Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04739/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04739-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HANK SPACONE, on behalf of and as

Trustee for the General Unsecured

Creditors' Liquidating Trust of At

Home Corporation, and on behalf of and

in the name of the At Home Liquidating

Trust of At Home Corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Defendant/Counterclaim

Plaintiff, 

v.

HANK SPACONE, on behalf of and as

Trustee for the General Unsecured

Creditors' Liquidating Trust of At

Home Corporation, and on behalf of and

in the name of the At Home Liquidating

Trust of At Home Corporation, and

JACQUELYN CRAWFORD, as Trustee for the

At Home Liquidating Trust of At Home

Corporation,

Counterclaim Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-4739 CW

ORDER ON CROSSMOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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1

Defendant notes, however, that it does not oppose the

portions of Plaintiff’s motion directed to Defendant’s affirmative

defenses based on 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112 and laches, and that it

does not intend to pursue those defenses. Therefore, the Court

will grant Plaintiff’s motion with respect to those defenses. 

2

Plaintiff and Counter-defendant Hank Spacone, on behalf of and

as Trustee for the General Unsecured Creditors' Liquidating Trust

of At Home Corporation, and on behalf of and in the name of the At

Home Liquidating Trust of At Home Corporation, moves for partial

summary judgment that Defendant and Counter-claimant Microsoft

Corporation infringes various claims of the patent-in-suit, that

claim 8 of the patent is valid and that Defendant's theories of

invalidity under §§ 101 and 112 and laches fail, as a matter of

law. Defendant opposes the motion, and cross moves for summary

judgment of non-infringement of all asserted claims and invalidity

of all claims except claim 8.1 The matter was heard on January 13,

2006. Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties,

the evidence cited therein and oral argument on the motion, the

Court grants in part Plaintiff's motion for partial summary

judgment and denies it in part and grants Defendant's motion for

summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

At Home Corporation (At Home) was an internet service provider

that provided high-speed internet connections through cable

infrastructure. On September 19, 2000, At Home was issued U.S.

Patent No. 6,122,647 (the '647 patent), entitled "Dynamic

Generation of Contextual Links in Hypertext Documents." The

application corresponding to the ‘647 patent was filed on May 19,

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1998. 

The Background of the patent represents as follows. The World

Wide Web is today’s most commonly used information retrieval

system, and one of the distinguishing features of documents on the

web is the use of hypertext links that associate a portion of one

document with another document. ‘647 patent, 1:13-16. In

conventional hypertext documents, links were statically defined and

when a user accessed the source document, the links were provided

exactly as defined by the creator/editor. This had several

drawbacks, including that a link could only refer to documents that

existed at the time the link was defined; after the source document

and its links were defined, it could be immediately out-of-date. 

‘647 patent, 1:55-59. There were, however, systems, such as search

engines, that could automatically generate hypertext links. But

even those more advanced search systems were limited in their

capabilities and were not dynamic in nature. Once a user accessed

a referenced document in the search result, the search engine was

then incapable of providing any analysis of the referenced

document. ‘647 patent, 2:21-30. 

The ‘647 patent teaches how to overcome the limitations of

conventional information retrieval systems “by providing a system

and method that dynamically generates contextual hypertext links in

a source document to other topically relevant documents in response

to the content of the source document or user-selected portion

thereof.” ‘647 patent, 41-48. The patent enables users to see

only those documents that are relevant to their subject of interest

in the current context, rather than all documents related to the

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current document they are accessing or the terms it contains, and

to navigate through documents based on topical subjects, rather

than by the terms that occur in the documents. Furthermore, the

patented technology automatically ensures that target documents are

live and current, not static or stale. 

Defendant develops, sells and produces computer software with

smart tag functionality that Plaintiff alleges infringes the ‘647

patent. Smart tags are a feature of Word, Excel and PowerPoint

2003; smart tags are capable of recognizing data types including

names, dates, times, addresses, places, telephone numbers, recent

e-mail recipients and financial symbols. Higashiyama Dec., ¶ 2, 4. 

A number of smart tag recognizers are provided “out of the box” in

Word. Id. at ¶ 4. Other of Defendant’s programs, Microsoft

Outlook, Internet Explorer and Access 2003, do not recognize text,

but they do permit smart tag actions for previously recognized

text. Id. at ¶ 2. 

