Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00240/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00240-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity - Legal Malpractice

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

LAND VENTURES FOR 2, LLC, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:12-CV-240-WKW

 ) [WO]

MICHAEL A. FRITZ, SR., et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Land Ventures for 2, LLC (“Land Ventures”), commenced this 

legal malpractice action against its former bankruptcy attorney, Michael Fritz, and 

his law firm (collectively, “Fritz”), invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction, see

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Chief Magistrate Judge Susan Russ Walker has been 

presiding over this action pursuant to the parties’ consent and a general order of the 

court regarding the primary assignment of a percentage of specified civil cases to 

the magistrate judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); In re: Assignment of “Regular 

Civil Cases” to United States Magistrate Judges, General Order No. 3156 (M.D. 

Ala. Aug. 29, 2003), as amended. But that consent and assignment do not stand on 

solid legal ground. As this opinion explains, because this malpractice action is 

“otherwise related to a case under title 11,” the authority to enter a final judgment 

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resides solely in “the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge’s 

proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to 

which any party has timely and specifically objected.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). 

Additionally, this court has in place a general order that precludes the referral and 

primary assignment of bankruptcy cases to the magistrate judges. See General 

Order 3156 (excluding bankruptcy cases from its provisions governing primary 

assignment of civil cases to the magistrate judge). For these reasons, which 

constitute good cause, the primary assignment of this matter to Judge Walker is

VACATED sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4).

1

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

When Land Ventures filed this malpractice action in March 2012, it was in 

the midst of a bankruptcy proceeding in this district. See In re Land Ventures for 

2, LLC, No. 10-30651 (M.D. Ala. Bankr. Mar. 16, 2010). Because the propriety of 

the primary assignment of this case to the magistrate judge and the parties’ ensuing 

consent to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge hinges upon whether the 

proceedings before this court are related to the bankruptcy proceeding, it is helpful 

 

1

Section 636 authorizes a full-time magistrate judge to conduct proceedings in civil 

matters, including entry of judgment, “when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by 

the district court” and upon the consent of the parties. § 636(c)(1). It further provides that “[t]he 

court may, for good cause shown on its own motion, . . . vacate a reference of a civil matter to a 

magistrate judge.” Id. § 636(c)(4).

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to begin with a summary of the pertinent procedural history in the bankruptcy 

proceeding.

A. The Bankruptcy Case

Michael A. Fritz, an attorney, filed a Chapter 11 voluntary petition on behalf 

of Land Ventures in March 2010.

2

 By September 2011, the attorney-client 

relationship had soured, however, and Mr. Fritz moved to withdraw as counsel. 

The day prior to moving to withdraw, Mr. Fritz also filed an application for 

attorney’s fees. (See B. Ct. Doc. # 234 (Fritz’s 8/31/11 application for 

compensation)). Mr. Windham T. Pittman – Land Ventures’ manager, 99% 

owner,

3

and an unsecured creditor of the estate – filed a pro se objection to Mr. 

Fritz’s application, contending that Mr. Fritz had “not progressed on this matter as 

a reasonable competent attorney would proceed,” and the bankruptcy judge

conducted a hearing on the application in November 2011. (B. Ct. Doc. # 308 

(Pittman’s 11/7/11 objection).)

A month after the hearing, Nicholas Wooten, Esq., filed a notice of 

appearance on behalf of Land Ventures in the bankruptcy case. (B. Ct. Doc. # 334 

(Wooten’s 12/16/11 notice of appearance).) On the same date, Mr. Wooten also 

 

2

The bankruptcy case was filed under Chapter 11, but later was converted into a Chapter 

7 liquidation proceeding. (B. Ct. Doc. # 180.)

3

See Exhibit 48 to Fritz’s summary judgment motion at 2 (Pittman’s testimony at the 

April 23, 2010 meeting of the creditors in the underlying bankruptcy case).

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filed a notice advising the bankruptcy court of a potential malpractice claim against 

Mr. Fritz and his firm and requested that the trustee abandon the claim. 

