Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01879/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01879-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Dwight Hunley, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Orbital Sciences Corporation; Richard

Mark Haynie; Louis M. Amorosi and

Gina M. Amorosi; Richard L. Fahrner

and Janet R. Fahrner; Ronald J. Grabe

and Lynn O’Keefe-Grabe; Mark J. Ogren

and Cindy L. Ogren; Satya Prasad

Maganty and Sowbhagya L. Maganty;

Brian T. Mullet and Lisa E. Mullet;

Michael G. Sims and Patricia C.

Treharne; Richard S. Straka and Purna R.

Straka; Craig N. Stuart and Susan K.

Wyman; and Charles M. Whitmeyer and

Sandra L. Whitmeyer,

Defendants.

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No. CV-05-1879-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendants have filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Docs. ##66-67. Plaintiff has filed responses and Defendants have filed

replies. Docs. ##68-71. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim in part, and grant the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

common law claims.

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I. Background.

Defendant Orbital Sciences Corporation (“Orbital”) develops, manufactures, and

operates satellite launch vehicles and related space systems. Orbital hired Plaintiff in 1996

as an engineer and technical staff member. The individual Defendants in this case are

Plaintiff’s managers and their spouses.

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint against Defendants on

June 22, 2005. Doc. #1. Plaintiff filed a revised second amended complaint (“complaint”)

on May 3, 2006, alleging generally that Defendants discriminated against him because of his

mental disability and retaliated against him for complaining about waste and misuse of

government funds. Doc. #65. The complaint purports to allege six claims for relief against

various Defendants: violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, violation of the False

Claim Act, defamation of character, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent

infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. Id.

II. Legal Standard.

The Court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim “unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would

entitle him to relief.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994). When analyzing

a complaint for failure to state a claim, “[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d

1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, the Court must assume that all general allegations

“embrace whatever specific facts might be necessary to support them.” Peloza v. Capistrano

Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court may not assume, however,

that the plaintiff can prove facts different from those alleged in the complaint. See

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526

(1983); Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027,

1035 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences

are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1998).

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1

Section 3729(a) creates liability for “[a]ny person who-- (1) knowingly presents, or

causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government . . . a false

or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to made

or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the

Government; . . . [or] (4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or

to be used, by the Government and intending to defraud the Government . . . delivers, or

causes to be delivered, less property than the amount for which the person receives a

certificate or receipt[.]”

2

Section 3730(h) provides that “[a]ny employee who is discharged, demoted,

suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms

and conditions of employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the

employee . . . in furtherance of an action under this section . . . shall be entitled to all relief

necessary to make the employee whole.”

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III. Discussion.

A. The False Claim Act Retaliation Claim.

The False Claim Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, was enacted during the Civil War

to combat “widespread fraud by government contractors who were submitting inflated

invoices and shipping faulty goods to the government.” United States ex rel. Hopper v.

Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1996).1

 “Congress added 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) to the

FCA in 1986 to protect ‘whistleblowers,’ those who come forward with evidence their

employer is defrauding the government, from retaliation by their employer.” Id. at 1269.2

To prevail on an FCA retaliation claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he engaged in

protected activity, (2) the employer knew that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, and

(3) the employer discriminated against the plaintiff because of his protected activity. Id.; see

Moore v. Cal. Inst. of Tech. Jet Propulsion Lab., 275 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002).

Defendants argue that any claims based on conduct occurring before June 22, 2004

are time-barred and that the individual Defendants may not be held liable under the FCA.

Doc. #66 at 4-5, 10. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has not alleged the first two

elements of an FCA retaliation claim. Id. at 5-9. Plaintiff states that he will not respond to

“Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety.” Doc. #68 at 3. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that

certain allegations sufficiently state an FCA retaliation claim against Orbital. Id. at 3-5.

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Because Plaintiff does not address Defendants’ arguments that any claims based on

alleged conduct occurring before June 22, 2004 are time-barred and that the individual

Defendants may not be held liable under the FCA, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss

with respect to these issues. See LRCiv 7.2(i) (stating that a party’s failure to respond may

be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion

summarily); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that district court

did not abuse its discretion in summarily granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant

to a local rule where the pro se plaintiff failed to respond to the motion).

Defendants contend Plaintiff has not alleged that he engaged in any activity

protected by the FCA or that Orbital knew that he engaged in such activity. Doc. #66 at 5-9.

Plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently pled all three elements of an FCA retaliation claim.

Doc. #68. The Court agrees.

“The federal rules require only a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir.

