Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00542/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00542-31/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MATTHEW M. DENNIS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SCOTT KERNAN, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:16-cv-0542 DAD AC P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 

ECF Nos. 149, 211. 

I. Procedural History 

The procedural history of this case is long and complex and will be recited only as 

relevant to the pending motions. 

The case proceeds on the third amended complaint. ECF No. 45. On screening, the court 

found that plaintiff had stated cognizable Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Mays and 

Phui and ordered service of the complaint. ECF No. 51 at 9-10, 17-19. Service was also found to 

be appropriate on then California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) 

Secretary Diaz in his official capacity only for purposes of injunctive relief. Id. at 4. All other 

defendants were dismissed. Id. at 4-17, 19-21, 28 (findings and recommendations); ECF No. 67 

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(order adopting findings and recommendations in full). Kathleen Allison, in her official capacity, 

was later substituted for defendant Diaz. ECF No. 141 at 10. 

After the close of discovery, Mays, Allison, and Phui moved for summary judgment. ECF 

Nos. 149, 158. Plaintiff then moved to voluntarily dismissed Phui (ECF No. 168); that motion 

was granted and Phui’s motion for summary judgment was denied as moot1 (ECF No. 177 at 8). 

Plaintiff filed a response to Mays and Allison’s motion for summary judgment that was captioned 

as a cross-motion. ECF No. 171. Because the cross-motion was untimely, the filing was 

construed as an opposition to the motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 177 at 5, 9. 

Defendants’ opposition to the cross-motion (ECF No. 176) was disregarded as untimely, both as 

an opposition to the cross-motion and as a reply in support of their motion for summary 

judgment. ECF No. 177 at 5 n.3. Defendants were later granted leave to file an untimely reply. 

ECF No. 184. Defendants were required to resubmit their exhibits consisting of plaintiff’s 

medical records and grievances (ECF No. 177 at 5-8), which they did along with an amended 

declaration by counsel (ECF No. 186). For reasons previously addressed, paragraph 9 of 

counsel’s amended declaration has been disregarded. See ECF No. 202 at 2-3, 5. 

Plaintiff was ultimately granted leave to file an untimely motion for summary judgment 

(ECF No. 207) and he then moved for summary judgment against Mays and Allison (ECF No. 

211). Defendants oppose the motion. ECF No. 222. Also pending are plaintiff’s motions for an 

extension of time to file his reply (ECF Nos. 233, 237), for clarification (ECF No. 234), and to 

seal (ECF No. 239). The motions for extension of time will be granted and plaintiff’s reply is 

deemed timely. All other pending motions will be addressed below. 

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

The third amended complaint alleges that defendant Mays violated plaintiff’s rights under 

the Eighth Amendment and state tort law. Plaintiff alleges that from March to November 2015, 

Mays, a nurse practitioner, was his treating medical provider. ECF No. 45 at 12. During that 

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 To the extent the motion also sought summary judgment as to Allison, it was denied as 

duplicative because Allison had also moved for summary judgment in conjunction with Mays, 

and the portions of each motion as they pertained to Allison were identical. ECF No. 177 at 4, 9 

& n.2. 

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time, plaintiff had eleven encounters with Mays related to his chronic pain from his left wrist, 

degenerative disc disease, and hernia. Id. During this time Mays was dismissive of plaintiff’s 

complaints and refused to order diagnostic tests or treat his wrist pain and hernia. Id. at 12-13. 

At plaintiff’s first appointment with Mays, she refused to address his complaints of wrist pain, 

instead telling him it was a hepatitis C (HCV) follow-up and that she would only address one 

issue per visit. Id. at 12. It was eventually discovered that plaintiff had two hernias and an 

advanced, full collapse of his left wrist. Id. at 13. Defendant Allison was named for the purposes 

of providing injunctive relief only. Id. at 5. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of 

medical treatment and transfer to a medical facility. Id. at 31. 

III. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

A. Defendants’ Arguments 

Defendants argue that Mays was not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical 

needs because she provided appropriate care and treatment for his hernia and wrist, and plaintiff 

did not meet the criteria for HCV treatment during the time she was treating plaintiff. ECF No. 

151 at 14-23, 26-28. Alternatively, they argue that Mays is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 

23-25. Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted for Allison because there are 

no grounds for liability against her, and any policies related to plaintiff’s request for injunctive 

relief would be outside of her authority because medical policies and procedures are governed by 

California Correctional Health Care Services (CCHCS), not the CDCR. 

B. Plaintiff’s Response 

“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” 

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds, 

Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). However, it is wellestablished that district courts are to “construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro 

se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 

F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). The unrepresented prisoner’s choice to proceed without counsel 

“is less than voluntary” and they are subject to “the handicaps . . . detention necessarily imposes 

upon a litigant,” such as “limited access to legal materials” as well as “sources of proof.” 

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Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) (alteration in original) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Inmate litigants, therefore, should not be held to a standard of 

“strict literalness” with respect to the requirements of the summary judgment rule. Id. (citation 

omitted). 

