Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05495/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05495-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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A fuller recitation of the facts is contained in the Court’s January 17, 2007 Order Re

Summary Judgment.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAO-QI GONG, and JEFFERY PETERS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF ALAMEDA, et. al.,

Defendants.

NO. C 03-5495 TEH 

ORDER DENYING

MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

This matter came before the Court on Monday, July 9, 2007 on Plaintiff Gong’s

Motion for Reconsideration. Having carefully considered the parties’ written and oral

arguments, and the record herein, the Court denies the motion for the reasons set forth below.

I. INTRODUCTION

As discussed in prior orders, this case stems from the arrest of Plaintiffs Hao-Qi Gong

(“Gong”) and Jefferey Peters (“Peters”) following a welfare check on their son, Kyle, by the

City of Alameda Police Department on February 4, 2003. To briefly summarize,1

 two

officers went to Plaintiffs’ apartment but received no response to their repeated knocks on

the front door. They observed, however, a shadowy figure through the peep hole and

subsequently entered the apartment due to concerns for the safety of Plaintiffs’ son. After

the ensuing interactions with Peters, and a brief encounter with Gong, the officers arrested

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both Peters and Gong for obstructing a welfare check in violation of California Penal Code

§ 148 and took them into custody. 

Defendant Officer Westmoreland (“Westmoreland”), supervisor of the Alameda

Police Department’s Youth Services section, subsequently interviewed Kyle regarding the

assertions by his grandmother that Kyle had been digitally anally penetrated twice by his

mother, Plaintiff Gong. In light of his observations during that interview, and all of the

surrounding circumstances, Westmoreland took Kyle into temporary protective custody and

filed additional charges against Plaintiff Gong for violation of California Penal Code

§§ 288(a) and 289(d)(4), which prohibit lewd acts with children and penetration by a foreign

object (hereinafter “sex charges”). He also referred Kyle for an interview with the Child

Abuse Listening Interviewing Coordination Center (referred to as “CALICO”) located in San

Leandro, California.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed this action alleging several constitutional violations under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 17, 2007, this Court granted in part and denied in part

Defendants’ motion for summary judgement. Relevant to this motion, the Court granted

summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff Gong’s § 1983 claim that

the addition of the sex charges violates her Fourth Amendment rights. Gong subsequently

sought and obtained leave to file the instant motion for reconsideration with respect to the

following two issues: (1) whether Westmoreland lacked probable cause to add the sex

charges against Gong, and (2) even if probable cause was lacking, whether Westmoreland is

protected against a claim for money damages under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Each

issue is discussed in turn below.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Probable cause to add the sex charges against Gong

This Court previously found that there was probable cause to support the sex charges

in light of (1) the grandmother’s allegations, (2) the confirmation of the digital penetration by

Kyle, and (3) Westmoreland’s assessment of Kyle’s verbal and non-verbal responses during

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his interview with Kyle. The Court, however, did not address the more narrow question of

whether there was probable cause as to the specific intent elements of the sex charges. 

Generally, an officer need not have probable cause for each element of a crime; however,

“‘when specific intent is a required element of the offense, the arresting officer must have

probable cause for that element in order to reasonably believe that a crime has occurred.’”)

United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Both Penal

Code § 288(a) and § 289(k)(1) require a showing of specific intent. The former requires that

the penetration occur “with the [specific] intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the

lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child” while the latter requires that the

penetration occur by false pretenses. 

Probable cause to arrest requires “more than mere suspicion.” Gasho v. United States,

39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994). Probable cause exists when the “facts and circumstances

within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of

reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed,

is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37

(1979). Alternatively, probable cause is established when “‘under the totality of

circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that

there was a fair probability’” that a crime was committed.” Lopez, 482 F.3d at 1072 (citation

omitted). Once a defendant has provided “some evidence” of probable cause, it is the

plaintiff’s burden to prove a lack of probable cause. Dubner v. City and County of San

Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2001). A summary judgment, however, is

“appropriate only if no reasonable jury could find that the officers did or did not have

probable cause to arrest.” McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984).

Upon reconsideration, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Gong,

the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that probable cause was lacking with

respect to the specific intent elements of the sex charges. While there is no direct evidence

of intent, that is not unusual in cases of this nature. With respect to the circumstantial

evidence, a jury viewing it from Plaintiff’s point of view could infer that Westmoreland had

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a reasonable suspicion that Gong acted with the requisite intent but that it did not rise to the

level of establishing probable cause. For example, the jury could conclude that it was more

likely that Kyle’s change in demeanor had an innocent explanation or discount this portion of

Westmoreland’s testimony given its omission from his police report. A jury could also give

more weight to the fact that Kyle reported an innocent explanation for the digital penetration

(to help Kyle go to the bathroom) to both his grandmother and Westmoreland, and view this

explanation as more consistent with the evidence of general parental neglect than a sexual

motive. Accordingly, the Court concludes upon reconsideration that Westmoreland is not

entitled to a summary judgment that probable cause was lacking as a matter of law with

respect to the specific intent elements of the sex charges.

