Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-02296/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-02296-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Christina Dawn Mertens, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W Colvin, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-15-02296-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

Plaintiff Christina Dawn Mertens seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the 

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security which denied her disability 

insurance benefits under Sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act. Because 

the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial 

evidence and is not based on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed. 

I. Background. 

Plaintiff, a 49-year-old woman, has an MBA and previously worked as a 

marketing researcher, elementary and middle school teacher, and retail supervisor. On 

November 17, 2011, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability 

beginning March 12, 2010. On February 21, 2014, she appeared with her attorney and 

testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A vocational expert also testified. On April 14, 

2014, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the 

Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

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hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. 

II. Legal Standard. 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id.

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

III. The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation Process. 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 

be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

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claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is 

still capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant 

is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final 

step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the 

Social Security Act through December 31, 2015, and that she had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since March 12, 2010, the alleged onset date. A.R. 23. At 

step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with a history of decompression 

laminectomy, discectomy, and fusion; diabetes; post-traumatic disorder; and depression. 

Id. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 

Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. A.R. 25. At step four, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff has the RFC to perform “light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §] 404.1567(b) 

except she can perform only simple, repetitive tasks.” A.R. 27. The ALJ further found 

that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of her past relevant work. A.R. 35. At step five, 

the ALJ concluded that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and 

RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 

Plaintiff could perform. A.R. 36. 

IV. Analysis. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by: (1) improperly rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony as 

to the severity of her symptoms; (2) improperly rejecting the VA disability determination; 

(3) improperly relying on medical-vocational guidelines to determine that Plaintiff could 

perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy; (4) failing to 

consider that Plaintiff could only perform simple, repetitive tasks; and (5) failing to 

articulate a basis for determining Plaintiff’s work capacities. 

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A. Plaintiff’s Credibility. 

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or 

other symptoms, the ALJ is required to engage in a two-step analysis: (1) determine 

whether the claimant presented objective medical evidence of an impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the pain or other symptoms alleged; 

and, if so with no evidence of malingering, (2) reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of the symptoms only by giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons for the 

rejection. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). In this case, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected 

to cause the alleged symptoms. The ALJ then found Plaintiff’s statements regarding the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms not credible to the extent they 

are inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC assessment. 

Plaintiff testified that her fibromyalgia “works hand-in-hand with [her] spinal cord 

injury and . . . it takes [her] about four hours in the morning to where [she] can actually 

get going.” A.R. 58. Plaintiff testified that after “two or three hours” she needs to take a 

nap because she is usually “pretty exhausted.” Id. Plaintiff testified that she has pain that 

radiates throughout her body, including pain in her back, ankles, elbows, wrists, or 

shoulders. A.R. 58-59. Plaintiff described the pain as like “a thousand or a million 

sharp, hot needles prickling all at one time.” A.R. 59. Plaintiff testified that stress or 

pressure can cause her to experience radiating pain. Id. Plaintiff stated that her “lower 

back is almost constantly in pain because of the implants,” which causes chronic 

migraines. Id. Plaintiff testified that she experiences three-to-five migraines a month 

that last one-and-a-half days on average. A.R. 60-61. Plaintiff estimated that this would 

cause her to miss around seven days of work per month. A.R. 61. During a migraine, 

Plaintiff cannot eat and must remain “quiet and still” in “a dark room.” Id.

 

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Plaintiff also testified about her mental limitations. She testified that she has been 

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, which causes her to avoid social 

interaction. A.R. 64-65. Plaintiff testified that she experiences panic attacks on an 

almost daily basis. A.R. 65. These panic attacks can be caused by “[a] group of people, 

a conflict, [her] husband yelling at the dogs,” or a traumatic event, like the death of a 

loved one. Id. It can take her up to five hours to get control of her attacks. A.R. 65-66. 

Plaintiff testified that it takes her about three or four hours to “grease the joints so 

that [she] can get moving” in the morning. A.R. 61. She testified that during this warmup period, she usually reads, watches television, or “just kind of wait[s] until [she] can 

get into the shower where [she] feel[s] comfortable that [she is] not going to fall.” A.R. 

