Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01947/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01947-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive &amp; Declaratory Relief

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD A. BRISTOW, for

himself and a class of 

others similarly situated,

NO. CIV. S-06-1947 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v.

LYCOMING ENGINES, a O R D E R

Division of Avco Corporation;

AVCO CORPORATION; TEXTRON,

INC.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff Richard Bristow brings suit against defendants

Lycoming Engines, AVCO Corporation, and Textron, Inc. for injuries

associated with an allegedly faulty airplane crankshaft. Pending

before the court are defendants’ motion to transfer and motion to

dismiss. The court resolves the matter on the parties’ papers and

after oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court

denies the motion to transfer, and grants in part and denies in

part the motion to dismiss, with leave to amend.

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2

I. Facts

A. General Background

In this putative class action, plaintiff seeks to recover

costs associated with the replacement of an allegedly faulty

airplane crankshaft on behalf of himself and other similarly

situated California consumers. The defendants in this action are

Lycoming Engines, AVCO Corporation, Textron, Inc. Lycoming, an

operating division within AVCO, is alleged to manufacture the

crankshaft. Textron is the parent corporation of AVCO. Plaintiff

has brought claims based upon California’s Unfair Competition Law

(“UCL”), Cal. Civ. Code § 17200, and California’s Consumers Legal

Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750.

A crankshaft is the part of the airplane engine that

translates the piston motion into rotation and turns the propeller.

When crankshafts fail, power loss, engine failure, and damage to

the airplane result. First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 2. An engine

overhaul is required after a specific amount of time. During an

overhaul, the crankcase is separated and specified parts are

inspected or replaced. FAC ¶ 3. Unlike other parts of the engine,

a crankshaft is typically not replaced, and can last the life of

the plane with regular maintenance. FAC ¶ 3.

In 2006, Lycoming issued Mandatory Service Bulletin 569 and

569A (collectively, “MSB 569A”), which instituted an “early

retirement” program for certain Lycoming crankshafts. Under the

program, Lycoming directed aircraft owners to replace their

crankshafts the next time the crankcase was split or at the next

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scheduled overhaul, but not later than February 21, 2009. FAC ¶

4. Later in 2006, the FAA issued a corresponding Airworthiness

Directive (“AD”). 71 Fed. Reg. 57412 (September 29, 2006). The

AD differs from MSB 569A in that it extends the maximum compliance

time from three to twelve years. MSBs are not legally binding on

aircraft owners but ADs, as mandatory regulations promulgated by

the FAA, are binding on aircraft owners. Crigler v. Cessna

Aircraft Co., 830 F.2d 169, 171 (11th Cir. 1987).

If owners decide to replace their crankshafts prior to 2009,

and get their engines overhauled at Lycoming, they will not be

charged for the cost of a new crankshaft. Freight charges are not

covered. If owners opt to have their engines overhauled prior to

2009 at a non-Lycoming facility, they will be charged $2,000 for

the crankshaft, which is discounted from the $16,000 retail cost

of a new crankshaft. If, however, owners opt have their

crankshafts replaced after 2009, they will bear the full $16,000

cost.

B. Facts Relevant to Motion to Transfer

Defendants are headquartered in Pennsylvania and at least

twenty-three of defendants’ sixty some witnesses live in

Pennsylvania. A significant portion of defendants’ business

appears to take place outside Pennsylvania, particularly in Texas,

as well as numerous distribution centers throughout the country,

including five in California.

Currently before the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is a

case, factually similar to this one, involving a class of consumers

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from other states, excluding California, who purchased engines from

defendant with the same crankshaft issue. The case before this

court differs in that it is brought on behalf of California

residents pursuant to California law.

Previously, defendants requested the Judicial Panel on

Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL panel”) to transfer the case to

Pennsylvania for coordinated pretrial proceedings. The MDL panel

denied the transfer, finding that “centralization would not

necessarily serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses or

further the just and efficient conduct of this litigation.” Order

Denying Transfer, Ex. A to Defs.’ Notice Regarding Mot. to

Transfer. The MDL panel concluded that: “[N]o overlap exists

between the putative classes in the Pennsylvania actions and the

California action. The proponents of centralization have failed

to persuade us that any common questions of fact and law are

sufficiently complex and/or numerous to justify Section 1407

transfer.” Id. 