B. Qualified Immunity

 Plaintiff has not, however, presented any persuasive basis for reversing this Court’s

prior conclusion that, even if probable cause was lacking, Westmoreland is protected by

qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability if

“their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

Thus “our inquiry now turns to whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the [sex

charges] were lawful in light of the clearly established law and the information the arresting

officer[] possessed.” Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1439. This is “an objective standard” that leaves

“‘ample room for mistaken judgments.’” Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th

Cir. 1990)(citation omitted). Indeed, qualified immunity protects “‘all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 437

(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)

(even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause

is present are entitled to immunity). 

 As both parties agree, the law was clearly established that probable cause was

required with respect to any specific intent elements of a crime. As noted above, direct

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evidence of a sexual intent is often lacking, particularly in cases involving children. 

Looking at the totality of the circumstances known to Westmoreland, however, the Court

concludes that even if a jury finds that probable cause was lacking, a reasonable but mistaken

officer could have believed that adding the sex charges did not violate clearly established

law. 

Westmoreland was aware of the general investigation into Kyle’s welfare including

the concerns raised by Kyle’s grandmother (with whom Kyle was living for six months up

until January 2003) that Plaintiff Gong had digitally penetrated Kyle for improper purposes. 

Kyle also confirmed the penetration in a manner that led Westmoreland to believe that Kyle’s

proffered explanation was rehearsed and not the truth. See Westmoreland Dep. at 57. This

conclusion was based on his training on the subject of child victims of sexual abuse and his

experience in interviewing “hundreds and hundreds of kids over the years in similar kinds of

cases.” Id.; Westmoreland June 26, 2007 Dec. at ¶ 2. A reasonable officer could also

conclude that anal digital penetration is not a customary manner of treating childhood

constipation. Westmoreland had also been informed by the officers conducting the welfare

check that they had met with resistance from Peters and that they “were lied to [and] both

parents were very uncooperative.” Westmoreland Dep. at 37. 

There is no case law that addresses what is sufficient to establish probable cause for

the specific intent elements of the sex charges. In hindsight, it appears that it would have

been the better course under the circumstances of this particular case for Westmoreland to

await the results of the forensic interview by CALICO. Given the totality of the

circumstances, however, the Court concludes that Westmoreland could have reasonably but

mistakenly believed that there was a sufficient basis for concluding that there was a “fair

probability” that the specific intent elements of the charges could be established, Lopez, 482

F.3d at 1072, 1076-77. Cases involving potential sexual abuse against children raise

particularly difficult questions of judgment. In light of all of the above, and the state of the

pre-existing law, the Court is not prepared to find that it would have been clear to a

reasonable officer in Westmoreland’s position that adding the sex charges was unlawful. 

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 Plaintiff Gong emphasizes that this conclusion is inconsistent with Westmoreland’s

deposition testimony that he had no information at the time that Gong had digitally

penetrated Kyle with the purpose of sexual arousal but that he hoped the CALICO interview

would provide it. See Westmoreland Dep. at 72-73. Westmoreland also testified, however,

that his department’s policy was that if an officer believed there was “sexual misconduct on

the child, [then the officer should] get enough basic information from the child or from a

reliable witness . . . to establish probable cause and then shut it down, bring the child in and

let’s get them to CALICO where he or she can be interviewed more thoroughly and help us

build the case [sic].” Westmoreland Dep. at 55 (emphasis added). Accordingly,

Westmoreland’s testimony regarding the lack of information and the role of the CALICO

interview could be viewed as an inartful way of expressing that while he did not have direct

information confirming specific intent he believed he had reached the threshold of probable

cause and that it was appropriate to “shut down” the interview and develop the case through

the CALICO process. More importantly, the qualified immunity analysis turns on what a

reasonable officer could have believed under the circumstances, not the subjective state of

mind of the particular officer in question. Butler v. Elle, 281 F. 3d 1014, 1031 (9th Cir.

2002)(“As stated, qualified immunity is a question of law and the factual question of [the

defendant’s] state of mind is completely irrelevant to that issue.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the above, and good cause appearing, the Court reaffirms its conclusion that

Westmoreland is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Gong’s claim that the

addition of the sex charges violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, it is

HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

2. The parties are referred back to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Laporte for a further

settlement conference in light of this ruling. 

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3. The parties shall notify this Court’s Courtroom Deputy, Rowena Espinosa, within

7 days of the conclusion of the proceedings before Magistrate Judge Laporte, as to whether

the matter has settled. If the matter has not settled, the parties shall request a status

conference for the purpose of setting a new trial date.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 30, 2007 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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