Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08131/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08131-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dewey Derald Gullick, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Deputy Warden Bock; et. al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-8131-PCT-JWS (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. No. 1). Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this

Court, this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for Report and

Recommendation. For the following reasons the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as untimely.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. State Proceedings

1. Indictment and Conviction

“The Navajo County Grand Jury’s return of three separate indictments against

Petitioner set in motion the events that culminated in the 25-year prison term that Petitioner

is currently serving in the Arizona Department of Corrections.” (Answer, p.2) (Doc.No. 16).

The first indictment, dated August 28, 2001, charged Petitioner in CR 2001-0552 with six

crimes against three children. (Answer, pp. 2-3 & Exh. A). Counts One, Two and Three

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charged Petitioner with committing Aggravated Assault, class 2 felonies and dangerous

crimes against children under the age of 15, by pointing a rifle at Rhonda A. (Count One),

Bonnie G. (Count Two), and Jason G. (Count Three). (Answer, p.3 & Exh. A). Counts Four

through Six alleged: (1) Sexual Conduct With A Minor, a class 6 felony, which Petitioner

committed sometime in October or November 1992 by penetrating Rhonda’s vagina with his

penis when Rhonda was 14 years of age (Count Four); (2) Sexual Assault, a class 2 felony

and dangerous crime against children, when, sometime between January 1, 1992 and May

31, 1992, Petitioner forced Rhonda to have oral sexual contact with his penis (Count Five);

and (3) Continuous Sexual Abuse Of A Child, a class 2 felony and dangerous crime against

children, which Petitioner committed against Bonnie G. between January 1, 1993 and

December 31, 1994 (Count Six). (Answer, Exh. A). 

Two weeks later, on September 11, 2001, the Navajo County Grand Jury returned its

second indictment against Petitioner, charging Petitioner in CR 2001-0574 with two counts

of Sexual Abuse, class 3 felonies and dangerous crimes against children, based upon his acts

of touching the breasts of two children under the age of 15, S.W. (Count One) and J.G.

(Count Two), sometime in May 2000. (Answer, Exh. C).

On September 18, 2001, the Navajo County Grand Jury returned its third indictment

against Petitioner, charging Petitioner in CR 2001-595 with one count of Sexual Abuse, a

class 5 felony, which Petitioner committed on August 17, 1998 by causing Melinda S., a

person of 15 years of age or more, to have indirect contact with Petitioner’s genitals.

(Answer, Exh. C).

On March 1, 2002, Petitioner entered into a “universal plea agreement with the State

to resolve all three cases against him.” (Answer, p.4; see also Answer, Exh. D). Petitioner

entered a guilty plea to committing sexual assault against Rhonda, Count Five in CR 2001-

552, in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the remaining five counts in that cause number,

as well as the three counts collectively charged in CR 2001-574 and CR 2001-595. (Answer,

p.4 & Exh. D, E). The plea agreement specified in pertinent part that:

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See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007) (using the term “Rule

32 of-right proceedings...” to refer to the initial post-conviction relief proceeding filed in lieu

of a direct appeal by an Arizona defendant, like Petitioner herein, who has pled guilty). See

also discussion, infra, at II.A. 

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The crime of Sexual Assault, A CLASS 2 FELONY DANGEROUS CRIME

AGAINST A CHILD carries a presumptive sentence of 20 years

imprisonment..., a minimum sentence of 15 years, and a maximum sentence

of 25 years. Probation is not available. The Defendant is not eligible for

release until the entire sentence is served except as authorized by 31-233

section A or B.

(Answer, Exh. D, pp.1-2) (capitalization and underline in original). “The parties reached no

agreement as to sentencing, which afforded the trial court discretion to impose any prison

term within the range of 15 and 25 years.” (Answer, p.4). On April 30, 2002, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to prison for the maximum aggravated term of 25 years. (Answer, Exh.

F).

2. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

a. Of-Right Proceeding

On June 7, 2002, Petitioner filed a timely pro se notice of post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and, thereafter, Petitioner’s

retained counsel successfully moved to withdraw and the trial court appointed counsel to

represent Petitioner. (Answer, p.4 & Exh. G, H, I). On November 4, 2003, Petitioner’s

counsel filed a “Notice of Completion Pursuant to Rule 32 and Motion for Extension of Time

for Filing of Pro-Per Petition,” wherein counsel stated that she had reviewed the record, had

found no grounds for relief pursuant to Rule 32, and requested additional time for Petitioner

to file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (Answer, Exh. J). The trial court granted

counsel’s request and extended the filing deadline until February 27, 2004, to enable

Petitioner to file a pro se petition. (Answer, Exh. K).

On February 26, 2004, Petitioner filed his pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

(hereinafter “of-right PCR Petition”1

) . (Answer, Exh. L). Petitioner raised the following

claims in his of-right PCR Petition:

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1. Petitioner’s trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel;

2. The trial court misapplied A.R.S. 13-604.01 and Arizona sentencing precedent

when it imposed Petitioner’s sentence; and

3. “Partiality of Judge. Official missconduct [sic]” when the trial court: (a)

considered the report that Dr. Gray prepared prior to sentencing; (b) in

imposing sentence, “reflect[ed] on the trauma suffered by the victim”; and (c)

improperly considered Petitioner’s misdemeanor conviction for statutory rape

as an aggravating circumstance.

(Id.; see also, Answer, Exh. M, N).

After the matter was fully briefed, the trial court set an evidentiary hearing to address

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Answer, Exh. O). The evidentiary

hearing lasted three days and concluded on October 5, 2004. (Answer, Exh. P, Q, R, S, T,

U). Upon conclusion of the hearing on October 5, 2004, the trial court held that defense

counsel’s performance was not deficient, found the remaining two claims were groundless,

and denied Petitioner’s of-right PCR Petition in its entirety. (Answer, Exh. T, U at pp. 69-

72). 

Although the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to extend time in which to file a

timely petition for review, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted Petitioner’s request for

same and ordered Petitioner to file his petition for review on or before January 14, 2005.

(Answer, Exh. V, W). On April 8, 2005, the appellate court dismissed the matter because

Petitioner neither filed his petition for review nor requested to extend the January 14, 2005

filing deadline. (Answer, Exh. X (“To date, the court has received neither a complaint

petition for review nor a request for extension of time.”)). Respondents submit the affidavit

of Philip Urry, Clerk for Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals wherein Mr. Urry

indicates that court records reflect that after the April 8, 2005 dismissal of his action,

Petitioner “filed no subsequent pleadings or documents...” in that cause number and the court

“closed its file in that case on May 23, 2005.” (Answer, Exh. SS, ¶5).

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Petitioner’s motion initiating his second PCR proceeding was signed on May 13,

2005 and filed with the trial court on May 17, 2005. (Answer, Exh. Y). In compliance with

state law, Respondents cite May 13, 2005 as the date on which the motion is deemed filed.