II. Legal Standards & Analysis

A. Motion to Transfer

1. Standard for Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

Section 1404(a) of Title 28 provides that "[f]or the

convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of

justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any

other district or division where it might have been brought."

Although the statute was drafted in accordance with the doctrine

of forum non conveniens, it was intended to be a revision rather

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than a codification of the common law. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno,

454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981); Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32

(1955).

The burden is upon the moving party, however, to show that

transfer is appropriate. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.

Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979). The plaintiff's choice

of forum is generally accorded great weight. Lou v. Belzberg, 834

F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987). Section 1404(a) provides for

transfer to a more convenient forum, not to a forum likely to be

equally convenient or inconvenient. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S.

612, 646 (1964).

Several factors should be considered by the court in resolving

a motion brought pursuant to § 1404(a). The common law factors

that are still appropriate for consideration include: “relative

ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory

process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining

attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises,

if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical

problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and

inexpensive.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).

Other factors that would not have been relevant under the

prior doctrine of forum non conveniens are now appropriate for the

court's consideration. These include: “the administrative

difficulties flowing from court congestion; the ‘local interest in

having localized controversies decided at home’; the interest in

having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home

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with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of

unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of

foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an

unrelated forum with jury duty.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241

n.6.

In sum, "[t]he basic factors to be considered then, in

determining whether, on balance, a transfer to a different forum

would allow a case to proceed more conveniently and better serve

the interests of justice, are: (1) the plaintiff's choice of

forum; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the convenience of

the witnesses; and (4) the interests of justice." Los Angeles

Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 89 F.R.D.

497, 499 (C.D. Cal. 1981).

2. Analysis

Defendants have failed to show that transferring the pending

case is appropriate. Upon consideration of the relevant factors,

the motion to transfer should be denied.

a. Interests of Justice 

As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that the factors for

transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)

(the multidistrict litigation statute) are essentially the same.

The MDL panel may transfer cases involving one or more common

questions of fact to any district for coordinated or consolidated

pretrial proceedings where transfer “will be for the convenience

of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient

conduct of such actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 

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In the case at bar, the MDL panel rejected essentially the

same arguments that defendants present in their motion to change

venue. Although a motion pursuant to the multidistrict litigation

statute is different from a traditional motion to transfer under

Section 1404, the MDL panel did specifically consider matters of

convenience and efficiency, finding that those interests would not

be served by transfer. See Order Denying Transfer, Ex. A to Defs.’

Notice Regarding Motion to Transfer. Defendants’ motion to

transfer is based on the same facts which were before the MDL panel

and defendants fail to explain how, if at all, circumstances have

changed so as to warrant transfer pursuant to Section 1404(a). 

Under the “law of the case” doctrine, “a court is generally

precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided

by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.”

Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993). The doctrine

is not a limitation on a court's power, but rather a guide to

discretion. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). 

Although the motion to transfer under the multidistrict litigation

statute and the pending motion to transfer are not identical, the

law of the case doctrine suggests that this court should refrain

from reconsidering the very issues considered and rejected by the

MDL panel. The court is inclined to deny the motion to transfer

on these grounds alone. 

Even if the court were to disregard the finding of the MDL

panel, other factors weigh in favor of keeping the case in this

district. First, the Pennsylvania case is apparently at a later

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 In fact, it appears that the parties have already agreed 1

that the coordination of discovery, “in the Bristow action with the

Pennsylvania cases . . . is in the best interests of everyone.”

Craven Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. F (March 15, 2007 email). This agreement

was made independent of any motions to transfer. 