61-62. Plaintiff testified that she helps with household chores, including sweeping, 

cooking meals, and helping care for her husband. A.R. 61-63. Plaintiff testified that she 

drives to medical appointments, runs errands, and does the family’s grocery shopping, 

although she goes early in the morning to avoid crowds. A.R. 55, 68. After about three 

or four hours, Plaintiff testified that she needs to take a nap, which typically lasts between 

one and four hours. A.R. 61-62. 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely credible.” A.R. 29. 

The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s testimony, which covered her physical limitations, her 

mental limitations, and her activities of daily living. See A.R. 27-29. The ALJ found that 

“the longitudinal evidence of record supports a finding that she is limited as contained in 

[the ALJ’s RFC formulation], but is not as limited as she alleges.” A.R. 29. In support 

of this conclusion, the ALJ provided a thorough summary of the medical evidence in the 

case. See A.R. 29-35. Although Plaintiff has been assessed with severe mental and 

physical impairments, the ALJ found that she engages in significant daily activities not 

expected of a totally disabled person, that one medical provider opined she could reenlist 

in the military, and that the assessed RFC was consistent with the Global Assessment 

Functioning (“GAF”) scores and Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. A.R. 35. 

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 1. Brown-Hunter.

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ’s treatment of Plaintiff’s symptom evidence is 

inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487 

(9th Cir. 2015). See Doc. 13 at 8-10. In that case, the district court affirmed the ALJ’s 

decision rejecting as inconsistent with the RFC the claimant’s statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms. 806 F.3d at 491. On appeal, 

the Ninth Circuit stated that an ALJ errs “by making only a single general statement that 

the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of 

these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above [RFC], 

without identifying sufficiently specific reasons for rejecting the testimony, supported by 

evidence in the case record.” Id. at 493 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The 

Ninth Circuit found that the ALJ “simply stated her non-credibility conclusion and then 

summarized the medical evidence supporting her RFC determination,” which “is not the 

sort of explanation or the kind of ‘specific reasons’ we must have in order to review the 

ALJ’s decision meaningfully . . . [to] ensure that the claimant’s testimony was not 

arbitrarily discredited.” Id. at 494. “Because the ALJ failed to identify the testimony she 

found not credible, she did not link that testimony to the particular parts of the record 

supporting her non-credibility determination. This was legal error.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

In contrast to Brown-Hunter, the ALJ in this case linked Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony that he did not find credible to particular parts of the record. The ALJ 

provided a detailed summary of Plaintiff’s testimony (A.R. 27-29), and then devoted six 

pages to detailing the medical evidence in the record and explaining why it did not 

support Plaintiff’s claim (A.R. 29-35). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “allegations 

regarding her symptoms and limitations are not entirely credible” for three reasons: 

(1) evidence of significant daily activities; (2) a medical provider’s opinion that Plaintiff 

could reenlist in the military; and (3) objective medical assessments including her GAF 

scores. A.R. 35. 

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The ALJ recounted the following list of Plaintiff’s daily activities: caring for her 

disabled husband; caring for her mother, her home, and a pet; preparing simple meals 

daily; doing small loads of laundry; getting outside two to three days per week; riding 

public transportation; shopping; managing finances; reading; using a computer; 

socializing; gardening; belonging to a community group; walking one-to-three miles for 

exercise; and volunteering for a senator. A.R. 26-27, 33-34. The ALJ also noted that 

Plaintiff reported to her doctor that she was looking for work in May of 2011, after her 

claimed disability onset date (A.R. 31), and that she fell and bruised her forearm while 

“moving a dresser” in November 2012 (A.R. 33). The ALJ found these activities 

inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ claims and the opinions of some medical sources she cited. 

A.R. 33, 34, 35. The ALJ also noted that Dr. Anthony Rappaport, who treated Plaintiff 

for more than four years, “was of the opinion that [Plaintiff] was functionally capable [of] 

reenlisting in the Army” (A.R. 34), and discussed Plaintiff’s GAF scores in considerable 

detail (A.R. 30-32). 