Smart tags operate through a combination of two components:

recognizers and action handlers. Id. at ¶ 4. The action handlers

allow users to choose appropriate actions for specific data types,

such as place data or name data. 

A user does not have to prompt the system or select any text

for smart tag recognition to occur. When a smart tag data type is

recognized in Word or PowerPoint, it is underlined with a purple

dotted line; when it is recognized in Excel, a small purple

triangle is placed in the corner of the spreadsheet cell. The

position of a smart tag and its data type are recorded in the Word,

Excel or PowerPoint document. Id. at ¶ 6. 

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At the time of recognition, the smart tag or its data type is

not linked to or associated with any other entity or document. Id.

at ¶ 7. After recognition, nothing happens unless the user decides

to invoke the action handler. Id. at ¶ 8. The action handler

controls the actions allowed for each smart tag data type. If the

cursor is positioned over the underlined text or purple triangle,

or if the smart tag text is selected, a smart tag icon will appear. 

If the user clicks on this icon, an action handler is invoked and

displays a menu which lists possible actions for that data type. 

Each data type has its own pre-determined group of actions to

choose from; the user can select an action by clicking on a menu

item and the action will then be carried out. Id. at ¶ 9. The

financial symbol and address smart tags are the two data types

provided by Defendant out of the box that allow the user to search

for and access external information. Id. at ¶ 5. A financial

symbol, or stock ticker, smart tag can search for and access

information related to a stock price, company report or company

news; an address smart tag can search for and access information in

the form of a map or directions. Id. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

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The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving

party is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a

material fact on such issues, nor must the moving party support its

motion with evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.;

see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990);

Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). If the moving party shows an

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific

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evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to

show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. See UA Local 343

v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). 

That is, the moving party must present evidence that, if

uncontroverted at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. 

See id.; see also Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d

1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). Once it has done so, the non-moving

party must set forth specific facts controverting the moving

party's prima facie case. See UA Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The

non-moving party's "burden of contradicting [the moving party's]

evidence is not negligible." Id. This standard does not change

merely because resolution of the relevant issue is "highly fact

specific." See id.

DISCUSSION

I. Infringement

As the Federal Circuit states, "An infringement analysis is a

two-step process in which the court first determines, as a matter

of law, the correct claim scope, and then compares the

properly-construed claim to the accused device to determine, as a

matter of fact, whether all of the claim limitations are present,

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either literally or by a substantial equivalent, in the accused

device." Johnson Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d

985, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Court has already completed the

first step and only the second step remains. 

A. Smart Tags

Before the Court can examine whether smart tags infringe, the

Court must first determine which smart tag types are at issue.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff addresses only the stock ticker

smart tag in Microsoft Word 2002 and 2003. It argues that, because

Plaintiff never identified the stock ticker smart tag in his Final

Infringement Contentions, the Court should not allow Plaintiff to

pursue the stock ticker claim. In the alternative, Defendant

argues that Plaintiff has provided no analysis of the other smart

tag types, such as telephone number, date, person and place, which

do not have the same functionality as the stock ticker smart tag;

thus, Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment

that these other smart tag types do not infringe. In a footnote in

his reply, Plaintiff responds that these arguments are nonsense; he

addresses them in his opposition to Defendant's motion to strike. 

Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff cannot bring a claim based

on the stock ticker smart tag merely because it was not identified

in Plaintiff’s final infringement contentions is not persuasive. 

The cases Defendant cites are distinguishable. And, as Plaintiff

notes, the stock ticker smart tag is an example of the alleged

infringing activity; it did not need to be specifically listed on

Plaintiff's final infringement contentions. 

Defendant's argument that Plaintiff has failed to meet his

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2

Plaintiff's evidence regarding third-party smart tags does

not show that these tags operate any differently than the stock

ticker tag. See Soffer Dec. ¶¶ 16, 27-31. 

9

burden with other smart tag types, however, is compelling. 

Plaintiff did not need to list and analyze every type of smart tag

in his final infringement contentions. But to defeat this motion

for summary judgment, in which Defendant contends that there is an

absence of evidence to support infringement by any smart tags other

than the stock ticker smart tags found in Word, Plaintiff must

produce specific evidence regarding every smart tag type. 

