Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00585/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00585-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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* This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq.);

section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. §§ 70, et

seq.); the California Disabled Persons Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54, et

seq.); and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, et seq.).

(SUF ¶ 1; Compl. ¶¶ 8, 23-36.) 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD KEMPER, )

) 2:06-cv-585-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

SACRAMENTO RADIOLOGY MEDICAL )

GROUP, a California corporation, )

d/b/a ADVANCED IMAGING CENTER OF ) 

CARMICHAEL, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s

federal and state disability law claims.1 Plaintiff is a qualified

individual with a disability under the ADA. (Def.’s Opp’n at 2;

Compl. ¶ 3.) Defendant is an imaging center that performs diagnostic

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imaging services, such as cat-scans. (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed

Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 33.) Defendant filed its motion and supporting

declarations on May 18, 2007, in which it explains that “[a]t this

point in time the facility is fully compliant with the [ADA]

Accessibility Guidelines [(“ADAAG”)] per Plaintiff’s allegations in

his Complaint” and that therefore Plaintiff’s “ADA and Rehabilitation

Act claims are moot” and the court should decline supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. (Pl.’s Mot. at 2.) 

Plaintiff cross-moves for summary judgment on his Unruh

Civil Rights Act claim and responds to Defendant’s summary judgment

motion by requesting a continuance of said motion under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56(f). 

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for a

Continuance

Plaintiff did not file a statement of undisputed facts with

his motion as required by Local Rule 56-260; therefore, Plaintiff’s

cross-motion for summary judgment is stricken. See L.R. 56-260(a)

(“Each motion for summary judgment . . . shall be accompanied by a

‘Statement of Undisputed Facts’ that shall enumerate discretely each

of the specific material facts relied upon in support of the motion

and cite the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit,

deposition, interrogatory answer, admission or other document relied

upon to establish that fact.”); see also Engrahm v. County of Colusa,

2005 WL 3440025, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2005) (stating that

“failure to comply with Local Rule 56-260(a) is an appropriate basis

for denying a motion for summary judgment.”)

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Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s summary judgment motion

should be continued “under Rule 56(f) [so that Plaintiff could

undertake an] additional site inspection of [] Defendant’s facility in

order to determine [whether Defendant is in fact in compliance with

Plaintiff’s allegations].” (Def.’s Opp’n at 1.) In particular,

Plaintiff requests a court “order granting his request for an

additional site inspection . . . within 14 days from the hearing date

on Defendant’s motion.” (Id. at 14.) Such a request would require an

amendment of the August 9, 2007 discovery completion date prescribed

in the Rule 16 Scheduling Order. 

But Plaintiff has not shown why he did not conduct a second

site inspection earlier, or why he did not serve a request on

Defendant for inspection of its facility under Rule 34 shortly after

May 18, 2007, when Plaintiff was served with Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. Further, “[i]n considering [a request to allow

further discovery under Rule 56(f)], the stage of the litigation is an

important consideration. For example, if the movant has failed [to]

diligently [] pursue discovery in the past, the court has discretion

to deny the Rule 56(f) application.” In re Deep Vein Thrombosis

Litig., 2007 WL 2029326, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2007) (citing

Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Since Plaintiff has not specifically requested a modification of the

Scheduling Order, nor shown good cause for such a modification, the

August 9, 2007 discovery completion date is not modified and

Plaintiff’s request for the court to order an additional site

inspection is denied. 

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II. Defendant’s Motion

Defendant contends that since its facility is fully

compliant with the ADAAG, Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act

claims are moot and therefore the court should decline to continue

exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims. (Pl.’s Mot. at 2.) Plaintiff counters that his ADA and

Rehabilitation Act claims are not moot because Defendant has failed to

properly remedy all of the access barriers and violations alleged in

his complaint. (Def.’s Opp’n at 7.) 

“Mootness is a jurisdictional defect that can be raised at

any time by the parties or the court sua sponte.” Access 4 All, Inc.

v. Casa Marina Owner, LLC, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2006)

(citing Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1989)). “A

claim is moot if it has lost its character as a ‘present, live

controversy.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Geophysical Corp. of

Alaska, 732 F.2d 693, 698 (9th Cir. 1984)). “If an ADA ‘plaintiff

[has] already . . . received everything to which [he] would be

entitled,’ i.e., the challenged conditions have been remedied, then

these particular claims are moot absent any basis for concluding that

plaintiff will again be subjected to the same wrongful conduct by this

defendant.” Id. (quoting Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp.

