Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00994/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00994-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kye James Harding, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00994-PHX-SPL (BSB)

ORDER AND REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Kye James Harding has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents assert that the Petition should be 

dismissed as untimely under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(AEDPA), which provides the statute of limitations applicable to state prisoners seeking 

federal habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 21 at 2.) Alternatively, Respondents argue that 

Petitioner waived review of Grounds One through Three, and that federal habeas corpus 

review of Petitioner’s claims is procedurally barred. (Id.) Petitioner has filed a reply in 

support of his Petition. (Doc. 24.) For the reasons below, the Court finds the Petition 

untimely, recommends that it be dismissed, and does not consider Respondents’ 

alternative arguments. 

 Petitioner has also filed motions for relief from judgment and to unseal records 

under “Rule 11.” (Docs. 17, 18, 26.) The Court also recommends that these motions be 

denied. Petitioner also requests that the Court reconsider its order denying the 

appointment of counsel. (Doc. 26.) The Court denies this motion. 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Plea, and Sentencing 

 On December 14, 2009, Petitioner, along with a co-defendant, was indicted in the 

Maricopa County Superior Court on fourteen counts of armed robbery, class two 

dangerous felonies (Counts 1, 4, 9, 13, 15, 16, 18, 21, 23, 26, 29, 32, 34, & 35), fifteen 

counts of kidnapping, class two dangerous felonies (Counts 5–8, 10–12, 19, 24, 25, 27, 

28, 30, 33, 36), one count of attempted armed robbery, a class three dangerous felony 

(Count 14), one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, a class three dangerous 

felony (Count 20), and two counts of aggravated assault, class three dangerous felonies 

(Counts 37 & 38).1

 (Doc. 21, Ex. A.) 

 On November 18, 2010, Petitioner entered a stipulated plea agreement and 

Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of armed robbery; the State dismissed the 

remaining counts. (Doc. 21, Ex. D.) During the change of plea hearing, Petitioner 

confirmed that he understood that he could be sentenced to sixteen to twenty-seven years’ 

imprisonment. (Doc. 21, Ex. D at 1; Ex. F at 5-7.) The trial court accepted Petitioner’s 

guilty plea after finding a factual basis for the plea, and that it was knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily made. (Doc. 21, Ex. E at 2; Ex. F at 12.) On February 4, 

2011, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to presumptive terms of ten-and-one-half years’ 

imprisonment for each count. (Doc. 21, Ex. H at 2; Ex. I at 22.) In accordance with the 

plea agreement, the court ordered the prison terms to run consecutively. (Id.) 

B. Post-Conviction Review 

 1. First Post-Conviction Proceeding (of-right proceeding) 

 On February 9, 2011,2

 Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial 

court to commence an “of-right” post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32 of the 

 

1

 The presentence report describes the events giving rise to these charges. The Court does not reiterate that factual background. (Doc. 21, Ex. G at 1-3.) 

2

 In their Answer, Respondents consider Petitioner’s pro se filings to be filed on the date on which Petitioner delivered them to prison officials for mailing, as indicated by the dates on which he signed those filings. (Doc. 21 at 6 n. 4) The timeliness of 

Petitioner’s filings in the state courts is a matter of state law. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

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Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 (Doc. 21, Ex. J.) The court appointed postconviction counsel, who later filed a notice stating that she had reviewed the record and 

was “unable to find any claims for relief to be raised in post-conviction relief 

proceedings.” (Doc. 21, Ex. K, L.) Counsel requested an extension of time for Petitioner 

to file a pro se petition. (Doc. 21, Ex. L.) The court granted the extension and ordered 

that post-conviction counsel serve as advisory counsel. (Doc. 21, Ex. M.) 

 Petitioner filed a letter in which he requested the appointment of substitute 

counsel, an investigator, and a paralegal to investigate his claims. (Doc. 21, Ex. N.) The 

court denied the motion. (Doc. 21, Ex. O.) Petitioner also requested that post-conviction 

counsel be removed as advisory counsel because she had hindered the Rule 32 

proceeding. (Doc. 21, Ex. P.) The court found no support for Petitioner’s allegations and 

denied the motion. (Id.) Petitioner filed a motion for discovery which the court denied. 

(Doc. 21, Ex. Q.) However, the court extended the deadline for Petitioner to file a pro se 

petition to December 9, 2011. (Id.) 

