Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00239/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00239-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

DENNIS J. CHEATHAM,

ADC #136117 PLAINTIFF

V. 5:16CV00239 BRW/JTR

JOHN DOES 1-4,

unknown Varner Unit Warden

and Correctional Officers; and

CHERYLE JOHNSON,

Captain, Varner Unit, ADC DEFENDANTS

RECOMMENDED PARTIAL DISPOSITION

The following Recommended Partial Disposition (“Recommendation”) has

been sent to United States District Judge Billy Roy Wilson. You may file written

objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must:

(1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be

received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this

Recommendation. The failure to timely file objections may result in waiver of the

right to appeal questions of fact. 

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, Dennis J. Cheatham ("Cheatham"), is a prisoner in the North Central

Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction ("ADC"). He has filed this pro se §

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1983 action alleging that, while he was in the Varner Unit, Defendants Captain

Cheryle Johnson ("Johnson") and John Does, who are unknown members of a 

Security Response Team and the warden of the Varner Unit, failed to protect him

from being attacked by two other prisoners. Docs. 2, 6, & 24.

Johnson has filed two Motions to Dismiss and two Briefs in Support arguing

that: (1) she is entitled to sovereign and qualified immunity; (2) Cheatham has failed

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and (3) Cheatham has failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. Docs. 12, 13, 25, & 26. Cheatham has filed a

Response to the Motions to Dismiss and supporting Exhibits. Docs. 18 & 22. 

II. Relevant Facts

Cheatham's failure to protect claims are based on the following facts as

contained in his pleadings:1

1. On April 27, 2016, Cheatham lived on the top floor of 4 Barracks, a twostory open barrack at the Varner Unit. Docs. 2, 6, & 24.

2. Around 11:00 p.m., Cheatham was on the second floor of 4 Barracks

when two prisoners beat and stabbed him multiple times, and left him in a semiconscious state on the floor. Cheatham admits this was a "surprise attack" and that he

1

 A motion to dismiss should be granted if, assuming the truth of the factual assertions made

in the plaintiff's pleadings, he has failed to state a viable claim as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 

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had no prior problems with his two attackers. Id.

3. Cheatham's two attackers then went to the first floor of 4 Barracks and

attacked another prisoner ("the first floor prisoner"). After being stabbed multiple

times, the first floor prisoner broke free from the two attackers and banged on the door

to 4 Barracks. The officer outside of 4 Barrack rescued the first floor prisoner, and

immediately called for back-up. Id.

4. Johnson and the Security Response Team answered the call. They spoke

to the first floor prisoner, who was in the hallway outside of 4 Barracks, and took him

to the infirmary for medical treatment. Johnson and the Security Response Team did

not enter 4 Barracks to apprehend the attackers, seize their weapons, or otherwise

secure the barracks. Id.

5. After Johnson and the Security Response Team left, the two attackers

returned to the second floor of 4 Barracks, found Cheatham, and stabbed him several

more times. In total, Cheatham was stabbed twenty-three times. Id.

III. Discussion

A. Sovereign Immunity

Cheatham has sued Johnson in both her official and individual capacity. 

Johnson correctly argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits Cheatham

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from obtaining monetary damages against her, in her official capacity.2

 See Zajrael

v. Harmon, 677 F.3d. 353, 355 (8th Cir. 2012); Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936,

939-40 (8th Cir. 2005). Thus, Cheatham's failure to protect claim against Johnson, in

her official capacity, should be dismissed, with prejudice. 

B. Qualified Immunity

Johnson argues that qualified immunity shields her from the failure to protect

claim Cheatham has asserted against her in her individual capacity. 

Qualified immunity protects government officials, like Johnson, from liability

for monetary damages in a § 1983 action unless their conduct violates a clearly

established federal statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person would

have known. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736 (2011); Saylor v. Nebraska, 812

F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2016). However, Johnson is not entitled to qualified immunity

if: (1) the facts, as alleged by Cheatham, state a viable claim for the violation of a

constitutional right;3

 and (2) that constitutional right was clearly established at the

time of the alleged violation. See Dadd v. Anoka Cnty., 827 F.3d 749, 754-55 (8th

2

 Sovereign immunity does not apply to a request for prospective injunctive relief. Id. 

Because Cheatham is no longer incarcerated in the Varner Unit, he has not requested any injunctive

relief. 

3

 Johnson also makes a separate argument that she is entitled to dismissal, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because Cheatham has failed to state a viable failure to protect

claim against her. Because the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis is the same as the first prong of the qualified

immunity analysis, the Court will consider these arguments together. See Dadd, 827 F.3d at 745-55.

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Cir. 2016); Hager v. Ark. Dept. of Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2013).

To state a viable Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, the allegations in

Cheatham's pleadings must establish that: (1) objectively, there was a substantial risk

that he might be seriously harmed; and (2) subjectively, Johnson was deliberately

indifferent to that substantial risk of serious harm. See Walls v. Tadman, 763 F.3d

778, 782 (8th Cir. 2016); Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 2011).

Cheatham's pleadings do not assert a failure to protect claim against Johnson

or the other Defendants for the first attack, which he concedes was a surprise attack.

See Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 104, 1048 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that prison

officials cannot be held liable for failing to protect an inmate from a surprise attack);

Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d 999, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 2010) (same). 

