Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00648/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00648-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JAY DAVID RAMSEY, SR. 

Petitioner, 

vs.

I. BARTOS, Warden, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-648-TUC-FRZ (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On February 17, 2006, Petitioner, an inmate confined in the Arizona State

Prisons Complex in Buckeye, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus by a Person in State Custody, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition").

(Doc. No. 1) Named as Respondent in the Petition is Warden I. Bartos. The Attorney

General of the State of Arizona is named as an additional Respondent. Respondents

filed an Answer (“Answer”) to the Petition on April 9, 2007, with exhibits A through

FF attached. (Doc. No. 4) Petitioner filed a Reply on April 30, 2007, with exhibits 1

through 9 attached. (Doc. No. 9) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation on October

1, 2007. 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order dismissing the Petition. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Indictment

On October 18, 2001, Petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jurors of Pima

County, Arizona, with four counts of sexual abuse of a minor under fifteen, class three

felonies (Counts 1, 3, 5, 7), four counts of sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen,

class two felonies (Counts 2, 4, 6, 8 ), and two counts of furnishing obscene or harmful

items to a minor, class four felonies (Counts 9, 10). (Answer, Ex. H) The State further

alleged that all counts were offenses not committed on the same occasion consolidated

for trial; counts one through eight were offenses involving dangerous crimes against

children; and counts nine and ten were committed for the purpose of sexual gratification

by defendant. (Id.) 

B. Motion to Dismiss

The Arizona Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction of Petitioner’s challenge to

the trial judge’s order denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss eight of the ten counts

alleged in the indictment as duplicitous. (Answer, Ex. I.) Because the court of appeals

found that, based on the manner in which the counts were charged, they were in fact

duplicitous, the court granted relief, and vacated the trial judge’s order. 

C. Second Indictment

On October 1, 2002, after remand of the sexual abuse and sexual conduct counts

to the grand jury, Petitioner was indicted with thirty-two (32) counts of sexual abuse of

a minor under fifteen, class three felonies (Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22,

24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64), and

thirty-two (32) counts of sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen, class two felonies

(Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45,

47, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63). (Id., Ex. J) The State further alleged that all counts

were offenses not committed on the same occasion consolidated for trial; counts one

through eight were offenses involving dangerous crimes against children; and counts

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nine and ten were committed for the purpose of sexual gratification by defendant. (Id.)

Allegations of separate offenses consolidated for trial and offenses involving dangerous

crimes against children were again filed by the State. (Id.) Counts 9 and 10 from the

original indictment, charging Petitioner with furnishing obscene or harmful items to a

minor, were consolidate with the second indictment, and were renumbered as counts 65

and 66 to the second indictment. (Answer, Ex. K) 

D. Pretrial Motions

Prior to Petitioner’s first trial, Petitioner filed a Motion to Sever/Motion to

Preclude. (Answer, Ex. N) Petitioner argued that the evidence the State would be

moving to admit in support of counts five and six, the furnishing counts, would be too

inflammatory and prejudicial as to counts one through four, the sexual abuse and sexual

conduct counts, and that therefore the State should be precluded from introducing

evidence regarding the furnishing counts in relation to the sexual abuse or conduct

counts and those counts should be severed from the furnishing counts. (Id.) 

E. First Trial

The case proceeded to trial. After previously hearing argument from counsel

(Answer, Ex. A), the trial court ruled on the admissibility of the evidence on the second

day of trial, finding the possession of stories and videos which depict sex between

fathers and daughters or sex between adult males and young girls admissible under Rule

404(b) and 404(c); finding the notebook at issue admissible, and the evidence sufficient

to prove that the defendant possessed the notebook and showed it to his daughter, and

that the evidentiary value was not outweighed by unfair prejudice and other Rule 403

concerns . (Answer, Ex. P)

On December 13, 2002, at the close of trial on the merits, Petitioner moved for

a mistrial and the trial court granted the motion. (Id., Ex. L) Prior to the second trial,

the State moved to dismiss with prejudice counts 5 through 64 and proceed to trial on

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Counts 1 through 4, 65 and 66 (renumbered as counts 5 and 6). (Id., Ex. M) The trial

court granted the motion. (Id.)

F. Second Trial

The case proceeded to trial a second time. On day four of the jury trial, the trial

court granted Petitioner’s Rule 20 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Count One.

(Answer, Ex. Q, and E (Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) 2/19/03 at 97)). On February 21,

2003, at the close of trial on day six, the jury found Petition not guilty of Count Two,

and left the verdicts blank for Counts Three and Four. (Answer, Ex. R) The jury found

Petitioner guilty of Counts Five and Six. (Id.) 

G. Motion for New Trial

Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial. (Answer, Ex. S) Petitioner filed a pro

se supplement to the motion for a new trial. (Id., Ex. T) The trial court denied

Petitioner’s motion for a new trial (Id., Ex. U) 

H. Sentencing

On October 30, 2003, the trial court sentenced Petitioner on Count Five to the

presumptive term of two and a half years’ imprisonment in the Arizona Department of

Corrections. (Id., Ex. V, at 2) The court gave Petitioner credit for 750 days

presentence incarceration credit. (Id.) As to Count 6, the court suspended imposition

of sentence, and placed Petitioner on a period of 4 years probation commencing upon

completion of the sentence imposed in Count Five. (Id., Ex. V, at 3) The conditions of

probation included sex offender conditions. (Id.) 

