Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01759/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01759-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANKIE MENDEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIAZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:19-cv-01759-NONE-BAM (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE 

TO OBEY A COURT ORDER, AND 

FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

(ECF No. 14)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

I. Background

Plaintiff Frankie Mendez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United 

States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

On March 11, 2020, the Court issued a screening order granting Plaintiff leave to file an 

amended complaint within thirty (30) days. (ECF No. 14.) The Court expressly warned Plaintiff 

that the failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s order would result in 

a recommendation for dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order, 

failure to prosecute, and for failure to state a claim. (Id. at 11.) The deadline has expired, and 

Plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise communicate with the Court.

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II. Failure to State a Claim

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 

or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 

true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted 

unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at Folsom State Prison. The events at issue in the complaint 

took place at Avenal State Prison. Plaintiff names the following Defendants: (1) Secretary of the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Ralph Diaz; (2) Director of 

Adult Institutions CDCR Kathleen Allison; and (3) Warden of Avenal State Prison Rosemary 

Ndoh.

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Plaintiff alleges that, on December 12, 2017, Defendant Allison authored a departmental 

memorandum which announced the expansion of the merging of the Sensitive Needs Yards 

(“SNY”) prisoners with the General Population (“GP”) prisoners in all level 1 and level 2 yards.

On July 19, 2018, the Inmate Representatives at Avenal State Prison submitted a group 

statement to Defendant Ndoh voicing their concerns and disagreement with the proposed merger.

On September 10, 2018, Defendant Diaz authored a departmental memorandum which 

sets forth the schedule for the yard mergers. The memo stated that Avenal State Prison was 

scheduled to be merged in January 2019.

Plaintiff alleges that both the Courts and CDCR officials understand and are aware that 

SNY prisoners cannot safely merge with GP prisoners. Plaintiff alleges that, each and every time 

these mergers have taken place, intentionally or unintentionally, there have been welldocumented incidents of violence where either the SNY prisoners attacked and assaulted the GP 

prisoners out of fear for their lives or the SNY prisoners were attacked and assaulted by GP 

prisoners. Plaintiff asserts that the planned merger would place Plaintiff at serious risk of harm or 

injury and in violation of his right to be protected from violence. Plaintiff further asserts that the 

Defendants are well aware of, and are completely disregarding, such an excessive risk to 

Plaintiff’s health and safety. Finally, Plaintiff states that he is suing each of the Defendants in 

both their individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment stating that the Defendants’ actions constitute 

deliberate indifference to his health and safety and, thus, violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

rights. Plaintiff also seeks a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a 

permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants, their successors in office, employees, and all other 

persons acting in concert and participation with them, from merging the SNY and GP prisoners at 

Avenal State Prison together in what they refer to as Non-Designated Programming Facilities 

(“NDPF”).

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C. Discussion

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 

are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969.

In this case, while Plaintiff’s complaint is short, it is not a plain statement of his claims. 

Many of Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and generalized statements unsupported by any 

facts. Further, many of Plaintiff’s allegations are ascribed to “Defendants.” Since Plaintiff fails 

to identify which specific Defendant or Defendants he is referring to when he states 

“Defendants,” Plaintiff’s complaint fails to give fair notice of all of the allegations and claims 

directed against each separately named Defendant. Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 

1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“Plaintiff must allege the basis of his claim against each defendant to 

satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)[.]” (emphasis added)); see also Van Dyke Ford, 

Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D. Wis. 1975) (“Specific identification of the 

parties to the activities alleged by the plaintiffs is required . . . to enable the defendant to plead 

intelligently.”).

Therefore, as currently pled, Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain enough factual content 

to permit the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants Diaz, Allison, and Ndoh are 

liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint does 

not comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an 

amended complaint.

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2. Official Capacity

Plaintiff asserts that he is suing Defendants Diaz, Allison, and Ndoh in both their official 

and individual capacities.

“Suits against state officials in their official capacity . . . should be treated as suits against 

the State.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 

1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (treating prisoner’s suit against state officials in their official capacities as a 

suit against the state of California). An official-capacity suit “represent[s] only another way of 

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citation omitted). Such a suit “is not a suit against the official personally, 

for the real party in interest is the entity.” Id. at 166.

A claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in his or her official 

capacity is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment provided the official has authority to 

implement the requested relief. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 92 (1989). 

Moreover, “[a] plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against the State is not required to allege a 

named official’s personal involvement in the acts of omissions constituting the alleged 

constitutional violation.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th 

Cir. 2013); see Rouser v. White, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (proper defendant 

for injunctive relief in suit seeking implementation of CDCR policy is the CDCR Secretary in his 

official capacity). Instead, Plaintiff need only identify the law or policy challenged as a 

constitutional violation and name the official or officials within the entity who is or are alleged to 

have a “fairly direct” connection with the enforcement of that policy, see Ex Parte Young, 209 

U.S. 123, 157 (1908), and can appropriately respond to injunctive relief. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 

1127 (citation omitted); see also Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 576 (9th Cir. 2012).

Here, Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a 

permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants Diaz, Allison, and Ndoh, their successors in office, 

employees, and all other persons acting in concert and participation with them, from merging the 

levels 1 and 2 SNY and GP prisoners at Avenal State Prison together into NDPF yards. However, 

while attachments to the complaint make it clear that Plaintiff was housed at Avenal State Prison 

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in January 2019, Plaintiff was housed at Folsom State Prison when Plaintiff filed his complaint on 

December 10, 2019. (ECF No. 1, at 1, 18, 22, 23.)

“In general a case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the 

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 

(1982) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The law provides that claims for 

prospective injunctive relief “relating to [a prison’s] policies are moot” when the prisoner has 

been transferred from the prison and “he has demonstrated no reasonable expectation of returning 

to [the prison].” Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); see also

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). In this case, while Plaintiff is 

seeking injunctive relief relating to the application of the NDPF policy to Avenal State Prison’s 

levels 1 and 2 yards, Plaintiff has been transferred from Avenal State Prison and Plaintiff has 

failed to allege facts demonstrating that he has a reasonable expectation of returning to Avenal 

State Prison. Therefore, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief are 

moot.

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for prospective declaratory relief against 

state officers, sued in their official capacities, to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal 

law. See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, when a prisoner seeks injunctive relief concerning conditions at a prison, the prisoner’s 

claims for prospective injunctive relief are moot when the prisoner is “no longer subject to the 

prison conditions or policies he challenges.” Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 

2012). As noted above, while Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief relating to the application of 

the NDPF policy to Avenal State Prison’s levels 1 and 2 yards, Plaintiff has been transferred from 

Avenal State Prison and Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that he has a reasonable 

expectation of returning to Avenal State Prison. Therefore, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for 

prospective declaratory relief are also moot.

Consequently, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled a cognizable official capacity claim 

against Defendants Diaz, Allison, and/or Ndoh.

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3. Supervisory Liability

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Diaz, Allison, and Ndoh liable based 

solely upon their supervisory roles, Plaintiff may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on 

supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of 

respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 

1020–21 (9th Cir.2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. 

Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any 

personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 

repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 

Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations 

marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Diaz, Allison, and Ndoh, who are 

supervisory officials, are liable in their individual capacities for violating his Eighth Amendment 

rights by implementing a policy that merges SNY prisoners with GP prisoners in all level 1 and 

level 2 yards, including at Avenal State Prison, where Plaintiff was housed when the complaint 

was filed. However, first, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the policy to 

merge SNY and GP prisoners on all level 1 and level 2 yards into NDPFs is itself a repudiation of 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.

Second, Plaintiff has not alleged that the implemented NDPF policy resulted in a violation 

of his Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any factual allegations 

asserting that he was or has been housed on a NDPF yard at Avenal State Prison, or that he has 

otherwise been subjected to an actual, non-speculative risk of harm due to Defendants Diaz’s, 

Allison’s and/or Ndoh’s implementation of the NDPF yard policy. Therefore, Plaintiff has not 

sufficiently pled a cognizable claim of supervisory liability based on a constitutionally deficient 

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policy against Defendants Diaz, Allison, and/or Ndoh.

4. CDCR Implementation of the NDPF Policy

Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from 

violence at the hands of other prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). “[A] 

prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the 

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official’s act or omission 

must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 834 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “For a claim (like the one here) based on a

failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a 

substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. Second, the prison official must subjectively have a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind, “one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The official is not liable under the Eighth 

Amendment unless he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the 

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. Then, the official 

must fail to take reasonable measures to abate the substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 847. 

