Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00362/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00362-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 120
Nature of Suit: Marine Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 46:741 Shipping

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Petitioners each filed Second Amended Petitions on 1

October 5, 2006 (Docs. 72 & 73), without leave of court or

consent of the opposing party. Subsequently, on October 12,

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LT. CMDR. RICHARD T. GENGLER and

LT. CMDR. DANIEL S. McSEVENEY,

 Petitioners,

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THROUGH

ITS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND

NAVY; and SECRETARY DONALD C.

WINTER, 

 Respondents.

1:06-CV-00362 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DENYING UNITED STATES’

MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 78), 

ADDRESSING VARIOUS

PROCEDURAL MOTIONS (DOCS. 53

& 54), AND 

SETTING FURTHER SCHEDULING

CONFERENCE 

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court for decision are numerous motions in this

habeas case concerning the military service obligations of

Petitioners, Lieutenant Commander Richard T. Gengler and

Lieutenant Commander Daniel S. McSeveney. Petitioners filed

first amended petitions for habeas corpus on September 15, 2006,

alleging (1) that the Navy’s decision to deny their requests for

discharge violates the seven-year active duty term of their

service agreements; and (2) that the Navy should be equitably

estopped from arguing that an eight year statutory active service

requirement trumps the written terms of their service agreements. 

(Docs. 51 & 52.) 

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2006, Petitioners each filed Third Amended Complaints (Doc. 76

&77), again without leave of court or consent of the opposing

party. The United States has requested that these petitions be

stricken. (Doc. 78 at 6 n1.) 

2

The United States moves to dismiss the petitions, arguing,

(1) that military officers have no contract rights and cannot

unilaterally terminate their terms of active service; and (2)

that Petitioners have failed to properly plead equitable

estoppel. (Doc. 78.) Petitioners oppose dismissal (Doc. 85),

request that the district court enter an order requiring the

United States to answer their petitions and participate in

discovery (Docs. 53 & 54), and request that the district court

set an evidentiary hearing (id.). The government does not oppose

being ordered to answer, but requests a minimum of 30 days within

which to do so. (Doc. 79.) The United States does oppose the

scope and nature of the Petitioners’ proposed discovery as well

as Petitioners’ request that discovery take place on an expedited

schedule. (Id.) Finally, the government maintains that the

request for an evidentiary hearing is premature. (Id.)

In addition, on October 13, 2006, Lt. Cmdr. Gengler filed a

separate motion concerning his current leave status. He

requested that the district court either (1) order the Navy to

allow him to remain in Chicago until December 8, 2006 (or pending

a decision on the merits of this case); or (2) release him on

habeas corpus bail. (See Doc. 90 at 2.) Gengler’s request for

bail is addressed in a separately filed findings of fact and

conclusions of law. (Doc. 100.) 

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3

II. BACKGROUND

Petitioners Lt. Cmdr. Richard T. Gengler and Lt. Cmdr.

Daniel S. McSeveney are Naval Officers and Aviators who are

currently stationed with the Operational Test Evaluation Squadron

Nine (VX-9) in China Lake, California. At least until recently,

both had been physically assigned as Operational Test Directors

for the F/A-18C-F weapons system programs and currently are on

“detachment” in Key West, Florida, performing operational tests

on a radar system. (Doc. 16 at 1; Gengler and McSeveney Decls.

at ¶7; Gunter Decl. at 3.) Lt. Cmdr Gengler’s current situation

has changed, however. He was initially granted a 60 day leave to

begin studying at the University of Chicago Graduate Business

School, but the Navy recently refused to extend his leave past

November 4, 2006. This subject is discussed in greater detail in

a separately filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

(Doc. 100.) 

Petitioners both entered the Navy in April 1996, after

signing separate “Aviation Officer Candidate Program Service

Agreements” (the “Service Agreements”). The Service Agreements,

which were drafted by the Navy and signed on the Navy’s behalf by

another Naval Officer, provide in pertinent part:

1. Having volunteered for Aviation Officer

Candidate training under the Aviation Officer

Candidate Program, I hereby acknowledge:

a. If entering the program from civilian

life

(1) that I will be required to enlist

in the Naval Reserve; and

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(2) that I will receive orders to

active duty for the Aviation

Officer Candidate Program and I do

hereby consent to serve on active

duty in an enlisted status for such

period of indoctrination in the

program as may be prescribed; and

(3) that, in the event I fail to complete

satisfactorily the requirements for

appointment to commissioned grade or

request disenrollment from the Aviation

Officer Candidate Program prior to

acceptance of a commission, I will be

discharged from my enlisted status.

***

d. That upon satisfactory completion of all

requirements, I will accept an

appointment to commissioned grade as a

Reserve Officer in the United States

Navy, if such a commission is tendered

to me, and upon acceptance, will be

discharged from my enlisted status;

e. That:

(1) a commission as a[] Reserve Officer

in the United States Navy is held

at the pleasure of the President.

(2) upon acceptance of a commission, I will

be required to serve at least eight

years as a Reserve Officer in the United

States Navy from the date of appointment

to commissioned grade; and

(3) any portion of this eight-year period

not served on active duty will be served

on inactive duty; and

(4) a resignation of my commission as a

Reserve Officer submitted prior to

completion of this eight-year

period will normally be rejected

and, after this period, may be

accepted or rejected by the

President, as the needs of the

service may then require.

f. That section 671a and 671b of Title 10,

United States Code, currently provides as

follows:

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“671a. Members: Service extension during

war. 

Unless terminated at an earlier date by the

Secretary concerned, the period of active

service of any member of an armed force is

extended for the duration of any war in which

the United States may be engaged and for six

months thereafter. 

671b. Members: Service extension when

Congress is not in session.

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of

law when the President determines that

the national interest so requires, he

may, if Congress is not in session

having adjourned sine die [without

assigning a day for a further meeting or

hearing,] authorize the Secretary of

Defense to extend for not more than six

months, enlistments, appointments,

periods of active duty for training,

periods of obligated service of other

military status, in any other component

of the Armed forces of the United

States, that expire before the

thirteenth day after Congress next

convenes [or] reconvenes. 

(b) An extension under this section

continues until the sixtieth day after

Congress next convenes or reconvenes or

until expiration of the period of

extension specified by the Secretary of

Defense, whichever occurs earlier,

unless sooner terminated by law or

Executive order.” 

g. That Federal statutes and pertinent

regulations applicable to personnel in

the United States Navy may change

without notice and that such changes may

affect my status as a[n] Aviation

Officer Candidate or a commissioned

officer and obligations to serve as

such.

2. I consent to serve on active duty as a

commissioned officer for a period of seven

years from date of designation as a Naval

Aviator (unless sooner released to inactive

duty or discharged by the Chief of Naval

Personnel[)].

***

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(Gengler Decl., Doc. 17, & McSeveney Decl., Doc. 19, filed July

25, 2006, Ex. A at 1-3.) 

A few months after signing their Service Agreements, on

September 23, 1996, Petitioners received Orders to report to

Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, Florida. Those orders

reiterated that they were “obligated to serve the number of years

indicated on [his Service Agreement] following date of completion

of training within the Naval Air Training Command.” (GFAP at

¶76; MFAP at ¶75.) 

Petitioners successfully completed their flight training and

were designated as Naval Aviators on February 2, 1999 (Mcseveney)

and April 2, 1999 (Gengler), respectively. The Navy asserts that

Petitioners confirmed their eight year term of duty when

Petitioners were given their “winging orders,” a document both

Petitioners received in 1999. (Gunter Decl. at ¶2.) Petitioners

assert, however, that the seven year commitment term contained in

their Service Agreements was confirmed orally by a “Student

Control Officer” in April 1999. (Gengler’s First Amended

Petition (“GFAP”) at ¶82; McSeveny’s First Amended Petition

(“MFAP”) at ¶81.) Also in April 1999 (to McSeveney) and May 1999

(to Gengler), an unidentified “Training Officer” allegedly

confirmed the seven year contractual active service term applied,

rather than the eight-year statutory active service term. (GFAP

at ¶82; MFAP at ¶81.)

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs have served with

distinction since 1999 and have been commissioned officers in the

Naval Reserve continuously since 1996. Each logged more than 150

hours in combat situations and each received numerous medals for

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There is apparently a distinction drawn between the 2

augmentation process, which would elevate an individual from

“Reserve Officer” status to “Regular Officer” status, and

whatever process is applied when one becomes a commissioned

“Naval Aviator.” Both Petitioners became Naval Aviators in 1999

but apparently retained their status as “reserve officers” until

they were involuntarily augmented. According to their service

agreements, becoming a Naval Aviator started their seven year

commitment. According to the government, their augmentation to

regular officer status eviscerated this seven year term. 

7

valor during combat. (Doc. 16 at 4.) 

When the end of their respective contractual seven-year term

of active service approached, both Plaintiffs timely notified

their Commanding Officer (“CO”) that they would be requesting

release from active duty (“RAD”). (Pltfs’ Decls. at ¶8.) The

Navy denied Plaintiffs’ requests. (Id.) Plaintiffs appealed the

denials to (a) their CO, (b) the Naval Personnel Department, 

(c) the Board for Correction of Naval Records (“BCNR”), and (c)

the Secretary of the Navy. (Id. at ¶¶9-13 & Ex. I-S.) All these

appeals were rejected, and the Navy informed Plaintiffs that

their administrative remedies had been exhausted. (Id. at Ex.

E.) 

Petitioners both were commissioned as Navy Reserve Officers

in 1996 and intended to retain that status throughout their

service with the Navy, rather than seek “augmentation” to the

status of a Regular Officer. Gengler, for example, asserts that 2

he “determined that remaining a Reserve Officer was a better fit

for me personally than being augmented to a Regular Officer.” 

(Doc. 87 at ¶3.) Some time around 2004, shortly after their

first RAD requests were denied, Petitioners received unsolicited

paperwork from the Navy, pertaining to augmentation to Regular

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See All Officers Commissioned Regular Navy, available 3

at: “http://www.news.navy.mil/cck/NNS050314-11.pdf (last visited

Oct. 18, 2006),

8

Officer Status. Both Petitioners “assumed that [the Navy] was

simply trying to trick [them] with the augmentation given [their]

recent dispute over contractual commitments (there was ambiguous

language with respect to possible additional commitments in the

instruction pertaining to Augmentation.” (Id. at ¶5.) Both

determined that it was in their best interests to decline

augmentation and did so. (Id. at ¶6.) However, in August of

2006, they discovered that they had been augmented without their

consent. This augmentation apparently took place pursuant to a

Navy policy aimed at transitioning all Reserve Officers to

Regular Officer Status. But, in implementing this transition

program, the Navy promised that an “officers' rights and

obligations under their original contract remains unchanged, and

their oath of office remains in effect.” (Doc. 86, Tab 6

(emphasis added). ) At oral argument, the government disclaimed 3

reliance on this regular officer status theory. 

