Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00186/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00186-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT 

DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICHARD W. COREY, in his official 

capacity as Executive Officer of the 

California Air Resources Board, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-CV-00186-MCE-AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. (“OOIDA”), along 

with a number of individual truck owner-operators (collectively “Plaintiffs”), initiated this 

action challenging California’s enforcement of the “Regulation to Reduce Emissions of 

Diesel Particulate Matter, Oxides of Nitrogen and Other Criteria Pollutants, from In-Use 

Heavy-Duty Diesel-Fueled Vehicles,” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 2025 (the “Regulation”), 

against all vehicles, with limited exceptions, weighing over 14,000 pounds that operate in 

California, regardless of their origin. Presently before the Court is a Motion for Judgment 

on the Pleadings (“Motion”) (ECF No. 33) filed by Defendants Richard W. Corey, in his 

official capacity as Executive Officer of California’s Air Resources Board (“ARB”), Mary 

D. Nichols, in her official capacity as Chairman of the ARB, and Matt Rodriguez, in his 

official capacity as Secretary of the California Environmental Protection Agency

Case 2:14-cv-00186-MCE-AC Document 40 Filed 10/29/14 Page 1 of 11
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(collectively “Defendants”). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is 

GRANTED with leave to amend.1

BACKGROUND2

A. Implementation of the Regulation 

The Regulation became effective January 1, 2012, and applies to both intrastate

and interstate owner-operators. In a nutshell, it requires 1996-2006 model year vehicles 

weighing over 14,000 pounds to be replaced or retrofitted with new technology to comply 

with state emissions reduction standards. The ARB implemented the Regulation as part 

of its State Implementation Plan (“SIP”), which is a set of measures intended to enable 

the state to attain and maintain national ambient air quality standards promulgated 

pursuant to the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) by the federal Environmental Protection Agency 

(“EPA”). Motion, ECF No. 33 at 2-3 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a), 7410(a); Bayview 

Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 366 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 

2004)). States are required to submit their SIPs to the EPA for review and approval. Id.

In May 2011, the ARB submitted the Regulation to the EPA to be added to 

California’s SIP. Id. at 4 (citing 76 Fed. Reg. at 40653). Two months later, the EPA 

proposed approving the regulation, stating, “[W]e know of no obstacle under Federal or 

State law in CARB’s ability to implement the regulations.” Id. at 40658. The EPA issued 

its final rule approving the Regulation in April of the following year. Id. (citing 77 Fed. 

Reg. 20,308 (April 4, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52)). 

B. The instant action 

OOIDA is a non-profit organization of approximately 150,000 truckers residing 

throughout the United States. Among its members are owner-operators who reside 

 1 Having determined that oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefing. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

2 Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are taken, largely verbatim, from Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint. ECF No. 1. 

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and/or operate trucking businesses primarily outside of the State of California, but who 

also conduct some business within the state and are thus required to comply with the 

Regulation. According to OOIDA, out of 8,621,853 registered trucks, approximately 

6,208,000 are not compliant with the Regulation and must be retrofitted to meet 

California’s emissions standards. 

More specifically, the Regulation requires trucks to be replaced or retrofitted with 

particulate matter filters on a scheduled basis depending on truck type and model year. 

Older trucks that have not been retrofitted are prohibited from operating on public 

roadways until they are compliant, and steep fines are imposed on anyone operating in 

violation of the Regulation. 

Plaintiffs aver, however, that it is cost prohibitive (i.e., tens of thousands of dollars 

per truck) to bring their vehicles into compliance with the Regulation. OOIDA’s 

members, as with the individual Plaintiffs, made long-term investments in equipment

(typically at least $150,000 per truck), which met applicable standards at the time of 

purchase, with the reasonable expectation they would be able to use those trucks for 

many years. Because trucks are purchased with the intent that they be used for 

decades, many owner-operators have lengthy mortgages on their vehicles. If interstate 

owner-operators do not comply with the retrofitting mandates, the resale value of their 

existing trucks will diminish. On the other hand, the cost of compliance is so high that, 

for many, their only other alternative will be to discontinue conducting business in 

California. 