 Petitioner continued to file letters with the court, but did not file a petition for 

post-conviction relief. (Doc. 21, Ex. R.) The court ordered Petitioner to file a petition by 

January 27, 2012 and warned that if he failed to do so the court would dismiss the postconviction proceeding. (Id.) On January 9, 2012, Petitioner filed a “Declaration in the 

Nature of an Affidavit” (the Declaration). (Doc. 21, Ex. S.) The court construed the 

 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005). Accordingly, the Court considers Petitioner’s state court 

filings to be filed on the date determined by the state courts. However, the Court considers the federal Petition filed on March 26, 2015, the date on which Petitioner 

certifies he placed the Petition in the prison mailing system. (Doc. 1 at 11.) See Houston 

v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988) stating a legal document is deemed filed on the date 

a petitioner delivers it to the prison authorities for filing by mail); Miles v. Prunty, 187 

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the mailbox rule to a federal habeas petition). 

3

 Because Petitioner pled guilty, his only avenue of direct review was a Rule 32 

“of-right” proceeding. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033(B) ([I]n noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement . . . .”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (“[a]ny person who pled guilty or no contest . . . 

shall have the right to file a post-conviction relief proceeding, and this proceeding shall be known as a Rule 32 of-right proceeding”). 

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Declaration as a petition for post-conviction relief and ordered the State to file a 

response. (Doc. 21, Ex. T.) 

 On the State’s motion to dismiss, the court later determined that Petitioner’s 

Declaration was not a proper Rule 32 petition because it did not contain the signed 

certification required by Rule 32.5. (Doc. 21, Exs. U, V.) On February 14, 2012, the 

court struck the Declaration and directed Petitioner to file a petition with a signed 

certification within forty-five days of the court’s order. (Doc. 21, Ex.V.) Petitioner filed 

additional letters with the court, but did not file a petition with the required certification 

by the deadline. (Doc. 21, Ex. W.) On March 29, 2012, the court granted Petitioner “one 

last extension of time,” until April 27, 2012, to file a proper petition. (Id. at 2.) 

 Petitioner then filed additional documents in the trial court including a motion to 

withdraw counsel, filed on April 13, 2012, a motion to reveal remedy, filed on April 17, 

2012, an affidavit of indigence, filed on April 17, 2012, an notice of exception to court’s 

rulings, filed on April 19, 2012, a motion to dismiss counsel, filed on April 19, 2012, a 

memorandum in support of motion to vacate, filed on May 3, 2012, and a motion for 

grand jury transcripts, filed on April 26, 2012. (Doc. 21, Ex. Z.) On April 9, 2012, 

Petitioner also filed a petition in which he argued that: (1) his confession and guilty plea 

were involuntary; (2) trial counsel was ineffective; and (3) the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction over him. (Doc. 21, Ex. X.) 

 On May 9, 2012, the trial court issued a minute entry noting Petitioner’s numerous 

filings. (Doc. 21, Ex. Z.) The court treated Petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment as a 

petition for post-conviction relief. (Id.) However, the court stated that the motion, 

construed as a petition, did not include the required Rule 32.5 certification, which the 

court had ordered Petitioner to file by April 27, 2012, with the warning that failure to do 

so would result in dismissal of the Rule 32 proceeding. (Id.) The court explained that it 

was dismissing the Rule 32 proceeding because Petitioner had not “compl[ied] with the 

law or with the [c]ourt’s directives.” (Id. at 2.) The May 9, 2012 minute entry did not 

specifically refer to Petitioner’s April 9, 2012 filing or indicate whether that filing 

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complied with Rule 32.5. (Id.) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 21, Ex. AA at 1; Ex. EEE at 5.) 

 2. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On July 2, 2012, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Automatic Reversal” of his guilty 

plea, which the trial court construed a second petition for post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 21, Exs. BB, DD.) In that petition, Petitioner asserted that the trial court denied his 

Sixth Amendment right to self-representation during his criminal trial. (Doc. 21, 

Ex. BB.) On August 23, 2012, the court dismissed the petition because it was untimely 

under Rule 32.4 and did not raise any claims that could be raised in an untimely or 

successive Rule 32 proceeding. (Doc. 21, Ex. DD.) Petitioner did not seek review in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 21, Ex. FF at 1; Ex. EEE at 4.) 

 3. Third Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On September 12, 2013, Petitioner filed an “Amended Petition for Reversal and 

New Trial.” (Doc. 21, Ex. EE.)4

 The court construed that filing as a third petition for 

post-conviction relief. (Doc. 21, Ex. FF). In that petition, Petitioner alleged that his 

guilty plea was involuntary, he was denied counsel, and an irreconcilable conflict with 

counsel violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. 21, Ex. EE.) Petitioner also asserted that 

the trial court had overlooked a Rule 32 petition that it had received by certified mail on 

April 5, 2012. (Doc. 21-2 at 22, 45.) He stated that that petition was timely and 

complied with Rule 32’s certification requirement. (Doc. 21-2 at 22-23.) 

