Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN JONES, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL A. TOZZI et al.,

Defendants.

1:05-CV-0148 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

RE NUMEROUS OUTSTANDING

MOTIONS.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court for decision are several related motions: 

(1) Plaintiff’s motion re: the recusal of Magistrate Judge Dennis

L. Beck (2) Plaintiff’s motion to file a third amended complaint

alleging new claims against dismissed Defendant Leslie Jensen;

(3) Defendant John Hollenback’s motion to dismiss the operative

second amended complaint; (4) Defendant John Hollenback’s motion

to strike state law claims from the second amended complaint

pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute; (5) previously

dismissed defendant Leslie Jensen’s motion to strike state law

claims pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute; and (6) what

appears to be Plaintiff’s own motion to strike pursuant to the

anti-SLAPP statute.

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See Jones v. California, 1:04-CV-065676; Jones v. 1

Strangio, 1:04-CV-06567; and Jones v. Strangio, 1:05-CV-00410. 

2

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of a child custody dispute between

Plaintiff and Kea Chhay, the mother of Plaintiff’s minor child.

The case was first filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court,

but was later transferred to Stanislaus County. Additional

background concerning the state proceedings is set forth in

various memorandum opinions in this case and related cases.1

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on February 3, 2005. 

(Doc. 1.) Then, prior to the filing of any Defendant’s

responsive pleading, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on

March 3, 2005. (Doc. 7.) The first amended complaint named as

defendants: Michael A. Tozzi, the Executive Officer of

Stanislaus County Superior Court; Superior Court Judge Marie

Sovey-Silveria; and attorneys Leslie Jensen and John Holenback.

Defendants Tozzi and Silveria moved to dismiss on March 9,

2005. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff opposed this motion (Doc. 13, filed

Mar. 14, 2005), and moved for default judgment against defendants

Jensen and Hollenback. (Doc. 14, filed Mar. 14, 2005.) 

Plaintiff then (improperly) filed an additional “counter motion”

in opposition to Defendants Tozzi and Silveria’s motion to

dismiss, along with a motion to amend the complaint a second

time. (Doc. 16, filed Mar. 24, 2005.) Four days later, on March

28, 2005, Plaintiff lodged yet another “second amended complaint”

to “supercede” the second amended complaint that was attached to

his motion for leave to amend. (Doc. 19, filed Mar. 28, 2005.) 

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On March 18, 2005, an order issued dismissing Plaintiff’s

related case, Jones v. Strangio. (See Doc. 72, 1:04-cv-06567.) 

In light of that dismissal, the district court ordered Plaintiff

to show cause why this case should not be dismissed as well.

(Doc. 18, filed Mar. 29, 2005.) Plaintiff responded to the order

to show cause on April 20, 2005. (Doc. 29.) At the same time,

Plaintiff filed yet another (third) proposed amended complaint

intended to supercede the complaint lodged on March 28, 2005. 

(See Proposed “Second Amended Complaint” lodged Apr. 20, 2005.) 

This complaint contained numerous, entirely new, allegations that

Defendant Hollenback made racially derogatory remarks to

Plaintiff as part of a conspiracy to violate his constitutional

rights in contravention of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986. 

A memorandum decision and order, dated May 11, 2005,

dismissed all claims against Defendants Tozzi and Silveria on

immunity grounds, denied Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment

against Defendants Jensen and Hollenback, and denied Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to amend the complaint a second time. (Doc.

47.)

On June 22, 2005, Defendants Jensen and Hollenback’s motion

to dismiss was granted, affording Plaintiff one final opportunity

to amend the complaint. (Doc. 61.) A separate memorandum

decision, dated June 29, 2005, denied Plaintiff’s April 9, 2005

motion for sanctions. (Doc. 65.) On July 6, 2005, Plaintiff

voluntarily dismissed Defendant Jensen from the case. (Doc. 66.) 

Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint alleging that

Defendant Hollenback made racially derogatory remarks to

Plaintiff with the goal of deterring Plaintiff’s participation in

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legal proceedings related to Plaintiff’s family law case. (See

Doc. 67, filed July 6, 2005.

Defendant Hollenback moved to dismiss the second amended

complaint on a variety of grounds. (Doc. 78, filed Sept. 8,

2005.) Defendant Hollenback also moved for sanctions, alleging

that Plaintiff made false statements in his amended complaint. 

(Doc. 91, filed Sept. 27, 2005.) Both motions were denied. 

(Doc. 103.) 

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 104,

filed Oct. 31, 2005.) Defendant failed to timely file an

opposition. The court then issued a warning to Defendant about a

litigant’s obligation to file an opposition or statement of nonopposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing pursuant

to Local Rule 78-230(c). (Doc. 118.) Defendant filed a proposed

opposition along with a request for leave to late-file the

opposition. (Doc. 120, filed Dec. 5, 2005.) Plaintiff objected

to granting Defendant leave to file this opposition and submitted

that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Docs. 115,

116, 119, 128 & 129.) Plaintiff continued to insist on a speedy

trial.

A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held

December 12, 2005. The district court granted Defendant’s

request to late file-his opposition and denied Plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment, but granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

amend the complaint to add state law claims. (Doc. 185, filed

February 15, 2006.) 

Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on February 8,

2006. (Doc. 182.) The second amended complaint alleges that

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5

Defendant Hollenback became involved in Plaintiff’s family law

dispute in December 2003 as counsel for Ms. Chhay. (Doc. 67 at

¶44.) Plaintiff filed contempt charges against Ms. Chhay in

early 2004 to enforce a court order. (Id. at ¶ 45.) Plaintiff

alleges that on April 22, 2004, Defendant Hollenback told

Plaintiff that he “called the Stanislaus County Housing Authority

and told them what a lazy low-life black piece of shit you

are...you get nigger justice.” (Id. at ¶ 47.) Plaintiff also

alleges that “after the child support trial and out of court”

Defendant Hollenback stated that “he would knock the teeth out of

his black greasy face...and rattle them out of his jive-monkey

ass if he showed up for the contempt hearings.” (Id. at ¶48.) 

Plaintiff asserts that “as a direct and proximate cause of the

defendant’s threats, [he] withdrew [the] contempt charges....” 

