Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03429/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03429-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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Patrick Fisher 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Tenth Circuit 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, Colorado 80294 

(303) 844-3157 

May 17, 1996 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-3429 Compton v. Subaru 

April30, 1996 by The Honorable John C. Porfilio 

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Please be advised of the following correction to the captioned decision: 

On page 7, line 6 of the first full paragraph reads "after carefully examining Mr. 

Compton's testimony." It should read "after carefully examining Mr. Bihlmeyer 's 

testimony." 

Please make the correction to your copy 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, Clerk 

Beth Morris 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-3429 Document: 01019279377 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

STEVEN D. COMPTON, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC.; FUll 

HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., 

Defendants-Appellants. 

PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVISORY 

COUNCIL, INC., 

Amicus Curiae. 

No. 94-3429 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 90-CV-1088) 

Richard C. Hite (Scott J. Gunderson with him on the briefs), Kahrs, Nelson, Fanning, Hite 

& Kellogg, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellants. 

Lynn R. Johnson (Stephen N. Six and Patrick A. Hamilton with him on the brief), 

Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd., Overland Park, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Appellate Case: 94-3429 Document: 01019279377 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 2 
. ' 

Marc R. Brosseau and Scott D. Peterson, Weller Friedrich, LLC, Denver, Colorado, and 

Hugh F. Young, Jr., Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Reston, Virginia, for 

Amicus Curiae. 

Before PORFILIO, MCWILLIAMS, and ALARCON; Circuit Judges. 

PORFILIO, Circuit Judge. 

·The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

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1 

Steven D. Compton brought this products liability action 

after sustaining severe injuries in an automobile rollover 

accident. Mr. Compton sued the automobile manufacturer, Fuji 

Heavy Industries, Ltd. (Fuji), and the distributor, Subaru of 

America, Inc. (Subaru), alleging the accident vehicle was 

defectively designed. After a jury trial, Subaru and Fuji were 

found 56% at fault for Mr. Compton's injuries, and judgment was 

entered against them in the amount of $6,574,081. 

On appeal, Subaru and Fuji raise two issues. First, they 

contend the district court erroneously admitted the testimony of 

Mr. Compton's design expert and thus failed to carry out its 

gatekeeping function as required under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993) . 1 Second, Subaru 

and Fuji argue the district court improperly denied their renewed 

motion for judgment as a matter of law. We affirm. 

I . 

1

The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., filed an 

amicus brief in support of Subaru and Fuji urging us to apply 

Daubert to all expert testimony. However, as discussed below, we 

expressly decline to reach this issue. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3429 Document: 01019279377 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 4 
On the evening of February 19, 1988, Mr. Compton and four 

other teenaged friends consumed several six-packs of beer and 

drove around Scott County, Kansas, in a 1982 Subaru GL Station 

Wagon. While traveling on U.S. Highway 83, the teenagers spotted 

the automobile of Mr. Compton's ex-girlfriend. Tailing behind, 

the Subaru weaved back and forth across the yellow line until one 

of the teenagers reached over and yanked on the steering wheel, 

causing the driver to lose control. The Subaru skidded across 

the highway, entered a ditch, and rolled over twice. During its 

first roll, Mr. Compton, seated in the rear seat behind the 

driver and not wearing a seatbelt, suffered a spinal cord injury 

resulting in quadriplegia. 

Mr. Compton filed this action against Subaru and Fuji in 

February 1990. In his complaint, Mr. Compton alleged the 

accident vehicle was defectively designed because there was 

"excessive and extensive intrusion of the roof and side of the 

automobile into the passenger compartment during the rollover." 

According to Mr. Compton, he would have avoided serious injury 

during the rollover if the roof had not "collapsed inward" onto 

his head. Therefore, Mr. Compton asserted Subaru and Fuji were 

strictly liable for his injuries. 

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During trial, Subaru and Fuji objected to the proposed 

testimony of Mr. Compton's sole design expert, Larry Bihlmeyer, 

because they contended Mr. Bihlmeyer's background and experience 

did not qualify him as an expert on the design of automobile 

roofs or roof support structures. Furthermore, Subaru and Fuji 

urged Mr. Bihlmeyer failed to meet the requirements for expert 

testimony set out in Daubert, 113 S.Ct. 2786. After a Rule 

104(a) hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, 

however,· the district court ultimately concluded Mr. Bihlmeyer 

was sufficiently qualified and allowed him to testify. 

Having survived the district court's initial scrutiny of his 

qualifications, Mr. Bihlmeyer, an aerospace and mechanical 

engineer, testified the design and roof support structures in the 

accident vehicle were defective because they permitted excessive 

roof crush. He then pinpointed areas of the roof structure 

where, in his expert opinion, additional support was required. 

