Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04068/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04068-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 05:552 Freedom of Information Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ECOLOGICAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT AGENCY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04068-DMR 

ORDER ON JOINT DISCOVERY 

LETTER

Re: Dkt. No. 34

The parties filed a joint discovery letter in which Defendant Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (“FEMA”) seeks clawback of three documents inadvertently produced to 

Plaintiff Ecological Rights Foundation in response to a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)

request. [Docket No. 34 (Jt. Letter).] This matter is appropriate for resolution without a hearing 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on September 5, 2015, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 

under FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Plaintiff challenged FEMA’s response to its June 8, 2015 

request for 

all documents addressing Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) section 

7 consultations (16 U.S.C. § 1536) that have been initiated or 

proposed pertaining to the implementation of the National Flood 

Insurance Program (“NFIP”) in California; all documents 

concerning any ESA section 10 permits or habitat conservation 

plans (16 U.S.C. § 1539) that have been initiated or proposed, 

pertaining to the implementation of the NFIP in California; and all 

documents submitted to FEMA by [the National Marine Fisheries 

Service], [U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service], the [California 

Department of Fish and Wildlife], or any other State or Federal 

agency or department pertaining to the ESA and the implementation 

of the NFIP in California. 

Compl. ¶ 15. 

By way of background, section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 

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1536(a)(2), which the Ninth Circuit has described as “[t]he heart” of the Act, requires all federal 

agencies to “‘insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out’ by the agency ‘is not likely 

to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in 

the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.’” W. Watersheds Project v. 

Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 495 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)); Nat. Res. Def. 

Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998). “To carry out this substantive mandate,

agencies must engage in a consultation process with the appropriate expert wildlife agency on the 

effects of any federal action to listed species.” Cal. ex. rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 

F.3d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009). “After the formal consultation is completed, the relevant Service 

will issue a Biological Opinion evaluating the nature and extent of effect on the threatened or 

endangered species. If the Biological Opinion concludes that the proposed action is likely to 

jeopardize a protected species, the agency must modify its proposal.” Nat. Res. Def. Council, 146 

F.3d at 1125.

Plaintiff is a public interest environmental organization. According to Plaintiff, the 

requested documents “are of vital importance to the public to understand how the National Flood 

Insurance Program, which can have an enormous impact on development in floodplains and on 

wildlife habitat, is fulfilling its obligations under the [Endangered Species Act].” Compl. ¶ 15. 

Plaintiff alleges that it “is concerned that since a number of federal courts have already held that 

FEMA had failed to properly consult with National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) or [U.S. 

Fish and Wildlife Service] over the [National Flood Insurance Program], that FEMA has not 

fulfilled its requirements under the [Endangered Species Act] in California.” Id. Plaintiff made its

FOIA request “to learn more about whether the required consultations between FEMA and the 

National Marine Fisheries Service and/or U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service have occurred over the 

[National Flood Insurance Program].” [Docket No. 19 (Dec. 9, 2015 Jt. CMC Statement at 2).] In 

its complaint, Plaintiff alleges that FEMA failed to provide a final determination concerning the 

June 8, 2015 request within statutory or regulatory time limits and failed to promptly release 

documents that are responsive to the request. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 37, 38.

On October 19, 2015, Defendant sent its first interim FOIA response and release of 

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documents to Plaintiff. Jt. Letter at 1. It reviewed 445 pages and determined that 213 pages were 

“entirely releasable,” and that portions of 204 pages were exempt from disclosure. Id. In this 

discovery dispute, Defendant states that it “inadvertently” produced the following three documents 

to Plaintiff: 1) a letter dated July 6, 2015; 2) a letter dated August 25, 2016; and 3) a June 2015 

email chain. Id. Defendant does not state when it produced the three documents to Plaintiff, but 

asserts that it first learned of the inadvertent production on March 11, 2016. Defendant requested 

clawback nine business days later. Id. Ex. 1 (Mar. 24, 2016 letter to Plaintiff seeking clawback). 

According to Defendant, the three documents are protected from release by FOIA Exemption 5. It 

asks the court to order Plaintiff to destroy all copies of the documents in its possession and refrain 

from using any information contained therein, as well as “take reasonable steps to retrieve” all 

copies of the documents that Plaintiff has disseminated to third parties. Jt. Letter at 3.

