Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01822/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01822-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dale Faulkner, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV-07-1822-PHX-JAT (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person

in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (docket # 1) Respondents have filed an

Answer asserting that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely. Respondents

alternatively assert that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred or fail as too vague to

merit relief. Petitioner has filed a Reply disputing Respondents’ assertion of the time bar. 

(docket # 11) For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be dismissed as untimely

and, therefore, the Court does not reach Respondents’ alternative arguments.

I. Procedural Background

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing

On June 29, 1990, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner with five counts of

child molestation and two counts of sexual conduct with a minor, all class 2 felonies and

dangerous crimes against children. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 1) Petitioner’s case proceeded

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1

 The Honorable Gregory H. Martin presided. 

2 Although the file stamp on the document indicates a filing date of January of 2001,

Petitioner’s notarized signature is dated “02 January 2002.” (Respondents’ Exh. A at 145, p.

4) Moreover, the clerk’s index reflects a January 18, 2002 filing date. (Respondents’ Exh. A,

Index, p. 7)

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to trial1, but ended in a mistrial when the jury could not reach a verdict. (Respondents’ Exh.

A at 96) Petitioner and that State subsequently entered into a plea agreement whereby

Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to three counts of attempted molestation of a child, class 3

felonies and dangerous crimes against children. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 115, 116) On July

29, 1991, the trial court accepted the plea. (Respondents’ Exh. B, Respondents’ Exh. A at

115, 116) On September 12, 1991, the trial court found aggravating factors and sentenced

Petitioner to an aggravated term of 12 years imprisonment on the attempted child

molestation counts, to run consecutively. (Respondents’ Exh. C, Tr. 9/12/91 at 22-25) The

trial court suspended imposition of the sentence on the third count, and placed Petitioner on

lifetime probation, to begin after he finished serving his two prison sentences. 

(Respondents’ Exh. C, Tr. 9/12/91 at 25-27) 

B. Direct Appeal

On September 23, 1991, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. (Respondents’

Exh. A at 128) Petitioner’s opening brief raised a single issue: that he received insufficient

pre-sentence incarceration credit against his sentences. (Respondents’ Exh. D) On February

13, 1992, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted Petitioner an additional 83 days of presentence incarceration credit and otherwise affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences.

(Respondents’ Exh. E) Petitioner did not seek review with the Arizona Supreme Court and

the mandate issued on March 23, 1992. (Respondents’ Exh. F)

C. First Post-Conviction Proceeding

On or about January 2, 20022

, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim. P. 32 claiming sentencing error based on a subsequent amendment

to A.R.S. § 13-604. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 145) On February 8, 2002, the trial court

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dismissed the petition for failure to state a colorable claim, noting that Arizona law requires

that a defendant be sentenced under the law existing when he committed the crime. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 147) Petitioner did not seek appellate review of the trial court’s

order of dismissal. (Respondents’ Exh. A, Index, p. 7)

D. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding 

On May 13, 2005, Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32 alleging that his sentences were unconstitutional under

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and related opinions, because they were based

on facts neither admitted by Petitioner nor found by a jury. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 148,

150) Petitioner further argued that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily or intelligently made

because he was not informed of his right to a jury trial regarding aggravating factors that

might affect his sentencing. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 150, pp. 2, 11, 17) Petitioner also

attacked the imposition of consecutive sentences, the aggravating factors, and the trial

court’s weighing of mitigating circumstances. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 150, pp. 14-16, 23) 

On June 14, 2005, the trial court denied relief. The court noted that Blakely does

not apply retroactively to convictions that were final before that opinion was issued in 2004

and found that Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were final in 1992. (Respondents’

Exh. A, at 151, pp. 1-2) The court further ruled that Petitioner’s other claims of error were

precluded under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), because they either were or should have been raised

on direct review. (Respondents’ Exh. A, at 151 at 2) 

On July 5, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court’s order

dismissing his Rule 32 petition with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Respondents’ Exh. G) 

Although Petitioner raised eleven issues, he primarily argued that he was entitled to relief

under Blakely. (Respondents’ Exh. G at 6) On June 19, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals

summarily denied review. (Respondents’ Exh. H) On or about July 6, 2006, Petitioner filed

a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court (Respondents’ Exh. I) which was

summarily denied on January 5, 2007. (Respondents’ Exh. J)

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E. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Thereafter, on September 24, 2007, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus alleging violations of the Sixth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments

when the State “broke” the plea agreement. (docket # 1 at 6) Respondents assert that the

Petition is untimely. Petitioner contends that his untimeliness should be excused in view of

Blakely.

