Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06199/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06199-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 15:1126 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ORCINUS HOLDINGS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-CV-06199-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 27

Plaintiff Orcinus Holdings, LLC filed a patent infringement suit against Defendant 

Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant infringes claims of U.S. Patent 

No. 7,567,541 (“the ’541 Patent”). Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss, which 

contends that the claims of the ’541 Patent fail to recite patent-eligible subject matter under 35 

U.S.C. § 101. ECF No. 27. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and 

the record in this case, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the ’541 Patent claims. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. The Parties and Technology at Issue

Plaintiff, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dropbox Inc. (“Dropbox”), is a Delaware 

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corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. ECF No. 1 

(complaint, or “Compl.”) at ¶ 1. Dropbox was founded in June 2007, and launched “as a simple 

way for people to access their files wherever they are and share them easily.” Id. at ¶ 9. 

Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Bridgewater, 

New Jersey, and conducts business from a permanent physical location in San Jose, California. Id.

at ¶¶ 2, 5. Defendant sells its “Personal Cloud” product “as a white-label data backup and transfer 

solution to network operators or service providers, such as Verizon.” Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges 

that the “Personal Cloud” product, as well as other Synchronoss Cloud products, infringe the ’541 

Patent. The Court next summarizes the Patent.

2. The ’541 Patent

The ’541 Patent is entitled “System and Method for Personal Data Backup for Mobile 

Customer Premises Equipment.” ’541 Patent at front page. It was filed on October 18, 2005, and 

issued on July 28, 2009. Id.

The claims of the ’541 Patent generally relate to backing up data from a “customer 

premises equipment” (“CPE”) such as “cell phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), iPodsTM, 

and MP3TM digital recorders.” Id. at 2:64-66. More specifically, the ’541 Patent is directed to 

uploading and downloading data from a CPE to a server by way of a mobile network. Id. at 3:56-

4:4, 5:19-20. The Court first discusses the aspect of uploading data from a CPE to a server, then 

retrieving data from the server to the CPE.

Assume the CPE is a cellphone. First, either the cellphone or the server initiates the backup 

process in response to an elapsed time. Id. at 3:57-59. In other words, the backup process is on a 

timer, and once enough time has elapsed for a predetermined time interval, the server initiates the 

backup process. In one embodiment, the server initiates the backup process by generating an 

update request signal. Id. at 3:61-62. “This signal may also indicate the type of data requested, 

including a full backup of all data, or only the backup of changed data . . . .” Id. at 3:63-65. A 

switch, which is an access point to a mobile network, then forwards the signal to the cellphone. Id.

at 3:2-3, 4:1. The backup data is “structured by tagging required data in accordance with the data 

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type. XML, html, or other methods . . . may be used to create the structured data.” Id. at 4:10-13. 

The cellphone then transmits the backup data across the mobile network to the switch. Id. at 4:21-

23. Once the data transfer process has transferred all of the relevant data from the cellphone to the 

switch, which then transfers the data to the server, the server terminates the data transfer. Id. at 

4:38-45. At that point, the server restarts the timer for the predetermined time interval at which 

updates take place. Id. at 4:45-47.

Figure 1 exemplifies uploading data from a CPE to a server. In response to an elapsed time 

signal (item 105) that signals the beginning of a backup cycle, the server (item 104) generates an 

update request signal (item 106). Id. at 3:59-65. The server’s update request signal (item 106) is 

transmitted to the mobile network’s switch (item 103), which forwards the update request signal 

(item 107) to the CPE (item 101), such as a cellphone. Id. at 4:1. The CPE (item 101) prepares the

data to be backed up, and then begins to transfer the data in one or more “Info signals” (item 109) 

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to the switch (item 103), which passes the Info signal (item 110) onto the server (item 104). Id. at 

4:26-30. An acknowledgement “Ack” signal (items 111 and 112), acknowledging the receipt of 

the data, might be sent from the server (item 104) through the switch (item 103) across the mobile 

network (item 102) to the CPE (item 101). Id. at 4:30-33. “[I]f more data is to be downloaded, a 

next Info signal is sent” (item 113 and 114) from the CPE (item 101) across the mobile network 

(item 102) through the switch (item 103) to the server (item 104). Id. at 4:35-38. “The entire 

process may be repeated until the last information signal is sent by CPE [(item 101)] in which a 

last Info data component is provided to the structure or an END signal is transmitted to indicate to 

server [(item 104)] that the entire information should have been received.” Id. at 4:38-42. Once the 

server determines that transmission is completed “by a successful optional END signal being 

acknowledged in [items] 118, 119, or some other means, server [item] 104 starts the timer for the 

predetermined time interval [(item 117)] . . . and the cycle is repeated.” Id. at 4:43-47. 

Second, stored data can be retrieved from the server and uploaded to the CPE. The CPE, 

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such as a cellphone, transmits a retrieve request signal over the mobile network to the switch. Id.

at 5:24-25. The switch then transmits the retrieve request signal to the server. Id. at 5:34-35. In 

response, the server transmits data to the switch, which then transmits data to the CPE. Id. at 5:44-

48.

Figure 2 exemplifies retrieving data from the server to the CPE. In Figure 2, “a user 

initiates the retrieval of the stored data” from the server (item 104) by “dialing” in accordance with 

item 205. Id. at 5:22-23. Or, the retrieval process can be initiated by processes described above, 

such as in response to an elapsed time signal. Id. at 3:59-61, 5:23-24, 6:31-33. The CPE (item 101) 

transmits the retrieve request signal (item 206) to the switch (item 103). Id. at 5:24-25. The switch 

(item 103) then transmits the retrieve request signal (item 207) to the server (item 104). Id. at 

5:34-35. The server (item 104) then prepares the data to be transmitted. Id. at 5:49-64. Data begins 

to be transmitted from the server (item 104) to the switch (item 103) via an information signal 

(item 209). Id. at Fig. 2. The switch (item 103) then transmits the information signal (item 210) 

across the mobile network (item 102) to the CPE (item 101). Id. at 5:65-66. An acknowledgement 

signal (items 212 and 213) might be sent by the CPE (item 101) through the switch (item 103) to 

the server (item 104). Id. at 6:1-3. “If more data is to be sent, then successive information signals 

are forwarded” in items 214 and 215 through the switch (item 103). Id. at 6:3-5. The last 

information signal to be sent “may include an end of data signal END” received by the CPE (item 

101). 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant “directly infringed and continues to directly infringe one or 

more claims of the ’541 Patent.” Compl. at ¶ 29. Defendant’s motion to dismiss focuses on claim 

1.1 Claim 1 recites:

1. A method for backing up data stored on a mobile customer premises equipment 

comprising the steps of:

storing data at the mobile customer premises equipment;

 

1 Plaintiff has not identified any representative claims of the ’541 Patent. As discussed below, the 

Court finds claim 1 to be representative of the ’541 Patent.

