Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00579/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00579-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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1

 The parties raise a number of evidentiary objections, many of which we need not

address here, as they concern facts that are immaterial to the resolution of these motions.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donna J. Lehman; Brian Lehman, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Maricopa County Community College

District; Virginia Stahl; Frederick Stahl, 

Defendants. 

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CV 11-00579-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (doc. 71) and

separate statement of facts ("PSOF1") (doc. 72), defendants' response (doc. 81) and

controverting statement of facts ("DSOF1") (doc. 82), and plaintiffs' reply (doc. 87). Also

before us is defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 73) and separate statement of

facts ("DSOF2") (doc. 74), plaintiffs' response (doc. 83) and controverting statement of facts

("PSOF2") (doc. 84), and defendants' reply (doc. 88).

I

On a motion for summary judgment we determine whether a genuine issue of material

fact exists for trial, drawing all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor.1

 See

Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendant Maricopa

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2

 Brian Lehman and Frederick Stahl are included as parties pursuant to Arizona

community property law. However, the facts of this case concern Donna Lehman's

employment. We will simply refer to Donna Lehman as "plaintiff" and Virginia Stahl as

"Stahl."

3

 The parties dispute whether plaintiff officially retained her Coordinator of Adult ReEntry Services title, or was given a new title of Coordinator of Student Success Services and

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County Community College District ("MCCCD") includes Scottsdale Community College

("SCC") and Chandler-Gilbert Community College ("CGCC"). Defendant Virginia Stahl

worked during the relevant period as Vice President of Student Affairs at SCC. Plaintiff

Donna Lehman began working for MCCCD in May 2002 as Coordinator of Adult Re-Entry

Services at SCC.2

 At the time of hire, plaintiff was placed on a one-year probationary period,

which she successfully completed in May 2003. Plaintiff was classified as a Grade 15

employee and member of the Management, Administration, and Technology ("MAT")

employee group. As a MAT employee, plaintiff was covered by the written MAT policy and

could request up to twelve weeks Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") leave.

Moreover, if a MAT employee exhausted FMLA leave, MAT policy permitted the employee

to request an additional medical leave of absence. According to MAT policy, in order to lay

off a MAT employee for budgetary reasons, an employee must be given notice by December

15th of the preceding fiscal year. MCCCD's fiscal year closes on June 30th. In order to lay

off a MAT employee in June 2009, for example, the employee must receive notice by

December 15, 2008. The MAT policy also outlines the grievance process available to MAT

employees who believe that the MAT policy has been violated. This is a multi-step process

culminating with the opportunity to present an appeal to the governing board.

Plaintiff took FMLA leave in 2005 and 2006. In May 2007, the Adult Re-Entry

Services department was closed. Plaintiff was one of the affected employees. Because MAT

policy requires notice by December 15th of the preceding year, plaintiff could not be

immediately laid off. Instead, she was assigned to the Student Success Initiative department

at SCC.3

 As a part of her new job duties, plaintiff organized and ran new student

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Early Alert Programs. See DSOF1 ¶ 13. However, this dispute is not material to resolution

of these motions.

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orientations.

In 2008, plaintiff requested FMLA leave due to knee replacement surgery. The

request was granted, and plaintiff began FMLA leave on July 8, 2008. Prior to commencing

her leave, plaintiff arranged with co-workers to handle her job responsibilities in her absence.

Plaintiff exhausted her FMLA leave on September 16, 2008. She was still recovering, so she

began MAT medical leave on September 17, 2008.

Jan Gehler became SCC president in July 2008. Gehler instructed SCC vice

presidents to submit proposals for budget reductions, as budget cuts for the next fiscal year

at MCCCD were needed. Stahl was asked by Gehler to propose budget cuts. She explored

various budget reduction options. At some point, Stahl created a spreadsheet titled

"Reduction Scenarios." The spreadsheet includes a row that lists plaintiff's name, "17950,"

and, under a column titled "Opportunity," "Unpaid Leave 3 mos." PSOF1, ex. 19.

