Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02083/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02083-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

.. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

GEORGE SWIGER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

. FILED 

Unit.ad S;'-t.6s Court of Appeals ~ : .. ... ~~ . ("f , 'Mfl ~ · ' 

APR 1 41989 

ROBERT L. H~CKER 

Clerk 

V • ) 

) 

WILLBROS ENERGY SERVICES COMPANY, ) 

No . 87-2083 

(D.C . No . 85-C-180-B) 

(N . D. Okla . ) 

a Delaware corporation; BOBBY ) 

MOSELEY; PIPELINERS LOCAL UNION, ) 

NO . 798 OF THE UNITED ASSOCIATION ) 

OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF ) 

THE PLUMBING AND PIPE FITTING ) 

I NDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ) 

CANADA; CLIFTON THRONEBERRY; and ) 

DOYLE HENDRIX, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges . 

Plaintiff-appellant George Swiger (Swiger) brought thi s 

d i versity action against defendant Willbros Energy for wrongful 

termination based on an alleged oral employment agreement. Swiger 

joined defendant-appellee Bobby Moseley (Moseley), a supervisory 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34 (a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

e x cept for purposes of establishing the law of the case, res 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-2083 Document: 010110035129 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 1 
.., employee of Willbros Energy. Also named were defendant-appellee 

Local Union 798 and two union officers, defendants-appellees 

Clifton Throneberry and Doyle Hendrix (union defendants). All 

defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

in response to Swiger's various contract and tort theories of 

liability. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court denied 

the motion of Willbros Energy, but granted those of Moseley and 

the union defendants. The district court declined to enter a Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification, so the parties agreed to a joint 

stipulation of dismissal concerning the one remaining defendant, 

Willbros Energy. On appeal, Swiger raises four points of error 

which we discuss below. Our jurisdiction to review this matter 

arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

I• 

Did Swiger Sufficiently Allege a Tolling of the Applicable Limitation Period? 

Swiger's amended complaint, filed May 1, 1986, expressly 

stated that the acts alleged occurred no later than August 1983, 

and Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 95 (Third) (West 1988) provides 

that the limitation period for actions sounding in tort is two 

years. Swiger attempted to allege fraudulent concealment on the 

part of the defendants to overcome this problem. In his amended 

complaint Swiger alleged: 

In August 1983, defendant Moseley and defendants 

Throneberry and Hendrix, acting on behalf of the Union, 

affirmatively represented to plaintiff that Throneberry, 

Hendrix and Local 798 had no part in the decision by 

defendants Willbros and Moseley not to continue to 

employ plaintiff. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 87-2083 Document: 010110035129 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 2 
Rec. vol. I, doc. 19 at 5. Ta~ing these allegations to be true, 

as we must, the union defendants denied, in August 1983, that they 

were responsible for the decision of the other defendants 

concerning Swiger's continued employment. Without more, though, 

these statements allege only a denial of liability by the union 

defendants. 

To be sure, Oklahoma recognizes that fraudulent concealment 

tolls a limitation period; however, 

"the mere failure to disclose that a cause of action 

exists is not sufficient to prevent the running of the 

statute. There must be something more; some actual 

artifice to prevent knowledge of the fact; some 

affirmative act of concealment or some misrepresentation 

to exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry." 

Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Nipper, 51 P.2d 741, 747 (Okla. 1935) 

(quoting Waugh v. Guthrie Gas, Light, Fuel & Improvement Co., 131 

P. 174, 178 (Okla. 1913)). Pleading fraudulent concealment to 

· toll a limitations period requires a particularity which is 

conspicuously absent in this amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 9(b); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 

1041 (10th Cir. 1980). No facts have been alleged which would 

have deterred a reasonable person from further inquiry. We are in 

agreement with the district court's decision dismissing Swiger's 

tort claims against the union defendants and Moseley on 

limitations grounds. Rec. vol. I, docs. 35 & 37. Moreover, we 

note that Swiger's amended complaint makes no allegations of 

fraudulent concealment against defendant Moseley, so there is no 

question that the two-year limitation period bars tort claims 

against defendant Moseley. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 87-2083 Document: 010110035129 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 3 
II. 

Can Defendant Moseley Be Liable for Interference with Contractual 

Relations? 

Although Swiger's claims against defendant Moseley on this 

tort theory were rejected on limitations grounds, there are 

additional reasons for its rejection. In the amended complaint, 

Swiger alleged that: 

It was contemplated that plaintiff would be employed by 

defendant Willbros as long as there was work and that he 

could only be terminated for just cause. 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 19 at 3. Fairly read, this alleges an 

employment-at-will contract with an implied duty of good faith and 

fair dealing. 1 An employment contract of indefinite duration is 

an employment-at-will contract. Pierce v. Franklin Elec. Co., 737 

P.2d 921, 923 n.4 (Okla. 1987). Indeed, the essence of Swiger's 

claim against defendant Moseley is that Moseley breached an 

implied duty of good faith because Swiger was not terminated for 

just cause. However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recently held 

that, absent a termination which is contrary to a clear mandate of 

public policy, there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing which requires an employer to terminate only for just 

cause in an employment-at-will contract. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 

No. 67785 (Okla. Feb. 7, 1989) (found at 60 Okla. B.J. 305, 307 

(Feb. 11, 1989)). 