(See Answer, p. 7); see also State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App.

1999); State v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20, 22-23 & n.3, 106 P.3d 1035, 1037-38 & n.3 (App.

2005). Cf. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988). 

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b. Second PCR Proceeding

On May 13, 2005,2 Petitioner filed with the trial court a pro se “Motion to Correct

Unconstitutional and Unlawful Sentence” (hereinafter “Second PCR Petition”) wherein he

argued that his sentence violated several Arizona constitutional provisions, the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and several United States

Supreme Court decisions including United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

(Answer, Exh. Y). 

On July 29, 2005, the trial court denied relief finding that:

the United States Supreme Court opinion of Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct.

1026 [sic](2004), was decided on June 24, 2004. This Court ruled on the first

Rule 32 Petition on October 5, 2004 after conducting an evidentiary hearing.

At no time during the course of the first Rule 32 proceedings did the defendant

raise the Blakely issue. Therefore, because Blakely had been decided prior to

the completion of the first Rule 32 proceeding, the defendant is precluded from

raising a Blakely claim in a second Rule 32 petition pursuant to Rule

32.2(a)(3).

(Answer, Exh. AA).

Pursuant to Rule 32.9 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Petitioner had 30

days from the trial court’s denial of his Second PCR Petition to file a petition for review with

the Arizona Court of Appeals. On August 24, 2005, Petitioner requested that the trial court

grant an extension of time to file a petition for review. (Answer, Exh. BB). Concluding that

Petitioner failed to set forth sufficient reasons to justify an extension, the trial court denied

Petitioner’s request on September 9, 2005. (Answer, Exh. CC). 

Although Petitioner’s request for extension was denied, he nonetheless submitted to

the Court of Appeals a petition for review wherein he argued that: (1) the trial court

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Citing the October 19, 2005 filing date of Petitioner’s petition for review,

Respondents maintain that Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s October 17, 2005

order denying his Third Petition for review discussed infra, at I.2.c. (See Answer, p.9)

However, that cannot be the case given that the petition for review was signed by Petitioner

and received by the appellate court before the trial court entered its ruling on Petitioner’s

Third PCR Petition.

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improperly precluded the Blakely claim; and (2) the trial court’s sentence was the product of

improper application of A.R.S. §13-702(C) and violated the double jeopardy clauses of the

federal and Arizona constitutions.3

 (Answer, Exh. FF). Petitioner signed the petition for

review on September 29, 2005. The petition for review bears stamp marks indicating that

it was “received” by the appellate court on October 4, 2005 and “filed” by the Clerk of the

Arizona Court of Appeals on October 19, 2005. (Answer, Exh. FF (capitalization omitted)).

On September 13, 2006, the Arizona court of Appeals denied review without

comment. (Answer, Exh. GG). Petitioner made no further filings, such as a petition for

review to the Arizona Supreme Court, with regard this matter. (Answer, p.10 (citing Answer,

Exh. SS at ¶6)). 

c. Petitioner’s Third PCR Proceeding

On September 20, 2005, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (hereinafter

“Third PCR Petition”) wherein he contended that his absence during the grand jury

proceedings violated Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). (Answer, Exh. DD). 

On October 17, 2005, the trial court denied relief finding that the notice of post-conviction

relief was untimely filed. (Answer, Exh. EE).

Petitioner did not seek review from either the Arizona Court of Appeals or the

Arizona Supreme Court with regard to his Third PCR Petition. (See Answer, Exh. SS. See

also supra, at n.3).

d. Petitioner’s Fourth PCR Proceeding

On March 15, 2006, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (hereinafter

“Fourth PCR Petition”). (Petition, p.5A; Answer, p.10). Petitioner’s Fourth PCR Petition

has not been made part of the record because “Respondents’ file does not contain a copy...”

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Petitioner’s summary of the claims raised in his Fourth PCR Petition is consistent

with Respondents’ summary set forth in their Answer. (See Petition, p.5A).

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(Answer, p.10). Respondents contend that according to their response to the Fourth PCR

Petition, Petitioner alleged that he was entitled to post-conviction relief based upon the

following claims: 

1. He was improperly sentenced;

2. The trial court considered false and misleading information at sentencing;

3. Petitioner’s attorneys engaged in malfeasance;

4. The prosecutors engaged in malfeasance;

5. Trial counsel failed to investigate all available defenses;

6. The trial court engaged in malfeasance;

7. The indictment was duplicitous; and

8. Petitioner was illegally sentenced under A.R.S. 13-604.01.

(Answer, Exh. HH; see also Petition, p.5A4

). 

On April 3, 2006, the trial court denied relief because the matter was untimely filed.

(Answer, Exh. II). 

On May 1, 2006, Petitioner filed a “Petition for Special Action” in the Court of

Appeals arguing that he had filed in the trial court a “‘Motion for Leave to File Untimely

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief for Good Cause’ but the state convinced the trial court

this was actually a fourth and untimely ‘notice’...” and, thus, the state trial court’s ruling was

erroneous. (Answer, Exh. JJ, pp.2-3). 

On May 12, 2006, the appellate court directed the clerk to redocket Petitioner’s

Special Action matter as a petition for review from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction

relief. (Answer, Exh. KK). On May 23, 2007, the appellate court summarily denied review.

(Answer, Exh. LL). 

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Petitioner made no further filings, such as a petition for review to the Arizona

Supreme Court, with regard to his Fourth PCR Petition. (Answer, p.12 (citing Answer, Exh.

SS at ¶7)). 

e. Petitioner’s Fifth PCR Proceeding

On April 2, 2007, Petitioner filed in the trial court a pleading captioned “Motion for

Clarification of Sentence” wherein he sought an explanation why he had been sentenced

pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01, the sentencing statute governing “Dangerous Crimes Against

Children” (hereinafter “Fifth PCR Petition”). (Answer, Exh. MM). On April 23, 2007, the

State filed its response asserting that the motion was essentially a fifth PCR petition and was

untimely and precluded under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Answer, Exh. NN).

On April 24, 2007, the trial court entered an order stating: “Motion to clarify sentence is

denied.” (Answer, Exh. OO). Thereafter, the State moved the trial court to sign the State’s

previously proposed form of order submitted with its April 23, 2007 response to Petitioner’s

motion. (Answer, Exh. PP). On May 21, 2007, the trial court signed the State’s proposed

order wherein, inter alia, the court stated that: (1) Petitioner’s motion was treated as a fifth

PCR petition; (2) Petitioner’s motion was untimely, and, alternatively, was precluded under

Rules 32(a)(2) and 32(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (3) the motion

was dismissed. (Answer, Exh. QQ). 

