Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00606/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00606-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sean Patrick Ward, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora P. Schriro, Director, Arizona

Department of Corrections; Terry

Goddard, Attorney General, 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-606-PCT-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Petitioner Sean Patrick Ward’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, (Doc. 1), and

Magistrate Judge Mark Aspey’s Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 24). After reviewing

the record and determining oral argument is unnecessary, the Court issues the following

Order.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 19, 2007, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition seeking a Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) on September 14, 2007. (Doc. 13). On

December 7, 2007, Petitioner replied. (Doc. 23). Magistrate Judge Mark Aspey filed a

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) on September 30, 2008, recommending that

Petitioner’s habeas petition be denied in full. (Doc. 24). On December 1, 2008, Petitioner

Case 3:07-cv-00606-MHM Document 44 Filed 09/30/10 Page 1 of 34
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filed his objections to the R&R, (Doc. 27), which Respondents replied to on May 19, 2009.

(Doc. 32). The objections became fully briefed on June 15, 2009. (Doc. 36).

The state level factual and procedural background of this case is extensively and

thoroughly detailed with citation to the record in Section I, “Procedural History,” of

Magistrate Judge Aspey's R&R. (Doc. 24, pp. 1–42). It does not appear that the Petitioner

objects to the R&R’s recitation of the facts, which includes detailed accounts of the evidence

and testimony brought forth at trial and at the Post Conviction Relief (“PCR”) evidentiary

hearing. Instead, he takes issue with Magistrate Judge Aspey’s interpretation of those facts

as they pertain to his claims for relief. This Court, therefore, fully incorporates by reference

Section I of the R&R into this Order, and which should be read in conjunction with this

Order. It also notes that this case stems from an April 6, 2000, Mohave County, Arizona,

grand jury indictment that charged Petitioner with the first-degree murder of his ex-girlfriend

Ms. Kristine McLaughlin. (Answer, Exh. A1). At trial, Petitioner was represented by

counsel; Mr. Engan. On Friday, March 16, 2001, the jury returned a verdict of guilt on the

offense of second degree murder. (Id., Exh. A). On April 13, 2001, after a hearing, Petitioner

was sentenced to a term of 22 years imprisonment pursuant to this conviction. (Id., Exh. R).

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal from his judgment and

sentence. (Id., Exh. A). Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in his direct

appeal. (Id.) Petitioner raised eleven issues, including a due process claim regarding the

prosecutor’s closing arguments and the failure to video-tape the police station photo line-up

interview with the victim’s son, Bryce McLaughlin. (Id., Exh. S). On September 26, 2002,

the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected all of Petitioner’s claims and affirmed his conviction

and sentence in a memorandum decision. (Id., Exh. V). Petitioner sought review of the

decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on March 18, 2003.

(See Petition for Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1 at 2). Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari

from the United States Supreme Court. 

On May 20, 2003, Petitioner initiated a timely action seeking state post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. In his action for

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post-conviction relief Petitioner raised three general arguments, including an allegation that

his trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective. (Answer, Exh. W). The Mohave County

Superior Court found that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was colorable

and conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner’s claims on April 23, 2004. (Id.,

Exh. A). On May 17, 2004, the trial court issued a lengthy order denying post-conviction

relief. (Id.). Petitioner filed a timely petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals.

(Id., Exh. C). On October 17,2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review

of the trial court’s denial of relief. (Id., Exh. AA). Petitioner sought review of this decision

by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on May 25, 2006. (Id., Exh. BB).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court must review the legal analysis in a Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In addition, a district court must

review the factual analysis in the Report and Recommendation de novo for those facts to

which objections are filed. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.

2003) (en banc); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court shall make a de

novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.”). “Failure to object to a magistrate judge's

recommendation waives all objections to the judge's findings of fact.” Jones v. Wood, 207

F.3d 557, 562 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a

federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in state court proceedings” unless the state court decision was (1) contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S.

Supreme Court, or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly

established precedent if (1) “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are

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materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives

at a result different from [its] precedent.” Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. “A state court’s

decision can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either correctly

identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is

objectively unreasonable, or extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle

to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d

1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, a state court’s application of federal law must be more

than incorrect or erroneous, it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Furthermore, “[w]hen applying these standards, the federal court should

review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a state court.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

III. EXHAUSTION

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus makes two overarching legal claims: (1)

ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) violation of due process. Before addressing the

merits of Petitioner’s claims, however, the Court must consider Respondents’ allegations

concerning exhaustion. In their Answer, Respondents argued that Petitioner did not properly

exhaust three of his instant claims. These are: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”)

predicated on trial counsel’s failure to interview and call two potential alibi witnesses,

Yvonne Johnson and Philip Enoch; (2) IAC predicated on trial counsel’s failure to discover

and present evidence regarding the lack of motor oil outside of Ms. McLaughlin’s residence;

and (3) IAC predicated on trial counsel’s closing argument. (Doc. 13 at 54–55). In his

Reply, Petitioner admitted that he did not properly exhaust the ineffectiveness claim

concerning trial counsel Engan’s failure to interview Yvonne Johnson and Philip Enoch, but

argued that the other two claims identified by Respondents are fully exhausted and properly

before this Court. Magistrate Judge Aspey did not address Respondents’ exhaustion

arguments in his R&R, which Respondents pointed out in their response to Petitioner’s

objections. (Doc. 32, p.2, n.1). Accordingly, because Respondents have renewed their

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exhaustion arguments, this Court will consider them now. (Id.).

A. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) a federal court can only consider a petitioner’s writ of

habeas corpus after the petitioner exhausts all available state remedies. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). “ Exhaustion requires the state prisoner give the state

courts a ‘fair opportunity to act’ on each of his claims before he presents those claims in a

federal habeas petition.” Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999)). A claim is fairly presented if the

petitioner described both the operative facts and the legal theory on which his claim is based

to the appropriate state court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). With

the exception of death penalty cases, an Arizona prisoner exhausts his state remedies by

fairly presenting his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Castillo v. McFadden,

399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2004) (“To exhaust his Arizona remedies, Castillo had to give

the Arizona courts a ‘fair opportunity’ to act on his federal due process claim before

presenting it to the federal courts. . . . We consider Castillo’s briefing to the Arizona Court

of Appeals to determine whether he fairly presented his federal due process claim to the

Arizona courts.”) (citations omitted); Swoops v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“Arizona has declared that its complete round [of appellate review] does not include

discretionary review before the Arizona Supreme Court.”).

B. Discussion 

1. IAC Based on Engan’s Closing Argument

The Court turns first to Respondents’ argument that Petitioner failed to exhaust his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated on Engan’s closing argument. Petitioner

alleges that Engan performed ineffectively during his closing argument by both undermining

his suicide and third-party murderer defenses, and by bolstering the state’s case by referring

to irrelevant and prejudicial evidence introduced by the prosecution. The Parties agree that

Petitioner properly exhausted a claim for IAC based on Mr. Engan’s closing argument.

