Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55575/USCOURTS-ca9-13-55575-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MULTI TIME MACHINE, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AMAZON.COM, INC.; AMAZON

SERVICES, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-55575

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-09076-

DDP-MAN

ORDER AND

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 9, 2015—Pasadena, California

Opinion Filed July 6, 2015

Opinion Withdrawn and New Opinion Filed

October 21, 2015

Before: Barry G. Silverman and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit

Judges and Gordon J. Quist,* Senior District Judge.

* The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

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2 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

Order;

Opinion by Judge Silverman;

Dissent by Judge Bea

SUMMARY**

Trademark

The panel granted a petition for panel rehearing, denied

as moot a petition for rehearing en banc, withdrew its

opinion, and filed a superseding opinion and dissent in an

appeal from the district court’s summary judgment in a

trademark infringement action under the Lanham Act against

online retailer Amazon.com.

Multi Time Machine, Inc., manufacturer of MTM Special

Ops watches, alleged that Amazon’s website infringed its

trademark because of the manner in which the website

responded to a shopper’s search request for the watches. 

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment in favor of

Amazon, the panel held that Amazon’s search results page

did not create a likelihood of confusion by displaying a list of

several other brands of military style watches. The panel

concluded that because the page clearly labeled the name and

manufacturer of each product offered for sale and even

included photographs of the items, no reasonably prudent

shopper accustomed to shopping online would likely be

confused as to the source of the products.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 3

Dissenting, Judge Bea wrote that there was a genuine

issue of material fact regarding “initial interest confusion.”

COUNSEL

Eric Levinrad (argued) and Ryan Stonerock, Wolf, Rifkin,

Shapiro, Schulman, & Rabkin, LLP, Los Angeles, California;

Jeffrey Cohen, Millen, White, Zelano & Branigan, P.C.,

Arlington, Virginia, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Marc C. Levy (argued) and Kathryn Feiereisel, Faegre Baker

Daniels LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.

Paul Alan Levy and Scott Michelman, Public Citizen

Litigation Group, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Public

Citizen, Inc., and Electronic Frontier Foundation.

Catherine R. Gellis, Sausalito, California; Rebecca Tushnet,

Georgetown Law School, Washington, D.C., for Amicus

Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors.

Margret Caruso and Carolyn Thomas, Quinn Emanuel

Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Redwood Shores, California, for

Amici Curiae Google, Inc., Pinterest, Inc., Yahoo! Inc., eBay,

Inc., and Twitter, Inc.

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4 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

ORDER

Judges Silverman and Quist have voted to grant panel

rehearing. Judge Bea has voted to deny rehearing. The

petition for rehearing en banc is now moot. The Opinion

filed July 6, 2015, and appearing at 792 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.

2015), is withdrawn. The Superseding Opinion and Dissent

are filed contemporaneouslywith this order. The parties may

file additional petitions for panel rehearing or rehearing en

banc.

OPINION

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:

In the present appeal, we must decide whether the

following scenario constitutes trademark infringement: A

customer goes online to Amazon.com looking for a certain

military-style wristwatch — specifically the “MTM Special

Ops” — marketed and manufactured by Plaintiff Multi Time

Machine, Inc. The customer types “mtm special ops” in the

search box and presses “enter.” Because Amazon does not

sell the MTM Special Ops watch, what the search produces

is a list, with photographs, of several other brands of military

style watches that Amazon does carry, specifically identified

by their brand names – Luminox, Chase-Durer, TAWATEC,

and Modus.

MTM brought suit alleging that Amazon’s response to a

search for the MTM Special Ops watch on its website is

trademark infringement in violation of the Lanham Act. 

MTM contends that Amazon’s search results page creates a

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 5

likelihood of confusion, even though there is no evidence of

any actual confusion and even though the other brands are

clearly identified by name. The district court granted

summary judgment in favor of Amazon, and MTM now

appeals.

We affirm. “The core element of trademark

infringement” is whether the defendant’s conduct “is likely to

confuse customers about the source of the products.” E. & J.

Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th

Cir. 1992). Because Amazon’s search results page clearly

labels the name and manufacturer of each product offered for

sale and even includes photographs of the items, no

reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online

would likely be confused as to the source of the products. 

Thus, summary judgment of MTM’s trademark claims was

proper.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

MTM manufactures and markets watches under various

brand names including MTM, MTM Special Ops, and MTM

Military Ops. MTM holds the federally registered trademark

“MTM Special Ops” for timepieces. MTM sells its watches

directly to its customers and through various retailers. To

cultivate and maintain an image as a high-end, exclusive

brand, MTM does not sell its watches through Amazon.com. 

Further, MTM does not authorize its distributors, whose

agreements require them to seek MTM’s permission to sell

MTM’s products anywhere but their own retail sites, to sell

MTM watches on Amazon.com. Therefore, MTM watches

have never been available for sale on Amazon.com.

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6 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

Amazon is an online retailer that purports to offer

“Earth’s Biggest Selection of products.” Amazon has

designed its website to enable millions of unique products to

be sold by both Amazon and third party sellers across dozens

of product categories.

