Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00751/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00751-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 Servina Molina, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

Phoenix Union High School District, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 05-0751-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant Phoenix Union High School District's

("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.28) and Plaintiff Servina Molina's

("Plaintiff") Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Retaliation Claim. (Dkt. 33)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff commenced this Title VII action on March 10, 2005, alleging claims for

sexual harassment and retaliation. (Dkt. 1) On October 13, 2006, after completion of

discovery, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt.28) Plaintiff responded

to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and filed a Cross Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment on Retaliation Claim on November 16, 2006. (Dkt. 33) In turn, Defendant filed

a Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. 39) as well as an Objection to

Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Facts (Dkt. 40). Plaintiff has not filed a reply in support of

her Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or a response to Defendant's Objection and

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The parties have had the opportunity to submit evidence and briefing, and the Court would

not find oral argument helpful in resolving this matter. Accordingly, the Court finds the pending

motion for summary judgment suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 56.2; Local

Rules of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”) of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona

7.2(f); Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 728-29

(9th Cir. 1991) (“When a party has an adequate opportunity to provide the trial court with evidence

and a memorandum of law, there is no prejudice” when oral arguments are not held on motions for

summary judgment.)

- 2 -

the time for filing such a reply or response has lapsed. Therefore, the Court will address the

pending motions on the merits using the materials submitted by the parties.1

OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant requests that the Court accept their Statement of Facts in Support of Motion

for Summary Judgement ("Statement of Facts") as true because Plaintiff has not controverted

any of their facts. (Dkt. 30) In addition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff "provided no

independent factual support for the statements she advances as 'facts.'" (Dkt. 40 at 1)

 When, as here, a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as required

under Rule 56(c), "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment must set

forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). In

addition, the Local Rules provide that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment

must:

[F]ile a statement, separate from that party's memorandum of law, setting forth: (1)

for each paragraph of the moving party's separate statement of facts, a

correspondingly numbered paragraph indicating whether the party disputes the

statement of fact set forth in that paragraph and a reference to the specific admissible

portion of the record supporting the party's position if the fact is disputed; and (2) any

additional facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact or otherwise preclude

judgment in favor of the moving party. Each additional fact shall be set forth in a

separately numbered paragraph and shall refer to a specific admissible portion of the

record where the fact finds support. Each numbered paragraph of the statement of

facts set forth in the moving party's separate statement of facts shall, unless otherwise

ordered, be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment if not

specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered paragraph in the opposing

party's separate statement of facts.

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

LRCiv 56.1(b) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff's Controverting Statement of Facts and

Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion for Summary

Judgment and Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Retaliation Claim

("Controverting Statement of Facts") do not comply with LRCiv 56.1(b). Plaintiff did not

provide correspondingly numbered paragraphs for each paragraph of Defendant's statement

of facts. Instead, Plaintiff provided a collection of notes, most of which were lacking any

independent factual support; a few conclusory paragraphs that responded to Defendant's

Statement of Facts; and, three exhibits. Therefore, the Court deems each paragraph of

Defendant's Statement of Facts (Dkt 30), except paragraph nine (9), admitted pursuant to

LRCiv. 56.1(b). 

Paragraph 9 of Plaintiff's Controverting Statement of Facts does comply with LRCiv.

56.1(b); however, it does not controvert paragraph 9 of Defendant's Statement of Facts and

is, therefore, deemed admitted. Defendant's paragraph 9 states, "[i]n order to diffuse the

situation and to allow both Mr. Royer and Plaintiff to return to their positions and to focus

on their job duties, the District transferred both employees to different high schools." (Dkt.

30) Plaintiff's response simply states, "Paragraph 2 and 9 of Defendant[']s Statement of Facts

[are] false. Jeff Royer was not placed on Administrative leave." Apart from the unsupported

assertion that paragraph 9 is false, Plaintiff does not address Defendant's statement or provide

any independent evidence to contradict Defendant's statement. Moreover, the references

Plaintiff cites do not address whether she and Royer were in fact transferred to different high

schools. Accordingly, the Court deems paragraph 9 of Defendant's Statement of Facts

uncontroverted and, therefore, admitted for purposes of resolving the pending motion for

summary judgment. 

FACTS

The following facts are undisputed. 

Plaintiff, a former employee of Defendant, was employed as a security assistant at

Cesar Chavez High School ("Chavez") and her supervisor was a male by the name of Jeff

Royer ("Royer"). On April 8, 2002, three female security employees- Plaintiff, Barbara

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Bennett, and Naomi Wilkerson– verbally accused Royer of sexual harassment and race and

gender discrimination. 

