Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01568/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01568-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEE A. BAKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATHANIEL BIER, ROBERT GIBSON, 

and DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-cv-1568-CAB (DHB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 36]

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or in the 

alternative partial summary judgment. [Doc. No. 36.] For the reasons set forth below, the 

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On July 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint setting forth three causes of action 

under 42 U.S.C. §1983, as well as various state law causes of action, arising from an 

incident involving Deputies Bier and Gibson on July 19, 2013. [Doc. No. 1.] On 

October 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint setting forth the three causes 

of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 but omitting the state law causes of action. [Doc. No. 

6.] On October 27, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the FAC. [Doc. No. 8.] 

In opposition, Plaintiff requested leave to amend. [Doc. No. 9.] Therefore, on November 

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23, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend and denied the motion 

to dismiss the FAC as moot. [Doc. No. 12.]

On December 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint which also 

sets forth three causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for the following alleged 

constitutional violations: 1) unlawful seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; 2) 

excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and 3) deliberate indifference to 

his serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. [Doc. No. 13.]

On December 16, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the SAC. [Doc. No. 

14.] On January 28, 2016, the Court granted the motion in part, and dismissed the §1983 

claims for unlawful seizure and deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. [Doc. 

No. 17.] Thus, the only remaining claim against Defendants is for excessive force.

On September 8, 2017, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment or in the 

alternative partial summary judgment. [Doc. No. 36.] On October 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed 

an opposition. [Doc. No. 43.] On October 13, 2017, Defendants filed a reply to the 

opposition. [Doc. No. 47.] 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Defendants’ Proffer.1

On July 19, 2013, Deputy Bier and Deputy Gibson were on patrol in Poway when 

they received a radio call reporting a domestic dispute at the intersection of Parkway 

Center Drive and Scripps Poway Parkway. (Ex. A1 – Bier Dec. at ¶ 3; Ex. B – Gibson 

Dec. at ¶ 3.) It was reported that a man was observed assaulting a woman, that the woman 

hit the man in the head with a beer bottle, and both were covered with blood. (Id.) The 

dispatcher advised that the male had left the scene and was walking northbound on 

Parkway Centre Drive from Scripps Poway Parkway. (Ex. A – Bier Dec. at ¶ 3.)

Deputy Bier responded to the scene. (Ex. A – Bier Dec. at ¶ 4.) As he responded, he 

 

1 Doc. No. 36-1 at 5-9. The Court does not necessarily agree with Defendants’ characterization of the 

proffered testimony.

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activated a video camera in his patrol vehicle and placed it on the dashboard. (Id.; Ex. C –

Incident Video.) When Deputy Bier was on Danielson Street, he observed Plaintiff 

walking. (Ex. A – Bier Dec. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff matched the description of the male 

involved in the domestic violence dispute and he had blood on his face. (Id.)2

Based on the description provided by dispatch, both Deputy Bier and Deputy 

Gibson believed that they were responding to a potential domestic violence call. (Ex. A –

Bier Dec. at ¶¶ 3 & 6; Ex. B – Gibson Dec. 3.) Both deputies were aware that responding 

to domestic violence calls are some of the potentially most dangerous situations for law 

enforcement because of the level of emotions involved. (Id.) With this in mind, Deputy 

Bier parked his car then approached Plaintiff on foot and ordered him to sit on the curb to 

place him in a position of disadvantage. (Ex. A – Bier Dec. at ¶ 6.) Initially, Plaintiff did 

not comply with the instruction and presented an agitated manner. (Id.) Deputy Bier 

instructed Plaintiff to sit down a second time and he complied. (Id.) Deputy Bier asked 

Plaintiff if he required medical care, but Plaintiff did not respond. (Id.)

Out of concern for his own safety, as well as to prevent Plaintiff from fleeing

during his investigation, Deputy Bier determined it was necessary to handcuff Plaintiff 

before questioning him. (Ex. A – Bier Dec. at ¶ 7.) Deputy Bier’s concern was based on 

several factors: the nature of the call (probable domestic violence situation where 

Plaintiff had been reported to have assaulted a woman); that Plaintiff had not been 

searched for weapons; that Deputy Bier was the only deputy on the scene; as well as 

Plaintiff’s agitated attitude and demeanor. (Id.) Deputy Bier ordered Plaintiff to place his 

hands behind his back so he could be handcuffed. (Id.) Plaintiff did not comply. (Id.) 

Deputy Bier repeated his command several times and Plaintiff continued to refuse to 

submit to handcuffing. (Id.) Deputy Bier withdrew his Taser and pointed it at Plaintiff’s 

feet, but Plaintiff continued to refuse to put his hands behind his back. (Id.) Plaintiff told 

 

2 Plaintiff suffered a laceration and bruise to his nose when his girlfriend threw a frozen Gatorade bottle 

at him. (Ex. D – Excerpt from Plaintiff’s Depo. at 61:23-62.5.)