II. Statute of Limitations

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996

established a one year statute of limitations for filing a federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Petitioner filed his Petition after the effective date

of the AEDPA, it governs this action. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). The

statute of limitations is a threshold issue the Court must resolve before reaching other

procedural issues or the merits of Petitioner’s claims. White v. Klitzkie, 283 F.3d 920, 921-

22 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A. Commencement of Limitations Period 

On April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) went into effect drastically altering the time limit imposed on state prisoners

filing habeas corpus petitions in federal court. Before the AEDPA, virtually no time limit

restrained the filing of federal habeas petitions. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 128

F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997) (Beeler), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1, and cert. denied, 523 U.S.

1061 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1377 (1999). The AEDPA, however,

established a one-year period in which to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Petitioner filed his Petition after the effective date

of the AEDPA, it governs this action. The AEDPA’s one-year limitations period runs from

the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) provides: “in computing any time period specified

in these rules or in any local rule, court order, or statute . . . [e]xclude the day of the act, event,

or default that begins the period.” Id. 

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(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States 

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Generally, subsection (A) applies and AEDPA’s one-year

limitations period runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). In Arizona, a direct appeal is final upon the expiration of the time for

seeking direct review of the Court of Appeals’ decision in the Arizona Supreme Court,

rather than upon the issuance of the mandate. Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1609, 1073-74

(9th Cir. 2007). An Arizona litigant must file a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme

Court within 30 days after the Arizona Court of Appeals files its decision. Ariz.R.Crim.P.

31.19. 

Here, Petitioner’s convictions became final 30 days after February 13, 1992,

when the Arizona Court of Appeals’ issued its decision affirming his convictions and

sentences, as modified. (Respondents’ Exh. D) Accordingly, his state judgment became

final on March 16, 1992. 

State prisoners, like Petitioner, whose convictions became final before the 1996

enactment of the AEDPA, had a one-year grace period in which to file a habeas corpus

petition in federal court. In Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001), the

Ninth Circuit held that “AEDPA’s one-year grace period for challenging convictions

finalized before AEDPA’s enactment date is governed by Rule 6(a)3

 and ended on April 24,

1997 in the absence of statutory tolling.” Id. Thus, in this case, the AEDPA grace period

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expired on April 24, 1997. Id. Because Petitioner did not file the pending Petition until

September 24, 2007, more than ten years after the limitations period expired, it is untimely

unless 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), or (D) operate to delay the commencement of the

statute of limitations or tolling applies.

B. Delayed Start of Limitations Period 

Liberally construing the Reply, Petitioner argues that § 2244(d)(1)(C) applies

and that the limitations period should not commence until the Supreme Court issued Blakely

in 2004. (docket # 11) The Court notes that nothing in the record supports an application of

subsection (B) or (D). However, the Court will consider whether subsection (C) applies. 

Section 2244(d)(1)(C) provides that the limitations period commences on “the date on which

the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right

has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases

on collateral review.” Id. The Supreme Court issued Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004) more than a decade after Petitioner’s conviction became final in 1992.

While Blakely recognizes a new rule of criminal procedure, the Supreme Court

has not made that rule retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. A Supreme

Court decision does not have retroactive effect unless the Court so holds. Tyler v. Cain, 533

U.S. 656, 663 (2001)(stating that “[w]e thus conclude that a new rule is not ‘made

retroactive to cases on collateral review’ unless the Supreme Court holds it to be

retroactive.”) Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the new rule announced in Apprendi

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), upon which Blakely was based, does not apply

retroactively. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d

1025, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005)(holding that “the Supreme Court announced a new rule in

Blakely v. Washington that does not apply retroactively to a conviction that was final before

that decision was announced” and thus “the state court’s sentencing decision cannot be

challenged in a petition for habeas corpus.”); Cook v. United States, 386 F.3d 949, 950 (9th

Cir. 2004)(noting that “the Supreme Court has not made Blakely retroactive to cases on

collateral review.”); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 673 (9th Cir.

