Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00405/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00405-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAUNE PATTERSON,

Plaintiff, No. C 04-0405 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING

APPLE COMPUTER, INC., et al., MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and motion for sanctions came on for

hearing before this court on July 20, 2005. Plaintiff appeared by her counsel Rachel Orejana,

and defendants appeared by their counsel Lynne Hermle. Having read the parties’ papers

and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause

appearing, the court hereby GRANTS the motions as follows.

INTRODUCTION

This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff Shaune Patterson is an AfricanAmerican lesbian who was formerly employed by defendant Apple Computer, Inc. (“Apple”). 

Also named as defendants are Apple employees Dan Walker (“Walker”), Sheri Parker

(“Parker”), and Steve Burmeister (“Burmeister”). 

Plaintiff asserts 14 causes of action in the fifth amended complaint (“5thAC”) – racial

discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, against Apple; racial discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), against Apple; racial

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discrimination, in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California

Government Code § 12900, et seq., against Apple; violation of the California Equal Pay Act,

California Labor Code § 1197.5, against Apple; harassment, in violation of FEHA, against

Apple, Walker, and Parker; retaliation, in violation of FEHA, against Apple, Walker, Parker,

and Burmeister; failure to take reasonable steps to prevent discrimination from occurring, in

violation of FEHA, against Apple; failure to maintain environment free from harassment, in

violation of FEHA, against Apple; defamation (slander), against Apple, Walker, and Parker;

defamation (libel), against Apple, Walker, and Parker; invasion of privacy, against Apple,

Walker, and Parker; wrongful termination in violation of public policy, against Apple; sexual

orientation discrimination, in violation of FEHA, against Apple; and genetic characteristic

discrimination, in violation of FEHA, against Apple.

The four defendants now move for summary judgment as to all claims asserted against

them. Plaintiff opposes the motions as to all claims, with the exception of the fourth cause of

action for violation of the Equal Pay Act, which she concedes. Apple and Walker also move

for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, arguing that the claims alleged

against Walker are unwarranted by law and unsupported by any facts. 

BACKGROUND

In 1996, plaintiff’s brother Byron Patterson, a long-time friend of defendant Steve

Burmeister, asked Burmeister to interview plaintiff for a position at Burmeister’s thenemployer, PacifiCare. Burmeister interviewed and hired plaintiff, at an annual salary of

$37,000. Burmeister and plaintiff worked well together at PacifiCare, and Burmeister gave

her a salary increase. According to plaintiff, she and Burmeister shared interests and

background, and discussed many personal issues. Burmeister also socialized with plaintiff’s

family. Burmeister is gay, and he knew plaintiff was a lesbian before he hired her. Burmeister

subsequently left PacifiCare for Rand, where he again recruited and hired plaintiff, at an

annual salary of $55,000. 

Plaintiff eventually left Rand, because she had determined to become an options

trader. However, she remained in contact with Burmeister. When she told him her trading

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career was not a success, Burmeister told her there might be an opening at Apple, where he

was then working. Plaintiff applied for a position, giving Burmeister as a reference. She flew

in from Southern California for the interview, and Burmeister picked her up at the airport and

drove her to the interview. In May 2001, Apple hired plaintiff as a Compensation Consultant in

the Human Resources (“HR”) Compensation Group, at a starting salary of $88,000. 

According to Burmeister, he pushed for her salary to be larger than initially planned because

he was aware that a salary freeze made it difficult to get pay increases at Apple. 

As a Compensation Consultant, plaintiff was expected to provide different types of

employee compensation support services and information to various Apple clients. 

Compensation employees worked frequently with colleagues from a variety of Apple

organizations, and were required to have good interpersonal and communication skills. 

In February 2002, plaintiff’s first supervisor at Apple, Karen Kaufman (“Kaufman”),

rated plaintiff as a “solid contributor,” which is in the middle rank of Apple’s performance

evaluations. Kaufman noted that plaintiff had a number of interpersonal difficulties – she

needed to work on being more communicative, to participate more in team meetings, and to

be more forthcoming with her knowledge. Kaufman also noted comments by plaintiff’s

colleagues that plaintiff was not flexible or willing to jump in when others needed help. 

In November 2002, Burmeister became plaintiff’s supervisor. According to Burmeister,

plaintiff continued to discuss her personal issues with him, including her sexual orientation,

weight problems, and medical issues. According to plaintiff, she experienced a lessening of

the stress she had felt under prior supervisors.

Burmeister offered plaintiff an opportunity to support the Apple Hardware Engineering

organization, believing that this opportunity would give her a chance to showcase her skills

and build a base of support for her clients. Plaintiff was expected to provide support through

market comparisons, to respond to questions about compensation, to complete bonus

presentations, and to attend staff meetings. This assignment was not successful. Plaintiff’s

engineering clients, including Cheryl Smith (“Smith”), an African-American HR Senior Director,

found plaintiff to be unresponsive, unhelpful, and rude. Smith believed plaintiff had minimal

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interpersonal skills. According to Smith, plaintiff frequently responded, “No,” or “That’s not my

job,” when Smith sought her assistance. Plaintiff was also resistant to providing data on

bonuses, stating that the task was hard. Smith received complaints from her HR team about

plaintiff’s attitude and refusal to perform work. These problems caused Smith ultimately to

limit her interaction with Smith, and to seek intervention from Burmeister. 

Judy Goodson (“Goodson”), another African-American HR Director, found plaintiff to be

often unavailable, rude, disrespectful, and negative. To create an opportunity for plaintiff,

Goodson invited her to make a presentation to a Senior Vice President and his staff. 

However, plaintiff declined. Plaintiff also refused to attend Goodson’s staff meetings, despite

frequent requests from Goodson that she attend. Goodson informed Burmeister of these

problems. Despite plaintiff’s flaws, Burmeister states that he did not want to terminate her. 

Instead, he moved her back to her prior compensation duties, which involved mainly analysis

and infrequent personal interaction.

According to plaintiff’s colleague Deborah House (“House”), plaintiff was frequently

absent from department staff meetings and quarterly HR Department meetings. According to

Burmeister, plaintiff was rude to her colleagues in the Compensation Group, prompting

Burmeister to counsel her repeatedly about her inappropriate tone, demeanor, and ability to

work with others and be a team player.

Plaintiff’s work day was also interrupted by ongoing personal appointments and

activities. She maintained a standing weekly hair appointment during working hours. Starting

in February 2002, she commenced weekly sessions with a psychologist whose office was in

Oakland, approximately 60 miles from Apple’s Cupertino offices. She also spent up to and

hour and a half a day trading her personal stock portfolio, and at other times played video

games and did crossword puzzles on her computer.

Plaintiff believed she was entitled to yearly merit increases and promotions. However,

Apple had a salary freeze in effect from the time plaintiff was hired until late 2003. Thus, the

first opportunity for plaintiff to receive a merit increase was in connection with the review cycle

in November 2003. When plaintiff learned that she was not receiving a merit increase, she

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accessed two Apple databases during work hours to obtain confidential salary and tenure

information regarding certain of her colleagues. 

On November 12, 2003, plaintiff sent an e-mail to defendant Dan Walker, Apple’s

Chief Talent Officer, requesting that he provide her with a promotion and/or merit increase

(“the November 12th e-mail”). The e-mail contained the confidential salary and tenure

information that plaintiff had accessed from the Apple databases, and she copied the e-mail

(or the information) to her brother, her psychologist, and an attorney she had consulted (but not

retained). She did not block out any of the confidential information, such as her colleagues’

names and salaries before sending the e-mail. 

Plaintiff subsequently testified in her deposition that the November 12th e-mail was not

a complaint of discrimination, and that she was not implying that she intended to make a claim

or initiate a lawsuit. Nevertheless, upon Walker’s receipt of the e-mail, Apple became

concerned about plaintiff’s possible misuse of the information. 

According to Walker and Burmeister, plaintiff’s November 12th e-mail generated

concern at Apple because it was apparent that plaintiff had accessed salary and other

confidential information regarding her manager and co-workers, and that this information had

been accessed for personal purposes, not business purposes. It also appeared that plaintiff

had disclosed the confidential information to third parties. Plaintiff was permitted to use her

personal laptop computer for business purposes, and, as a result, her laptop contained an

extensive compilation of confidential Apple employee information. Thus, Apple became

concerned about plaintiff’s possible misuse of this confidential information. This concern was

heightened when Burmeister entered plaintiff’s work area on November 12 to retrieve some

documents, and discovered that plaintiff had left sensitive employee data unsecured on a

table in her office next to what appeared to be a list of non-Apple personnel.

Walker asked defendant Sheri Parker, Apple’s Director of Employee Relations, to

investigate the e-mail and make an appropriate response. This was consistent with Parker’s

job duties and responsibilities. Parker then met with Burmeister and discussed the possibility

of suspending plaintiff during the investigation, as was common in such situations. Burmeister

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 While plaintiff was suspended, her building access and network password were disabled

for security purposes, as was standard in such situations.

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shared with Parker his concerns about how plaintiff might respond to such a suspension,

telling her that Patterson had told him she had “guns,” and had also stated on more than one

occasions that if she was ever walked out of the company she would go out in a “blaze of

glory.” Parker was concerned, and telephoned David Hull (“Hull”), then an Apple Security

Manager, to assess security concerns. 

During that call, Parker and Hull asked Burmeister to share with them what he knew

about plaintiff, including information about plaintiff’s family and personal situation, so they

could determine whether plaintiff might be a danger to herself or others. In response,

Burmeister discussed how plaintiff might react to being informed that she was being

suspended, and answered questions about plaintiff’s state of mind. He mentioned that plaintiff

was unhappy for several reasons, and had been taking anti-depressant medication. When

asked, Burmeister provided a physical description of plaintiff, stating that she was Black and

obese. He also said that she was a lesbian. According to Parker, this information about

plaintiff was not shared with anyone other than Parker or Hull. 

Subsequently, as part of the investigation, plaintiff met with Parker and Hull. Plaintiff

confirmed that she had accessed and reviewed her manager’s and co-workers’ salaries and

confidential information independent of any business reason. She considered it appropriate

to access the information, and admitted that she had distributed the information to her attorney

and therapist. She also confirmed that she had chosen to use a personal laptop for her work

at Apple, and therefore possessed confidential Apple information on that laptop. At the

conclusion of the meeting, Parker told plaintiff she was suspended with pay pending the

outcome of the investigation.1 Parker asked plaintiff whether Apple could inspect her laptop,

and plaintiff consented.

On November 18, 2003, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC

(charge No. 377-2004-00145), alleging discrimination on the basis of race, and retaliation for

engaging in protected activities. She claimed that Walker had suspended her. She

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requested immediate closure, and on November 20, 2003, the EEOC issued plaintiff a rightto-sue letter 

Apple hired independent investigator Rebecca Speer (“Speer”) to investigate the

compensation and promotion issues plaintiff had raised. Speer is an attorney who consults

with companies about employment-related issues. In her initial interview with Speer, plaintiff

complained that the failure to promote her or increase her salary was inequitable because she

believed it “didn’t make sense” for her not to receive a raise or promotion. She reiterated the

position she had taken in the November 12th e-mail, which was that she could think of no

rational reason for her not to receive a promotion, in view of the fact that her responsibilities

had grown and that three different managers had promised her she would receive a

promotion. She then told Speer that the only difference between her and those who had

received promotions was “race.” In addition to interviewing plaintiff, Speer also interviewed

Walker, Burmeister, Kaufman, Valerie Williams (“Williams” – a former Compensation

Director), Smith, Goodson, and Denise Young Smith (a former Director of Employee

Relations). 

In the course of the ongoing internal Apple investigation, Parker met with Burmeister

and several Compensation Group employees regarding department policy. She did not

reveal to them (except possibly Burmeister) that she was investigating plaintiff’s conduct. 

