Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01491/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01491-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MAURICIO MENDEZ (1), 

Defendant. 

 Case Nos.: 09CR0710-JLS 

 16CV1491-JLS 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, 

OR CORRECT SENTENCE UNDER 

28 USC § 2255 

Presently before the Court is Defendant Mauricio Mendez’s Motion to Vacate, Set 

Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 526). The Government has 

filed a response and opposition to Defendant’s motion and Defendant has filed a reply, 

supplemental briefing, and a supplemental notice. Having considered these submissions, 

the applicable legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court will grant 

Defendant’s motion. 

BACKGROUND 

On September 10, 2010, Defendant pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to 

two counts of a superseding information. Count 1 of the superseding information 

charged a conspiracy to conduct enterprise affairs through a pattern of racketeering 

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activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); Count 2 charged Defendant with brandishing 

a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). (ECF No. 288.) 

The plea agreement set forth the elements of the Count 1 offense, the RICO 

conspiracy, as: 

1. The defendant was employed by or associated with an enterprise, that 

is, a group of individuals associated in fact, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 

1961(4); 

2. The enterprise engaged in or its activities in some way affected 

interstate commerce between one state and another state, or between a 

state of the United States and a foreign country; [and] 

3. The defendant knowingly agreed with at least one other person to 

conduct or participate in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs through 

a pattern of racketeering activity, as that term is defined in Title 18, 

United States Code, Sections 1961(1) and (5). That is, the defendant 

agreed to participate in the enterprise with the knowledge and intent 

that a least one member of the RICO conspiracy (which could be the 

defendant himself) would commit at least two racketeering acts 

described above in Section I of this agreement. 

Plea Agreement, ECF No. 292 at 3. 

The elements of Count 2, set forth under the heading “Use of Firearm During and 

in Relation to a Crime of Violence,” were: “1) the defendant committed a crime of 

violence or a drug trafficking crime; and 2) the defendant knowingly brandished a 

firearm during and in relation to one of those crimes.” Id. Regarding the factual basis for 

the Count 2 offense, the Plea Agreement set forth the following: 

Among the acts that defendant committed as evidence of the conspiracy..., 

were: 

a. On August 30, 2008, in San Diego, Mendez, along with other coconspirators, went to a residence in Coronado to collect a drug debt. 

The conspirators, including Mendez, entered the home and unlawfully 

restrained the occupants. Mendez brandished a firearm to prevent the 

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occupants from fleeing. Mendez threatened the occupants of the

home with injury or death if they did not pay $54,000. Mendez 

searched the house for valuables while others guarded the occupants 

downstairs. Mendez and his co-conspirators, through intimidation and 

threats of violence, prevented the occupants from fleeing or contacting 

law enforcement. Eventually, Mendez and his co-conspirators left the 

residence. When they left, they unlawfully took (1) two Dodge 

trucks, (2) a Land Rover, (3) a Mercedes Benz, (4) approximately 

$2,000 in cash, (5) two laptop computers, (6) several Movado watches 

and (7) miscellaneous jewelry. All of these items were taken without 

permission by force or threats or force. 

b. Mendez forced an individual to leave the residence. 

c. Mendez knowingly brandished a firearm during the commission of the 

above-described offense. 

Id., at 5-6. 

Defendant was sentenced on December 3, 2010 to a total of 318 months’ 

imprisonment. This Court found a total offense level of 41 and that Defendant was a 

career offender,1 resulting in a criminal history category of VI, for a guideline sentencing 

range of 360 months to life. (Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, ECF No. 514 at 11-12.) 

Because the Count 1 offense carried a statutory maximum term of 20 years, Defendant 

was sentenced to 240 months’ custody with credit for six months served in state custody, 

resulting in a sentence of 234 months’ custody on Count 1. Id. at 12-13. Defendant was 

sentenced to the mandatory consecutive sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment for Count 

2, resulting in the total sentence of 318 months’ imprisonment. Id. 

                                               

1

 Defendant challenges his designation as a career offender on the grounds that neither the RICO 

conspiracy nor his prior convictions for California residential burglary, California robbery, and 

California battery by a prisoner are crimes of violence after Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 

(2015). However, even without the career offender designation, Defendant’s guideline range would 

have exceeded the 240-month statutory maximum, thus this determination is without material 

consequence and will not be addressed. 

