Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01364/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01364-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Melvin De Freitas, Jr.

Plaintiff,

v. 

Todd Thomas, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-13-01364-PHX-SRB (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

This is a civil rights action initiated by Melvin De Freitas Jr. (“Plaintiff”) pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1942. On October 2, 2015, Defendants filed a “Motion for Sanctions 

Pursuant to Rule 11” (Doc. 104). Plaintiff has responded (Doc. 112), and Defendants 

have replied (Doc. 116). In addition, Defendants have filed a “Supplement to Motion for 

Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11 [Doc. 104 & 116]” (Doc. 136). On March 16, 2016, the 

Court referred the Motion for Sanctions to the undersigned for a Report and 

Recommendation. (Doc. 145).

In their Motion (Doc. 104), Defendants contend that Plaintiff knowingly filed (i) 

two allegedly false declarations prepared by inmate Kawika Vinano (“Vinano”) and (ii) 

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one allegedly false declaration prepared by former inmate Brandon Lafoga (“Lafoga”).

1

 

However, Plaintiff moved to withdraw Vinano’s declarations within the twenty-one day 

safe harbor period provided in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 

addition, the undersigned finds that Defendants have failed to meet their burden of 

showing that sanctions are warranted as to Plaintiff’s submission of Lafoga’s declaration. 

For the reasons explained herein, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny the 

“Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11” (Doc. 104) without holding an evidentiary 

hearing.

2

 

I. RULE 11 SANCTIONS

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides for the imposition of sanctions when 

a filing is frivolous, legally unreasonable, without factual foundation or brought for an 

improper purpose.” Petrella v. Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 

2012), reversed on other grounds, 132 S.Ct. 1962 (2014). The party moving for Rule 11 

sanctions bears the burden of proof and persuasion. See Tom Growney Equip., Inc. v. 

Shelley Irr. Dev., Inc., 834 F.2d 833, 837 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that burden of proving 

Rule 11 sanctions were not justified was erroneously placed on non-moving party); Rich 

Art Sign Co, Inc. v. Ring, 122 F.R.D. 472, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (denying motion for 

sanctions where defendants failed to prove that claim was frivolous); Phinney v. 

Paulshock, 181 F.R.D. 185, 197 (D.N.H. 1998) (stating that “[i]n general, the burden of 

proof is on the party seeking the sanction”).

Rule 11 contains a “safe harbor” provision. This provision states that a motion for 

sanctions “must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the 

court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or 

1 Vinano and Lafoga’s declarations are contained in Plaintiff’s “Motion of 

Witnesses Declarations and New Evidence” (Doc. 83).

2 Pursuant to the Court’s referral Order (Doc. 145), the undersigned set an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for Sanctions. (Doc. 149). However, given the 

conclusions set forth in this Report and Recommendation, the undersigned has vacated the evidentiary hearing.

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appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). “The purpose of the safe harbor . . . is to give the offending 

party the opportunity . . . to withdraw the offending pleading and thereby escape 

sanctions.” Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original); 

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments, Subdivisions 

(b) and (c) (explaining that the “safe harbor” provision protects the non-moving party 

from a motion for sanctions if the party makes a timely withdrawal of the contention that 

gave rise to the motion). 

Failure to comply with the safe harbor provision precludes an award of Rule 11 

sanctions. Barber, 146 F.3d at 710-11 (“An award of sanctions cannot be upheld” where 

the movant does not comply with the twenty-one day notice requirement); Winterrowd v. 

Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s 

ruling that there was “no basis” for awarding Rule 11 sanctions where moving party did 

not comply with safe harbor provision); Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 

789 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing district court’s grant of Rule 11 sanctions where the 

moving party failed to comply with the safe harbor provision); Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., 

Inc., 200 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that “the twenty-one day safe harbor 

is not merely an empty formality,” and a “court that imposes sanctions by motion without 

adhering to this twenty-one day safe harbor has abused its discretion”); Holgate v. 

Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[w]e must reverse the award of 

sanctions when the [moving] party failed to comply with the safe harbor provisions, even 

when the underlying filing is frivolous”).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Summary of Plaintiff’s Claims 

Plaintiff is a Hawaiian inmate who is confined in the Saguaro Correctional Center 

(“SCC”), a Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”) facility in Eloy. On July 8,

2013, Plaintiff filed a sixteen-count Complaint (Doc. 1) against a number of current or 

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former SCC employees. The Complaint sought relief for alleged threats to safety, 

retaliation, sexual assault, violation of mail rights, and deprivation of property. (Doc. 6 at 

3). After screening the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court ordered 

Defendant Correctional Officers Romero and Carrier to answer Count IV (in part), 

Count VII, and Count VIII (in part). (Id. at 19). The Court dismissed all other

Defendants and claims in the Complaint without prejudice. (Id.). Defendants Romero 

and Carrier filed their Answer on April 15, 2014 (Doc. 11).