Accordingly, though plaintiff has largely complied with the rules of procedure, the court 

will consider the record before it in its entirety. However, only those assertions in the opposition 

which have evidentiary support in the record will be considered. 

Plaintiff opposes defendants’ motion and argues that Mays delayed and denied treatment 

for his wrist, hernia, and HCV and is not entitled to qualified immunity, and that defendant 

Allison should not be dismissed because she is necessary to obtaining his requested injunctive 

relief. ECF No. 171 at 5-69. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

A. Plaintiff’s Arguments 

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because defendant Mays 

committed medical malpractice and was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical conditions, 

specifically his wrist pain and hernia. ECF No. 211 at 1-35. 

B. Defendants’ Response 

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof, that the evidence 

shows that Mays was not deliberately indifferent, and that plaintiff’s malpractice claims are 

barred. ECF No. 222. 

V. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, “[t]he moving party initially bears the burden 

of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 

F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The 

moving party may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, 

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 

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stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory 

answers, or other materials” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or 

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

“Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle 

Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 

Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, “after adequate time for discovery and upon 

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 

trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 

of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. In such 

a circumstance, summary judgment should “be granted so long as whatever is before the district 

court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. 

“When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the 

burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which 

would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went 

uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the 

initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact 

on each issue material to its case.” 

Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting C.A.R. Transp. 

Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a 

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fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and that the dispute is 

genuine, i.e., “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). Thus, the 

“purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see 

whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 “In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact, [the 

court] draw[s] all inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.” Walls 

v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). It is the 

opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations 

omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank, 391 

U.S. at 289). 

Defendants simultaneously served plaintiff with notice of the requirements for opposing a 

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure along with their motion for 

summary judgment. ECF No. 150; see Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(pro se prisoners must be provided with notice of the requirements for summary judgment); Rand 

v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (movant may provide notice). 

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VI. Legal Standard for Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need 

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 

must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires plaintiff 

to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and 

(2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (some internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

Deliberate indifference is a very strict standard. It is “more than mere negligence.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). Even civil recklessness—failure “to act in the face 

of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be 

known”—is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 836-37 (citation 

omitted). A prison official will be found liable under the Eighth Amendment when “the official 

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. A plaintiff can establish deliberate 

indifference “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible 

medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citing McGuckin, 

974 F.2d at 1060). 

A difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel—or between 

medical professionals—regarding the appropriate course of treatment does not by itself amount to 

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th 

Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). To establish that a difference of 

opinion rises to the level of deliberate indifference, plaintiff “must show that the chosen course of 

treatment ‘was medically unacceptable under the circumstances,’ and was chosen ‘in conscious 

disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s] health.’” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (quoting 

Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

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VII. Evidentiary Issues 

A. Request for Judicial Notice 

Both parties have requested that the court take judicial notice of various filings in this 

case. ECF Nos. 153, 204. “The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable 

dispute because it: (1) is generally known . . . or (2) can be accurately and readily determined 

from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The 

requests for judicial notice will therefore be granted. 

Plaintiff has also filed a document styled as a request for judicial notice that alleges 

defense counsel is attempting to paint him as a drug abuser and requests that the court disallow 

any discussion of his medical records after October 22, 2015. ECF No. 235. This is not a matter 

proper for judicial notice and the request will be denied. With respect to plaintiff’s medical 

records, the court will consider only those records that are relevant to deciding the motions for 

summary judgment. 

B. Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections 

Plaintiff objects to the declaration of Dr. Feinberg (ECF No. 154), which defendants rely 

on to support their motion for summary judgment, on the ground that they failed to disclose Dr. 

Feinberg as an expert witness, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A). ECF 

No. 214, 228, 232. However, absent a stipulation or court order, expert witnesses are not required 

to be disclosed until at least ninety days before trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D). To the extent 

plaintiff is attempting to argue that Dr. Feinberg should have been disclosed as a witness as part 

of initial disclosures, this case is exempt from initial disclosure because when plaintiff first 

brought this action he was a prisoner and unrepresented by counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(a)(1)(B)(iv). Accordingly, defendants were not required to disclose the fact that they would 

be relying on Dr. Feinberg’s declaration in moving for summary judgment absent a discovery 

request from plaintiff. 

C. Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections 

Defendants have made various objections to evidence produced by plaintiff. ECF No. 

223. Rule 56(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that affidavits and declarations 

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submitted for or against a summary-judgment motion “must be made on personal knowledge, set 

out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent 

to testify on the matters stated.” In other words, only admissible evidence may be considered by 

the court. Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations 

omitted). “In general, inadmissible hearsay evidence may not be considered on a motion for 

summary judgment.” Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Nat. Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 345 n.4 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Statements in affidavits that are legal conclusions, speculative 

assertions, or statements of hearsay evidence do not satisfy the standards of personal knowledge, 

admissibility, and competence required by Rule 56(c)(4). Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 

F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). However, “[a]t the summary judgment stage, 

[the court does] not focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s form. [It] instead focus[es] on 

the admissibility of its contents.” Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citations omitted). In other words, the court can consider the evidence if its contents could be 

presented in an admissible form at trial. Fraser, 342 F.3d at 1037. 