In short, the ALJ in this case provided far greater detail for his decision than did 

the ALJ in Brown-Hunter. The Court concludes that Brown-Hunter is not controlling. 

2. GAF Scores. 

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s numerous GAF scores revealed only moderate 

symptoms, difficulties, and limitations. A.R. 32. Plaintiff objects to use of GAF scores 

for two reasons. 

First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ went “‘outside the record to medical 

textbooks for the purpose of making his own exploration and assessment as to’” 

Plaintiff’s condition. Doc. 13 at 10 (quoting Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 

(9th Cir. 1975)). The Court does not agree. The ALJ cited the “American Psychiatric 

Association’s (“APA”) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) 

to explain the significance of Plaintiff’s GAF scores. The ALJ’s citation of the DSM was 

not for the purpose of independently exploring Plaintiff’s condition – it merely explained 

medical evidence in the record. 

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Second, Plaintiff argues that both the APA and the Social Security Administration 

(“SSA”) have “abandoned the GAF rating system.” Doc. 13 at 10-11. Plaintiff correctly 

notes that the APA omitted GAF scores from the most recent version of the DSM. Id. at 

10. Plaintiff erred, however, in asserting that the SSA has “repudiated” the use of GAF 

scores. Plaintiff’s error is illustrated by the very document she cites. In Administrative 

Message 13066, effective October 14, 2014, the SSA sought to “provide[] guidance to all 

[s]tate and [f]ederal adjudicators (including administrative law judges) on how to 

consider [GAF] ratings . . . when assessing disability claims involving mental disorders.” 

Doc. 13-1 at 1. The SSA acknowledged that although the APA no longer included GAF 

scores in the latest version of the DSM, the SSA would “continue to receive and consider 

GAF in medical evidence.” Id. at 2. The SSA noted that “[u]nless the GAF rating is well 

supported and consistent with other evidence in the file, it is entitled to little weight,” and 

therefore should not be used “as the primary support for findings of impairment severity 

or of mental limitations.” Id. at 3. The SSA further cautioned that adjudicators should 

not rely solely on GAF scores to support a disability decision, equate a particular GAF 

score with a listing-level limitation, or equate a particular GAF score with a particular 

mental RFC assessment. Id. at 3-4. 

Here, the ALJ used Plaintiff’s GAF scores in accordance with the SSA’s guidance. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s GAF scores were relatively consistent. Plaintiff received 22 GAF 

scores within the range of 51 to 58. See A.R. 466, 579, 589, 610, 619, 626, 636, 639, 

641, 651, 661, 670, 687, 805, 880, 953, 958, 986, 994, 1207, 1238, 1243. The ALJ 

afforded only “partial weight” to outlier GAF scores on both ends of the spectrum (A.R. 

30), including scores of 48 (A.R. 741, 772), 50 (A.R. 1263), and 63 (A.R. 1168). The 

GAF scores were considered in the context of a more thorough medical examination, 

supported by detailed notes from the treating or examining physician. The ALJ found 

that the moderate GAF scores were consistent with other evidence in the record, 

including the evidence of significant daily activities and the opinion of Dr. Rappaport that 

Plaintiff could reenlist in the military. The ALJ did not rely solely on GAF scores to 

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support a disability determination, nor did he equate a GAF score with a listing-level 

limitation or with a particular mental RFC assessment. 

3. Daily Activities. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected her symptom testimony as 

inconsistent with her activities of daily living. Doc. 13 at 11-12. Plaintiff faults the ALJ 

for failing to show how her activities were inconsistent with any particular symptoms or 

their severity. Id. Plaintiff also contends that the record does not show that she spent a 

substantial part of a typical day engaged in activities of daily living. Id. at 12. 

Even where a claimant’s reported activities of daily living “suggest some 

difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to 

the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). As noted above, the ALJ 

recounted a thorough list of Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. A.R. 26-27, 33-34. The 

extent and nature of these activities provided substantial evidence for the ALJ to 

conclude that Plaintiff’s activities consumed a significant part of her day. The ALJ 

acknowledged that Plaintiff provided some evidence of difficulty functioning, including 

both physical and mental limitations, but the ALJ found that these limitations were not as 

severe as alleged due to their inconsistency with Plaintiff’s daily activities. Because the 

ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and there is no legal error, they 

must be upheld. 

