Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00686/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00686-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 1 “Doc. No.” refers to documents in this Court’s file. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROSENDO RODRIGUEZ JR.,

Petitioner, 

vs.

CHARLES L. RYAN, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 08-686-PHX-ROS (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

On April 8, 2008, Petitioner, Rosendo Rodriguez, Jr., an inmate confined in the

Arizona State Prison, Lewis Unit, in Buckeye, Arizona, Florence, filed a pro se

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (“Petition”),

pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.)1

 The District Court dismissed

Grounds 3, 7 (in part), and 8, for failure to state a cognizable claim, and called for an

answer to the remaining grounds in the Petition. (Doc. No. 3.) On August 1, 2008,

Respondents filed an Answer with Exhibits A through TT attached. (Doc. No. 9.) 

A Reply was filed by Petitioner on September 30, 2008. (Doc. No. 13.)

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation.

For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order DISMISSING the Petition in its entirety.

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2 This uncontested factual assertion is alleged in the Answer, but not

found in the supporting exhibits. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Indictment, Trial and Sentencing

On July 2, 1996, Rosendo Rodriguez Jr. was indicted by the Grand Jurors of

Maricopa County for first degree murder (counts 1 through 3), aggravated assault

(counts 4 through 8 ), and reckless endangerment (counts 9 and 10). (Answer, Ex. A.)

 The State filed a notice of intention to seek the death penalty, an allegation of three

historical priors, and an allegation of dangerous nature of the offense for counts 1

through 3. (Answer, Ex. C.) The trial court directed verdicts on the first degree

murder charges for lack of premeditation, reducing the charges to second-degree

murder,2

 and dismissed count 8. (Answer, Ex. F at 6.) A jury found Petitioner guilty

of all 9 remaining counts, and, on April 28, 2000, the trial court sentenced Petitioner

to a combination of consecutive and concurrent aggravated sentences that totaled 78

years’ imprisonment. (Answer, Ex. D, F.) A motion for a new trial was denied by the

trial court. (Answer, Ex. Q, Reporters Transcript (“R.T.”) 10/15/99 at 19.) 

B. Appeal

Rodriguez, through counsel, filed an appeal raising two arguments: 1) a new

trial was required because Petitioner was forced to use a peremptory strike on a biased

juror who the court refused to strike for cause; and 2) there was insufficient evidence

to support counts 9 and 10 of the indictment. (Answer, Ex. G.) On May 10, 2001, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Rodriguez’s conviction and sentence in an

unpublished memorandum decision. (Answer, Ex. H.)

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3

Respondents employ the date on which the Arizona Supreme Court dated the

document announcing its decision and hence making it a public record, not the earlier

date on which the court made its decision. (Answer, n.1) This Court will rely on the

same date. 

4

Respondents correctly employ the prison-mailbox rule to calculate the filing

date of Petitioner’s pro se pleadings based on the date that Petitioner signed and

delivered the documents to prison authorities for mailing, not the subsequent date that

a court accepted the pleadings as filed. See State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266 (App.

1999). 

-3-

Rodriguez filed a petition for review. (Answer, Ex. I.) On November 21,

20013

, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Answer, Ex. J.) The mandate

issued on December 12, 2001. (Answer, Ex. K.)

C. First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On January 18, 20024, Rodriguez filed a notice of post-conviction relief.

(Answer, Ex. K.) On February 27, 2002, the trial court appointed counsel to represent

Petitioner, and set a briefing schedule for the Rule 32 petition. (Answer, Ex. L.)

After Petitioner’s first two appointed counsel were withdrawn due to conflicts, the

trial court appointed attorney Stephen Johnson to represent Petitioner, and set a July

12, 2002 deadline for filing the Rule 32 petition. (Answer, Ex. L.) On June 3, 2002,

Petitioner sent a letter to the Clerk of Court requesting contact information for

Johnson. (Answer, Ex. M.) On June 17, 2002, Petitioner sent a letter to the trial

court, requesting Johnson’s contact information. (Id.) The trial court responded on

June 26, 2002, by providing Petitioner with Johnson’s contact information. (Id.) The

trial ordered counsel to file a petition by August 20, 2002, or appear before the court

to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failure to file a petition on

behalf of the Petitioner. (Answer, Ex. O.)

