Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-02367/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-02367-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CHAN-WOONG PARK, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 16-cv-02367-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

[Re: ECF 18] 

Plaintiff Power Integrations, Inc. (“Power Integrations”) brings this suit against Defendant 

Chan-Woong Park (“Park”) alleging that Park interfered with contractual relations and prospective 

economic relations, among other causes of actions. Park moves to dismiss the complaint for lack 

of personal jurisdiction over him, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and for failure to state a 

claim. Mot., ECF 18. Pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), the Court finds Park’s motion to dismiss 

suitable for submission without oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing scheduled for 

March 16, 2017. For reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 

PART the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Power Integrations filed two separate complaints against Park on the same day in this 

District, Case No. 16-cv-02366 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2016) and this case. In these two related 

cases, the parties are identical and the relevant facts are also overlapping. The Court has issued an 

order in the related case, Case No. 16-cv-02366, denying Park’s motion to dismiss. The Court 

will summarize the facts as alleged by Power Integrations briefly here. 1

 

1

 When a defendant challenges a court’s personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing that jurisdiction is proper. Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015). 

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Power Integrations is a Delaware corporation that supplies electronic components used in 

high voltage power conversion systems. Compl. ¶ 5, ECF1. Its headquarters and principal place 

of business are in San Jose, California. Id. ¶ 1. Park was an employee of Power Integrations from 

approximately November 2000 to October 2008. Id. ¶ 6. On March 29, 2001, Park signed an 

Employee Agreement Regarding Confidentiality and Inventions (“Inventions Agreement,” or 

“IA”) in San Jose, California, agreeing that any information related to conception, design, 

development or support of Power Integrations’ products (“Proprietary Information”) belongs to 

Power Integrations. Id. ¶ 7; Compl. ¶ 7. 

Power Integrations alleges that it has learned that Park is using its Proprietary Information 

to file and obtain patents in the United States and South Korea, including Korean Patents Nos. 

1436958 and 1588481, and that Park is interfering with its business relationships. Id. ¶¶ 8-15. 

Specifically, Park sent letters to Dong Yang E&P Inc. (“Dong Yang”), and Samsung Electronics 

(“Samsung”), customers of Power Integrations, claiming that the products supplied by Power 

Integrations infringe his Korean patents. Id. ¶¶ 12-15. 

In its complaint, Power Integrations asserts that Park intentionally and negligently 

interfered with its contractual relations. Id. ¶¶ 19-27. Power Integrations further asserts that Park 

intentionally and negligently interfered with its prospective economic relations. Id. ¶¶ 29-41. In 

addition, Power Integrations claims that the statements Park made to its customers were false and 

disparaging, giving rise to the claim of trade libel. Id. ¶¶ 43-48. Finally, the complaint asserts 

violations of California Business and Professions Code section 17200 (“UCL”). Id. ¶¶ 50-51. 

Park moves to dismiss the complaint based on lack of personal jurisdiction and belatedly 

has raised a forum non conveniens basis for dismissing this case on reply. Mot.; Reply, ECF 26. 

The Court granted leave for Power Integrations to file a sur-reply to respond to Park’s forum non 

conveniens arguments. ECF 45. Park also moves to dismiss each of the asserted claims for failure 

 

The plaintiff may meet that burden by submitting affidavits and discovery materials. Doe v. 

Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, in deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, 

the court is not restricted to the pleadings, but can also “review any evidence, such 

as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes regarding the evidence of jurisdiction.” 

McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). 

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to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mot. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Personal Jurisdiction 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes a defendant to seek dismissal of an 

action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). “Where, as here, the defendant’s 

motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only 

make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Ranza v. 

Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“[T]he plaintiff cannot simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint.” Schwarzenegger v. 

Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). However, uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and factual 

disputes created by conflicting affidavits are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.

Where no applicable federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, “the law of the state in 

which the district court sits applies.” Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements 

Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003). “California’s long-arm statute allows courts to exercise 

personal jurisdiction over defendants to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the 

United States Constitution.” Id. “[D]ue process requires that the defendant ‘have certain 

minimum contacts’ with the forum state ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Int’l 

Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

B. Forum Non Conveniens 

A party seeking dismissal of an action on forum non conveniens grounds “must show two 

things: (1) the existence of an adequate alternative forum, and (2) that the balance of private and 

public interest factors favors dismissal.” Boston Telecomms. Grp., Inc. v. Wood, 588 F.3d 1201, 

1206 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the 

court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 

U.S. 235, 255 n.22 (1981). Then, the court “must evaluate both the convenience of the parties and 

various public-interest considerations.” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of 

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Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013); see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 

(1996). The plaintiff’s choice of forum is also entitled to some weight, and “[a] defendant 

invoking forum non conveniens ordinarily bears a heavy burden in opposing the plaintiff’s chosen 

forum.” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007). 