I. Post-Conviction Relief

On October 31, 2003, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Id., Ex.

W) Counsel was appointed on November 18, 2003, (Petition, Ex. D) and, apparently,

at some point, became Petitioner’s acting counsel and moved for a stay of his Rule 32

petition due to the loss in the mail of the petition that had been sent to advisory counsel

for filing, and the inability of Petitioner to work on both his petition for review to the

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Arizona Supreme Court simultaneously with his petition for post-conviction relief.

(Petition, Ex. F) The trial court granted an extension of time until thirty days after

filing of the petition for review. (Id.) No petition for post-conviction relief was filed,

and, on October 6, 2006, the trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s Notice of

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief for failing to meet timeliness requirements pursuant

Rule 32.4(c), Ariz. R. Crim. P. (Answer, Ex. X) 

J. Appeal

Petitioner, acting in propria persona, with advisory counsel, filed a notice of

appeal on October 30, 2003. (Answer, Ex. Y) Petitioner filed an opening brief on May

3, 2002. (Id., Ex. Z.) Petitioner raised the following claims:

1. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it

reversed its ruling and admitted evidence previously ruled

inadmissible. 

2. The trial court committed fundamental error and abused its

discretion in rendering an unwarranted pretrial ruling under

Rule 404(c).

3. The trial court erred in reversing its previous rulings with

regard to admissibility of pornographic stories (especially

after the defense had concluded its case) because the

stories were too inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial to

present to the jury, thus violating “law of the case”,

provision of Rule 16.1, and finality of pretrial rulings.

4. The state used intentional prosecutorial misconduct aimed

at preventing an acquittal.

5. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it

denied Appellant’s motion for new trial.

6. Appellant was denied a fair trial because of the bias of the

judge.

7. Prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments were

impermissible comments on appellant’s failure to testify on

his own behalf; the trial court erred in denying appellant’s

motion for mistrial; prosecutor’s actions constitute

intentional prosecutorial misconduct.

(Id., Ex. K.)

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After the appeal was fully briefed, on August 31, 2005, the Arizona Court of

Appeals issued its memorandum decision affirming Petitioner's conviction and

sentence. (Id., Ex. CC.) On October 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review

to the Supreme Court. (Id., Ex. DD) The Supreme Court denied review on June 27,

2006. (Id., Ex. EE) 

K. Federal Habeas

Petitioner filed the present petition for habeas corpus in the District Court on

December 22, 2006. The Petition raises the following grounds for relief:

5th and 14th Amendments right to due process and the 6th Amendment

right to a fair trial – unfairly prejudicial evidence.

(Doc. No. 1, at 5) 

Respondents filed an answer to the Petition on April 9, 2007. Petitioner

submitted a reply on April 30, 2007. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

(“AEDPA”). 

B. Timeliness

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1).

C. Exhaustion

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the

petitioner has exhausted the state court remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b);

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27(2004); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989). The

exhaustion inquiry focuses on the availability of state court remedies at the time the

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petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed in federal court. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel,

526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion generally requires that a prisoner give the state courts

an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court.

Id. A petitioner has not exhausted a claim for relief so long as the petitioner has a right

under state law to raise the claim by available procedure. See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).

A habeas petitioner may exhaust his claims in one of two ways. First, a claim

is exhausted when no remedy remains available to the petitioner in state court. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Second, a claim is exhausted if there is an absence of available

state corrective process or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to

protect the rights of the petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). 

To meet the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have "fairly present[ed]

his claim in each appropriate state court...thereby alerting that court to the federal nature

of the claim." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

66 (1995). A petitioner fairly presents a claim to the state court by describing the

factual or legal bases for that claim and by alerting the state court "to the fact that

the...[petitioner is] asserting claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513

U.S. at 365-366. See also Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001)

(same). Mere similarity between a claim raised in state court and a claim in a federal

habeas petition is insufficient. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. 

Furthermore, to fairly present a claim, the petitioner "must give the state courts

one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete

round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.

Once a federal claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). In habeas

petitions, other than those concerning life sentences or capital cases, the claims of

Arizona state prisoners are exhausted if they have been fairly presented to the Arizona

Court of Appeals either on appeal of conviction or through a collateral proceeding

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1 Although the Ninth Circuit recently suggested that under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, there are exceptions to the rule that a

district court can decide whether state remedies remain available

for claims that require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent

waiver see Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 1336 (2006), this Court need not

address such waiver because it has not been affirmatively raised

by Petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n.5 (9th

Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1053 (2003).

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pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Swoopes v. Sublett,

196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1124 (2200). 

In some instances a claim can be technically exhausted even though the state

court did not address the merits. This situation is referred to as "procedural bar" or

"procedural default." A claim is procedurally defaulted if the state court declined to

address the issue on the merits for procedural reasons. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d

1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). Procedural default also occurs if the claim was not

presented to the state court and it is clear the state would now refuse to address the

merits of the claim for procedural reasons. Id. The procedural bar provides an

independent and adequate state-law ground for the conviction and sentence and, thus,

prevents federal habeas corpus review unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and

prejudice for failing to raise the claim in the state proceedings. Gray v. Netherland,

518 U.S. 152, 161-162 (1996); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-495

(1986); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. Accordingly, the procedural default doctrine

prevents state prisoners from obtaining federal review by allowing the time to run on

available state remedies and then rushing to federal court seeking review. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-732 (1991).

