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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13714

____________________

SHA'OLA TERRELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ALABAMA STATE UNIVERSITY, 

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ALABAMA STATE 

UNIVERSITY, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00047-RAH-CWB

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13714

Before WILSON, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Sha’ola Terrell appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of her former employer Alabama State 

University and its Board of Trustees (collectively, “ASU”) on her 

claims of sex discrimination under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and 

sex discrimination and retaliation under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 

29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and the Clarke-Figures Equal Pay Act

(“CFEPA”), Ala. Code § 25-1-30. In granting summary judgment,

the district court determined that Terrell failed to carry her burden 

as to each claim. After review and with the benefit of oral 

argument, we affirm as to the Title IX and retaliation claims, but 

vacate and remand as to the EPA and CFEPA sex discrimination 

claims in the light of our recent clarification of the analytical 

framework for EPA claims in Baker v. Upson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 94 F.4th 

1312 (11th Cir. 2024).

I. BACKGROUND

From October 2018 to September 2021, Terrell was the 

Senior Associate Athletic Director for Internal Operations at ASU. 

The job announcement she applied to advertised a salary of 

$75,000, and Athletic Director Jennifer Williams, who had invited 

Terrell to apply for the position, hired Terrell at that $75,000 salary. 

Williams also designated Terrell as the Athletic Department’s 

Senior Woman Administrator. This leadership role was intended 

for the highest-ranking female involved in the management of an 

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23-13714 Opinion of the Court 3

intercollegiate athletics program in order to promote the

representation of women in college sports. 

According to Terrell, she had a history of vocalizing 

complaints about not being paid for the Senior Woman 

Administrator role, which had a line item in ASU’s budget for 

$15,000 in 2019 and $10,000 in both 2020 and 2021. Specifically, 

Terrell alleged that she sent Dr. Jason Cable, who replaced 

Williams as Athletic Director in August 2021, a memo complaining 

that she was not paid the budgeted amount for the Senior Woman 

Administrator role. No copy or record of this memo was produced 

during discovery. 

After Dr. Cable became Athletic Director, he decided to 

restructure the department. As part of his restructuring plan, 

Dr. Cable decided to eliminate and revise the positions of Senior 

Associate Athletic Director of Internal Operations (held by Terrell) 

and Deputy Athletic Director (held by a male employee, Terrance

Jones). Both Terrell and Jones were non-reappointed on 

September 15, 2021. 

After Terrell was non-reappointed, she sued ASU alleging 

sex discrimination and retaliation claims under the EPA and 

CFEPA and a sex discrimination claim under Title IX. The district 

court granted summary judgment to ASU on all claims, and Terrell

timely appealed.

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-13714

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing 

“the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Battle v. Bd. of 

Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 759 (11th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is 

appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Title IX Claim

On appeal, Terrell argues that the district court erred in 

ruling that she failed to establish a triable claim for sex 

discrimination based on pay disparity under Title IX. She contends 

that the record contains sufficient circumstantial evidence that ASU

discriminated against her because of her sex to satisfy the 

burden-shifting test in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

792 (1973). 

After appellate briefing concluded, however, this Court held

in Joseph v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia that 

Title IX “does not provide an implied right of action for sex 

discrimination in employment.” --- F.4th ---, Nos. 23-11037, 

23-12475, *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2024). Joseph explained that 

although the Supreme Court has held that Title IX provides an 

implied right of action for students who complain of sex 

discrimination by schools that receive federal funds, the Supreme 

Court had “never extended the implied private right of action 

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23-13714 Opinion of the Court 5

under Title IX to claims of sex discrimination for employees of 

educational institutions.” Id. at *6. Joseph further explained that it 

is “unlikely that Congress intended Title VII’s express private right 

of action and Title IX’s implied right of action to provide 

overlapping remedies.” Id. at *8. 

After Joseph, the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing 

its impact on Terrell’s Title IX claim. Terrell urges us not to apply 

Joseph and argues that its holding was inconsistent with Supreme 

Court precedent and contrary to the text of Title IX. ASU asserts

that the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Terrell’s 

Title IX claim should be affirmed based on our Joseph decision. 