When an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case, a federal court may dismiss on 

the ground of forum non conveniens if “trial in the chosen forum would establish . . . 

oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience, or . 

. . the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s own 

administrative and legal problems.’” Id. at 429 (alterations in original) (quoting Am. Dredging 

Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1994)). 

The factors relating to the private interests of the litigants include: “(1) the residence of the 

parties and the witnesses; (2) the forum’s convenience to the litigants; (3) access to physical 

evidence and other sources of proof; (4) whether unwilling witnesses can be compelled to testify; 

(5) the cost of bringing witnesses to trial; (6) the enforceability of the judgment; and (7) all other 

practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Carijano v. 

Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1229 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Boston Telecomms., 588 

F.3d at 1206-07). The public factors related to the interests of the forums include: “(1) the local 

interest in the lawsuit, (2) the court’s familiarity with the governing law, (3) the burden on local 

courts and juries, (4) congestion in the court, and (5) the costs of resolving a dispute unrelated to a 

particular forum.” Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1232 (Boston Telecomms., 588 F.3d at 1211). 

Dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds represents a court’s determination, after 

balancing all of the relevant factors, that “in light of certain conditions . . . jurisdiction ought to be 

declined.” Am. Dredging, 510 U.S. at 453. This determination is committed to the trial court’s 

sound discretion. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 429; Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257. 

C. Rule 12(b)(6) 

“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’” Conservation 

Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 

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729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). When determining whether a claim has been stated, the Court accepts 

as true all well-pled factual allegations and construes them in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 690 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the 

Court need not “accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial 

notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed 

factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Personal Jurisdiction 

“The strength of contacts required [for exercising personal jurisdiction] depends on which 

of the two categories of personal jurisdiction a litigant invokes: specific jurisdiction or general 

jurisdiction.” Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068. Power Integrations contends that Park is subject to both 

general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. The Court addresses those contentions in turn. 

i. General Personal Jurisdiction 

The parties’ arguments on whether Park is subject to general jurisdiction are the same as 

those presented in Case No. 16-cv-02366 in connection with Park’s motion to dismiss the 

complaint. Park argues that there is no general jurisdiction because he is not domiciled in 

California and “has not stepped foot in California for almost ten years.” Mot. 10. He also has no 

contact with this forum that would constitute a “continuous and systematic” affiliation with 

California. Reply 9-10 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014)). 

Power Integrations contends that Park has sufficient contacts to give rise to general 

jurisdiction citing to several allegations. Opp’n 8-9. The totality of these contacts, Power 

Integrations argues, shows a pattern of continuous contacts with California. Id. at 9 (citing 

Coremetrics, Inc. v. Atomic Park.com, LLC, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2005)). 

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General jurisdiction exists when the defendant’s contacts “are so continuous and 

systematic as to render [him] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A nonresident that is subject to the court’s general 

jurisdiction may be sued for claims “arising from dealings entirely distinct” from the forumrelated activities. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). “[O]nly 

a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose 

jurisdiction there.” Id. at 760. “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 

jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.” Id.

Power Integrations admits that Park is not a California resident but cites the following facts 

in an attempt to demonstrate that Park has continuous and systematic contacts with California: (1) 

Park had lived in California between 2001 and 2003; (2) Park executed the IA, governed by 

California law; (3) Park corresponded with Power Integrations for business and personal reasons; 

(4) Park filed patent applications to assert patents against Power Integrations’ customers in 

California; (5) Park sent “business proposals” to California; (6) Park sent cease and desist letters 

to Power Integrations’ customers; and (7) Park discussed settlement with Power Integrations. 

Opp’n 8-9. 

None of these weigh in favor of a finding that Park is subject to general jurisdiction in 

California. Where Park had lived or worked prior to the filing of this case is not relevant here, 

because “the focus [of this inquiry] is upon the domicile of the parties at the time the action is 

filed,” not at some prior time. E.g., Repp v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 972 F. Supp. 546, 549 n.2 (D. 

Or. 1997). Park’s interaction with Power Integrations, alone, also cannot render him “essentially 

at home” in California. E.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 

(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “engaging in commerce with residents of the forum state is not in and 

of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical presence within the state’s borders”); see 

also Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801 (finding that being party to a contract governed by 

California law is not sufficient for general jurisdiction in California). As such, the correspondence 

between the parties regarding Park’s compensation and settlement, and the cease and desist letters 

Park had allegedly sent to California are not sufficient to subject him to general jurisdiction. 

