Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-00047/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-00047-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The court dismissed plaintiff’s first two complaints for failure to state a claim. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARREN BROWNE, aka AARON

BROWN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SAN FRANCISCO SHERIFFS

DEPARTMENT, et al., 

Defendants. /

No. C 03-0047 PJH (PR)

ORDER DISCHARGING

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE;

DENYING MOTION TO

STRIKE; GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(Docket Nos. 35, 64, 67)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Darren Browne, a former California pretrial detainee, filed this civil rights

action seeking redress for alleged injuries caused by the officers and medical staff of the

San Francisco Sheriffs Department. After plaintiff filed his second amended complaint1, the

court dismissed several claims and defendants in its December 11, 2006 Order of Partial

Dismissal and Service. The remaining defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on

the remaining claims. Plaintiff filed an opposition with the court, but failed to serve copies

on defendants, who, in response, filed a motion asking the court to strike plaintiff’s

opposition and deem it forfeited, and grant their motion for summary judgment. The court

issued an order to show cause re plaintiff’s failure to serve, and plaintiff responded. For the

following reasons, the court DISCHARGES the order to show cause, DENIES the motion to

strike, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion for summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND

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 Plaintiff has for the most part used the last names to refer to the sheriff’s deputies and

officers and the first names of the medical staff. For consistency, the court does so as well;

no disrespect to those defendants is intended. Additionally the court has attempted to discern

the full names of all defendants and the correct spellings of their names from the declarations

filed, and provides them, to the extent available in the conclusion. 

2

Plaintiff’s cognizable claims arise from events which occurred over a period of

approximately two months in late 2002 and early 2003 at the San Francisco County Jail. 

Order of Partial Dismissal and Service (“ODS”) at 3. The operative complaint is 20

handwritten, single-spaced pages, containing plaintiff’s allegations against nearly 50

defendants, all of whom are allegedly responsible for abusing him in some way during the

two-month period of his pretrial incarceration. The claims that survived the initial review are

for both excessive force and denial of medical treatment at the hands of the 26 remaining

defendants. 

Plaintiff alleges that on November 21, 2002, while in custody at the San Francisco

County Jail, he was assaulted and injured without legitimate cause by Deputies Madden,

Huntoon, Im, Balmy, Rodriguez, and Wong. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that on November

28, 2002, during a cell search, he was assaulted by Deputy Castro without cause. Id. at 6. 

He further alleges that on December 10, 2002, he was assaulted by Deputy Madden after

complaining about him to Chief Dempsey, and that Deputy Sung joined the assault. Id. at

3. He was then put in a safety room by Deputies Madden, Sung, and Im, where he was

again attacked by Madden. Id. 

Plaintiff also alleges that immediately after the November 21, 2002 assault he was

denied medical treatment by the deputies and by nurses James and Jackie, and that the

next day he was denied medical treatment by Captain Butler and nurses James and Lisa.2

Id. He alleges that immediately after the December 10, 2002 assault he was denied

medical treatment by nurses James and Linda, and that Deputy Sung threw cold water on

him and turned on the air-conditioning while he was naked in the safety cell. Id. He further

alleges that on December 22, 2002, nurses Evangelica and Bacari denied him medical

treatment for back pains he was suffering from the assault. Id. 

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Plaintiff also alleges that on January 14, 2003, while he was en route to new

housing, he was assaulted by Deputy Miller because he had complained to Lieutenant

Peacoo that his artwork had been confiscated. Id. at 6. He further alleges that he was

attacked twice on January 22, 2003: first by Sergeant Freeman, Deputy Miller and Deputy

Fields when he was in a safety cell, and later by Deputies Prato, Murphy, Sanprano and

Forde, while Lieutenant Peacoo stood-by, failing to stop the attack. Id. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show

that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may

affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the

moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at

trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support

the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. If the evidence in opposition to the motion is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-250. However, “self-serving affidavits are cognizable to establish a

genuine issue of material fact so long as they state facts based on personal knowledge and

are not too conclusory.” Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 902 (9th Cir. 2001);

see also Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005) (in equal

protection case, conclusory statement of bias not sufficient to carry nonmoving party’s

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burden).