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formatting the data stored at the mobile customer premises equipment into fields by 

determining data fields, identifying which portions of said data correspond to a respective data 

field, and tagging said data,

transmitting the data with a user ID from the mobile customer premises equipment across a 

mobile network to a server for storage;

retrieving said data from said server across a mobile network in response to one of an 

expiration of time and request from said mobile customer premises equipment by transmitting said 

data to said mobile customer premises equipment; and

transmitting said data to said mobile customer premises equipment by transmitting the data 

in more than one information signal and sequentially numbering each of said information signals.

B. Procedural History

On June 20, 2018, in Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. (“the Dropbox 

Action”), Dropbox filed a related patent infringement suit asserting the ’541 Patent as well as U.S. 

Patent No. 6,058,399 and U.S. Patent No. 6,178,505. Case No. 18-CV-03685-LHK, ECF No. 1. 

On August 13, 2018, in the Dropbox Action, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Id., ECF No. 24 

(“Mot.”). On August 27, 2018, Dropbox filed an opposition. Id., ECF No. 27 (“Opp.”). On 

September 4, 2018, Defendant filed a reply. Id., ECF No. 31 (“Reply”). 

On October 18, in the Dropbox Action, Dropbox filed a motion to amend the complaint. 

Id., ECF No. 46. In its motion to amend the complaint, Dropbox sought to “remove its assertion of 

U.S. Patent No. 7,567,541 . . . from this lawsuit” because Dropbox’s wholly-owned subsidiary, 

Orcinus Holdings LLC (i.e., Plaintiff), was going to assert that patent in another case (i.e., the 

instant action). Id., ECF No. 46 at 1.

On October 10, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant patent infringement suit asserting just the 

’541 Patent against Defendant. ECF No. 1. On November 5, 2018, Defendant filed the instant 

motion to dismiss, incorporating the briefing from the Dropbox Action. ECF No. 27. On 

November 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed an opposition, incorporating the briefing from the Dropbox 

Action. ECF No. 32. On November 16, 2019, Defendant filed a reply, incorporating the briefing 

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from the Dropbox Action. ECF No. 33. Thus, even though the parties’ briefing discusses U.S. 

Patent Nos. 6,058,399 and 6,178,505, these patents are not at issue in the instant motion to dismiss 

because they are no longer being asserted against Defendant in the instant case; instead, these 2 

patents are asserted against Defendant in the related Dropbox Action.

Also, in the complaint, Plaintiff fails to identify any specific claims that are being asserted 

against Defendant. See, e.g., Compl. at ¶ 29 (“Synchronoss directly infringed and continues to 

directly infringe one or more claims of the ’541 Patent . . . .”). So, by the time Defendant refiled its 

motion to dismiss, the complaint had not put Defendant on notice as to which specific claim or 

claims in the ’541 Patent Defendant is alleged to have infringed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an 

action for failure to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).

For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations 

in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Nonetheless, the Court is not required to “‘assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because 

they are cast in the form of factual allegations.’” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 

2011) (quoting W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). Mere “conclusory 

allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” 

Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, “‘[a] plaintiff may plead 

[him]self out of court’” if he “plead[s] facts which establish that he cannot prevail on his . . . 

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claim.” Weisbuch v. County of Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Warzon v. Drew, 60 F.3d 1234, 1239 (7th Cir. 1995)).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Patent Eligibility Challenges Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

Defendant’s motion argues that the patents-in-suit fail to claim patent-eligible subject 

matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. Pty. 

Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). The ultimate question whether a claim 

recites patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 is a question of law. Intellectual Ventures I LLC 

v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Patent eligibility under § 101 is 

an issue of law[.]”); In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same). 

However, the Federal Circuit has identified that there are certain factual questions underlying the 

§ 101 analysis. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Accordingly, 

a district court may resolve the issue of patent eligibility under § 101 by way of a motion to 

dismiss. See, e.g., Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 912 (Fed. Cir. 

2017) (affirming determination of ineligibility made on 12(b)(6) motion); Content Extraction & 

Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(same).

Although claim construction is often desirable, and may sometimes be necessary, to 

resolve whether a patent claim is directed to patent-eligible subject matter, the Federal Circuit has 

explained that “claim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination 

under § 101.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 

1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Where the court has a “full understanding of the basic character of the 

claimed subject matter,” the question of patent eligibility may properly be resolved on the 

pleadings. Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1349; see also Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Co., 72 F. Supp. 3d 521, 539 (D. Del. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial 

L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

C. Substantive Legal Standards Applicable Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

1. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

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Section 101 of Title 35 of the United States Code “defines the subject matter that may be 

patented under the Patent Act.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010). Under § 101, the 

scope of patentable subject matter encompasses “any new and useful process, machine, 

manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Id. (quoting 

35 U.S.C. § 101). These categories are broad, but they are not limitless. Section 101 “contains an 

important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 

patentable.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 216 (citation omitted). These three categories of subject matter are 

excepted from patent-eligibility because “they are the basic tools of scientific and technological 

work,” which are “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 

Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has 

explained that allowing patent claims for such purported inventions would “tend to impede 

innovation more than it would tend to promote it,” thereby thwarting the primary object of the 

patent laws. Id. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has also cautioned that “[a]t some level, all 

inventions embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract 

ideas.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 

Accordingly, courts must “tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow 

all of patent law.” Id.

In Alice, the leading case on patent-eligible subject matter under § 101, the U.S. Supreme 

Court refined the “framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural 

phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those 

concepts” originally set forth in Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. This analysis, 

generally known as the “Alice” framework, proceeds in two steps as follows:

First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patentineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before 

us?” To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both 

individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional 

elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. We 

have described step two of this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—

i.e., an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the 

patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible 

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concept] itself.”

Id. at 217-18 (alterations in original) (citations omitted); see also In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent 

Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (describing “the now familiar two-part test described by 

the [U.S.] Supreme Court in Alice”).

2. Alice Step One—Identification of Claims Directed to an Abstract Idea

Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has set forth a bright-line test 

separating abstract ideas from concepts that are sufficiently concrete so as to require no further 

inquiry under the first step of the Alice framework. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (noting that 

“[the U.S. Supreme Court] need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ 

category in this case”); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 

2014) (observing that the U.S. Supreme Court did not “delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract 

ideas’ category” in Alice (citation omitted)). As a result, in evaluating whether particular claims 

are directed to patent-ineligible abstract ideas, courts have generally begun by “compar[ing] 

claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous cases.” 

Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

Two of the U.S. Supreme Court’s leading cases concerning the “abstract idea” exception 

involved claims held to be abstract because they were drawn to longstanding, fundamental 

economic practices. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (claims “drawn to the concept of intermediated 

settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk” were directed to a patentineligible abstract idea); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611-12 (claims drawn to “the basic concept of 

hedging, or protecting against risk” were directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea because 

“[h]edging is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and 

taught in any introductory finance class” (citation omitted)).

Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that information itself is intangible. See 

Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 451 n.12 (2007). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 

has generally found claims abstract where they are directed to some combination of acquiring 

information, analyzing information, and/or displaying the results of that analysis. See 

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FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims 

“directed to collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user when 

misuse is detected” were drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. 

Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims directed to an abstract idea because 

“[t]he advance they purport to make is a process of gathering and analyzing information of a 

specified content, then displaying the results, and not any particular assertedly inventive 

technology for performing those functions”); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC, 823 F.3d at 611 (claims 

were “directed to the abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized 

manner”); see also Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353-54 (collecting cases).

However, the determination of whether other types of computer-implemented claims are 

abstract has proven more “elusive.” See, e.g., Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 

F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[P]recision has been elusive in defining an all-purpose 

boundary between the abstract and the concrete[.]”). As a result, in addition to comparing claims 

to claims in U.S. Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedents, courts considering computerimplemented inventions have taken varied approaches to determining whether particular claims 

are directed to an abstract idea.

For example, courts have considered whether the claims “purport to improve the 

functioning of the computer itself,” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225, which may suggest that the claims are 

not abstract, or instead whether “computers are invoked merely as a tool” to carry out an abstract 

process, Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336; see also id. at 1335 (“[S]ome improvements in computerrelated technology when appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not abstract, such as a chip 

architecture, an LED display, and the like. Nor do we think that claims directed to software, as 

opposed to hardware, are inherently abstract[.]”). The Federal Circuit has followed this approach 

to find claims patent-eligible in several cases. See Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 

1253, 1259–60 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claims directed to an improved memory system were not abstract 

because they “focus[ed] on a ‘specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities’—the use of 

programmable operational characteristics that are configurable based on the type of processor” 

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(quoting Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336)); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 

1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims directed to automating part of a preexisting method for 3-D 

facial expression animation were not abstract because they “focused on a specific asserted 

improvement in computer animation, i.e., the automatic use of rules of a particular type”); Enfish, 

822 F.3d at 1335–36 (claims directed to a specific type of self-referential table in a computer 

database were not abstract because they focused “on the specific asserted improvement in 

computer capabilities (i.e., the self-referential table for a computer database)”).

Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found that claims directed to a “new and useful 

technique” for performing a particular task were not abstract. See Thales Visionix Inc. v. United 

States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “claims directed to a new and useful 

technique for using sensors to more efficiently track an object on a moving platform” were not 

abstract); Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1048, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 

(holding that claims directed to “a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving 

hepatocytes,” a type of liver cell, were not abstract); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 

187 (1981) (holding that claims for a method to cure rubber that employed a formula to calculate 

the optimal cure time were not abstract).

Another helpful tool used by courts in the abstract idea inquiry is consideration of whether 

the claims have an analogy to the brick-and-mortar world, such that they cover a “fundamental . . . 

practice long prevalent in our system.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 219; see, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I 

LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding an email processing 

software program to be abstract through comparison to a “brick-and-mortar” post office); 

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 100 F. Supp. 3d 371, 383 (D. Del. 2015) (“Another 

helpful way of assessing whether the claims of the patent are directed to an abstract idea is to 

consider if all of the steps of the claim could be performed by human beings in a noncomputerized ‘brick and mortar’ context.” (citing buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 

1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).

Courts will also (or alternatively, as the facts require) consider a related question of 

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whether the claims are, in essence, directed to a mental process or a process that could be done 

with pencil and paper. See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1147 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016) (claims for translating a functional description of a logic circuit into a hardware 

component description of the logic circuit were patent-ineligible because the “method can be 

performed mentally or with pencil and paper”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 

F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (claim for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction over 

the Internet was patent-ineligible because the “steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a 

human using a pen and paper”); see also, e.g., Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. 

Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims for computer-implemented system to enable 

borrowers to shop for loan packages anonymously were abstract where “[t]he series of steps 

covered by the asserted claims . . . could all be performed by humans without a computer”).2

Regardless of the particular analysis that is best suited to the specific facts at issue in a 

case, however, the Federal Circuit has emphasized that “the first step of the [Alice] inquiry is a 

meaningful one, i.e., . . . a substantial class of claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible 

concept.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335. The court’s task is thus not to determine whether claims 

merely involve an abstract idea at some level, see id., but rather to examine the claims “in their 

entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter,” 

Internet Patents, 790 F.3d at 1346.

3. Alice Step Two—Evaluation of Abstract Claims for an Inventive Concept

A claim drawn to an abstract idea is not necessarily invalid if the claim’s limitations—

considered individually or as an ordered combination—serve to “transform the claims into a 

patent-eligible application.” Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348. Thus, the second step of the 

Alice analysis (the search for an “inventive concept”) asks whether the claim contains an element 

 

2 One court has noted that, like all tools of analysis, the “pencil and paper” analogy must not be 

unthinkingly applied. See Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc’ns Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 995 

(C.D. Cal. 2014) (viewing pencil-and-paper test as a “stand-in for another concern: that humans 

engaged in the same activity long before the invention of computers,” and concluding that test was 

unhelpful where “error correction codes were not conventional activity that humans engaged in 

before computers”).

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or combination of elements that “ensure[s] that the patent in practice amounts to significantly 

more than a patent upon the [abstract idea] itself.” 573 U.S. at 218 (citation omitted).

The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that transforming an abstract idea to a patenteligible application of the idea requires more than simply reciting the idea followed by “apply it.” 

Id. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72). In that regard, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held 

that “[f]or the role of a computer in a computer-implemented invention to be deemed meaningful 

in the context of this analysis, it must involve more than performance of ‘well-understood, routine, 

[and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 

1347-48 (alteration in original) (quoting Alice, 134573 U.S. at 225); see also Mortg. Grader, 811 

F.3d at 1324-25 (holding that “generic computer components such as an ‘interface,’ ‘network,’ 

and ‘database’ . . . do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement”); Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 

1278 (“To salvage an otherwise patent-ineligible process, a computer must be integral to the 

claimed invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making calculations or 

computations could not.”). 

Likewise, “[i]t is well-settled that mere recitation of concrete, tangible components is 

insufficient to confer patent eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea” where those components 

simply perform their “well-understood, routine, conventional” functions. In re TLI Commc’ns 

LLC, 823 F.3d at 613 (citation omitted); see also id. (ruling that “telephone unit,” “server,” “image 

analysis unit,” and “control unit” limitations were insufficient to satisfy Alice step two where 

claims were drawn to abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in an organized 

manner). “The question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is wellunderstood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact” 

that “must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368. This 

inquiry “goes beyond what was simply known in the prior art.” Id. at 1369.

In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Bilski that “limiting an abstract idea to 

one field of use or adding token postsolution components [does] not make the concept patentable.” 

561 U.S. at 612 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 222

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(same). The Federal Circuit has similarly stated that attempts “to limit the use of the abstract idea 

to a particular technological environment” are insufficient to render an abstract idea patenteligible. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 

F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“An abstract idea does not become nonabstract by limiting the 

invention to a particular field of use or technological environment, such as the Internet.”).

