Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

AMY McCONNELL and AMY

McCONNELL on behalf of her

four minor children, A.B.,

A.B., J.M. and J.M.,

NO. CIV. S-05-0909 FCD DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA;

JAMES CHAPMAN, BOB PYLE, LLOYD

KEIFER, BRIAN DAHLE and JACK

HANSON, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

OF LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA;

MARGARET CROSBY, DIRECTOR OF

CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES,

LASSEN COUNTY, TERRY CHAPMAN,

LOEL GRIFFITH and DIRECTOR OF

CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF

SOCIAL SERVICES,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendant Director of

California State Department of Social Service’s (“Director”)

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1 Plaintiff Amy McConnell brings this action on her own

behalf and on the behalf of her four minor children. 

2 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

3 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,

the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

4 Plaintiff’s oldest child was taken from school, not

from plaintiff’s home, by Lassen CPS.

2

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s1 second amended complaint pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 For

the reasons set forth below,3 defendant’s motion is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Amy McConnell and her husband James McConnell

lived in Susanville, California with her four minor children. 

(Pl’s Second Am. Compl., filed November 10, 2005 [“SAC”], at ¶¶

13-14). On May 5, 2003, plaintiff alleges that her children were

removed from her home without her authorization and taken to

Lassen County Child Protective Services (“Lassen CPS”).4 (Id. at

¶¶ 15-19). The children were initially placed in the

Environmental Alternatives Foster Family Agency by Lassen CPS. 

(Id. at ¶ 23). Subsequently, the children were placed in a

foster home by Lassen CPS, where plaintiff alleges that they were

repeatedly sexually molested and abused. (Id. at ¶¶ 36, 45-46). 

Plaintiff contends that the Lassen CPS defendants, which

include Lassen County, Terry Chapman, Margaret Crosby, and Loel

Griffith, failed to provide medical or psychological care to

either the plaintiff or the children after these events. (Id. at

¶ 48). Plaintiff further contends that the Lassen CPS defendants

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failed and refused to give plaintiff any regular visitation with

the children. (Id. at ¶ 47). In addition, plaintiff alleges

that no investigation or analysis of alternatives was made by the

Lassen CPS defendants, such as in-family placement of the

children. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-30, 41). Furthermore, plaintiff alleges

that the Lassen CPS defendants did not prepare a case plan; did

not notify the parents of the court hearing regarding the

petition for custody of the children; and did not record one

visitation to the foster home after the children were placed in

the home. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 37-39, 44). 

Plaintiff does not allege that defendant Director was

involved with the removal or treatment of plaintiff’s minor

children. Plaintiff alleges, generally, that defendant Director

had notice of violations of policy and law by Lassen CPS and did

not take steps to ascertain that the law be followed. (Id. at ¶

31). Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Director knew that

he had accepted funding from the federal government pursuant to

42 U.S.C. §§ 620, 671, and 672. (Id. at ¶ 32) Plaintiff

believes that the defendant Director was prohibited from funding

programs like those at Lassen CPS because he accepted federal

funding. (Id.) 

Plaintiff filed her complaint on May 10, 2005. Plaintiff

subsequently filed a first amended complaint on June 10, 2005. 

Thereafter, on July 29, 2005, the defendant Director filed a

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint pursuant to

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court granted defendant

Director’s motion to dismiss in its Memorandum and Order dated

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5 While the court’s Order states that it granted in part

and denied in part defendant Director’s motion, this conclusion

was in error. The substance of the Order demonstrates that all

of plaintiff’s claims against defendant Director were dismissed. 

As such, the court’s conclusion should have stated that defendant

Director’s motion to dismiss was granted in its entirety.

6 Although defendant Director brings this motion pursuant

to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the substance of the motion does

not address Rule 12(b)(1). Accordingly, the court reviews the

motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only. 

