Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01520/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01520-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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Dignity Health argues it was formerly known as Catholic 1

Healthcare West, and was erroneously sued as Sierra Nevada Memorial

Hospital.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NORA LAVERY-PETRASH,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,

JAMES (JIM) HEARD, DAVID

WITTHAUS, ARTHUR DEWSEN, and

ANNALISE O’CONNOR, 

 Defendants.

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2:11-cv-01520-GEB-DAD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

DISMISSAL MOTION 

Defendants David Witthaus (“Witthaus”), Arthur Dewsen

(“Dewsen”), Annalise O’Connor (“O’Connor”), and James Heard (“Heard”)

(collectively referred to as “individual Defendants”), and Dignity

Health (“Dignity Health,” and collectively, “Defendants”) each move 1

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for dismissal of

all claims in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Plaintiff

Nora Lavery-Petrash (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition brief.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Decision on Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion

requires determination of “whether the complaint’s factual allegations,

together with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible claim for

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relief.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047,

1054 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949-50 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

When determining the sufficiency of a claim, “[w]e accept

factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party[; however, this

tenet does not apply to] . . . legal conclusions . . . cast in the form

of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir.

2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Therefore,

conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.’”).

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims do not contain sufficient

factual allegations to alleges actionable claims. Plaintiff’s claims

concern her employment with Dignity Health. Plaintiff alleges that

during her employment, she experienced harassment, a hostile work

environment, and retaliation in violation of the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Plaintiff also alleges Defendants were

negligent in failing to prevent harassment and retaliation.

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A. Harassment Claims for Hostile Work Environment

Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to allege actionable claims

under FEHA and Title VII for harassment and hostile work environment,

since she “fail[s] to plead that she was subjected to harassment based

on a particular characteristic, such as age or sex.” (Defs.’ Mot.

(“Mot.”) 5:17-18.) Plaintiff counters that “[she] has clearly stated

. . . she was discriminated [against] and harassed based on gender/age.”

(Pl.’s Opp’n (“Opp’n”) 9:12-13.) 

“[A]n employee claiming harassment based upon a hostile work

environment [under FEHA or Title VII] must demonstrate that . . . she

was subjected to . . . conduct[] or comments that were (1) unwelcome;

(2) because of sex [and/or age]; and (3) sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an

abusive work environment.” Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prod., 38

Cal. 4th 264, 278-79 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted) (noting that the elements for a harassment claim under FEHA and

Title VII are the same). “[A] workplace may give rise to liability when

it is permeated with discriminatory [sex- and/or age-based]

intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that is sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create

an abusive working environment.” Id. at 279 (internal quotation marks,

citation, and alterations in original omitted)).

Plaintiff alleges the following in her SAC concerning her

harassment and hostile work environment claims: 

Co-worker Mike Olsen opined to Plaintiff that . . .

Dewsen “treats women differently.” Plaintiff

observed that . . . Dewsen harassed her (age 58,

gray hair, small build) and co-worker Constance

Goodwin (. . . 250 lbs and approximate age 50), but

not co-worker Patricia Daniels (approximate age 40

. . . ). [Goodwin], who worked under the

Supervision of . . . Dewsen[,] was subsequently

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fired. Prior to [her] termination . . . , [Goodwin]

observed the harassment and discrimination of

Plaintiff by . . . Dewsen. 

. . . Dewsen dictated restrictions as to the duties

allowed to certain lab technicians, in particular

. . . [Plaintiff]; i.e., he would not allow her to

plate the urines or conduct cultures—procedures

that he prescribe[d] exclusively to male lab

technicians such as Mike Olsen. 

. . . 

Plaintiff [was] forced to continue to work with coworker [Dewsen] after . . . reporting . . . his

constant and ongoing harassment of her (yelling,

screaming, threatening), despite her request to

work with another technician (Mike Olsen) in

another area of the laboratory when [Dewsen] was

working the same shift as Plaintiff. . . . When

Plaintiff was forced to work with [Dewsen],

approximately 90 [percent] of her 40 hour work

week, . . . [Dewsen] would physically hover over

her, refuse to assist her if he believed she

need[ed] assistance, and then commence to scream,

yell and threaten her.

(SAC ¶¶ 8-9 & 21(a).) 