Ultimately, after learning of the debtor’s potential lawsuit against Mr. Fritz and his 

law firm for malpractice, the bankruptcy judge permitted Mr. Fritz to withdraw in 

December 2011.4 (B. Ct. Doc. # 345 (12/20/11 order granting Fritz’s motion to 

withdraw).)

Subsequently, on February 15, 2012, the trustee filed notice of her intent to 

abandon the malpractice claim. On March 15, 2012, the bankruptcy judge entered 

an order approving the trustee’s abandonment of the claim. On May 31, 2012,

concluding that “the attorneys for the debtor are entitled to a reasonable fee for 

their services,” the bankruptcy judge entered an order granting Mr. Fritz’s 

application and awarding fees in the amount of $16,272.00 and expenses in the 

amount of $3,255.22. (B. Ct. Doc. # 309 (11/8/11 order setting hearing); B. Ct. 

Doc. # 333 (transcript of 11/15/11 hearing); B. Ct. Doc. # 335 (Land Ventures’ 

12/16/11 notice of potential malpractice claim against Fritz and request for 

abandonment); B. Ct. Doc. # 338 (Fritz’s 12/19/11 motion to withdraw); B. Ct. 

Doc. # 355 (trustee’s notice of intent to abandon the malpractice claim against 

Fritz); B. Ct. Doc. # 360 (3/15/12 order approving trustee’s abandonment of 

 

4 On September 15, 2011, the bankruptcy judge had denied without prejudice Mr. Fritz’s 

earlier motion to withdraw, filed on September 1, 2011. (B. Ct. Docs. # 236, 256.) 

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malpractice claim); B. Ct. Doc. # 378 (5/31/12 order awarding fee).) Several 

months later, on September 13, 2012, Land Ventures successfully moved the 

bankruptcy court to vacate the order awarding fees to Mr. Fritz. (B. Ct. Docs. 

# 403–08). However, the fee already had been paid to Mr. Fritz, and the order of 

the bankruptcy court did not order disgorgement. 

In July 2013, the bankruptcy case was closed, and the trustee was 

discharged. (B. Ct. Doc. # 452.) The bankruptcy court retains the authority, 

however, to reopen the bankruptcy case to resolve the fee petition, if necessary. 

See 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (“A case may be reopened in the court in which such case 

was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.”); 

§ 554(d) (“Unless the court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not 

abandoned under this section and that is not administered in the case remains 

property of the estate.”).

B. The District Court Malpractice Action 

On March 15, 2012, the same date that the bankruptcy court had approved 

the trustee’s abandonment of the malpractice claim, Land Ventures commenced the 

present action in the district court as a regular civil case within the court’s diversity 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This action was assigned to Judge Walker 

pursuant to General Order No. 3156, which provides that the magistrate judges 

shall be given primary assignment of a specified percentage of regular civil cases. 

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The order defines “regular civil cases” as “civil cases which are not pro se or 

bankruptcy cases” and “primary assignment” as “presumptive assignment of a case 

to a Magistrate judge for all purposes including entry of judgment unless a party 

declines consent.” General Order No. 3156, at 2. Thereafter, the parties consented 

to have a magistrate judge conduct all proceedings including the trial and entry of 

judgment.

On July 25, 2012, which was during the pendency of the bankruptcy court’s 

short-lived Order awarding Mr. Fritz attorney’s fees, Mr. Fritz moved for summary 

judgment on the malpractice claim, arguing that the claim was “barred under the 

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel due [to] the final order issued by 

the bankruptcy court concerning the quality, nature and extent of the legal services 

provided by the Defendants to [Land Ventures].” (D. Ct. Doc. # 19, at 1; D. Ct. 

Doc. # 18.) The magistrate judge denied the summary judgment motion without 

prejudice based upon the pendency of Land Ventures’ pending motion in the 

bankruptcy court to vacate the order awarding Mr. Fritz attorney’s fees, and, as 

indicated above, the bankruptcy court ultimately granted Land Ventures’ motion 

and vacated the order awarding attorney’s fees. 

