Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01507/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01507-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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In re: 

MICHELLE MARIE BALETTI CASE NO. CIV. S-06-1507 WBS

 Debtor, (Bankruptcy Court No. 05-

27329-C7)

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(Adversary Proceeding No. 05-

PREM DHAWAN, 2302)

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

v. BANKRUPTCY APPEAL

A. LEWIS CHANDLER,

 Defendant and Appellant.

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Appellant A. Lewis Chandler appeals, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 158(a), several orders of the United States Bankruptcy

Court denying summary judgment and finding a waiver of his right

to a jury trial.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On June 15, 2005, Michelle Marie Balletti (“Debtor”)

filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. (March 28, 2006

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The property in question is commonly known as 551 Jean 1

Street #304, Oakland, California, a condominium (“Oakland

property”).

Default was eventually entered against CAC, based on 2

its failure to ever file an answer, acquire counsel or appear in

the adversary proceeding. (October 27, 2005 Bankruptcy Court

Entry of Clerk’s Default.)

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Opposition at 5.) On August 18, 2005, as part of that bankruptcy

action, appellee Prem Dhawan, trustee in bankruptcy of Debtor’s

estate, initiated an adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court

against Consumer Action Committee (“CAC”), a corporation, seeking

declaratory relief and a turnover of real property formerly owned

by Debtor. The complaint alleged that the January 4, 2005, deed 1

executed by Debtor, granting the Oakland property to CAC, was a

“fraudulent transfer” that should be avoided under 11 U.S.C.

548(a). (Id. ¶ 3.) On November 23, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court

granted a motion by appellant A. Lewis Chandler to intervene as

defendant, based on his assertions that while CAC was the named

title holder, appellant was in fact the legal and equitable owner

of the property, and thus a real party in interest. (November 2

23, 2005 Bankruptcy Court Order.) 

On February 21, 2006, appellant filed a motion for

summary judgment with the Bankruptcy Court, in which he asserted

that plaintiff appellee had failed to set forth any genuine issue

of material fact. On April 14, 2006, the Bankruptcy Court denied

appellant’s motion, based on its finding that disputes still

existed as to material facts. (April 14, 2006 Bankruptcy Court

Order.) In particular, it appeared that both parties continued

to dispute the value of the Oakland property. (Id.) On May 30,

2006, appellant again moved for summary judgment on essentially

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Subsequent to a December 6, 2005 status conference, on 3

December 7, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court entered a pre-trial

scheduling order, in which it ordered that “any right to a jury

trial is waived by the omission of such a request from the

complaint.” (December 7, 2005 Bankruptcy Court Order 8.) 

Presumably, appellant is appealing this pre-trial scheduling

order.

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identical grounds. On June 9, 2006, the Bankruptcy Court again

denied the motion, based this time on appellant’s failure to

abide by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1, which requires that a

party file a motion at least twenty eight days prior to the

hearing date. (June 9, 2006 Bankruptcy Court Order.)

On June 16, 2006, appellant noticed an appeal to this

court from the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of his Second Motion for

Summary Judgment, (June 9, 2006 Bankruptcy Court Order), as well

“all interlocutory orders that gave rise to that judgment.” 

(June 16, 2006 Notice of Appeal.) Appellant presents three

issues for appeal in his opening brief: 1) the court erred in

denying appellant’s second summary judgment motion; 2) the court

erred in denying appellant’s first summary judgment motion; and

3) the court erred in denying appellant’s demand for jury trial.3

(Appellant’s Opening Brief 5 (Statement of Issues Presented).)

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

The bankruptcy court’s findings are reviewed for clear

error and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. In re

Britton, 950 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1991). In reviewing the

Bankruptcy Court’s order, this court’s review is not limited to

consideration of the grounds upon which the lower court decided

the issue; an appellate court can affirm based on any grounds in

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the record. Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 860 n.17

(9th Cir. 1995); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937)

(“In the review of judicial proceedings the rule is settled that,

if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although

the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong

reason.”).

B. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction over an appeal from an order of a

bankruptcy court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 158. That section

vests the district courts with jurisdiction to hear appeals “from

final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . and with leave of the

court, from other interlocutory orders and decrees.” 28 U.S.C.

§§ 158(a) & (c). Thus, only “final” rulings may be appealed as a

matter of right; a party seeking to appeal any other order must

seek leave of the court. In re Frontier Props., Inc. v. Elliot,

979 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1992).

