Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03207/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03207-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MICHAEL KEITH SMITH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-3207 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

ADULT PROBATION DEPARTMENT, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SOMEONE ELSE, )

)

Respondents. )

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

Mr. Michael Smith(“Petitioner”), filed a pro se

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on October 13, 2005, and

filed an amended petition (Docket No. 12), with attachments

(Docket No. 13), on June 16, 2006. At that time, Petitioner was

confined at the Arizona State Hospital in the Arizona Community

Protection Treatment Center. Respondents filed an Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Limited to Affirmative

Defenses, on November 2, 2006, asserting the petition is moot.

See Docket No. 30. On January 12, 2007, Petitioner filed a

reply to the response to his habeas petition. See Docket No.

35.

1. Procedural History

In 1993, pursuant to a written plea agreement,

Petitioner pled guilty to attempted sexual assault and attempted

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1 Per the suggestion of Respondents, the Court takes judicial

notice of Smith v. Herman, No. 98 CV 00371 PHX RGS, which provides the

procedural history of Petitioner’s various legal actions through the

year 1998.

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kidnapping. See Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Limited to Affirmative Defenses (“Answer”) (Docket No. 30),

Exhs. A-2 & A-3. Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive

term of ten years imprisonment for the attempted sexual assault

conviction and to lifetime probation for the attempted

kidnapping conviction. See id., Exh. A-4. 

Petitioner pursued two actions for federal habeas

relief from these convictions and sentences in the United States

District Court for the District of Arizona; in both cases habeas

relief was denied. See Smith v. Hallahan, 91 CV 00983 PHX WPC,

and Smith v. Herman, 98 CV 00371 PHX RGS.1 Served in its

entirety, Petitioner’s ten-year sentence of imprisonment

pursuant to his 1993 conviction for attempted sexual assault

would have expired in March of 2003. See Petitioner’s

attachments to his amended petition at Docket No. 13, Exh. 7.

In April 2000, prior to Petitioner’s imminent release

from prison for his 1993 conviction resulting from his accrual

of earned release credits, a complaint was filed against

Petitioner pursuant to Arizona’s Sexually Violent Persons

(“SVP”) Act, codified at Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated

sections 36-3701 to 3717, and Petitioner was involuntarily

confined at the state hospital. See Answer, Exh. B. 

Petitioner filed a special action in the Arizona state

courts asserting the state had breached the 1993 plea agreement

by committing him to the state hospital rather than requiring

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him to receive outpatient treatment during his sentence of

lifetime probation. See id., Exh. B. The Arizona Superior

Court denied relief on August 29, 2000. See id., Exh. B.

Petitioner appealed this decision to the Arizona Court of

Appeals, which denied relief. See id., Exh. B. 

On July 29, 2002, Petitioner filed two actions seeking

federal habeas corpus relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in

this Court. See Smith v. Messer, 02 CV 1421 PGR SLV and Smith

v. Messer, 02 CV 1420 PGR SLV. In the first action, Petitioner

argued his confinement pursuant to Arizona’s Sexually Violent

Persons Act violated the 1993 plea agreement and, therefore,

that his 1993 criminal convictions should be vacated because the

government had violated the plea agreement. In the second

federal habeas action, Petitioner asserted his 2000 commitment

to the Arizona State Hospital pursuant to the SVP Act violated

his federal constitutional rights. Relief was denied in both of

these federal habeas actions in April and September of 2003,

respectively. 

Approximately three years after his transfer from

prison to the Arizona State Hospital, in a civil proceeding

occurring in July of 2003, a state jury concluded Petitioner was

a “sexually violent person” as that term is defined by Arizona

statutes. See Answer, Exh. C. Pursuant to the jury’s

conclusion, Petitioner was committed by the state court to the

custody of the Arizona Community Protection and Treatment

Center, a facility under the supervision of the Arizona State

Hospital. Id., Exh. C.

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Prior to the jury trial resulting in the finding

Petitioner was a sexually violent person, in December of 2002,

the State of Arizona filed a petition to revoke Petitioner’s

probation, alleging Petitioner had violated a term of probation.

Id., Exh. A-7. In March of 2003, the Arizona Superior Court

conducted a hearing regarding the petition to revoke probation,

at which hearing Petitioner’s probation officer testified and

evidence was admitted. Id., Exhs. A-8 & A-9. The Superior

Court heard testimony that a December 2002 search of

Petitioner’s room at the Arizona State Hospital revealed

sexually stimulating or oriented materials, written in

Petitioner’s handwriting, which possession violated a condition

of his probation. Id., Exh. A-9.