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Coremetrics, a case cited by Power Integrations, is not analogous to this case. In 

Coremetrics, the court, although acknowledging that the facts presented a close situation, decided 

that there was general jurisdiction because of the many contacts the defendant had with California, 

including the “volume of sales made to California consumers—both in absolute numbers and as a 

percentage of total sales,” making up its largest percentage of sale by state. 370 F. Supp. 2d at 

1021-23. The degree of contact Park has with California is not similar to that of the defendant in 

Coremetrics and there is also no allegation that a substantial portion of Park’s business or personal 

relationships are in California. Based upon the facts of this case, the Court finds that Park is not 

“at home” in California, and thus is not subject to this Court’s general jurisdiction. 

ii. Specific Personal Jurisdiction 

Park presents the same arguments against finding specific personal jurisdiction as those in 

his motion to dismiss filed in Case No. 16-cv-02366. Power Integrations’ argument in this case is 

focused on the “purposeful direction” inquiry as opposed to “purposeful availment.” Opp’n 11, 

ECF 20. Specifically, Power Integrations contends that there is purposeful direction because Park 

intentionally interfered with, and attempted to disrupt Power Integrations’ business by targeting 

Power Integrations’ customers. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has established a three-prong test for determining whether a non-resident 

defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in a forum: 

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his 

activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or 

resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully 

avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; 

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant’s forum-related activities; and 

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (citing Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

a. Purposeful Direction 

Because the causes of action asserted in the complaint involve tortious conduct, 

“purposeful direction” is indeed the first prong of the test for specific personal jurisdiction in this 

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case. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004)). In determining 

whether a defendant purposefully directs his activities at the forum state, courts apply an “effects” 

test that focuses on the forum in which the defendant’s actions were felt, whether or not the 

actions themselves occurred within the forum Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1228 (citations omitted). The 

“effects” test requires that “the defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) 

expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be 

suffered in the forum state.” Id. (citations omitted). In the motion to dismiss, Park only disputes 

the second prong of “expressly aiming.” Mot. 11. The Ninth Circuit does not require in 

purposeful direction cases that all (or even any) jurisdictionally relevant effects have been caused 

by wrongful acts. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 

1208 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, the Court considers the alleged tortious act of Park as well as his 

other alleged contacts with California in considering whether specific jurisdiction is proper. 

First, the Court finds that Park “committed an intentional act,” and Park does not dispute 

this. Mot. 11. Power Integrations alleges that Park, as a former employee, knew information 

related to Power Integrations’ customers. Walker Decl. ¶ 18, ECF 20-1. He then intentionally 

sent cease and desist letters to Dong Yang and Samsung in Korea. Id. Park then contacted Power 

Integrations in California numerous times to discuss these cease and desist letters. Id. ¶ 20. Park 

has also had several discussions in person with Power Integrations CEO Mr. Balakrishnan to 

resolve the dispute. Id. These alleged facts support that Park had committed an intentional act. 

Second, the Court finds that Park’s acts were “expressly aimed” at California, the forum 

state. The “express aiming” requirement “is satisfied when the defendant is alleged to have 

engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of 

the forum state.” Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 

2000). Dole Food Co. v. Watts presents a situation similar to the case here. 303 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit in Dole found that the California court had specific jurisdiction 

over the defendants who were citizens and residents of European countries based on their alleged 

fraudulent conduct against the plaintiff, Dole Food Company (“Dole”), whose headquarter was in 

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California. Id. at 1108. Dole alleged that the defendants persuaded it to switch from a “cost and 

freight” system to a “landed duty paid” system only to later lease warehouse space to Dole at 

exorbitant rates. Id. at 1109. In finding “purposeful direction,” the Ninth Circuit found that the 

non-resident defendants’ actions were “expressly aimed” at California because they knew that 

Dole’s principal place of business was in California, knew that the decisionmakers for Dole were 

located in California, and communicated directly with those California decisionmakers. Id. at 

1112. The court also specifically noted that while not every communications with Dole about 

foreign operations would create specific jurisdiction, here the defendants’ fraudulent 

communications were not “untargeted negligence,” but rather were “performed for the very 

purpose of having their consequences felt in the forum state.” Id.