The seven year active service contractual commitments for

Petitioners expired in April 2006 (for Gengler) and February 2006

(for McSeveney). Petitioners assert that being required to serve

on active service beyond the seven-year contractual term has

“resulted in the involuntary forfeiture of [their]

Constitutionally protected rights to liberty, freedom and right

to pursue a career and happiness.” (GFAP ¶70; MFAP ¶69.) 

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A. Allegations Regarding the Navy’s Treatment of Other

Aviators. 

Petitioners allege that the Navy discharged 400 Naval

Aviators in December 2003, and another 120 in May 2004, pursuant

to its Involuntary Release from Active Duty (hereinafter “IRAD”)

policy. (GFAP at ¶38; MFAP at ¶37.) These IRAD releases

allegedly resulted in many Naval Aviators being released prior to

serving their eight or six-year statutory active service terms

contained in 10 U.S.C. § 653. (GFAP at ¶38; MFAP at ¶37.)

Petitioners further allege that the Navy involuntarily

released at least one Naval Aviator with essentially the same

experience as Lt. Cmdrs. Gengler and McSeveney. Specifically,

Petitioners allege that Lieutenant Commander Charles E. Garret

("Garret"), an F/A-18 pilot currently stationed in San Diego,

California, has a similarly exemplary service record and was a

member of Gengler and McSeveney’s flight squadron from 2002

through 2005. (GFAP at ¶41; MFAP at ¶40.) Garret allegedly

possesses the same amount of cruise and combat experience, has

essentially the same knowledge of “the fixed wing jet aircraft

test community,” and has performed essentially the same jobs as

Petitioners. Yet, although neither Gengler nor McSeveney were

considered for the IRAD program, Garret was scheduled to be

discharged pursuant to the IRAD program on September 30, 2006,

prior to the running of his eight-year statutory service term. 

(Id.)

Next, Petitioners allege that the Navy implemented a

Voluntary Separation Program (“VSP”), to encourage other Naval

Aviators to leave the service prior to the completion of their

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statutory service terms. The VSP process allows Naval Aviators

who fall into certain categories, categories which do not

encompass either Gengler or McSeveney, to submit a bid stating a

reduced amount of retirement benefits each would be willing to

accept to be discharged from the Navy. (GFAP at ¶45; MFAP at ¶

44.) Specifically, the Petitions allege that in September 2006,

“the Navy will discharge or release another 300 Naval Aviators

pursuant to its [VSP program] many prior to their completion of

the statutory service terms contained in 10 U.S.C. § 653.” (GFAP

at ¶44; MFAP at ¶43.) Petitioners allege that “[m]any of the

Naval Aviators chosen by Defendants to participate in the VSP

process have exemplary service records.” (GFAP at ¶47; MFAP at

¶46.)

Petitioners’ requests to participate in the VSP program were

refused and Petitioners were not considered for the IRAD program

because of their “exemplary service records.” (GFAP at ¶49; MFAP

at ¶48. 

Finally, Petitioners allege that the Navy has honored the

exact same seven-year active service term contained in

Petitioners’ Service Agreements for at least eight other Naval

Aviators, none of whom have less than exemplary service records: 

Lieutenants William Frado, Keith Hurley, Craig Olsen, Benjamin

Renda, Martin Williams, Edward Wilkinson, Eric Werner, and Andrew

Smolenack. (GFAP at ¶¶ 51-58; MFAP at ¶¶ 50-57.)

Petitioners contend that the Navy’s creation and

implementation of the IRAD and VSP programs, as well as their

honoring of the seven year active service terms of the eight

above-named Naval Aviators, which resulted in the release or

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discharge of Naval Aviators prior to their completion of the

applicable active statutory service terms contained in 10 U.S.C.

§ 653, “was affirmative, knowing, deliberate and intentional.” 

(GFAP at ¶¶ 42, 48, 59; MFAP at ¶¶ 41, 47, 58.)

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 31, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint

which contained five causes of action: (1) breach of contract;

(2) equitable estoppel based; (3) violation of the Administrative

Procedure Act; (4) a claim styled as a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus, requesting discharge from the Navy; and (5) a

request for declaratory relief. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs sought

specific performance of the seven year term in their Service

Agreements and attorneys fees and costs. (Id. at ¶¶51-52.) 

On the same day the complaint was filed, Plaintiffs filed an

ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order, requesting the

entry of an order “preventing Defendants from changing

Plaintiffs’ status from non-deployable to deployable or otherwise

sending them to Iraq or any location outside [the Continental

United States.” (Doc. 2 at 2, filed March 31, 2006.) A few days

later, the parties reached an agreement as to the requested

injunctive relief. The Navy promised that Plaintiffs would

remain on non-deployable status until July 10, 2006 in exchange

for Plaintiffs withdrawing their request for a temporary

restraining order. On June 1, 2006, the parties extended the

duration of the agreement until August 9, 2006, pending further

internal discussion by the Navy regarding Plaintiffs’ discharge

requests. Subsequently, the Navy notified Plaintiffs that they

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would not be discharged or released from active service. 

Plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining

order on July 25, 2006. (Doc. 15.) Defendants were afforded an

opportunity to oppose on July 27, 2006. (Docs. 24 & 25.) After

a hearing on the motion, held August 4, 2006, the request for a

temporary restraining order was denied, although the Navy was

ordered to give Plaintiffs’ at least twenty (20) days notice

prior to changing their status from non-deployable to deployable. 

(Doc. 37.) 

The United States moved to dismiss on August 3, 2006. (Doc.

31.) In an August 24, 2006 memorandum decision, the district

court dismissed all but one of the claims in the case. 

Petitioners’ habeas corpus claim survived, but their equitable

estoppel claim was dismissed with leave to amend. Petitioners,

having indicated their intent to re-plead their equitable

estoppel claim, were granted leave to file a revised habeas

corpus petition containing an equitable estoppel claim. (Doc. 49

at 43-44.) 

On September 15, 2006, Petitioners filed amended petitions

for writ of habeas corpus, each setting forth (1) a breach of

contract claim and (2) an equitable estoppel claim. (Docs. 51,

52.) 

On September 20, 2006, Petitioners filed a motion requesting

an order requiring the United States to answer the amended

petitions, authorizing discovery, and setting an evidentiary

hearing. (Docs. 53-62.) On September 21, 2006, Petitioners

filed an ex parte application requesting that this motion be

heard on shortened time. (Docs. 63-66.)

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On September 28, 2006, a status conference was held

regarding the ex parte application, at which time a schedule was

set for the filing of the United States’ motion to dismiss, its

opposition to Petitioners’ motion for an

answer/discovery/evidentiary hearing, and Petitioners’ opposition

briefs. (Docs. 70, 75.)

On October 5, 2006, Petitioners filed seconded amended

petitions for writ of habeas corpus, without leave of court or

stipulation from the United States. (Docs. 72-73.) On October

12, 2006, again without leave of court or stipulation from the

United States, Petitioners filed third amended petitions for writ

of habeas corpus. (Docs. 76-77.) 

Also on October 12, 2006, the United States filed its motion

to dismiss and opposition to Petitioners’ motion for an

answer/discovery/evidentiary hearing. (Docs. 78-79.) 

On October 13, 2006, Lt. Cmdr. Gengler filed a motion

requesting an order that would require the Navy to allow Lt.

Gengler to remain in Chicago until the end of the academic

semester (December 8, 2006) or pending a decision in this matter. 

Alternatively, Gengler requested that he be released on bail

pending a decision on the habeas petition. Along with this

motion, Lt. Cmdr. Gengler filed an ex parte request to shorten

time, asking that the motion be heard alongside the other pending

motions on October 23, 2006. The government opposed having this

motion heard on an expedited schedule, arguing, among other

things, that the motion presents factual issues that will take

the government some time to investigate. (Doc. 89 at 6.) 

Oral argument on the motion to dismiss was heard on October

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23, 2006. (Doc. 91.) On October 27, 2006, Lt. Cmdr. Gengler

requested a further earing on his motion for habeas bail. (Doc.

92.) The government filed opposition, along with the declaration

of United States Navy Captain Bruce W. Fecht, Gengler’s

Commanding Officer. (Doc. 94, filed Oct. 27, 2006.) Further

oral argument on Gengler’s motion was heard on November 1, 2006. 

After oral argument, the district court granted Gengler’s request

for bail up to and including December 8, 2006, understanding that

Gengler had stipulated to adding any missed service days onto his

term of service should he not prevail on the merits of his

lawsuit. The district court issued a written order regarding the

bail motion along with written findings of fact and conclusions

of law concerning. (Doc. 100, filed Nov. 11, 2006.) 

On November 2, 2006, the government filed a motion to

reconsider the grant of bail. (Doc. 101.) 

Also on November 2, 2006, the government filed a

supplemental memorandum of points and authorities, addressing

Petitioners’ third amended petitions for habeas corpus. (Doc.

98.) 

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The government also objects to the substance of some of 4

the material added to Gengler’s third amended petition (Doc.

98.), but these objections are mooted by the fact that the second

and third amended petitions must be stricken from the record. 

In passing, Petitioners suggest various reasons why it 5

was necessary to file their amended petitions. In particular,

the amended petitions incorporate information about various

recent events involving Lt. Cmdr. Gengler. But, nowhere have

Petitioners requested leave to amend or acknowledge that their

repeated amendments might affect the government’s ability to meet

deadlines under the expedited schedule Petitioners have

requested. 

15

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Strike.

In a footnote to its motion to dismiss, the United States

requests that the second and third amended petitions for writ of

habeas corpus be stricken on the ground that Petitioners neither

had leave of court to file the amended petitions nor did the

United States stipulate to their filing. (Doc. 78 at 6 n.1).4

Petitioners have not sought leave of court to file the amended

petitions. Where an amended pleading cannot be made as of right

and is filed without leave of court or consent of the opposing

party, it is without legal effect. See U.S. ex rel. Mathews v.

Healthsouth Corp., 332 F.3d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 2003). The second

and third amended petitions are unauthorized and are stricken. 

The remainder of this memorandum decision will rely upon the

First Amended Petitions.5

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B. Motion to Dismiss.

