Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03622/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03622-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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California Penal Code § 4021 provides in relevant part:

(b) It shall be unlawful for any officer, station officer, jailer, or custodial

personnel to search the person of any prisoner of the opposite sex, or to

enter into the room or cell occupied by any prisoner of the opposite sex,

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MERCY AMBAT, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

ET AL., 

Defendants. /

No. C 07-3622 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO STAY PENDING

RESOLUTION OF STATE COURT

PROCEEDING

On October 19, 2007, the Court heard argument on defendants’ motion to dismiss or stay

pending resolution of an overlapping state court proceeding. Having considered the arguments of

counsel and the papers submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion to STAY pending the

resolution of the state court action. 

BACKGROUND

On February 20, 2007, seven deputy sheriffs of the County of San Francisco, along with the San

Francisco Deputy Sheriff’s Association (“SFDSA”), filed a putative class-action complaint in San

Francisco Superior Court alleging gender discrimination against the City, Sheriff Michael Hennessey,

and Undersheriff Jan Dempsey. The complaint asserted two causes of action, one alleging violations

of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and the second alleging violations of

California Penal Code § 4021.1

 The class action suit arose from defendants’ reorganization of the San

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except in the company of an employee of the same sex as the prisoner.

Except as provided herein, the provisions of this subdivision shall not be

applied to discriminate against any employee by prohibiting appointment

or work assignment on the basis of the sex of the employee. (Emphasis

added). 

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The Court grants defendants’ supplemental request for judicial notice in support of their motion.

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Francisco County Jail system, which involved reassigning all female inmates from various county jails

to one central location housed in County Jail #8. Along with this reorganization, defendants instituted

a new staffing policy that permits only female deputies to work in the female pods of County Jail #8.

The new policy also creates a gender-based two-tiered process for selecting days off by which a female

deputy with less seniority than a male deputy may receive preference in selecting days off because her

seniority is only compared to that of other female deputies. 

The state plaintiffs alleged the policy discriminates against female deputies because it prevents

them from gaining the training and experience necessary to receive promotions and further their careers

in law enforcement, as well as forces them to work overtime. The policy allegedly discriminates against

male deputies because it prevents them from gaining the training and experience that comes with

working in female pods and it also prevents them from signing up for working overtime in the female

pods. The plaintiffs also alleged that the policy discriminates against both genders because they must

work less desirable shifts and schedules since the gender-based two-tiered system limits deputies’ right

to choose regular days off. The complaint seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney

fees, injunctive relief, and costs of suit.

The plaintiffs in the state case filed a First Amended Complaint on or about March 15, 2007.

Subsequently, the City filed a demurrer, the parties began discovery, and they participated in a Case

Management Conference. On October 4, 2007, the City’s demurrer was sustained and the Superior

Court granted leave to amend the FEHA cause of action. On October 16, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a

Second Amended Complaint that folded their allegations regarding violations of California Penal Code

§ 4021 into one cause of action under the FEHA.2

 

Five months after the filing of the state complaint, on July 13, 2007, the thirty-five plaintiffs

here, seven of whom were originally named as plaintiffs in the state action, filed this federal action.

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Plaintiffs, both male and female deputy sheriffs, bring nine causes of action arising under Title VII,

FEHA, the California Labor Code, and the California Peace Officer Bill of Rights. Similar to the state

case, plaintiffs allege suffering general damages and emotional distress due to the new staffing policy.

Unlike the state complaint, however, plaintiffs here allege three individual complaints of retaliation.

Plaintiffs seek similar relief as sought by the plaintiffs in the state complaint. 

