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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TERRYL J. SCHWALIER, Brig. Gen., USAF, Ret.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES T. HAGEL, Secretary of Defense AND

DEBORAH LEE JAMES, Secretary of the Air Force,

Defendant-Appellees.

______________________ 

2014-1113

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia in No. 1:11-CV-00126, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer.

______________________ 

Decided: January 8, 2015

______________________ 

EDWARD F. RODRIGUEZ, JR., Law Offices, of Fairfax, 

Virginia, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the 

brief was DAVID P. SHELDON, Law Offices of David P. 

Sheldon, of Washington, DC. 

DOUGLAS K. MICKLE, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States 

Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for 

defendants-appellees. With him on the brief were STUART 

F. DELERY, Assistant Attorney General, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., Director, and STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM, 

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2 SCHWALIER v. DEFENSE

Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was TODI S.

CARNES, Air Force Legal Services Agency, General Litigation Division, Military Personnel Law Branch, of Joint 

Base Andrews, Maryland. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, REYNA and HUGHES, Circuit 

Judges.

HUGHES, Circuit Judge.

Following nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate, Brigadier General Terryl J. Schwalier 

was scheduled to be appointed to major general in early 

1997. Before that time, however, his appointment was 

delayed and the President later chose not to appoint him. 

Nonetheless, Mr. Schwalier argues that he was appointed 

by operation of law after the delay of his appointment 

expired and before the President’s decision. The appointment process for senior military officers does not 

allow for automatic appointments, and a President’s 

decision not to appoint an officer is unreviewable. Because the district court correctly held that the Air Force 

and the Department of Defense did not act arbitrarily or 

capriciously by not retroactively appointing

Mr. Schwalier, we affirm.

I 

In 1995, a Major General Promotion Selection Board 

placed Mr. Schwalier on a list of candidates to be promoted to major general. Promotion to major general constitutes an appointment that must be made by the 

President, by and with the advice and consent of the 

Senate. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; 10 U.S.C. 

§ 624(c). Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 624, President Clinton 

received the list and nominated Mr. Schwalier for the 

promotion. The Senate confirmed the nomination in 

March 1996, and Mr. Schwalier’s projected effective date 

of promotion was to be in January or February of 1997. 

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SCHWALIER v. DEFENSE 3

Before the effective date of his promotion, 

Mr. Schwalier assumed command of the 4404th Wing 

(Provisional) at the King Abdulaziz Airbase in Saudi 

Arabia. Many of the Wing’s personnel lived in the Khobar 

Towers, a nearby apartment complex. On June 25, 1996, 

a terrorist group detonated a truck bomb at the Khobar 

Towers, killing 19 airmen and injuring hundreds of others. In December 1996 and in January 1997, 

Mr. Schwalier was told that his promotion would be 

delayed. Meanwhile, Congress, the Department of Defense, and the Air Force commissioned investigations of 

the attack. The Department of Defense’s investigation 

was unfavorable to Mr. Schwalier, and the Secretary of 

Defense recommended that President Clinton remove 

Mr. Schwalier from the Selection Board’s list. On July 31, 

1997, President Clinton removed Mr. Schwalier’s name 

from the list.

Mr. Schwalier retired in September 1997. In 2003, he 

filed an application to correct his military records with 

the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records. 

According to Mr. Schwalier, the permissible length of 

promotion delay under 10 U.S.C. § 624(d)(4) ended before 

the President removed Mr. Schwalier from the list. He 

argued that he was therefore promoted by operation of 

law when the delay ended. 

Initially, the Corrections Board agreed with 

Mr. Schwalier. It recommended that the Secretary of the 

Air Force “correct an error” under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1)

in Mr. Schwalier’s records to reflect that, among other 

things, he was promoted to major general. The Department of Defense, however, disagreed with the recommendation. Its General Counsel determined that, according to

this court’s decision in Dysart v. United States, 369 F.3d 

1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004), promoting Mr. Schwalier retroactively would be without legal effect. Based on the determinations of the General Counsel for the Department of 

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4 SCHWALIER v. DEFENSE

Defense, the Corrections Board ultimately denied 

Mr. Schwalier’s application. 