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Deputy Bier that he was not going to put his hands behind his back. (Id.; Ex. D – Excerpt 

from Plaintiff’s Depo. at 72:17 – 22.) Deputy Bier spent approximately one minute 

attempting to gain compliance from Plaintiff with verbal and visual commands. (Ex. A –

Bier Dec. at ¶ 7; Ex. C – Incident Video at 1:24 – 2:27.)

After Deputy Bier’s numerous attempts using verbal and visual techniques to gain 

compliance from Plaintiff failed, Deputy Bier re-holstered his Taser and walked behind 

Plaintiff who was still sitting on the curb. (Ex. A – Bier Dec. at ¶ 8; Ex. C – Incident 

Video.) As Deputy Bier walked behind Plaintiff, Deputy Bier observed Plaintiff lock his 

hands together in front of his body and tense up. (Id.) Fearing that Plaintiff was going to 

resist, attempt to assault him, or escape, Deputy Bier tried to gain a tactical advantage by 

placing his hands on Plaintiff’s back and pushing Plaintiff forward. (Id.) Deputy Bier 

followed Plaintiff to the ground where Plaintiff continued to refuse to put his hands 

behind his back so that Deputy Bier could place the handcuffs on Plaintiff. (Id.)

Deputy Bier then placed his right arm around Plaintiff’s neck and straddled 

Plaintiff’s back in an attempt to control him. (Ex. A – Bier Dec. at ¶ 9; Ex. C – Incident 

Video.) Deputy Bier used the microphone on his shoulder to notify dispatch that he 

needed cover. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to resist Deputy Bier’s attempts to place Plaintiff 

in handcuffs. (Id.) Deputy Bier began to attempt to apply pressure to Plaintiff’s carotid 

artery but Deputy Bier knew that Plaintiff was able to breathe because Deputy Bier was 

not applying much pressure. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to resist by grabbing onto Deputy 

Bier’ arm and pulling it away from him. (Id.) Plaintiff was also tensing his body and 

trying to get out of Deputy Bier’s grasp. (Id.)

As Deputy Gibson arrived on the scene, he perceived that Plaintiff was

successfully resisting Deputy Bier’s attempt to place Plaintiff in a carotid restraint hold. 

(Ex. B – Gibson Dec. at ¶ 4.) It appeared to Deputy Gibson that Plaintiff was able to lift 

Deputy Bier’s left arm up over Plaintiff’s chin and it appeared that Plaintiff was biting 

Deputy Bier’s left forearm and was about to kick Deputy Bier with both feet or use his 

feet to break free. (Id.) It was Deputy Gibson’s impression that Plaintiff was very close to 

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escaping Deputy Bier’s hold. (Id.) Deputy Gibson was concerned for Deputy Bier’s 

safety. (Id.)

When Deputy Gibson approached, Deputy Bier and Plaintiff, Deputy Bier stopped

attempting to apply the carotid restraint hold. (Ex. A – Bier Dec. at ¶ 10.) Nevertheless 

Plaintiff continued to resist Deputy Bier’s attempts to gain control of his arms. (Id.) 

Deputy Gibson placed his knee on Plaintiff’s abdomen. (Ex. B – Gibson Dec. at ¶ 5; Ex. 

C – Incident Video.) Noting that hand to hand combat was not working to gain control of 

Plaintiff, Deputy Gibson then un-holstered his Taser and removed its cartridge so it 

would be in drive stun mode (which has a lesser quantum of force than when the probes 

are deployed). (Id.) Deputy Gibson placed the Taser against Plaintiff’s pectoral muscle 

and then ordered Plaintiff to stop resisting immediately or warned that he would be 

Tased. (Id.) Plaintiff responded by stating “fuck you.” (Ex. B – Gibson Dec. at ¶ 5; Ex. D 

– Excerpt from Plaintiff’s Depo. at 91:22 – 92:4.) Deputy Gibson made a second order to 

Plaintiff to stop resisting or he would be Tased. (Ex. B – Gibson Dec. at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff 

continued to struggle and Deputy Gibson activated his Taser for 3 to 5 seconds. (Id.) 

Plaintiff let go of his hold on Deputy Bier and rolled onto his stomach. (Id.; Ex. C –

Incident Video.) Plaintiff brought both of his hands underneath his body and began to 

push himself up. (Id.) Concerned that Plaintiff would be in a position of advantage if he 

got up, Deputy Gibson placed the Taser on Plaintiff’s back and activated the charge 

again. (Id.) Plaintiff then stopped resisting and submitted to handcuffing. (Id.; Ex. A –

Bier Dec. at ¶ 10.) Neither deputy used further force against Plaintiff after he stopped 

resisting. (Id.)

