Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04352/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04352-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASSOCIATED STUDENTS OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT SANTA

BARBARA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-04352 SI

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

On October 31, 2005, the Court heard argument on plaintiff’s application for a temporary restraining

order. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the application.

BACKGROUND

On November 8, 2005, the state ofCalifornia will hold a specialelection on eight ballotinitiatives. One

of these initiatives, titled Proposition 76, is at the center of the current dispute. The California Secretary of

State describes the subject matter of Proposition 76 as follows: “State expenditures would be subject to an

additionalspending limit based on an average of recent revenue growth. The Governor would be granted new

authority to unilaterally reduce state spending during certain fiscal situations. School and community college

spending would be more subject to annual budget decisions and less affected by a constitutional funding

guarantee.” Cal. Sec. of State, Official Voter Information Guide, available at

http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/ballot_measure_summary.shtml.

Plaintiff, the Associated Students ofthe University ofCalifornia at Santa Barbara (“ASUCSB”), is the

“official organization authorized to administer student government and student extracurricula r affairs” at the

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University of California at Santa Barbara (“UCSB”). Pl. Compl. at ¶ 1. ASUCSB believes that the passage

of Proposition 76 would “make it easier to cut higher education funding, increase student fees, and decrease

appropriations to state-funded academic preparation programs.” Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, on October 6, 2005,

ASUCSB took a unanimous position in opposition to Proposition 76. It also passed a resolution allocating

$1,000 ofstudent fundsto print flyers and educate voters about the perceived negative effectsthe proposition

would have on higher education.

Based upon general University of California (“UC”) policies, UCSB’s administration refused to

disburse the $1,000 fromthe student fee accounts. The administration claimed that such a disbursement would

have violatedSection66.00 ofUC’s Polices Applying to Campus Activities, Organizations, and Students (“UC

Campus Policies”), which provides in relevant part: “[S]tudent governments may not use University resources

to support or oppose a particular candidate or ballot proposition in a non-University political campaign.”

Declaration of Christopher M. Patti in Opposition to Application for Temporary Restraining Order (“Patti

Decl.”), Exh. 2.

On October 25, 2005, ASUCSB filed this suit, claiming that defendants had violated its First

Amendment rights under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief. In its current application, ASUCSB seeks a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), enjoining

defendants from enforcing Section 66.00 of the UC Campus Policies.

LEGAL STANDARD

The standard for granting a TRO is substantially the same as the standard for granting a preliminary

injunction. This standard “balances the plaintiff’s likelihood of success against the relevant hardship to the

parties.” Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003). Under

Ninth Circuit law, this balancing act can be performed through two related tests:

Under the traditionaltest, a plaintiff mustshow:(1) a strong likelihood ofsuccess on the merits,

(2) the possibility of irreparable harm, (3) a balance of hardships favoring plaintiff, and (4)

advancement of the public interest (in certain cases). The alternative test requires that plaintiff

demonstrate either a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of

irreparable injury orthat serious questions are raised and the balance ofhardships tipssharply

in his favor. These two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the

required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases. They

are not separate tests but rather outer reaches of a single continuum.

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1Because the Court finds that plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, it

does not reach plaintiff’s contentions that there is the possibility of irreparable harm, that the balance of

hardships tips in plaintiff’s favor, and that the public interest favors injunctive relief. See Johnson v. Cal. State

Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1995).

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RanchersCattlemenActionLegalFund United Stockgrowers ofAm. v. USDA, 415 F.3d 1078, 1092-93 (9th

Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). To issue a TRO, a court must further find that “there is some threat of

immediate irreparable injury, even ifthat injury is not of great magnitude.” Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Intern.

Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (N.D. Cal 1999).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims that defendants’ policy infringes upon its First Amendment rights. It argues that the only

way its rights can be adequately protected is if the Court issues a TRO allowing it to spend student funds to

oppose Proposition 76 before the November 8 specialelection. The Court finds that a TRO is not warranted

because plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success on its First Amendment claim.1

There can be little doubt that lobbying in generalelections constitutes core political speech, deserving

of the full protections ofthe First Amendment. See, e.g., First Nat’lBank ofBoston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,

776, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (1978) (statute that bars banks fromspending money forthe purpose ofinfluencing

referendums submitted to the generalpopulation “is atthe heart ofthe First Amendment’s protection”). Indeed,

defendants do not contest this point. Rather, the parties’ central point of dispute is over whether ASUCSB

is a governmental entity or a student organization. Defendants argue thatASUCSB is the former, and that, as

such, it has no independent First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of

University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2518-19 (1995) (“[W]hen the State is the

speaker, it may make content-based choices.”); Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003,

1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that when schooldistrict chooses to speak it may do so “without the constraint

ofviewpoint neutrality”); Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument that

sheriff, in official capacity, had cognizable First Amendment rights). ASUCSB argues that it is the latter, and

that the restrictions are therefore unconstitutional. See Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin v.

Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235, 120 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2000) (distinguishing student speech from speech

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of university); First Nat’l Bank, 435 U.S. at 776, 98 S. Ct. at 1415.

Based on the arguments the parties have submitted thus far, the Court believes that plaintiff does not

have a strong likelihood of success on its argument that UC’s policy violates its First Amendment rights.

Rather, the Court finds that defendants are likely to prevail in their argument that ASUCSB is a unit of the

University, and that the restrictions on its speech are therefore permissible.

