Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01895/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01895-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1895

___________

Pearl Cottier, Rebecca Three Stars, *

*

Appellants, *

*

v. *

* Appeal From the United States

City of Martin; Todd Alexander, * District Court for the 

Rod Anderson, Scott Larson, Don * District of South Dakota.

Moore, Brad Otte, Molly Risse, *

in their official capacities as members *

of the Martin City Council; Janet *

Speidel, in her official capacity as *

Finance Officer of the City of Martin, *

*

 Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: January 9, 2006

Filed: May 5, 2006 (Corrected May 8, 2006)

___________

Before BYE, HEANEY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Martin, South Dakota is a city of 1,078 people located adjacent to the Pine

Ridge and Rosebud Indian Reservations. The city is divided into three, dual member

wards, each of which elects its two aldermen every two years in staggered terms.

Native-Americans make up nearly 45% of the total population and 36% of the votingAppellate Case: 05-1895 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/05/2006 Entry ID: 2041525
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42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).

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age population. Only twice since 1984 has an Indian-preferred candidate been elected

alderman. In each case, their election was uncontested.

The American Civil Liberties Union brought an action on behalf of two Native

Americans in district court, challenging the 2002, 2003, and 2004 elections. The

complaint alleged that the city wards were configured in a manner that intentionally

and effectively diluted the voting strength of Native-Americans and kept Indianpreferred aldermen candidates from being elected, contrary to the provisions of the

Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution. The district court denied relief, concluding that the white

majority did not usually vote in a way to defeat the Indian-preferred candidate. We

disagree and remand the matter to the district court to complete the analysis required

by the United States Supreme Court pursuant to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act1

as construed by Thornberg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49-50 (1986). If the district court

then finds in favor of the plaintiffs, it shall develop a plan under which NativeAmericans will have a reasonable opportunity to elect an Indian-preferred candidate.

BACKGROUND

For more than a decade Martin has been the focus of racial tension between

Native-Americans and whites. In the mid-1990's, protests were held to end a racially

offensive homecoming tradition that depicted Native-Americans in a demeaning,

stereotypical fashion. Concurrently, the United States Justice Department sued and

later entered into a consent decree with the local bank requiring an end to “redlining”

loan practices and policies that adversely affected Native-Americans, and censuring

the bank because it did not employ any Native-Americans. Most recently, resolution

specialists from the Justice Department attempted to mediate an end to claims of racial

discrimination by the local sheriff against Native-Americans. 

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Ordinance 122 divides Martin into three wards. Although Native-Americans

make up approximately 36% of the voting-age population in Martin, each ward

created a white super-majority of at least 62%.

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With these conflicts as a background, Martin redrew the city’s wards because

population shifts had rendered the existing boundaries obsolete. After the new wards

were drawn and published as Ordinance 121, attorneys for a Native-American public

interest group alleged the new boundaries violated the one-person, one-vote principle,

see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964), and that the boundaries violated

section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 

In March 2002, new districts were drawn to address the one-person, one-vote

violation. After review by the South Dakota Attorney General’s office, the city

council adopted the new ward boundaries and implemented them under Ordinance

122.2

 After a failed attempt under South Dakota law to refer the ordinance to a voter

referendum, see South Dakota Codified Laws § 9-20-6, plaintiffs initially brought suit

alleging Ordinance 121 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint as moot because that

ordinance had been repealed by Ordinance 122, but the court also granted plaintiff’s

motion to supplement its complaint to include the allegations currently pending before

this court.

In March 2005, the district court entered a final judgment disposing of all of the

parties’ claims. It found that although the plaintiffs met the first two conditions of

Gingles, the plaintiffs failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the third

Gingles precondition. As a result, the district court concluded the plaintiffs could not

prevail in their vote dilution claim. Additionally, the court concluded that, since there

was not sufficient evidence to prove a vote-dilution or “effects” claim, the plaintiffs

also could not prove that the city of Martin adopted and maintained Ordinance 122 for

a discriminatory purpose.

