Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01009/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01009-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRITTNEY FLOW-SUNKETT, GLENN 

SUNKETT,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RALPH DIAZ, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-1009 KJM KJN P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs, a state prisoner and his wife, both proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action 

seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the wife paid the court’s filing fee. Because the nature 

of plaintiffs’ allegations concern prison conditions and seek relief from officers of a government 

entity, this case was deemed to be a prisoner case, and the matter was referred to a United States 

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

On July 18, 2019, the undersigned recommended that this action be dismissed because this 

action was duplicative of an action filed in the Fresno division of this court by the prisoner 

plaintiff. However, since that time, plaintiffs’ Fresno action has been dismissed. Good cause 

appearing, the findings and recommendations are vacated.

On June 6, 2019, plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed, and plaintiffs were granted leave to 

file a pleading bearing both their signatures. On June 19, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend 

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accompanied by an amended complaint bearing both signatures. Because plaintiffs were entitled 

to amend under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs’ motion to amend is 

unnecessary and is denied as moot. This action proceeds on plaintiffs’ amended complaint.

As discussed below, the amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

II. Screening Standards

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).1 In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss 

claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

1

 It is undisputed that plaintiff Glenn Sunkett is a state prisoner, and both plaintiffs challenge the 

conditions of his confinement at Kern Valley State Prison, where Mr. Sunkett is housed. It is 

unclear whether a court may screen a complaint brought jointly by a nonprisoner and where the 

nonprisoner paid the court’s filing fee. However, a district court may dismiss a complaint for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

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In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 

However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 

quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 

true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

III. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint

The gravamen of plaintiffs’ pleading is that plaintiffs have been wrongfully denied family 

visits based on a July 30, 2009 Mendocino County Jail Disciplinary Report (ECF No. 12 at 16) 

improperly issued against Mr. Sunkett.2 Plaintiffs argue that the Mendocino County Superior 

2

 Inmate applications for family visits are evaluated under 15 C.C.R. § 3177. Accord, CDCR 

Department Operations Manual (“DOM”) § 54020.33.1. Title 15 C.C.R. § 3177 provides in 

pertinent part:

(b) Family visiting is a privilege. Eligibility for family visiting shall 

be limited by the assignment of the inmate to a qualifying 

work/training incentive group as outlined in section 3044.

 (1) Family visits shall not be permitted for inmates convicted of a 

violent offense involving a minor or family member or any sex 

offense, which includes but is not limited to the following Penal 

Code sections: 187 (when the victim is a family member as defined 

in Section 3000 or minor); 192 (when the victim is a family member 

or minor); 243.4; 261; 261.5, 262; 264.1; 266c; 266j; 273a; 273d; 

273.5; 273.6; 285; 286; 288; 288a; 288.2; 288.5; 289; 289.5; 311.1; 

311.2; 311.3; 311.4; 313.1; 314; or 647.6.

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Court dismissed the attempted escape charges filed against Mr. Sunkett.

3

 Thus, the allegedly 

incomplete Mendocino County Jail Disciplinary Report added to Mr. Sunkett’s central file by 

county jail staff upon his transfer to state prison should not be used to preclude family visits under 

California Code of Regulations, title 15, Section 3177. Plaintiffs allege violations of their First 

(Free Exercise), Eighth (deliberate indifference) and Fourteenth (Due Process) Amendment 

rights, as well as myriad violations of state law and regulations and the California Constitution.

IV. Discussion 

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint suffers from several deficiencies as discussed below.

A. Federal Claims

First, the undersigned observes that any defendant’s reliance on an invalid jail disciplinary 

or rules violation report to deny plaintiffs family visits under California Code of Regulations, title 

15, Section 3177 does not, without more, support an actionable claim. Prisoners are not protected 

from false charges or official reliance on such charges. See Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F. Supp. 2d 

1216, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (prisoners have no constitutional right to be free from wrongfully 

issued disciplinary reports), aff’d without opinion, 168 F.3d 498 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners do not 

(A) Inmates may be prohibited from family visiting where substantial 

documented evidence or information of the misconduct described in 

section 3177(b)(1) exists, without a criminal conviction. The 

evidence or information appropriate for the purpose of this regulation 

shall include rule violation reports as well as the standard described 

in section 3173.1.

. . . 

