Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00516/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00516-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRENDA DAVIDSON, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 16-0516-KD-C

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE :

COMPANY,

:

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

This matter is before the Magistrate Judge for issuance of a report and 

recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and General Local Rule 72(a)(2)(S), on 

the notice of removal (Doc. 1), plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 8), as supplemented 

(Doc. 10), defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s1 response in opposition 

(Doc. 11),2 and plaintiff’s reply to the response in opposition (Doc. 14)

3

.

4 Based upon a 

 1 Hereinafter, the defendant is referred to as “Liberty Mutual.”

2 The defendant has filed an opposition to what it describes as plaintiff’s motion to 

supplement her motion to remand (Doc. 12); however, plaintiff simply filed a supplemental 

motion to remand (Doc. 10), not a motion to supplement her motion to remand as defendant 

suggests (Doc. 12). Therefore, there is nothing for this Court to deny, as defendant requests (see 

id. at 4). Regardless, such action is unnecessary because, as made clear infra, plaintiff’s affidavit 

in no manner informs the contents of this report and recommendation.

3 The plaintiff’s propounded requests for admission (see Doc. 2) do not inform the 

undersigned’s report and recommendation; therefore, the defendant’s objection to and motion 

to strike plaintiff’s requests for admission (Doc. 7) is MOOT. 

4 Contemporaneously herewith, the undersigned is entering an order cancelling 

oral argument regarding the motion to remand and motion to strike.

Case 1:16-cv-00516-KD-C Document 16 Filed 12/08/16 Page 1 of 20
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consideration of only those relevant matters before the Court, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the Court GRANT plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 8).5

FINDINGS OF FACT

The undersigned finds that the following facts are both undisputed and relevant 

to consideration of the motion to remand. Brenda Davidson filed a two-count complaint 

against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company in the Circuit Court of Escambia County, 

Alabama on September 2, 2016—Count 1 alleging Fraud, Negligence/Wantonness and 

Count 2 alleging Negligent or Wanton Misrepresentation/Suppression—which arises 

from the sale of her automobile by the storage yard to which it was towed during the 

pendency of her insurance claim with the defendant following a May 21, 20166

automobile accident. (Doc. 1, Exhibit A, COMPLAINT, at ¶¶ 5-9.) With respect to Count 

1, plaintiff claims the following damages: “Plaintiff paid for insurance coverage with 

the Defendant that was not provided; Plaintiff lost her vehicle and the use and 

enjoyment thereof; Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress, which continues; 

Plaintiff has been otherwise injured and damaged. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands 

judgment against Defendant in such an amount of compensatory damages and punitive 

 5 The undersigned’s recommendation in this regard is not informed either by the 

contents of plaintiff’s affidavit attached to her supplement to motion to remand (Doc. 10, 

Exhibit A) or, not surprisingly, see n.3, supra, by any argument by counsel for plaintiff that 

Liberty Mutual’s counsel has admitted that the amount in controversy in this case is less than

$75,000.00 “by attempting to avoid responding to Plaintiff’s rightfully issued Requests for 

Admissions that were directed at the diversity jurisdictional issue only.” (Doc. 8, at 1.) Instead, 

because plaintiff clearly stakes the position in her motion to remand that the amount in 

controversy in this case is less than $75,000.00 and the defendant has failed to establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of 

interest and costs, the undersigned recommends that this Court find that it lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over this matter. In reaching this result, the undersigned has given consideration to 

paragraphs 1 and 3 of plaintiff’s reply to defendant’s response in opposition (see Doc. 14, at ¶¶ 1 

& 3). 

6 On this date, plaintiff struck a deer with her 2015 Camaro SS and her car was 

rendered inoperable. (Doc. 1, Exhibit A, COMPLAINT, at ¶ 5.)

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damages as a jury deems reasonable and may award, plus costs.” (Id. at 3-4.) As for 

Count 2, plaintiff also “demands judgment against Defendant in such an amount of 

compensatory and punitive damages as a jury deems reasonable and may award, plus 

costs.” (Id. at 4.)

Liberty Mutual removed this action to this Court on October 6, 2016. (Doc. 1.)

Therein, the defendant asserts that removal is proper because this Court may exercise 

diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. With respect to the amount in 

controversy requirement,7 the removing party states, in relevant measure, the 

following:

9. In satisfying its burden on removal, “a removing defendant 

is not required to prove the amount in controversy beyond all doubt or to 

banish all uncertainty about it.” Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754. To the contrary, 

“Eleventh Circuit precedent permits district courts to make ‘reasonable 

deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations’ 

from the pleadings to determine whether it is facially apparent that a case 

is removable.” Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061-62 (quoting Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754). Put 

simply, “a district court need not ‘suspend reality or shelve common sense 

in determining whether the face of a complaint . . . establishes the 

jurisdictional amount.’ Instead, courts may use their judicial experience 

and common sense in determining whether the case stated in a complaint 

meets federal jurisdictional requirements.” Id. at 1062 . . . . Here, judicial 

experience and common sense dictate that the amount in controversy put 

forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint easily exceeds $75,000.00. Out of an 

abundance of caution, however, Defendant will demonstrate that the 

amount in controversy is satisfied both through the Complaint and also 

through additional evidence.8

10. Plaintiff’s claims in this case arise from the sale of her 

automobile by a storage/towing yard. Plaintiff avers that the wrongful 

sale of her automobile was due to Liberty Mutual’s fraudulent, 

 7 Liberty Mutual points out that plaintiff is a resident citizen of Florida (Doc. 1, at 

¶ 2) and that it is a citizen of Massachusetts (id. at ¶ 3). Because plaintiff makes no argument to 

the contrary, it is clear that complete diversity exists. 

