Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01550/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01550-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Hugo Rosales, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-1550-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Hugo Rosales Tamayo, which 

challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 12.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms that decision. 

BACKGROUND

 On January 17, 2008, Rosales applied for a period of disability and disability 

insurance benefits, as well as supplemental security income, alleging a disability onset 

date of May 16, 2007. (R. at 15.) Rosales’s date last insured (“DLI”) for disability 

insurance benefits, and thus the date on or before which he must have been disabled, was 

December 31, 2011. (Id. at 17.) Rosales’s claim was denied both initially and upon 

reconsideration. (Id. at 15.) Rosales then appealed to an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”). (Id.) The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter in Yuma, Arizona on July 7, 

2010. (Id.) 

 In evaluating whether Rosales was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step 

Case 2:12-cv-01550-GMS Document 17 Filed 04/08/13 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

sequential evaluation for determining disability.1 (Id. at 16–17.) At step one, the ALJ 

determined that Rosales had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged 

onset date. (Id. at 17.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Rosales suffered from the 

severe impairments of status post C5-C6 anterior decompression discectomy and fusion 

and status post plantar fasciotomy. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that none of 

these impairments, either alone or in combination, met or equaled any of the Social 

Security Administration’s listed impairments. (Id. at 20.) 

At that point, the ALJ made a determination of Rosales’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”),2

 concluding that Rosales could perform the full range of sedentary 

work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). (Id.) The ALJ thus determined 

at step four that Rosales did not retain the RFC to perform his past relevant work as a 

 1

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. '

404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. ' 416.920 (governing 

supplemental security income). Under the test: 

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she 

is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) 

that her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets 

or equals one of the specific impairments described in the 

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of 

the specific impairments described in the regulations, the 

claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by 

proving at step four that in addition to the first two 

requirements, she is not able to perform any work that she has 

done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five to 

demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five 

determination is made on the basis of four factors: the 

claimant=s residual functional capacity, age, work experience 

and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

2

 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his 

impairments. See S.S.R. 96-8p (July 2, 1996). 

Case 2:12-cv-01550-GMS Document 17 Filed 04/08/13 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

seafood processor, production line worker, laborer, dishwasher, or cook. (Id. at 22.) The 

ALJ therefore reached step five, determining that Rosales could perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy that met his RFC limitations. (Id. at 23.) 

Given this analysis, the ALJ concluded that Rosales was not disabled. (Id.) 

The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (Id. at 1.) The Council 

accepted the ALJ’s statements of the law, the issues in the case, and the evidentiary facts, 

as well as the ALJ’s findings and ultimate conclusions regarding whether Rosales was 

disabled. (Id.) The Council thereupon agreed that Rosales was not disabled. (Id.) 

Rosales filed the complaint underlying this action on July 19, 2012, seeking this 

Court’s review of the ALJ’s denial of benefits.3

 (Doc. 1.) Rosales filed an opening brief 

and the Commissioner filed a response brief, but Rosales declined to file a reply brief. 

(Docs. 12, 16.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review 

 A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 

which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

 3

 Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g) (“Any 

individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a 

hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 

action . . . .”). 

Case 2:12-cv-01550-GMS Document 17 Filed 04/08/13 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the 

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either 

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 

 Harmless errors in the ALJ’s decision do not warrant reversal. Stout v. Comm’r, 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2006). Errors are harmless if they are 

“inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 

1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)). Thus, for example, an error is harmless if the record shows 

that “the ALJ would have reached the same result absent the error” or “it was clear [the 

errors] did not alter the ALJ’s decision.” Id. “[T]he burden of showing that an error is 

harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. 

Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009). 

II. Analysis

Rosales argues that the ALJ erred by: (A) failing to consider the opinion of Dr. 

Horowitch, Rosales’s treating physician (Doc. 12 at 4–5), and (B) failing to consider a 

closed period of disability for Rosales (id. at 6–7). The Court will address each argument 

in turn. 