1 Swiger also alleged that his oral agreement entitled him to 

standby pay when he was not working. The duration of his 

employment would then be unlimited. We note that an oral 

employment contract which cannot be performed within one year is 

unenforceable. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 136 (West 1983); St. 

Louis Trading Co. v. Barr, 32 P.2d 293, 294-95 (Okla. 1934). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 87-2083 Document: 010110035129 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 4 
There is a~other reason why defendant Moseley, as an agent 

for the corporate defendant (Willbros Energy), cannot be held 

liable under the interference with contractual relations theory. 

To do so would be to expose the corporation to both contractual 

liability for breach of contract and tort liability for inducing a 

breach. Bowman v. Grolsche Bierbrouwerij B.V., 474 F. Supp. 725, 

733 (D. Conn. 1979); Allison v. American Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 

37, 39 (N.D. Okla. 1953). 

III. 

Does Swiger's Amended Complaint State a Claim of Civil Conspiracy 

to Blacklist Against the Union Defendants? 

The relevant statute provides: 

No firm, corporation or individual shall blacklist or 

require a letter of relinquishment, or publish, or cause 

to be published, or blacklisted, any employee, mechanic 

or laborer, discharged from or voluntarily leaving the 

service of such company, corporation or individual, with 

intent and for the purpose of preventing such employee, 

mechanic or laborer, from engaging in or securing 

similar or other employment from any other corporation, 

company or individual. 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 172 (West 1986) (emphasis added). "An 

intent to injure by preventing future employment is the essence of 

the offense of blacklisting." State v. Dabney, 141 P.2d 303, 308 

(Okla. Cr. 1943); see also Pierce v. Otis Elevator Co., 331 P.2d 

481, 482 (Okla. 1958) (action by former employee against 

employer). Swiger has predicated liability on the statute, and we 

agree with the district court that this statute concerns the 

employer-employee relationship, not the employee-union 

relationship. As an appellate court reviewing a diversity 

-5-

Appellate Case: 87-2083 Document: 010110035129 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 5 
judgment, we decline to extend the statute in the absence of an 

indication that an Oklahoma court would do so. 

IV. 

Is Swiger's Blacklisting Claim Against Defendant Moseley Barred? 

The district court concluded that any action against 

defendant Moseley was barred by a two-year limitation period. 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, S 173 (West 1986) contains a penalty for 

blacklisting and also provides that an employee may seek damages. 

To the extent that a penalty is involved, the limitations period 

would be one year. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, S 95 (Fourth) (oneyear limitation period for "an action upon a statute for penalty 

or forfeiture, except where the statute imposing it prescribes a 

different limitation"). But the limitation period is three years 

for "an action upon a liability created by statute other than a 

forfeiture or penalty." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, S 95 (Fourth). 

A successful blacklisting claim by a private person would result 

in a defendant's liability giving rise to a recovery of damages 

pursuant to a statute. See Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. American 

Book Co., 144 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1944) (action brought 

pursuant to federal antitrust statute for recovery of treble 

damages subject to Oklahoma's three-year limitations period). An 

action for damages in this case is remedial and it is simply not 

the same as an action for a penalty. Smith Engineering Works v. 

Custer, 151 P.2d 404, 407-08 (Okla. 1944). Accordingly, the 

three-year limitation period applies. Id.; Hughes v. Reed, 46 

-6-

Appellate Case: 87-2083 Document: 010110035129 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 6 
.F.2d 435, 440 (10th Cir. 1931). Swiger is within the limitation 

period on the blacklisting claim against Moseley. 

Defendant Moseley argues that under the statute only the 

employer may be held liable, in this case defendant Willbros 

Energy. He suggests that the statute provides for liability based 

upon the particular type of business entity, whether it be a firm, 

corporation or an individual. In State v. Dabney, 141 P.2d 303, 

305 (Okla. Cr. 1943), a business manager of a business college was 

charged with blacklisting. The manager was an employee of the 

college, and the college was not charged. Id. at 308. State v. 

Dabney suggests that the construction of the statute by defendant 

Moseley is not correct. 

The judgment in favor of the union defendants is affirmed. 

The judgment in ·favor of defendant Moseley is affirmed with 

respect to all of Swiger's claims, except those predicated on a 

violation of the blacklisting statute. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED. 

-7-

Entered by the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 87-2083 Document: 010110035129 Date Filed: 04/14/1989 Page: 7