Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05333/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05333-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

Argued February 15,20 10 Decided July 13,2010 

MOHAMMED AL-ADAHI, DETAINEE, CAMP DELTA, 

GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, 

CUBA AND MIRIAM ALI ABDULLAH AL-HAJ, NEXT FRIEND OF 

MOHAMMED AL-ADAHI, 

APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS 

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES 

Consolidated with 09-5339 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(NO. 1 :05-CV-00280-GK) 

Anne Murphy, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued 

the cause for appellants/cross-appellees. With her on the briefs 

were Douglas N. Letter and Robert M. Loeb, Attorneys. 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 1 of 19
John A. Chandler argued the cause for appellees/crossappellants. With him on the briefs were Patricia L. Maher and 

Richard G. Murphy, Jr. Gregory S. Smith entered an appearance. 

Before: HENDERSON and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

RANDOLPH. 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: In the summer of 200 1, 

a thirty-nine year-old Yemeni security guard took a six-month 

leave of absence from his job to move to Afghanistan. Leaving 

his wife and his two children, he stayed at the Kandahar home 

of his brother-in-law, a close associate of Usama bin Laden. 

Twice he met personally with bin Laden. From Kandahar he 

moved into a guesthouse used as a staging area for al-Qaida 

recruits. He then attended al-Qaida's A1 Farouq training camp, 

where many of the September 1 lth terrorists had trained. He 

traveled between Kabul, Khost, and Kandahar while American 

forces were launching attacks in Afghanistan. Among other 

explanations for his movements, he claimed that he had decided 

to take a vacation. After sustaining injuries requiring his 

hospitalization, he crossed the Pakistani border on a bus carrying 

wounded Arab and Pakistani fighters. This man, Mohammed 

Al-Adahi, who is now a detainee at Guantanamo Bay Naval 

Base, admits all of this but insists he was not a part of al-Qaida 

and never fou~ht a~ainst the United States. Others identified 

On his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the 

district court ordered him released. We reverse. 

Pakistani authorities captured Al-Adahi in late 200 1. In 

2004, a Combatant Status Review Tribunal determined, by a 

preponderance of evidence, that he was part of al-Qaida. AlUSCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 2 of 19
Adahi filed his habeas corpus petition in 2005. In 2008 the 

Supreme Court ruled that despite statutes depriving the federal 

courts ofjurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from Guantanamo 

detainees, the Suspension Clause of the Constitution at least 

preserved the writ as it existed in 1789. Boumediene v. Bush, 

553 U.S. 723 (2008). 

Al-Adahi's habeas petition presented the question whether 

he was part of al-Qaida and therefore justifiably detained under 

the Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 

115 Stat. 224 (2001). The district court considered the government's two factual returns and Al-Adahi's three traverses, in 

addition to a substantial record that included intelligence reports, 

interrogation summaries, expert declarations, and Al-Adahi's 

direct and cross-examination (transmitted live from 

Guantanamo). The court found "no reliable evidence in the 

record that Petitioner was a member of al-Qaida" and ruled that 

he should be released. Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280, Mem. 

Op. at 41,2009 WL 2584685 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,2009) ("Mem. 

Op."). The government brought this appeal and Al-Adahi crossappealed. 

The Authorization for Use of Military Force empowers the 

President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against 

those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 

authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 

occurred on September 1 1,200 1, or harbored such organizations 

or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 

terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Pub. L. No. 107-40, 5 2(a). "[A]lI necessary 

and appropriate force" includes the power to capture and detain 

those described in the congressional authorization. Hamdi v. 

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 5 19 (2004). The government may 

therefore hold at Guantanamo and elsewhere those individuals 

who are "part of' al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated forces. 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 3 of 19
See Awad v. Obama, No. 09-535 1, slip op, at 18 (D.C. Cir. June 

2,20 10); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866,872,874-75 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010). 

