Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01272/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01272-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LAWRENCE GEORGE HASH, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

T. RALLOS, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:20-cv-1272 TLN AC P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. 

I. Procedural History 

In screening the complaint, the undersigned recommended that the claims against 

defendants Rallos, Phile,1

 Allen, and Zamora in Claim One be severed from the original case and 

opened as a separate civil action. ECF No. 3 at 15. Those findings and recommendations were 

adopted by the district judge, resulting in the opening of this action. ECF No. 4. After 

defendants waived service, they filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 15) and a motion to revoke 

plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status and dismiss the complaint (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff opposes 

both motions. ECF Nos. 21, 22. 

1

 Defendant Phile was identified in the complaint as “Pfile.” The Clerk of the Court will be 

directed to update the docket to reflect defendant Phile’s true name. 

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II. Motion to Revoke Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Status 

Defendants argue that plaintiff has accrued at least three strikes, has not alleged that he 

was in imminent danger at the time the complaint was filed, and is therefore barred from 

proceeding with this case until he pays the filing fee in full. ECF No. 16 at 4-8. They also argue 

that plaintiff is not indigent, has intentionally concealed significant funds, and should be subject 

to terminating sanctions. Id. at 8-10. 

In opposition, plaintiff argues that the cases identified by defendants do not constitute 

strikes and that the cases dismissed after the filing of this action cannot count as strikes with 

respect to this action. ECF No. 22 at 7-14. He also argues that the motion should be denied 

because he has not misrepresented his financial status as he has no idea whether any funds remain 

in his trust, and even if they do, he does not have access to them. Id. at 14-25. 

A. The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Three Strikes Rule 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) permits any court of the United States 

to authorize the commencement and prosecution of any suit without prepayment of fees by a 

person who submits an affidavit indicating that the person is unable to pay such fees. However, 

[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment 

in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, 

on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States 

that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the 

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The plain language of the statute makes clear that a prisoner is precluded 

from bringing a civil action or an appeal in forma pauperis if the prisoner has brought three 

frivolous actions and/or appeals (or any combination thereof totaling three). Rodriguez v. Cook, 

169 F.3d 1176, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999). “[Section] 1915(g) should be used to deny a prisoner’s IFP 

status only when, after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and other relevant 

information, the district court determines that the action was dismissed because it was frivolous, 

malicious or failed to state a claim.” Andrews v. King (King), 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2005). 

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 Once a plaintiff has accrued three strikes, he is precluded from proceeding IFP unless he 

is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). To satisfy the 

exception, plaintiff must have alleged facts that demonstrate that he was “under imminent danger 

of serious physical injury” at the time of filing the complaint. Andrews v. Cervantes (Cervantes), 

493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is the circumstances at the time of the filing of the 

complaint that matters for purposes of the ‘imminent danger’ exception to § 1915(g).”). 

B. Plaintiff’s Strikes 

Defendants have identified the following six cases which they argue resulted in dismissals 

that constitute strikes within the meaning of § 1915(g): (1) Hash v. Thornberry, 3:05-cv-2438 

MMC (N.D. Cal.), dismissed October 18, 2005; (2) Hash v. Hinkle, 05-cv-2291 MMC (N.D. 

Cal.), dismissed October 14, 2005; (3) Hash v. Giacomazzi, 20-cv-1116 EJD (N.D. Cal.), 

dismissed July 17, 2020; (4) Hash v. Williams, 10-cv-1796 MMC (N.D. Cal.), dismissed June 15, 

2010; (5) Hash v. Santoro, 19-cv-0783 YGR (N.D. Cal.), dismissed March 3, 2020; and (6) Hash 

v. Santoro, 19-cv-0784 YGR (N.D. Cal.), dismissed May 29, 2020. ECF No. 16 at 5-6; ECF No. 

18. The court will take judicial notice of these cases. See United States ex rel. Robinson 

Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (court “may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” (citations omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b)(2) (court may take judicial notice of facts that are capable of accurate determination by 

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned). 

As an initial matter, the order provided by defendants in Hash v. Giacomazzi, 5:20-cv1116 EJD (N.D. Cal.), reflects that the complaint was dismissed in part without prejudice to filing 

as a habeas action and the remainder of the complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. ECF 

No. 18 at 14-21. This does not meet defendants’ burden of “produc[ing] court records or other 

documentation that will allow the district court to determine that a prior case was dismissed 

because it was ‘frivolous, malicious or fail[ed] to state a claim,’” King, 398 F.3d at 1120 (second 

alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)), and a review of the docket 

in that case reveals that it is in fact still ongoing. Additionally, as plaintiff points out, Hash v. 

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Giacomazzi was not even filed until after plaintiff initiated the instant case.2 

Section 1915(g) prohibits in forma pauperis claims brought by 

prisoners who have, while incarcerated, on “3 or more prior

occasions” had claims dismissed due to their frivolity, maliciousness, 

or failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added). 

