Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00120/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00120-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

BILL D. THOMPSON, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:09-cv-0120 JWS

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

CROWN ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC, ) [Re: Motions at Dockets 8 and 16]

a foreign limited liability company )

registered with the Arizona )

Corporation Commission; GURSTEL, )

STALOCH & CHARGO, P.A.; and )

JESSICA M. LAGINESS, a licensed )

Arizona Attorney, )

)

Defendants. )

)

I. MOTIONS PRESENTED

At docket 8, defendants Gurstel, Staloch & Chargo, P.A. (“GSC”) and Jessica M.

Laginess (collectively, "defendants") move for summary judgment on plaintiff Bill D.

Thompson's claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). At

docket 16, Thompson moves to continue the court’s ruling on defendants' motion for

summary judgment as to the application of the bona fide error defense pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(2). Oral argument was requested on the motion

for summary judgment, but would not assist the court.

Case 2:09-cv-00120-JWS Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 1 of 6
1

See generally Doc. 8.

2

Doc. 16 at 2.

3

Id.

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II. BACKGROUND

The background of the matter is recited at docket 13 and will not be repeated

here. Defendants GSC and Laginess filed for summary judgment at docket 8, arguing

that (1) Thompson's claim alleging that defendants collected a debt by

misrepresentation under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f(1) fails because the collection

was authorized by law; (2) Thompson's claim that defendants contacted Thompson

directly after being notified of his representation by counsel is defensible because it was

a bona fide error pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c); and (3) Thompson's claims against

defendant Laginess should be dismissed as a matter of law because she is not a "debt

collector" under the FDCPA and is otherwise veiled from personal liability.1

 As he did at

docket 9, Thompson argues in his renewed, and nearly identical, Rule 56(f)(2) motion at

docket 16 that he has been unable to initiate any discovery because the court has not

yet issued a Rule 26 order or otherwise permitted discovery to begin.2 Nevertheless,

Thompson attempted to schedule several depositions prior to filing his Rule 56(f)(2)

motion, but was unsuccessful.3

 Counsel for Thompson has submitted an affidavit in

support his motion detailing purported “facts,” which Thompson intends to elicit through

discovery. Included among them: (1) the existence of defendants’ policies and

procedures in effect as of July 7, 2009, that were reasonably designed to prevent

FDCPA violations; (2) whether defendants had a “special system” in effect as of July 7,

Case 2:09-cv-00120-JWS Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 2 of 6
4

Doc. 17 at 2.

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2008, that was reasonably designed to prevent FDCPA violations; (3) whether

defendants had a “checking mechanism” in place to insure that their policies and

procedures were followed; and (4) whether the three affidavits submitted by defendants

are true.4

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion at Docket 16

Thompson’s motion at docket 16 again seeks to continue the court’s ruling on

defendants’ summary judgment motion until such time as discovery on defendants’

bona fide error defense may be obtained. Resolution of the motion at docket 9,

therefore, requires careful consideration of Rule 56(f).

Prior to 2007, Rule 56(f), Fed. R. Civ. P., read as follows:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the [summary

judgment] motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by

affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may

refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit

affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had

or may make such other order as is just.

There is considerable case law interpreting the above version of Rule 56(f). The 2007

Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure revised the language of Rule 56(f),

but a comparison of the revised language with that quoted above discloses no

substantive difference. That conclusion is supported by the statement of the Advisory

Committee on the rules: “The language of Rule 56 has been amended as part of the

general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make

style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to

Case 2:09-cv-00120-JWS Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 3 of 6
5

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Adv. Comm. Notes regarding 2007 Amendments.

6

Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Fund v. Chlorox Company, 353 F.3d 1125

1129 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting VISA Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472,

1475 (9th Cir. 1986). See also, United States v. One Mercedes, 917 F.2d 415, 418 (9th Cir.

1990; Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1989).

7

Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505, 353 F.3d at 1129-30; Chance v. Pac Tel Teletrac Inc.,

242 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001).

8

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998).

9

Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir.1986).

10Campbell, 138 F.3d at 779.

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be stylistic only.”5 The court concludes that case law interpreting the older statement of

the rule retains full vitality and now turns to such case law.

As explained by the Ninth Circuit: “To prevail under this Rule [56(f)], parties

opposing summary judgment must make ‘(a) a timely application which (b) specifically

identifies (c) relevant information, (d) where there is some basis for believing that the

information sought actually exists.’”6 Furthermore, the circuit court has instructed that

the party seeking discovery bears the burden of providing facts sufficient to demonstrate

that the evidence sought exists and that it would foreclose summary judgment.7 In the

context of this case, then, to obtain relief under Rule 56(f), Thompson must show by

affidavit or declaration (1) the specific facts that he hopes to elicit from further discovery,

(2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are "essential" to

resist the summary judgment motion.8

 "References in memoranda and declarations to a

need for discovery do not qualify as motions under Rule 56(f)."9 Rather, Rule 56(f)

requires litigants to submit affidavits setting forth the particular facts expected from

discovery.10

Case 2:09-cv-00120-JWS Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 4 of 6
11Doc. 17.

12Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986).

13Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003) (refusing to affirm entry

judgment against a non-moving party based on a failure to timely oppose a deficient summary

judgment motion). 

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Counsel for Thompson, Richard Groves, has again submitted an affidavit in

support of Thompson’s motion for Rule 56(f)(2) relief.11 Like the affidavit submitted in

connection with Thompson’s earlier Rule 56(f)(2) motion, this affidavit “does not identify

a single specific fact that Thomson hopes to obtain by conducting further discovery.” As

a result, Thompson has again failed to establish that relevant facts exist or that they are

essential. The affidavit does nothing more than speculate that the affidavits submitted

in support of the summary judgment motion are not true. It follows, as it did in the

court’s order at docket 13, that Thompson is not entitled to relief under Rule 56(f), and

the motion at docket 16 lacks merit. 

B. Motion at Docket 8

As discussed at docket 13, "[f]ailure to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f)

is a proper ground for denying discovery and proceeding to summary judgment."12

Defendants’ summary judgment motion seeks a ruling in their favor on all three of

Thompson’s FDCPA claims, discussed above. Thompson has failed to oppose

defendants’ summary judgment motion, despite being ordered at docket 13 to “respond

to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.” Rather, Thompson filed another

deficient Rule 56(f)(2) motion. Although a failure to oppose is typically an insufficient

reason, standing alone, for granting a motion for summary judgment,13 Thompson’s illadvised effort to file another Rule 56(f)(2) motion after having his earlier, nearly identical

Case 2:09-cv-00120-JWS Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 5 of 6
14Docs. 8-1, 8-2, and 8-3.

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motion denied, constitutes a sufficient reason to rule on the merits in the absence of an

opposition. Having reviewed Thompson’s complaint and defendants’ motion, the court

concludes that Thompson has failed to establish any cognizable violation of the FDCPA. 

Thompson has neither pointed to any alleged false or misleading representation by

GSC, nor an attempt by defendants to collect an unauthorized debt, nor any authority

establishing Laginess’ individual liability. Moreover, defendants have established,

through their affidavits, entitlement to claim the bona fide error defense based on

declarations that GSC unintentionally contacted Thompson as a result of a clerical error,

immediately corrected the error, and had policies and procedures in place to avoid such

errors.14 Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment at docket 8 is granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Thompson’s motion for Rule 56(f) relief at

docket 16 is DENIED. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment at docket 8 is

GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to please enter judgment for the defendants, and

plaintiff shall take nothing.

DATED this 22nd day of September 2009.

/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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