Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02115/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02115-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID FLYNN,

Former CDCR #AI-8119,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CANLAS, MD; D. MADDOX, FNP; 

N. MALAKKLA, MD; J&J DOE 1-100,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-cv-2115 WQH (PCL)

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING SUPPLEMENTAL 

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[ECF Doc. No. 5]

AND

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT AS 

TO DEFENDANT CANLAS FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)(1)

David Flynn (“Plaintiff”), while incarcerated at Valley State Prison (“VSP”) in 

Chowchilla, California, filed a civil rights Complaint (“Compl.”) in this Court pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 on September 21, 2015 (ECF Doc. No. 1).

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I. Procedural History

Plaintiff did not prepay the $400 civil filing fee required to commence a civil action 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2). Soon after, Plaintiff 

filed a Notice of Change of Address indicating his release from state custody (ECF Doc. 

No. 3).

On December 12, 2015, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, because

while it “include[d] a statement of all assets” Plaintiff possessed while a prisoner, it failed 

to account for his post-incarceration income, assets, or expenses. See Dec. 12, 2015 Order 

(ECF Doc. No. 4) at 5-6. Plaintiff was granted thirty days in which to file a supplemental 

IFP motion which “include[d] an affidavit documenting his post-release income, assets,

and expenses,” and demonstrated his current inability to pay the filing fees required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a). Id. at 7. Plaintiff was further cautioned that should he elect to proceed 

by filing a supplemental IFP motion, his Complaint would be subject to the sua sponte 

screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and immediately dismissed if it was found 

frivolous or malicious, if it failed to state a claim, or if he sought damages from immune 

governmental defendants. Id. at 6-7. In fact, Plaintiff was specifically warned that as to 

Defendant Canlas, “his Complaint currently fail[ed] to include any factual matter to support 

a plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 7 n.4.

On December 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed a supplemental Motion to Proceed IFP in 

compliance with the Court’s December 12, 2015 Order (ECF Doc. No. 5).

II. Supplemental Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay 

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the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal court may authorize 

the commencement of a civil action without prepayment of fees if a person submits an 

affidavit, including a statement of all assets he possesses, which shows he is unable to pay 

the required filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The determination of indigence falls within 

the court’s discretion. See Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 

1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). See also Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de 

Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (noting that while a civil litigant need not “be 

absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of the [28 U.S.C. § 1915],” his affidavit must 

nevertheless demonstrate to the court that he cannot, because of poverty, pay or give 

security for the costs of suit “and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the 

necessities of life.”) (internal quotations omitted). The facts as to the affiant’s poverty must 

be stated with “some particularity, definiteness, and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 

647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion and Affidavit to Proceed IFP 

(ECF Doc. No. 5) is sufficient to satisfy both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR

3.2. Plaintiff’s affidavit shows his only source of income is an expected monthly military 

disability payment of $258 and an additional $330 in “EBT” cash relief. See ECF Doc. 

No. 5 at 2. He and his spouse, who support a 10-year-old daughter, claim an additional 

$200 in cash and $60 in a Citibank checking account; but they own no home, vehicles, or 

any other assets. Id. at 2-3, 5. Plaintiff further claims $300 in total monthly expenses, attests 

to be “unemployable,” and ‘ha[s] filed for SSI” benefits. Id. at 5. 

From this supplemental affidavit, the Court finds Plaintiff has insufficient available 

funds from which to pay any filing fees at this time, and therefore GRANTS his 

supplemental motion for leave to proceed IFP (ECF Doc. No. 5).

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III. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard

The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also require 

that the Court review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like 

Plaintiff, who file civil actions while “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused 

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or 

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as 

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are 

immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (“Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied 

in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 

To state a claim, every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual 

allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there 

are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then 

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determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009).

While a plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to 

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an 

obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the 

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 

627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 

(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially 

pled.” Ivey v. Bd of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Even 

before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights 

violations” were not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that while he was incarcerated at Richard J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, in December 2011, he 

submitted a “Health Care Services Request Form, CDCR 7362” requesting treatment for 

“possible cancer on [his] face.” Compl. at 3 ¶¶ 8-9. In his CDCR 7362, which he identifies 

as HC Appeal No. 2365578, and has attached as an exhibit to his pleading,

1 Plaintiff 

 

1

 “A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for 

all purposes.” FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c); Schneider v. California Dept. of Corrections, 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998)

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reported “peeling and bleeding” on the left side of his face, and to have been previously 

been “diagnosed with skin cancer.” Id. Ex. A at 16. Plaintiff claimed he had received 

“freezing treatment” two years prior, but had “no treatment since,” and he requested “a 

cream” or some other medical attention. Id. The CDCR 7362 indicates Plaintiff’s request 

was received on 12/6/11, completed by “Stedman, LVN,” reviewed by “J. Bersan,” and 

signed by “S. Pauley.” Id. The CDCR 7362 also indicates Plaintiff was evaluated by a 

registered triage nurse, prescribed “AA ointment,” instructed on its use, and referred to a 

primary care doctor (“PCP”) on December 8, 2011. Id.