(Id. at ¶ 51.) The complaint further alleges that the statute of

limitations on the contempt charges expired in July 2004. (Id.

at ¶ 54.) As a result, “Mr. Jones’ access to the judicial system

was deprived.” (Id.)

The complaint alleges that Defendant’s conduct deprived

Plaintiff of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in

seven different ways. Specifically, Defendant:

(1) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to sue on

account of his race and ethnicity”;

(2) deprived Plaintiff of his federal right to enforce

contracts on account of his race and ethnicity”;

(3) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to be a party

to proceedings on account of his race and ethnicity”;

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(4) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to give

evidence at proceedings on account of his race and

ethnicity”;

(5) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to full

benefit of proceedings on account of his race and

ethnicity”;

(6) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to equal

benefit of all proceedings on account of his race and

ethnicity”; and

(7) deprived Plaintiff of his “federal right to equal

benefit of all laws on account of his race and

ethnicity.”

(Id. at ¶64-77 (emphasis added).) 

The second amended complaint also included a number of state

law claims:

Count 8: Slander Per Se 

Counts 9-11: Intentional Interference with

Contractual Relations

Counts 12-14: Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress

Counts 15-22: Negligent Infliction of Emotional

Distress

Plaintiff included Leslie Jensen as a defendant in many of the

claims in the second amended complaint, without first obtaining

leave to reinstate Leslie Jensen as a defendant.

Plaintiff at one point presented an affidavit from his

mother, Rosalind Jones. (Doc. 108.) Ms. Jones’s statements in

the affidavit corroborate Plaintiff’s accusations that Hollenback

made racially derogatory statements to Plaintiff. (Id. at 3.) 

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7

Defendant sought to conduct further discovery regarding Ms.

Jones’ statements and to depose her. Throughout December 2005

and January 2006, the parties engaged in discovery disputes over

the method, timing, and circumstances of any such discovery. As

is the normal practice in this district, these discovery disputes

were heard before a United States Magistrate Judge, in this case

Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck. After a hearing on February 3,

2006, Judge Beck issued an order denying Plaintiff’s motion for a

protective order and granting Defendant’s motion to compel Ms.

Jones to participate in an oral deposition. (Doc. 181, filed

February 8, 2006.) Shortly after the adverse rulings, Plaintiff

moved to recuse Judge Beck from participating in this case. (See

Doc. 179.)

A few weeks after filing his second amended complaint,

Plaintiff moved yet again for leave to amend, again alleging both

federal and state law claims against both Hollenback and Jensen.

(See Doc. 190, third amended complaint, filed Feb. 22, 2006.) 

Defendant Hollenback moves to dismiss all the claims in the

second amended complaint. (Docs. 191 & 2.) Defendant Jensen

objects to being reinstated as a defendant. (Doc. 209.) Both

Defendants move to strike all of the state law claims pursuant to

California’s anti-SLAPP statute. (Docs 194 & 197.) Plaintiff,

in a series of confusingly organized documents, appears to (1)

oppose the motions to dismiss and to strike and (2) assert his

own anti-SLAPP motion to strike. 

//

//

//

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8

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss.

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a court

must “take all of the allegations of material fact stated in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party.” Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979,

983 (9th Cir. 2002). In general, “a pro se complaint will be

liberally construed and will be dismissed only if it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). However, “a liberal

interpretation of a [pro se] complaint may not supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Id. 

B. Motion to Strike.

Both Hollenback and Jensen move to strike the state law

claims against them under California’s “Anti-SLAPP” statute,

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, which provides

in relevant part:

A cause of action against a person arising from

any act of that person in furtherance of the

person’s right of petition or free speech under

the United States or California Constitution in

connection with a public issue shall be subject to

a special motion to strike, unless the court

determines that the plaintiff has established that

there is a probability that the plaintiff will

prevail on the claim.

***

As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a

person’s right of petition or free speech under

the United States or California Constitution in

connection with a public issue” includes: 

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(1) any written or oral statement or writing

made before a legislative, executive, or

judicial proceeding, or any other official

proceeding authorized by law; 

(2) any written or oral statement or writing

made in connection with an issue under

consideration or review by a legislative,

executive, or judicial body, or any other

official proceeding authorized by law; 

(3) any written or oral statement or writing

made in a place open to the public or a

public forum in connection with an issue of

public interest; 

(4) or any other conduct in furtherance of

the exercise of the constitutional right of

petition or the constitutional right of free

speech in connection with a public issue or

an issue of public interest.

Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 425.16(b)(1) & (e)(emphasis added). 

A court considering a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP

statute must engage in a two-part inquiry. First, a defendant

must make an initial prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s

suit “aris[es] from” activity protected by the anti-SLAPP

statute. Brill Media Co. v. TCW Group, Inc., 132 Cal. App. 4th

324, 329 (2005); Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 425.16(b)(1). In

performing this analysis, the California Supreme Court has

stressed, “the critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of

action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the

defendant’s right of petition or free speech.” City of Cotati v.

Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 78 (2002) (emphasis in original).

If the defendant is able to make this threshold showing, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of

prevailing on the challenged claims. In practice, a plaintiff

must show that the claim is “both legally sufficient and

supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain

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a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff

is credited.” Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal. 4th

728, 744 (2003). Claims which satisfy this burden are “not

subject to being stricken as a SLAPP.” Id.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Recuse Magistrate Judge Beck.

Plaintiff moves to have Magistrate Judge Beck removed from

participation in this case. Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. § 455,

which requires any judge or magistrate judge of the United states

to “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” § 455 (emphasis

added). Specifically, Plaintiff concludes that Magistrate Judge

Beck has expressed a “self-proclaimed bias” in favor of defense

counsel. The only ground provided by Plaintiff to show the

nature of this “self-proclaimed bias” is Plaintiff’s suggestion

that “Magistrate [Judge] Beck appeared to state on [the] record

his long term relationship with the law offices of McCormick,

Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth LLP.” (Doc. 206,

“Clarification of Doc. 179 - Extrajudicial Bias.”) No evidence

of any relationship between Magistrate Judge Beck and the

McCormick law firm is provided. Nor is a transcript excerpt of

such an alleged “statement” furnished by Plaintiff. An adverse

ruling against a party does not provide a basis for recusal of a

judge. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994).