Whether Al-Adahi fit that description was and is the 

ultimate issue. The obvious preliminary question is what sort of 

factual showing does the government, or the detainee, have to 

make? In this court the question is open. Al-Bihani held that 

the government does not have to prove the legality of detention 

"beyond a reasonable doubt" or by "clear and convincing 

evidence." See 590 F.3d at 878; see also Awad, slip op. at 17- 

1 8. Al-Bihani also decided that the preponderance-of-theevidence standard is constitutionally permissible. 590 F.3d at 

878. But we have yet to decide whether that standard is 

required. Id. at 878 n.4; see also Awad, slip op. at 18 n.2. 

The district judge in this case adopted the preponderance 

standard. Mem. Op. at 5. Other district judges in our circuit 

have done the same. See, e.g., Awad, slip op. at 8. Their 

rationale is unstated. After Boumediene, the district judges met 

in executive session and decided to coordinate proceedings in 

Guantanamo habeas cases. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee 

Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 309,310 (D.D.C. 2008). On November 

6, 2008, the coordinating judge issued a Case Management 

Order. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08- 

442, 2008 WL 4858241 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008). The Order 

stated, among other things, that the government should bear the 

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

petitioner's detention is lawful. Order at 4. In support, the 

Order cited Boumediene. But Boumediene held only that the 

"extent of the showing required of the Government in these 

cases is a matter to be determined." 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2271 .' 

' Earlier in the opinion the Court seemed to put the burden on the 

detainee: the Court stated that "the privilege of habeas corpus entitles 

the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 4 of 19
Boumediene also held that in determining the scope of the 

writ, "the analysis may [must?] begin with precedents as of 

1789, for the Court has said that 'at the absolute minimum' the 

Clause protects the writ as it existed when the Constitution was 

drafted and ratified." Id. at 2248 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 

U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). Yet we are aware of no precedents in 

which eighteenth century English courts adopted a preponderance standard. Even in later statutory habeas cases in this 

country, that standard was not the norm. For years, in habeas 

proceedings contesting orders of deportation, the government 

had to produce only "some evidence to support the order." St. 

Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306; Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360 F.3d 414,421 

& n.7 (3d Cir. 2004). In such cases courts did not otherwise 

"review factual determinations made by the Executive." St. Cyr, 

533 U.S. at 306 (citing Ekiu v. Unitedstates, 142 U.S. 65 1,659 

(1892)). In habeas petitions challenging selective service 

decisions, the government also had the minimal burden of 

providing "some evidence" to support the decision. See Eagles 

v. US. ex rel. Sanders, 329 U.S. 304, 3 1 1 - 12 (1 946). Habeas 

petitions contesting courts martial required the government to 

show only that the military prisoner had received, in the military 

tribunal, "full and fair consideration" of the allegations in his 

habeas petition. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,142 (1 953). 

And in response to habeas petitions brought after an individual's 

arrest, the government had to show only that it had probable 

cause for the arrest. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 

125, 130 (1807). 

After oral argument, we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs discussing "what factual showing" (if any) the 

government must make to justify detaining Al-Adahi. The 

being held pursuant to 'the erroneous application or interpretation' of 

relevant law." 128 S. Ct. at 2266 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 

289,302 (2001)). 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 5 of 19
supplemental briefs we received were not exactly illuminating. 

The government stated that "in the circumstances currently 

presented in this Guantanamo habeas litigation," a preponderance standard is "appropriate," Supp. Br. of Appellants at 1, 

although "a different and more deferential standard may be 

appropriate in other cases or contexts," Supp. Reply Br. of 

Appellants at 2.2 Al-Adahi readily agreed with the government 

that the preponderance standard should govern his case. Supp. 

Br. of Appellee at 2-3. We are thus left with no adversary 

presentation on an important question affecting many pending 

cases in this court and in the district court. Although we doubt, 

for the reasons stated above, that the Suspension Clause requires 

the use of the preponderance standard, we will not decide the 

question in this case. As we did in Al-Bihani, we will assume 

arguendo that the government must show by a preponderance of 

the evidence that Al-Adahi was part of al-Qaida. 590 F.3d at 

878 & n.4. 