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond

the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A dispute about a material fact is

“genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. If the nonmoving party fails to make

this showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex

Corporation, 477 U.S. at 323.

At summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party: if evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with evidence

produced by the nonmoving party, the judge must assume the truth of the evidence set

forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that fact. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d

1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). A court may not disregard direct evidence on the ground that

no reasonable jury would believe it. See id. (where nonmoving party’s direct evidence

raises genuine issues of fact but is called into question by other unsworn testimony, district

court may not grant summary judgment to moving party on ground that direct evidence is

unbelievable). The district court may not resolve disputed issues of material fact by

crediting one party’s version of events and ignoring another. Wall v. County of Orange, 364

F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004). “By deciding to rely on the defendants’ statement of fact

[in deciding a summary judgment motion], the district court became a jury.” Id. But “[w]hen

opposing parties tell different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,

so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts

for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769,

1776-1777 (2007) (police officer entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity

in light of video evidence capturing plaintiff’s reckless driving in attempting to evade capture

which utterly discredits plaintiff’s claim that there was little or no actual threat to innocent

bystanders).

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It is not the task of the district court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue

of triable fact. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party

has the burden of identifying with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes

summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, the district court may

properly grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Id.; see, e.g., Carmen v.

San Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026, 1028-1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (even if

there is evidence in the court file which creates a genuine issue of material fact, a district

court may grant summary judgment if the opposing papers do not include or conveniently

refer to that evidence). Although the district court has discretion to consider materials in

the court file not referenced in the opposing papers, it need not do so. Id. at 1029. 

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Strike and Order to Show Cause

Defendants contend that plaintiff failed to serve them with a copy of his opposition,

even though the court, in its April 11, 2007 order, had ordered plaintiff to serve his

opposition on defendants, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Defendants’ Reply in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike at 1. Because of this

failure, defendants ask that the court strike plaintiff’s opposition and deem that plaintiff has

forfeited all opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Id. 

The court issued an order to show cause regarding plaintiff’s failure to serve

defendants. Plaintiff filed a timely response indicating that he had suffered an emotional

breakdown on or about June 28, 2007, and was unable to follow through with serving his

opposition to defendants. In his response, he describes some of his troubles between May

and October 2007, resulting in “mental distress and severe depression”.

Rule 5(a) requires that, unless otherwise directed by the court or unless a special set

of circumstances exist, a copy of every motion filed must be served on the opposing party. 

Plaintiff has been advised of this requirement by the court in two separate orders filed on

December 11, 2006 and April 22, 2007.

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Given the circumstances described by plaintiff, the court will not strike plaintiff’s

opposition. Plaintiff is, however, required to comply with the court’s instructions and with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Any future failures to fully comply with all instructions

and rules will result in the imposition of harsh sanctions which may include dismissal. The

court’s leniency at this juncture is based on plaintiff’s pro se status, the personal problems

he has provided to excuse his non-compliance, and the apparent lack of prejudice to

defendants. Defendants filed a timely reply brief in which they noted their awareness that

plaintiff had filed a brief with the court, yet they posed no alternative should the court deny

their motion, nor did they request an extension of time to reply or that the court provide

them with a copy of the opposition. The court can only assume that defendants obtained a

copy of the brief on their own. 

The order to show cause is DISCHARGED and the motion to strike the opposition

brief is DENIED.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Excessive Force Claims

a. Background

Defendants counter the allegations in the complaint, that they used excessive force

against plaintiff, in two ways. First, they contend that plaintiff “has no factual support that

he received any injuries in conjunction with many of his allegations of excessive force and

only alleges minor injuries from a few of the instances.” Defendants’ Memorandum in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1. Defendants assert that the absence of

injuries in the allegations of excessive force fatally undercuts plaintiff’s contentions. Id.

