Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00525/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00525-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

STEVEN ABNEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

STATE OF ARIZONA, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 04-525-TUC-RCC (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Currently pending before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Document # 17),

pursuant to Rule 12(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., filed by Defendants on February 25, 2005, along

with a memorandum of points and authorities. On May 3, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a

response. On June 17, 2005, Defendants filed a reply to the Plaintiffs' response. The

Court heard oral argument on the motion on July 14, 2005. For reasons which follow,

the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review,

DENY IN PART, GRANT IN PART, and GRANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, seventeen current or previously incarcerated inmates in the Arizona

Department of Corrections assigned to work on a dump site near the Fort Grant Prison,

filed a complaint on March 23, 2004, in Maricopa County Superior Court. The

Complaint alleged eleven claims arising from their work at the dump site, including

allegations that Defendants knowingly or negligently exposed Plaintiffs to toxic

substances including asbestos and biohazardous wastes. Eight of the claims involved

state law claims, two claims raised federal issues alleging violation of the Plaintiffs'

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1 As discussed below, in an unenumerated 12(b) motion to dismiss, the

facts as alleged by plaintiffs are not taken to be true. As such, the

statement of facts in this report and recommendation is provided as

background for an understanding of the relevance of the present

motion, and factual disputes that are relevant to the motion will be

discussed further, below.

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constitutional rights, and one claim alleged punitive damages under both state and

federal law. 

Defendants removed this action to this Court based on federal question

jurisdiction, and the case was transferred to the Tucson Division on September 2, 2004.

On October 21, 2004, this case was referred to Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco

for all pretrial proceedings and report and recommendation in accordance with 28

U.S.C. 636(b)(1). 

Defendants assert in this Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their

administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) and that therefore, pursuant to the Act, their claims must be dismissed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS1

The seventeen Plaintiffs are current or former prisoners of the Arizona

Department of Corrections ("ADOC"). In late March to April of 2003, the Plaintiffs

were assembled at the Fort Grant Unit of the Arizona State Prison Complex Safford

("Fort Grant"). The Plaintiffs all have experience in construction and were transferred

to Fort Grant to do construction-related work. The Plaintiffs allege that while working

on the site, they uncovered hazardous materials including asbestos pipes and shingles

and red biohazard bags containing medical waste. The Plaintiffs further allege that

authorities at the prison, the Defendants, denied the presence of asbestos and instructed

them to crush and bury the materials they found.

While working on the site, Plaintiffs complained of the conditions but did not

file any grievance on the matter. Plaintiffs allege that they were told that work

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conditions were not grievable, a fact in dispute by Defendants who claim they never

advised the Plaintiffs that they could not grieve any condition pertaining to

incarceration.

In June, 2003, an article was published by the Phoenix New Times, entitled

"Outlaw Dumping," that claimed the prison was attempting to make hazardous waste

at the Fort Grant dump "disappear" using inmate labor illegally. The article included

interviews with some of the Plaintiffs in this case and alluded to asbestos pipe smuggled

out of the site by Plaintiff Steven Abney. This article is relevant because Plaintiffs

claim that prior to its publication, they had no definite cause of action because they had

no outside confirmation of the nature of the materials to which they were allegedly

exposed. Two Plaintiffs, including Abney, were released from custody in May, 2003.

The Plaintiffs filed their complaint in March, 2004, nine months after the publication

of the New Times Article. By this time, a total of eight of the Plaintiffs were no longer

in custody. 

The grievance system available to prisoners is a four-tiered process regulated by

ADOC Department Order No. 802. The order lists grievable issues including, among

others, conditions of confinement. In order to exhaust available grievance remedies,

a prisoner must first submit a letter to his prison counsel (CO III) within ten days

following the incident at issue. If not satisfied with the response, the prisoner may file

a formal grievance, and continue appealing the results of the grievance up to the

Director of ADOC. The Director's response is final and it will serve to exhaust the

prisoner's available administrative remedies.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

According to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), "No action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of

the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in

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any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). In the Ninth Circuit, the proper pretrial

motion for establishing nonexhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is

an unenumerated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss.

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). The defendant must raise this

motion as an affirmative defense and the burden is on the defendant to prove

nonexhaustion of the remedies by the plaintiff. Id.

Defendants' Position

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust or even to make use of

available grievance system remedies prior to filing suit. Defendants point out that

failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to such a claim brought by prisoners.

Defendants further contend that the PLRA is applicable to the claims in this case

brought by former prisoners, citing a recent case in this jurisdiction, Morgan v.

Maricopa County, for support. 259 F.Supp. 985, 992 (D.Ariz. 2003). Regarding the

issue of whether prisoners had no "available" remedies due to the alleged statements of

guards that work conditions were not grievable, Defendants contend that this is an issue

of fact that should not be considered in a motion to dismiss hearing, but that if it is to

be considered as in a summary judgment proceeding, that there should be an evidentiary

hearing to resolve this dispute. In sum, Defendants move that all federal claims be

dismissed and the remaining state claims be remanded to state court.

