Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00510/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00510-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1,

2005, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal

Code § 5075(a).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES K. BARNFIELD,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-0510 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner James Barnfield, a state prisoner, has filed a pro

se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to title 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, challenging as a violation of his constitutional rights the

denial of parole by the California Board of Parole Hearings

(Board).1 Respondent Anthony Kane has filed an answer. Petitioner

has filed a traverse. Having considered all of the papers filed by

the parties, the Court DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

On January 29, 1982, Petitioner was in a Ventura County motel

room drinking alcohol with his brother, his friend James Nolan and

other individuals. Petitioner and Nolan started arguing and the

dispute turned violent. Petitioner and his brother beat Nolan,

allegedly because Nolan knew Petitioner had committed several armed

robberies earlier and he and his brother wanted Nolan to keep

silent. After the beating, a witness to the fight overheard

Petitioner and his brother discussing how they would have to take

care of Nolan because Nolan knew Petitioner had committed the

robberies. Following the fight, those in the motel room continued

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to drink. 

Later that evening, Petitioner and his brother invited Nolan

to accompany them to another party. The witness never saw Nolan

again. Several hours later, Petitioner and his brother returned to

the motel room and picked up the witness. They drove to a coinoperated car wash, where the witness observed Petitioner washing

what appeared to be dried blood from his trunk. The witness

observed that Petitioner's pants were stained with blood. Later

that day, Petitioner told the witness that he had shot Nolan in the

head and placed him in his car's trunk, and that after opening the

trunk later and discovering that Nolan was still breathing, he shot

Nolan in the head again. Petitioner also told the witness that he

had buried Nolan's body with his brother's aid. Nolan's family

recovered his body several days later. Petitioner and his brother

fled to Sacramento, where they were arrested on February 15, 1982. 

On September 22, 1982, Petitioner plead guilty to one count of

second-degree murder with a gun use enhancement in exchange for the

prosecution's agreement to drop other counts. The trial court

sentenced Petitioner to a term of seventeen years to life with the

possibility of parole. Petitioner was received into the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on September 8, 1982,

and his minimum parole eligibility date was December 25, 1992. 

In 1997, Petitioner received a disciplinary violation report

for drug trafficking. (Resp't Ex. 2 at 32.) He has received four

counseling chronos since 2001, including three for failing to

report to work. (Id. at 47.) Petitioner conceded he has a

substance abuse problem and began attending Alcoholics Anonymous

(AA) meetings in 2002. (Id. at 52.) 

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Petitioner has completed various vocational courses in prison,

including welding, small engines and air frame. (Id. at 33-34.) 

He has worked at the Prison Industry Authority in textiles since

2001. (Id.) In August and December of 2004, Petitioner completed

a program on controlling anti-social behavior. (Id. at 37.) 

Petitioner was accepted into the Impact Program, where he met with

victims of crime. (Id. at 38.) Finally, Petitioner helped start a

group for other inmates who, like himself, were veterans of the

armed forces. (Id. at 39.)

On February 14, 2005, Petitioner attended his seventh parole

suitability hearing before the Board. In addition to Petitioner's

prison record, the Board considered the Probation Officer's report,

the sentencing transcript, various counselors' and Board reports,

and Petitioner's psychiatric reports. (Id. at 12.) The Board

noted that Petitioner had been cited three times for non-drug

related Vehicle Code violations between 1979 and 1981. (Id.) 

The Board reviewed Petitioner's personal background, noting

that his parents separated when he was five and that his father

died in 1992. (Id. at 14.) Petitioner's father had an alcohol

problem, and his mother had a gambling problem. (Id. at 16.) 

Petitioner testified that he abused drugs and alcohol during his

adolescent years and dropped out of high school in the eleventh

grade. (Id. at 16-17.) (He subsequently earned his GED while

incarcerated at Deuel Vocational Institution in 1984. (Id. at

17.)) Petitioner joined the armed forces at seventeen and served

for two years before being discharged for "black-marketing." (Id.) 

 Petitioner testified that he intended to live with his sister

in Kern County if the Board granted him parole. (Id. at 19.) A

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letter from his sister confirmed that arrangement. (Id. at 21.) 

His sister was part-owner of a smog certification business, and her

partner wrote the Board to confirm that Petitioner could work there

if paroled. (Id. at 19-22.) Petitioner's mother wrote the Board,

pleading that she was "77 years old and need[ed] to be able to

spend time with [her] son." (Id. at 21.) His niece also submitted

a letter asking the Board to grant Petitioner parole. (Id. at 23.)