Dr. Romero at RJD thereafter referred Plaintiff for an examination by P. Haines Ely, 

MD on March 7, 2012, via the UC Davis Telemedicine Service. Id. at 3 ¶ 10. Dr. Ely 

assessed Plaintiff with “multiple actinic keratosis in the face,” prescribed Efudex 5% 

cream, and recommended a follow-up in 2 months. Id., Ex. B at 18. Plaintiff was again 

referred to Dr. Ely on May 16, 2012, by RJD Dr. Choo. Id. at 3 ¶ 11 & Ex. C at 20. Dr. Ely

noted that Plaintiff had been denied Efudex as “non-formulary,” and he therefore 

recommended a biopsy. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff contends, however, that he was “never informed 

that further treatment was needed,” “did not see Dr. Canlas MD again,” and was not “put 

on medical hold.” Id.

Plaintiff was then transferred to CRC Correctional Institution in Norco, California, 

on July 17, 2012, id. at 4 ¶ 12, and again transferred to VSP on November 6, 2012. Id. ¶ 13. 

Almost a year after his transfer to VSP, on December 9, 2013, Plaintiff again claims 

to have “expressed his concerns about the cancer spots around his face and forehead” to 

Defendant Maddox, a registered nurse. Id. at 4 ¶ 15. Plaintiff contends Maddox failed to 

adequately or timely address his dermatological needs, and “falsified” documents related 

to his medical appeals until July 29, 2014, when he was once again examined by Dr. Ely. 

Id. at 5-8. At that time, Dr. Ely assessed Plaintiff as “need[ing] Mohs surgery for the tumors 

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of his left outer canthus and nose,” noted that “[h]is scalp could probably be done at the 

same time,” and that the matter was “urgent” because Plaintiff’s “tumors ha[d] been 

enlarging and bleeding since at least 2012.” Id., Ex. K at 46.

Plaintiff was first referred to the West Coast Skin and Cancer Medical Center, in 

Fresno, California, on September 9, 2014, where Dr. Babar Rao, MD, a dermatologist, 

recommended several biopsies for Plaintiff’s face, cheeks, forehead, arms and scalp. Id.

¶ 24. Plaintiff’s Exhibit L indicates Dr. Rao performed Mohs micrographic surgery to 

Plaintiff’s left lateral eye, left nasal wall, left scalp, and forehead on September 9, 2014, 

October 13, 2014, and December 17, 2014, respectively. Id., ¶¶ 24, 26, 27 & Ex. L at 47-

52. Two of those biopsies indicated squamous cell carcinoma, id. ¶ 27 & Ex. L at 53-54, 

and Plaintiff was returned to Dr. Rao for additional Mohs surgery to his scalp and forehead 

on February 19, 2015. Id. ¶ 28 & Ex. M at 55-59.

After he returned to VSP on February 19, 2015, Plaintiff claims to have reported 

“severe pain” in the surgical area on his scalp to an unidentified “TTA nurse” and to VSP’s 

Chief Physician and Surgeon, N. Malakkla, MD. Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff claims Malakkla 

“ignored” him, told him to “sshh,” prescribed two aspirin, and walked away. Id. ¶ 29. 

Plaintiff claims he then had “severe pain” for the rest of the day, vomited, and suffered 

“migrain[e]s all night.” 

Plaintiff admits he “continues to be seen,” and to “get freeze treatments” from Dr. 

Rao. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. Dr. Rao also performed another Mohs surgery on Plaintiff’s left temple 

on April 15, 2015. Id. ¶ 32 & Ex. O at 64-69. 

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and $1,500,000 in damages against Dr. Canlas (at 

RJD), and D. Maddox, RN, and N. Malakkla, MD, (both at VSP) based on their “deliberate 

indifference to [his] medical needs.” Id. at 12-13, ¶ 41.

/ / /

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C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 

Campbell v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Canlas, Maddox, and Malakkla were all employed at 

RJD and VSP and acting in their capacities as prison medical personnel during the times 

mentioned in his Complaint. See Compl. at 2. “Generally, a public employee acts under 

color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his 

responsibilities pursuant to state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988). Thus, the 

Court next turns to the second inquiry, “whether the prison officials’ conduct deprived 

[Plaintiff] of [his] rights under the Eighth Amendment.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 

633 (9th Cir. 1988).