(D) Family visiting shall be restricted as necessary to maintain order, 

the safety of persons, the security of the institution/facility, and 

required prison activities and operations, pursuant to section 3170.

15 C.C.R. § 3177. 

3

 Mr. Sunkett’s criminal charges for attempted escape in Mendocino were dismissed, but 

plaintiffs do not allege that he was acquitted of attempted escape. Mr. Sunkett was found guilty 

in the 2009 jail disciplinary, but it is unclear whether he challenged the 2009 disciplinary in state 

or federal court because plaintiffs do not allege that the 2009 jail disciplinary was set aside or 

overturned by a state or federal court. In any event, none of the named defendants were involved 

in the imposition or hearing of the 2009 jail disciplinary.

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have a right to be free from false accusations of misconduct, so the mere falsification of a report 

does not give rise to a claim under § 1983. Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 

1989) (“Sprouse’s claims based on the falsity of the charges and the impropriety of Babcock’s 

involvement in the grievance procedure, standing alone, do not state constitutional claims.”); 

Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986) (“The prison inmate has no 

constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which 

may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”); Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 

1141 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[A]n allegation that a prison guard planted false evidence which implicates 

an inmate in a disciplinary infraction fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted where 

the procedural due process protections . . . are provided.”). 

In addition, prisoners generally have no due process right to a particular prison 

classification. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976). Alleged deprivations of rights 

arising from prison officials’ classification decisions do not give rise to a federal constitutional 

claim encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 

(1972). State statutes and regulations give rise to an interest protected by the Fourteenth 

Amendment only where the restraint on a prisoner’s liberty “imposes atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472, 483 (1995). Inmates have no federal constitutional right to particular procedures 

established by state law. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 1986), 

abrogated in part on other grounds, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472. 

Second, “[i]t is well-settled that prisoners have no constitutional right while incarcerated 

to contact visits or conjugal visits.” Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (en 

banc) (citing, inter alia, Kentucky v. Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460

(1989) (the Due Process Clause does not guarantee a right of unfettered visitation).) In Gerber, 

the Ninth Circuit held that “while the basic right to marry survives imprisonment, . . ., most of the 

attributes of marriage -- cohabitation, physical intimacy, and bearing and raising children -- do 

not.” Gerber, 291 F.3d at 621; cf. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131-32 (2003) (declining to 

decide whether the right to intimate association survives incarceration because the “challenged 

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regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests.”). Thus, plaintiffs’

contention that they have a constitutional right to family visits is unavailing because the benefits 

of marriage do not survive incarceration.4 “The fact that California prison officials may choose to 

permit some inmates the privilege of conjugal visits is simply irrelevant to whether there is a 

constitutional right to conjugal visits . . . while in prison.” Gerber, 291 F.3d at 621-22 (emphasis 

added) (§ 3177(b) states “[f]amily visiting is a privilege.”). 

Third, the operative pleading fails to state a claim for interference with plaintiffs’ religious 

practices. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no 

law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion U.S. Const., Amend. I. Any assertion that 

§ 3177 runs afoul of that clause is defeated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Employment 

Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). There, the Court held that generally-applicable laws that 

incidentally burden a religious practice do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Smith, 494 U.S. 

at 878; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005). Because section 3177 does not prohibit 

conjugal visitation on the basis of religion, but rather based on crimes and other penological 

security concerns, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 

(1987) (holding that a prison inmate retains those constitutional rights that are not inconsistent 

with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the correctional 

system); Noguera v. Rowland, 1991 WL 148766 (9th Cir. July 29, 1991) (holding that a 

condemned inmate’s claim to a right to conjugal visits under the Free Exercise Clause failed 

because the inmate could not “show that the prison regulation prohibiting conjugal visits for 

condemned inmates is not rationally related to a valid penological interest.”)

Fourth, construing plaintiffs’ claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 

Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, also offers no relief. RLUIPA provides: “No 

4

 Plaintiff Mr. Sunkett retains the First Amendment right to free exercise of his religious faith, 

but that right “is limited by institutional objectives and by the loss of freedom concomitant with 

incarceration.” Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corrections and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 

(9th Cir. 2013) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)). To state a 

cognizable claim under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment, plaintiff Mr. Sunkett

must allege facts which show that the challenged regulation is not valid or neutral with respect to 

religion. 

