Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01432/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01432-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONDA SCOTT, ) 2:07-cv-1432-GEB-DAD

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

CITIZEN’S COMMUNICATIONS dba )

ELECTRIC LIGHTWAVE; )

INTEGRA TELECOM; GREG BOGUS, )

individually and in his official )

capacity; MIKE HOGAN, individually )

and in his official capacity; )

DAVID SMITH, individually and in )

his official capacity; GARY )

NEIBOER, individually and in his )

official capacity; and DOES 1-20, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff Ronda Scott, a California citizen, moves to remand

this action to the state court from which it was removed, arguing that

there is no diversity jurisdiction justifying removal since three of

the defendants are also California citizens. Defendants Integra

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Defendants assert that Plaintiff erroneously named the 1

corporation that employed her as “Citizen’s Communications dba Electric

Lightwave; Integra Telecom.” Instead, Defendants assert that the

corporation is “Electric Lightwave LLC dba Integra Telecom.” (Integra

and Hogan’s Not. of Removal (“Removal”) at 2:6-7.) This order will

refer to the corporation that employed Scott at all relevant times as

“Integra.”

2

Telecom (“Integra”), Greg Bogus (“Bogus”), Mike Hogan (“Hogan”) and 1

David Smith (“Smith”) counter that complete diversity exists because

the three defendants who would defeat diversity are “sham” defendants. 

(Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Remand (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 2:8-12.) 

Specifically, Defendants argue that Bogus, Hogan and Smith

(collectively, “the in-state Defendants”), who are California

citizens, are “sham” defendants because Plaintiff does not allege a

viable claim against them and they were only named as defendants to

destroy diversity. (Id.) Plaintiff disagrees, and also moves for

attorney fees relating to the motion to remand.

PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint, inter alia, that

Integra, Defendant Gary Nieboer (“Nieboer”), and the in-state

Defendants retaliated against her in violation of California

Government Code section 12940.5 (the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”)). (Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 61-76.)

Plaintiff began working as an account executive at Integra

in June 1996. (Id. ¶ 6.) Her main job duties were to sell and

install telecommunication services. (Id.) 

In September 2003, Plaintiff was diagnosed with

fibromyalgia, a musculoskeletal disease that resulted in chronic pain,

irritable bowel syndrome, narcolepsy and fatigue. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.) 

She took a twelve-week leave of absence from work because of the

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Though Plaintiff does not allege what her specific request 2

was, it was presumably a request for leave under the Family and Medical

Leave Act.

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disability. (Id. ¶ 11.) Her symptoms made it difficult to sit for

extended periods of time, especially in the morning, and it was

difficult for her to commute to work and sit at her desk. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

When her symptoms had a “flare-up,” she had to take an increased

dosage of medication that made her unable to drive to work. (Id.) 

Based on Plaintiff’s difficulty commuting and pain in the mornings,

her supervisors permitted her to work from home up to three times per

week. (Id. ¶ 14.)

In April 2005, Smith became Plaintiff’s supervisor. (Id. ¶¶

14-15.) Smith knew that Plaintiff had fibromyalgia and that this made

it difficult for her to attend morning meetings, but required her

attendance nonetheless. (Id. ¶ 24.) 

In January 2006, Plaintiff submitted a “FMLA request.”2

(Id. ¶ 16.) After submitting this request, Plaintiff alleges that

Smith retaliated against her by instructing her to introduce him to

the sales contacts of all her best clients and by telling her she

should consider leaving the job because of her health problem. (Id. ¶

17.) 

In March 2006, Nieboer gave Plaintiff a negative performance

evaluation for 2005. (Id. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges that she received

this negative review because she had “filed for FMLA.” (Id.) Nieboer

also issued Plaintiff a “corrective action memo,” which criticized

Plaintiff’s performance on a variety of grounds Plaintiff alleges were

baseless, including Plaintiff’s failure to attend morning meetings,

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failure to process orders in a timely fashion, and failure to be

reachable when out of the office. (Id. ¶¶ 19-34.)

Also in March 2006, Hogan was promoted to sales manager and

became Plaintiff’s new supervisor. (Id. ¶ 18.) The position had not

been posted and Integra had not undertaken a competitive selection

process, contrary to company policy. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that

she was the “most qualified candidate” for this position. (Id.)

In May 2006, Hogan issued Plaintiff a “Final Written

Warning” purporting to document Plaintiff’s poor performance as

outlined in the negative 2005 performance evaluation, but at the time

the warning was issued, Plaintiff was the top performer in sales. 

(Id. ¶ 40.) 

In June 2006, Plaintiff sought accommodations for her

disability by speaking with the human resources department at Integra. 

(Id. ¶¶ 45-50.) Accommodations were eventually granted in October

2006. (Id. ¶ 50.) One accommodation permitted Plaintiff to

telecommute on a regular basis and arrive at the office later in the

day. (Id. ¶ 59.) 

On December 13, 2006, Hogan issued Plaintiff another “Final

Written Warning” based on Plaintiff’s failure to meet a “new logo

quota.” (Id. ¶ 58.) Hogan also criticized Plaintiff for failing to

arrive at work for scheduled meetings. (Id. ¶ 60.) He told Plaintiff

that she would not be permitted to telecommute anymore. (Id. ¶¶ 38,

40.) Hogan further required Plaintiff to attend 11:00 a.m. meetings

with him every morning to discuss her daily activity, despite her

accommodation. (Id. ¶ 60.) In the alternative, Plaintiff was allowed

to call Hogan at 11:00 a.m. if she was unable to attend the morning

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meeting. (Id.) No other sales representatives were required to

attend daily meetings. (Id.)

For four days, Plaintiff complied with Hogan’s directive to

meet with him or call him at 11:00 a.m. (Id.) Plaintiff met with

Hogan on one day, and called him on the other three days. (Id.) 