On July 22, 2014, the Court allowed Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 35) to reassert the claims that Defendants Romero and Carrier answered and to

raise four new claims against Defendant Correctional Officers Romero, Carrier, Griego, 

and Flores for use of excessive force arising out of an alleged March 28, 2014 incident 

(Counts XIII-XVI of the Second Amended Complaint). (Doc. 35 at 4). Defendants 

Carrier and Romero answered the Second Amended Complaint on August 8, 2014 (Doc. 

40). Defendants Flores and Griego were served in July 2015, and filed their Answer on 

September 4, 2015. (Docs. 94, 95, and 100).

B. In June 2015, Plaintiff Submitted Declarations by Inmate Kawika Vinano 

and Former Inmate Brandon Lafoga. In August 2015, Defendants

Submitted a Declaration by Vinano Recanting the Statements Made in His 

Declarations Supporting Plaintiff’s Claims.

On June 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed a “Motion of Witnesses Declarations and New 

Evidence” (Doc. 83). Plaintiff attached two declarations dated May 24, 2015 by inmate 

Vinano (the “May 2015 Declarations” or the “May 2015 Vinano Declarations”). (Id. at 

4-8). Plaintiff also attached a declaration dated January 11, 2015 by former inmate 

Lafoga (the “Lafoga Declaration”).

3

 (Id. at 9). All three declarations corroborated 

portions of Plaintiff’s claims. 

In his July 15, 2015 filing, captioned as “Motion Notify the Court of Retaliation 

3 Defendants indicated that Lafoga was released from prison on March 2015 (Doc. 104 at 2-3). Lafoga is not listed as a witness in the parties’ Joint Prehearing Memorandum (Doc. 156).

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Done to Inmate Witnesses . . .” (Doc. 91), Plaintiff alleged that Defendants intimidated 

Vinano and that Vinano “signed a paper agreeing on not being a witness and will not 

testify in Court.” In their Response (Doc. 93), Defendants denied the allegations. 

Defendants explained that Vinano could not have witnessed the incidents alleged by 

Plaintiff because Vinano was not assigned to the prison unit in which the alleged 

incidents took place. (Id. at 2). Defendants attached to their Response a declaration by 

Vinano dated July 8, 2015. (Doc. 93-2 at 2). In the declaration, Vinano recanted the 

statements made in the May 2015 Declarations. (Id. at 4). Vinano asserted that he signed 

the declarations because Plaintiff told him that “if [Plaintiff] got money from his case, he 

would send money to my family . . . .” (Id.).

In his August 24, 2015 Reply, Plaintiff asserts that had Defendants given him 

certain requested information pertaining to cell assignments, “Plaintiff would have 

known that inmate Vinano was a liar.” (Doc. 97 at 1). Plaintiff, however, maintained 

that he “still honestly believe [sic] that inmate Vinano was a true witness . . . .” (Doc. 97 

at 3).

C. On August 25, 2015, Defendants Demanded that Plaintiff Withdraw the 

May 2015 Vinano Declarations and the Lafoga Declaration and Dismiss 

his Lawsuit.

On August 25, 2015, Defendants mailed Plaintiff a letter enclosing an unfiled

“Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11.” (Doc. 104-1 at 3-19). Defendants stated

that they would file the Motion for Sanctions unless Plaintiff (i) withdrew the May 2015 

Vinano Declarations and the Lafoga Declaration and (ii) dismissed his lawsuit within 

twenty-one days of the date of the letter.4

 (Id. at 4). Twenty-one days from August 25, 

2015 is September 15, 2015. Because Defendants served the Motion for Sanctions on 

Plaintiff by mail, three days are added to the twenty-one day safe harbor period pursuant 

4 Yet “[t]he Rule 11 safe harbor provision, by its plain language, does not require that a party drop its claims with prejudice.” Sneller v. City of Bainbridge Island, 606 

F.3d 636, 639 (9th Cir. 2010). 