1

The parties jointly lodged the three documents for in camera review pursuant to court 

order. [Docket No. 32.] Plaintiff also filed an administrative motion for leave to file four 

additional exhibits in support of its position, which Defendant does not oppose. [Docket Nos. 35, 

36.] On November 22, 2016, the court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing 

addressing whether the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine applies 

to the June 2015 email chain. [Docket No. 45.] The parties timely filed the requested briefing. 

[Docket Nos. 46 (Def.’s Brief), 51 (Pl.’s Brief).]

II. DISCUSSION

A. Whether the Court Has Authority to Order Plaintiff to Return the Documents

As a threshold issue, the parties dispute whether the court may order the requested relief. 

Defendant argues that the court has the inherent authority to order the requested relief to prevent 

Plaintiff “from irresponsibly retaining documents that are exempt, were produced inadvertently, 

and that FEMA acted promptly to claw back.” Jt. Letter 2. It notes that Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 26(b)(5)(B)2provides for the return of privileged or attorney work product produced in 

 

1 After filing the instant letter, the parties settled the action and stipulated to dismissal of all claims 

except for this dispute. [Docket No. 42.]

2 Under Rule 26(b)(5)(B), “[i]f information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege 

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discovery, and asks the court to apply the same in these circumstances. Plaintiff argues that 

clawback is not available in these circumstances. Since the documents at issue were released 

under FOIA rather than produced in discovery, Plaintiff argues that FOIA governs this matter, not 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In support of its position, Defendant cites three cases in which courts ordered a receiving 

party to destroy or return copies of documents inadvertently produced in response to a FOIA 

request. In Hersh & Hersh v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, No. C 06-4234 PJH, 

2008 WL 901539, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2008), the court ordered the plaintiff to return two 

FOIA productions that were later superseded and which contained inadvertently produced 

documents. In ACLU v. Department of Defense, No. 09 Civ. 08071 (BSJ) (FM), slip. op. at 13-15 

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2012), the court, citing its inherent authority and Hersh, ordered the plaintiffs 

to return a classified document that had been inadvertently produced by the producing agency. 

The document had been part of a production made in accordance with a court-supervised FOIA 

response. Finally, in Kielty v. FEMA, No. 14-CV-3269 (PGS)(LHG), slip. op. (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 

2014), the court ordered the plaintiff to destroy or return all copies of information that was 

inadvertently produced in response to his FOIA request and enjoined his use of the information for 

any purpose unless it was disclosed under FOIA or by court order. Plaintiff attempts to 

distinguish these cases, arguing that Hersh and Kielty are conclusory, and that ACLU is 

distinguishable because the production occurred pursuant to a court-ordered process. However, all 

three cases support the conclusion that the court may exercise its inherent powers to order the 

return of the documents if they are protected from release under an applicable FOIA exemption. 

See also Long v. U.S. IRS, 693 F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 1982) (describing courts as the 

“enforcement arm of the FOIA”). Accordingly, the court will analyze whether the documents are 

 

or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party that 

received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must 

promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has; must not use 

or disclose the information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve the 

information if the party disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the 

information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. The producing party must 

preserve the information until the claim is resolved.” 

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exempted from disclosure under FOIA.

B. Exemption 5

Defendant contends that the three documents are protected from release by FOIA 

Exemption 5. Exemption 5 protects “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that

would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “The exemption is ‘cast in terms of discovery law,’” and thus covers the 

deliberative process privilege, the attorney-client privilege, and the attorney work product 

doctrine. Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997)

(citations omitted). 

Defendant argues that all three documents are protected by the deliberative process 

privilege. It also asserts that parts of the third document, the June 2015 email chain, are protected 

by the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine.

1. Deliberative Process Privilege

a. Legal Standard

The deliberative process privilege “permits the government to withhold documents that 

reflect advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by 

which government decisions and policies are formulated.” FTC v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 742 

F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984). The privilege is designed to “promote frank and independent 

discussion among those responsible for making governmental decisions,” id., and the “ultimate 

purpose” of the privilege is to “prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions.” NLRB v. Sears, 

Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975).