According to Parker, her investigation revealed that employees in the Compensation Group

understood that it was not appropriate for them to access the confidential salary information of

co-workers for non-business-related purposes (although there was apparently no explicit

written policy in effect). Parker concluded that plaintiff’s conduct had been improper and that

she had exhibited poor judgment. Nevertheless, she says she gave plaintiff the benefit of the

doubt, and recommended that she not be disciplined. Burmeister accepted this

recommendation and did not discipline plaintiff, and plaintiff returned to work after four weeks

of (paid) suspension. 

Speer sent a copy of the report of her investigation to Apple on January 8, 2004. The

report reflects that plaintiff’s claim that “three different managers” had promised her a

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promotion was not accurate. The report indicates that in July or August 2001 (i.e., two or three

months after plaintiff was hired at Apple), Williams and Kaufman had asked plaintiff to assume

responsibility for additional client groups, prompting plaintiff to ask how that would affect her

salary and title. According to plaintiff, both said in independent conversations, “We’ll see.” 

Speer’s report further reflects that in May 2002, plaintiff again approached Williams to

ask about a promotion, and Williams told her salaries were frozen and that she would review

her compensation and title at the next review cycle (November 2003). In January or February

2003, however, Apple announced that a merit review would take place in March 2003. 

Plaintiff again raised the subject of a raise with Burmeister. According to Speer’s report,

plaintiff claimed that Burmeister told her the merit review would take place in November, and

at that time, both she and House would receive promotions and raises. However, in his

deposition, Burmeister subsequently vehemently denied having told plaintiff that either she or

House would receive a raise in November 2003. Burmeister also denied plaintiff’s

description of her job duties (as claimed in the November 12th e-mail). 

Speer reported that Burmeister had explained that he had not granted plaintiff a raise

in November 2003 because plaintiff was rated “solid contributor,” not “significant contributor”

or higher; and because plaintiff was already fairly compensated, as she had come in at a high

level. Burmeister stated that Walker’s organization (the HR-related groups) had received only

a small pool of funds for merit increases, and that Walker had told Burmeister to limit raises

and/or promotions to those who had made a “significant” contribution. 

Speer concluded that there was no merit to plaintiff’s claim that she had been unfairly

denied a salary increase and promotion. Speer looked at the other employees mentioned in

plaintiff’s e-mail, and found that Burmeister had applied the same criteria to those as to

plaintiff. Only House had received an increase, because of her superior performance and

because of her extraordinary level of responsibility. Speer also looked at the employees that

plaintiff had pointed out as earning more money than she did, and set forth Burmeister’s

reasons for paying those employees at a higher rate. 

Plaintiff returned to work in late December 2003 or early January 2004. On January 8,

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2004, she sent another e-mail to Walker, complaining of retaliation for having “fil[ed] a

complaint of racial discrimination.” She copied the e-mail to Burmeister, Fred Anderson

(Apple’s then-CFO), and her attorney, Waukeen McCoy. In the e-mail, plaintiff complained

that her suspension and Parker’s investigation were retaliatory, and that Parker’s investigation

also invaded her privacy and set her up for “public censure” as it involved a search of her

office, a confiscation of her personal laptop, interviews with her peers, harassing questions by

Parker, and an attempt to “freeze” out her attorney. 

Plaintiff also asserted that certain written guidelines that had been distributed at a

December 15, 2003, HR staff meeting – regarding access by HR employees to confidential

employee information – implicitly communicated to co-workers that plaintiff had done

something wrong. Finally, she claimed that Walker and Parker had cut her responsibilities to

10% of the duties she had before her suspension, and denied her access to information she

needed for her work. Apple again retained Speer to investigate plaintiff’s allegations. 

On January 28, 2004, plaintiff filed a three charges of discrimination with DFEH. In the

first, E200304-G-0644-00cr, plaintiff alleged that she had been harassed, denied a

promotion, denied equal pay, and retaliated against by Walker, because of her race. The

same day, DFEH provided plaintiff with a notice of case closure and right-to-sue letter.

In the second charge, E200304-G-0644-01rc, plaintiff alleged that she had been

harassed, denied a promotion, denied equal pay, and suspended from work on November 13,

2003, by Walker, because of her race. The same day, DFEH provided plaintiff with a notice

of case closure and right-to-sue letter

In the third charge, E200304-G-0644-02rc, plaintiff alleged that she had been 

harassed, denied a promotion, denied equal pay, and suspended from work by Walker and

Parker, because of her race. The same day, DFEH provided plaintiff with a notice of case

closure and right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff filed the present action on January 29, 2004. 

On February 9, 2004, Speer sent Apple the report of her second investigation. Speer

found that the concerns stemming from plaintiff’s handling of confidential employee

information – and not a desire to retaliate against her – led to the decision to suspend her and

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conduct an investigation. Speer concluded that none of plaintiff’s allegations had merit. 

In early 2004, Walker told Burmeister and other managers within HR that they had to

cut several hundred thousand dollars from their budgets. Consequently, Burmeister made the

decision to lay off three of the seven employees who reported to him. Plaintiff was laid off on

March 5, 2004, along with two other employees who had worked at Apple longer than plaintiff

had. When plaintiff was laid off, her duties were reassigned to her remaining colleagues in the

Compensation Group. No one was hired to replace her. Moreover, when another

Compensation Group employee left the group about a month later, that position was not filled. 

Like her colleagues, plaintiff was offered two months’ pay as severance. Neither Walker nor

Parker were involved in the decision to lay off plaintiff.

On November 10, 2004, plaintiff filed an amended administrative charge, E200304-G0644-00cr, to amend the three charges that had originally been filed on January 28, 2004. In

the amended charged, she alleged that Steve Burmeister had discriminated against her on

the basis of sexual orientation and genetic characteristic, when he laid her off on March 5,

2004. 

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to material facts

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Material

facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The court may

not weigh the evidence, and is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the

basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at

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trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for

the moving party. On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence

of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “To show the

existence of a ‘genuine’ issue, . . . [a plaintiff] must produce at least some significant probative

evidence tending to support the complaint.” Smolen v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d

959, 963 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted). The court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. City of Tacoma, 332 F.3d 574, 578

(9th Cir. 2003). The court must not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but

only determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047,

1054 (9th Cir. 1999).

Deference to the non-moving party has some limits. Thus, a plaintiff cannot rest on the

allegations in her pleadings to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Brinson v. Linda

Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995); Ghebreselassie v. Coleman Sec.

Serv., 829 F.2d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 1987). Self-serving affidavits will not establish a genuine

issue of material fact if they fail to state facts based on personal knowledge or are too

conclusory. Rodriquez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 902 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Regardless of whether plaintiff or defendant is the moving party, each party must

“establish the existence of the elements essential to [its] case, and on which [it] will bear the

burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

B. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment 

The four defendants – Apple, Walker, Parker, and Burmeister – seek summary

judgment on all causes of action asserted against them. 

1. Racial discrimination

In the first, second, and third causes of action, plaintiff alleges claims of racial

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discrimination against Apple under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, and FEHA, asserting that she

was denied a promotion and a salary increase because of her race. Title VII and FEHA

claims are analyzed under the same legal theory. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d

917, 923 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). Claims of employment discrimination under § 1981 require

the same elements of proof as Title VII cases. Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Maduka v. Sunrise Hosp., 375 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2004) (same

analysis applies to Title VII and § 1981 discrimination claims). 

In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff must show that intentional discrimination was

the determinative factor in the adverse employment action. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507

U.S. 604, 610 (1993). There are two ways of proving intentional discrimination – 1) direct

evidence and 2) indirect or circumstantial evidence, invoking the McDonnell-Douglas analysis. 

Direct evidence is evidence that proves the fact of discriminatory animus without

inference or presumption. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In most cases, however, there is no direct evidence of discrimination by the employer, and

discrimination claims must be proved indirectly (circumstantially). In such cases,

discrimination claims are analyzed under an allocation of burdens of production and proof,

based on the model set forth in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 

Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, the burden of production first falls on the

plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. She may do so by showing that (1)

she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position she held (or for the

position to which she wished to be promoted and for which she applied), (3) she was

terminated or demoted from (or denied a promotion to) that position, and (4) the job went to

someone outside the protected class. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506

(1993); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The burden of production then shifts to the employer, who must present evidence

sufficient to permit the factfinder to conclude that the employer had a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. St. Mary's Honor Center, 509

U.S. at 506-07. If the employer does so, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s

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articulated reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination by either directly persuading the

court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing

that the employer’s proffered reason is unworthy of credence. Texas Dep’t of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); see also Aragon v. Republic Silver State

Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 658-59 (2002) (en banc). 

Here, Apple seeks summary judgment on the claims of racial discrimination, arguing

that plaintiff cannot establish either a prima facie case or pretext, on either the claim of failure

to promote or the claim of failure to increase plaintiff’s salary. Apple first argues that plaintiff

cannot establish a prima facie case of failure to promote because she cannot show that she

applied for a specific promotion, that she was qualified for the Senior Compensation Analyst

position to which she claims she wished to be promoted, or that she applied for but did not

receive the promotion in question. In addition, Apple asserts that because plaintiff fails to

show that she was more qualified than House, the only person that Burmeister promoted, she

cannot establish a prima facie case. 

In response, plaintiff asserts that she has established a prima facie case because she

has shown that she is a member of a protected class who performed competently. She

argues that has met her “competence burden” by showing that she received a rating of “solid

contributor.” She also notes that Burmeister indicated that she was “smart,” and hired or

recommended that she be hired into two positions after he had worked with her at PacifiCare. 

She argues that she is not required to show that she formally applied for a promotion because

it was not the practice at Apple to list available positions. For example, she claims that when

Burmeister needed to fill a position, he interviewed candidates who had “expressed an

interest” in the position. She also asserts that House did not actually apply for the promotion

that she received from Burmeister. She claims that it was common for Apple employees to

take on additional responsibilities prior to being given a promotion, and argues that she

herself had the right to expect promotion based on the fact that she took on extra

responsibilities.

Apple contends that even if plaintiff has made a minimally sufficient showing of the

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prima facie case, Apple’s failure to promote her was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons that had nothing to do with plaintiff’s race – specifically, that plaintiff was not qualified

for the Senior Compensation Analyst position and had significant communication and

leadership issues that precluded promotion. Burmeister, who was aware of plaintiff’s race,

hired or recommended her for three jobs in which she worked directly under him; evaluated

her performance as satisfactory over time, granting her substantial salary increases at jobs

prior to her employment at Apple; and had a long-term social relationship with her and her

family. 

Plaintiff responds that Apple’s articulated explanation is pretextual. She asserts that

the fact that there was only one African-American Compensation Consultant in her work group

is evidence of pretext, as is the fact that Burmeister made racially disparaging comments.

Apple also argues that plaintiff cannot show that she was more deserving of a raise

than Deborah House, the only employee in the Compensation Group who did receive a raise. 

Apple contends that although plaintiff may have believed she deserved a raise, the evidence

shows that she did not meet the criteria for analyst skills, teamwork, communication skills, or

responsiveness, as demonstrated by the criticism in her performance review and in the

complaints of her co-workers. Burmeister, who made the recommendation that House

receive a raise in November 2003 and that plaintiff not receive a raise, stated that House’s

performance was exceptional while plaintiff was ranked only “solid performer.” 

In response, plaintiff does not address Apple’s arguments regarding her qualifications. 

She reiterates that there was only one African-American Compensation Consultant it her

group at Apple. She also claims that her non-African-American counterparts were paid more

than she was, despite her “more extensive education” and experience. 

In reply, Apple notes that plaintiff has failed to address any of Apple’s arguments with

regard to the claim of failure to increase salary because of race. Specifically, Apple contends

that plaintiff does not respond to the argument that she was not more qualified for a raise than

Deborah House, the only employee in the Compensation Group who did receive a raise. 