Instead, they dispute whether the claim that Petitioner exhausted is based on the same

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underlying facts as the claim presented in the instant habeas petition. This is an important

distinction; Petitioner fairly presented his claim in state court only if the state court claim

described both the same set of operative facts, in addition to the applicable law. Tamalini

v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner first raised an IAC claim based on Engan’s closing argument in his Petition

for Post-Conviction Relief. Petitioner argued that Engan performed ineffectively by

“fail[ing] to argue vital evidence that had been presented at trial in support of his defense of

suicide, accident or third party.” (Answer, Exh. W at 26). In support of this claim, Petitioner

highlighted numerous examples of evidence and trial testimony elicited during trial and that

supported a suicide theory, but which Engan failed to argue during his closing. Specifically,

Petitioner noted that Engan did not mention Dr. Keen’s testimony that a person could cut

off their air supply, pass out, and die, but still not evidence neck trauma, and that such a

death would be consistent with Dr. Nelson’s findings and testimony concerning the pristine

condition of McLaughlin’s neck. He also claimed that Engan failed to argue any evidence

that disputed Dr. Keen’s conclusion of homicide, noting that Engan failed to remind the jury

of Dr. Keen’s admission that he did not examine certain of McLaughlin’s neck tissues and

of Dr. Keen’s statement that he did not believe the bruises he found on McLaughlin’s hands

and arms were defensive bruises. Finally, Petitioner also argued that Engan failed to tell the

jury that the ovoid bruises on McLaughlin’s front left scalp area could have been caused by

the Buzz Lightyear doll found next to her body, and that other evidence found at the scene,

such as the green box, supported a suicide theory.

 In his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner also made

reference to Engan’s allegedly ineffective closing argument, although not explicitly. As part

of his argument that Engan fundamentally misunderstood the crime scene because he failed

to consult with a crime scene or medical examiner, Petitioner cited Engan’s closing

argument, suggesting it evidenced this misunderstanding. (Answer, Exh. Z at 5–6). The

only other mention of Plaintiff’s closing argument is found under the heading: “Counsel was

ineffective by failing to present autopsy photos and evidence to rebut the State’s theory that

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DNA under Kristine’s fingernails was the result of her clawing at the rope around her neck

during hanging proving a violent and prolonged death.” (Id. at 11). Petitioner noted that the

prosecutor, during his closing, argued that the DNA under McLaughlin’s fingernail proved

that she scratched at the roper around her neck and suffered a painful death, and that Engan

failed to rebut this evidence during his closing argument. (Id.).

The evidence on which Petitioner currently rests his IAC claim is very different from

that presented in state court. In his instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner

argues that Engan performed ineffectively during closing by mentioning prosecution

evidence that painted Petitioner in a bad light, such as Petitioner’s conviction for drug

possession and proclivity for non-traditional sexual practices, such as anal sex. He also

points out that Engan undercut his own theory of the case by explaining to jurors that the

state would likely characterize his two-hook suicide theory as “preposterous,” and by stating

“I don’t know who killed her. Frankly, that’s not my business. I am not here to tell you

that,” which, Petitioner argues, discredited the suicide theory, while simultaneously implying

McLaughlin’s death was, as the prosecution contended, a murder, not a suicide. Finally,

Petitioner argues that Engan bolstered the prosecution’s case by: (1) stating that Bryce

McLaughlin was “not dumb,” and a “pretty smart kid;” (2) noting that Petitioner had been

indicted by the grand jury and, therefore, “Someone thinks he is guilty;” and (3) vouching

for the intelligence and knowledge of the prosecutor and the police, making the statement,

“[the prosecutor and the police] probably know more about this case than I do. They have

lived with this case almost a year.” 

 The claim Petitioner pressed in state court is similar to the one presented in

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition only to the extent that both allege ineffective performance

by Engan during closing argument. The fact, however, that both claims share a general legal

theory does not give Petitioner license to rely on a completely different set of operative facts

in federal court. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 989 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding conflict

of interest claim unexhausted where the conflict on which the petitioner based his claim

changed from state court to federal court ). It is well-established that “in order to fulfill

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exhaustion requirements, a petitioner must present to the state courts the substantial

equivalent of the claim presented in federal court.” Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040

(9th Cir. 2007). “However, a petitioner may provide further facts to support a claim in

federal district court, so long as those facts do not ‘fundamentally alter the legal claim

already considered by the state courts.’” Id. (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260

(1986)). Accordingly, Petitioner argues that his claim is exhausted because his instant

petition does nothing more than “provid[e] a slightly different or more detailed explanation

of Engan’s failures on closing argument.” The Court does not agree. 

 In state court, Petitioner claimed that Engan performed ineffectively because he

failed to argue trial evidence that supported Engan’s theory of suicide, accident, or third

party. To factually support this argument, Petitioner pointed to potentially exculpatory

testimony and evidence presented at trial that was not mentioned by Engan during his

closing. In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner argues that Engan performed ineffectively

during closing because he spent significant time discussing “inconsequential facts and

evidence” that painted Petitioner in a bad light and undercut his own case in a number of

different ways. To support of this claim, Petitioner relies namely on a number of statements

Engan made during closing argument. In other words, Petitioner previously based his

allegation of ineffective performance on what Engan did not say during closing. Now,

however, Petitioner asks this Court to find Engan performed unreasonably based on what he

did say. None of the statements on which Petitioner now relies, however, were brought to the

state courts’ attention. 

Accordingly, it does not appear to the Court that petitioner has presented a

substantially similar claim to the one he presented at state court. Although Petitioner makes

the same general legal claim, the facts he has marshaled to support that argument have

fundamentally altered its character. And these do not, as Petitioner suggests, merely place

his state claim in a stronger evidentiary posture or add greater specificity to the factual

allegations, as none is remotely related to Engan’s failure to bring trial evidence to the jury’s

attention that supported his defense theories. Instead these facts lead towards a different

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conclusion—the one strongly suggested in the Petition—that Engan performed ineffectively

during closing because he highlighted prejudicial information and otherwise bolstered the

prosecutions case. This allegation, however, is neither made nor even suggested in

Petitioner’s state court petitions, and as the Court has already mentioned, the facts that

underpin this allegations are nowhere to be found either. Cf. Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d

1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding petitioner exhausted his state remedy where he “at least

ma[de] the general allegations of his counsel's lack of penalty phase preparation to the

Arizona Supreme Court (including improper delegation to an inexperienced subordinate and

failure to prepare mental health experts)”). The Arizona State courts, therefore, were not

afforded a meaningful opportunity to consider this allegation of legal error. See Casey v.

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004), and this Court must find that Petitioner has not

exhausted his IAC claim predicated on Engan’s closing argument.

2. IAC based on Engan’s Failure to Discover the Lack of Motor Oil

Respondents also argue that Petitioner’s did not fully exhaust his IAC claim

predicated on Engan’s failure to discover and present evidence regarding the lack of motor

oil outside of Ms. McLaughlin’s residence. The record shows that Petitioner referenced

Engan’s failure to discover the lack of motor oil in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

as part of his argument that Engan failed to properly investigate facts which would support

an alibi defense. Petitioner argued, as he does here, that Engan failed to investigate

Petitioner’s Pinto to confirm the presence of an oil leak, and that the crime scene photos and

video did not show the presence of any new oil leaks, just some older stains that appear to

have been washed, suggesting Petitioner did not go to McLaughlin’s house on the night of

the murder. (Exh. X, pp.9–10). Petitioner’s Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of

Appeal, however, is devoid of any mention of this claim or, for that matter, any other claim

based on Engan’s failure to investigate and pursue potential alibi evidence. Instead, in the

Petition, Petitioner made only a general allegation that “Egan was Ineffective by Failing to

Investigate the Scene and Present a Clearly Viable Suicide or Accident Defense in a Hanging

Case Where the Physical Evidence was Inconsistent with the Child Eye-Witness Testimony

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and Verdict,” followed by seven specific allegation of ineffectiveness focused on Engan’s

failure to investigate and, therefore, understand evidence inside McLaughlin’s home and in

direct proximity to the scene of the hanging.