B. VA Disability Determination. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the VA’s disability 

determination. Doc. 13 at 12-14. Although an ALJ must ordinarily afford the VA’s 

disability determination “great weight,” he can afford it less weight if he provides 

“persuasive, specific, valid reasons for doing so that are supported by the record.” 

McCarthey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

The ALJ rejected the VA’s disability determination as inconsistent with both VA 

records and Plaintiff’s other medical evidence. First, the ALJ noted that the VA 

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determination is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s extensive activities of daily living set forth 

in its records, as recounted above. A.R. 34. Second, the ALJ found that the 

determination was inconsistent with other evidence in Plaintiff’s file, including the 

medical opinion of Dr. Rappoport and the January 3, 2012 consultative examination. 

A.R. 31-32, 34. Plaintiff seeks to undermine the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Rappoport’s 

opinion as conclusory and not based on physical evidence, but Dr. Rappoport treated 

Plaintiff for over four years when he wrote the letter. He did not provide an unqualified 

opinion that Plaintiff was not disabled so as to prevent her from re-enrolling in the 

military; instead, he recommended some limitations on high-impact physical limitations. 

The Court finds that the ALJ provided persuasive, specific, and valid reasons for 

affording little weight to the VA’s disability determination. 

C. Medical-Vocational Guidelines. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines (“Guidelines”) because they failed to account for non-exertional limitations 

that significantly limited the range of work Plaintiff could perform. Doc. 13 at 14-16. 

“There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of showing that there is 

other work in ‘significant numbers’ in the national economy that claimant can do: (1) by 

the testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) by reference to the” Guidelines. Tackett, 180 

F.3d at 1099. 

The Guidelines present, in table form, a short-hand method for determining 

the availability and numbers of suitable jobs for a claimant. These tables 

are commonly known as “the grids.” The grids categorize jobs by their 

physical-exertional requirements and consist of three separate tables – one 

for each category: “[m]aximum sustained work capacity limited to 

sedentary work,” “[m]aximum sustained work capacity limited to light 

work,” and “[m]aximum sustained work capacity limited to medium work.” 

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, rule 200.00. Each grid presents various 

combinations of factors relevant to a claimant’s ability to find work. The 

factors in the grids are the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 

For each combination of these factors, e.g., fifty years old, limited 

education, and unskilled work experience, the grids direct a finding of 

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either “disabled” or “not disabled” based on the number of jobs in the 

national economy in that category of physical-exertional requirements. See 

id.

Id. at 1101 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). 

 The Commissioner may rely on the Guidelines “where they completely and 

accurately represent a claimant’s limitations.” Id. (emphasis in original; citing Heckler v. 

Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 (1983)). “In other words, a claimant must be able to 

perform the full range of jobs in a given category, i.e., sedentary work, light work, or 

medium work.” Id. (emphasis in original). An alleged non-exertional limitation “does 

not automatically preclude application of the” Guidelines; instead, the Guidelines are 

inapplicable only when a claimant’s “sufficiently severe” non-exertional impairments 

“significantly limit the range of work permitted by his exertional limitations.” Id. at 

1101-02 (citation omitted). In the case of significant limitations, the ALJ must rely on a 

vocational expert to establish that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers that a 

claimant could perform. Id. at 1103-04. 

Here, the ALJ relied on the Guidelines to determine that there are jobs Plaintiff 

could perform. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered that Plaintiff was subject 

to additional limitations, which, the ALJ concluded, “have little or no effect on the 

occupational base of unskilled light work” because there are a significant number of jobs 

that qualify as sedentary work. A.R. 36. Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ should not have 

relied on the Guidelines because Plaintiff suffers from non-exertional impairments 

sufficiently severe as to impact her ability to work. Doc. 13 at 15. Plaintiff specifically 

identified the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could only perform simple, repetitive tasks and 

that Plaintiff testified that she needed to lay down during the day. 

