Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02549/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02549-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The date filed is the date on which Petitioner signed the Petition, and delivered it to prison

officers, under Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE ROGERS,

 

 Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06 CV 2549 H

ORDER ADOPTING

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND

DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

G.J. GIURBINO,

Respondent.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Tyrone Rogers filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 14, 2006

challenging his prison sentence.1 (Petition, at 11.) On January 13, 2004, a San Diego

County Superior Court judge found Petitioner guilty on one count of rape by foreign

object of an unconscious victim under California Penal Code §289(d) and one count

of attempted rape of an unconscious person under Penal Code §261(a)(4), 664.

(Lodgment 1, at 40; Lodgment 2, vol. 2, at 156.) Petitioner appealed his conviction,

which the California Court of Appeal denied in part on September 12, 2005.

(Lodgment 6.) Rogers argued the trial court erroneously denied his Faretta motion, the

admission of evidence as to his prior convictions under California Evidence Code

§1108 violated his due process and equal protection rights, the proof of prior

convictions by the preponderance of evidence violated his due process right to proof

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2 Facts summarized from California Court of Appeal opinion, Lodgment 6, at 2-4.

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of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the evidence in support of his prior convictions was

insufficient, and his sentence of 25 years to life under the three strikes law was cruel

and unusual. (Lodgment 6, at 2.) The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and

sentence except the imposition of one of two five-year enhancements under Penal Code

§667(a). The court remanded with directions to amend. (Lodgment 6, at 36.) The

California Supreme Court denied review on November 16, 2005. (Lodgment 7,

Lodgment 8.)

Petitioner argues on habeas corpus that the trial court erroneously denied his

Faretta motion, the admission of evidence as to his prior convictions under California

Evidence Code §1108 violated his due process and equal protection rights, and the

proof of prior offenses by the preponderance of evidence violated his due process right

to proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (Petition, at 6-8.) Respondent filed an

answer to the Petition on February 6, 2007. (Document 5-2.) Petitioner filed a traverse

on February 28, 2007. (Document 7.) The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and

Recommendation to deny the Petition on April 19, 2007. (Document 1, at 15.) This

Court adopts the Report and Recommendation and denies the Petition. 

FACTS 

The 2003 Offenses2

Rogers temporarily shared a townhouse in July 2003 with his former girlfriend,

LouAnne Stewart. LouAnne slept in the master bedroom downstairs and Petitioner

slept in a spare bedroom downstairs. Tom Nichols also lived in the townhouse and slept

in the living room upstairs. Petitioner agreed to move out of the house by the end of

July. 

On July 14, LouAnne watched movies with Nichols. She consumed alcohol and

at 11:30 P.M. she went downstairs to her bedroom to do paperwork. Around 11:45

P.M. Rogers entered LouAnne’s bedroom and asked whether she wanted to watch a

movie with him. She declined and he went to his bedroom. 

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3 Facts summarized from California Court of Appeal opinion, Lodgment 6, at 2-4.

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At 1:30 A.M. LouAnne put on her nightgown and took clonazepam, a

prescription anti-anxiety pill. She fell asleep. At about 3:00 A.M., LouAnne awoke and

found Petitioner lying on top of her. Her legs were spread apart, her nightgown was

pushed up, and Petitioner was raping her. She shouted: “You’re raping me. Ty, you’re

raping me.” Rogers replied, “Shhh...Don’t say anything.” She tried to push him off her.

When she threatened to call the police, Rogers got up and was naked. LouAnne tried

to call 911 from her bedroom telephone but it did not work because Rogers had

unplugged it. She tried to use her cellular phone but its battery was missing. As she left

her bedroom to use the upstairs telephone, Rogers walked ahead of her. Nichols, who

woke up to the sound of unusual noises, saw Rogers walk out of LouAnne’s bedroom,

naked. Nichols heard her scream that Rogers had raped her. 

