Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01126/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01126-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 On December 21, 2006, the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii reassigned this case to the undersigned for all 1

purposes, pursuant to the parties’ consent to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEREMY STEPHENS, et al., )

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Plaintiffs, )

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v. )

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STANISLAUS COUNTY SHERIFF, et al., )

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Defendants. )

 )

1:05cv1126 DLB

ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Document 33)

Defendants Stanislaus County Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff (“Defendants”) filed the instant

Motion for Summary Judgment on December 15, 2006. Pursuant to the Court’s March 7, 2007,

Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief From Filing an Untimely Opposition, and Local

Rule 78-230(h), the Court deems the matter suitable for decision without oral argument. 

1

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Jeremy Stephens, a minor, by and through his guardian Dorothy Shockley,

Dorothy Shockley, Tisha Pleake, Jacob Stephens and Timothy Stephens, Jr., (collectively

“Plaintiffs”), filed the instant civil rights action on September 1, 2005. Plaintiffs, all relatives of

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28 Plaintiffs do not name provide the names of the individuals named as Defendants. It is also unclear 2

whether Defendants are named in their individual or official capacity. 

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the decedent Timothy Stevens (“Decedent”), allege violations of Decedent’s Eighth Amendment

rights and negligence against Defendants. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages.. 2

Defendants answered the Complaint on October 24, 2005. 

On December 15, 2006, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. 

After filing a late opposition, the Court vacated the January 19, 2007, hearing date and allowed

Plaintiffs to move for relief from their untimely opposition prior to ruling on the motion.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) on

January 26, 2007. The Court denied the Motion on March 7, 2007, and informed the parties that

it would proceed to the merits of Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion. 

Discovery closed in August 2006, but Plaintiffs were permitted to take three additional

depositions by January 30, 2007.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

1. Decedent, Timothy Stephens, was incarcerated in the Stanislaus County Jail on

September 24, 2004. He was intoxicated. Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 13. While incarcerated, he was

assaulted by another inmate and died from his injuries. Scheduling Conf. Order, Jan. 30, 2006,

3:11-13; Complaint, ¶¶ 6-7. 

2. Plaintiff Dorothy Shockley is the mother of Decedent and the remaining Plaintiffs

are Decedent’s children. Complaint, ¶21.

3. Following the assault, Decedent received medical care at the jail and a local

hospital prior to his death. Complaint, ¶ 8.

4. The Sheriff of Stanislaus County at the time of the incident was Les Weidman. 

Mr. Weidman did not have any personal involvement in housing Decedent. He did not have any

personal involvement in placing Decedent in a holding cell. He did not have any personal

involvement in any of the circumstances surrounding Decedent’s death, including his post injury

care. Declaration of Jennifer Hudson (“Hudson Dec.”), ¶ 3.

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3. At the time of the incident, Decedent had been booked, but not convicted. 

Hudson Dec., ¶ 3. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317

(1986). “If the party moving for summary judgment meets its initial burden of identifying for the

court those portions of the material on file that it believes demonstrates the absence of any

genuine issues of material fact,” the burden of production shifts and “the non moving party must

set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.’” T.W. Electric Service, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d

626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). As to the specific facts offered by the

nonmoving party, the court does not weigh conflicting evidence, but draws all inferences in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 630-31.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not

rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

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trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Rule 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must

be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out

of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.

Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment Cause of Action

In their First Cause of Action, Plaintiffs allege that Decedent, as an intoxicated person,

was in a protected class of prisoners and was owed a duty to protect him from other prisoners and

himself during and after his sobering process. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants breached this

duty and therefore violated Decedent’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment by (1) failing to timely process and release him within four to six hours, as

he would not be subject to prosecution; (2) failing to separate him as an older, intoxicated inmate

from the younger, more aggressive prisoners who are known to assault people incapable of caring

for themselves; (3) failing to properly assess the intoxicated and poor physical condition of

Decedent; (4) failing to closely supervise and/or isolate him during the sobering process; (5)

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failing to obtain a medical clearance to hold Decedent beyond the first six hours pursuant to 15

CCR § 1056; (6) allowing and permitting Decedent to be housed with violent felony offenders

rather than providing him with separate housing pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure

sections 4001 and 4002; (7) failing to properly remove and inventory the possessions of inmate

Augustine, a violent felon who Defendants knew, or should have known, was foreseeably

aggressive due to his transfer from another facility; and (8) failing to monitor, safeguard and

protect Decedent while in their custody.

