Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02140/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02140-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Mark Anthony Escobar, Jr.,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02140-TUC-DCB (BPV)

 

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Mark Anthony Escobar, Jr., has filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed a Limited Answer 

(Doc. 14). Petitioner did not file a reply. 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the 

undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. For the following 

reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss the Petition as 

procedurally defaulted. 

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Petitioner pled guilty in state court to manslaughter and burglary in the first 

degree. (Doc. 14 at 2 (citing Exh. A)). He was sentenced to concurrent, presumptive 

prison terms of 10.5 years for each offense. (Id. (citing Exh. B)). On October 29, 2010, 

Petitioner timely filed a Notice for Post-Conviction Relief. (Id. (citing Exh. C)). 

 During the PCR proceeding, Petitioner’s appointed counsel, Stephen McCafferty, 

informed the court that he found no colorable claim to present, and Petitioner 

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subsequently filed a pro se motion describing himself as mentally ill and requesting new 

counsel. (Id. (citing Exhs. D, E, F)). The trial court appointed Ken Sanders as new 

counsel and stated that Petitioner’s pro se motion would be considered as part of his 

Notice for Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 14, Exh. G). 

 Thereafter, Petitioner, through counsel Sanders, filed a timely PCR Petition (“First 

PCR Petition”) in which he asserted that: (1) the trial court erred in finding him 

competent to accept the plea, which resulted in denial of due process; and (2) trial 

counsel was ineffective by failing to have Petitioner’s competency assessed prior to entry 

of the guilty plea. (Doc. 14, Exh. H). The trial court subsequently denied relief without 

holding an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 14, Exh. M). 

 Three months later, Petitioner filed a second PCR Notice in which he alleged 

ineffective assistance of PCR counsel McCafferty and Sanders. (“Second PCR 

Proceeding”) (Doc. 14, Exh. N). Petitioner’s appointed counsel for this proceeding, 

Harold Higgins, notified the court that he had a conflict and the court then appointed 

Brick Storts. (Doc. 14, Exhs. O, P, Q). Counsel Storts notified the court that he found no 

colorable claim to present, but upon noticing that Petitioner had not timely filed a petition 

for review of the trial court’s ruling on Petitioner’s First PCR Petition, requested 

permission, and was granted leave, to file a delayed petition for review with regard to the 

First PCR Petition. (Doc. 14, Exhs. S, U). Thereafter, Petitioner, through counsel Storts, 

filed a Petition for Review in which he alleged the same claims that had been raised in 

the First PCR Petition, and he argued that the state court erred in not holding an 

evidentiary hearing on the claims. (Doc. 14 at 3, (citing Exh. V)). In response, the State 

maintained its position that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on the merits, but 

conceded that Petitioner should have received an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 14, Exh. W). 

On July 2, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted review and also granted relief in part by 

remanding the case to the trial court for reconsideration of Petitioner’s due process claim 

and an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 14, 

Exh. X). 

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 Meanwhile, before the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its July 2014 ruling, 

Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Petition on December 4, 2013 (“Third PCR Petition”) in 

which he alleged several new claims as a well as a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. (Doc. 14 at 3 & Exh. Y). “The handwritten petition was largely illegible, but 

the trial court summed up the claims as follows: ‘his sentence was unconstitutional, his 

arrest was unconstitutional, his interrogation by police was in violation of his rights under 

the 5[th] and 14th [a]mendments, his [d]ue [p]rocess rights during trial were violated, his 

trial was unjustly delayed in violation of his 6th amendment rights, and prosecutorial 

misconduct tainted his case.’” (Doc. 14 (quoting Exh. CC at 2)). On March 14, 2014, 

the trial court summarily denied the petition, holding that the claims were precluded 

under rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because they: could have 

been raised on direct appeal or on post-trial motion; were finally adjudicated on the 

merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceedings; or had been waived at trial, on 

appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding. (Doc. 14, Exh. CC). 

 On June 6, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas action, which 

Respondents concede is timely field. (Doc. 14 at 4). He raises the following claims: (1) 

denial of “[d]ue [p]rocess of law under [t]he 4th Amendment...” resulting from unlawful 

arrest (Ground One); (2) violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments by officers who 

refused to stop questioning Petitioner causing Petitioner to make incriminating statements 

(Ground Two); (3) violation of the 6th Amendment resulting from the prosecutor delaying 

trial and defense counsel failing to object (Ground Three); (4) prosecutorial misconduct 

resulting in denial of due process under the 14th Amendment (Ground Four); (5) 

ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from counsel permitting Petitioner to enter a 

guilty plea before the trial court ruled on a pending motion to suppress (Ground Five); (6) 

denial of due process when Petitioner was booked into jail “without ever being advised of 

his...right to a post booking phone call...” (Ground Six); and (7) he was sentenced in 

violation of law because his plea was entered under duress (Ground Seven). (Doc. 1) 

 Soon after filing his federal Petition, Petitioner requested this Court to stay the 

