Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01185/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01185-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 751
Nature of Suit: Labor - Family and Medical Leave Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

TINA CANUPP,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHILDREN’S RECEIVING HOME OF 

SACRAMENTO; and DOES 1 to 25, 

inclusive,

 Defendant.

CIV. NO. 2:14-01185 WBS EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

I. Brief Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Tina Canupp began working as the Health and 

Wellness Manager for defendant Children’s Receiving Home of 

Sacramento (“CRH”) on October 31, 2010. In December 2013, she 

experienced back pain and anticipated having back surgery. To 

accommodate this disability, she went on leave protected by the 

Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654, and 

California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2. 

CRH calculated that her leave under the FMLA and CFRA would 

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expire on January 11, 2014. Because plaintiff could not resume 

working by that date, CRH provided plaintiff with an additional 

thirty days of personal leave. When plaintiff did not return to 

work at the expiration of her personal leave, CRH terminated 

plaintiff. 

Plaintiff initiated this action, alleging that CRH

failed to reasonably accommodate her disability and terminated 

her when she was still entitled to FMLA and CFRA leave in 

retaliation for her disability. Plaintiff also alleges that CRH 

terminated her in retaliation for reports she had made to the 

California Department of Social Services, Division of Community 

Care Licensing (“DSS”) about alleged sexual misconduct by staff 

at CRH. In her Complaint, plaintiff alleges the following

claims: (1) disability discrimination in violation of subsection 

12940(m) of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940-12951; (2) failure to engage 

in the interactive process in violation of subsection 12940(n) of 

FEHA; (3) failure to provide reasonable accommodation in 

violation of subsection 12940(m) of FEHA; (4) retaliation in 

violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5; (5) 

interference with entitlements protected by CFRA; (6)

interference with entitlements protected by the FMLA; (7)

retaliation in violation of CFRA; (8) discrimination in violation 

of the FMLA; and (9) wrongful termination in violation of public 

policy. (Docket No. 2.) 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, CRH now 

moves for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims and her

requests for injunctive relief, back pay, and front pay. (Docket 

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No. 25.) Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on her 

failure to engage in the interactive process claim under 

subsection 12940(n) of FEHA and CRH’s affirmative defenses of 

after-acquired evidence, unclean hands, good faith/bad faith, and 

undue hardship. (Docket No. 27.) 

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome 

of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a 

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s 

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial 

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that 

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the moving party can demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential 

element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the 

burden shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 

324 (quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, 

the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita 

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Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 252.

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 

255. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, 

and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment . . . .” Id. On cross-motions for summary 

judgment, the court “must review the evidence submitted in 

support of each cross-motion [in a light most favorable to the 

non-moving party] and consider each party’s motions on their own 

merits.” Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 

1097 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 

III. Analysis

A. FEHA Claims

1. Subsection 12940(m): Reasonable Accommodation 

Under subsection 12940(m) of FEHA, it is unlawful for 

an employer “to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the 

known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee” 

unless the accommodation would “produce undue hardship.” Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 12940(m); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(u)

(defining “undue hardship”). “The elements of a reasonable 

accommodation cause of action are (1) the employee suffered a 

disability, (2) the employee could perform the essential 

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functions of the job with reasonable accommodation, and (3) the 

employer failed to reasonably accommodate the employee’s 

disability.” Nealy v. City of Santa Monica, 234 Cal. App. 4th 

359, 373 (2d Dist. 2015). The first element in this case is

undisputed as the parties agree plaintiff suffered a disability 

for purposes of FEHA. 

FEHA defines “essential functions” of a job as “the 

fundamental job duties of the employment position.” Cal. Gov’t 

Code § 12926(f). Essential functions do not include “marginal 

functions,” which are those functions that, “if not performed, 

would not eliminate the need for the job or that could be readily 

performed by another employee or that could be performed in an 

alternative way.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11065(e)(3). 

Under FEHA, the following non-exhaustive reasons may 

render a job function essential: 

(A) . . . the reason the position exists is to perform 

that function. 

(B) . . . the limited number of employees available 

among whom the performance of that job function can be 

distributed. 

(C) The function may be highly specialized, so that 

the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her 

expertise or ability to perform the particular 

function.

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(f)(1). FEHA provides that “[e]vidence of 

whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not 

limited to, the following:”

(A) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are 

essential.

(B) Written job descriptions prepared before 

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advertising or interviewing applicants for the job.

(C) The amount of time spent on the job performing the 

function.

(D) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to 

perform the function.

(E) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement.

(F) The work experiences of past incumbents in the 

job.

(G) The current work experience of incumbents in 

similar jobs.

Id. § 12926(f)(2). 

a. Essential Functions of Plaintiff’s Position

At her deposition, plaintiff testified that the duties 

of the Health and Wellness Manager were described during her 

interview as follows: 

That I would oversee the staff and the health and 

wellness department, that I would provide assessments 

for youth in the clinic and oversee the physician and 

the psychiatrist, that I would be over the kitchen and 

the kitchen staff, and that I would be over the 

medication assistants, provide incidental care to the 

youth, and then maintain compliance inside the medical 

clinic and in the kitchen.

(Canupp Dep. at 52:4-15.)

While working as CRH’s Health and Wellness Manager, 

plaintiff estimated that she devoted about eighty percent of her 

daily time to providing direct medical care to the youth at CRH. 

(Id. at 63:9-17, 66:12-19.) She agreed that providing this care 

“basically” required her to be present at the clinic and that the 

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care included performing health assessments and responding to 

health care emergencies. (Id. at 63:18-25.) Plaintiff further 

testified that she spent approximately five percent of her daily 

time performing indirect medical care, such as overseeing and 

reviewing her staff’s filling out of medical charts. (Id. at 

66:3-67:9.) Plaintiff described some of her additional duties as

training and hiring employees in the clinic and kitchen and 

training CRH staff on first aid, CPR, and OSHA. (Id. at 69:21-

70:25.) Plaintiff’s descriptions of her duties are consistent 

with those identified by CRH’s executive director, David Ballard, 

(Ballard Dep. at 62:8-63:13), and CRH’s clinical manager, Anna 

Naify, (Naify Dep. at 50:25-51:14). 

Despite the undisputed evidence about plaintiff’s 

primary responsibilities, plaintiff argues that all of her 

responsibilities were only “marginal” because “they could be 

readily performed by another employee.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, 

§ 11065(e)(3). According to plaintiff, none of her duties were 

essential because CRH was able to reshuffle her responsibilities 

to account for her unanticipated absence, did not hire a new 

nurse until June 2014, and the new nurse worked only part time. 

A judge in this district recently rejected this precise

argument, concluding that an employee could not “show the inperson aspects of his cashier position were not essential by 

showing [the employer] was able to cope with his absence by 

reassigning other employees to fulfill them.” Neufeld v. Winco 

Holdings, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1505 DAD JLT, 2016 WL 815649, at *4 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2016) (Mueller, J.). In Neufeld, the court 

entered summary judgment in favor of the employer and held that 

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“[r]egular, physical attendance was an essential function” of the 

plaintiff’s cashier position. Id. at *3. The court further 

explained that “an employee may not create a dispute of material 

fact by claiming the employer could have shifted others into the 

plaintiff’s position to perform the essential functions 

temporarily.” Id. at *4. 

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lawler v. Montblanc N. 

Am., LLC also cuts against plaintiff’s position. 704 F.3d 1235 

(9th Cir. 2013). In Lawler, the employer had denied the manager 

employee’s request for reduced hours and a five-month leave of 

absence. Id. at 1243. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer under 

sections 12940(a) and (h) of FEHA even though the employer had 

filled the employee’s position by making the assistant manager a

“de facto” manager and waited seven months to hire a new manager 

after terminating the plaintiff. See id. at 1241, 1244. The 

Ninth Circuit did not suggest that the employer’s assignment of 

the plaintiff’s duties to another employee for seven months 

rendered all of the plaintiff’s duties non-essential or marginal. 

That CRH had previously allowed plaintiff to work from 

home for a short duration in September 2013 due to prior medical 

issues and thereby temporarily excused her from her duties that 

could not be performed remotely also does not create a disputed 

fact as to plaintiff’s essential functions. Neufeld, 2016 WL 

815649, at *4 (“[The employer’s] willingness to make a temporary 

exception does not create a disputed question of fact as to the 

essential functions of [the employee’s] job.”).

The court therefore finds from the undisputed evidence 

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that one essential function of plaintiff’s position was providing 

direct medical care to the youth at CRH. If plaintiff could not 

perform this essential function with a reasonable accommodation, 

defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s failure 

to accommodate claim under subsection 12940(m). Cf. Nealy, 234 

Cal. App. 4th at 374 (“The fact that one essential function may 

be up for debate does not preclude summary judgment if the 

employee cannot perform other essential functions even with 

accommodation.”). 

b. Reasonable Accommodation

“A reasonable accommodation is a modification or 

adjustment to the work environment that enables the employee to 

perform the essential functions of the job he or she holds or 

desires.” Id. at 373. “Reasonable accommodations may include, 

among other things, job restructuring or permitting an alteration 

of when and/or how an essential function is performed,” but 

“elimination of an essential function is not a reasonable 

accommodation.” Id. at 374-75. Plaintiff contends CRH should 

have provided her with the reasonable accommodations of (1) 

additional leave time; (2) the ability to work from home; or (3) 

assignment to a vacant position. 

To the extent plaintiff argues that an accommodation is 

reasonable so long as it does not impose an undue hardship on the 

employer, she misstates the law. “The question presented . . . 

is not whether [an accommodation] imposes an undue hardship, but 

whether the accommodation requested is reasonable and thus 

required in the first place.” Raine v. City of Burbank, 135 Cal.