Consumers who wish to shop for products on Amazon’s

website can utilize Amazon’s search function. The search

function enables consumers to navigate Amazon.com’s large

marketplace by providing consumers with relevant results in

response to the consumer’s query. In order to provide search

results in which the consumer is most likely to be interested,

Amazon’s search function does not simply match the words

in the user’s query to words in a document, such as a product

description in Amazon.com’s catalog. Rather, Amazon’s

search function – like general purpose web search engines

such as Google or Bing – employs a variety of techniques,

including some that rely on user behavior, to produce relevant

results. By going beyond exactly matching a user’s query to

text describing a product, Amazon’s search function can

provide consumers with relevant results that would otherwise

be overlooked.

Consumers who go onto Amazon.com and search for the

term “mtm special ops” are directed to a search results page. 

On the search results page, the search query used — here,

“mtm special ops” — is displayed twice: in the search query

box and directly below the search query box in what is

termed a “breadcrumb.” The breadcrumb displays the

original query, “mtm special ops,” in quotation marks to

provide a trail for the consumer to follow back to the original

search. Directly below the breadcrumb, is a “Related

Searches” field, which provides the consumer with alternative

search queries in case the consumer is dissatisfied with the

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 7

results of the original search. Here, the Related Search that

is suggested to the consumer is: “mtm special ops watch.” 

Directly below the “Related Searches” field is a gray bar

containing the text “Showing 10 Results.” Then, directly

below the gray bar is Amazon’s product listings. The gray

bar separates the product listings from the breadcrumb and

the “Related Searches” field. The particular search results

page at issue is displayed below:

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-10-

10

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8 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 9

MTM watches are not listed on the page for the simple

reason that neither Amazon nor MTM sells MTM watches on

Amazon.

MTM filed a complaint against Amazon, alleging that

Amazon’s search results page infringes MTM’s trademarks

in violation of the Lanham Act. Amazon filed a motion for

summary judgment, arguing that (1) it is not using MTM’s

mark in commerce and (2) there is no likelihood of consumer

confusion. In ruling on Amazon’s motion for summary

judgment, the district court declined to resolve the issue of

whether Amazon is using MTM’s mark in commerce, and,

instead, addressed the issue of likelihood of confusion. In

evaluating likelihood of confusion, the district court utilized

the eight-factor test set forth in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,

599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).1 Relying on our recent decision

in Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts,

638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011), the district court focused in

particular on the following factors: (1) the strength of MTM’s

mark; (2) the evidence of actual confusion and the evidence

of no confusion; (3) the type of goods and degree of care

likely to be exercised by the purchaser; and (4) the

appearance of the product listings and the surrounding

context on the screen displaying the results page. Upon

reviewing the factors, the district court concluded that the

relevant Sleekcraft factors established “that there is no

likelihood of confusion in Amazon’s use of MTM’s

1 The eight factors enumerated in Sleekcraft are as follows: “1. strength

of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the marks;

4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type of

goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser;

7. defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion

of the product lines.” 599 F.2d at 348–49.

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10 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

trademarks in its search engine or display of search results.” 

Therefore, the district court granted Amazon’s motion for

summary judgment.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

“The decision to grant summary judgment in a trademark

infringement claim is reviewed de novo, and all reasonable

inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” 

Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 630

(9th Cir. 2005). “Although disfavored in trademark

infringement cases, summary judgment may be entered when

no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. Indeed, in

several trademark cases, we have concluded that there is no

likelihood of confusion as a matter of law and affirmed the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the

defendant. See, e.g., One Indus., LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distrib.,

578 F.3d 1154, 1162–65 (9th Cir. 2009); M2 Software, Inc. v.

Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 1080–85 (9th Cir. 2005);

Surfvivor Media, 406 F.3d at 631–34.

III. Discussion

To prevail on a claim of trademark infringement under the

Lanham Act, “a trademark holder must show that the

defendant’s use of its trademark ‘is likely to cause confusion,

or to cause mistake, or to deceive.’” Fortune Dynamic, Inc.

v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)–(a)(1)(A)). 

“The test for likelihood of confusion is whether a ‘reasonably

prudent consumer’ in the marketplace is likely to be confused

as to the origin of the good or service bearing one of the

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 11

marks.” Dreamwerks Prod. Group v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d

1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998). “The confusion must ‘be

probable, not simply a possibility.’” Murray v. Cable NBC,

86 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, the district court was correct in ruling that there is

no likelihood of confusion. Amazon is responding to a

customer’s inquiry about a brand it does not carry by doing

no more than stating clearly (and showing pictures of) what

brands it does carry. To whatever extent the Sleekcraft

factors apply in a case such as this – a merchant responding

to a request for a particular brand it does not sell by offering

other brands clearly identified as such – the undisputed

evidence shows that confusion on the part of the inquiring

buyer is not at all likely. Not only are the other brands clearly

labeled and accompanied by photographs, there is no

evidence of actual confusion by anyone.

To analyze likelihood of confusion, we utilize the eightfactor test set forth in Sleekcraft. However, “[w]e have long

cautioned that applying the Sleekcraft test is not like counting

beans.” One Indus., 578 F.3d at 1162; see also Network

Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, 638 F.3d 1137,

1145 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The Sleekcraft factors are intended as

an adaptable proxy for consumer confusion, not a rote

checklist.”). “Some factors are much more important than

others, and the relative importance of each individual factor

will be case-specific.” Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast

Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Moreover, the Sleekcraft factors are not exhaustive and other

variables may come into play depending on the particular

facts presented. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1145–46. 

