Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_24-cv-00482/USCOURTS-azd-4_24-cv-00482-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Chris Magis Nero,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Lacee Collins, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-24-00482-TUC-JCH

ORDER 

Pro se Plaintiff Chris Magis Nero has filed a "Complaint for Violation of Federal 

and Constitutional Law, Breach of Contract, Failure to Comply with Performance Bond 

Obligations, and Demand for Indictment and True Bill under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2" (Doc. 1). 

Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 

(Doc. 2), Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 3), and Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 9). For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny Plaintiff's

Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, dismiss without prejudice the 

Complaint for failure to state a claim, and deny the Emergency Motion for Temporary 

Restraining Order and Motion for Summary Judgment. 

I. Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 

On September 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma 

Pauperis. Doc. 3. On October 4, 2024, before the Court ruled on the Application, Plaintiff 

paid the filing fee in full. See Doc. 7. As such, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Application 

for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis as moot.

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II. Statutory Screening of a Pro Se Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), notwithstanding the payment of any filing fee, the 

Court shall dismiss a case brought by a Plaintiff seeking in forma pauperis status if the 

Court determines the action "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 

from such relief."

A pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 

not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Instead, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 566 

at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is 

plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

Determining whether a claim is plausible is "a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. 

Still, the Court must "construe pro se filings liberally." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 

338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A "complaint [filed by a pro se litigant] 'must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). If the Court determines a complaint could 

be cured by the allegation of additional facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity 

to amend that complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

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B. Analysis

The Complaint here is comprised almost entirely of generalized and conclusory 

statements. It never refers to conduct specific to any of the Defendants. In fact, it never

refers to any of the Defendants by name, instead naming "Defendant(s)" generally in each 

allegation. See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 2, 3. Further, within the body of the Complaint, Plaintiff 

names Lacee Collins and Chris Kamminua as Defendants but names Lacee Collins, Antony 

Blinken, and Vincent Sisneros in the caption. Compare Doc. 1 at 2, with id. at 1. Plaintiff 

asserts that Defendants "entered into a contractual relationship" governed by a number of 

standard forms prescribed by the Code of Federal Regulations for use in acquisitions. Doc. 

1 at 2; see 48 C.F.R. §§ 53 et seq. But he provides no context as to when these contracts 

were performed, the parties involved in the contracts, when and how they were breached,

or any other factual information that shows rather than tells the Court that Defendants 

violated the law.1 Plaintiff's allegations are thus too vague to provide the Court any 

guidance as to what claims Plaintiff is trying to state and against whom, let alone state a 

claim against any one defendant. 

Should Plaintiff choose to amend his Complaint, he is encouraged to avoid blanket 

statements that Defendants violated the law. See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 3 ("By conspiring to 

prevent the liquidation and operation of the bonds, Defendant(s) are attempting to 

monopolize a commercial process, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2."); id. at 4 ("These actions 

amount to racketeering under the [RICO] Act . . . ."); id. ("Plaintiff . . . has superior 

executive and commercial authority, which the Defendant(s) have unlawfully ignored or 

obstructed."). Plaintiff should simply inform the Court of what happened instead of telling 

the Court his judgment of what happened. Plaintiff is also reminded to be specific in his 

reference to the individual Defendants and acts that gave rise to this action. See Marcilis v. 

Twp. of Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding the dismissal of a complaint 

1 Plaintiff attaches to his Complaint nearly 100 pages of documents but never references 

these documents within the body of the Complaint. See Doc. 1-1 at 1–94. If Plaintiff wants 

the Court to consider this information to evaluate his claim, he must include it written into 

the allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiff is reminded that, at this stage, the Court construes 

the allegations in the Complaint as true, and as such, he should avoid attaching evidence to 

the Complaint. 

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that referred to all defendants "generally and categorically" because the plaintiff had failed 

to "allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the 

asserted constitutional right." (internal quotation omitted)); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 

1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Given the complaint's use of either the collective term 

'Defendants' or a list of the defendants named individually but with no distinction as to 

what acts are attributable to whom, it is impossible for any of these individuals to ascertain 

what particular unconstitutional acts they are alleged to have committed."). 

C. Leave to Amend

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss all counts and Defendants without 

prejudice. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a first amended complaint to cure the 

deficiencies outlined above. The first amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in 

its entirety, and no part of the original Complaint may be incorporated by reference. Any 

cause of action raised in the original Complaint is waived if not alleged in the first amended 

complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 

III. Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 

In light of the dismissal without prejudice of the Complaint in its entirety, the Court 

will deny the Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order as moot. 

IV. Motion for Summary Judgment 

On October 9, 2024, before the Court completed the mandatory screening of 

Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 9). Similarly 

to the Complaint, the Motion for Summary Judgment fails to establish essential facts, 

spending more time telling the Court that the facts are undisputed. See, e.g., Doc. 9 at 2 

(“The facts surrounding the dishonor and default of the Defendants are undisputed and 

incontrovertible.”). Further, the Court cannot entertain a motion for summary judgment 

until it screens the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Dews v. Cty. of Kern, 599 F. 

App'x 681, 682 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2015) ("The district court properly denied [Plaintiff’s] 

motions for summary judgment as premature” because the court had not yet screened his 

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915). The Court will thus deny Plaintiff’s Motion for 

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Summary Judgment as premature. 

V. ORDER 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED 

1. DENYING AS MOOT Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma 

Pauperis (Doc. 3). 

2. DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1). 

Plaintiff may amend his Complaint within 30 days of this Order. 

3. DENYING AS MOOT Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Temporary 

Restraining Order (Doc. 2). 

4. DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 9) as premature. 

Dated this 10th day of October, 2024.

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