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to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). Accordingly, the safe harbor period expired on September 18, 

2015. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (stating that moving party must serve the unfiled 

motion for sanctions on opposing party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5); Fed R. Civ. P. 6(d) 

(“When a party may or must act within a specified time after service and service is made 

under Rule 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F), 3 days are added after the period would otherwise 

expire under Rule 6(a)); Carruthers v. Flaum, 450 F. Supp. 2d 288, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 

(explaining that if a motion for Rule 11 sanctions was served via first class mail, the safe 

harbor period is extended by three-days pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, thereby giving the 

non-moving party “24 rather 21 days within which to respond”).

As discussed below, Plaintiff filed a Motion (Doc. 101) within the safe harbor 

period requesting that the May 2015 Vinano Declarations be dismissed.

D. In September 2015, Plaintiff Filed a Timely Motion (Doc. 101) Seeking to 

Dismiss the “False Declaration of Inmate Kawika Vinano.” 

On September 21, 2015, the Clerk of Court docketed a document filed by Plaintiff 

entitled “Motion to Complete and Clarify the Record Regarding the False Declaration of 

Inmate Kawika Vinano . . . .” (Doc. 101). The Certificate of Service states that Plaintiff 

mailed the Motion to the Court on September 15, 2015. (Id. at 4). The undersigned 

deems September 15, 2015 as the Motion’s filing date. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 

266, 270-71 (1988) (providing that a filing is deemed “filed” when handed by the 

prisoner to a prison official for mailing).

On its face, Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 101) is ambiguous as to Plaintiff’s requested 

relief. Plaintiff stated: “According to the CCA’s Legal Team inmate witness declaration 

of Kawika Vinano is totally false and it’s proven to be correct and it need’s [sic] to be 

dismissed by the Honorable Court.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff also states that he has requested 

certain information from Defendants “to attempt to solve and prevent False declarations 

. . . .” (Id.). Plaintiff requested “the Honorable Court to dismiss the False declaration of 

inmate Kawika Vinano.” (Id. at 3). Plaintiff initially did not clearly delineate to which 

Vinano declaration he referred.

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E. Before Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 101) Seeking to Dismiss the “False 

Declaration of Inmate Kawika Vinano” was Fully Briefed, Defendants 

Filed the Motion for Sanctions.

On October 2, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 104). 

Defendants filed their Response to Plaintiff’s “Motion to Complete and Clarify the 

Record . . .” on October 8, 2015. (Doc. 105). Defendants implicitly acknowledge the 

possibility that Plaintiff’s Motion was an attempt to avoid Rule 11 sanctions pursuant to 

the safe harbor provision. Defendants state that:

Plaintiff’s request in the Conclusion section of his Motion to 

Clarify that the Court “dismiss the false declaration of inmate 

Kawika Vinano” is insufficient to allow Plaintiff to avoid 

sanctions under Rule 11. There are three declarations from 

Inmate Vinano currently before the Court—the two 

fraudulent declarations submitted by Plaintiff as exhibits to 

Doc. #83, and the declaration submitted by Defendants as an 

exhibit to Doc. #93 regarding Plaintiff’s efforts to obtain 

declarations from Inmate Vinano-but Plaintiff did not specify 

which of the three he is seeking to have “dismissed.” 

(Id. at 2).

F. In an October 28, 2015 Order (Doc. 113), the Undersigned Interpreted 

Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 101) as Requesting that the Court Dismiss 

Vinano’s July 8, 2015 Declaration Submitted by Defendants.

Plaintiff’s Reply in support of his Motion (Doc. 101) was not docketed by the 

October 19, 2015 reply deadline. In an October 28, 2015 Order, the undersigned deemed 

a portion of Plaintiff’s “Motion to Complete and Clarify the Record . . .” (Doc. 101) as a 

request to strike Vinano’s July 8, 2015 declaration submitted by Defendants. (Doc. 113

at 4). The undersigned therefore denied Plaintiff’s request. (Id.). 

G. After the Court’s Order, the Clerk of Court Docketed Plaintiff’s Reply in 

Support of His Motion (Doc. 101). The Reply Clarified the Ambiguities in 

the Motion and Requested that the Court Dismiss the Two May 2015 

Vinano Declarations.

On November 2, 2015, the Clerk of Court docketed Plaintiff’s Reply in support of 

his “Motion to Complete and Clarify the Record . . .” (Doc. 115). The Certificate of 

Service states that Plaintiff mailed the Reply on October 25, 2015. (Id. at 3). The date 

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next to Plaintiff’s signature is October 16, 2015, which was within the October 19, 2015 

reply deadline. (Id.). In light of the leniency to be afforded to pro se prisoner litigants, 

the undersigned has reviewed and considered Plaintiff’s Reply. See Draper v. 

Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that a pro se plaintiff is treated 

with great leniency in evaluating compliance with technical rules of civil procedure); 

Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1221 (D. Haw. 2010) (stating that 

“[w]hen a plaintiff proceeds pro se and technically violates a rule, the court should act 

with leniency toward the pro se litigant”); see also Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 938-

40 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing hardships faced by prisoners proceeding pro se).

Plaintiff’s Reply clarified the ambiguities in his Motion (Doc. 101) by explicitly 

requesting the Court to “please dismiss the two declarations of Inmate Kawika Vinano 

for the May 18, 21, 2013 and March 28, 2014 incidents dated May 24, 2015 that was 

written and sworn by inmate Vinano.” (Doc. 115 at 3).

H. The Undersigned Amended the October 28, 2015 Order (Doc. 113). The 

Undersigned Granted Plaintiff’s “Motion to Complete and Clarify the 

Record . . .” and Ordered the May 2015 Vinano Declarations Withdrawn

Effective September 15, 2015.

Upon referral by the District Judge (Doc. 145), the undersigned scheduled an 

evidentiary hearing on Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions for May 19, 2016. (Doc. 149). 

Pursuant to the undersigned’s Order (Doc. 149), the parties submitted a Joint Prehearing 

Memorandum (Doc. 156) detailing their anticipated witnesses and exhibits. (Id.). The 

undersigned carefully reviewed the Joint Prehearing Memorandum and docket in 

preparation for the hearing. After reviewing the docket, including Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 

115) in support of his “Motion to Complete and Clarify the Record . . .” (Doc. 101), the 

undersigned amended the October 28, 2015 Order (Doc. 113). The undersigned (i) 

construed Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 101) as a timely request to withdraw the May 2015 

Vinano Declarations; (ii) granted Plaintiff’s “Motion to Complete and Clarify the Record

. . .” (Doc. 101); and (iii) ordered the May 2015 Vinano Declarations withdrawn effective 

September 15, 2015. (Doc. 162). The undersigned vacated the evidentiary hearing in 

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light of the conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The May 2015 Vinano Declarations

The safe harbor provision was added to Rule 11 as part of the 1993 amendments to 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11 does not explicitly provide how a party 

must “withdraw” or “correct” a challenged filing so as to fall within the protections of the 

safe harbor provision. However, an Advisory Committee note to the 1993 amendments

states that a motion for sanctions should not be filed with the court if the “alleged 

violation is corrected, as by withdrawing (whether formally or informally) some 

allegation or contention.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 

Amendments, Subdivisions (b) and (c) (emphasis added). This suggests that something 

other than a court order withdrawing or correcting a challenged filing within the safe 

harbor period may be sufficient to preclude Rule 11 sanctions. See STEVEN S. GENSLER, 

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND COMMENTARY RULE 11 (2016) 

(stating that with respect to the safe harbor provision, “[i]n general, courts should 

consider whether a party has clearly signaled its intent to withdraw or correct the 

offending paper, even if further steps remain to be taken”); see also Carruthers, 450 F. 

Supp. 2d at 306 (finding it sufficient for purposes of the safe harbor provision for a party 

to send a stipulation of withdrawal to opposing counsel and stating that “[s]o as long as 

the plaintiff takes some step leading to the withdrawal of the offending claim—whether 

offering to withdraw the claim or moving for leave to withdraw them—Rule 11 will be 

satisfied . . . .”). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Sneller v. City of Bainbridge 

Island, 606 F.3d 636 (9th Cir. 2010) is instructive. The plaintiffs in Sneller were 

developers who filed an action against the City of Bainbridge Island, Washington (the 

“City”) and other defendants after a dispute arose regarding the plaintiffs’ efforts to 

develop land that included a wetland. Id. at 637. The City served an unfiled Rule 11 

motion for sanctions on plaintiffs and requested that the plaintiffs drop certain claims 

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from their complaint. Id. at 637-38. Three days before the safe harbor period expired, 

the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint. Id. at 638. The proposed amended 

complaint attached to the plaintiffs’ motion omitted the claims referenced in the City’s 

motion for sanctions, but added two new causes of action. After the safe harbor period 

had expired, but before the motion to amend had been ruled on, the City filed the motion

for sanctions with the district court. Id. The court granted the City’s motion for 

sanctions and awarded the City $24,000. Id. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion 

to amend and granted the City’s motion for partial summary judgment. Id.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s imposition of sanctions. 

