Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_00-cv-02516/USCOURTS-cand-4_00-cv-02516-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HULEN T. HARRELL,

Petitioner,

 v.

DON TAYLOR, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 00-2516 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the California State Prison -

Solano, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

challenging his state conviction. For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree robbery, first degree burglary and 

felony false imprisonment in 1993. The jury also found true six prior convictions. With the

enhancements for the prior convictions, petitioner was sentenced to 34 years in prison. As

grounds for habeas relief, petitioner asserts the following claims: (1) his due process rights

were violated when Justice Chin improperly decided motions on his case while on the state

court of appeal, then participated in the denial of petitioner’s habeas petition after he was

elevated to the California Supreme Court; (2) his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated by the trial court’s failure to preserve a jury note and report in-chambers

hearings; (3) his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated with respect to the denial of

his motion to disqualify the trial judge; (4) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise the contention that allegedly false information was admitted at trial; (5) his Sixth

Amendment confrontation rights were violated by restrictions placed on his crossCase 4:00-cv-02516-PJH Document 72 Filed 09/22/08 Page 1 of 32
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examination of a prosecution witness; (6) his due process rights were violated by the denial

of his motion for new trial; (7) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise all

issues petitioner believed were arguable; (8) the trial court erred in failing to give limiting

jury instructions regarding the use of his incriminating statements which were obtained in

violation of his Fifth Amendment rights; (9) his due process rights were violated in that his

statement and confession were involuntary; (10) his prior 1975 conviction was

unconstitutional; (11) he was denied the right to counsel and right to be present during

critical stages of the criminal proceedings; and (12) his 1983 prior conviction was

unconstitutional. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner does not dispute the following facts, which are excerpted from the opinion

of the California Court of Appeal: 

Just before 5:30 a.m. on July 25, 1993, Kim Malcolm was asleep in

her Oakland home. When Malcolm heard “banging” at the back of her

house, she called 911 from her bedside telephone. Before Malcolm could

speak to the operator, she saw a man standing in the doorway of her

bedroom. She was not able to see the intruder’s face clearly. 

Malcolm put the telephone down on her bed without speaking to the

911 operator. The operator could hear Malcolm talking to the intruder and

recorded their conversation. After someone hung up the telephone, the

operator redialed the number but only reached Malcolm’s answering

machine. The operator then dispatched the police. 

Malcolm screamed, asked the intruder’s identify, and said: “Please,

don’t hurt me.” The intruder replied: “I won’t hurt you. I’m not into that.” He said he needed money, and Malcolm said she had $40 or $50 in her purse. 

The intruder tied Malcolm’s hands and legs but not tightly enough to prevent

some movement. He brought her purse into the bedroom and turned on the

lights. When Malcolm started to turn around, the intruder told her not to

look at him. He then searched Malcolm’s purse. 

Oakland Police Officer Bischoff arrived at Malcolm’s address at 5:41

a.m. He found the back door was broken in half. Through a window

Bischoff saw Malcolm lying face down on a bed with her hands tied behind

her back. [Petitioner] stood nearby rummaging through a handbag. Bischoff

entered the kitchen and saw [petitioner] running through the dining room. 

Bischoff gave chase, saying: “Police officer, freeze.” [Petitioner] did not stop

but was subdued near the front door by Bischoff and Officer Paul Bernard. 

As the officers were handcuffing him, [petitioner] volunteered: “This was just

a burglary, nothing more.”

A search of [petitioner] revealed $38, a pair of work gloves, cording,

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and a belt. From the floor next to Malcolm’s bed, the police recovered a

hammer with a hatchet on one end, a metal pipe, a screwdriver, and a box

cutter. Other than the cash, none of the items belonged to Malcolm. 

[Petitioner] waived his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona

(1966) 384 U.S. 436 and signed a written statement admitting he had

broken into Malcolm’s house and taken money from her purse. [Petitioner]

told the police he never intended to hurt Malcolm and did not touch her

except to tie her up. 

At trial, [petitioner] testified that he had been released from Soledad

Prison the day before the robbery and given $200 in cash. He took a bus to

Oakland, planning to stay with a friend. Unable to do so, he slept for a while

in an open garage. Before leaving, he stole a pair of overalls and some

tools. He decided to enter Malcolm’s house, thinking there was no one

there. [Petitioner] used the stolen tools to break in the back door. 

Once inside, [petitioner] heard a scream. He ran to the master

bedroom and saw Malcolm. She said, “Please don’t hurt me,” to which he

responded: “Hey, I’m not even in here for that. I’m not into that.... I’m just

trying to get something that I could get me a room or a place to stay. That’s

it.... All I want to do is get me a place to stay, get me enough money so that

I can get me a room.” Malcolm told [petitioner] she had about $50.

[Petitioner] tied Malcolm’s hands loosely with some of her clothing to

prevent her from calling the police. When he could not find her wallet, he

returned to the bedroom and found Malcolm with the telephone. [Petitioner]

took the telephone from her and asked where her purse was. She directed

him to the kitchen. [Petitioner] tied Malcolm’s feet with some clothing he

found, had her lie down on the bed, and covered her with a blanket. 

Malcolm told him to take her credit cards, but he left them and took only

cash. The police arrived, pursued him to the front door, and arrested him. 

[Petitioner] was charged with residential robbery, burglary of an

inhabited dwelling, and felony false imprisonment. The indictment alleged

nine prior convictions. [Petitioner] filed a number of motions, including a

motion for self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S.

806, and challenges to all the alleged prior convictions. The trial court

denied the challenges to the priors and granted the Faretta motion. 

The trial court dismissed three priors on the motion of the

prosecution. The jury found [petitioner] guilty on all counts, determined that

the robbery and burglary were in the first degree, and found the remaining

six priors were true. [Petitioner’s] posttrial motions were denied. The court

sentenced [petitioner] to the upper term of six years for the robbery. It

imposed consecutive terms of sixteen months for the burglary, eight months

for the felony false imprisonment, five years for each of the five prior serious

felonies, and one year for the remaining prior, for a total term of thirty-four

years. 

People v. Harrell, No. A067248, slip op. 2-4 (Cal.Ct.App. Jul. 22, 1996); Answer Ex. 9. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

judgment but stayed the sentence on the false imprisonment conviction, directing that

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1 Petitioner’s original petition was stayed to allow him to exhaust three

unexhausted claims. Petitioner returned to this court after exhausting all claims and moved

to reopen the action. The court granted the motion on September 15, 2004, and issued an

order to show cause on the 12 cognizable claims. 