4

September 21, 2005.5 Plaintiff subsequently filed a second

amended complaint on November 10, 2005. Plaintiff’s second

amended complaint re-alleges two claims for relief against the

defendant Director: (1) violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983; and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress

under state law. Defendant Director again moves to dismiss

plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).6 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

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(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

 Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendant[]

ha[s] violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover,

the court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie

v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant Director moves to dismiss plaintiff’s state tort

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s allegations remain verbatim

what they were in the first amended complaint. Defendant also

argues that plaintiff admits to a failure to comply with the

California Tort Claims Act. 

In her opposition, plaintiff does not respond to defendant

Director’s motion to dismiss her claims of intentional infliction

of emotional distress. The court previously granted defendant’s

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim based upon state law immunity. The court granted

plaintiff leave to amend her claim to include allegations that

defendant Director breached a mandatory duty in relation to her

state tort claim. Plaintiff failed to allege such facts in her

second amended complaint. 

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Further, plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to plead

compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. Rather,

plaintiff states that “[n]o claim under the California Tort

Claims Act . . . was filed with the State of California.” (SAC ¶

52). Under Government Code § 950.2, any suit against a public

employee is barred in cases where a plaintiff’s action against

the agency is barred for failure to present a claim. Plaintiff

has the burden of pleading compliance with the California Tort

Claims Act in her complaint. Wood v. Riverside General Hospital,

25 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1119 (1994). Moreover, compliance with

the California claims statute is mandatory. City of San Jose v.

Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 4447, 454 (1974). Because compliance

with the California Torts Claim Act is a prerequisite to suit and

because plaintiff admits to a failure to file a claim with the

State of California against defendant Director, defendant’s

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress is GRANTED with prejudice. 

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

Defendant Director contends that plaintiff fails to state

sufficient allegations to support a § 1983 claim. To state a

claim under § 1983, plaintiff must plead that (1) defendant acted

under color of state law, and (2) defendant deprived plaintiff of

rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson

v. U.S., 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff’s complaint must allege a causal connection

between personal conduct by defendant Director and the alleged

constitutional violation. See Mabe v. San Bernardino County, 237

F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001). “The Supreme Court has

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concluded that in enacting section 1983 Congress did not intend

to ‘impose liability vicariously on [employers or supervisors]

solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee

relationship with the tortfeasor.’” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dept.

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)). To be liable under §

1983, a defendant must subject the plaintiff to the deprivation

of a constitutional right through an affirmative act or an

omission to perform an act which he is legally required to

perform. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

“The requisite causal connection can be established not only by

some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation,

but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which

the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to

inflict the constitutional injury.” Id. at 743-44.

 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges that defendant

Director “failed to perform his mandatory and requisite acts

required by the acceptance of funding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 620

et seq. in that he failed to require Lassen County CPS to comply

with the law and further to adequately train its social workers.” 

(SAC ¶ 66). Based on this allegation, the court cannot discern

what duty plaintiff alleges was mandatory upon defendant

Director. “Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the

involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are

not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982). Even under the liberal notice pleading standards,

plaintiff has failed to put defendant Director on notice as to

what mandatory duty he has allegedly breached. 

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7 To the extent that the court speculates as to which

subsections of § 671 plaintiff may be referencing, plaintiff’s

claims are futile. In her opposition, plaintiff argues that

sections of the California Department of Social Services Manual

(“DSS Manual”) “requiring a case plan, reunification with the

parents and foster homes visits would have protected the

plaintiffs.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3:21-23). 

While § 671 does not address foster home visits, reunification

with parents and case plans are addressed in §§ 671(a)(15) and

(16), respectively. However, the Supreme Court held that no

private right of action under § 1983 exists for violations of §

671(a)(15). Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992). 

Furthermore, § 671(a)(16) requires that the state plan simply

provide for the development of a case plan and provide a case

review system. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16). Plaintiff does not

allege that California’s plan lacks these components. In fact,

plaintiff contends that the DSS Manual requires a case plan. 

Therefore, plaintiff cannot, in good faith, bring an action under

§ 1983 for violations of §§ 671(a)(15) or (16). 

