Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00093/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 

 : 

MYCOSAFE DIAGNOSTICS GMBH 

 : 

 

 v. : Civil Action No. DKC 12-2842 

 : 

LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, 

 ET AL. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 Presently pending and ready for review in this breach of 

contract case is a motion filed by Defendants Life Technologies 

Corporation (“Life”) and Applied Biosystems, LLC (“AB”) to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 7). The 

issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no 

hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the 

following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted, and 

this action will be transferred to the Southern District of 

California. 

I. Background 

A. Factual Background 

The following facts are alleged in the first amended 

complaint. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff Mycosafe Diagnostics GMBH 

(“Mycosafe”) is a corporation organized under the laws of the 

Republic of Austria and maintains its principal place of 

business in Vienna, Austria. Mycosafe is a research 

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organization that provides consulting and testing services in 

connection with mycoplasma detection and safety. 

Life is a Delaware corporation that maintains its principal 

place of business in Carlsbad, California. Life is a global 

biotechnology company that manufactures and sells mycoplasmadetection kits. Life is registered to do business in the state 

of Maryland and owns a facility located in Frederick, Maryland, 

where it employs approximately 250 people. In 2009, Life 

received a grant from the Office of Economic Development for 

Frederick County, Maryland. That same year, Life paid local 

property taxes on five different properties in Frederick County. 

AB is a wholly owned subsidiary of Life’s. AB is a limited 

liability company that is organized under the laws of Delaware 

and maintains its principal place of business in Carlsbad, 

California. AB is registered to do business in Maryland and 

“transacts systematic and continuous business” in the state, 

including at Life’s Frederick location. 

On October 27, 2009, Defendants requested a quote from 

Mycosafe for the costs associated with testing certain 

mycoplasma-detection kits manufactured by Defendants to 

determine the kits’ effectiveness and compliance with 

international regulations.1

 On October 30, Mycosafe sent the 

 1

 Except in the headings titled “The Parties” and 

“Jurisdiction and Venue,” the factual allegations in the amended 

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requested quote to the attention of “Dr. Mike Brewer, Senior 

Manager” of “Applied Biosystems-Life Technologies” at a 

California address. Shortly thereafter, Defendants asked 

Mycosafe to proceed with conducting the studies. 

At Defendants’ direction, on December 18, 2009, Mycosafe 

sent its first invoice for €21,480 directed to the attention of 

“Applied Biosystems” at a California address. Defendants paid 

this invoice in full on January 27, 2010. During this same time 

period, Defendants requested an expansion in the scope of 

Myscosafe’s services, as reflected in both the “draft study 

protocol” sent to Mycosafe in December 2009 and the final 

“Validation Study Plan” signed by all parties in February 2010. 

Mycosafe performed testing on Defendants’ kits in accordance 

with the parties’ correspondence – namely, Defendants’ original 

quote request; the quote provided by Mycosafe; the draft study 

protocol; and the Validation Study Plan. Although Defendants 

had agreed to provide Mycosafe with all of the kits needed to 

conduct this testing, Mycosafe ultimately used a number of kits 

that it had independently purchased from Defendants at a cost of 

€37,406.40, with the expectation that this amount would be 

reimbursed by Defendants. 

 

complaint do not distinguish between AB and Life, but refer to 

them collectively as “Defendants.” (See generally ECF No. 5). 

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Mycosafe provided a draft report to Defendants detailing 

the results of its tests on September 3, 2010. On three 

separate occasions thereafter, Defendants asked Mycosafe to 

perform additional testing. Defendants made one of these 

requests during a November 2010 visit to Mycosafe’s facility in 

Austria. 

On March 2, 2011, Mycosafe provided a final report to 

Defendants reflecting all testing work performed to date and the 

corresponding results. On the same day, Mycosafe sent four 

invoices totaling €210,000 to Defendants. Each of these 

invoices is directed to “Applied Biosystems – Life Technologies” 

at a California address. To date, Defendants have paid only 

€23,100 against these invoices and have not reimbursed Mycosafe 

for the costs of certain kits used in the testing. 

B. Procedural Background 

On September 24, 2012, Mycosafe filed a complaint against 

Defendants in this court alleging counts for breach of contract, 

account stated, and unjust enrichment. (ECF No. 1). On 

November 2, 2012, Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction and improper venue. (ECF No. 3). In 

response, Mycosafe filed an amended complaint pursuant to 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B). (ECF No. 5). On December 3, 

Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for, inter 

alia, lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 

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12(b)(2). (ECF No. 7). Mycosafe filed an opposition (ECF No. 

8), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 9). 

II. Analysis 

A. Personal Jurisdiction 

When a court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction is 

challenged by a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), “the 

jurisdictional question is to be resolved by the judge, with the 

burden on the plaintiff ultimately to prove grounds for 

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Carefirst of 

Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 

(4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). If jurisdiction turns on 

disputed facts, the court may resolve the challenge after a 

separate evidentiary hearing, or may defer ruling pending 

receipt at trial of evidence relevant to the jurisdictional 

question. Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989). 

If the court chooses to rule without conducting an evidentiary 

hearing, relying solely on the basis of the complaint, 

affidavits, and discovery materials, “the plaintiff need only 

make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.” 

Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 396. In determining whether the 

plaintiff has met its burden, all jurisdictional allegations 

must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 

and the most favorable inferences must be drawn for the 

existence of jurisdiction. New Wellington Fin. Corp. v. 

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Flagship Resort Dev. Corp., 416 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2005) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

“The nature of the claim and the defendant’s contacts with 

the forum state determine whether a court may assert specific or 

general personal jurisdiction.” Johansson Corp. v. Bowness 

Constr. Co., 304 F.Supp.2d 701, 703 (D.Md. 2004). Specific 

personal jurisdiction applies where a controversy is “related to 

or ‘arises out of’ a defendant’s contacts with the forum.” 

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 

414 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 

(1977)). General jurisdiction, by contrast, may be exercised 

where a defendant maintains “continuous and systematic” contact 

with the forum state. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 (quoting 

Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 

(1952)). 

Where the defendant is a nonresident, a federal district 

court may exercise personal jurisdiction only if “(1) an 

applicable state long-arm statute confers jurisdiction and 

(2) the assertion of that jurisdiction is consistent with 

constitutional due process.” Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 

F.2d 1195, 1199 (4th Cir. 1993). The Maryland Long–Arm Statute, 

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6–103, authorizes the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted by the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See ALS Scan, 

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Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 710 (4th

Cir. 2002) (citing Androutsos v. Fairfax Hosp., 323 Md. 634, 637 

(1991)). This broad reach does not suggest that analysis under 

the long-arm statute is irrelevant; rather, it reflects that, 

“to the extent that a defendant’s activities are covered by the 

statutory language, the reach of the statute extends to the 

outermost boundaries of the due process clause.” Dring v. 

Sullivan, 423 F.Supp.2d 540, 545 (D.Md. 2006) (quoting Joseph M. 

Coleman & Assocs., Ltd. v. Colonial Metals, 887 F.Supp. 116, 

118–19 n. 2 (D.Md. 1995)); see also Mackey v. Compass Mktg., 

Inc., 391 Md. 117, 141 n. 6 (2006) (although the “long-arm 

statute is coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction 

set by the due process clause,” it is not “permissible to 

dispense with analysis under the long-arm statute”). To satisfy 

the long-arm prong of the analysis, a plaintiff must 

specifically identify a statutory provision that authorizes 

jurisdiction, either in his complaint or in opposition to a Rule 

12(b)(2) motion. See Ottenheimer Publishers, Inc. v. Playmore, 

Inc., 158 F.Supp.2d 649, 652 (D.Md. 2001); Johansson, 304 

F.Supp.2d at 704 n. 1. 

The Maryland Long-Arm Statute provides, in relevant part: 

(a) If jurisdiction over a person is based 

solely upon this section, he may be sued 

only on a cause of action arising from any 

act enumerated in this section. 

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(b) A court may exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a person, who directly or 

by an agent: 

(1) Transacts any business or performs 

any character of work or service in 

the State; 

(2) Contracts to supply goods, food, 

services, or manufactured products 

in the State; 

(3) Causes tortious injury in the State 

by an act or omission in the State; 

(4) Causes tortious injury in the State 

or outside of the State by an act 

or omission outside the State if he 

regularly does or solicits 

business, engages in any other 

persistent course of conduct in the 

State or derives substantial 

revenue from goods, food, services, 

or manufactured products used or 

consumed in the State; 

(5) Has an interest in, uses, or 

possesses real property in the 

State; or 

(6) Contracts to insure or act as 

surety for, or on, any person, 

property, risk, contract, 

obligation, or agreement located, 

executed, or to be performed within 

the State at the time the contract 

is made, unless the parties 

otherwise provide in writing. 

