Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00307/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00307-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

LUTHER JEROME WILLIAMS, )

 )

PLAINTIFF, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:07-cv-307-MEF-SRW

 )

RICHARD ALLEN, et al., ) (WO-Not Recommended for Publication)

 )

DEFENDANT. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On April 10, 2007, Luther Jerome Williams (“Williams”), an Alabama death row

inmate scheduled for execution on August 23, 2007, filed this civil rights action in which he

seeks declaratory and injunctive relief aimed at stopping the State of Alabama from

executing him using its lethal injection protocol. This cause is now before the Court on the

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 6). The Court has carefully considered the

arguments in support of and in opposition to this motion and the applicable law. For the

reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court finds that the motion is

due to be GRANTED. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Williams alleges that Alabama’s method of execution violates his rights under the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and brings suit pursuant

to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (“§ 1983")

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 1 of 16
Williams was convicted of intentional murder during the course of a robbery which 1

was made a capital offense by Alabama Code § 13A-5-40(a)(2) (1975). Williams v. State,

601 So. 2d 1062, 1065 (Ala. Cr. App. 1991). 

2

Consequently, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court further finds

that venue is appropriate and that both defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this

Court. 

BACKGROUND, FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS, AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 30, 1989, Williams was convicted of capital murder in Tuscaloosa 1

County, Alabama. Compl. at ¶ 6. He was convicted of the January 1988 murder of John

Robert Kirk. The facts of Williams’ crime are set forth in the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeal’s opinion affirming dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus:

On January 22, 1988, a 1981 dark blue Oldsmobile Regency

automobile was stolen from a motel parking lot in Birmingham,

Alabama. In the trunk of this vehicle was, among other items,

a .22 caliber pistol. A dark blue car arrived at the Smithfield

housing project in Birmingham later that same evening and

[Williams] was identified as the sole occupant. On the morning

of January 23, 1988, John Robert Kirk was on his way home

from work. He stopped his vehicle - a red 1984 Chevrolet

pickup truck with a camper on the back - near the West Blocton

exit on Interstate 59 South in Tuscaloosa County. [Williams]

and two men were traveling south on Interstate 59 in the stolen

Oldsmobile. After noticing the victim’s vehicle beside the road,

they stopped and confronted him. [Williams] led the victim to a

nearby wooded area and shot him once in the left side of the

head, “execution style,” with the .22 caliber pistol which had

been in the trunk of the stolen Oldsmobile. The victim’s body

was left at the site of the shooting, and his money and vehicle

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 2 of 16
 The jury recommended that Williams be given a death sentence and the trial court 2

accepted its recommendation and sentenced Williams to death by electrocution. Williams

v. State, 601 So. 2d at 1065.

 On June 14, 1991, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction 3

and sentence. Williams v. State, 601 So. 2d 1062 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). On March 6,

1992, the Alabama Supreme Court granted his petition for writ of certiorari and affirmed

without opinion. Ex parte Williams, 662 So. 2d 929 (Ala. 1992). The United States Supreme

Court denied his writ of certiorari. Williams v. Alabama, 506 U.S. 957 (1992) 

 On March 31, 2000, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of 4

Williams’ Rule 32 petition. Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied rehearing, and then on October 27, 2000, the

Alabama Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari on this case. Williams v.

Allen, 458 F.3d 1233, 1237 (11th Cir. 2006).

3

were taken.

Williams v. Allen, 458 F.3d 1233, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2006). On February 12, 1990, Williams

was sentenced to death. Id. Williams pursued an unsuccessful direct appeal of his 2

conviction and sentence. 

3

After the completion of his unsuccessful direct appeal, Williams pursued an equally

unsuccessful collateral attack in the state court system. On April 8, 1994, Williams filed a

petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 in the

court of his conviction, which petition he later amended. Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 108,

111-112 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). After a hearing in 1997, the Circuit Court denied Williams’

Rule 32 petition. Id. at 112. Williams unsuccessfully appealed the denial of his Rule 32

petition.4

On March 29, 2001, after exhausting his available legal challenges in the state courts

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 3 of 16
 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that the Grayson opinion is to 5

be published, however, the official citation for the federal reporter is not yet available. 