Defendants object to plaintiff’s reliance upon allegations contained in his prior filings 

However, “[a] plaintiff’s verified complaint may be considered as an affidavit in opposition to 

summary judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in 

evidence.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The third 

amended complaint, as well as plaintiff’s other motions identified by defendants, have all been 

signed under penalty of perjury. See ECF No. 45 at 31; ECF No. 115 at 14; ECF No. 117 at 7; 

ECF No. 169 at 16. Therefore, to the extent the contents are based on personal knowledge they 

may be considered and the objection is overruled. 

Defendants also object to plaintiff’s health care appeals as unauthenticated and 

inadmissible hearsay. ECF No. 223 at 2. Although defendants’ assert the documents are 

unauthenticated, they do not actually challenge their authenticity or accuracy, and have in fact 

submitted many of the same appeals in support of their motion for summary judgment. Assuming 

authentication, the documents are not hearsay. To the extent there may be hearsay statements 

contained within the appeals, defendants have not identified any specific instances of hearsay and, 

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regardless, they are not grounds to disregard the appeals as a whole. Since the existence and 

contents of plaintiff’s appeals could be made admissible at trial with proper authentication, and 

defendants do not contest their accuracy, the court will consider the records to the extent they are 

relevant to resolving the motion and the objections are overruled. 

Defendants object to documents related to housing assignments and transfers as irrelevant 

to resolving the motion and unauthenticated but do not identify the documents at issue. Id. at 2-3. 

The objections are therefore overruled. 

Next, defendants object to declarations made by other inmates as containing hearsay and 

lacking personal knowledge and competency to testify to the matters contained therein. Id. at 3. 

Defendants have not identified any specific instances of hearsay within the declarations. To the 

extent the declarations are not based upon personal knowledge or do not establish competency to 

testify, they will not be considered. Defendants’ objections are otherwise overruled. 

Plaintiff has also submitted a printout from the Mayo Clinic that defendants object to as 

unauthenticated. Id. at 3-4. However, to the extent the information provided in the printouts is 

available on the Mayo Clinic’s website,2 it is easily authenticated and the objection is overruled. 

Defendants object to various statements within plaintiff’s statement of facts as medical or 

legal conclusions. Id. at 4. To the extent plaintiff’s facts contain medical or legal conclusions, 

the court agrees that plaintiff has not established competency as a medical expert and legal 

conclusions are not facts upon which summary judgment can be supported. Defendants’ 

objections will therefore be sustained. 

Finally, defendants object to plaintiff’s hernia journal on the grounds that it is immaterial, 

irrelevant, and constitutes a conclusory, self-serving document. Id. Because plaintiff’s journal 

addresses matters of which plaintiff has personal knowledge, their contents could be made 

admissible through plaintiff’s testimony and can therefore be considered on summary judgment 

and defendants’ objections are overruled. See Fraser, 342 F.3d at 1036-37 (ruling that diary’s 

contents may be considered on summary judgment although diary inadmissible at trial). 

2

 See Mayo Clinic, Inguinal hernia, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/inguinalhernia/symptoms-causes/syc-20351547. 

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VIII. Material Facts 

A. Preliminary Considerations 

Local Rule 260(a) provides that a motion for summary judgment “shall be accompanied 

by a ‘Statement of Undisputed Facts’ that shall enumerate discretely each of the specific material 

facts relied upon in support of the motion.” However, upon review of the parties’ statements of 

undisputed facts, the court finds that neither party has complied with this rule. 

Rather than addressing the specific care provided by Mays, defendants’ statement of 

undisputed facts (DSUF) is largely comprised of compound, summary statements regarding the 

care plaintiff received from defendant Mays and other health care providers. See, e.g., DSUF 

(ECF No. 152) ¶¶ 7-10. Yet in arguing that summary judgment is appropriate, defendants go 

through specific encounters plaintiff had with Mays and other providers and rely on statements 

regarding the appropriate standard of care included in Dr. Feinberg’s declaration but not included 

in their statement of facts. ECF No. 151 at 15-23, 26-28. Defendants are clearly relying upon 

these facts as material support for their motion and they were therefore required to be included in 

their statement of facts. Defendants’ failure to comply with the rule has made it unnecessarily 

complicated for plaintiff to respond to the facts and the court to resolve the motion. The court 

further notes that defendants’ citations to the second amended complaint are not in a useable 

format and will therefore be disregarded. 

Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts (PSUF) is also defective. Rather than setting out 

discrete material facts, plaintiff’s statement of facts is comprised almost entirely of arguments and 

irrelevant allegations related to counsel’s conduct and his conditions while drafting his motion. 