In arguing that he fully exhausted this claim, Petitioner’s asserts only that he has

exhausted claims that Engan was ineffective in failing to investigate the physical evidence.

The issue, however, is not if Petitioner exhausted some claims based on Engan’s failure to

investigate physical evidence, which he has, but if he exhausted this particular claim, which

he has not. Quite simply, Petitioner did not mention the oil leak in his Petition for Review

to the Arizona Court of Appeals. And, while a petitioner may provide “further facts to

support a claim in federal district court,” the oil spill is unrelated to the other investigation

claims made by Petitioner in state court, all of which focus on Engan’s failure to investigate

and understand physical evidence found at the scene of the crime. Lopez, 491 F.3d at 1040.

Instead, the oil spill evidence clearly goes towards Engan’s failure to investigate potential

alibi claims. Petitioner, however, has not exhausted any claims alleging IAC based on

Engan’s failure to investigate potential alibi evidence. Lopez, 491 F.3d at 1040. Petitioner

had an opportunity to present this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, but failed to do so.

Accordingly any claim predicated on Engan’s failure to investigate alibi evidence in the form

of the oil leak is not exhausted.

C. Procedural Default

Having determined that two of Petitioner’s claims are not exhausted, the Court must

now consider whether they are procedurally defaulted as well.

1. Legal Standard

 If a petition contains claims that were not fairly presented in state court, then the

federal court must determine whether any state remedies remain available to the petitioner.

See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-70 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court

may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of the state remedies.

Rose, 455 U.S. at 520. However, if the Court finds that the petitioner no longer has state

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remedies available, his claims are procedurally defaulted and must be dismissed with

prejudice unless petitioner can show a miscarriage of justice, cause and prejudice, or actual

innocence that would excuse the default. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989);

Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002). The standard for “cause and

prejudice” is one of discretion and is intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional

circumstances only. See Hughes v. Id.State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th

Cir. 1986). Although both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural

default, the Court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at

1123 n.10. Status as an inmate and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute cause for

failure to present claims to state courts. Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.

1988)(finding that petitioner’s arguments concerning his mental health and reliance upon

jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause); Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding

that illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a

procedural default). Failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case,

where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). 

2. Discussion

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 bars a petitioner who has already filed a direct

appeal and had a full round of post-conviction relief proceedings from re-raising claims in

a subsequent petition that could have been raised in the first one. Ariz. R. Crim P.

32.2(a)(3) (“A defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule based upon any

ground: that has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.”).

The Arizona Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to bar a petitioner from raising claims

in a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief that could have been raised in a first such

petition, but were not. See Krone v. Hotham, 181 Ariz. 364, 366 (Ariz. 1995) ( “Thus, if a

defendant's early petition for post-conviction relief raises a limited number of issues, the

defendant waives other issues he could have then raised but did not.”). Petitioner’s claims

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are procedurally defaulted, as he does not have any available remedies left at state court,

having already enjoyed a full round of post-conviction relief proceedings. 

Having determined Petitioner has no remaining state court remedies, the Court must

consider whether Petitioner can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice, cause and prejudice,

or actual innocence that would excuse the default. Because Petitioner bares the burden of

making such a showing and has argued only that his claims are properly exhausted, not

addressing procedural default, the Court must find that Petitioner has failed to establish that

his claims should be permitted to move forward despite the procedural default. Sandgathe,

314 F.3d at 376.

IV. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Based on the headings in his Petition for Habeas Corpus, Petitioner only made three

IAC claims: (1) failure to hire an investigator; (2) deficient examination of both his and the

State’s medical expert with regards to the condition of McLaughlin’s neck; and (3)

ineffective performance during closing. (Doc. 1 at 27, 36, 45). In light of the Court’s

determinations concerning exhaustion and procedural default, only the former two claims

remain. Within each of these IAC claims, however, Petitioner has a tendency to make

additional allegations of IAC that are distinct from the one claimed in the section heading.

This presents a challenge for the Court, as it must divine what exactly is the conduct, or

absence of conduct, that constitutes the deficient performance. Accordingly, despite the fact

that Petitioner appears to only have two IAC claims remaining, the Court finds there are in

fact six, and will discuss them each separately. 

Additionally, in his objections to the R&R, Petitioner alleges that Magistrate Judge

Aspey correctly cited, but failed to apply the legal standard for ineffective assistance of

counsel to his claims. Specifically, Petitioner criticizes the R&R for focusing on the

sufficiency of the evidence as a metric for whether Engan provided effective assistance of

counsel. In light of Petitioner’s concerns about the application of the ineffectiveness

standard, which appear to have some merit, this Court will not merely review the legal

conclusions in the R&R de novo, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c), but instead conduct its own

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1

 In their papers, Respondents argue that relief based on an ineffectiveness theory is

precluded by the fact that Engan did not testify at the evidentiary hearing. In making their

argument, Respondents have not cited to, and this Court is unaware of, any authority that

supports such a categorical rule. Petitioner, on the other hand, has cited authority that

affirmatively demonstrates an IAC claim can proceed, and even succeed, without the

testimony of trial counsel. See, e.g., Hamblin v. Mitchell,354 F.3d 482, 492 (6th Cir. 2003)

(finding ineffective assistance based on a failure to investigate despite the lack of testimony

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independent analysis of Petitioner’s claims. 

A. Legal Standard

The right to counsel guaranteed to criminal defendants by the Sixth Amendment “is

the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th

Cir. 1999) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). The two-prong

test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth by the Supreme Court in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a

defendant must show (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, (2) that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 687-88;

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1237 (9th Cir. 2002).

In reviewing trial counsel’s performance, “a court must indulge a strong presumption

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that

is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. at 689 (internal quotation

omitted). A court may not engage in hindsight analysis, but instead must “evaluate the

conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Id. As the Ninth Circuit has artfully

explained: “The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is

the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some

reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted

at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds,

525 U.S. 141 (1998).1

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from trial counsel at the PCR hearing); Henry v. Scully, 918 F. Supp. 693, 714-15 (S.D.N.Y.

1995) (finding that counsel’s decision to not object must be examined as to whether it was

within the constitutional boundaries of reasonable competence, where counsel was deceased

and could not testify as to his reasons for not objecting). The effect of bringing an

ineffectiveness claim without the benefit of trial counsel’s testimony, however, is not de

minimis. The Supreme Court has explained that the presumption that counsel performed

effectively “has particular force where a petitioner bases his ineffective-assistance claim

solely on the trial record, creating a situation in which a court ‘may have no way of knowing

whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive.’”

Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added) (quoting Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.

500, 505, 123 S.Ct. 1690 (2003). Accordingly, while the absence of Engan’s testimony may

turn out to be consequential, it is not per se determinative. 

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If a defendant proves deficient performance, he must still show prejudice. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691–92. To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceedings would have been different.” Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is “a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

B. IAC: Failure to Investigate

Petitioner argues that Engan performed ineffectively by (1) failing to hire an

investigator; and (2) failing to adequately investigate potentially exculpatory evidence. 

Failure to investigate can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment

imposes on “[c]ounsel [] a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at. 691.

Counsel has performed ineffectively “where he neither conducted a reasonable investigation

nor made a showing of strategic reasons for failing to do so.” Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911,

918-919 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994)).

Still, as with all other IAC claims, “[a] particular decision not to investigate must be directly

assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference

to counsel's judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at. 691. 