Plaintiff had no issues with Magistrate Judge Beck until rulings

adverse to Plaintiff were made. Plaintiff has provided no

evidence of a basis to disqualify Magistrate Judge Beck. 

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B. Previously Dismissed Defendant Jensen’s Objection to

Being Named in the Operative Second Amended Complaint.

On January 24, 2006, Plaintiff sought leave of court to

amend his complaint to add state law claims against defendant

Hollenback. No mention was made in this request for leave to

rejoin previously dismissed Defendant Leslie Jensen, nor of

Plaintiff’s desire to re-assert claims against her. At oral

argument on January 30, 2006, the district court indicated intent

to grant Plaintiff leave to amend pursuant to his request, with

the understanding that the time for trial would be delayed. (I

Doc. 185 at 14, Memorandum decision filed February 15, 2006.) On

February 8, 2006, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint

setting forth not only additional claims against Defendant

Hollenback, but also purporting to assert new federal and state

law claims against Ms. Jensen. (See Doc. 182 at 22.) Jensen

objects and moves to strike any allegations in the second amended

complaint against her. (Doc. 209, filed March 16, 2006.) 

The amendment of pleadings is governed by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(a), which provides:

 A party may amend the party's pleading once as a

matter of course at any time before a responsive

pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which

no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has

not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may

so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is

served. Otherwise a party may amend the party's

pleading only by leave of court or by written consent

of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given

when justice so requires....

Leave to amend should be “freely given,” “[i]n the absence of any

apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to

cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

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prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

178, 182 (1962). 

Here, although Plaintiff obtained leave of court to file

additional claims against Defendant Hollenback, he never obtained

such leave to rejoin the previously dismissed Defendant Jensen.

He made no motion to explain why his prior dismissal of Jensen

should not be binding. Leave to amend may be denied where a

party unduly delays alleging facts or legal theories of which he

or she was previously aware. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Southwest

Marine, 194 F.3d 1009, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, Plaintiff

now seeks to assert (for the first time) that Jensen also made

racially derogatory remarks toward Plaintiff, an allegation he

has never mentioned in the almost two years that this dispute has

been pending. It is inconceivable that Plaintiff has not had

full knowledge of any such facts for over two years. Plaintiff

has been afforded multiple opportunities to amend the complaint. 

No explanation is provided why the claim has never been advanced. 

A district court has discretion to deny leave to amend under such

circumstances. Mir v. Fosburg, 646 F.2d 342, 347 (9th Cir.

1980). Unjustified delay, unjustified failure to ever mention

this purported claim, unjustified failure to allege the claim

while Jensen was a party to the case are all grounds to deny

leave to rejoin Jensen as a defendant. 

Previously dismissed Defendant Jensen’s motion to strike her

status as a defendant is GRANTED.

//

//

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C. Plaintiff’s motion to file a third amended complaint.

On February 16, 2006, Plaintiff moved again to amend the

complaint. (Doc. 187; Doc. 217, Corrected Proposed Third Amended

Complaint.) Plaintiff has been warned in the past that his

practice of filing multiple complaints unfairly creates a moving

target for opposing parties and necessary burdens on an overtaxed

court. Defendants are entitled to have their motions to dismiss

and to strike heard as to the second amended complaint. 

Plaintiff has provided no explanation as to why he could not have

included information contained in the third amended complaint in

the previously-filed second amended complaint. This is in

substance the fifth time Plaintiff has endeavored to alter the

facts of his lawsuit. Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a

third amended complaint is DENIED.

D. Hollenbak’s Motion to Dismiss: The Federal Claim Under

42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint relies upon 42 U.S.C. §

1981 to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant

Hollenback moves to dismiss this allegation on the ground that

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under section 1981.

Section 1981 provides: 

(a) Statement of equal rights.

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United

States shall have the same right in every State and

Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be

parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal

benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of

persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,

and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,

penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every

kind, and to no other.

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(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined

For purposes of this section, the term "make and

enforce contracts" includes the making, performance,

modification, and termination of contracts, and the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and

conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment

The rights protected by this section are protected

against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination

and impairment under color of State law.

42 U.S.C. § 1981. This provision prohibits private individuals

as well as state actors from discriminating against an individual

on the basis of his or her race with respect to that individual’s

right “to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and

equal benefit of all laws...” See General Bldg. Contractors

Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). 

In order to establish a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must

establish that (1) he or she is a member of a racial minority;

(2) the defendant intended to discriminate against plaintiff on

the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or

more of the activities enumerated in the statute (i.e., the right

to make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence,

etc.).” Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., 7 F.3d

1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993); see Green v. State Bar of Tex., 27

F.3d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff continues to suggest that his section 1981 clam

may rest on deprivations separate and distinct from those founded

on contract. For example, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Hollenback’s actions deprived him of his federal right “to sue,”

“to be a party to proceedings,” “to give evidence at proceedings”

“to full benefit of proceedings,”“to equal benefit of all

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proceedings,” and “to equal benefit of all laws” on account of

Plaintiff’s race and ethnicity. (See Compl. at ¶¶64-77.) But,

section 1981 has not been construed as a “general proscription of

racial discrimination...” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491

U.S. 164, 176 (1989). Its reach has been limited and interpreted

to prohibit discrimination “only in the making and enforcement of

contracts.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Georgia v. Rachel,

384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966) ("The legislative history of the 1866

Act clearly indicates that Congress intended to protect a limited

category of rights").

In this respect, [Section 1981] prohibits

discrimination that infects the legal process in ways

that prevent one from enforcing contract rights, by

reason of his or her race, and this is so whether this

discrimination is attributed to a statute or simply to

existing practices. It also covers wholly private

efforts to impede access to the courts or obstruct

nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes about the

force of binding obligations, as well as discrimination

by private entities, such as labor unions, in enforcing

the terms of a contract.

Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177. The Supreme Court emphasized in

Patterson that “one cannot seriously contend that the grant of

the other rights enumerated in § 1981 [that is, other than the

right to make contracts,] i.e., the rights to sue, be parties,

give evidence, and enforce contracts' accomplishes anything other

than the removal of legal disabilities to sue, be a party,

testify or enforce a contract. Indeed, it is impossible to give

such language any other meaning.” Id. at 178. The Supreme Court

recently reiterated that “a plaintiff cannot state a claim under

§ 1981 unless he has (or would have) rights under [an] existing

(or proposed) contract that he wishes ‘to make and enforce.’” 

Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 126 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 (2006).

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Plaintiff argues that the merits of the section 1981

2

claim have been addressed by the district court and suggests that

this motion to dismiss is therefore not properly before the

court. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, although

Defendants did previously challenge the sufficiency of the § 1981

claim, they did so in response to a previously-filed complaint.

Plaintiff subsequently moved for and was granted leave to amend. 

Upon the filing of an amended complaint, Defendant is entitled to

file new Rule 12 motions. Second, the sufficiency of the § 1981

claim was never completely resolved by the district court. 

Specific questions were raised as to whether the custody and

visitation document constituted a contract covered by § 1981. 

(See Doc. 185 at 11.) 

16

Plaintiff continues to insist that bringing the contempt

proceeding in state court against Ms. Chhey was an effort to

enforce a family law visitation “contract” between Plaintiff and

Ms. Chhey. Doubt has previously been expressed as to whether

imposing liability under section 1981 is appropriate in this

case. The legal issue has not been squarely raised or adequately

addressed by any party in any prior proceeding. Defendant now 2

challenges the sufficiency of the complaint on the ground that

the family law visitation agreement is not a contract. 

In California, a contract is defined as an agreement to do

or not to do a particular thing. Cal. Civ. Code § 1549. In

order for a contract to exit, (1) there must be two or more

parties capable of contracting, (2) they must consent, (3) to a

lawful object, and (4) there must be “sufficient cause or

consideration.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1550. 

//

//

//

//

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The header for the document in question provides as follows:

Melvin Jones, Jr. vs. Kea Chhay 

Petitioner Respondent

Case # 285954 Hearing Date: December 10, 2002

This order applies to the following minor child:

Lauren Jones DOB 9/01/97

(Doc. 193-2 at 3 (page 1 of 5 of the document). The first

paragraph provides:

1. The following custody and visitation orders are

imposed by the Court based upon the agreement of

the parties. This order shall supersede all prior

orders. 

(Id.) The subsequent five pages of text contain various

provisions pertaining to the custody and visitation arrangement. 

Plaintiff relies heavily on the fact that the first paragraph

contains the language “based upon the agreement of the parties.” 

This, Plaintiff suggests, is evidence that the document is a

contract. Hollenback objects that the “findings and order” that

constituted the custody/visitation agreement in no way depends on

the parties’ mutual consent to the custody arrangement and its

related provisions. 

Even assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s assertion that the

order was based upon an agreement between Plaintiff and Chhay,

that agreement was reduced to an order of the family court. Once

the order was entered, any agreement was merged in the order and

a party can no longer bring a breach of contract action to

enforce the agreement. The only remedy is by way of a contempt

proceeding. See In re Marriage of Lane, 165 Cal. App. 3d 1143,

1148 (1985)(“[A]s to orders made and not complied with, the

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Plaintiff correctly notes that a civil rights plaintiff

3

is not required to plead facts in support of each of the prima

facie elements of a claim of discrimination. Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002). However, Swierkiewicz does not

shield Plaintiff entirely from a motion to dismiss based on the

facts actually pled in the complaint. A court may nevertheless

dismiss a complaint “if it is clear that no relief could be

granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent

with the allegations.” See id. at 506. 

18

[aggrieved party] should enforce her rights via contempt or

execution and not by way of a breach of contract cause of

action.”); see also In re Marriage of Lynn, 101 Cal. App. 4th

120, 130 (2002)(where marital settlement agreement is merged into

a judgment of dissolution, “it ceases to have any independent

legal significance [and] the parties’ rights and obligations are

governed by the judgment alone.”). Under the doctrine of merger,

the “contract” has been merged into the order which governs the

parties’ rights and obligations. 

Plaintiff’s conduct admits this, as he was in the process of

prosecuting a contempt action when the alleged racially

derogatory remarks were purportedly made. As additional support

for his contention that the custody and visitation order is not a

contract, Hollenback points out that such orders are modifiable

at any time by the court if such modification would serve the

best interest of the child. 

The visitation and custody order is not a contract.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s efforts to “enforce” the order are not

protected by section 1981. Defendant Hollenback’s motion to

dismiss the 1981 claim is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. 

3

The only conceivable basis for Plaintiff’s claim for private

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The first clause of § 1985(2) applies only to conduct 4

tending influence participation in federal court proceedings:

If two or more persons in any State or Territory

conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat,

any party or witness in any court of the United States

from attending such court, or from testifying to any

matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully,

or to injure such party or witness in his person or

property on account of his having so attended or

testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or

indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such

court, or to injure such juror in his person or

property on account of any verdict, presentment, or

indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being

or having been such juror...

(emphasis added).

19

party racial discrimination is section 1985. As previously

explained in general terms to Plaintiff (see Doc. 47 at 16-17),

section 1985 prohibits several forms of conspiracies to deprive

individuals of the rights and privileges held by a citizen of the

United States. Under the facts currently pled, the second clause

of sub-section 1985(2), “Obstructing justice; intimidating party,

witness, or juror,” appears to be applicable:

...if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of

impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any

manner, the due course of justice in any State or

Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal

protection of the laws, or to injure him or his

property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to

enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons,

to the equal protection of the laws [an action for

damages exists];

42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). 

4

The elements of a cause of action under this clause of

section 1985(2) are: (1) that defendants (or defendant and nondefendant co-conspirators) conspired, (2) for the purpose of

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depriving any person of equal protection of the laws, (3) that

defendant(s) acted in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) that

Plaintiff was injured or deprived of a civil right. Griffen v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-103 (1971). In addition, because

this clause requires “intent to deny to any citizen the equal

protection of the laws,” Plaintiff must set forth an allegation

of “class-based animus.” See Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,

1029 (1985)(applying the class based animus standard from Kush v.

Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983) to the second clause of § 1985(2)).

In other words, Plaintiff must allege that he was denied access

to a state court proceeding because of his membership in a

protected class. Plaintiffs currently operative complaint

contains such an allegation. 

Critically, section 1985(2) only applies to conspiracies. 

In the Ninth Circuit, conspiracy claims are subject to a

heightened pleading standard. To survive a motion to dismiss a

conspiracy allegation requires more than a conclusory accusations

that Defendant conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his civil

rights. In other words, bare allegations that one defendant

"conspired" with another are insufficient. See Harris v.

Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Buckey v. County

of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Woodrum v.

Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather,

"[t]o state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one's

constitutional rights under section 1983, the plaintiff must

state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed

conspiracy." Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th

Cir. 1989); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

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Plaintiff has in the past and continues to attempt to 5

state a claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which provides for

recovery of damages against persons who, having the knowledge and

power to do so, fail to prevent the commission of a conspiracy

pursuant to § 1985. Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim under

§ 1986 unless there is also a valid claim under § 1985. Mollnow

v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1983).

21

679 n.6 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that plaintiffs must allege facts

which are "specific and concrete enough to enable the defendants

to prepare a response, and where appropriate, a motion for

summary judgment based on qualified immunity." Plaintiff may

meet the heightened pleading standard by alleging "which

defendants conspired, how they conspired and now the conspiracy

led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights...." Harris,

126 F.3d at 1196. Thus far, Plaintiff has failed to meet this

burden. 

5

Plaintiff will be afforded one final opportunity to amend to

assert section 1985 and 1986 claims against Defendant Hollenback. 

E. Hollenback’s Motion to Dismiss: the State Law Claims.

A validly asserted federal claim is a prerequisite to the

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.

Defendant Hollenback argues that all of the state law claims

should be dismissed on a variety of grounds.

1. Defendant’s argument that all state-law claims are

barred by the litigation privilege.

California Civil Code § 47(b) provides in pertinent part.

A privileged publication or broadcast is one made:

(a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.

(b) In any...(2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other

official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in

the initiation or course of any other proceeding

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authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to

Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title

1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except

as follows:

(1) An allegation or averment contained in

any pleading or affidavit filed in an action

for marital dissolution or legal separation

made of or concerning a person by or against

whom no affirmative relief is prayed in the

action shall not be a privileged publication

or broadcast as to the person making the

allegation or averment within the meaning of

this section unless the pleading is verified

or affidavit sworn to, and is made without

malice, by one having reasonable and probable

cause for believing the truth of the

allegation or averment and unless the

allegation or averment is material and

relevant to the issues in the action.

***

(c) In a communication, without malice, to a person

interested therein, (1) by one who is also

interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a

relation to the person interested as to afford a

reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the

communication to be innocent, or (3) who is

requested by the person interested to give the

information....

The most relevant portion of section 47 is subsection b, which

provides absolute privilege for any “publication or broadcast”

made in any judicial proceeding. California courts have given

this privilege an “expansive reach.” Rubin v. Green, 4 Cal. 4th

1187, 1193-94 (1993). It extends to any communication that bears

“some relation to any ongoing or anticipated lawsuit.” Id. at

1194. The privilege also applies to a wide range of causes of

action. The California Supreme Court noted “the only exception

to [the application of [section 47(b) to tort suits has been for

malicious prosecution.” Id. The California courts have applied

the privilege to claims of abuse of process, Pollock v. Univ. of

So. Cal., 112 Cal. App. 4th 1416 (2003), fraud, Carden v.

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Getzoff, 190 Cal App. 3d 907 (1987), invasion of privacy, Ribas

v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 364 (1985), and interference with

contract, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal.

3d 1118 (1990).

Critically, the privilege only applies to communicative

acts, not noncommunicative conduct. Rubin, 4 Cal. 4th at 1195-

96. For example, an attorney’s act of counseling his or her

client is covered, even if it is alleged that the attorney made

misrepresentations during the course of such communications. Id. 

However, pure conduct, such as eavesdropping, is not covered. 

Id. 

Under certain circumstances, section 47 is only applicable

if communications are made “without malice.” The “without

malice” language is used twice in section 47. It first applies

as an exception to the litigation privilege for certain

communications made during the course of “marital dissolution or

legal separation.” See Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b)(1). It appears

again in section 47(c), which provides:

A privileged publication or broadcast is one made:

In a communication, without malice, to a person

interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested,

or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the

person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for

supposing the motive for the communication to be

innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person

interested to give the information.

(emphasis added). Subsection (c) operates to protect against

liability for communications made outside the context of

litigation (i.e., statements that would not qualify for

protection under subsection (b)). The statute gives an example

of such a communication:

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This subdivision applies to and includes a

communication concerning the job performance or

qualifications of an applicant for employment, based

upon credible evidence, made without malice, by a

current or former employer of the applicant to, and

upon request of, one whom the employer reasonably

believes is a prospective employer of the applicant.

Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c). With respect to communications falling

under the scope of subsection (c), the privilege only applies in

the absence of evidence of malice. Neither of these exceptions

applies here. The “without malice” language is inapplicable. 

Defendant Hollenback contends that the alleged derogatory

statements that form the basis of all of Plaintiff’s claims,

which were uttered in the context of a judicial or quasi judicial

proceeding, were therefore made in furtherance of Ms. Chhay’s

litigation goals, and, thus, are privileged under California law. 

No cases have been located which address whether the

litigation privilege applies under the alleged circumstances

presented here. The general rule is that the litigation

privilege applies where a particular communication is “logically

related” to a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.” Silberg v.

Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 219-20 (1990). See Mann v. Quality Old

Time Serv., Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th 90, 108 (2004) (privilege

does not apply to allegedly defamatory statements made to a

corporation’s customers because there was no evidence that the

statements had “any relationship” to a judicial proceeding or

related investigation). 

The connection or logical relation which a

communication must bear to litigation in order for the

privilege to apply, is a functional connection. That is

to say, the communicative act...must function as a

necessary or useful step in the litigation process and

must serve its purposes. This is a very different thing

from saying that the communication's content need only

be related in some way to the subject matter of the

litigation.... 

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And as for furthering the objects of the

litigation,...[this is] satisfied only by

communications which function intrinsically, and apart

from any consideration of the speaker's intent, to

advance a litigant's case. Notably...A party's

pleadings obviously satisfy this test.

Kashian v. Harriman, 98 Cal. App. 4th 892, 920-21 (2002)(internal

citations and quotations omitted). 

