Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01275/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01275-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

u .J'8JJ&~llppcatn m Tenth C1rcU1t 

l~OV 11991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ECKER ROBERT L. HO . II 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

ROLANDO R. LUNA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CITY & COUNTY OF DENVER, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC) 

WORKS, STAPLETON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT; ) 

JACK w. BRENNAN, in his official capacity as ) 

Airport Engineer, Stapleton International ) 

Airport; ROBERT STORCK, in his official ) 

capacity as Chief Construction Engineer, ) 

Stapleton International Airport; and WILLIAM) 

E. SMITH, in his official capacity as ) 

Assistant Director of Aviation (Engineering),) 

Stapleton International Airport, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

'No. 90-1275 

OH APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. Ho. 87-B-1380) 

George C. Aucoin (Richard Hipp and Patrick w. Johnson with him on 

the brief) .of Hackethal, McNeil! & Aucoin, P.C., Lakewood, 

Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Geoffrey s. Wasson, Assistant City Attorney (Patricia L. Wells, 

City Attorney, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Before MCKAY, Chief Circuit Judge, and BARRETT and BRORBY, Circuit 

Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-1275 Document: 010110096824 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 1 
This appeal arises from the district court's finding that the 

City and County of Denver unlawfully discriminated against an 

employee on the basis of his national origin in violation of Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et .2.§.fL. 

Plaintiff Rolando Luna, a thirteen-year employee with the 

City and County of Denver, brought suit alleging defendants failed 

to promote him on the basis of his Asian descent and promoted 

instead a less qualified Anglo-American. The district court 

granted defendants' summary judgment motions in an unpublished 

order dated July 18, 1988, dismissing Luna's civil rights claim 

under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, and a companion claim under the Age 

Discrimination and Employment Act, 29 u.s.c. § 621. The district 

court also granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on 

Luna's civil rights claim under 42 u.s.c. § 1981. See Luna v. 

City & County of Denver, 718 F. Supp. 854 (D. Colo. 1989). A twoday bench trial resolved the remaining Title VII discrimination 

claim in Luna's favor. The trial court ordered defendants to 

promote Luna to the first available vacancy of Engineer Ill and to 

pay Luna the difference between his current salary and Engineer 

III during the interim. Additionally, the trial court awarded 

Luna back pay stipulated at $18,642, as well as attorney fees and 

costs. 

The City and County of Denver now appeals, claiming Luna 

failed to present evidence from which the court could find that 

defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting 

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\ 

plaintiff was a pretext for discrimination. Because we find the 

district court's ultimate finding of intentional discrimination is 

not clearly erroneous, we affirm. 

FACTO.AL BACKGROUND 

The basic facts are not in dispute. Luna, an AmericanFilipino of Asian race, was born in the Philippine Islands where 

he acquired his initial education and eventually received a 

bachelor of science degree from Feati Institute of Technology in 

Manila in 1950. 

Luna later obtained a master of science degree in 

aeronautical engineering from the University of Notre Dame and a 

master of business administration degree from St. Louis 

University. 

structural 

Washington. 

Luna also 

engineering 

He began 

undertook advanced nondegree courses in 

and mathematics at the University of 

his professional career in 1958 as an 

engineer for Boeing Corporation and received two promotions in a 

five-year period. He became a naturalized citizen of the United 

States in 1963, and thereafter held a variety of engineering 

positions. He worked two years as an aeronautical engineer for 

McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation. He also worked over four 

years as a civil engineer and consultant for private corporations· 

in the Philippines and the United States, including a six-month 

assignment to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's 

Apollo and Saturn space projects. 

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After receiving high ratings from the Denver Career Services 

Authority (CSA), a centralized personnel agency that recruits 

employees for municipal positions, the City of Denver hired Luna 

in 1972 as a Project Inspector for the Department of Public Works. 

