Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00578/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00578-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWIN MCMILLAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. RINGLER, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2: 13-cv-0578 MCE KJN P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No 49.) For the reasons stated herein, the 

undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. 

II. Is Defendants’ Motion Procedurally Proper?

Plaintiff argues that defendants’ motion to dismiss is improper because it raises arguments 

that were raised in their first motion to dismiss or that could have been raised in their first motion 

to dismiss. For the following reasons, the undersigned rejects this argument.

On March 12, 2014, the undersigned ordered service of plaintiff’s first amended 

complaint. (ECF No. 17.) On July 1, 2014, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to 

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state a colorable claim for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 

29.) On December 19, 2014, the undersigned issued a detailed findings and recommendations, 

recommending that defendants’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 41.) In 

particular, the undersigned recommended that defendants’ motion be granted as to claim six 

against defendant Muldong, claim eight against defendant Warden Swarthout in his official 

capacity, and claim nine, under California Civil Code § 52.1, as to defendants Henry, Scotland, 

Ruiz, Muldong, Popovits, Arnold, Young and Swarthout. (Id.) The undersigned recommended 

that defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied in all other respects. (Id.)

On February 13, 2015, the Honorable Morrison C. England adopted the findings and 

recommendations. (ECF No. 44.) However, Judge England granted plaintiff leave to file a 

second amended complaint as to claims six and nine. (Id.) In response to Judge England’s order, 

plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on March 16, 2015. (ECF No. 45.) In response to 

the second amended complaint, defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 49.)

Plaintiff is correct that defendants’ second motion to dismiss raises new arguments as well 

as some arguments that were raised in the first motion to dismiss and rejected by the court. 

“The law is clear in this Circuit that an ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the 

latter being treated thereafter as nonexistent.’” Gundy v. California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation, 2013 WL 522789 at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).) “Courts in this Circuit therefore have permitted 

defendants moving to dismiss an amended complaint to make arguments previously made and to 

raise new arguments that were previously available.” Gundy, 2013 WL 522789 at *6; see In re 

Sony Grand WEGA KDF–E A10/A20 Series Rear Projection HDTV Television Litig., 758 

F.Supp.2d 1077, 1098 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“When Plaintiffs filed the [first amended complaint], it 

superseded their previous complaint, and Sony was therefore free to move again for dismissal.”); 

Stamas v. Cnty. of Madera, 2010 WL 289310, at *4 (E.D. Cal. January 15, 2010) (“[A]n amended 

pleading is a new round of pleadings ... [and] is subject to the same challenges as the original 

(i.e., motion to dismiss, to strike, for more definite statement).”); Migliaccio v. Midland Nat’l 

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Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 316873, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. January 30, 2007) (rejecting plaintiffs’

argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2)’s ban on successive Rule 12 motions 

barred the defendants from raising new arguments or resurrecting arguments considered by the 

court in their first motion to dismiss). “The defense of failure to state a claim may be raised at 

any time before trial.” Gundy, 2013 WL 522789 at * 6.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, defendants’ second motion to dismiss is 

properly brought. 

III. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for motions to dismiss for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In 

considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court 

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 

(2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 

1999). Still, to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must contain more 

than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. Attachments to a complaint are considered to be part of the complaint for purposes 

of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Reiner & Co., 

896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears 

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would 

entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In general, pro se 

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pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe such pleadings liberally. Bretz 

v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal 

interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 

pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

IV. Plaintiff’s Claims

The second amended complaint proceeds against defendants Arnold, Henry, Muldong, 

Popovits, Ringler, Ruiz, Scotland, Swarthout, Young and Zuniga. (ECF No. 45.) All relevant 

events occurred at California State Prison-Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”). 

Plaintiff alleges that on or around October 2012, he was summoned to the Facility B 

program office to receive a telephone call from a judge regarding a settlement conference. (Id. at 

4.) The telephone call occurred in defendant Scotland’s office. (Id.) During the telephone call, 

defendant Scotland displayed anger toward plaintiff and repeatedly asked why the telephone call 

was routed through his office. (Id.) Defendant Ringler arrived shortly later and defendant 

Scotland told defendant Ringler the purpose of plaintiff’s telephone call. (Id.) At this time, 

plaintiff told the judge that defendants Ringler and Scotland were listening to the discussion. (Id.) 

Plaintiff told the judge that defendants’ presence made him uncomfortable. (Id.) 

Approximately 1 1⁄2 hours into the mediation, defendant Scotland told plaintiff to go sit on 

the bench in the hallway. (Id.) Plaintiff heard defendant Scotland tell the judge that he did not 

want plaintiff on his phone. (Id.) Plaintiff was then moved to a different location and given 

access to another phone to finish the settlement conference. (Id. at 4-5.)

As a result of hearing plaintiff on the telephone, plaintiff alleges that defendants Ringler 

and Scotland became aware that plaintiff was engaged in civil litigation against the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) or its officers. (Id. at 5.) After October 

2012, plaintiff alleges that defendants Ringler and Ruiz conducted repeated searches of plaintiff 

and his property under the supervision of defendant Scotland. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on December 5, 2012, defendants Ringler and Zuniga conducted a 

contraband search of plaintiff’s housing area. (Id.) Prior to that time, contraband searches were 

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conducted by the correctional officers assigned to the respective housing units. (Id.) From 

October 2012 until around January 17, 2013, defendants Ringler and Zuniga were assigned as 

yard Security and Escort officers for Facility D. (Id.) Defendants Ringer and Zuniga also 

supervised the D yard recreational yard and yard crew workers. (Id.) In other words, they were 

not assigned to plaintiff’s housing unit. Plaintiff alleges that on December 5, 2012, defendants 

Ringler and Zuniga abandoned their Search and Escort positions in order to conduct the 

contraband search in plaintiff’s dorm living area. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that prior to December 5, 2012, contraband searches were conducted once 

per month. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that during the December 5, 2012 search, plaintiff’s bed linens, personal 

effects and photographs of family members were thrown to the ground. (Id.) In addition, 

plaintiff’s legal materials were unbound and separated from their binding, and two of plaintiff’s 

Holy Korans were destroyed. (Id.) At the end of the search, defendant Ringler asked plaintiff in 

a sarcastic voice, “How did your case turn out?” (Id) After asking this question, defendant 

Ringler confiscated plaintiff’s personal appliances. (Id.)