The police arrested Petitioner. He admitted he had digitally penetrated LouAnne

and had unplugged her bedroom telephone to prevent her from calling the police. An

information charged Rogers with one count of rape by a foreign object of an

unconscious victim and one count of attempted rape of an unconscious person. It

further alleged Petitioner had two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning

of California Penal Code §667(a)(1) and the three strikes law, §667(b)-(i), 1170.2. 

Rogers testified in his defense that his sexual activity with LouAnne was

consensual. He admitted he digitally penetrated her. He also admitted his prior serious

felony convictions. In rebuttal, LouAnne denied she consented to any sexual activity

with Petitioner. 

The 1994 Offenses3

A jury convicted Petitioner in 1994 on two counts of first degree burglary of a

residence for sexual purposes under California Penal Code §459. (Lodgment 1, at 2-3;

Lodgment 2, vol. 1, at 3; Lodgment 2, vol. 3, at 15; Lodgment 2, vol. 2, at 157.) At trial

in 2004, Ruth S. testified that at 5 A.M. on August 6, 1994 she saw Petitioner kneeling

beside her bed, touching her leg. She screamed and her boyfriend chased Rogers out

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of their apartment. Ruth later found a condom in her bedroom that did not belong to her

or her boyfriend. 

Donna K. testified at Petitioner’s trial in 2004 that at 3:20 A.M. on August 13,

1994 she awoke to find Petitioner kneeling beside her bed. She asked Rogers what he

was doing. He replied that he had been drinking and had accepted a dare. She told him

to leave and led him to the front door. On leaving, Rogers told her: “Well, it’s too bad

that you weren’t up for it.” Donna replied: “Excuse me?” Rogers clarified: “For a little

lovin’.” 

Trial Motions

At an In Limine hearing on January 9, 2004, counsel for Petitioner objected to

the court receiving evidence of Petitioner’s prior sex offenses that occurred in 1994.

(Lodgment 2, vol.1, at 2-3.) Counsel objected on grounds the evidence was “highly

prejudicial under Evidence Code 352” and would be “terribly inflammatory against

[his] client.” (Id.) He argued the two prior offenses were remote and dissimilar to the

current allegation. (Id.) The judge accepted the evidence because he found it to be

relevant under California Evidence Code §1108 and because the pattern of behavior

in the prior offenses was similar to the conduct in question. (Id., at 3, 4-5.) Therefore,

he found the evidence was not overly prejudicial. (Id., at 4.) 

At a Marsden Hearing on January 12, 2004, Petitioner asked the trial judge to

relieve counsel. People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970). (Lodgment 2, vol.3, at 8-20.)

The court asked: “Why do you want [counsel] relieved?” (Id., at 11.) Petitioner

responded: “I don’t really want him—your honor, I actually wanted to, ah, —a

continuance.” (Id.) After further discussion on the admissibility of evidence that

Petitioner wanted to introduce (Id., at 13), and before the judge had made any ruling

or suggestion as to the status of counsel, Petitioner admitted: “...maybe I should talk

to my counsel about it. I know you haven’t dismissed him or anything. I – it’s still – I

still feel if I had a month, I would be comfortable. Or two weeks.” (Id., at 14.) 

When the court informed Petitioner that trial was to commence that day,

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Petitioner asked: “So you’re not dismissing my counsel.” (Id., at 17.) The court

responded that there was no basis to do so. (Id.) Petitioner then asked: “What if I

decide to go pro per? You have to grant that.” (Id.) The court agreed, and Petitioner

then stated that he wanted “to go pro per.” (Id.) The judge responded that “[t]his is not

a stall contest, sir. You have given me no reason to relieve [counsel]...And if you say

you want to go pro per, you have the right to do that...But not—not to delay the trial

for that purpose.” (Id.) Petitioner asked: “I mean, how do I go pro per if I don’t

have...preliminaries in front of me?” (Id., 17-18.) The court declined to postpone trial

and determined Petitioner’s Faretta motion was a stall tactic. (Id., at 20.) After a recess,

the court resolved Petitioner’s request by inquiring, in light of the court’s decision to

deny a continuance, whether Petitioner wanted to proceed pro per. “There was a

possible request by Mr. Rogers to represent himself. Anything else you want to say in

that regard, Mr. Rogers?” (Id., at 21.) Petitioner responded: “No, your Honor. I decline

on that.” (Id.) The court found “there was no unequivocal intent to relieve counsel, just

a frustration over not being able to continue the matter...” (Id.) 

Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. (Lodgment

2, vol.2, at 27.) The judge found Petitioner guilty of rape by a foreign object of an

unconscious victim and attempted rape of an unconscious person. (Id., at 156.) The

judge sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of 35 years to life in state prison.

(Lodgment 2, vol. 4, at 9.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Standard of Review on Habeas Corpus

Congress enacted a statute in 1867 providing that federal courts “shall have

power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained

of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United

States. ...” Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, §1, 14 Stat. 385; Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 374-375 (2000).

Congress modified the federal habeas statute in 1996 through passage of the

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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The Act placed new

restrictions on the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to state

prisoners. 

“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or 2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court decision is contrary to clearly established United States Supreme

Court precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to the Supreme

Court’s on a question of law or if the state court confronts facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent but arrives at an opposite

result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. To make this finding, a habeas court must determine

the state court’s action to be “diametricallydifferent,” “opposite in character or nature,”

or “mutually opposed” to controlling precedent. Id.

A state court decision unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent if the state

court identifies the correct authority but unreasonably applies it to the facts of a habeas

petitioner’s case, or if a state court extends precedent to an inappropriate context or

fails to extend it to a context where it should apply. Id., 407. The state court decision

must be more than incorrect or erroneous. Rather, its application of clearly established

law must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 65 (2003);

Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 410, 412. 

On questions of fact, a habeas court’s standard of review is even more

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deferential. Indeed, a state court’s finding of fact is presumptively correct. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner has

the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id.

Nonetheless, the presumption of correctness applies only to pure questions of historical

fact. Id., 976. On the other hand, state decisions applying law to fact are mixed

questions falling under §2254 (d)(1). 

Standard of Review of a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). The Court

reviews de novo the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions of law. Britt v. Simi Valley

Unified School District, 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds

by United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-1122 (9th Cir. 2003).

Exhaustion

Habeas petitioners must exhaust remedies available in state courts for individual

claims before petitioners seek a writ in federal court on those claims. 28 U.S.C. §2254

(b)(1)(A); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-519 (1982).

Look Through Doctrine

“Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim,

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon

the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). “[A] presumption

which gives [unexplained orders] no effect-which simply ‘looks through’ them to the

last reasoned decision-most nearly reflects the role they are ordinarily intended to

play.” Id., 804.

ARGUMENTS

Right to Self-Representation

Petitioner’s first claim is that the trial court improperly denied his request to

represent himself, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation

recognized in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). (Petition, at 6.) However, the

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trial judge found “there was no unequivocal intent to relieve counsel.” (Lodgment 2,

vol.2, at 21.) Indeed, Petitioner withdrew his Faretta motion after the court determined

that it was sought for purposes of delay at the start of trial and declined to grant a

continuance. (Lodgment 2, vol. 3, at 17-18; Lodgment 2, vol. 2, at 21.) In People v.

Morgan, 101 Cal.App.3d 523, 527-528 (1980), the California Court of Appeal found

that, where denial of a continuance amounts to a de facto denial of a Faretta motion,

the reviewing court must reverse if the defendant can show that he was entitled to have

the motion granted. The question on habeas review is whether the trial court had

discretion to deny the motion because Petitioner offered it at the beginning of trial.

