Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00134/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00134-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rigberto Ortiz Sanchez, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 12-00134 PHX ROS(MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles Ryan, Arizona Attorney ) 

General, )

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus on January 20, 2012. Respondents filed an

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc.

10) on May 18, 2012. Petitioner was granted three extensions of

the time allowed to file a reply to the answer, which reply was

due October 5, 2012. As of October 24, 2012, no reply has been

docketed.

I Procedural History

On April 11, 2006, 14-year-old “V.O.”, Petitioner’s

daughter, was taken to a Phoenix hospital because she was not

feeling well. See Answer, Exh. N. After undergoing a series of

routine tests, the hospital determined that V.O. was two months

pregnant. See id., Exh. N. V.O. told the hospital staff that

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her father, Petitioner, was the father of her unborn child.

Id., Exh. N. She advised the hospital staff that Petitioner

first had sexual intercourse with her when she was 13 years old.

Id., Exh. N. Petitioner was arrested at the hospital and

admitted to law enforcement that it was possible he was the

father of V.O.’s child. Id., Exh. N.

On April 21, 2006, a Maricopa County grand jury

indicted Petitioner on two counts of sexual conduct with a

minor, class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children.

Id., Exh. A. On October 4, 2006, pursuant to a written plea

agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of sexual conduct

with a minor under the age of 15, a class 2 felony and dangerous

crime against children in the first degree (Count 1 one of the

indictment), and one amended count of attempted sexual conduct

with a minor, a class 3 felony and dangerous crime against

children (Count 2 of the indictment). Id., Exhs. G, H, I. The

plea agreement specified Petitioner would receive a sentence of

between 13 and 27 years imprisonment. Id., Exh. I. The plea

agreement also required Petitioner to submit DNA and register as

a sex offender. Id., Exh. I.

On January 12, 2007, the state trial court sentenced

Petitioner to a term of 20 years imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction on one count of sexual conduct with a minor under the

age of 15, with credit for 280 days of presentence

incarceration, and to a term of lifetime probation pursuant to

his conviction on one count of attempted sexual conduct with a

minor. Id., Exh. O & Exh. P.

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The plea agreement waived Petitioner’s right to a

direct appeal of his convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. I.

On March 28, 2007, Petitioner initiated an action pursuant to

Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. Id., Exh. Q.

Petitioner was appointed counsel, who notified the state court

that they could find no colorable claims for post-conviction

relief. Id., Exh. R. Petitioner filed a pro per Rule 32

petition in which he asserted that: (1) his guilty plea was not

knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made; (2) the

prosecutor committed misconduct and violated the state’s “Brady”

obligations to disclose the results of a DNA paternity test; (3)

his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) he

did not make any incriminating statements to police; (5) he was

denied his Miranda rights; (6) his “counsel was acting as a

second prosecutor;” and (7) newly-discovered material facts

existed that would change the outcome of his case. Id., Exh. T.

On September 2, 2008, the trial court summarily

dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 action, finding that he had

failed to present any colorable claims for relief. Id., Exh. W.

The trial court determined that, after being read his Miranda

rights, Petitioner had admitted he could be the father of his

daughter’s baby. The trial court noted that the state had been

awaiting the birth of V.O.’s baby to conduct DNA testing to

establish paternity when Petitioner decided to plead guilty and,

accordingly, the state did not continue with the DNA testing to

confirm the baby’s paternity. The trial court concluded the

state’s failure to complete DNA paternity testing after

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Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty did not give rise to a

colorable claim of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective

assistance of counsel. 

The state court also determined Petitioner had

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty

plea. Additionally, the court found Petitioner had failed to

demonstrate that his attorney’s performance was deficient or

that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiencies. The trial

court further concluded Petitioner had waived his Miranda and

Brady claims when he entered his guilty plea. The state court

also determined that Petitioner’s proffered “newly discovered

evidence”, i.e., an affidavit from his wife stating her belief

that the crimes did not occur, did not warrant relief. Id.,

Exh. W. 

On October 1, 2008, Petitioner sought review of the

trial court’s decision denying Rule 32 relief by the Arizona

Court of Appeals, which summarily denied review on January 19,

2011. Id., Exh. X & Exh. Y. Petitioner did not seek review of

this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court.

On January 20, 2012, Petitioner filed his action for

federal habeas relief, asserting three grounds for relief.

