Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02309/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02309-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SHAVONDA HAWKINS, on behalf of 

herself and all others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

ADVANCEPIERRE FOODS, INC., 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 15-cv-2309-JAH (BLM)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. # 11) 

INTRODUCTION 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant AdvancePierre Foods, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff Shavonda Hawkins’ (“Plaintiff”) complaint. (See Doc. # 11). 

The motion has been fully briefed by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

BACKGROUND 

Defendant manufactures, distributes, and sells microwaveable sandwiches under the 

brand name Fast Bites. (Doc. # 1, ¶¶ 3, 10). Plaintiff is a consumer who has purchased Fast 

Bites microwaveable sandwiches “as many as a hundred times” since January 1, 2008. Id. 

¶¶ 11, 64, 94. On October 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit challenging 

Defendant’s use of partially hydrogenated oil (“PHO”) in its microwaveable sandwiches. 

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(See Doc. # 1). Plaintiff asserts that PHO is a source of artificial trans fat and that “there 

is ‘no safe level’ of PHO or artificial trans fat intake” because PHO and artificial trans fat 

cause inflammation, cardiovascular heart disease, diabetes, cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, and 

cognitive damage. Id. ¶¶ 4, 16, 17, 54. Plaintiff further asserts that there are safe, 

economical alternatives to PHO, which Defendant “unfairly” declines to use in its Fast Bites 

microwaveable sandwiches. Id. ¶ 7. As a result of purchasing and consuming Defendant’s 

microwavable sandwiches, Plaintiff contends that she suffered both pecuniary and physical 

injuries, and thus brought suit against Defendant. Id. ¶¶ 85, 86. 

In her complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) unlawful business practices in 

violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code 

§§ 17200, et seq. (“UCL”), (2) unfair business practices in violation of the UCL, (3) 

nuisance in violation of California Civil Code §§ 3479–93, and (4) breach of the implied 

warranty of merchantability. Id. at 23–27.1 Plaintiff asserts these claims individually and 

on behalf of a class of all individuals “who purchased in the United States, on or after 

January 1, 2008 . . . for household or personal use, microwavable sandwiches products [sic] 

manufactured or distributed by Defendant containing partially hydrogenated oil.” Id. ¶ 94. 

Plaintiff’s claims are based solely on Defendant’s use of PHO; Plaintiff does not assert that 

the Fast Bite sandwiches were mislabeled. Id. ¶ 89. 

On November 6, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, 

arguing that Plaintiff failed to properly allege any of her claims and that Plaintiff’s claims 

are preempted by federal law. (See Doc. # 11). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss on January 18, 2016, and Defendant filed a reply in support 

of its motion to dismiss on January 25, 2016. (See Docs. # 12, 14). The Court then took 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss under submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. (See 

Doc. # 13). 

 

1 Page numbers cited refer to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s Electronic Court 

Filing system.

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On March 11, 2016, Defendant filed a notice of supplemental authority in support 

of its motion to dismiss providing the Court with an opinion recently issued in a putative 

class action case entitled Backus v. Nestle USA, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 

2016), in which the plaintiff asserted similar claims against a food manufacturer based on 

the manufacturer’s use of PHO in its products. (See Doc. # 15).2 On April 28, 2016, 

Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for leave to file a surreply in opposition to Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss, which Defendant opposed. (See Docs. # 16, 17). This Court granted 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a surreply on May 11, 2016, and Plaintiff filed her 

surreply that same day. (See Docs. # 18, 19). On October 7, 2016, Defendant filed a second 

notice of supplemental authority providing the Court with an opinion from another case 

involving similar claims entitled Backus v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 16–0454 WHA, 

2016 WL 3844331 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016).3 (See Doc. # 20). 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to 

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. Dismissal is warranted under Rule 

12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts 

to support a cognizable legal theory. Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013). “To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A 

claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. In other words, “the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable 

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff 

 

2 Defendant provided this Court with a copy of the relevant opinion printed from 

LexisNexis. However, the Court refers to the opinion’s citation as assigned in the Federal 

Supplement. 

