Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06409/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06409-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

CARLTON K. HILLMON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

EDWARD S. ALAMEIDA, et al., )

) 

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F- 03-6409 REC DLB P 

FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS RE

DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL

MOTION TO DISMISS 

(DOC 25) 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. This action involves allegations that the California Department

of Corrections’ grooming policy violates plaintiff’s religious beliefs. Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss on June 14, 2004. On October 7, 2004, this Court entered Findings and Recommendations

recommending that the motion be granted on the ground that the Ninth Circuit has determined that

the California Department of Corrections’ grooming standards on hair length serve legitimate

penological interests and do not infringe on inmates’ First Amendment rights, citing Henderson v.

Terhune, 379 F.3d 709 (2004). Plaintiff filed objections to the Findings and Recommendations on

December 2, 2004. On December 2, 2004, the District Court vacated the Findings and

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Recommendations. The Court noted that plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges a violation of the

Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), which the Ninth Circuit did

not address in Henderson. Accordingly, the Court remanded the motion to dismiss to the Magistrate

Judge for further consideration on the merits of the motion under the RLUIPA. On January 18,

2005, the Court ordered defendants’ to file supplemental briefing on their motion to dismiss

addressing the RLUIPA. Defendants filed their supplemental motion to dismiss on January 26,

2005. Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 22, 2005 and Defendants filed a reply on March 23,

2005. The Court now enters findings and recommendations on defendants’ supplemental motion to

dismiss.

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must accept as true

the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,

and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied,

396 U.S. 869 (1969). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984)(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake

Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims that the California Department of Corrections grooming standards found at

California Code of Regulation, Title 15, Section 3062 violate his rights under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments in that wearing long hair in “unferreted [sic] growth of locks” is part of his

unspecified religion. Plaintiff contends that he may receive disciplinary violations for refusing to cut

his hair and may later be denied parole. Plaintiff also alleges the regulation violates the RLUIPA. 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive and monetary relief.

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Defendants claim that to the extent defendants are sued in their official capacities, they are

entitled to sovereign immunity. Defendants reassert their motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First

Amendment claim, arguing that there is a rational relationship between the grooming regulations and

a legitimate governmental objective. See Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 715-16 (9th Cir.

2004). Defendants further argue that the RLUIPA is unconstitutional and to the extent it is

constitutional, the grooming standards do no substantially burden plaintiff’s exercise of his religion,

they serve a compelling governmental interest and are the least restrictive means of advancing that

interest. Finally, defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity.

A. Defendants Sued in their Official Capacity.

The Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against state officials in their official

capacity. See Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); Eaglesmith

v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1996); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992). 

However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in their

personal capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Ashker v. California Dep’t of

Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 168 (1997); Pena v. Gardner, 976

F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992). “Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a

government official for actions [the official] takes under color of state law. See Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1988). Where plaintiff is seeking damages against a state official, such

as in the instant action, this “necessarily implies” a personal-capacity suit because an officialcapacity suit would be barred. See Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968,

973 n.16 (9th Cir. 1994); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284

(9th Cir. 1994); Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, where a plaintiff is

seeking injunctive relief against a state official in their official capacity, the claim is not barred. See

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491. U.S. 58, 71 n. 10. 

Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff seeks damages against defendants in their official

capacities, his claims are dismissed. 

///

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B. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim.

The California Code of Regulations provides as follows:

[a] male inmate’s hair shall not be longer than three inches and shall

not extend over the eyebrows or below the top of the shirt collar while

standing upright. Hair shall be cut around the ears, and sideburns shall

be neatly trimmed, and shall not extend below the mid-point of the ear. 

The width of the sideburns shall not exceed one and one-half inches

and shall not include flared ends.

Cal. Code Regs., Title 15, ¶ 3062(e). Plaintiff claims that wearing his hair long is mandated by his

religious beliefs. (Compl., p. 3). Plaintiff claims that if he refuses to cut his hair, he will receive

disciplinary reports for refusing to cut his hair. (Compl., p. 2). 

