Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02777/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02777-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

t~· l L!.? D 

Unitf.'ti SfittO§ (::muJ ~-tf Appeais 

'tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS {\IJ(j i J 19~0 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SIERRA CLUB, a nonprofit California 

corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CLAYTON K. YEUTTER, in his official 

capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; 

MAX PETERSON, in his official capacity 

as Chief of the Forest Service, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

) 

MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, a ) 

nonprofit Colorado corporation, on ) 

behalf of named and unnamed members; ) 

COLORADO CATTLEMEN'S ASSOCIATION, a ) 

nonprofit Colorado corporation; COLORADO) 

FARM BUREAU, a nonprofit Colorado ) 

corpo·ration; NATIONAL CATTLEMEN'S ) 

ASSOCIATION, a nonprofit Colorado ) 

corporation; COLO. WATER CONGRESS; ) 

COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BOARD; THE ) 

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, acting by ) 

and through its Board of Water ) 

Commissioners, ) 

) 

Defendants~Intervenors-Appellants. ) 

Nos. 88-2777 

88-2871 

88-2918 

88-2920 

88-2922 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 84-M-2) 

Lori Potter, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Denver, Colo., for 

plaintiff-appellee Sierra Club. 

• 

Robert L. Klarquist, Attorney, (Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Edward J. 

Shawaker, Attorneys, Land and Natural Resources Division, 

Washington, D.C.); Donald A. Carr, Acting Asst. Attorney General, 

Washington, D.C.; Michael J. Norton, u.s. Attorney, Denver, Colo.; 

John R. Hill, Jr., Attorney, Land and Natural Resources, Denver, 

Colo., and Stuart L. Shelton, Office of General Counsel, 

Appellate Case: 88-2777 Document: 01019370330 Date Filed: 08/10/1990 Page: 1 
Dep't of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.; for defe~dants-appellants 

Yeutter and Peterson. · 

Lois Witte, Deputy Attorney General, Natural Resource Section, 

Denver, Colo., for defendant-intervenor-appellant Colorado Water 

Conservation Board. 

Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Donna Melson Arthur & Bennett W. Raley, of 

Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colo., for defendant-intervenorappellant Colorado Water Congress. 

Wayne D. Williams, Michael L. Walker & Henry c. Teigen, Counsel 

for City and County of Denver, acting by and through its Board of 

Water Commissioners, Denver Colo., for defendant-intervenorappellant City and County of Denver. 

Eric Twelker, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Denver, Colo., for 

defendants-intervenors-appellants Mountain States Legal 

Foundation, Colorado Cattlemen's Association, Colorado Farm 

Bureau, and National Cattlemen's Association. 

Christopher H. Meyer, National Wildlife Federation, Boulder, 

Colo., for amici curiae National Wildlife Federation, American 

Rivers, American Wilderness Alliance, Colorado Environmental 

Coalition, Colorado Wildlife Federation, National Audubon Society, 

National Parks and Conservation Association, Southern Utah 

Wilderness Alliance, Trout Unlimited, and The Wilderness Society. 

Kathryn A. Oberly & Kerry Edwards Cormier (John J. Rademacher, 

General Counsel, and Michael J. Stientjes, Assistant Counsel, 

American Farm Bureau Federation, Park Ridge, Ill., with them on 

the brief), of Mayer Brown & Platt, Washington, D.C., for amicus 

curiae American Farm Bureau Federation. 

Before LOGAN and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and THEIS, * Senior 

District Judge. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Frank G. Theis, Senior District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by 

designation. 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2777 Document: 01019370330 Date Filed: 08/10/1990 Page: 2 
This is an appeal from the order of the United States 

District Court for the District of Colorado granting the Sierra 

Club's request for a declaratory judgment that the Wilderness Act 

of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified at 16 u.s.c. 

§§ 1131-1136), creates federal reserved water rights in all 

twenty-four wilderness areas administered by the United States 

Forest Service ("Forest Service"). Secretary of Agriculture 

Yeutter and Chief of the Forest Service Peterson ("federal 

defendants" or "government") appeal, contending that the district 

court is without jurisdiction and that the district court rendered 

an unconstitutional advisory opinion. The federal defendants also 

challenge the district court's order directing the Forest Service 

to prepare a plan to ensure the protection of wilderness water 

values. The defendant-intervenor-appellants, various groups 

representing water development and management interests 

("intervenors"), also appeal. They contend: (1) that the 

district court does not have jurisdiction; and (2) that the 

Wilderness Act does not create federal reserved water rights. We 

dismiss and vacate the judgment below. 

I. 

Sierra Club commenced this litigation in 1984 against the 

Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the Forest Service. In 

its second amended complaint, the Sierra Club stated that the 

United States had been joined in various water rights 

adjudications in the Colorado state courts. The complaint alleged 

that the United States had not claimed any federal reserved water 

rights based on the Wilderness Act ("wilderness water rights") for 

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the twenty-four wilderness areas on national forest lands. The 

complaint contained three requests for relief: (1) that the court 

"declare that the United States possesses federal reserved water 

rights to fulfill Wilderness Act purposes in the Colorado 

wilderness areas under the control of the defendants;" (2) that 

the defendants' failure to attempt to claim wilderness water 

rights in the ongoing Colorado water rights adjudications 

"constitutes a violation of their duties under 16 U.S.C. § 526 and 

the Wilderness Act, is arbitrary and capricious, and constitutes 

unlawfully withheld agency action in violation of the 

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 u.s.c. § 701 et ~"; and (3) 

that the failure to claim wilderness water rights constituted a 

violation of the public trust. The complaint concluded with a 

request for declaratory relief, specifically "[a]n order requiring 

defendants to take such action as this Court finds is necessary to 

protect reserved rights in Colorado wilderness areas." 

The federal defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for 

lack of jurisdiction, contending that their nonassertion of 

reserved water rights fell within the Heckler ~ Chaney, 470 U.S. 

821 (1985), presumption of unreviewability. Alternatively, the 

federal defendants contended that the existence of reserved water 

rights under the Wilderness Act was uncertain and therefore that 

the failure to claim such rights in the Colorado proceedings was 

not arbitrary and capricious. 

The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Sierra Club 

~Block, 615 F. Supp. 44 (D. Colo. 1985). The district court 

found that sections 2(a) and 4(b) of the Wilderness Act provide 

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"clear and specific directives" requiring "the Forest Service to 

protect the wilderness areas, including water resources" and that 

the "Wilderness Act provides both legislative direction and 

manageable standards by which to judge the agency's failure to act 

in this case." Id. at 47-48. The district court thus concluded 

that the presumption of unreviewability was rebutted and that 

rsview was proper. The court deferred deciding the federal 

defendants' alternative argument that their failure to assert 

wilderness water rights was not arbitrary and capricious because 

the existence of wilderness water rights was uncertain. 

