cause of action, Medepalli’s claim is

barred to the extent it seeks compensation for violations prior

to October 3, 2003.

D. Fourth Cause of Action: Failure to Provide Rest Periods

Medepalli’s fourth cause of action alleges failure to

provide rest periods. Like Medepallis’ third claim for relief,

this claim also seeks compensation for time worked. See Cal.

Labor Code § 226.7(b) (“If an employee fails to provide an

employee a meal period . . . the employer shall pay the employee

one additional hour of pay at the employer’s regular rate of

compensation . . . .”). It therefore is a claim for wages. See

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(a); Murphy, 40 Cal. 4th at 1110-11

(holding § 226.7’s “additional hour of pay” constitutes a wage). 

As such, the claim is barred to the extent Medepalli seeks

compensation for violations occurring prior to October 3, 2003. 

E. Fifth Cause of Action: Conversion

Medepalli’s fifth and final cause of action for conversion

is subject to a three-year statute of limitations under § 338(c)

of the Code of Civil Procedure. See Bono v. Clark, 103 Cal. App.

4th 1409, 1433 (2002) (“As a general rule, the statute of

limitations for conversion is triggered by the act of wrongfully

taking property.”). Thus, the fifth claim is also barred to the

extent Medepalli seeks recovery for acts prior to October 3,

2003.

In sum, the court finds plaintiff’s first, third, fourth,

and fifth claims for relief are barred to the extent they seek

recovery for wage and hour law violations occurring prior to

October 3, 2003. Therefore, plaintiff may only seek recovery

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5 Maximus also argues Medepalli is exempt as an

administrative employee. Because, as set forth infra, the court

finds Medepalli is exempt as a professional employee, it need not

address whether Medepalli meets the requirements of the

administrative exemption.

10

based upon these claims to the extent the alleged violations

occurred in the six month period between October 3, 2003, and

April 30, 2004, when plaintiff’s employment with defendant was

terminated. With respect to plaintiff’s second claim for relief,

the court finds the applicable statute of limitation has run. As

such, defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s second claim for relief is GRANTED.

II. Wage Order Exemptions

Maximus next argues that Medepalli is exempt from wage and

hour laws as a professional employee.5 The California Industrial

Welfare Commission (“IWC”) is authorized to promulgate orders

regulating wages, hours, and conditions of employment for

employees throughout California. Nordquist v. McGraw-Hill

Broadcasting Co., Inc., 32 Cal. App. 4th 555, 562 (1995). 

Pursuant to this authority, the IWC has promulgated seventeen

different “wage orders” that apply to various groups of

employees. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, §§ 11010-11170. At issue in

this case is IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001, regulating, inter alia,

overtime, itemized pay statements, meal periods, and rest

periods. Cal. Code Reg. tit. 8, § 11040(3)(A), (7)(B), (11)(A),

12(a). IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001 exempts “persons employed in

administrative, executive, or professional capacities” from its

provisions. Cal. Code Reg. tit. 8, § 11040(1)(A)(3). The

exemptions are affirmative defenses, and, therefore, the burden

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11

is on the employer to prove that an employee is exempt. Ramirez

v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal. 4th 785, 794-95 (1999).

In order to qualify under the “professional” exemption, an

employer must show that an employee: (1) received a monthly

salary at least two times the state minimum wage based on a forty

hour work week; (2) performed work requiring knowledge of an

advanced type in a field customarily acquired by prolonged course

of specialized intellectual instruction and study; (3) performed

work that was predominately intellectual and varied in character

and is of such character that the output produced could not be

standardized in relation to a given period of time; (4) exercised

discretion and independent judgement customarily and regularly;

and (5) primarily engaged in duties that meet the test of the

exemption. Cal. Code Reg. tit. 8, § 11040(1)(A)(3)(b)-(d).

