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Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 20, 2015 Decided January 5, 2016

No. 14-5304

ANGLERS CONSERVATION NETWORK, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

PENNY SUE PRITZKER, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-01761)

Roger M. Fleming argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs were Erica A. Fuller and Stephen E. Roady.

Robert J. Lundman, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the briefs

were John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, and Brian C.

Toth, Attorney. Thekla Hansen-Young, Attorney, entered an

appearance.

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and SENTELLE and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

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RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: 

Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit claiming that federal

agencies unlawfully neglected to manage stocks of river herring

(alewives and blueback herring), and shad (American shad and

their smaller relatives, hickory shad) in the Atlantic Ocean from

New York to North Carolina.

These are schooling ocean fish. In early spring, as waters

warm, river herring and shad begin their annual spawning runs

into the mid-Atlantic coastal rivers and tributaries.1 Shad,

especially American shad, and more specifically the larger female

American shad, are prized game fish. They are like small tarpon,

some say, and are caught on shad darts (tiny lures) in the rivers

even though shad feed on plankton at sea and feed not at all on

their spawning runs. While migrating upstream, shad and river

herring2

 are prey for bald eagles and ospreys and other birds, such

as cormorants and gulls, and for striped bass making their annual

spawning run from the ocean about the same time into many of

the same rivers, and for other fish when they are at sea. 

Plaintiffs are two membership organizations. One is

dedicated to conserving wild marine fish, the other to promoting

1

 Historians believe that the 1778 early spring spawning run

of shad in the Schuylkill River at Valley Forge saved George

Washington’s army from starvation. See JOHN MCPHEE, THE

FOUNDING FISH 150-52 (2002). At Mt. Vernon, Washington had seen

enormous numbers of spawning shad moving up the Potomac River

toward Great Falls. Mr. McPhee plausibly surmises that, in

anticipation of a similar spring run and in the hope of preserving his

army, Washington decided to encamp that winter at Valley Forge on

the edge of the Schuylkill River. Id. 151-52.

2

 The term “river” herring distinguishes these fish from the

Atlantic herring, which does not spawn in freshwater.

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surf fishing for striped bass and other saltwater fish. Two

individuals are also plaintiffs, one a fishing boat captain on the

New Jersey shore, the other a town “herring warden”

responsible for ensuring fish passage during spawning runs. 

They sued the Secretary of the Department of Commerce, the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the

National Marine Fisheries Service (an agency within the

Commerce Department), claiming that a decision of the MidAtlantic Fishery Management Council – of which more hereafter

– failed to manage and protect river herring and shad, thus

reducing their availability as food for other species such as

striped bass. The district court granted the government’s motion

to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no basis

for judicial review of the Fishery Council’s decision. 

In support of their complaint, plaintiffs invoked the

Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.

94-265, 90 Stat. 331, as amended, and the judicial review

provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. 

The 1976 Fishery Conservation Act, commonly known as the

Magnuson-Stevens Act, seeks to “promote domestic commercial

and recreational fishing under sound conservation and

management principles,” 16 U.S.C § 1801(b)(3), in the

“exclusive economic zone” of the United States, an area

extending 200 nautical miles seaward from each state’s

coastline. (Within the territorial sea, which extends three

geographic miles from the coastline, the state has jurisdiction to

regulate fishing, see United States v. Maine, 469 U.S. 504, 513

(1985).) The Act established eight regional Fishery

Management Councils, each of which has “authority over a

specific geographic region and is composed of members who

represent the interests of the states included in that region.” 

C&W Fish Co., Inc. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1557-58 (D.C. Cir.

1991) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1852). The voting members of these

Councils are officials responsible for fishery management in

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each coastal state in the region, individuals nominated by state

Governors and others appointed by the Commerce Secretary,

and the regional administrator of the Commerce Department’s

Fisheries Service. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b). The Mid-Atlantic

Council now has twenty-one voting members – seven state

officials, thirteen private individuals, and the Fisheries Service

regional administrator. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)(B). The Council

adopts proposals by a majority vote of those present and voting. 

