Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-04732/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-04732-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

POUNCE CONSULTING, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-04732-PJH 

ORDER

Re: Dkt. 229

Plaintiff Cadence Design Systems, Inc.’s (“Cadence”) motion to amend judgment 

to add Roger Viera as a judgment debtor came on for hearing before this court on July 

17, 2019. Plaintiff appeared through its counsel, Guy Ruttenberg and Michael 

Eshaghian. Both defendants, Pounce Consulting, Inc. (“Pounce USA”) and Pounce 

Consulting, S.A. de C.V. (“Pounce Mexico” or “Pounce SA,” collectively “Pounce”), are in 

default and did not appear. Roger Viera appeared through his counsel, Tammy Lund. 

Having read the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their arguments and 

the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

As with its previous order, the court declines to recite this action’s tortured 

procedural history. The court finds it sufficient to note that after nearly two years of onand-off again participation, the court entered both defendants’ default for failing to retain 

substitute counsel. On April 22, 2019, the court adopted Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim’s

recommendations that this court grant default judgment against both defendants and find 

that Pounce USA is an alter ego of Pounce Mexico. See Dkts. 205, 218, 219. Three 

days later, the court entered final judgment, awarding plaintiff $6,983,178.29 for 

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defendants’ breach of contract, copyright infringement, and circumvention of copyright 

protections. Dkt. 221 at 2-3. A subsequent order awarded plaintiff about $2.1 million in 

attorneys’ fees and costs. Dkt. 242. 

The Pounce defendants have not voluntarily paid any of those amounts, which has 

forced plaintiff to engage in post-judgment litigation to secure payment. Presumably as 

part of that attempt, on May 29, 2019, plaintiff filed the present motion to amend the

judgment to add Viera as a judgment debtor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

69(a) and California Code of Civil Procedure § 187. That motion argues that Viera was 

not only the named CEO of Pounce Mexico and the named CFO of Pounce USA at times 

relevant to this litigation, but in fact was the alter ego of both companies and controlled 

the Pounce entities’ conduct in this litigation. On June 26, 2019, Viera filed an opposition 

and plaintiff subsequently filed a timely reply. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Rule 69(a) provides that “[t]he procedure on execution—and in proceedings 

supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the procedure of 

the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” 

The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Rule 69(a) as “empower[ing] federal courts to rely on 

state law to add judgment-debtors[.]” In re Levander, 180 F.3d 1114, 1120–21 (9th Cir.

1999).

Here, the applicable state law is § 187 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 

“Under section 187, the court has the authority to amend a judgment to add additional 

judgment debtors.” See NEC Elecs. v. Hurt, 208 Cal. App. 3d 772, 778 (1989) (“NEC”).

“This is an equitable procedure based on the theory that the court is not amending the 

judgment to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of the real 

defendant.” Id. The doctrine “does not guard every unsatisfied creditor of a corporation 

but instead affords protection where some conduct amounting to bad faith makes it 

inequitable for the corporate owner to hide behind the corporate form. Difficulty in 

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enforcing a judgment or collecting a debt does not satisfy this standard.” Sonora 

Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 539 (2000); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 

Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2017) (same).

“A § 187 amendment requires (1) that the new party be the alter ego of the old 

party and (2) that the new party had controlled the litigation, thereby having had the 

opportunity to litigate, in order to satisfy due process concerns.” Katzir's Floor & Home 

Design, Inc. v. M-MLS.com, 394 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 

marks omitted; emphasis in original) (henceforth, “Katzir”); Toho–Towa Co., Ltd. v. 

Morgan Creek Prods., Inc., 217 Cal. App. 4th 1096, 1106 (2013) (same); NEC, 208 Cal. 

App. 3d at 778-79 (same). The judgment creditor bears the burden of satisfying both 

requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. Wollersheim v. Church of 

Scientology, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1012, 1018 (1999); Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc. v. Mungchi, 

Inc., No. CV 16-00663-GHK, 2018 WL 6267823, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2018).

