Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00769/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00769-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM R. BUSH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:15-cv-00769-JEO

)

J.P. MORGAN CHASE )

BANK, N.A., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this action, plaintiff William R. Bush has alleged a variety of federal and 

state law claims against defendants J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) and 

U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for ABN AMRO Mortgage 

Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2003-4 (“U.S. Bank”)

(collectively, the “Defendants”). (Doc. 12). The claims are based on allegations 

that the Defendants falsely reported that Bush was in default on a mortgage loan 

and wrongfully initiated foreclosure proceedings on his property. The Defendants 

have moved to dismiss all of the claims except for Bush’s claim for breach of 

contract. (Doc. 15). For the reasons discussed below, the Defendants’ motion is 

due to be granted in part and denied in part.

FILED

 2016 Jan-27 PM 02:04

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:15-cv-00769-JEO Document 27 Filed 01/27/16 Page 1 of 32
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bush filed this action in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, 

asserting fourteen separate claims against the Defendants: negligence, wantonness, 

unjust enrichment, wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, breach of contract, fraud, 

false light, defamation/libel/slander, violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 

violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, violation of the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act, violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and a claim for 

declaratory relief. (Doc. 1-1). The Defendants removed the action to this court

and then moved to dismiss all of the claims except for the breach of contract claim. 

(Doc. 7). Bush filed a motion for an extension of time to respond to the motion to 

dismiss, representing in the motion that he “intend[ed] to file an amended 

complaint [that would] address most, if not all, of the issues raised in the motion to 

dismiss and render the motion moot.” (Doc. 10). The court granted Bush’s 

motion, which was unopposed. 

Bush then filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 12). His amended complaint 

contains a more detailed set of factual allegations than his original complaint, but 

otherwise the differences between the two complaints are minimal. In particular, 

the amended complaint contains the same fourteen claims as the original 

complaint. As before, the Defendants have moved to dismiss all of the claims in 

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the amended complaint except for the breach of contract claim.1 (Doc. 15). The 

motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for decision. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Defendants have moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the dismissal of all or some of 

the claims in a complaint if the allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order 

to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The court assumes the 

factual allegations in the complaint are true and gives the plaintiff the benefit of all 

reasonable factual inferences. Hazewood v. Foundation Financial Group, LLC, 

551 F.3d 1223, 1224 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). However, “courts ‘are not 

bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) 

(“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a 

plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”). Nor is it proper to assume 

 1 In light of the filing of the amended complaint, the court denied the Defendants’ initial motion 

to dismiss as moot.

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that the plaintiff can prove facts he has not alleged or that the defendants have 

violated the law in ways that have not been alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 

(citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 

(1983)). 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not 

need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of 

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id., 550 U.S. at 555

(citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). “Factual allegations 

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....” Id. Thus, 

“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” i.e., its “factual content ... allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).

The Defendants have also moved for a dismissal of Bush’s fraud claim

pursuant to Rule 9(b). Rule 9(b) requires that “in all averments of fraud or 

mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 

particularity.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). The “particularity” requirement “serves an 

important purpose in fraud actions by alerting defendants to the ‘precise 

misconduct with which they are charged’ and protecting defendants ‘against 

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spurious charges of immoral and fraudulent behavior.’ ” Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, 

Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Bush alleges that he received a loan from ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, 

Inc. on November 15, 2002, to purchase the property located at 2013 Country 

Ridge Place in Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. 12 at ¶5). The loan was evidenced 

by a promissory note and secured by a mortgage on the property.2

 (Id.) The note 

and mortgage were subsequently assigned to U.S. Bank, and Chase became the 

servicer of the loan. (Id. at ¶ 2). Bush alleges that the assignment of the note and 

mortgage to U.S. Bank was defective, but provides no factual basis for his 

allegation and did not attach a copy of the allegedly defective assignment to the 

amended complaint. (Id. at ¶ 11).

In March 2013 the Defendants initiated foreclosure proceedings on Bush’s 

property and scheduled a foreclosure sale for May 7, 2013. According to Bush, he 

was not in default on his loan at that time. He sent a letter disputing the debt to the

foreclosing attorney and a qualified written request (“QWR”) to both the 

 2 Bush did not attach copies of the note and mortgage to his amended complaint (or to his 

original complaint), but copies were attached as exhibits to the defendants’ notice of removal. 

(Doc. 1-1 at 35-47). Because the note and mortgage are referenced in the amended complaint, 

the court may consider the documents in ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss. See La 

Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (“In analyzing the 

sufficiency of the complaint, we limit our consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations, 

documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed.”). 

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foreclosing attorney and Chase.

3

 The foreclosure sale was postponed as a result. 

(Id. at ¶ 7). 

The Defendants scheduled several other foreclosure sales in 2013, all of 

which were either cancelled or postponed. After a period of inactivity, the 

Defendants resumed foreclosure proceedings in October 2014. Bush sent another 

QWR to Chase, but Chase never responded to the QWR. Another foreclosure sale 

was set for March 31, 2015. Bush alleges that the sale was cancelled due to the 

filing of this action. (Id.)

