Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02213/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02213-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

DONALD w. FLYNN, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

FI LED 

United St:ites wurt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

rl~i~'/ 1 6 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

NO. 88-2213 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Third Party PlaintiffAppellee, 

v. 

JOYCE ROBERTSON, 

Third Party Defendant-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 86-C-0354W) 

Paul w. Mortensen, (Robert H. Wilde, Cook & Wilde, P.C., Midvale, 

Utah, with him on the brief), Moab, Utah, for PlaintiffsAppellants. 

Dee V. Benson, United States Attorney (Brent D. Ward, United States 

Attorney and Joseph w. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney, 

on the brief) , Salt Lake city, Utah, for Defendant-Third Party 

Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America. 

Darwin C. Hansen, Hansen & Crist, Bountiful, Utah, for Third Party 

Defendant-Appellee Joyce Robertson. 

Before SEYMOUR, BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and THEIS,* District 

Judge. 

THEIS, District Judge 

1 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 1
*The Honorable Frank G. Theis, District Judge, United States 

District court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Plaintiffs appeal from the district court's grant of summary 

judgment in favor of defendant United states of America and third 

party defendant Joyce Robertson. Plaintiffs brought this action 

against the United States of America pursuant to the Federal Tort 

Claims Act for the wrongful death of their decedent. R. Vol. I, 

Doc. 1. The United States filed a third party complaint against, 

among others, third party defendant Joyce Robertson. R. Vol. I, 

Doc. 23. Subsequently, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add 

a claim of negligence directly against Joyce Robertson. R. Vol. 

I, Doc. 28. 

summarized from the district court's opinion, the undisputed 

facts are as follows. In the evening of March 13, 1985, Helga 

Robertson ("Helga") was driving southbound on Highway 191, a four 

lane highway, south of Moab, Utah. Helga's sister-in-law, Joyce 

Robertson ("Joyce") , was a passenger in Helga's vehicle. At 

approximately 7:50 p.m., Helga's car struck Betty Daniels 

("Daniels") while Daniels was walking across Highway 191. Helga's 

vehicle came to rest on the center lines of the highway. Joyce 

told Helga to move the car to the side of the road to prevent the 

car from being struck. Helga moved the car to the side of the 

road. She and Joyce then returned to the center of the road to 

assist Daniels. Joyce directed traffic. 

Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs' decedent Joan Flynn ("Flynn") 

arrived at the accident scene. Flynn was driving a van northbound 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 2
on Highway 191. Flynn stopped her van near Daniels in the outside 

lane of the highway and turned on the van's emergency flashing 

lights. Flynn went to the assistance of Daniels, who was near the 

center line of the highway. Joyce then went to call for help. 

Within minutes of this first accident, three National Park 

Service (NPS) employees were driving southbound on Highway 191 in 

an NPS truck equipped with emergency lights and siren. The NPS 

employees were travelling to a training session. The NPS employees 

came upon the scene of the accident, which is outside the 

boundaries of the National Park System. The driver, Cornelius, 

pulled the vehicle over to the shoulder and turned on the emergency 

lights as the vehicle slowed to a stop. As Cornelius turned on the 

lights, he activated the siren for a few seconds. 

A few seconds after the NPS vehicle arrived on the scene, a 

pickup truck driven by Kenneth Partridge swerved into Helga 

Robertson, Joan Flynn, and Betty Daniels, all three of whom were 

positioned in the middle of the highway. Partridge was driving in 

a southbound lane at approximately 52 miles per hour in a 45 miles 

per hour zone. Partridge testified that he had been following the 

NPS truck and swerved into the center of the highway when he saw 

the brake lights of the NPS truck flash on. Partridge testified 

that he was distracted by the overhead emergency lights on the NPS 

vehicle. 

The district court specifically found that several other 

factors impaired Partridge's ability to respond to the initial 

accident. First, the night was dark and the highway was unlighted. 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 3
Second, Partridge was speeding. Third, he was legally intoxicated. 

(Partridge subsequently pleaded no ·contest to two counts of 

negligent homicide). All three women died--at least two of them, 

Joan Flynn and Helga Robertson, by the collision caused by 

Partridge. R. Vol. I, Doc. 127, at pp. 3-6. 