B. Analysis

1. Whether Due Process Prohibits a § 187 Amendment of a Default 

Judgment. 

Viera first argues that § 187’s amendment procedure does not apply to default 

judgments. That argument, if correct, would short circuit plaintiff’s present motion. Nor is 

it a position that lacks support. Indeed, a leading authority on California civil procedure 

states that “because of due process concerns, a default judgment is not subject to . . . 

amendment” pursuant to § 187. Rutter Group, Amending Judgment to Add Nonparty 

Alter Egos as Judgment Debtors, Cal. Prac. Guide Enf. J. & Debt Ch. 6G-15 (2019) (the 

“Rutter Guide”); see also Lloyd v. Martinez, No. E057370, 2014 WL 5162226, at *3 (Cal. 

Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014) (unpublished) (“ ‘When a judgment is by default, the defendant 

did not have an opportunity to present a defense and amending the judgment would 

violate due process.’ ” (quoting 3 Cal. Trial Practice: Civil Procedure During Trial (Cont. 

Ed. Bar 3d ed. 2014) Judgments, § 23.31 at 23–30.)). In support, the Rutter Guide cites 

what appear to be the three seminal California cases on the topic: Motores De Mexicali, 

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S. A. v. Superior Court In & For Los Angeles Cty., 51 Cal. 2d 172, 173 (1958); NEC, 208 

Cal. App. 3d at 775–781; and Wolf Metals Inc. v. Rand Pac. Sales, Inc., 4 Cal. App. 5th 

698 (2016). 

This court, however, concludes that those cases do “not stand for the broad 

proposition that piercing the corporate veil to enforce a default judgment is a per se 

violation of due process.” Ermis Mgmt. Co. Ltd. v. United California Disc. Corp., 2008 WL 

11450869, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 2, 2008) (reaching the same conclusion with respect to 

Ninth Circuit precedent). And, as explained below, the Ninth Circuit appears to agree. 

In Motores, the California Supreme Court first recognized the due process 

concerns implicated by § 187. There, after suing a corporation and obtaining a default 

judgment, plaintiff sought to add three individuals as judgment debtors on an alter ego 

theory. Motores, 51 Cal. 2d at 173. The California Supreme Court held that adding the 

alleged debtors to a default judgment would violate their due process rights. Id. at 176. 

In reaching that conclusion, Motores distinguished two prior California appellate court 

opinions, by explaining that, unlike in those cases, the proposed judgment debtors in 

Motores “in no way participated in the defense of the basic action[.]” Id. at 175. The 

proposed judgment debtors “did not have attorneys subsidized by them appearing and 

defending the action against the corporation [ ] alleged to be their alter ego. Instead, the 

judgment was entered against [the corporation] strictly by default.” Id. at 175-76. 

Motores explained that due process “guarantees that any person against whom a claim is 

asserted in a judicial proceeding shall have the opportunity to be heard and to present his 

defenses.” Id.. “To summarily add” the proposed debtors “to the judgment . . . without 

allowing them to litigate any questions beyond their relation to the allegedly alter ego 

corporation would patently violate this constitutional safeguard.” Id. at 176. Nor were the 

proposed judgment debtors under any “duty to appear and defend personally in that 

action, since no claim had been made against them personally.” Id.1 

 

1 The California Supreme Court reached that conclusion without engaging with plaintiff’s 

allegation that the proposed judgment debtors “knew that their financial manipulations 

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Thirty years later, in NEC, a California appellate court applied Motores to a 

situation where the corporate defendant failed to present a defense at trial. NEC, 208 

Cal. App. 3d at 775-81. After appearing and filing a general denial—and without any 

other proceedings being conducted—the day before trial, the corporate defendant’s CEO 

and sole shareholder notified the plaintiff that the corporation would not appear, 

apparently in light of a potential bankruptcy. Id. at 775, 781. The court subsequently 

entered judgment after holding a one-day trial, for which defendant did not appear. Id. at 

775–76. Thereafter, the court granted the plaintiff’s § 187 motion to add the corporation’s 

CEO to the judgment. Id. at 776. 

