Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00097/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00097-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Melvin Gene Ross, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-05-0097-PHX-DGC (VAM)

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Unit ed States Magistrate Judge Virginia A. Mathis'

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). Doc. #24. The R&R recommends that the Court

dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. Doc. #1. Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R on September 12, 2005. Doc.

# 28. The Court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which

objections are made. See id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United States v .

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003). The Court may accept, reject, or modify ,

in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. See id.

Background

In December 1998, Petitioner was charged in stat e court wit h auto theft, a Class 3

felony, CR-98-017796. Doc. #24 at 1. The State amended the charges against Petitioner

to include the charge that Petitioner committed the offense while released on bond in

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another case, CR 98-016058, and that he had five historical prior felony convictions. Doc.

#16, Ex. J at 64-65. At the sent encing hearing, the trial court found that the Petitioner had

been convicted of felonies in three separate cases, namely CR 96-03770 (burglary in the

third degree), CR 92-09161 (burglary in the second degree and burglary in the t hird degree),

and CR 150619 (burglary in t he second degree), and that he had committed the auto theft

while on release in CR 98-016058. Doc #16, Ex. K at 18-19. Petitioner was sentenced to

13.25 years in prison. Doc. #16, Ex. M at 1. 

He filed a timely direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id. On July 25, 2000,

the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Doc. #16, Ex. Q. Petitioner then filed

for post-conviction relief in May, 2002. Doc. #15, Ex. G. On February 3, 2003, the trial court

summarily dismissed the Rule 32 petition with respect to all claims. Id. After Petitioner's

direct appeal and p ost conviction relief efforts were unsuccessful, the present federal

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed. Doc. #1. Petitioner alleges five grounds for

relief, all involving federal due process violations, as detailed in the Magistrate's R&R.

Doc. #24 at 5-6. 

Discussion

I. Legal Standards.

Under the Antit errorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Court may not

grant habeas relief unless it concludes that the state’s “adjudication of the claim – (1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable det erminat ion of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-

(2); see Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 21 (2002).

A federal court has authority to review a federal constitutional claim presented by

a state prisoner if available state remedies have been exhausted. See Duckworth v.

Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9t h Cir. 1991). One

way the exhaust ion requirement can be satisfied is if a petitioner presents his claim to the

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Arizona Court of Appeals through either the state's direct appeal process or through

appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir.

1999). Claims presented in habeas petitions are considered exhaust ed if they have been

ruled upon by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

As an alternative to present ing his claims to the highest state court, a petitioner can

satisfy the exhaustion requirement by showing that no state remedies remained available

at the time the federal habeas petition was filed. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125

(1982). If, however, "state remedies are not available because the petitioner failed to

comply with the state procedures and thereby prevented the highest state court from

reaching the merits of his claim, t hen a federal court may refuse to reach the merits of that

claim." Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

II. The R&R and Objection.

A. Exhaustion Requirement.

Federal claims are considered exhausted only if the substance of the complaint has

been fairly p resented to and ruled upon by the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Anderson

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). The Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s conclusion

that the claims asserted by Petit ioner in Grounds I and II were not exhausted because they

were not presented to the state court as a violation of his rights under the United States

Constitution. Doc. 16, Ex X. Petitioner argues that although "the claims may not be in the

sound language or proper wording . . . [all were] made to alert state court's [sic] officials of

their state law and federal law const.,'l, [sic] nature." Doc. # 28 at 6. While a federal habeas

petitioner may somewhat reformulate the claims made in state court, the substance of the

federal habeas claim must have been "fairly presented" in state court in order to satisfy the

exhaustion requirement. Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6; Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F.3d 261, 262

(9th Cir. 1986). It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were

before the state courts or that a "somewhat similar state law claim was made." Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971). 

The Court also agrees with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Grounds III (with

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the exception of failure to interview and call exculpatory witnesses), IV (with the exception

of failure to disclose exculpatory evidence), and V were never properly presented to the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Doc. #24 at 14. Petitioner claims to have raised the substance

of Grounds III, IV, and V in a motion to the Arizona Court of Appeals as part of his Rule

32 proceedings, but t hat motion was denied on June 14, 2004, and the merits of Petitioner’s

claims were not considered. Id. 