In a decision issued March 19, 2003, Petitioner was

found guilty of violating a term of his probation. See id.,

Exh. A-10. However, the Superior Court did not revoke

Petitioner’s probation and order him incarcerated; the Superior

Court “reinstated” Petitioner on lifetime probation “with

conditions identical to those originally imposed.” Id., Exh. A10. 

The Court finds Defendant has violated the

conditions of probation previously imposed.

IT IS ORDERED reinstating the Defendant on

probation for lifetime to date from 4/15/2000

under the supervision of the Adult Probation

Department of this Court under the rewritten

conditions and regulations as explained by

the Court.

Id., Exh. A-10.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s

violation order on April 1, 2004. Id., Exh. E. The Arizona

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Supreme Court denied review of the decision on December 1, 2004.

Id., Exh. G.

On April 29, 2004, the government filed another

petition to revoke Petitioner’s probation. Id., Exh. A-12. In

response to the petition, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss

the petition to revoke and a motion to terminate his probation.

Id., Exh. A-13. A hearing regarding the petition to revoke was

conducted July 16, 2004. See id., Exh. A-14. At that hearing,

the trial court granted the government’s motion to dismiss this

petition to revoke Petitioner’s probation. Id., Exh. A-14. At

a hearing conducted August 18, 2004, the trial court denied

Petitioner’s motion to have his probation terminated. See id.,

Exh. A-15. 

Petitioner filed this federal habeas action on October

13, 2006, and he filed an amended section 2254 petition on June

16, 2006. On July 19, 2006, the Arizona trial court granted

Petitioner’s petition for absolute discharge from his civil

commitment pursuant to the SVP Act. Id., Exh. M. Accordingly,

Petitioner is no longer being held in the state hospital

pursuant to the SVP Act, nor is Petitioner incarcerated.

Petitioner is still serving a sentence of lifetime probation as

a consequence of his 1993 conviction for attempted kidnapping.

In the instant habeas action, Petitioner does not

assert he is entitled to habeas relief because his 1993

convictions and sentences were in error. Neither does

Petitioner challenge the fact of his civil commitment, which has

now been terminated. In this action, Petitioner contends the

state court’s 2003 finding that he violated a term of probation,

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2 The Court notes the central theme of Petitioner’s other

arguments is that the State of Arizona is using criminal laws to

“punish” the fact of his civil commitment. Petitioner raised a

similar arguments in two of his prior federal habeas actions. The

assertion that Petitioner’s civil commitment is unconstitutional

additional punishment for his criminal convictions has been rejected

by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has concluded

an individual’s federal constitutional rights regarding double

jeopardy and ex post facto laws are not violated by their civil

commitment pursuant to a state statute governing “sexually violent”

persons, which may be based on the fact of their criminal convictions.

See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263, 121 S. Ct. 727, 735 (2001);

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997).

To the extent Petitioner asserts his criminal adjudication and

his civil commitment were constitutionally incompatible, Petitioner

may not raise these claims in this habeas action because Petitioner

raised the claims in a prior federal habeas petition. Federal

statutes provide a “claim presented in a second or successive habeas

corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior

application shall be dismissed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2006).

Petitioner previously raised his claims that his civil commitment and

probation status violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s instant petition raising those claims is a second or

successive habeas corpus application stating a claim for relief

presented in a prior petition and the claims must be denied and

dismissed. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531, 125 S. Ct.

2641, 2647 (2005); Burris v. Parke, 130 F.3d 782, 795 (7th Cir. 1997).

Compare Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (9th Cir.

2003).

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which resulted in his “reinstatement” on lifetime probation,

violated his federal constitutional right to due process of law.

Petitioner’s other claim for relief asserts he was

unconstitutionally subject to a sentence of probation in a

criminal matter while also being civilly committed pursuant to

the SVP.2 

Respondents argue Petitioner’s claims for relief are

moot because Petitioner has now been released from civil

commitment. Respondents further argue the claims are moot

because Petitioner has not demonstrated any specific, concrete

injury in fact resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional

revocation of his probation. 

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3 Petitioner asserts there is a “high probability of placing

Petitioner in the county jails on condition of his probation for any

period length of time up to one year... Petitioner may finds himself

in the untenable position of being required to resubmit to psychiatric

examination which would then place him in jeopardy of incurring yet

another petitioner (sic) to revoke probation and a potential prison

sentence of 15 years.” Reply at 6. Additionally, Petitioner contends

he is being “punished” for receiving SVP treatment, arguing his

probation and his status as an SVP are incompatible. Id. at 8.

Petitioner contends he is “forced to choose between obtaining the

therapy and treatment that the Court had deemed necessary and exposing

himself to potential criminal liability.” Id. at 7. 

