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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 2003 Decided June 6, 2003

No. 02-7163

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION,

APPELLANT

v.

EXPRESSTRAK, L.L.C.,

APPELLEE

Consolidated with

02–7164, 03–7058, 03–7059

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv01773)

(No. 02cv02012)

–————

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-7164 Document #753329 Filed: 06/06/2003 Page 1 of 13
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Jack McKay argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the briefs was Jonathan W. Gannon.

Philip A. Nacke argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the briefs were John G. DeGooyer and Steven C. Lambert.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and TATEL,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In this expedited appeal, the National Railroad Passenger Corp. (‘‘Amtrak’’) appeals orders of

the district court (1) interpreting its lease agreements with

ExpressTrak, L.L.C., to require arbitration of any disputes;

(2) enjoining the parties to continue performing under the

terms of the leases during arbitration; and (3) confirming an

interim arbitration award. Amtrak contends that the district

court failed to abide by the parties’ clearly expressed intent

to litigate disputes arising under the leases. Our jurisdiction

to review the grant of the injunction compelling continued

performance of the leases and the order confirming the

interim arbitrator’s award is clear. Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1)(2002), the court has jurisdiction to review the

district court’s entry of the injunction because, although

denominated ‘‘permanent,’’ the injunction is interlocutory in

nature, as the district court has not entered a final order

winding up the parties’ litigation. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (‘‘FAA’’), 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(D), the court has

jurisdiction to review the district court’s order confirming the

interim award. Although orders compelling arbitration are

usually non-appealable under FAA § 16(b), to review either

the injunction or the interim award, the court must determine

whether the parties’ dispute was properly arbitrable; hence,

the court has pendent appellant jurisdiction over that order

as well. As to arbitrability, we hold that the parties’ dispute

was not properly arbitrable. Accordingly, we reverse the

order compelling arbitration as well as the injunction and the

confirmation order, and we remand the case to the district

court for trial on Amtrak’s claim that ExpressTrak breached

the lease agreements.

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I.

Amtrak and ExpressTrak executed three agreements providing for the transportation of perishable goods in temperature-controlled express cars attached to Amtrak passenger

trains: an Operating Agreement, a Sublease, and a Direct

Lease. Under the Operating Agreement of October 27, 1999,

ExpressTrak was to acquire express cars, have them refurbished, and convey the express cars to a third-party lessor.

The third-party lessor would then lease the cars to Amtrak,

which, in turn, would sublease the cars to ExpressTrak.

Operating Agreement § 1.8. Orix Financial Services, acting

as the third-party lessor, agreed to purchase 110 express

cars, and on May 15, 2001, Orix executed a Headlease with

Amtrak, which required Orix to lease the express cars to

Amtrak. On the same day, Amtrak entered a Sublease with

ExpressTrak, in which Amtrak agreed to sublease the 110

express cars to ExpressTrak. In November 2001, after

financing only fifty-five of the 110 express cars, Orix suspended its funding. Amtrak and ExpressTrak subsequently entered into a letter agreement (‘‘Direct Lease’’) on November

30, 2001, whereby Amtrak agreed to purchase the fifty-five

remaining express cars from the refurbishing vendor, and

lease them to ExpressTrak. The letter agreement stated

that the parties have ‘‘substantially the same rights and

obligations with respect to the railcars made subject thereto

as each currently holds with respect to the railcars subject to

the SubleaseTTTT’’ Direct Lease ¶ 2. Although the parties

contemplated executing a more formal document, they never

did.

