Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01589/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01589-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Background

The complaint alleges that late in the evening or early on the morning on August 24th/25th, 

Plaintiff encountered Defendant Hughes, a sworn peace officer. (Doc. 7 at 4) During this encounter, 

Plaintiff alleges that Hughes had no justification to detain or arrest him or to use force against him. Id.

at 4-8. Based upon these allegations, Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officer 

for various claims under the Fourth Amendment1and asserts a Monell claim against the entity.

II. Legal Standards Governing Motions in Limine

“Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the 

 

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In particular, Plaintiff’s first cause of action asserts excessive force. His second claims false arrest and malicious 

prosecution. His third—against Doe defendants—claims failure to intervene and his fourth cause of action asserts 

municipal liability for unlawful customs of the using excessive force, performing illegal searches and seizures, making 

false arrests, falsifying evidence and filing false police reports by the entity’s law enforcement agency. Hi fifth cause of

action (also titled the fourth cause of action) claims Hughes intentionally inflicted emotional distress and the final claim 

asserts an assault and battery.

BRENNAN COLBERT,

 Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF KERN, et al,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-01589- JLT

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN 

LIMINE

(Doc. 50)

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practice has developed pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of 

trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n. 2 (1984). The Ninth Circuit explained motions in 

limine “allow parties to resolve evidentiary disputes ahead of trial, without first having to present 

potentially prejudicial evidence in front of a jury.” Brodit v. Cabra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 

2003) (citations omitted). 

Nevertheless, motions in limine seeking to exclude broad categories of evidence are 

disfavored. See Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975). The 

Court “is almost always better situated during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of 

evidence.” Wilkins v. Kmart Corp., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1218 (D. Kan. 2007). The Sixth Circuit 

explained, “[A] better practice is to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence as they arise [in 

trial]” as opposed to ruling on a motion in limine. Sperberg, 519 F.2d at 712. Nevertheless, motions 

in limine are “an important tool available to the trial judge to ensure the expeditious and evenhanded 

management of the trial proceedings.” Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Services, 115 F.3d 436, 

440 (7th Cir. 1997). 

“[A] motion in limine should not be used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence,” C & E 

Services, Inc. v. Ashland Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 316, 323 (D. D.C. 2008), because that is the province 

of the jury. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). 

III. Defendants’ Motions in Limine

A. Defendants’ Motion in Limine #1 to exclude evidence and argument that a lesser 

amount of force should have been used

Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiff from offering evidence that a lesser amount of force or 

less forceful alternatives could have been used. Though Plaintiff confirms that he “has no intention of 

eliciting from Mr. Clark any opinions or legal conclusions on issues that will determine the outcome of 

the case,” Plaintiff does intend to elicit testimony from Mr. Clark about “the alternative methods 

available to Defendant Hughes at the time he tased Plaintiff and when taser deployment is an 

appropriate use of force thereby assisting the jury to determine whether Defendant Hughes’ use of the

taser was objectively reasonable.” (Doc. 52 at 5)

The objective reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment applies to uses of force by 

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government officials. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Thus, the trier of fact must 

determine whether the officer’s action was “‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting [the officers], without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 

397. Graham instructs that the trier of fact must consider, “the severity of the crime at issue, whether 

the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively 

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. The suspect’s mental fitness may be 

a factor as well if, that capability was apparent. Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 980 (9th 

Cir.2010). Other considerations include the ability of the officer to give a verbal warning, whether a 

verbal warning was given and, “[i]n some cases . . . the availability of alternative methods of capturing 

or subduing a suspect may be a factor to consider.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th 

Cir.2005)

The Ninth Circuit authority holds when considering the totality of the circumstances, the 

availability of alternative forceful responses may be a factor in determining the reasonableness of the 

force used. “While police officers need not employ the least intrusive degree of force possible during 

an arrest, they must at least consider less intrusive methods, and the presence of feasible alternatives is 

a relevant consideration in an excessive force analysis. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 831 n. 15 

