Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02230/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02230-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MCGHEE TONY DUCLOS, Case No.: 3:16-cv-02230-H-KSC

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Petitioner, REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

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v.

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DANIEL PARAMO,

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Respondent.

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On August 31, 2016, McGhee Tony Duclos (“petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction in San Diego County

Superior Court.1 [Doc. No. 1].

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

Marilyn L. Huff pursuant to Title 28 United States Code, Section 636(b), and Civil Local

Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 ofthe United States District Court for the Southern District of

California. Based on the moving and opposing papers, and for the reasons outlined below,

this Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.

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28 i People v. McGhee Tony Duclos, SCD246946.

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1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 20, 2013, petitioner was charged as follows in a criminal Complaint: (1)

one count of carjacking (Cal. Pen. Code § 215(a)); and (2) one count ofrobbery (Cal. Pen.

Code § 211). [Doc. No. 9-1, at pp. 7-11]. Both counts included an enhancement for the use

of a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the offenses (Cal. Pen. Code

§ 12022(b)(1)). [Id.]. The Complaint also alleged petitioner was previously convicted of

multiple felony offenses between 2004 and 2007 that could increase his sentence if

convicted. [Id.].

On January 31,2014, a jury found petitioner guilty on all charges. [Doc. No. 9-2, at

pp. 246-249]. The trial court sentenced petitioner to an aggregate term of 36 years to life

in prison. [Doc. No. 9-2, atpp. 251],

On October 3,2014, petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court ofAppeal,

Fourth Appellate District.2 [Doc. No. 9-10]. On direct appeal, petitioner argued (1) the trial

court abused its discretion in excluding certain evidence related to his unconsciousness

defense under California state law; (2) the trial court’s ruling on exclusion ofsuch evidence

violated his constitutional right to due process and his right to present a defense; (3) the

trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to the CALCRIM instruction on

unconsciousness because the instruction improperly lessened the prosecution’s burden of

proving every element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the trial

court erred in failing to exclude evidence from his cell phone after his arrest because the

search ofhis phone was conducted without a warrant; and (5) the cumulative effect ofthe

errors alleged required reversal. [Doc. No. 9-10, at pp. 11-12]. On September 4, 2015, in

an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claims and

affirmed the judgment. [Doc. No. 9-12].

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27 2 People v. McGhee Tony Duclos, D065591 2015 WL 5176814 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2015).

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On September 30, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court.3 [Doc. No. 9-13]. Therein, petitioner argued (1) the jury instruction’s

presumption of consciousness was contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent; (2)

the trial court’s ruling excluding evidence ofpetitioner’s recent dissociate episodes was in

violation ofstate evidentiary law and petitioner’s constitutional right to present a defense;

and (3) the cumulative effect of the multiple errors deprived petitioner of his state and

federal due process rights to a fair trial. [Doc. No. 9-13]. On November 24, 2015, the

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review. [Doc. No. 9-14].

On August 31, 2016, petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus. [Doc. No. 1]. On October 11,2016, petitioner filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma

Pauperis, which the Court granted on October 13,2016. [Doc. Nos. 4,5]. The Court issued

a briefing schedule on October 20,2016. [Doc. No. 6]. On December 12,2016, respondent

filed an Answer. [Doc. No. 8]. On June 26, 2017, petitioner filed his traverse. [Doc. No.

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14 13].

15 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In reviewing a federal petition for writ ofhabeas corpus, this Court gives deference

to the state court findings offact and presumes them to be correct. Petitioner may rebut

this presumption, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1); see

also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992). The following facts are taken from the

California Court ofAppeal’s unpublished decision denying petitioner’s direct appeal in

Case No. D065591.

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A. The prosecution’s evidence

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On an evening in March 2013, [the victim] drove her Jaguar to a

shopping mall. After parking her car, [the victim] popped open the trunk and

got out ofthe car. [The victim] realized that she had left $10 on the seat ofthe

car, and she reached down and picked up the money.

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[Petitioner] approached [the victim] with a gun[FN2] and told her to put

her purse down and to place her keys on the driver’s seat. [Petitioner] came

within one or two feet of [the victim]. [The victim] put her purse on the

driver’s seat. [Petitioner] took the car keys and the $10 from [the victim], told

her to back away, and got into her car.