Furthermore, the convenience of defendants’ witnesses who 2

neither reside in Pennsylvania or California (many are located in

Texas) is not entitled to any weight. The court does not consider

the convenience of parties and witnesses who are located outside

both the current and transferee fora. See, e.g., Ricoh Co., Ltd.

v. Honeywell, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 473, 484-85 (D. N.J. 1993)

(finding that plaintiff, a Japanese corporation, was "already

inconvenienced by having to travel thousands of miles from their

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pretrial stage than this one. Decl. of Erica Craven (“Craven

Decl.”), Ex. B. There is no indication that transferring this case

would necessarily result in greater coordination. Second, this 1

case, unlike the one pending in Pennsylvania, is brought pursuant

to California state law. Accordingly, if the case were

transferred, plaintiff would not have the benefit of a jury

comprised of fellow Californians. In sum, it cannot be said that

interests of justice weigh in favor of transfer. 

b. Convenience to the Parties & Witnesses 

While defendants may be headquartered in Pennsylvania, their

distribution network is expansive, with outlets across both the

United States and Canada. Five distributors are located California

alone. Given the presence of Lycoming both nationally and in this

state, it does not appear that it would be especially inconvenient

for defendants to litigate in this district. 

Defendants also argue that it would be more convenient for its

witnesses to testify in Pennsylvania. The convenience of most of

these witnesses is entitled to little weight. As employees of the 2

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homes to testify" and traveling to Minnesota would be no more

inconvenient than to New Jersey despite fewer flights and lack of

a non-stop flight to Minnesota). 

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party seeking transfer, defendants’ will be able to compel their

testimony at trial. See, e.g., Ashmore v. N.E. Petroleum Div. of

Cargill, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 36, 38 (D. Me. 1996) ("a defendant's

motion to transfer under section 1404(a) may be denied when the

witnesses are employees of the defendant and their presence may be

obtained by the party"). 

c. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum 

Furthermore, it is well-established that a plaintiff's choice

of forum is generally accorded great weight in deciding a motion

to transfer. Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987).

Defendants must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant

upsetting plaintiff's choice of forum. Decker Coal Co. v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). Here,

plaintiff alleges that defendants violated two of California’s

consumer protection laws, the UCL and the CLRA.

Plaintiff has a strong interest in litigating this case involving

California law in a California court, and defendant has not

demonstrated sufficient reason to upset that choice. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to transfer is denied.

B. Motion to Dismiss

1. Standards

a. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction

It is well established that the party seeking to invoke the

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jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of establishing

that jurisdiction exists. KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S.

269, 278 (1936); Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir.

1986). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1), the standards that must be applied vary

according to the nature of the jurisdictional challenge.

If the challenge to jurisdiction is a facial attack, i.e., the

defendant contends that the allegations of jurisdiction contained

in the complaint are insufficient on their face to demonstrate the

existence of jurisdiction, the plaintiff is entitled to safeguards

similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made.

The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true,

and the motion is granted only if the plaintiff fails to allege an

element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. See 2A J.

Moore, J. Lucas & G. Grotheer, Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 12.07

(2d ed. 1987); see also Eaton v. Dorchester Development, Inc., 692

F.2d 727, 731 (11th Cir. 1982); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,

412 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Mortensen

v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

A complaint will be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction (1) if the case does not "arise under" any federal law

or the United States Constitution, (2) if there is no case or

controversy within the meaning of that constitutional term, or (3)

if the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).

If the challenge to jurisdiction is made as a "speaking

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motion" attacking the truth of the jurisdictional facts alleged by

the plaintiff, a different set of standards must be applied.

Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Where the jurisdictional issue is

separable from the merits of the case, the district court is free

to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue

prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where necessary.

Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983);

Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. "In such circumstances '[n]o

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional

claims.'" Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077 (quoting Thornhill, 594 F.2d

at 733).

However, where the jurisdictional issue and

substantive issues are so intertwined that the

question of jurisdiction is dependent on the

resolution of factual issues going to the merits, the

jurisdictional determination should await a

determination of the relevant facts on either a motion

going to the merits or at trial.

Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077 (citing Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733-35;

5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350, at

558 (1969 & Supp. 1987)). On a motion going to the merits, the

court must, of course, employ the standard applicable to a motion

for summary judgment. Farr v. United States, 990 F.2d 451, 454 n.

