Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_06-cv-00044/USCOURTS-ared-5_06-cv-00044-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

FRIENDS OF EUDORA PUBLIC SCHOOL *

DISTRICT OF CHICOT COUNTY, *

ARKANSAS; DAVID GREEN; JUANITA *

BURTON; HENRY COOK; PAULINE *

DAVIS; and ROBERT THOMAS; * 

*

Plaintiffs, *

*

vs. * No. 5:06CV0044 SWW

*

MIKE BEEBE, in his official capacity, *

as Governor of the State of Arkansas; *

KENNETH JAMES, in his official capacity *

as Director of the Arkansas Department of *

Education; CALVIN KING; BEN MAYS; *

SHELBY HILLMAN; DIANE TATUM; *

NACCAMAN WILLIAMS; RANDY *

LAWSON; JEANNA WESTMORELAND; *

SHERRY BURROW; MARYJANE REBICK; *

STATE OF ARKANSAS; LAKESIDE *

SCHOOL DISTRICT; JOYCE L. VAUGHT, *

In her official capacity as Superintendent of *

Lakeside School District; *

*

Defendants. *

Memorandum Opinion and Order 

Before the Court are defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint to which

plaintiffs responded. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds the motions to dismiss should

be granted.

Background

Plaintiffs describe themselves as residents of the former Eudora School District of Chicot

County, Arkansas (“District”), and either taxpayers with or without children attending school in

the District, “patrons” of the District, parents of children attending school in the District, or

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members of the local Board of the District. They filed this action on February 24, 2006,

apparently in response to the February 13, 2006, decision of the Arkansas State Board of

Education (“ASBE”) to annex the District to the Lakeside School District of Chicot County. 

In March 2005, the Arkansas Department of Education (“ADE”) identified the

predominantly black District as being in “fiscal distress” pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 6-20-

1904. The District appealed that designation, but on April 11, 2005, the ASBE denied the appeal

and classified the District as being in fiscal distress. On February 13, 2006, the ASBE issued an

order annexing the District to the Lakeside School District. According to the allegations of the

complaint, Lakeside is a predominantly white school district. Under Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-

1410, plaintiffs could appeal the decision to the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas

pursuant to the Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act, Ark. Code Ann. §25-15-201 et seq.

There is no indication plaintiffs appealed the decision.

Plaintiffs sue the Governor of Arkansas, the Director of the State Board of Education,

and the State Board of Education and its members, all in their official capacities (“State

defendants”). Plaintiffs also name as defendants the Lakeside School District and the

Superintendent of the Lakeside School District, in her official capacity (“Lakeside defendants”). 

Plaintiffs set forth in approximately 100 paragraphs various allegations and causes of action

under both state and federal law, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1973. Compl. at

¶ ¶ 14-15. While they do not state any specific state law causes of action, they contend Act 60 of

2003 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly, codified at Ark. Code Ann.

§ 16-13-1602(a), is unconstitutional. Compl. at ¶ 3 They also assert Ark. Code Ann. § 6-220-

1901 et seq. is unconstitutional, ¶ ¶ 25-27; that the State does not have jurisdiction to effectuate

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The State defendants filed a motion to dismiss on March 27, 2006, and the Lakeside

defendants filed their motions to dismiss on April 10, 2006. Plaintiffs responded, and on September

1, 2006, the Court abstained from further action in light of on-going proceedings before the

Arkansas Supreme Court in Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 220 S.W.3d 645 (Ark. 2005).

On May 31, 2007, the Arkansas Supreme Court issued the mandate, see Lake View Sch. Dist. No.

25 v. Huckabee, 370 Ark. 139, __ S.W.3d ___ (2007), and on June 29, 2007, plaintiffs moved to

reopen the case and set it for trial. Defendants renewed their motions to dismiss filed in 2006, and

in October 2007, the Court reopened the case and denied without prejudice the motions to dismiss.

See docket entry 43.

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an annexation or consolidation of the District, ¶ 52; that the State Public School System Funding

Formula is unconstitutional, ¶ ¶ 63-67; that the annexation of the District violates the 1965

Federal Voting Rights Act, ¶ ¶ 75-76; that the implementation of Act 59 allows the State to

discriminate against plaintiffs, ¶ 77; that Amendment 74 of the Arkansas Constitution violates

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, ¶ ¶ 85, 89; and that the ASBE did

not follow state law or its own regulations when it made the decision to annex the District, ¶ ¶

98-101. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages. 

