Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01370/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01370-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, CASE NO. CV F 10-1370 LJO MJS

et al.,

ORDER TO DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE

PLAINTIFFS’ F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) MOTION

vs. (Doc. 25.)

CITY OF MODESTO, et al,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiffs seek F.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) relieffrom dismissal of their excessive force, unlawful arrest, 1

Monell and related claims against the City of Modesto and eight of its peace officers (collectively

“defendants”) despite plaintiffs’ pending appeal of dismissal of their claims. 

This Court’s January 6, 2011 order dismissed with prejudice all of plaintiffs’ claims in their First

Amended complaint, and judgment effective January 6, 2011 was entered against plaintiffs and in

defendants’ favor. Plaintiffs failed to file papers to oppose defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs

filed an February 4, 2011 notice of appeal of dismissal of their claims, and the appeal remains pending

before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

On April 8, 2011, plaintiffs filed their F.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) motion for relief of the judgment to

claim that their counsel failed to calendar the deadline to oppose defendants’ motion to dismiss and that

Plaintiffs are Miguel Rodriguez (“Mr. Rodriguez”), Charisse Fernandez (“Ms. Fernandez”), and Adrian

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Alizaga (“Mr. Alizaga”) and will be referred to collectively as “plaintiffs.”

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this Court erroneously dismissed plaintiffs’ claims. 

“The filing of a notice of appeal generally divests the district court of jurisdiction over the

matters appealed.” Davis v. U.S., 667 F.2d 822, 824 (9 Cir. 1982) (vacating district court’s order on th

motion to amend complaint during pendencyof appeal). In the Ninth Circuit, the general rule is that “the

filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction to dispose of the motion after an

appeal has been taken, without remand from this court.” Scott v. Younger, 739 F.2d 1464, 1466 (9 Cir. th

1984) (quoting Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d 1310, 1318 (9 Cir. 1981)). “Because th

the filing of a notice of appeal generally divests the district court of jurisdiction over matters appealed,”

a district court lacks power to amend its dismissal of an action. Pro Sales, Inc. v. Texaco, U.S.A., 792

F.2d 1394, 1396, n. 1 (9 Cir. 1986). th

“To seek Rule 60(b) relief during the pendency of an appeal, ‘the proper procedure is to ask the

district court whether it wishes to entertain the motion, or to grant it, and then move this court [Ninth

Circuit], if appropriate, for remand of the case.’” Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 586 (9 Cir. th

2004) (citations omitted). An “appellant may make a motion to the court of appeals for a remand if the

district court indicates an intention to grant the Rule 60(b) motion.” A district court lacks jurisdiction

to address a post-appeal F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion “without remand” from the Ninth Circuit. Smith v.

Lujan, 588 F.2d 1304, 1307 (1979). “Because [petitioner] did not observe the procedure required to

revest the district court with jurisdiction to consider his Rule 60(b) motion, we conclude that the district

court’s . . . order denying the motion is void for lack of jurisdiction.” Williams, 384 F.3d at 586. 

Plaintiffs’ F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion is premature and beyond this Court’s jurisdiction. Plaintiffs

do not follow the Ninth Circuit’s procedure in that they essentially ask this Court to ignore the Ninth

Circuit’s jurisdiction over dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs have not asked whether this Court

will entertain the motion, they presume it will. Plaintiffs make no reference to the Ninth Circuit’s

procedure to seek remand for this Court’s consideration of their F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion. 

The gist of plaintiffs’ F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion is to unwind dismissal of their excessive force

claims as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). At this stage, this Court’s

order to grant plaintiffs’ requested relief would be void for lack of jurisdiction. Putting aside the effect

of the pending appeal, this Court questions the limited record of the excusable neglect of plaintiffs’

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counsel’s failure to oppose timely dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims. Nonetheless, this Court is open to

consider the issue as well as whether it erred to dismiss plaintiffs’ excessive force claims, if it had

jurisdiction to do so.

In the absence of this Court’s jurisdiction, this Court is unable to entertain or grant plaintiffs’

requested relief. Upon proper remand from the Ninth Circuit, this Court will consider plaintiff’s

F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion but not prior to remand. As such, without such remand, this Court DENIES

without prejudice plaintiffs’ F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion and VACATES the May 19, 2011 hearing on

plaintiffs’ F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion.

Defendants need not respond to plaintiffs’ F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion at this time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2011 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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