Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00084/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00084-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEDRO REYES,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16-CV-84 JLS (BLM)

ORDER: (1) ADOPTING REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION; (2) 

DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT: 

AND (3) DENYING AS MOOT 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS

(ECF Nos. 70, 76, 79)

Presently before the Court are Defendants R. Ortega, R. Beltran, and R. Madden’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim, 

(ECF No. 70). Also before the Court are (1) Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major’s Report 

and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Court grant Defendants’ motions 

to dismiss, (ECF No. 76); and Plaintiff Pedro Reyes’s Objections to the R&R, (“R&R 

Objs.,” ECF No. 78). Defendants did not file a reply. After considering the parties’ 

arguments and the law, the Court rules as follows.

/ / /

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BACKGROUND

Judge Major’s R&R contains a thorough and accurate recitation of the factual and 

procedural histories underlying the instant Motion to Dismiss. (See R&R 1–5.)

1 This 

Order incorporates by reference the background as set forth therein. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

court’s duties regarding a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court 

“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also 

United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980). In the absence of a timely 

objection, however, “the Court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the 

face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory 

committee’s note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 510 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

ANALYSIS

I. Summary of the R&R Conclusion 

A brief summary of this case’s procedural history is relevant here. On January 5, 

2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 19), and Plaintiff 

requested leave to amend his complaint, (ECF No. 30). This Court granted Plaintiff’s 

motion to amend and denied as moot Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 36.) On 

July 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint, (“FAC,” ECF No. 37), and

alleged Defendants Madden, Ortega, Beltran, and Does 1 through 6 violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights. (R&R 2.) Plaintiff alleged that he was forced to endure unsafe prison 

conditions, was denied adequate medical care, and suffered cruel and unusual punishment. 

 

1 Pin citations to docketed material refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page.

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(See generally FAC.) On April 4, 2017, Judge Major issued a Report and Recommendation 

that concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference against 

Defendants Ortega, Madden, and Beltran. (“Prior R&R,” ECF No. 57.) This Court 

adopted Judge Major’s prior R&R, dismissed all Plaintiff’s claims, but granted Plaintiff 

leave to amend so that he could plead a declaratory relief claim first raised in his prior 

objections to the prior R&R. (“Prior Order,” ECF No. 63.)

On August 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint, (“SAC,” ECF 

No. 69), which again names Defendants Ortega, Madden, and Beltran and the Doe 

Defendants in the caption. (R&R 3–4.) On August 30, 2017, Defendants filed the pending 

Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 70.) Defendants moved to dismiss only two portions of 

Plaintiff’s SAC: his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant 

Ortega and his declaratory relief claim against Defendant Beltran. (See ECF No. 70-1.) 

Judge Major’s R&R addresses both issues.

First, Judge Major recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference

allegations against Defendant Ortega because they lack specificity how Defendant Ortega 

violated Plaintiff’s rights. (R&R 7.) In the “Parties” section of the SAC, Plaintiff states 

“Defendant Ortega is a medical doctor, who at all times relevant hereto was assigned to 

Centinela State Prison.” (Id. (quoting SAC 4).) The only other reference to Defendant 

Ortega in the entire SAC is Plaintiff’s statement that “[i]t is, without any doubt to the 

common layman, the fault of Defendant Ortega that Plaintiff continues to suffer from 

delayed treatment after the accident on March 11, 2015.” (Id. (quoting SAC 2).)

Judge Major found that Plaintiff satisfies the objective prong of the test for an Eighth 

Amendment “deliberate indifference” violation because the Court must accept as true 

Plaintiff’s allegations that he fell down and seriously injured his neck, resulting in the need 

for surgery. (Id. at 8–9.) However, Judge Major found that Plaintiff failed to meet the 

subjective prong because he simply has not alleged any facts describing Defendant 

Ortega’s role in his medical treatment. (Id. at 9.) Thus, Judge Major recommends that the 

Court grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of 

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deliberate indifference against Defendant Ortega without leave to amend. (Id. at 10.) 