Land Ventures also sought an order from the magistrate judge withdrawing 

the reference of Mr. Fritz’s application for compensation from the bankruptcy 

court. Land Ventures argued that permissive withdrawal of the “admittedly core” 

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fee petition from the bankruptcy court was appropriate because it was “related to 

this attorney malpractice action.” Land Ventures contended that an order resolving 

Mr. Fritz’s fee petition “might affect the debtor’s rights in the . . . malpractice 

matter” and that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the malpractice 

action because it had been “abandoned by the Bankruptcy Estate.” (D. Ct. Doc.

# 26, at 1, 5; D. Ct. Doc. # 27.) On February 14, 2013, the magistrate judge denied 

the motion for permissive withdrawal and referred the malpractice action to the 

bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157 for pretrial proceedings, “including 

entry of any required orders and/or proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 

law, as appropriate.”5 (D. Ct. Doc. # 28.) The magistrate judge also directed the 

bankruptcy court to refrain from ruling on Mr. Fritz’s pending fee petition until the 

malpractice claim was resolved, noting that “disposition of the malpractice claims 

may inform the Bankruptcy Judge’s decision on the defendant’s pending 

application for compensation.” (D. Ct. Doc. # 28.) 

Discovery proceeded, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment. The bankruptcy court has entered a Recommendation on the pending 

motions for summary judgment, recommending that Mr. Fritz’s summary 

judgment motion be granted, that Land Ventures’ summary judgment motion be 

denied, and that this malpractice action be dismissed with prejudice. That 

 

5

In the bankruptcy court, the referred malpractice action was assigned Miscellaneous No. 

13-302. 

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Recommendation, to which Land Ventures objected, remains pending and will be 

addressed in a separate Order.

III. DISCUSSION

Part III addresses three issues. The first two issues – whether the 

malpractice action relates to the bankruptcy case and whether the district court 

must enter judgment in the malpractice action – reveal why the primary assignment 

of this malpractice action to the magistrate judge and the parties’ ensuing consent 

to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge cannot stand. The third issue addresses 

and confirms that the referral of this action to the bankruptcy court for a 

recommendation was proper. 

A. Whether the District Court Malpractice Action Relates to Title 11

The first issue is whether the malpractice action relates to a title 11 case. By 

statute, the court is authorized to refer to the bankruptcy judges for this district 

“any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or 

arising in or related to a case under title 11,” § 157(a), i.e., cases that fall within the 

original jurisdiction granted to the district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Consistent 

with the permission granted by § 157(a), the court has entered a general order

permitting referrals to the bankruptcy judges to the full extent permitted by the 

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statute. General Order of Reference, Bankruptcy Matters, No. M-32 (M.D. Ala. 

Apr. 25, 1985).6

Land Ventures commenced the present action in the district court as a 

regular civil case within this court’s diversity jurisdiction, apparently in reliance on 

the general rule that bankruptcy jurisdiction ceases to exist over property 

abandoned by the trustee.

7

This court initially must decide whether the trustee’s

abandonment of Land Ventures’ malpractice action means the malpractice action is 

not related to the bankruptcy case within the meaning of § 157(a). 

Upon the bankruptcy judge’s approval of the trustee’s abandonment of the 

malpractice claim, the estate relinquished its interest in the claim. See Old W.

Annuity & Life Ins. Co. v. Apollo Group, 605 F.3d 856, 863 (11th Cir. 2010)

(“When a bankruptcy trustee abandons estate property, the estate is completely 

 

6

The operative language of the general order is as follows:

[I]t is ORDERED, pursuant to the authority granted to this United States District 

Court by 28 U.S.C. 157(a), that all cases under title 11, United States Code, and 

all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 

11 shall be referred to the Bankruptcy Judges for this District.

