Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02197/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02197-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RABI YOUSSOFI,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 15CV2197-GPC(JLB)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO STRIKE

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

[Dkt. No. 5.]

v.

ALLIED INTERSTATE LLC,

Defendant.

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s affirmative defenses. 

(Dkt. No. 5.) An opposition was filed on November 20, 2015. (Dkt. No. 10.) A reply

was filed on November 23, 2015. (Dkt. No. 11.) After a review of the briefs, the

answer, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike

Defendant’s affirmative defenses.

Background

Plaintiff Rabi Youssofi (“Plaintiff”) filed a putative class action complaint

alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) based on a

violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) , and California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection

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“A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation 1

or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general

application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . .

(11) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the consumer and,

in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is oral, in that initial oral

communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any

information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure to disclose in

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Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Defendant Allied Interstate LLC

(“Defendant”) filed an answer along with its affirmative defenses of standing, due

process, due process, bona fide error, and preemption. (Dkt. No. 4.) 

Discussion

A. Legal Standard 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)12(f), the Court may, by motion

or on its own initiative, strike “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent or scandalous” matter from the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The

purpose of Rule 12(f) is “to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise

from litigating spurious issues by disposing of those issues prior to trial.” 

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi–Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds

by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)). The Court begins its analysis by

determining whether the affirmative defenses are “(1) an insufficient defense; (2)

redundant; (3) immaterial; (4) impertinent; or (5) scandalous.” See id. at 973-74. 

The Court must view the pleading in the light more favorable to the pleader

when ruling upon a motion to strike. In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 114 F. Supp.

2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citing California v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 36, 39

(N.D. Cal. 1981)). Motions to strike are regarded with disfavor because striking is

such a drastic remedy. Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 919, 923

(N.D. Cal. 2012). If a claim is stricken, leave to amend should be freely given when

doing so would not cause prejudice to the opposing party. Vogel v. Huntington Oaks

Delaware Partners, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 438, 440 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Wyshak v. City

Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1979)).

In the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an

subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector, except

that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading made in connection with a legal

action. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). 

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affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Simmons

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v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wyshak v. City

Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979)). “Fair notice generally requires that the

defendantstate the nature and grounds for the affirmative defense.” Roe v. City of San

Diego, 289 F.R.D. 604, 608 (S.D. Cal. 2013). “It does not, however, require a detailed

statement of facts.” Id. 

1. First Affirmative Defense - Standing

Plaintiff argues that under Ninth Circuit law, a plaintiff only needs to show a

violation of a statutory right to establish Article III standing and the affirmative defense

of standing fails as a matter of law. Defendant argues that the issue of whether a

plaintiff can establish standing based on a bare violation of a federalstatute is currently

before the United States Supreme Court. Since it needs to preserve the defense,

Defendant argues that the Court should not strike its standing defense. 

The first affirmative defense alleges that “Plaintiff has not alleged that he

suffered any actual harm, therefore, he lacks standing to bring this suit under Article

III of the United States Constitution.” (Dkt. No. 4, Ans. at 5.) 

In the Ninth Circuit, the Article III “injury in fact” requirement can be met by a

violation of a statute. Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 2010);

see also Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (2014). Currently before the United

States Supreme Court is the issue of whether a plaintiff can establish Article III

standing by alleging a violation of a statutory right. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct.

1892 (2015). Since the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the standing

issue in Spokeo, Inc., Edwards is currently good law and binding authority on this

The Ninth Circuit has not yet decided whether the pleading standard in Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662 (2009) apply to affirmative defenses. District courts within the Ninth Circuit are

split on the issue. See J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Scace, No.

10cv2496–WQH–CAB, 2011 WL 2132723, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2011). Plaintiff

acknowledges the split, notes that the courtsin the Southern District ofCalifornia apply

the “fair notice” standard, and applies the “fair notice” standard in his analysis. (Dkt.

No. 5-1 at 7-8.) 

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Court. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike the affirmative

defense of standing. If the Supreme Court rules on Spokeo, Inc. during the pendency

of this case, and reverses the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on “injury in fact” as to standing,

Defendant may request leave to file an amended answer to add the affirmative defense

of standing. 

2. Second, Third and Fifth Affirmative Defenses - “Due Process” “Due

Process” and “Preemption”

The second and third affirmative defenses of “due process” and the fifth

affirmative defense of “preemption” concern the statutory damages available under the

FDCPA and California’s Rosenthal Act. 