Relying on Motores, the California Court of Appeals reversed. NEC explained that

because the corporation “did not make any attempt to defend the NEC lawsuit . . . [the 

CEO’s] interests were [not] represented in the underlying action.” Id. at 780. NEC, 

however, did not stop there. Rather, NEC next turned to whether the corporate 

defendant’s interests aligned with the proposed judgment debtor’s interest. Id. at 780. 

The NEC court answered that question in the negative. Though the corporate defendant 

believed it had a defense, it let the matter proceed uncontested because it planned to file 

a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and thus had no incentive to defend against the lawsuit. 

Id. In contrast, and unlike the usual situation where alter ego interests align, the CEO 

“was not named as a party, had no risk of personal liability and therefore was not 

required to intervene.” Id. at 780–81. Because the interests of the corporation and the 

CEO were different, the appellate court could not “say that [the CEO] had occasion to 

conduct the litigation with a diligence corresponding to the risk of personal liability that 

was involved or that [the CEO] was virtually represented in the lawsuit.” Id. at 781. Like 

Motores, NEC completed its analysis by considering whether there was sufficient 

“evidence to show that [the CEO] controlled the defense of the litigation.” Id. at 781. The 

 

would ultimately lead the [the corporate judgment debtor] into bankruptcy.” Motores, 51 

Cal. 2d at 174. 

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court held that that factor too was not met because “[t]here was no defense for [the 

proposed judgment debtor] to control,” as other than a “general denial, no further 

proceedings were conducted.” Id. (control contemplates “some active defense of the 

underlying claim”).

Admittedly, Wolf Metals, the final case cited by the Rutter Guide, gets closest to 

stating a per se rule against amending default judgments. In Wolf Metal, after initially 

appearing and answering the complaint, the corporate defendant abandoned the 

litigation, which prompted the trial court to strike the corporation’s answer and enter 

default judgment. Wolf Metals, 4 Cal. App. 5th at 701-02. Subsequently, the trial court 

granted plaintiff’s § 187 motion to amend judgment to add the corporation’s president. Id.

702. Reviewing the holdings in NEC and Motores, the Wolf Metals appellate court 

reversed. The court held that the action was factually indistinguishable from Motores: 

“Like the defendant corporation in Motores, [the corporate defendant] offered no 

evidence-based defense in the underlying action, and the judgment against [the 

corporation] was entered by default.” Id. 

But neither Motores nor NEC stand for the conclusion that § 187 does not apply to 

judgments entered after a defendant fails to present an “evidence-based defense.” 

Rather, Motores and NEC require courts to consider whether the proposed judgment 

debtor’s interest aligned with the named debtor’s interest, and whether the type of and 

degree of control the proposed judgment debtor exerted over the named debtor 

ameliorates any due process concerns. Critically, that analysis does not require active 

litigation or an “evidence-based defense.” Instead, what matters is whether the proposed 

judgment debtor had “the opportunity to be heard and to present his defenses.” Motores, 

51 Cal. 2d at 176 (emphasis added). Requiring that defenses actually be presented

“would create a perverse incentive for potential alter ego defendants to incur default 

judgments when their corporations are sued, because default judgments would make 

them immune from personal liability.” Ermis, 2008 WL 11450869, at *4 (rejecting 

conclusion that there is a per se rule against § 187 amendments to default judgments). 

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And requiring that the corporate defendant actually present defenses related to its 

officers’ personal liability—the natural extension of the argument—would aggravate those 

perverse incentives. 

