Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01415/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01415-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

---

" 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

FILED 

tOIUtAY·~ P" to" 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PAMELA CHYBA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC 

aka BAYVIEW and MARILYN CORO, 

Defendants. 

Case No.: 14cv1415 BEN (BLM) 

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING IN PART 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(3) REQUIRING COMPLIANCE 

WITH LOCAL RULES 

Before this Court are the Parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. This case 

arises out of the actions taken by Defendants Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC and Marilyn 

Coro in an attempt to service Plaintiffs mortgage loan. For the reasons stated below, the 

Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion and denies Plaintiffs Motion. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Factual Background 

Plaintiff Pamela Chyba obtained a mortgage loan from Ryland Mortgage Company 

in 2005. (Def. Mot., Dec!. of Randall Jackson ("Jackson Dec!.") Ex. A.) The loan was 

14CV1415 

Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 95 Filed 05/03/16 Page 1 of 11
1 secured by a deed of trust on real property located in Texas. (Def. Mot., Jackson Decl. 

2 Ex. B.) Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") was named as the 

3 beneficiary of the deed of trust. (!d.) On January 21, 2011, all beneficial interest under 

4 the deed of trust and the note was transferred to The Bank of New York Mellon. (Id.) 

5 On September 26, 2012, Bank of America sent a letter to Plaintiff, notifying her 

6 that the mortgage loan would be transferred to a new servicer on October 16, 2012. (Def. 

7 Mot., Jackson Decl. Ex. C.) The new servicer was Bayview Loan Servicing LLC. (Id.) 

8 On October 26,2012, Bayview sent a Transfer of Service Notice to Plaintiff, informing 

9 her that the loan, which was previously serviced by Bank of America, would now be 

10 serviced by Bayview. (Def. Mot., Decl. of Leslie Collazo ("Collazo Decl.") Ex. F; PI's 

11 Opp'n Ex. 1.) Defendant Coro, First Vice President of Bayview, signed the letter. (Id.) 

12 On October 30,2012, Ms. Coro sent a Debt Validation Letter to Plaintiff. (Collazo Decl. 

13 Ex. G; PI's Opp'n Ex. 2.) The validation letter stated that the owner of the loan was The 

14 Bank of New York Mellon, the previous servicer was Bank of America, and the current 

15 amount ofthe debt due was $153,664.77. (Collazo Decl. Ex. G; PI's Opp'n Ex. 2.) 

16 On November 9, 2012, Bayview sent a letter to Plaintiff requesting proof of hazard 

17 insurance for the property. (PI's Opp'n Ex. 6.) On November 14,2012, Plaintiff sent a 

18 letter to Bayview disputing the debt and requesting validation. (PI's Opp'n Ex. 3.) She 

19 specifically asked for "competent evidence that [she has] some contractual obligation to 

20 pay" Bayview. (Id.) On November 20, 2012, Plaintiff sent a "qualified written request" 

21 to Bayview, asking for considerable irrelevant information. (Pi's Mot. Ex. 3; PI's Opp'n 

22 Ex. 4.) Also on November 20,2012, Bank of America sent Plaintiff another letter 

23 confirming that Bayview was servicing the loan and informing Plaintiff that a payment 

24 history on the loan would be sent under separate cover, as Plaintiff requested. (Jackson 

25 Decl. Ex. D.) The following day, Bank of America sent the requested payment history. 

26 (Jackson Decl. Ex. E.) The payment history shows that someone made payments on the 

27 loan from 2005 through September 3, 2010 to Bank of America. (Jackson Decl. Ex. E.) 

28 The Court held a motion hearing on April 18, 2016, and questioned Plaintiff about who 

2 

14CV1415 

Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 95 Filed 05/03/16 Page 2 of 11
.' 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the last servicer or creditor was that she paid. Plaintiff would not answer. 1 

On December 10,2012, Bayview sent another notice to Plaintiff, following up on 

proof of insurance for the property. (PI's Opp'n Ex. 7.) On December 14,2012, 

Bayview responded to Plaintiffs letters disputing the debt. (Collazo Decl. Ex. H.) 

Bayview's December 14 response included (1) an October 2010 letter from Bank of 

America stating who the current creditor was, (2) the Note stating who the original 

creditor was; (3) Bank of America's September 2012 transfer of service letter; (4) 

Bayview's October 2012 transfer of service letter; (5) Bank of America's loan payment 

history; and (6) Bayview's loan payment history. (Def. Opp'n, Collazo Dec!. Ex. F.) 