Deputy Bier suffered a slight abrasion to his left forearm. (Ex. A – Bier Dec. at ¶ 

11.) Plaintiff claims he suffered: several minor asphalt abrasions to his face, elbow, hand, 

and knees; Taser marks on his chest and back; cuts on his wrists from the handcuffs; as 

well as right shoulder pain and discomfort from the encounter with Defendants. (Ex. E –

Pl.’s Interrogatory Response No. 1.) Plaintiff does not know if the cuts on his wrists 

allegedly caused by the handcuffs occurred when the handcuffs were initially applied, or 

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later when he was in the care of other, non-defendant deputies. (Ex. D – Excerpt from 

Plaintiff’s Depo. at 151:12 – 152: 15 & 153:15 – 155:8.) Plaintiff did not ask Deputy Bier 

or Deputy Gibson to loosen the handcuffs. (Id. at 152:13 – 15.) Plaintiff was taken to a 

hospital for the evaluation of his injuries. (Ex. A – Bier Dec. at ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff was arrested and was convicted for being under the influence of 

methamphetamines during the incident. (Ex. D – Excerpt from Plaintiff’s Depo. at 102:1 

– 22.)

B. Plaintiff’s Proffer.

3

At approximately 5:53 p.m. Defendant Bier received a radio call of, “a male and 

female actively in a physical confrontation. The male was seen assaulting the female. 

Assault without injury is misdemeanor assault (PC §240). The female had also hit the 

male in the head with a beer bottle. The male was bleeding in result of the beer bottle

hitting him in the head. While (Defendant Bier) was en route, dispatch advised that the 

male had left the scene and was walking northbound on Parkway (sic) Center Drive from 

Scripps Poway Parkway.” (Excerpt of Defendant Bier’s Sheriff Deputy Officer report, p. 

1, ¶1).

As Defendant Bier travelled eastbound on Danielson toward Parkway (sic) Centre 

Drive he notice a man who matched the description given by dispatch walking down the 

street. (Id. at p. 1 ¶2). The male had a lot of blood on his face that looked as if it were 

coming from his nose. The man was later identified as Mr. Baker. (Id).

Defendant Bier stopped his patrol car and approached Mr. Baker on foot. (Excerpt of Lee 

Baker Depo. at 69:20-24). Defendant Bier told Mr. Baker to sit down twice. Mr. Baker 

told Defendant Bier he would sit down and did sit down within thirteen seconds of their 

contact. [Criminal Trial (CT) TS Vol. 1 at 225:27-28, to 226:1, 16-18]. Defendant Bier 

asked Mr. Baker whose blood was on him. Mr. Baker told Defendant Bier that it was his 

 

3 Doc. No. 43 at 6-11. The Court does not necessarily agree with Plaintiff’s characterization of the 

proffered testimony.

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blood, that he had just been attacked by his girlfriend, that she had thrown a frozen bottle 

of Gatorade at his face, that he was the victim and he might need medical attention. 

(Excerpt of Lee Baker Depo at 70:13-19).

Next Defendant Bier told Mr. Baker to put his behind his back because he was 

under arrest. (Id. at 70:21-22.) Mr. Baker asked why he needed to put his hands behind 

his back; he was the victim. (Id. at 70:24-25.) Mr. Baker asked what he was being 

arrested for. (Excerpt of Lee Baker Depo at 71:1). Defendant Bier never advised Mr. 

Baker why he was being detained or arrested. [PE TS at 36:1- 17]. Prior to Defendant 

Bier pointing his taser at Mr. Baker and as Defendant Bier continued to tell Mr. Baker to 

put his hands behind his back, Mr. Baker continued to ask what he was being arrested for 

and to try to explain the situation to Defendant Bier but Defendant Bier was not listening. 

Defendant Bier never told Mr. Baker that he was placing him in handcuffs for officer 

safety or because he was conducting an investigation. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 207:1-7].

At trial Defendant Bier could not recall whether Mr. Baker asked why he was 

being arrested or whether Mr. Baker told Defendant Bier he was the victim of a battery. 

“I cannot recall the whole conversation...I can’t remember what he said.” (CT TS at 

205:22-27). While watching the video Defendant Bier acknowledged that Mr. Baker was 

talking, “His lips moving. Yes.” (CT TS at 230:25-28; 231:1, 23-28, 232:1-15). But 

Defendant Bier answered at least six times “no,” as he watched the video, he could not 

recall what Mr. Baker said to him. (CT TS at 230-232).

Defendant Bier testified he remembered thinking that it seemed like Mr. Baker 

was wondering why he was being told to put his hands behind his back but he testified he 

did not remember Mr. Baker asking him why he was being told to put his hands behind 

his back. (CT TS at 231:3-8, 17-18). Defendant Bier testified three times during the 

underlying criminal proceedings. He never testified that Mr. Baker told him he was not 

going to put his hands behind his back as he did recently in his declaration. Now 

Defendant Bier remembers Mr. Baker telling him he wouldn’t put his hands behind his 

back. But, he does not acknowledge the other half of Mr. Baker’s statement which was, 

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“until you tell me what I’m being arrested for.” [CT TS Vol. 2 at 56:11-12].