For a document to qualify for exemption 5 under the deliberative process privilege, it must 

be both “predecisional” and “deliberative.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 

1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1988). Predecisional means that the document was “antecedent to the 

adoption of agency policy.” Id. Deliberative means that the document “must actually be related to 

the process by which policies are formulated.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 861 F.2d at 1117. This dual 

requirement reflects the privilege’s purpose of protecting the deliberative process leading up to 

decisions. Id. “Purely factual material that does not reflect deliberative processes is not 

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protected.” FTC, 742 F.2d at 1161.

Because the deliberative process is “so dependent upon the individual document and the 

role it plays in the administrative process[,] [t]he agency must establish what deliberative process 

is involved, and the role played by the documents in issue in the course of that process.” Elec. 

Frontier Found. v. CIA, No. C 09-3351 SBA, 2013 WL 5443048, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 

2013) (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Dep’t of Air Force, 44 F. Supp. 2d 295, 299 

(D.D.C. 1999) (quotation omitted) and Senate of Puerto Rico v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 

574, 585-86 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The agency must also “describe the nature of the decision making 

authority vested in the office or person issuing the disputed documents, and the positions in the 

chain of command of the parties to the documents.” Id. (citing Arthur Andersen & Co. v. IRS, 679 

F.2d 254, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).

The burden of establishing application of the privilege is on the party asserting it. North 

Pacifica, LLC v. City of Pacifica, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2003). “Because FOIA’s 

purpose is to encourage disclosure, its exemptions are to be narrowly construed.” Carter, 307 

F.3d at 1088.

b. Analysis

The first document is a two-page letter dated July 6, 2015 with an attachment from Donna 

S. Wieting, Director, Office of Protected Resources, NMFS, to Michael Grimm, Acting Assistant 

Administrator for Mitigation with FEMA (the “NMFS letter”). NMFS Letter, 149-153. In the

letter, on behalf of NMFS, Wieting objects to a FEMA draft rule for the National Flood Insurance 

Program, expressing the concern that the proposed rule fails to protect endangered species critical 

habitat. She states NMFS’s position that it is “premature to concur on this draft rule” until NMFS

is able to review FEMA’s biological evaluation and complete its own “biological opinion pursuant 

to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.” Id. at 149. She also states that the NMFS had 

previously identified necessary changes to the proposed rule which had not been incorporated into 

the draft rule, and encloses a three-page attachment containing additional comments on the draft 

rule. Id. at 151-53. In the attachment, the NMFS asserts its position that “FEMA . . . must consult 

with NMFS under Section 7(a)(2)” regarding the National Flood Insurance Program. Id. at 151

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(“NMFS should conduct an [Endangered Species Act] [section 7(a)(2)] consultation for this 

project . . .”).

The second document is an August 25, 2015 letter with an attachment from FEMA’s 

Grimm to Wieting in response to Wieting’s July 6, 2015 letter (the “FEMA letter”). FEMA 

Letter, 175-184. In response to Wieting’s statement that it would be premature for NMFS to 

concur on the draft rule, Grimm states, “FEMA wishes to clarify that it is not seeking to undertake 

consultation on the proposed rule per se.” Id. at 175. He also informs Wieting that FEMA has 

concluded that it lacks authority to enact the NMFS’s requested changes to the proposed rule. Id. 

at 177-179. The five-page attachment to Grimm’s letter is entitled, “Limitations on FEMA’s 

Legal Authority and the Scope of the Proposed Action: Supporting Law and Analysis.” Id. at 180-

84.

The third and final document is a June 2015 email chain consisting of nine emails between 

several FEMA employees. Email chain, 212-215. Plaintiff asserts that the emails “discuss 

FEMA’s position that it lacks authority to enforce the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and that, 

while due to certain ‘litigation outcomes and settlements’ it must ensure its National Flood 

Insurance Program (NFIP) complies with the Endangered Species Act in some areas, its position 

remains that it is not otherwise required to engage in ESA § 7 consultations and will not with 

respect to a proposed rule modifying the NFIP.” Jt. Letter at 3. Defendant does not dispute this 

characterization of the email chain.

According to Defendant, all three documents are protected by the deliberative process 

privilege. It does not address how each individual document falls within the privilege, instead 

arguing that all three documents are “predecisional, in that they involve FEMA’s ongoing, 

unresolved deliberations with NMFS and internally over the development of a proposed rule.” Jt. 

