Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01000/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01000-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID DEAN WATKINS, 

CDCR #V-04739, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

JUDGE BERNARD REVAK; 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; 

TALETHA SUITTS, 

Defendants. 

 Case No.: 3:19-cv-1000-JAH-WVG 

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM AND 

FOR SEEKING DAMAGES FROM 

IMMUNE DEFENDANT PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

AND § 1915A(b) 

I. Procedural History 

On May 28, 2019, David Dean Watkins (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the 

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”) located in Corcoran, California, and 

proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., 

ECF No. 1. 

/ / / 

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Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). 

On July 3, 2019, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but 

simultaneously DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted and for seeking money damages against immune defendants. (ECF No. 

3 at 9-10.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading in order to correct the 

deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id.) On August 2, 2019, 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 4.) 

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) 

A. Standard of Review 

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in 

the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

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Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. Detailed 

factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; 

see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015). 

C. Discussion 

1. Heck Bar 

 Plaintiff’s FAC is far from clear, but it appears is that he is challenging his 

conviction following a jury trial in 2003. (See FAC at 3.) Plaintiff requests that this 

Court “reduce” his sentence and order a “new trial in the interest of justice.” (FAC at 7.) 

He also seeks $155,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. (See id.) 

 First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief based on claims 

that he was wrongfully convicted, he may not pursue those claims in a civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without first showing his conviction has already been 

invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 

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In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by 

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or 

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, 

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state 

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that 

relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so 

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. 

Id. at 486-87; Washington v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 

(9th Cir. 2016).

“Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within 

‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state 

prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but 

not to the fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 

2003) (emphasis added), quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973) 

(holding that a writ of habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a 

state prisoner with the “exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in 

federal court). 

 Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on an allegedly unlawful sentence, he may 

not proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless that conviction and/or sentence has already been 

invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a 

showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no 

cause of action under § 1983.’”), quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. 

Thus, because Plaintiff does not claim to have already invalidated his sentence by 

way of direct appeal, executive order, or through the issuance of either a state or federal 

court writ of habeas corpus, Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, his current FAC must be dismissed in 

its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. 

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 2. Rooker Feldman Doctrine 

Additionally, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking a ruling from this Court essentially 

overturning a California State Court decision. However, this is not a viable form of relief 

in this action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “‘a losing party in state court 

is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment 

in a United States District Court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment 

itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’” Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 

2005) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)); see District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 & 486 (1983); Rooker v. 

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). 

 Review of state court decisions may only be conducted in the United States 

Supreme Court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476 & 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see 28 

U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar applies even if the complaint 

raises federal constitutional issues. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16 & 486; Henrichs v. 

Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the bar 

applies if the challenge to the state court decision is brought as a § 1983 civil rights 

action. See Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995); Worldwide Church of God 

v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 A complaint challenges a state court decision if the constitutional claims presented 

to the district court are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision in a 

judicial proceeding. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16. “[T]he federal claim is inextricably 

intertwined with the state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent 

that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 

481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987)(Marshall, J., concurring); see also Worldwide Church of God, 805 

F.2d at 891-92. 

 Because Plaintiff appears to seek this Court’s assistance in overturning orders 

made by state court judges based on the same claims brought in this action, his claims are 

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inextricably intertwined with the state court proceedings, and are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine. 

 4. Eleventh Amendment 

Plaintiff also names the “State of California” as a Defendant. (Compl. at 1, 2.) 

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state, absent the state’s affirmative waiver 

of its immunity or congressional abrogation of that immunity. Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. 

of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The 

Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its agencies for all types of relief, 

absent unequivocal consent by the state.”) (internal citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit 

has recognized that “[t]he State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment 

immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court, and the Supreme 

Court has held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment 

immunity.” Brown v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009); 

see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67, 71 (1989) (“We cannot 

conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State 

from being sued without its consent. [...] We hold that neither a State nor its officials 

acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”). 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the State of California as a party to this action 

sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) as barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment. 

F. Leave to Amend 

 Plaintiff has already been provided a short and plain statement of his pleading 

deficiencies, as well as an opportunity to amend those claims to no avail. See ECF No. 3. 

Therefore, the Court denies further leave to amend as futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned 

Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, 

justify the denial of ... leave to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 

(9th Cir. 1995)); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 

2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has 

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subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, [t]he district court’s 

discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (second alteration in original)). 

III. Conclusion and Order 

 Accordingly, the Court: 

1) DISMISSES this civil action without further leave to amend for failure to 

state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 

§ 1915A(b); 

2) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and 

3) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and to 

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 22, 2019 

 HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge 

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