In a subsequent decision, the district court ruled upon 

various motions for dismissal or for summary judgment presented by 

Sierra Club and the intervenors. Sierra Club ~ Block, 622 F. 

Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985). The district court first found that 

Sierra Club had standing to pursue this action. Id. at 847-49. 

On Sierra Club's cross motion for summary judgment, the court held 

that "federal reserved water rights do exist in the designated 

Colorado wilderness areas." Id. at 851. The court held, however, 

that although the federal defendants are under a "general duty 

under the Wilderness Act to protect and preserve all wilderness 

resources," id. at 864, "[t]here is, however, no specific 

statutory duty to claim reserved water rights in the wilderness 

areas even though Congress impliedly reserved such rights in order 

to effectuate the purposes of the Act .... " Id. (emphasis in 

original). The court ruled that it was without power to order the 

Attorney General to initiate litigation to obtain such rights in 

the Colorado state court proceedings. The court explained that 

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under the doctrine of separation of powers, it could not order the 

executive to litigate the wilderness water rights in the absence 

of a statute requiring the executive to do so. Id. (quoting 

Sierra Club ~ Department of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172, 175 

(N.D. Cal. 1976)). The court also held that because of the 

controversy over the existence of federal reserved water rights 

under the Wilderness Act, the federal defendants had not acted 

arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to claim such rights. Id. 

at 864-65. 

The court then stated that it "must determine whether federal 

defendants' failure to assert federal reserved water rights in the 

wilderness areas conflicts in any way with their general statutory 

duty to protect wilderness water resources." Id. at 865. The 

court noted that reserved water rights represent only one 

alternative available to the federal defendants to fulfill their 

statutory duty to preserve wilderness water resources. After 

concluding that the briefs and administrative record were not 

adequate to evaluate fully Sierra Club's assertion that reserved 

water rights were the only means to protect water resources, the 

court remanded the matter to the federal defendants with 

directions ordering them to "come forward with a memorandum 

explaining their analysis, final decision, and plan to comply with 

their statutory obligations .... " Id. Finally, the court 

dismissed Sierra Club's public trust doctrine claim. Id. at 865-

66. 

Following an unsuccessful attempt to appeal to this court, 

which was denied due to lack of finality, Sierra Club ~ 1Yng, 

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Nos. 86-1153, 86-1154 & 86-1155 (lOth Cir. Oct. 8, 1986), the 

1 Forest Service submitted the plan ordered by the district court. 

In response, Sierra Club contended that the first report was 

inadequate and that the other methods of preserving wilderness 

water values presented in the first report were arbitrary and 

capricious. The intervenors also moved the district court to 

reconsider its earlier decision declaring the existence of federal 

reserved water rights under the Wilderness Act. 

The district court addressed these contentions in a third 

decision. See Sierra Club ~ ~' 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 

1987). The court reaffirmed its earlier holding that federal 

reserved water rights exist under the Wilderness Act. The court 

held that the first report submitted by the Forest Service was 

"deficient in the kind of detail necessary to conduct a 

satisfactory review" of the agency's decision not to adjudicate 

federal reserved water rights based on the Wilderness Act. Id. at 

1501. In the second portion of its plan, the Forest Service 

listed various non-adjudicatory methods of protecting wilderness 

water resources. The district court held that these alternatives, 

as justified in the first plan, were so inadequate as to 

constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. Accordingly, the court 

struck the first report and ordered the Forest Service to submit a 

proper plan. Id. at 1502. 

1 United States Forest Service, Report on Methods for 

Protecting Wilderness Water Resources on Lands Administered Qy the 

Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture (Nov. 26, 

1986) [hereinafter first report]. 

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Thereafter, the Forest Service submitted a new plan, 2 which 

analyzed the status of existing absolute and conditional water 

rights on and above the wilderness areas. The second report 

stated: 

The Forest Service, pursuant to the Court's orders of 

November 20, 1986 and June 3, 1987, examined the 24 

wilderness areas in Colorado named in the Second Amended 

Complaint, to identify any threats to wilderness water 

resources and evaluated the various alternatives 

available, including claiming Federal reserved water 

rights, to carry out the statutory responsibility to 

protect wilderness resources. Our analysis did not 

indicate any present or foreseeable future threats to 

the wilderness resources which would diminish their 

wilderness characteristics. 

Second report, at 1. The second report outlined a number of 

options the Forest Service could use to protect wilderness water 

values. These included: administrative land use controls; 

recommendations to the President, Congress, and other agencies; 

recommending assertion of reserved water rights under the Organic 

Administration Act of 1897, 30 Stat. 34; and recommending the 

assertion of reserved water rights under the Wilderness Act. See 

second report, at 10-19. The filing of the second plan and its 

alternatives superseded the stricken first plan and the "arbitrary 

and capricious" alternatives contained therein. 

On September 30, 1988 the district court, stating that 

counsel for the Sierra Club had given the court assurance that 

"the position of the plaintiff now is that Judge Kane's ruling 

constitutes a declaratory judgment on all legal issues in this 

2 United States Forest Service, Report on Methods for 

Protecting Wilderness Water Resources on Lands in Colorado 

Administered Qy the Forest Service, United States Department 

Agriculture (Sept. 22, 1987) [hereinafter second report]. 

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case and no additional relief is sought," ruled that "all claims 

for relief other than the adjudicated claim for declaratory relief 

are dismissed," and entered final judgment. 3 Sierra Club Y..:.. I:!Yn,g, 

No. 84-M-2 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 1988). Both the federal defendants 

and the intervenors appealed to this court. 

II. 

The first issue we address is whether this case is properly 

before us. On the one hand, the federal defendants contend that 

the district court's declaratory judgment is an unconstitutional 

advisory opinion. The intervenors agree with this 

characterization and further contend that the district court erred 

in finding that judicial review is not precluded by the rule in 

Heckler Y..:.. Chaney, 470 u.s. 821 (1985). On the other hand, Sierra 

Club contends that the case is properly before us under the 

Administrative Procedure and Declaratory Judgment Acts. Given the 

present factual background and procedural posture of this case, we 

hold that the issues presented are not ripe for adjudication. 

The greatest difficulty presented by this case is determining 

the proper method of analysis. Although the doctrine of ripeness 

was substantially restated in the 1967 Gardner trilogy, Abbott 

Laboratories Y..:.. Gardner, 387 u.s. 136 (1967); Toilet Goods 

Association Y..:.. Gardner (Toilet Goods Jl, 387 u.s. 158 (1967); 

Gardner Y..:.. Toilet Goods Association (Toilet Goods l!l, 387 U.S. 

3 Sierra Club did not seek to challenge the second report. 

Sierra Club thus has dropped its earlier request for a declaratory 

judgment that the Forest Service's failure to assert federal 

reserved water rights based on the Wilderness Act is arbitrary and 

capricious. The only relief granted by the district court which 

remains before us on appeal is the declaratory judgment that the 

Wilderness Act gives rise to federal reserved water rights. 