Counsel filed a petition on August 29, 2002, arguing that Petitioner was

eligible for relief because of abuse of discretion by the trial judge in not awarding

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Petitioner’s motion for new trial or evidentiary hearing on motion for new trial in light

of substantial evidence previously presented to the trial court. (Answer, Ex. P.) The

petition itself consisted of little argument and relied almost entirely on the

incorporation of the previously filed motions for new trial. (Id.) Petitioner continued

to file motions with the trial court indicating that he had not been in contact with

Johnson. (Answer, Ex. R, T, U.) It is apparent from these filings that Petitioner was

unaware that a petition for post-conviction relief had been filed by counsel. (Id.) On

January 31, 2003, the trial court dismissed the post-conviction petition on the ground

that “[t]he arguments and claims raised by the defendant through counsel concerning

post-verdict proceedings are precluded now as not raised in defendant’s direct

appeal.” (Answer, Ex. V.) On February 20, 2003, Rodriguez filed a complaint

against Johnson with the State Bar of Arizona. (Answer, Ex. QQ.) On May 27, 2004,

Johnson was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and one

day based on the knowing fabrication of a document for submission with his response

to the bar complaint. (Id.) 

D. Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On October 18, 2004, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a second petition for

post-conviction relief raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

(Answer, Ex. W.) After the trial court accepted the successive petition, which the

trial court found set forth sufficient information concerning a claim of actual

innocence pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(h) to allow it to proceed (Answer, Ex. X),

Petitioner filed a supplement to the petition raising the additional claims of

prosecutorial misconduct, sentencing error under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004), and ineffective assistance of counsel. (Answer, Ex. Y.) The trial court

accepted the filing. (Id.) On April 6, 2005, the trial court dismissed the second

petition, finding that 1) the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel precluded as

not raised in the first petition; 2) the Blakely claim not well taken as Blakely had no

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retroactive application to Petitioner’s case; and 3) his argument regarding actual

innocence not related to the presence of new evidence not presented to and heard by

the jury other than some impeachment evidence, and thus failed under Rule 32.1(h),

which requires an affirmative, express claim of evidence that shows actual innocence

by clear and convincing evidence. (Answer, Ex. BB.) Rodriguez filed a petition for

review on May 6, 2005. (Answer, Ex. CC.) The petition for review was denied by

the appellate court on March 2, 2006. (Answer, Ex. EE.) Rodriguez petitioned the

Arizona Supreme Court for review, and, on July 20, 2006, the petition was denied.

(Ex. HH.) 

E. Third Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On October 12, 2006, Petitioner filed, pro se, a third notice of post-conviction

relief. (Answer, Ex. II.) The trial court noted that the notice was untimely, and while

Petitioner had checked the box claiming he is actually innocent, his claim was based

on alleged ineffectiveness of his first Rule 32 attorney. (Answer, Ex. JJ.) Moreover,

the trial court found that Petitioner had already been allowed to pursue his claim of

actual innocence in his second Rule 32 proceeding. (Id.) The trial court ordered the

petition dismissed. (Id.) Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal as

untimely. (Answer, Ex. KK.) Rodriguez filed a motion to exceed page count, a

motion for reconsideration, and a supplement to the motion for reconsideration on

March 12, 2007. (Answer, Ex. MM.) The trial court denied the motion for

reconsideration on April 4, 2007. (Answer, Ex. NN.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review on May 30, 2007. (Answer, Ex. OO.) .

(Answer, Ex. EE.) On June 6, 2007, the appellate court denied the petition as

untimely. (Answer, Ex. PP.) 

F. Federal Habeas Petition

Rodriguez filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in District Court on

April 8, 2008. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner raises Petitioner raises 18 grounds for relief.

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In Ground 1, he alleges that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss a juror for cause.

In Ground 2, he alleges that his endangerment convictions are supported by

insufficient evidence. In Grounds 3, 7 (in part) and 8, he alleges ineffective assistance

of post-conviction counsel. In Grounds 4, 7 (in part), and 9-16, he alleges that he

received ineffective assistance of trial and/or appellate counsel. In Grounds 5, 17 and

18, he alleges the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. In Ground 6, Petitioner alleges

the trial court violated his right to a jury trial by aggravating his sentence based upon

facts not found by the jury; made statements that conveyed the court’s view that he

was guilty of second degree murder in violation of Petitioner’s right to the

presumption of innocence; and imposed a sentence that exceeded the statutory

maximum. The Court previously dismissed Grounds 3, 7 (in part), and 8, for failure

to state a cognizable claim. (Doc. No. 3.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Rodriguez filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

(“AEDPA”). 

B. Timeliness

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1).

The running of this one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state

convictions is tolled during any period when "a properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending" in any state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, the statute

of limitations is tolled during the pendency of a state court action for post-conviction

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

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An application contemplated by section 2244(d)(2) is properly filed "when its

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings. These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document,

the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and

the requisite filing fee." Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (footnote omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has held that untimely state post-conviction

petitions are not “properly filed” under AEDPA, and do not toll AEDPA's statute of

limitations. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA's limitations period may be

equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. 

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997),

overruled, in part, on other grounds by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly)

163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). Tolling is appropriate when "extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time." Id.; see also, Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002)(stating

that "the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high,

lest the exceptions swallow the rule.") (citations omitted); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d

796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir.1999). The extraordinary circumstances requirement is a "high hurdle," see

Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1289, and policy considerations counsel against

equitable tolling. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980). A petitioner seeking

equitable tolling must establish two elements: "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Petitioner must also establish a "causal

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connection" between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely

petition. Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007).

