Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00654/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00654-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES MICHAEL WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

WILLIAM D. GORE, Sheriff, et al., 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 15-cv-654 

ORDER: 

(1) DECLINING IN PART REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION; 

(2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT ON EXHAUSTION 

GROUNDS; AND 

(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT ON EXHAUSTION 

GROUNDS. 

[Doc. Nos. 74, 52, and 50, respectively] 

Presently before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), (Doc. No. 

74), of Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis recommending this Court grant Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 52), and deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment, (Doc No. 50). Plaintiff James Michael Williams, a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se, has filed a timely Objection. (Doc. No. 78.) After a review of the parties’ pleadings and 

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the entire record before it, the Court DECLINES IN PART the R&R, OVERRULES IN 

PART AND SUSTAINS IN PART Plaintiff’s objections, DENIES Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment, and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND1

On March 23, 2015, Plaintiff James Michael Williams (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner 

proceeding pro se, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of 

his Eighth Amendment rights from an alleged denial of medical care while incarcerated in 

the San Diego County jail system. (Doc. No. 1.) The complaint makes claims against San 

Diego County Sheriff William D. Gore in his capacity as policy maker for the San Diego 

County jails and the Medical Director of the County jail later identified as Dr. Alfred 

Joshua, M.D., (“Defendants”). (Doc. Nos. 1, 58.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants 

denied him medical care for two injuries: first, for a knee injury sustained prior to his March 

9, 2011 incarceration at the George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”), and second, for 

a facial injury sustained in an attack by another prisoner on April 3, 2011. (Doc. No. 1 at 

3-4.) Plaintiff further alleges that jail personnel ignored two-Court ordered referrals for 

treatment and surgery for his alleged conditions. (Id. at 4.) 

On his form complaint, Plaintiff checked a box indicating that he exhausted all forms 

of administrative relief for the alleged denial of medical care before filing suit, but admits 

that he was not able to fully exhaust the inmate administrative grievance procedure because 

“there exist no viable exhaustion with the Medical Department when every verbal request 

for my leg surgery was ignored with a reply ‘you’ must wait to be evaluated by our doctor.” 

(Id. at 6.) Plaintiff additionally claims that his “written request/complaints were not 

responded to.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that “all attempts to secure a reply, written reason, 

                                               

1

 Magistrate Judge Lewis’ R&R provides a thorough and detailed summary of the 

relevant factual background in this case, and the majority of this section has been taken 

directly from the R&R. 

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were a frivolous act, and there exist in this specific instance no viable exhaustion 

available.” (Id.) 

On May 21, 2015, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds 

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Doc. No. 9.) 

The Court denied Defendants’ motion on procedural grounds so as to allow the parties to 

“flesh out the details of the exhaustion issue.” (Doc. Nos. 18, 19.) On August 1, 2016, 

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that Defendants’ failure to 

provide Plaintiff with the necessary surgeries to treat his facial and knee/leg injuries 

constituted deliberate indifference. (Doc. No. 50.) On August 29, 2016, Defendants filed a 

second motion for summary judgment again in part on the failure to exhaust issue. (Doc. 

No. 52.) On October 20, 2016, Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion. (Doc. No. 64.) 

A. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

Defendants describe the administrative remedy available at the jail and allege 

Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust such remedy. Defendants proffer the declaration of Lieutenant 

Derick Jones, who describes the San Diego County jails’ administrative grievance 

procedure, by which all prisoner grievances are addressed. (Doc. 52-6 ¶¶ 1-7.) Grievance 

forms are readily available for all prisoners to complete and submit, with three levels of 

subsequent review wherein jail facility personnel can resolve the grievance. (Id. at 2-3.) 