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ANALYSIS

“The district court’s findings regarding the factual context . . . are reviewed for

clear error.” Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 71 F.3d 1382, 1386 (8th Cir. 1995) (en

banc). Legal conclusions, “‘including those that may infect a so-called mixed finding

of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the

governing rule of law,’ are subject to [de novo] review.” Id. (quoting Gingles, 478

U.S. at 79). 

“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure

interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the

opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred candidates.”

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides that a denial of

the right to vote occurs when:

based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political

processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political

subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class

of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members

have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate

in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.

42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). 

The Supreme Court in Gingles established three preconditions to establishing

a section 2 claim: 

1) that the minority group is large enough and geographically compact

enough that it would be a majority in a single-member district; 2) that the

minority group is politically cohesive [in the sense that its members vote

in a similar fashion]; and 3) that the white majority votes

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sufficiently as a bloc to enable it, in the absence of special

circumstances, [to] usually . . . defeat the minority's preferred candidate.

Harvell, 71 F.3d at 1385 (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51). If the three Gingles

preconditions are met, the court then considers the totality of the circumstances. Id.

at 1390. Failure to establish all three preconditions defeats a section 2 claim. Clay

v. Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 1357, 1362 (8th Cir. 1996)

The district court found that the plaintiffs met the first two, but failed to meet

the third, Gingles preconditions. We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs

fulfilled the first two preconditions. As to the third precondition, we hold the

plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the white majority votes as

a bloc to usually defeat Indian-preferred candidates. 

To establish the first Gingles precondition, a plaintiff must demonstrate a proper

and workable remedy exists. Stabler v. County of Thurston, 129 F.3d 1015, 1025 (8th

Cir. 1997). The plaintiffs in this case offered three redistricting plans. The first

redistricts Martin into three wards and creates at least one Native-American majority

ward. The second redistricts Martin into six wards and creates at least two NativeAmerican majority wards. Both would allow Native-Americans in Martin a more

reasonable opportunity to place two representatives on the Martin city council. The

third plan eliminates all ward boundaries and implements a system in which three

members of the city council would be elected in each election. According to expert

testimony, this would allow Native-Americans a reasonable opportunity to elect at

least two representatives to the Martin city council. The district court found that the

first two plans presented proper and workable remedies that could be implemented to

alleviate the inequalities of the current system, but determined that it lacked the

authority to authorize the at-large remedy proposed in the third plan. 

Martin disagrees with the district court and argues that the first two plans

presented by the plaintiffs are not viable or stable. We agree with the district court.

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The ultimate viability and effectiveness of a remedy is considered at the remedial

stage of litigation and not during analysis of the Gingles preconditions. At the initial

stage, the plaintiff must only show that “minority voters possess the potential to elect

representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practices.” Gingles, 478

U.S. at 50 n.17; see also Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497, 503

(7th Cir. 1991); Houston v. Lafayette County, 56 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1995).

Although Martin argues the plans are not viable or stable, the ultimate end of the first

Gingles precondition is to prove that a solution is possible, and not necessarily to

present the final solution to the problem. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17.

The equal protection clause is violated if race is the predominant factor

motivating the placement of a significant number of voters within or without a

particular district. Stabler, 129 F.3d at 1025 (stating that bizarrely shaped districts

“considered in combination with racial and population densities of the proposed

districts, support [a] finding that race was the predominant factor in drawing proposed

districts to create a majority-minority single-member district”). As the district court

noted, examples of bizarrely shaped districts that should raise concern include those

that look like “a sacred Mayan bird, with its body running eastward . . . [s]pindly legs

reach south . . . while the plumed head rises northward . . . an open beak appears to be

searching for worms.” (Appellants’ Add. at 19 (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,

974 (1996) (additional citations omitted)).) “[Section] 2 compactness inquiry should

take into account ‘traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities

of interest and traditional boundaries.’” Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 92 (1997)

(quoting Bush, 517 U.S. at 977); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995)

(recognizing “respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual

shared interests” as a traditional, race-neutral districting principle); Shaw v. Reno, 509

U.S. 630, 651-52 (1993) (recognizing population equality as a “sound” districting

principle).