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[FN2] Police later determined that the gun was a BB gun. [END FN2] 6

[Petitioner] backed up the car and the trunk popped open. [Petitioner]

stopped the car, got out, and closed the trunk. [The victim] screamed at

[petitioner] to return her belongings. [Petitioner] pointed the gun at [the

victim], got back into the car, and sped off. According to [the victim], during

the encounter, [petitioner] appeared “very serious and very organized.” Inside

the Jaguar were [the victim’s] iPhone, her purse, and a pair of diamond

earrings.

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12 As [petitioner] drove off, [the victim] began screaming for help. A

woman heard [the victim’s] screams and called 911. A responding police

officer allowed [the victim] to use his iPhone to track the location of [the

victim’s] iPhone. Additional police units responded to the location at which

[the victim’s] iPhone had been detected. At that location the officers saw a car

matching the description of[the victim’s] Jaguar.

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A short time later, a police officer saw [petitioner] walking away from

the Jaguar. The officer stopped [petitioner] at gunpoint. [Petitioner] dropped

the iPhone and car key and put his hands in the air. An officer recovered a BB

gun from [petitioner’s] waistband. [The victim] later identified [petitioner] at

a curbside lineup.

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Police transported [petitioner] to the police station. Once there, police

searched [petitioner] and found cash, earrings, and [the victim’s] credit cards

and identification. Police also searched [petitioner’s] cell phone and

discovered a photograph ofthe BB gun that officers had found in [petitioner’s]

waistband.

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San Diego Police Detective John Smith interrogated [petitioner].

[Petitioner] acknowledged having taken [the victim’s] car, and provided

several details concerning the incident. For example, [petitioner] stated that

he obtained the BB gun from his brother's room and had taken a bus to the

mall. According to Smith, [petitioner] also stated that he saw “the blonde lady

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in the car, with her purse open, counting money, and he decided to take her

car and money.” Smith stated that [petitioner’s] answers were responsive and

“made perfect sense.”

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B. The defense 4

[Petitioner] presented evidence that he committed the acts comprising

the offenses while in a dissociative fugue state. [ ] According to a defense

expert, a person suffering from a fugue state may commit acts that appear to

be purposeful without actually being conscious.

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8 C. Rebuttal evidence

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Three women testified that [petitioner] had robbed each ofthem during three

separate robberies in 2006. In addition, Francisco Ramirez, a former San

Diego police officer, testified concerning [petitioner’s] commission of a

robbery in 2003. According to Ramirez, during a police interview, [petitioner]

initially denied committing the robbery, but subsequently admitting having

robbed the victim after Ramirez told [petitioner] that witnesses had identified

him.

[Doc. No. 9-12, atpp. 3-5],

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STANDARD OF REVIEW: 16

Federal habeas corpus reliefis available only to those who are in custody in violation

ofthe Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “A federal court

may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error ofstate law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465

U.S. 37, 41 (1984). “[A] mere error ofstate law is not a denial of due process.” Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,121 n.21 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).

This Petition is governed by the provisions ofthe Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). AEDPA

imposes a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands

state-court decisions be given the benefit ofthe doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,

24 (2002) (internal citations omitted). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition addressing a state

court judgment imposes the following:

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“[A petition] on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication ofthe claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court ofthe United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination ofthe facts in light ofthe evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.”

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)&(2). For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal

law” means “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at

the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72

(2003). Therefore, a lack of controlling Supreme Court precedent can preclude habeas

corpus relief. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008).

The standard ofreview under AEDPA is highly deferential and “difficult to meet.”

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). For mixed questions of fact and law, if

the state court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court

cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts, federal habeas reliefmay be granted under the “contrary to” clause

of § 2254. Bellv. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,694 (2002). The focus ofinquiry underthe “contrary

to” clause is “whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable.” Id. “[A]n unreasonable application is different from an incorrect

one.” Id. In other words, federal habeas relief cannot be granted simply because a

reviewing court concludes the state court decision is erroneous or incorrect based on its

own independentjudgment. Id. Habeas reliefis only available under § 2254(d)(1) “where

there is no possibility fair-minded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision

conflicts” with Supreme Court precedents. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. In addition,

“review under §2254(d)(l) is limited to the record that was before the state court that

adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

Where there is no reasoned decision from a state’s highest court, a Federal Court

“looks through” to the “last reasoned state-court opinion” and presumes it provides the

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basis for the higher court’s denial. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-806 (1991). If

the state court does not provide a reason for its decision, the Federal Court must conduct

an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

objectively reasonable. Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 2010). To be

objectively reasonable, a state court’s decision need not specifically cite Supreme Court

precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor

the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent],” the state

court’s decision is not deemed “contrary to clearly established Federal law.”[M],

“AEDPA also requires federal habeas courts to presume the correctness of state courts’

factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with ‘clear and convincing

evidence.’ § 2254(e)(1).” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-474 (2007).