8

In order to receive federal funds for foster care and

adoption assistance, a state is required to have a plan that

meets certain criteria set forth in § 671(a). 42 U.S.C. § 671

(West 2006). Plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not

allege the absence of or insufficiencies in the plan. 

Furthermore, plaintiff failed to allege any mandatory duty set

forth in § 671 that the state or defendant Director failed to

comply with.7 There is no requirement under § 671 that the

director of the program perform certain acts to ensure compliance

or to ensure adequate training of the social workers. 

Rather, the Supreme Court concluded that the legislative

history of the Adoption Act, 42 U.S.C. § 620, et seq., does not

evince a view that § 671 places any requirement for the state

receipt of federal funds other than the requirement that a state

submit a plan for approval. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,

361 (1992). In Suter, the Supreme Court found that the

legislative history indicates that it was enacted to encourage

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the states to adopt a series of reforms to their foster care

laws, but that it also left a great deal of discretion to the

states. Id. at 361-362 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the

legislative history demonstrates that the decision as to the

appropriateness of specific services must be made by the

administering agency having immediate responsibility for the care

of the child. Id. at 362 (citations omitted). Accordingly, §

671 provides that “the plan shall be in effect in all political

subdivisions of the State, and if administered by them, be

mandatory upon them.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(3) (emphasis added). 

In California, the legislature has declared that the

“administration of public social services in each of the several

counties of the state is . . . a county function.” Cal. Welf. &

Inst. Code § 10800 (West 2006). Therefore, because the counties

are charged with the administration of social services, proper

implementation of the plan is mandatory upon them. 

Defendant Director’s role with regard to the plan is set

forth in California Welfare and Institutions Code § 10605, which

gives him discretion to take or not take action if he believes

that a county is substantially failing to comply with any program

administered by the Department of Social Services. Cal. Welf. &

Inst. Code § 10605 (West 2006). Plaintiff’s allegation that

defendant Director failed to require Lassen CPS to comply with

the law is within his discretionary powers under § 10605. 

Furthermore, plaintiff’s allegation that defendant Director

failed to adequately train social workers does not support

liability under § 1983. Plaintiff is required to demonstrate an

affirmative link between the constitutional deprivation and

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defendant Director’s conduct in order to proceed under § 1983. 

Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. Plaintiff has not alleged that

defendant Director was legally required to train the social

workers in Lassen County, which is a county function. Id. Nor

has plaintiff alleged that defendant Director was personally

involved in the conduct leading to plaintiff’s alleged

constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., Whitley v. N.M. Children,

Youth and Families Dep’t, 184 F.Supp 2d 1146, 1153 (D.N.M. 2001)

(finding no liability under § 1983 where defendant cabinet

Secretary of NM CYFD had no actual or personal knowledge of the

child’s circumstances and did not make or participate in any

decisions concerning the child’s treatment needs or placements). 

Finally, plaintiff admits that she cannot allege any legally

required duties that defendant Director failed to perform. In

her opposition, plaintiff states that “further facts are

necessary to determine which function the [defendant Director]

failed to engage in, whether it was mandatory, [and] whether it

was within his discretion.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to

Dismiss at 8:11-14). “Conclusory allegations in a complaint, if

they stand alone, are a danger sign that the plaintiff is engaged

in a fishing expedition.” DM Research, Inc. v. College of

American Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999). 

Plaintiff has not alleged “a factual predicate concrete enough to

warrant further proceedings, which may be costly and burdensome.” 

Id. 

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Plaintiff has failed to set forth facts sufficient to state

a claim. Moreover, plaintiff has admitted that she cannot do so

without a “fishing expedition” to determine if a mandatory

exists, if the defendant Director breached such a duty, and if

his acts were discretionary in nature. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s

Mot. to Dismiss at 8:11-14). Therefore, defendant Director’s

motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Director of California

State Department of Social Services’ motion is GRANTED with

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 27, 2006 

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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