On May 3, 2007, Petitioner bypassed the Arizona Court of Appeals by filing in the

Arizona Supreme Court a petition for special action seeking review of the trial court’s denial

of his “Motion to Clarify Sentence”, i.e., his Fifth PCR Petition. (Petition, Exh. B(II);

Answer, Exh. RR; Answer, p.13 (citing Answer, Exh. SS at ¶8)). On June 5, 2007, the

Arizona Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s special action as follows:

Dewey Gullick has filed a Petition for Special Action seeking review of the

[S]uperior [C]ourt’s order denying his “Motion to Clarify Sentence” on April

24, 2007. Petitioner fails to set forth sufficient reasons for filing the petition

initially in this Court instead of the Court of Appeals. See Rule 7(b), Rules of

Procedure for Special actions. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Special Action is dismissed.

(Answer, Exh. RR). 

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After the Arizona Supreme Court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s Special Action, Petitioner

did not file any pleading in the Arizona Court of Appeals to seek appellate review of the trial

court’s dismissal of his motion, which the trial court construed as a Fifth PCR Petition.

(Answer, p.14 (citing Answer, Exh. SS at ¶8)).

 B. Petitioner’s Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

The instant pro se Petition for federal habeas relief was signed by Petitioner on

November 18, 2007 and filed-stamped by the Clerk of the Court on November 19, 2007.

(Doc. No. 1). A federal habeas petition is deemed filed when handed by the inmate to a

prison official for mailing. See Houston, 487 U.S. at 270-71; Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

1243, 1245 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Under the prison ‘mailbox rule’...a pro se petitioner's petition

is deemed constructively filed at the moment it is delivered to prison officials to be

forwarded to the court clerk.") The Court deems the Petition commencing this action as filed

on November 18, 2007. See id. 

Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief:

 1. Petitioner’s conviction or sentence violated the Sixth Amendment due to

ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel: (a) promised Petitioner he

would only have to serve 15 years if he accepted the plea agreement thus

rendering Petitioner’s plea unknowing and involuntary; (b) failed to present

mitigating evidence at sentencing such as that Petitioner suffered from “posttraumatic syndrome [sic] disorder (P.T.S.D.) ” or that he was emotionally

abused as a child; (c) failed to corroborate Petitioner’s mental and physical

health problems; (d) failed to challenge the statement expressed in the presentence report characterizing Petitioner as a “predator”; and (e) failed to

challenge the assertion in the pre-sentence report that Petitioner had molested

“‘two young girls’ and a co-worker”;

2. The trial court’s imposition of a 25-year prison term violated the Fourteenth

Amendment because the version of A.R.S. §13-604.01 that applied to

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Petitioner provided a maximum sentence of 15 years of imprisonment for

sexual assault;

3. The trial court violated the Fourteenth Amendment by improperly sentencing

Petitioner when the court: (a) considered a report from Dr. Gray prepared

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 26.5; (b) considered Petitioner’s prior misdemeanor

conviction for second-degree rape; and (c) did not allow Petitioner to call an

expert to rebut Dr. Gray’s report;

4. Petitioner’s sentence violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights under

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) because a jury did not determine

all of the aggravating circumstances enumerated by the court at sentencing;

and

5. Petitioner’s sentence violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights under

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) because a jury did not determine

all of the aggravating circumstances enumerated by the court at sentencing.

(Petition).

Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. No. 16) on June 13, 2008. 

On July 9, 2008, Petitioner filed his Reply wherein he asserted, inter alia, that he “was

in and out of mental treatment from January 5, 2005, 2006, 2007 and currently in 2008...”

(Reply, p.2 (Doc. No. 17)). In light of this assertion, the Court informed Petitioner on July

14, 2008 that more specific information was required and directed Petitioner to file a

Supplemental Reply stating the specific dates of treatment and type of treatment on such

dates, type of medication Petitioner took, and documentation to support Petitioner’s

statements concerning treatment. (Doc. No. 18). Respondents were granted leave to file a

Surreply. (Id.). 

On August 8, 2008, Petitioner requested an extension of time to file his Supplemental

Reply (Doc. No. 19) and on August 20, 2008 he filed various documents and records which

he attached to this Court’s July 14, 2008 Order directing him to file a Supplemental Reply

(Doc. No. 20). On August 22, 2008, the Court granted Petitioner’s request for an extension

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to the extent that the Court accepted Petitioner’s August 20, 2008 Supplemental Response

as timely filed. (Doc. No. 21).

On August 29, 2008, Respondents filed their Surreply (Doc. No. 22).

II. DISCUSSION

Respondents argue that the Petition is time-barred under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (hereinafter “AEDPA”). (Answer; Surreply) Alternatively,

Respondents argue that all of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. (Answer).

Petitioner contends that his Petition is timely under either 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2) or

the doctrine of equitable tolling. (Reply). He also argues that his claims are not procedurally

defaulted. (Id.).

A. Commencement of AEDPA Statute of Limitations

The “AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions

filed by state prisoners in federal court." Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1245 (citing 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)) (footnote omitted). Pursuant to section 2244, the limitations period:

shall run from the latest of– 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

Of the possible starting date, only section 2244(d)(1)(A) is relevant to the instant

action. Petitioner does not suggest an alternative calculation of the commencement date of

the AEDPA limitations period. Nor does Petitioner assert: (1) that he was impeded from

filing his federal habeas petition due to state action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States; (2) a newly-recognized right; or (3) that his Petition is predicated on

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Respondents maintain that the conviction became final on April 8, 2005 when the

appellate court dismissed Petitioner’s appellate matter “because of his failure to file a petition

for review on or before the prescribed extended deadline (January 14, 2005).” (Answer, pp.

17-18 (citing Answer, Exh. X)). However the law is clear that the conviction is final upon

either “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or

until the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Summers, 481 F.3d

at 711 (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A) (the conviction becomes final

“by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”).

In Petitioner’s case, the time to seek review expired on January 14, 2005 and Petitioner did

not avail himself of the opportunity to seek review before that deadline or at all. Moreover,

even if Respondents’ suggested date of April 8, 2005 was used as the date upon which

Petitioner’s conviction became final, the Petition is still time barred for the reasons stated in

Respondents’ Answer. 

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newly-discovered facts that could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of

due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

For Arizona petitioners who enter a guilty plea, like Petitioner herein, a petition for

post-conviction relief filed under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, in lieu

of a direct appeal, is considered a form of “direct review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§2244(d)(1). See Summers, 481 F.3d at 711, 716-17 (referring to such post-conviction relief

proceedings as “Rule 32 of-right proceeding[s]...” and concluding that “[b]ecause a Rule 32

of-right proceeding is a form of direct review, AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations does

not begin to run until the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that

proceeding, or until the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.”); see

also 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A) (stating that the judgment becomes final at the later of either

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review). 