 On October 24, 2012, the court dismissed the petition because it was untimely 

under Rule 32.4(a) and did not state a claim for relief that could be asserted in an 

untimely Rule 32 proceeding. (Doc. 21, Ex. FF.) Petitioner did not seek review in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 21, Ex. EEE at 4.) 

/ / / 

 

4

 Exhibit EE appears on the Court’s docket as Doc. 21-2. The Court uses the 

CM/ECF docket and page numbers when necessary to cite to a specific page within Exhibit EE. 

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 4. Fourth Post-Conviction Proceeding

 On December 14, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief and 

commenced a fourth post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 21, Ex. GG.) Petitioner alleged 

that he was denied legal representation in his prior post-conviction proceedings. (Id. at 

3.) On January 8, 2013, the trial court dismissed the notice because it was untimely 

under Rule 32.4, and did not state a claim that could be raised in an untimely Rule 32 

proceeding. (Doc. 21, Ex. HH.) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 21, Ex. JJ at 1; Ex. EEE at 4.) 

 5. Fifth Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On March 18, 2013, Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief, 

commencing his fifth post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 21, Ex. II.) In the notice, he 

asserted that his untimely filing should be excused because “[t]here had been a significant 

change in the law that would probably overturn the conviction or sentence.” (Id. at 2-3.) 

Petitioner, however, did not describe the change in the law or cite any case law. (Id.) On 

April 2, 2013, the court dismissed the notice as untimely under Rule 32.4(a). (Doc. 21, 

Ex. JJ.) Petitioner did not seek review in the appellate court. (Doc. 21, Ex. EEE at 3.) 

 6. Sixth Post-Conviction Proceeding

 On April 11, 2013, Petitioner initiated a sixth post-conviction proceeding by filing 

another notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 21, Ex. KK.) In that notice, Petitioner 

again stated that there was a significant change in the law that would probably affect the 

outcome of his case. (Id. at 2-3) He cited several cases. (Id.) The court found that the 

case law Petitioner cited did not apply to his case. (Doc. 21, Ex. LL.) On May 30, 2013, 

the court dismissed the notice of post-conviction relief because it was untimely under 

Rule 32.4(a), and failed to state a claim that could be granted in an untimely Rule 32 

proceeding. (Id.) The court extended the deadline for Petitioner to file a notice of appeal 

to June 24, 2013. (Doc. 21, Ex. MM.) Petitioner, however, did not file an appeal. 

(Doc. 21, Ex. EEE at 3.) 

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 7. Seventh Post-Conviction Proceeding

 On June 12, 2013, Petitioner filed a “Notice of Writ of Error by Pro Se Litigant” in 

the trial court, which the court construed as a notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 21, 

Exs. NN, OO.) In that filing, Petitioner claimed the trial court deprived him of his choice 

of counsel, and argued his guilty plea was involuntary. (Doc. 21, Ex. NN.) On July 19, 

2013, the trial court dismissed the notice because it was untimely under Rule 32.4(a), and 

did not state a claim that could be presented in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding. 

(Doc. 21, Ex. OO.) Petitioner did not appeal. (Doc. 21, Ex. EEE.) 

 8. Eighth Post-Conviction Proceeding

 On August 5, 2013, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief, commencing 

an eighth post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 21, Ex. PP.) Petitioner argued that he 

should be excused from Rule 32’s timeliness requirements because counsel in his Rule 32 

of-right proceeding was ineffective, and he was denied access to the law library during 

that proceeding. (Id.) On August 19, 2013, the trial court dismissed the Rule 32 

proceeding as untimely. (Doc. 21, Ex. QQ.) 

 On September 4, 2013, Petitioner filed a “motion for rehearing” in the trial court. 

(Doc. 21, Ex. RR.) On October 25, 2013, the court denied the motion. (Doc. 21, 

Ex. TT.) While the motion for rehearing was pending, on September 30, 2013, Petitioner 

filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals, which was summarily 

dismissed as untimely. (Doc. 21, Exs. SS.) 

 On October 31, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion in the trial court seeking an 

extension of the deadline to file a petition for review. (Doc. 21, Ex. UU.) On January 21, 

2014, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion. (Doc. 21, Ex. VV.) The court stated that 

Petitioner had “demonstrated [] knowledge of the legal rules” over the previous three 

years, while filing “no less than eight petitions for post-conviction relief.” (Id.) 

Petitioner then filed a motion in the Arizona Court of Appeals asking for reinstatement of 

his petition for review. (Doc. 21, Ex. WW.) On April 16, 2014, the appellate court 

denied the motion. (Id.) 

