Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00008/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00008-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABRAHAM G. PINZON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF HEALTH 

CARE SVCS.,

Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-0008 DJC DB PS

ORDER

Plaintiff Abraham G. Pinzon is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred 

to the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff 

commenced this action on January 3, 2023, by filing a complaint and a motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The court is required to screen complaints brought by parties 

proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Plaintiff’s complaint largely consists of allegations of wrongdoing asserted against the 

Northern District of California. On April 24, 2023, the undersigned issued findings and 

recommendations recommending that this action be dismissed without further leave to amend. 

(ECF No. 8.) Thereafter, plaintiff filed objections and a “motion for relief.” (ECF Nos. 9-11.) 

Having reviewed plaintiff’s filings, the April 24, 2023 findings and recommendations will be 

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vacated, plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend, and plaintiff’s motion for 

relief will be denied as having been rendered moot. 

I. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application makes the financial showing required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma 

pauperis status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. “‘A district court may deny 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed 

complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 

1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th 

Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Department of Child Support Services, 584 Fed. Appx. 638 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee’s request to proceed 

IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee’s action is frivolous 

or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the 

District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine 

whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, 

the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). 

Moreover, the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of 

poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune 

defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an 

arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. 

Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a 

complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the 

factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as 

true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most 

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favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. 

Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 

(9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by 

lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true 

conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western 

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court, as explained by Rule 8 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”), are as follows:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a 

short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s 

jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for 

judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

II. Plaintiff’s Complaint

The complaint alleges that the court of the “S.F. Division” of the Northern District of 

California “has denied accommodation to procedures from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” 

and provided “aid and comfort to violators that conspire to commit wire fraud against the United 

States.” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 5-6.) In this regard, the complaint alleges that “Clerk for Judge 

Beeler treats this Plaintiff differently,” and that “Judge Illman acted automatically to interfere 

with Plaintiff’s civil rights.” (Id. at 6.) That “Judge Chhabria was absent from judicial duties in 

his abandonment.” (Id.) And that the “Northern District’s intent; with their low balled level of 

sub standard accommodations” is to “intimidate” plaintiff. (Id.) 

“[T]he in forma pauperis statute . . . ‘accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a 

claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the 

veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are 

clearly baseless.’” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 

327). “Examples of the latter class are claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims 

with which federal district judges are all too familiar.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328.

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Here, the complaint’s allegations with respect to the conduct of the Northern District are 

clearly baseless. Even assuming, arguendo, that the complaint’s allegations were not baseless, 

judges are generally absolutely immune from civil liability for actions taken in their judicial 

capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). And “[a]bsolute judicial immunity is not 

reserved solely for judges, but extends to nonjudicial officers for ‘all claims relating to the 

exercise of judicial functions.’” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Burns 

v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In this 

regard, judicial personnel “have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights 

violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. 

U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). 

For these reasons the undersigned issued findings and recommendations recommending

that this matter be dismissed without leave to amend. (ECF No. 8.) However, plaintiff thereafter 

filed objections. (ECF Nos. 9 & 10.) Although it is difficult to decipher, it appears that the 

objections explain that plaintiff’s complaint was also attempting to allege allegations related to 

“fraud against the United States & Pinzon” in relation to a decision of the “Social Security 

Administration.”1 (ECF No. 9 at 1.) 

Attached to the complaint is a decision from the Social Security Administration advising 

plaintiff that the State of California would no longer pay plaintiff’s Medicare Part B premiums. 

(Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 11.) Accordingly, the Social Security Administration began “deducting” 

those premiums from plaintiff’s monthly Social Security payment. (Id.) 

Plaintiff is advised that pursuant to the Social Security Act this court may only review a 

“final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Pursuant to § 405(g) a plaintiff must obtain a “final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security made after a hearing” before seeking judicial review of an agency decision 

1 Attached to plaintiff’s complaint is a page making similar allegations. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 

10.) However, it was unclear if plaintiff intended those allegations to be part of the complaint as 

they are included in exhibits to the complaint as opposed to the body of the complaint. 

