Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-06089/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-06089-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

AMELIA MARQUEZ, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NLP JANITORIAL, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-06089-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT; 

VACATING MAY 23, 2019 HEARING

[Re: ECF 78, 79]

Plaintiffs Amelia Marquez, Lorenzo Diego Cano, Maria Tonayan Reyes, and Aaron Lugo 

Hernandez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) have moved for the entry of default judgment against 

Defendant janitorial services business NLP Janitorial, Inc., as well as the principal of that 

company, defendant Nicole Pascariello, and Defendant Coast to Coast West, Inc. (collectively, 

“Defendants”). ECF 78; Mot., ECF 79. Plaintiffs seek damages and statutory penalties, as well as 

injunctive relief, for Defendants’ violations of state and federal labor laws. The Court finds that 

the motion is appropriate for submission without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

Accordingly, the hearing set for May 23, 2019 is VACATED. For the following reasons, 

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendants NLP Janitorial, Inc. (“NLP”), Coast to Coast West, Inc. (“CTC”), and Nicole 

Pascariello (collectively, “Defendants”) are a group of corporations, partnerships, and individuals 

operating a large janitorial contracting business in California. Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 1, 

16, ECF 1-2. Plaintiffs worked as nighttime cleaning crew for Defendants at the Hyatt Carmel 

Highlands hotel in Monterey County for various periods of time between September 2008 and 

March 2013. Plaintiffs allege that they generally worked six to seven hours per night, seven 

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nights per week, except during special events when they worked up to ten hours per night. Id. ¶ 

20. Plaintiffs’ supervisors transported Plaintiffs to and from work, directed them about when to 

begin and end work, assigned them tasks at the work site, told them which tools and supplies to 

use to perform their work, and told them when and whether they could take rest breaks. Id. ¶¶ 18–

19. 

According to Plaintiffs, they were paid a set amount of money per week, regardless of the 

number of hours they worked, such that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs the applicable 

minimum wage and overtime wages. Id. ¶ 20. Defendants also told Plaintiffs not to take meal or 

rest periods and made nonconsensual deductions from Plaintiffs’ pay for equipment and supplies, 

missed workdays, and check-cashing fees. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23. Defendants also allegedly withheld 

Plaintiffs’ wages for the first several weeks of their employment, failed to pay all wages due when 

Plaintiffs quit, and failed to provide Plaintiffs with accurate itemized wage statements. Id. ¶¶ 22, 

24. And Defendants knowingly misclassified Plaintiffs as independent contractors instead of 

employees. Id. ¶ 25. Finally, Plaintiff Marquez alleges that she was paid through direct deposit 

without authorization, such that she had to pay a fee each time she withdrew the funds, and she 

received her pay several weeks late on one occasion. Id. ¶ 26.

Based on the foregoing, on February 19, 2014 Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Monterey 

Superior Court against Defendants NLP; Pascariello; CTC; Winters Company d/b/a Winters 

Janitorial; Robert Winters; and Augustin Janitorial, LCC (collectively, “Original Defendants”). 

Not. of Removal ¶ 2, ECF 1. They alleged that each Defendant was an agent of every other 

Defendant, and specifically that Pascariello was a supervisorial employee and/or agent of NLP and 

CTC. SAC ¶¶ 9, 14. On May 4, 2016, Plaintiffs added new defendants Hyatt Corporation, 

Highlands Inn Investors II, LP and Interval Leisure Group, Inc. (collectively, “Hyatt Defendants”). 

On September 14, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. Not. of Removal ¶ 6. 

Based on Defendants’ alleged actions, Plaintiffs brought the following causes of actions: (1) 

failure to pay state or federal minimum wages in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 1197; (2) failure 

to pay overtime wages in violation of Cal. Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198; (3) on behalf of 

themselves and others similarly situated, failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair 

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Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 216(b); (4) failure to provide meal periods and authorize 

and permit rest periods in violation of Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512; (5) failure to provide 

accurate itemized wage statements in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 226(a); (6) failure to pay all 

wages due upon discharge or resignation in violation of Cal. Labor Code §§ 202 and 203; (7) 

unlawful competition in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; (8) labor code 

violations under the Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq.; and (9) 

failure to sufficiently fund contract for janitorial services in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 2810, 

as to only Original Defendants who are no longer defendants in this action. Plaintiffs requested 

compensatory and liquidated damages, as well as restitution, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees 

and costs. See generally SAC.

On July 27, 2014, the state court entered default against CTC, and on October 3, 2014, the 

state court entered default against NLP. See Katz Decl., Ex. 13, ECF 79-18. According to 

documents previously filed in this case, but not submitted with the instant motion, the state court 

again entered default against NLP and CTC on March 22, 2016, this time including a court 

judgment with an indication that a default prove-up was necessary. See ECF 37-2, 37-3. 