At the end of the search, plaintiff told his housing unit officers Rothman and Williamson 

to summon the facility sergeant to take note of and document the status of his property.1 (Id.) 

After making a telephone call, Officer Rothman told plaintiff that the facility sergeant on duty, 

Sergeant Militano, had instructed plaintiff to “put it in a 602.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the circumstances of the search of his property were memorialized by 

the CSP-Solano Catholic Chaplain R. Boyle, in a memorandum dated December 6, 2012. (Id.) 

On that same day, the memorandum was personally delivered to defendant Young, Associate 

Warden. (Id.) Defendant Young summoned Investigative Lieutenant Brown to photograph 

“them” for evidentiary purposes. (Id.)

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1

 At some places in the second amended complaint, plaintiff refers to Officer Williamson as 

“defendant Williamson.” (See ECF No. 45 at 8: 21.) However, Officer Williamson is not listed 

as a defendant in the caption of the complaint, nor is he consistently referred to as a defendant. 

Accordingly, the undersigned does not find that Officer Williamson is named as a defendant. 

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On December 14, 2012, defendant Ringler stated to plaintiff, “I know all about you. I’m 

not finished with you yet.” (Id. at 6.) Defendant Ringler made this statement in the presence of 

Lieutenant Bickham. (Id.) Plaintiff asked Lieutenant Bickham to intercede on his behalf 

concerning defendant Ringler’s statements and actions. (Id.)

Chaplain Boyle’s memorandum was forwarded to Rachel Roberts at the Council on 

American-Islamic Relations. (Id.) After receiving the memorandum, Ms. Roberts sent a letter to 

the CSP-Warden addressing defendant Ringler’s handling of plaintiff’s Korans during the search. 

(Id. at 7.) 

Chaplain Boyle’s memorandum was forwarded to Jean Weiss, CDCR Ombudsman. (Id.) 

Ms. Weiss informed plaintiff’s family by telephone that an investigation of the December 5, 2012 

search would be conducted. (Id.) 

Plaintiff filed a 602 grievance alleging that the December 5, 2012 search was retaliatory 

and in violation of prison regulations, grievance no. 12-3044. (Id.) Plaintiff submitted another 

602 requesting the return of the personal property confiscated by defendant Ringler during the 

search. (Id.)

Defendant Henry was appointed to investigate the allegations in plaintiff’s 602 

grievances. (Id.) Defendant Henry’s investigation consisted mainly of interviews of defendants 

Ringler and Zuniga, Officer Rathman, Officer Williamson and inmate witnesses Pratt and 

McClellan. (Id. at 8.) 

Defendants Ringler and Zuniga were disciplined as a result of plaintiff’s grievance no. 12-

3044. (Id.) Prior to or during the completion of the investigation of this grievance, on January 

17, 2013, defendant Ringler submitted a chrono stating that plaintiff was attempting to file a class 

action against him. (Id.) Defendant Ringler stated that based on this class action, plaintiff should 

be deemed a threat to him and to the safety and security of the institution. (Id.)

As a result of the chrono prepared by defendant Ringler, on January 17, 2013, Officer 

Williamson searched plaintiff’s personal property and living space. (Id.) Officer Williamson did 

not discover any contraband as a result of this search. (Id.) 

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Approximately 30 minutes after Officer Williamson conducted the search of plaintiff’s 

living quarters, defendant Ruiz conducted another search of plaintiff’s living quarters. As a result 

of this search, documents belonging to plaintiff were confiscated and defendant Ruiz reportedly 

discovered an electrical plug or charger. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that in January 2013, CDCR 

permitted inmates to buy and possess various types of chargers. (Id. at 9.) 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Ruiz is a close personal friend with defendant Ringler. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Ruiz conducted the search in retaliation for the grievance 

plaintiff filed against defendant Ringler. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Ruiz did not 

normally conduct contraband searches in plaintiff’s housing unit. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Ruiz issued a rules violation report against plaintiff 

charging him with possession of dangerous contraband. (Id.) Immediately after the search, 

plaintiff was handcuffed by defendant Ruiz and taken to the D Facility program office and placed 

in a holding cage. (Id.)

Plaintiff was later given a CDCR Form 114 “lock up order,” authored by defendant Henry 

which referenced defendant Ringler’s claim that plaintiff should be deemed an institutional 

security concern for his involvement in a class action lawsuit naming defendant Ringler. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Henry is a close personal friend of defendant Ringler. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Henry agreed to assist defendant Ringler in his attempt to retaliate 

against plaintiff for filing a grievance against him. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that but for defendant 

Ringler’s plan to retaliate against him, he would not have received the lock-up order that resulted 

in his placement in administrative segregation (‘ad seg”). (Id. at 10.)

While in ad seg, plaintiff was served with another rules violation report dated January 8, 

2013, alleging “misuse of state computer during work assignment,” i.e., report no. 01-0013. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was alleged to be have authored and printed a document describing defendant Ringler’s 

actions. (Id.) The rules violation report described the document as color printed on white card 

stock paper. (Id.) The rules violation report also contained a statement by defendant Muldong 

that no documents can or may be printed from plaintiff’s work area due to padlocks on all inmate 

accessible computers and or printers. (Id.) Defendant Muldong went on to state that the 

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document was printed prior to plaintiff’s arrival at his work assignment on the date it was 

discovered. (Id.)

The rules violation report also contained a statement by defendant Scotland that the 

document was printed in color on white card stock paper. (Id. at 11.) Defendant Scotland also 

stated that the document could not have been printed by plaintiff because CSP-Solano inmates do 

not have access to color printers or card stock paper. (Id.) 