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petitioner be re-sentenced. Id. Petitioner was re-sentenced to a term of 33 years, and

following a second appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment following

re-sentencing on June 11, 1998. Answer Ex. 8. Petitioner commenced this federal

habeas action on July 7, 1999.1

 The court ordered respondent to show cause why the

writ should not be issued on the cognizable claims. Respondent has filed an answer, and

petitioner has filed a traverse. The petition is submitted for a decision on the merits. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence

on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state

court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law

and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09

(2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations,

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under

the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to

that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a

case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable

application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if

it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

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federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application

must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322 at

340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir.

2000). Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its decision on a

petitioner's federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court decision on the claim, a

federal court conducts “an independent review of the record” to determine whether the

state court's decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

See Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006); Himes v. Thompson,

336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

DISCUSSION

A. Judicial bias on direct appeal

Petitioner’s first claim is that his due process rights were violated by “judicial

extrinsic fraud” perpetuated by Justice Ming Chin, who was allegedly biased against

petitioner while deciding motions on petitioner’s case before the state court of appeal. 

After Justice Chin was elevated to the California Supreme Court, petitioner alleges that

Justice Chin thereafter improperly participated in the denial of petitioner’s habeas petition

before the state high court. Pet. at 12. Petitioner alleges that Justice Chin, while serving

on the California Court of Appeal, acted unlawfully to delay petitioner’s appeal and “to

preclude petitioner from obtaining meaningful appellate review” in order to “pursue

[J]ustice Chin’s personal a[]genda, financial interest and political ambitions of being

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elevated to the highest State court.” Id. Petitioner also alleges that Justice Chin violated

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.1(b) by failing to disqualify himself from

deciding petitioner’s state habeas petition in the state high court after having participated

in the state appellate court decision. Id. at 13. 

The Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair and

impartial judge. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Kennedy v. Los Angeles

Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702, 709 (9th Cir. 1989). There are two general ways in which a

defendant may establish that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial

judge. In some cases, the proceedings and surrounding circumstances may demonstrate

actual bias or an appearance of advocacy on the part of the judge, i.e., improper conduct. 

See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-04 (1974); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741

(9th Cir. 1995) (civil context). In other cases, the judge's pecuniary or personal interest in

the outcome of the proceedings may create an appearance of partiality that violates due

process, i.e. improper influences. See id. 

When petitioner, as in this case, is alleging improper influences, a federal court

must be convinced that a particular influence, "under a realistic appraisal of psychological

tendencies and human weakness," poses "such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that

the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately

implemented." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 47. Federal habeas relief is therefore

limited to those instances where there is proof of actual bias, or of a possible temptation

so severe that one might presume an actual, substantial incentive to be biased. See Del

Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1380 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert.

denied, 514 U.S. 1037 (1995). 

The Supreme Court has found that due process requires disqualification of a judge

if he has direct financial interests in the outcome of a case, see, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.

Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822-24 (1986) (state justice's opinion established legal proposition

which enhanced status and settlement value of two pending cases he filed as plaintiff);

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520-23 (1927) (judge in criminal case paid only if defendant

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was convicted), if he is faced with substantial direct personal insults from a litigant, see,

e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971) (insults so severe that they were

likely to strike at the most vulnerable and human qualities of judge's temperament), if he

becomes "personally embroiled" in a controversy, see, e.g., United States v. Galin, 222

F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (although judge lost patience and repeatedly admonished

lawyer, judge need not be disqualified from lawyer's post-trial contempt hearing), or if he

had significant prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in the same case, see, e.g.,

Murchison, 349 U.S. at 134-36 (judge charged two witnesses with contempt and

subsequently tried and convicted them). The cases requiring disqualification all involved

"direct, personal [and] substantial" influences on the judges involved. See Aetna, 475 U.S.

at 822. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Supreme Court has found that disqualification was

not necessary where similar influences on the judges were not direct, personal or

substantial. See, e.g., id. at 825-26 (disqualification not required for justices with only

slight pecuniary interests and whose gains were speculative); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S.

575, 584 (1964) (litigant's disobedience and criticism of judge did not require

disqualification where judge did not become personally embroiled with litigant); Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47-55 (1975) (medical board could adjudicate same charges it

investigated and decided to prosecute without violating doctor's due process rights).

Petitioner’s allegation that Justice Chin was acting under an improper influence, i.e.,

his desire for an appointment to the state high court, in deciding petitioner’s state appeals

is without merit. Petitioner alleges that Justice Chin did not want to bring “unwanted

disrepute” to the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office or the Superior Court bench by

allowing petitioner’s claim of “substantial false material evidence” to be heard. Pet. at 13. 

Petitioner’s sole support for this claim is his allegation that Justice Chin issued a minute

order on January 29, 1996, which had the affect of “unlawfully deferring and delaying

judicial action on petitioner’s trial level filed and then still pending ... petition... in order to

preclude petitioner from obtaining meaningful appellate review.” Id. at 12. However,

judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for bias or partiality, as they "can

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only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required"

for such a showing. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Furthermore,

respondent has presented evidence showing that the minute order merely deferred the

matter “until appeal is considered on the merits.” Answer Ex. 8. Later, the appellate court

took judicial notice of the petition and treated it as “simultaneously before this court for

purposes of our decision in this appeal.” Answer Ex. 9 at 15, n.7. 

This court is not convinced by petitioner’s conclusory allegations that Justice Chin’s

alleged interest in winning endorsements from Alameda County for an appointment to the

state high court was of such a particular influence in the review of petitioner’s state

appeals that, "under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human

weakness," it posed "such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment” to raise concerns that due

process was violated. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 47. Neither is the court convinced

that Justice Chin in these circumstances was faced with a “possible temptation so severe

that one might presume an actual, substantial incentive to be biased.” See Del Vecchio,

31 F.3d at 1380.

Lastly, petitioner's claim that Justice Chin improperly failed to recuse himself in

accord with state law, i.e., California Code of Civil Procedure § 170.1(b), is rejected

because violations of state law do not lie in federal habeas corpus. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim as the state court’s

rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d at 1198. 

B. Failure to preserve jury note and report in-chambers hearings

Petitioner’s second claim is that the trial judge erred in failing to preserve a jury note

and report in-chambers hearings, which violated petitioner’s right to due process. Pet. at

27-29. To whatever extent these claims are constitutionally based, they are factually

without merit. 

With respect to the allegedly un-preserved note, respondent has provided a copy of

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the jury’s note, dated December 23, 1993, and bearing the file stamp of the Alameda

County Superior Court. Answer Ex. 12. Furthermore, the note was explicitly made a part

of the record by the trial court at petitioner’s request during trial. Answer Ex. 2 (Reporter’s

Transcript (“RT”) at 995). 

As for the unreported in-chambers proceedings, petitioner claims that on December

22, 1993, the trial court held an “unrecorded in -chambers proceeding” and thereby

violated petitioner’s constitutional rights. Pet. at 16-17. Petitioner offered an audiotape

into evidence before the jury to which the prosecution objected. RT at 615. The trial court

stated that it would have to “review it in chambers” in order to “make a determination as to

whether it is appropriate.” RT at 616. The trial court then proceeded to do so as shown by

the record:

THE COURT: I’ll listen to it and I will decide it. Now you need a

couple moments to review your documents. While you are doing that, I’ll

listen to the tape.

