Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08126/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08126-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anthony Joseph Kuc, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MTC Financial Inc., dba Trustee 

Corporation; et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-08126-PCT-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss and Alternatively, Motion to 

Strike of MTC Financial Inc. dba Trustee Corps (“Trustee Corps”). (Doc. 23). For the 

reasons discussed below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted with prejudice and the Motion 

to Strike is denied as moot. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Anthony Joseph Kuc Junior (“Kuc”), pro se, filed an Amended Complaint 

against Trustee Corps and related parties on December 11, 2012 (the “Amended 

Complaint”). (Doc. 22.) Kuc’s Original Complaint, filed with this Court on June 11, 2012 

(the “Original Complaint”), sought to quiet title to his home and to obtain relief for the 

filing of false documents. (Doc. 1-1 at 7–8.) Because Kuc failed to allege any facts 

showing that Trustee Corps was a proper party to the action, this Court granted Trustee 

Corps’ Motion to Dismiss the Original Complaint with leave to amend on October 24, 

2012 (the “First Order”). (Doc. 19 at 6.) The facts of the present claim and Kuc’s prior 

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related suit against Bank of America are set out more fully in the First Order. (Doc. 19 at 

2.) See also Kuc v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV-12-08024-PCT-FJM, 2012 WL 1268126 

(D. Ariz. Apr. 16, 2012). 

 The thrust of Kuc’s suit against Trustee Corps remains that because he has paid off 

his loans in full by allegedly tendering payment in full to the holder of the underlying 

debt, he is entitled to clear title to the property located at 5804 Kingman Reef Road. On 

December 21, 2012, Trustee Corp filed a Motion to Strike Kuc’s Amended Complaint or, 

in the alternative, to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. Kuc 

alleges a total of six causes of action against Trustee Corps. Counts 1–3 allege violations 

by Trustee Corps under various provisions of the DOT. Counts 4 and 5 allege that 

Trustee Corps also violated A.R.S. §§ 33-707 and 33-712 when it failed to release the 

DOT in full satisfaction of the loan. (Doc. 22 at 4–5.) Finally, Count 6 alleges that 

Trustees Corps’ failure to transfer clear title to Kuc amounts to tortious interference with 

an unspecified “relationship.” (Doc. 22 at 5.) 

 Trustee Corps has incorporated into its current Motion its Request for Judicial 

Notice (Doc. 10-1.) and all supporting exhibits and documents submitted therewith. (Doc. 

23 at 2.) In the First Order, this Court took judicial notice of the Deed of Trust (“DOT”) 

from Anthony J. Kuc and Kathleen Kuc, as Borrowers, in favor of MERS, (Doc. 10-2); 

the Assignment of Deed of Trust from MERS to BAC Home Loans Servicing, (Doc. 10-

3); the Substitution of Trustee, appointing Trustee Corps as Trustee, (Doc. 10-4); and the 

Notice of Trustee’s Sale, (Doc. 10-5). (Doc. 19 at 2–3.) For the reasons stated in the First 

Order (Doc. 19 at 2–3.), the Court continues to take judicial notice of Kuc’s DOT (Doc. 

10-2). The Court does not find that judicial notice of the remaining documents is 

necessary for resolving this Motion and declines to take notice of them. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Motion to Dismiss 

 A. Legal Standard 

 A court may not grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

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“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 

his claims which would entitle him to relief.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (citing Buckey v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

When analyzing a complaint under this standard, “[a]ll allegations of material fact are 

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v. 

Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, a complaint must contain more 

than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action”; it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

 A district court generally will not consider evidence or documents beyond the 

complaint in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990) (amended decision). 

However, courts may “consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, 

documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—

without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” United 

States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 B. Analysis 

 Arizona law requires plaintiffs to bring suit against beneficiaries, rather than 

trustees, when they wish to challenge actions authorized by a deed of trust or Arizona 

statute. Puzz v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1125 (D. Ariz. 2011). 

Moreover, it requires dismissal of any actions against trustees that do not allege a breach 

of A.R.S. Title 33 Chapter 6.1 or the deed of trust. Under Arizona law, a trustee “need 

only be joined as a party in legal actions pertaining to a breach of the trustee’s obligations 

under this chapter or under the deed of trust.” A.R.S. § 33-807(e) (2012). 