3

 Defendant again provided this Court with a copy of the relevant opinion printed from 

LexisNexis, but the Court refers to the opinion’s Westlaw citation.

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to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . 

be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must assume the truth 

of all factual allegations and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are “cast in the 

form of factual allegations.” Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The court may 

consider facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents 

relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and 

matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

688–89 (9th Cir. 2001). If a court determines that a complaint fails to state a claim, the 

court should grant leave to amend unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts. Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 

1995). 

DISCUSSION 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to state 

any claims and because Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by federal law. The Court will first 

address the federal regulations on the use of PHO in human food. Then, the Court will 

address whether federal law provides a basis for Plaintiff’s UCL claims and whether 

Plaintiff’s state claims are preempted by federal law. 

A. The Federal Regulatory Scheme on PHO 

In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act, “which was the first 

comprehensive federal legislation designed to protect consumers from fraud or 

misrepresentation in the sale of food and drugs.” Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc., No. CV 

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10–00927 MMM (AJWx), 2011 WL 1045555, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011) (citing 

JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 3:1–13 (3d ed. 2009)). Then, in 

1938, Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) as successor 

legislation. See Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, 52 Stat. 1040 

(1938). The FDCA established the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) within the 

Department of Health and Human Services and empowered the FDA to protect public 

health by regulating food safety and labeling. 21 U.S.C. § 393. Specifically, the FDCA 

requires the FDA to (i) ensure that “foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly 

labeled,” (ii) promulgate regulations to enforce the provisions of the FDCA, and (iii) enforce 

its regulations through administrative proceedings. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 371, 393(b)(2)(A); 21 

C.F.R. § 7.1 et seq. 

The FDCA also prohibits “[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into 

interstate commerce of any food . . . that is adulterated.” 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). A food is 

adulterated “if it . . . contains . . . any food additive that is unsafe within the meaning of” 

21 U.S.C. § 348.4 Id. § 342(a)(2)(C)(i). In relevant part, a food additive is deemed unsafe 

unless there is “a regulation issued . . . prescribing the conditions under which such additive 

may be safely used,” and the additive is used in conformity with the regulation. Id. § 

348(a)(2). In addition, the FDCA explicitly exempts from the definition of “food additive” 

foods that are “generally recognized . . . as having been adequately shown through scientific 

procedures (or, in the case of a substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through 

either scientific procedures or experience based on common use in food) to be safe . . . .” 

Id. § 321(s). This status is referred to as “Generally Recognized as Safe” or “GRAS.” 21 

C.F.R. § 170.30. Substances that are GRAS may be used in food without FDA approval or 

review. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s), 348(b).The FDA maintains a non-exhaustive list of foods that 

 

4

 A food additive is “any substance the intended use of which results . . . in its becoming a 

component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food . . . if such substance is not 

generally recognized, among experts qualified . . . to evaluate its safety . . . to be safe under 

the conditions of its intended use.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(s). 

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have been deemed GRAS. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(d). PHOs are not on this list. See 21 C.F.R. 

Part 184.4. 

On June 17, 2015, the FDA issued a final determination on the use of PHO in food 

(“Final Determination”). See Final Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 

80 Fed. Reg. 34650 (June 17, 2015). In the Final Determination, the FDA recognized that 

common PHOs “have been considered GRAS by the food industry based on a history of 

use prior to 1958,” while other PHOs have been deemed GRAS. Id. at 34651. However, 

the FDA announced that based on current scientific evidence “there is no longer a consensus 

that PHOs . . . are [GRAS] for use in human food. . . .” Id. at 34669. The FDA set June 18, 

2018, as a compliance date by which time food producers must have removed PHO from 

their food products or petitioned for and received approval to use PHO in their products. 

Id. at 34668. By selecting a compliance date three years in the future, the FDA expressed 

an intention to “minimiz[e] market disruptions by providing industry sufficient time to 

identify suitable replacement ingredients for PHOs, to exhaust existing product inventories, 

and to reformulate . . . affected products.” Id. at 34669. 

