Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02838/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02838-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS 

INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 

LOCAL 2-286, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

:) ·,; .. ·:. ' . .-.:.~ ·~' .. :-.. '.,, .:.... .. ; ; ~ ., ·,,,.,.. · . .__, .. _· '.- '::,; ... 

SEP l ;} 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 86-2838 

AMOCO OIL COMPANY (SALT LAKE 

CITY REFINERY), 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District o_f Utah, Central Division 

(D.C. No. 86-C-0988G) 

Arthur F. Sandack, Sandack & Sandack, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Robert .M. O'Connell, Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Johnson & 

Williams, Houston, Texas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 1 
Local 2-286 of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers 

International Union, AFL-CIO filed suit for declaratory and 

injunctive relief against Amoco Oil Company pursuant to section 

301 of the Labor Management and Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. § 185 

(1982) (LMRA). The Union sought to enjoin Amoco's implementation 

of a drug testing program at its Salt Lake City refinery pending 

the outcome of arbitration over Amoco's right, under the parties' 

Collective Bargaining Agreement, to unilaterally impose the 

testing program. The district court granted the requested relief 

and Amoco appeals. We affirm. 

I. 

Amoco has operated its Salt Lake City refinery for over 

seventy yearj, and has had a collective bargaining reiationship 

with the Union for approximately forty years •. The Agreement in 

force at the time the Union filed this suit contains broad 

grievance and arbitration provisions, 1 as well as a management 

1 The grievance procedure is set forth at Article 16 of the 

Agreement. It permits "any employee or group [that] believes 

himself or themselves to have been injured or treated unfairly in 

the application of any .term of the Agreement" to seek redress by 

means of a three-step process ultimately leading to arbitration if 

the dispute is "arbitrable under the terms of Article 17." 

Addendum to Appellant's Brief, doc. 2, Articles of Agreement, at 

45-46. 

Article 17, the arbitration provision, provides in pertinent 

part that 

"[i]f there is a dispute over the proper interpretation 

or application of this Agreement, which the Union has 

-2-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 2 
rights clause. 2 Article 21 of the Agreement, which addresses 

.health and.safety issues, establishes a joint labor-management 

committee for "the purpose of considering, inspecting, 

investigating and reviewing health and safety conditions and 

practices." Rec., vol. I, doc. 1, Ex. A at 55. The committee is 

responsible for making constructive recommendations "including but 

.not limited to the implementation of corrective measures to 

eliminate unhealthy and unsafe conditions and practices and to 

improve existing health and safety conditions and practices." Id. 

Article 21 further provides that Amoco shall continue "its 

existing industrial hygiene program," id. at 56, and that Amoco . shall pay for physical and medical tests "at a fre~uency and 

extent determined ••• by the joint committee." Id. at 54. 

· Finally, Article 21 specifies that 11·[a]ny dispute arising with 

iespect to the interpretation or application" of it~ provisions is 

been unable to adjust to its satisfaction through its 

use of the grievance procedure set forth in Section 

16.3, the Union may, within the specified time limits, 

demand in writing that the dispute be decided by 

arbitration." 

Id. at 47. 

2 

that 

Article 14 of the Agreement, "Rights of Management," provides 

"[e]xcept as expressly limited by this Agreement, the 

management and direction of the Company is the 

prerogative of the Company. This includes, but is not 

limited to, the right to hire and assign employees, 

apply discipline, demote or discharge employees for 

cause, and determine the size of the working force." 

Id. at 43. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 3 
subject to the Agreement's grievance and arbitration procedures. 

Id.-at 56. 

In May 1986, Amoco notified the Union that it wanted to 

implement a drug testing program at the Salt Lake City refinery. 

The Union objected to Amoco's proposal and responded with a 

counterproposal, but four months of negotiations failed to produce 

agreement about the nature and scope of the proposed testing 

program. Amoco therefore decided to implement a drug testing 

program unilaterally, and notified its employees by letter dated 

September 12, 1986, that it intended to do so thirty days hence. 3 

In broad outline, the program requires an annual test for those 

"[e]mployees who, by the nature of their job, could pos'e an 

immediate safety risk to themselves, fellow employees, property, 

and/oi the general public if working under the influence of drugs 

or alcohol." Rec., vol. I, doc. 1, Ex. B. The program also 

provides for the random testing of any employee "who, in the 

judgment of management may be working under the influence of drugs 

and alcohol or whose work performance is being adversely affected 

by the abuse of drugs and alcohol." Id. 

The Union filed a written grievance objecting to Amoco's 

unilateral implementation of the new program. The grievance 

alleged that Amoco's action violated various provisions of the 

3 The starting date for testing was postponed until October 23, 

because employees did not timely receive the notification letters. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 4 
{ 

\. 

Agreement, including Article 21, and it requested that the company 

·postpone implementation of -the prog-ram ·pending resolution of the 

grievance. Notwithstanding the Union's request, Amoco implemented 

the policy, and ultimately denied the grievance. The Union then 

filed this action for a temporary restraining order and a 

preliminary injunction, and the district court ordered Amoco to 

show cause why ·a restraining order should not issue. 

At a hearing during which the district court heard testimony 

and received evidence, both sides agreed that the underlying 

dispute was arbitrable and acknowledged that they were proceeding 

to arbitration as called for by their Agreement. They also agreed 

in large measure on the applicable law. They disagreed, however, 

on the application of the governing law to the instant case. . . . 

Amoco argue_d that an injunction· is precluded by the jurisdictional 

limitations on the issuance of injunctions imposed by the 

Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). Amoco further 

contended that the case falls outside the exception to NorrisLaGuardia set forth in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 

U.S. 275 (1970), and refined in Buffalo Forge v. United 

Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 428 U.S. 397 (1976), construing 

those cases as holding that injunctive relief is precluded by the 

Act if a dispute can be resolved through arbitration and the 

parties are proceeding with arbitration. Amoco acknowledged that 

cour_ts may properly enjoin employer actions which threaten the 

arbitral process, but argued that implementation of the testing. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 5 
program would not make arbitration a "hollow formality" by 

irreparably-injuring ,the Union's employees. The Union vigorously 

disagreed with these contentions. 

Based on the evidence before it, the district court concluded 

that the Boys Markets exception was applicable because Amoco's 

action threatened the integrity of the arbitral process and 

equitable principles favored issuance of a status quo injunction. 

The court specifically found that the Union employees would suffer 

irreparable injury absent a status quo injunction because they 

potentially would be "humiliated," "frustrated," "stigmatized," 

and "embarrassed" by the testing program. Rec., vol. III, at 159. 

The court concluded that the Union's position was sufficiently 

sound to prevent arbitration from being a futile endeavor, and 

hence that the Union had satisfied the criterion of likelihood of 

success on the merits. The court also determined that the balance 

of harms favored issuance of an injunction and that the public 

interest would be served by a status quo injunction. 

Consequently, the court enjoined Amoco from implementing its drug 

testing program pending the outcome of arbitration. 