Throughout his thirteen years with the City and County of Denver, 

Luna performed a variety of functions. He spent much of his first 

year evaluating all of the city's bridges and viaducts after 

receiving specialized technical training from the Federal Highway 

Administration and Colorado State Highway Commission. Thereafter 

he served as a Project Engineer I at Stapleton International 

Airport, evaluating airport facilities, waste and noise pollution, 

and overseeing a variety of special projects related to airport 

construction and management. Evidence presented at trial 

indicated that Luna often performed duties above those normally 

required of a project engineer. Projects assigned to Luna often 

required him to utilize his experience in structural, mechanical, 

electrical, and civil engineering. He was also required to 

evaluate technical, 

projects. Luna had 

legal and economic factors affecting certain 

an "unblemished record" and consistently 

maintained an evaluation of "strong or better." 

This dispute arose in 1985, when CSA announced a vacancy for 

the position of Engineer III at Stapleton International Airport. 

The initial job description required a bachelor of science degree 

in civil engineering from an accredited university or equivalent 

work experience in civil engineering. The vacancy also required 

four years' work experience in engineering, as well as 

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Appellate Case: 90-1275 Document: 010110096824 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 4 
registration by the State of Colorado as a professional engineer. 

Advanced education could substitute for the required work 

experience. Although the position initially called for two years' 

experience in airport construction and project management, the 

city later deleted this requirement to attract additional 

candidates. At the time, the applicant pool numbered less than 

the five required for CSA certification. 

Two city employees William Shirk, a white male, and 

plaintiff Luna -- were among those who submitted applications. 

Although Shirk's application was facially deficient for failure to 

include all required forms detailing his work experience, CSA 

nonetheless certified him as eligible along with the five highest 

scoring applicants on its preliminary oral examination. CSA 

rejected Luna's application, however, on the erroneous assumption 

that a civil engineer degree was prerequisite for the position. 

CSA failed to recognize that civil engineering work experience 

could substitute for the lack of a formal civil engineer degree. 

Two airport engineers conducted the pre-appointment 

interviews and hired one male and two females at the Engineer III 

level, all Caucasian. Shirk was not selected for any of the 

available slots since he lacked the design engineering experience 

sought by the department. Shirk had only two years' experience 

working for the city Public Works Department as an engineer on 

roads, bridges and related projects. He had no experience in the 

airport engineering field. Nor did he have the two years' airport 

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Appellate Case: 90-1275 Document: 010110096824 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 5 
construction and project management experience originally sought 

by Stapleton International Airport. 

Nevertheless, both hiring engineers believed Shirk was a 

strong candidate for the construction section of the engineering 

department and recommended the city create a position for him. 

The construction supervisor met with Shirk on December 20, 1985, 

to review his qualifications and discussed the anticipated opening 

with him on at least two additional occasions. Soon thereafter, 

the city granted the airport authority to create the additional 

Engineer III position for the purpose of hiring Shirk. 

Meanwhile, Luna inquired why CSA found him not qualified for 

the Engineer III position when he had been certified as eligible 

for the more stringent Engineer IV slot four years earlier, as 

well as for airport engineer in 1977 and assistant airport 

engineer in 1978. He was not hired for any of the three 

positions. CSA reexamined Luna's record, discovered its 

processing error on his application, and ultimately certified Luna 

to the airport hiring authority in January 1986. Neither of the 

hiring engineers was aware of Luna's application until this date. 

Since two qualified candidates now existed for the newlyapproved Engineer III position, city hiring policy required 

interviews of both Luna and Shirk. At trial, defendants 

introduced testimony that had Shirk been the only candidate, he 

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would likely have been awarded the position automatically without 

an interview. 

At this juncture, the parties diverge slightly on their 

recall of the events. However, the district court found that on 

the evening of February 20, 1986, Luna was told to report to the 

airport engineer's office the following day but was not aware 

until he arrived that the meeting was in fact an interview for the 

Engineer III position. A hiring committee comprised of the two 

hiring engineers and two other department heads asked Luna a 

series of questions related to engineering principles, 

construction management, scheduling, contracts, and 

correspondence. Luna testified he was totally surprised and felt 

unfairly treated because he was unable to prepare for the meeting. 

He also testified that many of the questions asked were unrelated 

to the skills needed to perform at the Engineer III level. 

Shirk responded to the identical questions asked of Luna 

during his interview and the committee found his responses "more 

appropriate" overall than Luna's. However, the trial court found 

Shirk had advance notice of the interview schedule. Shirk 

received the promotion and this suit followed. 