In addition, a “non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional 

pieces” can amount to an inventive concept. BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T 

Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For example, in BASCOM, the Federal 

Circuit addressed a claim for Internet content filtering performed at “a specific location, remote 

from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user.” Id. Because this 

“specific location” was different from the location where Internet content filtering was 

traditionally performed, the Federal Circuit concluded this was a “non-conventional and nongeneric arrangement of known, conventional pieces” that provided an inventive concept. Id. As 

another example, in Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that 

claims relating to solutions for managing accounting and billing data over large, disparate 

networks recited an inventive concept because they contained “specific enhancing limitation[s] 

that necessarily incorporate[d] the invention’s distributed architecture.” 841 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (Nov. 27, 2017). The use of a “distributed architecture,” 

which stored accounting data information near the source of the information in the disparate 

networks, transformed the claims into patentable subject matter. Id.

4. Preemption

In addition to these principles, courts sometimes find it helpful to assess claims against the 

policy rationale for § 101. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the “concern that 

undergirds [the] § 101 jurisprudence” is preemption. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223. Thus, courts have 

readily concluded that a claim is not patent-eligible when the claim is so abstract that it preempts 

“use of [the claimed] approach in all fields” and “would effectively grant a monopoly over an 

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abstract idea.” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612. However, the inverse is not true: “[w]hile preemption may 

signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate 

patent eligibility.” FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1098 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant’s motion to dismiss contends that the claims of the ’541 Patent fall within the 

patent-ineligible “abstract ideas” exception to § 101. The Court applies the Alice framework 

described above to the ’541 Patent. However, the Court need not individually analyze every claim

if certain claims are representative. See generally Alice, 573 U.S. at 224-27 (finding claims to be 

patent-ineligible based on analysis of one representative claim). Here, the parties do not agree on 

any representative claims. Nevertheless, in the absence of agreed-upon representative claims, the 

Court need not analyze each and every claim of the patent. Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348. 

A district court may conduct its own analysis and determine which claim or claims are 

representative if “all the claims are substantially similar and linked to the same . . . idea.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

First, the Court discusses the representative claims of the ’541 Patent, then turns to the 

substantive Alice analysis of the ’541 Patent.

A. Representative Claim of the ’541 Patent

The Court finds that claim 1 is representative of the ’541 Patent. Claim 1 encapsulates the 

other claims in the ’541 Patent, which are “substantially similar” and “linked to the same . . . 

idea,” per the Content Extraction court. 776 F.3d at 1348. The Federal Circuit has also held that if 

the claims “contain only minor differences in terminology but require performance of the same 

basic process, . . . they should rise or fall together.” Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago 

Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1368 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

Claim 1 discloses: (1) storing data at the mobile customer premises equipment (“CPE”); 

(2) formatting the data stored at the CPE; (3) transmitting the data with a user ID from the CPE 

across a mobile network to a server; (4) retrieving data stored in the server in response to either an 

expiration of time or a request from the CPE; and (5) transmitting the data to the CPE in multiple 

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sequentially-numbered information signals. ’541 Patent at 10:52-11:4.

The remaining independent claims (claims 11, 17, and 21) of the ’541 Patent are directed 

to concepts that are substantially similar to and require performance of the same idea as claim 1, 

per the Content Extraction and Smart Systems Innovations courts. 

For instance, claim 11 is directed to a “method for backing up data stored on a mobile 

customer premises equipment,” which is identical to claim 1, also directed to a “method for 

backing up data stored on a mobile customer premises equipment.” Id. at 10:52-53, 11:31-32. 

Claim 11 is also similarly directed to the idea of transmitting data “from the mobile customer 

premises equipment across a mobile network to a server for storage,” which claim 1 discloses in 

its step of transmitting the data with a user ID from the CPE across the mobile network to a server. 

Id. at 10:60-62, 11:38-40. 

Moreover, claim 17 similarly is directed to a “system for backing up data on a mobile 

customer premises equipment.” Id. at 12:7-8. Claim 17 discloses a CPE on which data is stored 

and formatted, transmitting the data from the CPE to a server, then retrieving the data from the 

server in response to either an expiration of time or a request from the CPE. Id. at 12:8-25. These 

steps are all disclosed by claim 1, which also discloses “storing data” at the CPE, “formatting the 

data” stored at the CPE, “transmitting the data” from the CPE to a server, then “retrieving said 

data from said server” in response to either an expiration of time or request from the CPE. Id. at 

10:54-67.

Likewise, claim 21 is similarly directed to a “system for backing up data on a mobile 

customer premises equipment.” Id. at 12:34-35. Claim 21 discloses a CPE on which data is stored, 

formatted, then transmitted to a server. Id. at 12:36-51. Only “changes in data which have 

occurred since a previous transmission” are transmitted to the server. Id. at 12:45-47. As discussed 

above, claim 1 discloses “storing data” at the CPE, “formatting the data stored at the CPE,” then 

“transmitting the data” from the CPE to a server. Id. at 10:54-67. It is of no moment that claim 21 

discloses that only changes in data are transmitted to the server. Claim 1 already encapsulates the 

fundamental idea of data transfer between the CPE and the server, so the underlying idea of data 

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transfer between the CPE and the server is the same for claims 1 and 21.

Plaintiff cites to claims 6 and 8 as disclosing “new and different techniques” not 

represented in representative claim 1. Opp. at 17. For instance, “Claim 6 includes sending a server 

ID with an update request, and Claim 8 includes sending a user ID with a retrieval request to the 

server.” Id. Claim 6 depends from claim 5, which in turn depends from claim 1. Claim 6 and claim 

1 “require performance of the same basic process” of data transfer using a server. Smart Sys. 

Innovations, 873 F.3d at 1368 n.7. Claim 6 appends nothing more than an identificatory label to 

the server, which does not defeat the basic idea that the two claims are directed to the same idea of 

using a server in the process of data transfer. Therefore, claim 1 is still representative of claim 6.

Likewise, claim 8 depends from claim 7, which depends from claim 5, which depends from claim 

1. Claim 8 discloses the use of a user ID with retrieving data from the server. However, claim 8 

does not differ from the same basic process as claim 1 because claim 1 also discloses retrieving 

data from the server. Claim 8, like claim 6, merely adds an identificatory label to the process of 

retrieving data from the server, which does not change the basic process of retrieving data from 

the server. Thus, claim 1 is representative of claim 8.

In sum, claim 1 is representative of the claims of the ’541 Patent. Next, the Court conducts 

the Alice analysis for claim 1 of the ’541 Patent.

B. Alice Step One for Claim 1 of the ’541 Patent—Whether the Claim is Directed to 

an Abstract Idea

Defendant argues that the ’541 Patent is directed toward the abstract idea of “storing, 

formatting, transmitting, and retrieving data.” Mot. at 22. Plaintiff responds by arguing that the 

’541 Patent is not directed toward an abstract idea because the “claimed invention . . . is a 

technological solution for backing up and transferring data across different customer premises 

equipment (CPE)—a specialized solution to a specific problem that did not previously exist.” Opp. 

at 18. 