Several months later, on December 18, 2015, the President signed into law the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 (“2016 CAA”). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, § 754, 129 Stat. 2242, 2284 (2015). Section 754 of the 2016 

CAA, which discusses the use of PHO in food and the FDA’s Final Determination, states 

as follows: 

No partially hydrogenated oils as defined in the [Final 

Determination] shall be deemed unsafe . . . and no food that is 

introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate 

commerce that bears or contains a partially hydrogenated oil 

shall be deemed adulterated . . . by virtue of bearing or 

containing a partially hydrogenated oil until the compliance date 

as specified in such order (June 18, 2018). 

Id. 

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B. Federal Law Does Not Provide a Basis for Plaintiff’s Claim under the Unlawful 

Prong of Section 17200 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the unlawful prong of section 17200 of the 

UCL, in part, by using PHO in its microwavable sandwiches. (See Doc. # 1, pg. 23–24). 

Section 17200 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” CAL.

BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. Under the unlawful prong of section 17200, violations of 

other laws are treated as unlawful practices that are independently actionable under the 

UCL. See Goldman v. Standard Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff 

argues that Defendant has violated numerous sections of the FDCA by using PHO in its 

microwavable sandwiches, and has thus violated the unlawful prong of section 17200. (See 

Doc. # 1, pg. 23–24). However, as explained below, the Court finds that the current use of 

PHO in food products does not violate federal law. Therefore, federal law cannot serve as a 

basis for Plaintiff’s claim for violation of the unlawful prong of section 17200. 

By choosing June 18, 2018, as the compliance date, the FDA makes evident in the 

Final Determination that it is not currently unlawful to use PHO in food products. Final 

Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650, 34668 (June 

17, 2015). If the FDA intended to make illegal the current use of PHO in food, it is 

reasonable to expect that the Final Determination would have contained language to that 

effect. Instead, the Final Determination states that, by offering three years’ advanced notice 

of the compliance date, the FDA intended, in part, to allow affected parties to “exhaust 

existing product inventories.” Id. at 34669. Thus, the Final Determination specifically 

contemplates and allows for the continued sale of food products that may contain PHO 

until June 18, 2018. 

Further, the 2016 CAA explicitly says that foods shall not be considered adulterated 

based on their PHO content and PHOs shall not be deemed unsafe under the FDCA until 

June 18, 2018. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, § 754, 

129 Stat. 2242, 2284 (2015). This is a clear step by Congress to preclude parties, like 

Plaintiff, from bringing suit against food manufacturers based on use of PHO before the 

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compliance date, or, as another court explained it, section 754 is “essentially [Congress’s] 

ratif[ication] [of] the FDA’s Final Determination.” See Backus v. Nestle USA, Inc., 167 F. 

Supp. 3d 1068, 1073–74 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 

Finally, other courts have held that the current use of PHO in food products neither 

violates federal law nor provides a basis for a claim of unlawful business practices under 

section 17200. See Backus v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d 909, 926–28 (N.D. Cal. 

2015) (finding that the use of PHO in food products is not currently unlawful under federal 

law such that federal law “cannot serve as the basis for [the plaintiff’s] ‘unlawful’ UCL 

claim”); Backus v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 16–0454 WHA, 2016 WL 3844331, at *2–

3 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) (examining federal regulations on the use of PHO and holding 

that the plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that the sale of food products containing PHO 

violates federal law, so federal law could not serve as the basis for his “unlawful” section 

17200 claim). 

In similar fashion, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that 

Defendant violated federal law by manufacturing and selling microwavable sandwiches that 

contain PHO. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for violation of the unlawful prong of section 

17200 of the UCL fails to the extent it is premised on alleged violations of federal law. 

C. Plaintiff’s State Claims Are Preempted 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims attempt to “make it immediately unlawful 

to market or sell” in the United States any food product containing trans fat. (Doc. # 11-

1, pg. 32). In doing so, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s claims directly conflict with federal 

regulations and are thus preempted. (Doc. # 11-1, pg. 32–33; Doc. # 14, pg. 7–9). 