Petitioner was granted an extension until January 14, 2005 to file his of-right PCR

Petition. (Answer, Exh. W). Petitioner never filed a petition for appellate court review, nor

did he request a further extension of the time do so. Therefore, Petitioner’s conviction

became final on January 14, 2005,5

 when his opportunity to petition the Arizona Court of

Appeals for review expired. See Id. This determination is not altered by the fact that direct

review is not normally complete until the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to

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the United States Supreme Court has expired, See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th

Cir. 1999). Certiorari can only be sought following a decision or denial of discretionary

review by the state court of last resort, i.e., the Arizona Supreme Court. See Sup.Ct.R. 13.

Because Petitioner did not seek discretionary review from the Arizona Supreme Court, the

time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court does not

factor into the statute of limitations calculation herein. Consequently, Petitioner’s conviction

became final on January 14, 2005.

B. Statutory Tolling

Under section 2244(d)(2), “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for

State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under...” section

2244(d). 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). However, “a state postconviction petition rejected by the

state court as untimely is not ‘properly filed’ within the meaning of section 2244(d)(2)” and,

thus, statutory tolling is not applicable. Allen v. Siebert , 552 U.S. 3, 5 (2007) (citing Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005)). See also Pace, 544 U.S. at 414-17 (untimely

action for post-conviction relief is not properly filed for purposes of section 2244(d)(2) and,

therefore, does not statutorily toll the AEDPA limitations period). The Ninth Circuit has

noted that:

A petitioner must be careful to timely file in federal court after he concludes

his first full round of state collateral review, lest he run afoul of the statute of

limitations. To avoid that circumstance, a petitioner...could have timely filed

a federal petition for habeas corpus after his first round was completed, then

requested the district court to exercise its discretion to stay the petition until

he fully exhausted his Round Two claims. See James v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124,

1126-27 (9th Cir.2001).

Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).

On May 13, 2005 Petitioner filed a pro se “Motion to Correct Unconstitutional and

Unlawful Sentence” which the trial court treated as a PCR petition filed pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32 and denied on July 29, 2005. (Answer, Exh. Y, AA). Petitioner initially

had thirty days to file a petition for review. See Ariz.R.Cr.P. 32.9. Petitioner did not file a

timely petition for review. Instead, on August 24, 2005, Petitioner requested that the trial

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6

Even if Petitioner’s untimely petition for review had statutorily tolled the limitations

period, the instant Petition would still be untimely. This is so because, as discussed infra,

Petitioner’s subsequent PCR attempts did not toll the limitations period. Thus accounting

for the 118 days that ran between the conclusion of Petitioner’s of-right PCR proceeding and

the filing of Petitioner’s Second PCR Petition, Petitioner would have had 247 days from the

appellate court’s September 13, 2006 order denying review in which to file his federal habeas

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court grant him an extension of time to file a petition for review and the trial court denied

Petitioner’s request on September 9, 2009. (Answer, Exh. BB, CC). Respondents point out

that although Petitioner had previously successfully moved the Arizona Court of Appeals for

an extension of time to file a petition for review from the trial court’s denial of his of-right

PCR Petition, Petitioner did not pursue this alternative avenue for obtaining an extension to

seek appellate review of the denial of his Second PCR Petition. (See Answer, pp.18-19

(citing Answer, Exh. SS at ¶¶4-8)). 

Even though Petitioner had not received leave to file an untimely petition for review,

on September 29, 2005, Petitioner signed a petition for review which, inter alia, challenged

the trial court’s denial of his claim under Blakely. (Answer, Exh. FF). Petitioner had raised

a Blakely claim in his Second PCR Petition. (See Answer, Exh. Y). On September 13, 2006,

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review without comment. (Answer, Exh. GG). With

regard to statutory tolling under section 2244(d)(2), only an appeal that is timely will toll the

statute of limitations for the time period between the lower court’s adverse decision and the

filing of a notice of appeal in the higher court. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191

(2006). It is clear on the instant record that Petitioner’s petition for review was untimely

filed given that it was filed outside the 30 day time limit provided in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9 and

given that Petitioner’s request for extension of this deadline had specifically been denied on

September 9, 2005–twenty days before he filed his untimely petition for review. Because

Petitioner failed to seek timely review by the Arizona Court of Appeals regarding the trial

court’s denial of his Second PCR Petition, the statute of limitations herein was tolled

pursuant to section 2244(d)(2) until July 29, 2005–the date the trial court denied Petitioner’s

Second PCR Petition.6

 See Id. 

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Petition. Pursuant to this calculation, the limitations period would have expired on May 21,

2007. Petitioner did not file the instant action until November 18, 2007.

7

The actual deadline is Sunday, April 2, 2006. Because the deadline fell on a Sunday,

the filing deadline is extended to the following Monday under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). See

Patterson, 251 F.3d 1243 (applying former verison of Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) to AEDPA).

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Consequently, the statute of limitations commenced to run on January 15, 2005 and

ran 118 days until the May 13, 2005 filing of Petitioner’s Second PCR proceeding which

then tolled the AEDPA limitations period until July 29, 2005. The statute of limitations

commenced to run again on July 30, 2005 and, accounting for 118 days between January 15,

2005 and May 13, 2005, expired 247 days later on Monday, April 3, 20067

 absent any

subsequent tolling.

Beginning on September 20, 2005, Petitioner filed several subsequent petitions for

post-conviction relief, i.e., Petitioner’s Third through Fifth PCR petitions. The trial court

found these attempts at post-conviction relief to be untimely. (Answer, Exh. EE, II, QQ).

Given the state court’s finding that Petitioner’s third through fifth attempts at post-conviction

relief were untimely, such proceedings were not “properly filed” under section 2244(d)(2)

and, thus, these proceedings do not qualify for statutory tolling. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2);

Allen, 552 U.S. at 4 (because petitioner’s “petition for state postconviction relief was rejected

as untimely by the...[state] courts, it was not ‘properly filed’ under section 2244(d)(2).”);

Pace, 544 U.S. at 416-17 (same). Consequently, the AEDPA statute of limitations expired

on April 3, 2006. Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition over one year later on November

18, 2007. 

C. Equitable Tolling

Respondents argue that in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bowles v.

Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), the AEDPA is not subject to equitable tolling. (See Answer,

pp. 22-24; see also Surreply, pp. 11-15). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the

Supreme Court has never explicitly determined whether section 2244(d) allows for equitable

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tolling. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,

__ U.S. __, __ S.Ct.__, 2009 WL 2058179 (Oct. 5, 2009). However, the Ninth Circuit has

specifically held that “Bowles did not invalidate equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of

limitations.” Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011 n.2. Therefore equitable tolling remains

viable for Petitioner herein.