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 9. Ninth Post-Conviction Proceeding

 On April 29, 2014, Petitioner filed a ninth notice of post-conviction relief in the 

trial court. (Doc. 21, Ex. XX.) On May 7, 2014, the court dismissed the notice as 

untimely under Rule 32.4(a) and noted that the notice did not include any claims for 

relief. (Doc. 21, Exs. YY, ZZ.) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the trial 

court. (Doc. 21, Ex. ZZ.) The court denied the motion on October 17, 2014. (Doc. 21, 

Ex. AAA.) On October 27, 2014, Petitioner filed an appeal with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 21, Ex. GGG.) He later filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which the 

court granted. (Id.) 

 10. Tenth Post-Conviction Proceeding

 On December 8, 2014, Petitioner filed a tenth notice of post-conviction relief and 

a petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 21, Exs. BBB, CCC.) Petitioner asserted that 

post-conviction counsel was ineffective and, citing Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S.___, 132 

S. Ct. 1309 (2012), argued that there had been significant change in the law would 

probably affect the outcome of his convictions and sentences. (Doc. 21, Ex. BBB.) He 

also argued that the trial court had erroneously dismissed his Rule 32 of-right proceeding 

without considering the petition that he filed on April 5, 2012, which included a 

certification in compliance with Rule 32.5. (Doc. 21, Ex. CCC at 9.) On February 12, 

2015, the trial court dismissed the notice as untimely under Rule 32.4(a). (Doc. 21, Ex. 

DDD.) The court also stated that Martinez did not apply to state post-conviction 

proceedings, but “may permit [Petitioner] to seek relief in federal court.” (Id. at 2.) 

C. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On May 26, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner asserts that: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for advising him 

to “abandon a meritorious motion to suppress” and to plead guilty, and Rule 32 of-right 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue (Ground One); (2) trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence (Ground Two); (3) the trial 

court violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, and Rule 32 ofCase 2:15-cv-00994-SPL Document 28 Filed 10/21/15 Page 8 of 21
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right counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue (Ground Three); and 

(4) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the trial court appointed 

incompetent trial and Rule 32 of-right counsel, and when the trial court denied 

Petitioner’s request for the appointment of counsel during his second post-conviction 

proceeding (Ground Four). (Doc. 1 at 6-9.) Respondents assert that the Petition should 

be dismissed as untimely. (Doc. 21 at 2.) Alternatively, Respondents argue that 

Petitioner waived review of Grounds One, Two, and Three, and that federal habeas 

corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is procedurally barred. (Id.) Petitioner has filed a 

reply in support of his Petition. (Doc. 24.) For the reasons below, the Court finds the 

Petition untimely, recommends that it be dismissed, and does not consider Respondents’ 

alternative arguments. 

II. Statute of Limitations 

 A. Commencement of the Limitations Period 

The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The 

limitations period generally commences on “the date on which the judgment became final 

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).5

 Therefore, to assess the timeliness of the Petition, the Court 

 

5

 The statute of limitations commences on the latest of the dates determined by applying §§ 2244(d)(1)(A) through (D). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Petitioner 

does not make any allegations indicating that subsections (B) or (C) should apply, or that application of these subsections would result in a starting date for the statute of limitations that is later than the date determined under § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

However, Petitioner states that on December 8, 2014, he “found” the following claims: “erroneous advice to plead, IAC for not finding claim in First PCR, IAC trial for not challenging seizure illegal or warrantless GPS, illegal confession, and denial of self- representation.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) Thus, he might argue that § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies and that the limitations period did not commence until December 8, 2014. Under 

§ 2244(d)(1)(D), the AEDPA statute of limitations commences on “the date on which the 

factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). The record reflects Petitioner 

knew the factual predicate of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims and his claim 

that he was denied his right to self-representation before December 8, 2014, because he 

presented these claims to the state courts in 2012. (Doc. 21, Exs. Z, EE.) Additionally, these claims relate to events that occurred before Petitioner entered his guilty plea, thus, 

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determines the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became “final by the conclusion of 

direct review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). By pleading guilty, Petitioner was precluded 

from pursuing a direct appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-

4033(B). Rather, Petitioner could seek review in an “of-right” proceeding pursuant to 

Rule 32, which is the functional equivalent of a direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 

and 32.4.; Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that Arizona 

courts consider Rule 32 of-right proceedings a form of direct review). 