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Between 1990 and 2000, the overall population of Martin decreased by 24

people; the Native-American population during that time increased by 111 people. 

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In this case, we agree that the shapes of the proposed districts would not draw

constitutional scrutiny because the districts are not primarily based on race. The

record reflects that the proposed plans follow census blocks, marked streets, exhibited

more than point contiguity, created wards of equal population, and recognized

traditional neighborhoods. Moreover, Martin has maintained a ward system for at

least forty years, proving its stability. Furthermore, according to census figures used

at trial, it is highly unlikely that a Native-American majority district would fail to

maintain its majority over time because the Native-American population in Martin is

increasing rather than decreasing.3

 For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s

finding that the Native-American community in Martin is sufficiently large and

geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. 

To satisfy the second Gingles precondition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that

the minority group is politically cohesive. “If the minority group is not politically

cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure

thwarts distinctive minority group interests.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. Evidence of

political cohesiveness is shown by minority voting preferences, distinct from the

majority, demonstrated in actual elections, and can be established with the same

evidence plaintiffs must offer to establish racially polarized voting, because “political

cohesiveness is implicit in racially polarized voting.” Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d

1303, 1312 (10th Cir. 1996).

Proving political cohesiveness requires evaluating elections through statistical

and non-statistical evidence. Cf. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993) (finding

the district court erred in concluding political cohesiveness was proven where it was

unsupported by statistical or anecdotal evidence). The district court relied on three

proven approaches to evaluating elections: homogenous precinct analysis, bivariate

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ecological regression analysis, and ecological inference. See Rural W. Tenn. AfricanAmerican Affairs Council v. Sundquist, 209 F.3d 835, 839 (6th Cir. 2000)

(considering homogenous precinct analysis and bivariate ecological regression

analysis); Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the

district court erred by disregarding “the established acceptance of regression analysis

as a standard method for analyzing racially polarized voting”).

 

We agree with the district court that the record is clear that the statistical and

non-statistical analysis proved political cohesion within the Native-American

community. Statistically, experts from both sides found that the Native-American

population on average voted for the same candidates more than 60% of the time. See

African American Voting Rights Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 54 F.3d 1345, 1353

n.11 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that “60% majority is merely a guideline, not an absolute

threshold,” for finding political cohesion). Lay testimony demonstrates that NativeAmericans in Martin and the surrounding area were politically cohesive. Examples

of cohesion include political protests against the abuse of Native-American rights, the

endorsement of a slate of Native-American political candidates, and the use of tribal

governments to confront social issues such as education and housing. 

Martin argues that if Native-Americans are politically cohesive, it is because

of their political partisanship, and not because of racial identity. Although potentially

relevant in the totality of the circumstances analysis, the reason for the cohesion is

irrelevant in the threshold determination of whether the Gingles preconditions are met.

Goosby v. Town Bd., 180 F.3d 476, 493 (2d Cir. 1999) (interpreting Gingles as

treating “causation as irrelevant in the inquiry into three Gingles preconditions”);

Lewis v. Alamance County, 99 F.3d 600, 615 n.12 (4th Cir. 1996) (same). To imply

that party affiliation should negate political cohesion would have the effect of denying

minority voters an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice regardless

of the reason. Goosby, 180 F.3d at 495-96. For these reasons, we affirm the district

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4

The district court was able to define the Indian-preferred candidates, and we

rely on its findings of fact to identify the Indian-preferred candidates for this analysis.

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court’s decision that the Native-American community in Martin is a politically

cohesive minority group.

A racial voting bloc “exists where there is a consistent relationship between the

race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes, or to put it differently, where

black voters and white voters vote differently.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.21 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). To be legally significant for the purposes of

Gingles, the plaintiff must show that “whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to

defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.” Id. at 56; see also Sanchez, 97 F.3d at

1319. “The correct question is not whether white voters demonstrate an unbending

or unalterable hostility to whoever may be the minority group’s representative of

choice, but whether, as a practical matter, the usual result of the bloc voting that exists

is the defeat of the minority-preferred candidate.” Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch.

Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1123 (3d Cir. 1993). “[T]he presence of racially

polarized voting will ordinarily be the keystone of a vote dilution case.” Buckanaga

v. Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.2d 469, 473 (8th Cir. 1986). 

To determine whether the white majority voted as a bloc to defeat the Indianpreferred candidate, three inquiries are required. First, who are the minority-preferred

candidates?4

 Old Person v. Cooney, 230 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2000). Second,

did the white majority vote “as a bloc to defeat the [minority]-preferred candidate”?

Id. And third, were there special circumstances, “such as the minority candidate

running unopposed,” present when minority-preferred candidates won? Gingles, 478

U.S. at 51. 

In our view the district court erred in three respects when it determined the

white majority usually did not defeat the minority-preferred candidate. First, it did not

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give sufficient weight to the exit poll of the 2003 elections. Second, it did not give

any weight to the results of the 2002, 2003, and 2004 aldermanic elections. Finally,

the district court relied exclusively on county, state, and national elections in

determining that the evidence failed to prove that Indian-preferred candidates usually

lost elections.

First, the district court rejected the exit poll results of the 2003 aldermanic races

in Wards I and III. In Ward I, the Indian-preferred candidate received an adjusted

25% of the white vote and 100% of the Native-American vote. In Ward III, the

Indian-preferred candidate received almost 37% of the white vote and almost 86% of

the Native-American vote. The district court rejected these results because it believed

the poll failed to ascertain a representative sample of the voters as a whole and

because there was inconsistency between the poll results and the actual returns.

In our view, it was clear error to reject these statistics. Although the exit poll

probably under-represents white voters and likely over-represents Native-American

voters, the results show that despite a cohesive political effort by Native-American

voters, their candidates for alderman were defeated. We find this, at the very least,

probative. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011-12 (1994); Jenkins, 4 F.3d

at 1126 (holding that the third Gingles factor “may be satisfied with a variety of

evidence, including lay testimony or statistical analysis of voting patterns”). Because

the record reflects that Native-Americans and whites are, by and large, the only racial

groups in Martin, the only conceivable explanation for the results of the exit poll and

the final election tallies is that the white majority voted as a bloc against Indianpreferred candidates. See Buckanaga, 804 F.2d at 473 (stating that “[t]he surest

indication of race conscious politics is a pattern of racially polarized voting extending

over time”); Collins v. City of Norfolk, 816 F.2d 932, 935 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding

that racially polarized voting patterns can establish “both cohesiveness of the minority

group and the power of white bloc voting to defeat the minority's candidates"). 

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Second, the district court ignored the results of the 2002, 2003, and 2004

aldermanic elections. The record clearly reflects that in 2002, the Indian-preferred

candidates for alderman in each of the three wards lost. In 2003, the Indian-preferred

candidates for alderman in Wards I and III lost. And in 2004, the Indian-preferred

candidates for alderman in each of the wards lost. 

The district court clearly erred when it ignored these election results. The

plaintiffs presented eight aldermanic elections over the span of three years that

established a sufficient pattern of defeat for Indian-preferred candidates in Martin’s

aldermanic elections. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 58-59, 80-82 (finding data from three

election years, involving minority candidates, sufficient to uphold district court’s votedilution ruling); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 502-03

(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989) (stating that “Gingles . . . suggests

flexibility in the face of sparse data”). Importantly, it is these elections–the Martin

aldermanic elections–that are at the center of this litigation. Clark v. Calhoun County,

88 F.3d 1393, 1397 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that virtual absence of electoral success

in relevant district has the greatest impact on the evaluation of vote-dilution claims).

In short, the absence of Native-American aldermen, combined with evidence of

racially polarized voting, provides striking proof of vote dilution in Martin. 

