Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00035/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00035-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONTY R. STANLEY, 

individually and doing 

business as NORTH WEST

SURFACING,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOBO CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

a California corporation; 

CITY OF ELK GROVE,

Defendants.

No. 14-cv-00035 JAM-EFB

ORDER GRANTING BOBO CONSTRUCTION 

INC’S AND THE CITY OF ELK 

GROVE’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Bobo

Construction, Inc.’s (“BCI”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth 

Cause of Action of his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #5)

and Defendant City of Elk Grove’s (the “City”) Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s FAC (Doc. #6). Plaintiff Monty R. Stanley, 

individually and doing business as North West Surfacing, 

(“Plaintiff”) opposes both motions (Doc. ##8, 9) and Defendants

replied (Doc. ##13, 14).1 For the reasons set forth below, BCI’s 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 

for March 26, 2014.

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Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action of his FAC

and the City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC are granted.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally filed this action on September 9, 2013, 

in Sacramento County Superior Court (Doc. #1) against BCI and the 

City (collectively “Defendants”). This action was removed to 

this Court on January 6, 2014, based on federal question 

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. In the FAC, Plaintiff 

alleges five causes of action: (1) Breach of contract as to BCI; 

(2) deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. 1983 by Defendants; (3) common counts against 

Defendants; (4) interference with contractual relations against 

the City; and (5) interference with prospective economic 

advantage against Defendants (Doc. #1). 

According to the allegations in the FAC, the City awarded 

BCI a contract for a public works construction project, the 

Special Waste Collection Center and Disposal Lane Project 

(“Project”) in May 2012. FAC ¶¶ 7-8. In or about May 2012, BCI

and Plaintiff entered into a subcontract agreement, under which 

Plaintiff was to furnish and perform site demolition work at the 

Project. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that beginning in or about 

August 2012 and continuing through September 21, 2012, the City 

and BCI discharged him as a subcontractor because he complained 

about potentially hazardous and toxic contaminants at the Project 

site and requested that appropriate protective measures be taken. 

Id. ¶ 19. On or about August 31, 2013, Plaintiff presented a 

written claim for economic damages to the City. Id. ¶ 16. 

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II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice

The City requests judicial notice of the government claim 

made by Plaintiff to the City dated August 31, 2013 (“August 31 

Government Claim”). August 31 Government Claim, Ex. A, Def.’s 

Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Doc. #7. Courts may 

consider extrinsic evidence when the plaintiff’s claim depends on 

the contents of a document and the parties do not dispute the 

authenticity of the document. See, e.g., Sherman v. Stryker 

Corp., 2009 WL 2241664, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (citing 

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) and 

Fed. R. Evid. 201). Here, Plaintiff refers to the government 

claim in the FAC and Plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity 

of the government claim. Accordingly, the Court grants the 

City’s request for judicial notice.

Plaintiff also requests judicial notice of the government 

claim made by Plaintiff dated February 19, 2014. Ex. A, Pl.’s 

Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Doc. # 9-2. For the same 

reasons mentioned above, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for 

judicial notice. 

B. Evidentiary Objections

The City objects to the Declaration of John J. Rueda 

submitted by Plaintiff with his opposition to the City’s motion 

to dismiss. Objections, Doc. #15. 

Generally, courts may not consider materials beyond the 

pleadings in ruling on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

motion. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citing Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 

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1994)). There are two exceptions to this rule: First, a court 

may consider “material which is properly submitted as part of the 

complaint” on a motion to dismiss. Id. Second, under Federal

Rule of Evidence 201, “a court may take judicial notice of 

‘matters of public record.’” Id. (citing Mack v. South Bay Beer 

Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)).

In this case, as part of his opposition, Plaintiff submitted 

a declaration by his counsel. This declaration was not attached 

to the complaint nor has Plaintiff requested judicial notice of 

it; therefore, this declaration is outside the pleadings. 

Accordingly, the Court sustains the City’s objection and will not 

consider the declaration. 

C. Discussion

1. BCI’s Motion to Dismiss

BCI moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for 

interference with prospective economic advantage because 

Plaintiff fails to allege that BCI engaged in an independently 

wrongful conduct. Plaintiff argues that the independently 

wrongful conduct requirement for this cause of action is BCI’s 

retaliation.

The elements for interference with prospective economic 

advantage are (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff 

and some third party, with the probability of future economic 

benefit to the Plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the 

relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant 

designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of 

the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff 

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proximately caused by the acts of the defendant. Korea Supply 

Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1153 (2003)). For 

the third element, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant 

engaged in an independently wrongful act, which is an act 

“proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common 

law, or other determinable legal standard.” Id. at 1159.