The Court concluded that “[b]y filing the motion to amend within the 21-day safe harbor 

period, [the plaintiffs] withdrew all of the challenged claims as required by Rule 11. 

There is nothing more that [the plaintiffs] were required to do in terms of withdrawing 

the challenged claims.” Id. at 639. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff’s motion to 

amend the complaint constituted effective withdrawal because it was the only procedure 

available under the rules to withdraw individual claims. Id. The Court’s ruling was not 

altered by the fact that the plaintiffs’ motion to amend was not ripe for decision until after 

the twenty-one day safe harbor expired. Id. at 640 n.5.

As discussed, Defendants mailed their unfiled Motion for Sanctions to Plaintiff on 

August 25, 2015. (Doc. 104-1 at 3-19). The last day of the safe harbor period was 

September 18, 2015. Applying the prison mailbox rule, Plaintiff filed his Motion (Doc. 

101) requesting that the May 2015 Vinano Declarations be dismissed on September 15, 

2015. The undersigned granted Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 101) and ordered that the May 

2015 Vinano Declarations be withdrawn effective September 15, 2015. (Doc. 162). 

Because Plaintiff filed his Motion requesting to withdraw the May 2015 Vinano 

Declarations before the safe harbor period expired, Defendants are precluded from 

moving for Rule 11 sanctions as to the May 2015 Vinano Declarations. See Sneller, 606 

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F.3d at 6405; AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1529 (10th Cir. 1997) (ruling that 

the voluntary dismissal of claims prior to the filing of a Rule 11 motion precluded 

sanctions). 

The undersigned notes that Defendants acknowledged in their Motion for 

Sanctions that Plaintiff filed his “Motion to Complete and Clarify the Record . . .” 

seeking to dismiss the “false declaration of inmate Kawika Vinano.” (Doc. 104 at 7 n.4). 

However, instead of waiting for Plaintiff’s Motion to be fully briefed and ruled on, 

Defendants asserted that Plaintiff “has not withdrawn or corrected the challenged 

document, such that sanctions are now warranted.” (Id.). Defendants’ premature filing 

of the Motion for Sanctions has frustrated the purpose of the safe harbor period and has 

needlessly complicated this case. See Retail Flooring Dealers of America, Inc. v. 

Beaulieu of America, LLC, 339 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying a motion for 

sanctions served after the time in which the plaintiff could correct or withdraw its 

complaint and stating that “[a]n award of sanctions under these circumstances would 

frustrate the safe harbor provision”). Id.

For the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny the 

Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 104) as to the May 2015 Vinano Declarations. 

B. The Lafoga Declaration

Defendants have the burden of showing that sanctions are justified. Regarding the

Lafoga Declaration, Defendants recount that “Inmate Vinano further stated that he knows 

former inmate Brandon Lafoga . . . and that Lafoga told him that he was ‘playing a role’ 

5 The fact that Plaintiff filed a motion rather than a notice of withdrawal to 

withdraw the May 2015 Vinano Declarations does not alter the undersigned’s conclusion that the May 2015 Vinano Declarations were withdrawn within the safe harbor period. 

First, Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 101) signaled his intent to withdraw the May 2015 Vinano Declarations. See STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES 

AND COMMENTARY RULE 11 (2016) (stating that pertaining to the safe harbor provision, “[i]n general, courts should consider whether a party has clearly signaled its intent to withdraw or correct the offending paper, even if further steps remain to be taken”); see 

also Carruthers, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (finding it sufficient for purposes of the safe harbor provision for a party to send a stipulation of withdrawal to opposing counsel). 

Second, courts afford pro se litigants such as Plaintiff leniency. See Draper, 792 F.2d at 

924.

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for Plaintiff, suggesting that Lafoga’s declaration is false, as well.” (Doc. 104 at 2) 

(emphasis added). Setting aside hearsay issues, even if the Court assumed arguendo that 

Lafoga did in fact state that he was “playing a role” for Plaintiff by providing a witness 

declaration, that statement alone is insufficient proof that (i) Lafoga’s statement is false 

and (ii) Plaintiff knowingly submitted the allegedly false declaration.6

 

Defendants have offered no other evidence to show that the Lafoga Declaration is 

false and that Plaintiff knew that it was false. Lafoga has been released from custody,

and Defendants have been unable to reach him. (Doc. 104 at 5 n.3). Moreover, neither 

party listed Lafoga as a witness in their Joint Prehearing Memorandum. (Doc. 156 at 1-

11). None of the evidence Defendants intended to present at the evidentiary hearing 

pertained to Lafoga. (Id. at 8-11, 35-37). For example, although Defendants planned to 

introduce testimony from inmate James Clancy (“Clancy”), who allegedly overhead 

Plaintiff’s attempts to bribe inmates to provide statements, Defendants state that “Plaintiff 

has not submitted affidavits, declarations, or other statements from any of the inmates 

identified by Mr. Clancy.” (Doc. 136 at 2). In addition, Clancy states that he arrived at 

the prison on January 28, 2015, which is after Lafoga’s January 11, 2015 declaration. 