It is further ORDERED that papers in all cases under title 11, United States Code, 

and all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under 

title 11 shall be filed with the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court for this District.

General Order of Reference, Bankruptcy Matters, No. M-32 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 25, 1985).

7

Land Ventures brought this action on the basis of diversity of citizenship, and the 

bankruptcy judge concluded in his pending Recommendation that diversity jurisdiction is proper. 

(D. Ct. Doc. # 1, 34-1). This court analyzes bankruptcy jurisdiction, not because it is necessary 

to sustain this court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, but to determine the applicability of 

the statutes and general orders governing referral to the bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges 

of this court.

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divested of any interest in the abandoned property.”); Martin v. Pahiakos (In re 

Martin), 490 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Trustee’s abandonment was 

a ministerial act pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code which divested the Trustee, and 

Martin’s estate, of any remaining interest in the state court litigation. However, 

this abandonment “in no way affected either the bankruptcy court’s order 

approving the settlement or the court’s jurisdiction to enforce that order.”

(emphasis omitted)). Generally, bankruptcy jurisdiction over estate property lapses 

upon its abandonment. An abandoned civil claim falls within an exception to the 

general rule, however, and remains “related to a case under title 11” and within the 

court’s bankruptcy jurisdiction if its disposition could affect the administration of 

the estate in bankruptcy. Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 

813 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1987). This is such a case. 

A civil proceeding is “related to” a case under title 11 if its outcome “‘could 

conceivably have an effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Miller 

v. Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 910 F.2d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 1990)

(quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984), overruled on 

other grounds by Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995)). In 

other words, “‘[a]n action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the 

debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or 

negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of 

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the bankrupt estate.’” Id. (quoting Pacor, Inc., 743 F.2d at 994). When Land 

Ventures commenced the present action in the district court, the action was at least 

“related to a case under title 11” within the meaning of the statute and the court’s 

general order of reference of bankruptcy matters. This is so – despite the court’s 

approval, several hours earlier, of the bankruptcy trustee’s abandonment of the 

malpractice claim – because Mr. Fritz’s fee petition remained pending. 

The bankruptcy code precludes the bankruptcy judge from awarding any 

compensation for “services that were not . . . reasonably likely to benefit the 

debtor’s estate,” 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A)(ii), and mandates that the bankruptcy 

judge consider the “nature, the extent, and the value” of Mr. Fritz’s professional 

services in determining “the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded,”

§ 330(a)(3); id. at subsection (3) (listing relevant factors). Evaluating the “nature” 

and “value” of the professional services rendered by Mr. Fritz implicates the 

quality of his legal representation. See Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery 

Co., 908 F.2d 874, 880 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating, in reviewing a fee award under 

§ 330(a), that, “[e]ven exceptional results do not warrant enhancement ‘unless 

there is specific evidence in the record to show that the quality of representation 

was superior to that which one would reasonably expect in view of the [rates] 

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claimed’”)8(quoting Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 

1292, 1302 (11th Cir. 1988)); Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302 (“[T]he reasonable 

hourly rate . . . should reflect the skill demonstrated by the advocate.”). 

Additionally, Mr. Pittman, an unsecured creditor and 99% owner of Land 

Ventures,

9

had objected to the payment of fees to Mr. Fritz by the estate, asserting 

that Mr. Fritz had not proceeded as a reasonably competent attorney would have 

proceeded. Whether Mr. Fritz committed malpractice in prosecuting the 

bankruptcy case as alleged in the instant complaint was put at issue before the 

bankruptcy judge by Mr. Pittman’s objection and by virtue of the bankruptcy 

judge’s independent statutory mandate under § 330(a)(3).10 The trustee’s 

abandonment of the malpractice claim did not relieve the bankruptcy judge of his 

statutory obligation to evaluate the nature and value of Mr. Fritz’s legal 

 

8 Grant was decided before the 1994 amendment to the statute; however, the statutory 

text then also required that fees be awarded “based on the nature, the extent, and the value of 

such services.” Grant, 908 F.2d at 878; Pub. L. 103-393, § 224(b) (revising § 330(a), effective 

Oct. 22, 1994). In Grant, the Eleventh Circuit held that reasonable compensation under § 330(a) 

is determined by the lodestar method, taking into account the factors identified in Johnson v. 

Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974). Grant, 908 F.2d at 877–

79. The 1994 amendment to § 330(a), in essence, codified a lodestar approach; it added a nonexclusive list of factors relevant in the bankruptcy context. See Pub. L. 103-393, § 224(b). The 

most recent amendment modified the list slightly. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3), as amended by Pub. L. 

109-8, effective Oct. 2005. 

9

See B. Ct. Doc. # 195, 369, 377; see also Exhibit 48 to Fritz’s motion for summary 

judgment (D. Ct. Doc. # 34-11, at 11.)

10 See D. Ct. Doc. # 34-4, Land Ventures’ brief in opposition to Fritz’s motion for 

summary judgment at 4 (“LV2’s challenges to the attorney fee applications of . . . Mr. Fritz again 

arose directly from Mr. Fritz’s malpractice. . . . If Mr. Fritz had not committed malpractice[,]

there would have been no objection to his fees by LV2.”).

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representation in resolving the application for compensation, a “core” matter that 

remained pending before him. When the malpractice complaint was filed, 

therefore, resolution of its claims conceivably could have affected distribution of 

the estate; a judgment in favor of Land Ventures on the malpractice claim may 

very well have precluded re-litigation of the “value” of Mr. Fritz’s professional 

services in his petition seeking the payment of fees from the estate, just as the 

bankruptcy judge’s order granting the application for fees – had it remained a final 

order – may have had preclusive effect on the malpractice claim.11 Accordingly,

the malpractice action was, at its inception, within this court’s bankruptcy 

jurisdiction as a case related to a case under title 11. 

Moreover, the malpractice claim continues to have a conceivable effect on 

the bankruptcy estate based upon the bankruptcy judge’s order vacating his earlier 

award to Fritz of compensation from the estate. Though Fritz had been paid by the 

trustee before the bankruptcy judge vacated his order authorizing such payment, 

the record of the hearing on the motion to set aside the fee award reveals that the 

bankruptcy court did not require Fritz to disgorge the previously awarded fees. 

 

11 Federal courts of appeals have found bankruptcy court orders granting fee petitions to 

preclude malpractice claims against court-approved professionals. See, e.g., Capitol Hill Group 

v. Pillsbury, Winthrop, Saw, Pittman, LLC, 569 F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Grausz v. Englander, 

321 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2003); Iannochino v. Rodolakis, 242 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2001); Southmark 

Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 163 F.3d 925 (5th Cir. 1999). In its motion filed in the district 

court after the bankruptcy judge vacated the order awarding fees, Land Ventures advanced the 

interrelatedness of the “admittedly core” fee petition and the present malpractice claim as 

grounds for permissive withdrawal of the reference (D. Ct. Docs. # 26, 27.) 

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The bankruptcy court advised the parties that it would leave the matter open for 

later determination pending resolution of the malpractice action. (Bankruptcy Case 

No. 10-30651, recording of 09/11/12 hearing at approximately 21:02–21:40 and 

26:40 - 27:10) (not transcribed).) Thus, once the bankruptcy court vacated its 

order, the fees paid previously to Fritz once again became property of the estate 

(albeit in the hands of Fritz), subject to further order of the court regarding its 

disposition. The bankruptcy court’s subsequent closing of the estate, approval of 

the trustee’s final report, and discharge of the trustee did not effect a transfer of 

this property to Fritz, in view of the prior orders of the court and the court’s ability 

to reopen the bankruptcy case to resolve the fee petition, if necessary. See 11 

U.S.C. §§ 350(b), 554(d). 

Through several conceptual avenues, the malpractice action relates to the 

bankruptcy.