In December 2012, defendant Muldong informed plaintiff that he would not discipline any 

inmate for printing personal documents on the computers because they were made available for 

that purpose. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that prior to January 8, 2013, defendant Muldong allowed 

other inmates to type, edit and print personal documents on the computers without risk of 

discipline. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Muldong, Scotland, Ringer and Young conspired to issue 

the January 8, 2013 disciplinary report against plaintiff in retaliation for his exercise of his First 

Amendment rights. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the January 8, 2013 rules violation report served as 

a basis for his retention in ad seg at the direction of defendants Arnold, Young and Popovits at the 

January 24, 2013 classification hearing. (Id. at 12.) Defendants Arnold, Young and Popovits also 

requested plaintiff’s transfer away from CSP-Solano. (Id.) On May 25, 2013, plaintiff was 

transferred to Folsom State Prison. (Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff sent defendant Swarthout a “written communication” via the U.S. Mail, 

informing him of the retaliation by defendants Ringler, Young, Ruiz and Scotland. (Id.) 

Defendant Swarthout disregarded plaintiff’s plea for assistance in a memorandum dated April 29, 

2013, in which he advised plaintiff to submit another 602 grievance. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that all at times relevant, defendant Swarthout was aware of the policy of 

retaliation enacted by defendants Ringler, Ruiz and Young via complaints submitted from civil 

rights organizations. (Id. at 14.) 

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IV. Plaintiff’s Legal Claims

The undersigned herein describes the legal claims raised by plaintiff. 

Claim One

Plaintiff alleges a retaliation claim against defendants Ringler, Zuniga and Scotland based 

on the December 5, 2012 search of his property. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants 

were retaliating against him based on their knowledge of his lawsuit against CDCR discussed 

during the telephonic settlement conference in defendant Scotland’s office. (Id.)

Claim Two

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Zuniga and Ringler destroyed his Korans during the 

December 5, 2012 search in retaliation for his lawsuit against CDCR discussed during the 

telephonic settlement conference in defendant Scotland’s office. (Id.)

Claim Three

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Ringler retaliated against him for his legal activities when 

Ringler prepared the January 17, 2013 chrono. (Id. at 16.)

Claim Four

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Henry, Young, Popovits and Arnold retaliated against him 

for his legal activities when they held him in ad seg from January 16, 2013 to April 25, 2013. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that these defendants entered into an agreement with the other defendants to 

retaliate against plaintiff for his legal activities. (Id.) 

Claim Five

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Ruiz retaliated against him for his legal activities when he 

conducted the search of plaintiff’s quarters on January 17, 2013. (Id.) As discussed above, this 

search resulted in plaintiff being charged with possession of contraband, i.e., a charger. Plaintiff 

alleges that defendant Ruiz entered into an agreement with the other defendants to retaliate 

against plaintiff for his legal activities. (Id.) 

 Claim Six

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Muldong retaliated against him for his legal activities by 

issuing the rules violation report charging plaintiff with misuse of the state computer. (Id. at 17.) 

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Plaintiff alleges that defendant Muldong entered into an agreement with the other defendants to 

retaliate against plaintiff for his legal activities. (Id.) 

Claim Seven

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Ringler retaliated against him for his legal activities when 

Ringler confiscated plaintiff’s personal property for no legitimate purpose. (Id.)

Claim Eight

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Swarthout’s failure or refusal to properly supervise or train 

the other named defendants “fostered or created a policy of overt retaliation.” (Id.)

Claim Nine

Plaintiff alleges that all defendants conspired to retaliate against him for his legal activities 

and to violate his right to religious freedom pursuant to California Civil Code § 52.1. (Id. at 18.) 

V. Analysis

Defendants move to dismiss claims 1 and 2 against defendant Zuniga, and claims 3, 4, 5, 

6, 8 and 9.

A. Claims 1 and 2 Against Defendant Zuniga, Claims 3, 4, 5, 6

Legal Standard for Retaliation

It is well-established that prison inmates have a constitutional right to freedom from 

retaliation for engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 

F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2005). A prisoner retaliation claim has five elements. First, plaintiff must 

allege and show that he engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment. See Watison v. 

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). Second, a “plaintiff must claim that the defendant 

took adverse action against the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567). “The adverse 

action need not be an independent constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 

802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995)). Third, the plaintiff must allege and show a causal connection between 

the protected conduct and the adverse action. Id. Fourth, the plaintiff must allege and prove 

either a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights or some other harm. Id.

Finally, plaintiff must allege and show that the retaliatory action “‘did not advance legitimate 

goals of the correctional institution....’” Id. (quoting Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th 

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Cir. 1985)).

Claims 1 and 2 Against Defendant Zuniga

In claim 1, plaintiff alleges that defendant Zuniga participated in the December 5, 2012 

search of plaintiff’s housing area with defendant Ringler in retaliation for plaintiff’s legal 

activities. In claim 2, plaintiff alleges that, during the December 5, 2012 search, defendants 

Zuniga and Ringler destroyed plaintiff’s Koran in retaliation for his legal activities. 

Defendants move to dismiss the retaliation claims alleged against defendant Zuniga in 

claims 1 and 2 on the grounds that plaintiff fails to allege that defendant Zuniga knew about any 

of plaintiff’s First Amendment activities. Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to plead facts 

demonstrating that plaintiff’s protected conduct, i.e., his legal activities, were a substantial 

motivating factor behind defendant Zuniga’s cell searches.

Defendants are correct that plaintiff has not directly alleged that defendant Zuniga had 

knowledge of his legal activities. However, plaintiff alleges that defendant Zuniga joined 

defendant Ringler, against whom he has stated a potentially colorable retaliation claim, to conduct 

the December 5, 2012 search. Plaintiff alleges that defendants conducted the search, although 

neither defendant was assigned to his housing area. Plaintiff alleges that at the conclusion of the 

search, defendant Ringler asked plaintiff, in a sarcastic voice, “How did your case turn out?” 

Plaintiff alleges that both defendant Ringler and Zuniga were disciplined as a result of the 

grievance he filed alleging that the December 5, 2012 search was retaliatory.

The timing and nature of the alleged retaliatory activities can provide circumstantial 

evidence of retaliation. See Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 13116 (9th Cir. 

1989); see Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (“timing can properly be considered as circumstantial evidence of 

retaliatory intent”). Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts against defendant Zuniga from which 

retaliatory intent may be reasonably inferred. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss 

plaintiff’s retaliation claims against defendant Zuniga should be denied.