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167 (1967), the doctrine's application remains a confused mix of 

principle and pragmatic judgment reflecting its mixture of article 

III case and controversy requirements with prudential restraints 

on the exercise of jurisdiction. The difficulty in application is 

aggravated in this case because Sierra Club is challenging the 

Forest Service's failure to act rather than a more traditional 

agency action. 

A. Is There Law to Apply? 

We begin our analysis by determining whether there is any law 

to apply. This determination is critical in two respects: (1) it 

controls the availability of judicial review under section 

701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 u.s.c. 

§ 701(a)(2); and (2) it establishes the framework that guides our 

ripeness inquiry. 

1. Reviewability Under the APA 

As a general matter, all agency action is presumed 

reviewable. See Abbott Laboratories, 387 u.s. at 140. Section 

701(a) of the APA provides for two exceptions, however: 

This chapter applies, according to the provisions 

thereof, except to the extent that --

(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or 

(2) agency action 

discretion by law. 

is committed to agency 

5 U.S.C. § 701(a). No party contends that review is precluded 

explicitly by statute. We therefore turn to the subsection (a)(2) 

exception for "agency action . . . committed to agency discretion 

by law." The Supreme Court defined this exception in Citizens to 

Preserve Overton Park Y...:.. Volpe, 401 u.s. 402 (1971), as a "very 

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narrow exception . . . applicable in those rare instances where 

'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there 

is no law to apply.'" Id. at 410 (quoting in partS. Rep. No. 

752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). 

In Heckler~ Chaney, 470 u.s. 821 (1985), the Supreme Court 

elaborated on the subsection (a)(2) exception, explaining: 

[E]ven where Congress has not affirmatively precluded 

rev1ew [under subsection (a)(l)], review is not to be 

had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have 

no meaningful standard against which to judge the 

agency's exercise of discretion. In such a case, the 

statute ("law") can be taken to have "committed" the 

decisionmaking to the agency's judgment absolutely. 

This construction avoids conflict with the the "abuse of 

discretion" standard of review in § 706 if no 

judicially manageable standards are available for 

judging how and when an agency should exercise its 

discretion, then it is impossible to evaluate agency 

action for "abuse of discretion." 

Id. at 830. The Court thus adopted a "meaningful standards" test 

for determining the scope of the exception to reviewability 

established by section 70l(a)(2). 

In applying the subsection (a)(2) exception to the 

presumption of reviewability, Chaney concluded that an agency 

decision not to take enforcement action fell within the subsection 

(a)(2) exception. The Court held that agency enforcement 

decisions are presumptively unreviewable as "actions . . . 

committed to agency discretion by law." See id. at 831. The 

Court distinguished Overton Park and the general presumption of 

reviewability: 

Overton Park did not involve an agency's refusal to 

take requested enforcement action. It involved an 

affirmative act of approval under a statute that set 

clear guidelines for determining when such approval 

should be given. Refusals to take enforcement steps 

generally involve precisely the opposite situation, and 

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• 

in that situation we think the presumption is that 

judicial review ·is not available. This Court has 

recognized on several occasions over many years that an 

agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether 

through civil or criminal process, is a decision 

generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion. 

This recognition of the existence of discretion is 

attributable in no small part to the general 

unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to 

refuse enforcement. 

Id. (citations omitted). The Court reasoned that review of 

enforcement decisions was unsuitable for a number of reasons. 

First, "an agency decision not to enforce often involves a 

complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly 

within its expertise." Id. These factors include whether a 

violation has occurred, probability of success, whether action 

fits the agency's overall policies, and availability of agency 

resources. Second, agency refusal to act generally does not 

involve an exercise of coercive power over an individual. Id. at 

831-32. Third, the Court drew an analogy to the decision of a 

prosecutor not to indict, which "has long been regarded as the 

special province of the Executive Branch" Id. at 832. 

Although the Court interpreted the subsection (a)(2) 

exception to the presumption of reviewability as establishing a 

presumption of unreviewability in cases where the agency declined 

to take enforcement action, the Court was careful to state that 

"the presumption [of unreviewability] may be rebutted where the 

substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to 

follow in exercising its enforcement powers." Id. at 832-33. The 

Court cited Dunlop~ Bachowski, 421 u.s. 560 (1975), as an 

example of a statute that established guidelines governing agency 

enforcement actions. The. Court noted that the relevant statute 

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provided that "[t]he Secretary shall investigate such complaint 

and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation . . . 

had occurred . . . he shall . bring a civil action." Chaney, 

470 U.S. at 832-33 (quoting 29 u.s.c. § 482). This language 

"indicated that the Secretary was required to file suit if certain 

'clearly defined' factors were present." Id. at 834. The Court 

therefore concluded that "[t]he statute being administered quite 

clearly withdrew discretion from the agency and provided 

guidelines in the exercise of its enforcement power." Id. 

Finally, the Court in footnote 4 left open the possibility of 

judicial review where the agency refused to act because it 

believed it lacked jurisdiction or because it had abdicated its 

statutory responsibilities. Id. at 833 n.4 (citing Adams ~ 

Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane)). 

Most recently, in Webster~ Doe, 486 u.s. 592 (1988), the 

Supreme Court considered a challenge to the CIA Director's 

decision to terminate an employee. The relevant statute permitted 

the CIA Director to terminate an employee whenever the director 

"shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the 

interests of the United States." Webster, 486 U.S. at 600 

(emphasis in Webster) (quoting in part National Security Act 

§ 102(c), 50 u.s.c. § 403(c)). The Court found that the quoted 

language provided "no law to apply" and held that the director's 

decision to terminate was unreviewable under the APA. 4 Webster 

thus stands for the proposition that where a statute provides "no 

4 Webster held, however, that the relevant statute did not 

preclude review of constitutional claims. Webster, 486 U.S. at 

603. 

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substantive standards on which a court could base its review," id. 

at 600, then the agency action is unreviewable. 

2. Application of Reviewability Standard 

With this understanding of reviewability, we must determine 

whether the Forest Service's conduct is reviewable. 

~ Chaney footnote ! exceptions permitting review. 

Sierra Club seeks to avoid examination of the reviewability 

of the Forest Service's inaction by contending that the Forest 

Service has either mistaken the extent of its jurisdiction or has 

consciously abdicated its statutory duties. Sierra Club is 

attempting to invoke the possible exceptions to reviewability 

analysis reserved by the Supreme Court in Chaney footnote 4. See 

Chaney, 470 u.s. at 833 n.4. We are not persuaded, however, that 

either exception applies. First, the Forest Service has not 

mistaken the extent of its jurisdiction. It does not contend that 

it is without jurisdiction to seek federal reserved water rights 

based on the Wilderness Act. The Forest Service has stated that 

in its view it is preferable not to seek such rights for the 

Colorado wilderness areas for a variety of reasons. Rather than 

having mistaken its jurisdiction, the Forest Service has merely 

declined to exercise it. 