As a result, Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 6, 2013, alleging the 

Regulation is unconstitutional because it discriminates against out-of-state truckers in 

violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Defendants answered the Complaint on 

April 11, 2014, and filed the instant Motion on May 15, 2014. For the following reasons, 

Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with leave to amend.

///

///

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STANDARD3

A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Under Rule 12(c), “a party may move for judgment on the pleadings” after the 

pleadings are closed “but early enough not to delay trial.” A motion for judgment on the 

pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) “challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party's 

pleadings.” See, e.g., Westlands Water Dist. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 805 F. Supp. 

1503, 1506 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings should only be granted if “the moving 

party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact 

remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach 

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). In 

reviewing a Rule 12(c) motion, “all factual allegations in the complaint [must be 

accepted] as true and construe[d] . . . in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). Judgment on the 

pleadings under Rule 12(c) is warranted “only if it is clear that no relief could be granted 

under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Deveraturda 

v. Globe Aviation Sec. Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations 

omitted).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and are presumptively without 

jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). The burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Id. Because subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s power to hear a 

 3 Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, but since the motion is jurisdictional it could 

be construed as having been brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Accordingly, both 

standards are set forth here. The outcome in this case will be the same under either standard, and, 

regardless of the procedural mechanism by which Defendants have presented their challenge, this Court 

is obligated to dismiss the action if at any time it determines it lacks jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 

12(h)(3). 

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case, it can never be forfeited or waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 

(2002). Accordingly, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by either party at 

any point during the litigation, through a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also Int’l 

Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Cnty. of Plumas, 559 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may also be raised by the district court sua sponte. 

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Indeed, “courts . . . have an 

independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even in 

the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss the action if subject matter 

jurisdiction is lacking).

There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: a 

facial attack and a factual attack. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, a party may either make an attack on the 

allegations of jurisdiction contained in the nonmoving party’s complaint, or may 

challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, despite the formal 

sufficiency of the pleadings. Id.

When a party makes a facial attack on a complaint, the attack is unaccompanied 

by supporting evidence, and it challenges jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings. 

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). If the motion to 

dismiss constitutes a facial attack, the Court must consider the factual allegations of the 

complaint to be true, and determine whether they establish subject matter jurisdiction. 

Savage v. Glendale High Union Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2003). In the case of a facial attack, the motion to dismiss is granted only if the 

nonmoving party fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. 

Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

In the case of a factual attack, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s 

allegations.” Thornill, 594 F.2d at 733 (internal citation omitted). The party opposing the 

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motion has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction does exist, and must 

present any necessary evidence to satisfy this burden. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 

880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). If the plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdictional facts are 

challenged by the adversary in the appropriate manner, the plaintiff cannot rest on the 

mere assertion that factual issues may exist. Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Ind., 

Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Touche 

Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1976)). Furthermore, the district court may 

review any evidence necessary, including affidavits and testimony, in order to determine 

whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 

(9th Cir. 1988); Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. If the nonmoving party fails to meet its 

burden and the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must 

dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

C. Leave to Amend

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (citing DCD Programs, 

Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is 

proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” 

Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re 

Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Although Rule 12(c) does not mention leave to amend, courts have the discretion 

in appropriate cases to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend, or to simply grant 

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dismissal of the action instead of entry of judgment. See Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 

300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 

982 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs contend that the Regulation violates the Dormant Commerce Clause 

because it discriminates against those owner-operators who reside and/or conduct 

business primarily outside of the State of California. According to Defendants, however, 

Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law because: (1) the court of appeals has exclusive 

jurisdiction over this action; and (2) this suit cannot proceed absent joinder of the EPA, a 

necessary and indispensable party. This Court previously addressed essentially 

identical arguments in California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Nichols, 924 F. Supp. 2d 

1126 (E.D. Cal. 2012), where it dismissed preemption challenges to the Regulation 

brought by intrastate truckers.4 This case is materially indistinguishable, and the same 

reasoning controls. 

