Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01313/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01313-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COLLINS CHARO CAPITAL, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSEPH ROBINETTE BIDEN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-01313-JLT-EPG

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE BE 

DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE AND 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR LACK 

OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION,

BEING DUPLICATIVE OF AN EARLIER 

FILED LAWSUIT, AND LACK OF 

COUNSEL

(ECF No. 1)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 30

DAYS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Collins Charo Capital, LLC proceeds pro se in this civil case.1(ECF No. 1). 

Generally, Plaintiff alleges that government officials, including President Joseph Biden, have 

violated the Lanham Act. 

Because the complaint is absolutely meritless, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction 

and the undersigned will recommend that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice and without 

leave to amend. Additionally, dismissal is warranted because this case is duplicative of an earlier 

filed lawsuit and because Plaintiff is not represented by an attorney. 

\\\

1 Plaintiff paid the filing fee in this case and is not proceeding in forma pauperis. 

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II. PENDING CASES

Plaintiff has two pending cases that are relevant here.

2 Plaintiff filed its first case, 1:24-cv1309-JLT-EPG, using the name Marvin Charo Collins (Plaintiff Collins) as the plaintiff on 

October 25, 2024, suing (1) President Biden; (2) Phillip Talbert, United States Attorney for the 

Eastern District of California; (3) Brittany Gunter, Assistant United States Attorney; and (4) 

United States Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. (1:24-cv-1309-JLT-EPG, ECF No. 1).3

Plaintiff Collins lists various federal statutes—Lanham Act provisions, criminal statutes, and a 

civil rights statute—as the basis for federal question jurisdiction. He seeks approximately $3 

million in damages based on “crimes by government.” He includes conclusory assertions against 

the Defendants, e.g., “conspiracies to violate constitutional rights,” “violation of oath,” and 

“treason.” 

Plaintiff offers no developed allegations to indicate how any Defendant violated the 

statutes at issue. Rather, in his statement of his claims, Plaintiff states: “Precedents of law 

establish by court case which are in violation of law, render violation of law legally unassailable. 

Such a situation violations several specifically stated intents and purposes of the Constitution set 

forth in the Preamble.”

Three days after filing 1:24-cv-1309-JLT-EPG, Plaintiff filed this materially similar case, 

suing the same Defendants. While the plaintiff is listed as Collins Charo Capital, LLC in this 

case, Plaintiff Collins signed the complaint with his name. The complaint lists the same Lanham 

Act provisions (albeit adding an additional provision) as the earlier filed case as the basis for 

federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff seeks approximately $2 million in damages based on 

“infringement by government.” Plaintiff provides no developed allegations as to how any 

Defendant violated its rights. Rather, in its statement of its claims, it states as follows:

Via a phone call [on October 18, 2024] it was mentioned to managing director a 

warrant for an arrest in the name of the company’s intellectual property, i.e., 

trademark(s) that identifies goods or services and distinguishes the company from 

competition. 

A message was pass via phone call, stating a warrant for an arrest for the name 

2 For readability, minor alterations, like changing capitalization and correcting misspellings, have been 

made to some of Plaintiff’s quotations without specifying each change.

3 The Court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases. United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 

118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

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“Marvin Collins,” which is a trademark, along with “Marvin Charo Collins” from 

a government agency, person acting for the United States Department of the 

Treasury.

Collins Charo Capital, LLC could and will suffer losses that would make it 

difficult to compensate or measure, the company would sustain false designations 

of origin, false description, and dilution forbidden.

(ECF No. 1, pp. 4-5). 

Also, in this case, Plaintiff has filed a “notice to cease and desist” addressed to Judge 

McAuliffe based on her purported “unauthorized use of the trademark Marvin Charo Collins.” 

(ECF No. 4). 