Defendants conceded at trial, and the district court agreed, 

that Luna established a prima facie case of employment 

discrimination on the basis of national origin under Title VII. 

The evidence presented clearly showed (1) Luna belonged to a 

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racial minority; (2) he applied for and was qualified for a job 

for which the City and County of Denver sought applicants; (3) 

despite his qualifications, he was denied promotion; and (4) 

another employee who was not a member of a protected group was 

promoted at the time Luna's request was denied. See McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Rich v. Martin 

Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 345-47 (10th Cir. 1975). 

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden 

shifts to the employer to show that it based its promotion 

decision strictly on a legitimate business consideration and not 

an illegitimate factor such as race. Furnco Constr. Co. v. 

Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 

at 802. An employer need only "articulate some legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection," McDonnell 

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, in order for the burden of production to 

shift back to the employee to show that the offered justification 

served only as a mere pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. 

Defendants assert Shirk was better qualified for the position 

than Luna based solely on their responses to questioning at the 

interviews. While the trial court found this reason sufficient to 

meet defendants' burden of production, it nonetheless concluded 

that the proffered reason was a pretext. The trial court 

determined defendants possessed a mindset to hire Shirk and the 

"interview was just simply a ministerial process that they would 

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go through to protect themselves and the city." We are asked to 

find the trial court's decision clearly erroneous. 

DISCUSSION 

Defendants argue that Luna failed to present any evidence, 

direct or circumstantial, from which the trial judge could find 

that racial discrimination was more likely than not the reason for 

the city's decision not to promote him. To support their claim, 

defendants argue that the trial court erroneously equates the 

defendants' "race conscious-free decision to hire Shirk" in 

December 1985, as evidence of an intent to discriminate against 

Luna when the defendants held interviews in February 1986. In 

short, defendants assert the trial court could not logically find 

discrimination where defendants made their decision to hire Shirk 

at a time prior to receiving notice of Luna's 

disagree with how defendants characterize 

findings and therefore reject the argument. 

eligibility. We 

the trial court's 

The district court determined defendants had a mindset to 

hire Shirk prior to the interview. Yet this predisposition to 

hire Shirk arose only because no other eligible applicants existed 

prior to the time CSA certified Luna. This mindset cannot be 

viewed in isolation, however, or as determinative on the issue of 

defendants' claimed lack of discriminatory intent. Shirk had not 

yet been offered the job at the time of the February interview and 

defendants' own witnesses testified unequivocally that their 

decision to hire Shirk was based solely on the interview itself. 

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As the trial court emphasized, the focus, therefore, is not on the 

initial desire to hire Shirk back in December, but rather on the 

ultimate hiring decision made between Luna and Shirk. Simply 

because defendants were predisposed to hire Shirk does not, by 

itself, answer the question of why Luna's application received 

less than fair consideration after CSA certified him as eligible 

in January 1986. The trial court was clearly disturbed that Luna 

received no warning of the interview and that the hiring committee 

never bothered to read Luna's file prior to the meeting. 

Furthermore, the trial judge found the interview questions 

"substantially subjective." 

Simply because "a court may think that the employer misjudged 

the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him 

to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether 

the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination." Texas 

Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981). 

Defendants' mindset is directly relevant to whether their 

proffered reason for not hiring Luna is mere pretext. Defendants 

assert they based their employment decision solely on Shirk's 

performance during the interview and therefore lack the requisite 

discriminatory intent. Nevertheless, the evidence shows Luna was 

significantly disadvantaged at the interview by defendants' own 

acts. The trial court found this incongruency definitive and that 

defendants' mindset to hire Shirk -- "given the discrepancy in the 

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race in this case" -- made their articulated reason for bypassing 

Luna a mere pretext. 

A plaintiff may succeed in a Title VII action "either 

directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more 

likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 

employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. It is firmly established that this 

evidence may "take a variety of forms." 

U.S. at 578; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 

Furnco Construction, 438 

at 804-805. In some 

cases "the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective 

cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the 

defendant's explanation." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10. In 

other situations an aggrieved plaintiff "might be able to prove 

pretext by showing that the employer has promoted white employees 

who lack the qualifications the employer relies upon, or by 

proving the employer's 'general policy and practice with respect 

to minority employment.'" Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 

U.S. 164, 217 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting 

in part) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-805). 