(9th Cir.2010).” Kanda v. Longo, 2012 WL 1893565 at *1 (9th Cir. 2012). However, the mere 

availability of alternatives does not render the forceful action taken unreasonable. Scott v. Henrich, 39 

F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir.1994); Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2010). Indeed, a police 

officer is not obligated to start with a lesser forceful response and, only when that fails, graduate to a 

more forceful response. Rather, the officer is obligated to use that degree of force that is reasonable to 

the totality of the circumstances. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

Thus, though Plaintiff’s expert may testify as to the forceful alternatives Hughes had available 

and what reasonably well-trained officers are taught regarding when they may use force, he may not

testify that using the taser in the circumstances confronting Hughes was excessive or unreasonable or 

the like. He is limited to responding to hypothetical situations posed to him. With these conditions, the 

motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

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B. Defendants’ Motion in Limine #2 to preclude Roger Clark from offering 

testimony about what Dawson purportedly told Hughes

Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiff’s expert, Roger Clark, from testifying that the prowler 

described by Dawson “was not similar to” Plaintiff. Defendants argue that, at the time of his 

deposition, Mr. Clark was unable to state his source for the information as to what Dawson told 

Hughes when he report his report. Defendants provide an excerpt of Mr. Clark’s deposition at which 

he indicated he relied upon statements of Plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Moreno, the complaint and the event 

chronology. (Doc. 50-1 at 8) 

Notably, the Court has found no reference in the complaint or the first amended complaint to a 

claim that Plaintiff’s physical characteristics varied from those given the officer regarding the prowler 

suspect. (Docs. 1, 7) Moreover, as pointed out by counsel at the deposition, the event chronology 

does not indicate that Dawson gave Hughes a physical description; rather it seems to detail only that 

the dispatcher was given a description, though, presumably by Dawson. (Doc. 52-1 at 20) There is no 

indication whether Hughes received this information. Finally, the portion of the deposition transcript 

provided does not indicate what Mr. Moreno told Mr. Clark. 

However, at his deposition, Mr. Clark explained that when he wrote his report, he presumed 

that Dawson gave Hughes a more complete description, consistent with what the dispatcher noted. 

(Doc. 50-1 at 10-11) One inference from this testimony is that Mr. Clark formed his opinion on this 

topic before he had an evidentiary basis for it. Another is that the opinion he formed at the time he 

wrote his report was based on speculation. However, it is undisputed that Mr. Clark learned later 

about what Dawson told Hughes and, in Mr. Clark’s opinion, this information verified his 

assumptions. 

In the Court’s view, though Mr. Clark may note the various descriptions given, he is not 

entitled to testify that the descriptions given were or were not similar to Mr. Colbert’s appearance. He 

may say what he learned about what Hughes was told and what he learned about the description given

the dispatcher. He may not opine that the various descriptions match, that the descriptions don’t 

match or that there is variability between the descriptions; this is a determination is for the jury. On 

the other hand, Mr. Clark may respond to hypothetical situations, e.g. “If a reasonably well-trained 

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officer is given a description of a prowler and then sees a person on the street who looked much 

different, would the officer have reasonable suspicion to detain the person for prowling?” 

Defendants cite to no legal authority that would require Mr. Clark’s opinions to be further 

limited. Indeed, while Mr. Clark’s methodology may be damaging to his credibility, Mr. Clark was

fully prepared to explain his opinions and the bases for them at the time of his deposition. Thus, the 

motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

C. Defendants’ Motion in Limine #3 to preclude Plaintiff and his witnesses from 

referring to the prowler as “Hispanic.”

Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiff’s police procedures expert, Roger Clark, from referring 

to the prowler as “Hispanic” or the “Hispanic suspect.” Defendants argue that what is at issue is what 

Hughes was told and the conclusions he drew from that information, and that Mr. Clark’s attempt to 

call the prowler, “Hispanic” is an effort to sway the jury to believe the prowler’s description was 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s appearance. 

