Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01200/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01200-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

United Scates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cirruit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL .. 11991 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DR. KARL H. PLOTT, D.C., 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

JOHN DOE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DR. J. ERIC GRIFFITHS, D.C.; 

DR. WILLIAM DOLO, D.C.; 

DR. RICHARD RATLIFF, D.C.; 

DR. MELANIE TIAHRT, D.C.; 

CELESTE C DE BACA, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

KARL H. PLOTT, D.C., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

JOHN DOE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DR. J. ERIC GRIFFITHS, D.C.; 

DR. WILLIAM DOLO, D.C.; 

DR. RICHARD RATLIFF, D.C.; 

DR. MELANIE TIAHRT, D.C.; 

CELESTE C DE BACA, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1200 

No. 90-1294 

(D.C. No. 90-C-250 

(D. Colo.) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 90-C-250) 

Appellate Case: 90-1200 Document: 01019293774 Date Filed: 07/01/1991 Page: 1 
Submitted on the briefs: 

Duane Woodard, Attorney General, Charles B. Howe, Deputy Attorney 

General, Richard H. Forman, Solicitor General, Linda K. Baker, 

First Assistant Attorney General, Regulatory Law Section, Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants and Defendants-Appellees. 

K. Kelly Smith, Denver, Colorado, Roger w. Calton & Associates, 

Laguna Nigel, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee and 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Before McKAY, SETH, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Defendants, individual members of the Colorado State Board of 

Chiropractic Examiners (Board), appeal an order of the district 

court enjoining them from enforcing or threatening to enforce 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-33-117(2)(i) (1985) to prohibit plaintiff, 

Dr. Karl H. Plott, a licensed chiropractor, from employing third 

persons to use telemarketing to advertise his services. Dr. Plott 

appeals the district court's denial of attorney's fees under 42 

U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). We affirm on the merits and reverse on the 

attorney's fees issue. 1 

1 After exam~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1200 Document: 01019293774 Date Filed: 07/01/1991 Page: 2 
In August 1988, the Board received a written complaint 

alleging that Dr. Plott improperly arranged for a woman to 

telephone prospective patients on Dr. Plott's behalf to offer them 

a free spinal examination. The Board referred the complaint to 

the Complaints and 'Investigations Section of the Colorado 

Department of Regulatory Agencies, Division of Registrations, for 

investigation. In response to written questions from the 

investigator, Dr. Plott admitted paying telemarketers to call 

people selected from the telephone book to offer them free spinal 

examinations. After reviewing the investigation report, the Board 

referred the case to the Colorado Attorney General's Office for 

prosecution for unprofessional conduct under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 

12-33-117(1)(b), due to alleged violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 

12-33-117(2)(i). 2 

Dr. Plott then commenced this action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 

alleging that section 12-33-117(2)(i) on its face is in violation 

2 Section 12-33-117(2)(i) provides: 

(2) For the purpose of this article, any one of the 

following acts by a licensed chiropractor is declared to 

constitute unprofessional conduct: 

(i) Either directly or indirectly paying or compensating or 

agreeing to pay or compensate any person, firm, association, 

or corporation for sending or bringing any patient or any 

person to such licentiate for examination or treatment, for 

recommending such licentiate to any person, or for being 

instrumental in causing any other licentiate to rebate fees 

on a referral basis. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1200 Document: 01019293774 Date Filed: 07/01/1991 Page: 3 
of his first and fourteenth amendment rights to free speech. 

Dr. Plott also alleged the statute as applied violates his fifth 

and fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection, because the 

statute creates a system of classification among licensed health 

care professionals which discriminates against chiropractors by 

prohibiting them from using advertising or marketing services 

permitted other health care professionals. To remedy the alleged 

constitutional violations, Dr. Plott sought (1) declarations that 

section 12-33-117(2)(i) is null and void on its face or as applied 

and that Dr. Plott's use of telemarketing is constitutionally 

protected, and (2) an injunction prohibiting the Board from 

proceeding with any further action against him for his 

telemarketing of chiropractic services. 

In his memorandum in support of his motion for a preliminary 

injunction, Dr. Plott additionally contended that the Board had 

misconstrued the statute, which he argued does not preclude him 

from using telemarketing to advertise his services. Without 

reaching the merits of the constitutional issues, the district 

court disposed of the case on the state statutory construction 

grounds. The court held that when the statute was enacted it did 

not apply to telemarketing; rather its purpose was to prohibit 

fee-splitting. The court ruled that section 12-33-117(2)(i) does 

not prohibit a chiropractor from paying third parties to engage in 

telephone solicitation of patients, and that Dr. Plott was 

therefore not prohibited from employing third parties to engage in 

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Appellate Case: 90-1200 Document: 01019293774 Date Filed: 07/01/1991 Page: 4 
honest, truthful advertising to market his services. Accordingly, 

the court enjoined the Board from enforcing the statute to 

prohibit Dr. Plott's use of telemarketing. However, the court 

declined to award attorney's fees to Dr. Plott under section 1988. 

I. 

In its appeal, the Board argues (1) the district court 

incorrectly determined that section 12-33-117(2)(i) does not apply 

to telephone solicitation and therefore improperly restrained the 

enforcement activities of the Board, and (2) the statute is 

constitutional. Because we affirm the district court's 

construction of the statute, we need not reach the constitutional 

issue. 

