Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_17-cv-01508/USCOURTS-caed-1_17-cv-01508-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Lawrence D. Rohlfing, counsel for Plaintiff Mercedes Morales De Romero, seeks an award of 

attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 22) Neither Plaintiff nor the Commissioner of 

Social Security oppose the motion.2 For the following reasons, the motion for attorney fees is

GRANTED.

I. Relevant Background

Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement with the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing

on October 9, 2017. (Doc. 22-1) The agreement entitled counsel to an award of “25% of the past due 

benefits awarded” if judicial review of an administrative decision was required, and the adverse 

decision of an ALJ was reversed. (Id. at 1) The agreement also required counsel to “seek compensation 

 

1 This action was originally brought against Nancy A. Berryhill in her capacity as then-Acting Commissioner. 

(See Doc. 1) Andrew M. Saul, the newly-appointed Commissioner, has been automatically substituted as the defendant in 

this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

2 The Commissioner filed a response to the motion, in which he offered an “analysis of the requested fees” but 

asserted he was “not in a position to either assent to or object to the §406(b) fees that Counsel seeks.” (Doc. 24 at 2)

MERCEDES MORALES DE ROMERO,

 Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL1,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:17-cv-01508- JLT

ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

(Doc. 22)

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under the Equal Access to Justice Act,” and the amount awarded would be credited to Plaintiff “for fees 

otherwise payable for court work.” (Id.)

On November 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint for review of the administrative decision 

denying her application for Social Security benefits. (Doc. 1) The Court found the ALJ failed to 

support his findings regarding Plaintiff’s language and did not address apparent conflicts between two 

vocational resources. Therefore, the Court remanded the matter for further proceedings pursuant to 

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (See Doc. 18) Following the entry of judgment in favor of 

Plaintiff (Doc. 19), the Court awarded $3,300 in attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice 

Act. (Doc. 21 at 1)

Upon remand, an ALJ issued a “fully favorable” decision, finding Plaintiff was disabled 

beginning September 11, 2015. (Doc. 22-2 at 1, 12) On December 14, 2019, the Social Security 

Administration concluded Plaintiff was entitled to monthly benefits from Social Security beginning

March 2016. (Doc. 21-3 at 1) In total, Plaintiff was entitled to $42,250.52 in past-due benefits, from 

which the Commissioner withheld $10,312.63 for payment of Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. (Doc. 22 at 3; 

Doc. 22- at 3)

Mr. Rohlfing filed the motion now before the Court on January 2, 2020, seeking fees in the 

amount of $7,612.63. (Doc. 21) Mr. Rohlfing served Plaintiff with the motion and informed her of the 

right to file a response to indicate whether she agreed or disagreed with the requested fees. (Id. at 2, 11) 

Plaintiff has not opposed the motion.

II. Attorney Fees under § 406(b)

An attorney may seek an award of fees for representation of a Social Security claimant who is 

awarded benefits:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [42 USC § 401, 

et seq] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine 

and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in 

excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is 

entitled by reason of such judgment. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794 (2002) (Section 406(b) 

controls fees awarded for representation of Social Security claimants). 

A contingency fee agreement is unenforceable if it provides for fees exceeding the statutory 

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amount. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807 (“Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements are 

unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits.”).

III. Discussion and Analysis

District courts “have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts § 406(b) cases.” 

Hern v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). However, the Court must review 

contingent-fee arrangements “as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in 

particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. In doing so, the Court should consider “the character of 

the representation and the results the representative achieved.” Id. at 808. In addition, the Court should 

consider whether the attorney performed in a substandard manner or engaged in dilatory conduct or 

excessive delays, and whether the fees are “excessively large in relation to the benefits received.” 

Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

Plaintiff entered into the contingent fee agreement in which she agreed to pay twenty-five 

percent of any awarded past-due benefits. (Doc. 22-1 at 1) The Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing

accepted the risk of loss in the representation and expended a total of 18.4 hours while representing 

Plaintiff before the District Court. (Doc. 22 at 3; Doc. 22-4 at 1-2) Due to counsel’s work, the action

was remanded further proceedings, and Plaintiff received a fully favorable decision. For this, Mr. 

Rohlfing requests a fee of $ 7,612.63. (Doc. 22 at 3) Because $3,300.00 was previously paid under the 

EAJA, the net cost to Plaintiff is $4,312.63. Finally, though served with the motion and informed of 

the right to oppose the fee request (Doc. 22 at 2, 11), Plaintiff did not file oppose the request and 

thereby indicates her implicit belief that the fee request is reasonable. 

Significantly, there is no indication that counsel performed in a substandard manner or engaged 

in severe dilatory conduct. Plaintiff was able to secure a remand for payment of benefits following her 

appeal, including an award of past-due benefits. Finally, the fees requested are approximately ten 

percent of the past-due benefits, and do not exceed twenty-five percent maximum permitted under 42 

U.S.C. §406(b), or the amount withheld by the administration for payment of fees. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

Based upon the tasks completed and results achieved following the remand for further 

proceedings, the Court finds the fees sought by Mr. Rohlfing and the Law Offices of Lawrence D. 

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Rohlfing are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS:

1. Counsel’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to 24 U.S.C. §406(b) in the amount of

$7,612.63 is GRANTED;

2. The Commissioner shall pay the amount directly to Counsel, the Law Offices of 

Lawrence D. Rohlfing; and

3. Counsel SHALL refund $3,300.00 to Plaintiff Mercedes Morales De Romero.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 7, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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