This is particularly true in the Internet context. See

Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 (“We must be acutely aware of

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12 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet

context; emerging technologiesrequire a flexible approach.”). 

Indeed, in evaluating claims of trademark infringement in

cases involving Internet search engines, we have found

particularly important an additional factor that is outside of

the eight-factor Sleekcraft test: “the labeling and appearance

of the advertisements and the surrounding context on the

screen displaying the results page.” Network Automation,

638 F.3d at 1154.

In the present case, the eight-factor Sleekcraft test is not

particularly apt. This is not surprising as the Sleekcraft test

was developed for a different problem — i.e., for analyzing

whether two competing brands’ marks are sufficientlysimilar

to cause consumer confusion. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at

348. Although the present case involves brandsthat compete

with MTM, such as Luminox, Chase-Durer, TAWATEC, and

Modus, MTM does not contend that the marks for these

competing brands are similar to its trademarks. Rather, MTM

argues that the design of Amazon’s search results page

creates a likelihood of initial interest confusion2because

2

“Initial interest confusion is customer confusion that creates initial

interest in a competitor’s product. Although dispelled before an actual

sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly capitalizes on the

goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore actionable trademark

infringement.” Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 354 F.3d

1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004).

Following the issuance of the original opinion in this action, several

amici filed briefs questioning the validity of the doctrine of initial interest

confusion in the context of the Internet. However, in the present appeal,

the parties did not dispute the application of the doctrine of initial interest

confusion, and we as a three-judge panel are bound by the precedent of

our court. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A]

three-judge panel may not overrule a prior decision of the court.”).

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 13

when a customer searches for MTM Special Ops watches on

Amazon.com, the search results page displays the search term

used – here, “mtm special ops” – followed by a display of

numerous watches manufactured by MTM’s competitors and

offered for sale by Amazon, without explicitly informing the

customer that Amazon does not carry MTM watches.

Thus, the present case focuses on a different type of

confusion than was at issue in Sleekcraft. Here, the confusion

is not caused by the design of the competitor’s mark, but by

the design of the web page that is displaying the competing

mark and offering the competing products for sale. Sleekcraft

aside, the ultimate test for determining likelihood of

confusion is whether a “reasonably prudent consumer” in the

marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of the

goods. Dreamwerks, 142 F.3d at 1129. Our case can be

resolved simply by a evaluation of the web page at issue and

the relevant consumer. Cf. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 (“[I]t

is often possible to reach a conclusion with respect to

likelihood of confusion after considering only a subset of the

factors.”). Indeed, we have previously noted that “[i]n the

keyword advertising context [i.e., where a user performs a

search on the internet, and based on the keywords contained

in the search, the resulting web page displays certain

advertisements containing products or services for sale,] the

‘likelihood of confusion will ultimately turn on what the

consumer saw on the screen and reasonably believed, given

the context.’” Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1153. In

other words, the case will turn on the answers to the

following two questions: (1) Who is the relevant reasonable

consumer?; and (2) What would he reasonably believe based

on what he saw on the screen?

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14 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

Turning to the first question, we have explained that

“[t]he nature of the goods and the type of consumer is highly

relevant to determining the likelihood of confusion in the

keyword advertising context.” Network Automation,

638 F.3d at 1152. “In evaluating this factor, we consider ‘the

typical buyer exercising ordinary caution.’” Au-Tomotive

Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1076

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353). 

“Confusion is less likely where buyers exercise care and

precision in their purchases, such as for expensive or

sophisticated items.” Id. Moreover, “the default degree of

consumer care is becoming more heightened as the novelty of

the Internet evaporates and online commerce becomes

commonplace.” Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1152.

The goods in the present case are expensive. It is

undisputed that the watches at issue sell for several hundred

dollars. Therefore, the relevant consumer in the present case

“is a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping

online.” Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d

1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010).

Turning to the second question, as MTM itself asserts, the

labeling and appearance of the products for sale on Amazon’s

web page is the most important factor in this case. This is

because we have previously noted that clear labeling can

eliminate the likelihood of initial interest confusion in cases

involving Internet search terms. See, e.g., Playboy Enters.,

354 F.3d at 1030 n.44 (explaining that clear labeling “might

eliminate the likelihood of initial interest confusion that exists

in this case”); Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154 (same). 

Indeed, MTM itself argues: “The common thread of [the

Ninth Circuit’s decisionsinBrookfield, Playboy, and Network

Automation] is that liability under the Lanham Act can only

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 15

be avoided as a matter of law where there is clear labeling to

avoid the possibility of confusion – including initial interest

confusion – resulting from the use of another’s trademark.” 

Thus, MTM agrees that summary judgment of its trademark

claims is appropriate if there is clear labeling that avoids

likely confusion.

Here, the products at issue are clearly labeled by Amazon

to avoid any likelihood of initial interest confusion by a

reasonablyprudent consumer accustomed to online shopping. 

