Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05819/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05819-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In 1998, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and DUI causing injury after he 

collided with the victim’s motorcycle. Though the victim suffered serious injuries, he died after 

medical staff improperly inserted his feeding tube, leading to peritonitis. Petitioner claims here, as he 

did in the state courts, that his lawyer failed him by not properly informing him of the legal 

implications of the medical negligence and that, in fact, he is actually innocent of the murder charge.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 23, 1998, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and driving while 

under the influence of alcohol causing injury after entering a guilty plea. (Doc. 8, Exh. A) The Court 

imposed an indeterminate 15-year-to-life sentence for the second degree murder conviction plus a 

determinate three-year concurrent term for drunk driving offense. (Id.). Petitioner did not timely 

TOMMY RAY WILLIAMS,

 Petitioner,

v.

MIKE KNOWLES, Warden,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:03-cv-05819-JLT

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO WITHDRAW AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF 

UNTIMELINESS

ORDER TAKING EVIDENTIARY HEARING OFF 

CALENDAR

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE ON 

THE MERITS OF THE PETITION

Case 1:03-cv-05819-JLT Document 111 Filed 08/24/15 Page 1 of 10
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appeal his conviction.1

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Tuolumne County Superior Court. 

(Doc. 8, Exh. B) This petition raised four grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

in that counsel, fearing for her own safety and intimidation resulting from the local publicity, 

pressured Petitioner to accept a guilty plea rather than go to trial; (2) newly discovered evidence, i.e., 

an autopsy report of the victim indicating that peritonitis from an improperly placed feeding tube, not 

from blunt head trauma resulting from the collision with Petitioner’s vehicle, caused the victim’s 

death; (3) failure of the trial court to sua sponte inquire into the ineffective of counsel once the court 

was advised of threats against counsel and Petitioner; and (4) error in imposing a restitution fine 

without conducting a hearing on Petitioner’s ability to pay. (Doc. 8, Exh. B) The Superior Court 

denied the petition as untimely. (Id., Exh. C)

Next, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Fifth District Court of Appeal, raising the same 

issues (Doc. 8, Exh. D) as in his previous petition; it was denied. (Id., Exh. E) Petitioner filed a third 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court which, again, raised the same 

issues. (Id., Exh. F) Once again, this petition was denied. (Id., Exh. G)

Petitioner filed his initial federal petition on June 16, 2003. (Doc. 1) Appended to that petition 

were the same legal briefs and arguments Petitioner raised in each of his three state court habeas 

petitions. (Id.) In response, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss based upon the argument that the 

petition was untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. (Doc. 8) 

The Court granted the motion to dismiss (Docs. 11, 12) and Petitioner appealed. (Doc. 13) The

Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case “for further factual development, and if determined 

appropriate by the district court, an evidentiary hearing, to determine (1) whether petitioner satisfied 

the actual innocence test set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); (2) whether the statute of 

 

1

The parties have disputed whether Petitioner timely appealed his conviction. On December 17, 1998, Petitioner signed 

two requests to withdraw his guilty plea, one for the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“5th DCA”) and one for the 

Tuolomne County Superior Court. (Doc. 38, Exh. B). Prison mail records logged these two documents on December 23, 

1998. (Doc. 38, Exh. C). It is undisputed that the Superior Court received the document on December 28, 1998, and 

lodged it but did not file it. (Doc. 38, Exh. D). Although the Superior Court apparently construed the document as a notice 

of appeal, it notified Petitioner that his filing was deemed late since it was received beyond the sixty-day period for filing a 

notice of appeal. (Id.). On March 24, 1999, the 5th DCA issued an order denying the motion for acceptance of appeal, 

indicating that the appeal had been received beyond the sixty-day period and that Petitioner had waived his right to appeal 

because of his change of plea. (Doc. 38, Exh. E).

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limitations began to run on August 30, 2001, the date petitioner discovered the factual predicate for his 

claims; and (3) whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled until August 30, 2001.” 