Here, according to Power Integrations’ complaint and the supporting declaration, Park 

obtained information relating to Power Integrations’ technologies and customers while employed 

by Power Integrations. Walker Decl. ¶¶ 13, 18. Armed with that knowledge, he filed patent 

applications in his own name based on Proprietary Information taken from Power Integrations and 

began asserting patent rights against Power Integrations’ customers. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. Park then 

contacted Power Integrations in California numerous times to discuss these cease and desist 

letters. Id. ¶ 20. Park knew that Dong Yang and Samsung exported their products containing 

Power Integrations’ technology to California and in the cease and desist letters, stated that selling 

those products in the United States will cause a legal dispute. Id. ¶ 18. Park also had several 

discussions in person with Power Integrations CEO Mr. Balakrishnan to resolve the dispute. Id. ¶ 

20. Moreover, Park repeatedly reached out to Power Integrations in California through phone 

calls, emails, written correspondences, and requests to meet in person with Power Integrations’ 

executives to discuss “business proposals,” in an attempt to sell back to Power Integrations its own 

technology. Id. ¶ 17; Opp’n 11 n.3. These alleged facts support that Park’s conduct expressly 

aimed at California, the location of Power Integrations’ headquarter and principle place of 

business. Although Park argues that his conduct occurred in Korean, this does not preclude 

finding that his conduct was aimed at California. Like the defendants in Dole, whose conduct 

occurred mostly outside of the forum state, the conduct was not “untargeted negligence” but had 

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the “purpose of having [the] consequences felt in [by Power Integrations in California].” Dole, 

303 F.3d at 1112. 

The Court does not find that the cases relied upon by Park, Walden v. Fiore and Picot v. 

Western, preclude a finding of specific personal jurisdiction in this case. 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 

(2014); 780 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2015); Mot. 11-13. As noted by Park, Walden concerns a 

false arrest of Nevada and California residents made by a Georgia police officer in a Georgia 

airport. 134 S. Ct. at 1120. The Supreme Court found that the officer defendant, a resident of 

Georgia, was not subject to the jurisdiction of Nevada because the Nevada resident plaintiff was 

the only link between the defendant and the forum. Id. at 1126. However, the Georgia police 

officer’s fortuitous link to Nevada is not comparable to Park’s extensive contacts directed to 

California based on his use of Power Integrations’ Proprietary Information and other 

communications he initiated with Power Integrations and its customers. 

As to Picot, the facts are also distinguishable. In Picot, the two partners in a venture 

disputed their obligations pursuant to an oral agreement that was formed in Michigan, based on 

work that was performed in Michigan, directed mostly to customers in Michigan. 780 F.3d at 

1209-10. Because Picot concerned claims that arose primarily out of a contractual dispute, Picot’s 

application on “purposeful direction” is limited. Regardless, Picot is distinguishable. Although 

the defendant traveled to California twice and the plaintiffs sought California investors to support 

the venture, the court found those contacts to be insufficient for a California court to exercise 

jurisdiction. Id. at 1213. In Picot, the defendant’s travel to California created no more than a 

“transitory presence” in California. Id. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit determined that the 

defendant’s travel aided the plaintiffs’ search for California inventors and was conduct initiated by 

the plaintiffs. Id. In contrast to Picot, Park repeatedly reached out to California to communicate 

with Power Integrations and purposefully asserted his patents against Power Integrations’ 

customers. Because these and other facts discussed above, Picot does not compel a different 

conclusion. 

Now turning to the third element of the “effects” test, the Court concludes that Park has 

caused harm that he knew was likely to be suffered in California. “[A] corporation can suffer 

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economic harm both where the bad acts occurred and where the corporation has its principal place 

of business.” Dole, 303 F.3d at 1113. Because Power Integrations’ headquarter and principle 

place of business are in California and Power Integrations alleges that it has suffered harm based 

on Park’s conduct, this element is satisfied and Park does not dispute this third element. Mot. 11. 

b. Arising Out of Forum-Related Activities 

As to the second prong of the test, the Court finds that Power Integrations’ claims arise out 

of and are related to Park’s California-related activities. Park presents no argument directed to this 

prong. In determining whether a plaintiff’s claims arise out of the defendant’s forum-related 

activities, the Ninth Circuit applies a “but-for” test. Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th 

Cir. 2007). That is, but for Park’s contacts with California, would Power Integrations’ claims 

against Park have arisen? See Mattel, Inc. v. Greiner and Hausser GmbH, 354 F.3d 857, 864 (9th 

Cir. 2003). 

