Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00661/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00661-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ANTHONY RENDON,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRESNO POLICE DEPARTMENT, POLICE

OFFICER MARCUS K. TAFOYA, POLICE

SGT. MIKE MANFREDI, POLICE

OFFICERS JOHN DOES 1-20, and THE

CITY OF FRESNO,

Defendants.

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1:05-CV-00661 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND

MOTIONS FOR MORE DEFINITE

STATEMENT.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motions to

dismiss and for a more definite statement, pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e). Pro se Plaintiff, David Rendon (“Rendon”),

alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when

Fresno police officers unlawfully entered his parents’ home and

began using excessive force on him. Plaintiff seeks declaratory

and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive

damages. Defendants City of Fresno (“City”), Fresno Police

Department (“FPD”), and Sgt. Mike Manfredi (“Manfredi”)

(collectively, “City Defendants”) together submitted motions to

dismiss and motions for more definite statement, and Defendant

Officer Marcus Tafoya (“Tafoya”) individually submitted a motion

to dismiss and for a more definite statement--all of which are

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addressed herein. Docs. 14 & 17. 

II. SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff names as Defendants the City of Fresno, the FPD,

Sergeant Manfredi, and Officer Tafoya. Doc. 1, Compl., filed on

May 20, 2005. Although Plaintiff’s allegations are not entirely

clear, when construing his Complaint liberally, he appears to

allege that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when: (1)

FPD officers unlawfully entered his parents’ home; and (2) when

FPD officers used excessive force in the course of his arrest. 

Plaintiff also claims that (3) FPD officers conspired to violate

his rights by falsifying a police report. It is not clear

whether this conspiracy allegation is grounded in the Fourth

Amendment or whether Plaintiff is instead advancing a Fifth

Amendment procedural due process claim.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to dismiss

may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” However, motions to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. The

question before the court is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether the plaintiff could

prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984). “A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

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of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Rule 8 Pleading Standard.

A complaint must “contain a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The “short and plain” statement must give the

defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957). “Under the liberal pleading standards, pleadings in

federal courts are only required to fairly notify the opposing

party of the nature of the claim.” City of South Pasadena v.

Slater, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 1999)(internal

citations and quotations omitted). This liberal standard applies

to all of Plaintiff’s claims, with the exception of his

conspiracy claim, which is, as explained below, subject to a

heightened pleading standard. 

Courts have a “duty...to construe pro se pleadings

liberally.” Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir.

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2001); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). The pleadings of

pro se litigants are “held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes, 449 U.S. at 10

(citation and internal quotations omitted). However, “a liberal

interpretation of a [pro se] complaint may not supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992).

C. Motion for More Definite Statement.

If a complaint “is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot

reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party

may move for a more definite statement before interposing a

responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects

complained of and the details desired.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 

A Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement must be

considered in light of the liberal pleading standards set forth

in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See, e.g., Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922

F. Supp 1450, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Sagan v. Apple

Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994)

(“Motions for a more definite statement are viewed with disfavor

and are rarely granted because of the minimal pleading

requirements of the Federal Rules.”)). The Court must deny the

motion if the complaint is specific enough to notify defendant of

the substance of the claim being asserted. See Bureerong, 922 F.

Supp. at 1461; see also San Bernardino Pub. Employees Ass’n v.

Stout, 946 F. Supp. 790, 804 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“A motion for a

more definite statement is used to attack unintelligibility, not

mere lack of detail....”). Whether to grant a Rule 12(e) motion

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1 Plaintiff also cites Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens provides a private cause of

action against federal agents (or other federal officials) for

civil rights violations because § 1983 does not apply to federal

actors. Here, however, no federal agents were involved in the

alleged unlawful actions taken against Plaintiff, so Bivens is

not relevant. 

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for a more definite statement lies within the discretion of the

district court. See Stout, 946 F. Supp. at 804.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In order to sue a local government entity or its employees

in a federal court for civil rights violations, a plaintiff must

rely on statutory provisions that permit individuals to seek

relief in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which Plaintiff

brings this suit, provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States...to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress.... 

Section 1983 “creates a cause of action against a person who,

acting under color of state law, deprives another of rights

guaranteed under the Constitution.” Henderson v. City of Simi

Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002).1

To prevail under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and

ultimately prove that a government official acting under color of

state law deprived him of a right secured by the United States

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2 Congress included customs within the scope of § 1983 to

encompass persistent and widespread discriminatory practices

which, although not authorized by law, may be so permanent and

well-settled so as to have the force of law. Adickes v. S. H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970). 