(Doc. 23) 

On remand, Respondent filed a renewed motion to dismiss, again based on a violation of the 

one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA. (Doc. 28) In this motion, Respondent addressed

“actual innocence” under Schlup and tolling for newly discovered evidence under § 2244(d)(1)(d); 

Respondent did not address the issue of equitable tolling. (Doc. 28, pp. 5-9) Petitioner opposed the 

motion and submitted, in support, his own declaration, prison mail logs and the case log of trial 

counsel. (Doc. 37) 

The Court denied the motion to dismiss based on the conclusion that the record did not 

establish that trial counsel expressly told Petitioner of the contents of the autopsy report, i.e., that the 

improper insertion of the feeding tube was the cause of the victim’s death. (Doc. 40) Based thereon, 

the Court concluded there was insufficient evidence that Petitioner discovered the factual basis for his 

claim of ineffective assistance at the time of the plea and denied the motion Id.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that the Court’s interpretation of trial 

counsel’s statement that she had “shared” the contents of the autopsy report with Petitioner was 

misconstrued and that counsel’s meaning, in truth, was that Petitioner’s version of events was “a lie.” 

(Doc. 41, p. 5) The Court denied the motion for reconsideration, concluding that Respondent’s 

“evidence” regarding trial counsel’s meaning was not new and that Respondent had failed to provide 

the Court with specific probative evidence regarding precisely what trial counsel had told Petitioner 

prior to the entry of the guilty plea. (Id.) Thereafter, Respondent filed an answer to the merits of the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but also contended, once again, that the petition was untimely 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (Doc. 45) In his traverse, Petitioner addressed both the timeliness issue 

and the merits. (Doc. 48)

On April 29, 2009, the Court held an evidentiary to determine the timeliness issue. 

Specifically, the Court sought evidence as to whether trial counsel was ineffective in “failing to advise 

[Petitioner] of the contents and legal significance of the autopsy report prior to his guilty plea.” (Doc. 

51, p. 8) The Court indicated that, due to the absence of expert testimony, it was “not in a position to 

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determine whether the hospital’s actions were grossly negligent under the circumstances and, hence, 

whether Petitioner would have likely succeeded at trial by asserting a lack of causation defense.” (Id.) 

At the hearing, Petitioner and his trial counsel, Karen Block-Davis, testified. (Doc. 57; Doc. 60) 

After the hearing, the Court granted the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 78) The Court concluded 

that it had insufficient evidence to determine whether the hospital’s conduct constituted gross 

negligence—and thus, it could not determine whether there was an intervening legal cause of the 

victim’s death. Id. However, the Court found that Petitioner had discovered the “factual basis” of his 

claim before entering his plea. Id. As a result, the Court found the petition was untimely. Id.

Petitioner appealed. (Doc. 80) The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s determination that 

Petitioner knew the factual basis of his claim before he entered his plea, which would make the 

petition untimely. (Doc. 89) However, during the pendency of the appeal, the United States Supreme 

Court determined that actual innocence constituted a basis for avoiding AEDPA’s one-year limitation

period. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S.___, 133 S.Ct. 1925 (2013). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 

remanded the case to this Court “for a determination of whether [Petitioner’s] actual innocence claim 

meets the standard set forth in McQuiggin so that he is entitled to an exception to the expiration of the 

AEDPA statute of limitations.” (Doc. 89, pp. 2-3). 

After remand and further briefing, the Court scheduled a second evidentiary hearing limited to 

whether the hospital staff’s conduct in improperly inserting the victim’s feeding tube constituted gross 

negligence such that it constituted the sole cause of death. (Doc. 99). 

On August 18, 2015, Respondent filed a request to withdraw his motion to dismiss and 

expressly waived with prejudice, the affirmative defense of untimeliness. (Doc. 108) As a result, 

Respondent requested the Court cancel the evidentiary hearing. (Id.) While not opposing the 

withdrawal of the affirmative defense, Petitioner argued that Respondent’s delay in litigating the 

motion to dismiss, coupled with the eleventh-hour request to withdraw that affirmative defense,

amounted to an admission that Petitioner has met the actual innocence test under AEDPA and, 

accordingly, that the petition should be granted. (Doc. 109, p. 3). Alternatively, Petitioner requested 

that the hearing remain on calendar and that evidence be presented on the actual innocence claims 

which, he contends, “lie at the heart of [Petitioner’s] habeas claims.” (Id.)

