Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02640/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02640-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 Magistrate Judge Hollows granted Petitioner two 1

extensions of time to file a traverse, but no traverse

was ever filed. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BILLY JEROME LACEY,

Petitioner,

v.

M.C. KRAMER, Warden,

Respondent.

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Case No. 2:07-cv-02640-VAP

(HC)

[Petition filed on December

7, 2007]

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED

BY A STATE PRISONER

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Billy Jerome Lacey is a state prisoner.

Proceeding in pro se, he filed a habeas corpus petition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 7, 2007, and an

amended petition on January 22, 2008. Respondent filed

an Answer on April 23, 2008. On January 5, 2009, the

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action was transferred to this Court pursuant to an Order

of Designation of Judge to Serve in Another District

within the Ninth Circuit. 

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For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the

Petition.

A. Statement of Facts

1. The Events of October 13, 2004

Sacramento Police Department officers arrested

Petitioner on October 13, 2004 at an "undercover buybust" in Oak Park. (RT at 80:23-25, 81:7-9; 148:11-17.) 

At approximately 10:20 p.m. on that evening, Detective

John Jennings, in an unmarked vehicle, approached

Petitioner's co-defendant Kerry Duncan, who was walking

on foot, and asked him "What's up?" (RT at 83:28.)

Duncan responded "Are you looking for it?" (RT at 83:28-

84:1.) Based on his experience, Jennings interpreted

this to be a reference to mean narcotics. (RT at 84:23-

85:1.) Jennings responded "Yes," and pulled over his

vehicle. (RT at 85:18-23.)

Duncan then asked Jennings "what [he] was looking

for," and Jennings responded "a $20 piece of rock," slang

for a twenty-dollar piece of rock cocaine. (RT at 85:24-

86:6.) Duncan said he would "take [Jennings] to it," got

into Jennings's vehicle, and directed Jennings to an area

about two blocks away, where his partner was waiting in a

van. (RT at 86:7-19.) After driving the two blocks,

Jennings handed Duncan a twenty dollar bill, from a

series of bills with pre-recorded serial numbers, and

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Duncan exited the vehicle and walked towards a van. (RT

at 88:23-26, 90:5-7.)

Duncan later returned to Jennings's vehicle, said

"get ready for an exchange," and dropped a "small,

whitish rock wrapped in clear plastic" into Jennings's

hand through the open passenger's side window. (RT at

93:5-16.) Jennings then indicated to other officers that

they should "move in and take the subject in[to]

custody." (RT at 93:17-24.)

Officer Erika Woolson then approached the van,

announced her presence, and knocked several times on the

driver's side window. (RT at 145:11-20.) She then

noticed movement inside the van, and saw a female, later

identified as Kelly Stadum. (RT at 145:21-28.) Woolson

directed Stadum to exit the vehicle through the driver's

side door. (Id.) Stadum did so, and Woolson patted her

down for weapons and "passed her on" to Sergeant Susan

Fenistra. (RT 146:18-22.) Stadum then told Woolson that

her boyfriend was inside the van. (RT at 146:23-27.) 

Woolson first noticed a male, later identified as

Petitioner, standing in the back of the van, and directed

him to exit the van. (RT at 147:2-9.) A search of the

van led to the discovery of "torn off baggy corners,"

which, based on her training and experience, Woolson

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 Although the parties refer to the juror at issue by

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name, the Court refers to him only by the initial of his

last name out of respect for his privacy.

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identified as "the type of packaging used for narcotics."

(RT at 148:27-149:6.)

Petitioner was arrested, and placed in the back of a

police car. (RT at 148:11-13, 158:14-16.) Officer

Cynthia Stinson later searched Petitioner, and found

United States currency in his pants pocket and socks. 

The serial number on the $20 bill found in his left sock

corresponded with one of those that had been pre-recorded

for use in the buy-bust operation that evening. (RT at

159:20-160:19.) When asked how he obtained that bill,

Petitioner told Stinson that "he had been at different

places that day and gotten $20 bills from those places,"

including a store and in Reno. (RT at 161:25-162:6.) 