See, e.g., PSUF (ECF No. 212) passim. Plaintiff’s statement of facts also largely fails to address 

specific instances of defendant Mays conduct, instead relying on broad, general claims that she 

disregarded his conditions and lied in her notes. See, e.g., PSUF ¶¶ 21-23, 41. 

As a result of both parties’ failure to comply with Local Rule 260(a), the court will rely 

largely upon plaintiff’s medical records, the authenticity of which is not in dispute. Plaintiff’s 

disputes as to how accurately the records depict each encounter will also be addressed, to the 

extent he has addressed specific encounters. 

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B. The Facts Before the Court 

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise specified. In 2014, while in the 

custody of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Office, plaintiff was diagnosed with a hernia and had 

x-rays taken that showed an old scaphoid fracture in his left wrist. DSUF ¶ 3; Response to DSUF 

(ECF No. 169) ¶ 3; ECF No. 186-1 at 412-13. Plaintiff began his incarceration with the CDCR in 

July 2014, and his preexisting hernia, fractured wrist, and HCV infection were identified and 

documented in his medical record. DSUF ¶ 4; Response to DSUF ¶ 4. He also underwent 

laboratory testing for his HCV. Id. During the time plaintiff was treated by Mays, he did not 

meet the treatment eligibility for HCV and was to be reassessed annually. DSUF ¶ 5.3 

On March 12, 2015, plaintiff had his first appointment with defendant Mays during which 

plaintiff’s HCV was discussed and his request for treatment was denied. PSUF ¶ 19; Response to 

PSUF ¶ 19; ECF No. 186-1 at 314, 316. Plaintiff told Mays he had pain and nausea from his 

hernia and pain in his left wrist, but she refused to address these issues, instead telling him that 

she would only address one issue per visit. PSUF ¶ 30. Mays disputes these statements. 

Response to PSUF ¶ 30. 

Plaintiff was scheduled to see Mays for his wrist, back, and hernia pain on March 24, 

2015, but he was not seen due to a scheduling conflict on Mays’ part and had to be rescheduled. 

PSUF ¶ 23; ECF No. 186-1 at 303. He was rescheduled for April 7, 2015, but was not seen. ECF 

No. 186-1 at 291. Plaintiff asserts that he reported to the CTC, but another nurse filled out a 

fraudulent refusal form and refused to have him escorted to the RN line after he started asking 

why his HCV, wrist, and hernia were being ignored. PSUF ¶ 24. Defendants dispute these 

statements as being contradicted by the medical records and based solely on plaintiff’s 

uncorroborated and self-serving declaration. Response to PSUF ¶ 24. They assert that plaintiff 

refused to be seen and refused to sign the refusal form, and that his refusal was witnessed by two 

3

 Plaintiff disagrees with the CCHCS Care Guidelines cited by defendants but does not dispute 

that he was ineligible for treatment under those guidelines. Response to DSUF ¶ 5. To the extent 

plaintiff asserts that he should have received an ultrasound every six months rather than annual 

reassessment, the policy he cites states that six-month ultrasounds are to be provided “[a]fter 

diagnosis of clinical or biopsy proven cirrhosis” (ECF No. 171 at 177), and there is no evidence 

that plaintiff had diagnosed cirrhosis. This portion of DSUF ¶ 5 is therefore deemed undisputed. 

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individuals. Id. The refusal form from April 7, 2015, is not signed by plaintiff. ECF No. 32-3 at 

188. 

On April 16, 2015, plaintiff was seen by Mays. PSUF ¶ 32. The record indicates that 

plaintiff was being seen for his wrist, back, and hernia pain and that plaintiff complained of 

increased groin pain over the last four months with radiation to his right testicle, but that he 

denied nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, or constipation. ECF No. 186-1 at 287. With respect to 

plaintiff’s hernia, Mays recorded “small outpouching noted to R inguinal area [with] easy 

reduction [with] one finger 0 abd bruising” and that plaintiff stated he had not worn his 

abdominal binder because he lost it. Id. The notes further reflect that Mays ordered an 

abdominal ultrasound and abdominal binder, gave plaintiff a hernia educational brochure, and 

ordered a follow-up in forty-five to sixty days. Id. at 287, 289. According to plaintiff’s records, 

the ultrasound was cancelled on April 20, 2015, because plaintiff did not meet the minimum 

criteria for an ultrasound. Id. at 285. The record noted that plaintiff’s hernia was “small, easily 

reducible” and that plaintiff was without symptoms other than intermittent pain and that there was 

no evidence of strangulation. Id. 

Plaintiff asserts that Mays refused to address any issue other than his hernia and again told 

him that she would only address one issue per visit even though his wrist was swollen and he told 

her it was causing him pain. PSUF ¶ 32. With respect to his hernia, he agrees that Mays 

provided educational materials and ordered an abdominal binder and ultrasound, but asserts that 

she cancelled the ultrasound order four days later. PSUF ¶¶ 33-34. Plaintiff disputes the 

recorded size of his hernia and states that his hernia was “the size of a banana or cucumber” and 

“hung down 5-6 inches from the lower stomach.” PSUF ¶ 34. Mays affirms the size of plaintiff’s 

hernia as recorded and states that the ultrasound request was denied by the supervising medical 

providers because plaintiff did not meet the criteria for a surgical referral or ultrasound. 

