Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-02196/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-02196-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHERRI LYNN FRAZIER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-97-2196 LKK CHS P

vs.

TINA FARMON, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Cherri Frazier is a state prisoner proceeding with counsel on a

second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Frazier attacks her March 16, 1994 conviction in the Solano County Superior Court,

case number C35712, for conspiracy to commit first degree murder.

II. ISSUES

Petitioner’s May 14, 2009, second amended petition raises three issues as

follow, verbatim:

A. Violation of Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment and the right to a jury verdict by failure to instruct the

jury on conspiracy to commit a lesser offense;

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1 This statement of facts is taken from the July 1, 1996 opinion by the California Court of Appeal

for the First Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), lodged with respondent’s answer as Exhibit L, Part 1. 

The murder of Hop Summar resulted in the prosecution of multiple defendants, in separate trials, one of

which involved two different juries. Frazier was tried along with Sue Hamby and Robert Fenenbock in

front of a common jury. This statement of facts from the California Court of Appeal is drawn from only the

facts presented at Frazier’s trial and presented to the jury that determined Frazier’s guilt, unlike the

statement of facts from the California Court of Appeal opinion concerning Bond and MacCarlie, where that

court consolidated the appeals of Bond, MacCarlie, Adcock and Lockley, resulting in a single statement of

facts that not only referenced the testimony heard by the Bond jury and the MacCarlie/Dodds jury, but also

the testimony heard by the Adcock/Lockley jury. That is why the California Court of Appeal statement of

facts may be relied upon here, but not in the Bond (99-cv-2150) and MacCarlie (00-cv-1830) Findings and

Recommendations. 

Frazier argues however that because the prosecution’s theory regarding the homicide was false,

and because this theory “permeates the lower court opinion . . . it is not possible to rely solely upon the

facts” as summarized in the July 1, 1996 opinion. Second Amended Petition at 8. Frazier instead draws

facts from the opinion, her trial, the trials of other defendants, and from “evidence unmentioned in these

lower court opinions . . .” Id.

On federal habeas review, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct” unless rebutted by the petitioner by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S .C. §

2254(e)(1). See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007) (“AEDPA also requires federal

habeas courts to presume the correctness of state courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this

presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ”) (citing Section 2254(e) (1)); Pollard v. Galaza, 290

F.3d 1030, 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002) (statutory presumption of correctness applies to findings by both

trial courts and appellate courts); Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

“Clear and convincing evidence” within the meaning of § 2254(e) “requires greater proof than

preponderance of the evidence” and must produce “an abiding conviction” that the factual contentions

being advanced are “highly probable.” Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 919 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 2004)). Here, Frazier has not presented

evidence that would permit the presumption of correctness that has attached to the State court’s factual

2

B. Violation of Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment and the right to a jury verdict by failure to instruct the

jury on the requested lesser related offense instruction on

Accessory After the Fact; and

C. The accumulation of error rendered her conviction fundamentally

unfair and a violation of her rights to Due Process under the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 

Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the

undersigned will recommend this petition for habeas corpus relief be denied.

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Facts1

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3

The events occurred in Hawkins Bar, a small hamlet located

on Highway 299 in Trinity County. Hawkins Bar consists of a

general store, a set of BP gasoline pumps adjoining the

store, and a bar (Simon Legree’s) located across the

highway from the store. Next to the store was a trailer park. 

It was here that Barbara Adcock lived with Bernard “Bird”

MacCarlie and her three children from a prior marriage.

Below the highway, along the river, was a United States

Forest Service campground accessible by a service road. In

September and October 1991 a group of people were

camped in the campground. They were described by local

residents as drunk and violent, especially wild and out of

control. Some of the campers had been there several

weeks; some were drifters. One couple had come to get

married at the Harvest Moon Festival on October 5. 

Defendant Cherri Frazier was there to attend the wedding. 

Some of the local residents-including Adcock, MacCarlie and

defendants Fenenbock and Hamby-spent time at the

campground.

The Prosecution's Case

It was the prosecution’s theory that Hop Summar was killed

by a mob from Hawkins Bar seeking to avenge an alleged

act of child molestation upon Barbara Adcock’s daughter.

The Victim

Hop Summar was a pathetic figure. Crippled from numerous

childhood orthopedic surgeries, he walked with a limp (hence

the nickname, “Hop”). Though he was in his 30’s, he was

physically frail, wore a colostomy bag, and had a rather

meek disposition. He lived on SSI (Supplemental Security

Income) and drank to excess nearly every day. He seldom

bathed and was distinctive for his offensive body odor. 

Hop had known Bird MacCarlie for several years, and he

often lived with Bird in the trailer Bird shared with Barbara

Adcock and her children. Sometimes Hop looked after

Adcock’s children while Adcock was partying at the

campground.

The Molestation Accusations

On September 30, 1991, Barbara Adcock reported to the

Trinity County Sheriff’s Department that Hop Summar had

molested her five-year-old daughter Rachelle H. (Ultimately

neither the sheriff nor the county’s Child Protective Services

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found any evidence that Rachelle had been molested.) 

Adcock and Bird MacCarlie then proceeded to spread the

accusations among the denizens of Hawkins Bar.

Solicitation of Mike Sutton

Defendant Cherri Frazier arrived at the Hawkins Bar

campground on September 30. She was there to attend the

wedding of Leafe and Michelle Dodds. Frazier had camped

at Hawkins Bar earlier that summer.

Almost immediately upon her arrival, Frazier encountered

Barbara Adcock, who told her of the molestation of Rachelle. 

That same day, or the following day, Frazier gave a ride to

Mike Sutton, a drifter also camping at Hawkins Bar. During

the ride Sutton noticed a blue-handled knife on the

dashboard. Frazier said, “I’m going to go and cut off Hop’s

balls.” Frazier asked Sutton to come with her, but he

refused. She then told him to “stay out of it.”

In that same ride, Frazier told Bert Jones (another transient

camped at Hawkins Bar) that she needed to do something

about Hop’s molestation of Barbara Adcock’s daughter; that

she would drag Hop into the woods herself and kill him if she

had to.

On the evening of October l, Mike Sutton was in the

campground and heard Bird MacCarlie, Barbara Adcock and

“Redbeard” Bob Bond discussing how to kill Hop. Barbara

Adcock was sitting at a picnic table with defendants Cherri

Frazier and Sue Hamby. Barbara and Cherri asked Sutton if

he wanted to be in on it, as they weren’t getting any help

from the others. He declined. As he walked away from the

group of women, Sutton heard the women discussing that

defendant Sue Hamby was to keep Hop at her house so that

Barbara Adcock could find him once she rounded up help to

hurt him. Later that night, Sue Hamby apologized to Mike

Sutton for being so forward in the conversation.