 In the motions now before the Court, defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), failure to

state a claim.1

Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may challenge the factual truthfulness or the facial

sufficiency of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations. Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir.

1993). Therefore, in deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court must distinguish between a

“facial attack” and a “factual attack.” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir.

1990). Where a defendant makes a “facial attack” to jurisdiction, the Court limits its review to

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the face of the pleadings, similar to the review conducted under Rule 12(b)(6). Where a

defendant makes a “factual attack” to jurisdiction, the Court may consider matters outside the

pleadings without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Id. at 729;

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In a factual attack the Court “is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself

as to the existence of its power to hear the case. . . . [N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to the

plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude a trial court

from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730 (quoting

Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). The plaintiff

bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Id.

In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), all facts alleged in the

complaint are assumed to be true. Doe v. Northwest Bank Minn., N.A., 107 F.3d 1297, 1303-04

(8th Cir. 1997). The complaint should be reviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

McMorrow v. Little, 109 F.3d 432, 434 (8th Cir. 1997), and should not be dismissed if there are

pled “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). A motion to dismiss is not a device for testing the truth

of what is asserted or for determining whether the plaintiff has any evidence to back up what is

in the complaint. ACLU Foundation of Southern California v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 467 (D.C.Cir.

1991). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the plaintiff is

entitled to offer evidence to support the claims, irrespective of a judge’s disbelief of a

complaint’s factual allegations or a judge’s belief that the plaintiff cannot prove what the

complaint asserts. Id.

Discussion

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Official capacity claims against the individual defendants are, in fact, suits against the state of

Arkansas. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)(suits against state officials in their official

capacities are suits against the state).

3

Because the operative language of both § 1981 and § 1982 is traceable to the Civil Rights Act of

1866, they are generally construed the same. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 410 U.S. 431

(1973).

5

Defendants assert plaintiffs’ damage claims; claims under § § 1981, 1982, and 1983;

state law claims; and claims against the Governor are barred by sovereign immunity; that there is

no justiciable case or controversy as to plaintiffs’ claims for relief as to Acts 59 and 60; and that

plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the doctrine of res judicata.

Defendants further argue plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action as to their claims under the

Voting Rights Act, the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteen Amendments. 

1. Sovereign Immunity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity, also known as Eleventh Amendment immunity,

deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over lawsuits brought by private citizens against states2

unless the state has waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated the state's immunity under a

valid exercise of Congressional power. The State of Arkansas and its agencies have not

consented to be sued in the federal courts, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ sovereign

immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § § 1981, 1982, and 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.

332, 345 (1979) ( § 1983 does not abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity); Bakhtiari

v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132, 1138 (8th Cir. 2007)(plaintiff’s claims for relief under § § 1981 and 1983

against defendants in their official capacities are barred); Singletary v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrections,

423 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2005)( § 1981 claims barred).3

 The Court finds that plaintiffs’ claims

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983 must be dismissed.

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The Eleventh Amendment also bars suits in federal court “by private parties seeking to

impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury.” Edelman v.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). Therefore, plaintiffs’ damages claims are barred by sovereign

immunity. With respect to plaintiffs’ state law claims, the Eleventh Amendment “bars federal

court jurisdiction over state law claims against unconsenting states or state officials when the

state is the real party in interest, regardless of the remedy sought. This constitutional bar applies

with equal force to pendent state law claims.” Cooper v. St. Cloud State Univ., 226 F.3d 964,

968 (8th Cir. 2000). 

Under the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), state officials may

be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief without violating the Eleventh

Amendment. However, to be a proper defendant under Ex Parte Young, plaintiffs would have to

plead and prove that a state official threatened and is about to commence proceedings to enforce

against parties affected an unconstitutional act and that the official has a special relation to the

particular statute alleged to be unconstitutional or is expressly directed to see to its enforcement. 

209 U.S. at 155-7.

Plaintiffs argue the ASBE has a special relationship to the enforcement of the annexation

statute and that the Governor, as Chief Executive Officer of the State, is a necessary party. 