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Constitution or the laws of the United States. Flagg Bros., Inc.

v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). Here, Plaintiff alleges

several Fourth Amendment violations and possibly a Fifth

Amendment violation. See Doc. 1, Compl. Plaintiff implicates

both local government entities and individual police officers in

his suit. Section 1983 extends liability differently to local

governments than to individuals.

1. Local Government Liability Under Monell.

Local government entities can be directly liable under 

§ 1983 for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief, but only

if the allegedly unconstitutional actions were taken pursuant to

a “policy statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted

and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 659, 690 (1978). Alternatively, local

government entities can be liable for adopting an

unconstitutional custom, even if such custom has not received

formal approval through the body’s official decision-making

channels. Id. at 691.2

A local government entity cannot be held liable under 

§ 1983 simply because it employs someone who has acted

unlawfully. 

Instead, it is when execution of a government’s

policy or custom, whether made by its law-makers or

by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

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represent official policy, inflicts the injury that

the government as an entity is responsible....

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Rather, local government liability is

limited to acts that the local government has “officially

sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.

469 at 470. Liability may even be “imposed for a single decision

by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Id.

If the decision to adopt a particular course of action is

directed by those who establish policy, the local government is

responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be

taken repeatedly. Id.

2. Individual Local Government Officer Liability.

Individual local government officers can be named as

defendants either in their personal or official capacities. A

suit against an individual officer in his or her official

capacity is “only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165 (1985). As such, to state a claim against an

individual officer in his official capacity, a plaintiff must

allege an unconstitutional “policy statement, ordinance, or

decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s

officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 659, 690. 

In contrast, a claim against an individual local government

officer acting in his or her personal capacity is quite different

from a Monell claim against a local government entity. A

plaintiff suing an individual officer in his or her personal

capacity is not required to establish any connection between the

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3 Deciding whether an individual official is entitled to

qualified immunity (and is thereby immune from liability) entails

a two-step analysis. First, a court must ask whether the

plaintiff’s Constitutional or federal statutory rights were

violated at all. If the answer to this question is yes, the

court must then inquire whether the right violated was “clearly

established” by asking whether a reasonable individual could

believe that the defendant’s actions were lawful. If the

official reasonably believed his or her actions were lawful, the

official cannot be subjected to further litigation. See Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

4 If otherwise valid, claims that involve the FPD and/or

its employees may proceed against the City or against the

individual officers.

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alleged unlawful act and a governmental “policy or custom.” 

However, officials sued in this manner may assert personal

immunity defenses such as qualified3 immunity. Hafer v. Melo, 502

U.S. 21, 25 (1991). 

B. Motions to Dismiss.

1. The FPD is a Redundant Defendant.

Plaintiff names both the City and the FPD as Defendants. 

Doc. 1, Compl. at 1. City Defendants move to dismiss the FPD

from this suit. Doc. 14, City’s Motion at 2-3. City Defendants

argue that naming the FPD--a department of the City--as a

separate defendant is redundant. Id. at 2-3. Defendants are

correct. The City is ultimately liable for the actions of its

departments, and it is not necessary to name FPD as a separate

defendant. The FPD is DISMISSED AS A DEFENANT.4

//

//

2. Naming Manfredi in his Official Capacity is

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5 Plaintiff’s claims against Manfredi in his personal

capacity are not affected by this ruling. 

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Redundant.

Plaintiff names Defendant Manfredi in both his official and

personal capacities. Doc. 1, Compl. at 4. City Defendants argue

that naming Defendant Manfredi alongside the City (his ultimate

employer) is redundant. Doc. 14, City’s Motion at 3. As 

explained above, official capacity suits are “only another way of

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 165. 

Suits against state officials in their official

capacity therefore should be treated as suits

against the governmental entity....[b]ecause the

real party in interest in an official-capacity suit

is the governmental entity and not the named

official....

Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (citations and internal quotations

omitted). Suing Defendant Manfredi in his official capacity

alongside the City is therefore redundant. Plaintiff’s claim

against Manfredi in his official capacity is DISMISSED for

redundancy.5

3. Plaintiff’s Claims of Unlawful Entry and/or Use of

Excessive Force Against the City of Fresno are

Sufficient to Survive a Motion to Dismiss. 