1997) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “The Rule 8 standard contains ‘a powerful presumption

against rejecting pleadings for failure to state a claim.’” Id. at 249 (citation omitted). “All

that is required are sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims

against them.” McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges the following in his second cause of action:

Plaintiff is an individual who has engaged in protected activity under U.S.C.A.

§ 3730(h). Orbital was aware that Plaintiff had engaged in this protected

activity under 31 U.S.C.A § 3730(h), and then willfully and wantonly

harassed, discriminated against, and retaliated against Plaintiff based on his

engagement in this protected activity.

Doc. #65 ¶ 114. Taking these allegations as true and assuming that they include the specific

facts necessary to support them, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled an

FCA retaliation claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 248-49; McKeever, 932

F.2d at 798; Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1269 (setting forth the “three elements the plaintiff must

prove in any § 3730(h) claim”). This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Court must

construe the complaint liberally given Plaintiff’s pro se status. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449

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U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (“It is settled law that the allegations of [a pro se plaintiff’s] complaint,

‘however inartfully pleaded’ are held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.’”) (citations omitted); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir.

1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful

pleading’ of pro se litigants.”) (citation omitted); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078

(9th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e hold [plaintiff’s] pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than

formal pleadings prepared by lawyers.”); Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court

must construe the pleading liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.”).

The Court will deny the motion to dismiss with respect to the FCA retaliation claim against

Defendant Orbital based on alleged conduct occurring on or after June 22, 2004.

B. The Defamation of Character Claim.

“To be defamatory, a publication must be false and must bring the defamed person

into disrepute, contempt, or ridicule, or must impeach [the] plaintiff’s honesty, integrity,

virtue, or reputation.” Godbehere, 783 P.2d at 787 (citations and emphasis omitted). The

publication must be a statement of actual fact susceptible to proof of truth or falsity. See

Turner v. Devlin, 848 P.2d 286, 294 (Ariz. 1993). Pure opinion is not actionable as

defamation. See Glaze v. Marcus, 729 P.2d 342, 344 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that several individual Defendants caused the following

statement to be placed in Plaintiff’s 2004 review:

Dwight’s inability to change and/or adjust his interpersonal skills and his

business etiquette are not suitable for the technical position he is currently

representing. His inability to work with management and outside customers

is not acceptable. I am relieving Dwight of his duties as the acting leader of

the actuator modeling and performance group.

Doc. #65 ¶ 125. Defendants argue that this statement is not defamatory as a matter of law

because the statement merely expresses a subjective opinion about Plaintiff’s interpersonal

skills and business etiquette. Doc. #67 at 4-5. Plaintiff does not address this argument in his

response. See Doc. #69.

/ / /

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Given this ruling, the Court need not address Defendants’ arguments that the

statements were not published to a third party and that any publication was protected by a

qualified privilege. See Doc. #67 at 5-7. 

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The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the alleged statement is not defamatory.

The statement is mere opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to interact with others at work.

The statement cannot reasonably be construed as a factual statement about Plaintiff that can

be proven true or false. See Glaze, 729 P.2d at 344 (holding that an employer’s description

of the plaintiff as unprofessional, insubordinate, and abusive was “nonactionable opinion”);

Turner, 848 P.2d at 292-94 (holding that the defendant’s statements that a police officer was

rude and brutal and that his manner was uneducated, outdated, and bordered on police

brutality were not actionable as a matter of law because the statements could not reasonably

be interpreted as actual facts and were not susceptible to proof of truth or falsity);

MacConnell v. Mitten, 638 P.2d 689, 692 (Ariz. 1982) (“Mitten’s opinion about the reason

for MacConnell’s discharge was not laden with any false factual content, nor did it

imply undisclosed defamatory facts. It was pure opinion and not actionable.”); see also

Naeemullah v. Citicorp Servs., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that

the defendant’s statements that the plaintiff had “poor interpersonal skills and run-of-the-mill

professional abilities” were “nonactionable statements of subjective opinion”); Schibursky

v. IBM, 820 F. Supp. 1169, 1182 (D. Minn. 1993) (“The court holds that, as a matter of law,

the alleged statements that Schibursky is ‘hard to work with’ and ‘rude’ are not actionable.”).

The Court will grant the motion to dismiss with respect to the defamation of character claim.3

C. The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim.

To prevail on an intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim, the

plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, (2) the

defendant intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the near certainty

that distress would result from the conduct, and (3) the defendant’s conduct actually caused

severe emotional distress. See Nelson v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 888 P.2d 1375, 1386 (Ariz.

Ct. App. 1995) (citing Lucchesi v. Stimmell, 716 P.2d 1013, 1015-16 (Ariz. 1986)).