Step one of the Alice framework directs the Court to assess “whether the claims at issue are 

directed to [an abstract idea].” Alice, 573 U.S. at 218. The step one inquiry “applies a stage-one 

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filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a 

whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335 (citation omitted). Thus, 

the Court conducts its step one inquiry by first identifying what the “character as a whole” of 

claim 1 of the ’541 Patent is “directed to,” and then discussing whether this is an abstract idea. In 

distilling the character of a claim, the Court is careful not to express the claim’s focus at an unduly 

“high level of abstraction . . . untethered from the language of the claims,” but rather at a level 

consonant with the level of generality or abstraction expressed in the claims themselves. Enfish, 

822 F.3d at 1337; see also Thales Visionix, 850 F.3d at 1347 (“We must therefore ensure at step 

one that we articulate what the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step 

one inquiry is meaningful.”).

The Court finds that claim 1 of the ’541 Patent is directed to the abstract idea of 

transmitting and retrieving data. Claim 1 is straight-forward. It discloses (1) storing data at the 

mobile customer premises equipment (“CPE”); (2) formatting the data stored at the CPE; (3) 

transmitting the data with a user ID from the CPE across a mobile network to a server; (4) 

retrieving data stored in the server in response to either an expiration of time or a request from the 

CPE; and (5) transmitting the data to the CPE in multiple sequentially-numbered information 

signals. ’541 Patent at 10:52-11:4.

Claim 1 is abstract because first, it only discloses generalized steps to carry out generic 

computer functions, and second, because there are long-standing practices analogous to the 

claimed steps. 

1. Claim 1 Discloses Generalized Steps to Carry Out Generic Computer Functions

Claim 1 is not directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality. Rather, the 

Federal Circuit has recognized that “[g]eneralized steps to be performed on a computer using 

conventional computer activity are abstract.” RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 855 F.3d 

1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). For instance, the Federal Circuit 

found that a patent claim for taking digital images using a telephone, storing the images, then 

transmitting the images to a server which receives the images failed step one of Alice. TLI, 823 

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F.3d at 610, 612. In explaining why the patent claim failed step one of Alice, the TLI court wrote: 

Contrary to TLI’s arguments on appeal, the claims here are not 

directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality. Rather, 

they are directed to the use of conventional or generic technology in 

a nascent but well-known environment . . . . The specification does 

not describe a new telephone, a new server, or a new physical 

combination of the two. The specification fails to provide any 

technical details for the tangible components, but instead 

predominantly describes the system and methods in purely functional 

terms. For example, the “telephone unit” of the claims is described as 

having “the standard features of a telephone unit” . . . . Likewise, the 

server is described simply in terms of performing generic computer 

functions such as storing, receiving, and extracting data.

Id. In essence, the TLI court found that because the TLI patent’s specification failed to provide 

technical details for the components, but instead described the system and methods “in purely 

functional terms,” functions that were generic to a computer, the TLI patent claim failed step one 

of Alice. Id.

The ’541 Patent’s specification concedes that the methods, which are described in purely 

functional terms, are generic to a computer. Moreover, what little tangible components are 

disclosed in claim 1 are entirely generic computing components. 

First, the disclosed CPE is a generic computer. The specification gives examples of CPEs: 

“mobile devices such as cell phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), iPodsTM and

MP3TM digital recorders (collectively known as CPEs).” ’541 Patent at 2:64-66. In the background 

of the invention, the Patent discloses “cell phones, iPods, MP3 players, pagers, personal digital 

assistants (PDA), even personal computers” as devices well known in the prior art as they have 

become more “personalized” over time. Id. at 1:19-22. The specification provides no additional 

detail as to whether the CPEs are customized or specialized computing devices. Rather, the 

specification uses a cellphone as an example of a CPE without ever specifying whether the 

cellphone is a specialized computing device. See, e.g., id. at 3:1-2 (“A CPE [] such as a cell phone 

is part of a mobile communications network [].”). Thus, like the TLI patent, the ’541 Patent fails to 

provide technical details for the tangible components of the claim, such as the CPE.

Second, the process of formatting the data stored at the CPE invokes generic computing 

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devices. The specification admits that “[f]ormatting is performed by [the] CPE,” id. at 5:50-51, 

and as discussed above, the CPE is a generic computing device. Moreover, the process of 

formatting the data is conventional and well-known in the art. Claim 1 discloses that the process of 

formatting the data consists of “tagging” data that “correspond to a respective data field.” Id. at 

10:57-59. However, the patent specification concedes that as “known in the art, the structure of the 

data may identify each element type by using unique tags for the different record types. . . . By 

utilizing a unified tag and data structure, the methodology and system enables different types of 

CPE to interpret the data structure accordingly.” Id. at 3:34-42 (emphasis added). Thus, the Patent 

itself concedes that the process of tagging data that correspond to a respective data field was 

known in the art, and thus conventional. Claims that are “directed to the use of conventional or 

generic technology” are abstract. TLI, 823 F.3d at 612.

Third, the process of transmitting the data with a user ID from the CPE across a mobile 

network to a server is known in the art and generic. The specification admits that “communication 

methods, as known in the art, may be utilized to transmit the data between CPE 101 and server 

104.” ’541 Patent at 3:45-47 (emphasis added). Further, use of a user ID in conjunction with the 

transmission of data is hardly a specific improvement on computer functionality or a 

nongeneralized computer activity. The specification vaguely and generally defines user ID as “an 

identifier . . . to identify the device for which data is being backed up.” Id. at 3:24-25. Per the 

Content Extraction court, the “concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly 

well-known.” 776 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis added). Moreover, the mobile network is generic, as 

disclosed in the specification. ’541 Patent at 3:2-3 (“As is known in the art, mobile network 102 

has an access point at a switch 103.”). The Patent neither adds any more specificity nor discloses 

any improvement on the mobile network to render it a non-generic mobile network. Furthermore, 

the server is also a generic server. See, e.g., id. at 2:1-2 (“The remote server receives data from the 

CPE for remote storage by the server.”); id. at 2:20-21 (“The server collects the data and stores 

it.”); id. at 5:10-13 (“[S]erver 104 could easily be another CPE, either inside or outside of network 

102, or a server located within network 102 communicating with the target CPE across a mobile 

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network.”); see also TLI, 823 F.3d at 611 (recitation of a generic “server” “merely provide[d] a 

generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea”). Plaintiff even admits in the 

opposition that servers “may have been known” in the prior art. Opp. at 19. Thus, though the 

server is a tangible element of the claim, its conventional and generic nature does not lift the claim 

out of abstractness.