Petitioner contends he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel during his plea proceedings. Petitioner

also contends he was denied his right to due process of law

because the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence favorable to

Petitioner. Petitioner also asserts he is actually innocent of

the crimes for which he was convicted.

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Respondents allow that the petition is timely filed and

that Petitioner properly exhausted his federal habeas claims in

the state courts. Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims

must be denied and his petition dismissed because the state

courts’ decisions denying the claims were not contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. 

II Standard of review regarding exhausted claims 

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Carey v. Musladin, 549

U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque,

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544

U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v.

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004);

Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). A

state court decision involves an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law if it correctly identifies a

governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in a way

that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to

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extend, a clearly established legal principle to a new set of

facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. McNeal v.

Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,

131 S. Ct. 3066 (2011).

For example, a state court's decision is considered

contrary to federal law if the state court erroneously applied

the wrong standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim.

See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419

(2009); Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124–25, 128 S. Ct.

743, 746–47 (2008); Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th

Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1557 (2011). See also

Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008); Bledsoe v.

Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009).

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987,

994 (9th Cir. 2010); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th

Cir. 2008). However, the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g.,

Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). An unreasonable

application of law is different from an incorrect one. See id.;

Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That

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test is an objective one and does not permit a court to grant

relief simply because the state court might have incorrectly

applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v.

Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011).

A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief

so long as “fairminded jurists could

disagree” on the correctness of the state

court's decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140,[ ] (2004).

And as this Court has explained,

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s

specificity. The more general the rule, the

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes

in case-by-case determinations.” Ibid. “[I]t

is not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law for a state court to

decline to apply a specific legal rule that

has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,

129 S.Ct. 1411, 1413–14, [ ] (2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).

The phrase “clearly established Federal law”

refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the

dicta,” of the Supreme Court's decisions “as

of the time of the relevant state-court

decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412, 120 S. Ct. 1495 [ ] (2000). A state

court's decision is “contrary to” this body

of law if it applies a rule that contradicts

the governing law articulated by the Supreme

Court or arrives at a result different than

that reached by the Supreme Court in a case

with materially indistinguishable facts. Id.

at 405–06, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, [].

 A decision involves an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal

law if it “identifies the correct governing

legal principle ... but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Id. at 413, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct.

1495 []. The Supreme Court has emphasized

that “an unreasonable application of federal

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law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law.” Id. at 410, 529

U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, []. Accordingly,

“a federal habeas court may not issue the

writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411, 529 U.S. 362, 120

S. Ct. 1495.Instead, the court must determine

whether the state court's application of

Supreme Court precedents was objectively

unreasonable. Id. at 409, 529 U.S. 362, 120

S. Ct. 1495, []. Although the Supreme Court’s

decisions are the focus of the

unreasonable-application inquiry, we may look

to Ninth Circuit case law as “persuasive

authority for purposes of determining whether

a particular state court decision is an

‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court

law.” Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600

(9th Cir. 2000).

Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2010).

 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be

correct and can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when

the federal court is presented with clear and convincing

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke, 545

U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325(2005); Miller–El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003);

Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010); Stenson

v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007); Anderson v.

Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006). The “presumption

of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate

court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of

fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303,

1304–05 (1982). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court

has held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits

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in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to

the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the

claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

1398 (2011).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

otherwise requires. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,

953–54, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858–59 (2007); Greenway v. Schriro,

653 F.3d 790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Norris, 622 F.3d at 1286;

Howard, 608 F.3d at 568.

III Analysis of Petitioner’s claims for relief

A. Petitioner contends he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel during his plea proceedings. 

Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations

because: (1) counsel allegedly told Petitioner that he had to

sign the plea agreement; (2) counsel did not request the results

of a DNA paternity test and Petitioner would not have pled

guilty had he known the results of the test; (3) counsel did not

provide Petitioner with a written confession or electronically

recorded admission to determine if Petitioner’s Miranda rights

had been violated; and (4) Petitioner’s wife alleged counsel

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told her that he “wasn’t there to help [Petitioner], but that he

was there to put [Petitioner] in prison,” and counsel was thus

working as a “second prosecutor.” Answer, Exh. Z (Petition) at

6.

Petitioner asserted in his state Rule 32 action that he

was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

The state court concluded Petitioner had not presented a

colorable claim for relief. This decision was not clearly

contrary to federal law nor an unreasonable application of

federal law.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a habeas petitioner must show both that his attorney’s

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the

his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,

104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064. To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. See also, e.g., Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-88.

