Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01935/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01935-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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- 1 - 09cv1935

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID JOHNS, on behalf of himself and all

others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09CV1935 DMS (JMA)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

STRIKE, AND (2) GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Docs. 13-14]

vs.

BAYER CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”), and Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC. Defendants also request

judicial notice of several documents. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to strike is

granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. 

I.

BACKGROUND

Defendants Bayer Corporation and Bayer Healthcare, LLC, manufacture, distribute, and sell

One A Day Men’s 50+ Advantage (“Men’s 50+”) and One A Day Men’s Health Formula (“Men’s

Health”) vitamin products. (FAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiff David Johns filed a putative class action alleging that

Defendants misrepresented on product packaging, commercial advertisements, their website, and in

other marketing materials and media, that one of the products’ key ingredients, selenium, has “the

Case 3:09-cv-01935-AJB-DHB Document 21 Filed 02/09/10 Page 1 of 8
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ability to reduce the risk of prostate cancer in men.” (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

promoted the health benefits of selenium based on “emerging evidence,” but that selenium does not

in fact prevent or reduce the risk of prostate cancer and may actually cause diabetes. (Id. at ¶ 20.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Bayer Corporation was sued by the federal government in 2007 for

violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) stemming from marketing of its One a Day

Weightsmart product. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges Bayer settled the claim and entered into a Consent

Decree, which prohibits Bayer from claiming a product will “cure, treat, or prevent any disease” unless

such statement is supported by “competent and reliable scientific evidence.” (Id. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff

further alleges that the Center for Science in the Public Interest (“CSPI”) sent a letter to the Federal

Trade Commission (“FTC”) complaining about Bayer’s statements regarding selenium. The CSPI

letter cites to multiple scientific studies that found selenium does not reduce or prevent prostate cancer

and can increase risk of diabetes. (Id. at ¶ 25.) The CSPI requested that the FTC take action against

Bayer. (Id. at ¶ 21.) 

Plaintiff alleges he purchased one bottle of Men’s Health in July 2009 for approximately $8.00.

(Id. at ¶ 37.) He alleges he read the information regarding selenium on the product packaging and

relied on those statements in making his purchasing decision. (Id. at ¶ 38.) Plaintiff consumed the

Men’s Health vitamins. (Id. at ¶ 39.) Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges he learned that Defendants’

statements regarding selenium were not supported by scientific studies and that selenium could lead

to increased risk of diabetes. (Id. at ¶ 40.) Based upon these events, Plaintiff seeks to bring a class

action on behalf of “all persons in the United States or, alternatively, all California residents who from

and after September 3, 2005, purchased One a Day Men’s 50+ Advantage or One a Day Men’s Health

Formula.” (Id. at ¶ 42.) 

Plaintiff alleges claims for: (1) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, California

Business & Professions Code § 17200 (“UCL”), (2) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act,

California Civil Code § 1750 (“CLRA”), and (3) unjust enrichment. Plaintiff filed his FAC on

October 16, 2009, (Doc. 10), and Defendants filed the instant motions on October 30, 2009. (Docs.

13 & 14.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to each motion (Docs. 15 & 16), and Defendants filed a reply.

(Docs. 17 & 18.)

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 All references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted. 1

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II.

DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice

Judicial notice may be taken of facts “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1)

generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(b). A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001). A court may also consider documents on which a plaintiff’s claims are

based, but which are not attached to the complaint, without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into

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a motion for summary judgment. Id. In that instance, the authenticity of the documents must not be

contested. Id.

Defendants request judicial notice of: 1) a Complaint filed in United States v. Bayer, Case No.

07-CV-00001 (D. N.J. 2007), 2) the resulting FTC Consent Decree, 3) a “Memorandum Opinion and

Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Portions of the First Amended

Complaint,” issued in Fraker v. Bayer Corp., Case No. 08-CV-1564 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2009), and 4)

the product packaging for Bayer One-A-Day Men’s Health Formula. (Def. Req. for Judicial Notice,

Doc. 13-3.) The first three documents are a matter of public record. The fourth document, the

packaging, serves as the basis for several of Plaintiff’s allegations and Plaintiff does not contest its

authenticity. Accordingly, Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted.

B. Motion to Strike

1. Legal Standard

Rule 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading...any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” A motion to strike “should not be granted unless it is clear that

the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.”

Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991). The Court may strike

“requested relief [that] is not recoverable as a matter of law.” Wilkerson v. Butler, 229 F.R.D. 166,

172 (E.D. Cal. 2005).