 Kuc’s allegation that Trustee Corps is required to deed the property back to him is 

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ostensibly based on his assertions that he has paid off his loans in full. The First Order 

granted Kuc leave to amend with instructions as to why his claim against Trustee Corps 

was insufficient to state a claim. The Order further stated that if Kuc was unable to 

appropriately amend his claims against Trustee Corps Trustee Corps “is entitled to be 

immediately dismissed and to recover costs and reasonable attorney fees from the person 

joining the trustee.” A.R.S. § 33-807(e) (2012). In the interest of creating clarity and 

finality as to these issues, the Court will address each claim in the amended complaint 

grouped according to subject matter.1

 

 1. Kuc’s Statutory Claims 

 Kuc alleges that Trustee Corps’ failure to release the DOT constitutes a violation 

of A.R.S. §§ 33-712 and 33-707(A). Section 33-707(A) provides that if a “mortgagee, 

trustee or person entitled to payment receives full satisfaction of a mortgage or deed of 

trust, he shall acknowledge satisfaction of the mortgage or deed of trust by delivering to 

the person making satisfaction or by recording a sufficient release or satisfaction.” A.R.S. 

§ 33-707(A) (2012). 

 Although A.R.S. § 33-707(A) does included the words “trustee” and “obligation,” 

the statute only creates an obligation to release the DOT if the trustee has received full 

satisfaction of the DOT. Kuc continues to allege in his Amended Complaint that the 

EFTs he submitted to his lender “by definition of the law have satisfied and discharged 

each of the three loans in this case....” (Doc. 22 ¶ 10.) Even if that were true , see Kuc, 

2012 WL 1268126 at *3–4, Kuc further fails to allege that the lender notified Trustee 

Corps of the alleged “satisfaction,”or that he provided the trustee with “a sufficient 

 

1

 As one basis for its Motion to Dismiss, Trustee Corps also alleges claim preclusion on the grounds that Kuc has already brought suit against the beneficiary, Bank of America. See Kuc, 2012 WL 1268126. Trustee Corps has already argued that Kuc’s current suit is subject to dismissal on these grounds (Doc. 10 at 11–13.). In the First Order, this Court declined to accept such a basis for dismissal. (Doc. 19 at 5, n.1.) The 

Court explained although the previous opinion is binding on Trustee Corps as trustee, it is unclear on which of Kuc’s three loans, if any, the opinion would have preclusive effect. (Id.) Trustee Corps has not alleged additional facts to demonstrate with specificity the preclusive effect of the previous opinion. As such, the Court again cannot find that this suit is precluded by the previous order which dealt with only one loan. 

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release or satisfaction” that he had received from the lender. He simply states that Trustee 

Corps “should have known” because he personally informed Trustee Corps of the loans’ 

satisfaction. (Doc. 22 ¶¶ 16–17.) 

 In carrying out its contractual or statutory duties, “a trustee shall, when acting in 

good faith, have the absolute right to rely upon any written direction or information 

furnished to him by the beneficiary.” A.R.S. § 33-820(A) (emphasis added). Thus, as an 

agent of the beneficiary, Trustee Corps is only required by statute to do that which the 

beneficiary has directed. Kuc fails to allege in either his Original or Amended 

Complaints any facts suggesting that the lender directed Trustee Corps to release the 

loans. Thus, Trustee Corps had no statutory obligation to record or deliver any release of 

the DOT. Thus, even taking as true Kuc’s claim that his loan obligations were paid in 

full, Kuc fails to satisfy the pleading standard required under Rule 8(a)(2). See Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (explaining that a “naked assertion” or “unadorned...accusation” does not 

satisfy Rule 8’s requirement of a “short and plain statement of the claim”) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

 Without any underlying obligation, Plaintiff’s citation to A.R.S. § 33-712 also 

fails to state a claim. A.R.S. § 33-712 simply establishes liability for any person receiving 

satisfaction of a mortgage or DOT who fails to record a release or satisfaction of the 

mortgage or DOT. Because Kuc has alleged that it was the lender, and not the trustee, 

who received satisfaction of the security interest on Kuc’s Property, he has failed to show 

that Trustee Corps was obligated to record a release. Without allegations beyond mere 

repayment of his debt, Kuc has failed to state a claim that Trustee Corps breached its 

obligation under Title 33 Chapters 6 and 6.1. 

 2. Kuc’s DOT Claims 

 In an attempt to allege a contractual duty on the part of Trustee Corps, Plaintiff 

cites to three specific provisions in the DOT which he claims Trustee Corps has breached 

(Doc. 22 at 3–4.), none of which demonstrate a legally cognizable obligation to release 

the DOT on the part of the trustee. 

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 Clause 24 of the DOT only ensures that any successor trustee appointed by the 

Beneficiary will have the same rights and obligations as the trustee named at the time of 

execution of the deed of trust. (Doc. 10-2 at 9.) This clause creates no additional, 

actionable obligations for the named trustee or any successors. Clause 25 of the DOT is a 

standard “time is of the essence clause.” (Id.) This simply reinforces any preexisting 

contractual dates and times. In order for this to be of any relevance, the DOT must also 

state some underlying duty or obligation that must be completed within a certain length 

of time. This Plaintiff has failed to do. 

