Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02219/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02219-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO ANTHONY CARMONA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOE McGRATH, Warden; et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-2219 MHP (pr)

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

This case is now before the court for consideration of defendant Ater's motion for

summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted. Defendant

Ater is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim

and on his defense of qualified immunity. The claims against the other defendants will be

dismissed. 

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted:

The incident that gives rise to Marco Carmona's complaint occurred on February 24,

2004, while he was incarcerated in the security housing unit ("SHU") at Pelican Bay State

Prison. The California Department of Corrections operational procedure manual describes

the purpose and objective of the SHU:

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The SHU is designed to maximize control of inmates who pose a definite and serious

threat to the safety of others or themselves. SHU inmates may also be deemed a threat

to the security of the institution for escape, major destruction of property, or activities

leading to disorder. . . . [¶] The SHU is a segregated housing complex, which serves

to place extreme limits on inmate opportunity for violent and disruptive behavior. The

SHU provides physical controls to prevent disorder and provide protection for others. 

The close supervision of the SHU inmates affords an opportunity to observe inmate

behavior and, if necessary, intervene with mental health services or stricter controls.

Opposition brief, Ex. H, p. AGO-0001. The SHU is made up of several pods, and each pod

in facility D of the SHU has two tiers with four cells on each tier for a total of 8 cells per pod. 

Id. at AGO-0002; Complaint, p. 12. 

The parties disagree about whether inmates were ever allowed to move about the SHU

without restraints. Defendant Ater states that inmates must be moved while restrained in

double-locked handcuffs and sometimes also leg irons. Carmona states that he normally was

able to move about the pod without an escort and without handcuffs. Their disagreement is

not material to the present action because, regardless of whether restraints were or were not

always required, the parties agree that Carmona and Garcia were initially let out of their cell

unrestrained to pack up their property for a cell move and to be searched, that only after they

refused to move did prison officials determine they needed to be put in handcuffs, and that

Carmona and Garcia then refused the orders to submit to handcuffing. 

At about 9:00 a.m. on February 24, 2004, correctional officer Harkins told Carmona

and his cellmate, Hector Garcia, they were being moved to different housing. He told them

to pack their personal belongings on carts but refused to tell them where they were being

moved to or why they were being moved. Carmona and Garcia packed their property on two

moving carts. They were strip-searched at about 9:40 a.m. Correctional officer Gaylord told

them they were being moved to "F" pod "behind glass." Complaint, p. 13. 

A cell "behind glass" refers to one that has a Lexan plexiglass-type front to reduce an

inmate's ability to assault passersby with food, body fluids, feces, and weapons. See id. at 13

and n.3. Carmona and his cellmate were outside their cell and were cooperative until they

learned they were going to be moved to a cell with a Lexan front. Garcia yelled to another

inmate in F pod and learned that there was an available cell behind glass. 

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When Carmona and Garcia found out they were to be moved behind glass, they

refused to move. Carmona and Garcia were ordered by C/O Harkins to "cuff up" (i.e.,

submit to be handcuffed) but they refused. They refused to be moved because they had not

received the paperwork for the move. In response to the inmates' refusal, their cell door was

shut and they were now outside their cell and in the pod. 

At approximately 9:55 a.m. sergeant Navarro came to the area and told Carmona and

Garcia "cuff up. We're going to move both of you behind glass." Id. at 13. The inmates

continued to refuse and wanted to discuss the matter to obtain an explanation for the move. 

Garcia explained that they had been in the same cell for over 3 years without any problems

and there was no reason to move them. Garcia asked to have the cell door opened so they

could return to their original cell. Sergeant Navarro said "better cuff-up or I will bring the

extraction team and make it very painful for both of you." Id. at 14. Garcia responded that

they wanted "an explanation or justification" for the move. Sergeant Navarro walked away.

While the inmates were out of their cell, a guard had aimed a 40 mm. launcher at

them. A 40 mm. launcher is a rifle-like weapon that shoots hard rubber blocks. Id.

At about 10:00, Garcia picked up a blanket off the floor and put it on the stair rails. 

Carmona contends the blanket was put on the stair rails to dry; guards interpreted it as a

barricade. See Ater Decl., ¶ 7 ("Inmates commonly use blankets as barricades during an

extraction to conceal themselves, hide weapons, make the floor slippery with water, etc. 