A. Monthly Salary

Maximus asserts Medepalli meets the first prong of the

professional exemption because, at all times during his

employment, Medepalli was paid at least twice the state minimum

wage based on full-time employment. Specifically, Maximus

asserts Medepalli was paid $2,166.67 per month in 2001 and was

paid $2,340 per month from 2002 to 2004. Medepalli does not

dispute these facts. The minimum wage requirement in 2001 was

$6.25 per hour, or $1,000 per month. See Cal. Code Reg. tit. 8,

§ 11040(4) (2001). From 2002 to 2004, the minimum wage

requirement was $6.75 per hour, or $1,080 per month. See Cal.

Code Reg. tit. 8, § 11040(4) (2004). Thus, Medepalli’s wages

during his employment were at least twice the monthly minimum

wage requirement based on a forty-hour work week. Accordingly,

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the court finds Medepalli meets the first criteria for the

professional exemption.

B. Advanced Knowledge

Maximus contends Medepalli also meets the second prong of

the professional exemption because he was engaged in an

occupation that required advanced knowledge obtained through a

prolonged course of study. The requirements for plaintiff’s

position at Maximus included, at a minimum, a bachelor’s degree

in computer science and three to five years of experience in

business application development, including the ability to

program with Oracle Designer, PL/SQL, and other Oracle

development tools. Medepalli met these criteria by obtaining a

master’s degree in computer science and by receiving

certification from Oracle Corporation in PL/SQL. Medepalli does

not dispute that he acquired his knowledge in computer code,

business applications, and data modeling through a prolonged

course of study. Nor does Medepalli dispute that this course of

instruction was in a field of advanced and specialized knowledge. 

The court therefore concludes Medepalli meets the second element

of the professional exemption.

C. Intellectual, Varied Work

Maximus next contends the third criteria for the

professional exception is met because Medepalli’s work was highly

complex and varied in nature. IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001

expressly incorporates certain regulations of the Federal Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”) effective as of the date the wage order

was issued. Among the provisions incorporated by the wage order

is § 541.306, which provides the following example of an employee

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6 The court notes that the U.S. Department of Labor

amended the FLSA’s implementing regulations effective August 23,

2004, repealing § 541.306. See Combs v. Skyriver Commc’ns, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 182 n.5 (Ct. App. 2008). However, the wage

order incorporates the FLSA regulations as they existed on

January 1, 2001, the date the wage order was issued. Id. at 181. 

Because § 541.306 was in force at that time, its provisions are

incorporated into the wage order. Moreover, § 541.306 was

amended in August of 2004, well after plaintiff’s employment with

defendant was terminated. As such, the subsequent repeal of §

541.306 does not affect its applicability in this case. 

13

engaged in intellectual and varied work, as opposed to routine

work:

While a doctor may make 20 physical examinations in the

morning and perform in the course of his examinations

essentially similar tests[, i]t requires not only

judgment on his part but a continual variety of

interpretation of the tests to perform satisfactory

work. Likewise, although a professional chemist may

make a series of similar tests, the problems presented

will vary as will the deductions to be made therefrom.

See 29 C.F.R. § 541.306.6

Applying these principles to the present case, the court

finds no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether

Medepalli’s work was intellectual and varied. The undisputed

evidence demonstrates that, although Medepalli had certain overarching standards or templates for the appearance and operation

of the final product, the codes and applications Medepalli used

to achieve the required results were within his discretion. 

Indeed, Medepalli does not dispute that he exercised a degree of

discretion in his work.

Rather, Medepalli contends that his work was routine. 

However, he proffers no evidence to support this contention. 

Moreover, the undisputed facts establish that each project

Medepalli worked on required different applications. The MMCS

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7 The court notes that plaintiff’s proffered transcript

of his deposition is not properly authenticated in accordance

with Federal Rules of Evidence 901. However, since defendant

does not object to this evidence, the court assumes for purposes

of this motion that it is a correct copy of plaintiff’s

deposition transcript.

14

project required computer applications that computed the amount

payable to healthcare providers based on numerous rules,

regulations, and contract provisions. The Utah Drug rebate

program, however, required a web-based system that calculated and

invoiced drug rebates. Finally, the California Healthy Families

program required modification of the Utah programs to conform to

the different rules and regulations of California. 

