Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05417/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05417-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 17, 2003 Decided February 21, 2003

No. 01-5417

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,

AFL-CIO, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv03001)

Sandra Sue Adams-Choate argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs was Mark Roth. Charles A.

Hobbie entered an appearance.

Joel E. Wilson, Special Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-5417 Document #733349 Filed: 02/21/2003 Page 1 of 10
2

Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., United States Attorney, and R. Craig

Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney. Thomas M.

Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: Appellants American Federation

of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, et al., appeal from a

judgment of the District Court dismissing their claims that

the Redstone Arsenal Army installation has failed to adhere

to instructions, directives, and regulations promulgated by

the Department of Defense (‘‘DOD’’), Department of the

Army (‘‘Army’’), and Office of Personnel Management

(‘‘OPM’’), pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act

(‘‘OSHA’’), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678. The District Court held

that appellants lacked standing, and that their claims were

not ripe for review. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v.

Rumsfeld, No. 00-3001 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2001), Joint Appendix

(‘‘J.A.’’) 7. Appellees also urge that appellants’ claims are

precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act, Pub. L. No.

95–454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sections of 5

U.S.C.). Because we hold that appellants’ action fails for

want of prudential standing, we do not reach the ripeness and

statutory preclusion issues.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

OSHA requires heads of federal agencies to ‘‘establish and

maintain an effective and comprehensive safety and health

program.’’ 29 U.S.C. § 668(a). In compliance with this

statutory provision, DOD, Army, and OPM have implemented

various directives, instructions, and regulations. For example, DOD Directive 1000.3, J.A. 33-36, mandates, inter alia,

that the military service components, including the Department of the Army, implement ‘‘[c]omprehensive programs TTT

to TTT [p]rotect DoD personnel from accidental death, injury,

USCA Case #01-5417 Document #733349 Filed: 02/21/2003 Page 2 of 10
3

or occupational illness,’’ id. § 3.1, J.A. 34. Pursuant to this

directive, DOD has issued Instruction 6055.1, J.A. 59-103,

which establishes the Department’s occupational safety and

health program. The safety and health program applies to ‘‘all

DoD personnel and operations worldwide during peacetime

and military deployments.’’ Id. § 2.2, J.A. 60.

Instruction 6055.6 of DOD’s program outlines policies related to fire prevention and suppression, training, fire apparatus, fire administration, emergency medical response, rescue,

and hazardous emergency response. See J.A. 37-58. The

policies mandate that fire departments on military installations ‘‘shall be prepared TTT to respond TTT to emergencies

involving facilities, structures, aircraft, transportation equipment, hazardous materials, and both natural and man-made

disasters (including acts of terrorism).’’ Id. § E2.5.2, J.A. 46.

In particular, the Instruction requires that every installation

complete a comprehensive analysis of all structures located

within its boundaries in order to assess how much ‘‘fire flow’’

(water pumped at x gallons per minute) is necessary to

mitigate damages and loss. Id. § E2.5.6, J.A. 47. The

installation must then gather and examine data relating to the

time and distance required for a single piece of apparatus to

respond to a fire or other emergency at each structure on the

installation. Id. § E2.5.3, J.A. 46. Based on this analysis,

the installation determines the number and location of fire

companies needed to comply with DOD’s directive and instructions to insure that individuals are adequately protected

from fire and other emergencies.

Army Regulation (‘‘AR’’) 420-90 was issued by Army to

implement DOD Instruction 6055.6. See J.A. 105-36. The

provisions of AR 420-90 are substantively the same as those

in DOD Instruction 6055.6 with respect to the issues raised

by appellants.

Also at issue in this case are regulations promulgated by

OPM concerning the appointment of nonpermanent employees (‘‘term employees’’) by agencies. See 5 C.F.R. § 316.301-

.304; 5 C.F.R. § 316.401-.403. These regulations were promulgated pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3302.

USCA Case #01-5417 Document #733349 Filed: 02/21/2003 Page 3 of 10
4

B. Procedural History

Appellants are unincorporated labor unions and individuals

who are employed at Redstone Arsenal, an Army installation

located near Huntsville, Alabama. Redstone Arsenal consists

of more than 12 million square feet of buildings. Its tenant,

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Marshall Space Flight Center, occupies an additional four million

square feet of building space. Appellants assert that many of

the structures at Redstone Arsenal are deemed extra hazardous because they house numerous fuels, hydraulic fluid, motorized missile launchers, explosives, radiation hazards, and a

variety of hazardous and/or explosive chemicals.

Appellants allege that Redstone Arsenal is not in compliance with the applicable health and safety instructions, directives, and regulations. In particular, they argue that

Redstone Arsenal has failed to comply with the risk analysis

mandated by DOD Instruction 6055.6 and AR 420-90. Appellants contend that Redstone Arsenal’s risk analysis concluded

that the installation needed five fire companies, and that five

companies require 55 firefighters plus additional administrative and supervisory staff. Redstone Arsenal currently maintains only three fire companies, and appellants claim that

those three companies are not fully staffed.