These allegations do not support drawing a reasonable

inference that Plaintiff was harassed based on her gender or age, or

that her work environment “[wa]s permeated with discriminatory [sexand/or age-based] intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Lyle, 38 Cal. 4th

at 279. Therefore, this portion of the dismissal motion is GRANTED. 

B. Retaliation

Dignity Health argues “Plaintiff’s [retaliation] claim . . .

fails because she . . . fail[s] to allege that she engaged in protected

conduct under either Title VII or . . . FEHA.” (Mot. 3:4-5.) Dignity

Health also argues “Plaintiff cannot establish that any alleged

retaliation is causally related to any negative performance reviews or

written warnings she received.” Id. at 3:6-7. Plaintiff does not address

these arguments in her opposition brief. 

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“In order to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation

under FEHA [or Title VII], [P]laintiff[] must prove that [she] engaged

in protected activity, [her] employer subjected [her] to adverse

employment action, and there was a causal link between the protected

activity and the employer’s action.” Lee v. Eden Med. Cntr., 690 F.

Supp. 2d 1011, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star

Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the

same elements for a retaliation claim under Title VII and FEHA).

“Causation sufficient to establish the third element of the prima facie

case may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the

employer’s knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in protected activities

and the proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly

retaliatory employment decision.” Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371,

1376 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff alleges she was “forced to continue to work with

[Dewsen] after [she] report[ed] . . . his constant and ongoing

harassment of her[.]” (SAC ¶ 21(a).) Plaintiff also alleges: 

Plaintiff recei[ved] . . . a written warning after

an investigation meeting in [July 2010] regarding

an allegation of her non-use or inability to use

the Mobil Lab machine after the operational issues

of said machine had been reported by other

employees . . . to [Witthaus and O’Connor]. No

other employees received such a written warning. 

[Witthaus] provid[ed] a list to Plaintiff in midSeptember, 2010, containing the names of several of

her co-workers and their alleged comments about

her—none of which were substantiated or verified by

him—and were later refuted by said co-workers upon

their subsequent initial knowledge of said list and

the alleged comments contained therein[.]

Plaintiff [was] notified by [Witthaus] in midSeptember, 2010, immediately after receipt by

[Whitthaus] of the challenge of those co-workers to

the above-referenced list and negative comments,

that she was subject to a 90-day performance reevaluation of her last performance evaluation[,]

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which took place in May, 2010. Said “re-evaluation”

took place in December, 2010, some 7 months

afterward, and resulted in another negative

performance evaluation.

Id. ¶ 21(b)-(d).

These allegations do not support drawing a reasonable

inference that Plaintiff’s report about Dewsen’s conduct was causally

related to the negative performance reviews and written warnings

Plaintiff received. Therefore, this portion of the dismissal motion is

GRANTED.

C. Negligence

Defendants argue “Plaintiff references the alleged harassment

as a basis for her negligence claim . . . [but] since [she] has failed

to properly allege a claim for harassment, her negligence claim fails.”

(Mot. 10:5-16.) “In the employment context, a claim for negligence

requires the existence of a legal duty of care by an employer to an

employee, a breach of that [duty], proximate causation of plaintiff’s

damages, and damages.” Scott v. Solano Cnty. Health & Soc. Servs. Dep’t,

459 F. Supp. 2d 959, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 

Plaintiff alleges in her SAC that her “claim for negligence

. . . [is] based on her employer’s alleged failure to protect her from

harassment.” (SAC ¶ 24.) Plaintiff further alleges: 

[D]efendants had a duty to act to protect Plaintiff

from harassment and retaliation. Plaintiff brought

the acts of harassment and retaliation to the

attention of her supervisors, as well as Human

Resources, on many occasions. Defendants were

negligent in not exercising due care to prevent the

harassment and retaliation. 

Id. ¶ 25. However, Plaintiff failed to allege non-conclusory allegations

in support of her negligence claim, or to otherwise state allegations

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sufficient to allege the elements of this claim. Therefore, this portion

of the dismissal motion is GRANTED. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ dismissal motion is

GRANTED. Further, Plaintiff is granted ten (10) days from date on which

this order is filed to file a Third Amended Complaint in which she

addresses the deficiencies in any dismissed claim.

Dated: September 5, 2012

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

Senior United States District Judge

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