Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00635/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00635-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Betty J. Argabrite, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 04-635-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment pertaining to the

denial of disability benefits by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") in her case. Also

pending before the Court is Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the

same denial of disability benefits. 

United States Magistrate Judge Charles R. Pyle issued a Report and Recommendation ("R

& R") on February 13, 2006. In that R & R, Magistrate Judge Pyle recommended granting

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Defendant's Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment. The R & R indicated that any party could file written objections to the

R & R. Defendant filed its objections to the R & R on February 24, 2006. Plaintiff filed her

response to those objections on April 7, 2006. 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews de novo the objected-to portions of the R & R. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Court reviews for clear error the unobjected-to portions of the

R & R. Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Conley

v. Crabtree, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1204 (D. Or. 1998).

III. DISCUSSION OF DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS

A. Determination of Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC")

Defendant argues that the R & R mischaracterized the ALJ's statement that "Plaintiff's

residual functional capacity remains to be assessed." See Objections at 2. Defendant argues

that the R & R excerpted this statement to suggest that the ALJ believed there was not

enough evidence to make a RFC determination. See id. However, as Defendant correctly

argues, the excerpted statement by the ALJ was simply made in reference to proceeding to

the Fourth Step of the sequential analysis which required an assessment of Plaintiff's RFC

to perform her past relevant work. See id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (discussing the five-step

sequential evaluation process); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)(discussing step four pertaining to

the RFC to perform past work). Thus, this objection is granted.

Defendant also argues that the R & R mischaracterizes the ALJ's findings at Step Four that

Plaintiff could not perform her past work. See Objections at 2-3. The R & R states in

relevant part: 

The ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff is capable of performing medium level physical

activity is not supported by substantial evidence. The Social Security Administration

classifies work as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy depending on the

required physical exertion. 20 CFR § 404.1567. Medium level work is defined as

follows:

Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with

frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. If

someone can do medium work, we determine that he or she can also do

sedentary and light work.

***

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as bartender,

waitress, and grill cook. According to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, both work

as bartender and waitress are considered light work. It does not follow that if Plaintiff

cannot perform past light work, that she is capable of performing medium level work.

Accordingly, the ALJ's finding at step five that Plaintiff can perform medium level

work and is thus not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence.

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See R & R at 13-14. Defendant argues that contrary to the assertion in the R & R, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff could not perform her past work as a bartender, waitress, and grill cook

due to Plaintiff's inability to tolerate concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gases and

poor ventilation. Defendant argues that the ALJ's finding had nothing to do with exertional

level. See Objections at 2-3. To support this position, Defendant cites to the ALJ's opinion

at page 16 of the transcript. See id. However, a review of this portion of the opinion shows

that the ALJ did not specify that Plaintiff could not perform her past work as a bartender,

waitress, and grill cook only because these jobs would expose her to environmental irritants.

Rather, this portion of the opinion discusses not only environmental irritants, but Plaintiff's

physical and mental capabilities as well. See Transcript at 16. As such, Defendant's

objection is denied. On remand, the ALJ may address this issue in further detail to clarify

her position.

Defendant generally argues that the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff's RFC as it was

supported by the entire record evidence. See Objections at 3-4. Specifically, Defendant

objects to the R & R's conclusion that the ALJ erred by failing to obtain the opinion of a

vocational expert. See id. Defendant argues that the mere existence of a non-exertional

impairment does not require a vocational expert; rather, Defendant argues that a "vocational

expert is only needed when the ALJ determines that a claimant's non-exertional impairments

significantly limit the range of work permitted by exertional limitations." See id. Defendant

argues that the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff's mental impairments (depression and

anxiety disorder) and inability to tolerate environmental irritants did not significantly limit

Plaintiff's range of work as the limitations were only mild to moderate obstacles. However,

as the R & R correctly emphasized, and Defendant does not dispute, if the "grids accurately

and completely describe a claimant's impairments, an ALJ may apply the grids instead of

taking testimony from a vocational expert . . . If they do not, then the ALJ must also hear

testimony from a vocational expert . . . The grids are based only on strength factors . . . Thus

they are sufficient only when a claimant suffers only from exertional limitations . . . The

functional limitations caused by anxiety, depression, concentration, and memory impairments

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are nonexertional limitations." Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th

Cir.2001)(holding that the ALJ committed clear legal error by relying on the grids and not

obtaining testimony from a vocational expert where plaintiff suffered from nonexertional

limitations such as depression and anxiety); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 729

(9th Cir.1998)(same). Thus, in light of this authority, the R & R correctly reasoned that a

vocational expert was required and failure to obtain one was legal error; the R & R stated in

relevant part: 

If the grids do not completely and accurately describe a claimants impairments

then the ALJ must hear testimony from a vocational expert. Id. In this case, Plaintiff

was diagnosed with depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. The ALJ

concluded that "claimant's capacity for a wide range of medium work is substantially

intact and has not been significantly compromised by her nonexertional limitations."