1. Standard of Review.

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it

“appears beyond doubt that the non-movant can prove no set of

facts to support its claims.” Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc.,

452 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006). Alternatively, dismissal

can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory. SmileCare

Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 88 F3d 780, 783

(9th Cir. 1996). In evaluating such a motion “[a]ll allegations

and reasonable inferences are taken as true, and the allegations

are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party, but conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” 

Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1046. 

2. Summary of the Government’s Arguments

The United States nominally relies upon both Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) as grounds for its motion

to dismiss (Doc. 78 at 1). However, apart from repeatedly

mentioning the catchphrase “subject matter jurisdiction,” the

government does not appear to be seriously disputing the district

courts jurisdiction over the merits of this case. The United

States acknowledges that habeas corpus is the appropriate means

by which an individual who claims to be “unlawfully retained” by

the armed services may seek relief. See Parisi v. Davidson, 405

U.S. 34, 39 (1972). 

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In substance, the United States advances two central

arguments to support its argument that the first amended

petitions fail to state legally cognizable claims. First, the

government argues that, as commissioned military officers,

Petitioners have no unilateral right to resign from the military

until their resignations have been accepted by the President. In

essence, the government argues that Petitioners have no contract

rights in their offices and no right to argue that equitable

estoppel applies here. Assuming, arguendo, that this is the

case, earlier-cited habeas cases involving the service agreements

of enlisted personnel are inapplicable. In addition, the United

States maintains that Petitioners still have not pled the

existence of the type of “affirmative misconduct” required to

maintain an equitable estoppel claim. 

a. The Government’s theory that petitioners

serve at the pleasure of the President and

therefore that their contract-based claims

fail as a matter of law.

The United States contends:

Commissioned officers of the armed forces, as opposed

to enlisted personnel, have no contract right in their

offices. Officers do not hold their positions by

contract, but rather serve at the pleasure of the

United States. As such, officers have no unilateral

right to resign their commissions, even assuming they

have fulfilled their contractual terms of service. An

officer of the armed forces cannot leave the service

until his resignation has been accepted by the

President, and the decision whether to accept the

resignation rests within the sole discretion of the

executive branch. Thus, Petitioners, as commissioned

Naval officers, cannot state a legally cognizable claim

for breach of contract or equitable estoppel based on

the Navy’s denial of their RAD requests. 

(Doc. 78 at 2.) As counterintuitive as this may seem, given the

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fact that Plaintiffs were both required to sign contracts

containing minimum service terms that apply to their service as

Naval officers, there is some authority that lends support to the

government’s position. 

(1) Caselaw.

The government’s reasoning finds its origin in a series of

cases. In Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 90 (1953), relied

upon by the government, a doctor was lawfully drafted into the

Army. He brought a habeas corpus action, arguing that the Army

refused to commission him as an officer, a rank to which he

claimed he was entitled under the law that permitted conscription

of doctors. He argued that the Army should be ordered to either

commission him or discharge him. The Supreme Court first

concluded that the applicable statues and regulations did not

require that he be commissioned in order to be inducted as a

doctor, id. at 88-89, and noted that there was good cause for the

denial of his application for a commission, namely that he

refused to supply certain requested information concerning his

prior affiliation with the Communist Party. Id. at 89-90. 

Orloff held:

The petitioner appears to be under the misconception

that a commission is not only a matter of right, but is

to be had upon his own terms.

The President commissions all Army officers. 5 U.S.C. s

11, 5 U.S.C.A. s 11. We have held that, except one

hold[ing] his appointment by virtue of a commission

from the President, he is not an Officer of the Army.

United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303. Congress has

authorized the President alone to appoint Army officers

in grades up to and including that of colonel, above

which the advice and consent of the Senate is required.

55 Stat. 728, as amended, 57 Stat. 380, 10 U.S.C.A. s

506d note.

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It is obvious that the commissioning of officers in the

Army is a matter of discretion within the province of

the President as Commander in Chief. Whatever control

courts have exerted over tenure or compensation under

an appointment, they have never assumed by any process

to control the appointing power either in civilian or

military positions.

345 U.S. at 90-91 (parallel citations omitted). 

The United States next cites American Jurisprudence, Second,

on Military and Civil Defense, for the proposition that:

[a]n officer of the Armed Forces, appointed for a

definite term or during good behavior, has no vested

interest or contract right in his or her office, since

he or she does not hold by contract, but enjoys a

privilege revocable by the sovereignty at will, and his

or her appointment to and tenure of office do not come

within the import of the term “contracts” intended to

be protected by the United States Constitution.

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Military and Civil Defense, § 46 (2006). This

passage is drawn from Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99

(1890). Crenshaw involved a dispute between an individual who

graduated from the Naval Academy in 1883. After graduation, he

was sent home and told to await orders. Later that month,

however, the Navy informed him that there were no appropriate

vacancies in the Navy and discharged him from service with one

year's sea pay. Crenshaw filed suit, arguing that his discharge

was unlawful and seeking recovery of back pay. In this context,

the Supreme Court concluded that an officer has no vested

contract right in his office. Rather, the sovereign retains the

power to revoke his commission at will. Id. at 108. 

Similarly, Hix v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 546 (1981),

also cited by the government, involved an individual who sued on

the theory that the Army had wrongfully released him from active

duty. In holding that this claim had no merit, the Hix court

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noted that “Plaintiff’s breach of contract theory ignores the

well-established principle that a military officer’s status has

no contractual basis.” Id. at 546. 

The government also relies upon Mimmack v. United States, 97

U.S. 426, 432 (1878). That case involved an Army officer

(Mimmack) who tendered his resignation to the president. The

resignation was accepted, but then the acceptance was revoked and

the President ordered him to active duty. Meanwhile, Mimmack had

enlisted in the marine corps and was paid accordingly (i.e., not

as an officer). Mimmack filed suit in the Court of Claims,

asserting that the President’s revocation of the acceptance of

his resignation reinstated him to officer status and,

accordingly, he should recover back pay at the officer salary

rate. The Supreme Court rejected this claim, reasoning that,

because re-commissioning Mimmack as an officer would have

required the advice and consent of the Senate, the President’s

revocation of the acceptance of the resignation was invalid

without the Senate’s consent. Accordingly, Mimmack was not

entitled to recover pay as an officer for the time period he

served in the marines as an enlisted man. In reaching this

conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned:

Nothing short of a written resignation to the

President, or the proper executive department, by

a commissioned officer of the army, navy or marine

corps, and the acceptance of the same duly

notified to the incumbent of the office, in the

customary mode, will of itself create a vacancy in

such an office....

Prior to notice that the resignation tendered has

been accepted by the President, the officer in

such a case may not without leave quit his post or

proper duties, nor is he deprived of any of the

rights or privileges conferred and enjoyed by

virtue of his appointment and commission.

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Id. at 427. (As discussed below, the government relies upon

cases that apply this reasoning in a different context.)

Mimmack, Crenshaw, and Hix stand for the simple proposition

that an officer cannot sue on a breach of contract theory to

require a branch of the armed forces to retain him in service,

while Orloff stands for the principle that one’s commission as an

officer cannot be “had upon [ones] own terms,” 345 U.S. at 90,

and courts should not intrude upon a military branch’s decision

not to issue an individual a commission. 

Springstead v. Claytor, 586 F.2d 990, 992 (4th Cir. 1978),

upon which the government places great weight, appears to be the

first and only published case to apply the general language used

in Mimmack, Crenshaw, Hix, and Orloff, to an officer’s right to

resign from the military, holding that an officer is not entitled

to resign from the military because he holds his position at the

pleasure of the president. In other words, an officer may not

resign his commission unilaterally. Springstead originally

joined the Marine Corps as a reserve officer. His service

agreement required him to accept a reserve commission as a second

lieutenant upon graduation from college and to serve on active

duty for four years after he completed law school. Springstead

began his period of active service as a second lieutenant, but

subsequently accepted a presidential commission as a first

lieutenant in the regular service on the condition that he remain

on active duty through his original four-year obligation. Id. at

991. Upon the conclusion of his four-year service obligation,

Springstead submitted his resignation, but the Navy denied his

request for a discharge. Id. After his administrative appeals

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were denied, Springstead filed suit, arguing “that the

Secretary's action was arbitrary and capricious because it

abrogated his right to resign after the four-year period for

which he contracted in his original service agreement.” The

district court agreed with Springstead, and ordered the Navy to

accept his resignation. Id. The Fourth circuit reversed,

reasoning:

[T]he contract [the officer] made when he became a

reservist does not limit the duration of the

obligation he subsequently assumed when he

accepted a commission as a regular officer. 

Consequently, [the officer] has no unilateral

right to resign his commission after the

satisfaction of his minimum service obligation.

[The officer’s] commission as a regular military

officer has no definite duration. An officer

serves until his appointment terminates in a

manner prescribed by statute or regulation. The

commission of a regular officer who originally

enlisted as a reservist with a fixed period of

service does not differ from the commissions of

other regular officers in this respect. . . .

***

As a regular Marine Corps officer, [the officer]

serves at the pleasure of the President under

regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the

Navy. Although [the officer] may resign his

commission, he is not released from his indefinite

term of service until his resignation has been

accepted by the Secretary acting on behalf of the

President.

Id. at 992.

At first glance, Springstead appears to be easily

distinguishable, as there is no indication that Springstead

signed a contract limiting the length of his active service as a

first lieutenant. However, the government argued in its motion

to dismiss that, like Springstead, Petitioners abandoned their

contractually limited obligation when they were elevated from

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reserve officer to regular officer status:

Petitioners entered the Navy as enlisted personnel and

upon satisfactory completion of the requirements, were

then appointed as commissioned Reserve Officers. 

Petitioners, both Lieutenant Commanders, now hold

regular commissions in the Navy. (Doc. 51, ¶ 14; Doc.

52, ¶ 14.) As in Springstead, the service agreements

that Petitioners entered into in conjunction with the

Aviation Officer Candidate Program do not limit the

duration of the obligation they subsequently assumed

when they became regular commissioned officers. As

regular commissioned officers, they have no unilateral

right to resign their commissions after satisfaction of

their minimum service obligations. Springstead, 586

F.2d at 992. Rather, they serve at the pleasure of the

President under regulations promulgated by the

Secretary of the Navy. Ibid.

(Doc. 78 at 12-13.)

