Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02896/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02896-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:185 Employee Pension Plan

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 09cv2896

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS RHODES,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09-CV-2896 H (JMA)

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

REMAND

vs.

COSTCO WHOLESALE

CORPORATION, a Corporation; and

DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendant.

On November 2, 2009, Douglas Rhodes (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Costco

Wholesale Corporation (“Defendant”) in the San Diego Superior Court, North County Branch.

(Doc. No. 1, Compl.) Plaintiff alleged causes of action for (1) employment discrimination

based on disability or perceived disability in violation of the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq.; (2) employment discrimination

based on failure to accommodate disability or perceived disability in violation of FEHA; (3)

failure to engage in a timely, good-faith interactive process in violation of FEHA, Cal. Gov’t

Code § 12940(n); (4) retaliation; and (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

(Id.) On December 23, 2009, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. No.

1, Ans.) On December 24, 2009, Defendant filed a notice of removal on the basis of federal

Case 3:09-cv-02896-H-BGS Document 9 Filed 03/03/10 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 09cv2896

question and diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. (Doc. No. 1.) On January 20,

2010, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), contending that his

fourth cause of action for retaliation due to filing a workers’ compensation claim renders his

case non-removable. (Doc. No. 5.) On February 22, 2010, Defendant filed a response in

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Doc. No. 7.) On February 26, 2010, Plaintiff filed

a reply in support of its motion to remand. (Doc. No. 8.) The Court, pursuant to its discretion

under Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1), determines this matter is appropriate for disposition without

oral argument and submits it on the parties’ papers. 

DISCUSSION

When a plaintiff moves to remand a case, the defendant bears the burden of establishing

that removal was proper. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Any

questions regarding the propriety of removal are resolved in favor of the party moving for

remand. Matheson v. Progressive Speciality Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff argues that removal is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) because his claim “arises

under” California’s workers’ compensation laws. (Doc. No. 5 at 6.) Congress enacted 28

U.S.C. § 1445(c) to preserve a plaintiff’s choice of forum, to protect “‘states’ interest in

administering their own workers’ compensation schemes,’” and to reduce the workload that

workers’ compensation cases cause in federal courts. Vasquez v. N. County Transit Dist., 292

F.3d 1049, 1061, 1061 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Armistead v. C & M Transport, Inc., 49

F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1995)). Section 1445(c) provides that “[a] civil action in any State court

arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any

district court of the United States.”

The term “arising under” in the context of section 1445(c) has the same meaning as

“arising under” in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which governs federal question jurisdiction. See Reed

v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1059 (11th Cir. 2000); Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238,

1245-46 (8th Cir. 1995); Names v. Lee Publ’ns, No. 09-CV-132 BEN CAB, 2009 WL

3008296, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009). In defining “arising under” for purposes of section

1331, the Ninth Circuit has explained that

Case 3:09-cv-02896-H-BGS Document 9 Filed 03/03/10 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

California Labor Code section 132a, which is part of the State’s workers’ compensation

laws, codifies a claim for retaliatory discharge: 

It is the declared policy of this state that there should not be discrimination

against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment.

(1) Any employer who discharges . . . any employee because he or she has filed

or made known his or her intention to file a claim for compensation with his or

her employer . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor and the employee's compensation

shall be increased by one-half . . . . Any such employee shall also be entitled to

reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by the

acts of the employer.

Cal. Lab. Code § 132a.

- 3 - 09cv2896

[a] claim arises under a federal law within § 1331 if it is apparent from the face

of the complaint either that (1) a federal law creates the plaintiff's cause of

action; or (2) if a state law creates the cause of action, a federal law that creates

a cause of action is a necessary element of the plaintiff's claim.

Virgin v. County of San Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff argues that his fourth cause of action for retaliation arises under California’s

workers’ compensation laws. (Doc. No. 5 at 6-10.) Plaintiff’s retaliation claim alleges that

Defendant violated FEHA by terminating him because he (1) filed a workers’ compensation

claim and (2) requested an accommodation. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 42-47.) FEHA, and not

California’s workers’ compensation laws, creates Plaintiff’s cause of action. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim arises under California’s workers’ compensation laws only if those

laws are a necessary element of Plaintiff’s claim. See Virgin, 201 F.3d at 1242-43. 

The Court concludes that California’s workers’ compensation laws are not a necessary

element of Plaintiff’s FEHA retaliation claim. Importantly, the Court notes that in June 2009,

a judge for the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board approved a compromise and release

between Plaintiff and Defendant in which Plaintiff settled and released any claim for disability

discrimination under Labor Code section 132a.1

 (Doc. No. 7-1 Ex. C.) Plaintiff is therefore

precluded from pursuing a claim for retaliation under the relevant section of California’s

workers’ compensation laws. Since Plaintiff may not bring a claim under Labor Code section

132a directly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s FEHA retaliation claim does not arise under

this section. Moreover, resolution of Plaintiff’s claim does not require analysis of California’s

Case 3:09-cv-02896-H-BGS Document 9 Filed 03/03/10 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The parties dispute whether federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331

exists in this case. (See Doc. Nos. 5 at 5, 7 at 7-10, & 8 at 3-5.) Since the case is properly

before this Court based on diversity jurisdiction, the Court declines to reach the issue of

whether federal question jurisdiction exists.

- 4 - 09cv2896

workers’ compensation laws. Rather, Plaintiff’s filing a workers’ compensation claim is

merely one of two events that allegedly provided Defendant with motivation to retaliate against

Plaintiff. Finally, Defendant argues that a claim for retaliation under FEHA cannot be based

on the filing of a workers’ compensation claim, but instead must be based upon a plaintiff’s

opposition to activities that a plaintiff reasonably believed to constitute unlawful

discrimination. (Doc. No. 7 at 11-15 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal

USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1043 (2005).) 

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim does not arise under California’s

workers’ compensation laws, and accordingly denies Plaintiff’s motion to remand pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). Since this case is properly before this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the

Court will maintain jurisdiction over this matter.2

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 3, 2010

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record

Case 3:09-cv-02896-H-BGS Document 9 Filed 03/03/10 Page 4 of 4