8 Interestingly, Liberty Mutual does not attach to the notice of removal such other 

“evidence”; instead, it simply cites to such other evidence, e.g., Kelley Blue Book websites on 

the Internet. (See Doc. 1, at 6 & n.1.)

Case 1:16-cv-00516-KD-C Document 16 Filed 12/08/16 Page 3 of 20
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intentional, negligent, and/or wanton conduct, or Liberty Mutual’s 

knowingly false representations to the Plaintiff. (See Plaintiff’s Complaint, 

at ¶¶ 10, 13, 17). Accordingly, the nature of Plaintiff’s alleged damages 

suggest an amount in excess of the $75,000.00 threshold. After all, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint includes a demand for an unspecified amount of 

damages for: 1) amounts Plaintiff paid for insurance coverage that was not 

provided by Liberty Mutual; 2) the loss of Plaintiff’s vehicle and the use 

and enjoyment thereof; 3) Plaintiff’s severe emotional distress, which 

continues; and 4) Plaintiff’s other injuries and damages. (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 18). 

A cursory review of automobile values on the websites of the National 

Automobile Dealers Association and Kelley Blue Book reveals that [] the 

Plaintiff’s 2015 Chevrolet Camaro SS Coupe may have been worth 

anywhere from $22,075 to $27,075, depending on the condition of the 

vehicle and whether it was offered at private sale or as a trade-in.9

Furthermore, courts in the Eleventh Circuit have considered a plaintiff’s 

claim for mental anguish or emotional distress in determining the amount 

in controversy. See Love v. N. Tool & Equip. Co., Inc., 08-20453-CIV, 2008 

WL 2955124, [] *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2008);10 see also Butler v. Charter 

 9 “For example, Kelley Blue Book calculates that the value of a 2015 Chevrolet 

Camaro SS Coupe with 15,000 miles may be worth approximately $24,238 to $27,075 in a sale to 

a private party, and approximately $23,456[] to $26,075 in trade-in value, depending on the 

condition of the vehicle. . . . Similarly, the National Automobile Dealers Association calculates 

that the value of a 2015 Chevrolet Camaro SS Coupe with 15,000 miles may be worth 

approximately $22,075 to $26,725, depending on the condition of the vehicle and whether it is a 

trade-in or sold at retail value.” (Doc. 1, at 6 n.1.) 

10 While the Court in Love certainly recognized that “[c]ourts have considered 

plaintiffs’ claims for emotional distress damages in determining the amount in controversy[,]” 

id. at *5, it also significantly noted the following: 

Determining the value of Love’s emotional distress claim is a difficult 

task to undertake without a large amount of speculation. Northern Tool suggests 

that I accept, for purposes of determining the amount in controversy, that Love’s 

emotional distress award will equal her award for back pay based on her base

salary alone, i.e., $27,999.00. Northern Tool does not, however, offer any 

evidence or point to any underlying facts that might support such an assertion. 

Instead, it cites to cases where courts have awarded emotional distress damages 

well in excess of Love’s $27,999.00 in lost wages without comparing the factual or 

legal claims made in those cases to Love’s claims or explaining the relevance of 

those awards to the issue at hand. Love, on the other hand, notes that she has not 

undergone any psychological counseling or medical attention that would make 

her emotional distress any more significant than the garden variety 

discrimination claim. A plaintiff need not, however, “introduce evidence of 

medical treatment to recover for emotional distress . . . under the FCRA.” Brown, 

2005 WL 1126670, at 5 (citing Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1348-

49 (11th Cir. 2000)). Although Love may recover some damages for emotional 

distress, there is no evidence before me to determine that amount. Under these 

circumstances, I cannot divine some dollar amount as emotional distress 

(Continued)

Case 1:16-cv-00516-KD-C Document 16 Filed 12/08/16 Page 4 of 20
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Communications, Inc., 755 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1196 (M.D. Ala. 2010).11 . . . In 

short, the Court does not need to “suspend reality or shelve common 

sense” to determine that the Plaintiff’s claimed damages for the loss of her 

2015 Chevrolet Camaro SS Coupe, severe emotional distress, and the 

payment of insurance premiums for coverage which was not provided 

could easily exceed $25,000 to $30,000. []

11. Plaintiff also demands punitive damages. Plaintiff’s demand 

for punitive damages is, of course, included in the determination of the 

amount in controversy. Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc’y, 320 U.S. 238, 

240 (1943) (claims for compensatory and punitive damages should be 

aggregated to determine amount in controversy); Holley Equip. Co. v. Credit 

Alliance Corp., 821 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987) (“When determining the 

jurisdictional amount in diversity cases, punitive damages must be 

considered, unless it is apparent to a legal certainty that such cannot be 

recovered.”) . . . ; see also South Dallas Water Auth. v. Guarantee Co. of North 

America, USA, 767 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1303 & n.21 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (holding 

that the defendant could have “marshaled enough evidence of the 

jurisdictional facts to support a notice of removal . . . when one considers 

plaintiff’s demand for compensatory and punitive damages”12); Blackwell 

v. Great American Financial Resources, Inc., 620 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1290 (N.D. 