Plaintiff does not. Plaintiff provides evidence regarding

third-party smart tags and smart tags in other applications, such

as Excel and PowerPoint; however, Plaintiff does not provide

evidence regarding other smart tag types. Directly referring to

smart tag types is not enough. As noted above, Defendant includes

a declaration stating that the stock ticker and address smart tags

are the only two smart tag types provided by Defendant out of the

box that can search for and access external information. The

telephone number smart tag, for example, only gives the user the

option of adding that telephone number to Outlook Contacts; it does

not access the Internet. Plaintiff provides no evidence to create

a dispute that the other smart tag types, like the name and date,

have the same functions as the stock ticker and address smart tags. 

Thus, the Court concludes that only the stock ticker, address and

third-party smart tags remain at issue in this case, and, using the

stock ticker tag as the example,2

 the Court will consider whether

these smart tag types infringe the ‘647 patent. 

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3

 "Hypertext link," "link" and "hyperlink” are synonymous and

are used interchangeably.

10

 B. Literal Infringement

The parties cross-move for summary judgment on literal

infringement, both asserting that there are no material factual

disputes. Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s smart tags

functionality, which consists of the smart tags features in

Defendant’s Office and Windows products, and the related software

modules, program and tools that support its functionality, is

indistinguishable from the ‘647 patent and thus literally infringes

the '647 patent. But Defendant contends that its smart tags

feature takes an approach to accessing information that is entirely

different from that of the '647 patent and thus it does not

infringe any of the asserted claims. 

1. Hypertext Links (Claims 1, 2, 6, 8, 11, 12 and 13)

All of the asserted claims require a hypertext link.3 The

Court defined hypertext link as "a computer implemented association

between a portion of the source document and a target document that

includes an anchor and information sufficient to get to a network

location of the target document, and allows a user to navigate from

the source document to the target document by activation of the

link anchor and thereby retrieve the target document." 

Plaintiff argues that Microsoft’s own literature indicates

that smart tags generate hyperlinks. For example, PressPass, an

online resource providing information for journalists, titled

“Office XP Adds New Tools and Innovations to Foundation of Past

Versions,” states:

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Smart tags work like automatic hyperlinks with multiple

options. They search and offer direct access to Web

sites, personal notes and other documents that expand on

the information on the user’s screen. For example, if a

user types one of thousands of company stock-ticker

names, Word creates a tag with links to a variety of

information, such as company reports, stock information

or news from MSN Money Central. Smart tags provide more

power than simple hyperlinks.

Soffer Dec., Ex. Q at MSM 14540. And Defendant’s tutorial on how

to create an XML list description explains:

Test out the smart tag list . . . . One of the action

options in the list should be “View A. Datum Website”. 

Click this command to go to the hypothetical Web site. 

The other action option should be “A. Datum Corporation

Company Reports”, which is also a hyperlink.

Soffer Dec., Ex. B at 10522.

Defendant responds that there is no evidence that it uses

hyperlinks as defined by the Court and that smart tags do not have

a hyperlink as defined by the Court. Defendant argues that

Plaintiff’s characterization of the menu action items as the

hyperlinks fails because these menu items do not include an

“anchor,” as required by the Court’s claim construction. 

Plaintiff, however, responds that he did not assert that the menu

action items are hypertext links. Plaintiff points to deposition

testimony of his expert Stuart B. Soffer, who, when asked if he was

equating, for the purposes of claim 6, the action items with

hypertext links, responded, "No. They are representative of the

hypertext links . . . ." Supp. Smith Dec., Ex. A at 117:21-24;

119:3-6 (menus items are "simplified titles" for hypertext links). 

Plaintiff does not attempt to reconcile this testimony with Mr.

Soffer's testimony that, in the stock ticker smart tag, the

hypertext links that are presented to the user are "going to be the

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three actions" in the menu. Bush Dec., Ex. B. at 169:3-5. 

Instead, Plaintiff notes that his position that menu items are

representative of the hypertext links is consistent with the ‘647

patent specification, which states,

If there is more than one link for the tag, then a menu

of links to target documents is created at the link

anchor. In this implementation, dynamic HMTL (DHTML) is

used to create the menu of links, with each link being

named by a simplified title.

‘647 patent at 10:28-32.