D. Individual Liability – Dr. Canlas

As to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding RJD Dr. Canlas, the Court finds Plaintiff’s 

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted, because it contains 

no individualized allegations of wrongdoing by Dr. Canlas, and instead only describes him 

as a “physician on D-Yard” at RJD whom Plaintiff claims is “legally responsible for the 

health and welfare” of prisoners confined there. See Compl. at 2 ¶ 4. 

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits,” Plaintiff “must plead 

that each Government-official defendant, though the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, contains 

no “further factual enhancement” to describe what Dr. Canlas did, or what he failed to do 

with regard to the health services request Plaintiff first submitted at RJD on December 6, 

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2011, or the medical treatment he received between March and July 2012, when he was 

transferred to another institution. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see Compl. 

at 3-4, ¶¶ 8-11. 

Plaintiff only mentions Dr. Canlas once when describing his medical care at RJD. 

Plaintiff claims that he “did not see Dr. Canlas MD again;” however, Plaintiff fails to first 

mention that Dr. Canlas ever treated or was responsible for treating Plaintiff. See Compl. 

at 4, ¶ 11. Rather, Plaintiff claims that he was evaluated twice by Dr. Ely at UC Davis. See

Compl. at 4, ¶ 11 & Exs. B & C. While Plaintiff does claim that he was “never informed 

that further treatment was needed” after Dr. Ely re-evaluated him on May 16, 2012, id., he 

does not attribute this duty or failure to Dr. Canlas.

“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.” Estate of Brooks v. 

United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). “The inquiry into causation must be 

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant 

whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer, 844 

F.2d at 633. A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 

which [the plaintiff complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 

F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Without some specific “factual content” that might allow the Court to “draw the 

reasonable inference” that Dr. Canlas may be held personally liable for any failure to 

provide Plaintiff with medical care while he was at RJD, the Court finds his Complaint, as 

currently pleaded, contains only the type of “defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusations,” which Iqbal makes clear, fail to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

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face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 568.

E. VSP Medical Care Claims 

As to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims arising at VSP against Defendants 

Maddox and Malakkla, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficient to survive the “low 

threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

103 (1976) (prison officials may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment if they act 

with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs); id. at 104-05 (deliberate indifference 

may be shown if prison officials “intentionally deny[] or delay[] access to medical care or 

intentionally interfer[e] with the treatment once prescribed.”).

F. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel and he has now been provided with 

notice of his Complaint’s deficiencies as to Dr. Canlas, the Court will grant him an 

opportunity to amend. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A 

district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 

complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 

1212 (9th Cir. 2012)).

F. Venue

Finally, Plaintiff is cautioned that should he choose not to amend his Complaint as 

to Defendant Canlas, who is the only party alleged to reside in San Diego County, the 

remainder of his Eighth Amendment claims as to Defendants Maddox and Malakkla, and 

arising at VSP in Chowchilla, California, located in Madera County, will be subject to a 

sua sponte transfer to the Eastern District of California for lack of proper venue pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. 84(b). See Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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Section 1391(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides, in pertinent part, that a “civil 

action may be brought in – (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all 

defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; [or] (2) a judicial 

district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim 

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated[.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 1391(b); Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488; Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison 

Co., 805 F.2d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 1986). “The district court of a district in which is filed a 

case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interests 

of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

To the extent Plaintiff’s original Complaint included claims arising in and against 

Defendants alleged to reside both in San Diego and Madera Counties, venue in either the 

Southern or the Eastern Districts of California was proper. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 84(b), (d). 

Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Canlas, however, have been dismissed. Therefore, if Plaintiff 

fails to amend, his sole remaining claims, alleged to have arisen at VSP and involving only 

VSP officials, will be subject to transfer to the Eastern District of California, where they 

could have been brought, because the Southern District of California will no longer be a 

proper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons stated above, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 5);

2. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Dr. Canlas without prejudice and with 

leave to amend for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1);

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3. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order to 

file an Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading a claim against 

Defendant Canlas as described in this Order. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be 

complete in itself without reference to his original Complaint. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. 

Any Defendant not named, and any claim not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will 

be considered waived. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 

1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave 

to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if 

not repled.”); and

4. CAUTIONS Plaintiff that should he elect not to file an Amended Complaint 

within the time provided, the Court will, in lieu of dismissal, transfer Plaintiff’s remaining 

claims to the Eastern District of California for the convenience of the parties and in the 

interests of justice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2016

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