Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-06357/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-06357-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANCORA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

APPLE INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 11-cv-06357-YGR 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

SUPPLEMENT INVALIDITY CONTENTIONS

Re: Dkt. No. 171 

On August 25, 2015, defendant Apple Inc. filed a motion for leave to supplement its 

invalidity contentions pursuant to Patent Local Rule 3-6. (Dkt. No. 171 (“Mot.”).) Plaintiff 

Ancora Technologies, Inc. opposes the motion. (Dkt. No. 172.) The Court heard argument on 

September 29, 2015. Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the record in this case, 

and the arguments of counsel, and good cause shown, the Court DENIES the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

This patent infringement action, wherein plaintiff asserts U.S. Patent No. 6,411,941 (the 

“’941 Patent” or the “patent-in-suit”), was filed in the Central District of California on December 

29, 2010. (Dkt. No. 1.) The case was transferred to this District on December 15, 2011. (Dkt. 

No. 66.) 

Prior to the transfer, plaintiff served its infringement contentions on September 14, 2011. 

(Dkt. No. 171-1, Ex. A.) Defendant submitted its invalidity contentions on October 28, 2011. 

(Id., Ex. B.) In part, defendant contended the asserted claims were obvious in light of certain prior 

art, namely U.S. Patent No. 6,185,678 (the “’678 Patent”). (Id., Ex. B at 3.) According to 

defendant, it did not then assert that the ’941 Patent was anticipated by the ’678 Patent, because at 

the time defendant was arguing in connection with this litigation that the claim term “program” in 

the patent-in-suit was limited to “software application[s] that interact[] with and rel[y] on the 

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operating system,” whereas the ’678 Patent involves an operating system initialization process. 

(See Mot. at 2; Dkt. No. 107 at 11.) 

On December 31, 2012, the Court issued a claim construction order, construing “program” 

in the context of the ’941 Patent as “a set of instructions for software applications that can be 

executed by a computer.” (Dkt. No. 107 at 16.) After claim construction, defendant filed an 

unopposed motion for summary judgment of non-infringement. (Dkt. Nos. 108, 119.) On April 

29, 2013, summary judgment was entered in favor of defendant. (Dkt. No. 121.) Plaintiff 

appealed the Court’s “program” construction to the Federal Circuit. 

On June 12, 2014, the Federal Circuit issued its mandate after having affirmed in part and 

reversed in part this Court’s earlier order. (Dkt. Nos. 147, 149.) The Federal Circuit reversed the 

Court’s construction of “program.” (Dkt. No. 147 at 5.) Defendant’s petition for a writ of 

certiorari was denied on January 12, 2015. Apple Inc. v. Ancora Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 957 

(2015). The Court held a case management conference on May 11, 2015. (Dkt. No. 164.) On 

August 11, 2015, plaintiff filed a new action against defendant, asserting the same patent but 

accusing a new set of products. See Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Apple Inc., Case No. 15-cv-3659 (N.D. 

Cal.) at Dkt. No. 1. The two cases were related. (Dkt. No. 170.) On August 25, 2015, defendant 

filed the instant motion. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The Northern District of California’s Patent Local Rules require plaintiffs and defendants 

to disclose their respective infringement and invalidity contentions in a timely manner. Pat. L.R. 

3-1, 3-3; see also Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846 LHK, 2012 WL 

1067548, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2012) (“The rules . . . seek to balance the right to develop new 

information in discovery with the need for certainty as to the legal theories.”) (quoting O2 Micro 

Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Patent Local 

Rule 3-6 permits amendment of infringement or invalidity contentions “only by order of the Court 

upon a timely showing of good cause.” The present incarnation of the Rule provides a “nonexhaustive” set of examples that, “absent undue prejudice” to the opposing party, may constitute 

good cause: 

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(a) A claim construction by the Court different from that proposed 

by the party seeking amendment; 

(b) Recent discovery of material, prior art despite earlier diligent 

search; and 

(c) Recent discovery of nonpublic information about the Accused 

Instrumentality which was not discovered, despite diligent efforts, 

before the service of the Infringement Contentions. 

Pat. L.R. 3-6; see also Acer, Inc. v. Tech. Properties Ltd., No. 5:08-CV-00877 JF/HRL, 2011 WL 

1838768, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2011) (noting that to succeed on its motion, the movant “must 

show first that it was diligent in amending its contentions and then that the non-moving parties 

will not suffer undue prejudice if the motion to amend is granted”) (citing O2 Micro Int’l Ltd., 467 

F.3d at 1366-68). Here, as the movant, defendant bears the burden of establishing it acted 

diligently. See id. at *3. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Defendant seeks to supplement its invalidity contentions in the following ways: (1) arguing 

the ’678 Patent anticipates the asserted claims; (2) pointing to prior art relating to SunOS and 

MATLAB; and (3) claiming the patent-in-suit is directed to ineligible subject matter pursuant to 

35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court addresses each in turn. 

