Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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28 1 The case was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Eastern District

Local Rule 72-302.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GERALD F. STANLEY,

NO. CIV. S-95-1500 FCD GGH P

Petitioner,

DEATH PENALTY CASE

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JEANNIE WOODFORD,

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on petitioner Gerald

Stanley’s request for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s

order, entered September 20, 2005 (Docket #542).1 In said order,

despite finding “no good cause . . . to modify the scheduling

order,” the magistrate judge granted respondent a brief extension

to time to file its expert’s report. (Order, filed Sept. 20,

Case 2:95-cv-01500-JAM-CKD Document 573 Filed 11/08/05 Page 1 of 4
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2 Respondent’s expert’s report was due September 7, 2005;

rather than file its expert’s report that day, respondent moved

for clarification and/or to modify the magistrate judge’s

scheduling order as to the necessity for filing expert reports. 

Per the magistrate judge’s September 20 order, respondent was

given to September 30, 2005 to file its expert’s report.

3 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

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2005, 2:6-10.)2 The magistrate judge did so “in order to avoid a

probable default on the mental health issues.” (Id. at 2:8.)

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of this order arguing that

the magistrate judge should have excluded the expert testimony

for untimely disclosure pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 37(c)(1).3 Under Rule 37, exclusion of evidence is

mandated unless the failure to disclose the required information

is substantially justified or harmless. Id. While petitioner is

correct that the magistrate judge found respondent’s failure to

disclose unjustified, he is incorrect that exclusion is required

because there is no prejudice to petitioner by virtue of the late

disclosure.

As a non-dispositive pre-trial matter, the magistrate

judge’s instant order is governed by the “clearly erroneous or

contrary to law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

As such, his order cannot be set aside or modified unless the

findings of fact are clearly erroneous or the conclusions are

contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Grimes v. San Francisco,

951 F.2d 236, 239-40 (9th Cir. 1991). The order should be

modified or set aside only if the reviewing court is left “‘with

the definite and firm conviction,’ that the [Magistrate Judge’s]

key findings are mistaken.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,

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4 The court also finds petitioner’s “waiver” argument

(not discussed by the magistrate judge in his order) unavailing. 

Respondent did not violate the magistrate judge’s scheduling

order, requiring objections thereto by September 22, 2004, by

filing the subject “motion to clarify or modify.” Nothing in the

scheduling order prevented respondent from later seeking

clarification or modification, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 16.

3

243 (2001) (citation omitted).

Here, while the magistrate judge did not expressly find a

lack of prejudice to petitioner, petitioner’s own request for

reconsideration as well as the underlying record reveal a lack of

prejudice to petitioner. While admittedly shortening the

applicable deadlines, the magistrate judge’s order did not

preclude petitioner from deposing respondent’s expert after

receipt of his report. Indeed, some two weeks remained before

the close of discovery on October 13, 2005. Likewise, in light

of the magistrate judge’s express invitation to petitioner’s

counsel to “seek monetary sanctions [against respondent], if

counsel so [desired],” the magistrate judge would have likely

been receptive to granting petitioner an extension of time to

depose respondent’s expert, if necessary based on respondent’s

late disclosure of its expert’s report. In that regard, the

court notes that the magistrate judge’s October 27, 2005 order

granted such an extension of time to petitioner (see Order at

2:6-8 [granting petitioner to and including December 9, 2005 to

depose respondent’s expert]). Because petitioner was not

prejudiced by the late disclosure, the court cannot find the

magistrate judge’s order “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”4

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4

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the magistrate 

judge’s September 20, 2005 order is therefore DENIED.

DATED: November 8, 2005

 /s/Frank C. Damrell, Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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