Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01968/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01968-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LUIS FRANCISCO BARRON, 

Petitioner,

v. 

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 14cv1968 BEN (DHB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

On August 21, 2014, Petitioner Luis Francisco Barron (“Petitioner”), a state 

prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner seeks relief from his November 8, 2011 conviction 

in San Diego Superior Court Case No. SCD230124 for first degree murder and assault 

with a firearm. Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel as grounds for 

relief. 

The Court has reviewed the parties’ pleadings, the record, and controlling law, and 

for the reasons discussed below, hereby RECOMMENDS the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus be DENIED. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

The following facts are taken from the unpublished California Court of Appeal 

Opinion in People v. Barron, Case No. SCD230124 (Cal. Ct. App. March 6, 2013). 

(Lodgment No. 6.) The Court presumes these factual determinations are correct pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (finding 

factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary). 

The Murder 

Around 1:15 a.m. that same morning [August 27, 2010], a white 

SUV approached Lindbergh Park. About 15 seconds later, a gunshot rang 

out. Joanna Vargas, who was at the park with Jose Flores and two others 

(including Mr. Cardenas), fell to the ground; Flores, who had been dancing 

with Vargas, felt something strike him. After the shot, Cardenas saw the 

SUV, with its headlights off and windows open, cruising past slowly. The 

SUV was occupied by three or four people. 

[Petitioner]’s Companions’ Testimony

Around 8:00 p.m. on August 26, Mr. Zaragosa and Mr. Mendoza 

met [Petitioner] at the home of [Petitioner]’s girlfriend (Ms. Ikonen) and 

the group consumed alcohol. Zaragoza testified he had four “glasses” of 

whiskey, [FN2] and also consumed two Xanax pills, and [Petitioner] drank 

about the same amount of alcohol. Mr. Mendoza testified he drank less 

than the others, drinking only two glasses of whiskey and (after the group 

took a break to go to the store to buy beer) later drank a beer. Mendoza 

saw [Petitioner] consume one Xanax pill. The group left the house around 

9:30 p.m. because [Petitioner] wanted to acquire some spray cans of paint 

to go “tagging.” 

[FN2] Zaragosa stated they drank from oversized coffee 

mugs, and each of the cups he drank was filled half to 

three-quarters full. 

Mendoza testified the alcohol he consumed did not impair his 

faculties or awareness, and [Petitioner] did not appear to be falling down 

drunk or to slur his words during the course of the evening. Ms. Ikonen 

also testified [Petitioner] was not “particularly drunk,” was not “stumbling 

over,” and was holding a conversation without slurring his words. 

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Ikonen drove the group to [Petitioner]’s mother’s apartment in 

Ikonen’s SUV. [Petitioner] went inside the apartment; Zaragosa and 

Mendoza got out and waited next to the SUV, and Ikonen remained in the 

driver’s seat. When [Petitioner] emerged and came back to the SUV, he 

was carrying a shotgun. Ikonen, who had seen two men (Westbrooks and 

Pope) watched [Petitioner] return to the car, told [Petitioner] the two men 

had seen him. [Petitioner], Zaragosa and Mendoza then approached the 

two men and [Petitioner] “got into . . . one of the gentlemen’s face” and 

appeared to be aggressively confronting him. During the confrontation, 

[Petitioner] pulled out the shotgun and brandished it at one of the men, 

asking “Are you talking shit?” causing the man to back away. 

At one point, Zaragosa saw Mendoza chasing another man while 

[Petitioner] remained standing with the black man. When Mendoza 

returned, he, [Petitioner] and Zaragosa went back to the car and got in. 

[Petitioner] told Ikonen to drive away, and at some point explained to her 

that the reason he had chosen not to “do something” was because the black 

man whom [Petitioner] was confronting was “an old man.” [FN3] 

[Petitioner] put the shotgun down on the floor of the car as they drove 

away. 

[FN3] Westbrooks was 49 years old at the time of trial. 

