Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01256/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01256-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WITKIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. SOLIS,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:12-cv-01256-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT IN 

PART AND DENY IN PART 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(ECF No. 45)

CASE TO REMAIN OPEN

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

On June 8, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued findings and recommendations (ECF No. 

45) to grant in part and deny in part Defendant’s January 15, 2016 motion for summary judgment 

(ECF No. 39.) On June 22, 2016, Defendant filed her objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 

findings. (ECF No. 46.) On July 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed his reply to Defendant’s objections.

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I. Background

Plaintiff’s case proceeds on his May 20, 2013 second amended complaint alleging that 

Defendant S. Solis intentionally converted funds from Plaintiff’s inmate trust account and 

retaliated against Plaintiff for reporting the conversion by denying him access to the prison law 

library. (ECF No. 17.) 

Defendant moved for summary judgment on the conversion claim on the ground 

Plaintiff’s claim was untimely filed under Cal. Gov. Code. § 911.2(a). Plaintiff conceded his 

claim was untimely and conceded summary judgment was appropriate on that claim. Without 

reaching the merits of Defendant’s arguments, therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommended

summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendant on the conversion claim.

On the retaliation claim, Defendant argued Plaintiff failed to allege facts to showing 

Defendant harbored a retaliatory animus when she allegedly denied Plaintiff access to the law 

library as a priority legal user (“PLU”) on the dates in question. Defendant also argued Plaintiff 

failed to show the existence of an adverse action, as the undisputed evidence showed Plaintiff had 

some amount of access to the law library. Finally, Defendant argued Defendant’s actions in 

denying Plaintiff PLU status advanced a legitimate penological goal, for two reasons: (1) the 

prison was suffering from an overcrowding crisis and could not accommodate every prisoner who 

wanted access to the law library, and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to PLU status on the dates in 

question because he did not have a court imposed deadline. The Magistrate Judge rejected 

Defendant’s arguments on each point, finding a triable issue of fact did exist, and recommended 

denying Defendant’s motion.

Defendant now proffers one objection. She argues, as she did in her summary judgment 

motion, that Plaintiff was not entitled to PLU status during the time periods in question. (ECF No. 

46.) She states that in order to obtain PLU status under California Code of Regulations § 

3122(b)(1), an inmate must show that he has “an established court deadline.” Cal Code Regs. tit. 

15 § 3122(b)(1). Here, Plaintiff claimed he was entitled to PLU status because of deadlines 

imposed in the findings and recommendations in his federal habeas appeal, case no. 2:10-cv0091, on February 10, 2011 and the order adopting the same on March 10, 2011. Defendant 

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argues that as both the findings and recommendations and the order were favorable to Plaintiff, he 

was not required to file a response, and therefore the deadlines set forth did not apply to Plaintiff. 

In rejecting this argument in his findings and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge 

stated that, since there existed a dispute as to Plaintiff’s entitlement to PLU status, the Court need 

not consider Defendant’s claim.

II. Discussion

A. Prison Law Library Usage

To provide context, the Court will briefly summarize the procedures underlying prison 

law library usage.

California prisons are required to provide legal materials through its law library in order to 

give prisoners meaningful access to the courts. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3122(a). Prisoners who 

wish to use the law library fall into two categories: General Legal Users (“GLUs”) and Priority 

Legal Users (“PLUs”). 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3122(b). PLUs are given greater access to the law 

library than GLUs, and a prisoner achieves PLU status when he can show that he has an 

upcoming court deadline. Id. § 3122(b)(1). To achieve PLU status, a prisoner has to submit a 

form to the law librarian indicating his court deadline, and if the librarian approves the request, 

he or she will notify corrections officers to bring the prisoner to the library during the extended 

PLU hours. Id. An inmate who does not have PLU status can still access the law library on GLU 

status. Id. § 3122(b).

B. Plaintiff’s Habeas Petition

As Defendant’s sole objection to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendation 

stems from Plaintiff’s entitlement to PLU status on the basis of Plaintiff’s federal habeas petition, 

the Court will summarize the relevant procedural history of that action, taking judicial notice of 

all filings in that case. MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986).

On December 21, 2009, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United 

States District Court for the Central District of California challenging his 2005 conviction for 

resisting arrest, a conviction which enhanced his prison sentence after his subsequent conviction 

in 2009 for attempted robbery. The case was transferred to the Eastern District of California 

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under case number Witkin v. Yates, 2:10-cv-00091-GEB-DAD (“the habeas case”). On February 

11, 2011, in an order issued in response to Respondent’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s petition, 

then-Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd issued findings and recommendations rejecting Plaintiff’s 

habeas challenge to his 2005 conviction as time-barred and instead construing Plaintiff’s habeas 

petition as a challenge to his 2009 conviction as enhanced by his 2005 conviction, denying 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and granting Respondent thirty days from the date of service of 

any order by the district court adopting these findings and recommendations in which to either 

file another motion to dismiss or file an answer to the claims raised in Plaintiff’s petition. Judge 

Drozd also granted both parties fourteen days to file any objections to his findings and 

recommendations. 