The Board reported that the Simi Valley Police Department and

the Ventura County District Attorney had both submitted oppositions

to granting Petitioner parole. (Id. at 24-31.) The District

Attorney's letter opposing parole stated in part:

Based on the best evidence in this case, the Inmate

executed Nolan because he feared Nolan would reveal to

police the Inmate and his brother's participation in

multiple armed robberies. The Inmate's failure to

acknowledge the extent of his participation in this

commitment crime and his effort to conjure a self-serving

explanation of the murder is a clear expression that this

Inmate is both unwilling and incapable of returning to

society. This crime involved extreme violence in that

the Inmate executed Nolan in cold blood, preceded by

beating him for approximately half-an-hour. 

(Id. at 29-30.) The District Attorney suggested that parole be

denied because of the "violent and callous" nature of the

commitment offense, Petitioner's "failure to acknowledge his

culpability in the commitment crime," and Petitioner's "lack of any

parole plan." (Id. at 26.) 

Nolan's next-of-kin also appeared at the hearing, and his

sister pleaded with the Board to deny Petitioner parole. (Id. at

48-50.) 

The Board considered a report assessing Petitioner's

dangerousness as "moderate to possibly low" if he remained sober. 

(Id. at 33.) The Board also noted a psychiatric report from

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January, 2001 which indicated that Petitioner's violence potential

was "average" for a Level II inmate. (Id. at 36.) 

After deliberation, the Board concluded that Petitioner was

not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released. (Id.

at 51.) The Board issued a two-year denial of parole. (Id.) In

support of its decision, the Board cited the "cruel fashion" with

which Petitioner killed Nolan and noted "the motive for this crime

is really inexplicable." (Id.) The Board also stated that

Petitioner had not sufficiently participated in self-help

programming and had an "unstable" social history that included drug

and alcohol abuse. (Id.) Given that Petitioner's psychiatric

evaluation stated his violence potential was higher than average if

he abused alcohol, the Board voiced concern that Petitioner only

started attending AA in 2002. (Id. at 52.) The Board also was

influenced by the testimony of Nolan's sister as well as the

letters from the Ventura County District Attorney and Simi Valley

Chief of Police. (Id.) 

The Board recommended Petitioner continue to participate in

self-help sessions and remain "clean and sober." (Id. at 53.) The

Board felt Petitioner's improvements were relatively recent and

that he should "demonstrate an ability to maintain those gains over

an extended period of time." (Id.) The Board concluded by

commending Petitioner on his recent progress, encouraging him to

remain "disciplinary free," and ordering a new psychological

evaluation to be completed prior to the next parole hearing. (Id.

at 54-56.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with

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the Ventura County Superior Court challenging the Board's decision

and asserting that the denial of parole violated his plea

agreement. On July 8, 2005, the superior court denied the

petition. On September 20, 2005, the California Court of Appeal

summarily denied his petition. On November 30, 2005, the

California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for review. 

Petitioner now seeks federal habeas relief in this Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge

to a state parole eligibility decision, the applicable standard is

contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir.

2002). 

Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief

unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412 (2000). A federal court must presume the correctness of

the state court's factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Respondent concedes that Petitioner has exhausted his state

remedies by filing a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court. Where, as here, the highest state court to reach the merits

issued a summary opinion which does not explain the rationale of

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its decision, federal court review under § 2254(d) is of the last

state court opinion to reach the merits. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d

964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the last state

court opinion to address the merits of Petitioner's claim is the

opinion of the Ventura County Superior Court.

DISCUSSION

I. Due Process Claim

Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated

by the Board's decision to deny parole because that decision was

not supported by "sufficient reliable evidence." (Pet. at 15.) 

Petitioner's claim fails. 

Because California prisoners have a constitutionally protected

liberty interest in release on parole, they cannot be denied a

parole date without the procedural protections necessary to satisfy

due process. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902. A parole board's

decision must be supported by "some evidence" to satisfy the

requirements of due process. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

455 (1985); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Morales v. California

Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on

other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). The evidence underlying the

board's decision must have some indicia of reliability. 

McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833

F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The Ventura County Superior Court concluded that Petitioner

did not show that "the decision of the Board of Prison Terms was

not supported by substantial evidence." (Resp't Ex. 5, Ventura

County Superior Court Minute Order dated July 8, 2005.) The

Board's decision was supported by "some evidence" and as such the

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California state courts' denial of Petitioner's claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, controlling federal

law, nor based on an unreasonable determination of facts. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

In denying Petitioner's request for parole, the Board first

cited as evidence the exceptionally cruel and seemingly

inexplicable nature of the commitment offense. The Board noted

that Petitioner methodically murdered Nolan with gunshots to the

head and added:

And just to add insult to injury, the Inmate then

attempted to cover up the scene, cover up the crime

rather, by washing the vehicle, by burying Mr. Nolan's

body in Northern California. Clearly, the crime shows he

lacked regard for the life and suffering of another. 