Second, this Court previously allowed Plaintiff to amend his complaint to plead a 

declaratory judgment claim against Defendant Beltran as to the “constitutionality of the 

policy, practice, or custom Beltran might have been complying with.” (Prior Order 7.) The 

Court reasoned that it appeared that Plaintiff sought to challenge a policy Defendant 

Beltran followed rather than Beltran’s decision to follow that policy. (Id.) Thus, the Court 

concluded that it would be appropriate to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his 

complaint to address the policy itself. Judge Major concludes that, despite the opportunity 

to state a claim for declaratory judgment, Plaintiff fails to mention any policy that 

Defendant Beltran did or did not follow, or a policy that was unconstitutional in some way. 

(R&R 10.) Because Plaintiff does not identify any policy, Judge Major recommends 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Beltran be dismissed without leave to amend. (Id.)

II. Summary of Plaintiff’s Objections

Plaintiff mailed a document to the Clerk of Court on January 16, 2018, which was 

filed January 18, 2018. That document contains both objections to the R&R and what 

appears to be Plaintiff’s third amended complaint. For reasons discussed in the Conclusion, 

the Court construes the January 18, 2018 document as only Plaintiff’s objections, not an 

amended complaint.

Plaintiff objects to Judge Major’s R&R on two grounds. First, Plaintiff appears to 

argue that Defendant Ortega was responsible for Plaintiff’s care, Plaintiff sustained injuries

resulting in surgery, and therefore Defendant Ortega violated Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights. (R&R Objs. 1.) Plaintiff points to Judge Major’s prior R&R where she recognized 

that Plaintiff met the objective prong for a deliberate indifference claim. (Id.) He argues 

that Defendant Ortega was the “attending Doctor when [Plaintiff] went to see [Defendant 

Ortega] about his injuries” and “Dr. Ortega was responsible for [Plaintiff’s] woulds [sic] 

and injuries.” (Id.) Plaintiff reiterates that Defendant Ortega’s medical assistance was 

“way below standard.” (Id. at 3.) 

Second, Plaintiff states the following as to Defendant Beltran: “that defendant was 

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the first one to deniy [sic] me any kind of assistance in the matter nad [sic] is liable for 

them [sic] actions under the law and should be put on the first addresses in the court asking 

why he never acted according to law.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff does not further address 

Defendant Beltran in his objections.

III. Court’s Analysis 

The Court will review, de novo, those parts of the R&R to which Plaintiff objects.

A. Defendant Ortega

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from delayed treatment after his accident, due to 

Defendant Ortega’s actions. (R&R 7.) Further, his objections to Judge Major’s R&R again 

reiterate that Defendant Ortega’s medical assistance was “way below standard.” (R&R 

Objs. 1.) Thus, Plaintiff’s SAC seeks to state a claim for deliberate indifference under the 

Eighth Amendment.

An inmate has an Eighth Amendment right to adequate physical and mental health 

care. Doty v. Cnty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). “To establish 

unconstitutional treatment of a medical condition . . . a prisoner must show deliberate 

indifference to a “serious” medical need. Id. (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 

1059 (9th Cir. 1992)). Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate is 

inconsistent with the basic standards of human decency and antithetical to the Eighth 

Amendment’s proscription of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Gregg v. 

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).

A determination of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need involves a twostep analysis consisting of both objective and subjective inquiries. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 837 (1994). First, the plaintiff must demonstrate a serious medical need such 

that failure to provide treatment could “result in further significant injury” or “unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Second, the plaintiff must show that the 

defendant’s response to the medical need was deliberately indifferent. Id. (citing 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059–60).

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Deliberate indifference consists of (1) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (2) harm caused by the indifference. Id. Such 

indifference may be manifested when “prison officials deny, delay[,] or intentionally 

interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians 

provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). 

This standard is one of subjective recklessness. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839–40. “To satisfy 

this subjective component of deliberate indifference, the inmate must show that prison 

officials ‘kn[e]w [] of and disregard[ed]’ the substantial risk of harm, but the officials need 

not have intended any harm to befall the inmate; ‘it is enough that the official acted or 

failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Lemire v. Cal. 

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) 

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. 

A showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional 

deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.” Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092 

(9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004)); see

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.