4

of Alabama, Williams filed a federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in

the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Williams v. Allen, 458

F.3d 1233, 1237 (11th Cir. 2006). He later amended his habeas corpus petition on June 7,

2001. Id. On April 20, 2005, the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Alabama denied Williams relief on his federal habeas corpus petition and dismissed it. Id.

On August 2, 2006, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. See

generally, Williams v. Allen, 458 F.3d 1233. On March 26, 2007, the United States Supreme

Court denied Williams’ petition for writ of certiorari. Williams v. Allen, 127 S. Ct. 1874

(2007). 

While Williams’ federal habeas corpus petition was pending the in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the State of Alabama changed its

primary method of execution. On July 1, 2002, the State of Alabama changed its primary

method of execution from electrocution to lethal injection and gave death row inmates thirty

days from the date on which the Alabama Supreme Court’s affirmed their death sentences

to elect electrocution instead. See Grayson v. Allen, No. 07-12364, 2007 WL 2027903 at *2

(11th Cir. July 16, 2007) ; Ala. Code § 15-18-82.1. It is undisputed that Williams did not 5

elect electrocution and by operation of law will be executed by lethal injection.

Consequently, his challenge in this lawsuit is to his execution by lethal injection under the

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 4 of 16
 As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, 

6

[t]he Alabama Supreme Court is authorized to enter an order

fixing an inmates date of execution “at the appropriate time.”

Ala. R. App. P. 8(d) (“The supreme court shall at the

appropriate time enter an order fixing a date of execution.”

(emphasis added)). It is common practice in Alabama for the

State to seek an execution date soon after the Supreme Court

denies certiorari review of an inmate’s federal habeas petition.

As a matter of common sense, completion of collateral review

eliminates the last possible obstacle to execution, and [a death

-sentenced inmate] should [foresee] that the execution date

would likely be set promptly upon completion of collateral

review.

Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635, 639 n.2 (11th Cir. 2007). 

5

protocol currently employed by the State of Alabama. 

Consistent with its practice of asking the Supreme Court of Alabama to set execution

dates for death row inmates shortly after the United States Supreme Court denies certiorari

review of such prisoners’ federal habeas petitions, the State of Alabama filed a motion 6

asking the Supreme Court of Alabama to set an execution date for Williams. See Ex. A to

Doc. # 6. This request was filed on April 4, 2007. Id. Williams filed an opposition to the

motion. See Ex. A to Doc. # 18. 

After the State of Alabama asked the Supreme Court of Alabama to set an execution

date for Williams, he filed this lawsuit. On April 10, 2007, Williams filed this action

challenging the method of execution. Williams names two defendants: Richard Allen, the

Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, and Grantt Culliver, the Warden

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 5 of 16
 The Complaint also purports to bring claims against other unknown employees and 7

agents of the Alabama Department of Corrections involved in the development and execution

of lethal injections. Compl. at ¶ 5. Of course, there is no fictitious party practice in federal

courts. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092,

1094 n.1 (11th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1304

n.6 (M.D. Ala. 2002); Edwards v. Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1257 (M.D.

Ala. 2000). Accordingly, there are only two proper party defendants to this lawsuit.

 This drug is also known as sodium pentothal. Compl. at ¶ 9. 8

 This drug is also known as pancuronium bromide. Compl. at ¶ 11. 9

6

of Holman Correctional Facility (collectively referred to as “Defendants”). Compl. at ¶ 5. 7

He contends that the Alabama Department of Corrections is responsible for carrying out

executions in Alabama and that all executions take place at Holman Correctional Facility.