On October 21, 2016, Defendants removed the action to federal court. See Not. of 

Removal. The Hyatt Defendants indicated that Defendant Pascariello consented to the removal on 

behalf of herself and as principal of NLP, as did Robert Winters, principal of CTC. Id. ¶ 13. In 

May 2017, Plaintiffs and the Hyatt Defendants settled, and in December 2017 the Court approved 

the settlement. See ECF 50. On October 18, 2017, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Defendants 

Robert Winters d/b/a Winters Janitorial, and Augustine Janitorial, LLC. Because Pascariello filed 

an Answer in Superior Court, Plaintiffs sought to compel discovery or sanctions as a result of her 

failure to participate in the action, which the Court granted. See ECF 51, 62. Pascariello never 

produced the compelled discovery. See ECF 55. On February 21, 2018, the Court issued an Order 

to Show Cause why Pascariello’s Answer should not be stricken and entry of default should not be 

entered against her. See ECF 62. Pascariello never responded, and the Court struck her Answer 

and entered default pursuant to Rule 55(a) on March 29, 2018. ECF 65. Pascariello has not filed 

a single document in this action since removal. 

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On July 18, 2018, Plaintiffs moved for default against NLP and Pascariello. On November 

12, 2018, Plaintiffs amended their motion for default to include CTC.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), the Court may enter default judgment 

against a defendant who has failed to plead or otherwise defend an action. “The district court’s 

decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F. 2d 

1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 

In exercising its discretion to enter default judgment, a district court considers seven 

factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(“Eitel factors”): (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s 

substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; 

(5) the possibility of dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether default was due to excusable 

neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring 

decisions on the merits. In considering these factors after a clerk’s entry of default, the court takes 

all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, except those with regard to damages. 

Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court may, in its 

discretion, consider competent evidence and other papers submitted with a motion for default 

judgment to determine damages. Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Adoption of Entry of Default and Default Judgment as to Defendants NLP 

Janitorial, Inc. and Coast to Coast West, Inc.

“After removal, the federal court takes the case up where the State court left it off.” 

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 436 (1974) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “The federal court . . . treats everything that occurred in the state court as if it had taken 

place in federal court.” Butner v. Neustadter, 324 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1963). Consequently, 

an order entered by a state court “should be treated as though it had been validly rendered in the 

federal proceeding.” Id. at 786; see also Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 887 

(9th Cir. 2010). Here, the state court entered default and a default judgment against NLP and 

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CTC, with the default judgment subject to proof of damages by Plaintiffs. Because the Court is 

bound by the state court’s order, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment as to 

NLP and CTC. 

B. Eitel Factors as to Pascariello

All seven of the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ motion as to Pascariello. 

First, prejudice would befall the Plaintiffs were default judgment to be denied because Pascariello 

refuses to litigate this action. Plaintiffs would then be left without recourse and would be denied 

their earned, but unpaid, wages.

Next, both the second and third Eitel factors weigh in favor of entering default judgment 

against Pascariello. Plaintiffs’ substantive claims appear meritorious, and their Complaint is 

sufficiently pled. The FLSA covers enterprises who are engaged in commerce or whose 

employees are engaged in commerce. 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1). Defendants are, or own and 

operate, a janitorial service employed by hotels, which engages in commerce under 29 U.S.C. §§ 

203(b). Should an employee work for more than forty hours in one week, the FLSA requires 

employers to pay those employees “at a rate not less than one-half times the regular rate.” Id. 

Pascariello is alleged to have been a supervisorial agent of both NLP and CTC and has represented 

herself to be the principal of NLP. SAC ¶ 14. She is thus an “employer” for the purposes of 

California law, because she is an “owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the employer.” 

Cal. Labor Code § 558.1. Section 510 of the California Labor Code (“CLC”) restates the FLSA’s 

overtime wage payment requirement. Plaintiffs allege that they repeatedly worked more than forty 

hours per week during their employment for Defendants at the hotel but were never paid overtime. 

SAC ¶ 20. Taken as true, the allegations are sufficient to establish a claim for violations of the 

FLSA and CLC. Similarly, under § 1197 of the CLC, employers must pay employees minimum 

wage for their work. Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants did not pay them overtime wages, 

taken as true, sufficiently indicate that they were not paid a minimum wage for their work, thereby 

establishing violations of §§ 206 and 207 of the FLSA and § 1197 of the CLC. See SAC ¶¶ 20, 

29. 