This language makes clear its application to claims dismissed prior 

to the current proceedings. 

Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 

1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011) (strike incurred after initiation of current proceedings did not take 

place on a “prior occasion” and therefore did not count as a strike for purposes of those 

proceedings), overruled on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 237 (2015) 

(holding that “[a] prior dismissal on a statutorily enumerated ground counts as a strike even if the 

dismissal is the subject of an appeal.”). Accordingly, any dismissal in Hash v. Giacomazzi, as 

well as the dismissals in Hash v. Santoro, 4:19-cv-0783 YGR (N.D. Cal.), and Hash v. Santoro, 

4:19-cv-0784 YGR (N.D. Cal.), which were also initiated after this action, cannot serve as strikes 

to bar plaintiff from proceeding in forma pauperis in this case. 

In their reply, defendants argue that Silva, supra, does not “bar a defendant from seeking 

to revoke a plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status based upon subsequent events” and instead held 

only that a strike cannot be considered until any appeals were exhausted.” ECF No. 25 at 10. 

However, Silva explicitly found with respect to one of the alleged strikes that “[t]he district 

court’s order of dismissal . . . was dated January 29, 2009—over nine months after Silva filed his 

notice of appeal in this case. Thus, this dismissal did not take place on a ‘prior occasion’ and 

cannot count against him here.” Silva, 658 F.3d at 1100 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the 

plain language of the statute is clear, and defendants present no authority holding that strikes 

accrued after the initiation of a case can bar in forma pauperis status in that case. 

Upon review of the remaining three cases relied upon by defendants, the court finds that 

defendants have not shown that plaintiff has accrued three strikes because the last remaining case 

2

 Although this case was not docketed by the Clerk of the Court until June 25, 2020, because the 

claims were severed from another action, the complaint retained its original filing date and was 

deemed filed as of August 11, 2017, subject to adjustment pursuant to the prison mailbox rule. 

ECF No. 4 at 3. 

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they rely upon, Hash v. Williams, 3:10-cv-1796 MMC (N.D. Cal.), does not meet the criteria for 

being counted as a strike. In Hash v. Williams, the district court dismissed the action because 

plaintiff failed to pay the filing fee or complete an application to proceed in forma pauperis, 

despite being notified of the deficiency. ECF No. 18 at 23-24. This dismissal does not fall within 

the statutorily defined grounds of “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted.” Although defendants argue that “[t]he failure to cure a defect associated with 

an in forma pauperis application can constitute a strike,” ECF No. 25 at 8, the case they rely upon 

for this proposition, Ortiz v. Cox, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (D. Nev. 2011), is neither controlling nor 

persuasive. 

 In Ortiz, the court considered an action in which plaintiff had filed two appeals in the 

Ninth Circuit. Id. 759 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. The district court certified that the first appeal was 

not taken in good faith, and the plaintiff filed an appeal of that order. Id. Both appeals were 

dismissed for failure to perfect the appeals. Id. The court in Ortiz held that “Plaintiff’s failure to 

perfect either appeal, combined with other circumstances, warrants the imposition of at least one 

strike in relation to these appeals.” Id. Even assuming that the court in Ortiz properly found that 

the plaintiff had incurred a strike based on his appeals, there is no evidence of similar conduct or 

“other circumstances” here. 

Defendants also cite Tierney v. Atkin, No. 13-cv-0136 SOM/RLP, 2013 WL 1991907, 

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67713 (D. Haw. May 13, 2013), and argue that the court in that case 

“similarly advised a prisoner’s failure to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies 

identified in the dismissal order may result in the order counting as a strike for purposes of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g).” ECF No. 25 at 9. In Tierney, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to 

state a claim and gave plaintiff leave to amend. 2013 WL 1991907, at *5, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

67713, at *12. Failing to file an amended complaint after the previous complaint was dismissed 

for failure to state a claim is not the same as or analogous to failing to pay the filing fee or file an 

application to proceed in forma pauperis. 

This court cannot find that the mere failure to pay the filing fee or submit an application to 

proceed in forma pauperis falls within the definition of a strike. Even assuming that the other two 

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cases identified by defendants count as strikes, plaintiff is not disqualified from in forma pauperis 

status here. Because defendants have not identified at least three prior dismissals that counts as 

strikes, the motion to revoke plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status should be denied. 

C. Plaintiff’s Indigency 

Defendants argue in the alternative that plaintiff is not indigent and has deliberately 

concealed the fact that he is the beneficiary of a trust. ECF No. 16 at 8-10. They assert that the 

California Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in Hash v. Hash, No. C068869, 2012 WL 

5449627, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8188 (Cal. App. Nov. 8, 2012), establishes that plaintiff 

is the beneficiary of a trust; he is able to obtain funds from the trust to pay the filing fees in this 

case; he has received funds from the trust to pay for various expenses, including paying for 

packages and investigative costs related to his criminal case; that he has avoided having the trust 

proceeds placed in his prison account to prevent them from being used to satisfy his obligations; 

and that in 2009 the trust had a balance of $69,697.05 and was earning 0.90% interest. Id. at 8-9. 