THE COURT: Off the record. 

We are back in the record in open court. 

The [petitioner] is present, the district attorney is present. The jury is

not present. 

I have listened to the tape exhibit G for identification that the

[petitioner] asked me to listen to. And having done so, I’m satisfied that it is

inadmissible hearsay. 

The objection is sustained. 

Now we are ready to proceed with the jury. 

RT at 619. There was no error by the trial court who properly retired to chambers to listen

to a tape offered into evidence to determine its admissibility. The fact that he did so is

recorded, and the tape itself was made part of the record as an exhibit. Accordingly,

petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim as the state court’s rejection

of this claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d at 1198. 

C. Denial of motion to disqualify judge

Petitioner claims that he was denied due process when his motion to disqualify the

trial judge was denied. Petitioner filed three motions pursuant to California Code of Civil

Procedure § 170.6, which permits a litigant to challenge a trial judge based upon the

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litigants belief that the judge is biased. A defendant is limited to a single peremptory

challenge pursuant to § 170.6 for each case. See Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 170.6, subd. (3).

Respondent argues that this claim must be denied because a mere assertion of a

violation of state law does not present a federal claim, and cites Chromiak v. Field, 406

F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1969). Even assuming a federal claim has been presented,

respondent asserts that petitioner has not demonstrated that § 170.6 was violated or that

the state arbitrarily failed to follow its own procedural rules. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447

U.S. 343, 346 (1980). The record shows that petitioner’s first challenge was denied as

untimely, the second motion was granted, and the third was denied because petitioner had

already exercised his single peremptory challenge under § 170.6. Answer at 9-10. 

Petitioner challenges the denial of his third motion to disqualify Judge Sarkisian. Petitioner

claims that he was the victim of judicial bias because Judge Sarkisian reappeared as the

trial judge after he had recused himself whereby “it can be reasonably concluded that trial

judge Sarkisian had allied himself with the prosecutions [sic] case.” Pet. at 36. 

Petitioner appeared before Judge Sarkisian on September 20, 1993, for various

pretrial matters. Judge Sarkisian was not the assigned trial judge at that time. In fact,

Judge Sarkisian informed petitioner of the following: 

...I have talked to the presiding judge and he is going to be sitting in

Department 7 and he has asked that I send the case to Department 7 and

it will be assigned out of that courtroom, so thank you very much. 

RT 09/20/93 at 3.

Subsequently, the case was assigned to Judge Sarkisian. During a pretrial hearing

on October 7, 1993, petitioner expressed concerns about Judge Sarkisian being the trial

judge because he was also the judge who decided petitioner’s motion to suppress. RT

10/7/93 at 4-5. He made an “informal request” for the judge to recuse himself, which the

judge denied, apparently for lack of cause, and particularly in light of the fact that a

challenge for cause previously filed by petitioner against him had been denied by a

different judge. Id. at 6. The next day, petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Judge

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Sarkisian under § 170.6, but the motion was denied as untimely. Answer Ex. 1 (Clerk’s

Transcript (“CT”) at 235).

On November 2, 1993, Judge Sarkisian ordered the case returned to Department 7

for assignment to a new judge for trial due to scheduling conflicts as he stated on the

record: “I am in another trial. So we’re going to have to assign your case to another court.” 

RT 11/1/93 at 16. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is no evidence in the record to show

that this constituted a formal recusal for cause by Judge Sarkisian. The case was

assigned to Judge Marguiles against whom petitioner filed a § 170.6 challenge. CT at

279, 288. The § 170.6 challenge was granted, and the case was again returned to

Department 7 for reassignment. Id. at 279. The case was reassigned to Judge Sarkisian,

against whom petitioner filed another § 170.6 challenge on November 29, 1993. Because

petitioner had already exercised his single peremptory challenge against Judge Marguiles

under § 170.6, the motion was denied. 

Petitioner makes a conclusory statement that Judge Sarkisian’s alleged recusal and

then reappearance as trial judge means the judge had allied himself with the prosecution. 

Petitioner offers no evidence to support his claim that having Judge Sarkisian as his trial

judge violated due process. In fact, petitioner makes no allegation of judicial misconduct

that occurred after the trial commenced. Furthermore, the California Court of Appeal in

rejecting this claim found that the Judge Sarkisian had afforded petitioner wide latitude

during the course of the trial:

The record shows that the trial court exercised remarkable patience in

dealing with [petitioner’s] efforts to represent himself. Contrary to

[petitioner’s] assertion, the trial court did not hold him to a higher standard

than it held the prosecuting attorney. Indeed, the trial court gave [petitioner]

considerable leeway in arguing his numerous motions, challenges, and

objections as the trial progressed. There is no evidence to support

[petitioner’s claim]. 

Answer Ex. 9 at 16. 

Finally, similar to petitioner’s first claim that a judge’s failure to recuse himself

violated his right to due process, see supra at 6-8, petitioner has here failed to show

improper conduct by the proceedings and surrounding circumstances to demonstrate

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2 Although the right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is guaranteed to

state criminal defendants by the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states through the

Fourteenth, see Lucey, 469 U.S. at 392, the Sixth Amendment does not address a defendant's

rights on appeal; the right to effective state appellate counsel is derived purely from the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee, see id. 

12

actual bias or an appearance of advocacy by Judge Sarkisian. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418

U.S. at 501-04. Nor has petitioner shown that the judge's pecuniary or personal interest in

the outcome of the proceedings has created an appearance of partiality that violates due

process, i.e. improper influences. See id. Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of this

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable determination of, clearly established

Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

D. Ineffective assistance by appellate counsel

Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

violation of the Sixth Amendment by failing to raise the contention that allegedly false

information was admitted at trial. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal

defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. See Evitts v.

Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985).2

 Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel are reviewed according to the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984). Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States

v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1986). A defendant therefore must show that

counsel's advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, he would have

prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694;

Birtle, 792 F.2d at 849).

Appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous

issue requested by defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983);

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 n.10. 

The weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective

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appellate advocacy. See id. at 1434. Appellate counsel therefore will frequently remain

above an objective standard of competence and have caused his client no prejudice for

the same reason – because he declined to raise a weak issue. Id. 