But the problem with this position is that, although Plaintiff

states that smart tags functionality generates hyperlinks as

construed by the Court, Plaintiff fails to identify in his briefs

what in smart tags technology is the alleged hypertext link. Nor

was Plaintiff able adequately to identify at the hearing what in

smart tags is the hypertext link; instead, Plaintiff listed several

elements that create an “effective hyperlink.” Furthermore, as

Defendant notes, Plaintiff’s position cannot be reconciled with his

allegation that smart tags infringe claim 6, which expressly

requires a menu of hypertext links, and for which Plaintiff points

to the menu of action items. See Bush Dec., Ex. A at 11 (Claim

Chart). Plaintiff has the burden of providing evidence to dispute

Defendant’s contention that smart tags lack hyperlinks as construed

by the Court. He cannot, and does not, meet his burden by merely

stating that the menu items represent hypertext links. Therefore,

the Court grants Defendant summary judgment that its smart tags do

not literally infringe claims 1, 2, 6, 8, 11, 12 and 13 of the ‘647

patent. 

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 2. Topics (Claims 2, 8, 12 and 13)

Claims 2, 8, 12 and 13 require determining at least one topic

associated with each selected term. Plaintiff’s final infringement

contentions provide, “Recognized text is tagged as being associated

with data type, i.e., topic, to thereby determine topics in the

knowledge base associated with the selected terms relevant to the

user selected portion.” Plaintiff’s opening brief, however,

provides, “While the type information itself is not necessarily a

topic, it is indicative of a topic.” Defendant argues that

Plaintiff abandoned his theory that a data type is a topic and

adopted new theories of infringement, violating the Patent Local

Rules because the new theories were not disclosed in Plaintiff’s

infringement contentions, and thus the Court should not consider

them. See Integrated Circuit Systems, Inc. v. Realtek

Semiconductor Co., Ltd., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1107 (N.D. Cal.

2004) (quoting Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 1998 WL

775115 at 2-3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1998)) (“The patent local rules

were adopted by this district in order to give claim charts more

‘bite.’ The rules are designed to require parties to crystallize

their theories of the case early in the litigation and to adhere to

those theories once they have been disclosed. . . . Unlike the

liberal policy for amending pleadings, the philosophy behind

amending claim charts is decidedly conservative, and designed to

prevent the ‘shifting sands' approach to claim construction [and]

ensure that litigants put all their cards on the table up front.”). 

In his reply, Plaintiff does not respond to Defendant’s request

that the Court hold him to the theory he advanced in his final

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infringement contentions. Regardless, the Court will address

Plaintiff's new theories of infringement.

In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff identifies the

words “Microsoft Corporation,” as a “topic." Defendant argues

that, because the words Microsoft Corporation are not stored in the

smart tag infrastructure, smart tags cannot determine topics, as

required by the patent. Plaintiff does not dispute that the words

Microsoft Corporation are not stored in the smart tags

infrastructure. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that a topic can be

represented by a "topic ID," such as, in this example, “MSFT,”

which Plaintiff states “is exactly what Smart Tags Functionality

does.” See ‘647 patent at 5:60-62 (“Each topic in the knowledge

base 120 may have a unique topic ID code for cross-referencing in

other tables.”). But, as Defendant notes, Plaintiff provides no

evidence in support of this assertion; Plaintiff’s statement that

this “is exactly what smart tag functionality does” is unsupported

by any citation to the record. This “topic ID” theory is not found

in Plaintiff’s final infringement contentions; nor does Plaintiff

point to any mention of it in Plaintiff’s expert reports. The

claim language requires topics and not topic ID codes; topics and

topic ID codes are not synonymous. 

Plaintiff again fails to meet his burden of providing specific

evidence to show that a dispute exists. Thus, for this additional

reason, the Court grants Defendant summary judgment that its smart

tags do not literally infringe claims 2, 8, 12 and 13 of the ‘647

patent.

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3. Presentation and Tagging Modules (Claim 8)

Claim 8 requires three separate modules: a knowledge base, a

tagging module and a presentation module. In its claim

construction order, the Court defined presentation module as:

A software product stored on computer readable media and

executable by a computer that is connected to exchange

information with the knowledge base, and that is operative

to receive the user selected portion of the source

document and the selected terms determined by the tagging

module, and for each selected term, (1) determines the

topics associated with the term, and the at least one

document associated with each topic, (2) creates hypertext

links to the at least one document associated with the

topics, (3) associates the hypertext links with the source

document, and (4) presents hypertext links to the user

interface.