Claim 3 Against Defendant Ringler

In claim 3, plaintiff alleges that defendant Ringler submitted the 128-B Chrono dated 

January 17, 2013, in retaliation for plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. Defendants 

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moved to dismiss this claim in the first motion to dismiss. In the December 19, 2104 findings and 

recommendations, the undersigned recommended that defendants’ motion to dismiss claim 3 be 

denied for the reasons stated herein: 

According to defendants, the Bulletins allegedly authored by 

plaintiff gave Ringler legitimate concern as to his own safety, as 

well as the safety and security of the institution, and the proper way 

to document this information was on a 128-B Chrono. In support, 

defendants cite Title 15, California Code of Regulations § 3000, 

which provides in pertinent part:

General Chrono means a CDC Form 128-B (Rev. 4-74) which is 

used to document information about inmates and inmate behavior. 

Such information may include, but is not limited to, documentation 

of enemies, records of disciplinary or classification matters, pay

reductions or inability to satisfactorily perform a job, refusal to 

comply with grooming standards, removal from a program, records 

of parole or social service matters.

(See Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 29-1 at 14-15.)

Plaintiff counters that he had a right, under applicable regulations, 

to file a grievance on behalf of a group of inmates. See 15 Cal. 

Code Regs. § 3084.2(h) (addressing procedures for a “Group 

appeal.”). According to plaintiff, “Since plaintiff’s exercise of his 

First Amendment [r]ight to seek redress of grievances was the 

ultimate subject of the 128B Chrono, plaintiff submits it should be 

construed as an adverse action supporting his claim of retaliation.” 

(Opposition, ECF No. 33 at 8.) Plaintiff further argues that it has 

not been established that he was the author of the Bulletins, and that 

defendant Ringler “erroneously and unjustifiably concluded that 

plaintiff was the ‘author.’” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff is essentially 

arguing that Ringler retaliated against him for perceived 

participation in protected activity under the First Amendment.

This issue seems better-suited for resolution at summary judgment 

or trial than on a motion to dismiss. It is unclear whether authoring 

and posting the Bulletins constitutes protected activity under the

First Amendment. At this stage of the pleadings, defendants have 

failed to establish that it was not so protected.

Moreover, significant factual questions are presented regarding who 

posted the Bulletins, where and when they were posted, what 

communications defendant Ringler received in connection with 

their posting, and whether he had, as defendants assert, a 

“legitimate safety concern” arising out of their contents. The 

allegations in the first amended complaint and the documents cited 

therein do not provide a basis for conclusively determining that 

plaintiff posted the Bulletins; accordingly, defendants cannot 

establish that plaintiff was legitimately disciplined for posting 

them.

Finally, the Chrono recommends plaintiff’s transfer to another 

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institution. Transfer can constitute adverse action for purposes of a 

First Amendment retaliation claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527 

(9th Cir. 1985). While the mere fact that defendant Ringler 

recommended plaintiff’s transfer does not make him liable for 

retaliation, the recommendation does, at the pleadings stage, bolster 

plaintiff’s claim that Ringler had a retaliatory motive in writing the 

Chrono.

Therefore, it is recommended that defendants’ motion to dismiss 

plaintiff’s third claim be denied.

(ECF No. 41 at 14-15.)

In the pending motion, defendants move to dismiss claim 3 against defendant Ringler on 

essentially the same grounds raised in the first motion to dismiss. (ECF No9. 49-1 at 17-18.) 

The undersigned recommends that the motion to dismiss claim 3 against defendant Ringler be 

denied for the reasons set forth above. 

Claim 5 Against Defendant Ruiz

The undersigned herein summarizes plaintiff’s retaliation claim against defendant Ruiz. 

Plaintiff alleges that on January 17, 2013, Officer Williamson searched plaintiff’s living 

space and personal property and discovered no contraband. Plaintiff alleges that 30 minutes after 

Officer Williamson conducted this search, defendant Ruiz searched plaintiff’s living quarters 

again. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Ruiz found an electrical plug or charger. Plaintiff alleges 

that although he was allowed to possess this charger, defendant Ruiz charged plaintiff with 

possession of dangerous contraband based on his possession of this charger. Plaintiff alleges that 

defendant Ruiz conducted the search and issued the disciplinary report in retaliation for the 

grievance plaintiff filed against defendant Ringler based on the December 5, 2012 search. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Ruiz is a close personal friend of defendant Ringler and that 

defendant Ruiz does not normally conduct contraband searches in plaintiff’s housing unit. 

In the first motion to dismiss, defendants argued that cell searches were permitted under 

California law, and that in this instance, defendant Ruiz’s search of plaintiff’s cell was justified 

by his discovery of contraband. (ECF No. 41 at 16-17.) The undersigned rejected this argument, 

finding that cell searches may not be undertaken solely for retaliatory purposes. (Id.) The 

undersigned also rejected defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s claims against defendant Ruiz 

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were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), on the grounds that this argument was 

more appropriately raised in a summary judgment motion. (Id.)

In their second motion to dismiss, defendants move to dismiss the conspiracy to retaliate 

claim against defendant Ruiz on the grounds that plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts that 

defendant Ruiz entered into an agreement with defendant Ringler to retaliate against plaintiff.

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim that defendants Ringler and Ruiz were close friends is not 

sufficient to demonstrate that defendants entered into an agreement to retaliate against plaintiff.

The undersigned agrees with defendants that plaintiff is raising a conspiracy to retaliate 

claim against defendant Ruiz. A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons who, 

by some concerted action, intend to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of 

harming another which results in damage. Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 

(9th Cir. 1999). “Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under § 1983, and it does not enlarge 

the nature of the claims asserted by the plaintiff, as there must always be an underlying 

constitutional violation.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts to plausibly show an 

agreement between co-conspirators to retaliate with the common objective to violate 

constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Furthermore, a retaliation claim is not 

plausible if there are “more likely explanations” for the action. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 195. 

Plaintiff must allege enough facts to plausibly show defendants agreed to retaliate against him. 

