Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04514/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04514-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTOINE ARDDS,

Petitioner,

 v.

M.S. EVANS, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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No. C 08-4514 SBA (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

This matter is now before the Court for consideration of Petitioner's pro se petition for a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2005 conviction in Alameda County

Superior Court. Respondent M.S. Evans, Warden of Salinas Valley State Prison, opposes the

petition. Petitioner has filed a traverse. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is DENIED as

to all claims.

BACKGROUND

I. Case History

On July 20, 2005, a jury in Alameda County Superior Court convicted Petitioner of the

following crimes arising out of two separate incidents that occurred in 1997 and 2003: kidnaping

with intent to commit rape (Cal. Pen. Code § 207(a)); five counts of forcible rape (Cal. Pen. Code §

261(a)(2)); four counts of forcible oral copulation (Cal. Pen. Code § 288a(c)(2)); sodomy by use of

force (Cal. Pen. Code § 286(c)(2)); possession of a firearm by a felon (Cal. Pen. Code §

12021(a)(1)). The jury found true allegations of personal use of firearm and committing sex

offenses against multiple victims. (Resp’t Ex. A at 609-11; Ex. B at 925-37.) 

On October 28, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 13 years and 8 months

in state prison and a consecutive term of 25 years to life in state prison. (Resp’t Ex. A at 669-72,

688-94; Ex. B at 940-52.) 

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Diane also acknowledged on cross-examination that she testified at a 2004 preliminary

hearing that her assailant had blondish red hair.

2

In an unpublished opinion dated July 27, 2007, the California Court of Appeal reversed the

conviction for kidnaping as time-barred, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (Resp’t. Ex. E.) The

California Supreme Court denied a petition for review on October 10, 2007. (Resp’t Ex. G.) 

The instant petition was filed on September 26, 2008. On April 28, 2009, Respondent was

ordered to show cause. Respondent filed an answer and memorandum of points and authorities on

August 21, 2009, and lodged a number of exhibits. Petitioner filed a traverse on September 15,

2009. 

II. Statement of Facts

The following facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal:

The 1997 Incident

The prosecution contended defendant attacked and raped Diane Doe in the early

morning hours in Oakland, California, in 1997. Defendant was arrested some years

later as the result of a DNA analysis.

Diane Doe's Testimony

Diane, 44 years old at the time of the trial, testified that she lived with her husband

and three children in Oakland in June 1997. She went to a friend's house on the

evening of June 19, where she and three other women “played dominoes, drank, [and]

got high” on crack cocaine throughout the night. At the time, she used crack cocaine

twice a week and had been a drug user for about 10 years.

Early the next morning, as Diane walked home alone, a man grabbed her from

behind, choking her so she could not speak, and dragged her about a block to a more

secluded dirt area, where he beat and raped her. She fought with him, and lost and

regained consciousness, as he continued to rape her until he jumped up and ran away.

Diane testified about a taped statement she made with the police in 1997, soon after

this assault. She acknowledged she lied in the interview when she said she had run

around the lake, and had talked to a homeless man and a woman prior to the attack.

She was ashamed of her drug addiction and in denial about it, wanted to protect her

family, did not feel what she was doing before the attack was anybody's business, and

did not want the police to find her assailant because she did not want him to come

back and “finish me up.” She told the police she had some alcohol and a little

marijuana the night before, but did not mention the crack cocaine.

In her 1997 police interview and at the 2005 trial, Diane said her assailant was an

African-American male, and had dark red hair,1 a natural hairstyle and chipped front

teeth. She also told the police in 1997, that he was five feet seven inches tall with a

medium build, although defendant was, as indicated post, six feet three inches tall.

She testified that she never had consensual sex with defendant. She also was unable

to identify him as her assailant in a 2004 lineup or at trial.

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After the assault, Diane and her family moved to Sacramento because she was afraid.

Her husband left her about 15 months later because Diane had nightmares and would

not let him touch her. Diane returned to the Bay Area and continued using drugs and

alcohol. Whenever she thought about the rape she blamed herself, and would use

more drugs and alcohol until she passed out in order to forget about it. When the

police contacted her in 2003, about the assault, she could not recall the incident; she

later underwent therapy to regain her memories. She continued to use drugs and

alcohol until she entered recovery about 14 months before she testified at trial.