Second, defendants counter plaintiff’s allegations by simply denying them. 

Defendants have submitted nineteen declarations, all of which contain flat denials of

plaintiff’s allegations and little more. Docket Nos. 37-55. According to these declarations,

defendants did not attack, assault, kick, punch, crush, pull, or use excessive or

unreasonable force on plaintiff on any of the occasions he alleges. Id. 

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b. Applicable Federal Law

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit

inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Although the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a post-arraignment pretrial

detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment, Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)), the

Ninth Circuit has routinely used the Eighth Amendment as a benchmark for evaluating

claims brought by criminal pretrial detainees. See, e.g., Redman v. County of San Diego,

942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991). In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment,”

the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use

excessive force against prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The

Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide all prisoners with the

basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and

personal safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of

Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th

Cir. 1982). 

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: 

(1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, see Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)), and (2) the prison official

possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, see id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).

When a prisoner claims that prison officials used excessive force, he must show that the

officials applied force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at

6-7. 

c. Analysis

With respect to their first contention, that plaintiff has not made sufficient allegations

of injury, the Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he absence of serious injury is . . .

relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. 

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“When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary

standards of decency always are violated. This is true whether or not significant injury is

evident.” Id. 9 (internal citation removed). “That is not to say that every malevolent touch

by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action . . . . The Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (citations and internal quotation

marks removed). 

In the complaint, plaintiff contends that, without legitimate cause and in retribution,

sheriffs’ deputies assaulted him, dragged him down prison halls, twisted his wrist, jumped

on his back, left him naked and cold in a safety cell for a night, among other acts. These

acts allegedly resulted in bruises, abrasions, and back and wrist pain. If plaintiff’s

allegations are true, defendants’ acts could be seen as illegitimate uses of force and

certainly more than de minimis, resulting in some injury and giving rise to an Eighth

Amendment violation. Accordingly, defendants’ contention that no serious injury was

alleged, is not dispositive.

In support of their second contention, defendants have submitted nineteen

declarations in which they flatly deny that plaintiff’s allegations are true and that the acts

they are accused of committing ever occurred. 

Plaintiff’s 3-page opposition includes only a general description of the alleged

events. However, he has attached to it an Exhibit A which is comprised of several prisoner

grievance forms apparently prepared and submitted by him while he was incarcerated. The

opposition does refer to these forms as his evidence and the opposition was signed by

plaintiff under penalty of perjury, although briefs are not required to be verified. Defendants

did not object to plaintiff’s evidence or refer to it any anyway in their reply brief. The court

finds that the opposition with its attached Exhibit A is the evidentiary

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 Exhibit A is comprised of 13 unnumbered pages which have been numbered by the

court as 1 - 13, for ease of reference.

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equivalent of a declaration and the court accepts it as such.3

 As previously noted, selfserving declarations are sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact, provided

that they state facts based on the declarant’s personal knowledge and are not too

conclusory. Rodriguez, 265 F.3d at 902. 

Although it is not explicitly stated, it appears to the court that the statements

contained in the grievance forms are based on plaintiff’s personal knowledge of the events. 

Thus, the only question is whether the statements are sufficiently detailed or are merely

conclusory. To the extent that plaintiff has named his abuser and described conduct

amounting to more than the use of de minimis force, from which an intent to apply such

force maliciously and sadistically can be inferred, the court finds that the declaration

creates a triable issue of fact, notwithstanding the self-serving nature of the declaration and

the denials of each of the defendants. However, to the extent that plaintiff has not identified

a particular defendant, has not described the conduct about which he complains, or has

provided only his conclusion that excessive force was used, the court finds no triable issue

of fact has been created.

A comparison of Ex. A with the complaint reveals that plaintiff named some Sheriff’s

Department officials in his grievances that he did not name in this lawsuit, or who were

previously dismissed. The court thus ignores the allegations as to them. It also reveals

that the majority of the remaining named defendants are not even mentioned in Ex. A. 

