Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02385/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02385-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES HINES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-2385 GEB PAN P

vs.

NUCKLE, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 28, 2006, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended

complaint together with a proposed pleading. Defendants have not filed an opposition.

A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course any time before a

responsive pleading is served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Defendants filed an answer on February 28,

2005. 

Four factors are commonly used to determine the propriety of a

motion for leave to amend. These are: bad faith, undue delay,

prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment. Loehr,

743 F.2d at 1319; Howey, 481 F.2d at 1190. These factors,

however, are not of equal weight in that delay, by itself, is

insufficient to justify denial of leave to amend. Webb, 655 F.2d at

980; Hurn v. Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing, 648 F.2d 1252,

1254 (9th Cir.1981).

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 “‘[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual 1

punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.’” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)

(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.

651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). “It is obduracy and

wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. In order to prevail on

any claim of cruel and unusual punishment, a plaintiff must show that, objectively, he suffered a

sufficiently serious deprivation and that, subjectively, the defendant had a culpable state of mind

in allowing or causing the plaintiff’s deprivation to occur. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

298-99 (1991).

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DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185-86 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff contends he needs to amend his complaint because his excessive force

claim should have been pled as a Fourth Amendment violation rather than an Eighth Amendment

violation as originally pled in his November 17, 2003 complaint. However, plaintiff is mistaken. 

His excessive force claim is properly brought under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, no 1

amendment is required and plaintiff’s motion to amend will be denied.

On May 8, 2006, plaintiff filed a notice of change of address, which was signed on

April 29, 2006. Good cause appearing, the April 27, 2006 findings and recommendations issued

for plaintiff’s failure to keep the court apprised of his current address will be vacated. 

 Plaintiff also filed a request for continuance to finish the discovery phase of the

instant action. In his request for continuance, plaintiff alleges he was transferred on April 5,

2006 to Corcoran State Prison, and a prison official told him it would take six weeks until

plaintiff’s legal materials are returned to him. It is unclear from plaintiff’s request whether he

had begun preparing the written questions for direct examination of inmate witnesses Tucker and

Wilson before his transfer. (See March 17, 2006 order at 3.) Plaintiff had been given thirty days

from the March 17 order in which to do so. That order also extended the discovery deadline to

September 1, 2006. 

Plaintiff will be granted until June 26, 2006 in which to submit his proposed

written questions pursuant to the March 17 order. This grants plaintiff an additional two weeks

to submit his questions, since he had about two weeks prior to his transfer to begin work on his

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questions. However, if plaintiff has not received his legal materials by June 5, 2006, he should

again seek court intervention and counsel for defendants will be called upon to assist plaintiff in

obtaining his legal materials. 

At present, if both plaintiff and defendants are diligent, it should not be necessary

to extend the discovery deadline further. To the extent that plaintiff sought extension of the

discovery deadline, that request is denied without prejudice. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s March 28, 2006 motion for leave to file an amended complaint is

denied.

2. The April 27, 2006 findings and recommendations are vacated.

3. Plaintiff’s May 8, 2006 motion for continuance is partially granted.

4. Plaintiff is granted until June 26, 2006 in which to submit his proposed written

questions pursuant to the March 17 order. 

DATED: May 23, 2006.

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hine2385.mta

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