Response to PSUF ¶¶ 33-34. She disputes plaintiff’s claim that she refused to address anything 

other than his hernia. Response to PSUF ¶ 32. 

On June 5, 2015, plaintiff was seen by Mays regarding Appeal 8389, which dealt with the 

treatment of plaintiff’s hernia. ECF No. 186-1 at 254; ECF No. 186-2 at 93-102. The appeal 

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stated that plaintiff had “daily nausea, pain, septic poop (not normal odor) sometimes an 

abnormal amount” and that the abdominal binder he was given “increases symptoms 10 fold.” 

ECF No. 186-2 at 95, 97. Mays noted that plaintiff was not wearing his abdominal binder, that 

there was no change in his hernia, and that all issues had been previously addressed during his 

April 16, 2015 appointment. ECF No. 186-1 at 254. She also completed a referral for hernia 

surgery, which was denied because the hernia was “reducible and small per provider information 

above. No indication for surgical intervention was given.” Id. at 236. Plaintiff asserts that 

during the interview Mays was hostile and deliberately refused to include his explanation for why 

he was not wearing the abdominal binder. ECF No. 171 at 34-35. He disputes that there was no 

change in his hernia at the time of the interview. Id. at 34. 

On June 19, 2015, plaintiff was seen by Mays regarding Appeal 8429, which dealt with 

his wrist and back pain. ECF No. 186-1 at 238; ECF No. 186-2 at 106-118. The appeal stated 

that plaintiff had been putting in medical requests since March but had yet to see a doctor about 

his issues. ECF No. 186-2 at 109. It also stated that he was in constant pain and that he kept 

“getting told, this is for Hep-C or this is for hernia, blown every time. ‘4 times.’” Id. Mays 

recorded that plaintiff “admits to refusing surgery despite MRI L wrist results” and that he filed 

an appeal before seeing a provider because “he felt like it was going to be awhile for pain issues 

to be addressed.” ECF No. 186-1 at 238. The notes further reflect that plaintiff could sit, stand, 

bend at the waist in all directions, and ambulate without an altered gait. Id. Plaintiff requested to 

be removed from oxcarbazepine because he felt it was not effective and requested gabapentin, 

which he had received at a prior facility. Id. Mays discontinued the medication with instructions 

to continue with NSAIDS and submitted plaintiff’s name to the pain committee for his left wrist 

and back pain. Id. at 238, 240. The denial of plaintiff’s hernia surgery was also discussed and 

plaintiff was issued a scrotal support. Id. 

On July 9, 2015, plaintiff was seen by Mays for a chronic care follow-up for his HCV and 

hernia. ECF No. 186-1 at 225-26, 228. Mays recorded that plaintiff denied abdominal pain, 

nausea, vomiting, and dark stools or blood in stools, but that he complained of occasional 

intermittent constipation. Id. at 225. She further noted that plaintiff’s hernia was “a very small 

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outpouching in the right inguinal area which is easily reducible at this time.” Id. Plaintiff was to 

continue using the hernia truss and NSAIDs for pain as well as fiber and a stool softener for 

constipation. Id. He was to return in three to four months for an HCV follow-up and laboratory 

values. Id. 

 On August 6, 2015, plaintiff was seen by Mays regarding his hernia pain and Appeal 

8807, which appears to relate to plaintiff’s housing status. ECF No. 186-1 at 216. Plaintiff 

reported difficulty urinating and vomiting and that it had been a week since the last time he 

vomited. Id. He denied any fever, chills, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, or abdominal pain at the 

time of the appointment. Id. Mays noted that plaintiff’s hernia truss was in place, he should 

continue using the hernia truss and NSAIDs for pain, milk of magnesia was to be discontinued, 

and plaintiff should continue with stool softeners as needed for constipation. Id. 

 On September 10, 2015, Mays saw plaintiff for a follow-up on x-rays that were taken of 

his left wrist. ECF No. 186-1 at 205. The x-rays showed that plaintiff had scapholunate 

advanced collapse. Id. at 209. An ortho consult was requested and took place the following day, 

and it was recommended that plaintiff receive surgery and pain management. Id. at 203, 205. 

 On September 16, 2015, plaintiff was seen by Mays for a follow-up to his consult. ECF 

No. 186-1 at 197. Mays noted that plaintiff denied any change in his current chronic pain and 

that he was to continue using NSAIDs and gabapentin. Id. A request for surgery was submitted 

on a routine basis. Id. at 162. 

 On October 13, 2015, plaintiff was seen by Mays and counseled regarding his refusal to 

take oxcarbazepine, which he stated did not work for his pain. ECF No. 186-1 at 185. 