Plaintiffs claimed that Joyce Robertson was negligent in 

causing the first accident, by distracting Helga, and in causing 

Flynn's, death by causing Helga to move the car from the middle of 

the highway, thus leaving Daniels and the rescuers exposed to 

danger. Plaintiffs claimed that the NPS employees were negligent 

in failing to place their vehicle in a position where it would 

block traffic from striking Daniels and the rescuers, in stopping 

their vehicle on the side of the road away from the accident, in 

activating their emergency lights thereby distracting other 

drivers, in activating their siren and emergency lights thereby 

distracting the pedestrians, and in having the controls to the 

emergency lights and siren improperly installed. Plaintiffs also 

claimed the United States was negligent in failure to train the NPS 

officers regarding the safe and proper use of emergency equipment 

and in entrusting the emergency vehicie to the NPS employees. R. 

Vol. I, Docs. 1, 28, 79. 

The district court held that the NPS employees owed no duty 

to Flynn; that Utah's Good Samaritan Act exonerated them; that the 

discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act 

barred the claims relating to NPS supervisory personnel for failure 

to train; and that the Good Samaritan Act immunized Joyce Robertson 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 4
from liability. R. Vol. I, Doc. 127, at pp. 8-23. The district 

court denied the plaintif~s• motion for reconsideration. R. Vol. 

I, Doc. 144. Judgment was entered in favor of the United States 

and Joyce Robertson. R. Vol. I, Doc. 148. Plaintiffs appeal. We 

affirm the summary judgment in favor of the United States. 

Plaintiffs' complaint against Joyce Robertson must be dismissed for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

We review an order granting or denying summary judgment under 

the same standard applied by the trial court in determining whether 

summary judgment is proper. United States v. Gammache, 713 F.2d 

588, 594 ( 10th cir. 1983) . summary judgment is proper if the 

record before the court shows that "there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. civ. P. 56(c). 

A. Liability Under Utah Law 

The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"}, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 

2671-2680, makes the United States liable on tort claims under 

those circumstances in which a private individual would be liable 

under state law. The court must apply the law of the place where 

the alleged negligence occurred. Ewell v. United States, 776 F.2d 

246, 248 (10th Cir. 1985). We therefore look to Utah law to 

determine whether the United states is liable to the plaintiffs. 

Under Utah law, an essential element of a negligence claim is 

a duty of reasonable care owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. 

Beach v. University. of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986). 

Generally, the law does not impose upon a party the affirmative 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 5
duty to care for another. The law does impose upon a party the 

affirmative duty to act only when certain special relationships 

exist. These special relationships generally arise when a party 

assumes responsibility for another's safety or deprives another of 

the normal opportunities for self-protection. Id. Before the NPS 

employees may he held liable for negligence, it must be determined 

that they owed a duty of care to plaintiffs' decedent. The 

district court held that no duty of care existed and that if a duty 

arose as a result of their acts in rendering aid, the Utah Good 

Samaritan Act shielded them from liability. 

Plaintiffs argue that the NPS employees were subject to 

certain statutory duties. Plaintiffs quote 16 u.s.c. § la-6(a), 

which they assert gave the NPS employees authority to investigate 

the accident which in turn gave rise to a corresponding duty to 

render competent assistance. The statute provides: 

In addition to any other authority conferred by law, the 

Secretary of the Interior is authorized to designate, 

pursuant to standards prescribed in regulations by the 

Secretary, certain officers or employees of the 

Department of the Interior who shall maintain law arid 

order and protect persons and property within areas of 

the National Park System. In the performance of such 

duties, the officers or employees, so designated, may-

(1) carry firearms and make arrests without 

warrant for any offense against the United 

States committed in his presence, or for any 

felony cognizable under the laws of the United 

States if he has reasonable grounds to believe 

that the person to be arrested has committed 

or is committing such felony, provided such 

arrest occur within that system or the person 

to be arrested is fleeing therefrom to avoid 

arrest; 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 6
(2) execute any warrant or other process 

issued by a court or officer of competent 

jurisdiction for the enforcement of the 

provisions of any Federal law or regulation 

issued pursuant to law arising out of an 

offense committed in that system or, where the 

person subject to the warrant or process is in 

that system, in connection with any Federal 

offense; and 

(3) conduct investigations of offenses against 

the United states committed in that system·in 

the absence of investigation thereof by any 

other Federal law enforcement agency having 

investigative jurisdiction over the offense 

committed or with the concurrence of such 

other agency. 