On February 22, 2011, Plaintiff filed his objections to Judge Drozd’s findings and 

recommendations. On March 10, 2011, Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr., signed an order rejecting 

Plaintiff’s objections and adopting Judge Drozd’s findings and recommendations in full, directing 

Respondent to file either another motion to dismiss or an answer to the claims raised in the 

petition within thirty days of the date of service of his order, and directing Plaintiff to file his 

opposition to any motion filed by Respondent within thirty days after the date of service of said 

motion.

On April 5, 2011, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which was served on Plaintiff on 

April 8, 2011. Plaintiff filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss on May 9, 2011.

On April 4 and November 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed motions for reconsideration of Judge 

Drozd’s February 11, 2011, findings and recommendations on that grounds that the Court’s 

findings rejecting his challenge to his 2005 conviction as time-barred were based on an error of 

fact. On December 14, 2011, Judge Drozd issued findings and recommendation granting 

Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration and vacating his February 11, 2011 order. On January 4, 

2012, Judge Burrell issued an order adopting Judge Drozd’s findings and recommendations in full 

and vacating his March 10, 2011, order.

C. Plaintiff’s Entitlement to PLU Status

Here, Defendant appears to argue that as Judge Drozd’s February 11, 2011 findings and 

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recommendations and Judge Burrell’s March 10, 2011 order adopting the same denied 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s petition, those orders were therefore favorable to 

Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was not entitled to file objections. Therefore, the fourteen day objection 

deadline imposed by Judge Drozd on February 11, 2011 and the thirty day response deadline 

imposed by Judge Burrell on March 10, 2011 were somehow inapplicable to Plaintiff. 

These arguments lack merit. First, Defendant provides no authority for her assertion that 

only parties for whom the Magistrate Judge’s findings were unfavorable may file an objection, 

and indeed, the plain language of the statute makes clear that within fourteen days of being served 

with the findings, “any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and 

recommendations as provided by rules of court.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (emphasis added).

Second, and more significant, it is clear that the February 11, 2011 findings were not 

completely in Plaintiff’s favor. A portion of Judge Drozd’s order rejected Plaintiff’s habeas 

challenge to his 2005 conviction as time-barred, instead construing Plaintiff’s habeas petition as a 

challenge to his 2009 conviction as enhanced by his 2005 conviction. Plaintiff, disagreeing with 

this conclusion, filed two motions to reconsider, arguing his challenge to his 2005 conviction was 

not time-barred. Judge Drozd ultimately granted Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and 

vacated his prior adverse finding; Judge Burrell, in turn, vacated his order adopting Judge 

Drozd’s findings. In light of the fact Judge Drozd ultimately vacated his findings at Plaintiff’s 

urging, it seems quite apparent to the Court that Plaintiff could have, and should have, filed 

objections within fourteen days to the February 11, 2011 findings.

Furthermore, Judge Burrell’s March 10, 2011 order did, in fact, impose a thirty day 

deadline for Plaintiff—Judge Burrell directed Respondent to file an answer to Plaintiff’s petition 

within thirty days of the Judge’s order, and directed Plaintiff to file a response thirty days after 

that. Respondent filed an answer on April 5, 2011, which was served on Plaintiff on April 8, 

2011. Plaintiff was required to file a response by May 8, 2011. Plaintiff plainly had a Court 

imposed deadline between April 8 and May 8, 2011, thus Defendant’s argument that he did not 

lacks merit. 

Finally, the Court addresses Defendant’s claim that the Magistrate Judge refused to 

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consider Defendant’s argument on this point because it was raised for the first time in her reply 

brief. (ECF No. 46 at 2.) This is incorrect. The Magistrate Judge refused to consider this 

argument because he found there existed disputed issues of fact regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement 

to PLU status, precluding summary judgment.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, the 

Court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the 

Court finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper 

analysis. Defendant’s objections have been considered and found to lack merit.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Court adopts the findings and recommendations filed on June 8, 2016 (ECF 

No. 45) in full;

2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 39) will be GRANTED in 

part and DENIED in part, as set out in the Magistrate Judge’s findings and 

recommendations.

3. The case shall remain open.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2016 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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