Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00941/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00941-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

WO MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Juan Velazquez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

James Logan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-00941-PHX-SPL (MEA) 

ORDER 

On March 20, 2014, Plaintiff Juan Velazquez, who is confined in the Maricopa 

County Fourth Avenue Jail, filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of Maricopa County 

against Defendants James Logan, Michelle McCloskey, Tammy Hardy, Tom Manos, 

Sandy Wilson, and Maricopa County. On April 1, he filed an Amended Complaint. On 

May 2, Defendants Maricopa County, Wilson, and Manos (“Removing Defendants”) 

filed a Notice of Removal. 

On May 6, 2014, Removing Defendants and Defendant Logan filed a Notice 

informing the Court that they were waiting for the Court to issue a screening order before 

filing an answer to the Amended Complaint. On May 9, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Seal 

(Doc. 5) and lodged under seal a Rule 65(b) Motion (Doc. 6). On May 23, Plaintiff filed 

a “Response to Defendants[’] Screening Motion.” 

On May 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed an Objection to Removal (Doc. 9). On June 4, he 

filed a “Request for Entry of Judgment Re: Objection to Removal” (Doc. 10). On June 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 1 of 19
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

12, Removing Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Objection to Removal. On 

June 24, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority and Arguments in Support of 

Objection for Removal (Doc. 12). On June 26, Removing Defendants filed a Notice of 

Receipt of Plaintiff’s Supplemental Arguments. 

On July 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Non-Receipt of Responsive Pleading 

by Maricopa County Attorney; Request for Copy and Time to Reply” (Doc. 15). On July 

9, Removing Defendants filed a Notice of Service (Doc. 16), indicating that they had sent 

Plaintiff another copy of their Opposition to his Objection to Removal. On July 21, 

Plaintiff filed a Rule 12(f) Motion (Doc. 17), seeking to strike the Opposition. On July 

23, Removing Defendants filed a Notice of Receipt of Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike. On 

August 1, Plaintiff filed a Reply. 

On August 1, 2014, Plaintiff also filed a Rule 4(m) Motion for Extension of Time 

or Suspension of Time Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A Screening” (Doc. 20). On August 

19, Removing Defendants filed a Response to the Motion). On August 20, Defendant 

Logan filed a Response to the Rule 4(m) Motion. 

I. Removal, Objections, and Related Filings 

 In their Notice of Removal, Removing Defendants seek to remove this case 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443, and 1446. They allege that Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that 

this action is “properly removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c), 1443, and 1446(b).” 

They claim that they and Defendant James Logan have executed waivers of service and 

mailed them to Plaintiff, that Defendant Logan consents to removal and that, upon 

information and belief, Defendants McCloskey and Hardy have not been served. 

 A state court defendant may remove to federal court any civil action brought in the 

state court over which the federal district courts would have original jurisdiction. 28 

U.S.C. § 1441(a). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, 

violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This Court’s 

jurisdiction extends to such claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a federal court has original 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 2 of 19
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States”). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law 

claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (court has supplemental jurisdiction over “all other 

claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they 

form part of the same case or controversy”). Removal, therefore, was proper pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

 A. Plaintiff’s Objections to Removal

 In his Objection to Removal, Plaintiff raises three objections to removal. First, he 

claims that Removing Defendants failed to obtain unanimity, as required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1446(b). He contends that Defendants McCloskey and Hardy were served by first-class 

mail to their last-known mailing addresses, that this constitutes proper service, and that 

there is no unanimity because Defendants McCloskey and Hardy did not consent to 

removal or join in the removal. Second, Plaintiff claims that Removing Defendants did 

not cite to 28 U.S.C. § 1443 “with any particularity” and, therefore, it is improper for 

Removing Defendants to rely on § 1443 as an “additional or independent basis for 

removal.” Third, Plaintiff asserts that if the Court retains jurisdiction over the federal 

claims in this lawsuit, the Court must stay this case to allow the state court to first 

proceed with the state law claims. He alleges that the state court has a “primary and 

strong interest in resolving this suit” because of “the fact-specific content, the parties 

being sued and the State constitutional questions presented.” 