The only thing routine about Medepalli’s work appears to be

the fact it was predominately code development. However, as §

541.306 explains, the test is not whether the same type of work

is done, but whether the work is intellectually varied. In this

case, Medepalli may have spent ninety percent of his time

developing codes, but the intellectual skills required to develop

those codes varied depending on the needs of the client and the

number of people working on the project. As Medepalli himself

explained, “it’s almost like sentence structure . . . [y]ou can

make it [sic] elegant and easy to read code, which I used to do,

and you can also make it really complex so that nobody can

understand.” (See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. of Undisputed

Facts, filed Mar. 18, 2008, at 27 (quoting Medepalli’s Deposition

at 134:9-19).)7 Medepalli further clarified, “That’s where you

have independence. The other programmer uses a 4 loop, I use a Y

loop, something like that.” (Deposition of Prasad Medepalli, Ex.

A to Declaration of Brian Mills, filed Feb. 28, 2008, (“Medepalli

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8 Moreover, Medepalli admits that each code developer was

responsible for his or her own piece of the project, which

required the developers to integrate their own independent work

into the independent work of others. (Deposition of Prasad

Medepalli, Ex. A to Declaration of Brian Mills, filed Feb. 28,

2008, (“Medepalli Depo.”) at 52:8-19.) This also influenced

choice of codes.

9 A much stronger adjective could be used to describe

plaintiff’s brief opposing summary judgment. (See Pl.’s P. & A.,

filed Mar. 18, 2008.) Plaintiff’s argument against a finding of

exemption, under either the professional or administrative

exemptions, is a sum total of three pages and contains a single

citation to Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.

4th 319, 324-25 (2004), for the proposition that defendant

carries the burden of showing an exemption.

10 Because California wage and hour laws are modeled on

federal laws, federal cases provide persuasive guidance for the

court. Nordquist v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 32 Cal. App.

4th 555, 562 (1995). 

15

Depo.”) at 140:1-3.)8

 Thus, like a doctor performing similar

tests to diagnose different and diseases and recommend different

treatments, the computer codes and applications Medepalli

developed were unique to the needs of each of Maximus’ clients. 

No reasonable trier of fact could conclude based on the evidence

that Medepalli’s work was routine, and his bald9 assertion

otherwise is not sufficient to overcome summary judgment. Cf.

Powell v. American Red Cross, 518 F. Supp. 2d 24, 40 (D.D.C.

2007) (holding registered nurse satisfied the professional

exemption where plaintiff did not dispute the tasks she performed

but rather the characterization of those tasks as intellectual

and varied).10 The court therefore finds that Medepalli meets

the third prong of the professional exemption.

D. Exercise of Discretion

Maximus argues the fourth element of the professional

exemption is met because Medepalli customarily and regularly

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exercised discretion in developing codes. As with the third

prong of the exemption, IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001 incorporates

provisions of the FLSA that provide guidance. Section 541.207(a)

defines “discretion” as “the comparison and the evaluation of

possible courses of conduct and acting or making after the

various possibilities have been considered.” 29 C.F.R. §

541.207(a). With respect to computer programmers and systems

analysis, § 541.207(c)(7) states:

In the data processing field a systems analyst is

exercising discretion and independent judgment when he

develops methods to process, for example, accounting,

inventory, sales, and other business information by

using electronic computers. He also exercises

discretion and independent judgment when he determines

the exact nature of the data processing problem, and

structures the problem in a logical manner so that a

system to solve the problem and obtain the desired

results can be developed. Whether a computer programer

is exercising discretion and independent judgment

depends on the facts in each particular case.

29 C.F.R. § 541.207(c)(7) (emphasis added). Thus, an employee in

the computer industry exercises discretion by analyzing a problem

and determining the steps to reach a solution. Moreover, §

541.207(e) makes clear that the exercise of discretion does not

require “the decisions made by the employee must have a finality

that goes with unlimited authority and a complete absence of

review.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(e). Rather, “[t]he fact an

employee’s decision may be subject to review and that upon

occasion the decisions are revised or reversed after review does

not mean that the employee is not exercising discretion.” Id.