The Assaults Upon Hop

On October 1, Hop went into Arcata and withdrew $600 in

cash from his bank account. About 5:30 in the evening, he

returned to Hawkins Bar, having hitched a ride. The driver

dropped him at the BP pumps. As Hop tried to enter the

trailer where he resided with MacCarlie and Adcock, a group

approached him and began to call him a rapist and a child

molester. Included in the group were MacCarlie, Adcock,

defendant Fenenbock, defendant Frazier and others. As the

crowd egged her on, a woman named April May Gault

chased Hop, caught up with him when he stumbled, and

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beat him.

The attendant at the BP pumps did not see the beating, but

he saw Hop just afterward. His face was cut and bleeding. 

Hop told him April May had hit him with a beer can.

Sometime later, Hop was assaulted again. About 6:00 he

went into Simon Legree’s, the town bar. The bartender and

patrons observed that Hop’s face was cut and bleeding. 

Hop told the bartender that Harry Darr had struck him in the

face with a pistol because he had refused to get into Darr’s

truck.

Indeed, just beforehand, Harry Darr had come into Maeolla

Berry’s trailer in the trailer park. When he left, he jumped

into his truck and rode across the highway. Maeolla Berry

could see a gun in the truck. Hop Summar was standing

across the street. Maeolla Berry did not see Darr get out of

his truck, but she heard Hop yelling for help, and she saw

Darr drive off as patrons of the bar came out to help.

Defendant Hamby’s Role

Defendant Sue Hamby lived in a trailer east of Hawkins Bar. 

Her friend, Michael “Scarecrow” Roanhouse, lived in a

second trailer on Hamby’s property. She gave him food in

exchange for repairwork on the property. Hamby was

engaged to marry Tex Lockley.

On the morning of October 1, Barbara Adcock and her

children appeared at Hamby’s trailer. Adcock told Hamby

her accusations against Hop Summar. After Adcock left,

Hamby told Scarecrow Roanhouse, but Scarecrow said he

didn’t believe Adcock’s story.

That afternoon, Hamby went to Maeolla Berry’s trailer and

asked for her advice. Hamby told Maeolla Berry that she was

supposed to keep Hop in her trailer and let Barbara Adcock

know so that Adcock could call the police. Berry advised

Hamby to call the police herself.

After their conversation, Berry drove Hamby to the

campground so Hamby could retrieve her truck. On the way

Hamby telephoned Hop to tell him to stay where he was, at

Simon Legree’s, and she would pick him up. Later that

evening, Hamby and Scarecrow Roanhouse came into

Simon Legree’s. Hop was dozing on his bar stool, with his

purple backpack at his side. When he awoke, Hamby got

him into her truck and drove him to her trailer. He slept on

her couch. The next morning, Hamby left her trailer and

went to the campground. According to her testimony,

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Hamby told Scarecrow to keep an eye on Hop in case the

police arrived.

The Confrontation with Hop

Hop did not stay in Hamby’s trailer. About 6:15 or 6:30 p.m.

Tex Lockley and Scarecrow Roanhouse were driving in

Lockley’s red flatbed truck from the general store down to

the campground when they saw Hop on the access road. 

They stopped and gave him a ride in the back. Hop was

carrying his purple backpack.FN

FN. Tex Lockley’s truckbed was bloodied from

the carcass of a wounded pit bull dog.

As the truck approached the campground, however, a group

angrily came toward the truck, shouting, “Get him out of

here.” Barbara Adcock shook a baseball bat, yelling, “Get

the fuck on out of here.” Tex Lockley shifted quickly into

reverse and backed the truck up the hill to the highway.

Scarecrow Roanhouse testified that as the truck reached the

top of the hill and the passengers got out, defendant

Fenenbock and Redbeard Bob Bond walked toward the

truck. The two men walked up to Hop and struck him in the

face. Redbeard Bob hit him in the mouth; defendant

Fenenbock hit Hop in the eye. They accused Hop of being a

child molester, and Hop replied, “Not guilty. Not guilty.”

At this point Steven Thayer was walking up the access road

and passed the red truck. As he did so, he saw Bird

MacCarlie and Leafe Dodds drive up in Barbara Adcock’s

white Ranchero.FN2 They, too, talked to Hop, and Hop

replied that he hadn’t done anything. Hop asked, “What are

you going to do? Kill me here? Throw me in the bushes or

something?” Bird MacCarlie replied, “Yeah, something like

that.” Steven Thayer testified that when last he saw Hop,

Hop was seated inside the Ranchero between Redbeard

Bob Bond and Bird MacCarlie. The Ranchero pulled out

onto the highway and headed east. The red truck followed.

FN. Meanwhile, Mike Sutton was in the

campground and saw Bird MacCarlie leave in

the white Ranchero with Randy H. part way

under some blankets in the back. Defendant

Fenenbock was not in the campground. He

showed up later that evening, along with Bird

MacCarlie, Redbeard Bob Bond, and Tex

Lockley.

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The Murder

Barbara Adcock’s son, Randy H., Jr., then age 9, was

sleeping on a mattress in the back of the white Ranchero. 

He testified that after stopping at the top of the hill the

Ranchero drove to a place where the men started stabbing

Hop. The men included Bird MacCarlie, defendant

Fenenbock, Redbeard Bob Bond and Leafe Dodds. 

Afterwards the men dragged Hop to another spot.

Four days later, on October 6, Hop Summar’s body was

discovered at a logging site. The body was covered with

branches and dirt. A piece of rope was found nearby and

there were ligature marks on Hop’s arms, suggesting he had

been tied and dragged. Two logs found nearby were

bloodied with Hop’s blood. A bloody knife was found 50 to

75 feet away. The blood was Hop Summar’s. The knife was

the same one used by Bird MacCarlie earlier on October 2 to

stab Bert Jones. Faint tire marks consistent with Tex

Lockley’s red truck (but not the Ranchero) were found in the

roadway at the end of the drag marks.

Hop Summar died of multiple stab wounds and bludgeoning. 

His genitals showed signs of severe trauma from a blunt

instrument. Numerous bones in his face were fractured. His

left ear had been cut off while he was still alive. He had

been stabbed 18 times in the skull, 13 times in the chest. 

His left eye had been cut out. His arm and leg had been

stabbed, bringing the total stab wounds to over 70.

The Stabbing of Bert Jones

Earlier on the day of the murder, on October 2, Bert Jones, a

drifter staying in the campground, got into an altercation with

Michelle Dodds. Defendant Cherri Frazier intervened by

pushing Jones and demanding that he leave. Barbara

Adcock came at Jones with a baseball bat. Jones retreated

to his camp about a quarter of a mile from the main

campground to pack up and leave.

That evening, Bird MacCarlie and Tattoo Ernie Knapp having

heard about Jones's run-in with Michelle Dodds, drove in the

Ranchero to Jones’s campsite. Bird MacCarlie jumped out

of the car and immediately began stabbing Jones. Bird

MacCarlie forced Jones and his camp-mate, Steven Thayer,

into the Ranchero, and they drove back to the main

campground. When Jones got out of the car, Bird MacCarlie

put a knife to his ear and threatened to cut it off. Harry Darr

eventually intervened and told Jones to leave. Throughout

the assault upon Jones, Barbara Adcock castigated Jones

for defending Hop.FN

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FN. A couple of days earlier, when accusations

were circulating about Hop’s molestation, Bert

Jones had expressed his view to the group at

the campground that he didn’t believe Hop was

guilty. After that, Bert Jones felt unwelcome at

the campground, shunned by the others.

