Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06870/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06870-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

FRANKLIN RAY BROWN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

A.A. LAMARQUE, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:03-cv-6870-TAG HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF

RESPONDENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At the time this petition was filed, Petitioner was in custody of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation serving a indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life, pursuant

to a judgment of the State of California, County of Fresno. (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (“CT”)

304-306). On March 28, 2000, Petitioner was convicted by jury of petty theft with two prior theftrelated convictions (Cal. Pen. Code § 666), and theft of account information (Cal. Pen. Code

§ 484e(e)), with ten prior serious felony convictions that qualified as strikes under California’s Three

Strikes law (Cal. Pen. Code §667, subds. (b)-(I), & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)). (CT 192-203). 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

(“5th DCA”), which affirmed the judgment on September 23, 2002. (Doc. 13, Ex. E). On

November 1, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court (id., Ex. H),

which was denied on December 11, 2002. (Id., Ex. I). 

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Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on December 3, 2003. (Doc. 1). On May 18,

2004, Respondent filed his Answer. (Doc. 13). On August 27, 2004, Petitioner filed his Traverse. 

(Doc. 17). 

Respondent concedes that, insofar as Petitioner’s issue challenges the state court’s ruling on

his motion to replace counsel at the sentencing hearing, it is exhausted. (Doc. 13, p. 3). Respondent

asserts that, to the extent Petitioner seeks to challenge the state court’s denial of new counsel as it

would have affected the trial itself, Petitioner’s claim is not exhausted and Respondent does not

waive the exhaustion requirement. (Doc. 13, p. 3). 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the succinct Statement of Facts in the 5th DCA’s unpublished decision:

“The facts are of little relevance to the issues on appeal; therefore, we will only

recount them briefly. Appellant, while an employee of a department store, placed

some items of merchandise into a customer’s bag without scanning them and used

another person’s credit card account number for the transaction. The merchandise

was valued at $130.57.” 

(Doc. 13, Ex. E, p. 2). 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction.

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 n. 7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the

United States Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Fresno County Superior

Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241(d). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over this action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th

Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding the

AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute’s enactment). The instant petition was filed on

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December 3, 2003, after the enactment of the AEDPA, and thus it is governed by the AEDPA.

II. Legal Standard Of Review.

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) will not be granted unless the

adjudication of a prisoner’s claim (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States” or (2) resulted in a decision that “was based on an unreasonable determination of /

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412-413. 

The first prong of federal habeas review involves the “contrary to” and “unreasonable

application” clauses of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This prong pertains to questions of law and mixed

questions of law and fact. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407-410; Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d

628, 637 (9th Cir. 2004). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law

“if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,”

or “if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision

but reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405. A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly

established federal law “if the state court applies [the Supreme Court’s precedents] to the facts in an

objectively unreasonable manner.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. at 141. Consequently, a federal court

may not grant habeas relief simply because the state court’s decision is incorrect or erroneous; the

state court’s decision must also be objectively unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 511

(2003), citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 409. Section 2254(d)(1)’s reference to “clearly

established Federal law” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s

decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412;

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 412; Barker v. Fleming, 423 F. 3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005).

The second prong of federal habeas review involves the “unreasonable determination” clause

of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. 

Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d at 637, citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Under

§ 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s

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claims “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520; Jeffries v.

Wood, 114 F.3d at 1500 (when reviewing a state court’s factual determinations, a “responsible,

thoughtful answer reached after a full opportunity to litigate is adequate to support the judgment”). 

A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable when it is “so clearly incorrect that it would not be

debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id. ; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 (9th Cir.

2004), cert.denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004). The AEDPA also requires that

considerable deference be given to a state court’s factual findings. A state court’s factual findings are

presumed to be correct, and such presumption of correctness may be rebutted only by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to

the last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. Robinson v. Ignacio,

360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state court decided the petitioner’s claims on the

merits but provided no reasoning for its decision, the federal habeas court must independently review

the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-982 (9th Cir.

2000). Where the state court denied the petitioner’s claims on procedural grounds or did not decide

such claims on the merits, the deferential standard of the AEDPA do not apply and the federal court

must review the petitioner’s ’s claims de novo. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir.

2002).

III. Review Of Petitioner’s Claims.

The instant petition itself alleges a single ground for relief, discussed below.