Ultimately, Stahl recommended the elimination of plaintiff's position. Stahl believed that the

loss of plaintiff's position would have the least impact on Student Services. On September

25, 2008, Gehler wrote a memorandum to MCCCD Chancellor Rufus Glasper,

recommending that plaintiff's position be eliminated due to "budget reductions and

reallocation of [plaintiff's] work duties." PSOF1 ¶ 37.

In early November 2008, while plaintiff was still on medical leave, plaintiff received

a call from MCCCD's Human Resources department notifying her that her employment

would be terminated as of June 30, 2009 due to budget cuts. Plaintiff was informed that the

layoff would be confirmed at an upcoming governing board meeting. Plaintiff received a

letter dated December 5, 2008 from Chancellor Glasper, confirming both her selection for

layoff and the December 2008 board meeting. Plaintiff's layoff was approved by the

MCCCD governing board on December 9, 2008 to take effect on June 30, 2009. Plaintiff

was one of several SCC employees selected for layoff in 2008 and 2009.

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Plaintiff remained on medical leave until February 2, 2009. In January 2009, Stahl

sent her an email notifying her that her duties at SCC had been reassigned, and that Stahl was

looking into alternative employment to carry plaintiff through June 30, 2009. After plaintiff

returned to work, she was assigned to a temporary position with Dr. Sylvia Manlove, the

Associate Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs. Plaintiff returned to SCC later that spring.

According to plaintiff, after she returned to work in February 2009, two of her coworkers told her that they were told by MCCCD management that plaintiff's duties had been

permanently reassigned to them in August 2008. PSOF1 ¶ 36. Plaintiff testified that

Rebecca ("Becky") Bradley told her "I didn't think you were coming back, because. . . when

we took on the orientations last - last time they had permanently assigned those back to us."

PSOF1, ex. 2, Lehman Dep. 138:11-15. According to plaintiff, Bradley told her that Stahl

and another employee, Yira Brimage, told her that the reassignment of duties was permanent.

PSOF1, ex. 2, Lehman Dep. 138:16-18. Bradley denies telling plaintiff that her duties were

permanently reassigned in August 2008. DSOF1, ex. 8, Bradley Decl. ¶ 3. She states that

because plaintiff did not return to work until February 2009, Bradley also had to cover

plaintiff's duties relating to the Spring 2009 new student orientations, which were held in

January 2009. DSOF1, ex. 8, Bradley Decl. ¶¶ 4. According to Bradley, the January 2009

orientations were the "most recent" orientations that took place prior to plaintiff's return.

DSOF1, ex. 8, Bradley Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff also testified that another employee, Shelley

Skinner, "said to me that my job had been. . . permanently assigned to her back in August,"

however Skinner did not tell plaintiff the names of the people who permanently assigned

plaintiff's duties. PSOF1, ex. 2, Lehman Dep. 139:8-140:22.

Plaintiff met with Chancellor Glasper in Spring 2009 regarding the termination letter

she received in December 2008. Glasper personally contacted staff at CGCC, and discovered

there was an available one-year position. Plaintiff began working at CGCC as Coordinator

of Adult Re-Entry. According to plaintiff, her employment was not terminated on June 30,

2009. Instead, she argues that she was temporarily reassigned to the position at CGCC.

PSOF1 ¶ 76. Defendants argue that she was laid off on June 30, 2009 and re-hired into the

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temporary position at CGCC. DSOF1 ¶ 76. Although the parties dispute whether plaintiff

was re-hired or merely transferred to CGCC, it is undisputed that plaintiff was aware that the

CGCC position was for one year only.

Plaintiff interviewed for a number of jobs within MCCCD without success. In May

2010, she met with Chancellor Glasper regarding her search for a permanent position for

2010-2011. Glasper is the highest ranking official at MCCCD. Pursuant to Glasper's

suggestion, plaintiff met with Dr. Phil Randolph, Interim Vice Chancellor of Human

Resources (the highest ranking Human Resources official at MCCCD) on June 23, 2010 to

discuss her employment situation. Plaintiff's one-year position with CGCC ended on June

30, 2010. Plaintiff chose not to submit a grievance to MCCCD regarding the termination of

her employment at CGCC.

Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts two counts for (1) violation of the FMLA and

(2) deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the issue of liability for both counts. Defendants

cross-move for summary judgment on both counts.

II

The FMLA prohibits an employer from interfering with an employee's exercise of her

FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). This includes a prohibition on negatively considering

an employee's use of FMLA leave when making adverse employment decisions. Bachelder

v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001). To prevail on her FMLA

interference claim, plaintiff must show "by a preponderance of the evidence that her taking

of FMLA-protected leave constituted a negative factor in the decision to terminate her." Id.

at 1125. She may do so by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id.

Plaintiff argues that she has shown that taking FMLA leave constituted a negative

factor in defendants' decision to lay her off in 2008 and is entitled to summary judgment on

her interference claim. First, plaintiff argues that Gehler's September 25, 2008 memorandum

to Chancellor Glasper reveals that she was recommended for layoff because her duties were

reallocated. According to plaintiff, her duties were only reallocated because she was on

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4

 Whether reassignment of plaintiff's duties would violate MAT policy is a separate

question that is not before us.

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FMLA leave, and thus the memorandum constitutes direct evidence that her FMLA leave

played a negative role in her layoff. It is undisputed, however, that plaintiff failed to return

to work after she exhausted her FMLA leave on September 16, 2008. Instead, she remained

on MAT medical leave until February 2009. An employee is no longer entitled to job

protection under the FMLA if she fails to return to work at the expiration of her FMLAeligible leave. See Farina v. Compuware Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1054 (D. Ariz. 2003)

("Because Plaintiff took longer than 12 weeks leave, she is only entitled to an equivalent

position under the FMLA if she was prepared to return to work during a time designated as

FMLA leave."); see also Jackson v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 949, 965 (N.D.

Cal. 2011) (because plaintiff was not able to return to work at end of 12-week FMLA period,

"the FMLA did not entitle Plaintiff to be restored to his former position or to any other

position"). Thus, after September 16, 2008, the FMLA did not require defendants to restore

plaintiff to her prior position, or any position. In other words, defendants were free to

permanently reassign her duties after September 16, 2008 without violating the FMLA.4

That a memorandum dated September 25, 2008 states that plaintiff's duties were permanently

reassigned and is a reason for recommending she be laid off is not in itself direct evidence

that her taking of FMLA leave was a negative factor, because defendants were not required

by the FMLA to return her to any position after the expiration of her 12-week FMLA leave

on September 16, 2008. That the memorandum is dated only nine days after her FMLA leave

expired may constitute circumstantial evidence that her FMLA leave influenced the decision,

if plaintiff can show that the decision to permanently reassign her duties was made while she

was still on FMLA-protected leave.

Plaintiff attempts to show that her duties were permanently reassigned while she was

on FMLA-protected leave by referencing statements made to her by co-workers Bradley and

Skinner that her duties were permanently reassigned as of August 2008. Defendants argue

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both statements are inadmissible hearsay. With respect to Skinner's statement, plaintiff

testified that Skinner did not identify the names of people who told Skinner plaintiff's duties

were reassigned. PSOF1, ex. 2, Lehman Dep. 139:8-140:22. Even assuming Skinner's

statement to plaintiff is admissible, the statements to Skinner by unidentified MCCCD

employees are inadmissible hearsay. See Zaben v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc.. 129 F.3d

1453, 1457 (11th Cir. 1997) (statements made to plaintiff by employees that "other

unidentified declarants" said "they" wanted to get rid of older employees properly excluded

as hearsay); Carden v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir. 1988)

(statement by unidentified person not admissible as an admission by party-opponent because

"the author of the statement is unknown").

Plaintiff argues that Bradley's statement to her about the permanent reassignment of

her duties qualifies as an admission by party-opponent. A party seeking to admit a statement

under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) must lay adequate foundation to show that the statement

"relates to a matter within the scope of the agent's employment." Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v.