Bert Jones and Steven Thayer separately walked up the

access road to Hawkins Bar. (It was on this walk that

Thayer observed the confrontation between the men in the

white Ranchero and Hop Summar.) At the general store

Jones showed his stab wound to some people, and one man

drove them to the nearest hospital in Willow Creek. There

Jones called 911.

Jones told the responding sheriff’s deputy that a man named

“Hopalong” was going to be killed or injured. As a result of

Jones’s report, sheriff’s deputies descended upon the

campground to investigate. They did not find Hop’s body. (It

was not discovered until October 6, by a local resident

searching for wood.) But they did uncover some

incriminating pieces of evidence.

The Investigation

When various officers (from Humboldt and Trinity County

Sheriff's Departments, the California Highway Patrol, the

Department of Forestry) arrived in Hawkins Bar, the white

Ranchero was parked at the top of the access road with Bird

MacCarlie in the front seat. 

Sergeant Kartchner, the investigating officer, first checked

several places he thought he might find Hop-Sue Hamby’s

trailer, Bird MacCarlie’s trailer, and adjoining trailers. In the

trailer occupied by Ron Ammon and Ila Olson he found

Redbeard Bob Bond and defendant Fenenbock, both drunk

and disheveled. Neither had seen Hop, they said.

Sergeant Kartchner headed for the campground. On the

way, he passed the white Ranchero with Bird MacCarlie at

the wheel. Sergeant Kartchner stopped to talk to MacCarlie,

and within a few minutes Randy H. popped up from beneath

some blankets in the back of the truck; he then sank back

down again.

A trail of blood drops led from underneath the Ranchero to a

larger area of blood near some beads and scalp hair. The

officers asked MacCarlie to move the Ranchero so they

could get a better look, but MacCarlie told them the truck

was inoperable. The officers pushed the vehicle forward.

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Bird MacCarlie had a fresh cut on his index finger. He wore

a knife sheath, but the sheath was empty. He was barefoot

and wearing a clean Hard Rock Cafe T-shirt. MacCarlie was

eventually placed under arrest that night.

Down in the campground, Sergeant Kartchner interviewed

several people. Tex Lockley had a bloody knife and was

arrested. Deputy Rist was assigned to stand by defendant

Sue Hamby while she was waiting to be questioned. The

deputy observed and seized a large buck knife in her back

pocket. Human blood was later detected on the knife.

Mike Sutton told Sergeant Kartchner that night that he knew

nothing. Later, however, he provided much of the

incriminating evidence against defendants.

The Aftermath

Mike Sutton testified that on the night of October 2, Tex

Lockley returned to the campsite and said to Barbara

Adcock, “It’s done.” Defendant Cherri Frazier replied,

“Good.” Barbara Adcock told them both to “shut up.”

Defendant Fenenbock lived in a trailer on the property of Sid

Smith. Redbeard Bob Bond and defendant Fenenbock were

dropped off at the Smith residence about 8 p.m. that night by

Bird MacCarlie driving the white Ranchero.FN Fenenbock

told Patsy Brown, Sid Smith’s wife, “You don’t have to worry

about that child molester anymore. We took care of him.” 

Patsy Brown later told Sergeant Kartchner that two women

were in the back seat of the Ranchero, and she heard Cherri

Frazier’s voice.

FN. This evidence-from Patsy Brown and from

a neighbor of Sid Smith’s-corroborates the

testimony of Randy H., who said that after the

killing Bird drove to Sid Smith’s and dropped off

Redbeard Bob and defendant Fenenbock.

The next day, October 3, defendant Fenenbock, Redbeard

Bob Bond, and Barbara Adcock arrived at the home of Sue

Mendes in Willow Creek. Fenenbock gloated that the “cops

didn’t even check [his] hands for blood.” When Sue Mendes

commented that she hoped Hop’s body was not in locations

where she hunted for mushrooms with her children, both

Fenenbock and Redbeard Bob told her not to worry about it.

The Back Pack

On the morning of October 3, Mike Sutton saw defendant

Sue Hamby rummaging through the back of Tex Lockley’s

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red truck. She pulled out a backpack, which she said was

Hop’s.

Scarecrow Roanhouse also saw Hamby with the backpack. 

He saw her open it, search through it, then wipe the outside

with a wet cloth. She asked Scarecrow to burn it, but he

refused. According to Scarecrow, Mike Sutton suggested

cutting it into pieces.

That afternoon, Hamby approached Deputy Litts in the

campground and told him she wanted to turn over Hop’s

backpack. He picked it up from her house that evening. 

Hamby told him Hop had given it to her the day before. The

backpack was stained with Hop’s blood.

The Physical Evidence

Although the white Ranchero was observed near a pool of

blood on the night of October 2, Sergeant Kartchner did not

notice anything of evidentiary value, and the car was not

seized until late October. By then there were no traces of

blood.

Tex Lockley’s red truck, however, was seized after a sheriff’s

deputy noticed blood on it. Blood splatters were found inside

the truck, as if numerous blows had been struck there. And

blood stains were found several places on the exterior of the

truck. There was also blood on the driver’s seat, smeared

as if someone sat in it. And there were blood stains on the

seat of Tex Lockley’s pants. Rope was also found in the

back of the truck.

A shovel found in the red truck had a mixture of blood

matching Hop’s blood and Bird MacCarlie’s blood. Bird

MacCarlie had a fresh cut on his finger when he was

arrested on October 2. The prosecutor theorized that Bird

cut himself burying Hop.

Defendant Fenenbock was arrested the following day, on

October 3, on an outstanding warrant. He had a bloody

knife which was seized by police. The blood could not be

proven to be human.

A $20 bill and a $100 bill in the police inventory were found

to be stained with Hop’s blood. Bird MacCarlie had $525.59

when he was arrested. Defendant Fenenbock had $32.96. 

(The booking procedures used by the Trinity County Sheriff’s

Department do not isolate particular bills taken from

prisoners.)

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Fenenbock’s Defense

Defendant Fenenbock testified that he first heard of the

molestation allegations on the morning of October 2. He

heard Barbara Adcock tell the group about the molestation,

and when someone asked, “What are you going to do about

Hop?” Barbara Adcock said the police were looking for him

and if anything happened to him, she and Bird would be the

first ones the police would come to.

Fenenbock admitted confronting Hop that afternoon with

Redbeard Bob Bond at the top of the access road. He

claimed that he tried to calm Redbeard Bob down and

restrained him from hitting Hop. Fenenbock admitted

punching Hop once, but only after Hop swung his backpack

at him.

