Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00208/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00208-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOROTHY DANIELS, CASE NO. CV F 08-0208 LJO TAG

Plaintiff, ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

vs. (Doc. 3.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

On February11, 2008, pro se plaintiff DorothyDaniels (“Ms. Daniels”) filed a document entitled

“Notice of Petition and Verified Petition for Warrant of Removal by Three-Judge Panel; Wrongful

Foreclosure, Conversion, Complaint to Quiet Title to Real Property Injunctive Relief 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

This Court construes the document as a complaint to address foreclosure of Ms. Daniels’ home and will

refer to the document as a complaint. The complaint appears to take issue with financial institutions

which have held a promissory note(s) for debt or a mortgage on Ms. Daniel’s home. The complaint

appears to seek transfer of Ms. Daniels’ home to her after foreclosure.

On February 11, 2008, Ms. Daniels also filed a document entitled “Order to Show Cause for

Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.” The first heading in the document’s body

reads: “PLAINTIFF APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER.” This Court construes the document to seek to seek to enjoin the Kern

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County Superior Court to proceed in an unlawful detainer action against Ms. Daniels. For the reasons

discussed below, this Court DENIES Ms. Daniels injunctive relief.

DISCUSSION

Younger Abstention

The abstention doctrine under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971), precludes

Ms. Daniels’ requested injunctive relief. Younger abstention is proper where (1) there are ongoing state

judicial proceedings,(2) that implicate important state interests, and (3)there is an adequate opportunity

in the state proceedings to raise federal questions. MiddlesexCounty Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521 (1982); Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398,

1405 (9 Cir. 1994). The “policy objective behind Younger abstention is to avoid unnecessary conflict th

between state and federal governments.” United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 707 (9 Cir. 2001). th

Younger permits “state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts,” particularly

where the party to the federal case may fully litigate his claim before the state court. Hicks v. Miranda,

422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281 (1975) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 43, 91 S.Ct. 746). Younger

“contemplates the outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and

federal, to the state courts.” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577, 93 S.Ct. 1689 (1973); Beltran v.

State of California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9 Cir. 1988). “Younger generally directs federal courts to th

abstain from granting injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial

proceedings.” Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125 F.3d 777, 781 (9 Cir. 1997), overruled on other

th

grounds, Green, 255 F.3d 1086.

Ms. Daniels’ requested injunctive relief would interfere with underlying state court proceedings.

Younger directs this Court to abstain from doing so. The state court proceedings provide Ms. Daniels

an adequate opportunity to address issues raised in her papers seeking injunctive relief. This Court is

not in a position to interject into ongoing state court proceedings.

Injunction Merits

As to the merits, Ms. Daniels fails to demonstrate that she is entitled to injunctive relief. The

purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo if the balance of equities so heavily

favors the moving party that justice requires the court to intervene to secure the positions until the merits

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of the action are ultimately determined. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).

A preliminary injunction is available to a plaintiff who “demonstrates either (1) a combination of

probable success and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the

balance of hardship tips in its favor.” Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F. 2d 935, 937 (9th

Cir. 1987). Under either approach the plaintiff “must demonstrate a significant threat of irreparable

injury.” Arcamuzi, 819 F.2d at 937. Also, an injunction should not issue if the plaintiff “shows no

chance of success on the merits.” Arcamuzi, 819 F.2d at 937. At a bare minimum, the plaintiff “must

demonstrate a fair chance of success of the merits, or questions serious enough to require litigation.”

Arcamuzi, 819 F.2d at 937.

When a government agency is involved, it must “be granted ‘the widest latitude in the dispatch

of its own internal affairs,’” Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-79, 96 S.Ct. 598, 608 (1976)), and “[w]hen a state agency is involved, these

considerations are, if anything, strengthened because of federalism concerns,” Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1128.

“[A]ny injunctive relief awarded must avoid unnecessarydisruption to the state agency’s ‘normal course

of proceeding.’” Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1128 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 501, 94 S.Ct.

669, 679 (1974)).

Ms. Daniels fails to demonstrate probable success on her claims or significant threat of

irreparable injury, especially given that the underlying state proceedings apparently continue. Ms.

Daniels makes no attempt to demonstrate even a fair chance of success on the merits or the existence

of serious questions to require litigation. Ms. Daniels relies on an impertinent order from another federal

district court and merely recites the order.

Furthermore, equitable remedies are “unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a

requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the

plaintiff will be wronged again - a ‘likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.’” City of

Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1670 (1983) (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 502,

94 S.Ct. at 679). In this instance, Ms. Daniels alleges no identifiable, potentially repeatable wrongs,

especially if the foreclosure is completed. If Ms. Daniels prevails, her injury will not go unrecompensed

because she has an adequate remedy at law. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111, 103 S.Ct. at 1670. Ms. Daniels is

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not entitled to equitable relief because there is no allegation that she will be wronged again. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, this Court DENIES Ms. Daniels injunctive relief, including a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2008 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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