Here, Plaintiff meets the “serious medical need” element because he alleges that he 

fell down and seriously injured his neck, eventually resulting in surgery. (SAC 4–6.) Judge 

Major reaches the same conclusion in her R&R. (R&R 9.) Plaintiff’s objections 

recognized that Judge Major found he had a serious medical need. (R&R Objs. 1.) The 

Court turns to the subjective component of the deliberate indifference test. 

The Court begins by briefly describing the relevant procedural history of this case. 

Plaintiff’s FAC contained detailed allegations against Defendant Ortega. (See FAC.) 

Judge Major’s first R&R determined that Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to meet 

the subjective prong for deliberate indifference. (See Prior R&R 17–20.) This Court

agreed with Judge Major and expressed its serious doubt that Plaintiff could re-plead his 

claims against Defendant Ortega, but allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his 

complaint. (Prior Order 5.) Moreover, the Court also discussed the general rule that “an 

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amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.” (Id. (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 

(9th Cir. 2012)).) The Court explained that “[o]nce Plaintiff files an amended complaint, 

the original pleadings no longer serve any function in the case.” (Id. (quoting Loux, 375 

F.2d at 57).) This means that once Plaintiff filed his SAC, the contents of the SAC replaced 

the contents of the FAC—there is no carryover between the documents.

Despite this warning, Plaintiff’s SAC barely mentions Defendant Ortega, much less 

explain how Defendant Ortega’s actions meet the subjective deliberate indifference prong. 

Instead, Plaintiff states that “[i]t is, without any doubt to the common layman, the fault of 

Defendant Ortega that Plaintiff continues to suffer from delayed treatment after the 

accident on March 11, 2015.” (SAC 2.) This is precisely the sort of “unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” that the Supreme Court has held is 

insufficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff’s allegations 

are conclusory and devoid of facts explaining how Defendant Ortega was deliberately 

indifferent towards him. 

Plaintiff’s objections do not change the Court’s conclusion. Plaintiff states that “Dr. 

Ortega was responsible for my woulds [sic] and injuries from the time he saw Plaintiff till 

Plaintiff was releas[ed] by the hospital.” (R&R Objs. 1.) The subjective element of 

deliberate indifference is a difficult standard; Plaintiff must show, by well-pled factual 

allegations, that Defendant Ortega knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm. See 

Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074. Instead, both Plaintiff’s SAC and his objections do not address 

Defendant Ortega’s subjective state of mind. At most, Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate 

that Defendant Ortega was responsible for his care, but do not address Defendant Ortega’s 

subjective awareness of Plaintiff’s condition. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[T]he official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”). Accordingly, the Court 

OVERRULES Plaintiff’s first Objection and ADOPTS Judge Major’s R&R as to 

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Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Ortega.

B. Defendant Beltran

In its Prior Order, this Court allowed Plaintiff to re-plead a declaratory relief claim 

against the policy, practice, or custom that Defendant Beltran might have been complying 

with. (Prior Order 7.) Judge Major concludes that Plaintiff’s SAC does not mention a 

policy that Defendant Beltran did or did not follow. (R&R 10.) Plaintiff objects to the 

R&R because Defendant Beltran denied Plaintiff “any kind of assistance.” (R&R Objs. 4.)

The Court agrees with Judge Major that Plaintiff does not address a policy that 

Defendant Beltran did or did not adhere to. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Beltran 

was deliberately indifferent because Defendant Beltran deprived Plaintiff of immediate 

medical assistance. (SAC 5.) Defendant Beltran allegedly made Plaintiff return to his cell 

after Plaintiff was carried to the infirmary and Defendant required Plaintiff to wait nine 

days before he was seen by a medical professional. (Id. at 5–6.) Plaintiff also alleges that 

Defendant Beltran was untrained in the medical profession. (Id. at 6.) Thus, Plaintiff’s 

allegations attempt to state a deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Beltran—not 

that Beltran adhered or failed to adhere to a policy. The Court analyzes Plaintiff’s 

deliberate indifference claim here.