Originally, the law firm of Mastagni, Holstedt, Amick, Miller, Johnsen & Uhrhammer

represented all plaintiffs in the state action, both the seven named plaintiffs and the SFDSA. On June

22, 2007, however, Lawrence D. Murry substituted in as counsel to represent the seven individual

plaintiffs in the state action. He then filed this federal action where he represents the thirty-five

individual plaintiffs. On September 14, 2007, two months after filing this federal action and two weeks

after defendants brought this motion to dismiss or stay pending resolution of the state court proceeding,

plaintiffs’ counsel filed, and was granted, a request with the state court to dismiss without prejudice the

seven named plaintiffs in the state action, leaving only the SFDSA as the named plaintiff in the state

court class action. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction may either “attack the allegations of the complaint or may be made as a

‘speaking motion’ attacking the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Publ'g Co.

v. Gen. Tel. and Elec., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Land v. Dollars, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.

4. (1947)). Where the jurisdictional issue is separable from the merits of the case, the Court need only

consider evidence related to the jurisdiction issue, and rule on that issue, resolving factual disputes as

necessary. Id. (citing Berardinelli v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 587 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1978)).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion that mounts a factual attack on jurisdiction, “no presumption

of truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not

preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Moreover, the

plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav.

& Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). 

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The Supreme Court has stated that Younger abstention “represents the sort of ‘threshold

question’ [that] may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction.” Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4

(2005). However, numerous courts have also considered abstention arguments within the framework

of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1). See D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (declaring

“Younger abstention is jurisdictional”); Miller Brewing Co. v. Ace U.S. Holdings, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d

735, 739 (E.D. Wisc. 2005) (“[A] motion to dismiss or stay based on an abstention doctrine raises the

question of whether a court should exercise subject matter jurisdiction.”); Beres v. Village of Huntley,

824 F. Supp. 763, 766 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

“appears to be an appropriate method for raising the issue of abstention”). 

DISCUSSION

Defendants have requested that this Court abstain pursuant to the doctrine set out in Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. Under the Younger doctrine, absent extraordinary

circumstances, a federal court should abstain from proceeding with a case if: (1) there is an on-going

state court proceeding; (2) there is an important state interest at issue; and (3) there is an adequate

opportunity for plaintiffs to litigate the federal claims in the state court proceeding. See Younger, 401

U.S. at 40 (criminal proceedings only); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457

U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (outlining the three Younger criteria); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1

(1987) (extending Younger doctrine to civil proceedings). Defendants argue that abstention pursuant

to Younger is appropriate because a similar complaint raising similar issues is ongoing in state court and

the other two elements of Younger are met as well. 

The circumstances here satisfy all three prongs of the Younger doctrine. As to the first Younger

element, plaintiffs argue that there is no ongoing state court proceeding because the parties in the state

court action are no longer the same parties involved in this action. When the state court action was first

filed on February 20, 2007, it named seven individuals and the SFDSA as plaintiffs. Those seven

individuals were also included as part of the thirty-five plaintiffs named in the federal complaint, filed

five months after the initiation of the state court proceeding. However, two weeks after defendants

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moved this court to abstain on Younger grounds, those seven individual plaintiffs withdrew as named

plaintiffs from the state court proceeding, leaving the SFDSA as the only plaintiff in state court.

Although plaintiffs correctly observe that the named parties in state court no longer contain any named

parties here, that observation does not alter the fact that those seven individuals, as deputies and

members of the SFDSA, remain members of the putative class in the pending state court class action

being brought by the SFDSA, its members, and others similarly situated. Thus, plaintiffs’ contention

that the state court proceeding has been resolved as to those seven individuals because of their

successful request for dismissal is not wholly accurate.