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s claims conflict with the FDA’s regulatory scheme that 

allows for the production and sale of foods containing PHO through June 18, 2018. (Doc. 

# 11-1, pg. 32–33; Doc. # 14, pg. 7–8). Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s claims 

contravene the FDA’s goal in providing three years’ notice of the compliance period so as 

to minimize market disruptions and allow existing food inventories to be used up. (Doc. # 

14, pg. 7–8). Defendant also notes that since it filed its motion to dismiss Congress passed 

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and the President signed into law the 2016 CAA. (Doc. # 14, pg. 6) (citing Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, § 754, 129 Stat. 2242, 2284 (2015)). 

Defendant argues that section 754 of the 2016 CAA expressly preempts Plaintiff’s UCL 

claims and impliedly preempts all of Plaintiff’s state claims because “making it immediately 

unlawful to sell any food products containing trans fat” would contravene Congress’s 

intention in enacting section 754, which was to thwart frivolous lawsuits until 2018. (Doc. 

# 14, pg. 8–9). 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that her claims are not preempted by federal law. 

Plaintiff contends that her claims are not expressly or impliedly preempted by the FDA’s 

regulatory scheme on PHO because, although the FDA set the compliance date relating to 

PHO usage as June 18, 2018, the FDA nonetheless stated in the Final Determination that 

PHOs are not GRAS and did not expressly permit food manufacturers to use PHO in their 

food products until the compliance date. (Doc. # 12, pg. 30–32). Put another way, Plaintiff 

asserts that the FDA’s Final Determination did not declare that PHOs are considered safe 

until 2018; rather, the Final Determination just set forth the date the FDA would begin 

enforcing a prohibition on use of PHO in food. (Doc. # 19, pg. 2–4). Therefore, Plaintiff 

contends that the “[r]emoval of PHOs does not conflict with the FDA’s determination,” 

and her claims are not preempted. (Doc. # 12, pg. 32). Plaintiff also argues that her claims 

are not preempted by the 2016 CAA. (Doc. # 19, pg. 2–4). Plaintiff contends that states 

have “plenary control” over the regulation of food, and the 2016 CAA does not alter that 

right. Id. at 2. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the 2016 CAA does not create a safe harbor 

because it does not expressly permit the use of PHO. Id. at 5. 

In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff erroneously stated that the FDA declared 

PHOs unsafe in the Final Determination when, in fact, the Final Determination said only 

that “there is no longer a consensus” that PHOs are GRAS. (Doc. # 14, pg. 7). Defendant 

again reasserts that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted under federal law. Id. at 7–9. 

Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal law can 

preempt and displace state law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Ting v. AT & T, 319 F.3d 

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1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). There are three types of preemption: (1) express preemption,5

(2) field preemption,6 and (3) conflict preemption. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1135 (citations 

omitted); see also Bank of America v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 

558 (9th Cir. 2002). The latter two types of preemption are often referred to as implied 

preemption. See Bank of America, 309 F.3d at 558; Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 

918 (9th Cir. 2011); Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 775 (9th Cir. 2008). This case 

presents a question of conflict preemption, specifically whether Plaintiff’s state claims are 

barred under that doctrine. 

“Conflict preemption is found where ‘compliance with both federal and state 

regulations is a physical impossibility,’ or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Ting, 319 

F.3d at 1136 (citations omitted). When considering whether a state claim is barred by 

conflict preemption, the Court focuses on Congress’s purpose and the goals and policies of 

the federal law. Id. Additionally, there is a presumption against preemption when the 

inquiry involves a field that “has been traditionally occupied by the States.” De Buono v. 

NYSA–ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 (1997) (quotations and 

citations omitted); see also Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 

546 F.3d 639, 647 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Because the regulation of health and safety is a field traditionally occupied by states, 

the presumption against preemption applies. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 

475 (1996) (regulation of health and safety matters is a field traditionally occupied by 

states); accord Chem. Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Nonetheless, the Court finds the presumption overcome and Plaintiff’s state law claims 

barred under the doctrine of conflict preemption. 