 On October 22, 2015, plaintiff was seen by Mays for a follow-upon his left wrist pain and 

medication refusal. ECF No. 186-1 at 178. Mays noted that plaintiff complained of left wrist 

pain and stated that he refused oxcarbazepine because it did not work. Id. She further noted that 

plaintiff “wants opiates, nothing else,” and became upset when he was informed that he would 

continue with his current medication until his surgery. Id. 

Plaintiff disputes that he demanded opioids, but acknowledges that he did request them. 

Response to DSUF ¶ 13; ECF No. 214 at 7. He further states that Mays’ notes regarding 

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plaintiff’s condition were inaccurate, as she failed to note his “hernia limp and slow gait,” and 

that she fails to note that his oxcarbazepine was supposed to have been discontinued in June 

because it had not done anything to alleviate his pain. Id. 

 Plaintiff refused any further appointments with Mays (DSUF ¶ 13), including a November 

3, 2015, HCV follow-up (ECF No. 186-1 at 175). He had surgery on his wrist on November 5, 

2015. Id. at 170-71. On May 16, 2016, plaintiff underwent surgery to repair his hernia and was 

found to have two hernias, both of which were repaired. ECF No. 32-2 at 271. 

IX. Discussion 

A. Defendant Allison 

As an initial matter, the court notes that plaintiff has recently filed a notice of change of 

address that indicates he has been released from prison, and there is no indication that he will 

return to CDCR custody. ECF No. 243. As such, his requests for injunctive relief are now moot 

and defendant Allison, who has been named solely in her official capacity for the purposes of 

providing injunctive relief should be dismissed. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 

1995) (inmate’s release from prison generally moots any claims for injunctive relief unless suit 

has been certified as a class action.). 

B. HCV Treatment 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that defendant Mays 

was deliberately indifferent when she denied him HCV antiviral treatment. ECF No. 151 at 26-

28. However, the third amended complaint did not state a claim against Mays for denial of HCV 

treatment and no such claims are before this court.4 See ECF No. 45 at 12-13. The undersigned 

further notes that any to bring such claims would be futile. While plaintiff clearly disagrees with 

the criteria for HCV treatment eligibility, he does not contest that he did not meet those criteria 

while being treated by defendant Mays, nor does he argue or provide evidence that she had the 

ability to override those criteria. 

//// 

4

 Although plaintiff was found to state a claim against defendant Phui for failing to treat his HCV 

(ECF No. 51 at 17-19), Phui has since been dismissed from this action (ECF No. 177). 

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C. Hernia Treatment 

As set forth above, the facts regarding Mays’ treatment of plaintiff’s hernia are in dispute. 

Mays asserts that plaintiff’s hernia was small and easily reducible, that his only symptom was 

intermittent pain, and that he refused to wear his hernia belt or take his prescribed medications. 

ECF No. 16-19. She further contends that she continued to monitor plaintiff’s condition, which 

did not change throughout the time she saw him. Id. Mays states that while she put in requests 

for an ultrasound and surgery, they were denied because plaintiff did not meet the eligibility 

criteria. Id. at 16-17. She also submits the declaration of Dr. Feinberg, who opines that surgical 

intervention was not recommended in those circumstances and that Mays’ treatment was 

appropriate. ECF No. 154 at 3-7. Plaintiff, on the other hand, avers both generally and with 

respect to specific encounters, that Mays consistently ignored his complaints of nausea, vomiting, 

constipation, and increased pain; falsified records regarding his symptoms and the size of his 

hernia, which he claims was the size of a banana or cucumber; and refused to address or record 

his complaints that his abdominal binder caused pain, nausea, vomiting, and gagging when worn. 

Response to DSUF ¶ 7; PSUF ¶¶ 34, 36, 38; ECF No. 171 at 26-29, 34-35; ECF No. 211 at 19-

22. 

The evidence before the court establishes that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as 

to whether Mays was deliberately indifferent with regard to plaintiff’s hernia and both parties’ 

motions for summary judgment should be denied. Assuming Mays’ version of events to be true, 

she provided appropriate treatment for plaintiff’s hernia. However, assuming plaintiff’s version 

of the facts to be true—particularly as to the size of his protruding hernia—Mays failed to address 

a worsening condition that quite obviously posed a serious medical risk, and falsified plaintiff’s 

records which preventing him from obtaining further treatment. While plaintiff has not 

established competency to make medical diagnoses or to opine as to whether treatment was 

medically acceptable, he is competent to testify to things within his personal knowledge, such as 

how he was feeling, his objective condition (including the visible size of his hernia), and what he 

reported to defendant Mays during their encounters. Taking plaintiff’s facts as true and drawing 

inferences in his favor as the non-moving party, the records indicate that Mays’ minimization of 

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plaintiff’s condition led to the requests for an ultrasound and surgery being denied, since they 

state plaintiff did not qualify because the hernia was small and reducible and that plaintiff’s only 

symptom was intermittent pain. ECF No. 186-1 at 236, 285. That other providers’ notes were 

consistent with Mays’ notes goes towards plaintiff’s credibility, which the court cannot assess on 

summary judgment. 