W. Bruce Croft, Defendant's expert, explains that, under

claim 8, the tagging module must "receive a user selected

portion of the source document," and the presentation module

must be "operative to receive the user selected portion of the

source document." According to Dr. Croft, smart tags do not

meet this limitation because there is no portion of the smart

tags source code that receives "any user selected portion"

twice. Croft Dec., Ex. A at ¶ 77. Defendant argues that

Plaintiff fails to offer any evidence that the smart tag

functions are "operative to receive the user selected portion

of the source document," as required by claim 8.

Plaintiff responds that there is nothing in the claim or

the Court's construction requiring that the receipt of a user

selected portion by the tagging and presentation modules be

accomplished in two separate steps or by two different pieces

of software code. That is incorrect. As Defendant notes,

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claim 8 requires two separate modules: the tagging module

“receiv[es] a user selected portion of the source document,”

and the presentation module “receive[s] the user selected

portion.” In Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190

F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999), the court explained, “It is

clear from the language of the claim itself that the term ‘a

discharge rate’ in clause [b] is referring to the same rate as

the term ‘the discharge rate’ in clause [d].” Here, it is also

clear that the “the user selected portion” that the

presentation model receives is the same user selected portion

that the tagging module receives. The claim does not, as

Plaintiff contends, need to say “first” and “second.” 

Defendant correctly notes that the case Plaintiff cites does

not hold that a claim must use the terms “first” and “second”

to distinguish between multiple instances of the same

limitation; instead, the case addressed whether the terms

“first pattern” and “second patten” impose a serial or temporal

limitation on when the patterns are created. See 3M Innovative

Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed.

Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff fails to provide evidence that both the tagging

module and the presentation module receive the user selected

portion. “Made available to” is not the same as “received by.” 

Thus, for this additional reason, the Court finds that

Defendant does not literally infringe claim 8.

B. Doctrine of Equivalents

Defendant asserts that, in addition to summary judgment of

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4Defendant moves to strike these two paragraph in its Motion

to Strike Mr. Soffer’s Untimely New Opinions Regarding the Doctrine

of Equivalents. Responding to Defendant’s argument, discussed

above, that claim 8 requires the user selected portion to be

received by both the tagging module and the presentation module,

Mr. Soffer, for the first time, explains how claim 8 is infringed

by smart tags under the doctrine of equivalents. Plaintiff argues

that Defendant’s motion to strike should be denied because Mr.

Soffer presents no new theory of infringement and Defendant would

not be prejudiced by its consideration. Plaintiff’s argument that

Defendant would not be prejudiced is persuasive. And Defendant

does not dispute that it would be not prejudiced by the

introduction of these two paragraphs. But Plaintiff’s argument

that this is not a new theory is not persuasive. Although the

evidence Mr. Soffer relies on was disclosed in the expert report,

the theory that claim 8 is infringed under the doctrine of

equivalents was not disclosed. Plaintiff stated in his Final

Infringement Contentions and expert report that if the smart tags

do not literally infringe then they infringe under the doctrine of

equivalents; claim 8, however, was not specifically mentioned. 

Plaintiff’s argument that he could not have asserted this theory of

infringement before because he did not know that Defendant believed

that claim 8 requires that the user selected portion be received

twice is not compelling. Nonetheless, reviewing the five factors

the Ninth Circuit has instructed a district court to consider in

determining whether a discovery sanction is appropriate, the Court

DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Strike (Docket No. 225). See Wendt v.

Host Intern., Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 1997) ((1) the

public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; 2) the

court's need to manage its docket; 3) the risk of prejudice to the

parties; 4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on

their merits; 5) the availability of less drastic sanctions)).

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no literal infringement, it is entitled to summary judgment of

no infringement by the doctrine of equivalents. According to

Defendant, Plaintiff has offered only conclusory statements,

and no evidence, that smart tags infringe any of the asserted

claims under the doctrine of equivalents. See Croft Dec., Ex.

A ¶ 96, 97. Plaintiff contends that, while he did not move for

summary judgment under the doctrine of equivalents and thus did

not present evidence in his moving papers, he has presented

evidence; he cites to six paragraphs in Mr. Soffer’s expert

report and two paragraphs in his supplemental declaration.4 

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Paragraphs forty to forty-four in the expert report,

however, make no mention of equivalents. And paragraph 101

contains only a conclusory catch-all statement: 

In addition, if for any reason a claim limitation or

element of the ‘647 patent claims identified above are

found to not be literally infringed by Smart Tags

functionality, I conclude there is infringement under

the Doctrine of Equivalents. In particular, based on my

analysis, any aspect of Smart Tags functionality not

found to be literally within the scope of a particular

claim limitation or element is merely an insubstantial

change and that Smart Tags functionality includes

corresponding elements that perform substantially the

same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve

substantially the same result as the elements in claim

1, 2, 6, 8, 11, 12 and 13.