1. Failure to hire an investigator

As a preliminary matter, the Court must reject Petitioner’s theory that Engan

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performed ineffectively by not hiring an investigator or for requesting funds for a courtappointed investigator. Given the gravity of the charges against Petitioner—first degree

murder—the Court agrees that hiring an investigator was probably the most prudent course

of action. The problem with Petitioner’s argument, however, is that he conflates Engan’s

failure to hire an investigator with Engan’s alleged failure to investigate. The two are not

identical. Investigation is not the sole province of professional investigators. Undoubtedly,

in many instances, a lawyer can conduct an investigation that satisfies the requirements of

the Sixth Amendment without the aid of a hired investigator. And while it is conceivable that

certain cases might be so complex that counsel’s failure to hire an investigator would be per

se ineffective, Petitioner has not explained why this case fits that mold, and nothing in the

record suggests that Engan could not have investigated the physical evidence at the crime

scene on his own. Iinstead, the real issue appears to be that Engan chose not to undertake

such an investigation at all. His failure to hire an investigator, therefore, was merely a

symptom of his failure to investigate, not its cause. Petitioner has not, as a result, overcome

the presumption of effectiveness to which Engan’s decision not to hire an investigator is

entitled. Accordingly, the state court’s decision, which likewise recognized that “foregoing

the use of an investigator and doing one’s own investigation, even in a first degree murder

case, is [not] in an of itself a deficient performance failing to meet prevailing professional

standards,” was not an unreasonable application of law.

2. Failure to investigate the crime scene

The Court turns next to Petitioner’s claims that Engan’s performed deficiently by

failing to conduct a sufficient investigation of the crime scene. Specifically, Petitioner faults

Engan for failing to investigate, or for failing to hire an investigator to investigate, forensic

evidence a Buzz Lightyear doll and green box found in the vicinity of McLaughlin’s body,

and a pair of scissors left sitting on a counter in McLaughlin’s kitchen.

At the PCR evidentiary hearing, Steven W. Bernard, an investigator hired by

Petitioner, testified that Engan should have investigated these particular objects because that

investigation may have uncovered evidence that supported a suicide theory. (Answer, Exh.

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Y at 75–77). Bernard stated that because the police initially suspected suicide, he would

have tested the green box found next to McLaughlin’s head for footprints and fingerprints.

(Id. at 76). He explained that the presence of McLaughlin’s footprints on the box would have

suggested that McLaughlin stood on top of the box and put the rope on the hook herself.

(Id.). Bernard also stated that he would have tested the Buzz Lightyear doll for tissue and

DNA. (Id.). He explained that the ovoid bruises found on McLaughlin’s head could have

been postmortem, as it appeared to him that the feet of the Buzz Lightyear doll were the same

shape as the bruises and may have, therefore, caused them. (Id.). Similarly, Bernard also

testified that the Buzz Lightyear doll may have been the cause of the wound found just

below McLaughlin’s knee. (Id. at 77). Finally, Bernard mentioned the scissors on the

kitchen counter, but did not explain why he would have tested them. (Id.).

Although the Court finds disconcerting Engan’s failure to investigate the crime scene

evidence highlighted by Bernard, it need not consider whether Engan’s failure to do so

constitutes deficient performance, as assuming, without deciding, that Engan performed

unreasonably, Petitioner cannot prove prejudice. The prejudice caused by a failure to

investigate is not based on the lack of an investigation itself, but instead results from trial

counsel’s inability to introduce the helpful evidence that the investigation would have

uncovered. See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 919 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We have repeatedly

found that a lawyer who fails adequately to investigate, and to introduce into evidence,

[evidence] that demonstrates his client's factual innocence, or that raises sufficient doubt as

to that question to undermine confidence in the verdict, renders deficient performance.”

(emphasis added, and internal quotation omitted); Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th

Cir. 1999) (same). That a court’s analysis of the prejudice prong of an investigation-based

ineffectiveness claim must focus on the evidence that an investigation would have uncovered,

as opposed to the investigation itself, makes perfect sense; if a particular investigation would

not have turned up beneficial evidence, a petitioner, or for that matter a jury, can not be said

to have been deprived of the benefit of that investigation.

In line with this principle, the Ninth Circuit has held that courts may not find prejudice

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Petitioner has not been able to conduct the tests suggested by Bernard, as the relevant

evidence has been destroyed. 

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based on speculation about what evidence an investigation might have turned up. Grisby v.

Blodgett, 130 F.3d. 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1997); see Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032,

1042 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Absent an account of what beneficial evidence investigation into any

of these issues would have turned up, Hendricks cannot meet the prejudice prong of the

Strickland test.” (emphasis added)); McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962, 973 (11th Cir. 1994)

(“McBride's unsupported assertions about what further investigation of the medical report

and automobile could have revealed do not establish a reasonable probability that the result

of his trial would have been different.”(emphasis added)). In Grisby, the petitioner argued

that his counsel performed ineffectively for failing to pursue testing of a carpet, “the results

of [which] might have exculpated him by showing that his blood was not present in the

hallway, a fact that would make it unlikely that he was [the] assailant.” Id. at 372. In

finding that the petitioner could not demonstrate prejudice, the Ninth Circuit relied on the

fact that “[petitioner] cannot now show that the results of the test would have been in his

favor, the carpet having long since been destroyed,” labeling his argument a “speculative

claim of prejudice.” Id. at 373. 

 Like in Grisby, Petitioner’s prejudice argument is predicated on speculation.

Although due to no fault of his own, Bernard testified only as to what a proper investigation

might have uncovered.2

 For example, Bernard noted only the “possibility” that

McLaughlin’s footprints would be found on top of the green box. (Answer, Exh. Y at 76).

 Similarly, he stated that “it appears to me that the Buzz Light year may have been the cause

of the ovoid bruises on her head which, in my opinion, could have been postmortem.” (Id.)

(emphasis added). Bernard offered no explanation at all as to what evidence the scissors

might have produced. While it is certainly possible testing of these objects would have turned

up evidence that benefitted Petitioner, it is far from certain. As in Grisby, this lack of

certainty prevents the Court from being able to find prejudice, even assuming Engan

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performed ineffectively by not conducting the investigation. Accordingly, the state court’s

determination that Petitioner was not prejudiced by Engan’s alleged failure to conduct a

proper investigation of the crime scene evidence is not an unreasonable application of law.

3. Failure to Request 911 Tape

Petitioner also argues that Engan performed ineffectively by failing to request the

tapes of the two 9-1-1 calls made by Tim Koonce, from the scene of the crime, after he

discovered McLaughlin’s body. Petitioner argues this claim under the umbrella of his

investigation theory of IAC. In other words, he cites the fact that Engan did not request the

911 tapes as evidence of Engan’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation. 

Once again, even if Petitioner could demonstrate deficient performance, his claim

would not succeed, as he cannot meet his burden concerning prejudice. Petitioner argues

that Engan’s failure to request the 9-1-1 tapes “depriv[ed] the jury of hearing the initial call

and ‘possible suicide’ comments or any other information that could have been gleaned from

it.” This argument is not persuasive. Because the 9-1-1 tapes have been destroyed, no one

will ever know what “other information” could have been gleaned from them, and

speculation as to what the tape may have contained is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice.

Grisby, 130 F.3d. at 371. It is not speculation, however, that Koonce reported a possible

suicide in his first 9-1-1 call, but changed his opinion to possible homicide in a second.

(Answer, Exh. Y at 62–63.) Even if the jury had heard this evidence, the Court does not

find it reasonably probable that the outcome of Petitioner’s trial would have been different.