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2002)(Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.); Cooper-Smith v.

Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005 )(finding that “Summerlin does not

undermine the reasoning of Sanchez-Cervantes.”) Because Blakely has not been made

retroactive on collateral review, § 2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply. Thus, Petitioner’s petition

is untimely absent tolling.

C. Tolling the Limitations Period

1. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA one-year limitations period is tolled during the time that a “properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d

1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999)(stating that an application for collateral review is pending in State

court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state

court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with regard to particular post-conviction

proceedings.”) This time period includes the intervals between the disposition of an appeal

or post-conviction petition and the filing of an appeal or successive petition at the next state

appellate level. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. However, the ADEPA limitations period is “not

tolled from the time a final decision issued on a state direct appeal and the time the first state

collateral challenge is filed because there is no case pending during that interval.” Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006. See also, Curtiss v. Mt. Pleasant Correctional Facility, 338 F.3d 851, 854 (8th

Cir. 2003)(no tolling during the time between the completion of direct review and the

initiation of post-conviction proceedings).

Statutory tolling does not save the Petition. Petitioner did not file his first notice

of post-conviction relief until January 2, 2002, more than five years after the AEDPA

limitation period had expired. Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently

filed petition for post-conviction relief cannot restart the statute of limitations. Jiminez v.

Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 2244(d)(2) cannot “revive ‘the limitation

period (i.e. restart the clock to zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully

run. Once the limitation period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a

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statute of limitation.’” Johnson v. Galaza, No. C 00-0450 CRB (PR), 2001 WL 125312, * 1

(N.D.Ca., Feb. 7, 2001)(quoting Rashia v. Kuhlman, 991 F.Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y.

1998)). See also, Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)(holding that

“section 2244(d) does not permit reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before

the state petition was filed.”).

Likewise, Petitioner’s second notice of post-conviction relief, filed on May 13,

2005, does not toll the already-expired limitation period. Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823.

Because statutory tolling is unavailable, the AEDPA limitations period expired

on April 24, 1997. Petitioner did not file his pending § 2254 petition until September 24,

2007, over ten years after the AEDPA limitations period expired. Accordingly, the pending

Petition should be dismissed as untimely unless equitable tolling applies. 

2. Equitable Tolling

a. Bowles v. Russell

Respondents argue that in view of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bowles

v. Russell, ___ U.S. ___ , 127 S.Ct. 2360 (2007), the AEDPA statute of limitations is

jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. In Bowles, Supreme Court held that the

timely filing of an appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement. Id. at 2366. The

Bowles Court reasoned that because federal statutes set forth time limits on filing a notice of

appeal and reopening the appeal period, Congress intended to preclude a court from

exercising jurisdiction over otherwise legitimate cases after a ceratin period of time had

elapsed after final judgment. Id.

Similar to the federal statutes at issue in Bowles, the AEDPA establishes time

limits on when a petitioner may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C.§

2244(d)(1). On two occasions, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari on the issue of

whether these limits are jurisdictional. See David v. Hall, 540 U.S. 815 (2003); Flanders v.

Graves, 537 U.S. 1236 (2003). The Supreme Court has noted that it has never squarely

addressed whether equitable tolling applies to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

Lawrence v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007). Accordingly, whether the

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AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling remains an open question. However, a recent decision

in the District of Arizona followed the Second Circuit in holding that Bowles does not apply

to the AEDPA. Hernandez v. Arpaio, CV-07-1712-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 370900, * 2

(D.Ariz., Feb. 11, 2008)(citing Diaz v. Kelly, No. 1-2687-RR, 2008 WL 199846, * 3)(2d

Cir., Jan. 25, 2008). Although the Court is inclined to follow Hernandez and hold that

Bowles does not apply to the AEDPA, the Court need not resolve that issue because even

assuming equitable tolling remains viable after Bowles, as Respondents alternatively argue,

Petitioner does not satisfy the requirements for such tolling. 

b. Equitable Tolling Analysis 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States

Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled, in part, on other grounds

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly) 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The Supreme Court has avoided deciding whether the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations may be equitably tolled. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 

However, because the parties in Pace had argued on the basis that it could, the Court

assumed that equitable tolling applies and observed that a petitioner seeking equitable tolling

must show: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. 