Bush alleges that each time a foreclosure sale was scheduled, the Defendants 

published notice of the sale in The Alabama Messenger and included false 

information regarding his alleged default on his mortgage loan. (Id. at ¶ 10). He 

further alleges that the false information regarding his alleged default was 

published on the internet and reported to the national credit bureaus, which 

damaged his reputation and his credit. (Id.) He asserts that he was not in default 

on his mortgage payments and that the attempted foreclosure proceedings were 

wrongful. (Id. at ¶ 12).

 3 A “qualified written request” is written correspondence to the servicer of a federally related 

mortgage loan that “(i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the name and 

account of the borrower; and (ii) includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the 

borrower, to the extent applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to the 

servicer regarding other information sought by the borrower.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). 

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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Bush’s Federal Claims

In his amended complaint, Bush alleges that Chase violated four federal 

statutes: the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (Count 

Ten); the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et 

seq. (Count Eleven); the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 

et seq. (Count Twelve); and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 

U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. (Count Thirteen). His federal claims are asserted only 

against Chase and not against Bank One. The Defendants have moved to dismiss 

all four claims.

1. TILA

TILA is a remedial consumer protection statute designed to “assure a 

meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare 

more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed 

use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit 

billing and credit card practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a); see Beach v. Ocwen Fed. 

Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998). TILA requires creditors to provide consumers 

with “clear and accurate disclosures of terms dealing with things like finance 

charges, annual percentage rates of interest, and the borrower's rights.” Id. at 412. 

Under TILA, a consumer has a private right of action against “any creditor who 

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fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this part ....” 15 U.S.C. § 

1604(a).

In Count Ten, Bush alleges that Chase committed “multiple violations” of 

TILA and Regulation Z.

4

 (Doc. 12 at ¶ 81). He alleges that Chase failed to

provide required disclosures “prior to consummation” of his loan transaction, 

failed to make required disclosures “conspicuously and in writing,” and failed to 

advise him of certain charges “incident to the extension of credit,” including 

attorney fees and late charges. (Id. at ¶ 84). He also alleges that Chase 

“understated the disclosed annual percentage rate.” (Id. at ¶ 87).

By its plain language, TILA’s private right of action applies only to actions 

against “creditors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a). TILA defines the term “creditor” as 

follows:

The term “creditor” refers only to a person who both (1) regularly 

extends, whether in connection with loans, sales of property or 

services, or otherwise, consumer credit which is payable by agreement 

in more than four installments or for which the payment of a finance 

charge is or may be required, and (2) is the person to whom the debt 

arising from the consumer credit transaction is initially payable on the 

face of the evidence of indebtedness or, if there is no such evidence of 

indebtedness, by agreement.

15 U.S.C. § 1602(g). “The definition given in this sentence is restrictive and 

precise, referring only to a person who satisfies both requirements.” Cetto v. 

 4 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1 et seq., consists of various rules promulgated by the Federal 

Reserve Board to further the purposes of TILA. Hendley v. Cameron-Brown Co., 840 F.2d 831, 

833 (11th Cir. 2000).

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LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 518 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in

original); see also Parker v. Potter, 232 F. App’x 861, 864 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting 

that a person must satisfy both prongs of the definition in order to be considered a 

creditor under TILA). 

In its motion to dismiss, Chase argues that, even assuming that it satisfies 

the first prong of the statutory definition of “creditor,” it does not satisfy the 

second prong and therefore is not a creditor for purposes of Bush’s TILA claim. 

The court agrees. The court notes that Bush has alleged in conclusory fashion that 

Chase “regularly extended or offered to extend consumer credit for which a 

finance charge is or may be imposed or which, by written agreement, is payable in 

more than four installments, and is the person to whom [the debt arising from] the 

transaction which is the subject of this action is initially payable.” (Doc. 12 at ¶ 

83). However, this allegation is nothing more than a condensed recital of the two 

prongs of the statutory definition and is not entitled to a presumption of truth for 

purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 

1246, 1248 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2013). Moreover, Bush’s factual allegations 

demonstrate that Chase is not, in fact, the person to whom the debt arising from his

loan transaction was initially payable. According to his amended complaint, he 

received his loan from ABN AMRO Mortgage Group and, as part of the 

transaction, executed a note and mortgage with that entity. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 5). 

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Consistent with these allegations, his note and mortgage both identify ABN

AMRO Mortgage Group as the “Lender.” (Doc. 1-1 at 36, 40). Simply put, there 

are no factual allegations from which the court could infer that Bush’s mortgage 

debt was “initially payable” to Chase. Accordingly, Chase is not a “creditor” for 

purposes of liability under TILA and Bush’s TILA claim is due to be dismissed.5

2. RESPA

In Count Eleven, Bush alleges that Chase violated RESPA by “failing to 

acknowledge or properly respond to [his] Qualified Written Requests (QWR).” 

(Doc. 12 at ¶ 91). RESPA establishes certain actions that must be followed by 

entities or persons responsible for servicing federally related mortgage loans, 

including responding to borrower inquiries. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605. As previously 

noted, a QWR is written correspondence to the servicer that “(i) includes, or 

 5

Bush’s response to the Defendants’ TILA arguments is off point and smacks of unedited 

“cutting and pasting” from another brief. He asserts: “[The] argument propounded by Chase is 

that the ‘quirky language’ of § 1640 particularly defines ‘creditor’ in such an exclusive fashion 

that if forecloses assessment of statutory damages against a ‘Servicer.’ They completely rely for 

authority upon the decision in Selman v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2013 U.S. LEXIS 37017 (S.D. Mar. 