When a shopper goes to Amazon’s website and searches for

a product using MTM’s trademark “mtm special ops,” the

resulting page displays several products, all of which are

clearly labeled with the product’s name and manufacturer in

large, bright, bold letters and includes a photograph of the

item. In fact, the manufacturer’s name is listed twice. For

example, the first result is “Luminox Men’s 8401 Black Ops

Watch by Luminox.” The second result is “Chase-Durer

Men’s 246.4BB7-XL-BR Special Forces 1000XL Black

Ionic-Plated Underwater Demolition Team Watch by

Chase-Durer.” Because Amazon clearly labels each of the

products for sale by brand name and model number

accompanied by a photograph of the item, it is unreasonable

to suppose that the reasonably prudent consumer accustomed

to shopping online would be confused about the source of the

goods.

MTM argues that initial interest confusion might occur

because Amazon lists the search term used – here the

trademarked phrase “mtm special ops” – three times at the

top of the search page. MTM argues that because Amazon

lists the search term “mtm special ops” at the top of the page,

a consumer might conclude that the products displayed are

types of MTM watches. But, merely looking at Amazon’s

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search results page shows that such consumer confusion is

highly unlikely. None of these watches is labeled with the

word “MTM” or the phrase “Special Ops,” let alone the

specific phrase “MTM Special Ops.” Further, some of the

products listed are not even watches. The sixth result is a

book entitled “Survive!: The Disaster, Crisis and

Emergency Handbook by Jerry Ahem.” The tenth result is

a book entitled “The Moses Expedition: A Novel by Juan

Gómez-Jurado.” No reasonably prudent consumer,

accustomed to shopping online or not, would assume that a

book entitled “The Moses Expedition” is a type of MTM

watch or is in any way affiliated with MTM watches. 

Likewise, no reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to

shopping online would view Amazon’s search results page

and conclude that the products offered are MTM watches. It

is possible that someone, somewhere might be confused by

the search results page. But, “[u]nreasonable, imprudent and

inexperienced web-shoppers are not relevant.” Tabari,

610 F.3d at 1176; see also Network Automation, 638 F.3d at

1153 (“[W]e expect consumers searching for expensive

products online to be even more sophisticated.”). To

establish likelihood of confusion, MTM must show that

confusion is likely, not just possible. See Murray, 86 F.3d at

861.

MTM argues that in order to eliminate the likelihood of

confusion, Amazon must change its search results page so

that it explains to customers that it does not offer MTM

watches for sale before suggesting alternative watches to the

customer. We disagree. The search results page makes clear

to anyone who can read English that Amazon carries only the

brands that are clearly and explicitly listed on the web page. 

The search results page is unambiguous – not unlike when

someone walks into a diner, asks for a Coke, and is told “No

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 17

Coke. Pepsi.” See Multi Time Mach., Inc. v. Amazon.com,

Inc., 792 F.3d 1070, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2015) (Silverman, J.,

dissenting).

In light of the clear labeling Amazon uses on its search

results page, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that

Amazon’s search results page would likely confuse a

reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online

as to the source of the goods being offered. Cf. Playboy,

354 F.3d at 1030 n.44 (Clear labeling “might eliminate the

likelihood of initial interest confusion that exists in this

case.”); Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154 (same). As

Judge Berzon put it, “I do not think it is reasonable to find

initial interest confusion when a consumer is never confused

as to source or affiliation, but instead knows, or should know,

from the outset that a product or web link is not related to that

of the trademark holder because the list produced by the

search engine so informs him.” Playboy, 354 F.3d at

1034–35 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring).

MTM attempts to argue that summary judgment of its

claims is inappropriate because there are numerous factual

disputes related to Amazon’s search results page. But, to the

extent there are factual disputes between the parties, none is

material to the analysis. MTM cannot dispute the fact that

the watches at issue sell for hundreds of dollars. Therefore,

as a matter of law, the relevant consumer would be a

reasonablyprudent consumer accustomed to shopping online. 

See Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1176; Network Automation, 638 F.3d

at 1152–53. Further, MTM cannot dispute the contents of the

web page at issue. A review of Amazon’s web page shows

that each product listed for sale is clearly labeled with the

product’s name and manufacturer and a photograph, and no

product is labeled with MTM’s mark. Thus, the undisputed

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18 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

facts show that it is highly unlikely that a reasonably prudent

consumer accustomed to shopping online would be confused

as to the source of the goods offered for sale on Amazon’s

web page.

The likelihood of confusion is often a question offact, but

not always. In a case such as this, where a court can conclude

that the consumer confusion alleged by the trademark holder

is highly unlikely by simply reviewing the product

listing/advertisement at issue, summary judgment is

appropriate. Cf. M2 Software, 421 F.3d at 1085 (explaining

that summary judgment of a trademark claim is appropriate

where the plaintiff has failed to present “sufficient evidence

to permit a rational trier of fact to find that confusion is

‘probable,’ not merely ‘possible’”). Indeed, in the similar

context of evaluating claims of consumer deception when

dealing with false advertising claims, we have at least twice

concluded – after a review of the label or advertisement at

issue – that there was no likelihood of consumer deception as

a matter of law because no reasonable consumer could have

been deceived by the label/advertisement at issue in the

manner alleged by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Davis v. HSBC

Bank, 691 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012); Freeman v. Time,

Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289–90 (9th Cir. 1995).