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Request to withdraw the affirmative defense

Under federal procedural rules, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be 

raised in a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 8(c)(1). Under federal habeas rules, a 

respondent must assert a statute of limitations defense in the responsive pleading or it is waived. Rule 

5(b) of the Rules Governing sec. 2254 Cases2; Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir.2005).

An affirmative defense, once forfeited, is “exclu[ded] from the case,” 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1278, pp. 644–645 (3d ed. 2004), and, as a rule, cannot be asserted 

on appeal. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 217 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Weinberger v. 

Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975); McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 950 F.2d 13, 22 (C.A.1 

1991) (“It is hornbook law that theories not raised squarely in the district court cannot be surfaced for 

the first time on appeal.”). Respondent complied with both rules by filing his motion to dismiss for 

violation of the AEDPA’s statute of limitation in his first responsive pleading. (Doc. 8) 

On the other hand, a state forfeits its statute of limitations defense only if it intentionally 

waived it. Day, 547 U.S. at 202. In Day, the Court determined that the state’s miscalculation of the 

AEDPA statute of limitations leading to the failure to raise the statute of limitations in the responsive 

pleading, did not constitute an “intelligent waiver on the [s]tate’s part.” Id. The Supreme Court held 

that the state did not forfeit the statute of limitations defense because there was no evidence that the 

state “strategically withheld the defense or chose to relinquish it [,] ... [rather,] it was merely an 

inadvertent error.” Id. at 211. 

Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that a court has the authority, but not the obligation, to 

address the timeliness of a state prisoner's federal habeas petition on the court's own initiative except 

where it was deliberately and intelligently waived. Wood v. Milyard, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1826,

1833-1835 (2012). Once a respondent knowingly waives a “threshold bar” the court abuses its 

 

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The Civil Rules “govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature.” Rule 1. This 

includes “proceedings for ... habeas corpus,” Rule 81(a)(2), but only “to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is

not set forth in statutes of the United States [or] the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases” (Habeas Rules), Civil Rule 

81(a)(2); see also Habeas Rule 11. Thus, “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in the context of habeas suits to the 

extent that they are not inconsistent with the Habeas Corpus Rules,” Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 208, 123 S.Ct. 

1398, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003), and do not contradict or undermine the provisions of the habeas corpus statute, Gonzalez v. 

Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529–530, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 2644–2645, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005).

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discretion if it denies the petition on the basis of that bar without reaching the merits of the claims. 

Wood, 132 S.Ct. at 1830 (a “court is not at liberty...to bypass, override, or excuse a State’s deliberate 

waiver of a limitations defense.”). As the Supreme Court has explained, “should a State intelligently 

choose to waive a statute of limitations defense, a district court would not be at liberty to disregard 

that choice.” Day, 547 U.S. at 210, 126 S.Ct. at 1684, n. 11.

Indisputably, Respondent has intentionally and knowingly waived the statute of limitations

affirmative defense and this Court is not in a position to second-guess that waiver. Though Petitioner

argues that Respondent has delayed the proceedings by repeatedly reasserting the timeliness defense at 

every juncture over the last twelve year, there is no evidence of bad faith or dilatory intent. Both sides 

have pursued the prosecution and defense of this issue with vigor and zealousness. The fact that 

Respondent has made a strategic decision to abandon that defense at this time is within his rights and 

in no way suggests any impropriety. Accordingly, the Court will grant Respondent’s request to 

withdraw the motion to dismiss and the affirmative defense of statute of limitations.3 

B. The Evidentiary Hearing.

The record relating to the primary issue on remand, i.e., actual innocence, is limited because, 

as the procedural history establishes, this issue has never been squarely presented to the Court as a 

merits question. During the course of the evidentiary hearing held in 2009, the parties presented 

evidence related to when Petitioner became aware of the possibility that the victim died as a direct 

result of peritonitis rather than due to the injuries inflicted by Petitioner. The primary evidence in this 

regard included the Memorial Hospital Discharge Summary, the hospital’s treatment notes and the 

autopsy report. (Doc. 93, Exhibits 1, 2, and 3). 

