Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08020/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08020-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jace F. Eden, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-08020-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

 

 Petitioner Jace Eden filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. On January 12, 2016, Magistrate Judge Metcalf issued a 65-page 

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) that the Petition be dismissed with prejudice. 

Doc. 34 at 64. Petitioner objected to the R&R. Doc. 37. The Court will deny the 

objections and accept Judge Metcalf’s recommendations in full. 

I. Background. 

 Petitioner seeks habeas relief from a sentence imposed by the Navajo County 

Superior Court on April 5, 2012. That sentence is based on the revocation of probation in 

two cases: (1) a 2007 aggravated driving under the influence (“DUI”) conviction; and 

(2) a 2009 stalking conviction. It is also based on two new convictions: (1) a 2009 

aggravated DUI; and (2) a 2011 sexual abuse. Petitioner entered into a consolidated plea 

agreement and received an effective sentence of 5.75 years. 

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 A. 2007 DUI, CR2007-01075 and CR2009-00017. 

 Petitioner was indicted twice for events occurring on or about June 7, 2007. 

Doc. 26-1 at 13 (CR2007-01075), 18-19 (CR2009-00017). The first indictment included 

one count for aggravated DUI on a suspended license. Id. at 13. The second indictment 

included two counts: (1) aggravated DUI as a third DUI offense within 84 months; and 

(2) aggravated DUI with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more as a third DUI 

offense within 84 months. Id. at 18. The cases were subsequently consolidated for 

purposes of trial under Rule 13.3 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 27. 

Petitioner was represented in this consolidated matter by attorney Kate Roberts. Id. at 15. 

 After a two-day trial, the jury returned the following verdict: (1) not guilty as to 

count one, aggravated DUI with a suspended license; (2) guilty of the lesser-included 

offense of count one of driving while impaired to the slightest degree; (3) guilty as to 

count two, aggravated DUI as a third DUI offense within 84 months; and (4) guilty as to 

count three, aggravated DUI with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more as a 

third DUI offense within 84 months. Docs. 26-1 at 135; 26-2 at 58-65. On August 27, 

2009, Petitioner was sentenced to four months of incarceration with credit for one day 

already served, and four years of probation, to run concurrently. Doc. 26-2 at 69-70, 95. 

 Petitioner challenged his conviction on direct appeal. Petitioner was represented 

during the appeal by attorney Benjamin Brewer. Id. at 97. Petitioner raised four 

arguments: (1) the trial court erred in denying his request for sanctions based on the 

State’s untimely disclosure of the traffic stop and DUI investigation recording; (2) he was 

denied due process by the recording’s untimely disclosure; (3) he was denied the right to 

cross-examine and confront witnesses with the recording; and (4) the trial court erred in 

denying his request to stay his imprisonment pending appeal. Id. at 98. The Court of 

Appeals rejected each argument. Id. at 111. The court vacated, sua sponte, Petitioner’s 

conviction of the lesser-included offense of count one, driving while impaired to the 

slightest degree, because it was also a lesser-included offense of the aggravated DUI as a 

third DUI offense within 84 months charge, of which he was convicted. Id. at 111-13. 

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The court found that this duplicate conviction violated Petitioner’s double jeopardy 

rights. Id. at 113. 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. at 116-

25. Petitioner sought review only on the trial court’s failure to grant a continuance as a 

sanction for the State’s untimely disclosure of the recording. Id. at 117. On August 1, 

2011, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Id. at 127-28. 

 B. 2009 Stalking, CR2009-00700. 

 Petitioner was indicted for events that occurred between February 2007 and April 

2009. The indictment contained counts of stalking and influencing a witness. Id. at 156-

57. Petitioner was represented by attorney Kate Roberts. Id. at 186. After a two-day 

bench trial, the court entered a verdict of: (1) guilty as to the stalking count; and (2) not 

guilty of influencing a witness. Id. at 192. On July 9, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to 

two days incarceration with credit for two days already served, and three years of 

probation, to run concurrently with his probation term from the 2007 DUI. Id. at 221-22. 

Petitioner did not appeal the conviction or sentence. Doc. 34 at 6. 

 C. 2009 DUI, CR2009-00960. 

 Petitioner was indicted for events occurring on August 16, 2009. The indictment 

contained two counts: (1) aggravated DUI as a third DUI offense within 84 months; and 

(2) aggravated DUI with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more as a third DUI 

offense within 84 months. Doc. 26-3 at 12-13. The indictment was subsequently 

amended to allege Petitioner’s prior felony convictions and his probationer status as of 

August 16, 2009. Id. at 24-26. Petitioner was represented by attorney Benjamin Brewer 

until May 25, 2011, at which point attorneys Ronald Wood and Dirk LeGate appeared on 

his behalf. Docs. 26-3 at 28; 26-4 at 23. 