Fourth, claim 1 proceeds to claim retrieving data stored in the server in response to either 

an expiration of time or a request from the CPE. The data is then transmitted to the CPE in 

multiple sequentially-numbered information signals. The concept of data retrieval from a server is 

generalized computer activity. Courts have held that the “abstract ideas . . . of collecting, storing, 

and retrieving data [have been] found patent-ineligible in several recent cases.” Encyclopaedia 

Britannica, Inc. v. Dickstein Shapiro LLP, 128 F. Supp. 3d 103, 112 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Content 

Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347); see also buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (“[R]eceiv[ing] and send[ing] 

information over a network . . . is not even arguably inventive.”). For instance, in Content 

Extraction, the Federal Circuit invalidated patent claims “drawn to the abstract idea of 1) 

collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that 

recognized data in a memory” because “[t]he concept of data collection, recognition, and storage 

is indisputably well-known.” 776 F.3d at 1347.

Moreover, in West View Research, LLC v. Audi AG, the Federal Circuit held that claims 

that “do not go beyond receiving or collecting data queries, analyzing the data query, retrieving 

and processing the information constituting a response to the initial data query, and generating a 

visual or audio response to the initial data query” were directed to the abstract idea of collecting 

and analyzing information. 685 Fed. App’x 923, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).

Furthermore, according to the Patent’s specification, the idea of using a timer to control data 

retrieval is conventional. Specifically, the generic “server 104 stores time periods.” ’541 Patent at 

7:29-30. The “timer may be . . . on a daily basis, weekly basis or monthly basis as preferred by the 

user/subscriber.” Id. at 7:33-35. Similarly, the Federal Circuit has also held as invalid claims 

directed to “sending information back and forth, at specified time intervals or in sequence.” 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). 

Furthermore, the ’541 Patent specification describes as conventional the process of initiating the 

data retrieval process as a request from the CPE. The specification discloses that when a CPE 

initiates a request for data retrieval, it can take the form of “more conventional methods such as 

the dialing of a 1-800 call center number or logging on to a website. . . . This request may come 

directly from utilizing the CPE as is known in the art or may come from the user’s own 

conventional computer or conventional telephone or any other third party telephone.” ’541 Patent 

at 9:9-18 (emphasis added). Lastly, the transmission of data in multiple sequentially-numbered 

signals is a known process. The specification discloses that the data to be transmitted “in 

connection with IP protocol transfer, [can be] portioned into packets for transmission” and then 

these packets “are transported in one or more info signals.” Id. at 4:14-22. However, the 

specification expressly acknowledges that data transfer via IP protocol was known in the art: 

“Depending on the type of device, communications methods, as known in the art, may be utilized 

to transmit the data between CPE 101 and server 104. For example, . . . internet protocol 

connection[s may be used]. . . . As is known in the art, these techniques may be used to send any 

type of data request or data signal.” Id. at 3:45-55 (emphasis added). 

Claim 1 is similar to other claims the Federal Circuit has found to be directed to abstract 

ideas. For instance, in Two-Way Media, the claim in question was directed to “first processing the 

data, then routing it, [and] controlling it.” 874 F.3d at 1339. This was done in the context of 

“transmitting message packets over a communications network.” Id. at 1334. Here, claim 1 

discloses a similar structure to the Two-Way Media claim. First, data is processed by formatting 

the data stored at the CPE. Then, data is routed by transmitting the data from the CPE across a 

mobile network to a server. Lastly, data is controlled by retrieving data from the server and 

transmitting it to the CPE, a process controlled by either an expiration of time or a request from 

the CPE.

In addition, claim 1 is similar to the claims in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec 

Corp., 234 F. Supp. 3d 601 (D. Del. 2017), aff’d, 725 Fed. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In 

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Symantec, the claims were directed to “copying data from one location to another several times 

and sending a confirmation that the data has been received.” Id. at 607. Here, data is processed and 

copied from one location, the CPE, to be received at another location, the server. Instead of merely 

sending a confirmation signal when data is received at the remote location as the Symantec claims 

recite, the server can send data back to the CPE in the data retrieval process. The Symantec court 

found the claims to be abstract because “the focus of the claims is the abstract idea of backing up 

data.” Id. According to Symantec, it is “undisputed that institutions have long backed up data in 

general.” Id.

In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Federal Circuit has “confirmed that 

improvements to data storage and computer memory systems . . . are patent eligible.” Opp. at 18. 

Specifically, Plaintiff cites Visual Memory, 867 F.3d at 1259. However, Visual Memory is 

inapposite. The Visual Memory claims were directed to a “computer memory system.” Id. The 

Visual Memory claims “focus on a specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities—the 

use of programmable operational characteristics that are configurable based on the processor—

instead of on a process that qualifies as an abstract idea for which computers are invoked merely 

as a tool.” Id. at 1259-60 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, claim 1 does not focus on an 

improvement in computer capability, but rather, just the opposite. The tangible computing devices

found in claim 1—the CPE and the server—are nothing but generic, as the ’541 Patent’s 

specification has shown. The server is merely a tool with which the data storage and retrieval 

process from the generic CPE is accomplished. See, e.g., ’541 Patent at 4:61-62 (“As discussed 

above, server 104 stores the data in an organized manipulatable form.”); see also TLI, 823 F.3d at 

611 (holding that a server designed to store “digital images in an organized manner” was generic). 

There is nothing in claim 1 to indicate that the server or the CPE are improvements on prior art 

servers and CPEs. 

Moreover, Plaintiff cites Enfish, which dealt with claims directed to “a specific type of data 

structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory,” and held 

that the claims were not abstract. 822 F.3d at 1339. However, similar to Visual Memory, the Enfish

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“claims are directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a problem.” Id. Here, as 

discussed in reference to Visual Memory, claim 1 is not directed to a “specific implementation” of 

any of the claim elements and tangible computing components. Id. Rather, claim 1 discloses wellknown steps to be executed on generic computing devices. Thus, claim 1 is set apart from the

Enfish claims by the lack of specificity of the claim language and the generic nature of the claim 

elements.

In sum, the Federal Circuit has held that “[g]eneralized steps to be performed on a 

computer using conventional computer activity are abstract.” RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1326. All 

of the aforementioned steps are, according to the specification and case law, conventional 

computer activity. Moreover, these steps are performed on generic computing devices such as a 

CPE and server, and there is no evidence from the specification that these computing devices are 

anything but generic. Notably, Plaintiff’s opposition fails to cite anything from the claim or 

specification that would indicate otherwise.

2. There are Long-Standing Practices Analogous to the Claimed Steps

Claim 1 is also abstract because as the specification discloses, there are long-standing 

practices analogous to the claimed steps. Steps that can be performed by a human without a 

computer are abstract. See, e.g., Mortg. Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324 (claims for computerimplemented system to enable borrowers to shop for loan packages anonymously were abstract 

where “[t]he series of steps covered by the asserted claims . . . could all be performed by humans 

without a computer”); Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 (finding claims abstract where 

“humans have always performed these functions”). 