By letters of April 15, 2002, Amtrak informed ExpressTrak

that because ExpressTrak had failed to make its January and

April 2002 payments, it was in default under the Sublease and

the Direct Lease (collectively ‘‘the Leases’’), and Amtrak was

terminating the Leases; Amtrak also demanded return of all

express cars leased to ExpressTrak under the Leases. ExpressTrak paid Amtrak the overdue amounts on April 17,

2002, and by letter of April 25 to Amtrak denied that it had

defaulted under the Leases and asserted that the April 15

notice of default was ‘‘ineffective and unenforceable,’’ that

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Amtrak could not unilaterally ‘‘demand return of the express

cars,’’ and that Amtrak had ‘‘defaulted on numerous obligations’’ under the Operating Agreement. In an attempt to

resolve their differences, the parties operated under a standstill agreement from May 3, 2002, to September 8, 2002,

pursuant to which Amtrak agreed not to take any steps

toward repossessing the express cars. During this period,

Amtrak continued to run the express cars with ExpressTrak

freight and make payments to Orix, as required under the

Headlease.

On September 9, 2002, Amtrak filed suit against ExpressTrak, alleging that ExpressTrak had defaulted under the

Leases when it failed to make timely payments, and seeking

declaratory relief and damages. In response, ExpressTrak

moved for a stay of the litigation pending arbitration and an

order compelling Amtrak to continue conducting business,

arguing that the Operating Agreement requires the parties to

submit their disputes to arbitration. Amtrak then moved to

enjoin the arbitration on the ground that the Leases require

the parties to settle their differences by litigation, not arbitration. On October 15, 2002, ExpressTrak filed suit against

Amtrak seeking a preliminary injunction and an order compelling arbitration. The district court consolidated the lawsuits, and on December 5, 2002, ruled that the dispute

resolution provisions of the Operating Agreement, and not

those in the Leases, governed the parties’ dispute. Nat’l

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. ExpressTrak, L.L.C., 233 F. Supp. 2d

39 (D.D.C. 2002). Accordingly, the district court stayed both

cases, directed the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration, and entered a preliminary injunction ‘‘requiring the

parties to continue conducting business while such arbitration

proceedings are pending.’’ Amtrak appealed the December 5

Order and also filed a motion in the district court to set bond

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c), which ExpressTrak opposed.

On Amtrak’s emergency motion, this court expedited its

appeal, and set oral arguments for May 9, 2003. In the

interim, the district court heard testimony on the amount of

damages Amtrak would suffer as a result of the injunction,

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and on January 27, 2003, ordered ExpressTrak to post bond

by February 15, 2003, in the amount of $857,415, to cover the

first three months of the injunction period. By notice of

February 14, 2003, ExpressTrak informed the district court

that it was unable to post bond. Amtrak responded by filing

a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction, and the

district court sua sponte, on March 11, 2003, ordered ExpressTrak to post bond by March 14, 2003, in the amount of

$110,000 – the maximum amount ExpressTrak claimed it

could pay. ExpressTrak complied with the bond order.

The arbitration panel also convened during the interim

period to consider Amtrak’s request that it not be required

to continue contract performance pending arbitration. Following a hearing, the panel by Order of March 19, 2003,

denied Amtrak’s request. Order, In re Arbitration Between

ExpressTrak and Amtrak 2 (Mar. 19, 2003) (‘‘Interim Arbitration Order’’). In light of the panel’s decision, Amtrak renewed its motion in the district court to dissolve the preliminary injunction, and ExpressTrak moved the district court to

confirm the panel’s interim award. By Order of May 1, 2003,

the district court confirmed the interim arbitration award,

declined to dissolve the preliminary injunction, and converted

the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. Order, Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. ExpressTrak, L.L.C., at 2

(D.D.C. May 1, 2002) (‘‘May 1 Order’’).

Both parties then filed emergency motions in this court.

Amtrak moved to expedite its appeal from the district court’s

May 1 Order, consolidate the May 1 appeal with the pending

appeal of the December 5, 2002 Order, and require supplemental briefing. ExpressTrak, in turn, moved to dismiss

Amtrak’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court granted

Amtrak’s emergency motion and deferred decision on the

motion to dismiss pending oral argument.

II.