Apple asserts that plaintiff also fails to provide competent evidence showing that House was

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performing comparable work to the work plaintiff was doing. 

Apple also argues that plaintiff did not receive a salary increase for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. Apple provides evidence showing that it had a salary freeze in effect

until November 2003, at which time plaintiff did not meet the standard for a pay increase

because she had received only a “solid” on her performance review and had significant

communication and leadership issues. Apple contends that the salaries of other employees

in the Compensation Group are irrelevant to plaintiff’s claim that she did not receive a pay

raise on one particular occasion. Apple also asserts that the fact that Burmeister hired

plaintiff into several different jobs, over the years, with ever-increasing salaries, dispels any

suggestion that he harbored discriminatory animus toward her on account of her race. And as

with the claim of failure to promote, the fact that plaintiff was the only African-American in the

group is irrelevant, or, at most, suggest non-discrimination, as five of the six employees who

did not receive raises were non-African-Americans.

The court finds that plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence to show that Apple’s

explanation regarding the failure to promote her or the failure to increase her salary was

pretextual. A plaintiff may meet the burden of showing pretext by using either direct or

circumstantial evidence. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Direct evidence typically consists of

clearly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory statements or actions by the employer. 

Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005). Because

direct evidence is so probative, the plaintiff need offer “very little” direct evidence to raise a

triable issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. 

Circumstantial evidence is evidence that requires an additional inferential step. It can

take two forms. See id. The plaintiff can make an affirmative case that the employer is

biased, based, for example, on statistical evidence that points to bias. Aragon, 292 F.3d at

663. Alternatively, the plaintiff can provide evidence that shows that the employer’s proffered

explanation for the adverse action is “unworthy of credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. When

a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence – or evidence that negatively discredits the

employer’s stated rationale – that evidence must be “specific and substantial” in order to

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defeat a motion for summary judgment. Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095; see also Stegall v.

Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, plaintiff attempts to make her case with both direct and circumstantial evidence. 

As direct evidence, she provides a declaration in which she states that Burmeister made

racially derogatory comments. However, she was able to recall only three such comments by

Burmeister over all the years that she had known him – the statement that African-Americans

“couldn’t have a house party without shooting up the neighborhood;” the statement that

African-Americans are somehow involved in “shooting up the screens at movie theaters;” and

the statement that “every time we [presumably referring to African-Americans] were

interviewed on television they always seemed to get the person who’s in curlers, missing

teeth.” These stray remarks are not evidence of discrimination. Horn v. Cushman &

Wakefield Western, Inc., 72 Cal. App. 4th 789, 810 (1999). In general, stray remarks not

acted upon or communicated to a decision maker are insufficient to establish pretext. 

Mondero v. Salt River Project, 400 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2005). There is no evidence that

the comments attributed to Burmeister were directed at her or at any other Apple employee,

or were uttered in any employment-related context. 

Plaintiff provided no evidence that anyone else at Apple made racially disparaging

comments, or that anyone at Apple took any action based on her race. Burmeister’s

comments, while tasteless, are not sufficient on their own to provide specific and substantial

evidence of pretext, particularly in view of the fact that plaintiff testified in her deposition that

she never believed that Burmeister harbored any animus against African-Americans based on

race. When she was asked in her deposition whether Burmeister’s conduct toward her was in

any way connected with her race, plaintiff testified that, in her view, Burmeister’s conduct

towards her “was because someone else was using it as a racial bias and he went along with

it.” Moreover, it is undisputed that it was Burmeister who hired or recommended plaintiff for

three jobs in which she worked under him, who evaluated her performance as satisfactory

over time, who granted her substantial salary increases at jobs prior to her employment at

Apple, and who had a long-standing social relationship with her and her family. 

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Plaintiff’s effort to provide circumstantial evidence is even less effective, as she relies

entirely on the assertion that she was the only African-American in her department. A

statistical incident of one in a seven-person department is not significant. Statistics are 

probative only if they are based on a sufficiently large sample size, see Aragon, 292 F.3d at

663, which is not the case here.

The court finds that summary judgment must be GRANTED on the claims of racial

discrimination because plaintiff has failed to provide evidence showing that Apple’s

explanation for the failure to promote her and failure to give her an increase in salary was

pretextual. 

2. Harassment

In the fifth cause of action plaintiff alleges harassment on the basis of race against

Apple, Walker, and Parker. She asserts that by “creating, maintaining, encouraging, failing to

investigate properly, and by failing to remedy a hostile work environment,” defendants violated

FEHA. Plaintiff claims that defendants Apple, Walker, and Parker “created several new

policies targeting plaintiff’s habits” – specifically, that defendants changed starting and ending

times for the workday, which impacted plaintiff but no other employees. She claims that these

changes prevented her from attending her therapy appointments. She asserts that after she

complained about differential treatment, Apple, Walker and Parker disabled her network

password and building access card, removed the nameplate from her door, interrogated her

co-workers about her, and reduced her workload drastically. 

Under FEHA, it is unlawful for an employer to harass any employee based on race. 

Cal. Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (j)(1). Harassment is distinct from discrimination. Janken v.

GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 64-65 (1996). To establish a prima facie case

of harassment, plaintiff must show that she was subject to a hostile work environment based

on her race, and that the harassment was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of

employment and create an abusive work environment. Doe v. Capital Cities, 50 Cal. App. 4th

1038, 1045 (1996). 

"[H]arassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance,

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conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or

for other personal motives. Harassment is not conduct of a type necessary for management of

the employer's business or performance of the supervisory employee's job." Janken, 46 Cal.

App. 4th at 63. Harassment may include racial epithets and racially derogatory comments;

physical interference with normal work movement; and racially derogatory posters, cartoons or

drawings. 2 Cal. Code Regs., § 7287.6, subd. (b)(1); see also Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at

63. 

By contrast, making a personnel decision is conduct of a type fundamentally 

different from the type of conduct that constitutes harassment. 

Commonly necessary personnel management actions such as hiring and firing,

job or project assignments, office or work station assignments, promotion or

demotion, performance evaluations, the provision of support, the assignment or

nonassignment of supervisory functions, deciding who will and who will not

attend meetings, deciding who will be laid off, and the like, do not come within

the meaning of harassment. 

Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 64-65. 

In its motion, Apple asserts that its potential liability is derived from the alleged conduct

of Walker and Parker, and so refers to the motions to dismiss filed by those two defendants. 

a. Walker

Walker was the Chief Talent Officer at Apple, responsible for all human resources

functions. During the time plaintiff was at Apple, Walker held quarterly HR staff meetings

which plaintiff and other members of the HR Department attended. Plaintiff testified in her

deposition that at each of the meetings she attended, Walker discussed his goal of increasing

diversity at Apple. He discussed various organizations, including the Black MBA Association,

that he was working with to increase diversity hiring. Smith and Goodson (both AfricanAmerican) state in their declarations that Walker was committed to encouraging and

supporting diversity at Apple and providing opportunities for minorities, including AfricanAmerican women. 

Walker had four Senior Directors reporting to him. Two were African-American

women, one was Asian, and one was Caucasian. Walker had promoted each of those

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2

 Walker does not mention the allegation that plaintiff’s job duties were severely curtailed

after she returned from the suspension, but plaintiff provides no evidence that Walker was

involved in any decision regarding her job duties.

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individuals into their positions. Eight of the thirteen people who reported directly to Walker

were members of minority races, and four of those were African-American. 

Walker testified that he and plaintiff had only two direct interactions during the time

plaintiff was employed at Apple. Plaintiff testified that she had “two or three” conversations

with Walker, consisting of “basic idle chitchat.” She recalled the subjects as “[t]he weather or

the final bonus promotion report that I gave a presentation to him on one occasion, and then to

Fred on the other occasion.” She stated that Walker told her she had done a good job on the

report, and that he was “bragging to everyone about the report.” She said she had no other

communications with Walker, and admitted that he never harassed her directly – not face-toface, not through an e-mail, not through a phone call.

Walker argues that the race harassment claim against him is baseless. First, he

asserts that he did not participate in any of the actions that plaintiff alleges as “harassment.” 

He contends that plaintiff has no evidence showing that he created a Compensation Group

work policy, and as confirmed by his deposition testimony, he was not involved in the

promulgation of the policy. He claims there is no evidence that he interrogated any of

plaintiff’s co-workers about her, and he testified in his deposition that he did not. He also

asserts that there is no evidence that he prevented plaintiff from attending her therapy

appointments, and he asserts in his declaration that he did not. Moreover, he contends that

the evidence shows that plaintiff continued to see her therapist until April 2004, when she

stopped herself because of her financial situation. Finally, he argues that there is no evidence

that he disabled plaintiff’s access during her suspension or removed her nameplate from her

door, and he states in his declaration that he did not. Indeed, as plaintiff admitted in her

deposition, Walker himself took no action to harass her.2 

Walker argues further that plaintiff’s harassment claim is not actionable race

harassment because the actions about which plaintiff complains can all be considered

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3

 This is the total of plaintiff’s argument regarding harassment, and applies to both Walker

and Parker.

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personnel management activity related to the workplace investigation that followed plaintiff’s

misuse of confidential data. Under California law, a manager cannot be individually liable for

damages based on personnel management activity unless the liability arises from statute. 

Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 66. 

Walker contends that even if the alleged conduct is not personnel management activity,

it is neither severe nor pervasive. Whether harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive

must be judged by an objective standard. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22

(1993). Walker argues that these activities, which he claims were accompanied by no

shouting or even rudeness, cannot be considered severe or pervasive. 

Finally, Walker claims that there is no evidence of racial animus on his part. He asserts

that even if plaintiff could prove that he engaged in any of this conduct (which she cannot), and

even if the conduct could be considered sufficiently severe and pervasive (which it cannot),

there are no facts whatsoever to suggest that Walker held any animus against AfricanAmerican employees. He maintains that, indeed, the reverse is true, as the evidence shows

that Walker was committed to workplace diversity, recruited had hired qualified AfricanAmerican employees, and promoted employees who were members of minority races. 

In opposition, plaintiff argues that there is evidence that Burmeister made a number of

derogatory comments about African-Americans, including comments to the effect that Black

people, especially Black women, are “so fat.” Plaintiff claims that such comments are “the

epitome of conduct engaged in for meanness or bigotry.” Plaintiff also asserts that Walker

testified that he gave Burmeister free reign “as long as [he] was not violating wage and hour

laws.”3

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED as to Walker. Plaintiff has not met

her burden of showing that Walker personally engaged in harassing conduct that was so

severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment, or that he engaged in any

conduct that was motivated by racial animus. She does not dispute Walker’s assertion that

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any action allegedly taken by Walker was personnel management activity for which a

supervisory employee cannot be liable as a matter of law. She does not dispute that the

actions allegedly taken against her were neither severe nor pervasive, and she provides no

evidence that any conduct engaged in by Walker was due to her race, or that Walker even

engaged in the conduct that she alleges was harassing. 

The sole piece of evidence plaintiff cites in support of her claim that Walker harassed

her is the alleged derogatory comments made by Burmeister, who is not even named as a

defendant in the harassment cause of action. California courts have long held that a

supervisor cannot be sued individually under FEHA for harassment by another employee,

even where the plaintiff actually complains to the supervisor about the alleged harassment. 

See Fiol v. Doellstedt, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1325-28 (1996); Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at

64. There is no evidence, moreover, that Walker had any knowledge of these alleged

harassing comments by Burmeister. Nor is there any evidence that plaintiff made any

complaints about the alleged comments, either to Burmeister or Walker. 

b. Parker

Parker makes three arguments in support of her motion. She argues, first, that all

activity alleged against her (regardless of whether it occurred) pertains to day-to-day

management activity, which does not constitute harassment. Second, she contends that the

conduct alleged against her is not severe or pervasive, judged under an objective standard. 