They further argue that plaintiff has demonstrated bad faith because he has failed to disclose the 

existence of the trust, the amount of the trust, and that he has received funds from the trust in his 

application to proceed in forma pauperis in this action and others, including applications made at 

or near the time he was litigating Hash v. Hash, and that he has attempted to conceal the funds by 

keeping them out of his prison trust account. Id. at 10. 

In opposition, plaintiff argues that he is indeed indigent and his representations that he has 

no funds were made in good faith. ECF No. 22 at 14-25. Plaintiff claims that his “alleged trust 

(and the funds in it) may or may not actually exist” and that even if it does exist, he does not have 

access to the funds because his brother, the trustee, has told him that he will not give plaintiff any 

money and plaintiff does not have any other way to access what money may remain in the trust. 

Id. at 16, 22-24. In his declaration, plaintiff avers that according to a friend, his brother said the 

trust’s funds were nearly exhausted; he believes his brother may have appropriated the funds for 

his own use; it has been around ten years since the last time he received any funds from the trust; 

and the last time his brother responded to one of his letters was in 2016, and the “response said 

something to the effect of, “I’m tired of your ‘shit’, don’t ask for anything ever again because you 

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won’t get anything or any money from me ever, so don’t ask!” Id. at 19-20, 22-23. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, federal courts may authorize the commencement and prosecution 

of a civil suit without prepayment of fees if the plaintiff demonstrates by affidavit that he is 

unable to pay the fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, “the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the allegation of poverty is untrue.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(A). “To dismiss [a] complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), a showing of bad faith is 

required, not merely inaccuracy.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 n.8 (9th Cir. 

2015). 

The court finds that defendants have failed to establish that plaintiff’s allegations of 

poverty were untrue at the time this action was initiated. Even assuming that the trust for which 

plaintiff is a beneficiary had a balance of $69,697.05 and that plaintiff misrepresented his assets 

in in forma pauperis applications filed at or around the time of the decision in Hash v. Hash, that 

decision was rendered in November 2012, nearly five years before the instant action was initiated, 

and there is no evidence before the court as to what funds, if any, remained in the trust at the time 

the complaint in this case was filed. Furthermore, though the evidence indicates that plaintiff has 

received funds and packages paid for by the trust in the past, those records are from 2010. See 

ECF No. 18 at 93, 95-96. There is no evidence that plaintiff has received any benefit from the 

trust since that time, which aligns with plaintiff’s declaration that it has been approximately a 

decade since he last received funds from the trust. There is also no evidence to dispute plaintiff’s 

claim that his brother has not responded to his correspondence since 2016. Because there is 

insufficient evidence to demonstrate that plaintiff’s allegations of poverty at the time this action 

was initiated were untrue, the motion to revoke plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status and dismiss 

the case should be denied.3

3

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to untrue allegations of poverty, those cases are distinguishable as they all involved evidence of 

the plaintiffs’ assets at or immediately preceding the time of filing. See Kennedy v. Huibregtse, 

831 F.3d 441, 443-44 (7th Cir. 2016) (plaintiff concealed account containing approximately 

$1,400 at the time of his in forma pauperis application which he was accessing regularly in the 

weeks and months leading up to filing the application); David v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 669 F. 

(continued) 

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D. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s in forma pauperis 

status and dismiss the complaint should be denied. 

III. Motion to Dismiss 

Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that it does not state 

any cognizable claims for relief and is barred by the statute of limitations. ECF No. 15. Plaintiff 

opposes the motion and argues that he has sufficiently pled claims against the defendants and that 

his complaint was filed within the applicable statute of limitations. ECF No. 21. 

A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it makes 

only “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” rather than factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). In order for the claim to be plausible on its face, it must 

contain sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of an affirmative 

defense is proper only if the defendant shows some obvious bar to securing relief on the face of 

the complaint.” ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citations omitted). 

App’x 793, 793-94 (7th Cir. 2016) (plaintiff had access to and failed to disclose savings account 

with a balance of over $32,000 at the time of the application); Vann v. Comm’r of New York City 

Dep’t of Corr., 496 F. App’x 113, 116 (2d Cir. 2012) (plaintiff intentionally omitted over $2,000 

in deposits he received during twelve-month period preceding the filing of his application); 

Cuoco v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 328 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (plaintiff 

failed to disclose settlements totaling $13,500 entered into in the weeks before filing application 

and had money sent to her mother to further “illusion of poverty”); Thomas v. Gen. Motors 

Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff authorized distribution of $73,714 

from retirement account, minus applicable taxes, nine day before filing application); Witkin v. 