Additionally, some of the firefighter positions are staffed by

term employees, many of whom appellants allege do not meet

the basic requirements for federal firefighters employed by

DOD. Appellants claim that this use of term employees is

contrary to the intent of OPM’s regulations. They contend

that ‘‘[w]hen a portion of the team is employed for a limited

period of time and the make-up of the team thereby is

constantly changing, not only is its effectiveness diminished

but the permanent firefighter employees are at risk in the

performance of their jobTTTT’’ Br. of Appellants at 5.

Because of these perceived regulatory violations, the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1858, filed

an Unfair Labor Practice Charge against Redstone Arsenal

on June 4, 1998. On February 26, 1999, the Regional Director of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (‘‘FLRA’’)

USCA Case #01-5417 Document #733349 Filed: 02/21/2003 Page 4 of 10
5

declined to issue a complaint. The union appealed to the

FLRA and, on June 29, 1999, the FLRA affirmed the Regional Director’s decision.

Thereafter, appellants brought suit in District Court. They

sought an order requiring appellees at Redstone Arsenal to

comply with DOD Instruction 6055.6 and AR 420-90, and

directing the Army to staff Redstone Arsenal’s fire department with permanent, rather than term, employees. Appellees moved to dismiss, and the District Court granted their

motion on October 26, 2001. The court held that appellants

lacked standing and that, in any event, the case was not ripe

for review. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, No. 00-3001,

J.A. 7. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Because appellants lack prudential standing, we affirm the

judgment of the District Court. We review the dismissal of

appellants’ claims de novo, Sloan v. United States Dep’t of

Housing & Urban Dev., 236 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001),

and ‘‘ ‘accept as true all material allegations in the complaint.’ ’’ Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d

1249, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,

Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 264 (1991)).

The Supreme Court has enunciated two principal forms of

standing: ‘‘Article III (case or controversy)’’ and ‘‘prudential.’’ See Mudd v. White, 309 F.3d 819, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(explaining the separate categories of constitutional and prudential requirements). Prudential standing, unlike Article III

standing, is ‘‘based not on the Constitution, but instead on

prudent judicial administration.’’ ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 60 (3d ed. 1999).

In Mudd, we recently explained the differences

between these standing doctrines:

[Article III standing], which is jurisdictional and

cannot be modified by Congress, entails three requirements:

USCA Case #01-5417 Document #733349 Filed: 02/21/2003 Page 5 of 10
6

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an

‘‘injury in fact’’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘‘actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ’’ Second, there must be

a causal connection between the injury and the

conduct complained of—the injury has to be

‘‘fairly TTT trace[able] to the challenged action

of the defendant, and not TTT th[e] result [of]

the independent action of some third party not

before the court.’’ Third, it must be ‘‘likely,’’ as

opposed to merely ‘‘speculative,’’ that the injury

will be ‘‘redressed by a favorable decision.’’

The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears

the burden of establishing these elements.

Since they are not mere pleading requirements

but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in

the same way as any other matter on which the

plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the

manner and degree of evidence required at the

successive stages of the litigation.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61,

112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations omitted).

Prudential standing ‘‘denies a right of review if

the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to

or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the

statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that

Congress intended to permit the suit.’’ Clarke v.

Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S. Ct. 750,

757, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987). The Court has amplified

the doctrine, as follows:

In addition to the immutable requirements of

Article III, ‘‘the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear

on the question of standing.’’ Like their constitutional counterparts, these ‘‘judicially selfUSCA Case #01-5417 Document #733349 Filed: 02/21/2003 Page 6 of 10
7

imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction’’ are ‘‘founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in

a democratic society’’; but unlike their constitutional counterparts, they can be modified or

abrogated by Congress. Numbered among

these prudential requirements is the doctrine of

particular concern in this case: that a plaintiff’s

grievance must arguably fall within the zone of

interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked

in the suit.

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S. Ct. 1154,

1161, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (citations omitted).

Mudd, 309 F.3d at 823.

Appellants have an insurmountable hurdle with respect to

their OSHA claims: their claims, resting on 29 U.S.C. § 668,

are not ‘‘arguably within the zone of interests to be protected

or regulated by the statute TTT in question.’’ Ass’n of Data

Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).

Because Congress has neither modified nor eliminated the

‘‘zone of interests’’ requirement with respect to claims arising

under § 668, ‘‘appellant[s] must show that [their] asserted

interest is among the group of claims that is envisioned by

the relevant statute.’’ Mudd, 309 F.3d at 824; see also

Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 870-

71 (D.C. Cir. 2001). ‘‘[They] fail[ ] this test if [their] interests

are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the implicit

purposes in the statute ‘that it cannot reasonably be assumed

that Congress intended to permit the suit.’ ’’ Mudd, 309 F.3d

at 824 (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. at 399).