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6-103. 

In its opposition, Mycosafe argues that, pursuant to 

subsection (b)(4) of the Maryland Long-Arm Statute, this court 

has general jurisdiction over Defendants based on their 

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systematic and continuous business activity that is “indicative 

of entities domiciled in Maryland.” (ECF No. 8, at 4-5).2 

Defendants raise two principal arguments in reply. First, 

Defendants contend that the limitation imposed by subsection (a) 

of the Maryland Long-Arm Statute cannot be met here, given that 

none of Mycosafe’s claims “arise from the facts alleged as the 

basis for jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 9, at 6). Second, Defendants 

contend that Mycosafe cannot rely on subsection (b)(4) as the 

complaint sounds in contract and does not allege any “tortious 

injury.” (Id. at 5-6). Although Defendants’ first argument 

fails, their second position is availing. 

1. The Limitation Imposed By Subsection (a) 

As noted above, subsection (a) of the Maryland Long-Arm 

Statute requires that, “[i]f jurisdiction over a person is based 

solely upon this section, he may be sued only on a cause of 

action arising from any act enumerated in this section.” Based 

on this language, Defendants contend that Mycosafe is precluded 

from relying on any provision in subsection (b) because its 

 2

 Mycosafe concedes that Defendants – which are alleged to 

be organized under Delaware law and to have their principal 

places of business in California – are non-residents. (See ECF 

No. 8, at 4-7). Mycosafe thus addresses only the applicability 

of the Maryland Long-Arm Statute and does not contend, either in 

its complaint or its opposition, that personal jurisdiction is 

proper pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6-102(a), 

which provides that “[a] court may exercise personal 

jurisdiction as to any cause of action over a person domiciled 

in, served with process in, organized under the laws of, or who 

maintains his principal place of business in the State.” 

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causes of action do not arise from any of Defendants’ alleged 

contacts in Maryland – namely, their activities in Frederick 

County. Specifically with respect to subsection (b)(4), 

Defendants contend that, because Mycosafe’s claims do not arise 

from Defendants’ conduct in “regularly do[ing] or solicit[ing 

business, engag[ing] in any other persistent course of conduct 

in the State or deriv[ing] substantial revenue from . . . 

services . . . in the State,” subsection (a) is not satisfied. 

Had Mycosafe asserted specific jurisdiction based on any 

other provision in subsection (b), Defendants’ argument would be 

well-taken. Clearly, there is no connection between Defendants’ 

alleged contacts with Maryland and the alleged events giving 

rise to Mycosafe’s claims. Thus, Defendants are correct in 

arguing that Mycosafe cannot rely on subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), 

(b)(3), (b)(5), or (b)(6), each of which requires such a 

connection. 

For purposes of jurisdiction under subsection (b)(4), 

however, Defendants’ argument misreads the language of the 

Maryland Long-Arm Statute. When the limitation imposed by 

subsection (a) is applied to that provision, the “act” from 

which a plaintiff’s causes of action must arise is the “act or 

omission outside the State” that “[c]auses tortious injury in 

the State or outside of the State” – not the conduct enumerated 

in the latter portion of the provision (i.e., regularly doing or 

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soliciting business, engaging in any other persistent course of 

conduct, or deriving substantial revenue from services performed 

in the State). As explained by the Maryland Court of Appeals: 

The reference [in subsection (a)] to ‘act 

enumerated in this section’ with respect to 

subsection (b)(4) refers only to the act or 

omission which causes tortious injury; to 

hold otherwise would be to impose a 

limitation not required by due process. 

Furthermore, subsection (b)(4) would add 

little or nothing to the statute if it were 

held that the cause of action must arise out 

of the defendant’s doing or soliciting 

business, engaging in any other persistent 

course of conduct or deriving substantial 

revenue from activities in the State. Such 

actions would be provided for in other 

sections of § 6-103. 

Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 232 (1976); see also, e.g., 

Paxton v. S. Penn. Bank, 93 F.R.D. 503, 505 n. 2 (D.Md. 1982) 

(“If, in fact, [defendant] does business in Maryland, engages in 

any other persistent course of conduct in Maryland, or derives 

substantial revenue from services performed in Maryland, longarm jurisdiction would exist despite the fact that the acts 

which may give rise to the (b)(4) findings are unconnected with 

the [negligence] cause of action asserted.”); Carter v. Massey, 

436 F.Supp. 29, 32 (D.Md. 1977) (“[N]either the regular 

solicitation of business, nor the persistent course of conduct, 

nor the substantial revenues required within the State by § 6-

103(b)(4) of the Maryland statute need have a relationship to 

the acts or omissions that caused the tortious injury.”); cf. 