Petitioner does not assert any basis for equitable tolling. Petitioner’s lack of

familiarity with the law and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations period. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150,

1154 (9th Cir. 2006)(affirming denial of equitable tolling because neither the district court’s

failure to advise the petitioner of the right to amend his petition to include unexhausted

claims nor petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the limitations period were

extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling); Ballesteros v. Schriro, CV-06-

675-EHC (MEA), 2007 WL 666927 (D.Ariz., February 26, 2007)(noting that a petitioner’s

pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the applicable filing period,

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and temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary circumstances)(citing Fisher v.

Johnson, 174 F.3d 170, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th

Cir. 2004)(holding that petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s “rules, statutes, and the time

period set forth therein do not justify equitable tolling.”). “[I]t is well established that

‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse

prompt filing.’” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000)(quoting Fisher v.

Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 1999)). See also, Hughes v. Idaho State Board of

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986)(finding that a pro se prisoner’s illiteracy was

not sufficient to satisfy the standard of an objective, external factor amounting to “cause” for

purposes of avoiding the procedural bar on his habeas claim). 

Likewise, Petitioner’s status as a prison inmate does not constitute an

extraordinary circumstance beyond his control warranting the tolling of the one-year

limitations period. Marsh, 223 F.3d at 1220. The ordinary difficulties inherent in prison life

do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the AEDPA limitations

period. Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(stating that “[e]ach of the

cases in which equitable tolling has been applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by

state officials or occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”). 

Even if Petitioner demonstrated extraordinary circumstances, equitable tolling is

not available because he has not met his burden of showing that he has been pursuing his

rights diligently. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021,

1026 (9th Cir. 2005)(stating that petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating grounds for

equitable tolling); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 1992). It is only when

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely habeas petition that equitable tolling may be appropriate. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling is not permissible if the claimant has failed to

exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.

In Pace, the Supreme Court noted that although Petitioner’s claims were

available in 1986 and 1991, he “waited years without any valid justification” to assert those

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claims in an untimely state petition. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Because Petitioner sat “on his

rights for years before he filed his [state] petitioner” and “also sat on them for five more

months after his [state] proceedings became final before deciding to seek relief in federal

court, the Court concluded that Petitioner’s lack of diligence precluded equitable relief. Id. 

Similar to Pace, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling on any basis

because he failed to exercise diligence in pursuing his claims. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. See

also, Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005)(finding that petitioner did not

diligently pursue his claims where he did not commence state post-conviction proceedings

until three years after judgment was entered and 21 months after the AEDPA’s effective

date); Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)(finding that petitioner was not

entitled to equitable tolling due to his lack of diligence); Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d

559, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2001)(holding that petitioner did not exercise diligence because he had

no motions or cases pending in state or federal court during three intervals totaling 364

days); Delaney v. Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2001)(finding no equitable tolling

where petitioner waited over two years after his conviction became final (and ten months

after the AEDPA’s effective date) to file his first habeas petition). 

Petitioner’s direct appeal was dismissed in 1992 and Petitioner did not seek 

further review. The AEDPA was enacted in 1996. Petitioner’s case lay dormant for nearly

ten years after the conclusion of his direct appeal, or for over five years after the AEDPA

was enacted until he filed his first notice of post-conviction relief in 2002. (Respondents’

Exh. A, at 145) After Petitioner’s first post-conviction proceedings were dismissed on

February 8, 2002, Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. His case

again lay dormant for over three years until Petitioner filed his second notice of postconviction relief on May 13, 2005. (Respondents’ Exh. A, at 148) 

The nearly ten-year delay between Petitioner’s direct appeal and his first postconviction proceedings, Petitioner’s failure to seek appellate review of his first postconviction proceedings, and the extended period of inactivity between Petitioner’s first and

second petitions for post-conviction relief illustrate Petitioner’s lack of diligence.

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Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he diligently pursued his rights and that an

“extraordinary circumstance” prevented him from filing a timely petition. Pace, 544 U.S. at

418. Accordingly, there is no basis for equitably tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations

and the Petition should be dismissed as untimely.

III. Summary

Because Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely under the ADEPA and equitable

tolling is not justified, the Court does not address the merits of Petitioner’s claims, or

Respondents’ contention that his claims are procedurally defaulted or otherwise lack merit.. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (docket # 1) be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 2nd day of June, 2008.

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