Mendoza asked to be dropped off at his girlfriend’s house, near the 

site of the murder. As they drove past the park, [Petitioner] asked Ikonen 

to slow down. Suddenly, Mendoza saw [Petitioner] pointing the shotgun 

out the window and heard the “boom” when he fired. The others were 

startled, and were exclaiming “what the fuck,” and “what’s going on,” but 

[Petitioner] told Ikonen to shut up and said “I think I hit somebody” or “I 

think I just hit a girl.” [Petitioner] instructed Ikonen to stop the car, after 

which he opened the door, got out and retrieved the gun shell. He then got 

back into the car and urged Ikonen to “go, go, go.” 

Iknonen drove to Ocean Beach near Sunset Cliffs before finally 

stopping. They threw the gloves [Petitioner] was wearing over the cliff, 

[Petitioner] hid the shotgun in a bush, and the group then drove off. After 

a short stop at an apartment where he conferred with a friend, [Petitioner] 

announced they were going to drive to Mexico and explained he wanted to 

get the car cleaned up to get rid of gunpowder traces. Once there, he let 

Mendoza and Zaragosa out to find their own way home, but not without 

warning them that “snitches get stitches,” to deter them from reporting the 

incident. 

[Petitioner] and Ikonen spent the night at [Petitioner]’s father’s 

house in Mexico while the car was being cleaned. [Petitioner] told his 

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father that he had shot a girl. The day after the shooting, Mrs. Campbell 

(who had a child with [Petitioner]) confided to a friend that [Petitioner] 

had phoned her, crying and hysterical, and told her “I didn’t mean to shoot 

the girl. I meant to hit the boy.” 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 2-5.) 

B. Procedural Background 

On November 10, 2010, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed an 

amended information charging Petitioner with one count of murder, under California Penal 

Code § 187(a) with a special allegation for the personal discharge of a firearm, California 

Penal Code § 12022.53(d), and one count assault with firearm, under California Penal Code 

§ 245(a)(2) with a special allegation for the personal use of a firearm, under California 

Penal Code §12022.5(a). (Lodgment No. 1 at 3-4). 

Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder under Penal 

Code § 187, subdivision (a) and assault with a firearm under Penal Code § 245, subdivision 

(a)(2). (Lodgment No. 1 at 280, 282.) The jury found true enhancing allegations that 

Petitioner discharged and personally used a firearm in connection with the crimes. (Id.) 

On January 6, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life, 

plus a consecutive determinate term of 14 years. (Lodgment No. 1 at 285.) 

On May 18, 2012, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of 

Appeal, contending he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel based on his 

attorney’s failure to seek a jury instruction for voluntary intoxication. (Lodgment No. 3.) 

On March 6, 2013, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s conviction and denied 

Petitioner’s claim, finding there was insufficient evidence to support a voluntary 

intoxication instruction, and there was a reasonable explanation for trial counsel’s decision 

not to request the instruction. (Lodgment No. 6 at 10-11.) On April 10, 2013, Petitioner 

filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied without 

comment on May 15, 2013. (Lodgment Nos. 7-8.) 

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On August 21, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

(ECF No. 1.) Respondent filed an Answer on February 26, 2015, and Petitioner filed a 

Traverse on May 26, 2015. (ECF Nos. 12, 22.) 

/ / / 

II. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the 

trial court instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication under CALCRIM No. 625. (ECF No. 

1.) Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim was reasonably rejected by the state courts 

and therefore, federal habeas relief is precluded under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 12.) 

A. Standard of Review 

A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf 

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). The Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966 (“AEDPA”) controls 

review of this petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a 

habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by 

the state court unless that application: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in 

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2); Early v. 