In both cases, Plaintiff Collins includes “UCC 1-308” in the signature section by his 

name. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, “[a] federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in 

a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes 

of the Colville Rsrv., 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, Plaintiff invokes federal question jurisdiction. Under federal question jurisdiction, 

federal district courts “have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The presence or absence 

of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides 

that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the 

plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Further, “it is well established that ‘a court may raise the question of subject matter 

jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the pendency of the action, even on appeal.”’ Nevada 

v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 

F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir.2002)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time 

that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Moreover, the 

Supreme Court has held that a court lacks jurisdiction over absolutely meritless claims: 

Over the years this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without 

power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are ‘so 

attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,’ Newburyport 

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Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579, 24 S.Ct. 553, 557, 48 L.Ed. 795 

(1904); ‘wholly insubstantial,’ Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33, 82 S.Ct. 549, 

550-551, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962); ‘obviously frivolous,’ Hannis Distilling Co. v. 

Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288, 30 S.Ct. 326, 327, 54 L.Ed. 482 (1910); ‘plainly 

unsubstantial,’ Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105, 53 S.Ct. 

549, 550, 77 L.Ed. 1062 (1933); or ‘no longer open to discussion,’ McGilvra v. 

Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 80, 30 S.Ct. 27, 31, 54 L.Ed. 95 (1909).

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

While it is difficult to decipher Plaintiff’s claims in this case, the complaint appears to 

allege that Defendants have violated the Lanham Act. The key provision at issue is 15 U.S.C. § 

1125(a), which provides as follows:

(a) Civil action

(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 

container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, 

or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 

description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which--

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 

affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or 

as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 

commercial activities by another person, or

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 

characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's 

goods, services, or commercial activities,

shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is 

likely to be damaged by such act.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

More specifically, Plaintiff appears to be alleging that Defendants violated this provision 

by using Plaintiff Collins’s name in connection with an arrest warrant. However, there is no legal 

support for such a position. Notably, the Lanham Act requires a person’s conduct to be in 

connection with “commerce,” which is absent here.

Moreover, Plaintiff Collins’s use of “UCC 1-308” by his name also illustrates the 

frivolousness of this action. UCC 1-308(a) provides as follows: “A party that with explicit 

reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner 

demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such 

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words as ‘without prejudice,’ ‘under protest,’ or the like are sufficient.”

Plaintiff’s intent behind citing this provision is unclear. However, similar notation has 

been used by persons who consider themselves to be “sovereign citizens.” See Hill v. Rivera, No. 

ED CV 22-0060-JLS(E), 2022 WL 21663917, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2022) (noting plaintiff’s 

signing complaint with reference to UCC 1-308 and self-identification as a sovereign citizen); Joe 

Elton Mosley, LLC v. Walmart, No. 3:20-CV-00184-MMD-WGC, 2020 WL 1846553, at *2 (D. 

Nev. Mar. 26, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1821307 (D. Nev. Apr. 10, 

2020) (noting that a plaintiff’s IFP application with UCC 1-308 inserted above plaintiff's name 

indicated “an adherence to the ‘sovereign citizen’ anti-government movement”).

Generally, sovereign citizens disclaim any authority by government authorities over them 

based on the person’s own purported sovereignty. See Vazquez v. California Highway Patro, No. 

2:15-CV-756-JAM-EFB (PS), 2016 WL 232332, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2016) (explaining 

“sovereign citizen” ideology). To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert any sovereign citizen 

ideology in this case, courts have uniformly rejected such arguments as completely meritless. 

Mackey v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:15-CV-1934-LJO-BAM, 2016 WL 3254037, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 

June 14, 2016) (noting that “[c]ourts across the country” have rejected sovereign citizen 

arguments “as frivolous, irrational, or unintelligible”). Moreover, “advancement of such utterly 

meritless arguments is now the basis for serious sanctions imposed on civil litigants who raise 

them.” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986).

In short, Plaintiff’s claims are absolutely meritless so as to deprive the Court of 

jurisdiction. 

B. Duplicative Lawsuit

Beyond the Court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, there are additional reasons to 

dismiss this case. 