In Marshall v. Taylor, 395 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) the Ninth Circuit

determined the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Faretta incorporates a timing

element. The Supreme Court mentioned that Faretta's request was “[w]ell before the

date of trial” (Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807) and “weeks before trial” (Id., at 835). It held

that “[i]n forcing Faretta, under these circumstances, to accept against his will a stateappointed public defender, the California courts deprived himof his constitutional right

to conduct his own defense.” Id., at 836. The Supreme Court thus incorporated the facts

of Faretta into its holding, which may require a trial court to grant a Faretta request

when made “weeks before trial.” Marshall, 395 F.3d at 1061.

In the Ninth Circuit, a Faretta motion is untimely if made for the purpose of

delaying the trial. U.S. v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Flewitt,

874 F.2d 669, 679 (9th Cir.1989). The record supports the trial judge’s conclusion that

Petitioner offered his motion as a delay tactic. Indeed, Petitioner admitted so. When the

court asked why Petitioner wanted counsel relieved, Petitioner responded: “I don’t

really want him—your honor, I actually wanted to, ah, —a continuance.” (Lodgment

2, vol. 3, at 11.) 

State courts are free to determine when Faretta motions become untimely as long

as their standards comport with the United States Supreme Court's holding that a

request made “weeks before trial” is timely. Marshall, 395 F.3d at 1061; Faretta, 422

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U.S. at 835. The California Supreme Court did so in People v. Windham, 19 Cal.3d 121

(1977), which held that when a defendant motions to represent himself at trial but does

so after the trial has commenced, the court has discretion to grant or deny the request.

Defendants must offer the motion within a “reasonable time prior to the

commencement of trial.” Id., at 127-128. The California Court of Appeal upheld the

denial of Petitioner’s Faretta motion on that basis. (Lodgment 6, at 12.) “...Rogers’

motion for self-representation was untimely because it was not made ‘within a

reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.’ (People v. Windham, supra, 19

Cal.3d at p.128, fn. omitted.) Because his Faretta motion was made on the first (or

possibly second) day of trial, it was untimely and the trial court then had discretion

whether to grant or deny it.” (Id.) In Petitioner’s case, the California Court of Appeal

did not misapply United States Supreme Court precedent in upholding the denial of his

untimely Faretta motion.

Due Process Challenge of Admission of Prior Offenses 

Petitioner argues the trial court improperly admitted unduly unfair evidence of

his prior sex offenses in violation of due process. (Petition, at 7.) For this argument to

prevail on habeas corpus, Petitioner must show the trial court strayed from clearly

established federal law as defined in United States Supreme Court decisions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1); Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 407, 409. A state evidentiary rule “is not

subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless ‘it offends some principle

of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as

fundamental.’” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-202 (1977). The primary

guide to establish fundamentality is historical practice. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S.

37, 44 (1996). Nonetheless, a long-standing principle does not necessarily reflect a

fundamental constitutional principle. United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432

(10th Cir. 1998), cert. den. (1998). 

Courts recognize a historical rule against the prosecution’s introduction of

propensity evidence because “its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues,

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4

 Section 1101(a) provides: “a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 1108,

and 1109, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an

opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is

inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.”

5

 Section 1108(a) provides: “In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual

offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made

inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.”

6

 Section 352 prescribes a balancing test to determine, on a case by case basis, whether evidence of

prior bad acts is unduly prejudicial given its probative value. “The court in its discretion may

exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its

admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue

prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”

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unfair surprise and undue prejudice.” Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-

476 (1948). California Evidence Code §11014 applies this rule. Evidence Code §11085

provides an exception to it for sex offenses. However, §1108 incorporates Evidence

Code §3526, which gives trial courts discretion to bar unduly unfair evidence of prior

sex offenses. The California Supreme Court upheld §1108 because of this discretion.

People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th 903 (1999). In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75, fn.

