Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00505/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00505-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TRACEY FLETCHER, # 186876, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 16-505-KD-N

MS. CUNNINGHAM, et al., :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action has been referred to the 

undersigned for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. Ala. 

GenLR 72(a)(2)(R). After careful review, it is recommended that this action be 

dismissed with prejudice as frivolous, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

I. Complaint. (Doc. 1).

Plaintiff names as defendants: Ms. Cunningham, head classification officer at 

Fountain Correctional Center (“Fountain”); Kenneth Peters, Deputy Warden at 

Fountain; Captain Bishop; and Lieutenant Davis. (Doc. 1 at 5-6). Plaintiff’s claim 

against them is for the denial of access to courts. (Id.).

Plaintiff’s brief complaint on this Court’s complaint form contains sketchy 

information. His allegations are as follows. He was placed in segregation after he was 

assaulted on August 7, 2016. (Id. at 4). While in segregation, he “decided to try to fight 

[his] child support case in Indiana.” (Id.). When in segregation, the segregation review 

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board, which is comprised of the head of classification and the warden, comes to an 

inmate’s cell. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that when he tried to get help, defendant 

Cunningham, the head of classification, would “go[] off the deep end, a[b]out its federal 

guide lines, the[y] ‘can’t’ help [him].’” (Id.). The following week at the next 

segregation board, he presented it to defendant Peters, who told plaintiff that he will 

look into it. (Id.). Plaintiff did not hear anything. (Id.). Later, defendant Bishop got 

mad and told plaintiff that plaintiff knows their job well; then, they walked off. (Id.). 

At the next segregation review board, plaintiff stopped them and talked to defendant 

Bishop, who told plaintiff to talk to the CRB, and then they walked off. (Id.). Plaintiff 

identifies his claim against each defendant as occurring in front of his cell during 

different segregation reviews. (Id. at 5-6). For relief, plaintiff seeks $400,000 and the 

defendants’ jobs and retirement benefits. (Id. at 8).

II. Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is reviewing his 

complaint (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a claim may 

be dismissed as “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).1 A claim is 

frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are immune from suit, id.

at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833, or the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist. 

Id.

 1 Neitzke’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is applied to § 1915(d)’s superseding 

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346,1348-49 (11th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 534 U.S. 1044 (2001). 

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Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 

1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, the allegations must show plausibility. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). That is, 

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level” and must be a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1966 

(second brackets in original). But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 

129 S.Ct. at 1949. 

When considering a pro se litigant’s allegations, a court gives them a liberal 

construction holding them to a more lenient standard than those of an attorney. 

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), but it does not have 

“license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” 

GJR Investments v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), 

overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662. The court treats as true factual 

allegations, but it does not treat as true conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of 

action’s elements. Id. at 681, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. In addition, a pro se litigant “is subject to 

the relevant law and rules of court including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 

Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989).

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III. Discussion.

After reviewing plaintiff’s allegations, the court finds that they are extremely 

vague and that they do not convey a clear claim. The only comprehensible information 

is that he wants to fight his child support case and alleges that he has been denied 

access to courts in connection with this case. Plaintiff does not explain how he has been 

denied access to courts, or at least he has not done so in unambiguous terms. 

Despite the pleading deficiencies, the Court will address plaintiff’s claim for 

denial of access to courts. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 

(1977), the Supreme Court recognized a prisoner's right of access to the courts. The 

Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires 

prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal 

papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from 

persons trained in the law.” Id. at 346, 352, 116 S.Ct. at 2177, 2180. Later, in Lewis v. 

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2181-82, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), the Court 

refined its holding in Bounds and counseled that an inmate’s right of access to the 

courts can be fulfill in different ways, for example, access to law libraries, a system of 

court-provided forms, or minimal access to legal advice. Id. at 352, 116 S.Ct. at 2180. 

The Lewis Court made clear that the Bounds decision “did not create an abstract, 

freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance[.]” Id. at 351, 116 S.Ct. at 2180. 

Law libraries and legal assistance programs were found by the Lewis Court not to be 

ends themselves, “but only the means for ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity 

to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Id.

Thus, the Lewis Court determined that “the inmate must . . . demonstrate that the 

alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to 

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pursue a legal claim.” Id. That is, the inmate must show that he sustained an actual 

injury by showing that he was frustrated or impeded in attacking his conviction, 

directly or collaterally, or in a civil rights action challenging his conditions of 

confinement. Id. at 351-52, 355, 116 S.Ct. at 2180 (emphasis added); see Cunningham v. 

District Attorney’s Office for Escambia Cty., 592 F.3d 1237, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The 

injury requirement means that the plaintiff must have an underlying cause of action the 

vindication of which is prevented by the denial of access to the courts.”). The inmate 

must further show that the underlying claim that he was advancing was a nonfrivolous 

claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353, 116 S.Ct. at 2181. This underlying claim “must be 

described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the ‘arguable’ 

nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 

403, 415-16, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2187, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002). In other words, an inmate is

not guarantee the ability by Bounds to litigate any type of action, but he is provided the 

tools needed to bring an action attacking his sentence, directly or collaterally, and 

challenging his conditions of confinement. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355, 116 S.Ct. at 2182. 

“Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and 

perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id.

In the present action, plaintiff indicates that the action in which he wants to 

litigate is a child support action in Indiana. However, a child support action is not one 

of the types of cases in which the Lewis Court found that an inmate could suffer a 

violation of access to courts. Gilbert v. Gunja, 184 F.3d 817, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999) 

(unpublished) (holding that no violation of access to courts occurred when the inmate 

was denied access to Texas books to challenge the state court judgment ordering him to 

pay child support because Lewis limited his right of access to courts to cases 

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challenging his conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement); Briggs v. Donahue, 

2005 WL 1787863, at *1-2 (D. Idaho 2005) (unpublished) (same); cf. Wilson v. 

Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that an in rem forfeiture 

action was not one of the actions recognized by Lewis in which an inmate may have a 

claim for the denial of access to courts). Rather, an inmate can only suffer a violation of 

the right of access to courts in an action attacking a conviction, directly or collaterally, 

or in a civil rights action challenging his conditions of confinement. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 

355, 116 S.Ct. at 2182. Whereas, plaintiff’s underlying action is based on subject matter 

outside the scope of the type of actions enumerated by Lewis Court in which a violation 

of the right of access to courts could occur for an inmate. As a consequence, plaintiff’s 

action lacks an arguable basis in law and is therefore frivolous.

IV. Conclusion.

Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that this action be 

dismissed with prejudice as frivolous, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in 

it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D. Ala. Gen.LR 72(c). The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 

3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based

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on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time 

period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence 

of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if 

necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an 

objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is 

made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s 

report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 8th day of February, 2017. 

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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