 D. 2011 Sexual Abuse, CR2011-00340.

 Petitioner was indicted for events occurring on or about May 13, 2011. The 

indictment was for sexual assault. Doc. 26-4 at 166. The indictment was subsequently 

amended to allege Petitioner’s prior felony convictions and his probationary status as of 

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May 13, 2011. Id. at 182-84. Petitioner was represented attorneys Ronald Wood and 

Dirk LeGate. Doc. 26-4 at 23. 

 E. Consolidated Plea Agreement. 

 On September 1, 2011, Petitioner entered into a consolidated plea agreement 

covering the 2009 DUI charge, the 2011 sexual abuse charge, and the probation 

violations related to the 2007 DUI conviction and the 2009 stalking conviction. Doc. 26-

4 at 154-56; see also Doc. 26-5 at 32-37. Petitioner was represented during the change of 

plea hearing by attorney Dirk LeGate. Doc. 26-4 at 154. 

 On December 13, 2011, Petitioner was not present for sentencing and the court 

issued a warrant for his arrest. Doc. 26-5 at 39. Attorneys Wood and LeGate were 

permitted to withdraw from representation. Id. at 41-42. 

 On December 28, 2011, Petitioner made an initial appearance on his bench 

warrant. Id. at 44. The court appointed attorney Sam Roser to represent Petitioner during 

sentencing, which occurred on April 5, 2012. Id. at 46-47, 70-73. Petitioner was 

sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment for the sexual abuse charge and 4.5 years for the 

aggravated DUI charge, to run concurrently. Id. at 71-72. Petitioner also received 

additional a concurrent sentence for violation of his probation from the 2007 DUI 

conviction. Id. at 73-74. Because Petitioner violated the terms of his probation for the 

2009 stalking charge, he received an additional 0.75 year sentence to run consecutively to 

the other sentences. Id. at 75. Petitioner therefore received an effective sentence of 5.75 

years, less time served, for the 2009 DUI conviction, the 2011 sexual abuse conviction, 

and violation of probation for the 2007 DUI conviction and the 2009 stalking conviction. 

Petitioner did not appeal. Id. at 79. 

 F. Subsequent Proceedings. 

 On May 25, 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se notice of post-conviction relief in the 

Navajo County Superior Court. Id. at 79-80. Attorney Brett Rigg subsequently appeared 

to represent Petitioner. Id. at 82. Rigg filed a notice of no colorable issues in the 

Superior Court and sought withdrawal, which the court granted. Id. at 85-86, 88. 

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 On June 3, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at 

91-122. His Rule 32 petition focused on alleged failings of his prior counsel, including 

attorneys Brewer, Wood, Roser, and Rigg. Id. at 92. The petition also alleged various 

forms of misconduct involving prosecutors and judges. Id. at 100-03. The court 

dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition. Doc. 26-6 at 99-114. 

 Petitioner filed several motions related to his Rule 32 petition, each of which was 

denied. First, Petitioner sought an injunction to obtain DNA testing in connection with 

the 2011 sexual abuse charge. Id. at 19. The court denied his request, finding that 

Petitioner had not provided a reasonable probability he would not have been convicted or 

would have obtained a more favorable sentence had DNA testing been conducted. Id. at 

59-60. Second, Petitioner sought court records and transcripts as part of his Rule 32 

proceedings. Id. at 2-4. The court ordered that he receive two transcripts, but not a 

January 21, 2011 transcript. Id. at 6. Third, Petitioner filed a request for discovery and 

an evidentiary hearing (id. at 62-65), which was denied (Doc. 27-5 at 79). Fourth, 

Petitioner filed a motion for judgment by default because the State had failed to timely 

respond (Doc. 26-6 at 79-81, 86-90, 92-94), which was denied (id. at 83, 96). Fifth, 

Petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend his Rule 32 petition (Doc. 26-7 at 14-19), 

which was also denied (id. at 69). 