 On February 9, 2011, Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief to 

commence a Rule 32 of-right proceeding. (Doc. 21, Ex. J); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 

32.4(a) (“In a Rule 32 of-right proceeding, the notice must be filed within ninety days 

after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the 

final order or mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner’s first petition for postconviction relief proceeding.”). The trial court denied relief on May 9, 2012. (Doc. 21, 

Ex. Z.) Petitioner had thirty-five days, until June 13, 2012, in which to seek review in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals.6

 See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (providing that a petition for 

review must be filed within thirty days form the final decision in a post-conviction 

proceeding); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3 (adding five days for mailing). Petitioner did not seek 

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 21, Exs. AA at 2; EEE at 5.) 

 Because Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding is considered a form of direct 

review, his conviction become final for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) upon the expiration 

 Petitioner knew the factual predicate of these claims at the time of his guilty plea. Accordingly, § 2244(d)(1)(D) does not supply the starting date for the limitations period. 

6

 Petitioner also had fifteen days to file a motion for rehearing in the trial court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(a) (stating that a party may challenge the final decision in a post-conviction proceeding by filing a motion for rehearing within fifteen days). On May 16, 2012, Petitioner filed a “notice of exception” in the trial court. On July 23, 2012, the trial court ruled that it would not take any action related to the “notice of exception.” (Doc. 21, Ex, AA) Thus, the state court did not consider the “notice of exception” to be a motion for rehearing. However, if the “notice of exception” were considered a motion for rehearing, Petitioner’s conviction would have become final on August 27, 2012. See

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (stating that a petition for review that challenges a ruling on a motion for rehearing must be filed within thirty days); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3 (adding five days). Under those circumstances, the Petition would still be untimely. 

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the time for seeking further review, June 13, 2012. See Summers, 481 F.3d at 711; 

Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (for purposes of 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) direct review is final upon conclusion of direct review or the time to 

seek such review). Therefore, the one-year limitations period commenced the next day, 

June 14, 2012, and expired one year later, on June 13, 2013. See Patterson v. Stewart, 

251 F.3d 1243, 1245-47 (9th Cir.2001) (the AEDPA limitations period begins to run on 

the day after the triggering event pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). Because Petitioner did 

not file his Petition until March 26, 2015, it is untimely unless statutory tolling, equitable 

tolling, or an exception to the statute of limitations applies. 

B. Statutory Tolling 

 Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time 

that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). After his Rule 32 of-right proceeding 

was dismissed, Petitioner commenced nine additional post-conviction proceedings. 

(Doc. 21, Exs. BB & DD, EE & FF, GG, II, KK, NN & OO, PP, XX, BBB & CCC.) As 

discussed in Section I.B, the trial court dismissed all of those proceedings as untimely 

under Rule 32. (Doc. 21, Exs. DD, FF, HH, JJ, LL, OO, QQ, YY & ZZ, DDD.) Because 

the applications for post-conviction relief were untimely under Arizona law, they were 

not “properly filed” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), and therefore, they did not 

toll the limitations period.7

 See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (holding 

 

7

 Several of the post-conviction actions were commenced after the AEDPA 

limitations period had expired on June 13, 2013. (Doc. 21, Exs. PP, XX, BB &CCC.) 

Even if those applications were properly filed, they could not toll the already expired limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(holding that “section 2244(d) does not permit the re-initiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”). 

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that time limits are filing conditions and concluding that “[b]ecause the state court 

rejected petitioner’s [post-conviction] petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ 

and he [was] not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)”). 

 Additionally, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of any time between his postconviction proceedings (gap or interval tolling). Courts within the Ninth Circuit apply a 

two-part test to determine whether a petitioner is entitled to gap tolling for the period of 

time between the disposition of a first post-conviction petition in state court and the 

initiation of a second petition in the same court. See King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th 

Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). First, 

the court considers whether “the petitioner’s subsequent petitions are limited to an 

elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition.” King, 340 F.3d at 823. 

If not, the subsequent “petitions constitute a ‘new round’ and the gap between the rounds 

is not tolled.” Id. (citing Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003)). However, if 

the subsequent petition “simply attempted to correct the deficiencies” in the prior 

petition, the court construes the new petitions as part of the first “full round” of collateral 

review. King, 340 F.3d at 823 (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222, 122 (2002)). 

 Second, the court determines whether the petitions were denied on the merits or 

deemed untimely. King, 340 F.3d at 823. If the petitions were denied on the merits, the 

time period between the two properly-filed petitions is tolled. If the petitions were 

deemed untimely, the gap is not tolled. Id. In this case, even if the post-conviction 

proceedings related to each other, because they were dismissed as untimely, gap tolling 

does not apply. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007) (when a 

subsequent post-conviction petition relates back to the prior petition, the time between 

the two petitions is not tolled if the prior petition was deemed untimely). 