See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. 

For a section 1983 conspiracy claim, “an agreement or meeting of minds to violate [the 

plaintiff's] constitutional rights must be shown.” Woodrum v. Woodward Cnty., 866 F.2d 1121, 

1126 (9th Cir. 1989). However, “[d]irect evidence of improper motive or an agreement to violate 

a plaintiff’s constitutional rights will only rarely be available. Instead, it will almost always be 

necessary to infer such agreements from circumstantial evidence or the existence of joint action.”

Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1302 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, “an 

agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of circumstantial evidence such as

the actions of the defendants.” Id. at 1301.

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The undersigned agrees with defendants that plaintiff’s assertion that defendants Ruiz and 

Ringler were close friends does not sufficiently demonstrate that defendants agreed to violate 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Bliss v. U.S. , 2014 WL 4415319 at *6 (M.D. Penn.) 

(granting Rule 20 motion to dismiss conspiracy claim on grounds that allegation that defendants 

were friends did not adequately demonstrate an agreement between individuals); O’Toole v. City 

of Antioch, 2015 WL 5138277 at *21 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting defendants summary judgment 

as to conspiracy claim based solely on allegations that defendants used to work together and were 

friends for years; court found that these allegations were not sufficient to establish that defendants 

were involved in any agreement to commit constitutional violations); McGee v. Dunn, 2015 WL 

9077386 at * 7 (S.D. N.Y. 2015) (court granted summary judgment as to conspiracy claim, 

finding that, “Other than asserting that defendants Dunn and Karst were friends as stated in the 

complaint, the plaintiff offers no evidence to show an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ 

between the two.”).

The undersigned further finds that an agreement to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights 

between defendants Ringler and Ruiz cannot be reasonably inferred from plaintiff’s suggestion 

that defendant Ruiz planted the charger. Plaintiff’s claim that defendant Ruiz planted the charger 

is not adequate circumstantial evidence of an agreement between defendants Ruiz and Ringler.2

Plaintiff’s opposition contains no additional allegations demonstrating a meeting of the 

minds between defendants Ringler and Ruiz. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the 

conspiracy to retaliate claim against defendant Ruiz be granted on grounds that plaintiff has not 

pled sufficient facts to demonstrate a meeting of the minds between defendants Ruiz and Ringler.3

 

2

 The undersigned notes that plaintiff’s claims regarding the charger are somewhat inconsistent. 

While he suggests that the charger was planted, he also claims that he was allowed to possess it.

 

3

 Defendants further argue that the documentation shows that defendant Ruiz searched the entire 

building # 20, in accordance with his duties. Defendants attach a copy of the Rules Violation 

Report prepared by defendant Ruiz as exhibit E to their motion to dismiss. Defendants argue that 

this report demonstrates that defendant Ruiz had no knowledge of whether plaintiff’s cell had 

been previously searched and that he had no reason to target plaintiff. This argument is very 

similar to the one raised in defendants’ first motion to dismiss. However, the undersigned need 

not reach this argument because plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts in support of his 

conspiracy claim.

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Claim 4 Against Defendant Henry

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Henry issued the “lock up order” for plaintiff to be placed 

in administrative segregation because he was conspiring with defendant Ringler to retaliate 

against plaintiff for filing the grievance against defendant Ringler regarding the December 5, 

2012 search. Defendants have attached a copy of the lock-up order to the motion to dismiss. 

(ECF No. 49-1 at 39.) 

A court ordinarily may not consider evidence outside the complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 

2001). However, a court may consider evidence on which the complaint “necessarily relies” if: 

(1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff’s claim; and 

(3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion. See Branch v. 

Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County 

of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 

328 F.3d 1136, 1141 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 n.3 

(2d Cir. 2002). The court may treat such a document as “part of the complaint, and thus may 

assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” United 

States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

Because the second amended complaint refers to the lock-up order issued by defendant 

Henry, the lock-up order is essential to plaintiff’s claim, and no party questions the authenticity of 

the lock-up order attached to the motion to dismiss, the undersigned treats this lock-up order as 

part of plaintiff’s second amended complaint.

The lock-up order states that on January 16, 2013, plaintiff was removed from Facility D 

general population and placed in ad seg. (ECF No. 19-1 at 39.) The lock-up order goes on to 

state that information was received by staff identifying plaintiff as the “author of and placing 

inappropriate material about Correctional Officer S. Ringler in all Facility D housing unit.” (Id.) 

“Based on the nature of this article, it could be deemed as solicitation for other inmates to create 

disorder.” (Id.) “Also, any interactions by Officer Ringler with you can be deemed as retaliation 

for your publications.” (Id.) “Your presence in the general population ... is deemed a threat to 

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the safety and security of the institution...” (Id.) 

According to the lock-up order, plaintiff was placed in ad seg because of the bulletins he 

allegedly printed and posted containing statements regarding defendant Ringler. 

In their first motion to dismiss, defendants argued that defendant Henry had a legitimate 

reason for writing the lock-up order. (ECF No. 41 at 15.) The undersigned rejected this 

argument on the grounds that plaintiff’s alleged authoring and posting of the bulletins, on which 

the lock-up order was based, may have constituted protected activity under the First Amendment. 

(Id. at 16.) The undersigned also found that the allegations in the complaint did not provide a 

basis for concluding that plaintiff posted the bulletins, meaning that the argument that he was 

legitimately placed in administrative segregation was unavailing at this stage of the case. (Id.) 

In the second motion to dismiss, defendants argue that plaintiff has not pled sufficient 

facts in support of his claim that defendant Henry conspired with defendant Ringler to retaliate 

against plaintiff. Defendants move to dismiss the conspiracy to retaliate claim against defendant 

Henry on the grounds that plaintiff has not plead sufficient facts that defendant Henry entered into 

an agreement with defendant Ringler to retaliate against plaintiff. Defendants argue that 

plaintiff’s claim that defendants Ringler and Henry were close friends is not sufficient to 

demonstrate that defendants entered into an agreement to retaliate against plaintiff.