Ground One Petitioner Was Denied His Federal Constitutional Rights When The

Trial Court, At Sentencing, Denied His Marsden Motion.

Petitioner contends that the state trial court committed prejudicial error when it “refused to

allow Petitioner to move the court for substitution of counsel, refused to appoint new counsel; and

refused to allow him or his counsel to state the reasons for this motion/request.” (Doc. 1, p. 6). 

Petitioner explains that because no state court permitted him a hearing on his motion, made pursuant

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to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970), to replace counsel who, Petitioner maintains, “was

prejudicially ineffective due to a conflict of interest,” the “adverse effects of trial counsel’s divided

fiduciary loyalty between a prosecution witness and the petitioner has never been evaluated.” (Id.). 

This contention is without merit.

A. Procedural History.

At his sentencing hearing, Petitioner told the trial court that he had recently discovered that

his attorney, appointed as an alternate public defender, was associated with a firm that had

represented one of the prosecution witnesses in another matter, that he was entitled to a “conflict

free” defense, and therefore that he was requesting “to have a new attorney represent me at my

judgment hearing.” (RT 1731). The judge told Petitioner he would only hear arguments from

Petitioner’s attorney; thereafter, Petitioner’s attorney asked permission to make a Marsden motion,

but the court stated, “Not at this time.” (Id.). Counsel attempted to rephrase his request, but the trial

court again denied it: “That’s denied. It’s untimely at this point.” (Id.).

Counsel then attempted to gain permission for Petitioner to raise other issues related to a

request for a new trial, but the trial court again refused. (RT 1733). Counsel stated, “Without

hearing the issues, I don’t know how they could be denied, without hearing them.” (Id.). The court

responded, “Should have been done before today’s date, Counsel. That’s denied.” (Id.). 

In his direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the trial court’s summary refusal to grant a

Marsden hearing as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his right to due process. 

(Doc. 13, Exh. B, p. 11). Although Petitioner accepted that the “harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt” standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) was applicable, he nevertheless

argued for a reversal of his conviction per se, relying on the Marsden decision itself, which

concluded that, because the trial court had not conducted any hearing at all, on such a deficient

record the California Supreme Court “cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this denial of

the effective assistance of counsel did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction.” (Doc. 13, Exh.

B, p. 16, quoting Marsden, 2 Cal.3d at 126). 

Respondent contended on appeal that Petitioner had only requested a Marsden hearing to

replace his counsel at sentencing; therefore, even if the trial court committed error, the remedy would

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be to remand the case to conduct a Marsden hearing and, potentially, to resentence Petitioner with

new counsel present. (Doc. 13, Exh. C, p. 15, n. 6). 

Citing Marsden, the 5th DCA concluded that the trial court had indeed erred in refusing to

conduct a hearing into Petitioner’s request to appoint new counsel. (Doc. 13, Exh. E, p. 5). 

However, the 5th DCA concluded that the error was not prejudicial. Relying on People v.

Washington, 27 Cal.App.4th 940 (1994), in which the failure to conduct a Marsden hearing upon a

request made at the motion for a new trial was found not to be prejudicial error, the 5th DCA

concluded as follows:

Likewise here, we fail to see how appellant was prejudiced in any way by the trial

court’s failure to hold a Marsden hearing. Appellant’s motion was not based on

ineffective assistance of counsel; rather, it was based solely upon appellant’s

complaint that he felt his trial counsel had a conflict of interest. Thus, appellant

was essentially arguing that his counsel could not properly represent him at

sentencing. Even if appellant was correct in that assertion, we fail to see how

different trial counsel could have provided appellant with a more favorable result. 

Appellant was sentenced under the Three Strikes scheme. The prosecution alleged,

and the jury found true, that appellant had previously suffered 10 prior serious

and/or violent felonies. Nine of the prior felonies were for robbery (§ 211) and one

was for kidnapping (§ 207). All 10 of the prior convictions are defined as serious

and violent felonies pursuant to the Three Strikes law. Appellant’s sentence would

remain the same, unless the trial court struck nine of appellant’s prior convictions. 

However, at sentencing, the trial court explained that it felt it would be an abuse of

discretion to sentence appellant to anything but a Three Strikes sentence. Therefore,

we find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant would have received the same

result regardless of the Marsden error.

(Doc. 13, Exh. E, pp. 7-8)(citations omitted). 