Amoco raises essentially the same arguments on appeal. Its 

primary contention is that the district court lacked jurisdiction 

to issue an injunction because the case does not fit the Boys 

Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.· Amoco also asserts 

that the district court's finding of irreparable injury is neither 

-6-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 6 
legally sufficient to justify the injunction in this case, nor 

supported by the record. Finally, Amoco challenges the court's 

assessment that the public interest favors issuance of the 

injunction. 

II. 

Amoco's jurisdictional challenge presents us with a question 

of first impression in this circuit: whether Boys Markets 

injunctions may issue to enjoin employer breaches of collective 

bargaining agreements, and if so, under what circumstances. Our 

inquiry does not proceed through uncharted terrain, however. A 

majority of circuits have addressed these issues and have 

established helpful and, for the most part, well-settled reference 

points. See,~, Aluminum Workers Int'l v. Consolidated 

Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1982); Local Lodge No. 1266 

v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981); United 

Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 

1979); Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1388 v. Greyhound Lines, 

Inc., .529 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.) (Greyhound I), vacated and 

remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), rev'd, 550 F.2d 1237 (Greyhound 

!.!), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); Lever Bros. Co. v. 

International Chemical Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th 

Cir. 1976); Hoh v. Pepsico, 491 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1974). 

-7-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 7 
Understanding the role of the judiciary and the proper use of 

--- injunctions in-resolving.labor disputes.governed-by collective 

bargaining agreements requires the consideration of several 

fundamental policies embedded in our national labor laws. The 

peaceful resolution of labor disputes through voluntary 

arbitration constitutes the overarching concern of national labor 

policy. Indeed, " [ t ]here is no more fundamental poli·cy in our 

national labor laws." Consolidated Aluminum, 696 F.2d at 441. 

See,~, 29 u.s.c. 173(d) (1982); Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local 

358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 430 U.S. 243, 253, 255 

(1977); Steelworkers Trilogy (United Steelworkers v. American 

Manuf·actur ing Co., 363 U.S. 564 ( 1960); United Steelworkers v. 

Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 

Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 

(1960)). 

Both the Labor Management Relations Act and the 

Norris-LaGuardia Act contribute to the advancement of this policy. 

Section 30l(a) of the LMRA grants district courts jurisdiction to 

enforce, "contracts between an employer and a labor organization 

representing employees in· an industry affecting commerce •••• " 

29 u.s.c. S 185(a). This jurisdictional grant permits federal 

judicial enforcement of collective bargaining agreements and 

thereby encourages their use. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 242, 

245. The Norris-LaGuardia Act broadly prohibits the issuance of 

injunctions in labor disputes. Its policy against judicial 

-8-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 8 
interference in such disputes,~ Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 252; 

Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 410-411; .Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, 

Inc. v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 707-21 

(1982), is rooted in a concern for "foster[ing] the growth and 

viability of labor organizations," Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 252, 

but it also encourages parties to work out their differences 

without judicial involvement. See Consolidated Aluminum, 696 F.2d 

at 441. 

Although each in its own way promotes the peaceful resolution 

of labor disputes through voluntary arbitration, the 

jurisdictional grant of the LMRA and the jurisdictional 

limitations of Norris-LaGuardia often conflict. The accommodation 

of these conflicting policies has been left to the courts •. Boys 

Markets, 398 U.S. at 251. The Supreme Court has created a broad 

framework to guide lower courts in assessing how best to 

accommodate these interests when they conflict. In Boys Markets, 

the Court recognized an exception to the anti-injunction 

provisions of Norris-LaGuardia when an employer brings suit under 

section 30l(a) of the LMRA to enforce a union's contractual 

obligation to arbitrate grievances rather than strike over them. 

The exception was necessary because the "unavailability of 

equitable relief in the arbitration context present[ed] a serious 

impediment to the congressional policy favoring the voluntary 

establishment of a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor 

disputes •••• " Boys Markets, 338 U.S. at 253. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 9 
Six years later, the Court in Buffalo Forge refined the 

holding of Boys Markets by clarifying that it applied only to 

those situations in which the labor dispute precipitating the 

strike is subject to arbitration. The Court emphasized that the 

rationale underlying Boys Markets was to protect the arbitral 

process from being frustrated and to ensure that the parties 

honored their bargains. Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 407. This 

rationale does not apply, the Court reasoned, when the underlying 

dispute is not subject to mandatory arbitration procedures, for 

then a "strike ha[s] neither the purpose or the effect of denying 

or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of depriving the employer 

of its bargain." Id. at 408. 

Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge both involved employers 

seeking to enjoin employees from striking allegedly in violation 

of a no-strike clause. Numerous circuit courts have concluded 

that the principles of these cases are equally applicable to 

analyzing whether injunctive relief is appropriate to restrain 

employers from acting so as to undermine the arbitration process. 4 

4 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue, but 

it encouraged this extension of the principles by vacating and 

remanding for consideration in light of Buffalo Forge the Ninth 

Circuit decision in Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1388 v. 

Greyhound Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.) (Greyhound I), 

vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), rev'd, 550 F.2d 1237 

(Greyhound II), cert. denied, 434 u.sd 837 (1977), in which 

employees sought inJunct1ve relief against the employer. See 

Local Lodge No. 1266 v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 280"'"""'ii":"8 

(7th Cir. 1981). 

-10-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 10 
See,~' Consolidated Aluminum, 797 F.2d at 441; Panoramic, 668 

F.2d at-"280; Fort Pitt, -598 F.2d at 1278;.Greyhound II, 550 F.2d 

at 1238; Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 120. We agree with these courts 

and hold that Boys Markets injunctions are available to enjoin 

employer breaches of collective bargaining agreements which 

threaten the arbitral process. 

Amoco does not dispute the availability of injunctive relief 

against employer breaches, as a general proposition. As it points 

out in its brief, however, the circuits have employed different 

methods for determining whether a status quo injunction case fits 

within the principles announced in Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge. 