Third, the district court found that the results of county, state, and national

elections supported the view that Indian-preferred candidates did not usually lose

elections in Martin. At the national level, the district court factored in the 1998 and

2002 races for United States Senate and House of Representatives as indications that

Indian-preferred candidates were able to win elections. At the state level, victories by

the Indian-preferred candidate in the 2002 elections for state senate district 26, state

house district 26, state auditor, state secretary of state, and state treasurer were

considered as part of the analysis of the third Gingles precondition. The district court

also used county elections such as the 2002 races for county commissioner, sheriff,

and school board as examples of Indian-preferred candidates who won elections. The

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Exogenous elections are elections that are outside of the district at issue.

Endogenous elections are elections that involve the district at issue. 

6

Plaintiffs also appealed the district court's adverse finding on the claim that

Ordinance 122 was adopted and maintained for a discriminatory purpose in violation

of the Voting Rights Act. We do not address whether a discriminatory intent claim

requires proof of discriminatory effect. Instead, for the reasons set forth by the district

court, we agree that the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding that Ordinance

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court held these elections were evidence that the Indian-preferred candidates did not

usually lose their elections in spite of the white majority bloc.

In our view, these elections provide very little evidence of whether Martin’s

ward system allows Native-Americans to elect their preferred candidates. Although

it can be appropriate to factor in exogenous elections,5

 these elections are meant to

supplement, not replace, endogenous elections. See Clay, 90 F.3d at 1362. The data

gained from state and national elections did little to reveal whether there was racial

polarization within the city of Martin’s ward system. For example, citing Tom

Daschle’s 1998 victory in the United States Senate race may prove the relevance of

the Native-American vote throughout the state, but Daschle’s victory fails to reveal

whether Martin’s ward system allows Native-American residents to elect their

preferred candidates to alderman. Accord Westwego Citizens for a Better Gov’t v.

City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1209 n.11 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that “evidence

derived from exogenous elections . . . must be evaluated according to its probative

value”). Because of their far-reaching scope, state and national elections offered little

probative insight into whether Martin’s ward system violated section 2 of the Voting

Rights Act. The same can be said for election results from Bennett County, where

Martin is located. Indian-preferred candidates fare better in the county simply because

Native-Americans make up 49.25 percent of the county’s voting-age population while

whites make up 49.65 percent of the county’s voting age population. See id. at 1209-

10 (focusing its analysis on the exogenous data from the precincts of the jurisdiction

directly at issue).6

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122 was adopted and maintained for a discriminatory purpose.

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Considering the entirety of evidence presented in this case, we hold that the

plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the white majority usually

defeated the Indian-preferred candidate in Martin aldermanic elections. First, the

2003 exit poll clearly showed racial polarization. See De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011

(recognizing that the “ultimate conclusions about equality or inequality of opportunity

were intended by Congress to be judgments resting on comprehensive, not limited,

canvassing of relevant facts”); Harvell, 71 F.3d at 1386 (considering statistical

analysis, exit polling, and lay testimony). Although Native-Americans predominantly

voted for the Indian-preferred candidates, those candidates lost when the actual votes

were counted. Because Native-Americans and whites make up more than 99% of

Martin’s population, the only conclusion available is that whites voted as a bloc to

defeat the Indian-preferred candidates. See Buckanaga, 804 F.2d at 473.

Secondly, whereas the district court did not give the aldermanic election results

of 2002 through 2004 probative value, we consider these elections central to the

analysis of whether there was a section 2 violation. The plaintiffs proved the third

Gingles precondition in part because the aldermanic election results of 2002 through

2004 reveal the Indian-preferred candidates for alderman always lost these elections.

See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 58-59, 80-82; Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1103, 1123 (recognizing the

most important aspect of the analysis is to determine whether the white voting bloc

usually results in the defeat of the minority-preferred candidate). Finally, county,

state, and national election results were not probative in determining whether Martin’s

ward system denied Native-Americans a reasonable opportunity to elect their

preferred candidates. 