5, 2013).” (Doc. 23 at 34-35). Not only is this a mischaracterization of the Defendants’ 

argument, the Defendants do not rely on or even cite the Selman decision as support for their 

argument. Bush then devotes more than four pages of his response to arguing that the court 

should adopt the reasoning espoused in Runkle v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 905 F. Supp. 2d 

1326 (S.D. Fla. 2012), a case that addresses “whether an assignee [of a loan] is liable for its 

servicer’s conduct.” Runkle, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1332 (emphasis in original). As Bush does not 

allege that Chase is an assignee of his mortgage loan and is not seeking to hold Chase liable as 

an assignee, Runkle has no application here. Finally, Bush concludes his argument with this non 

sequitur: “In the [p]resent case, Bush has alleged Chase violated TILA. Accordingly, he has met 

the elements of the complaint [sic] and the motion to dismiss is due to be denied.” (Doc. 23 at 

43). The mere fact that he has accused Chase of violating TILA in no way establishes that he has 

adequately pleaded such a claim, which he has not. 

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otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the name and account of the borrower; 

and (ii) includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the 

extent applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail to the 

servicer regarding other information sought by the borrower.” 12 U.S.C. § 

2605(e)(1)(B). Upon receipt of a QWR, a servicer must provide a “written 

response acknowledging receipt of the correspondence” within five business days 

and must take action on the QWR within thirty days. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(1)(A)

and 2605(e)(2). 

The Defendants argue that Bush’s RESPA claim should be dismissed 

because he has not pleaded sufficient facts to establish either that his QWRs met 

the requirements of § 2605(e)(1)(B) or that he suffered any actual damages caused 

by the alleged RESPA violations. Although it is a close question, the court is 

satisfied that Bush has adequately pleaded his RESPA claim and that the claim 

should not be dismissed at this time. The court readily acknowledges, as the 

Defendants point out in their motion, that the allegations in Bush’s RESPA claim 

are confusing and perhaps even contradictory.6

 Nonetheless, Bush does allege that 

 6 The court also acknowledges that Bush’s opposition to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss fails 

to address the Defendants’ RESPA argument as such. Instead of responding to the Defendants’

argument that his RESPA claim against Chase should be dismissed, Bush argues that U.S. Bank 

can be held vicariously liable for its “servicer’s” RESPA violation, a curious argument given that 

his RESPA claim is not asserted against U.S. Bank. (The court notes that the RESPA claim in 

Bush’s original complaint was asserted against “Defendants” (doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 91-92), while the 

RESPA claim in his amended complaint is asserted only against Chase.) Even though his 

argument misses the mark completely, it is clear that he has not abandoned his RESPA claim. 

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he sent QWRs to Chase on April 29, 2013 and October 19, 2014; that Chase never 

responded to the QWRs; and that he was damaged by Chase’s failure to provide 

him with the requested information about his loan because, without the requested 

information, he was unable to stop the foreclosure proceedings on his own and had 

to retain and pay an attorney to stop the foreclosure. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 92). The court 

is satisfied that these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for violation of 

RESPA that is at least plausible on its face and provides Chase with fair notice of 

the basis of the claim. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Bush’s

RESPA claim will be denied. 

3. FCRA

In Count Twelve, Bush seeks to hold Chase liable under the FCRA for 

allegedly reporting inaccurate information regarding his mortgage loan to the 

national credit bureaus and failing to properly investigate his disputes. “[T]he 

FCRA places distinct obligations on three types of entities: consumer reporting 

agencies, users of consumer reports, and furnishers of information to consumer 

reporting agencies.” Chipka v. Bank of Am., 355 F. App’x 380, 382 (11th Cir.

2009). It is apparent from Bush’s allegations that he is seeking to hold Chase 

liable as a “furnisher” of information, and in his opposition to the Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss he confirms as much. (Doc. 23 at 43).

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“The FCRA imposes two separate duties on furnishers. First, [15 U.S.C.] § 

1681s–2(a) requires furnishers to submit accurate information to [credit reporting 

agencies]. Second, § 1681s–2(b) requires furnishers to investigate and respond 

promptly to notices of [consumer] disputes.” Green v. RBS Nat’l Bank, 288 F. 

App’x 641, 642 (11th Cir. 2008). However, the FCRA does not provide a private 

right of action to redress violations of § 1681s-2(a). Id.; see also Peart v. Shippie, 

345 F. App’x 384, 386 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he statute explicitly bars private suits 

for violations of [§ 1681s-2(a)].”). The FCRA does provide a private right of 

action for violations of § 1681s-2(b), “but only if the furnisher received notice of 

the consumer’s dispute from a consumer reporting agency.” Peart, 345 F. App’x 

at 386; Green, 288 F. App’x at 642. 