This is a security concern. Direct-impact rounds will knock a blanket down if it has not been

securely fastened. Otherwise a blanket will stop the direct-impact rounds.") Two control

officers who were 30-35 feet away started shooting at Garcia with the 40 mm. launcher. 

Garcia grabbed the blanket and ran for cover under the stairs; Carmona continued to stand in

front of cell # 116. The guards continued to shoot the 40 mm. launcher at Garcia, and one of

the rounds hit Garcia in the head. Carmona was not hit by any of the rounds. Once the

shooting stopped, Carmona walked to Garcia and tried to stop the blood with a towel given to

him by inmates in another cell. 

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After Garcia had been shot, two medical technical assistants asked Garcia if he was

okay and slipped some gauze under the pod door for him. Carmona did not want to expose

himself to being shot so he did not go to get the gauze.

After "awhile" -- about 45 minutes after Garcia had been hit, according to Carmona,

see Complaint, Exh. C, p. 13 – lieutenant Swift came to the pod door and ordered the inmates

to submit to handcuffs or a cell extraction team would enter. Complaint, p. 16. Carmona and

Garcia still did not comply. Carmona asked for a Spanish interpreter. Captain Ater said, "I

know Carmona and he understands English okay." Id. Carmona alleges that he has a limited

ability to speak English and was communicating through Garcia, who spoke better English. 

Carmona presented no evidence and does not argue that he did not understand what the staff

wanted him to do. An order was given to remove Carmona and Garcia from the pod. 

The pod door was opened, and two cell extraction teams (of 14 officers total) entered

the pod wearing protective gear. As they approached, Garcia and Carmona were standing in

a "non-combatant/unaggressive manner," id. at 17, although neither inmate had signaled any

willingness to submit to handcuffs. When the extraction team got within about 7-8 feet of

Carmona, an extraction team member squirted Carmona with oleoresin capsicum (i.e., pepper

spray). Immediately thereafter, Carmona was shot with a 40mm launcher by another officer. 

The rubber blocks hit Carmona's foot and outside thigh, causing Carmona to fall to the floor. 

Carmona was then sprayed again with pepper spray. The extraction team piled on Carmona,

forcefully put him on his stomach, twisted his arms and feet and put handcuffs tightly on his

ankles and wrists. Once pushed to the floor, Carmona did not resist the efforts to handcuff

him. After Carmona was handcuffed, he was yanked up from the floor by his arms and taken

to a shower to have the pepper spray washed off. After he was washed off, Carmona was

taken for medical care in the clinic. Carmona sustained a broken toe and a deep bruise and

abrasion on his right thigh (with nerve damage) as a result of being shot with the hard rubber

blocks.

Defendant Ater, the acting facility captain, authorized the use of force to extract

Carmona and Garcia. He explained in his declaration that inmates out in the pod

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unrestrained posed a safety and security concern. "Officers would have been unable to

respond to emergency situations concerning any of the other inmates in the pod without first

restraining Plaintiff and Garcia because they could have attacked the responding officers. 

Also, regular daily activity such as escorting inmates to medical appointments, dental

appointments, time on the yard, showers, etc. had to be stopped while Plaintiff and Garcia

were out in the pod unrestrained." Ater Decl., ¶ 3. Ater explained that Carmona and Garcia

"were provided a cool-down period of about an hour and a half from the time they stopped

complying with the order to move to the time the extraction teams entered the pod." Id. at ¶

5. This was longer than the normal 30-45 minute cooling down period before an extraction

and was intended to give the inmates an opportunity to voluntarily submit to restraints

without the need for force. Id. 

Ater explained the reasons for the several different methods of force used on

Carmona. Pepper spray affects vision and makes it difficult to breath, causing "an inmate to

become disoriented and [] unable to resist being restrained." Id. at ¶ 10. When the extraction

teams entered, the inmates posed a security concern because they were standing when they

had been ordered by sergeant Navarro to lay face down on the floor. "Thus, direct-impact

rounds were fired at Plaintiff's legs in an effort to get him to drop to the floor. Plaintiff was

struck in his right foot and thigh. The use of the direct-impact rounds prevented the

extraction from escalating to a dangerous physical altercation." Id. at ¶ 11. When Carmona

fell to the floor, physical "force was used to restrain him in order to prevent him from

reaching for a weapon he may have concealed." Id. at ¶ 12. There is no evidence that either

inmate had a weapon at any time during the incident or did anything more aggressive than

refuse to assume the position to be handcuffed.