The court’s jurisdiction to review the district court orders

enjoining the parties to continue conducting business under

the Leases and confirming the interim arbitration award is

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clear. First, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), the court has

jurisdiction to review ‘‘[i]nterlocutory orders of the district

courts of the United States TTT granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve

or modify injunctionsTTTT’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Although the provision is typically invoked to appeal preliminary injunctions, it can be invoked to appeal permanent

injunctions that are interlocutory in nature. Smith v. Vulcan

Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518 (1897); see also Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns

Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123

S. Ct. 892 (2003); Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Med. &

Dentistry, 867 F.2d 1455, 1464 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989); CFTC v.

Preferred Capital Inv. Co., 664 F.2d 1316, 1319 n.4 (5th Cir.

1982); 16 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 3924 (2d ed. 1996). While the

district court characterized its May 1 injunction as ‘‘permanent,’’ both parties agree that the district court has not

entered a final order winding up the litigation in the consolidated cases. Inasmuch as Amtrak remains compelled to

operate ExpressTrak business for the remainder of the arbitration proceedings, and there has been no ruling on the

merits of the parties’ dispute, the district court’s May 1 Order

is interlocutory. Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), to review the injunction.

Second, insofar as the district court’s order confirming the

arbitration panel’s interim award was actually an order continuing the injunction, the court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review that order. Insofar as the

order was ‘‘confirming TTT an [arbitration] award or partial

award,’’ 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(D), the court has jurisdiction

under the FAA, which authorizes an appeal from an order

confirming an interim arbitration award. Id.

As Amtrak contends, however, the court cannot meaningfully review the order enjoining the parties or the order

confirming the interim arbitration award without determining

whether the parties’ dispute was properly arbitrable. Recognizing that interlocutory orders compelling arbitration are not

ordinarily appealable under FAA § 16(b), Amtrak properly

urges the court to exercise pendent jurisdiction to review the

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question of arbitrability, and hence the correctness of the

district court’s decision to confirm the interim arbitration

award and continue the injunction.

A court exercises pendent jurisdiction when, while reviewing an order over which it has appellate jurisdiction, it

entertains an appeal from another order that, although part

of the same case or controversy, would not otherwise be

within its jurisdiction. 13 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 3523. This court does not exercise pendent

appellate jurisdiction frequently or liberally, see Gilda Marx,

Inc. v. Wildwood Exercise, Inc., 85 F.3d 675, 678 (D.C. Cir.

1996), but it generally will invoke pendent jurisdiction in two

circumstances: (1) ‘‘when substantial considerations of fairness or efficiency demand it,’’ id. at 679, such as when a nonappealable order is ‘‘inextricably intertwined’’ with an appealable order, id., or (2) when review of the former decision is

‘‘necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter.’’ Id.

(quoting Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51

(1995)). See also Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa,

115 F.3d 1020, 1026–27 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rendall-Speranza v.

Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Hartman v.

Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Wagner v.

Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf. Swint, 514 U.S.

35; McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346,

353 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Both justifications for exercising pendent jurisdiction exist

in this case. First, the district court’s grant of the injunction

compelling continued performance was ‘‘inextricably intertwined’’ with, and in fact, dependent upon, its determination

that the parties’ dispute was arbitrable. After determining

that the parties’ dispute was governed by the arbitration

clause in the Operating Agreement, to wit section 6.6, rather

than the litigating clause in the Leases, to wit section 30 of

the Sublease, the district court enjoined the parties to continue business operations ‘‘as called for by [s]ection 6.6(e)’’ – a

provision found only in the arbitration clause of the Operating

Agreement. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d at

52. The district court accordingly declined to engage in the

traditional four-step analysis that typically accompanies inUSCA Case #02-7164 Document #753329 Filed: 06/06/2003 Page 7 of 13
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junction orders, see, e.g., O’Hara v. Dist. No. 1–PCD, 56 F.3d

1514, 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1995), instead reasoning, based on

section 6.6(e) of the Operating Agreement, that ‘‘a form of

injunctive relief was clearly contemplated pending the submission of a dispute to the arbitration process.’’ Nat’l R.R.