Here, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition without comment and

therefore the California Court ofAppeal’s unpublished written opinion constitutes the “last

reasoned state-court opinion” in the record. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-806. This Court will look

to the California Court ofAppeal’s decision when evaluating each ofthe petitioner’s claims

under AEDPA’s standards.

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17 DISCUSSION

18 A. Exhaustion

19 As an initial matter, this Court must determine whether petitioner’s constitutional

claims have been exhausted in the state court. Prisoners in state custody who seek collateral

relief in federal habeas proceedings are required to exhaust state judicial remedies, either

on direct appeal or through state collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state

court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise

in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b) and (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129,133-

34 (1987). It is undisputed that the petitioner exhausted his state court remedies as to the

first, second, and third grounds for reliefraised in his instant Petition. However, respondent

contends that petitioner’s fourth ground for relief has not been exhausted. The issue of

exhaustion, however, need not be reached because the claim can be denied on the merits

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forthe reasons discussed below. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (allowing district court to deny

unexhausted claim on its merits); see also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 270 (2005) (a

district court would abuse its discretion ifit granted a stay when the unexhausted claim is

plainly meritless).

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5 Grounds One and Two: Exclusion ofEvidence

In Ground One, petitioner contends the trial court abused its discretion in excluding

certain evidence of his unconsciousness defense under California Evidence Code § 352

while allowing the prosecution to present evidence of seven prior offenses to prove

consciousness. [Doc. No. 1, at pp. 6,14]. In Ground Two, petitioner argues the trial court

inappropriately excluded evidence, applied state law unevenly and arbitrarily, and

therefore deprived him of his constitutional right to due process and to present a defense

under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. [Doc. No. 1, at pp. 7,40-43].

Summary of Trial Court’s Ruling at Motions In Limine Hearing

Petitioner’s defense to the charges was that he was in a dissociative fugue state and

therefore unconscious when he acted. [Doc. No. 1, at p. 14]. Prior to trial, petitioner filed

a motion in limine requesting permission to present mental health evidence and

corroborating witnesses at trial in order to: (1) negate the offenses’ specific intent element;

and (2) prove unconsciousness as an affirmative defense. [Doc. No. 9-1, at pp. 21-25].

On January 21, 2014, during the hearing on the motions in limine, petitioner moved

to admit evidence of his history of seizures and dissociative episodes through expert

testimony and testimony from petitioner’s family and friends. [Doc. No. 9-4, atpp. 9-14].

Petitioner also sought to introduce video evidence of an incident at George Bailey

Detention Facility on August 16, 2013 that petitioner’s counsel contended would support

“the fact that [petitioner] suffers from a mental illness such that he has these psychogenic

seizures, as well as these dissociative-fugue states, that are not explained by any organic,

neurological cause.” Id. at pp. 13, 16. Petitioner’s counsel described the video at the in

limine motions hearing as follows: “It does show [petitioner] coming out of his cell,

bleeding, and apparently disoriented. He is walking in a stiff, odd manner, and yet he’s

B.

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being followed by all these deputies, and eventually sits down and seems to fall or be

pushed to the ground. But he doesn’t seem to be concerned that he is bleeding.” [Doc. No.

9-4, atp. 15].

The prosecution objected to the presentation ofpetitioner’s history ofseizures under

California Evidence Code § 352 and argued that at the time petitioner committed the

charged crimes, he was acting purposefully and there was “no evidence there [was] a

seizure anywhere related to this activity. It’s extremely prejudicial.” Id. at pp. 18:22-25.

The prosecution also objected to the video petitioner sought to introduce, arguing it was

irrelevant and should be excluded. Id. at pp. 18-19. Nonetheless, the prosecution conceded

petitioner should be allowed to present “some kind oftestimony” concerning his alleged

dissociative fugue state, but limitations should be “imposed and maintained.” Id. at pp. 17-

18, 20.

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13 At the continued in limine motions hearing the next day, the trial court ruled that

petitioner could present expert-witness testimony to show that he exhibited symptoms of a

dissociative fugue state and a history of prior seizures.4 [Doc. No. 9-4, at pp. 93-94]. The

Court permitted testimony from both the petitioner and his family showing that petitioner

had previously exhibited fugue state behaviors. [Doc. No. 9-4, at pp. 99-100]. Namely,

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20 4 The trial court explained the scope ofthe ruling on the evidence during the in limine motions hearing

as follows: 21

I think those two facts, that [petitioner’s] been diagnosed and he’s been given

medication for years, are relevant and admissible and may be testified to from the

review ofthe medical records. What I am not going to allow, either by live witnesses

or from the medical records, is all the evidence that supports these two facts.