"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way." Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. See also Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011. Additionally, “[a] petitioner must show that his untimeliness was caused by an

external impediment and not by his own lack of diligence.” Bryant v. Arizona Attorney

General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011

(an external force must cause the untimeliness, and thus, mere oversight, miscalculation or

negligence on the petitioner’s part would preclude the application of equitable tolling). The

petitioner must also establish that the extraordinary circumstances asserted were, in fact, the

reason why the federal habeas petition was untimely. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799

(9th Cir. 2003). “[A] pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling." Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Petitioner asserts that:

from January 5, 2005, 2006, 2007[,] 2008, that I was being treated for severe

post-traumatic stress disorder, and was not about to file my state appeals or

federal habeas due to my illness, mentally. That I relied on the other inmates

to help me argue and write [sic] research of my legal case.

(Reply, Exh. 1). Also, according to Petitioner, he

relied on other people to help him file his pro se briefs in the state’s court and

now in the federal courts. Petitioner claims that he relied on these individuals

to know the Rules of Court and the correct filings of his petitions in the

different courts in the state’s courts. Petitioner claims that due to his mental

treatment that he was not aware or knew about court deadlines, because of the

drugs that he was taken [sic] in order to just function daily in his life.

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(Reply, p.2). In response to the Court’s Order requesting specific information regarding

Petitioner’s mental issues and treatment for same, Petitioner submitted approximately 37

pages of medical records with no further explanation. (See Doc. No. 20).

The Ninth Circuit has “held that a ‘putative habeas petitioner’s mental incompetency

[is] a condition that is, obviously, an extraordinary circumstance beyond the prisoner’s

control,’ so ‘mental incompetency justifies equitable tolling’ of the AEDPA statute of

limitations.” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Calderon v. United

States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds

by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). However, “[a] habeas petitioner’s

mental incompetence is not a per se reason to toll the statute of limitations for filing a federal

habeas petition.” Brown v. McKee, 232 F.Supp.2d 761, 767 (E.D. Mich. 2002). See also

Weisner v. Evans, 2009 WL 3353452, *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009) (“While Laws and Kelly

permit equitable tolling for mental incompetence, they do not stand for the proposition that

every mental illness automatically tolls the limitation period. Most mental illnesses are

treatable, and with proper treatment many, if not most, sufferers are capable of managing

their own affairs.”). Instead, equitable tolling should be applied “[w]here a habeas

petitioner’s mental incompetence in fact caused him to fail to meet the AEDPA filing

deadline...” because his delay in such an instance “was caused by an ‘extraordinary

circumstance beyond [his] control’...” Laws, 351 F.3d at 923. See also Gaston v. Palmer,

417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2003) (petitioner failed to show causal connection sufficient

for equitable tolling where he filed state habeas proceedings during relevant time period

despite his alleged mental condition), modified on other grounds, 447 F.3d. 1165 (9th Cir.

2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134 (2007).

A chronological summary of the documents submitted by Petitioner reveal the

following:

• An undated Arizona Department of Corrections Mental Health Assessment

form which Respondents “calculate...was prepared sometime in 2002 before

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8

To support their suggested date, Respondents point to the following: the form

indicates that Petitioner was 56 years of age at the time of evaluation; he was born on

October 12, 1945; and he was sentenced to prison on March 1, 2002. (Surreply, p.5 n.2).

9

The page submitted does not refer to Petitioner by name. However, Petitioner

submitted a Declaration from the prison Medical Record Librarian stating that the record was

a true copy of a record relating to Petitioner. (Doc. No. 20 (August 13, 2008 Declaration)).

10Based upon other records submitted by Petitioner, the Court interprets “MH=3” to

mean that Petitioner was assessed a mental health score of 3. (See e.g., April 19, 2005

Mental Health Services Review by Linda A. Griffin, Psych. R.N. II (indicating Petitioner’s

mental health score of 3);“SMI and Level of Service Determination Worksheet” completed

by Jaime Whitford, Mental Health Therapist II, in March 2006 (same)). 

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October 12th....”8

 (Surreply, p.5 n.2). The following information is indicated

on the form: (1) Petitioner was diagnosed with “PTSD–Viet Nam” by the

Veteran’s Administration in Phoenix when he was 54 years of age; Petitioner

takes Paxil and at least one other drug indicated in illegible writing for

depression; when Petitioner was 46 years of age he attempted suicide by

cutting his wrist; Petitioner consumed “1/5” hard liquor a day but he did not

use drugs; Petitioner was physically abused by his father and step father until

he was 13 years of age; Petitioner did not experience hallucinations, paranoia

or mania; nor had he been placed in special education classes.

• A page from a May 16, 2002 Mental Health Assessment9

 completed by Jaime

Jorquez, DSW, Mental Health Therapist, II. The assessment indicates, inter

alia, that Petitioner, did not exhibit: emotional problems while in jail or

previous incarceration; current suicidal ideation; or serious episodes of

depression. His affect was normal, his mood was euthymic, his appearance

was unremarkable, his hygiene was good, his speech was normal, and he was

cooperative and alert. DSW Jorquez indicated: “No Mental Health services

needed at this time” and “MH=3.”10 Illegible notations follow.

• A May 18, 2004 “S[erious] M[ental] I[llness] Determination/Mental Health

Needs Summary” form completed by Rose M. Allinder, Ph.D., Psychologist

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11Only those prisoners falling within any need level of the first and second categories

or in the high need level of the third category would qualify for the SMI diagnosis. Those

prisoners falling within the fourth category do not qualify for the SMI diagnosis.

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II, wherein a diagnosis of “Depressive D/O NOS, Antisocial Traits” was

indicated. In assessing four areas of Petitioner’s functional criteria, Dr.

Allinder made no indication that Petitioner, in the last six months, exhibited:

(1) “Dysfunction in Role Performance: Impairment in the person’s capacity to

perform present major developmentally appropriate role functions

vocationally, educationally, interpersonally and behaviorally in a correctional

setting”; (2) “Inability to Live in General Population Without Supervision

(Self-Care/Basic Needs)...” concerning hygiene and health; and/or (3) “Risk

of Harm to Self or Others...” including acts of self harm. As to the fourth

category, “Risk of Deterioration...” Dr. Allinder indicated that Petitioner did

“not currently meet any one of the above functional criteria 1. through 3., but

may be expected to deteriorate to such a level without treatment.”11 Although

the form prompts the reviewer to indicate by check mark the reason supporting

a finding of Risk of Deterioration, Dr. Allinder did not do so. She did assess

Petitioner as “Low Need” and not qualifying for a diagnosis of serious mental

illness. 