(Resp't Ex. 2 at 51.) 

The Board also cited as evidence Petitioner's unstable social

history and need for more therapy before release. (Id. at 52.) 

The Board noted that Petitioner's past psychological assessment

indicated his risk of violence increased significantly if he abused

drugs and alcohol. (Id.) Taking note that Petitioner was addicted

to alcohol and had a history of taking "marijuana, PCP, cocaine,

[and] heroin," the Board concluded that "the Inmate has not yet

participated in sufficient levels of self-help in that he has been

an ongoing participant in AA since 2002." (Id.) The Board was

pleased with Petitioner's new-found commitment to AA, but noted it

was relatively recent and stressed the importance of his continuing

to "develop the skills that will allow him to remain clean and

sober." (Id. at 53.) 

Finally, the Board cited the oppositions of the Ventura County

District Attorney, Simi Valley Police Department and Nolan's

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sister. (Id. at 54.) 

Petitioner claims that, under the reasoning of Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003), in denying parole

the Board improperly relied on static factors that do not outweigh

Petitioner's "extended years of positive behavior and his

demonstrated rehabilitation," particularly in light of his clean

criminal record prior to his commitment offense. (Pet. at 18-19.) 

In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit found that parole denial based

solely on the gravity of the commitment offense can initially

satisfy due process requirements, and that the "some evidence"

standard could be satisfied by the Board's consideration of the

gravity of the offense. However, in dicta, the Biggs court held

that courts may also consider the parole board's decision-making

process over time: "The Parole Board's decision is one of 'equity'

and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors

considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor . . . runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals

espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process

violation." Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. 

Petitioner's reliance on Biggs is misplaced. The Board relied

on more than the single "unchanging factor" of Petitioner's

commitment offense in denying him parole. Although the "cruel"

nature of Petitioner's commitment offense weighed heavily in the

Board's determination, his "unstable social history" also counseled

against parole. Petitioner's heightened tendency towards violence

when he abused drugs and alcohol, in tandem with his relatively

recent commitment to AA, led the Board to conclude that Petitioner

had not "participated yet in sufficient levels of self-help to

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ensure that he will remain clean and sober and to ensure that he

will remain disciplinary free." (Resp't Ex. 2 at 54.) While the

Board commended Petitioner on his recent attendance at AA meetings,

the conclusion that he needed more exposure to self-help

programming contributes to "some evidence" for denying him parole. 

(Id. at 55.) 

The Ninth Circuit's evolving guidance in Biggs, Sass v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir.

2006), and Irons v. Carey, No. 05-15275, slip op. 8335, 8344 (9th

Cir. July 13, 2007), suggests that the Board can continue to

evaluate static factors, including the nature of the commitment

offense and pre-conviction criminality, as "some evidence" in

deciding whether to grant parole. The weight to be attributed to

those immutable events, however, should decrease as a predictor of

future dangerousness as the years pass and the prisoner

demonstrates favorable behavior. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17;

Irons, slip op. at 8344. Should Petitioner continue to follow the

Board's advice by attending self-help programming and maintaining a

positive disciplinary record, continued parole denials based on

Petitioner's commitment offense alone could eventually give rise to

a due process violation. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. 

II. Violation of the Plea Agreement

Petitioner claims that the Board's denial of parole violated

the terms of his plea agreement because it was "based on facts

associated with a dismissed charge" and deprived him "of his

reciprocal benefit of lessened punishment," so that he is "serving

a term for a higher degree of his plea stipulated crime." (Pet. at

13.) Petitioner alleges that the Board's breach of his plea

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agreement violated his constitutional right to due process. 

Petitioner's due process claim is without merit. 

Petitioner claims that his agreement to plead guilty to

second-degree murder included an implication that future parole

boards would evaluate his eligibility for parole based on "solely

those facts which comport with the stipulated offense." (Pet. at

14.) Petitioner now alleges that the Board violated the terms of

his plea agreement in denying him parole because it considered

facts that did not comport with his conviction for second-degree

murder. Petitioner takes particular issue with the letter from the

Ventura County District Attorney, which in Petitioner's assessment

"recharacteriz[ed] the crime as a first-degree execution style

murder." (Id. at 9.) Because, Petitioner concludes, he "entered

into his plea agreement under false premises . . . it can no longer

stand." (Id. at 22.) 