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CONCLUSION

For each of the reasons noted herein, we reverse the decision of the district

court and find that the plaintiffs met, by a preponderance of the evidence, all three

Gingles preconditions. Thus, we remand the matter to the district court with

instructions to initially determine whether, in view of the fact that plaintiffs have met

all three Gingles preconditions, the plaintiffs are entitled to relief in light of the

totality of the circumstances. The Supreme Court has listed the following factors as

relevant in the totality of the circumstances analysis: 

(1) the history of voting-related discrimination in the state or political

subdivision; (2) the extent to which voting in the state or subdivision is

racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state or subdivision has

used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance opportunities for

discrimination against the minority group; (4) whether minority

candidates have been denied access to any candidate-slating process; (5)

the extent to which minorities have borne the effects of past

discrimination in relation to education, employment, and health; (6)

whether local political campaigns have used overt or subtle racial

appeals; (7) the extent to which minority group members have been

elected to public office in the jurisdiction; (8) whether there is a

significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the

particularized needs of members of the minority group; and (9) whether

the policy underlying the use of voting qualifications is tenuous.

Harvell, 71 F.3d at 1385-86 (citing Gingles 478 U.S. at 36-37). This court has

previously focused the totality of the circumstances analysis on racial polarization and

the ability to elect minority-preferred candidates under the challenged scheme. Id. at

1390.

Plaintiffs do not need to prove a particular number of the above-listed factors

or prove that a majority of them point one way or the other. Rather, “the final

determination of whether the voting strength of minority voters is canceled out

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7

We disagree with the district court’s finding that it is unable to apply an atlarge voting system in Martin. In Cane, the court considered the amount of deference

due to a legislative policy decision underlying proposed electoral schemes. Cane, 35

F.3d at 927-28. Even where the legislative body fails to propose a plan or where the

plan proposed is legally unacceptable, “the court, in exercising its discretion to fashion

a remedy that complies with § 2, must to the greatest extent possible give effect to the

legislative policy judgments underlying the current electoral scheme or legally

unacceptable remedy offered by the legislative body.” Id. at 928. If, at the remedy

stage, a redistricting of Martin’s wards appears unworkable, it appears that plaintiffs’

third plan would be a viable option. Whereas the plan in Cane completely eliminated

elected positions, plaintiffs’ at-large plan continues Martin’s practice of staggering its

aldermanic elections and maintains the current number of aldermen. Moreover, its

current form of aldermanic government is by choice, not by legislative mandate. See

S.D. Codified Laws §§ 9-11-5; 9-11-6. In essence, an at-large election would change

Martin into a single ward rather than three wards. More importantly, an at-large

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demands the court’s overall judgment, based on the totality of the circumstances and

guided by those relevant factors in the particular case.” Whitefield v. Democratic

Party, 890 F.2d 1423, 1432 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting S. Rep. No. 417, at 29 n.118)

(internal quotations and modifications omitted).

In the event the district court finds that under the totality of the circumstances,

the plaintiffs are entitled to relief, the district court shall devise and implement a

remedy that will give Native-Americans in Martin a reasonable opportunity to elect

Indian-preferred candidates to alderman. In so doing, the defendant shall be given an

opportunity to propose a remedy within a specified amount of time. See Cane v.

Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1994). The court should then review

the proposed order to determine whether it is “legally unacceptable.” Id. If the

defendant fails to propose a legally acceptable remedy, the district court shall devise

a plan that ensures that Indian-preferred candidates have a reasonable chance of

prevailing in Martin municipal elections for alderman. Among its options, the district

court has the discretion to implement any of the three plans presented by the

plaintiffs.7

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system would conform Martin to the requirements of section 2 of the Voting Rights

Act. 

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The appeal in this case, involving a claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights

Act, focuses on the third precondition for such a claim established in Thornburg v.

Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The district court found that the plaintiffs had not

established that the white majority in Martin, South Dakota, “votes sufficiently as a

bloc to enable it – in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority

candidate running unopposed – usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”

Id. at 51. Because I do not believe the district court clearly erred in its conclusion that

plaintiffs failed to meet their burden, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

Vote dilution claims are “peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case,”

requiring “an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the contested

electoral mechanisms.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79 (internal quotations omitted). To

“preserve[] the benefit of the trial court’s particular familiarity with the indigenous

political reality,” id., we apply a “clear error” standard of review both to the predicate

factual determinations and to the ultimate finding regarding vote dilution. Id.; Abrams

v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91, 93 (1997). It is the plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate the

existence of vote dilution. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1993).

On appeal, the plaintiffs urge that the district court improperly relied on

exogenous election results from a jurisdiction other than Martin, and the court appears

to conclude that the district court improperly relied on statewide and national election

results. Ante, at 11-12. In the district court, however, the plaintiffs themselves

presented and advocated the use of exogenous election data to estimate the

demographics of voting within the city. The district court fully recognized that

endogenous elections are more probative than exogenous elections. (Mem. Op. and

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Order, R. Doc. No. 377, at 24) (hereafter “Order”). But given the conclusion of the

plaintiffs’ own expert that the small size of the city precluded both regression analysis

based only on the city precincts and homogenous precinct analysis, (Appellants’ App.

at 530), the plaintiffs presented exogenous data in an effort to meet their burden of

proof. 

Citing the testimony of their expert, Dr. Cole, the plaintiffs argued that “[w]hile

endogenous contests are the most probative of racial bloc voting, courts routinely

consider voting patterns in exogenous contests on the ground that any election in

which residents of a jurisdiction vote tells us something about voting behavior.” (Pls.’

Post-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. Doc. No. 360, at ¶¶

243, 374-90). Cole testified that in drawing a conclusion with respect to the third

Gingles factor, he followed a process similar to that he used for the second Gingles

factor, in which “you look to the exogenous contests,” and “give more weight to

exogenous contests that are closer in nature to the city council contests like county

level contests as opposed to state and federal contests.” (T. Tr. III at 647-49).

The plaintiffs now disagree with the district court’s finding that the evidence

did not establish white bloc-voting behavior that usually defeated the Indian-preferred

candidate, but I see no legal error in the court’s reliance upon the exogenous election

statistics offered by the plaintiffs, and no clear error in the court’s factual

determinations based on those data. Although the district court did use data from

state and national elections, the district court did not rely on the state and national

outcomes in tabulating the wins and losses of Indian-preferred candidates. Cf. ante

at 11-12. Rather, the district court relied on the precinct-level results for those

elections, which were reported by Dr. Cole and cited by the plaintiffs as the election

results for the city of Martin. For example, the court tallied the 1996 presidential

election as a “loss” for the Indian-preferred candidate, because that candidate –

President Clinton – “lost” in the precincts from the City of Martin, even though he

won the office of President in the national election. (Order at 72; Appellants’ App.

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at 576). The court did, in a few instances, rely on county election results, (Order at

55-56), but this was consistent with the plaintiffs’ position that exogenous data of this

type should be used to supplement endogenous data. (R. Doc. No. 360, at ¶¶ 243; T.

Tr. III at 647-49). 

The hypothetical city results derived from exogenous elections do not

demonstrate that the district court’s overall finding as to the third Gingles factor was

clearly erroneous. The numbers of interracial elections presented to the district court

were very small. There were only four head-to-head interracial countywide races; one

race was non-polarized, and the non-Indian-preferred candidate won the other three

in the city. (Order at 57-58; Appellants’ App. at 555-56). There were only three

statewide interracial head-to-head races, and the non-Indian-preferred candidate won

those in the city. (Order at 60-61; Appellants’ App. at 555-56). But there were 25

statewide races with white-only candidates, and the Indian-preferred candidate won

15 of those contests in the city. (Order at 64-73; Appellants’ App. at 573-577). There

were three “white-only” countywide races; one contest was non-polarized, and the

Indian-preferred candidate was victorious in one of the other two in the city. (Order

at 62; Appellants’ App. at 574-76). The county results that the district court used to

supplement the city results showed that Indian-preferred candidates won five of nine

interracial multi-candidate races in Bennett County. (Order at 55-56; Appellants’

App. at 547, 549, 550). Overall, even according lesser weight to the county results,

these data are mixed, and they fall short of demonstrating clear error by the district

court in finding an absence of proof that white voters typically vote as a bloc to defeat

Indian-preferred candidates.