Letter at 2 (emphasis in original). Defendant further asserts that the documents are “deliberative, 

as they are part of the consultation process by which FEMA externally and internally deliberates 

and seeks guidance regarding its interpretation of and compliance with the Endangered Species 

Act.” Id. It provides no additional context for the communications at issue.

Defendant’s showing is insufficiently specific to establish the deliberative process 

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privilege as to any of the three documents. As noted, “[b]ecause the deliberative process is “so 

dependent upon the individual document and the role it plays in the administrative process[,] [t]he 

agency must establish what deliberative process is involved, and the role played by the documents 

in issue in the course of that process.” Elec. Frontier Foundation, 2013 WL 5443048. Further, 

Defendant must “describe the nature of the decision making authority vested in the office or 

person issuing the disputed documents, and the positions in the chain of command of the parties to 

the documents.” Id. While Defendant identifies the deliberative process at issue—the 

development of a proposed FEMA rule for the National Flood Insurance Program—it does not 

provide basic context and information about the documents at issue, such as a description of the 

individuals involved in authoring the documents and emails, their roles within their respective 

agencies, or their roles in the rulemaking process. Defendant also does not explain the 

relationship between the two agencies communicating about FEMA’s draft rule nor does it 

describe how these documents played a role in the deliberative process it has identified. FEMA 

operates under the Department of Homeland Security, while NMFS operates under the 

Department of Commerce. It is entirely unclear whether NMFS has any official role in FEMA’s 

rulemaking process. 

Without the benefit of necessary context, the court is left to guess about the nature of the

correspondence between NMFS and FEMA. On their faces, the letters seem to stake out each 

agency’s official position on a controversial issue: namely, whether FEMA is legally obligated to 

engage in a section 7(a)(2) consultation with NMFS pursuant to the Endangered Species Act as 

part of FEMA’s rulemaking process regarding the National Flood Insurance Program. FEMA 

says it is not legally obligated to do so; NMFS says that FEMA is. This does not appear to be

predecisional, because the letters convey each agency’s official policy to the other agency. A 

document is predecisional if it was “prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in 

arriving at his decision,” and includes “recommendations, draft documents, proposals, 

suggestions, and other subjective documents which reflect the personal opinions of the writer 

rather than the policy of the agency.” Maricopa Audubon Soc’y, 108 F.3d at 1093. “Exemption 5 

does not protect . . . communications that promulgate or implement an established policy of an 

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agency.” Brinton v. Dep’t of State, 636 F.2d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 

The letters also do not appear to be deliberative. A document is deemed “deliberative” if 

“it reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process,” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug 

Admin., 449 F.3d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted), and is “part of the ‘deliberative 

process,’ if ‘the disclosure of [the] materials would expose an agency’s decisionmaking process in 

such a way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine the 

agency’s ability to perform its functions.’” Maricopa Audubon Soc’y, 108 F.3d at 1093 (quotation 

omitted). Defendant does not explain how the NMFS and FEMA letters reflect the “give-andtake” of the consultative process or reflect FEMA’s decisionmaking process in a way that would 

undermine the agency.3 

As to the June 2015 email chain, the emails reflect an internal FEMA discussion about 

whether FEMA must engage in Endangered Species Act section 7 consultations. It is not clear 

whether this discussion relates to the proposed rule discussed in the NMFS and FEMA letters, and 

Defendant does not “‘pinpoint an agency decision or policy to which the document contributed,’ 

or identify a decisionmaking process” to which the email chain contributed. See Judicial Watch, 

Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 297 F. Supp. 2d 252, 259 (D.D.C. 2004) (citations omitted). The Ninth 

Circuit has held that “an agency may not satisfy its burden of proof simply by producing the 

withheld materials for in camera review.” Maricopa Audubon Soc’y, 108 F.3d at 1093, 1093 n.1 

(“the district court’s inspection prerogative is not a substitute for the government’s burden of 

proof.” (quotation omitted)). By failing to provide basic information about the deliberative 

process at issue, and the role played by the specific documents, Defendant cannot meet its burden 

of establishing that the deliberative process privilege protects any of the three documents.