Based on the totality of the circumstances here, the trial 

court had ample additional evidence upon which to base its 

decision. It is uncontradicted the airport engineering department 

employed no racial minorities in the Engineer III position and 

Luna maintained an exemplary record throughout his thirteen years 

of service with the city. The trial court also found Shirk 

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"didn't have the same track record that Mr. Luna did. His 

qualifications and credentials on paper [going] into this 

interview were not as good as Mr. Luna's." Luna's tenure as an 

employee with the city was nearly six times that of Shirk. Luna, 

unlike Shirk, also had the precise airport construction and 

project management experience that the airport initially required 

but later deleted for lack of qualified candidates. Additionally, 

Luna's application 

application remained 

was technically 

facially deficient 

correct, while 

throughout the 

Shirk's 

entire 

application process. While it is true the record is devoid of any 

evidence regarding the extent of defendants' knowledge of this 

deficiency, it is nonetheless a fact which the trial court could 

consider. 

Defendants, however, equate their decision to hire Shirk to 

Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 825 (4th Cir. 1989), 

where the court ruled that the city's decision to hire the nephew 

of a panelist who conducted job interviews, as well as the son of 

a crew supervisor, rather than a qualified black candidate with 

greater experience although distasteful and based on "reasons 

other than merit" did not violate Title VII. We find 

defendants' argument unconvincing. While we agree that Title VII 

does not "authorize[] courts to declare unlawful every arbitrary 

and unfair employment decision," id., the statute "tolerates no 

racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise." McDonnell Douglas, 

411 U.S. at 801. In short, if defendants offer a pretext for why 

Shirk was selected over Luna, then the trial court "may infer that 

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the employer is trying to conceal a discriminatory reason for its 

action." Bell v. A.T. & T., __ F.2d __ , No. 90-6201, 1991 WL 

208257, *6 (10th Cir. Oct. 18, 1991). 

The evidence established here, coupled with the defendants' 

own concession that Luna established a prima facie case of 

discrimination, clearly supports the trial court's ruling. It is 

beyond dispute that once defendants conceded the prima facie case, 

they conceded there were at least some tenable facts upon which 

the trial court could base a finding of employment discrimination. 

While defendants successfully rebutted the legal inference of 

discrimination that arose out of Luna's prima facie case, the 

basic facts remain in evidence nevertheless. Accordingly, 

defendants' additional claim that CSA's nondiscriminatory 

processing error imputed Title VII liability upon the city by 

delaying Luna's application until after the airport selected Shirk 

is without merit. 

Our decision is guided, in part, by the broad deference 

afforded to the trial court. We are bound to uphold the trial 

court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 52(a). We may not find the trial court's findings 

"clearly erroneous unless, after a review of the entire record, we 

are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made." Higgins v. State ex rel. Okl. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 

642 F.2d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 1981) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1275 Document: 010110096824 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 13 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)). We are not 

left with such a conviction in this case. 

issue 

It is not our duty as an appellate court to 

to determine if the trial court reached 

relitigate an 

the correct 

decision. Rather, we are called only to judge "whether it reached 

a permissible one in light of the evidence." Higgins, 642 F.2d at 

1202. Furthermore, "'the resolution of conflicting evidence and 

the determination of credibility are matters particularly within 

the province of the trial judge who heard and observed the 

demeanor of the witnesses.'" Id. (quoting Dowell v. United 

States, 553 F.2d 1233, 1235 (10th Cir. 1977)). Based on our 

review of the record, the trial court's finding that the City and 

County of Denver discriminated against Luna on the basis of his 

national origin is not clearly erroneous. 

We are mindful that Title VII does not obligate an employer 

to extend preferential treatment to a minority where competing 

candidates possess comparable qualifications. Burdine, 450 U.S. 

at 259; Furnco Construction, 438 U.S. at 577-78. However, it is 

incumbent upon an employer to give minority candidates equal and 

fair consideration, thus insuring that an employment decision is 

"not based upon unlawful criteria." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259; 

Furnco Construction, 438 U.S. at 577-78. Such was not the case 

here. 

AFFIRMED. 

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