Ala. 2009) [] (“[I]n determining the jurisdictional amount in controversy in 

diversity cases, punitive damages must be considered unless it is apparent 

to a legal certainty that such cannot be recovered.”) . . . . 

 

damages to aggregate to Love’s back pay damages so that Northern Tool can 

meet the jurisdictional threshold for federal diversity jurisdiction.

Id. at *5. 

11 Plaintiff’s claims in Butler arose out of a fire that resulted in a total loss of her 

residence and its contents, id. at 1193, and the Court found the following: “The copies of 

records, which are stated to be from the Macon County Revenue Commissioner’s office, 

indicate that Butler has suffered a property loss of approximately $110,000, even without 

consideration of the contents of the dwelling. Notably, Butler does not dispute the accuracy of 

these appraisals. Therefore, the specific facts alleged by the Defendants, and supported by the 

attachments to the Notice of Removal and opposition to remand, along with the request for 

additional damages for emotional distress and punitive damages, sufficiently establish that the 

amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” Id. at 1196.

12 This is mere dicta, the Court having commented in this footnote, as follows: 

“That The Guarantee Company could have established the jurisdictional threshold within thirty 

days of the filing of the complaint is even more apparent when one considers plaintiff’s demand 

for compensatory and punitive damages in Counts II and III of the complaint.” Id.

Case 1:16-cv-00516-KD-C Document 16 Filed 12/08/16 Page 5 of 20
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12. In the recent Blackwell decision,

13 the court held that an 

unspecified claim of punitive damages can be added to fulfill the amount 

in controversy requirement when the compensatory damages claim alone 

falls short. 620 F.Supp.2d at 1292. In Blackwell, the plaintiffs claimed 

$23,172.28 in compensatory damages, but also claimed an unspecified 

amount of punitive damages. Id. at 1290. The Blackwell court said that “it is 

the constitutionally-permissible limits of punitive damages in a particular 

case that are used to compute the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy 

requirement.” Id. at 1291. Since the compensatory damages in Blackwell 

were already $23,172.28, the court held that “a punitive award of slightly 

more than double the compensatory damages claim . . . is 

uncontroversially (sic) within the limits of the Due Process Clause.” Id. 

Therefore, since that was all that was needed to reach the required amount 

in controversy, the court found that it had diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 

1292.

13. The holding in Blackwell is squarely on point here and 

helpful to the Court’s analysis in this case. Plaintiff[] claim[s] an 

unspecified amount of punitive damages, which, under Blackwell, should 

be calculated up to “the constitutionally permissible limits.” Id. In this 

case, even if Plaintiff’s potential compensatory damages for the loss of her 

2015 Chevrolet Camaro SS Coupe, severe emotional distress, and the 

payment of insurance premiums for coverage which allegedly was not 

provided totaled only $25,000[.]00 or $30,000.00 (which is highly unlikely, 

given the potential value of the Plaintiff’s vehicle as discussed above), 

utilizing the Blackwell analysis those amounts would be sufficient to reach 

the jurisdictional floor using Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim.14

14. The amount in controversy in this case exceeds the $75,000 

statutory threshold. Plaintiff has alleged the loss of a 2015 Chevrolet 

Camaro SS Coupe and severe emotional distress, along with a claim for 

unspecified punitive damages, which would support a potential recovery 

 13 In Blackwell, in contrast to the instant case, there was no dispute but that “the 

core compensatory damages sought by the plaintiff are $23,172.28 in ‘surrender charges’ 

withheld by defendants because of plaintiff’s termination of the annuities contracts.” 620 

F.Supp.2d at 1290. Here, there is no similar “undisputed” amount of damages which plaintiff 

seeks; instead, reaching some “solid” number requires this Court to engage in speculation. 

14 In Love, supra, the Court made the following interesting observations with respect 

to punitive damages: “Northern Tool has not introduced any evidence on which to base any 

calculation of punitive damages in this case. For example, it did not introduce evidence of jury 

verdicts with respect to punitive damages in similar cases. It also has not explained why the 

facts in this case would support a large punitive damages award. Under these circumstances, I 

find that Northern Tool has not met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

Love will recover $100,000.00 [under the Florida Civil Rights Act] or any other amount in 

punitive damages.” Id. at *6.

Case 1:16-cv-00516-KD-C Document 16 Filed 12/08/16 Page 6 of 20
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in excess of the requisite amount. Taking into account these alleged 

damages, it is beyond clear that Defendant Liberty Mutual has met its 

burden of proving the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000.00 

requirement.

(Id. at 5-9 (emphasis supplied; certain footnotes added).) 