Lozen Int'l, LLC, 285 F.3d 808, 821 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Although we

consider the contents of the statement, contents alone are insufficient to establish that the

statement was made within the scope of the relationship. Id. Plaintiff offers no argument to

show that Bradley's statement was made within the scope of her employment; she simply

states that it was. Even if Bradley's statement is admissible under this rule, however, it still

fails to support plaintiff's argument that her job duties were permanently reassigned in

August 2008. Plaintiff testified that Bradley told her that her job duties regarding new

student orientation were permanently reassigned "when we took on the orientations last - last

time." PSOF1, ex. 2, Lehman Dep. 138:4. Bradley testified that the "last time" she had to

assist with orientation prior to plaintiff's return was January 2009. DSOF1, ex. 8, Bradley

Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to suggest that the January 2009

orientation did not happen. Accordingly, plaintiff has not supported her assertion that her

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5

 Plaintiff's statement of facts references an email sent by Stahl on December 15, 2008

indicating that there was no longer work for Lehman at SCC, and an email from Stahl to

plaintiff on January 13, 2009 notifying plaintiff that her job duties had been reassigned.

PSOF1 ¶¶ 59-60. Neither of these emails, sent well after the exhaustion of plaintiff's FMLA

leave, suggest that her duties were reassigned prior to September 16, 2008. Plaintiff also

references an email Stahl sent on August 20, 2008 regarding who was working on "Early

Alert," one of the programs headed by Lehman. Stahl suggested discussing whether the

program would be functioning by mid-September, because "[w]e cannot count on Donna

Lehman to be back before then." PSOF2, ex. 16. But it is undisputed that Lehman was

entitled to remain on FMLA leave through September 16, 2008. Nothing in the email would

allow a jury to reasonably infer that Stahl was looking to permanently reassign Lehman's

Early Alert duties.

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duties were permanently reassigned in August 2008.5

Next, plaintiff argues that the "Reduction Scenario" spreadsheet listing plaintiff's

name with the notation "Unpaid Leave 3 mos.," PSOF1, ex. 19, is a striking indication that

defendants negatively considered plaintiff's use of FMLA leave when deciding to end her

employment. Plaintiff argues that the spreadsheet was a list of prospective people being

considered for layoff, and lists her FMLA leave as a reason for her inclusion on the list.

PSOF1 ¶ 42. She attempts to support this contention by citing to Gehler's deposition. The

portions cited, however, reveal that Gehler did not know who prepared the report, it did not

look familiar, and she did not know what the numbers represented or what the "Unpaid Leave

3 mos." meant. PSOF1, ex. 3, Gehler Dep. 99:20-101:19. By contrast, it is undisputed that

Stahl was looking for ways to cut the budget without conducting layoffs. Defendants

presented Stahl's testimony that she created the spreadsheet in an attempt to meet the required

reductions without conducting layoffs by calculating overlooked savings. Stahl testified that

she listed plaintiff's unpaid leave to show that this had saved the department money. DSOF1,

ex. 2. Plaintiff has not pointed to any controverting evidence to support her assumptions

about the purpose of the spreadsheet.

Plaintiff also argues that Stahl's preparation of a timeline detailing five years of

plaintiff's medical absences reveals her consideration of FMLA leave as a negative factor

when deciding to recommend her for layoff. The timeline reveals that it was created

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sometime after plaintiff's return to work on February 2, 2009, because it lists this as her exact

date of return. PSOF1, ex. 17. Plaintiff has not argued otherwise. It is unclear, and plaintiff

does not explain, how a reasonable jury could conclude that a timeline created months after

Stahl's September 2008 memorandum recommending plaintiff's position for layoff, and

months after the Board voted to approve plaintiff's layoff, shows that plaintiff's use of FMLA

leave played a part in Stahl's September 2008 recommendation.

Finally, plaintiff argues that we should conclude that her discharge was influenced by

her FMLA leave because her name does not appear on two memoranda sent by Gehler to

Chancellor Glasper and Human Resources Vice Chancellor Crusoe on December 1, 2008.