However, Petitioners vehemently object to the way in which

the government attempts to draw parallels to the Springstead

case. Specifically, the government’s argument rests at least in

part on the assertion that Petitioners “now hold regular

commissions in the Navy.” Thus, the government maintains, “[a]s

in Springstead, the service agreements that Petitioners entered

into in conjunction with the Aviation Officer Candidate Program

do not limit the duration of the obligation they subsequently

assumed when they became regular commissioned officers.” 

Petitioners assert, however, that they never consented to augment

their commissions as reserve officers to regular officer status: 

Until the summer of 2006, Petitioners served in the

Navy Reserve, as they agreed to do in their Service

Agreements. They completed ten years of active duty in

the Navy Reserve and seven years as aviators on active

duty as Reserve officers. On several occasions, the

Navy asked the men if they wished to augment their

commissions and join the Regular Navy. The Petitioners

consistently declined an appointment into the Regular

Navy.

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All Officers Commissioned Regular Navy, available at:

6

“http://www.news.navy.mil/cck/NNS050314-11.pdf (last visited Oct.

18, 2006). 

24

McSeveney declined these requests for augmentation in

2002 and 2004. McSeveney declined to augment his

commission because there are fewer restrictions placed

on the resignation process for Reserve officers, and

Reserve officers find it easier to transfer to an

inactive Reserve status. Although he desired to remain

in the Reserve, the Navy augmented McSeveney in summer

2006 without his consent. He was not informed about

the augmentation and he was given no choice. He

learned of his augmentation while researching another

request with the Navy's Bureau of Personnel. Gengler's

situation was similar in all important aspects. 

(Doc. 85 at 12 (record citations omitted).) According to the

Petitioners’ version of events, “the Navy augmented the men's

commissions to Regular status without their knowledge or

consent.” (Id.) Assuming the truth of these assertions for the

purposes of this motion to dismiss, the government’s argument --

that Petitioners’ “consent” to become regular commissioned

officers eviscerates the terms of their pre-existing Service

Agreement under Springstead –- cannot be countenanced. The

government at oral argument agreed not to pursue the argument as

to the regular officer status theory. 

In addition, the involuntary augmentation apparently took

place “as part of a program to transition all reserve

commissioned officers on the active duty list to regular officer

status.” (See McSeveney Dec., Doc. 88, ¶8 & Ex. B.) In

implementing this transition program, the Navy promised that an

“officers' rights and obligations under their original contract

remains unchanged, and their oath of office remains in effect.” 

(See Doc. 86, Tab 6. ) The Navy’s own policy statements 6

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Springstead is also cited without much discussion in a 7

footnote by the Fifth Circuit in Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d

639, 644 (5th Cir. 1976). 

25

undermine the government’s argument.

There is also reason to question the soundness of

Springstead, a Fourth Circuit case, as persuasive decisional

authority. It relied upon the language from Mimmack without

closely examining the context within which the Mimmack court

utilized that language. In so doing, Springstead adapted the

holding from Mimmack, in which an officer sued to recover back

pay, to an entirely different factual circumstance. 

The government next cites a recent unpublished decision from

the District Court for the District of Arizona, Klein v.

Rumsfeld, 2006 WL 1788952 (D. Ariz., June 27, 2006), the only

federal court decision that has relied upon Springstead. Klein 7

graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1985 and served

as a helicopter pilot in the Marine Corps until his discharge

from active duty in 1996, after which he worked as a civilian

engineer. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,

Plaintiff inquired about serving in the national guard as an

attack helicopter pilot. On July 1, 2002, he was commissioned as

a “Chief Warrant Officer Two.” After going through some training

regarding the operation of a particular military helicopter,

Klein tendered his resignation three times in 2005 due to chronic

mental illnesses suffered by his three children. Id. at *1. All

of his requests to resign were rejected. On April 14, 2006,

Klein was ordered to active duty. He filed suit in federal

district court to enjoin his activation. 

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Klein apparently did not sign a service agreement with any

particular duration or term when he rejoined the military in

2002, as there is no mention made of any such agreement in the

district court opinion. Rather, the legal dispute in Klein

involved the interpretation of 10 U.S.C. § 12241(c), which

provides that, 

Appointments as Reserves in permanent warrant officer

grades are for an indefinite term and are held during

the pleasure of the Secretary concerned.

(emphasis added). Klein argued that the § 12441(c) did not

create an indefinite “obligation” but rather created an

“indefinite term,” simply meaning that a warrant officer need not

re-enlist, “because his term of service (as opposed to his

service obligation) has no built-in expiration.” Id. at *3. In

support of this argument, Klein looked to a different statue, 10

U.S.C. § 651(a), which provides:

Each person who becomes a member of an armed

force...shall serve in the armed forces for a total

initial period of not less than six years nor more than

eight years...

This statute, Klein maintained, creates a six to eight year

service “obligation” after which the military lacks authority to

deny a resignation (subject to the President's stop-loss

authority), and during which resignation is subject to the

discretion of the military. (The district court opinion implies,

by omission of any discussion of the issue, that Klein satisfied

this requirement through his initial term of service after

graduation from the Naval Academy.) Klein argued that 

§ 12441(c)’s use of the phrase “indefinite term,” read alongside

§ 651(a), merely obviates the need for re-enlistment should a

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warrant officer choose to remain in the military. 

The district court rejected this interpretation, reasoning

that the plain language of the statute states that warrant

officers serve an “indefinite term” “at the pleasure of the

Secretary concerned.” The Klein court concluded that “[t]he

plain meaning of the latter phrase is that a warrant officer may

not simply resign at will, but must seek a favorable exercise of

discretion from his superiors.” Id.

Plaintiff’s argument confuses eligibility for

voluntary separation with the right to voluntary

separation. An officer who undergoes certain

training must continue to serve for a specified

period of time; that is, he is ineligible for

voluntary separation. Once the obligation ends

(and he becomes eligible for voluntary

separation), he is free to tender his resignation,

but the Army is under no requirement to accept

it....

In sum, because Plaintiff is an officer, he may

not resign at will. His resignation is subject to

[the Secretary of the Army’s] discretion. The

manner in which [the Secretary] [has] chosen to

exercise that discretion, even Plaintiff concedes,

is beyond this Court’s review.

Id. at *5.

Klein marginally supports the government’s position insofar

as it stands for the proposition that one’s eligibility for

voluntary separation is not equivalent to a right to voluntary

separation. But, Klein is distinguishable, because Klein signed

no service agreement when he was re-commissioned in 2002 and was

under a statutory indefinite term of service. Moreover, Klein is

an unpublished opinion from another District that is, at best,

only persuasive authority. Its value as any form of authority is

questionable, as the district court's opinion is currently on

appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit granted Klein's

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emergency motion for injunctive relief pending decision on the

appeal, staying the Marine Corps’ order requiring Klein to report

for active military service. (See Order, Klein v. Rumsfeld, No.

06-16203 (9th Cir. July 20, 2006), Doc. 86 at Tab 4.)

The final case cited by the government, Baldauf v. Nitze,

261 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1966), is equally unavailing. In

that case, a Naval officer tendered his resignation, but the Navy

refused to accept it pursuant to various directives allowing for

deferral of resignations on a selective basis. Id. at 169. The

district court, noting the contemporaneous build-up of the armed

forces through conscription of enlisted personnel for the war in

Vietnam, concluded that the directives promulgated by the Navy

authorizing deferral of resignations were valid and enforceable. 

The court also noted that “[h]istorically, it has been

universally accepted that an officer of the armed forces of the

United States cannot leave the service until his resignation is

accepted by the President.” The government cites this quote out

of context, advancing it in support of the proposition that any

officer’s term of service may be extended indefinitely for any

reason. But, in Baldauf, the Navy not only had a reason

(Vietnam) but a written regulation permitting deferral of

resignations. Here, no currently effective directive,

regulation, or statute specifically permitting the Navy to defer

acceptance of resignations. Moreover, it is undisputed that the

Navy has (or at least had when Petitioners tendered their

resignations) a surplus of Naval Aviators. 

Petitioners cite one unpublished district court case that

has issued habeas relief to an officer who challenged the term of

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his service obligation. Wallace v. Brown, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

10156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Although the circumstances of Wallace are

distinct from this case, the district court in Wallace referred

to cases involving enlistment contracts (i.e., the service

agreements of enlisted personnel) and applied those cases to an

officer service agreement to find enforceable contract rights. 

Id. at *20. The Wallace court did not, however discuss any of

the cases or regulatory provisions which discuss that an Officer

serves “at the pleasure of the President.”

(2) The Service Agreements.

The government also argues that the Service Agreements

signed by Petitioners give them notice of the general rule that a

commission as an officer is held at the pleasure of the President

and any resignation after the minimum service period may be

accepted or rejected by the President, as the needs of the

service then require. Petitioners’ Service Agreements provide,

in pertinent part:

1. Having volunteered for Aviation Officer

Candidate training under the Aviation Officer

Candidate Program, I hereby acknowledge:

a. If entering the program from civilian

life

(1) that I will be required to enlist

in the Naval Reserve; and

(2) that I will receive orders to

active duty for the Aviation

Officer Candidate Program and I do

hereby consent to serve on active

duty in an enlisted status for such

period of indoctrination in the

program as may be prescribed; and

//

//

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(3) that, in the event I fail to complete

satisfactorily the requirements for

appointment to commissioned grade or

request disenrollment from the Aviation

Officer Candidate Program prior to

acceptance of a commission, I will be

discharged from my enlisted status.

***

d. That upon satisfactory completion of all

requirements, I will accept an

appointment to commissioned grade as a

Reserve Officer in the United States

Navy, if such a commission is tendered

to me, and upon acceptance, will be

discharged from my enlisted status;

e. That:

(1) a commission as a[] Reserve Officer

in the United States Navy is held

at the pleasure of the President.

(2) upon acceptance of a commission, I will

be required to serve at least eight

years as a Reserve Officer in the United

States Navy from the date of appointment

to commissioned grade; and

(3) any portion of this eight-year period

not served on active duty will be served

on inactive duty; and

(4) a resignation of my commission as a

Reserve Officer submitted prior to

completion of this eight-year

period will normally be rejected

and, after this period, may be

accepted or rejected by the

President, as the needs of the

service may then require.

f. That section 671a and 671b of Title 10, United

States Code, currently provides as follows:

“671a. Members: Service extension during

war. 

Unless terminated at an earlier date by the

Secretary concerned, the period of active

service of any member of an armed force is

extended for the duration of any war in which

the United States may be engaged and for six

months thereafter. 

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671b. Members: Service extension when

Congress is not in session.