Because we are bound to apply our Joseph precedent, we agree with 

ASU and affirm the grant of summary judgment to ASU on 

Terrell’s Title IX claim in the light of Joseph. See id. at *1; United 

States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Under [the 

prior panel precedent] rule, a prior panel’s holding is binding on all 

subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined 

to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court 

sitting en banc.”); see also Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1302-03 

(11th Cir. 2001) (rejecting an “overlooked reason” exception to the 

prior precedent rule).

B. Retaliation Claim

Terrell argues that her non-reappointment was causally 

connected to her history of complaining about not receiving the 

budgeted funds for the Senior Woman Administrator role and 

specifically to her allegedly sending a memo to Dr. Cable asking to 

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-13714

be paid the line-item funds designated for that role a few days 

before she was non-reappointed. And she argues that ASU’s

proffered reason—the restructuring of the department—was false. 

We affirm the summary judgment on Terrell’s retaliation 

claim. As the district court explained, Terrell’s evidence was 

insufficient to establish that her alleged complaints were causally 

connected to ASU’s decision to non-reappoint her. In particular, 

her evidence reveals that ASU made the same decision to 

non-reappoint Jones, a male colleague, because both of their 

positions were being restructured within the athletic department. 

Because Terrell and Jones were simultaneously non-reappointed, 

we can discern no triable fact issue of but-for causation as to 

Terrell.

C. Discrimination Claims under the EPA and CFEPA

As to Terrell’s sex discrimination claims under the EPA and 

CFEPA, the district court cited our precedent in Steger v. Gen. Elec. 

Co., 318 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2003), and applied a three-step 

burden-shifting test akin to the McDonnell-Douglas framework. 

After briefing concluded in this appeal, however, this Court

clarified in Baker that claims of sex discrimination under the EPA 

are analyzed under a two-step framework. See Baker, 94 F.4th at

1317. 

Baker’s two-step framework requires the plaintiff to make 

her prima facie case by demonstrating “that an employer pays 

different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on 

jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 

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23-13714 Opinion of the Court 7

responsibility, and which are performed under similar working 

conditions.’” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195

(1974) (quoting § 206(d)(1)). Once the plaintiff establishes her 

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the 

difference in pay is justified by one of the EPA’s four exceptions: (1) 

“a seniority system”; (2) “a merit system”; (3) “a system which 

measures earnings by quantity or quality of production”; or (4) “a 

differential based on any factor other than sex.” Baker, 94 F. 4th at 

1317 (quoting Brock v. Ga. Sw. Coll., 765 F.2d 1026, 1036 (11th Cir. 

1985)); see also § 206(d)(1). These exceptions are affirmative 

defenses for which the defendant bears the burden of proof. 

Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196-97; Gosa v. Bryce Hosp, 780 F.2d 

917, 918 (11th Cir. 1986). 

Thus, as we explained in Baker, there is no third “pretext” 

step. Baker, 94 F.4th at 1318; see also Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery 

Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The Equal Pay Act 

prescribes a form of strict liability: Once the disparity in pay 

between substantially similar jobs is demonstrated, the burden 

shifts to the defendant to prove that a ‘factor other than sex’ is 

responsible for the differential. If the defendant fails, the plaintiff 

wins. The plaintiff is not required to prove discriminatory intent 

on the part of the defendant.” (emphasis added)); Mitchell v. Jefferson 

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 936 F.2d 539, 547 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The Supreme 

Court has stated that the EPA consists of two parts, a definition of 

the violation followed by four affirmative defenses.”). 

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-13714

In the light of our Baker decision clarifying the proper 

framework for analyzing EPA, and thus CFEPA, claims of sex 

discrimination, we vacate the district court’s summary judgment 

on these sex discrimination claims and remand for the district court 

to apply the correct test in the first instance.

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment to ASU on 

Terrell’s claims of sex discrimination under Title IX and retaliation. 

We VACATE the grant of summary judgment to ASU on Terrell’s 

sex discrimination claims under the EPA and CFEPA and 

REMAND those two claims for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. The district court shall permit the parties to brief 

the evidence under Baker’s two-step framework pursuant to a 

schedule to be determined by the district court.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN 

PART.

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