The two primary approaches were developed by the Ninth and Fourth 

Circuits. See Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 282-83; Cantor, Buffalo 

Forge and Inj~nctions Against Employer Breaches of Collective 

Bargaining Agreements, 1980 Wis.L.Rev. 247, 268-274. The Ninth 

Circuit in Greyhound II, 550 F.2d at 1238, construed Buffalo Forge 

as generally limiting the availability of injunctive relief under 

Boys Markets to those situations in which the employer expressly 

promises to maintain the status quo. We have no such promise in 

this case. The court acknowledged in Greyhound II the 

appropriateness of inferring a promise to maintain the status quo 

if necessary to prevent frustration of the arbitral process, but 

it reasoned that such circumstances would be rare because employer 

actions generally do not interfere with arbitration. Id. at 1238-

39 .. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 11 
The approach-adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Lever Brothers, 

554 F.2d at 122-123, by contrast, dispenses with the need for 

distinguishing between express and implied promises, and instead 

focuses on the effect the employer's action will have on the 

ability of the arbitrator to "return the parties substantially to 

the status- quo ante." Id. at 123. This approach directly 

considers whether the employer's action will make the arbitral 

process a "hollow formality." It is ultimately consistent with 

the Ninth Circuit's approach because "once it is conceded that a 

duty to preserve the status quo pending arbitration may be 

implied," Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 282, the dispositive question 

under Greyhound II also becomes whether the action will frustrate 

the arbitral process. We find the Fourth Circuit position 

preferable,. because we believe it more accurately embodies the 

rationale underlying the Boys Markets exception. It also has the 

advantage of being more straightforward. We thus join the Third, 

Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in adopting the frustration-ofarbitration analysis as the standard in this circuit. 5 See 

Nursing Home & Hospital Union No. 434 v. Sky Vue Terrace, Inc., 

5 The Sixth Circuit's position is consistent with Lever 

Brothers although not phrased in exactly the same terms: "[T]he 

courts have extended the Boys Markets exception to embrace 

employer behavior which has the effect of evading a duty to 

arbitrate or which would otherwise undermine the integrity of the 

arbitral process." Aluminum Workers Int'l v. Consolidated 

Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 1982). 

-12-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 12 
/ 

I 

I 

759 F.2d 1094, 1098 (3d Cir. 1985) (Sky Vue); Lever Brothers, 554 

F.2d at 122-23; Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 282-83. 

Under Boys Markets, a court must also satisfy itself that the 

"'ordinary principles of equity'" support the issuance of 

injunctive relief. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254 (quoting 

Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 .U.S. 195, 228 (1962) 

(Brennan, J., dissenting)). Thus, in addition to establishing 

that the dispute is'subject to mandatory arbitration under the 

labor contract, id., and that the arbitrable dispute is the 

underlying dispute and not a collater~l one, Buffalo Forge, 428 

U.S. 408-11, the moving party must show that it will suffer 

irreparable injury, that the balance of hardships favors it, and 

that it has a probability of success on the merits, Boys Market, 

398 U.S. at 254; Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 283. If all of these 

requirements are satisfied, the proper accommodation of the 

various conflicting national labor policies will not be undercut 

by the issuance of an injunction to maintain the status quo. We 

now consider whether these requirements are met in the instant 

case. 6 

6 We postpone consideration of the frustration-of-arbitration 

analysis until our discussion of irreparable injury because the 

two issues coincide. See infra at p. 17. 

-13-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 13 
III. 

We review a district court's grant or denial of a preliminary 

injunction for abuse of discretion. Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 

61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980); Tri-State Generation v. Shoshone River 

Power, Inc., 805 F._2d 351, 354 (10th Cir. 1986). The abuse of 

discretion standard applies in the context of Boys Markets 

injunctions as well. See Lever Brothers, 554 F.2d at 120; 

Panoramic; 668 F.2d at 289; cf. Brotherhood of Locomotive 

Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry., 363 U.S. 528, 535 (1960) 

(M-K-T Railway). This standard of review requires that we 

carefully examine the district court's exercise of its discretion, 

but "we may not • substitute our own judgment for that of the 

trial court." Tri-Sta-te Generation, 805 F.2d at 354-55; see 

Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 390 (7th 

Cir. 1985). In addition, we must consider whether the court below 

relied on clearly erroneous fact findings, or made any clear 

errors of law. See Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 

846 F.2d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir.) ("Unless the district court 

abuses its discretion, commits an error of law, or is clearly 

erroneous in its preliminary factual findings, the appellate court 

may not set aside the injunction."), cert. denied 109 s.ct. 260 

(1988). 7 

7 We treat these later two inquiries as sub-categories of abuse 

of discretion review in this context, even though they require 

application of a distinct standard of review. A district court 

abuses its discretion if it relies nn clearly erroneous fact 

-14-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 14 
The parties agree that their dispute over Amoco's right to 

unilaterally implement a drug testing program is arbitrable, and 

they do not contend that this dispute is a collateral one rather 

than the underlying dispute. 8 We therefore turn immediately to 

consider the district court's assessment of the relevant 

traditional principles of equity. 

One-of the criteria for injunctive relief is ~ikelihood of 

success on the merits. Applying this factor in the traditional 

manner, however, would require courts to inquire into the merits 

of the dispute and encroach on the role of the arbitrator, a 

result clearly eschewed by the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge, 428 

U.S. at 410-411. See also Consolidated Aluminum, 696 F.2d at 442 

n.2; Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 284-85. We therefore agree with those· 

courts that have adopted the standard first enunciated by the 

Ninth Circuit in Greyhound I: 

''[A) plaintiff, without regard to whether he is the employer 

or the union, seeking to maintain the status quo pending 

arbitration pursuant to the principles of Boys Markets need 

only establish that the position he will espouse in 

findings or commits an error of law in deciding whether to issue a 

preliminary injunction. 

8 . We thus do not address the proper standard for making this 

latter determination. See Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 283-84. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 15 
arbitration is sufficiently sound to prevent the arbitration 

from being. a futile endeavor. [·There must be] a .genuine 

dispute with respect to an arbitrable issue •••• " 

Greyhound I, 529 F.2d at 1077-7'8. See Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 

120; Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 284-85; Consolidated Aluminum, 797 

F.2d at 442 n.2; see also Sky Vue, 759 F.2d at 1098 n.3. But see, 

~, Hoh, 491 F.2d at 561 (criterion must mean "not simply some 

likelihood of success in compelling arbitration but in obtaining 

the award in aid of which the injunction is sought"). 

We agree with the district court that the Union's position is 

sufficiently sound to prevent arbitration from being a futile 

end~avor. It is not clear from the face of the Agreement that 

either the Union or Amoco will prevail in arbitration. To the 

extent Amoco claims it is entitled under the management rights 

clause to unilaterally implement its drug testing program, it 

confronts the Union's contention that Article 21, the section 

dealing with health and safety matters, limits management's 

prerogatives. Nor do any of the other provisions of the Agreement 

included in the appellate record decisively favor either party. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 

the Union satisfies the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits 

requirement. 

-16-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 16 
A party seeking a Boys Markets injunction must also establish 

that it will suffer irreparable injury absent injunctive relief. 

Boys Markets, 338 U.S. at 254. The nature of the required 

irreparable injury assumes a specific character in the context of 

status quo injunctions against employer breaches of collective 

.bargaining agreements. Following the Supreme Court's decision in 

M-K-T Railway, 363 U.S. at 534-535, courts have construed 

irreparable injury in this context as an injury that would 

undermine the integrity of the arbitration process by making an 

eventual award only an "empty victory." See,~ Panoramic, 668 

F.2d at 285-86, Lever Brothers, 554 F.2d at 122, Consolidated 

Aluminum, 696 F.2d at 443. 