16 U.S.C. § 1852(e)(1).

The Mid-Atlantic Council, like all regional Councils, has

no authority to promulgate federal rules. See Gen. Category

Scallop Fishermen v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 635 F.3d

106, 112 n.15 (3d Cir. 2011). Under its long-time Executive

Director, Daniel T. Furlong, the Mid-Atlantic Council has

assisted federal authorities in seeking to accomplish the goals of

the Act. The Mid-Atlantic Council has held numerous open

hearings, conducted extensive research, and forwarded proposals

to the National Marine Fisheries Service, to whom the Secretary

delegated authority. 

Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the Council “shall”

propose fishery management plans and implementing

regulations “for each fishery under its authority that requires

conservation and management . . ..” 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1). 

The Council “shall” also propose amendments to these plans

when “necessary from time to time,” id., and suggest regulations

to implement these proposed amendments, 16 U.S.C. § 1853(c). 

After receiving a proposal from the Mid-Atlantic Council, the

Fisheries Service must initiate a comment period and must then

decide to accept, reject, or partially accept the proposed plan or

amendment. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(3). If the Fisheries Service

takes no action within thirty days after the close of the comment

period, the Council’s proposal goes into effect “as if approved.” 

Id. The Act also provides that the Commerce Secretary “may

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prepare a fishery management plan” for fisheries in need of

conservation if “the appropriate Council fails to develop and

submit [a plan] after a reasonable period of time . . ..” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1854(c)(1).

The controversy here deals with a proposed amendment

to an existing management plan that the Fisheries Service first

adopted in 1983. The plan covers mackerel, squid, and

butterfish, which are managed together because they are

commercially fished in the same manner, using bottom or midwater trawls. The initial management plan, amended many

times since its adoption, established yearly quotas for each of

these species and limited the gear used to catch them. The

management plan also acknowledged that foreign and domestic

ships trawling for mackerel, squid, and butterfish inadvertently

catch other fish in their nets. Among the “bycatch” in the

mackerel fishery are river herring and shad. In an effort to

protect river herring and shad in the exclusive economic zone,

plaintiffs and others encouraged the Mid-Atlantic Council to

propose amendments to add these species to the mackerel, squid,

and butterfish plan and subject them to “science-based annual

catch limits . . . and accountability measures . . ..” Appellants’

Br. 2. 

The Mid-Atlantic Council has not yet taken that step. In

2012, the Council began developing Amendment 15 to the

Mackerel, Squid, and Butterfish Fishery Management Plan,

which would have proposed adding river herring and shad to the

Plan. Notice of Initiation of Scoping Process, 77 Fed. Reg.

65,867 (Oct. 31, 2012). After considering the Amendment, the

Council — in a ten-to-nine vote — decided in an October 2013

meeting that rather than approving the Amendment and

proposing it to the Fisheries Service, the Council would set up 

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a working group to study river herring and shad in more detail

and revisit the issue in three years.3

This decision, plaintiffs claim, violated the MagnusonStevens Act and is subject to judicial review under § 1855(f) of

that statute and the judicial review provision of the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. The MagnusonStevens Act provides for judicial review of “[r]egulations

promulgated by the Secretary under this chapter and . . . actions

that are taken by the Secretary under regulations which

implement a fishery management plan . . ..” 16 U.S.C. §

1855(f)(1)-(2). The Act incorporates, but only in part, the

judicial review section of the APA: “the appropriate court shall

only set aside any such regulation or action on a ground

specified in section 706(2)(A), (B), (C), or (D) of” the APA. 16

U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1)(B).4

 The Magnuson-Stevens Act thus does

not incorporate § 706(1) of the APA, which authorizes courts to

“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably

delayed.” 

According to plaintiffs, the Council’s decision not to

propose Amendment 15 at this time is within the MagnusonStevens Act’s provision allowing judicial review of “actions that

3

 To date, the Fisheries Service has taken no steps to add river

herring and shad to the Mackerel, Squid, and Butterfish Fishery

Management Plan.