In his opposition to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Bush correctly 

asserts that “Chase must perform a reasonable investigation of a consumer dispute

after receiving notice from a credit bureau, such as Equifax, Experian or Trans 

Union.” (Doc. 23 at 43 (emphasis added)). Nowhere in his amended complaint, 

however, has Bush pleaded any facts to suggest that Chase received notice of his 

dispute from a credit agency. Bush alleges that he informed Chase and the national 

credit bureaus that he disputed Chase’s alleged inaccurate reporting (doc. 12 at ¶ 

94), but he does not allege or offer any facts to suggest that the credit bureaus then 

notified Chase about the dispute. Therefore, he has failed to plead an essential 

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element of his FCRA claim and the claim is due to be dismissed. See Rice, 2014 

WL 3889472, at *6 (dismissing the plaintiff’s FCRA claim where the plaintiff

failed to plead any facts to suggest that the credit bureaus contacted the furnisher 

regarding the dispute). 

4. FDCPA

Bush’s final federal claim against Chase is for violation of the FDCPA. 

Bush alleges that Chase committed numerous FDCPA violations, including: 

attempting to collect amounts not owed under his mortgage contract; seeking 

unjustified amounts; threatening legal action that was not permitted or not actually 

contemplated; revealing or discussing the nature of his debt with third parties; 

failing to identify itself as a debt collector in its communications; and falsely 

stating the amount of his debt. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 107). The Defendants argue that

Bush’s “conclusory” allegations do not satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 

8(a), and specifically argue that Bush has alleged no facts demonstrating that 

Chase is a “debt collector” for purposes of the FDCPA.

To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must establish, among other

things, that the defendant is a “debt collector.” Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & 

Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012). The FDCPA defines a debt 

collector as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or 

the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any 

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debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts 

owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 

Expressly excluded from this definition are persons “collecting or attempting to 

collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent 

such activity ... concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was 

obtained by such persons.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F). Furthermore, the FDCPA’s 

legislative history suggests that a mortgagee and its assignee, including mortgage 

servicing companies, are not debt collectors under the FDCPA when the debt was

not in default at the time it was assigned. See Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 

1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 95–382, at 3 (1977), 1977 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698).

In paragraph 1 of his amended complaint, Bush alleges that Chase is a “debt 

collector” for purposes of the FDCPA, but offers nothing in the way of factual 

support for his allegation. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 1). Merely labeling Chase a “debt 

collector” does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 8. In paragraph 106 Bush

makes the further allegation that Chase is subject to the FDCPA “because as 

previously stated, it began servicing this loan while [he] was in default or past due 

with his payments.” (Doc. 12 at ¶ 106). The court first notes that Bush did not 

“previously state” anywhere in his amended complaint that Chase began servicing 

his loan when he was in default. To the contrary, Bush repeatedly asserts 

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throughout the amended complaint that he was not in default and was not behind in 

his mortgage payments. (See Doc. 12 at ¶¶ 7, 9, 12, 53). Apart from this glaring 

contradiction, Bush provides no factual allegations to support the conclusion that 

Chase began servicing his loan when it was in default, such as the date (or even the 

year) Chase became the loan servicer and the date (or even the year) the loan went 

into default. In sum, Bush has failed to allege sufficient facts showing that Chase 

is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA, and his claim for violation of 

the FDCPA is due to be dismissed. See Prickett v. BAC Home Loans, 946 F. Supp. 

2d 1236, 1249 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (“Because the Complaint fails to allege facts 

showing the BANA is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA, 

Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the FDCPA is subject to dismissal.”). 

B. Bush’s State Law Claims

In his amended complaint, Bush has also asserted state law tort claims based 

on negligence (Count One), wantonness (Count Two), wrongful foreclosure (Count 

Four), slander of title (Count Five), fraud (Count Seven), false light (Count Eight),

and defamation/libel/slander (Count Nine), along with state law claims for unjust 

enrichment (Count Three) and breach of contract (Count Six) and a claim for 

declaratory relief (Count Fourteen). The negligence, wantonness, fraud, and unjust 

enrichment claims are asserted against Chase, while the wrongful foreclosure claim 

is asserted against U.S. Bank. The other state law claims are asserted against both 

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Defendants. The Defendants have moved to dismiss all of the state law claims 

except for the breach of contract claim.

1. Unjust Enrichment, False Light, Defamation/Libel/Slander, and 

Declaratory Relief

 

The court first notes that Bush has offered no opposition or other response to 

the Defendants’ arguments that his claims for unjust enrichment, false light, 

defamation/libel/slander, and declaratory relief fail as a matter of law and are due 

to be dismissed. Consequently, he has effectively abandoned those claims and 

they are all subject to dismissal. See Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana 

Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[F]ailure to 

brief and argue this issue during the proceedings before the district court is grounds 

for finding that the issue has been abandoned.”); see also McMaster v. United 

States, 177 F.3d 936, 940–41 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that a claim may be 

considered abandoned when the allegation is included in the plaintiff's complaint 

but he fails to present any argument concerning the claim to the district court).

2. FCRA Preemption

The Defendants argue that Bush’s negligence, wantonness, and fraud claims, 

to the extent they are based on alleged inaccurate credit reporting to credit 

agencies, are preempted by the FRCA.7 (Doc. 15 at 4). There are two potentially 

 7 The Defendants also argue that Bush’s false light and defamation/libel/slander claims are

preempted by the FCRA (doc. 15 at 4), but as noted above Bush has abandoned those claims. 