Fenenbock saw the white Ranchero drive up with Bird

MacCarlie driving and Leafe Dodds and Harry Darr in the

back seat. There was also a yellow Toyota truck with

someone in the driver’s seat.FN Fenenbock, however, left the

scene and went back down to the campground. Redbeard

Bob Bond and Harry Darr came with him. Later, Bird

MacCarlie returned to the campground and gave defendant

Fenenbock and Redbeard Bob Bond a ride back to

Fenenbock’s trailer on Sid Smith’s property.

FN. Tattoo Ernie Knapp had a yellow pickup

truck.

Trena Knapp, wife of Tattoo Ernie Knapp, testified that after

the confrontation with Bert Jones she saw Bird MacCarlie

drive the white Ranchero out of the campground with

Redbeard Bob Bond and Leafe Dodds, but it returned five

minutes later. After dinner, about 8:30, Bird MacCarlie,

Redbeard Bob Bond, and defendant Fenenbock left in the

Ranchero with Randy H. asleep in the back.

Frazier’s Defense

Defendant Frazier testified that she gave a ride to Mike

Sutton on September 30, but she did not discuss the

molestation accusations with Sutton or threaten Hop. In fact,

she did not know about the molestation at that time. She

gave Mike Sutton and Bert Jones a ride again on October 1,

but there was no conversation about Hop.

Frazier was at the picnic table when Barbara Adcock

complained that the authorities weren’t going to do anything. 

But Frazier denied discussing how to kill Hop or asking Mike

Sutton or Bert Jones if they wanted to be involved.

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When Hop came into the campground in Tex Lockley’s truck,

Frazier took Rachelle H. and the two boys into the bathroom

at Barbara Adcock’s request. She heard Redbeard Bob

Bond yell that Hop was at the top of the hill. And she saw

Bird MacCarlie, Redbeard Bob Bond, Leafe Dodds and

Randy H. leave the campground in the Ranchero.

Frazier and Michelle Dodds then drove into Willow Creek to

buy some tequila. They passed Bert Jones and Steven

Thayer hitchhiking on the highway. Frazier testified that she

drank too much tequila and passed out for about three

hours. When she awoke, she saw Bird MacCarlie,

Redbeard Bob Bond, defendant Fenenbock and others in

the campground. Bird MacCarlie was wearing no shirt and

his hair was wet. He said he had stabbed Hop.

The next day Frazier asked Barbara Adcock what happened

to Hop, and Barbara Adcock traced her finger across her

throat. Frazier also heard Barbara Adcock and Sue Hamby

discussing where the body was located, whether the police

would ever find the body.

A few days later, Frazier was riding in the Ranchero with

Barbara Adcock when Adcock asked Frazier to look around

and see if there was any blood on the door or dashboard.

Frazier didn’t see any.

Hamby’s Defense

Defendant Sue Hamby testified that she and Hop were

friends. He showed up at her house on September 29 and

joined her and Scarecrow Roanhouse for a barbecue. Hop

spent the night on her couch. The next day she dropped him

off near the trailer park.

On October l, Barbara Adcock arrived at Hamby’s trailer and

told Hamby that Hop had molested Rachelle. Barbara

Adcock said she had told the police Hop was staying at

Hamby’s house and the police were on their way. Hamby

replied that Adcock was misinformed; that she (Hamby) did

not know where Hop was. Adcock asked Hamby not to tell

Hop that the police were coming for him.

That night Hamby went into Simon Legree’s bar to use the

phone. Hop was there, passed out at the bar. Hop’s face

had been beaten. Hop told Hamby he had been called a

rapist, and he asked Hamby if he could stay at her house for

the night. Hop got into the back of her truck, and she drove

him to her house. He slept on her couch. When Hamby left

the next morning, Hop was still asleep on her couch. She

never saw him again.

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Hamby went to the campground to see why Hop had been

beaten. When she got there, Barbara Adcock complained

that the police weren’t going to do anything about the

molestation of her daughter.

Hamby disputed the testimony of Mike Sutton. Hamby

denied asking Barbara Adcock or others whether she should

keep Hop at her place. When Barbara Adcock asked

Hamby where Hop was, Hamby lied and said she did not

know. Later, Michelle Dodds asked Hamby if she was going

to keep Hop at her place until Hop could be dealt with. 

Hamby replied that she was not keeping Hop at her house;

that she did not know where Hop was. Hamby denied

apologizing to Mike Sutton for soliciting his help.

Hamby left the campground, and when she returned the

confrontation with Bert Jones had just concluded. Barbara

Adcock was yelling and screaming, and she yelled at Hamby

that she was “going to kick [her] ass.” Hamby did not see

Hop come down into the campground. She was in the

bathroom, but she heard Barbara Adcock shout “Get him out

of here.” When Hamby emerged from the bathroom, Cherri

Frazier was entering with the [] children.

Hamby heard but did not see the Ranchero leave the

campground. Hamby herself left the campground with

Scarecrow and Trena Knapp to get a grill for the barbecue.

On October 3, the day after Hop disappeared, Hamby was in

the campground talking with Barbara Adcock, and Hamby

told Adcock, “They are not going to find anybody ... with a

helicopter.” What she meant was that a helicopter would be

useless for finding Hop in the forest.

Hamby denied taking Hop’s backpack from Tex Lockley’s

truck. She denied wiping blood or fingerprints off Hop’s

backpack. What Scarecrow Roanhouse saw her cleaning

was dirt (Scarecrow’s footprints) from her own purse. 

Hamby did turn in Hop’s backpack to Deputy Litts-the

backpack Hop had left in her trailer.

/////

Opinion at 2-14.

B. State Court Proceedings

Nine persons, Robert Bond, Bernard MacCarlie, Leafe Dodds, Robert

Fenenbock, Ernest Knapp, Anthony Lockley, Barbara Adcock, Cherri Frazier, and Sue

Hamby were charged in December of 1991 and October of 1992 with various crimes

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relating primarily to the death of Gary Hop Summar. There were extensive and

voluminous pretrial proceedings. Ultimately all charges as to Ernest Knapp were

dismissed. The remaining eight persons were tried in three separate cases in two

different counties. Frazier was tried together with Hamby and Fenenbock in front of a

common jury. With the exception of Dodds, all were convicted of various offenses, and

the post-trial proceedings were eventually concluded.

C. Federal Court Proceedings

Frazier’s federal habeas corpus proceeding has been pending for a

decade, consumed by the vast state record, the five related federal cases pending in

this Court, and overwhelming procedural issues. On September 9, 2005, Magistrate

Judge Dale A. Drozd held a hearing, resulting in a lengthy report and recommendation

resolving complex procedural matters, particularly the respondent’s motion to dismiss,

involving circuitous issues concerning the timeliness of multiple claims. Judge Drozd’s

comprehensive report of September 11, 2006, was adopted by Senior United States

District Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on July 6, 2007. 