Defendant's Employee Conduct/Discipline Handbook ("the Handbook") specifically

sets forth the procedure for making a sexual harassment complaint. According to the

Handbook, for all complaints of sexual harassment, except when the designated contact

person is the party alleged to have committed the harassment, an employee is required to file

a written complaint containing all relevant information with the local administration. Neither

Plaintiff nor Ms. Bennet or Ms. Wilkerson, ever filed a formal written sexual harassment

complaint. At her deposition, Plaintiff admitted that she knew about the Defendant's sexual

harassment policy and procedure 

In addition to the Handbook, Defendant regularly requires employees to complete

inservice training, which specifically includes training on sexual harassment. Royer

completed Defendant's inservice training, on October 13, 2000, and August 10, 2001.

According to Plaintiff, Royer made only two sexually oriented comments to her, both

of which were uttered on November 1, 2001. The sexually oriented comments were: (1)

comments to the effect that she and Naomi Wilkerson, another security assistant, should get

together in a sexual way, and (2) that she could pose for Royer naked on his desk. Plaintiff

and Wilkerson stated in their depositions that these comments were made after Royer

witnessed Plaintiff showing Wilkerson a picture of herself in a two-piece bathing suit in the

security office. Plaintiff also alleged that Royer committed various acts of disparate

treatment against the female security assistants; however, neither the pleadings nor the

Complaint state a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII. Plaintiff has only alleged

claims for sexual harassment and retaliation. 

The harassment accusation was not the only dispute involving Royer and Plaintiff at

this time. At or about the same time the female security employees verbally accused Royer

of harassment and discrimination, Plaintiff was accusing Royer of dating a Chavez student.

Plaintiff approached Officer Adrian Giona ("Officer Giona"), Chavez's School Resource

Officer ("SRO"), and Jose Arenas, Chavez Athletic Director, to report that Royer was dating

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

a student. According to Officer Giona, Plaintiff believed Royer had falsely accused her of

impersonating a police officer and she decided to report his sexual misconduct shortly

thereafter. 

In light of the circumstances existing between Plaintiff and Royer, Defendant

determined that it was in their best interest to place both he and Plaintiff on paid

administrative leave pending the outcome of an external investigation. The placement of an

employee on administrative leave with pay for the duration of an investigation was standard

practice for Defendant and was used regularly to ensure that investigations were completed

in a timely and unbiased fashion. Nancy Oyen ("Oyen"), Executive Director for Employee

Relations/Legal Services, appointed Dr. Phil Berra ("Dr. Berra") as the external investigative

officer to investigate all of the allegations against Mr. Royer. Dr. Berra investigated the

allegations against Royer, and ultimately found that he acted inappropriately towards female

security assistants. 

Based on the investigative results set forth in Dr. Berra’s report, Defendant issued

Royer a written reprimand on May 14, 2002. In order to diffuse the situation and to allow

both Royer and Plaintiff to return to their positions and to focus on their job duties,

Defendant transferred both employees to different high schools. Both Plaintiff and Mr.

Royer retained the same job positions, respectively, same pay, and were transferred to

high schools within the southern portion of the District in the vicinity of Cesar Chavez

High School. 

Plaintiff has expressly stated that her Title VII claims relate only to Defendant's

decision to place her on administrative leave, not their decision to transfer her to another

high school. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

Jesinger v. Nevada Federal Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Substantive law determines which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. “Only disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the

entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be

genuine, that is, the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130.

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial.” Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th

Cir. 1994). The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the

burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The party opposing summary

judgment need not produce evidence "in a form that would be admissible at trial in order

to avoid summary judgment." Id. at 324. However, the nonmovant “may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-88; Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049

(9th Cir. 1995).

DISCUSSION

I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Title VII provides that an employer may not "discriminate against an individual

with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment

because of [her] ...sex[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Supreme Court has made clear

that sexual harassment constitutes unlawful discrimination under Title VII. Meritor Sav.

Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).; see Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d

1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (citing Meritor). There are two types of sexual

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

harassment recognized by the courts. The first, referred to as "quid pro quo" harassment,

is characterized by a loss (either actual or threatened) of tangible economic benefits to the

employee who rejects the employer's sexual demands. See Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d

1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995). The second, referred to as "hostile environment" harassment,

occurs when there exists an offensive or intimidating work environment for employees of

one particular gender. See Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A. Quid Pro Quo Harassment

Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's sexual harassment claims,

arguing that there is no evidence showing that Royer made quid pro quo threats to her or

that her job was affected by Royer's alleged comments. To establish a prima facie case of

quid pro quo sexual harassment, plaintiff must show that an individual explicitly or

implicitly conditioned a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job detriment, upon an

employee's acceptance of sexual conduct. Heyne, 69 F.3d. at 1478. Here, Plaintiff has not

pled a claim for quid pro quo sexual harassment and has not advanced any arguments or

presented any evidence to support such a claim. Notably absent from Plaintiff's filings is

any claim that her job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job detriment, was conditioned

upon the acceptance of sexual conduct. Rather, Plaintiff's allegations concern disparate

treatment of female employees and offensive comments. Based on Plaintiff's Complaint

and her summary judgment briefs, the Court finds that her sexual harassment claim is for

hostile environment based on sex. 

B. Hostile Work Environment

To establish a claim for hostile environment based on sex, plaintiff must prove that

she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct, that the conduct was unwelcome, and

that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of

her employment and create an abusive work environment. See Rene, 305 F.3d at 1065

(citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991)). The work environment

must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable [female] would

find hostile or abusive, and one that the [plaintiff] in fact did perceive to be so. Faragher

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22); see

Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-80 (adopting a "reasonable victim" standard). The plaintiff must

also prove that "any harassment took place 'because of sex."' Nichols v. Azteca Rest.

Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore

Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998)); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 

i. Objectively Hostile Environment

Courts look at the totality of circumstances to determine whether conduct was

sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title VII. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69. 

Occasionally annoying or merely offensive comments do not constitute sexual

harassment; however "[s]exual or gender-based conduct which is abusive, humiliating, or

threatening violates Title VII ... ." Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463

(9th Cir. 1994). "It is enough ... if such hostile conduct pollutes the victim's workplace,

making it more difficult for her to do the job, to take pride in her work, and to desire to

stay on in her position." Id.

The evidence in this case, construed in Plaintiff's favor, shows the following. On

April 8, 2002, three female security employees accused Royer, their supervisor, of sexual

harassment and gender discrimination. At the request of Oyen, Defendant's Executive

Director for Employee Relations/Legal Services, Dr. Berra was appointed to conduct an

external investigation into the allegations against Royer. Dr. Berra investigated the

allegations and found that Royer violated Defendant's polices regarding sexual

harassment and standards of employee conduct. Specifically, Dr. Berra found that Royer

"engaged in verbal interchanges of a sexual nature with specific female members." (Id.) 

The 'verbal interchanges' relevant to this matter arise from comments Royer made

on September 5, 2001 and on November 1, 2001. On September 5, 2001, after learning

that some of the female security employees had complained to Dr. McElroy about his

behavior, Royer said, "I don't know what kind of problem you girls are having with the

way things are run around here but nothing is going to change no matter what you guys

say." (Dkt. 30, Ex. K 120:9-24). This statement was uttered over the radio used by the

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

security employees to communicate with each other. The second incident occurred on

November 1, 2001, after Royer witnessed Plaintiff showing Wilkerson a picture of herself

in a two-piece bathing suit. After seeing the picture, Royer said, "Hey, 7. I'm ready now.

I brought my camera. You can pose for me naked on my desk." (Dkt. 29, Ex. K 123:14-

16) Later that same day, Royer said to Plaintiff, "Hey 7. Now you and Naomi will be all

alone. Now you guys can get together. I would like to see the both of you together." (Id.,

Ex. K 127:17-24) No other sexually offensive statements were attributed to Royer. Based

on the results of Dr. Berra's investigation, Defendant issued a written reprimand to Royer

on May 14, 2002, and transferred both Royer and Plaintiff to different high schools. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim should be

dismissed because her allegations, if assumed to be true, do not constitute the type of

"severe or pervasive" harassment required to establish a claim under Title VII. The Court

agrees.

 Looking at all of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable person in 

Plaintiff's position, the Court finds that Royer's conduct was not of a severity or frequency

to create an objectively hostile working environment. Royer's comments, while

offensive, were not abusive, humiliating or threatening. The fact that the comments were

uttered immediately after Royer saw a picture of Plaintiff in a bathing suit indicate that

this was teasing, albeit offensive, inappropriate teasing. Moreover, only two sexual

comments were made to Plaintiff and both occurred on the same day – the day Royer saw

her showing the picture to Wilkerson. Finally, Royer's reference to the female security

employees as "girls" was arrogant and chauvinistic; however, there is no evidence that he

habitually spoke to the female employees in this way. As the Supreme Court has

previously recognized, "[s]imple teasing, offhand comments and isolated incidents

(unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and

conditions of employment." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Construing the evidence in Plaintiff's favor, there is no doubt that

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Defendant does not address whether Plaintiff established the second and third elements of

the hostile environment sexual harassment claim: (1) whether the harassment was 'unwelcome' and

(2) whether it occurred 'because of sex.' Nichols, 256 F.3d at 871-872. Having found that there was

no triable issue as to the first element of the claim (that the workplace was not objectively hostile

environment), the Court will also refrain from discussing the second and third elements of the claim.