The district court divided the government's evidence into 

five categories in rough chronological order: Al-Adahi's trip to 

Afghanistan; his meetings with bin Laden; his stay in an alQaida guesthouse; his military training at A1 Farouq; and his 

other, later activities in Afghanistan. Mem. Op. at 13. We will 

generally follow the court's organization, but before we get to 

the specifics we need to mention an error that affects much of 

The government added that "the same [standard of review] may not 

apply in other cases or contexts involving review of the lawfulness of 

military detention." Supp. Br. of Appellants at 13-1 4. The government never explained why there should be a difference. The government also stated that although it was "not here seeking deference to a 

military tribunal, this Court should make clear that deference to 

military and intelligence judgments is nonetheless still essential in 

evaluating the evidence in these cases." Id. at 19. Again the government failed to explain why it was not seeking deference to the 

judgment of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal in this case. 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 6 of 19
the district court's evaluation of the evidence. The error steins 

from the court's failure to appreciate conditional probability 

analysis. United States v. Prandy-Binett, 5 F.3d 558, 558-60 

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying rehearing). 

"Many mundane mistakes in reasoning can be traced to a 

shaky grasp of the notion of conditional probability." JOHN 

ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY 

AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 63 (1988). The key consideration is 

that although some events are independent (coin flips, for 

example), other events are dependent: "the occurrence of one of 

them makes the occurrence ofthe other more or less likely . . . ." 

JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, BEYONDNUMERACY: RUMINATIONS OF A 

NUMBERS MAN 189 (1 99 1). Dr. Paulos gives this example: "the 

probability that a person chosen at random from the phone book 

is over 250 pounds is quite small. However, if it's known that 

the person chosen is over six feet four inches tall, then the 

conditional probability that he or she also weighs more than 250 

pounds is considerably higher." INNUMERACY 63. 

Those who do not take into account conditional probability 

are prone to making mistakes in judging evidence. They may 

think that if a particular fact does not itself prove the ultimate 

proposition (e.g., whether the detainee was part of al-Qaida), the 

fact may be tossed aside and the next fact may be evaluated as 

if the first did not exist. Prandy-Binett, 5 F.3d at 559-60. This 

is precisely how the district court proceeded in this case: AlAdahi's ties to bin Laden "cannot prove" he was part of AlQaida and this evidence therefore "must not distract the Court." 

Mem. Op. at 18. The fact that Al-Adahi stayed in an al-Qaida 

guesthouse "is not in itself sufficient to justify detention." Id. at 

20. Al-Adahi's attendance at an al-Qaida training camp "is not 

sufficient to carry the Government's burden of showing that he 

was a part" of al-Qaida. Id. at 25. And so on. The government 

is right: the district court wrongly "required each piece of the 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 7 of 19
government's evidence to bear weight without regard to all (or 

indeed any) other evidence in the case. This was a fundamental 

mistake that infected the court's entire analysis." Br. of 

Appellants at 42. 

Having tossed aside the government's evidence, one piece 

at a time, the court came to the manifestly incorrect - indeed 

startling - conclusion that "there is no reliable evidence in the 

record that Petitioner was a member of al-Qaida and/or the 

Taliban." Mem. Op. at 41. When the evidence is properly 

considered, it becomes clear that Al-Adahi was - at the very 

least - more likely than not a part of al-Qaida. And that is all 

the government had to show in order to satisfy the preponderance standard. Awad, slip op. at 17-1 8; see Concrete Pipe & 

Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 

602, 622 (1993) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 

(1 970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 

Al-Adahi served in the Yemeni army for two years and was 

later employed as a security guard at the Yemeni state oil 

company. In July 2001 he took a six-month leave of absence 

from his job and left his wife and his two children to travel with 

his sister Amani to Afghanistan (by way of Pakistan). Amani 

had entered into an arranged marriage with Riyadh Abd A1-Aziz 

Almujahid, a Yemeni citizen then residing in Kandahar. 