Soffer Dec. ¶ 104.

Apart from the two paragraphs in Mr. Soffer’s Supplemental

Declaration, paragraph forty-five in the expert report is

Plaintiff’s only attempt to address a specific limitation:

Finally, even were it determined that Smart Tags

functionality does not literally generate “hyperlinks”,

Smart Tags functionality generates the equivalent of

“hyperlinks”. Smart Tags functionality performs

substantially the same function (associating a target

document with a source document for document navigation

and retrieval), in substantially the same way (invoking

a routine for document navigation and retrieval), to

achieve substantially the same result (navigating to and

retrieving a target document from the source document). 

Any difference is insubstantial.

Id. at 45. Defendant asserts that this “analysis by

parenthetical” is not enough for Plaintiff to meet his burden.

As the Federal Circuit has held, “Having presented the

district court with only conclusory statements regarding

equivalence, without any particularized evidence and linking

argument as to the ‘insubstantiality of the differences’

between the claimed invention and the accused device,” the

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plaintiff is “foreclosed from invoking the substantive

application of the doctrine of equivalents.” PC Connector

Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed.

Cir. 2005); see also General Elec. Co. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd.,

179 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming summary

judgment because “conclusory assertion of equivalence” was

“insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact”

and the plaintiff therefore failed to carry its burden). 

In his opposition to Defendant’s motion to strike the two

paragraphs from Mr. Soffer’s supplemental declaration,

Plaintiff acknowledges that he has not presented detailed

doctrine of equivalents analyses for each asserted claim of the

‘647 patent. Nonetheless, the Court determines that paragraph

45 and Mr. Soffer’s supplemental declaration provide

evidentiary support, although minimal, for infringement under

the doctrine of equivalents, but only with respect to

hyperlinks in all of the asserted claims and the tagging and

presentation models of claim 8. Plaintiff does not provide

evidence of an equivalent of topics. Therefore, there is no

infringement, even under the doctrine of equivalents, of claims

2, 8, 12 and 13. The Court grants summary judgment to

Defendant of non-infringement, literally or by equivalents, of

claims 2, 8, 12 and 13. A dispute of fact remains in respect

to infringement by equivalents of the hyperlinks limitation in

claims 1, 6 and 11. However, as will be discussed below,

summary judgment is granted to Defendant on these claims as

well because they are invalid as anticipated.

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II. Validity

Defendant argues that, as a matter of law, all of the

asserted claims, except claim 8, are invalid as anticipated. 

See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (providing that a patent is invalid if the

invention disclosed was fully anticipated by a prior art

reference). Plaintiff argues that, as a matter of law, claim 8

is valid, neither anticipated nor obvious. 

A patent is presumed to be valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282. A

party alleging that a patent is invalid bears the burden of

proof, id., and must overcome this statutory presumption of

validity by proving invalidity through clear and convincing

evidence. Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co.,

204 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

A. Anticipation

Defendant contends that claims 1, 2, 6, 11, 12 and 13 are

anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 5,815,830 (Anthony) and an

article by Paul Thistlewaite. Plaintiff contends that, as a

matter of law, Defendant does not and cannot provide clear and

convincing evidence that claim 8 is anticipated by any prior

reference. Because the Court found that, even under the

doctrine of equivalents, claims 2, 8, 12 and 13 were not

infringed, the Court considers only claims 1, 6 and 11. See

Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1468

(Fed. Cir. 1998) (district court has discretion to dismiss as

moot a counterclaim alleging that a patent is invalid where it

finds no infringement).

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1. Legal Standard

“A patent is invalid for anticipation when the same device

or method, having all of the elements contained in the claim

limitations, is described in single prior art reference.” 

Crown Operations Int’l, Ltd. v. Solutia Inc., 289 F.3d 1367,

1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Scripps Clinic & Research Fdn.

v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991)

("Invalidity for anticipation requires that all of the elements

and limitations of the claim are found within a single prior

art reference."). “An anticipating reference must describe the

patented subject matter with sufficient clarity and detail to

establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art and

that such existence would be recognized by persons of ordinary

skill in the field of invention.” Crown Operations, 289 F.3d

at 1375. “The question of what a reference teaches and whether

it describes every element of a claim is a question for the

finder of fact.” Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v.

Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

2. Description of Prior Art

a. Anthony

Andre Charles Anthony filed his patent application on

December 18, 1995; the patent, entitled “Automatic Generation

of Hypertext Links to Multimedia Topic Objects” issued on

September 29, 1998. Kirk Dec., Ex. A. Anthony is prior art to

the ‘647 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

The patented technology in Anthony relates to methods and

systems of information management and, more specifically, to

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hypertext information retrieval and display. Id. at 1:5-8. 

The object of the patented technology was to provide a method

of arranging and retrieving data in a computer which did not

require a time-consuming authoring process. The patented

technology provides a structure for cross-referencing text

which does not require manual authoring of cross-reference

links, and therefore reduces the time and effort required to

produce and maintain hypertext documents. The patented

technology further eliminated the need for the author to

identify a word or phrase in which to embed codes to indicate

the existence of a cross reference, or to specify instructions

for navigation to the referred text. Id. at 3:16-25. Because

the text stored is compared, and associated, with topic names

at the moment of display, the links between text portions are

always up to date. Id. at 3:47-50. The patented technology

provides links, “meaning that the word or phrase in the text

found to be a match with a topic name is highlighted on the

display, and linked to the topic to which the topic name

refers.” Id. at 5:6-12. The user can then jump to the

associated topic by selecting the highlighted word or phrase in

the first topic text. 

b. Thistlewaite

Paul Thistlewaite’s article, Automatic Construction and

Management of Large Open Webs, 33 Information Processing &

Management, 161-73, was published in March, 1997, and is prior

art to the ‘647 patent. Kirk Dec., B. The abstract notes that

many researchers have commented on the difficulties associated

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with manually created or maintained hyperdocument links and the

consequent need for automated methods. The article describes a

system for the automatic detection and management of structural

and referential links, specifically addressing the issues

engendered by large volatile hyperbases. The article concludes

with a case study, describing the use of the approaches

advocated in the paper to build a hyperbase of the complete

electronic documents holdings of the Australian Parliament.

Although this is a single article, Plaintiff contends that

it is not a single reference as required for purposes of

anticipation. According to Plaintiff, while Defendant attaches

only this one article, Dr. Croft’s expert report and claim

chart incorporate multiple articles by this author and another

author relating to this system and the Australian Parliament

case study. Defendant responds that it has made clear that it

is relying on this single article, and that Dr. Croft

concludes, and his invalidity claim chart shows, that each and

every element of claims 1, 2, 6, 11, 12 and 13 is present in

this article. The claim chart states that the Thistlewaite

article and the systems described therein anticipate the

alleged claims. There is a footnote after “systems described

therein” that lists three additional references “describing

this same system”; the three additional references are cited in

the claim chart. Croft Dec., Ex. D at 1, n.1. Before their

citations, however, is a “see also,” indicating that these

additional references only provide additional support for a

proposition already supported. The Court will consider the

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Thistlewaite article as a single reference, without relying

upon any of the additional support provided by the other

references. 

3. Anticipation of Claims 1, 6 and 11

Claim 1 consists of: 

A computer-implemented method of dynamically generating

hypertext links from a source document to at least one

document other than the source document, comprising: 

receiving a user selected portion of the source

document; 

selecting a plurality of terms from the user

selected portion; and 

for at least one selected term, automatically

creating at least one hypertext link to a document,

other than the source document, relevant to the

term. 

Claim 6 depends on claim 1 and further requires the creation of

a menu of hypertext links. Claim 11 is similar to claim 1,

except that it does not require “selecting a plurality of terms

from the user selected portion.” 

Defendant’s expert concludes that these three claims are

anticipated by many different works of prior art. Croft Dec.,

Ex. B at 20, 33-35. Plaintiff, however, provides no expert

testimony regarding the validity of these claims. His rebuttal

expert testified only that claims 2, 3, 8, 9, 10 and 12 are

valid in spite of the prior art references presented by

Defendant’s expert. Plaintiff responds that his decision not

to offer expert testimony on the validity of claims 1, 6 and 11

is irrelevant; he notes that there is no requirement that a

plaintiff offer expert testimony about claims upon which the

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating invalidity. 