2. Jury Selection and the Wheeler Motion

Petitioner challenges the prosecutor's peremptory

challenge to a Black juror, "Mr. P."2

At voir dire, Mr. P. told the court that, while he

was in college at Humboldt State University, his roommate

and basketball teammate was arrested for marijuana

possession and spent time in jail as a result of that

arrest. (Voir Dire RT at 15:5-19.) He also indicated

that, "out of ten friends [he] grew up with[,] three were

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 In evaluating a Wheeler motion, California state

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courts use the same burden-shifting analysis as that used

under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). "First,

the defendant must make out a prima facie case ‘by

showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives

rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’ Second,

once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the

‘burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the

racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral

justifications for the strikes. Third, ‘[i]f a

race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court

must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike

(continued...)

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murdered," and that his brother had been charged with

grand theft auto for stealing a stock car. (Voir Dire RT

at 36:12-17.) Mr. P. later told counsel for Petitioner's

co-defendant that his mother "had a drug problem" while

he was growing up, and currently worked in drug abuse

prevention. (Voir Dire RT at 52:27-53:3.) 

In the first round of peremptory challenges, the

prosecutor exercised three challenges, one of which was

exercised against Mr. P. (Voir Dire RT at 74:1-3.)

Counsel for both Petitioner and his co-defendant

later brought a motion pursuant to People v. Wheeler, 22

Cal. 3d 258 (1978), ("the Wheeler motion") based on the

dismissal of Mr. P. and a second Black juror "within a

short period of each other." (RT at 51:4-19.) The trial

judge found that the defendants had met their burden of

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, and

thus asked the prosecutor to explain why he had exercised

peremptory challenges as to the two Black jurors.

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(...continued) 3

has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’” People v.

Mills, 48 Cal. 4th 158 (2010), quoting Johnson v.

California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005). 

 The prosecutor also provided an explanation for his

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exercise of a peremptory as to the other Black juror. 

(RT at 55:8-56:22.) Petitioner does not challenge the

dismissal of that juror in this Petition.

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The prosecutor provided a lengthy explanation as to

why he excused Mr. P. First, he identified Mr. P.'s

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dreadlocks, and his own understanding that "dreadlocks

are somewhat associated with a Reggae culture which

certainly as a culture has pretty liberal views and I

think a lot of time promotes drug use, although maybe

specifically marijuana not cocaine base." (RT at 53:19-

25.) Next, the prosecutor cited Mr. P.'s attendance at

Humboldt State University, which he claimed had a

reputation as a "kind of a hot-bed for marijuana use," as

well as the arrest of his roommate there for the sale of

marijuana. (RT at 53:36-54:3.) 

The prosecutor also mentioned several aspects of Mr.

P.'s family history which led him to exercise a

peremptory challenge. He noted that Mr. P.'s brother's

status as a defendant in a vehicle theft case likely led

him to "see[] the law work in -- pretty up close." (RT

at 54:6-9.) The prosecutor argued that the murders of

three of Mr. P.'s childhood friends also served as an

"example[] where he's either seen the system work or not

work." (RT at 54:10-12.) He also discussed Mr. P.'s

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mother and noted that her drug addiction and Mr. P.'s

resulting experience and personal knowledge about

addiction could have an impact on the case, as he thought

"addiction is going to be something that the defense is

gonna try and kind of make an issue in this case. (RT at

54:13-27.)

The trial court found that the prosecutor

"articulated sufficient basis, variety of reasons why he

exercised peremptory challenge as to each of the two

jurors," and denied the Wheeler motion. (RT at 58:22-

25.)

3. Conviction and Sentencing

At the conclusion of a two-day trial, Petitioner's

counsel argued that the prosecution had not proven beyond

a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was involved with the

actual sale of the narcotics. (RT at 200:9-202:5.) The

prosecutor responded that, based on "common sense,"

Petitioner's possession of the pre-recorded bill could

only mean he was involved with the sale, at the least,

under a theory of aiding and abetting. (RT at 202:7-

209:20.) 

On April 7, 2005, the jury found Petitioner and his

co-defendant each guilty of selling cocaine base, in

violation of section 11352(a) of the California Health

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 Cal. Penal Code § 1170.12 is part of California's 5

"Three Strikes Law," which provides for enhanced

sentences for defendants who have previously been

convicted of certain felonies.

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and Safety Code. (RT at 242:5-10.) Petitioner waived

his right to a jury determination as to the issue of

whether he had previously been convicted for a serious

felony, and thus qualified for a sentencing enhancement

under California Penal Code section 1170.12. (RT at 5

234:8-235:12.) The trial court heard evidence on this

issue, and found that Petitioner's January 24, 1984

conviction of first degree burglary, in violation of

section 1192.7(c) of the California Penal Code, in the

Alameda County Superior Court, constituted a conviction

for a serious felony. (RT at 245:23-251:14.)