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federal proceeding because “issues filed with the Arizona Court of appeals” had not been 

completely settled. (Doc. 5). The Court denied the motion without prejudice because the 

Court could not ascertain from Petitioner’s filings what was pending before the appellate 

court or whether his claims had been exhausted. (Doc. 7). Thereafter, Respondents 

informed the Court that Petitioner’s First and Third PCR Petitions contained the same 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that he raised in Ground Five of the instant federal 

Petition and that, after Petitioner filed the federal Petition, the state appellate court 

remanded the claim to the trial court for a hearing. (Doc. 11). Based on this information, 

Respondents requested that this Court stay these proceedings until the claim was resolved 

in state court. (Id.). This Court granted Respondents’ motion to stay and directed 

Respondents to inform the Court of the outcome of the issues pending in state court. 

(Doc. 12). This Court also directed Respondents to file an answer to the federal Petition 

no later than 60 days from the filing of the trial court’s ruling if Petitioner failed to timely 

seek review from such ruling.1

 (Id.). 

 In compliance with this Court’s order, Respondents informed the Court on 

October 21, 2014 that the evidentiary had been held on October 13, 2014, and the trial 

court had issued its ruling on that same date. (Doc. 13). “At the hearing, [Petitioner], 

represented by counsel, withdrew his first PCR petition. . . .After discussing the decision 

with [Petitioner] and counsel, the trial court found that [Petitioner] understood ‘the nature 

of withdrawing’ the petition and ordered it withdrawn.” (Doc. 14 at 4 (quoting Doc. 13)). 

 

1

 The Court specifically ordered Respondents to notify this Court, in writing, within 14 

days of the filing of the trial court’s ruling on the First PCR Petition, of the outcome of 

the ruling. (Doc. 12 at 2). The Court also ordered: 

If Petitioner seeks further review Respondents shall notify this court within 

14 days of the filing of the state court’s mandate. [And that] . . . [e]ither the 

filing of the state court’s mandate or the Petitioner’s failure to seek review 

within thirty days after a denial of his PCR by the trial court will serve to 

automatically lift the stay granted in this order, and Respondents’ answer 

will be due no later than sixty (60) days from the filing date of the trial 

court’s disposition or, if a petition for review is filed, no later than thirty 

(30) days from the filing date of the mandate in state court. 

(Id.). 

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Respondents next filed their Limited Answer to Petitioner’s federal habeas Petition in 

which they argue that all of Petitioner’s federal claims are procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 

14). Petitioner did not file a Reply. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD FOR EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

 Because Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was filed after April 24, 1996, this 

case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“§ 2254). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); 

see also Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003). 

 Under the AEDPA, a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted unless it appears 

that the petitioner has exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509 (1982). To exhaust state court remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” 

his claims to the state’s highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death 

penalty, ‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas 

once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 

993, 998 n. 3 (9th Cir.2005) (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 

1999)). 

 A claim is fairly presented if the petitioner has described the operative facts and 

the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 

(1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277–78 (1971). A petitioner must clearly alert 

the state court that he is alleging a specific federal constitutional violation. See Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir. 2004). He must make the federal basis of the claim 

explicit either by citing specific provisions of federal law or federal case law, even if the 

federal basis of a claim is “self-evident,” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 

1999), or by citing state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional 

claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

 In Arizona, there are two procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners to 

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exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. Rule 32 of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a 

petitioner is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or 

in a prior PCR petition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a) 

may be avoided only if a claim falls within certain exceptions and the petitioner can 

justify his omission of the claim from a prior petition or his failure to present the claim in 

a timely manner. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(b), 32.4(a). 

 A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways. 

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in 

state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 729–30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed 

to present it in state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 

1998) (explaining that the district court must consider whether the claim could be 

pursued by any presently available state remedy). Therefore, in the present case, if there 

are claims that were not raised previously in state court, the Court must determine 

whether Petitioner has state remedies currently available to him pursuant to Rule 32. See 

Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931. If no remedies are currently available, Petitioner’s claims are 

“technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 If there are claims that were fairly presented in state court but found defaulted on 

state procedural grounds, such claims will be found procedurally defaulted in federal 

court so long as the state procedural bar was independent of federal law and adequate to 

warrant preclusion of federal review. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). It is 

well established that Arizona’s preclusion rule is independent of federal law, see Stewart 

v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002), and the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly determined that 

Arizona regularly and consistently applies its procedural default rules such that they are 

an adequate bar to federal review of a claim. See Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014) (Arizona’s waiver rules are independent and 

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adequate bases for denying relief); Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (Rule 32.2(a)(3) regularly 

followed and adequate); Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding 

Arizona not “irregular” in application of procedural default rules); Martinez-Villareal v. 

Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996) (same). 