Each level of review provides the prisoner with a written response and a resolution, or 

reasons for its denial. (Id.) Written grievances may be submitted in one of two ways: (1) 

by placing them in a locked grievance box located outside the housing module, in which 

case the second page of the form would be signed and returned to the inmate “within a 

couple of days;” or (2) by handing them to a deputy or staff member, who, in his or her 

discretion, will sign and return the second page of the grievance form. (Id.) Inmates are 

instructed to keep a copy of this receipt for their records. (Id.) The rules state that a written 

grievance will be answered within 10 days, and each time a grievance is appealed to a 

higher level of command, it will invoke another 10-day response period. (Id.) The rules 

further state that there are three levels of review for grievances, and the inmate can submit 

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the grievance for review to the third and final level of grievance review, which is conducted 

by the Facility Commander. (Id.) 

Defendants provide evidence that Plaintiff was aware of the Sheriff’s administrative 

grievance procedure because he had previously used it to address concerns about library 

access, mail issues, and how the jail responded to his previous grievances. (Id. at 3-4.) Lt. 

Jones ultimately attests that Plaintiff never submitted a grievance regarding the alleged 

failure to provide medical care for either his leg/knee or face, and never pursued exhaustion 

at any level of review in the jail process. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Opposition 

In response, Plaintiff confirms he is “very familiar” with the administrative 

grievance process. (Doc. 64 at 21.) Plaintiff states in this instance, he submitted six 

grievances regarding the jail’s failure to provide medical care—three regarding his 

leg/knee injury and three regarding his facial injuries. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he could not 

secure a deputy or guard to sign off on any of his six grievances. (Id. at 27.) Rather, Plaintiff 

submitted all of his grievances in the locked grievance box. (Id. at 30.) However, Plaintiff 

contends Defendants never responded, nor returned any copies of the submitted grievances 

to Plaintiff. (Id. at 21, 31.) 

Plaintiff proffers declarations from two inmates, Leonardo V. Pena and Patrick 

Stanley Pawlicki, to demonstrate that administrative remedies were effectively unavailable 

to Plaintiff. (Id. at 58-61.) First, inmate Pena attests that he “heard deputies/guards tell 

inmates to put their grievances in the designated grievance box,” but refused to sign-off on 

such grievances personally, and that “some guards would sign-off, where others would 

not.” (Id. at 59.) He further attests that in the majority of cases, guards told inmates to put 

their grievances, especially the serious ones like staff abuse, in the box rather than sign off 

on them. (Id.) Second, inmate Pawlicki similarly attests that “on many occasions I 

witnessed the jailers tell inmates to put their grievances in the grievance box” and “not 

signing off on the grievance so that the inmate would have a copy of it.” (Id. at 61.) He 

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further declared that inmates would “complain when jailers would not sign-off, because 

they wanted proof of their grievances being filed/sent.” (Id.) 

C. Plaintiff’s Objection to the R&R 

Attached to Plaintiff’s timely-filed Objection is his signed declaration. (Doc. No. 78 

at 14-23.) Plaintiff attests, in detail, to the dates and circumstances regarding each time he 

submitted a grievance seeking medical care for his leg/knee and facial injuries. (Id.) 

Plaintiff further attests to never receiving a response from the jail regarding those 

grievances. (Id. at 19.) 

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Review of the Report and Recommendation 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provide a district 

judge’s duties regarding a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district 

judge should “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report to which the 

objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the finding or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also 

United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). 

II. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 

Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all available 

administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a). Congress enacted the PLRA in part to “allow prison officials a chance to resolve 

disputes regarding the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court; to 

reduce the number of prison suits; and to improve the quality of suits that are filed by 

producing a useful administrative record.” Garcia v. Miller, No. 14cv2266-LAB (BGS), 

2015 WL 5794552, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2015). With the passage of the PLRA, the 

exhaustion requirement was strengthened—it is “no longer left to the discretion of the 

district court, but is mandatory.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006); Ross v. Blake, 

136 S.Ct. 1850, 1857 (“[M]andatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA establish 

mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial discretion.”). “The obligation to 

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exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as some remedy remains ‘available.’ Once 

that is no longer the case, then there are no ‘remedies ... available,’ and the prisoner need 

not further pursue the grievance.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-41 (2001)). “Failure to exhaust is fatal to a 

prisoner’s claim.” Bush v. Baca, No. CV 08-1217-SJO (PJW), 2010 WL 4718512, at *3 

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010). 