1. Standing

In moving for summary judgment, Defendants first contend that Plaintiffs lack standing

to assert Decedent’s constitutional rights. Plaintiffs’ allege that as a result of Defendants’ acts

and omissions, Decedent sustained fatal injuries, and they attempt to recover on this basis. 

Complaint, ¶ 16. Their section 1983 claim, then, is based on a violation of Decedent’s Eighth

Amendment rights. 

Courts have long recognized that rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are

personal rights. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (only the person subject to the

penalty has standing to assert an Eighth Amendment objection under the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (rights created by the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are "by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The

rights established are personal rights."). The general rule is that “only the person whose

[personal] rights were violated can sue to vindicate those rights.” Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro.

Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir.1998).

 In section 1983 actions, however, survivors of a deceased individual whose rights were

violated before death may assert these personal claims on the decedent’s behalf if state law

authorizes a survival action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a); Moreland, 159 F.3d at 369. It is the plaintiff's

burden to establish that applicable state law permits a survival action. Id. Under California law,

if an injury giving rise to liability occurs before a decedent's death, then the claim survives to the

decedent's estate. Cal.Civ.Proc. § 377.30. Where there is no personal representative for the

estate, the decedent’s “successor in interest” may prosecute the survival action if the person

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purporting to act as successor in interest satisfies the requirements under California Code of Civil

Procedure section 377.32. Section 377.32 requires a person seeking to commence a survival

action to execute and file an affidavit setting forth specific information. 

Here, Plaintiffs are Decedent’s mother and his four children, alleged to be Decedent’s

surviving heirs. There is no indication, however, that Plaintiffs are suing in a representative

capacity as successors in interest to Decedent or as personal representatives of his estate. Nor is

there any indication that Plaintiffs followed the procedure set forth in section 377.32. In fact, the

Complaint does not even mention any of the applicable state statutes. “The party seeking to

bring a survival action bears the burden of demonstrating that a particular state's law authorizes a

survival action and that the plaintiff meets that state’s requirements for bringing a survival

action.” Moreland, 159 F.3d at 369. Plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden. 

The Court recognizes that the Complaint is not clear as to whether Plaintiffs allege the

section 1983 claim on behalf of Decedent as survivors, or whether they attempt to recover for

their own losses. If it is the former, they have failed to satisfy the statutory requirements, as set

forth above. If it is the latter and Plaintiffs’ allegations are made in the context of a wrongful

death action, such recovery is not permitted under section 1983. See Whitfield v. California,

2007 WL 496342 (E.D.Cal. 2007) (California wrongful death and survivor statutes do not permit

recovery of a decedent’s pain and suffering, and therefore such damages are not recoverable

under section 1983.); Martinez v. County of Madera, 2005 WL 2562715, *3 (E.D.Cal. 2005)

(“only survival actions, not wrongful death claims, are compensable under § 1983").

Presumably, Plaintiffs might have amended the complaint, without prejudice to

Defendants, to cure this defect, however they never moved to do so and this is not the only issue

raised in Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

2. Application of Eighth Amendment

As their second argument in support of summary judgment, Defendants correctly assert

that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to Decedent, who was a pretrial detainee at the time of

the incident that led to his death. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment only protects convicted prisoners. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979);

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Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 

Instead, the source of Decedent’s rights is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Although the same standards apply to prisoners’ rights under the Eighth Amendment and

pretrial detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiffs’ Complaint states only an

Eighth Amendment claim. Again, Plaintiffs have made no attempt to amend their Complaint to

remedy this deficiency. In fact, Defendants’ counsel Dan Farrar states that as early as October

2005, he informed Plaintiffs’ counsel that, among other deficiencies, the Eighth Amendment did

not apply to the facts of the case. Declaration of Dan Farrar, ¶ 2. Despite this information,

Plaintiffs never moved to amend.