Plaintiff timely filed her motion to remand on November 7, 2016, and therein 

asserts that the amount in controversy in this case “is less than $75,000.00, which is the 

jurisdictional limit of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332[.]”(Doc. 8, at 1.)15

In its response in opposition, Liberty Mutual has addressed at some length the 

requests for admission “issue” (see Doc. 11, at 4-7); however, since, as aforesaid, the 

undersigned’s report and recommendation is not informed by the argument that 

defense counsel has admitted that the amount in controversy in this case is less than 

$75,000.00 by attempting to avoid responding to plaintiff’s propounded requests for 

admission, the undersigned finds no reason to address this portion of the defendant’s 

response in opposition. The first few pages of the response in opposition are directed to 

a “condensed” version of the contents of the notice of removal (compare Doc. 11, at 1-4 

with Doc. 1, at 1-3 & 4-9) and, therefore, the undersigned only “highlights” the 

condensed version, as follows:

4. In light of the fact that Plaintiff has made claims for 

compensatory, mental anguish or emotional distress, and punitive 

damages in connection with the alleged complete loss of her 2015 

Chevrolet Camaro SS, the amount in controversy exceeds the 

jurisdictional floor. See Love v. N. Tool & Equip. Co., Inc., 08-20453-CIV, 2008 

WL 2955124, [] *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2008) (discussing mental 

anguish/emotional distress damages); see also Butler v. Charter 

Communications, Inc., 755 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1196 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (“[T]he 

specific facts alleged by Defendants, and supported by the attachments to 

 15 Plaintiff supplemented her motion to remand, on November 16, 2016, with her 

sworn affidavit. (See Doc. 10.) However, because, as aforesaid, the contents of Davidson’s 

affidavit are not relevant to this Court’s jurisdictional analysis, they are not delineated herein.

Case 1:16-cv-00516-KD-C Document 16 Filed 12/08/16 Page 7 of 20
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the Notice of Removal and opposition to remand, along with requests for 

additional damages for emotional distress and punitive damages, 

specifically establish the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, 

exclusive of interests and costs.”); Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc’y, 320 

U.S. 238, 240 (1943) (claims for compensatory and punitive damages 

should be aggregated to determine amount in controversy); Holley Equip. 

Co. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 821 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987) (“When 

determining the jurisdictional amount in diversity cases, punitive 

damages must be considered, unless it is apparent to a legal certainty that 

such cannot be recovered.”) . . .; [] South Dallas Water Auth. v. Guarantee Co. 

of North America, USA, 767 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1303 & n.21 (S.D. Ala. 2011) 

(holding that the defendant could have “marshaled enough evidence of 

the jurisdictional facts to support a notice of removal . . . when one 

considers plaintiff’s demand for compensatory and punitive damages”); 

Blackwell v. Great American Financial Resources, Inc., 620 F.Supp.2d 1289, 

1290 (N.D. Ala. 2009).

5. Furthermore, as discussed at length in the Notice of 

Removal (Doc. 1), the recent Blackwell decision is squarely on point here 

and helpful to the Court’s analysis in this case. . . .

(Doc. 11, at 2-3.)

Plaintiff timely filed her reply to defendant’s response in opposition on 

December 6, 2016. (Doc. 14.) Plaintiff’s reply reads, in relevant measure, as follows:

1. The statutes governing removal are to be strictly construed 

against removal and in favor of state court jurisdiction. See Shamrock Oil 

& Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941); see also Burns v. Windsor Ins. 

Co., 31 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s allegations must be evaluated 

most favorably to the Plaintiff, and all uncertainty or contested facts must 

be resolved in favor of the Plaintiff. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T, 139 

F.3d 1368[ ,] 1373 (11th Cir. 1998) . . . . The party invoking the removal 

jurisdiction of a federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction 

by a preponderance of the evidence. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T, 139 F.3d 

1368[ ,] 1373 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) . . . .

. . .

3. Defendant[,] in its Response[,] . . . directed the Court to 

Blackwell v. Great American Financial Resources, Inc., 620 F.Supp.2d 

1289, 1290 (N.D. Ala. 2009), and said it was “on point” with the instant 

case. However, Defendant Liberty Mutual forgot to mention that 

Blackwell’s reasoning has been rejected by other United States District 

Courts in Alabama that have held that the Blackwell reasoning “fails to 

put the burden of proof on the removing party, ignores established 

precedent, and undermines the foundational principal (sic) that a federal 

court should construe its removal jurisdiction narrowly” and have stated 

Case 1:16-cv-00516-KD-C Document 16 Filed 12/08/16 Page 8 of 20
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that applying even a “single digit multiplier” to the amount of 

compensatory damages “assumed away” the removing party’s burden to 

prove the propriety of the removal by a preponderance of the evidence as 

required by § 1446. Mustafa v. Market Street Mortgage Corp., 840 

F.Supp.2d 1287, 1291 (M.D. Ala. 2012); see also Arrington v. State Farm Fire 

& Cas. Co., Docket No. 2:14-cv-2090-CSC at *6 (M.D. Ala. 2014); Benton v. 

