Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-06-55675/USCOURTS-ca9-06-55675-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD M. FELDMAN, an 

individual; ROBERT LEE

PUDDICOMBE, an individual; IN

DEFENSE OF ANIMALS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. No. 06-55675

MARY BOMAR,* in her official D.C. No.

capacity as the Director of the CV-05-04900-DT

National Park Service; KATE  ORDER FAULKNER, in her official capacity AMENDING as the Chief of Natural Resources OPINION AND Management at Channel Islands AMENDED National Park; NATIONAL PARK OPINION SERVICE, a bureau of the US

Department of the Interior;

NATURE CONSERVANCY, an

international non-profit

corporation,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dickran M. Tevrizian, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 8, 2007**

Pasadena, California

*Mary Bomar is substituted for her predecessor, Fran Mainella, as

Director of the National Park Service, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.

43(c)(2). 

**The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

1891

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Filed January 10, 2008

Amended March 3, 2008

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Carlos T. Bea, and

N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw

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COUNSEL

Yano L. Rubinstein and Cindy J. Scribe, Rubinstein Law

Group, San Francisco, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Todd S. Aagaard, U.S. Department of Justice, Environmental

& Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C., and

Andrew B. Sabey and Scott B. Birkey, Cox, Castle & Nicholson, LLP, San Francisco, California, for the defendantsappellees.

ORDER

The opinion filed January 10, 2008 is amended as follows:

Slip op., page 371, line 6: After the sentence reading, “On

July 5, 2005, two years after the SCIPRP was approved, IDA,

Feldman, and Puddicombe (individuals who frequent the

island and enjoy viewing the pigs) filed suit principally seeking to enjoin the feral pig eradication,” add footnote No. 3 as

follows: “

3Because Appellants concede the pigs could not

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remain on the island and contest only the manner in which

they should have been removed, it is at least open to question

whether Appellants’ frequenting the island and viewing the

pigs is sufficient to grant them standing to pursue this action.

Because we dismiss this appeal as moot, however, it is unnecessary to resolve that question.” 

No petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc was filed

within the original time period, and that time period has now

expired. No subsequent petitions for rehearing or rehearing en

banc shall be filed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge: 

Richard M. Feldman, Robert Lee Puddicombe, and In

Defense of Animals (IDA) (collectively “Appellants”) appeal

the judgment in favor of the Nature Conservancy (TNC), the

National Park Service (NPS), NPS’s director, and the Chief of

Natural Resources Management at Channel Islands National

Park (collectively “Appellees”) on their claims that Appellees

violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and

the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in adopting NPS’s program to restore and protect Santa Cruz Island

by, in part, eradicating its feral pig population. Appellants do

not dispute that the pigs threatened Santa Cruz Island’s ecological and archeological infrastructure; however, they would

have preferred eliminating the population through non-lethal

means, such as sterilization or removal of the pigs to the

mainland, and they challenge NPS’s process in reaching its

conclusion that the pigs should be killed instead. Because

NPS completely eradicated the feral pigs from Santa Cruz

Island during the pendency of this litigation,1 and because

Appellants allege only procedural violations in the develop1The district court denied Appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction, and we affirmed. Feldman v. Mainella, 166 F. App’x 969 (9th Cir.

2006). 

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ment of the eradication program and do not seek compensation in monetary damages, we grant Appellees’ motion to

dismiss the appeal as moot. Appellees have met their heavy

burden of demonstrating that “no effective relief for the

alleged violation[s] can be given.” Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002).

I

Santa Cruz Island, a part of the Channel Islands National

Park, is located off the California coast between Ventura and

Santa Barbara. The island is jointly owned by TNC and NPS,

and contains a wealth of undisturbed Native American archeological resources and several unique species of plants and

animals. Many of the island’s notable resources, however,

were adversely affected by non-native feral pigs, who rooted

in the soil, destroying endangered vegetation, causing erosion,

and damaging archeological artifacts. Moreover, feral piglets

served as the primary food source for another non-native species, the golden eagle, that in turn hunted and decimated the

native Santa Cruz Island Fox population to near-extinction.

Golden eagles were attracted to the island both by the abundant food supply of feral piglets and by the relatively recent

absence of native bald eagles, who historically repelled the

golden eagles but were nearly obliterated by DDT and other

pollutants. 