Even assuming for purposes of this motion that Plaintiffs’ claim was properly stated, the

claim has no merit. To determine whether the conditions of Decedent’s confinement constituted

cruel and unusual punishment, the Court must first determine whether Decedent was deprived of

the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304

(1991). If so, a prison official may be held liable if he acted with “deliberate indifference” to a

substantial risk of serious harm. Mere negligence is not sufficient to establish liability. Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). 

The evidence before the Court, including the evidence submitted in opposition to the

motion, demonstrates that he was assessed prior to being placed in the M-1 holding cell for

processing. Correctional officer Santos De Los Santos testified at his deposition that he assessed

Decedent prior to putting him in the M-1 holding cell, and felt comfortable about his placement

decision. Deposition of Santos De Los Santos, attached to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed

Facts, at 86. In his professional judgment, he felt that the M-1 holding cell was an appropriate

place to hold Decedent until the sergeant could make further decisions about his release. 

Deposition of Santos De Los Santos, attached to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, at 87. 

When Plaintiff was injured, he received treatment for his obvious facial laceration within a

reasonable time at the jail. When Plaintiff went into convulsions, he was transported by

ambulance to Memorial Medical Center. There is simply no evidence to suggest that Defendants

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acted with deliberate indifferent in choosing Decedent’s holding cell or in rendering medical

care. 

Nor is there any evidence of the actually policies or procedures in effect at the Stanislaus

County Jail at the time of the incident. Insofar as Plaintiffs purport to rely on the report of expert

William F. Naber, his statements are merely opinion not fact and are based on admittedly

incomplete records. 

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs lack standing and the Eighth Amendment is not

applicable to this case, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s

first cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. State Law Claim

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for negligence alleges that Defendants conducted

themselves in a negligent manner with respect to the care, custody, control and medical care of

Decedent.

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants point to California

Government Code section 820.8, which provides:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury

caused by the act or omission of another person. Nothing in this section exonerates a

public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or

wrongful act or omission.

Plaintiffs name the Stanislaus County Sheriff and the Stanislaus County Deputy Sheriff as

Defendants. As public employees, then, they cannot be held liable for the acts or omissions of

other people. Section 820.8 does not, however, protect a public employee from liability for

injury proximately caused by his own negligent of wrongful act or omission. Here, though,

neither the Sheriff nor the Deputy Sheriff had any involvement in the acts that lead to Decedent’s

death. Declaration of Jennifer Hudson, ¶ 3. A plaintiff cannot state a cause of action against a

superior merely for the negligent act or omissions of subordinate public employees. Rather, the

liability of the superior must be found in his personal fault, i.e., by personally participating in, or

encouraging, the acts complained of. Martinez v. Cahill, 215 Cal.App.2d 823, 824 (1963). 

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 At times, Plaintiffs have indicated that their negligence cause of action is based on the implementation of 3

policies and procedures, in a likely attempt to circumvent the immunity conferred by section 820.8 and to state a

Monell claim. However, the Complaint contains no such allegations and the Court cannot assume these allegations

for purposes of analyzing this summary judgment motion. Moreover, as explained above, there is no evidence

before the Court of the policies and procedures in effect at the time of the incident. 

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Plaintiffs’ Complaint wholly fails to allege any direct, personal involvement by either

Defendant. 

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Defendants further argue that to the extent this action can be construed as one against the

County of Stanislaus, California Government Code section 844.6 provides immunity. Section

844.6(a) provides that a public entity is not liable for an injury caused by a prisoner or an injury

to a prisoner. Under the facts of this case, it is undisputed that the injury to Decedent was caused

by a prisoner and immunity is therefore conferred on the County by way of section 844.6. For

the same reasons that no personal involvement can be found under section 820.8, no personal

involvement can be found under 844.6(d) (allowing a public employee to be held liable for injury

proximately caused by his negligent act or omission). 

Defendants also contend, and this Court agrees, that the exception found in section 845.6

does not apply. Section 845.6 confers liability on a “public employee, and the public entity

where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, if the employee knows or has

reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take

reasonable action to summon such medical care.” The Complaint states that Plaintiff was

examined and treated at the jail, and there is no evidence before the Court to suggest any failure

to take reasonable action.

Therefore, based on the allegations in the Complaint, Defendants are immune from

liability and the summary judgment motion as to the second cause of action is GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Judgment SHALL BE

entered against Plaintiffs and in favor of Defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 27, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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