App. 4th 1215, 1227 (2d Dist. 2006). “Consideration of the 

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potential hardship to an employer in assessing the reasonableness 

of an accommodation does not alter the fact that, ‘as part of 

[his] prima facie case, [plaintiff] must establish [ ]he was 

qualified to perform the essential duties of [his] job.’” Pratt 

v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-00815-CAS, 2015 WL 2153397, 

at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2015) (quoting Wills v. Superior Court, 

195 Cal. App. 4th 143, 170 (4th Dist. 2011)) (alterations in 

Pratt). 

i. Additional Leave Time

“[A] finite leave can be a reasonable accommodation 

under FEHA, provided it is likely that at the end of the leave, 

the employee would be able to perform his or her duties.” Hanson 

v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 215, 226 (2d Dist. 1999). 

A reasonable accommodation does not, however, “require the 

employer to wait indefinitely for an employee’s medical condition 

to be corrected.” Id. at 226-27 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

At the time CRH terminated plaintiff, the undisputed 

evidence was that plaintiff did not know when any of her 

surgeries would be performed or when she might be able to return 

to work. Moreover, in January 2014, not only was plaintiff 

dealing with the back pain and problems she reported to CRH, she 

also had the onset of foot drop, (Canupp Dep. at 320:21-23), and 

has admitted that she “could not perform the essential functions 

of her job as a nurse with a right foot drop.” (Oceguera Decl. 

Ex. 43 at 10:9-11 (Docket No. 26).) Because of the foot drop,

plaintiff’s back surgeries were postponed indefinitely, and 

plaintiff did not learn until June 2014 that she was no longer a 

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candidate for back surgery. (Second Canupp Decl. ¶ 107 (Docket 

No. 46).) Although plaintiff did not inform CRH of the foot drop

or the postponing of her back surgeries, both only further 

eliminated the possibility of plaintiff requesting a finite leave 

of absence. The undisputed evidence is that, at the time of her 

termination, plaintiff did not know when any surgeries would be 

performed or when she would be able to return to work. 

Plaintiff suggests she may have been able to resume 

working in May 2014 if she had received an epidural as initially

planned. (Id. ¶ 94.) It is undisputed, however, that plaintiff

remained on disability in May 2014. (See Oceguera Decl. Ex. 30 

(statements of disability benefits from California Employment 

Development Department from January 2014 through August 2014).) 

In fact, plaintiff continued to claim an inability to work due to 

her disabilities in her October 21, 2014 disability benefits 

claim submitted to the California Employment Development 

Department and was certified by her medical practitioner as 

disabled as part of that claim. (Oceguera Decl. Ex. 31.) 

Plaintiff did not resume working for a new company until November 

20141 after she received an epidural on November 3, 2014. 

(Second Canupp Decl. ¶ 95.) Even assuming that her position with 

the new company required the same physical duties as at CRH,2

 

1 The evidence is not entirely clear as to when plaintiff 

resumed working. The court adopts the earliest date plaintiff 

suggests she resumed working or could have begun working for 

purposes of this motion. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 387:1-9.)

2 The parties dispute whether plaintiff’s subsequent 

positions, which were more administrative in nature, required the 

same physical demands as her position at CRH. (See, e.g., Canupp 

Dep. at 253:6-20, 378:7-19 (testifying that she began working for 

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this would have required CRH to provide plaintiff with a minimum 

of nine additional months of leave. Not only would this have 

been a substantial duration of time, plaintiff’s ability to even 

return to work at that time was still unknown when CRH made the 

decision to terminate her.

Under FEHA, this sort of indefinite leave is not a 

reasonable accommodation. Hanson, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 226-27. 

The Ninth Circuit has also held that an employee who is “totally 

disabled” cannot work at all and thus cannot present a genuine 

issue of material fact that the employee could have performed the 

essential duties with a reasonable accommodation. See Lawler, 

704 F.3d at 1243 (affirming the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of the employer when the employer had denied

the plaintiff’s requests for reduced hours and a five-month leave 

of absence (citing Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1482 

(9th Cir. 1996))).

Because the undisputed evidence shows that the duration 

of any leave of absence at the time of plaintiff’s termination 

would have been indefinite, plaintiff cannot show that any 

additional leave would have been a reasonable accommodation under 

FEHA. Accord Neufeld, 2016 WL 815649, at *4 (“[A] leave of 

absence of undefined length is not a reasonable accommodation.”); 

 

Elica Health Care in January 2015 as the Director of Quality 

Assurance and Compliance and that the position did not involve 

patient care or physical requirements akin to her duties at 

CRH).) The court assumes for purposes of this motion that 

plaintiff’s subsequent positions required similar physical duties 

as her position at CRH or, even if they did not, that plaintiff 

would have been able to fulfill similar physical duties during 

the times she was employed after her termination. 

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Lara v. DNC Parks & Resorts at Tenaya, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-000103

LJO SAB, 2015 WL 4394618, at *14 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2015) (“[I]f 

the employer does not know when the employee will be able to 

return to duty, the employer is not required to grant an 

indefinite and lengthy leave.”) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

ii. Working From Home

Plaintiff contends that, if she had been granted 

the accommodation of working from home on a part-time basis, she 

could have fulfilled her duties of (1) overseeing the medical 

clinic; (2) managing recordkeeping; (3) receiving phone calls to 

determine whether or not a youth’s health would allow admission 

into CRH facilities; (4) maintaining stock of vaccines; and (5) 

continuing policies and procedures processes. (Second Canupp 

Decl. ¶ 91; accord Canupp Dep. at 317:12-318:1.) Even assuming 

plaintiff could have adequately performed these duties remotely, 

she does not contend that she could have performed all of her 

essential duties from home. Plaintiff represents that she could 

have provided some patient care remotely by taking phone calls 

and charting, (Canupp Dep. 318:19-320:2), but she neither argues

nor could a rational trier of fact find that she could have 

provided all aspects of direct patient care, such as examining 

patients, from her home. See Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 

F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Working at home is a reasonable 

accommodation when the essential functions of the position can be 

performed at home and a work-at-home arrangement would not cause 

undue hardship for the employer.”); compare Samper v. Providence 

St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 

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that “on-site regular attendance” is an essential function for a 

neo-natal nurse for numerous reasons, including the requirements 

of “face-to-face interactions with patients and their families[]

and working with medical equipment”), with Humphrey, 239 F.3d at

1137 (concluding that physical attendance is not an essential job 

function for a medical transcriptionist, especially when other 

medical transcriptionists for the employer already worked from 

home). 

It is therefore undisputed plaintiff could not have 

remotely fulfilled all aspects of her essential duty of providing 

direct medical care to the youth at CRH. Working from home was 

therefore not a reasonable accommodation under FEHA because “FEHA 

does not obligate the employer to accommodate the employee by 

excusing him or her from the performance of essential functions.” 

Nealy, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 376; see also Samper, 675 F.3d at 

1239 (“Except in the unusual case where an employee can 

effectively perform all work-related duties at home, an employee 

who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job 

functions, essential or otherwise.”) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

iii. Vacant Position

“Reasonable accommodation may also include 

‘reassignment to a vacant position’ if the employee cannot 

perform the essential functions of his or her position even with 

accommodation.” Nealy, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 377 (quoting Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 12926(p)(2)). “FEHA requires the employer to offer 

the employee ‘comparable’ or ‘lower graded’ vacant positions for 

which he or she is qualified,” but “does not require the employer 

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to promote the employee or create a new position for the employee 

to a greater extent than it would create a new position for any 

employee, regardless of disability.” Id. (quoting Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 2, § 11068(d)(1), (2)). 

“In cases when courts have found a triable issue on 

reassignment, the employees have adduced evidence obtained 

through discovery that vacant positions for which they were 

qualified existed during the relevant period, but the employer 

failed to offer the positions to them.” Id. Here, there is no 

evidence from which to even infer that CRH had a vacant position 

for which plaintiff was qualified. Moreover, plaintiff has 

established that the only possible responsibilities she could 

have performed would have had to be performed exclusively from 

home and there is no evidence that CRH had any positions that 

allowed an employee to work entirely from home. A genuine issue 

of material fact thus does not exist as to whether CRH could have 

reasonably accommodated plaintiff by offering her a vacant 

position. 

Accordingly, because it is undisputed that plaintiff 

could not perform all of the essential functions of her position 

with a reasonable accommodation, the court must grant defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment on her subsection 12940(m) claim.

2. Subsection 12940(a): Disability Discrimination 

Subsection 12940(a) of FEHA renders it unlawful for an 

employer to discharge an employee because of the employee’s 

“medical condition” unless the employee, “because of his or her 

physical or mental disability, is unable to perform his or her 

essential duties even with reasonable accommodations.” Cal. 

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Gov’t Code § 12940(a)(1). “A prima facie case of disability 

discrimination under FEHA requires the employee to show he or she 

(1) suffered from a disability, (2) was otherwise qualified to do 

his or her job, and (3) was subjected to adverse employment 

action because of the disability.” Nealy, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 

378. “[A] qualified individual is someone who is able to perform 

the essential functions of his or her job, with or without 

reasonable accommodation,” which is “identical” to the showing 

“required for a cause of action for failure to reasonably 

accommodate.” Id.; accord Green v. State, 42 Cal. 4th 254, 262 

(2007) (“[I]n order to establish that a defendant employer has 

discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of the 

FEHA, the plaintiff employee bears the burden of proving he or 

she was able to do the job, with or without reasonable 

accommodation.”).

CRH does not dispute that it terminated plaintiff 

because of her disability once her leave expired and her 

disability prevented her from returning to work. Nonetheless, 

plaintiff cannot establish a triable issue of fact with respect 

to whether she was qualified to do her job because, as previously 

discussed, it is undisputed that she could not perform the 

essential duties of her job with a reasonable accommodation. 