2. Attorney Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine

Defendant also asserts that the bulk of the June 2015 email chain is protected by the 

 

3

The court also notes that the FEMA and NMFS letters were apparently published online by 

NMFS, (Jt. Letter at 4), indicating that NMFS was not concerned that the disseminating the 

communications would undermine the goal of promoting “frank and independent discussion” 

between the two agencies.

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attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine. The email chain consists of nine 

emails between FEMA employees, with the first email in the chain sent on June 11, 2015 at 1:45 

pm and the last, most recent email sent on June 12, 2015 at 2:38 pm. In supplemental briefing, 

FEMA clarifies its position that the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine apply to 

only the seven most recent emails in the chain (the third through ninth emails). It no longer 

contends that the first two emails in the chain (sent June 11, 2015 at 1:45 pm and June 11, 2015 at 

4:51 pm) are protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.

4

a. Legal Standards

The attorney-client privilege protects from discovery “confidential communications 

between attorneys and clients, which are made for the purpose of giving legal advice.” United 

States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The privilege, which is 

narrowly construed, In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012), attaches 

when:

(1) legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal 

adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to 

that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his 

instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by

the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection be waived.

Richey, 632 F.3d at 566 (brackets and citation omitted). 

The fact “[t]hat a person is a lawyer does not, ipso facto, make all communications with 

that person privileged.” United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996). “The 

privilege does not allow an agency to withhold a document or portions thereof merely because it is 

a communication between the agency and its lawyers.” Elec. Frontier Found., 2013 WL 5443048, 

at *16. Rather, “the agency must show that it supplied information to its lawyers with the 

expectation of secrecy and the information was not known by or disclosed to any third party.” Id.

The work product doctrine shields from discovery “documents and tangible things that are 

prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative.” Fed. 

 

4 Defendant also apparently abandoned its claim that the first two emails in the chain are protected 

by the deliberative process privilege. See Def.’s Brief at 2 (“Defendant would not object to 

producing the first two emails in the chain (i.e., the last two emails on Page 215).

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R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). The doctrine aims to balance the “promotion of an attorney’s preparation 

in representing a client” and “society’s general interest in revealing all true and material facts to 

the resolution of a dispute.” In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1375 (Fed. Cir.2007) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

b. Analysis

i. The Privileged Status of the June 2015 Email Chain

In response to the court’s order for supplemental briefing, Defendant submitted a

declaration by Amy Weinhouse, an “Attorney-Advisor” in the Flood Insurance and Mitigation 

Legal Division of FEMA’s Office of Chief Counsel (“OCC”). [Docket No. 47 (Weinhouse Decl., 

Dec. 5, 2016) ¶ 1.] She explains that in the second email in the chain, a FEMA employee named 

G. Morgan Griffin seeks clarification about his role in an internal process. In the third email in the 

chain, dated June 11, 2015 at 1:54 pm, FEMA’s Michael Nakagaki responded to Griffin’s question 

by stating “[w]e will coordinate our conversation with OCC here” and copying Weinhouse. 

Weinhouse asserts that starting with Nakagaki’s 1:54 pm email, legal advice was being sought 

from the OCC. Weinhouse Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4. What follows includes an email from Weinhouse that 

she states includes legal advice and an ensuing email “conversation” between Griffin, Nakagaki, 

Weinhouse and others. Id. at ¶ 4. Weinhouse states that the information discussed “was not 

known by or disclosed to any third party until the email chain was inadvertently produced to 

Plaintiff.” Id. at ¶ 6.

Upon careful review of the email chain and the Weinhouse declaration, the court finds that 

Defendant has satisfied its burden to demonstrate that the most recent seven emails in the June 

2015 email chain are attorney-client privileged communications. The chain involves 

communications sent between FEMA employees, including an OCC attorney, which were made 

for the purpose of obtaining legal advice about FEMA’s Endangered Species Act section 7 

consultations. See Richey, 632 F.3d at 566. 

ii. Waiver

Notwithstanding the court’s conclusion that the most recent seven emails in the June 2015 

email chain contain privileged communications, the court must determine whether FEMA waived 

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its claim of privilege. Plaintiff argues that FEMA waived privilege for the June 2015 email chain 

(as well as for the NMFS and FEMA letters), because it produced the document in October 2015 

but did not request clawback until March 2016, over five months later. 