On March 16, 2009, the Court having resolved the labyrinthine procedural

questions, Frazier was given time to file a second amended petition raising the three

claims remaining in the case. Respondent’s answer was filed on July 14, 2009, and

Frazier filed her traverse on August 13, 2009. This matter is therefore now ready for

resolution.

/////

IV. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

/////

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Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the

merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Although “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any

one methodology,” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S 63, 71 (2003), there are certain

principles which guide its application. 

First, the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the

“contrary to” clause if the state court applies a rule different

from the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it decides

a case differently than we have done on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. The court may grant relief under the

“unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case. 

The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the state court’s

application of clearly established federal law is objectively

unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show the

state court’s decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal

law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357, 360 (2002). It is appropriate to

look to lower court decisions to determine what law has been "clearly established" by

the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular application of that law. See

Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 2000). 

/////

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Second, the court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the

basis for the state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

So long as the state court adjudicated petitioner’s claims on the merits, its decision is

entitled to deference, no matter how brief. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76; Downs v. Hoyt, 232

F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2000).

Third, in determining whether a state court decision is entitl deference, it is

not necessary for the state court to cite or even be aware of the controlling federal

authorities “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). Moreover, a state court

opinion need not contain “a formulary statement” of federal law, so long as the fair

import of its conclusion is consonant with federal law. Id.

V. DISCUSSION OF PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

A. Lesser Indluded Instruction

1) Description of Claim

Frazier argues that, based on the testimony of Michael Sutton and Bert

Jones, the trial court had a sua sponte obligation under California law to instruct the jury

on lesser included target offenses. Second Amended Petition at 27. Frazier argues

that it “was a denial of her federal and state constitutional rights to due process for the

trial court not to instruct on the lesser included offenses of conspiracy to assault or

batter Hop . . .” Id. at 27-28. It was also, she argues, a “violation of federal due

process for the court not to instruct on the lesser included offense of conspiracy to

commit voluntary manslaughter.” Id. at 28. 

2) State Court Opinion

While Frazier did not specifically raise this claim to the California Court of

Appeal, she joined in with all issues raised by her co-appellants, Hamby and

Fenenbock, in her Appellants Opening Brief. Answer, Exhibit P at 40. The California

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Court of Appeal rejected this claim [as raised by co-defendant Hamby and adopted by

Frazier], stating: 

We agree with the Attorney General that the record does not

indicate that instructions on lesser target offenses were

requested below. However, the Attorney General

acknowledges that the trial court has a sua sponte obligation

to instruct on lesser included target offenses if there is

evidence from which the jury could find a conspiracy to

commit a lesser offense. Under Penal Code section 182, the

jury must determine which felony the defendants conspired

to commit. The jury cannot perform that task unless it is

instructed on the elements of the offense the defendants are

charged with conspiring to commit and any lesser offenses

which the jury could reasonably find to be the true objects of

the conspiracy. 

Defendant Hamby argues in her brief that instructions should

have been given on conspiracy to commit second degree

murder. She reasons as follows: The jury could have found

that the conspiracy into which she entered was a conspiracy

to hurt Hop Summar-to punish him, yes, but not to kill him. 

Because coconspirators are liable for the reasonably

foreseeable consequences of the planned offense and

because death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence

of the plan to inflict physical harm, the jury could have found

a conspiracy to commit second degree murder.

Hamby’s reasoning is faulty. The principle that conspirators

are liable for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of

the planned offense would render Hamby liable for the

substantive offense of second degree murder, not for

conspiracy to commit second degree murder. The offense of

conspiracy requires not only the intent to conspire, but also

the specific intent to commit the planned offense. Under

Hamby’s theory, the conspirators had no specific intent to

kill; thus, they could not be convicted of conspiracy to

murder. 

The more logical argument underlying Hamby’s theory is that

the jury should have been instructed on conspiracy to

commit offenses other than murder, e.g., assault, battery, or

mayhem. We requested supplemental briefing on whether

assault, battery, and mayhem qualify as offenses necessarily

included within the charged target offense of murder. We

conclude they do not.FN

FN. Because no instructions were requested,

we do not decide here whether the offenses of

assault, battery, or mayhem would qualify as

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lesser related target offenses to justify

instructions upon request. 

An offense is necessarily included in the charged offense if

(1) under the statutory definition of the charged offense the

charged offense cannot be committed without committing the

lesser offense, or (2) the charging allegations of the

accusatory pleading include language describing the offense

in such a way that if the charged offense was committed as

specified, the lesser offense was necessarily committed. 

Here, the parties concede that neither assault, nor battery,

nor mayhem qualify as offenses included within the statutory

definition of murder. However, defendants Hamby and

Frazier argue in their supplemental briefs that the offenses

qualify as lesser included target offenses by virtue of

language in the information describing the overt acts.FN We

are not persuaded.

FN. Specifically, the third amended information

charged that defendants “did conspire together

to murder Gary L. ‘Hop’ Summar and thereafter

in furtherance of said conspiracy ... did commit

the following overt acts: ... [¶] [A] number of

conspirators talked in the Hawkins Bar

Campground of what was to be done to

suspected child molester Gary L. ‘Hop’

Summar.... [¶] [Bird] MacCarlie went around to

different individuals asking if they were ‘in on it

or not.’ ... [¶] [Redbeard Bob] Bond called Gary

L. ‘Hop’ Summar a child molester and hit

him.... [¶] [Defendant] Fenenbock called Gary

L. ‘Hop’ Summar a child molester and hit

him.... [¶] [A] conspirator bound Gary L. ‘Hop’

Summar's arms.... [¶] [A] conspirator cut off

one of Gary L. ‘Hop’ Summar's ears.... [¶] [A]

conspirator gouged out one of Gary L. ‘Hop’

Summar's eyes.... [¶] [A] conspirator broke

bones in Gary L. ‘Hop’ Summar's face.... [¶] [A]

conspirator broke one of Gary L. ‘Hop’

Summar's ribs.... [¶] [A] conspirator hit Gary L.

‘Hop’ Summar in the testicles.... [¶]

[C]onspirators repeatedly stabbed Gary L.

‘Hop’ Summar with knives.”

In People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d 394, 405, the

Supreme Court first authorized using the language of the

accusatory pleading as a yardstick for measuring what

offenses qualify as “necessarily included” offenses for

purposes of deciding whether the defendant could properly

be convicted of a lesser offense. The Supreme Court

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reasoned that when the charging allegations reveal all the

elements of a lesser offense, the defendant is fairly put on

notice that he should be prepared to defend against a

showing that he committed the lesser offense. (Id. at pp.

399, 405 [defendant charged with robbery of an automobile

could be convicted of lesser offense of auto theft].)

Here, in the context of deciding whether the trial court was

obligated to instruct sua sponte on lesser included offenses,

we conclude that allegations of overt acts committed in

furtherance of the alleged conspiracy do not provide notice

of lesser included target offenses.