At the evidentiary hearing, Koonce explained that he changed his mind about the

cause of McLaughlin’s death between the first and second 9-1-1 calls—from possible

suicide, to possible homicide—because of the position of McLaughlin’s body and the size

of the rope. (Id. at 63). Koonce could not reconcile the length of the rope around

McLaughlin’s neck with McLaughlin having hung herself—i.e. the rope appears too long to

have permitted McLaughlin’s feet to leave the ground. (Id.). In his habeas petition, relying

on the evidentiary hearing testimony of Dr. Peters, Petitioner argues that the length of the

rope does not, in fact, preclude a suicide theory, as people sometimes commit suicide by

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hanging themselves even while their feet can touch the ground. That fact, however, does not

render Koonce’s explanation for his change of opinion unreasonable. To the contrary, upon

encountering a dead woman lying on the ground, under a hook, with a rope around her neck,

one would expect the 9-1-1 call of a first responder to make reference to possible suicide.

That Koonce, a policeman, changed his mind about the possible cause of death after further

examining the scene and discovering that the rope around McLaughlin’s neck appeared too

long to permit hanging seems perfectly plausible. Additionally, such an explanation would

have appeared all the more reasonable to the jury given Engan’s two-hook suicide theory,

which appears to have been an attempt to explain how McLaughlin could have hung herself

despite the length of the rope. 

The Court doubts, therefore, that the jury would have ascribed any special significance

to Koonce’s initial determination of a possible suicide. Instead, the Court agrees with the

state court that the 9-1-1 tape, had it been procured, would have been of “marginal value.”

(Answer, Exh. Z at 38). This evidence, therefore, does not undermine the Court’s

confidence in the outcome of Petitioner’s trial and, as a result, it cannot find that Engan’s

failure to procure and introduce the 9-1-1 tapes caused Petitioner prejudice. Petitioner IAC

claim based on Engan’s failure to request the 9-1-1 tape is denied; the state court’s decision

that Engan was not ineffective for failing to get the 911 tapes was not an unreasonable

application of law.

C. IAC: Failure to Adequately Elicit Testimony That Supported a Suicide

Defense.

Petitioner argues that Engan performed ineffectively by failing to elicit testimony

from both his medical expert, Dr. Nelson, and the prosecution’s medical expert, Dr. Keen,

that supported a suicide theory. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that Engan’s examination of

these witnesses did not sufficiently emphasize the condition of McLaughlin’s neck, which

did not exhibit any signs of violent strangulation. Given the fact that Drs. Keen and Nelson

disagreed on the manner of death, Petitioner argues that Engan’s failure to bring forth

testimony concerning the condition of McLaughlin’s neck constitutes ineffective assistance

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The Court notes that Engan did, in fact, elicit testimony, albeit indirectly, from Dr.

Nelson, concerning the condition of McLaughlin’s neck. In response to Engan’s question,

“did you perform any tests to attempt to determine a window when the victim might have

died?” Dr. Nelson answered: “We did an anterior neck incision and found very little trauma

to the soft tissue of the neck. I took some skin incision over the area of the ligature and again

they showed minimal what are called cellular abrasion to the red cells within the soft tissue

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of counsel, as such testimony would have bolstered a suicide theory and discredited Keen’s

finding of homicide.

Dr. Nelson conducted the first autopsy on McLaughlin’s body. He performed a

complete neck dissection and found no cracks or fractures in any of the bones or vertebrae.

Additionally, his examination uncovered found no soft tissue damage that would have been

indicative of a violent or forced death. Dr. Keen examined the body after Dr. Nelson, but

did not have access to the neck organs that had been removed by Dr. Nelson during his

examination—the thyroid, cartilage, the hyoid bone, and the upper trachea. Petitioner argues

that Dr. Keen’s failure to examine these neck organs severely undermined his conclusion

that McLaughlin’s death was a homicide. In support of this position, he points to the PCR

evidentiary-hearing testimony of Pima County medical examiner, Dr. Peters. (Answer,

Exh. Y at 9–55). At that hearing, Dr. Peters, based on his examination of the autopsy

reports, photographs of McLaughlin’s neck, and other data, testified that he too could not

determine the manner of death. He also stated, however, that nothing in the photographs

suggested a forced strangulation and that the relatively pristine condition of McLaughlin’s

neck was more consistent with a suicide than not. 

Petitioner criticizes Engan’s failure to sufficiently explore the topic of McLaughlin’s

neck with Dr. Keen, noting that Engan asked Dr. Keen only a single question about the

condition of McLaughlin’s neck and failed to ask any follow-up questions concerning how

Dr. Keen’s lack of access to the removed neck organs impacted his conclusion of homicide.

Similarly, Petitioner faults Engan for asking no questions of his own expert, Dr. Nelson,

about the absence of signs of violent strangulation and for not asking Dr. Nelson questions

which would allow him to elaborate on Dr. Keen’s inability to examine the neck anatomy.3

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of the neck.” (Answer, Exh. L2 at 116–17). Engan did not, however, follow up on Dr.

Nelson’s answer. 

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“Under Strickland, counsel's representation must be only objectively reasonable, not

flawless or to the highest degree of skill.” Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2000).

This includes counsel’s decisions during examination of witnesses. As the Ninth Circuit has

explained, “counsel's tactical decisions at trial, such as refraining from cross-examining a

particular witness or from asking a particular line of questions, are given great deference and

must similarly meet only objectively reasonable standards.” Id. At first glance, Engan’s

decision not place more emphasis on the condition of McLaughlin’s neck appears

questionable, as one might expect the victim of a homicide by strangulation to exhibit signs

of neck trauma. However, placed in its proper context and given the substantial deference

which it is due, the Court cannot conclude that Engan’s performance was constitutionally

deficient. Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 8 (noting the “particular force” the presumption of

effective assistance has in the face of a silent record).

The underlying assumption of Petitioner’s argument is that the condition of

McLaughlin’s neck supported a strong suicide theory. The Court, however, is hesitate to

accept this proposition The record shows that both medical examiners agreed that the cause

of McLaughlin’s death was asphyxiation. Their disagreement concerned the manner of her

death. Dr. Nelson was unable to make a definitive determination on this subject, finding that

McLaughlin’s death could have been homicide, suicide, or accident. (Answer, Exh. L2 at

125). Dr. Keen, on the other hand, did conclude that McLaughlin’s death was a homicide.

The discrepancy between the two expert’s conclusions, however, was not predicated on the

condition of McLaughlin’s neck. Dr. Keen concluded McLaughlin’s death was a homicide

based on the presence of various bruises on her body, and at testified at trial that because he

had been unable to view the neck organs removed by Dr. Nelson, he relied on Dr. Nelson’s

conclusions concerning McLaughlin’s neck when making his determinations. (Id., Exh I at

89). Additionally, the condition of McLaughlin’s neck was not sufficient for Dr. Nelson,

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Petitioner’s own expert, to conclude that McLaughlin had committed suicide or to rule our

homicide as a possible manner of death. 

Thus, while Petitioner now characterizes the condition of McLaughlin’s neck as a

“critical issue,”it does not appear to have been a determinative factor for either medical

examiner that testified at trial. The Court, therefore, is dubious of Petitioner’s claim that

Engan overlooked a strong suicide defense. Instead, it appears that Petitioner, based on Dr.

Peter’s testimony, has ascribed a special significance to the condition of the neck that was

not apparent to either expert trial witness. Requiring Engan to have effectuated a strategy

based on such hindsight analysis runs counter to the cannons of ineffectiveness law. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (stating that courts must avoid engaging in hindsight analysis).