Accordingly, the court must grant defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment on plaintiff’s subsection 12940(a) disability 

discrimination claim.3 

 

3 Subsection 12940(a) also makes it unlawful for an 

employer to discharge an employee because of the employee’s 

“military and veteran status.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). In 

her opposition to CRH’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff 

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3. Subsection 12940(n): Interactive Process

Under subsection 12940(n), it is unlawful for an 

employer “to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive 

process with the employee or applicant to determine effective 

reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for 

reasonable accommodation by an employee or applicant with a known 

physical or mental disability or known medical condition.” Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 12940(n). “The employee must initiate the process 

unless the disability and resulting limitations are obvious,” and 

the employee must “‘specifically identify the disability and 

resulting limitations, and [] suggest the reasonable 

accommodations.’” Scotch v. Art Inst. of Cal.-Orange Cnty., 

Inc., 173 Cal. App. 4th 986, 1013 (4th Dist. 2009) (quoting 

Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 

1996). “FEHA requires an informal process with the employee to 

attempt to identify reasonable accommodations, not necessarily 

ritualized discussions.” Nealy, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 379.

“Both employer and employee have the obligation ‘to 

keep communications open’ and neither has ‘a right to obstruct 

the process.’” Scotch, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1014 (quoting Jensen 

v. Wells Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 4th 245, 266 (2d Dist. 2000)). 

“Each party must participate in good faith, undertake reasonable 

efforts to communicate its concerns, and make available to the 

 

mentions that CRH’s Chief Financial Officer had stated he would 

not have hired plaintiff if he knew she was disabled and a 

veteran. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 29:19-22 (Docket No. 44).) Assuming 

plaintiff raises this circumstantial evidence to suggest CRH 

terminated her because of her status as a veteran, her claim and

the allegations in her Complaint are limited to disability 

discrimination. (See Compl. ¶¶ 32-39.) 

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other information which is available, or more accessible, to one 

party.” Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4th 34, 62 

n.22 (2006). “Liability hinges on the objective circumstances 

surrounding the parties’ breakdown in communication, and 

responsibility for the breakdown lies with the party who fails to 

participate in good faith.” Id. 

While an employee “cannot necessarily be expected to 

identify and request all possible accommodations during the 

interactive process itself” because the employee does not have 

all the information about possible positions and accommodations, 

“once the parties have engaged in the litigation process, . . .

the employee must be able to identify an available accommodation 

the interactive process should have produced.” Scotch, 173 Cal. 

App. 4th at 1018. “[T]he employee who brings a section 12940(n) 

claim bears the burden of proving a reasonable accommodation was 

available before the employer can be held liable under the 

statute.” Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 166 Cal. 

App. 4th 952, 984 (1st Dist. 2008); accord Nealy, 234 Cal. App. 

4th at 379; Scotch, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1018-19; Neufeld, 2016 

WL 815649, at *5; Weeks v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., --- F. Supp. 3d -

---, ----, No. 1:13-CV-1641 AWI JLT, 2015 WL 5915271, at *17 

(E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2015); Alejandro v. ST Micro Elecs., Inc, No. 

15-CV-01385 LHK, 2015 WL 5262102, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 

2015).

4

 

4 “The California courts are split on whether an employer 

can still be held liable for failure to engage in the interactive 

process even if it turns out that no reasonable accommodation was 

available.” DelGiacco v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., No. SACV 14-0200 

DOC, 2015 WL 1535260, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015). In 

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a. Breakdown in Communications

On December 9, 2013, plaintiff informed CRH’s human 

resources manager, Norma Mesa,

5 and, CRH’s clinical manager,

Naify, via email that she would be sending her FMLA paperwork and 

would be “filling [sic] for disability after [] miss[ing] the 8th 

day of work.” (Oceguera Decl. Ex. 12.) Plaintiff stated that 

she did “not have a return date as of right now due to the 

pending appointment with the specialist.” (Id.) 

 

Scotch, the Fourth District “synthesize[d]” the apparent split to 

distinguish between the employee’s lesser burden during the 

interactive process and heightened burden to prevail on a FEHA 

claim. See Scotch, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1018 (“We synthesize 

Wysinger, Nadaf–Rahrov, and Claudio with our analysis of the law 

as follows: To prevail on a claim under section 12940, 

subdivision (n) for failure to engage in the interactive process, 

an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that would 

have been available at the time the interactive process should 

have occurred. An employee cannot necessarily be expected to 

identify and request all possible accommodations during the 

interactive process itself because [e]mployees do not have at 

their disposal the extensive information concerning possible 

alternative positions or possible accommodations which employers 

have. However, as the Nadaf–Rahrov court explained, once the 

parties have engaged in the litigation process, to prevail, the 

employee must be able to identify an available accommodation the 

interactive process should have produced . . . .”) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original).

The Central District recently found Scotch’s “reasoning 

persuasive because it incentivizes employers to provide 

information about potential reasonable accommodations during the 

interactive process (since that information will come out in 

discovery anyway) and it gives employees leverage to hold 

employers accountable to their obligation to engage in the 

interactive process without burdening employees with the 

responsibility to articulate reasonable accommodations before 

they gain access to information in the employer’s possession.” 

DelGiacco, 2015 WL 1535260, at *16. This court agrees with 

DelGiacco. 

5 Norma Mesa’s last name was Thomson at the time she 

worked at CRH and some of the evidence refers to her by that last 

name. (Mesa Decl. ¶ 2.) 

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Less than four hours later that same day, plaintiff 

sent Mesa and Naify a second email to verify that they had 

received her FMLA paperwork. In that email, plaintiff proposed 

working from home:

I could still possibly do work from home in bed if you 

would like. I can still work on paperwork and p&p’s 

during my down time. I could even still accept phone 

calls. I can do a lot of my work from a distance. 

The only thing that will be affected is head to toe 

assessment which I can have doctor Carson do. My MA’s 

are still able to issue TB test under my license I 

will just need to sign off on those once weekly. I 

can work on IR’s and other training or program 

statements.

(Id. Ex. 13.) 

That same day, CRH approved plaintiff’s FMLA leave and 

indicated that her leave would expire on January 11, 2014 because 

CRH utilizes a “rolling” calendar that measures leave from the 

date of the employee’s first FMLA leave usage. (Id. Exs. 15, 

16.) Mesa notified plaintiff via mail and also mailed plaintiff 

FMLA forms and notices. (Mesa Decl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff denies 

that she received the FMLA leave approval and paperwork. (Second 

Canupp Decl. ¶ 82.)

On December 10, plaintiff sent Mesa and Naify an email 

to “figure out how [she] should proceed for now with work.” 

(Oceguera Decl. Ex. 17.) Plaintiff explained that she had been 

receiving “phone calls and emails all day long” and wanted to 

know whether she was “allowed to work from home” or should “let 

them know [she] is out.” (Id.) Mesa contends she told plaintiff 

that CRH could not accommodate her request to work from home, but 

that her FMLA leave was approved. (Mesa Decl. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff, 

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on the other hand, indicates that Mesa never returned her phone 

call and she never spoke with anyone from CRH about her request 

to work from home. (Second Canupp Decl. ¶¶ 77-79.) 

On December 19, plaintiff sent Mesa and Naify an email 

informing them that she had met her “spinal doctor” and he said 

she would need surgery and “must stay laying down until surgery.” 

(Oceguera Decl. Ex. 20.) A surgery date had not yet been 

scheduled because plaintiff’s insurance company needed to approve 

the surgery. (Id. Ex. 20.) 

On January 2, 2014, plaintiff emailed Mesa, Naify, and 

Ballard inquiring about the status of her FMLA leave request and 

the specific date her FMLA coverage would end. She explained, 

“The reason I am asking for this is because my temporary medical 

disability may exceed the time allotted for FMLA. I am trying to 

start the interactive process to discuss reasonable 

accommodations that I will need during the time that I am 

temporarily disabled and can return to work after surgery.” (Id.

Ex. 21.) In that email, plaintiff indicated that she was 

currently “waiting for the insurance approval for two separate 

procedures” and would “have a better timeframe” once the approval 

was received. (Id. Ex. 21.)

At her deposition, plaintiff testified that she sent 

the January 2 email because she had left multiple voicemails 

since December 19 requesting returned calls to discuss her FMLA 

leave, but never received a return call. (Canupp Dep. at 134:1-

19, 136:2-18.) Mesa, Naify, and Ballard deny that they ever 

received a voicemail from plaintiff asking for a return call to 

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discuss her situation. (Mesa Decl. ¶ 16; Naify Decl. ¶ 16; 

Ballard Decl. ¶ 14.) 

The following day, on January 3, Mesa sent plaintiff a 

letter reaffirming that her FMLA leave had been approved and was 

set to expire on January 11, 2014. (Oceguera Decl. Ex. 22.) 

Mesa also informed plaintiff that CRH was “automatically 

extend[ing] a 30-day personal leave for [plaintiff] starting 

immediately after [her] FMLA exhausted,” and this personal leave 

would expire February 11, 2014. (Id. Ex. 22.) The letter also 

stated that plaintiff’s “doctor note indicates no possible return 

date,” and Mesa requested plaintiff immediately, but no later 

than February 11, forward “any other information from [her]

doctor indicating [her] surgery/recovery date and/or return 

date.” (Id. Ex. 22.) Plaintiff denies that she received this 

letter. (Canupp Dep. at 136:22-137:9.) 

About a week after she sent the email on January 2, 

plaintiff went to CRH to talk with Mesa about her email. Because 

Mesa was out of the office, plaintiff went to Naify’s office and 

Naify told plaintiff that Mesa would get back to her. (Id. at 

310:10-25.) Other than this visit, there is no evidence that 

plaintiff and CRH exchanged any communications about plaintiff’s 

leave or request to work from home between January 3 and her 

termination. Plaintiff does not recall whether she sent another 

email to anyone at CRH, (id. at 314:5-315:1, 324:17-21), and 

contends that she never received a phone call, email, or letter 

from CRH during this time, (Second Canupp Decl. ¶ 84). On 

January 13, Naify had sent an email to all employees, including 

plaintiff, indicating that CRH did not have a “solid return date” 

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for plaintiff and that employees should contact Naify or another 

manager in her absence. (Oceguera Decl. Ex. 23.) CRH also

exchanged at least one additional email with plaintiff on another 

matter. (See Canupp Dep. at 302:10.) 