§ 226.7 of the CLC mandates that when an employer does not allow its employees to take 

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required meal breaks in accordance with state law, “the employer shall pay the employee one 

additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each workday that the 

meal or rest or recovery period is not provided.” Cal. Labor Code § 226.7. In their complaint, 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants never provided them meal or rest breaks and that they worked 

through these mandatory breaks. SAC ¶ 21. Taken as true, these allegations are sufficient to 

show a violation of § 226.7. § 226(a) of the CLC requires an employer to furnish to its employee 

itemized wage statements on a semimonthly basis or at the time of each payment of wages. 

Plaintiffs allege they were not provided these statements. Id. ¶ 24. Finally, § 202 of the CLC 

requires that when an employee quits without having a contract for a set time period, the employer 

must pay the employee all wages due within 72 hours of the employee’s quitting. Plaintiffs 

sufficiently allege that Defendants did not comply with this requirement. Id. ¶ 22.

Violations of the above statutory provisions can constitute unlawful business practices in 

violation California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. Similarly, 

California’s Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), Cal. Labor Code § 2698, et seq., allows 

aggrieved employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations, provided they give 

notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”). Plaintiffs allege they sent 

notice to the LWDA on May 14, 2013. SAC ¶ 68. Their PAGA claim is thus successfully pled as 

to the Labor Code violations asserted in their complaint. The ninth cause of action was not 

asserted against Pascariello, NLP, or CTC.

The fourth Eitel factor—the amount in controversy—does not weigh against default 

judgment. Plaintiff Marquez seeks $81,101.74; Plaintiff Cano seeks $12,469.99; and Plaintiff 

Tonayan seeks $11,349.60. See Rice. Suppl. Decl., Ex. 4. Each of these totals consists of unpaid 

minimum wages, unpaid overtime wages, meal and rest period compensation, compensation for 

unprovided itemized wage statements (Marquez only), waiting time penalties for unpaid wages, 

pre-judgment interest, and PAGA civil penalties. Plaintiffs also seek PAGA penalties for other 

aggrieved employees in the amount of $21,166.00. And finally, Plaintiffs seek PAGA penalties 

for the LWDA in the amount of $40,650.00. These PAGA totals consist of penalties for failure to 

pay minimum wages, failure to maintain business records, failure to pay timely wages upon 

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termination, failure to pay overtime, and failure to pay for meal and rest periods. These amounts 

are not excessive, are what Plaintiffs are entitled to under federal and state law, and, as addressed 

below, are sufficiently established through documentary proof. The amount in controversy 

therefore does not weigh against granting default judgment. 

The fifth and sixth factors also weigh in favor of default judgment. Though Piscariello 

answered, her failure to participate in this action led this Court to strike her answer, and thus the 

allegations in the Complaint are taken as true, especially in light of Plaintiffs’ declarations 

supporting those allegations. See Cruz v. Quang, No. 13-CV-00181-VC, 2015 WL 348869, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2015). Piscariello’s continued failure to comply with orders of this Court does 

not appear to have been due to excusable neglect, especially in light of the fact that Piscariello 

engaged with the litigation prior to removal.

Lastly, while federal policy does not favor entering default judgment against unresponsive 

defendants, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) permits the court to enter default against 

defendants who simply refuse to litigate. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Deleon, No. 5:13-CV02030, 2014 WL 121711, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) (citation omitted). Therefore, despite 

this general reluctance, the seventh Eitel factor also weighs in favor of entering default judgment 

against Piscariello. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment as to 

Pascariello. 

C. Damages

Plaintiffs1seek a variety of damages and penalties, as well as injunctive relief. The Court 

discusses the remedy warranted under each cause of action. 

A default judgment for damages may not differ in kind or exceed the amount demanded in 

the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(c). In this case, although Plaintiffs did not set forth any 

specific amount of damages demanded, such amount can be determined from the pleading itself. 

Plaintiffs request statutory damages and penalties based on their work history with Defendants. 

 

1 Although Plaintiff Aaron Lugo Hernandez is still in the case, he does not seek any remedies 

through the present motion. As such, the Court awards him $0.

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As Plaintiffs’ employers, Defendants are deemed to know the working hours of their employees 

and to know the statutory wage requirements and penalty provisions. Thus, the Court is satisfied 

that the SAC sufficiently informed Defendants of the total liability they were facing. Nothing 

more than simple arithmetic would be required to calculate the damages requested.

Before turning to the individual causes of action, the Court describes the evidence 

Plaintiffs put forward in support of their motion. Id. Each of the Plaintiffs submits a declaration 

in support of the motion for default judgment. See generally Marquez Decl., ECF 79-20; Tonayan 

Decl., ECF 79-21; Cano Decl., ECF 79-22. They also provide various documents collected from 

Defendants during discovery. Ultimately, in calculating damages, “Plaintiffs have reconstructed 

their time based on the daily schedule that they worked, as no time records were maintained by the 

Defendants.” Mot. at 20. The Court finds these declarations sufficient to support a finding of 

specific damages. See Brock v. Seto, 790 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding employees’ 

testimonies sufficient to allow for reasonable inferences as to amount of damages for FLSA 

claim); Cruz, 2015 WL 348869, at *6 (awarding back wages “based on Plaintiffs’ recollection of 

their respective overtime hours”).