4

 Section 706(2) of the APA has two additional subsections

not incorporated in the Magnuson-Stevens Act – § 706(2)(E), dealing

with judicial review of adjudications subject to APA §§ 556 and 557,

and § 706(2)(F), dealing with trial de novo in the reviewing court. 

The review provision of the Magnuson-Stevens Act also expressly

makes § 705 of the APA “not applicable.” 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1)(A). 

This APA provision authorizes reviewing courts to grant relief

pending review. 5 U.S.C. § 705. 

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are taken by the Secretary under regulations which implement

a fishery management plan.” 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(2). This, they

say, was an “action under the regulations that define all MidAtlantic fisheries” because “the Secretary terminated [the]

rulemaking . . ..” Appellants’ Br. 26. But it was the MidAtlantic Council, not the Secretary or the Fisheries Service, who

tabled Amendment 15 pending further study. Plaintiffs’ efforts

to show otherwise do not survive examination. 

In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that because the

regional administrator of the Fisheries Service spoke against

adopting the Amendment and voted against it in the October

2013 meeting, the Council’s decision could be attributed to the

Fisheries Service. See Anglers Conservation Network v.

Pritzker, 70 F. Supp. 3d 427, 435-36 (D.D.C. 2014). On appeal,

plaintiffs have not repeated this argument. Instead, they assert

that if a Council decides to forgo a necessary management plan

or amendment, the Fisheries Service is “the party responsible for

that action” because it “must fulfill its statutory responsibility as

a backstop” to the Council. Appellants’ Br. 30 (quoting

Guindon v. Pritzker, 31 F. Supp. 3d 169, 197-98 (D.D.C. 2014). 

But even if the Fisheries Service had such a broad, mandatory

duty to act as a “backstop” – a subject we discuss later – this

would at most obligate the Fisheries Service to act when the

Council fails to do so. It would not somehow transform the

inactions of the Council into “actions that are taken by the

Secretary” or the Fisheries Service. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(2). 

The Fisheries Service took no action subject to judicial review

under the Act.

Plaintiffs cite Flaherty v. Bryson, 850 F. Supp. 2d 38

(D.D.C. 2012), and Oceana, Inc. v. Pritzker, 24 F. Supp. 3d 49

(D.D.C. 2014), but those decisions do not support their position. 

The complaints in both cases objected to amendments of fishery

management plans and alleged that it was arbitrary and

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capricious for the Fisheries Service not to consider including

river herring and shad. Flaherty, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 45-46;

Oceana, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 56-57, 60-61. In Flaherty and in

Oceana, the Fisheries Service thus took federal agency action:

it issued regulations amending fishery management plans. As

a result, both cases were squarely within 16 U.S.C. §1855(f)(1),

which makes judicial review available “within 30 days after . .

. regulations are promulgated or the action is published in the

Federal Register . . ..” In this case, plaintiffs are not

complaining about a regulation or any other action taken by the

Fisheries Service. The only “action” they identify is that of the

Mid-Atlantic Council. 

Plaintiffs also assert a right to judicial review under §

706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which allows

review of “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. But this adds

nothing to their case. The judicial review provision of the

Magnuson-Stevens Act expressly incorporates most of APA §

706(2). For reasons already mentioned, the Mid-Atlantic

Council took the only action here – putting off a final decision

on Amendment 15. That action cannot be attributed either to the

Secretary or to the Fisheries Service. Plaintiffs do not contend

that the Council is itself a federal agency within the meaning of

the APA. Besides, the Council is not a defendant in this suit,

and we would therefore have no jurisdiction to review its

decision. See, e.g., Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff &

Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d

282, 295 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Even if the Mid-Atlantic Council were considered a

division of the federal Fisheries Service, and even if the

Council’s decision were somehow considered “agency action,”

it still would not be “final agency action” as § 704 of the APA

requires. Recommendations of subordinate officials are not

final for purposes of judicial review, regardless whether those

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recommendations might turn out to be influential. In Franklin