However, Cheatham alleges that Johnson violated his constitutional rights by

failing to protect him from the second attack, which he believes would not have

occurred if Johnson and the Security Response Team had entered 4 Barracks to locate

and disarm the two attackers as soon as they arrived on the scene. In other words,

Cheatham contends that Johnson and the Security Response team were deliberately

indifferent to the serious and obvious risk of injury to other prisoners that was created

by their decision not "to enter 4 Barracks to secure, investigate, detain likely suspects,

and/or confiscate weapons involved." Doc. 19 at 4; Doc. 24 at 4. Cheatham claims

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that if Johnson had done so, he would not have been attacked the second time.

4

Johnson argues that she is entitled to dismissal of that claim because, as to the

second element (subjective deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious

harm), she did not specifically know that Cheatham had been attacked and was lying

on the second tier of 4 Barracks in a semi-conscious state. See Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994) (holding that a prison official's negligent "failure to alleviate

a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not" fails to rise to the level of

a constitutional violation); Pagels v. Morrison, 335 F.3d 736, 742 (8th Cir. 2009)

(same).

Johnson's argument construes Cheatham's allegations too narrowly. In his

pleadings, Cheatham alleges that Johnson actually knew that armed prisoners, who

had just viciously shanked one prisoner, were still inside 4 Barracks where the other

prisoners in that open barrack were still at risk of being attacked. In other words, the

allegations in Cheatham's pleadings are that: (1) objectively, there was a "substantial

risk" that he and other prisoners in 4 Barracks "might be seriously harmed" by the two

4

 Johnson argues that Cheatham is improperly attempting to hold her vicariously liable for

the actions of the Security Response Team. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)

(explaining that, because there is no vicarious liability in § 1983 actions, a prisoner must allege

facts suggesting that "each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution"). To the contrary, Cheatham specifically alleges that Johnson,

through her own individual actions, directly violated his constitutional rights when she failed to

enter and/or order the Security Response Team to enter 4 Barracks to locate and disarm the

attackers, thereby preventing them from carrying out the second attack on Cheatham.

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attackers roaming around the open barrack armed with shanks; and (2) subjectively,

Johnson was deliberately indifferent to this obvious and substantial risk of harm to

him and the other prisoners in 4 Barracks, as demonstrated by her and the Security

Response Team failing to enter 4 Barracks, as soon as they arrived at the scene, to

locate and disarm the attackers before they could further injure anyone else. As a

result, the prisoners in 4 Barracks were left to fend for themselves against the two

armed assailants, even though Johnson and the Security Response Team knew that the

assailants had used shanks and badly injured the first floor prisoner, and that they

remained at large in the open barrack with those weapons still in their hands to use

against other prisoners in 4 Barracks. 

These factual allegations are sufficient to support a failure to protect claim. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 ("[I]t does not matter . . . whether a prisoner faces an

excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his

situation face such a risk") (emphasis added). Consistent with Court's holding in

Farmer, the Eighth Circuit has held that prison officials can be held liable, in a § 1983

action, if they are deliberately indifferent to a known and substantial risk of harm to

any of the prisoners in their care -- regardless of whether the threat of harm was

targeted specifically at the plaintiff. See, e.g., Doe v. Washington Cnty., 150 F.3d 920,

923 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming a jury verdict where jail officials were subjectively

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aware that overcrowding created a substantial risk of harm to all juvenile detainees in

their care); Riley v. Olk-Long, 282 F.3d 592, 595-997 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming a jury

verdict where officials were subjectively aware that a guard had been accused,

numerous times, of sexually assaulting female prisoners prior to assaulting the

plaintiff); Nei v. Dooley, 372 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2004) (denying summary

judgment when there was evidence that prison officials were subjectively aware that

a HIV-positive inmate was threatening to assault and infect his fellow inmates). 

Because this legal precedent was well established long before the April 27, 2016

attack on Cheatham, Johnson is not entitled to qualified immunity.

C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Finally, Johnson argues that Cheatham's failure to protect claim should be

dismissed, without prejudice, because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires inmates to: (1) fully and properly

exhaust their administrative remedies as to each claim in the complaint; and (2)

complete the exhaustion process prior to filing an action in federal court. Johnson v.

Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003); Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th

Cir. 2000). Importantly, the Supreme Court has emphasized that "it is the prison's

requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) Thus, to satisfy the PLRA, a prisoner must

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fully comply with the specific procedural requirements of the incarcerating facility.

Id.

Johnson alleges that Cheatham did not timely and properly comply with the

ADC's exhaustion policy. Johnson bases this argument on the single grievance

Cheatham attached to his Complaint. Doc. 2 at 8-11.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be

proved by the defendants. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874,

876 (8th Cir. 2005). Johnson has not presented any evidence: (1) explaining the

ADC's exhaustion policy; (2) demonstrating how Cheatham’s grievance or grievances

violated the ADC's exhaustion policy; or (3) verifying that the grievance Cheatham

attached to his Complaint is the only grievance he filed regarding the April 27, 2016

attack. 

Based on the current record, Johnson has not established that Cheatham failed

to timely and properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, at this time,

she is not entitled to the dismissal of Cheatham's failure to protect based on his alleged

failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.

IV. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

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1. Johnson's Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 12 & 25) be GRANTED, IN PART,

and DENIED, IN PART.

2. Cheatham's failure to protect claim against Johnson, in her official

capacity, be DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE.

3. Cheatham be allowed to PROCEED with his failure to protect claim

against Johnson, in her individual capacity. 

4. The Court CERTIFY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in

forma pauperis appeal from any Order adopting this Recommended Disposition

would not be taken in good faith. 

Dated this 19th day of January, 2017.

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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