The court sentenced Petitioner to a term of eight

years: four years for the Health and Safety Code

violation, doubled due to the previous serious felony

conviction. (RT at 274:5-8.)

B. Procedural History

Petitioner, represented by counsel, appealed his

conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Third

Appellate District, on May 5, 2005, challenging the trial

court's ruling on his Wheeler motion. The Court of

Appeal affirmed his conviction on December 4, 2006.

Petitioner, still represented by counsel, then sought

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review by the California Supreme Court on January 11,

2007. The court denied review without opinion on

February 21, 2007.

While his appeal was pending in the Court of Appeal,

Petitioner, acting in pro se, filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus in that intermediate appellate court on

October 4, 2006, alleging ineffective assistance of trial

counsel for failure to move for severance. The appellate

court summarily denied the petition with a reference to

In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App. 2d 293 (1962), on October

12, 2006.

On November 20, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California

Superior Court, Sacramento County, again on the basis of

his trial counsel's failure to move for severance. This

petition was denied by written opinion on January 10,

2007. On February 8, 2007, Petitioner filed another

habeas petition stating the same basis in the Court of

Appeal, which was denied summarily on March 8, 2007. On

March 21, 2007, Petitioner then filed a habeas petition

in the California Supreme Court addressing this same

issue, which was denied summarily on July 25, 2007. 

On April 11, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se habeas

petition in the Sacramento County Superior Court,

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alleging the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and

misinterpreted the California Penal Code in sentencing

him. The Superior Court denied this petition by written

opinion on June 7, 2009. On June 29, 2007, Petitioner,

filed another habeas petition in the Court of Appeal on

these same grounds. The Court of Appeal summarily denied

the petition on July 5, 2007. Finally, Petitioner filed

a habeas petition on these grounds in the California

Supreme Court on July 23, 2007, which was denied

summarily on January 3, 2008.

C. Petitioner's Claims

Petitioner filed this petition on December 7, 2007,

and asserts the following grounds for federal habeas

corpus relief:

1. Petitioner was deprived of the effective

assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to

seek severance;

2. Petitioner was deprived of his right to a jury of

his peers, based on the denial of his Wheeler/Batson

motion;

3. Petitioner was deprived of the effective

assistance of counsel by appellate counsel's "failure to

investigate and research the trial records for a legal

defense on a non-recidivist application"; 

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4. Petitioner was deprived of his right to appeal

and "increase conduct alleged bey[o]nd the statutory time

period limitation" in his 1984 case;

5. Petitioner was deprived of his right to due

process by the trial court's disregard of the terms of a

prior plea agreement;

6. "Counsel's duty to inform defendant of all

consequence supports petitioner's claim that he was duly

informed of 3 years parole and the 1 to 5 years future

recidivist enhancement";

7. Petitioner was deprived of his right to

effective assistance of counsel by trial counsel's

"failure to seek specific performance" of the terms of

the prior plea agreement;

8. Petitioner's right not to be subjected to a Bill

of Attainder was violated by actions of the California

Legislature;

9. The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by

sentencing Petitioner under an invalid statute; and

10. Petitioner's right to due process was violated

by the trial court's incorrect application of the

California Penal Code.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 ("AEDPA") governs the Court's review of this

Petition, as the Petition was filed after AEDPA's

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effective date. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), "a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States."

When considering a properly exhausted claim under

AEDPA, a federal court must defer to a state court's

holding unless it “'was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,' or if the state court decision 'was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'”

Smith v. Curry, 580 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009),

quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2).

"Clearly established Federal law" is defined as “the

governing legal principle or principles set forth by the

Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its

decision." Curry, quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 71-72 (2003). "[I]t is not 'an unreasonable

application of clearly established Federal law' for a

state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule

that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme]

Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct.

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1411, 1419 (2009). However, "the Supreme Court need not

have addressed an identical fact pattern to qualify as

clearly established law, as 'even a general standard may

be applied in an unreasonable manner.'” Jones v. Ryan,

583 F.3d 626, 635 (9th Cir. 2009), quoting Panetti v.

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner's First Claim

Petitioner first claims trial counsel's failure to seek

severance of Petitioner's trial from that of his codefendant constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

To establish a constitutional violation based on

ineffective assistance of counsel, "a petitioner must

show that: (1) his trial counsel's performance 'fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness'; and (2)

'there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.'” Jones, 583 F.3d

at 636, quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

688, 694 (1984). 

