Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_00-cv-04036/USCOURTS-arwd-4_00-cv-04036-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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AO72A

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

ANDREW SASSER PETITIONER

V. Civil No. 00-4036

LARRY NORRIS, Director of

Arkansas Department of Corrections RESPONDENT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Currently before this Court are Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or

Amend Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (Doc. 73),

Respondent’s Response (Doc. 76), and Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 79).

Respondent opposes the motion, contending the 28 U.S.C. § 2244 does

not permit Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion, and if the motion is

permitted, Petitioner has failed to show that the judgment was

clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. (Doc. 76.)

The Court finds that these matters are ripe for consideration. For

the reasons stated in this Order, Petitioner’s motion (Doc. 73) is

hereby DENIED. 

“Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited function of correcting

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered

evidence.” United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440

F.3d 930, 933 (8 Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and additional th

citation omitted). “Such motions cannot be used to introduce new

evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments which could

have been offered or raised prior to entry of judgment.” Id. In a

habeas action, a Petitioner may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to file

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what in reality is a second or successive petition without proper

authorization. United States v. Lambros, 404 F.3d 1034, 1036, 1037

(8 Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1135 (2005) (finding that the th

petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion “sought ultimately to resurrect the

denial of his earlier § 2255 motion” and upheld the district court’s

dismissal, as the motion was properly construed as an effort to file

a successive motion for postconviction relief).

I. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Petitioner contends the Court wrongly applied 28 U.S.C.

2254(e)(2) when it decided not to order an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner argues that 2254(e)(2) was not applicable because

Petitioner did not fail to develop the factual basis for his claim

in State court, as required by the statute (as the basis for the

claim was not available to him until after his State court

proceedings had fully concluded). (Doc. 73, p. 35.)

We find that Petitioner did fail to develop the factual basis

for his mental retardation claim in State Court. There was a lack

of diligence on Petitioner’s part in developing the facts of his

mental retardation claim, as a State statute, Ark. Code. Ann § 5-4-

618, that protected mentally retarded persons from execution existed

at the time of Petitioner’s State trial and Petitioner failed to

assert the State protections. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,

(2000) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) is applicable to

situations where a petitioner lacked diligence, or some greater

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fault, in developing the facts of his claim in State court). 

 At the time of Petitioner’s trial, Arkansas had a statute that

provided an avenue for Petitioner to assert that he was mentally

retarded. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618. The Arkansas statute

clearly set out the requirements for a criminal defendant in a

capital case to show that he is mentally retarded; thus, making him

ineligible for the death penalty. Petitioner did not take advantage

of the Arkansas statute. It appears that the Arkansas statute

complies with providing the protections required by Atkins v.

Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (finding that it is unconstitutional

to execute a person who is mentally retardad). Therefore, even if

Atkins is a new rule of constitutional law, the rule of Atkins was

not “previously unavailable” to Petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2)(A)(i). 

Even if we were to find that the mental retardation claim was

not “previously unavailable,” we would find that Petitioner failed

to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Petitioner’s

conclusory allegations and provisional conclusions, contained in an

affidavit (Doc. 58), even if proven, would not be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have given

Petitioner a sentence of death. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B); see

also, Wiggins v. Lockhart, 825 F.2d 1237, 1238 (8 Cir. 1987), cert. th

denied, 484 U.S. 1074 (1988) (holding that “[m]ere conclusory

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Examples of allegations contained in the affidavit are: 1

The affidavit states that Petitioner’s intelligence quotient (IQ) of

79, while taking into account the five-point margin of error, may place him

cognitively in the range of mental retardation. To be presumed mentally

retarded in Arkansas, one must have an IQ of 65 or lower. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-

4-618. Even with a five-point margin of error, Petitioner does not have low

enough of an IQ to be presumed mentally retarded. 

The affidavit also contained several different accounts by Petitioner’s

family members, however, no affidavit from the family members or any other form

of evidence regarding the family member’s recollections were offered. An

unidentified brother of Petitioner stated that Petitioner never took the

written test to obtain a learner’s permit to drive a car and never received a

driver’s license. The brother stated he didn’t think Petitioner could pass the

test. There were also statements that Petitioner never attempted to rent or

buy a home, or paid any utilities, phone or other bills associated with

independent living. Also, the affidavit discussed Petitioner’s work history,

which consisted largely of manual labor jobs, which was inconsistent with the

sort of employment his siblings have (consistent employment at the same company

for many years, one being a preacher). The affidavit described an event where

Petitioner stated he was leaving home to join the Army, but was later found to

have been living in an abandoned truck in a wooded area. There was no

supportive evidence to support any of these statements. There was also

information that Petitioner lived with his mother and his cousins, and he

never attempted to obtain or manage a checking account. Again, no supporting

evidence was offered regarding these statements.

The affidavit stated that Petitioner received a Certificate of Attendance

instead of a high school diploma. Petitioner’s childhood friend described

Petitioner as the “class clown” in elementary school and pondered why, if

Petitioner wasn’t in the same classes as he, was Petitioner not in special

education classes, since he received a Certificate of Attendance. These

statements, again are not supported by any additional evidence. Furthermore,

the statement by the friend alludes to special education classes being offered

at Petitioner’s school, yet Petitioner was not enrolled in these classes; thus,

leading one to believe that Petitioner was not regarded as mentally retarded

during his formative years.

