Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00314/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00314-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Erik Scott Maloney, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CV 13-00314-PHX-RCB(BSB)

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al. )

)

Defendants. ) )

Background

Plaintiff pro se Erik Scott Maloney is confined in the

Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence in Florence, Arizona. 

On February 12, 2013, he filed a three count civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming five

defendants. Plaintiff is alleging various constitutional

violations, as well as a violation of the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). Basically,

those alleged violations stem from a claimed Arizona

Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) policy or regulation which

plaintiff claims does not accommodate his meal and prayer 

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1 For brevity’s sake, hereinafter the court will refer to this as

“the TRO motion.” 

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requirements during the month of Ramadan. In its screening

order, the court ordered that only three of the five named

defendants were required to file an answer. See Ord. (Doc.

5) at 7, ¶ (4). Those defendants are Charles L. Ryan, ADOC

Director; Mike Linderman, ADOC Administrator of Pastoral

Activities; and Wayne Mason, East Unit Chaplain at Florence

Complex. See Co. (Doc. 1) at 3, ¶¶ 1-2; and at 2, ¶ 5. To

date, there is nothing in the record showing that any of

those three defendants have been served with the complaint. 

 On June 13, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for a

temporary restraining order “and/or” a preliminary

injunction.1 Mot. (Doc. 8) at 1. The plaintiff broadly seeks

a TRO “requiring the defendants to accommodate meal

requirements of [M]uslim practitioners in accordance to [sic]

the tenets of their religion.” Id. at 6:10-12 (footnote

added). Because Ramadan commences on July 9, 2013, this year,

Mot. (Doc. 8) at 1:25, the court ordered the expedited filing

of a response and reply, if any. See Ord. (Doc. 9). Although

the defendants’ responses were due on June 26, 2013, due to

the State’s “internal administrative process[,]” counsel for

defendants Linderman and Ryan, Neil Singh, Assistant Attorney

General, did not see this court’s order until June 27, 2013. 

Mot. (Doc. 12) at 1:21-25. Mr. Singh then promptly filed an

“Emergency Motion for Extended Time Re[:] Plaintiff’s Motion

for Temporary Restraining Order” (Doc. 12). 

In the meantime, on June 25, 2013, plaintiff Maloney 

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2 The FAC first came to the court’s attention when it was entered

the next day, June 26, 2013. 

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filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 11).2 That

single count complaint alleges strictly a violation of RLUIPA

against a single defendant, Mr. Ryan. The plaintiff alleges

that defendant Ryan rescinded an ADOC policy regarding

inmates’ possession of religious books, “substantially

burdening” the “religious exercise of Dawwah[,]” which is

“require[d] [of] [M]uslim practitioner[s][.]” FAC (Doc. 11)

at 4:10; at 3, ¶ 3. The ramifications of the FAC are

discussed below, including how the court intends to proceed

given that recent filing by the plaintiff. 

Discussion

Preliminarily, the court observes that plaintiff’s FAC

does not comport with LRCiv 15.1(b). That Rule requires,

among other things, “a separate notice of filing the amended

complaint[,]” to which a copy of the amended pleading is

attached. LRCiv 15.1(b). Plaintiff Maloney did not do that,

however. Despite the requirements of that Rule, plaintiff

Maloney also did not “indicate[] in what respect [the FAC]

differs from the pleading which it amends, by bracketing or

striking through the text that was deleted and underlining

the text that was added.” See id. 

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with that Local Rule is

troubling, but his situation is further complicated by the

manner in which he presents the FAC. As just mentioned, it

contains a single RLUIPA count, designated as “Count IV[,]”

and lists only Mr. Ryan as a defendant. FAC (Doc. 11) at 3. 

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The FAC is void of any mention of Ramadan whatsoever. On the

other hand, plaintiff’s original complaint, set forth three

counts, enumerated as Counts I, II, and III – all pertaining

to Ramadan, and listed five defendants, including Mr. Ryan. 

Because the FAC does not mention any of those original three

counts pertaining to Ramadan, and because it begins with

Count IV, presumably, the plaintiff intends the FAC to be a

continuation of the complaint and that the two complaints be

read together. 