1 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1023 (1993).

b. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must

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be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).

Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact

if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged.

See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963)

(inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). So

construed, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle

him or her to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

In spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the

plaintiff's allegations, however, it is not proper for the court

to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she]

has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . .

laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

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26 The issue of ripeness is separately addressed below. 3

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2. Analysis

a. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction

i. Injury in Fact

First, defendants argue that plaintiff has suffered no injury

and therefore lacks standing. In order to demonstrate standing,

Article III requires plaintiffs to demonstrate an “injury in fact

-- an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)

concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Here, with regard to defendants’ facial

attack, there is nothing speculative about the injury that class

members allegedly have suffered or will suffer.3

Class members must elect one of three choices. First, they

can obey MSB 569A and replace their crankshafts at overhaul for

“free” before 2009 at Lycoming -- but bear the extra cost of a

Lycoming overhaul (as compared to overhauls performed by other FAA

authorized facilities), higher freight charges, and longer

downtime, FAC ¶¶ 18-21 -- or overhaul their engines at a

local/preferred FAA facility to the tune of $2,000 for replacement

parts. Second, class members can wait until after 2009 to replace

their crankshafts at overhaul and pay $16,000 for parts. Third,

class members can replace the crankshaft in advance of overhaul and

pay the costs to remove and reinstall the engine. Under any

choice, plaintiffs will assuredly suffer harm.

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Accordingly, even if plaintiffs sold their planes prior to 4

an engine overhaul -- thereby avoiding the costs associated with

such an endeavor -- the diminution in resale value would still

confer standing on plaintiffs.

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Furthermore, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants engaged

in deceptive business practices, including the failure the

disclosure material facts. FAC ¶¶ 48-58. This omission allegedly

concerned “facts that a reasonable consumer would have considered

important in deciding whether or not to purchase or lease the

aircraft.” FAC ¶ 52. If true, the injury caused by that omission

occurred at the moment of the purchasing or leasing decision (and

likely accrued upon discovery of the omission).

Finally, plaintiffs have alleged that as soon as MSB 569A was

released, class members’ planes suffered a diminution in value.4

FAC ¶ 23. That diminution in value was an immediately cognizable

injury, and there is no principled basis for finding that an injury

is not cognizable until plaintiffs are poised to liquidate their

assets. Taken to its logical conclusion, defendants’ argument

would mean that an automobile owner whose vehicle was hit by

someone else could not recover for that loss until the owner was

prepared to sell the vehicle.

 ii. Ripeness

Alternately, defendants contend under their factual attack

that plaintiffs’ claims are unripe for review. Defendants argue

that because plaintiffs may elect to have an overhaul performed by

Lycoming and thereby avoid the cost of a replacement crankshaft,

they will be able to avoid injury. The problem with this argument,

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 Defendants’ reliance on Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 5

1104 (9th Cir. 1997), is not to the contrary. There, the court

dismissed for lack of standing an Eighth Amendment challenge by

death row inmate to death by lethal gas, because he had not yet

elected between lethal gas or lethal injection. Here, by contrast,

regardless of which course of action plaintiffs elect, there will

be a cognizable injury under state law.

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as noted above, is that even opting for a Lycoming overhaul will

entail extra cost for plaintiffs. Indeed, under any of the three

options available to class members, injury in some form is

certain. Furthermore, the injuries related to diminution in 5

market value and defendants’ allegedly deceptive business practices

have already occurred.

b. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Next, defendants also move to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, arguing that (1) the UCL causes of action have not been

sufficiently pled, (2) plaintiff is not a “consumer” under the

CLRA, and (3) Textron is not a proper party to the suit.

a. UCL

First, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to allege

“actual injury” under the UCL claim. I cannot agree. The

complaint specifically alleges that “[p]laintiff, like all

California Class members, has been damaged by Defendants’ uniform

misconduct in that he has or will incur the cost of replacing the

Lycoming Crankshaft.” FAC ¶ 33. Furthermore, the complaint

alleges that “[p]laintiff, like all California Class members, has

also suffered diminished value of the aircraft, including . . .

diminished resale value, as a result of the Lycoming Crankshaft.”

