Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01376/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01376-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Raymond L. Erickson, United States Magistrate Judge for the

District of Minnesota, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent

of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1376

___________

John Starway, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

St. Cloud Technical College, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant-Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: August 5, 2004

Filed: August 19, 2004

___________

Before MELLOY, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

John Starway appeals pro se from the district court’s1

 entry of summary

judgment in favor of Defendant, St. Cloud Technical College, in his employment

discrimination action. Starway’s complaint alleged that he applied for and was

denied the position of instructor of anatomy and physiology on the basis of his

national origin and age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29

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U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Starway also alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Applying the traditional burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the district court concluded that

Starway failed to carry his burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination

insofar as the evidence clearly demonstrated that Defendant had already filled the

position prior to receiving Starway’s application for employment. See Chambers v.

Wynne Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that an element of the

plaintiff’s prima facie case in a failure to hire action is that “after his rejection, the

position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons

of complainant’s qualifications”) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). In

the alternative, the district court reasoned that this same evidence warranted the

conclusion that Defendant proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its

decision not to hire Starway, and that this reason was not shown to be pretextual.

On appeal, Starway contends that the district court’s rigid application of the

McDonnell Douglas framework is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). Swierkiewicz, however,

addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff must plead specific facts establishing a

prima facie case of employment discrimination under McDonnell Douglas in order

to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Swierkiewicz, 534

U.S. at 508. The present case, by contrast, involves the evidentiary showing

necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment, see id. at 514 (noting that

“claims lacking merit may be dealt with through summary judgment under Rule 56”),

and we see no reason to depart from our well-settled precedent in this area. See, e.g.,

Schiltz v. Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1412 (8th Cir. 1997). We have

considered the remainder of Starway’s contentions and find them to be without merit.

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Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R.

47B.

______________________________

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