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24 In other words, the doctor can say, ‘Look. He’s been diagnosed with seizures going

back as far as whenever. He’s been given medication for seizures going as far back

as whenever.’ That’s fine. That comes in. But what doesn’t come in is, ‘Well, the

reason that that seizure diagnosis was valid was because on this date this happened

to him, and on this date this happened to him, and his family members said this, and

the jail said that.’ We’re not going to go into all that.

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testimony that during some, but not all seizures, petitioner appeared to act with purpose

and intentionality with no recollection of doing so afterwards. [Id.]. However, the trial

court excluded the video recording from the jail and related testimony. [Doc. No. 9-4, at

pp. 94-95].

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Ground One: Alleged Abuse of Discretion for Excluding Evidence

of Recently Suffered Seizures

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Petitioner fails to raise a cognizable basis for federal habeas relief in Ground One,

in which he alleges the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of his

unconsciousness defense under California Evidence Code § 352.

evidence consisted ofpotential testimony from witnesses who were present when petitioner

experienced dissociative episodes. These witnesses were excluded only afterthe following

witnesses were approved to testify on the subject: petitioner, himself; petitioner’s parents;

and two expert witnesses. The California Court ofAppeal denied this claim for the reasons

stated herein:

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9 Specifically, this

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[Petitioner] contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

‘precluding [him] from presenting evidence of his most recent

dissociative episodes.’ We are not persuaded.

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Most importantly, the evidence that the trial court prevented [petitioner]

from presenting was evidence of his suffering what appeared to be

‘seizures’ during which he appeared not to be acting purposively. Thus,

the evidence that the trial court excluded was not direct evidence of

[petitioner] having been in a fugue state at the time he engaged in the

lengthy set of seemingly purposive acts that comprised the charged

offenses, including committing the carjacking and robbery and driving

away from the scene ofthe crimes.

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[Doc. No. 9-12, atpp. 15-16].

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) only on the basis of

some transgression offederal law binding on the state courts. Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d

1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 95 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983).

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Such a writ is unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or application ofstate law.

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas corpus cannot be used to try state issues de

novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972).

The Supreme Court has reiterated the standard ofreview for a federal habeas court.

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas

court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). In Estelle, the

Court emphasized that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for error in state law.” Id.

at 67. The Supreme Court further notes the standard ofreview for a federal habeas court

“is limited to deciding whether a conviction violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States.” Id. at 68 (internal citations omitted). An error in the trial court

proceedings constitutes a due process violation when it involves issues of “fundamental

fairness.” The Supreme Court goes on to clarify that “we have defined the category of

infractions that violate fundamental fairness very narrowly.” Id. at 73. Habeas review does

not lie in a claim the state court erroneously allowed or excluded particular evidence under

state evidentiary rules. Jammal v. Van DeKamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). This

Court agrees with the California Court of Appeals and finds the trial court’s decision to

deny requests to call multiple, duplicative, witnesses to support petitioner’s

unconsciousness defense did not violate due process. [Doc. No. 9-12, at pp. 2].

The California Court of Appeal’s decision limiting petitioner’s presentation of

evidence is binding on this Court. [Doc. No. 9-12, at pp. 6, 15]; See Bradshaw v. Richey,

546 U.S. 74 (2005) (“We have repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state

law, including one announced on direct appeal ofthe challenged conviction, binds a federal

court sitting in habeas corpus.”). Accordingly, to the extent petitioner argues the trial court

erred under state law by excluding evidence of his dissociative episodes, such a claim is

not cognizable because this Court is bound by the Court ofAppeal’s construction ofstate

law. See Id. at 76.

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the state trial judge’s ruling was

correct under state law. See People v. Boyette, 29 Cal. 4th 381, 428 (2002) (“Although

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completely excluding evidence ofan accused’s defense theoretically could rise to this level,

excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not impair an accused’s

due process right to present a defense”). The testimony of the witnesses the trial court

prevented petitioner from calling was deemed “marginally probative” and “cumulative.”