D. Wrist Treatment 

Whether defendant Mays was deliberately indifferent in treating plaintiff’s wrist is 

similarly dependent on which version of the facts is believed. Mays asserts that she did not see 

plaintiff for his complaints of wrist pain until June 19, 2015, when she saw him regarding a health 

care appeal. ECF No. 151 at 20. Prior to that, he was either seen by other providers regarding his 

complaints or did not raise any complaints when seen. Id. She also argues that plaintiff refused 

to take his medications or be seen by other providers and demanded opioids to manage his pain 

even though they were not medically indicated. Id. at 20-22; ECF No. 222 at 13-17. However, 

though defendants assert that plaintiff regularly refused to take the medications he was 

prescribed, the records cited do not demonstrate the habitual refusal portrayed by defendants and 

instead indicate that plaintiff gave the medications a chance to work before discontinuing them 

when they did nothing to relieve his pain. See ECF No. 186-1 at 185 (10/13/15: refusing represcription of oxcarbazepine because it does not work), 191 (10/7/15: refusing Abilify), 193 

(indicating Abilify first prescribed on 7/23/15), 236 (6/19/15: wanted to discontinue 

oxcarbazepine because it does not work), 254 (6/5/15: request to stop oxcarbazepine), 318 

(showing oxcarbazepine first prescribed on 2/24/15); ECF No. 32-2 at 56 (5/21/15: requesting 

that oxcarbazepine be stopped because it does not work). 

Furthermore, plaintiff asserts that he raised the issue with Mays multiple times, starting 

with his first appointment on March 12, 2015, and that each time she refused to examine his wrist 

or discuss his complaints of swelling and increasing pain or falsified records to minimize his 

reported symptoms to prevent further treatment from the pain management committee. Response 

to DSUF ¶¶ 10-12; PSUF ¶¶ 19, 21-22, 27, 29-30, 32, 39, 41; ECF No. 171 at 14, 28-29; ECF No. 

211 at 9, 12-13, 16, 25. Plaintiff further assets that the medication he was prescribed had no 

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effect on his pain, which he reported to Mays and she ignored, and he never demanded opioids, 

but instead sought effective pain management for his increasing pain, which he mentioned had 

included opioids in the past. Response to DSUF ¶¶ 13-14; PSUF ¶ 25; ECF No. 171 at 11-12, 14-

15; ECF No. 211 at 14-15, 31; ECF No. 238 at 16. 

While plaintiff does not have the right to dictate what medication or treatment he receives, 

see Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420, 421 n.3 (9th Cir. 1967),5 he is entitled to constitutionally 

adequate treatment, see Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 793 (9th Cir. 2019) (doctor was 

deliberately indifferent when he continued treatment plan he knew was ineffective without 

reevaluating prisoner or recommending change to treatment). For these reasons, there is a dispute 

of fact as to whether Mays was made aware of and ignored plaintiff’s complaints of swelling, 

increased pain, and ineffective pain relief and minimized his symptoms to interfere with his 

ability to receive alternate treatment. Accordingly, neither party is entitled to summary judgment. 

E. Medical Malpractice 

Defendants do not move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s malpractice claim. ECF 

No. 151. In their opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment they argue that plaintiff 

should not be able to pursue a claim for medical malpractice because it was not pled in the 

complaint, he has failed to meet establish the elements of a malpractice claim, and any such claim 

is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. ECF No. 222 at 30-32. However, plaintiff’s 

complaint clearly stated he was alleging both deliberate indifference and malpractice against 

defendant Mays. ECF No. 45 at 12. Defendants’ argument that a malpractice claim is barred by 

Eleventh Amendment immunity is also without merit. Defendant Mays is sued in her individual 

capacity and the Eleventh Amendment therefore does not bar plaintiff’s malpractice claim. See 

Ashker v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1997) (Eleventh Amendment does not 

bar state tort claims against defendants sued in their individual or personal capacities). 

5

 “[P]laintiff’s allegations show only that he has not been receiving the kind and quality of 

medical treatment he believes is indicated. Like the Seventh Circuit, ‘we know of no authority 

standing for the proposition that such a claim as plaintiff attempts to assert here is cognizable 

under the Federal Civil Rights Act.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Ragen, 323 F.2d 

410, 412 (7th Cir. 1963)). Id. 

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Defendants also argue that plaintiff cannot prevail on his malpractice claim because he has 

not produced any expert testimony establishing that Mays failed to meet the standard of care or 

that her conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injuries. ECF No. 222 at 30-31. 

They assert that their introduction of expert testimony, and plaintiff’s failure to provide expert 

testimony, necessarily doom the claim. Id. However, while plaintiff may have failed to meet his 

burden to show that he is entitled to summary judgment, see Flowers v. Torrance Mem’l Hosp. 

