Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02025/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02025-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMON QUIROZ,

Plaintiff.

 v.

VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY, et

al., 

Defendants.

_______________________________________

No. C 05-2025 SBA

 

ORDER

[Docket No. 8]

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Ramon Quiroz's Motion to Remand [Docket No. 8].

Having read and considered the arguments presented by the parties in the papers submitted to the Court, the

Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's

Motion for Remand [Docket No. 8]. 

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. Parties

Plaintiff Ramon Quiroz ("Quiroz") is a resident and citizen ofAlameda County, California. Compl. at

¶ 1. Defendant Valley Forge Life Insurance Company ("Valley Forge") is a corporation duly organized and

existing under and by virtue of the laws of Pennsylvania, with its principalplace ofbusinessin Chicago, Illinois.

Id. ¶ 2. Valley Forge was a wholly owned subsidiary of CNA Financial Corporation until approximately 2004,

when CNA FinancialCorporation sold ValleyForge to Swiss Re Life & Health America Inc. Id. Defendant

Mark Jun Xing Jeng ("Jeng") is a resident and citizen of California. Id. ¶ 3. At all times relevant to the instant

action, Zeng was an agent for CNA Financial Corporation and/or Valley Forge. Id.

2. Allegations of the Complaint
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On or about August 2002, Zeng began pursuing Quiroz forthe purpose ofselling him life and disability

insurance, as well as a living trust. Compl. at ¶ 6. When Zeng made contact with Quiroz, he represented that

he was an expert in financial planning and recommended that Quiroz purchase life and disability insurance to

cover his mortgage and to protect his wife in the event that Quiroz died or became disabled. Id. Zeng

represented that CNA Financial was a great company and that Quiroz should purchase life insurance in the

amount of $278,000, which was the amount of Quiroz's mortgage, in addition to disability insurance with a

monthly disability benefit of$2,300. Id. Zeng was persistent and persuasive. Id. Zeng eventually succeeded

in persuading Quiroz to apply for the recommended insurance. Id.

In September 2002, Zeng brought an insurance application for insurance to Quiroz's house. Id. ¶ 7.

After asking Quiroz questions, Zeng filled out an application dated September 11, 2002 (the "September 2002

application") and submitted it to Continental Assurance Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of CNA. Id.

The September 2002 application noted that, in the past ten years, Quiroz had been treated for or had

headaches, high blood pressure, and allergies. Id. The September 2002 application also noted that Quiroz

had quit smoking in 1995 after smoking for approximately seven years. Id. As part ofthe application process,

Quiroz underwent a paramedic examination wherein a doctor or nurse came to Quiroz's home, took his blood

pressure, obtained a blood sample, and obtained further information from Quiroz. Id. at ¶ 8. 

At some point during the following weeks, Zeng informed Quiroz that his September 2002 application

had been denied by Continental Assurance Company. Id. ¶ 9. However, Zeng informed Quiroz that he was

going to submit a new applicationto anotherCNAsubsidiary, ValleyForge. Id. Subsequently, Zeng submitted

an application dated October 4, 2002 (the "October 2002 application") to Valley Forge. Id. Unbeknownst

to Quiroz, the Valley Forge application omitted health information that Quiroz previously told Zeng, some of

which had been contained in the September 2002 application. Id. Zeng then informed Quiroz that Valley

Forge had approved his application, and thatQuiroz had been issued an insurance policy through ValleyForge

Life Insurance Consumer Products Trust (hereinafter the "Policy"). Id. at ¶ 11. Believing he was insured,

Quiroz began paying premiums pursuant to the terms of the Policy. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 15. 

In July 2003, Quiroz was injured on the job. Id. ¶ 13. His injuries included two herniated discs in his

back, pinched nerves, and pain radiating down his right leg. Id. at ¶ 13. Quiroz timely submitted a claim for
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disability benefits under the Policy. Id. at ¶ 14. After submitting his claim, Quiroz called Valley Forge on

several occasions seeking the status of his claim. Id. In response to each call, Quiroz was told that his claim

was under investigation. Id.

On March 4, 2004, DeborahWatts, the Director ofUnderwriting for CNA, informed Quiroz that the

insurance Policy had been rescinded due to certain misrepresentations that had been included in his application.

Id. at ¶ 15. Specifically, the letter stated:

Our investigation, however, has revealed that Dr. Gail Dressler, 2147 Mowry Ave.