Thus, there is no evidence to support the allegations in the complaint, not even plaintiff’s

own self-serving declaration, as to the following defendants: Im, Balmy, Rodriguez, Wong,

Butler, Sung, Prado, Murphy, Sanprano, Forde, Peacoo (correctly spelled Pecot; see Decl.

Johna Pecot).

Of the defendants that are named in Ex. A, only five – Castro (Ex. A at 1), Madden

(Exhibit A. at 2), Freeman (Ex. A at 7, 9, 12), Fields (Ex. A at 9), and Miller (Ex. A at 9) –

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 The court’s conclusion is based upon the allegation that Freeman grabbed, snatched

and threw plaintiff, and not on his fantastical allegation that Freeman tried to kill him by putting

a “lethal venemous [sic] white tipped legged spider with white dots on its back” inside plaintiff’s

cell.

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are accused of excessive force with a sufficient degree of particularity as to support a

viable claim under Rodriquez. Although both Paddillia and Bliss are named in Ex. A,

plaintiff alleges excessive force in conclusory fashion and does not describe what they did. 

Ex. A at 4. And a second reference to Paddillia is a claim of bias and deliberate

indifference as shown by Paddillia’s lies about plaintiff which resulted in his being housed

for a time in a safety cell, an allegation that is not before the court. Ex. A at 6. One

prisoner grievance form, Ex. A at 13, mentions Ma, but the court, cannot discern from the

largely illegible document, any articulation of evidence to support an allegation of excessive

force against Ma. Another grievance form, Ex. A at 6, also mentions Ma but also fails to

allege any colorable constitutional claim. Huntoon is mentioned in another grievance form,

but the allegation is only that Gene (last name illegible) began taunting plaintiff and making

jokes about Madden and Huntoon “jumping on me last nite.” Ex. A at 10. This hardly

suffices as evidence of excessive force against Huntoon. As noted, all remaining named

defendants are not mentioned in Ex. A.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment with

respect to plaintiff’s claims of excessive force as to defendants Im, Balmy, Rodriguez,

Wong, Butler, Sung, Prado, Murphy, Sanprano, Forde, Peacoo/Pecot, Paddillia, Bliss, Ma

and Huntoon. These claims and these defendants are DISMISSED from the action. 

The court DENIES summary judgment as to the following excessive force claims

and defendants which are adequately described in Ex. A: Castro, Freeman, 4

 Fields, Miller,

and Madden. 

2. Medical Care Claims 

 a. Applicable Federal Law

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth

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Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's

condition could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.” Id. The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find

important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and

substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a “serious” need for

medical treatment. Id. at 1059-1060. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if she knows that a prisoner faces a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps

to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. at 837. A prison official cannot be held liable

under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement

unless the standard for criminal recklessness is met, i.e., the official knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id. The official must both be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists and have actually drawn the inference. Id. If a prison official should have been

aware of the risk, but was not, the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no

matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir.

2002). 

A claim of mere negligence or harassment related to medical problems is not

enough to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.; see, e.g., Frost v. Agnos,

152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no merit in claims stemming from alleged

delays in administering pain medication, treating broken nose and providing replacement

crutch, because claims did not amount to more than negligence); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920

F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) (repeatedly failing to satisfy requests for aspirins and antacids

to alleviate headaches, nausea and pains is not constitutional violation; isolated

occurrences of neglect may constitute grounds for medical malpractice but do not rise to

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 “Compl.” refers to the operative complaint, i.e., the second amended one. 

6

 The correct names of the defendants are apparently Bagares and Evangeline. See

Decl. Joseph Bagares; Decl. Evangeline Anacleto.

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level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain). 

b. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that after the November 21, 2002 assault, he was denied medical

treatment by the deputies and by nurses. Compl. at 2.5

 Medical staff refused to treat the

“bruises to my legs, arms, and my right wrist [which as with the excessive force claims

discussed above] was swollen with cuts.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that he received no

medical treatment for the November 21 injuries until he was transferred to County Jail No. 2

on November 25, four days later. Id. at 3. Plaintiff further alleges that immediately after the

December 10, 2002 assault, he was denied medical treatment by nurses James and Linda. 