Bayview's loan payment history indicates that no one made payments on the loan since 

Bayview became servicer. There is no evidence in the loan file that the October and 

December 2012 letters were ever returned. (Docket No. 90, Dec!. of Sara Torres' 6,f 

Nearly one year later, on October 1, 2013, Bayview sent a debt collection letter to 

Plaintiff. (PI's Opp'n Ex. 9.) That same day, Bayview checked Plaintiffs credit report. 

(PI's Mot. Ex. 12.) On November 21,2013, Bayview sent another debt collection letter 

to Plaintiff. (PI's Opp'n Ex. 10.) On December 8, 2013, Plaintiff sent a request for 

validation to Bayview. (PI's Mot. Ex. 2.) On December 20, 2013, Bayview notified 

Plaintiffthat it received her letter regarding the loan and would respond in due time. 

(PI's Mot. Ex. 7.) On January 11,2014, Bayview sent another debt validation letter, 

1 The Court also asked Plaintiff where she lived. Oddly, she refused to say. Not only 

was the answer to this question relevant to the merits of Plaintiff s FDCP A claim, but it 

also relates to Plaintiff s standing-which courts have a duty to consider even sua sponte. 

See D'Li! v. Best Western Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The FDCPA applies only to consumer debts. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (debts must arise out 

oftransactions which "are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes."). A 

mortgage loan on a Texas property may not be a consumer debt under the FDCP A where 

Plaintiff claims she lives somewhere in San Diego, California. In any event, Plaintiff s 

FDCP A claims fail for other reasons as discussed below. 

2 Plaintiffs Objection to Ms. Torres' Declaration is overruled. (Docket No. 91.) The 

Court requested the supplemental declaration during the motion hearing. 

3 

14CV1415 

Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 95 Filed 05/03/16 Page 3 of 11
1 which included a copy ofthe Note and Notice of Service Transfer. (PI's Mot. Ex. 9.) On 

2 January 26,2014, Plaintiff sent another letter to Bayview, again explaining her 

3 dissatisfaction with the debt validation letter. (PI's Mot. Ex. 1.) On May 12,2014, 

4 Bayview sent a Notice of Default to Plaintiff. (PI's Opp'n Ex. 11.) 

5 In addition to correspondence by mail, Bayview telephoned Plaintiff on eleven 

6 occasions from 2012 to 2014. 

7 II. Procedural Background 

8 Plaintiff initiated this action on June 10, 2014. (Docket No.1.) . The following 

9 claims remain: (1) failure to verify the debt under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

10 ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) against Bayview; (2) use offalse or misleading 

11 information under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e against Bayview and Ms. Coro; (3) 

12 violations of California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("Rosenthal 

13 Act"), Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17 against Bayview and Ms. Coro; and (4) violation of the 

14 Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A) against 

15 Bayview. (Docket Nos. 48, 60.) 

16 STANDARD OF REVIEW 

17 Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any 

18 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

19 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In 

20 considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be 

21 believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 

22 U.S. at 255. 

23 A moving party bears the initial burden of showing there are no genuine issues of 

24 material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It can do so by 

25 negating an essential element of the non-moving party's case, or by showing that the non26 moving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that 

27 party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. The burden 

28 then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. 

4 

14CV1415 

Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 95 Filed 05/03/16 Page 4 of 11
1 "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

2 governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes 

3 that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. As a 

4 general rule, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" will be insufficient to raise a 

5 genuine issue of material fact; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably 

6 find for the non-moving party. Id. at 252. 

7 A moving party is only entitled to summary judgment where it has shown that 

8 there are no genuine issues of material fact, even if the nonmoving party does not offer 

9 materials in support of its opposition. Henry v. Gill Indus. Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th 

10 Cir. 1993). Summary judgment is inappropriate where the movant's papers are 

11 insufficient to support that motion or on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact. 

12 See id. "The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment' does not necessarily mean 

13 that there are no disputed issues of material fact and does not necessarily permit the judge 

14 to render judgment in favor of one side or the other. '" Hahn v. Massage Envy 

15 Franchising, LLC, No. 12cv153, 2014 WL 5100220, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2014) 

16 (citation omitted); see Halbert v. Cnty. o/San Diego, No. 07cv1607, 2010 WL 1292163, 

17 at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2010). 

