Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00512/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00512-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH DISCENZO, an individual,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 13-cv-512 BAS (MDD)

ORDER DENYING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT (ECF 14)

v.

HARDIN TRUCKING, a California 

Corporation,

Defendant.

On March 20, 2014, Defendant Hardin Trucking moved for partial summary 

judgment on Plaintiff Joseph Discenzo’s first, sixth, and seventh causes of action. 

After briefing on the motion completed, the Ninth Circuit settled an outstanding 

issue of law, clarifying that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act 

(“FAAAA”) did not preempt California state laws on rest periods and meal 

periods. Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 12-55705, 2014 WL 4401243 (9th Cir. 

Sept. 8, 2014).

Hardin’s motion for partial summary judgment seeks to strike Discenzo’s 

sixth and seventh claims for failure to provide meal periods and failure to provide 

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rest periods (respectively, both under California law) as preempted by the FAAAA. 

In light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dilts, Hardin’s motion for partial 

summary judgment as to these claims is DENIED.

DISCUSSION

Hardin also challenges Discenzo’s first cause of action for unpaid overtime 

wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). 29 U.S.C. § 207. Hardin 

argues that the Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”) exemption (29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1)) 

under the FLSA applies to Discenzo because Hardin is mainly involved in 

interstate commerce, and therefore Discenzo is exempted from the FLSA’s 

overtime wages provision. Discenzo argues that there are material facts showing he 

was engaged in intrastate commerce. 

A. Facts

Hardin Trucking regularly transports dry cargo throughout Southern 

California. ECF 14-1, 6:14–15. This includes Power-Sonic batteries manufactured 

in Mexico, plastic bags labeled for frozen hamburger patties manufactured in 

China, liquid Vitamin E manufactured in Chicago, and grain grown in Washington 

and Oregon. Id. at 3:19–4:15.

Discenzo is a former employee of Hardin Trucking. Discenzo never crossed 

state lines within the scope of his employment with Hardin Trucking. ECF 17,

3:19–21. He transported paper goods manufactured in Los Angeles and delivered 

them to San Diego, carried electronic recyclables and frozen gel packs within San 

Diego County, carried HAZMAT materials from Santa Fe Springs to Vista, carried 

medical plastics from Los Angeles County to San Diego, and conducted 

emergency deliveries. Id. at 4:1–24. 

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate on “all or any part” of a claim if there is 

an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

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477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“Celotex”). A fact is material when, under the 

governing substantive law, the fact could affect the outcome of the case. See 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Freeman v. 

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute about a material fact is 

genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. One of the principal purposes of 

Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323–24. 

The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “The burden then 

shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 

(9th Cir. 2006) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

“When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of 

proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a 

directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the 

moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue 

of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transportation Brokerage Co., 

Inc. v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoted by 

Miller, 454 F.3d at 987).

“In contrast, when the non-moving party bears the burden of proving the 

claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden by pointing out the absence 

of evidence from the non-moving party. The moving party need not disprove the 

other party's case.” Miller, 454 F.3d at 987 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). 

“Thus, ‘[s]ummary judgment for a defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff fails 

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential 

to[his] case, and on which [he] will bear the burden of proof at trial.’ ” Miller, 454 

F.3d at 987 (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 

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805–06 (1999) (internal quotations omitted)).

A genuine issue at trial cannot be based on disputes over “irrelevant or 

unnecessary facts[.]” See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Similarly, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of 

evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient.” Triton 

Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). The party opposing summary judgment must “by [his 

or her] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 

for trial.’ ” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 56(e)). That party

cannot “rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his or her] pleadings.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). 

The Court is not obligated “to scour the records in search of a genuine issue 

of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 

Richards v. Combined Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)). “[T]he district 

court may limit its review to the documents submitted for the purposes of summary 

judgment and those parts of the record specifically referenced therein.” Carmen v. 

San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).

When making its determination, the Court must view all inferences drawn

from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

“Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of 

legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] 

he [or she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255.

C. “Motor Carrier” Exemption

The FLSA requires employers engaged in interstate commerce to pay their 

employees overtime wages for work in excess of forty hours per week. See 29 

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U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). However, any employee over whom the Secretary of 

Transportation can exercise power under the MCA is exempted from this 

provision. Id. § 213(b)(1). This is designed to reduce jurisdictional conflicts. See 

Spires v. Ben Hill County, 980 F.2d 683, 686 (11th Cir.1993). 

FLSA exemptions are narrowly construed against the employer, applying 

only to those employees “plainly and unmistakably within [the] terms and spirit” 

of the exemption. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 396 (1960). The 

employer bears the burden of asserting the exemption. See id. at 394 n. 11.

Hardin’s evidence presented on summary judgment exclusively goes to the 

character of its business generally, not to Discenzo’s interstate actions within the 

scope of his employment. As such, Hardin fails to meet its burden. Accordingly, 

summary judgment is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 26, 2014

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