C. Equitable Tolling

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: “(1) that he has 

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been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. “The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes 

is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply the doctrine of equitable 

tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 

(9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). “When considering whether to apply 

equitable tolling, the Supreme Court has emphasized the need for ‘flexibility’ and for 

‘avoiding mechanical rules.’” Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 650). 

 Liberally construing Petitioner’s filings, he argues that equitable tolling applies for 

the following reasons: (1) he is a “blind laymen” (Doc. 24 at 3); (2) counsel during 

Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding was ineffective for failing to find the issues 

Petitioner would have presented to the state court, and the trial court failed to appoint 

counsel during the second post-conviction proceeding, therefore, his untimely filing is 

excused by Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct 1309 (2012), “Detrich, Dickens, and 

Thaler” (Doc. 1 at 11; Doc. 24 at 3); and (3) the trial court erred by dismissing 

Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding without considering his timely, Rule-32.5 

certified petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 1 at 11.) As discussed below and in 

Respondents’ answer (Doc. 21 at 15-17), these reasons do not justify equitably tolling the 

AEDPA limitations period. 

 1. Lack of Legal Knowledge and Visual Impairment

 In his Reply, Petitioner argues that equitable tolling should apply because he is a 

“blind laymen.” (Doc. 24 at 4.) Although Petitioner uses the word blind, there is no 

indication in the record that Petitioner is visually impaired. Thus, it appears that 

Petitioner is asserting a lack of legal knowledge to justify equitably tolling the limitations 

period. However, in an abundance of caution, the Court also considers whether an 

alleged visual impairment justifies tolling the limitations period. 

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 Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law and lack of legal assistance do not 

constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations period. “[I]t is 

well established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, 

generally does not excuse prompt filing.’” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th 

Cir. 2000) (quoting Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir.1999)). Petitioner’s 

ignorance of the law and indigent status do not distinguish him from the great majority of 

inmates pursuing habeas corpus relief. Such circumstances are not extraordinary and do 

not justify tolling the limitations period. “If limited resources, lack of legal knowledge, 

and the difficulties of prison life were an excuse for not complying with the limitation 

period, the AEDPA’s limitation period would be meaningless since virtually all 

incarcerated prisoners have these same problems in common.” Bolanos v. Kirkland, 

2008 WL 928252, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008). See also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir.2006) (affirming denial of equitable tolling because neither the 

district court’s failure to advise the petitioner of the right to amend his petition to include 

unexhausted claims nor petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the limitations period 

were extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling). 

 Additionally, in a document that Petitioner signed on July 22, 2012, nearly a year 

before the AEDPA statute of limitations expired, he acknowledged that he could 

challenge his convictions in a “federal habeas corpus” action. (Doc. 21-2 at 28, 31.) 

Petitioner also filed numerous documents in state court and does not explain why he was 

unable to file a timely petition in this Court. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-

35 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that a petitioner’s ability to file documents in state court shows 

the petitioner could have filed a federal habeas petition). Accordingly, Petitioner’s lack 

of legal knowledge does not warrant equitable tolling. 

 In addition, assuming that Petitioner’s statement that he is a “blind laymen,” refers 

to some sort of visual impairment, that impairment does not justify equitably tolling the 

limitations period. (Doc. 24 at 4.) The record reflects that Petitioner filed numerous 

documents in the state court. Petitioner does not explain why he was able to file 

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numerous documents in state court, but was unable to timely file a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in this Court. Thus, any visual impairment itself is not an extraordinary 

circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See Fischer v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 715 

(5th Cir. 1999) (equitable tolling not justified during petitioner’s seventeen day stay in 

psychiatric ward, during which he was confined, medicated, separated from his glasses 

and thus rendered legally blind, and denied meaningful access to the court); Dunlap v. 

Scutt, 2009 WL 3059145, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2009) (concluding that a 

petitioner’s conclusory and unsubstantiated assertions regarding vision impairment were 

insufficient to invoke equitable tolling where petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was 

rendered wholly unable to pursue his legal rights during relevant time period due to legal 

blindness); Santiago v. Miller, 180 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (legal blindness 

was not a sufficient reason to equitably toll limitations period because that condition did 

truly prevent the petitioner from pursuing his legal rights). 

 2. The Martinez, Detrich, Dickens, and Thaler Decisions 

 Liberally construing Petitioner’s Petition and Reply, he argues that the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct 1309 (2012), tolls the AEDPA 

limitations period because counsel during his Rule 32 of-right proceeding did not identify 

the issues that Petitioner would have raised in that proceeding and because the trial court 

did not appoint counsel in his second post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 1 at 11; Doc. 24 

at 4.) In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that, under limited circumstances, the 

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could constitute cause to excuse the 

procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 

1315; see also Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293-95 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(extending the holding in Martinez to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel). 