The irreparabl~ injury jnquiry thus coincides with the 

frustration-of-arbitration analysis used for determining the 

applicability of the Boys Markets exception. See Retail, 

Wholesale & Dept. Store Union Local 1034 v. Doxsee Food Corp., 650 

F.Supp. 861, 865 (D. Del. 1987). This coincidence often elevates 

the assessment of irreparable injury into the central inquiry in 

status quo injunction cases. See Consolidated Aluminum, 696 F.2d 

at 443. As have other courts, we merge these ideas into a single 

inquiry. See Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 286. 

As we begin our analysis, it is helpful to describe in 

greater detail the nature of Amoco's proposed drug testing 

program, which would subject its employees to testing in four 

-17-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 17 
circumstances. Employees would be tested whenever their "actions, 

.·. demeanor,. or behavior" prompt. supervisory personnel to refer the 

employee to the medical department and medical personnel believe a 

drug test is appopriate. They also would be tested after 

"hazardous accidents or near-hazardous accidents," at the 

discretion of management. All employees would be routinely tested 

during regularly scheduled annual physical examinations. 9 

Finally, an employee who tested positive in any of the above 

circumstances would be subject to follow-up testing.lo·· Rec., vol. 

III, at 9-10. 

Acknowledging that Amoco is entitled to· test for cause, the 

Union focuses its challenge on the testing to be conducted at the 

annual physical examinations and the follow-up testing, both of 

which it believes constitute testing without cause. Of particular 

concern to the Union in this regard are the detection levels for 

positive results established by the proposed policy. These levels 

are unusually low in the case of alcohol and marijuana, according 

9 The Union points out that Amoco's proposal provides for more 

frequent testing when the company deems it is necessary. See 

Rec., vol. III, at 144. "In most cases, drug and alcohol testing 

for employees will be conducted annually. However, management may 

direct more frequent testing when it is deemed necessary." Rec., 

vol. I, doc. 1, Ex.Bat 3 (emphasis added). This provision makes 

the transformation of the annual testing to random testing a real 

possibility. 

10 It should be noted that Amoco's proposal leaves open-ended 

the period following a positive test during which an employee 

would remain subject to follow-up testing. Rec., vol. III, at 

99-100. 

-18-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 18 
to evidence submitted by the Union, and positive test results for 

them would not correlate to the impairment of an individual at the 

time of testing. Rec., vol. I, doc. 4, Affidavit of Richard E. 

Collins; Rec., vol. III, at 44. Amoco's manager of human 

resources at the Salt Lake City refinery conceded on crossexamination that traces of marijuana can remain in a person's 

system long after its use. Id. at 127-28. The low detection 

levels of Amoco's drug testing program, the Union contends, would 

result in the regulation of the private lives of its employees, 

regulation which exceeds Amoco's legitimate interests as an 

employer. This potential intrusion into the employees' private 

lives threatens to cause them stigmatization, humiliation, and 

damage to reputation. These injuries wouid be all the more 

grievous, the Union argues, bec.ause of the numerous familial 

relationships between its members, and the strong religious 

character of the community. Rec., vol. III, at 41, 74. 

The major.ity of Amoco's argument focuses on what types of 

po~ential injury are so irreparable as to threaten the integrity 

of the arbitral process. 11 Amoco contends that because work11 In addition, Amoco argues that the district court misapplied 

inadequacy of the 

by Amoco's 

the Boys Markets exception when it looked to the 

remedy available to employees adversely affected 

program. In so doing, Amoco misconstrues the 

frustration-of-arbitration analysis and misunderstands 

relationship to the concept of irreparable injury. 

its 

The frustration-of-arbitration analysis focuses on actions by 

a party that, although not literally interfering with the arbitral 

process, will irreparably injure the other party and thereby 

-19-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 19 
related drug and alcohol discipline cases are the "grist for t~e 

mill of grievance procedures and arbitration," the arbitration 

process necessarily must afford adequate remedies to employees 

"enmeshed in a drug or alcohol" case. Relying on Panoramic, 668 

F.2d at 285 n.12, Amoco also urges that the type of harm alleged 

is legally insufficient to warrant injunctive relief. These 

arguments, which are variations on a single theme, present the 

question whether invasion of privacy, stigmatization, and 

humiliation qualify as irreparable injuries that threaten to 

frustrate the arbitral process. In addition, Amoco contends that 

the harm alleged by the Union is too speculative. 

·The Union replies that the stigmatization and humiliation 

resulting from the drug ·testing program's invasion of privacy12 

can support findings of irreparable injury because these injuries 

undermine the arbitration by making it impossible for an 

arbitrator to award an adequate remedy. Assessing the adequacy of 

the remedy, contrary to Amoco's assertion, does not require that 

the court infringe on the arbitrator's territory. As the court in 

Panoramic stated in response to a similar argument, "an 

examination of the arbitrable dispute to determine whether 

irreparable injury is threatened ••• is very different from the 

examination subsequently to be made by an arbitrator." 668 F.2d 

at 285. Cf. M-K-T Railway, 363 U.S. at 533-34. If accepted, 

Amoco's argument, like Panoramic's, would essentially prevent the 

issuance of Boys Markets injunctions in virtually every case. 

12 Interwoven throughout the Union's argument is the suggestion 

that refusing to be tested will result in immediate termination, 

and testing positive will lead to immediate suspension. These 

consequences are relevant here only to the extent they contribute 

to the stigmatization and humiliation of the workers. Wrongful 

termination or suspension can be compensated by reinstatement and 

backpay. See Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 286. 

-20-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 20 
cannot be redressed by an arbitral award. The Union counters 

.Amoco's speculativeness charge by .pointing to testimony before the 

district court concerning workers' responses to the program. 

In support of its primary argument, Amoco relies on two cases 

involving suits to enjoin the implementation of drug testing 

programs at two of its other refineries. 13 The district courts in 

both instances declined to issue the requested injunctive relief. 

In Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers; Local 6-10 v. Amoco Oil Co., 653 

F.Supp. 300, 303 (D. N.D. 1986) (OCAW, Local 6-10), the court 

concluded that irreparable injury would not result from Amoco's 

implementation of its new drug policy because 1) the policy did 

not qualitatively alter existing company policies against the use 

of alcohol and drugs while worki~g, or _the possession of such 

substances on the refinery grounds;. 2) affected employees could be 

"made whole" by reinstatement and backpay, and stigmatization did 

not constitute irreparable injury; and 3) the arbitration process 

itself would be "unaffected" by the company's unilateral 

implementation of the program. The court in Oil Chemical & Atomic 

Workers, Local 2-124 v. Amoco Oil Co., 651 F.Supp. 1, 5 (Wyo. 

1986), while apparently acknowledging the possible stigmatization 

of employees, also concluded that reinstatement and backpay were 

adequate remedies. Neither of these decisions was appealed. 

13 The drug testing program instituted at Amoco's Mandan, North 

Dakota and Casper, Wyoming refineries is apparently identical to 

the one proposed for the Salt Lake City refinery. Brief of 

Appellant- at 2. 