 Clause 23 instructs that “upon payment of all sums secured by this Security 

Instrument, Lender shall release this Security Instrument.” (Doc. 10-2 at 9.) (Emphasis 

added.) Thus, under Clause 23 of the DOT it is the lender, not the trustee, who is 

obligated to release the security interest on Kuc’s property upon full payment of the debt. 

(Doc. 10-2 at 9.) Moreover, Kuc has previously alleged that he tendered full repayment to 

his Lender, not to Trustee Corps. (Doc 1-1 at 3–4.) Thus, Kuc has not stated a claim 

against Trustee Corps for a breach of any obligation under the DOT. 

 3. Tortious Interference Claim 

Kuc’s final count against Trustee Corps is a claim for “torttious [sic] interference” 

with his “relationship and constitutional rights to his property.” (Doc. 22 at 5.) Plaintiff 

fails to state how this is different than a cause of action for quiet title which must for 

reasons stated above, be brought against the lender. To the extent that the Plaintiff 

intends to state a claim for intentional interference with a contractual relationship, he has 

failed to do so. The elements of intentional interference are: “(1) existence of a valid 

contractual relationship, (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the interferor, 

(3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach, (4) resultant damage to the party 

whose relationship has been disrupted, and (5) that the defendant acted improperly.” 

Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 

Pension Trust Fund, 201 Ariz. 474, 493, 38 P.3d 12, 31 (2002). In support of his claim, 

Kuc alleges only that Trustee Corps knew about the EFTs payment to his lender but 

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refused to transfer the subject property to him. 

 Trustee Corps does not dispute the existence of or its knowledge of the contractual 

relationship between Kuc and his lender created by the DOT. Rather, Trustee Corps 

argues that no sufficient facts are alleged as a matter of law to suggest that it engaged in 

any activity tending to induce or cause a breach. (Doc. 23 at 12.) Even taking as true 

Kuc’s allegation that his EFTs constituted full payment of his loan obligations to the 

lender, Trustee Corps’ failure to release the DOT or “transfer property” to Kuc is in 

accordance with its own obligations under the DOT. As noted above, it is the lender, not 

the trustee, who is obligated to release the security interest on Kuc’s property upon full 

payment of the debt. (Doc. 10-2 at 9.) Absent an allegation that the lender directed 

Trustee Corps to act, Kuc has not alleged any other facts tending to show that Trustee 

Corps engaged in any action that induced a breach of the DOT by either party. Because 

Kuc has failed state facts sufficient to establish this third element, he has also failed to 

state claim for intentional interference and the claim must be dismissed. Having 

previously provided Plaintiff the Supreme Court's latest pronouncements in Twombly 

and Iqbal on the factual requirements for a complaint to state claims for relief (Doc. 19 at 

6.), Plaintiff will not be given an additional opportunity to amend her Complaint. To do 

so would be unfair to Defendant. 

II. Motion to Strike 

 Trustee Corps first moves to strike Kuc’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(f) and LRCiv 7.2(m)(1). Trustee Corps alleges only that Kuc had no 

authorization to file his Amended Complaint against them. In the First Order, however, 

this Court expressly granted Kuc leave to amend his Original Complaint. (Doc. 19 at 6.) 

Although he was given 30 days to file this Amended Complaint, Kuc filed a Motion for 

Extension of Time to File which this Court granted on November 29, 2012. (Docs 20, 

21.) Kuc had authorization to file the Amended Complaint against Trustee Corps and 

Trustee Corps’ Motion to Strike is denied as moot. 

 / / / 

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CONCLUSION

 Kuc has not alleged that Trustee Corps breached its obligations under either the 

DOT or Arizona’s statutory scheme. Thus, Trustee Corps is not a proper party to this 

action and A.R.S. § 33-807(e) requires that the action against Trustee Corps be 

dismissed. Pursuant to the mandate of the statute, Trustee Corps is awarded whatever 

costs and reasonable attorney fees it has incurred in defending this action. These costs 

and fees will be awarded upon Trustee Corps’ filing of a motion and supporting 

memorandum in compliance with LRCiv. 54.2. 

 Because Trustee Corps is not a proper party to this action, Trustee Corps’ Motion 

to Dismiss is granted. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss of MTC Financial 

Inc., dba Trustee Corp. (Doc. 23) is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE and the 

Alternative Motion to Strike Amended Complaint (Doc. 23) is denied as moot. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 Dated this 10th day of April, 2013. 

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