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Defendant’s plea agreement contained a waiver of appeal and collateral attack. 

(Plea Agreement, ECF No. 292 at 11.) Defendant did not file an appeal, but, on June 15, 

2016, filed the instant motion under Section 2255. In its response to Defendant’s motion, 

the Government sought a stay while the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of whether 

Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) invalidates the residual clause in Section 

924(c)(3)(B). Although the Court did not formally grant the stay, it did defer ruling on 

Defendant’s motion for clarification of the issue. On June 24, 2019, the Supreme Court 

issued its decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019) holding that that the 

residual clause in Section 924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness. 

ANALYSIS 

 In Johnson v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court struck down the residual 

clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (AACCA@) as unconstitutionally vague. Under 

the ACCA, a sentencing judge is required to impose a mandatory 15-year minimum 

sentence for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), when the defendant has three or more 

prior convictions for a Aserious drug offense@ or a Aviolent felony.@ AViolent felony@ is 

defined as a felony that: 

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person of another; or 

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 

otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another. 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 

The second clause of Subsection (ii), italicized above, is what has come to be 

known as the residual clause. This clause was struck down in Johnson, but the 

force/elements clause, subsection (i) above, and the enumerated-offenses clause, the first 

clause of subsection (ii) above, were untouched. In Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 

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1257, 1268 (2016), the Supreme Court held that Johnson announced a substantive rule 

that applies retroactively on collateral review. 

In Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018), the Supreme Court struck down the 

residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 162

 as unconstitutionally vague. The Dimaya Court noted 

that § 16’s residual clause suffered from the same two features that rendered the residual 

clause at issue in Johnson unconstitutionally vague: “an ordinary-case requirement and 

an ill-defined risk threshold [that] necessarily “devolv[ed] into guesswork and intuition,” 

invited arbitrary enforcement, and failed to provide fair notice.” 138 S.Ct. at 1223, 

quoting Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2559. 

In United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), the Supreme Court considered 

the residual clause of the “crime of violence” definition in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B). 

Under § 924(c)(3), a crime of violence is “an offense that is a felony” and: 

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person or property of another, or 

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against 

the person or property of another may be used in the course of 

committing the offense. 

The Davis court noted that Johnson and Dimaya “teach that the imposition of 

criminal punishment can’t be made to depend on a judge’s estimation of the degree of 

risk posed by a crime’s imagined “ordinary case.”” 139 S.Ct. at 2326. The Court 

rejected the Government’s suggestion that this problem could be alleviated by adopting a 

case specific interpretation of § 924(c)(3)(B) which would require courts to analyze the 

defendant’s actual conduct in the predicate offense, holding that the statutory text, 

                                               

2

 Section 16 defines the term “crime of violence” as: “(a) an offense that has as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or 

(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 

against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 

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history, and relationship with other criminal statutes command the categorical approach. 

Ultimately the Davis court determined that the residual clause of § 924(c)(3) suffered the 

same defects as those at issue in Johnson and Dimaya and thus is unconstitutionally 

vague. 

Defendant contends that, particularly in light of Davis, his conviction and sentence 

for § 924(c), Count 2 of the superseding information, must be vacated. The Government 

responds3

 that: 1) Defendant waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence; 2) 

Defendant procedurally defaulted his challenge to § 924(c)(3)(B); 3) Defendant has not 

carried his burden of proving he was convicted under the residual clause in § 

924(c)(3)(B); and 4) Johnson does not invalidate § 924(c)(3)’s residual clause.4

 

Although it is true that Defendant waived his right to collaterally attack his 

conviction in his plea agreement and failed to file a direct appeal, the Court rejects the 

notion that Defendant can fairly be deemed to have waived or procedurally defaulted his 

claim herein. A plea agreement waiver will not apply if a defendant’s sentence is 

“illegal,” which includes a sentence that “violates the Constitution.” United States v. 

Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016), quoting United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 

621, 624 (9th Cir. 2007). If Defendant was sentenced under the residual clause of § 

924(c)(3), his sentence would be illegal pursuant to Davis and his plea agreement waiver 

of collateral attack would be inoperative. 