However, “[a] federal court may nonetheless excuse a prisoner’s failure to exhaust 

if the prisoner takes ‘reasonable and appropriate steps’ to exhaust administrative remedies 

but prison officials render administrative relief ‘effectively unavailable.’ Ellis v. Navarro, 

No. C 07-05126 SBA (PR), 2011 WL 845902, at *1 (N.D. Cal. March 8, 2011). The 

mandatory exhaustion requirement under the PLRA is excused in three circumstances: (1) 

when an administrative procedure “operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or 

consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) when “an 

administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable 

of use”; and (3) when “a grievance process is rendered unavailable when prison 

administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of it through machination, 

misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1853-54. “Proper exhaustion 

demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” 

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92. “The relevant rules governing exhaustion are not defined by the 

PLRA, ‘but by the prison grievance process itself.’” Ayala v. Fermon, No. 14-cv-1794 GPC 

(JLB), 2017 WL 836193, at *5 (S.D. Cal. March 2, 2017) (quoting Jones v. Block, 549 

U.S. 199, 219 (2007)). “Exhaustion should be decided, if feasible, before reaching the 

merits of a prisoner’s claim.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (en 

banc). 

III. Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust 

A Court should grant summary judgment where the movant demonstrates “there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 

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disputed must support the assertion by: [] citing to particular part of materials in the record, 

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “An affidavit or declaration used to support 

or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be 

admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the 

matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). 

In a summary judgment motion for failure to exhaust, the Ninth Circuit instructs that 

it is defendant’s burden to use this evidence to “prove that there was an available 

administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino, 

747 F.3d at 1172. “Once the defendant has carried that burden, the prisoner has the burden 

of production. That is, the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence 

showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally 

available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. “If the undisputed 

evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a 

defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.” Id. at 1166. However, “[i]f 

material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and the district judge 

rather than a jury should determine the facts.” Id. (“[F]actual questions relevant to 

exhaustion should be decided by the judge, in the same manner a judge rather than a jury 

decides disputed factual questions relevant to jurisdiction and venue.”). 

“The Court must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes entry of judgment.” 

Fialho v. Herrera, No. 16cv1170-MMA (DHB), 2017 WL 840880, at *3 (S.D. Cal. March 

3, 2017). The Court determines only whether there is a genuine issue for trial, and in doing 

so, it must liberally construe Plaintiff’s filings because he is a pro se prisoner. Id. 

IV. Evidentiary Hearing 

“If ‘summary judgment is not appropriate,’ as to the issue of exhaustion, ‘the district 

judge may decide disputed questions of fact in a preliminary proceeding.’” Hamilton v. 

Hart, No. 1:10-cv-00272-LJO-EPG-PC, 2016 WL 1090109, at *4 (E.D. Cal. March 21, 

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2016) (citing Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168)). “[W]hile parties may be expected to simply 

reiterate their positions as stated in their briefs, ‘one of the purposes of an evidentiary 

hearing is to enable [ ] the finder of fact to see the witness’s physical reactions to the 

questions, to assess the witness’s demeanor, and to hear the tone of the witness’s voice.’” 

Hamilton, 2016 WL 1090109, at *4 (quoting U.S. v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 315 (9th Cir. 

1995)). “All of this assists the finder of fact in evaluating the witness’ credibility.” 