Plaintiffs' Position

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have not met their burden of proof as to

nonexhaustion of available administrative remedies. Plaintiffs argue that the PLRA is

not applicable to certain Plaintiffs who were not prisoners at the time the suit was filed.

Plaintiffs further contend that for those Plaintiffs who were prisoners at the time the suit

was filed, there were no administrative remedies available because they were denied

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access to the grievance process by prison authorities. In addition, Plaintiffs point out

that the PLRA does not apply to the state law claims included in their complaint.

Analysis

Does the PLRA exhaustion requirement apply to prisoners released at the time

a complaint is filed?

The PLRA defines "prisoner" to mean "any person incarcerated or detained in

any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent

for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial

release, or diversionary program." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(h).

 While the Ninth Circuit noted that a "broad" reading of the statute would lead

to an absurd result, (the definition of "prisoner" would include every person detained

in any facility who had ever been accused of, convicted of, or sentenced for a criminal

offense), it rejected such a broad reading, and looked to a "natural reading" of the text

instead. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In Page, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in a case involving a plaintiff who

was civilly committed for care and treatment pursuant to California's Sexually Violent

Predators Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2000). Noting that the PLRA

exhaustion requirements, by their express language, apply only to "prisoners," the Ninth

Circuit narrowed the issue to whether or not the plaintiff fell into the category of "[a]

prisoner seeking to bring a civil action ..." The Ninth Circuit held that, to fall within

the definition of "prisoner," "the individual in question must be currently detained as

a result of accusation, conviction, or sentence for a criminal offense." Page, 201 F. 3d

at 1139 (citations omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit found that although Page was a "prisoner" within the meaning

of the PLRA when he served time for his conviction, he ceased being a "prisoner" when

he was released from the custody of the Department of Corrections. Page, 201 F. 3d

at 1140 (citations omitted).

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While it is true that the issue before the Ninth Circuit in Page addressed directly

only the issue of civil commitments following a criminal detention, the broad holding

in Page suggested that the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA would not apply to a

plaintiff who had been released from custody at the time a lawsuit is brought. 

Defendants point to Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F. Supp.2d 985 (2003),

for support for their assertion that all Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their claim, and

that Page has been overruled. In Morgan, a magistrate in this district found that

"[i]nterpreting the PLRA as inapplicable to former prisoner's claims which arose during

the prisoner's incarceration if a prisoner waits to file suit, like Morgan did, until a month

after his release from custody and over ten month's after the cause of action arose would

nullify Congress' intent in passing the PLRA. The absurdity of such an interpretation

is reason enough to reject it." Morgan, 259 F.Supp.2d at 992.

However, the Supreme Court cases relied upon by the magistrate in Morgan,

while assuredly addressing Congress' intent in passing the PLRA, did not address or

consider the present issue, since the plaintiffs in those cases were both inmates in state

prisons at the time the actions were filed. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121

S.Ct. 1819 (2001) (holding that the PLRA requires administrative exhaustion even

where grievance process does not permit award of money damages and prisoner seeks

only money damages, as long as grievance tribunal has authority to take some

responsive action), and Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983 (2002) (holding

that exhaustion requirement under PLRA for prison conditions claims applied to

inmate's claims). Defendants claim that Page has been overruled by these cases is a

gross misstatement.

In fact, since Booth and Porter were decided, a number of district courts and

circuit courts have addressed the issue and found that the touchstone is the status of the

plaintiff at the time the complaint is filed. See Chase v. Peay, 286 F.Supp.2d 523

(D.Md. 2003) (Plaintiff is a "prisoner" for purposes of exhaustion requirements under

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the PLRA when plaintiff is incarcerated on the date of filing of complaint, regardless

of release while action is pending); Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2002) ("a

plaintiff's status as a "prisoner" is to be determined as of the time he brought the

lawsuit."); Ahmed v Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201 (3rd Cir. 2002) (adopting the view that a

prisoner who has been released is not precluded by the PLRA from filing a § 1983 suit

for incident concerning prison conditions which occurred prior to his release. " Any

other view would ... be inconsistent with the spirit of the PLRA, which was designed

to deter frivolous litigations by idle prisoners."); Kritenbrink v. Crawford, 313

F.Supp.2d 1043 (D.Nevada 2004) (rejecting policy reasons outlined in Booth, Churner,

and Morgan, and holding that plain language of the statute in conjunction with

supporting decision, although overly broad, in Page, compels conclusion that the

exhaustion requirement applies only to persons who, "at the time they seek to file their

civil actions, are detained as a result of being accused of, convicted of, or sentenced for

criminal offenses" citing Page, supra.) Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874 (8th Cir.

2005) (PLRA's exhaustion requirement does not apply to plaintiffs who file § 1983

claims after being released from incarceration). 