Riyadh was affiliated with al-Qaida. He arranged for 

Amani's and Al-Adahi's trip to Afghanistan. He helped them 

obtain passports from the passport agency in their hometown of 

Ta'iz. He then sent Al-Adahi to the Yemeni capital city of 

Sana'a. Al-Adahi was instructed to wear a red jacket and wait 

outside a specified building for a man he did not know. This 

man, Ali Yayha, recognized Al-Adahi and gave him two plane 

tickets and travel money. Yayha also arranged for Al-Adahi and 

Amani to obtain visas. The government presented evidence that 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 8 of 19
al-Qaida paid for Al-Adahi's and Amani's trip. Al-Adahi 

admitted that the sort of arrangements that Riyadh made for him 

and his sister were the same as those al-Qaida used for bringing 

jihadist recruits to Afghanistan.' And he described how Riyadh 

had obtained Al-Adahi's travel funds from "the Saudi who 

handled the money" for al-Qaida in Kandahar. That Al-Adahi 

was an al-Qaida recruit is also supported by a witness's statement - not addressed bv the district court - that Al-Adahi was 

Riyadh was "from mujahidin" - that is, those who fought 

against the Russians and in the Afghan civil war. Many 

mujahidin frequented the guesthouse Riyadh operated in 

Kandahar. Al-Adahi stayed at Riyadh's house, located in the 

same compound. Al-Adahi told interrogators that Riyadh "had 

achieved a very - high - status" in al-0aida.' Like Al-Adahi. 

Riyadh was described to interrogators as 

admitted that Riyadh's compound was very close to the compound of Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban. 

Bin Laden hosted the male-only celebration of Riyadh's 

marriage to Al-Adahi's sister. Bin Laden held the celebration at 

his compound, which Al-Adahi described as "surrounded by a 

concrete fence further secured by a large metal gate." Inside the 

compound, a group of armed guards "draped in munitions belts, 

Al-Adahi insisted that this was not the impetus for his own travel. 

He told interrogators that his purpose was to accompany Amani as she 

traveled to meet her husband. 

Al-Adahi told interrogators that Riyadh was a bin Laden bodyguard. 

But during the habeas proceedings he said he "doubt[ed]" this was 

true. Riyadh's brother, Da'ood Al-Ta'zai, was a member of bin 

Laden's security detail. 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 9 of 19
grenades, and Kalashnikov rifles" welcomed the wedding 

guests. At the party, bin Laden gave a speech congratulating 

Riyadh. Al-Adahi and bin Laden were introduced and sat next 

to each other during the meal. 

Several days later, bin Laden summoned Al-Adahi for 

another meeting. According to Al-Adahi, at his meeting bin 

Laden asked him about people he was connected with in Yemen 

- some of whom were involved in jihad. (The events following 

the meeting, including Al-Adahi's showing up at the al-Qaida 

training camp, suggest that more transpired in the meeting than 

what Al-Adahi related.) In the habeas proceedings, Al-Adahi 

tried to explain his personal audience with bin Laden on the 

basis that "meeting with Bin Laden was common for visitors to 

Kandahar." Mem. Op. at 17. This is, as the government points 

out, utterly implausible. Al-Adahi's story was "contradicted by 

the undisputed evidence that in 2001 Usama bin Laden, who 

knew he was a military target ofthe United States, had gone into 

hiding under tight security . . . ." Br. of Appellants at 64. 