Relatedly, while the Court agrees with Petitioner that it was necessary for Engan to

undermine Dr. Keen’s conclusion of homicide, it cannot find, as Petitioner suggests, that

emphasizing the condition of McLaughlin’s neck was a necessary component of any

objectively reasonable strategy to do so. To wit, by focusing his examinations of the medical

experts on the source of their disagreement concerning the manner of McLaughlin’s

death—i.e. whether McLaughlin’s body exhibited pre-death bruises or post-death

livor—Engan sought to undermine Dr. Keen’s finding of homicide. He appears, then, to

have pursued a strategy focused on highlighting the undeterminable nature of the manner of

McLaughlin’s death, as opposed to pushing a suicide theory based on the condition of the

neck. This comports with the evidentiary hearing testimony of Petitioner’s ex-wife, Janet

Ward, who explained that Engan decided early that he needed to “take the focus of any

suicide scenario.” (Id., Exh. Y at 99). While this is clearly not the strategy that Petitioner’s

current counsel would have pursued, the Court is unprepared to find that it was completely

unreasonable. Engan did seek to undermine Dr. Keen’s conclusion of homicide, and contrary

to Petitioner’s current position, the importance of the condition of McLaughlin’s neck was

not so apparent or obvious as to make Plaintiff’s decision not to emphasize it objectively

unreasonable. Ultimately, while it might have been prudent to highlight the pristine

condition of McLaughlin’s neck and attempt to discredit Dr. Keen’s conclusions concerning

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the bruising, Engan’s performance “cannot be deemed ineffective because, with the benefit

of hindsight, we now determine that other trial strategies . . . may have been a better choice.”

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 876 (9th Cir. 2002). Having determined that Engan did

not perform unreasonably, the court does not need to consider prejudice.

D. IAC: Failure to Call a Second Defense Medical Expert to Testify

Petitioner argues that Engan performed ineffectively by failing to call a second

defense medical expert to support the “indeterminate” manner of death conclusion reached

by Dr. Nelson. Engan’s decision not to do so, Petitioner alleges, was unreasonable because

a second expert would have added weight to the conclusions of Dr. Nelson, who was a less

experienced medical examiner than was the prosecutions expert, Dr. Keen. The Court must

reject this claim. 

It is not uncommon for the respective experts of the prosecution and a defendant to

reach different conclusions and offer conflicting testimony, as was the case here. In all such

situations, it might potentially be helpful for the defendant to call a second expert witness to

testify as to the same facts as his first expert witness, thereby bolstering or lending credence

to the first expert’s testimony. What would be helpful and what is constitutionally required,

however, are two very different things. To the extent that Petitioner advances such an

argument, the Court must reject his theory that effective assistance of counsel requires that

trial counsel hire a second expert when the testimony of his first expert conflicts with the

prosecution’s expert. Such a rule would be logistically impractical and improperly suggests

that veracity is necessarily related to the number of people that make a claim. 

Assuming, however, that in some circumstances effective assistance of counsel might

require the hiring of a second expert, Petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating that

Engan’s failure to do so was unreasonable. “The choice of what type of expert to use is one

of trial strategy and deserves a heavy measure of deference.” Turner, 281 F.3d at 876. The

record shows that Egan consulted with a second medical expert before trial, Dr. Peters, but

elected not call to him. (Answer, Exh. Y at 14). Engan’s decision not to call Dr. Peters at

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trial is entitled to significant deference, and Petitioner has not adduced reasons that persuade

this court it was an unreasonable one. To the contrary, the crux of Petitioner’s claim is that

Dr. Peters would have testified more or less identically to Dr. Nelson. While it is easy for

Petitioner to speculate about the possible benefits of such testimony—such as adding weight

to Dr. Nelson’s findings— it is possible Engan concluded that any such benefit was

outweighed by the potential negatives. Engan may have decided, for example, that calling

a second expert would have suggested to the jury that he did not have faith in his expert or

that duplicative testimony would be confusing. In light of the significant deference owed to

Engan’s decision, the Court cannot find he performed unreasonably merely by deciding

against presenting duplicative or overlapping expert testimony, and the state court did not err

by rejecting this claim.

E. IAC: Failure to Show a Second Expert the Crime Scene Photos

Relatedly, Petitioner argues that Engan performed unreasonably by failing merely to

show photographs of the crime scene to a second medical examiner or crime scene expert.

Specifically, he states that “if Engan had simply shown the crime scene photos to a medical

examiner or crime scene expert from the outset, he would have learned that suicide or in the

alternative, accident after an auto-erotic asphyxiation, based on a victim's body position, is

very common,” and which would have supported a suicide claim. In support of his position,

Petitioner notes the PCR evidentiary hearing testimony of Dr. Peters, who described how

someone could hang himself without their feet ever leaving the ground, and testified that the

physical evidence supported such a scenario better than it did the homicide theory posited

by the prosecution. (See Answer, Exh. Y at 11–50 ). 

As the Court has mentioned, the record shows that Engan did, in fact, consult with Dr.

Peters about the possibility of conducting a third autopsy of McLaughlin’s body, but elected

not do so after Dr. Peters told him that a third autopsy would not have been likely to provide

any new information. (Answer, Exh. Y at 14). As the state court that considered this claim

explained, “[w]ith the benefit of hindsight one can argue that Mr. Engan should have gone

one step further an asked Dr. Peters [or another expert] whether reviewing the record and

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asking him to render an opinion based thereon, as to doing another autopsy, might yield

something productive.” (Petition, Exh. B at 8). Like the state court, however, this Court is

unable to find that Engan’s failure to take this additional step constituted ineffective

assistance of counsel. 

Engan already had the benefit of one medical expert, Dr. Nelson, who testified on

direct and cross-examination that he viewed the crime scene photographs before conducting

his autopsy. (Answer, Exh. L2 at 121, 141). Petitioner’s argument, then, implies that it was

objectively unreasonable for Engan to have trusted Dr. Nelson’s conclusions, despite the fact

those conclusions were based on the same evidence, including the crime scene photos, to

which a second expert would likely have had access. Petitioner, however, has not explained

why Engan should have had such mistrust, and instead improperly relies on the benefit of

hindsight in the form of Dr. Peter’s testimony. In other words, because Dr. Peter’s review

of the same crime scene photographs and autopsy information caused him to conclude that

the position of McLaughlin’s body was consistent with a hanging during which the victim’s

feet do not leave the ground, Petitioner argues that Engan should have known not to trust Dr.

Nelson’s analysis, which apparently did not include such a finding, and sought out a second

opinion. 

The Supreme Court has been very clear with respect to hindsight analysis. “A fair

assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689. Petitioner has not explained why from Engan’s perspective at the time it would

have been unreasonable not to have a second expert double check his own expert’s

conclusions. To the contrary, in other arguments presented to this Court, Petitioner has

suggested Engan performed unreasonably for not hiring a second expert to corroborate Dr.

Nelson’s conclusions regarding the indeterminate nature of McLaughlin’s death, which

works against their instant position regarding the quality of Dr. Nelson’s work. 

Accordingly, this Court, like the state court before it, can hardly find that Engan performed

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unreasonably by not showing photographs of the crime scene to a second medical examiner

or crime scene expert.

V. PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS CLAIMS

Petitioner also argues that violations of his constitutional right to due process of law

warrant a new trial. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the state violated his due process

rights when: (1) Detective Spoerry failed to record an interview he conducted with Bryce

McLaughlin, depriving Petitioner of potentially relevant evidence; and (2) the prosecutor,

Matthew J. Smith, made improper remarks during his closing argument, rendering

Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. In his R&R, Magistrate Judge Aspey concluded that

neither of Petitioner’s due-process allegations warrants relief, as the Arizona Court of

Appeals findings with respect to these claims were not unreasonable applications of

controlling federal law. Petitioner has only objected to Magistrate Aspey’s findings with

respect to his prosecutorial misconduct claim. 