Second, we cannot say the Forest Service has "'consciously 

and expressly adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to 

amount to an abdication of its statutory r~sponsibilities." Id. 

at 833 n.4 (quoting Adams ~Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. 

Cir. 1973) (en bane)). The Forest Service argues that it has 

numerous other ways to protect wilderness water values in addition 

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to seeking federal reserved water rights under the Wilderness Act. 

It has provided a list of these other methods and an examination 

of possible threats to wilderness water values. See second 

report, at 10-19. Given this record and the absence of clear 

statutory commands, we cannot say the Forest Service has 

"consciously and expressly . . . abdicated its statutory 

responsibilities." Because we determine that neither of the 

Chaney footnote exceptions are applicable, we now turn to consider 

whether the Forest Service's actions fall within the statutory 

exception to reviewability established by section 701(a)(2) of the 

APA. 

~ Section 701(a)(2) exception to reviewability. 

As a general rule, all agency action is presumed reviewable. 

See Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 140. Section 701(a)(2) 

provides for an exception to review where a statute provides "no 

law to apply." Sierra Club cites three statutes as providing the 

requisite law to apply. The first statute, the Department of 

Agriculture Organic Act of 1944, provides: 

There are authorized to be appropriated for 

expenditure by the Forest Service such sums as may be 

necessary for the investigation and establishment of 

water rights, including the purchase thereof or of lands 

or interests in lands or rights-of-way for use and 

protection of water rights necessary or beneficial in 

connection with the administration and public use of the 

national forests. 

16 U.S.C. § 526. Section 526 does not provide "meaningful 

standards" of law to apply. On its face the section merely 

authorizes appropriations for the Forest Service's use in 

investigating and establishing water rights. The provision does 

not command the agency to spend monies and certainly imposes no 

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duty to actually investigate or establish water rights. As such, 

the statute clearly is permissive and fails to provide the 

necessary law under the "meaningful" or "substantive" standards 

tests in either Chaney or Webster. 

Sierra Club also points to two provisions of the Wilderness 

Act as supplying the necessary law. The first is the 

congressional statement of purpose, which states in relevant part: 

[Wilderness areas] shall be administered for the use and 

enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will 

leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as 

wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of 

these areas, [and] the preservation of their wilderness 

character . . . . 

16 u.s.c. § 1131(a). The second provision establishes guidelines 

for agency management of the wilderness areas. 

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter each 

agency administering any area designated as wilderness 

shall be responsible for preserving the wilderness 

character of the area and shall so administer such area 

for such other purposes for which it may have been 

established as also to preserve its wilderness 

character. Except as otherwise provided in this 

chapter, wilderness areas shall be devoted to the public 

purposes of recreation, scenic, scientific, educational, 

conservaton, and historical use. 

16 u.s.c. § 1133(b). 

We agree with Sierra Club that these sections provide law to 

apply, albeit limited. Section 1133(b) imposes an affirmative 

duty on the Forest Service to administer the wilderness areas so 

as "to preserve [their] wilderness character." If the Forest 

Service were, by its inaction, to permit strip-mining, road 

construction, or other action directly inconsistent with the 

Wilderness Act, this court could review that inaction. Our Sierra 

Club~ Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (lOth Cir. 1988), decision stands for 

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... 

this proposition. In Hodel, we found law to apply in the 

prohibition by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 

("FLPMA"), Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744, on "unnecessary or 

undue degradation" and its imposition of a duty to define and 

protect "roadless" areas of 5,000 or more acres having wilderness 

characteristics as defined by the Wilderness Act. Id. at 1074-76. 

"Roadless" was defined in the Department of Interior regulations. 

Because the challenge involved a road right-of-way, the "roadless" 

provision was directly implicated and provided judicially 

manageable standards. We concluded: 

Sierra Club alleges that [Bureau of Land 

Management] has refused to take action which would 

prevent a road from invading and redefining the 

boundaries of two [Wilderness Study Areas ("WSAs")]. 

The federal courts are capable of determining whether a 

WSA has remained "roadless," and whether the boundaries 

of public lands and rights-of-way will be breached. A 

court can measure whether the improvement of the Burr 

Trail will "impair the suitability of [WSAs] for 

preservation as wilderness" or will cause "unnecessary 

or undue degradation." 

Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1076. 

There is no provision similar to the "roadless" criterion in 

Hodel to support review in this case. Sierra Club can only point 

to the preservation language in the congressional statement of 

policy and the statutory management guidelines. This language, 

without more, does not provide meaningful or substantive standards 

for us to review agency land management practices unless the 

practices are irreconcilable with the statutory preservation 

mandate imposed by the Wilderness Act. The Wilderness Act does 

not specify guidelines for agency management of water resources 

and water rights; indeed, the Act does not speak to them at all. 

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.. 

Nor does Sierra Club point to any binding regulations that limit 

the Forest Service's discretion in managing the wilderness waters 

or, more specifically, water rights in wilderness areas. Compare 

this case with Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1076 (FLPMA's imposition of duty 

to protect roadless areas with wilderness characteristics, when 

coupled with Interior's regulations defining roadless and 

Wilderness Act's definition of wilderness, gives law to apply),and 

Kola, Inc. ~ United States, 882 F.2d 361, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(Forest Service's adoption of standards for consideration of 

special use permits, 36 C.F.R. § 251.54-.56, is adequate law to 

apply). 

The danger that agencies may not carry out their 

delegated powers with sufficient vigor does not 

necessarily lead to the conclusion that the courts are 

the most appropriate body to police this aspect of their 

performance. That decision is in the first instance for 

Congress, and we therefore turn to the [Act] to 

determine whether in this case Congress has provided us 

with "law to apply." If it has indicated an intent to 

circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, and has 

provided meaningful standards for defining the limits of 

that discretion, there is "law to apply" under 

§ 701(a)(2), and courts may require that the agency 

follow that law; if it has not, then an agency refusal 

to institute proceedings is a decision "committed to 

agency discretion by law" within the meaning of that 

section. 

Chaney, 470 u.s. at 834-35. We do not sit as "monitors of the 

wisdom and soundness of Executive action," Laird~ Tatum, 408 

U.S. 1, 15 (1972), nor may we substitute our judgment for that of 

the agency, cf. Overton Park, 401 u.s. at 416. Because the 

Wilderness Act does not provide meaningful standards to review all 

land and water management decisions, we hold that the Forest 

Service's decision to use or not to use federal reserved water 

rights allegedly created by the Wilderness Act is "committed to 

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agency discretion by law," except in those situations where the . \. 

agency's conduct cannot be reconciled with the Act's mandate to 

preserve the wilderness character of the wilderness areas. We 

conclude that we should not review the Forest Service's land and 

water management decisions unless Sierra Club has shown such an 

irreconcilable threat to the Wilderness Act's preservation 

mandate. 5 

B. Is This Issue Ripe for Decision? 

Review of the Forest Service's inaction is available only if 

its inaction is irreconcilable with the Act's mandate to preserve 

the wilderness character of the wilderness areas. Determining 

whether the statutory mandate is so threatened requires evaluation 

of the extent and immediacy of the alleged harm, possible agency 

responses, and the probable efficacy of such responses. Because 

of the contextual nature of such an inquiry, we must determine 

whether the challenge is ripe for adjudication at this time. 

