Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04824/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04824-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAKIM GULAID,

Plaintiff,

v.

CH2M HILL, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04824-JST 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 20

Before the Court is Defendant CH2M Hill, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 20. For the 

reasons stated below, the motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

For purposes of deciding this motion, the Court accepts as true the following allegations 

from Plaintiff’s complaint. Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff Hakim Gulaid, appearing pro se, is a resident of California who alleges that he 

was constructively discharged from his employment with Defendant CH2M Hill, Inc. (“CH2M”) 

on March 4, 2014 and that he was forced to resign due to discriminatory and harassing conduct. 

ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 4-6. Gulaid was born in Somaliland, is Muslim, and speaks Somali as his native 

language, although he also now speaks English fluently. Id. at ¶¶ 12-16. He was hired by CH2M 

as a Project Quality Control Manager on December 30, 2013 for a project in Djibouti, Djibouti. 

Id. at ¶ 22. While Plaintiff was originally told he would report to Defendant Michael Weinmuller, 

which was in conflict with contract requirements, CH2M subsequently changed his “reporting 

relationship” to Vice President Dave Bird, which was in harmony with project contract 

requirements. Id. at ¶ 25. However, Weinmuller “insisted that he remain Plaintiff’s supervisor 

and prevailed,” and became “Plaintiff’s supervisor on a daily basis in all practical respects.” Id. at 

¶ 26.

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Gulaid was excited about his job but it was cut short “due to unlawful discrimination, 

racial harassment and retaliation that he experienced during his employment.” Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. He 

was “treated . . . so poorly that he was forced to resign” and return to the United States. Id. at ¶ 

28. Gulaid alleges that “Defendant clearly breached the terms of the Offer Letter and company 

policies with respect to Mr. Gulaid.” Id.

Plaintiff had to leave Oakland, California and move himself and his family to Djibouti. Id. 

at ¶ 29. CH2M did not provide assistance that he needed on a timely basis. Id. Gulaid was 

excluded from important meetings with management and the client, id. at ¶ 30, and was not 

provided material information related to his job or with a properly working computer, id. at ¶ 31. 

He was never formally introduced to his supervisor David Bird. Id. at ¶ 32. He was ignored at 

meetings by his superiors, which “created a climate whereby his co-workers would do the same.” 

Id. at ¶ 33. He was verbally abused in front of the client, required to report to an individual in 

violation of the project contract (presumably, Mr. Weinmuller), and Defendant “retaliated against 

him for complaining” about his treatment. Id. at ¶ 34-36. Gulaid “resigned his position given that 

he and no other reasonable individual would be able to tolerate the hostile working environment 

created by Defendant.” Id. at ¶ 37.

Gulaid filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing 

Commission on February 20, 2015, which provided him with a Right to Sue Notice on February 

26, 2015. Id. at ¶¶ 38, 40. He stated that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued 

him a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on July 20, 2015. Id. at ¶ 39.

Gulaid filed his complaint in this Court on October 20, 2015. Id. He brings the following 

claims: (1) violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) retaliation 

in Violation of Title VII

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; (3) violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”); (4) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision; (5) breach of contract; (6) fraud and 

misrepresentation; and (7) wrongful termination. Id. at ¶¶ 42-70.

 

1 Both Gulaid’s second and fourth causes of action are titled “Retaliation in Violation of Title VII” 

and contain identical language. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 48-53, 47-52. The Court therefore considers 

these two causes of action as a single claim.

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II. JURISDICTION

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Civil Rights Act 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining claims pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1367.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 

the ground upon which it rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 

appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support 

a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 

Cir. 2008). The Court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe 

the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 

1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims, his FEHA claims, and his state law 

claims should all be dismissed. The Court discusses these claims in turn below.

A. Title VII

Plaintiff alleges in his first count that Defendant violated Title VII by discriminating 

against him on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 44. He states 

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Defendants did so by “creating, fostering, and accepting, ratifying and/or otherwise failing to 

prevent or to remedy a hostile work environment that included, among other things, severe and 

pervasive harassment of Plaintiff because of [his] protected status.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 44. He 

alleges in his second count that Defendant “has retaliated against Plaintiff by failing to provide 

him with adequate resources, excluding him from meetings and other material channels for 

obtaining information, derogatory communications, both written and oral, untimely providing 

resources for relocation to and from the project from his home in the United States, embarrassing 

him in front of co-workers and clients, among other acts.” Id. at 50.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff has 

not exhausted his claims before the EEOC. ECF No. 20 at 6. “In order to litigate a Title VII 

claim in federal district court, [a plaintiff] must have exhausted her administrative remedies.” 

Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1995). “Although failure to file an EEOC 

complaint is not a complete bar to district court jurisdiction, substantial compliance with the 

exhaustion requirement is a jurisdictional pre-requisite.” Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 

(9th Cir. 2003). Because Plaintiff first filed a charge with the California Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing Commission, he was required to file a complaint with the EEOC within 

300 days of the date the allegedly unlawful employment practice occurred or 30 from notice by the 

DFEH that state administrative proceedings had terminated, whichever was earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-5(e)(1); Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not timely exhaust his administrative remedies 

because he was constructively terminated on March 4, 2014, and therefore was required to file his 

complaint with the EEOC by December 29, 2014, or 300 days after he was allegedly 

constructively terminated.2 ECF No. 20 at 6-7. Plaintiff does not allege the date on which he filed 

his complaint with the EEOC. However, he states in his Opposition that he did not file his EEOC 

claim until after he filed his claim with the California Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing, ECF No. 24 at 7, which according to his complaint occurred on February 20, 2015, ECF 

 

2

This is the earlier of the two dates specified by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), as Plaintiff did not 

receive notice of the termination of his state agency proceedings until February 26, 2015.

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No. 1 at 6. Accordingly, it appears that Plaintiff has failed to timely exhaust his administrative 

remedies with the EEOC. 

Plaintiff argues his lawsuit is proper because he filed his lawsuit in this court within the 

90-day requirement specified on his Notice of Rights from the EEOC. ECF No. 24 at 7. That 

argument addresses a different requirement than the one at issue here. The 300-day limit 

described in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) sets the deadline for when Plaintiff must have filed his 

claim with the EEOC in order to exhaust his administrative remedies, not when he must have filed 

his complaint in this court.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first and second counts under Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act is accordingly granted without prejudice. Any amended pleading must explain 

how Plaintiff has met the exhaustion requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

B. FEHA

Plaintiff alleges in his third count that Defendant has violated the California FEHA through 

the same discriminatory conduct that supported his Title VII claims. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 41-45. He 

alleges that Defendant “denied Plaintiff the same terms and conditions of employment available to 

employees who are not of the same race, religion, and national origin as Plaintiff, including but 

not limited to, subjecting him to disparate working conditions and denying the opportunity to work 

in an employment setting free of unlawful harassment.” Id. at ¶ 42.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s FEHA claim must fail because FEHA does not apply to 

conduct that occurs outside of California and lacks a factual nexus between the alleged 

discriminatory conduct and any of Defendant’s California-based activities. ECF No. 20 at 7-8. 

Defendant cites to Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 4th 1850, 1858 (1996), which held 

that the FEHA could not be applied to conduct that occurred outside of California, to a plaintiff 

who was a non-resident of California, and which involved no participation by any corporate 

officer in the Defendant company’s California headquarters. Courts in this circuit have applied 

this extraterritoriality rule even if the plaintiff is a California resident. See, e.g., Anderson v. 

CRST Intern., Inc., No. CV 14-368 DSF (MANx), 2015 WL 1487074 at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 

2015) (holding that the concept of extraterritoriality applies “regardless of the plaintiff’s 

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residency”); see also Rulenz v. Ford Motor Co., No. 10cv1791-GPC-MDD, 2013 WL 2181241 at 

*3 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2013) (“Therefore, to properly plead a FEHA claim, a plaintiff must 

sufficiently allege the tortious conduct occurred in the state of California”); Gonsalves v. Infosys 

Tech., LTD., No. C 09-04112 MHP, 2010 WL 1854146 at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2010) (Plaintiff 

must aver “a factual nexus between [Defendant’s] California-based activities and the alleged 

discriminatory conduct”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that a work environment was created in Djibouti in which he was 

discriminated against, verbally abused, and ignored. He does not, however, allege that any of this 

conduct was connected to Defendant’s California-based activities or that any California employee 

participated in or authorized the conduct. In his Opposition, Plaintiff cites to Roger-Vasselin v. 

Marriot Intern., Inc., No. C04-4027 TEH, 2006 WL 2038291 at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2006), and 

Sims v. Worldpac Inc., No. C12-05275, 2013 WL 663277 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013) 

(unpublished) for the proposition that the Court may apply FEHA to conduct outside of California. 

ECF No. 24 at 7. However, in both of those cases the plaintiff was able to specifically identify 

connections between the alleged discriminatory conduct and the activities of particular employees 

of defendants in California. See Roger-Vasselin, 2006 WL 2038291 at *8 (plaintiff presented 

material factual dispute as to whether a California-based manager “provided input” in promotion 

denials); Sims, 2013 WL 663277 at *3 (plaintiff identified particular individuals who, while in 

California, made the decision to terminate him). Gulaid, by contrast, does not make any such 

specific allegations.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Gulaid’s FEHA claims is granted without 

prejudice. Any amended pleading must identify the specific California-based conduct that was 

connected to the alleged discriminatory conduct.

C. Remaining Claims

Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action bring claims for negligent hiring, retention, and 

supervision; for breach of contract; for fraud and misrepresentation; and for wrongful termination. 