As to the latter point the district court said nothing, despite 

the well-settled principle that false exculpatory statements are 

evidence - often strong evidence - of guilt. See, e.g., United 

States v. Penn, 974 F.2d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 1992); United 

States v. Meyer, 733 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir. 1984). The court 

characterized the rest of the evidence about Al-Adahi's meetings 

with bin Laden as "sensational and compelling" but not "actual, 

reliable evidence that would justifl" detention. Mem. Op. at 4 1 . The court's statements are incomprehensible. On what possible 

ground can the court say that the evidence on this subject was, 

on the one hand, "compelling," and yet say, on the other hand, 

that it was not "actual" and "reliable"? All that comes to mind 

is the idea that two personal meetings with bin Laden are not 

enough to prove that an individual is part of al-Qaida. If that is 

what the court intended, then it was once again engaging in the 

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mistaken reasoning we mentioned in connection with conditional probability analysis. The court rounded off its discussion 

by characterizing the government's presentation as merely 

indicating that Al-Adahi had "familial ties to Usama bin Laden," 

a statement incorrect as a factual matter (Al-Adahi's family ties 

were to a top aide of bin Laden's) and one that misses the strong 

thrust of the evidence. The evidence derived its power not only 

from Al-Adahi's family relationships, but also from his meetings with bin Laden. That close association made it far more 

likely that Al-Adahi was or became part of the organization. 

Rather than grasping this essential point, the district court 

called the evidence regarding the meetings a distraction - 

something that should not divert "the Court from its essential 

focus - the nature of Al-Adahi's own conduct, upon which this 

case must turn." Mem. Op. at 18. Here again the court's 

remarks are perplexing. If Al-Adahi's meetings with bin Laden 

were not his "own conduct," whose conduct were they? 

The next event in this narrative greatly strengthened the 

government's case against Al-Adahi. Not long after his second 

meeting with bin Laden, Al-Adahi moved to the A1 Nebras 

guesthouse. He said he wanted to go there because it was a 

gathering place for Muslims, as if that distinguished it from any 

other place he stayed during his time in Afghanistan. A1 Nebras 

was not just another gathering place: it served as a staging area 

for al-Qaida recruits en route to the A1 Farouq training camp. 

Al-Adahi was treated like a recruit. Staff at the guesthouse 

instructed him and the other recruits on how to pack and prepare 

for their training before taking a bus to A1 Farouq. The district 

court seemed to think that Al-Adahi's stay at the guesthouse - 

one or two days - was evidence in his favor because it was so 

brief. But the court failed to take into account that A1 Nebras 

functioned as a way station. 

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The district court dealt with this evidence in the following 

way: "the guesthouse evidence is not in itself sufficient to 

justify detention." Mem. Op. at 20. Note the "not in itself." 

Again the court erred. Al-Adahi's voluntary decision to move 

to an al-Qaida guesthouse, a staging area for recruits heading for 

a military training camp, makes it more likely - indeed, very 

likely - that Al-Adahi was himself a recruit. There is no other 

sensible explanation for his actions. This is why we wrote in AlBihani that an individual's attendance at an al-Qaida guesthouse 

is powerful - indeed "overwhelming[]" - evidence that the 

individual was part of al-Qaida. 590 F.3d at 873 n.2. 

Al-Adahi left the guesthouse after a few days and, as 

expected, entered al-Qaida's A1 Farouq training camp. By then 

it was August 200 1. At least eight of the September 1 1 th 

hijackers had trained at A1 Farouq. While Al-Adahi was there, 

he received training in rocket-propelled grenades, other weapons, and basic physical fitness, as well as some classroom 

instruction. His statements to interrogators indicated that he had 

a deep knowledge of the operation of A1 Farouq. He described 

camp leaders in a manner that showed he was familiar with 

them; he reported details of the camp's training regimen and 

layout; and he identified the types of weapons used for training. 

He also knew the training routines of other recruits. 

The district court seemed to think it important to determine 

Al-Adahi's motive for attending the al-Qaida training camp. We 

do not understand why. Whatever his motive, the significant 

points are that al-Qaida was intent on attacking the United States 

and its allies, that bin Laden had issued a fatwa announcing that 

every Muslim had a duty to kill Americans, and that Al-Adahi 

voluntarily affiliated himself with al-Qaida. 