2d 1065 (D. Haw. 2000)). Therefore, the court will reach the issue of

whether Defendant is fully compliant with the alleged violations of

the ADAAG (as stated in Plaintiff’s complaint).

A. Allegations and Compliance

i. Inaccessible Paths of Travel and Waiting Area

Defendant declares that all alleged violations Plaintiff

asserts concerning inaccessible paths of travel and waiting area have

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been fixed or are otherwise in compliance with the ADAAG. (SUF ¶¶ 6,

7, 13.) Plaintiff counters that Defendant has not provided sufficient

proof of compliance and that he needs to conduct a second site

inspection. (Pl.’s Response to Def.’s SUF (“Pl.’s Opp’n to SUF”) at

2, 3, 4.) This conclusory statement is insufficient for Plaintiff to

meet his obligation under Rule 56(e); specifically, Plaintiff was

required to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue

for trial. T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d

626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Further, Plaintiff responds to Defendant’s averments of

compliance with the ADAAG by generally referencing the expert report

of John Lonberg, Plaintiff’s expert. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to SUF at 3.) 

However, since Plaintiff does not cite to any particular portion of

Mr. Lonberg’s report, Plaintiff’s reference to Mr. Lonberg’s report

will not be considered. See L.R. 56-260(b) (“Any party opposing a

motion for summary judgment . . . shall reproduce the itemized facts

in the Statement of Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that are

undisputed and deny those that are disputed, including with each

denial a citation to the particular portions of any pleading,

affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, admission or other

document relied upon in support of that denial.”) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted on

Plaintiff’s allegations concerning inaccessible paths of travel and

the waiting area. 

ii. Restroom

Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he restroom door requires over

[five] pounds of pressure to operate.” (Compl. ¶ 8D.) Defendant

avers that “[t]he door does not take more than five pounds of pressure

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2 Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that the court were to

consider the expert report, Defendant still prevails on this allegation

since Mr. Lonberg’s report does not make any averment regarding the

restroom door. (See Expert Report of John Lonberg in Supp. of Def.’s

Opp’n.) 

6

to open.” (SUF ¶ 17.) Plaintiff replies by making only a general

reference to Mr. Lonberg report, without specifying any particular

portion of the document. (Pl.’s Opp’n to SUF at 4.) This nonspecific

response is insufficient to withstand summary judgment.2

Plaintiff also alleges that “[t]he restroom door is hidden

behind the dressing room entrance door so that when Plaintiff tries to

access the restroom, he will be hit if someone enters the dressing

room.” (Compl. ¶ 8D.) Defendant counters, averring that

“[c]urrently, there is no such dressing room door.” (SUF ¶ 15.) 

Further, Plaintiff alleges that the restroom door “has no automatic

door closure.” (Compl. ¶ 8D.) Defendant counters, averring that “an

automatic door closer has been installed[,]” “[t]he restroom door has

the compliant amount of clear space, which means that a person in a

wheelchair can fully maneuver around and shut the door[,]” and the

restroom “is fully compliant with all accessibility codes.” (SUF

¶ 19.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the restroom “door has a

grasp-and-twist door lock [and] [t]he latch side clearance is 16.5

inches.” (Compl. ¶ 8D.) Defendant avers that “[a]t this time, the

door has a compliant lock” and “[t]he latch side clearance is

currently 18 inches, which is compliant.” (SUF ¶¶ 21, 23.) Plaintiff

rejoins that Defendant has not provided sufficient proof of compliance

and that he needs to conduct a second site inspection. (Pl.’s Opp’n

to SUF at 4, 5.) 

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Plaintiff’s general references to Mr. Lonberg’s report and

conclusory statements do not satisfy his burden under Rule 56(e). See

T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is granted on Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the

restroom.

iii. Parking

Plaintiff alleges that “[t]here are an insufficient number

of handicapped parking spaces and van accessible spaces.” 

(Compl. ¶ 8B.) Defendant avers that the lot has a capacity of

approximately 50 cars, that it has five fully accessible parking

spaces, and is therefore in compliance with the accessibility code

which requires that ten percent of the parking spaces be accessible. 