Hamilton, 2016 WL 1090109, at *4. “It is only in rare instances that credibility may be 

determined without an evidentiary hearing.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

DISCUSSION

 Plaintiff objects to the R&R on four grounds: (1) The Magistrate Judge improperly 

relied upon the declaration of jail deputy, Lt. Derick Jones, (“Jones’ Declaration”), in 

finding that Defendants met their burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion 

in Plaintiff’s case; (2) the Magistrate Judge improperly discounted the two declarations 

from inmates Leonardo V. Pena and Patrick Stanley Pawlicki (“Pena and Pawlicki 

Declarations”) as inadmissible hearsay evidence in finding that Plaintiff failed to 

demonstrate there were no administrative remedies available to him; (3) the Magistrate 

Judge erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants; and (4) the 

Magistrate Judge erroneously denied summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Court 

will address each of Plaintiff’s objections in turn.2

 

                                               

2

 The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s last objection that the Magistrate Judge 

erroneously denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. In his motion, Plaintiff 

incorrectly argues the wrong legal standard—that his motion should be granted due to 

“the existence of genuine issues of material facts that entitle the plaintiff to a Judgment as 

a matter of law.” (Doc. No. 50 at 12.) Similarly, in his Objection, the Plaintiff requests 

the Court to grant summary judgment in his favor, while simultaneously requesting the 

Court to “permit this case to respectfully proceed to trial.” (Doc. No. 78 at 12-13.) The 

R&R does not analyze at length its recommendation to deny Plaintiff’s motion; however, 

based on the following analysis, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED on exhaustion grounds. 

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1. The Magistrate Judge Properly Relied Upon the Declaration of Lt. Derick Jones in Determining that Defendants Satisfied Their Initial Burden of 

Raising the Absence of Plaintiff’s Exhaustion 

Plaintiff’s first objection to the R&R involves the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that 

Defendants met their burden, through the submission of Lt. Derick Jones’ declaration, that 

an available administrative remedy existed and Plaintiff failed to exhaust that remedy. The 

Magistrate Judge determined that the Jones’ Declaration proffered evidence that “Plaintiff 

was aware of the jail’s grievance procedure, had used it for other grievances and received 

responses from the jail, and failed to use any stage of the grievance process regarding the 

two Eighth Amendment claims in Plaintiff’s instant complaint.” (Doc. No. 74 at 6.) 

Plaintiff argues that the Jones’ Declaration is “more than questionable” and does “not 

present[] conclusive proof that Plaintiff did-not-file his grievances alleged, based solely on 

a review of an inconclusive, or complete record subject to Derick Jones review.” (Doc. No. 

78 at 6-7.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that it is “unknown” whether Lt. Jones worked at 

GBDF at the relevant time period and whether he is familiar with the jail’s administrative 

procedure and the “internal abuses” associated with that procedure. (Id. at 2.) For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objection in part. 

“In a typical PLRA case, a defendant will have to present probative evidence . . . to 

‘plead and prove’ [ ] that the prisoner has failed to exhaust available administrative 

remedies under § 1997e(a).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169 (citing Jones v. Block, 549 U.S. at 

204)). This burden is achieved by producing testimony from jail deputies that describe the 

jail’s grievance procedure and provide an overview of the jail’s record-keeping system. See 

e.g. Morton v. Hall, 599 F.3d 942, 944 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s finding 

that defendants satisfied their initial burden by submitting testimony of jail coordinators 

who declared that they reviewed records and “found no evidence that Morton had ever filed 

a grievance pertaining to his assault.”). Lt. Jones’ statements appear to be based upon his 

personal knowledge regarding the regular practice of the jail’s inmate grievance procedure 

and Plaintiff’s grievance records. (Doc. No. 52-6.) According to Lt. Jones’ account of the 

inmate administrative grievance procedure and his review of Plaintiff’s records, 

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Defendants have at least met their burden of showing that administrative remedies were 

available to Plaintiff. See Smith v. Cobb, No. 3:15-cv-00176-GPC-WVG, 2016 WL 

4523847, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016) (“[T]hese declarations ‘at most meet[] their 

burden of demonstrating a system of available administrative remedies at the initial step of 

the Albino burden-shifting inquiry.’”) (citing Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 

(9th Cir. 2015)). Whether the Jones’ Declaration is enough for Defendants to carry their 

ultimate burden of proof in light of Plaintiff’s factual allegations is a separate inquiry and 

is addressed below. See Williams, 775 F.3d at 1192. 