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

Venue is proper in the Northern District of California because the events or omissions

giving rise to the claims occurred in Del Norte County, which is located within the Northern

District. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1391(b). This Court has federal question jurisdiction over this

action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

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LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that

there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A court will grant summary judgment

“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit

under governing law, and a dispute about such a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Generally, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of

the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden

then shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or

by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted).

A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it

is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff's

verified complaint as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity

with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and

correct, and allegations were not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). 

The court will consider the statements of fact in Carmona's verified complaint in addition to

his opposition papers in evaluating the motion.

The court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See

T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The

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evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the

inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See id. at 631.

DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment Claim

A prisoner has the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, including

physical abuse by guards. Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive

physical force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is whether

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (citing Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 317 (1986)). In determining whether the use of force was for the

purpose of maintaining or restoring discipline, or for the malicious and sadistic purpose of

causing harm, a court may evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship

between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the threat

reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity

of a forceful response. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; see also Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d

189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) (guards may use force only in proportion to need in each situation).

Carmona incorrectly argues that the mental state of "deliberate indifference" applies to

this case, i.e., that defendants could be liable if they were deliberately indifferent to a risk of

harm if they used force on him. See Opposition, pp. 9, 28. Defendants' response to an

ongoing disturbance is governed by the "malicious and sadistic" standard for the use of force

rather than the "deliberate indifference" standard that applies when considering a prison

condition. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 ("Extending Whitley's application of the 'unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain' standard to all allegations of force works no innovation,"

whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption); cf. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d

895, 913 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Because this contention does not target behavior occurring during

an ongoing prison security measure, the 'deliberate indifference' standard governs.") The

length of the incident and the absence of imminent danger to human life or property are

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relevant to the inquiry but do not mean that the legal standard changes. 

Applying the several Hudson factors to the evidence before the court leads to the

conclusion that the force used by defendants did not violate Carmona's Eighth Amendment

rights. 

First, there was a need for the use of some force against Carmona. He was one of two

inmates who was unrestrained in a common area and presented safety and security concerns

for staff and other inmates. As long as he and Garcia were out of their cell, normal activity

in the pod was at a standstill. The area where this incident occurred has higher security

concerns than the prison's general population, houses inmates who have been deemed

particularly violent or have shown an inability to function in the general population, and

physically isolates inmates to control them. At the time force was used on him, Carmona

was refusing to be handcuffed, even knowing that force would be used to compel compliance

and having had ample time to reflect on whether to submit to handcuffs. 

Second, the amount of force used was reasonably related to the need for that force. 

The evidence shows the extreme resolve of Carmona and Garcia not to comply with the

orders. They refused the initial orders to move and to submit to handcuffs. They continued

to refuse after they were told that it would be painful if they did not comply. They continued

to refuse to submit to handcuffs even after Garcia was hit in the head by a hard rubber block

shot from the 40mm launcher. They refused another verbal order to submit to handcuffs. 

They refused an order to lay down on the ground and refused to submit to handcuffs when

they knew the extraction team was about to enter the pod. Even when the extraction team

entered the pod, Carmona did not comply with orders to get down on the ground and submit

to handcuffing. Three different kinds of force were applied to subdue Carmona, with the

intent that their combined effect would bring him to the ground and in a position to be

forcibly handcuffed. Carmona was squirted with pepper spray and hit with a shot to his right

toe, but it was not until he was shot in the thigh with a rubber block that he fell to the ground;

even then, he didn't lay down purposely but instead fell down when the shot to his thigh

caused him to lose control of his leg. It is not at all clear what lesser method might have

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worked to end the disturbance. 

Third, the extent of the injury inflicted was serious. Carmona sustained a broken toe

and a deep bruise to his thigh as well as the temporary effects of pepper spray. Although his

leg was not broken, the medical records he submitted showed that his leg was seriously

injured. 

Fourth, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials was significant.

Two inmates housed in a most restrictive prison setting were unambiguously choosing not to

follow orders that pertained to prison security. No other inmates safely could be released

from their cells and the staff could not enter the pod safely while these two inmates were out

and unrestrained. While there was no immediate threat to human life, there was a serious

threat to prison security. 

