Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03713/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03713-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ultimate Creations, Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Andrew Wright, and Jane Doe Wright, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-3713-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Defendant Andrew Wright, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint based on improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(2) and (3) (Doc. 7) supported by a legal brief (Doc. 9) and his Declaration. (Doc. 10).

Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) and Defendant

has filed a reply. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff has filed a motion to strike Defendant's reply (Doc. 13)

and Defendant has filed a response in opposition (Doc. 15) and his Declaration. (Doc. 14).

The Court enters this Order on these pending motions.

Plaintiff has moved to strike Defendant's reply because it was untimely filed.

Plaintiff's motion to strike (Doc. 13) is denied.

Plaintiff has filed a complaint asserting claims for breach of contract and federal

trademark violation under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. Plaintiff Ultimate

Creations, Inc. is an Arizona corporation and Defendant is a resident and citizen of New

Case 2:05-cv-03713-MHM Document 16 Filed 08/31/06 Page 1 of 7
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Jersey. As alleged in the complaint, on or about February 22, 2005, Plaintiff entered into a

Film Documentary Development Contract ("Contract") with Defendant that provided that

Defendant was to film, edit, produce, and distribute versions of a documentary styled film

in cooperation with Plaintiff. On July 25, 2005, the parties executed Amendment No. 1 to

the Contract. 

According to the Contract, Defendant pursued this venture on behalf of BuzzMEDIA.

Further according to the Contract, "the project [was] understood by the parties to be a

documentary-style film about the life, career, and future of Warrior, the creator, owner, and

performer of the Sports Entertainment/Professional Wrestling character Ultimate Warrior."

(Doc. 1, Exh. 1 - Contract at Article 2). As further alleged in the complaint, Defendant was

required to provide Plaintiff with a DVD version of the project according to a schedule as

described in the Contract and the version of the project was to be completed within an

appropriate time and be suitable material for sale and as meeting Plaintiff's standards for

production and content quality. Plaintiff further alleges in the complaint that Defendant was

to compensate Plaintiff by paying a specific flat fee amount plus percentage profits from film

sales. According to the Complaint, Defendant paid Plaintiff an initial payment as

contemplated by the parties within five days of the signing of the agreement but Defendant

thereafter failed to pay the balance of the flat fee or bring the project to a successful

conclusion as required. 

In support of the breach of contract claim, Plaintiff alleges that it was the intent of the

parties to provide a positive piece on Warrior to be used for marketing but a review of the

footage reveals negative footage. Plaintiff further alleges that the quality of the work was

not up to the standards expected and that Defendant "was requested to come to New Mexico

to meet with Warrior's family and to film and he refused." Plaintiff alleges that there has

been no financial backing and that Defendant is in breach for falling behind the production

schedule agreed to by the parties. In support of its trademark violation claim, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant's use of the intellectual property is in violation of the Contract, has

diminished its value and amounts to misappropriation. Plaintiff seeks damages in the sum

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of $190,000.00, plus interest and attorneys' fees, and the return of all footage, notes, films,

disks, tapes and all materials produced in the project. Jurisdiction is based on federal

question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue in a civil action in which jurisdiction is not founded

solely on diversity of citizenship generally may be brought in (1) a judicial district where any

defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which

a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial

part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which

any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be

brought. Title 28, United States Code, section 1406(a) provides that "[t]he district court of

a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss,

or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it

could have been brought." 

In moving to dismiss the complaint based on improper venue, Defendant points out

that he signed the Contract on behalf of BuzzMEDIA, a Limited Liability Company formed

in New Jersey. Defendant emphasizes that he is a resident of New Jersey. Defendant

additionally points out that the Contract was signed by "Warrior", the President of Plaintiff

Ultimate Creations, who lives in New Mexico. Defendant asserts that no provision of the

Contract indicated that Plaintiff is an Arizona corporation. In addition, the notice provision

of the original Contract stated that all notices were to be sent to Ultimate Creations at an

address in Knoxville, Tennessee. This notice provision was revised in the parties'

Amendment No. 1 to provide a mailing address for "Warrior" and Plaintiff Ultimate

Creations in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Defendant contends that no events relevant to the

Contract have occurred in Arizona. Defendant has attached his sworn Declaration in which

he states that he has never been to the State of Arizona.