(SUF ¶¶ 9, 10; see ADAAG § 4.1.2(5)(d)(i).) Plaintiff counters,

referencing Mr. Lonberg’s declaration where he states that during his

site evaluation, he “inspected the parking lot and documented

approximately 89 total parking spaces” and that “[t]he parking lot was

uninterrupted and unsegregated.” (John Lonberg Decl. in Supp. of

Pl.’s Opp’n (“Lonberg Decl.”) ¶ 3.) Defendant, however, presents the

declaration of Bill Johnston, Defendant’s recently retired Chief

Operating Officer (“COO”), in which Mr. Johnston declares that “[a]s

COO, I am readily familiar with [Defendant’s] property boundaries. 

[Defendant]’s parking lot is shared with a medical facility that has

no affiliation with [Defendant]. The parking lot on [Defendant’s]

property has 50 parking spaces. The other parking spaces are on the

other facility’s property.” (Bill Johnston Decl. in Supp. of Def.’s

Reply (“Johnston Decl.”) ¶¶ 1, 2 .) Accordingly, Defendant has

“demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact”

concerning the number of parking spaces in its lot and Plaintiff has

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failed to counter with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue

for trial. T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. 

Plaintiff also alleges that the parking spaces are not

located close enough to the hospital entrance. (Compl. ¶ 8B.) 

Plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Lonberg, declares that “[t]hree of the five

designated accessible parking spaces are not located on the shortest

accessible route to the [f]acility entrance in violation of ADAAG

§ 4.6.2.” (Lonberg Decl. ¶ 5.) In response, Defendant’s witness, Kim

Blackseth, a consultant and expert on disabled access issues, declares

that “[t]wo of [D]efendant’s accessible parking spaces are located

nearest the entrance, however the other three parking spaces are

located nearby, in the next closest feasible locations to the

entrance.” (Kim Blackseth Decl. in Supp. of Def.’s Reply (“Blackseth

Decl.”) ¶ 9.) Further, Defendant argues that “due to physical

restraints and ADA requirements, three more spaces in front of the

entrance is not feasible because there is no sidewalk, there are major

electrical units servicing the diagnostic imaging center, a water

access hole, and fencing.” (Reply at 8.) In support of this

argument, Defendant filed photographs which show the landscaped area

where the cars park and the aforementioned physical constraints. 

(Zachary Best Decl. in Supp. of Def.’s Reply (“Best Decl.”); see also

Johnston Decl. ¶ 4.) Finally, Ms. Blackseth further declares that

“[a]ll five accessible spaces could not be located in front of the

entrance because this would violate [the relevant California

regulation], which requires that parking be arranged such that persons

are not compelled to wheel or walk behind parked cars other than their

own.” (Blackseth Decl. ¶ 10.) Since ADAAG § 4.6.2 only requires that

the accessible spaces are located on the shortest possible route to

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3 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant violated California law

because its parking spaces have the incorrect dimensions and because the

designated accessible parking spaces require wheelchair users to

traverse behind parked cars. (Compl. ¶ 8B; Opp’n at 8 (“Although not

part of [Plaintiff’s] federal claims, Mr. Lonberg [] noted several

violations of [] California disability law [including] designated

accessible parking spaces that lack a front path of travel and require

wheelchair users to traverse behind parked cars [and the] California

requirement of providing nine foot wide parking stalls . . . .”)

(emphasis added). Since the federal claims are moot and the court will

decline to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law claims, these issues need not be reached.

9

the entrance, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate facts supporting his

opposition to Defendant’s motion on this issue.3 ADAAG § 4.6.2;

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

Plaintiff also alleges that a curb ramp was located on the

access aisle in the parking lot. (Compl. ¶ 8B.) Defendant avers that

“[c]urrently there is a compliant curb-ramp that is not located in the

access aisle.” (SUF ¶ 10.) Plaintiff counters by citing to portions

of his own and Mr. Lonberg’s declarations. (Pl.’s Opp’n to SUF at 3.) 

However, both declarations are silent as to whether there is a

compliant curb-ramp located in the access aisle. (See Lonberg Decl.

¶ 5; Edward L. Kemper Decl. in Supp. of Pl.’s Opp’n (“Kemper Decl.”).) 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the parking lot has the

incorrect signage. (Compl. ¶ 8B.) Defendant avers that it “has the

proper signage posted in its lot.” (SUF ¶ 11.) Plaintiff counters

that Defendant has not provided sufficient proof of compliance and

that it needs to conduct a second site inspection. (Pl.’s Opp’n to

SUF at 3.) 