v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992), the Supreme Court

held that the Secretary of Commerce’s census report to the

President was not “final agency action” within the meaning of

§ 704. Although the President often accepted census reports

without change, the President is not bound to do so and can

order the Secretary to “reform the census” before the President

submits it to Congress. Id. at 797-98. Because the Secretary’s

report did not “directly affect the parties” or “complete[] [the

agency’s] decisionmaking process,” the Supreme Court

determined that the report was not then subject to judicial

review. Id. at 797. The Mid-Atlantic Council’s decision

regarding Amendment 15 is indistinguishable. This too was but

an intermediate step toward final agency action. 

Plaintiffs come closer to the nub of their grievance,

though no closer to a successful claim, when they describe their

complaint as aimed at agency inaction under § 706(1) of the

Administrative Procedure Act. There is one rather glaring

problem with this argument: the Magnuson-Stevens Act’s

judicial review provision states that a reviewing court “shall

only set aside” regulations and actions “on a ground specified

in” § 706(2)(A)-(D) of the APA. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1)(B)

(italics added).5

 APA § 706(1) is excluded, yet this is the APA

subsection giving courts the authority to “compel agency action

unlawfully withheld.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance,

5

 The judicial review provision of the Clean Air Act, which

plaintiffs invoked in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

467 U.S. 837, 841 (1984), contained a comparable modification of the

Administrative Procedure Act: “The provisions of section 553 through

557 and section 706 of Title 5 shall not, except as expressly provided

in this subsection, apply to actions to which this subsection applies.” 

42 U.S.C. §7607(d).

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542 U.S. 55, 62 (2004). So how can § 706(1) possibly entitle

plaintiffs to relief? Perhaps they believe that because the

Magnuson-Stevens Act excludes § 706(1), there is – in the

words of APA § 704 – “no other adequate remedy in a court” for

agency inaction and so judicial review pursuant to § 706(1) must

be available. We say “perhaps” because plaintiffs have not

shared with us their rationale. They have not done so because

the government, despite 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1)(B), conceded

that APA § 706(1) may provide a basis for relief in cases under

the Magnuson-Stevens Act. See Anglers, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 436

n.10; Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss,

at 18 n.7, ECF No. 29. The APA is not jurisdictional, see

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105-06 (1977), and so we will

assume arguendo that § 706(1) does apply.

Even so, plaintiffs are not entitled to relief. Section

706(1) permits judicial review of agency inaction, but only

within strict limits. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Courts can compel an

agency “to take a discrete agency action that it is required to

take.” Norton, 542 U.S. at 64; see also Montanans for Multiple

Use v. Barbouletos, 568 F.3d 225, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2009). This

standard reflects the common law writ of mandamus, which the

APA “carried forward” in § 706(1). Norton, 542 U.S. at 63. 

Thus, § 706(1) grants judicial review only if a federal agency

has a “ministerial or non-discretionary” duty amounting to “a

specific, unequivocal command.” Id. at 63-64.

Section 1854(c)(1) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act states

that if “the appropriate Council fails to develop and submit to

the Secretary, after a reasonable period of time, a fishery

management plan for . . . [a] fishery [that] requires conservation

and management,” the Secretary “may prepare” such a plan. 16

U.S.C. § 1854(c) (italics added). This is a “grant of authority,”

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as plaintiffs say, but it is a grant of discretionary, not mandatory,

authority.6

“The traditional, commonly repeated rule is that shall is

mandatory and may is permissive . . ..” ANTONIN SCALIA &

BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF

LEGAL TEXTS 112 (2012). Ordinarily, legislation using “shall”

indicates a mandatory duty while legislation using “may” grants

discretion. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001). 

We acknowledge that matters are not always so clear cut. There

are instances when “may” has been taken to mean “must” and

when “shall” has been construed to mean “may.” See, e.g.,

Mason v. Fearson, 50 U.S. 248, 258-59 (1850); Sierra Club v.

Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 856 (D.C. Cir. 2011). But when a

statutory provision uses both “shall” and “may,” it is a fair

inference that the writers intended the ordinary distinction. See,

e.g., Lopez, 531 U.S. at 241; United States ex rel. Siegel v.

Thoman, 156 U.S. 353, 359-60 (1895). One section of the

Magnuson-Stevens Act, the one at the center of plaintiffs’

complaint, uses the word “shall” nearly fifty times and the word

“may” nearly twenty. For example, if the Fisheries Service

determines that a fishery is overfished, the Service “shall” notify

the appropriate Council and ask it to develop a management

plan. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(2). If the Council does not do so

 6 Plaintiffs also rely on an amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens

Act setting a 2011 deadline for the Service to adopt management plans

for all fisheries that have not been designated as overfished. Pub. L.

No. 109–479, § 104(b), 120 Stat. 3575, 3584 (2007); see also

Flaherty, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 51-52. They argue that this deadline

requires the Fisheries Service to add “all stocks in need of

conservation and management,” including river herring and shad, to

a fishery management plan. Appellants’ Br. 44. Plaintiffs never

made this argument in the district court, and we therefore will not

consider it. See, e.g., Flynn v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue Serv., 269

F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 

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within two years, the Fisheries Service “shall prepare a fishery

management plan . . . to stop overfishing . . ..” 16 U.S.C. §

1854(e)(5) (italics added); see also N.C. Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v.

Gutierrez, 550 F.3d 16, 17 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The provision

with which we are concerned, on the other hand, states that the

Service “may prepare” its own plan or amendment for a fishery

that “requires conservation and management” if the Council has

not done so “after a reasonable period of time.” 16 U.S.C. §

1854(c) (italics added). If the “may” in § 1854(c) actually

meant “shall” or “must” – if, in other words, § 1854(c) imposed

a mandatory duty – § 1854(e) would be largely redundant. Any

fishery that is overfished will also necessarily require

conservation and management. Why impose a specific duty to

make a plan for overfished fisheries if there is already a general

duty to make a plan for all fisheries requiring conservation and

management, including those that are overfished?

Plaintiffs also suggest that the Fisheries Service was

required to identify river herring and shad as overfished stocks,

and therefore had a mandatory duty under § 1854(e) to develop

a fishery management plan. Appellants’ Br. 49-51. But the

Magnuson-Stevens Act makes clear that this duty arises only

if “the Secretary determines . . . that a fishery is overfished . .

..” 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(2) (italics added). Neither the

Fisheries Service nor the Secretary has ever determined that

river herring or shad are overfished, and the Magnuson-Stevens

Act does not impose a discrete ministerial duty on them to do

so.7

 Compare Sierra Club, 648 F.3d at 856. 

7

 The status of river herring and shad populations is unclear.

Some evidence suggests that these species are doing very well. For

example, the Fisheries Service recently found that on the Atlantic

coast, populations of alewives are either stable or significantly

increasing. See Notice of a Listing Determination, 78 Fed. Reg.

48,944, 48,992 (Aug. 12, 2013). Other evidence, however, suggests

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In short, plaintiffs’ claims are not subject to judicial

review under the Magnuson-Stevens Act or the Administrative

Procedure Act. The judgment of the district court is therefore

affirmed.

So ordered.

that most stocks of river herring and shad are seriously depleted. See

MID-ATLANTIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, AMENDMENT 14 TO

THE ATLANTIC MACKEREL, SQUID, AND BUTTERFISH (MSB) FISHERY

MANAGEMENT PLAN (FMP): FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

STATEMENT 208 (2013). The cause of this decline, if it exists, is

equally uncertain. Plaintiffs argue that fishing at sea is a substantial

factor. Appellants’ Br. 12-14. The Fisheries Service has found that

“[d]ams and hydropower facilities, water quality and water

withdrawals from urbanization and agricultural runoff, [and] dredging

and other wetland alterations” have had a significant impact. 78 Fed.

Reg. 48,953-58. These uncertainties are among the issues the MidAtlantic Council decided to study further when it postponed

consideration of Amendment 15.

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