Physician's Assistant's Testimony

A physician's assistant, who was a forensics examiner, head of the sexual assault

response team (SART) at the hospital, and an expert in sexual assault examinations,

examined Diane for two hours after she was admitted at the hospital the same

morning as the assault. Diane told her she had been assaulted by an

African-American male with reddish hair, had been strangled, and had been beaten on

her face and raped; she also admitted to heavy alcohol and crack cocaine use. She had

a contusion on the left side of her face, difficulty swallowing, neck pain, cuts on her

feet, hemorrhaging in her eardrums consistent with strangulation, broken blood

vessels in her eyes, and swelling around her nose and one eye. There were no gross

abrasions in her vagina or cervix, but there were numerous sand and dirt particles

near her vagina, rectum, and anus. Swabs of her vaginal and rectal areas revealed

non-motile sperm. Diane was admitted to the transitory care unit, one of only three

percent of sexual assault cases so treated, and discharged three days later.

Police Investigation

In late July 1997, a police officer encountered defendant about a mile from the assault

and noted he was an African-American man, 26 years old, six feet three inches tall

and weighed 190 pounds, with red hair and a moustache.

A forensic DNA analyst testified that in May 2003, evidence relating to Diane's rape

was analyzed as part of the “DNA Cold Hit Program.” Sperm from Diane's vaginal

swab yielded an unambiguous DNA profile, which made it clear it was from a single

source, a DNA profile from a male individual. The profile matched that of defendant,

by then a convicted offender, in a Department of Justice database. The analyst

confirmed the match after obtaining a fresh DNA sample from defendant. She

testified that this DNA profile occurred in one out of 608 quadrillion people.

The 2003 Incident

The prosecution also contended defendant sexually assaulted D. Doe and A. Doe in

2003.

Testimony by A. Doe and D. Doe

A. and D. testified that they were close friends. A. was engaged to, and sexually

active with, Jermaine R., D.'s brother; D. was sexually active with a boyfriend,

Melvin M.

On the evening of September 6, 2003, D. and A. went to an Oakland dance club

called “Sweet Jimmie's.” According to A., D. was interested in finding a new

boyfriend, which D. denied at trial. On their way, A. had some marijuana and wine

cooler; although D. denied it, A. recalled D. had a little of each too.

The women met defendant at the club and danced with him. He seemed to be

interested in D., who thought he was nice. The three left the club and went to a store

to buy a few things, and defendant suggested they go to his car and smoke marijuana.

The women accompanied him on a long walk to an RV and waited as defendant

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retrieved a key for the vehicle from a nearby apartment. Once in the RV, they talked

and the women smoked marijuana and drank wine coolers. D. had spoken to Michael

M. on her cell phone during the walk to the RV, and now received a call from

Jermaine. The women told defendant they were going to leave. When they declined

his offer of a ride home, defendant pulled out a handgun from under a bed and told

them to remove their clothes. D. at first refused, complying only after defendant

repeated his demand while putting his gun to her head and threatening to shoot her.

Defendant orally copulated both women, ordered each woman to orally copulate him

(D. could not recall whether or not she did so), ordered them to orally copulate each

other, and ordered A. to kiss D. and rub her breasts. The women did as they were told

(although A. faked orally copulating D.). Defendant vaginally penetrated each

woman, ejaculating inside each of them. He insisted D. urinate into a bucket after he

ejaculated inside her. Defendant vaginally penetrated the women more than once.

When he penetrated A., he told her she had gotten his friend locked up and had run

away with his money. A. did not know what he was talking about. Defendant ordered

A. to lay on top of D. while he attempted to sodomize A., but his penis did not fully

penetrate her anus. Each woman testified she did not consent to the sex, but complied

out of fear because of the gun.

Defendant allowed the women to leave the RV early that morning, apologized as he

accompanied them to a bus stop, and told them not to call the police. On their way

home, the women decided to lie and say they were ordered into a car by two men

with a gun because they were scared, and worried about how their boyfriends and

families would react to the truth. They agreed to tell the truth about what happened in

the RV.

When they arrived home, their boyfriends and families were upset with the women,

even after they told their story. The women walked to Summit Hospital, where A.

told police their story. The women were taken to Highland Hospital for sexual assault

examinations. A. identified defendant as their assailant when he was brought to the

hospital, and later showed police the RV.

D. admitted she had lied to the police and at the preliminary hearing about two men

picking them up, but was telling the truth at trial. A. testified she too had lied to the

police, for fear the case would not be pursued if she admitted they had voluntarily

gone to the RV.

