Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-03668/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-03668-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID WESLEY HAWKINS,

Petitioner, No. C 03-3668 PJH

v.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER

OR AMEND JUDGMENT

JOHN CAVALLI, Chief, Santa Clara

County Probation Department

Respondent.

_______________________________/

Before the court is petitioner David Wesley Hawkins’ (“Hawkins”) motion to alter

and/or amend the judgment. On September 22, 2006, this court denied Hawkins’ petition

for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in a fifty-five page order that detailed the complex

procedural history of the case before this court and the numerous additional evidentiary

submissions filed by Hawkins. On October 6, 2006, Hawkins filed the instant motion. The

state filed an opposition, and Hawkins a reply. For the reasons set forth below, the court

DENIES the motion.

DISCUSSION

A district court may reconsider a ruling under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59(e) or 60(b). See Sch. Dist. Number. 1J. Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d

1255, 1262 (9th Cir.1993). “Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court: (1) is

presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision

was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Id. at

1263. 

The court will not repeat the lengthy iteration of the factual and procedural

Case 4:03-cv-03668-PJH Document 112 Filed 12/15/06 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Hawkins refers to the exhibits at issue in this motion as the “seven exhibits.”

Depending on whether one considers one of the exhibits, the 3Com Buyers Guide, which was

attached to one of the declarations as an exhibit itself, as a separate exhibit, there are either

seven or eight exhibits. Regardless of whether they are considered either “seven” or “eight”

exhibits, they should not be confused with another set of eight (coincidental) exhibits that were

detailed in this court’s September 22, 2006 Order at 40 n.16.

2

It should be noted that Hawkins did contend that one additional exhibit, submitted with

this group of exhibits - the Mitnick declaration - should have been introduced by trial counsel;

thus, the court addressed whether counsel was deficient for failing to introduce the Mitnick

declaration in conjunction with its discussion of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

2

background of this case, set forth in its September 22, 2006 order, but will address only

those facts pertinent to the instant motion.

Claim six of Hawkins’ petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, and was

actually comprised of five sub-claims, including: (1) his counsel’s failure to challenge the

access date evidence with expert testimony; (2) his counsel’s failure to challenge Foss’

testimony with other testimony; (3) his counsel’s failure to present expert testimony that

NTI had copied part of the PIX source code; (4) his counsel’s failure to request a jury

instruction on the destruction of evidence; and (5) the cumulative effect of the alleged

errors.

At pages 29-39 of this court’s September 22, 2006 order, the court detailed and

discussed eight exhibits, not presented to the state court by Hawkins, that it allowed into

the record on March 11, 2005 pursuant to Habeas Rule 7 and § 2254(e)(2). See March 11,

2005 Order (citing Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2005)

(requirements for evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2) apply to request to expand

record)).1

 Those exhibits included the: (1) Hewitt Decl. (Exh. A); (2) Kryss Decl. (Exh. B);

(3) Cuaresma Decl. (Exh. C); (4 & 5) Petersen Decl. and 3Com Buyer’s Guide (Exh. D); (6)

Singh Decl. (Exh. E); (7) Bartas Decl. (Exh. G); and (8) Pozar Decl. (Exh. H).

In the September 22, 2006 order, in accordance with Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984), the court reviewed and considered the above eight exhibits in connection

with Hawkins’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As the court noted, though, Hawkins

did not argue that counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce those particular exhibits. 

See September 22, 2006 Order at 38.2

 

Case 4:03-cv-03668-PJH Document 112 Filed 12/15/06 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

See September 22, 2006 Order at 41-47.

3

The evidence that Hawkins is claiming “might have been presented” with respect to his

ineffective assistance of counsel sub-claims includes Daniel Farmer’s declaration (Exh. 9,

Petition); Kevin Mitnick’s declaration (Traverse, Exh. F); Nicholas Sayer’s declaration (Exh. 10,

Petition); G. Paul Ziemba’s declaration (Exh. 11, Petition); Veronica Hawkins’ declaration (Exh.

12, Petition); Marshall McKusick’s declaration (Exh. 6, Petition); Thomas Brennan’s declaration

(Exh. 7, Petition); Jonathan Seder’s declaration (Exh. 8, Petition); Plan 9 Licensing Agreement

(Exh. 10, Petition). Additionally, regarding Hawkin’s Brady claim, the evidence that Hawkins

asserts should have been disclosed is not that in the seven declarations discussed above, but

that from the Foss, Mayes, Wu, and Boggess depositions conducted in conjunction with his

federal habeas petition.

3

Turning to the issue of prejudice, the court then concluded that Ninth Circuit law

precluded the court from considering the new evidence, not presented to the state court, on

the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.