Plaintiff’s conclusory statements are not sufficient to meet

his burden under Rule 56(e). See T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. 

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Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment concerning

Plaintiff’s parking allegations is granted. 

iv. X-Ray Tables and Equipment

Plaintiff alleges that he “had to transfer from his

wheelchair to an x-ray table, and this proved difficult due to the

excessive height of the table.” (Compl. ¶ 8E.) Defendant avers that

“[t]he staff helps those who have difficulty transferring onto the xray table.” (SUF ¶ 25.) Defendant also argues that there are no

accessibility codes that govern x-ray tables. (Mot. at 6.) Plaintiff

concedes this, but argues that he can prevail on his ADA claim if

Defendant’s facility has a policy of discrimination and references a

Department of Justice (“DOJ”) advisory opinion regarding exam tables. 

(Opp’n at 9.) 

However, Plaintiff has neither shown that Defendant has a

policy of discrimination nor how the DOJ advisory opinion, which

concerns exam tables and not x-ray tables, applies. (See Opp’n at 9

(“The DOJ issued an advisory opinion regarding exam tables.”)

(emphasis added); see also www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/tal842.html.) 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

alleged violation of disability law concerning the x-ray table is

granted.

v. Miscellaneous

Defendant avers that “[t]he slope of the side exit is now

compliant with [the relevant accessibility codes] [and] [c]ompliant

handrails are present[;]” that “[t]he doors to the main entrance and

patio are now compliant with [the relevant accessibility codes;]” and

that “Plaintiff’s expert alleged that there was an insufficient amount

of latch side clear space next to the patio door, due to a plotted

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plant that was encroaching into clear space [but that the] plotted

plant is no longer located in the clear space, [so] therefore, this

item is compliant with [the relevant accessibility codes].” (SUF

¶¶ 26, 27, 28.) Defendant also avers that the height of its front

counter is now compliant with [the relevant accessibility codes] and

that service counters do not require knee clearances.” (Id. ¶ 29.) 

Plaintiff responds that Defendant has not provided sufficient proof of

compliance and, regarding the knee clearance issue, Plaintiff makes

only a general reference to Mr. Lonberg’s report. (Pl.’s Opp’n to SUF

at 6.) 

Defendant also avers that Plaintiff’s “expert alleges that

the coat hook in the men’s bathroom is too high [but it] is now

compliant with the [relevant accessibility codes;]” and that

“Plaintiff’s expert alleges that the changing room doors swing into

the changing room [but that the] men’s changing room is now fitted

with curtains instead of a door.” (SUF ¶¶ 31, 32.) Plaintiff

counters that Defendant has not provided sufficient proof of

compliance. (Pl.’s Opp’n to SUF at 7.) 

Finally, Defendant avers that it has one “water cooler

[that] meet[s] the requirement for water coolers found in [the

relevant regulation].” (SUF ¶ 30). Plaintiff counters with the

conclusory statement that “Chapter 4.15 of the ADAAG manual addresses

and suggests water accessibility for one water cooler or drinking

fountain” and that “providing one water cooler that only able bodied

people can use constitutes discrimination” without citing to a

particular regulation that Defendant has violated or showing how

Defendant is discriminating against Plaintiff. (Pl.’s Opp’n to SUF at

7.) 

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Plaintiff’s conclusory statements in response to Defendant’s

averments are not sufficient to meet his burden under Rule 56(e). See

T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. For the reasons stated, summary

judgment is granted to Defendant on Plaintiff’s miscellaneous

disability law claims. 

B. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Since all federal claims have been resolved on summary

judgment, the court will reach the discretionary decision of whether

it should continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s remaining state claims. This decision is made under 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and “is informed by the [United Mine Workers v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966),] values of economy, convenience, fairness,

and comity.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In the

usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated . . . , the

balance of [these] factors . . . will point toward declining to

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); see also Wade v.

Reg’l Credit Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996). The Gibbs

values of comity and fairness do not weigh in favor of the federal

court deciding Plaintiff’s state disability and damage claims. 

Accordingly, the court declines to continue exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims and therefore

these are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial

summary judgment is stricken and his request for a continuance under

Rule 56(f) is denied; Defendant’s summary judgment motion on

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Plaintiff’s federal disability law claims is granted; and Plaintiff’s

remaining state law claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3) as of the date on which this Order is filed. The Clerk

of the Court is ordered to enter judgment in favor of Defendant on the

federal claims. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 28, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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