 Petitioner filed a special action to appeal the dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. Docs. 26-7 at 71-73; 26-8 at 2-32. The Arizona Court of Appeals 

declined to exercise special action jurisdiction. Doc. 26-9 at 122-23. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 A party may file specific, written objections to an R&R within fourteen days of 

being served with a copy of it. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(b) (“Section 2254 

Rules”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court must 

undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific objections are 

made. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 

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part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. Section 2254 Rules 

8(b); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

III. Analysis. 

 Petitioner objected to Judge Metcalf’s R&R on 17 different grounds. The Court 

will refer to the objections using Petitioner’s numbers. See Doc. 37. 

 A. Grounds One and Two. 

 Grounds One and Two are closely related. In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that 

Judge Metcalf erred in concluding that two of Petitioner’s filings were untimely: his 

April 10, 2014 notice of appeal (Doc. 26-7 at 71-73) and his July 23, 2014 petition for 

review of the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction review (Doc. 37-4 at 17-35). 

See Doc. 37 at 1, 17. Petitioner argues that because he had requests for transcripts 

pending, the time within which he could file his petition for post-conviction review was 

tolled under A.R.S. § 13-4234(H) and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(d). Doc. 37 at 17. 

Petitioner asserts that the time between the filing of his notice, May 25, 2012 (see 

Doc. 37-1 at 7), and the date on which he received his last records, April 1, 2014 (see id.

at 9), was tolled. Doc. 37 at 17. In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that a miscarriage of 

justice occurred as a result of having to file his petition for post-conviction review before 

receiving the outstanding transcript. Id. at 2-3. 

 Both grounds lack merit. The Ninth Circuit “has specifically stated that federal 

habeas relief is not available to redress alleged procedural errors in state post-conviction 

proceedings.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) 

(finding state court judge’s violation of Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(c) during post-conviction 

proceedings inappropriate for federal habeas relief). Even if Petitioner’s allegations that 

the trial court violated A.R.S. § 13-4234(H) and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(d) are true, this 

Court may not correct these errors on habeas review. Moreover, Petitioner has not 

asserted any specific harm or prejudice that resulted from being denied the transcripts. 

The Court concludes that Petitioner’s filings were untimely, and any claims contained 

within the petition for post-conviction review are procedurally barred. 

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B. Ground Three. 

 Petitioner objects to Judge Metcalf’s conclusion that claims raised for the first 

time in a petition for review before the Arizona Supreme Court were not fairly presented. 

Docs. 34 at 27; 37 at 4. The Ninth Circuit has “held that to exhaust a habeas claim, a 

petitioner must properly raise it on every level of direct review.” Casey v. Moore, 386 

F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Raising “federal constitutional claims 

for the first and only time to the state’s highest court on discretionary review” is not fair 

presentation. Id. at 918. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his convictions or 

sentences for the 2009 stalking charge, the 2009 DUI charge, or the 2011 sexual abuse 

charge. Docs. 26-5 at 79; 34 at 6. As a result, no claims arising from these proceedings 

could be fairly presented in a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Petitioner did file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence for his 2007 DUI. See

Doc. 26-2 at 97. The Court carefully compared the four claims raised in Petitioner’s 

direct appeal (id. at 98) with the claims raised in his petition for review (see Doc. 27-3 at 

46-62), and finds that the claims raised in his petition for review were not raised on direct 

review. The Court therefore finds that Petitioner’s claims were not fairly presented in his 

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

C. Ground Four. 

 Petitioner objects to Judge Metcalf’s conclusion that Petitioner’s double jeopardy 

claims in his special action to the Arizona Court of Appeals were not fairly presented 

because a special action is a discretionary proceeding. Docs. 34 at 33-34; 37 at 5. 

Petitioner insists that his double jeopardy claims were fairly presented simply because 

they were presented to the Court of Appeals in a special action. Doc. 37 at 5. Because 

Petitioner fails to account for the unique characteristics of an interlocutory appeal in the 

double jeopardy context, the Court agrees with Judge Metcalf. 

 A claim raised for the first time in a discretionary proceeding, such as a special 

action, is not fairly presented for purposes of habeas review. See Roettgen v. Copeland, 

33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)). A 

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double jeopardy claim, however, is fairly presented in a special action if it is used to 

obtain interlocutory1

 appellate review of the claim. See State v. Moody, 94 P.3d 1119, 

1133, ¶ 22 (Ariz. 2004) (citation omitted). “The reasons underlying the preference for 

special action review of denials of motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy are 

obvious: Because the Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees the right to be free from 

subsequent prosecution, the clause is violated by the mere commencement of retrial.” Id.

(citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1977)). Petitioner raised a variety 

of double jeopardy claims in his special action proceedings (see Doc. 26-8 at 26), but not 

as interlocutory appellate review. He brought those proceeding after the trial court’s final 

ruling on the entire case. Petitioner’s double jeopardy claims were not fairly presented 

for purposes of habeas corpus review. 