 The Martinez decision, however, does not address the timeliness of a habeas 

petition or the tolling of the AEDPA limitations period. See Worrell v. Ryan, WL 

1951657, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 28, 2015) (“[T]he Martinez decision has no application to 

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the issue of the timeliness of the petitioner’s habeas petition.”); Wheelwright v. Wofford, 

2014 WL 3851155, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2014) (“Although the rule in Martinez is an 

equitable one, it applied only to procedural default issues and does not apply to equitable 

tolling principles pertinent to the AEDPA limitations issue.”); see also White v. Martel, 

601 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2010) (the adequacy analysis used to decide procedural 

default issues is inapplicable to the determination of whether a federal habeas petition 

was barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations); Moreno v. Ryan, 2014 WL 24151, at *1 

(D. Ariz. Jan. 2, 2014) (rejecting the petitioner’s claim that Martinez delayed the start of 

the limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) and finding that “Martinez

has no applicability to this action as it does not concern the timeliness of a habeas 

petition.”). Accordingly, the Martinez decision does not justify tolling the limitations 

period. 

 Petitioner also argues that the Court should excuse his untimely filing and consider 

the merits of his claims under “Detrich, Dickens, and Thaler.” (Doc. 1 at 11.) Petitioner 

does not provide specific citations for these cases. However, because Petitioner refers to 

these cases immediately after he mentions Martinez, he appears to be referring to Trevino 

v. Thaler, __ U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 

2014); and Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013). These cases discuss the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez in relation to habeas corpus petitioners whose 

claims were procedurally defaulted. See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1912-14; Dickens, 740 

F.3d at 1332-1338; Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1242-1246. These cases do not discuss whether 

the Martinez decision applies to the AEDPA statute of limitations. Therefore, these cases 

do not provide a basis for tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations. 

 Additionally, assuming counsel during the Rule 32 of-right proceeding failed to 

recognize issues to present in that proceeding, and that the trial court failed to appoint 

counsel during the second post-conviction proceeding, Petitioner does not explain how 

those failures prevented him from filing a timely habeas corpus petition in this court. See 

Glen v. Ontiveros, 2008 WL 2367256, at *8 (D. Ariz. Jun. 6, 2008) (equitable tolling 

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does not apply when counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness does not cause the petitioner to fail 

to meet the statute of limitations). Accordingly, Petitioner’s allegations regarding Rule 

32 of-right and post-conviction counsel do not justify tolling the limitations period 

 3. Trial Court’s Failure to Consider Petition 

 Petitioner also appears to argue that equitable tolling should apply because the trial 

court during his Rule 32 of-right proceeding did not consider his timely, Rule-32.5 

certified petition. (Doc. 1 at 11.) Petitioner, however, does not specify the period during 

which the limitations period should be tolled for this reason. As discussed below, this 

reason does not justify equitably tolling the limitations period. 

 The record reflects that while Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding was 

pending, he filed a petition in the trial court on April 9, 2012 in which he argued that 

(1) his confession and guilty plea were involuntary, (2) trial counsel was ineffective, and 

(3) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him. (Doc. 21, Ex. X.) On May 9, 2012, the 

trial court issued a minute entry noting that Petitioner had filed numerous documents with 

the court. (Doc. 21, Ex. Z.) The court noted that Petitioner had filed a motion to vacate 

judgment, which the court construed as a petition for post-conviction relief. (Id.) 

However, the court also noted that the filing did not include the required Rule 32.5 

certification, and it had previously ordered Petitioner to comply with Rule 32.5 by April 

27, 2012, warning Petitioner that failure to do so would result in dismissal of the Rule 32 

proceeding. (Id.) The court then dismissed the Rule 32 proceeding because Petitioner 

had not “compl[ied] with the law or with the [c]ourt’s directives.” (Id. at 2.) However, 

the May 9, 2012 minute entry did not specifically refer to Petitioner’s April 9, 2012 filing 

or indicate whether that filing complied with Rule 32.5. (Id.) Thus, as Petitioner argues, 

it appears that the trial court did not consider the April 9, 2012 filing. 

 Petitioner, however, did not seek review of the trial court’s decision in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 21, Ex. AA at 1; Ex. EEE at 5.) Rather, he filed numerous postconviction actions in the state court. Petitioner does not explain why he was able to file 

numerous actions in the state court, but was unable to file a timely federal petition for 

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writ of habeas corpus. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034-35. Accordingly, the state court’s 

alleged error during his Rule 32 of-right proceeding does not justify equitably tolling the 

limitations period. Therefore, Petitioner has not established a basis for equitably tolling 

the AEDPA limitations period. 