Further, we are able to conclude that summary judgment

is appropriate in the present case without delving into any

factors other than: (1) the type of goods and the degree of

care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; and (2) the

labeling and appearance of the products for sale and the

surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page. 

Cf. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 (“[I]t is often possible to

reach a conclusion with respect to likelihood of confusion

after considering only a subset of the factors”). However, if

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 19

we were to evaluate each of the remaining Sleekcraft factors,

those factors would not change our conclusion, here, because

those factors are either neutral or unimportant.

“Actual confusion” – We have held that “[a] showing of

actual confusion among significant numbers of consumers

provides strong support for the likelihood of confusion.” 

Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1026 (noting that a strong showing by

the plaintiff in regard to this factor alone can reverse a grant

of summary judgment). However, here, there is no evidence

of actual confusion. The only “evidence” MTM presented to

the district court of actual confusion is the deposition

testimony of MTM’s president stating that someone named

Eric told him, in reference to Amazon’s web page, “it’s

confusing.” Hearsay problems aside, this testimony is too

speculative to show actual confusion because there is no

evidence showing that Eric was a potential consumer. 

Indeed, at oral argument, MTM conceded that it does not

have evidence of actual consumer confusion. Therefore, this

factor does not weigh in MTM’s favor.

“Defendant’s Intent” – We have also held that “[a]

defendant’s intent to confuse constitutes probative evidence

of likely confusion: Courts assume that the defendant’s

intentions were carried out successfully.” Playboy, 354 F.3d

at 1028 (footnote omitted). MTM argues that the design of

Amazon’s search results page is evidence of its intent to

cause confusion. The design, however, indisputablyproduces

results that are clearly labeled as to the type of product and

brand. Amazon has designed its results page to alleviate any

possible confusion about the source of the products by clearly

labeling each of its products with the product’s name and

manufacturer. Therefore, this factor also does not weigh in

MTM’s favor.

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20 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

“Strength of the Mark” – MTM argues that it has

presented sufficient evidence below from which a jury could

properly conclude that its trademark is both conceptually

strong and commercially strong. However, we find that this

factor is unimportant under the circumstances of this case. 

Even assuming MTM’s mark is one of the strongest in the

world – on the same level as Apple, Coke, Disney, or

McDonald’s – there is still no likelihood of confusion

because Amazon clearly labels the source of the products it

offers for sale.

Further, as we previously found in Network Automation,

the remaining Sleekcraft factors are unimportant in a case,

such as this, involving Internet search terms where the

competing products are clearly labeled and the relevant

consumer would exercise a high degree of care. See Network

Automation, 638 F.3d at 1150–53 (finding “proximity of

goods,” “similarity of marks,” “marketing channels,” and

“likelihood of expansion” to be unimportant in a trademark

case involving Internet search terms where the advertisements

are clearly labeled and the relevant consumers would exercise

a high degree of care).

IV. Conclusion

In light of Amazon’s clear labeling of the products it

carries, by brand name and model, accompanied by a

photograph of the item, no rational trier of fact could find that

a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping

online would likely be confused by the Amazon search

results. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Amazon.

AFFIRMED.

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 21

BEA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Today the panel holds that when it comes to internet

commerce, judges, not jurors, decide what labeling may

confuse shoppers. In so doing, the court departs from our

own trademark precedent and from our summary judgment

jurisprudence. Because I believe that an Amazon shopper

seeking an MTM watch might well initially think that the

watches Amazon offers for sale when he searches “MTM

Special Ops” are affiliated with MTM, I must dissent.

If her brother mentioned MTM Special Ops watches, a

frequent internet shopper might try to purchase one for him

through her usual internet retail sites, perhaps Overstock.com,

Buy.com, and Amazon.com.1 At Overstock’s site, if she

typed “MTM special ops,” the site would respond “Sorry,

your search: ‘mtm special ops’ returned no results.” 

Similarly, at Buy.com, she would be informed “0 results

found. Sorry. Your search for mtm special ops did not

return an exact match. Please try your search again.”

Things are a little different over at “Earth’s most

customer-centric company,” as Amazon styles itself. There,

if she were to enter “MTM Special Ops” as her search request

on the Amazon website, Amazon would respond with its page

showing (1) MTM Special Ops in the search field (2) “MTM

Specials Ops” again—in quotation marks—immediately

below the search field and (3) yet again in the phrase

“Related Searches: MTM special ops watch,” (emphasis in

original) all before stating “Showing 10 Results.” What the

website’s response will not state is the truth recognized by its

competitors: that Amazon does not carry MTM products any

 

1

 MTM sells its products only through its own approved distributors.

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22 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

more than do Overstock.com or Buy.com. Rather, below the

search field, and below the second and third mentions of

“MTM Special Ops” noted above, the site will display

aestheticallysimilar, multi-functionwatchesmanufactured by

MTM’s competitors. The shopper will see that Luminox and

Chase-Durer watches are offered for sale, in response to her

MTM query.