Thus, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objection to the extent it challenges the 

Court’s consideration of the Jones’ Declaration for purposes of determining whether 

Defendants demonstrated the existence of an available administrative remedy. 

2. The Magistrate Judge Properly Discounted the Pena and Pawlicki 

Declarations in Determining that Plaintiff Failed to Demonstrate The 

“Unavailability” of Administrative Remedies 

Plaintiff also objects to the R&R on the basis that the Magistrate Judge improperly 

concluded that the Pena and Pawlicki Declarations were based upon hearsay. Plaintiff 

argues that these declarations “constitute more than mere hearsay evidence, and should 

therefore be accepted by the Court as evidence.” (Doc. No. 78 at 6.) Specifically, Plaintiff 

contends that Mr. Pena and Mr. Pawlicki “attest to witnessing a behavior by the Guards 

that give rise to a pattern, behavior reflecting non-acceptance of grievances and providing 

inmates with receipts of the grievance, through the receipt of a copy.” (Id. at 5.) For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court finds the Magistrate Judge did not err in disregarding the 

Pena and Pawlicki Declarations as inadmissible hearsay. 

References to unsworn statements are insufficient to generate a genuine dispute of 

fact and cannot properly be considered in opposition to a summary judgment motion. Jones 

v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2015). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56(c)(4), “affidavits ‘shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 

facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 

competent to testify to the matters stated therein.’” Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 

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410, 419 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding it was an abuse of discretion for the district court, at 

summary judgment, to consider information from an affidavit based on inadmissible 

hearsay rather than the affiant’s personal knowledge). 

In his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff proffers 

the Pena and Pawlicki Declarations to satisfy his burden of production. The Magistrate 

Judge highlights the inadmissible hearsay within those Declarations as follows: 

Inmate Pena merely ‘heard deputies/guards tell inmates to put their 

grievances in the designated grievance box’ but refused to sign-off on such 

grievances personally and merely heard that many inmates would complain 

over ‘non-responses to their issue.’ (Doc. No. 64 at 59.) Inmate Pawlicki 

likewise merely heard ‘jailers tell inmates to put their grievances in the 

grievance box” and heard inmates ‘complain when the jailers would not signoff, because they wanted proof of their grievance being filed/sent.’ (Doc. No. 

64 at 61.) (Emphasis added.) 

Because the referenced statements made by the deputies/guards, jailers, and inmates 

within the Pena and Pawlicki Declarations are unsworn, and the source of those unsworn 

statements are unknown and unclear, they are inadmissible hearsay and cannot be used to 

demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d at 1032. Thus, 

the Magistrate Judge correctly disregarded the Pena and Pawlicki Declarations as 

inadmissible hearsay in concluding that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden. For these 

reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objection. 

3. The Magistrate Judge Improperly Granted the Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment on the Basis of Failure to Exhaust Because Disputed Material Facts Exist 

Lastly, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that summary 

judgment be granted in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is 

improper because “there exist disputed factual questions relevant to the exhaustion of 

administrative remedies, where these issues are of material fact that cannot be overcome 

by the inconclusive sole submission of the Declaration of Derick Jones.” (Doc. No. 78 at 

7.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees that disputed material facts exist and 

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finds the Magistrate Judge incorrectly recommended that the Court grant Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment. 

In support of his Objection to the R&R, Plaintiff attaches his signed declaration in 

an effort to demonstrate the “unavailability” of the jail’s administrative remedies. (Id. at 

14-23.) Plaintiff outlines each instance he filed a grievance regarding his need for medical 

care: 

April 28, 2011: Plaintiff filed the first leg/knee injury grievance in the locked 

grievance box because the assigned deputy would not sign-off on the 

grievance at that instance. 

May 23, 2011: Plaintiff filed the second leg/knee injury grievance when no 

response to the first grievance was received. 

June 7, 2011: Plaintiff filed the first facial injury grievance. 

June 28, 2011: Plaintiff filed the second facial injury grievance when no 

response to the first grievance was received. 