 D. Ground Five. 

 Petitioner asserts that Judge Metcalf wrongly concluded that five claims for 

ineffective assistance of counsel were not raised in his petition for post-conviction 

review. Docs. 34 at 45; 37 at 6. The five claims are as follows: (1) in the 2007 DUI, 

Roberts failed to raise the double jeopardy violation regarding the lesser included 

offense; (2) in the 2007 DUI, Brewer failed to file charges of false imprisonment based 

on the double jeopardy violation; (3) in the 2009 DUI and 2011 sexual abuse charge, 

Roser failed to compare the presentence report with the plea agreement and failed to 

object to the use of the additional charges in the 2007 DUI as a sentence enhancement; 

(4) in the 2009 DUI and 2011 sexual abuse charge, Roser failed to correct sentencing 

errors in the plea agreement admitting the probation violations; and (5) in the 2009 DUI 

and 2011 sexual abuse charge, Roser failed to ensure the sentencing minute entry 

reflected the vacatur of his misdemeanor conviction in the 2007 DUI. Doc. 34 at 45. 

 Claims presented for the first time in a petition for review of the denial of a 

petition for post-conviction review are unexhausted. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c); see 

 

1

 An interlocutory appeal is “[a]n appeal that occurs before the trial court’s final 

ruling on the entire case.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 

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also State v. Vera, 334 P.3d 754, 756-57, ¶ 8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). Petitioner contends 

that the first claim was raised in his petition for post-conviction review. See Doc. 37 at 6. 

The Court disagrees. The cited portion of the petition for post-conviction relief is 

discussing actions taken by Brewer, not Roberts. Doc. 26-5 at 93. The paragraph begins 

by referring to Brewer, not Roberts. Id. Roberts is not mentioned anywhere in that 

paragraph. Id. This ineffective assistance of counsel argument is clearly directed at 

Brewer, not Roberts. The four other claims are similarly not contained in the petition for 

post-conviction relief. Petitioner failed to present these five claims for ineffective 

assistance of counsel in his petition for post-conviction relief. 

 E. Ground Six. 

 Petitioner objects to Judge Metcalf’s statement that Petitioner’s counsel may have 

made “strategic choices” in declining to pursue certain claims. Doc. 37 at 6. Petitioner’s 

objection is directed solely towards Judge Metcalf’s formulation of the legal standard. 

He does not object, in Ground Six, to Judge Metcalf’s application of the legal standard. 

A party wishing to object to magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must file 

specific written objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (“Within 14 days after being served 

with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written 

objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”) (emphasis added). 

Petitioner has failed to do so in this case. 

 F. Ground Seven. 

 Petitioner objects to Judge Metcalf’s conclusion that “because, at the time 

Petitioner’s [post-conviction relief] proceeding he had already fully served the sentence 

on the lesser included offense, any challenge by [post-conviction relief] counsel would 

have been futile.” Docs. 34 at 48; 37 at 7. Petitioner asserts that had his counsel raised 

the double jeopardy issue, it would have “invalidated the indictment,” which means that 

his subsequent convictions would not have resulted in probation violations and his 2007 

DUI would not have been counted as a prior felony. Doc. 37 at 7. The Court does not 

agree. Petitioner has not provided, nor has the Court found, authority for the proposition 

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that a double jeopardy violation vacates both the lesser included offense and the greater 

conviction. The greater conviction in the 2007 DUI would still count as a prior felony 

and the subsequent convictions remain probation violations. As Judge Metcalf 

concluded, because “the additional sentence was already served” and the greater offense 

from the 2007 DUI conviction stands, “any attack based on such sentence was moot.” 

Doc. 34 at 48. 

 G. Ground Eight. 

 Judge Metcalf concluded that Petitioner could have earlier raised his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims against attorney Roberts for her failure to raise the double 

jeopardy issue in connection with his 2007 DUI conviction. Doc. 34 at 47-48. Petitioner 

objects, arguing that his petition for post-conviction relief in 2012 was his first 

opportunity to raise this issue in the state courts. Doc. 37 at 9. The Court does not agree. 

First, even if it is true, Petitioner’s allegation that “the trial court dropped the ball and 

never provided counsel” after he filed a notice of post-conviction relief does not entitle 

him to federal habeas relief. See Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 939 (The Ninth Circuit “has 

specifically stated that federal habeas relief is not available to redress alleged procedural 

errors in state post-conviction proceedings.”) (citations omitted). Second, as discussed 

above, there can no continuing prejudice stemming from this ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim because the Court of Appeals vacated the conviction and Petitioner already 

served the additional sentence. 