16 u.s.c. § la-6(a). Plaintiffs misconstrue the statute. NPS 

employees have limited law enforcement duties, relating primarily 

to offenses committed within the National Park system. NPS 

officers are authorized to make arrests and serve process within 

the National Park System. Id. § la-6(a) (1)-(2). They have only 

limited authority to make arrests outside the National Park System. 

Id. § la-6(a) (1). Their investigative authority is not limited by 

the statute to park property. Id. § la-6(a) (3); United states v. 

Smith, 713 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1983). However, their 

investigative authority is limited to federal offenses occurring 

within the park system. 16 u.s.c. § la-6(a) (3). NPS officers are 

subject to geographical and other limitations on their law 

enforcement authority. Their statutory duties do not include the 

duty to investigate and render assistance at automobile accidents 

occurring outside of the National Park System. 

Plaintiffs argue that all law enforcement officials have an 

inherent duty to rescue. Plaintiffs rely on Lee v. state, 490 P.2d 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 7
1206 (Alaska 1971). In Lee, an on-duty state police officer was 

summoned to rescue a girl who was being attacked by a lion at an 

amusement park. During the course of the rescue, the pol ice 

officer shot the lion, then accidentally shot the girl. The girl 

sued the state and the officer for the off~cer's negligence. The 

Alaska Supreme Court held that the police officer was under a duty 

to go to the aid of the plaintiff, arising out of the general 

responsibility of the police to protect the lives and the welfare 

of the citizenry. Id. at 1209-10. The officer was not protected 

by the Alaska Good Samaritan Statute, since that statute is 

directed at persons who are not under a pre-existing duty to 

rescue. Id. We agree with the district court that Lee is 

distinguishable. It is perfectly reasonable to impose upon general 

law enforcement officials the duty to rescue. NPS officers are 

not, however, general law enforcement officials. The NPS officers 

have no general duty to protect the public outside the confines of 

the National Park System. 

Plaintiffs also focus on the fact that some or all of the NPS 

officers were trained as emergency medical technicians ("EMT's"). 

According to plaintiff, EMT' s have a duty to stop and render 

assistance. The uncontroverted facts show that the NPS employees 

did stop, but did not render any emergency medical care at the 

scene of the first accident. The second, fatal accident occurred 

before they were able to render medical assistance. Even had they 

rendered medical assistance, they would be immune under Utah law. 

Utah Code·Ann § 26-8-11 provides in pertinent part: 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 8
No basic or advance life support personnel who, 

during training or after certification, or licensed 

physician or registered nurse who in good faith, provides 

emergency medical instructions or renders emergency 

medical care authorized by this chapter shall be liable 

for civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions, 

unless found guilty of gross negligence or willful 

misconduct. 

Utah Code Ann. § 26-8-11(2). EMT' s are included within the 

category of "advanced life support personnel." Id. § 26-8-2(2). 

Plaintiffs next argue that the NPS officers were acting as 

public officers when they stopped to render assistance. Plaintiffs 

argue that as public officers, the Park Service employees had the 

duty to protect the scene of the accident. We have already 

rejected plaintiffs' argument that NPS officers are general law 

enforcement officials. Since the officers were outside the 

confines of the National Park System, where they do have general 

law enforcement authority, they were necessarily acting as private 

individuals who were under no duty to stop and render assistance. 

Plaintiffs assert that the NPS officers' knowing use of 

improperly installed equipment and their practice of selfprotection created a pre-existing duty of care for the safety of 

plaintiff's decedent. Plaintiffs' argument is that the NPS 

officers had a duty not to be negligent; i.e., they were under the 

general duty of ordinary care applicable in all matters. This does 

not translate into a duty to rescue or render assistance. 