A. said she was seeing a psychologist and taking anti-depressants. She felt disgusted

with men and could not have sexual relations with her fiancé for a year. D. testified

that she had seen many counselors and could not have sex for a long time after the

attack.

The Sexual Assault Examinations

A physician's assistant, a member of Highland Hospital's SART and an expert in

sexual assault examinations, testified about her examinations of A. and D.A. told the

physician's assistant she had engaged in consensual vaginal intercourse and oral

copulation two days before. She said she had been sexually assaulted around

midnight the night before by an unknown African-American male in his twenties who

had a gun and told her, “I'll blast your head off if you don't shut up.” The man had

penetrated her vagina and anus and ejaculated in her vagina, they had orally

copulated each other, and he had kissed her lips and breasts.

The physician's assistant observed A. had injuries in her vaginal area, specifically a

tearing of her fossa navicularis and posterior fourchette, areas where a woman who

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The physician's assistant testified that “nonspecific TB uptake” means the tissue has been

disturbed in some way, but that there was not a definite linear tear, a deep tear, or any tear visible to

the naked eye.

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resists a sexual assault is more likely to have tearing. A. also had bruising and redness

in her cervix. The physician's assistant did not perform an anascope in A.'s rectal area

because it was too difficult. She observed non-motile sperm on a slide taken from a

vaginal swab. She concluded that the results of her exam were consistent with the

history A. provided.

D. told the physician's assistant she had last engaged in consensual vaginal

intercourse and oral copulation two days before. She said she had been sexually

assaulted early that morning by an unknown African-American male in his twenties

who had threatened her with a gun to her head and said, “I'll blast your head off if

you don't shut up,” had penetrated her vagina with his penis and ejaculated, had

demanded they orally copulate each other, and had kissed her lips and breasts.

The physician's assistant did not find any deep tears in D.'s vaginal tissue, but found

“two to three millimeter nonspecific TB uptake with tenderness and slight

erythema.”2

 She also noticed some pooling of a white liquid substance at the

posterial vaginal vault.

The Police Investigation

Police officers testified they found defendant inside the RV the same morning the

attacks were reported and arrested him. Defendant lied about his name, and his

appearance matched the description of the suspect as having loose braids, bad teeth, a

jacket, and dark pants. The police did not find a gun in the RV. Both A. and D.

promptly identified defendant as their attacker in a field lineup.

A DNA analyst testified that D. could not be eliminated as a major donor of DNA

found in epithelial cells taken from defendant's penis. D., her boyfriend, and

defendant could not be eliminated as sources of DNA found in sperm cells taken from

D.'s vaginal swab and in epithelial cells found on her underwear. Defendant was the

clear major donor of sperm cells found in the underwear.

Defendant also could not be eliminated as the major donor of a sperm fraction found

on the outside of A.'s underwear. A swab of A.'s left breast showed a mixture of

epithelial cells of A. and D., and defendant could not be eliminated as a source.

Testimony of the Sexual Assault Expert

An expert in sexual assault and rape trauma syndrome testified that rape trauma

syndrome has three phases: (1) the acute or crisis phase, (2) the “I'm fine” phase, and

(3) the “I'm going crazy” phase. The first typically lasts two weeks to two months.

Among other things, victims sometimes initially lie to law enforcement until they

develop a trust. Most of the dishonesty involves the beginning portions of the incident

that do not involve the assault itself. Victims fear retaliation, blame, not being

believed, and getting in trouble. In the “I'm fine” phase, victims commonly repress or

block out memories of the assault. In the “I'm going crazy” phase, they address their

emotions and feels more in control, but not every woman reaches this final phase.

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Petitioner was previously convicted of charges arising from this incident, and none of the

charges in the instant case pertained to it. Rather, the evidence of this incident was admitted under

California Code Sections 1101(b) and 1108, permitting evidence of Petitioner’s prior bad acts and

sexual offenses, respectively. 

6

The 1999 Incident[

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]

K. Doe, 22 years old at the time of trial, testified that in January 1999, when she was

15, she and a 13-year-old girlfriend met defendant in downtown Oakland. Defendant

paid to wash their clothes at a laundromat, and led them to a motel room where he

said they could shower. When K. saw defendant was actually trying to break into the

room, she and her friend went downstairs to a public restroom; defendant entered the

restroom and punched both girls in their faces, knocking out K.'s three front teeth. K.

fell and started to bleed and cry.