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has implicitly recognized that the normal § 187 

analysis applies to attempts to amend a default judgment. In Katzir, the Ninth Circuit 

reversed a district court’s order adding the owner, “sole director, president, treasurer, and 

secretary of the corporation” to a default judgment under Cal. Civ. Code § 187. Katzir, 

394 F.3d at 1148-50. Reviewing Motores and NEC, Katzir concluded that NEC

“represents the law that the California Supreme Court would apply if faced with th[e]

issue of” whether the proposed judgment debtor exercised sufficient control. Katzir, 394 

F.3d at 1150. Katzir, however, did not go on to interpret NEC as prohibiting § 187 

amendments of default judgments. To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit applied the 

standard § 187 two-part analysis and held that the trial court had failed to make factual 

findings to support either the alter ego finding or the finding of control. 

As to the “control” prong, which embodies the due process concerns first set forth 

in Motores, see Katzir, 394 F.3d at 1149, in lieu of applying a per se rule, the Ninth Circuit 

explained that “Section 187 ‘is an equitable procedure . . . [that] ‘bind[s] new individual 

defendants where it can be demonstrated that in their capacity as alter ego of the 

corporation they in fact had control of the previous litigation, and thus were virtually 

represented in the lawsuit.” Id. at 1149 (quoting NEC; alterations in original; some 

internal quotations omitted). “A prior judgment against a corporation . . . ‘can be made 

individually binding on a person associated with the corporation only if the individual to be 

charged . . . [1] had control of the litigation and [2] occasion to conduct it with a diligence 

corresponding to the risk of personal liability that was involved.’ ” Id. at 1150 (emphasis 

added) (quoting NEC). As the Katzir trial court failed to analyze that question as it 

applied to the owner of the defaulted corporation, the Ninth Circuit reversed.2 Further,

 

2 The Ninth Circuit also found insufficient plaintiff’s evidence that the owner had hired the 

corporation’s attorneys, appeared at settlement conferences, financed the litigation, and 

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the Ninth Circuit noted that, as in NEC, the owner “was not named individually, knew [the 

corporation] was on the verge of dissolution through Canadian bankruptcy law, and had 

no personal duty to defend the underlying lawsuit.” Katzir, 394 F.3d at 1150. That is, like

the NEC court, the interests of the owner and his corporation were not aligned, such that 

the owner was not virtually represented in the underlying suit. In short, beyond how it 

factored into the control analysis, it was of no matter to the Ninth Circuit that the judgment 

was entered pursuant to default. 

True, at first blush, one might conclude that that is a distinction without a 

difference because the control requirement articulated by Motores, NEC, and Kazmir

could never be satisfied vis-à-vis a default judgment. For, how could a proposed 

judgment debtor’s interest be effectively represented by a named defendant that failed to 

present any defense at all? Relatedly, if an alter ego faces personal liability, is it 

consistent for him to control the litigation “with a diligence corresponding to the risk of

personal liability” by allowing the named defendant to default? 

While those considerations factor into a § 187 analysis, they do not show that the 

analysis is a foregone conclusion when applied to a default judgment.3 That is because, 

as noted above, Motores, NEC, and Kazmir stand for a narrower proposition: The 

proposed judgment debtor must have had the “opportunity to be heard and present 

defenses[,]” Motores, 51 Cal. 2d at 176 (emphasis added), and the “occasion to conduct” 

the litigation “with a diligence corresponding to the risk of personal liability,” Katzir, 394 

F.3d at 1149 (emphasis added); NEC, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 781. “The real issue is not 

whether [the proposed judgment debtors] (or, technically, [the named defendant]) actually 

litigated the issue of [the named defendant’s] liability, but rather whether [the proposed 

judgment debtors] had an opportunity to present a defense.” Dow Jones Co. v. Avenel, 

 

discharged the attorneys. Katzir, 394 F.3d at 1150.

3

Indeed, numerous post-NEC, Katzir, and Motores cases have amended default 

judgments. See, e.g., Mad Dogg Athletics, Inc. v. NYC Holding, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 

1130 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Oceans II, Inc. v. Skinnervision, Inc., No. 212CV06867CASEX, 

2015 WL 4484208, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2015).

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151 Cal. App. 3d 144, 150 (1984) (emphasis added) (proposed judgment debtors were 

given opportunity to litigate summary judgment through alter ego corporate defendant). 