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of

law when the President determines that

the national interest so requires, he

may, if Congress is not in session

having adjourned sine die [without

assigning a day for a further meeting or

hearing,] authorize the Secretary of

Defense to extend for not more than six

months, enlistments, appointments,

periods of active duty for training,

periods of obligated service of other

military status, in any other component

of the Armed forces of the United

States, that expire before the

thirteenth day after Congress next

convenes [or] reconvenes. 

(b) An extension under this section

continues until the sixtieth day after

Congress next convenes or reconvenes or

until expiration of the period of

extension specified by the Secretary of

Defense, whichever occurs earlier,

unless sooner terminated by law or

Executive order.” 

g. That Federal statutes and pertinent

regulations applicable to personnel in

the United States Navy may change

without notice and that such changes may

affect my status as a[n] Aviation

Officer Candidate or a commissioned

officer and obligations to serve as

such.

2. I consent to serve on active duty as a

commissioned officer for a period of seven

years from date of designation as a Naval

Aviator (unless sooner released to inactive

duty or discharged by the Chief of Naval

Personnel[)].

***

(Gengler Decl., Doc. 17, & McSeveney Decl., Doc. 19, filed July

25, 2006, Ex. A at 1-3 (emphasis added).)

The government places great emphasis on the underlined

passages, which express consent that one’s “commission as a[]

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Reserve Officer in the United States Navy is held at the pleasure

of the President,” and that the “resignation of [one’s]

commission as a Reserve Officer submitted prior to completion of

this eight-year period will normally be rejected and, after this

period, may be accepted or rejected by the President, as the

needs of the service may then require.” 

First, the government ignores the distinction drawn in the

Service Agreement between being commissioned as a reserve officer

and a committing to a term of service on active duty. 

Petitioners consented to serve as reserve officers for a period

of eight years; agreed that “any portion of this eight-year

period not served on active duty will be served on inactive duty”

(Service Agreement ¶1.e(3)); and acknowledged that their

commissions as reserve officers are held “at the pleasure of the

President.” It is undisputed, however, that Petitioners have

already served eight years as reserve officers. The critical

language concerns their further commitment to specifically serve

seven years on active duty after being “designat[ed] as a Naval

Aviator.” (Service Agreement at ¶2.) 

Perhaps more importantly, the government entirely ignores

the context within which this language is placed in the contract. 

Immediately following the language acknowledging that one’s

commission as a reserve officer “may be accepted or rejected by

the President as the needs of the service may then require,” the

Service Agreement quotes verbatim from 10 U.S.C. § 671a and 671b,

which provide mechanisms by which one’s service may be extended:

//

//

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f. That section 671a and 671b of Title 10, United

States Code, currently provides as follows:

“671a. Members: Service extension during war. 

Unless terminated at an earlier date by the

Secretary concerned, the period of active service

of any member of an armed force is extended for

the duration of any war in which the United States

may be engaged and for six months thereafter. 

671b. Members: Service extension when Congress

is not in session.

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law

when the President determines that the

national interest so requires, he may, if

Congress is not in session having adjourned

sine die [without assigning a day for a

further meeting or hearing,] authorize the

Secretary of Defense to extend for not more

than six months, enlistments, appointments,

periods of active duty for training, periods

of obligated service of other military

status, in any other component of the Armed

forces of the United States, that expire

before the thirteenth day after Congress next

convenes [or] reconvenes. 

(b) An extension under this section continues

until the sixtieth day after Congress next

convenes or reconvenes or until expiration of

the period of extension specified by the

Secretary of Defense, whichever occurs

earlier, unless sooner terminated by law or

Executive order.” 

Service Agreement at 2-3. Finally, the Service Agreements

explain that subsequent statutes may alter one’s obligations to

serve. 

g. That Federal statutes and pertinent

regulations applicable to personnel in the

United States Navy may change without notice

and that such changes may affect my status as

a[n] Aviation Officer Candidate or a

commissioned officer and obligations to serve

as such.

Here, none of the provisions of sections 671a or 671b, nor any

subsequent law has been invoked by the government to justify

retaining Petitioners in active duty service. 

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(3) Naval Regulations.

The government next points to various Naval regulations to

support its position that Naval officers may not resign at will. 

Congress delegated to the Secretary of the Navy the authority to

manage the Department of the Navy, including the authority to

staff the Navy to ensure its proper functioning and efficiency. 

10 U.S.C. § 5013. The Secretary promulgated various regulations

under this authority, including a number of regulations

concerning officer resignations. For example, the Secretary of

the Navy (“SECNAV”) issued an instruction that explains:

Officers serve at the pleasure of the President

and no terminal dates are established for their

commissions. SECNAV, by virtue of his authority

to act for the President, may establish such

criteria for the voluntary resignation of an

officer’s commission as deemed necessary for the

maintenance of a sound officer corps.

SECNAV Instruction 1920.6C, Policy Governing Voluntary Separation

¶ 1(a), attached to Doc. 78 at Tab 5. Various other related

provisions explain the conditions under which an officer may be

voluntarily separated: 

a. Expiration of Statutory Service Obligation. 

An officer may be separated upon completion

of the statutory service obligation...

provided the officer has no other obligated

service.

b. Expiration of Obligated Service. An officer

may be separated upon completion of all

service prescribed in the officer program

through which accessed, any other obligation

incurred by the officer in consideration for

being tendered an initial appointment, and

any additional obligated service incurred by

the officer while serving on active duty, or

in an active status in the Ready Reserve.

SECNAV Instruction 1920.6C, at ¶5.

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Additionally, the Naval Military Personnel Manual

(“MILPERSMAN”) states:

a. Once members have legally accepted a

commission or warrant and have executed the

oath of office, they have acquired a legal

status. Termination of this status may be

effected only through a specific legal

process. The forms of termination presently

authorized for officers include dismissal,

revocation of commission, acceptance of

resignation, dropping from rolls, termination

of commission, and separation for cause.

***

c. Separations of officers from Naval Service

must be approved by Secretary of the Navy.

MILPERSMAN 1920-130(1), Doc. 78 at Tab 4 (emphasis added). 

MILPERSMAN reiterates the general rule that there are no

“terminal dates” established for an officer’s commission:

1. Policy. Officers of the Regular Navy and

Navy Reserve retain their commissions at the

pleasure of the President and no terminal

dates are established for their commissions. 

The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) by virtue

of his authority to act for the President,

prescribes criteria for the voluntary

termination of an officer’s status.

***

7. Approval Considerations. Action on any

resignation submitted under the above

provisions will be governed by the needs of

the service, including availability of a

qualified relief.

MILPERSMAN 1920-200.

But, Petitioners cite other Navy regulations and provisions

of Navy policy that essentially codify the Navy’s obligation to

abide by the terms of duty set forth in service agreements. 

First, Petitioners cite MILPERSMAN 1001-090 (“Minimum Required

Active Service of Reserve Officers”) which provides in pertinent

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part:

1. Policy. Reserve officers will be eligible for

release from active duty after completing their

minimum required (obligated) active service, and

any additional required (obligated) active service

incurred by them.

2. Minimum Required Active Service

a. Minimum required active duty service is

specified in the directive which describes the

program through which the officer obtained a

commission or is specified in the service

agreement executed by the officer.

(emphasis added). 

In response to the government’s argument that the term set

forth in the Service Agreement merely establishes an officer's

eligibility to be released from active duty, without obligating

the Navy to accept an officer's resignation, Petitioners argue

that such assertion is contrary to the Navy’s own policies. As

an example of how the Navy’s own policies conflict with the

government’s theory, Petitioners point out that the Navy revised

the timing requirements for when Reserve Officers must file

requests for release from active duty. The revised policy, which

became effective on January 1, 2000, provides in pertinent part

that the timing changes are: 

...intended to preserve Reserve officers' rights for

release from active duty upon completion of their

minimum service requirement (MSR) and any obligated

service in addition to MSR. It is also intended to

make timing of the request for RAD consistent with the

one applicable to resignation requests for regular

officers.

(Doc. 86, Tab. 2, “Policy revised for Naval Reserve officer

resignations.”) Petitioners assert that this is an

acknowledgment of the right of Reserve officers to be released

upon completing their minimum service requirement (MSR).

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The government’s position is premised on two grounds: 

(1) that an officer's commission has no termination date and (2)

that resignation by an officer is not effective until it is

accepted. With respect to the first proposition, Petitioners

argue that, the fact “[t]hat an officer's commission has no

terminal date merely relieves an officer of the need to re-enlist

at the end of a fixed term to continue on active duty, as an

enlisted soldier must do. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 505(d)

(re-enlistment of enlisted men).” This understanding of the

difference between a terminal date and an obligation was

expressly rejected by the district court in Klein, but, as

discussed, Klein is of dubious value as it is an unpublished

decision currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which granted

Klein’s emergency motion for injunctive relief. (Klein v.

Rumsfeld, No. 06-16203 (9th Cir. July 20, 2006).) Rather,

Petitioners’ assertion that service without a terminal date does

not obligate an officer to an indefinite term of service on

active duty is supported by MILPERSMAN 1331-010, which provides: 

4. Reserve Officers

a. Requests for extension on active duty beyond

Minimum Service Requirement (MSR) are no

longer required for Naval Reserve officers. 

Absence of a Release from Active Duty (RAD)

request prior to the first day of the sixth

month before the month of an officer's

Projected Rotation Date (PRD) will be

construed as an officer's request to be

retained beyond MSR. These officers can be

issued orders and will be obligated to no

less than the Minimum Tour for Separation

(MTS) outlined in MILPERSMAN 1321-010 at the

next duty station.

//

//

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b. If an officer's MSR extends beyond his or her

current PRD, a letter of intent may be

submitted to notify Chief of Naval Personnel

that officer does not desire to remain on

active duty beyond MSR plus any additional

service obligations. If received at least 6

months prior to PRD, a letter of intent will

preclude issuance of orders obligating

officer for service beyond MSR plus any

additional service obligations.

NOTE: Officer must still file RAD request 9-12 months

prior to MSR.

(emphasis added). 

The first part of this policy, at paragraph 4a, is entirely

consistent with the proposition that the fact that an officer’s

commission has no termination date merely relieves a commissioned

officer of the need to re-enlist (or be "re-commissioned"). As

MILPERSMAN 1331-010 ¶4b explains, an officer who does not submit

a request for release from active duty agrees by default to serve

past his MSR, without any need to re-enlist or obtain a new or

extended commission. Paragraph 4b supports Petitioners’ critical

assertion that the terms of service set forth in a Service

Agreement are enforceable. MILPERSMAN 1331-010 ¶4b clearly

explains that if an officer submits a timely RAD request, such a

request “will preclude issuance of orders obligating officer for

service beyond” his or her minimum service requirement plus any

additional service obligations. 

