Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00544/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00544-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARLAND JONES,

CDCR #F-47928

Plaintiff,

vs.

MRS. TISCORNIA; MRS. MONRT,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00544-GPC-PCL

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

I. Procedural History

On March 15, 2018, Garland Jones (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner incarcerated at the 

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), located in San Diego, California, and 

proceeding pro se, filed a civil complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doc. No. 1 at 

1. 

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Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the 

time of filing; instead he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 2).

On March 26, 2018, this Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and 

sua sponte DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could 

be granted. See Doc. No. 4 at 7-8. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended his 

complaint in order to correct the deficiencies noted in the Court’s Order. See id. On 

April 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Doc. No. 5. 

However, once again, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim and 

DISMISSED his FAC with leave to amend. Doc. No. 9. On July 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed 

his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Doc. No. 10.

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because he is a prisoner and is 

proceeding IFP, his SAC requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 

prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state 

a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Williams v. King, 875

F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and citing

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 

621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of 

[screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the 

expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) calls for dismissal of a complaint that 

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does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of 

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and 

statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 

1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two 

essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 

F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

C. Access to Courts claim

While Plaintiff’s SAC is not clear at times, it appears that he is alleging that 

Defendant Tiscornia, Prison Law Librarian, and her supervisor, Mrs. Monrt, attempted to 

“derail” Plaintiff’s complaints, denied Plaintiff “indigent person allowances of services,” 

and caused complaints to be untimely filed with the courts. SAC at 2, 3. Plaintiff also 

claims that the actions of Defendants caused a “serious deprivation” of his civil rights. 

Id. at 3.

Prisoners have a constitutional right to access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the 

frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking 

access claim) or from the loss of a suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking 

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claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002); see also Silva v. Di 

Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011) (differentiating “between two types of 

access to court claims: those involving prisoners’ right to affirmative assistance and those 

involving prisoners’ rights to litigate without active interference”).

However, Plaintiff must allege “actual injury” as the threshold requirement to any 

access to courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. An “actual 

injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the 

inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual injury as the 

“inability to file a complaint or defend against a charge”). The failure to allege an actual 

injury is “fatal.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Failure to 

show that a ‘non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is fatal.”) (quoting Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 353 & n.4). Here, Plaintiff must allege the loss of a “non-frivolous” or “arguable” 

underlying claim. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14. The nature and description of the 

underlying claim must be set forth in the pleading “as if it were being independently 

pursued.” Id. at 417. Finally, Plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may be 

awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be 

brought.” Id. at 415.

Despite the Court’s informing Plaintiff of the deficiency of his pleadings as to this 

issue in previous Orders, see Doc. No. 4 at 6; Doc. No. 9 at 4, Plaintiff’s SAC again fails 

to allege the actual injury that incurred as a result of any of Defendants’ actions. This is 

fatal to his claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. Plaintiff’s SAC

fails to include any “factual matter” to show how or why any of Defendants caused him 

to suffer any “actual prejudice,” “such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to 

present a claim,” with respect to any case. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; Jones, 393 F.3d at 936; 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show 

that any named Defendant caused him to suffer any “actual injury” with respect to any

non-frivolous action he may have filed, see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354, the Court finds 

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Plaintiff’s access to courts claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon 

which § 1983 relief can be granted. 

Plaintiff’s SAC must be dismissed in its entirety for failing to state a claim upon 

which § 1983 relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. Because 

Plaintiff has already been provided two opportunities to amend his claims but has failed 

to cure the deficiencies notes in the Court’s rulings, the Court denies further leave to 

amend because it would be futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759 F.3d 1112, 

1116 (9th Cir. 2014).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons discussed, the Court finds Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted and DISMISSES this civil action without further leave 

to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). 

The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 30, 2018

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