Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01927/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01927-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID M. MINOR 

CDCR # J-99820, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:16-cv-1927-AJB-NLS 

ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL 

ACTION: 

1) FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING 

FEES AND/OR MOVE TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS 

AND 

2) AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) 

DAVID M. MINOR (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has 

filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). 

I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status

 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

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$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 

(“PLRA”) amendments to § 1915 require that every prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP must pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, 

__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th 

Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Section 1915(a)(2) requires all persons seeking to proceed without full prepayment 

of fees to submit an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets possessed and 

demonstrates an inability to pay. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 

Cir. 2015). In support of this affidavit, prisoners must also submit a “certified copy of the 

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 

Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the 

account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the 

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then 

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until 

the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629. 

Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee required to commence a civil action, nor has he 

filed a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). Therefore, his 

case cannot yet proceed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1051. 

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II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 

 Even if Plaintiff paid the filing fee or were granted leave to proceed IFP, however, 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, also enacted as part of the PLRA, requires sua sponte dismissal of 

prisoner complaints, or any portions of them, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ ] to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); See Coleman v. 

Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (2015). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.”’ 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). 

 Plaintiff’s allegations are far from clear, but those that are clearly qualify as 

frivolous under § 1915A(b)(1). For example, Plaintiff claims that the State of California 

and several RJD officials have engaged in “unfair labor practices,” violated unidentified 

provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, have “collective[ly] bargained in the 

criminal context,” and have committed a “possibl[e]” but unspecificed “act of anarchy” 

against him even though “there is no doubt in [his] mind that [he] ha[s] been tested in 

cognitive thinking and telekinesis.” See Compl. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7.) Plaintiff further 

contends that “Republicans ha[ve] descended into a bitter exchange with [his] attorney, 

Hillary Clinton,” and that these “outright unethical practice[s]” could result in 

“unpleasant litigation ... that poses a much greater threat to Colin Powell.” (Id. at 7.) 

“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal 

conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact....[The] 

term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal 

conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 

325 (1989). A pleading is “factual[ly] frivolous[ ]” under § 1915A(b)(1) if “the facts 

alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are 

judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 

25, 33 (1992). When determining whether a complaint is frivolous, the court need not 

accept the allegations as true, but must “pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual 

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allegations,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, to determine whether they are “ ‘fanciful,’ 

‘fantastic,’ [or] ‘delusional,’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325-

28). 

Applying these standards to the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court 

finds it must sua sponte dismiss his pleading in its entirety as both legally and factually 

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 920 n.1. 

III. Conclusion and Order 

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

 (1) DISMISSES this civil action based on Plaintiff’s failure to pay the $400 

civil filing and administrative fee or to submit a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) and 1915(a); 

 (2) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1); and 

(3) DENIES leave to amend as futile. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 

n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that if claims are classified as frivolous, “there is by 

definition no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”). 

The Clerk may close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 8, 2016 

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