Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01293/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01293-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MACK A. WEST, Jr.,

Plaintiff,

v.

NOEL DIZON,

Defendant.

No. 2:12-cv-1293 MCE DAD P

ORDER AND

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an action for alleged violations of his 

civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Both parties have recently filed their pre-trial 

statements. The case is currently scheduled to commence trial before the Honorable Chief Judge 

Morrison C. England, Jr., on January 4, 2016. There are three motions currently pending before 

the court which will be addressed below.

I. Plaintiff’s Request for Injunctive Relief

First, plaintiff, who is housed at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP), seeks a “special 

order” from this court to remove “ongoing impediments” that he claims obstruct his contact with 

inmates at other California prisons whom he would call as witnesses at his trial. (ECF No. 129.) 

The undersigned construes the request as one for a preliminary injunction.

A preliminary injunction should not issue unless necessary to prevent threatened injury 

that would impair the court’s ability to grant effective relief in a pending action. “A preliminary 

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injunction . . . is not a preliminary adjudication on the merits but rather a device for preserving the 

status quo and preventing the irreparable loss of rights before judgment.” Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. 

Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). A preliminary injunction represents 

the exercise of a far reaching power not to be indulged except in a case clearly warranting it. 

Dymo Indus. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964). “The proper legal standard 

for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the 

merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, 

Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 

Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (internal quotations omitted)). In cases brought by prisoners 

involving conditions of confinement, any preliminary injunction “must be narrowly drawn, 

extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, 

and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

A plaintiff cannot, as a general matter, obtain injunctive relief against non-parties. 

“Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits[.]” George v. Smith, 507 

F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). However, a federal court does have the power to issue orders in 

aid of its own jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and to prevent threatened injury that would 

impair the court’s ability to grant effective relief in a pending action. Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. 

Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984); Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 

863 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Defense counsel’s opposition to plaintiff’s motion for this “special order” includes several 

sworn declarations from prison officials and counsel’s own letter of July 14, 2015, written to 

plaintiff, in which counsel updates plaintiff on the status of his requests to communicate with five 

other inmates. These documents detail a concerted effort by defense counsel and the litigation 

coordinators from at least three different California prisons to facilitate correspondence between

plaintiff and his potential trial witnesses. The documents show that two of the inmates, Jones and 

Ellard, have received plaintiff’s correspondence. (See Declaration of E. Takehara (ECF No. 132-

2) at 2; Letter from Tracy S. Hendrickson (ECF 132-6) at 5.) As defense counsel put it to 

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plaintiff in her letter to him, “[n]either I nor the litigation coordinators can control when and 

whether your inmate witnesses submit correspondence to be reviewed and processed back to the 

SVSP litigation coordinator for review and delivery to you.” (ECF No. 132-6 at 5.) Defense 

counsel further informed plaintiff that another two of the inmates, Chalk and Lee, have been 

released from CDCR custody. (Id.) As for plaintiff’s purported fifth potential trial witness, 

inmate Barker, an employee in the litigation office at SVSP states that plaintiff was required to resubmit his request to write Barker and, as of August 10, 2015, had not done so. (See Declaration 

of V. Ryan (ECF No. 132-3) at 1.)

Based on defense counsel’s showing in opposition to plaintiff’s “special motion,” the 

undersigned concludes plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any relief he presently seeks is 

essential to preserve the status quo in the underlying action. More significantly, plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that in the absence of preliminary relief he is likely to suffer irreparable harm –

either on the merits of the instant litigation or, more fundamentally, to his person.1 “Speculative 

injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary 

injunction.” Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 

Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984)). A presently 

existing actual threat must be shown in order to be entitled to preliminary injunctive relief, 

although the injury need not be certain to occur. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 

Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); FDIC v. Garner, 125 F.3d 1272, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1997);

Caribbean Marine, 844 F.2d at 674. Plaintiff has not made the required showing.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to the 

preliminary injunctive relief he seeks. His motion for a “special order” should therefore be 

denied.

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The same is true of any suggestion plaintiff makes regarding his access to the prison law 

library. A quick review of the docket shows that plaintiff’s activity in this case remains as 

prolific as ever, including (but not limited to) his recently filed pre-trial statement, which, with its 

exhibits, registers at 149 pages long. (See ECF No. 130.)

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II. Motion for Court Appointed Doctor

Next, plaintiff asks the court to appoint a doctor to testify as an expert witness at his trial. 

Plaintiff claims that his case “presents a complex issue” regarding the physical effects of 

“ongoing harassment or retaliation[.]” (ECF No. 135 at 1.) Trial in this case will concern two 

alleged instances of retaliation against plaintiff that occurred in May 2009. Plaintiff’s retaliation 

claims present no complex medical questions. His motion to appoint a doctor to testify on his 

behalf will be denied. 

III. Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time

Finally, defendant moved for two additional days in which to file his pre-trial statement. 

(ECF No. 133.) That motion will be granted, and defendant’s pre-trial statement will accepted by 

the court as timely filed.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for a court-appointed doctor to testify on his behalf at trial (ECF No. 

135) is denied.

2. Defendant’s motion for extension of time to file a pre-trial statement (ECF No. 133) is 

granted. Defendant’s pre-trial statement filed August 19, 2015 (ECF No. 137) is accepted by the 

court as timely filed.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for a “special order” (ECF No. 

129), which the court should construe as a motion for preliminary injunction, be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

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parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: August 26, 2015

hm

west1293.ord(9)

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