With respect to the second ground –- that a resignation is

not effective until it is accepted –- Petitioners maintain,

essentially, that this begs two questions: (1) “whether and under

what circumstances the Navy must accept a tendered resignation”

and (2) “whether the Navy must honor an agreement about length of

service on active duty.” (Doc. 85 at 7.) According to the

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Petitioners also note that the position now taken by 8

the government is “completely different from the stance taken by

the Navy when it denied the two men's requests for relief from

active duty. In moving to dismiss the amended Petitions,

Respondents now assert that the Service Agreements...have no

force or effect at all.” (Doc. 85 at 2.) Although Petitioners

are correct that the government is advancing a dramatically new

theory in this motion, it is not improper for it to do so. 

39

government’s theory, the Navy is under essentially no obligation

to accept a tendered resignation. (In other words, such

resignations may be rejected at will and without any cause or

justification, and any officer’s term of service on active duty

is unlimited.) 

Petitioners insist that accepting the government’s theory

would have dramatic practical implications for the entire

military. If it is indeed the case that “Officers serve at the 8

pleasure of the President and no terminal dates are established

for their commissions,” there would be no limitation at all to

the time that Petitioners must serve on active duty. 

They need not be released from active duty after seven

years. Indeed, they need not even be released after

eight years, the period set forth in § 653(a). They

must continue to serve on active duty until the Navy

decides, in its sole and unreviewable discretion, to

let them go. Accordingly, an officer's commission and

his or her service on active duty may be for life. 

This would seemingly apply to commissioned officers in

both the Naval Reserve and Regular Navy.

(Doc. 85 at 3.) Petitioners argue that “[t]he implications of

Respondents' new legal theory are breathtaking.” 

If Respondents are correct, then the provisions of the

Service Agreements have no force—not because of §

653(a) but because the Navy does not consider itself

bound either by contractual service terms contained in

the Service Agreements they drafted and issued to

recruits such as Petitioners, or the service terms

enacted as law by Congress. Obviously, Respondents'

position will affect the Service Agreements of

thousands of other commissioned officers that would

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similarly be without force or effect, regardless of the

expectations of the honorable men and women who entered

the armed forces after signing them.

(Id.) Petitioners also suggest adoption of the government’s

position would likely require the military to reform its officer

recruiting practices to avoid making material misrepresentations.

In response, the government asserts that “all officers are aware

that they may be retained in the military for indefinite periods

of time and that their resignations may be accepted or rejected

at the ‘pleasure of the President.’” But, as is evidenced by

this case, not all officers share this understanding and the very

fact that the Service Agreement contains a term that explicitly

defines the numbers of years Petitioners must commit to active

duty belies the government’s assertion. 

Petitioners next argue that the government’s focus on the

fact that a commission as an officer in the Navy is held “at the

pleasure of the President” is largely irrelevant to the matter at

hand. It is undisputed that the President retains the power to

appoint or remove a person from his or her commissioned office. 

See, e.g., Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227, 233-35 (1880)

(explaining the history of the President's power to remove or

discharge officers); Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 334

(1897) (discussing the President's discretion to remove

officers); Orloff, 345 U.S. at 90-91 (confirming the President's

discretion to issue an officer's commission). Petitioners

acknowledge that this power is “relevant...to the initial

appointment power or power to remove,” but insist that “it does

not somehow confer unfettered authority on the President to

require a person to continue to serve on active duty,

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particularly in the face of a Service Agreement that expressly

states the period during which an officer has consented to be on

active duty.” The only cases that so hold, Springstead and

Klein, are distinguishable, and in the case of Klein, arguably

not good law.

In the final analysis, the government’s position is

unsupportable. It cannot be the law that any service term

contained within any service agreement signed by any officer in

the nation is unenforceable. The government has not demonstrated

that Springstead, the strongest case cited in support of its

motion to dismiss, should control here. First, Springstead, a

Fourth Circuit case, is distinguishable because Petitioners here

contend that they did not voluntarily consent to being

transferred from reserve officer status into regular officer

status and never accepted regular officer status. The Navy’s

policy that apparently caused this involuntary transfer expressly

states that such a transfer shall not alter the terms of service

set forth in prior agreements. The reasoning of Springstead is

suspect, as it draws its critical holding from a line of cases

that concern disputes over backpay, not over whether branches of

the armed forces have the right to unilaterally obliterate the

service terms contained within service agreements drafted by

those branches. Moreover, contrary to the government’s

assertions, the Service Agreements did not disclose to

Petitioners that the Navy would retain unilateral authority to

deny their requests to be released from active duty after serving

the number of years on active duty contractually provided. 

Finally, the Navy’s own regulations conflict with the

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government’s positions that officers serve unlimited service

terms at the pleasure of the President and Secretary of the Navy

and that express minimum service terms contained withing military

Service Agreements are meaningless.

The habeas based contract claims cannot be dismissed. The

August 24, 2006 decision held that service agreements are subject

to general principles of contract interpretation. (Doc. 49 at

29.) No cases definitively hold that a contradictory active duty

service term contained within a pre-existing law trumps the

express minimum active duty service terms contained within

Petitioners’ Service Agreements. Finally, in articulating an

applicable standard, the district court reasoned that: 

Essentially, Plaintiffs seek specific enforcement of

the Service Agreement, which contains an erroneous term

of service, while the United States argues that the

seven year service term cannot be enforced because it

is contrary to statute. Many cases have held that

unlawful contracts (or unlawful contract terms) may not

be enforced. See Fomby-Denson v. Dept. of Army, 247

F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2001)(reviewing the “wellsettled” “principle[] of general contract law that

courts may not enforce contracts that are contrary to

public policy”). The Supreme Court in Hurd v. Hodge,

344 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948), held that 

The power of the federal courts to enforce the

terms of private agreements is at all times

exercised subject to the restrictions and

limitations of the public policy of the United

Sates as manifested in the Constitution, treaties,

federal statutes, and applicable legal precedents. 

Where the enforcement of private agreements would

be violative of that policy, it is the obligation

of courts to refrain from such exertions of

judicial power.

Id. A long line of cases from federal labor law has

applied this “public policy doctrine” in determining

whether to enforce agreements. See e.g., W.R. Grace &

Co. v. Local Union, 759, Intern. Union of Un. Rubber,

Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S.

757, 766-67 (1983)(refusing to bar enforcement of

collective bargaining agreement because it did not

compromise public policy); Kaiser Steel Corp. v.

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Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 79 (1982)(refusing to command

contracting party to perform under contract, as that

would “command conduct that assertedly renders the

promise an illegal undertaking under the federal

statutes.”).

Whether a contract is unlawful is determined by

referencing “laws and legal precedents and not from

general considerations of supposed public interests.” 

W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766 (quoting Muschany v. United

States, 324 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1945)). However, “good

faith contracts of the United States should not be

lightly invalidated.” 

Only dominant public policy would justify such

action. In the absence of a plain indication of

that policy through long governmental practice or

statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious

ethical or moral standards, this Court should not

assume to declare contracts of the War Department

contrary to public policy. The courts must be

content to await legislative action.

Muschany, 324 U.S. at 66-67.

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 178,

concerns the enforceability of bargains that violate

public policy. It provides:

(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is

unenforceable on grounds of public policy if

legislation provides that it is unenforceable or

the interest in its enforcement is clearly

outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy

against the enforcement of such terms.

(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of

a term, account is taken of

(a) the parties' justified expectations,

(b) any forfeiture that would result if

enforcement were denied, and

(c) any special public interest in the

enforcement of the particular term.

(3) In weighing a public policy against

enforcement of a term, account is taken of

(a) the strength of that policy as manifested

by legislation or judicial decisions,

(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce

the term will further that policy,

(c) the seriousness of any misconduct

involved and the extent to which it was

deliberate, and

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(d) the directness of the connection between

that misconduct and the term.

(emphasis added.)

The United States Supreme Court relied upon this

provision to evaluate whether public policy was

violated by a plea agreement providing for dismissal of

criminal charges in exchange for a waiver of the

defendant’s right to file a civil rights action. Town

of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 n.2 (1987). 

More recently, the Court of Federal Claims relied upon

this provision to reject the government’s argument that

a contractor should be strictly liable for the unlawful

acts of its subcontractors. Transfair Int’l, Inc., v.

United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 78 (2002). The government

in Transfair argued that a contract should be declared

void because a subcontractor performed the contract in

an unlawful manner (by employing an Iranian airliner to

deliver goods), even though the contractor argued that

it had no knowledge of the unlawful performance. 

Following similar decisions from other circuits,

including the Seventh Circuit case, Northern Indiana

Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d

265 (7th Cir. 1986), the Transfair court reasoned that

“the defense of illegality, being in character if not

origins an equitable and remedial doctrine, is not

automatic but requires...a comparison of the pros and

cons of enforcement.” Transfair, 54 Fed. Cl. at 85

(quoting Carbon County, 799 F.2d at 273). The

Transfair court denied the United States’ motion to

dismiss the contractors’ suit for payment. Its

reasoning is instructive:

This court is mindful of the vital foreign policy

concerns at issue and the result here is in no way

intended to denigrate those concerns. But, the

short of the matter is that while it is highly

relevant that legal requirements, tied to those

concerns, were apparently violated here, that fact

alone is not decisive. Rather, this court must

determine, first, whether, under the

circumstances, plaintiff is responsible for the

illegal performance of its subcontractor and,

then, applying the balancing test of the

Restatement, consider whether the nature of that

illegality was such as to warrant the forfeiture

of all compensation. As fact issues lurk beneath

both considerations, this court must deny

defendant's motion. 

Here, although the contract directly conflicts with a

federal statute, the legislation does not explicitly

state that any contract made in violation of the

statute is unenforceable. There are fact inquiries

that must precede any reasoned application of the

restatement factors, including the strength of the

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public policy that underlies the statutory eight year

service provision; the government’s interest in a

return on its investment in training Navy fixed-wing

jet pilots; the impact upon Plaintiffs that would

result if relief was denied; and the nature of any

misrepresentations and/or mistakes that have occurred

as a result of the Navy’s negligence in drafting the

service contracts. 

(Doc. 49 at 35-39.)

It is anomalous that the government asks officers to sign

service agreements and to abide by their terms, except when the

contract is sought to be enforced against the government. The

motion to dismiss the contract based habeas claim must be DENIED.

