Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01208/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01208-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

u FILED 

Dlted States C~ o1 Appeat1 Tf'nth r.n·r••it 

APR 0 4 1995 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

PATRICK FISHEll 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Cieri' 

CAPTAIN STEVEN J. CLARK, 

USAFR, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v. 

SHEILA WIDNALL, Honorable, 

Secretary of the Air Force; 

JAMES H. WHITE, Colonel, 

Commander, Air Reserve Personnel Center, Lowry Air Force 

Base, Denver, Colorado, 

Respondents-Appellants. 

No. 94-1208 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Colorado 

D.C. No. 94-Z-455 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C.; 

Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado; and 

Barbara C. Biddle and Robert D. Kamenshine, Attorneys, Appellate 

Staff, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., on the briefs for 

Respondents-Appellants. 

John A. Wickham of Gary Myers & Associates, Evergreen, Colorado, 

on the brief for Petitioner-Appellee. 

Appellate Case: 94-1208 Document: 01019282902 Date Filed: 04/04/1995 Page: 1 
Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1208 Document: 01019282902 Date Filed: 04/04/1995 Page: 2 
The Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall, appeals the 

district court's order granting Captain Steven J. Clark a 

preliminary injunction prohibiting his call to active duty. 

Because the district court ignored the explicit requirement of the 

contract between the parties calling for resolution of disputes in 

a military tribunal and otherwise failed to give proper deference 

to military authority, it erroneously concluded Clark had 

established grounds for the preliminary injunction. Therefore, 

the judgment is reversed.1 

The case deals with several issues arising from a contract 

between Clark and the Air Force adopted under the Armed Services 

Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP), 10 U.S.C. §§ 2120-

2127. This program was established "[f]or the purpose of 

obtaining adequate numbers of commissioned officers on active duty 

who are qualified in the various health professions " 10 

U.S.C. § 2121. The statutory scheme commissions a medical student 

selected for participation in the reserve component of a branch of 

the armed services in return for the government's covering all 

educational expenses, including tuition and usually a monthly 

stipend. 10 U.S.C. § 2121(d). That is, in return for each year's 

financial assistance, the participant promises to serve a year on 

active duty. A participant's breach or default is not remedied by 

1 The case also presents a preliminary jurisdictional question 

whether the United States failed to file an appeal within 10 days 

of the district court's order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The 

district court, however, granted a preliminary injunction; and the 

United States timely appealed under § 1292(a) (1). We DENY the 

motion to dismiss. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1208 Document: 01019282902 Date Filed: 04/04/1995 Page: 3 
damages or repayment. During the course of study, the student is 

not a civilian, but is a member of the military reserve. 

To receive the scholarship, a participant signs the contract 

which sets forth these terms and states, for example, "I will not 

be relieved of my active duty obligation solely because I am 

willing and able to reimburse the Government for the total cost of 

advanced education." The Graduate Medical Education (GME) portion 

of the contract requires the student to apply to the Air Force GME 

Board "in the specialty of my choice . [i]f selected . " 

The selected student may complete advanced training either at a 

military facility or civilian institution. If a program is not 

available, the military "may defer me for one year of clinical 

training and then order me to active duty as a general medical or 

flight medical officer." The student also agrees that only the 

Secretary of the Air Force "can excuse me from my obligation." 

Further, the student agrees: 

Should any dispute arise over the terms or conditions of 

this contract ... I acknowledge, and agree to exhaust 

my available administrative remedies prior to seeking 

judicial review. Exhaustion of the Air Force Board for 

the Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR) remedy . . . shall be mandatory in every case except with respect to ... conscientious objector[s]. I will remain subject 

to active duty or transfer orders while exhausting 

administrative remedies. 

In 1988, Clark, then an ·oral maxillofacial surgeon having 

taken advanced training after his general dentistry degree, 

accepted a scholarship from the Air Force under the HPSP. He 

returned to medical school in exchange for which he agreed to 

serve three years on active duty in the Air Force. In 1990, the 

Air Force granted Clark a five-year deferment allowing him to 

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Appellate Case: 94-1208 Document: 01019282902 Date Filed: 04/04/1995 Page: 4 
complete residency training in Otolaryngology (ENT)", a specialty 

in short supply in the Air Force. From June 1990 to June 1992, 

Clark notified the Air Force that he was participating in a 

Surgery/ENT program. Sometime in 1992, however, Clark decided he 

wanted to continue his training in plastic surgery and submitted a 

different Hospital Agreement Form (HAF) , this one indicating he 

planned to begin a three-year surgery program. 