In 1999, NPS convened a team to develop strategies to

recover the island fox populations to viable levels. The team

proposed four emergency measures: (1) “[r]elocate golden

eagles from the northern Channel Islands [to the mainland]”;

(2) “[e]stablish fox sanctuary/captive breeding programs on

Santa Rosa and San Miguel Islands”; (3) “[e]radicate feral

pigs”; and (4) “[r]eintroduce bald eagles.” On February 1,

2001, NPS issued a draft Environmental Impact Statement

(EIS) for the Santa Cruz Island Primary Restoration Plan

(SCIPRP), which proposed, inter alia, to eradicate the non1896 FELDMAN v. BOMAR

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native feral pig population.2

 NPS allowed interested parties to

comment on the draft EIS, and responded to these comments

in its final EIS, which was released in June 2002 and

approved in April 2003. 

During the comment period, appellant IDA, a non-profit

group that advocates for the humane treatment of all animals,

recommended that NPS “avoid . . . all-kill policies . . . and . . .

seek a non-lethal, alternative solution,” such as sterilization.

NPS rejected IDA’s recommendation, finding that non-lethal

methods were impractical. For example, NPS considered the

“use of contraception or sterilization,” but found that “[t]he

logistics of delivering . . . sterilant to all pigs on the island

[would be] an insurmountable obstacle.” Similarly, it dismissed the possibility of “[l]ive capture of feral pigs and relocation to the mainland,” because state agencies would not

permit such transfer for fear of potential disease. Finally, NPS

considered various methods of killing the feral pigs, including

snares, poisons, and swine diseases, but found that “a wellplaced gunshot” was far more efficient and often more

humane. 

On July 5, 2005, two years after the SCIPRP was approved,

IDA, Feldman, and Puddicombe (individuals who frequent

the island and enjoy viewing the pigs) filed suit principally

seeking to enjoin the feral pig eradication.3 They asserted that

Appellants violated NEPA and CEQA by deciding to extermi2The reintroduction of bald eagles to Santa Cruz Island was not part of

the SCIPRP. In 2002, a “Feasibility Study for Reestablishment of Bald

Eagles on the northern Channel Islands, California” proposed releasing

young bald eagles to Santa Cruz Island and monitoring contaminants in

their eggs and food. 

3Because Appellants concede the pigs could not remain on the island

and contest only the manner in which they should have been removed, it

is at least open to question whether Appellants’ frequenting the island and

viewing the pigs is sufficient to grant them standing to pursue this action.

Because we dismiss this appeal as moot, however, it is unnecessary to

resolve that question. 

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nate the feral pigs before releasing the EIS; failing to include

the pig eradication, the golden eagle relocation, the bald eagle

reintroduction, and the fox breeding in the same EIS; “tiering”

the EIS on an outdated general management plan; failing to

consider reasonable alternatives; failing to analyze the cumulative effects of the pig eradication; failing to create a new

EIS when supplemental information about new contraceptives

became available; and failing to file its environmental review

documents with the California State Clearinghouse. 

The district court denied all preliminary injunctive relief,

and we affirmed. Feldman v. Mainella, 166 F. App’x 969 (9th

Cir. 2006) (mem.). District Judge Tevrizian then entered summary judgment for Appellees, denying each of Appellants’

claims on the merits. He also granted summary judgment on

the alternative ground that Appellants’ claims were barred

under the doctrine of laches because Appellees were prejudiced by Appellants’ two-year delay in filing suit. Appellants

timely appealed, both parties completed briefing, and oral

argument was scheduled for November 8, 2007. 

On October 15, 2007, Appellees moved to dismiss this

appeal as moot, asserting that the pig eradication challenged

in this case had been completed and representing that “no pigs

remain on Santa Cruz Island.” The motion referenced an

August 28, 2007, press release in which NPS announced the

successful eradication:

Launched in April 2005, the eradication program

was completed in record time by Prohunt Inc., a professional hunting firm from New Zealand that specializes in island conservation through the

elimination of non-native animals. . . . A total of

5,036 pigs were dispatched using non-lead bullets

and following euthanasia guidelines set forth by the

American Medical Veterinary Association. 