 Nonetheless, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, however, the 

Court will not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless the petitioner 

demonstrates legitimate cause for his failure to exhaust the claim in state court and 

prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were not heard on the merits in federal 

court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

 Generally, “cause” for a procedural default exists if the petitioner can demonstrate 

that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply 

with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); accord 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged 

constitutional error or violation. Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998). To 

establish prejudice resulting from a procedural default, the petitioner bears the burden of 

showing not merely that the errors at his trial were possibly prejudicial, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with errors of 

constitutional dimension. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). 

 A habeas petitioner “may also qualify for relief from his procedural default if he 

can show that the procedural default would result in a ‘fundamental miscarriage of 

justice.’” Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 321(1995)). See also Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776–777 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(analyzing this exception in a non-capital case). This exception to the procedural default 

rule is limited to habeas petitioners who can establish that “a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent[.]” Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 327. See also Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028. “‘To be credible, such 

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a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new 

reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.’” Cook, 538 F.3d 

at 1028 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 

B. ANALYSIS

 Respondents argue that “[e]very claim” raised in Petitioner’s instant federal 

habeas Petition is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to exhaust his state 

court remedies. (Doc. 14 at 7). Respondents point out that although “a subpart of 

[Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim]. . . in [Ground] Five was presented 

in his first PCR proceeding and raised in his [petition for review] to the Court of 

Appeals[,] the claim was remanded for an evidentiary hearing, at which [Petitioner] 

expressly withdrew the petition.” (Id. (citing Doc. 13)). Petitioner’s decision to 

withdraw the claim prevented the state court from resolving the issue. Moreover, 

Petitioner never again presented the claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Although 

Respondents acknowledge that the claims raised in the instant Petition were also raised in 

Petitioner’s Third PCR Petition (Doc. 14 at 4), they point out that Petitioner did not seek 

appellate review of the trial court’s denial of his Third PCR Petition. 

 Under these circumstances, Respondents are correct that Petitioner’s failure to 

present to the Arizona Court of Appeals the claims he raises in his federal Petition results 

in the conclusion that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court remedies. See 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“To provide the State with the necessary 

‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . 

. . ,thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.”). Further, Petitioner 

would no longer have a remedy if he returned to the Arizona courts to present the claims 

he raises here. Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 

a defendant is precluded from post-conviction relief on any ground that was waived in 

any previous collateral proceeding. Petitioner waived review of his ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim raised in his First PCR Petition by withdrawing that Petition in 2014 at 

the hearing on remand from the appellate court. Although he also raised the claim in his 

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Third PCR Petition filed in 2013, he failed to request appellate court review of the trial 

court’s denial of his Third PCR Petition and the time has now passed to seek such review. 

See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a); see also Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir 2002) 

(a state post-conviction action is futile when it is time-barred). Nor do the claims qualify 

for any of the timeliness exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h). Thus, any additional 

petition would be subject to summary dismissal. See State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 

987 P.2d 226, 228 (App. 1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432, 897 P.2d 734 (App. 1995); 

Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (1998) (timeliness is a 

separate inquiry from preclusion). On the instant record, Petitioner’s claims raised in his 

federal habeas Petition are procedurally defaulted.2 Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 

1139 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]here a petitioner did not properly exhaust state remedies and 

‘the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet 

the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred,’ the 

petitioner's claim is procedurally defaulted.”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1 ); 

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas review is 

precluded where petitioner has not raised his claim in the state courts and the time for 

doing so has expired); Parra v. Ryan, No. 2014 WL 3747635 at *4 (D. Ariz. July 30, 

2014) (same). 

 Petitioner has not argued or otherwise shown cause or prejudice to overcome the 

procedural default in this case. Nor has he argued that a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice has occurred which would require this Court to address his claims on the merits. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s procedural default cannot be excused and the District Court 

 

2

 Because these claims are procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court need not determine whether the claims are of 

“sufficient constitutional magnitude” to require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 

waiver. See e.g. Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir.2005). Moreover, the 

procedural timeliness bar of Rule 32.4(a) is clear, consistently applied, and well 

established. Powell v. Lambert, 357 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2004); see e.g., Rosario, 195 Ariz. 

264, 987 P.2d 226 (where petitioner did not raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d) through 

(g), the petition could be summarily dismissed if untimely); Jones, 182 Ariz. at 434, 897 

P.2d at 736; see also Wagner v. Stewart, 2008 WL 169639, *9 (D.Ariz. Jan. 16, 2008). 

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should dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as procedurally defaulted.3 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court, after its independent review, should 

dismiss Petitioner’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 

1) because the Petition is procedurally defaulted. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS

after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond 

to another party’s objections within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from 

the District Court to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following 

case number: CV 14-2140-TUC-DCB. 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to review. 

 Dated this 7th day of June, 2016. 

 

3

 In addition to arguing that Petitioner’s Petition is procedurally defaulted, Respondents also argue that Petitioner waived his federal claims by pleading guilty. (Doc. 14 at 10‒ 11). Because Petitioner’s claims should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted, the Court need not address this alternative argument. 

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