The Court now discusses the relevant damages for each cause of action in turn.

1. Unpaid Minimum Wages and Overtime Wages

§ 510 of the CLC states that employees will be paid “at the rate of no less than one and 

one-half times the regular rate of pay for an employee” should they work in excess of either eight 

hours in one day, or over forty hours in one week.2 CLC § 1197 provides that employees shall be 

paid the minimum wage, and payment less than the minimum wage is unlawful. CLC § 1194(a) 

provides that “any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime 

compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance 

of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, 

reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.”

Plaintiffs’ testimony and the records they have submitted demonstrate that they were 

 

2 Plaintiffs do not seek separate compensation under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207. See Mot. at 26. 

Thus, the Court need not consider approval of a collective action under the FLSA.

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denied minimum wage and overtime pay. Plaintiff Marquez worked for Defendants from 

September 2008 to March 2013. SAC ¶ 17. Marquez avers that she worked at the hotel seven 

nights per week, spending 6.5 hours cleaning and 1.5 hours traveling to and from the worksite

under her employer’s control, for a total of 8 hours per night. Marquez Decl. ¶ 7. To travel to and 

from the worksite, she was required to use the employer’s transportation. Id. ¶ 11. She thus 

worked 56 hours per week, including 16 hours of overtime. From September 2008 to September 

10, 2010, she was paid $1600 per month. From September 11, 2010 through December 31, 2010, 

she was paid $1662.08 per month. From January 1, 2012 through July 24, 2012, she was paid 

$376.62 per week, and from July 25, 2012 through March 2, 2013, she was paid $369.08 per 

week. She also was not paid for six total weeks of employment. See id. ¶¶ 7–9. Employer 

records and Marquez’s records indicate that a different (though largely comparable) pay rate than 

Marquez remembers was used for several of these pay periods. Rice Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 5–7, 9–10, 

ECF 84; ECF 79-7 at 29–30; ECF 79-6 at 32–33; 79-9 at 115–24. Where discrepancies exist, 

Plaintiffs and the Court rely on the records over Marquez’s recollections.

Plaintiff Cano worked for Defendants from April 22, 2012 to September 6, 2012. Cano 

Decl. ¶ 5. Like Marquez, he worked seven nights per week for 8 hours (including transportation 

time). Id. ¶ 6. He thus worked 56 hours per week, including 16 hours of overtime. He was paid a 

fixed rate no matter the hours works: From April 22, 2012 to May 26, 2012, he was paid $367.83 

per week, and from May 27, 2012 to September 6, 2012, he was paid $340.53 per week. Id. ¶¶ 8–

9. He also was never paid for two weeks and five days of wages. Id. ¶ 10; Rice Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13. 

Employer records and Cano’s records indicate that a different (though largely comparable) pay 

rate than Cano remembers was used for several of the pay periods. Rice Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 14; ECF 

79-22 at 6–11. Where discrepancies exist, Plaintiffs and the Court rely on the records over Cano’s 

recollections.

Finally, Plaintiff Tonayan worked for Defendants from July 13, 2012 to October 18, 2012. 

Tonayan Decl. ¶ 5. She worked seven nights a week for eight hours (including transportation). 

She thus worked 56 hours per week, including 16 hours of overtime. She was paid a fixed fee of 

$360.60. Id. ¶ 7. She is still owed two weeks of wages. Id. ¶ 8. These recollections are 

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confirmed by the employer’s and Tonayan’s records. Rice Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 15; ECF 79-21 at 6–13; 

ECF 79-6 at 43.

Each Plaintiff alleges he or she was not paid for the 1.5 hours per day spent travelling to 

and from the work site. These hours are compensable, as each Plaintiff has averred that the travel 

was compulsory. See Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 587–88 (2000), as 

modified (May 10, 2000) (holding “hours worked” under Wage Order No. 14-80 includes 

compulsory travel time); Rodriguez v. SGLC, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-01971-MCE, 2012 WL 5705992, 

at *18 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) (citing Rutti v. Lojack Corp., 596 F.3d 1046, 1062 (9th Cir. 

2010)) (same for Cal. Labor Code § 510). Thus, each Plaintiff is owed eight hours of minimum 

wage per work day, up to 40 hours in the week. Moreover, Plaintiffs are owed 16 hours of 

overtime pay. Plaintiffs are thus owed the difference between the amount earned (40 hours of 

minimum wage and 16 hours of overtime) and the amount the employer paid (the weekly or 

monthly flat fee). 