• A November 18, 2004 “SMI Determination/Mental Health Needs Summary”

form completed by Dr. Allinder. As reflected in a similar form completed by

Dr. Allinder on May 18, 2004, Petitioner’s diagnoses were Depressive

Disorder Not Otherwise Specified and Antisocial Traits. In assessing four

areas of Petitioner’s functional criteria, Dr. Allinder made no indication that

Petitioner, in the last six months, exhibited: (1) “Dysfunction in Role

Performance...”; (2) “Inability to Live in General Population Without

Supervision (Self-Care/Basic Needs)...”; and/or (3) “Risk of Harm to Self or

Others....” As to the fourth category, “Risk of Deterioration...”, Dr. Allinder

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12Respondents indicate that the provider also placed a check mark next to the

following form statements: “no significant mental health problems were evident” and “no

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indicated that Petitioner did “not currently meet any of the above functional

criteria 1. through 3., but may be expected to deteriorate to such a level

without treatment.” To support this finding, Dr. Allinder checked a box

stating: “Diagnostic Category I diagnosis with probable chronic, relapsing and

remitting course.” She assessed Petitioner as “Low Need” and not qualifying

for a diagnosis of serious mental illness. 

• A February 15, 2005 Continuous Progress Record indicating that Petitioner

was involved in Bible studies and “legal work.” His energy had been low the

previous four or five days and he was sleeping very little. “‘Young Inmates’

on run–stress him.” His last episode of suicidal ideation was in “[19]91-

[19]92” and he had no current suicidal ideation. Petitioner was coherent, his

thoughts were logical, he had no hallucination, paranoia, mania or panic

episodes. Diagnosis was Axis I “DD NOS”, Axis II “Antisocial traits”.

Prozac was prescribed.

• A March 15, 2005 Continuous Progress Record by Lisa Kaufman, MC, Psych.

Assc. II, indicating “[f]ile review...” and “ MH-3”. 

• An April 19, 2005 Mental Health Services Record Review by Linda A.

Griffin, Psych. R.N. II, indicating that Petitioner “has a [history] of

psychotropic medications being prescribed within the past 12 months” and that

14-day assessment would occur followed by another appointment.

Petitioner’s mental health score was assessed at 3.

• An May 13, 2005 Mental Health Services Record Review indicating that

Petitioner had a history of psychotropic medications, i.e., “Prozac”, being

prescribed within the past 12 months and he was referred for a follow-up

appointment with a psychiatrist.12

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mental health services are necessary at this time.” (Surreply, p.10) (referring to “May 17,

2005” record, however, the date of the record appears to be May 13, 2005). While it is true

that a check mark appears by each statement, the record also shows that a line has been

drawn through both check marks and both bear the initials of the person who completed the

form, whose name is illegible. Instead, the statements set forth in the Court’s summary of

this record reflects the statements by which the provider entered check marks that have not

been crossed out.

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• A May 24, 2005 Psychiatric Progress Note indicating that Petitioner: was

worried about his wife and mother because he had not heard from them; was

sleeping better; had a good appetite; had fought with an inmate; and was

spending his time reading and studying the Bible. He was oriented,

cooperative, he spoke coherently and clearly, and his thought process was

logical and goal-oriented. He had no hallucinations, paranoia, mania or

current suicidal ideation. His affect was appropriate. Diagnoses included

Depressive Disorder NOS and Antisocial Traits. Prozac was prescribed.

• A July 19, 2005 Psychiatric Progress Note by William Trimble, M.D.,

reflecting that Petitioner had anxiety concerning family and personal issues.

He said that his wife was his main source of anxiety. Petitioner rated his

depression at 8 out of 10 and said that it had decreased during the last 2

months. He had no current suicidal ideation. Dr. Trimble found that

Petitioner’s speech was coherent, his thought processes were logical with goal

orientation, his mood was “stressed”, and his insight and judgment were fair.

 Petitioner was continued on Prozac.

• An August 16, 2005 Psychiatric Progress Note by Dr. Trimble reflecting that

Petitioner was in a better mood, was sleeping better, and had a good appetite.

Dr. Trimble found that Petitioner was oriented, coherent, his thought processes

were logical but his insight and judgment were limited. Petitioner reported

anxiety caused by his wife’s lack of support and he rated his depression as 4

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out of 10. Dr. Trimble indicated that Petitioner had “few mood symptoms”

and continued Petitioner on Prozac.

• A September 20, 2005 “SMI Determination/Mental Health Needs Summary”

form completed by Dr. Allinder. The diagnosis was Depressive Disorder Not

Otherwise Specified. Dr. Allinder’s assessment this date was exactly the same

as that rendered on November 18, 2004 which resulted in a finding that

Petitioner fell within that category indicating a “Risk of Deterioration” in that

he may expected to deteriorate without treatment, Petitioner was of “Low

Need”, and he did not qualify for a diagnosis of suffering from serious mental

illness.

 • A September 22, 2005 Mental Heath Services Record Review by Jaime

Whitford, Mental Health Therapist II, indicating that Petitioner had a history

of receiving psychotropic medication and mental health treatment in the past

12 months and had a history of suicide attempts, PTSD, and depression.

Therapist Whitford also indicated that Petitioner had taken Paxil and Prozac.

• A November 15, 2005 Psychiatric Progress Note by Dr. Trimble indicating

that Petitioner’s activities included reading, studying the Bible, and writing.

Dr. Trimble also indicated that Petitioner’s concentration was good, he was

alert, his speech, thought process, and perception were unremarkable, his

mood was “relaxed [and] appropriate”, his orientation and memory were intact,

and his judgment was fair. Diagnoses were Depressive Disorder NOS,

Antisocial Traits and Narcissistic. According to Dr. Trimble, Petitioner’s

status was unchanged and he was continued on Prozac. 

• A February 1, 2006 Psychiatric Progress Note and Continuous Progress

Record by Dr. Trimble reflecting Petitioner’s comments that he was having

problems with other inmates in his pod and in the yard. Petitioner reported

taking his medication, which was effective and did not cause side effects. He

reported that his mood was “Not OK” . Dr. Trimble indicated that Petitioner

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13The date of this form is partially blocked out by a stamp bearing the provider’s

name. However, it appears that the date may be March 2006.

14An inmate with a mental health score of 3 who is designated as having routine needs

is considered “Moderate Need” in that he “requires placement in a prison complex...that has

regular, full-time psychological and psychiatric staffing and services. Offender has a

recognized need, or, there exists a routine level of need for MH treatment and/or

supervision.” Arizona Department of Corrections, Objective Classification: Custody &

Internal Risk Technical Manual, pp. 34-35 (June 1, 2009) available at

www.azcorrections.gov/classification/Classificationpublic_Manual_060309.pdf. See also

Thomas v. Baca, 2006 WL 2547321, *5 (D.Ariz. Aug. 31, 2006). On the mental health

scoring scale, a score of 1 represents “No Need” and a score of 5 represents an “Acute

Need.” Id.