On February 13, 2014, CRH terminated plaintiff’s 

employment indicating that her FMLA and personal leave had 

expired and plaintiff had “not provided [CRH] with any possible 

return date to work” and “[a]ll indications that [plaintiff had] 

provided are that [her] absence will be of a protracted and 

unknown duration.” (Oceguera Decl. Ex. 25.) 

Although it is undisputed that plaintiff initiated the 

interactive process, there are numerous factual disputes that 

preclude the court from determining which party is responsible 

for the breakdown in communications as a matter of law. While 

CRH has put forth evidence of its attempts to communicate with 

plaintiff and requests for information about her condition, 

plaintiff denies receiving all of these correspondences. It is 

the jury’s role to assess the credibility of the witnesses and 

determine whether CRH in fact sent and plaintiff received the 

communications CRH claims it sent to plaintiff to obtain 

information plaintiff was obligated to provide. Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 255.

b. Availability of Reasonable Accommodation

Nonetheless, even if the court assumes that all fault 

for the breakdown in the interactive process lies with CRH, 

plaintiff could survive summary judgment only by showing that “a 

reasonable accommodation was available.” See Nadaf-Rahrov, 166 

Cal. App. 4th at 984. As discussed in the context of plaintiff’s 

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subsection 12940(m) claim, plaintiff cannot show or even 

establish a triable issue of fact with respect to whether a 

reasonable accommodation was possible. As the court previously 

concluded, neither an indefinite leave of absence nor working 

remotely were reasonable accommodations under the circumstances

and there is no evidence that a vacant remote position was 

available. 

Accordingly, because no rational jury could find that a 

reasonable accommodation existed, plaintiff cannot create a 

triable issue of fact on her subsection 12940(n) interactive 

process claim and the court must grant CRH’s motion for summary 

judgment and deny plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment 

on that claim. 

B. FMLA Claims

“The FMLA creates two interrelated, substantive 

employee rights: first, the employee has a right to use a certain 

amount of leave for protected reasons, and second, the employee 

has a right to return to his or her job or an equivalent job 

after using protected leave.” Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, 

Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001). Subsection 2615(a) of 

the FMLA “sets forth two very different ways to protect these 

substantive rights.” Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 

777 (9th Cir. 2011). First, an employee can bring a 

“discrimination” or “retaliation” claim if the employer 

“‘discharge[s] or in any other manner discriminate[s] against any 

individual for opposing any practice made unlawful’” by the FMLA. 

Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)). Second, an employee can 

bring an “interference” or “entitlement” claim if the employer 

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“‘interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or den[ies] the exercise of or 

the attempt to exercise’ the substantive rights guaranteed by 

FMLA.” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)). 

1. FMLA Retaliation Claim

Although plaintiff’s eighth cause of action alleges 

discrimination in violation of the FMLA, she neither alleges nor 

submits evidence supporting an inference that she “‘oppos[ed] any 

practice made unlawful’” by the FMLA. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2615(a)(2)). Nor does she articulate a theory of an FMLA 

retaliation claim that is independent of CRH’s alleged 

miscalculation of her FMLA leave entitlement. (See Pl.’s Opp’n 

at 49:19-50:2); see also Johnson v. Morehouse Coll., Inc., 199 F. 

Supp. 2d 1345, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (“[A]n employer is not 

subject to the ‘retaliation’ prohibitions of the statute by 

virtue of his miscalculation, alone.”). Accordingly, because 

there is no genuine issue of material fact giving rise to a 

cognizable FMLA retaliation claim, the court will grant CRH’s 

motion for summary judgment on that claim.

2. FMLA Interference Claim

With respect to plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim,

“[t]he FMLA creates two interrelated substantive rights for 

employees”: 

First, an employee has the right to take up to twelve 

weeks of leave for the reasons described above. 

Second, an employee who takes FMLA leave has the right 

to be restored to his or her original position or to a 

position equivalent in benefits, pay, and conditions 

of employment upon return from leave.

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Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003). To 

establish a prima facie case based on an FMLA interference claim, 

“the employee must establish that: (1) he was eligible for the 

FMLA’s protections, (2) his employer was covered by the FMLA, (3) 

he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) he provided 

sufficient notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his 

employer denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.” Id.

at 778; see also id. (noting that other circuits apply the 

McDonnell Douglas burden shifting to FMLA interference claims, 

but the Ninth Circuit has rejected this approach). Under an FMLA 

interference claim, “the employer’s intent is irrelevant to a 

determination of liability.” Id.

Here, the parties do not dispute that CRH was subject 

to the FMLA, that plaintiff was eligible for and entitled to take 

FMLA leave, and that plaintiff provided sufficient notice of her 

intent to take leave. The only dispute is whether CRH 

incorrectly calculated her FMLA leave and failed to reinstate her 

in violation of the FMLA.

a. FMLA Entitlement to Twelve Weeks of Leave

Under the FMLA, “an eligible employee’s FMLA leave 

entitlement is limited to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during 

any 12–month period.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(a). Under 

§ 825.200(b), an employer may “choose any one of the following 

methods for determining the 12–month period in which the 

[employee’s] 12 weeks of leave entitlement” is calculated: 

(1) The calendar year;

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(2) Any fixed 12–month leave year, such as a fiscal 

year, a year required by State law, or a year starting 

on an employee’s anniversary date;

(3) The 12–month period measured forward from the date 

any employee’s first FMLA leave under paragraph (a) 

begins; or,

(4) A “rolling” 12–month period measured backward from 

the date an employee uses any FMLA leave as described 

in paragraph (a).

Id. § 825.200(b)(1)-(4). An employer may “choose any one of the 

alternatives . . . provided the alternative chosen is applied 

consistently and uniformly to all employees.” Id.

§ 825.200(d)(1). “If an employer fails to select one of the 

options in paragraph (b) of this section for measuring the 12–

month period for the leave entitlements described in paragraph 

(a), the option that provides the most beneficial outcome for the 

employee will be used.” Id. § 825.200(e). 

The parties dispute the total FMLA leave plaintiff had 

utilized prior to her taking FMLA leave in December 2013 through 

January 2014. For example, while the parties agree plaintiff 

took FMLA leave from December 2012 and January 2013, the evidence 

is inconsistent as to the dates plaintiff was actually on leave. 

(Compare Oceguera Decl. Ex. 4 (plaintiff’s FMLA request 

indicating plaintiff took FMLA leave from December 28, 2012 to 

January 14, 2013 to undergo a surgery), with Second Canupp Decl. 

¶ 60, Ex. Q (indicating plaintiff was on leave December 10, 2012 

to January 4, 2013).) 

The parties also dispute how much time plaintiff was on 

leave in August and September 2013. During that time, plaintiff 

was originally scheduled to be on leave from August 9, 2013 to 

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September 2, 2013, but on September 5, plaintiff informed CRH via 

email that her incision had opened and she would not be able to 

return to work until September 23, 2013. (Oceguera Decl. Ex. 7.) 

Plaintiff contends that September 2 was a holiday and that she 

had worked from home September 3-6, 2013 and again from home on

September 16-20, 2013. (Second Canupp Decl. ¶¶ 66, 69.) Mesa on 

the other hand, testified that she does not recall plaintiff 

having worked from home during that time. (Mesa Dep. at 79:7-12. 

But see Naify Dep. at 174:1-22 (testifying that she did not 

recall what days plaintiff worked from home in September 2013, 

but recognized that emails reflect plaintiff did work on 

September 3-5).) 

Even assuming the parties did not dispute when 

plaintiff took off in August and September 2013, it is undisputed 

that CRH did not initially designate any of that time off as FMLA 

leave. Mesa contends only that she “later” told plaintiff that 

her time off in August and September had been approved as FMLA 

leave and that the time off was “subsequently marked as FMLA time 

on attendance reports.” (Mesa Decl. ¶ 8.) Mesa does not 

identify or estimate when she later determined that the time off 

in August and September 2013 would count as FMLA leave, when she 

told plaintiff it had been approved as FMLA leave, or when it was 

subsequently marked on plaintiff’s timesheets. In her letter 

dated January 3, 2014 informing plaintiff that her FMLA leave was 

approved, Mesa stated: 

Since [CRH] uses a “rolling calendar” and FMLA was 

taken last year summer, your FMLA will expire on 

January 11, 2014. All absences in connection with 

your serious health condition were counted as leave 

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provided under the [FMLA] and [CFRA]. This will be 

the case whether the leave taken is part of a day, one 

full day, or two or more consecutive days.

(Oceguera Decl. Ex. 22.) 

Although § 825.301(d) permits an employer to 

“retroactively designate leave as FMLA leave . . . provided that 

the employer’s failure to timely designate leave does not cause 

harm or injury to the employee,” it requires the employer to 

provide the employee with notice of the retroactive designation. 

29 C.F.R. § 825.301(d). Plaintiff denies that she received the 

January 3, 2014 letter from Mesa and contends that she was never 

given notice that any of her time off in August and September 

would be counted as FMLA leave. (Second Canupp Decl. ¶¶ 64, 68.) 

Plaintiff further represents that she and Mesa had agreed that 

the time from August 27-30, 2013 would be considered sick leave. 

(Id. ¶¶ 64-65, 68). Genuine disputes of fact therefore exist as 

to the amount of time plaintiff was off in August and September 

2013 and whether CRH provided plaintiff with sufficient notice to 

retroactively designate any of that time as FMLA leave. 

Plaintiff also disputes CRH’s right to calculate 

plaintiff’s leave under the twelve-month rolling basis under

§ 825.200(b)(4). According to plaintiff, Mesa verbally informed 

her in December 2013 that CRH would utilize the twelve-month 

period method and that plaintiff was eligible for a full twelve

weeks of FMLA leave. (Canupp Dep. at 108:23-111:3, 122:10-18.) 