Plaintiffs have calculated these amounts based on the applicable $8 minimum wage at the 

time. See Rice Suppl. Decl., Exs. 1 & 2; Cal. Labor Code § 1182.12 (effective Jan. 1, 2007 to 

Dec. 31, 2013) ($8 per hour minimum wage). Defendants have not brought forth any evidence to 

rebut these calculations. See Brock, 790 F.2d at 1448. This evidence is sufficient to establish a 

reasonable inference that Plaintiffs are owed the amount they seek. See Ulin v. ALAEA-72, Inc., 

No. C-09-3160-EDL, 2011 WL 723617, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2011) (where “very few 

records were kept,” overtime compensation “must necessarily be approximated”); accord Rosas v. 

Hua Ping Chang, No. 5:13-CV-01800-HRL, 2014 WL 4925122, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29 2014); 

Telles v. Li, No. 5:11-CV-01470-LHK, 2013 WL 5199811, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013). 

The Court has reviewed these calculations and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for the 

following unpaid wages: Marquez: $22,632.66; Cano: $3,675.99; and Tonayan: $3,143.60. 

Plaintiffs are also entitled to pre-judgment interest on their unpaid wages from February 

20133until now at a rate of 10% per annum. See Rice Suppl. Decl., Ex. 3. As such the Court 

 

3 Though Plaintiffs Cano and Tonayan ended their employment before February 2013, their 

calculations for pre-judgment interest begin on this date.

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GRANTS pre-judgment interest in the following amounts4: Marquez: $17,158.73; Cano: 

$2,786.92; and Tonayan: $2,383.29.5

2. Liquidated Damages

Plaintiffs also request liquidated damages under Cal. Labor Code § 1194.2, based on their 

wages due for the 1.5 hours of compulsory travel each day at the minimum wage rate of $8.00 per 

hour, and for the hours for weeks in which they were not paid at all. See Rice Suppl. Decl., Ex. 1, 

Column 10 (Marquez); Rice Suppl. Decl., Ex. 2, Section 1, Column 10 (Cano); Rice Suppl. Decl., 

Ex. 2, Section 2, Column 10 (Tonayan). Plaintiffs request these damages for the past three years, 

based on the relevant statute of limitations. See Cal. Labor Code § 1194.2 (“A suit may be filed 

for liquidated damages at any time before the expiration of the statute of limitations on an action 

for wages from which the liquidated damages arise.”); Cuadra v. Millan, 17 Cal. 4th 855, 859 

(1998) (wage liability actions have three year statute of limitations period under Cal. Code Civ. 

Proc. § 338(a) and wage calculations date from filing of complaint back to beginning of statutory 

limitation period). The Court agrees that Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages and that 

these calculations are correct. See Sillah v. Command Int’l Sec. Srvs., 154 F. Supp. 3d 891, 914 

(N.D. Cal. 2015) (awarding liquidated damages where defendant had not rebutted the plaintiffs’ 

evidence). The Court thus GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for the following liquidated damages 

amounts: Marquez: $9,268,00; Cano: $1,596.00; and Tonayan: $1,344.00.

 

4 Plaintiffs calculate their pre-judgment interest by including the amount owed for meal and rest 

period violations. See Rice Suppl. Decl., Ex. 3. But their motion does not cite case law 

supporting the argument that pre-judgment interest can be awarded for meal and rest period 

violations, and it does not include the pre-judgment interest request with respect to such 

violations. Indeed, case law appears to hold that pre-judgment interest is not warranted for meal 

and rest period violations. See Van v. Language Line Servs., Inc., No. 14-CV-03791-LHK, 2016 

WL 3143951, at *18 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2016); In re: Autozone, Inc., No. 3:10-MD-02159-CRB, 

2016 WL 4208200, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016). As such, the Court calculates the prejudgment interest owed based only on the total unpaid minimum wage and overtime wages due.

5 These calculations are based on the following formula: (Amount A x 0.1 + Amount A) = 

Amount B; (Amount B x 0.1 + Amount B) = Amount C; etc., where each Amount is measured in a 

365-day period for 5 years between February 1, 2013 and January 31, 2018, and the final Amount 

is measured in an 11-month period from February 1, 2018 through December 31, 2018. See Rice 

Suppl. Decl., Ex. 3.

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3. Rest and Meal Break Penalties

CLC § 226.7 mandates that if “an employer fails to provide an employee a meal or rest or 

recovery period in accordance with a state law . . . the employer shall pay the employee one 

additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each workday that the 

meal or rest or recovery period is not provided.” Although the wording is somewhat ambiguous, 

California courts interpreting this provision have concluded that an employee “may recover up to 

two additional hours of pay on a single work day for meal period and rest period violations—one 

for failure to provide a meal period and another for failure to provide a rest period.” United 

Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 4th 57, 70 (2011); see Valdez v. Neil Jones 

Food Co., No. 1:13-cv-00519-AWI-SAB, 2013 WL 4500568, at *4–*5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013). 