Plaintiff alleges that his injuries were caused, at least in

part, by the City and the FPD’s negligent training, staffing,

supervision, control, and discipline of Defendants Manfredi and

Tafoya. Doc. 22, Opp. at 10. City Defendants move to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Fresno/FPD for failure to

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allege a governmental “policy or custom” of civil rights

violation. Doc. 14, City’s Motion at 3:19-22. 

Under certain circumstances, a municipality can be liable

for failure to properly train its employees. City of Canton,

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). To prevail on a

failure to train theory, a plaintiff must prove that the

inadequacy of training amounted to “deliberate indifference to

the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”

Id.; see also Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 582-83 (9th Cir.

1989). Only where plaintiff can prove that a failure to train

reflects a “deliberate” or “conscious” choice by a municipality

can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983. It will

not suffice to prove that an injury or accident could have been

avoided “if an officer had had better or more training,

sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing

conduct. Such a claim could be made about almost any encounter

resulting in injury....” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. 

“[A]dequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the

fact that they do says little about the training program or the

legal basis for holding the city liable.” Id. “[F]or liability

to attach in this circumstance[,] the identified deficiency in a

city’s training program must be closely related to the ultimate

injury.” Id. 

A municipality’s failure to failure to supervise its

employees can also give rise to § 1983 liability, but only in

those situations where there is a history of wide-spread abuse. 

See Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir.

1983)(cited with approval in City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 399). 

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6 As explained below, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims are

dismissed with leave to amend. During oral argument on the

motion to dismiss, Plaintiff expressed his interest in re-stating

his conspiracy allegations in an amended complaint. Accordingly,

Plaintiff will be required to re-state all of his claims in any

amended complaint, including those that survived this motion to

dismiss.

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Similarly, "municipal inaction such as the persistent failure to

discipline subordinates who violate civil rights could give rise

to an inference of an unlawful municipal policy of ratification

of unconstitutional conduct within the meaning of Monell.” Sarus

v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397, 400-01 (2d Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff need not satisfy all of the requirements set forth

above at the motion to dismiss stage. Rather, a claim against a

local government is sufficiently pled so long as it states a

“short and plain” statement of an unconstitutional act or

decision for which the local government is responsible. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff claims that the City of Fresno/FPD

negligently trained, staffed, supervised, controlled, and

disciplined Defendants Manfredi and Tafoya--all of which led to

his injuries. Doc. 22, Opp. at 10. This is sufficient to

satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and Monell at

the pleading stage. City Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

Complaint with regard to the City of Fresno/FPD is DENIED.

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4. Plaintiff’s Standing to Allege Unlawful Entry into

His Parents’ Home.

Plaintiff claims that police officers violated his Fourth

Amendment rights when they unlawfully entered his parents’ house. 

Doc. 1, Compl. at 9. Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks

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7 One who owns or lawfully possesses property will usually

have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of his right

to exclude. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. However, a property

interest may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate

expectation of privacy in some situations. An obscure landlord,

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standing to make a claim for unlawful entry into “the home of his

parents.” Doc. 14, City’s Motion at 4. 

To invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a party

must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of

the Constitution: A plaintiff must demonstrate “a personal stake

in the outcome[, which] assures...concrete adverseness [and]

sharpens the presentation of issues....” City of L.A. v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). To satisfy the standing requirement, a

plaintiff must have “a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

area searched.” United States v. Perez, 700 F.2d 1232, 1236 (8th

Cir. 1983); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). 

“[A] person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place

other than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him

from unreasonable governmental intrusion in that place.” Id. at

142. A party can claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment

even if his interest in the premises is not “a recognized

property interest at common law.” Id. at 143. Standing will be

denied to a “casual visitor who walks into a house one minute

before a search commences” or “has never...been permitted to

visit” the room searched. Id. at 142.

In this case, Plaintiff asserts in his opposition that he is

in fact the owner of the home in question. Ownership of the

residence would make Plaintiff more than a “casual visitor”

within the meaning of Rakas. Doc. 22, Opp. at 13.7 Moreover,

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for example, may not have a privacy expectation in a tenant’s

apartment, and thus may lack standing to raise the issue of the

legality of an entry into the tenant’s apartment. United States

v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1345 (10th Cir. 1979); see also Looney v.

City of Wilmington, 732 F. Supp. 1025, 1031 (D. Del. 1989).

8 In his opposition, Plaintiff correctly cites Mendocino

Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir.