One California case has addressed somewhat similar factual

circumstances. In Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal. App. 4th 577

(1999), a number of parties were litigating before a particular

state court judge. Pursuant to a court order, the parties were

participating in a settlement conference in the courthouse,

apparently in the presence of the presiding judge. During the

lunch hour, the parties continued to work on developing a

settlement. Some participants were gathered in the hallway when,

according to one of the parties, the judge suddenly burst into

the hall “pointing his finger” at a party, “angrily yelling that

[the parties’] settlement demand was ‘bullshit,’ and, if they

thought there was money in the case, they had ‘shit for brains.’” 

Id. at 187. Applying the litigation privilege contained within

section 47(b)(2), the Soliz court found that the judge was

absolutely immune from damages for the remarks made in the

hallway. 

The facts as alleged here are similar to those in Soliz. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made racially derogatory

statements to him in the hallway of the courthouse.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant said he had

“called the Stanislaus County Housing Authority and told them

what a lazy low-life black piece of shit you are...you get nigger

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justice.” (Id. at ¶ 47.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant

Hollenback stated that “he would knock the teeth out of his black

greasy face...and rattle them out of his jive-monkey ass if he

showed up for the contempt hearings.” (Id. at ¶48.) Plaintiff

asserts that “as a direct and proximate cause of the defendant’s

threats, [he] withdrew [the] contempt charges....” The

statements, if true, are certainly reprehensible, but are also

connected to the litigation. The first statement suggests that

Defendant called a county housing agency and made derogatory

statements to the agency concerning Plaintiff. Such

communications between Hollenback and the county housing agency

are arguably connected to the child custody dispute and serve the

purpose of furthering Ms. Chhay’s interests to show Plaintiff was

not a suitable custodial parent. Similarly, the second statement

-- the alleged threat to “rattle” out Plaintiff’s teeth if he

showed up for the contempt proceeding, is also logically

connected to the child custody dispute as it seeks to deter

Plaintiff from participating in the custody and contempt

proceeding. The litigation privilege bars all state law claims

based upon these statements. 

Plaintiff asserts that the alleged derogatory statements in

this case cannot be covered by the litigation privilege because

they were unlawful. This is a logical assertion, but is contrary

to the law:

[C]ommunications made in connection with litigation do

not necessarily fall outside the privilege simply

because they are, or are alleged to be, fraudulent,

perjurious, unethical, or even illegal. This is

assuming, of course, that the communications are

"logically related" to the litigation.

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Kashian, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 921. Hollenback’s alleged

statements were made to influence the housing authority’s

decision about availability of housing. The alleged threat to

deter Plaintiff from participating in the contempt proceeding

also directly concerns the family law court case.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss all of the state law claims

pursuant to the litigation privilege is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. Count 8 - Slander Per Se and the Statute of

Limitations.

Even if the litigation privilege did not bar all of the

state law claims, the statute of limitations would bar

Plaintiff’s slander per se cause of action. The statute of

limitations for a slander action is one year. Cal. Code Civ.

Pro. § 340(c). Under limited circumstances, the one year time

limit does not begin to run until plaintiff discovers, or with

reasonable diligence should discover, all of the facts

constituting the action. This exception only applies, however,

if the defamation was committed in an inherently secretive

manner. See Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal. 4th 1230, 1248-50

(2003). 

Here, according to Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant

Hollenback made the allegedly defamatory statements directly to

Plaintiff on April 22, 2004. The notice imparted by such words

was immediate. There is no basis to apply the delayed discovery

rule to extend the statute of limitations beyond one year. 

Plaintiff did not file his defamation claim until February 8,

2006, more than one year after he became aware of the statement. 

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The defamation claim is time-barred.

Defendant Hollenback’s motion to dismiss the slander per se

claim on statute of limitations grounds is GRANTED WITH PREJUDCE.

3. Counts 9-11 - Intentional Interference with

Contractual Relations.

Counts nine through eleven of Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint allege that Defendant Hollenback intentionally

interfered with Plaintiff’s contractual relations. The elements

of a cause of action for intentional interference with

contractual relations are: (1) A valid contract; (2) defendant’s

knowledge of the contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts

designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual

relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual

relationship; and (5) resulting damage. Quelimane Co. v Stewart

Title Guaranty Co., 19 Cal. 4th 26, 55 (1998); Pac. Gas & Elec.

Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1126 (1990). As

discussed above, the findings and order regarding

custody/visitation is not a contract. Moreover, representing an

adverse party in a dispute over a contested custody case that

produced a visitation agreement that merged into a court order

left no “contract” with which to interfere. Defendant

Hollenback’s motion to dismiss counts nine through eleven must be

GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. 

//

//

//

//

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4. Counts 12-14 - Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress.

Counts twelve through fourteen of the second amended

complaint allege that Hollenback’s conduct constitutes

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The elements of

this claim are (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2)

defendant’s intentional act causing (or reckless disregard of the

probability of causing) severe or extreme emotional distress; and

(4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by

defendant’s outrageous conduct. See Hernandez v. Gen. Adjustment

Bureau, 199 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1007 (1988). Ordinarily, mere

profanity, obscenity, abuse, indignity, insult or threats,

without aggravating circumstances, is not sufficiently

outrageous. Yurick v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116,

1128-29 (1989). However, there is authority that suggests some

kinds of statements, if sufficiently outrageous or if uttered by

a person in a particular position vis-a-vis the complainant, may

satisfy the outrageousness requirement. 

On the spectrum of offensive conduct, outrageous

conduct is that which is the most extremely offensive.

Depending on the idiosyncracies of the plaintiff,

offensive conduct which falls along the remainder of

the spectrum may be irritating, insulting or even

distressing but it is not actionable and must simply be

endured without resort to legal redress....

...The extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct may

arise not so much from what is done as from abuse by

the defendant of some relation or position which gives

the defendant actual or apparent power to damage the

plaintiff's interests.

Id. at 1129. Whether a particular statement is sufficiently

outrageous is a question of fact best decided on summary judgment

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Defendant makes an alternative argument for dismissal 6

concerning the harm element. Specifically, Defendant points out

that Plaintiff’s only claim of harm is that Defendant’s conduct

impacted his custody/visitation “contract.” Defendant argues

that, because there was no “contract,” there can be no such harm.

This is an overly restrictive reading of Plaintiff’s complaint.

Whether the custody and visitation order is viewed as a contract

or an order, Plaintiff’s inability to pursue his rights under it

has the potential to cause him harm.