ODS at 3. He had back pain, red marks and cuts resulting from the assault, in addition to

dizziness and shortness of breath. Compl. at 4-5. He also alleges that medical staff

refused to give him clothing when he was naked and cold after having been in the safety

cell. Id. He further alleges that on December 22, 2002, nurses Evangelica and Bacari

refused to treat him for back pain.6

 ODS at 3. 

In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants submit the

declarations of medical staff members Bagares, Jackie, Linda, James, and Evangelica. 

The sixth medical staff member who is a defendant, Lisa, has not been identified by plaintiff

or defense counsel with a last name, and as a consequence has not been served. See

Decl. Robert Bonta. The unrebutted evidence as to Bagares is that he ceased working for

the Jail Medical Services in September 2002, and was not even present during plaintiff’s

period of incarceration. See Decl. Joseph Bagares. Accordingly, defendants Lisa and

Bacari/Bagares are DISMISSED. Although the complaint suggests that the medical care

allegations are meant to apply to non-medical staff, the actual evidence submitted by

plaintiff refers only to conduct of the medical staff with respect to these claims. Thus the

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medical care claims, to the extent they are meant to be alleged as to non-medical staff, are

DISMISSED. 

The remaining four medical staff members have all submitted declarations similar to

those submitted by the sheriff’s department officials, and have flatly denied plaintiff’s

allegations.

 As with the excessive force claims discussed above, plaintiff’s opposition, with its

Ex. A, is the only evidence plaintiff submitted and is consequently the only source of

evidence that might create a triable issue and thereby defeat defendants’ motion. Ex. A

contains only three references that bear on the medical care claims. They are summarized

as follows:

Page 2 is a December 15, 2002 grievance sent by plaintiff to the attention of Dr.

Joe Goldenson in which plaintiff advises that he is having extreme back pains and needs

pain medication due to an injury to his back when he was attacked by Madden on

December 10, 2002. He requests to be seen and says that nurses Pauline (not a

defendant), Bacari, Linda, James, Jackie, Evangelica, Lisa and other med-morning staff

have deliberately not responded to his verbal or written inquiries. 

Page 4 is a December 30, 2002 grievance. Although it is not entirely clear to whom

it was sent, it reflects plaintiff’s complaint that staff (perhaps both physicians and nurse

practitioners) “are medically neglecting to reasses [sic] further repeated injuries to my right

wrist, right knee and back pains resulting also from an [sic] recent attack on December 27,

2002...” He further complains that all of his written requests and inquiries to be seen by a

doctor and “promises that I would be seen by a doctor has [sic] not materialized and

continues to be ongoing medical neglect.” And he claims to have instructed “Nurse Kate

(pysch)” on December 28, 2002 and “Nurse Jackie and Elissa (J3)” that he needed to see a

doctor.

Page 10 is a largely illegible November 22, 2002 grievance in which plaintiff

appears to claim that someone (perhaps Gene who is really James) said that he would not

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assist plaintiff because plaintiff is a jive turkey and that’s why he (perhaps Gene or James)

told the nurse (not sure who) that he would not assist plaintiff in getting his medication.

This latter reference does not support the allegations of the complaint with respect

to the November 2002 incident. There are simply no facts in this grievance that establish

with any degree of clarity that plaintiff suffered from a serious medical need or that any

defendant was deliberately indifferent to that need. Moreover, the complaint makes it clear

that plaintiff received medical attention, albeit four days later.

The allegations involving the December 2002 incident, are that he was denied

treatment by nurses James and Linda on December 10, and by nurses Evangelica and

Bacari on December 22. 

The December 30 grievance does not appear to be related to the December 10

attack or to the December 22 refusal by Evangelica and Bacari. Rather that grievance was

filed in response to a subsequent attack which allegedly occurred on December 27, 2002. 