The allegedly false information petitioner is challenging is the testimony of officers

Bernard and Bischoff. Petitioner alleges that Officer Bernard gave false testimony on the

witness stand and that he perjured himself. Pet. at 40. Petitioner alleges that Officer

Bischoff wrote and filed a false police report and gave false and misleading testimony at

trial. Id. at 41. Petitioner’s claim fails because even if appellate counsel erred in failing to

raise this claim on appeal, petitioner fails to show prejudice, i.e., but for counsel's failure,

he would have prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 & n.9. According to the state

appellate court, “there was overwhelming evidence in support of the jury verdict.” Answer

Ex. 9 at 17. The evidence included the following: (1) petitioner was arrested in the

victim’s home after she dialed 911, RT at 298, 473; (2) the 911 tape revealed the victim

confronting petitioner, RT at 304, 344-48; (3) “the police caught [petitioner] in the victim’s

home, looking through her purse while she lay bound on the bed beside him,” Answer Ex.

9 at 16; (4) petitioner signed a written confession admitting that he broke into the house,

bound the victim, and took money from her purse, RT at 392-94; and (5) petitioner testified

at trial, again confessing that he broke into the house, bound the victim, and took money

from her purse, RT at 640-52. In light of this overwhelming evidence, including petitioner’s

own written confession and testimony at trial, it cannot be said that petitioner would have

prevailed on appeal but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise claims of false testimony

prosecution witnesses. This claim does not warrant federal habeas relief as the state

court’s rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d at 1198. 

E. Sixth Amendment right to confrontation

Petitioner claims that he was denied his right to confrontation under the Sixth

Amendment when the trial judge limited his cross examination of a prosecution witness. 

Petitioner alleges that his defense was based on “mistake of fact, conspiracy to frame

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[petitioner], police manufacture of corpus delicti for residential robbery, and the defense of

necessity brought about by inhumane living conditions, and the god [sic] given right to

food, shelter, and clothing.” Pet. at 52. To prove the police-related defenses, petitioner

alleges that the needed to show that Bischoff “fabricated his arrest of [petitioner] and

falsified his prepared crime reports and then came into court and other administrative

hearings and perjured himself under oath while testifying.” Id. To this end, petitioner

sought to play a tape of Officer Bischoff’s testimony from petitioner’s parole revocation

hearing with which he intended to cross examine Bischoff “regarding his inconsistent and

contradictory testimony.” Id. Petitioner claims that the trial court’s refusal to allow him to

play the tape violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and coss-examination. 

In a criminal prosecution, a defendant has a constitutional right to confront

witnesses against him. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-407 (1965). Undue

restrictions on a criminal defendant's confrontation of a prosecution witness may deprive

him of this right. Davis v. Alaska, U.S. 308, 318 (1974). The right to cross-examine

includes the opportunity to show not only that a witness is biased, but also that the

testimony is exaggerated or otherwise unbelievable. Fowler v. Sacramento County

Sheriff's Dep't, 421 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480

U.S. 39, 51-52 (1987) (plurality)). Even if cross-examination is not certain to affect the

jury's assessment of the witness's reliability or credibility it may implicate the Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation if "a jury 'might reasonably' have questioned the

witness's reliability or credibility in light of the cross- examination." Id. (quoting Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679). However, not every restriction on a defendant's desired method

of confronting a witness's credibility is a constitutional violation. See Delaware v.

Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam). The Confrontation Clause does not

prevent a trial judge from placing reasonable limits on relevant evidence based on

concerns of harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues, witness safety or interrogation

that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,

679 (1986). 

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During the trial, Officer Bischoff testified for the prosecution and gave direct

testimony of his dispatch to the scene and what occurred after he arrived at the victim’s

house. Officer Bischoff’s testified that he found the back door broken in half, and when he

looked through a window into the house, he saw a woman bound on the bed and a man

going through a purse. RT at 456-62. Officer Bischoff testified that he kicked and forced

the back door open, chased petitioner through the house, and arrested him in the living

room. Id. at 465-70. Officer Bischoff stated that he transmitted information of what was

transpiring at the house through his handheld walkie-talkie over the radio to other officers. 

Id. at 467. A tape of Officer Bischoff’s broadcast from inside the house was played for the

jury. Id. at 471-72. 

Petitioner, acting as his own attorney, was given an opportunity to cross-examine

Officer Bischoff immediately following his direct testimony. Id. at 474. His crossexamination ranged from the initial dispatch to the scene, the condition of the front and

back doors, and what could be seen from the bedroom window. Id. at 474-80. Petitioner

extensively used the taped broadcast to cross-examine the officer, playing different

portions of the tape eleven times throughout the examination and then questioning the

officer thereon. Id. at 488-504. Cross-examination of Officer Bischoff was continued to

the next day, when petitioner played the tape again and asked more questions about it. 

Id. at 530. Petitioner began to question Officer Bischoff about prior inconsistent

statements, and the following exchange occurred: 

Q: Is there any time during your testimony at any other proceeding,

in relationship to what you have stated here, that’s inconsistent with your

testimony here?

A: You would have to go through the record. I don’t have the record

of all my testimony, every proceeding I went to. As far as I understand, no. 

Q: You have never given an inconsistent statement?

A: Have you got a particular – 

[PROSECUTION]: Your Honor; argumentative.

[PETITIONER]: I was just asking. 

THE COURT: Just a moment. 

The objection is sustained. It is not an appropriate question. 

Q: Well, have you ever stated, I’ll give you an example, that you

obtained certain information before or after the arrest?

A: That’s vague. I don’t understand that. Have you got something

specific you are unsure of? Because I don’t understand what you are

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asking. 

Q: Okay. At a prior hearing, you testified, since you wanted

specifics; right? At a prior hearing, you testified that, when you got to the

back, there was not a fence there. That’s the specific questions. And I want

to know, at that time what you testified that there was no fence there – 

[PROSECUTION]: Your Honor, this has been asked and answered. 

THE COURT: We have been over this. 

Do you have some point in the prior testimony that you want to refer

the witness to, Mr. Harrell, some arguably inconsistent statement that he

may have made?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, I do, Your Honor, because during these

proceedings, he stated that, uh, yes, it was a fence there. He already

testified. 

[PROSECUTION]: I believe that’s misstating the evidence, Your

Honor. I don’t think the witness stated that there was or wasn’t. 

THE COURT: That was my recollection .

THE WITNESS: I didn’t recollect that there was or wasn’t.

THE COURT: There’s no basis, then, for the, for that question. 

We have to move on, Mr, Harrell. Thank you. Move to another area,

please. 

Id. at 536-37. Thereafter, petitioner completed his questioning without offering any prior

testimony to use for impeachment, and the witness was dismissed after petitioner

indicated that he had no further questions for Officer Bischoff. Id. at 564. It is clear from

the record that petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to cross examine Officer Bischoff

while he was on the stand. 

The tape which petitioner claims the trial court did not permit him to use in violation

of his right to confrontation was offered into evidence during the defense case. 

Specifically, the tape was of petitioner’s parole revocation hearing on August 30, 1993, at

which petitioner alleges Officer Bischoff was “talking about this offense” under oath. Id. at

617. The trial court asked for an offer of proof with respect to the tape, and the following

proceedings took place: 

THE COURT: The jury has left the courtroom.