18 DISCUSSION3 

19 I. Verification under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) 

20 Plaintiff argues that she disputed the debt and requested validation from Bayview 

21 as early as November 14,2012, yet she never received validation. She argues that 

22 because Bayview sent debt collection letters in October and November 2013, Bayview 

23 violated the statute because it did not validate the debt before resuming debt collection. 

24 

25 3 The Court denies Plaintiffs requests for judicial notice (Docket Nos. 74-5, 81, 84) as 

26 untimely, irrelevant and/or subject to dispute. See Fed. R. Evid. 402; Milton H Greene 

Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 991 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining 

27 to take judicial notice of facts not relevant); Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 

28 F.3d 955, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Docket No. 46, Mar. 23,2015 Order at 4-5. 

5 

14CV1415 

Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 95 Filed 05/03/16 Page 5 of 11
1 In response, Bayview produced a letter sent to Plaintiff on December 14,2012, which 

2 includes the amount owed and the name and address of the original creditor, among other 

3 information. Plaintiff attests that she did not receive the December 14 letter, and even if 

4 she had, it does not constitute validation under the Act. 

5 If a consumer disputes a debt, the debt collector must stop collection efforts "until 

6 the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name 

7 and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment or name 

8 and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector." 15 

9 U.S.c. § 1692g(b). "[V]erification of a debt involves nothing more than the debt 

1 0 collector confirming in writing that the amount being demanded is what the creditor is 

11 claiming is owed." Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 

12 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting the Fourth Circuit's test outlined in Chaudhry v. 

13 Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 1999)). 

14 Plaintiff only contends that she did not receive the December 14 letter. However, 

15 receipt is not an element of section 1692g. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau, 171 F.3d 1197, 

16 1201 (9th Cir. 1999) ("We hold that section 1692g(a) requires only that a Notice be 'sent' 

17 by a debt collector."). Following the same type of analysis as conducted in Mahon, 

18 section 1692g(b) only requires that verification be mailed. "Nowhere does the statute 

19 require receipt of the [verification]." Id. 

20 Plaintiffs affidavit is insufficient to rebut Bayview's evidence that the letter was 

21 mailed.4 The record reveals that the communications between Bayview and Plaintiff 

22 occurred either by mail or telephone. Neither Party presents any evidence, or even 

23 argues, that documents were exchanged via fax or email or any other medium. In other 

24 words, there is no dispute that delivery of any documents between parties was done by 

25 

26 

4 It appears that Bayview uses "responded," "provided," and "sent" interchangeably, 

27 meaning "mailed." Bayview does not use any variation of the word "mailed" in its 

papers. All correspondence from Bayview to Plaintiff, which was submitted by both 

Parties, is addressed to Plaintiffs post office box. 28 

6 

14CV1415 

Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 95 Filed 05/03/16 Page 6 of 11
1 mail. Thus, no genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the letter was mailed. It was. 

2 Moving on to the issue of verification. Plaintiff is correct in that the Ninth Circuit 

3 has approved of verification under section 1692g where the debt collector provides an 

4 itemized statement of the debt to the consumer. See Clark, 460 FJd at 1167; Mahon, 171 

5 FJd at 1199. However, while an itemized statement is satisfactory, it also exceeds the 

6 requirement under the Act. Clark, 460 FJd at 1173-74. Last year, in Zhangv. 

7 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., the Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's order 

8 holding that the debt collector verified the debt by sending a letter listing the plaintiffs 

9 address, the date that the deed of trust was secured on the property, and the name and 

10 address ofthe original creditor. 601 F. App'x 567, 567 (9th Cir. 2015), ajJ'g No. II-evIl 3475,2012 WL 1245682, at * 11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13,2012). There is no indication that 

12 the verification letter in Zhang confirmed the amount owed in writing. See 2012 WL 

13 1245682, at * 11. The plain text of section 1692g(b) and a reading of Ninth Circuit case 

14 law reveals that verification is simply a writing from the debt collector to the consumer 

15 (1) confirming the amount ofthe alleged debt or (2) listing the name and address of the 

16 original creditor. 