July 14 or 15, 2011: Plaintiff filed two grievances in the locked grievance 

box, one for each injury. 

(Id. at 16-18.) Plaintiff attests that the jail never responded to, nor acknowledged any of his 

six submitted grievances. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff claims that because of the jail’s nonresponse, he has “no copy retained to verify the grievance was submitted through the 

Grievance-Box.” (Id.) In addition to the filed grievances, Plaintiff explains that he 

frequently followed up with medical personnel, both verbally and in writing, about the 

status of his written grievances and never received definitive answers. (Id. at 16-19.) The 

overarching theme of Plaintiff’s sworn testimony purports to demonstrate an 

“unavailability” of administrative relief where “there has been an on-going consistent 

failure to provide adequate and appropriate” responses to Plaintiff’s filed grievances, thus, 

“foreclosing the ability to exhaust.” (Id. at 21-22.) 

In finding that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden, the Magistrate Judge focused on 

the lack of Plaintiff’s “signed declaration” and “tangible evidence.” (Doc. No. 74 at 7.) 

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Specifically, the Magistrate Judge held “Plaintiff provides no information as to when he 

attempted to give any deputies completed copies of the grievance forms or when he placed 

them in the grievance box. Plaintiff fails to provide copies of any of his grievances that 

were placed in the locked box. Plaintiff fails to show how he made a good faith effort to 

get a response from the jail on any of his grievances.” (Id.) The Magistrate Judge concluded 

the court “would be remiss to take Plaintiff’s word in his opposition papers that jail officials 

ignored Plaintiff’s submitted grievances when Plaintiff provides no tangible evidence 

admissible to a court that these grievance forms were actually filled out in the first place.” 

(Id. at 7-8.) 

When “material facts relevant to the issue of exhaustion are disputed, then ‘summary 

judgment should be denied’ and disputed factual questions relevant to exhaustion should 

be decided by the Court ‘in a preliminary proceeding.’” Willard v. Sebok, No. CV 13-2251-

MMM (RNB), 2015 WL 391673, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2015) (citing Albino, 747 F.3d 

at 1170-71). See also Jones v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 2014 WL 3908184, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 

12, 2014) (“district courts should hear oral testimony where [...] factual questions [are] not 

readily ascertainable from the declarations of witnesses or questions of credibility 

predominate . . .”) (now citable for its persuasive value pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36–

3); Coleman v. Brown, 938 F. Supp. 2d 955, 961-62 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (resolving credibility 

determinations are normally accomplished through an evidentiary hearing). Here, 

Plaintiff’s declaration raises disputed material facts relevant to the issue of exhaustion and 

thus, prompts the Court to deny summary judgment. (See Doc. No. 78.) Since Plaintiff’s 

declaration purports to arise from his own personal knowledge and experience in 

navigating the jail’s administrative relief procedure, a genuine issue exists as to whether 

something rendered Plaintiff’s ability to exhaust effectively “unavailable.” See Willard, 

2015 WL 391673 at *8. After setting forth evidence through his sworn declaration, (Doc. 

No. 78 at 14-23), the Court agrees with Plaintiff that “[t]here exist disputed factual 

questions relevant to the exhaustion of administrative remedies” where Plaintiff has raised 

evidence suggesting that the jail may have foreclosed his ability to exhaust. (See Doc. No. 

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78 at 7-8.) See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Dole v. 

Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[P]rison officials’ failure to respond to a 

properly filed grievance makes remedies ‘unavailable’ and therefore excuses failure to 

exhaust.”). 