3

Royer completed Defendant's inservice training on October 13, 2000 and August 10, 2001.

- 10 -

Royer made inappropriate, offensive comments to Plaintiff. However, these comments

were isolated and not severe enough to render Plaintiff's workplace objectively hostile.2

ii. The Faragher/Ellerth Defense

Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of hostile

work environment sexual harassment, the Court finds that summary judgment on the

claim is nonetheless warranted because Defendant has demonstrated both parts of the

affirmative defense known as the Faragher/Ellerth defense. 

Generally, an employer is vicariously liable for a hostile environment created by a

supervisor. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. However, when no "tangible employment action"

has been taken, an employer may raise an "affirmative defense to liability or damages,

subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. The

Faragher/Ellerth defense requires the employer to show: (1) that it exercised reasonable

care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) that the

employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities

provided by the employer. Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir.

1999). 

Here, the record unequivocally demonstrates that Defendant exercised reasonable

care both to prevent and correct sexual harassment. Defendant promulgated an antiharassment policy, which is contained in the Handbook. The Handbook defines harassing

conduct and provides a specific reporting procedure. In addition, Royer completed

Defendant's inservice training , which specifically included training on sexual harassment,

at least twice before the alleged harassment occurred.3

 Plaintiff acknowledged receiving

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

the Handbook, reading the portions regarding Defendant's harassment policy and

understanding the procedure for reporting sexual harassment. Precautions similar to the

ones employed by Defendant have been recognized by the Ninth Circuit as satisfying the

employer's burden under the first prong of the Faragher/Ellerth defense to show that it

exercised reasonable preventive care. See, e.g., Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. Tech., 339 F.3d

1158, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendant has also provided evidence to show that it took reasonable remedial

measures upon learning of Royer's inappropriate conduct toward female employees. The

day after the security employees accused Royer of race and gender discrimination,

Defendant placed him on administrative leave. Defendant appointed an external

investigator, Dr. Berra, to investigate the allegations against Royer. After a detailed

investigation, Dr. Berra concluded "that Royer's treatment of females in the workplace

was at times less than professional," that Royer used sexually derogatory language, and

that Royer's "macho" attitude led him to the disparate treatment of males and females in

the workplace. (Dkt. 28, Ex. D at 10) Based on the results of Dr. Berra's investigation,

Defendant formally reprimanded Royer, provided Royer with additional training on their

sexual harassment policy and transferred him to another school within Phoenix Union

High School District.

Plaintiff has provided no evidence that explains why she did not follow the

reporting procedures set forth in the Handbook. According to the Handbook, Plaintiff

was required to file a complaint containing all relevant information with the local

administration. Plaintiff admitted to being aware of the policies and procedure set forth in

the Handbook; however, the Court finds that she did not file a formal written sexual

harassment complaint against Royer. While Plaintiff asserted that she filed written

complaint regarding the sexual harassment in her Controverting Statement of Facts, there

is no evidence to support this assertion. Morever, in light of Plaintiff's failure to adhere to

the Local Rules governing motions for summary judgment, Defendant's statement that she

did not file a written grievance, which was supported by the affidavit of Oyen, was

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

deemed admitted pursuant to LRCiv 56.1(b). Thus, the undisputed facts demonstrate that

Plaintiff did not file a formal complaint regarding harassment against Royer. Having

failed to provide any evidence that she utilized the available preventive or corrective

opportunities, the Court finds that Defendant established the both prongs of the

Faragher/Ellerth defense.

Plaintiff produced no evidence capable of rebutting Defendant's Faragher/Ellerth

defense. Rather, Plaintiff argues that Defendant may not assert the Faragher/Ellerth

defense because she suffered a tangible employment action– namely, the administrative

leave. A tangible employment action is defined as a "significant change in employment

status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different

responsibilities." Ellerth, 524 U.S. 761. The allegations involving Plaintiff were not

confined to the sexual harassment issue; around the same time the female security

employees accused Royer of sexual harassment, Plaintiff accused Royer of dating a

student at Chavez and attempted to have the Officer Giona, the SRO, charge him with

dating a student. Defendant's decision to place Plaintiff on administrative leave was part

of their standard practice and was used regularly to ensure investigations were objective

and timely. Moreover, Plaintiff admits that she received full pay while she was on leave

and she retained the same position and responsibilities upon her return to work. Because

Plaintiff did not experience a tangible employment action, the Court finds that the

Faragher/Ellerth defense does apply to her claim. 