Compl. at ¶ 7. Williams further alleges that the three drug protocol Alabama currently uses

in lethal injection executions is likely to cause him an excruciatingly painful and torturous

death. Compl. at ¶ 8. Williams alleges that, like other states employing execution by lethal

injection, the State of Alabama uses Thiopental , Pavulon , and potassium chloride to 8 9

anesthetize, paralyze, and induce cardiac arrest. Compl. at ¶ 8. In addition to challenging

the actual drugs Alabama uses in executions, Williams contends that Alabama’s anesthesia

procedures lack medically necessary safeguards and increase the risk that he will suffer

unnecessary pain. Compl. at ¶¶ 8-19. He also challenges the qualifications of those tasked

with injecting the drugs and the lack of the involvement of properly licensed and credentialed

medical personnel. Id. 

Invoking this Court’s equitable powers, Williams seeks an injunction barring

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 6 of 16
7

Defendants from executing him with inadequate anesthesia and execution procedures that

violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. He also

seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ lethal injection protocol violates that

prohibition. Finally, he seeks an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and

the costs of this lawsuit. 

On May 7, 2007, Defendants filed the motion to dismiss. Doc. # 6. They argue that

the claims in the Complaint are time-barred either by operation of the statute of limitations

or by the document of laches. The essence of both of the State of Alabama’s arguments is

that Williams waited too long to file his action. Williams has briefed his opposition to this

motion. Doc. # 8. 

On May 21, 2007, the Supreme Court of Alabama entered an Order setting an

execution date of August 23, 2007 for Williams. Doc. # 12. On June 6, 2007, Williams filed

a motion with this Court seeking a temporary stay of his execution pursuant to the All Writs

Act arguing that his execution should be postponed until after he has an opportunity to

litigate this action. Doc. # 18. The State of Alabama opposed the temporary stay. Doc. #

23. On July 10, 2007, this Court applied the binding precedent from the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals and denied Williams’ request for a temporary stay of his execution. Doc.

# 25. Despite the fact that his execution date is rapidly approaching, Williams has not asked

this Court to expedite its consideration of the pending motion to dismiss, nor has he sought

to expedite this case in any way. 

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 7 of 16
 In accordance with then existing precedent from the Eleventh Circuit Court of 10

Appeals, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida had dismissed

Hill’s complaint due to for failure to comply with the requirements for a successive habeas

petition. 126 S. Ct. at 1099, 2101. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. On

January 25, 2006, the United States Supreme Court granted Hill’s petition for writ of

certiorari. 126 S. Ct. 1189 (2006). On June 12, 2006, the United States Supreme Court

decided the case and reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 126 S. Ct. 2096.

 The Court does not mean to suggest that Williams was precluded from bringing this 11

action prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill. To the contrary, unfavorable circuit

precedent does not foreclose all avenues for relief or excuse delay in raising § 1983 lethal

injection claims. Grayson, 2007 WL 2027903 at *4. After all, the plaintiff in Hill was not

deterred by the unfavorable precedent from the Eleventh Circuit and his suit is what

ultimately changed the law in this circuit. Id. Moreover, Williams’ argument is not

persuasive because he waited to file this lawsuit until approximately fifteen months after the

grant of certiorari in Hill and approximately ten months after the decision in Hill removed

the supposed impediment of the unfavorable circuit precedent. Id. 

8

DISCUSSION

In June of 2006, the United States Supreme Court held that a death row inmate in

Florida could bring a claim pursuant to § 1983 raising a challenge to the constitutionality of

the particular method of lethal injection planned for his execution even though he had already

brought an unsuccessful federal habeas corpus petition which did not include such a claim.

Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006). By filing this lawsuit, Williams seeks to do 10

just that. He challenges the lethal injection protocol used by the State of Alabama for

executions since a change in Alabama law in 2002. 

When the United States Supreme Court clarified that an action such as this one could

be brought pursuant to § 1983, it clearly stated that “[f]iling an action that can proceed

11

under § 1983 does not entitle the complainant to an order staying an execution as a matter

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 8 of 16
 Williams contends that this Court should not consider Grayson because it was 12

decided by the district court on a motion for summary judgment and not a motion to dismiss.

The Court notes that the language of the Eleventh Circuit decision in Grayson emphasizes

the appropriateness of dismissal of an unnecessarily delayed action seeking injunctive relief.