When, after the most recent remand, the Court ordered the parties to submit briefs on the issue 

of actual innocence, neither party contended that further evidence was required or that an evidentiary 

hearing was desired. Indeed, the briefs of the parties spend scant time on this issue, both apparently 

assuming that the current record was entirely adequate to resolve the fact question of actual innocence 

 

3

Petitioner argues that Respondent’s withdrawal of the affirmative defense is tantamount to an admission that Petitioner is 

actually innocent, and therefore, the petition must be granted. (Doc. 109, p. 4). Nothing in the Court’s review of the law 

regarding affirmative defenses suggests that waiving of a defense constitutes an admission of any sort. Indeed, Petitioner 

does not cite any legal authority in support of that proposition. Accordingly, the Court rejects it.

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now before the Court. In that brief, Petitioner argued succinctly that the autopsy report and the 

hospital’s medical records,

. . . establish petitioner Williams’ actual innocence of second-degree murder. The coroner’s 

autopsy report identified a misplaced feeding tube and the resulting peritonitis as the cause of 

the victim’s death, and the hospital records establish the gross negligence of medical staff for 

reinserting a feeding tube into the victim’s abdomen instead of his stomach. [footnote] This 

reliable exculpatory evidence meets the threshold requirement articulated in Schlup and House, 

“in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(Doc. 93, pp. 6-7). 

Respondent was even more concise, emphatically concluding that “the autopsy report does not 

show Petitioner is innocent,” before going on to point out that it would have been a jury question and 

that jurors could have reasonably concluded that Petitioner’s conduct was the “but for” cause of the 

victim’s death “even if there was another contributing cause.” (Doc. 92, p. 8). The parties relied on

no other evidence and neither party cited any specific portion of the autopsy report or the hospital’s 

medical notes as support for his legal position.

Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that where a petition is not 

dismissed at a previous stage in the proceeding, the court, after the answer and transcripts and record 

of the state court proceedings are filed, shall, upon review of those proceedings, determine whether an 

evidentiary hearing is required. The purpose of an evidentiary hearing is to resolve the merits of a 

factual dispute. An evidentiary hearing on a claim is required where it is clear from the petition that: 

(1) the allegations, if established, would entitle the petitioner to relief; and (2) the state court trier of 

fact has not reliably found the relevant facts. See, Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th

Cir.1992). As the function of an evidentiary hearing is to try issues of fact, Townsend v. Swain 372 

U.S. 293, 309 (1963)(overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715 

(1993)), such a hearing is unnecessary when only issues of law are raised. Id.

AEDPA sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner. Section 2254(a) permits a federal court to entertain only 

those applications alleging that a person is in state custody “in violation of the Constitution or law or 

treaties of the United States.” Likewise, sections 2254(b) and (c) provide that a federal court may not 

grant such applications unless, with certain exceptions, the applicant has exhausted state remedies.

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If an application includes a claim that has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings,”(§ 2254(d)), the Court may not grant the petition “unless the adjudication of the claim,”

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

This is a “difficult to meet” (Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)) and “highly deferential 

standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the 

benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of proof. Id. at 25.

Petitioner still has not established any entitlement to an evidentiary hearing.4 Petitioner’s 

asserts his change of plea occurred under circumstances that violated his right to federal due process, 

 

4 Error! Main Document Only.In Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), decided after the first evidentiary 

hearing was held in this case, the Supreme Court held that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was 

before the state court that adjudicated the prisoner’s claim on the merits. The Court held that the provision’s “backwardlooking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made.” Id., at 1398. Thus, § 

2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to “focu[s] on what a state court knew and did,” and to measure state-court decisions 

“against this Court’s precedents as of ‘the time the state court renders its decision.’” Id., at 1399 (quoting Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003)(emphasis in original). As the Court explained, “It would be contrary to that purpose 

to allow a petitioner to overcome an adverse state-court decision with new evidence introduced in a federal habeas court 

and reviewed by that court in the first instance effectively de novo.” Id. The Court reiterated that “[i]f a claim has been 

adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the 

record that was before the state court.” Id. at 1400. It recognized that “not all federal habeas claims ... fall within the scope 

of § 2254(d), which applies only to claims ‘adjudicated on the merits in the State court proceedings.’” Id . at 1401; Stokley 

v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir.2011) (“Pinholster also held that this bar on new evidence is coterminous with the 

scope of § 2254(d). If a petitioner presents a claim that was not adjudicated on the merits ... federal review is not 

necessarily limited to the state record.”).