Thus, only the issues of ineffective counsel with regard to failure to interview

p ot ential witnesses (Ground III) and failure to disclose exculpatory evidence (Ground IV)

have been exhausted in state court . Only these issues may be addressed in Petitioner’s

federal habeas petition.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

The R&R correctly sets forth the law regarding ineffect ive assistance of counsel

claims. To p revail on his claim, Petitioner must show that his counsel’s representation fell

below an object ive st andard of reasonableness and that Petitioner was prejudiced.

Doc. #24 at 5-6. Petitioner can establish prejudice by showing that there is a reasonable

probabilit y t hat the proceedings would have been different but for his counsel’s deficient

performance. Id. at 6. 

Petitioner asserts his counsel was ineffective when "[n]o interview was conducted

of the exculpatory witnesses who were made known . . . ." Doc. #1 at 7. Specifically,

Pet itioner argues that counsel erred in failing to interview (1) Girtha Gist, a vehicle owner

(and Pet itioner's sister) who will testify that she saw Petitioner driving the victim's vehicle

before it was reported stolen, thereby casting some doubt on the timing of when the car

was actually st olen; (2) the victim's boss, who might testify that the victim was not in

possession of his car on the day he rep ort ed the car stolen; and (3) the tow truck driver

who "would have impeached the insurance witness" on the vehicle's condition at the time

of the theft. Docs. ##16, Ex. X at 11-12, #24 at 21. As st at ed in t he R&R, Petitioner has

provided no assurances, by way of affidavit or sworn statement, that any of the witnesses

would have testified as he claims. Doc. #24. Petitioner fails to address this deficiency in

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his objection t o the Magistrate's R&R and even attaches to his response a document that

admits "[t]here are, unfortunately no one whom can corroborate my truthful claim" that the

vehicle was not stolen. Doc #26, Mot. to File Supp . Brief with Pro Se Petition for Exhibits,

p 3, side 5. Without presenting some evidence to confirm what these witnesses would say,

Pet itioner has failed to show that trial counsel erred in failing to interview them or that the

failure caused him prejudice. See Evans v. Cock rell, 285 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2002)

("comp laint s of uncalled witnesses are not favored in federal habeas corpus review

because allegations of what the witness would have testified are largely speculative . . .

unsupported claims regarding the uncalled witnesses are speculative and disfavored by

this Court as grounds for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel."); United States

v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991) (". . . evidence about the testimony of a putative

witness must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony or by the witness by

affidavit. A defendant cannot simp ly st ate that the testimony would have been favorable;

self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.") (citation

omitted). 

C. Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence.

Petitioner claims that the exculpatory evidence presented at his sentencing hearing

by Michael Gordon, the insurance agent for the stolen car, should have been disclosed by

t he p rosecution and that failure to do so violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Doc. #16, Ex. X at 13. Specifically, Petitioner states that the testimony of Mr. Gordon and

the photographs he took of the damaged vehicle constituted exculpatory evidence because

it would show that t he owner of the stolen vehicle "was not being truthful about the

vehicle's condit ion [and] [s]uch a showing of untruthfulness . . ." might have supported

his defense that the Petitioner was given permission to damage the truck as a part of an

insurance scam and to buy drugs. Doc. # 24 at 23. 

In order to succeed in proving a Brady violation, Petitioner must show that t he

evidence sought is material – that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence

been disclosed t o t he defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See

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United States v . Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). The Court agrees with the magistrate

judge’s conclusion that the evidence described by Petitioner has not been shown to have

been in the possession of the prosecutor and, in any event , would not likely have affected

t he outcome of the trial. The Court agrees with and adopts the magistrate judges reasons

for this conclusion as set forth on pages 24-25 of her order. See Doc. #24 at 24-25. 

T he Court will accept the R&R and deny the petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(stating that the district court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

IT IS SO ORDERED:

1. Magistrate Judge Virginia A. Mathis's R&R (Doc. #24) is accepted.

2. Petitioner Ross's petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. #1) is denied.

3. Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc #25) is denied

 as moot.

4. Petit ioner's Motion by Leave of the Court to request to Amend the Magistrate's

 R&R (Doc #27) is granted.

5. Petitioner's Objection to the Magistrate's R&R (Doc. #28) is denied.

6. Petitioner's M otion by Leave of the Court to Request all Copies of all Legal

 Documents filed in this Court (Doc. #29) is denied as moot.

7. Petitioner's Motion to Request Documents without Cost (Doc. #26) is denied as

 moot.

8. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate this action.

DATED this 15th day of December, 2005.

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