Let me just ask a question. And I’m going to give you time to look

through your records for other exhibits, Mr. Harrell.

This exhibit G is entitled “Hulen Harrell C-33747, copy, revocation

hearing, August 30, 1993.

Is this a tape of a parole revocation hearing? Is that what this is?

[PETITIONER]: It is, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: All right. 

And this is testimony, I presume, presented by you and officer – 

[PETITIONER]: – Bischoff. 

Yes, it is. 

THE COURT: That’s what it is. 

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[PETITIONER]: It is not hearsay, it is his actual testimony on the

record, under oath. 

THE COURT: I understand. That’s the offer of proof?

[PETITIONER]: Pardon me?

THE COURT: That’s your offer of proof with respect to this? That’s

your representation as to what this is?

[PETITIONER]: That it is his testimony?

THE COURT: Yes.

[PETITIONER]: Yes, it is his testimony. 

Now if you want to – 

THE COURT: I believe it is, if you tell me it is his testimony. 

[PETITIONER]: You will hear more there if you listen to it. 

THE COURT: I accept your word that it is his testimony. I’m trying to

see if we can expedite it. 

[PROSECUTION]: It is hearsay, Your Honor. So far there’s been no

offer of relevance to this hearing. 

THE COURT: The objection is sustained to G. 

[PETITIONER]: Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Yes, sir. 

[PETITIONER]: Can I make an offer of relevancy on this.

THE COURT: I thought you had. Do you have something to add?

[PETITIONER]: No. You didn’t ask me about the relevance. 

THE COURT: You just said it was his testimony. You tell me the

relevancy of it. 

[PETITIONER]: Your Honor, the relevancy of it is this. Now I am

entitled under impeachment or rebuttal to present rebuttal evidence, and

that constitutes rebuttal evidence, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: In what sense?

[PETITIONER]: In what sense? He’s testified to various things in this

trial. 

THE COURT: Yes, sir. 

[PETITIONER]: On that tape, many of those details, if you want me

to go into detail – I can’t. Okay. But – 

THE COURT: You are saying this contains inconsistent statements?

[PETITIONER]: It does. That’s exactly what it contains. 

THE COURT: I’ll listen to it and I will decide it. 

Now you need a couple moments to review your documents. While

you are doing that, I’ll listen to the tape.

THE COURT: Off the record. 

We are back on the record in open court. 

The [petitioner] is present, the district attorney is present. The jury is

not present. 

I have listened to the tape exhibit G for identification that the

[petitioner] asked me to listen to. And having done so, I’m satisfied that it is

inadmissible hearsay. 

The objection is sustained. 

Now we are ready to proceed with the jury. 

[PETITIONER]: Yes.

But, uh, Your Honor, that wasn’t my actual offer. My offer was

dealing with rebuttal. 

THE COURT: I understand what you are saying. It is, the evidence

is relevant but it is not admissible evidence. If anything, it is consistent with

his testimony at the trial. 

In any event, it is inadmissible hearsay. 

[PETITIONER]: So you are saying I can’t impeach the witness with

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that?

THE COURT: Yes. The witness has been excused. That evidence

on that tape will not be heard by the jury. 

[PETITIONER]: And I can’t use it as rebuttal evidence, during

rebuttal?

THE COURT: Correct. 

Id. at 617-20.

Petitioner claims that denying him the use of the tape to impeach Officer Bischoff’s

testimony amounts to a denial of his right under the confrontation clause. This is simply

not the case. Instead of offering the tape during his cross examination of Officer Bischoff,

petitioner waited until the witness has been excused. Petitioner clearly understood how to

use a tape for impeachment purposes, as shown by his extensive use of the broadcast

tape from the incident to cross-examine Officer Bischoff. See supra at 15-16. Petitioner’s

failure to use the parole hearing tape for impeachment purposes at the proper time, i.e.,

during cross-examination, may have been due to trial strategy or an ignorance of trial

procedures. Even so, the trial court did not violate petitioner’s constitutional right to

confront witnesses by its decision to exclude potential impeachment evidence as

inadmissible hearsay in accordance with the state rules of evidence. Furthermore, the trial

court listened to the tape in camera and found that Officer Bischoff’s statements thereon

were not inconsistent with his in-court testimony contrary to petitioner’s claim: “I

understand what you are saying. It is, the evidence is relevant but it is not admissible

evidence. If anything, it is consistent with his testimony at the trial.” Id. at 619:24. 

Therefore, it cannot be said that "a jury 'might reasonably' have questioned the witness's

reliability or credibility” had petitioner properly used the tape to attempt to impeach Officer

Bischoff during the cross examination. Fowler, 421 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. at 679). Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable

determination of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Plascencia v.

Alameida, 467 F.3d at 1198. 

F. Denial of motion for new trial

Petitioner next claims that he was denied due process when the trial court denied

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his motions for a new trial based on the following: (1) trial court abused its direction in

denying petitioner a “necessary continuance in order to obtain trial juror declarations,”; (2)

trial court denied petitioner the right to an investigator to investigate juror misconduct; (3)

petitioner was unfairly surprised by the prosecution’s production of bailiff McKenzie as a

material witness in connection with petitioner’s jury misconduct allegations; (4) trial court

erred in conducting an unrecorded ex parte communication with bailiff McKenzie; (5)

petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to present juror witnesses on his behalf

during the motion for new trial hearing; (6) multiple instances of juror misconduct denied

petitioner his right to a fair trial; (7) trial court erred in denying petitioner use of statutorily

authorized additional peremptory challenges; and (8) trial court erred in denying

petitioner’s Wheeler motion. Pet. at 65. The first six claims involve the allegation of juror

misconduct and will be addressed together, and then claims 7 and 8 separately thereafter. 

1. Juror misconduct

Petitioner raised the issue of potential juror misconduct on December 23, 1993, and

had the following exchange with the trial court:

[PETITIONER]: One item Your Honor. Yesterday when the jury was

coming down, I overheard a matter where the jury room was open. One of

the jurors, I think, was talking to the bailiff or something, and the juror said

something like, I think I’ve heard enough already. Now, I think he was

referring to the trial. I think it was a legitimate matter of inquire. If you would

inquire about that. 

THE COURT: I guess that’s what prompted you to mention this in

aside to me to make sure to tell jury to keep an open mind until they heard

all the evidence. 

[PETITIONER]: At that particular time I really wanted to call a

hearing at that time. But since we’re right in the middle of testimony I didn’t

want to interrupt at that point. But I would like to have an inquiry made as to

exactly who it was that said it. I mean the door was open. I heard the juror

say, I couldn’t determine – he was talking to a bailiff though. Because the

bailiff was saying something like yes, and something like – I couldn’t make

out the words. It was like a joking matter what the bailiff said. 