Passenger Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d at 50. Any doubt that the

injunction is inextricably bound to the order compelling arbitration is allayed by the fact that the district court relied on

the Interim Arbitration Order to make the injunction permanent, and reiterated that it was converting the ‘‘injunction

from a preliminary to a permanent one TTT to enforce the

bargained-for terms of [s]ection 6.6(e) of the Operating

Agreement.’’ May 1 Order, at 9. Although pendent appellate jurisdiction over orders compelling arbitration will not

always be appropriate where a party has appealed a preliminary injunction, the unique factual context of this case reveals

that the orders enjoining the parties and compelling arbitration were not just legally, but also factually intertwined, and

that Amtrak is not ‘‘parlay[ing] TTT collateral orders into

multi-issue interlocutory appeal tickets.’’ Swint, 514 U.S. at

49. Second, because the district court can only enforce an

arbitral award if the arbitrator had authority to grant it, 9

U.S.C. § 10(d)(4), effective review of the confirmation order

would – as ExpressTrak concedes – be detrimentally impaired without first determining whether the district court

properly submitted the parties’ dispute to arbitration.

Nor is FAA § 16(b), which ordinarily prevents appellate

review of arbitration orders, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 87 n.2 (2000), a bar to the court’s exercise

of pendent jurisdiction. In its brief, ExpressTrak relied

heavily on IDS Life Insurance Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 103

F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 1996), in which the Seventh Circuit declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over an order

staying federal court proceedings pending arbitration. Id. at

528. Observing that the ‘‘validity and scope’’ of the doctrine

of pendent appellate jurisdiction has ‘‘been thrown into doubt

by the Supreme Court’s decision in Swint,’’ id. (citing 514

U.S. 35), the court viewed the exercise of pendent jurisdiction

in that case as contrary to Congress’ ‘‘support for facilitating

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arbitration in order to effectuate private ordering and lighten

the caseload of the federal courts.’’ Id. The Supreme Court

in Swint cautioned against ‘‘a rule loosely allowing pendent

appellate jurisdiction,’’ 514 U.S. at 49, and adhering to its

advice, this court has exercised discretion by limiting pendent

jurisdiction to the two circumstances described above. See,

e.g., Jungquist, 115 F.3d 1020; Rendall-Speranza, 107 F.3d

913; Gilda Marx, 85 F.3d 675; cf. McKesson Corp., 52 F.3d

346. But nothing in Swint, or even in IDS Life, suggests that

the Supreme Court has nullified the doctrine of pendent

jurisdiction.

Similarly, the court is unpersuaded that the ‘‘proarbitration tilt’’ of FAA § 16, which promotes appeals from

orders barring arbitration and limits appeals from orders

directing arbitration, precludes – much less eliminates – the

long-standing doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. As an initial

point, even the Seventh Circuit in IDS Life acknowledges it

‘‘cannot be certain’’ that Congress ‘‘precluded the application

of the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction to [orders

compelling arbitration].’’ 103 F.3d at 528. Furthermore,

since IDS Life, the Second and Ninth Circuits have exercised

pendent appellate jurisdiction to review orders compelling

arbitration, Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1372,

1379–80 (9th Cir. 1997); Freeman v. Complex Computing Co.,

119 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1997), and the Eighth Circuit has

indicated that it would invoke the doctrine if review of an

arbitration order was ‘‘necessary to ensure meaningful review

of the appealable issue.’’ Manion v. Nagin, 255 F.3d 535, 540

(8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Like the Second Circuit,

we conclude that ‘‘[a]lthough the FAA clearly manifests support for [arbitration],’’ there is no indication that Congress

intended § 16 to interfere with the court’s authority to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Freeman, 119 F.3d at 1050.

We therefore hold that, because the arbitrability of the

dispute is inextricably intertwined with other orders over

which we have jurisdiction, and because we must finally

resolve the arbitrability of the dispute in order to review

those orders, we have pendant appellate jurisdiction to resolve the issue of arbitrability.