1. The Ripeness Standard. 

The law of ripeness was authoritatively restated by the 

Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories ~ Gardner, 387 u.s. 136 

5 The defendant intervenors contend that the Forest Service's 

inaction in this case is an agency decision not to enforce that 

falls within the Chaney presumption of unreviewability. See 

Chaney, 470 u.s. at 832. We reach the same result applying the 

Chaney presumption of unreviewability. The Chaney Court 

explicitly stated that "the presumption [of unreviewability] may 

be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines 

for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers." 

Id. at 832-33. We determined above that the Wilderness Act does 

provide guidelines the agency must follow: the agency cannot 

abandon, by action or inaction, the statutory mandate to preserve 

the wilderness characteristics of the wilderness areas. To the 

extent the Forest Service's inaction implicates this command of 

the Wilderness Act, the Chaney presumption of unreviewability is 

rebutted and we may review the agency's action. See id. 

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. \. 

(1967). Abbott Laboratories involved a challenge brought by 

pharmaceutical manufacturers to FDA regulations requiring the use 

of the "established name" in addition to the proprietary or trade 

name any time those latter names were used. The manufacturers 

contended that the FDA Commissioner had exceeded his authority. 

The Court concluded that the challenge was ripe and the regulation 

reviewable. In reaching this result, the Court held that the 

purpose of the ripeness doctrine is: 

to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature 

adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract 

disagreements over administrative policies, and also to 

protect the agencies from judicial interference until an 

administrative decision has been formalized and its 

effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging 

parties. 

Abbott Laboratories, 387 u.s. at 148-49. The Court proposed a 

two-factor test to guide the ripeness inquiry: "The problem is 

best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the 

fitness of the issue for judicial resolution and the hardship to 

the parties of withholding judicial consideration." Id. at 149. 

In determining whether an issue is fit for judicial resolution, 

the Court considered whether the issue was purely legal and 

whether the agency action was final. Id. at 149-52. In 

evaluating possible hardship to the parties the Court considered 

whether the regulations had: (1) a direct impact on the day-today business activities of the parties challenging the 

regulations; and (2) the possible harms to the parties of delaying 

consideration. Id. at 152-55. Although the FDA had not yet 

enforced the regulations, the Court concluded that the case was 

ripe because the legislation at issue produced "an immediate and 

20 

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significant change in the plaintiffs' conduct of their affairs 

with serious penalties attached to noncompliance ..•. " Id. at 

153. 

In Toilet Goods Association ~ Gardner (Toilet Goods !l, 387 

U.S. 158 (1967), the Court applied the same test, but with a 

different result. Toilet Goods I involved a challenge by 

manufacturers to an FDA regulation permitting the FDA Commissioner 

to suspend certification if FDA inspectors were refused access to 

manufacturing facilities and certain records. As in Abbott 

Laboratories, the Court found the issue presented was purely legal 

and also constituted "final agency action." Id. at 162-63. 

Nevertheless, the Court found that the issue was not fit for 

judicial resolution. 

These points which support the appropriateness of 

judicial resolution are, however, outweighed by other 

considerations. The regulation serves notice only that 

the Commissioner may under certain circumstances order 

inspection of certain facilities and data, and that 

further certification of additives may be refused to 

those who decline to permit a duly authorized inspection 

until they have complied in that regard. At this 

juncture we have no idea whether or when such an 

inspection will be ordered and what reasons the 

Commissioner will give to justify his order. The 

statutory authority asserted for the regulation is the 

power to promulgate regulations "for the efficient 

enforcement" of the Act, § 701 (a). Whether the 

regulation is justified thus depends not only, as 

petitioners appear to suggest, on whether Congress 

refused to include a specific section of the Act 

authorizing such inspections, although this factor is to 

be sure a highly relevant one, but also on whether the 

statutory scheme as a whole justified the promulgation 

of the regulation. This will depend not merely on an 

inquiry into statutory purpose, but concurrently on an 

understanding of what types of enforcement problems are 

encountered by the FDA, the need for various sorts of 

supervision in order to effectuate the goals of the Act, 

and the safeguards devised to protect legitimate trade 

secrets. We believe that judicial appraisal of these 

factors is likely to stand on a much surer footing in 

21 

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the context of a specific application of this regulation 

than could be the case in the framework of the 

generalized challenge made here. 

Id. at 163-64 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). The 

Court cautioned against decision where the harm was contingent 

upon uncertain or speculative future administrative action. With 

respect to the second Abbott Laboratories factor, the Court found 

that the regulation in Toilet Goods I did not constitute the type 

of direct interference in day-to-day business that demonstrates 

hardship to the parties. The Court also emphasized that no 

irremediable adverse consequences flowed from postponing judicial 

review pending the actual invocation of the access regulations by 

the FDA. See id. at 165. 

Abbott Laboratories establishes the central purpose of the 

ripeness doctrine and provides a two factor test to guide its 

application. Toilet Goods I amplifies the decision in Abbott 

Laboratories and cautions against a mechanical interpretation of 

the two factor test, emphasizing instead the inappropriateness of 

judicial intervention where administrative action is contingent 

and dependent on context. This flexible approach has continued in 

cases applying Abbott Laboratories. In Wheeler~ Barrera, 417 

u.s. 402 (1974), the Supreme Court found that a challenge to 

Missouri's compliance with Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 

Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, was ripe 

while an Establishment Clause challenge was not. The Court 

emphasized that the state could comply with Title I in several 

different ways and that the constitutional questions "may vary 

according to the precise contours of the plan that is formulated." 

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Id. at 426. The Court declined to address the Establishment 

Clause issue until the state adopted its plan. In Babbitt ~ 

United Farm Workers National Union, 442 u.s. 289 (1979), the Court 

found first and fourteenth amendment challenges to the Arizona 

Agricultural Employement Relations Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 

23-1381 to 23-1395 (Supp. 1978), ripe because of their chilling 

effect upon speech, but held that challenges to a provision 

permitting employers to refuse labor organizations access to 

employees was not ripe because it was impossible to know how 

access would be denied. "We can only hypothesize that such an 

event will come to pass, and it is only on this basis that the 

constitutional claim could be adjudicated at this time." Id. at 

304. Adjudication was inappropriate until the labor organizations 

could "assert an interest in seeking access to particular 

facilities as well as a palpable basis for believe that access 

will be refused." Id. 