B. Petitioner Was Not Denied His Federal Constitutional Rights By The 

Trial Court’s Refusal To Conduct A Marsden Hearing.

Assuming that the 5th DCA was correct that the trial court erred in not affording Petitioner a

hearing on his Marsden motion, the issue now before this Court is whether the state court’s

determination beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the error was either

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Court concludes

that it is not.

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right

to counsel and therefore is properly considered in a habeas proceeding. Bland v. California Dept. of

Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218

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F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir.2000). It is well settled that when a criminal defendant voices a seemingly

substantial complaint about counsel, the trial judge should make a thorough inquiry into the reasons

for the defendant's dissatisfaction. See id. at 1475-76; United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 716

(9th Cir.1990). 

It is also well-settled, however, that a defendant does not have the right to counsel of his

choice in a criminal proceeding. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624

(1989); United States v. Rewald, 889 F.2d 836, 856 (9th Cir.1989). The Sixth Amendment

guarantees effective assistance of counsel, not a “meaningful relationship” between an accused and

his counsel. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). While a defendant has the right to make a

motion for new counsel based on the defendant’s perception of ineffective assistance of counsel, he

does not have an automatic right to the substitution of counsel simply because he is dissatisfied with

appointed counsel's performance. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1990). 

The ultimate inquiry in a federal habeas proceeding is whether the petitioner's Sixth

Amendment right to counsel was violated. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1024-1025. The habeas court

considers whether the trial court's denial of or failure to rule on the motion “actually violated

[petitioner’s] constitutional rights in that the conflict between [petitioner] and his attorney had

become so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant impediment that

resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by the Sixth

Amendment.” Id. at 1026. 

Here, as mentioned, error by the state trial court in denying outright Petitioner’s motion

without a hearing is assumed. The next issue is whether and to what extent a prejudice analysis

should be applied to determine whether granting the petition is appropriate in this instance. In

Bland, the Ninth Circuit reached a conclusion similar to that of the California Supreme Court in

Marsden, i.e., that because denial of a hearing creates a record from which no meaningful review can

be had, reversal of the conviction without a prejudice analysis is appropriate. Bland, 20 F.3d at

1477-1479.

However, Bland’s holding was later limited and distinguished by the Ninth Circuit in Schell. 

In that case, the petitioner contended that he was entitled under Bland and Crandell v. Bunnell,

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144 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998), to a per se reversal of his conviction. The Schell court rejected this

contention:

In Bland, the defendant wanted appointed counsel to replace his previously retained

counsel. The Bland court held that failure to allow the defendant to replace his

retained counsel violated his qualified right to choice of counsel, which was

prejudicial per se. The qualified right of choice of counsel applies only to persons

who can afford to retain counsel....In this case, Schell sought appointment of counsel

to replace appointed counsel. There is no suggestion that Schell could or wanted to

retain his own counsel. Consequently, the erroneous denial of the motion for

substitute counsel did not implicate Shell’s qualified right to counsel of his choice,

and the per se prejudice rule from Bland is not applicable....

Crandell also is distinguishable. In Crandell, the defendant was improperly forced to

choose between incompetent counsel and no counsel at all. He chose the latter and

to represent himself. Under those unique circumstances, we concluded that no

showing of prejudice was required because Crandell was improperly left with no

counsel at all. The inherent prejudice in Crandell was therefore the denial altogether

of the right to counsel, not the denial of a motion for substitute counsel....

In this case, the issue is neither Schell’s right to choice of counsel nor a denial of

counsel. Instead, the basic question is simply whether the conflict between Schell

and his attorney prevented effective assistance of counsel. 

Schell, 218 F.3d at 1025-1026. (Citations omitted)(Emphasis supplied). 

Having distinguished both Bland and Crandell, the Ninth Circuit then framed the issue as

“not whether the state trial court ‘abused its discretion’ in not deciding Schell’s motion, but whether

this error actually violated Schell’s constitutional rights in that the conflict between Schell and his

attorney had become so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant

impediment that resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by

the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 1026. (Emphasis supplied). 

The Ninth Circuit went on to point out, however, that “not every conflict or disagreement

between the defendant and counsel implicates Sixth Amendment rights.” Id. at 1027. The Court

remanded the case to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to

determine the nature and extent of the conflict between Schell and his attorney, and whether that

conflict deprived Schell of the representation to which he was entitled under the Sixth Amendment. 