17 The December 14 letter goes beyond what is required for verification under the 

18 FDCP A. It states that it is responding to Plaintiff s "several letters" and "inquiries," 

19 including a qualified written request, regarding the mortgage loan. The letter included 

20 loan origination documents that Bayview had in its possession and that it "believe[ d 

21 Plaintiff] received at loan closing." The letter included the Note, which stated the name 

22 and address of the original creditor-Ryland Mortgage Company. That in itself is 

23 sufficient to satisfy the verification requirement. In addition, the letter restated the 

24 amount owed as $153,664.77. The December 14, 2012 letter and its enclosures satisfy 

25 section 1692g(b). 

26 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendant, Bayview sent the 

27 letter to Plaintiff and it contained sufficient information to validate the debt pursuant to 

28 section 1692g. Plaintiffs Motion is therefore DENIED. Even viewing the facts in the 

7 

14CV1415 

Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 95 Filed 05/03/16 Page 7 of 11
1 light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff did not receive the letter, but the letter was sent 

2 and it constitutes adequate validation. Defendant's Motion is therefore GRANTED. 

3 II. False & Misleading Statements under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e 

4 Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from making "any false, deceptive, or 

5 misleading representation[s]" in connection with collecting a debt. Section 1692e(4) 

6 specifically prohibits a debt collector from representing or implying that "nonpayment of 

7 any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure ... or sale 

8 of any property ... unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends 

9 to take such action." The Ninth Circuit has held that the false identification of the 

10 original creditor is misleading under section 1692e. See Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. 

11 Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Isham v. Gurstel, Staloch & 

12 Chargo, P.A., 738 F. Supp. 2d 986,996 (D. Ariz. 2010). 

13 Plaintiff argues that Bayview and Ms. Coro made false or misleading statements in 

14 a number of ways. First, she argues that informing her that The Bank of New York 

15 Mellon is the creditor of the loan was false or misleading because she is unfamiliar with 

16 the entity. She also argues that telling her that Bank of America was the previous 

17 servicer of the loan was false or misleading because "Bank of America has never been a 

18 servicer to Plaintiff." And, she contends that the Notice of Default and Intent to 

19 Accelerate threatened that she could lose her property if she did not pay her debt in full, 

20 which Defendants had no authority to do. 

21 A review ofthe evidence reveals that there are no material facts in issue, and that 

22 as a matter of law Defendants did not violate section 1692e. Defendants sent Plaintiff an 

23 initial communication and debt validation letter within five days of each other as required 

24 by section 1692g(a). These initial letters identified The Bank of New York Mellon as the 

25 current creditor, not the original creditor. The deed oftmst shows that Plaintiff obtained 

26 a loan from Ryland Mortgage in 2005. A later recorded document also shows that all of 

27 Ryland's interest was assigned to The Bank of New York Mellon in 2011. No evidence 

28 presented disputes that The Bank of New York Mellon is the current creditor, holding all 

8 

14CV1415 

Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 95 Filed 05/03/16 Page 8 of 11
1 beneficial interest in the deed of trust. Thus, Defendants did not make a false or 

2 misleading statement with regards to the current creditor. 

3 In addition, the record shows loan payments were being made to Bank of America 

4 for a number of years. The Court has attempted to elicit from Plaintiff who she was 

5 paying if not Bank of America, but Plaintiff refused to provide that information and has 

6 been uncooperative. There are also letters from Bank of America to Plaintiff discussing 

7 the same loan at issue in this case. These letters are addressed to the same post office box 

8 that Plaintiff claims she has had for decades and where Bayview's transfer of service 

9 notice was sent. Finally, before and after Bayview began servicing Plaintiffs loan, Bank 

10 of America sent Plaintiffletters notifying and confirming the transfer to Bayview. To 

11 Plaintiffs knowledge, she has never had an account with Bank of America and "Bank of 

12 America N.A. has never been a servicer" to her. However, Plaintiff must present more 

13 than a scintilla of evidence in support of her claim. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Here, 

14 the evidence shows that Bank of America serviced the loan for some length oftime 

15 immediately preceding Bayview. As such, Defendants did not make a false statement 

16 with regards to the previous servicer. 

17 Finally, it appears Plaintiff contends that Bayview had no authority to send the 

18 Notice of Default. As noted above, the record shows that Bayview is a proper servicer of 

19 the loan, that it may collect payments on the loan, and may take the necessary steps on 

20 behalf ofthe creditor. Plaintiff presents no evidence to negate this. Accordingly, 

21 Defendants did not make a misleading statement by sending the Notice of Default. 

22 There are no genuine issues of fact here. Even viewing the facts in the light most 

23 favorable to Plaintiff, she is not entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. The Court 

24 therefore GRANTS Defendants' Motion and DENIES Plaintiffs Motion. 