 In their Opposition to Plaintiff’s Objection, Removing Defendants allege that the 

case was properly removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443, and 1446, and that 

Defendants McCloskey’s and Hardy’s consent to removal is not required because those 

Defendants have not been properly served. 

 In his Notice of Supplemental Authority, Plaintiff alleges that Removing 

Defendants did not provide a “short and plain statement of the grounds for removal,” as 

required by § 1446(a), and that the statutes on which Removing Defendants rely—

§§ 1441(c), 1443, and 1446(b)—do not support removal. 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 3 of 19
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

 In their Notice of Receipt of Plaintiff’s Supplemental Arguments, Removing 

Defendants allege that they reviewed Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority and 

“determined that a supplement response is not required” because they “have already 

provided a full response to Plaintiff’s objection.” 

 As explained in more detail below, Plaintiff’s objections do not justify remanding 

this action. Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Objection and Notice of Supplemental 

Authority. 

1. Defendants McCloskey’s and Hardy’s Consent was not 

Required

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A), when a civil action is removed under 28 

U.S.C. § 1441(a), “all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in 

or consent to the removal of action.” In his Objection to Removal, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants did not unanimously consent to removal because Defendants McCloskey and 

Hardy were properly served and did not consent to removal. Plaintiff relies on a 

document entitled “Acceptance of Service” (Doc. 1-1 at 8-9) that he filed in the Superior 

Court. In that document, he states that he mailed Defendants McCloskey and Hardy, by 

first-class mail, “a copy of the Complaint, Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 

Summers, and a Waiver of Service of Summons for signature and return. Plaintiff is 

awaiting these responses and will notify the Court and other parties when these waivers 

are returned or of any other result.” 

 Rule 4.1(d) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure governs service on an 

individual. Like Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4.1(d) requires 

service “upon an individual from whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed,” by 

delivering a copy of the summons and complaint “to that individual personally,” by 

leaving copies “at that individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some 

person of suitable age and discretion residing therein,” or by delivering copies “to an 

agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Plaintiff 

contends that both individuals were served by first-class mail delivered to their last 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 4 of 19
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

known mailing address. This is not an appropriate means of service under either Rule 

4.1(d) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

 Although both Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1(c)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 4(d)(1)(G) authorize a plaintiff to notify a defendant “by first-class mail 

or other reliable means” of the commencement of the action and request that the 

defendant waive service of the summons, a defendant is not required to waive service. If 

a defendant does not waive service, then a plaintiff must properly serve the summons and 

complaint. Larsen v. Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 867-868 (8th Cir. 2000) (if a 

plaintiff seeks waiver of service, but “the defendant does not waive service, service has 

not been effected”); Dietz v. Quality Loan Serv.e Corp. of Wash., 2014 WL 4546953, *1 

(W.D. Wash. 2014) (“if the defendant does not return the waiver form, the plaintiff must 

still serve the summons and complaint in a manner prescribed by Rule 4”); Kotzev v. 

Ryan, 2011 WL 941333, *3 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“A request for waiver does not constitute 

effective service.”); see also Lacey v. Malandro Commc’n, Inc., 2009 WL 4755399, *3 

(D. Ariz. 2009) (under Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, service was not effective until 

defendants signed the waiver of service form); Jenkins v. State, 2008 WL 4356274, *1 

n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (“a plaintiff is not relieved of the duty to effect service of 

process merely because the defendant has not signed and returned the plaintiff’s request 

for waiver of service”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 

Amendments (“The revised rule is clear that, if the waiver is not returned and filed, . . . 

the action will not otherwise proceed until formal service of process is effected.”). 