Power Integrations asserts claims of tortious interference with contractual relations and 

prospective economic relations, trade libel, and UCL, all of which are based on Park’s relationship 

with Power Integrations and his communications with Power Integrations’ customers discussed 

above. These causes of actions could not have arisen but for Park’s contacts aimed at Power 

Integrations and its customers. Had Park not targeted Power Integrations’ customers, the effects 

of which were felt in California, the basis for the claims simply would not exist. Thus, Power 

Integrations has shown that its claims arise out of Park’s contacts aimed at California. 

c. Determining Whether the Exercise of Jurisdiction Would Be Reasonable 

The third prong of the specific jurisdiction test ensures that the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. Jurisdiction is presumed to be 

reasonable once the first two prongs have been met. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The 

burden then shifts to the defendant “to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction 

would be unreasonable and therefore violate due process.” CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, 

Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78). In 

determining “whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice 

and is therefore reasonable,” the court considers the following seven factors: 

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(1) the extent of the defendants’ purposeful injection into the forum state’s 

affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the 

extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the 

forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient 

judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to 

the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the 

existence of an alternative forum. 

CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 1079 (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 

2002)). 

Park argues that an exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable because he is a foreign 

national, and should not be “haul[ed] [] across the world to litigate his rights to Korean patents.” 

Mot. 13. He also states that South Korea should be the sovereignty to resolve this dispute and 

would be the most efficient forum, and that California has no interest in a dispute concerning 

Korean patents. Id.

First, Park conclusorily states that as a foreign national, litigating the case imposes 

financial hardship but does not elaborate how the alleged hardship differs from the burden of 

litigation generally. Further, “modern advances in communications and transportation have 

significantly reduced the burden of litigating in another country.” Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 

854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988). Second, the Court has already addressed above that his 

relationship and contacts aimed at California should have reasonably apprised him of a potential 

future litigation in California so the extent of Park’s “purposeful injection into the forum state’s 

affairs” justifies the exercise of jurisdiction. Third, as to Park’s argument that there could be 

conflicts with South Korea’s sovereignty, that California has minimal interest in a dispute 

concerning Korean patents, and South Korea is an efficient forum, these arguments are not entirely 

persuasive because the causes of action are tortious acts and may not necessarily concern Korean 

patents. Compl. ¶¶ 19-22, 29-34, 36-51. Lastly, not only does California have an interest in 

adjudicating this case, but it is also important to Power Integrations to obtain convenient and 

effective relief in this forum, at least because of Park’s contacts aimed at California, as discussed 

above. Considering all of these factors, Park has not made a “compelling case” that the exercise 

of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. 

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B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

The parties’ arguments on whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over all the 

asserted claims are the same as those presented in Case No. 16-cv-02366 in connection with 

Park’s motion to dismiss the complaint. Park insists that this case is a Korean patent dispute in 

disguise, referring to the allegation in the complaint that Park sent letters to Samsung representing 

that Power Integrations’ products infringed his Korean patents. Reply 5. Power Integrations 

counters that this case is about “ownership” of intellectual property, and not a case about 

infringement of foreign patents. Opp’n 7. 

Courts have frowned upon exercising jurisdiction over infringement and validity issues of 

foreign patents, either in the context of supplemental jurisdiction or others. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 

476 F.3d 887, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In many circumstances, factors of “judicial economy, 

convenience, fairness, and comity” do not weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction over foreign 

patent law issues. Id. at 898, 905; see also Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 

1368, 1370, 1373-75 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Stein Assocs., Inc. v. Heat & Control, Inc., 748 F.2d 653, 

655-56. (Fed. Cir. 1984). 

Here, the complaint asserts causes of action sounding in tort and it is not disputed that 

there are no patent infringement claims asserted. However, in support of its causes of action, 

Power Integrations claims that the Korean patents are “invalid,” in several instances in the 

complaint as set forth below. 

Park’s claims and demands are baseless. Park’s ’958 and ’481 Patents are 

invalid and based on Power Integrations’ Proprietary Information such 

that they belong to Power Integrations, not Park. 

Compl. ¶ 16. 

Park’s conduct was wrongful as it misrepresented the validity and 

ownership of the ’958 and ’481 Patents, disparaged Power Integrations’ 

products by characterizing them as infringing valid Park-owned patents 

and violated California Business and/or Professions Code § 17200. 

Id. ¶ 32. 

Park’s conduct was wrongful as he misrepresented the validity and 

ownership of the ’958 and ’481 Patents, disparaged Power Integrations’ 

products by characterizing them as infringing valid Park-owned patents 

and violated California Business and/or Professions Code § 17200. 

Id. ¶ 39. 

Park made statements to at least Dong Yang that would be clearly or 

necessarily understood to have disparaged the quality of Power 

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Integrations’ products, including without limitation that those products 

infringed Park’s valid ’958 and ’481 Patents. Park’s statements were 

untrue. Park’s ’958 and ’481 Patents are invalid and based on Power 

Integrations’ Proprietary Information such that they belong to Power 

Integrations, not Park. 