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Tech. Patents, LLC v. Deutsche Telkom AG, 573 F.Supp.2d 903, 912 

n. 11 (D.Md. 2008) (“Subsection (b)(4) has been construed by the 

Maryland courts as a general jurisdiction statute . . . .”).3 

Thus, the lack of a connection between Defendants’ alleged 

acts and omissions giving rise to Mycosafe’s claims and 

Defendants’ contacts with the state of Maryland is not, in and 

of itself, fatal to Mycosafe’s reliance on subsection (b)(4) to 

satisfy the statutory prong of the personal jurisdiction 

analysis. 

2. Subsection (b)(4)’s “Tortious Injury” Requirement 

Defendants are nevertheless correct that Mycosafe’s 

assertion of a claim for unjust enrichment does not satisfy the 

“tortious injury” requirement in subsection (b)(4). 

Although the Maryland Long-Arm Statute does not define the 

phrase “tortious injury,” the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 

has interpreted the phrase on one occasion. In Green v. N.B.S., 

 3

 In support of their reading of the Maryland Long-Arm 

Statute, Defendants principally rely on Egeria, Societa di 

Navigazione Per Azioni v. Orinoco Mining Co., 360 F.Supp. 997 

(D.Md. 1973), where the court indicated that the predecessor to 

subsection (b)(4) did not authorize jurisdiction when a 

defendant’s alleged derivation of substantial revenue in 

Maryland was unconnected to the causes of actions asserted in 

the complaint. That portion of the Orinoco Mining opinion has 

been expressly rejected in subsequent decisions. See Paxton, 93 

F.R.D. at 505 n. 2; see also Greenwood v. Tides Inn, Inc., 504 

F.Supp. 992, 996 n. 11 (D.Md. 1980) (explaining that, although 

the result in Orinoco Mining was proper, its discussion 

regarding the predecessor to subsection (b)(4) “would appear 

erroneous”). 

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Inc., 180 Md.App. 639 (2008), aff’d, 409 Md. 528, the court 

addressed whether a violation of Maryland’s Consumer Protection 

Act constituted “tortious conduct,” as that phrase is used in 

the state’s statutory damages cap for personal injury actions, 

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-108. The plaintiff in 

Green argued that, because a cause of action under the Maryland 

Consumer Protection did not exist at common law, a violation of 

the statute could not constitute “tortious conduct” for purposes 

of the damages cap. 180 Md.App. at 646. In rejecting this 

argument, the court relied on the plain meaning of the phrase 

“tortious conduct,” observing that the dictionary defines 

“tortious” as “‘[c]onstituting a tort; wrongful’” and “tort” as 

“‘[a] civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained, usually in 

the form of damages; a breach of a duty that the law imposes on 

everyone in the same relation to one another as those involved 

in a given transaction.’” Id. at 647 (quoting Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1497 (7th ed. 1999)). Based on these definitions, the 

Green court reasoned that a claim need not derive from common 

law to involve “tortious conduct” within the meaning of Section 

11-108. In support of its conclusion, the Green court observed 

that, for purposes of the “tortious injury” requirement in 

subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4) of the Maryland Long-Arm Statute, 

“the fact that a cause of action is statutory is irrelevant to 

the issue of deciding whether the defendant committed a tortious 

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act . . . resulting in injury.” Id. at 651 (citing Craig v. 

Gen. Fin. Corp. of Ill., 504 F.Supp. 1033, 1037 (D.Md. 1980)). 

Although Green does not resolve the issue directly, it 

suggests that Mycosafe’s claim for unjust enrichment satisfies 

subsection (b)(4) only if it alleges an injury resulting from a 

“civil wrong” or “a breach of a duty that the law imposes on 

everyone in the same relation to one another as those involved 

in a given transaction.” Green, 180 Md.App. at 647. Deciding 

this question thus requires an examination of both the nature of 

an unjust enrichment claim under Maryland law and the 

allegations in the amended complaint. 

In Maryland, a cause of action for unjust enrichment is 

based on quasi-contract, meaning a contract that is implied by 

the law. Alts. Unlimited Inc. v. New Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. 