Plaintiffs each attest that they were never provided meal or rest breaks during their 

employment. Marquez Decl. ¶ 16; Cano Decl. ¶ 13; Tonayan Decl. ¶ 13; SAC ¶¶ 21, 43. 

Assuming two hours for each shift that they worked, Plaintiffs determined what premium 

payments they are owed for missed meal and rest periods. Rice Suppl. Decl, Exs. 1 & 2. This 

evidence is sufficient to establish Plaintiffs’ entitlement to the following amounts in statutory 

penalties for missed meal and rest breaks. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for 

penalties for missed meal and rest breaks in the following amounts: Marquez: $5,936.00 (meal) 

and $5,936.00 (rest); Cano: $1,064.00 (meal) and $1,064.00 (rest); Tonayan: $896.00 (meal) and 

$896.00 (rest).

4. Itemized Wage Statements

Cal. Labor Code § 226(a) requires that employers provide wage statements that accurately 

itemize earnings, hours worked, applicable rates of pay, the name and address of the legal entity 

that is the employer, and payroll deductions, among other information. If an employer knowingly 

and intentionally fails to provide an accurate wage statement to an employee, the employee may 

recover “the greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars ($50) for the initial pay period in which a 

violation occurs and one hundred dollars ($100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent

pay period, not to exceed an aggregate penalty of four thousand dollars ($4,000).” Id. To 

establish that Defendants’ violation of § 226(a) was “knowing and intentional,” Plaintiffs must 

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demonstrate that Defendants were “aware of the factual predicate underlying the violation[s].” 

Novoa v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 100 F.Supp.3d 1013, 1028 (E.D. Cal. 2015). For example, an 

“isolated and unintentional payroll error due to clerical or inadvertent mistake” will not suffice. 

Cabardo v. Patacsil, 248 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1010 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Cal. Labor Code § 

226(e)(3)). This claim has a one year statute of limitations. See Falk v. Children’s Hosp. L.A.,

237 Cal. App. 4th 1454, 1469 (2015).

There is no dispute that Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs with itemized statements. 

Marquez Decl. ¶4; Cano Decl. ¶ 3; Tonayan Decl. ¶¶ 3, 14; Katz Decl., Exs. 1, 2, 4; SAC ¶¶ 49, 

50. Marquez worked for Defendants for almost five years and was never provided a wage 

statement. Though Cano and Tonayan worked for Defendants for only a few months, they too 

were never given itemized wage statements, and their periods of employment began many years 

after Marquez’s began. From these facts, the Court can reasonably infer that Defendants knew 

they were not providing itemized wage statements; this failure was not due to a mere clerical error. 

Plaintiff Marquez is the only one who worked within the applicable statute of limitations, and she 

worked for only two pay periods. As such, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request to award 

Plaintiff Marquez $150 for failure to provide itemized wage statements.

5. Waiting Time Penalties 

Cal. Labor Code § 203 mandates that a worker who is discharged or quits and whose 

wages are not paid continues to accrue his daily wages for up to thirty days for a willful violation. 

“Willful” in the context of § 203 does not require malicious intent. It only requires that the 

employer intentionally paid the employee in the manner that payment was made. See Barnhill v. 

Robert Saunders & Co., 125 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (“As used in section 203, 

‘willful’ merely means that the employer intentionally failed or refused to perform an act which 

was required to be done.”). If the Court finds that Plaintiffs are owed unpaid wages, waiting time 

penalties in the amount of thirty-days’ wages should also be awarded because the complaint was 

filed after the thirty-day period passed. 

Plaintiffs were not timely paid all wages owed after they left Defendants’ employment 

more than five years ago, despite repeated requests to be compensated. Marquez Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 9, 

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18; Cano Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16; Tonayan Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7, 8, 9, 15. This evidence, in 

combination with the evidence that Defendants routinely missed paying Plaintiffs altogether, 

shows that Defendants willfully withheld the payments after Plaintiffs quit. As such, Plaintiffs are 

entitled to the statutory maximum of 30 days of waiting time penalties. The Court GRANTS 

Plaintiffs waiting time penalties as follows: Marquez: $1,920.00; Cano: $1,920.00; Tonayan: 

$1,920.00.

6. Injunctive Relief 

Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to injunctive relief under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203. 

“According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction 

must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: 

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 

damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 

hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the 

public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 

L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Plaintiffs fail to argue that they satisfy any of these elements. 