PSOF1 ¶¶ 52-53. Plaintiff argues that the absence of her name on these memoranda, which

recommend the elimination of certain positions at SCC, shows that she was not really part

of the layoffs conducted for budgetary reasons. Plaintiff concludes that the termination of

her position must be connected to her FMLA leave. Yet plaintiff agrees that Gehler

recommended her position for layoff to Glasper back in September 2008, and was notified

of the decision to lay her off by Human Resources in November 2008. Thus, at the time

Gehler sent the December memorandum to Glasper, it is undisputed that Gehler had already

recommended plaintiff's position for layoff, and plaintiff was already notified of the Board's

intention to vote on her layoff at the December 2008 meeting. Plaintiff argues that Gehler's

failure to recommend her position for layoff to Glasper in December 2008 (when Gehler had

already made this recommendation to Glasper months prior) is significant. Even if plaintiff

is correct in concluding that her omission from the December 1, 2008 memoranda means she

was not a part of that round of layoffs, it does not reasonably follow that Gehler's

recommendation to lay her off in September 2008 must have been influenced by her taking

of FMLA leave.

In sum, it is undisputed that plaintiff's FMLA-protected leave ended on September 16,

2008, and Gehler recommended the termination of her position, citing budgetary concerns

and the reassignment of plaintiff's duties, on September 25, 2008. Plaintiff has not offered

admissible evidence that shows that her duties were permanently reassigned prior to the

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expiration of her FMLA leave. She concedes that SCC had been tasked with cutting the

budget. Plaintiff's remaining arguments regarding Stahl's spreadsheet, the timeline created

months after plaintiff was selected for layoff, and her absence from two December 2008

memoranda proposing layoffs are built on speculation, and thus fail to raise a genuine issue

of material fact regarding whether plaintiff's use of FMLA leave was a negative factor in the

decision to terminate her employment. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d

978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (conclusory or speculative testimony "insufficient to raise genuine

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment"). Accordingly, we find that defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on the FMLA interference claim.

III

Plaintiff argues that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they terminated her

employment on June 30, 2010 "without providing her any form of due process." Pls.' MPSJ

at 14. To prevail on her procedural due process claim, plaintiff must show (1) that she was

deprived of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest, and (2) that she was

denied "adequate procedural protections." Hufford v. McEnaney, 249 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). To possess a protected property interest, a person must have

a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to it; a unilateral expectation of, need of, or desire for it

is not enough. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701,

2709 (1972). Plaintiff argues that she had a constitutionally protected property interest in her

employment with CGCC. According to plaintiff, she was never actually laid off from

MCCCD, but rather was temporarily reassigned before the layoff was effective. Thus, under

plaintiff's view, she retained her status as a MAT employee and was entitled to the

protections of the MAT policy manual throughout her employment at CGCC. To support

this argument, plaintiff points to a Personnel Action Form completed by MCCCD staff,

which lists plaintiff as being temporarily assigned to CGCC rather than hired into a new

position, PSOF1 ¶ 80, and to another internal form that notes that the new position is a

"Temporary Reassigment - in lieu of layoff." PSOF2, ex. 29. Moreover, plaintiff notes that

she never received separation paperwork (such as COBRA information) after her

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employment at SCC ended in 2009.

It is undisputed, however, that plaintiff received notice of her layoff from her SCC

position prior to December 15, 2008, as required by MAT policy. It is also undisputed that

in December 2008, the Board voted to approve the layoff in December 2008, effective June

30, 2009. Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to show that this action was ever reversed.

Based on these facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff had a legitimate

expectation in returning to her old job at SCC after June 30, 2009. It is also undisputed that

plaintiff knew prior to beginning her position at CGCC that it would only last for one year.

Plaintiff offers no evidence to suggest that there was a possibility to renew the CGCC

position. Indeed, even the internal form referenced by plaintiff that characterizes the move

to CGCC as an assignment in lieu of layoff notes that the "[a]ssignment ends 06/30/10," and

specifies that plaintiff "[d]oes not have reversion rights to regular assignment." PSOF2, ex.