5 (1991) the United States Supreme Court expressly left unanswered whether the

admission of propensity evidence necessarily violates due process. Therefore, the

question on habeas review is whether the California Supreme Court, in upholding

§1108, followed clearly established federal law barring admission of propensity

evidence that is unduly unfair. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476. Petitioner must show that

the rule against admitting propensity evidence in §1101 is a fundamental principle of

justice that ensures a fair trial, and that the exception to that rule in §1108 violates due

process. 

The California Supreme Court properly applied United States Supreme Court

precedent to uphold §1108 on the basis of protections afforded in §352. Falsetta, 21

Cal.4th at 903. Therefore, the trial court’s reliance on these statutes to admit evidence

of Petitioner’s prior sex offenses was proper. In Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th 903 the California

Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to §1108, holding that the admission

of a defendant’s prior sex crimes for the purpose of showing a propensity to commit

such crimes was constitutional. The Falsetta court found unclear whether “the rule

against ‘propensity’ evidence in sex offense cases should be deemed a fundamental

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7

 Subsection (a) of Rule 413 provides: “In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an

offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of

sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is

relevant.”

8

 Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.”

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historical principle of justice.” Id., 914, emphasis included. In any case, the court

determined “even if [the rule against introduction of propensity evidence in sex offense

cases] were deemed fundamental from a historical perspective, we would nonetheless

uphold section 1108 if it did not unduly ‘offend’ those fundamental due process

principles.” Id, 915; Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 444-446 (1992). The court

concluded: “[I]n light of the substantial protections afforded to defendants in all cases

to which section 1108 applies, we see no undue unfairness in its limited exception [in

sex offense cases] to the historical rule against propensity evidence.” Falsetta, 21

Cal.4that 915. The cornerstone of this protection was the balancing test prescribed in

§352, which gives trial courts power to exclude remote, misleading, or otherwise unfair

evidence of prior criminal conduct. Id., 917. The court determined §352 protects

against undue unfairness, which is what United States Supreme Court precedent

requires. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476.

In addition, the Falsetta court pointed out that §1108 mirrors Rule 413 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.) adopted in 1994, which federal courts have

upheld against due process and equal protection challenges.7 Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th at

920. While the rule does not expressly incorporate Rule 4038, which is the equivalent

of California’s §352, federal circuit courts have upheld Rule 413 against constitutional

attack because of the protections afforded defendants in Rule 403. United States v.

Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 800-801 (8th Cir. 1998); Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1432; United

States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330-1331 (10th Cir. 1998). 

The San Diego County Superior Court judge’s admission of Petitioner’s prior

bad acts under §1108 and §352 was consistent with clearly established United States

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Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, Petitioner’s due process challenge fails. The

judge balanced the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect and

concluded that evidence of Petitioner’s prior criminal acts was not unduly prejudicial.

(Lodgment 2, vol. 1, at 3-5.) As a result, the California Court of Appeal properly

upheld its admission. (Lodgment 6, at 19.)

Equal Protection Challenge of Admission of Prior Offenses 

The California Court of Appeal ruled in People v. Fitch, 55 Cal.App.4th 172,

184 (1997) that §1108 does not violate equal protection because the statute has a

rational basis. Nonetheless, Petitioner contends the admission of his prior sex offenses

deprived him of equal protection of law. His argument is that California Evidence Code

§1108 is unconstitutional because it treats sex offenders differently from other

offenders in allowing prior bad acts into evidence. (Petition, at 7.)

The Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equal protection of law must “coexist

with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another,

with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.

620, 631 (1996); Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-272

(1979). If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, a

legislative classification withstands constitutional challenge so long as it bears a

rational relation to a legitimate end. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. An equal protection

challenge to a statute that creates two categories of defendants, without implicating a

constitutional right, is subject to a rational basis inquiry that asks whether the

classification has any rational relation to its purposes. Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S.

534, 537-538 (1975). 