Neither Defendants2 nor Judge Major specifically addressed Plaintiff’s deliberate 

indifference claim against Defendant Beltran. However, Judge Major’s prior R&R 

discussed why Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Defendant Beltran for deliberate 

indifference. (Prior R&R 24–25.) The Court quotes Judge Major’s prior opinion at length:

Defendant Beltran provided medical care, informed Plaintiff of 

how to obtain an appointment with a doctor, and did not deny, 

delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment. See 

Hartsfield v. Colburn, 491 F.3d 394, 398 (8th Cir. 2007) 

(affirming District Court’s finding in favor of defendants where 

 

2 The Court acknowledges Defendants did address the deliberate indifference claims against Defendant 

Beltran in their motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended complaint. (See ECF No. 79-1, at 14–16.)

Because the Court denies the pending motion as moot, see infra Conclusion, the Court addresses the claims 

against Defendant Beltran here.

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plaintiff alleged deliberate indifference due to a prison policy 

requiring him to submit a second sick call request to receive 

medical treatment that resulted in a very painful delay before 

having three teeth extracted, and noting that the District Court 

found that “[s]ick call requests were Jail policy, and it was not 

unreasonable for medical staff to tell Hartsfield how to request 

more medical attention and expect him to comply”); see also 

Jenkins v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 557 F.3d 628, 633–34 (8th Cir. 

2009) (stating that “a policy that results in delayed treatment is 

not unconstitutional unless it evinces deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs. The Constitution does not require jailers 

to handle every medical complaint as quickly as each inmate 

might wish”) (citing Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 972–73 

(8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a one-month delay in treating a 

fractured finger did not rise to a constitutional violation)).

Moreover as discussed above, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. 

Ortega within a few days of his fall. See FAC at 6. Again, even 

if Defendant Beltran’s treatment of Plaintiff was found to be 

negligent or consisted of malpractice, neither of those rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation.

(Id. at 25.) Judge Major’s analysis is equally applicable to Plaintiff’s SAC. 

Plaintiff’s SAC must show, by well-pled factual allegations, that Defendant Beltran 

knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm. See Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074. Here, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Beltran deprived Plaintiff immediate medical assistance. 

(SAC 5.) Plaintiff’s SAC reveals that Plaintiff was injured on March 11, 2015, was taken 

to the infirmary, received initial triage at the infirmary, and then Defendant Beltran refused 

to treat Plaintiff3 until he returned to his cell to fill out the proper prison forms. (Id. at 4–

5.) Plaintiff was not seen by Dr. Qazi (who is not a party to these proceedings) until June 

20, 2015 and was sent to surgery two days later. (Id. at 5.) At most, these allegations 

demonstrate a delay in Plaintiff’s initial treatment with Defendant Beltran until he was later 

 

3 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s FAC alleged that he received “600 mg. of motrin/ibuprofen” from 

Defendant Beltran, (FAC 5), which suggests Plaintiff received at least some level of care from Defendant 

Beltran. Yet, Plaintiff’s objections state that he did not receive any care from Defendant Beltran. (R&R 

Objs. 4.) The Court need not resolve this discrepancy because Plaintiff has not demonstrated facts 

sufficient to explain Defendant Beltran’s subjective intent.

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seen by Defendant Ortega and Dr. Qazi. Yet, delay alone is not sufficient to state a claim 

for deliberate indifference. See Johnson, 452 F.3d at 972–73. Even if Defendant Beltran 

was negligent in his care of Plaintiff, negligence alone does not constitute deliberate 

indifference. See Hamby, 821 F.3d at 1092. Plaintiff’s allegations do not speak to 

Defendant Beltran’s subjective knowledge of Plaintiff’s medical situation. Nor do the 

allegations explain how Defendant Beltran acted or failed to act on his knowledge. See 

Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074.

The Court finds Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference against 

Defendant Beltran. Furthermore, as Judge Major notes, Plaintiff does not address 

Defendant Beltran’s adherence (or failure to adhere to) a policy. Thus, the Court 

OVERRULES Plaintiff’s second Objection and ADOPTS Judge Major’s R&R as to 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Beltran.

C. Defendant Madden

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 70), does not address Plaintiff’s claims 

against Defendant Madden, the warden at Centinela State Prison.4 Consequently, Judge 

Major’s R&R does not address Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Madden. Yet, 

Plaintiff’s SAC addresses some factual allegations towards “Defendant, Warden of 

Centinela State Prison[’s] fail[ure] to properly train and manage the Medical Trainee 

Assistance (Beltran) for emergency medical needs, and the management of road repairs 

that badly needed attention because they were unsafe (as they were found to be in this 

instant cause and matter).” (SAC 5.) 