Defendant Bier acknowledged that Mr. Baker “wasn’t aggressive towards me. He

wasn’t trying to fight me.” [CT TS Vol. 1 at 206:16-17.] Defendant Bier also 

acknowledged that at no time prior to Defendant Bier going behind Mr. Baker to try to 

handcuff him did Mr. Baker make any movement forward, or up, looking like he was 

going to flee. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 199:14-17]. As Mr. Baker sat on the curb, after Defendant 

Bier told him to sit on the curb, Mr. Baker never tried to reach into his pocket, never 

reached his hand toward any other part of his body, didn’t reach his arms out to 

Defendant Bier. (CT TS Vol. 1 at 199:5-13). After he sat down Mr. Baker never tried to 

get up from the curb again. At no time did Mr. Baker ever try to punch or kick Defendant 

Bier, nor did he threaten him. [PE TS at 30:3-12; 61:24-28].

Defendant Bier was the first deputy to arrive on scene. He knew, however, before 

he went hands-on with Mr. Baker, that Defendant Gibson was en route to Defendant 

Bier’s location. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 201:5-6, 11-12]. Defendant Bier noticed a slight size 

difference but never mentioned being concerned about a size differential between him 

and Mr. Baker, or that he was particularly intimidated by Mr. Baker. Defendant Bier 

testified that he was only one inch shorter and 20 pounds lighter than Mr. Baker. [CT TS 

Vol. 1 at 204:1-15].

Defendant Bier decided to immediately put Mr. Baker in handcuffs because it was 

his “common procedure” when he was by himself to place someone he is contacting in 

handcuffs for his safety, and to control the situation because he “didn’t have to worry 

about him anymore by placing him in handcuffs.” [PE TS at 17:17-25].

Defendant Bier never tried to engage Mr. Baker in any friendly or quasi-friendly 

conversation at all. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 221:19-22]. Defendants’ expert Ronald McCarthy 

testified that verbalization during a detention is a technique that should be employed by 

San Diego Sheriff’s Deputies when possible, and Sheriff’s Deputies are directed to use 

this technique in San Diego Sheriff training materials “Addendum F.” (Excerpt of Ronald 

McCarthy Depo. at 32:2-25; 33:1-2.)

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Mr. Baker had not given Defendant Bier any indication that he was a present 

physical threat to Defendant Bier or anyone else, and he had made no movements to flee 

at the initial encounter. [Motion to Suppress (MS) TS at 50:18-25]. Defendant Bier 

agreed that Mr. Baker had submitted to him when Mr. Baker was seated on the curb and 

before Defendant Bier tried to put the handcuffs on. [MS TS at 53:18-22].

That’s why Mr. Baker could not understand why Defendant Bier wanted to 

handcuff him, and despite his multiple inquiries, Defendant Bier wasn’t telling. Contrary 

to what the Sheriff’s Department teaches, and Defendant Bier learned in training manual 

“Addendum F,” that is, to use verbalization to prevent escalation of a situation, including 

explaining any actions that are about to be taken, Defendant Bier didn’t do that. [CT TS 

Vol. 1 at 211:10-16]

Defendant Bier testified at trial he said only three things to Mr. Baker before going 

hands on with him: 1. Sit down; 2. Do you need medical attention, and 3. Put your hands 

behind your back. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 221:10-18]. Defendant Bier admitted that if 

verbalization had been used in the beginning of the encounter it is possible the situation 

with Mr. Baker could have been deescalated. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 211:23-28; 212:1-4.] 

Further, Defendant Bier admitted that by yelling within the first minute of their contact 

Defendant Bier “heightened the level of” the situation. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 222:13-14].

When Defendant Bier went behind him, Mr. Baker was scared and felt like he was 

being attacked. [CT TS Vol. 2 at 56:14-19]. Defendant Bier appeared as if he was going 

to grab Mr. Baker’s arms but then he pushed Mr. Baker onto the ground. [CT TS Vol. 1 

page 170, lines 16-17]. Mr. Baker put his arm out to break his fall but he made no 

movement to specifically avoid being handcuffed, to fight Defendant Bier or try to get 

away; he simply held himself up off the ground. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 171:4-5, 9-12; Incident 

Video]. Defendant Bier then wrapped his body around Mr. Baker and rolled Mr. Baker 

into a supine position. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 172: 4-8]. Mr. Baker remained essentially still. 

He did not flail, hit, or kick. (Incident Video).