-21-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 21 
The Union relies ·heavily on·an unpublished opinion from the 

district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers System Council 4-9 

and Local 563 v. Metropolitan Edison Co., CA No. 86-4426 (E.D. Pa. 

1986). This opinion has no precedential value per se, but we find 

relevant the court's conclusion that the invasion of privacy 

associated with drug testing, and resulting humiliation and damage 

to reputation, constitute irreparable injury. 

Several other district court opinions have treated the drug 

testing issue in the Boys Markets context. Two opinions reach 

conclusions consistent with Metropolitan Edison. In Stove, 

Furnace & Applied Applicance Workers' IntJl, Local 185 v. 

Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., 650 F.Supp. 431 (S.D. Ill.· 1986), the 

union contended that the testing program could in certain 

circumstances invade the privacy of its members and result in a 

"'black mark' on the[ir] personnel records." Id. at 433·. The 

court agreed, concluding that these contentions were sufficient to 

show irreparable injury. Id. at 434. See also International 

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Florida Power & Light, 678 

F.Supp. 257, 258 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 

In a third case, International Brotherhood of Electrical 

Workers, Local 1900 v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 634 F.Supp. 642 

(D.D.C. 1986), the court implied that implementation of a wide 

-22-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 22 
;.,~,::, ··---·' .. ·, .,··;_,_, .. 

ranging drug testing program could result in irreparable injury. 

There, Potomac Electric unilaterally imposed a new drug testing 

regime. The court rejected the union's allegations of injury 

resulting from potential invasions of privacy and unjustified 

discharges, 14 because it found that the company's in-court 

representations "guarantee that the scope of testing of PEPCO 

employees will remain essentially unchanged from the policy prior 

to March 13, 1986 pending an arbitral decision. II Id. at 

645. The court held that the postponement of the potentially 

broad application of the new rules removed the specter of 

irreparable injury, and the justification for a status quo 

injunction under the Boys Markets exception, because the only new 

injuries that could possibly result were not materially different 

th~~ injuries possibl~ under the old policy. The court's 

reasoning suggests that it would have found irreparable injury and 

enjoined implementation of the new rules had the company been 

unwilling to postpone their implementation. 

Contrary to the opinion in OCAW, Local 6-10, 653 F.Supp. at 

303, we are convinced that implementation of a drug testing 

14 The parties also disputed the extent to which the company's 

new program altered the previous policy. The company claimed the 

new program merely imposed stiffer penalties, whereas the union 

contended that the new program additionally permitted testing at 

random and without cause. The court concluded that the imposition 

of stiffer penalties did not "materially change the effect on an 

employee's reputation which would be affected by some lesser 

penalty •••• " International Brotherhoood of Electrical Workers, 

Local 1900 v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 634 F.Supp. 642, 644 

(D.D.C. 1986). 

-23-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 23 
program is qualitatively different than the existence of policies 

- ... against. the~use and.possession of drugs in .the workplace. This is 

especially true where, as here, the program includes wide ranging 

testing without cause15 and utilizes low thresholds for positive 

results. The record indicates that because of the low detection 

levels selected by Amoco, an employee could test positive.when his 

prior use of a drug or alcohol is not impairing his job 

performance. Rec., vol. I, doc. 4, Affidavit of Richard E. 

Collins; rec., vol. III, at 44. Consequently, the qualitative 

difference does not just threaten an incremental increase in 

damage to reputation, such as the increased penalties in Potomac 

Electric, it threatens to invade an employee's privacy by 

disclosing information about his off-the-job conduct that is 

unrelated to his performance at work. The attenuation of the 

relationship between Amoco's legitimate interests in implementing 

a drug testing program and the actual scope of the program makes 

the potential invasion of privacy especially egregious. 

15 In its recent decision in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway 

Labor Executive Ass'n, 57 U.S.L.W. 4742, 4747 (1989), the Supreme 

Court recognized the difference between testing for cause and 

routine testing, and acknowledged that this difference "perhaps 

could be of significance to arbitrators in deciding the merits of 

drug testing disputes." Although the Court declined to rely on 

this distinction for the limited purpose of assessing whether 

Conrail's claim of its contractual right to implement a drug 

testing program was "obviously insubstantial," id., we believe the 

Court's recognition of the distinction's potential relevance to 

the merits supports our reliance on it for the somewhat broader 

purpose of .evaluating irreparable injury. 

-24-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 24 
Moreover, even if we accept Amoco's assurances of 

confidentiality, employee privacy remains threatened. An employee 

who tests positive at the low detection levels will be required 

either to enter a rehabilitation program, or to take thirty days 

off work. The record reflects that as a practical matter, the 

employee's co-workers would know that he is attending a 

rehabilitation program, or would notice his absence when his 

shifts have to be filled. Id. at 67-68. Alternatively, an 

employee's co-workers would learn of positive test results by 

virtue of the Onion's representation of the employee in a 

grievance proceeding. Id. at 67. 

In light of the invasion of privacy threatened by Amoco's 

testing program, and the potential for stigmatization and 

humiliation of its employees, we do not believe that an arbitral 

award of reinstatement and backpay could make affected employees 

whole. These injuries would potentially be all the more severe 

because of the close-knit character of the employees and the fact 

that the predominant religion in the community proscribes the 

drinking of alcoholic beverages. Id. at 41 and 74. The 

consequences of revelations about drug or alcohol use could have 

long term consequences for a member of ~uch a community. For 

these reasons, we are persuaded that the integrity of the 

arbitration process will be seriously undermined by Amoco's 

unilateral implementation of the testing program. Once an 

employee's reputation is sullied, we see no way. that an arbitral 

-25-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 25 
award prohibiting the company from unilaterally implementing the 

drug testing program would provide relief. We thus agree with the 

district court that the invasion of privacy, stigmatization, and 

humiliation alleged by the Union constitute irreparable injuries 

that threaten the integrity of the arbitral process and adequately 

support the issuance of a status quo injunction. 

We are aware that some courts have been reluctant to 

recognize every irreparable injury as a sufficient basis for 

issuing a status quo injunction. These courts have created a 

category of injuries that are considered irreparable, but not so 

irreparable that they undermine the integrity of the arbitral 

process. The court in Panoramic, for example, concluded that 

injuries frequently suffered by employees pending arbitration of 

their disputes, but "not compensated by the contract remedies (in 

contrast to tort damages) typically awarded in· arbitration," can 

not form the basis for injunctive relief. Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 

285 n.12. Th• types of injuries the court had in mind are the 

lost interest on earnings and expenses incurred by an employee 

improperly discharged and seeking other employment; the 

uncompensated injuries suffered by an employee on the job pending 

arbitration of a grievance over safety; and injuries resulting 

from an employer's unauthorized change in his employees' vacation 

schedules, such as lost deposits, schedule changes for the family, 

and general inconvenience. See Payne, Enjoining Employers Pending 

Arbitration---From M-K-T to Greyhound and Beyond, 3 Ind.Rel.L.J. 

