Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03060/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03060-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GEORGE M. PAPA, and DEBRA JO

PAPA, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs, 

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA; ARIZONA

COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION

ONE; ARIZONA SUPREME COURT;

RUTH V. MCGREGOR; JOHN C.

GEMMILL; and ARIZONA

COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL

CONDUCT,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-3060-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs George and Debra Papa’s (“Plaintiffs”) motion

for the Court to give verification that it will entertain or grant Plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. #33).

After reviewing the pleadings, the Court will decline to entertain Plaintiffs’ motion.

On July 5, 2007, the Court sua sponte found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

divested the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Dkt. #26). As

such, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss to the extent that it sought dismissal

of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit, and thus denied as moot Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment,

request to expedite judgment, and motion for entry of default. (Id., p.7). Plaintiffs

subsequently appealed the Court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Case 2:06-cv-03060-MHM Document 37 Filed 04/15/08 Page 1 of 4
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Ninth Circuit. (Dkt. #28). On January 16, 2008, the Acting Clerk of the Court for the Ninth

Circuit issued an order that denied Plaintiffs’ opposed motion for a limited remand “without

prejudice to renewed motion that provides the court with verification that the district court

is willing to consider appellants’ motion. See Crateo, Inc. v. Intermark, Inc., 536 F.2d 862,

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976).” Then, on January 30, 2008, Plaintiffs filed the instant

motion requesting that the Court indicate that it would either entertain Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)

motion or grant such a motion.

The instant motion, as well as the Ninth Circuit’s January 16, 2008 order, derives from

the following passage in Crateo, Inc. v. Intermark, Inc.: “Because of the pending appeal, the

District Court had no jurisdiction to enter an order under Rule 60(b). The most the District

Court could do was to either indicate that it would ‘entertain’ such a motion or indicate that

it would grant such a motion. If appellant had received such an indication, its next step

would have been to apply to this Court for a remand.” 536 F.2d 862, 869 (9th Cir. 1976),

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976). As such, because this lawsuit is currently on appeal before

the Ninth Circuit and the Court retains no jurisdiction to enter an order under Rule 60(b), the

most the Court can do is to indicate whether it would entertain or grant Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)

motion if the matter were to come before the Court on the basis of a limited remand from the

Ninth Circuit.

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and are only appropriate if the Court “(1)

is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision

was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 114 S.Ct. 2742 (1994). A motion for reconsideration is not the time to ask the Court

to rethink what it has already thought. See Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 252 F.Supp.2d 936,

938 (D.Ariz. 2003) (citation omitted). Accordingly, courts grant such motions only in rare

circumstances. See Sullivan v. Faras-RLS Group, Ltd., 795 F.Supp. 305, 308-09 (D.Ariz.

1992).

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Here, Plaintiffs contend that their case meets the limited circumstances of “mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” and thus warrants reconsideration under Rule

60(b). Plaintiffs contend (1) that it was improper for the Court to sua sponte find that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Defendants

did not argue for dismissal on that basis in their motion to dismiss (Dkt. #35, pp. 1-3); and

(2) that the Court was wrong to find that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied because

Plaintiffs allegedly do not challenge the Arizona state courts’ judgments, but rather their

rejection of Plaintiffs’ multiple motions for reconsideration “without even remotely

considering whether or not there was merit or authorization for this relief.” (Dkt. #36, p.2).

First, in its July 5, 2007 order, the Court cited to Scholastic Entertainment, Inc. v. Fox

Entertainment, 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003), for the well-established proposition that

a district court has the authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction. The

Court finds no reason to revisit this decision. Further, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’

contention of surprise at the Court’s holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied in this

case is somewhat disingenuous since, although Defendants did not argue that the doctrine

applied to this case in their motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs themselves addressed the RookerFeldman doctrine in their complaint and argued that the doctrine did not divest the Court of

jurisdiction. (Dkt. #1, pp. 26-31).

Second, the Court finds no reason to revisit its decision that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does in fact divest the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ complaint.

As the Court stated in its July 5, 2007 order, “Plaintiffs’ entire complaint appears to be based

upon the premise that the Superior Courts, the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona

Supreme Court erroneously decided Plaintiffs’ suits and erroneously determined Plaintiffs’

appeals. This Court does not have the authority to review such issues.” (Dkt. #26, p.6). The

Court remains steadfast in its determination that it lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

complaint based on the finding that Plaintiffs’ complaint constitutes a de facto appeal under

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. District Courts do not have jurisdiction over challenges to a

state court’s decision in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those

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challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). However, the Court notes that

District Courts do “have subject matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules,

promulgated by state courts in non-judicial proceedings, which do not require review of a

final state court judgment in a particular case.” Id.

In the instant action, Plaintiffs attempt to draw a distinction between the elements of

their complaint that challenge the state courts' decisions to summarily reject their

multitudinous motions for reconsideration and the elements of their complaint that attack the

state courts’ judgments on the merits of Plaintiff’s lawsuit. However, such a distinction here

is one without meaning. Plaintiffs’ challenge to the summary rejection of their multitudinous

motions for reconsideration is inextricably intertwined with Plaintiffs' de facto challenge to

the judgments on the merits of their lawsuit. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“As a practical matter, the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test of Feldman is likely to apply

primarily in cases in which the state court both promulgates and applies the rule at issue-that

is, to the category of cases in which the local court has acted in both legislative and a judicial

capacity-and in which the loser in state court later challenges in federal court both the rule

and its application.”). As such, the Court will not entertain, and is not likely to grant,

Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for the Court to give verification

that it will grant Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion is DENIED. (Dkt. #33). 

DATED this 14th day of April, 2008.

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