Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01693/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01693-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 42:1471 Declaratory &amp; Injunctive Relief - Foreclosure Sale

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Vicky S. Benson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Daren W. Jantz; Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, 

Inc., et al. 

 Defendants. 

NO. CV-12-1693-PHX-FJM 

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Amended Ex Parte Application for 

Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 6). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s 

motion will be denied. 

 The instant action is Plaintiff Vicky S. Benson’s third attempt to obtain federal 

relief from state-court eviction proceedings. On July 16, 2012, Plaintiff removed an 

eviction action brought against her in Hassayampa Justice Court to this Court. See Jantz 

v. Seitz, et. al, 2:12-cv-01532-SRB, Doc. 1, Ex. 1. On July 23, 2012, the Court remanded 

the action back to the justice court, holding that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over 

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the state law eviction action. See id., Doc. 4. On July 25, 2012, Plaintiff again removed 

the eviction action to this Court and at the same time moved for a temporary restraining 

order. The Court again remanded the action back to the justice court for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction and denied the TRO request as moot. 

Plaintiff now tries a new tack. On August 9, 2012, she filed the Complaint in this 

action against various “owners of plaintiff’s real property” and against Defendant Joseph 

Arpaio, the Sheriff of Maricopa County. (Doc. 1). In her Complaint, Plaintiff brings 

claims against the owners of her property for negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, 

wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quiet title, slander of title, 

and RICO violations. (Id.). In addition, Plaintiff brings claims against Sheriff Arpaio for 

civil rights violations under 18 U.S.C. § 242 arising from his alleged continuation of 

eviction proceedings “while KNOWING of a valid removal [to federal court] to be in 

place and existing.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 126). 

Also on August 9, Plaintiff moved for an ex parte TRO. Plaintiff argued in the 

TRO that Defendants refuse to relinquish jurisdiction over her eviction proceedings to the 

federal court and that they must be forced to relinquish such jurisdiction or else she “will 

be wrongfully removed from her single family home.” (Doc. 3 at 3). Because Plaintiff 

had not notified Defendants of her TRO request, and because she had failed to explain 

why notice should not be provided as required by Rule 65(b), the Court denied her 

motion for an ex parte TRO “without prejudice to her filing it again in compliance with 

the rule.” (Doc. 5 at 2). 

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Now Plaintiff has filed an amended TRO application. Although the amended 

application itself is virtually unchanged from her initial application, she has attached a 

notarized “Declaration” in which she details various damages that Defendants have 

allegedly caused her. (Doc. 6 at 6–10). This declaration does not, however, explain why 

Defendants cannot be provided with notice of her TRO application. This alone renders 

her request for an ex parte TRO invalid. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(B) (stating that the 

court may issue a TRO without giving the defendants notice “only if” the movant 

“certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be 

required”). 

Moreover, to prevail on her TRO application, Plaintiff must establish four 

elements, including that she “is likely to succeed on the merits, that [s]he is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities 

tips in h[er] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat’l Res. 

Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Although these elements are evaluated using a 

sliding scale approach, where likelihood of success is concerned a plaintiff must at least 

raise “serious questions going to the merits.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 

632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has failed to raise serious questions 

going to the merits. Plaintiff states in her TRO application that that she seeks the TRO 

because the state court and state authorities have engaged in “[w]illful, intentional refusal 

to relinquish jurisdiction” over her eviction proceedings to federal court. (Doc. 6 at 2). As 

discussed above, however, the eviction action was remanded back to state court and state 

authorities have no discretion to decline a remand order. 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Ex Parte Application 

for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 6) is DENIED.

 Dated this 14th day of August, 2012. 

Case 2:12-cv-01693-FJM Document 8 Filed 08/14/12 Page 4 of 4