More importantly, Grayson is merely a logical extension or further refining of the holding

of Rutherford which specifically addressed the appropriateness of a ruling on a motion to

dismiss. 

9

of course.” 126 S. Ct. at 2104. Furthermore, it recognized that “[b]oth the State and the

victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence” which

interest was not diminished by the recognition of the ability of the inmate to file an action

pursuant to § 1983. Id. The Supreme Court further explained that its decision recognizing

the ability of death row inmates to bring such claims was not intended to deprive federal

courts of the means to protect the interest of the State and the victims of crime in the timely

enforcement of a sentence. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court made plain that “[t]he federal

courts can and should protect States from dilatory or speculative suits[.]” Id. (emphasis

added). 

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

twice affirmed the dismissal of cases brought inmates sentenced to death challenging the

method of execution pursuant to § 1983. See, e.g., Grayson v. Allen, No. 07-12364, 2007

WL 2027903 at *1 (11th Cir. July 16, 2007) (explaining that district court properly dismissed

action because of plaintiff’s unnecessary delay in seeking equitable relief pursuant to §

1983); Rutherford v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 12

465 (2006) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of § 1983 complaint on equitable

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 9 of 16
 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit twice affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 13

Rutherford’s § 1983 challenge to Florida’s lethal injection protocol, which like Alabama uses

sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. Rutherford v. Cosby, 466

F.3d 970, 1089-93, 1099-1100, & n.3 (11th Cir. 2006); Rutherford v. Cosby, 438 F.3d 1087

(11th Cir. 2006). Rutherford filed his § 1983 suit challenging Florida’s lethal injection

procedure and seeking a permanent injunction less than a week before his scheduled

execution. Rutherford v. Crosby, 438 F.3d at 1092. The district court dismissed on two

alternative grounds: (1) Rutherford’s claim was properly brought as a habeas corpus

proceeding, and he had not obtained the requisite order from the Eleventh Circuit permitting

him to file a second or successive petition; and (2) even if the complaint states a cognizable

claim under § 1983, he had unnecessarily delayed in bringing his claim and thus was not

entitled to injunctive relief. 438 F.3d at 1089. In its first hearing of Rutherford’s appeal, the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on both grounds. 466 F.3d at 973. Thereafter,

the United States Supreme Court granted a stay of execution to Rutherford, granted

certiorari, and vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment with instructions for the case to be

reconsidered in light of Hill. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Crosby, 126 S. Ct. 1191 (2006)

(granting a stay); Rutherford v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2915 (2006) (granting certiorari,

vacating and remanding). On remand, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated its prior holding that

the case was due to be dismissed because Rutherford could and should have brought it earlier

and again affirmed the district court on this basis. 466 F.33d at 973-78. Thereafter, the

United States Supreme Court denied Rutherford’s petition for writ of certiorari on that issue.

10

grounds). In deciding Rutherford, the Eleventh Circuit explained that when an inmate 13

sentenced to death seeks to challenge the method of execution in a suit brought pursuant to

§ 1983 that includes a prayer for a permanent injunction, well-established equitable

principles must be applied and these principles are equally applicable to all types of equitable

relief whether that relief is permanent or temporary. 466 F.3d at 976. Accord, Grayson,

2007 WL 2027903 at *3 (“Additionally, the equitable principles at issue when inmates facing

imminent execution delay in raising their § 1983 method-of-execution challenges are equally

applicable to requests for both stays and injunctive relief.”) (emphasis added). This means

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 10 of 16
 This is not so surprising a result. It is not realistic to expect this type of case to be 14

able to be litigated in less than a year. Discovery, briefing dispositive motions, evidentiary

hearings, and the like take a great deal of time. The burdens of docket congestion or the

complexity of issues may further slow litigation. The appeal process also takes time. Thus,

a litigant should know that waiting until weeks or months before his execution date is likely

to be set or until after the request for the setting of an execution date has been made to file

this type of suit is a high risk strategy. Waiting to file suit during the brief window of time

11

that a district court faced with a motion to dismiss a claim for prospective injunctive relief

pursuant to § 1983 by an inmate seeking to challenge the method of execution must consider

the interests of the State in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue interference from

the federal courts and the interests of the family of the victims interest in the timely

enforcement of a death sentence. See Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2104; Rutherford, 466 F.3d at 976.