On the other hand, Plaintiff argues Mr. Clark is entitled to refer to the prowler as “Hispanic,” 

because that is how Dawson described him. Plaintiff provides an “Event Chronology” in which the 

dispatcher notes, “An unknown Hispanic male between 25 to 30 years of age has been going into his 

backyard in the early morning hours . . .” (Doc. 52-1 at 20) However, Plaintiff also provides Deputy 

Hughes’ report in which he documented, “ . . . the subject said back to him in Spanish, “Buenas Dias. 

Michael Dawson said he thought this was odd because the subject did not appear to be Hispanic.”2, 3

(Doc. 52-1 at 28) Finally, Plaintiff provides a copy of the report of his police procedures expert in 

which the expert opines that Plaintiff “clearly did not match the description of the person Mr. Dawson 

observed and described to Deputy Hughes.” (Doc. 52-1 at 4, 8) 

It appears that whether Plaintiff matched the description of the suspect will be a central theme 

of the trial. However, the Court agrees that only what Hughes knew is at issue regardless of whether a 

witness told others the prowler was “Hispanic.” Given this situation, the witnesses may refer to the 

 

2 At the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel reported that Dawson has claimed that he told Hughes that he thought it was odd that 

the prowler addressed Dawson in Spanish because Dawson does not look “Hispanic.”

3 Notably, the term “Hispanic” is vague. The Court is unclear whether the parties are using the term to describe skin color, 

or national heritage.

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prowler as the “suspect” or the “prowler” but they are not permitted to refer to him as the “white or 

Caucasian suspect,” the “Hispanic suspect,” the “white or Caucasian prowler” or the “Hispanic 

prowler.” The lack of probative value to the title “white or Caucasian” or “Hispanic” is clear and the 

only reason for attaching these words would be attempt to pre-condition the jury members towards the 

factual findings they must make. Thus, the motion is GRANTED.

D. Defendants’ Motion in Limine #4 to preclude Roger Clark from opining as to the 

positioning of Plaintiff’s body and location on the premises when he was tased

An expert’s “opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.”” Fed. R. 

Evid. 404(a). However, an expert cannot offer opinions as to his legal conclusions.4 United States v. 

Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir.1994) [“When an expert undertakes to tell the jury what result to 

reach, this does not aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute the expert’s 

judgment for the jury’s.”]

Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiff’s police procedures expert, Mr. Clark, from testifying as 

to the position and location of Plaintiff’s body at the time the officer deployed the taser. At his 

deposition, Mr. Clark indication that based upon his analysis of “the trajectory of the darts, the 

distance of the darts apart, and other factors, the physical aspects of the Taser, Colbert was not tased 

opening the door.” Defendant argues Mr. Clark has inadequate qualifications to testify on this topic, 

that he did not perform a forensic examination and that the only point to his testimony is to bolster 

Plaintiff’s version of the events.

Plaintiff argues that the evidence that he was struck with the taser darts “in the right side of his 

shoulder and chest area” (Doc. 52 at 9) is sufficient grounds upon which Mr. Clark may opine that 

Plaintiff was “facing Hughes when he was tased” so it, therefore, does not call for medical expertise. 

However, Plaintiff has not shown how any of Mr. Clark’s experience prepares him to offer this 

opinion. Indeed, it is not beyond the lay understanding of the jurors that the chest is the in the front of 

 

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In short, “Whether the officers’ actions were “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 

them is . . . a question for the jury or, if no material facts are in dispute, for the Court. See Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 

916 (9th Cir.1994). Although the Court finds that Clark is qualified to opine as to whether the officers’ use of force was 

excessive or unreasonable, the Court concludes that such testimony should be explored through hypothetical questioning so 

as to avoid invading the province of the jury. Accord Engman v. City of Ontario, 2011 WL 2463178, at *7 (C.D.Cal. June 

20, 2011).” Valtierra v. City of Los Angeles, 99 F.Supp.3d 1190, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2015).