If a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available.1

 See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

263 n.9 (1989); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231. In Arizona, such a determination often

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2 Such claims include: (1) that the petitioner is being held in

custody after his sentence has expired; (2) certain circumstances

where newly discovered material facts probably exist and such

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence; (3)

the petitioner's failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction

relief was without fault on his part; (4) there has been a

significant change in the law that would probably overturn

petitioner's conviction if applied to his case; and (5) the

petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish

that no reasonable fact-finder would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b) (citing

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h)). 

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involves consideration of Rule 32 et seq. of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

governing post-conviction relief proceedings. For example, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1

specifies when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction proceedings based on

federal constitutional challenges to convictions or sentences. Under Rule 32.2, relief

is barred on any claim which could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for postconviction relief, with the exception of certain claims2

 which were justifiably omitted

from a prior petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2.

In summary, failure to exhaust and procedural default are different concepts.

Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1230-1231. Under both doctrines, the federal court may be

required to refuse to hear a habeas claim. Id. The difference between the two is that

when a petitioner fails to exhaust, he may still be able to return to state court to present

his claims there. Id. In contrast, "[w]hen a petitioner's claims are procedurally barred

and a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice for the default...the district court

dismisses the petition because the petitioner has no further recourse in state court." Id.

at 1231.

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3 Should the Court reject the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation, Respondents have requested leave to file a supplemental

answer to address the merits of the claims raised in the petition. (Answer,

at 18)

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D. Cause and Prejudice

A petitioner may be relieved from a procedural default on a showing of cause

and prejudice. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85-87 (1977). “[T]he existence of

cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show

that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply

with the State's procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). The

following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2)

a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3)

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. To establish prejudice, a prisoner

must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation "worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimension." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Where petitioner fails

to establish cause, the court need not reach the prejudice prong. To establish a

"fundamental miscarriage of justice" resulting in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent, a state prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no reasonable

juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new evidence.

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).

E. Standard of Review: Merits3

Pursuant to the provisions of the AEDPA, the Court may grant a writ of

habeas corpus only if the state court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or 

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Timeliness

Respondents do not contest the timeliness of the habeas petition. A review of

the petition suggests that it is timely. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Petition is

timely.

B. Ground One

Petitioner argues that the “the State of Arizona used evidence repeatedly deemed

too inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial to Petitioner and that evidence was used to

provoke the convictions as to counts 5 and 6 of the indictment violating Petitioner’s 5th

and 14th Amendment rights to Due Process and his 6th Amendment right to a fair trial

and that there is insufficient evidence to support the convictions on those two counts.”

(Petition, at 5) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his state court

remedies for his claim, because he did not fairly present it in the Arizona courts, and

it is procedurally defaulted. (Answer, at 10) 

1. Relevant Facts

Prior to Petitioner’s first trial, Petitioner filed a Motion to Sever/Motion to

Preclude. (Answer, Ex. N) Petitioner argued that a binder of pornographic stories the

State would be moving to admit in support of counts five and six, the furnishing counts,

would be too inflammatory and prejudicial as to counts one through four, the sexual

abuse and sexual conduct counts, and that therefore the State should be precluded from

introducing evidence regarding counts five and six, the furnishing counts, in relation

to the sexual abuse or conduct counts and those counts should be severed from the

furnishing counts. (Id.) Petitioner cited three reasons his motion should be granted.

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4 Referred to hereafter as “A.R.”

5 Petitioner’s daughter reported her father’s conduct to her mother

shortly after her twelfth birthday, October 4, 2001. (RT

11/12/02, at 43, Answer, Ex. N, Exhibit A - Interview with

Detective Dollar) An investigation ensued, and the initial

indictment was handed down shortly thereafter. (Answer, Ex.

H, Ex. N, Exhibit A - Interview with Detective Dollar) 

6 In addressing the trial court’s statement that “subsection (b)

deals with other acts that are used to prove intent and motive

and so on...” (RT 11/12/02 at 46) Counsel stated, regarding

404(c) that it “did not exist until fairly recently, I forget exactly

when it was, and I think it was modeled after the federal rule, to

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First, there was a time differential between the obscene item charges on October 4,

2001, and the sexual abuse and conduct charges which occurred as much as four years

earlier. Second, the State’s case was much stronger as to the furnishing obscene items

charges. Third, Petitioner argued that the probative value of the stories was greatly

outweighed by the prejudice to defendant, and cited Rule 13.4 requiring severance to

promote the interests of justice and Rule 404(c) requiring specific findings for the

admission of acts like those alleged. (Id.) 

The trial court heard argument on Petitioner’s motion regarding the admissibility

of the evidence. (Answer, Ex. A, RT 11/12/02) Counsel for Petitioner argued that the

evidence which should be precluded included a story that was read by Petitioner to the

minor victim, his daughter4

, on her birthday, along with a “whole stack of other

documents.” (RT 11/12/02 at 44-45) Petitioner stated that there was no evidence from

the victim that any of the stories, other than the one that was read to her on her

birthday5

, was shown to her during the roughly four years that she was alleged to have

been abused by her father. (Id. at 45) Counsel argued that, the stories were remote in

time, only the one story that was read to A.R. might be relevant, the stories were otheracts evidence, and the State had not met its burden, under Rule 404(c)6

, of showing the

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the propensity of - - in essence, in sex cases.” 