She asserts that plaintiff alleges no conduct involving shouting, slurs, or even impolite conduct,

and that the activities mentioned by plaintiff simply therefore cannot objectively be considered

severe or pervasive.

Third, Parker argues that there is no evidence that any of her alleged conduct was tied

to plaintiff’s race. Parker contends that plaintiff has no evidence that Parker harbored animus

against African-Americans. Parker asserts that plaintiff’s only “evidence” that Parker

discriminates on the basis of race is plaintiff’s belief that Parker considered plaintiff’s

November 12 e-mail to Walker to constitute a discrimination claim. Parker argues that

plaintiff’s opinion as to whether an e-mail is a discrimination claim is not probative of whether

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Parker discriminates. 

Plaintiff makes the same arguments in opposition to Parker’s motion as she did in

opposition to Walker’s. She contends that Burmeister made a number of derogatory

comments about African-Americans, including comments to the effect that Black people,

especially Black women, are “so fat.” Plaintiff claims that such comments are “the epitome of

conduct engaged in for meanness or bigotry.” Plaintiff also asserts that Walker testified that

he gave Burmeister free reign “as long as [he] was not violating wage and hour laws.” 

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED as to Parker. As with the claim

against Walker, Plaintiff does not dispute that any conduct allegedly taken by Parker was

personnel management activity for which a supervisory employee cannot be liable as a matter

of law; does not dispute that the conduct allegedly taken against her was neither severe nor

pervasive; provides no evidence that the conduct was taken on account of plaintiff’s race; and

fails to provide any evidence that Parker even engaged in the conduct alleged to be

harassing. As with Walker, plaintiff has not met her burden of showing that Parker personally

engaged in harassing conduct that was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her

employment, or that she engaged in any conduct that was motivated by racial animus.

The motion must also be GRANTED as to Apple, as Apple’s liability depends on the

liability of Walker and Parker. While it is true that an employer is strictly liable for harassment

of an employee by a supervisor, State Dep’t of Health Servs. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 4th

1026, 1041 (2003), the court’s finding that summary judgment must be granted as to both

Walker and Parker on the harassment claim necessarily means that Apple’s motion must also

be granted.

3. Retaliation

In the sixth cause of action, plaintiff alleges a claim of retaliation against Apple, Walker,

Parker, and Burmeister. She asserts that she complained to defendants on numerous

occasions that she was being harassed and denied promotional opportunities based on her

race. She alleges that defendants “had numerous opportunities to remedy the hostility of their

workplace, but Apple, through its management level employees and agents, chose to engage

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 Under California law, requisites for proving unlawful retaliation under FEHA are the same

as for Title VII. Flait v. North Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 475-76 (1992). 

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in a campaign of intimidation, harassment and abuse as alleged.” 

She asserts that after she complained about “differential treatment and compensation,

Walker and Parker created several new policies regarding employee attendance, which she

claims targeted her “habits.” Specifically, she alleges that Walker, Parker, and Burmeister

prevented her from attending therapy sessions. She alleges that the timing of these changes,

combined with the fact that she was the only employee affected, clearly indicates that they

were designed to retaliate against her for complaining about differential treatment to

supervisors, as well as to the DFEH. She alleges further that after she complained about

differential treatment and compensation, Apple, Walker, and Parker disabled her network

password and building access card, and that Walker and Parker removed the nameplate from

her door, interrogated her co-workers about her, and drastically reduced her workload. 

California Government Code § 12940, subdivision (h) makes it unlawful for any

employer "to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the

person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a

complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part." Subdivision (a) of the

statute specifies the prohibited employment practices, which include harassment and

discrimination because of race, sex, religion or national origin. 

California courts apply the traditional McDonnell-Douglas shifting-burdens analysis in

cases alleging violation of state anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., Nelson v. United Tech., 74

Cal. App. 4th 597, 613 (1999). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of

FEHA,4 a plaintiff must show that she engaged in a protected activity, that the employer

subjected her to an adverse employment action, and that a causal link existed between the

protected activity and the adverse action. Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 32

Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 444-45 (2005). Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden

shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate non-retaliatory explanation for its conduct. If the

defendant offers a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff

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to show that the proffered explanation is merely a pretext for retaliation. Flait, 3 Cal. App. 4th

at 476.

In its motion, Apple asserts that its potential liability is derived from the alleged conduct

of Walker, Parker, and Burmeister, and so refers to the motions to dismiss filed by those

defendants.

a. Walker

Plaintiff claims that Walker retaliated against her for sending the November 12th 

e-mail by changing company policies that affected her (by preventing her from attending

therapy sessions), by conducting an investigation into her disclosure of confidential employee

information (which included questioning other employees) and by suspending her (which

included blocking her network and employee access, removing her name from the door, and

possibly reducing her workload). She also suggests that the suspension pending the internal

investigation of her misuse of confidential information, and the March 2004 lay-off were

retaliatory.

Walker argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because

she cannot show she engaged in protected activity or that she suffered an adverse action by

Walker. “Protected activities” fall into two categories: 1) opposing any practices forbidden

under FEHA; and 2) filing a complaint, testifying, or assisting in any FEHA proceeding. Cal.

Gov. Code, § 12940(h). Opposing practices prohibited by FEHA includes 1) opposing

employment practices which an individual reasonably believes to be an FEHA violation; and

2) participating in an activity which is perceived by the employer as opposition to

discrimination. Cal. Admin. Code Tit. 2, § 7287.8(a)(1)(C), (D). 

Walker argues that the sending of the November 12th e-mail cannot be considered

“filing a complaint” because plaintiff testified in her deposition that her intention in sending the

e-mail was not to complain that she had been the victim of race discrimination or of any other

type of discrimination, but rather to ask Walker to reconsider and give her a raise or a

promotion. In addition, she acknowledged that she could not have been participating in a

“protected activity” at the time she sent the e-mail because no investigation or proceeding

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 The allegations under the “Retaliation” cause of action in the 5thAC do not mention the

lay-off. However, in the “General Allegations” section, plaintiff asserts that defendants “terminated

[plaintiff] after she filed a lawsuit against them.” As to that last allegation, plaintiff was laid off on

March 4, 2004, which, according to the docket, is the same day that Apple was served with the

summons and complaint.

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existed. 

Walker also contends that plaintiff did not engage in “oppositional” activities because

she was not opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII or FEHA. Walker asserts that a

demand for a specific outcome – here, a raise and promotion – that is not tied to actual

discrimination cannot be protected activity. Walker argues in addition that the act of sending

confidential information outside of Apple was not protected because Apple’s interest in

maintaining the confidentiality of employee records outweighs any interest plaintiff might have

had in sharing that information with third parties. Thus, Walker asserts, plaintiff’s conduct in

accessing, using, and disclosing the private information of her colleagues for her own

purposes cannot be considered a reasonable good faith protestation.

Walker argues further that plaintiff cannot show that he was responsible for any alleged

adverse action. He notes that plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she was not demoted as

a result of the investigation concerning her handling of confidential material, and that she did

not suffer any loss of pay grade, or loss of any money whatsoever – her title, office, and

compensation remained the same. Walker contends that the acts of promulgating new

department-wide personnel policies, disabling access to Apple during the period of paid

suspension, changing computer access to coincide with a new assignment, and conducting

an investigation that resulted in no discipline, had nothing to do with Walker and cannot be

said to have had a substantial and adverse material effect on plaintiff’s employment. 

Finally, with regard to any possible claim that plaintiff might make that she was laid off

in retaliation for engaging in protected activity,5 Walker argues that the evidence shows he

was not involved in the decision to lay her off. Both Walker and Burmeister state in their

declarations that Burmeister made the decision to lay plaintiff off.

In response, plaintiff argues that she did engage in protected activity, and that she did

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6

 As evidence of this, plaintiff cites to a “Patterson Declaration” that was never filed. In the

“amended opposition,” plaintiff cites to her deposition testimony, rather than to the nonexistent

Patterson Declaration. However, that testimony, even had the court not stricken the amended

opposition, does not support plaintiff’s factual assertions.

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suffer an adverse action. She contends that the November 12th e-mail specifically identified

non-African-American employees in the Compensation Group who were paid more than

plaintiff was, despite the fact that she had an MBA, six years of compensation experience,

and a “certification” in compensation.6 She claims that the e-mail “substantively functioned as

a complaint,” regardless of whether she herself actually characterized it as such. She

maintains that the e-mail was an attempt to bring potential discrimination to the attention of

someone in a position to remedy the situation, and that the question whether her belief that

she was discriminated against was in good faith and sincere presents a triable issue of fact

that precludes summary judgment. 

Plaintiff also argues that she suffered an adverse action. She contends that after she

returned from the suspension, her workload was drastically reduced – her former projects

were reassigned and she was assigned to handle Latin America and Canada, along with

another employee (who was also given additional projects, while she herself was not). She

argues (without any support) that an employee whose workload has been drastically reduced

is vulnerable to a reduction in force, as her contributions are less visible and she seems less

valuable to the company. She also suggests that the lay-off was an adverse action.

Plaintiff contends in addition that there is a triable issue as to the causal link between

the sending of the e-mail and the alleged adverse action. She claims that improper motive

can be inferred from the fact that she sent the e-mail on November 12, 2003, and she was laid

off three and a half months later, in March 2004.

She does not respond to Walker’s argument that she can provide no evidence that

Walker himself subjected her to any adverse actions. In fact, she says nothing at all about

Walker, except in the most general terms – “it was [Walker’s] call to Parker that set in motion

the chain of events that are now at issue;” and “Walker admits that he instructed Sheri Parker,

employee relations director, to investigate the [e-mail] and to take appropriate action;” and

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that she sent Walker the November 12th e-mail in order to bring the information in it to

Walker’s attention.

 The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED as to Walker. Plaintiff has not

established her prima facie case, as she has not provided evidence of any adverse action

taken by Walker, or even any evidence that he engaged in any of the conduct that she has

identified as retaliatory. 

In addition, plaintiff has not shown that she engaged in any protected activity prior to the

filing of the EEOC/DFEH charges. Indeed, the evidence shows that she accessed the

confidential information for her own benefit – not as part of her legitimate work duties, or to

make a complaint of discrimination. Certainly the act of accessing confidential employee

information and sending the November 12th e-mail was not protected activity. Despite the

fact that the e-mail does state, for each of the various employees, his or her gender and race

(among other things), plaintiff cannot now claim it was intended as a complaint about

discriminatory treatment when she previously testified under oath that it was not. In addition,

she stated in the January 8, 2004, e-mail that “I made no claim or allegation of racial

discrimination in the [November 12th e-mail].” 

b. Parker

Plaintiff claims that Parker retaliated against her for sending the November 12th 

e-mail by changing company policies that affected her (by preventing her from attending

therapy sessions), by conducting an investigation into her disclosure of confidential employee

information (which included questioning other employees) and by suspending her (which

included blocking her network and employee access, removing her name from the door, and

possibly reducing her workload). She also suggests that the suspension pending the internal

investigation of her misuse of confidential information, and the March 2004 lay-off were

retaliatory. 

As did Walker, Parker argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case

because she cannot show that she engaged in protected activity prior to the filing of the

EEOC/DFEH charges, and because she cannot show any adverse actions by Parker, making

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the same argument as Walker, above. In addition, Parker contends that she had no role in

plaintiff’s working conditions after the investigation, and that her sole involvement was limited

to overseeing the legitimate internal investigation of plaintiff’s misuse of confidential employee

information. 

Parker asserts that even if disabling of plaintiff’s network and building access during

her suspension, asking questions of the Compensation Group employees during the

investigation, and promulgating new department policies regarding confidential information

(and presumably, employee hours) could be construed as adverse actions, plaintiff has

provided no evidence of retaliatory motive. Parker contends that the evidence shows that

these actions were taken as part of a good-faith investigation of plaintiff’s apparent misuse of

confidential Apple personnel data, and that Parker’s actions were not retaliatory. 

