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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 24-60152

____________

Gayle J. Evans, Jr., a Montana Resident, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Chance J. Evans, a Mississippi Resident, 

Defendant—Appellee. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 5:22-CV-37

______________________________

Before Jones and Oldham, Circuit Judges, and Hendrix, District

Judge.*

Per Curiam: 

In open court, Gayle J. Evans, Jr., confirmed settlement of his lawsuit 

against his brother Chance J. Evans. They agreed that Chance would manage

a Mississippi LLC into which they would each transfer their respective 

interests in certain real property. Despite agreeing in open court that no 

material terms were left out of the agreement, Gayle reneged and refused to 

_____________________

* United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by 

designation.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 15, 2025

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 24-60152 Document: 71-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/15/2025
No. 24-60152

2

sign any LLC operating agreement. The district court granted Chance’s

motion to enforce the agreement. We AFFIRM.

Gayle argues that the district court improperly added a material term 

to the settlement agreement by authorizing Chance to form the LLC without 

a written operating agreement. But Mississippi law enables the formation 

and operation of an LLC without one. Miss. Code Ann. § 79-29-105(t); 

see Rest. of Hattiesburg, LLC v. Hotel & Rest. Supply, Inc., 84 So. 3d 32, 39 n.1 

(Miss. 2012) (“The Revised LLC Act . . . was adopted to . . . set up more 

default rules for LLCs without operating agreements.”); Coast Plaza LLC v. 

RCH Cap. LLC, 281 So. 3d 1125, 1132 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (Wilson, J.)

(“The Act’s statutory requirements serve as ‘default rules’ governing 

limited liability companies that do not have an operating agreement.”); see 

also Logan v. RedMed, LLC, 377 So. 3d 956, 964 (Miss. 2024) (explaining that 

a district court cannot supply material terms to a contract, but the law itself 

can).

For the first time on appeal, Gayle raises issues pertaining to a nonparty trust’s partial ownership of the relevant property. These arguments 

are meritless because (1) Gayle was both trustor and beneficiary of the trust, 

(2) no trust documents are in the record of the district court or this court, 

and (3) Gayle represented both in the district court and in multiple lease 

agreements submitted to this court that he, not the trust, personally owned 

the property under lease.

Gayle also argues that the parties’ leasing the relevant property to a 

new tenant moots this case. But the case is not moot because the lease 

agreement is independent of this litigation, Chance still seeks to form the 

LLC agreed on in the settlement, and Gayle continues to renege.

We therefore AFFIRM. We retain jurisdiction to consider any action 

stemming from the concurrent Show Cause order, but REMAND to the 

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No. 24-60152

3

district court to consider sanctions against Gayle J. Evans, Jr., personally and 

to act as needed to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.

Case: 24-60152 Document: 71-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/15/2025