Defendants McCloskey and Hardy did not waive service and Plaintiff did not properly 

serve them pursuant to Rule 4.1 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 4 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 In addition, Plaintiff’s reliance on Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 5(c)(2)(c) and 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(C) is misplaced. Both Rules govern the service 

of papers other than the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1)(B) (noting that the rule 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 5 of 19
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

applies to “a pleading filed after the original complaint”); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 5(a) (applying 

the rule to “every pleading subsequent to the original complaint”); Morgan v. Foreman ex 

rel. County of Maricopa, 973 P.2d 616, 618-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (“Rules 4 and 4.1, 

rather than Rule 5, control the service of a complaint.”); see also Employee Painters’ 

Trust v. Ethan Enters., Inc., 480 F.3d 993, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2007) (“an amended 

complaint can often be served [under Rule 5] if the original complaint is properly served 

and the defendants appeared in the first instance”) (emphasis added). 

 Because Defendants McCloskey and Hardy were not properly served, Removing 

Defendants were not required to obtain their consent to remove this action. 

 2. Citation to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c) and 1443 is Not Fatal

 In his Objection, Plaintiff alleges that Removing Defendants did not cite to 28 

U.S.C. § 1443 “with any particularity.” In his Notice of Supplemental Authority, 

Plaintiff alleges that Removing Defendants did not provide a “short and plain statement 

of the grounds for removal” and that the statutes on which Removing Defendants rely—

§§ 1441(c), 1443, and 1446(b)—do not support removal. 

 “While it is the usual practice to cite the section of the United States Code under 

which an action is removed, failure to cite the proper section in a petition for removal is 

not a fatal defect where an adequate basis of removal is set forth.” Wormley v. Southern 

Pac. Transp. Co., 863 F. Supp. 382, 385 (E.D. Tex. 1994); see also Harlem River 

Produce Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 257 F. Supp. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (“Failure 

to cite the section under which removal is sought is not a fatal defect, and at most is a 

technical defect where an adequate factual basis for removal is set forth”). 

 Section 1446(a) only requires “a short and plain statement of the grounds for 

removal.” The Notice of Removal complies with that requirement because it states that 

the Amended Complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff’s federal civil rights. As 

previously noted, the Court has jurisdiction over such claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and, 

therefore, removal was appropriate under § 1441(a). Removing Defendants’ citation to 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 6 of 19
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

§§ 1441(c) and 1443, rather than § 1441(a), is, at most, a technical error, not a fatal 

defect, and does not require remand. 

 3. A Stay is Inappropriate 

 There is no need to stay this case to allow the state court to decide the state law 

claims. The Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal law claims and will 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. This Court can 

decide both the federal and state claims. 

 B. Request for Entry of Judgment Re: Objection to Removal

 In his Request for Entry of Judgment, Plaintiff requests that the Court remand this 

case because there was no unanimous consent to removal. Because the Court has 

rejected this claim, the Court will deny the Request for Entry of Judgment. 

C. Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike

 In his Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike, Plaintiff requests that the Court strike 

Removing Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Objection to Removal and, as a result, 

find that Removing Defendants have waived their opportunity to oppose remand of this 

case, and remand the case. 

 Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that 

“[t]he court may order stricken from any pleading an insufficient defense or any 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) 

(emphasis added). Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines “pleadings” 

generally as complaints and answers. Thus, a motion to strike filed pursuant to Rule 

12(f) only permits the Court to strike pleadings, not motions, responses, or other papers. 

See Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Under the 

express language of the rule, only pleadings are subject to motions to strike.”). Thus, the 

Court will deny the Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike. 