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A plaintiff “may recover for [IIED] only where the defendant’s acts are ‘so outrageous in

character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to

be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Patton v. First

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Phoenix, 578 P.2d 152, 155 (Ariz. 1978) (quoting Cluff v.

Farmers Ins. Exch., 460 P.2d 666, 668 (Ariz. 1969)); see Cummins v. Mold-In Graphic, 26

P.3d 518, 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965).

“It is the duty of the court as society’s conscience to determine whether the acts complained

of can be considered sufficiently extreme and outrageous to state a claim for relief.” Patton,

578 P.2d at 155; see Lucchesi, 716 P.2d at 1016 (same).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Haynie “exerted excessive and undue

control and inflexibility over the time and conditions of Plaintiff’s performance review

meetings” and “treated Plaintiff with total hostility and one-sided, false, unfair, and

unfounded verbal criticism during each of these interviews.” Doc. #65 ¶¶ 41, 46,

132. Defendants argue that this alleged conduct was not extreme and outrageous as a

matter of law. Doc. #67 at 8-11 (citing Nelson, 888 P.2d 1375; Mintz v. Bell Atlantic Sys.

Leasing Int’l, Inc., 905 P.2d 559 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)). Plaintiff counters that the

allegations against Defendant Haynie are sufficient to state an IIED claim. Doc. #69 at 3

(citing Walls v. Sonora Behavioral Health Hosp., No. CIV 05-201-TUC-CKJ, 2006 WL

1127148 (D. Ariz. April 27, 2006); Coffin v. Safeway, Inc., 323F. Supp. 2d 997 (D. Ariz.

2004)).

Even taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and construing them liberally in his favor,

the Court concludes that they are insufficient to state an IIED claim. At most, Haynie’s

alleged conduct toward Plaintiff was unfair and unjustified. See Doc. #65 ¶¶ 41, 46, 132.

Arizona courts have made clear that “[e]ven if a defendant’s conduct is unjustifiable, it does

not necessarily rise to the level of ‘atrocious’ and ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency’

that would cause an average member of the community to believe it was ‘outrageous.’”

Nelson, 888 P.2d at 1386 (quoting Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987)). “‘It

is extremely rare to find conduct in the employment context that will rise to the level of

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Plaintiff’s reliance on Walls and Coffin is misplaced because those cases involved

allegations of continuous sexual harassment that included both verbal and physical assaults.

See Coffin, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1006; Walls, 2006 WL 1127148, at *2.

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outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of [IIED].’” Mintz, 905

P.2d at 563 (citation omitted). Defendants’ alleged conduct in this case simply does not rise

to the level of outrageousness necessary to support an IIED claim. See id. at 563-64 (holding

that the defendant’s failure to promote the plaintiff did not go beyond all possible bounds of

decency even if it was motivated by retaliation and that the defendant’s alleged conduct of

forcing the plaintiff to return to work and hand delivering a job-reassignment letter to her

while in the hospital for severe emotional problems did not constitute IIED as a matter of

law); Nelson, 888 P.2d at 1387-88 (holding that the plaintiff’s termination was not extreme

and outrageous as a matter of law even though he was called to work in the middle of the

night, handed a termination letter, and escorted off the premises by armed security guards in

front of reporters notified by the defendant); Perez v. Curcio, 710 F. Supp. 259, 262 (D. Ariz.

1989) (holding that the defendants’ conduct of demoting the plaintiff to an unsuitable

position and beginning a “witch hunt” to “dig up” good cause to terminate her when she

challenged the demotion could “hardly be characterized as ‘outrageous,’ ‘extreme,’ or

‘beyond the bounds of human decency.’”); Baker v. Asarco, Inc., No. CIV-94-1045-PHXROS, 1995 WL 795663, at *7 (D. Ariz. Nov. 9, 1995) (finding no IIED claim as a matter of

law where the plaintiff was forced to take a medical leave of absence following his return to

work after suffering a heart attack because the defendant “didn’t want him to die on company

property”). The Court will grant the motion to dismiss with respect to the IIED claim. 4

D. The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Haynie’s misconduct caused Plaintiff to suffer severe

emotional distress resulting in a manifest physical injury. Doc. #65 ¶ 136. Plaintiff further

alleges that Defendant Grabe was aware of Haynie’s misconduct and negligently failed to

stop him. Id. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Orbital is liable for Grabe’s negligence under

the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id.

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Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim must

be dismissed because workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy against an employer

for work-related injuries. Doc. #67 at 12 (citing A.R.S. § 23-1022(A)). Plaintiff does not

address this argument in his response. See Doc. #69.