Hogan then fired Plaintiff on December 20, 2006. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that Hogan justified the termination by indicating that the

reason she was fired was for not meeting with Hogan in person every

day at 11:00 a.m., but that “Hogan’s discriminatory intent [was]

obvious.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated and

discriminated against her in violation of the FEHA. (Id. ¶¶ 61-110.) 

Plaintiff alleges that even though she “complained of sex and

disability discrimination” during her employment, “Defendants did not

take immediate corrective actions to stop [the] discriminatory

conduct.” (Id. ¶ 67.) Plaintiff alleges that because she “object[ed]

to, and oppos[ed], this discriminatory conduct,” Defendants retaliated

against her by failing to hire her for the sales manager position,

giving her bad evaluations, harassing her, and firing her. (Id. ¶¶

65-67.) Plaintiff further alleges that the in-state Defendants were

“in a supervisory capacity over Plaintiff” and that they “either

caused or directed all, or most, of the acts perpetrated against

Plaintiff described [in the Complaint].” (Id. ¶ 64.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Remand

The issue is whether Plaintiff has stated a claim against

non-diverse defendants “sufficient to withstand a dismissal motion

under Rule 12(b)(6).” See Sessions v. Chrysler Corp., 517 F.2d 759,

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761 (9th Cir. 1975). If so, the defendants are not “sham” defendants

and the motion to remand should be denied. Id. To be a “sham”

defendant, the failure to state a claim against that defendant must be

“obvious” under settled state law. McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811

F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987).

Pleadings need contain only a “short and plain” statement of

the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The allegations in Plaintiff’s

Complaint are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and

all reasonable inferences are drawn in Plaintiff’s favor. Cahill v.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996); Retail

Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Shermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

Moreover, to be a “sham” defendant, Plaintiff’s failure to state a

claim against that defendant must be “obvious” under settled law of

the state. McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339. 

Plaintiff alleges the in-state Defendants retaliated against

her in violation of the FEHA. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 61-76.) To establish

a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, Plaintiff “must show

(1) . . . she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer

subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a

causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer's

action.” Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042

(2005). 

First, Plaintiff has alleged that she “complained of sex and

disability discrimination” while an employee at Integra. (Pls.’

Compl. ¶ 67.) This is a protected activity under the FEHA. Cal.

Gov’t Code § 12940(h); see Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1043 (“[A]n

employee’s conduct may constitute a protected activity for purposes of

the antiretaliation provision of the FEHA . . . when the employee 

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opposes conduct that the employee reasonably and in good faith

believes to be discriminatory . . . .”). 

Second, Plaintiff alleges that the in-state Defendants,

including Hogan, retaliated against her by firing her, which

constitutes an adverse employment action. See Loggins v. Kaiser

Permanente Int’l, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1102, 1109-10 (2007).

Third, Plaintiff alleges a causal link between her

complaints about discriminatory conduct and the adverse employment

action. Plaintiff alleges in paragraph 67 of the Complaint: “During

the time of plaintiff’s employment . . . , Plaintiff complained of sex

and disability discrimination [and that] Defendants did not take

immediate corrective actions to stop . . . the discriminatory

conduct.” (Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 67.) Plaintiff alleges she was “retaliated

against for objecting to, and opposing, this discriminatory conduct.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that the in-state Defendants were “in a

supervisory capacity over Plaintiff” and that they “either caused or

directed all, or most, of the acts perpetrated against Plaintiff 

. . . .” (Id. ¶ 64.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that when Hogan

fired her, his “discriminatory intent [was] obvious.” (Id. ¶ 60.) 

Defendants argue that these allegations are insufficient

because (1) they are “brief and conclusory,” (2) no other part of the

Complaint “details or even alludes to any complaints by Plaintiff to

anyone,” (3) there is no way to tell which defendant failed to take

corrective action because Plaintiff fails to define “Said Defendants,”

and (4) the concluding sentence of paragraph 67 fails to identify the

alleged retaliators. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 6:8-7:8.)

Under the liberal pleading standard, however, Plaintiff has

adequately pled a claim for retaliation. The paragraph of the

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Complaint immediately prior to paragraph 67 begins with “Defendants

Bogus, Hogan, Smith and Neiboer . . . .” (Id. ¶ 66.) It is

reasonable to infer that the reference in paragraph 67 to “Said

Defendants” refers to these defendants, including Hogan, who allegedly

retaliated against Plaintiff by firing her. (See Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 67.) 

It is also reasonable to infer that the retaliation referenced in the

final sentence of paragraph 67 was carried out by Hogan, especially

considering that Plaintiff also specifically alleges (1) that Hogan

fired her and his “discriminatory intent [was] obvious,” and (2) that

“Defendants Bogus, Hogan, Smith and Neiboer either caused or directed

all, or most, of the acts perpetrated against Plaintiff . . . .” (Id.

¶¶ 60, 64.) Accordingly, at least one of the in-state Defendants is

on notice of the claim against him.

Because Plaintiff has stated a claim against at least one

in-state defendant, Defendants’ removal based on diversity

jurisdiction was improper since complete diversity does not exists. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is granted.

II. Attorney Fees

Plaintiff requests attorney fees she incurred as a result of

bringing the motion to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). (Pls.’ Not.

of Mot. and Mot. to Remand at 5:3-4.) “Absent unusual circumstances,

courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the

removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking

removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists,

fees should be denied.” Martin, 546 U.S. at 141.

 While Defendants have not demonstrated that the in-state

Defendants are “sham” defendants, their basis for removal was

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objectively reasonable. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney

fees is denied. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion to remand is granted. Plaintiff’s motion

for attorney fees is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 28, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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