Med. Ctr., 8 Cal. 4th 992, 1001 (1994) (“The standard of care against which the acts of a 

physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents 

the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by their testimony, unless the 

conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the 

layman.” (citations omitted)), that does not mean that defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment. As noted above, defendants have not moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s 

malpractice claim. Moreover, while defendants have proffered an expert opinion, that opinion is 

based upon facts as reflected in plaintiff’s medical records, which are very much in dispute. That 

dispute prevents summary judgment in defendants’ favor on plaintiff’s malpractice claim for the 

same reasons it prevents summary judgment on plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims, as 

explained above. See Griffith v. Los Angeles County, 267 Cal. App. 2d 837, 847 (1968) 

(“Opinions of value and other expert opinions, even though uncontradicted, are worth no more 

than the reasons and factual data upon which they are based.”). 

F. Qualified Immunity 

“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from 

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted). In analyzing a qualified immunity defense, the court 

must consider the following: (1) whether the alleged facts, taken in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, demonstrate that defendant’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) 

whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident. Saucier v. Katz, 533 

U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) 

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(overruling Saucier’s requirement that the two prongs be decided sequentially). 

Defendants argue that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085 

(9th Cir. 2016), entitles Mays to qualified immunity with respect to the treatment she provided 

plaintiff, particularly with respect to his hernia. ECF No. 151 at 23-25. In Hamby, the Ninth 

Circuit found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for their denial of surgery 

for the plaintiff’s reducible hernia because the existing case law demonstrated “that existing 

precedent does not ‘place[ ] beyond debate the unconstitutionality of’ the course of non-surgical 

treatment pursued by the prison officials in Hamby’s case.” 821 F.3d at 1094. But Hamby is 

distinguishable from this case because there is no indication that plaintiff’s underlying condition 

was in dispute or that the defendants were deliberately minimizing or failing to address or 

accurately record the plaintiff’s symptoms in order to interfere with treatment or prevent surgery. 

While Mays would be entitled to qualified immunity if it were undisputed that plaintiff’s hernia 

was small and easily reducible and that he was not reporting increasingly severe symptoms, those 

are not the circumstances presented here. If plaintiff’s statements regarding the size of his hernia, 

his increasingly severe symptoms, and Mays deliberate minimization of his symptoms are taken 

as true, then Mays may well have been deliberately indifferent. No reasonable person would have 

believed that it was constitutional to falsify records and interfere with a prisoner’s ability to 

obtain further treatment for a serious and worsening condition. Similarly, accepting plaintiff’s 

evidence as true, the record before the court does not permit a conclusion that a reasonable person 

would not have understood that a failure to examine and treat plaintiff’s wrist in response to his 

complaints about swelling and pain would violate the Eighth Amendment. 

X. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment should 

be denied, and defendant Allison should be dismissed because the claims for injunctive relief are 

moot. 

XI. Miscellaneous Relief 

Plaintiff has filed a motion for clarification and motion to seal records. ECF Nos. 234, 

239. In his motion for clarification, he asks whether it is normal for defendants’ counsel to 

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provide him documents without page numbers or Bates stamps and asserts that he was provided 

4,000 pages of records without any Bates stamps. ECF No. 234. Defendants assert that the 

records they provided were Bates stamped and that plaintiff has made subsequent filings that 

included Bates stamped pages.6 Response to PSUF ¶ 5. The court will provide clarification to 

the extent that plaintiff is advised that voluminous records should be numbered in a way that 

allows for specific pages to be referenced. 

With respect to plaintiff’s request to seal, he requests that the court seal any medical 

records from after October 22, 2015. ECF No. 239. However, he does not identify the specific 

documents he seeks to have sealed. Plaintiff was previously advised that if he sought to have 

additional records sealed, they would need to be identified by either their ECF number and page 

number or Bates stamp number. ECF No. 202 at 3. Plaintiff’s assertion that he was provided 

records without Bates stamps does not prevent him from otherwise identifying the specific 

documents at issue. The court will not comb through plaintiff’s records to identify pages that 

may fall within the category of documents plaintiff seeks to seal. The request to seal will 

therefore be denied. 

XII. Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant 

Because there are disputes of fact regarding your condition and Mays conduct, and the 

outcome depends on which version of facts is believed, it is being recommended that defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment and your motion for summary judgment be denied. It is also being 

recommended that defendant Allison be dismissed because your requests for injunctive relief are 

moot now that you are no longer in prison. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Defendants’ request for judicial notice (ECF No. 153) is GRANTED. 

2. Plaintiff’s April 22, 2022 request for judicial notice (ECF No. 204) is GRANTED. 

3. Plaintiff’s motions for extension of time (ECF Nos. 233, 237) are GRANTED and 

plaintiff’s reply in support of his motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 238) is deemed timely. 

6

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4. Plaintiff’s motion for clarification (ECF No. 234) is GRANTED to the extent 

clarification has been provided above. 

5. Plaintiff’s September 13, 2022 request for judicial notice (ECF No. 235) is DENIED. 

6. Plaintiff’s motion to seal (ECF No. 239) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 149) be DENIED. 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 211) be DENIED. 

3. Defendant Allison be dismissed from this case. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 6, 2023 

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