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was alert, he had fair concentration, insight and judgment, his memory and

orientation were intact, and he was “able to laugh [and] joke.” There was no

change in Petitioner’s status and he was continued on Prozac.

• A form captioned “SMI and Level of Service Determination Worksheet”

completed by Therapist Whitford indicating that Petitioner was diagnosed as

“Depressive d/o NOS...” on February 1, 2006.13 Petitioner was assigned a

mental health score of 3, had no serious mental illness, and Petitioner was not

classified as a “Special Need”, instead he was classified as having “Routine

Need” of service.14 

• An Arizona Department of Corrections “Mental Health Treatment Plan”

prepared by Therapist Whitford indicating that Petitioner’s initial staffing

occurred on March 2, 2006 and diagnoses of Axis I: “Depressive d/o NOS”

and Axis II: “A.S.P.D. and Narcicistic...” and Axis III: “Chronic pain;

dizziness; Gastroreflux.” Petitioner was compliant with prescribed

“Psychotrocic [sic] Medications.” Petitioner had no mental health alerts such

as suicide attempts, self-mutilation, substance abuse, feigning/manipulations,

violence or sexual assault. Petitioner’s “Target Problem[]...” was “Mood

Disturbance.” He was not suffering from psychotic symptoms or cognitive

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defects. This same form reflects that Petitioner was evaluated again on April

2, 2007 and was determined to have “on going” mood disturbance which was

“[s]table during this period.” When Petitioner was evaluated the following

year on April 14, 2008, it was determined that his mood disturbance was “on

going.”

• A March 2, 2006 Continuous Progress Record by Therapist Whitford

reflecting Petitioner’s report that he had been taking his medication and felt

that it was helping him. Petitioner reported experiencing pains, dizziness and

gastric reflux. He also complained about his wife and denied suicidal ideation.

Therapist Whitford noted that Petitioner mumbled and stuttered. Therapist

Whitford found Petitioner to be alert, focused, oriented, logical, of euthymic

mood, and that Petitioner’s thought process and affect were within normal

limits. Petitioner was continued on his then current medication. 

• A May 19, 2006 mostly illegible Continuous Progress Record reflecting

Petitioner’s prior diagnoses of Depression NOS, Antisocial Personality Traits

and Narcissistic, and that Petitioner was experiencing nausea. The provider

also noted that Petitioner was taking Prozac.

• An August 22, 2006 Continuous Progress Record by Michael Stumpf, M.D.,

indicating that Petitioner had been taking his medication which he found to be

effective and without side effects. Petitioner stated that Prozac helped his

mood and “keeps me stable.” Dr. Stumpf found Petitioner to have good

concentration, euthymic mood, unremarkable thought processes and

perception, fair insight and judgment, and that his orientation and memory

were intact. Petitioner was continued on Prozac.

• A February 14, 2007 Psychiatric Follow-Up Note reflecting that Petitioner was

taking his medication which was effective and had no side effects. New

stressors were difficulties with Petitioner’s wife and marriage. Petitioner gave

“[n]o reports of mood liability; feels controlled.” Petitioner’s memory and

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15Respondents point out that this record and all subsequent records listed below were

created after Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas Petition. (Answer, p.6 n.3).

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orientation were intact, his concentration was good, his insight and judgment

were fair, and perception together with his speech and thought processes were

within normal limits. He was directed to “continue Fluoxetine.”

• On February 14, 2007, Petitioner signed an “Informed Consent for

Psychotropic Medications” which set forth the side-effects of “Fluoxetine or

Prozac” prescribed to Petitioner.

• An April 2, 2007 Continuous Progress Record by Therapist Whitford reflects

Petitioner’s complaints about problems with his anger and another inmate. He

denied being suicidal. Therapist Whitford found Petitioner to be alert,

focused, logical, coherent, goal oriented, oriented, cooperative, of euthymic

mood, and that his thought processes were within normal limits. Petitioner

was continued on his medication.

• A June 21, 2007 Continuous Progress Record indicating that Petitioner had a

history of depression and PTSD and that he had a better response to Paxil. 

• On June 21, 2007, Petitioner signed an “Informed Consent for Psychotropic

Medications” which set forth the side-effects of Paxil prescribed to Petitioner.

• A July 14, 2007 Psychiatric Follow-Up Note completed by John Lee,

Psychiatrist. Dr. Lee found Petitioner was taking medication as prescribed

with no side effects and he was symptom free. Petitioner’s concentration was

good, his perception, speech and thought process were within normal limits,

his memory was intact, and he had no self-destructive ideation. He was

continued on Paxil. 

• A December 12, 2007 Continuous Progress Record indicating that Petitioner’s

chart had been reviewed “for return to clinic psychiatrist line on 12/14/07.”15

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• A December 14, 2007 Psychiatric Follow-Up Note completed by John Lee,

Psychiatrist. Dr. Lee found Petitioner was taking medication as prescribed

with no side effects and he was symptom free. Petitioner’s concentration was

good, his perception, speech and thought process were within normal limits,

his memory was intact, and he had no self-destructive ideation. He was

continued on Paxil. 

• An April 4, 2008 Psychiatric Follow-Up Note completed by Dr. Lee who

found Petitioner was taking medication as prescribed with no side effects.

Petitioner’s concentration was good, his judgment was fair, his memory was

intact, and he had no self-destructive ideation. He was continued on Paxil. 

• An April 14, 2008 Continuous Progress Record completed by Therapist

Whitford indicating Petitioner’s report that he was compliant with his

medication, would soon be starting culinary classes, and he was not suicidal.

Therapist Whitford found Petitioner to be alert, focused, logical, coherent, goal

oriented, of appropriate affect and of euthymic mood. Petitioner’s manner and

stream of speech, tone and thought processes were within normal limits.

• A July 8, 2008 record indicating that Petitioner’s psychiatric appointment was

rescheduled.

• A July 16, 2008 Continuous Progress Record wherein Petitioner indicated he

had received “a letter”, which presumably was the Court’s Order, requiring

information concerning his mental health treatment and “that has me stressed

out a little.” He had been taking culinary classes and studying the scriptures,

he had been compliant with psychiatric medications and denied suicidal or

homicidal ideation. J. Cohen, PRN II, found Petitioner to be calm,

cooperative, of euthymic mood, logical and coherent.

• A July 21, 2008 Continuous Progress Record indicating that Petitioner

discussed the Court’s Order requiring information concerning his mental

health treatment. Petitioner reported that he had been attending culinary

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school since April, he was studying scriptures, he was not suicidal, and he had

applied for several jobs. Therapist Whitford found Petitioner to be alert,

focused, cooperative and that his tone, rate and manner of speech and thought

process were within normal limits. Petitioner’s affect was appropriate and his

mood was euthymic.

