Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01734/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01734-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAY KIMPEL,

CDCR #V-01627,

Civil No. 08-1734 LAB (JMA)

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)

[Doc. No. 42]

vs.

ROBERT WALKER, Doctor;

P. JAYASUNDARA, Doctor,

Defendants.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I.

Jay Kimpel (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Defendants Walker and Jayasundara (“Defendants”) have filed a Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. No.

42]. Plaintiff filed his Opposition on April 29, 2010 [Doc. No. 43] to which Defendants have

filed their Reply [Doc. No. 44].

The Court has determined that Defendants’ Motion is suitable for disposition upon the

papers without oral argument and that no Report and Recommendation from Magistrate Judge

Jan M. Adler is necessary. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1(d)(1), 72.3(e). 

Case 3:08-cv-01734-LAB-JMA Document 45 Filed 06/21/10 Page 1 of 8
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 Dr. Hunt is not a named Defendant in this matter. 1

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II. PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

On December 15, 2007, while incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility (“RJDCF”) Plaintiff sought medical treatment for “unbearable pain.” (See SAC at 1,

3.) Plaintiff claims that he was examined by Defendants Walker and Jayasundara who refused

to renew pain medication that had been prescribed for him by a different doctor. (Id.) Plaintiff

claims that Defendants told him he was “faking it” and denied him any treatment. (Id.)

Several months later, Plaintiff was being examined by Dr. Hunt on June 24, 2008. (Id.

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at 4.) Plaintiff claims that DefendantJayasundara interrupted this examination and told Dr. Hunt

that Plaintiff was a “big faker.” (Id.) On July 7, 2008, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Jayasundara refused to provide a wrist brace for Plaintiff that was ordered by Dr. Hunt. (Id. at

5.) 

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any of them

acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. 

B. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’

or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v.

Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In other words, the plaintiff’s

complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled

to relief.” Id. (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need

only give the defendant[s] fair notice of what ... the claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

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A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) .

In addition, factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully

pleaded,” are held “to less stringentstandards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972). Thus, where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil

rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the

doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988).

Nevertheless, and in spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to any factual

allegations made, it is not proper for the court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts

which [he or she] has not alleged.” Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v.

California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Nor must the court “accept

as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit” or

those which are “merely conclusory,” require “unwarranted deductions” or “unreasonable

inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted),

amended on other grounds, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d

1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusions

of law cast in the form of factual allegations). 

C. Eighth Amendment Inadequate Medical Treatment Claims

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint on grounds that he

has failed to plead facts to show the deliberate indifference required to support an Eighth

Amendment violation. (See Defs.’ P&A’s at 17-20.)

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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1. Standard of Review

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of

 the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with

deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). Before it can

be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs

must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support

this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980)

(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)). “[A] complaint that a physician has been

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a

constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see

also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny,

delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison

physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992),

overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)

(en banc). Where a prisoner alleges delay in receiving medical treatment, he must show that the

delay led to further harm. Id. at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs,

766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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2. Application to Plaintiff’s Allegations

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under

this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw

the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have

been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no

matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175,

1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff alleges that on December 15, 2007 Defendant Walker refused to renew

Plaintiff’s prescription for the pain medication Neurontin. (See SAC at 3.) Plaintiff further

claims that Defendant Walker accused him of “faking” his pain. (Id.) These are the only

allegations against Defendant Walker. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Jayasundara accused

him of “faking” his pain and refused to order a wrist brace for Plaintiff that Dr. Hunt had

prescribed. When considering whether a prison official has acted with deliberate indifference,

the court must focus on the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical needs and the nature of each

defendant’s response to those needs. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. Here, it is not at all clear

from Plaintiff’s factual allegations that he had a “serious medical need.” While he complains

of muscle pain, his allegations are vague at best. 

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations and exhibits, and finds no facts sufficient

to show that either Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical

needs simply by allegedly failing to provide him with the medication he believed he needed or

the wrist brace. It is well-settled that a difference of opinion between a physician and a prisoner

concerning the appropriate course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference.

Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). Even when medical officials disagree

as to the proper course of treatment, deliberate indifference is only shown when the prisoner can

show that “the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the

circumstances,” and that “they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to

[the prisoner’s] health.” Id. at 332. 

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In his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff claims that he has alleged facts

sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim and argues that the Court should liberally

construe his Second Amended Complaint. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.) Liberal construction does not

require the Court to consider facts alleged in the Opposition that are not contained in the body

of the pleading itself. See Associated General Contractors of California, Inc., 459 U.S. at 526.

Moreover, the Court previously found that the allegations contained in his previously filed First

Amended Complaint were defecient to state an Eighth Amendment claim and yet, Plaintiff

alleges even fewer facts in his Second Amended Complaint. This is despite the fact that the

Court informed him that he must take heed of the Court’s instructions to correct the deficiencies

of pleading identified by the Court. (See Feb. 8, 2010 Order at 3-4.)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would demonstrate

deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants Walker or Jayasundara Accordingly,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

 12(b)(6) is GRANTED.

IV. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 15

In Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion, he requests that the Court provide him

leave to file a Third Amended Complaint in order add a conspiracy cause of action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 9.) The Court construes this to be a Motion for Leave

to File a Third Amended Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a). Under Rule 15(a), a party

may amend his pleading “once as a matter of course” only if it is within certain time frames. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). Otherwise, a party may amend only by leave of the court or by written

consent of the adverse party. Id. Leave to amend under FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) “shall be freely

given when justice so requires,” therefore the decision to grant leave to amend is one that rests

in the sound discretion of the trial court. International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace

Workers v. Republic Airlines, 761 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1985). This discretion must be

guided by the strong federal policy favoring the disposition of cases on the merits and permitting

amendments with “extreme liberality.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

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Courts generally consider four factors in determining the propriety of a motion for leave

to amend: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.

Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 628 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, while the Court finds no

evidence that Plaintiff seeks leave to file a Third Amended Complaint in bad faith or for

purposes of undue delay, it does appear that it would be futile to add conspiracy claims to this

action.

“To state a cause of action under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy,

(2) to deprive any person or a class of persons the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of

the conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, property damage or a deprivation of any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir.

1980); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp.,

978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he language requiring intent to deprive equal

protection . . . means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiou

bvsly discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also

Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536.

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege anywhere in his Opposition a membership in a protected

class and fails to allege that any Defendant acted with class-based animus, both of which are

essential elements of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Griffin, 403 U.S. at

101-02; Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that conspiracy plaintiff

must show membership in a judicially-designated suspect or quasi-suspect class); Portman v.

County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint is

DENIED pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a).

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby:

/ / /

/ / /

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GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all claims against them found in Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 42] and DENIES

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint. Moreover, because the Court

finds amendment of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims would be futile at this time, leave to amend is

DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a

leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile); see also

Robinson v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Since

plaintiff has not, and cannot, state a claim containing an arguable basis in law, this action should

be dismissed without leave to amend; any amendment would be futile.”) (citing Newland v.

Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996)).

The Clerk of Court shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 19, 2010

 

HON. LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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