Similarly, procedural default may be excused in cases where a defendant can 

demonstrate both cause to excuse the default and actual prejudice. United States v. 

                                               

3

 The Court refers to the United States’ response and opposition to Defendant’s § 2255 motion (ECF 

No. 549); the Government has not submitted any supplemental briefing specifically addressing Davis, 

nor has the Court requested further briefing due to the length of time Defendant’s motion has already 

been pending. 

4

 The Government also suggested that this Court should stay this case pending the Ninth Circuit Court 

of Appeals’ decision in United States v. Begay and other cases. On August 19, 2019, the Ninth Circuit 

rendered its decision in Begay, holding that second-degree murder does not constitute a crime of 

violence under the remaining definition of “crime of violence,” the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A). 

United States v. Begay, __ F.3d. __, 2019 WL 3884261 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2019). 

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Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993). Cause may be demonstrated when a claim is 

“so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel.” Reed v. Ross, 468 

U.S. 1, 16 (1984). The Supreme Court has recognized three situations in which such a 

claim may arise: 1) where a Supreme Court decision explicitly overrules Supreme Court 

precedent; 2) where a Supreme Court decision “overturn[s] a longstanding and 

widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous 

body of lower court authority has expressly approved”; and 3) where a Supreme Court 

decision disapproves of a practice the Court arguably sanctioned in prior cases. Reed, 

468 U.S. at 17, quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982). When a case 

falling into the first two categories is given retroactive application, “there will almost 

certainly have been no reasonable basis upon which an attorney previously could have 

urged a state court to adopt the position that [the Supreme Court] ultimately has 

adopted.” Id.

Here, Defendant satisfies the first and second Reed categories. Johnson overruled 

two prior rulings rejecting challenges to the ACCA’s residual clause: Skyes v. United 

States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011) and James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007). Johnson, 135 

S.Ct. at 2563. The Tenth Circuit has found cause excusing procedural default in a postJohnson § 2255 challenge to the ACCA’s residual clause, noting that, “it is fair to say 

that no one—the government, the judge, or the [defendant] could reasonably have 

anticipated Johnson.” United States v. Snyder, 871 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 2017), 

quoting United States v. Redrick, 841 F.3d 478, 480 (D.C.Cir. 2016). Thus, Davis, which 

was extension of Johnson, also could not have been foreseen at the time of Defendant 

was sentenced in 2010. As Defendant points out, at that time the Ninth Circuit had 

consistently upheld the practice of imposing punishment under § 924(c)’s residual clause. 

See e.g., United States v. Springfield, 829 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that 

involuntary manslaughter carried a “substantial risk” of force justifying § 924(c) 

conviction); United States v. Mendez, 992 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that 

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conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery by its nature involves a 

substantial risk of force within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(B)). Accordingly, the Court 

finds that Defendant has established cause for his failure to file a direct appeal. 

Defendant has also established actual prejudice because a decision in his favor on the 

merits would render illegal Defendant’s sentence on Count 2. 

As to the Government’s third argument, the Court is persuaded that Defendant has 

met his burden of establishing that he may have been convicted under the residual clause 

of 924(c)(3). The Government contends that Defendant must establish that he was in fact 

sentenced under the residual clause to merit relief and notes that the Court “never uttered 

the phrase “substantial risk” during the sentencing hearing, nor relied on § 924(c)(3)(B) 

to sentence Mendez, at all.” (Gov’t Resp., ECF No. 549 at 9.) However, the record also 

contains no reference to the elements clause of 924(c)(3) and is silent as to the particular 

definition this Court applied in its determination that the sentence was warranted. 

The Ninth Circuit has determined that when it is unclear from the record whether 

the sentencing court relied on the residual clause, but it may have, the defendant’s § 2255 

claim “relies on” the constitutional rule announced in Johnson. United States v. Geozos, 

870 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2017), overruled on other grounds by Stokeling v. United 

States, 139 S.Ct. 544 (2019). Thus, because the record is not clear which clause this 

Court relied upon in its determination that the predicate offense for Defendant’s § 924(c) 

conviction constituted a violent felony, the Court finds that Defendant’s claim “relies on” 

the rule announced in Johnson. Furthermore, because the predicate offense, conspiracy 

to conduct enterprise affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1962(d), does not contain as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 

use of physical force against the person property of another, Defendant’s sentence 

necessarily relied upon the residual clause. 