A. Failure to Preserve Relevant Evidence

In his habeas petition, Petitioner argued that the state violated his due process rights

when Detective Spoerry failed to record an interview he conducted with Bryce McLaughlin.

In his R&R, Magistrate Judge Aspey recommended that this claim be denied, explaining that

while “bad faith failure to preserve or to collect potentially exculpatory evidence is a

violation of the defendant’s right to due process of law, there is no United States Supreme

Court opinion holding that the prosecution’s bad faith failure to create potential impeachment

evidence.” (Doc. 24, p.66). Petitioner has not objected to the R&R’s conclusions of law or

fact (on this claim), and his decision not to do so was prudent, as this Court agrees with

Magistrate Judge Aspey’s analysis.

In Arizona v. Youngblood, the Supreme Court held that failure to preserve

“potentially useful evidence,” along with a showing of bad faith, could constitute a due

process violation. 488 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1988). Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit has extended

Youngblood, holding that due process also requires a state to collect potentially useful

evidence, not merely preserve evidence that is already in its possession. Miller v. Vasquez,

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Additionally, even if Detective Spoerry’s conduct could be described as a failure to

collect exculpatory evidence, Miller is Ninth Circuit precedent and is not, therefore, clearly

established federal law. As a result, this Court could not conclude that the State Court of

Appeals, which rejected Petitioner’s on the grounds that the state did not fail to preserve an

material evidence, was contrary to or unreasonable application of federal law, as the relevant

Supreme Court precedent—Youngblood—only requires the preservation of potentially

relevant evidence. Additionally there are no allegations that Spoerry or anybody else

destroyed any evidence.

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868 F.2d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989). Petitioner’s claim, however, does not allege that

Detective Spoerry failed to preserve or collect evidence about which he already knew.

Instead, as Magistrate Judge Aspey so artfully explained, Petitioner has accused Detective

Spoerry of failing to create evidence, something neither Miller nor Youngblood appear to

dictate. 

In Miller, for example, the investigating officer learned that the victim possessed a

jacket with the perpetrator's blood on it. Id. After interviewing the victim, the officer failed

to take the jacket from her. Id. Shortly after this interview, the victim washed the jacket,

destroying its evidentiary value. Id. Accordingly, the officer in Miller was aware of specific,

pre-existing evidence that might be useful, but failed to collect it. This case is not analogous

to Miller, as Petitioner has not alleged that Detective Spoerry failed to collect evidence that

predated the interview with Bryce McLaughlin and which he knew might be potentially

exculpatory. Instead, he has alleged that Detective Spoerry failed to record an interview at

which such evidence might have been produced. The Court, therefore, agrees with

Magistrate Judge Aspey that petitioner is not entitled to relief based on this due process

claim.4

 

B. The Prosecutor’s Comments During Closing Arguments

Finally, Petitioner alleges that three remarks made by Smith during his rebuttalclosing argument violated his due process rights. In support of this claim, Petitioner points

to three comments in particular: (1) “I believe Mr. Engan does not have any interest in

looking at the truth”; (2) “What Mr. Engan wants you to do in this case is to go back into that

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jury room and look at this case as a series of isolated events, a series of coincidences, things

that aren't that important, things that may be slightly more important. That's a favorite

Defense type of strategy”; and (3) “Anybody here think that I or Bob Spoerry or the police

department don't have things better to do than just say gee, I think that I will prosecute Sean

Patrick Ward today. You think that we don't have better things to do with your time.”

(Answer, Exh. P, 65–66, 100). Engan did not object to these statements during trial.

When a petitioner does not allege a specific deprivation of a provision of the Bill of

Rights, such as the right to counsel or the privilege against self-incrimination, “the

appropriate standard of review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus is the narrow one

of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.” Darden v. Wainwright,

477 U.S. 168, 181 (U.S. 1986) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, in addressing

Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, “the relevant

question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make

the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This

standard reflects the reality that “the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).

The state trial court found that only two of the alleged improper statements were, in

fact, improper. This Court agrees. Smith’s statement, “What Mr. Engan wants you to do

in this case is to go back into that jury room and look at this case as a series of isolated

events, a series of coincidences, things that aren't that important, things that may be slightly

more important. That's a favorite Defense type of strategy,” was not improper, as it was

nothing more than a comment on a tactic, which is fair territory for a closing argument.

United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Criticism of defense

theories and tactics is a proper subject of closing argument.”); United States v.Catlett, 97

F.3d 565, 572 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“In this case, the prosecutor was within his rights to suggest

to the jury that the arguments raised in defense counsel’s summation were merely diversions.

Such an argument is not misconduct.”) The other two comments, however, were improper.

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It is well established that a prosecutor may neither vouch for his own credibility, nor

the credibility of a witness. United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999)

(stating that prosecutor may not implicitly vouch for a witness's credibility); United States

v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 933-34 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a prosecutor may not vouch

for his or her own credibility). “The rule against vouching . . . [is] designed to prevent

prosecutors from taking advantage of the natural tendency of jury members to believe in the

honesty of lawyers in general, and government attorneys in particular, and to preclude the

blurring of the fundamental distinctions between advocates and witnesses.” United States

v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002)(internal quotations omitted). 

Smith’s statement, “Anybody here think that I or Bob Spoerry or the police

department don't have things better to do than just say gee, I think that I will prosecute Sean

Patrick Ward today. You think that we don't have better things to do with your time?”

crossed the line from aggressive advocacy into impermissible vouching. First, by stating

that both he and the police department had better things to do than prosecute Petitioner,

Smith implied special knowledge of Petitioner’s guilt. He may have well as said that he did

not prosecute people, unless he knew they were guilty. Second, this statement improperly

suggests that the testimony of a key state witness, Detective Spoerry, was credible, as it

implied that Spoerry likewise would not testify unless he was sure of Petitioner’s guilt.

Smith also committed misconduct when he stated, “I believe Mr. Engan does not have

any interest in looking at the truth.” The Ninth Circuit has found that a prosecutor commits

misconduct when he denigrates the defense as a sham. United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d

1214, 1225 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The prosecutor committed misconduct in vouching for his

witnesses, denigrating the defense as a sham, and arguing that it was the jury's duty to find

the defendants guilty.”). By stating that Engan had no interest in looking at the truth, Smith

clearly implied that the defense presented by Engan was dishonest or willfully blind to the

truth; in other words, a sham. Conversely, this remark also suggests that the prosecutor,

unlike Engan, had a special interest in looking at the truth, thus bolstering his own credibility.

The Court, therefore, must find that Smith’s statement was improper. 

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Having found that Smith made two improper statements during his closing arguments,

the Court must determine whether those statements rendered Petitioner’s trial fundamentally

unfair. Given this stringent standard, “it is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were

undesirable or even universally condemned.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Instead,

a court must attempt to place the prosecutor’s remark in its proper context. Williams v. Borg,

139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 (1988)).

This means considering the “probable effect the prosecutor’s [comments] would have on the

jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly,” taking into account such factors as whether the

prosecutor’s remarks were an invited reply or response to comments made by the defense

attorney, United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 13 (U.S. 1985), and the overall strength of the

prosecution’s case. United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1980).

