Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02559/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02559-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331pi Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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18cv2559-JAH (MDD)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER J. BURCHER, JR.; J.J.B, a 

minor; SUSAN BURCHER

Plaintiffs,

v.

KIMBERLY LAWHEAD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18cv2559-JAH (MDD)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. No. 11]

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs originally filed this action on November 8, 2018, alleging violations of 

their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and various state law 

claims. See generally Doc. No. 1. On May 24, 2019, Defendant Kimberly Lawhead moved 

to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. Doc. No. 11. Pursuant to Civ. L. R. 

7.1(e)(2) & (4), Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss was due to be filed 

and served no later than June 14, 2019, based on the July 1, 2019, hearing date. See Civ. 

L. R. 7.1(e)(2) & (4). On June 21, 2019, Defendant Kimberly Lawhead filed a Notice of 

Lack of Opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 12.

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18cv2559-JAH (MDD)

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DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks to dismiss the instant action for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs

have filed no response to the motion. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may properly grant a motion to 

dismiss as unopposed pursuant to a local rule that permits, but does not require, the granting 

of a motion for failure to respond. See generally, Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal for failure to timely file opposition papers). 

Civil Local Rule 7.1 provides that “each party opposing a motion ... must file that 

opposition ... with the clerk ... not later than fourteen (14) calendar days prior to the noticed 

hearing.” S.D. Cal. Civ. Local Rule 7.1(e)(2). “If an opposing party fails to file the papers 

in the manner required by Local Rule 7.1.e.2, that failure may constitute a consent to the 

granting of that motion or other request for ruling by the court.” S.D. Cal. Civ. Local Rule 

7.1(f)(3)(a).

“Although there is ... a [public] policy favoring disposition on the merits, it is the 

responsibility of the moving party to move towards that disposition at a reasonable pace, 

and to refrain from dilatory and evasive tactics.” In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1454 (9th Cir.

1994) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute); see also Steel v. City 

of San Diego, No. 09cv1743, 2009 WL 3715257, at *1 (S.D. Cal., Nov.5, 2009) (dismissing 

action pursuant to Local Rule 7.1 for plaintiff's failure to respond to a motion to dismiss).

The instant motion to dismiss in this case contains proof of service indicating that 

Plaintiffs were served with the motion. Doc. No. 11-2. The motion to dismiss reflects that 

the hearing for the motion was noticed for July 1, 2019. As of the date of this Order, 

Plaintiffs have failed to file any opposition to the motion to dismiss. 

Prior to granting an unopposed motion for dismissal, the Court must weigh the 

following factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the 

court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 

policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 

sanctions.” Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 

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(9th Cir. 1986)). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the first and fourth factors cut in 

opposite directions. See Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(first factor always weighs in favor of dismissal); Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 

393, 401 (9th Cir. 1998) (fourth factor counsels against dismissal). 

With regard to the Ghazali factors, the Court will address only the second, third, and 

fifth factors, as the first and fourth factors cut in opposite directions. The Court finds the 

second factor weighs in favor of dismissal, as Plaintiffs failed to comply with one of the 

most basic requirements of litigation and offers no excuse for failing to respond to 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Additionally, the Court finds the third factor also weighs 

in favor of dismissal, as significant delay in the resolution of this matter prejudices 

Defendants. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the Ghazali factors weigh heavily in 

favor of granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Notably, Plaintiffs Walter J. Burcher and Susan Burcher filed this action listing their 

minor child, J.J.B., as a plaintiff. The Court must then turn to the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure (“Fed.R.Civ.P”) which govern who can sue and be sued, and in what capacity. 

See generally Rule 17, Fed.R.Civ.P. 

Rule 17 states that “an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 

interest,” unless brought by a duly appointed representative. Rule 17(a)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 

“A minor person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next 

friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a guardian ad litem--or issue 

another appropriate order--to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented 

in an action.” Rule 17(c)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. “The [appointed representative] must be truly 

dedicated to the best interests of the [minor] on whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate,” 

and not motivated by any personal gain. Smith v. Adamas, No. C 09-3764 PJH (PR), 2010 

WL 458913, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010). In any case, if the person attempting to bring 

suit in federal court on behalf of the minor is the minor’s parent or guardian, the parent 

must retain a lawyer. Tagle v. Clark Cty., 678 F. App'x 600 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis 

added) (quoting Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (a parent 

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or guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor child without retaining a lawyer); 

see also Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74, 82 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[No] asserted or actual

parent[ ] may claim to be a guardian ad litem of his minor child as a matter of right.”).

While J.J.B lacks capacity as an infant to sue on his own behalf, Walter J. Burcher 

and Susan Burcher acting alone also lack the capacity to bring this action on behalf of their

infant child. The minor’s interest must be represented by a trained legal professional. See 

Johns, 114 F.3d at 877 (agreeing with Third Circuit rationale that minors are entitled to 

trained legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected.)

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Defendant Kimberly Lawhead’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Defendant is

DISMISSED from the case without prejudice.

2. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order 

in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading. 

Plaintiffs are cautioned, however, that should they choose to file an Amended 

Complaint, it must be complete by itself, comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and that any claim not realleged will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. 

CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 

1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”; Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 963 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed 

with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 

“considered waived if not repled.” )

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 13, 2019 

_____________________________

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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