Id. ¶¶ 43-44. 

At least since September 2015, Park has committed acts of unfair 

competition, as described by Business and Professions Code section 

17200, by misrepresenting the validity and ownership of the ’958 and ’481 

Patents to improperly exert leverage in the marketplace. 

Id. ¶ 50. 

Given that the allegations that the Korean patents are “invalid” are incorporated by 

reference in each cause of action and also expressly stated in some claims, the issue of whether the 

Korean patents are “valid” or “invalid” infects the whole complaint. Although it does not appear 

that Power Integrations intended to assert a claim for invalidity of the Korean patents, its use of 

the term “invalid” raises the concern that such a claim is intended to be asserted. Insofar as this 

Court is not the proper court to determine patent validity under Korean law, the Court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction and GRANTS Park’s motion to dismiss the complaint on this basis. 

Voda, 476 F.3d at 898-905. If Power Integrations chooses to amend the complaint to delete any 

claim or reference to invalidity, this case may go forward. 

C. Forum Non Conveniens 

The parties’ arguments on whether this Court should dismiss this case based on forum non 

conveniens are the very similar as those presented in Case No. 16-cv-02366 in connection with 

Park’s motion to dismiss the complaint. Park contends that Korea provides an adequate 

alternative forum, especially in this case where Power Integrations already had experience before 

the Korean Labor Commission. Reply 2. According to Park, the public interest factors counsel 

against having the case adjudicated in California because the case concerns Korean patents and 

Korea has a strong interest in deciding its own patent-related issues. Id. at 3-4. 

Power Integrations counters that there is a strong presumption in favor of its choice of 

forum. Sur-reply 2. Power Integrations also claims that many of its witnesses will be its 

employees in California, and the evidence relating to its customer relations and the development 

of the technology is also located in California. Id. at 3. All the private factors weigh in favor of 

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this forum. Id. at 4. As to public factors, Power Integrations claims that California has a 

significant local interest in this dispute based on location of Power Integrations and on the IA, 

which was entered into in California and governed by California law. Id. at 4-5. Power 

Integrations further asserts that this case concerns California law and whether issues of Korean 

patent law would arise as a “collateral consequence” does not affect the public interest factor. Id.

at 5. According to Power Integrations, the burden on local courts and juries also favors California. 

Id. 

Although Korea may be an adequate alternative forum, which is not disputed by the 

parties, the Court finds that Park fails to show that a trial in California would establish 

“oppressiveness and vexation” to him “out of all proportion to [Power Integrations’] 

convenience,” or that California is “inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s 

own administrative and legal problems.” Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 429. The Court addresses each of 

the private and public interest factors in turn. 

i. Private Interest Factors 

First, with respect to “the residence of the parties,” Park resides in South Korea and Power 

Integrations is located in California so this factor is neutral. Next, as to the residence of the 

witnesses, Park argues that Samsung and Dong Yang reside in Korea, but Power Integrations 

counters that Samsung and Dong Yang also have offices in San Jose. Moreover, Power 

Integrations anticipates that it will rely on its employees as witnesses, including witnesses who can 

testify to Power Integrations’ customer relationships, all of whom reside in California. Sur-reply 

3. Accordingly, the factors of “residence of the parties and witnesses,” “cost of bringing witnesses 

to trial,” and “whether unwilling witnesses can be compelled to testify” are at best neutral. 

Second, the Court has already addressed above that while Park resides in South Korea and 

may experience more inconvenience than Power Integrations to litigate in this forum, it is not 

unreasonable for him to be sued in this forum. The factor of “forum’s convenience to the 

litigants” is nevertheless neutral here. 

Third, as to the factor of “access to physical evidence and other sources of proof,” Park 

argues evidence relating to Samsung and Dong Yang is in Korea. Reply 4. Power Integrations 

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counters that it expects to present evidence relating to the parties’ employment relationship, 

formation of the IA, and development of the Proprietary Information, all of which is located in 

California. Sur-reply 4. Power Integrations also avers that most of the documents are in English 

and fewer relevant documents are authored in Korean than in English. Given Power Integrations’ 

representation that more relevant documents are in English than in Korean, this factor weighs 

slightly against dismissal. 

Power Integrations admits that the factor of “the enforceability of the judgment” is neutral 

and Park does not discuss this factor. The judgment rendered by this Court can be enforced at 

least in United States. Whether it can be enforced in Korea is less clear. Accordingly, the Court 

finds this factor to be neutral. 

