Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01501/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01501-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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RP

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Michael Trollope,

aka: Tom Michaels, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Barbara Rodriguez Mundell, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 10-1501-PHX-DGC (DKD)

ORDER

Plaintiff Thomas Michael Trollope, aka: Tom Michaels, who is confined in the

Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1), a pleading entitled “Petitioner’s Motion For Court Order”

(Doc. 3), a “Motion For Appointment Of Counsel” (Doc. 4), a “Motion To File In Excess Of

Pages Allowed By Rule” (Doc. 5), a “Certified Statement Of Account” (Doc. 6), an

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 7), and a pleading entitled “Petitioner’s

Brief In Support Of Civil Rights Action” (Doc. 8) (“Brief”).

The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, will assess

an initial partial filing fee, will grant Plaintiff’s “Motion To File In Excess Of Pages Allowed

By Rule,” will deny Plaintiff’s pleading entitled “Petitioner’s Motion For Court Order” and

Plaintiff’s “Motion For Appointment Of Counsel,” and will dismiss the Complaint and this

action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 7) will be granted.

Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court will

assess an initial partial filing fee of $6.00. The remainder of the fee will be collected

monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the amount in the

account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order

requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the

statutory formula. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

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allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, No. 07-17265, 2010 WL

2947323, at *3 (9th Cir. Jul. 29, 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).

If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts,

a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court

should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of advice “would

undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225,

231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to decide whether the court was

required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for

failure to state a claim, without leave to amend because the defects cannot be corrected.

III. Complaint

Named as Defendants in the Complaint are: (1) Barbara Rodriguez Mundell, Chief

Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court; (2) Steven R. Sheldon, Judge, Maricopa County

Superior Court; (3) Richard J. Trujillo, Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court; (4) Paul J.

McMurdie, Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court; (5) Maricopa County; (6) State of

Arizona; (7) Ann A. Scott Timmer, Chief Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals; (8) Anthony

Mackey, Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals; and (9) Ronald R. Reinstein, former Presiding

Judge, Maricopa County Superior Court. 

Plaintiff alleges two counts in the Complaint. In both counts, Plaintiff claims that his

right of unfettered access to the courts, his right to a fair and impartial trial, his right to an

evidentiary hearing, and his right to a trial by an impartial jury were violated. Plaintiff also

alleges that his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were violated in “this

‘1983’ suit.”

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Release from prison is not a form of relief that is available in a civil action brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The appropriate avenue for seeking release for prison is a petition

for habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973). 

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In Count I, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Steven R. Sheldon “struck” Plaintiff’s

“State Superior Court Motion For Rehearing instead of ‘dismissing’ or ‘denying’ it, which

then rendered [Plaintiff’s] Petition For Review ‘untimely.’” Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant

Sheldon engineered [Plaintiff’s] ‘default to [the] Court of Appeals.” Plaintiff also alleges

that Defendant Anthony Mackey “found [Plaintiff’s] Petition For Review ‘untimely’ despite

that [Plaintiff] provided [a] stamped, confirmed copy of [the] Motion For Rehearing.”

In Count II, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Richard J. Trujillo and Paul J. McMurdie

“have refused to rule on [Plaintiff’s] current Motion For Rehearing, and are again implying

that [Plaintiff’s] Motion For Rehearing is ‘untimely.’” Plaintiff alleges that the “Superior

Court Defendants are again engineering [Plaintiff’s] ‘default’ to [the] Court of Appeals just

as they did more than a year ago.”

Plaintiff seeks a jury trial, immediate release from prison, and cash reparations for the

denial of his civil rights.1

IV. Dismissal of Defendants

A. Defendants Mundell, Timmer, and Reinstein

To state a viable constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must show an

affirmative link between the alleged injury and the conduct of an individual Defendant.

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

To state a claim against a state official, the civil rights complainant must allege that

the official personally participated in the constitutional deprivation, or that a state

supervisory official was aware of the widespread abuses and with deliberate indifference to

the inmate's constitutional rights failed to take action to prevent further misconduct. King,

814 F.2d at 568; see also Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658, 691 (1978); Williams v. Cash, 836 F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1988).

There is no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior,

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and, therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated a

plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 n.12 (1988); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723

F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984).

Although Plaintiff names Barbara Rodriguez Mundell, Ann A. Scott Timmer, and

Ronald R. Reinstein as Defendants in the Complaint, he has not described any specific

conduct by these Defendants that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and led to his

injuries. Indeed, Plaintiff does not mention these Defendants in the body of the Complaint.

Apparently, Plaintiff has named these judges as Defendants because they were the Chief

Judge or Presiding Judge when other judges in their courts made decisions that Plaintiff is

complaining about in this action. However, as noted above, there is no liability for individual

defendants in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior.