Lee, No. 2:17-cv-0232 JAM EFB, 2020 WL 2512383, at *5, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86104, at 

*13-14 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2020) (plaintiff received $5,666.09 and settled a case for $1,200 in the 

month before filing application but averred no income from any source in twelve-month period 

preceding application); Witkin v. Sloan, No. 2:16-cv-2950 JAM EFB, 2019 WL 6918216, at *5, 

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218427, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2019) (same). 

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In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976) 

(citation omitted), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 

(1969) (citations omitted). The court will “presume that general allegations embrace those 

specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 

510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). 

However, while pro se pleadings are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) (citations omitted), 

the court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations,” W. Mining 

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). 

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

The complaint alleges that defendants Rallos, Phile, Allen, and Zamora violated plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment rights when they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 

ECF No. 1 at 8-13. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that on July 10, 2012, he underwent surgery on 

his esophagus and stomach, but the procedure was a failure. Id. at 8. He was discharged the 

following day, and the day after that he began throwing up blood and food. Id. He subsequently 

lost twenty-five pounds, had stomach gas, bowel problems, stomach aches, and could not swallow 

or eat properly. Id. On November 13, 2012, plaintiff filed a health care appeal in which he 

identified all the side effects he was suffering from the surgery and stated that the surgeon who 

had performed the surgery recommended that the surgery be reversed. Id. at 9. 

On December 11, 2012, Rallos interviewed plaintiff with regard to his health care appeal. 

Id. at 10. On January 2, 2013, Phile conducted the second-level review of plaintiff’s appeal. Id. 

On February 11, 2013, Allen reviewed and approved the second-level response. Id. On August 

7, 2013, Zamora signed off on the third-level response. Id. Plaintiff alleges that his appeal put 

each of the defendants on notice of his medical condition, that his condition was continuing to 

decline, and that the longer he went without surgery, the less chance he had of the reversal being 

successful. Id. at 11-12. He also asserts that each defendant had the authority to speed up the 

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process and promptly arrange for him to undergo reversal surgery but failed to do so, causing him 

to needlessly suffer for over four years until he finally received the necessary surgery on February 

2, 2017. Id. at 12-13. 

C. Request for Judicial Notice 

Defendants’ reply in support of their motion to dismiss is accompanied by a request for 

judicial notice. ECF No. 24. They request that the court take judicial notice of the complaint and 

first amended complaint that plaintiff filed in Hash v. Kanaan, No. 2:16-cv-1603 EFB (E.D. Cal.). 

“[A] court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases.” United States v. 

Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (court may 

take judicial notice of facts that are capable of accurate determination by sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned). 

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if a district court 

considers evidence outside the pleadings, it must normally convert 

the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, 

and it must give the nonmoving party an opportunity to respond. A 

court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached 

to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the 

complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the 

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 

United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 

However, “[a]s a general rule, a court may not take judicial notice of proceedings or records in 

another cause so as to supply, without formal introduction of evidence, facts essential to support a 

contention in a cause then before it.” M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 

F.2d 1483, 1491 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). 

The request will be granted to the extent defendants seek judicial notice of the 

proceedings in Hash v. Kanaan and the general subject matter of the pleadings, in support of their 

argument that plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling because he was previously able to file a 

complaint regarding the same issues within the statute of limitations. However, to the extent 

defendants request the court take notice of the specific facts alleged in the context of whether they 

contradict the current facts and provide a basis for finding that plaintiff has not stated a claim for 

deliberate indifference, see ECF No. 23 at 11-12, the request will be denied because it is outside 

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the proper scope of judicial notice. Furthermore, even if the pleadings had been filed in the 

instant case, they would not be grounds for finding that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for 

relief. See PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856, (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]here is 

nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent a party from filing successive 

pleadings that make inconsistent or even contradictory allegations.”). 

D. Statute of Limitations 

1. Legal Standard 

“If the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint, the defense may be 

raised by a motion to dismiss.” Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) 

(citations omitted). “When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute of 

limitations, it can be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required 

liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Id. (citation 

omitted); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 

Because § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, the court applies the forum 

state’s limitations period for personal injury claims. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. In California, 

the limitations period is two years. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1). The court also applies “the forum state’s law regarding tolling, 

including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal 

law.” Id. (citing Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

In California, the limitations period is statutorily tolled for another two years for prisoners 

serving less than a life sentence. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a); Johnson v. State of California, 

207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 2000). Additionally, “the applicable statute of limitations must be 

tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 

926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal. 3d 410, 414 (1974) 

(“[W]henever the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to the initiation of a civil 

action, the running of the limitations period is tolled during the time consumed by the 

administrative proceeding.” (citations omitted)). 

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“Although state law determines the length of the limitations period, ‘federal law 

determines when a civil rights claim accrues.’” Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 936 (quoting 

Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Under federal law, a 

claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of 

the action.” TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991 (citation omitted). 