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FAC ¶ 34. This is sufficient to plead a cause of action under the

UCL.

Defendants also maintain that plaintiffs have failed to

properly plead proximate causation and reliance. Under the UCL and

CLRA, the legally relevant question is framed not in terms of

“reliance,” which is required in common law fraud, but of

materiality. See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Superior

Court, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1282, 1288 (2002); Chamberlan v. Ford Motor

Co., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144-45 (N.D. Cal. 2005). Here, as

already noted, the complaint states that defendants failed to

disclose material information, and that this omission concerned

“facts that a reasonable consumer would have considered important

in deciding whether or not to purchase or lease the aircraft.” FAC

¶ 52. This is sufficient to allege the required element of

materiality.

Defendants additionally contend that unjust enrichment is not

an available remedy under the UCL. FAC ¶¶ 46, 57 (alleging that

“[d]efendants have been unjustly enriched” and demanding

restitution and disgorgement). It appears that the disagreement

between the parties is one of form, rather than substance. There

is no dispute that restitution is permitted under the UCL, see Bank

of the West v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538, 557 (1992),

and “Plaintiff seeks nothing more for himself or the Class members

than . . . injunctive relief and restitution.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 15.

b. CLRA

Second, defendants contend that plaintiff is not a “consumer”

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under the CLRA because a consumer is defined as “an individual who

seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for

personal, family or household purposes.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d).

Defendants argue that, as a matter of law, an aircraft engine

cannot be for “personal, family or household purposes.” The only

case cited for this at least questionable proposition, Cinquegrani

v. Waypoint Aviation Servs., 2001 WL 649488, *3 (N.D. Ill. June 8,

2001), arose under the Magnusson-Moss Act, which defines consumer

products based on how they are “normally used,” rather than the

purposes for which they are actually bought. Compare 15 U.S.C. 6

§ 2301(1) with Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d). Plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged that he is a consumer under the CLRA, FAC ¶

67, meaning that he bought and uses his plane primarily for

personal, family, or household purposes.

3. Textron’s Liability

Third, defendants argue that Textron, as a parent corporation

of AVCO, is an improper defendant to this action because it did not

design, manufacture, service, market, or sell aircraft engines.

Plaintiff responds that Textron engineers knew of the problems with

the crankshaft, and even recommended various design changes to

counteract the problems, but that Lycoming refused to make the

recommended changes. FAC ¶ 6. Accordingly, plaintiff alleges that

“Textron knew of its subsidiaries’ refusal to change and correct

the design problems and remained silent respecting the same.” Id.

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Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the basis for

Textron’s liability. For example, Textron could be held liable on

an alter ego theory, but plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient

to warrant disregarding the corporate form. See, e.g., Chan v.

Soc’y Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1294 (9th Cir. 1997).

Similarly, if plaintiff were to allege that Textron did, in fact,

design, manufacture, service, market, or sell the engines,

liability could attach more directly. But plaintiff has not done

so.

Furthermore, the fact that Textron knew of the alleged

problems but took no action to prevent its subsidiaries’ alleged

wrongdoing is not sufficient to create liability, without more.

See Joiner v. Ryder System Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1478, 1490 (C.D. Ill.

1996) (noting that every parent corporation has the power to

control its subsidiaries’ actions but that such control does not

by itself create liability). Plaintiff responds that its position

is not that Textron is liable merely because it is a parent

corporation but that “Textron is liable based on the independent

actions of its employees or officers.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 17.

Plaintiff, however, has not answered the threshold question of why

those engineers were under a duty to disclose the alleged design

defect, or otherwise act to stop it, when the product in question

was apparently designed, manufactured, and sold by a separate

entity.

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III. Conclusion

Accordingly, the court orders as follows:

1. The motion to transfer is DENIED.

2. The motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction is DENIED.

3. The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff is granted 20

days to amend the complaint. The parties shall brief the issue

and the court will then determine if a hearing is required. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 9, 2007.

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