Beyond these exogenous election results, there was simply a failure of proof by

the plaintiffs. The only other statistical evidence presented to the district court was

a 2003 exit poll concerning aldermanic elections. The district court gave specific and

cogent reasons for its decision to give no weight to this exit poll. It found that the poll

“was not a representative sample of voters as a whole” because it under-represented

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The court also was “troubled by the fact that some of the poll takers were

related to one of the plaintiffs,” (Order at 42), but found it unnecessary to determine

whether this fact alone was a sufficient basis to disregard the data. 

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non-Indians, over-represented Indians, and slightly over-represented females. (Order

at 41). The court found that the “high nonresponse rates of non-Indians seriously

distorted inferences that could be drawn from the exit poll.” (Order at 42). These

factors were a legitimate cause for concern, because exit polls are “‘prone to high

nonresponse rates which can seriously bias estimates and distort inferences, because

people who do not respond may vote differently than those who do.’” (Order at 41

(quoting Aldasoro v. Kennerson, 922 F. Supp. 339, 352 (S.D. Cal. 1995)). The court

further expressed the concern that “exit poll respondents may lie,” id., and thus

observed that “[a] truly representative poll of the votes actually cast should logically

demonstrate some consistency between the responses to the poll and the actual

returns.” Id. In this case, however, the exit poll “fail[ed] to demonstrate consistency

between the responses to the poll and the actual returns,” thus tending to undermine

any inference that the poll was a reliable indicator of voting behavior. (Order at 41-

42).8

 

Under these circumstances, it was not clear error for the court to decline to view

the poll as reliable evidence of voting behavior by residents of the City of Martin.

There were reasonable grounds for the district court to believe that the poll results

may understate the number of Indians who prefer the “non-Indian-preferred

candidate,” understate the number of white voters who prefer the “Indian-preferred

candidate,” and fail to reflect truthful answers of those who responded. 

Nor do I think the district court was required to base its conclusions on the

results of the aldermanic elections in 2002, 2003, and 2004, in the city of Martin.

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There was no statistical evidence regarding the results of these elections, other than

the 2003 exit poll that the district court found unreliable. The only other evidence

regarding these elections was the testimony of several lay witnesses who indicated an

opinion regarding the Indian-preferred candidates for those elections, and whether

those candidates won or lost. This testimony was disputed. Some of these witnesses

presented by the plaintiffs did not even live in Martin. (T. Tr. III at 540; T. Tr. IV at

849, 880, 934). The defendants introduced testimony from Indian voters who did

reside in Martin, and this evidence tended to show that Indians, in fact, have varied

opinions on issues of the day and on preferred candidates for elective office. (T. Tr.

VIII at 1580-85, 1620, 1694; T. Tr. IX at 1802; T. Tr. X at 2104). The district court

considered the lay testimony, but found that “[i]n light of the overwhelming statistical

evidence, this lay testimony is not sufficient to meet plaintiffs’ burden of

demonstrating the usual defeat of the Indian-preferred candidate.” (Order at 74). This

is a factual finding that addresses the relative persuasiveness of disputed lay testimony

and statistical evidence unfavorable to the plaintiffs, and there is no clear error in the

district court’s finding.

At bottom, this is not a case in which the district court materially misapplied the

relevant law, failed to address the evidence presented by the plaintiffs, or considered

facts that were irrelevant. It is a case in which the plaintiffs disagree with the weight

the district court gave to the evidence that they presented. The district court has

“particular familiarity with the indigenous political reality,” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79,

and the record in support of the plaintiffs’ case is not so strong as to generate a

“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City

of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). I would

therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

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