3. Equitable Estoppel Claim.

The second claim advanced in the habeas petitions is for

equitable estoppel. Petitioners essentially argue that the

government should not be permitted to advance its illegality

defense because it has engaged in ongoing misrepresentations

warranting the application of equitable estoppel. The government

moves to dismiss this claim on the ground that it fails as a

matter of law. The August 24, 2006 opinion set forth the

relevant standard and discussed a key Ninth Circuit case:

Equitable estoppel “precludes a party from

claiming the benefits of a contract while

simultaneously attempting to avoid the burdens that

contract imposes.” Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d

1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]he party claiming

estoppel must have relied on his adversary’s

[misleading] conduct in such a manner as to change his

position for the worse, and that reliance must have

been reasonable in that the party claiming the estoppel

did not know nor should it have known that its

adversary’s conduct was misleading.” River City

Ranches #1 Ltd v. Comm’r Internal Revenue, 401 F.3d

1136 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit applies a twoprong test to determine when it is appropriate to apply

equitable estoppel against the government. First

Plaintiffs must demonstrate “affirmative conduct [by

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the government] going beyond mere negligence,” Purcell

v. United States, 1 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 1993); and

second that the “government’s wrongful act will cause a

serious injustice, and the public’s interest will not

suffer undue damage” if the requested relief is

granted, United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d 1402, 1411

n.12 (9th Cir. 1991). 

In the context of ruling on an equitable estoppel

claim brought against the government, the Ninth Circuit

held that “[n]either the failure to inform an

individual of his or her legal rights nor the negligent

provision of misinformation constitute affirmative

misconduct.” Suilt v. Schiltgen, 213 F.3d 449, 454

(9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs assert, however, that the

Navy’s conduct went beyond mere negligence, citing

Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.

1989), for the proposition that the government’s

conduct in this case is actually affirmative

misconduct. In Watkins, the Army was well aware from

the time of Watkins’ initial enlistment in 1967 that he

had “homosexual tendencies,” to which he admitted on

several occasions. At that time, engaging in

homosexual acts with other servicemen was considered a

crime under military law. Watkins was investigated

several times by the Army for allegedly committing

sodomy and his fitness for duty was questioned on

several other occasions. But, until 1981, he was

always cleared of all wrongdoing and allowed to

reenlist on several separate occasions because of his

excellent performance. Id. at 702. In 1981, the Army

promulgated a regulation which mandated the discharge

of homosexuals regardless of merit. Soon thereafter an

Army Board convened and determined that Watkins should

be discharged. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit held that equitable estoppel

could be invoked against the government in Watkins

because the Army repeatedly represented over a 14-year

period that Watkins was qualified for reenlistment. 

Although acknowledging the general principle that

“persons dealing with the government assume the risk

that government agents may exceed their authority and

provide misinformation,” the Watkins court noted that

the government “acted affirmatively in admitting,

reclassifying, reenlisting, retaining, and promoting

Watkins.” Id. at 708. Furthermore, the defendant’s

conduct “involve[d] ongoing active misrepresentations

by Army officials acting well within their scope of

authority.” Id. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit found

the Army’s conduct to be “affirmative misconduct.” Id. 

(Doc. 49 at 39-41.)

In ruling on the prior motion to dismiss, the district court

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In an apparent attempt to rebut the government’s 9

argument that the equitable estoppel claim is barred because

Petitioner’s have no contract rights in the terms of their

Service Agreements, Petitioners engage in a lengthy discussion of

whether equitable estoppel can be applied outside the realm of

contract Law. (Doc. 85 at 15-17.) It is not necessary to engage

in this debate here because the government’s “no contract right”

theory has been rejected. 

47

applied the heightened pleading standard set forth in Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to Petitioners’ equitable estoppel

claim. See Miscellaneous Service Workers Drivers & Helpers v.

Philco-Ford Corp., 661 F.2d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 1981)(pleading

pursuant to Rule 9 was required for a claim that alleged

affirmative misrepresentation). The district court found the

initial complaint to be “insufficient to state a claim for

equitable estoppel.”

Paragraph 32 is conclusory as it fails to describe what

misrepresentations about Plaintiffs’ service term were

made, when, or by whom. Intentional misrepresentation

is not alleged, nor do Plaintiffs allege a pattern of

affirmative misrepresentations like those in Watkins. 

Negligence is not enough. 

(Doc. 49 at 43.) 

The government again moves to dismiss the equitable estoppel

claim, raising some new arguments, while repeating the argument

that the petitions are not pled with sufficient specificity. To 9

justify application of equitable estoppel against the government,

Petitioners must demonstrate (1) “affirmative conduct [by the

government] going beyond mere negligence,” Purcell v. United

States, 1 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 1993); and (2) that the

“government’s wrongful act will cause a serious injustice, and

the public’s interest will not suffer undue damage” if the

requested relief is granted, United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d

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1402, 1411 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991). 

a. Showing of Affirmative Misconduct.

It is undisputed that a party seeking to estop the

government must make an additional showing of “affirmative

misconduct going beyond mere negligence.” Morgan v. Heckler, 779

F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1985). Under the heightened pleading

standard of Rule 9, at a bare minimum, Petitioners must plead

what misrepresentations about Plaintiffs’ service term were made,

when, and by whom. 

Rule 9(b) demands that, when averments of fraud are

made, the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud

be specific enough to give defendants notice of the

particular misconduct so that they can defend against

the charge and not just deny that they have done

anything wrong. Averments of fraud must be accompanied

by “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the

misconduct charged. A plaintiff must set forth more

than the neutral facts necessary to identify the

transaction. The plaintiff must set forth what is false

or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.

Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)

The government insists that Petitioners have failed to meet

this heightened pleading standard because the “make no factual

allegations evidencing that any misstatements were deliberately

false and not the result of negligence or mistake.” (Doc. 78 at

19.) More specifically, the government argues:

Petitioners first allege that the United States engaged

in affirmative misconduct by entering into Service

Agreements with them that contained service terms in

conflict with federal statute. However, Petitioners

set forth no facts evidencing that the individuals who

entered into the Service Agreements were aware of the

change in statutory law or in any way acted to

deliberately mislead them of their service obligations

in entering into the Service Agreements. Nor do

Petitioners allege any facts to establish that the

language in their “form” Service Agreements was

intentionally retained after the change in federal law. 

(Doc. 51, ¶¶ 32-37; Doc. 52, ¶¶ 31-36.) Petitioners

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have demonstrated nothing more than mere negligence or

oversight on the part of the Navy in not updating its

service agreement form.

Petitioners next allege that the Navy’s release of

other naval aviators evidences affirmative misconduct. 

(Doc. 51, ¶¶ 38-40; Doc. 52, ¶¶ 37-39.) Petitioners

wholly fail to show how the Secretary of the Navy’s

discretion in granting certain naval aviators discharge

from the military is in any way misconduct. 

Petitioners apparently confuse affirmative “conduct”

with affirmative “misconduct.”

Petitioners next allege that they received orders

reiterating that they were obligated to serve the

number of years in their Service Agreements. (Doc. 51,

¶¶ 76-81; Doc. 52, ¶¶ 75-80.) Again, Petitioners fail

to plead any facts to suggest that the individuals

issuing those orders were aware of any inconsistency

between the Service Agreements and federal law and yet

deliberately concealed such misinformation. Contrary

to Petitioners’ allegations, the issuance of such

orders does not constitute affirmative misconduct.

Petitioners finally allege that they were told on two

occasions, by unnamed officers, that the seven-year

contractual service term applied. (Doc. 51, ¶¶ 82-94;

Doc. 52, ¶¶ 81-93.) Yet, Petitioners fail to allege

specific facts to establish any affirmative misconduct

going beyond mere misinformation. Petitioners fail to

identify the names of the officers, the specific

fraudulent statements made, or even that the

individuals involved had knowledge of the change in the

federal statutory provision or knowledge that the Navy

would not discharge Petitioners at the end of their

seven-year terms.

Instead, Petitioners set forth conclusory statements

that the United States engaged in deliberate,

intentional, affirmative misconduct. Under Ninth

Circuit precedent, as a matter of law, Petitioners’

allegations fail to establish affirmative misconduct

required to maintain an estoppel claim against the

government. See Sulit v. Schiltgen, 213 F.3d 449, 454

(9th Cir. 2000) (“Neither the failure to inform an

individual of his or her legal rights nor the negligent

provision of misinformation constitute affirmative

misconduct.”)....

(Doc. 78 at 19-21.) The government ignores the crux of the Ninth

Circuit’s holding in Watkins, 875 F.2d 699. As the district

court previously explained, in Watkins “ongoing active

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misrepresentations by Army officials acting...within their scope

of authority,” constituted “affirmative misconduct.” Id. There

is no need for direct proof of intentional misconduct. As a

result, the government’s myriad of related arguments (e.g., that

“Petitioners set forth no facts evidencing that the individuals

who entered into the Service agreements were aware of the change

in statutory law or in any way acted to deliberately mislead them

of their service obligation in entering into the Service

Agreements”) fail. Under Watkins, a widespread pattern of

misrepresentations may be sufficient:

Affirmative misconduct does require an affirmative

misrepresentation or affirmative concealment of a

material fact by the government... although it does not

require that the government intend to mislead a party. 

Watkins, 875 F.2d at 707. 

The amended petitions sufficiently allege such a pattern of

misconduct. For example, one petition alleges:

23. At some time preceding the enactment of 10 U.S.C.

§ 653, Defendants became aware that Congress was

deliberating on a bill that would establish a

longer service term for Naval Aviator candidates

than those in existence at that time....

25. Prior to the enactment of 10 U.S.C. § 653,

Defendants, through Vice Admiral Jeremy Boorda,

former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, and

others participated in discussions with various

members of Congress and their staff regarding the

initially proposed nine-year statutory service

term for Naval Aviators in the bill that became

law as codified at 10 U.S.C. §653.

31. At the time of the enactment of 10 U.S.C. § 653,

Defendants became aware and had knowledge of the

eight-year statutory service terms for Naval

Aviator candidates trained to fly "fixed-wing jet

aircraft,"and the six-year term for those trained

to fly "other type of aircraft" established by law

as codified at 10 U.S.C. §653.