Although the Governor is the Chief Executive of the State, the Governor’s duty to generally

administer state law is insufficient to make him a proper defendant under Ex Parte Young. Acts

59 and 60 do not give the Governor any role in the annexation or consolidation process, and

there is no allegation he played any role in the ASBE’s decision. While the members of the

ASBE played a role in the annexation decision, they are not connected with the enforcement of

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the law in question. Because the Governor and ASBE members are not proper defendants under

Ex Parte Young and no other exception to sovereign immunity applies, plaintiffs’ §§ 1981, 1982,

and 1983 claims against them should be dismissed.

2. Case or Controversy

Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief regarding Acts 59 and 60. 

These claims present no justiciable controversy. Specifically, plaintiffs’ Act 59 claims are moot,

and the Act 60 claims are barred for lack of standing. Act 59 established the major portion of the

State’s “funding formula” for public school districts for the 2004-05 school year, which ended

on June 30, 2005. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive

relief as to Act 59 are moot. 

Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the provisions of Act 60. To establish Article III

standing, a plaintiff must show (1) injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between that injury and

the challenged conduct, and (3) the likelihood that a favorable decision by the court will redress

the alleged injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). “The party

invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id. at 561. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint and the exhibits referenced therein clearly establish that the District’s

annexation occurred pursuant to the fiscal distress statutes - not Act 60. Because plaintiffs have

not alleged and cannot otherwise establish that they have been injured by Acts 59 or 60, and

because they have not alleged that they are likely to be impacted in the future by the operation of

these Acts, plaintiffs lack standing to challenge their provisions.

3. Rooker-Feldman and Res Judicata

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See docket entry no. 43 at n.4 for a history of the case.

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Defendants assert plaintiffs’ claims are barred either by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or

the principles of res judicata because they have already been litigated in state court. Plaintiffs

concede that they were plaintiffs in the long-running state-court litigation challenging the

constitutionality of Arkansas’s public school system, known as the Lake View case.4

 However,

they say their specific claims regarding the constitutionality of Acts 59 and 60 could not have

been raised in the original Lake View case because the Acts did not exist. They further point out

that during a hearing in this matter in August 2005, the State defendants admitted that Act 60

was “not on the table” in state court. Pls.’ Resp. to Mot. Dismiss, Ex. F.

In Lake View, the plaintiff class included “all public school districts in the State of

Arkansas; all students and parents of students in all public school districts in the State of

Arkansas; all members of the Board of Directors of all public school districts in the State of

Arkansas; and all taxpayers, regardless of residence or domiciles, who have paid taxes which

were levied for the purpose of supporting public schools in the State of Arkansas.” See State

Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A.

In response to the Arkansas Supreme Court’s 2002 Lake View decision, the 84th Arkansas

General Assembly passed a number of education reform measures during its 2003 Regular and

Second Extraordinary Sessions, including Acts 59 and 60. The plaintiffs were parties in the

state-court litigation culminating in the Arkansas Supreme Court’s appointment of Special

Masters, the submission of the Special Masters’ Report, and the Arkansas Supreme Court’s June

18, 2004, decision to relinquish jurisdiction over the case. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v.

Huckabee, 189 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2004).

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Defendants argue it is plain from the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision that all of the

legislative acts passed after the Supreme Court’s 2002 opinion were open for scrutiny and

challenge to any party, and it is also plain that the District, as part of the plaintiff class, had a full

and fair opportunity to, and in fact did, attack the validity of Acts 59 and 60 before the Special

Masters and, again before the Arkansas Supreme Court. See State Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Ex. B;

Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 189 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2004). The Arkansas Supreme

Court, however, did not grant the class any relief with regard to those Acts, and dismissed the

case, allowing the mandate to issue. Lake View, 189 S.W.3d 1.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two cases-- District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), which revived a doctrine of federal court

jurisdiction established by Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Under the 

doctrine, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain claims which would in

essence cause them to engage in appellate review of prior state court decisions. Postma v. First

Federal Savings and Loan, 74 F.3d 160, 162 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Ballinger v. Culotta, 322

F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003)(lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges

to state court judgments); Williams v. McKenzie, 834 F.2d 152, 153 (8th Cir. 1987)(federal courts

are not empowered to review state court proceedings even if a federal claim has been asserted

therein). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to "cases of the kind from which the doctrine

acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the court proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544

U.S. 280 (2005).