 H. Ground Nine. 

 Petitioner argues that attorney Roser’s failure to correct sentencing errors in the 

consolidated plea agreement constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Docs. 34 at 

50-54; 37 at 10. The sentencing error that Petitioner complains of is that the plea 

agreement lists the violations of the terms of his probation for CR2007-01075, and not 

for CR2009-00017. Doc. 37 at 10. Petitioner contends that he was prejudiced because he 

was not permitted to rescind the plea agreement at the sentencing hearing and proceed to 

trial on the charges. Id. The Court has closely reviewed the transcript of the April 5, 

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2012 sentencing hearing. See Doc. 26-5 at 46-68. There is no truth to the assertion that 

Petitioner requested, and was denied the ability, to rescind the plea agreement during the 

sentencing hearing. The Court agrees with Judge Metcalf’s conclusions that “it is clear 

that the parties utilized interchangeably the case numbers from the consolidated cases 

(CR2007-1075 and CR2009-0017) on the 2007 DUI,” and that “Petitioner was admitting 

a violation of probation in the 2007 DUI and agreeing to be sentenced to a presumptive 

prison term for that violation.” Doc. 34 at 53. Again, Judge Metcalf correctly concluded 

that “Petitioner ultimately received what he bargained for: a presumptive prison term on 

the aggravated DUI probation violation.” Id. 

 I. Grounds Ten, Eleven, and Twelve. 

 Petitioner argues that Judge Metcalf erred by finding that his claim of actual 

innocence was based on speculation that DNA testing could prove his innocence. 

Docs. 34 at 58-60; 37 at 11-12. Petitioner asserts that DNA testing could prove his actual 

innocence with respect to the DUI charge (Ground Ten) and the 2011 sexual abuse 

charge (Ground Eleven), and that it was error to deny him an evidentiary hearing 

(Ground Twelve). The Court again disagrees. 

 In Ground Ten, Petitioner asserts that the “State admitted that the blood test was 

performed outside the statutory window of 2 [hours], see A.R.S. [§] 28-1381(A)(2), 

which procedurally barred the State from using it as evidence.” Doc. 37 at 11 (emphasis 

added). As an initial matter, Petitioner’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(2) 

appears to be incorrect. See State v. Stanley, 172 P.3d 848, 853, ¶ 24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2007) (“To avoid additional evidentiary hurdles, the police typically need to have the 

blood sample drawn within two hours of the arrest.”) (citing A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(2) 

(emphasis added)). More fundamentally, however, Petitioner seeks to improperly 

broaden his claim by asserting additional operative facts not presented to the state courts. 

Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1995). Petitioner’s arguments involving 

DNA testing have all been directed at the sexual abuse case, not the DUI cases. See, e.g., 

Docs. 26-5 at 96-97; 26-6 at 19-20, 22-57; 26-8 at 25. Petitioner’s petition for a writ of 

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habeas corpus does not even address DNA testing in connection with Petitioner’s DUIs. 

See Doc. 1 at 21. The Court therefore rejects Petitioner’s Ground Ten. 

 In Ground Eleven, Petitioner contends that Judge Metcalf erred by rejecting 

Petitioner’s assertion that DNA testing in the sexual abuse case could prove his actual 

innocence. Docs. 34 at 58-60; 37 at 12. Petitioner asserts that if he had “used his mouth, 

penis, and/or fingers then the alleged victim[’s] DNA would [have] been transferred onto 

the Petitioner.” Doc. 37 at 12. But Petitioner does not establish how this could exculpate 

him from the sexual abuse. As Judge Metcalf correctly notes, “[t]his case is not an 

ordinary case of mistaken identification of a stranger as a rapist.” Doc. 34 at 59. There is 

ample incriminating evidence, even without inculpatory DNA evidence. The victim 

knew the Petitioner, she immediately identified him as the assailant, police officers found 

Petitioner in the area where the victim was assaulted, and Petitioner was extremely 

intoxicated. Id. Petitioner has failed to establish that DNA testing would show actual 

innocence. United States v. Watson, 792 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Where the 

presence or absence of the movant’s DNA would not show actual innocence, there is no 

reason to test for it.”); Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 

U.S. 52, 62 (2009) (“DNA testing alone does not always resolve a case. Where there is 

enough other incriminating evidence and an explanation for the DNA result, science 

alone cannot prove a prisoner innocent.”). The Court therefore rejects Ground Eleven. 