In 2007, Mr. Schwalier requested that the Corrections 

Board reconsider his application. The Corrections Board 

found in favor of Mr. Schwalier. In November 2007, it 

determined that the decision to remove Mr. Schwalier 

from the list caused an “injustice” under 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1552(a)(1), warranting the requested corrections. The 

Air Force then issued a letter in December 2007, stating 

that Mr. Schwalier was appointed to major general, 

effective January 1, 1997. Shortly after, the General 

Counsel for the Department of Defense again advised the 

Secretary of the Air Force that the implementation of the 

Corrections Board’s recommendations would be without

legal effect and that the Secretary of Defense agreed. 

Accordingly, the Secretary of the Air Force rescinded all 

corrections of Mr. Schwalier’s records on April 3, 2008. 

In 2011, Mr. Schwalier filed a complaint against the 

Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force

(collectively, the government) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The complaint 

sought back pay and other relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court granted 

summary judgment to the government, finding that it did 

not act arbitrarily or capriciously by refusing to retroactively promote Mr. Schwalier.

Mr. Schwalier then appealed to the United States 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The 

D.C. Circuit determined that the district court had jurisdiction over Mr. Schwalier’s case because it was based in 

part on the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), and 

in part on the APA. Given this holding, the D.C. Circuit

held that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Schwalier’s case. 

Consequently, the D.C. Circuit transferred the appeal to 

this court.

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SCHWALIER v. DEFENSE 5

II

As an initial matter, the government argues that 

Mr. Schwalier’s complaint should have been dismissed as 

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to Little 

Tucker Act claims, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction. 

But Mr. Schwalier’s complaint is also based on the APA. 

Actions for judicial review under the APA accrue at the 

time of final agency action and are subject to the six-year 

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). See Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008); Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1018 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014). Mr. Schwalier filed his complaint in 2011, 

requesting review under the APA of the government’s

final action in 2008. Accordingly, Mr. Schwalier filed his 

complaint within the statute of limitations. 

Moreover, we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction 

over Mr. Schwalier’s appeal, as it is based “in whole or in 

part” on the Little Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2). 

And even “when a mixed case is presented and the nontax 

Little Tucker Act claim is dismissed, the other claims may 

be reviewed provided the Little Tucker Act claim was 

nonfrivolous.” Banks v. Garrett, 901 F.2d 1084, 1088 

(Fed. Cir. 1990). As the D.C. Circuit held, Mr. Schwalier’s 

request for back pay in his complaint is “unambiguously 

monetary in nature” and based “in part” on the Little 

Tucker Act. Schwalier v. Hagel, 734 F.3d 1218, 1222 

(D.C. Cir. 2013). Thus, we have jurisdiction over 

Mr. Schwalier’s appeal.1

1 To the extent Appellees suggest we must retransfer Mr. Schwalier’s appeal, doing so at this point would 

create the “jurisdictional ping-pong” the Supreme Court 

has cautioned against. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988). “Under law-of-the-

 

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6 SCHWALIER v. DEFENSE

III

Applying D.C. Circuit law here, we review a grant of 

summary judgment de novo. Epos Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus 

Techs. Ltd., 766 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

The APA entitles “a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved 

by agency action . . . , to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 702. The reviewing court must set aside a final agency 

action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A). 

A 

The Secretary of the Air Force may correct a military 

record when it is “necessary to correct an error or remove 

an injustice.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1). The procedures for 

such corrections are established by the Secretary of the 

Air Force and must be approved by the Secretary of 

Defense. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(3). The regulations provide 

that if a Corrections Board’s recommendation would affect 

an appointment or promotion requiring confirmation by 

the Senate, as is the case here, the recommendation must 

be forwarded to the Secretary of the Air Force for final 

decision. 32 C.F.R. § 865.4(l)(3). After a final decision

has been made, it is “final and conclusive on all officers of 

the United States.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(4).

case principles, if the transferee court can find the transfer decision plausible, its jurisdictional inquiry is at an 

end.” Id. at 819.

 

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SCHWALIER v. DEFENSE 7

Mr. Schwalier interprets 10 U.S.C. § 1552 as turning

the Air Force’s December 2007 retroactive appointment 

letter into a final decision that is binding on all officers of 

the United States, even though the President chose not to

appoint Mr. Schwalier in 1997. He argues that the underlying Corrections Board’s recommendation to retroactively 

appoint him was proper, as he was promoted by operation 

of law before the President acted to remove Mr. Schwalier 

from the promotion list. 