Id. “In the event that the trial court determines that a serious conflict did exist that resulted in the

constructive denial of assistance of counsel, no further showing of prejudice is required ; and

Schell’s trial shall be presumed to have been unfair.” Id. at 1028. If, however, the “serious conflict

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did not rise to the level of a constructive denial of counsel, [then] Schell would have to prove he was

prejudiced by the conflict.” Id. 

Here, as in Schell, Petitioner maintains that a conflict of interest existed between him and his

appointed counsel, by virtue of counsel’s association with a law firm that had represented a

prosecution witness on a prior occasion. “To establish a sixth amendment violation based on a

conflict of interest, a defendant must show that (1) that counsel actively representing conflicting

interests, and (2) that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” 

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). Petitioner must prove an actual conflict “through a

factual showing on the record.” Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 455 (9th Cir. 1991). As

mentioned previously, Petitioner must also show that the conflict was so egregious that it resulted in

the constructive denial of assistance of counsel. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1028.

Petitioner has not met this burden. First, it bears emphasis that Petitioner never requested a

Marsden motion during trial, nor did the scope of the Marsden motion he attempted to make during

his sentencing hearing encompass trial counsel’s performance at the trial itself. Indeed, Petitioner

explicitly indicated he wanted to make a Marsden motion to replace his attorney at the sentencing

hearing. At no time during the trial court proceedings or in his appeal, did Petitioner indicate any

broader scope for his request, nor did he ever raise the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, nor

the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel for failure to raise a similar claim against trial counsel. 

Moreover, in this petition, Petitioner has narrowly framed his issue to challenge the state court’s

denial of that Marsden request at sentencing. 

Thus, the Court’s initial inquiry is limited to a determination whether Petitioner has shown

that any conflict between trial counsel and him was sufficiently grave to constructively deny him the

effective assistance of counsel during his sentencing hearing. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1028. It was not. 

At the time of his sentencing hearing, Petitioner had already been convicted by a jury. Also,

ten prior “strike” convictions had already been established. In California, when a defendant who has

been convicted of a felony is shown to have suffered two or more previous serious or violent felony

convictions, California’s Three Strikes law provides that “[p]robation for the current offense shall

not be granted....” Cal. Pen. Code § 667(c)(2). Moreover, in such cases, “[t]here shall not be a

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commitment to any other facility other than the state prison.” Cal. Pen. Code § 667(c)(4). Finally,

the law expressly provides that the minimum sentence under such circumstances is an indeterminate

term of twenty-five years to life, the very sentence Petitioner received in this case. Cal. Pen. Code

§ 667(e)(2)(A)(I).

Although in California the trial court retains the discretion to dismiss prior strikes “in the

interest of justice,” see People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996), the trial court

here was unequivocal in stating that Petitioner, with ten prior strikes, including nine for burglary and

one for kidnapping, was not a legitimate candidate for dismissing prior strikes under Romero. 

(RT 1734). Indeed, the court went so far as to say that “[i]t would be an abuse of discretion for any

judge in the State of California to give you something other than a Three Strikes sentence.” (Id.)

(Emphasis supplied). 

For his part, Petitioner’s attorney argued vigorously at the sentencing hearing for a reduced

sentence under Romero. (RT 1726-1730). Indeed, after counsel’s request for a continuance of the

hearing in order to prepare a written Romero motion and to make copies of letters supporting

Petitioner was denied, counsel discussed the length of time during which Petitioner had accumulated

his strikes, that most of the strikes resulted from a single 1983 prosecution, that Petitioner incurred a

17-year sentence for those offenses, that he had successfully completed parole, that he had obtained

employment, that the underlying petty theft conviction was not itself a serious crime, that the loss to

the victim amounted only to several hundred dollars, and that Petitioner had been honest with the

court about his prior convictions. (Id.). Given the limitations imposed by the Three Strikes law and

the trial court’s refusal to even consider dismissing any prior strikes, there was little more any trial

counsel could have done to affect the outcome of the sentencing hearing. This is precisely what the

5th DCA concluded in its opinion. 