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applicable FCRA preemption provisions, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681h(e) and

1681t(b)(1)(F). Section 1681h(e) provides:

Except as provided in sections 1681n and 1681o of this title, no 

consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of 

defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the 

reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency, any 

user of information, or any person who furnishes information to a 

consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant 

to section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on 

information disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a 

consumer against whom the user has taken adverse action, based in 

whole or in part on the report2 except as to false information furnished 

with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.

Section 1681t(b)(1)(F) provides:

No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any 

State ... with respect to any subject matter regulated under ... section 

1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who 

furnish information to consumer reporting agencies ....

When dealing with a furnisher of credit information such as Chase, these two

provisions are difficult to reconcile; “§ 1681t(b)(1)(F) is an absolute bar to state 

causes of action, while § 1681h(e) only bars claims [where] the information was 

‘furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.’” Dial v. Midland 

Funding, LLC, 2015 WL 751690, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2015).

As United States District Judge Abdul K. Kallon has observed, “FCRA 

preemption of state law torts is an area of little agreement among this district’s 

judges.” Hamilton v. Midland Funding, LLC, 2015 WL 5084234, at *6 (N.D. Ala. 

Aug. 27, 2015); see Taylor v. Midland Funding, LLC, 2015 WL 4670314, at *9-12 

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(N.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2015), and Dial, 2015 WL 751690 at *6-7, for overviews of the 

various approaches to FCRA preemption taken by the judges in this district. 

However, there appears to be a growing consensus, which the undersigned joins, 

that tort claims based on a furnisher’s alleged reporting of inaccurate credit 

information to credit agencies fall within the scope of section 1681t(b)(1)(F), not 

section 1681h(e), and are preempted. As Judge Blackburn has noted, “[t]he three

[FCRA] sections covered by § 1681h(e)—1681g, 1681h, and 1681m—regulate 

disclosures to consumers and duties of users of information. These duties do not 

concern a furnisher’s duties of reporting and investigation. Section 1681t(b) 

covers furnishers.” Schlueter v. BellSouth Tellecomms., 770 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 

1209 (N.D. Ala. 2010). Section 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts “the laws of any state”

with respect to any subject matter regulated under § 1681s-2, and § 1681s-2, in 

turn, imposes duties on furnishers to provide accurate credit information to credit 

agencies, to investigate credit disputes after notification, and to correct inaccurate 

information. See § 1681s-2(a) and (b). Consequently, the court agrees with the 

growing trend finding that §1681t(b)(1)(F) bars state law tort claims based on 

inaccurate credit reporting by furnishers. See Schlueter, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 1210-

11 (finding that § 1681t(b)(1)(F) barred the plaintiffs’ state law claims against 

BellSouth, including their claims for negligent, reckless, and wanton conduct and 

misrepresentation, where the claims arose out of BellSouth’s furnishing of 

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information to credit reporting agencies); Hamilton, 2015 WL 5084234, at *7

(finding that § 1681t(a)(1)(F) barred the plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim based 

on the defendant’s credit reporting.”); Taylor, 2015 WL 4670314, at *13 (same);

Ferrell v. Midland Funding, LLC, 2015 WL 2450615, at *6 (N.D. Ala. May 22, 

2015) (same); Dial, 2015 WL 751690, at *7 (same); Williams v. Student Loan 

Guarantee Found. of Arkansas, 2015 WL 241428, at *13 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 20, 2015) 

(“§ 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts Williams’s state-law claims to the extent they address 

the subject matter regulated under § 1681-s2.”); Barnett v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 

Nat. Ass’n, 2013 WL 3242739, at *13 (N.D. Ala. June 26, 2013) (holding that § 

1681t(b)(1)(F) preempted the plaintiff from pursuing defamation, libel, or slander 

claims against Chase arising out of any false reports to credit agencies).

Here, Bush’s negligence and wantonness claims are based, in part, on the 

allegation that Chase failed to ensure that the credit information it disseminated to 

the national credit bureaus rose to the level of maximum accuracy and was not 

false, libelous, or slanderous. (Doc. 12 at ¶¶ 26, 30). The claims are also based on

allegations that Chase failed to properly train its employees on the thorough 

investigation of disputed accounts and failed to remove its adverse reporting once 

Bush disputed it. (Id.) Bush’s fraud claim is based, in part, on Chase’s alleged 

“dissemination of inaccurate information regarding [his] loan being in default and 

dissemination of information regarding [his] credit history and credit ... that was 

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known to be false.” (Id. at ¶ 55). In other words, Bush’s negligence, wantonness, 

and fraud claims are based, at least in part, on allegations relating to Chase’s 

alleged failure to fulfill its duties under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 (i.e., its duties to 

provide accurate credit information to credit reporting agencies, to investigate 

credit disputes after notification, and to correct inaccurate information). 

Accordingly, to the extent Bush’s negligence, wantonness, and fraud claims are 

based on such allegations, the claims are preempted by the FRCA, 15 U.S.C. § 

1681t(b)(1)(F).

