Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02656/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02656-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURT A. ROSANDER,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social

Security

Defendant.

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No. 05-02656 BZ

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Curt Rosander appeals from a final decision by

the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) affirming the decision of the Administrative

Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that since plaintiff was

capable of performing light work with certain restrictions, he

was not disabled and therefore not eligible for Disability or

Disability Insurance Benefits, or Supplemental Security Income

under Sections 216(I), 223, and 1614(a)(3) of the Social

Security Act. Tr. at 20.

The Social Security Administration Appeals Council

declined to review the ALJ decision. Tr. 6-9. Plaintiff

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timely requested judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C §405(g),

and moved for summary judgment, requesting that the case be

remanded to the Commissioner with instructions to award and

pay plaintiff disability benefits. In her reply, defendant

made a cross-motion for summary judgment.

The Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits will be

disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence

or is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Batson v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004);

Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less

than a preponderance. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098

(9th Cir. 1999). It means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509. As a result of the

limited scope of the review, the ALJ’s decision will be upheld

where the evidence is conflicting, Allen v. Secretary of

Health & Human Servs., 726 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984), or

open to multiple interpretations. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d

676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The ALJ found that plaintiff had not performed

substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2001 and that he

had a history of severe grand mal seizures, alcohol abuse and

back pain. Tr. at 19. The ALJ also found that plaintiff did

not have an impairment or a combination of impairments of the

level of severity listed in or medically equal to that in the

grid regulations, the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1 to

Subpart P of Regulation No. 4. Id. The ALJ found that

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plaintiff could not perform past relevant work but was capable

of performing other jobs including surveillance monitor, table

worker and information clerk. Tr. at 20. 

While there is some conflicting evidence in the record,

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions. The ALJ

relied in part on the internal medical evaluation, dated

October 28, 2003, of Jaskaran Momi, M.D. of the Bayview

Medical Clinic. Dr. Momi examined plaintiff, observing that

plaintiff was “awake, alert oriented” with “[f]ull range of

movement in all directions” and there were no abnormalities. 

Tr. at 193. Dr. Momi was aware of plaintiff’s complaints of

seizures, low back pain and panic attacks, yet concluded that

the “only limitation by history in this patient is that he

should not be working on moving machinery, close to a large

body of water or uneven surfaces” and plaintiff “can sit

comfortably” for an 8-hour shift, “can stand and/or walk 1 to

2 hours at a time” and “can lift and carry 25 pounds of weight

most of the time.” Tr. at 194. Plaintiff can control his

seizures for the most part with regular medication, as most of

his past seizures appear to have occurred after he

discontinued or decreased his medication. Plaintiff offered

only subjective evidence regarding his panic attacks and fear

of public interaction, and there is sufficient evidence to

support the ALJ’s conclusion that these are not debilitating

enough to preclude plaintiff from working. Substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity is such that he could perform several

light exertional jobs such as surveillance monitor, table

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worker and information clerk.

Plaintiff challenges these findings, contending that the

ALJ: (1) failed to consider plaintiff’s Post Traumatic Stress

Disorder (PTSD); (2) erroneously relied on plaintiff’s

activities of daily living; and (3) erroneously rejected

evidence that plaintiff is unable to work. 

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly discounted

the evidence that he suffers from PTSD. The only medical

evidence plaintiff presented of PTSD were diagnoses on June,

15, 1998 and September 2, 1998. Tr. at 138. Neither

diagnosis was certain, and there is no diagnosis of PTSD in

the record after the date of onset of the alleged disability. 

The ALJ gave “[c]areful consideration” to plaintiff’s

“subjective complaints and testimony which . . . are supported

by few objective medical findings, and which are not fully

credible.” Tr. at 18. Plaintiff has not provided medical

evidence that he suffered from PTSD during the time he now

claims he was disabled, which he is required to do in order to

receive benefits. He did not seek to supplement the record to

include examinations or diagnoses regarding his claimed PTSD. 

Putting aside plaintiff’s subjective complaints, there is

substantial evidence in the record to support discounting

plaintiff’s claimed PTSD. 

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s reliance on

plaintiff’s activities of daily living is legal error and not

supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ noted that

plaintiff’s activities include “walking the dog, gardening,

shopping, cooking, cleaning, and helping his parents.” Tr. at

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18. Plaintiff alleges that these actions are not inconsistent

with his limitations and he should not be penalized for trying

to perform common activities. He testified that he must

maintain telephone contact with his mother when he takes the

bus to go shopping, Tr. at 300-01, and that while cleaning he

often must work slowly and take breaks because of his back. 