30

or at trial. See id. at 1128 (“[T]he standard for judging

outrageous conduct does not provide a ‘bright line’ rigidly

separating that which is actionable from that which is not.

Indeed, its generality hazards a case-by-case appraisal of

conduct filtered through the prism of the appraiser's values,

sensitivity threshold, and standards of civility.”). Plaintiff’s

complaint satisfies the liberal notice pleading standard of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 with respect to the issue of

outrageousness. Racially discriminatory remarks as alleged

satisfy the outrageousness requirement. However, as discussed

above, this claim and all the other state law claims must be

dismissed because the underlying conduct is protected by the

litigation privilege. Moreover, Defendants argue that this and 6

the other claims are subject to California’s anti-SLAPP statute,

the application of which would require a more stringent measure

of proof than normally required by Rule 8. The negligent

infliction of emotional distress claim is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

//

//

//

//

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5. Counts 15-22 - Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress. 

Counts 15-22 allege that Defendant’s actions constituted

negligent infliction of emotional distress. Under California

law, this is not a separate tort, but rather permits the recovery

of emotional distress damages in the context of an otherwise

valid negligence claim. To establish a negligence claim,

plaintiff must show that (1) defendant owed him a duty of care,

(2) defendant breached that duty, and (3) the breach caused him

(4) damages. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic,

Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 588 (1989). Here, Plaintiff has not pled

the fundamental elements of a negligence claim, nor does it

appear that he could do so, as Defendant Hollenback never has

been in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff nor is there any

suggestion that Hollenback otherwise would owe Plaintiff a duty

of care that would form the basis of a negligence claim. 

Attorneys do not owe any duty of care to adverse third parties in

a litigation. Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 178

(1979); Parnell v. Smart, 66 Cal. App. 3d 833, 837-38 (1977). 

Moreover, the conduct alleged is intentional and wholly

inconsistent with a negligence claim.

6. Defendant’s Argument that All of Plaintiff’s State

Law Claims Are Barred by Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §

340.6.

Defendant offers the additional argument that all of the

state law claims raised in this case are barred by the statute of

limitations contained within California Code of Civil Procedure §

340.6(a), which provides, in pertinent part:

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An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or

omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the

performance of professional services shall be commenced

within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or

through the use of reasonable diligence should have

discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or

omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful

act or omission, whichever occurs first.

Defendant suggests that this provision is not limited to causes

of action against an attorney by the attorney’s client. In

Knoell v. Petrovich, 76 Cal. App. 4th 164 (1999), a California

court refused to permit a third party (i.e., a non-client) to

invoke this provision to toll the statute of limitations in a

defamation action. Defendant attempts to distinguish Knoell, but

cites no cases in support of his interpretation of the provision. 

In light of Knoell and the fact that Plaintiff’s claims can be

dismissed or stricken on other grounds, § 340.6 does not apply to

the circumstances of this case. 

In sum, all of Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. 

F. Defendants’ Jensen and Hollenback’s Motions to Strike

Pursuant to California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute. 

As discussed above, all of Plaintiff’s state law claims have

been dismissed on various grounds. Accordingly, Defendants’

motions to strike pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP Statute are

DENIED AS MOOT. Arguendo, the following general discussion of

application of the anti-SLAPP statute is provided. 

//

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//

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1. Legal Background on California’s Anti-SLAPP

Statute. 

A court considering a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP

statute must engage in a two-part inquiry. First, a defendant

must make an initial prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s

suit “aris[es] from” activity protected by the anti-SLAPP

statute. Brill Media, 132 Cal. App. 4th at 329; Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. § 425.16(b)(1). A cause of action does not “arise from”

protected activity simply because it is filed after protected

activity took place. Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th at 76-77. Nor does

the fact “[t]hat a cause of action arguably may have been

triggered by protected activity” necessarily mean that it arises

from such activity. Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th at 78. The trial court

must instead focus on the substance of the plaintiff’s lawsuit in

analyzing the first prong of a special motion to strike. Scott

v. Metabolife Intern., Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 404, 413-414

(2004); see also Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th at 78. In performing this

analysis, the California Supreme Court has stressed, “the

critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself

was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of

petition or free speech.” Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th at 78 (emphasis

in original). In other words, “the defendant’s act underlying

the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in

furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.” Id. 

If the defendant is able to make this threshold showing, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of

prevailing on the challenged claims. In practice, a plaintiff

must show that the claim is “both legally sufficient and

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supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain

a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff

is credited.” Jarrow, 31 Cal. 4th at 738. Claims for which

Plaintiff is able to satisfy this burden are “not subject to

being stricken as a SLAPP.”

2. Application to the Claims in this Case.

The burden-shifting of the anti-SLAPP statute must be

applied to any “publication or broadcast” made in any judicial

proceeding. California courts have given this privilege an

“expansive reach.” Rubin, 4 Cal. 4th at 1193-94. It extends to

any communication that bears “some relation to any ongoing or

anticipated lawsuit.” Id. at 1194. 

The alleged derogatory statements made by Defendant Hollenback

satisfy this requirement. The burden-shifting approach must be

applied to the remaining state law claims in this case. 

The state law claims in the second amended complaint are as

follows:

Count 8: Slander Per Se 

Counts 9-11: Intentional Interference with

Contractual Relations

Counts 12-14: Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress

Counts 15-22: Negligent Infliction of Emotional

Distress

All of the state law claims have already been dismissed on

privilege grounds. Alternatively, Count 8 has been dismissed on

statute of limitations grounds, and Counts 9-11 have been

dismissed because there is no contract at issue here. Counts 15-

22 have been dismissed because no tort action of this nature

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exists independent of a separate negligence claim, which requires

a duty of care and unintentional conduct. Plaintiff has not and

cannot plead the existence of a duty of care owed by Defendant,

an opposing attorney, to Plaintiff as a party to litigation.

Even if the litigation privilege did not apply, none of

Plaintiff’s state law claims would survive this motion to strike

because Plaintiff cannot possibly establish their legal

sufficiency as required under Jarrow, 31 Cal. 4th at 738. 

Although Counts 12-14 (intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress) have been dismissed pursuant to California’s litigation

privilege, these claims were not analyzed separately in the

context of the motion to dismiss. These claims are analyzed

under the anti-SLAPP statute. 