A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Challenges to the 

Regulation, Which Must Instead be Brought in the Court of Appeals. 

According to Defendants, Plaintiffs must initiate their action in the court of appeals 

because their challenge to the Regulation pertains to the EPA’s approval of that 

Regulation as part of California’s SIP. Plaintiffs object, arguing to the contrary that only 

Congress has the power to pass laws interfering with interstate commerce, that the EPA 

thus could not and did not approve the Regulation to the extent it applies to out-of-state 

owner-operators, and that the EPA’s decision will thus not be affected by a decision in 

Plaintiffs’ favor here. Defendants have the better argument.

///

 4 The appeal in that case has been briefed before the Ninth Circuit, but no argument has yet been 

scheduled. See Case No. 13-15175.

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In California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n, this Court addressed in great detail why 

challenges to the Regulation, which has been approved by the EPA as part of 

California’s SIP, must be brought in the court of appeals in the first instance. 

924 F. Supp. 2d at 1136-44. More specifically, with regard to the interplay between state 

and federal emissions regulations, the Court explained: 

Under the CAA, the EPA has the authority to issue national 

air quality standards establishing the maximum allowable 

concentration of a given pollutant. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a). “To 

implement these standards, the Act establishes a system of 

State Implementation Plans (‘SIPs’), whereby states submit, 

subject to the [EPA] review and approval, proposed methods 

for maintaining air quality.” Safe Air for Everyone v. U.S. 

E.P.A., 488 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir.2007). 

. . . . 

The CAA also requires states to provide “necessary

assurances” that “the State . . . will have adequate personnel, 

funding, and authority under State (and, as appropriate, local) 

law to carry out such implementation plan (and is not 

prohibited by any provision of Federal or State law from 

carrying out such implementation plan or portion thereof).” 

42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E). “[I]f an emission standard or 

limitation is in effect under an applicable implementation 

plan . . . such State or political subdivision may not adopt or 

enforce any emission standard or limitation which is less 

stringent than the standard or limitation under such plan or 

section.” 42 U.S.C. § 7416. Upon approval by the EPA, a 

SIP is printed in the Federal Register and becomes 

enforceable as federal law. See Safe Air for Everyone,

488 F.3d at 1091 (Once approved by EPA, SIPs “have the 

force and effect of federal law.”).

Id. at 1136. 

Moreover, “[a] petition for review of the Administrator’s action in approving or 

promulgating any [state] implementation plan . . . or any other final action of the 

Administrator under this chapter . . . may be filed only in the United States Court of 

Appeals for the appropriate circuit.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). 

“[J]udicial review of final actions by the EPA Administrator [including SIP approvals] rests 

exclusively in the appellate courts.” Envtl. Defense v. Leavitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 55, 63 

(D.D.C. 2004). Accordingly, in that case, this Court determined that the preemption 

///

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challenge to the Regulation, even if not directly challenging the EPA approval, must still

be brought in the Ninth Circuit: 

[A]lthough Plaintiff is technically correct that it's complaint 

does not present a direct challenge to the EPA approval of 

California's SIP revision, “[t]he answer to the jurisdictional 

question lies not in determining which of the parties' 

characterizations makes better sense semantically, but in 

determining which better satisfies the policies underlying the 

CAA's jurisdictional scheme.” See Natural Res. Defense 

Council, 788 F.Supp. at 273. Were this Court to decide that 

the Truck and Bus Regulation is preempted . . . , such a 

decision would undermine the validity of EPA's final action 

and would amount to an implicit repeal of a portion of the 

EPA-approved SIP. Proceeding with this action would also 

undercut the special judicial review process created by 

Congress for challenging federally-approved SIP measures 

and could result in potentially inconsistent or redundant 

interpretations of federal law by different courts and EPA. If 

CDTOA disagrees with a state regulation incorporated into an 

EPA-approved SIP it “must follow appropriate federal 

procedures to revise it.” See Paisley, 2011 WL 3875992, at 

*5. Because Plaintiff's instant challenge necessarily 

implicates the EPA final action approving the Truck and Bus 

Regulation as part of California's SIP, it cannot be litigated in 

this Court.