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government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or 

confined to an institution,” unless the government shows that the burden furthers “a compelling 

governmental interest” by “the least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). 

“Religious exercise” includes “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central 

to, a system of religious belief.” Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). For a RLUIPA claim, the prisoner must 

show that the government has imposed a substantial burden on his religious exercise. A 

“substantial burden” is one that imposes a significantly great restriction or onus on religious 

exercise. San Jose Christian College v. Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The U.S. Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have not 

addressed whether a sincerely held religious belief requiring conjugal visits must be 

accommodated under RLUIPA. But various lower courts have found that conjugal visits are 

subject to substantial restriction due to incarceration and need not be accommodated under 

RLUIPA. Owens v. Kernan, 2016 WL 3361885 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2016) (screening out, for 

failure to state a claim, challenge to § 3177 by prisoner serving life without parole); Martin v. 

Cate, 2014 WL 348442, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (holding denial of conjugal visits to 

Christian prisoner based on status as a life prisoner was not cognizable under RLUIPA); Shields 

v. Foston, 2013 WL 3456964 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 9, 2013) (surveying district court decisions and 

finding § 3177 was narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling government interest in 

enhancing prison security); Lucas v. Tilton, 2010 WL 431737 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010) (finding 

the balance of equities did not support prisoner’s request for a preliminary injunction “because 

the loss of intimate association is a well-known aspect of being imprisoned.”) 

Here, plaintiffs allege that they are denied family visits based on an improperly issued jail 

disciplinary report from the 2009 finding that Mr. Sunkett attempted an escape from the 

Mendocino County Jail. Plaintiffs concede that the denial of conjugal visits was issued under 

state regulations, including DOM section 54020.33.1, but argue the regulations were improperly 

applied. (ECF No. 12 at 8-9, citing Ex. N; ECF No. 1 at 77 (Ex. N) (CDC 128-B dated Nov. 28, 

2017).) The CDC 128-B issued thereafter confirms that family visits “shall be restricted as 

necessary to maintain order, the safety of persons, the security of the institution/ facility, and 

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required prison activities and operations, pursuant to section 3170 and DOM section 54020.33.1.” 

(ECF No. 1 at 77.) Thus, plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim for relief under RLUIPA

because “section 3177 is narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling government objective of 

enhancing prison security.” Shields, 2013 WL 345964, at *6. See also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722 

(“We do not read RLUIPA to elevate accommodation of religious observances over an 

institution’s need to maintain order and safety. Our decisions indicate that an accommodation 

must be measured so that it does not override other significant interests.”). Absent exceptional 

circumstances not alleged here, the undersigned will not intervene in the day-to-day management 

of prisons. See, e.g., Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 (“We must accord substantial deference to the 

professional judgment of prison administrators”); Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482-83 (“federal courts 

ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile 

environment.”) 

Fifth, the amended complaint fails to state a due process claim against persons who 

processed or denied inmate appeals. There is no constitutional right to a prison or jail 

administrative appeal or grievance system in California, and therefore no due process liability for 

failing to process or decide an inmate appeal properly. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 

(9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Sixth, plaintiffs’ cause of action based on an alleged “failure to investigate” also does not 

state a cognizable federal civil rights claim. “There is . . . no constitutional right to an 

investigation by government officials.” Stone v. Dep’t of Investigation of New York, 1992 WL 

25202, *2 (S.D. N.Y. Feb. 4, 1992), citing Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (1985) (“no 

instance where the courts have recognized inadequate investigation as sufficient to state a civil 

rights claim unless there was another recognized constitutional right involved.”); see also Page v. 

Stanley, 2013 WL 2456798, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2013) (dismissing Section 1983 claim 

alleging that officers failed to conduct thorough investigation of former prisoner’s complaints 

because he “had no constitutional right to any investigation of his citizen’s complaint, much less a 

‘thorough’ investigation or a particular outcome”). Absent an underlying violation of a

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constitutional right by named defendants, plaintiffs’ contentions that defendants fail or refuse to 

investigate plaintiffs’ allegations do not state cognizable civil rights claims.