D. Notice of Non-Receipt and Request for Copy and Time to Reply

 In his July 8, 2014 “Notice of Non-Receipt of Responsive Pleading by Maricopa 

County Attorney; Request for Copy and Time to Reply,” Plaintiff states that he did not 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 7 of 19
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

receive a copy of Removing Defendants’ Opposition to his Objection to Removal and 

requests that the Court order Removing Defendants to send him a copy of the Opposition 

and provide him with an opportunity to reply to it. On July 9, 2014, Removing 

Defendants filed a Notice indicating that they had sent Plaintiff another copy of their 

Opposition. In lieu of a reply, Plaintiff filed his July 21, 2014 Rule 12(f) Motion to 

Strike. Thus, the Court will deny as moot Plaintiff’s request in his Notice of NonReceipt. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a).1

 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

 

1

 In his “Response to Defendants[’] Screening Motion,” Plaintiff takes issue with 

the need for a screening order and also requests that he be given leave to amend if the Court identifies defects in his Amended Complaint. Section 1915A(a) applies, notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff originally filed in state court. See Wrinkles v. 

Davis, 311 F. Supp. 2d 735, 737-738 (N.D. Ind. 2004). Accordingly, the Court will proceed to screen the Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff wants to seek leave to amend his 

Amended Complaint after receiving this Order, he must follow the procedures in Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1. 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 8 of 19
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

III. Amended Complaint 

 In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: Maricopa 

County, Maricopa County Manager Tom Manos, Maricopa County Deputy Manager 

Sandy Wilson, Office of Public Defense Services (OPDS) Director James Logan, 

Michelle McCloskey, and Tammy Hardy. 

 Plaintiff alleges that he hired Defendants McCloskey and Hardy as a mitigation 

specialist and private investigator, respectively, for the post-conviction portion of his 

criminal case and provided them with private and confidential information and materials 

(“materials”)2

 and access to those materials. Because Plaintiff was transferred from 

prison to jail to attend court proceedings and because Plaintiff needed access to his 

materials that had been stored at the prison, a state court judge granted Plaintiff funds for 

 

2

 These materials include legal documents Plaintiff has filed with the courts; his 

legal notes and strategies; notes he took while meeting with his attorneys and other criminal defense personnel; law books, case law, scientific research materials, and notes 

he took after reading these items; transcripts, police reports, investigative reports, and medical and institutional records; correspondence between Plaintiff and his attorney and other criminal defense personnel; copies of attorney notes and printed e-mails; logs of correspondence and meetings with defense personnel; DVDs, VHS cassettes, and audio cassettes; draft affidavits; and other documents regarding his criminal defense. 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 9 of 19
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

a private storage facility. The order for funding for a private storage facility was directed 

to OPDS. 

 After a private storage facility was reserved, Plaintiff consented to Defendant 

McCloskey obtaining Plaintiff’s materials from the prison and delivering them to the 

storage facility. In February 2013, Defendants McCloskey and Hardy transferred the 

materials to the storage facility. Defendants McCloskey and Hardy and Plaintiff’s thenattorney were given access to the storage unit to get materials from the storage unit for 

Plaintiff and return them to the storage unit. 

 The state court subsequently determined that there was a conflict of interest 

between Plaintiff and his attorney and Plaintiff attempted to obtain his files3

 from the 

attorney and Defendants McCloskey and Hardy. Although the attorney gave Plaintiff’s 

family members files, an access code to the storage facility, and a key to open the lock on 

the storage unit, the attorney informed them that Defendant McCloskey had retained 

some of Plaintiff’s materials and had not returned them the attorney and that Defendant 

McCloskey also had a key to the storage unit. 

 On June 2, 2013, Plaintiff called Defendant McCloskey and left a message about 

arranging a meeting so Plaintiff’s family members could pick up the materials Defendant 

McCloskey had retained. Plaintiff spoke to Defendant McCloskey three days later and 

Defendant McCloskey stated that she was speaking on behalf of herself and Defendant 

Hardy and that they would not be returning any of the files or materials they had retained. 

Defendant McCloskey stated that she had spoken to Defendant Logan, whom she referred 

to as “Boss,” and that they had agreed that Plaintiff would need to obtain a court order to 

obtain the files and materials. Plaintiff also attempted to obtain the storage unit key from 

Defendant McCloskey. 

