Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02662/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02662-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALPHA ONE TRANSPORTER, INC.,

and AMERICAN HEAVY MOVING

AND RIGGING, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

Case Nos. 

13-cv-2662-H-NLS

13-cv-2663-H-NLS

13-cv-2669-H-NLS

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 33]

vs.

PERKINS MOTOR TRANSPORT,

INC., d/b/a PERKINS SPECIALIZED

TRANSPORTATION,

Defendant.

ALPHA ONE TRANSPORTER, INC.,

and AMERICAN HEAVY MOVING

AND RIGGING, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

GOLDHOFER FAHRZEUGWERK

GMBH & CO., INTERMOUNTAIN

RIGGING AND HEAVY HAUL, and

BARNHART CRANE AND

RIGGING CO.,

Defendants.

ALPHA ONE TRANSPORTER, INC.,

and AMERICAN HEAVY MOVING

AND RIGGING, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

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Case 3:13-cv-02662-H-DHB Document 44 Filed 07/01/14 Page 1 of 7
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vs.

BRAGG COMPANIES d/b/a HEAVY

TRANSPORT, INC., and SCHEUERLE

FAHRZEUGFABRIK GMBH,

Defendants.

On May 16, 2014, Defendants Goldhofer AG (“Goldhofer”), Intermountain

Rigging and HeavyHaul (“Intermountain”), and Barnhart Crane and Rigging Company

(“Barnhart”) filed a motion for summary judgment in this consolidated action. (Doc.

No. 33.) On June 23, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to Defendants’ motion. 

(Doc. No. 42.) On June 30, 2014, Defendants filed their reply. (Doc. No. 43.) A

hearing on the motion is currently scheduled for July 7, 2014 at 10:30 a.m. The Court,

pursuant to its discretion under Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1), submits the motion on the

parties’ papers. The Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Background

This action involves three consolidated patent infringement actions brought by

Plaintiffs against Defendants for infringing U.S. Patent No. 8,424,897 (“the ’897

Patent”). The abstract for the asserted patent describes a dual lane, multi-axle transport

vehicle for transporting or hauling heavy loads. (See Doc. No 1-2 at 1, ’897 Patent,

Abstract.) The ’897 Patent is a continuation-in-part of a provisional application filed

May 24, 2002, No. 60/383,554 (the “2002 Provisional”). (See id. col.1 ll.7-17.) The

’897 Patent claims priority to the 2002 Provisional’s filing date. The Court

consolidated these actions for pretrial purposes on February 12, 2014. (Doc. No. 11.) 

Under the Court’s March 24, 2014 scheduling order, the parties have until August 11,

2014 to complete claim construction discovery. (Doc. No. 29.) The parties’ opening

claim construction briefs are due August 25, 2014 and the Court will hold a claim

construction hearing on October 31, 2014. (Id.) 

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Discussion

Defendants argue that the asserted independent claims ofthe ’897 Patent (Claims

1, 16, and 19) are not entitled to the 2002 priority date because the claims contain

subject matter not present in the 2002 Provisional. (Doc. No. 33-1 at 10.) Plaintiffs

respond that Defendant’s argument is based on insufficient evidence and inaccurate

legal standards because it fails to address whether a person having ordinary skill in the

art (“PHOSITA”) would understand the claimed corresponding structure to be within

the 2002 Provisional’s written description. (Doc. No. 42 at 7.) 

I. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th

Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1241 (2013). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving

party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the

nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving at trial. Id. at 322-23.

“Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary

judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626,

630 (9th Cir. 1987). Once the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues

of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing that

a genuine issue of disputed fact remains. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The nonmoving

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party cannot oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by “rest[ing] on

mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. “The

‘opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to

the material fact.’” Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 265–66 (9th Cir.

1991) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1986)). 

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must view all

inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The district court does not make

credibility determinations with respect to evidence offered. See T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d

at 630-31 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587). Summary judgment is therefore not

appropriate “where contradictory inferencesmay reasonably be drawn fromundisputed

evidentiary facts.” Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324,

1335 (9th Cir. 1980).

II. Analysis

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that the asserted claims

are “means plus function” claims, required by 35 U.S.C. §112 to describe

corresponding structures that accomplish the claimed means, but that the asserted

claims teach structures outside the written description of the 2002 Provisional. (Doc.

