Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-04669/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-04669-40/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYNOPSYS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICOH CO., LTD.,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

RICOH CO., LTD.,

Plaintiff,

v.

AEROFLEX, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-03-2289 MJJ (EMC)

No. C-03-4669 MJJ (EMC)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART RICOH’S MOTION

FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

(Docket No. 409 in C-03-2289; 

Docket No. 546 in C-03-4669)

Ricoh has filed a motion for a protective order with respect to certain “discovery requests”

and third-party subpoenas. 

A. “Discovery Requests”

In its previous order of August 18, 2006, the Court noted that Ricoh did not present any

evidence demonstrating that Synopsys and the Customer Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”)

propounded any formal discovery requests upon which they could move to compel. Ricoh, however,

still filed a motion for a protective order with respect to the “discovery requests.” The reason for

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See, e.g., Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 119 F.R.D. 680, 681-82 (D. Minn. 1987) (noting that

“[s]ome courts treat a request to compel production in the absence of a Rule 34 request as a Rule 34

request” and that those courts that “decline to consider a motion to compel production until a Rule 34

request is properly served” do so based “on the principle that the party subject to the request should have

an opportunity to voluntarily comply”). See also Mary Imogene Bassett Hosp. v. Sullivan, 136 F.R.D.

42, 48 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[D]enial of the motion on [the] ground [that no formal discovery request was

made] would merely delay resolution of the real issue at hand. The letter does inform the defendant that

plaintiff seeks access to, i.e. wants to inspect, the contents of the data base. The Form Request for

Production contains no more detail than does the letter. One can easily surmise that, if the motion to

compel is denied, plaintiff will serve a technically correct Form, defendant will refuse access, and

plaintiff will then move to compel under Rule 37(a).”).

2

Ricoh’s action was made clear by Defendants’ opposition. Apparently, the parties had an agreement

that expert discovery other than depositions would occur informally. See Andelman Decl. ¶ 8.

In light of the parties’ agreement as well as case law indicating that a formal discovery

request is not always necessary in order for a party to move to compel,1 the Court shall consider

Ricoh’s request for a protective order regarding the “discovery requests” made by Defendants. For

reasons similar to those discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion for a

protective order regarding the “discovery requests.” The motion is granted to the extent that the

requests are overbroad. The parties are ordered to meet and confer to narrow the scope of the

requests as discussed below.

B. Subpoenas

Regarding the subpoenas, the Court does -- as Ricoh contends -- have authority to issue a

protective order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (stating that a protective order can be issued by “the court

in which the action is pending). However, Ricoh must first show that it has standing to seek the

protective order. As explained by one legal treatise, “[a] party may not ask for an order to protect the

rights of another party or a witness if that party or witness does not claim protection for himself, but

a party may seek an order if it believes its own interest is jeopardized by discovery sought from a

third person.” 8 Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 2d § 2035. See, e.g., Del Campo v.

Kennedy, No. C-01-21151 JW (PVT), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31955, at *13 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2006)

(concluding that defendants had standing to seek a protective order with respect to third-party

subpoenas because the discovery related to defendants’ operation of a program and third parties were

participants in the program). 

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2

 Although Ricoh suggests that Defendants also did not give Ricoh a reasonable time to comply

with the “discovery requests,” Ricoh cites only Rule 45, which is applicable to subpoenas only.

3

The Court holds that Ricoh has standing to seek a protective order only with respect to the

arguments that the subpoenas are untimely (with respect to the case management schedule), that they

seek irrelevant information, that they impose an undue burden on Ricoh and its expert Dr.

Papaefthymiou, that they are intended to harass, and that they are intended to delay trial. See, e.g.,

Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426, 429 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“As

parties, Defendants clearly have standing to move for a protective order if the subpoenas seek

irrelevant information.”). Ricoh does not have standing to seek a protective order with respect to the

arguments that the subpoenas do not allow a reasonable time for compliance2 and that they impose

an undue burden on the subpoenaed third parties. While Ricoh also argues that Dr. Papaefethymiou

does not consent to the disclosure of the information sought by the subpoenas, the Court does not

consider this argument because (1) Ricoh does not provide any evidence such as a declaration from

its expert establishing that he is objecting and (2) Ricoh does not state the basis of the objection.

The Court rejects the argument that the subpoenas are untimely because they were issued

prior to the expert discovery cut-off date and shortly after Dr. Papefthymiou’s deposition wherein the

relevance of some of the course materials became evident. Although Defendants knew of Dr.

Papaefthymiou’s CV in May 2006 and have had his expert report since June 24, 2006, that does not

change the fact that the discovery sought is still within the case management schedule deadlines

imposed by Judge Jenkins. Nor has Ricoh demonstrated that the need for the requested information

was clearly evident from the expert report prior to the deposition. In addition, the Court rejects the

argument that the subpoenas impose an undue burden on Ricoh and Dr. Papaefthymiou because

Ricoh and Dr. Papaefthymiou do not have to do anything to respond to the subpoenas. While they

will have to review what is produced (if anything), that review should not be an undue burden since,

presumably, Dr. Papaefthymiou will be familiar with documents related to his course work and

invention disclosures. The amount of material that will have to be reviewed shall be reduced

because the Court is ordering the parties to meet and confer to narrow the scope of the subpoenas so

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3

 Although Ricoh and Dr. Papaefthymiou will have to do work to respond to the “discovery

requests,” again, the meet and confer should narrow the scope of the requests.

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that only information directly relevant to this litigation need be produced.3 Finally, the Court rejects

the arguments that the subpoenas are intended to harass and/or delay trial. Defendants have stated a

reasonable basis for seeking at least some of the information sought. Any resulting delay in the trial

is purely speculative at this point.

However, the Court shall grant the motion for a protective order to a limited extent, more

specifically, on the basis that, as the subpoenas now stand, they are overbroad. The subpoenas ask

for anything related to courses taught, invention disclosures, and documents authored, without any

real limitation. Defendants’ opposition, in contrast, focuses on the issue of the definition or nature

of RTL. The subpoenas should focus on the matters fairly raised by the deposition testimony of this

expert. 

Accordingly, the Court orders the parties to meet and confer to narrow the scope of the

subpoenas. Of course, this order does not bar the subpoenaed parties from moving to quash on any

basis. The parties are hereby ordered to meet and confer and reach an agreement upon the amended

scope of the subpoenas within two court days of the date of this order. If no agreement is reached,

each party shall submit to the Court by the third court day after the date of this order, a proposed

form of subpoena containing a revised scope of production. The Court will chose the form which

best accords with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 24, 2006

 

 EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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