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stories were relevant, and, the stories were too prejudicial and inflammatory when

weighed against whatever relevance they do have, that the jury would convict Petitioner

once they read the stories. (Answer, Ex. A, RT 11/12/02, at 45-49)

The State responded to Petitioner’s arguments, arguing from two cases United

States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995) and State v. Sharp, 193 Ariz. 414 (1999),

noting particularly that Yazzie was a federal case from Arizona that defines “evidence

as unfairly prejudicial if it makes conviction more likely because it provokes an

emotional response in jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury’s attitude

toward the defendant, and, here’s the key, wholly apart from its judgment as to his guilt

or innocence.” (Answer, Ex. A, RT 11/12/02, 52-53) 

On the second day of trial, the trial court ruled on the motion, and recorded its

findings that:

... under Rule 404(B) that the possession of stories and videos which

depict sex between fathers and daughters or sex between adult males and

young girls is admissible to show intent and plan and absence of mistake

or accident in this case.

... the same stories shall be admissible under Rule 404(C) because they

are relevant to show that the defendant had a character trait giving rise to

an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the charged offense.

... the notebook is admissible, subject to the proper foundation being laid,

and that evidence is sufficient to prove that the defendant possessed the

notebook and showed it to his daughter.

... defendant’s possession of the notebook with the stories and related

videos provided a reasonable basis to infer that the defendant had an

interest in sex between adults and young females, including familial sex.

... the evidentiary value is not outweighed by unfair prejudice and other

Rule 403 concerns. The other acts are not remote in time and place; the

evidence depicts the sexual preference at issue in this case; and there is

strong evidence that the defendant possessed the material. 

(Answer, Ex. P, at 3) 

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The court further held that, “while we would not provide the exact stories

themselves to the jurors, based on [Petitioner’s counsel’s] concern that they would just

be repulsed by the nature of the stories and reach verdicts based on that reaction, that

we’d allow a description of the contents of the notebook without the actual material

being provided, so I want a record of what I reviewed in reaching that decision.” (RT

12/11/02 at 5) 

In Petitioner's second trial, after an initial mistrial, A.R. testified that Petitioner

read a story to her from the binder about fathers teaching their daughters to have sex.

(Answer, Ex. C, RT 2/11/03, at 84) Then, after establishing that the binder was in

Petitioner's possession, Detective Roat testified regarding the content and nature of the

stories in the binder. (Answer, Ex. D, RT 2/12/03, at 170–180) Detective Roat was

asked if the binder contained what he would describe as educational materials, or how

to teach children about sex. (Id., at 170) Detective Roat answered no to both questions.

(Id.) Detective Roat was then asked what some of the titles of the stories were. (Id.,

at 171-172) After several titles were recited, counsel for Petitioner objected, asking to

approach the court, and the following colloquy took place:

MR. HIGGINS: Well, she’s had him characterized, generally gone through

five or six of them and telling what they’re about, and

she’s gotten names of them. And I think its more than

what the Court said we could go with. And then the Court

precluded - -

THE COURT: What we did was agree that the nature of these stories was

so graphic, and I believe you characterized it as having

such a likelihood and such a strong emotional reaction by

the jury by reading them, that you requested whether,

although, in all due respect, it would be properly

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admissible documents, that we didn’t want to risk that

emotional reaction in the jury.

And I’m sure I said at the time that having reviewed them

myself I agreed with you, that was likely to happen

because they would be disgusted by the stories. But we

did agree that in fairness to the child, because they

corroborate her testimony, that there were stories about

sex. And you know, she’s characterized what the stories

say in different ways.

But the State has to have some ability here to characterize

the nature of these stories, and I don’t know if they need

every single one of them, but - - 

MR. HIGGINS: I understand that and I think they’ve done that, so I’m just

saying it ought to stop here. I guess that’s the point of my

objection. 

THE COURT: Ms. Chi, do you plan to go through - - 

MS CHI: I’m going to flip through two more.

THE COURT: How many more?

MS. CHI: The father and the daughter.

THE COURT: I want to flip through the ones that discuss father and

daughter.

THE COURT: Why don’t you limit yourself to maybe - - how many more

of those?

MS. CHI: There’s a lot more.

THE COURT: Well, you can have him say how many stories there are,

but this is a compromise to keep from otherwise admitting

it.

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MS. CHI: I understand.

THE COURT: So I’m going to give here some leeway to continue

establishing the nature of the stories.

MR. HIGGINS: Okay.

(Id. at 172-174) Detective Roat also testified to the content and nature of, Exhibit 6, a

handwritten story entitled "My Little Niece's Special Gifts," involving a man being

sexually involved with his eight year old niece. (Answer, Ex. D, RT 2/12/03, at

177–180) Likewise, Petitioner's wife testified that the handwritten story was in

Petitioner's handwriting, found on a shelf underneath his blue jeans. (Id. at 121–22.)