2. Parties’ Positions 

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s cause of action began to accrue, at latest, on November 

13, 2012, when he filed his administrative grievance appealing the denial of his surgery; they 

reason that the cause of plaintiff’s injury was the denial of his surgery, not the processing of his 

grievance. ECF No. 15 at 6-7. Because plaintiff was an inmate imprisoned for less than life, he 

was entitled to two years of statutory tolling in addition to the two-year statute of limitations. Id. 

at 7-8. As a result, the statute of limitation expired on November 13, 2016, but plaintiff did not 

file the complaint in this action until August 11, 2017, making it untimely. Id. at 8. 

In opposition, plaintiff argues that his cause of action accrued, at the earliest, on August 7, 

2013, when Zamora signed off on the third-level appeal response, because the statute of 

limitations was tolled while he exhausted his administrative remedies.4 ECF No. 21 at 10. 

Plaintiff also argues that his claim did not ripen until the conclusion of his appeal because his 

surgery was delayed, not denied, so no denial of relief occurred until the appeals process was 

complete. Id. at 11. Finally, plaintiff asserts that under the prison mailbox rule, his complaint 

was filed on August 1, 2017, and was therefore filed within the four-year statute of limitations. 

Id. at 8-10. 

In reply, defendants argue that any tolling plaintiff is entitled to for the exhaustion of his 

administrative remedies took place within the two-year statutory tolling provided by section 

352.1(a) of the California Civil Procedure Code. They contend that these periods of tolling run 

concurrently rather than consecutively, and that plaintiff cannot string together periods of 

disability to extend the tolling period. ECF No. 23 at 3-7. They also argue that plaintiff is not 

4

 Plaintiff asserts that he did not receive the response until “much, much later,” but does not 

specify when it was received. ECF No. 21 at 8. 

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entitled to equitable tolling, because the complaint he filed in Hash v. Kanaan, No. 2:16-cv-1603 

EFB (E.D. Cal.), included the same allegations against defendants and was filed within the 

applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 6-8. 

3. Discussion 

There are two issues before the court: (1) the date of accrual for plaintiff’s claims and (2) 

whether tolling of the statute of limitations during the exhaustion of administrative remedies runs 

concurrently or consecutively to statutory tolling for the disability of imprisonment. 

With respect to the date of accrual, neither party is correct as to the date that plaintiff’s 

claims accrued. “[A] claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 

which is the basis of the action,” TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991 (citation omitted), and “[l]iability 

under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant,” Taylor 

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims 

against the defendants in this action could not have accrued on November 13, 2012, as defendants 

claim, because at that time none of them had been involved in plaintiff’s attempts to obtain 

treatment. On the other hand, plaintiff is also incorrect that his claims against all of the 

defendants did not accrue until he exhausted his administrative grievances. Rather, plaintiff’s 

claim against each defendant arose when that individual responded to plaintiff’s appeal and 

plaintiff became aware of the response. Although plaintiff does not specify the dates on which he 

became aware of each defendants’ responses, the information provided in the complaint is 

sufficient to determine whether plaintiff’s claims are timely. 

Considering plaintiff’s claims against defendant Zamora, plaintiff alleges that Zamora 

signed off on the third-level response on August 7, 2013. ECF No. 1 at 10. Although defendants 

argue the complaint in this action was not filed until August 11, 2017, plaintiff correctly points 

out that he is entitled to the application of the prison mailbox rule since he is a prisoner 

proceeding pro se. Under the prison mailbox rule, the complaint is deemed filed on the date 

plaintiff delivered the document to prison officials for mailing, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 

266, 276 (1988), and the envelope the complaint was mailed in indicates that it was handed over 

to prison officials on August 1, 2017, ECF No. 1 at 93. Accordingly, the claim against defendant 

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Zamora was filed within four years of its accrual, and is therefore timely regardless of whether 

statutory and equitable tolling run consecutively or concurrently. 

As for plaintiff’s claims against defendants Rallos, Phile, and Allen, plaintiff alleges that 

Rallos interviewed him on December 11, 2012; Phile conducted the second-level review on 

January 2, 2013; and Allen reviewed and approved the second-level response on February 11, 

2013. ECF No. 1 at 10. Although the complaint does not specify when plaintiff received the 

second-level response, he presumably received it sometime shortly after February 11, 2013.5 

With statutory tolling, the statute of limitations therefore expired on or about February 11, 2013, 

and the claims against Rallos, Phile, and Allen are untimely unless tolling for the period of time 

he was exhausting the administrative appeals process and the period of statutory tolling run 

consecutively. 