Finally, Parker contends that she was not involved in plaintiff’s lay-off. Both Parker and

Burmeister state in their declarations that the decision to lay off plaintiff was made by

Burmeister.

Plaintiff’s opposition is as stated above, with regard to Walker. Specifically, plaintiff

claims that she did engage in protected activity, attempting to cast the November 12th 

e-mail as a complaint of racial discrimination. She also asserts that she suffered adverse

actions, claiming that after she returned from the suspension, her workload was reduced. She

also claims that improper motive can be inferred from the fact that she sent the e-mail on

November 12, 2003, while she was laid off on March 4, 2005. 

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED as to Parker, for the reasons stated

above with regard to Walker. Plaintiff has not shown that she engaged in any protected

activity, or that Parker engaged in any adverse action. In addition, plaintiff provides no

evidence that the actions taken by Parker during the course of the investigation into plaintiff’s

misuse of confidential employee information were not part of Apple’s legitimate business

response to plaintiff’s wrongful actions. 

c. Burmeister

The only allegation of retaliation that plaintiff specifically makes against Burmeister in

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the 5thAC is that he prevented her from attending therapy sessions. She also alleged, in the

amended DFEH charge filed January 28, 2004, that Burmeister’s decision to lay her off was

retaliatory. 

Burmeister argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because she

cannot show she engaged in protected activity prior to the filing of the EEOC/DFEH charges. 

This is the same argument made by Walker and Parker, above. 

Burmeister also contends that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because

she cannot show that she suffered an adverse action. He asserts that the sole allegation –

that he prevented her from attending therapy appointments – is not sufficient to constitute an

adverse action because it is not an act that has a substantial and material adverse effect on

the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. Burmeister notes that plaintiff does not

claim that she suffered any loss of pay grade, or loss of any compensation whatsoever as a

result of her alleged inability to attend therapy appointments. Moreover, Burmeister notes that

plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she attended her therapy appointments throughout the

remainder of her employment at Apple, which constitutes a concession that this claim is false. 

He argues that she cannot establish retaliatory motive for a non-existent cause of action.

Finally, Burmeister asserts that plaintiff provides no evidence of pretext or retaliatory

motive as to the lay-off. He argues that the undisputed evidence shows that budget cuts

required him to lay off three of the seven employees who reported to him, and that this

decision was based on legitimate reasons – Apple cut the total budget for Walker’s

department, and Walker required three of his subordinates, including Burmeister, to reduce

their budgets by $200,000 each. Burmeister concluded that plaintiff should be one of the

three employees laid off because she was one of the lowest performing. The laid-off

employees were not replaced, and a month later, when another employee left the group, no

replacement was hired. 

Burmeister contends that plaintiff provides no evidence that the real reason for her layoff was retaliation for making a protected complaint of discrimination. He notes that when

plaintiff first raised the issue of retaliation in the January 8, 2004 e-mail to Walker, Apple

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immediately hired independent investigator Rebecca Speer to investigate plaintiff’s claims. 

Speer found no evidence of wrongdoing by anyone at Apple. Burmeister claims that he had

no motive to retaliate against plaintiff for making any complaints, as he was not the subject of

any of plaintiff’s complaints until he was named a defendant in this suit in January 2005, after

the case had already been pending for more than a year. 

Plaintiff’s opposition is as stated above, with regard to Walker and Parker. 

Specifically, she claims that she did engage in protected activity, attempting to cast the

November 12th e-mail as a complaint of racial discrimination. She also asserts that she

suffered adverse actions, claiming that after she returned from the suspension, her workload

was reduced. She also claims that improper motive can be inferred from the fact that she sent

the e-mail on November 12, 2003, while she was laid off on March 4, 2005. 

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED as to Burmeister. For the reasons

stated above with regard to Walker and Parker, plaintiff cannot show that she engaged in

protected activity before she filed the DFEH charges. Moreover, she cannot show that she

suffered an adverse action, because she was suspended with pay, and suffered no loss of

compensation or benefits, and no demotion or job title change; and cannot show a causal

nexus because there was no protected activity prior to plaintiff’s suspension, which occurred

before she filed any charge with DFEH. 

Finally, plaintiff can show no evidence of retaliatory motive, as Burmeister was not

named by plaintiff in any administrative charge or complaint until November 2004, and was not

named as a defendant in this lawsuit until January 2005, a year after the original complaint

was filed. Thus, Burmeister would have had no reason to retaliate against plaintiff. Moreover,

Burmeister has provided evidence of a legitimate business reason for the suspension, and

plaintiff has provided no evidence showing that the articulated reason is pretextual. 

4. Failure to prevent discrimination and failure to maintain environment free 

from harassment

In the seventh cause of action, plaintiff alleges that Apple failed to take reasonable

steps to prevent discrimination from occurring. In the eighth cause of action, plaintiff alleges

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that Apple failed to maintain an environment free from harassment. 

California Government Code § 12940 provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful

employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification . . . (k) For an

employer . . . to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and

harassment from occurring." The California Supreme Court has stated that FEHA "makes it a

separate unlawful employment practice" for an employer to violate § 12940(k). State Dept. of

Health Servs., 31 Cal. 4th at 1040. 

However, there can be no violation of 12940(k) absent a finding of actual

discrimination. See Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4th 280, 283-84 (1998)). “[T]here's no logic

that says an employee who has not been discriminated against can sue an employer for not

preventing discrimination that didn't happen." Trujillo, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 289. 

Apple argues that these two claims fail because plaintiff cannot state a claim for either

discrimination or harassment. Apple also asserts that plaintiff cannot show that Apple lacked

adequate policies to prevent discrimination, as Apple has provided evidence that it has an

extensive anti-discrimination program, which includes clear and frequently-disseminated

policies setting forth Apple’s stand against discrimination and other types of unlawful conduct. 

Apple also notes that although plaintiff did not believe that her November 12th e-mail was a

discrimination complaint, Apple immediately hired an outside investigator to look into her

claims and address any race or gender concerns. See Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Workers'

Comp. Appeals Bd., 103 Cal. App. 4th 1021, 1035 (2002) ("Prompt investigation of a

discrimination claim is a necessary step by which an employer meets its obligation [under

section 12940(k)").

Plaintiff does not oppose the motion as to these two causes of action in her original

opposition. In the untimely “amended opposition,” plaintiff argues that while Apple did conduct

an investigation, that investigation “did not meet the appropriate standards.” Relying on Silva

v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th 256, 272 (1998), plaintiff argues that an investigation

should be performed by someone who is uninvolved in the incident and who is trained to

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investigate, and should occur promptly; that important witnesses should provide their own

written statements; that the investigator should ask “open-ended” questions and attempt to

draw out facts, not opinions; that those interviewed should be encouraged to contact

investigator later if they think of anything else; that the complainant should be notified of the

investigation and should be afforded an opportunity to present her own version of events; and

that after interviews are completed, the complainant should have opportunity to comment on

result of investigation. 

In her amended opposition, plaintiff claims that Rebecca Speer, the third-party

investigator hired by Apple, was not “uninvolved” in the investigation, because she was hired

by Apple. Plaintiff also complains that Speers’ first report wasn’t completed until two months

after the original complaint, that the employees who were interviewed did not provide their

own written statements, and that plaintiff was not kept informed of all the steps taken or the

results of the investigation. Plaintiff asserts that she was willing to speak with Speer, but only

with her attorney present, and that Apple refused to allow her to bring her attorney to the

interview because it was an “internal” Apple investigation. Plaintiff claims that the result was a

biased summary that did not tell all sides of the story. This, plaintiff asserts, Apple did not take

all reasonable steps to maintain a workplace free from discrimination.

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED, as plaintiff has not established the

existence of any actual discrimination or harassment. The alleged defects in the investigation

cannot provide a basis for a claim of failure to prevent discrimination, as plaintiff admits she

sent the November 12th e-mail in an attempt to obtain a promotion or increased

compensation, not in an effort to complain about discrimination. Moreover, the California

Supreme Court has made clear that the requirement of a fair procedure does not compel

adherence to a single process, but may be satisfied by any of a number of procedures. See

Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int’l, Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 93, 108 (1998). 

5. Defamation

In the ninth and tenth causes of action, plaintiff alleges claims of slander and libel

against Apple, Walker, and Parker, asserting that Walker and Parker made statements that

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implied that plaintiff had accessed her co-workers’ records, including their compensation

history, for her own benefit. Plaintiff alleges that these statements were false, and were

slanderous because they lowered plaintiff’s reputation in the community. 

To prevail on a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove an intentional publication of a

statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which

causes special damage. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 45, 45a, 46. Truth is a complete defense to a

claim of defamation. Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal. App. 4th 637, 646 (1999). 

In its motion, Apple argues that its potential liability is derived from the conduct of

Walker and Parker, and refers to those defendants’ motions. Walker argues that plaintiff’s

defamation claim fails to meet any of the required elements. He asserts that it is undisputed

that he was not involved in the investigation of plaintiff’s handling of Apple’s confidential

personnel information, and that he made no such statements. He contends that there is no

evidence that he communicated anything in writing on this subject to Speer or to anyone else. 

He also asserts that it is undisputed that plaintiff did access her co-workers’ private

compensation information for her own use, and argues that truth is a complete defense to a

claim of defamation. 

Parker makes arguments similar to Walker’s. She notes that it is undisputed that she

did not specifically discuss plaintiff in the course of discussing Apple’s policies regarding

confidential information with the Compensation Group employees. She also contends that

there is no evidence that she made any false verbal statements about plaintiff, or that either

she or Walker made any written statements in which they “accused” plaintiff of accessing her

co-workers’ information. Moreover, Parker notes, plaintiff did in fact access her co-workers’

private compensation information for her own purposes. Thus, she argues, as truth is a

complete defense, the claim has no merit.

Parker also asserts that plaintiff cannot establish that she suffered any special damage

as a proximate result of Parker’s investigation. Parker argues that her contention that Parker

defamed her by asking about misuse of confidential information is not defamatory on its face,

and cannot therefore be defamation per se. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is

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not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that she suffered special damages as a

result. See Cal. Civ. Code § 45a; see also 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts, § 480. 

Parker contends that plaintiff has offered no such evidence, and that the claim fails on this

ground as well.

In opposition, plaintiff asserts that she can show that Apple, through its agent Steve

Burmeister, made statements about her that were false, unprivileged, and had a tendency to

injure. She claims that during the security meeting with Parker and Hull that took place on

either November 12 or 13, 2003, Burmeister told Parker and Hull that plaintiff kept “guns” to

protect herself, and sat in her family’s living room during the L.A. riots, and that she had stated

that she would “go out in a blaze of glory” if she were ever terminated, and that she was

“looking for a big payout.” 

Plaintiff claims that Burmeister later admitted he thought plaintiff was joking when she

said she would “go out in a blaze of glory,” and that he testified that her family laughed about

her sitting in her living room with a gun. Plaintiff asserts that Burmeister “clearly” did not

believe that plaintiff posed a threat to herself or to others, and yet he told Parker and Hull that

she did. Plaintiff also claims that Burmeister testified that the comment about the “big payout”

had been made in reference to plaintiff’s supervisor at Rand, and not about her employment at

Apple, and that it was not made in the context of indicating a desire to take advantage of an

employer. 

Plaintiff asserts that the privilege that defendants now assert – the “common interest

privilege” – is not absolute. She argues that it can be overcome by evidence of actual malice

on the part of the speaker. She argues that Burmeister “clearly” did not believe the statements

he made about plaintiff were true, and that this creates a strong presumption of malice.