A federal court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over a 

state law claim when the federal claim is of sufficient substance 

to support federal jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers of Am. 

v. Gibbs, 383 u.s. 715, 725 (1966). A federal claim is 

insubstantial only if it is "obviously without merit or is wholly 

frivolous," or "is clearly foreclosed by prior decisions of the 

Supreme Court." 13B c. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal 

Practice & Procedure§ 3564, at 68-70 (2d ed. 1984); see also 

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 u.s. 528, 536-39 (1974); Martinez v. United 

States Olympic Comm., 802 F.2d 1275, 1280 (lOth Cir. 1986). When 

a substantial federal question regarding the constitutionality of 

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Appellate Case: 90-1200 Document: 01019293774 Date Filed: 07/01/1991 Page: 5 
a state statute is alleged, therefore, the district court has 

jurisdiction to decide all state questions in the case, even if 

the court decides the case on the basis of state law only. 

Louisville & N. R.R. v. Garrett, 231 u.s. 298, 303 (1913); Siler 

v. Louisville & N. ·R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909). Where a case 

"can be decided without reference to questions arising under the 

Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not 

departed from without important reasons." Siler, 213 u.s. at 193; 

accord Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 

(1984)("unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a 

substantial federal constitutional question can be decided"); 

Hagans, 415 U.S. at 546 (courts deal first with possibly 

dispositive state law claims pendent to federal constitutional 

claims); City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 u.s. 439, 448-49 

(1930)(court will not decide important constitutional questions 

unnecessarily or hypothetically). 

In this case, Dr. Plott raised a federal constitutional 

question that was sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction, and 

the district court appropriately addressed the statutory 

construction issue first. With respect to the statute, the court 

concluded that 

"the statute, when enacted, did not prohibit 

chiropractors from hiring telemarketers, nor did the 

legislature intend such a prohibition. Indeed it is 

clear from the words of the statute that it was aimed at 

fee-splitting. Since the Board has cited no valid 

Colorado statute, regulation or rule prohibiting a 

chiropractor from hiring telemarketers, I conclude that 

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Appellate Case: 90-1200 Document: 01019293774 Date Filed: 07/01/1991 Page: 6 
there is none. Further, I conclude that Plott has not 

violated Colo. Rev. Stat. 12-33-117(2)(i)." 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 7 at 5. After reviewing the record and 

considering the issue, we affirm the district court's construction 

of the statute. 

II. 

Dr. Plott argues in his cross-appeal that he is entitled to 

attorney's fees because he was the prevailing party in the 

district court within the meaning of 42 u.s.c. § 1988. Section 

1988 provides for an award of attorney's fees for plaintiffs who 

prevail in actions to enforce civil rights violations. Although 

Dr. Plott prevailed in the district court, it was not necessary to 

decide his constitutional claims. Therefore, we must decide 

whether a plaintiff who obtains relief on state statutory rather 

than federal constitutional grounds is a prevailing party entitled 

to attorney's fees under section 1988. 

In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), the Supreme Court 

noted that a plaintiff who prevails on a claim not covered by 

section 1988 may nevertheless receive an award of attorney's fees 

under that section in the following circumstances: 

"In some instances, .•. the claim with fees may 

involve a constitutional question which the courts are 

reluctant to resolve if the non-constitutional claim is 

dispositive. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 u.s. 528 (1974). In 

such cases, if the claim for which fees may be awarded 

meets the 'substantiality' test, see Hagans v. Lavine, 

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Appellate Case: 90-1200 Document: 01019293774 Date Filed: 07/01/1991 Page: 7 
supra; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 u.s. 715 

(1966), attorney's fees may be allowed even though the 

court declines to enter judgment for the plaintiff on 

that claim, so long as the plaintiff prevails on the 

non-fee claim arising out of a 'common nucleus of 

operative fact.' United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra, 

at 725." 

Id. at 133 n.15. 

Federal appellate courts confronted with analogous cases 

involving constitutional and state law claims have held that, 

under Maher, when a plaintiff raises both a substantial 

constitutional claim and a pendent state law claim which is 

closely factually related, and the plaintiff prevails on the state 

claim, he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees under section 

1988 even though the district court does not address the 

constitutional claim. See Seaway Drive-In, Inc. v. Township of 

Clay, 791 F.2d 447 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 884 (1986); 

McDonald v. Doe, 748 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1984); see also 

Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

1987). For attorney's fees to be awarded, the constitutional 

claim must be substantial and both the statutory and 

constitutional claims must arise out of a common nucleus of 

operative facts. Maher, 448 u.s. at 133 n.15; Seaway Drive-In, 

791 F.2d at 451-52. This test of substantiality is identical to 

the one described above that the district court must apply to 

determine whether it has pendent jurisdiction over a state law 

claim. See Seaway Drive-In, 791 F.2d at 452. If a constitutional 

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Appellate Case: 90-1200 Document: 01019293774 Date Filed: 07/01/1991 Page: 8 
claim is substantial for jurisdictional purposes, therefore, it 

will also be substantial for attorney's fees purposes. See id. 

We have already held that the constitutional claims raised in 

this case were suff1ciently substantial to support federal 

jurisdiction. In addition, the constitutional and state law 

claims were based on a common nucleus of operative facts, and Dr. 

Plott essentially sought the same relief based on alternative 

claims. See Seaway Drive-In, 791 F.2d at 452, 455. Consequently, 

Dr. Plott was the prevailing party and was entitled to an award of 

attorney's fees under section 1988, even though the district court 

did not decide the constitutional claims. The district court 

therefore erred in denying attorney's fees. We remand for further 

proceedings to determine an appropriate award of fees. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED as to its decision on the merits 

(appeal No. 90-1200) and REVERSED and REMANDED for further 

proceedings on the issue of attorney's fees (appeal No. 90-1294). 

The Board's motion for certification of a state law question is 

DENIED. 

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