Comm’rs., 155 Md.App. 415, 494 (2004). The Alternatives 

Unlimited court explained that a plaintiff may prevail on an 

unjust enrichment claim if “services are rendered by request, 

but . . . the parties have no valid and enforceable contract” 

because “the defendant may still be liable for the value of the 

plaintiff’s services.” Id. at 498 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). The court also noted that “[w]hat is 

essential” about this type of unjust enrichment claim “is that 

the defendant receives a benefit without fault or breach of duty 

on his part, yet is at least arguably under a duty to give up 

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that benefit on the ground that otherwise he will be unjustly 

enriched.” Id. at 456 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

This is precisely the scenario alleged in Mycosafe’s 

amended complaint. In Count I for breach of contract, Mycosafe 

seeks a judgment in the amount of $305,002.30 for Defendants’ 

alleged breach of an agreement with Mycosafe for the performance 

of certain testing services. (ECF No. 5 ¶¶ 42-50). In Count 

III for unjust enrichment, Mycosafe seeks a judgment in an 

identical amount ($305,002.30), based on allegations (1) that 

Mycosafe conferred a benefit upon Defendants by performing 

certain testing services and (2) that it would be inequitable 

for Defendants to retain the benefit of Mycosafe’s services 

without making full payment. (Id. ¶¶ 56-61). Thus, Mycosafe 

has alleged a claim for unjust enrichment as an alternative 

theory of liability. In other words, in the event that Mycosafe 

cannot establish an enforceable contract with Defendants, it 

will argue that the law should imply a contract to prevent 

unjust enrichment. Such a claim does not allege “tortious 

injury” for purposes of subsection (b)(4) as it does not assert 

that Defendants committed a “civil wrong” or “breach[ed] a duty 

that the law imposes on everyone.” Green, 180 Md.App. at 647.4

 

 4

 Mycosafe does not argue that “Count II – Account Stated” 

alleges a “tortious injury” for purposes of the Maryland LongCase 3:13-cv-00093-BTM-MDD Document 10 Filed 01/11/13 Page 15 of 24
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 This conclusion is in accord with the holdings of several 

other courts that a claim for unjust enrichment does not satisfy 

the “tortious injury” or “tortious act” requirement in similarly 

worded long-arm statutes. See, e.g., Kinetic Co. Inc. v. BDO 

EOS Svetovanje, d.o.o., 361 F.Supp.2d 878, 883-84 (E.D.Wis. 

2005) (a claim for unjust enrichment does not “relate[] to a 

tort injury” and does not allege “tortious injury” for purposes 

of Wisconsin’s long-arm statute); Franceskino v. Womak, 

3:01CV1835, 2002 WL 100602, at *1, *3 (D.Conn. Jan. 25, 2002) 

(“tortious act” requirement in Connecticut’s long-arm statute 

was not met where plaintiff asserted claims for breach of 

contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment because 

“the complaint simply fails to state any cause of action 

grounded in tort and, instead, is composed of claims arising in 

contract and quasi-contract”). 

In its opposition, Mycosafe cites a number of extrajurisdictional cases as standing for the proposition that 

 

Arm Statute, nor could it, given that a claim for account stated 

requires an agreement between the parties and thus sounds in 

contract. See SunDance Rehab. Corp. v. Hermitage Healthcare of 

Manokin Manor, LLC, Civ. No. WMN–12–153, 2012 WL 2190749, at *4 

(D.Md. June 13, 2012) (a claim for account stated requires “an 

agreement between parties who have had previous transactions of 

a monetary character that all the items of the account 

representing such transactions, and the balance struck, are 

correct, together with a promise, express or implied, for the 

payment of such balance” (quoting Wathen v. Perace, 3 A.2d 486, 

491 (Md. 1939)). 

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“language concerning tortious conduct in a state’s long-arm 

statute should not be confined to traditional concepts of a 

tort.” (ECF No. 8, at 6). As Defendants note, however, the 

majority of these cases address whether a statutory claim can 

meet the “tortious inquiry” requirement – the question addressed 

by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Green. See, e.g., 

Reese v. Arrow Fin. Servs., 202 F.R.D. 83, 88 (D.Conn. 2001) 

(addressing without deciding whether a violation of the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act constitutes “tortious conduct”); 

Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., No. 8-70642, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

14542, at *5 (E.D.Mich. Nov. 5, 1978) (federal patent 

infringement claim is an “action for tort” for purposes of 

Michigan’s long-arm statute). 

