Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00275/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00275-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YOUNG JO LEE

CDCR #v-32076,

Civil No. 10cv0275 H (WVG)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[Doc. No. 2]; AND

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)

vs.

D. PARAMO, et al.,

Defendants.

Young Jo Lee, a former state inmate, has submitted a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead,

he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

[Doc. No. 2]. 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

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only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, “[u]nlike other indigent

litigants, prisoners proceeding IFP must pay the full amount of filing fees in civil actions and

appeals pursuant to the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act].” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871,

886 (9th Cir. 2002). As defined by the PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or

detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent

for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release,

or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Here, while Plaintiff was an inmate at one time,

it appears that he was not incarcerated at the time he filed this action and he is no longer housed

within the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

Accordingly, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets, just as it would for any

other non-prisoner litigant seeking IFP status, see S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2(d), finds it is sufficient

to show that Plaintiff is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain this action,

and hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc.

No. 2].

II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

Any complaint filed by a person proceeding IFP is subject to sua sponte dismissal by the

Court to the extent it contains claims which are “frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)

(holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits,

but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

claim.”). “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true

all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 

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A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were

violated when he was wrongfully charged with a disciplinary violation. “The requirements of

procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth

Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569

(1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to

invoke due process protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However,

the Supreme Court has significantly limited the instances in which due process can be invoked.

 Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in

confinement that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28

(9th Cir. 1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of his disciplinary conviction which show “the type of atypical, significant

deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For example, in

Sandin, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff

possessed a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus

discretionary nature of the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s

confinement and whether they amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when

compared to those shared by prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibility of

whether the prisoner’s sentence was lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the deprivation

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the

Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of

the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions”

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of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due

process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege a liberty interest, and thus, has failed to state a due process claim. See May, 109 F.3d

at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.

B. Property Claims

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his constitutional rights when they searched his

cell and removed his property. (See Compl. at 5.) Where a prisoner alleges the deprivation of

a liberty or property interest caused by the unauthorized negligent or intentional action of a

prison official, the prisoner cannot state a constitutional claim where the state provides an

adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129-32 (1990);

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”)

provides an adequate post-deprivation state remedy for the random and unauthorized taking of

property. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, Plaintiff has an

adequate state post-deprivation remedy and his claims relating to the taking of his property are

not cognizable in this § 1983 action, and must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

and 1915A(b)(1).

Accordingly, the Court must DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for all the reasons set forth

above but will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to amend his Complaint to correct the

deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court.

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]

is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

2. The case is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

/ / /

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3. Plaintiff is granted sixty (60) days from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to

file an amended complaint which addresses each deficiency of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading.

See S.D.CA.CIV.LR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended

Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 4, 2010

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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