“As with all evidentiary privileges, the burden of proving that the attorney-client privilege 

applies rests not with the party contesting the privilege, but with the party asserting it. One of the 

elements that the asserting party must prove is that it has not waived the privilege.” Weil v. 

Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citations 

omitted). “‘[I]nadvertence’ of disclosure does not as a matter of law prevent the occurrence of 

waiver.” Id. at 24. However, inadvertent disclosure does not constitute a waiver of the attorneyclient privilege or work product doctrine if:

(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;

(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to 

prevent disclosure; and

(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, 

including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

26(b)(5)(B).

Fed. R. Evid. 502(b).5

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that the disclosure of the June 2015 email chain in 

Defendant’s October 19, 2015 FOIA production was inadvertent, satisfying the first factor of the 

test. As to the remaining factors, Defendant states only that it discovered the inadvertent 

production on March 11, 2016 and requested clawback on March 24, 2016, nine business days 

later. Jt. Letter at 1, Ex. 1. Defendant is silent as to whether it took any “reasonable steps to 

prevent disclosure” of privileged information and does not identify any precautions it took to 

 

5

Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) applies to inadvertent disclosures “made in a federal proceeding 

or to a federal office or agency.” Fed. R. Evid. 502(b). The parties did not brief the waiver 

standard applicable in this context, where Defendant inadvertently disclosed documents in 

connection with a FOIA release, outside the usual discovery process. However, since Defendant 

contends that all of the documents at issue are protected from release by FOIA Exemption 5, 

which “is ‘cast in terms of discovery law,’” Maricopa Audubon Soc’y, 108 F.3d at 1092, the court 

finds it appropriate to analyze the issue of waiver under Rule 502(b). Moreover, in its March 24, 

2016 letter advising Plaintiff of the inadvertent production, Defendant sought clawback of the 

documents pursuant to Rule 502(b). Jt. Letter Ex. 1.

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prevent such disclosure. It provides no information about the initial inadvertent production or its 

discovery thereof, such as a description of any time constraints it faced in responding to Plaintiff’s 

FOIA request or the number of documents it reviewed in order to respond to the request. See Fed. 

R. Evid. 502 Advisory Comm. Notes (describing factors a court may consider in evaluating 

whether an inadvertent disclosure waives privilege or protection, including “the reasonableness of 

precautions taken” and “the number of documents to be reviewed and the time constraints for 

production.”). In the absence of any information at all about Defendant’s efforts to identify and 

protect privileged materials, Defendant has not demonstrated that it took reasonable steps in order 

to prevent inadvertent disclosure. 

As to the third factor, Defendant asserts that it acted “promptly” to request clawback of the 

documents, notifying Plaintiff nine business days after discovering its inadvertent production. In 

light of Defendant’s failure to establish that it “took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” of 

privileged or protected information, the court need not decide whether Defendant’s nine-day delay 

before requesting clawback was reasonable. However, the court notes that numerous courts have 

held that “once a party realizes a document has been accidentally produced, it must assert privilege 

with virtual immediacy.” Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 571, 585 (Fed. Cl. 

2012) (citing cases in which failure to assert privilege within periods ranging from six days to six 

months weighed in favor of waiver); see also Mycone Dental Supply Co. Inc. v. Creative Nail 

Design Inc., No. C-12-00747-RS (DMR), 2013 WL 4758053, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2013) 

(collecting cases). Since Defendant has failed to establish that its production of the June 2015 

email chain did not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the June 2015 email chain 

is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.6

In sum, the court concludes that Defendant has failed to establish that the three documents 

inadvertently produced to Plaintiff fall within the protections of the deliberative process privilege. 

Further, Defendant waived the attorney-client privilege as to emails in the June 2015 email chain

 

6 Based on the court’s finding of waiver, it need not address whether the June 2015 email chain is 

also protected by the work product doctrine, since any such protection was also waived by 

Defendant’s disclosure of the emails to Plaintiff. 

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for which it claimed privilege. Defendant’s motion for clawback is therefore denied.7 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for clawback is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2017

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

 

7 Because the court did not rely on any of the exhibits submitted with Plaintiff’s administrative 

motion to supplement the record, the administrative motion is denied as moot.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

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