Prior to the State resting, the State indicated that it still had some exhibits that it wanted

to move to admit. (Answer, Ex. E, RT 2/19/03, at 34) Petitioner agreed to let the State

move to admit those exhibits later, because he had several witnesses waiting to testify

at that point. (Id.) After Petitioner's witnesses testified, the State moved to admit

Exhibit 6, the handwritten pornographic story. (Id. at 77, 82) Petitioner indicated that

he thought Exhibit 6 was included in the court's prior ruling that the stories' content and

nature could be discussed but they would not go to the jury. (Id. at 77–78) The court

stated, "Let me take a look at what it says. It will depend on the graphic nature. As I

pointed out a number of times, I have only reviewed and made a specific ruling on

certain materials. So this is—certainly the policy considerations that applied there will

also apply here, and I will take a look at the story and see." (Id. at 78.) The court held:

All right, I am going to admit Exhibit 6. I believe it's the most probative

evidence that's been presented on defendant's aberrant sexual propensity

to commit the crime charged. I am going to make sure we have

incorporated into this record the record from the first trial on why this is

admissible under Rule 404(c) as character evidence. I am requiring [sic]

under the rule permitting that evidence to make a record, and I have made

that record previously, and I will affirm it at this time. 

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I will also make the additional findings. I believe the evidence is

sufficient to permit the jury to find that the defendant committed the other

act that was identified as being found with his clothing and by his wife

in his home and as being in his handwriting; that the commission of this

act, this story that was written, provides a reasonable basis to infer that

the defendant had a character trait which gives rise to an aberrant sexual

propensity to commit the crime charged. 

And, finally, I will find that the evidentiary value of this act is not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and other rule

403 issues. I believe this [sic] probative on intent. This is the issue in this

case is whether the defendant committed the—particularly the first four

counts as to whether the defendant intended to commit those acts. 

As the trial progressed, it has been a theory of the defense that some of

this evidence may not have been there, that the defendant's wife may

have set up some of the scene, may have caused the implantation of false

memories and so on. And, because this is in his own handwriting, it's the

best evidence of his intent and the propensity.

(Answer, Ex. E, RT 2/19/03 at 84–85; Ex. Q) Petitioner pointed out to the court that the

only evidence that suggested the story was in Petitioner's handwriting was testimony

from his ex-wife, the person that Petitioner had suggested was trying to frame him.

(Answer, Ex. E, RT 2/19/03 at 85) The court agreed but stated that the credibility of

his ex-wife's testimony was an issue that goes to the weight of the evidence. (Id.)

Petitioner made no further objection regarding the admission of Exhibit 6 and allowing

the jury to view it. (Id.) After Petitioner's closing argument, the judge indicated for the

record, that when she ruled on the admissibility of Exhibit 6, she did not believe that

Exhibit 6 was part of the original materials she had reviewed and had sealed. (Answer,

Ex. F, RT 2/20/03, at 66) However, after reviewing the materials she was originally

given to review, the judge discovered that Exhibit 6 was included. (Id.) Nonetheless,

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the court affirmed its ruling that Exhibit 6 was admissible for all of the reasons that

were previously stated on the record. (Id. at 66–67.)

Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial, raising, among other issues, the

argument that the trial court erred in admitting Exhibit 6. (Answer, Ex. S, at 2)

Petitioner argued that there was no evidence the victim had seen this story, and its

admission was grossly prejudicial and reversed the Court’s previous ruling, upon which

defendant had relied. (Id.) Petitioner cited no authority, federal or otherwise, in

support of his argument. Petitioner filed a pro se supplement to the motion for a new

trial, stating that the Court’s initial ruling was based on the holding in United States v.

Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807. (Id., Ex. T at 3) Petitioner argued that the unfairly prejudicial

evidence released to the jury provoked his conviction on the two furnishing counts,

citing United States v. Horne, 225 F.3d 549 (5th Cir. 2000). Petitioner also argued that

a “[n]ew [t]trial is necessary when there is significant possibility that improperly

admitted prejudicial evidence had substantial impact on verdict, viewed in light of

entire record.” (Answer, Ex. T at 4) Petitioner further argued that he was denied the

right to a fair trial and due process of law because of intentional prosecutorial

misconduct by and through the admission of evidence repeatedly deemed unfairly

prejudicial as defined in Yazzie, and the last minute reversal of the trial court’s rulings

made regarding the inadmissibility of evidence violated the required mandate of Rule

404(c)(3). (Answer, Ex. T at 4-5) The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for a new

trial, finding that the items were properly admitted. (Id., Ex. U) 

In his appeal, Petitioner raised the issue of the trial court’s reversal of its

previous rulings with regard to the admissibility of Exhibit 6. Petitioner argued that

there were “two serious errors with the court’s position.” (Answer, Ex. Z at 16) First,

the court had already reviewed Exhibit 6 as part of the random sampling of material

used to determine all of the stories were unfairly prejudicial, and second, no stipulation

was ever made limiting her unfairly prejudicial inadmissibility determination to just the

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random sampling of material provided by the State. (Id. at 16-17) Petitioner argued

that the court’s admission of Exhibit 6 was erroneous, and an abuse of discretion under

state law. (Id. at 17) Petitioner further argued that the judge’s action violated the “law

of the case” doctrine, citing state law, and the restrictions imposed by Rule 16.1(d),

Ariz.R.Crim.P., 17 A.R.S. (Id. at 17) Petitioner also argued that the court erred when

it held Exhibit 6 was admissible under the Rule 404(c) evidentiary ruling of December

11, 2002. (Id. at 19) Petitioner stated that the admission of Exhibit 6 denied him a fair

trial, citing U.S. Const., Amend. V. (Answer, Ex. Z, at 24)

Petitioner separately argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for

a new trail, stating that, under United State v. Hoover, 225 F.3d 549 (5th Cir. 2000), a

new trial is necessary when there is a significant possibility that improperly admitted

character evidence had substantial impact on the verdict. (Answer, Ex. Z at 28)

Petitioner argued that the trial court deemed the stories to be unfairly prejudicial as

defined by Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807, United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir.