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III.

Turning to the issue of arbitrability, we begin by acknowledging that ‘‘questions of arbitrability must be addressed with

a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.’’

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S.

1, 24 (1983). Nonetheless, ‘‘the FAA does not require parties

to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.’’ Volt Info.

Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489

U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (citation omitted). The district court

interpreted section 6.6 of the Operating Agreement together

with section 30 of the Sublease to limit court litigation to

matters peripheral to arbitration or not capable of being

arbitrated, and it found that the parties’ underlying dispute is

not such an issue. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 233 F. Supp.

2d at 49–50. Amtrak contends, and we agree, that the

district court’s interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning

of section 13.2 of the Sublease, which contemplates court

litigation of a case in which Amtrak alleges a breach of

contract, as it does here. Because the Sublease came later,

section 13.2 controls, and the district court erred by applying

the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement, rather

than the litigation clauses of the Leases, to compel the parties

to submit their dispute to arbitration.

In determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate

their dispute, our review is de novo. AT&T Techs., Inc. v.

Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986);

KenAmerican Res., Inc. v. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers

of Am., 99 F.3d 1161, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1996). To discern the

parties’ intent, the court applies ‘‘ordinary state-law principles

that govern the formation of contracts.’’ First Options of

Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); see also

Bailey v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 209 F.3d 740, 746 (D.C.

Cir. 2000). The parties’ agreements provide that they are to

be interpreted under District of Columbia law. Operating

Agreement § 6.7; Sublease § 25. Under the applicable District of Columbia law, a contract ‘‘containing a term inconsistent with a term of an earlier contract between the same

parties regarding the same subject matter [is] interpreted to

rescind the inconsistent term in the earlier contract.’’ Chang

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v. Louis & Alexander, Inc., 645 A.2d 1110, 1114 (D.C. 1994)

(citing Egan v. McNamara, 467 A.2d 733, 740 (D.C. 1983));

see also Hershon v. Hellman Co., 565 A.2d 282, 284 (D.C.

1989).

When the parties executed the Operating Agreement in

1999, they agreed to arbitrate their disputes ‘‘concerning the

interpretation, application, or implementation of this agreement.’’ Operating Agreement § 6.6(a). Eighteen months

later, however, the parties executed the Sublease, which

bound ExpressTrak to Amtrak on substantially the same

terms that bound Amtrak to Orix under the Headlease.

Section 4.1 of the Sublease requires ExpressTrak to make

quarterly payments to Amtrak on the same date as Amtrak’s

payments to Orix, and section 5.2 of the Sublease, like section

5.2 of the Headlease, makes those payments an ‘‘absolute and

unconditional’’ obligation. The default and dispute resolution

provisions in the Sublease similarly mirror those in the

Headlease. Thus, in the event of a default by ExpressTrak,

Amtrak has the right to ‘‘proceed by appropriate court action

or actions, either at law or in equity, to enforce performance

by [ExpressTrak] TTT or to recover damages for the breach

thereof.’’ Compare Sublease § 13.2(i) with Headlease

§ 13.2(i); see also Sublease § 13.2(vii); Headlease § 13.2(viii).

Section 30 of the Sublease further provides, in relevant part,

that Amtrak and ExpressTrak:

waive all rights to a trial by jury in the event of any

litigation with respect to any matter related to this lease

or the operative documents, and [both parties] irrevocably consent to the jurisdiction of the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia TTT in connection with any action or proceeding arising out of or

relating to this lease or the [O]perative [D]ocuments.

Sublease § 30; cf. Headlease § 30. As noted, the subsequently executed Direct Lease gives Amtrak and ExpressTrak ‘‘substantially the same rights and obligations’’ as those

set forth in the Sublease. Direct Lease ¶ 2.