California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1144. The same holds true 

here for the same reasons this Court put on the record in that case.

5

 

Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that: (1) enforcement of the Regulation violates the 

Commerce Clause; (2) only Congress is authorized to enact laws that interfere with 

interstate commerce; and (3) it follows that the EPA did not and could not approve 

enforcement of the Regulation in violation of the Commerce Clause

Plaintiff’s first argument is easily dispatched. Whether the Regulation was 

implemented in violation of the Commerce Clause is the very issue underlying the merits 

of this case. The current Motion, however, is jurisdictional. Even if Plaintiffs are correct, 

this Court cannot reach the Commerce Clause question unless it is satisfied that the 

case is properly before it in the first place. 

Plaintiff’s second and third arguments fare no better. In fact, by arguing that the 

EPA did not have the power to approve (or did not approve) the Regulation in derogation 

 5 That reasoning is incorporated here in its entirety.

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of the Commerce Clause, Plaintiffs inadvertently make Defendants’ point. If the EPA 

exceeded its authority in approving the Regulation as part of California’s SIP, the 

appropriate forum for review is the court of appeals. 

Indeed, the EPA approved the Regulation as written, and the Regulation very 

clearly and expressly sets forth its scope, stating “this regulation applies to any person, 

business, federal government agency, school district or school transportation provider 

that owns or operates, leases, or rents, affected vehicles that operate in California.” 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 2025(b) (emphasis added).6 Moreover, the EPA opined that it 

knew “of no obstacle under Federal or State law in CARB’s ability to implement the 

regulations.” 76 Fed. Reg. 40658. Accordingly, by asking this Court to find to the 

contrary, Plaintiffs’ current action directly challenges the EPA’s approval of the 

Regulation. In sum, Defendants are correct that this action is materially indistinguishable 

for jurisdictional purposes California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n, and their Motion is 

GRANTED with leave to amend. 7 

B. Even If this Court had Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Claims, Dismissal is 

Warranted Because the EPA is A Necessary and Indispensable Party. 

Alternatively, Defendants contend this case must be dismissed for failure to add a 

necessary and indispensable party, namely the EPA, under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 19. Plaintiffs again disagree, for the same reasons that they object to 

Defendants’ jurisdictional argument. Again, however, the Court previously addressed 

this same issue in California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1144-1150, 

///

 6 A number of the Regulation’s definitions confirm the interstate scope of the regulation. For 

example, “’Fleet’ means one or more vehicles, owned by a person business, or government agency, 

traveling in California and subject to this regulation.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 2025(d)(28) (emphasis 

added). “’Fleet Owner’ means . . . either the person registered as the owner or lessee of a vehicle by the 

California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), or its equivalent in another state, province, or country 

. . . .” Id., § 2025(d)(29) (emphasis added). “’New Fleet’ . . . may include new businesses or out-of-state

businesses that bring vehicles into California for the first time after January 1, 2012.” Id., § 2025(d)(44) 

(emphasis added). 

7 The Court DENIES without prejudice Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 35-1) 

because the Court had no need to consider that authority in reaching its decision.

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and for the reasons set forth there (which are again fully incorporated here), Defendants’

Motion is GRANTED on this basis as well. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons just stated, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

(ECF No. 33) is GRANTED with leave to amend. Not later than twenty (20) days 

following the date this Order is electronically filed, Plaintiffs may (but are not required to) 

file an amended complaint. If no amended complaint is filed by that date, the complaint 

will be dismissed with prejudice upon no further notice to the parties. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 29, 2014

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