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., Docket No. 2:14-cv-77-CSC at *4-5 (M.D. Ala. 

2014) (both rejecting Blackwell); and Dean v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Docket 

No. CA-13-00487-C at *6 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (noting that attempting to place a 

value on a claim for punitive damages would require the court to engage 

in “pure speculation”).

(Id. at ¶¶ 1 & 3 (emphasis in original).)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Jurisdiction in General.

The removing defendant “must establish the propriety of removal under 28 

U.S.C. § 1441 and, therefore, must demonstrate the existence of federal jurisdiction.” 

Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Lakewood Investors, 2011 WL 3267160, *2 (S.D. Ala. Jul. 28, 2011), 

citing Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2008) and 

Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2005). Moreover, 

“[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and there is a presumption against 

the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction 

are to be resolved in favor of remand.” Russell Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 264 

F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Allen v. Christenberry, 327 F.3d 

1290, 1293 (11th Cir.) (“[R]emoval statutes should be construed narrowly, with doubts 

resolved against removal.”), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 877, 124 S.Ct. 277, 157 L.Ed.2d 140 

(2003); see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 

1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They 

possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be 

expanded by judicial decree[.]” (internal citations omitted)). Stated differently, because 

federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction “[i]t is . . . presumed that a cause lies 

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outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon 

the party asserting jurisdiction[.]” Kokkonen, supra, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. at 1675 

(internal citations omitted). Indeed, “[b]ecause removal infringes upon state sovereignty 

and implicates central concepts of federalism, removal statutes must be construed 

narrowly, with all jurisdictional doubts being resolved in favor of remand to state 

court.” Brown v. Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 38 F.Supp.3d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Ala. 2014) 

(citation omitted); see also University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 

405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism 

concerns, federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly. . . . Indeed, all 

doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.”); Federal 

Deposit Ins. Corp. ex rel. Colonial Bank v. Banc of America Funding Corp., 2013 WL 3968017, 

*1 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2013) (“[I]n actions removed from state court to federal court, 

federal courts strictly construe removal statutes, resolve all doubts in favor of remand, 

and place the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction on the defendant.”). 

B. Diversity Jurisdiction. 

The removing party predicates removal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of 

citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Doc. 1, at 3-9),16 and, therefore, Liberty Mutual 

bears the burden of establishing complete diversity of citizenship, that is, that the 

plaintiff is diverse from the defendant, Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 

1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), and, in addition, must establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than not 

exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement, Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 

 16 Federal courts may exercise diversity jurisdiction over all civil actions where the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the action is 

between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

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1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e hold where a plaintiff has made an unspecified 

demand for damages in state court, a removing defendant must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than not 

exceeds the $[75,000] jurisdictional requirement.”), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. 

Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Roe v. Michelin North America, 

Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010) (“If a plaintiff makes ‘an unspecified demand 

for damages in state court, a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the . . . 

jurisdictional requirement.’”); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 

805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]here jurisdiction is based on a claim for indeterminate 

damages, . . . the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim on which it is basing 

jurisdiction meets the jurisdictional minimum.”).

C. Whether the Amount in Controversy Has Been Satisfied.

Mere diversity of citizenship is not sufficient to create jurisdiction under § 1332 

since “the court is obligated to assure itself that the case involves the requisite amount 

in controversy.” Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(citations omitted). And, “[w]hen, as here, damages are not specified in the state court 

complaint, a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the jurisdictional requirement.” 

Pate v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3372195, *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2010) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Fitzgerald v. Besam Automated 

Entrance Systems, 282 F.Supp.2d 1309, 1314 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (“When the state court 

complaint is indeterminate, then an intermediate burden[—preponderance of the 

evidence—]is placed upon the removing defendant since there is no representation by 

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12

plaintiff’s counsel that would be entitled to deference.”), aff’d, 107 Fed.Appx. 893 (11th 

Cir. Jun. 4, 2004). Because the defendant removed this case under the first paragraph of 

Section 1446(b)17 (see Doc. 1, ¶¶ 6-7 (“28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) allows for removal of a civil 

action within thirty days after receipt by the Defendant of a copy of the initial pleading 

setting forth the claims for relief. [] Liberty Mutual was served with the Complaint in 

this action on September 6, 2016. . . . This Notice of Removal is filed within thirty days 

of September 6, 2016.”)), the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Roe v. Michelin North America, 

Inc., 613 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 2010), guides the undersigned’s analysis. See id. at 1062 

 17 The first paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides:

The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 

thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a 

copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such 

action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons 

upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not 

required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

Id. Of course, Congress, through § 1446(b), has established a “bifurcated removal approach,” Lee 

v. Lilly Trucking of Virginia, Inc., 2012 WL 960989, *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 2012), under which

a state court defendant may remove a case to federal court at two procedurally 

distinct moments in time. First, if it is facially apparent from the initial pleading 

that subject matter jurisdiction exists, § 1446(b)(1) provides the procedure for 

removal. See, e.g., Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 754 (11th Cir. 

2010); Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). Such a 

removal must be accomplished “within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant 

. . . of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which 

such action is based . . . .” § 1446(b)(1). However, “[i]f the case stated by the 

initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days 

after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an 

amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be 

ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable . . . .” § 

1446(b)(3); see also Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007).