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Rooker-Feldman requires a federal court to examine the claims asserted or the relief

sought to determine if the court is basically being asked to rule that a state court order or

judgment was in error. Impermissible federal appellate review can occur even though state and

federal claims are not identical if the federal court is being asked to rule on issues which are

“inextricably intertwined” with a state court determination. If a federal claim can succeed only

to the extent that a state court wrongly decided issues before it, the federal court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over such claim. Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296-7 (8th Cir. 1990); In

re Ferren, 203 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 2000).

The Court finds plaintiffs’ claims are inextricably intertwined with those brought before

the Arkansas Supreme Court in Lake View because their success in this lawsuit would void the

determination by the Arkansas Supreme Court that the State’s public education system is

constitutional. In 2004, the Lake View class specifically objected to the Masters’ Report on the

basis that it failed to conclude that “Act 60 violates voting rights laws and cases by diluting

representation” and “violates equal protection because it fails to provide for the orderly transfer

or retention of personnel.” State Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Ex. B. Plaintiffs further requested that the

Arkansas Legislature be “ordered to reconvene in special session within 45 days and repeal Act

60 as unconstitutional and a violation of equal protection and voting rights.” Id.

Plaintiffs’ claims attacking the constitutionality of Acts 59 and 60 were raised, briefed,

and rejected by the Arkansas Supreme Court in its June 2004 decision. See Lake View, 189

S.W.3d at 14-15. The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the Acts passed by the General

Assembly in 2003, including Acts 59 and 60, adequately addressed the Arkansas Supreme

Court’s November 2002, decision with respect to the constitutionality of the State’s public

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education system. Id. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s determination that the State’s public

education system was constitutional was premised upon the conclusion that Act 60's

administrative consolidation was not only lawful, but necessary for the State to meet its

constitutional obligations with regard to the State’s public education system. Id. at 10-16.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal district court jurisdiction only if the

federal suit is commenced after the state court proceedings. Exxon Mobil Corp., supra, 544 U.S.

280, 284 (2005). Plaintiffs’ federal lawsuit was filed on February 24, 2006, two years after the

Arkansas Supreme Court rendered its decision rejecting the claims asserted by plaintiffs in the

suit before the Court. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 189 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ark.

2004). Although the Supreme Court later withdrew its final mandate and the Lake View

litigation continued for another three years in order to address all of the other issues raised by

plaintiffs pertaining to the State’s public education system, plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments

regarding Acts 59 and 60 and administrative annexation and consolidation of Arkansas school

districts were not revisited by any party or the Arkansas Supreme Court. See Lake View Sch.

District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 370 Ark. 139, ___S.W.3d ___ ( 2007); Lake View Sch. Dist. v.

Huckabee, 368 Ark. 231, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006); Lake View Sch. Dist. v. Huckabee, 220

S.W.3d 645 (Ark. 2005).

Rooker-Feldman does not require a “final” state-court judgment on the merits to preclude

jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit has explained that Rooker-Feldman is broader than claim and

issue preclusion in this regard. See Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 n.1 (8th

Cir. 1995). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to attempted appeals of both “final” state

court orders and state court orders that are “interlocutory” or otherwise not “final.” In re

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Goetzman, 91 F.3d 1173 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996). “Application of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not depend on a final judgment on the merits of an issue . . . nor

is there a procedural due process exception to the doctrine.” Id. The Court finds the RookerFeldman doctrine precludes plaintiffs from bringing claims in federal court to overturn the

Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Lake View.

Defendants further argue plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

“Res judicata precludes the relitigation of a claim on grounds that were raised or might

have been raised in a prior action. Res judicata consists of two preclusion concepts-issue

preclusion and claim preclusion.” Klipsch, Inc. v. WWR Tech., Inc., 127 F.3d 729, 733 (8th Cir.

1997). “The claim preclusion aspect of res judicata . . . provides that ‘a final judgment on the

merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.’” Id.

“The test applied to determine whether res judicata bars litigation of a claim is: (1) whether the

prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) whether the judgment was

a final judgment on the merits; and (3) whether the same causes of action and same parties or

their privies were involved in both cases.” Gurley v. Hunt. 287 F.3d 728, 731 (8th Cir. 2002). “If

the three elements are met, the parties are thereafter bound ‘not only as to every matter which

was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible

matter which might have been offered for that purpose.’ ” Lundquist v. Rice Mem’l Hosp., 238

F.3d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 2001). 