3. Negligence and Wantonness

In addition to arguing that Bush’s negligence and wantonness claims are 

preempted by the FCRA, the Defendants assert that the claims are due to be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim. “The elements of a negligence claim are a 

duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damage.” Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. 

AmSouth Bank, 817 So.2d 665, 679 (Ala. 2001). Wantonness is not just a higher 

level of negligence, but involves “the conscious doing of some act or the omission 

of some duty while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, 

from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result.” Ex parte 

Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 9 (Ala. 2007) (emphasis in original).

The Defendants argue that Bush’s negligence and wantonness claims fail as 

a matter of law because they are based on Chase’s alleged breach of duties and 

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obligations created by contract—namely, Bush’s note and mortgage. (Doc. 15 at 

10). The court agrees. Alabama law “does not recognize a tort-like cause of action 

for the breach of a duty created by a contract.” Blake v. Bank of America, N.A., 

845 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210 (M.D. Ala. 2002); see also Barber v. Bus. Prods. Ctr., 

Inc., 677 So. 2d 223, 228 (Ala.1996), overruled on other grounds by White Sands 

Grp., LLC v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5 (Ala.2009) (“a mere failure to perform a 

contractual obligation is not a tort”). Here, in addition to the allegations relating to 

inaccurate credit reporting, Bush’s negligence claim includes allegations that 

Chase negligently serviced his loan, attempted to collect sums he did not owe,

caused his property insurance to be cancelled, defaulted him, and attempted a 

foreclosure sale on his property. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 26). Bush’s wantonness claim 

includes the same allegations, except he alleges that Chase’s conduct was wanton 

rather than negligent. (Id. at ¶ 30). All of these allegations are based on duties 

arising out of the note and mortgage and amount to allegations that Chase 

negligently or wantonly breached its contractual servicing obligations. Because 

Alabama law does not permit Bush to assert a tort claim against Chase for its 

purported breach of a contract, Bush’s negligence and wantonness claims are not 

legally cognizable and are due to be dismissed. See, e.g., James v. Nationstar 

Mortg., LLC, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1198 (S.D. Ala. 2015) (noting that “a veritable 

avalanche of recent (and apparently unanimous) federal precedent has found that 

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no cause of action for negligent or wanton servicing of a mortgage account exists 

under Alabama law”); Duke v. JPMorgan Chase Bank Nat. Ass’n, 2014 WL 

5770583, *4 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 5, 2014) (holding that the plaintiffs’ negligence, 

wantonness, and/or willfulness claims were due to be dismissed because all of the 

duties the defendant allegedly breached arose out of a mortgage agreement, note, 

and loan modification agreement); Rice v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., 2014 WL 

3889472, *8 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 5, 2014) (“According to the complaint, Chase 

collected funds that were not owed, caused insurance to be canceled, defaulted 

Rice, and attempted a foreclosure sale, among other things. While Rice may 

pursue these claims under a breach of contract theory, as he has done, his 

negligence and wantonness claims are due to be dismissed.”).

Although not mentioned by the Defendants in their motion to dismiss, 

Bush’s negligence and wantonness claims also include the allegation that Chase 

failed to properly train and/or supervise its employees with regard to the handling 

of his loan account. (Doc. 12 at ¶¶ 26, 30). Even assuming that Bush might 

otherwise be able to assert a claim for negligent or wanton training/supervision, he 

has not done so here. In the context of a claim for negligent or wanton 

training/supervision, “the master is held responsible for his servant’s incompetency 

when notice or knowledge, either actual or presumed, of such unfitness has been 

brought to him.” Thompson v. Havard, 235 So. 2d 853, 858 (Ala. 1970). Bush 

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has not pleaded any facts regarding how Chase employees handled his loan 

account, what training and supervision they received, or what notice Chase had of 

their alleged incompetency. He has offered no facts from which the court could 

infer that he has a plausible claim against Chase for failure to properly train and/or 

supervise its employees.

In his opposition to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Bush attempts to 

rescue his negligence and wantonness claims by arguing that “federal law and 

regulations impose a duty of affirmative care on the servicing Defendant, Chase,” 

which duty he claims Chase breached. (Doc. 23 at 23). A similar argument was 

soundly rejected by Judge Steele in James:

Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent these principles [that mortgage 

servicing obligations are a creature of contract, not of tort] by 

asserting that statutes, rather than contracts, form the basis for the 

duties that plaintiffs claim were breached.... This argument is 

unpersuasive for a host of reasons. First, plaintiffs’ Complaint neither 

provides an inkling that Counts V [negligence] and VI [wantonness] 

are proceeding under a negligence per se theory nor recites any 

statutes as being the source of the duties that they claim were 

breached; therefore, it does not comport with Twombly/Iqbal pleading 

requirements.... Second, federal courts in Alabama have given short 

shrift to similar efforts invoking the doctrine of negligence per se to 

outflank the phalanx of case authorities holding that Alabama law 

does not recognize a cause of action for negligent or wanton mortgage 

servicing.... [T]he Jameses’ appeal to negligence per se cannot help 

them because the legal duties underlying their claims against FNMA 

and Nationstar arise in contract. The statutes in play in this case 

regulate the contractual relationship between the Jameses and 

FNMA/Nationstar, but do not eliminate or supplant that contractual 

relationship ....