3. Counts 12-14 - Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress Analyzed Pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP

Statute’s Burden Shifting Approach.

The elements of this claim are (1) outrageous conduct by the

defendant; (2) defendant’s intentional act causing (or reckless

disregard of the probability of causing) severe or extreme

emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the

emotional distress by defendant’s outrageous conduct. See

Hernandez v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, 199 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1007

(1988). Ordinarily, mere profanity, obscenity, abuse, indignity,

insult or threats, without aggravating circumstances, is not

sufficiently outrageous. Yurick v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App.

3d 1116, 1128-29 (1989). However, there is authority that

suggests some kinds of statements, if sufficiently outrageous or

if uttered by a person in a particular position vis-a-vis the

complainant, may satisfy the outrageousness requirement. 

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On the spectrum of offensive conduct, outrageous

conduct is that which is the most extremely offensive.

Depending on the idiosyncracies of the plaintiff,

offensive conduct which falls along the remainder of

the spectrum may be irritating, insulting or even

distressing but it is not actionable and must simply be

endured without resort to legal redress....

...The extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct may

arise not so much from what is done as from abuse by

the defendant of some relation or position which gives

the defendant actual or apparent power to damage the

plaintiff's interests.

Id. at 1129. 

Whether a particular statement is sufficiently outrageous is

a question of fact. See id. at 1128. In the context of this

anti-SLAPP motion, Plaintiff must show that the claim is “both

legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie

showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence

submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” Jarrow, 31 Cal. 4th at

738. Claims for which Plaintiff is able to satisfy this burden

are “not subject to being stricken as a SLAPP.” that is

appropriate for determination in an anti-SLAPP motion. The

language plaintiff alleges defendant used is unacceptable racial

disparagement having no value as speech and is entitled to no

protection under the law. Such language is prima facie

outrageous. 

Nevertheless, because Counts 12-14 must be dismissed

pursuant to California’s litigation privilege, Plaintiff cannot

possibly establish that these claims would be legally sufficient

as is required under Jarrow, 31 Cal. 4th at 738. 

//

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//

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G. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike. 

Plaintiff has filed a document entitled “Plaintiff’s: AntiSLAPP special motion to strike, [and] motion for fees (425.16(c))

which advances a number of arguments that suggest Plaintiff

misunderstands the nature and effect of the anti-SLAPP statute.

(Doc. 204.) 

First, Plaintiff suggests that California’s anti-SLAPP

statute cannot be applied here because it conflicts with federal

law and violates Plaintiff’s own free speech rights. (See id. at

7-8.) To clarify, Defendant Hollenback has moved to dismiss both

the federal section 1981 claim and several of the state law

allegations for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Both Defendants have also filed

separate motions to strike pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP

statute. These anti-SLAPP motions to strike apply only to the

state law claims. It is Plaintiff who elected to belatedly

allege state law claims in this federal forum Plaintiff correctly

points out that California’s anti-SLAPP statute cannot override

federal civil rights law. However, the anti-SLAPP statute is

properly applied to Plaintiff’s state law claims, which are

governed by California law. None of the doctrines of state law

upon which Plaintiff bases his state law allegations have been

preempted by federal law, nor has California’s anti-SLAPP

statute. The Ninth Circuit has specifically ruled that the

California's anti-SLAPP statute is not preempted by the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and is applicable in federal cases where

supplemental claims are pled under California law. See United

States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 971 (9th

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Cir. 1999).

Second, Plaintiff attempts to reverse the burden of proof by

calling Hollenback the “plaintiff” and referring to himself as

the “defendant” in the context of his own anti-SLAPP motion.

Doc. 204 at 20-22. A critical element is missing with respect to

Plaintiff’s anti-SLAPP motion -- an existing claim to strike. 

Neither Hollenback nor Jensen have asserted any claims (let alone

state law claims) against Plaintiff. 

In Plaintiff’s motion to strike and related opposition

papers, Plaintiff has cut and pasted large portions of inapposite

caselaw into his filing, often providing no citation to the case

from which he cuts and pasts. He has also appended various

arguments pertaining to the case language in hand-written text.

This is an extremely unorthodox and confusing method of

presentation, but, to the extent possible, the arguments

presented have been analyzed. Plaintiff quotes extensively from

two cases, Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity, 19

Cal. 4th 1106 (1999) and Condit v. National Enquirer, Inc., 248

F. Supp. 2d 945 (E.D. Cal. 2002). But, Plaintiff misunderstands

and misapplies the holdings from these cases.

Plaintiff relies heavily on the extensive discussion in

Briggs of the “public issue” requirement applicable in certain

anti-SLAPP cases. But, critically, Briggs was concerned with

clause (4) of subdivision (e) of the anti-SLAPP statute. The

entire subdivision (e) provides:

As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a

person's right of petition or free speech under the

United States or California Constitution in connection

with a public issue" includes: (1) any written or oral

statement or writing made before a legislative,

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executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other

official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written

or oral statement or writing made in connection with an

issue under consideration or review by a legislative,

executive, or judicial body, or any other official

proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral

statement or writing made in a place open to the public

or a public forum in connection with an issue of public

interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of

the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or

the constitutional right of free speech in connection

with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 425.16(e). 

Here, by contrast, clause (2) concerning written or oral

statements made in connection with an issue under consideration

by a judicial body, is implicated. Briggs specifically noted

that the California legislature “thought it unnecessary to add an

‘issue of public interest’ limitation to these clauses.” Id. at

1122-23. Therefore, whatever the subject matter of the

litigation, any written or oral statements made in connection

with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body

are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute. There is no requirement

that the subject matter be one of public interest. Condit

similarly concerned interpretation of section 425.16(e)(3) and

(4). 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

(1) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file his proposed third

amended complaint is DENIED; 

(2) Defendant Jensen’s motion to strike her as a defendant

from the operative second amended complaint is GRANTED;

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(3) Defendant Hollenback’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as

to all claims (federal and state). 

(4) Defendant Hollenback’s motion to strike is DENIED AS

MOOT.

Plaintiff shall have one final opportunity to frame a

complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 in accordance with

this decision. Any amended complaint must be filed within twenty

(20) days following the date of service of this order.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2006

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

_____________________________ 

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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