A final order is one that “ends the litigation on the

merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the

judgment.” Id. (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229,

233 (1945)). The Ninth Circuit has observed, however, that

finality rules in the context of bankruptcy proceedings warrant

additional flexibility. In re Mason, 709 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th

Cir. 1983) (“[C]ertain proceedings in a bankruptcy case are so

distinctive and conclusive either to the rights of individual

parties or the ultimate outcome of the case that final decisions

as to them should be appealable as of right.”); see also In re

Victoria Station, Inc., 840 F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus,

courts have adopted a “pragmatic approach” to assessing finality

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that focuses on whether “the decision appealed from ‘effectively

determined the outcome of the case.’” In re Frontier Props., 979

F.2d at 1363 (citing In re Mason, 709 F.2d at 1318). 

Specifically, a bankruptcy order may be appealed as a matter of

right where it “1) resolves and seriously affects substantive

rights and 2) finally determines the discrete issue to which it

is addressed.” Id.; In re Allen, 896 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir.

1990).

In this case, appellant appeals three orders entered by

the Bankruptcy Court--two denials of summary judgment and a pretrial scheduling order which found a waiver of appellant’s right

to a jury trial. (Appellant’s Opening Brief 5 (Statement of

Issues Presented).) “The denial of summary judgment is

interlocutory by nature and is thus not appealable.” In re

Smith, 735 F.2d 459, 461 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Harris, 209 B.R.

990, 992 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that a denial of summary

judgment is not “an appealable order because it does not dispose

of the entire case but requires it to be resolved at trial.”); In

re Kong, 196 B.R. 167 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that the

bankruptcy court’s summary judgment in an adversary proceeding

brought by trustee against debtors who allegedly made improper

transfers was interlocutory, since it did not resolve all claims

between trustee and bank; thus, trustee was required to have

leave to appeal); see also Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514

U.S. 35, 49 (1995) (noting the Eleventh Circuit’s lack of

jurisdiction to review a lower court’s denial of a summary

judgment motion). 

Here, when the Bankruptcy Court denied appellant’s

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motions for summary judgment, it did not adjudicate any of

appellant’s rights in regards to the Oakland property with any

sort of finality. The only practical effect of the orders was to

“merely preserve[] the status quo in the case” for a later

determination on the merits. In re Smith, 735 F.2d at 461. The

order denying both of these motions was therefore interlocutory.

Moreover, it is clearer still that an order denying a

jury trial is not final for the purposes of appeal. City of

Morgantown, W. Va. v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 258 (1949)

(“The ruling from which the appeal in this case was prosecuted

[denying a demand for jury trial] is an order interlocutory in

form and substance. Nothing in the language of the rules or the

Judicial Code brings it within the class of appealable

decisions.”); In re Hooker Invs., 937 F.2d 833, 837 (2d Cir.

1991) (an order with the collateral effect of eliminating a right

to a jury trial was not final); In re S. Indus. Banking Corp., 70

B.R. 196, 199-200 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (“Denial of a jury trial may

not be characterized as a final order.”); In re Bowers, 123 B.R.

821, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (“Even under the most liberal

definition of finality, this court cannot conclude that an order

which grants (or denies) a jury trial, standing alone, is

final.”). The only effect of a grant or denial of a jury trial

is to “prescribe the method of fact-finding to be applied to the

underlying dispute; it obviously does not dispose of the

dispute.” In re Hooker Invs., 937 F.2d at 837 (citing City of

Morgantown, 337 U.S. at 256). The Bankruptcy Court’s pre-trial

scheduling order, in which appellant’s right to jury trial was

waived, was therefore interlocutory. 

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Additionally, it must be noted that the notice of 4

appeal from a bankruptcy court order must be filed with the clerk

of the bankruptcy court “within 10 days of the date of the entry

of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from.” Fed. R. Bankr.

P. 8002(a). The untimely filing of the notice of appeal is

jurisdictional. In re Souza, 795 F.2d 855, 857 (9th Cir. 1986);

In re Mouradick, 13 F.3d 326, 327 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The

provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 8002 are jurisdictional; the

untimely filing of a notice of appeal deprives the appellate

court of jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court’s order.”). 

In this case, the pre-trial scheduling order was entered by the

Bankruptcy Court on December 7, 2005; the first order denying

summary judgment was entered on April 12, 2006; and the second

order denying summary judgment was entered on June 9, 2006. 

Appellant’s singular notice of appeal was filed on June 16, 2006. 

Thus, even if appellant had sought leave of this court,

appellant’s notice of appeal to the Bankruptcy Court was only

timely with regard to that court’s June 6, 2006, order. 

Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction over all other orders on

this ground as well.

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All of the orders that appellant appeals from the

Bankruptcy Court are interlocutory in nature, and because

appellant has not sought leave of the court, this court is

without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 28 U.S.C. 158(c). 4

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that appellant’s appeal be, and

the same hereby is, DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

DATED: October 26, 2006

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