In Pacific Gas ~ Electric Co. ~ State Energy Resources 

Conservation~ Development Commission, 461 u.s. 190 (1983), the 

Court considered challenges to California's moratorium on nuclear 

power plant construction, which would last until the named 

Commission found "that the United States through its authorized 

agency has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology for 

the disposal of high-level nuclear waste," id. at 198 (quoting 

Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 25524.2(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983)), 

and that on a case-by-case basis there is adequate capacity for 

storage of spent fuel rods, id. at 197 (citing Cal. Pub. Res. Code 

Ann. § 25524.1(b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983)). The Court found that 

23 

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the challenge to section 25524.2 was ripe because it was 

predominantly legal and delay would work a substantial hardship to 

the parties. Id. at 201-02. The challenge to the section 

25524.l(b) storage regulations, however, was not ripe. 

Particularly significant in the Court's view was the fact that 

section 25524.l(b) operated on a case-by-case basis and that "we 

cannot know whether the Energy Commission will ever find a nuclear 

power plant's storage capacity to be inadequate." Id. at 203. 

Taken together, Abbott Laboratories, Toilet Goods I, Wheeler, 

Babbitt, and Pacific Gas define the contours of the ripeness 

doctrine. Abbott Laboratories establishes the test; the other 

cases guide our interpretation of the two factors and caution 

against a rigid or mechanical application of a flexible and often 

context-specific doctrine. 

2. Application of the Ripeness Standard 

With this understanding of the ripeness doctrine, we consider 

Sierra Club's request for a declaratory judgment that the 

Wilderness Act establishes federal reserved water rights. Because 

we can only review Forest Service actions that are irreconcilable 

with the statutory preservation mandate, the question thus 

presented to us is whether the Forest Service's failure to assert 

wilderness water rights is irreconcilable with its duties under 

the Wilderness Act. 

We begin our ripeness analysis by applying the two factor 

Abbott Laboratories test. Under the fitness for judicial 

resolution factor, the Court in Abbott Laboratories considered 

both the legal nature of the question presented and the finality 

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of the administrative action in making its decision. One aspect 

of the question presented by Sierra Club -- whether the Wilderness 

Act creates federal reserved water rights -- is undoubtedly legal. 

See, ~' United States ~New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978) 

(scope of federal reserved water rights turns on congressional 

intent); Cappaert ~United States, 426 u.s. 128, 138 (1976) 

(reserved water rights can arise by implication from reservations 

of land). The other aspect of the question presented to us--

whether federal reserved water rights are necessary to preserve 

the wilderness characteristics of the wilderness areas -- is 

either a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact. 

Although Sierra Club submitted affidavits alleging that federal 

reserved water rights are necessary to preserve the wilderness 

characteristics of the Colorado wilderness areas, the Forest 

Service's second report generally denies the existence of any 

threat to the wilderness areas, see second report, at 5-10, apps. 

II, III, and asserts that other administrative measures could 

adequately address the preservation of wilderness characteristics. 

See id. at 10-18. Where disputed facts exist and the issue is not 

purely legal, greater caution is required prior to concluding that 

an issue is ripe for review. See Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 426-27 

(legal implications may vary with contours of state's plan); 

Toilet Goods I, 387 u.s. at 163-64 (validity of regulation, 

enacted pursuant to statute permitting promulgation of regulations 

"for the efficient enforcement" of the act in question, depends in 

part on factual basis asserted in justification of regulation). 

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In assessing the fitness for judicial resolution factor of 

the Abbott Laboratories test, we also consider the finality of the 

Forest Service's conduct. Administrative finality is interpreted 

pragmatically. Abbott Laboratories, 387 u.s. at 149. An 

administrative decision is final when it is definitive rather than 

tentative, id. at 151, when it has a "direct and innnediate . . . 

effect on the day-to-day business" of the parties, id. at 152, and 

when it has "the status of law" and requires immediate compliance, 

id. In FTC~ Standard Oil Co., 449 u.s. 232, 239-40 (1980), the 

Court heavily emphasized that an administrative complaint filed by 

the FTC was not "definitive" final agency action. The Court held 

that a complaint served merely to institute agency action and had 

"no legal force comparable to that of the regulation at issue in 

Abbott Laboratories." Id. at 242. More recently, in Lujan~ 

National Wildlife Federation, 496 U.S. ---, 58 U.S.L.W. 5077 (June 

27, 1990), the Supreme Court concluded that the Department of the 

Interior's "land withdrawal review program," which involved 

hundreds of decisions reclassifying federal lands, did not 

constitute "'agency action' within the meaning of [28 u.s.c. 

section] 702, much less 'final agency action' within the meaning 

of [28 u.s.c. section] 704." 58 u.s.L.W. at 5082. Instead, the 

Court ruled that the individual classification decisions were the 

final agency action. 

In light of these cases, the finality of the Forest Service's 

action in this case is uncertain. The Forest Service's principal 

position is not that federal reserved water rights do not exist, 

but rather that their assertion at this time is unnecessary and 

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possibly counterproductive. Indeed, the Forest Service stated in 

the second report that the assertion of federal reserved water 

rights based on the Wilderness Act was a possible option. 6 See 

second report, at 14. It is thus difficult to say that the Forest 

Service has reached a "final decision" given its possible 

acceptance of a wilderness water right in an appropriate case. 

Even if we were to rule in favor of Sierra Club's request for 

a declaratory judgment that the Wilderness Act creates federal 

reserved water rights, the Forest Service is not obligated to 

assert those rights in the absence of a threat to the wilderness 

characteristics of the Colorado wilderness areas. Sierra Club 

could thus be forced to litigate once again to show that the 

Forest Service's inaction violated the preservation duty imposed 

by the Act. The Court has cautioned against finding finality 

where judicial "[i]ntervention leads to piecemeal review which at 

the least is inefficient and upon completion of the agency process 

might prove to have been unnecessary." Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 

at 242 (citing McGee~ United States, 402 u.s. 479, 484 (1971); 

McKart ~United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969)). In this case, 

because of our limited scope of review, the possibility that the 

Forest Service's position may change when presented with an actual 

case of imminent harm, and the possibility of piecemeal 

litigation, we find that this case is not fit for judicial 

resolution at this time. 

6 We note, however, that this statement, while not inconsistent 

with the Forest Service's initial position, was reached after 

substantial proceedings had already taken place in the district 

court. 

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We next apply the second factor of the Abbott Laboratories 

test, which turns on the hardship to the parties of withholding 

judicial consideration. We conclude that delaying consideration 

until there is a more imminent threat to wilderness water values 

does not impose a substantial hardship on the parties. Such delay 

benefits the government by allowing it to pursue its alternative 

program of protecting wilderness water values. Nor does such a 

delay prejudice Sierra Club, which can seek judicial review when a 

threat to wilderness statutory mandate is imminent. 