The question becomes, then, whether the first Younger prong is satisfied where individual

members of a trade association seek to proceed in federal court when their organization is currently

litigating the matter on their behalf in state court. The Supreme Court has discussed this issue in the

broader context of whether the Younger doctrine applies to instances where a party in a federal action

shares similar interests as a different party in a state action. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452

(1974), two men distributing pamphlets at a shopping center received warning that if they continued

distribution, they would be charged with trespassing. One of the men continued distributing the

handbills and was arrested and prosecuted. The other left the area, avoided arrest, and filed suit in

federal court seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief. Although the two men shared similar

interests, the Supreme Court held that the federal court erred by abstaining under Younger because the

federal plaintiff was not a party in the state court adjudication. Id. at 455-60. The Supreme Court

narrowed this holding, however, in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), where the state seized from

a theater owner four copies of a film that a state court had declared obscene. Around the same time, the

state initiated criminal proceedings against two employees of the theater, but not against the theater

owner. The owner filed suit in federal court seeking the return of the seized films and a declaration that

the state obscenity statute was unconstitutional. The Court held that the ongoing state court proceedings

against his employees provided the owner the opportunity to adjudicate his constitutional issues such

that the lower court erred by not abstaining, despite the fact that the theater owner was not a party in any

state court action. Id. at 349. Later, in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), the Court reached

a similar conclusion as in Steffel, but stated that “there plainly may be some circumstances in which

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legally distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations

which govern any one of them.” Id. at 928.

While the above cases discuss scenarios involving related parties, they do not directly confront

the situation in the present case where an organization is the plaintiff in the state court action and

members of that organization are the plaintiffs in the federal action. See Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of

Barbering and Cosmetology, 962 F. Supp. 1260, 1269-70 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (“No courts appear to have

directly confronted this issue.”). However, Chief Justice Burger discussed this issue in a concurring and

dissenting opinion. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 830-31 (1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part). In Allee, state officials in Texas arrested and prosecuted union members for

violating state statutes while picketing. The union and several of its members brought suit in federal

court seeking injunctive relief and judgment that declared the state statutes unconstitutional. A three

judge district court panel, having heard the case before the Supreme Court’s decision in Steffel came

down, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the statutes unconstitutional. The case reached the

Supreme Court after its decision in Steffel and, consistent with that opinion, the Court vacated and

remanded the district court’s ruling based in part on abstention issues. Chief Justice Burger advised the

lower court on the manner by which it should apply Younger when it heard the case on remand:

The union, to the extent that it has standing, will be seeking interference with state court

prosecutions of its members. There is an identity of interest between the union and its

prosecuted members; the union may seek relief only because of the prosecutions of its

members, and only by ensuring that such prosecutions cease may the union vindicate the

constitutional interests which it claims are violated. The union stands in the place of its

prosecuted members even as it asserts its own constitutional rights. The same comity

considerations apply whether the action is brought in the name of the individual arrested

union members or in the name of the union . . .

Allee, 416 U.S. at 830-31 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

The Southern District of California applied Chief Justice Burger’s rationale to a similar scenario

involving two pending actions, one involving an organization in federal court and the other involving

two members of that organization in state court. See Cornwell, 962 F. Supp. at 1270. In Cornwell, Dr.

Cornwell, an African-American hair stylist, and the American Hairbraiders and Natural Hair Care

Association (“AHNHCA”) brought suit in federal court alleging various violations of both the federal

and California constitutions. Meanwhile, a hair salon and its owner, both belonging to the AHNHCA,

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The SFDSA has standing in state court to bring an action on behalf of its members challenging

the staffing policy and seeking damages if: (1) the individual members would otherwise have standing

to sue in their own right; (2) the interests being protected are relevant to the organization’s purpose; and

(3) the individual members are not required to participate in the lawsuit. See Apartment Ass’n of Los

Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 136 Cal. App. 4th 119, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 

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were involved in state court proceedings as a result of being cited and fined by the California Board of

Barbering and Cosmetology. After applying Younger to the facts, the court allowed Dr. Cornwell to

proceed with her action in federal court. However, guided by Chief Justice Burger’s analysis in Allee,

the court abstained under Younger in regard to AHNHCA. The court reasoned that:

[t]he problem with the current complaint is that the relief sought is really sought on

behalf of all AHNHCA’s members, not on behalf of AHNHCA itself . . . AHNHCA does

not operate an African hair styling business; rather it is a trade association of African

hair styling businesses. AHNHCA is actually seeking an injunction prohibiting

enforcement of the [Barbering and Cosmetology Act] as applied to its members . . . As

currently framed, the Court cannot grant plaintiffs the relief they seek because it would

act to enjoin a pending state proceeding.