Tr. at 297. 

Plaintiff is correct that the ability to complete

activities at home does not necessarily transfer to the

workplace. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir.

1998). The ALJ, however, found that plaintiff was not

disabled because plaintiff does not have a medically severe

impairment or combination of impairments. Any error the ALJ

may have committed in relying on plaintiff’s daily activities

to conclude that plaintiff could perform substantial gainful

work was harmless. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. (“A decision

of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are

harmless.”)

Plaintiff also contests the ALJ’s rejection of the

vocational expert’s testimony suggesting there are no jobs for

plaintiff. At the hearing, the ALJ asked two hypothetical

questions regarding the types of jobs that plaintiff could

perform. Tr. at 308-10. The ALJ asked the expert to consider

jobs for people with characteristics similar to those of

plaintiff, in age and education and with mild mobility and

exertional limitations. Tr. at 308. The vocational expert

listed surveillance monitor, table worker and information

clerk as possible jobs, Tr. at 308-09, which the ALJ cited in

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his decision. Tr. at 20. In his second hypothetical

question, the ALJ then asked for possible jobs for people with

moderate impairment with “concentration, persistence and

pace.” Tr. at 309. The expert testified that if moderate

impairment meant losing 20% of a work day, such a scenario

would preclude competitive employment. Tr. at 310.

Hypotheticals and a vocational expert’s opinions are

valuable only if they are supported by medical evidence. 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756 (9th Cir. 1989). The

only medical evidence in the record regarding plaintiff’s

moderate mental limitations are the reports of consulting

psychologist, Dr. Gary Balestin, and DDS physician, Dr. Ida

Hilliard. Dr. Balestin and Dr. Hilliard determined that

plaintiff is moderately limited in following instructions,

maintaining attention and concentration and performing at a

consistent pace. Tr. at 170-71, 187-88. The ALJ may reject

the conclusions in a medical report as long as he sets forth

specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on

substantial evidence in the record. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at

751; Jackson v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 2008037 at * 7 (N.D. Cal.

2005). 

The ALJ accepted the reservations Dr. Balestin himself

expressed in his report that Dr. Balestin’s conclusions were

“not corroborated by either his own or any other mental

status findings.” Tr. at 18. In his report, Dr. Balestin

cast doubt on his findings of moderate limitations, noting

that the intelligence estimates “appeared inconsistent with

clinical presentation, reflecting lack of effort” and finding

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that plaintiff had at least low average mental capacity. Tr.

at 168-69. 

The decision does not mention Dr. Hilliard’s report. 

Dr. Hilliard’s report consists of a form with checked boxes

without explanation or elaboration of her markings. The ALJ

did not commit legal error in disregarding Dr. Hilliard’s

report. See Stempien v. Barnhart, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

21670 *6 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“The ALJ also need not accept the

opinion of any physician . . . if that opinion is brief,

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical

findings.”)

Plaintiff contends that it was legal error for the ALJ

to rely on Dr. Balestin’s report to find that plaintiff is

not disabled while rejecting Dr. Balestin’s determinations

that plaintiff has some moderate limitations. I disagree. 

That mischaracterizes Dr. Balestin's report, since it was the

Doctor who questioned his own findings. To the extent there

is a discrepancy, the ALJ is responsible for resolving any

discrepancies between experts and within a single expert’s

opinion. See id. at 753. (“It is not necessary to agree

with everything an expert witness says in order to hold that

his testimony contains ‘substantial evidence.”)(internal

quotations omitted). See also Clay v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d

922, 930 (8th Cir. 2005)(holding that consulting physician’s

“opinion was equivocal and that it was not error for the ALJ

to disregard his findings” about claimant’s low IQ, given

“his specific claim that [she] failed to put forth a serious

effort when taking the IQ test”). Because the ALJ did not

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find credible evidence of plaintiff’s moderate limitations,

he disregarded the vocational expert’s testimony about

hypothetical moderate limitations that would preclude

competitive employment.

For the reasons described above, the ALJ's decision to

deny plaintiff Disability or Disability Insurance Benefits,

and Supplemental Security Income is supported by substantial

evidence and free of legal error. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is

DENIED and defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED.

DATED: March 10, 2006 

 Bernard Zimmerman

United States Magistrate Judge

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