-26-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 26 
169, 199 (1979); Cf. Consolidated Aluminum, 696 F.2d at 444-45 

(P-repossessions,-foreclosures, and injury to credit rating" not 

the type of harm that threatens the integrity of the arbitral 

process). However, our review of the Supreme Court's decision in 

M-K-T Railway, the source of the irreparable injury standard in 

the status quo injunction context, reinforces our conviction that 

the stigmatization and humiliation alleged her~ are injuries 

sufficient to support the issuance of a status quo injunction in 

this context. 16 

The Court in M-K-T Railway considered whether district courts 

may impose status quo obligations on employers as a condition for 

issuing no-strike injunctions in order to prevent irreparable 

injuiy to employees and thereby pre~erve the jurisdiction of the 

National Railroad Adjustment Board. 17 In assessing whether the 

16 Lever Brothers, 554 F.2d 115 (1976), also supports a broad 

reading of the types of irreparable injury sufficient to support 

status quo injunctions. The parties in Lever Brothers disagreed 

over the proper characterization of the company's decision to 

close one plant and transfer production to a facility in another 

state. The union argued that the proposed action constituted a 

"contracting out" under the contract. Therefore, contended the 

union, the company was required to provide it with "full 

information" about the action and to reach a final decision only 

after giving "due consideration" to the employees' interests. Id. 

at 118-19. The threatened injury in Lever Brothers was thus the-"" 

union's loss of its right to participate in the decision-making 

process. Although a permanent loss of jobs would result from the 

transfer, this was not the injury which threatened the integrity 

of the arbitral process because the company was entitled to take 

the action after due consideration of the employee's interests. 

17 The relevance of M-K-T Railway is not diminished by the fact 

that it involves the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 u.s.c. § 151-188 

(1982), which establishes a system of compulsory arbitration, 

-27-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 27 
conditions imposed by the district court protected the 

.jurisdiction of .the .board, the Court reasoned: 

"The dispute out of which the judicial controversy arose 

does not merely concern rates of pay or job assignments, 

but rather involves the discharge of employees from 

positions long held and the dislocation of others from 

their homes. From the point of view of these employees, 

the critical point in the dispute may be when the change 

is made, for, by the time of the frequently long-delayed 

Board decision, it might well be impossible to make them 

whole in any realistic sense. If this be so, the action 

of the district judge; rather than defeating the Board's 

jurisdiction, would operate to preserve that 

jurisdiction by preventing injury so irreparable that a 

decision of the Board in the unions' favor would be but 

an empty victory." 

M-K-T Railway, 363 U.S. at 534 (emphasis, added). Significantly, 

the Court's discussion of irreparable injury indicates that it 

viewed the issue in a manner consistent with traditional concepts 

rather than the LRMA. The Supreme Court made clear in Boy~ 

Markets, 398 U.S. at 251-52, that the concerns underlying its 

accommodation of Norris-LaGuardia and the RLA, also underlay its 

accommodation of Norris-LaGuardia and the LMRA: 

"The court concluded [in Brotherhood of Railroad 

Trainmen v •. Chicago River & Ind. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 

(1957)) that ••• Norris-LaGuardia's policy of 

nonintervention by the federal courts should yield to 

the overriding interest in the successful implementation 

of the arbitration process [established by the RLA]." 

· "The principles elaborated in Chicago River are 

equally applicable to the present case." 

The Court so concluded because of the importance assigned to 

arbitration in the administration of collective bargaining 

agreements by Congress. Similarly, the concerns underlying the 

reasoning of M-K-T Railway about the circumstances under which 

status quo obligations may be. imposed as a condition of no-strike 

injunctions are sufficiently analogous to the concerns facing us 

here that its reasoning is "equally applicable" in this context. 

-28-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 28 
of irreparable injury. The Court in no way indicates that a. 

higher threshold for such a~ f-inding · should apply -in the context of 

a status quo injunction. Moreover, the language used by the Court 

to describe injuries it considered irreparable, the discharge of 

employees from long· held positions and the dislocation of 

employees from their homes, strongly suggests that courts should 

use a wide focus in assessing the nature of the threatened injury, 

as well as adopt a broad view of what constitutes irreparable 

injury in this context. There seems no other way to account for 

the Court's characterization of discharge and dislocation as 

irreparable given, for example, that reinstatement and backpay has 

traditionally be~n considered an adequate remedy for improper 

discharge. It is especially the collateral effects of being 

discharged f rem long held employment or being disloca_ted from 

one's home that make it "impossible to make [employees] whole in 

any realistic sense." !d. 

Our holding does not undermine the framework established by 

the Supreme Court for accommodating Norris-LaGuardia's policy 

against widespread judicial involvement in labor disputes to the 

LMRA's provision permitting judicial enforcement of collective 

bargaining.agreements. This accommodation was intended to protect 

the arbitral process by preventing injuries that could not be 

adequately redressed through an arbitral award. Our holding 

furthers this goal. 

-29-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 29 
As for Amoco's argument that the alleged injuries are too 

speculative, we note that district-courts have wide discretion in 

exercising their equitable powers. M-K-T Railway, 363 U.S. at 

535. The scope of these powers is jurisdictionally circumscribed 

in the context of labor disputes, but once it is determined that 

jurisdiction is proper, the court may freely exercise its powers. 

Based on our review of the record, we decline to hold that the 

district court in this case abused its discretion in concluding 

that the Union's allegations of irreparable injury were not 

speculative. 

The last18 of the traditional equitable principles that a 

party seeking Boys Markets injunctive relief must satisfy is that 

the balance o~ hardships favors issuance of the injunction. Boys 

Markets, 398 U.S. at 254. An examination of the record reveals 

that the district court found no evidence of a drug problem at the 

Salt Lake City refinery, but only of a nationwide problem. As a 

consequence, the court concluded that no injury to Amoco would 

result except for a delay in the testing program. On the other 

hand, the court found that the Union members would be irreparably 

18 Although public interest findings are not one of the 

traditional equitable principles referred to by the Boys Markets 

Court, the court below found that issuance of the injunction in 

this case was in the public interest. Amoco's final argument 

focuses on this issue. Amoco urges that both federal and state 

policy favor drug testing. Amoco's argument fails to mention 

another important, and in this instance, countervailing policy 

consideration: the peaceful resolution of labor disputes through 

voluntary arbitration. 

-30-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 30 
injured by implementation of the program. The district court thus 

-found.--that -the.balance .of.hardships favored issuance of the 

injunction. We are not persuaded that the district court abused 

its discretion in this regard. 

IV 

We affirm the order of the district court for the 

aformentioned reasons. Our ruling should not be construed as in 

any respect indiqating this court's view of issues that the 

parties.have agreed to submit to arbitration. 

AFFIRMED. 

-31-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 31 
No. 86-2838, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. 