#D4, Freemont [sic], CA 94538 indicated in his notes 5-26-98 recovering alcoholic

1997, 6-17-98 back still hurts off and on, 9-24-98 chronic recurrent rightshoulder pain

and 11-19-98 to 10-8-02 depression. 

See Answer to Compl. at Ex. 3. The letter further stated that: "Had we been given the correct answers to

[certain questions] . . . on the Part II Medical Application, we would not have issued the policy." Id.

Accordingly, CNA provided Quiroz with a refund of $1,980.72, which was intended to cover all of the

premiums paid on the policy through March 2004. Id. 

B. Procedural Background

On February 28, 2005, Quiroz filed a Complaint against ValleyForge and Zeng in the SuperiorCourt

of Alameda County. In the Complaint, Quiroz alleges claims against Valley Forge for (1) breach of the duty

of good faith and fair dealing and (2) breach of contract. Quiroz also alleges a claim against Zeng for

professional negligence. 

On May 18, 2005, Valley Forge filed a Notice of Removal in this Court. In the Notice of Removal,

Circuit City alleges that jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441 because

the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Although Valley Forge concedes that

Defendant Zeng is a citizenofCalifornia, ValleyForge argues thatZeng's citizenship should be disregarded on

the grounds that there is no possibility that Quiroz will be able to establish liability against Zeng. Quiroz filed

the instant Motion to Remand on June 16, 2005. 
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LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action where the amount

in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and there is diversity of

citizenship between the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, provides that "any civil action brought in a State court

. . . may be removed by the defendant or the defendants" to federal court on the basis of federal question or

diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1441(a); Snow v. Ford MotorCo., 561 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1977). The

removal statute is to be strictly construed against removal and any doubt is resolved in favor of remand.

Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). The burden of establishing jurisdiction rests with

the party effecting the removal. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988)

(citations omitted). 

Removalof a civil action that alleges claims against a non-diverse defendant is proper where it appears

that such defendant has been fraudulently joined. McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339

(9th Cir.1987). As a matter of general principle, however, courts generally employ a presumption against

fraudulent joinder. Diaz v. Allstate Ins. Group, 185 F.R.D. 581, 586 (C.D. Cal.1998) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, the burden of proving fraudulent joinder is a heavy one. Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 707

F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir.1983). The removing party must prove that there is absolutely no possibility that the

plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in state court. Kruso v.

Int'l Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1426 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court need not determine

whether the plaintiff will actually or even probably prevail on the merits, and must look only for the possibility

that he may do so. Dodson v. Spiliada MaritimeCorp., 951 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir.1992). The failure to state

a claim against the non-diverse defendant must be "obvious according to the well-settled rules of the state."

United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Where jurisdiction depends on a finding of fraudulent joinder, the removing defendant "is entitled to

present the facts showing the joinder to be fraudulent."Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318

(9th Cir.1998). However, in making its determination, the court must resolve all disputed questions of fact and

all ambiguities in the controlling state law in favor of the non-removing party. 
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See Dodson, 951 F.2d at 42.

ANALYSIS

In the instant Motion to Remand, the sole issue in dispute is whether the citizenship of Zeng can

properly be disregarded by this Court forthe purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction. The parties concede

that Zeng and Plaintiff are both citizens ofCalifornia, thereby potentially destroying complete diversity between

the parties. However, Valley Forge argues that Zeng is merely a "sham" defendant and that there is no

possibility that Quiroz can establish liability against him. Valley Forge's position is premised on two theories:

(1) that Quiroz has not alleged sufficient facts to support the elements of his professional negligence claim

against Zeng; and (2) that, under California law, an agent of a disclosed insurance company principal is not

individually liable to the insured for actions conducted within the scope of the agency. 

A. Sufficiency of the Complaint 

With respect to its first theory, Valley Forge argues that Quiroz has not sufficiently alleged facts in

support of the elements of his professional negligence claim because "it is obvious from the Complaint and

Defendant's March 4, 2004 rescission letter that there is no nexus between Mr. Zeng's alleged negligent acts

(failing to properly or correctly disclose Mr. Quiroz' medicalhistory) and the alleged harm(rescission)." Opp.

at p. 10. Specifically, Valley Forge argues that the March 4, 2004 rescission was based on Quiroz's failure

to disclose his "longstanding history of alcohol abuse and depression" and thatQuiroz has not "alleged that he

informed Mr. Zeng of his prior alcohol abuse or depression." Id. ValleyForge also argues that the sequence

of events alleged in the Complaint are not supported by the exhibits attached to the Complaint. Valley Forge's

sole support forthis argument,however, isthe fact thatQuiroz appears to have mistakenly attached a document

relating to a November 9, 2002 paramedic evaluationto his Complaint, rather than his September 2002 CNA

application. 