Comparing the complaint in this case to Plaintiff Collins’s earlier-filed complaint in 1:24-

cv-1309-JLT-EPG demonstrates that this suit is duplicative. Referred to as the doctrine of claimsplitting, “[p]laintiffs generally have ‘no right to maintain two separate actions involving the 

same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.’” Adams 

v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Walton v. Eaton Corp., 

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563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977)), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 

904 (2008). 

“To determine whether a suit is duplicative, we borrow from the test for claim 

preclusion.”4 Adams, 487 F.3d at 688. “‘[T]he true test of the sufficiency of a plea of ‘other suit 

pending’ in another forum [i]s the legal efficacy of the first suit, when finally disposed of, as ‘the 

thing adjudged,’ regarding the matters at issue in the second suit.’” Id. (second alteration in 

original) (quoting The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118, 124 (1894)). “Thus, in assessing whether 

the second action is duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief 

sought, as well as the parties . . . to the action, are the same.” Adams, 487 F.3d at 689; see also 

Serlin v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 3 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A] suit is duplicative if the 

claims, parties, and available relief do not significantly differ between the two actions.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). The following transaction test is used to determine whether the causes 

of action are the same:

(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be 

destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether 

substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the 

two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits 

arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.

Adams, 487 F.3d at 689 (quoting Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201–02 

(9th Cir.1982)). The last criterion—whether the two suits arise out of the same transaction 

nucleus of facts—is the most important. Id. “After weighing the equities of the case, the district 

court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a duplicative later-filed action, to stay that action 

pending resolution of the previously filed action, to enjoin the parties from proceeding with it, or 

to consolidate both actions.” Id. at 688. The claim-splitting doctrine is a discretionary one, 

intended to give judges flexibility to “promote[] judicial economy.” Id. at 692; see Kerotest Mfg. 

Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952) (“Wise judicial administration, giving 

regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation, does not 

4 The primary difference between dismissing a case as duplicative and dismissing a case under the doctrine 

of claim preclusion is that a final judgment need not have been entered to dismiss a case as duplicative 

while claim preclusion requires a final judgment on the merits. See Cook v. C.R. England, Inc., 2012 WL 

2373258, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2012) (noting that determination of whether suit is duplicative assumes 

that the first suit was final). 

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counsel rigid mechanical solution of such problems.”).

With these standards in mind, the Court notes that Plaintiff sues the same four Defendants 

in each case, claims that Defendants violated the Lanham Act (including citing mostly the same 

provisions), argues that Defendants violated its rights in connection with a warrant issued for the 

arrest of Plaintiff Collins, and seeks millions of dollars in monetary damages. In short, the claims, 

parties, and available relief are materially the same in both actions.

C. Requirement for an Attorney 

Lastly, although the Plaintiff in this case is listed as Collins Charo Capital, LLC, Plaintiff 

Collins signed the complaint and is purportedly representing the LLC, despite there being no 

indication that Plaintiff Collins is an attorney. However, “[i]t is a longstanding rule that

[c]orporations and other unincorporated associations must appear in court through an attorney.”

D-Beam Ltd. P’ship v. Roller Derby Skates, Inc., 366 F.3d 972, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation, 

quotation marks, and footnote omitted); see Zazai v. Graff Logistics LLC, No. 2:22-CV-1729-

KJM-DB (PS), 2023 WL 2815597, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2023) (concluding that an LLC could 

only proceed via an attorney). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot proceed in this case without an attorney. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Because Plaintiff’s claims are devoid of merit for the reasons given above, and are

duplicative of an earlier-filed case, it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by 

amendment; thus, the Court will recommend that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice and 

without leave to amend. Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear 

on de novo review that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.”); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 

F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion 

for leave to amend.”). 

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:

1. This action be dismissed, with prejudice and without leave to amend, for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, being duplicative of an earlier filed lawsuit, and lacking an attorney.

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to the 

case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days after being 

served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the 

Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Any objections shall be limited to no more than 15 pages, including exhibits. 

Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver 

of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 11, 2024 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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