For the crime of conspiracy, the criminal act is the

agreement. The agreement is not punishable unless some

overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.FN

But the overt act itself need not be committed by the

defendant, and it need not be a criminal offense. “To render

him guilty it is not necessary that a conspirator perform some

act which is in itself unlawful in carrying out the criminal

conspiracy. If there is a conspiracy to commit murder by

means of poison sent through the mail, a conspirator may

not escape responsibility because he only agreed to and did

purchase the postage stamps with which the poison is sent

to the victim, an act entirely lawful in itself, but punishable if

done under an agreement among the conspirators and in

carrying out the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy.” It is the

agreement, not the overt act in furtherance of the

agreement, which constitutes the offense.

FN. The prosecution must plead and prove, in

addition to a criminal agreement, an overt act

(Pen.Code, §§ l 82, subd. (b), 184), and due

process principles require that overt acts be

pleaded with particularity to give the defendant

notice of the prosecution's theory. We need

not reach the question whether the overt act is

an actual element of the conspiracy. The

Attorney General relies upon cases holding

that the jury need not unanimously agree upon

the same overt acts. Yet, the case law is in

conflict on this point. Other cases have held

that the overt act is an element of the crime of

conspiracy and jury unanimity is required. 

Because overt acts need not be criminal offenses or even

acts committed by the defendant, the description of the overt

acts in the accusatory pleading does not provide notice of

lesser offenses necessarily committed by the defendant.FN

Moreover, inasmuch as overt acts may be lawful acts, the

overt acts do not necessarily reveal the criminal objective of

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the conspiracy. For example, in the hypothetical posed by

the Corica court, an alleged overt act of purchasing postage

stamps provides no notice of even the charged target

offense of murder, much less of a necessarily included target

offense.FN

FN. Indeed, in the present case some of the

alleged overt acts were allegedly committed by

Bird McCarlie or persons other than

defendants Hamby or Frazier, and some acts

were themselves lawful, e.g., talking about

what was to be done with Hop, calling Hop a

child molester.

FN. We reject the Attorney General’s argument

that allegations of overt acts are analogous to

enhancement allegations, which the Supreme

Court has held are not part of the accusatory

pleading for the purpose of defining lesser

included offenses. (People v. Wolcott (1983)

34 Cal.3d 92, 100-101 [assault with deadly

weapon held not a lesser included offense

under a charge of robbery with enhancement

for use of a firearm].) In Wolcott, the Supreme

Court reasoned that (1) because an

enhancement allegation becomes relevant only

if the defendant is convicted of the substantive

crime, a defendant may not be adequately

notified, to satisfy principles of due process,

that he must controvert the enhancement

allegation to protect against a conviction for a

lesser offense; and (2) because the jury

determines the truth of an enhancement

allegation only after it determines guilt on the

charged or a lesser offense, this procedure

would become muddled if evidence of the

enhancement must be considered in

determining guilt of a lesser offense. Neither of

these considerations applies to overt acts of a

conspiracy.

In our view, it is the description of the agreement within the

accusatory pleading, not the description of the overt acts,

which must be examined to determine whether a lesser

offense was necessarily the target of the conspiracy. Here,

the information alleged only that defendants conspired to

murder Hop Summar. There is nothing in this terse

description of the agreement to indicate an agreement with a

lesser objective. We therefore we [sic] hold that the trial

court was not required to instruct the jury sua sponte on

conspiracy to commit assault, battery, or mayhem as lesser

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offenses included within the charged offense of conspiracy

to commit murder.FN

FN. The argument of Hamby and Frazier that

the agreement was not, as alleged, to murder,

but merely to assault, batter, or maim, is in

essence an argument that there was more than

one conspiracy: a conspiracy to assault, batter,

or maim (of which Hamby and Frazier were a

part) and a separate conspiracy to murder (of

which Fenenbock and the other killers were a

part). However plausible this argument might

have been at trial, it was not made. No

instructions were requested, and the trial court

had no sua sponte duty to instruct upon this

theory.

/////

Opinion at 19-23 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

3) Applicable Law And Discussion

Frazier argues that “she was denied due process by the lower court’s

failure to instruct on lesser included defenses as mandated by California law.” Traverse

at 2, FN 1. Federal courts however are bound by a state appellate court’s determination

that an instruction was not warranted under state law. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546

U.S. 74,76 (2005) (per curiam) (noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that

“a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of

the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”); Murtishaw v.

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 956 (9th Cir. 2001) (deference must be given to a state

supreme court’s interpretation of state law governing a jury instruction), cert. denied, 535

U.S. 935 (2002). 

Thus, “[n]ormally jury instructions in State trials are matters of State law.” 

Hallowell v. Keve, 555 F.2d 103, 106 (3rd Cir. 1977) (citation omitted); see also Williams

v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996). 

An instructional error “does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas

proceeding.” Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted);

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see also Van Pilon v. Reed, 799 F.2d 1332, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986) (claims that merely

challenge correctness of jury instructions under state law cannot reasonably be

construed to allege a deprivation of federal rights) (citation omitted). A claim that a state

court violated a federal habeas petitioner’s due process rights by omitting a jury

instruction requires a showing that the error so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violated due process. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977);

Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Estelle, 502 U.S. at

72 (discussing due process standard). In cases in which a petitioner alleges that the

failure to give an instruction violated due process, her burden is “especially heavy,”

because “[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a

misstatement of the law.” Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155. Frazier fails to meet this heavy

burden.

First, there is no clearly established federal law that requires a state trial

court to give a lesser included offense instruction as would entitle Frazier to relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 & n. 7 (1980) (holding that

failure to instruct on lesser included offense in a capital case is constitutional error if

there was evidence to support the instruction but expressly reserving “whether the Due

Process Clause would require the giving of such instructions in a non-capital case”);

Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (in non-capital case,

failure of state court to instruct on lesser included offense does not alone present a

federal constitutional question cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 839; Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998) (failure

of state trial court to instruct on lesser included offenses in non-capital case does not

present federal constitutional question), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 950 (2004). Accordingly,

to the extent Frazier’s argument is solely predicated upon the trial court’s failure to give a

lesser included offense instruction, this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review

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2

 This argument does not appear in Frazier’s second amended petition, or in the

section of her traverse related to this claim, but instead in the section of her traverse

discussing her claim concerning the lesser related jury instruction issue. 

23

and should be denied on that basis. 

Second, although “the defendant’s right to adequate jury instructions on his

or her theory of the case might, in some cases, constitute an exception to the [foregoing]

general rule,” Solis, 219 F.3d at 929, Frazier’s was not such a case. See Clark v. Brown,

450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) (state court’s jury instructions violate due process if

they deny the criminal defendant “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete

defense”), cert. denied by Ayers v. Clark, 549 U.S. 1027 (2006) (quoting California v.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).