Nonetheless, in light of plaintiff’s pro se status the undersigned will allow plaintiff an opportunity 

to amend and clarify the complaint’s allegations. 

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regarding Social Security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). “A final decision 

has two elements: (1) presentment of the claim to the Commissioner, and (2) complete exhaustion 

of administrative remedies.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). “[F]ailure to 

exhaust the procedures set forth in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. [section] 405(g), deprives 

the district court of jurisdiction.” Bass v. Social Sec. Admin., 872 F.2d 832, 833 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(citing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 617 (1984).). 

Plaintiff alleges that “the State of California conspired with an associate at the Mendocino

County Health and Human Service Agency.” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 10.) “Using the MedicalCal program as a ruse & weapon: these entities produced a false statement on a federal form to 

abscond revenue from the Social Security Administration.” (Id) This is “an . . . ongoing & 

longstanding . . . fraud.” (Id.) 

From these vague and conclusory allegations, however, it is entirely unclear what claim 

plaintiff is attempting to allege against what defendant. Although the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the 

plaintiff’s claims and must allege facts that state the elements of each claim plainly and 

succinctly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th 

Cir. 1984). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked 

assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancements.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 

particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claims. Jones, 

733 F.2d at 649.

It may be that plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim pursuant to the False Claims Act 

(“FCA”). Pursuant to the FCA, “‘[a]ny person” who, among other things, ‘knowingly presents, 

or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government . . . a false 

or fraudulent claim for payment or approval’ is liable to the Government for a civil penalty, treble 

damages, and costs.’” Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir.

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2007) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)). However, a plaintiff cannot proceed pro se on an FCA 

claim. Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1127. Plaintiff, therefore, would need to retain counsel to proceed on 

an FCA claim. 

III. Leave to Amend

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. The undersigned 

has carefully considered whether plaintiff may amend the complaint to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, 

prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 

1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 

701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given, the 

court does not have to allow futile amendments). 

However, when evaluating the failure to state a claim, the complaint of a pro se plaintiff 

may be dismissed “only where ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 

1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972)); see also Weilburg v. 

Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to 

amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 

cured by amendment.”) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 

1988)).

Here, given the vague and conclusory nature of the complaint’s allegations, the 

undersigned cannot yet say that it appears beyond doubt that leave to amend would be futile. 

Plaintiff’s complaint will therefore be dismissed, and plaintiff will be granted leave to file an 

amended complaint. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that if plaintiff elects to file an amended 

complaint “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint 

is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. “While 

legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported by factual

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allegations.” Id. at 679. Those facts must be sufficient to push the claims “across the line from 

conceivable to plausible[.]” Id. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Plaintiff is also reminded that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make an 

amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that any amended complaint be complete 

in itself without reference to prior pleadings. The amended complaint will supersede the original 

complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Thus, in an amended complaint, 

just as if it were the initial complaint filed in the case, each defendant must be listed in the caption 

and identified in the body of the complaint, and each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. Any amended complaint which plaintiff may elect to file 

must also include concise but complete factual allegations describing the conduct and events 

which underlie plaintiff’s claims.

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief

On July 6, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for “relief” from the April 24, 2023 findings and 

recommendations. (ECF No. 11.) Because those findings and recommendations will be vacated, 

plaintiff’s motion will be denied as having been rendered moot. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The April 24, 2023 findings and recommendations (ECF No. 8) are vacated.

2. The complaint filed January 3, 2023 (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to 

amend.2

3. Within twenty-eight days from the date of this order, an amended complaint shall be 

filed that cures the defects noted in this order and complies with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice.3 The amended complaint must bear the case number 

assigned to this action and must be titled “Amended Complaint.”

2 Plaintiff need not file another application to proceed in forma pauperis at this time unless 

plaintiff’s financial condition has improved since the last such application was submitted.

3 Alternatively, if plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action plaintiff may file a notice of 

voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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4. Failure to comply with this order in a timely manner may result in a recommendation 

that this action be dismissed.

5. Plaintiff’s July 6, 2023 motion for relief (ECF No. 11) is denied as having been 

rendered moot. 

Dated: February 12, 2024

DLB:6

DB\orders\orders.pro se\pinzon0008.dism.ord

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