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Petitioner acknowledges he was released from the

custody of the Arizona State Hospital on July 19, 2006. Reply

(Docket No. 35) at 2. However, “Petitioner moves the court to

terminate his probation and to dismiss the Petition to Revoke

Probation on State and Federal Constitutional Grounds. The

petition was dismissed, leaving a question whether or not the

probation should be terminated.” Id. at 3. With regard to

Respondents’ argument that his federal habeas action is moot,

Petitioner alleges injuries “in-facts” as a result of the filing

of the December 2002 petition to revoke his probation. Id. at

4-5. Petitioner contends the continuing collateral consequences

of the 2002 petition to revoke probation include his continued

status on probation. Id. at 5. Petitioner also contends there

are potentially “various adverse consequences” on his “record”

which might arise as a result of the 2002 petition to revoke

probation. Id.3 

2. Analysis

Respondents argue Petitioner’s claims are moot because

Petitioner has been released from confinement. 

The case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, §

2, of the United States Constitution “subsists through all

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stages of federal judicial proceedings ... The parties must

continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the

lawsuit.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,

477-78, 110 S. Ct. 1249, 1253-54 (1990) (internal quotations

omitted). If it appears that the Court is without the power to

grant the relief requested by a habeas petitioner, then the

petition is moot. See Picrin-Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773, 775

(9th Cir. 1991). If a habeas action seeking the petitioner’s

release from confinement is adjudicated after the petitioner has

been released, “some concrete and continuing injury” or

“collateral consequence” of the challenged decision must exist

for the habeas action to be maintained. See Spencer v. Kemna,

523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S. Ct. 978, 982 (1998).

Part of the relief that Petitioner requested in his

amended habeas petition, i.e., his release from his thenpotentially indefinite civil detention pursuant to the SVP Act,

can no longer be granted by the Court. Therefore, to the extent

Petitioner asserts his civil detention pursuant to the SVP Act

violated his constitutional rights, his amended petition is

moot. Cf. id., 523 U.S. at 8-16, 118 S. Ct. at 983-87 (finding

moot a habeas petition challenging parole revocation procedures

after the petitioner was released from prison); Lane v.

Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 633, 102 S. Ct. 1322, 1327 (1982);

Fendler v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 846 F.2d 550, 555

(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a section 2241 petition becomes

moot once the petitioner, seeking release from parole rather

than challenging the validity of his original conviction, is

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4 In certain circumstances a claim that the petitioner’s

commitment was a violation of his constitutional rights might not be

moot. Cf. Carty v. Nelson, 426 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 2037 (2006) (interpreting California’s SVP law and

concluding a habeas petition challenging an initial commitment

pursuant to the SVP law was not moot upon the petitioner’s release due

to the collateral risk of the petitioner’s incarceration if he failed

to comply with SVP reporting requirements). However, in this action

Petitioner challenges the probation revocation, not the proceedings

regarding his civil commitment.

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released from parole).4

However, Petitioner also seeks relief in the form of

the Court declaring that his status on probation violates his

constitutional rights. Petitioner asserts the 2003

“reinstatement” of his sentence of lifetime probation was

improper, inter alia, because he was deprived of due process in

the 2003 proceedings to revoke his probation. Petitioner also

contends that the state courts improperly denied his motion to

terminate his probation in 2004. 

The Court agrees with Respondents that Petitioner’s

allegation his 2003 probation violation proceedings violated his

constitutional rights is moot because there are no collateral

consequences attaching to the decision Petitioner violated a

term of his probation. As noted by Respondents, the finding

Petitioner had violated a term of his probation, resulting in a

“reinstatement” on probation, did not prevent Petitioner’s

release from the state hospital after his SVP commitment, one of

the collateral consequences asserted by Petitioner.

Petitioner’s allegation that he might suffer future collateral

consequences from the violation decision is not a sufficient

allegation of collateral consequences to avoid the conclusion

the claim is moot. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 15, 118 S. Ct. at

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5 In Spencer and Lane v. Williams the Supreme Court held the

presumption that a wrongful criminal conviction always has continuing

collateral consequences, such that habeas corpus relief would be

available, does not extend to parole or probation revocation hearings.

See also, e.g., Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 480-81 & n.5 (9th

Cir. 2003); Diaz v. Duckworth, 143 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1998). 

6

Cofield is not entitled to presentence incarceration credit

for his time spent detained as an alleged SVP because he

was not “in custody” within the meaning of A.R.S. §

13-709(B). “Arizona court decisions have consistently

interpreted the ‘in custody’ requirement of this statute to

mean actual or constructive control of prison or jail

authorities.” State v. Reynolds, 170 Ariz. 233, 235, 823

P.2d 681, 683 (1992)[]. 

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987; Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 480-81 & n.5 (9th Cir.

