Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00606/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00606-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

NATHANIEL SHAW, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:07cv606-ID

 ) (WO)

D. T. MARSHALL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the court is the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, filed April 9,

2008 (Doc. No. 80), and Plaintiff’s Objection, filed April 23, 2008. (Doc. No. 86.) 

Having conducted a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation of

the Magistrate Judge to which Plaintiff objects, the court finds that Plaintiff’s Objection

is due to be overruled in its entirety, but that one aspect of the Recommendation is due to

be modified as follows. 

Citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Magistrate Judge opines that, “[i]n view of this

court’s determination that the federal claims against Dr. [Johnny] Bates should be

dismissed, the court concludes that the supplemental state law claim against this medical

defendant should also be dismissed without prejudice.” (Doc. No. 80 at 23.) Because the

Fourth Amendment excessive force claims brought pursuant to § 1983 remain pending

against Officers C. J. Coughlin and J. W. Hall, the court has not “dismissed all claims

Case 2:07-cv-00606-TMH-CSC Document 87 Filed 05/01/08 Page 1 of 5
 Dr. Bates is a pendent-party defendant, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) allows a court to 1

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over “claims involving parties not named in any

independently cognizable federal claim.” Hammond v. Clayton, 83 F.3d 191, 194 (7th

Cir. 1996). Specifically, the supplemental jurisdiction statute, i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),

codifies the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction and encompasses “claims that involve

the joinder . . . of additional parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see Ortega v. Brock, 501 F.

Supp.2d 1337, 1340-41 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (Thompson, J.) (“pendent-party jurisdiction is

. . . cognizable as a form of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)”);

Walters v. City of Andalusia, 89 F. Supp.2d 1266, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (DeMent, J.)

(same). The statute, thus, makes “no distinction . . . between pendent-claim and pendentparty cases.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005). 

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over which it has original jurisdiction” and, thus, § 1367(c)(3) is inapplicable. The 1

court, however, agrees with the Magistrate Judge that dismissal of the state-law claim is

appropriate, but for a different reason. 

The supplemental jurisdiction statute also provides that a court “may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the claim substantially

predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2); see Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468

F.3d 733, 744 (11 Cir. 2006). The state-law claim will focus on whether Dr. Bates th

“failed to exercise such reasonable care, skill, and diligence as other similarly situated

health care providers” in treating Plaintiff’s eye and other medical conditions. Ala. Code

§ 6-5-548(a). In contrast, on the remaining federal-law claims, that is, the § 1983 Fourth

Amendment excessive force claims against Officers Coughlin and Hall, the inquiry will

focus on whether, on the day of Plaintiff’s arrest, Officers Coughlin and Hall “used force

against [Plaintiff], whether there was a need for the use of force, and whether the force

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used was excessive under the circumstances.” (Doc. No. 80 at 20.) Having considered

these inquiries, the court finds that the federal- and state-law claims do not share common

facts or have similar or overlapping elements of proof but, rather, raise issues which will

require wholly distinct legal and factual analyses. See Szendrey-Ramos v. First Bancorp,

512 F. Supp.2d 81, 86 (D.P.R. 2007) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) where state-law claims had elements distinct from

federal claims); Walters, 89 F. Supp.2d at 1288 n.29 (recognizing that declining

supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) based on “unrelatedness” of federal- and

state-law claims would be appropriate). 

Moreover, given the legal complexities which often arise in presenting medical

malpractice claims, particularly where the legal issue is fought by competing experts, it is

likely that the state-law claim would require substantially more judicial resources to try

than the federal claims and would command the majority of the jury’s time both in the

courtroom and during deliberations. Cf. Hubbard v. Moore, 537 F. Supp. 126, 131 (W.D.

Ark. 1982) (declining exercise of pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims because

proof would be “simple” on federal-law claims, but “considerably more” complicated on

state-law claims). Similarly, the court finds that combining Plaintiff’s state- and federallaw claims would create the potential for jury confusion and delay. Based on the

foregoing, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law

claim on the ground that it would “substantially predominate[]” over the remaining

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federal-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). In all other respects, the court finds that the

Recommendation is due to be adopted.

Based on the foregoing, it is CONSIDERED and ORDERED as follows:

(1) Plaintiff’s Objection be and the same is hereby OVERRULED;

(2) the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as MODIFIED above, be and

the same is hereby ADOPTED, APPROVED and AFFIRMED;

(3) the motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claims concerning

retaliation against C. Smith (“Smith”) (Doc. Nos. 22 & 49), the destruction of mail

against Gina Savage (“Savage”), Smith, and Sondra Wright (Doc. Nos. 22 & 49), and the

conditions of confinement against D. T. Marshall and Savage (Doc. No. 22) be and the

same is hereby GRANTED and these claims are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice;

(4) to the extent that Plaintiff claims that Officers Coughlin and Hall used

excessive force against him in a supermarket parking lot, the motion for summary

judgment be and the same is hereby DENIED (Doc. Nos. 23 & 47);

(5) the motion for summary judgment with respect to the remaining claims

against Defendants be and the same is hereby GRANTED (Doc. Nos. 22, 23, 41, 47, 48,

49); 

(6) to the extent that Plaintiff has alleged a state-law claim of medical malpractice

against Dr. Bates, the court in its discretion declines supplemental jurisdiction over said

claim and said state-law claim is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(2) & (d); and

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(7) by separate Order, the excessive force claims against Officers Coughlin and

Hall shall be set for a jury trial.

DONE this 1 day of May, 2008. st

/s/ Ira DeMent 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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