The Court resolves Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Madden as follows. In its 

prior Order, this Court adopted Judge Major’s prior R&R and dismissed all Defendants, 

including Defendant Madden. (Prior Order 7.) Judge Major’s prior R&R discussed at 

length Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Madden and how Plaintiff failed to state a 

 

4 The Court again acknowledges that Defendants address Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Madden in 

their pending motion to dismiss, (see ECF No. 79-1, at 10–14). Because the Court denies the pending 

motion as moot, the Court addresses the claims against Defendant Madden here.

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claim for deliberate indifference. (See Prior R&R 7–15.) As to Plaintiff’s “management 

of road repairs” argument, his SAC alleges fewer facts than the FAC, (compare FAC 3 

with SAC 5), and does not address the deficiencies highlighted in Judge Major’s prior 

R&R. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Madden “failed to properly train and manage” 

Defendant Beltran. (SAC 5.) As Judge Major previously discussed, a supervisor is only 

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the supervisor was either personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation or there was a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. (Prior R&R 14 (quoting

Henry v. Sanchez, 923 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).) Because Plaintiff has not 

sufficiently alleged that Defendant Beltran (or any other Defendant) has violated his 

constitutional rights, Defendant Madden—in his capacity as Defendant Beltran’s 

supervisor—cannot be liable for violating Plaintiff’s rights. Thus, the Court finds that 

Judge Major’s prior analysis, adopted by this Court, applies with equal weight and 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Madden must be dismissed.5 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court (1) OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections; (2) 

ADOPTS Judge Major’s R&R in its entirety except as noted below, (ECF No. 76); and (3) 

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 70). Accordingly, the Court 

DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, (ECF 

No. 69). 

On January 16, 2018, Plaintiff mailed a document that was docketed twice: once as 

an objection to the R&R and once as a Third Amended Complaint, (compare ECF No. 77 

with ECF No. 78). In her R&R, Judge Major interpreted Plaintiff’s objection to 

 

5 Though Defendants have not moved to dismiss the claims against Defendant Madden, the Court may 

sua sponte screen Plaintiff’s SAC under the Prison Litigation Reform Act “at any time.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2); see Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“This ‘at any time’

language strongly suggests that the court’s power does not exist solely at the screening stage provided for 

in § 1915A, but at all stages of the case.”).

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Defendants’ Motion as both an opposition and a motion to file a third amended complaint 

and set a briefing schedule for Plaintiff’s third amended complaint. (R&R 11.) 

Understandably, Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s “third amended 

complaint.” (ECF No. 79.) The parties have fully briefed Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

(See ECF Nos. 81, 82, 85.)

However, Plaintiff could not have filed an operative third amended complaint while 

his Second Amended Complaint had an R&R pending before this Court. Moreover, 

Plaintiff did not have the benefit of this Court’s Order when drafting his third amended 

complaint. Therefore, because Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, (ECF No. 77), is not 

properly before this Court, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, (ECF No. 79). The Court emphasizes that it does not 

consider Plaintiff’s January 16, 2018 document to be his third amended complaint. The 

Court will allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint and re-file a third amended complaint.

The Court entertains serious doubts concerning Plaintiff’s ability to cure the 

deficiencies outlined in Judge Major’s R&R as well as in this Order. Plaintiff has filed 

multiple complaints with similar factual allegations and each time has filed fewer factual 

allegations than the prior complaint. See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 

876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that a district court may deny leave to amend due to a 

litigant’s “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed”). 

However, the Court will allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint. Plaintiff MAY 

FILE a Third Amended Complaint, if any, on or before forty-five (45) days from the date 

on which this Order is electronically docketed. The Court cautions Plaintiff that should he 

choose to file a Third Amended Complaint, it must be complete by itself and that any claim, 

against any defendant not re-alleged will be considered waived. See Lacey v. Maricopa 

Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend 

which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not 

repled”). This means that the Court cannot consider any of Plaintiff’s previously alleged 

claims unless he includes them in an amended complaint. Failure to file an amended 

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complaint within the time allotted may result in a dismissal of Plaintiff’s case with 

prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 23, 2018

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