Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01791/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01791-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS WAYNE GORDON,

Petitioner,

v.

TOM L. CAREY, Warden,

Respondent.

CIV-S-01-1791 DFL PAN P

ORDER

Petitioner Curtis Wayne Gordon, a state prisoner proceeding

pro se, has filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging

his convictions in state court for voluntary manslaughter,

attempted voluntary manslaughter, kidnaping and vehicle theft. 

Petitioner was sentenced to 17 years in prison, which includes a

10-year sentence enhancement for the use of a firearm in the

commission of the crimes of conviction. Respondent has filed an

answer to the petition. 

Petitioner’s conviction arises out of an altercation with

victims Stephan Clark and Clifton Stovall, which ended in

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 Unless otherwise noted, the facts laid out below are taken 1

from the December 23, 1998 and March 23, 2000 opinions of the

California Court of Appeal, which are Exs. A and D, respectively,

to respondent’s answer. 

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shootings that left Clark wounded and Stovall dead.1

Petitioner’s theory at trial was that he was acting in selfdefense and in defense of others. 

Petitioner raises five different claims in his petition: (1)

the trial court erroneously rejected his proposed “antecedent

threat” instructions, which prevented him from effectively

presenting his defense; (2) the trial court erroneously denied a

mistrial after the prosecutor, in his closing argument, used a

co-defendant’s statement to impeach petitioner’s testimony; (3)

the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the

prosecutor to reopen his case-in-chief to present another witness

during the defense case; (4) the prosecutor systematically

excluded black jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476

U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986); and (5) the trial court judge

arbitrarily increased the length of his sentence for the gun

enhancement on remand.

 Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim

decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to 

or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The “contrary to” clause applies when a

state court applies a rule different from the governing law set

forth in the Supreme Court’s cases, while the “unreasonable

application” clause applies if the state court correctly

identifies the governing legal principle but unreasonably applies

it to the facts of the particular case. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (2002). The petitioner has the burden

of showing that the state court’s decision was either contrary

to, or an unreasonable application, of state law. Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25, 123 S.Ct. 357 (2002). All of the

claims Gordon’s petition were raised in his two state court

appeals, and were either addressed on the merits or found to be

procedurally barred. Therefore, the court must defer to the

state court determinations of these claims, unless petitioner

satisfies his burden of overcoming the presumption of

correctness.

Petitioner’s first claim is that the trial court erred in

refusing to give to the jury his requested “antecedent threat”

instructions, which would have expressly informed the jury that

prior threats by a victim could be used to determine the

reasonableness of a claim of self-defense. A defendant has a due

process right to have the judge instruct the jury on his theory

of defense, provided that it is supported by law and has some

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foundation in the evidence. United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d

1434 (9th Cir. 1990). The failure to give such instructions,

where warranted, is generally reversible error. Id. However, it

is not reversible error to reject a defendant’s proposed

instructions on his theory of the case if other instructions, in

their entirety, adequately cover that defense theory. Id.;

United States v. Romero-Avila, 210 F.3d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir.

2000). A defendant is not entitled to any particular form of

instruction, nor is he entitled to an instruction that merely

duplicates what the jury has already been told. United States v.

Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 597 (9th Cir.1992).

The state court determined that the instructions given

adequately informed the jury of the relevance of prior threats by

the victims, and that the failure to give the proposed

instructions was harmless error. (Answer Ex. A at 31-32.) This

determination is not contrary to or an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law, nor is it an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Therefore, this claim is DENIED.

Petitioner’s second claim asserts that the trial court erred

in failing to declare a mistrial after the prosecutor improperly

invoked a co-defendant’s statement to impeach petitioner. The

state court found that petitioner was procedurally barred from

bringing this claim because his trial counsel did not

contemporaneously object to the prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.

at 52-54.) The requirement of a contemporaneous objection to

prosecutorial misconduct is an independent and adequate state

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procedural ruling that bars petitioner from raising the claim

now. Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). As

petitioner has made no showing of cause and prejudice for his

default, this claim is DENIED because of the procedural default. 

In his third claim, petitioner argues that the trial court

erred by permitting the prosecutor to re-open the prosecution’s

case-in-chief to present another witness in the middle of

petitioner’s testimony. Because this testimony would have been

proper rebuttal testimony, had it been presented at the end of

the defense case, the sole ground for petitioner’s claim is that

permitting the witness to testify in the middle of his testimony

undermined his ability to adequately present his defense. There

were perfectly good reasons why the trial judge accommodated the

particular witness.

In the absence of a specific constitutional violation,

habeas review of trial error is limited to whether the error “so

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.” Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d

1030, 1045 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the relevant inquiry for

the court is whether the state court’s determination that the

interjection of this testimony in the midst of Gordon’s defense

case did not affect his ability to present his defense was

erroneous. The state court offered a reasonable explanation as

to why the timing of the testimony did not unduly prejudice

petitioner. (Answer Ex. A at 42-44.) Therefore, this claim is

DENIED. 

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Petitioner’s fourth claim asserts that the prosecutor

systematically excused African-American jurors in violation of 

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986). The

state court of appeal found this claim was procedurally defaulted

because petitioner did not contemporaneously object to the

exclusions, and rejected Gordon’s argument that the objections of

co-defendants satisfied his state law obligation to object. (Id.

at 18-19.) The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on the specific issue

of whether California’s requirement of a contemporaneous Batson

objection is an independent and adequate state law procedural

rule that should be enforced by federal courts. However, the

requirement of a contemporaneous Batson objection meets the

applicable standards for applying a state procedural bar. See

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000); Bargas

v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 1999). The requirement

is independent of federal law and had been consistently and

regularly applied in numerous California cases at the time of

petitioner’s default. See, e.g., People v. McPeters, 2 Cal.4th

1148, 1174, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 (1992); People v. Montiel, 5

Cal.4th 877, 908 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 (1993); People v. Wheeler, 22

Cal.3d 258, 280, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 (1978). Therfore, this claim

is DENIED as procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner’s final claim is that his sentence for the gun

enhancement was arbitrarily increased by the trial judge. To

state a federal claim for an allegedly erroneous sentence, a

petitioner must demonstrate that the sentence is “so arbitrary or

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capricious as to constitute an independent due process or Eighth

Amendment violation.” Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50, 113

S.Ct. 528 (1992). Habeas corpus relief is generally not

available for a mere violation of state sentencing laws. Id. 

Moreover, where the sentence in within the allowable range under

state law, the imposition of state law sentence enhancements is

reviewed under a deferential standard. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497

U.S. 764, 783-84, 110 S.Ct. 3092 (1990); Martinez-Villareal v.

Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1307-08 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Petitioner’s reliance on a single, out-of-context comment by

the trial judge that “I still have a murderer in front of me no

matter how you look at” is misplaced. First, when the statement

is considered in context, it is clear that the judge was simply

stating that the character of the victims was irrelevant to his

sentencing decision, not that he was prepared to ignore the

decision of the appeal court to vacate petitioner’s attempted

murder conviction. Second, the state court of appeal found that,

regardless of any preliminary commentary, the judge’s ultimate

decision was based only on proper aggravating factors. (Answer

Ex. D at 9-10.) This decision is not an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Finally, the sentence is not

unreasonable, given the presence of at least two aggravating

factors -- a prior felony conviction and the violent and

dangerous nature of the crime. Therefore, this claim is DENIED.

For the above stated reasons, Gordon’s petition under 28

U.S.C § 2254 is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 9/26/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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