Here, it cannot reasonably be inferred that Congress intended to permit this law suit under OSHA, because appellants

have no basis upon which to rest a private right of action

under OSHA. See Mudd, 309 F.3d at 824 (finding that the

plaintiff lacked prudential standing because he had no private

cause of action under the relevant statute).

OSHA provides:

USCA Case #01-5417 Document #733349 Filed: 02/21/2003 Page 7 of 10
8

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen’s compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in

any manner the common law or statutory rights,

duties, or liabilities of employers and employees

under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or

death of employees arising out of, or in the course

of, employment.

29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this

provision, it is now well established that ‘‘OSHA violations do

not themselves constitute a private cause of action for

breach.’’ Crane v. Conoco, Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 553 (9th Cir.

1994); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647

F.2d 1189, 1235-36 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ries v. Nat’l R.R.

Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1164 (3d Cir. 1992); Jeter v.

St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1975);

Byrd v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323, 1323 (4th Cir.

1974) (per curiam); Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 334, 336 (6th

Cir. 1974). Moreover, this court has affirmed a judgment

rejecting private rights of action under OSHA against federal

employers. See Fed. Employees for Non-Smokers’ Rights v.

United States, 446 F. Supp. 181, 183 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d, 598

F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The District Court’s opinion in

that case offered reasoning that is perfectly on point here:

[T]he enforcement scheme of the OSH Act further

indicates the congressional intent not to allow employees to bring an action against a federal agency

as an employer. The Act establishes an elaborate

enforcement procedure in 29 U.S.C. § 659 that the

Secretary of Labor may use against an ‘‘employer.’’

However, the term ‘‘employer’’ does not include the

United States. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5). Therefore, although 29 U.S.C. § 668(a) does require federal agencies to ‘‘provide safe and healthful places and conditions of employment,’’ the Act confers no authority

upon the Secretary to take enforcement action

against federal agencies. The reason for this is that

the federal agency area is one ‘‘in which ordinary

enforcement and penalty provisions are hardly appliUSCA Case #01-5417 Document #733349 Filed: 02/21/2003 Page 8 of 10
9

cable.’’ H.R. Rep. No. 90-1720, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.

20 (1968). If Congress did not intend the Secretary

of Labor to enforce the OSH Act against federal

agencies, then, a fortiori, Congress did not intend

private litigants to enforce the OSH Act against

federal agencies. Accordingly, the Court finds that

the OSH Act does not create a private right of action

against federal agencies.

446 F. Supp. at 183.

Nor does 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3302, pursuant to which the

OPM regulations were enacted, place appellants within ‘‘the

group of claims that is envisioned by [a] relevant statute.’’

There is simply no reason to believe that Congress intended

that federal employees who have been hired and treated

lawfully would be entitled to sue over the procedures used to

hire coworkers. The plain language of these statutory provisions does not at all suggest such a cause of action. See id.

§ 3301 (providing that the President may ‘‘prescribe such

regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil

service in the executive branch as will best promote the

efficiency of that service’’); § 3302 (authorizing the President

to ‘‘prescribe rules governing the competitive service’’). In

short, appellants have failed to demonstrate that Congress,

through 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3302, or any other statutory enactment, intended to confer rights on federal employees authorizing them to contest decisions regarding the appointment of

term employees. The cited statutory provisions were merely

intended to facilitate the streamlining of the civil service

appointment system, not to protect individual employees from

comparatively less well trained and less experienced term

employees.

Appellants try to overcome the legal hurdles to standing by

arguing that this suit arises under § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 702, not OSHA or 5 U.S.C.

§§ 3301-3302. Section 702 provides standing to ‘‘[a] person

suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely

affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of

a relevant statute.’’ Appellants argue that this provision

USCA Case #01-5417 Document #733349 Filed: 02/21/2003 Page 9 of 10
10

allows them to sue appellees for violations of DOD Instruction

6055.6, AR 420-90, and the OPM regulations governing term

employees. This argument fails, because appellants have no

private right of action under the ‘‘relevant statute,’’ i.e.,

OSHA. As we noted in National Federation of Government

Employees v. Cheney, 883 F.2d 1038 (1989):

The issue is not whether appellants’ interests are

within the zone of interest of [an] OMB Circular TTT;

section 702 clearly requires that the party seeking

relief be ‘‘legal[ly] wrong[ed] TTT, or adversely affected or aggrieved TTT within the meaning of a

relevant statute.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis added).

The Circular is not a statute, see, e.g., Ketler, Federal Employee Challenges to Contracting Out: Is

There a Viable Forum?, 111 MILITARY L.REV. 103,

110 (1986) (‘‘Circular A-76 promulgates executive

branch managerial policy’’), and, although promulgated pursuant to congressional authority, the Circular itself cannot grant standing.

Id. at 1043. The instructions, directives, and regulations at

issue here are not statutes, and thus cannot confer standing

upon appellants.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District

Court is affirmed.

USCA Case #01-5417 Document #733349 Filed: 02/21/2003 Page 10 of 10