The press release quotes Dr. Lotus Vermeer, director of

TNC’s Santa Cruz Island Preserve: “ ‘Based on extensive

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monitoring over the past year we believe the island is pigfree. We are now well on our way to restoring the biological

balance of the island and saving unique species found

nowhere else on Earth.’ ” In their response, Appellants conceded they “cannot present any evidence indicating that pigs

remain on the Santa Cruz Island.” 

II

[1] As the parties acknowledge, we lack jurisdiction to hear

moot claims. Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 893

F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1990). However,“[t]he burden of

demonstrating mootness is a heavy one.” Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.

v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988). Even if a

case is moot with respect to injunctive relief, a court may

invoke jurisdiction over a claim for declaratory relief. Super

Tire Eng’g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 121-22 (1974).

Nonetheless, “a case or controversy exists justifying declaratory relief only when the challenged government activity is

not contingent, has not evaporated or disappeared, and, by its

continuing and brooding presence, casts what may well be a

substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning

parties.” Headwaters, 893 F.2d at 1015 (internal quotation

and alteration omitted). “The adverse effect . . . must not be

so remote and speculative that there is no tangible prejudice

to the existing interests of the parties.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation and alteration omitted). “The basic

question in determining mootness is whether there is a present

controversy as to which effective relief can be granted.” Gordon, 849 F.2d at 1244. 

[2] This motion presents the question of whether, in light

of the successful eradication of the feral pigs, any “effective

relief” for the alleged procedural violations exists. We have

found “live” controversies in environmental cases even after

the contested government projects were complete. In each of

those cases, however, we could nonetheless remedy the

alleged harm. E.g., Or. Natural Res. Council v. U.S. Bureau

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of Land Mgmt., 470 F.3d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding

that “an appropriate [Environmental Assessment] can yet

yield effective post-harvest relief” for challenges to a timber

harvesting project); Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2002) (“If warranted,

[the district court] might order the Forest Service to adjust

future timber plans to compensate for this allegedly unlawful

one.”); Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678-79

(9th Cir. 2001) (finding that a challenge to the destruction of

historic buildings was not moot because, although the buildings had already been destroyed, the court could still craft a

remedy to mitigate the injury to the birds that had been inhabiting them); Tyler v. Cuomo, 236 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th Cir.

2000) (allowing challenge to the development of a housing

project that was already built because the project could still be

modified to grant the plaintiff relief); West v. Sec’y of the

Dep’t of Transp., 206 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2000) (allowing

challenge to the construction of a highway that was already in

use because the district court could still order the highway

closed or taken down); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians

v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 368 (9th Cir. 1989) (allowing challenge to a completed governmental action that threatened a

certain species of fish because the court could still remedy the

harm through protections in future spawning seasons); Gordon, 849 F.2d at 1245 (same); Columbia Basin Land Prot.

Ass’n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 591 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981)

(finding that a suit to enjoin construction of a power line was

not moot because, although it had been built, it could still be

removed). The common thread in these cases is that “the violation complained of may have caused continuing harm and

. . . the court can still act to remedy such harm by limiting its

future adverse effects.” Gordon, 849 F.2d at 1245. In such a

scenario, “the parties clearly retain a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. 

[3] Appellants’ claim for declaratory relief does not fall

within this scenario. They do not face a continuous, remediable harm that concretely affects their “existing interests.”

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Headwaters, 893 F.2d at 1015. Appellants have never contested that the presence of feral pigs on Santa Cruz Island

endangered important archeological and ecological resources;

rather, they simply desired an alternative means of resolving

the problem. Now that the pigs have been killed, Appellants

have suffered whatever harm could conceivably result from

the challenged agency action. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist.

No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding

that a student’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief

against a school’s graduation prayer policy were moot once

the student graduated because he or she had “already . . . suffered any injury that would result from the alleged forced participation in prayers [in the] graduation ceremony”). Because

we cannot resurrect the pigs, nor retroactively remedy any

pain that they might have felt from being shot, nor take any

other action to prevent or undo the eradication at issue here,

we lack the power to grant any effective relief. See Sierra

Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1318 (9th Cir. 1988). 