1987), and State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 415 (1977). Petitioner argued that the trial court

made the same two serious errors cited above, and that the trial court’s “last day-last

minute” reversal of ruling improperly admitted bad character evidence prohibited by

Rule 403, Ariz.R.Evid., 17A A.R.S., and is a clear abuse of discretion as defined in

State v. Douglas, 87 Ariz. 182 (1960). Additionally, Petitioner argued that there was

a significant possibility that improperly admitted character evidence had a substantial

impact on the verdicts in the case, and the trial court erred and abused its discretion

when it denied the motion for new trial. (Id. at 29-30) 

After the appeal was fully briefed, on August 31, 2005, the Arizona Court of

Appeals issued its memorandum decision affirming Petitioner's conviction and

sentence. (Id., Ex. CC.) The Court of Appeals held that the story was properly

admitted under both Rule 404(b) and (c), and, accordingly, found no abuse of discretion

in the trial court’s admission of Exhibit 6. (Id., Ex. CC, at 6) Additionally, the appellate

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court found that Rule 16.1(d) specifically permits a trial court to change pretrial rulings

for “good cause,” and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so in this

case. (Id., Ex. CC, at 6-7) The appellate court also found that Petitioner had not

demonstrated that the court abused its discretion in finding the probative value of the

evidence greater than its potential prejudice. (Id., Ex. CC, at 7) The appellate court did

not address Petitioner’s argument that the admission of Exhibit 6 constituted

fundamental error because he had objected to its admission, and thus addressed only his

specific arguments on appeal. (Id., Ex. CC, at 8) Finally, the appellate court found that

the trial court did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion for a new trial, as there was no

error in the admission of Exhibit 6. (Id., Ex. CC, at 809) 

On October 14, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review to the Supreme

Court. (Id., Ex. DD) Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred by failing to

establish just how many times a trial court can review a prior ruling before it is

considered unreasonable and an abuse of discretion, and erred in this case by finding

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing four reconsiderations of the

same evidence without a showing of good cause. (Id., Ex. DD.) The Supreme Court

denied review in a minute order issued on June 27, 2006. (Id., Ex. EE) 

2. Exhaustion

Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated when the trial court admitted into evidence Exhibit 6. Respondent asserts that

Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust this claim by failing to raise this issue as a

federal claim, instead centering his objections to Exhibit 6 entirely around rules of

evidence and state law. The Magistrate Judge concurs in Respondents’ assertion.

During his trial court proceedings, specifically, Petitioner’s Motion to Sever/

Motion to Preclude, Petitioner did not raise any federal constitutional arguments against

the admission of the stories, generally, or the handwritten story (Exhibit 6), specifically.

(See Answer, Ex. N) Likewise, during oral argument on the admission of the stories,

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Petitioner never raised a federal constitutional issue. (Answer, Ex. A, RT 11/12/02, at

44–62; Ex. E., RT 2/19/03, at 77–78, 85) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting the handwritten pornographic story into evidence. (Answer, Ex. Z, at 8–27.)

Petitioner specifically argued the trial court erred in making a ruling that the story was

admissible under Rule 404(c), the trial court violated the law of the case doctrine by

admitting the story, and the State seeking the admission of the handwritten story

constituted prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.) Petitioner argued that the court’s Rule

404(c) ruling violated Appellant’s “right to due process specified by Rule 15.1(a)(6)

and Rule 404(c), and because the court and the State later rely on this ruling to admit

evidence, it was grossly prejudicial to Appellant and denied him a fair trial. See U.S.

Const., Amend. V.” (Answer, Ex. Z, at 8-10, 24) 

Petitioner also cites to his supplement to his motion for a new trial, again citing

to United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995), and asserting that his arguments

were based solely on federal law. (Reply, Doc. No. 9, at 12) Petitioner argues that the

trial court had adequate notice that Petitioner was arguing a federal claim by “the

repeated citation of federal rules of evidence and controlling federal case law.” (Id.)

Petitioner also argued in his appeal that the stories were inflammatory and

unfairly prejudicial, citing Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807, and United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d

1065 (9th Cir, 1987). (Answer. Ex. Z, at 11) Petitioner argued that the trial court erred

and abused its discretion when it changed its ruling, violating both the “law of the case”

doctrine and the restrictions imposed by Rule 16.1(d), Ariz.R.Crim.P., 17.A.R.S.

(Answer, Ex. Z, at 17) Petitioner further argued that any probative value of Exhibit 6

was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, citing Rule 403,

Ariz.R.Crim.P. (Answer, Ex. Z, at 21) Petitioner cited several state cases in support of

his argument that evidence, even if relevant, should be excluded if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, or has a tendency to

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suggest a decision on an improper basis such as emotion, sympathy or horror. (Answer,

Ex. Z, at 21-22) 

Finally, Petitioner’s petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court was

devoid of any federal legal claim. (Answer, Ex. DD) 

Petitioner first contends that Ariz.R.Evid., Rules 401, 402, 403 and 404 were

adopted and codified verbatim in 1979 by the Arizona State Legislature from the

Fed.R.Evid.. Rules 401, 402, 403 and 404 respectively. “There is no independent

construct in any part of these rules adopted by the Arizona state legislature.” (Reply,

Doc. No. 9 at 11) Thus, Petitioner asserts that his argument “was fundamentally a

federal argument.” (Id.) 