Additionally, the court must consider whether the plaintiff has been dilatory in bringing his

claim. Rutherford, 466 F.3d at 974. 

Of course, one might have read Rutherford as narrowly holding that a § 1983 action

challenging a method of execution and seeking injunctive relief is due to be dismissed if the

plaintiff has unnecessarily delayed in bringing the claim by waiting until less than a week

before a scheduled execution date to file his claim. 466 F.3d at 974. Obviously in that case,

such a plaintiff would know “that the discovery, evidentiary hearing, and decision on the

merits that he demands could not possibly be accomplished in that short period of time.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit’s more recent decision in Grayson, however, clarifies that unreasonable

delay encompasses more than waiting until less than a week before a scheduled execution

to file suit. 

14

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 11 of 16
between the denial of certiorari on the inmate’s federal habeas petition and the state’s chosen

execution date allows an insufficient period in which to litigate the issues raised on the

merits. See, e.g., Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d at 639 n.2 (discussing the foreseeability of the

risks of waiting until too late to file suit and the inadequacy of the length of time between the

denial of certiorari on the federal habeas petition and the execution date for litigation of the

merits).

12

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in Grayson that the death row inmate’s

challenge pursuant to § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief due to an alleged

future violation of the inmate’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment was

appropriately dismissed because the inmate “delayed unnecessarily” in bringing the action

and “did not leave sufficient time for full adjudication on the merits.” 2007 WL 2027903 at

*6-*7. In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff in Grayson

had waited until his execution was imminent. Id. In that case, the execution had twice been

“imminent”: once “when his § 2254 post-conviction proceedings were completed” and once

again when his the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an earlier filed § 1983 action

that had resulted in a temporary stay of his execution. Id. at *7. Thus, Grayson has clarified

that Rutherford applies not only to cases filed within days of execution, but also that the rule

announced in Rutherford applies to § 1983 suits for injunctive relief that are not filed in

sufficient time to allow full adjudication on the merits without entry of a stay. See generally,

Grayson, 2007 WL 2027903 *1. This binding precedent must inform this Court’s analysis

of the motion to dismiss now pending before it. 

Like the plaintiff in Grayson, Williams waited to bring this action. He filed this

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 12 of 16
 The district court ruled against Williams on his federal habeas petition nearly a year 15

before he filed suit. When the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court ruling on that case

on August 2, 2006, Williams did not file this lawsuit. Instead he waited until April 10, 2007,

two weeks after the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on Williams’ federal

habeas claims. 

13

lawsuit more than eighteen years after he was convicted and sentenced to death. He filed this

lawsuit nearly fifteen years after the conclusion of his unsuccessful direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence. He filed this lawsuit nearly seven years after the conclusion of his

unsuccessful Rule 32 proceedings. He filed this suit more than six years after he commenced

his federal habeas corpus suit. He filed this suit nearly five years after he knew that the State

of Alabama would use lethal injection to execute him. He filed this suit approximately

fifteen months after the United States Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari in the Hill

case. He filed this suit approximately ten months after the United States Supreme Court

issued its decision in Hill. He filed this lawsuit after the conclusion of his unsuccessful

federal habeas corpus action. He filed this lawsuit after the State of Alabama moved for 15

the setting of an execution date. In this Court’s view, Williams waited until there was no

possible way for this Court to adjudicate the merits of the claims in this lawsuit without entry

of a stay. 

While Williams could not have brought this lawsuit challenging the lethal injection

protocol employed by the State of Alabama for executions before 2002, when it adopted that

method of execution, he certainly could have done so any time after that. His delay was

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 13 of 16
Williams contends that his claim was not ripe prior to the United States Supreme 16

Court’s denial of certiorari on his petition for federal habeas corpus relief on March 26,

2007. The Eleventh Circuit has rejected this argument. See Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d at 639

n.2. Indeed, there is no convincing reason why, after Alabama made lethal injection its

primary method of execution, any inmate who is reasonably likely to be executed in the

future could not have brought a method-of-injection challenge. See 485 F.3d at 640.