(TR. 18). The ALJ made this conclusion despite the opinion of Dr. Cooke, who

indicated that Plaintiff's "ability to perform in an emotionally stable manner would be

poor" and that her ability to handle the stress and pressures of day-to-day work would

also be poor. (TR. 160). In determining that Plaintiff's mental health did not pose a

substantial limitation to Plaintiff's ability to work, the ALJ may have relied on the

consultative reports of Dr. Ross and Dr. Brake. Both doctors assessed Plaintiff as

having depression and anxiety disorders but found that they posed at most only mild

to moderate limitations. 

Even if the ALJ did not find Plaintiff's mental health diagnosis sufficient to

warrant the testimony of a vocational expert, her own determination that Plaintiff

should avoid jobs with concentrated exposure to fumes, odor, dusts, gases, and poor

ventilation (Id.) indicates that Plaintiff did suffer from nonexertional limitations

affecting the types of jobs available. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir.1984). In

her decision, the ALJ states that "the nonexertional aspects of the claimant's condition

preclude strict application of the Medical-Vocational Rules." (TR. 17). The ALJ then

indicates that she still finds the grids to be useful in assessing the Plaintiff's disability.

(Id.) Since the grids only address problems with strength, they could not have

completely and accurately described the Plaintiff's impairments and the ALJ should

have taken testimony from a vocational expert. 

See R & R at 14-15. As the R & R appropriately found that a vocational expert should have

been used to present testimony under the circumstances at issue, Defendant's objection is

denied. On remand, the ALJ should further consider the testimony of the vocational expert

in determining whether or not Plaintiff is disabled.

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B. Opinion of Plaintiff's Treating Physician

Defendant argues that the R & R incorrectly indicated that a treating physician's

opinion can only be discredited by clear and convincing evidence. See Objections at 5.

However, where the treating physician's position is controverted in the record by another

expert, an ALJ may reject the treating physician's opinion by providing specific and

legitimate reasons. See id.; Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). As Dr.

Carnett's opinion was controverted by Dr. Ratliff's opinion, the ALJ is permitted to reject Dr.

Carnett's opinion based on specific and legitimate reasons on remand. See id. Therefore,

Defendant's objection is granted.

Defendant also generally argues that just because two of Plaintiff's treating physician's

(Dr. Carnett and Dr. Rotkis) diagnosed Plaintiff with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease

("COPD"), that is not conclusive of disability and disability is a legal conclusion appropriate

for the ALJ. See Objections at 5. Nonetheless, the ALJ's conclusion is not entitled to

unfettered deference and the R & R pointed out why the ALJ's stated reasons for rejecting

Dr. Carnett's opinion were insufficient. The R & R correctly reasoned in relevant part:

The ALJ reasoned that Dr. Carnett's assessment was vague and conclusory as

well as inconsistent with his own notes and the findings of other doctors. (TR.

17). Courts have found this to be a sufficient reason for rejecting a treating

physician's opinion, however, substantial evidence must exist to support such

a conclusion. Holohan 246 F.3d at 1205. The ALJ noted that Dr. Carnett's

notes indicated improvement in Plaintiff's breathing and that this was

inconsistent with his determination that Plaintiff was disabled. However, Dr.

Carnett's notes from that visit still indicate that Plaintiff's breathing required

continued monitoring. (TR. 230). Those notes also indicate that Dr. Carnett

assessed Plaintiff with COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease). Notes

from each of the Plaintiff's visits with Dr. Carnett indicate that the doctor was

monitoring her breathing and believed her problems to be consistent with

COPD. 

Dr. Carnett further referred Plaintiff to Dr. Rotkis, a pulmonary

specialist, for evaluation of the condition. (TR. 239-240). This treating

physician also indicated that Plaintiff suffered from at least moderate

obstructive lung disease. Id. While the ALJ did not have the report from the

pulmonary specialist to review at the time of the hearing, the report was

incorporated in the record by the Appeals Council. Because these records

were incorporated by the Appeals Council, they may be considered by the

reviewing court. Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir.1993). Thus, Dr.

Carnett's evaluation was consistent with the findings of another doctor, that of

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For example, the record reflects that Plaintiff was diagnosed with depression, but continued

to drink, and that Plaintiff had breathing problems, but continued to smoke; both of these continuing

activities contribute to and obviously do not help Plaintiff's conditions. Indeed, Plaintiff's treating

physicians directed her to cease with these activities in light of her conditions and medical treatment,

but she nevertheless continued to smoke and drink. See Transcript at 59, 161, 230, 231, 237, 239,

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Dr. Rotkis. As treating physicians, both Dr. Carnett's and Dr. Rotkis's,

opinions are entitled to great weight. 

See R & R at 15-16. Defendant's objection is denied. While the ALJ may not reject Dr.

Carnett's opinion based solely on the reasons discussed above, the opinion may still be

rejected based on additional reasons; for example, additional testimony on remand may

further bolster the evidence from Dr. Ratliff, Dr. Ross and Dr. Brake indicating that Plaintiff

is not disabled. See Transcript at 161, 168, 185. 