Lastly, with respect to “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, 

expeditious and inexpensive,” this factor relates to the witnesses and evidence discussed above. 

Because many of the witnesses and evidence are located in California, and will be presented or 

testify in English, this factor weighs slightly against dismissal. 

ii. Public Interest Factors 

The first factor, “the local interest in the lawsuit,” weighs strongly against dismissal. 

California has a strong interest in a dispute that concerns a company headquartered in California 

and its customer relationship. Moreover, this case also concerns intellectual property that was 

allegedly stolen from Power Integrations, located in California. See, e.g., Jacobs Vehicle Sys., Inc. 

v. Yang, No. 12-00181, 2013 WL 4833058, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 10, 2013) (refusing to dismiss 

the case on grounds of forum non conveniens because the case affects the “integrity of [the 

employer’s] contractual and intellectual property interests in the United States”). 

Second, as to “the court’s familiarity with the governing law,” the Court agrees with Power 

Integrations that this case would depend on analysis of California tort law. Accordingly, this 

Court would be more familiar with the governing law than the South Korean forum. As such, this 

factor weighs against dismissal 

Third, the factor of “burden on local courts and juries” also weighs against dismissal. Park 

avers that some evidence is located in Korean. However, as noted above, Park and Power 

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Integrations’ witnesses can testify in English, and more of the relevant documents are in English 

than in Korea. As such, on balance, a slightly lesser burden would be imposed on courts in this 

forum than courts in Korea. 

Fourth, the factor of “congestion in the court” is neutral as the parties do not identify 

concerns relating to “court congestion.” Lastly, as to “the costs of resolving a dispute unrelated to 

a particular forum,” this case mainly concerns a dispute relating to the California forum but may 

also involve Korea as a forum, based at least on Park’s residence and the ownership of two Korean 

patents. Accordingly, this factor is also neutral. 

In weighing all the private and public interest factors, many are neutral, none are in favor 

of dismissal, and a few weigh against dismissal. As such, Park fails to meet the heavy burden of 

showing that the California forum results in “oppressiveness and vexation” out of all proportion to 

Power Integrations’ convenience. See Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1227. Given the “strong presumption 

in favor of [Power Integrations’] choice of forum” and how most factors weigh against dismissal, 

the Court does not find it appropriate to dismiss this case. See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430. 

D. Failure to State a Claim 

Park argues that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

because the claims require adjudication of Korean law, as well as for other reasons discussed for 

each claim separately below. Mot. 14. On the basis that the claims require adjudication of Korean 

law, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the claims for reasons discussed above in 

connection with the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Setting aside the issue of subject matter 

jurisdiction, the Court now turns to other bases raised by Park for the complaint’s failure to state a 

claim. 

i. Intentional Interference of a Contractual Relationship 

Park argues that the complaint on its face fails to state a claim for intentional interference 

of a contractual relationship because he poses a “justification” defense. Mot. 15, ECF 18. Park 

claims that his representation to Dong Yang and Samsung that they were infringing his Korean 

patents was privileged conduct under Korean law. Id. at 15. Power Integrations counters that the 

complaint also states that Park’s representation was baseless because those patents are not owned 

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by Park. Opp’n 15-16, ECF 20. According to Power Integrations, such meritless representation is 

not a “justification” defense. Id. at 16 (citing GoForIt Entm’t, LLC v. DigiMedia.com L.P., 750 F. 

Supp. 2d 712, 741 (N.D. Tex. 2010)). 

The Court finds that the complaint has adequately pled facts that would overcome Park’s 

justification defense. Whether there is a justification defense to a claim of intentional interference 

can depend on “whether the actor’s conduct was fair and reasonable under the circumstances.” 

Oyan v. Albany Int’l Corp., 12 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1993). GoForIt Entm’t is instructive. 750 F. 

Supp. 2d at 741. The trademark owner in GoForIt Entm’t sought summary judgment on tortious 

interference with contract based on its “reasonable behavior” to protect its mark. Id. In denying 

summary judgment, the court found that a reasonable jury could find that the trademark owner had 

no colorable right and asserted the trademark in bad faith. Id. Here, the complaint contains 

allegations that Park had no legal right to the Korean patents and was asserting those patents in 

bad faith. E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 10. Accordingly, the claim of intentional interference of a 

contractual relationship is plausible and sufficiently pled with respect to Park’s justification 

defense. See also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 797 F.2d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1986) 

(upholding the lower court’s finding of tortious interference with contractual relations because 

Universal City Studios, Inc. did not have a good faith basis in sending “cease and desist” letters, 

threatening suit to coerce others into sharing their Donkey Kong profits). 