1999) for the proposition that “[w]hether defendants were

involved in an unlawful conspiracy is generally a factual issue

and should be resolved by the jury.” However, that case was

decided on summary judgment (a later stage in the litigation

process where a court is asked to determine whether there are any

factual disputes that should be left for a jury to decide).

Different standards apply in the analysis of a motion to dismiss,

at which stage a judge must determine whether a complaint meets

the applicable pleading standards. 

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Plaintiff is the son of the regular occupants of the home. Under

these facts, it would be reasonable to afford Plaintiff a

legitimate expectation of privacy in the entire home. However,

Plaintiff’s complaint does not assert his ownership of the

residence. Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s unlawful

entry claim for lack of standing is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

5. Plaintiff Fails to Properly Allege a Conspiracy.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Manfredi and Tafoya

conspired to violate his rights by falsifying a police report. 

Doc. 1, Compl. at 13-14. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has

failed to allege facts that support a conspiracy claim. Doc. 14,

City’s Motion at 4. 

In the Ninth Circuit, conspiracy claims are subject to a

heightened pleading standard (i.e., a more demanding standard

than is set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). See Harris v.

Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).8 Plaintiff may

meet the heightened pleading standard by specifically alleging

“which defendants conspired, how they conspired and how the

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conspiracy led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights....” 

Id. at 1196 (emphasis added). “[V]ague conclusory allegations”

are insufficient to meet this pleading standard. Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Manfredi and Tafoya

conspired to violate his rights by falsifying a police report. 

Doc. 1, Compl. at 14. Regardless of whether Plaintiff’s

conspiracy claim is grounded in the Fourth or Fifth Amendment, he

provides absolutely no factual basis for his “conclusory

allegations” of conspiracy. See Id. at 13-14. Plaintiff’s

complaint is devoid of any discussion of an agreement between

Manfredi and Tafoya to violate his constitutional rights. As

currently pled, the Complaint fails to meet the heightened

pleading standard for conspiracy. However, Plaintiff asserted at

oral argument on these motions that he could allege additional

facts related to the conspiracy. Plaintiff will be afforded an

opportunity to amend his complaint. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for

conspiracy are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

6. Plaintiff Fails to Allege a Fifth Amendment

Violation.

In the introductory paragraphs of his Complaint, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants have violated his Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional rights. Doc. 1, Compl. at 5

and 7. The Complaint fails to mention any specific Fifth

Amendment violation and Plaintiff’s Opposition appears to concede

his failure to properly allege a Fifth Amendment claim. See Doc.

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22, Opp. at 13. Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiff does plead

a Fifth Amendment claim, Defendants move to dismiss. Doc. 14,

City’s Motion at 3-4. 

Given the facts of the case, the only plausible Fifth

Amendment claim is a deprivation of a plaintiff’s procedural due

process rights resulting from the alleged falsification of a

police report. Where a plaintiff alleges the deprivation of a

liberty interest without procedural due process of law, plaintiff

must demonstrate that no “meaningful postdeprivation remedy” is

available to him under state law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.

517, 533 (1984). Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no allegation

that he has pursued any state judicial review of this claim,

through trial or appeal, or why such alternative remedies would

be inadequate. To the extent that Plaintiff does make a Fifth

Amendment claim, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND.

7. Declaratory Relief is not Appropriate.

Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment that the

Defendants’ “acts and conduct...violated [his] constitutional

rights....” Doc. 1, Compl. at 15. Defendants move to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief. Doc. 14, City’s Motion

at 5.

A declaratory judgment simply declares the “rights of the

parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of

law, without ordering anything to be done.” Gutensohn v. Kansas

City S. Ry., 140 F.2d 950, 953 (8th Cir. 1944). A declaratory

judgment is distinguished from other actions in that it does not

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seek execution or performance from the opposing parties. Id.

“The declaratory judgment procedure may be resorted to only in

the sound discretion of the Court and where the interests of

justice will be advanced and an adequate and effective judgment

may be rendered.” Alabama State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325

U.S. 450, 462 (1945).

Declaratory relief is appropriate if there is an actual

“controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of

sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a

declaratory judgment.” Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co.,

312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); Seattle Audobon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80

F.3d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996). An actual controversy is

definite and concrete, and is “distinguished from a difference or

dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is

academic or moot.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v.

Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). A controversy exists

justifying declaratory relief only when the challenged government

activity has not disappeared or evaporated, and, “by its

continuing and brooding presence, casts what may well be a

substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning

parties.” Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management, 893

F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotations

omitted). The adverse effect, however, cannot be “so remote and

speculative that there is no tangible prejudice to the existing

interests of the parties.” Id. (citation and internal quotations

omitted). “That the dispute turns upon questions of fact [rather

than law] does not withdraw it...from judicial cognizance.” 

Aetna, 300 U.S. at 242. Moreover, “[t]he existence of another

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adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory

relief in cases where it is appropriate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 57. 

Here, Plaintiff claims that his Constitutional rights have

been violated and seeks money damages. In his Opposition,

Plaintiff also asserts that he lost his job as a result of this

controversy and impliedly asserts that declaratory relief might

vindicate him in the eyes of his employer. Doc. 22, Opp. at 16. 

If Plaintiff prevails in this case by establishing a violation of

his civil rights, he will be entitled to damages, even if

nominal. This will provide objective verification of the

efficacy of his position. A declaratory judgment cannot be

issued to remedy past wrongs that are compensable by damages. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for

declaratory relief are GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

8. Plaintiff is not Entitled to Injunctive Relief.

Plaintiff seeks an injunction to prohibit Defendants from

“harassing, retaliating, or reprising Plaintiff” for filing this

suit, and from “taking any action against Plaintiff until [he]

has been afforded his rights secured under the United States

Constitution....” Doc. 1, Compl. at 15-16. Defendants move to

dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief for failure to

establish the necessary grounds for its award. Doc. 14, City’s

Motion at 5-6.

To obtain injunctive relief, plaintiff must establish

“irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.” 

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). The key

word in this consideration is “irreparable.” Sampson v. Murray,

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9 Plaintiff suggested at oral argument that he desired an

injunction to prevent the city from prosecuting him. Federal

courts almost never enjoin state criminal proceedings. See

Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974). Mere injuries, however substantial, in

terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the

absence of a stay, are not enough.” Id. Moreover, The purpose

of an injunction is to prevent future violations. “Where the

activities sought to be enjoined have already occurred, and

the...courts cannot undo what has already been done, the action

is moot.” Friends of The Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 576 F.2d 1377

(9th Cir. 1978). However, if a plaintiff can demonstrate the

existence of “some cognizable danger of [a] recurrent violation”

of a previous harm beyond “mere possibility,” an injunction may

be granted. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633

(1953).

Plaintiff fails to assert that there is any danger of future

violations beyond a “mere possibility.” See id. Plaintiff does

assert that he was fired from his job as a result of the incident

at issue. Doc. 22, Opp. at 16. However, this was not a decision

made by Defendants, nor ameliorable by Defendants, because

Defendants are not and were not Plaintiff’s employer. See id.

Moreover, even if he was fired by Defendants, absent a “genuinely

extraordinary situation,” termination of employment does not

constitute “irreparable injury.” Sampson, 415 U.S. at 91-92.9

Plaintiff fails to satisfy the requirements for injunctive

relief. Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for

injunctive relief are GRANTED.

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B. Motions for More Definite Statement

1. False Arrest Claim.

The complaint appears to allege that police officers

unlawfully/falsely arrested Plaintiff. Doc. 1, Compl. at 7-11. 

Plaintiff “waives” this claim in his opposition, and apparently

does not oppose dismissal. Doc. 22 at 16. Accordingly,

Defendants’ motions for a more definite statement as to any claim

of false arrest is DENIED AS MOOT because any such claim must be

DISMISSED. 

2. Conspiracy Claim.

Defendants’ motions for a more definite statement of

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is DENIED AS MOOT because

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim has been dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

A. Motions to Dismiss.

1. City Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claim against the FPD for redundancy is GRANTED.

2. City Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendant Manfredi in his official

capacity for redundancy is GRANTED. 

3. City Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment claims against the City of Fresno

is DENIED. 

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4. Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

of unlawful entry into his parents’ home for lack

of standing is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

5.. Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s

conspiracy claim against Defendants Manfredi and

Tafoya are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

6. Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth

Amendment claim is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

7. Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

for declaratory relief are GRANTED.

8. Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

for injunctive relief are GRANTED.

B. Motions for More Definite Statement.

1. Defendants’ motions for a more definite statement

of Plaintiff’s claim of false arrest are DENIED AS

MOOT.

2. Defendants’ motions for a more definite statement

of Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim are DENIED AS

MOOT.

Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint within 20 days of

service of this order. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 11, 2005

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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