For the same reasons the undersigned above found that plaintiff’s conspiracy to retaliate 

claim against defendant Ruiz was not adequately pled, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s 

conspiracy to retaliate claim against defendant Henry is not adequately pled. Plaintiff’s claim that 

defendants Henry and Ringler were close friends does not adequately demonstrate a meeting of 

the minds. 

Even assuming that plaintiff did not post the bulletins, this circumstance does not 

adequately demonstrate an agreement between defendants Ringler and Henry to violate 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The alleged fact that defendant Ringler falsely accused plaintiff 

of posting the bulletins does not demonstrate that defendant Henry knew that the accusations 

were false when he issued the lock-up order. Plaintiff has pled no facts demonstrating that 

defendant Henry knew that the charges were allegedly false. Accordingly, the undersigned 

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recommends that the conspiracy to retaliate claim against defendant Henry be dismissed. 

Claim 4 Against Defendants Young, Popovits and Arnold 

Plaintiff alleges that on January 8, 2013, defendants Young, Popovits and Arnold decided 

to retain him in ad seg based on the rules violation report charging him with misusing the 

computer as part of the conspiracy with defendant Ringler to retaliate against plaintiff for filing a 

grievance against him. (ECF No. 45 at 12.) These defendants also requested that plaintiff be 

transferred away from CSP-Solano. (Id.) 

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s conspiracy to retaliate claims against defendants Young, 

Popovits and Arnold should be dismissed because plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that 

these defendants knew about plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights or that these 

defendants acted in response to plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. Defendants 

argue that plaintiff has alleged no facts demonstrating that any of these defendants had any reason 

for believing that the rules violation report, the supporting documentation, or the decision of the 

hearing officer, were written in bad faith. 

The undersigned agrees with defendants that plaintiff’s second amended complaint 

contains no allegations demonstrating that defendants Young, Popovits and Arnold knew that the 

disciplinary charges and related documents were allegedly false. Plaintiff has also pled no facts 

demonstrating that these defendants had an agreement to conspire with defendant Ringler to 

retaliate against plaintiff for his legal activities. Accordingly, defendants Young, Popovits and 

Arnold should be dismissed.

Claim 6: Retaliation Claims Against Defendant Muldong

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Muldong retaliated against him for his legal activities by 

issuing the rules violation report charging plaintiff with misuse of the state computer. 

In the findings and recommendations addressing the first motion to dismiss, the 

undersigned recommended that the motion to dismiss the retaliation claim against defendant 

Muldong be granted:

Defendants have the better of this argument. Regardless of whether 

plaintiff did or did not print the Flier, Muldong had some basis for 

believing that plaintiff was responsible, based on plaintiff’s 

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admission that he “did initially start on the document at my work 

site about C/O Ringler, however, I decided to erase it off the 

computer.” (ECF No. 29-1 at 46.) As such, Muldong had a duty 

under § 3312(a)(3) to report “misconduct ... believed to be a 

violation of law...”

For this reason, plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim against 

defendant Muldong and it is recommended that defendants’ motion 

to dismiss be granted.

(ECF No. 41 at 18.) 

As discussed above, Judge England granted plaintiff leave to amend as to this claim. 

In the second amended complaint, plaintiff now claims that defendant Muldong stated in 

the rules violation report that the bulletin was printed before plaintiff arrived at his work 

assignment. (ECF No. 45 at 11.) Plaintiff also alleges that in December 2012, defendant 

Muldong told plaintiff that he would not discipline any inmate for printing personal documents on 

the computers because they were available to inmates for that purpose. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff also 

alleges that prior to January 8, 2013, defendant Muldong allowed other inmates to type, edit and 

print personal documents on the computers without risk of discipline. (Id.) Based on these 

allegations, plaintiff is apparently claiming that defendant Muldong had no basis to believe that 

plaintiff had committed misconduct when he issued the rules violation report.

Defendants have attached a copy of the rules violation report issued by defendant 

Muldong to the motion to dismiss. Because the second amended complaint refers to the rules 

violation report, the rules violation report is essential to plaintiff’s claim, and no party questions 

the authenticity of the rules violation report attached to the motion to dismiss, the undersigned 

treats this rules violation report as part of plaintiff’s second amended complaint. See Branch v. 

Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County 

of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).

The rules violation report charges plaintiff with misuse of a state computer during work 

on assignment. (ECF No. 29-1 at 22.) The rules violation report states that plaintiff admitted that

he was the author of the document but that his original intent was not to print the document. (Id.) 

Plaintiff also stated that while he started to work on the document at his work site, he decided to 

erase it off the computer. (Id. at 26.) Plaintiff stated that he did not know who made the 

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document or how it got out. (Id.) The Rules Violation Report contains a statement by defendant 

Muldong that the document discovered on January 8, 2013, i.e., the Bulletin, was printed before 

plaintiff arrived at work. (Id. at 32.) Defendant Muldong also stated that it was possible that the 

document was printed by a clerk other than plaintiff. (Id.) 

Defendants also provided a copy of the bulletin plaintiff is alleged to have authored. 

Because the second amended complaint refers to this document, it is essential to plaintiff’s claim, 

and no party questions the authenticity of this document, the undersigned treats this document as 

part of plaintiff’s second amended complaint. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th 

Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

The bulletin states that defendant Ringler recently harassed inmates in retaliation for using 

the appeals process, destroyed property and defaced sacred religious artifacts. (ECF No. 29-1 at 

33.) The bulletin goes on to state that as a result of these actions by defendant Ringler, CDCR 

Hiring Authority is conducting an investigation to determine whether sanctions should be 

imposed against defendant Ringler. (Id.) The bulletin asks inmates who have observed defendant 

Ringler engaging in any of the listed activities to provide a statement to CAIR California and S.D. 

Legal Services. (Id.)

In the second amended complaint, plaintiff added allegations in an attempt to demonstrate 

that defendant Muldong did not have good reason to believe that plaintiff had committed 

misconduct. In the pending motion to dismiss, defendants argue that the allegations in the second 

amended complaint still demonstrate that defendant Muldong had good reason to believe that 

plaintiff had committed misconduct. The undersigned agrees with defendants. Even if plaintiff 

did not actually print the bulletin, he does not deny being the author. Moreover, even if defendant 

Muldong allowed inmates to use the computers for personal use, it is clear that defendant 

Muldong did not intend for inmates to use the computers to prepare documents such as the 

bulletin described above. 

