Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06584/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06584-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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On February 13, 2006, the Court granted defendants’ prior motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff leave to file an

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amended complaint.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

CAMERON HOOKER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

D. ADAMS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F- 04- 6584 REC DLB P 

FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS RE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS 

[Doc 35]

I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Cameron Hooker (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding against

defendants Adams and Woodford (“defendants”) on plaintiff’s amended complaint filed February

27, 2006 alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause and that defendant Adams discriminated against him in violation

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Plaintiff is seeking both injunctive relief and 1

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U.S. District Court

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money damages. 

On March 17, 2006, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

defendants filed the present motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff filed an opposition on April 14, 2006.

B. Legal Standard

“The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider v. California

Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). In considering a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the

light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The federal system is

one of notice pleading. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (2002). “Rule

8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions,” none of

which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002);

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a

statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any

set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. Discovery and summary

judgment motions - not motions to dismiss - “define disputed facts” and “dispose of unmeritorious

claims.” Id. at 512. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the

pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353

F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

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U.S. District Court

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2001))). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to

relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th

Cir. 1981). 

C. Discussion

1. Due Process Claim

In his first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he is dyslexic, reads very slowly and has

a 4 grade spelling level. He states that on July 6, 1993, he purchased a typewriter with spelling and th

grammar check under the belief that he would be able to retain the typewriter. He also states that

between the year 2000 and 2001, he bought a color television. Plaintiff was transferred from Folsom

State Prison to the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”) on November 19, 2003. Plaintiff

states that upon arrival at SATF, he was told that the typewriter and the television were not allowed. 

Plaintiff states that he had no prior notice that the property would not be allowed because Warden

Adams’ customs and Operational Procedures were not available at Folsom State Prison. Plaintiff

alleges he was given three (3) choices for the disposal of his property. Plaintiff chose option number

one, which was to send the property home at his own expense. Because prison was the only home he

had, he wrote down his address as CSATF A1-ZZ01U, the address that had been issued to him upon

arrival at SATF. Plaintiff alleges this choice was denied. Plaintiff states that on November 21,

2003, he filed an inmate appeal regarding the property issue but on December 24, 2003, his property

was mailed out of the institution at plaintiff’s expense. The property is now at plaintiff’s father’s

home. Plaintiff states that his father considers the property to be a “gift.” 

Defendants argue that these allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

because he was not deprived of his property.

An authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process

Clause. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush

Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985). An authorized

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deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, regulations, or statutes. 

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 436; Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). Authorized

deprivations of property are permissible if carried out pursuant to a regulation that is reasonably

related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

“‘Ordinarily, due process of law requires [notice and] an opportunity for some kind of

hearing prior to the deprivation of a . . . property interest.’” Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d

1257, (9 Cir. 1995)(internal quotations and citations omitted). “However, when the action th

complained of is legislative in nature, due process is satisfied when the legislative body performs its

responsibilities in the normal manner prescribed by law.” Id. “[G]overnmental decisions which

affect large areas and are not directed at one or a few individuals do not give rise to the constitutional

due process requirements of individual notice and hearing; general notice as provided is sufficient.” 

Id.

Where the inmate still retains ownership of the property, some courts have found the

requirements of due process satisfied as long as the prison authorities provide the inmate with the

opportunity to dictate where to send the property. See Searcy v. Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th

Cir. 2002); Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10 Cir. 1991). Here, plaintiff admits that he was

th

given the opportunity to dictate where to send the property. Instead of choosing one of the options

provided, plaintiff choose an option that he knew was unavailable - retaining the property at SATF. 

Defendants’ subsequent action in sending the property to plaintiff’s father does not violate plaintiff’s

due process rights. 

2. ADA Claim

Defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the ADA because he has

failed to claim that dyslexia is a disability within the meaning of the ADA; he fails to allege what

programs, services or benefits he was denied; he does not allege defendants discriminated against

him because of his disability; and he fails to allege that defendants refused to provide him access to

other forms of assistance to accommodate his disability. 

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Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act provides that:

No qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of

the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected

to discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12132. Because Title II of the ADA was modeled after § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973, “[t]here is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by the

ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” Zukle v. Regents of the University of California, 166 F.3d 1041,

1045, n. 11 (9 Cir. 1999). To establish a claim under the ADA and RA, plaintiff must demonstrate th

that (1) he is a person with a disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified; and that the defendants’

actions either (3) excluded his participation or denied him the benefits of a service, program, or

activity; or (4) otherwise subjected him to discrimination on the basis of his physical handicap. See

Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 477, 455 (9 Cir. 1996). Title II of the ADA and the RA apply to th

inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1955

(1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9 Cir. 1997); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 th

F.3d 447, 453-56 (9 Cir. 1996). In order to state a claim, plaintiff must have been “. . . improperly

th

excluded from participation in, and denied the benefits of, a prison service, program, or activity on

the basis of his physical handicap.” Armstrong at 1023. Education, vocational training, and medical

attention can be seen as benefits to inmates. Id. at 1024. 

The Court finds the allegations in the first amended complaint sufficient, at the pleading

stage, to state a claim for violation of the ADA. Plaintiff alleges that he is dyslexic and has a very

difficult time reading and spelling. Plaintiff contends that while the prison allows typewriters that

people with normal spelling and writing skills can use, the prison prohibits typewriters needed by

dyslexic inmates, such as plaintiff. As previously stated, “‘[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will

ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed

it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not

the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings

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need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin,

262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). At this stage in the proceedings and absent the presentation of

any authority the compels the court to conclude otherwise, the court declines to find that the

allegations are insufficient to state a claim under the ADA. 

D. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss is GRANTED in PART as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s due process claim be GRANTED; and 

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ADA claim against defendants be DENIED;

and

3. Should this Findings and Recommendations be adopted in full, defendants be ordered

to file a response to plaintiff’s amended complaint within thirty days from the date of

the issuance of the district court’s order.

The Court HEREBY ORDERS that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted to

the United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy of these

Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written Objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)©. The parties are advised that failure to file Objections within

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 19, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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