In sum, the record reflects that Petitioner reported that in 1991 or 1992 he attempted

suicide. The record reflects that Petitioner has a history of PTSD, depressive disorder, and

antisocial traits and that he has consistently taken medications such as Paxil or Prozac for

these conditions. The submitted records reveal that during the relevant AEDPA

limitations period, which expired on April 3, 2006, Petitioner was repeatedly described as

being alert, coherent, logical and goal-oriented in his thought processes, oriented as to

person, time, place and situation, involved in Bible study, and in February 2005 he was also

involved in “legal work.” He did not suffer from hallucinations, paranoia, nor did he have

manic episodes. He also reported that he was taking his medication as prescribed, that it was

effective and he did not suffer side effects. More than one court has noted that “‘the fact that

petitioner has been receiving psychotropic medications ‘would actually weigh more in favor

of his being able to function than not.’” Brown, 232 F.Supp.2d at 768 (quoting Williams v.

Price, 2002 WL 551037, *5 (E.D. Mich. March 29, 2002)). 

The record reflects that Petitioner was able to represent himself at a three-day

evidentiary hearing during his of-right PCR proceeding in 2004. Petitioner was also able to

commence several state post-conviction relief proceedings during the time that he alleges that

his mental illness prevented him from complying with the AEDPA statute of limitations. In

fact, Petitioner filed his Third and Fourth PCR proceedings while the AEDPA statute of

limitations was running.

Respondents also aptly point out that “even though Petitioner presently takes the same

medications for his diagnosed conditions that he received during the period he seeks to toll...,

the administration of these drugs did not prevent him from: (1) responding to this Court’s

Order by asking prison officials for the medical reports he submitted on August 20, 2008...;

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16Petitioner filed his pro se of right PCR Petition and represented himself at a threeday evidentiary hearing on this matter in 2004.

17During this time, Petitioner pursued his May 13, 2005 Second PCR Petition.

18During this time, Petitioner filed: (1) an August 24, 2005 motion for extension of

time to file a petition for review of the trial court’s denial of his Second PCR Petition; (2) his

September 20, 2005 Third PCR Petition; (3) an September 29, 2005 petition for review; and

(4) his March 15, 2006 Fourth PCR Petition.

19During this time, Petitioner filed: (1) a May 1, 2006 petition for special action; (2)

an April 2, 2007 Fifth PCR Petition; and (3) a May 3, 2007 special action.

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and (2) seeking an extension of this Court’s deadline when Petitioner recognized an

impending delay in the provision of the records at issue.” (Surreply, p. 18). 

The Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district court’s refusal to apply equitable tolling in

a case, like the instant case, where the petitioner, despite his claims of mental illness, had

prepared and filed petitions with the state court immediately before the commencement of

the AEDPA statute of limitations as well as a few months following expiration of the

limitations period. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034-35. Like the petitioner in Gaston, the instant

Petitioner was able to complete various filings in the state court prior to commencement of

the AEDPA statute of limitations16, while that period was statutorily tolled17, and also while

that period was running.18 He also completed state filings after the limitations period had

expired and before he filed the instant federal Petition.19 Like Gaston, there is no suggestion

in the record that Petitioner’s condition was significantly worse during the AEDPA

limitations period than his condition immediately before or after that period. See Id. at 1035.

On the instant record, Petitioner herein has failed to establish exceptional circumstances

that would justify equitable tolling on the basis of mental incapacity. See Gaston, 417 F.3d

at 1034-1035; Brown, 232 F.Supp.2d at 768 (“The exceptional circumstances that would

justify equitable tolling on the basis of mental incapacity are not present when the party who

seeks the tolling has been able to pursue his or her legal claims during the period of his or

her alleged mental incapacity.”).

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Petitioner also claims that he relied on “other inmates to help me argue and write [sic]

research of my legal case.” (Reply, Exh. 1; see also Reply, p.2 (“[P]etitioner relied on other

people to help him file his pro se briefs...” in the state and federal courts and “to know the

Rules of Court and the correct filings of his petitions....”)). Petitioner has not alleged facts

which would justify equitable tolling based upon his reliance on other inmates. Mistakes

by jailhouse lawyers generally do not provide a basis for equitable tolling. See United States

v. Cicero, 214 F.3d 199, 204-05 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (no equitable tolling warranted where

petitioner “gave his legal papers to a jailhouse lawyer whose placement in segregation

separated [petitioner] and his papers...” in light of the petitioner’s lack of diligence to pursue

a timely filing); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that the

petitioner “chose to rely upon assistance from the prison legal access attorney and an inmate

law clerk...” and holding that “[t]he fact that an inmate law clerk was assisting in drafting the

state petition does not relieve [the petitioner] from the personal responsibility of complying

with the law.”); Paige v. United States, 171 F.3d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1999) (no equitable tolling

warranted where the petitioner “decided to count on someone in another prison to draft his

motion and mail it to him through the prison and U.S. mail systems, he voluntarily took the

risk of a late delivery.”); Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F.Supp. 2d 650, 655, (N.D. Tex. 1998)

(“Inmates who assist other prisoners with legal matters are not subject to the ethical and

fiduciary obligations of lawyers. If their miscreant, inept, or negligent conduct were deemed

sufficient of itself to toll the AEDPA limitations period, the time-bar would be rendered

virtually meaningless.”); Brissette v. Herndon, 2009 WL 1437822 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2009)

(“It cannot be deemed extraordinary that jailhouse lawyers might make errors in their

representation of fellow inmates.”) Gallegos v. Carey, 2008 WL 4078731 (E.D. Cal. Aug.

29, 2008) (“It is simply not extraordinary that jailhouse lawyers might give bad advice or

work less diligently than they should.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2008 WL

4372443 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2008); Lemos v. Marshall, 2008 WL 4410151, *4 (C.D. Cal.

Aug. 21, 1008) (“entrusting his record transcripts to fellow inmates hardly qualifies as an

extraordinary circumstance beyond petitioner’s control. Rather, entrusting his transcripts to

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fellow inmates and thereby assuming the risk the transcripts could be misplaced or lost was

a matter entirely within petitioner’s control.”). Cf. Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381

(9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s reliance upon allegedly incompetent jailhouse lawyer does not

constitute “cause” for procedural default). Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

AEDPA limitations period based upon his reliance on advice from other inmates.

Under the instant circumstances, Petitioner has failed to establish that equitable tolling

of the AEDPA statute of limitations is warranted.

III. CONCLUSION

The AEDPA limitations period in Petitioner’s case expired on April 3, 2006.

Petitioner did not file the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus until November 18,

2007–over one year after expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations. Consequently,

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely filed and barred from federal

court review. Because the Petition is untimely, the Court need not address Respondents’

alternative argument that all of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review, dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc.

No. 1).

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), an party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections

are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 07-8131-PCT-JWS. A party

may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy

thereof. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 20th day of November, 2009.

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