Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01138/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01138-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Roderick Tyler Kamalo,

Petitioner

-vsLance R. Hetmer, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-11-1138-PHX-FJM (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Tucson, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June

6, 2011 (Doc. 1). On September 15, 2011, Respondents filed their Limited Answer 

(Doc. 11). Petitioner has not filed a Reply.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In June and July, 2005 Petitioner and others were involved in a series of armed 

robberies of homes that were drop houses for marijuana, using DEA uniforms for cover. 

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(Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. at 1-6.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 11, are referenced herein 

as “Exhibit __.”)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On September 30, 2005, Petitioner and 3 others were indicted in the Maricopa 

County Superior Court, Case CR 2005-013230-004. Charges against Petitioner included: 

two counts of conspiracy to commit armed robbery; one count of assisting a criminal 

syndicate; and one count of misconduct involving weapons. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

On February 24, 2006, Petitioner and a different co-defendant were indicted in the 

Maricopa County Superior Court, Case CR 2006-006288-001, on three counts of armed 

robbery, and one count of burglary. (Exhibit B, Indictment.) 

The state moved to consolidate the two matters for trial (Exhibit C), and the trial 

court granted the motion, finding that the charges arose out of a common scheme and 

plan. (Exhibit E, M.E. 11/20/6.)

Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial, and was convicted on all counts, including: 

three counts of armed robbery; one count of burglary; two counts of conspiracy to 

commit burglary; one count of assisting a criminal syndicate; and one count of 

misconduct involving weapons. (Exhibit F, M.E. 2/23/06.)

The judge sentenced Appellant to aggravated terms of fifteen years 

on each of the three armed robbery convictions, and presumptive 

terms of ten and one-half years on the first-degree burglary 

conviction, four and one-half years on the assisting a criminal 

syndicate conviction, and four and one-half years on the misconduct 

involving weapons conviction, all terms to be served concurrently. 

The judge sentenced Appellant to mitigated sentences of five years 

on each of the conspiracy convictions, each to be served 

consecutively to the other sentences, and consecutive to one

another.

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(Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. at 6-7.) Combined, Petitioner is serving a total of 25 years in 

prison.

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, asserting claims that:

1. the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating the offenses for trial;

2. the two conspiracy counts, counts 5 and 6 were multiplicitous;

3. the armed robbery sentence was improperly enhanced with an element used to 

make the offense a “dangerous offense”; and

4. the presentence incarceration credits were improperly calculated. (Exhibit I, 

Opening Brief.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the conviction and sentence on Count 6, 

finding the offenses multiplicitous because there was only one conspiracy alleged, and 

corrected the presentence incarceration credits. (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec.)

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit K, PFR), 

which was summarily denied. (Exhibit M, Order 9/23/9.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner then filed a Notice of Postconviction Relief (Exhibit N), and counsel 

filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit O), arguing that:

1. Petitioner’s federal Due Process rights were violated when the trial court 

appointed counsel for a defense witness; and

2. trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to object to that 

appointment. 

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The PCR court found Petitioner’s first claim “precluded” under Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.2, and that the second claim was without merit. (Exhibit Q, M.E. 

7/12/10.) 

Petitioner asserts that he appealed his “First petition” and “Second Petition” to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.) However, Petitioner has provided no 

record of any such proceedings beyond his first PCR Petition. The records provided by 

Respondents reflect no such proceedings. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that 

Petitioner filed only one PCR petition, and that he sought no review from its denial.

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 6, 2011 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following five grounds for relief:

1. Ineffective Assistance - ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his 

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right;

2. Consolidation - violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

based on consolidation of charges;

3. Double Jeopardy - violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

where he was convicted twice of the same offense in violation of double 

jeopardy;

4. Aggravation of Sentence - the elements of the crime of armed robbery were 

unlawfully used to aggravate his sentence for that offense; and

5. Actual Innocence - violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights by 

conviction despite his actual innocence. 

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Response - On September 15, 2011, Respondents filed their Limited Answer 

(Doc. 11). Respondents argue that: Ground 3 is moot; Grounds 2, 4, and 5 fail to state 

cognizable federal claims; and Grounds 1, 2, and 4 are procedurally defaulted; and 

Ground 5 is unexhausted.

Reply – Petitioner was given 30 days from service of the Answer to file a reply. 

(Order 6/14/11, Doc. 3 at 3.) Petitioner has not replied.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUNDS 1, 2, 4 and 5 - EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents contend that Grounds 1 (Ineffective Assistance), 2 (Consolidation), 

4 (Aggravation of Sentence), and 5 (Actual Innocence) were never fairly presented to the 

state courts and all but Ground 5 are now procedurally defaulted and barred from federal 

habeas review. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 21 et seq.) As to Ground 5, Respondents contend 

that Petitioner’s remedies are simply unexhausted. As to Ground 3 (Mulitiplicity), 

Respondents concede the claim was exhausted, but assert it is now moot because of the 

relief granted by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 11 et seq.) 

Petitioner argues Ground 1 was presented in his first PCR (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6), 

Grounds 2 and 4 were presented on direct appeal (id. at 7, 9). He asserts that his failure 

to present Ground 5 was his lawyer’s failing (id. at physical 9). 