To correct the alleged defects, Mr. Bihlmeyer testified he would 

design the vehicle to allow only 2 to 3 inches of roof crush. He 

also explained crush should be limited to ensure 33 inches of 

remaining headroom after an accident occurring at a speed of SO 

m.p.h. Under this standard, the roof of the vehicle would be 

required to sustain average forces of between 48,000 and 71,000 

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' ' 

pounds, which the district court remarked useems more applicable 

to a Sherman tank than to any vehicle which the ordinary consumer 

would drive." 

In arriving at his conclusion that the accident vehicle was 

defectively designed, Mr. Bihlmeyer relied upon his inspection of 

the accident vehicle and an identical, undamaged 1982 GL Subaru 

Station Wagon. Next, Mr. Bihlmeyer established his proposed roof 

crush and headroom requirements by comparing the headroom 

measurements in the accident vehicle with measurements compiled 

from hundreds of other accident vehicles he had examined during 

his eight-year career as a uconsulting engineer." Mr. Bihlmeyer 

also used six other sources to support his proposed requirements: 

(1) a summary of a 1972 proposed, but not adopted, Ford Motor 

Company (Ford) standard which would have required a remaining 

headroom of 29.4 inches after roof crush on unnamed vehicles; (2) 

technical papers containing information about a Ford experimental 

safety vehicle which was not a production vehicle; (3) a 1966 

proposed, but not adopted, federal standard for light utility 

vehicles with open bodies which would have required roll bars and 

a minimum of 33 inches remaining headroom after roof crush; (4) a 

Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) paper presented by an 

engineer at Fiat, discussing the advantages of roof crush as an 

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' . 

energy-absorbing device for seat-belted occupants; (5) Federal 

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216, which sets no requirements for 

remaining headroom after roof crush; and, (6) an SAE paper 

entitled "Field Studies of Rollover Performance," which studied 

rollover accidents involving British cars and light vans, but did 

not propose any headroom requirements. 

At the close of Mr. Compton's case, and again at the close 

of all the evidence, Subaru and Fuji moved for judgment pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), arguing Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony was 

so ludicrous no reasonable juror could conclude his testimony was 

more likely than not true. In both instances, the district court 

denied the motions after carefully examining Mr. Compton's 

testimony. Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict finding 

Subaru and Fuji 56% at fault for Mr. Compton's injuries. After 

the verdict, Subaru and Fuji renewed their Rule 50 motion, which 

the district court denied. Subaru and Fuji now appeal. 

II. 

Upon Subaru's and Fuji's motion, the district court heard 

argument regarding the admissibility of Mr. Bihlmeyer's 

testimony. Although expressing doubts about his credibility, the 

court ultimately determined Mr. Bihlmeyer met the qualifications 

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Appellate Case: 94-3429 Document: 01019279377 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 8 
.. for expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The 

district court addressed Daubert's applicability and explained: 

I don't think the Daubert case has a lot to do with the 

problem that I'm faced with .... I don't think we're 

dealing with [a Daubert situation] here. Really. But 

to the extent that you might say that we are, clearly 

there's some scientific knowledge involved in the 

testimony of Mr. Bihlmeyer and it seems to me that ... 

his testimony ... is being offered and will assist the 

jurors to understand whether or not there is a design 

or manufacturing defect involved in this case. So to 

the extent the Daubert case is applicable, it's 

applicable. 

Thus, the district court relied, in part, on Daubert in reaching 

its conclusion Mr. Bihlmeyer was qualified as an expert. 

Subaru and Fuji now contend the district court erred in 

admitting Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony. Under Daubert's test for 

the admissibility of scientific evidence, Subaru and Fuji argue 

Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony should have been excluded because it 

lacked evidentiary reliability and was not grounded in any 

particular reasoning or methodology. They contend Mr. 

Bihlmeyer's testimony was nothing more than his personal opinion 

the roof of the accident vehicle was not sufficiently resistant 

to crush. Indeed, Subaru and Fuji assert Mr. Bihlmeyer did not 

rely on industry data and did not refer to any scientific 

principles or knowledge supporting his personal standard for roof 

crush resistance. Accordingly, because there was no peer review, 

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Appellate Case: 94-3429 Document: 01019279377 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 9 
no testing, and no evidence of general acceptance of Mr. 

Bihlmeyer's theory, Subaru and Fuji argue Mr. Bihlmeyer's 

testimony should have been excluded under Daubert. 

In response, Mr. Compton contends Daubert is inapplicable to 

Mr. Bihlmeyer's nonscientific testimony. Mr. Compton asserts Mr. 