Mere negligent failure to protect an inmate from harm is not actionable under § 1983. Id. at 835.

a. Facial Challenge

A constitutional challenge to a policy is “‘facial’ [if] it is not limited to plaintiff[’s] 

particular case, but challenges application of the law more broadly. . . .” John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 

561 U.S. 186, 194 (2010) (facial challenges “reach beyond the particular circumstances of these 

plaintiffs.”) Facial challenges are disfavored. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican 

Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008). “A facial challenge to a [policy] is, of course, the most difficult 

challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances 

exists under which the [policy] would be valid. The fact that the [policy] might operate 

unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly 

invalid[.]” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).

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Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that implementation of the NDPF 

policy would always violate the Eighth Amendment, no matter which SNY or GP inmates or 

which Level 1 or 2 prison yards the policy was applied to. As Plaintiff has not included 

allegations that the policy would be unconstitutional as applied in all situations, Plaintiff has not 

pled a cognizable claim against Defendants Diaz, Allison, and Ndoh, in their individual 

capacities, that the NDPF policy is facially invalid under the Eighth Amendment.

b. As Applied Challenge

“‘[A] [policy] . . . may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to 

deprive an individual of a protected right although its general validity as a measure enacted in the

legitimate exercise of state power is beyond question.’” Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) 

(quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). Thus, to support an “as applied” 

challenge, Plaintiff must show that his individual circumstances make the general application of 

the NDPF policy unconstitutional. See Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 

2005).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the implementation of the NDPF policy at Avenal State Prison 

would place Plaintiff at serious risk of harm or injury, in violation of his right to be protected 

from violence and that Defendants Diaz, Allison, and Ndoh are well aware of, and are completely 

disregarding, such an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. (ECF No. 1, at 3.) However, 

first, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support his conclusory allegation that implementation 

of the NDPF policy would place Plaintiff at serious risk of harm or injury. In fact, Plaintiff does 

not allege that he was ever housed on an NDPF yard at Avenal State Prison before he was 

transferred to Folsom State Prison. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that he had any known 

enemies, or that he was threatened with an assault by any person or group, that would have been, 

or were housed, at the Avenal State Prison NDPF yard that Plaintiff was, or would have been, 

housed at. Therefore, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that he has been incarcerated under 

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm because “speculative and generalized fears of 

harm at the hands of other prisoners do not rise to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm to 

his future health.” Williams v. Wood, 223 F. App’x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Second, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants Diaz, Allison, and Ndoh are well aware of, 

and are completely disregarding, the excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety is also a 

conclusory statement unsupported by any facts. Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that he 

told Defendants Diaz, Allison, and/or Ndoh, or that each of the Defendants was aware, of a nonspeculative, specific risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety. Therefore, Plaintiff has not adequately 

pled that Defendants Diaz, Allison, and Ndoh knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of 

serious harm to Plaintiff’s health and/or safety. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 

1986) (“The [deliberate indifference] standard does not require that the guard or official believe 

to a moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack another at a given place at a time certain

before that officer is obligated to take steps to prevent such an assault. But, on the other hand, he 

must have more than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not pled a cognizable claim against Defendants Diaz, Allison, 

and Ndoh, in their individual capacities, that, as applied to Plaintiff, the NDPF policy is invalid 

under the Eighth Amendment.

III. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order

A. Legal Standard

Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with 

any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . 

within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their 

dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where 

appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 

court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, 

failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 

F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring 

amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(dismissal for failure to comply with court order).

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In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: 

(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 

cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 

F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988).

B. Discussion

Here, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overdue, and he has failed to comply with the 

Court’s orders. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his

case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a 

presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. 

Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against 

dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 

639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose 

responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes 

progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products 

Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 

dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 

Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s March 11, 2020 screening 

order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to file an amended complaint would result in a 

recommendation of dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order, 

failure to prosecute, and for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 14, p. 11.) Thus, Plaintiff had 

adequate warning that dismissal could result from his noncompliance. 

Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that 

would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further 

unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this 

action, making monetary sanctions of little use, and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is 

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likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

Accordingly, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY 

RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to obey a Court order, and for Plaintiff’s failure to 

prosecute this action.

These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 

(14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 

findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 23, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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