There is currently no binding authority on whether equitable tolling while a prisoner 

pursues administrative remedies runs concurrently or consecutively to the two-year statutory 

tolling provided based on incarceration, and there is a split among the district courts that have 

considered the matter. In Stevenson v. Holland, the court aptly summarized the applicable tolling 

rules and the rationale behind the opposing positions as follows: 

After a claim has accrued, California law may operate to toll the 

running of the limitations period. Such is the case when a plaintiff is 

incarcerated for a term less than life; California Code of Civil 

Procedure § 352.1 tolls the statute of limitations for up to two years. 

The tolling ends at the first of (1) release from custody or (2) two 

years of tolling. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 

378-379 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In addition to the statutory tolling afforded under California law, 

federal courts in California also apply California’s equitable tolling 

rules in Section 1983 actions. Cervantez v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 

1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). Under California law, “the effect of 

equitable tolling is that the limitations period stops running during 

the tolling event, and begins to run again only when the tolling event 

has concluded. As a consequence, the tolled interval, no matter when 

it took place, is tacked onto the end of the limitations period . . . .” 

Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal.4th 363, 370-371 (2003), modified 

(Aug. 27, 2009). California’s judge-made doctrine of equitable 

5

 Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss confirms this, as he states that Zamora took 

approximately six months to respond to his third-level appeal, ECF No. 21 at 15, which would 

have been submitted after receiving the second-level response. 

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tolling allows tolling of a claim where alternative relief was sought 

prior to filing suit upon a showing of: (1) “timely notice” of the first 

claim for relief to the defendants; (2) “lack of prejudice[ ] to the 

defendant[s]”; and (3) “reasonable and good faith conduct on the part 

of the plaintiff.” McDonald v. Antelope Valley Comm. College 

Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 102 (2008); accord Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1275; 

Thomas v. Gilliand, 95 Cal. App. 4th 427, 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); 

see Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal. 3d 410, 414 (1974) (en banc) (Equitable 

tolling applies “when an injured person has several legal remedies 

and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.”) The Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a prisoner to exhaust 

remedies within the prison grievance system before filing a related 

Section 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Filing of a prisoner 

grievance can place the defendants on notice of the claim. Running 

of the limitations period “must be tolled” during the pendency of the 

exhaustion process. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 

2005); Donoghue v. Orange County, 848 F.2d 926, 930-931 (9th Cir. 

1988). As a general matter, the applicability of equitable tolling is a 

fact-specific inquiry, not well suited to resolution on a motion to 

dismiss. Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008). 

. . . 

Most of the district courts that have permitted equitable tolling in 

addition to statutory tolling when the tolling events overlap have 

relied upon language from Lantzy: “[e]quitable tolling under 

California law operates independently of the literal wording of the 

[California] Code of Civil Procedure to suspend or extend a statute 

of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and 

fairness.” E.g., Carranza v. Lewis, 2017 WL 1050538, *17-18 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 17, 2017); Beard v. Pennington, 2015 WL 7293652, *6-7 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2015); Burns v. Crook, 2008 WL 5103183, *3 

(S.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008). Those courts have read California law 

regarding equitable tolling to require tacking of additional time 

(beyond the statutory tolling period) to the end of a limitations period 

when an equitable tolling event occurs during a period of statutory 

tolling. Carranza, 2017 WL 1050538 at *18 (“[N]o matter when [the 

equitable tolling event] took place, [the duration of the equitable 

tolling event] is tacked onto the end of the limitations period.”); 

Akhtar v. Mesa, 2014 WL 1922576, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2014); 

(applying tolling for the duration of the prison exhaustion process 

and statutory tolling to a prisoner’s claim to extend the limitations 

period beyond four years); Dawkins v. Woodford, 2012 WL 554371, 

*5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012) (same); Crayton v. Hedgpeth, 2011 WL 

1988450, *9 (E. D Cal. May 20, 2011) (same); Burns, 2008 WL 

5103183 at *3 (same); see also Adler, 2013 WL 3481584 at *5 

(assuming without deciding that the plaintiff could receive the 

benefit of equitable and statutory tolling even when the tolling events 

overlap in time). 

The district courts that have declined to apply equitable tolling in 

addition to statutory tolling when the equitable tolling event overlaps 

with the period of statutory tolling have relied upon (1) the “common 

sense” explanation that “when two or more reasons for tolling exist” 

during the same period that those reasons “will toll concurrently 

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during the time they are both active, and are not tacked 

consecutively, one upon the other,” and (2) Rose v. Petaluma & S.R. 

Ry. Co. for the proposition that separate periods of disability cannot 

be tacked. Lopez v. Schwarzenegger, 2012 WL 78377, *5 (E.D. Cal. 

Jan. 10, 2012); accord Oliver v. McDaniel, 2016 WL 4535389, *3 

(C.D. Cal. June 2, 2016); see also Martin v. Biaggini, 2015 WL 

1399240, *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2015) (identifying that Rose and 

Lantzy are both inapt analogs but agreeing that overlapping reasons 

for tolling should result in only a single period of tolling). 

