Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00185/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00185-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 This information is derived from Respondent’s motion to dismiss and Petitioner’s amended petition.

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 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARENCE WYATT,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY A. LAMARQUE,

Respondents.

 /

CV F 05-00185 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Docs. 23, 24]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

On March 17, 2003, in the Fresno County Superior Court, a jury convicted Petitioner of

robbery (Cal. Pen. Code § 211),2 attempted robbery (§ 664/211), and assault with a deadly

weapon (§ 245(a)(1)), including numerous enhancements. Petitioner received a state prison term

of fifty years to life, plus an indeterminate term of eleven years. (Lodged Item No. 1.)

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate

District. On August 25, 2004, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. 

(Lodged Item No. 5.)

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On September 28, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme

Court. (Lodged Item No. 7.) It was denied on November 10, 2004. (Lodged Item No. 7.)

Petitioner has not filed any collateral state habeas corpus petitions.

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 4, 2005. 

This action is proceeding on the amended petition, filed April 18, 2005. By order of April 26,

2005, the Court directed Respondent to file a response to the amended petition.

On June 3, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition as a “mixed’

petition. Petitioner did not file an opposition.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state

remedies may be raised by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as

to that ground.” The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley,

533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct.

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1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133

F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court

violated his due process rights “he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is 

insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance

that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

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wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the 

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the amended petition, Petitioner raises the four claims for relief. Respondent contends

that Ground One is exhausted, however, Grounds Two, Three, and Four are unexhausted,

resulting in a “mixed” petition.

 Respondent’s contention has merit. The Court will address each Ground separately.

1. Ground One

Petitioner contends that his constitutional rights were violated because he was shackled

during the trial proceedings without a showing of manifest need.

Petitioner presented this claim to the California Supreme Court in the petition for review. 

(Lodged Item No. 7, at 2-7.) Thus, this claim is exhausted.

2. Ground Two

Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of

Ms. Session in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

As Respondent submits this claim is unexhausted because it was not presented to the

state’s highest court - the California Supreme Court. While this claim was presented in the direct

appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeal (Lodged Item No. 2, at 26-31), it was not made a part

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of the petition for review submitted to the California Supreme Court. (See Lodged Item No. 7.)

Further, Petitioner has not filed any collateral state habeas corpus petitions to the California

Supreme Court, or any other state court, in an effort to exhaust this claim. Accordingly, this

claim is unexhausted.

3. Ground Three

Petitioner contends that the trial court failed to sua sponte instruct the jury on accomplice

testimony in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Like Ground Two, this claim is unexhausted because it was not presented to the

California Supreme Court. This claim was presented in the direct appeal to the Fifth District

Court of Appeal (Lodged Item No. 2, at 32-35), it was not made part of the petition for review

submitted to the California Supreme Court. (See Lodged Item No. 7.) Because the claim was

not presented for review to the California Supreme Court, it is unexhausted and subject to

dismissal.

4. Ground Four

Petitioner contends that the cumulative errors violated Petitioner’s right to a fair trial

provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.

This claim too is unexhausted. Like Grounds Two and Three, this claim was presented in

the direct appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeal (Lodged Item No. 2, at 36), it was not

however made part of the petition for review submitted to the California Supreme Court. (See

Lodged Item No. 7.) Thus, because it was not presented to the California Supreme Court for

review it is unexhausted. 

In sum, Ground One is exhausted, however, Grounds Two, Three and Four are

unexhausted. Because the amended petition is a mixed petition containing exhausted and

unexhausted claims, it must be dismissed. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 522. The Court must

dismiss such a petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the claim if

he can do so. See Pliler v. Ford, 121 S.Ct. 2441, 2444 (2004); Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22. 

However, Petitioner should be provided with an opportunity to withdraw the unexhausted

claim as an alternative to dismissal. Smith v. Ratelle, 323 F.3d 813, 816-819 (9th Cir.2003);

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 The Supreme Court has held that:

[I]n the habeas corpus context it would be appropriate for an order dismissing a mixed 

petition to instruct an applicant that upon [her] return to federal court [she] is to bring only 

exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a) and (b). Once the petitioner is made 

aware of the exhaustion requirement, no reason exists for [her] not to exhaust all potential 

claims before returning to federal court. The failure to comply with an order of the court 

is grounds for dismissal with prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(b).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000).

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Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir.2000) (“district courts must provide habeas

litigants with the opportunity to amend their mixed petitions by striking unexhausted claims as an

alternative to suffering dismissal”). 

In the event that Petitioner opts to dismiss the instant petition and return to the state

courts to exhaust his unexhausted claims, Petitioner is advised that, upon his return to federal

court, he is to bring only exhausted claims. Failure to do so may be grounds for dismissal with

prejudice.3

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED and the amended petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED for

failure to exhaust the state remedies. It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be granted

leave to file a motion to withdraw the unexhausted claims or an amended petition deleting the

unexhausted claims as an alternative to suffering dismissal.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

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specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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