2

MTM asserts the shopper might be confused into thinking

a relationship exists between Luminox and MTM; she may

think that MTM was acquired by Luminox, or that MTM

manufactures component parts of Luminox watches, for

instance. As a result of this initial confusion, MTM asserts,

she might look into buying a Luminox watch, rather than junk

the quest altogether and seek to buy an MTM watch

elsewhere. MTM asserts that Amazon’s use of MTM’s

trademarked name is likely to confuse buyers, who may

ultimately buy a competitor’s goods.

MTM may be mistaken. But whether MTM is mistaken

is a question that requires a factual determination, one this

court does not have authority to make.

2 As of June 17, 2015, the shopper might be subject to even more

confusion if she began her search of Amazon’s wares through Google. If

she searched Google for “Amazon MTM special ops watch,” one of the

search results would be a static page on Amazon’s website. Amazon’s

static webpage stated that “At Amazon.com, we not only have a large

collection of mtm special ops watch products [which, of course, is flatly

untrue], but also a comprehensive set of reviews from our customers.

Below we’ve selected a subset of mtm special ops watch products [a

repetition of the untruth] and the corresponding reviews to help you do

better research, and choose the product that best suits your needs.” 

Amazon, http://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?ie=UTF8&docId=

1001909381. Amazon has since removed the page.

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 23

By usurping the jury function, the majority today makes

new trademark law. When we allow a jury to determine

whether there is a likelihood of confusion, as I would, we do

not make trademark law, because we announce no new

principle bywhich to adjudicate trademark disputes. Today’s

brief majority opinion accomplishes a great deal: the majority

announces a new rule of law, resolves whether “clear

labeling” favors Amazon using its own judgment, and, sub

silentio, overrules this court’s “initial interest confusion”

doctrine.

Capturing initial consumer attention has been recognized

by our court to be a grounds for finding of infringement of the

Lanham Act since 1997. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v.

Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir.

1997) (identifying “initial consumer attention” as a basis for

infringement). In 1999, citing Dr. Seuss, we expressly

adopted the initial interest confusion doctrine in the internet

context, and never repudiated it. Brookfield Communications,

Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062

(9th Cir. 1999). It may not apply where the competing goods

or services are “clearly labeled” such that they cause only

mere diversion, but whether such goods or services are

clearly labeled so as to prevent a prudent internet shopper’s

initial confusion depends on the overall function and

presentation of the web page. The issue is whether a prudent

internet shopper who made the search request and saw the

Amazon result—top to bottom—would more likely than not

be affected by that “initial interest confusion.” That is, an

impression—when first shown the results of the requested

MTM Special Ops search—that Amazon carries watches that

have some connection to MTM, and that those watches are

sold under the name Luminox or Chase-Durer. Whether there

is likelihood of such initial interest confusion, I submit, is a

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24 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

jury question. Intimations in our case law that initial interest

confusion is bad doctrine notwithstanding, it is the law of our

circuit, and, I submit, the most fair reading of the Lanham

Act.

Tellingly, the majority does not cite to the statutory text,

which provides that the nonconsensual use of a registered

trademark will infringe where “such use is likely to cause

confusion, or cause mistake, or deceive.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1114(1)(a). The majority reads the statute to contain

language that it does not, essentially reading the clause “at

point of sale” into the end of § 1114(1)(a). Similarly, the

majority reads 15 U.S.C. § 1125 to apply only at point of

sale—the majority writes that it is unreasonable to suppose

that a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping

online would be confused about the source of the goods

where Luminox and Chase-Durer watches are labeled as

such, but does not address the possibility that a reasonably

prudent consumer might initially assume that those brands

enjoyed some affiliation with MTM which, in turn, could

cause such a shopper to investigate brands which otherwise

would not have been of interest to her.3

To reach its conclusion, the majority purports to apply

this court’s precedent in Network Automation, Inc. v.

Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th

Cir. 2011). In so doing, the majority ignores the procedural

3 Any person who “uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or

device . . . which is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the affiliation,

connection, or association ofsuch person with another person, or as to the

origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services of

commercial activities” is also subject to injunction and liable for damages

to one likely to be damaged. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 25

posture of that case. There, plaintiff Network Automation

and defendant Advanced Systems Concepts both sold job

scheduling and management software. Id. at 1142. Network

Automation advertised its product by purchasing certain

keywords—including registered trademarks belonging to

Advanced Systems—which, when typed into various search

engines, included Network Automation’s website

“www.NetworkAutomation.com” as a labeled, sponsored link

among the search results. Id. Advanced Systems alleged

violation of the Lanham Act and moved for a preliminary

injunction. Id. at 1143. The district court granted a

preliminary injunction to Advanced Systems, and Network

Automation appealed. Id. On appeal, this court reversed and

vacated the preliminary injunction.

To do so, this court did not find that there was no genuine

issue of fact as to likelihood of confusion. Instead, this court

properlyconsidered whether the facts, as the court understood

them, favored Advanced Systems in Network Automation

because a preliminary injunction requires “the moving party

[there, the plaintiff alleging infringement] demonstrate a fair

chance of success on the merits or questions serious enough

to require litigation.” Arc of California v. Douglas, 757 F.3d

975, 993 (9th Cir. 2014). Therefore, the Network Automation

court properly considered the weight of the evidence to

decide whether Advanced Systems had a fair chance of

success on the merits. Here, we are not tasked to determine

whether MTM is likely to succeed, nor to consider the weight

of the evidence. As this is an appeal from a summary

judgment, we must decide whether the non-moving party

(MTM) tendered a genuine issue of fact. Network

Automation did not announce a rule that clear labeling is per

se a question of law, nor that a judge’s determination that

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26 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

products are clearly labeled precludes a triable issue of fact as

to trademark infringement.