And that is all due process requires. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) 

(“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a 

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)); Shanghai Minguang Int'l Grp. Co. v. Yang, No. E044331, 2008 WL 4004697, at 

*4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2008) (unpublished) (default judgment amended where 

proposed judgment debtor had “the opportunity to present his own defense and 

controlled the corporations' defense but chose not to do so[.]”).

Accordingly, like the Ninth Circuit in Katzir, this court applies § 187’s standard twoprong analysis to plaintiff’s request to amend the default judgment to add Viera. In 

undertaking that analysis, the court is cognizant of the serious due process concerns

implicated by applying that analysis to a default judgment, as plaintiff requests the court 

do here. 

2. Section 187 Analysis 

As discussed above, a § 187 amendment requires plaintiff prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence “(1) that the new party [is] the alter ego of the old party 

and (2) that the new party [ ] controlled the litigation, thereby having had the opportunity 

to litigate, in order to satisfy due process concerns.” Katzir, 394 F.3d at 1148. Plaintiff no 

doubt has a strong argument regarding the alter ego prong of that analysis.

4 The court, 

however, finds no cause to reach that issue because plaintiff has failed to show that Viera 

“controlled” the litigation in a manner that satisfies due process. As explained above, 

under Katzir and NEC, due process requires that Viera (1) controlled the litigation and (2)

had occasion to conduct that control with a diligence corresponding to the risk of personal 

 

4 See, e.g., Dkt. 218 at 10 (adopted report and recommendation stating “Cadence has 

adduced ample evidence that Viera treats Pounce USA as a personal piggy bank”); 

Dkt. 215-6 (email from Viera instructing counsel to make Pounce USA the contracting 

party “[b]ecause [it] is the one that has no ASSETS!!!”). 

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liability that was involved. Those issues require consideration of, inter alia, whether Viera 

was “virtually represented in the lawsuit” and whether his interest in the litigation aligned 

with the judgment debtors’ interests.

Here, plaintiff has shown that Viera exercised some control over the litigation. 

Plaintiff has uncovered evidence that shows Viera controlled Pounce’s pre-litigation 

response to Cadence’s accusation of copyright infringement. Dkt. 102-7 at 

CAD_0000018, 21–22; Dkt. 229-8 (pre-litigation emails between Viera and Cadence);

Ruttenberg Decl., Ex. F (Viera directing lawyer to “handle” plaintiff’s continued prelitigation communications); Dkt. 181-23 (Viera directing counsel to stop responding to

Cadence’s prelitigation communication). Further, the evidence shows that Viera 

controlled Pounce’s litigation strategy in the immediate aftermath of plaintiff filing this suit. 

Dkt. 172-4 (Viera directing Pounce USA’s counsel to respond that plaintiff had sued the 

wrong entity because Pounce SA and Pounce USA were independent entities that have 

no relationship); Dkt. 15 ¶¶ 4-7 (Pounce USA’s Answer largely following Viera’s 

instruction);

5 Dkt. 172-5 (pre-Answer email from Viera directing counsel to file for an 

extension). 

That said, beyond Pounce’s early litigation strategy, the evidence of Viera’s control 

becomes murkier. True, plaintiff has submitted the declaration of Pounce USA’s former 

CEO, Juan Llera, who testified that he reported to Viera and was expected to comply with 

Viera’s instructions and that Viera “dictate[d] case strategy.” Llera Decl. ¶¶ 7, 53-54. 

Llera’s testimony also provides support for plaintiff’s argument that Viera caused Pounce 

USA to default by refusing to allow Pounce USA to produce his emails, in contravention 

of this court’s discovery order. Id. ¶ 55 (Llera asked Viera to produce emails but Viera 

refused); see also id. ¶ 56 (Llera testifying that “[i]It was not [his] decision to stop Pounce 

USA from participating in the Cadence litigation.”); Dkt. 189 (order requiring Pounce USA 

 

5 Subsequent discovery has proven those representations misleading if not outright false. 

Indeed, the court has already found that Pounce USA is an alter ego of Pounce SA. See

Dkt. 218 at 8-11; Dkt. 219.