Bihlmeyer reached his conclusions based upon his own expertise 

and experience, not the methods and procedures of science. 

Therefore, Mr. Compton argues the district court correctly stated 

"[f]actors such as rate of error, peer review and acceptance in a 

'relevant scientific discipline' have little, if any, bearing on 

mundane, 'professional witness' engineering testimony such as 

[Mr.] Bihlmeyer' s." Daubert aside, Mr. Compton contends the 

district court did not err in admitting Mr. Bihlmeyer's 

testimony. 

The applicability of Daubert is a question of law which this 

court reviews de novo. See, e.g., Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 

436 (7th Cir. 1994) ("we undertake a de novo review of whether 

the district court properly followed the framework set forth in 

Daubert"). However, once we determine Daubert's relevance and 

application, our review of the district court's decision to admit 

expert testimony is limited. We may reverse the district court 

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• 

only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Barbee, 968 F.2d 

1026, 1031 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

We begin our analysis with a discussion of Daubert's impact 

on the law governing the admissibility of expert opinion 

testimony in a federal trial. Rule 702, which regulates the 

admission of expert testimony, states: 

If scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 

qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 

of an opinion or otherwise. 

Fed. R. Evid. 702. 

Prior to Daubert, we recognized, under the Federal Rules, 

trial courts "are accorded broad discretion in determining the 

competency of expert witnesses." Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 

F.2d 1090, 1100 (lOth Cir. 1991). Our cases further noted, 

however, the trial court "may not employ [this] discretion to 

restrict viable and relevant theories offered by a party." 

Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 906 F.2d 1399, 1409 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). Instead, mindful of the "'liberal 

thrust' of the Federal Rules," Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 

488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988), we have instructed, "the 'touchstone' 

of admissibility [under Rule 702] is helpfulness to the trier of 

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Appellate Case: 94-3429 Document: 01019279377 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 11 
fact." Wertb v. Makita Blec. Works, Ltd., 950 F.2d 643, 648 

(lOth Cir. 1991). Therefore, "as long as a logical basis exists 

for an expert's opinion ... the weaknesses in the underpinnings 

of the opinion[] go to the weight and not the admissibility of 

the testimony." Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 663 

(11th Cir. 1988); see also, Ortb v. Emerson Blec. Co., WhiteRodgers Div., 980 F.2d 632, 637 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert now mandates a 

further Rule 702 inquiry under certain circumstances. In 

Daubert, the Court considered the admissibility of novel 

scientific evidence. There, petitioners brought suit against 

Merrell Dow for birth defects allegedly caused by ingestion of 

the drug Bendectin during pregnancy. Daubert, 113 S.Ct. 2786. 

Petitioners sought to introduce the testimony of several experts 

who relied upon animal rather than epidemiological (human 

statistical) studies in reaching their conclusion that Bendectin 

caused birth defects. Because petitioners' experts did not base 

their testimony on epidemiological evidence, the district court 

held the expert testimony failed to meet the "general acceptance" 

test as set out in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 

1923), 727 F.Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989). On appeal, the 

Ninth Circuit affirmed. 951 F.2d 1128 (1991). 

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After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. 

Rejecting the Frye test, the Court set out a new framework for 

determining the admissibility of expert scientific testimony: 

[T]he trial judge must determine at the outset, 

pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is 

proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that 

(2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or 

determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary 

assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology 

underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of 

whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be 

applied to the facts in issue. 

Daubert, 113 S.Ct at 2796. The Court then outlined a nonexhaustive list of factors courts should consider when reviewing 

a proffer of expert scientific testimony. These include whether 

the theory or technique has been tested, subjected to peer review 

or publication, is generally accepted within the relevant 

scientific community, or has a known or potential rate of error. 

Id. at 2796-97. In considering these factors, the Court 

reminded, "[t]he focus, of course, must be solely on principles 

and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." Id. 

at 2797. 

The language in Daubert makes clear the factors outlined by 

the Court are applicable only when a proffered expert relies on 

some principle or methodology. In other words, application of 

the Daubert factors is unwarranted in cases where expert 

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"'' 

testimony is based solely upon experience or training. See, 

e.g., United States v. Rice, 52 F.3d 843, 847 (lOth Cir. 1995) 

(citing Daubert but applying a traditional Rule 702 analysis to 

tax attorney's expert testimony which was based upon his personal 

experiences) . In such cases, Rule 702 merely requires the trial 

court to make a preliminary finding that proffered expert 

testimony is both relevant and reliable while taking into account 

"[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is ... a flexible one." 

Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2795-97. 