Defendants contend that almost every aspect of the State’s public education system,

including the constitutionality of Acts 59 and 60, was comprehensively litigated by the parties

and intensely scrutinized by the Special Masters. They argue that even if the Court finds those

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claims were not specifically litigated during the Lake View proceedings, they could have and

properly should have been raised in that matter. The Court finds the record indicates plaintiffs,

as part of the class which filed the Lake View lawsuit in state court and who were represented by

the same attorneys, raised the issues of the constitutionality of Acts 59 and 60 during the Lake

View proceedings. 

4. Failure to State a Claim 

a. Voting Rights Act

Plaintiffs allege that the annexation of the District violated the Voting Rights Act

(“VRA”) because it diluted the voting strength of the black citizens of Eudora, Arkansas. 

Defendants move for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing plaintiffs are not proper

parties, they have no standing to assert a violation, and they fail to state a valid cause of action.

The VRA prohibits a “State or political subdivision” from engaging in any practices

which deny or abridge a person’s right to vote on the basis of race. Title 42 United States Code

section 1973(c)(2) defines “political subdivision” as “any county or parish, except that where

registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall

include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.” Defendants do

not fall within the meaning of this definition. See African-American Citizens for Change v.

Robbins, 825 F.Supp. 885, 891 (E.D.Mo. 1993), aff’d, 24 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 1994) (Board of

Police Commissioners and its members do not fall within the definition of “political subdivision”

as provided for in the VRA).

Under the Supreme Court’s prudential standing rules, a litigant’s complaint must comply

with Article III of the Constitution and fall “within the zone of interests protected by the law

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involved.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). To meet the “zone of interests” test, the

court must examine whether “the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests

properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial

relief.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).

Plaintiffs complain that the annexation will “dilute” their vote and leave them with less

influence over the board that will govern the new-formed larger school district than they had

over the smaller, majority black District. The general desire to preserve “local control” or to

preserve the status quo of a political subdivision of a community is not a concern that falls

within the “zone of interests” that the VRA was intended to protect. In fact, Section 2 of the

VRA does not require local school boards to be elected at all. See e.g., Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d

389 (6th Cir. 1999)(VRA does not prohibit appointed, rather than elected, school boards); Moore

v. Sch. Reform Bd. of Detroit, 147 F.Supp.2d 679 (E.D.Mich.2000), aff’d, 293 F.3d 352 (6th Cir.),

cert. denied (2003)(state statute establishing new appointed rather than elected school board did

not violate VRA); see also Sailors v. Bd. of Educ. of Kent County, 387 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1967)

(no constitutional impediment to appointing, rather than electing, officers of nonlegislative

character). There is no “fundamental” constitutional or other right to maintain “local control” of

school districts or to maintain or preserve the identity of a school district or community. 

Mirrione v. Anderson, 717 F.2d 743, 744, 746 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1036

(1984). The Court finds plaintiffs do not have standing under the VRA. The Court finds

plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the VRA.

b. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

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Plaintiffs allege their due process rights were violated because they were not afforded a

proper hearing before the District was dissolved and there is an “unconstitutional symbiotic

relationship” between the “Director” of the ADE and the ASBE. Compl. at ¶ ¶ 30-37.

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Plaintiffs have no right or property

interest to control the State’s public education system in their district. The control of the public

schools is a State matter, delegated and lodged in the State Legislature by the Arkansas

Constitution. See Ark. Const. amend. 4, § 1. School districts, as political subdivisions of the

State, cannot invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment as against the State itself. See

Delta Special Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. State Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.1984). To the extent

plaintiffs seek to invoke the “rights” of the District, they do not state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.

With regard to plaintiffs’ contention that the ADE Commissioner’s relationship with the

ASBE violates due process, the United States Supreme Court explained in Withrow v. Larkin,

421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975):

The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions

necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication

has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must overcome a

presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must

convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human

weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same

individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must

be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.

See also Marler v. Mo. State Bd. of Optometry, 102 F.3d 1453, 1457 (8th Cir. 1996)(mere

statement of personal belief that Board members acted out of personal spite and animosity fails

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to overcome presumption of tribunal’s integrity). Plaintiffs’ complaint does not present the

requisite circumstances outlined by the Supreme Court in Withrow. 