Petitioner contends that counsel had "knowledge of

[a] statement made by [his] co-defendant," that should

have led counsel to seek severance of the cases for

trial. (Pet. at 5.) This claim is set out in more

detail in Petitioner's state court petitions, where he

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 "When reviewing a state court's summary denial of 6

a habeas petition, we 'look through' the summary

disposition to the last reasoned state court decision." 

Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2009).

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argued that, had the trials been severed, his codefendant could have testified that Petitioner did not

supply the drugs sold in this case. See, e.g., Ct. of

App. Oct. 4, 2006 Pet. at 2-4. The record contains no

evidence whatsoever suggesting that Petitioner's codefendant would have given any such testimony. 

Even if such evidence existed, the Superior Court

found that any failure of trial counsel to seek severance

was not prejudicial. The court stated:

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[I]t is unlikely such testimony would have been

deemed credible given the police testimony that

an officer gave marked money to the co-defendant

who then approached petitioner's van (where the

latter was waiting) and shortly thereafter

returned with drugs. In addition, a search of

the van yielded drug-packaging material along

with the marked money.

(Jan. 10, 2007 Order, In re Billy Lacey, Case No.

06F09802, Sacramento Co. Super. Ct. at 2.) Upon an

independent review of the factual record, the Court

concludes that the Superior Court's conclusion that any

failure to seek severance was not prejudicial was not an

unreasonable view of the facts under clearly established

federal law, and thus federal habeas relief is not

warranted.

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B. Petitioner's Second Claim

Petitioner bases his second claim on the trial

court's denial of his Wheeler motion, based on the

District Attorney's exercise of a peremptory challenge

against juror Mr. P. "for having [a] dread-lock hair

style." (Pet. at. 5.)

The Court construes a challenge to a denial of a

Wheeler motion, alleging that a peremptory challenge was

exercised based on a prohibited characteristic, as one

brought under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 

See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Brown, 585 F.3d 1202, 1210 (9th

Cir. 2009); Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 694 (9th

Cir. 2008). "The Batson framework proceeds in three

steps. First, a defendant raising a Batson claim must

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The

burden of production then shifts to the prosecutor to

offer race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes.

After the prosecutor comes forward with race-neutral

reasons, '[t]he trial court then will have the duty to

determine if the defendant has established purposeful

discrimination.'” Paulino, 542 F.3d at 699, quoting

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.

Since the trial court determined that Petitioner had

indeed established a prima facie case of discrimination,

the issue is whether, given the race-neutral reasons

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offered by the prosecutor, Petitioner established

purposeful discrimination.

The last reasoned state court decision addressing

Petitioner's Wheeler claim was the Court of Appeal's

decision on direct appeal, People v. Duncan, No. C049739,

2006 WL 3480375 (Cal. Ct. of App. Dec. 4, 2006). As to

Mr. P., that court agreed with Petitioner that, "standing

alone, the prosecutor's reference to [Mr. P.'s]

dreadlocks may have sent a mixed message that suggested

consideration of his race." Evaluating the reference to

dreadlocks in a greater context, though, the Court of

Appeal found that:

the prosecutor's explanation for excusing [Mr.

P.] focused on the potential impact of [Mr.

P.'s] personal experiences with the drug culture

on his view of the prosecution's case. [Mr.

P.'s] statements revealed multiple incidents of

drug possession and addiction involving people

he loved. As voir dire progressed, [Mr. P.]

interrupted to volunteer that he had 'a pretty

good knowledge just on a lot of things to do

with drug addiction and all that stuff. . . . My

brother's been in it for 15, 20 years.' On this

record, the court could decide the prosecution

was legitimately concerned that [Mr. P.'s] life

experience, as revealed in voir dire

examination, would influence his ability to

assess the case objectively.

2006 WL 3480375, at *6. 

"To accept a prosecutor's stated nonracial reasons,

the court need not agree with them. The question is not

whether the stated reason represents a sound strategic

judgment, but whether counsel's race-neutral explanation

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for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Kesser

v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 

Only one United States Supreme Court case has addressed

the issue of Batson challenges as related to jurors'

grooming or hairstyles. In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S.

765, 769 (1995), the Court held that the exclusion of a

Black male juror because "he had long, unkempt hair, a

mustache, and a beard - is race neutral and satisfies the

prosecution's step two burden of articulating a

nondiscriminatory reason for the strike." In doing so,

the Court noted that “The wearing of beards is not a

characteristic that is peculiar to any race.” Id.,

quoting EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 190,

n. 3 (3d Cir. 1980). 