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allegations will not suffice” to warrant relief or even an

evidentiary hearing). We found that many of the alleged facts were

not proven; such as Petitioner’s claim that the supporting affidavit,

Doc. 58, “confirmed” Petitioner’s mental retardation (Doc. 48, p. 8),

when in actuality the affidavit contained several conclusory

allegations and expressed the opinion that Petitioner’s background

suggests that Petitioner “may be mentally retarded” (Doc. 58, para.

12).1

More importantly, the affidavit itself states that the

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conclusions contained were only provisional and that “it is

imperative that a complete psychosocial history and thorough

evaluation by a medical doctor or professional qualified by an

appropriate licensing board to evaluate developmental disabilities

be conducted.” (Doc. 58, para. 12.) 

At least by September 3, 2004, Petitioner’s counsel were aware

that additional evidence was needed. See Doc. 48, p. 5, Second

Supplemental and Amended Petition (Petitioner stated that the filing

of the petition did not waive “any additional time that Mr. Sasser

needs to complete the investigation and preparation of a complete

social history and otherwise be in a position to determine what if

any additional testing and/or evaluation may be necessary.”).

Arguably, Petitioner’s counsel were aware of the need for a complete

psychosocial history and thorough evaluation as early as May 25,

2003, the day the affidavit (Doc. 58) was sworn to and subscribed.

Petitioner has had over two years in which to complete the social

history and to request access for the purpose of evaluation. 

We find that the affidavit was provisional, consisting of many

conclusory allegations, and further evidence was needed to warrant

relief or even an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing was

not ordered due to Petitioner’s failure to allege sufficient facts

to warrant an evidentiary hearing. We cannot find that there is

reason to believe Petitioner can show by clear and convincing

evidence that he is mentally retarded. Therefore, pursuant to 28

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Because Petitioner has failed to present arguments necessitating we 2

revisit his claims, we do not reach the question of whether this part of the 

motion is a successive petition under United States v. Lambros, or is a proper

Rule 59(e) motion under a rule analogous to that which was presented in

Gonzales v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (explaining that a Rule 60(b) motion

attacking a previous ruling which precluded a determination on the merits was a

proper motion, unlike an attack on a ruling made on the merits - which would be

construed as a successive petition). 

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U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B), we may not hold an evidentiary hearing. 

Furthermore, we find that, absent § 2254(e)(2), no error was

made in denying Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. The

Court would not have been assisted by an evidentiary hearing. See

Newton v. Kemna, 354 F.3d 776, 785 (8 Cir. 2004) (“[T]he court may th

deny an evidentiary hearing if such a hearing would not assist in

resolving the petitioner’s claim.... [E]ven if the facts [the

petitioner] seeks to prove are true, if those facts would not entitle

him to relief... then the District Court did not abuse its discretion

in denying [the petitioner’s] request for an evidentiary hearing.”)

If Petitioner’s alleged facts were proved, they did not amount to a

showing that Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief. We are not

persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that we should have granted an

evidentiary hearing; nor are we convinced that any error occurred

regarding the decision not to order an evidentiary hearing.

II. REMAINING CLAIMS2

Petitioner also claims that his mental retardation claim is not

subject to dismissal on grounds of procedural default and if it was

defaulted, he can show cause and prejudice excusing the default or

that the miscarriage of justice exception applies. Additionally,

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Petitioner claims that his trial counsel’s failure to investigate and

present evidence of his mental retardation at trial was

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel and Petitioner’s

failure to previously present Claims X (ineffective assistance of

counsel in failing to investigate and present evidence of mental

retardation), XI (competency to stand trial), and XII (ability to

knowingly and intelligently waive the right to remain silent) should

be excused as he can show cause and prejudice for the omissions.

(Doc. 73.)

Petitioner raises various arguments in support of the above

claims, specifically arguing that the claims were not procedurally

defaulted, and if they had been, they meet the requirements of excuse

or the miscarriage of justice exception applies. The arguments

presented are reiterations of arguments Petitioner previously made

in support of his habeas petition. Relief is not warranted as we

have fully considered and rejected these arguments during our

resolution of Petitioner’s successive habeas petition (Doc. 48). 

See Williams v. Norris, 461 F.3d 999, 1004 (8 Cir. 2006) (“A Rule th

59(e) motion cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and

should, have been made before the trial court entered final

judgment.”) (additional citation omitted); Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d

1106, 1137 n. 69 (11 Cir. 2000) (explaining that “the function of th

a motion to alter or amend a judgment is not to serve as a vehicle

to relitigate old matters”). Moreover, Petitioner has failed to

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present anything that necessitates we revisit these claims, such as

showing manifest errors of law or fact, or providing newly discovered

evidence. 

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the above findings, the Court finds that

Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion (Doc. 73) should be and hereby is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 18 day of April 2007. th

 /S/ Harry F. Barnes 

 Harry F. Barnes

 United States District Judge

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