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Although the government argues that “Petitioners wholly 10

fail to show how the Secretary of the Navy's discretion in

granting certain naval aviators discharge from the military is in

anyway misconduct,” (Doc. 78 at 20), Petitioners point out that

at least one district court (albeit in an unpublished case) has

held that evidence of the inconsistent and disparate application

of policies and regulations governing the service terms in the

military provides a basis to construe conflicting regulations

against the military and result in the grant of a serviceman's

habeas petition. See Wallace v. Brown, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

10156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

51

36. Defendants’ continued drafting, issuing and

signing Service Agreements with Naval Aviator

candidates, including McSeveney, that contained a

seven-year service term that conflicted with the

eight and six-year statutory service terms

established by law as codified at 10 U.S.C. § 653

was knowing and deliberate, and constitutes a

pattern of affirmative misconduct going beyond

mere negligence.

(Doc. 52, MFAP). To the extent possible, Petitioners have

identified specific individuals and specific instances of

misconduct. 

Petitioners have also alleged that Respondents have engaged

in a systematic release of hundreds of pilots in recent years,

including seven in accordance with the same exact seven-year

service term that is contained in their Service Agreements: 

63. The release of the Naval Aviators by Defendants as

described above created a justified expectation in

[Petitioner] that he too would be released after

completion of the seven-year contractual service

term contained in his Service Agreement and not be

held to serve the eight-year statutory service

term contained in10 U.S.C. § 653.

64. The release of the Naval Aviators by Defendants as

described above makes any expectation by Defendant

that [Petitioner] would not be released after

completion of the seven-year contractual term

contained in the Service Agreement unjustified.

(Id.)10

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Finally, Petitioners specifically allege that the Navy

represented that they were to serve only seven years in orders

issued to Petitioners in 1996. The government contends that the

“issuance of such orders does not constitute affirmative

conduct.” (Doc. 78, at 20.) Perhaps not, if those orders were

isolated, but, under Watkins it is impossible to conclude as a

matter of law that Petitioners have failed to state a claim. 

The government makes much of the fact that Petitioners

cannot identify the names of individual officers who reassured

Petitioners that their seven year service terms controlled, but

the petitions are sufficiently specific. For example, Gengler’s

petition alleges:

82. Gengler successfully completed his flight training

and was designated as a Naval Aviator in April

1999. Defendants orally confirmed that the

seven-year contractual service term contained in

Gengler's Service Agreement applied rather than

the eight-year statutory service for the first

time to Gengler in April 1999, through Defendants'

representative and "Student Control Officer" at

Gengler's command, Training Squadron Two located

in Kingsville, Texas (hereinafter the "first oral

representation").

83. The first oral representation was made by

Defendants through its Student Control Officer 

acting within his authority and official capacity. 

The first oral representation made by the Student

Control Officer constituted affirmative

misconduct.

***

88. Defendants [again] orally confirmed that the

seven-year contractual service term contained in

Gengler's Service Agreement applied rather than

the eight-year statutory service term for a second

time to Gengler in April or May 1999 by Defendants

through a "Training Officer" at Gengler's command,

Strike Fighter Squadron One Two Five in Lemoore,

CA (hereinafter the "second oral representation").

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89. The second oral representation was made by

Defendants through its Training Officer acting

within his authority and official capacity. 

(GFAP.) These allegations sufficiently apprise the government of 

the circumstances constituting the alleged misrepresentations so

as to “give defendants notice of the particular misconduct so

that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that

they have done anything wrong.” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106

Although it is not clear whether the Petitioners will

ultimately be able to demonstrate a pattern of affirmative

misconduct sufficient to establish entitlement to equitable

estoppel, their claim cannot be dismissed as a matter of law at

this stage.

There is no single test for detecting the presence of

affirmative misconduct; each case must be decided on

its own particular facts and circumstances. 

Watkins, 875 F.2d at 707. 

b. No Serious Injustice; Public Interest

After sufficiently pleading the existence of affirmative

misconduct, Petitioners must also sufficiently allege that

“government’s wrongful act will cause a serious injustice, and

the public’s interest will not suffer undue damage” if the

requested relief is granted, United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d

1402, 1411 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991). The government argues in the

alternative that the equitable estoppel claim must fail as a

matter of law because: 

There is no “serious injustice” in requiring

Petitioners to adhere to their obligation “to serve at

the pleasure of the President” as commissioned naval

officers. In addition, no serious injustice can

possibly result from Petitioners’ alleged reliance on

representations that they would be discharged after

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seven years, particularly in light of the specific

language in the Service Agreements advising Petitioners

that, as Reserve Officers, they would be serving at the

pleasure of the President and that any request for

resignation of their commissions may be rejected by the

President. 

(Doc. 78 at 18-19.) The government’s argument that service “at

the pleasure of the President” equates to a complete loss of

one’s contract rights has been rejected. 

The United States’ motion to dismiss the equitable estoppel

claim must be DENIED in its entirety. 

C. Petitioners’ Procedural Motions.

Petitioners seek an order requiring that the government

answer their petitions and participate in discovery on an

expedited basis. Petitioners also request that an evidentiary

hearing be held. 

1. Request for an Order Requiring the United States

to Answer the Petitions on an Expedited Basis. 

Petitioners request that the United States be ordered to

answer the petitions within five (5) days. The government does

not oppose answering the Petition, but opposes doing so on an

expedited basis. The government requests 30 days from the date

of decision. Given the length of the petitions and the

complexity of the issues raised, it is not reasonable to expect

the government to answer within five days. The government shall

answer the amended petitions within ten (10) days of service of

this order, given the time this case has been pending and the

government has had the pleadings.

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2. Request for an Order Requiring the United States

to Participate in Discovery on an Expedited Basis.

Next, Petitioners request that the government be required to

respond to their discovery requests on an expedited schedule,

specifically within ten (10) days. The government objects both

to the scope and nature of the discovery and to the request that

they be required respond on such an expedited basis. 

Habeas Corpus Rule 6, which governs discovery in habeas

cases, provides in pertinent part:

(a) Leave of Court Required. A judge may, for

good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery

under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and may

limit the extent of discovery...

(b) Requesting Discovery. A party requesting

discovery must provide reasons for the request. The

request must also include any proposed interrogatories

and requests for admission, and must specify any

requested documents. 

Habeas Corpus Rule 6. Granting discovery is left to the

discretion of the court, to be exercised where there is a

“showing of good cause why discovery should be allowed.” Habeas

Corpus Rule 5 Advisory Committee notes. Any discovery must be

“relevant and appropriately narrow.” Habeas Corpus Rule 6

Advisory Committee notes.

The government maintains that the “majority of Petitioners’

requested discovery is not supported by a showing of good cause. 

Moreover, until the United States files an answer to the amended

petitions, it is impossible to evaluate what, if any, discovery

is needed and whether the discovery is relevant and appropriately

narrow. 

For example, Petitioners propose 174 requests for admission

that essentially recite verbatim the allegations in the amended

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petition. (Doc. 60, Ex. A.) The government argues that any such

discovery is duplicative, as the government would be required to

make such admissions in its answer. This is untrue. The

government can deny and provide no information with its denial.

The United States also objects to Petitioners’ document

requests as violative of the attorney-client privilege,

overbroad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant, vague, and premature. 

(Doc. 79 at 6.) For example, Petitioners seek all documents

reviewed or consulted by the Navy in preparing the Responses and

Answers to Gengler and McSeveny’s Petitions. (See Doc. 60, Ex.

B., Request for Production No. 1.) Petitioners also seek all

documents “reviewed or generated by Defendants related to or

evidencing its position on or policy concerning the bill that

became law as codified and amended as 10 U.S.C. § 653 including

documents prior and subsequent to the enactment. (See id.,

Request for Production No. 4.) These requests appear to

implicate the work product privilege. 

The government objects to the proposed interrogatories,

which essentially mirror the requests for production. (See Doc.

60 at Ex. C.) Petitioners seek to depose:

The individual or individuals most knowledgeable about:

1) each and every allegation contained in Gengler’s and

McSeveny’s Petitions; 2) the responses and affirmative

defenses and other information contained in Defendants’

Answer or other response to the Petitions; the Response

to Petitioners’ Request for Admissions; and 3) the

facts, documents and communications identified and

produced by Defendants in its Response to Petitioners’

Interrogatories and Request[s] for Production.

(Doc. 60 at Ex. D.) The government argues that the deposition

notice “does not set forth proper matters for examination

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) and “calls 

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for legal conclusions, violates the attorney-client privilege and

third party privacy rights, and is overboard, unduly burdensome,

and vague.” The government is correct that the request “is

certainly not narrowly tailored for a habeas proceeding.” 

However, it does not appear that the parties have followed

the normal procedure for resolving discovery disputes. First,

they must meet and confer to attempt to resolve the dispute. 

Local Rule 37-251. This does not appear to have happened yet and

it is therefore premature for the district court to intercede. 

3. Request for an expedited schedule. 

Petitioners request that any discovery responses be due 10

days after the court issues an order authorizing discovery. The

government objects “[b]ecause of the broad nature and voluminous

amount of discovery requested, and the need for the government to

respond to requests related to events nearly two decades ago.” 

The government requests a minimum of 30 days to respond to any

discovery. It appears a further scheduling conference is best

suited to determine an appropriate schedule. 

4. Request for an evidentiary hearing. 

Finally, Petitioners request an evidentiary hearing. 

Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is governed by Habeas

Corpus Rule 8(a), which provides:

(a) Determining Whether to Hold a Hearing, If the

petition is not dismissed, the judge must review the

answer, any transcripts and records of state-court

proceedings, and any materials submitted under Rule 7

to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is

warranted. 

The government resists setting an evidentiary hearing, suggesting

that one is not necessary where only issues are raised or when

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questions presented in the petition can be readily resolved by

reference to the record. (Doc. 79 at 8, citing Yeaman v. United

States, 326 F.2d 293, 294 (9th Cir. 1963)). This is incorrect,

as Petitioners make specific allegations that can only be

confirmed by the testimony of the individuals alleged to have

made the misrepresentations. 

In ruling on the previous motion to dismiss, the district

court suggested that an evidentiary inquiry is required to

resolve some of the remaining issues in this case. Although some

evidentiary matters may be undisputed after discovery, it appears

likely in this case that some fact issues can only be resolved by

a trier of fact.

Whether this case can be resolved on summary judgment,

without the need for an evidentiary hearing appears unlikely. 

This issue will be discussed at the further scheduling

conference.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, 

(1) Petitioners’ Second and Third Amended Petitions (Docs. 

72, 73, 76 & 77) are stricken;

(2) The Untied States’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

(3) A further scheduling conference is set for Thursday,

November 9, 2006 at 11:30 a.m. in Courtroom 3.

SO ORDERED

DATED: November 3,2006

 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

OLIVER W. WANGER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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