Here, the Court acknowledges that the specific

hairstyle cited by the prosecutor may indeed be

associated with one race more than another. But "[t]he

court must evaluate the record and consider each

explanation within the context of the trial as a whole,"

Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360, and, given the prosecutor's

explicit discussion of the association between dreadlocks

and drug use, in addition to Mr. P.'s personal

experiences with crime, drug use and addiction, the Court

of Appeal's determination that the prosecutor "was

legitimately concerned that [Mr. P.'s] life experience,

as revealed in voir dire examination, would influence his

ability to assess the case objectively," was not

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objectively unreasonable. Thus, the denial of the

Wheeler motion does not warrant federal habeas relief.

C. Petitioner's Third Claim

In Petitioner's third claim he contends he was denied

effective assistance of counsel by his appellate

counsel's "failure to investigate and research the trial

records for a legal defense on a non-recidivist

application." (Pet. at 6.) 

Even construing Petitioner's seven state court habeas

petitions liberally, this argument was not "fairly

presented" to the state courts, as no petition contained

any argument of ineffective assistance by either trial or

appellate counsel in relation to the application of the

Three Strikes Law to him. Accordingly, Petitioner's

third claim is procedurally barred. See Cone v. Bell,

129 S. Ct. 1769, 1781 (2009) ("A claim is procedurally

barred when it has not been fairly presented to the state

courts for their initial consideration.")

Even if the third claim were not procedurally barred,

though, it would fail on the merits. The Strickland

standard, discussed above, applies to Petitioner's claim

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 872 (9th Cir. 2002).

There is no dispute that Petitioner was actually

convicted of a serious felony in 1984. See, e.g.,

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Clerk's Supp. Trans. at 008 (1984 Abstract of Judgment). 

As described more fully below, Petitioner's contentions

that the application of the Three Strikes Law was

unlawful are unsupported by statutory and case law, and

thus any failure to "investigate" these legal theories

was nonprejudicial. 

D. Petitioner's Fourth Claim

Petitioner's fourth claim is that he was denied his

right to appeal his 1984 conviction in the Alameda County

Superior Court, as he was not "advised of his right to

appeal the information that in itself did not carry a

life sentence." (Pet. at 6.) This claim is barred,

though. "[O]nce a state conviction is no longer open to

direct or collateral attack in its own right because the

defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were

available (or because the defendant did so

unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as

conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to

enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may

not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition

under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was

unconstitutionally obtained," except in the limited

circumstance where "the prior conviction used to enhance

the sentence was obtained where there was a failure to

appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment." 

Lackawanna County Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403-

04 (2001). Since Petitioner's challenge to the 1984

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conviction does not fall under this narrow exception, his

fourth claim does not assert a valid ground for federal

habeas relief.

E. Petitioner's Fifth Claim

Next, Petitioner claims that the use of his 1984

conviction, which was the result of a plea agreement, to

enhance his sentence violated the terms of the 1984 plea

agreement, and thus was a violation of his right to due

process. Even construing Petitioner's state court

petitions liberally, this argument was not "fairly

presented" to the state courts prior to this petition,

and, as such, is procedurally barred. See Cone, 129 S.

Ct. at 1781.

Even if this claim were not procedurally barred,

though, it would fail on the merits. Although Petitioner

contends he was told that the collateral consequences of

his plea were limited to use in the future as a "1 to 5

years," (Pet. Att. at 1), enhancement for a future

felony, he has failed to show any evidence in support of

this statement. See Calloway v. White, 649 F. Supp. 2d

1048, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (petitioner bears burden to

show evidence prosecutor agreed not to use conviction in

subsequent proceedings). Moreover, a prosecutor would

have had no authority to make such a binding promise as

to future prosecutors of other crimes. Miles v. Runnels,

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No. CIV S-04-1431 LKK EFB P, 2010 WL 489678 at *14 (E.D.

Cal. Feb. 5, 2010). 

The court that accepted Petitioner's plea in 1984

also had no duty to inform Petitioner of the possibility

that his conviction could be used against him in the

future. "When accepting a defendant's plea, courts must

inform defendants of only direct, rather than collateral,

consequences of a guilty plea." Garcia v. Felker, No. CV

06-7732-RSWL(CT), 2009 WL 2776664, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug.