Lt. Jones vouches that after a review of Plaintiff’s jail records, Defendants 

determined that “Plaintiff did not file any written grievances regarding the alleged denial 

of medical care.” (Doc. No. 52-6 ¶ 17.) However, while this testimony is persuasive to 

Defendants’ position, it is not dispositive to the exhaustion issue in light of Plaintiff’s 

sworn account to the contrary. See e.g. Bush, 2010 WL 4718512, at *3 n. 7 (“The fact that 

the jail has no record of ever having received the complaint is of no moment. Assuming 

that it was lost by jail staff, this fact is inconsequential to the Court’s determination that 

Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies . . . Assuming instead that Plaintiff never 

filed one and his declaration that he did is untrue, as Defendants’ seem to imply in their 

briefs, this is a factual issue that can only be resolved by a jury.”); Ellis, 2011 WL 845902, 

at *4 (holding the fact that defendants had no record of plaintiff’s grievance, “at most, 

corroborates their claim of non-receipt. It does not, however, prove that Plaintiff failed to 

timely and properly seek to submit” his grievance . . . “Nor does it prove the falsity of 

Plaintiff’s statements in his declaration.”); Dole, 438 F.3d at 811 (“Because Dole properly 

followed procedure and prison officials were responsible for handling his grievance, it 

cannot be said that Dole failed to exhaust his remedies.”). At this stage, it remains to be 

seen whether Plaintiff “has done everything humanly possible” to comply with the jail’s 

grievance procedure. (Doc. No. 78 at 20.) 

The Court finds it unpersuasive that Plaintiff has not provided copies of any of the 

grievances he submitted in the locked grievance boxes because the return of such copies is 

seemingly at the discretion of the deputies/guards—they only provide prisoners with a copy 

at some point in time after acknowledging receipt of the grievance. (Doc. No. 52-6 at 2.) 

Since this response structure undoubtedly places the prisoner’s word against that of the jail 

guard’s, a disputed issue of credibility arises. See e.g. Dole, 438 F.3d at 813 (“We believe 

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that the potential for fraud does not justify obligating truthful prisoners to prove that they 

mailed their complaints when the prison authorities do not provide them with means for 

verification.”); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-72 (1988) (“And if there is a delay like 

the prisoner suspects is attributable to the prison authorities, he is unlikely to have any 

means of proving it . . .”). 

Nor does the Court find it persuasive that Plaintiff did not elaborate on his efforts to 

exhaust the administrative grievance procedure in his Complaint. See Jones v. Block, 549 

U.S. at 216 (“[Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and ... inmates 

are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”). In fact, 

it was on this basis that the Court denied summary judgment in favor of Defendants in the 

first instance, so as to allow for discovery on the exhaustion issue at the pre-answer stage. 

(See Doc. No. 19.) See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169, citing Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 

F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[O]nly in rare cases will a district court be able to 

conclude from the face of the complaint that a prisoner has not exhausted his administrative 

remedies and that he is without a valid excuse.”). Notably, it appears that since that time, 

Defendants proffered no new evidence in their summary judgment motion as to the 

exhaustion issue other than the previously submitted Jones’ Declaration, which attests to 

the void of the six grievances in Plaintiff’s prison records. This time around, the record is 

equipped with two competing sworn testimonies: Defendants’ account that Plaintiff failed 

to exhaust and Plaintiff’s account that he exhausted administrative remedies up until the 

point there was no “available” procedure left. Thus, the existence of disputed material facts 

here raises issues of credibility and renders summary judgment improper. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (“[A]t the summary judgment stage the 

judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter 

but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”). See e.g. Willard, 2015 WL 

391673 at *8 (holding questions that go toward the evaluation of plaintiff’s credibility are 

not properly considered at the summary judgment stage); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166 

(“[F]actual questions relevant to exhaustion should be decided by the judge, in the same 

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manner a judge rather than a jury decides disputed factual questions relevant to jurisdiction 

and venue.”). 

Thus, the Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s objection that Magistrate Judge incorrectly 

granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment due to the existence of disputed 

material facts on the issue of exhaustion. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court DECLINES IN PART the R&R, OVERRULES 

IN PART AND SUSTAINS IN PART Plaintiff’s objections, DENIES Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds, and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment on exhaustion grounds. The Court orders an evidentiary hearing on the 

issue of exhaustion to be heard on June 15, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. Defendants are ordered to 

arrange for transportation of Plaintiff to the United States District Court for this hearing. 