Plaintiff argues that BCI’s independently wrongful act in 

this case is discharging Plaintiff in retaliation for his 

complaints in violation of California Labor Code sections 6310 

and 1102.5(b). BCI argues that Sections 6310 and 1102.5(b) do 

not apply to non-employees, such as Plaintiff. Section 6310 

makes it unlawful to fire or otherwise retaliate against an 

employee who makes a workplace safety complaint with government 

agencies. Cal. Lab. Code § 6310. Section 1102.5(b) prohibits 

retaliation by an employer against employees who report illegal 

activity. Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5(b). Therefore, both sections 

of the labor code apply to employees. Plaintiff, however, was a 

subcontractor and he has not alleged that he was misclassified as 

an independent contractor. See FAC ¶ 9. Accordingly, Sections 

6310 and 1102.5(b) do not apply. 

Plaintiff also argues that BCI’s retaliation infringed on 

his constitutional rights of speech and petition for redress of 

grievances, citing Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310 

(9th Cir. 1989) and Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, amended, 828 

F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1987). However, in both Soranno’s Gasco and 

Allen, the plaintiffs brought retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 claims. Under § 1983, “plaintiffs must plead that (1) the 

defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived 

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plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal 

statutes.” Soranno’s Gasco, 874 F.2d at 1313-14 (quoting Gibson 

v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)). Here, 

Plaintiff alleged that BCI “acted under the color of state law, 

California Contract Code § 4107” but has not alleged any facts to 

show that BCI’s actions as a general contractor amounted to state 

action. FAC ¶ 23. Therefore, Plaintiff has not sufficiently 

alleged that BCI was acting under the color of state law. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action against BCI 

is dismissed. Because Plaintiff may be able to allege an 

independently wrongful act, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to 

amend.

2. The City’s Motion to Dismiss

The City moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s second, third, fourth, 

and fifth causes of action. In his opposition, Plaintiff 

concedes that his third cause of action for common counts against 

the City cannot be maintained. 

a. Intentional Tort Causes of Action

The City argues that Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth causes of 

action for intentional interference with contractual relations 

and interference with economic advantage (collectively 

“intentional tort claims”) fail as a matter of law, in part, 

because the City is not liable for tortious injury unless 

liability is imposed by statute or a mandatory duty of care 

exists. Plaintiff argues that the City is liable under 

Government Code sections 815.2 and 815.4. 

The California Government Tort Claims Act provides that a 

public entity is not liable for any injury except as provided by 

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statute. See Cal. Gov. Code § 815. However, a public entity may 

be vicarious liable under Government Code section 815.2, 

providing for respondeat superior liability for acts or omissions 

of employees, and Government Code section 815.4, providing for 

liability for acts or omissions of independent contractors to 

“the same extent that the public entity would be subject to such 

liability if it were a private person.”

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that it can be 

reasonably inferred that the City was acting through its 

employees and as a result, the City is liable for any wrongful or 

tortious activities by the employees. However, BCI is not an 

employee of the City and the FAC does not contain any factual 

allegations to establish vicarious liability predicated on the 

conduct of an independent contractor. Further, to the extent the 

City’s liability is premised on BCI’s liability for interference 

with prospective economic advantage, Plaintiff’s claim against 

the City fails for the reasons mentioned above. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s intentional 

tort claims against the City. The Court grants Plaintiff leave 

to amend because he may be able to allege vicarious liability and 

clarify his claims. Therefore, the Court need not address at 

this time the City’s remaining three arguments that these claims

should be dismissed because: (1) they are time barred under the 

statute of limitations of the Government Claims Act; 

(2) Plaintiff’s intentional tort claims fail to comply with 

Government Claims Act by not giving notice of the claims; and 

(3) Plaintiff fails to state a claim because he does not allege 

the City intended to disrupt any contract or economic 

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relationship.

b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The City moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action 

for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in part, because Plaintiff

failed to allege sufficient facts to establish the requisite 

elements of a claim under Monell v. Department of Social 

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Plaintiff argues that he 

has alleged a policy under Monell because the City had final 

policy-making authority to remove him.

Respondeat superior liability does not apply to actions 

against local government entities under § 1983. See Monell, 436 

U.S. at 691. Therefore, to prevail in a civil action against a 

local governmental entity, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that 

he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; 

(2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy 

‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff’s 

constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving 

force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt By & Through 

Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting 

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)). For the 

second element, a single decision may constitute an act of 

official government policy. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 

U.S. 469, 480 (1986). However, “[m]unicipal liability attaches 

only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to 

establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.”

Id. at 481.

In the FAC, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to establish 

that there was a policy as required under Monell. At most, 

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Plaintiff alleges that the City “acted under the color of state 

law, California Contract Code § 4107,” which does not establish 

that the City possessed final authority. In his opposition, 

Plaintiff argues that the City possessed final decision-making 

authority under the Public Contract Code. However, these 

allegations are not in the FAC. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim 

against the City. Because Plaintiff may be able to allege a 

Monell claim, the Court grants leave to amend. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS BCI’s 

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action with leave to 

amend and GRANTS the City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC 

with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file his Amended Complaint 

within twenty (20) days from the date of this Order. Defendants 

shall file their responsive pleadings to the Amended Complaint 

within twenty (20) days from the date it is filed. If Plaintiff 

elects not to file an Amended Complaint, the case will proceed

against BCI on the FAC with Plaintiff’s remaining claims. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 9, 2014

 

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