Notably, the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s state habeas petition noting that Petitioner had “failed to raise his 

claims in a timely fashion. He does not show that his delay was justified by recent discovery of a new legal or factual basis 

in support of his claim or that his claim falls within an exception to the time limits bar.” (Petitioner’s Excerpt of Record, 

Ninth Circuit, Ex. 3, p. 2). Subsequently, the 5th DCA and the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s habeas 

petitions without comment. To determine whether a state procedural ruling bars federal review, the district court will look 

to the last reasoned opinion on the claim. Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001). Where, as here, a 

superior court imposes the procedural bar, an unexplained denial from the state supreme court presumptively does not 

represent a decision on the merits that lifts that default. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991).

The record indicates that Respondent did not raise the state procedural bar in his responsive pleading and, instead, 

relied only on AEDPA’s one-year limitation period. Indeed, Respondent has not raised the procedural bar at any time 

during the 12-year life of this case. Accordingly, Respondent has waived the defense. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 8(c)(1); 

Rule 5(b) of the Rules Governing sec. 2254 Cases. However, this means only that the Court, in addressing the merits of 

Petitioner’s claims, will conduct a de novo review of the record. Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(When it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner's claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de novo); Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 

1099, 1109 (9th Cir.2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.2003). Thus, Respondent’s waiver of the state 

timeliness bar does not answer the question whether an evidentiary hearing is required in this instance. 

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that Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel, that the trial court failed to inquire into a 

possible conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel, and that the state restitution order was 

invalid. Whether the hospital was the sole cause of the victim’s death has no bearing upon whether 

counsel was ineffective or whether the plea was constitutionally valid. It is clear from the present 

record—including the Court’s findings after the first evidentiary hearing—that trial counsel knew the 

hospital’s action caused the peritonitis that this could preclude criminal liability, that she conveyed 

this information to Petitioner, and that knowing this information, Petitioner decided to change his plea

nonetheless. Determining whether the hospital’s action was, indeed, the sole cause of death would not 

address whether Petitioner’s change of plea was knowing and voluntary or whether counsel, who acted 

on the assumption that the hospital’s misfeasance was a complete defense, was ineffective in 

recommending that Petitioner plead guilty.

Likewise, to the extent that Petitioner contends that his due process claim is equivalent to a 

claim of actual innocence, the latter has never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief 

absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding. 

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993); see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (“the 

existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground 

for relief on federal habeas corpus” in the absence of a claim regarding the constitutionality of the 

petitioner’s detention). On the other hand, though ambiguously pleaded, it appears that Petitioner’s

federal due process claim is based upon the assertion that his guilty plea was infected with 

constitutional error by virtue of Petitioner pleading guilty to a crime for which no factual basis existed. 

Standing on this contention, he seems to assert that this claim can be adjudicated only after conducting 

an evidentiary hearing on the issue of his actual innocence, i.e., whether the death was due solely to 

hospital malfeasance. However, Petitioner conflates the McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. ___, 133 

S.Ct. 1924 (2013), actual innocence standard and the due process inquiry into the validity and 

voluntariness of Petitioner’s plea. They are separate and distinct legal issues. Moreover, the 

circumstances of Petitioner’s plea are shown in the transcript of the change of plea hearing and in

documentary evidence subsequently presented to this Court. 

Thus, because Petitioner has not established that a factual determination regarding the 

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hospital’s purported culpability in the victim’s death would, if established, entitle Petitioner to relief, 

no evidentiary hearing is warranted. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir.1992). 

Accordingly, the Court orders the evidentiary hearing to be vacated.

C. Briefing Schedule.

Though the merits were briefed in 2006, the Court will afford the parties the opportunity to 

address the merits in light the development that have ensued in the succeeding nine years. 

Accordingly, the parties are ordered to file simultaneous merits briefs within thirty days of the service 

of this order. The parties may file simultaneous reply briefs within fifteen days thereafter. 

 ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS: 

1. Respondent’s motion to withdraw the affirmative defense of untimeliness, is 

GRANTED;

2. The evidentiary hearing scheduled for September 15, 2015, is VACATED;

3. The Parties are ORDERED to file briefs on the merits of the petition within thirty days 

of the date of service of this order. The parties may file reply briefs within fifteen days 

of the filing of the briefs on the merits. The matter will be deemed submitted at that 

time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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