 Plaintiff filed a motion with the court seeking a return of the files and materials 

retained by Defendants McCloskey and Hardy, but neither Defendant filed a response to 

 

3

 Plaintiff states that the attorney, Defendant McCloskey, and Defendant Hardy were given files compiled by prior defense personnel and by Plaintiff, and also had 

documents and information that were being contemporaneously developed. 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 10 of 19
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

the motion. However, Defendant McCloskey spoke to Plaintiff by phone and informed 

him that she had spoken to Defendant Logan regarding the issue and they had agreed that 

Defendant Logan would take possession of the storage unit key and the contents of the 

storage unit. When Plaintiff attempted to dissuade Defendant McCloskey from doing 

this, she became upset, yelled that she was not going to do what Plaintiff had asked, 

stated that she was quitting the case, and yelled obscenities. 

 Plaintiff then contacted his sister, who made a three-way call to Defendant Logan. 

Defendant Logan confirmed that he was taking control of the key and the storage unit and 

that Plaintiff would need to obtain a court order to regain his materials. Plaintiff told 

Defendant Logan that it was Defendant Logan who needed court authorization to take 

Plaintiff’s materials. As an explanation for his actions, Defendant Logan blamed 

Plaintiff’s former attorney for not making proper arrangements for Plaintiff’s materials, 

asserted that he had the authority to determine to whom he would return the materials, 

and claimed that Plaintiff or anyone else was prohibited from entering the storage unit. 

However, records from the storage facility show that someone accessed the storage unit 

after the phone call. 

 Plaintiff filed a motion in the state court requesting that Defendant Logan return 

his materials, Defendant Logan received a copy of the motion but did not respond, and, 

due to the status of the case, the state court would not rule on the motion. Plaintiff sent 

an e-mail to Defendants McCloskey and Hardy requesting that they inventory the 

materials they had retained. Defendant McCloskey responded that she had given some of 

the materials to Hardy to place in the storage unit, but had retained some other materials. 

Defendant Hardy stated that she had none of Plaintiff’s materials because she had placed 

them in the storage unit. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Hardy knew Defendant Logan 

was intent on prohibiting Plaintiff from accessing the storage unit. Plaintiff also contends 

that Defendants McCloskey and Hardy subsequently “provide[d] contradictory 

statements and actions . . . and/or gained access to [the] storage unit.” 

. . . . 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 11 of 19
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

 Defendant Hardy contacted Plaintiff’s new attorney to provide some of the 

materials Defendant Hardy retained. Plaintiff sent notices of claim to each of the 

Defendants, but only Defendants McCloskey and Hardy replied. Defendants McCloskey 

and Hardy admitted that they had placed Plaintiff’s materials in the storage unit 

controlled by Defendant Logan and claimed to have no more of Plaintiff’s materials. 

Plaintiff contends their responses are misleading, contradict their earlier actions and 

responses to his requests, and do not identify when they last accessed the storage unit. 

 Plaintiff contends that he is the rightful owner of the materials, that Defendants 

McCloskey and Hardy were granted special access to his materials, and that, at the end of 

their employment with Plaintiff, abused their access by giving Plaintiff’s materials to the 

government and knowingly providing assistance to the government in seizing and 

controlling Plaintiff’s materials. Plaintiff claims Defendant Logan abused his 

governmental position to seize and control Plaintiff’s materials and that he and 

Defendants McCloskey and Hardy conspired or otherwise agreed to deprive Plaintiff of 

his materials. Plaintiff contends that Defendants Manos and Wilson failed to properly 

supervise Defendant Logan and ratified Defendant Logan’s actions because they refused 

to take corrective action after they became aware of his actions. 

 In his First Claim for Relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Logan, without legal 

authority, interfered with Plaintiff’s private affairs, in violation of the Fourth Amendment 

and article II, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution, by taking possession of Plaintiff’s 

materials, deciding what would happen to the materials and who could receive them, and 

usurping Plaintiff’s decision-making abilities regarding his private affairs. In his Second 

Claim for Relief, Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to an unconstitutional seizure in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment and article II, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution. 