Plaintiff does not have to offer expert testimony, but he

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does have to offer some evidence. Although the ultimate burden

of proof remains on Defendant, once it comes forward with clear

and convincing evidence to establish invalidity, the burden of

production of evidence shifts to Plaintiff. See TP Labs., Inc.

v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971 (Fed. Cir.

1984) (if a prima facie case is made, “the patent owner must be

able to point to or must come forward with convincing evidence

to counter that showing”). Here, Dr. Croft’s expert report and

claim charts provide a clear and convincing prima facie case of

anticipation of claims 1, 2, 6, 11, 12 and 13. Yet, as noted

above, Plaintiff has no expert or other evidence to show that a

dispute exists with respect to claims 1, 6 and 11. As

Defendant notes, “Attorney argument is no substitute for

evidence.” Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d

1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiff offers little more than attorney argument. 

Citing Anthony, Plaintiff states that the links created in

Anthony are the created in the absence of any “user selected

portion,” as required by claims 1, 6 and 11. Defendant notes,

however, that Plaintiff does not address the Court’s

construction of “user selected portion,” which is “the entirety

or part, as chosen by the user, of a document accessed by the

user, wherein the user can choose the entirety of the document

by accessing the document.” In Anthony, the entirety of a

document is selected by the user and accessed from a database

in the first step in the system’s search for relevant terms; 

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thus, it discloses what Plaintiff claims it does not disclose. 

See Kirk Dec., Ex. A at 4:53-63. Plaintiff presents no other

evidence. Because Plaintiff has failed to show a factual

dispute, the Court grants summary judgment that claims 1, 6 and

11 are invalid as anticipated by Anthony.

With respect to Thistlewaite, Plaintiff contends that

Defendant did not meet its burden of establishing a prima facie

case because, in order to anticipate the ‘647 patent, the

article must be enabling. He notes that Defendant does not

provide any testimony or evidence that would demonstrate how

Thistlewaite enabled one of ordinary skill in the art to

practice the patented technology recited in claims 1, 6 and 11. 

Defendant does not claim to have provided such evidence;

instead, it responds that Thistlewaite is presumptively

enabling. But the case on which it relies did not hold that

prior art printed publications are presumptively enabling. See

Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355

(Fed. Cir. 2003). Rather, the court noted “that by logical

extension” its reasoning that the prior patent was

presumptively enabled “might also apply to prior art printed

publications as well, but as Sugimoto is a patent we need not

and do not so decide today.” Id. at 1355 n.22. Because the

Court has found that claims 1, 6 and 11 are anticipated by

Anthony, it need not decide whether Thistlewaite is

presumptively enabling.

B. Obviousness

Plaintiff contends that, as a matter of law, Defendant

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5In addition, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Strike

Inadmissible Evidence (Docket No. 189) and Plaintiff’s Motion to

Strike Inadmissible Evidence (Docket No. 211). To the extent that

the Court relies upon evidence to which there is an objection, the

parties' objections are overruled. To the extent that the Court

does not rely on such evidence, the parties' objections are

overruled as moot. 

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does not, and cannot, provide clear and convincing evidence

that claim 8 is invalid for obviousness. Because the Court

found that, even under the doctrine of equivalents, claim 8 was

not infringed, the Court will not consider whether Defendant's

claim of obviousness fails as a matter of law. See

Phonometrics, Inc., 133 F.3d at 1468.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 196). The Court GRANTS

Defendant summary judgment that its smart tags do not literally

infringe the ‘647 patent and do not infringe claims 2, 8, 12

and 13 by equivalents. Although there is a dispute of facts as

to whether smart tags infringe claims 1, 6 and 11 by an

equivalent of the hyperlinks limitation, the Court further

GRANTS summary judgment that claims 1, 6 and 11 are invalid as

anticipated by Anthony. Because there is no infringement of

claims 2, 8, 12 and 13, the Court DISMISSES as moot Defendant’s

counter-claim that these claims are invalid. The Court GRANTS

IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket

No. 166) and DENIES it IN PART.5 The Court GRANTS Plaintiff

summary judgment that Defendant’s theories of invalidity under

§§ 101 and 112 and laches fail, as a matter of law, but the

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Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment that

Defendant infringes claims 1, 2, 6, 8, 11, 12 or 13 of the ‘647

patent and that claim 8 is valid as neither anticipated nor

obvious. Judgment shall enter accordingly. Defendant shall

recover its costs from Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/10/06 CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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