[Doc. No. 9-12, at p. 17]. And contrary to petitioner’s claim, the trial court permitted

petitioner to present extensive evidence in support of his defense that he was in a

dissociative fugue state, including his own testimony, the testimony ofhis parents, and that

of two experts. [Id. at p. 19]. Petitioner was not prevented from proffering testimony to

support his defense and the trial court’s reasoning is reasonable and persuasive.

Ground Two: Alleged Arbitrary Application of State Law, and Due

Process Violations For Excluding Petitioner’s Video Evidence

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In Ground Two, petitioner argues that the trial court’s decision to exclude video

evidence and apply state law arbitrarily and unevenly amounted to a deprivation of his

constitutional rights to due process, and to present a defense under the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. [Doc. No. 1, atpp. 7, 68].

Claiming a state court improperly applied state law, and therefore violated a

petitioner's due process rights, does not transform the claim into a federal one. Langford v.

Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). A criminal defendant has the constitutional

right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to have a “meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). However, a

defendant’s right to present evidence in support of his defense is not unlimited. Greene v.

Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081,1090 (9th Cir. 2002). “[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad

latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.”

Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S.Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted).

Indeed, “the Supreme Court has indicated its approval of ‘well-established rules of

evidence [permitting] trial judges to exclude evidence ifits probative value is outweighed

by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to

mislead the jury.’” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 757 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Holmes v.

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South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006)). The Ninth Circuit has found it is clearly

established federal law that “a state rule or ruling may not arbitrarily deprive a defendant

of his rights to present a defense or his right to present witnesses on his behalf.” Gray v.

Klauser, 282 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 2002).

Even assuming constitutional error, a petitioner must show that the excluded

testimony had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Brecht

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). Excluding evidence pursuant to a state

evidentiary rule is unconstitutional only where it “significantly undermined fundamental

elements ofthe defendant’s defense.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315 (1998);

see also Moses, 555 F.3d at 757 (“Evidentiary rules do not violate a defendant’s

constitutional rights unless they infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused and are

arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve” (internal citations

omitted)).

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Here, the California Court of Appeal held that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings

did not violate petitioner’s constitutional rights because petitioner was in fact permitted to

present extensive evidence in support of his defense; including his own testimony, the

testimony ofhis parents, and that oftwo experts. [Doc. No. 9-12, at pp. 19-21]. Moreover,

the Court ofAppeal agreed (1) the video was minimally probative, and (2) potentially overprejudicial because it depicted petitioner “in a custodial setting, covered with blood, and

disoriented”. [Id, at p. 17-18]. Petitioner, ultimately, has failed to show how the excluded

video evidence, deemed minimally probative, had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence on the verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623.

An independent review ofthe record reveals ample evidence supporting the Court

ofAppeal’s decision that petitioner was afforded due process protections by the trial court

to present his defense. Consequently, the California Court ofAppeal’s conclusion was not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was

the decision the result of an unreasonable determination ofthe facts in light ofthe evidence

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presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the

District Court DENY Grounds One and Two for relief.

Ground Three: Jury Instructions

Petitioner contends the trial court issued erroneous jury instructions contrary to

federal due process. [Doc. No. 1, at pp. 70, 74]. Petitioner contends the presumption of

consciousness instruction given to the jury relieved the prosecution ofits burden to prove

every element ofthe offense beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id.].

Habeas petitions asserting erroneousjury instructions warrant relief only where the

petition establishes the ailing instruction “so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72; see also Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,643 (1974) (explaining that the challenged instruction cannot

merely be “undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned”; it must violate some

constitutional right); Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 2009). A jury

instruction is unconstitutional ifthere is a “reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied

the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally

relevant evidence.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). Put differently, an error

exists when there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction

unconstitutionally. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). The unconstitutional

instruction must have “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The instruction “may not be judged in artificial

isolation,” but rather must be judged against the backdrop of all instructions given and the

trial record. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71 (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)).

Here, the trial court relied on CALCRIM No. 3425 to instruct the jury regarding

petitioner’s unconsciousness defense, which provides in pertinent part:

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The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was

conscious when he acted. Ifthere is proofbeyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant acted as ifhe were conscious, then you should conclude that he was

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conscious, unless based on all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that

he was conscious, in which case you must find him not guilty.

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3 [Doc. No. 9-l,atpp. 151].

Petitioner contends the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Babbitt, 45

Cal. 3d 660 (1988), upholding a presumption of consciousness instruction, is contrary to

the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). [Doc. No. 1, at pp. 81].

