Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02180/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02180-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

CHARLES EDWARD STINE PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-2180

 

STATE OF ARKANSAS; ARKANSAS

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; 

SEBASTIAN COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S

OFFICE; FORT SMITH POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; POLK COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; FORMER

ATTORNEY GENERAL MARK PRYOR;

ATTORNEY GENERAL MIKE BEEBE;

CIRCUIT JUDGE NORMAN WILKINSON;

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY MICHAEL

WAGONER; ASSISTANT PROSECUTING

ATTORNEY MELANIE MAYNER; CORPORAL

ALFRED FIESCHER, Fort Smith Police 

Department; LARRY CLARK, Jail Administrator, 

Polk County Sheriff’s Department, and CASH

HAASER, Deputy Public Defender DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Charles Edward Stine brings this pro se civil rights action. His complaint is before the

court for pre-service screening pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and/or § 1915A.

I. Background

On Friday, March 22, 2002, Stine alleges he was arrested at his house by Corporal Alfred

Fiescher. Stine maintains the arrest was allegedly based on his having confessed to sexually

assaulting his niece. Stine asserts there was no confession or statement and his attorney Cash

Haaser knew it but failed to have the confession thrown out of court.

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Stine states he contacted Haaser a number of times asking him to file various motions.

Finally, on May 28, 2002, Haaser showed up at the jail to talk to Stine about a plea bargain. At

that time, Stine alleges Haaser indicated he had not filed any of the motions, the judge would not

allow them, and there was no reason to file them.

After a period of time, a second plea offer was made. Stine took this plea offer of one

hundred and twenty days and five years probation and entered a plea in front of Judge Norman

Wilkinson on May 29, 2002. The prosecuting attorney, Michael Wagoner, told the judge that

the victim’s family was not cooperating and that was why the offer was being made. Stine states

he also had to register as a sex offender, which was not part of the deal, and attend counseling.

After Stine served his time, he asserts he received a letter informing him he had to go to

Pine Bluff to be assessed by the Arkansas Department of Correction. Stine indicates he filed

a motion to stop the action. Stine indicates Judge Wilkinson, Melanie Mayner, and Cash Haaser

were all involved in this motion. Stine asserts Judge Wilkinson ruled that Stine had no option.

Stine now maintains the law he was prosecuted under was unconstitutional because the

judge did not have the authority to order him to register as a sex offender or surrender any DNA

to the State. Stine also maintains the sex offender registry is illegal.

On July 3, 2003, Stine states he was arrested at a friend’s house by Officer Daniel

Grubbs. Stine states he never saw an arrest warrant and was only told what he was arrested for.

He maintains this arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

On September 5, 2003, Stine asserts he received a letter from the Polk County Sheriff’s

Office stating he must appear on September 22nd so his file could be updated. When Stine

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arrived at the sheriff’s office, Larry Clark took his picture and DNA. As there was no court order

authorizing this, Stine maintains these actions were unconstitutional.

Stine maintains the laws he was prosecuted under are unconstitutional. Stine contends

the unconstitutional laws are the fault of former Attorney General Mark Pryor and current

Attorney General Mike Beebe. Stine asks the court to set aside his conviction, expunge his arrest

record, expunge all court records, remove his DNA and fingerprints from all data banks, and

award him monetary damages from each of the defendants. Additionally, he would like all other

individuals whose rights have been violated to be freed from incarceration.

II. Discussion

Stine’s claims are subject to dismissal because they are barred by the statute of

limitations. The claims are based on events that occurred more than three years before the filing

of this complaint. Section 1983 actions are characterized as personal injury claims for purposes

of applying the appropriate state statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105

S. Ct. 1938, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985). Arkansas’ three-year personal injury statute applies to any

§ 1983 actions that accrued in this state. Searcy v. Donelson, 204 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2000);

Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992). This case was filed on

October 16, 2006. The events challenged by Stine began on March 22, 2002, and the last event

identified by him occurred on September 5, 2003, more than three years prior to the filing of the

complaint.

Even if Stine’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations, they are subject to

dismissal for a variety of reasons. First, Cash Haaser is not subject to suit under § 1983. A §

1983 complaint must allege that each defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived

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plaintiff of "rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United

States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70 L.

Ed. 2d 509 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a public defender does not act under color of

state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to indigent defendants in

state criminal proceedings. Thus, when the claim is that a public defender failed to adequately

represent a client in his criminal proceedings, it does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.

See also Gilbert v. Corcoran, 530 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1976)(conclusory allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel do not state a claim against public defenders under § 1983).

Second, Michael Wagoner and Melanie Mayner, both prosecuting attorneys, are immune

from suit. The United States Supreme Court, in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S.

Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976), established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from

a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the

State's case." Id., 424 U.S. at 427. This immunity extends to all acts that are “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id., 424 U.S. at 430. See also

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2615, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209

(1993)(Prosecutor acting as an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is entitled to

absolute immunity while a prosecutor acting in an investigatory or administrative capacity is only

entitled to qualified immunity). Based on the allegations of the complaint, it is clear the

defendant prosecuting attorneys are entitled to absolute immunity. See also Brodnicki v. City of

Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996)(County prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity

from suit).