Deferring a decision is even more compelling given the 

provision in Colorado water law permitting parties asserting a 

claim to water rights to intervene in a general water rights 

adjudication during that calendar year while still preserving 

their relative priority date vis-a-vis the other parties in the 

adjudication. See Bell ~ United States, 724 P.2d 631, 641-42 

(Colo. 1986) (en bane); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-306 (1973). When 

and if a water development claim that may threaten wilderness 

water values is filed, and the Forest Service does not assert a 

federal reserved water right based on the Wilderness Act, and 

furthermore such failure to assert the reserved water right is 

irreconcilable with the Forest Service's duty to protect 

wilderness characteristics, then the Sierra Club may either 

intervene in the state water proceeding as appropriate under state 

law or may seek judicial review of the Forest Service's failure to 

act in federal court. At that time the record will be more fully 

developed and the courts can better determine whether the Forest 

Service's proposed alternatives to the use of wilderness water 

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•' 

rights are adequate to reconcile its actions with its obligations 

under the Act. If the proposed alternatives are not adequate, 

appropriate corrective orders can be issued. 

Our conclusion is bolstered by the speculative and contingent 

nature of the harm in this case. Because of the limited scope of 

review provided by the Wilderness Act, only agency conduct that is 

irreconcilable with the statutory mandate to preserve the 

wilderness characteristics of the Colorado wilderness areas will 

invoke judicial review. Yet Sierra Club has not even contended 

that the wilderness water values are themselves imminently and 

directly threatened in this case. Instead, Sierra Club contends 

only that the federal reserved water rights that protect these 

wilderness water values are threatened by the operation of the 

Colorado postponement doctrine, 7 which may subordinate the 

priority of wilderness water rights if the Forest Service fails to 

assert the rights in the state water courts. See, e.g., Bell, 724 

P.2d at 641-42 (explaining operation of postponement doctrine); 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-306. 

7 Briefly stated, the Colorado postponement doctrine provides 

that holders of senior conditional water rights (which are similar 

to federal reserved water rights, see Navajo Development Co. ~ 

Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1982) (en bane)), may lose 

their priority to junior conditional appropriators who adjudicate 

their rights first if the senior conditional appropriators do not 

intervene in the same calendar year. See Bell, 724 P.2d at 641-

42; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-306. For example, if a senior 

conditional appropriator with a priority date of 1907 did not 

appear in an adjudication started by a junior conditional 

appropriator with a priority date of 1976, the junior 

appropriator's conditional right would become absolute on 

adjudication and have priority over the senior appropriator's 

conditional right. 

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Sierra Club has not, however, shown that even if the alleged 

federal reserved water rights created under the Wilderness Act are 

threatened, that then the wilderness water values themselves are 

threatened. Nor does that conclusion inevitably follow. First, 

federal reserved water rights, as creatures of federal law, are 

protected from extinguishment under state law by the Supremacy 

Clause, u.s. Canst. art. VI. See United States ~ City~ County 

of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 34-35 (Colo. 1983) (en bane); Navajo 

Development Co. ~ Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Colo. 1982) (en 

bane). Second, even if federal reserved water rights are subject 

to postponement under Colorado law as held by Bell, there is no 

guarantee that the point of any diversion will be above or within 

the wilderness areas, where the direct impact of such change in 

water rights status would be the greatest. Absent a diversion 

within or above the wilderness area, it is difficult to see what 

harm might befall the wilderness water values that a wilderness 

water right could prevent. Third, the Forest Service contends 

that there are either adequate administrative controls in place 

that will prevent diversions above or within wilderness area or 

that geographical features render such diversions or projects 

impractical in areas within or above the wilderness areas. See 

second report, at 10-19. Fourth, there is no guarantee that any 

diversion which might occur in or above a wilderness area would 

even have a noticeable impact on wilderness water values. The 

mere statement of the contingencies that must occur before Sierra 

Club's asserted harms to wilderness water values will occur even 

if there are water appropriations underscores the speculative and 

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hypothetical nature of this issue. Based on these considerations, 

we conclude that there is simply no showing of a harm with the 

necessary degree of magnitude or imminence that would justify a 

finding that the Forest Service's conduct is irreconcilable with 

its duty to preserve the wilderness characteristics of the 

wilderness areas. Accordingly, we find that judicial intervention 

is inappropriate at this time. 

We hold that this case is not ripe for adjudication. Both 

factors of the Abbott Laboratories test as well as the speculative 

and contingent nature of the harm support our conclusion that 

judicial intervention is inappropriate in this case. The 

contingency of any harm on the Forest Service's choice of 

alternatives makes this case indistinguishable from other cases 

where the Court had found ripeness lacking. In Toilet Goods I, as 

in this case, the Court found that where the harm and 

justification for action are both contingent on future 

administrative action, adjudication should be postponed. See 

Toilet Goods I, 387 u.s. at 163-64. Nor was judicial resolution 

appropriate in Wheeler, where the Court found, as is the case 

here, that the statutory or constitutional implications of the 

agency's action depended on the contours of the agency's actual 

choice of action and hence could not be decided in the abstract. 

See Wheeler, 417 u.s. at 426. See also Babbitt, 442 u.s. at 303-

05 (issue unripe where First Amendment claim "depends inextricably 

upon the attributes of the situs involved" and no access has yet 

been denied to any particular situs); Blanchette~ Connecticut 

Gen. Ins. Corps. (Regional Rail Reorganization Cases), 419 U.S. 

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. ' 

102, 145-49 (1974) (valuation controversy unripe because "it 

cannot be determined now what impact any particular theory of 

valuation may have when applied . . . nor can we know where the 

interests of the parties lie."). Sierra Club is seeking to invoke 

judicial relief based largely on speculation and hypotheticals. 

This we will not do. The federal courts do not render advisory 

opinions. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. ~Haworth, 300 u.s. 227, 239-

41 (1937). 8 

Finally, we note that our determination is supported by the 

Supreme Court's recent decision in Lujan, 58 U.S.L.W. 5077. In 

Lujan, the National Wildlife Federation sought to challenge the 

Department of the Interior's "land withdrawal review program," 

which consisted of hundreds of administrative decisions 

reclassifying federal lands. The Court emphasized: 

a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of 

agency action "ripe" for judicial review under the APA 

until the scope of the controversy has been reduced to 

more manageable proportions, and its factual components 

fleshed out, by some concrete action applying the 

regulation to the claimant's situation in a fashion that 

harms or threatens to harm him. 

8 Prudential considerations also come into play. Declaratory 

judgments are an equitable remedy and are not granted of right, 

but only at the sound discretion of the court. See Public Affairs 

Assocs. ~ Rickover, 369 u.s. 111, 112 (1962); accord Hewitt~ 

Helms, 482 u.s. 755, 762 (1987) ("The fact that a court can enter 

a declaratory judgment does not mean that it should." (emphasis in 

original)). The Supreme Court has cautioned that important issues 

of public law should not be decided by declaratory judgment in the 

absence of need. Kleppe ~New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546-47 

(1976); Rickover, 369 u.s. at 112. Because the existence of 

federal reserved water rights based on the Wilderness Act is an 

important public issue of great moment in Colorado, and because of 

the uncertain and tenuous nature of the record, we conclude that 

forbearance is justified in this case. 

