Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_07-cv-00550/USCOURTS-ared-4_07-cv-00550-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal-Constitutional Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

CLUB PROPERTIES, INC. PLAINTIFF 

 

v. CASE NO. 4:07-CV-00550 GTE

CITY OF SHERWOOD, ARKANSAS;

MAYOR BILL HARMON, in his official and 

individual capacities; BECKI VASSAR, CHARLIE

HARMON, LEX DAVIS, DAVID HENRY, SHEILA

SULCER, MARINA BROOKS, KEITH RANKIN 

and DR. STEVE FENDER, in their official capacities

as members of the Sherwood City Council and in their

individual capacities; RON CAMPBELL; and 

ROY MARPLE DEFENDANTS 

ORDER

On January 29, 2008, the parties, incident to the taking of depositions, requested a ruling

from the Court on the issue of attorney-client privilege with regard to certain communications

between an attorney and his clients in two separate scenarios. 

I. Facts Applicable to this Discovery Dispute

The two communications at issue are as follows: (1) On January 14, 2008, Mayor

Hillman, Michael Clayton, the City Engineer, Steve Cobb, and attorney David Fuqua met to

discuss the pending litigation and the issues related to it (the “First Meeting”). (2) On January

24, 2008, the members of the Sherwood City Council, Mayor Hillman, other non-elected City

officials, and several members of the public who are not city officials met to discuss the pending

lawsuit (the “Second Meeting”). Notice was given to the press regarding the Second Meeting

because two or more Council members were in attendance. Attorney David Fuqua spoke at the

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Second Meeting regarding the issues of this case and answered questions from the Council

members about the case. 

II. Applicable Law 

Fed. R. Evid. 501 provides:

[T]he privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision

thereof shall be governed by the principals of the common law . . . . However, in

civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as

to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,

government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in

accordance with State law.

Ark. R. Evid. 502(a)(5), (b) and (d)(6) provides:

(a) . . . (5) A communication is “confidential” if not intended to be disclosed to

third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the

rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary

for the transmission of the communication. 

(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to

prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for

the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client

(1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer’s

representative, (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer’s representative, (3) by him

or his representative or his lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or

a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and

concerning a matter of common interest therein, (4) between representatives of the

client or between the client and a representative of the client, or (5) among

lawyers and their representatives representing the same client.

. . . 

(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:

. . . 

(6) Public Officer or Agency. As to a communication between a public officer or

agency and its lawyers unless the communication concerns a pending

investigation, claim, or action and the court determines that disclosure will

seriously impair the ability of the public officer or agency to process the claim or

conduct a pending investigation, litigation, or proceeding in the public interest.

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“The attorney-client privilege only applies to confidential communications, not to those

uttered in public or intended for disclosure to others or in fact disclosed by the client to others.” 

Shankle v. State, 309 Ark. 40, 47, 827 S.W.2d 642, 646 (1992) (where client talked to his

attorney on a jail telephone that he knew was monitored and recorded). In City of Fayetteville v.

Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 186, 801 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1990), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that

memoranda prepared by outside counsel for the city in connection with possible litigation over

the issuance of bonds were public records within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act.

III. Arguments and Conclusion

Plaintiff and Defendants Campbell and Marple argue that the communications at the

Second Meeting was not privileged because third parties were present. The City Defendants

argue that Shankle is distinguishable because it did not consider a claim of privilege by a public

official, and here, the meeting had to be held in public because of the Freedom of Information

Act. Thus, the disclosure was both made in furtherance of professional legal services and was

reasonably necessary, and by the only means possible, for the transmission of the

communication. The City Defendants concede that there is no privilege in written

communication between the lawyer and the public client. The City Defendants further argue that

the communications fall under Rule 502(d)(6), as there is a pending action, disclosure would

impair the ability of the City to conduct the litigation, and the preservation of the privilege is in

the public interest.

The Court finds that the attorney-client privilege applies with regard to the

communications in the First Meeting, but not the Second Meeting. The Court notes that Plaintiff

and Defendants Campbell and Marple fail to address the application of the attorney-client

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privilege as to the First Meeting. Furthermore, it appears that those at the First Meeting were in

attendance in their capacities as City Officials to assist in the litigation as representatives of the

City. Thus, the attorney-client privilege applies as to the First Meeting. 

As to the Second Meeting, the City Defendants fail to cite any precedent in support of

their contention that the privilege applies to communications between the lawyer and the public

client, even though the communications were made at a public meeting with non-parties present. 

The Court finds that the communications at the Second Meeting are analogous to the

communications in Edmark, 304 Ark. at 186. Additionally, the Court questions whether the

communications could be considered confidential when it is clear that no party intended the

communication to remain undisclosed. Furthermore, even assuming that the communications

could be considered “confidential,” a requirement of attorney-client privilege, the Court cannot

find that the disclosure will seriously impair the ability of the public officer or agency to conduct

the litigation in the public interest. Therefore, the attorney-client privilege does not apply in the

context of the Second Meeting. 

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 30th day of January, 2008.

/s/Garnett Thomas Eisele 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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