Counsel’s performance will be held constitutionally deficient

only if the habeas petitioner proves counsel’s actions “fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as measured by

“prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,

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104 S. Ct. 2052. See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987,

994-95 (9th Cir. 2010). To succeed on a claim that his counsel

was constitutionally ineffective regarding a guilty plea, a

petitioner must show that his counsel’s advice as to the

consequences of the plea was not within the range of competence

demanded of criminal attorneys. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985). 

To establish deficient performance, a person

challenging a conviction must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. A court

considering a claim of ineffective assistance

must apply a strong presumption that

counsel’s representation was within the wide

range’ of reasonable professional assistance.

The challenger’s burden is to show that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.

Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011) (internal citations

and quotations omitted), citing Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. See also, e.g., Cheney, 614 F.3d at 994. Therefore, to

succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance was deficient

because counsel failed to raise a particular argument, the

petitioner must establish the argument was likely to be

successful, thereby establishing that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s omission. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144

(9th Cir. 2007); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th

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Cir. 2006). “It is not enough for the defendant to show that

the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the

proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067.

Counsel’s performance is not deficient nor prejudicial when

counsel “fails” to raise an argument that counsel reasonably

believes would be futile. See Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 741;

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788. Accordingly, prejudice from

counsel’s allegedly deficient performance is less likely when

the case against the defendant is strong. See, e.g., Wong v.

Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 130 S. Ct. 383, 390-91 (2009); Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2002); Godwin v. Johnson,

632 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2011). 

It is Petitioner’s burden to establish both that his

counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced

thereby. See, e.g., Wong, 130 S. Ct. at 384-85. “Surmounting

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.

Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010), quoted in Harrington,

131 S. Ct. at 788.

Petitioner alleges his counsel told Petitioner that he

had to sign the plea agreement. However, the state court found

that Petitioner had entered the plea agreement knowingly and

voluntarily. Petitioner also asserts counsel did not request

the results of a DNA paternity test and Petitioner would not

have pled guilty had he known the results of the test. As a

matter of fact, no paternity test was conducted because

Petitioner decided to plead guilty. Petitioner also asserts

counsel did not provide Petitioner with a written confession or

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electronically recorded admission to determine if Petitioner’s

Miranda rights had been violated. Counsel is not ineffective

for failing to raise an argument that Petitioner’s Miranda

rights were violated when counsel could conclude that this

argument would not prevail. Petitioner further alleges, without

supporting evidence, that Petitioner’s wife alleged counsel told

her that he “wasn’t there to help [Petitioner], but that he was

there to put [Petitioner] in prison,” and counsel was thus

working as a “second prosecutor.” The state trial court did not

err in concluding, after reviewing the record before it, that

this assertion standing alone indicated counsel’s performance

was deficient. 

Petitioner has not established that his counsel’s

performance was deficient or that, absent his counsel’s

deficient performance, he would not have pled guilty but instead

would have proceeded to trial on the charges against him.

Petitioner faced a substantially longer sentence had he

proceeded to trial and been found guilty. The state court’s

determination that Petitioner was not denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel in his plea proceedings was not

clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal

law. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief on this claim. 

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B. Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to due

process of law because the prosecutor failed to disclose

evidence favorable to Petitioner. 

Petitioner argues that the state failed to disclose

evidence that was favorable to his defense, thus violating his

right to due process rights in violation of the doctrine of

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).

Specifically, Petitioner contends that the prosecutor failed to

conduct a DNA paternity test with regard to V.O.’s baby, the

results of which he alleges would have exculpated him of the

charged offenses, i.e., sexual abuse of V.O.. 

Respondents aver:

Following the indictment, the State

successfully moved to take DNA samples from

Petitioner so that a comparative analysis

could be conducted upon the birth of V.O.’s

child. (Exhibits B & C.) That analysis,

however, was halted when Petitioner pled

guilty before the baby was born. (Exhibit K,

at 9.) Petitioner then moved to withdraw from

the plea and change counsel. (Exhibit J.) At

the hearing on his motion, the State noted

that if the court allowed Petitioner to

withdraw from his plea, it would complete the

DNA paternity test. (Exhibit K, at 9.)

Despite the State’s avowal, however,

Petitioner chose to withdraw his motion and

move forward with the existing plea

agreement. (Id. at 10.)