Amoco Oil Co. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

This case was argued and submitted to the court on July 16, 

1987. The arbitrator has had the same dispute under advisement 

since October 7, 1988, and no doubt awaits our decision. 1 

Notwithstanding, the court ignores the maxim that a dispute over 

the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement must be 

resolved not by a court, but as the parties have agreed, by an 

arbitrator. !.:_g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. MissouriKansas-Texas R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 533 (1960). The court today 

does nothing less than render a decision on the merits of a labor 

dispute, albeit under a one-sentence disclaimer at the conclusion 

.. of its opinion; Court's Opinion at 31, that will certainly 

influence if not preempt the arbitrator's views. Buffalo Forge 

Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 412 (1976). I 

respectfully dissent. 

Amoco's drug testing program essentially consists of three 

parts: (1) annual testing, (2) testing for cause, and (3) periodic 

l 

of 

Our delay in rendering a decision surely contravenes section 10 

the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as amended, which states: 

Whenever any court of the United States shall issue or 

deny any temporary injunction in a case involving or 

growing out of a labor dispute, the court shall, upon 

the request of any party to the proceedings and on his 

filing the usual bond for costs, forthwith certify as in 

ordinary cases the record of the case to the court of 

appeals for its review. Upon the filing of such record 

in the court of appeals, the appeal shall be heard and 

the temporary injunctive order affirmed, modified, or 

set aside expeditiously. 

29 U.S.C. S 110 (emphasis added). 

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 32 
retesting for employees testing_positive in either of the first 

two instances. The union does not object to testing for cause but 

rather contends that annual testing and periodic retesting 

constitute arbitrary invasions of its members' privacy. For 

years, however, Amoco has required an annual physical examination 

of its employees during which both a urine specimen and blood 

sample are taken. The union has never objected. Thus, Amoco's 

acquisition of the urine specimen and blood sample are not 

disputed .. While the Supreme Court has recognized that the 

"procedures for collecting the necessary samples, which require 

employees to perform an excretory function traditionally [have 

been] shielded by great privacy," Skinner v. Railway Labor 

Executives Ass'n, 109 s. Ct. 1402, 1418 (1989), we are not 

concerned in this case with "procedures." Only the ~ctual 

screening of the employees' urine and blood for drugs is in issue. 

Still, the union argues that an "arbitrator would find offensive 

and in violation of the contract such testing policy." Appellee's 

Brief at 15. Yet the arbitrator's substantive construction of the 

collective bargaining agreement is not our concern. 

To justify its intrusion into the arbitration process, the 

court focuses largely on the district judge's finding that the 

union's members would suffer irreparable harm via an invasion of 

privacy if Amoco was not enjoined from implementing its drug 

testing program pending arbitration. See Court's Opinion at 17-

29. The court correctly notes that such a finding generally may 

not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Amoco Oil Co. v. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 33 
Rainbow Snow, Inc., 809 F.2d 656, 663 (10th Cir. 1987). But 

_factfindings~made under an erroneous-view of the law or in tbe 

absence of a defined legal standard are not binding on appeal. 

Pullman Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). Although the 

district judge expressed a belief that his failure to-award the 

union injunctive relief would render arbitration meaningless, he 

did not adequately explain why. Instead, the judge seemed to have 

imposed a personal conviction upon the governing law when he 

stated: "Employees should not be subjected to that [drug testing] 

in my view, and they would suffer irreparable injury ••. This 

[drug testing program] is essentially based upon a national 

program that you [Amoco] want to institute, and if you do, you 

ought to institute it right." Rec. vol. III at 159-60. 

We must begin with the language contained in section one of 

the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. S 101: "No court of the 

United States ••• shall have jurisdiction to issue any 

restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case 

involving or growing out of a labor dispute " As 

construed, section one divests the district court of jurisdiction 

and precludes the issuance of an injunction where the denial of 

injunctive relief would not result in frustration of the arbitral 

process. See Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 404-412. 2 In Boys 

2 Because we have adopted a modified interpretation of the 

"likelihood of success on the merits" requirement, holding that 

"it will ordinarily be enough that the p1aintiff has raised 

questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult 

and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litigation," City of 

Chanute v. Kansas Gas and Elec. Co., 754 F.2d 310, 314 (10th Cir. 

(footnote continued on next page) 

-3-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 34 
,• .... .;·. ,.:/·: ' . ~ ' , ' ' ' ·~ ... ~ .. ,, : ;· .. ,,~ 

Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the. 

-Supreme Court fashioned a ~narrow'' exception to the 

anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 u.s.c. 

§§ 101-15. In order to enforce the union's express promise to 

arbitrate, the Court enjoined a labor strike in breach of a 

no-strike obligation under a collective bargaining agreement 

stating that "a no-strike obligation ••• is the quid pro quo for 

an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to the 

process of arbitration." Id. at 248. Subsequently, in Buffalo 

Forge, 428 U.S. at 404-12, the Court further delineated the limits 

of Boys Markets when it refused to enjoin a union's sympathy 

strike where management and labor had agreed to arbitrate whether 

such a strike was in violation of the collective bargaining 

agreement. The Court explained: 

[An injunction] would cut deeply into the policy of 

the Norris-LaGuardia Act and make the courts potential 

participants in a wide range of arbitrable disputes 

under the many existing and future collective bargaining 

contracts, not just for the purpose of enforcing 

promises to arbitrate, which was the limit of Boys 

Markets, but for the purpose of preliminarily dealing 

with the merits·of the factual and legal issues that are 

subjects for the arbitrator and of issuing injunctions 

that would otherwise be forbidden by the NorrisLaGuardia Act. 

(footnote continued from preceding page) 

1985), I agree with the court that, in view of article 21 of the 

collective bargaining agreement, arbitration of the parties' 

dispute is not a "futile endeavor." Court's Opinion at 16. 

Similarly, because the record reflects no history of drug-related 

accidents at the Salt Lake City refinery and no evidence of a drug 

problem among its employees, I believe the balance of hardships 

weighs in favor of the union, see id. at 30-31, despite the lack 

of irreparable injury. See infra at 7-9. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 35 
This is not what the parties have bargained for. 

Surely it cannot be concluded here, as it was in Boys 

Markets, that such .. injunctions .pending arbitration are 

essential to carry out promises to arbitrate and to 

implement the private arrangements for the 

administration of the contract. As is typical, the 

agreements in this case outline the prearbitration 

settlement procedures and provide that if the grievance 

"has not been •• ·• satisfactorily adjusted," 

arbitration may be had. Nowhere do they provide for 

coercive action of any kind, let alone judicial 

injunction~, short of the terminal decision of the 

arbitrator. The parties have agreed to submit to 

grievance procedures and arbitrate, not to litigate. 

The have not contracted for a judicial preview o·f the . facts and the law •••• The parties' agreement to 

adjust or to arbitrate their differences themselves 

would be eviscerated if the courts for all practical 

purposes were to try and decide contractual disputes at 

the preliminary injunction stage. 

Id. at 410-12 (emphasis added). 