Sex offenders are not a suspect class. United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018,

1030-1031 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition, there is no United States Supreme Court

precedent recognizing a fundamental right to have a trial free from relevant propensity

evidence that is not unduly unfair. Id. California Evidence Code §352 provides

safeguards to the admission of unduly unfair evidence. Therefore, §1108 does not

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burden a fundamental right. The California Court of Appeal properly applied a rational

basis standard of review in Fitch, 55 Cal.App.4th at 184, to uphold §1108. The court

found that “the nature of sex offenses, both their seriousness and their secretive

commission which results in trials that are primarily credibility contests, justified the

admission of relevant evidence of a defendant’s commission of other sex offenses. This

reasoning provides a rational basis for [§1108].” Id. Consequently, the Superior Court’s

admission of Petitioner’s prior bad acts into evidence under §1108 did not violate his

equal protection rights. The California Court of Appeal properly upheld the admission

of this evidence. (Lodgment 6, at 19-20.)

Improper Standard of Proof to Admit Prior Offenses

Petitioner erroneously argues the trial court improperly used the preponderance

of evidence standard of proof to establish his prior sex offenses. (Petition, at 8.) 

Due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of an

offense. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The admission of propensity

evidence for a trier of fact to evaluate requires sufficient evidence to support a finding

by the trier of fact that the defendant committed the similar act. Enjady, 134 F.3d at

1433; Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). That is, a trial court must

make a preliminary finding that a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of

evidence that the “other act” occurred. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. The trier of fact must

then find true, beyond reasonable doubt, all facts necessary to render a guilty verdict.

Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. 

The trial judge admitted Petitioner’s 1994 offenses for presentation to the jury.

(Lodgment 2, vol. 1, at 4-5.) Indeed, Petitioner admitted both were true. (Lodgment 2,

vol. 2, at 147.) He waived his right to a jury trial. (Id., at 27.) The judge properly

explained his reasoning on the record to justify the conviction. (Lodgment 2, vol. 2,

155-156.) 

In sum, the record shows Petitioner’s trial was constitutional and fair. The Court

of Appeal found the judge applied the correct burden of proof and determined there

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9

 The Court of Appeal noted the trial judge in Petitioner’s case used California Jury Instruction

Code Number 2.50.01 (Lodgment 6, at 21-22), which says: “if you find by a preponderance of

the evidence that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense ..., that is not sufficient by

itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crime.” (CALJIC No.

2.50.01 (Jan. 2005 ed.).) Rather, the trier of fact must prove all elements of an offense beyond

a reasonable doubt. To the extent Petitioner challenges CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the California

Supreme Court held in People v. Reliford, 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1012 (2003) that CALJIC No.

2.50.01 did not lower the burden of proof because the instruction explicitly states that evidence

of prior bad acts is insufficient to render a guilty verdict. Id., 1013. Jurors would reasonably

understand this instruction. Id., 1014. Judges would, too. Adherence to CALJIC No. 2.50.01 in

Petitioner’s case did not lower the burden of proof to convict and was therefore constitutional.

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was sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt. Clearly, the

record supports this finding. The judge did not rely on propensity evidence of prior sex

offenses to the exclusion of other evidence.

9

 (Id., at 155.) For example, the judge

considered the victim’s credibility and determined she was truthful. (Id.) There is no

indication the judge found Petitioner guilty by the preponderance of evidence. As the

Court of Appeal rightly concluded, “the trial court, even more than a jury, would be

cognizant of the requirement that a defendant’s guilt of a charged offense be proved

beyond a reasonable doubt despite proof of prior sexual acts by only a preponderance

of the evidence. Therefore, we conclude the burden of proof of Rogers’s guilt of the

charged offenses in this case was not lowered below the requisite standard of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Lodgment 6, at 22-23.) 

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CONCLUSION

 For the above stated reasons, this Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation and DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 11, 2007

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO :

**Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes

Tyrone Rogers

Centinela State Prison

C1-145

P.O. Box 921

Imperial, CA 92251

Kyle Niki Shaffer

Deputy Attorney General

110 West A Street, Suite 1100

San Diego, CA 92101

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