According to Al-Adahi, he stayed at A1 Farouq for seven to 

ten days, and then was expelled for smoking tobacco, a violation 

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of a camp rule. The government introduced evidence casting 

doubt on Al-Adahi's explanation for leaving the camp. This 

evidence - which included Al-Adahi's own statements - showed 

that trainees expelled from A1 Farouq were treated as spies and 

beaten. Al-Adahi left A1 Farouq unharmed. His story was that 

the camp's instructors treated him gently because they were 

close to his brother-in-law Riyadh. The government offered 

another explanation. Al-Adahi did not spend a great deal of 

time in the camp because he needed little training. He was not 

a green, untested, recruit. He had served in the Yemeni army, 

and he had been working as a security guard in Yemen. As to 

his loyalty to the al-Qaida cause, his sister was married to one of 

bin Laden's most trusted associates. 

The district court reached the following conclusions about 

Al-Adahi's attendance at A1 Farouq: (1) this was "not affirmative evidence that Al-Adahi embraced al-Qaida, accepted its 

philosophy, and endorsed its terrorist activities"; and (2) his 

training at Al-Farouq did not show that he "occup[ied] some sort 

of structured role in the hierarchy of the enemy force" or could 

"be deemed a member of the enemy's armed forces." Mein. 

Op. at 24-25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The court appeared to rule that an individual must embrace 

every tenet of al-Qaida before United States forces may detain 

him. There is no such requirement. See Awad, slip op. at 19. 

When the government shows that an individual received and 

executed orders from al-Qaida members in a training camp, that 

evidence is sufficient (but not necessary) to prove that the 

individual has affiliated himself with al-Qaida. See id. ; Gherebi 

v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 69 (D.D.C. 2009). Al-Adahi's 

statements confirm that he received and followed orders while 

he was at A1 Farouq. His attendance at an al-Qaida military 

training camp is therefore - to put it mildly - strong evidence 

that he was part of al-Qaida. In Al-Bihani, we stated that if a 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 13 of 19
person stays in an al-Qaida guesthouse or attends an al-Qaida 

training camp, this constitutes "overwhelming" evidence that the 

United States had authority to detain that person. 590 F.3d at 

873 n.2. 

The district court ruled that Al-Adahi did not "receive and 

execute" orders because he violated the camp rule against 

smoking tobacco. Mem. Op. at 23, 25. This was error. AlAdahi's violation of a rule or rules did not erase his compliance 

with other orders. One would not say that an Army trainee 

ceased to be part of the Army if he failed to shine his shoes or 

overslept one morning. Furthermore, there was no evidence that 

Al-Adahi ever affirmatively disassociated himself from alQaida, even though he "accepted his expulsion." Id. at 40. 

The district court ended its discussion of Al-Adahi's 

training at A1 Farouq with the following statement: Al-Adahi's 

"admission that he trained at A1 Farouq is not sufficient to carry 

the Government's burden of showing that he was a part, or 

substantial supporter, of enemy forces." Id. at 25. We disagree 

that this evidence, standing alone, was insufficient. See AlBihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2. In any event, we are sure that the 

court erred in treating this evidence as if it stood alone. 

The court gave similar treatment to the government's proof 

that Al-Adahi wore the same model of Casio watch the military 

has linked to al-Qaida and terrorist activity. When Pakistani 

authorities picked up Al-Adahi they confiscated his watch. A 

witness reported seeing him wearing the Casio watch before his 

capture. The district court threw out these telling facts because, 

after all, "Casio watches are hardly unique items, even in 

Afghanistan." Mem. Op. at 34. 

It is true that not everyone in Afghanistan with a Casio 

watch could be identified with al-Qaida. But the evidence did 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 14 of 19
not relate to every such person. It related to a particular 

individual wearing a Casio model favored by al-Qaida leaders, 

an individual who had met with bin Laden, had stayed in an alQaida guesthouse, and had trained in an al-Qaida camp. 