Valley Forge's arguments do not persuasively overcome the strong presumption in favor of remand.

First, contrary to Valley Forge's assertion, it not "obvious" that there is no nexus between Zeng's allegedly

negligent acts and the alleged harm. In fact, the Complaint plainly states that "[u]nbeknownst to Mr. Quiroz,

the Valley Forge application omitted health informationthatMr. Quiroz previously told Zeng, some of which

was contained on the September 2002 application previously submitted to CNA." Compl. at ¶ 10 (emphasis
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added). The Complaint also states that "there were no misrepresentations regarding Mr. Quiroz' medical

history as Mr. Quiroz' health history was properly disclosed on either the Valley Forge application, the

September 2002 application orto Valley Forge's agent,Zeng." Compl. at ¶ 16 (emphasis added). In light

ofthese allegations, Valley Forge's attempt to construe the Complaint as conclusively establishing thatQuiroz

did not disclose his history of alcoholism to Zeng is untenable. 

Further, although Valley Forge appears to have correctly noted that Exhibit A to the Complaint is not

the September 2002 application to Continental Assurance Company, it is not clear how this renders the

remainder of the allegations in the Complaint "facially deficient," as Valley Forge contends. While a removing

defendant is entitled to present facts showing the joinder of a non-diverse defendant to be fraudulent, see

Ritchey, 139 F.3d at 1318, the only relevant fact that Valley Forge has presented to this Court in its Notice

ofRemovalis the fact thatQuiroz participated in a follow-up paramedic evaluationin connectionwith his Valley

Forge application in November 2002. See Not. of Removal at p.3 n.1. This does not create a dispute offact

as to whether Zeng submitted an application to Continental Assurance Company on Quiroz's behalf in

September 2002. Further, even if it did create a dispute of fact, this Court is required to resolve all disputed

questions in favor of the non-removing party. See Dodson, 951 F.2d at 42. Accordingly, Valley Forge's

arguments regarding the alleged deficiencies in Quiroz's Complaint are insufficient to support removal of this

action to this Court. 

B. Zeng's Individual Liability 

With respect to its second theory, ValleyForge argues that Quiroz has no possibility of establishing a

viable cause of action against Zeng because, under Lippert v. Bailey, 241 Cal. App. 2d 376, 382 (1966), an

insurance agentwhose principalis disclosed cannot be held individually liable to an insured. Valley Forge bases

its argument on the fact that Quiroz has alleged in his Complaint that Zeng was an "agent of Defendants at the

time he solicited and submitted Plaintiff's insurance applications to Defendants." Compl. at ¶ 3. 

In response, Quiroz contends that, the holding of Lippert notwithstanding, an action for professional

negligence can be maintained against Zeng on various theories, including: (1) that Zeng was a dual agent for

both Quiroz and Valley Forge; (2) that Zeng owed a special duty toward Quiroz due to the fact that he

represented to Quiroz that he was an expert in financial planning; and (3) that Zeng assumed a special duty
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toward Quirozwhen he failed to disclose certain essential medical information on the Valley Forge application

and misrepresented to Quiroz that the medical information was not material to Valley Forge. 

It is generally true in California that an agent, when acting in the name of a disclosed principal, is not

personally liable for negligence committed within the scope of his or her employment. See Lippert, 241

Cal.App.2d at 382. However, as Quiroz has correctly noted, California courts have recognized two separate

"lines of exception" to the general Lippert rule: (1) the dual agency exception, and (2) the "special duty"

exception. See Macey v. AllstateProperty andCasualtyInsuranceCo., 220 F.Supp.2d 1116, 1120 (N.D.

Cal. 2002). Since Valley Forge is the removing party, it bears a heavy burden of conclusively establishing that

neither exception applies here. 

1. The Dual Agency Exception

Accordingly, the first issue to be resolved is whether it is obvious, under California law, that Plaintiff

cannot possibly prevail on the theory that Zeng was acting as a "dual agent." United Computer Sys., Inc. v.

AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d at 761 (failure to state a claim against non-diverse defendant must be "obvious

according to the well-settled rules of the state."). 