Carmona suggests he and his cellmate could not have posed any threat because they

had just been strip-searched and were in undershorts and t-shirts. However, they had access

to other inmates and ample time and ability to obtain a weapon from another inmate in the

pod – an ability evidenced by the fact that they were able to obtain a towel from an inmate in

another cell to tend to Garcia's scalp wound. Moreover, even an unarmed inmate need not be

considered completely harmless as he can still physically fight with persons who try to

subdue him. 

Fifth, defendants tried to temper the force that they used. Before Carmona was

touched by any defendant, correctional staff tried using numerous verbal commands to get

him to submit to handcuffs and tried a cool-down period of about 45 minutes to secure

compliance without the need for use of force. Force was employed on Carmona only after

the inmates refused to comply with orders, were allowed considerable time to change their

minds, and again refused to comply with orders. There is no evidence that Carmona ever

intended to submit voluntarily to being handcuffed. The use of the 40 mm. launcher and

pepper spray, as well as physically tackling Carmona were tempered uses of force in

response to the dangerous situation presented by two inmates who refused to submit to

restraints. The evidence clearly does not support Carmona's argument that "excessive force

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was the first option used by correctional officials." Opposition, p. 12.

The overriding theme of Carmona's opposition was that he could rightfully refuse to

comply with an order to submit to restraints and a cell move unless and until he received an

explanation for the decision. See, e.g., Opposition, p. 11, 14, 16, 17, 23, 26-27, 33, 36, 38.

Other than two short sentences on the 40th page of his opposition brief – where he admits he

was wrong to refuse to move without an explanation and was wrong to refuse to be

handcuffed – Carmona remains adamant that he had no obligation to comply with the order

until he received an explanation for the move. The law does not support Carmona's view. 

He has not pointed to a single case that provides legal support for his contention that prison

officials must provide a satisfactory explanation for an order before an inmate is obliged to

follow it. If an inmate disagrees with the lawfulness of an order, he can file an inmate

grievance and perhaps a court case. There may be that extremely rare situation where the

order is so blatantly illegal and dangerous – such as a command to "come over here so I can

shoot you in the face" -- that a prisoner might rightfully disobey the order. This wasn't such

a situation, nor did it come anywhere near to being such a situation. The correctional staff's

failure to explain the reasons for the orders to submit to handcuffs and move to a new cell is,

in a nutshell, legally irrelevant. To rule otherwise would result in chaos in the prisons by

making compliance with orders negotiable and optional: inmates could pick and choose

which orders to follow, could delay compliance with orders by demanding explanations, and

could refuse to comply with orders for which they found the explanations unsatisfactory. 

This is not to say that disobedience of an order gives prison officials carte blanche to use

whatever force they choose on the disobedient prisoner, as their conduct is subject to judicial

and administrative review. 

Carmona also contends that the correctional staff failed to properly document and

videotape each use of force. These bureaucratic concerns are irrelevant to determining

whether there was an Eighth Amendment violation. 

Although Carmona and Garcia asked for a Spanish interpreter because Carmona's

English skills were limited, there is absolutely no evidence that Carmona did not understand

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what was expected of him by the correctional staff. Additionally, Carmona apparently

wanted the interpreter so he could receive and understand the reasons for the cell move and

use of force. See Opposition, p. 12. But he had no right to such an explanation in either

English or Spanish. 

The undisputed evidence shows that (1) Carmona was repeatedly ordered to submit to

being handcuffed, (2) he refused to comply with the orders, (3) the guards informed Carmona

and his cellmate that if they didn't comply with the order, a cell extraction would be sent in to

enforce compliance and it would hurt, (4) Carmona and his cellmate continued to fail and

refuse to submit to handcuffing, (5) even after his cellmate was shot and hit with a rubber

block, Carmona did not submit to handcuffs, and (6) about 20 minutes passed between the

inmates' initial refusal to submit to handcuffs and the time the rubber blocks were first shot at

the cellmate, and about 45 more minutes passed before any force was applied to Carmona. At

the time Carmona was subjected to the force – i.e., being shot with rubber blocks, being

pepper-sprayed and being tackled by an extraction team -- the guards confronted a situation

where two inmates were out of their cell in the SHU and were refusing to comply with orders

to be handcuffed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Carmona, no

reasonable jury could find that defendants applied force maliciously and sadistically for the

very purpose of causing harm. Carmona failed to establish a triable issue of fact as to

whether he was subjected to excessive force by defendants. Defendant Ater is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on the Eighth Amendment claim.