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court 

is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, 

the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state 

court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 

(2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in the United States Supreme 

Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

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indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A federal court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the 

governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions, but unreasonably applied those 

decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application” 

clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant 

habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established federal law must be 

“objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

“Clearly established Federal law” means the law as determined by the United States 

Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

“Circuit precedent may provide ‘persuasive authority’ for purposes of determining whether 

a state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court precedent, but 

“only Supreme Court holdings are binding on state courts, and ‘only those holdings need 

be reasonably applied.’” Rodgers v. Marshall, 678 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(citation omitted); see also Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“[W]hen a Supreme Court decision does not ‘squarely address[] the issue . . . it cannot be 

said, under AEDPA, there is ‘clearly established’ Supreme Court precedent addressing the 

issue,” and the federal court “must defer to the state court’s decision.” Moses v. Payne, 

555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (the 

lack of holdings from the Supreme Court on the issue presented precludes relief under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

In applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), federal habeas courts must defer to reasonable 

factual determinations made by the state courts, to which a statutory presumption of 

correctness attaches. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 475-

74 (2007). To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the Court 

“looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for its analysis. Ylst 

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-03 (1991). 

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B. Petitioner’s Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failure to 

Request Jury Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication 

Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury 

instruction on voluntary intoxication; specifically, that evidence of voluntary intoxication 

could negate the intent element that is required for first degree murder. Petitioner further 

argues that there was a reasonable probability he would have obtained a more favorable 

result had the instruction been given. (Id.) Respondent counters that the state court 

properly rejected Petitioner’s claim because he failed to establish that his counsel’s conduct 

was deficient pursuant to the standard provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). (ECF No. 12.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Respondent. 

Petitioner presented his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the California 

Supreme Court, and it was denied without comment. (Lodgment Nos. 7, 8.) Accordingly, 

the Court will look through the silent denial to the last reasoned decision, which is the 

California Court of Appeal’s March 6, 2013 decision. (Lodgment No. 6.) The California 

Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument that his counsel was ineffective, as follows: 

[A]lthough there was evidence that [Petitioner] had been drinking 

alcohol earlier in the evening, the defense produced absolutely no 

evidence, from either lay or expert witnesses, that his drinking had any 

effect on his ability to formulate intent at the time of the shooting. To the 

contrary, the only evidence was that [Petitioner] had stopped drinking 

several hours before the shooting, and two of his coparticipants testified 

[Petitioner] did not appear “particularly drunk,” was not “stumbling over,” 

and was holding a conversation without slurring his words. Moreover, 

despite the alcohol consumption, [Petitioner] continued to manifest an 

ability before the shooting both to engage in purposeful and goal-directed 

behavior (e.g. by directing Ikonen to drive him to his mother’s apartment 

where he was able to find and retrieve the shotgun inside the home) and to 

make decisions based on discrete and rational criteria (e.g. his decision not 

to escalate his assault on Westbrooks because Westbrooks was an “old 

man”). The evidence also showed he was able to engage in rational and 

goal directed-behavior during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the 

shooting: he directed Ikonen to “slow down” immediately before firing the 

fatal shot; he directed her to stop the car so he could remove evidence of 

his crime (the shotgun shell); he told her to “go, go, go” after returning to 

the car (suggesting he was subjectively able to appreciate the need to 

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escape); he twice stated “I think I just hit a girl,” suggesting he was 

sufficiently sober that he could accurately perceive and recollect events; 

and he was able immediately to begin formulating and implementing a plan 

of escape (by ridding himself of the weapon and fleeing to Mexico to 

sanitize the escape vehicle). Finally, he admitted to Campbell he “didn’t 

mean to shoot the girl [but instead] meant to hit the boy,” suggesting his 

ability to engage in intended behavior was not impaired. 

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Petitioner] 

must show his counsel’s conduct was deficient – that it fell below an 

objective standard or reasonableness under prevailing professional norms 

– and that he was prejudiced as a result, meaning a favorable verdict was 

reasonably probable had the instruction been given. (People v. Palmer

(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1158.) Because there was no substantial 

evidence his condition was significantly impaired (People v. Miller, supra,

57 Cal.2d at pp. 830-831), must less that the level of inebriation made him 

unaware of what he was doing (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 

p.395), there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction and 

therefore [Petitioner]’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance 

of counsel by not requesting the instruction. (See People v. McPeters

(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1173 [defense counsel not required to advance 

unmeritorious arguments].) 