While perhaps a logical presumption for a layperson,

settled law undermines such a presumption. That is because

“the general rule is that an amended complaint supercedes the

original complaint and renders it without legal effect[.]”

Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (en

banc) (emphasis added); see also Valadez–Lopez v. Chertoff,

656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and

citations omitted) (“[I]t is well-established that an amended

complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated

thereafter as non-existent.”). Simply put,“[o]nce an amended

complaint is filed, the original pleading no longer serves

any function in the case.” Hasegawa v. State of Hawaii, 2011

WL 2020715, at *1 n. 1 (D.Hawai’i May 24, 2011). 

Application of that rule here means that plaintiff’s

FAC, which is void of any allegations pertaining to Ramadan,

supercedes his original complaint, which focused solely on

Ramadan issues. Consequently, because plaintiff’s original

complaint “no longer serves any function in this case[,]” it

cannot form the basis for his pending TRO motion seeking

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3 The court recognizes that it has a “duty to construe pro se

pleadings liberally[.]” See Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 393 F.3d 920,

925 (9th Cir. 2003). Consistent with that duty, and disregarding the

plaintiff’s specific indication that the pleading filed June 25, 2013, is

a “First Amended Complaint,” (Doc. 11), the court will briefly consider

whether the FAC could, instead, be construed as a supplemental pleading.

The distinction between a supplemental and an amended pleading is

significant because a “supplemental pleading, unlike [an] amended pleading,

does not supersede the original pleading[.]” See Gregory v. Hill, 2013 WL

2130887, at *4 n. 1 (C.D.Cal. April 5, 2013) (citing Puget Sound Power &

Light Co. v. City of Seattle, 5 F.2d 393, 393 (9th Cir. 1925), adopted by

2013 WL 2138540 (C.D.Cal. May 13, 2013).

The FAC cannot be read as a supplemental pleading, however, because

by definition supplemental pleadings pertain to matters that “happened after

the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d)

(emphasis added). Plaintiff Maloney’s FAC pertains to a matter which

occurred prior to the filing of his original complaint though. In

particular, the FAC alleges a RLUIPA violation by defendant Ryan when, in

January 30, 2013, he allegedly rescinded a policy “allowing for an unlimited

number of religious books, provided they fit into a property box.” FAC

(Doc. 11) at 3-4, ¶ 3. Plaintiff filed his original complaint after that,

however, on February 12, 2013. Thus, the court declines to construe the FAC

as a supplemental, rather than an amended pleading. Plaintiff therefore

cannot avail himself of the rule that a supplemental pleading does not

supersede the original pleading. 

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relief solely related to Ramadan. See id. Thus, the court

VACATES its order filed July 20, 2013 (Doc. 9), ordering

expedited briefing as to plaintiff’s TRO motion and DENIES

that motion as moot.3 Likewise, the court DENIES as moot the

emergency motion by defendants Linderman (Doc. 12). As

explained below, however, because the court is granting

plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint, this order

does not preclude the filing of a motion for a temporary

restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction at a later

date. 

 “Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of

procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by

Lacey, 693 F.3d 896; see also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52 (9th

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Cir. 1995) (“pro se litigants are bound by the rules of

procedure.”). At the same time, however, the court recognizes

its obligation to “ensure that pro se litigants do not

unwittingly fall victim to procedural requirements.” Waters

v. Young, 100 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996). Balancing those

competing concerns, the court finds that “justice requires”

allowing plaintiff to file a second amended complaint, if he

so chooses. See Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

Based upon the foregoing, the court HEREBY ORDERS that:

(1) the order filed June 20, 2013 (Doc. 9), requiring

expedited briefing as to plaintiff’s TRO motion is VACATED;

(2) the “Emergency Motion for Extended Time Re[:]

Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order” by

defendants Linderman and Ryan (Doc. 12) is DENIED as moot;

(3) Plaintiff’s “Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order

and/or Preliminary Injunction” (Doc. 8) is DENIED as moot; and 

(4) plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a second amended

complaint, which shall be filed no later than twenty (20) days

from the date of entry of this order.

 DATED this 28th day of June, 2013.

Copies to plaintiff pro se and Neil Singh, Arizona State

Assistant Attorney General

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