Under the Constitution, three actions are ordinarily 

required for a person to be appointed to a senior military 

office: the President’s nomination; confirmation by the 

Senate; and the President’s appointment. Dysart, 369 

F.3d at 1311 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 155–

56 (1803)). For a promotion of a senior military officer to 

be effective, including a promotion to major general, all 

three acts must be completed. Id. at 1311–12. And 10 

U.S.C. § 624, the statute under which Mr. Schwalier was 

to be appointed in 1997, incorporates this constitutional 

design. See 10 U.S.C. § 624(b)–(c); Dysart, 369 F.3d at 

1313. Importantly, § 624 does not provide for an appointment by operation of law without a final act of 

appointment by the President. Dysart, 369 F.3d at 1313. 

Here, the President chose not to exercise his appointment 

power by removing Mr. Schwalier’s name from the promotion list in 1997. Accordingly, the third and final act 

required for an appointment is missing altogether in this 

case. 

According to Mr. Schwalier, the Air Force’s December 

2007 retroactive appointment letter overrides the President’s decision in 1997 to remove Mr. Schwalier from the 

promotion list because the letter issued pursuant to 

§ 1552. It is true that § 1552 states that a record correction decision is “final and conclusive.” But in this case, 

the President chose not to appoint Mr. Schwalier in 

1997—long before any record correction decision arose—

and § 1552 does not apply here. In any event, interpretCase: 14-1113 Document: 36-2 Page: 7 Filed: 01/08/2015
8 SCHWALIER v. DEFENSE

ing § 1552 as allowing for the reversal of the President’s 

decision to withhold Mr. Schwalier’s appointment cannot 

be the correct interpretation of the statute. See Dysart, 

369 F.3d at 1316–17. Indeed, accepting Mr. Schwalier’s

interpretation of § 1552 would effectively allow Congress 

to compel the President to appoint senior officers of the 

United States. “Congress does not have the authority to 

require the President to exercise his appointment power; 

such authority would be akin to an exercise by Congress 

of the appointment power itself, which is prohibited.” 

Dysart, 369 F.3d at 1317. Thus, we hold that § 1552 does 

not allow for appointment by operation of law when the 

President has chosen not to appoint a person to office.

B 

Mr. Schwalier also argues that the General Counsel 

for the Department of Defense acted arbitrarily and 

capriciously when it “coerced” the Secretary of the Air 

Force into rescinding the corrections of his records. 

Appellant’s Br. 18–19. But the Air Force is a subcomponent of the Department of Defense. 10 U.S.C. § 111(a)(8). 

It acts “subject to the authority, direction, and control of 

the Secretary of Defense,” 10 U.S.C. § 8013, who has 

prescribed that the General Counsel for the Department 

of Defense will resolve legal disagreements within itself, 

Department of Defense Directive 5145.01 §§ 3.01, 3.10 

(May 2, 2001). Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense and

the General Counsel for the Department of Defense did 

not violate the law when they stepped in to resolve the 

issue of whether the Air Force legally could correct 

Mr. Schwalier’s records. 

Additionally, the government’s decision to rescind the 

corrections of Mr. Schwalier’s records itself was not

arbitrary or capricious. Mr. Schwalier was slated to be 

promoted to major general under 10 U.S.C. § 624. The 

recommendations to correct Mr. Schwalier’s records were

based on the theory that he was promoted by operation of 

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SCHWALIER v. DEFENSE 9

law before the President removed him from the list. But 

§ 624 does not allow for such “automatic” appointments, 

and “Congress could not have permissibly altered the 

appointment process . . . by providing for automatic 

appointments.” Dysart, 369 F.3d at 1313–14. Moreover, 

the President’s decision not to appoint Mr. Schwalier “is 

simply unreviewable.” Id. at 1316. In sum, as the General Counsel for the Department of Defense correctly 

determined, Dysart controls Mr. Schwalier’s case, and the 

government did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by 

following the General Counsel’s advice. 

IV

We have considered Mr. Schwalier’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Because the government did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by declining to

correct Mr. Schwalier’s records, the judgment of the 

district court is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

No costs.

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