In arguing that Quiroz cannot establish that Zeng was acting as a "dual agent," Valley Forge relies on

Charlin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 19 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1141 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1998) and Mercado v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 340 F.3d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 2003). Valley Forge's reliance on these case is misplaced, however. For

example, in Charlin, the district court concluded that the agent was not a dual agent after finding the plaintiff

had not sufficiently alleged that the insurance agent, an employee of Allstate, had acted in any way beyond his

capacity as an agent forthe insurer. Charlin, 19 F.Supp.2d at 1141. Notably, the Charlin court was careful

to distinguishitsfacts fromthose of Eddy v. Sharp, 199 Cal.App.3d 858, 856-66 (1988), a case in which the

California Court ofAppeals did find the existence ofdualagency. See Charlin, 19 F.Supp.2d at 1141 (noting

that the key distinguishing factors were that the agent "did not selectAllstate as the one company among many

for Plaintiff to insure with, nor did he undertake to prepare any proposals for Plaintiff."). Similarly, Mercado,

which relies exclusively on the holding ofCharlin, concludes – with relatively no analysis – that the insurance

agent was not a dual agent merely because she "did not take on any additional duties for the benefit of [the

plaintiff]." Mercado, 340 F.3d at 826 n. 1. The holdings ofCharlin and Mercado are therefore quite limited
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1This factfurther distinguishesthe instant case from Mercado and makes it more closely analogous to

Eddy. For example, in Mercado, the agent was clearly and unambiguously affiliated with only one company,

Allstate, and was named in the complaint only because she was the agent responsible for handling the insurance

claim. Mercado, 340 F.3d at 825. In contrast, in Eddy, the agent represented numerous insurance companies

and was responsible for recommending a specific company's insurance policy to the plaintiffs. Eddy, 199

Cal.App.3d at 862. This difference is important because, as stated in Eddy, "[i]fan insurance agent is the agent

for several companies and selects the company with which to place the insurance or insures with one of them

according to directions," the insurance agent may also be properly considered to be the agent of the insured.

Id. at 865.

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in applicability, and, as such, the Court finds that Charlin and Mercado do not compel the conclusion that

Quiroz has no possibility of establishing dual agency. 

Further, both Charlin and Mercado fail to acknowledge the holding of Kurtz, Richards, Wilson &

Co. v. Insurance Communicators, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1249 (1993). In Kurt, after noting that "an insurance

agent has a duty to use reasonable care, diligence, and judgment in producing the insurance requested by a

client," the California Court of Appeals held that a superior court may not dismiss a cause ofaction against an

agent ifthe complaint does not clearly state that the nature ofthe relationship between the agent and insurer was

disclosed to the plaintiff. Kurt, 12 Cal.App.4th at 1257 ("demurrer was improperly granted, since the

complaint does not allege thatthe relationship of ICMC and Hoge to Union was diclosed to KRW, but only

that it existed.") (emphasis added). The holding of Kurt is highly significant here, where it is not clear from

Plaintiff's complaint whether Zeng's relationship to ValleyForge was disclosed to Quiroz at the time he entered

into the contractual relationship with Valley Forge. 

Indeed, while it is true that Quiroz's Complaint states that Quiroz is currently "informed and believes"

thatZeng was an agent ofValleyForge, the factualallegations do not establish that Zeng actually disclosed this

to Quiroz. See Compl. at ¶ 6 (indicating that Zeng merely stated thatCNA Financialwas a "great company.").

Further, contrary to Valley Forge's assertions, the Complaint does not foreclose the possibility that Zeng was

acting as either an independent agent or in dual capacity as an agent for both Quiroz and Valley Forge. For

example, significantly, the October 2002 application does not state that Zeng is affiliated with Valley Forge,

but instead states that he is an agent of "Insurance Wholesalers." See Def's Answer at Ex. 3 (October 2002

application).1 Additionally, numerous allegations in the Complaint suggest that Quiroz had reason to believe

that Zeng was acting as his agent. Compl. at ¶¶ 6, 7, 9, 11. For example, the Complaint alleges that Zeng

initiated contact with Quiroz and made several recommendations to Quiroz with respect to the scope of
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coverage Quirozwould need; thatZeng recommended more than one CNA company to Quiroz; and thatZeng

made certain recommendations with respect to what information should, or should not, be included in the

insurance applications. Id. The Complaint also allegesthatQuiroz relied upon the informationZeng provided,

and that Quiroz believed that Zeng was engaged in "undertaking to obtain coverage for Plaintiff." Id. at ¶ 34.

 

It is therefore – at best – a disputed issue as to whether Zeng was acting as an agent for both Valley

Forge and Quiroz. Since disputed issues are resolved in favor of remand, the Court concludes that Valley

Forge has not met its burden of proof on this issue.