C. Lay Witness Testimony

Defendant argues that the R & R suggests that the case should be remanded for

payment based in part on the ALJ's decision not to discuss the lay witness testimony of

Plaintiff's cousin in the form of two letters. See Objections at 5-6. Defendant argues that this

decision was harmless and does not warrant a remand for payment. The Court need not

address this issue as the Court is already remanding the case for further proceedings to

consider the testimony of a vocational expert, as opposed to a remand for payment; on

remand, the ALJ should consider and discuss the letters of Plaintiff's cousin in assessing

Plaintiff's alleged disability. See R & R at 16-17.

D. Credibility of Plaintiff's Testimony

Defendant argues that the R & R inappropriately found the ALJ's credibility finding

deficient because the ALJ did not discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints solely because

they were inconsistent with medical evidence or based on her daily activities. See Objections

at 6-7. Rather, Defendant argues that the ALJ gave specific, additional reasons that are valid

grounds for discrediting Plaintiff's testimony and credibility determinations are the province

of the ALJ. While the ALJ was aware of some other issues that could impact Plaintiff's

credibility,1

 it appears that the ALJ actually discounted Plaintiff's credibility based on

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240; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir.1996) ("unexplained or inadequately explained

failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment" may be considered by the

ALJ in assessing credibility). Further, the record also reflects that while Plaintiff claimed she could

not afford medications to treat her conditions for many years, she apparently lived at home with her

parents since 1994, received some minimal income for caring for her parents or acting as a nanny,

and continued to smoke at least one pack a day during this time. See Transcript at 15, 43, 44, 47,

159, 161, 239. Lastly, the Court notes that at the hearing before the ALJ in March of 2004, Plaintiff

testified: "I was smoking about a pack-and-a-half a day . . . But I've cut that way down. I have not

completely quit, I won't lie to you, but I have cut it down quite a bit. I maybe smoke six or eight

during the day sometimes, and that's not near what it was." See Transcript at 59. In June of 2004,

however, Dr. Rotkis reported: "Despite the history of lung problems she began smoking at age 28

and has smoked one to two packs per day all her life. In the last six months, as she has been having

problems, she has been cutting down on her tobacco intake but still smoking almost a pack a day."

See id. at 239. On remand, the ALJ may consider these issues along with any other appropriate facts

in assessing Plaintiff's credibility.

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inconsistencies with the medical evidence and based on her daily activities. See Transcript

at 15-16. Defendant does not dispute that the ALJ improperly relied on these facts in

discrediting Plaintiff; rather, the R & R correctly analyzed this issue in detail and properly

found that the ALJ should not have relied on those factors to discredit Plaintiff. See R & R

at 17-21. As such, Defendant's objection is denied. On remand, there may be other valid

grounds tending to undermine Plaintiff's credibility.

E. Remand for Benefits or Further Administrative Proceedings

Defendant argues that contrary to the suggestion in the R & R, remand for the award

of benefits is not appropriate in this case. The Court agrees. A district court has discretion

to remand for further proceedings or to award benefits. See McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d

599, 603 (9th Cir.1989). A reviewing court should credit improperly rejected evidence and

remand the matter for an award of benefits only when: "(1) the ALJ has failed to provide

legally sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that

must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the

record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence

credited." Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000)(quoting Smolen v. Chater,

80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir.1996)). Generally, a remand for an "award of benefits [is

appropriate only] in cases where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative

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proceedings." Id. at 1399 (citation and internal quotes omitted). It is "the unusual case in

which it is clear from the record the claimant is unable to perform gainful employment in the

national economy" justifying an immediate award of benefits. Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d

587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004). This is not one of those unusual cases. For example, a review of

record shows that Dr. Carnett's conclusion as to Plaintiff's disability stems from a boilerplate

form where he checked off a couple of boxes and essentially offered no explanation for his

conclusions as to Plaintiff's functional limitations. See Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d at

1202 (more weight is given to opinions that are explained as opposed to those that are not

explained). Further, there is other evidence in the record which does not support or

contradicts these conclusions as to Plaintiff's functional limitations. See Andrews v. Shalala,

53 F.3d at 1041 (giving more weight to a treating physician's opinion does not mean that no

weight is given to other opinions where a treating physician's opinion is contradicted). As

already discussed above, remand in this case for further proceedings is necessary to obtain

additional evidence and resolve additional issues pertaining to Plaintiff's alleged disability.

F. Remaining Issues

As to the remaining issues that were not objected to by the parties, the Court has

reviewed the entire record and concludes that Magistrate Judge Pyle’s recommendations are

not clearly erroneous. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Johnson v. Zema

Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); Conley v. Crabtree, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1203,

1204 (D. Or. 1998). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

(1) United States Magistrate Judge Pyle's R & R (Doc. #22) is accepted and adopted in

part and rejected in part.

(2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #14) is granted in part and denied in

part.

(3) Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #16) is denied. 

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(4) This case is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings

in accordance with this Order and the adopted portions of the R & R. 

(5) Any other pending motions in this case are denied as moot. The Clerk of the Court

shall enter judgment accordingly and close the file in this matter. 

DATED this 27th day of June, 2006.

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