Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01394/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01394-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lawrence Eugene Greer, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-1394 PHX EHC (VAM)

)

Dora B. Schriro, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Lawrence Eugene Greer ("petitioner") filed a pro se Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner raises four grounds for relief in the amended petition. 

(Doc. 4 at pp. 5-8). Respondents filed an answer opposing the

granting of habeas relief. (Doc. 14, 15 and 16). 

BACKGROUND

On September 26, 2001, petitioner was convicted in Maricopa

County Superior Court on one count of aggravated assaultdisfigurement. (Doc. 15, Exhibit A at 46). The prosecution also

alleged petitioner had six prior felony convictions. (Id. at 7). 

On October 26, 2001, the trial court held a trial on the prior

historical felony convictions and found the State had proved two. 

(Id., Exhibit B at 51). As a result of this finding, the Court

sentenced petitioner to a prison term of 12 years. (Id., Exhibit

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

B at 51; Exhibit E at 15-16, 21-25).

Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals. His

attorney filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738 (1967). (Doc. 15 at Exhibit F). Although, as noted by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, petitioner's pro se appeal did not

clearly raise any issue, reading his appeal brief liberally, it

appears petitioner raised an allegation of "suppression of

evidence" in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) as

well as a claim of coercing witnesses to commit perjury. (See

Doc. 15, Exhibit G at pp. 2-3). In addition, the Arizona Court of

Appeals addressed claims presented in a motion to dismiss that was

attached to his appeal brief. In the motion to dismiss,

petitioner alleged that certain evidence should be precluded at

trial because the prosecution failed to respond to discovery

requests in violation of Ariz.R.Crim.P. 15.1(a)(4) and that this

failure also violated his speedy trial rights. (Id., Exhibit G,

Motion to Dismiss at pp. 1-2). 

In a memorandum opinion filed on January 9, 2003, the Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence. 

(Doc. 16, Exhibit H at p. 4). In affirming, the Arizona Court of

Appeals denied on the merits his claim that evidence should have

been precluded at trial due to the prosecutions failure to respond

to discovery requests. The court stated that any claims

petitioner raised alleging coersion of witnesses to give perjured

testimony and failing to disclose exculpatory evidence in

violation of Brady should be raised in a post-conviction relief

petition where an evidentiary hearing may be held. (Id.).

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

Petitioner initiated a post-conviction relief petition

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 on January 23, 2003. (Doc. 15 at

Exhibit I). Eventually, petitioner filed a pro se Rule 32

petition. Reading his rambling 20-plus page brief liberally, it

appears he raises claims of both a Brady violation and

prosecutorial use of perjured testimony, as well as a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to test the

substance of the prosecution's case. (See Doc. 16 at Exhibit O).

The State sought dismissal of the petition arguing it did not

comply with Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.5 in that petitioner failed to

certify he was raising "every ground known to him or her for

vacating, reducing, correcting or otherwise changing all judgments

or sentences imposed" and for failing to submit an affidavit

attesting to the fact he had personal knowledge of all facts

raised in the petition. (Doc. 16 at Exhibit P). The State asked

that the petition be dismissed and that petitioner be given 30

days to file a new petition in compliance with Rule 32.5. 

The trial court issued a minute order directing petitioner to

address these deficiencies outlined by the State. Petitioner

filed additional briefs which the State contended still failed to

comply with Rule 32.5. (See Doc. 16 at Exhibits Q,R,S). 

Eventually, on March 17, 2004, the trial court entered a minute

order dismissing the Rule 32 petition. (Doc. 16 at Exhibit AA). 

Petitioner filed what the trial court characterized as a motion to

reconsider but the motion was denied. (Id. at Exhibits BB, DD and

EE).

It appears that petitioner sought review before the Arizona

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

Court of Appeals but his petition for review was denied as

untimely, but noted that petitioner could return to the trial

court and attempt to provide an excuse for the untimeliness which,

if granted, would allow him to proceed with the petition for

review. (Doc. 16 at Exhibit FF). On approximately July 21, 2004,

petitioner did ask the trial court for permission to file an

untimely petition for review, (see id. at Exhibit GG), but then on

July 28, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for review in the

Arizona Supreme Court. (Id. at Exhibit HH). The Arizona Supreme

Court denied the petition for review without comment on November

8, 2004. (Id. at Exhibit LL). 