Thus, Buffalo Forge cautions federal courts "to stay out of 

the merits of labor disputes." Lever Bros. Co. v. International 

Chem. workers·union, 554 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir. 1976). 

Injunctive relief as an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act is 

appropriate only when necessary to enforce an agreement to 

arbitrate. Local Lodge No. 1266· v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 

281 (7th Cir. 1981). In other words, an injunction in aid of 

arbitration is necessary when its absence would render the 

arbitral process a "hollow formality." Court's Opinion at 12. 

But cf. Utility Workers v. Southern California Edison Co., 852 

F.2d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 1530 

(1989) (district court erred in issuing injunction against 

implementation of drug testing program where employer did not 

expressly or impliedly promise to maintain status quo pending 

arbitration). Because frustration of the arbitral process would 

-5-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 36 
•'' r : \ ".•~ • ••• •" C • 

constitute irreparable injury to the aggrieved party, courts have 

·focused on the former to determine the latter. !.!.9_., Aluminum 

Workers Int'l Union v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 

443 (6th Cir. 1982). 

This court's suggestion that we "use a wide focus in 

assessing the nature of the threatened injury, as well as adopt a 

broad view of what constitutes irreparable injury," Court's 

·opinion at 29 (emphasis added), is simply wrong. The cases on 

which the court relies do not stand for such a proposition. For 

instance, in Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 363 U.S. at 528, 

the Supreme Court approved a district court order preventing the 

railroad from eliminating the jobs of certain freight crews and 

changing the home terminals of other crews prior to arbitration. 

The Court reasoned that.because the railroad proposed to discharge 

or dislocate employees from long held positions, the arbitrator in 

the absence of a temporary injunction could not "make them whole 

in any realistic sense," if they prevailed on the merits. Id. at 

534. Likewise, in Panoramic, 668 F:2d at 276, the Seventh Circuit 

upheld an injunction restraining an employer from selling its 

corporate assets pending an arbitrator's decision on the union's 

claim that the sale violated the parties' collective bargaining 

agreement. The court concluded that because the employer's 

proposed action threatened a permanent loss of jobs, a damage 

remedy was inadequate: "Consummation of the sale would have left 

the arbitrator with no certain and effective means of remedying 

the breach of contract that the union has alleged." Id. at ·288. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 37 
Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 115, presented the Fourth Circuit with a 

similar scenario. In that caseJ Lever Brothers sought to transfer 

its Baltimore, Maryland soap production operation to Hammond, 

Indiana. The district court enjoined the company from moving 

pending arbitration and the court of appeals affirmed: "[H]ad 

there not been an injunction pending arbitration to preserve the 

status guo, the employees at the Baltimore plant would have been. 

totally and permanently deprived of their employment." Id. at 122 

(emphasis in original). Despite this court's contrary assertions, 

Court's Opinion at 29, reinstatement and backpay for the employees 

in these cases would have been .difficult at best given the 

fundamental change in business structure and operations. Thus, 

injunctive relief operated to preserve the arbitrators' 

jurisdiction "by,preventing injury so irreparable that a decision 

of the [arbitrators] in the unions favor would be but an empty 

victory." Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 363 U.S. at 534. 

Such is not the case here. To be sure, those employees who might 

be accused unjustly of drug use may suffer some stigmatization 

which backpay and reinstatement cannot fully redress. But 

"·[ i] rreparable injury means not simply any injury resulting f rem a 

breach of contract that would not be fully redressed by an 

arbitral award," Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 28, but rather that which 

wouid make arbitration a futile endeavor. 

This court expresses grave concern over Amoco's purported 

attempt to regulate the private lives of its employees. Relying 

on the union's expert, the court claims that the detection levels 

-7-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 38 
for alcohol and marijuana are so low that a positive test result 

-•twould not correlate to the impairment of an individual at the 

time of testing," Court's Opinion at 18-19, and thus would exceed 

Amoco's legitimate interes.t in testing. Maybe; maybe not. That 

merits determination, like the determinations of whether the union 

should have input into the company's testing procedures or whether 

testing at· the refinery should be banned outright, is for the 

arbitrator to decide. 

The court does not identify the source of the employees' 

right to privacy it directly relies upon for its advisory holding. 

Because Amoco is not a state actor, the Constitution's guarantee 

of privacy is inapplicable. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 

479, 480-86 (1965). Moreover, I am unaware of any general federal 

common law right to privacy. Any right to privacy,. the_refore, 

must come from federal labor law for section 301 of the Labor 

Management Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. •s 185, preempts state law, 

mandating resort to federal law in the interpretation of 

collective bargaining agreements. ~., Teamsters v. Lucas Flour 

Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-104 (1962). But because the Constitution is 

inapplicable in the absence of state action and no general federal 

common law right to privacy exists, the court must rely on either 

the express terms of the agreement or industrial common law to 

find this right of privacy, and in doing so encroaches upon the 

jurisdiction of the arbitrator. As Justice Douglas so aptly 

explained in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 

363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960): 

-8-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 39 
The labor arbitrator'$ source of law is not confined to 

the express provisions of the contract, as the 

industrial common law-:--the practices of the. industry and 

the shop--is equally a part of the collective bargaining 

agreement although not expressed in it. The labor 

arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' 

confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the 

shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring 

to bear considerations which are not expressed in the 

contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect 

that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect 

not only what the contract says but, insofar as the 

collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as 

the effect upon pro_ductivity of a particular result, its 

consequences to the morale of the shop, his judgment 

whether tensions will be heightened or diminished •••• 

The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same 

experience and competence to bear upon the determination 

of a grievance, because he cannot similarly be informed. 

(emphasis added). 

The reason why the irreparable injury requirement for 

injunctive relief must be narrowly viewed and the anti-injunction 

provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act given ef~ect .is because the 

expertise of the arbitrator is "foreign to the competence of 

courts." Id. at 581. Regardless of this court's ruling, the 

propriety of Amoco's drug testing program ultimately rests with 

the arbitrator. Arbitration would not be rendered a "hollow 

formality" in the absence of temporary injunctive relief, for the 

arbitrator will structure the plan as required by the contract and 

industry practice. See Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Amoco Oil 

Co., 653 F. Supp. 300, 303 (D.N.D. 1986) (holding that no 

injunction should issue against Amoco's drug testing plan at North 

Dakota refinery); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Amoco Oil Co., 

651 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D. Wyo. 1986) (holding that no injunction 

should. issue against Amoco's drug testing plan at Wyoming 

-9-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 40 
refinery). Today the court does little more than advise the 

arbitrator how this labor dispute should be decided. I can think 

of few labor disputes where this court's decision will not be 

cited for the proposition that a court of law should issue a 

preliminary injunction pending arbitration when asked to do so. I 

would reverse the judg~ent of the district court and remand with 

instructions to vacate the injunction and dismiss the complaint 

for want of jurisdiction. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 41 
Appellate Case: 86-2838 Document: 01019899984 Date Filed: 09/15/1989 Page: 42