Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_03-cv-01024/USCOURTS-arwd-1_03-cv-01024-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Records indicate that plaintiff had filed a previous application for DIB in October 1

1993, alleging disability since June 15, 1993. The application was denied initially, and on

reconsideration on April 25, 1994. (Tr. 53-54). Plaintiff failed to seek further administrative

review of this decision. (Tr. 53-54).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

DIANA MICELI PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL NO. 03-1024

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Diana Miceli (“plaintiff”), brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act

(“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

the Social Security Administration denying her applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”),

and supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”), under Titles II and XVI of the Act.

Background:

The applications for DIB and SSI now before this court were protectively filed on September

9, 1998, alleging an onset date of April 30, 1997, due to panic disorder with agoraphobia, anxiety, 1

and depression. (Tr. 202-206, 295-298). An administrative hearing was held on February 8, 2000.

(Tr. 306-327). Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel. 

On May 26, 2000, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), issued a written opinion finding

that, although severe, plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria of any of the

impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. (Tr. 17). At this time, plaintiff was

thirty-eight years old and possessed a ninth grade level education. (Tr. 348). The record reveals that

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she has past relevant work (“PRW”), as a certified nurse’s assistant, a delivery person, and a fast

food cashier/cook. (Tr. 12).

After discrediting plaintiff’s subjective allegations, the ALJ concluded that she maintained

the residual functional capacity ( “RFC”), to perform all work-related activities, except for work

involving a highly stressful environment. (Tr. 17). As her PRW as a clerical worker did not require

the performance of work-related activities precluded by her RFC, the ALJ concluded that she could

return to that position. (Tr. 17).

On September 9, 2004, the Appeals Council declined to review this decision. (Tr. 7-8).

Subsequently, plaintiff filed this action. (Doc. # 1). This case is before the undersigned by consent

of the parties. Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (Doc.

# 15, 16). 

Applicable Law:

This Court’s role is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.

2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind

would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. The ALJ’s decision must be

affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d

964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the

Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists

in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have

decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other words,

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if after reviewing the record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and

one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed.

Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of

proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year

and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines

“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that her

disability, not simply her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process

to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful

activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental

impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an

impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy

given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)- (f)(2003). Only if the final

stage is reached does the fact finder consider the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in

light of his or her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42

(8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

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Discussion:

Of particular concern to the undersigned is the ALJ’s RFC assessment. RFC is the most a

person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). A disability claimant has

the burden of establishing his or her RFC. See Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 737 (8th

Cir.2004). “The ALJ determines a claimant’s RFC based on all relevant evidence in the record,

including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own

descriptions of his or her limitations.” Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004);

Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005). Limitations resulting from symptoms such

as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court

of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical

question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s determination

concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s

ability to function in the workplace.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). “Under

this step, the ALJ is required to set forth specifically a claimant’s limitations and to determine how

those limitations affect her RFC.” Id.

In the present case, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could perform all work-related activities,

except for work involving a highly stressful environment. (Tr. 17). However, he failed to consider

and address Mental RFC assessments contained in the file, that indicated that plaintiff could only

perform work where the interpersonal contact was incidental to the work performed; the complexity

of the tasks was learned; the tasks required little judgment; and, the supervision required was simple,

direct, and concrete. (Tr. 45, 266). In addition, the ALJ failed to properly consider the fact that

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plaintiff was noted to have moderate limitations in the areas of understanding, remembering, and

carrying out detailed instructions; maintaining attention for extended periods of time; completing

a normal workday and work week without interruption; interacting appropriately with the general

public; accepting instructions and criticism from supervisors; setting realistic goals; and, making

plans independently of others. (Tr. 264-265, 286-287).

The medical evidence indicates that plaintiff has been consistently treated for panic disorder

with agoraphobia, anxiety, and depression. (Tr. 268-284, 290-294). She reported experiencing her

first panic attack at the age of fifteen. (Tr. 273). Plaintiff’s treatment has consisted of Xanax,

Prozac, Zoloft, and therapy. (Tr. 268-284, 290-294). However, in spite of her treatment, plaintiff

has continued to experience panic attacks when driving and going to public places. (Tr. 253, 273,

293). Accordingly, we believe that remand is necessary to allow the ALJ to reconsider the evidence

concerning plaintiff’s mental impairment and, in so doing, to reevaluate his RFC assessment. Due

to plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations, on remand, the ALJ should also call a vocational expert to

testify concerning the types of positions that plaintiff can still perform, if any. 

Also of significance is the fact that the ALJ did not perform a proper Polaski analysis. In

determining whether the ALJ properly disregarded Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain, the

Court must determine if the ALJ properly followed the requirements of Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d

1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984) (subsequent history omitted), in evaluating her pain and credibility. 

The absence of an objective medical basis which supports the degree of severity of

subjective complaints alleged is just one factor to be considered in evaluating the

credibility of the testimony and complaints. The adjudicator must give full

consideration to all of the evidence presented relating to subjective complaints,

including the claimant's prior work record, and observations by third parties and

treating and examining physicians relating to such matters as:

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1. the claimant's daily activities;

2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;

3. precipitating and aggravating factors;

4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication;

5. functional restrictions.

The adjudicator is not free to accept or reject the claimant's subjective complaints

solely on the basis of personal observations. Subjective complaints may be

discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole. 

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original).

However, in addition to the requirement that the ALJ consider the Plaintiff’s allegations of

pain, he also has a statutory duty to assess the credibility of plaintiff and other witnesses. Nelson v.

Sullivan, 966 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992). The ALJ may discredit subjective complaints of pain

inconsistent with the record as a whole. Ownbey v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 342, 344 (8th Cir. 1993). 

Here, the ALJ dismissed plaintiff’s subjective complaints by merely stating that they were

inconsistent with the record. (Tr. 16). He did not point to specific medical or testimonial evidence

in the record that contradicted her complaints. In fact, the ALJ also failed to include a proper

analysis of the medical evidence. Therefore, on remand the ALJ should discuss the relevant medical

evidence, and re-evaluate plaintiff’s subjective allegations in accordance with Polaski v. Heckler,

739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984), specifically discussing each Polaski factor in the context of

plaintiff’s particular case.

We also note that the only mental RFC assessments contained in the file were completed by

non-examining, consultative psychologists. We further note, that the opinion of a consulting

physician who examined the plaintiff once, or not at all, does not generally constitute substantial

evidence. See Jenkins v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 1999). As this plaintiff carries a

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diagnosis of panic disorder with agoraphobia, anxiety, and depression, and has been regularly treated

by a counselor and a psychiatrist, we believe that the case should be remanded to allow the ALJ to

obtain mental RFC assessments from plaintiff’s treating sources.

Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ is directed to address interrogatories to the physicians and

psychologists who have evaluated and/or treated plaintiff, asking them to review plaintiff’s medical

records; complete a mental and physical RFC assessment regarding plaintiff’s capabilities during the

time period in question; and, provide the objective basis for their opinions, so that an informed

decision can be made regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities on a sustained

basis during the relevant time period in question. Chitwood v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1376, 1378 n.1 (8th

Cir. 1986); Dozier v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 274, 276 (8th Cir. 1985). In addition, on remand, the ALJ

is also directed to perform a proper fibromyalgia evaluation to determine the severity of plaintiff’s

impairment. 

Conclusion:

Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence,

and therefore, the denial of benefits to the plaintiff, should be reversed and this matter should be

remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). 

ENTERED this 28th day of February 2006.

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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