(Doc. 135-1 at 2). In light of the above, the undersigned concluded that an evidentiary 

hearing would not facilitate the Court’s resolution of the Motion for Sanctions as to the

Lafoga Declaration. (Doc. 162). 

Defendants’ vague and conclusory “suggestion” that Plaintiff knowingly 

submitted a false declaration signed by Lafoga is insufficient to support Rule 11 

sanctions. See Rich Art Sign Co., 122 F.R.D. at 474 (finding that the defendants’ 

6 Defendants implicitly acknowledge that there is insufficient evidence to support the imposition of sanctions as to the Lafoga Declaration. In the Motion for Sanctions 

(Doc. 104 at 12 n.6), Defendants cite a case in which a district court imposed sanctions 

after finding that the plaintiff knowingly submitted two false affidavits, but found that it 

was unclear as to whether the plaintiff was aware that a third affidavit was fraudulent. 

Defendants state “[s]imilarly, here, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that 

the two declarations Plaintiff submitted from Inmate Vinano are fraudulent, such that it is 

not necessary that the Court determine whether the declaration Plaintiff submitted from 

Inmate Lafoga is fraudulent as well.” (Id.). 

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“allegations and innuendoes . . . are insufficient to impose Rule 11 sanctions”). 

Defendants may not shift to Plaintiff the burden of proving that sanctions are not justified 

as to the Lafoga Declaration. See Tom Growney Equip., Inc., 834 F.2d at 837 (reversing 

an award of Rule 11 sanctions where, among other errors, the burden of proving the 

sanctions were not justified was erroneously placed on the non-moving party). The 

undersigned recommends that the Court deny the Motion for Sanctions as to the Lafoga 

Declaration. 

C. Clancy and Smith’s Allegations Regarding Plaintiff’s Attempts to Bribe 

Inmates 

Attached to their Reply in Support of the Motion for Sanctions is a declaration 

dated October 29, 2015 by inmate Kalima Smith (“Smith”). (Doc. 116 at 2-5). Smith 

alleges that Plaintiff offered to give him stamps and other commissary items in exchange 

for a statement. (Id. at 3). Smith states that he declined Plaintiff’s offer. (Id.).

Defendants have also submitted a declaration by Clancy, dated December 22, 2015, in 

which Clancy stated that he overheard Plaintiff offer money to three different inmates 

after he won his lawsuit if they would make false statements. (Doc. 135-1 at 2-4). To 

reiterate, Defendants have stated that Plaintiff has not submitted affidavits, declarations, 

or other statements from any of the inmates identified by Clancy. (Doc. 136 at 2). 

The Motion for Sanctions seeks dismissal based on Vinano and Lafoga’s 

declarations only. To the extent Defendants seek sanctions based on Plaintiff’s alleged 

attempts to bribe inmates in exchange for declarations not filed with the Court, the 

conduct is not sanctionable under Rule 11. This is because Rule 11 “applies only to 

assertions contained in papers filed with or submitted to the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 

Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments, Subdivisions (b) and (c); see also Trulis 

v. Barton, 107 F.3d 685, 695 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Rule 11 sanctions are not an 

appropriate remedy for allegation that a party attempted to bribe an individual into 

signing a declaration); Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., 892 F.2d 

802, 813 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that misstatements made during oral argument cannot 

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constitute sanctionable offenses under Rule 11); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1187 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (holding that sanctions for discovery abuses are not governed by Rule 11, 

except for discovery motions). The undersigned thus concluded that an evidentiary 

hearing is unnecessary to allow the testimony of Smith and Clancy. (Doc. 162). To the 

extent Defendants request Rule 11 sanctions based on Smith and Clancy’s declarations, 

the undersigned recommends that the Court deny the request. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court deny Defendants’ “Motion for Sanctions 

Pursuant to Rule 11” (Doc. 104). 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 5th day of May, 2016. 

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