THE COURT: You’re not referring to Deputy Sichon, are you?

[PETITIONER]: No, not this deputy.

THE COURT: I’ll inquire. 

[PETITIONER]: I remember – 

THE COURT: Somebody made a joke or something. 

[PETITIONER]: Yes. 

THE COURT: All right. I’ll talk to the bailiff about the matter. I’m not

going to talk to the jurors at this point. I may inquire further depending on

what I find out from the bailiff. 

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[PETITIONER]: May I say something? Saying something like that

while the jury is going down, would it have some kind of prejudicial effect?

THE COURT: That’s rhetorical question. I can’t really respond to it. I

will make an inquiry of the bailiff about that matter. When did it occur,

yesterday afternoon, Mr. Harrell?

[PETITIONER]: You know, when the jury was coming back down. 

THE COURT: All right. 

[PETITIONER]: And I asked you because I thought that was

important, because it sounded like the jurors were, some jurors had been

making a decision up there. 

THE COURT: That’s certainly not appropriate. I’ll inquire of the

bailiff, and as I said, if a further inquiry is appropriate, I will do so. 

RT at 800-803.

The trial court later put on the record that he had investigated the allegation of juror

misconduct and came to the following conclusion: 

 I spoke with Deputy McKenzie and relayed your concerns. He said

there was nothing of the sort you reported. And, accordingly, it was my

decision not to make any further inquiry or to talk to the jurors with respect

to your concerns. 

Id. at 921. The trial court determined that there was an “insufficient showing to require any

further action on the court’s part beyond what we’ve already done.” Id. at 922. No

separate hearing was conducted on the allegation of juror misconduct until the issue was

addressed during petitioner’s motion for a new trial hearing. 

Petitioner’s first claim of abuse of discretion is without merit. It is well-established

that the decision to grant or deny a requested continuance lies within the broad discretion

of the trial court, Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964), and that the improper denial

of a requested continuance warrants habeas relief only if there is a showing of actual

prejudice to petitioner's defense resulting from the trial court's refusal to grant a

continuance, Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1072 ( 9th Cir. 1997). Here, it cannot

be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioner's request for a 

continuance of the new trial motion hearing in order to obtain juror declarations. 

Petitioner’s allegation was based solely on what he thought he heard an unidentified juror

say. Furthermore, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to decide that obtaining juror

declarations was not necessary, especially since Bailiff McKenzie was available to give

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direct testimony and be cross-examined by petitioner on what was or was not said on the

day in question. Finally, it cannot be said that petitioner was prejudiced from the denial of

a continuance - there is no indication that the juror declarations would have added much to

the record. See id. 

With respect to petitioner’s second claim, it was not unreasonable for the trial court

to decide that an investigator was unnecessary to investigate petitioner’s allegation of juror

misconduct. Petitioner had the assistance of counsel with his first motion for a new trial. 

CT at 401. Since petitioner had the assistance of counsel at that time, it was not

unreasonable for the trial court not to appoint an investigator.

Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, does not

require state or federal courts to hold a hearing every time a claim of juror bias is raised by

the parties. Tracey v. Palmateer, 341 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., Estrada

v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1241 (9th Cir. 2008) (district court did not abuse its discretion

in declining to hold hearing on juror bias where state court’s determination was not

unreasonable in finding two jurors were not actually biased, and that juror bias could not

be presumed based on jurors’ honesty during voir dire); Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148,

1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (trial court need not order a hearing sua sponte whenever presented

with evidence juror bias). Remmer v United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), and Smith v.

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), do not stand for the proposition that any time evidence of

juror bias comes to light, due process requires the trial court to question the jurors alleged

to have bias. Smith states that this “may” be the proper course, and that a hearing “is

sufficient” to satisfy due process. Tracey, 341 F.3d at 1044 (citing Smith, 455 U.S. at 217,

218). Smith leaves open the door as to whether a hearing is always required and what

else may be “sufficient” to alleviate any due process concerns. Id.; see, e.g., id. at 1044-

45 (concluding that state trial court’s decision not to question juror further to obtain names

of other jurors and to take additional testimony from them was not contrary, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent). Clearly,

investigation into juror misconduct is at the discretion of the trial court, to be conducted

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with or without a hearing. Accordingly, petitioner’s claim numbers 4 and 5 are without

merit since the trial court did not violate due process by having ex parte communication

with Bailiff McKenzie to inquire about what transpired in the jury room or by not

questioning jurors at the hearing. Id.

With respect to petitioner’s third claim that he was unfairly surprised by the

prosecution’s production of Bailiff McKenzie as a material witness in connection with

petitioner’s jury misconduct allegations, this claim is without merit. Petitioner’s allegation

was that an unidentified juror made an inappropriate comment to a bailiff on December 22,

1993. The bailiff was identified by name by the trial court in the presence of petitioner. RT

at 921. A declaration from the bailiff was filed with the court and served on petitioner. CT

at 965-966. Petitioner certainly knew the identity of the bailiff before the motion for new

trial hearing. Since Bailiff McKenzie’s testimony refuted petitioner’s allegation, the

prosecution’s decision to present Bailiff McKenzie as a material witness is hardly

unexpected. 

Petitioner’s sixth allegation that there were multiple instances of juror misconduct

which denied him the right to a fair trial is conclusory and lacks merit. Petitioner makes no

specific allegation of juror misconduct other than the incident discussed above. 

2. Peremptory challenges

Petitioner alleges that he was denied all the statutorily authorized peremptory

challenges during jury selection. Petitioner claims that he faced a “statutory equivalent of

a life time” and was therefore entitled to 20 peremptory challenges. Pet. at 81. He is

mistaken. Petitioner was facing a term of years and not a life sentence. Therefore, he

was entitled to 10 peremptory challenges during jury selection under California Code of

Civil Procedures § 231(b). The record shows that he exercised all 10 challenges. See RT

at 160, 172, 179, 185, 189, 192, 196, 199, 202 and 208. 

Petitioner’s claim that he was denied one peremptory challenge because the tenth

dismissal of “Mr. Shamrock” at Reporter’s Transcript page 208 cannot be accurate as a

juror by that name had already been dismissed. The court has reviewed the transcript,

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and finds that the juror dismissed with petitioner’s tenth challenge was named Ms. AllendaSurrence, not Mr. Shamrock. RT at 205-08. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the record

shows that petitioner was afforded all the peremptory strikes authorized by statute. 

3. Wheeler motion

 Petitioner’s final claim with respect with his new trial motion is that the trial court

erred in denying petitioner’s Wheeler motion based on the prosecution’s use of a

peremptory challenge against a potential juror who was African-American. Pet. at 65. 

Under California law, Wheeler motions are made in response to an alleged pattern of

discriminatory peremptory challenges used to strike potential jurors on the basis of race. 