The ALJ did not err in relying on the Guidelines despite the fact that Plaintiff 

could perform only simple repetitive tasks. See Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 

(9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n ALJ is required to seek the assistance of a vocational expert when 

the non-exertional limitations are at a sufficient level of severity such as to make the 

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grids inapplicable to the particular case.”); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, 

§ 202.00(b), (g); see also Angulo v. Colvin, 577 F. App’x 686, 687 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(unpublished) (holding that reliance on the Guidelines was appropriate despite 

“restriction to nonpublic, simple, repetitive work”); Drawn v. Colvin, No. CV15-03787-

BRO-KES, 2016 WL 2621296, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2016), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 2349090 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2016) (“Plaintiff has not, 

and cannot, prove that the limitation to simple, repetitive work so significantly erodes the 

occupational base at all exertional levels as to render the Grids inapplicable.”). 

Nor did the ALJ err by failing to account for Plaintiff’s testimony that she was 

required to lay down during the day. As discussed above, the Court concluded that the 

ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony was supported by substantial 

evidence and was not based on legal error. This non-exertional limitation therefore is not 

sufficiently severe to make the grids inapplicable. The ALJ was not required to rely on a 

vocational expert in determining that jobs exist that Plaintiff could perform. 

D. Simple, Repetitive Tasks. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to account for moderate limitations 

in social functioning recognized at step three when the ALJ concluded at step four that 

Plaintiff’s RFC is limited to simple, repetitive tasks. Doc. 13 at 16-17. The Ninth Circuit 

has recognized that the third and fourth steps involve distinct inquiries – a limitation at 

step three does not necessarily equate to a limitation at step four. See Hoopai, 499 F.3d 

at 1076 (recognizing a mild or moderate non-exertional limitation at step three while 

concluding that it need not be explicitly incorporated into the RFC at step four). An ALJ 

does not commit legal error, however, when he incorporates a moderate non-exertional 

limitation recognized at step three into a “simple tasks” limitation at the step four RFC 

formulation, so long as it is supported by the medical evidence in the record. StubbsDanielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The ALJ translated StubbsDanielson’s condition, including the pace and mental limitations, into the only concrete 

restrictions available to him – Dr. Eather’s recommended restriction to ‘simple tasks.’”). 

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At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in social 

functioning. A.R. 26. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform 

“light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §] 404.1567(b) except she can perform only simple, 

repetitive tasks.” A.R. 27. The ALJ afforded “great weight” to state psychological 

consultants who determined that Plaintiff could perform simple, repetitive tasks despite 

moderate limitations in social functioning. A.R. 34-35; see also A.R. 86, 89-90, 103, 

106-08. The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could perform simple, repetitive tasks 

despite moderate difficulties in social functioning was supported by substantial evidence. 

E. Work Capacities. 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to articulate any basis for Plaintiff’s RFC 

formulation. Doc. 13 at 17-20. An ALJ is tasked not only with determining whether a 

claimant is entitled to disability benefits, but also with providing his reasoning behind the 

decision. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014). 

There is, however, “‘no requirement in the regulations for a direct correspondence 

between an RFC finding and a specific medical opinion on the functional capacity in 

question.’” Gilbert v. Colvin, No. CV-15-02130-PHX-DLR, 2016 WL 3067767, at *3 

n.2 (D. Ariz. June 1, 2016) (quoting Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 

2012)). 

As the Commissioner notes, the ALJ in this case spent nearly eight full pages 

discussing the medical evidence underlying his RFC determination. Doc. 17 at 15; see 

also A.R. 27-35. This RFC determination is supported by several medical opinions cited 

in the ALJ’s decision, including those of Dr. Aaron Brown, the state agency medical 

consultants, and the state agency psychological consultants. A.R. 32, 34-35. What is 

more, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that the ALJ provided additional bases for his RFC 

determination, including the objective medical assessments such as Plaintiff’s GAF 

scores and Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living. A.R. 35. The Court has already 

addressed both of these issues. The ALJ’s RFC determination was supported by 

substantial evidence. 

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IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

Dated this 8th day of August, 2016. 

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