While Frazier devotes the majority of her argument to pointing out evidence

presented by the prosecution that she argues supported the trial court’s obligation to

instruct the jury on lesser included target offenses, she does not cite specific examples

of her testimony or argument that supported these instructions. Nor does she dispute

the State court’s determination that “the record does not indicate that instructions on

lesser target offenses were requested below.” Opinion at 19. Frazier appears to be

arguing that she was entitled to instructions which she did not request, on a defense

theory that she did not argue. 

Frazier however argues that her theory of defense was that she

participated in a conspiracy to assault and batter Hop Summar.2

 Traverse at 9. Frazier

argues that this theory was supported by her testimony, which established that she was

sympathetic to Adcock and her statements about Hop and the molestation accusations,

and by the fact that Frazier did not come forward to assist law enforcement. Id. 

On direct examination however Frazier testified that the first time Adcock

raised the molestation allegations, Frazier was going to tell Adcock that she “didn’t

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believe” the allegations against Hop, but “changed” her mind after Adcock “started to get

mad.” Reporter’s Transcripts (“RT”) at 3790. On cross-examination, Frazier elaborated:

Q. And can you - - can you describe that conversation

that created that fear in your mind? What was it that

she said?

A. Well, it was on the 30th the first conversation or

statement that she made when she told me that, um,

Rachelle had been molested.

Q. Okay.

A. And - -

Q. Is that at the picnic table?

A. Yes, we were sitting at the picnic table.

Q. She starts to tell you this then - -

A. Yes. And in my mind I was thinking “Well, you know, I

didn’t think that Hop would do something like that from

what I had seen of him.” And I started to state the fact,

you know, I told her, “Well, I don’t believe that, you

know, that Hop would - -“ and she kind of got upset. 

Then she got mad.

/////

RT at 3850-51.

With respect to an involvement in a conspiracy to assault and batter Hop,

Frazier testified:

Q. Okay. At any point did you ever tell Michael Sutton

that you wanted Hop dead?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Okay. Did you threaten to cut Michael Sutton with

your - - did you threaten to cut Gary Summar with your

knife in Michael Sutton’s presence?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you ever threaten to cut Gary Summar?

A. No, I did not.

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Q. Did you ask Michael Sutton at any point to become

involved in the death of Gary Summar?

A. No.

Q. Did you ask Robert Jones at any point to become

involved in the death of Gary Summar?

A. No.

Q. Did you tell Robert Jones you wanted Mr. Summar

dead?

A. No.

Q. Did you tell Mr. Jones that you were going to cut him

yourself?

A. No, I did not. 

Q. Did you ever ask anyone for help using eye signals?

A. No, I did not. 

Id. at 3832. On cross-examination Frazier denied remembering saying “Good” in

response to Tex Lockley’s statement, “It’s been done.” Id. at 3864. She recounted how

she stopped April May Gault from assaulting Hop and testified that at no time did she

agree that Hop was a child molester or that he “needed to be punished other than by law

enforcement.” Id. at 3857, 3861. With respect to Frazier’s failure to come forward and

assist the police, Frazier testified that she did not call the police after learning Hop had

been killed because she “didn’t want to end up like Mr. Summar.” Id. at 3831. 

Frazier’s testimony was consistent with her counsel’s closing arguments

which attacked the prosecution’s investigation and the credibility of Jones and Sutton. 

Id. at 4851-74. Those arguments in no way addressed or supported a theory that Frazier

participated in a conspiracy to assault and batter Hop. Id. 

The only theory apparent from Frazier’s testimony and closing arguments

was that she did not say the words attributed to her by Sutton and Jones and that she

was not part of any conspiracy to harm Hop. Frazier did not request a jury instruction on

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a lesser included offense and she did not present a theory of the case that involved a

lesser included offense. The trial judge’s decision therefore did not deny Frazier her

right to an adequate jury instruction on her theory of the case.

Finally, while Frazier’s argument cites California law, and alleged facts she

argues supported the instruction, she has not made a showing as to how the alleged

failure to instruct had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. Frazier

appears to be arguing that had the jury been instructed on lesser included offenses, the

jury would have found her guilty of a lesser included offense, if at all, and not guilty of

conspiracy to commit murder. That argument is purely speculative. 

The reality is that based on the evidence presented the jury found beyond

a reasonable doubt that Frazier was guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. Nothing in

Frazier’s argument establishes beyond pure speculation that had the jury been instructed

on a lesser included offense, it would have altered the verdict. Therefore, even

assuming that Frazier had established that the trial court constitutionally erred in failing

to give the instruction, and she did not, any such error was harmless. See Brecht, 507

U.S. at 637-38; see also Clark, 450 F.3d at 905 (habeas petitioner must show that the

alleged instructional error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

jury’s verdict). 

The state court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established constitutional law and Frazier is not

entitled to relief on this claim. 

B. Lesser Related Jury Instruction

1) Description of Claim

Frazier argues that evidence presented at the trial supported an instruction

on the lesser related offense of being an accessory after the fact and that such a finding

would have been “entirely consistent with the defense theory.” Traverse at 9. Frazier

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argues the trial judge’s refusal to issue the instruction was “a denial of her federal and

state constitutional rights to due process.” Second Amended Petition at 28. 

2) State Court Opinion

The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim stating: 

Defendants Hamby and Frazier further contend that the trial

court erred in refusing to instruct on the lesser related offense

of being an accessory-after-the-fact. Initially the prosecutor

agreed that an instruction on accessory would be appropriate

as to both the charged offenses, murder and conspiracy to

murder. The trial court indicated it would give the requested

instruction, but following closing arguments, the trial court

changed its mind, observing that neither defendant had relied

upon the accessory theory.

In People v. Geiger, supra, the Supreme Court held that in

appropriate circumstances a requested instruction on a lesser

related offense should be given. The court identified three

prerequisites to such an instruction: (1) there must exist some

basis other than an inexplainable rejection of prosecution

evidence, on which the jury could find the offense to be less

than that charged; (2) the offense must be one closely related

to that charged and shown by the evidence; and (3) the

theory of the defense must be consistent with a conviction for

the related offense.

Defendant Frazier relies upon her testimony that after the

murder Barbara Adcock asked for Frazier’s help to see if

there was any blood on the door or dashboard of the

Ranchero. Frazier checked and found none. As the Attorney

General correctly points out, there is nothing in this evidence

to support a conviction for being an accessory. Frazier did

nothing to assist Barbara Adcock avoid capture or

prosecution. She did not remove or conceal evidence. The

offense of being an accessory was not shown by the

evidence, and no instruction on that offense was required.

* * * * *

Defendants Frazier and Hamby further argue that even if an

instruction on accessory was not required under Geiger, the

trial court erred in withdrawing the instruction after having

announced that it would be given. Defendants rely upon

People v. Sanchez (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7, in which

the court found prejudicial error in the trial court’s belated

decision to withdraw an instruction on a defense theory. We

reject the argument.

Penal Code section 1093.5 requires the trial court to decide

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upon the instructions before the commencement of

argument.FN However, any error is harmless if there was no

hindrance to counsel’s ability to argue the case. The

Sanchez case is readily distinguishable. There, the trial court

changed its mind in the presence of the jury in the midst of

defense counsel’s closing argument, requiring counsel to

make abrupt changes in his argument and destroying

defense counsel’s credibility with the jury.