Subsequent to Daubert, we have continued to apply 

essentially the same Rule 702 analysis except in cases involving 

unique, untested, or controversial methodologies or techniques. 

In United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891 (lOth Cir. 1993), for 

example, we cited Daubert's analysis of Rule 702 in upholding the 

district court's decision to permit a fire chief's testimony 

based upon personal observations and the observations of fellow 

fire-fighters. There, because no methodology or technique was 

implicated, we applied a traditional Rule 702 analysis. Id .. at 

895-96. Similarly, in United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 

1338 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 175 (1994), we again 

resorted to the conventional Rule 702 approach, permitting expert 

testimony by a police officer with specialized knowledge of drug 

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., 

trafficking. However, in Muldrow, we also applied the Daubert 

factors to the expert testimony of a forensic chemist to 

determine the reliability and relevance of his methodology. Id. 

at 1337. 

In sum, we do not believe Daubert completely changes our 

traditional analysis under Rule 702. Instead, Daubert sets out 

additional factors the trial court should consider under Rule 702 

if an expert witness offers testimony based upon a particular 

methodology or technique. 

With this background in mind, we turn to the specific facts 

before us. We conclude, for reasons other than those urged by 

Mr. Compton, the district court erred in its application of 

Daubert in this case. 2 Mr. Compton characterizes Mr. Bihlmeyer's 

testimony as nonscientific evidence and argues Daubert is 

inapplicable to such evidence. However, it is unnecessary to 

reach the question whether Daubert mandates a further inquiry 

into Mr. Bihlmeyer's "scientific, technical, or other specialized 

2 "When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the 

court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by 

the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify 

and apply the proper construction of governing law." United 

States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 

113 S.Ct. 2173, 2178 (1993) (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 

Inc . , 50 0 U . S . 9 0 , 9 9 ( 19 91 ) ) . 

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Appellate Case: 94-3429 Document: 01019279377 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 15 
knowledge" under Rule 702 because we find his testimony was not 

based on any particular methodology or technique. Rather, Mr. 

Bihlmeyer reached his expert conclusions by drawing upon general 

engineering principles and his twenty-two years of experience as 

an automotive engineer. Absent some particular methodology or 

technique, Daubert simply has little bearing on Mr. Bihlmeyer's 

testimony. 

Although the district court erred in applying Daubert, we 

nevertheless affirm the court's decision to permit Mr. 

Bihlmeyer's testimony because we are convinced the court 

fulfilled its responsibility under Rule 702. 3 The district 

court, after carefully reviewing Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony, 

reluctantly concluded his testimony was "facially helpful and 

relevant." Moreover, citing Wheeler v. John. Deere Co., 935 F.2d 

1090, 1100 (lOth Cir. 1991), the court found Mr. Bihlmeyer· 

"possessed the basic qualifications to give such testimony." 

Subaru and Fuji argue Mr. Bihlmeyer was not qualified to 

give expert testimony under Rule 702 because he lacked experience 

3 "We are free to affirm a district court decision on any 

grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit 

conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district 

court." United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (lOth 

Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted). 

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Appellate Case: 94-3429 Document: 01019279377 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 16 
designing car roofs or supporting structures. We disagree. The 

record reveals Mr. Bihlmeyer is an aerospace and mechanical 

engineer with twenty-two years of experience in automotive 

engineering. During his fourteen years at Ford, Mr. Bihlmeyer 

spent nine years in the vehicle components engineering division 

and five years in vehicle engineering where he was involved in 

the development of the Ranger Supercab pick-up truck roof design. 

Although Mr. Bihlmeyer never conducted or observed rollover tests 

or static tests for roof crush while at Ford, in the eight years 

since leaving Ford to become a "consulting engineer," Mr. 

Bihlmeyer has performed numerous design analyses on the roof and 

roof support structures of various vehicles. 

As long as an expert stays "within the reasonable confines 

of his subject area," our case law establishes "a lack of 

specialization does not affect the admissibility of [the expert] 

opinion, but only its weight." Wheeler, 935 F.2d at 1100 

(mechanical engineer with expertise in the design of farm 

equipment permitted to testify on consumer expectations despite 

lack of experience in consumer sampling); see also, Lavespere v. 

Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 176-77 (5th Cir. 

1990) (engineer experienced in designing devices similar to a 

brake press qualified to testify on safety of brake press), cert. 

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Appellate Case: 94-3429 Document: 01019279377 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 17 
denied, 114 S.Ct. 171 (1993). In this case, Mr. Bihlmeyer based 

his testimony upon general engineering principles and concepts. 