The state court considered Petitioner’s Brady claim in

the context of his Rule 32 action and concluded Petitioner had

not been denied his right to due process of law. The state

court did not err in concluding that Petitioner’s right to due

process of law was not violated because the state did not

conduct a DNA test with regard to the paternity of V.O.’s baby.

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In Brady v. Maryland the United States Supreme Court

held that a defendant’s right to due process of law is violated

when the government fails to disclose evidence that is material

to the defendant’s guilt or innocence, including impeachment

evidence. See 373 U.S. at 86-87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97; Schad v.

Ryan, 595 F.3d 907, 915 (9th Cir. 2010). The state violates

this obligation and denies a criminal defendant due process of

law if “(1) the evidence in question was favorable to the

defendant, meaning that it had either exculpatory or impeachment

value; (2) the state ‘willfully or inadvertently’ suppressed the

evidence; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced by the

suppression.” Schad, 595 F.3d at 915, quoting Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (1999). See

also Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 578 (9th Cir. 2005).

Petitioner contends that the state had a duty to

perform the DNA test which he asserts could have been

exculpatory. However, the Supreme Court has held that the state

does not have “an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain

and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable

evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution,” Arizona

v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S. Ct. 333, 337 (1988), and

that “the police do not have a constitutional duty to perform

any particular tests.” Id., 488 U.S. at 59, 109 S. Ct. 338.

“Moreover, in Youngblood, the Supreme Court modified the

Trombetta test by imposing the additional requirement that the

defendant demonstrate that the police acted in bad faith in

failing to preserve the potentially useful evidence.” United

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As a fallback, Osborne also obliquely relies on

an asserted federal constitutional right to be

released upon proof of “actual innocence.”

Whether such a federal right exists is an open

question. We have struggled with it over the

years, in some cases assuming, arguendo, that it

exists while also noting the difficult questions

such a right would pose and the high standard any

claimant would have to meet. 

-16-

States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1997). “The

mere failure to preserve evidence which could have been

subjected to tests which might have exonerated the defendant

does not constitute a due process violation.” Paradis v. Arave,

954 F.2d 1483, 1488 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds,

113 S. Ct. 1837 (1993). 

Petitioner has not established that a DNA test would

have been exculpatory nor has Petitioner established that the

state acted in bad faith regarding the “failure” to conduct the

paternity test. Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not

clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal

law and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

C. Petitioner maintains he is actually innocent of the

crimes for which he was convicted.

The United States Supreme Court has not held that a

“freestanding” claim of factual innocence, i.e., one

unaccompanied by a substantive claim of constitutional error in

trial proceedings, provides a basis for federal habeas relief in

a non-capital case. See also District Attorney’s Office v.

Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71-74, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321-23(2009).1

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The Supreme Court has not decided whether a

persuasive demonstration of actual innocence

after trial would render unconstitutional a

conviction and sentence that is otherwise

free of constitutional error. See House v.

Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55, 126 S.Ct. 2064,

165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). The Court has

established, however, that the threshold for

any such claim, if it were recognized, would

be “extraordinarily high.” Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417, 113 S.Ct. 853,

122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). The threshold, if it

exists, would require “more convincing proof”

than the “gateway” standard that allows for

consideration of otherwise defaulted

constitutional claims upon a showing of

actual innocence. House, 547 U.S. at 555, 126

S.Ct. 2064; see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

315, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).

Thus, on a freestanding claim of actual

innocence, it is not sufficient that a

petitioner shows even that it is “more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. The

“extraordinarily high” threshold, if

recognized, would be even higher. House, 547

U.S. at 555, 126 S.Ct. 2064.

Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2012).

In this matter, to establish his innocence, Petitioner

relies on an affidavit from his wife in which she states she

believes Petitioner is innocent. Because post-trial affidavits

are “obtained without the benefit of cross-examination,” they

“are to be treated with a fair degree of skepticism...” Herrera

v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417, 113 S. Ct. 853, 872 (1993).

Petitioner has not stated a claim for federal habeas

relief by asserting that he is “actually innocent” of a crime to

which he pled guilty. Additionally, assuming a claim of actual

innocence is a basis for relief, Petitioner has not made the

extraordinarily high evidentiary standard for asserting such a

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claim. 

IV Conclusion

The Arizona state courts’ decision denying relief on

the claims raised in the federal habeas petition was not clearly

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

Additionally, Petitioner’s claim that he is “actually innocent”

of the crimes of conviction is not cognizable in a habeas action

regarding a non-capital case.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Sanchez’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

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Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 24th day of October, 2012.

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