FN. Penal Code section 1093.5 provides: “In

any criminal case which is being tried before the

court with a jury, all requests for instructions on

points of law must be made to the court and all

proposed instructions must be delivered to the

court before commencement of argument. 

Before the commencement of the argument, the

court, on request of counsel, must : (1) decide

whether to give, refuse, or modify the proposed

instructions; (2) decide which instructions shall

be given in addition to those proposed, if any;

and (3) advise counsel of all instructions to be

given. However, if, during the argument, issues

are raised which have not been covered by

instructions given or refused, the court may, on

request of counsel, give additional instructions

on the subject matter thereof.”

Here, in contrast, the jury did not know that the theory of

accessory had been withdrawn. Nor were defense counsel

hindered in their ability to argue the case. Neither defendant

relied upon the theory of being an accessory in closing

arguments. Counsel did not mention the offense, nor did

either counsel focus on the evidentiary

basis for the crime of being an accessory. We can see no

prejudice from the trial court’s belated decision to withdraw

the instruction.

/////

Opinion at 24-27 (citations omitted). 

3) Applicable Law And Discussion

Frazier argues that the California Court of Appeal opinion did not discuss

the evidence presented by the prosecution that supported an accessory after the fact

instruction under California law. Traverse at 9-10. Federal courts however are bound by

a state appellate court’s determination that an instruction was not warranted under state

law. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74,76 (2005) (per curiam) (noting that the

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 In fact Frazier argues that she was entitled to the instruction under California

law because she was “entitled to instructions on lesser offenses which were not

necessarily included in the charge” and that “[a]ccessory after the fact was not included

in the jury’s charge.” Traverse at 10. 

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Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “a state court’s interpretation of state law,

including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal

court sitting in habeas corpus.”); Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 956 (9th Cir.

2001) (deference must be given to a state supreme court’s interpretation of state law

governing a jury instruction), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 935 (2002). 

To the extent that Frazier is arguing that the trial court violated her

constitutional right to an instruction on accessory after the fact, there is no constitutional

right to an instruction based on lesser related offenses that are not lesser included

offenses under state law. Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 96-98 (1998) (“Almost all

States ... provide instructions only on those offenses that have been deemed to

constitute lesser included offenses of the charged crime. We have never suggested that

the Constitution requires anything more.”) (citations omitted). Frazier does not argue

that being an accessory after the fact to conspiracy is a lesser included offense of

conspiracy, and under California law being an accessory after the fact to murder is not a

lesser included offense of murder.3 People v. Majors, 18 Cal.4th 385, 408 (1998);

People v. Preston, 9 Cal.3d 308, 319-320 (1973).

To the extent Frazier is arguing that the trial court’s decision adversely

impacted her defense, the Supreme Court has held that a denial of an opportunity to

make a closing argument violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. Herring v.

New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (holding that statute authorizing trial judge in nonjury criminal case to refuse to hear defense closing argument violated the Sixth

Amendment); see also United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2004) (“It can

hardly be doubted that a defendant has a right to a closing argument.”). Further, the

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“[f]ailure to instruct on the defense theory of the case is reversible error if the theory is

legally sound and evidence in the case makes it applicable.” Beardslee v. Woodford, 358

F .3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 2004) (as amended); see also Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091,

1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he right to present a defense would be empty if it did not entail

the further right to an instruction that allowed the jury to consider the defense.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted); Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (as

amended) (“It is well established that a criminal defendant is entitled to adequate

instructions on the defense theory of the case.”). A habeas petitioner must show however

that the alleged trial error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citation omitted); see also Beardslee, 358

F.3d at 578.

It is undisputed that Frazier’s counsel presented a closing argument. 

Moreover Frazier does not argue that, by initially agreeing to issue the instruction and

then reversing that decision after closing arguments had already been completed, the trial

court prevented her counsel from “adequately representing” her. Instead Frazier argues

that if her counsel had made an accessory after the fact argument, only to have the trial

court ultimately refuse to instruct the jury on that issue, it would have eliminated the

defense’s credibility with the jury. Traverse at 10. That argument however ignores the

obvious fact that when given the opportunity Frazier’s counsel did not present an

accessory argument, and that it was only after that opportunity had passed that the trial

judge decided not to issue the instruction, specifically because an accessory argument

was not made. 

Nevertheless, even if Frazier were to argue that the trial judge’s decision

somehow impaired her representation, that argument would fail. It was only after

Frazier’s counsel and counsel for Frazier’s co-defendant completed closing arguments

that the trial judge announced that he “would not be giving the instructions on lesser

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related offense and accessory after the fact.” RT at 4974. Indeed it was Frazier’s

counsel’s closing arguments that caused the judge to reconsider the issue, and to

conduct further research, because the trial judge, “really expected [Frazier’s counsel] to

be arguing an accessory after the fact theory in some form.” Id. When the trial judge

“didn’t hear anything about it” that caused him “to ponder and reflect.” Id. 

That reflection led to further research and the conclusion that under

California law the judge should not issue the instruction. Id. Deciding not to issue the

instruction after Frazier failed to present an accessory argument in no way prevented

Frazier from presenting her theory of the case. Further, not issuing the instruction did not

negatively impact the jury’s verdict, because the jury heard no argument on the matter

and was totally unaware of the issue. 

Neither Frazier’s closing argument nor the jury’s verdict was impacted by

the trial court’s decision to not issue the instruction. Therefore, even if the trial court’s

decision was an error, which it was not, Frazier’s claim would still fail because she cannot

show that the decision had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. 

 The state court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established constitutional law and Frazier is not

entitled to relief on this claim. 

 C. Cumulative Error

1) Description of Claim

Frazier argues that the trial court’s failure to give instructions on the lesser

included and lesser related offenses, discussed herein, were cumulative error that

“rendered her conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder fundamentally

unfair and a denial of federal due process.” Second Amended Petition at 30; Traverse at

12.

///// 

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 There is no opinion by the state court as to this claim. 

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2) Applicable Law And Discussion4

In cases where there are a number of trial errors, the court may look at “the

overall effect of all the errors in the context of the evidence introduced at trial against the

defendant.” United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting

United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988)). “In other words, ‘errors

that might not be so prejudicial as to amount to a deprivation of due process when

considered alone, may cumulatively produce a trial setting that is fundamentally unfair.’ ” 

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 883 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Thomas v. Hubbard, 273

F.3d 1164, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001)).

However, “where there is no single constitutional error existing, nothing can

accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation.” Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th

Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Here,

there was no single error committed and therefore there was no cumulative error. Frazier

thus is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

VI. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Within twenty-one days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any

party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within seven

days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time

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may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). In any objections he

elects to file petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in

the event he elects to file an appeal from the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant).

DATED: May 20, 2010

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