Respondents argue that Smith’s comments were invited and, as a result, did not render

Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. In support of this position, they point to comments

made by Engan during his closing that allegedly challenged the integrity of the prosecutor,

the police, and Detective Spoerry. For instance, Respondents note that Engan repeatedly

accused Smith of having coached Bryce McLaughlin concerning his testimony, pointing to

the following statements from Engan’s closing:

What about the things Bryce did up here. . . . Remember I asked him, ever see

this man [Deputy County Attorney Smith] here before? What’s his name?

Matt. How many times have you seen Matt before? Two times? Five times?

Matt he teach me. Do you think that Mr. Smith might have gone over with

Bryce a few times, what it was Bryce was going to do, what he was going to

say. Do you think so? Matt he teach me. You bet he did.

The State has, again, no physical evidence at all—at all linking Sean to this

scene. The State has Bryce McLaughlin who had been led throughout. Led by

Mr. Smith. Been coached on what to say. Led by bias (sic) interrogators. Said

things, changed what he said. He is not reliable.

 (Answer, Exh. P at 52, 63–64). Additionally, Respondents claim that Engan challenged the

integrity of the investigating officers, including Detective Spoerry, by accusing them of being

disinterested in following other leads once Bryce had accused Petitioner of killing his

mother, when he said:

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They simply heard from Bryce McLaughlin daddy did it as reported to them

from the Advocacy Center. That’s when they lost their focus. More

particularly, that’s when they found their focus. Their focus on [Petitioner].

Any other evidence we don’t care. We got what we want. Is that fair?

(Id. at 13). Finally, Respondents also assert that Engan attacked the police and the

prosecution’s character by of accusing them of engaging in evidence shopping. 

“If the prosecutor's remarks were ‘invited,’ and did no more than respond substantially

in order to ‘right the scale,’ such comments [do] not warrant reversing a conviction.” Young,

470 U.S. 12–13. The Court finds Engan’s statements invited some kind of response, but it

cannot find that they invited the specific comments made by Smith. In other words, Smith’s

remarks did more than right the scale, they tipped it in the prosecution’s direction. First,

although Engan accused Smith of coaching Bryce, this accusation was not unprovoked, but

instead was predicated on Bryce’s testimony, “Matt he teach me.” It was not, then, a

generalized attack on Smith’s integrity, inviting a generalized response in return. Instead,

Engan’s comments warranted a response to the specific allegation—witness coaching.

Smith’s statements, however, are not directly responsive to Engan’s assertion of coaching.

Instead, they are an attack on Engan’s truthfulness and generalized vouching for the

prosecution’s overall case, which seem especially unwarranted given that Engan based his

accusation on the testimony of the prosecutions own witness; testimony which a reasonable

person could conclude was tantamount to an admission of coaching. 

As for Engan’s suggestion that the police stopped following leads once Bryce

identified Petitioner, the Court agrees that it called into question the integrity of the police,

inviting a response. Smith’s statement that the he and the police had better things to do than

prosecute Petitioner (if he was not guilty), is somewhat responsive to that allegation. Smith’s

comment concerning Engan’s inability to look at the truth, however, is not. The principle

of invited response permits a prosecutor to respond to inappropriate remarks by a defense

attorney. It is not, however, a license for a prosecutor to make his own unrelated

inappropriate comment. Smith’s questioning of Engan’s willingness to look at the truth was

not responsive to Engan’s comment that the police stopped following leads once Bryce

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identified Petitioner.

 In sum, the Court finds that the invited response doctrine somewhat mitigates Smith’s

“better things to do” statement, but does little to excuse his contention that Engan had no

interest in looking at the truth. Any remaining prejudicial impact stemming from Smith’s

“better things to do” statement was undermined by Engan’s own closing remarks. During

his closing arguments, Engan stated:

Mr. Smith [the prosecutor] here seems to be a pretty smart guy. He seems to

be pretty sure that the Defendant is guilty and you heard from a series of police

officers all of whom testified for the State and they think he is guilty so maybe

you should think that too. They probably know more about this case than I do.

They have lived with this case almost a year.

This comment vouches for the intelligence of the prosecutor and the police, placing their

level of knowledge above Engan’s own. Also, Engan’s strange sarcastic endorsement allows

a juror to infer the prosecution’s truthfulness, as it would be odd indeed to lavish such praise

on persons one thinks have been untruthful. Accordingly, this statement severely undercuts

any prejudicial effect that might have been caused by Smith’s statement that he and the

police and Detective Spoerry had better things to do than unfairly prosecute Engan.

This leaves only Smith’s statement concerning Engan’s disinclination to look at the

truth as a basis on which this Court could find that Petitioner’s trial was fundamentally

unfair. In making this determination, the Court must consider the strength of the

Prosecutions case, which it finds was not strong. The two medical examiners that conducted

an autopsy on McLaughlin did not agree on the cause of death, one concluding the cause was

unknown, the other that it was homicide; there was no physical evidence linking Petitioner

to the crime; the sole eyewitness was McLaughlin’s developmentally disabled four-year old

son; Petitioner put on an alibi defense; and one of McLaughlin’s children died three weeks

before her death, causing her to become very depressed. Additionally, the state relied on

great deal of circumstantial evidence, some of which appears to be have been of questionable

relevancy, especially the fact that McLaughlin was killed with a rope Petitioner made and

on ceiling hooks he installed, Petitioner’s propensity of using ropes and ceiling hooks during

sex with McLaughlin, and evidence demonstrating that Petitioner took his video-cameras,

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drawings of nude women tied up with rope, and homemade pornographic videos from

McLaughlin’s house on the night of the murder. In short, the evidence of Petitioner’s guilt

was far from overwhelming.

Given the closeness of this case, the Court cannot merely dismiss the possibility that

Smith’s suggestion that Engan did not want to look at the truth affected the fairness of his

trial. If after hearing all the evidence, a juror was conflicted about Petitioner’s guilt, which

seems likely given the weakness of the prosecution’s case, Smith’s implication that he, an

agent of the government, had an interest in the truth, whereas Petitioner’s lawyer did not,

may have been enough to sway the verdict. It may have caused the jurors to view all of the

evidence through a different light, attributing credibility to the state’s witnesses and

evidence, while discrediting or giving less credence to Engan’s evidence and argument. 

That being said, this error is not so prejudicial that reasonable jurists could not

disagree about its impact on the fundamental fairness of the trial. The analysis required is

one fraught with subjectivity, as a court must do its best to determine in light of all the

circumstances whether the improper conduct rendered the trial unfair. The Arizona Court of

Appeals, having considered this same issue, found that Smith’s comments, although

inappropriate, did not make Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. (Id., Exh. V at 19). This

decision, as Magistrate Judge Aspey found, is not an unreasonable application of federal law.

This Court agrees. Although very troublesome, it too is unprepared to say that Smith’s single

comment was so prejudicial that the Arizona Court of Appeals decision that it did not affect

the fundamental fairness of Petitioner’s trial was an unreasonable application of federal law.

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (U.S. 2000). Consequently, despite this Court’s

concerns about Smith’s comment, it cannot grant Petitioner’s claim for relief.

VI. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed all of Petitioners’ properly exhausted claims, the Court finds that

none merit relief. Thus, while the Court does not adopt in full the reasoning in Magistrate

Judge Aspey’s R&R, it agrees with his overall conclusions.

Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED adopting the conclusions of Magistrate Judge Mark

Aspey’s Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 24).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner Sean Patrick Ward’s Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, (Doc.

1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability and

leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right with respect to the following issue(s): whether the prosecutor’s

comments during closing arguments violated due process.

DATED this 30th day of September, 2010.

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