Stevenson, No. 1:16-cv-1831 AWI SKO, 2017 WL 2958731, at *4-6, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

107170, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2017) (bracketed alterations in original) (footnotes 

omitted). The Stevenson court ultimately held that 

[t]he former camp’s reasoning is most consistent with Ninth Circuit 

authority on tolling pending exhaustion of administrative relief. 

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d at 943 (tolling the limitations period 

during the administrative exhaustion process without regard to 

statutory tolling); see Elmore v. Arong, 2010 WL 366628, *2 (E.D. 

Cal. Jan. 26, 2010). Application of statutory and equitable tolling 

consecutively is also more consistent with the mandate of California 

law to tack time to the end of the limitations period for equitable 

tolling. See Lantzy, 31 Cal. 4th at 370-371. 

Id., 2017 WL 2958731, at *6, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107170, at *14-15. 

 Defendants acknowledge the split among the district courts and urge the court to find the 

tolling periods run concurrently. ECF No. 23 at 3-5. In support of their position, they argue that 

“California law does not permit distinct disabilities, or periods of disability to be strung together 

to extend a disability tolling period” and that plaintiff cannot qualify for equitable tolling because 

he previously initiated an action making the same allegations within the statute of limitations but 

voluntarily dismissed the defendants from that action. Id. at 6-8. The undersigned does not find 

either of these arguments persuasive. While California law does not permit distinct disabilities or 

periods of disability to be strung together, the time during which plaintiff was exhausting his 

administrative remedies was not a period of disability. Likewise, while plaintiff is not entitled to 

equitable tolling for the time he pursued these claims in Kanaan, the undersigned does not find 

that it bars his entitlement to equitable tolling for the period of time he exhausted his 

administrative remedies. See Martell v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 67 Cal. App. 4th 978, 

985 (1998) (no equitable tolling for claims pursued in the same forum); McDonald v. Antelope 

Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 101 (2008) (“Where exhaustion of an administrative 

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remedy is mandatory prior to filing suit, equitable tolling is automatic.” (citation omitted)). 

The court finds the reasoning of Stevenson to be persuasive, and therefore finds that 

plaintiff is entitled to consecutive tolling for the time that he pursued his administrative remedies. 

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the complaint as untimely should be denied. 

E. Failure to State a Claim 

1. Legal Standard 

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 

must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires plaintiff 

to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and 

(2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (some internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 

(9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate 

indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d 

at 1096 (citation omitted). Deliberate indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay 

or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 

physicians provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05). A difference of opinion between an inmate and prison 

medical personnel—or between medical professionals—regarding the appropriate course of 

treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Toguchi, 391 F.3d 

at 1058; Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). To establish a difference of opinion 

that rises to the level of deliberate indifference, plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment 

the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 

F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 

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Prison administrators cannot willfully turn a blind eye to constitutional violations being 

committed by subordinates. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1098 (prison administrators “are liable for 

deliberate indifference when they knowingly fail to respond to an inmate’s requests for help” 

(citations omitted)). Therefore, an individual who denies an inmate appeal and who had the 

authority and opportunity to prevent an ongoing constitutional violation could potentially be 

subject to liability if the individual knew about an existing or impending violation and failed to 

prevent it. See id. 

2. Parties’ Positions 

Defendants’ motion does not dispute that plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to allege a 

serious medical need. Instead, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to state a claim against 

them because they were not his treating physicians, were involved only through the appeals 

process,6

 and, with the exception of Rallos, were relying on information provided by others and 

6

 Defendants also argue in both their motion and reply that defendants cannot be held liable for 

denying a grievance because there is no constitutional right to a grievance process. ECF No. 15 

at 9-10; ECF No. 23 at 9-11. However, the cases they rely upon do not support the proposition 

that the denial of a grievance complaining of an ongoing violation cannot state a claim for relief. 

The cited cases are all inapposite, either because they involved the legal insufficiency of a due 

process claim based on the denial of appeals, or were decided on summary judgment, or dealt 

with the denial of grievances that occurred after the violation complained of was complete. See 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (alleged loss of liberty interest in 

processing of appeal does not state claim); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) 

(same); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) (denying a grievance does not 

contribute to completed act of misconduct); Dillingham v. Johnson, No. 13-cv-5777 YGR PR, 

2016 WL 304762, at *9-11, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9075, at *21-24 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016) 

(decided on summary judgment); Wright v. Shapirshteyn, No. 1:06-cv-0927 MHM, 2009 WL 

361951, at *3, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15655, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2009) (due process); 

Fairley v. Shelton, 664. F. App’x 616, 617 (9th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment); Oliver v. 