The Ninth Circuit has determined that the California Department of Corrections’ grooming

standards on hair length serve legitimate penological interests and do not infringe on inmates’ First

Amendment rights. Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 713 (2004). Because the grooming

standards have been upheld despite inmates’ claims of violation of First Amendment rights, plaintiff

fails to state a claim, and the Court recommends dismissal of this claim.

C. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA Claim.

The RLUIPA provides that: 

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person

residing in or confined to an institution. . . , even if the burden results from a rule of

general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the

burden on that person–

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. The RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of

religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc-5(7)(A). “A person may assert a violation of [RLUIPA] as a claim or defense in a judicial

proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” § 2000cc-2(a). 

The Supreme Court recently upheld RLUIPA against a challenge under the Establishment

Clause. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005). The Court found that RLUIPA’s

institutionalized persons provision was compatible with the Court’s Establishment Clause

jurisprudence and concluded that RLUIPA “alleviates exceptional government created burdens on

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private religious exercise.” Id. at 2121. The Court characterized RLUIPA “[a]s the latest of long

running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened protection from government

imposed burdens . . .” Id. At 2117. The Court noted that Congress sought to provide inmates a

mechanism to seek redress against the “’frivolous or arbitrary’ barriers [that] impeded

institutionalized persons’ religious exercise,” (Id. 2119) by replacing the “legitimate penological

interest” standard articulated in Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), with the “compelling

government interest” and “least restrictive means” tests codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). See

Cutter, 125 S.Ct at 2119. 

Following Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Ninth Circuit recently reversed the Central District

Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction in a suit challenging the same CDC hair grooming policy

at issue in the present case. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, - F.3d. - 2005 WL 1792117 (9th Cir.

2005). The Court found that CDC had failed to demonstrate that the disputed grooming policy was

the least restrictive means necessary to ensure prison safety and security. Because the plaintiff

established a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility that the grooming policy would

cause him to suffer an irreparable injury, the Court reversed the District Court’s denial of the

preliminary injunction.

Under RLUIPA, plaintiff bears the initial burden of going forward with evidence to

demonstrate a prima facie claim that CDC’s grooming policy and its punitive sections designed to

coerce him to comply with that policy constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise of his religious

beliefs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). If plaintiff establishes the prima facie existence of such a

substantial burden, on which he bears the burden of persuasion, the CDC shall bear the burden of

persuasion to prove that any substantial burden on plaintiff’s exercise of his religious beliefs is both

“in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and the “least restrictive means of furthering

that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); § 2000cc-2(b). By its terms,

RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor of protecting an inmate’s right to exercise his religious

beliefs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).

///

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1. Substantial Burden

While RLUIPA does not define “substantial burden,” the Ninth Circuit has held in the

context of a land use suit brought under RLUIPA that “for a land use regulation to impose a

substantial burden, it must be ‘oppressive’ to a ‘significantly great’ extent. San Jose Christian Coll.

v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004). In Warsoldier v. Woodford, - F.3d. -

2005 WL 1792117 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that the same grooming policy was a

substantial burden on the plaintiff’s religious practices because it “intentionally puts significant

pressure on inmates such as Warsoldier to abandon their religious beliefs by cutting their hair . . .” 

Warsoldier v. Woodford, - F.3d. - 2005 WL 1792117 at *5.

In his complaint, plaintiff states that wearing his hair long is part of his religious belief and

therefore the grooming standards violate his rights under RLUIPA. In opposing the motion to

dismiss, plaintiff asserts that he has taken a vow of a “Nazarite.” Plaintiff contends that the

“unfettered growth of Plaintiff’s dreadlocks is a fundamental aspect of Plaintiff’s sincerely held

religious beliefs and absolutely mandated by scripture as a fundamental practice.” Plaintiff’s

Opposition at p. 7:3-6. 

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing that the regulation

substantially burdens his religious activity because the regulation has only an incidental effect that

makes it more difficult to practice his religion. Defendants argue the impact is “de minimis” at most.