 

5

 A state law is expressly preempted when “Congress enacts an explicit statutory command 

that state law be displaced.” Ting v. AT & T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). 

6

 “Field preemption exists ‘where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently 

comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for 

supplementary state regulation.’” Id. at 1136 (citations omitted). 

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All of Plaintiff’s state claims are premised on Defendant’s use of PHO in its 

microwavable sandwiches. As Defendant aptly explains, Plaintiff’s claims are an attempt to 

make it “immediately unlawful” under California law to market or sell any food product 

that contains PHO. (Doc. # 11-1, pg. 32). However, the FDA considered and rejected 

recommendations that the Final Determination should be effective immediately. Final 

Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650, 34668 (June 

17, 2015). Instead, the FDA selected a compliance date three years in the future so affected 

parties could petition for and receive approval from the FDA to use PHO in their products, 

or exhaust current inventory of food products that may contain PHO and create new 

products sans PHO. Id. at 34668–69. By providing advance notice of the compliance date, 

the FDA hoped to minimize market disruptions. Id. Here, allowing Plaintiff’s remaining 

state claims to go forward would contravene the FDA’s regulatory scheme on the current 

use of PHO in food products and directly impede the goals and objectives of that scheme. 

It would seriously disrupt the market by causing food manufacturers to immediately throw 

out all existing products containing PHO without affording manufacturers time to 

reformulate the products, find alternative ingredients to PHO, and manufacture the 

revamped products. These are consequences that the FDA explicitly sought to avoid. 

Additionally, allowing Plaintiff to proceed on her state claims would contravene 

Congress’s purpose in passing section 754 of the 2016 CAA, which was to prevent economic 

disruption and preclude lawsuits against food producers based on PHO content until the 

compliance date set forth in the Final Determination. This purpose is demonstrated in 

legislative overviews of the 2016 CAA, which state that section 754 was drafted in response 

to concerns of market interference and is meant to prevent “frivolous lawsuits.”7

 The Court 

 

7

 See H.R. REP. NO. 114–205, at 71 (2015) (stating concerns of “economic disruption in 

the marketplace and . . . unnecessary litigation” surrounding the use of PHO in food in light 

of the Final Determination); FY 2016 Omnibus Summary – Agriculture Appropriations, 

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, available at

http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/12.15.15_fy_2016_omnibus_-_agriculture_-

_summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (stating that “[t]he legislation includes several 

policy provisions, including . . . [a] provision to amend FDA policy relating to the regulatory 

treatment of partially hydrogenated oils so that the baking industries and small businesses 

are not subject to frivolous lawsuits”); see also Legislative Digest, Dec. 18, 2015, 

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finds that Plaintiff’s current action is one of the frivolous suits that Congress meant to 

preclude until 2018. 

Because Plaintiff’s claims stand as a direct obstacle to the FDA’s objective to 

minimize market disruptions by providing three years’ notice of the compliance date on use 

of PHO in food and Congress’s objective to bolster the FDA’s Final Determination through 

the passage of section 754 of the 2016 CAA, Plaintiff’s remaining state claims are barred 

by conflict preemption. In making this determination, the Court joins with other courts 

which have dismissed nearly identical claims based on preemption. See Backus v. Nestle 

USA, Inc.,167 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1071–74, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding that the 

plaintiff’s state law claims, premised on defendant’s use of PHO in its food product, were 

preempted by the Final Determination and the 2016 CAA, and dismissing the claims 

without leave to amend); accord Backus v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. C 16–0454 WHA, 

2016 WL 3844331, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016). 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND. 

Dated: November 8, 2016 

______________________________ 

 JOHN A. HOUSTON 

 United States District Judge 

 

REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE, available at https://policy.house.gov/legislative/legislativedigest/friday-december-18-2015 (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (stating that “the omnibus . . . 

amends an FDA policy relating to the regulatory treatment of partially hydrogenated oils 

to prevent frivolous lawsuits”). 

Case 3:15-cv-02309-JAH-BLM Document 22 Filed 11/08/16 Page 12 of 12