Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03948/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03948-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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Pursuant to the Civil Local Rules of this District, opposition was due no later than

March 14, 2008. See Civil L. R. 7-3(a) (providing opposition to motion must be filed no

later than 21 days before hearing date).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLORIA DELLAFOSSE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-07-3948 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS, FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, AND FOR A MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT; VACATING

HEARING

Before the Court is defendants’ “Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon

Which Relief Can Be Granted (FRCP 12(b)(6), and in the Alternative, Motion for Summary

Judgment (FRCP 56) or Motion for a More Definite Statement,” filed February 15, 2008. 

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition or other response.1 Having read and considered the

papers submitted in support of the motion, the Court finds the matter suitable for decision

thereon, VACATES the hearing scheduled for April 4, 2008, and rules as follows.

A. County of Contra Costa (“The County”)

Plaintiff’s claims arise from her allegation that her employer discriminated against

her on account of an alleged disability and failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. 

Defendants have shown the County of Contra Costa (“the County”) is entitled to summary

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judgment on plaintiff’s claims, because it is undisputed the County was not plaintiff’s

employer; rather, it is undisputed plaintiff was employed by a separate legal entity, the

Contra Costa County In-Home Support Services Public Authority (“the Public Authority”). 

(See Cottrell Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4; Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. A); see also Cal. Welf. & Inst.

Code § 12301.6 (providing where county establishes public authority to provide in-home

supportive services, employees of public authority “shall not be employees of the county for

any purpose”).

B. Public Authority and Cottrell

1. First Cause of Action

a. Defendants have shown the Public Authority and its Acting Director John

Cottrell (“Cottrell”) are entitled to dismissal of the First Cause of Action, alleging a claim for

“negligent supervision,” to the extent it is based on a state law tort claim, because plaintiff

does not allege she presented a claim to the Public Authority prior to filing the instant case. 

See Watson v. State of California, 21 Cal. App. 4th 836, 843 (1993) (“It is well settled that a

government claim must be filed with the public entity before a tort action is brought against

the public entity or public employee.”); Ortega v. O’Connor, 764 F. 2d 703, 707 (9th Cir.

1985)), rev’d on other grounds, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (holding plaintiff’s failure to comply

with claim presentation requirements of California Government Code is bar to maintaining

state law claims against governmental entity and its employees). Plaintiff will be afforded

leave to amend to allege, if she can, compliance with the claim presentation requirements.

b. Defendants have not shown the Public Authority and Cottrell are entitled to

dismissal of the First Cause of Action, to the extent it is based on a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause. Although defendants argue a claim based an allegation of uneven

treatment on account of a disability “must be brought under the ADA [Americans with

Disabilities Act]” as opposed to under the Equal Protection Clause, (see Defs.’ Mot. at 7:22-

24), defendants cite no authority for such proposition. Indeed, the ADA does not preclude

a plaintiff from seeking relief under any other federal law that “provides greater or equal

protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by [the ADA].” See

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Plaintiff’s last date of employment with the Public Authority was April 10, 2006. 

(See Cottrell Decl. ¶ 4.)

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42 U.S.C. § 12201(b).

c. Defendants have shown the Public Authority and Cottrell are entitled to a

more definite statement as to the First Cause of Action, to the extent it is based on a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause. As defendants correctly note, the First Cause of

Action is vague and fails to give them fair notice of the nature of plaintiff’s claim. First,

plaintiff’s allegation that defendants “failed to provide supervision,” (see Compl. ¶ 23), fails

to give any notice of the nature of the asserted unequal treatment. Second, if plaintiff’s

claim is premised on the theory that she was discriminated against because of animus on

account of her alleged disability, plaintiff cannot state a claim under the Equal Protection

Clause. See Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 478 F. 3d 985, 993-996 (9th Cir.

2007) (holding “class-of-one” theory of equal protection inapplicable to employment

decisions made by public employers); Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F. 3d 634 (7th Cir. 2005)

(defining “class-of-one” as plaintiff “who does not belong to any ‘suspect’ (that is, favored)

class”); Doe v. Chandler, 83 F. 3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996) (“For the purposes of equal

protection analysis, the disabled do not constitute a suspect class.”); Sharer v. Oregon, 481

F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1162-63 (D. Ore. 2007) (citing Engquist; holding plaintiff could not

proceed with equal protection claim against public employer where plaintiff alleged she was

terminated because of disability).

2. Second Cause of Action

Defendants have shown the Public Authority and Cottrell are entitled to summary

judgment on the Second Cause of Action, alleging a claim under the ADA, because it is

undisputed the Public Authority employed “less than 15 employees for each working day in

20 or more calendar weeks in each calendar year from 1999 up to and including April 10,

2006.”2

 (See Cottrell Decl. ¶ 7); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (providing ADA only applicable to

employers with “15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more

calendar weeks in the current or preceding year”).

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3. Third Cause of Action

Defendants have shown the Public Authority and Cottrell are entitled to dismissal of

the Third Cause of Action, alleging a claim under the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”), because plaintiff filed the instant action more than one year from the

date of her right-to-sue notices. (See Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. C); Cal. Gov’t

Code § 12965(b) (providing FEHA claim must be filed “within one year from the date of

[right-to-sue] notice”). Plaintiff will be afforded leave to amend to allege, if she can, a basis

for statutory or equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion is hereby GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part, as follows:

1. To the extent defendants seek summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims against the

County, the motion is GRANTED.

2. To the extent defendants seek dismissal of the First Cause of Action, as alleged

against the Public Authority and Cottrell:

a. the motion is GRANTED to the extent such claim is based on a state law

tort claim, and the First Cause of Action is, to such extent, DISMISSED; and

b. the motion is DENIED to the extent such claim is based on a denial of

equal protection.

3. To the extent defendants seek a more definite statement as to the equal

protection claim alleged in the First Cause of Action, against the Public Authority and

Cottrell, the motion is GRANTED, and the First Cause of Action is, to such extent,

DISMISSED.

4. To the extent defendants seek summary judgment on the Second Cause of

Action, as alleged against the Public Authority and Cottrell, the motion is GRANTED.

5. To the extent defendants seek dismissal of the Third Cause of Action, as alleged

against the Public Authority and Cottrell, the motion is GRANTED, and the Third Cause of

Action is DISMISSED.

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6. Plaintiff is afforded leave to amend the First Cause of Action and Third Cause of

Action to cure the deficiencies identified above. Any First Amended Complaint shall be

filed no later than April 13, 2008.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2008 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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