Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00305/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00305-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODNEY WARD, )

) 2:04-cv-305-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

CITY OF SOUTH LAKE TAHOE, a )

Political Division of State of )

California; SOUTH LAKE TAHOE )

POLICE DEPARTMENT; POLICE OFFICER )

D. BAKER; POLICE OFFICER EVANS; )

and POLICE OFFICER RAMIREZ, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Plaintiff moves for a new trial and Defendants move for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”). Each motion is

opposed. 

BACKGROUND

This action was tried to a jury which entered a verdict in

favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims for battery, negligent

infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, Fourth Amendment excessive force, and failure to train, and

in favor of Plaintiff on his negligence claim. Plaintiff sued

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Defendants for injuries he received as he was transported by South

Lake Tahoe police officers (“Defendant officers”) at night from a

large meadow located along the upper Truckee River in South Lake

Tahoe, California. That night, South Lake Tahoe police dispatchers

received several calls from local residents reporting shouting and a

possible sound of gunfire coming from within a large meadow. The

Defendant officers responded to the call. After their arrival, they

heard shouting from within the meadow and also detected the smell of

smoke, possibly from a campfire. They proceeded to the location of

the noise and smoke and discovered Plaintiff; Plaintiff was

subsequently arrested on several charges. (Agreed Statement to the

Jury at 1-2.) 

Defendant officers then proceeded to escort Plaintiff out of

the meadow with his hands handcuffed behind his back. It was dark and

the area through which they traveled on foot was wet in places and had

an uneven terrain, and overgrown brush and tree roots. Plaintiff fell

at times during the travel. Plaintiff also periodically ceased

walking and was therefore dragged by Defendant officers. Once out of

the meadow, Plaintiff was placed in a patrol car and taken to Barton

Memorial Hospital for a medical screening, after which he was taken to

jail. (Id. at 2.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial

Plaintiff argues he is entitled to a new trial, contending

that the court abused its discretion by denying three of Plaintiff’s

expert witnesses the opportunity to testify at trial and by allowing

Defendants to cross-examine Plaintiff regarding his 2005 bankruptcy. 

(Mot. at 2:18-23.)

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A. Exclusion of Expert Testimony 

Defense counsel’s objection at trial to three of Plaintiff’s

expert witnesses was sustained since Plaintiff failed to produce

expert reports pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)

26(a)(2)(B). Plaintiff argues that this ruling was an abuse of

discretion because the experts were listed in the Final Pretrial Order

and Defendants had previously deposed them. (Mot. at 3:4-5.) 

Plaintiff further argues that Defendants did not properly object to

the experts pursuant to the procedure specified in the Final Pretrial

Order. (Id. at 4:19-21.) Defendants counter that Plaintiff blatantly

disregarded Rule 26’s disclosure requirements and that the depositions

do not satisfy these requirements. (Opp’n at 3:27-28, 4:1-15, 16-23.) 

Defendants also contend that they preserved these objections. (Id. at

2.) 

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires that the disclosure of each expert

witness be “accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the

witness.” As prescribed in Rule 37(c)(1), “[a] party that without

substantial justification fails to disclose information required by

Rule 26(a) . . . is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to

use as evidence at trial . . . any witness or information not so

disclosed.” 

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) imposed on Plaintiff an independent

obligation to produce his expert witness reports. “The burden is not

on defendants ‘to seek out the necessary information regarding

[plaintiff’s expert], rather [plaintiff has] the affirmative

obligation to demonstrate the qualifications of [his] own expert[].’” 

Rieger v. Orlor, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 99, 102 n.3 (D. Conn. 2006) 

(internal citation omitted); see Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor

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Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that “even though

[plaintiff] never violated an explicit court order to produce [his

expert’s] report and even absent a showing of bad faith or

willfulness, exclusion is an appropriate remedy for failing to fulfill

the required disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a).”). Further,

deposition testimony is not a substitute for the provision of expert

reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and “the failure to submit an expert’s

report ordinarily results in the exclusion of the expert witness’

testimony at trial.” Riddick v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 183 F.R.D. 327, 330

(D.D.C. 1998). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to show he had

substantial justification for his failure to comply with Rule 26(a). 

Plaintiff also argues that the court should not have

excluded his experts since his failure to produce expert reports was

harmless. (Mot. at 5:4-5, 19-25.) The harmlessness inquiry in Rule

37(c)(1) focuses on, inter alia, “the court’s need to manage [the

trial] and the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of

litigation.” Galentine v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 333 F.

Supp. 2d 991, 993 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (citing Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc.,

125 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 1997)). If Plaintiff’s experts had been

allowed to testify, considerable time would have been expended

reviewing the expert depositions in order to ensure that the expert

testimony was limited to matters discussed in their respective

depositions. Such an undertaking would have been time-consuming and

cumbersome. Under the circumstances, Plaintiff’s failure to comply

with Rule 26 was not harmless. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown

that the challenged ruling was erroneous under Rule 37. 