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James, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 1200, n.9. 

Here, similarly, Bush’s amended complaint provides no inkling that his 

negligence and wantonness claims are based, even in part, on Chase’s alleged 

breach of duties imposed by statute. In his opposition he asserts that Chase 

“violated the duty owed to him as imposed by RESPA when it fail[ed] to respond 

to a request for loss mitigation, failed to process his application for loss mitigation 

and failed to postpone proceeding with a foreclosure until a decision [was] made 

with regard to loss mitigation,” but those allegations are not included anywhere in 

Counts One (negligence) or Two (wantonness) of his amended complaint. Indeed, 

neither RESPA nor any other statute is mentioned in Counts One and Two. To the 

extent he now contends that his negligence and wantonness claims are based on 

Chase’s alleged breach of duties created by RESPA (or some other unidentified 

statute), his amended complaint does not comport with the Iqbal/Twombly pleading 

requirements because it provides no clue that he has been proceeding under such a 

theory. Moreover, the fact remains that the legal duties underlying Bush’s 

negligence and wantonness claims against Chase are a creature of contract; they 

stem from the underlying note and mortgage. Because Chase’s servicing 

obligations to Bush are rooted in contract, any claim for breach of those 

obligations must sound in breach of contract, not tort. 

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For all of the above reasons, Bush’s negligence and wantonness claims are 

due to be dismissed.

4. Fraud

In addition to their FCRA preemption argument, the Defendants argue that 

Bush’s fraud claim is due to be dismissed for two reasons: he has not pleaded his 

fraud allegations with the particularity required by Rule 9(b), and his “reliance” 

assertions make no sense. (Doc. 15 at 17-18). The court agrees on both fronts.

As noted, Rule 9(b) requires that “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the 

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 9(b). To satisfy Rule 9(b), a complaint must set forth “(1) precisely what 

statements were made in what documents or oral misrepresentations or what 

omissions were made, and (2) the time and place of each such statement and the 

person responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not making) same, and 

(3) the content of such statements and the manner in which they misled the 

plaintiff, and (4) what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud.” 

Ziemba, 256 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, 

Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1371 (11th Cir. 1997)) (quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Bush’s fraud allegations are far too vague to state a claim for relief 

consistent with Rule 9(b). He alleges that Chase “misrepresented” that his loan 

was in default; disseminated “inaccurate information” about his credit and credit 

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history that was “known to be false”; and “promised” that there would be no 

attempt to foreclose on his property until his application for a loan modification 

under the federal HAMP program was approved. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 55). However, he 

does not identify any person at Chase who was responsible for making the alleged 

misrepresentations and promises, how and when the alleged misrepresentations 

and promises were communicated, the manner in which the alleged 

misrepresentations and promises misled him, or what Chase obtained by the 

alleged fraud. Simply put, he has not pleaded the circumstances of Chase’s alleged 

fraud with the particularity necessary to satisfy Rule 9(b).

Additionally, a fraud claim in Alabama requires proof of four elements: “(1) 

[a] false representation (2) of a material existing fact (3) relied upon by the 

plaintiff (4) who was damaged as a proximate result of the misrepresentation.” 

Ala. Psychiatric Servs., P.C. v. 421 S. Court St., LLC, 81 So. 3d 1239, 1247 (Ala. 

2011) (quotation marks omitted). With respect to the “reliance” element, Bush’s 

amended complaint alleges in conclusory fashion that Bush “justifiably relied” 

upon “said representations” by Chase in deciding to proceed with the execution of 

his loan, and “detrimentally relied” on Chase’s promise that it would not attempt to 

foreclose on his property until his loan modification was approved. (Doc. 12 at ¶¶ 

55, 57). The first allegation makes no sense; Bush received his loan from ABN 

AMRO Mortgage Group, not from Chase, and there is no allegation anywhere in 

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the amended complaint that Chase had any involvement whatsoever in the 

origination of the loan. Moreover, none of the “said representations” described in 

Bush’s fraud claim have any relation to Bush’s decision to proceed with the 

execution of his loan. 

The second allegation—that Bush “detrimentally relied” on a promise by 

Chase to defer foreclosure until his loan modification application was approved—

is inconsistent with everything else he alleges in his amended complaint. As 

previously noted, Bush consistently asserts throughout his amended complaint that 

he was not in default on his loan, that he was not behind on his mortgage 

payments, that he made his payments every month, and that he disputed the 

Defendants’ efforts to foreclose on his home. In addition, no foreclosure sale ever 

occurred. If Bush remained current on his mortgage payments as he alleges, and 

there was no foreclosure sale, then his naked assertion that he detrimentally relied 

on Chase’s alleged promise is not plausible on its face. In this regard, the court 

notes that nowhere in Bush’s amended complaint does he identify even one 

specific detrimental action he took in reliance on Chase’s alleged promise to forgo 

foreclosure until he had received a loan modification. See Hunt Petroleum Corp. 

v. State, 901 So. 2d 1, 5 (Ala. 2004) (“[F]or a plaintiff to state a fraud claim, he 

must show that a misrepresentation induced him to act in a way that he would not 

otherwise have acted, that is, that he took a different course of action because of 

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the misrepresentation.”). Without more, Bush’s naked allegation of “detrimental 

reliance” is insufficient to state a viable fraud claim. 