Indeed, even if Network Automation were not so readily

distinguishable by its procedural posture, it is factually

distinguishable. In Network Automation, the “diversionary”

goods were clearly labeled on the response page as

“Sponsored Links,” showing that the producers of those

products were the ones advertising for themselves, not for the

firm named in the search request. Network Automation,

638 F.3d at 1144. Unlike the sponsored links at issue in

Network Automation, and unlike its competitorsBuy.com and

Overstock.com, Amazon does not forestall any confusion by

informing customers who are searching “MTM Special Ops”

that Amazon does not carry any such products. Amazon does

just the opposite. It responds by twice naming MTM, and

once specifically naming watches.

On this record, a jury could infer that users who are

confused by the search results are confused as to why MTM

products are not listed. There is a question of fact whether

users who are confused by the search result will wonder

whether a competitor has acquired MTM or is otherwise

affiliated with or approved by MTM. See Brookfield

Communications, 174 F.3d at 1057. This is especially true as

to a brand like MTM, as many luxury brands with distinct

marks are produced bymanufacturers of lower-priced, betterknown brands—just as Honda manufactures Acura

automobiles but sells Acura automobiles under a distinct

mark that is marketed to wealthier purchasers, and Timex

manufactures watches for luxury fashion houses Versace and

Salvatore Ferragamo. Like MTM, Luminox manufactures

luxury watches, and a customer might think that MTM and

Luminox are manufactured by the same parent company. The

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 27

possibility of initial interest confusion here is likely much

higher than if, for instance, a customer using an online

grocery website typed “Coke” and only Pepsi products were

returned as results. No shopper would think that Pepsi was

simply a higher end version of Coke, or that Pepsi had

acquired Coke’s secret recipe and started selling it under the

Pepsi mark.

In any event, even as to expensive goods—for instance,

pianos sold under a mark very similar to the famous Steinway

and Sons brand’s mark—the issue is not that a buyer might

buy a piano manufactured by someone other than Steinway

thinking that it was a Steinway. The issue is that the

defendant’s use of the mark would cause initial interest

confusion by attracting potential customers’ attention to buy

the infringing goods because of the trademark holder’s hardwon reputation. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1063 (citing

Grotrarian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v.

Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341–42 (2d. Cir. 1975)).

A jury could infer that the labeling of the search results,

and Amazon’s failure to notify customers that it does not

have results that match MTM’s mark, give rise to initial

interest confusion. If so, a jury could find that Amazon

customers searching for MTM products are subject to more

than mere diversion, since MTM is not required to show that

customers are likely to be confused at the point of sale. 

Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v.NetscapeCommunications Corp.,

354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004).

Assuming arguendo that the majority properly found that

Amazon’s search results are clearly labeled, the majority

extends its factual determinations further by determining that

in this case, clear labeling outweighs the other eight factors

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28 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

considered in trademark suits, factors that remain the law of

this circuit: (1) strength of the mark(s); (2) proximity or

relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks;

(4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels;

(6) degree of consumer care; (7) the defendants’ intent; and

(8) likelihood of expansion. Network Automation, 638 F.3d

at 1145 (citing AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341,

348–49 (9th Cir. 1979)). To be sure, courts must be flexible

in their application of the factors, as some may not apply in

every case. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1026. Here, for instance,

the likelihood of expansion does not apply because both

MTM and Amazon already sell luxury watches, so whether

either is likely to expand its sales into the luxury watch

market is not a question. However, where the Sleekcraft

factors could tip in either direction, there is a jury question. 

Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand

Management, Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Simply stating that the Sleekcraft factors do not favor the

plaintiff, or don’t bear on the clarity of the labeling, does not

resolve the underlying factual question.

Having exercised its own judgment to determine that this

presentation is not confusing, the majority purports to

consider the Sleekcraft factors, though the opinion essentially

states that some of the factors are per se irrelevant—for

instance, as to the Sleekcraft factor, “strength of the mark,”

the majority assert that “under the circumstances of this

case,” the factor is unimportant because “Amazon clearly

labels the source of the products it offers for sale.” Slip op.

at 20. By reiterating the conclusion at which it had already

arrived, the majority ignores the factor and the fact-intensive

analysis it entails. A mark’s strength is a measure of how

uniquely identified it is with a product or service, and

therefore how deserving of trademark protection. Fortune

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 29

Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1032. “A mark’s conceptual strength

depends largely on the obviousness of its connection to the

good or service to which it refers. The less obvious the

connection, the stronger the mark, and vice versa.” Id. at

1032. Conceptual strength is considered along a continuum,

and in this circuit, marks may be classified as falling into one

of five categories, from conceptually weak to conceptually

strong: generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful. 

Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1033. Whether a mark is

descriptive or suggestive is a question of fact. Id. at 1034. In

an infringement suit, “the distinction [between a descriptive

and suggestive mark] is important because if the mark is

suggestive, there is a stronger likelihood that the ‘strength of

the mark’ factor favors the [plaintiff].” Id. Here, the phrase

“MTM Special Ops” requires “a mental leap from the mark

to the product,” because the phrase does not expressly refer

to watches. Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1033. Indeed, by

evoking elite military forces (“Special Ops”), the goods

suggested by the phrase are as likely to be protective gear,

binoculars, weapons, or boots as they are watches. A jury

could find that the mark is suggestive and conceptually strong

because it does not obviously refer to watches, or that it is

merely descriptive because the watches are made in a military

style. Either way, the weight of the evidence is a question of

fact, and there is a genuine issue of fact as to the conceptual

strength of the mark. As in Fortune Dynamic, “a jury should

assess the conceptual strength of [plaintiff’s] mark in the first

instance.” 618 F.3d at 1033. However, the majority simply

brushes off the question as irrelevant “under the

circumstances.” The circumstances surrounding the case are

questions of fact, not law, and should be given to a jury to

determine.

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Similarly, the majority finds that Amazon’s intent weighs

in favor of Amazon. A defendant’s intent is relevant because

a “defendant’s intent to confuse constitutes probative

evidence of likely confusion.” Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1029. 

MTM submitted evidence that Amazon vendors and

customers had complained to Amazon because they did not

understand why they received certain non-responsive search

results when they searched for products that are not carried by

Amazon. The evidence showed that Amazon employees did

not take action to address the complaints by explaining to the

public how its search function works.4 One Amazon

employee noted that explainingBBS to the public might draw

customers’ and vendors’ unwanted scrutiny to the matter. 

Amazon did not disclose to shoppers that its search function

responds to customer behavior.

As in Playboy, this evidence suggests, “at a minimum,

that defendants do nothing to alleviate confusion . . .

Although not definitive, this factor provides some evidence

of an intent to confuse on the part of defendants.” Playboy,

4 Amazon’s search algorithm responds to its customers’ behavior using

a Behavior Based Search (“BBS”) technology, which uses data aboutwhat

customers view and purchase after searching certain terms. Amazon does

not program the terms; the function responds solely to customer behavior. 

If enough customers search for a certain keyword, “X,” and then look at

or purchase another product “Y,” even if X and Y are not obviously

related, future customers who search for X may receive search results

including Y. But the BBS function is not solely responsible for the search

results. The results list also includes matches based on a search of terms

on Amazon’s pages—for instance, streaming video of a show called

Special Ops Mission may be called up. Whether a particular result

appears because of BBS or a traditional search of matching terms is not

evident from the matches, and the relevant products (which are based on

search terms) and recommended products (based on BBS) are mingled

together.

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MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM 31

354 F.3d at 1029. From evidence that “Earth’s most

customer-centric company” took no action on these

complaints, a jury could infer that Amazon intended to

confuse its customers.

The majority ignores this evidence on the basis of its

conclusion that Amazon created a page with clearly labeled

wares, and further concludes that Amazon must not have

intended to confuse customers, or its page would not be

clearly labeled. Slip op. at 19–20. However, to conclude that

there is no triable issue of fact, the majority may not overlook

or ignore evidence to the contrary in the record, or assume

that a jury would weigh evidence the same way that the panel

does.

Finally, the majority repeatedly states that not only does

Amazon clearly label its products, but there is no evidence of

actual confusion. Assuming arguendo that there is no

evidence from which a jury could infer actual confusion,5the

absence of actual confusion is not dispositive of whether

there is a genuine issue of fact. Where evidence of actual

confusion is submitted, it is “strong support for the likelihood

5 Amazon submitted evidence that purports to show that no customers

were confused, because customers who searched for “Luminox” were 21

times as likely to purchase a Luminox watch as were customers who

searched for “MTM Special Ops.” It isn’t surprising that customers who

search for an item (Luminox watches) are more likely to buy that item

than customers who did not search for it but searched for another product

(MTM watches). However, a jury might view this purported evidence of

no actual confusion as flawed because a user researching watches might

initially be confused about the availability of MTM watches online and so

not purchase a Luminox the same day. Further, some users did search for

“MTM Special Ops” and purchase a competitor’s watch the same day,

which a jury could find probative of some confusion.

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32 MULTI TIME MACHINE V. AMAZON.COM

of confusion.” Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1151. But

actual confusion “is not necessary to a finding of likelihood

of confusion under the Lanham Act. Indeed, proving actual

confusion is difficult and the courts have often discounted

such evidence because it was unclear or insubstantial.” Id. 

A plaintiff need not show actual confusion to prevail.

Through its cursory review of the Sleekcraft factors and

conclusory statements about clear labeling, the majority

purports to apply this circuit’s trademark law, and ignores the

doctrine of initial interest confusion. In so doing, the

majority today writes new trademark law and blurs the line

between innovation and infringement.

More troubling, the majority ignores the role of the jury. 

Summary judgment law is an aid to judicial economy, but it

can be so only to the extent that it comports with the Seventh

Amendment. Were we to reverse and remand, MTM might

well lose. The likelihood of that outcome is irrelevant to the

question whether there is a genuine issue of fact. I

respectfully dissent.

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