This Court rejects Respondents argument that equitable tolling of the

Congressionally mandated limitations period cannot survive in the face of Bowles v.

Russell, 551 U.S. 2360 (2007). Respondents argue that the United States Supreme

Court opinion in Bowles, established that the AEDPA limitations period is

jurisdictional, and therefore equitable tolling does not apply. This Court disagrees.

Prior to Bowles, the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that equitable tolling

is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Lawrence v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 127

S.Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007). The Ninth Circuit continues to apply equitable tolling to the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations post-Bowles. Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054,

n.3 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, this Court rejects Respondents arguments and finds

that Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. 

C. Analysis

The Magistrate Judge finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the Petition filed in

this Court is untimely. Rodriguez had until one year after his conviction and sentence

became final to file his federal petition. 

1. Limitation Period Under § 2244(d)(1)(A)

Petitioner's conviction and sentence became final on February 19, 2003, ninety

(90) days after his direct appeal was denied by the Arizona Supreme Court on

November 21, 2002, when the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari from

the United States Supreme Court expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Wixom v.

Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001)(Judgment becomes final either by the

conclusion of direct review by the highest court, including the United States Supreme

Court, or by the expiration of the time to seek such review.). Accordingly, Petitioner

was required to file his petition for writ of habeas corpus within 1 year of the date his

convictions became final, i.e., one year from April 4, 2004, absent statutory tolling.

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2. Statutory Tolling

a. First Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

The limitations period was tolled immediately, however, by the pendency of

Petitioner’s petition for post conviction relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). There

was no gap between the conclusion of direct review, and Rodriguez’s properly filed

notice of petition for post-conviction review. See Isley v. Arizona Dept. of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2004)(State petition is “pending” within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) when properly filed notice of post-conviction

relief is filed.). Thus, the issue is not when direct review became final under §

2244(d)(1)(A), rather, this Court must determine how long Rodriguez’s petition for

post-conviction relief was “pending” for purposes of tolling the limitations period

pursuant to § 2244(d)(2). 

Statutory tolling continued through the conclusion of the first post-conviction

proceeding that concluded on January 31, 2003, the date the trial court denied postconviction relief. Petitioner did not file his federal habeas until more than five years

later. 

b. Second And Third Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief

Petitioner did not file his second petition for post-conviction relief until the

tolling period had expired. The second petition was filed 616 days after the trial court

denied post-conviction relief. The filing of the second petition or subsequent

pleadings could not revive the statute of limitations because it had already lapsed.

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Neither did the third petition restart the limitations period. See id.

Additionally, the third petition was untimely, rendering it not “properly filed” for

tolling purposes under § 2244(d)(2). Untimely pleadings summarily dismissed by the

state courts are not "properly filed" and do not result in statutory tolling of the 1-year

statute of limitations. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding that "[b]ecause the state

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court rejected petitioner's PCR petition as untimely, it was not 'properly filed,' and he

was not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)"). 

c. State-Bar Proceeding

Petitioner filed a bar complaint against his post-conviction counsel on February

20, 2003, alleging that counsel failed to adequately communicate with him during the

representation and that counsel was not diligent in the representation. (Answer, Ex.

QQ.) Counsel responded to the bar complaint by submitting a falsified letter that he

purportedly sent to Petitioner. (Id.) Following the recommendation of the

Disciplinary Commission, the bar proceeding concluded on May 27, 2004, when the

Arizona Supreme Court suspended counsel for 6 months and 1 day. (Id; Ex. RR.) 

Because review of a bar complaint is not a judiciary review of the pertinent judgment

or claim at issue in this case, it does not toll the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1); Cf. Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 957-62 (9th Cir. 2002)(holding that

a petition for clemency under Washington state law is not an application for “state

post-conviction or other collateral review’); Rodriguez v. Spencer, 412 F.3d 29, 36 (1st

Cir. 2005)(explaining that a pro se motion to revive an appeal or appoint counsel for

state post-conviction relief does not toll the statue).

Petitioner was required to file his petition for writ of habeas corpus within the

1-year period of limitations, excluding time where the statute of limitations was

properly tolled. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2). Petitioner did not file his

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus within the 1-year statute of limitations.

Unless there is a basis for equitably tolling the limitations period, Petitioner's habeas

petition, filed on April 7, 2008, is untimely. This Court must recommend denial of

Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus as untimely filed. 

