Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00471/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00471-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHAD E. SINGLETON,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 09cv0471-LAB (CAB)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT

OF COUNSEL AND ADOPTING

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

[Dkt. Nos. 6, 11, 15]

vs.

KEN CLARK, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

I. Introduction

Petitioner, a prisoner in state custody, brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus (the

“Petition”) in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and

Civil Local Rule 72.1(c) and (d), the Petition was referred to Magistrate Judge Cathy Ann

Bencivengo for a report and recommendation.

Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition on the grounds it is untimely. Petitioner

filed no responsive pleading. On June 4, 2009 Judge Bencivengo issued her report and

recommendation (the “R&R”), which recommended that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be

granted. Again, Petitioner filed no responsive pleading. Petitioner has, however, twice filed

a request for the appointment of counsel, one of which is still pending. 

/ / /

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 II. Legal Standards

A district court has jurisdiction to review a Magistrate Judge’s report and

recommendation concerning a dispositive pretrial motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). “The district

judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been

properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended

disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with

instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In other words, “the district judge must review the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not

otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9 Cir. 2003) (en banc). th

Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally

and affords him the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d

621, 623 (9 Cir. 1988). That said, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure th

that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9 Cir. 1987). th

III. Petitioner’s Request for Counsel

Petitioner has twice asked that counsel be appointed to assist him with the Petition.

His first request came on May 28, 2009, in a letter to the Clerk of the Court. Petitioner

represented he was blind and paraplegic, and unable to read, write, and even understand

his case. 

Judge Bencivengo denied that request, without prejudice, shortly before issuing the

R&R. She noted that Petitioner presented no evidence of his disabilities, appeared able

enough to articulate his claims and organize his filings, and faced a motion to dismiss his

Petition as untimely anyway.

The Court rejected as improper filings two subsequent requests for counsel filed by

Petitioner on July 10, 2009, a little over one month after Judge Bencivengo denied his initial

request. On October 8, 2009, Plaintiff again filed a motion for the appointment of counsel,

which the Court accepted. In this motion, which appears meager compared to those

rejected by the Court in July, Petitioner merely declares in typed text that he cannot afford

counsel, and in handwritten text “I’m blind and in a wheel. also.” The Court can discern from

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one of the rejected motions that Petitioner purported to have medical exhibits, but he did not

submit those with his motion for the appointment of counsel that the Court ultimately

accepted. 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus

actions by state prisoners. Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9 Cir. 1986). However, th

financially eligible habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain

representation whenever the Court “determines that the interests of justice so require.” 18

U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In the Ninth Circuit specifically, “[i]ndigent state prisoners applying

for habeas relief are not entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a

particular case indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process

violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1996. The appointment of counsel may be necessary if the

petitioner has such limited education that he or she is incapable of presenting his or her

claims. Hawkins v. Bennett, 423 F.2d 948, 950 (8 Cir. 1970). 

th

When Judge Bencivengo denied Petitioner’s first request for counsel, she noted he

“has filed pro se habeas petitions in all three state courts, as well as his pro se initiation of

the present action in this Court, and his filings are fairly organized and present the issues

and arguments with adequate clarity and efficiency.” While all Petitioner has filed in this

case is the Petition, a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and two requests for counsel,

the Court sees no evidence that Petitioner is unable to present and articulate his claims.

While Petitioner alleges he is blind, no doubt a serious impairment, he provides no evidence.

The Court is already obliged to construe Petitioner’s claims liberally, Knaubert v. Goldsmith,

791 F.2d 722, 729 (9 Cir. 1986), and the fact that Petitioner first requested counsel almost th

three months after he filed his Petition, and after Respondent moved to dismiss it, lead the

Court to further doubt that the appointment of counsel is appropriate in this case. 

Petitioner’s motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED.

IV. Timeliness of Petition

The R&R recommends that Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition be granted

because it is untimely. Petitioner filed no objection to the R&R, and the Court, having

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reviewed the R&R, finds that it thoroughly considered the timeliness of the Petition and

correctly concluded it was untimely. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court.” The limitation runs, in this case, from the date on which the judgment

became final, which the R&R explains was November 7, 2005. Petitioner did not file the

Petition, however, until March 2, 2009, which is 3 years and almost 4 months after his

judgment became final – and 2 years and almost 4 months past the deadline set by §

2244(d)(1)).

Petitioner did file a state habeas petition on March 7, 2007, which would typically

entitle him to statutory tolling (at least while it is pending), but by this time the period of

limitation on his federal habeas petition had already expired. Unfortunately, “section 2244(d)

does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state

petition was filed.” Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9 Cir. 2003). 

th

Equitable tolling of a limitation period is appropriate when there are “extraordinary

circumstances beyond the prisoner’s control that made it impossible to file a petition on

time,” Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9 Cir. 2001). Petitioner has asserted no

th

basis for equitable tolling, nor does the Court see one.

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition is GRANTED, and the Petition is

dismissed with prejudice for violating the limitation period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

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V. Conclusion

Petitioner’s request for counsel is DENIED, and the Court ADOPTS the R&R.

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition is GRANTED, and the Petition is dismissed with

prejudice on the grounds it is untimely. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 17, 2009

___________________________________

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge 

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