Defendant ordered the girls to remove their clothes and had sexual intercourse with

her friend. Defendant forced K. to orally copulate him. She told him she had a sexual

disease, and he did not attempt intercourse with her. Eventually defendant had the

girls walk him to Sweet Jimmie's, where he let them go.

K. initially lied and told her brother she had fallen on some metal because she had

just run away, but ended up telling her mother about the attack. She told police about

defendant's sexual intercourse with her friend, but not that she was forced to orally

copulate defendant.

A couple of months later, K. pointed out defendant to police on the street. She later

learned he pled guilty to assaulting her and was sentenced to state prison.

In a 1999 interview with police, defendant said he slapped both girls because they

had concealed they actually had money to pay for their laundry. K. was already

missing a tooth, and fell against a sink when he hit her, knocking out two others. He

had consensual sex with K.'s friend only after she offered to do so, essentially to pay

him back for the money he had spent on them, and he was ignorant about her young

age.

Defendant's Case

Defendant only presented one witness, the owner of the RV, whose testimony was

inconsequential to the issues of this appeal. His trial counsel, as suggested in his

cross-examinations and/or stated in his closing argument, contended Diane had

forgotten she had consensual sex with defendant in return for drugs before she was

physically attacked by another person, and insisted A. and D. had lied about their

consensual sex with defendant to avoid their families' and boyfriends' wrath. Defense

counsel relied heavily on the victims' admitted lies to police in making his arguments.

People v. Ardds, No. A111975, slip op. at 2-10 (Cal. Ct. App. July 27, 2007) (footnotes in original)

(Resp’t Ex. E). 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

A. Standard of Review for State Court Decisions

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a district court may

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grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

"adjudicated on the merits" in state court only if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court has "adjudicated" a

petitioner's constitutional claim "on the merits" for purposes of § 2254(d) when it has decided the

petitioner's right to post-conviction relief on the basis of the substance of the constitutional claim

advanced, rather than denying the claim on the basis of a procedural or other rule precluding state

court review on the merits. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). It is error for a

federal court to review de novo a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. See Price

v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638-43 (2003).

1. Section 2254(d)(1)

Challenges to purely legal questions resolved by a state court are reviewed under

§ 2254(d)(1), under which a state prisoner may obtain habeas relief with respect to a claim

adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that

was "contrary to" or "involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

402-04, 409 (2000). While the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses have

independent meaning, see id. at 404-05, they often overlap, which may necessitate examining a

petitioner's allegations against both standards, see Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1149-50 (9th

Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003).

a. Clearly Established Federal Law

"Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"

refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of

the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. "Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the

source of clearly established law to [the Supreme] Court's jurisprudence." Id. "A federal court may

not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from

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[the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous." Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003). If there is

no Supreme Court precedent that controls on the legal issue raised by a petitioner in state court, the

state court's decision cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established

federal law. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The fact that Supreme Court law sets forth a fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether

constitutional rights were violated "obviates neither the clarity of the rule nor the extent to which the

rule must be seen as 'established'" by the Supreme Court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 391. There are,

however, areas in which the Supreme Court has not established a clear or consistent path for courts

to follow in determining whether a particular event violates a constitutional right; in such an area, it

may be that only the general principle can be regarded as "clearly established." Andrade, 538 U.S.

at 64-65. When only the general principle is clearly established, it is the only law amenable to the

"contrary to" or "unreasonable application of" framework. See id. at 73.

Circuit decisions may still be relevant as persuasive authority to determine whether a

particular state court holding is an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent or to

assess what law is "clearly established." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 968 (2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1999).

b. "Contrary to"

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A "run-of-the-mill state-court decision" that

correctly identifies the controlling Supreme Court framework and applies it to the facts of a

prisoner's case "would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)'s 'contrary to' clause." Williams, 529

U.S. at 406. Such a case should be analyzed under the "unreasonable application" prong of

§ 2254(d). See Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000).

c. "Unreasonable Application"

"Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but

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unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411; accord

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state court's application

of governing federal law must be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable); Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam) ("unreasonable" application of law is not equivalent to

"incorrect" application of law). 

Evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the relevant

rule's specificity; if a legal rule is specific, the range of reasonable judgment may be narrow; if it is

more general, the state courts have more leeway. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664

(2004). Whether the state court's decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record

that court had before it. Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 651 (2004) (per curiam).