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the body. On the other hand, the mere fact that Plaintiff was struck in the chest does not mean that he 

was “facing” Hughes when he deployed the taser. Indeed, the angle of the taser and the positioning of 

Plaintiff’s body could vastly impact whether Plaintiff was “facing” Hughes at the time he deployed the 

taser.

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 There is no showing in Mr. Clark’s report that demonstrates he has expertise in this type of 

forensic re-creation and, if he contends he doesn’t need this training, than neither would the jurors.

Moreover, despite Mr. Clark’s claim that he is an expert on tasers (Doc. 52-1 at 18), the Court 

finds his showing to be insufficient, as noted recently by the court in the Central District of California,

the fact that Clark owns two tasers and has read TASER International's training 

materials does not render him “an expert in the features and use of TASER 

International's products” who is qualified to opine on the effects of such use. See 

Barber v. City of Santa Rosa, 2010 WL 5069868, at *8 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) 

(“[E]ven assuming Clark’s qualification to offer an opinion as to the general use and 

deployment of tasers, plaintiffs fail to show he qualifies as an expert on the 

physiological effect of [the] taser on [decedent].”). Thus, Clark may opine on whether 

tasers may cause bodily injury and when taser deployment is an appropriate use of 

force—but only to the extent that such testimony is based on Clar’'s expertise in POST 

and other law enforcement standards. However, Clark may not testify as to the medical 

consequences of the use of a taser on decedent, nor as to any purported expert 

knowledge of the taser product. See id. at *7 (noting that Clark has never “conducted or 

authored any studies related to tasers”). 

Valtierra, 99 F. Supp. at 1197. Thus, unless and until there is a Fed. R. Evid. 104 hearing outside the 

presence of the jury, Mr. Clark is precluded from testifying as to the relative positions of Plaintiff and 

Hughes at the time Hughes deployed the taser. To this extent, the motion is GRANTED.

E. Defendants’ Motion in Limine #5 to preclude introduction of the audio recording 

between the dispatcher and Hughes after the arrest of Plaintiff

Defendants seek to preclude introduction of an audio tape of a conversation between the 

dispatcher and Hughes after he had completed Plaintiff’s arrest. Apparently, while the dispatcher was 

running a check—at Hughes’ request—for any outstanding warrants, the dispatcher asked Hughes, “he 

ran to his own house?” and then chuckles. Hughes responds, “uh, yeah.” Defendants report that 

Plaintiff has taken the position that Hughes chuckled also but Hughes denies this. In any event, 

Defendant argues the exchange and Hughes’ chuckle—assuming he did chuckle, are irrelevant to the 

issues raised in the complaint. 

 

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For example, Plaintiff’s upper body could have been twisted toward Hughes, such to expose his right chest to the taser 

darts, while his lower body and head remained generally “facing” away from Hughes.

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Plaintiff argues this evidence is “a party admission.” (Doc. 52 at 10) Plaintiff argues that this

evidence shows that Hughes knew that Plaintiff ran into his own house and it discredits Hughes’ report 

in which he writes that he was uncertain whether Plaintiff was attempting to break into a stranger’s 

home. (Doc. 52) The Court has difficulty following this argument because Hughes wrote the to 

document his account of the events of the evening, as they were unfolding. By the time he wrote the 

report, he knew that Plaintiff entered his own home. However, at the time of the events, he claims he 

was uncertain. Indeed, when describing Plaintiff entering the home, Hughes writes, “At this point I 

did not know if Brennan Colbert lived at the residence . . . or if he was attempting to break in to get 

away . . . I also had the thought if he did live there he could possibly have weapons inside the 

residence.” (Doc 52-1 at 29) The fact that Hughes knew when he spoke to the dispatcher later that 

evening that Plaintiff did, in fact, run into his own home, is not an admission of Hughes knew this 

information earlier. However, “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 

Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996). Instead, liability may not 

attach unless his actions were objectively unreasonable, regardless of the officer’s motivation.