No. 33-1 at 10.) Specifically, Defendants argue that a “transport frame” isthe required

corresponding structure to the “connecting means” limitation in all three asserted

claims, but that the 2002 Provisional describes only a “gooseneck” corresponding

structure without mentioning a transport frame. (Id. at 11-12.) Without the 2002

priority date, Defendants argue, the asserted claims would be invalid under 35 U.S.C.

§ 102(a). (Id. at 20.) Plaintiffs respond that Defendants’ argument is based on

insufficient evidence and inaccurate legal standards because it failsto address whether

a person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) would understand the

corresponding “transport frame” structure at issue to be included within the 2002

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Provisional’s written description. (Doc. No. 42 at 7.) Defendant further argues that a

PHOSITA would conclude that the 2002 Provisionalsufficiently discloses the claimed

“transport frame” structure to comply with the written description requirement. 

The Court begins with the language of the asserted independent claims. Claims

1, 16 and 19 of the ’897 patent each include the limitation “means for mechanically

connecting said forward module to said rearwardmodule.” See ’897 Patent, col.33 ll.1-

2; col.34 ll.29-30; and col.35 ll.8-9. Courts will construe a means plus function claim

limitation “to cover the corresponding structure . . . described in the specification and

equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. §112(f). The Federal Circuit has outlined a two-step

process to construe these claims:first the Court must “determine the claimed function,”

and second, “the court must identify the corresponding structure in the written

description of the patent that performs that function.” Applied Med. Res. Corp. v.

United States Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

Dependent Claim 4 teaches a limitation where the “means for mechanically

connecting said forward module to said rearward module is a transport frame

comprising a pair of transport carrying beams.” Id. col.33 ll.26-29. The parties agree

on the claimed function, i.e., performing a mechanical connection, but disagree on how

to define the claimed “transport frame” corresponding structure and how it relates to

the 2002 Provisional’s description of a “gooseneck” connection. (Compare Doc. No.

33-1 at 21 with Doc. No. 42 at 6.) 

A means-plus-function claim complies with the written description requirement

of 35 U.S.C. §112 where the structure corresponding to the means limitation is

“disclosed in the written description in such a manner that one skilled in the art will

know and understand what structure corresponds to the means limitation.” Biomedino

v. Waters Technologies Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted)

(affirming invalidity of a means plus function asserted claim for indefiniteness where

the claimed means had no corresponding structure described in the specification). 

“Compliance with the written description requirement is a question of fact” and may

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be determined on summary judgment only “where no reasonable fact finder could

return a verdict for the non-moving party.” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,

522 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Here, the 2002 Provisional discloses a variety of embodiments “comprising a

front module and a rear module plus a gooseneck between them.” (See, e.g., Doc. No.

33-4, Pejic Decl. Ex. 1, 2002 Provisional at 12-13.) Defendants assert that because the

2002 Provisional does not use the words “transport frame,” it cannot sufficiently

describe the asserted claims. (Doc. No. 33-1 at 24.) In response, Plaintiffs present

evidence that a PHOSITA in 2002, upon reading the 2002 Provisional, would

understand the inventor to be disclosing the use of the genus of “drop center” transport

frames, including both a “bed and gooseneck” species and a “suspension girder”

species. (See Doc. No. 42-1, Decl. of Neal Bailey at 3-4.) Plaintiffs’ understanding

is consistent with Federal Circuit law that disclosure of a species often “provides

sufficient written description support for a later filed claim directed to the genus.” 

Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

1

Plaintiffs have supplied evidence that the 2002 Provisional’s description of a

“gooseneck” species of connections provides sufficient written description to support

its later filed claims directed to the genus of transport frames, sufficient to avoid

summary judgment. Pursuant to the Court’s consolidated scheduling order, claim

construction discovery is ongoing, and the Court will hold a claimconstruction hearing

on October 31, 2014. (See Doc. No. 29.) Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’

motion for summary judgment without prejudice and notes that they are premature

before the Court’s order construing the disputed claim terms. See Markman v.

TheBilstad court identified two exceptions to this generalrule, neither of which 1

are applicable here. The first is that “[i]f the difference between members of the group

is such that the person skilled in the art would not readily discern that other members

of the genus would perform similarly to the disclosed members, i.e., if the art is

unpredictable, then disclosure of more species is necessary to adequately show

possession of the entire genus.” Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1125. The second excepts

situations where the patent expressly disclaims other species of the genus. Id.

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Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 

Conclusion

The Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 1, 2014

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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