Neither Green nor the cases cited by Mycosafe suggest that 

the “tortious injury” requirement should be read out of the 

Maryland Long-Arm Statute altogether.5

 Indeed, construing 

subsection (b)(4) so broadly as to encompass a complaint that 

 5

 Mycosafe also relies on a case holding that a defendant’s 

execution of false affidavits and assignments on behalf of a 

mortgage company satisfies the “tortious injury” requirement in 

Ohio’s long-arm statute. See Ohio ex rel. DeWine v. GMAC Mortg. 

LLC, No. 10CV2537, 2011 WL 1884543, at *1-2 (N.D.Ohio May 18, 

2011). Although the GMAC court noted that “Ohio courts seem to 

be quite willing to give a broad definition to tortious 

conduct,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), nothing in 

that opinion suggests that conduct giving rise to a contractual 

or quasi-contractual claim would be included in this “broad 

definition.” 

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asserts only contractual and quasi-contractual claims would, in 

effect, dispense with the first prong of the personal 

jurisdiction analysis – an approach that has been expressly 

rejected by Maryland’s highest court. See Mackey, 391 Md. at 

141, n. 6. 

Because Mycosafe fails to establish that the alleged 

conduct falls within the language of Maryland’s Long-Arm 

Statute, this court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction 

over Defendants, and there is no need to decide whether 

Defendants’ contacts with Maryland satisfy constitutional due 

process requirements.6

 

B. Dismissal or Transfer 

Because personal jurisdiction over Defendants is lacking, 

it must next be decided whether to dismiss this action or 

transfer it to another district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406(a), 

which provides that “[t]he district court of a district in which 

is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district 

shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer 

such case to any district or division in which it could have 

been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). “‘[T]he Fourth Circuit has 

adopted a reading of section 1406(a) authorizing transfer ‘for 

any reason which constitutes an impediment to a decision on the 

 6

 Likewise, Defendants’ arguments regarding dismissal for 

improper venue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) will not be 

addressed. 

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merits in the transferor district but would not be an impediment 

in the transferee district.’” Estate of Bank v. Swiss Valley 

Farms Co., 286 F.Supp.2d 514, 522 (D.Md. 2003) (quoting Porter 

v. Groat, 840 F.2d 255, 258 (4th Cir. 1988)). Lack of personal 

jurisdiction is one such “impediment.” Id. Whether to dismiss 

or transfer an action under section 1406(a) rests within the 

discretion of the court. Id. 

The record here indicates that dismissal would not be in 

the interest of justice. In its opposition to Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss, Mycosafe argues in the alternative that the 

case should be transferred to the District of Delaware, the 

state under whose laws Life and AB are organized. (ECF No. 8, 

at 8-11). In reply, Defendants contend that “this matter is 

most properly heard in California,” where Defendants maintain 

their principal offices and which is “the only state in which 

any of the subject events took place.” (ECF No. 9, at 11-13). 

In light of these arguments, it appears likely that outright 

dismissal would result in two events: (1) Mycosafe’s re-filing 

of this case in the District of Delaware, followed by 

(2) Defendants’ filing of a formal motion to transfer pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In other words, dismissal will almost 

surely result in re-litigating many of the same issues that have 

already been briefed by the parties here. 

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To avoid further delay in resolving the merits of this 

dispute, the court will exercise its discretion under section 

1406(a) to transfer rather than dismiss this case. As both 

parties concede, the jurisdictional allegations in the amended 

complaint establish that Mycosafe could have brought this case 

either in the District of Delaware or the Southern District of 

California. (See ECF No. 7-1, at 11; ECF No. 8, at 11-12). The 

inquiry thus becomes which forum is more appropriate based on 

the factors typically considered in resolving motions to 

transfer. See, e.g., Goffe v. Blake, 605 F.Supp. 1151, 1160 

(D.Del. 1985) (when two potential transferee courts were both 

districts “in which [the action] could have been brought,” 

transferring to the “more appropriate forum” based on the 

convenience of the parties, the location of the witnesses, and 

the interest of justice); accord Gov’t of Egypt Procurement 

Office v. M/V Robert E. Lee, 216 F.Supp.2d 468, 473 (D.Md. 2002) 

(transfers under section 1406(a) should be based on an 

individualized inquiry into “private factors such as the 

convenience of obtaining witness testimony and physical 

evidence, as well as public factors such as the forum’s public 

policy interest in hearing the case”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Consideration of the relevant factors establishes that the 

Southern District of California is a more appropriate forum. 