Moreover, the grievance suggests that his real complaint was that he wasn’t seen by a

doctor not that he didn’t receive any medical attention, as the grievance refers to contact

that he had with a nurse on December 28. Accordingly, plaintiff’s declaration does not

support these particular allegations of his complaint. 

That leaves the December 15, 2002 grievance as the remaining evidence in support

of the these allegations. This grievance obviously does not support the allegation that he

was denied treatment on December 22, as it predates that denial. It does, however,

support the allegation that he was denied medical treatment after the December 10, 2002

attack. In the grievance plaintiff requests medical attention and pain medication for what he

describes as extreme back pain. And he reports that seven nurses have deliberately

ignored his prior requests for medical attention. 

However, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the court is

not persuaded that plaintiff has raised a triable issue. The totality of the evidence

surrounding plaintiff’s short stay in custody shows that plaintiff alleged at least 25 acts of

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abuse by combinations of 50 individual defendants, resulting in the filing of numerous

grievances. While the exact chronology of these alleged abuses is difficult to discern from

plaintiff’s long and rambling complaint, the actual evidence that he has submitted in support

of those allegations, is quite thin. The court finds that the complaint and Ex. A reflect that

medical staff responded to plaintiff on at least some of the occasions for which he

demanded attention and that it is impossible to find on plaintiff’s evidence that those

responses were either inadequate or too late. The grievances that comprise Ex. A also

suggest that they were primarily filed because plaintiff was unhappy about the delay in the

provision of pain medication and medical attention, and with having that medical attention

provided by nurses instead of doctors. Plaintiff has produced no evidence as to the

seriousness of his injuries or the extent of his pain, and has not provided even in his own

self-serving declaration that any of his injuries significantly affected his daily activities. The

court is unable to determine, on the basis of plaintiff’s conclusory allegations, if the delay in

providing pain medication or if the utilization of nurses instead of doctors, arose to

constitutional proportions. Nor has plaintiff provided any evidence that the medical staff

was both aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm existed and actually drew that inference. As previously noted, a claim of

mere negligence or harassment related to medical problems is not enough to make out an

Eighth Amendment violation. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d at 1130.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment with

respect to plaintiff’s claims of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs as to

these defendants: James, Jackie, Lisa, Linda, Evangelica/Evangeline, and Bacari/Bagares.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DISCHARGES the order to show cause and

DENIES the motion to strike plaintiff’s opposition. 

As to the excessive force claims, because there is a dispute as to material facts, the

court DENIES summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims against Harold Castro, Matthew

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Freeman, Fitzgerald Fields, Scott Miller, and John Madden.

The court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment on the excessive force

claims against the following defendants: Mark Huntoon, Pauler Im, Richard Balmy, Saul

Rodriguez, Eric Wong, Sabrina Butler, (FNU) Sung, Miguel Prado/Prato, David Murphy,

(FNU) Sanprano, David Forde, Johna Pecot/Peacoo, Chinli Ma, (FNU) Paddillia, and Milton

Bliss. 

The court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment on the medical care claims

against James Hafalia, Jackie Savage, Linda Hofer, and Evangeline/Evangelica Anacleto,

and DISMISSES the claims against Joseph Bagares/Bacari and Lisa (LNU) for the reasons

stated above. 

FUTURE PROCEEDINGS

The first order of business with regard to the remaining excessive force claim

against five defendants, is a mandatory settlement conference. Plaintiff should be

represented at the conference by an attorney. Plaintiff advised in his response to the order

to show cause, that a local attorney, Ms. Harriett Ross, who is familiar to the court, has

expressed a willingness to “take over the future proceedings once summary judgement has

been ruled on.” Accordingly, plaintiff has 30 days to secure representation and to advise

the court of such. Ms. Ross or whoever plaintiff retains, must enter an appearance in

writing no later than December 19, 2007. Thereafter, this matter will be referred to

Magistrate Judge Chen to conduct a settlement conference in January or February 2008. If

the parties cannot resolve the remaining claims, a trial scheduling conference will be held.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2007

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

 United States District Judge

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