Although defendant indicated in the FMLA paperwork from December 

2013 that it was utilizing the “rolling” method, (see Oceguera 

Decl. Ex. 15, Ex. 16 at 2), plaintiff denies having received 

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these notices. There is also no evidence tending to suggest that 

CRH had “consistently and uniformly” applied the rolling twelvemonth period to all employees.

Accordingly, because genuine issues of material fact 

preclude the court from determining the amount of FMLA leave 

plaintiff had taken prior to December 2013 and the method CRH 

utilized to calculate that leave, the court must deny CRH’s

motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s FMLA interference 

claim with respect to her claim that CRH did not provide her with 

twelve weeks of FMLA leave. 

b. FMLA Right to Reinstatement 

Plaintiff also seeks relief under the FMLA based on 

defendant’s failure to reinstate her at the expiration of her 

FMLA leave. “The right to reinstatement guaranteed by 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2614(a)(1) is the linchpin of the entitlement theory because 

the FMLA does not provide leave for leave’s sake, but instead 

provides leave with an expectation that an employee will return 

to work after the leave ends.” Sanders, 657 F.3d at 778 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

6 “Although the 

 

6 Sanders and cases cited therein could be read to 

suggest that plaintiff’s inability to return to work when her 

FMLA leave expired is also fatal to her FMLA claim based on CRH’s 

failure to provide her with the required twelve weeks of leave. 

See Sanders, 657 F.3d at 778 (citing Edgar v. JAC Products, Inc., 

443 F.3d 501, 506-07 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Edgar, 443 F.3d 

at 506-07 (“This court has consequently held that an employer 

does not violate the FMLA when it fires an employee who is 

indisputably unable to return to work at the conclusion of the 

12-week period of statutory leave.”); accord Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio 

Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 784-85 (6th Cir. 1998) 

(“[I]t would be elevating form over substance to say that the 

effective termination date chosen by [employer] is meaningful to 

the Court’s analysis under the FMLA” when it is undisputed the 

employee was unable to return to work when FMLA leave expired). 

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FMLA created a statutory right to reinstatement after taking FMLA 

leave, this right is not without limits.” Id. 

Subsection 825.214(b) provides, “[i]f the employee is 

 

The FMLA provides, however, that an employee may seek 

“damages equal to--(i) the amount of--(I) any wages, salary, 

employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such 

employee by reason of the violation . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 2617

(emphasis added); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(2) (“The taking of 

leave under section 2612 of this title shall not result in the 

loss of any employment benefit accrued prior to the date on which 

the leave commenced.”); 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1) (“Except as 

provided in paragraph (2), during any period that an eligible 

employee takes leave under section 2612 of this title, the 

employer shall maintain coverage under any ‘group health plan’ 

(as defined in section 5000(b)(1) of Title 26) for the duration 

of such leave at the level and under the conditions coverage 

would have been provided if the employee had continued in 

employment continuously for the duration of such leave.”); 

Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1122 n.7 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (“The FMLA also entitles employees to retain any 

employer-paid health benefits while using FMLA-protected leave, 

subject to the proviso that if the employee fails to return to 

work at the end of his or her leave, the employer may recover 

from the employee the premiums paid for maintaining coverage 

during the employee’s absence.”). 

The regulations governing FMLA claims directly address 

an employee’s right to continued medical coverage even when the 

employee “may be unable to return to work but expresses a 

continuing desire to do so.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b); see 29 

C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (“If an employee gives unequivocal notice of 

intent not to return to work, the employer’s obligations under 

FMLA to maintain health benefits (subject to COBRA requirements) 

and to restore the employee cease. However, these obligations 

continue if an employee indicates he or she may be unable to 

return to work but expresses a continuing desire to do so.”).) 

As previously discussed, the last correspondence CRH received 

from plaintiff indicated her desire to return to work after her 

surgeries and, although CRH requested additional assurances as 

the regulations contemplate, see id. § 825.311(a), plaintiff 

denies that she received any of these requests. 

Plaintiff has thus established disputed issues of 

material fact that CRH did not provide her with twelve weeks of 

FMLA leave, she never expressed an “unequivocal notice of intent 

not to return to work,” id. § 825.311(b), she lost FMLA-protected 

health coverage upon her termination, and she incurred damages as 

a result of prematurely losing her health coverage. 

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unable to perform an essential function of the position because 

of a physical or mental condition, including the continuation of 

a serious health condition, the employee has no right to 

restoration to another position under the FMLA.” 29 C.F.R. 

§ 825.214(b). The Ninth Circuit has held that, “when an employer 

seeks to establish that he has a legitimate reason to deny an 

employee reinstatement, the burden of proof on that issue rests 

with the employer.” Sanders, 657 F.3d at 780. 

According to plaintiff’s theory of how her FMLA should 

have been calculated, plaintiff’s leave should have extended 

through February 28, 2014. In her declaration, plaintiff seems 

to suggest that she could have returned to work at that time:

I was scheduled to receive pirifomris injections from 

Dr. Hendrickson’s office in January 2015, as these 

injections assist greatly in reducing my back pain and 

allow me to have higher functionality. However, due 

to a respiratory infection I was not able to have 

these pirifomris injections until after I had 

completed all my antibiotics which was in 

approximately late February 2015, as such I was 

required to manage my pain with oral medication. The 

pain I was experiencing during this period of time, 

however, was not unmanageable and it did not prevent 

me from going to work. After I finished my round of 

antibiotic I received the scheduled pirifomris 

injections and again obtained significant pain relief 

from this particular procedure.

(Second Canupp Decl. ¶ 97 (emphasis added).)

When faced with conflicting evidence about a 

plaintiff’s claim of an ability to work during litigation despite 

the plaintiff having previously sought and received disability 

benefits, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s 

“uncorroborated and self-serving” deposition testimony. Kennedy, 

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90 F.3d at 1481. The plaintiff in Kennedy testified in her 

deposition that she was not totally disabled during the period in 

question. Id. On the state disability and social security claim 

forms submitted for that time, however, the plaintiff had 

represented that she was “completely disabled for all workrelated purposes,” and this representation was consistent with 

her physician’s assessment of her. Id. The Ninth Circuit found 

that plaintiff’s “deposition testimony flatly contradicts both 

her prior sworn statements and the medical evidence,” and as such 

fails to create a “genuine dispute” as to whether the plaintiff 

was disabled during the time in question. Id.

Similar to Kennedy, it is undisputed that plaintiff was 

receiving disability benefits in February 2014, (Oceguera Decl. 

Ex. 30), and had been certified by her physician as disabled 

during that time. (See id. Ex. 31 at 4, 8-13.)7 The notice that 

 

7 Plaintiff objects to the court’s consideration of 

Exhibit 31 on the grounds that the attorney who submitted it via 

declaration lacks personal knowledge and cannot properly 

authenticate or lay the foundation for the documents and that the 

documents contain inadmissible hearsay. Although CRH could have 

done more to address these evidentiary concerns, plaintiff does 

not dispute that the claim forms are accurate copies of the claim 

forms she submitted or that CRH could address these evidentiary 

concerns at trial. See generally Burch v. Regents of Univ. of 

California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“[W]hen 

evidence is not presented in an admissible form in the context of 

a motion for summary judgment, but it may be presented in an 

admissible form at trial, a court may still consider that 

evidence. . . . Summary judgment is not a game of ‘Gotcha!’ in 

which missteps by the non-movant’s counsel, rather the merits of 

the case, can dictate the outcome. . . . Rule 56[c] requires only 

that evidence ‘would be admissible’, not that it presently be 

admissible. Such an exception to the authentication requirement 

is particularly warranted in cases such as this where the 

objecting party does not contest the authenticity of the evidence 

submitted but nevertheless makes an evidentiary objection based 

on purely procedural grounds.”). The court thus overrules 

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accompanied the statements of plaintiff’s disability payments 

instructed plaintiff, “To prevent overpayment on your claim, you 

must immediately notify the Department if you recover from your 

disability or return to work.” (Id. Ex. 30.) Plaintiff never 

indicated that she could return to work in February 2014 and 

continued to receive disability benefits for at least eight more 

months. Plaintiff cannot now rely on her self-serving deposition 

testimony that the reprieve in pain she experienced from a 

pirifomris injection creates a genuine dispute of fact that she 

would have been able to return to work in February 2014. 

Accordingly, because CRH has shown that plaintiff would 

not have been able to return to work at the expiration of her 

FMLA leave as she contends it should have been calculated, the 

court must grant CRH’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s 

FMLA interference claim based on CRH’s failure to reinstate 

plaintiff at the expiration of her FMLA leave. 

C. CFRA Claims

The parties agree that plaintiff’s CFRA claims are 

subject to the same standards as her FMLA claims and therefore 

withstand summary judgment only to the extent her FMLA claims do. 

(Def.’s Mem. at 29:24-9, 30:27-31:28; Pl.’s Reply at 48:13-50:2); 

accord Xin Liu, 347 F.3d at 1132 n.4 (“CFRA adopts the language 

of the FMLA and California state courts have held that the same 

 

plaintiff’s objection to Exhibit 31. 

Plaintiff also raises eleven other objections to 

evidence defendant submitted in support of its motion for summary 

judgment. (See Docket Nos. 49.) Because the court does not rely 

on any of the evidence objected to in plaintiff’s remaining 

objections, the court overrules those objections as moot. 

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standards apply.”). Accordingly, for the reasons previously 

stated, the court will grant CRH’s motion for summary judgment on 

plaintiff’s CFRA claims based on CRH’s alleged retaliation and 

termination of plaintiff before her CFRA leave expired, but deny 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s CFRA claim 

based on defendant’s alleged failure to provide plaintiff with 

the leave CFRA entitled her to take. 

D. Labor Code Section 1102.5: Whistleblower Claim

“Labor Code section 1102.5 is a whistleblower statute, 

the purpose of which is to encourag[e] workplace whistle-blowers 

to report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation.” Soukup v. 

Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal. 4th 260, 287 (2006) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in 

original). “Courts analyzing claims under Section 1102.5 apply 

the burden shifting analysis first set forth by the United States 

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 

(1973).” Ferretti v. Pfizer Inc., No. 11-CV-04486, 2013 WL 

140088, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013). 

Under this framework, the plaintiff must first

establish a prima facie case, which requires a showing that “she 

engaged in protected activity, that she was thereafter subjected 

to adverse employment action by her employer, and there was a 

causal link between the two.” Soukup, 39 Cal. 4th at 287-88 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).8 If the 

 

8 The court recognizes that, because defendant moved for 

summary judgment, it carries the initial burden at summary 

judgment on this state law claim. See Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & 

Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 745 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“Generally, the plaintiff [has] an initial burden of 

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. When an 

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plaintiff successfully establishes her prima facie case, the 

“burden of production, but not persuasion, [ ] shifts to the 

employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for the challenged action.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 

F.3d 1115, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 

U.S. at 802). Assuming the employer carries its burden, the 

plaintiff “must [then] show that the articulated reason[s] [are] 

pretextual.” Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1124. 

1. Protected Activity

Here, plaintiff repeatedly reported to management at 

CRH alleged misconduct by an employee at CRH who was “helping 

youth [from CRH] crawl out of a window” to leave CRH and engage 

in prostitution. (Second Canupp Decl. ¶ 6; see generally Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 4:8-8:2.) In February 2013, she also reported to CRH 

management alleged misconduct by a different employee at CRH who

bringing a CRH youth to her home to engage in illicit conduct. 

(Id. ¶ 14.) While plaintiff contends she was retaliated against 

for these internal complaints, internal complaints are not 

protected activity under section 1102.5. See Robles v. 

Agreserves, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-540 AWI JLT, 2016 WL 323775, at 

 

employer moves for summary judgment, however, the burden is 

reversed . . . because the defendant who seeks summary judgment 

bears the initial burden. Thus, [t]o prevail on summary 

judgment, [the employer is] required to show either that (1) 

plaintiff could not establish one of the elements of [the] [state 

law] claim or (2) there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for its decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations and 

omissions in original). Because the court would reach the same 

conclusion under the analysis laid out in Lucent Technologies, 

Inc., the court will assess the claim under the traditional 

burden-shifting framework. 

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*34-35 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016) (explaining that, prior to the 

Legislature amending section 1102.5 in 2014, “only complaints or 

reports made to a governmental agency [were] protected,” and 

“complaints or reports made ‘internally’ to the employer [were] 

not protected”). 

After becoming increasingly “concerned with the way [] 

CRH was handling the internal investigations,” however, plaintiff 

contacted the DSS in April or May 2013. (Second Canupp Decl. ¶ 

27.) On June 14, 2013, DSS interviewed plaintiff at her home and 

plaintiff disclosed to DSS what she knew about the alleged 

misconduct and sexual abuse of youth at CRH and provided DSS with 

notes and emails from her investigations of the misconduct. (Id.

Ex. B (CCL’s interview report).) The Investigative Field Report

from that interview indicates that plaintiff also reported that 

the Incident Reports submitted by CRH staff are “filtered through 

the Human Resources (HR) department,” which determines which 

incidents to report to DSS and that sometimes Incident Reports 

are not prepared after an internal investigation. (Id. Ex. B.) 

Three days later, on June 17, 2013, DSS interviewed 

plaintiff a second time at CRH. (Id. Ex. B.) In that interview, 

plaintiff told DSS that she does not agree with the ethical 

boundaries” of CRH’s associate director of residential services,

Karen Gregg, that there had been some “‘juggling’ of incident 

reports,” that Gregg had notified one of the CRH employees that 

he was being investigated, and that there was another allegation 

of alleged sexual misconduct between an employee of CRH and a CRH 

youth. (Id. Ex. B.) 

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Plaintiff has therefore established a prima facie case 

that she engaged in protected activity for purposes of section 

1102.5. 

2. Adverse Employment Action

“An adverse employment decision is one that ‘materially 

affect[s] the terms and conditions of employment.’” Ferretti, 

2013 WL 140088, at *10 (quoting Patten v. Grant Joint Union High 

Sch. Dist., 134 Cal. App. 4th 1378, 1387 (3d Dist. 2005)). “This 

includes not only terminations, but also the ‘entire spectrum of 

employment actions that are reasonably likely to adversely and 

materially affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity 

for advancement in his or her career.’” Id. (quoting Patten, 134 

Cal. App. 4th at 1387). “[W]here a plaintiff alleges that her 

employer engaged in a series of retaliatory acts, these acts may 

be considered collectively in determining whether they materially 

affected the plaintiff’s performance.” See id.

“While ‘[m]inor or relatively trivial adverse actions 

by employers or fellow employees that, from an objective 

perspective, are reasonably likely to do no more than anger or 

upset an employee do not’ constitute adverse employment actions, 

the definition of adverse employment actions ‘must be interpreted 

liberally and with a reasonable appreciation of the realities of 

the workplace.’” Id. (quoting Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 

Cal. 4th 1028, 1054 (2005)) (alteration in original). The 

California Supreme Court has, however, “rejected the definition 

of adverse employment action that has been adopted by the Ninth 

Circuit--which is any action that would deter an employee from 

engaging in a protected activity.” Beagle v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 

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08-CV-1517 PJH, 2009 WL 3112098, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009) 

(citing Yanowitz 36 Cal. 4th 1028).)

Plaintiff contends she suffered four adverse employment 

actions: (1) her termination in February 2013; (2) a reduction in 

her annual merit increase; (3) “Needs Improvement” ratings on her 

November 2013 employee review; and (4) written and verbal 

warnings.

9 CRH concedes that plaintiff’s termination constitutes 

an adverse employment action, but disputes whether the other 

three actions rise to the level of adverse employment actions for 

purposes of section 1102.5. 

As to plaintiff’s annual merit increase, Naify had 

originally proposed that plaintiff receive a 4% annual merit 

increase and then reduced the raise to 3%. The decision to 

reduce plaintiff’s merit increase is memorialized in an email 

from Mesa to Gregg dated October 31, 2013, which indicates only, 

“Okay, Anna responded and she is changing to 3%.” (Asbil Decl. 

Ex. 18.) The only evidence before the court also shows that 

other employees all received 4% or 5% annual merit increases. 

(See id. Ex. 22 (reflecting raises of 4% or 5% for six other 

employees).) Although plaintiff ultimately received an annual 

merit increase, the reduction of her merit increase from what she 

 

9 Although plaintiff has also put forth substantial 

evidence seeking to establish that she was mistreated by CRH 

employees because of her reporting, she seems to recognize that 

this conduct is not sufficient to rise to the level of an adverse 

employment action under section 1102.5. See Beagle, 2009 WL 

3112098, at *7 (“The alleged ostracism and blame by plaintiff’s 

co-workers cannot be considered an adverse employment action 

under the applicable definition of that term, because those 

actions did not materially affect the terms, conditions, or 

privileges of plaintiff’s employment.”). 

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would have otherwise received is sufficient to “‘materially 

affect the terms and conditions of employment.’” Ferretti, 2013 

WL 140088, at *10 (quoting Patten, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 1387). 

Next, plaintiff contends three “Needs Improvement” 

ratings on her November 2013 evaluation constitute an adverse 

employment action. Not only were these ratings more favorable 

than the “Area of Concern” and “Unsatisfactory” ratings, 

plaintiff has not put forth any evidence suggesting that these 

ratings materially affected the terms and conditions of her 

employment. The decision to reduce plaintiff’s annual merit 

increase was made the month prior to her evaluation and there is 

no evidence suggesting that the performance evaluation 

contributed to the decision to terminate plaintiff three months 

later. The “Needs Improvement” ratings on plaintiff’s November 

2013 employment evaluation do not rise to an adverse employment 

action under California law. See Mueller v. City of Los Angeles, 

176 Cal. App. 4th 809, 822 (2d Dist. 2009) (“Matters such as 

transferring employees, writing up employees, and counseling 

employees are personnel matters. ‘To exalt these exclusively 

internal personnel disclosures with whistleblower status would 

create all sorts of mischief. Most damagingly, it would thrust 

the judiciary into micromanaging employment practices and create 

a legion of undeserving protected “whistleblowers” arising from 

the routine workings and communications of the job site.’” 

(quoting Patten, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 1385)). 

Lastly, the written and verbal warnings plaintiff 

relies on relate to Naify’s accusation that plaintiff had stolen 

a copy of her November 2013 performance evaluation before Naify 

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had finalized it. (See generally Pl.’s Opp’n at 14:8-16:16.) 

Not only is there no evidence suggesting that this incident 

materially altered plaintiff’s employment, such warnings and 

internal personnel disputes do not constitute adverse employment 

actions under California law. See Mueller, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 

822. 

3. Causal Link

“A ‘causal link may be established by an inference 

derived from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer’s 

knowledge that the [employee] engaged in protected activities and 

the proximity in time between the protected action and allegedly 

retaliatory [adverse] employment decision.” Ferretti, 2013 WL 

140088, at *10 (quoting Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 

Cal. App. 4th 52, 69 (1st Dist. 2000)) (alterations in original). 

“Essential to a causal link is evidence that the employer was 

aware that the plaintiff had engaged in the protected activity.” 

Bowen v. M. Caratan, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-00397 LJO JLT, 2015 WL 

6703584, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2015) (citing Morgan v. 

Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 70 (1st Dist. 

2000)). “[F]or the purposes of causation, it is sufficient that 

at least one of the persons responsible for making each adverse 

employment decision had knowledge that Plaintiff had engaged in 

protected activity.” Ferretti, 2013 WL 140088, at *10. 