Defendant argues that all of these counts should be dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim. 

The Court considers each claim in turn.

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Under California law, a defendant employer may be liable for the acts of his agents where 

the employer “is either negligent or reckless in the hiring or supervision of the agent.” Deutsch v. 

Masonic Homes of Cal., Inc., 164 Cal. App. 4th 748, 783 (2008); see also Evan F. v. Hudson 

United Methodist Church, 8 Cal. App. 4th 828, 842 (1992) (liability attached when “the employer 

has not taken the care which a prudent man would take in selecting the person for the business at 

hand” (internal citation, quotation marks, and emphasis removed)). Here, Gulaid’s complaint 

contains no allegations as to which persons the Defendant was negligent or reckless in hiring or 

supervising, or why their actions in that regard were negligent or reckless. He argues in his 

Opposition that “Defendant knew or should have known of their supervisor’s discriminatory 

proclivities which resulted in irreparable harm to Plaintiff,” ECF No. 24 at 8, but he provides no 

allegations identifying any supervisor’s “discriminatory proclivities” or how Defendant knew or 

should have known of these proclivities. Instead, Plaintiff only alleges generally that he was 

mistreated while employed by CH2M as well as the conclusory assertion that his mistreatment 

resulted from discrimination. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for negligent hiring, retention and 

supervision is dismissed without prejudice.

To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must prove “(1) the contract, (2) the 

plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, 

and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff.” Richman v. Hartley, 224 Cal. App. 4th 1182, 1186 

(2014). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct towards him “clearly breached the terms of the 

Offer Letter and company policies.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 28; see also id. at ¶ 58 (alleging that 

Defendant “discriminated and harassed Plaintiff in contravention of its corporate policies and 

practices prohibiting discrimination and harassment”). However, in the absence of any allegations 

identifying contractual terms that were violated as well as specific conduct that violated those 

terms, these statements are conclusory. Holcomb v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 155 Cal. App. 4th 

490, 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 150 (2007), as modified (Oct. 22, 2007) (“Without specifying . . . 

the specific terms Holcomb claims the bank had breached, the complaint fails to adequately state a 

cause of action for breach of contract.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract is 

dismissed without prejudice.

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To plead a cause of action for fraud, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a knowingly false 

representation by the defendant, (2) an intent to defraud or to induce reliance, (3) justifiable 

reliance, and (4) resulting damages.” Croeni v. Goldstein, 21 Cal. App. 4th 754, 758 (1994). 

Every element must be specifically pleaded. Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2 Cal. 

App. 4th 153, 157 (1991). Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant actively and aggressively 

recruited and hired Plaintiff knowing that it had animus toward Plaintiff based upon his race, 

religion, and national origin,” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 61, and that he accepted his assignment on Djibouti 

over other potential opportunities “due to Defendant’s representations that he would enjoy the full 

support of Defendant’s resources related to the position that he would hold and that he would be 

treated in a manner consistent with this [sic] policies of non-discrimination and prohibition of 

harassment,” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 62. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded a 

claim of fraud. Outside of general statements, Plaintiff does not allege particular representations 

that were false or any conduct that indicates knowledge or fraudulent intent. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s claim for fraud and misrepresentation is dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff’s final claim is for wrongful termination. ECF No. 1 at 11. Defendant asserts that 

this claim “should fail because it is entirely derivative of Plaintiff’s statutory claims” under FEHA. 

ECF No. 20 at 11. In his Opposition, Plaintiff responds that “the discrimination occurred under 

the anti-discrimination statute in California, FEHA,” and that “FEHA may apply in a situation, 

like here, where both Plaintiff and Defendant both have significant contacts with the State of 

California and where some but not all alleged discriminatory [sic] occurred here in California.” 

ECF No. 24 at 10. It does not appear that Plaintiff disputes that his wrongful termination claim 

overlaps with his FEHA claim. As the Court has already found, Plaintiff’s FEHA claim must be 

dismissed because he has not shown a connection between the alleged discriminatory conduct in 

Djibouti and any California-based conduct by Defendant. For this reason, Plaintiff’s wrongful 

termination claim must also be dismissed without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted without prejudice. 

Any amended complaint must be filed within 21 days of the issuance of this order.

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Plaintiff is encouraged to seek the assistance of the Legal Help Center in amending his 

complaint. The Legal Help Center is located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 15th Floor, Room 2796, 

San Francisco, California. Assistance is provided by appointment only. Litigants may schedule 

an appointment by signing up in the appointment book located on the table outside the door of the 

Center or by calling the Legal Help Center appointment line at 415–782–8982. Plaintiffs may also 

wish to consult the Northern District of California manual, Representing Yourself in Federal 

Court: A Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, a copy of which may be downloaded at 

http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/prosehandbook or obtained free of charge from the Clerk's office.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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