Although at trial the burden of proving the Faragher/Ellerth defense would rest on

Defendant, Plaintiff needed to produce evidence capable of rebutting it to survive

summary judgment. Plaintiff has not done so and the Court finds that Defendant is

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim. 

II. RETALIATION

Title VII "prohibits retaliation against an employee 'because [she] has opposed any

practice made an unlawful employment practice'" by Title VII. Nelson v. Pima Cmty.

College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). A plaintiff

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Plaintiff asserts that the retaliation occurred prior to her transfer to South Mountain High

School. (Dkt. 33 at 17) Therefore, the Court's analysis of her retaliation claim will be confined to

her placement on administrative leave.

- 13 -

makes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation by producing evidence that she engaged

in activity protected by Title VII, that the employer subjected her to a materially adverse

action, and that there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit has

explained that "the requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for

Title VII on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a

preponderance of the evidence." Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054,

1061-62 (2002) (quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Defendant moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claim, arguing

that no materially adverse action was taken against Plaintiff. In turn, Plaintiff moved for

partial summary judgment as to liability on the retaliation claim and argued that

Defendant's decision to place her on administrative leave constituted an adverse action for

retaliation purposes.4

 According to Plaintiff, she was placed on leave after filing a

complaint with the SRO, which was also the same day other female security employees

filed a sexual harassment complaint against Royer. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's

actions "had a chilling effect on those sexually harassed and were designed to prevent

them from raising such claims in the future." (Dkt 33 at 17) Defendant does not dispute

these facts, but disputes Plaintiff's claim that their actions had a chilling effect on victims

of harassment. Defendant produced evidence demonstrating that the placement of an

employee on paid administrative leave for the duration of an investigation was a standard

practice "used regularly to ensure that District investigations were completed in a timely

and unbiased fashion." This fact was not controverted by Plaintiff. 

A materially adverse action is an act that is likely to deter a reasonable employee

from making or supporting a claim of discrimination. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe

Ry. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). As the Supreme Court has said, "[c]ontext

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

matters" when analyzing the significance of a given act of retaliation. Id. The evidence in

this case, construed in Plaintiff's favor, does not create a triable issue as to whether

Defendant's placement of Plaintiff on paid administrative leave constituted a materially

adverse action. At the time Plaintiff was placed on leave, her relationship with Royer had

taken an antagonistic turn and the situation between the two was becoming

unmanageable. For example, approximately a week before Plaintiff was placed on leave,

Royer was accused of dating a Chavez student. The source of the allegation informed Dr.

McElroy that she received the information from Plaintiff's daughter. The day before

Plaintiff was placed on leave, three Chavez female security employees accused Royer of

race and gender discrimination. That same day, the Chavez Athletic Director informed

Dr. McElroy that Plaintiff had made serious accusations about Royer's professional and

personal life. On the day Plaintiff and Royer were placed on leave, Officer Giona

informed Dr. McElroy that Plaintiff had asked her to charge Royer with dating a Chavez

student. According Officer Giona, Plaintiff believed Royer had accused her of

impersonating a police officer and informed her that she had evidence of sexual

misconduct by Royer with a student. Given the severity of the allegations, Defendant

appointed an outside investigator to investigate whether Royer had dated a student and

whether he had engaged in race and gender discrimination. Defendant also determined

that it was in their best interest to place both Plaintiff and Royer on paid administrative

leave pending the outcome of the investigation. In light of the turbulent situation at

Chavez, the Court finds that Defendant's placement of Plaintiff on paid administrative

leave was not a materially adverse action. Plaintiff and Royer were involved in an

acrimonious dispute that was becoming increasingly antagonistic. Moreover, while

Plaintiff was the only female security assistant placed on administrative leave during the

external investigation, she was not the only female security assistant that complained of

sexual discrimination. Given these circumstances, the Court finds that Defendant's

decision to place Plaintiff on paid administrative leave would not deter a reasonable

employee from making or supporting a claim of discrimination. Therefore, the Court will

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claim because the evidence, construed in her favor, fails to

establish that she was subjected to a material adverse action.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, in light of the reasons set forth above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Dkt.28) is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment on Retaliation Claim (Dkt. 33) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment

accordingly. 

DATED this 14th day of May, 2007.

Case 2:05-cv-00751-SMM Document 41 Filed 05/14/07 Page 15 of 15