Plaintiffs argue that by taking command of the situation, the 

NPS employees prevented the pedestrians from warning approaching 

vehicles of their presence and from escaping approaching vehicles. 

Finally, plaintiffs assert a duty not to increase the risk of harm 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 9
and/or not to cause harm to Flynn. These are not "duties, 11 but are 

the type of conduct contemplated by the Utah Good Samaritan Act, 

discussed below. 

B. The Utah Good Samaritan Act 

At the time of the accident, the Utah Good Samaritan Act 

provided: 

A person who renders emergency care at or near the scene 

of an emergency, gratuitously and in good faith, is not 

liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or 

omission by the person rendering the emergency care, 

unless the person is grossly negligent. As used in this 

section, "emergency" means an unexpected occurrence 

involving injury, threat of injury, or illness to a 

person, including motor vehicle accidents, disasters, and 

other accidents or events of a similar nature. 

Utah Code Ann.§ 78-11-22 (Supp. 1983). The statute has since been 

amended to exclude the person who caused the accident from the 

protection of the statute. The district court held that any 

negligent acts or omissions by the NPS employees, including failure 

to block the accident scene and the negligent activation of the 

siren, did not subject the government to civil liability. 

Plaintiffs first argue that the conduct of the NPS employees 

was not gratuitous because of pre-existing duties. We have held 

that no duties existed. Additionally, "gratuitously" means 

"without expecting compensation." See Lee v. state, 490 P.2d 1206, 

1208 (Alaska 1971) (quoting Alaska Stat. § 09.65.090(a)). 

Plaintiffs have not alleged that the NPS officers expected 

compensation for their rescue efforts. Next plaintiffs argue that 

the NPS officers lacked good faith because they knowingly operated 

an emergency vehicle with inverted switches for the lights and 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 10
siren and ignored the safety of pedestrians. If anything, these 

are allegations of negligence. Good faith is defined generally as 

honesty of intention and the absence of malice. Black's Law 

Dictionary 623 (5th ed. 1979). We find nothing in the record to 

support plaintiffs' argument that the NPS officers lacked good 

faith. 

Plaintiffs argue that the NPS employees intended to render 

medical assistance to Daniels (who was the only injured party at 

that time). Plaintiffs conclude that since the NPS employees were 

not rendering assistance to their decedent, they are not protected 

by the Good Samaritan Act. We reject the plaintiffs' narrow 

interpretation of the Good Samaritan Act. The statute grants 

immunity "for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission 

by the person rendering the emergency care, " Utah Code Ann. 

§ 78-11-22 (emphasis added). The statute covers any acts or 

omissions by the NPS off ice rs while rendering or attempting to 

render assistance to Daniels. 

Plaintiffs next argue that before the NPS officers arrived, 

no emergency existed. We disagree. When the NPS officers arrived 

at the scene, an automobile/pedestrian accident had just occurred. 

The pedestrian, Daniels, was lying injured in the highway. The 

situation presented by the first accident clearly was an emergency 

as defined in the Good Samaritan Act. 

Plaintiffs next assert that the officers caused the 

"emergency" (the second, fatal accident) by the improper 

positioning of their vehicle and activation of their lights and 

11 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 11
siren. The only "emergency" presented when the NPS officers 

stopped was the first accident. The NPS employees did not cause 

this initial accident, but were stopping to render aid when the 

second accident occurred. Any negligence by the officers in 

stopping to render aid is immunized by the Good Samaritan Act. 

c. Discretionary Function Exception 

Plaintiffs have alleged that the government was negligent in 

failing to train its employees to follow the regulations contained 

in the National Park Service Law Enforcement Policy and Guideline, 

NPS-9. Plaintiffs allege that Cornelius, the driver of the NPS 

vehicle, had never been taught to block the scene of an accident 

with his vehicle, had not been trained on the appropriate use of 

emergency lights, was not familiar with the placement of the 

switches, and had not been taught not to use the emergency 

equipment off park property. Because the alleged negligence 

occurred prior to the accident and did not arise from the rescue 

efforts, this conduct does not fall within the coverage of the Good 

Samaritan Act. 