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2. “Borrowed” Allegations

Defendants move to strike Paragraphs 17-32 of the FAC because the allegations are borrowed

from the FTC and the CSPI. Defendants argue these allegations violate Plaintiff’s duty under Rule

11(b) to conduct a reasonable factual investigation into the allegations made in a complaint. Plaintiff

argues the allegations are relevant to the litigation and that Plaintiff conducted an independent

investigation into the claims.

Attorneys have a duty to make a reasonable inquiry into whether the factual contentions made

in a complaint have evidentiary support. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(b). Two cases are noteworthy on this

issue. In the first case, In re Connectics, 542 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005-06 (N.D. Cal. 2008), the court

struck allegations from the plaintiffs’ complaint that were taken from a complaint the SEC had filed

against the defendants. The court found that the plaintiffs had relied solely on the SEC complaint as

the basis for the allegations and that they had not conducted an independent inquiry. Id. In the second

case, In re New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1220-21 (C.D. Cal. 2008), the court declined to strike

allegations taken from a bankruptcy examiner’s report because the report was deemed to be a reliable

source for pleading purposes.

Here, Paragraphs 17-19 of the FAC involve a previous matter from 2007, in which Defendant

Bayer Corporation was sued by the government for alleged FTCA violations. That lawsuit resulted

in a settlement and consent decree; there was no adjudication on the merits and no admission of

wrongdoing or fault on the part of Bayer. Paragraphs 20-32 of the FAC involve a letter written by

CSPI to the FTC, which alleges that Bayer violated the earlier consent decree with misrepresentations

regarding selenium. The CSPI letter provided examples of Bayer’s alleged misrepresentations and

cited to several studies which indicate that scientific support for Bayer’s claims regarding selenium

may be lacking. 

This matter is similar to Fraker v. Bayer Corp., 08cv1564 AWI (GSA), (E.D. Cal. 2008), in

which Bayer was sued for false advertising regarding “Epigallocatechin Gallate,” a product involved

in a government lawsuit and consent decree. (RJN, Ex. C.) There, the court struck allegations which

were lifted from the consent decree and an FTC order because the court could not find any

independently investigated evidence that supported the plaintiff’s claims. (Id. at Ex. C, p. 56.) The

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 Defendants also move to strike several allegations on standing grounds. The standing issues 2

are addressed in text below.

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court noted that “the entiretyof Plaintiff’s claims of wrongdoing are based on factual allegations made

in, or inferred from, either the Consent Decree or the FTC Order.” (Id.)(original emphasis). So it is

here. The only allegations that support a claim of wrongdoing are taken directly from the CSPI letter.

Because CSPI is an interest group, its allegations do not contain the same level of reliability as the

bankruptcy examiner’s report in In re New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1220-21. Accordingly,

Defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 17-32 of the FAC is granted.

3. Equitable Relief

Defendants seek to strike portions of the FAC in which Plaintiff states he is seeking

“disgorgement of Defendants’ profits from sales of the Products.” (FAC ¶¶ 2, 45(d), 59, 74, Prayer

for Relief ¶ D.) Although Defendants are correct that nonrestitutionary disgorgement is unavailable

under the UCL, disgorgement is available to the extent it is restitutionary. See Korea Supply Co. v.

Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1148 (2003) (“Under the UCL, an individual may recover

profits unfairly obtained to the extent that these profits represent monies given to the defendant or

benefits in which the plaintiff has an ownership interest.”). Defendants’ motion to strike on this

ground is denied.2

C. Motion to Dismiss

Because the Court grants Defendants’ motion to strike Paragraphs 17-32 of the FAC, there are

no factual allegations to support the claim that Defendants’ advertising was deceptive. Accordingly,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted without prejudice. Nonetheless, theCourt addresses several

of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss as guidance if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended

complaint.

1. Legal Standard

In two recent opinions, the Supreme Court established a more stringent standard of review for

12(b)(6) motions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss under this new standard, “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility

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when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950 (citing Iqbal

v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007)). The reviewing court must therefore “identify the

allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and evaluate “the factual

allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at

1951. 

2. Standing

Defendants argue Plaintiff lacks statutory standing to bring a claim under the UCL and CLRA

for violations involving the Men’s 50+ vitamin because Plaintiff does not allege he purchased that

particular product. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff does not allege he relied on any radio,

television, or internet advertisements in conjunction with his purchase of Men’s Health.