The government also introduced other evidence of AlAdahi's close connection to the al-Qaida leadership. Al-Adahi 

had detailed personal knowledge about a group of twelve men 

who worked for bin Laden. For example, he knew that one man 

was a trained sniper and could read, write, and speak English; he 

knew that another spoke Pashtu and Farsi and sent men to A1 

Farouq for training; and he knew that one "had fat thighs but 

was quick," owned a four-door pickup truck, fought in 

Chechnya and Bosnia, and had been with bin Laden in Sudan. 

This evidence tended to show Al-Adahi's close relationship 

with these men and thus strengthened the probability that he was 

part of al-Qaida. Yet the district court declined to credit the 

evidence because it was possible that Al-Adahi could have 

learned the biographical information in some other way, 

particularly since some of the men were from his hometown in 

Yemen. Mem. Op. at 35. In so ruling the court committed what 

a noted historian has called "the fallacy of the possible proof." 

DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A 

LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT 53 (1 970). "Valid empirical 

proof requires not merely the establishment of possibility, but an 

estimate of probability." Id. Yet the court spoke only of a 

possible alternative explanation for Al-Adahi's knowledge of 

bin Laden's bodyguards. At no point did the court make any 

finding about whether this alternative was more likely than the 

government's explanation. But such a "comparative judgment 

about the evidence" is at the heart of the preponderance standard 

of proof. Lindsay v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 47 F.3d 1209, 

1213 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

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Al-Adahi was in Kabul when the September 11 attacks 

occurred. He said that he then decided to take a month long 

vacation and travel throughout the countryside. He said he went 

to Kabul because he was bored staying in Kandahar. When the 

United States began its military campaign in Afghanistan on 

October 7, 2001, Al-Adahi claimed he was still in Kabul. 

About a week and a half after the bombing began, he left for 

Khost, Afghanistan, where he stayed in a mosque for about two 

weeks. He said he then left Khost to return to Kandahar to 

search for his sister. He spent another two to three weeks in 

Kandahar, including two or three days in a hospital recuperating 

from injuries to his arm and side. Al-Adahi said he sustained his 

injuries in a motorcycle accident. He offered different versions 

of how the accident occurred: he hit a speed bump on his way to 

the market; he crashed into a cart as he was riding around 

Kandahar; he fell off his motorcycle while attempting to flee the 

United States bombing; he crashed trying to avoid a small car. 

Al-Adahi left the hospital for Pakistan on a bus carrying 

wounded Arabs and Pakistanis. At one point in his interrogation, Al-Adahi described these fourteen men as Taliban soldiers; 

but he testified at the habeas proceeding that he learned this only 

from a newspaper article. 

From Al-Adahi's movements in Afghanistan, his injuries, 

his shifting versions of his supposed motorcycle accident, and 

his capture on a bus loaded with wounded Taliban fighters, the 

government infers that Al-Adahi was complying with "bin 

Laden's order to persist in the jihad" after the American attacks. 

Br. of Appellants at 21. The district court, once again treating 

items of evidence in isolation, pronounced that "there is no 

evidence that [Al-Adahi] sought to join or was already part of a 

band of fighters fleeing the region." Mem. Op. at 39. The court 

was wrong, and clearly so. Al-Adahi's capture on a bus carrying 

only himself and wounded Taliban fighters constituted such 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 16 of 19
evidence, as did his injuries, his movements in the country, and 

the contradictions contained in his explanations. We do not say 

that any of these particular pieces of evidence are conclusive, 

but we do say that they add to the weight of the government's 

case against Al-Adahi and that the district court clearly erred in 

tossing them aside. See Awad, slip op. at 14-1 5; Prandy-Binett, 

5 F.3d at 559-60. 

One of the oddest things about this case is that despite an 

extensive record and numerous factual disputes, the district 

court never made any findings about whether Al-Adahi was 

generally a credible witness or whether his particular explanations for his actions were worthy of belief. The court's omissions are particularly striking in light of the instructions in alQaida's training manuals for resisting interrogation. For those 