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to Petitioner in his state court

proceedings. See Fed.R.Evid. 101. Furthermore, Arizona Rules of Evidence, Rule 404

in particular, was amended in 1997 to create a new Rule 404(c) dealing with the

admission of other act evidence in sexual misconduct cases. This new rule is not a

verbatim codification of the federal rules. The comment to Rule 404(c), in relevant

part, states the following: 

Subsection (c) of Rule 404 is intended to codify and supply an analytical

framework for the application of the rule created by case law in State v.

Treadway, 116 Ariz. 163 [] (1977) and State v. McFarlin, 110 Ariz. 225

[] (1973). The rule announced in Treadaway and McFarlin and here

codified is an exception to the common-law rule forbidding the use of

evidence of other acts for the purpose of showing character or propensity.

 The Arizona Supreme Court notes that ultimately they “rejected the broad scope

of the federal rule, and instead adopted a compromise version. That compromise is

codified in Rule 404(c)...” State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 46 (2004). Thus, assuming

arguendo that it would be sufficient to cite a state rule that has as its root source an

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identical federal rule, in this instance, the state has explicitly rejected, at least as to Rule

404(c), the interpretive meaning of the rule. 

Even if the rules are identical, as in Fed.R.Evid. 403 and Ariz.R.Evid. 403, it

cannot be enough that the source of the Arizona Rule was federal law. Once adopted,

a state is free to interpret its own rules, within constitutional limit, and the resultant state

case law may diverge from the federal interpretation of an identical rule. See eg.

Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470 (2000)(interpreting Arizona Rule of Evidence 702

differently than its federal counterpart). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has

acknowledged the rejection of the “essentially the same” standard, and, if a petitioner

“fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim,

his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state

court.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (Petitioner did not “fairly

present” his federal claim in state court by limiting his arguments exclusively to state

evidentiary law, despite arguing that prior act evidence “infringed on his right to present

a defense and receive a fair trial.”). 

It is also not enough that, in reference to the interpretation of Arizona Rule of

Evidence 403 that Petitioner, or even Respondent or the court, cited Yazzie, supra, or

Johnson, supra. As a case with factual similarities to the instant case, and in which the

Ninth Circuit defined unfair prejudice under Fed.R.Evid. 403, Yazzie did neither

explored nor articulated nor even suggested a relationship between the federal rules of

evidence and a defendant’s constitutional right to due process and a fair trial. Yazzie,

59 F.3d at 811. Citation to Yazzie in the instant case did not serve to exhaust Petitioners

constitutional claims. 

Petitioner did argue that the court’s Rule 404(c) ruling violated Appellant’s

“right to due process specified by Rule 15.1(a)(6) and Rule 404(c), and because the

court and the State later rely on this ruling to admit evidence, it was grossly prejudicial

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to Appellant and denied him a fair trial. See U.S. Const., Amend. V.” (Answer, Ex.

Z, at 8-10, 24) 

This, however, is precisely the conclusory, “scattershot” type of citation,

“divorced from any federal legal theory” the Ninth Circuit found insufficient to fairly

present a federal legal claim in Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.

2005). 

 As previously noted by the Ninth Circuit, the “failure to comply with the state’s

rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting habeas relief.

While adherence to state evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a

procedurally fair manner, it is certainly possible to have a fair trial even when state

standards are violated; conversely, state procedural and evidentiary rules may

countenance processes that do not comport with fundamental fairness ... The issue for

us, always, is whether the state proceedings satisfied due process; the presence or

absence of a state law violation is largely beside the point.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp,

926 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1991)(citations omitted). 

To fairly present a federal claim, a petitioner must describe both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 28. It is not enough that all of

the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state court or that a

“somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 28 (stating that

a reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not alert the court to federal nature

of the claim). Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the specific

constitutional guarantee upon which he basis his claim in federal court. Tamalini v.

Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Petitioner cited solely to Arizona

law in support of his challenge to the evidentiary rulings, he has not exhausted a federal

challenge to the ruling. 

Although it is evident that Petitioner did not articulate his federal claim in state

court, it does give this Court a moment’s pause, in that, by design, the application of

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Rule 403 to propensity evidence eliminates due process concerns posed by the rules of

evidence. See United States v. Lemay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2001) (Holding

that as long as the protections of Rule 403 remain in place, so that trial judges retain the

authority to exclude potentially devastating evidence, rule allowing admission of

propensity evidence in sex crime cases is constitutional.) 

Despite these concerns, however, it was precisely Ariz.R.Evid. 403 that the

Ninth Circuit considered in Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2005). The

trial judge in Castillo’s trial allowed the jury to view a videotape of the police

interrogating Castillo that he argues was highly prejudicial. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 996.