Although Clark received information explaining he must obtain 

permission to change the specialty training supporting his 

deferment for postgraduate medical education, he nevertheless 

applied for a residency in plastic surgery. In April 1992, the 

University of Chicago accepted him into its three-year residency. 

He accepted the program in June 1992 to begin in June 1993. 

On January 19, 1993, the Air Force's GME Selection Board 

denied Clark permission to change specialty training on the ground 

it had an oversupply of plastic surgeons and needed ENT 

specialists. The Office of the Surgeon General of the Air Force 

rejected his appeal on April 1, 1993. Although Clark then 

tendered his resignation, the Secretary of the Air Force refused 

to accept it. 

Notwithstanding the denial of permission, Clark began his 

plastic surgery residency in June 1993. The Air Force discovered 

Clark's decision when the Surgeon General forwarded an August 24, 

1993 letter from Clark's counsel suggesting a settlement and 

explaining Clark had begun the program on the advice of counsel. 

On September 1, 1993, the Air Force immediately informed 

Clark of its intention to call him to active duty. Clark appealed 

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Appellate Case: 94-1208 Document: 01019282902 Date Filed: 04/04/1995 Page: 5 
the decision to the Office of the Surgeon General and the 

Secretary of the Air Force, Office of General Counsel. He claimed 

at age thirty-seven he did "not have expendable years to practice 

in areas where he is not professionally motivated." Clark was 

then ordered to report for active duty on March 7, 1994, to serve 

three years as a General Medical Officer (GMO) . 

Instead, Clark filed this petition for habeas relief,2 

claiming the "premature termination of plaintiff's medical 

specialty training program was a violation of due process, 

arbitrary and capricious agency action, and w[ould] irreparably 

damage [his] ability to ever train and practice in another 

surgical specialty." Clark sought a judgment "releas[ing] 

Plaintiff from military custody by setting aside his active duty 

orders to permit plaintiff to complete his medical specialty 

training program in plastic and reconstructive surgery at the 

University of Chicago on or about July 1995, before commencing his 

active duty obligation." Albeit expressing its reluctance to 

interfere in the internal affairs of the armed forces, the 

district court nonetheless entered judgment for Clark. 

Persuaded by Clark's "credible" testimony that he would 

suffer career injury were he to abort his plastic surgery 

residency to become a GMO at age thirty-seven and testimony by 

"two respected doctors," the court perceived "[t]he indications in 

this case of a liberty interest and a property interest are very 

strong." The court also found the implication of irreparable 

2 He asserted jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 2241 and the 

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and 706(2) (A). 

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Appellate Case: 94-1208 Document: 01019282902 Date Filed: 04/04/1995 Page: 6 
injury. To support this position, the court relied on Meinhold v. 

United States Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 

1993), aff'd in part, vacated in part, Meinhold v. United States 

Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994); and May v. Gray, 

708 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. N.C. 1988). 

To explain the court stated: 

This is not just a question . . . of Dr. Clark 

making more money if he's a plastic or reconstructive 

surgeon. His indication . . . is not just to make a lot 

of money as a plastic surgeon by making people look like 

Michael Jackson or straightening out noses. He is 

interested in cleft palates . . . facial surgery . . . . 

And what he is interested in is very substantial. 

These findings predicated the court's conclusion liberty and 

property interests are involved in this case. 

By finding Clark would be irreparably injured, the court 

continued, in the alternative, granting the preliminary injunction 

simply postponed the government's access to a GMO in exchange for 

which the Air Force would get a highly specialized surgeon in 

fifteen months. "It appears to me that not only would the 

Government not suffer damage but the Government would indeed be 

benefited by this injunction which would allow Dr. Clark to finish 

his training." 

The court surmised the only damage to the government occurred 

when Clark "did not get advance approval before changing his 

specialty." The court identified this flaw as "the public 

interest" and believed the public would be better served by 

utilizing Clark's sophisticated surgical skills rather than 

getting another GMO. In reaching this decision, the court 

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disregarded the Air Force's expressed assessment of its own needs 

for medical specialists, however. 

Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F. 2d 61 (lOth Cir. 1980), controls 

this case on the issuance of the preliminary injunction. There, 

plaintiff received a Navy scholarship to complete his medical 

school. In his fourth year, he requested specialized training in 

pathology and applied to the naval hospital, but was turned down. 

Though accepted to the program at the University of Utah, the Navy 

rejected his application for a four-year active duty deferment 

because it needed GMO's and had no projected needs for 

pathologists. Nevertheless, the Navy offered him a one-year 

deferment "to complete a year of graduate medical training." Id. 

at 62. Lundgrin argued the one-year deferment triggered the 

Navy's obligation to grant him the additional three years to 

complete his specialty training under the contract; and, 

alternatively, the contract was ambiguous. 

Although the case was presented as a breach of an enlistment 

contract, and not a habeas action, we concluded Lundgrin failed to 

raise questions "so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful 

as to make them a fair ground for litigation." Id. at 63 

(citation omitted). Key to this holding was the conclusion the 

contract was unambiguous. Id. at 64. 

This analysis must apply here as well. Recalling Clark had 

to make a prima facie showing of a reasonable probability he would 

be ultimately "entitled to the relief sought," id. at 63, we must 

decide the issues upon the provisions of the contract that formed 

the rights and responsibilities of the parties. Here, as in 

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Claytor, the contract was unambiguous. Not only did it give the 

Secretary of the Air Force the sole authority to excuse Clark from 

his military duties, it also provided as a condition precedent to 

judicial review of any dispute arising from the contract Clark had 

to exhaust his appeal rights to the Air Force Board for the 

Correction of Military Records. Because this action seeks to 

avoid both of these unequivocal provisions, Clark's prospect for 

success on the merits of his suit is problematical. 

The government concedes, however, when substantial 

constitutional rights are in jeopardy, a civilian court could 

exercise jurisdiction over military affairs. Indeed, in Lindenau 

v. Alexander, 663 F.2d 68, 70 (lOth Cir. 1981), we dealt with such 

a circumstance. Although we ultimately denied judicial review, we 

adopted the four-part test of Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201-

02 (5th Cir. 1971), which established those areas in which a 

federal court could appropriately review military action. Noting 

the traditional reluctance of courts to intervene in military 

affairs, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 US 498, 510 (1975), and the 

role of federal courts in the "internal affairs of the military is 

narrow and restricted," Schulke v. United States, 544 F.2d 453, 

455 (lOth Cir. 1976), we held courts may review military action to 

determine whether military officials have acted within the scope 

of their powers. Lindenau, 663 F.2d at 71. Additionally, courts 

may entertain actions against military officials "for violating 

their own regulations" and "questioning the constitutionality of 

statutes relating to the military, executive orders, and 

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Appellate Case: 94-1208 Document: 01019282902 Date Filed: 04/04/1995 Page: 9 
regulations." Id. Also included in the scope of review are 

11 [c]ourt-martial convictions alleged to involve errors of 

constitutional proportions" and selective service "induction 

procedures. 11 Id. (citation omitted); see also Noyd v. McNamara, 

378 F.2d 538, 540 (lOth Cir.) (Wide discretion is given to the 

military to decide what constitutes "for the good of the 

service."), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967). 

Given these specific limitations within which a civilian 

court may deal with military affairs, it is noteworthy that Clark 

appears before us, not as a civilian student, but as a reserve 

officer in the United States Air Force seeking to prevent the 

issuance of an order from his military superior. Thus, he has 

thrust the court squarely into a dispute founded upon his personal 

unwillingness to comply with authority he freely accepted in 

exchange for the furtherance of his professional education by the 

taxpayers. While he would like the court to consider this dispute 

as one involving his constitutional freedoms, when properly 

viewed, that attempt is seen to be without a fundament. 

We denigrate neither Clark's 

importance of his medical education. 

doubtless benefit members of the 

sincerity of purpose nor the 

Indeed, his pursuits will 

public in the future. Those 

laudatory circumstances notwithstanding, as an officer who has 

committed himself to certain conduct in exchange for valuable 

benefits, Clark is subject to the authority of his commander. 

Having failed to demonstrate the military authority has acted in 

any way that would justify the interference of a civilian court, 

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Clark's action must fail. Following that conclusion, we judge the 

remaining arguments unpersuasive. 

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS 

THE COMPLAINT. 

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