Id.

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(characterizing that case as a “§ 1446(b) first-paragraph case[ ] in which the plaintiff 

does not make a specific damages demand”). In Roe, the Eleventh Circuit stated:

If a defendant alleges that removability is apparent from the face of 

the complaint, the district court must evaluate whether the complaint 

itself satisfies the defendant’s jurisdictional burden. In making this 

determination, the district court is not bound by the plaintiff’s 

representations regarding its claim, nor must it assume that the plaintiff is 

in the best position to evaluate the amount of damages sought. [Pretka v. 

Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 771 (11th Cir.2010).] Indeed, in some 

cases, the defendant or the court itself may be better-situated to accurately 

assess the amount in controversy. See id. (explaining that “sometimes the 

defendant’s evidence on the value of the claims will be even better than 

the plaintiff’s evidence,” and that a court may use its judgment to 

determine “which party has better access to the relevant information.”).

Eleventh Circuit precedent permits district courts to make 

“reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable 

extrapolations” from the pleadings to determine whether it is facially 

apparent that a case is removable. See id. at 754. Put simply, a district 

court need not “suspend reality or shelve common sense in determining 

whether the face of a complaint . . . establishes the jurisdictional amount.” 

See id. at 770 (quoting Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 637 F.Supp.2d 995, 999 

(M.D. Ala. 2009)); see also Williams[v. Best Buy Co., Inc.], 269 F.3d [1316,] 

1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (allowing district courts to consider whether it is 

“facially apparent” from a complaint that the amount in controversy is 

met). Instead, courts may use their judicial experience and common sense 

in determining whether the case stated in a complaint meets federal 

jurisdictional requirements.

613 F.3d at 1061-1062.

The Eleventh Circuit further stated that the approach announced in Roe “is 

consistent with those of other circuits[,]” id. at 1062, specifically citing, inter alia, two 

Fifth Circuit cases—Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999), and Gebbia 

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2000). See 613 F.3d at 1062-1063. Luckett

and Gebbia both demonstrate that “the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly acknowledged the 

power of district court judges to appraise the worth of plaintiffs’ claims based on the 

nature of the allegations stated in their complaints.” Id. at 1063; see Luckett, 171 F.3d at 

298; Gebbia, 233 F.3d at 833; cf. Purdiman v. Organon Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 2008 WL 

Case 1:16-cv-00516-KD-C Document 16 Filed 12/08/16 Page 13 of 20
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686996, *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2008) (pre-Roe) (citing both Luckett and Gebbia, and holding 

that “[a]lthough the Complaint excludes any reference to the amount of damages 

Plaintiff has sustained as a result of Defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct, after full 

review and consideration, the Court concludes that is it apparent from the factual 

allegations in the Complaint that the amount in controversy in this action exceeds 

$75,000”). Thus, at least in the context of a Section 1446(b) first-paragraph removal case 

in which the plaintiff does not make a specific damages demand—such as this one—a 

district court may employ “its judicial experience or common sense in discerning 

whether the allegations in a complaint facially establish the jurisdictionally required 

amount in controversy.” Roe, 613 F.3d at 1063.

With these principles in mind, the undersigned considers Liberty Mutual’s 

arguments that “judicial experience and common sense dictate that the amount in 

controversy put forth in [p]laintiff’s [c]omplaint easily exceeds $75,000.00[]” (Doc. 1, at 

¶ 9 (emphasis supplied)), and that it has demonstrated “that the amount in controversy 

is satisfied both through the complaint and also through additional evidence.” (Doc. 1, 

at 5-6.) In this latter regard, the defendant attempts to demonstrate the value of 

plaintiff’s vehicle through Internet websites and then combine that “value” with her 

claims for emotional distress and punitive damages to “satisfy” the $75,000 threshold.

(See id. at 6-8.)

Initially, the Magistrate Judge understands Liberty Mutual to be arguing that 

Davidson’s requests for compensatory damages (including damages for severe 

emotional distress, damages for loss of her vehicle, etc.) and punitive damages as to all 

her claims clearly push the amount in controversy above the $75,000 threshold. (See 

Doc. 1, at ¶ 9.) In Robinson v. Clayton, 2012 WL 6028940, *2 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 3, 2012), this 

Court specifically determined that “merely listing categories of damage[,]” which is 

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exactly what Liberty Mutual purports to do in this case (see Doc. 1, at 5-7), does not 

satisfy the removing defendant’s burden of establishing that the amount in controversy 

exceeds the $75,000 threshold. In reaching this conclusion, this Court favorably cited the 

conclusion in Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1318 & 1320 (11th Cir. 2001) 

(“allegations that the plaintiff tripped over a curb and suffered permanent physical and 

mental injuries, that she incurred substantial medical expenses, that she suffered lost 

wages, that she experienced a diminished earning capacity, and that she would 

continue to suffer those damages in the future, along with a demand for both 

compensatory and punitive damages, did not render it facially apparent that the 

amount in controversy exceeded $75,000”), while parenthetically noting that “Williams 

is a governing application” of the governing principles set forth in Roe and Pretka and 

that Williams “was not overruled by Pretka or Roe (nor could it have been, given that 

Pretka and Roe were not en banc opinions).” Robinson, supra, at *2 & n.1. Based upon 

Williams and Robinson, therefore, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court 

conclude that the allegations here that plaintiff was caused to pay for insurance 

coverage that was not provided, lost her vehicle and the use and enjoyment thereof, 

was caused to suffer severe emotional distress, along with a demand for both 

compensatory and punitive damages, do not render it facially apparent that the amount 

in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Cf. Lambeth v. 