Then Defendant Bier wrapped his arm around Mr. Baker’s neck in a chokehold. He 

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placed his forearm over Mr. Baker’s trachea and squeezed so Mr. Baker could not 

breathe. [CT TS Vol. 2 at 56: 24-26]. Mr. Baker was afraid for his life. [CT TS Vol. 2 at 

56: 27-28; Excerpt of Lee Baker Depo. at 79:6-7]. Mr. Baker still did not fight back but 

he did try to get Defendant Bier’s arm off of his trachea by tapping on Defendant Bier’s 

arm. [CT TS Vol. 2 at 57:7-14]. Defendant Bier agreed he may have been putting 

pressure on Mr. Baker’s windpipe. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 219:4-6]. Mr. Baker was not tense 

and he did not try to get out of Defendant Bier’s hold. [Incident Video; CT TS Vol. 2 at 

70: 13-17; Excerpt of Lee Baker Depo. at 79:12-22]. To the contrary, he did not fight 

back, for fear he would be shot and killed. [Excerpt of Lee Baker Depo. at 80:5-8).

Defendant Bier had Mr. Baker under control when Defendant Gibson arrived

shortly thereafter and jumped on Mr. Baker’s abdomen, placing his knee in Mr. Baker’s 

chest. [Excerpt of Lee Baker Depo. at 82: 24-25, 83: 1-2]. Defendant Gibson tased Mr. 

Baker once in the chest, Defendant Bier released his hooks around Mr. Baker’s legs so he 

could roll over and Mr. Baker did roll over. “And right when he was tased he 

immediately rolled over and I was able to put my leg – my leg across his lower leg to 

keep him from kicking. And I put him in handcuffs.” [(Excerpt of Defendant Bier’s 

Sheriff Deputy Officer report, p. 2, ¶2; PE TS at 24:1-5, 19:3-10]. Mr. Baker was tased at 

least one more time in his back after he rolled over even though according to Defendant 

Bier Mr. Baker was compliant. [Decl. of Deputy Gibson in Support of Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment at 4: 22; PE TS Vol. 1 at 19: 9-10].

At no time prior to Mr. Baker’s arrest did Defendants Bier or Gibson form the 

opinion or any suspicion that Mr. Baker was under the influence of methamphetamine or 

any other drug, nor did that possibility affect the way Mr. Baker’s detention or arrest was 

handled. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 198:17-28; 199:1-2]. Mr. Baker was neither field-tested nor 

arrested for being under the influence of drugs. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 305:3-20]. At the time 

of his arrest neither Defendants intended to arrest or charge Mr. Baker with being under 

the influence of a controlled substance. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 315:21-28].

At approximately 9:14 p.m., after Mr. Baker had been arrested, transported to 

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Pomerado hospital, and from the hospital to the Poway Sheriff substation, Defendant 

Gibson had Mr. Baker’s blood drawn, he testified at trial, for two reasons: to test for 

communicable diseases if Mr. Baker had bitten Defendant Bier (even though Defendant 

Bier never told Defendant Gibson he had been bitten), and to test for controlled 

substances. [CT TS Vol. 1 at 257:7-28, 258:1-8, 219:17-22].

Elizabeth Jaworski was interviewed, and admitted throwing the frozen bottle at Mr. 

Baker because she was angry. Ms. Jaworski was arrested for felony domestic violence. 

(Excerpt of Darin Smith Depo. at 38:13-20; 41:8-19).

C. Undisputed Material Facts.

While the parties highlight different facts in their proffers, there are certain facts 

that are undisputed and material. For example, it is undisputed that Plaintiff matched the 

description of a male who was reportedly involved in a domestic violence dispute. [Ex. 

A – Bier Decl. at ¶5.] It is also undisputed that Plaintiff did not comply with over one 

minute of verbal commands to place his hands behind his back. [Ex. A – Bier Dec. at ¶7, 

Ex. D – Plf. Depo at 72:17 – 22; Ex. C – Incident video at 1:24 – 2:27.] While Plaintiff 

testified that he kept asking Deputy Bier why he was being arrested and Deputy Bier did

not respond [Ex. D – Plf depo at 70:24 – 71:1], Plaintiff admits that, when he was asked 

to put his hands behind his back, he did not comply:

Q. And what happened after you put your belongings down and sat 

on the curb?

A. He instructed me to put my hands behind my back – or he asked 

me whose blood is that?

And I told him that it was my blood; that I had just been 

attacked by my girlfriend. She threw a frozen bottle of Gatorade in my face 

and told him that – that I was the victim and that I might need medical 

attention.

Q. What happened next?

A. He – he told me to put my hands behind my back and that I was 

under arrest.

Q. Did you put your hands behind your back?

A. I told him, what – why do I need to put my hands behind my 

back. I told him that I’m the victim, and I asked him what is it that I’m 

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being arrested for.

Q. And what did he say?

A. And he said that he didn’t know what I was being arrested for; 

that – but he was going to find out.

Q. Did he instruct you more than one time to put your hands 

behind your back?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. How many times did he instruct you to put your hands behind 

your back?