The Court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true in ruling on a motion to dismiss. In

doing so the Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently stated facts, which if proved, would establish

that the regulation imposes a substantial burden on the practice of plaintiff’s religion.

2. Compelling Government Interest

Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim under RLUIPA that the challenged regulation

constitute a substantial burden on the exercise of his religious belief, the burden shifts to defendants

to establish that the regulation is in furtherance of a compelling government interest and is the least

restrictive means if furthering that compelling governmental interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). 

Defendants argue that prison officials have an interest in identifying inmates who are outside their

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approved area; preventing disturbances or escape; facilitating searches of inmates for concealed

contraband, including dangerous materials, by reducing the difficulty and time needed to conduct

searches; aiding the promotion of hygienic and healthy living conditions inside the prisons;

promoting effective use of safety devices and positive self-image for inmates; and reducing

animosity among inmates stemming from displays of individual loyalties or preferences by requiring

a more uniform appearance. 

As stated by the Court in Warsoldier v. Woodford, prison security is clearly a compelling

governmental interest Warsoldier v. Woodford, - F.3d. - 2005 WL 1792117 at *6, citing Pell v.

Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974). “Rather, the question is whether CDC's grooming policy is the

least restrictive alternative available to CDC to reach its compelling interest.” Id.

3. Least Restrictive Alternative

Assuming defendants have established the grooming policy furthers a compelling

government interest, they must still establish that the grooming policy is the least restrictive

alternative to achieve that interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Defendants argue that this Court

must find that the grooming policy is the least restrictive alternative to achieve the compelling

government interests because the Court must give deference to the experience and expertise of prison

administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security

and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources. Given the state of the

law regarding RLUIPA, the Court declines to find, as a matter of law, that the grooming regulations

are the least restrictive alternative to further defendants’ compelling government interest. 

In summary, plaintiff has stated facts that if proved, establish that the grooming regulation

substantially burdens the exercise of his religion. While defendants have a compelling government

interest in prison security, it they have is not established as a matter of law that the grooming

regulation is the least restrictive alternative to achieve those interests. Plaintiff need not allege facts

sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 

Plaintiff need only allege facts sufficient to give defendants fair notice of the basis of plaintiff’s

claims. Id. at 514. defendants’ arguments should be advanced in a motion for summary judgment,

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not a motion to dismiss. Whether or not the government substantially burdened the practice of

plaintiff’s religion and whether or not, if a substantial burden is found, there is a compelling interest

and the burden imposed is the least restrictive means are issues that are not appropriately resolved at

the pleading stage on a motion to dismiss. Id. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

RLUIPA claim should be denied.

D. Qualified Immunity

Finally, defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct

violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In ruling upon the issue of qualified

immunity, the initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, the facts alleged show the defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, a violation can be made out, the next step is to ask

whether the right was clearly established. Id. In resolving these issues, the court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of

plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Turning first to plaintiff’s free exercise claim, as discussed above, the Court has found that

the grooming policy does not violate plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and therefore qualified

immunity is not applicable. 

With respect to plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim, as discussed, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient

to state a claim for violation of RLUIPA.

RLUIPA was enacted in 2000 and has not yet generated much caselaw. Given the very

recent nature of the limited case law regaridng RLUIPA, the court finds that plaintiff’s right under

RLUIPA to be exempted from the grooming policy based on his religious beliefs is not sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violated that right. Saucier,

533 U.S. at 202. Accordingly, the court recommends that defendants’ motion for qualified immunity

on plaintiff’s damages claims under RLUIPA be GRANTED.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that defendants’ motion to

dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED in part as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for damages against defendants in

their official capacities be GRANTED;

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amendment claim be GRANTED;

3. Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under the RLUIPA be DENIED;

4. Defendants be granted qualified immunity as to plaintiffs claims for damages against

defendants under RLUIPA; and 

5. This case proceed on plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief under RLUIPA.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty (20)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations." The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 22, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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