D. Exception to the Statute of Limitations 

In his Petition, Petitioner argues that his untimely filing should be excused by 

“[t]he fact that the claim is substantial, meritorious, and exonerating . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 11.) 

Thus, he appears to assert that failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Petitioner, however, has not established that he has a credible 

claim of actual innocence that constitutes an equitable exception to the one-year statute of 

limitations. In McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924, (2013), the 

Supreme Court recognized an exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations for a claim 

of actual innocence. The Court adopted the actual innocence gateway previously 

recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), for excusing the bar to 

federal habeas corpus review of procedurally defaulted claims. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 

1928 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 937-38.) 

 The rule announced in McQuiggin does not provide for an extension of the time 

statutorily prescribed, but instead is an equitable exception to § 2244(d)(1). McQuiggin, 

133 S. Ct. at 1931. Actual innocence, if proven, merely allows a federal court to address 

the merits of a petitioner’s otherwise time-barred constitutional claims; the Supreme 

Court has not yet addressed whether “a freestanding claim of actual innocence” provides 

a separate basis for granting habeas relief. Id. 

 To pass through the Schlup gateway, a “petitioner must show that it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Schlup requires a petitioner ‘to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that 

was not presented at trial.’” Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

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Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). Petitioner has not presented new evidence and has not shown 

that failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

(Docs. 1, 24.) Thus, he has not met Schlup’s high standard and this exception does not 

excuse his untimely filing. 

III. Petitioner’s Other Motions for Relief 

 Petitioner has also filed separate motions for relief from judgment, to unseal the 

record, and for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying his request for the 

appointment of counsel. (Docs. 17, 18, 26.) Petitioner also requests an evidentiary 

hearing. (Doc. 26 at 2.) These motions should be denied for the reasons set forth below. 

 In his motions for relief from judgment, Petitioner relies on Rule 60 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure to support a request for relief from the trial court’s May 9, 2012 

dismissal of his Rule 32 of-right proceeding. (Docs. 17, 26.) Rule 60 does not authorize 

this Court to grant relief from a state court’s judgment or order. Petitioner also asks the 

Court to “find meritorious” the motion to suppress evidence that Petitioner filed in the 

state trial court. (Doc. 26 at 1 (citing Doc. 21, Ex. CCC.) This Court lacks the authority 

to rule on a motion that was filed in Petitioner’s criminal case. Accordingly, the Court 

will not determine whether the motion to suppress has merit. Based on the foregoing, the 

motions for relief from judgment should be denied. 

 Petitioner has also filed a motion to unseal the Rule 11 expert evaluations that 

were obtained in CR2009-176158-002 between August 2010 and October 2010 to 

determine Petitioner’s state of mind and relationship with counsel at the time of his guilty 

plea. (Doc. 18.) Even if this Court had the authority to grant this relief, the motion 

should be denied because the expert evaluations are not necessary for the Court to resolve 

the Petition on the basis of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the motion to unseal 

the record should be denied. 

 Petitioner also requests that the Court reconsider its September 15, 2015 Order 

(Doc. 22) denying his request for the appointment of counsel. (Doc. 26 at 2.) The Court 

denies Petitioner’s motion because it is untimely and Petitioner has not shown good cause 

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for his untimely filing. See LRCiv 7.2(g)(2) (stating that unless good cause is shown, 

“any motion for reconsideration shall be filed no later than fourteen (14) days after the 

date of the filing of the Order that is the subject of the motion.”). Additionally, the Court 

denies the motion because Petitioner has not shown “manifest error” or presented “new 

facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to [the Court’s] attention earlier 

with reasonable diligence” that would change the Court’s ruling. See LRCiv 7.2(g)(1). 

 Finally, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 26.) Petitioner merely 

requests a hearing and has not shown that he is entitled to a hearing under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Accordingly, his request for an evidentiary hearing is denied. 

IV. Conclusion 

 Petitioner did not file the pending habeas petition until May 26, 2015, nearly two 

years after the statute of limitations had expired on June 13, 2013. Therefore, the Petition 

is untimely. As set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, 

and has not established that an exception to the limitations period should apply. 

Accordingly, the Petition should be denied as untimely. Therefore the Court does not 

consider Respondents’ alternative grounds for denying habeas corpus relief. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 26) is 

DENIED. 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), 

and Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s motions for relief from 

judgment (Docs. 17, 26), and motion to unseal Rule 11 expert evaluations (Doc. 18) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

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procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days within which 

to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 20th day of October, 2015. 

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