Following the trial court’s decision to admit the videotape, the court expressed its

misgivings about the prejudicial effects of the videotape, and gave the jury a limiting

instruction. Id., at 997. Castillo was convicted, and his convictions were affirmed on

appeal. Id. Castillo filed a federal habeas petition alleging the trial court denied him

a fair trial in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution

by admitting the videotape of the interrogation and arrest. Id., at 998. The state argued

that Castillo failed to exhaust his federal due process claim in the Arizona state courts

and that his claim was procedurally defaulted. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit considered Castillo’s appellate briefing to determine whether

he fairly presented his federal due process claim to the Arizona courts. Id. The Ninth

Circuit held that Castillo’s brief to the court of appeals needed to apprise Arizona that

he was making a claim under the U.S. Constitution and describe both the operative facts

and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts could

have a fair opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon

his constitutional claim, and he must have characterized the claims specifically as

federal claims. Id., at 999 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit first rejected Castillo’s contention that his motion for a new

trial, trial supplemental briefing, and trial motion to reconsider fairly presented his

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federal, constitutional due process claim to the Arizona Court of Appeal, stating that the

Supreme Court decision in Baldwin , 541 U.S at 31, that the Arizona appeals court was

not required to comb the trial court’s decision to discover Castillo’s federal

constitutional issue, foreclosed that argument. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1000. 

Next, the Ninth Circuit considered Castillo’s claim in his appellate brief

“Whether the trial court committed fundamental error by allowing the jury to view

highly prejudicial videotapes of Appellant’s interrogation and arrest and in failing to

grant the subsequent motions for a new trial or the motion for reconsideration?” Id.

The Ninth Circuit found this claim silent as to any federal due process claim. Id.

Similarly, the argument section was all but devoid of any language presenting his

federal due process argument to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Castillo focused his

argument on whether the trial court should have excluded the videotape because it was

prejudicial under Arizona Rules of Evidence 403. Id. “Nowhere in the argument

concerning the videotape, until the penultimate sentence, did Castillo even refer to the

U.S. Constitution. Finally, at the end of his argument, Castillo claimed that ‘[b]ecause

this improper evidence was admitted, Appellant was denied a fair trial in violation of

the United States and the Arizona Constitutions.” Id. at 1000-1001. Castillo concluded

his brief by stating that “[t]he gross violations of Appellant’s Fifth, Sixth, and

fourteenth Amendment rights requires [sic] that his convictions and sentences be

reversed and that he be granted a new trial consistent with due process of law.” Id. at

1002. 

The Ninth Circuit found that Castillo failed to exhaust the federal constitutional

claims, stating that he could not “raise Arizona evidentiary claims, cite cases dealing

with the admission of evidence, mention the words “fair trial” and then reasonably

expect the Arizona Court of Appeals to understand that he is complaining of anything

other than evidentiary errors.” Id. at 1002. 

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This case is entirely on point with Castillo. By failing to actually argue a federal

constitutional violation in the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner did not exhaust his

claim. Moreover, as noted by Respondents, Petitioner failed to cite, let alone argue, in

any of his pleadings, that a Sixth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment violation

occurred. Furthermore, as noted by Respondent, a citation to the Fifth Amendment,

without reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, had no application to Petitioner in a

state prosecution. Thus, Petitioner failed to exhaust his claim by properly presenting

it as a federal constitutional claim to the Arizona courts. See Picard, 404 U.S. at

276–78; Baldwin, 541 U.S. 27, 31-32. 

Petitioner’s right to direct review having been completed, he would have to

present this claim in an additional Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Under Arizona

law, a defendant who was convicted at trial must file a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

within 90 days of the entry of judgment and sentence or within 30 days of the order and

mandate affirming the judgment and sentence on direct appeal, whichever is later. Rule

32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. Petitioner already completed his Rule 32 proceeding. If

Petitioner were to fairly present this issue in a second Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief, such presentation would be untimely. Moreover, this claim does not qualify for

any of the timeliness exceptions. Rules 32.1 and 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. Such a new

petition, therefore, would be subject to summary dismissal. State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz.

264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App.1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432, 897 P.2d 734

(App.1995); Moreno v. Gonzales, 192 Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (1998)

(timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion). Moreover, Petitioner would be

precluded from raising this claim in a second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Rule

32.2(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. This claim, therefore, is procedurally defaulted. Park v.

California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir.2000) (federal habeas review is precluded

where prisoner has not raised his claim in the state courts and the time for doing so has

expired). 

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Accordingly, federal habeas review of Ground One is barred absent a showing

of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v. Haley,

541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. 

Petitioner has not established cause for his procedural default. Petitioner's status

as an inmate and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute cause for his failure to

present any of his grounds for relief to the Arizona courts. Hughes v. Idaho State Board

of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.1986)(finding that an illiterate pro se

petitioner's lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural

default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.1988)(finding that petitioner's

arguments concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not

constitute cause.)

There was no objective factor external to the defense which impeded Petitioner’s

efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule, as demonstrated by his ability to file

a petition for post-conviction relief and petition for review - Petitioner merely failed to

raise this issue. 

Likewise, Petitioner has not satisfied the "fundamental miscarriage of justice"

standard, nor has he attempted to do so. Federal review of this claim is barred.

Recommendation: Ground One

Petitioner failed to exhaust the claim brought in Ground One in state court in a

procedurally appropriate manner, thereby procedurally defaulting this claim. Petitioner

has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice for this procedural default, and federal

habeas review is precluded as a matter of law on this ground for relief raised by

Petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Accordingly, this Court recommends that the

District Court find that Petitioner is precluded from obtaining federal habeas relief on

this claim. 

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IV. RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of

the record, dismiss this action in its entirety. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with

a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use the

following case number: CIV 06-0648-TUC-FRZ.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 2nd day of July, 2008.

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