Further, the procedural component of the due process clause provides only that a party be

given notice and an opportunity for a hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 

See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). The record reflects that sufficient process

was afforded. Moreover, the ASBE’s order advised that the District could further appeal the

decision under Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-1410 to the Pulaski County Circuit Court of Arkansas,

pursuant to the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-1410. There is

no allegation that plaintiffs exercised the right to appeal or were otherwise denied the right to

appeal. Therefore, any due process claim challenging the fiscal distress classification of the

District or its subsequent annexation has been waived. See Hroch v. Omaha, 4 F.3d 693, 695-6

(8th Cir. 1993).

To the extent plaintiffs are alleging a substantive due process violation, their claim is

without merit because they have not pled facts which establish that defendants’ conduct violated

the Supreme Court’s rigorous “shocks the conscience” standard for such violation. See, e.g.

Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 980-1 (8th Cir. 2005).

c. Fourteenth or Fifteenth Equal Protection 

Plaintiffs contend that Acts 59 and 60, on their face, violate their right to equal protection

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Classifications that do not involve a fundamental right or a

suspect class are subject to a rational basis test. Carter v. Arkansas, 392 F.3d 965, 968 (8th Cir.

2004). Under that test, it is permissible to treat classes of people differently if the legislation is

rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Id. Plaintiffs appear to assert that the Acts

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violate their right to equal protection because they deprive them of their elected representatives

(Compl. at ¶ ¶ 74-75); treat them differently than other school districts on account of their race

(Compl. at ¶ ¶ 79-89); and are calculated “to foster the complete annihilation of all AfricanAmerican School Districts” (Compl. at ¶ 90).

The Supreme Court has determined that education is not a fundamental right. See San

Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-37 (1973). Therefore, its regulation is

subject to rational review basis. Id. There is no fundamental right to vote for members of a

school board, “even if other cities in the state may do so.” Mixon, 193 F.3d at 403. 

A review of the Acts reveal that they are racially neutral on their face. Act 59 provided

per-pupil funding of $5,400 as the base-level foundation amount. See Lake View, 189 S.W.3d at

6. There is no distinction made on the basis of race or ethnicity. Id. Act 60 is also valid on its

face. It applies to all school districts with enrollments below 350 regardless of racial

composition. Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-1602. Because plaintiffs allege no facts to support their

conclusory allegations of purposeful discrimination and their claims do not otherwise involve a

fundamental right, their federal equal protection claims are subject to a rational basis review.

Under this review, a court must reject an equal protection challenge to a statutory

classification “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational

basis for the classification.” Carter, 392 F.3d at 968 (internal quotation omitted). “A legislative

choice . . . may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Id.

(internal quotation omitted). The Court finds there is a rational basis for the Acts challenged by

the plaintiffs. The legislative findings of Act 59 explain that its purpose is to establish a suitable

and efficient system of public education in compliance with the mandates of the Arkansas

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Supreme Court in Lake View v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002). The express legislative

purpose of Act 60 is to “ensure the delivery of an equal opportunity for an adequate education to

the people of Arkansas in an efficient and effective manner.” 

Plaintiffs do not elaborate on the nature of their Fifteenth Amendment claim beyond

stating that a violation has occurred. However, a statute that is racially neutral on its face

violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if it is motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Mobile v.

Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Because the challenged Acts are facially neutral and plaintiffs fail

to state facts establishing a discriminatory purpose, plaintiffs’ claims under the Fifteenth

Amendment must also be dismissed.

d. Fifth Amendment

Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim is brought under the Just Compensation Clause, which

provides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 

United States Const. Amend. V. Plaintiffs cite and the Court finds no authority for the

proposition that a former school district’s assets are the private property of its local taxpayers,

students, parents or board members. Therefore, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action under the

Fifth Amendment. or taxpayers. Even if plaintiffs had stated a valid Fifth Amendment claim,

federal courts are barred from considering the merits of a takings claim until a private litigant

exhausts state remedies. Williamson Co. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson

City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). Plaintiffs make no allegation they have exhausted their state court

remedies. Therefore, their Fifth Amendment claims should be dismissed.

Conclusion

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Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate [docket entry 55] is denied. See docket entry 85 in Friends of

Lakeview Sch.Dist. Inc. No. 25 v. Huckabee, Case No.2:04CV184 WRW.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motions to dismiss [docket entries 46 and 48]

are hereby granted. Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed.5

DATED this 25th of March 2008.

/s/Susan Webber Wright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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