[4] Appellants argue that because neither we nor they can

be certain that every pig on the island has been killed, relief

might be granted as to any remaining pigs, if they happen to

exist. This argument is speculative at best. It is undisputed

that NPS’s “announcement was made after extensive monitoring over the previous year to confirm that the island is pigfree.” There is no evidence in the record that any pigs remain

on the island. Therefore, any alleged future harm to pigs that

survived the extermination is “ ‘so remote and speculative

that there is no tangible prejudice to the existing interests of

the parties.’ ” Headwaters, 893 F.2d at 1015 (emphasis in

original) (quoting Super Tire, 416 U.S. at 123) (alteration

omitted). 

[5] Appellants next cite to Cuddy, Gordon, and Cantrell for

the proposition that we could still mitigate or reverse the damage done. However, each of those cases involved challenged

government projects that had a secondary effect on the

environment—that the government action was complete did

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not preclude the court from ordering the government to mitigate or reverse these secondary effects. In Gordon, for example, where the government’s action endangered several

species of fish, the court could still mitigate the resulting

harm. 849 F.2d at 1245 (“If the 1986 measures did cause

damage to the coho population in violation of federal law, the

damage can still be repaired or mitigated—obviously not by

restoring the fish harvested in 1986, but by allowing more fish

to spawn in 1989.”). In this case, however, the alleged harm

resulting from the government’s action was not to some secondary population, it was to the specific pigs that were eradicated. It is unclear how that harm can subsequently be

mitigated or reversed. Appellants’ suggestion that “pigs could

be reintroduced to the Island from the mainland” is nonsensical, because bringing more pigs from the mainland would

only force NPS to develop a new plan to deal with the uncontested threat they pose to the island’s natural resources. At

best, these pigs would be brought to the island only so that

they could (1) be returned to the mainland, or (2) be sterilized

until the population died off. At worst, they would be brought

to the island only so that they could later be hunted and shot.

We fail to see how any of these options even remotely mitigates the harm Appellants allege in their complaint. 

[6] Finally, Appellants argue that finding this case moot

would allow government agencies to evade their statutory

obligations:

Appellees cannot be absolved of liability for violating NEPA and CEQA by virtue of the fact that they

accomplished their illegal goal before the litigation

could run its course. To have such a result be

affirmed by the Court would be to give would-be

environmental policy violators carte blanche to completely disregard NEPA and CEQA so long as they

did so quickly—before plaintiffs and the courts

could stop them. Obviously, such a result would

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completely vitiate the effectiveness of such environmental regulations. 

We have some sympathy with this argument and our decisions have made similar observations. See Columbia Basin,

643 F.2d at 591 n.1 (“If the fact that the towers are built and

operating were enough to make the case non-justiciable, . . .

then the BPA (and all similar entities) could merely ignore the

requirements of NEPA, build its structures before a case gets

to court, and then hide behind the mootness doctrine.”). However, those considerations are lessened in this case. First,

Appellants waited two years after the NPS plan was approved

before bringing their case to court. Second, they had an

opportunity to request both a temporary restraining order and

a preliminary injunction, which were denied and affirmed on

appeal. Third, NPS in this case was rushing to complete the

pig-extermination not to evade judicial review of its challenged procedure, but because the pigs’ continued presence

on the island was itself an environmental hazard. In any event,

policy considerations alone cannot invest jurisdiction where

there is no live controversy. Appellants must demonstrate a

remediable harm that effects their “existing interests.” Here,

no such harm exists. 

[7] Finally, we must ask whether this case fits within the

mootness exception for claims that are “capable of repetition,

yet evading review.” “That exception applies when (1) the

duration of the challenged action is too short to allow full litigation before it ceases, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs will be subjected to it again.” Padilla

v. Lever, 463 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted). Appellants can satisfy neither of these

prongs. In particular, Appellants do not challenge any repetitive government policy, but rather only the one-time process

by which the final EIS was approved in this case. Given the

procedural nature of Appellants’ allegations, and that the particular threat to the environment NPS faced here has been

resolved, we cannot reasonably expect that plaintiffs will be

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subjected to the same alleged procedural violations in the

future. 

III

Because there is no longer a live controversy, we grant

Appellees’ motion and dismiss this appeal as moot. 

DISMISSED. 

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