who belong to al-Qaida, "[c]onfronting the interrogator and 

defeating him is part of your jihad." To this end al-Qaida 

members are instructed to resist interrogation by developing a 

cover story, by refusing to answer questions, by recanting or 

changing answers already given, by giving as vague an answer 

as possible, and by claiming torture. Put bluntly, the instructions to detainees are to make up a story and lie. Despite this the 

district court displayed little skepticism about Al-Adahi's 

explanations for his actions. To the extent the court expressed 

any doubts, it addressed them to the government's case and did 

so on the mistaken view that each item of the government's 

evidence needed to prove the ultimate issue in the case. 

We could go on, but what we have written thus far is 

enough to show that the district court clearly erred in its treatment of the evidence and in its view of the law. CJ: Barhoumi 

v. Obama, No. 09-5383, slip op. at 12-13 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 

20 10); Awad, slip op. at 17. The court's conclusion was simply 

not a "permissible view[] of the evidence." See Anderson v. 

City of Bessemer City, N. C., 470 U.S. 564,573-74 (1 985). And 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 17 of 19
it reached this conclusion through a series of legal errors, as we 

have discussed. We have already mentioned the suggestion in 

Al-Bihani that attendance at either an al-Qaida training camp or 

an al-Qaida guesthouse "would seem to overwhelmingly, if not 

definitively, justiQ" detention. 590 F.3d at 873 n.2. The 

evidence against Al-Adahi showed that he did both - stayed at 

an al-Qaida guesthouse and attended an al-Qaida training camp. 

And the evidence showed a good deal more, from his meetings 

with bin Laden, to his knowledge of those protecting bin Laden, 

to his wearing of a particular model of Casio watch, to his 

incredible explanations for his actions, to his capture on a bus 

carrying wounded Arabs and Pakistanis, and so on. One of the 

most damaging and powerful items of evidence against him is 

classifiede5 In all there can be no doubt that Al-Adahi was more 

likely than not part of al-Qaida. We therefore reverse and 

remand with instructions to the district court to deny Al-Adahi's 

petition for a writ of habeas c~rpus.~ 

Al-Adahi filed a cross-appeal. He argues that the district court had 

no authority to admit hearsay bearing on his habeas petition. We 

rejected that argument in Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879, and again in 

Awad, slip op. at 1 1. Al-Bihani also forecloses Al-Adahi's argument 

that admitting hearsay violated his Sixth Amendment right of 

confrontation. 590 F.3d at 879. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion by not ruling separately on the reliability of each item of 

hearsay, despite Al-Adahi's claim that the case management order 

required it to do so. Barhoumi, slip op. at 9-10. His claim that 

statements he made outside the presence of counsel should be 

suppressed also fails: Al-Adahi cites no precedent extending the 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), line of cases beyond the 

USCA Case #09-5333 Document #1254718 Filed: 07/13/2010 Page 18 of 19
So Ordered. 

criminal context. Cf Mem. Op. at 2 1 n. 14. As we noted in Al-Bihani, 

these constitutional habeas proceedings are not subject to all the 

protections given to defendants in criminal prosecutions. 590 F.3d at 

876. Al-Adahi points to the Army Rules of Professional Responsibility as also requiring suppression of his ex parte statements, but he 

waived this argument by failing to raise it until his cross-appeal reply 

brief. See Rollins Environmental Services (NJ, Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 

649,652 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 

Al-Adahi also claims his statements should be suppressed 

pursuant to the Third Geneva Convention. Even if the Convention had 

been incorporated into domestic U.S. law and even if it provided an 

exclusionary rule, Congress has provided explicitly that the Convention's provisions are not privately enforceable in habeas proceedings. 

See Military Commissions Act of 2006 5 5, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 

Stat. 263 1-32; Noriega v. Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290, 1296-97 (1 lth 

Cir. 2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 988 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 

2007). 

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