Because the Defendants focus their arguments on the holding in Morgan and the

policy considerations in Booth and Churner, this Court does not cite cases decided

before Porter and Booth, but note that prior to those cases every court of appeals to

have considered the issue had held that the PLRA does not apply to actions filed by

former prisoners. See Generally Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, n.10 (2002). 

FIRST RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Court focus on the status of the

plaintiffs at the time that a lawsuit is "brought" in federal court, and deny Defendants'

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust as to the plaintiffs in this case who are former

prisoners and who were not incarcerated or detained in any facility at the time of filing

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suit, as they are not "prisoners" under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) and are not subject to

Section 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement. 

Does the PLRA apply to state law claims?

Plaintiffs argue and Defendants concede that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement

only applies to the Plaintiffs' federal (not state) law claims.

SECOND RECOMMENDATION

As the magistrate recommends that at least some of the Plaintiffs' federal claims

survive under the analysis above, the magistrate further recommends that the District

Court deny Defendants motion to dismiss as to the state claims, and retain jurisdiction

over all of Plaintiffs' state law claims. 

Were administrative remedies available to all prisoners?

Section 1997e of the PLRA states:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983

of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available

are exhausted.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e.

Under a plain reading of the statute, in order for remedies to be exhausted, they

must first be available. As noted by the Eighth Circuit, "a remedy that prison officials

prevent a prisoner from "utiliz[ing]" is not an "available" remedy under § 1997e(a)." 

Miller v. Norris 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). See also Mitchell

v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3rd Cir. 2003) (dismissal of claim in error where District

Court did not consider prisoner's allegations that he was denied grievance forms.), and

Rivera v. Goord, 253 F.Supp.2d 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (A plaintiff may proceed despite

nonexhaustion where he has been led to believe by prison officials that his alleged

incident was not a grievance matter and assured that his claims were otherwise

investigated). This Court finds that, if Plaintiffs' factual statements are taken to be true,

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then Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence that there was no available remedy

of which they could have availed themselves under § 1997e(a). 

There is, however, a question of fact as to whether or not the prison officials in

this instance prevented plaintiffs from filing a grievance in this matter. Unlike an

enumerated 12(b) motion to dismiss, the allegations of the Plaintiffs in this case are not

automatically taken to be true for purposes of the motion. In deciding a motion to

dismiss for a failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th

Cir. 2003) (citing Ritza v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 837 F.2d

365, 369 (9th Cir.1988) (per curiam). This does not, as Defendants contend, mean that

the Court chooses to treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment. In fact, that

approach was directly disapproved in Wyatt. In Ritza, the Ninth Circuit recognized this

distinction, noting that factual disputes in matters for summary judgment are to be

resolved by a jury, while factual disputes regarding motions to dismiss for matters in

abatement may be resolved by the court ... "and that the court has a broad discretion as

to the method to be used in resolving the factual dispute." Ritza, 837 F.2d at 369 (citing

J. Moore, W. Taggert, J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.03 at 56-61 (footnotes

omitted) (2d ed. 1987). In Wyatt, the Ninth Circuit advised that "if the district court

looks beyond the pleadings to a factual record in deciding the motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust–a procedure closely analogous to summary judgment–then the court

must assure the [plaintiff] has fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record." 

In this case, the Defendants have submitted a partial deposition of Jim Bahn, the

prison official who allegedly misled the Plaintiffs into believing the issues were nongrievable, and/or denied grievance forms to Plaintiffs who asked for them. Defendants

also argue that, under ADOC policy, prison conditions, which are grievable, include

work conditions. However, Defendants, who urge this court not to consider the

"unsworn" Declarations of Plaintiffs, submit no proof that Jim Bahn's deposition was

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under oath, nor that ADOC policy, despite their bald assertions, actually allows for

grievance of work conditions. 

Plaintiffs have submitted statements given in an interview and signed "under

penalty of perjury" that they were told by Jim Bahn, in the presence of another

correctional officer, Officer Lackner, that work conditions were not grievable.

Plaintiffs have also submitted their own interpretation, contrary to Defendants', that

work conditions are not grievable. 

THIRD RECOMMENDATION

In light of the Court's "broad discretion as to the method to be used in resolving

the factual dispute" this Court makes the following recommendation. This Court

recommends that an evidentiary hearing be held in order to resolve the factual dispute.

This Court further recommends that, if the District Court adopts the above

recommendation, denying the motion to dismiss as to the prisoners who were out of

custody at the time the action was commenced, and denying the motion to dismiss as

to the state law claims, then due to the large number of Plaintiffs and their various

locations throughout the state and country, and the necessity for the presence of these

numerous Plaintiffs at trial, that such evidentiary hearing also be held at the time of

trial. The trial court will benefit from observing the witnesses directly, and from the

complete factual record developed for trial. 

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written

objections within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CIV 04-525-

TUC-RCC. 

DATED this 4th day of August, 2005.

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