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Id. at 5082-83. The Court then reviewed the nature of the 

challenged "program" and determined that because the program 

included hundreds of individual administrative decisions that it 

was neither final agency action nor ripe for judicial review. The 

Court concluded: 

But it is at least entirely certain that the flaws in 

the entire "program" -- consisting principally of the 

many individual actions referenced in the complaint, and 

presumably actions yet to be taken as well -- cannot be 

laid before the courts for wholesale correction under 

the APA, simply because one of them that is ripe for 

review adversely affects one of respondent's members. 

The case-by-case approach that this requires is 

understandably frustrating to an organization such as 

respondent, which has as its objecive across-the-board 

protection of our Nation's wildlife and the streams and 

forests that support it. But this is the traditional, 

and remains the normal, mode of operation of the courts. 

Except where Congress explicitly provides for our 

correction of the administrative process at a higher 

level of generality, we intervene in the administration 

of the laws only when, and to the extent that, a 

specific "final agency action" has an actual or 

immediately threatened effect. 

Id. at 5083 (citations and footnote omitted). We find this case 

to be similar to Luian. Both cases involve challenges to the 

cumulative effect of numerous agency actions that allegedly render 

the actions illegal. Both cases involve conjectural or 

speculative harms to the challenger. In light of the Supreme 

Court's decision in Lujan, we cannot say that Sierra Club's 

challenge to the Forest Service's administration of the wilderness 

areas is ripe for review. 

Therefore, because we find that the issues are not fit for 

judicial resolution, that the hardships to the parties of delaying 

judicial considerations are outweighed by the advantages of 

waiting for development of a full record, and that the harm sought 

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to be alleviated is remote and speculative so that we would be 

rendering an advisory opinion, we hold that this case is not ripe 

for adjudication. The district court erred in taking jurisdiction 

and declaring that the Wilderness Act creates federal reserved 

water rights. 

c. What Is the Proper Relief? 

The government contends that since the judgment of the 

district court is an "advisory opinion," we should vacate not only 

the appeal and judgment in this case but also the district court's 

orders to the Forest Service to prepare the first and second 

reports. We disagree. 

A federal court has jurisdiction to determine its 

jurisdiction. Familia de Boom~ Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 

1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981). 

It is well established that the district court may hold an 

evidentiary hearing or make other orders necessary to evaluate its 

jurisdiction. See Sherman ~American Fed'n of Musicians, 588 

F.2d 1313, 1314 (lOth Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 825 

(1979). Jurisdiction in this case includes determining 

reviewability. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(2) & 702. It is also well 

established that a district court may require an agency to 

supplement the administrative record, see Overton Park, 401 U.S. 

at 420, and prepare a statement of reasons for its position or 

explain its position, ~ Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. ~ FERC, 

782 F.2d 730, 746 (7th Cir. 1986); Environmental Defense Fund~ 

Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1971))· In our view, 

the district court's orders directing the preparation of the 

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•• 

reports are based at least in part on the need to determine 

jurisdiction. See Sierra Club ~ Block, 622 F. Supp. at 865. The 

district court needed the information presented in the reports to 

determine whether the Forest Service had consciously abdicated its 

statutory responsibilities, see Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4; Adams 

~ Richardson, 480 F.2d at 1163-64, and to determine the nature of 

the harm asserted. We also needed the information contained in 

the reports to evaluate our jurisdiction in this case. Therefore, 

to the extent the reports were used to determine jurisdiction, we 

hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

ordering their preparation. Because we hold that this case is not 

ripe for adjudication, the Forest Service is not bound by the 

policy statements contained in the reports, although the reports 

remain part of the record of this case. 

III. 

This case is not ripe for adjudication because the harm which 

is the basis of Sierra Club's claim to reviewability is 

speculative and contingent, the issues are not fit for judicial 

resolution, and prudential concerns counsel forbearance. The 

district court therefore erred in granting declaratory judgment 

that the Wilderness Act created federal reserved water rights. 

Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal, VACATE the judgment of the 

district court and REMAND with directions to dismiss the complaint 

as not ripe for adjudication. 

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• 

Nos. 88-2777, 88-2871, 88-2918, 88-2920, 88-2922, Sierra Club v. i Yeutter 

THEIS, Senior District Judge, concurring. 

Although I fully concur in the opinion and lucid analysis of 

the authored opinion, I write separately only to emphasize aspects 

of our decision that I deem particularly significant. 

We have determined that the Wilderness Act does provide 

limited guidelines by which courts may review the action or 

inaction of the Forest Service. As our opinion notes, judicial 

review extends to conduct of the agency that represents an 

abdication of its "statutory mandate to preserve the wilderness 

characteristics of the wilderness areas." Supra, at note 5. It 

is obvious to me that if and when any future threat to the 

wilderness areas results from the Forest Service's refusal to 

assert implied water rights, the very assumption of review under 

this standard should be a fair indication of the decision to 

follow. Congress withdrew and reserved such areas for the express 

purpose of providing "for the protection of these areas [and] the 

preservation of their wilderness character," 16 U.s.c. § 1131(a), 

and commanded that they "be devoted to the public purposes of 

recreation, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and 

historical use." Id. at§ 1133(b). Unless one can take seriously 

defendant-intervenors' suggestion that Congress created the 

wilderness areas with such specific language, but did not intend 

to reserve enough water to fulfill thei~ central purpose, I 

believe that the conclusion of the district court may well be 

vindicated in the appropriate case. 

Appellate Case: 88-2777 Document: 01019370330 Date Filed: 08/10/1990 Page: 36 
.. 

The opinion also observes that Colorado's postponement 

doctrine will not defeat any implied rights to wilderness waters 

reserved by the federal government under the Wilderness Act. 

Supra at note 7 and accompanying text. Thus, the intentional 

refusal or "benign neglect," Sierra Club Y...:.. Block, 622 F. Supp. 

842, 865 (D. Colo. 1985), of the federal government timely to 

adjudicate the issue of prior reserved rights to wilderness waters 

should not operate to extinguish any superior federal rights. If 

Forest Service inaction becomes incompatible with its statutory 

mandate to protect and preserve the wilderness character of these 

areas, "the Sierra Club may either intervene in the state water 

proceeding . . . or may seek judicial review . . . in federal 

court." Supra, at page 28. I read this statement as a 

repudiation of defendants' argument that under the McCarran 

Amendment, 43 u.s.c § 666, entertainment of this issue in federal 

court would never be appropriate in the face of ongoing stream 

adjudications in state court. 

-2-

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