Peterbilt Motors Co., 2012 WL 1712692, *3 (S.D. Ala. May 15, 2012) (“While the back 

injury is characterized as ‘serious,’ nothing in the Complaint elaborates on the nature or 

severity of that injury, or otherwise lends substance or meaning to it. We simply do not 

know—or have any basis for inferring from the pleadings—anything about how severe, 

permanent, debilitating or painful the injury might be; how extensive, costly, or 

traumatic the course of treatment was, is or might be; or whether and to what extent the 

Case 1:16-cv-00516-KD-C Document 16 Filed 12/08/16 Page 15 of 20
16

injury did, does or will constrain [the plaintiff’s] work or life activities.”); Hill v. Toys 

“R” Us, Inc., 2010 WL 3834532, *1-3 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2010) (remanding case to state 

court for failure to prove the amount in controversy where the plaintiff alleged that she 

suffered back, neck, arm and head injuries; that she has experienced and continues to 

experience pain and suffering, emotional distress, and mental anguish; and that she has 

incurred ongoing medical expenses). In other words, contrary to the removing party’s 

specific argument, the undersigned’s judicial experience and common sense does not 

dictate that the amount in controversy in Davidson’s complaint easily exceeds 

$75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs.18

In addition to the foregoing, to the extent defendant claims it has demonstrated 

that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold, the undersigned 

cannot agree. The plaintiff’s allegations of mental anguish and emotional distress are 

too vague and speculative for the undersigned to find that the plaintiff’s claims surpass 

the jurisdictional threshold.19 See Mustafa v. Market Street Mortgage Co., 840 F.Supp.2d 

 18 Indeed, the undersigned’s judicial experience and common sense dictates the 

opposite of what the removing party asserts, that is, the amount in controversy put forth in 

plaintiff’s complaint does not exceed $75,000.00. After all, plaintiff makes no claim for any 

physical injury to herself; instead, at bottom, all that is involved is plaintiff’s loss of her vehicle

and damages attendant thereto.

19 Liberty Mutual attempts to establish the value of plaintiff’s 2015 Chevrolet 

Camaro SS Coupe by citing to various websites. (See Doc. 1, at 6.) Initially, the undersigned 

would note that the defendant appears to recognize that its attempt to value plaintiff’s vehicle is 

speculative. (See Doc. 1, at ¶ 10 & n.1 (“A cursory review of automobile values on the websites 

of the National Automobile Dealers Association and Kelley Blue Book reveals that [] the 

[p]laintiff’s 2015 Chevrolet Camaro SS Coupe may have been worth anywhere from $22,075 to 

$27,075, depending on the condition of the vehicle and whether it was offered at private sale or 

as a trade-in. [] For example, Kelley Blue Book calculates that the value of a 2015 Chevrolet 

Camaro SS Coupe with 15,000 miles may be worth approximately $24,238 to $27,075 in a sale to 

a private party, and approximately $23,456[] to $26,075 in trade-in value, depending on the 

condition of the vehicle. . . . Similarly, the National Automobile Dealers Association calculates 

that the value of a 2015 Chevrolet Camaro SS Coupe with 15,000 miles may be worth 

approximately $22,075 to $26,725, depending on the condition of the vehicle and whether it is a 

trade-in or sold at retail value.” (emphasis supplied)).) Even without an implicit admission, 

(Continued)

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1287, 1291 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (concluding that the Court could not make a nonspeculative estimate of the value of the plaintiff’s mental anguish claim); Goodin v. 

Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 2012 WL 473913, *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2012) (finding that

“[plaintiff’s] allegations of ‘mental anguish and stress’ are impermissibly vague”), aff’d, 

491 Fed.Appx. 139 (11th Cir. Oct. 4, 2012), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 2810, 186 

L.Ed.2d 862 (2013). Indeed, Davidson’s complaint, like the complaint in Arrington v. 

State Farm Ins. Co., 2014 WL 2961104 (M.D. Ala. Jul. 1, 2014), “contains no specific 

allegations from which one could draw any reasonable inference regarding the extent of 

the [plaintiff’s] mental anguish [or] emotional distress,” and, as in Arrington, “[i]n [this] 

court’s ‘judicial experience,’ mental anguish and emotional distress damages in cases 

such as this vary widely depending on the circumstances, and even very similar 

circumstances may affect different plaintiffs in different ways.” Id. at *6. Thus, the 

undersigned declines to “indulge in speculation or fill empty gaps in the plaintiff’s 

factual averments with unfounded assumptions about what the evidence may show.” 