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B. Testimony Regarding Plaintiff’s Bankruptcy

Plaintiff also argues that the court abused its discretion

by overruling his objection to Defendants’ questioning of Plaintiff at

trial about his 2005 bankruptcy since the parties agreed in their

Joint Status Conference Statement “that [they] w[ould] make no

reference to the Bankruptcy proceedings of the Plaintiff . . . at the

time of the Trial.” (Joint Status Conference Statement at 2:8-10;

Mot. at 6:4-8.) Defendants counter that Plaintiff “opened the door”

to questions concerning his bankruptcy when he testified at trial that

he incurred debt as a result of the medical treatment he had because

of the subject incident. (Opp’n at 7:9-14.) At the June 11, 2006

hearing on the parties’ motions, Plaintiff argued that he understood

the parties’ agreement in the Joint Status Conference Statement to

mean that the bankruptcy issue would not be raised under any

circumstances, regardless of whether any party “opened the door.” 

This alleged agreement was not part of the Final Pretrial Order, and

its meaning is disputed. Nonetheless, “[a] new trial is only

warranted when an erroneous evidentiary ruling ‘substantially

prejudiced’ a party.” Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v.

Medtronic, Inc., 2000 WL 34334583, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 31, 2000)

(citing United States v. 99.66 Acres of Land, 970 F.2d 651, 658 (9th

Cir. 1992); Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1457-59 (9th

Cir. 1983)).

Plaintiff argues he was prejudiced by the questioning

regarding his bankruptcy because it negatively affected his character

in the eyes of the jury. Plaintiff contends he could not rebut

Defendants’ tarnishment of his character because he was not prepared

to meet this surprise evidence. However, Plaintiff has not shown he

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was substantially prejudiced by this questioning. Notwithstanding the

bearing this evidence may have had on Plaintiff’s character, the

evidence also indicated that Plaintiff was incurring financial

hardship as a result of the incident and could have been viewed by the

jury in this light. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial

is denied. 

II. Defendants’ Motion for JNOV

A. Inconsistency in the Jury Verdict

Defendants move for JNOV, arguing that the jury verdict is

inconsistent and contradictory since the jury found in their favor on

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim but against them on Plaintiff’s

negligence claim. (Mot. at 2:9-16, Further Decl. of Gayle Tonon in

Supp. of JNOV Mot. (“Tonon Decl.”) at 2:8-9.) Specifically,

Defendants contend that “in [o]rder for the jury to find in [their]

favor [on] the constitutional claim of ‘excessive force’ it was

necessary to find that the Defendant Officers acted reasonably”;

therefore, this finding contradicts the jury verdict against

Defendants on the negligence claim which required a finding of

unreasonableness. (Tonon Decl. at 2:10-13.) Plaintiff counters that

“[t]here was sufficient evidence presented at trial which would

support the [j]ury’s conclusion that the officers used unreasonable

force after the arrest and during the transportation of Plaintiff out

of the forest area, that constituted negligence per the jury

instructions.” (Opp’n at 2:5-8.) 

“[T]he standard for granting [JNOV] [is] whether there is

[a] ‘legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to

find for that party on [an] issue.’” Fisher v. City of San Jose, 475

F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007). There is sufficient evidence in the

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trial record that the Defendant officers failed to exercise due care

when escorting Plaintiff out of the meadow and Defendants have not

shown that the jury’s finding that the Defendant officers did not use

excessive force under the Fourth Amendment is inconsistent with the

jury’s negligence finding. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for JNOV

on this ground is denied. 

B. Immunities

Defendants also move for JNOV, contending that Defendant

officers are immune from Plaintiff’s negligence claim under California

Government Code sections 820.2 and 820.4, and California Penal Code

section 835a, and that the City of South Lake Tahoe is immune under

California Government Code section 815(a). (Id. at 7:1-9; 3:20-22.) 

Defendants did not raise these immunities in their motion

for a directed verdict, and the Defendant City of South Lake Tahoe

agreed that it was to be found liable if a Defendant officer was found

liable for a tort claim. “A party cannot raise arguments in its posttrial motion for [JNOV] that it did not raise in its pre-verdict . . .

motion [for a directed verdict].” Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347

F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003); see Def.’s Mot. for a Directed Verdict. 

Defendants’ motion for a directed verdict merely argued that “the

Defendant Officers have a right to qualified immunity.” (Id. at 13:22

(emphasis added).) “The doctrine of qualified [] immunity is a

federal doctrine that does not extend to state tort claims against

governmental employees.’” Ogborn v. City of Lancaster, 101 Cal. App.

4th 448, 460 (2002). Therefore, Defendants’ motion for JNOV is

denied. 

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III. Costs

Plaintiff and Defendants both seek costs under Rule

54(d)(1). “In cases in which ‘neither side entirely prevailed,’ some

courts have denied costs to both sides.” Barber v. T.D. Williams,

Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Amarel v.

Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1523 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating in such cases

“it is within the discretion of [the] district court to require each

party to bear its own costs.”). Since it is difficult to ascertain

what costs were incurred by each party, neither side is awarded costs. 

Amarel, 102 F.3d at 1523-24. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, both motions are denied and neither

side is awarded costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 7, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

 

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