The objectively unreasonable standard is not a clear error standard. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-

76 (rejecting Van Tran's use of "clear error" standard); Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067-69 (acknowledging

the overruling of Van Tran on this point). After Andrade, 

[t]he writ may not issue simply because, in our determination, a state court's

application of federal law was erroneous, clearly or otherwise. While the

"objectively unreasonable" standard is not self-explanatory, at a minimum it denotes

a greater degree of deference to the state courts than [the Ninth Circuit] ha[s]

previously afforded them.

Id. In examining whether the state court decision was unreasonable, the inquiry may require

analysis of the state court's method as well as its result. Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th

Cir. 2003).

2. Sections 2254(d)(2), 2254(e)(1)

A federal habeas court may grant a writ if it concludes a state court's adjudication of a claim

"resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). An unreasonable

determination of the facts occurs where a state court fails to consider and weigh highly probative,

relevant evidence, central to a petitioner's claim, that was properly presented and made part of the

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state court record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004). A district court must

presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless a petitioner rebuts

the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Section 2254(d)(2) applies to an intrinsic review of a state court's fact-finding process, or

situations in which the petitioner challenges a state court's fact-findings based entirely on the state

court record, whereas § 2254(e)(1) applies to challenges based on extrinsic evidence, or evidence

presented for the first time in federal court. See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1000 (9th Cir.

2004). In Taylor, the Ninth Circuit established a two-part analysis under §§ 2254(d)(2) and

2254(e)(1). Id. First, federal courts must undertake an "intrinsic review" of a state court's factfinding process under the "unreasonable determination" clause of § 2254(d)(2). Id. at 1000. The

intrinsic review requires federal courts to examine the state court's fact-finding process, not its

findings. Id. Once a state court's fact-finding process survives this intrinsic review, the second part

of the analysis begins by dressing the state court finding in a presumption of correctness under

§ 2254(e)(1). Id. According to the AEDPA, this presumption means that the state court's factfinding may be overturned based on new evidence presented by a petitioner for the first time in

federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof a state court finding

is in error. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). "Significantly, the presumption of correctness and the

clear-and-convincing standard of proof only come into play once the state court's fact-findings

survive any intrinsic challenge; they do not apply to a challenge that is governed by the deference

implicit in the 'unreasonable determination' standard of section 2254(d)(2)." Taylor, 366 F.2d at

1000. 

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the Petitioner’s

claims, the Court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06

(1991). Here, the California Court of Appeal was the highest state court to issue an explained

opinion on Petitioner’s claims. 

II. Exhaustion

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings

either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state judicial remedies,

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either on direct appeal or through state collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court

available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in

federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). It is

undisputed that Petitioner exhausted his state court remedies as to the first three claims raised in his

petition on direct appeal in the state courts. Respondent contends that the fourth claim is not

exhausted, an argument that need not be reached because the claim can be denied on its merits for

the reasons discussed below. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (allowing district court to deny

unexhausted claim on its merits).

III. Legal Claims

Petitioner raises four claims in his petition: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion

to sever trial on the 1997 and 2003 incidents; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of

his prior sex offenses; (3) that the trial court erred in giving an instruction pursuant to CALJIC No.

2.50; and (4) that Petitioner was convicted of the crimes against Diane Doe based on an

identification obtained through unconstitutionally suggestive procedure. 

1. Severance

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to due process his motion to sever the

trial on the 1997 and 2003 incidents. A joinder, or denial of severance, of counts may prejudice a

defendant sufficiently to render his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. Grisby v.

Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997). The risk of prejudice from the joinder of two sets of

charges is enhanced when the evidence is not cross-admissible, and when the evidence of one crime

is substantially weaker than the evidence of the other crime. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073,

1084-85 (9th Cir. 1998). Joinder generally does not result in prejudice if the evidence of each crime

is simple and distinct even if the evidence is not cross-admissible, and the jury is properly instructed

so that it may compartmentalize the evidence. Id. at 1085-86. Similarly, joinder generally does not

result in prejudice if the jury did not convict on all counts because it presumably was able to

compartmentalize the evidence. Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000). If the

petitioner shows that the joinder violated his right to due process, he must also establish that the

joinder had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Sandoval

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v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner argued in the state courts, as he does here, that joint trial of the two incidents

rendered the trial unfair because the case on the 1997 incident was stronger and more inflammatory

than on the 2003 incident, and that he would not have been convicted of the charges stemming from

the 2003 incident if they were tried separately. (Resp’t Ex. at 17.) He also argues that the evidence

of the two incidents would not have been cross-admissible at separate trials. (Id. at 17, n.5.) The

Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument that the 2003 incident was less inflammatory and

weaker than the 1997 incident based on the following reasoning:

Defendant's “inflammatory” argument amounts to a self-serving interpretation

of the facts from the two incidents. He contends the “stranger-on-stranger” nature of

the 1997 incident was “more terrifying” than the “acquaintance” nature of the 2003

incident, where the women “had gone with him voluntarily to the place where the

alleged offenses occurred,” and that the 1997 incident involved “actual violence with

strangulation to the point of temporarily being rendered unconscious, with injuries

such that a highly-unusual two-night stay in the hospital was required,” as opposed to

defendant's “brandishing a firearm” in 2003. Defendant also contends Diane's

subsequent extended trauma, including her move to Sacramento, divorce, drug use,

and memory block, was greater than anything suffered by A. and D.

Defendant's contentions lack merit. That A. and D. spent a few hours with the

defendant and went voluntarily with him to the R.V. does nothing to diminish the

substantial terror of their suddenly facing death at his hands. We reject the contention

that defendant's threat to kill them by pointing his gun at D.'s head was somehow less

significant than his violence against Diane, as brutal as that was; moreover, defendant

ignores the “actual violence” of defendant's raping of A. and D., his extended sexual

assault of them, and each woman's witnessing, and forced participation in the sexual

assault of the other. It is also unpersuasive that Diane suffered a more extensive

trauma from the assault. Both A. and D. testified about serious difficulties they had

after the assault. Nothing in the record indicates their difficulties were any less

meaningful than those Diane faced.

We are also unpersuaded that the 1997 case was a “sure winner” while the

2003 case was weak. Both cases had their strengths and weaknesses. While the DNA

evidence and Diane's testimony provided strong support for the jury's verdict, Diane's

inability to identify defendant, her admitted memory block, her initial lies to the

police, the lack of obvious signs of force uncovered in her sexual assault

examination, the lack of any corroboration for her recitation of events, and her

admitted use of crack cocaine and alcohol in the hours prior to the assault posed some

problems for the prosecution. On the other hand, the evidence of the 2003 incident

included strong indicators that A. and D. were telling the truth, including physical

evidence of forced sex found in their sexual assault examinations, each woman's

corroboration of defendant's sexual assault of the other, their consistent statements

about the assault to the medical staff at the hospital and to the police, their ability to

readily identify defendant, and A.'s identification of the RV. The cases were of

relatively equal strength.

Defendant further suggests that, while there was no evidence that Diane

voluntarily engaged in sexual relations with defendant, such evidence existed

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regarding A. and D. because they “went voluntarily with [defendant] to the RV. At

least A. must have foreseen some activity beyond conversation and smoking

marijuana because she believed [defendant] was trying to pick up [D.].” Defendant

also suggests the women were required to fabricate a story to avoid the wrath of their

boyfriends and D.'s mother. Defendant's argument is a sad reminder that some may

still believe that women who are raped in the course of providing social company to

men must have offered themselves sexually or, at the very least, must have “foreseen”

the irresistible temptation they presented and were, therefore, somehow responsible

for any sexual assault. We reject this view. Just as with Diane, there was no evidence

presented at trial that A. or D. had engaged in voluntary sexual relations with

defendant

(Id. at 17-19.) 

The state appellate court also found the evidence of the two crimes were cross-admissible

under California Evidence Code Section 1108, which allows admission of other sexual offenses to

show that the defendant had a propensity to commit the charged sexual offense. (Id.) This Court is

bound by the state appellate court’s determination of state law that the evidence of the two incidents

would have been admissible at separate trials. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005)

(holding that state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of

challenged conviction, binds federal court sitting in habeas corpus). The cross-admissibility of the

evidence of the two incidents is a strong indication that the joinder did not prejudice Petitioner so as

to violate his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by due process. 