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to produce Viera’s emails). 

Viera, however, tells a different story. Viera testifies that while he “was involved in 

some of the decisions regarding how to proceed with the case, [ ] [he] was also following 

direction of the Board of Directors of Pounce SA.” Viera Decl. ¶ 39. According to Viera, 

he could not ignore that direction because Pounce SA was paying Pounce USA’s 

litigation costs. Id. Relatedly, Viera testifies that Pounce USA stopped participating in 

this litigation not because Viera refused to produce discovery, as Llera implies, but rather 

because Pounce SA’s Board refused to continue funding Pounce USA’s litigation. Id. 

Pounce USA’s Board of Directors, according to Viera, reached the similar conclusion that 

“irrespective of the merits of Cadence’s position . . . Pounce USA simply did not have the 

funds to continue paying the costs of defense[.]” Id. ¶ 33. As to Pounce SA, Viera 

testifies that the company is currently undergoing “debt restructuring,” and, “at the 

insistence of Pounce SA’s banks and lenders,” Pounce SA’s Board has “refused to 

provide any further funds for litigation.” Id. ¶¶ 33, 39.

In sum, the court finds that there is largely undisputed evidence that Viera 

controlled Pounce’s litigation strategy early on in this litigation. But that evidence does 

not translate into evidence that Viera controlled the entire litigation. On that issue, the 

evidence largely amounts to a battle of contradicting declarations. That contradictory 

evidence extends to certain critical issues, like whether Viera strategically controlled 

Pounce’s decision to default—a decision that could show Viera exercised control with his 

personal interests in mind and not those of the corporation. With only that contradictory 

evidence before it, the court finds plaintiff has not carried its burden to show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Viera controlled the litigation.6 See Reno-Tahoe 

 

6 Plaintiff emphasizes that the timing of Pounce USA’s default is suspicious because it 

occurred after the court ordered Pounce USA to produce Viera’s documents. See

Dkt. 189 (November 8, 2018 order requiring production of documents); Dkt. 193 

(December 11, 2018 request to withdraw as attorney for Pounce USA); Dkt. 206 (January 

30, 2019 entry of default against Pounce USA for failure to retain substitute counsel). 

Given the heady due process concerns at issue, the court declines to tip the scales in 

plaintiff’s favor based on a suspicious temporal correlation. 

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Specialty, 2018 WL 6267823, at *3 (denying § 187 motion when faced with, inter alia, 

competing declarations regarding control).

Moreover, even if plaintiff could show that Viera controlled the litigation, plaintiff 

has presented virtually no evidence that Viera had “occasion to conduct [that control] with 

a diligence corresponding to the risk of personal liability.” Katzir, 394 F.3d at 1150. True, 

Viera participated in this litigation in various ways, such as being deposed and submitting 

declarations. But a CEO/CFO’s participation in his companies’ litigation is neither

uncommon nor sufficient. Id. (finding insufficient evidence of control where owner hired

and discharged the corporation’s attorneys, appeared at settlement conferences, and 

financed the litigation); Milton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 581 (1961) (“It is not sufficient 

that [the alter ego] supplies the funds for the prosecution or defense, that he appears as 

a witness or cooperates without having control.” (citing Rest., Judgments, § 84)). In any 

event, Viera’s mere participation in this litigation does not come close to outweighing the 

lack of evidence showing that Viera had notice that he faced the risk of personal liability 

before the court entered judgment.7 Given the due process concerns at stake, the court

cannot conclude that Viera had the opportunity to control the litigation with a diligence 

corresponding to the risk of personal liability when there is no evidence that Viera knew 

or should have known he faced the risk of such liability.8 Compare Oceans II, Inc., 2015 

WL 4484208, at *5 (amending default judgment to add CEO who was sued in his 

individual capacity and later defaulted).