Plaintiff claims that he cannot access his materials because Defendants seized his 

materials without a warrant or probable cause, that Defendants McCloskey and Hardy 

were engaged in joint action with government officials, and that Defendants have to legal 

right to retain the materials or keep them from Plaintiff. 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 12 of 19
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

 In his Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiff asserts that he was denied procedural due 

process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and article II, section 4 of 

the Arizona Constitution. Plaintiff contends Defendants failed to provide him with 

written notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before depriving him of his materials; there 

was no basis for postponing the hearing until after the deprivation had occurred; his 

possessory interests in his property were affected by their actions; and the procedures 

used by Defendants posed an unnecessary and high risk of erroneous deprivation. 

 In his Fourth Claim for Relief, Plaintiff alleges violations of his substantive due 

process rights. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Logan used his position to seize 

Plaintiff’s materials without an implicit, express, or governmental interest; conspired with 

Defendants McCloskey and Hardy to obtain a key to Plaintiff’s storage unit and assert 

ownership and control over the storage unit and the materials in it, knowing that the state 

court would not rule on any motion filed by Plaintiff; took advantage of Plaintiff’s low 

socioeconomic position; and acted oppressively, tyrannically, arbitrarily, and in a 

conscience-shocking manner. In his Fifth Claim for Relief, Plaintiff contends that he is 

entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. 

 Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Mano and Wilson ignored their fiduciary 

responsibilities, chose not to get involved, and, by their indifference, acquiesced to, 

condoned, and ratified Defendant Logan’s conduct. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant 

Maricopa County is liable because Defendants Manos and Wilson have the authority to 

set or terminate municipal plans and events and because Defendant Logan can 

appropriate County resources and create and enforce policy on behalf of Maricopa 

County. 

 In his Prayer for Relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary 

damages, his costs of suit, and pre- and post-judgment interest. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 13 of 19
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated claims against Defendants Maricopa 

County, Logan, McCloskey, and Hardy in his First, Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for 

Relief. The Court will require these Defendants to answer those claims. 

V. Failure to State a Claim

 A. Defendants Manos and Wilson 

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply 

conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of 

his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 Plaintiff contends that Defendants Manos and Wilson failed to properly supervise 

Defendant Logan and ratified Defendant Logan’s actions by refusing to take corrective 

action after they became aware of his actions. Plaintiff does not identify why Defendants 

Manos and Wilson were responsible for supervising Defendant Logan’s actions, how or 

when they failed to supervise Defendant Logan, how or when they became aware of his 

action, or how or when they refused to take corrective action. Because Plaintiff’s 

allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a claim against Defendants Manos and 

Wilson, the Court will dismiss them without prejudice. 

B. Fifth Claim for Relief

 Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim for Relief is a request for injunctive relief, not a separate 

ground for relief. Thus, the Court will dismiss it, without prejudice. If Plaintiff wants to 

seek a preliminary injunction, he should do so by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 65(a) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 14 of 19
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

VI. Motion to Seal and Rule 65(b) Motion

A. Motion to Seal

 In his Motion to Seal, Plaintiff requests that his Rule 65(b) Motion be filed “under 

seal/ex-parte” because it contains “confidential matters that are privileged” and that 

“sealing the motion is appropriate because the motion and attachments contain sensitive 

information in regards to the case.” The Court has reviewed the Rule 65(b) Motion and 

the attachments and finds that none of the information contained therein is privileged or 

sensitive information. 

 Ordinarily, if a request to file under seal is denied in full, the lodged document 

will not be filed and “the submitting party may, within five (5) days of the entry of the 

order denying the request, resubmit the document for filing in the public record.” LRCiv 

5.6(e). In an effort to move this case forward and because the Rule 65(b) Motion is 

deficient, the Court, it its discretion, will grant the Motion to Seal rather than require 

Plaintiff to refile a deficient motion that will ultimately be denied. Moreover, the Court 

finds no basis for filing this Order under seal because, in denying the Rule 65(b) Motion, 

the Court makes no reference to the contents of the Rule 65(b) Motion. 