On December 7, 2004, petitioner filed a paper entitled 28 USC

2254 in the trial court. (Doc. 16 at Exhibit MM). Petitioner

appears to have raised the following claims in the second Rule 32:

(1) the prosecution used perjured testimony at trial; (2) the

state failed to disclose evidence favorable to petitioner in

violation of Brady; and (3) appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance. (See id.). On December 23, 2004, the trial court

denied the petition finding that all claims were barred pursuant

to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) because they could have been raised in

petitioner's direct appeal or his first Rule 32 petition. (Doc.

16 at Exhibit NN). Petitioner filed a petition for review with

the Arizona Court of Appeals but the court held that his February

1, 2005, petition for review was untimely. (Id. at Exhibit OO). 

On July 7, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied the petition

for review without comment. (Doc. 11 at Attachment).

On May 11, 2005, petitioner filed for federal habeas relief. 

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

Subsequently, petitioner filed an amended petition. The amended

petition makes no sense and does not coherently raise any issue. 

The Court interprets the issues as follows:

GROUND I: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - 

The prosecution introduced perjured testimony

GROUND II: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel - 

"my counsel's functions vitiated my constitutional right

to counsel, when he opposed my first direct appeal ...." 

GROUND III: "In violation of due process clause of the Fifth 

Fourteenth Amendment [petitioner] states that he was

denied due process of law when the jury was duly

impanelled [sic] and sworned [sic] in I was judicially

overreached."

GROUND IV: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - counsel

had a conflict of interest and "... mislead his client

into believing that the trial judge dismissed the

provisions ..."

(Doc. 4 at pp. 5-8).

DISCUSSION

Respondents seek denial of the amended petition because they

contend all claims have been procedurally defaulted.

A. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the following standard for

granting a federal habeas petition originating from a state court

conviction applies:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

The Act also codifies a presumption of correctness of state

court findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) states that "a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof

to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." As

discussed more fully below, these provisions of the Act set the

standard for the Court’s evaluation of the merits.

The Act limits the district court’s discretion to hold

evidentiary hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) states:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis

of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall

not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that

was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

A petition may be denied on the merits even though it

contains unexhausted claims, and the state does not waive

exhaustion except by an express waiver on the record. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(2) and (3).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

1. Law Generally

A federal court has authority to review a federal

constitutional claim presented by a state prisoner if available

state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454

U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

833 (9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in

case law and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, now states:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that--

 (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available

in the courts of the State; or

 (B)(i) there is an absence of available state

corrective process; or

 (ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

.......

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted

the remedies available in the courts of the State,

within the meaning of this section, if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available

procedure, the question presented.

The exhaustion requirement can be satisfied in one of two

ways. First, a petitioner can fairly present his or her claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through

either the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Only one of these avenues of relief must be

exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. 

This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy,

827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059

(1989).

Claims presented in habeas petitions are considered exhausted

if they have been ruled upon by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

However, if the sentence received is life imprisonment, the claims

must be presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. Swoopes, 196 F.3d

at 1010. Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate

somewhat the claims made in state court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796

F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on other grounds by

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal

claim must have been "fairly presented" in state court. Anderson

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam); Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971). While the petitioner need not recite

"book and verse on the federal constitution," Picard, 404 U.S. at

277-78 (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir.

1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support

the federal claim were before the state courts or that a "somewhat

similar state law claim was made." Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

As an alternative to presenting his claims to the highest

state court, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement

by demonstrating that no state remedies remained available at the

time the federal habeas petition was filed. Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602

(9th Cir. 1989). However, this path is fraught with danger:

If state remedies are not available because the

petitioner failed to comply with state procedures and

thereby prevented the highest state court from reaching

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Appellate defaults are examined under the same standards that

apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim during trial.