3. Equitable tolling

“A pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

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F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner asserts, in response to Respondents’

contention that his Petition is untimely, that his “failure to file his petition for writ of

habeas corpus within one year of the statutory tolling was due to first Rule 32

counsel’s performance in not submitting [Petitioner’s] ineffective assistance of

counsel and prosecutorial misconduct issues attacking the constitutionality of

detention.” (Doc. No. 13, Reply at 15, 20.) Petitioner also asserts that at the time he

filed his second petition for post-conviction relief, he was not aware of the status of

the first post-conviction proceeding. (Id. at 17.) Similarly, Petitioner claims that, as

to his third petition for post-conviction relief, he was pursuing his rights diligently,

and his lack of knowledge that the state courts had reached a final resolution of his

case can provide grounds for equitable tolling. (Id. at 18-19.) Petitioner asserts that

his first appointed Rule 32 counsel “effectively abandoned” Petitioner and prevented

him from filing his habeas petition on time by failing to inform him of ruling in his

case. (Id. at 19.) 

Petitioner also raises an argument that constitutional considerations require an

actual innocence exception to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. (Id. at 21-22.)

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit, however, has held that a showing

of actual innocence may excuse an untimely section 2254 habeas petition. See Majoy

v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 2002) (“the question to be answered is whether

surviving the rigors of this gateway has the consequence of overriding AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitation, a legal question not yet decided by this Circuit or the

Supreme Court.”); Perez v. Evans, 2009 WL 2104853 at *16 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Jones

v. Marshall, 2009 WL 2189892 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2009). By analogy to the actual

innocence exception in the procedural context, to support a claim of actual innocence

a petitioner must “support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable

evidence – whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness

accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v.

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Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). Applying this same standard in the context of

timeliness, it is apparent from a review of the claims raised by Petitioner, including

the allegations asserted in Petitioner’s reply, that Petitioner has not offered any new

evidence of actual innocence to support his argument. Thus, assuming that

establishing “actual innocence” would warrant equitable tolling of the statue of

limitations, this Court finds that Petitioner has failed to assert a sufficient factual

predicate to demonstrate that he would be entitled to the benefit of this doctrine. 

The Court does find Petitioner’s arguments that his complete lack of

communication with his first Rule 32 counsel impeded his efforts to timely file a

habeas petition persuasive. It is clear from the record that counsel did not

communicate with Petitioner prior to or after filing his first petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner’s claim that he was not notified of the disposition of his

first state petition by Johnson is credible. The record further indicates that Petitioner

acted diligently to pursue his post-conviction claims in state court by obtaining

counsel and filing a second petition. Although ordinary attorney negligence will not

justify equitable tolling, the Ninth Circuit recognizes sufficiently egregious attorney

misconduct may constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ warranting equitable

tolling of AEDPA’s statue of limitations. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800 (9th

Cir. 2003)(citing Ford v. Hubbard, 330 F.1086, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)); see Fonseca v.

Hall, 486 F.Supp.2d 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2007)(egregious conduct demonstrated by

retained counsel’s failure to file habeas corpus petition on petitioner’s behalf and

dilegence demonstrated by petitioner and families conduct in attempting to ascertain

attorney’s progress sufficient to equitably toll the AEDPA’s limitations period.).

Furthermore, “a prisoner’s lack of knowledge that the state courts have reached a final

resolution of his case can provide grounds for equitable tolling if the prisoner has

acted diligently in the matter.” Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir.

2009)(quoting Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001). 

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The Court concludes that counsel’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to

justify equitable tolling of the one-year limitation period under AEDPA. Additionally,

counsel’s conduct resulted in Petitioner’s lack of knowledge that the trial court had

denied his first Rule 32 petition. These extraordinary circumstances justify equitable

tolling of some of the limitations period. Petitioner, however, has established no

causal connection between the extraordinary circumstance, counsel’s misconduct and

his lack of knowledge of the disposition of his first Rule 32, and his failure to timely

file a federal petition after his second state petition was denied. See Bryant, 499 F.3d

at 1061 (Petitioner not entitled to equitable tolling if there is no connection between

extraordinary circumstances and the untimeliness of habeas petition.) Even if

Petitioner did not know about the disposition of his first state petition, Petitioner does

not assert that he was unaware of the outcome of the second state petition, nor does

he assert any plausible basis for finding equitable tolling of the limitations period once

he was no longer in a position of reliance on his first Rule 32 counsel. Thus,

equitable tolling of the limitations period beyond the conclusion of the second state

petition is unwarranted. Petitioner’s second petition concluded, and the limitations

period began running again, on July 21, 2006, when the Arizona Supreme Court

denied the petition for review. As discussed above, the untimely third petition did not

toll the limitations period. Thus, the court finds that the federal petition, filed on

April 4, 2008, is untimely. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of

the record, DISMISS this action in its entirety as untimely. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation.

A party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served

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with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use

the following case number: CIV 08-686-PHX-ROS.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by

the District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 7th day of October, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-00686-ROS Document 17 Filed 10/07/09 Page 14 of 14