Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06968/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06968-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-06968 JSW

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff John Doe filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the Sexual

Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law (“SPPCA”), which was enacted by

California voters on November 7, 2006. The SPPCA prohibits registered sex offenders from

residing within 2,000 feet of any public or private school or park where children regularly

gather. Cal. Pen. Code § 3003.5. Over twenty years ago, Plaintiff pled guilty and was

convicted of a felony for which he must register as a sex offender pursuant to California Penal

Code § 290. (Declaration of John Doe, ¶ 2.) He was sentenced to three months confinement,

probation, and mandatory registration as a sex offender for life. (Id.) In 1999, a California

court set aside his plea and dismissed the original criminal charges pursuant to California Penal

Code § 1203.4. (Id., ¶ 3.)

On November 8, 2006, this Court granted Plaintiff’s application for a temporary

restraining order and set a briefing schedule on Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 

In the briefs filed in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, it appeared as though all parties agreed

that the SPPCA did not apply retroactively. (Docket No. 19 at p. 4-6; Docket No. 21 at p. 3.) If

the 

Case 3:06-cv-06968-JSW Document 56 Filed 02/22/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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SPPCA only applies prospectively, it would be inapplicable to Plaintiff, and, thus, he would not

have standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Because “standing is an aspect of subject

matter jurisdiction,” the Court may address this issue sua sponte. Fleck and Assocs., Inc. v.

Phoenix, City of, an Arizona Mun. Corp., 471 F.3d 1100, 1107 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006).

ANALYSIS

“Article III of the Constitution requires that a plaintiff have standing before a case may

be adjudicated.” Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 637 (9th Cir. 2004). To satisfy

the Constitution’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) an “injury in fact” that is (a)

concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the

injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it must be

likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also Covington, 358

F.3d at 637-38. If the statute does not apply retrospectively, Plaintiff would have no actual or

imminent injury in fact because the statute would not apply to him.

 “It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to operate prospectively absent an

express declaration of retrospectivity or a clear indication that the electorate, or the Legislature,

intended otherwise.” Tapia v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d 282, 287 (1991); see also

Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1193-94 (1988) (“It is a widely recognized

legal principle ... that in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary statutory

enactments apply prospectively.”). This legal principle is embodied specifically in both the

California Civil and Criminal Codes. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3 (“No part of it is retroactive,

unless expressly so declared”); Cal. Crim. Code § 3 (same). 

When a statute is silent on the issue of retrospectivity, California courts have held the

statute applies prospectively. Evangelatos, 44 Cal. 3d at 1194; see also Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 287

(finding a proposition operated prospectively where both the proposition and the related ballot

arguments were “entirely silent on the question of retrospectivity.”). Here, the text of the

SPPCA is silent on the issue of retrospectivity. Judge Karlton in the Eastern District of

California recently examined the SPPCA. Based on the absence of any language addressing

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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retroactivity in the SPPCA and based on the court’s view that it was not “very clear” from

extrinsic sources that voters intended it to be retroactive, he concluded that it applied

prospectively. Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 471002, *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2007). This

Court agrees with Judge Karlton’s reasoning and similarly concludes that the SPPCA applies

prospectively.

Despite the parties’ agreement that the SPPCA applies prospectively, they disagree on

what the term “prospsective” means in the context of the SPPCA. Plaintiff argues that

prospective means the statute does not apply to persons who were convicted before the date of

the SPPCA’s enactment. (Docket No. 50 at p.6.) The Governor argues that it applies only to

persons released after the SPPCA’s effective date. (Docket No. 55 at p.1-2.) The Attorney

General, on the other hand, argues that the SPPCA applies to registered sex offenders released

before the date of its enactment if they change their residence after November 7, 2006. Judge

Karlton recently described the Attorney General’s position as “border[ing] on the frivolous” and

noted: “The SPPCA makes absolutely no distinction between sex offenders currently residing

within a 2,000 feet zone and those who later relocate within such an area.” Doe v.

Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 471002, *4.

Under either the Plaintiff’s or the Governor’s position, the SPPCA clearly does not

apply to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was both convicted and released years before the SPPCA was

enacted. (Declaration of John Doe, ¶ 2.) Thus, under either interpretation, Plaintiff does not

have standing to challenge the SPPCA. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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