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) [“the Fourth Amendment regulates 

conduct rather than thoughts . . .]

In addition, though Plaintiff argues this evidence is relevant to show Hughes’ “consciousness 

of guilt,” the Court is at a loss to understand how or, if it does show this, to what element such a 

belated consciousness relates. Clearly, under § 1983, for liability to attach, the officer need only at 

intentionally; he need not act with ill will. Moreover, of course, the § 1983 action is determined—not 

on the specific officer’s subjective motivation—but on an objective, reasonable officer standard.

Despite this, Plaintiff’s counsel argued at the hearing that the chuckle demonstrates that 

Hughes’ was “chagrined” by his own conduct, that he knew he had acted improperly, that he covered

up what he had done with lies in the police report, that he had a poor and flippant attitude throughout 

the evening and that Hughes knew he would not suffer discipline because no investigation would 

occur. Without considering that some of these theories are contradictory, the Court notes that Plaintiff 

does not explain how this chuckle proves all or any of these claims.

In the Court’s view, the most appropriate basis for the admission of this evidence would be to 

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bear on punitive damages.6 However, admission on this topic suffers the same infirmity as those 

suggested by Plaintiff. There may be an argument that his attitude later that evening mirrors his 

attitude earlier in the evening such to support an inference that he acted maliciously. However, the 

ambiguity of the chuckle—assuming it belonged to Hughes—would require the jury to speculate as to 

its meaning. Is it evidence of being nervous, embarrassed, chagrined (as plaintiff suggests), is it mere 

agreement that, yes, indeed, Hughes chased Plaintiff into his own home? Determining the meaning of 

the chuckle and to whom it belonged, would require testimony by at least two witnesses—Hughes and 

the dispatcher—and, even still, adducing evidence to support what Plaintiff thinks the chuckle means, 

would seem to require even more testimony.

7

 This is a waste of time of a fairly minor issue. 

Moreover, this testimony has the potential to confuse the jury into thinking that Hughes’ subjective 

intention at the time he detained Plaintiff, used force on him and arrested him, when determining the §

1983 issues. Also, the Court finds that the unfair prejudicial impact of the evidence is significant such 

that whatever probative value exists, is completely overwhelmed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 403. Therefore, the 

motion is GRANTED.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

1. Defendants’ motions in limine (Doc. 50) are GRANTED IN PART, GRANTED and 

DENIED as follows:

a. Defendants’ motion in limine #1 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART. Plaintiff’s expert may testify as to the forceful alternatives Hughes had available and what 

reasonably well-trained officers are taught regarding when they may use force. He may not testify that 

using the taser in the circumstances confronting Hughes was excessive or unreasonable or the like. He 

is limited to responding to hypothetical situations posed to him;

b. Defendants’ motion in limine #2 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART. Plaintiff’s expert may testify about what he learned about what Hughes was told and what he 

 

6

Notably, counsel did not claim the evidence is admissible on this issue. 

7 Time might have been saved had Plaintiff taken the deposition of the dispatcher to determine whether she admits or 

denies that she was the source of the chuckle.

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learned about the description given the dispatcher. He may not opine that the various descriptions 

match, that the descriptions don’t match or that there is variability between the descriptions or that any 

of the descriptions match or don’t match Mr. Colbert;

c. Defendants’ motion in limine #3 is GRANTED. No witness may refer to the 

suspect/prowler as the “Hispanic suspect/prowler,” “white suspect/prowler,” “Caucasian

suspect/prowler” or the like;

d. Defendants’ motion in limine #4 is GRANTED to the extent that unless and 

until there is a Fed. R. Evid. 104 hearing outside the presence of the jury, Mr. Clark is precluded from 

testifying as to the relative positions of Plaintiff and Hughes at the time Hughes deployed the taser;

e. Defendants’ motion in limine #5 is GRANTED and the taped conversation 

between Hughes and the dispatcher during which one or both of them chuckled, will not be admitted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 8, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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