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

9

the merits of his claim, then a federal court may refuse

to reach the merits of that claim as a matter of comity.

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988); see also

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (determining that the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if a petitioner presented a claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct review or via a petition

for post-conviction relief). This failure to comply with

reasonable state procedures is usually characterized as

"procedural default," "procedural bar," or a "waiver." As

discussed, exhausting state remedies by means of a procedural

default is risky. The burden is on the petitioner to show that he

or she has properly exhausted each claim. Dismissal of the

petition is proper when the record does not show that the

exhaustion requirement is met. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103,

1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023

(1982). If the unavailability of state remedies is in no way the

fault of the petitioner or his or her counsel, the exhaustion

requirement will likely be satisfied and a federal court may reach

the merits of the petitioner’s habeas claims.

In many cases, however, the lack of available state remedies

is a direct result of the petitioner’s failure to avail himself of

the state remedies in a timely or procedurally correct manner. In

such instances, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted, and may

not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of

"cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse the default.1 Reed v.

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-

91 (1977); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989);

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). "Cause"

is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). "Prejudice" is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Id.

"Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a

procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court ‘has not given the

term "cause" precise content.’" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268,

1274 (11th Cir.)(quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that

cause should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to

petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a

claim was not reasonably available to counsel, (citation

omitted), or that "some interference by officials,"

(citation omitted), made compliance impracticable, would

constitute cause under this standard.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Harmon, 894

F.2d at 1275; Allen v. Risley, 817 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1987).

The standard is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). The

"cause and prejudice" standard is equally applicable to pro se

litigants, Harmon, 894 F.2d at 1274; Hughes, 800 F.2d at 908,

whether literate and assisted by "jailhouse lawyers," Tacho, 862

F.2d at 1381; illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or

non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989).

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

Finally, if a claim has been found to be procedurally

defaulted, the failure to establish cause for the default may be

excused under exceptional circumstances. For instance:

... in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ even in the absence of showing cause for

the procedural default.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995)(to meet the Murray standard, "the petitioner must show

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in the light of the new evidence").

2. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

Respondents contend that petitioner's habeas claims were not

properly exhausted in state court and are now procedurally barred

from consideration on federal habeas review. The record clearly

shows that petitioner never properly exhausted his habeas claims

in state court. In his direct appeal petitioner did raise a claim

of failing to disclose exculpatory evidence and use of perjured

testimony. However, the Arizona Court of Appeals declined to

address these issues on the merits because "[t]hese kinds of

issues can only be fully addressed after an evidentiary hearing

... due to the lack of a record. The proper procedure is a Rule

32 motion ..." (Doc. 15, Exhibit H at p. 4).

Petitioner never properly exhausted these issues, or any

other issues he raised in his amended habeas petition during his

two Rule 32 proceedings. Both proceedings were dismissed by the

state courts as procedurally infirm. (See Doc. 16 at Exhibits AA,

FF, LL, NN and OO). For this reason the claims were not properly

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

exhausted. Moreover, the time to return to state court and raise

these issues in a new Rule 32 proceeding has long since passed. 

Petitioner has not shown that his claims fall within any of the

narrow exceptions provided under Arizona law for filing successive

petitions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a). As a result, petitioner

has no remaining state remedies with respect to any of the claims

presented in his amended habeas petition and these claims are

technically exhausted. Technical exhaustion is not proper

exhaustion. See Reed, 468 U.S. at 11. Unless petitioner can

present cause and prejudice for failing to exhaust these claims

properly, his claims are procedurally barred from consideration in

a federal habeas petition.

Petitioner has not demonstrated cause for failing to present

these claims in a procedurally proper manner in state court. As a

result these claims are procedurally defaulted. However, the

Court may ignore the procedural default if petitioner can show

evidence of actual innocence such that it is more likely than not

that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. Murray, 477

U.S. at 496; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Petitioner has made no such

showing. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied. 

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties shall have ten (10) days

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to

timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 16th day of November, 2005.

Case 2:05-cv-01394-EHC Document 21 Filed 11/16/05 Page 13 of 13