2003) (concluding the possibility a parole revocation will

result in future harm in future criminal proceedings is too

speculative or tenuous to bely mootness).5

The use of the term “reinstatement” by the probation

violation court appears to have misled Petitioner into believing

he was not on probation at the time of the violation and

revocation hearing. Petitioner was on probation throughout the

entire time he was detained at the state hospital both before

and after the jury concluded he should be committed as a SVP.

As a resolution of the probation violation proceeding, the state

court “reinstated” Petitioner on probation, however, Petitioner

was not ever not on probation. The state court’s terminology

indicates a finding that Petitioner was not to be incarcerated,

or taken into the custody of the state prison or jail system,

rather than remain at the state hospital, as a result of his

violation of probation. See Arizona v. Cofield, 210 Ariz. 84,

86-87, 107 P.3d 930, 932-33 (Ct. App. 2005).6 

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Accordingly, the claim that Petitioner was deprived of

due process in his probation violation hearing is moot because

the finding of a violation did not result in additional

punishment, requirements, or sanctions on Petitioner. 

Additionally, Petitioner’s allegation his right to due

process was violated in the probation violation proceedings

because the court allowed hearsay statements as foundation to

admit documents, i.e., the documents Petitioner was prohibited

from possessing, may be denied on the merits. It is arguable

that this claim would even provide a basis for federal habeas

relief. Individuals in probation revocation proceedings are

not entitled to the full array of constitutional protections

afforded a defendant in criminal proceedings. See Morrissey v.

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972); United

States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2005). An

individual faced with the revocation of their probation is

constitutionally entitled only to notice and a right to be heard

and a neutral fact-finder. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606,

611-12, 105 S. Ct. 2254, 2257-58 (1985); Gill v. Ayers, 342 F.3d

911, 918-19 (9th Cir. 2003); Myers v. Miller-Stout, 117 Fed.

App. 542, 543 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 928

(2005). The federal courts have also determined that the

revocation of a petitioner’s parole or probation does not

violate due process if “some evidence supports the decision.”

Caswell v. Calderon, 363 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner was afforded sufficient due process during

the hearing regarding his probation violation. Compare McBride

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v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding a due

process violation where hearsay evidence regarding the violation

was the sole evidentiary basis for revocation). Additionally,

as noted by Respondents, Petitioner has not shown any prejudice

or injury arising from the finding he had violated a term of his

probation. Technical errors alone in a probation revocation

process do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation;

a petitioner must show prejudice before the Court can find a due

process violation. See Williams v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 300,

307-08 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming the denial of habeas relief

when the alleged error in refusing to allow a parole officer to

testify at the parole revocation hearing was harmless); Linton

v. Walker, 26 Fed. App. 381, 383-84 (6th Cir. 2001); White v.

United States Parole Comm’n, 856 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir. 1988)

(rejecting a claim of defective notice because the petitioner

had not shown prejudice).

Furthermore, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision

affirming the finding of a probation violation and concluding

the admission of hearsay in a probation revocation proceeding

did not violate Petitioner’s right to due process was not

clearly contrary to established federal law. See Ryan v. State

of Mont., 580 F.2d 988, 993 (9th Cir. 1978) (concluding the use

of hearsay and illegally seized evidence in a probation

revocation proceeding did not violate the probationer’s

constitutional rights). See also United States v. Simmons, 812

F.2d 561, 564 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Pattman, 535

F.2d 1062, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1976). Because the state court’s

decision evaluating the merits of Petitioner’s federal habeas

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due process claim was not clearly contrary to clearly

established federal law, the Court may not grant habeas relief

on the merits of Petitioner’s due process claim. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2006). 

Furthermore, Petitioner did not raise, in the state

courts of appeal, his claim that the 2004 denial of his motion

to terminate his probation violated his constitutional rights.

Accordingly, Petitioner has not exhausted this claim in the

state courts and relief may not be granted on the merits of the

claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 2006).

3. Conclusion

Petitioner’s claim that his 2003 probation violation

proceedings violated his right to due process is moot because

Petitioner has not established any collateral consequences

arising from the decision he violated a term of his probation.

Additionally, the state court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s

right to due process was not violated in this proceeding was not

clearly contrary to established federal law. Petitioner did not

exhaust any claim regarding the 2004 decision denying his motion

to terminate probation in the Arizona Court of Appeals and,

accordingly, relief may not be granted on this unexhausted

claim. Furthermore, Petitioner’s claims that his civil

commitment and probation status violated his constitutional

rights were raised in a previous federal habeas petition and,

accordingly, the claims must be dismissed as presented in the

instant action for relief.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Smith’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 4th day of April, 2007.

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