B. Rule 65(b) Motion

 Whether to grant or deny a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary 

injunction is within the Court’s discretion. See Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 

1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1979). A temporary restraining order can be issued without 

notice 

only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint show 

that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to 

the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and

(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to 

give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) (emphasis added). See also LRCiv 65.1 (“Ex parte restraining 

orders shall only issue in accordance with Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 

. . . . 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 15 of 19
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

 Plaintiff has not shown that he will suffer irreparable injury before Defendants can 

be heard in opposition. Because the Rule 65(b) fails to comply with Rule 65(b)(1), the 

Court, in its discretion, will deny without prejudice the Rule 65(b) Motion. See LRCiv 

65.1. See also American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 321 (7th Cir. 1984) 

(district court abused its discretion in granting ex parte temporary restraining order 

“when there was no valid reason for proceeding ex parte and by disregarding the strict 

procedural requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) for the issuance of such ex parte

orders”); Adobe Systems, Inc. v. South Sun Products, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 636 (S.D. Cal. 

1999). 

VII. Rule 4(m) Motion for Extension of Time or Suspension of Time

 In his Rule 4(m) Motion, Plaintiff seeks an extension of time to serve the unserved Defendants until after the Court completes its statutory screening of the Amended 

Complaint. The Court will grant the Rule 4(m) Motion. This Order will direct the 

United States Marshal to serve Defendants McCloskey and Hardy and will provide 

Plaintiff with information regarding the service procedure.

VIII. Warnings

A. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

B. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 16 of 19
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

C. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal (Doc. 5) is granted. The Rule 65(b) Motion 

(Doc. 6) must be filed under seal. 

 (2) Plaintiff’s Rule 65(b) Motion is denied without prejudice. 

 (3) Plaintiff’s Objection to Removal (Doc. 9) and Notice of Supplemental 

Authority and Arguments in Support of Objection for Removal (Doc. 12) are denied. 

 (4) Plaintiff’s “Request for Entry of Judgment Re: Objection to Removal” 

(Doc. 10) is denied. 

 (5) Plaintiff’s “Notice of Non-Receipt of Responsive Pleading by Maricopa 

County Attorney; Request for Copy and Time to Reply” (Doc. 15) is denied as moot. 

 (6) Plaintiff’s Rule 12(f) Motion (Doc. 17) is denied. 

 (7) Plaintiff’s Rule 4(m) Motion for Extension of Time or Suspension of Time 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A Screening” (Doc. 20) is granted. 

 (8) Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim for Relief is dismissed without prejudice. 

 (9) Defendants Manos and Wilson are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (10) Defendants Maricopa County, Logan, McCloskey, and Hardy must answer 

Plaintiff’s First, Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for Relief. 

 (11) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 1-1 at 21-47), this Order, and both summons and request for 

waiver forms for Defendants McCloskey and Hardy.4

 

 

4

 Although an attorney has filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Defendant 

Hardy, it is not clear whether Defendant Hardy has been served or has waived service. 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 17 of 19
- 18 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

 (12) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (13) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Amended Complaint on Defendants McCloskey 

and Hardy within 120 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing 

of this Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not 

served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

 (14) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the 

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (15) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants McCloskey and Hardy 

of the commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the summons 

pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants 

must include a copy of this Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers 

of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as 

undeliverable or is not returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the 

request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Amended Complaint, and 

this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure; and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Amended Complaint, or this 

Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 

required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 18 of 19
- 19 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 

ordered by the Court. 

 (16) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and 

Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States 

Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

 (17) Defendants Maricopa County, Logan, McCloskey, and Hardy must answer 

the Amended Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time 

provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

 (18) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on 

whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or 

paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 

 (19) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 27th day of October, 2014.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

Case 2:14-cv-00941-SPL-MEA Document 25 Filed 10/27/14 Page 19 of 19