In support of its response, Plaintiff has submitted the sworn Declaration of "Warrior"

who states that he is indeed the President of Ultimate Creations and that "[i]t was always part

of the DVD project that [Defendant] would conduct much of the work in Maricopa County,

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Arizona." (Doc. 11 - "Warrior" Declaration at paras. 2 & 4). "Warrior" states that he

presently resides in New Mexico but that he owns 20 acres in Carefree, Arizona and plans

to return there. (id., at para. 9). "Warrior" further states as follows regarding the completion

of the project:

5. It was agreed that an absolutely necessary component of the

DVD project was for [Defendant] to go through all of my

30,000 WWF litigation files and all of my Dingo

Warrior/Ultimate Warrior career costumes, photos, magazines,

titles and other memorabilia, which are all located in a 5000 sq.

ft. of storage in Maricopa County, Arizona, as they have been

for over 6 years now.

6. It was absolutely imperative to do the DVD project properly

that [Defendant] travel to Maricopa County, Arizona and spend

several days, if not weeks, there. This was implicit in the

Agreement. To be able to even begin to pursue the project, a

trip to Arizona to obtain and review vital materials would have

been necessary.

7. [Defendant] was to interview me in New Mexico and in

several scenic Arizona locals like Sedona and the Grand

Canyon. [Defendant] was aware that I own property in Maricopa

County, Arizona and it was contemplated that I would be

relocating to Maricopa County, Arizona.

(id., "Warrior" Declaration at paras. 5-7). Plaintiff contends that a substantial part of the

Agreement was to be fulfilled by actions taken in Arizona. Plaintiff further points out that

"Warrior" has no contacts with New Jersey and that litigating this case in Arizona will not

place an undue burden on Defendant.

Along with his reply, Defendant has submitted a second sworn Declaration in which

he states that "[i]t was never discussed or agreed upon that [he] needed to go to Arizona in

order to complete the project." (Doc. 12 - Exh. B, Wright Declaration at para. 5). Defendant

further states that "[i]t was never part of the agreement that [he] would go to the storage

facility in Arizona because Warrior has ample memorabilia at his home in New Mexico. ...

" (id., at para. 7). Defendant also states that he cannot financially travel to Arizona to defend

himself in this case. (id., at para. 8). Defendant has submitted alleged production schedules

as exhibits to his reply. (Doc. 12, Exh. C & D). These alleged production schedules indicate

locations in New Mexico and elsewhere but none in Arizona. Defendant also has submitted

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an alleged e-mail from "Warrior" which purportedly indicated that "Warrior" received the

production schedule but which does not mention any need to travel to Arizona. (id., Exh. E).

Defendant contends in his reply that Plaintiff has disregarded its obligations under the

Contract by refusing Defendant the opportunity to interview "Warrior." 

In this case, Plaintiff bases its claim of venue in the District of Arizona pursuant to

§ 1391 as providing, "in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." (see Doc. 11- Plaintiff's Response at p. 4). In

Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth

Circuit held in a breach of contract case that "the spirit of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) is better

served if venue for a claim based on breach of contract be the place of intended performance

rather than the place of repudiation." The Ninth Circuit favored this rationale "because the

place of performance is determined at the inception of the contract and therefore the parties

can anticipate where they may be sued." Id. At the time, section 1391(a), which applies to

cases founded solely on diversity jurisdiction, provided in part for venue in the judicial

district "in which the claim arose." Section 1391 was amended in 1990 after the decision in

Decker Coal. The parties in this case have not cited any case law authority in support of their

respective positions as to the propriety of venue in the District of Arizona.