First, defendant’s initial contentions posited that the patent-in-suit was obvious in light of 

the ’678 Patent. At the time, defendant purportedly did not assert anticipation because it believed 

a single limitation of the patent-in-suit—the “program” limitation—was not covered by the ’678 

Patent. This was apparently due to defendant’s position that the patent-in-suit’s “program” term 

should be limited to “software applications.” Thus, it would not be fully anticipated by the 

operating system initialization process addressed in the ’678 Patent. As noted above, while the 

Court’s construction—as with defendant’s proposal—limited the term to cover “software 

applications,” the Federal Circuit ultimately held otherwise, finding the term “program” was not 

so limited. (Dkt. No. 147 at 5.) 

Second, defendant seeks to add certain prior art relating to SunOS (a UNIX-based system) 

and MATLAB. The Court’s December 31, 2012 claim construction order construed the term 

“BIOS,” in part, as “the set of essential startup operations that run when a computer is turned on, 

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which tests hardware, starts the operating system, and supports the transfer of data among 

hardware devices.” In so doing, the Court rejected defendant’s proposal that the term be limited to 

“software routines on IBM PC compatible computers that handle startup operations and support 

the transfer of data among peripheral devices.” (Dkt. No. 147 at 8 (emphasis added).) 

Finally, defendant seeks to assert the patent-in-suit is invalid as directed to ineligible 

subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Since defendant served its invalidity contentions on 

October 28, 2011, the case law relating to Section 101 has developed substantially in light of the 

Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2349, 

and subsequent opinions by the Federal Circuit. 

These developments would, in the exercise of diligence, warrant leave to amend. 

However, in the instant case, defendant’s conduct fell far short of clearing that bar. Defendant 

waited more than seven months from the exhaustion of the appellate process and more than three 

months from the first case management conference that followed the issuance of mandate to move 

to amend. It is not clear how the limited scope of the amendments—assertion of an additional 

ground for invalidity as to a patent cited in its original contentions; a search for more prior art 

based on a single, years-old claim construction; and assertion of invalidity under Section 101 in 

light of a 2014 Supreme Court decision—would have necessitated a delay of weeks, let alone 

months.1 The proffered justification at the hearing of competing work schedules for defense 

 1

 Presumably defendant considered it inefficient to renew its prior art search before the 

exhaustion of appeals relating to the “BIOS” construction. However, defendant’s argument that 

“it was uncertain when and in what form this case would recommence,” and therefore held off on 

such a search for months after certiorari was denied until a case management conference was held, 

is not convincing. Moreover, defendant claims its initial 475 hours spent on searching the prior art 

constitutes a diligent search, with the newly discovered material falling under the “recent 

discovery of material, prior art despite earlier diligent search” example of circumstances that 

might justify leave to amend. However, diligence would have required defendant to complete its 

anticipated supplemental search as soon as practicable once mandate issued and certiorari was 

denied—not several months later. On the other hand, the Court rejects plaintiff’s suggestion that 

defendant was obligated to begin searching for prior art in light of plaintiff’s proposed 

constructions prior to the Court adopting said constructions. See Positive Technologies, Inc. v. 

Sony Electronics, Inc., No. C 11-2226 SI, 2013 WL 322556, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013) 

(noting a defendant, in the exercise of diligence, need not “identify all relevant prior art references 

that may become relevant to all possible claim constructions” prior to a court order adopting said 

constructions); but see Verinata Health, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., No. C 12-00865 SI, 2014 WL 

789197, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014) (finding lack of diligence where movant had been aware 

of non-movant’s constructions, which were ultimately adopted by the court, for more than a year). 

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counsel during the intervening months does not excuse the delay. See Verinata Health, Inc. v. 

Sequenom, Inc., No. C 12-00865 SI, 2014 WL 789197, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014) (“Several 

courts have found that a delay of three months before seeking amendment is too long to establish 

diligence.”). 

Having found defendant did not exercise diligence in moving to amend, the Court need not 

address the question of prejudice to plaintiff. Nevertheless, the Court notes that plaintiff would 

suffer prejudice stemming from some of the proposed additions. For instance, addressing the 

SunOS/MATLAB prior art might necessitate additional third-party discovery as the close of 

discovery nears. 

Finally, defendant’s request that the Court overlook defendant’s lack of diligence due to 

the import of the additional grounds for invalidity that it seeks to assert is unpersuasive. 

Defendant will have the opportunity to offer these same challenges in the newly filed related case 

asserting the same patent. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion for leave to supplement 

its invalidity contentions. 

This Order terminates Docket Number 171. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 30, 2015 

______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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