Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02548/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02548-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983bv Bivens Non-Prisoner

---

1

3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISABELLA JANE GODSHALL; 

BRAYDEN ERICKSON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS OR 

ALTERNATIVELY STRIKE 

PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ 

CLAIM WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

[Doc. No. 7]

On March 25, 2019, Defendants County of San Diego, San Diego Sheriff’s 

Department, and Sheriff’s Deputy Marcus Levine filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively 

to strike parts of Plaintiffs Isabella Godshall and Brayden Erickson’s complaint. (Doc. No. 

7.) Plaintiffs opposed the motions on April 29, 2019. (Doc. Nos. 8, 9.) Defendants replied 

on May 6, 2019. (Doc. No. 11.) For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss with leave to amend.

Background

On September 8, 2017, Plaintiffs were departing the Sprinter Train Station, when 

they heard someone say from behind them, “Hey you stop!” (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs 

Case 3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG Document 12 Filed 05/13/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 8
2

3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

turned around to see a man in a security uniform, who was later identified as San Diego 

Sheriff’s Deputy Levine, running towards them. (Id.) Plaintiff Godshall asked Deputy 

Levine “Why?” (Id.) He responded, “Because I said so!” (Id.) Deputy Levine then grabbed, 

twisted, and pulled Plaintiff Erickson’s right arm, which was broken and in a soft cast at 

the time. (Id. ¶ 14.) This caused Plaintiff Erickson to scream. (Id.) Plaintiff Godshall said 

“Stop, he has a broken arm!” (Id.) Deputy Levine released Plaintiff Erickson and grabbed 

Plaintiff Godshall’s arms, twisting them behind her back. (Id.) Deputy Levine pushed 

Plaintiff Godshall forward causing her to fall to the ground onto her stomach. (Id.) Deputy 

Levine then placed his knee into her back and handcuffed her. (Id.) He continued to hold 

her down for 15 minutes while she screamed and asked him to stop. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 18.) A 

civilian approached, in concern for Plaintiff Godshall, and asked “Why are you arresting 

her like that?” (Id.) Deputy Levine responded, “You need to back up and stop asking 

questions unless you want to be arrested too!” (Id.) Plaintiff Erickson called 9-1-1 and 

explained the situation to the operator. (Id. ¶ 16.) When other deputies arrived, Deputy 

Levine instructed them to take Plaintiffs into custody. (Id. ¶ 17.) Deputy Levine at no point 

communicated to Plaintiffs why he engaged with them. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs allege that they 

both were physically injured as a result of the altercation. (Id.)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging claims for unlawful detention, 

excessive force, arrest without probable cause, false imprisonment, assault, battery, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, failure to properly screen and hire, 

failure to properly train, failure to supervise and discipline, and violation of California Civil 

Code § 52.1. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendants now move to dismiss Defendant San Diego Sheriff’s 

Department, and Plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 

Monell liability. (Doc. No. 7.) Defendants also move to strike or alternatively dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ claim for false imprisonment. (Id.)

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG Document 12 Filed 05/13/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 8
3

3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Discussion

I. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 

646 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011). The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s 

plausibility standard governs a plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court has explained Rule 

8(a)(2) as follows:

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. As the Court held in [Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)], the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of 

further factual enhancement.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets 

omitted).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[a] claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). In addition, a court need not accept legal 

conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, it is improper for a court to assume 

that the plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have 

violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., 

Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Finally, a court may 

consider documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and items that are proper 

subjects of judicial notice. See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 

2010).

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG Document 12 Filed 05/13/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 8
4

3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

If the court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it must then determine 

whether to grant leave to amend. See Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 

1995). “A district court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend if it determines that allegation 

of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the 

deficiency, or if the plaintiff had several opportunities to amend its complaint and 

repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies.” Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 

(9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

II. Analysis

Defendants move to dismiss Defendant San Diego Sheriff’s Department on the 

premise that it is not a proper defendant. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 8–9.) Defendants also move to 

dismiss or strike Plaintiffs’ claim for false imprisonment because it is duplicative of other 

claims. (Id. at 15–16.) Finally, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress and municipal civil rights liability arguing that 

Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled such claims. (Id. at 9–14.) After consideration, the 

Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

A. San Diego Sheriff’s Department as Defendant

Defendants argue that San Diego Sheriff’s Department should be dismissed because 

it is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 and it is duplicative to name as Defendants 

both the County of San Diego and the San Diego Sheriff’s Department. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 

8–9.) Plaintiffs concede this point and expressly state that they do not oppose Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss the San Diego Sheriff’s Department. (Doc. No. 8 at 5.) Accordingly, the 

Court dismisses with prejudice the San Diego Sheriff’s Department.

B. False Imprisonment Claim

Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss or alternatively strike Plaintiff’s 

claim for false imprisonment because it is duplicative of Plaintiff’s claims for unlawful 

detention and arrest without probable cause. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 15–16.) Plaintiffs concede 

this point and expressly state that they do not oppose Defendant’s motion to strike their 

Case 3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG Document 12 Filed 05/13/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 8
5

3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claim for False Imprisonment. (Doc. No. 8 at 10.) Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ 

motion to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for false imprisonment as redundant.

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress against Deputy Levine. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 9–10.) To plead a claim of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) extreme and 

outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intent of causing or reckless disregard of the 

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered extreme emotional 

distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation. Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050–

51 (2009). “A defendant’s conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all 

bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. at 1151. “Severe emotional

distress means emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no 

reasonable person in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” Id.

Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead their claims 

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. While Plaintiffs sufficiently allege facts to 

show outrageous conduct by Deputy Levine, Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts showing

that they have suffered severe emotional distress, but instead merely state that “Plaintiffs 

suffered severe emotional distress and the outrageous conduct was the cause of the 

motional distress suffered by Plaintiffs.” (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 71.) Plaintiffs’ “formulaic recitation 

of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient to state a claim against for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, the Court concludes 

that Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claims should be dismissed.

D. Municipal Liability

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell § 1983 claims against the County 

for failure to properly screen and hire, failure to train, and failure to supervise and 

discipline. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 10–14.) Under Monell, a municipality can be held liable as a 

“person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if it caused a civil rights violation by virtue of (1) an 

official policy, practice or custom, (2) deliberately indifferent training or supervision, or 

Case 3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG Document 12 Filed 05/13/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 8
6

3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(3) ratification by an official with final policy-making authority. See Clouthier v. Cty. of 

Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010). “Allegations of Monell liability will be 

sufficient for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) where they: (1) identify the challenged 

policy/custom; (2) explain how the policy/custom is deficient; (3) explain how the 

policy/custom caused the plaintiff harm; and (4) reflect how the policy/custom amounted 

to deliberate indifference, i.e. show how the alleged deficiency was obvious and that the 

constitutional injury was likely to occur.” Lucas v. City of Visalia, 2010 WL 1444667 at 

*4 (E.D. Cal. Apr.12, 2010) (citing Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 

(E.D. Cal. 2009).

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled their municipal 

liability claims. First, Plaintiffs claim that the County was deliberately indifferent to their 

constitutional rights by failing to properly screen and hire police officers. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 

85–91.) Deliberate indifference in this context is only present “where adequate scrutiny of 

an applicant’s background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the 

plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation 

of a third party's federally protected right.” Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 

397, 411 (1997). Here, Plaintiffs merely make conclusory allegations that the County 

“failed to adequately and properly screen and hire [its] employees.” (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 79.) 

Plaintiffs fail to provide any facts about the County’s hiring practices or Deputy Levine’s 

background to support an allegation that the County was “deliberately indifferent” in its 

screening and hiring process. See Amaral v. City of San Diego, No. 17-CV-02409-L-JMA, 

2018 WL 3302987, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 5, 2018). Plaintiffs’ conclusory statements are 

insufficient to meet the pleading standard, and therefore the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ 

claim for failure to properly screen and hire. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Second, Plaintiffs claim that the County was deliberately indifferent to their rights 

by failing to train police officers. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 78–84.) A municipality may be liable 

under § 1983 when its “failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to rights of 

persons with whom the [employees] come into contact.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388; 

Case 3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG Document 12 Filed 05/13/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 8
7

3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2001). To state a claim for 

failure to properly train, a plaintiff “must show that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional 

right, (2) the City had a training policy that amounts to deliberate indifference to the 

constitutional rights of the persons’ with whom [its officers] are likely to come into contact; 

and (3) his constitutional injury would have been avoided had the City properly trained 

those officers.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by 

untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for 

purposes of failure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs here 

allege that “as a matter of custom, practice and policy, failed to maintain adequate and 

proper training as to the constitutional rights of citizens and arrestees; to prevent the 

consistent and systematic use of excessive force; and to prevent extra judicial punishment 

by officers.” (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 86.) Plaintiffs do not plead any facts about the alleged 

deficiencies of the County’s police officer training. Further, Plaintiffs fail to allege any 

pattern of similar constitutional violations to support such a claim. Accordingly, the Court 

concludes Plaintiffs’ formulaic recitation of the elements for their failure to train claim 

does not survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Third, Plaintiffs claim that the County’s failure to supervise and discipline police 

officers constituted deliberate indifference in violation of their rights. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 92–

98.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “knew or should have known of the dangerous 

propensities of [Deputy] Levine, but took no steps to supervise him, correct his abuse of

authority, or discourage his unlawful use of authority. To the contrary, [the County] 

condoned and acquiesced in the abusive behavior of [Deputy] Levine by refusing to retrain, 

discipline, or correct his abusive behavior.” (Id. ¶ 94.) Plaintiffs rely on a single incident 

with Deputy Levine in support of their claim against the County for failure to supervise 

and discipline officers. Plaintiffs do not allege any prior similar incidents of the County 

failing to discipline police officers or failing to discipline Deputy Levine. Plaintiffs allege 

that Deputy Levine was not disciplined in this instance, (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 94), but that does 

Case 3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG Document 12 Filed 05/13/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 8
8

3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not establish that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were the result of a failure to discipline or 

supervise. Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege that the County failed to discipline Deputy 

Levine in any prior incident. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to establish any causal link 

between any municipal action and the alleged violation of their rights. See Brown, 520 

U.S. at 404 (“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an 

injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability 

and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for 

the actions of its employee.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts 

that would permit the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the County had a custom 

or policy of failure to supervise and discipline its police officers and that Deputy Levine’s 

actions were the result of any such custom or policy. See Amaral, 2018 WL 3302987, at 

*4 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims for failure to properly screen and hire, failure 

to train, and failure to supervise and discipline.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss with 

prejudice San Diego Sheriff’s Department as a Defendant. The Court strikes Plaintiff’s 

claim for false imprisonment. The Court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, failure to properly screen and hire, failure to 

train, and failure to supervise and discipline. The Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend, if 

they can do so to cure the deficiencies noted in this order, on or before June 13, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 13, 2019

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:18-cv-02548-H-WVG Document 12 Filed 05/13/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 8