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To the extent Stine’s complaint seeks injunctive relief, we find the claim not cognizable.

While the Supreme Court has not held that this immunity insulates prosecutors from declaratory

or injunctive relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984),

a plaintiff must show some substantial likelihood that the past conduct alleged to be illegal will

recur. Stine can make no such showing here. Further, injunctive relief is not appropriate where

an adequate remedy under state law exists. Id., 466 U.S. at 542 & n.22. See also Bonner v.

Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975). 

Third, Circuit Judge Norman Wilkinson is immune from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502

U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991)("Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit,

not just from ultimate assessment of damages."). See also Duty v. City of Springdale, 42 F.3d

460, 462 (8th Cir. 1994). "Judges performing judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity from

§ 1983 liability." Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994). “A judge will not be

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in

excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed.

2d 331 (1978). 

Judicial immunity is overcome in two situations: (1) if the challenged act is nonjudicial;

and (2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. It is clear from the allegations of the complaint that neither

situation applies here.

In the past, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief “have been permitted under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against judges acting in their official capacity.” Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court

of Com. of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Mass. 2000), aff’d without op., 248 F.3d 1127 (1st

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Cir. 2000)(citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984)). 

“However, in 1996 Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act (“FCIA”), Pub. L. No.

104-317, Title III § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853, which legislatively reversed Pulliam in several

important respects.” Nollet, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 210. As amended by the FCIA, § 1983 now

precludes injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

 Stine does not allege that either of these prerequisites for injunctive relief are met. See

e.g., Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999)(holding injunctive relief against a

quasi-judicial official is barred if the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a declaratory decree

or the unavailability of declaratory relief); Fox v. Lee, 99 F. Supp. 2d 573, 575-576 (E.D. Pa.

2000)(claim for injunctive relief dismissed where plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that either

of the prerequisites to injunctive relief were met); Ackermann v. Doyle, 43 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273

(E.D. N.Y. 1999)(dismissing action against judicial officers because plaintiff failed to allege that

a declaratory decree was violated or the declaratory relief was unavailable). Thus, to the extent

Stine seeks injunctive relief his claims are subject to dismissal.

Furthermore, to be entitled to equitable relief, “plaintiff must show that he has an

inadequate remedy at law and a serious risk of irreparable harm.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy

Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1987)(citations omitted). Equitable

relief is not appropriate where an adequate remedy under state law exists. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at

542 & n. 22, 104 S. Ct. at 1981 & n. 22. See also Sterling v. Calvin , 874 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.

1989). An adequate remedy at law exists when the acts of the judicial officer can be reviewed

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on appeal or by extraordinary writ. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1392 (citation omitted). See also Nelson

v. Com, 1997 WL 793060, 2 (E.D. Pa. 1997)(appellate review of conviction provides plaintiff

an adequate remedy under state law). See also J&M Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Hampton, 347 Ark.

126, 60 S.W.3d 481 (2001)(discussing when a writ of prohibition is appropriate). 

Fourth, the Fort Smith Police Department and the Polk County Sheriff’s Department

cannot be sued under § 1983. The police department and sheriff’s department are buildings and

not considered persons or legal entities subject to suit under § 1983. See e.g., Dean v. Barber,

951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992)(“[s]heriff’s departments and police departments are not

usually considered legal entities subject to suit”); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757

(N.D. Ill. 1993)(jail not subject to suit); Marsden v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 856 F. Supp. 832,

836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)(“jail is not an entity that is amenable to suit”); In re Scott County Master

Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1163 n. 1 (D. Minn. 1987)(sheriff’s department is not a legal entity

subject to suit), aff’d, Myers v. Scott County, 863 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989).

Fifth, the claims against the State of Arkansas and the Arkansas Department of

Correction (ADC) are also subject to dismissal. The ADC is a state agency. Fegans v. Norris,

351 Ark. 200, 206, 89 S.W.3d 919 (2002). The State and the ADC are entitled to sovereign

immunity. See e.g. Campbell v. Arkansas Department of Correction, 155 F.3d 950, 962 (8th Cir.

1998). 

Finally, Stine’s claims seeking to overturn his conviction are subject to dismissal. In

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court

held that a claim for damages for "allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for

other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid"

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is not cognizable until "the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged

by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination,

or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S.

486-87. Stine’s conviction has not been reversed, set aside, or otherwise declared invalid.

 III. Conclusion

I therefore recommend Stine’s claims be dismissed on the grounds that the claims are

frivolous, fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted, and are asserted against

individuals immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)(IFP action, or any portion

thereof, may be dismissed on such grounds at any time). 

Stine has ten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which to file

written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections

may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. Stine is reminded that

objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

DATED this 28th day of November 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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