In addition, plaintiff is alleging that defendant Muldong was motivated to file the 

allegedly false disciplinary charges because he had conspired with defendant Ringler to retaliate 

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against plaintiff for his legal activities. However, plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not 

contain any specific allegations demonstrating an agreement between defendants Muldong and 

Ringler. Defendant Muldong’s admissions that it was possible that another inmate printed the 

bulletin and that the bulletin was printed before plaintiff arrived at work suggest that defendant 

Muldong was not “out to get” plaintiff in support of the alleged conspiracy to retaliate. 

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned again recommends that the conspiracy to 

retaliate claims against defendant Muldong be dismissed.

B. Claim 8

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Swarthout’s failure or refusal to properly supervise or train 

the other named defendants fostered or created a policy of overt retaliation.

Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to establish 

that defendant Swarthout knew of any unlawful conduct by any other defendants before or at the 

time the alleged unlawful conduct occurred. Defendants quote Henry v. Sanchez, 923 F.Supp. 

1266, 1272 (C.D. Cal. 1996), for the proposition that “[a] supervisory official, such as a warden, 

maybe liable under Section 1983 only if he was personally involved in the constitutional 

deprivations, or if there was a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 

conduct and the constitutional violation.” Citing Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F.Supp. 1235, 1239 (S.D. 

Cal. 1997), defendants argue that for there to be a sufficient causal connection, the official must 

have actually known of a constitutional violation.

Defendants’ argument that plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant Swarthout knew that 

defendants were violating plaintiff’s constitutional rights in order to state a “failure to train” claim 

is not accurate. However, for the reasons discussed below, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has 

not stated a potentially colorable “failure to train” claim against defendant Swarthout. 

To state a claim for failure to train, a prisoner must allege facts to support a finding that 

the failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference. See Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 

1213 (9th Cir. 1998). In other words, plaintiff must allege that, not only was the training 

inadequate, but that the inadequacy was the result of a deliberate or conscious choice by 

defendant Swarthout. Id. at 1213 (citing City of Canton,. Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 

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(1989).

Other than his conclusory assertion, plaintiff has pled no facts demonstrating that 

defendant Swarthout failed to train any defendant. Moreover, plaintiff has pled no facts 

demonstrating that any alleged failure to train by defendant Swarthout was the result of a 

deliberate or conscious choice. On these grounds, the undersigned recommends that the failure to 

train claim against defendant Swarthout be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (court may 

dismiss case at any time it determines that it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted).

C. Claim 9

In claim 9, plaintiff alleges that all defendants conspired to retaliate against him for his 

legal activities and to violate his right to religious freedom pursuant to California Civil Code § 

52.1, i.e., The Bane Act.

The Bane Act proscribes conduct by any person, “whether or not acting under color of 

law,” who “interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, 

intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of 

rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the 

Constitution or laws of this state. . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). An action may be brought by 

the government, id., or by an individual, id. § 52.1(b), in a “civil action for damages, including, 

but not limited to, damages under Section 52,4injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable 

 

4 Damages recoverable under Cal. Civil Code 52(b) are as follows: 

. . . (b) Whoever denies the right provided by Section 51.7 or 51.9, 

or aids, incites, or conspires in that denial, is liable for each and 

every offense for the actual damages suffered by any person denied 

that right and, in addition, the following:

(1) An amount to be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without 

a jury, for exemplary damages.

(2) A civil penalty of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be 

awarded to the person denied the right provided by Section 51.7 in 

any action brought by the person denied the right, or by the 

Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney. An action 

for that penalty brought pursuant to Section 51.7 shall be 

commenced within three years of the alleged practice.

(3) Attorney's fees as may be determined by the court.

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relief to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured,” id.

“To obtain relief under Civil Code section 52.1, a plaintiff need not allege the defendant 

acted with discriminatory animus or intent; a defendant is liable if he or she interfered with the 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion.” O’Toole v. 

Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 4th 488, 502 (2006), citing Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 32 

Cal. 4th 820, 841-43 (2004). Section 52.1 “require[s] an attempted or completed act of 

interference with a legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion.” Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 

Cal. 4th 329, 334 (1998) (quoted with approval in City and Cnty. of San Francisco v. Ballard, 136 

Cal. App. 4th 381, 409 (2006)). “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the 

specified improper means (i.e., threats, intimidation or coercion), tried to or did prevent the 

plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff 

to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.” Shoyoye v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 956 (2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Technically, whether a constitutional violation occurred and whether that violation was 

accompanied by any threats, intimidation or coercion are separate analytical inquiries (albeit with 

intertwining facts).” Barsamian v. City of Kingsburg, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1057 (E.D. Cal. 

2009).

“It may be true that this section and other similar California statutes were enacted in 

response to the alarming increase in hate crimes. Nevertheless, there is no requirement that the 

violence be extreme or motivated by hate in the plain language of the sections, or in the cases 

construing them; there is also no requirement that the act constitute a crime. If the California 

legislature wanted to limit the reach of the statute to extreme, criminal acts of violence, it could 

have explicitly said so.” Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1289 

(9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal punctuation marks omitted).

The elements of a claim under section 52.1 are:

(1) that the defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with 

the plaintiff's constitutional or statutory right by threatening or 

committing violent acts; (2) that the plaintiff reasonably believed 

that if she exercised her constitutional right, the defendant would 

commit violence against her or her property [or] that the defendant 

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injured the plaintiff or her property to prevent her from exercising 

her right or retaliate[d] against the plaintiff for having exercised her 

right; (3) that the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) that the defendant's 

conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm.

McCue v. South Fork Union Elementary School, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Cal. 2011) 

(citing Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 882 (2007), and CACI 

No. 3025).