Nor has plaintiff shown that it could not have raised Viera’s liability at an earlier 

stage because it only recently discovered that there was evidence supporting Viera’s 

 

7 Though Viera was represented both by Pounce lawyers and at least one personal 

lawyer at his deposition, see Dkt. 254-10, Ex. T, at 11:19-16:15, that provides little 

evidence that Viera thought he faced personal liability. 

8 The relevant notice also cannot be derived from Viera’s control and participation in this 

litigation. That is because such involvement only shows the proposed judgment debtor 

had notice of the litigation. It does not show that the proposed judgment debtor had 

notice that he faced the risk of being held personally liable. NEC, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 

781 (“[I]t is not enough [to establish control] that [the proposed judgment debtor] was 

‘aware’ of the action[.]”). 

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alleged alter ego status. Indeed, much of the alter ego evidence plaintiff relies upon 

matches the evidence that plaintiff’s February 2019 motion for default judgment relied 

upon. Compare Dkt. 208-25 at 9-16 to Dkt. 228-4 at 6-15. Plaintiff has provided no 

persuasive explanation for its failure to raise the issue of Viera’s alleged alter ego status 

until after default judgment had been entered. And the court will not countenance the

strategic use of § 187 in a manner that raises due process concerns. See also Correa 

Pallet, Inc. v. Lambeth, No. F052934, 2008 WL 1822639, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 

2008) (unpublished) (discussing § 187 and explaining that the alter ego doctrine is 

grounded in equity that requires the movant to act with “due diligence”). For those 

reasons, the court finds that plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence 

that Viera had the “opportunity” or “occasion” to conduct this litigation with a diligence 

corresponding to his risk of personal liability. 

For similar reasons, plaintiff has not shown that Viera was virtually represented in 

the lawsuit or that his interests aligned with the judgment debtors. Like in NEC, it is not 

apparent that Pounce’s “interests and [Viera’s] interests were [ ] the same.” NEC, 208 

Cal. App. 3d at 780. Though disputed, evidence shows that, as in NEC, Pounce 

defaulted because it “had no incentive to defend the [ ] lawsuit,” as it “was on the verge of 

bankruptcy.” Id. Plaintiff had the burden of showing that that litigation strategy effectively 

represented the personal interests of Pounce’s alleged alter ego, Viera, who “was not 

named as a party, had no risk of personal liability and therefore was not required to 

intervene.” Id. Because plaintiff has failed to carry that burden, the court “cannot say 

that [Viera] . . . had occasion to conduct the litigation with a diligence corresponding to 

the risk of personal liability that was involved or that [Viera] was virtually represented in 

the lawsuit.” Id. at 781.9 

 

9 Pointing to Shanghai Minguang, 2008 WL 4004697, *5-6 (unpublished), plaintiff argues 

that because Viera is the alter ego of the Pounce entities, his interests necessarily align 

with the companies’ interest. That analysis, however, largely collapses § 187’s control 

prong into its alter ego prong. It also disappears the due process-based requirement that 

the proposed judgment debtor not only had the opportunity to control the litigation

generally, but the opportunity to do so knowing that he or she risked being held 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to amend the default judgment to add 

Roger Viera is DENIED.10 Plaintiff’s administrative motion to file additional information in 

support of its motion to amend, Dkt. 261, is DENIED as moot because the evidence 

therein would not change the analysis set forth above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2019

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

 

personally liable. Plaintiff’s citation to In re Levander, 180 F.3d at 1118, is similarly 

unpersuasive because that case did not involve a default judgment and discusses neither 

Motores nor NEC. See also Katzir, 394 F.3d at 1148 (citing Levander but not discussing 

it in the context of using § 187 to amend a default judgment). 

10 Plaintiff’s motions to seal, Dkts. 228, 254, are DENIED because no declaration was 

filed showing that the documents sought to be sealed met the relevant standard. See 

Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(setting forth sealing standard).

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