29. Accordingly, regardless of whether plaintiff was rehired into the position as CGCC or

reassigned there, it is undisputed that plaintiff had no position to return to at SCC after June

30, 2009, and the position at CGCC would only last through June 30, 2010. Based on these

facts, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff had

a legitimate property interest in her one-year temporary position at CGCC beyond June 30,

2010. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578, 92 S. Ct. at 2709 (no legitimate property interest in position

when the employment contract "specifically provided that the respondent's employment was

to terminate" on a certain date without any "provision for renewal whatsoever"). Thus,

defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 due process claim.

However, even if plaintiff did have a constitutionally protected interest in the CGCC

position, the undisputed facts show that she was provided adequate due process. At its heart,

due process expresses the need for "fundamental fairness." Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of the

Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 983 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The Due

Process Clause demands "that a person deprived of property be given an opportunity to be

heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Id. at 984 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Before an employee with a constitutionally protected interest in her

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employment is laid off or fired, she must be provided with the opportunity for "some form

of pretermination hearing." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105

S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985). An employee must be provided "oral or written notice of the

charges against [her], an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to

present [her] side of the story." Id. at 546, 105 S. Ct. at 1495. The hearing need only happen

before the employee is finally deprived of her property interest. Brewster, 149 F.3d at 985.

Plaintiff first argues that she received no notice that her employment would terminate

in 2010, because she was not provided with notice pursuant to MAT policy that the Board

approved a release of her CGCC position prior to December 15, 2009. But as discussed

above, it is undisputed that plaintiff received timely notice prior to December 15, 2008 of the

Board's decision to lay her off from SCC, effective June 30, 2009. And it is undisputed that

plaintiff was aware that her new position at CGCC would only last through June 30, 2010.

Plaintiff's argument that she did not receive any notice that her employment would end is not

supported by the undisputed facts. To the contrary, she went into the position with full

knowledge that the position only lasted one year. Indeed, plaintiff admits that she received

an email from Chancellor Glasper on June 30, 2009 stating that "[b]y Board action [] you

have no position at SCC after June 30. It is my intent to work toward a permanent position

at CGCC or elsewhere. . . by June 30, 2010 but I cannot confirm such an action." DSOF2,

ex. 16. Moreover, it is undisputed that prior to termination of her position at CGCC, plaintiff

met with MCCCD personnel to discuss the possibility for continued employment for 2010-

2011. She met with Chancellor Glasper, who she admits is the highest-ranking official at

MCCCD, in May 2010. Upon Glasper's suggestion, plaintiff also met with Randolph, the

highest-ranking Human Resources individual at MCCCD, on June 23, 2010. Plaintiff argues

without elaboration and without citation to the record that her discussions with Glasper and

Randolph were "not meaningful." Reply to Pls.' MPSJ at 9-10. But she has not argued that

the meetings did not present her with an opportunity to present her side of the story. See

Brewster, 149 F.3d at 985 (noting that a pretermination hearing can be very limited, provided

that it gives notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity for the

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employee to present her side of the story).

Finally, plaintiff argues that she was not provided with a post-termination hearing as

required by Section 23.2 of the MAT policy. PSOF1 ¶ 89. Section 23.2 outlines the posttermination procedures followed when an employee is terminated for cause. PSOF1, ex. 7

at 17. Plaintiff has not argued that she was terminated for cause. She has not pointed to any

other section of the MAT policy that outlines a post-termination hearing process for

employees in limited-duration assignments that come to an end. Plaintiff admits, however,

that she was aware of the MAT grievance policy. This policy afforded plaintiff, who

believed herself a MAT employee, with the opportunity to request additional review of her

separation from MCCCD (up to the chance to present her grievance to the governing board).

Plaintiff elected not to file a grievance. She has not argued that she requested any other form

of review of her termination of employment from CGCC that was denied. In sum, even if

plaintiff had a property interest in her position at CGCC, she has not shown that the pre- and

post-termination procedures offered to her were inadequate.

Because we find that no genuine issue of material fact with respect to either claim, we

do not reach the parties' arguments regarding liquidated damages under the FMLA.

IV

IT IS ORDERED DENYING plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (doc.

71). IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 73).

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff.

DATED this 23rd day of August, 2012.

Case 2:11-cv-00579-FJM Document 89 Filed 08/24/12 Page 13 of 13