26, 2009), citing Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 235

(9th Cir. 1988). The possibility that a defendant will

be convicted of another offense in the future and receive

an enhanced sentence based on the current conviction is a

collateral, not direct, consequence of a plea. Id.,

citing United States v. Brownlie, 915 F.2d 527, 528 (9th

Cir. 1990).

Petitioner thus has failed to establish an

entitlement to habeas relief based on his fifth claim.

 

F. Petitioner's Sixth Claim

Petitioner's sixth claim is that "Counsel's duty to

inform defendant of all consequence supports

petitioner[']s claim that he was duly informed of 3 years

parole and the 1 to 5 future recidivist enhancement." 

(Pet. Att. at 1.) This does not appear to be a freestanding claim of constitutional violation, but merely

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additional support for his argument that the

consideration of his prior plea in his sentence was

unlawful. Accordingly, Petitioner's sixth claim fails to

justify habeas relief. 

G. Petitioner's Seventh Claim

Petitioner contends his trial counsel's performance

was constitutionally deficient because he failed to seek

"specific performance" of the terms of the 1984 plea

agreement. This claim was not fairly presented to the

state courts in any of Petitioner's state court

petitions, and thus is barred. Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d

896, 911 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, as explained above,

there is no indication that the 1984 plea agreement

actually was violated by the use of the 1984 conviction

in enhancing Petitioner's sentence, and there was thus no

prejudice under Strickland. Accordingly, this claim

provides no basis for habeas relief.

H. Petitioner's Eighth Claim

According to Petitioner, his constitutional rights

were violated when he received a "double sentence" by the

imposition of a sentencing enhancement under the Three

Strikes Law. Petitioner argues that this sentence was an

unlawful bill of attainder. This claim does not appear

to have been presented to the state court, and is thus

deemed waived. Even if Petitioner had not waived this

claim, though, the Three Strikes Law "is not a bill of

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attainder because it does not single anyone out." Wolfe

v. George, 486 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007).

To the extent Petitioner's claim can be construed as

a challenge to the Three Strikes Law under the

Constitution's prohibitions of double jeopardy and ex

post facto punishment, such a claim is without merit. 

See Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685, 689-90 (9th Cir.

2008) (rejecting double jeopardy challenge to Three

Strikes Law); United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188,

1199 (9th Cir. 1999) (three strikes law does not violate

ex post facto clause so long as statute was enacted at

the time the present offense was committed).

Petitioner's eighth claim thus fails to establish an

entitlement to habeas relief.

I. Petitioner's Ninth Claim

Petitioner's ninth claim is that the trial court

"acted in excess of its jurisdiction by imposing a

sentence on petitioner under an invalid statute," by

"fail[ing] to look first to the words of the statute."

(Pet. Att. at 3.) Petitioner does not specify what

statute he is challenging, and only states that the

"trial court failed to look first to the words of the

statute before he sentence[d] prisoner to 4 years double

plus 85%." (Id.) This claim "is too vague and

conclusory for the Court to determine the exact nature of

the claim. Petitioner must state his claim with

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sufficient specificity." Courtois v. United States, No.

1:06-cv-00182-OWW-TAG HC, 2007 WL 4463230 (E.D. Cal. Dec.

17, 2007). 

To the extent Petitioner seeks to challenge the trial

court's interpretation or application of a state

sentencing law, "the application of state sentencing law

does not raise a federal constitutional issue" in and of

itself. Bowlin v. Chrones, No. CV F 06-1361 LJO DLB HC,

2008 WL 3540617, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008). See

also Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner's ninth claim therefore does not justify

federal habeas relief.

 

J. Petitioner's Tenth Claim

In his tenth claim, Petitioner argues the trial court

"erroneously imposed a sentence in excess of statutory

law and under a generic statute," by misinterpreting Cal.

Penal Code section 2933.1, which applies to the

calculation of worktime credits. (Pet. Att. at 4.)

Petitioner's claim regarding the application of

worktime credits was considered and rejected by the

Superior Court in its June 7, 2007 written opinion, both

on the merits and because the court deemed Petitioner's

objections to sentencing errors waived based on his

failure to raise them at the time of sentencing, in his

appeal, or in his previous habeas petition. A state

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court's finding that a petitioner waived a claim bars

consideration of the merits of that claim on federal

habeas review. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860-61

(2002). Therefore, Petitioner's tenth claim fails to

identify a viable ground for habeas relief. 

 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

 Dated: April 12, 2010 

 VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS 

 United States District Judge

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