25 III. Violation of Rosenthal Act 

26 California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act requires debt collectors 

27 to comply with the FDCP A. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. As the Court granted Defendants 

28 judgment as a matter oflaw with respect to Plaintiffs FDCPA claims, Defendants are 

9 

14CV1415 

Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 95 Filed 05/03/16 Page 9 of 11
, , 

1 also entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw on Plaintiffs Rosenthal claim. Accordingly, 

2 the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion and GRANTS Defendants' Motion. 

3 IV. Violation ofthe TePA 

4 The Telephone Consumer Protection Act prohibits "mak[ing] any call (other than a 

5 call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called 

6 party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded 

7 voice- (iii) to any telephone number assigned ... to a cellular telephone service." 47 

8 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A)(iii). 

9 Plaintiff argues that Bayview placed at least eleven automated phone calls to her 

10 cell phone number ending in "2400" without her consent. She declares in her affidavit 

11 that she was called by 215-664-1300, and at the beginning of each call there was an 

12 "artificial time delay." Plaintiff submits a handwritten call log and photographs of a cell 

13 phone showing Bayview's number on the screen. 

14 On the other hand, Bayview contends that the 1300 number is a landline in 

15 Pennsylvania that "cannot be used" for autodialed calls.5 Defendant provides no 

16 evidence Plaintiff gave Bayview prior express consent to contact her cell phone number. 

17 As such, all that remains is a dispute as to whether or not Bayview called Plaintiffs cell 

18 phone using an automated dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice. 

19 As a genuine issue of material fact exists, neither party is entitled to judgment as a 

20 matter of law on this issue. However, the Court finds it appropriate to allow the parties to 

21 conduct limited discovery, as they may be able to properly support their claims with 

22 additional evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("If a party fails to properly support an 

23 

24 

5 Bayview's alternative argument that it was permitted to call Plaintiff using an 

25 automated system because it had an established business relationship with her is not 

26 persuasive. See Daniels v. Com Unity Lending, Inc., 13cv488, 2015 WL 541299, at *7 

(S.D. Cal. Feb. 09, 2015); Blair v. CBE Grp., Inc., 13-cv-134, 2013 WL 5677026, at *4 

27 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17,2013) (noting that the business relationship exemption does not apply 

28 to calls to cell phones). 

10 

14CV1415 

Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 95 Filed 05/03/16 Page 10 of 11
1 assertion of fact ... the court may (1) give an opportunity to properly support or address 

2 the fact."). Discovery should concern whether the 1300 phone line is able to and did use 

3 an automated system to call Plaintiff's cell phone on the dates Plaintiff claims and 

4 whether or not Plaintiff provided Bayview prior express consent. The Parties' Motions 

5 are therefore DENIED without prejudice. 

6 V. Local Civil Rule 5.1(j) 

7 On the first page of every filing, "[t]he name, address and telephone number ... of 

8 an individual appearing pro se, must be printed or typewritten in the space to the left of 

9 the page's center and beginning at line one." CivLR 5.10)(1). 

10 Plaintiff's filings include her name and an "in care of' address in Carlsbad, 

11 California. Plaintiff is therefore ORDERED to comply with Local Rule 5.10)(1). Any 

12 future filings by Plaintiff must include her address and her telephone number. 

13 CONCLUSION6 

14 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendants' Motion for 

15 Summary Judgment is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. The Motions for 

16 Summary Judgment as to the TCPA claim only are DENIED without prejudice. 

17 The Parties are ORDERED to conduct additional limited discovery related to 

18 Plaintiff's TCP A claim. Renewed motions for summary judgment shall be filed on or 

19 before June 6,2016. Any Oppositions thereto shall be filed on or before June 22, 2016. 

20 At that time, the matter will be taken under submission. 

21 It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff ensure that her filings comply with the Local 

22 Rules. 

23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

24 Dated: April/J, 2016 

25 Umted States District Judge 

26 

27 

28 6 The Parties' objections to the evidence are overruled to the extent they are inconsistent 

with this Order. 

11 

14CV1415 

Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 95 Filed 05/03/16 Page 11 of 11