B. Qualified Immunity Defense

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity "'provides ample protection to all

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Burns v. Reed, 500

U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

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In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth a particular

sequence of questions to be considered in determining whether qualified immunity exists. 

The court must consider this threshold question: "Taken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a

constitutional right?" Id. at 201. If no constitutional right was violated if the facts were as

alleged, the inquiry ends and defendants prevail. See id. If, however, "a violation could be

made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask

whether the right was clearly established. . . . 'The contours of the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.' . . .

The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is

whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted." Id. at 201-02 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)).

The first step under Saucier is to determine whether there was a constitutional

violation. As discussed above, the evidence in the record does not establish an Eighth

Amendment violation. The analysis need not proceed to the second step of the Saucier

analysis. Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the qualified immunity

defense.

C. The Unserved Defendants

The complaint in this action had 40 named defendants, 44 Doe defendants and (with

exhibits) was 200+ pages long. When the court did its initial screening under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, it used an unusual approach to avoid a potentially needless waste of paper and

resources by serving the complaint only on the one defendant who appeared to be in charge

and seeing what developed. The court explained in the initial review order:

This is a difficult case because the complaint presents a rather clear picture of what

happened that day. Even though a lot of force was used, it appears extremely unlikely

that Carmona will prevail on his claim that it was excessive. However, the court is

not prepared to say as a matter of law that the force used on Carmona was not

excessive. The court will require a fuller picture to make its determination because,

when the court considers only what is pled in the complaint, the need for the force

used under the circumstances is not alleged. For example, Carmona does not plead

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that he needed to be handcuffed, why he needed to be handcuffed, what security

issues were presented by un-handcuffed inmates out of their cell, whether there are

special security concerns in the SHU, and why prison staff decided to use three

different methods of force at the same time in order to handcuff Carmona. Although

some of this information is rather easily imagined, that would require the court to

speculate on the reasons and the need for the force used. For these reasons, the court

is unwilling to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. On the other hand, it is extremely unlikely that Carmona can prevail

based on what he has described in the complaint. It therefore is not a good

expenditure of limited resources to have the summons and 200+ page complaint and

exhibits copied and served on the dozens of named defendants at this time. The court will attempt to chart a middle course and will have the complaint

served on a single defendant and let the case proceed through the summary judgment

stage with that one defendant. The summons and complaint will be served on facility

captain M. Ater, who apparently made the decision to use force. See Complaint, ¶ 8

and Exh. A, p. 7. If, upon considering the motion for summary judgment (or notice

that one will not be filed), the court determines that the case cannot be resolved at the

summary judgment stage, the court will then order service on other defendants

involved in the use of force. Carmona is cautioned that he must present his very best

arguments and facts in opposition to any motion for summary judgment from the one

defendant now being served because if that one defendant provides adequate evidence

on the need for the force used, that may end Carmona's claims against all the

defendants. 

Order Of Service And Partial Dismissal, pp. 6-7. 

After being served with process, Ater moved for summary judgment. Carmona filed a

lengthy opposition to the motion for summary judgment. There is no suggestion in the

complaint, the motion for summary judgment or the opposition to the motion that the analysis

differs for defendant Ater as opposed to the many other defendants. As discussed above, the

use of force was a considered decision and done pursuant to Ater's commands. 

Now that the evidence has been developed, it is clear that there is no real dispute

about what happened on the day force was used and the force used did not amount to an

Eighth Amendment violation. The court therefore will dismiss the action as against all the

unserved defendants. The particular legal bases for the dismissal are the in forma pauperis

statute and the general prisoner screening statute, both of which allow the court to dismiss

the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i & ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In light of the

determination that there was no Eighth Amendment violation as a matter of law, Carmona's

further pursuit of the claims against the unserved defendants would be frivolous in that there

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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is no factual or legal merit to the claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Ater's motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. (Docket # 14.) Ater is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Eighth

Amendment claim will be dismissed with respect to the remaining defendants. Because all

claims over which the court has original jurisdiction have now been resolved, the court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). The state law claims are dismissed. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2006 ______________________

 Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-02219-MHP Document 24 Filed 07/31/06 Page 14 of 14