5. Wrongful Foreclosure 

The Defendants have also moved for dismissal of Bush’s wrongful 

foreclosure claim. This aspect of the Defendants’ motion requires little discussion. 

“A mortgagor has a wrongful foreclosure action whenever a mortgagee uses the 

power of sale given under a mortgage for a purpose other than to secure the debt 

owed by the mortgagor.” Reeves Cedarhurst Dev. Corp. v. First Am. Fed. Sav. & 

Loan. Ass'n, 607 So.2d 180, 182 (Ala. 1992). “To state a wrongful foreclosure 

claim, the plaintiff must plead facts suggesting there [was] an actual foreclosure 

sale.” Rice, 2014 WL 3889472, at * 8; see also ECP Financial II LLC v. Ivey,

2013 WL 6330936, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 5, 2013) (“The plain reading of the terms 

‘uses the power of sale’ in the wrongful foreclosure claim establishes that there 

must be an actual foreclosure sale.”); Vance v. Ocwen Financial Corp., 2012 WL 

2036412, at *3 (N.D. Ala. June 5, 2012) (“[I]n order to state a claim for wrongful 

foreclosure, a foreclosure sale must have actually taken place.”). 

Here, Bush has alleged only that Bank One “wrongfully initiated and 

attempted to conduct a foreclosure proceeding against [him] in violation of law.” 

(Doc. 12 at ¶ 40). He does not allege that an actual foreclosure sale ever occurred.

Accordingly, his wrongful foreclosure claim is due to be dismissed.

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6. Slander of Title

Lastly, the court turns to Bush’s slander of title claim. Under Alabama law, 

a slander of title claim has six elements: “(1) [o]wnership of the property by 

plaintiff; (2) falsity of the words published; (3) malice of defendant in publishing 

the false statements; (4) publication to some person other than the owner; (5) the 

publication must be in disparagement of plaintiff’s property or the title thereof; 

and (6) that special damages were the proximate result of such publication (setting 

them out in detail).” Merchants Nat. Bank of Mobile v. Steiner, 404 So. 2d 14, 21 

(Ala. 1981) (quoting Womack v. McDonald, 121 So. 57, 59 (Ala. 1929)). With 

respect to the special damages requirement, United States District Judge L. Scott

Coogler has explained: 

To satisfy the special damages pleading requirement, a plaintiff must 

allege that the defendant's false publication “interrupted, or injuriously 

affected, some dealing of the plaintiff with his property” or caused the 

plaintiff to incur expenses “to relieve his right to the property from the 

damnifying effect of such false and malicious slander.” Ebersole v. 

Fields, 181 Ala. 421, 62 So. 73, 75 (1913). Special damages must be 

“distinctly and particularly set out” in the complaint, and “[a]n 

allegation of loss in general terms is not sufficient.” Id. (holding that 

a complaint averring that the defendants falsely slandered the 

plaintiff’s title followed by general allegations of monetary loss was 

insufficient).

Prickett v. BAC Home Loans, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1244 (N. D. Ala. 2013).

Here, Bush has merely alleged that the Defendants “caused a cloud to be 

placed on the title of [his] property” and that “[a]s the proximate cause of the ... 

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slandering of [his] title, he was caused to suffer injuries and damages and claims 

all damages allowable under law.” (Doc. 12 at ¶¶ 44-45). This general allegation 

of damages comes nowhere close to satisfying the special damages pleading 

requirement. Bush has not “distinctly and particularly set out” any special 

damages, nor has he alleged that the purported slander of his title “interrupted or 

injuriously affected” his dealing with the property or caused him to incur expenses

to rectify the effect of the slander. In other words, he has not alleged any special 

damages that are traceable to the purported slander of his title to the property. 

Consequently, his slander of title claim fails as a matter of law and is due to be 

dismissed.

C. Leave to Amend

In his response in opposition to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Bush 

requests leave to amend his (amended) complaint to correct any deficiencies in his 

negligence, wantonness, fraud, TILA, and FCRA claims. (Doc. 23 at 26-27, 30, 

43, 45).

The court declines to allow leave to amend in this instance. Bush was 

placed on notice of the deficiencies in his case via the Defendants’ first motion to 

dismiss. (Doc. 7). He has had one opportunity to correct the deficiencies and has 

failed to do so. Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 869 (11th Cir. 

2010) (“A plaintiff has a right to amend a complaint once as a matter of course so 

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long as no responsive pleading has been filed.”). In view of the opportunity 

already afforded Bush to amend his complaint, his present allegations, and the 

foregoing legal determinations by the court, there is no reason to believe that Bush 

will be able to correct the deficiencies if he is given a second chance to amend his 

original claims. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is due to be 

granted in part and denied in part as follows: Bush’s state law, TILA, FCRA, and 

FDCPA claims are due to be dismissed and his RESPA claim will be allowed to 

proceed along with his breach of contract claim. To the extent Bush requests 

permission to file a second amended complaint, the request is due to be denied. 

An order consistent with the court’s findings will be entered.

DONE, this the 27th day of January, 2016.

_________________________________

JOHN E. OTT

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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