The state appellate court also explained persuasively why this was not a case in which a

weaker case was joined with a more inflammatory and stronger case. The two incidents involved

similarly extreme levels of abusive and terrifying conduct by Petitioner. In both incidents, in

addition to raping the victims, Petitioner gave them reason to believe he would kill them: in the 2003

incident, he pointed his gun at the victims and threatened to kill them, and in the 1997 incident, he

choked the victim to the point of her losing consciousness. Also both incidents involved additional

inflammatory conduct by Petitioner: in the 2003 incident, Petitioner raped the victims over a

prolonged period of time and forced them to participate in sexually assaulting each other, and in the

1997 incident, Petitioner dragged the victim for a block and beat her in addition to raping and

choking her. In short, the 2003 incident was just as terrifying and inflammatory as the 1997

incident. In addition, the evidence in the two cases was of comparable strength. The 1997 incident

had very strong DNA evidence, but there were also some weaknesses in that the victim did not

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4

This was a separate incident from the 1997 rape of Diane Doe for which Petitioner was tried

and convicted in this case.

5

Section 1101(b) allows “admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil

wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact.” Pursuant to this rule, evidence of previous

uncharged acts is admissible to prove a “common design or plan,” when “the similarity between the

circumstances of the prior acts and the charged offenses supports the inference that defendant

committed the charged offenses pursuant to the same design or plan defendant used to commit the

uncharged misconduct.” People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal.4th 380, 393 (1994).

Section 1108(a) provides: “In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual

offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made

inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” 

14

identify Petitioner, she admitted to memory problems, prior lies to the police, and drug and alcohol

use at the time of the incident, and her account of force was not corroborated by physical evidence

obtained in the sexual assault examination. In the 2003 incident there was no persuasive DNA

evidence, but the victims gave a positive identification of Petitioner, and their account of the rapes

was buttressed strongly by the consistency of their accounts, the physical evidence of force found in

the sexual assault examinations, and their prior consistent accounts to the police and medical staff. 

Based upon this record, the Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that this was not a case in

which the joinder of the trial on the two incidents caused undue prejudice. Consequently, the failure

to sever the trial did not render the trial fundamentally unfair, and the state courts’ decisions denying

Petitioner’s claim were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court precedent, nor were they based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2).

2. Admission of Evidence of Prior Sex Offense

Petitioner claims that the admission of evidence of the 1999 incident in which he sexually

assaulted two girls, violated his right to due process. Prior to trial, the prosecution sought admission

of the 1999 incident and another incident that occurred in 1997 in which Petitioner had raped and

robbed a 26-year-old woman.4 The trial court excluded the evidence of the 1997 incident, but

admitted the evidence of the 1999 incident under Evidence Code Section 1101(b) to show a

“common scheme or plan,” and under Section 1108 to show a propensity to commit the charged

offenses.5 

Petitioner argues that the evidence of the 1999 incident was not admissible under state

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evidentiary rules. (Pet. Ex. A at 2-7.) This argument does not raise a cognizable basis for federal

habeas relief because a state court's evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review unless

the ruling violates federal law. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). Failure to comply with

state rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief. 

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). In any event, the California Court of

Appeal’s ruling that the evidence was admissible under state law is binding on federal habeas

review. See Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76. 

Petitioner also argues that due process prohibits the admission of evidence of prior bad acts

to show a propensity to commit the charged offense, as occurred in this case with the admission of

the evidence of the 1999 incident pursuant to Evidence Code Section 1108. (Pet. Ex. A at 7-8.) The

California Court of Appeal rejected this claim, citing Petitioner’s concession to the fact that this

claim was rejected by the California Supreme Court in an earlier case. (Resp’t Ex. E at 14 (citing

People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 912-22 (1999).) 

The United States Supreme Court has left open the question of whether admission of

propensity evidence violates due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n. 5 (1991). Based

on the Supreme Court’s reservation of this issue as an "open question," the Ninth Circuit has held

that a petitioner’s due process right concerning the admission of propensity evidence is not “clearly

established” as required by AEDPA. Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)); accord Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008)

(reaffirming Alberni). Moreover, the Court notes that with respect to the analogous federal

evidentiary rule, the Ninth Circuit has held that it does not violate due process because, as under the

California rule, the evidence of the prior offense still is subject to the trial court’s balancing test

before it is admitted, which provides meaningful review. See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d

1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (addressing Federal Rule of Evidence 414 (allowing evidence of prior

sexual offenses to show a propensity to commit the charged sexual offense)). In any event, because

the Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question of whether using evidence of prior crimes to

show propensity for criminal activity could ever violate due process, the state courts’ rejection of

this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of “clearly established federal law”

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under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1). See Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Consequently, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

3. CALJIC No. 2.50.01

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to due process by issuing the 2002

version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01. Petitioner argues that the instruction relieved the prosecution of its

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by allowing the jury to find facts regarding the prior

offenses only by a preponderance of the evidence, and then infer that because Petitioner committed

prior crimes, he committed the charged crimes.

The relevant portion of the 2002 version of CALJIC 2.50.01 states:

If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you may, but

are not required to, infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit sexual

offenses. If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not

required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did commit the sexual offense or

offenses of which he is accused.

However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant

committed a prior sexual offense or offenses, that is not sufficient by itself to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crimes. If you determine

an inference properly can be drawn from this evidence, this inference is simply one

item for you to consider along with all the other evidence in determining whether the

defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crime.

(Resp’t. Ex. E at 14-15.) 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

crime with which he or she is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). This constitutional

principle prohibits jury instructions that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of

persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime. Yates v. Evatt, 500

U.S. 391, 400-03 (1991)

The Ninth Circuit has held that instructing the jury with the 1996 version of CALJIC Nos.

2.50.01 and 2.50.1 violates a defendant’s right not to be found guilty except upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 822 (2004). This is because that version of

2.50.01 says that the jury may, but is not required to, infer from evidence of previous offenses that

the defendant committed the crime with which he is charged, and 2.50.1 says that such previous

offenses need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. 

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The Gibson court in fact took note of this revision of the instruction with approval. Gibson, 387 F3d at 818. 

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Id. at 821-22. Together, the instructions allow conviction by a preponderance, rather than requiring

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

However, in this case the jury was instructed with the 2002 revision of 2.50.01, which added

the second paragraph quoted above. The crux of the Gibson decision is that the pre-revision

instructions given in that case provided “two routes of conviction, one by a constitutionally

sufficient standard and one by a constitutionally deficient one.” 387 F.3d at 823. When it is

impossible to know whether a jury used the impermissible legal theory or the one which meets

constitutional requirements, the unconstitutionality of one of the routes requires that the conviction

be set aside. Id. at 825. In this case, the revision to the instruction closed off the constitutionally

deficient rout of conviction by clearly instructing the jury that it could not find Petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt just because it had found by a preponderance of the evidence that he

committed prior bad acts.6

 The jury is presumed to have followed the instructions. Weeks v.

Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). By following the instructions, the jury could not have taken

the constitutionally impermissible route to a guilty verdict that Petitioner posits. 

Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated by the use of the 2002 version of CALJIC

No. 2.50.1. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the state court’s decision rejecting this claim was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was it an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1),(2).

4. Identification Procedure

Petitioner claims that that he was convicted of the 1997 crimes against Diane Doe based on

an identification procedure that was unconstitutionally suggestive. A conviction that rests upon a an

identification obtained via suggestive procedures violates due process. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.

188, 196-98 (1972). Petitioner’s claim fails because his conviction for the crimes against Diane Doe

did not rest upon any identification of him. Diane Doe never identified Petitioner as the man who

attacked her. She could not identify him at a lineup in 2004, nor could she identify him at trial. 

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As this claim fails on its merits, the Court need not address Respondent’s alternative argument

that the claim is not exhausted. 

G:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.08\Ardds4514.denyHC.wpd18

(Resp’t Ex. B at 254-57, 299, 311.) Indeed, Petitioner was not identified as the assailant until his

DNA was matched from a database in 2003. (Id. at 438-42, 448-60.) Petitioner was convicted based

on evidence that the DNA profile from Diane Doe’s vaginal swab matched Petitioner’s DNA profile,

a profile that occurs in one of 608 quadrillion people. (Id. at 456-60.) Consequently, Petitioner’s

conviction did not rest on any unconstitutionally suggestive identification procedures, and his right

to due process was not violated. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.7

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk of

the Court shall enter judgment and close the file.

No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (requiring district court to rule on certificate of

appealability in same order that denies petition). Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing

that any of his claims amounted to a denial of his constitutional rights or demonstrate that a

reasonable jurist would find this Court's denial of his claims debatable or wrong. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 5/17/10 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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G:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.08\Ardds4514.denyHC.wpd19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTOINE ARDDS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

M.S. EVANS et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV08-04514 SBA 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on May 21, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Antione L. Ardds P-59915

Mule Creek State Prison

P.O. Box 409020

Ione, CA 95640

Dated: May 21, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: LISA R CLARK, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:08-cv-04514-SBA Document 11 Filed 05/21/10 Page 19 of 19