As such, the Court DENIES the request for injunctive relief. Further, restitution is not available

because all statutory damages and penalties have been awarded. Thus, no relief is allowed under 

the seventh claim.

7. PAGA Claims

Plaintiffs also assert each of their claims under the California Private Attorneys General 

Act of 2004, California Labor Code § 2699 et seq. (“PAGA”). That section provides that “any 

provision of this code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the Labor 

and Workforce Development Agency or any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, 

agencies, or employees, for a violation of this code, may, as an alternative, be recovered through a 

civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or 

former employees[.]” Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a). The representative action authorized by PAGA 

is an enforcement action, with one aggrieved employee acting as a private attorney general to 

collect penalties from employers who violate the Labor Code. 

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The penalty available under PAGA is “one hundred dollars ($100) for each aggrieved 

employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred dollars ($200) for each 

aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation,” unless the code provision that 

is violated “specifically provide[s]” for a civil penalty. Id. § 2699(f)(2). These PAGA penalties 

are separate and apart from the actual damages that a Plaintiff may recover under other labor code 

sections. See Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc., 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1144–48 

(2012). 25% of the penalties recovered go to the aggrieved plaintiff and 75% goes to the Labor 

and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”). See id. § 2699(i). Aggrieved employees are 

entitled to penalties for violations that occurred no more than one year prior to the sending of 

notice to LWDA. See Culley v. Lincare Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1191 (E.D. Cal. 2017).

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs here are aggrieved employees under PAGA because they 

were “employed by the alleged violator” and “sustained one or more of the alleged violations,” as 

discussed above under the Eitel factors. Id. § 2699(c). They also satisfied the procedural 

requirement of providing notice to the LWDA sufficiently in advance of bringing this claim. Id. § 

2699.3(a); see SAC ¶ 68. This notice was also provided to Defendants and contained the 

necessary substantive allegations to constitute proper notice of Plaintiffs claims here. See Katz 

Decl., Ex. 7, ECF 79-12. 

Plaintiffs also bring this action on behalf of other former aggrieved employees, which is 

discussed in more detail below. First, the Court addresses each of Plaintiffs’ claims as to their 

own grievances, and then turns to the aggrieved former employees.

a. Plaintiffs’ PAGA Penalties 

Plaintiffs seek penalties for their minimum wage, overtime, meal and rest breaks, itemized 

wage statements, and waiting time claims. 

Minimum Wages: Plaintiffs seek penalties under § 1197.1(a), which provides specific 

penalties for an employer’s intentional failure to pay minimum wage at a rate of $100 per plaintiff 

for the first pay period, and $250 per plaintiff per pay period for each subsequent violation. 

Plaintiffs aver that they were paid on a weekly basis during the relevant time period, so they have 

used a weekly pay period calculation. See Marquez Decl. ¶ 8; Tonayan Decl. ¶ 7; Cano Decl. ¶ 8. 

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The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ calculations and GRANTS PAGA penalties in the following 

amounts: Marquez: $ 2,587.50 & LWDA: $ 7,762.50; Cano: $962.50 & LWDA: $2,887.50; 

Tonayan: $962.50 & LWDA: $2,887.50.

Overtime Wages: Plaintiffs seek recovery of penalties for failure to pay overtime wages 

under § 558. § 558 provides for civil penalties for violations of the provisions asserted as claims 

in this action, at a rate of “$50 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation, 

and $100 per employee for each subsequent violation for minimum wage, overtime, meal break 

and wage statement violations.” Guifu Li v. A Perfect Day Franchise, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-01189-

LHK, 2012 WL 2236752, at *17 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2012) (citing § 558). The Court has 

reviewed Plaintiffs’ calculations and GRANTS PAGA penalties in the following amounts: 

Marquez: $1,037.50 & LWDA: $3,112.50; Cano: $387.50 & LWDA: $1,162.50; Tonayan: 

$387.50 & LWDA: $1,162.50.

Meal & Rest Breaks: Failure to pay the premium due for meal and rest periods under 

§ 226.7 constitutes a failure to pay wages, which is recoverable under § 558. See Guifu, 2012 WL 

2236752, at * 17. Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs PAGA penalties in the following amounts 

for meal periods: Marquez: $1,037.50 & LWDA: $3,112.50; Cano: $387.50 & LWDA: 

$1,162.50; Tonayan: $387.50 & LWDA: $1,162.50. The Court also GRANTS PAGA penalties in 

the following amounts for rest periods: Marquez: $1,037.50 & LWDA: $3,112.50; Cano: $387.50 

& LWDA: $1,162.50; Tonayan: $387.50 & LWDA: $1,162.50. 