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First, Mycosafe misses the mark in arguing that its choice of 

Delaware as an alternative forum should be given deference. 

Although “a plaintiff’s choice of forum is ordinarily accorded 

considerable weight,” Lynch v. Vanderhoef Builders, 237 

F.Supp.2d 615, 617 (D.Md. 2002), this “weight is lessened when 

either (1) the chosen forum is not the plaintiff’s home, or 

(2) the chosen forum has little or no connection to the events 

giving rise to the litigation,” Tse v. Apple Computer, Civ. No. 

L-05–2149, 2006 WL 2583608, at *2 (D.Md. Aug. 31, 2006). 

Delaware is not Mycosafe’s home state, nor does it have any 

connection to the alleged events giving rise to Mycosafe’s 

claims against Defendants. Moreover, given that Mycosafe has 

offered Delaware as its second forum choice, it is not clear 

that the ordinary rule of deference should apply at all. 

Second, as to the convenience of the witnesses, Mycosafe 

has not identified any witnesses located in Delaware. Rather, 

Mycosafe makes an unsubstantiated assertion that there are three 

witnesses are likely to be called in this matter: one who lives 

in Austria, one who lives in Colorado or Massachusetts, and one 

who lives in Massachusetts. Defendants, by contrast, point out 

that any of their corporate representatives who may be deposed 

will likely be produced in California, where they maintain their 

principal offices. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of 

transferring to the Southern District of California. 

Case 3:13-cv-00093-BTM-MDD Document 10 Filed 01/11/13 Page 21 of 24
22 

Third, as to the convenience of the parties, the Southern 

District of California is a more preferable forum for 

Defendants, both of which maintain their principal offices in 

Carlsbad, California. Defendants also represent that they would 

suffer a hardship if the case is transferred to Delaware because 

their chosen counsel does not maintain offices there. As an 

Austrian entity, Mycosafe will need to travel internationally 

regardless of whether the case is transferred to California or 

Delaware. Obviously, however, Delaware is closer to Austria 

than California. Accordingly, this factor is neutral. 

Finally, the interest of justice weighs in favor of 

transfer to the Southern District of California. Although 

Mycosafe contends that “all of the events giving rise to this 

matter in controversy took place in Austria” (ECF No. 8, at 8), 

the exhibits attached to the amended complaint indicate that 

Plaintiff sent all of the invoices at issue in this action to a 

California address (ECF Nos. 5-5, 5-7, 5-9, 5-10, 5-11, 5-12).7 

Thus, to the extent that any U.S. state has a connection to the 

alleged events giving rise to Mycosafe’s causes of action, that 

state is California, not Delaware. 

 7

 Although the invoices were sent to Defendants’ offices in 

Foster City, California, which is located in the Northern 

District of California, no party has raised any argument 

regarding the propriety of a transfer to that district. 

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23 

Mycosafe also argues that transfer to the Southern District 

of California “would cause undue delay in the progression of 

this case, and would prejudice Plaintiff” because it “is one of 

the most congested districts in the country.” (ECF No. 8, at 

8). Docket conditions, including whether a transferee court may 

be able to “resolve the suit more efficiently and/or quickly,” 

can be a “minor consideration” in the interest of justice 

analysis. Kabat v. Bayer Cropscience LP, No. 3:07-CV-555, 2008 

WL 2156744, at *5 (E.D.Va. May 22, 2008). As Defendants note, 

however, a high number of case filings alone “does not speak to 

the current status” of a court’s docket. (ECF No. 9, at 13). 

Indeed, the very same statistics relied on by Mycosafe indicate 

that the median time from filing to disposition in civil cases 

is 6.4 months in the Southern District of California, as 

compared to 9.8 months in the District of Delaware.8

 

On balance, the relevant factors indicate that the Southern 

District of California is a more appropriate venue than the 

District of Delaware, and transfer will be ordered accordingly. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by 

Defendants will be granted, and this action will be transferred 

 8

 Federal Court Management Statistics, December 2011, 

http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/Fed

eralCourtManagementStatistics/2011/District_FCMS_Profiles_Decemb

er_2011.pdf&page=14 (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 

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24 

to the Southern District of California. A separate Order will 

follow. 

 /s/ 

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW 

United States District Judge 

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