The FTCA contains an exception for 

(a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee 

of the Government, exercising due care, ... based upon 

the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise 

or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part 

of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, 

whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 

28 u.s.c. § 2680(a). This is commonly known as the "discretionary 

function exception." Under this exception, 

if a government official in performing his statutory 

duties must act without reliance upon a fixed or readily 

ascertainable standard, the decision he makes is 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 12
discretionary and within the exception of the Tort Claims 

Act. 

Weiss v. United States, 787 F.2d 518, 523 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting 

Barton v. United States, 609 F.2d 977, 979 (10th Cir. 1979)). If 

a duty is neither mandatory nor clearly specified, it is 

discretionary. Id. The discretionary function exception applies 

even when the discretionary acts themselves constitute negligence. 

Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549, 553 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987). 

The relevant NPS regulations provide that an NPS officer may 

operate an emergency vehicle with the emergency devices activated: 

1. At such times, when in the reasonable belief of the 

operator, an emergency is imminent or exists and the 

activation of emergency warning devices is necessary in 

order to protect life or render assistance; 

6. When necessary while responding to the scene of a 

fire, accident, or other emergency. Emergency lights 

shall remain activated at the scene of such incidents 

when necessary to protect against further injury or 

property damage. 

National Park Service Law Enforcement Policy and Guideline, NPS9, Chapter 18 (April 1984), Brief of Defendant/Appellee, Exh. 

6. There are no fixed standards for the NPS employees to follow; 

the use of emergency devices is discretionary with the NPS officer 

in an emergency. The regulations do not mandate any specific 

training on the proper use of emergency equipment. There being no 

fixed standards for training or use of emergency vehicles, the 

conduct of the federal employees falls within the discretionary 

function of the FTCA. 

13 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 13
D. Plaintiffs' Claims Against Joyce Robertson 

No independent jurisdictional basis is required for a 

defendant to implead a third party defendant. See 6 C. Wright, A. 

Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1444, at 321 (2d 

ed. 1990). The plaintiff may then assert a claim directly against 

the third party defendant, Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a); however, there 

must be an independent basis for federal jurisdiction for any claim 

the plaintiff asserts against the third party defendant. See Owen 

Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 

Plaintiff Donald W. Flynn is a citizen and resident of the 

State of Utah. R. Vol. I, Doc. 1, 1 4. Third party defendant 

Joyce Robertson is a citizen and resident of Utah. R. Supp. Vol. 

II, deposition of Joyce Robertson, at 3. Complete diversity of 

citizenship is lacking. No other basis for federal jurisdiction 

is presented. The district court therefore lacked jurisdiction 

over plaintiffs' claims directly against third party defendant 

Joyce Robertson. See id. 

A Supreme Court decision from last term also supports our 

conclusion that the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims directly against Joyce 

Robertson in this FTCA action. The FTCA grants jurisdiction over 

civil actions on claims "against the United States." 

United States, 109 S. ct. 2003, 2008 (1989). The 

Finley v. 

statutory 

provision 11 'against the United States I means against the United 

States and no one else." Id. The FTCA therefore precludes the 

exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction over related claims against 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 14
defendants other than the United States. Id. at 2010. In the 

absence of an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such as 

diversity of citizenship, the district court lacks jurisdiction 

over a plaintiff's claims against defendants other than the United 

states in a FTCA action. our decision to the contrary in Stewart 

v. United States, 716 F.2d 755, 7557-59 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. 

denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984), that the district court has 

jurisdiction over a nondiverse defendant pendent to a claim against 

the government under the FTCA, is effectively overruled by Finley. 

The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 

plaintiffs' claim against third party defendant Joyce Robertson. 

Accordingly, the summary judgment must be vacated and plaintiffs' 

complaint against Joyce Robertson dismissed. 

AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED with directions to dismiss 

plaintiffs' complaint against Joyce Robertson for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-2213 Document: 010110296323 Date Filed: 05/16/1990 Page: 15