A. I don’t know exactly how many. But –

Q. More than three?

A. I really don’t know.

Q. Is it possible that it was more than three?

A. I – I don’t know.

Q. Okay.

A. To be honest.

Q. But it was more than once?

A. Yes, it was more than once.

Q. Was it more than three times?

Let me strike that.

More than – was it more than twice?

A. I – I really don’t know.

Q. So at least twice, but you’re not sure beyond that?

A. Yeah. I’m not too sure beyond that.

Q. Did he – what was he doing when he instructed you to put your hands 

behind your back?

A. Well, he was like raising his voice at me and kind of shouting and –

and yelling at me to put my hands behind my back. And he pulled out his 

Taser and was standing a couple feet in front of me pointing his Taser at my 

face and said for me to put my hands behind my back or else he was going to 

tase me.

And I told him, you know, that I was the victim in this altercation, I 

wasn’t the aggressor.

Q. Was this – you told him that previously?

A. Yes.

Q. So you repeated that you were the victim?

A. Yes.

Q. And what happened next?

A. And I told him, you know, I’m not going to put my hands behind my 

back.

And he said, if you don’t put your hands behind your back, I’m going 

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to tase you.

And I said, well, then I guess you’re going to have to tase me.

[Plf depo, 70:11 – 72:22.]

Even after Deputy Bier went behind Plaintiff and grappled him to the 

ground, Plaintiff did not voluntarily put his hands behind his back. While Plaintiff 

testified that he was not “resisting” during this time [Plf depo., 82:3-6], he does not 

provide any evidence that he complied with Deputy Bier’s directive to put his 

hands behind his back. The video is clear that Plaintiff’s hands did not go behind 

his back until after Deputy Gibson tasered him and the deputies had to force his 

hands behind him. [Incident video at 3:01.] And Plaintiff acknowledges that he 

used profanity against the deputies during the entire incident up until the time the 

officers were able to handcuff him. [Plf depo., 91:22 – 92:4.]

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). It is the moving party's burden to show there is no factual issue for 

trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets its 

burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show there is a genuine issue for 

trial. Id. at 331. 

The Court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 

212 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir.2000). The Court does not make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

Rather, the Court determines whether the record “presents a sufficient disagreement to 

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a 

matter of law.” Id. at 251–52.

/ / / / /

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B. Excessive Force.

As a preliminary matter, this Court previously ruled that any claims that Plaintiff 

“was unlawfully seized from the moment Deputy Bier attempted to place him in 

handcuffs by using physical force to gain control over Plaintiff, until the moment Plaintiff 

was released from custody on bond” [Doc. No. 13, ¶52], are barred by Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). [Doc. No. 17 at 5-6.] Therefore, it must be assumed 

that Deputies Bier and Gibson had the right to seize Plaintiff. Thus, the only question 

now is whether, in lawfully seizing Plaintiff, Defendants used excessive force.

Most of Plaintiff’s proffered facts go to the issue of why Deputy Bier had to 

handcuff Plaintiff, when it was Plaintiff’s belief that he was the victim of the domestic 

dispute and Plaintiff was merely trying to explain his side of the story to Deputy Bier. 

However, as set forth above, Plaintiff is barred from bringing any claim that the arrest or 

seizure was unlawful. Therefore, assuming the deputies had the right to handcuff 

Plaintiff, did they use excessive force?

The constitutional right at issue when it is alleged that a law enforcement officer 

used excessive force in the course of an arrest or other seizure is the Fourth Amendment 

right to be free from “unreasonable... seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 395 (1989). “Determining whether the force used to effect a 

particular seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing 

of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests 

against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Because the reasonableness standard is not capable of 

precise definition or mechanical application, “its proper application requires careful 

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of 

the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest 

by flight.” Id. The most important Graham factor is the immediacy of the threat posed to 

the safety of the officers or others. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir. 

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2005) (en banc). Courts also consider the “quantum of force used to arrest the plaintiff, 

the availability of alternative methods of capturing or detaining the suspect, and the 

plaintiff's mental and emotional state.” Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citations omitted). The reasonableness inquiry in excessive force cases is an 

objective one, meaning that “the reasonableness of a particular use of force must be 

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 

20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

1. Severity of the Crimes.

At the time they were responding, it was the Deputies’ understanding that Plaintiff 

had assaulted a woman, which is a serious crime and weighs against a finding of 

excessive force. Radwan v. City of Orange, No. SACV 08-0786AG, 2010 WL 3293354, 

at *17 (C.D. Aug. 18, 2010), aff’d, 519 F.App’x 490 (9th Cir. 2013), citing Bryan v. 

MacPherson, 608 F.3d 614, 625 (9th Cir. 2010). 