The court stated:

[C]learly established federal law provides that prejudice is to be assessed by

comparing “the evidence that actually was presented to the jury with the

evidence that might have been presented had counsel acted differently” or

with the evidence that was wrongfully suppressed. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 834

(9th Cir. 1995)) (regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims); see also

Ross, 372 F.3d at 1108 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112) (with respect to Brady

claims, materiality of suppressed evidence should be considered in light of

the other evidence admitted at trial); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (Brady standard

for materiality is the same as the standard for determining prejudice with

ineffective assistance of counsel claims). As noted above, the seven

declarations are not the evidence that Hawkins is claiming “might have been

presented had [trial] counsel acted differently” in this case. That evidence is

discussed below with the four sub-claims to Hawkins’ ineffective assistance

claim.3

 Moreover, since none of the above evidence was actually presented

at trial, it cannot and does not assist this court in determining whether

prejudice ensued from counsel’s failure to present the other evidence, see

infra n. 16, or from the prosecution’s alleged suppression of other evidence. 

See also infra n. 16.

September 22, 2006 Order at 40.

Additionally, the court noted that it was likely that Hawkins’ petition could be

considered unexhausted if the court were to assess prejudice in light of the evidence not

previously before the state courts. See id. at 40 (citing See Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063,

1067 (9th Cir. 2003)), and that although the issue was raised by the state, Hawkins failed to

address it at all in his briefs. The court then went on to consider one of the exhibits that

had been submitted with the group of exhibits at issue in this motion, the Mitnick

Case 4:03-cv-03668-PJH Document 112 Filed 12/15/06 Page 3 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Declaration, along with another eight additional exhibits submitted by Hawkins (not to be

confused with the eight at issue in the instant motion to amend) in evaluating trial counsel’s

allegedly deficient performance. 

In the instant motion, Hawkins argues that this court’s September 22, 2006 order is

inconsistent with its March 11, 2005 order and that he is entitled to relief under Rule 59(e)

and/or 60(b) on this basis. He makes essentially three arguments: (1) that this court

“implicitly” ruled in its March 11, 2005 order expanding the record that expansion would not

render the petition unexhausted; (2) that this court “revisited” the expansion issue in its

September 22, 2006 order; and (3) that the court failed to consider the eight exhibits at

issue in the March 11, 2005 order on the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim.

All three arguments fail. First, there was no ruling on the exhaustion issue in the

March 11, 2005 order, and the suggestion that one was “implicit” is without merit. 

Nevertheless, the court notes that the exhaustion considerations were secondary and

supplemental to its primary ruling in the September 22, 2006 order that the Ninth Circuit

does not permit consideration of evidence not submitted to the state courts in assessing

prejudice in conjunction with a habeas petition. See Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926,

940 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)) (regarding

ineffective assistance of counsel claims); see also Ross, 372 F.3d at 1108 (citing Agurs,

427 U.S. at 112) (with respect to Brady claims, materiality of suppressed evidence should

be considered in light of the other evidence admitted at trial); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (Brady

standard for materiality is the same as the standard). Hawkins has not submitted any

authority to the contrary, and to the extent that he disagrees with this court’s interpretation

of Ninth Circuit law, that is an issue for appeal.

Second, this court did not “revisit” its March 11, 2005 ruling in denying Hawkins’

habeas petition in its September 22, 2006 order. That argument absolutely flies in the face

of the extensive consideration and discussion allotted to the eight exhibits allowed into the

record, and clearly considered by the court in the September 22, 2006 order. See

Case 4:03-cv-03668-PJH Document 112 Filed 12/15/06 Page 4 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

September 22, 2006 Order at 30 (noting that “[t]he court has also reviewed and considered,

to the extent that they are relevant, the eight exhibits attached to Hawkins’ traverse that

this court permitted to be filed on March 11, 2005"), and 34-38 (discussing each of the

subject exhibits separately).

Finally, Hawkins’ instant motion fails because the court did consider the eight

exhibits on the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel sub-claims to the extent they

were relevant. It was Hawkins’ burden to demonstrate why or how his counsel’s

performance was deficient with respect to this group of exhibits; however, as noted, with

the exception of the Mitnick Declaration, which this court addressed in its discussion of

Hawkins’ sub-claims, Hawkins simply did not argue that counsel’s performance was

deficient for failure to introduce the subject exhibits or the information contained in the

exhibits. Again, to the extent that Hawkins disagrees with this court’s interpretation of

Ninth Circuit law regarding the issue of prejudice as pertains to expanded records in

habeas cases, that is an issue for appeal.

For the above reasons, Hawkins’ motion to amend and/or alter the judgment is

DENIED. This order fully adjudicates the motion listed at No. 105 of the clerk’s docket for

this case and terminates all other pending motions. The clerk shall close the file.

Dated: December 15, 2006

IT IS SO ORDERED.

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:03-cv-03668-PJH Document 112 Filed 12/15/06 Page 5 of 5