Accordingly, Defendants Barbara Rodriguez Mundell, Ann A. Scott Timmer, and

Ronald R. Reinstein are subject to dismissal from this action for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

B. Defendants Sheldon, Trujillo, McMurdie, and Mackey 

As Maricopa County Superior Court Judges, Defendants Steven R. Sheldon, Richard

J. Trujillo, and Paul J. McMurdie are absolutely immune from liability for damages. As an

Arizona Court of Appeal Judge, Defendant Anthony Mackey is also absolutely immune from

liability for damages.

“Judges are immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction

of their courts.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). Indeed,

judges are absolutely immune from suits for damages for their judicial acts, “even when such

acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or

corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1072.

Not even allegations by a plaintiff of “bad faith, personal interest or outright malevolence”

are enough to remove the cloak of absolute immunity from judges acting within the

jurisdiction of their courts. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078.

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Plaintiff’s asserts in his Brief (Doc. 8) that the “striking” of his “original Motion For

Rehearing” by Defendant Sheldon “was a ‘ministerial or administrative task’” and “hence

[the] [J]udge is not immune.” Plaintiff also asserts that the “recent Superior Court ruling

finding [Plaintiff’s] Motion For Rehearing ‘untimely’ was also an ‘administrative or

ministerial task.’” Plaintiff is mistaken. These acts were clearly judicial acts. Indeed,

Plaintiff also refers to these actions in his Brief as “[j]udicial actions.” 

All of Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Steven R. Sheldon, Richard J.

Trujillo, Paul J. McMurdie, and Anthony Mackey in the Complaint involve their judicial acts

as Superior Court Judges or as an Arizona Court of Appeals Judge. Thus, these Defendants

are absolutely immune from liability for damages.

Accordingly, Defendants Steven R. Sheldon, Richard J. Trujillo, Paul J. McMurdie,

and Anthony Mackey are subject to dismissal from this action for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

C. Defendants Maricopa County and State of Arizona

Other than noting that the “incidents took place” in Maricopa County and in the State

of Arizona, Plaintiff has not linked the actions of either Defendant Maricopa County or the

State of Arizona with the injuries that he complains about in the Complaint. Accordingly,

they are improper Defendants and are subject to dismissal from this action for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-72, 377. 

Also, under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a state

or state agency may not be sued in federal court without its consent. Pennhurst State School

and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). Furthermore, “a state is not a ‘person’ for purposes of section 1983.” Gilbreath

v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 

V. Dismissal of Complaint Without Leave to Amend

Because no Defendants now remain, the Complaint (Doc. 1) will be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Also, because it is clear from the

face of the Complaint that the deficiencies in the Complaint cannot be cured by amendment,

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the Court’s dismissal will be without leave to amend, and the Court will order that the action

be dismissed and judgment entered. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.

1987) (citing Broughton v. Cutter Lab, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980)).

To the extent that Plaintiff asks in his Brief for the Court to treat this § 1983 action

in the alternative as a “habeas petition,” the Court declines to do so because Plaintiff has

previously filed a habeas petition in this Court in case number CV 99-1270-PHX-ROS, in

which he challenged the conviction that he complains about in the instant action. Under 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), before a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition may be filed

in the district court, a petitioner must first obtain an order from the United States Court of

Appeals authorizing the district court to consider the petition. The Court of Appeals will not

issue an order authorizing a successive petition unless the petition meets the requirements

of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(A) and (B). Plaintiff does not allege that he has obtained permission

of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition

in his Court.

VI. Pending Motions

A. Motion for Court Order

On July 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed a pleading entitled “Petitioner’s Motion For Court

Order” (Doc. 3), in which he moves the Court to order him to produce his exhibits to support

his claim. The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion in light of the dismissal of the Complaint

and this action.

B. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

On July 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed a “Motion For Appointment Of Counsel” (Doc. 4).

There is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in a civil case. See Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982); Randall v.

Wyrick, 642 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1981). The appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(1) is required only when “exceptional circumstances” are present. Terrell v.

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). 

A determination with respect to exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of

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the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of Plaintiff to articulate his or her

claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issue involved. Id. “Neither of these

factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id.

(quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Having considered both elements, it does not presently appear that exceptional

circumstances are present that would require the appointment of counsel in this case.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied. 

C. Motion to File in Excess of Pages Allowed by Rule

On July 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed a “Motion To File In Excess Of Pages Allowed By

Rule” (Doc. 5), in which he request that the Court accept his Complaint with seven extra

pages. Plaintiff’s Motion will be granted. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 7) is granted.

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $6.00.

(3) Plaintiff’s pleading entitled “Petitioner’s Motion For Court Order” (Doc. 3) and

Plaintiff’s “Motion For Appointment Of Counsel” (Doc. 4) are both denied. 

(4) Plaintiff’s “Motion To File In Excess Of Pages Allowed By Rule” (Doc. 5) is

granted. 

(5) The Complaint (Doc. 1) and this action are dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment

accordingly.

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(6) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the

dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

(7) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of this

decision would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 8th day of September, 2010.

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