See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77 (1978). Batson, the federal counterpart of

Wheeler, provides similar protections against group bias in the exercise of peremptory

challenges. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986). African-Americans are a

cognizable group under both Wheeler and Batson. People v. Catlin, 26 Cal.4th 81, 116

(2001). 

 The Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of jurors by peremptory

challenge solely on account of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. Batson permits prompt

rulings on objections to peremptory challenges under a three-step process. First, the

defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory

challenges on the basis of race. Id. at 96-97. That is, the defendant must demonstrate

that the facts and the circumstances of the case "raise an inference" that the prosecution

has excluded venire members from the petit jury on account of their race. Id. at 96. If the

defendant makes this showing, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a

race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Id. at 97. Finally, the court

must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful

discrimination. Id. at 98. To fulfill its duty, the court must evaluate the prosecutor's

proffered reasons and determine whether there was intentional discrimination. Lewis v.

Lewis, 321 F3d 824, 831 (9th Cir 2003). 

The findings of the state trial court on the issue of discriminatory intent are findings

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of fact entitled to the presumption of correctness in federal habeas review. See Purkett v.

Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995). So are the findings of the state appellate court. See

Mitleider v. Hall, 391 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004); Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d

1101, 1108 ( 9th Cir. 2004). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 ("AEDPA"), this means that a state court's findings on discriminatory intent are

presumed sound unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. Miller- El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, 240 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 

The petitioner must show the state court's conclusion to be "an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 

Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). Therefore, a federal habeas court can only grant

habeas relief "if it was unreasonable to credit the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations

for the Batson challenge." Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969, 974 (2006). The standard is

demanding, but not insatiable. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240. 

Petitioner made a motion at the close of voir dire alleging that the prosecutor used a

“race based peremptory challenge” to remove one of two black jurors. (Pet. 86.) The trial

court denied the motion, with the following statement: 

THE COURT: Absolutely. If there is a single juror excluded for an

improper question, you are entitled to relief as in the motion you requested. 

Now, I’ve been carefully observing these jury selection proceedings,

and in my view, you’ve failed to make a prima facie showing. So I’m not

going to require the district attorney explain his reasons. 

I will let the record reflect Mr. Knight is a Black gentleman. [The

prosecutor] has his own reasons I’m not interested in. I don’t think they are

required. I’m satisfied, not on a race basis, this is a man who clearly did not

want to be here and asked – basically did everything but ask me to excuse

him. He wanted to travel to Southern California. And it was clear to me, just

from looking at him and from observing his expressions, he was not happy

with my ruling, although he was certainly a gentleman. He accepted it was

his duty to be here. I understand why [the prosecutor] excused him, given

his answers and demeanor. There is no prima facie showing. 

RT at 228.

The trial court found that petitioner had failed to make a prima facie showing of

racial discrimination and therefore found it unnecessary to question the prosecution as to

their motive. The trial court’s finding with respect to discriminatory intent is a finding of fact

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entitled to the presumption of correctness which petitioner must rebut by clear and

convincing evidence. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769; Miller- El, 545 U.S. at 240. Petitioner

has failed to do so. The trial court found that there was a race-neutral basis for exercising

the peremptory challenge against Mr. Knight who exhibited a strong unwillingness to 

serve on the jury because it would inconvenience his plans to go to Southern California. 

The trial court was not unreasonable in denying the motion since petitioner failed to

demonstrate that the facts and the circumstances of the case "raise an inference" of racial

discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The trial court’s conclusion that there were raceneutral grounds for the prosecution to use a peremptory challenge against Mr. Knight was

not "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented” Id.

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).

Petitioner’s claim of trial court error in denying his motion for a new trial on the

grounds discussed above is without merit. Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of this

claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d at 1198. 

G. Ineffective assistance by appellate counsel

Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

violation of the Sixth Amendment by failing to raise certain issues which petitioner believed

were arguable on appeal. For the same reasons discussed above in petitioner’s fourth

claim, this claim is also without merit as petitioner cannot show how he was prejudiced by

counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance. Petitioner was given an opportunity to file a

supplemental opening brief with the state court of appeal raising the issues which he

contends counsel failed to raise himself. Pet. at 93. The state court of appeal addressed

the merits of the claims presented in petitioner’s handwritten brief, and rejected eight of

the nine claims on the merits. Answer Ex. 9 at 15-17. The only claim that was rejected for

being “entirely handwritten and practically illegible” was the claim that petitioner’s right to

due process was violated by the trial court’s refusal to admit rebuttal evidence to show that

petitioner was actually a victim of a police conspiracy with the victim acting as an

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undercover police officer to entrap him into committing burglary and robbery. Id. at 17. 

The state appellate court found this claim “doubtful” and “lack[ing] evidence to support it.” 

Id. It also denied on the merits petitioner’s closely related claim that he was denied due

process when the trial court excluded evidence of police entrapment. Id. The state

appellate court denied this claim based on the overwhelming evidence, including

petitioner’s own written confession and testimony at trial, such that “no conceivable

prejudice could have resulted from the exclusion of the purported evidence.” Id.

Therefore, it cannot be said that petitioner would have had a more favorable outcome on

this claim but for counsel’s failure to raise the claim on appeal. Accordingly, the state

court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable determination

of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

H. Failure to give limiting jury instructions

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s “failure to sua sponte instruct [the] trial jury

under the Duncan doctrine regarding guilt phase witness stand confession obtained in

violation of [petitioner’s] Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights while self-represented

and appearing in court without the assistance of counsel constitutes prejudicial error and

[is] reversible per se.” Pet. at 114. In other words, petitioner claims that he gave his

witness stand confession without being advised of his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, which therefore required the trial court under People v. Duncan, 204

Cal.App. 3d 613, 619-21 (1998), to instruct the jury that the confession could be

considered only on the issue of petitioner’s credibility. Pet. at 115-16. 

First of all, this claim fails to state a cognizable claim in federal habeas because

petitioner’s claim is only grounded in state law, i.e., the trial court’s failure to give

instructions under People v. Duncan, which is state law precedent. A challenge to a jury

instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim cognizable in federal

habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. 

Furthermore, respondent presents evidence showing that petitioner was well aware

of his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner was the first

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defendant in Alameda County to take advantage of the decision in Faretta v. California,

422 U.S. 806 (1975), to represent himself at trial. RT at 932. Petitioner represented

himself in previous trials. See In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675 (1970); People v. Harrell, 207

Cal.App. 3d 1439 (1989). In moving to represent himself for the trial at issue in the instant

petition, petitioner signed a “Petition to Proceed in Propria Persona” which included the

following statement: “I understand that I have the right to testify at the time of trial, but that

I do not have to testify unless I so desire, and cannot be compelled to testify.” CT at 954. 

