Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01605/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01605-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FORREST LEE JONES,

Petitioner,

v.

JEANNE S. WOODFORD,

Respondent.

 /

1: 06 CV 01605 OWW WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 13]

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

On May 19, 1995, in Kings County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted of one count of

first degree burglary with two prior convictions of the same offense. The trial court sentenced

Petitioner to 25 years to life in state prison under California’s “Three Strikes Law.” Petitioner filed

a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“Court of Appeal”) and on

September 30, 1996, the court affirmed the judgment. Petitioner sought review in the California

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Supreme Court and the court denied the petition on November 4, 1996.

Petitioner filed petitions in both the Fresno County Superior Court and the Court of Appeal,

contending, as he does here, that he is entitled to credits earned through his participation in the

Inmate Work/Training Incentive Program. These petitions were denied on March 23, 2006, and

April 13, 2006, respectively.

Petitioner filed the present petition in this court on November 9, 2006.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out Pleasant Valley

State Prison, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). 

Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

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respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

In his petition, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to and has a federally protected liberty

interest in retaining credits he believes he has earned through his forced participation in the

California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation’s Inmate Work Training Incentive Program

(“IWTIP”). Petitioner claims that both penal and administrative statutes mandate that when conduct

credits and work-time credits are combined, inmates in CDCR “shall automatically” be given dayCase 1:06-cv-01605-JTM -NLS Document 19 Filed 02/20/08 Page 3 of 9
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for-day credits pursuant to Penal Code Section 2933. He further contends that even if he was not

entitled to halftime credits for both his conduct and worktime, he is entitled to the credits he has

already earned under equitable estoppel principles and his right to due process. He relies for this

contention on his assertion that he was forced to participate in the IWTIP.

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on three grounds. First, Respondent contends that

this petition is untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. Second, Respondent contends that

Petitioner does not state a federal claim in regard to his claim that the CDCR misapplied specific

sections of the California Penal Code. Third, Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim based on a

violation of equal protection rights does not state a federal claim.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

Petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5

of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be

raised by the Attorney General, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” 

The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss as a request for the court to

dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 th

F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and

case law, the court will review respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

Timeliness

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim that the CDCR incorrectly calculated his parole

date is untimely. Respondent claims that staff calculated Petitioner’s Minimum Eligible Parole Date

on January 24, 2000, using credit code number 35. Respondent provides a supporting exhibit in the

form of Petitioner’s January 24, 2000 Legal Status Summary. He states that under credit code

number 35, the prisoner is assigned a zero credit earning status when his Minimum Eligibility Parole

Date is calculated. Respondent claims that under these facts, Petitioner should have discovered the

factual predicate for any claim based on a failure to properly calculate his Minimum Eligibility Date

on January 25, 2000. Petitioner, however, did not begin the state review process until March 9,

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2006, when he filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in Fresno County Superior Court. 

Respondent concludes, therefore, that Petitioner allowed the applicable one-year statute of

limitations expire before beginning the state review process.

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In this case, Petitioner contends that his present petition is timely, because he did not

discover the factual predicate of his claim until much later than alleged by Respondent. He argues

that the fact that staff allegedly filed out a Legal Status Summary Sheet in 2000, does not

demonstrate that he was served with a copy of this document. He states that to the contrary, he has

never seen this Legal Status Summary. He further states every time he moved to a new program

assignment he filed out form after form, informing him that he was earning credits. Petitioner claims

that upon becoming aware of the claim in January of 2006, he pursued his claim through the

administrative channels at the CDC and then, in March of 2006, in the state courts.

Respondent did not file a reply to Petitioner’s opposition to the motion. Respondent offers

no proof in his motion that Petitioner received a copy of 2000 Legal Status Summary at any

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particular time. In light of the arguments made by Petitioner, this court is unable to find as a matter

of law that Petitioner became aware of the factual basis of his claim in January 2000. Accordingly,

the court is unpersuaded by Respondent’s contention that this petition is untimely.

Due Process Claim

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim that California law requires inmates in CDCR to

be given day-for-day conduct credits fails to state a federal claim. Citing In re Cervera, 24 Cal.4th

1073, 1080, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s conviction under Penal Code section 667 prohibits

him from earning credits for use against his mandatory indeterminate term of life imprisonment. 

Respondent further argues that the proper application and interpretation of state law is not amenable

to federal habeas review. 

In response, Petitioner argues in detail that Respondent fails to properly differentiate between

worktime and conduct credits, and that after 1987, all inmates are entitled to two types of credits

under Penal Code Section 1191.3, and that Section 667 limits worktime credits to 20%. Petitioner

also his claim that he has a due process right to retain credits he has already earned under the IWTIP. 