The Court has researched the issue of proper venue in a breach of contract case under

§ 1391(b)(2), which applies to cases not founded solely on diversity. In Daniel v. American

Board of Emergency Medicine, 428 F.3d 408, 432 (2d Cir. 2005), the Second Circuit

discussed the provisions of § 1391(b)(2) both pre- and post-amendment. The appellate court

noted that the Supreme Court had explained before the amendment to § 1391 that "[i]n most

instances, the purpose of statutorily defined venue is to protect the defendant against the risk

that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial." Id. (quoting Leroy v.

Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979)). In Daniel, the Second Circuit

suggested that the court should apply the following two-part inquiry: (1) the court should

identify the nature of the claim and the acts or omissions that the plaintiff alleges give rise

to those claims; and (2) the court should determine whether a substantial part of those acts

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or omissions occurred in the district where suit was filed, that is, "whether 'significant events

or omissions material to [those] claim[s] ... have occurred in the district in question.'" Id.

(quoting Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 2005), and citing Jenkins

Brick Co. v. Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366, 1372 (11th Cir. 2003)). In Glasbrenner, the Second

Circuit cautioned that "the adjective 'substantial'" should be taken seriously. Id., 417 F.3d

at 357. The appellate court observed that "for venue to be proper, significant events or

omissions material to the plaintiff's claim must have occurred in the district in question, even

if other material events occurred elsewhere.. It would be error, for instance, to treat the

venue statute's 'substantial part' test as mirroring the minimum contacts test employed in

personal jurisdiction inquiries." Id. (emphasis in original). 

In this case, the nature of the claims are breach of contract and alleged trademark

violation. The gist of the parties' dispute, however, appears to be centered around lack of

performance of their alleged Contract. Daniel, 428 F.3d at 432-33 ("'[s]ubstantiality' for

venue purposes is more a qualitative than a quantitative inquiry, determined by assessing the

overall nature of the plaintiff's claims and the nature of the specific events or omissions in

the forum, not by simply adding up the number of contacts"). Plaintiff essentially alleges in

the complaint that Defendant has failed to produce a film that meets the standards anticipated

by the parties and to otherwise fulfill his obligations under the Contract. Plaintiff specifically

alleges in support of its breach of contract claim that Defendant "was requested to come to

New Mexico to meet with Warrior's family and to film and he refused." (Doc. 1, complaint

at para. 19 (C)). 

Plaintiff has not set forth any allegation in the complaint that Defendant's actionable

conduct is based on his failure to travel to Arizona in furtherance of the project and Contract.

Similarly, no provision of the Contract or Amendment No. 1 included as a term that

Defendant was to fulfill his obligations under the Contract by traveling to Arizona to work

on the project. The Contract when originally executed by the parties contained a provision

that any dispute would be governed by the laws of the State of Tennessee exclusively in that

jurisdiction. (Doc. 1, Exhibit 1 - Contract, Article 15). In their Amendment No. 1, the

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parties deleted Article 15 and did not include any choice of law provision. (Doc. 1,

Amendment No. 1, paragraphs 3 & 6). 

It is not mentioned in either the Contract or Amendment No. 1 that Plaintiff is an 

Arizona corporation. No objective fact of record shows a nexus between performance of the

Contract and the State of Arizona. No physical act or omission relevant to the negotiation

of the Contract, its execution or its alleged breach has occurred in the State of Arizona. The

only record evidence that indicates that anything was to occur in Arizona is the Declaration

of "Warrior" to the effect that the parties contemplated filming in Arizona. However,

Plaintiff's assertion in the complaint that "Defendant was requested to come to New Mexico

to meet with Warrior's family and to film and he refused" contradicts this representation. 

Based on the pleadings, documents and declarations of record, Plaintiff has not made

a prima facie showing of venue in the District of Arizona under § 1391(b)(2). Plaintiff has

not moved for a transfer of venue and so the Court in its discretion has declined to consider

the appropriate venue on the present record. Having determined that venue does not lay in

the District of Arizona, the Court has not considered Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to strike (Doc. 13) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint

based on improper venue (Doc. 7) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint and action are dismissed without

prejudice based on improper venue under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3). 

DATED this 28th day of August, 2006.

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