Proposition 64, which was approved by California voters on November 2, 2004, amended

certain provisions of the UCL. To have standing under the UCL, as well as to serve as a class

representative, a plaintiff must plead and prove that he or she “has suffered injury in fact and has lost

money or property as a result of” a defendant’s unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices. Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203-04. See In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 326, 326 n.17 (2009)

(“Tobacco II”) (Proposition 64 “imposes an actual reliance requirement” under which plaintiffs

seeking to represent a class of consumers must “plead and prove actual reliance” on the challenged

conduct). 

Similarly, under the CLRA, an action may be brought by: “Any consumer who suffers any

damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to

be unlawful by Section 1770....” Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a). In order to have standing, a plaintiff must

allege he or she was damaged by an alleged unlawful practice. Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 45 Cal.

4th 634, 638 (2009.)

/ / /

/ / /

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Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the UCL by:

misrepresenting on Product packaging, in commercial advertisements, on their

website, and in other marketing materials and media that the Products’ key ingredient

- selenium - has the ability to prevent or reduce the risk of prostate cancer, and failing

to warn of the increased risk of diabetes caused by consumption of their Products.

(FAC at ¶¶ 54-56.) 

Plaintiff does not allege that he saw any advertisements for Men’s 50+, that he read the

packaging on the product, or that he even considered purchasing the product. Plaintiff also does not

allege that he relied upon on any radio, television, or internet advertisement in connection with his

purchase of Men’s Health. Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues he has standing to pursue his claims because

Defendants’ conduct is not limited to the labeling of Men’s Health, but rather stems from a uniform

advertising campaign designed to promote the health benefits of selenium. 

Plaintiff argues he was the “direct object of some aspect of” Defendants’ advertising campaign.

Citing In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 326, 326 n.17 (2009) (“Tobacco II”), Plaintiff asserts

he need not allege actual reliance on all aspects of Defendants’ advertising campaign: where “a

plaintiff alleges exposure to a long-term advertising campaign, the plaintiff is not required to plead

with an unrealistic degree of specificity that the plaintiff relied on particular advertisements or

statements.” 46 Cal. 4th at 328. The problem with this argument is that Plaintiff does not allege

exposure to a long-term advertising campaign; rather, he has alleged injury based upon a specific

misrepresentation on Defendants’ Men’s Health product. He cannot expand the scope of his claims

to include a product he did not purchase or advertisements relating to a product that he did not rely

upon. The statutory standing requirements of the UCL and CLRA are narrowly prescribed and do not

permit such generalized allegations. Plaintiff, therefore, has standing under the UCL and CLRA to

pursue his claim regarding Men’s Health product and the representations contained on that product;

but he lacks standing to pursue any other alleged claim under the UCL or CLRA. 

3. Rule 9(b)

Defendants argue that the FAC sounds in fraud and therefore is subject to the particularized

pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Fraud is not an essential element of a UCL or CLRA claim.

Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, claims brought under

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 While a split of authority appears to exist on this issue, (see, e.g., Nordberg v. Trilegiant 3

Corp., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“state and the federal courts appear to be unclear

whether in California a court may recognize a claim for ‘unjust enrichment’ as a separate cause of

action”), this Court agrees with those courts that conclude unjust enrichment is not a separate claim.

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the UCL and CLRA may be subject to Rule 9(b) if the claim “sounds in fraud” or is “grounded in

fraud.” Id. A claim is grounded in fraud where the plaintiff alleges a unified course of fraudulent

conduct and relies on that course of conduct as the basis of a claim. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA,

317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendants argue the present claims sound in fraud. The elements of fraud are: (1)

misrepresentation, i.e. false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure; (2) knowledge of falsity;

(3) intent to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) damage. Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1126. Here,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made misrepresentations and omissions on their product packaging,

but does not allege knowledge of falsity or intent to induce reliance. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims

are not “grounded in fraud” and Rule 9(b) does not apply.

4. Unjust Enrichment

Defendants correctly argue that Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment fails as a matter of law.

Unjust enrichment is a “general principle underlying various legal doctrines and remedies;” it is not

an independent cause of action. McBride v. Boughten, 123 Cal. App. 4th 379, 387 (2004) (quoting

Melchior v. New Line Products, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 4th 779, 793 (2003)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 3

claim for unjust enrichment fails.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to strike is granted in part and denied in part.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff may file a Second Amended Complaint within

thirty (30) days of the date this order is electronically posted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 9, 2010

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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