In the first motion to dismiss, defendants argued that plaintiff had failed to state a Bane 

Act claim because “[n]one of the [alleged] acts are violent acts, none of them involve physical 

contact, and some of these acts consist only of decision-making.” (ECF No. 41 at 21.) The 

undersigned found that defendants’ contention was largely correct, with the exception of 

defendants Ringler and Zuniga: 

Plaintiff alleges that after these defendants concluded their 

December 5, 2012 cell search, “two of plaintiff’s Holy Korans were 

destroyed and or desecrated. One Koran was torn lengthwise or 

crosswise while the other was discovered face down in some 

unknown liquid.” (FAC ¶ 11, ECF No. 18.) At the conclusion of 

the search, plaintiff alleges that Ringler sarcastically asked him, 

“How did your case turn out?” (Id. ¶ 12.) Nine days later, plaintiff 

alleges that defendant Ringler “spontaneously stated to [him,] ‘I 

know all about you, I’m not finished with you yet.’” (Id. ¶ 18.) 

These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the first two elements of a 

Bane Act claim. The alleged desecration and/or destruction of 

plaintiff’s Korans was both an allegedly violent act and an injury to 

his property. Ringler’s question regarding the prior case indicates 

an intent to interfere with or retaliate for plaintiff’s exercise of his 

Constitutional right of access to the courts. Ringler’s subsequent 

spontaneous statement to plaintiff, coming shortly after the 

challenged cell search in which the Korans were damaged, could be 

construed as a threat to commit such acts in the future. 

Plaintiff has also alleged that he suffered harm (the third element of 

a Bane Act claim), in that his Korans were damaged during the 

search. Finally, he has alleged harm (the fourth and final element) 

as a result of the December 5, 2012 search and Ringler’s 

statements, pleading, “As a proximate or direct result of the 

desecration of plaintiff’s Holy Koran and threats of further 

retaliation, plaintiff experienced what he believed to be stress due to 

symptoms such as depression, lack of energy, appetite and loss of 

weight,” for which he sought medical attention. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 27.)

Based on the foregoing, it appears that the first amended complaint 

states a claim against defendants Ringler and Zuniga under 

California Civil Code § 52.1. Nevertheless, this claim should be 

dismissed against the remaining defendants. [Footnote 5]

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[Footnote 5: As Judge O’Neill observed, “[N]o case has actually 

applied supervisor liability to a Bane Act claim and this federal 

court is loath to expand the reach of Bane Act liability.” Sanchez v. 

Cit of Fresno, 914 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1118 n.19 (E.D. Cal. 2012). It 

therefore appears that defendant Scotland cannot be properly named 

as a defendant under the Bane Act despite plaintiff’s allegation that 

Scotland supervised Ringler’s cell searches.]

(Id. at 21-22.)

In the second amended complaint, plaintiff now alleges that all defendants conspired to 

violate the Bane Act. (ECF No. 45 at 18.)

Under California law, civil conspiracy requires a plaintiff to plead that “the conspiring 

parties reached a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of the 

minds in an unlawful arrangement.” See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 

(1999) (citing Vieux v. East Bay Reg'l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1343 (9th Cir. 1990)). Each 

conspirator “need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share 

the common objective of the conspiracy.” Id. at 856.

Plaintiff’s potentially colorable Bain Act claim is that defendants Ringler and Zuniga 

damaged his Korans on December 5, 2012. Thus, to succeed on his Bane Act conspiracy claim, 

plaintiff must allege that defendants conspired to help defendants Ringler and Zuniga damage the 

Korans on December 5, 2012. 

Defendants argue that plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that 

defendants Henry, Ruiz, Muldong, Young, Popovits and Arnold conspired with defendants 

Ringler and Zuniga to violate his rights under the Bane Act. The undersigned agrees. Plaintiff 

has not pled sufficient facts demonstrating that defendants Henry, Ruiz, Muldong, Young, 

Popovits and Arnold were in any way connected to the December 5, 2012 damage to the Korans. 

Plaintiff’s claims against these defendants involve incidents occurring after December 5, 2012. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim against these defendants for conspiring to violate the Bane Act 

should be dismissed. 

With respect to defendant Swarthout, the second amended complaint includes no 

allegations demonstrating that Swarthout entered an agreement to violate plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim against defendant Swarthout for conspiring to violate the 

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Bane Act should be dismissed. 

With respect to defendant Scotland, plaintiff alleges that in October 2012, defendants 

Ringler and Scotland became aware of plaintiff’s litigation against CDCR after plaintiff used the 

telephone in defendant Scotland’s office to participate in a telephonic settlement conference. 

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of having knowledge of plaintiff’s litigation, defendants Scotland 

and Ringler began retaliating against him. Plaintiff alleges that the first act of retaliation occurred 

on December 5, 2012, when defendants Ringler and Zuniga searched his cell. Plaintiff alleges 

that defendant Ringler conducted the search under the supervision of defendant Scotland. Based 

on these allegations, it may be reasonably inferred that defendant Scotland conspired with 

defendants Ringler and Zuniga to engage in the search that resulted in the damage to plaintiff’s 

Korans. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the Bane Act claim against defendant 

Scotland should be denied.

Conclusion

The undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied as to claims 1 

and 2 against defendant Zuniga, claim 3 against defendant Ringler and claim 9 as to defendant 

Scotland. The undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted in all 

other respects. 

If these findings and recommendations are adopted, this action will proceed on the 

following claims: claim 1 against defendants Ringler, Zuniga and Scotland; claim 2 against

defendants Zuniga and Ringler; claim 3 against defendant Ringler; claim 7 against defendant 

Ringler; and claim 9 against defendants Ringler, Zuniga and Scotland. 

Based on the extensive briefing by the parties with respect to both motions to dismiss, as 

well as the undersigned’s careful consideration of plaintiff’s claims, the undersigned finds that it 

is not likely that plaintiff can cure the pleading defects discussed in these findings and 

recommendations. For that reason, the undersigned does not grant plaintiff leave to amend. 

Accordingly, IT IS HERBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF 

No. 49) be denied as to claims 1 and 2 against defendant Zuniga, claim 3 against defendant 

Ringler and claim 9 as to defendant Scotland; defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted in 

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all other respects. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 1, 2016

Mcmill578.57

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