Although another witness might certainly have provided greater 

expertise in the area of roof design and support structures, 

nevertheless, we think Mr. Bihlmeyer's education and experience 

as an automotive engineer were sufficient to permit his 

testimony. Thus, we hold the district court did not abuse its 

discretion. 

III. 

Next, Subaru and Fuji argue the district court erred in 

denying their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law made 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). We review the district 

court's denial of a Rule 50(b) motion de novo, Sheets v. Salt 

Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 

S.Ct. 74 (1995), applying the same standard used by the district 

court. TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 723 (lOth 

Cir. 1993). "Under this standard, we may find error only if the 

evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable 

inferences supporting the party for whom the jury found; we must 

construe the evidence and inferences most favorably to the 

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nonmoving party.'" Zimmerman v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of 

Rapid City, 848 F.2d 1047, 1051 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Subaru and Fuji argue, first, the district court was "dutybound" to grant the Rule SO(b) motion in light of the court's 

serious reservations about the testimony of Mr. Compton's sole 

design expert, Mr. Bihlmeyer. We disagree. In its Memorandum 

and Order denying the Rule SO(b) motion, the district court 

commented, "[r]ereading Bihlmeyer's testimony has done nothing to 

change the court's extremely low opinion of Bihlmeyer's 

credibility and of the validity of his opinions." The court then 

correctly noted the weight and credibility of Mr. Bihlmeyer's 

testimony were issues for the jury, and concluded his testimony 

met the requirements under Rule 702. This finding was critical 

to the court's acceptance of Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony. Having 

made its Rule 702 determination, the district court did not err 

in allowing Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony despite the court's opinion 

of his testimony. 

Second, Subaru and Fuji contend Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony is 

insufficient under Kansas law because it amounted to a conclusory 

allegation the roof of the Subaru was too weak. To prove 

defective design under Kansas law, a plaintiff must do more than 

merely assert a different design was feasible. Garst v. General 

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Appellate Case: 94-3429 Document: 01019279377 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 19 
Motors Corp., 204 Kan. 2, 20, 484 P.2d 47, 61 (1971); see also, 

Meyerhoff v. Michelin Tire Corp., 852 F.Supp. 933, 947 (D. Kan. 

1994), aff'd, 70 F.3d 1175 (lOth Cir. 1995). However, after 

reviewing the record, we conclude Mr. Bihlmeyer identified at 

least six specific design defects and adequately supported his 

conclusions. 

Finally, Subaru and Fuji assert Mr. Bihlmeyer's testimony 

was insufficient to rebut the presumption of nondefectiveness 

under the Kansas Product Liability Act (KPLA) . Under KPLA: 

When the injury-causing aspect of the product was, at 

the time of manufacture, in compliance with legislative 

regulatory standards or administrative regulatory 

safety standards relating to design or performance, the 

product shall be deemed not defective by reason of 

design or performance, ... unless the claimant proves 

by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonably 

prudent product seller could and would have taken 

additional precautions. 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3304(a). Subaru and Fuji argue their Rule 

50(b) motion should have been granted because Mr. Compton 

provided no evidence the alleged regulatory standard, Federal 

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 216, 49 C.F.R. § 571.216, 

was inadequate or that additional precautions were necessary. 

However, in this case, the parties contested the 

applicability of FMVSS 216, which "establishes strength 

requirements for the passenger compartment roof." 49 C.F.R. 

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§ 571.216. The district court found FMVSS 216 applied solely to 

the front pillars on either side of the windshield, known as the 

A pillars. Because Mr. Compton's injury occurred when the roof 

support pillars behind the rear doors (the C pillars) and the 

pillars behind the cargo deck (the D pillars) collapsed, the 

district court concluded Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3304(a) was 

inapplicable. 

We review de novo the district court's interpretation of 

federal regulations. Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1255 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). We have found few cases applying FMVSS 216 and none 

interpreting its scope. However, after reviewing the regulation, 

we are not convinced the district court's interpretation of FMVSS 

216 was unreasonable. FMVSS 216's roof crush resistance tests 

for passenger cars require the application of force to "either 

side of the forward edge of a vehicle's roof." 49 C.F.R. 

§ 571.216. Moreover, the regulation mandates "[b]oth the left 

and right front portions of the vehicle's roof structure shall be 

capable of meeting the requirements." Id. In view of FMVSS 

216's emphasis on the A pillars, we cannot hold it explicitly 

applies to C or D pillar crush. Accordingly, because there 

appears to be no applicable regulation governing rear seat roof 

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• 

• • 

crush, we agree Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3304(a) has no application 

on these special facts. 

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Compton, 

we hold the district court did not err in denying the Rule SO(b) 

motion. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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