Plaintiff argues that these affirmative defenses fail as a matter of law and cites

to the holding in Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Defendant opposes contending that allowing Plaintiff to recover statutory damages

under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act is duplicative and may lead to exceeding the

FDCPA statutory damages cap. It also argues that a duplicative statutory award would

be grossly out of proportion to any harm allegedly suffered by the failure to include a

single sentence in a limited number of debt collection letters sent out for a limited

amount of time. Lastly, Defendant argues that the FDCPA’s statutory cap on class

action damages preempts the damages provisions in the Rosenthal Act. In support,

Defendant cites to the dissenting opinion in Gonzales. 

The second affirmative defense states that “the penalties sought by Plaintiff

under different statutes violates Allied’s right to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution because they are duplicative.” (Dkt. No.

4, Ans. at 5.) The third affirmative defense provides that “the penalties sought by

Plaintiff violate Allied’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution because the penalties bear no relation to any harm allegedly

suffered.” (Id. at 5.) The fifth affirmative defense asserts that “Plaintiff’s attempt to

recover statutory penalties under state law is preempted by the cap on class action

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damages imposed under federal law. (Id. at 6.) 

In class action suits, statutory damages under the FDCPA are limited to the lesser

of $500,000 or 1% of the debt collector’s net worth. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B). In

Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit held that a consumer may seek cumulative damages under

both the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act as long as the damages does not exceed the

FDCPA statutory cap. Gonzales, 660 F.3d at 1067-68. In this case, Plaintiff agrees

that any damages over the FDCPA statutory cap is not allowed. Moreover, the Ninth

Circuit held that the Rosenthal Act is not preempted by the FDCPA. Id. at 1067. 

Based on the holding in Gonzales, the affirmative defenses of “due process”,

“due process”, and “preemption” fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike the second, third and fifth affirmative defenses. 

3. Fourth Affirmative Defense - Bona Fide Error

Plaintiff argues that the affirmative defense of “bona fide error” must be stricken

because it fails to plead the circumstances of the mistake with detail. In opposition,

Defendant argues that it explicitly told Plaintiff about the facts surrounding

Defendant’s error. 

“The bona fide error defense is an affirmative defense, for which the debt

collector has the burden of proof.” Reichert v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., 531 F.3d 1002,

1006 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1514 (9th

Cir. 1994)). The FDCPA provides an exception to liability “if the debt collectorshows

by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from

a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted

to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). District courts have held that the

affirmative defense of bona fide error must be stated with particularity under Rule 9(b). 

See Walters v. Performant Recovery,Inc., –F. Supp. 3d –, 2015 WL 4999796, at *4 (D.

Conn. Aug. 21, 2015) (bona fide error defense “is subject to a heightened pleading

standard, regardless of whether Iqbal or Twombly generally apply to affirmative

defenses”); Nguyen v. HOVG, LLC, No. 14CV837 BTM RBB, 2014 WL 5361935, at

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*2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) (granting Plaintiff’s motion to strike affirmative defense

of “bona fide error” since Defendant did not state any facts regarding the mistake that

was made and mistake must be stated with particularity); Jacobson v. Persolve, LLC,

14cv735-LHK, 2014 WL 4090809, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2014) (citing merely to

legal standard for bona fide error is not sufficient to assert affirmative defense); Wiebe

v. Zakheim & Lavrar, P.A., No. 6:12-cv-1200-ORL-18TBS, 2012 WL 5382181, at *2

(M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2012) (“A claim of bona fide error is tantamount to a claim of

mistake and therefore, the Defendant must plead this defense with the particularity

required by Rule 9(b).”); Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 725 F. Supp. 2d 532,

537 (D. Md. July 27, 2010) (striking “bona fide error” defense of merely copying

language of § 1692k(c) and failing to plead facts that give the plaintiffsufficient notice

of the specific mistake); Konewko v. Dickler, Kahn, Sloikowsi & Zavell, Ltd., No. 07-

C-5338, 2008 WL 2061551, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2008) (finding defendant

“obligated to comply with both Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 9(b)” when asserting bona fide

error defense under the FDCPA). 

Here, Defendant alleges that “Plaintiff’s claims are barred on the basis that any

statutory violation was the unintentional result of a bona fide error.” (Dkt. No. 4, Ans.

at 6.) This conclusory affirmative defense provides no facts to support the allegation

of “mistake.” Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike the fourth

affirmative defense of “bona fide error” with leave to amend. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike affirmative

defenses. Defendant is granted leave to file an amended answer to cure the deficiencies

as to the affirmative defense of “bona fide error.” Defendant shall file an amended 

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

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answer on or before January 29, 2016. The hearing set for January 8, 2016 shall be

vacated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 4, 2016

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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