2. Immediacy of Threat.

The “most important” Graham factor is whether the person “posed an immediate 

threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th

Cir. 2011). Here, Defendants were presented with evidence that they were encountering 

a domestic violence call, there has been a report that a man matching Plaintiff’s 

description had assaulted a female, Plaintiff was agitated and yelling profanities at the 

deputies, and Plaintiff was refusing verbal requests to submit to handcuffing. Thus, it 

was reasonable for Defendants to believe Plaintiff posed a physical threat.

3. Active Resistance.

It is undisputed that, for almost two minutes, Plaintiff did not comply with the 

deputy’s verbal commands to place his hands behind his back.4 Once Deputy Bier 

 

4 Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ own expert, Ronald McCarthy, agreed that verbalization during a 

detention is a technique that should be employed by San Diego Sheriff’s Deputies when possible, and 

Sheriff’s Deputies are directed to use this technique in San Diego Sheriff training materials “Addendum 

F.” [Doc. No. 43 at 18.] First, Addendum F is not attached or authenticated and, therefore, is not 

considered. See Hoffman v. Applicators Sales & Service, Inc., 439 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2006) (chart 

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attempted to physically restrain him, Plaintiff tensed up and locked his wrists together to 

prevent Deputy Bier from using physical force to handcuff him, and continued to resist 

Deputy Bier’s attempts to gain control of his arms when they were on the ground. After 

giving verbal warnings, Deputy Gibson deployed his Taser twice, in drive stun mode, 

before he and Deputy Bier were finally able to subdue Plaintiff. Thus, the use of force by 

the deputies was minor, only escalated as Plaintiff continued to resist attempts to secure 

him, and was not out of line with the resistance Plaintiff offered. See Arpin v. Santa 

Clara Valley Trnsp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)(use of force necessary to 

put handcuffs on arrestee who stiffened her arm and attempted to pull free to avoid 

handcuffing was not excessive).

4. Quantum of Force.

As discussed above, the quantum of force was minor, produced minor injuries, and 

only escalated as Plaintiff continued to resist attempts to handcuff him. Thus, the 

quantum of force used was not unreasonable.

5. Alternative Methods.

Here, the deputies attempted several methods of restraining Plaintiff before they 

were finally able to subdue him enough to handcuff him. First, Deputy Bier attempted 

verbal commands for one to two minutes. Then, Deputy Bier attempted to physically 

force Plaintiff to put his hands behind his back. It was only when Deputy Gibson 

perceived that Deputy Bier’s efforts in grappling with Plaintiff were not succeeding that 

he used a Taser on a low dosage. Therefore, alternative methods were explored and 

reasonably attempted.

 

purporting to summarize data in documents obtained through discovery could not be considered because 

documents themselves were not attached and authenticated). Moreover, the cited testimony merely 

confirms that, according to the (missing) Addendum F, verbalization would be appropriate in a situation 

where a deputy has a physical position of advantage over the suspect. [Doc. No. 43-1.] However, there 

is no opinion provided in the opposition to the motion for summary judgment as to whether the one to

two minutes Deputy Bier spent talking to the Plaintiff constitutes verbalization. Therefore, in addition 

to being hearsay, the cited testimony is irrelevant.

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6. Plaintiff’s Mental and Emotional State.

Plaintiff does not argue that he had any particular mental illness, and even denies 

having been under the influence of methamphetamine. Therefore, this is not a factor to 

be addressed.

7. Warnings.

Providing warnings is a factor to consider when conducting a Graham analysis. 

Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, both deputies warned 

Plaintiff that they would use force if he continued to resist.

8. Conclusion.

After balancing the foregoing Graham factors and “[a]llow[ing] for the fact that 

police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that 

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in 

a particular situation,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, the Court concludes as a matter of law 

that the officers did not use excessive force. No reasonable jury could find that 

defendants applied an excessive amount of force during the arrest of Plaintiff. See, e.g., 

Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 963-68 (9th Cir. 2003) (use of trained police dog to 

“bite and hold” suspect until officers arrived on the scene less than a minute later does 

not constitute unreasonable excessive force under 4th Amendment when suspect poses 

immediate threat to officers' safety, several attempts to arrest suspect with less forceful 

means are unsuccessful as a result of suspect's defiance, and use of police dog is wellsuited to task of safely arresting suspect). 

For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary judgment as to the 

excessive force claim is GRANTED on the grounds that there is no triable issue of 

material fact as to whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

C. Qualified Immunity.

Nevertheless, even if a jury could find a Fourth Amendment violation, under the

second prong of the qualified immunity test, the Court must decide if the alleged 

violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right against excessive force “was clearly 

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established at the time of the officer's alleged misconduct.” C.V. by and through Villegas 

v. City of Anaheim, 823 F.3d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2016)(citations omitted). If not, the 

officer receives qualified immunity. To be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right 

must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what [the 

official] is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 

“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the 

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 

S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 

(2011)). Further, the clearly established inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the 

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition,” especially in the Fourth 

Amendment context, where “[i]t is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how 

the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the 

officer confronts.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way, 

only the “plainly incompetent” officer will not enjoy qualified immunity. Id. (citation 

omitted).