 In Ground Twelve, Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing “because the lack of 

DNA transfer will prove the innocence of the Petitioner” in the sexual abuse case. 

Doc. 37 at 12. The decision of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is soundly within 

the discretion of the district court. Campbell v. Blodgett, 982 F.2d 1356, 1358 (9th Cir. 

1993) (citation omitted). A petitioner may be entitled to additional discovery if good 

cause has been shown. Section 2254 Rules 6(a). As discussed above, Petitioner has 

failed to establish good cause for conducting DNA testing. Moreover, the question of 

whether the prosecutor complied with ER 3.8(g) and (h) of the Arizona Rules of 

Professional Conduct is not an appropriate issue for habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“Today, we reemphasize that it 

is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on 

state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding 

whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”) 

(citations omitted). The Court therefore rejects Ground Twelve. 

 J. Ground Thirteen. 

 Judge Metcalf concluded that because “all of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

defaulted, discovery is only appropriate as necessary to establish cause and prejudice or 

Petitioner’s actual innocence.” Doc. 34 at 61. Petitioner objects to Judge Metcalf’s 

conclusion that he should not be granted an evidentiary hearing because he has failed to 

establish cause and prejudice or actual innocence with respect to the Wood and Brewer 

interviews or the Roberts deposition. Doc. 37 at 13. The Court agrees with Judge 

Metcalf. Petitioner fails to explain how the interviews or the Roberts deposition could 

establish his actual innocence. The fact that he talked about legal strategy with his 

lawyers would not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. In addition, Petitioner also 

alleges violations of A.R.S. § 13-4238(A) and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.8(a), which provide 

for evidentiary hearings during post-conviction proceedings in certain circumstances. 

Neither A.R.S. § 13-4238(A) nor Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.8(a), however, provides an 

appropriate basis for federal habeas relief. See Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 939 (The Ninth Circuit 

“has specifically stated that federal habeas relief is not available to redress alleged 

procedural errors in state post-conviction proceedings.”) (citations omitted). The Court 

rejects Ground Thirteen. 

 K. Ground Fourteen. 

 Petitioner objects to Judge Metcalf’s conclusion that Petitioner has failed to 

establish how the complete booking video of his arrest for the 2007 DUI would establish 

his actual innocence. Docs. 34 at 61; 37 at 14. Petitioner argues that the lack of the 

complete booking video constitutes “prosecutorial misconduct causing the trial court[’s] 

judgment to be voided.” Doc. 37 at 14. The Court disagrees. As Judge Metcalf correctly 

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concluded, “[a]t most, Petitioner suggests that [the complete booking video] would 

reflect a falsification of the timing of the blood draw,” but he “fails to show that such 

falsification would establish his actual innocence.” Doc. 34 at 6. The Court therefore 

rejects Ground Fourteen. 

 L. Ground Fifteen. 

 Petitioner once again argues that his petition was not untimely, and therefore 

procedurally barred, based on the pending requests for transcripts. Doc. 37 at 15. This is 

merely a repackaging of Grounds One and Two. See supra Section III(A). For the 

reasons stated above, the Court rejects Ground Fifteen. 

 M. Grounds Sixteen and Seventeen. 

 In Ground Sixteen, Petitioner objects to Judge Metcalf’s statement that “any 

ineffectiveness of [post-conviction relief] counsel in failing to raise [five claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel against trial and appellate counsel set forth above in 

Ground Five] could constitute cause under Martinez [v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012)].” 

Docs. 34 at 46; 37 at 16. In Ground Seventeen, Petitioner argues that the trial court’s 

correction of a sentencing error proved that attorney Rigg provided ineffective assistance. 

Docs. 34 at 10; 37 at 16. A party wishing to object to a magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation must file specific written objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (“Within 

14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may 

serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and 

recommendations.”) (emphasis added). Petitioner fails to argue with any specificity that 

any of the five claims in Ground Sixteen constitute cause under Martinez. Nor does he 

specifically object to any portion of Judge Metcalf’s R&R in Ground Seventeen. The 

Court therefore rejects Grounds Sixteen and Seventeen. 

 

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 IT IS ORDERED:

1. Magistrate Judge Metcalf’s R&R (Doc. 34) is accepted, Petitioner’s 

petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is denied, and a certificate of 

appealability is denied. 

2. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action. 

Dated this 11th day of March, 2016. 

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