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED as to Walker and Parker, as plaintiff

did not oppose the motion as to those two defendants. Moreover, it is undisputed that plaintiff

did access her co-workers’ personnel records, including their compensation history, for her

own use. 

The motion must also be GRANTED as to Apple, as there is no evidence that the

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statements attributed to Burmeister were false. The statements cannot form the basis of a

libel action because there is no evidence that Burmeister made any such statements in

writing. Further, the statements do not meet the standard for actionable slander because

plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she did tell Burmeister that she kept guns to protect

herself, and sat in her family’s living room during the L.A. riots; that she would “go out in a

blaze of glory” if she were ever terminated; and that she was “looking for a big payout.” Thus

the statements are true, and cannot form the basis of a claim of defamation. 

Further, the “interested party privilege” applies to the statements made by Burmeister

to Parker and Hull during the security meeting because they were made in the course of

Parker’s privileged investigation, between people who had a legitimate interest. See Cal.

Civil Code §§ 46, 47(c); Deaile v. Gen’l Tel., 40 Cal. App. 3d 841, 846 (1974). Plaintiff has

provided no evidence to overcome that privilege, and admits that Burmeister only repeated

statements that plaintiff had admittedly made. There is no evidence of malice. The evidence

shows that Burmeister was simply trying to communicate everything he knew about plaintiff

that might have a bearing on her reaction to a suspension.

6. Invasion of privacy

In the eleventh cause of action, plaintiff alleges a claim of invasion of privacy against

Apple, Walker, and Parker, asserting that Walker and Parker, acting as agents of Apple,

confiscated plaintiff’s personal laptop computer and read and erased some of the contents.

The elements of a claim of invasion of privacy are 1) a prying or intrusion, 2) which is

offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person, 3) into a place or into affairs which are

private and entitled to be private. Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 231

(1998). To prove an actionable intrusion, the plaintiff must show that the defendant penetrated

a zone of physical privacy or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to

data about, the plaintiff. Id. at 232. The plaintiff can prove the tort only if she can show she

had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation,

or data source. Id. 

The basis of plaintiff’s claim is that Walker and Parker looked at the contents of her

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7

 Plaintiff misstates Burmeister’s testimony. In the deposition excerpt attached as Exh.

A to the DeclarationofWaukeenMcCoy,Burmeisteris recordedas testifying thathe did notknow

whetherthe documents he sawonplaintiff’s desk were EEOC complaints, and thatthe document

he took was “a yellow piece of paper that just had attorneys’ names and numbers and

addresses.” He removed this document from plaintiff’s desk because he was concerned about

where the confidential Apple personnel data “may have gone outside of the Company.”

Burmeister stated in his declarationthatwhenhe entered plaintiff’s work area onNovember 12th

to retrieve business documents, he discovered that plaintiff had left sensitive employee data

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laptop, which she used to perform Apple work, while investigating her misuse of confidential

information. Walker argues that the claim against him is baseless, as the evidence shows that

he did not even look at the laptop. Walker also asserts that Apple’s written policies made it

clear that Apple had the right to inspect computers and that their employees had no

expectation of privacy. Thus, plaintiff could not have had any reasonable expectation that the

contents of her laptop, which contained Apple information and data, would remain confidential. 

In addition, Walker points out, plaintiff consented to the brief retention and review of the

contents of her laptop.

Parker makes a similar argument, asserting that plaintiff’s claim fails because she

cannot show that she had any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in her laptop. 

Parker also contends that there was no intrusion into plaintiff’s private information. Parker

states in her declaration that she told plaintiff she would not look at plaintiff’s personal files,

and she did not. She also kept the laptop secured. When plaintiff asked for the return of her

laptop the following day, she was permitted to retrieve it, after the confidential Apple files had

been deleted. 

In opposition, plaintiff argues that Apple’s policy about searching computers applies

only to Apple-owned computers, and that Apple had no right to search her personal computer. 

Plaintiff also contends that the search was intrusive, because Apple searched all the files, not

just the Apple-related files. (She provides no evidence in support of this claim.) Plaintiff also

notes that while Apple contends it did not access any of plaintiff’s personal information from

the laptop, Burmeister testified in his deposition that he took personal papers from plaintiff’s

desk that included attorneys’ names and phone numbers, notes written by plaintiff, and

plaintiff’s EEOC complaint.7 Plaintiff claims that this act of removing the papers, and then

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unsecured on a table in her office next to what appeared to be a list of non-Apple personnel,

which further heightened his concern that plaintiff might have disclosed confidential Apple

information to third parties. 

8

 According to defendants, Apple information technology analyst Ty Weiss (“Weiss”) took

an image of plaintiff’s laptop and saved a copy on Parker’s desktop. There is no evidence that

anyone at Apple other than Parker and Weiss viewed any information on plaintiff’s laptop.

Plaintiff called the following dayand requested the returnof herlaptop,and it was returned to her.

Weiss explained that he was deleting the confidential Apple files so she could have the laptop

back. Plaintiff stated in her deposition that she was unaware of any facts suggesting that her

personal information was accessed.

9

 The claim of invasion of privacy is not asserted against Burmeister.

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copying them (which he allegedly did at Parker’s request) constituted invasion of privacy.

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED as to Walker, as there is no

evidence that he reviewed any of the information on plaintiff’s laptop. The motion must also be

GRANTED as to Parker, as plaintiff consented to hand over her laptop to Parker, and Parker

returned it when plaintiff requested it the next day. In addition, Parker states in her declaration

that she did not review plaintiff’s private information, and plaintiff provides no evidence to the

contrary.8

As for the new claim – that Burmeister took personal documents from plaintiff’s office,

and that Parker ordered them copied – the motion must be GRANTED as to Parker and as to

Apple.9 Under the circumstances (the investigation into plaintiff’s use of confidential Apple

personnel information), Burmeister was justified in removing any documents containing

employee data from the table in plaintiff’s office, and Parker was justified in asking Burmeister

to make copies. Moreover, given Apple’s written policy – that Apple may review and monitor

the contents of employees’ “computer(s), file cabinets, desks, and offices (even if locked)” –

plaintiff could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of writings she

left on a table in her office. 

7. Wrongful termination in violation of public policy

In the twelfth cause of action, plaintiff alleges wrongful termination in violation of public

policy against Apple. To establish a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

under California law, plaintiff must show (1) that she was a member of a protected class, 

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10 “A person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession,

vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic origin.” Cal.

Const., Art. I, § 8.

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(2) that she was qualified for the position she sought or was performing competently in the

position she held, (3) that she was terminated from her employment, and (4) that some other

circumstance suggests discriminatory motive – i.e., that there was a nexus between the

termination and the plaintiff's status or protected activity, 5) and damages. See Guz v. Bechtel

Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal 4th 317, 355 (2000).

In order to support a wrongful discharge claim under California law, a public policy must

be (1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) “public” in the sense that it

“inures to the benefit of the public” rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; 

(3) well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) “substantial” and “fundamental." 

Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 880, 901 (1997). 

According to the 5thAC, the policy is derived from FEHA; California Constitution,

Article 1, § 8;10 and Title VII. A discharge in violation of FEHA may give rise to a common law

claim for wrongful discharge. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 1159-60

(1998 ). Federal law, and in particular, Title VII, may supply an alternative public policy basis

for a wrongful termination claim. Phillips v. St. Mary Regional Med. Ctr., 96 Cal. App. 4th 218,

234 (2002). The constitutional prohibition against disqualifying a person from entering or

pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employment because of race, also supports

actions alleging wrongful race-based terminations of employment relationships in violation of

public policy. Sistare-Meyer v. Young Men's Christian Assn., 58 Cal. App. 4th 10, 14-15

(1997). 

Apple argues that summary judgment should be granted on this cause of action

because plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case that her termination was in violation of

public policy. To establish a prima facie case regarding her lay-off, plaintiff must show that

she belongs to a protected class, that she was performing in a satisfactory manner, was

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discharged, and was replaced by a person with inferior qualifications who was not in the

protected class. Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 354-55.

Apple contends that plaintiff cannot show that she was replaced by another person,

because the evidence shows that her duties were assumed by the employees remaining in

the Compensation Department, and no one was hired to fill her position. Thus, Apple argues,

plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case. 

Apple also contends that it has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

plaintiff’s lay-off. The budgetary shortfall in Apple’s HR Department required that some

employees be terminated. A reduction-in-force is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for

termination. Winarto v. Toshiba America, 274 F.3d 1276, 1295 (9th Cir. 2001); Martin v.

Lockheed Missiles, 29 Cal. App. 4th 1718, 1732 (1994). 

Thus, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that Apple’s articulated reason was

pretextual. Plaintiff must provide either direct evidence of discrimination, or circumstantial

evidence that Apple is biased or that Apple’s explanation is otherwise unworthy of credence. 

Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1094-95; see also Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara, 104 Cal. App. 4th

1031, 1038 (2002). Apple argues that plaintiff cannot show that Apple’s stated reason for the

lay-off – the budget cuts that required Burmeister to lay off 3 of the 7 employees who reported

to him – was pretextual. 

In opposition, plaintiff contends that she meets the elements of the prima facie case. 

She was a member of a protected class. She was rated “solid contributor” in her performance

evaluation, and asserts that she meets the burden of showing that she was performing

satisfactorily. There is no dispute that she was discharged. With regard to the fourth element,

plaintiff claims that the number of employees reporting to Burmeister actually increased within

a year after plaintiff was terminated, when Ken Lara joined plaintiff’s former group. 

She argues that Apple’s articulated reason for the lay-off was pretextual, citing to the

same facts she cited in the claims of racial discrimination. She asserts that the fact that

Burmeister made racially derogatory comments and the fact that there has been only one

African-American consultant in the Compensation Group shows that Apple’s explanation is

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unworthy of credence. 

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED. Plaintiff has not established a

prima facie case of wrongful termination, because she has not shown that she was replaced. 

The fact that someone was hired into the Compensation Group a year after plaintiff was laid

off is irrelevant, as a year is too long to show replacement. The evidence shows that

Burmeister laid off three employees (including plaintiff) in March 2003, and lost another

employee in April 2004 when Higuchi left, and was then given responsibility for a small

reporting group in addition to his three remaining Compensation Group employees. Ken Lara

replaced one of the employees in this small additional group. 

In addition, plaintiff provides no evidence showing pretext or discriminatory intent. She

provides no competent evidence that she should have been retained instead of one of the four

employees who were retained after the reduction in force. Although “solid contributor” was not

an unfavorable rating, it is undisputed that Burmeister had received complaints about 

plaintiff’s performance and attitude from two HR representatives (both African-American

women). Burmeister’s comments are not sufficient to show pretext, for the reasons stated

above in the section on racial discrimination. The fact that there was only one AfricanAmerican employee in the seven-person Compensation Group is statistically immaterial.

 8. Sexual orientation discrimination

In the thirteenth cause of action, plaintiff alleges sexual orientation discrimination

(FEHA) against Apple. Specifically, she alleges that Apple “engaged in a continuing pattern

and practice of unlawful sexual orientation discrimination . . . in connection with plaintiff’s work

assignments, promotion and the terms and conditions of plaintiff’s employment, by failing to

promote and raise the rate of compensation of plaintiff when plaintiff applied for and was

otherwise qualified for a job position and by basing the decision to discipline plaintiff on her

sexual orientation.” 

Apple asserts, however, that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with

regard to the claim of failure to promote or the claim that she was unlawfully suspended. Her

amended DFEH charge, where she for the first time asserted claims of discrimination based

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on sexual orientation and genetic characteristic, identifies the adverse action only as “laid off.” 

To exhaust her administrative remedies as to a particular act made unlawful by FEHA, the

claimant must specify that act in the administrative complaint, even if the complaint does

specify other cognizable wrongful acts. Martin v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc., 29

Cal. App. 4th 1718, 1724 (1994). Failure to exhaust is a jurisdictional defect, see id., and

Apple argues that summary judgment should be granted for this reason. 