Respondent’s response to this claim is that simply alleging a due process right in Respondent’s

correct interpretation of state law cannot convert a state law claim into a federal claim. See Langford

v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9 Cir. 1996). th

The court disagrees with Respondent’s characterization of Petitioner’s claim as merely

alleging a due process right in the CDCR’s correct interpretation of state law. Petitioner presents a

reasoned argument that he has already earned both worktime and conduct credits, which cannot now

be taken away from him without due process. See generally, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

556 (1974)( prisoners retain their right to due process subject to the restrictions imposed by the

nature of the penal system). The court finds that Respondent has not addressed that claim.

Accordingly, the court rejects Respondent’s contention that Petitioner has not stated a federal

claim as a basis for dismissal of this case. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)(when a

state prisoner is challenging the duration of his physical imprisonment and the relief he seeks is a

determination that he is entitled to speedier release from such imprisonment, his sole federal remedy

is a writ of habeas corpus).

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Equal Protection Claim 

Petitioner claims that he has been deprived of equal protection of the law because similarly

situated prisoners have received the credits which he has been denied. 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated

alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal

protection claim may be established in two ways. First, a plaintiff establishes an equal protection

claim by showing that the defendant has intentionally discriminated on the basis of the plaintiff's

membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th

Cir.2001). Under this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff must show that the defendants’ actions

were a result of the plaintiff’s membership in a suspect class, such as race. Thornton v. City of St.

Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). 

If the action in question does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may establish an

equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated

differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook v.

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972);

Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir.2004); SeaRiver Mar. Fin.

Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). To state an equal protection claim under

this theory, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class; (2) the

plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; and (3) there is no

rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. If an equal

protection claim is based upon the defendant’s selective enforcement of a valid law or rule, a

plaintiff must show that the selective enforcement is based upon an "impermissible motive." Squaw

Valley, 375 F.3d at 944; Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.1995).

In this case, Petitioner makes no claim that he is a member of a protected class. Petitioner

must therefore show, in part, that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly

situated. Petitioner has submitted as an exhibit to his petition copies of legal status sheets from other

prisoners who were not convicted as third strike offenders under California Penal Code section 667,

the Third Strike Law. These status sheets which purportedly show these prisoners earning credits at

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a different rate than Petitioner. As Respondent argues, this does not support Petitioner’s equal

protection claim, because these prisoners are not similarly situated to Petitioner, who was convicted

as a third strike offender. Further, the court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner cannot show the

lack of a rational basis in treating him differently than prisoners who were not convicted under the

Three Strikes Law. See McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834-35 (9 Cir. 1991)(finding no th

denial of equal protection in having persons subject to different sentencing systems). Accordingly,

the court must conclude that Petitioner fails to state an equal protection claim.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Respondent’s contention that this petition

is untimely and as to Respondent’s contention that Petitioner fails to state a federal claim for

on due process based on the claim that Respondent misapplied California law when

calculating his credits;

2) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the Respondent’s contention that

Petitioner fails to state a claim for a violation of the right to equal protection of the law;

3) Respondent SHALL SUBMIT a RESPONSIVE pleading by filing one of the following: 

A. AN ANSWER addressing the merits of the Petition and due within NINETY (90)

days of the date of service of this order. Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases; Cluchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1473-1474 (9 Cir. 1985) (court has th

discretion to fix time for filing an Answer.).

Respondent SHALL INCLUDE with the Answer any and all transcripts or other

documents necessary for the resolution of the issues presented in the Petition. Rule 5 of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

Any argument by Respondent that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim(s) 

SHALL BE MADE in an ANSWER that also addresses the merits of the claims asserted.

This is to enable the Court to determine whether Petitioner meets an exception to procedural

default. See, Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 396 (9 Cir. 1997) (Procedurally defaulted th

claims may be reviewed on the merits to serve the ends of justice); Jones v. Delo, 56 F.3d

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878 (8 Cir. 1995) (the answer to the question that it is more likely than not that no th

reasonable juror fairly considering all the evidence, including the new evidence, would have

found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily requires a review of the

merits). 

Petitioner’s TRAVERSE, if any, is due THIRTY (30) days from the date

Respondent’s Answer is filed with the Court.

All motions shall be submitted on the record and briefs filed without oral argument unless

otherwise ordered by the Court. Local Rule 78-230(h). All provisions of Local Rule 11-110

are applicable to this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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