By its specific terms, section 6.6 of the Operating Agreement applies to disputes ‘‘concerning the interpretation, appliUSCA Case #02-7164 Document #753329 Filed: 06/06/2003 Page 11 of 13
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cation, or implementation of this agreement.’’ Operating

Agreement § 6.6(a) (emphasis added). By contrast, section

30 of the Sublease applies to ‘‘any litigation with respect to

any matter related to this lease or the [O]perative [D]ocuments.’’ Sublease § 30 (emphasis added). The Operating

Agreement is expressly included in the Sublease’s definition

of ‘‘Operative Documents.’’ Sublease § 1.1. That section 30

supplants section 6.6 of the Operating Agreement is further

evidenced by the fact that section 30 twice states that it

applies to any action arising out of ‘‘this Lease or the [O]perative [D]ocuments.’’ Sublease § 30 (emphasis added). Furthermore, section 13.2(ii) of the Sublease, which provides for

cancellation or termination of the Leases upon ExpressTrak’s

default, conflicts with section 6.6(e) of the Operating Agreement, which requires the parties to continue conducting business pending resolution of their dispute. The language of the

parties’ agreements thus reflects District of Columbia law

that in this context, the later provisions, section 30 and 13.2,

rescind the earlier provision, section 6.6. See Chang, 645

A.2d at 1114; Hershon, 565 A.2d at 284; Egan, 467 A.2d at

740; see also Swensen’s Ice Cream Co. v. Corsair Corp., 942

F.2d 1307, 1309 (8th Cir. 1991); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR

Corp., 763 F.2d 866, 872–73 (7th Cir. 1985); Seaboard Coast

Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1348–49

(11th Cir. 1982).

ExpressTrak’s position that section 21.2 of the Sublease

demonstrates that the Sublease was not intended to modify or

supersede the Operating Agreement is mistaken. Section

21.2 provides that ‘‘[e]xcept for the other Operative Documents, this Lease exclusively and completely states the rights

of Lessor and Lessee with respect to the leasing of the Units

and supersedes all other agreementsTTTT’’ Sublease § 21.2.

This provision, however, does no more than preserve sections

of the Operating Agreement that set forth the parties’ rights

under the Leases and do not conflict with Sublease provisions. Section 1.8 of the Operating Agreement, which among

other things, sets a cap on the amount of monthly rent

ExpressTrak must pay under the Sublease, exemplifies the

type of Operating Agreement provision section 21.2 was

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designed to protect. Section 21.2 cannot, however, alter the

conclusion that sections 13.2 and 30 of the Sublease conflict

with the Operating Agreement and supersede it under the

governing law.

Nor can we interpret section 30 – as the district court did,

and as ExpressTrak urges – to be merely a forum selection

clause that permits litigation only when a party challenges

the validity of the arbitration clause or its application. Section 13.2 of the Sublease specifically contemplates court litigation where Amtrak alleges breach of contract. Sublease

§§ 13.2(i) & (vii). The district court’s interpretation of section 30 thus conflicts with the plain language of section 13.2,

which controls the dispute in this case. ExpressTrak’s contention that section 13.2 is a right secondary to arbitration is

equally unpersuasive. Nothing in the Sublease supports the

assertion that the parties intended for arbitration to occur

before a lawsuit could be filed. Cf. Kvaerner v. Bank of

Tokyo–Mitsubishi, Ltd., 210 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2000).

In sum, arbitration ‘‘is a matter of consent, not coercion.’’

Volt, 489 U.S. at 479. While federal policy favors arbitration,

that policy cannot ‘‘override the will of the parties by giving

the arbitration clause greater coverage than the parties intended.’’ Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine

Corp., 850 F.2d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Here, the parties’

intent to litigate disputes like this one, expressed in sections

13.2 and 30 of the Sublease, is clear and supercedes section

6.6. of the Operating Agreement. Accordingly, because the

district court erred in compelling arbitration, affirming the

interim arbitration award, and granting an injunction compelling continued performance, we reverse the orders of December 5, 2002 and May 1, 2003, and remand the case to the

district court for trial on Amtrak’s breach claims.

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