It is clear that petitioner was aware of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination

during the course of the trial. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim

as the state court’s rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d at

1198. 

I. Involuntary statements

Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated because his post-arrest

statement was involuntary and should not have been admitted at trial. In addition,

petitioner alleges that his witness stand confession was “compelled” by the admission of

his post-arrest confession and was therefore “fruit of the poisonous tree” of the prior

erroneous decision. Pet. at 120.

Involuntary confessions in state criminal cases are inadmissible under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). The

voluntariness of a confession is evaluated by reviewing both the police conduct in

extracting the statements and the effect of that conduct on the suspect. Miller v. Fenton,

474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985); Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999). Absent

police misconduct causally related to the confession, there is no basis for concluding that a

confession was involuntary in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Colorado v.

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); Norman v. Ducharme, 871 F.2d 1483, 1487 (9th Cir.

1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1031, and cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1061 (1990).

To determine the voluntariness of a confession, the court must consider the effect

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that the totality of the circumstances had upon the will of the defendant. Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973). "The test is whether, considering the totality of

the circumstances, the government obtained the statement by physical or psychological

coercion or by improper inducement so that the suspect's will was overborne." United

States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Haynes v.

Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963)). "Coercive police activity is a necessary

predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. A confession

is only involuntary if the police use coercive activity to undermine the suspect's ability to

exercise his free will. Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

502 U.S. 853 (1991).

During trial, petitioner filed a motion to suppress his statement to the police,

claiming it was involuntary. Sergeant Glen Tomek, the officer who took petitioner’s post

arrest statement, testified that he gave petitioner a Miranda warning, see Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before taking the statement and that petitioner signed a

written Miranda waiver. RT at 361-63. Sergeant Tomek stated that he wrote a summary

of the statement and that petitioner made corrections to the statement before signing it. 

Id. at 363-64. Sergeant Tomek denied that he either threatened petitioner or made

promises of leniency. Id. at 368-74. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion and found

the statement voluntary: 

And that being the case, to the extent that there are any significant

conflicts between the [petitioner’s] testimony and that of Sergeant Tomek, I

believe the sergeant and I disbelief [sic] the [petitioner], a convicted felon. 

Having considered the evidence presented, it’s my conclusion that

the [petitioner’s] statement was voluntary in a constitutional sense. He was

duly acknowledged and made a knowing, intelligently waiver of his

constitutional rights. 

The motion to suppress the confession is denied. 

Id. at 384-85. 

A district court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by

a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and

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convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). For purposes of § 2254(e)(1), factual

issues are defined as "basic, primary, or historical facts: facts in the sense of a recital of

external events and the credibility of their narrators." Coombs v. Maine, 202 F.3d 14, 18

(1st Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Petitioner has failed to rebut the credibility of Sergeant Tomek’s testimony by clear

and convincing evidence. During the motion to suppress hearing, petitioner claimed that

Sergeant Tomek used “implied little psychological inducements” to obtain his confession

by threatening to file charges involving sexual misconduct unless he gave a statement. 

RT at 381. Petitioner claimed that Sergeant Tomek implied that the outcome of the

interview would determine what the charges would be. Id. However, Sergeant Tomek

testified that petitioner had already been formally charged before he was interviewed. RT

at 369. Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Sergeant

Tomek acted coercively to undermine the petitioner’s ability to exercise his free will. 

Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d at 818. The fact that petitioner “felt pressured” is not

sufficient to show that his will was overborne by police coercion. RT at 384. Accordingly,

the trial court’s determination of the credibility of Sergeant Tomek’s statement is entitled to

deference. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Because there was no error in admitting the written

statement, there is no merit to petitioner’s claim that his witness stand confession is a “fruit

of the poisonous tree” of the prior erroneous decision. Petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on this claim, and the state court’s rejection of this claim was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d at 1198. 

J. Challenge to constitutionality of 1975 prior conviction

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike his 1975

prior conviction on the ground that he was denied his right to counsel during the prior

conviction proceedings. 

A petitioner generally may not attack the constitutionality of a prior conviction used

to enhance a later sentence. "[O]nce a state conviction is no longer open to direct or

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collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies

while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction

may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a

criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence

through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was

unconstitutionally obtained." Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394,

403-04 (2001) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 295 F.3d

1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2002) (bar against collateral attacks on prior convictions also

applies where sentencing court declined to reduce sentence based on circumstances of

prior conviction). The only exception to the rule barring challenges to prior convictions

used to enhance current sentences is that a petitioner may challenge a prior conviction on

the ground that there was a failure to appoint counsel in that case in violation of the Sixth

Amendment. Coss, 532 U.S. at 404. 

Petitioner did not timely challenge the validity of his 1975 convictions in a direct or

collateral challenge to those proceedings and therefore cannot now challenge the

constitutionality of the prior conviction in the instant § 2254 habeas petition. Coss, 532

U.S. at 403-04. Furthermore, petitioner’s case does not warrant the exception under

Coss, id. at 404, because petitioner opted to represent himself during the 1975

proceedings which did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The state court’s

rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable determination of,

clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

K. Right to be present at every stage of the trial

Petitioner also claims that he was denied his “right to counsel and to be present

during every critical stage of the trial and criminal proceedings” and that he “did not

effectively waive his right to the assistance of counsel or to be present during the crucial

trial judge selection proceedings in question.” Pet. at 127. First of all, petitioner does not

make any specific factual allegations regarding the denial of his right to counsel. 

Furthermore, in light of the fact that petitioner opted to represent himself in the underlying

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criminal proceedings, there is no merit to this claim. Petitioner cannot now claim denial of

his right to appointment of counsel when he opted to exercise his Sixth Amendment right

to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975). Nor does

petitioner allege that the waiver of his right to counsel was other than knowing and

intelligent. Id. at 835. 

Petitioner’s second claim that he was denied his right to be present during the

“crucial judge selection proceedings” is without support. Due process protects a

defendant's right to be present "at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its

outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure." Kentucky v.

Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987). Petitioner appears to be believe that there was a

“judge selection proceeding” that took place without his presence. However, there is no

evidence to support this allegation. Petitioner was present at each and every motion to

disqualify judge proceedings for his underlying conviction, including the motions to

disqualify judges Goodman, Sarkisian, and Marguiles. CT at 104, 111, 172 & 279. 

Petitioner fails to identify any other proceeding that took place beyond those on the record

to support this claim. Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of this claim was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d at 1198. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

L. Challenge to constitutionality of 1983 prior conviction

Petitioner’s final claim challenges the constitutionality of his prior 1983 conviction

used to enhance his sentence. For the same reasons petitioner’s challenge to his 1975

prior conviction is invalid, this claim also fails. See supra 28-29; Coss, 532 U.S. at 403-04. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk of the court shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment for respondent, and

close the file. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 22, 2008 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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