Based on these principles, the court finds there is no

genuine issue of fact as to Medepalli’s customary and regular

exercise of discretion in developing codes. The undisputed facts

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establish that Medepalli exercised a large degree of discretion

in deciding what codes to use for a particular project and how

those codes would be written. Indeed, Medepalli’s own testimony

supports the conclusion he customarily and regularly exercised

independent judgment:

My boss would say “You are going to work on this one,

this piece.” So then we have a meeting and discuss

about this. Then he will actually tell you--this person

will give you the business rules or something. Some

document. Then you read that and then discuss with me. 

And finally he’ll tell how you want to implement the

system, what kind of technology you should be using,

whether would we do a form or best process. He would

tell you “This is what I want you to do.” Beyond that,

just write the code to make that happen, what he wants,

“This is what I want to see,” so you make that happen.

(Medepalli Depo. at 49:17-50:6 (emphasis added).) Since

Medepalli spent ninety percent of his time developing code, and

the codes developed were entirely within his judgement based on

the particular needs of Maximus’ clients, the court finds as a

matter of law Medepalli customarily and regularly exercised

discretion.

Medepalli argues he did not exercise discretion within the

meaning of the professional exemption because he had no control

over the assignments he received or the end product. However,

absolute discretion is not required in order for this exemption

to apply. Rather, discretion is defined as making a decision

based on the comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of

conduct. 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(a). Here, Medepalli developed code

based on the specifications required by the client. He was not

required to develop any particular code by any particular means;

he just had to “make it happen.” In other words, Medepalli did

not control the final product, but he did control the means by

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11 The court notes that the cases cited throughout this

section deal with the administrative exemption, as opposed to the

professional exemption. However, to the extent the two standards

look at similar factors, the cases provide persuasive support for

the court’s conclusion. 

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which to achieve that product. Such control is sufficient to

satisfy the professional exemption’s fourth prong. Cf. Combs v.

Skyriver Commc’ns, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 190 (Ct. App.

2008) (holding employee that spent seventy percent of his time

troubleshooting high-speed, wireless, broadband internet network

and had the authority to determine the course of action to

correct problems customarily and regularly exercised discretion);

Shillinglaw v. System Works, Inc., 1993 WL 603289, at *4 (N.D.

Ga. 1993) (holding a computer programmer/analyst that exercised

discretion in less than twenty percent of the work performed

satisfied exemption under federal labor standards).11

Medepalli also contends he did not exercise control because

he was “micromanaged.” He argues that he was subject to the

direct supervision of his superiors, who reviewed his work and

asked for modifications. However, as set for above, the exercise

of discretion does not require absolute discretion. 29 C.F.R. §

541.207(e). An employee can exercise discretion even if his

superiors overrule his decisions, review his work, or ask for

alterations of his work. Id.; cf. Zacek v. Automated Sys. Corp.,

541 S.W.2d 516, 519-20 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (affirming trial

court’s finding computer systems analyst exercised discretion

sufficient to qualify for federal labor standards exemption

despite oversight by supervisor). Accordingly, the court finds 

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that Medepalli meets the fourth prong of the professional

exemption.

E. Primarily Engaged

Maximus argues Medepalli meets the final prong of the

professional exemption because he was primarily engaged in

computer coding during his employment. Medepalli does not

dispute that he spent ninety percent of his time developing code. 

Thus, the court finds Medepalli meets the final criteria for

application of the professional exemption. 

Because the court finds as a matter of law Medepalli has met

all elements of the professional exemption, Maximus is not

required to comply with the provisions of IWC Wage Order No. 4-

2001. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on

the first, third, and fourth causes of action is GRANTED.

III. Conversion

Maximus contends Medepalli’s fifth claim for relief fails as

a matter of law because plaintiff was an exempt employee. The

court agrees. Medepalli’s claim for conversion is premised on

Maximus’ failure to pay overtime wages and failure to compensate

Medepalli for missed meal and rest periods. However, an exempt

employee is not entitled to overtime, meal periods, or rest

periods. Because Medepalli is an exempt employee, defendant’s

motion for summary judgment on the fifth cause of action is

GRANTED.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of the court is directed to close

this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: April 8, 2008. 

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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