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

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codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, 

but must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a 

"fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his 

constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 

(1971). A claim has been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has 

described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is 

based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, 

Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

/ /

/ /

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2. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Ground 1 (Ineffective Assistance) - Here, Petitioner’s only foray to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals was on direct appeal. He asserted no claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel in that proceeding. Accordingly, Ground 1 was not properly exhausted.

Ground 2 (Consolidation) – In Ground 2, Petitioner asserts the charges against 

him were consolidated for trial in violation of his 6th and 14th Amendment rights. On 

direct appeal, he argued that the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating the 

offenses for trial. (Exhibit I, Opening Brief at 27, et seq.) However, he cited only state 

authorities in support of that argument, relying on Arizona Rules of Evidence 404 and 

403, and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.3. (Id.) The Arizona Court of Appeals 

disposed of the claim on the basis of the latter rule and related state authorities. (Id at 7-

10.) 

Failure to alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the claim amounts to 

failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. at 366. While the 

petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 

404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 

1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were 

before the state courts or that a “somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson 

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). 

Accordingly, Petitioner has never fairly presented to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals the federal constitutional claims he asserts in Ground 2, and thus Ground 2 was 

not properly exhausted.

Ground 4 (Aggravation of Sentence) - In his Ground 4, Petitioner argues that 

his 6th and 14th Amendment rights were violated when an element of the offense (i.e. the 

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threat of injury) was used to enhance his sentence. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) On direct 

appeal, Petitioner argued that the armed robbery sentence was improperly enhanced with 

an element used to make the offense a “dangerous offense”. However, in making that 

argument, Petitioner never raised the constitutional claims he now raises. Instead, he 

relied solely upon constructions of the state sentencing statutes, and related state 

authorities. (Exhibit I, Opening Brief at 47-50).

Accordingly, Petitioner has never presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, the 

federal constitutional claims he asserts in Ground 4, and thus Ground 4 was not properly

exhausted.

Ground 5 (Actual Innocence) – In his Ground 5, Petitioner argues that he is 

actually innocent, and thus held in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at physical 9.) Petitioner never asserted such a claim to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, and thus his Ground 5 was not properly exhausted.

3. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper 

absent a “miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 

1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

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in Grounds 1, 2, and 4 to the state courts, and thus they are procedurally defaulted. 

Respondents generally rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 

32.2(a) and time bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.4(a). (Answer, Doc. 11 at 22.) 

As to Ground 5, Respondents acknowledge that the “Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure specifically exempt actual innocence claims from the time limitations and 

preclusion rules, and permit a defendant to raise such claims at any time.” (Doc. 11 at 

27.) Accordingly, they argue this claim is simply unexhausted.

Because at least one of Petitioner’s claims is unexhausted and not procedurally 

defaulted, the Court need not analyze whether the others are procedurally defaulted, or 

simply unexhausted.

4. Effect of Mixed Petition

Here, Petitioner’s petition contains a mix of exhausted (Ground 3)1, unexhausted

(Ground 5), and purportedly procedurally defaulted (Grounds 1, 2 and 4) claims. 

“Federal district courts must dismiss mixed habeas petitions.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 

225, 231 (2004) (rejecting Ninth Circuit mandate for advising pro se petitioner of 

potential of dismiss and stay approach). Petitioner has not sought leave to dismiss his 

unexhausted Ground 5, and thus dismissal of the entire petition, without prejudice, is 

appropriate.

5. Stay and Abeyance

The undersigned notes that a stay and abeyance approach may be utilized to avoid 

 

1 Respondents argue that Ground 3 is moot. Because the petition is a mixed petition, the 

undersigned does not reach whether the claim is moot.

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the effect of an expiring statute of limitations in the interim between the filing of a timely 

mixed petition dismissed as a mixed petition, and the filing of a second exhausted 

petition. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). However, that process is limited to 

situations where the petitioner has shown good cause for failure to exhaust his claims 

and that the claims are potentially meritorious. Id. at 277.

Petitioner has not sought such a process.

Further, Petitioner’s only purported explanation for his failure to exhaust his 

Ground 5 was his attorneys’ failure to do so on appeal. However, that does not explain 

Petitioner’s failure to raise the claim on his own in a subsequent PCR proceeding, an 

avenue that remained and remains open to him. 

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff would continue to reassert an exhausted 

claim of actual innocence, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) provides that habeas relief may be 

granted on an adjudicated state prisoner’s claim only if the state court’s decision was 

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The Supreme Court has not 

yet recognized actual innocence as a grounds for habeas relief. See Herrera v. Collins, 

506 U.S. 390, 400-401 (1993). See also Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1164-65 

(9th Cir. 2000) (pointing out that Herrera did not foreclose a free-standing claim of 

actual innocence, and a majority assumed that such a claim existed).

Accordingly, the undersigned finds no basis to stay consideration of the Petition 

pending exhaustion of Petitioner’s remedies on his unexhausted actual innocence claim.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

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that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that 

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth 

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herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the 

extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a 

certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed June 6, 2011 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

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right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: March 2, 2012

11-1138r RR 12 02 23 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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