Specifically, petitioner argues that Apprendi and Alleyne implicitly overruled another

Supreme Court case, Patterson v. New York 432 U.S. 197 (1997), which in turn implicitly

overrules Babbitt. [Id.}. Petitioner asserts, therefore, this Court should find California’s

presumption of consciousness instruction violates federal due process because it

impermissibly lightens the prosecution’s burden to prove every element of a crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.

In Babbit, the California Supreme Court held that consciousness is not an element

of an offense. 45 Cal. 3d at 693. Unconsciousness is a defense a defendant may raise and,

in doing so, the government assumes the burden of disproving consciousness beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id. However, “this fact of itself does not transform absence of the

defense - consciousness-into an element ofmurder for purposes ofdue process analysis.”

Id. The California Supreme Court Concluded “there is no constitutional impediment to the

state’s use of a rebuttable presumption in meeting its assumed burden - once the issue has

been raised -to prove consciousness beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 694.

Petitioner identifies two U.S. Supreme Court cases addressing the government’s

burden of proof and evidence admission that might serve to lessen punishment at the

sentencing stage of a case. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact

of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. InAlleyne, the Supreme Court held that any fact that establishes

a defendant’s eligibility for a mandatory minimum sentence is considered an element of

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the offense and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158.

Petitioner asserts that because consciousness is a “fact [that] alters the legally

prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it,” consciousness is an element that the

prosecution must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi and Alleyne.

[Doc. No. 1, at pp. 80]. Petitioner’s application ofApprendi and Alleyene to the dictates

ofBabbit is inapt. Apprendi and Alleyne dealt with sentencing factors, i.e., additional facts

that determine the floor of punishment, or raise an offense to a higher level warranting

greater punishment. Petitioner does not argue the alleged errors by the California Court of

Appeals turned on its misapplication - or misunderstanding - ofthe Supreme Court rulings

addressing sentencing. Instead he contends the California Appellate Court failed to

recognize how the two Supreme Court rulings created a cascade of overruled cases,

demanding Babbit be overruled. Thus the role Babbit played in petitioner’s case -

permitting the allegedly unconstitutional jury instruction - was improper. Put simply, the

Supreme Court in Apprendi and Alleyen does not speak to the same due process questions

the California Supreme Court speaks to in Babbit. Further, the California Court ofAppeal

found, and this Court agrees, that the Supreme Court has not directly overruled Babbitt.

[Doc. No. 9-12, at pp. 24-26]. The trial court followed the dictates ofBabbit when it issued

the jury instruction, and the prosecution met its burden. The Court ofAppeal reasoned that

until the California Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court provides authority that

is directly contrary to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Babbitt, it is bound to

follow the Court ofAppeal’s decision. Id.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the California Court of Appeal’s denial of

petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law. Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Ground Three for

reliefbe DENIED.

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1 D. Ground Four: Warrantless Search

Petitioner argues the trial court erred by failing to suppress a photograph taken from

his phone and therefore the good-faith exclusionary rule articulated by the Supreme Court

in Riley v. California, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights. 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014);

[Doc. No. 1, at pp. 9]. Petitioner’s fourth ground for reliefmust be denied.

Violations ofthe Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule are not cognizable under

federal habeas review. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Where the state has provided

an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner

may not be granted habeas corpus relief on the grounds that evidence obtained in an

unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 494;

Newman v. Wengler, 790 F.3d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2015) (Stone survived the passage ofthe

Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act and bars a Fourth Amendment claim on federal

habeas review where a petitioner had a full and fair opportunity in state court to litigate

such claim). “The relevant inquiry is whether the petitioner had the opportunity to litigate

his claim, not whether he did in fact do so or whether the claim was correctly decided.”

Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d at 899 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

The state trial court and California Court ofAppeal heard and considered petitioner’s

Fourth Amendment claim. [Doc. No. 9-12, at pp. 25-31]. Thus petitioner was afforded a

full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim. See Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044,

1053 (9th Cir. 2005); Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996); Gordon

v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, federal habeas corpus review of

the warrantless search ofpetitioner’s phone is precluded.

Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Ground Four for reliefbe

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1 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge

Marilyn L. Huff under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United

States District Court for the Southern District ofCalifornia. Forthe reasons outlined above,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: 1) approving and

adopting this Report and Recommendation; and 2) directing that Judgment be entered

denying the Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT any party may file written objections with the

District court and serve a copy on all parties no later than November 3, 2017. The

document should be entitled “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than two weeks after receipt ofthe objections

or November 17. 2017. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal ofthe Court’s order.

See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153,

1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 1%, 2017

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Hon. Karen S. Crawford

United States Magistrate Judge 20

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