Apple argues further that even if plaintiff had pled that her lay-off was due to her sexual

orientation, she cannot show that Apple’s articulated reason for the lay-off was pretextual. 

Apple asserts that there is no evidence that plaintiff’s sexual orientation played any role in

Burmeister’s decision to lay her off. Moreover, he had twice hired her at other companies,

and had been influential in getting her hired at Apple, and all that time he had been aware of

the fact that she was a lesbian. (Both Burmeister and plaintiff’s brother are also gay.) Apple

contends that the fact that Burmeister made the decision to lay her off establishes a strong

inference of non-discrimination as a matter of law. 

In opposition, plaintiff claims to be “at a loss as to why defendant has alleged that she

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies,” because she filed a DFEH charge in

November 2004 asserting sexual orientation discrimination. Plaintiff contends that she can

prove the elements of her claim, and that the failure to promote her, the suspension, and the

termination were motivated by sexual orientation discrimination. 

She contends that after she complained of race discrimination (referring to the

November 12th e-mail), Parker and Burmeister held a security meeting with Hull, and that

during that meeting, Burmeister indicated that plaintiff was a lesbian. He testified in his

deposition that he did so as part of an explanation as to why she might be unhappy with her

life. Plaintiff claims that there was no legitimate business reason for Burmeister to disclose

this information, and that Apple’s suggestion that was related to the security concerns is

without merit, as the fact that she was a lesbian is irrelevant to Apple’s concern over

workplace security. Plaintiff claims (without support) that Burmeister was angry that plaintiff

had made allegations that might subject him to scrutiny, and “attempted to capitalize on the

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unfortunate reality of homophobia in order to generate whatever ill-will that he could on the part

of Parker and Hull.” She claims that the fact that she was suspended for one month shows that

Burmeister was effective. 

Plaintiff asserts that Burmeister’s animus toward lesbians is shown by the fact that he

made many comments disparaging of lesbians, such as asking, “Why are lesbians so poor?” 

or “Why are lesbians so hostile?” or “Why are lesbians so violent, what is wrong with you

people?” She claims that on one occasion, Burmeister told her about a situation with a

lesbian he encountered in San Francisco, and that on another occasion, he asked, “Why are

black people, or black women, specifically black lesbians, why are they so fat?” She also

asserts that he said that “you people” must “surely love canes, because you need them to

support your weight.” She contends that he also asked why lesbians had such an affinity

towards trucks and camping. She claims to have been offended and insulted by these

comments.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the “same actor” inference is simply a presumption that can

be rebutted, and that it does not apply in this case because it was Kaufman, not 

Burmeister, who made the decision to hire her. 

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED. Plaintiff did not exhaust her

administrative remedies with regard to the claim of failure to promote or the claim that she

was unlawfully suspended. The administrative charge was premised only on her termination,

and she never alleged in the 5thAC that she was terminated based on her sexual orientation. 

Nor did she state in her deposition that her sexual orientation was a factor in her termination,

only in her suspension.

Moreover, Apple has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision

to lay her off, and plaintiff provides no substantial evidence that this explanation is pretextual,

and no evidence that her sexual orientation played any role in any decision made with regard

to her. The claim that Burmeister attempted to “capitalize on the unfortunate reality of

homophobia” is completely speculative and without support. There is no evidence that, as of

the time of the security meeting, plaintiff had made any allegations that might subject

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Burmeister to scrutiny. Nor does plaintiff provide any evidence that Parker or Hull are

homophobic, or that Burmeister’s alleged attempt to turn Parker and Hull against plaintiff was

successful. Indeed, the evidence shows that plaintiff was suspended with full pay while the

investigation as on-going, and that she was allowed to return to work with no discipline after

the investigation. 

The comments about lesbians were casual, stray comments made outside the

employment environment over a period of years by a person with whom plaintiff was

supposedly friends. Plaintiff admitted that the comments about lesbians camping, going to

dance clubs or political rallies, using canes, or being poor or hostile were sprinkled through

the many years of her friendship with Burmeister – amounting, according to plaintiff’s

deposition testimony, to maybe two or three comments a year – during which time she and

Burmeister frequently discussed their social lives, their families, their sexual orientation, and

during which time Burmeister twice personally hired plaintiff and once recommended her for a

position (at Apple) and advocated for a relatively high salary for her. 

Further, the fact that Burmeister made the decision to lay her off establishes a strong

inference of non-discrimination as a matter of law. Where the same person both hires and

fires within a relatively short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no

discriminatory motive. Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996);

Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc., 72 Cal. App. 4th 798, 809 (1999). Although, in

this case, plaintiff was hired to work at Apple by Kaufman, not by Burmeister, it is undisputed

that Burmeister recommended her for the job at Apple, and that he had previously hired

plaintiff to work under him for two other employers. 

The Ninth Circuit recently held, in Coghlan, that the burden of presenting “specific and

substantial” evidence of intentional discrimination is “especially steep” in cases where the

“same actor” inference applies. Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095. The “same actor” inference is

“neither a mandatory presumption . . . nor a mere possible conclusion for the jury to draw.” Id.

at 1098. Rather, it is a “strong inference,” and a plaintiff seeking to defeat this inference is

required to make out a strong case of bias. Id. Here, plaintiff provides no direct evidence and

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only weak and insubstantial circumstantial evidence.

9. Genetic characteristic discrimination

In the fourteenth cause of action, plaintiff alleges genetic characteristic discrimination

(FEHA) against Apple. Specifically, she alleges that Apple “engaged in a continuing pattern

and practice of unlawful genetic characteristic discrimination . . . in connection with plaintiff’s

work assignments, promotion and the terms and conditions of plaintiff’s employment, by failing

to promote and raise the rate of compensation of plaintiff when plaintiff applied for and was

otherwise qualified for a job position and by basing the decision to discipline plaintiff on her

sexual orientation.” 

Apple argues that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with regard to

the claim of failure to promote or the claim that she was unlawfully suspended. Her amended

DFEH charge, where she for the first time asserted claims of discrimination based on sexual

orientation and genetic characteristic, identifies the adverse action only as “laid off.” Failure

to exhaust is a jurisdictional defect, see Martin, 29 Cal. App. 4th at 1724, and Apple argues

that summary judgment should be granted for this reason. 

Apple also contends that plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim because she does not

meet the statutory definition of “genetic characteristic.” FEHA prohibits discrimination against

individuals who have a " physical disability, mental disability, or medical condition." Cal. Gov't

Code § 12920. "Medical condition" means either a) cancer or related health impairments, or

b) "genetic characteristics," which is defined as 

[a]ny scientifically or medically identifiable gene or chromosome, or combination

or alteration thereof, that is known to be a cause of a disease or disorder in a

person or his or her offspring, or that is determined to be associated with a

statistically increased risk of development of a disease or disorder, and that is

presently not associated with any symptoms of any disease or disorder 

or

[i]nherited characteristics that may derive from the individual or family member,

that are known to be a cause of a disease or disorder in a person or his or her

offspring, or that are determined to be associated with a statistically increased

risk of development of a disease or disorder, and that are presently not

associated with any symptoms of any disease or disorder. 

Cal. Gov't Code § 12926(h)(2). 

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Apple argues that under this definition, plaintiff can prevail on this claim only if she

shows that her obesity results from a physiological condition affecting one or more bodily

symptoms. In Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 5 Cal. 4th 1050, 1065 (1993), the California

Supreme Court held that an individual who asserts a FEHA claim on the basis of his or her

weight must adduce evidence of a physiological, systemic basis for the condition. Apple

contends that plaintiff, who testified in her deposition that she has never undergone any

genetic or medical testing, cannot establish that her weight was caused by a physiological

condition affecting one or more bodily symptoms, or that she has any other “scientifically or

medically identifiable gene or chromosomes.”

Moreover, under the FEHA definition, the genetic characteristic must not be “presently

associated with any symptoms of any disease or disorder.” Apple notes that plaintiff claimed

in her deposition that she had suffered multiple disorders because of her weight while she

was employed at Apple – high blood pressure, high cholesterol, gallbladder surgery as a

result of weight loss, removal of additional gallstone related to the gallbladder surgery. She

even claimed that doctors were advising her that she would “die” if she didn’t lose weight.

Finally, Apple argues that even if plaintiff had pled that her lay-off was based on her

weight, such a claim would fail because she has no evidence that her weight contributed to her

lay-off. She admitted that she was obese during the entire period that she knew Burmeister –

during which time he hired her into two jobs, and recommended her for a job at Apple and was

influential in getting her hired. Thus, Apple asserts, there is a strong inference of nondiscrimination as a matter of law (the “same actor” inference). 

In opposition, plaintiff claims she is “at a loss as to why defendants have alleged that

she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies,” as she filed a DFEH charge alleging

discrimination on the basis of genetic characteristics in December 2004 (actually November

2004). 

Plaintiff also claims that she has established the elements of her claim. With regard to

Apple’s argument that her weight does not meet the definition of a “genetic characteristic,”

she asserts that the opinion in Cassista is distinguishable because the plaintiff there had sued

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for disability discrimination, not genetic characteristic discrimination. She also claims that the

fact that she has not undergone genetic testing does not mean that there is not a genetic basis

for her obesity. She claims to have offered evidence that her obesity is caused by genetics –

pointing to her deposition testimony that several family members are clinically obese, and that

African-American women suffer disproportionately from obesity-related disease such as

stroke and heart disease. She claims that genetic testing would be expensive, and there

would be no benefit to her of incurring this expense, as there is no gene therapy for obesity. 

She asserts that Burmeister has shown evidence of animus toward obese people –

specifically, that he told her on a number of occasions that her chances of promotion at Apple

would be better if she lost weight. She adds that despite Apple’s evidence that Walker and

plaintiff’s brother Byron Patterson were obese at one time, this does not mean that no one at

Apple discriminated against plaintiff because of her weight. She speculates (without any

support) that it is “one of life’s hard realities” that physical imperfections are less tolerated in

women than in men – suggesting that people at Apple would view Walker’s obesity as

tolerable, while at the same time discriminating against her because of her weight. 

Finally, she argues that the “same actor” inference does not apply because it is a

presumption that can be rebutted. She notes that it was Kaufman who hired her, not

Burmeister. She claims that the fact that Burmeister knew of plaintiff’s obesity before she was

hired is not dispositive, as she asserts that her weight fluctuated during the years that she and

Burmeister were acquainted. She also claims that she had gastric-bypass surgery while she

was at Apple, and in fact weighed considerably less when she was terminated than when she

was hired, but that Burmeister knew she was having problems with the post-surgery diet, and

therefore “had no reason to believe” she would keep her weight down.

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED. Plaintiff did not exhaust her

administrative remedies with regard to the claim of failure to promote or the claim that she

was unlawfully suspended. The administrative charge was premised only on her termination,

and she never alleged in the 5thAC that she was terminated based on a genetic

characteristic. 

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Moreover, her obesity does not meet the statutory definition of “genetic characteristic”

– specifically, that the genetic characteristic not presently be associated with the symptoms of

any disease or disorder. Even if plaintiff had provided proof that her excess weight was

caused by some “scientifically or medically identifiable gene or chromosome,” she has

admitted that her obesity was “associated with . . . symptoms of . . . disease or disorder” –

specifically, that she suffered from high blood pressure, and high cholesterol, and that she was

required to undergo gallbladder surgery as a result of weight loss, and removal of additional

gallstone related to the gallbladder surgery. 