2. The "Special Duty" Exception 

Valley Forge has also not established that the "special duty" exception does not apply. It is well

established under California law that "[a]n insurance agent has an obligation to use reasonable care, diligence,

and judgment in procuring the insurance requested by an insured." Butcher v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 77 Cal.

App. 4th 1442, 1461 (2000) (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, "an agent's failure to deliver the

agreed-upon coverage may constitute actionable negligence and the proximate cause of an injury." Id. at 1464

(holding insurer and agent may be held liable for negligent misrepresentation, where insurer's agent misled

insureds into believing policy provided coverage for malicious prosecution); see also Desai v. Farmers Ins.

Exchange, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1110 (1996)(holdingagentmay be held liable for agent's negligent representation

that earthquake, fireand hazard insuranceprovided 100 percent replacement cost coverage); Free v. Republic

Ins. Co., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1726, 1729 (1992) (holding agent may be held liable for negligent representations

regarding adequacy of coverage limits); Paper Savers, Inc. v. Nasca, 51 Cal.App. 4th 1090, 1095 (1996)

(holding agent may be held liable for negligently representing the meaning and effect of "replacement cost

coverage" endorsement). 

While the general rule is that neither carriers nor their agent have an affirmative duty to offer advice

about coverage or to make sure that an insured understands all ofhis options and/oris adequately insured, this

generalrule changes, and a duty in an agent arises, when any one ofthe following circumstances can be proved:

(a) the agent misrepresents the nature, extent or scope of the coverage being offered or provided, (b) there is

a request or inquiry by the insured for a particular type or extent of coverage, or (c) the agent assumes an
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additional duty by either express agreement or by "holding himself out" as having expertise in a given field of

insurance being sought by the insured. Fitzpatrick v. Hayes, 57 Cal.App.4th 916 (1997); see also Paper

Savers, 51 Cal.App.4th at 1096-1097 (holding that an agent may assume a duty toward the insured by

misrepresenting the policy's terms or extent of coverage). 

In the instant case, Quiroz alleges that Zeng "held himself out" as being an "expert in financialplanning."

Compl. at ¶ 6. Quiroz further contends that he believed Zeng to be such an expert, and relied upon Zeng to

provide guidance as to:(1) the type of insurance policy he should obtain; (2) the type ofinformationthatwould

be material to an insurer in deciding whether a policy should issue. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 18, 34-39. 

Additionally, Quiroz alleges that he fully disclosed his medical history to Zeng and that Zeng made

certain misrepresentations to Quiroz regarding the significance of the information thatwas disclosed. Id. at ¶¶

18-19. Quiroz also alleges that "Zeng[] led Mr. Quiroz to believe that any facts not on the Valley Forge

application, but disclosed to Zeng, were not required, and/ormaterialto the issuance of the subject insurance

Policy." Id. at ¶ 18. Moreover, Quiroz contends that when his Continental Assurance Company application

was rejected, Zeng, without engaging in any further consultations with Quiroz, took it upon himself to submit

a new application to a different company, which application contained material representations regarding

Quiroz's medicalhistory. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. As a result of Quiroz's conversations with Zeng, Quiroz contends that

he was led to believe that his insurance policy was valid, and that Valley Forge would not have any basis to

rescind the policy. Id. at ¶¶ 16-18, 37. 

Due to the allegations in the Complaint regarding Zeng's alleged "financial expertise" and Zeng's fairly

significant misrepresentations, it cannot be said with certainty that California courts would refuse to recognize

a cause of action against Zeng. Since the presence of Zeng destroys diversity, remand of this action to state

court is therefore appropriate. See, e.g., Isch v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 2000 WL 274193 *3

(N.D. Cal. 2000) (remanding action after finding that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that agent had made

misrepresentations and omissions in insurance application); Smith v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co.,

1998 WL 775124 * 2 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (remanding action after finding that insurance agent had held himself

out to the plaintiff as an expert in matters of life insurance and estate planning and had assured plaintiff that he

would identify and procure policies with the features plaintiff requested); Macey, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1127
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(finding remand appropriate after recognizing applicabilityofthe "specialduty" exception); Kaighn v. National

Life of Vermont, 2003 WL 173863 *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (same). 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [Docket No. 8] is GRANTED. The

case is herebyREMANDED to the Superior Court for Alameda County. All pending matters are terminated

and the clerk is directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: 7-27-05 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge