Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00559/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00559-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT I. REESE, JR., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Department Deputy DUNCAN 

BROWN (Badge #1220), and 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Department Deputy ZACHARY 

ROSE (Badge #832), 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-00559-GEB-DAD 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN 

LIMINE*

 Defendants move in limine for a pretrial order 

precluding the admission of certain evidence at trial. Each 

motion is addressed below. 

 Motion in Limine No. 1

Defendants “move to exclude any and all evidence . . . 

regarding [Plaintiff’s] los[t] wages or future earning power 

. . . based on his waiver of those damages, failure to provide 

discovery responses with regard [thereto,] and failure to 

designate an expert to testify about those damages.” (Defs.’ MIL 

No. 1 1:26-2:3, ECF No. 83.) 

 Decision on this motion is unnecessary since Plaintiff 

 

*

 These motions are suitable for decision without oral argument. 

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states in his statement of non-opposition that he “does not 

intend to present evidence of lost wages or lost earning capacity 

at trial.” (Pl.’s Statement of Non-Opp’n to Defs.’ MIL No. 1, ECF 

No. 128.) 

Motion in Limine No. 2 

 a) Number of Witnesses Concerning Plaintiff’s 

 Medical Treatment 

 Defendants indicate Plaintiff has listed three 

physicians and five registered nurses to testify concerning 

Plaintiff’s treatment at Mercy San Juan Hospital. Defendants 

argue: “allowing all of these treating physicians and nurses [to 

testify] would be redundant and cumulative, and in turn, runs the 

risk of causing Defendants undue prejudice under [Federal Rule of 

Evidence (“FRE”)] 403.” (Defs.’ MIL No. 2 2:20-21, ECF No. 84.) 

Defendants request an order limiting Plaintiff 

to offer[] a single physician and a single 

nurse to testify about his treatment so that, 

by the sheer number of witnesses identified, 

Plaintiff is not able to play on the emotions 

of the jury with regard to dramatizing the 

treatment he received following the shooting 

. . . in support of his noneconomic damages 

claim. 

(Id. at 22-25.) “Alternatively, should [more than] one witness 

testify on the matter, Defendants []request a hearing [under FRE] 

402 be held to explore whether the testimony is not cumulative.” 

(Id. at 2:25-27.) 

 Plaintiff rejoins: 

Plaintiff does not intend to present 

cumulative testimony. Defendants argue that 

the testimony will be cumulative, but have no 

evidentiary support for that argument. 

Defendants did not depose the witnesses whose 

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testimony is the subject of this motion in 

limine. Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that 

the Court will be better situated during the 

actual trial to assess whether the testimony 

is cumulative or not. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MIL No. 2 2:24-3:1, ECF No. 129 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).) 

 Defendants have not shown they are entitled to a 

pretrial ruling on this issue or a FRE 402 hearing prior to the 

referenced witnesses’ testimony. 

b) Character Witnesses

Defendants state “Plaintiff has . . . identified 

[certain witnesses] . . . to testify about how the shooting has 

impacted [his] ‘quality of life.’” (Defs.’ MIL No. 2 3:3-5.) “To 

the extent these [witnesses] are offered to . . . testi[fy] 

regarding Plaintiff’s character, Defendants request [such] 

testimony be expressly excluded pursuant to [FRE] 404 as . . . 

improper character testimony.” (Id. at 3:6-8.) Further, “[t]o the 

extent Plaintiff proffers these witnesses to testify about how 

[his] life has changed for purposes of damages, Defendants 

[]request a hearing [under FRE] 402 be held to explore whether 

the witness[es] ha[ve] the requisite foundation [concerning 

Plaintiff’s] life both before and after the incident.” (Id. at 

3:9-12.) 

 Plaintiff counters: 

if Defendants wanted to challenge the 

foundation of the testimony or opinions of 

any witness, then the Defendants should have 

deposed that person. Then Defendants could 

demonstrate, with reference to a deposition 

transcript, that the witness did not have 

foundation to offer certain testimony. 

However, Defendants did not take the 

depositions of these witnesses. Accordingly, 

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Defendants have no evidentiary support for 

their objection to the testimony on the 

grounds of foundation. For this reason, their 

motion is not persuasive and should be 

denied. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MIL No. 2 3:16-23.) 

 Defendants have neither shown that a pretrial ruling on 

this matter should issue nor that a FRE 402 hearing should be 

conducted. 

Motion in Limine No. 3 

Defendants move “for an [o]rder precluding Plaintiff 

. . . from introducing any evidence or making any reference to 

attorney fees or costs incurred by Plaintiff during this 

litigation[,]” arguing, inter alia: “[t]he proper method and time 

. . . for resolving such fees and expenses is through a posttrial motion.” (Defs.’ MIL No. 3 1:23-26, 2:4-5, ECF No. 85.) 

 Decision on this motion is unnecessary since Plaintiff 

states in his statement of non-opposition that he “does not 

intend to present evidence of attorney’s fees or costs incurred 

by Plaintiff to the jury.” (Pl.’s Statement of Non-Opp’n to 

Defs.’ MIL No. 3, ECF No. 130.) 

Motion in Limine No. 4 

 Defendants move to preclude testimony by the “‘Person 

Most Knowledgeable/Custodian of Records’ for medical billing at 

Mercy San Juan Medical Center[,]” arguing “[t]his individual was 

never identified during . . . discovery[,]” but was subsequently 

“included on Plaintiff’s Proposed Witness list for trial.” 

(Defs.’ MIL No. 4 1:24-28, 2:10-14, ECF No. 86.) Defendants 

further contend that the Best Evidence Rule precludes said 

witness from testifying about the contents of Plaintiff’s medical 

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billings since “Plaintiff has not identified any medical billing 

records as part of his proposed trial exhibits.” (Id. at 4:17-21, 

5:12-16.) 

 Plaintiff responds: 

Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ 

assertion that the Person Most Knowledgeable 

(PMK)/Custodian of Records for Mercy San Juan 

Medical Center was not on Plaintiff’s initial 

disclosure list. The PMK was not identified 

at that point, as he or she was not and is 

not a known witness. Had that individual been 

a known person as opposed to a designee of 

the entity, he or she would have been listed. 

The Defendants’ recognition of this reality 

is apparent in their own witness list, . . . 

in which witness number 20 is identified as 

“Custodian of Records/Person Most Qualified 

at County Medical Indigent Services Program, 

to be identified by subpoena.” No such person 

was ever identified on any Rule 26 disclosure 

or discovery response Defendants provided in 

the course of the litigation. . . . 

 Furthermore, . . . during discovery, 

Plaintiff obtained and provided his medical 

bills from the Hospital to Defendants in 

response to Sacramento County’s First Request 

For Production of Documents on or about 

October 31, 2014. Because the records . . . 

are voluminous and potentially confusing to a 

jury (numbering 87 pages), Plaintiff’s 

counsel concluded that the best and most 

efficient method of introducing the evidence 

at trial would be to subpoena the Hospital’s 

PMK. In other words, Plaintiff provided the 

billing records during discovery and 

Defendants knew that the costs for services 

rendered by the Hospital were a component of 

Plaintiff’s damages throughout this case. For 

these reasons, there was no intentional 

failure to disclose and a Rule 37 sanction 

does not apply as the “failure to disclose,” 

if one even exists, was, at the very least 

given the actual facts, substantially 

justified or harmless. . . . 

 Additionally, . . . the PMK’s testimony 

about the Hospital’s valuation of the 

services rendered is not expert testimony. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MIL No. 4 1:27-3:2, ECF No. 131.) 

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Plaintiff further counters: “[the Best Evidence Rule, FRE] 1002 

does not prohibit oral or written evidence to prove something 

other than the content of a writing, even if the writing is 

arguably better or best evidence. In other words, courts do not 

bar oral proof of a matter merely because it is also provable by 

a writing.” (Id. at 3:17-19.) 

 The Court need not decide whether the subject PMK was 

required to be disclosed since Plaintiff has shown that any 

failure to disclose the PMK is harmless under the circumstances. 

See Lanard Toys, Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 Fed. App’x 705, 713 

(9th Cir. 2010) (“Among the factors that may properly guide a 

district court in determining whether a violation of a discovery 

deadline is . . . harmless are: (1) prejudice or surprise to the 

party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability of 

that party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of 

disruption of the trial; and (4) bad faith or willfulness 

involved in not timely disclosing the evidence.”). Plaintiff 

asserts he produced his billing records from Mercy San Juan 

Medical Center during discovery. Further, any best evidence rule 

objection is not decided now. 

Motion in Limine No. 5 

 Defendants seek to “preclude[e] Plaintiff . . . from 

proffering evidence or making any reference to previous charges, 

complaints or lawsuits against the County of Sacramento, 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Scott Jones, the 

individual named Defendants, or third party employees of the 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department.” (Defs.’ MIL No. 5 1:25-

2:2, ECF No. 87.) Defendants argue, inter alia, that such 

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evidence is irrelevant since Plaintiff’s Monell claims were 

dismissed, and any prior complaints are unrelated to Plaintiff’s 

remaining claims. (Id. at 3:25-4:5.) 

 Decision on this motion is unnecessary since Plaintiff 

states in his statement of non-opposition that he “does not 

intend to present evidence of previous charges, complaints or 

lawsuits against SCSD, County of Sacramento, the sheriff, or 

defendants.” (Pl.’s Statement of Non-Opp’n to Defs.’ MIL No. 5, 

ECF No. 132.) 

Motion in Limine No. 6 

Defendants move to preclude Plaintiff’s police 

practices expert, Roger Clark, from offering certain opinions at 

trial. (Defs.’ MIL No. 6 2:3-6, ECF No. 88.) Defendants’ multiple 

arguments raised in this in limine motion are addressed in turn. 

 First, Defendants move to preclude Mr. Clark from 

giving opinion testimony concerning whether the officer 

defendants’ “conduct was ‘objectively inappropriate,’ 

‘unreasonable’ or ‘excessive’” on the ground that such testimony 

comprises “impermissible legal conclusions.” (Id. 4:1-4.) 

Defendants argue: 

 [FRE] 704(a) permits opinion testimony 

that embraces an ultimate issue to be decided 

by the trier of fact. . . . That said, an 

expert witness cannot give an opinion as to 

her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an 

ultimate issue of law. . . . 

 In his Rule 26 report, Clark opines: 

“The use of lethal force was objectively 

inappropriate because: [Plaintiff] did not 

present an immediate threat of death or great 

bodily injury to the officers or any other 

person; and there was no direction for 

[Plaintiff] to drop the knife or “freeze” 

before using deadly force.” The report 

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continues to characterize . . . the officer’s 

conduct as “inappropriate.” The report also 

refers to the “excessive wounding of 

[Plaintiff].” Clark also opines in the report 

that “ . . . their force was grossly 

inappropriate, excessive, and unreasonable.” 

 In his deposition, Roger Clark confirmed 

those opinions . . . . 

 . . . . 

 Defendant[s] request that Roger Clark’s 

testimony be limited to what he believes 

acceptable force was, and what . . . course 

of conduct [he believes] would have been 

appropriate, but limit any opinion testimony 

by Clark as to whether conduct was 

“objectively inappropriate,” “unreasonable” 

or “excessive.” These are impermissible legal 

conclusions that should be excluded. . . . 

 Further, whether the deputies violated 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights is an 

ultimate issue of law on which Clark may not 

opine. Similarly, Clark may not give his 

opinion as to whether the deputies’ use of 

force against [Plaintiff] was “reasonable.” 

Here, “reasonable” has an eminently 

significant legal connotation such that 

Clark’s opinion as to the reasonableness of 

the deputies’ use of force constitutes a 

legal conclusion that risks usurping the 

jury’s role. Likewise, Roger Clark should be 

prohibited from opining that the deputies 

“should have” used less force, or some 

alternative force, relative to constitutional 

standards of reasonableness. 

(Id. at 2:10-4:17 (internal quotation marks, citations, and 

brackets omitted).) 

 Second, Defendants seek to preclude “any opinion by 

Roger Clark criticizing Defendants[’] ‘tactical 

approach’ . . . because it is not relevant to the . . . claim 

[of] excessive force.” (Id. at 4:21-23.) Defendants argue that 

none of the factors the jury is to consider in determining 

whether the defendant officers’ use of force was excessive 

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“speak[s] to whether a different tactical approach should have 

been used[,]” and “to isolate and separately analyze the approach 

to the door, would unduly confuse the jury.” (Id. at 6:2-22.) 

 Third, Defendants “submit that any opinion by Roger 

Clark that an ‘announcement’ was required prior to knocking on 

Plaintiff’s front door, or that the individual Defendants should 

have identified themselves prior to knocking on the front door 

should be excluded because it misstates the case law, and because 

an expert also may not opine to the jury about legal standards, 

or what the ‘law’ requires.” (Id. at 7:8-12.) 

 Fourth, Defendants move to preclude Mr. Clark “from 

opining about the conduct of Sgt. Millican and supervisory 

liability pursuant to [FRE] 401 and 403 because . . . this Court 

has dismissed all claims against Sgt. Millican with prejudice.” 

(Id. at 8:14-17.) 

 Fifth, Defendants request “an Order precluding Roger 

Clark from opining about the County of Sacramento, or SCSD’s, 

review and investigation of the incident, training, and decision 

whether to discipline and/or retrain the involved deputies” under 

FREs 401 and 403, arguing the “Court dismissed the Monell 

claim[,] . . . and Plaintiff abandoned all claims against Sheriff 

Scott Jones.” (Id. at 9:12-16.) 

 Plaintiff states in his opposition brief that Mr. Clark 

“will not offer opinions regarding Sgt. Millican, ratification, 

misconduct by supervisors, failure to train, customs and 

practices, or failure to discipline.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MIL 

No. 6 6:13-16, ECF No. 133.) Therefore, decision on Defendants’ 

fourth and fifth arguments is unnecessary. 

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 Concerning the remainder of the motion, Plaintiff 

responds, inter alia: 

 Mr. Clark intends to testify as to the 

generally accepted training and standards 

which inform the conduct of deputies such as 

the individual Defendants. By necessity, the 

deputies’ training, and the policies and 

procedures by which they should comply, to 

some extent[,] include legal principles that 

encompass the deputies’ use of force because 

they are designed in part to minimize a 

municipality’s liability for excessive force. 

However, a witness may refer to the law in 

expressing an opinion without that reference 

rendering the testimony inadmissible. Indeed, 

a witness may properly be called upon to aid 

the jury in understanding the facts in 

evidence even though reference to those facts 

is couched in legal terms. 

 Further, Mr. Clark’s testimony will take 

the appropriate hypothetical form, e.g., if 

the deputies acted as described by Plaintiff, 

then they acted contrary to POST standards. 

Since Mr. Clark’s testimony will take the 

appropriate form, the province of the jury is 

not invaded; Mr. Clark’s testimony simply 

helps [the jury] to understand the 

implications of the different factual 

circumstances alleged by the parties. 

Accordingly, Mr. Clark[’s] testimony will not 

. . . tell[] the jury what result to reach. 

Mr. Clark is familiar with policies and 

procedures in place at the time of the 

incident, and can testify as to what 

procedures were mandated for deputies to 

follow in hypothetical circumstances matching 

the circumstances of this case, such that the 

jury may infer that certain required 

procedures were not followed (which would be 

circumstantial evidence militating in favor 

of liability). 

 For the reasons above, Mr. Clark’s 

opinions . . . should not be excluded by 

reason of touching on an ultimate issue. 

 . . . [Further,] Defendants have not 

persuasively argued that alternative tactical 

approaches are not relevant in terms of an 

excessive force claim. Indeed, the model 

instructions instruct the jury to consider 

alternative methods as a factor. Mr. Clark’s 

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testimony can help the jury understand which 

alternative methods were reasonably available 

from a police practices standpoint. For this 

reason, the testimony of Roger Clark 

regarding alternative tactical approaches 

should not be excluded. 

(Id. at 4:22-5:21, 5:28-6:10 (internal quotation marks, 

citations, and brackets omitted).) 

Since it is unclear what questions Mr. Clark will be 

asked and whether any response could be challenged, a sufficient 

factual context is lacking to decide before trial the remaining 

portions of this motion. 

Motion in Limine No. 7 

Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiff’s “blood splatter 

expert, Peter Barnett, from offering any [FRE 702] opinions at 

trial.” (Defs.’ MIL No. 7 1:24-27, ECF No. 89.) Specifically, 

Defendants “request the following testimony by Barnett be 

excluded”: 

(1) whether Plaintiff was moving in any 

particular direction at the time he was shot; 

(2) whether he was standing still at the time 

he was shot; (3) whether Plaintiff was 

standing in any particular location at the 

time he was shot; (4) any specific source of 

any blood drop; or (5) the timing of those 

blood drops. 

(Id. at 2:8-11.) Defendants argue Mr. Barnett’s opinions “are not 

supported by any scientific reliability[,]” but instead “offer[] 

a series of examples of what ‘could have’ occurred.” (Id. 7:1-3, 

7:8.) Defendants contend: “the opinions offered by Mr. 

Barnett . . . are sheer conjecture and speculation about where 

Plaintiff was standing, [and] whether Plaintiff moved after he 

was shot.” (Id. at 7:13-15.) Defendants further argue that Mr. 

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Barnett’s testimony concerning the “timing of [Plaintiff’s] blood 

drops[ and] Plaintiff’s location at the time blood dropped to the 

floor[] is unnecessary and not helpful to the jury because it is 

a matter ‘of common sense.’” (Id. at 7:25-8:1.) 

 Plaintiff responds that Mr. “Barnett’s testimony is 

both scientifically reliable and relevant[,] and Defendant[s’] 

motion should be denied.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MIL No. 7 1:25-

26, ECF No. 134.) Plaintiff argues, inter alia: 

 In arguing that Barnett’s conclusions 

are unreliable, Defendants do not address the 

Daubert factors, but rather, assert that 

Barnett’s proposed testimony is 

scientifically unreliable because there are 

certain questions which he could not and did 

not conclusively answer. 

 Barnett’s “Conclusions” disclosed in his 

Rule 26 Report are, in relevant part as 

follows: “The only physical evidence of the 

location of Mr. Reese at the time he was shot 

or after he was shot are blood droplets on 

the floor and the carpeting inside the 

apartment. This trail of blood drops extends 

from a few inches inside the front door 

threshold to a position in the approximate 

center of the living room area. Only one of 

these droplets . . . indicate[s] possible 

movement of Mr. Reese. This droplet suggests 

that Mr. Reese was moving towards the 

interior of the apartment when that blood 

dripped from his injury, or perhaps that he 

swung his hand that had been in contact with 

the bleeding injury.” Barnett Rule 26 Report 

(ECF No. 89-1) at 4.b. 

 The stated purpose of Barnett’s 

examination was “Determination of the 

position of Mr. Reese when he was 

shot.” . . . 

 Ultimately, Barnett concluded there was 

no physical evidence outside the front door 

of the apartment that would indicate 

[Plaintiff was] outside [the] apartment when 

he was shot, and that the only blood droplets 

. . . indicating possible movement of 

[Plaintiff] suggested that [he] was either 

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moving towards the interior of the apartment 

when that blood dripped from his injury, or 

that those droplets fell when he swung his 

hand that had been in contact with the 

bleeding injury. See Barnett Rule 26 Report 

at 2, 4. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, 

Barnett based his conclusions on various 

facts, all of which are set forth in the 

“Examination and Results” section of his Rule 

26 Report. See Barnett Rule 26 Report at 2-5. 

 . . . . 

 . . . Barnett’s conclusions are neither 

speculative nor based on conjecture. His 

conclusions are based on . . . facts gleaned 

from the identified photos, diagrams, crime 

scene investigator reports and Plaintiff’s 

medical reports. . . . “Uncertainty” goes to 

the weight of the evidence rather than its 

admissibility. 

(Id. at 2:15-4:20.) 

 The in limine record lacks sufficient factual context 

for a pretrial ruling concerning the admission of Mr. Barnett’s 

proposed testimony under FREs 701 and/or 702. 

Motion in Limine No. 8 

 Defendants move to “preclude Plaintiff . . . from 

testifying as to any of his own opinions regarding whether or not 

the force used was ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’” both as an 

expert witness . . . or as a lay witness. (Defs.’ MIL No. 8 1:25-

2:2, ECF No. 90.) Defendants argue, inter alia, that Plaintiff 

“is not a qualified expert[,]” and such testimony “would invade 

the province of the jury and constitute an improper legal 

conclusion.” (Id. at 2:8-9, 4:23-5:6.) Defendants also argue that 

“Plaintiff’s testimony as to whether the use of force was 

excessive or unreasonable . . . should be excluded under [FRE] 

403” as “[a]ny [such] testimony by Plaintiff . . . would serve 

only to confuse the issues and the jury.” (Id. at 4:16-23.) 

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 Plaintiff rejoins: 

 Defendants take for granted that 

Plaintiff’s testimony (if he offers it) 

regarding the force that was used would 

constitute an expert opinion. Plaintiff 

disagrees. Plaintiff submits that 

observations regarding the use of force are 

not the exclusive province of experts. 

Plaintiff can testify about his own 

observations and experiences during the 

incident from personal knowledge. He can 

testify, for example, that he was not doing 

anything that would have invited deadly force 

under the circumstances. Accordingly, his own 

observations regarding the force that was 

used do not necessarily constitute 

“opinions.” 

 Even if [Plaintiff’s] observations 

regarding the force that was used would 

constitute “opinions” within the meaning of 

the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 701 

allows a lay witness to offer opinions that 

are (a) rationally based on the witness’s 

perception, (b) helpful to the jury, and (c) 

not based on scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge within the scope of 

expert testimony. In other words, even if it 

was an “opinion” to state that shooting him 

was unreasonable or excessive force, 

Plaintiff contends that his own opinion is 

founded in his own personal knowledge, 

observations, and experiences during the 

incident. Further, Plaintiff’s observations 

would be helpful to the jury since he was 

there and he is the only non-law-enforcement 

witness to the shooting. Accordingly, 

Defendants have not shown that the disputed 

evidence is “inadmissible on all potential 

grounds,” so the motion should be denied. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MIL No. 8 3:3-24, ECF No. 135.) 

 This motion lacks the concreteness required for an in 

limine ruling. 

Motion in Limine No. 9 

 Defendants move to preclude Plaintiff’s eight nonretained medical providers from testifying on the grounds that 

their expert disclosures did not comply with Federal Rule of 

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Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 26(a)(2)(C). (Defs.’ MIL No. 9 1:24-27, 

2:3-10, ECF No. 91.) Defendants argue: 

Witnesses, who are not retained but 

nonetheless provide expert testimony, must 

comply with [FRCP] 26(a)(2)(C). Such nonretained experts need not submit a written 

report but must disclose: “(i) the subject 

matter on which the witness is expected to 

present evidence under [FRE] 702, 703, or 

705; and (ii) a summary of the facts and 

opinions to which the witness is expected to 

testify.” See F. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C) 

(emphasis added). 

 . . . . 

 Here, Plaintiff[’s disclosures] . . . 

for each non-retained expert . . . omitted a 

summary of facts and opinions to which the 

witness[es] will testify, in contravention of 

the requirements of [FRCP] 26. 

(Id. at 3:14-4:26.) In the alternative, Defendants argue: 

to the extent the[se witnesses] are allowed 

to testify, [they] should only be permitted 

to testify as to the treatment that was 

provided to Plaintiff[ and] the diagnosis of 

Plaintiff’s conditions, and should not be 

allowed to testify about opinions that would 

be provided by a retained expert[, which] is 

the type of testimony that requires a report 

under F. R. Civ. P. 26. 

(Id. at 5:8-12.) 

 Plaintiff rejoins: 

The[ subject] disclosures substantially 

complied with [FRCP] 26(a)(2)(C) because each 

non-retained expert at issue is solely a 

percipient witness within a narrow time 

window (eight days), at a specific place 

(Mercy San Juan Hospital), and treated 

plaintiff solely in regard to a single injury 

(his gunshot wound). There are no additional 

facts or opinions to summarize for any of the 

non-retained expert/ percipient witnesses at 

issue. 

 . . . . 

 . . . [T]he non-retained experts 

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disclosed are not going to testify about 

matters outside the scope of their treatment 

of the patient. Accordingly, there were no 

additional summaries of facts and opinions to 

provide. . . . 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MIL No. 9 2:21-3:21, ECF No. 136.) 

Plaintiff further counters: 

where the failure, if any, was only a 

technical failure, and there was no unfair 

surprise, Plaintiff’s witnesses should not be 

excluded. 

 Defendants claim they were prejudiced 

due to the lack of summary of facts and 

opinions for each non-retained expert / 

percipient witness, but do not describe or 

explain how they were prejudiced. . . . 

 . . . . 

 . . . Here, there is no bad faith or 

willfulness involved; additional summaries 

were not provided solely because none of the 

thirteen non-retained expert / percipient 

witnesses will testify as to matters outside 

the scope of their treatment and assessment 

of Plaintiff as a percipient witness. 

Disruption at trial is also not a factor in 

this case due to its current procedural 

posture. 

 As to prejudice or surprise, despite 

Defendants’ unexplained claim of prejudice, 

there is none. As to each of the thirteen 

non-retained expert / percipient witnesses at 

issue, Plaintiff identified the subject 

matter of the testimony as the medical 

assessment and treatment of Plaintiff at a 

specified place and for the specified 

purpose. . . . None of the non-retained 

expert / percipient witnesses at issue will 

testify as to Plaintiff’s present medical 

condition, future medical condition, 

reasonableness of medical expenses, or any 

other facts or opinions beyond the treatment 

they rendered. Moreover, causation is not a 

disputed issue in this case. 

 . . . [Also, e]ach treatment provider’s 

specific involvement with Plaintiff’s medical 

treatment was previously disclosed and 

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summarized in a chart provided to Defendants. 

(Id. at 4:7-5:21 (citations omitted).) 

 The court need not decide whether the subject 

witnesses’ disclosures are sufficient under FRCP 26(a)(2)(C) 

since Plaintiff has shown that any deficiency is harmless under 

the circumstances. See Lanard Toys, Ltd., 375 Fed. App’x at 713 

(listing “factors” a court may consider “in determining whether a 

violation of a discovery deadline is . . . harmless”). Plaintiff 

states that none of the witnesses will “give any testimony 

outside the scope of their assessment and treatment of Plaintiff” 

over an eight day period in regard to a single injury, and 

Plaintiff provided Defendants during the discovery period with a 

summary chart of each witness’s treatment. Accordingly, this 

motion is DENIED. 

Motion in Limine No. 10 

 Defendants “seek to restrict Plaintiff’s claims for 

past medical expenses to those that have actually been paid, and 

limit Plaintiff to introduce into evidence only the paid amounts 

of past medical bills.” (Defs.’ MIL No. 10 1:27-2:1, ECF No. 92.) 

Defendants argue, inter alia,1

 “that under Howell v. Hamilton 

Meats & Provisions, Inc., 52 Cal. 4th 541 (2011) and Corenbaum v. 

Lampkin, 215 Cal. App. 4th 1308 (2013), the [gross] amount of 

past medical expenses billed for Plaintiff’s treatment [(versus 

the amount paid and accepted by the providers as payment in 

full)] is inadmissible.” (Id. at 2:17-24.) 

 

1

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also be excluded for reasons raised in their fourth motion in limine. 

Discussion and decision concerning those arguments is not repeated here. 

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 Plaintiff responds that “Defendants cite no federal 

cases” in support of their argument, and “[e]ven where the total 

amount paid is less than the [gross amount] of medical care, the 

[gross amount] may still be admissible as evidence of the nature 

of a plaintiff’s injuries.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MIL No. 10 

3:5-11, ECF No. 137.) Plaintiffs also argue: 

 On this motion, Defendants have the 

burden of establishing that the disputed 

evidence is inadmissible on all potential 

grounds. Since Defendants [have not shown] 

that the medical providers have . . . 

accept[ed] a lesser amount as full payment, 

they have not shown that there is no proper 

use for the disputed evidence. 

(Id. at 3:23-27.) 

 Defendants have not shown they are entitled to a 

pretrial ruling on this issue. 

Motion in Limine No. 11 

Defendants “move to exclude . . . the photographs 

identified as Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibits Nos. 42, 43, 44, 45 and 

46[,] which depict Plaintiff receiving treatment at Mercy San 

Juan Hospital following the incident on March 25, 2011[,] and 

Plaintiff’s wound” under FREs 401 and 403. (Defs.’ MIL No. 11 

1:25-2:1, ECF No. 93.) Defendants argue: 

Plaintiff has identified four separate photos 

of himself receiving serious medical 

treatment while in the hospital at Mercy San 

Juan. The photographs of Plaintiff in a 

hospital bed receiving treatment after he was 

shot do not have any tendency to prove a fact 

of consequence at issue in this action. No 

one disputes that Plaintiff was shot as a 

result of the incident. Likewise, no one 

disputes that Plaintiff sustained a gunshot 

wound and received a treatment. . . . 

 . . . . 

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 . . . To the extent that these 

photographs are deemed to have some probative 

value, Defendants respectfully request the 

photographs should be excluded under [FRE] 

403 because they are fairly dramatic 

depictions of the treatment received by 

Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s wound and will have 

a tendency to inflame the emotions of the 

jury. In this regard, there is a substantial 

risk of unfair prejudice should Plaintiff be 

permitted to offer these photographs at 

trial. 

(Id. at 2:8-27, ECF No. 93.) 

 Plaintiff responds: 

 As a preliminary matter, the location of 

the gunshot wound and the trajectory of the 

bullet through Plaintiff’s body is a critical 

part of the Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff 

contends that the location of the bullet 

strike, together with the blood and forensic 

evidence, clearly establishes that he was not 

outside the house lunging at the deputies at 

the time he was shot. This in turn undermines 

the defendants’ credibility and makes their 

account of the incident less probable. 

Plaintiff also contends that the bullet 

strike bears on his damages, including his 

pain and suffering. Accordingly, Plaintiff 

contends that a small number of photographs 

are relevant. 

 With respect to the issue of unfair 

prejudice, Plaintiff contends that the images 

are not intended to arouse the passions of 

the jury and inflame them against the 

Defendants. 

 . . . . 

 Plaintiff does not intend to offer into 

evidence all of the hospital photos, but 

instead, only four photos, only three of 

which even show any blood. The four photos 

included by Plaintiff on his exhibit list 

catalogue plaintiff’s condition at the 

hospital and the location of the shots, 

together with the results of the medical 

operation that sealed the wound. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MIL No. 11 2:24-4:1, ECF No. 138.) 

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 Defendants have not shown that the subject photographs 

should be excluded under FRE 403. Therefore, this motion is 

DENIED. 

Motion in Limine No. 12 

 Defendants move to exclude Plaintiff’s trial exhibits 

Nos. 12 and 13 under FREs 401 and 403, arguing as follows: 

 Plaintiff’s Proposed Trial Exhibit No. 

12 is a Second Amended Deposition Notice to 

the County of Sacramento requesting the 

deposition of “The person(s) most 

knowledgeable within the County of 

Sacramento[,] Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Department Internal Affairs, about the 

“administrative review” of the Officer 

Involved Shooting (“OIS”) investigation of 

the shooting of Plaintiff, Robert Reese.” 

Plaintiff’s Proposed Trial Exhibit No. 13 is 

a copy of Defendants’ Objections to that 

Notice. Those objections provide: 

““Objection. Vague and overly broad as to 

time. Pursuant to meet and confer efforts 

between the parties, Defendant COUNTY OF 

SACRAMENTO is of the understanding that 

Plaintiff is seeking the Person Most 

Knowledgeable within the County of 

Sacramento/Sacramento Sheriff’s Department 

Internal Affairs regarding the review which 

was actually conducted in regards to the 

incident arising out of the Officer Involved 

Shooting involving Plaintiff. Without waiver, 

Defendant COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO is able to 

produce somebody regarding the Professional 

Standards Bureau (a.k.a. ‘Internal Affairs’) 

level of review of the SSD Report #11-62631 

only, as distinguished from an executive 

level o[f] review. The County is unable to 

produce a PMK regarding the administrative 

review, if any, was actually conducted at the 

executive level of SSD report #11-62631.” 

 . . . Here, the Monell claim against the 

County was dismissed with prejudice at 

summary judgment. Any evidence that would 

relate to administrative review at an 

executive level—i.e. whether the involved 

deputies were investigated to determine 

whether County policy was followed, to 

determine whether retraining was required, or 

to determine whether any involved SCSD 

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personnel should be subject to discipline—is 

irrelevant to the claims that remain for 

trial. Further, Defendants anticipate that 

these documents will be used by Plaintiff, or 

his counsel, to suggest that the lack of 

executive level administrative review of the 

officer involved shooting in this case is 

commonplace within SCSD—as suggestion and 

argument that is completely improper given 

the dismissal of the Monell claim. 

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 To the extent that these discovery 

documents are deemed to have some probative 

value, Defendants respectfully request the 

Notice and Objections be excluded under [FRE] 

403 because [they] will confuse the issues 

before the jury and are unfairly prejudicial. 

As explained above, since the Monell claim 

has been dismissed, evidence related to 

whether an executive level administrative 

review to assess whether policy was followed, 

whether training is needed[,] or whether 

discipline needs to be meted out . . . does 

not relate at all to whether Plaintiff can 

prove that Deputy Rose or Brown used 

unreasonable force on the morning of March 

25, 2011. 

 In fact, in light of the substantial 

media that police practices have received 

across the county over the last 18 months, 

commentary by [Plaintiff’s] counsel in this 

case that SCSD exercised its discretion and 

did not perform an internal affairs 

investigation of the involved officers runs 

the risk of emotionally inflaming the jury. 

This is particularly dangerous in light of 

the fact that the Monell claim was 

dismissed . . . . 

(Defs.’ MIL No. 12 1:25-27, 2:20-4:19, ECF No. 94 (citations 

omitted).) 

 Plaintiff rejoins that “Defendants take for granted 

that the challenged exhibits bear only on the Monell-related 

issues that were dismissed from this case.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to MIL 

No. 12 2:24-26, ECF No. 139.) Plaintiff argues: 

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 According to the County’s designated 

representative produced pursuant to [FRCP] 

30(b)(6) to testify regarding the 

“administrative review” of [Plaintiff’s] 

shooting . . . , there was no forensic 

analysis ever performed to determine which 

bullet struck [Plaintiff]. There was no 

request by Internal Affairs for forensic 

analysis of the physical evidence. No one 

attempted to determine whose round struck 

[Plaintiff]. Accordingly, Plaintiff contends 

that Exhibit 12 is relevant and admissible to 

help show what weight should be assigned to 

this testimony, which in turn undermines any 

claim by Defendants that their investigation 

determined which round struck [Plaintiff]. 

Accordingly, the documents are relevant for a 

non-Monell purpose. Since Defendants have not 

shown that the documents are inadmissible on 

all potential grounds, their motion is not 

persuasive. 

(Id. at 139:3-17 (citations omitted).) Plaintiff also contends 

that “[s]ince the above documents undermine any claim that the 

County of Sacramento’s investigators determined which round 

struck Plaintiff, they are also admissible for impeachment 

purposes.” (Id. at 3:20-22.) 

 The in limine record lacks sufficient factual context 

for a pretrial ruling on this motion. 

Dated: October 26, 2015 

 

 

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