While the Court can easily imagine that a bona fide conflict of interest regarding a

prosecution witness could prejudice a criminal defendant during the guilt phase of a criminal trial,

it is much harder to envision how such a conflict would impede trial counsel’s performance within

the narrow parameters of a sentencing hearing such as has been described in this case, especially

where the prosecution witness purportedly at the heart of the conflict of interest plays no role

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whatsoever. Because of the limited scope of the sentencing hearing, the unavailability of any

sentencing options except the twenty-five year to life sentence imposed by the trial court, and that

court’s clearly-stated unwillingness to consider any relief under Romero, Petitioner simply cannot

establish that the purported conflict between him and his trial counsel was of such a serious nature

that it constructively denied him the right of counsel under the Sixth Amendment at his sentencing

hearing. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1028. 

Because Petitioner did not suffer a constructive denial of counsel, he must then demonstrate

prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Schell, 218 F.3d at 1028. For the

reasons already described by the 5th DCA, he cannot do so. 

In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court

must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687; Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344,

346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,

requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the

“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish this, the

petitioner must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Id. at 688. The petitioner must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that

were not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id.; United

States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s

performance is highly deferential, and a court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687;

Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994).

Second, a petitioner must show prejudice, i.e., whether counsel’s errors were so egregious as

to deprive him of a fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. To

establish prejudice, petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 391. In so doing, the Court must also evaluate whether the entire trial was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza,

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In his colloquy with the trial judge at sentencing, Petitioner stated, “And based on [the conflict 1

of interest] I would request a Marsden to have a new attorney represent me at my judgment hearing....”

(RT 1731). Although Petitioner referred to the “judgment” hearing, it is clear from the context that he

is referring to the sentencing hearing, the only remaining court proceeding prior to his appeal.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 12

78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In this case, Petitioner has established neither prong of Strickland. First, he has not shown

that counsel’s performance at the sentencing hearing was deficient. Indeed, as the Court has already

indicated, counsel appears to have done everything a competent attorney reasonably could have done

to obtain a reduced sentence; indeed, under the constraints imposed by the Three Strikes sentencing

scheme, the sentence imposed by the trial court was virtually inevitable regardless of what counsel

did or did not do. This, in turn, leads to Petitioner’s second failure–to establish that it was

reasonably probable that but for any deficiency in trial counsel’s performance, a different outcome

would have resulted. In light of all the circumstances in this case, Petitioner cannot make such a

showing. 

 Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. 

C. Petitioner’s Claim Does Not Extend To Trial Issues.

In the documents supporting his petition, Petitioner argues that the conflict with trial counsel

affected the outcome of the trial. (Doc. 8, pp. 10-20). Petitioner contends that his attorney had

previously represented a prosecution witness, Brian Risinger, in another criminal matter, that his

attorney was aware of Risinger’s criminal record, and that he took it upon himself to notify the

prosecution of this fact, which, Petitioner argues, allowed the prosecution to take preemptive

measures to avoid having Risinger impeached at trial. (Id.). This issue, however, has not been

properly raised or exhausted and is not therefore before this Court. 

The issue raised in the state court and exhausted in the California Supreme Court was limited

to the state court’s denial of the Marsden motion for new counsel at sentencing. At no point in the 1

state court proceedings did Petitioner ever argue he was denied a hearing on a Marsden motion

regarding replacement of trial counsel during trial. Nor did he ever argue, in state trial court or on

appeal, the ineffective assistance of his counsel at trial. As mentioned previously, Respondent has

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expressly refused to waive exhaustion insofar as Petitioner’s claim extends beyond the sentencing

hearing. 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9th Cir. 1988). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest

state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal

court. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971);

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state

court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest

state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (factual basis), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v.

Taylor, 528 U.S. 362 (2000). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), as amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106

(9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state

remedies requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the state courts

in order to give the State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged

violations of the prisoners’ federal rights” (some internal quotation marks omitted). 

If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of

prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are

asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes

to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of

law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal

court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. 

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The Court concludes that Petitioner’s claim is limited to the effect of the state court denial of

a Marsden hearing for replacement of counsel at sentencing, that any extension or construction of

that argument to counsel’s performance at trial has never been presented to the state court and is

therefore unexhausted, and that therefore this Court need not consider the effect of the state court’s

determination on the trial itself or Petitioner’s counsel’s representation at trial. Simply put, such

considerations are not properly part of these habeas proceedings.

For the foregoing reasons, the state court’s decision was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim must be

rejected and his petition must be denied.

ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Court Doc. 1), is DENIED with prejudice. 

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 20, 2007 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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