Plea agreements with specific promises are enforceable. See

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) ("when a plea

rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the

prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement

or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled"); Brown v. Poole,

337 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). Should the government breach

such a promise, the defendant can seek to withdraw from the plea

agreement or demand specific performance. See United States v.

Sandoval-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1997). Petitioner

presents no evidence, however, to show that his plea agreement

included a promise that the parole board would evaluate his parole

eligibility based solely on the stipulated offense of second-degree

murder. Indeed, the record suggests that Petitioner was or should

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 People v. Harvey, 25 Cal. 3d 754 (1979). 

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have been aware that his plea to second-degree murder did not mean

the facts surrounding dismissed counts could not be considered in

future proceedings. 

On July 21, 1982, the Ventura Country Superior Court accepted

Petitioner's plea agreement, which called for a plea of no contest

to second-degree murder with a gun use enhancement in exchange for

dismissal of the other counts. During this session, Petitioner

indicated he understood and agreed to the Harvey2 waiver included

in his plea agreement. The prosecutor described the waiver as

follows:

This is called a Harvey waiver. It says the defendant

agrees that all the facts in the Information relating to

any other counts and allegations of prior convictions and

other sentence enhancement allegations which are

dismissed as part of this plea can be included in the

probation report and considered by the Court in

determining the sentence. 

(Resp't Ex. 4 at 4.) 

Thus, the Court finds no promise in Petitioner's plea

agreement that the government has refused to fulfill. See

Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. Petitioner's claim that he "entered

into his plea agreement under false premises" is without merit. 

(Pet. at 22.) 

Petitioner next claims that the Board's denial of parole has

extended his term of imprisonment well beyond the "uniform term"

for his commitment offense and that he is now serving "a term

reserved for first-degree murder." (Id. at 9-10.) Petitioner

alleges that the Board's denial of parole violated his plea

agreement because he believed he would "serve the [uniform] term

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for the gravity of his crime and be released on parole." (Id. at

11 [brackets in original].) 

Petitioner cites People v. Collins, 21 Cal. 3d 208 (1978),

among other authorities, for the proposition that an offender

accepting a plea bargain is owed a reciprocal benefit of lessened

punishment, in this case a "uniform term" of incarceration

corresponding to Petitioner's commitment offense. See Collins, 21

Cal. 3d at 214. The courts have enforced plea agreements that

included stipulated incarceration terms. See, e.g., Brown, 337

F.3d at 1159-61 (government breached plea agreement to release

defendant in seven and a half years if she did not violate prison

disciplinary rules where defendant remained disciplinary-free and

incarcerated for more than seventeen years). Petitioner puts forth

no evidence, however, to show that his plea agreement included a

stipulation that he would serve a specific term, "uniform" or

otherwise. Rather, the record shows that during the July 21, 1982

plea colloquy, the prosecutor explicitly informed him that "the

District Attorney is not making any sentence commitment. . . ." 

(Resp't Ex. 4 at 4.) Petitioner voiced his assent to that element

of his plea. (Id.) Petitioner now claims he believed the plea

agreement included a stipulated, uniform term of incarceration, but

the record does not support his recollection. 

Petitioner was later sentenced to an indeterminate term of

seventeen-years-to-life. That Petitioner has now been incarcerated

longer than seventeen years does not mean the Board's denial of

parole either violated Petitioner's plea agreement or implicated

his due process rights. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. 

Petitioner has not shown that the Board's denial of parole

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 Respondent also argues that Petitioner's plea agreement

claim is untimely and barred under AEDPA's one year statute of

limitations. Habeas petitioners have one year to challenge the

decision of an administrative body, and that statue of limitations

begins to run from "the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Respondent

argues that Petitioner is challenging the statement of facts from

the 2005 parole hearing, which was first read into the record

during Petitioner's 1991 parole hearing. Because Petitioner waited

fourteen years to challenge the statement of facts, Respondent

argues this claim is barred.

The Court denies Petitioner's claim on the merits and does not

address its timeliness. 

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breached the terms of his plea agreement in violation of his right

to due process. The California state courts' denial of

Petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, controlling federal law, nor based on an

unreasonable determination of facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim.3

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/21/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES BARNFIELD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

A.P. KANE et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-00510 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on August 21, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

James K. Barnfield

CTF-Soledad

C-53123

P.O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Jessica N. Blonien

Attorney General’s Office

for the State of California

1300 I Street, Suite 125

P.O. Box 944255

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

Dated: August 21, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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