Before this Court can impose liability on Defendants, it must identify precedent as 

of July 19, 2013—the day of the incident—that put Defendants “on clear notice that 

using . . . force in these particular circumstances would be excessive.” S.B. v. County of 

San Diego (“S.B.”), 864 F.3d 1010, 1015 (2017). “General excessive force principles, as 

set forth in Graham5and Garner6, are ‘not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear 

warning to officers,’ but they “do not by themselves create clearly established law outside 

an obvious case.’” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, we must 

“identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as [Defendants] was 

held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

Plaintiff argues that specific case precedent is not required because “any 

 

5 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

6 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

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reasonable police officer would know that pushing an innocent, non-aggressive, nonthreatening man into the street face first would violate the Fourth Amendment.” [Doc. 

No. 43 at 19.] Plaintiff further argues that “any officer would know that jumping on top 

of the same innocent man, now terrified and confused, wrestling him to the ground, 

choking him and tasing him twice for no legitimate reason would constitute excessive 

force.” [Id.] 

First, Plaintiff’s characterization of the evidence is wildly exaggerated and ignores 

this Court’s previous ruling that Plaintiff is barred from bringing a claim that the seizure 

itself was unlawful. The only issue is whether the deputies’ actions in lawfully 

restraining Plaintiff constituted excessive force. Was it excessive force to attempt to 

grapple with Plaintiff after one to two minutes of Deputy Bier verbally ordering Plaintiff 

to put his hands behind his back? Was it excessive force for Deputy Gibson, after seeing 

Deputy Bier grappling with Plaintiff, and after warning Plaintiff, to use a taser to force 

Plaintiff’s compliance? Neither of these situations are “obvious” cases of a Fourth 

Amendment violation for which the general excessive force principals set forth in 

Graham and Garner provide clear notice to the Defendants.

While Plaintiff does not identify a particular case that would have put Defendants 

on notice that their actions were clearly unlawful, he does cite to the following cases for 

the proposition that excessive force violates the Fourth Amendment: Washington v. 

Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1187-90 (9th Cir. 1996); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 644-645 

(9th Cir. 1989); and Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991). None of 

these cases, however, meet the “exacting standard” required by the U.S. Supreme Court 

to provide the deputies with the “clear notice” that using the amount of force they did was 

unlawful. S.B., 864 F.3d at 1017, citing White v. Pauley, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551 (2017). For 

example, Washington involved an unlawful seizure. 98 F.3d. at 1185. Here, any claims 

Plaintiff asserts for unlawful seizure are barred. Moreover, the facts in Washington are 

dissimilar, as Washington involved numerous officers handcuffing two suspects for 

robberies that occurred six days earlier in a different part of town – and those suspects 

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complied with officer demands to submit to handcuffing. 98 F.3d at 1184. Therefore, 

Washington is not sufficiently similar to provide Deputies Bier and Gibson with “clear 

notice.” S.B., 864 F.3d at 1015.

The same is true of Hansen, which primarily involved a claim for unlawful arrest. 

885 F.2d at 644. Moreover, the excessive force claim in Hansen pertained to an officer 

allegedly putting handcuffs on in an excessively violent manner and causing the plaintiff 

physical injuries to her wrist and arm from the handcuffing. Id. at 645. Here, Plaintiff’s 

claims involve the deputies’ actions prior to putting on the handcuffs, and Plaintiff does 

not claim physical injuries from the handcuffing itself. Therefore, Hansen is also not 

sufficiently similar to provide Deputies Bier and Gibson with “clear notice.” S.B., 864 

F.3d at 1015.

Finally, Barlow also involved an unlawful seizure claim regarding whether police 

had grounds to detain someone who knocked down a sign at a protest. 943 F.2d at 1135. 

Moreover, the excessive force claim in Barlow pertained to whether police should have 

tackled the plaintiff from behind merely for knocking down a sign. Id. at 1136. This is 

completely different from the situation here, where Plaintiff was reportedly involved in a 

domestic violence incident and, for one to two minutes, refused to comply with verbal 

instructions to place his hands behind his back. Therefore, Barlow is also not sufficiently 

similar to provide Deputies Bier and Gibson with “clear notice.” S.B., 864 F.3d at 1015. 

For the reasons set forth above, the cases cited by Plaintiff do not provide “clear 

notice” to the deputies under the “exacting standards” required by White. S.B., 864 F.3d 

at 1015. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment as to the excessive force claim is 

GRANTED on the grounds of qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants and the Clerk of the Court 

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shall CLOSE the case.7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 14, 2017

 

7 All other pending motions [Doc. Nos. 37 and 38] are DENIED AS MOOT.

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