Although CRH contends that none of the CRH management 

knew the contents of plaintiff’s reports to DSS until this 

litigation commenced, plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence 

giving rise to the inference that upper management at CRH knew or 

at least suspected plaintiff reported misconduct to DSS. For 

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example, plaintiff contends that in September 2013, Mesa, Gregg, 

and Naify called her into a meeting and questioned plaintiff 

about what she had told DSS. (Second Canupp Decl. ¶ 31.) After 

plaintiff told Mesa, Gregg, and Naify that DSS had interviewed 

her twice and that she had provided DSS with a copy of her notes, 

plaintiff claims she was “immediately chastised by all three 

women.” (Id.) Plaintiff indicates that “[a]ll three women 

appeared visible [sic] upset and angry with [her] for providing 

[her] notes to licensing” and Naify told plaintiff that “she was 

not going to go down for this.” (Id.) After the meeting, 

plaintiff claims she heard Gregg “yell across the hallway” to 

Santiago and tell Santiago that it “was funny how [plaintiff was 

the one to bring up these issues, and it was stupid, and 

[plaintiff] liked to start drama.” (Id. ¶ 32.) This meeting 

occurred only one month prior to Naify’s decision to reduce 

plaintiff’s annual merit increase, which is sufficient for 

plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of a causal link between 

her reports to DSS and the decrease in her annual merit raise. 

Ballard, who “authorize[d]” plaintiff’s termination, 

indicates that he knew plaintiff was interviewed, but did not 

know she reported anything negative to DSS and thus did not 

terminate plaintiff because of any reports to DSS. (Ballard 

Decl. ¶¶ 16, 23, 35 (Docket No. 25-5).) However, CRH’s Associate 

Director of Operations, Tina Glass, testified in her deposition 

that she believed Ballard was upset DSS was investigating CRH and 

that he blamed plaintiff for the investigation. (Glass Dep. 

34:6-35:6.) Plaintiff also indicates that during a meeting on 

November 22, 2013 regarding the allegedly stolen performance 

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evaluation, Ballard asked plaintiff whether she “had a problem 

with him and whether [she] was coming after him.” (Second Canupp 

Decl. 54.) According to plaintiff, Ballard specifically 

mentioned the accusations of sexual misconduct and “stated that 

everything had been quiet before [plaintiff] was hired, and that 

it seemed that [she] was always in the middle of something bad.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff also claims Ballard told her “that it did not 

look good that [she] was the one brining up problems” and that he 

had heard that plaintiff had referred to herself as a 

“whistleblower.” (Id.) A triable issue therefore exists with 

respect to whether Ballard knew or inferred that plaintiff had 

reported negative information about CRH to DSS during her 

interviews. 

Defendant argues that the nine months between DSS’s 

interviews of plaintiff and CRH’s termination of plaintiff defeat 

any argument of causation based on a temporal connection. The 

Ninth Circuit has explained that “causation can be inferred from 

timing alone where an adverse employment action follows on the 

heels of protected activity,” but has repeatedly found that 

durations of four months and greater between the protected 

activity and termination are too remote to support a finding of 

causation based on temporal proximity. Villiarimo v. Aloha 

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 

cases); see also Swan v. Bank of Am., 360 F. App’x 903, 906 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (four months).

Plaintiff has submitted evidence showing that the 

investigation was on-going throughout 2013. Most significantly, 

on January 14, 2014, DSS sent a five-page letter to CRH 

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indicating that “[c]itations have been issued” because the 

investigation found that CRH had “violated requirements in the 

operation of its group home.” (Ballard Dep. Ex. MMM.) The 

letter explained that the violations were based on CRH’s “failure 

to file serious incident reports” with DSS, specifically noting 

that Ballard, Gregg, and Santiago “failed to report multiple 

allegations of sexual and other inappropriate conduct by staff 

towards clients at the facility.” (Id. Ex. MMM at 1.) DSS noted 

that this was a “serious deficiency” and issued a “Mandated Plan 

Correction” that itemized twelve corrective actions CRH was 

required to undertake. (Id. Ex. MMM at 2-4.) The letter also 

informed CRH that DSS would monitor it over the next twelve 

months to ensure compliance and perform “unannounced site 

inspections.” (Id. Ex. MMM at 4.) 

At the same time, however, the letter memorializes that 

“CRH’s regulatory violations were previously discussed during a 

Noncompliance Conference held on August 23, 2013 during which CRH 

agreed to make specific corrections.” (Id. Ex. MMM at 2.) CRH 

had thus known since August 2013 that DSS’s investigation had 

resulted in findings of regulatory violations. Nonetheless, 

taking all inferences in favor of plaintiff, a reasonable jury 

could infer that upper management at CRH became increasingly 

angered about plaintiff’s reports to DSS upon realizing that it 

was still facing repercussions for violations found four or five 

months ago. It is also unclear from the evidence before the 

court whether DSS had publically attributed blame to individual 

upper management, including Ballard, before its January 14, 2014 

letter. When considered in light of this timing of events,

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plaintiff has made the requisite prima facie showing of a causal 

link between the heightening of the DSS investigation and her 

termination. Cf. Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376 (finding causation 

based on proximity by evaluating the adverse employment actions 

in relation to when the investigation prompted by the protected 

activity was completed). 

4. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason

Because plaintiff established a prima facie case of 

retaliation, the burden “shifts to the employer to articulate 

some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged 

action.” Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1123–24 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 

411 U.S. at 802). As previously discussed in the context of 

plaintiff’s FEHA claims, defendant had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive to terminate plaintiff because at the time 

of her termination, she was unable to complete the essential 

duties of her position with a reasonable accommodation. 

Defendant has not, however, offered any satisfactory explanation 

as to why Naify decided to reduce plaintiff’s annual merit 

increase or give plaintiff only 3% annual merit increase when 

other employees received 4% or 5%. 

5. Pretext

With respect to defendant’s decision to terminate 

plaintiff, plaintiff “may establish pretext either by 

persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 

motivated the employer or by showing that the employer’s 

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Ferretti, 2013 

WL 140088, at *16. 

Given the proximity in time between DSS’s January 14, 

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2013 letter and plaintiff’s termination, a jury could find that 

CRH viewed plaintiff’s medical conditions and anticipated 

indefinite leave as an opportunity to terminate her in 

retaliation for her reports to DSS. Although the letter was 

issued after CRH first calculated January 11, 2014 as the date 

plaintiff’s FMLA leave would expire, CRH had known of the 

violations since August and Ballard had also participated in a 

Mandated Plan of Correction meeting with DSS on December 20, 

2013. (Ballard Dep. Ex. MMM.) A reasonable jury could find that 

as of December 2013, CRH was learning that the violations were 

not going to be easily resolved and blame was coming down on 

individual executives, including Ballard. Plaintiff has thus 

submitted sufficient evidence to show that CRH was aware of 

plaintiff’s role in the on-going investigation before it decided 

to retroactively count her August and September absences as FMLA 

leave. (See also Second Canupp Decl. ¶¶ 31-32; Gass Dep. 34:6-

35:6.) 

Based on this evidence, a jury could find that CRH’s 

decision to retroactively count plaintiff’s August and September 

absences as FMLA leave and terminate her because of her inability 

to resume working in the foreseeable future was pretext for its 

desire to terminate her in retaliation for her reports to DSS. 

Put another way, but for her reports to DSS that led to adverse 

findings and citations against CRH and its upper management, CRH 

may have extended additional leave time to plaintiff. 

Moreover, prior to the damaging DSS investigation, CRH 

had been generous in allowing plaintiff to take off work for her 

medical conditions and allowed her to work from home. There is 

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also circumstantial evidence giving rise to the inference that 

CRH felt it could manage without plaintiff for a significant 

duration. Most notably, in an email to Ballard on December 11, 

2013, Naify discussed coverage of plaintiff’s duties and, in 

light of CRH’s ability to cover her responsibilities, questioned 

whether her position was necessary:

I just wanted to update you on Tina’s absence. We do 

not have a return date . . . . I have spoken with 

Norma and Rich, and Rich says he feels comfortable 

giving Katelin a $1/hour increase for covering the 

clinic. . . .

I will be supervising all clinic staff. I have spoken 

to Katelin about coverage for the head-to-toe exams, 

TB tests, and immunizations. The interesting thing is 

that Katelin told me she can cover all of these things 

under Dr. Carson’s license. She already had him 

scheduled to come in 2 days a week and she thinks that 

is enough coverage. . . . This is interesting because 

it seems to me the clinic is set up to run without 

Tina, which begs the question, is that position 

needed? We do need someone to supervise the clinic 

staff, but could that person simply be a supervisor? 

(Oceguera Decl. Ex. 18.) Although the FEHA, FMLA, or CFRA did 

not require CRH to provide plaintiff with additional leave time 

or allow plaintiff to work from home, the evidence is susceptible 

to an inference that it would have made these generous allowances 

if CRH management was not upset with her about her reports to 

DSS. 

Accordingly, because plaintiff has established a 

triable issue of fact with respect to whether CRH retaliated 

against her for her reports of misconduct to DSS by reducing her 

annual merit raise and terminating her, the court must deny 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s section 

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1102.5 claim. Ultimately, the jury must determine whether CRH 

terminated plaintiff in retaliation for her reports to DSS and, 

if it did, whether it had a legitimate, independent reason to 

terminate her. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.6 (“In a civil action 

or administrative proceeding brought pursuant to Section 1102.5, 

once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence 

that an activity proscribed by Section 1102.5 was a contributing 

factor in the alleged prohibited action against the employee, the 

employer shall have the burden of proof to demonstrate by clear 

and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have 

occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee 

had not engaged in activities protected by Section 1102.5.”).

E. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy and 

Injunctive Relief

Under California law, “[t]he elements of a claim for 

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an 

employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the 

plaintiff’s employment, (3) the termination was substantially 

motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge 

caused the plaintiff harm.” Nosal-Tabor v. Sharp Chula Vista 

Med. Ctr., 239 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1234-35 (4th Dist. 2015) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). CRH concedes 

that if plaintiff withstands summary judgment on her claims under 

FEHA, FMLA, CFRA, or section 1102.5, she can withstand summary 

judgment on her wrongful termination in violation of public 

policy claim. (See Def.’s Mem. at 36:21-37:2.) Accordingly, 

because plaintiff has shown that a genuine issue of material fact 

exists on her FMLA, CFRA, and section 1102.5 claims, the court 

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must also deny CRH’s motion for summary judgment on her wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy claim. 

F. Injunctive Relief, Back Pay, and Front Pay 

Having determined that CRH is entitled to summary 

judgment in its favor on all of plaintiff’s FEHA claims and her 

more substantial FMLA and CFRA claims, CRH’s motion for summary 

judgment as to injunctive relief, back pay, and front pay is moot

as to those claims. With the remaining claims that survived 

summary judgment, it would be premature for the court to 

determine what remedies plaintiff may seek when the parties do 

not squarely address the remedies plaintiff is seeking and 

entitled to under her remaining claims. Accordingly, the court 

will deny CRH’s motion for summary judgment as to injunctive 

relief, back pay, and front pay without prejudice to CRH raising 

such arguments at trial. 

G. Affirmative Defenses

Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on CRH’s 

affirmative defenses of after-acquired evidence, unclean hands, 

good faith/bad faith, and undue hardship. Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment as to the first three affirmative defenses 

centers around plaintiff’s alleged misappropriation of Target 

gift cards. CRH gave plaintiff Target gift cards worth $400 on 

August 7, 2013 to purchase supplies for the medical clinic. 

(First Canupp Decl. ¶ 9.) On the same day she received the 

cards, plaintiff claims that she had left them in her truck at 

CRH and her truck was broken into and the cards were stolen. 

(Id. ¶ 14; Kelly Kluth Decl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff reported to CRH and 

the Sacramento Police Department that the gift cards had been 

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stolen. (First Canupp Decl. ¶ 15.) 

About six months later when plaintiff was on leave in 

February 2014,10 another CRH employee was using her office and 

found Target gift cards. (Naify Dep. at 153:13-154:16.) On 

approximately February 5, 2014, CRH’s accounting department 

determined that the cards found in plaintiff’s office were the 

same cards plaintiff had reported as stolen. (Ryan Dep. at 

28:21-14, 30:8-31:14, 31:25-32:11, 59:24-63:2, Ex. OOOO; Kluth 

Decl. ¶ 13.) CRH also determined that the entire balance on the 

gift cards had been used on the day they were given to plaintiff. 

(Kluth Decl. ¶ 12.) CRH contends that it was not able to 

complete its investigation into plaintiff’s alleged 

misappropriation of the gift cards because she was on leave when 

the gift cards were discovered in her office. (Second Ballard 

Decl. ¶ 6 (Docket No. 42-2).)11 According to CRH, if plaintiff 

 

10 It is unclear from the evidence exactly when the Target 

gift cards were found. (Compare Gregg Dep. at 64:10-65:23 

(testifying that he does not recall when the Target gift cards 

were found, but that it might have been summer or fall 2013), 

with Naify Dep. at 153:13-154:16 (testifying they were found in 

February 2014).) Taking the evidence in the light most favorable 

to CRH, the court infers for purposes of this motion that they 

were found in February 2014.

11 Plaintiff objects to the court’s consideration of this 

paragraph of Ballard’s declaration. Although the paragraph may 

contain other objectionable evidence, the court relies on the 

paragraph only for Ballard’s explanation as to CRH’s inability to 

interview plaintiff while she was on leave and intent to 

interview her when she returned. As the executive director of 

CRH, the court finds that Ballard has sufficient personal 

knowledge to testify to this issue for purposes of opposing 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and that this evidence is 

not otherwise objectionable. 

Plaintiff also raises five other objections to evidence 

defendant submitted in opposition to plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment. (See Docket No. 58.) Because the court does 

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did not have a legitimate and plausible explanation about the 

Target gift cards when she returned from FMLA leave, CRH would 

have terminated her. (Id.) 

1. After-Acquired Evidence

“The doctrine of after-acquired evidence refers to an 

employer’s discovery, after an allegedly wrongful termination of 

employment or refusal to hire, of information that would have 

justified a lawful termination or refusal to hire.” Salas v. 

Sierra Chem. Co., 59 Cal. 4th 407, 428 (2014). In Salas, the 

California Supreme Court explained that “allow[ing] such afteracquired evidence to be a complete defense would eviscerate the 

public policies embodied in the FEHA by allowing an employer to 

engage in invidious employment discrimination with total 

impunity.” Id. at 430 (discussing McKennon v. Nashville Banner 

Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995)). The Court concluded that while 

it could not serve as a complete defense, the employee’s remedies 

generally “should not afford compensation for loss of employment 

during the period after the employer’s discovery of the evidence 

relating to the employee’s wrongdoing.” Id. at 431. 

While plaintiff recognizes that this defense could be 

relevant to her claims, she points out that, “[b]y definition, 

after-acquired evidence is not known to the employer at the time 

of the allegedly unlawful termination or refusal to hire.” Id.

at 430. Here, just over one week before terminating plaintiff,

CRH discovered the used gift cards in plaintiff’s office and 

determined that they were the same gift cards she had reported 

 

not rely on any of this evidence, the court overrules those 

objections as moot.

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stolen. Relying on Peterson v. Nat’l Sec. Techs., LLC, CRH 

contends that the after-acquired evidence doctrine nonetheless 

remains viable because it could not have interviewed plaintiff to 

complete its investigation and determine whether to terminate her 

for misappropriating the gift cards while she was on FMLA leave. 

No. 12-CV-5025-TOR, 2013 WL 1758857, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 

2013).

In Peterson, the employer made the decision to 

terminate the plaintiff while an investigation into unrelated 

misconduct was on-going, and the misconduct under investigation 

did not play a part in the employer’s decision to terminate the 

plaintiff. Id. at *2. The Peterson court determined that the 

employer’s knowledge of the allegations of misconduct prior to 

its decision to terminate plaintiff did not preclude the employer 

from relying on the after-acquired evidence defense because the 

employer’s investigation was still on-going and it did not yet 

“know” whether the plaintiff had engaged in the misconduct under 

investigation. Id. at *10-11. The court emphasized that the 

employer “began its investigation promptly upon learning of the 

alleged misconduct” and it was “not a case in which Defendant had 

‘reason to know’ of the independent misconduct and simply failed 

to take action until after the plaintiff was fired.” Id. at *11. 

Here, while plaintiff suggests that some CRH employees 

thought plaintiff should not have left the gift cards in her car, 

CRH did not discover the gift cards in her office until February 

2014 and it promptly investigated and determined that they were 

the gift cards that plaintiff had previously reported as stolen. 

CRH has established a triable issue of fact that it intended to 

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interview plaintiff as part of its investigation, that it was 

waiting for plaintiff to return from FMLA leave to conduct that 

interview, and that it would have terminated plaintiff if it 

determined she had misappropriated the Target gift cards. 

Under these circumstances and given that the 

after-acquired evidence defense is an equitable defense that 

requires the court to “balance[] the public policy interest in 

eliminating unlawful discrimination against the equitable 

principle that an employer should not be held liable for damages 

when the employee invokes the aid of the court with unclean 

hands,” Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1071 (9th Cir. 

2004), the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment on CRH’s after-acquired evidence defense. Cf. McKennon, 

513 U.S. at 361 (“The proper boundaries of remedial relief in the 

general class of cases where, after termination, it is discovered 

that the employee has engaged in wrongdoing must be addressed by

the judicial system in the ordinary course of further decisions, 

for the factual permutations and the equitable considerations 

they raise will vary from case to case.”).

2. Unclean Hands

“Generally, the equitable doctrine of unclean hands 

applies when a plaintiff has acted unconscionably, in bad faith, 

or inequitably in the matter in which the plaintiff seeks 

relief.” Salas, 59 Cal. 4th at 432. “The misconduct which brings 

the clean hands doctrine into operation must relate directly to 

the transaction concerning which the complaint is made, i.e., it 

must pertain to the very subject matter involved and affect the 

equitable relations between the litigants.” Id. (internal 

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quotation marks and citation omitted). It is undisputed that 

plaintiff’s alleged misappropriation of the Target gift cards did 

not relate directly or have any relevance to CRH’s calculation of 

her FMLA and CFRA leave or CRH’s alleged termination of plaintiff 

in retaliation for her having reported sexual misconduct by CRH 

staff to DSS. Accordingly, because a triable issue does not 

exist on this affirmative defense, the court will grant 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on CRH’s unclean hands 

defense. 

3. Good Faith/Bad Faith and Undue Hardship

Lastly, CRH’s affirmative defenses of good faith/bad 

faith and undue hardship appear limited to plaintiff’s FEHA 

claims and, because the court will grant summary judgment in 

favor of CRH on those claims, it will deny plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment on those affirmative defenses as moot. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is:

(1) GRANTED with respect to plaintiff’s FEHA claims 

under subsections 12940(a), (m), and (n); 

(2) DENIED with respect to plaintiff’s FMLA and CFRA 

entitlement claims based on the denial of her full entitlement to 

twelve weeks of leave and GRANTED with respect to plaintiff’s 

FMLA and CFRA retaliation and reinstatement claims;

(3) DENIED with respect to plaintiff’s section 1102.5 

retaliation claim;

(4) DENIED with respect to plaintiff’s termination in 

violation of public policy claim; and

(5) DENIED AS MOOT with respect to plaintiff’s request 

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for injunctive relief, back pay, and front pay. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is:

(6) DENIED with respect to her FEHA claim under 

subsection 12940(n) and defendant’s affirmative defense of afteracquired evidence;

(7) GRANTED with respect to defendant’s affirmative 

defense of unclean hands; and 

(8) DENIED AS MOOT with respect to defendant’s 

affirmative defenses of good faith/bad faith and undue hardship.

Dated: April 20, 2016

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