As an initialmatter, the UC Regents is undoubtedly an armofthe state government. Article IX, section

9 of the California Constitution establishes the UC system, over which it grants the UC Regents “full powers

of organization and government.” Cal. Const. Art. IX, § 9. California courts have recognized that the UC

Regents is a “statewide administrative agency.” Ishimatsu v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 266 Cal. App. 2d

854, 864 (Cal. App. 1968); cf. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 221, 120 S. Ct. at 1350 (recognizing that the

University of Wisconsin is a state government organization). Plaintiff does not dispute that the UC Regents is

an arm of the state government; indeed, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim depends upon it.

As the arm of the state government responsible for administering the UC system, UC Regents has

expressed the intent thatstudent governments be regarded as official units of the University. For example, the

Policy on the Status of the Associated Students provides:

1. The Regents reaffirm that the Associated Students on the several campuses of the

University are official units of the University exercising authorities concerning student

affairs by delegations from the Regents, The President, and the Chancellors[.] 

Patti Decl., Exh. 1. Section 61.10 of the UC Campus Policies is consistent with this view: “It shall be the

responsibility ofstudent governments . . . to ensure that their enabling documents, as well as all their programs

and activities are consistent with the status ofsuch governments as officialunits ofthe University.” Patti Decl.,

Exh. 2, at 9; see also UC Campus Policies § 61.15 (granting student governments authority to “provide such

additional services to students as may be determined by the Chancellor or the Chancellor’s designee to be

consistent with the status of student governments as units of the University”).

A review of the powers of student governments also supports the view that student governments are

units ofthe University. UC Regents has delegated certain functions and authorities to student governments that

are not provided to ordinary campus organizations. For example, student governments are the only student

organizations authorized to use the name “University of California.” Def. Br. at 3; UC Campus Policies §

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2At oral argument, counsel for UC Regents also stated that student governments are the only student

organizations that are considered units of the University.

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70.40. In addition, student governments are authorized to administer and distribute university fees. See Pl.

Compl. at ¶¶ 10-11; UC Campus Policies § 61.13. They are also empowered to raise funds through student

referendum to increase mandatory fees, a power that is explicitly withheld from Registered Campus

Organizations. See UC Campus Policies at §§ 82.00, 86.12. As the campus organizations charged with

exercising these powers, student governments hold a unique status among campus organizations,2and are

explicitly prohibited from becoming Registered Campus Organizations. See id. at § 70.00 (“An authorized

student government of a campus shall not be eligible for registration also as a Registered Campus

Organization.”).

Given that the UC Regents consider student governments to be units of the University, that student

governments exercise unique powers within the University, and that they are classified as entities distinctfrom

other campus organizations, the Court findsit likely that defendantswillprevailontheir argument thatASUCSB

are units of the UC system.

Plaintiff raises three arguments against its classification as a unit of the UC Regents, but none is

convincing. First, plaintiff argues thatUC policy expressly indicatesthat student government speech is distinct

from that of the University. In support of this argument, plaintiff cites to Section 63.00 of the UC Campus

Policies, which states that positions adopted by student government organizations “shall not be represented as

or deemed to be positions of any entity of the University other than the student government.” Plaintiff has not

explained, however, how the authorization to adopt political positions indicates that the student governments

are independent from the UC Regents. Indeed, the quoted language fully supports UC Regents’ position that

student governments are a “unit of the University.”

Second, plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court decided in Southworth that “studentspeech was not

the same as that ofthe University or its agents.” Pl. Br. at 10. This argument does nothing to advance plaintiff’s

cause, however, because it assumes the precise question the Court must decide – whether student government

speech is properly classified as student speech or the speech of the University.

Finally, plaintiff argues that its status as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit undermines the contention that it is the

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3Plaintiff also argues that the UC Regents cannot justify its prohibitionon student government lobbying

in general elections based upon the California Supreme Court’s decision in Stanson v. Motts, 17 Cal. 3d 206

(1976). Stanson held that, absent legislative authorization, a public official could not spend public funds to

lobby for the passage of a bond initiative. Id. at 213-20. In reaching this conclusion, the court expressed

concern over the constitutional issues such a use of public funds would raise. Id. at 218 (“[E]very court which

has addressed the issue to date has found the use of public funds for partisan campaign purposes improper .

. . .”).

While plaintiffraises a number ofreasons why the policies underlying the Stanson decision do not apply

to this case, its argument misses the precise question before the Court. The question is not whether ASUCSB

may legally spend student fundsto advocate in general elections, but whether the UC Regents can legitimately

ban such an expenditure. For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that the UC Regents can.

4Plaintiff cites to thisCourt’s decisionin Associated Students ofthe University ofCalifornia at Riverside

v. Regents ofthe University of California , No. C 98-0021 CRB, 1999 WL 13711 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 1999),

in support of its application for a TRO. That case, however, concerned only whether the California Supreme

Court’s decision in Smith v. Regents of the University of California , 4 Cal. 4th 843 (1999), required the UC

Regents to ban the use of student activity fees for student government lobbying. The Court did not decide

whether a ban on student government lobbying would violate the First Amendment, nor did it address the issue

whether student governments were units of the UC Regents.

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same as any other university unit. But plaintiff fails to provide any description ofhow, exactly, this means that

it is not an entity within the UC system.3

Thus, from the arguments thus far presented, the Court finds that plaintiff is likely a unit of the UC

Regents.4 As such, no constitutional problem is raised by the Regents’ choice to limit the manner in which

plaintiff may use University resources in this initiative campaign. See Kotwica v. City of Tucson, 801 F.2d

1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding no First Amendment protection for government employee’s speech

made in her official capacity); Demery v. Arpaio , 378 F.3d at 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2004).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s application

for a TRO (Docket No. 2).

Dated: November 1, 2005

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SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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