Seventh, to the extent plaintiffs attempt to raise a procedural due process challenge in 

connection with the 2009 jail disciplinary, or to substantively challenge such disciplinary, such 

challenges appear to be time-barred. The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim filed in 

California is two years, and it may be tolled for up to two years for the disability of imprisonment 

for certain plaintiffs. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code §§ 335.1, 352.1, 357. In addition, to the extent plaintiffs attempt to raise procedural due 

process challenges in connection with subsequent classification procedures, plaintiffs are advised 

that basic procedural due process protection requires notice and the opportunity to be heard “at a 

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” prior to deprivation of an established interest. 

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982); see also Barnett, 31 F.3d at 815 

(prisoner only entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard). So long as Mr. Sunkett was 

provided notice of the reclassification procedure and afforded an opportunity to be heard, he was 

provided adequate procedural due process. 

Finally, plaintiffs raise a “deliberate indifference” claim, ostensibly under the Eighth 

Amendment, based on their allegations that defendants “compelled” plaintiffs to undertake 

hunger strikes. However, such allegations are unavailing because such hunger strikes were selfimposed, and not conditions that were caused by defendants.

For all of the above reasons, the undersigned finds that plaintiffs fail to state cognizable 

federal civil rights claims. 

B. Potential State Law Claims

Many of plaintiffs’ claims are based on violations of prison regulations, state law, or the 

California Constitution. (ECF No. 12, passim.) Any violation of state law, state regulations, or 

rules and policies of the department of corrections, is not sufficient to state a claim for relief 

under § 1983. As discussed above, to state a claim under § 1983, there must be a deprivation of 

federal Constitutional or statutory rights. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 

(9th Cir. 2007) (“Section 1983 requires [plaintiff] to demonstrate a violation of federal law, not 

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state law.”). The court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, but 

plaintiffs must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

Because this court has found that plaintiffs fail to state any cognizable federal claims, the court 

will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ putative state law claims. See

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (when federal claims are eliminated 

before trial, district courts should usually decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). Such 

dismissal does not preclude plaintiffs from pursuing such claims in state court.

V. Leave to Amend

In light of the authorities discussed above, it does not appear that plaintiffs can amend 

their pleading to state cognizable federal civil rights claims based on the alleged deprivation of 

family visiting under state regulations. However, in an abundance of caution, and because 

plaintiffs are appearing pro se and have not had an opportunity to substantively amend their 

pleading, plaintiffs are granted leave to amend should plaintiffs be able to allege facts 

demonstrating a violation of their federal civil rights. 

If plaintiffs choose to amend, plaintiffs must demonstrate how the conditions about which 

they complain resulted in a deprivation of their rights under the United States Constitution or 

other federal statute. See e.g., West, 487 U.S. at 48. Also, the complaint must allege in specific 

terms how each named defendant is involved. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). There 

can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection 

between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371; May v. 

Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of 

official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiffs are informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order 

to make plaintiff’s second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an 

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This 

requirement exists because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original 

complaint. See Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an

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‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” 

(internal citation omitted)). Once plaintiffs file a second amended complaint, the original 

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in the second amended complaint, 

as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be alleged. 

In the alternative, plaintiffs may opt to voluntarily dismiss this action and pursue their 

claims in state court.

VI. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

On July 11, 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss this action based on insufficient 

service of process. Because the court has determined this case is a prisoner case, and has not yet 

found plaintiffs stated a cognizable civil rights claim, defendants’ motion is premature and is 

dismissed without prejudice to renewal at a later date, if appropriate. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The findings and recommendations (ECF No. 21) are vacated;

2. Plaintiffs’ motion to amend (ECF No. 11) is dismissed as moot;

3. Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 16) is dismissed without prejudice; 

4. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint is dismissed; and

5. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiffs shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint 

must also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second Amended 

Complaint.” 

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Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the 

dismissal of this action. In the alternative, plaintiffs may opt to voluntarily dismiss this action 

and pursue their claims in state court.

Dated: March 11, 2020

/sunk0816.vac+

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRITTNEY FLOW-SUNKETT, GLENN 

SUNKETT,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RALPH DIAZ, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-1009 KJM KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order 

filed______________.

_____________ Amended Complaint

OR

_____________ Plaintiffs opt to voluntarily dismiss this action and pursue 

their claims in state court.

DATED: 

________________________________

Plaintiff

________________________________

Plaintiff

Case 2:19-cv-01009-KJM-KJN Document 24 Filed 03/11/20 Page 13 of 13