Here, the specification acknowledges that as “electronic devices such as cell phones, iPods, 

MP3 players, pagers, personal digital assistants (PDA), even personal computers have become 

more and more personalized, they are used to store more and more user-specific data.” ’541 Patent 

at 1:19-22. The specification admits that “[t]he creation of many of these databases, such as 

address or calendar, is time intensive requiring manual uploading at the device, such as utilizing 

the keypad of the telephone in the cell phone example, or the keypad of the PDA in the PDA 

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example to enter each address or calendar event.” Id. at 1:30-34 (emphasis added). In essence, the 

specification admits that a human being can manually transfer data from one CPE to another CPE

through manual entry, via the keypad, of a cellphone or a PDA. Though at first glance, there 

appears to be no server on which data is uploaded, this would ignore the role the human being 

plays in the process of transferring data on CPEs. The human mind essentially acts as the server, a

central clearinghouse for data that stores data from a CPE to be retrieved and transmitted to a CPE. 

Though the data transfer process may be tedious as the calendar or address database may contain 

many entries, the Federal Circuit has held that “mere automation of manual processes using 

generic computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.” Credit 

Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Univ. of Fla.

Res. Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1367 (“On its face, the ’251 patent seeks to 

automate ‘pen and paper methodologies’ to conserve human resources and minimize errors. This 

is a quintessential ‘do it on a computer’ patent . . . . We have held such claims are directed to 

abstract ideas”). Thus, claim 1 can be performed manually by a human being.

Plaintiff’s opposition argues that no “human or store has ever physically transmitted data . 

. . across a mobile network to a remote storage server, and then physically retrieved the data on 

command or on a periodic basis.” Opp. at 18-19. Though true, Plaintiff’s point misses the mark. 

So long as the underlying process claimed in the patent can be performed manually by a human, 

that is enough to find that a patent is directed toward an abstract idea. It does not matter that a 

human cannot wirelessly transmit and retrieve data. Indeed, in Content Extraction, the Federal 

Circuit rejected such an argument. The Content Extraction plaintiff argued that “because human 

minds are unable to process and recognize the stream of bits output by a scanner,” the “claims are 

not drawn to an abstract idea.” 776 F.3d at 1347. The Content Extraction court gave no regard to 

the fact that the claims recited computing devices, and still found the claims abstract because the 

claims were “drawn to the basic concept of data recognition and storage.” Id. The Content 

Extraction court stripped away the computing devices in the claims and found that the “basic 

concept” of the claims was abstract. Id. Here, stripping away the computing devices such as a 

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server and a mobile network, the fundamental steps recited by claim 1—storing data, transmitting 

data, and retrieving data—can all be performed by a human manually reading the data stored on a 

CPE, remembering it, then reentering the data back into a CPE. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. The Court next 

analyzes Alice step two.

C. Alice Step Two for Claim 1 of the ’541 Patent—Whether the Claim Contains an 

Inventive Concept

Defendant argues that claim 1’s elements were well-known in the art and use only “basic 

known functions of a mobile phone or PDA,” and thus do not transform the abstract idea into a 

patentable claim. Mot. at 22. On the other hand, Plaintiff argues that “the combination of the 

components, how they interact, and the purpose for which they were combined, as disclosed in the 

’541 Patent, were unconventional and novel.” Opp. at 19. 

“In step two of the Alice inquiry, [the Court] search[es] for an ‘inventive concept sufficient 

to transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.” RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 

1327 (quoting McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “To save the patent 

at step two, an inventive concept must be evident in the claims.” Id. This inventive concept “must 

be significantly more than the abstract idea itself,” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1349; “must be more 

than well-understood, routine, conventional activity,” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, 

LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016); “and cannot simply be an instruction to implement or

apply the abstract idea on a computer.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1349. For example, it may be found 

in an “inventive set of components or methods,” “inventive programming,” or an inventive 

approach in “how the desired result is achieved.” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1355. “If a 

claim’s only ‘inventive concept’ is the application of an abstract idea using conventional and wellunderstood techniques, the claim has not been transformed into a patent-eligible application of an 

abstract idea.” BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

The Court finds that none of the claim’s elements, assessed individually, provides an 

inventive concept. Claim 1 discloses: (1) storing data at the mobile customer premises equipment 

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(“CPE”); (2) formatting the data stored at the CPE; (3) transmitting the data with a user ID from 

the CPE across a mobile network to a server; (4) retrieving data stored in the server in response to 

either an expiration of time or a request from the CPE; and (5) transmitting the data to the CPE in 

multiple sequentially-numbered information signals. ’541 Patent at 10:52-11:4.

As discussed above, none of claim 1’s elements are unique to the ’541 Patent. In fact, the 

patent specification confirms that the ’541 Patent did not invent the limitations found in claim 1. 

For instance, the specification acknowledges that the Patent did not invent CPEs. The 

specification gives examples of conventional CPEs: “mobile devices such as cell phones, personal 

digital assistants (PDAs), iPodsTM and MP3TM digital recorders (collectively known as CPEs).” Id.

at 2:64-66.

Moreover, the specification confirms that the process of formatting the data stored at the 

CPE was known in the art. The specification admits that “[f]ormatting is performed by [the] CPE,” 

id. at 5:50-51, and as discussed above, the CPE is a generic computing device. Also, claim 1 

discloses that the process of formatting the data consists of “tagging” data that “correspond to a 

respective data field.” Id. at 10:57-59. However, the patent specification concedes that “[a]s 

known in the art, the structure of the data may identify each element type by using unique tags for 

the different record types. . . . By utilizing a unified tag and data structure, the methodology and 

system enables different types of CPE to interpret the data structure accordingly.” Id. at 3:34-42 

(emphasis added). Thus, the Patent itself concedes that the process of tagging data that correspond 

to a respective data field was known in the art, and thus conventional.

Furthermore, transmitting data with a user ID, which is vaguely defined in the specification 

as “an identifier . . . to identify the device for which data is being backed up,” is hardly anything

more than well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Use of an identifier in conjunction with 

data transfer is routine. Per the Content Extraction court, the “concept of data collection, 

recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known.” 776 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis added). The 

specification also admits that “communication methods, as known in the art, may be utilized to 

transmit the data between CPE 101 and server 104.” ’541 Patent at 3:45-47 (emphasis added). In 

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addition, the server is also a standard, well-known server. See, e.g., id. at 2:1-2 (“The remote 

server receives data from the CPE for remote storage by the server.”); id. at 2:20-21 (“The server 

collects the data and stores it.”); id. at 5:10-13 (“[S]erver 104 could easily be another CPE, either 

inside or outside of network 102, or a server located within network 102 communicating with the 

target CPE across a mobile network.”). Moreover, the mobile network is generic, as disclosed in 

the specification. Id. at 3:2-3 (“As is known in the art, mobile network 102 has an access point at a 

switch 103.”).