B. Whether Judgment Must Be Entered by a District Judge

The second issue is whether the district court must enter judgment in the 

malpractice action. The short answer is “yes.”

The statute that authorizes referral of bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy 

court provides that “[a] bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core 

proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 157(c)(1). “[I]n such a proceeding,” however, “the bankruptcy judge shall 

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submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court.” Id.

“[A]ny final order or judgment shall be entered by the district judge after 

considering the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings and conclusions and after 

reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely and specifically 

objected.” Id.

As to § 157(c)(1)’s first requirement, there is some authority that an action 

against a court-appointed or court-approved professional for malfeasance in the 

course of the bankruptcy proceeding is a “core” proceeding within the court’s 

“arising in” jurisdiction. See Schultze v. Chandler, 765 F.3d 945, 948–49 (9th Cir. 

2014) (collecting cases). The abandoned malpractice claim, however, is no longer 

property of the estate, even though it is related to the application for attorney’s 

fees. The court concludes that the instant malpractice action is not a core 

proceeding for purposes of § 157. Cf. Cont’l Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Sanchez (In 

re Toledo), 170 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 1999) (observing that “engrafted upon 

all of [the proceedings listed as ‘core’ in § 157(b)] is an overarching requirement 

that property of the estate under § 541 be involved”). 

As to § 157(c)(1)’s second requirement, the court already has determined 

that the malpractice action is related to the title 11 bankruptcy proceeding, see 

supra Part III.A. Because § 157(c)’s requirements are satisfied and this court has 

not authorized its magistrate judges to enter final judgment in bankruptcy matters, 

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the district judge must enter judgment in the malpractice action. Cf. Minerex 

Erdoel, Inc. v. Sina, Inc., 838 F.2d 781,786 (5th Cir. 1988) (referral of a § 158 

appeal from a bankruptcy judge’s award of fees to debtor’s counsel to a United 

States magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and the consent of the parties held 

to be improper). Accordingly, the magistrate judge lacks authority to enter final 

judgment in this malpractice action, and the referral of this case to the magistrate 

judge as a primary assignment was erroneous.

C. Whether the Referral to the Bankruptcy Court Was Proper

The third issue is whether the referral of the malpractice action to 

bankruptcy court was proper. This case falls within the terms of the court’s 

general order of reference of bankruptcy matters. See General Order M-32, at 4. 

By filing its malpractice action in the district court in contravention of the court’s 

general order of referral, Land Ventures, in essence, had “withdrawn the reference” 

of the malpractice action on its own, without obtaining the approval of the district 

court. Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s subsequent referral of this action to the 

bankruptcy court was proper. 12

 

12 Because Land Ventures presented the complaint to the district court clerk with a civil 

cover sheet that did not identify the nature of the suit as a bankruptcy matter, the clerk assigned 

the case to a magistrate judge pursuant to the court’s general order governing assignment of 

“regular civil cases” to the magistrate judges. General Order No. 3156. If the malpractice 

complaint had been filed originally in the bankruptcy court, and the case thereafter had come 

before the district court on either the bankruptcy clerk’s transmittal of the bankruptcy judge’s 

recommendation pursuant to § 157(c)(1) or a petition to withdraw the reference, the clerk would 

not have identified the case or petition to withdraw for primary assignment to a magistrate judge. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for good cause, it is ORDERED that, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) and General Order No. 3156, the erroneous 

primary assignment of this matter to the magistrate judge is VACATED. 

It is further ORDERED that the orders previously entered by the magistrate 

judge are ADOPTED and AFFIRMED.

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to annotate the docket to reflect the 

primary assignment of this case to the undersigned district judge.

DONE this 9th day of October, 2015.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

See General Order No. 3156 (excluding bankruptcy cases from primary assignment to a 

magistrate judge). Hence, this case was assigned primarily to a magistrate judge under the 

court’s consent procedures based upon Land Ventures’ error in commencing the action in the 

district court, and, unfortunately, that error has continued unabated until now.

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