Arizona law provides that “[t]he right to recover compensation pursuant to this

chapter for injuries sustained by an employee . . . is the exclusive remedy against the

employer or any co-employee acting in the scope of his employment[.]” A.R.S.

§ 23-1022(A) (emphasis added); see Gamez v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 34 P.3d 375, ¶ 5 (Ariz.

Ct. App. 2001) (“It is well settled that work related injury claims are generally addressed

exclusively under Arizona’s workers’ compensation scheme.”) (citing A.R.S. § 23-1022(A)).

Because Plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress alleges that he was

injured as a result of workplace conduct, the claim is barred by Arizona’s workers’

compensation scheme. See A.R.S. §§ 23-1022(A), 23-906(A) (“Employers who comply with

the provisions of § 23-961 or 23-962 as to securing compensation . . . shall not be liable for

damages at common law or by statute, except as provided in this section, for injury or death

of an employee wherever occurring[.]”); Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Combined

Shows, Inc. v. Superior Ct. (Farias), 680 P.2d 174, 181-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (holding

that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ negligent infliction

of emotional distress claim based on the exclusive nature of Arizona’s workers’

compensation statutes); Irvin Investors, Inc. v. Superior Ct. (Kuehne), 800 P.2d 979, 981-82

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff’s negligence claims against her former

employer were barred by Arizona’s workers’ compensation law, “which provides the

exclusive remedy for workers injured on the job”) (citing A.R.S. §§ 23-906, 23-1022);

Mosakowski v. PSS World Med., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1131 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Because,

pursuant to the holding in Irvin Investors, Arizona law precludes an employee from bringing

a tort action based on negligent hiring and negligent retention against their employer,

Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in its favor on Plaintiff’s claim of

negligence.”). The Court will grant the motion to dismiss with respect to this claim.

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E. The Civil Conspiracy Claim.

Civil conspiracy is a derivative tort. See Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 757

P.2d 105, 110 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). “In short, liability for civil conspiracy requires that two

or more individuals agree and thereupon accomplish ‘an underlying tort which the alleged

conspirators agreed to commit.’” Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement

Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust, 38 P.3d 12, ¶ 99 (Ariz. 2002) (citation omitted); see

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(a) (1979) (“For harm resulting to a third person from

the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . does a tortious act in

concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him[.]”); Estate of Hernandez

v. Flavio, 930 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Ariz. 1997) (“To be found liable under section 876(a), one

must have committed some tortious act.”).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to defame and inflict emotional distress

upon him. Doc. #65 ¶ 139. As explained above, however, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled

claims for defamation and infliction of emotional distress. Because Plaintiff has not pled an

underlying tort, his derivative civil conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law. See Estate of

Hernandez, 930 P.2d at 1314 (holding that the mere act of drinking alcohol by underage

pledges of a fraternity was not tortious and therefore could not subject them to liability for

civil conspiracy as a matter of law). The Court will grant the motion to dismiss with respect

to the civil conspiracy claim.

F. Leave to Amend the Complaint. 

In the Ninth Circuit, pro se litigants generally are entitled to notice of the complaint’s

deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal. See, e.g., Lucas v. Dep’t of

Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). In this case, however, Plaintiff filed an amended

complaint on October 19, 2005 and was granted leave to file a revised second amended

complaint on May 3, 2006. Docs. ##63-64. Plaintiff repeatedly sought leave to amend for

the specific purpose of curing the defects identified in Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Docs.

##24-34, 45, 49, 58. In the order granting Plaintiff leave to file a revised second amended

complaint, the Court set a litigation schedule pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of

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Procedure. Doc. #64. The Court concluded that the time for amending pleadings had closed

and that further amendments would not be permitted absent a showing of good cause. Id. at

3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)). Plaintiff has made no such showing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16

Advisory Comm.’s Notes (1983 Am.)(stating that good cause exists when a deadline “cannot

reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension”); Johnson v.

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’

standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.”). The Court

accordingly will deny Plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint. See Johnson, 975

F.2d at 611 (“As the torrent of civil and criminal cases unleashed in recent years has

threatened to inundate the federal courts, deliverance has been sought in the use of calendar

management techniques. Rule 16 is an important component of those techniques.”); Wong

v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In these days of heavy

caseloads, trial courts . . . set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient

treatment and resolution of cases.”).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s False Claim Act retaliation claim

(Doc. #66) is granted in part and denied in part as set forth in this order.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s common law claims (Doc. #67) is

granted.

3. The Court will schedule a Rule 16 case management conference by separate

order.

DATED this 22nd day of August, 2006.

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