Id., citing Roe, supra, 613 F.3d at 1061; see Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza, II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 

753-754 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]ithout facts or specific allegations, the amount in 

 

however, the undersigned finds this attempted “valuation” to be unhelpful speculation not only 

because the defendant has provided no foundation for this Court to determine the miles 

plaintiff’s vehicle had logged as of the date of her accident on May 21, 2016 (the 15,000 miles 

utilized by defendant having been “plucked” out of thin air) but, as well, because the removal 

petition provides no foundation for a determination that at that time (or when plaintiff’s vehicle 

was sold by the storage yard on July 14, 2016) plaintiff’s vehicle was in “good” condition, much 

less “excellent” condition (see Doc. 1, at 6 n.1 (defendant’s Kelley Blue Book “search” identified 

the vehicle as being in excellent condition)). At bottom, this Court simply has no basis to make a 

non-speculative estimate of the value of plaintiff’s loss of vehicle claim and, therefore, it should 

not “indulge in speculation or fill empty gaps in the plaintiff’s factual averments with 

unfounded assumptions about what the evidence may show.” Arrington, infra, at *6, citing Roe, 

supra, 613 F.3d at 1061.

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controversy could be ‘divined [only] by looking at the stars’—only through 

speculation—and that is impermissible.”).

And, finally, while punitive damages claims should be considered when 

evaluating whether the value of a case exceeds $75,000, “there is nothing talismanic 

about such a demand that would per se satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement 

and trigger federal subject-matter jurisdiction.” Lambeth, supra, at *4. Here, the 

undersigned cannot estimate the value of the plaintiff’s punitive damages claims 

without engaging in pure speculation, see Mustafa, 840 F.Supp.2d at 1291, an endeavor 

which Roe and Pretka eschew, see, e.g., 608 F.3d at 754.

The undersigned recognizes that, in Blackwell, supra, one judge in the Northern 

District of Alabama determined that where the plaintiff alleged $23,172.28 in 

compensatory damages, “a punitive award of slightly more than double the 

compensatory damages claim would occasion an amount in controversy that exceeds 

the jurisdictional minimum. Such an amount for punitive damages is uncontroversially 

within the limits of the Due Process Clause.” 620 F.Supp.2d at 1291. Accordingly, that 

court concluded that the punitive damages claims in that case established the 

jurisdictional requirements with regard to the amount in controversy. Id. at 1291-1292. 

However, the undersigned declines to follow the reasoning in Blackwell and, 

instead, follows the reasoning of the Middle District of Alabama in Mustafa, where it 

declined to apply a multiplier to the plaintiff’s $19,444.33 in compensatory damages 

when evaluating the plaintiff’s mental anguish and punitive damages claims. Mustafa, 

840 F.Supp.2d at 1291-1292. In Mustafa, the Middle District considered the analysis in 

Blackwell, but determined that it would be inappropriate for the court to evaluate 

punitive damages claims by applying multipliers to compensatory damages claims. Id. 

The Middle District stated as follows: 

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This Court finds Blackwell unpersuasive, however, for it fails to put 

the burden of proof on the removing party, ignores established precedent, 

and undermines the foundational principle that a federal court should 

construe its removal jurisdiction[] narrowly. First, applying a single digit 

multiplier sufficiently high to satisfy the amount-in-controversy 

requirement, without more, assumes away the removing party’s burden 

to prove the propriety of removal by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Second, it also ignores the Eleventh Circuit’s command in Lowery v. 

Alabama Power Company to look at the facts supporting a damages 

assertion, because “the existence of jurisdiction should not be divined by 

looking to the stars.” 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007). Woodenly applying a 

single digit multiple of the compensatory damages claimed, without a 

non-speculative reason to believe the jury would come back with such an 

award, violates Lowery’s explicit commands and is not a reasonable 

extrapolation from the pleadings under Roe. Third, assuming a punitive 

damages award of up to nine times compensatory damages (likely the 

highest multiplier that comports with due process) ignores the principle 

that courts should construe the remand statutes narrowly so as to resolve 

jurisdictional uncertainties in favor of remand. Burns v. Windsor Ins., Co., 

31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, using a multiplier, 

without more, would trigger grave federalism concerns: cases with 

compensatory damages of just $8,333.33 could begin finding their way 

into federal court, thus usurping the States’ jurisdiction over all but the 

smallest claims.

Id. Like the court in Mustafa, the undersigned declines to evaluate the plaintiff’s 

punitive damages claim by applying a multiplier to the plaintiff’s compensatory 

damages, particularly since plaintiff makes no specific claim for compensatory 

damages. Indeed, applying a multiplier in this case would require “double” speculation 

by this Court. Therefore, the undersigned simply reiterates that the value of plaintiff’s 

punitive damages claims cannot be estimated without engaging in impermissible

speculation. 

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion to 

remand (Doc. 8) be GRANTED and that this cause be remanded to the Circuit Court of 

Escambia County, Alabama from whence it came.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

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A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in 

it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D.ALA. L.R. 72.4. The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, 

“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based 

on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time 

period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence 

of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if 

necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection 

must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state 

the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not 

specific.

DONE this the 8th day of December, 2016. 

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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