Finally, the “same actor” inference requires that plaintiff provide specific and

substantial evidence of pretext. The only evidence she provides are the statements allegedly

made by Burmeister, to the effect that she would go farther at Apple if she lost weight. These

comments are little more than stray remarks about other decisionmakers. Plaintiff provides

no evidence that Burmeister ever told her plaintiff that his own decisions about her would be

different if she were to lose weight. Plaintiff even admitted at her deposition that Burmeister

indicated to her that her weight “wasn’t a factor in his mind, but it was a factor in others’

minds.” Standing alone, Burmeister’s comments are not sufficient to overcome the strong

inference of non-discrimination created by the fact that Burmeister twice hired plaintiff and

gave her a strong recommendation when she applied at Apple. 

10. Punitive damages

Defendants argue that the summary judgment should be granted as to the prayer for

punitive damages because plaintiff has not provided evidence of oppression, fraud, or malice. 

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED, as the court has found that summary

judgment appropriate as to all the causes of action in the 5thAC.

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

A. Legal Standard

Rule 11 sanctions may appropriately be imposed on the signer of a paper "if either (a)

the paper is filed for an improper purpose, or (b) the paper is 'frivolous.’” Townsend v.

Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc). A paper is

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"frivolous" if it is "both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry." Id.;

Buster v. Greisen, 104 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 1997). An assertion is baseless where it

completely lacks a factual foundation, see Montrose Chem. Corp. of Calif. v. American

Motorists Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir.1997), and a competent attorney could not

form a reasonable belief that it is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for

extension, modification or reversal of existing law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2); Golden

Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir.1986). Both the

"baseless" and "reasonable inquiry" determinations are governed by an objective standard of

"reasonableness under the circumstances." In re Keegan Mgmt Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431,

434 (9th Cir.1995) (confirming approach in Townsend).

B. Motion for Sanctions

Apple and Walker move for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,

arguing that the original complaint as well as all the amended complaints were presented to

the court for an improper purpose, that the claims and legal contentions related to Walker in

those complaints are unwarranted by existing law, and that the allegations against Walker lack

factual support. They seek fees and costs incurred in the defense of the claims asserted

against Walker – which they estimate at $24,000 to date. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and

also moves for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, requesting $3,120.

Plaintiff alleged five claims against Walker – racial harassment (FEHA), retaliation

(FEHA), slander, libel, and invasion of privacy. Defendants assert that it was clear from

plaintiff’s deposition that all these claims lacked any factual foundation from the time they were

asserted, but that plaintiff nonetheless included the allegations against Walker each time she

amended her complaint. 

On December 9, 2004, after completing the first three days of plaintiff’s deposition,

defense counsel sent Patterson and her counsel a letter addressing the lack of factual support

and legal viability of her claims against Walker. Defense counsel urged plaintiff’s counsel to

dismiss the claims against Walker. In response, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint in

which she added a claim of retaliation against Walker personally. After defense counsel

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wrote plaintiff’s counsel another letter pointing out the lack of a factual basis for those claims in

the third amended complaint, plaintiff filed a fourth amended complaint asserting an additional

claim of retaliation against Walker. 

Plaintiff took the depositions of Burmeister in October 2004, Parker in February 2005,

and Walker in March 2005. All three deponents, and especially Walker, confirmed Walker’s

lack of involvement in the investigation into plaintiff’s access and misuse of confidential Apple

personnel records. Following that deposition, on April 19, 2005, defendants’ counsel sent

another letter urging plaintiff to drop the claims against Walker. Plaintiff’s response was to file

a fifth amended complaint, alleging the same claims against Walker, and containing the same

factual allegations that the depositions had shown to be untrue (e.g., that Walker disabled

plaintiff’s network access, “interrogated” her co-workers about her, and prevented plaintiff

from attending her therapy appointment). According to defendants, plaintiff’s counsel never

responded to the April 19, 2005, letter. 

Defendants argue that the undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff had only two or

three personal contacts or interactions with Walker, and that those, according to plaintiff’s

deposition testimony, were brief and pleasant. Indeed, in one of them, Walker complimented

her on a report she had prepared. Walker had no involvement in hiring plaintiff, in supervising

her, or in the investigation into plaintiff’s inappropriate misuse of confidential Apple

information. When he received plaintiff’s November 12th e-mail stating her view that she

should receive a raise and a promotion, Walker asked Sheri Parker, Apple’s Director of

Employee Relations, to investigate the situation and take appropriate action. The evidence

shows further that Walker did not make the decision to suspend plaintiff – Parker did that –

and that he did not make the decision to lay her off during the March 2004 reduction in force –

that was Burmeister’s job.

Defendants argue that all five of the claims asserted against Walker are baseless. 

First, they assert that the racial harassment claim is without merit because, as disclosed in

discovery, Walker was not responsible for any of the acts that plaintiff claimed constituted

harassment (creating a new policy for the Compensation Department regarding work hours,

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interrogating plaintiff’s co-workers about her, preventing plaintiff from attending therapy

appointments, disabling plaintiff’s network and building access during her suspension, and

removing plaintiff’s name from her door). Moreover, defendants contend that the alleged

harassing conduct all constituted “personnel management activity,” which was related to a

legitimate investigation of plaintiff’s misuse of confidential employee information, and which

cannot constitute harassment as a matter of law. In addition, they assert that plaintiff has no

evidence of racial animus on the part of Walker, and that the conduct was not “severe” or

“pervasive.”

Second, defendants argue that the retaliation claim lacks a factual or a legal

foundation. The retaliation claim alleges all the same conduct as the harassment claim, and

defendants assert that discovery showed it was plainly without merit for the same reasons. 

Defendants also contend that this claim is without merit because plaintiff cannot show she was

subjected to an adverse action.

Third, defendants argue that the two defamation claims lack both a factual and a legal

basis. In the cause of action for defamation, plaintiff alleges that Walker made statements

implying that she accessed her co-workers’ records, and accused plaintiff of accessing her

co-workers’ compensation information in a writing transmitted to the independent investigator

and Burmeister. Defendants assert that the depositions showed that Walker was not involved

in the investigation of plaintiff’s violation of Apple’s confidential information policies, and that

there was never any evidence that Walker communicated anything about plaintiff in writing to

Speer or to anyone else. Finally, defendants contend that these claims lack a factual and

legal basis, because plaintiff admitted that she did access her co-workers’ private

compensation information for her own use, and the alleged defamatory statements were

therefore non-actionable because they were true.

Fourth, defendants contend that the privacy claim against Walker lacks a factual and

legal basis. The basis of the claim against Walker was the assertion that he looked at the

contents of her personal laptop – which she used to perform Apple work – while investigating

her misuse of confidential information. Defendants note that plaintiff testified in her deposition

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that she was unaware that anyone other than Parker and Weiss (the technician) had reviewed

any material on her laptop, let alone personal information. Moreover, defendants assert that

Walker’s deposition confirmed that he was not involved in the investigation, and that he had

asked Parker to handle it. Defendants argue in addition that there is no legal basis for the

privacy claim because Apple’s written policies make it clear that Apple has the right to inspect

computers and that the employees have no expectation of privacy in the contents of their

computers.

In opposition, plaintiff argues that the motion is frivolous, claiming that she did not do

anything prohibited by Rule 11, and asserting that she has provided sufficient evidence to

support every cause of action alleged in this lawsuit. She contends that after Walker received

her complaint that she was being treated differently in the workplace than her non-Black

counterparts (referring to the November 12th e-mail), she was suspended, forced to turn over

her personal computer, harassed, kept idle with no work when she returned from the

suspension, and then wrongfully terminated.

Plaintiff claims that she had a reasonable basis for believing that Walker was involved

in the acts at issue in the lawsuit. For example, she asserts that Burmeister told her that while

he had made the recommendations regarding the merit increases, Walker had done the

evaluations and determined the merit increases himself. She claims she was “in no position

to dismiss Dan Walker with nothing more than the self-serving statements of the defendant

upon which to base her decision.” She also asserts that it is for the trier of fact to weigh the

credibility of the witnesses, where their statements are in conflict with each other. 

Plaintiff maintains that each of her claims against Walker are warranted by existing law. 

First, she contends that the harassment claim is valid because Burmeister testified that he

gave Burmeister free rein, and the evidence shows that Burmeister made a number of

derogatory comments about African-Americans.

Second, she asserts that the retaliation claim against Walker has merit because she

has established all the elements of the claim. She submits that even though she testified that

the November 12th e-mail was not a complaint of racial discrimination, the fact was that it

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specifically identified a number of non-African-American employees in the Compensation

Group who were paid less than plaintiff was. Thus, plaintiff asserts, she engaged in protected

activity. She also claims that she suffered adverse action, in that her work load was reduced

after she returned from the suspension, and because she was terminated. She asserts further

that there is a triable issue as to pretext, claiming that the “timing” of the adverse actions is

suspect. Specifically, she notes that immediately after she wrote an e-mail to Walker

requesting that he end the discriminatory conduct of Apple with regard to salaries, she was

suspended for one month, her laptop was confiscated, and then she was terminated.

Third, plaintiff claims the defamation claims have merit, because she can show that

Burmeister made statements about her that were false and non-privileged, and which he did

not believe were true.

Fourth, she contends that the privacy claim is valid. She argues that Apple’s policy

regarding inspection of computers applies to Apple computers, not to personal computers. 

She also contends that Burmeister’s act of removing personal papers from the table in her

office, and then copying them at Parker’s request, satisfies the elements of invasion of

privacy. 

Finally, she argues that she is entitled to sanctions under Rule 37 for her counsel’s time

in “responding to this baseless motion.”

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED. Plaintiff has provided no facts to

support the racial harassment claim against Walker, failed to state any factual or legal basis

for the retaliation claim or the defamation claim against Walker, and stated no facts showing

that her invasion of privacy claim was well-grounded in fact or law. On more than one

occasion, defendants put plaintiff on notice that her claims against Walker were frivolous, but

plaintiff persisted. 

Plaintiff has misstated the standard for Rule 11. Defendants do not base the motion

solely on Walker’s testimony, but on the facts that, for example, plaintiff herself could not testify

to any harassment by Walker, that none of the statements in the defamation claim had

anything to do with Walker, and that plaintiff testified that she had no knowledge that Walker or

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anyone other than Parker and Weiss looked at the contents of her laptop. It is not necessary

that defendants establish bad faith on plaintiff’s part, as Rule 11 sanctions do not depend on a

finding of bad faith or malicious motive. Rather, the test is an objective one – “if the paper

filed is . . . frivolous, legally unreasonable or without factual foundation even though . . . not filed

in subjective bad faith.” Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Rule 11 sanctions are plainly warranted where claims against any defendant are frivolous,

even though a plaintiff may have stated a non-frivolous claim against another. Townsend, 914

F.2d at 1141-44. 

Rule 11 also applies to plaintiff’s continued advocacy of the claims against Walker by

filing multiple amended complaints alleging retaliation without any basis in law or fact, refusing

to withdraw her claims against Walker, responding to interrogatories stating that Walker had

acted deliberately and without regard to the high probability of economic harm to plaintiff, and

opposing the motion for sanctions and attempting to mislead the court by misrepresenting

Walker’s deposition testimony. 

The court awards defendants $5,000 in sanctions against plaintiff and her counsel, the

Law Offices of Waukeen Q. McCoy. The "central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless

filings in District Court and thus . . . streamline the administration and procedure of the federal

courts . . . . Although the rule must be read in light of concerns that it will spawn satellite

litigation and chill vigorous advocacy . . . any interpretation must give effect to the Rule's

central goal of deterrence." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). The

court finds that an award of sanctions in the amount of $5,000 is sufficient to serve the goal of

deterrence, as articulated by the Supreme Court. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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11 It is not clear why plaintiff moved for sanctions pursuant to Rule 37. Sanctions may be

awarded under Rule 37, upon motion, for failure to comply with a discovery order.

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Plaintiff’s request for Rule 37 sanctions is DENIED.11 

Defendants’ motion to strike all late-filed papers is GRANTED, as stated at the

hearing.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 19, 2005

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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