Waiting Time & Itemized Wage Statements:

As discussed above, Plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of penalties under § 203 and § 226 

for waiting time violations and Defendants’ failure to provide itemized wage statements, 

respectively. As such, granting PAGA penalties for these two claims would be duplicative 

recovery. Plaintiffs have provided no authority that would permit double recovery of essentially 

the same penalties. Accord Guifu, 2012 WL 2236752, at *17. Therefore, the Court DENIES 

Plaintiffs’ request for PAGA penalties for the failure to provide accurate wage statements or 

waiting time as these penalties have already been awarded. 

b. Aggrieved Former Employees’ PAGA Penalties 

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Plaintiffs also seek penalties for Defendants’ minimum wage, overtime, meal and rest 

breaks, itemized wage statements, and waiting time violations on behalf of 1–2 aggrieved former 

employees. While the Court finds Plaintiffs’ testimonies sufficient for calculating their own 

damages, the evidence they provide in support of a finding of penalties as to these former 

employees is insufficient to justify PAGA penalties as to those employees. The only evidence 

Plaintiffs provide is the declaration of Plaintiff Marquez that she sometimes worked with 2–3 

other people during her employment. See Mot. at 37–38. They then assume that those workers 

were paid the same amount, worked the same number of hours, faced the same conditions, and 

worked for the entirety of the PAGA limitation period. These assumptions do not constitute 

evidence sufficient to calculate proper PAGA penalties as to these employees. The Court thus 

DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for PAGA penalties for the former employees.

D. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 

The CLC requires the court to “award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing 

party if any party to the action requests attorney’s fees and costs upon the initiation of the action.” 

Cal. Labor Code § 218.5. Like, the FLSA § 216(b) provides for a reasonable attorney’s fee and 

costs. The party seeking attorney’s fees must show that the rates sought are “in line with the 

prevailing market rate of the relevant community.” Carson v. Billings Police Dept., 470 F.3d 889, 

891 (9th Cir. 2006). Typically, “affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding 

prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases . . . are satisfactory 

evidence of the prevailing market rates.” Rodriguez v. Wallia, No. C-11-03854-EDL, 2012 WL 

1831579, at *4 (N.D. Cal. April 18, 2012) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge 

Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

In the present case, Plaintiffs seek fees for four attorneys: (1) Cynthia L. Rice, an attorney 

admitted to the state bar in 1979, at a rate of $750; (2) Phyllis Katz, an attorney admitted to the 

state bar in 1979, at a rate of $550; (3) Elena Dineen, an attorney admitted to the state bar in 2009, 

at a rate of $400 (a $50 reduction from her normal hourly rate); and (4) Maureen Keffer, an 

attorney admitted to the state bar in 2011, at a rate of $400 (a $50 reduction from her normal 

hourly rate). See Katz Decl. ¶ 16; Rice Decl. ¶¶ 5–9; Mot. at 41. Plaintiffs request only 50% of 

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the totally attorney’s fees accumulated in this case.

The Court finds these hourly rates to be reasonable for attorneys of similar experience, 

respectively, in the Northern District of California. See Mot. at 42–43 (citing cases with similar 

hourly rates). The total amount of attorney’s fees requested is $148,007.50. Plaintiffs’ counsel 

further states that they incurred costs in the amount of $3,556.87. Katz Decl., Ex. 12, ECF 79-17. 

The Court finds the 66.8 hours devoted to this matter by attorney Rice, the 157.7 hours by attorney 

Katz, the 179.45 hours by attorney Dineen, and the 218.5 hours by attorney Keffer to be 

reasonable in prosecuting this matter. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for 

$148,007.50 in reasonable attorney’s fees and $3,556.87 in costs, totaling $151,564.37.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default 

Judgment is GRANTED. Defendants shall be jointly and severally liable for a total of 

$243,145.56, which includes the following amounts:

Damages, and Statutory Penalties:

• Plaintiff Marquez: $22,632.66

• Plaintiff Cano: $3,675.99

• Plaintiff Tonayan: $3,143.60

• Plaintiff Hernandez: $0

Pre-Judgment Interest:

• Plaintiff Marquez: $17,158.73

• Plaintiff Cano: $2,786.92

• Plaintiff Tonayan: $2,383.29

• Plaintiff Hernandez: $0

PAGA Penalties:

• Plaintiff Marquez: $5,700

• Plaintiff Cano: $2,125 

• Plaintiff Tonayan: $2,125 

• Plaintiff Hernandez: $0

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• LWDA: $29,850 

Attorney’s Fees:

• $148,007.50

Costs

• $3,556.87

The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive relief, relief under Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code §§ 17200, et seq., relief under the FLSA, PAGA penalties for itemized wage statements and 

waiting time violations, and PAGA penalties on behalf of aggrieved former employees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2019

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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