Additionally, the Court rejects Williams related argument that he cannot be found to have

delayed unnecessarily in filing his suit because the harm he seeks to avoid has not yet

occurred. While Williams is correct that he is seeking prospective injunctive relief to avoid

what he alleges would be a future violation of his constitutional rights, he is not correct that

he cannot be found to have delayed unreasonably because that future harm has not yet

occurred. Obviously, the future harm had not occurred in Grayson or in Rutherford either.

Like this case, those cases sought prospective injunctive relief relating to an execution to be

conducted at a date in the future. There is simple no way to square Williams’ argument in

this regard and the holdings of those cases. Indeed, Williams’ arguments as to why his delay

was “reasonable” lack support in the law of this Circuit and many have already been rejected

by the Eleventh Circuit. See, generally, Grayson, 2007 WL 2027903 *1; Jones, 485 F.3d

635; Rutherford, 466 F.3d 970.

14

unnecessary and inexcusable. Like the plaintiff in Grayson, if Williams “truly had intended 16

to change Alabama’s lethal injection protocol, he would not have deliberately waited to file

suit until a decision on the merits would be impossible without the entry of a stay or an

expedited litigation schedule.” Grayson, 2007 WL 2027903 at *7. The Court finds no

justification for Williams’ failure to bring this action earlier and his dilatory filing of this suit

leaves little doubt that the real purpose behind his claim is to seek a delay of his execution,

not merely to effect an alteration of the manner in which it is carried out. Both the State of

Alabama and the family of the victim of Williams’ crime have strong interests in seeing

Williams’ punishment carried out after waiting more than eighteen years. Grayson, 2007 WL

2027903 at *8. 

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 14 of 16
15

In light of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Grayson, this Court is compelled to find

that Williams is not entitled to injunctive relief because he delayed in filing his method-ofexecution § 1983 suit until his execution was imminent. He did not file this lawsuit until

after the last possible obstacle to the State of Alabama setting his execution date had passed.

Indeed, Williams did not file this lawsuit until after the State of Alabama had filed a motion

asking the Supreme Court of Alabama to set his execution date. Given the strong

presumption against the grant of equitable relief to those who have been dilatory in

requesting it, Williams’ suit is due to be dismissed because he unnecessarily delayed in

bringing suit until his execution wasimminent and until there was not sufficient time to allow

full adjudication on the merits of his claims without entry of a stay of his execution.

In light of this Court’s conclusion that dismissal is warranted on equitable grounds,

the Court need not and will not address the State of Alabama’s alternative argument that

Williams’ claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Due to the nature of the claims, the

statute of limitations issue is, in this Court’s view, a complex issue. It is also one on which

this Court has little guidance. There are few district court opinions from this Circuit on the

issue, and those opinions conflict with what appears to be the sole existing decision from a

Circuit Court of Appeals. Compare, Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (M.D. Ala. 2007)

(Thompson, J.) (holding that statute of limitations did not bar claim because statute did not

start to run until there was an invasion on a legally protected interest of the plaintiff which

in these suits would not occur until the execution itself) with Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 15 of 16
16

412 (6th Cir. 2006), reh’g denied, No. 05-4057, 2007 WL 1574663 *1 (6th Cir. 2007)

(holding that statute of limitations begins to run at the later of either the conclusion of the

direct review of the death sentence or the date when the challenged protocol became the

state’s exclusive execution method). Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the issue in this context. In fact, the

Eleventh Circuit had the issue before it in Grayson and declined to address it in light of its

holding. 2007 WL 2027903 at *8 n.5. This Court will take this cue from the Circuit and do

likewise. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. # 6) is GRANTED. A separate final judgment will be entered. 

DONE this the 30 day of July, 2007. th

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 2:07-cv-00307-MEF-SRW Document 26 Filed 07/30/07 Page 16 of 16