McDaniel, No. 14-cv-0334 JVS (PJW), 2016 WL 4535389, at *3-4, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

116683, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2016) (no right to grievance procedure and no liability for 

denying grievance about completed violation); Hernandez v. Cate, No. 11-cv-0627 R (AJW), 

2014 WL 6473769, at *5, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162332, at *13-14 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2014) 

(due process); Shallowhorn v. Molina, 572 F. App’x 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2014) (due process and 

completed violation); McCoy v. Roe, 509 F. App’x 660, 660 (9th Cir. 2013) (due process); 

Shroeder v. Yates, No. 1:09-cv-2236 AWI GBC, 2011 WL 6141060, at *3, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 142063, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (due process); Tatmon v. Hartley, No. 1:08-cv0695 BLW MHW, 2011 WL 674043, at *6, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15626, at *17-18 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 16, 2011) (summary judgment); Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2005) 

(continued) 

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did not speak directly to plaintiff. ECF No. 15 at 9-10. They further argue that plaintiff has 

alleged nothing more than a difference of opinion as to his treatment and that he has not alleged 

that defendants were “involved in any of the discussions with the outside providers, nor does 

Plaintiff allege that they were assigned to do so.” Id. at 10. Defendants also argue that because 

plaintiff has not alleged that a specific doctor had been selected or agreed to perform the surgery, 

they cannot have been deliberately indifferent because they could not have denied or delayed a 

surgery no surgeon had been selected to perform. Id. Finally, defendants argue that defendant 

Zamora is not a doctor, cannot engage in the practice of medicine, and therefore cannot have been 

deliberately indifferent for failing to respond to medical complaints when plaintiff was being 

treated by a doctor. Id. at 11. 

In opposition, plaintiff argues that the complaint sufficiently alleged that he suffered from 

a serious medical condition and that defendants intentionally delayed and denied his access to 

prescribed medical care. ECF No. 21 at 11-19. 

3. Discussion 

Defendants’ arguments are unavailing. Though defendants contend that they cannot be 

held liable because they were not plaintiff’s treating physicians and relied upon information 

provided by others, it is alleged that defendants were aware that plaintiff had been recommended 

for surgery and that his condition was deteriorating. Any determination that defendants’ reliance 

on the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians absolves them of liability, or that plaintiff’s 

desire for immediate surgery was nothing more than a difference of opinion, requires 

consideration of evidence outside the complaint and therefore are matters for summary judgment. 

Moreover, while allegations that a specific doctor had been selected and agreed to perform the 

surgery would certainly strengthen plaintiff’s claims, they are not necessary to state a claim for 

relief as there is no reason to believe that delays in scheduling can occur only once a surgeon has 

been selected. 

(summary judgment); McGee v. Adams, 721 F3d 474, 485 (7th Cir. 2013) (summary judgment); 

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (absent reason to believe prison medical staff 

are mistreating or not treating a prisoner, non-medical prison officials not liable for deliberate 

indifference). 

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The complaint alleges that defendants were aware of plaintiff’s deteriorating condition; 

that there was already a doctor’s recommendation that the surgery be reversed; that the longer the 

delay in surgery, the less chance it would be successful; and that that each of the defendants had 

the authority to expedite the process and promptly schedule his surgery but refused to do so. The 

court can infer from the complaint that plaintiff was not seeking approval of surgery, but prompt 

scheduling of his surgery, which even a non-physician7 would be able to accomplish, assuming 

they held a position with the required authority. Moreover, even if the court were to assume that 

plaintiff was seeking approval of the surgery, the allegations are sufficient to support the 

inference that the approval process had stalled or was being unreasonably delayed, and that 

defendants had the authority to move the process along but refused to do so. These allegations 

are sufficient, at the pleading stage, to state a claim for relief. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t., 865 

F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989) (defendants who denied grievance requests for prompt treatment of 

serious condition potentially liable for deliberate indifference). 

F. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as untimely 

and for failure to state a claim should be denied. 

IV. Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant 

It is being recommended that the motion to revoke your in forma pauperis status be denied 

because defendants have not shown that you had three cases dismissed for a qualifying reason 

before you filed the complaint in this case, and because they have not shown that you were 

untruthful in your in forma pauperis application. 

It is being recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied because you filed your 

complaint within the statute of limitations and the complaint was sufficient to state claims for 

relief against the defendants. 

//// 

7

 Although defendants assert that Zamora is not a physician, the complaint refers to defendants as 

“all four doctors.” ECF No. 1 at 17. Whether Zamora is actually a physician is irrelevant to the 

sufficiency of the allegations under Rule 12(b)(6). 

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CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Defendants’ request for judicial notice (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part as set forth above in Section III.C. 

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the docket to reflect that defendant 

“Pfile’s” name is correctly spelled “Phile.” 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendants’ motion to revoke plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status and dismiss the 

complaint, ECF No. 16, be DENIED. 

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 15, be DENIED. 

3. Defendants be required to file an answer to the complaint within twenty-one days of 

any order adopting these findings and recommendations. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 29, 2022 

 

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