Finally, claim 1 proceeds to claim retrieving data stored in the server in response to either 

an expiration of time or a request from the CPE. The data is then transmitted to the CPE in 

multiple sequentially-numbered information signals. Courts have found that “collecting, storing, 

and retrieving data [have been] found patent-ineligible in several recent cases.” Encyclopaedia 

Britannica, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 112 (citing Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347). For instance, in 

Content Extraction, the Federal Circuit invalidated patent claims “drawn to the abstract idea of 1) 

collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that 

recognized data in a memory” because “[t]he concept of data collection, recognition, and storage 

is indisputably well-known.” 776 F.3d at 1347. Furthermore, according to the Patent’s 

specification, the idea of using a timer to control data retrieval is conventional. Specifically, the 

“server 104 stores time periods.” ’541 Patent at 7:29-30. The “timer may be . . . on a daily basis, 

weekly basis or monthly basis as preferred by the user/subscriber.” Id. at 7:33-35. Similarly, the 

Federal Circuit has also held as invalid claims directed to “sending information back and forth, at 

specified time intervals or in sequence.” Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1332-33 (emphasis added). 

Also, the specification describes as conventional the process of initiating the data retrieval process 

as a request from the CPE. Specifically, when a CPE initiates a request for data retrieval, it can 

take the form of “more conventional methods such as the dialing of a 1-800 call center number or 

logging on to a website. . . . This request may come directly from utilizing the CPE as is known in 

the art or may come from the user’s own conventional computer or conventional telephone or any 

other third party telephone.” ’541 Patent at 9:9-18 (emphasis added). Lastly, the transmission of 

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data in multiple sequentially-numbered signals is a conventional process. The specification 

discloses that the data to be transmitted “in connection with IP protocol transfer, [can be] 

portioned into packets for transmission” and then these packets “are transported in one or more 

info signals.” Id. at 4:14-22. However, the specification expressly acknowledges that data transfer 

via IP protocol was known in the art: “Depending on the type of device, communications methods, 

as known in the art, may be utilized to transmit the data between CPE 101 and server 104. For 

example, . . . internet protocol connection[s may be used]. . . . As is known in the art, these 

techniques may be used to send any type of data request or data signal.” Id. at 3:45-55 (emphasis 

added).

Thus, none of claim 1’s elements, assessed individually, provides an inventive concept. 

After all, “[i]nstructing one to ‘apply’ an abstract idea and reciting no more than generic computer 

elements performing generic computer tasks does not make an abstract idea patent-eligible.” 

Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d at 1368. Moreover, the ordered combination of these elements also 

does not yield an inventive concept. In BASCOM, the Federal Circuit held that “an inventive 

concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, 

conventional pieces.” 827 F.3d at 1350. However, the arrangement of claim 1’s elements are 

conventional, as evidenced by Dealertrack and Two-Way Media.

In Dealertrack, the claims were directed to “receiving data from one source[,] . . . 

selectively forwarding the data . . . and forwarding reply data to the first source.” 674 F.3d at 

1333. Similarly here, claim 1 discloses that a mobile network receives data from CPE, forwards 

the CPE data to the server, then forwards data sent back from the server to the CPE when some 

predetermined time interval expires or upon request from the CPE. The fact that this data 

forwarding process in Dealertrack was “computer-aided” did not make it any more patent-eligible. 

Id. Thus, the Dealertrack court invalidated the claims.

In Two-Way Media, the claim in question was directed to “first processing the data, then 

routing it, [and] controlling it.” 874 F.3d at 1339. This was done in the context of “transmitting 

message packets over a communications network.” Id. at 1334. Here, claim 1 discloses a similar 

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structure to the Two-Way Media claim. First, data is processed by formatting the data stored at the 

CPE. Then, data is routed by transmitting the data from the CPE across a mobile network to a 

server. Lastly, data is controlled by retrieving data from the server and transmitting it to the CPE, 

a process controlled by either an expiration of time or a request from the CPE. The Two-Way 

Media court invalidated the claim, called the ordering of claim elements a “conventional ordering 

of steps . . . with conventional technology to achieve its desired result.” Id. Thus, claim 1’s 

elements are also a conventional ordering of steps.

Therefore, claim 1 of the ’541 Patent does not contain an inventive concept. The Court 

finds that at Alice step one, claim 1 of the ’541 Patent is directed to an abstract idea. At Alice step 

two, there is no inventive concept sufficient to save the claim. Thus, the Court concludes that the 

’541 Patent is directed to unpatentable subject matter under § 101. Next, the Court addresses 

whether there are open factual issues that preclude dismissal on the pleadings.

D. Whether there Exist Factual Questions that Preclude Resolution of the Instant 

Motion under Rule 12

Plaintiff’s opposition cites disclosures in the complaint that purportedly preclude 

resolution of the instant motion under Rule 12. Opp. at 21-22. For instance, Plaintiff vaguely 

alleges that the “claim elements, individually or in combination, are unconventional.” Id. at 22 

Likewise, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he solutions described and claimed in the ’541 Patent 

represented a significant advance over existing approaches and were not well-known, routine, or 

conventional in the field at the time the application leading to the ’541 Patent was filed.” Id.

However, there are no specific factual allegations or references to the ’541 Patent claims that 

undergird Plaintiff’s purported fact questions cited in Plaintiff’s opposition. 

Under Federal Circuit law, “[w]hether a claim recites patent eligible subject matter is a 

question of law which . . . has in many cases been resolved on motions to dismiss or summary 

judgment.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “As our cases 

demonstrate, not every § 101 determination contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts 

material to the § 101 inquiry.” Id.

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In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc., the court found the patent at issue invalid even though 

the plaintiff insisted there were factual disputes precluding judgment on the pleadings. 2018 WL 

2287675, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2018). The Uniloc court rejected plaintiff’s contentions that the 

claimed invention did not feature “routine and conventional elements like hardware 

configurations.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Uniloc court reasoned that the plaintiff was 

attempting to “manufacture a factual question” by relying on attorney arguments found in the 

complaint. Id. Here, the situation is analogous to that in Uniloc. Plaintiff can merely point to 

attorney argument found in the complaint as grounds for why claimed elements are not routine or 

conventional. Thus, per the Uniloc court, Plaintiff’s attorney arguments in the amended complaint 

do not create a factual dispute precluding disposition of the instant case on a Rule 12 motion. 

Moreover, under Federal Circuit law, the Alice inquiry must focus on the claim language. 

See, e.g., Accenture, 728 F.3d at 1345 (“[T]he important inquiry for a § 101 analysis is to look to 

the claim.”); CMG Fin. Servs., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 3d 1306, 1326 (“None of the elements in these 

Claims limit the level of their inherent abstraction.”), aff’d, 616 Fed. App’x 420 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

“In some cases, when improvements in the specification are captured in the claims, whether an 

element or combination of elements is well-understood becomes a question of fact.” Symantec 

Corp. v. Zscaler, Inc., 2018 WL 3539269, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2018) (citing Berkheimer, 881 

F.3d at 1368-69) (emphasis added). Here, attorney argument cannot save the Patent because the 

purported improvements over the prior art have not been captured in the claim language.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ’541 Patent is directed to unpatentable 

subject matter and is thus invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court therefore GRANTS 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 4, 2019

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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