Id. at 1271. The court allowed plaintiffs forty-five days to file an amended complaint.

Although Cornwell is not authoritative, the Court finds its analysis persuasive and instructive.

Much like the trade association in Cornwell, the SFDSA only has standing to bring an action in state

court because of the alleged injuries to its members.3

 It seeks relief in state court on behalf of all its

members, which includes the thirty-five plaintiffs in this federal action, and not relief for the SFDSA

itself. Five months after the SFDSA began its state court action, thirty-five individual members of the

SFDSA brought this action in federal court seeking damages as a result of the same new staffing policy

that forms the factual basis of the SFDSA’s state complaint. Thus, although the thirty-five plaintiffs

here are not named parties in the state court action, the SFDSA is currently litigating their interests in

the pending state action and plaintiffs here stand ready to recover monetary awards from that action if

the SFDSA is successful. A decision by this Court on the matter could interfere with the pending state

court proceeding. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491

U.S. 350, 373 (1989) (“It is true, of course, that a federal court’s disposition of such a case may well

affect, or for practical purposes preempt, a future – or, as in the present circumstances, even a pending

state court action.”). Therefore, as to the first Younger element, there is an ongoing state court

proceeding and the Court should abstain if the other two Younger requirements are met as well. See

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Beltran v. California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Younger abstention requires that the federal

courts abstain when state court proceedings were ongoing at the time the federal action was filed.”).

The second and third prongs of Younger are also satisfied here. As to the second Younger

element, the Supreme Court has held that administration of state criminal facilities and the protection

of employees from sexual discrimination are both important issues of state interest. See Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973) (“Since these internal problems of state prisons involve issues

so peculiarly within state authority and expertise, the States have an important interest in not being

bypassed in the correction of those problems.”); Ohio Civil Rights Comm. v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc.,

477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986) (“We have no doubt that the elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is

a sufficiently important state interest . . .”). As to the third prong of Younger, the court finds no reason

that plaintiffs cannot pursue all of the claims included in this lawsuit in state court. State courts are

courts of general jurisdiction and are able to adjudicate questions of federal law. See Nevada v. Hicks,

533 U.S. 353, 366-67 (2001). Thus, because the state court action began five months before this action,

plaintiffs had the opportunity to bring any issues of federal law, such as their claims under Title VII, in

the state court proceeding, and plaintiffs have failed to show otherwise. See Hicks, 422 U.S. at 349

(finding that the state court proceeding against a related party provided the federal plaintiff the

opportunity to raise his constitutional claims); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14-17

(1987) (finding that the burden rests on the federal plaintiff to show that state procedural law prevents

presentation of claims).

Having found that the Younger doctrine applies to the facts here, the Court must decide whether

to dismiss the action or stay the proceeding pending the outcome of the state court action. When

Younger applies and the federal party seeks injunctive relief, federal courts should dismiss the action

in its entirety. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (“Younger v. Harris contemplates the

outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and federal, to the

state courts.”); Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 816 n. 22 (1976) (“Where

a case is properly within [the Younger] category of cases, there is no discretion to grant injunctive

relief.”). “But when damages are sought and Younger principles apply, it makes sense for the federal

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Defendants also move this Court to abstain based on Colorado River principles. Because the

Court must abstain under Younger, it does not reach the matter of whether to also abstain under

Colorado River. 

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court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction temporarily by staying its hand until such time as the state

proceeding is no longer pending.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 981 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis

in original). Here, because Younger applies and plaintiffs seek damages along with injunctive relief,

the Court stays the proceeding pending resolution of the state court action.4

 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’

motion and STAYS plaintiffs’ claims pending the resolution of the state court action. The parties are

ordered to file joint reports on the status of the state court proceedings every 90 days until its

resolution. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 22, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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