Park’s reliance on Shapiro & Son Bedspread Corp. v. Royal Mills Assocs. is misplaced. 

764 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1985); Mot. 15-16; Reply 12-13. In Shapiro, the issue concerned whether 

the copyright owner published the copyrighted design without proper notice of copyright and 

whether the efforts to cure the defective notice were reasonable. 764 F.2d at 73. The court 

reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the accused infringer because 

“there remain[ed] a material question of fact as to whether Shapiro’s efforts, taken as a whole, 

were reasonable.” Id. at 75. Shapiro does not stand for the proposition that a plausible 

justification defense defeats a plausible claim of intentional interference at the pleading stage. 

Accordingly, Shapiro has limited application here. 

ii. Negligent Interference of a Contractual Relationship 

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Park argues that negligent interference of a contractual relationship is not a claim 

recognized in California. Mot. 16 (citing Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 636 (1960)). 

Power Integrations does not dispute this point. The Court agrees with Park that there is no such 

cause of action in California. E.g., HP Debt Exch. LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 13-04717-

EDL, 2014 WL 574600, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2014) (citing Fifield, 54 Cal. 2d 632). As such, 

the Court GRANTS Park’s motion to dismiss the claim of negligent interference of a contractual 

relationship. 

iii. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations; Negligent 

Interference with Prospective Economic Relations 

Park further contends that the complaint fails to allege an “independently wrongful” act in 

support of the intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic relations. Mot. 

17-18. According to Park, the “independently wrongful” act must be a conduct separate from 

interference itself. Id. at 17 (citing Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 

1159 (2003)). In opposition, Power Integrations reiterates its argument made in relation to the 

claim of intentional interference of contractual relations. Opp’n 18. Power Integrations claims 

that the complaint adequately pleads “independently wrongful act,” stating that “Park’s conduct 

was wrongful as it misrepresented the ownership of the [Korean] Patents, disparaged Power 

Integrations’ products by characterizing them as infringing Park-owned patents, and violated 

California Business and/or Professions Code § 17200.” Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 32, 39). 

The Court finds that the claims of intentional and negligent interference with prospective 

economic relations are adequately pled. In Korea Supply, the court stated that “the requirement of 

pleading that a defendant has engaged in an act that was independently wrongful distinguishes 

lawful competitive behavior from tortious interference.” 29 Cal. 4th at 1159. The court then 

found that the claim meets the “independently wrongful” requirement because there are allegations 

that “defendants bribed and offered sexual favors to Korean officials, and paid excessive 

commissions, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” Id. at 1165. Similarly here, the 

complaint alleges that Park obtained Korean patents based on Power Integrations’ Proprietary 

Information, in violation of the Inventions Agreement, and misrepresented the ownership of the 

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Korean patents to Power Integrations’ customers. Accordingly, the claims are not inadequately 

pled on this basis. 

iv. Trade Libel and California UCL 

Aside from arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because adjudication of 

Korean law would be necessary, Park does not raise a separate ground for failure to state a claim 

with respect to the trade libel and California UCL causes of action. As noted above, the Court has 

already granted Park’s motion to dismiss the claims on the basis of lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

E. Leave to Amend 

i. Amendment to Cure Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

In reading the entire complaint, allegations relating to validity of the Korean patents do not 

appear to be necessary to support Power Integrations’ causes of action. Deletion of those 

allegations would obviate this Court’s need to adjudicate issues relating to foreign patent law. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS leave to amend to delete instances in the complaint referring to 

the “validity” or “invalidity” of the Korean patents. 

ii. Negligent Interference of Contractual Relations 

As to the claim of negligent interference of contractual relations, Power Integrations has 

provided no arguments as to why its claim of negligent interference of contractual relations should 

proceed. Power Integrations summarily requests leave to amend without specifically addressing 

this cause of action. Opp’n 20 n.7. Insofar as this claim is not based on a valid legal theory, the 

Court DISMISSES the claim of negligent interference of contractual relations with prejudice and 

without leave to amend. 

IV. ORDER 

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

Park’s motion to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED IN PART with leave to amend on 

the grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the claims require 

adjudication of Korean law. Power Integrations shall file an amended complaint on or before 

March 10, 2017. 

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Park’s motion to dismiss is also GRANTED IN PART for failure to state a claim as to 

Power Integrations’ claim of negligent interference of contractual relations, which the Court 

DISMISSES without leave to amend. 

Park’s motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART as to all other grounds for dismissal. 

Dated: February 24, 2017 

 ______________________________________ 

BETH LABSON FREEMAN 

United States District Judge 

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