Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02358/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02358-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHIL ELIZALDE CAMILLO,

CDCR # AS-4716,

Civil No. 14cv2358 LAB (RBB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF Doc. No. 2] 

AND

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

vs.

BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

Phil Elizalde Camillo (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the

CaliforniaRehabilitation Center located in Norco, California, and proceeding pro se, has

filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2).

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I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All partiesinstituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite the plaintiff’s failure to prepay the

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entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a

prisoner and he is granted leave to proceed IFP, he nevertheless remains obligated to pay

the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir.

2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy

of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the six-month

period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2);

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly

depositsin the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the

account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of

the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding

month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forwards them to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP application, Plaintiff has submitted the certified copies of his

trust account statements required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. 

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after 1

May 1, 2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a),

(b); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May

1, 2013). However, the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is

granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account statements,

as well as the attached prison certificate where he is currently incarcerated verifying his

account history and available balances, and has determined that Plaintiff has no available

funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing

that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited frombringing a civil action or appealing

a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no

means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding

that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s

IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him

when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF Doc. No.

2) and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the

entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated must be garnished by the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of

the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II.

INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the

PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP

and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and]

accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as

soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under

these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v.

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Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claimshowing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when he was

subjected to a false arrest in January of 2011. “A claim may be dismissed [for failing to

state a claim] on the ground that it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations only

when ‘the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.’” Von Saher

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v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006)). However, “‘[a]

complaint cannot be dismissed unlessit appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.’” Id. (quoting Supermail

Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, in a case like this

one, where the running of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face of the

Complaint, the Court may dismiss it for failure to state a claim, but only after the

Plaintiff has been provided an opportunity to allege facts which, if proved, mightsupport

tolling. See Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1276-77; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.

Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 788 (9th Cir. 2000) (court may raise the

defense of statute of limitations sua sponte); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th

Cir. 2003) (upholding sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) of prisoner’s

time-barred complaint). 

Section 1983 contains no specific statute of limitation; therefore, federal courts

apply the forumstate’s statute of limitationsfor personal injury actions. Jones, 393 F.3d

at 927; Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); Fink v. Shedler, 192

F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Before 2003, California’s statute of limitations was one

year. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. Effective January 1, 2003, the limitations period was

extended to two years. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1). 

The law of the forum state also governs tolling. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

394 (2007) (citing Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1989)); Jones, 393 F.3d at

927 (noting that in actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitation,

the federal court also borrows all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period

found in state law). Under California law, the statute of limitationsfor prisonersserving

less than a life sentence is tolled for two years. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352.1(a);

Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds,

543 U.S. 499 (2005). Accordingly, the effective statute oflimitationsfor most California

prisoners is three years for claims accruing before January 1, 2003 (one year limitations

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period plustwo year statutory tolling), and four yearsfor claims accruing thereafter (two

year limitations period plustwo yearsstatutory tolling). Avery v. Moreno, Civil Case No.

2:12-CV-3083 KJN P, 2014 WL 413025 at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014).

Unlike the length of the limitations period, however, “the accrual date of a § 1983

cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.”

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; Hardin, 490 U.S. at 543-44 (federal law governs when a

§ 1983 cause of action accrues). “Under the traditional rule of accrual . . . the tort cause

of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when the wrongful act or

omission results in damages.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391. Put another way, “[u]nder

federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury

which is the basis of the action.” Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955; TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174

F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on September 29, 2014, but his claims are alleged

to arise in January of 2011. Thus, Plaintiff alleges the wrongful acts that caused him

harm occurred more than three years before he initiated this suit. This date of accrual

exceeds California’s statute of limitations. Plaintiff may be entitled to tolling during his

current incarceration if he was incarcerated prior to January of 2013 when the statute of

limitations ran. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 335.1 (tolling statute of limitations “for a

maximum of 2 years” during a prisoner’s incarceration).

Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal

because it is clear from the face of his pleading that his claims are barred by the statute

of limitations. See Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 969. 

Because Plaintiffis proceeding without counsel, and it is not “absolutely clear that

no amendment can cure” the defects of pleading set forth above, the Court will grant him

an opportunity to amend. See Lucas v. Dept. of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995);

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131; Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1276-77. 

/ / /

/ / /

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III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF

Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the

filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an

amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S

Street, Suite 502, Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSEDfor failing to state a claimupon which

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). 

However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order

in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading

noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to his original pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named

and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of a form § 1983 complaint.

DATED: October 10, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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