 In addition, and in preparation for the hearing, any Plaintiff’s motion to compel the 

attendance of incarcerated witnesses or correctional officers for such evidentiary hearing 

must be filed by April 24, 2017. Oppositions to these motions will be filed no later than 

May 8, 2017, and no written reply will be required. Plaintiff may reply orally at the motion 

hearing set for May 31, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. Defendants are ordered to make arrangements 

for Plaintiff to appear telephonically at the motion hearing. 

With regard to such motions, the Court sets forth the following procedures: 

A. Procedures for Obtaining Attendance of Incarcerated Witnesses Who Agree 

to Testify Voluntarily: 

An incarcerated witness who agrees voluntarily to attend the evidentiary hearing to 

give testimony cannot come to court unless this Court orders the warden or other custodian 

to permit the witness to be transported to court. This Court will not issue such an order 

unless it is satisfied that the prospective witness is willing to attend and the prospective 

witness has actual knowledge of relevant facts. 

A party intending to introduce the testimony of incarcerated witnesses who have 

agreed voluntarily to attend the evidentiary hearing must serve and file a written motion 

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for a court order requiring that such witnesses be brought to court at the time of the 

evidentiary hearing. The motion must: (A) state the name, address, and prison identification 

number of each such witness; and (B) be accompanied by declarations showing that each 

witness is willing to testify and that each witness has actual knowledge of relevant facts. 

The motion should be entitled “Motion for Attendance of Incarcerated Witnesses.” 

The willingness of the prospective witness can be shown in one of two ways: (1) the 

party himself can swear by declaration under penalty of perjury that the prospective witness 

has informed the party that he or she is willing to testify voluntarily without being 

subpoenaed, in which declaration the party must state when and where the prospective 

witness informed the party of this willingness; or (2) the party can serve and file a 

declaration, signed under penalty of perjury by the prospective witness, in which the 

witness states that he or she is willing to testify without being subpoenaed. 

The prospective witness’s actual knowledge of relevant facts can be shown in one 

of two ways: (1) if the party has actual firsthand knowledge that the prospective witness 

was an eyewitness or an ear-witness to the relevant facts (i.e., if an incident occurred in 

plaintiff’s cell and, at the time, plaintiff saw that a cell mate was present and observed the 

incident, plaintiff may swear to the cell mate’s ability to testify), the party himself can 

swear by the declaration under penalty of perjury that the prospective witness has actual 

knowledge; or (2) the party can serve and file a declaration signed under penalty of perjury 

by the prospective witness in which the witness describes the relevant facts to which the 

prospective witness was an eye or ear witness. Whether the declaration is made by the party 

or by the prospective witness, it must be specific about the incident, when and where it 

occurred, who was present, and how the prospective witness happened to be in a position 

to see or to hear what occurred at the time it occurred. 

The Court will review and rule on the motion for attendance of incarcerated 

witnesses, specifying which prospective witnesses must be brought to court. Subsequently, 

the Court will issue the order necessary to cause the witness’s custodian to bring the witness 

to court. 

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B. Procedures for Obtaining Attendance of Incarcerated Witnesses Who Refuse 

to Testify Voluntarily: 

If a party seeks to obtain the attendance of any incarcerated witnesses who refuse to 

testify voluntarily, the party should submit a motion for the attendance of such witnesses. 

Such motion should be in the form described above. In addition, the party must indicate in 

the motion that the incarcerated witnesses are not willing to testify voluntarily. 

C. Procedures Regarding Any Written Request by Plaintiff for the Attendance of 

Certain Correctional Officers as Witnesses in The Case, The Parties Must 

Proceed as Follows: 

Plaintiff’s motion must (1) state the name of each such witness; and (2) be 

accompanied by declaration of plaintiff describing what actual knowledge of relevant facts 

each such witness has to the triable issues in the case. The motion should be entitled 

“Motion to Compel Attendance of Correctional Officers at Evidentiary Hearing.” This 

motion may be combined with a motion to obtain attendance of incarcerated witnesses who 

agree to testify voluntarily. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 24, 2017 

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