Separately, and alternatively, we also note the record is silent on 

why defense counsel did not pursue a voluntary intoxication defense at 

trial. . . . One plausible explanation for the dearth of lay or expert 

testimony to support a defense that [Petitioner]’s drinking impaired his 

ability to formulate intent at the time of the shooting is that defense counsel 

did investigate that avenue and could find no testimonial support to 

undermine the evidence to the contrary. A second tactical reason for not 

proffering the defense could have been that counsel believed proffering an 

intoxication argument that it perceived to be a weak argument would have 

detracted from the defense theory of the case: that [Petitioner] specifically 

intended to shoot into a park he reasonably believed was empty of people, 

and it was a tragic accident that someone was present in a dark park after 

1:00 a.m. to be hit by the shot. Because this theory of accident was the 

proffered defense, counsel could have reasonably believed that asserting 

[Petitioner] was too intoxicated to form any intent could have been 

inconsistent with this argument. 

. . . 

Because there are reasonable tactical explanations for counsel’s 

decision not to request a voluntary intoxication instruction, [Petitioner] has 

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not shown his counsel was ineffective on direct appeal and must pursue 

this claim by petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 8-11 (emphasis in original).) 

The “clearly established” United States Supreme Court precedent governing 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

See Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that Strickland “has long 

been clearly established federal law determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States”). Under Strickland, a habeas corpus petitioner must show both incompetence of 

counsel and prejudice in order to justify issuance of the writ. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 

However, the court need not address both prongs if the petitioner fails to make a sufficient 

showing of either one. Id. at 697. 

A petitioner can establish incompetency by showing counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 689. However, judicial scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance should be highly deferential as there is a “strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. A 

petitioner can establish prejudice by showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 

(1993). This means that a petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, absent 

the counsel’s alleged error, the fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting 

guilt. Id. at 695. 

“Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness 

under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d).” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 

770, 788 (2011) (reversing a Ninth Circuit en banc grant of habeas relief on an ineffective 

assistance claim for lack of sufficient deference to the state court result.) “[T]he question 

is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable,” but rather “whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.; see also 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (“We take a ‘highly deferential’ look at 

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counsel’s performance . . . through the ‘deferential lens of § 2254(d).’”) (citation omitted). 

The petitioner “must show that the [state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case 

in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002). 

Here, the Court of Appeal concluded that Petitioner’s allegations failed to rise to the 

level of ineffective assistance of counsel under People v. Palmer, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1141, 

1158 (2005). The legal standard in Palmer is the same as the federal standard for 

ineffective assistance claims. See Palmer, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1158, citing Strickland, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984). Therefore, the Court finds the Court of Appeal’s decision was not 

contrary to clearly established federal law. 

Further, the Court finds the state court’s decision was not objectively unreasonable. 

As the Court of Appeal noted, there was insufficient evidence in the record that Petitioner’s 

drinking rose to the level of “voluntary intoxication” as defined in People v. Williams, 16 

Cal. 4th 635, 677-78 (1997). Further, given the deference to counsel’s performance, the 

Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that there were tactical explanations for why trial 

counsel did not request the voluntary intoxication instruction. Either a lack of evidence 

that Plaintiff’s drinking impaired his ability to formulate intent, or the probability that a 

voluntary intoxication argument would have detracted from the defense theory of the case, 

are both reasonable explanations for counsel’s tactical decisions. As such, the Court 

concludes that the state court reasonably determined Petitioner failed to state a cognizable 

claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel’s failure to request jury 

instruction on voluntary intoxication. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim be DENIED. 

II. CONCLUSION 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Roger T. Benitez under 27 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. For all the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Petition be DENIED. 

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Court issue an Order (1) approving and 

adopting this Report and Recommendation, (2) directing that judgment be entered denying 

the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than October 19, 2015, any party to this 

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than October 29, 2015. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9h 

Cir. 1988); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9h Cir. 1991). 

Dated: October 5, 2015 

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