The Government suggests that the residual clause of the “crime of violence” 

definition is not implicated in this case because Defendant was charged with and 

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admitted that the § 924(c) conviction occurred during and in relation to both a drug 

trafficking crime and a crime of violence. However, the conduct admitted by Defendant 

as a basis for the Count 2 § 924(c) conviction centered upon an incident on August 30, 

2008, where Defendant and other co-conspirators went to a residence in Coronado to 

collect a drug debt. (Plea Agreement, ECF No. 292 at 5-6.) Defendant admitted 

unlawfully entering the residence and brandishing a firearm to prevent the occupants 

from fleeing. He admitted threatening and restraining the occupants, taking property 

without permission by force or threats of force, and forcing an individual to leave the 

residence. Id. Thus, while the offense may have been charged as brandishing a firearm 

during both a drug trafficking offense and a crime of violence, the only conduct admitted 

by Defendant related to crimes of violence. Indeed, the plea agreement headings for the 

Count 2 offense describe it as “Count 2—Brandishing a Firearm During and In Relation 

to a Crime of Violence.” (Id. at 3, 7.) Thus, the Court finds no support for the 

Government’s suggestion that Defendant’s conviction for Count 2 rested upon a drug 

trafficking offense. 

 Finally, the Government contends that Johnson does not invalidate 924(c)(3)(B)’s 

residual clause, a position we now know fails in light of Davis. Although Davis has not 

yet been made retroactive to cases on collateral review, the Court finds that Davis, like 

Johnson before it, announces a new rule not dictated by existing precedent. See United 

States v. Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that Davis announced a new 

substantive rule and that Supreme Court’s holdings in multiple cases necessarily dictate 

retroactive application of the new rule for purposes of second or successive petitions 

under § 2255(h)(2).).5

                                               

5 Technically, Defendant’s § 2255 motion, filed within one year of Johnson, was premature. See

United States v. Blackstone, 903 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018) (recognizing that Johnson’s application 

to the residual clause of § 924(c) had not been addressed by the Supreme Court, thus Johnson did not 

announce a new rule that is applicable to § 924(c)’s residual clause). However, since Davis now settles 

the issue, the Government initially requested to stay Defendant’s motion until resolution of United 

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 Thus, turning to the merits of Defendant’s claim, the Court must analyze whether 

Defendant’s conviction can be sustained under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A). 

That is, the Court must determine whether the offense is a felony that “has as an element 

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property 

of another.” Summarized, the elements of the predicate offense, the RICO conspiracy, 

were set forth in the plea agreement as: 1) the defendant was employed by or associated 

with an enterprise...as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4); 2) the enterprise engaged in or in 

some way affected interstate commerce; and 3) the defendant knowingly agreed with at 

least one other person to conduct or participate in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs 

through a pattern of racketeering activity. (Plea Agreement, ECF No. 292 at 3.) None of 

these elements require the use or threatened use of physical force against the person or 

property of another and the Government makes no showing that they should be construed 

as such. Although it is clear that Defendant’s conduct in this case did involve the use and 

threatened use of physical force, Davis teaches that the Court may not analyze the actual 

conduct of the predicate offense in determining whether the definition of “crime of 

violence” has been met. Applying the categorical approach commanded by Davis, the 

Court concludes that the predicate offense for Defendant’s § 924(c) conviction does not 

qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A). Accordingly, 

the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to relief. 

 

                                               

States v. Begay, supra n.4, and Defendant would be entitled to file a second or successive petition for the 

reasons set forth in Hammond, the Court finds it appropriate to consider Defendant’s motion as filed. 

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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 

Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is GRANTED. The Court HEREBY VACATES 

Defendant’s sentence as to Count 2 of the superseding information. The sentence 

imposed for Court 1 remains in effect as do all other terms and conditions previously 

imposed. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 23, 2019 

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