A. Failure to Consider Dr. Horowitch’s Opinion

“The medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is entitled to special 

weight.” Walter v. Astrue, No. CV-09-1016-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 1511666 at *7 (D. 

Ariz. Apr. 15, 2010) (citing Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1989)) 

(internal quotations omitted). This is because the treating physician “is employed to cure 

and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual.” Andrews 

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 1995). However, “the opinion of the treating 

physician is not necessarily conclusive as to either the physical condition or the ultimate 

issue of disability.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 

Case 2:12-cv-01550-GMS Document 17 Filed 04/08/13 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1999). If medical evidence conflicts, it is the ALJ’s job to “determine credibility and 

resolve the conflict.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). If the ALJ 

chooses to reject the opinion of a treating physician, she must make “findings setting 

forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the 

record.” 

Here, Dr. Horowitch, Rosales’s treating physician, recommended in October 2007 

that Rosales stop working for one month. (R. at 391.) Later, in December 2007, Dr. 

Horowitch described Rosales as “temporarily totally disabled” and likely to remain so for 

several weeks after his scheduled surgery. (Id. at 393.) Rosales argues that Dr. 

Horowitch’s opinion is “worthy of controlling weight” and that the ALJ erred when she 

“ignore[d]” Dr. Horowitch’s findings. 

As an initial matter, the ALJ did not ignore the medical records from Dr. 

Horowitch. The ALJ discussed Dr. Horowitch’s assessment of Rosales during Step 2, 

when she was determining what severe impairments Rosales had. (R. at 18.) However, 

Rosales is correct that the ALJ did not mention Dr. Horowitch’s opinion in determining 

Rosales’ RFC. Assuming that the ALJ’s silence amounts to a rejection of Dr. 

Horowitch’s opinion, this rejection was not accompanied by “specific, legitimate reasons 

. . . based on substantial evidence in the record” and thus the ALJ committed error. 

Even if the ALJ committed error, however, the burden falls on Rosales to prove 

that he was harmed by her error. Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409. Rosales argues that the ALJ’s 

failure to consider Dr. Horowitch’s opinion “wrongfully avoids a finding that Mr. 

Rosales was not able to work and therefore disabled . . . .” (Doc. 12 at 5.) However, 

nothing in Dr. Horowitch’s opinion mandated or even strongly supported a finding that 

Rosales was disabled. The opinions were expressly limited in duration and at most 

support a finding that Rosales was unable to work for a month or two. A claimant must 

demonstrate an impairment preventing him from engaging in any substantial gainful 

activity for at least twelve consecutive months to show disability. 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(1)(A). Dr. Horowitch’s opinions regarding Rosales’s ability to work and “total 

Case 2:12-cv-01550-GMS Document 17 Filed 04/08/13 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

disability” did not cover a sufficiently lengthy period. As such, it does not appear that the 

ALJ would have reached a different result if she had expressly discussed Dr. Horowitch’s 

opinion in reaching the RFC determination. 

In addition, the ALJ discussed a number of other opinions in discussing Rosales’s 

RFC that would contradict any opinion that Rosales was unable to work. On July 25, 

2007, Dr. Zonis opined that Rosales should be able to return to work in about a month. 

(R. at 249.) On May 6, 2009, Dr. Ginsburg recommended that Rosales be re-trained in 

sedentary or light work, indicating his belief that Rosales would be capable of performing 

such work. (Id. at 422.) On June 2, 2010, Dr. Curry, another one of Rosales’s treating 

physicians, noted that Rosales had returned to school to learn skills for a job that would 

not require bending or lifting. (Id. at 452.) The ALJ also noted the assessment of Dr. 

Fina, a state agency physician, who opined on May 15, 2008 that Rosales could sit for six 

hours and stand or walk for four to five hours in a normal eight-hour workday. (Id. at 

305.) She also referred to the assessment of Kent Shafer, a vocational consultant, who 

recommended that Rosales “transition into more sedentary forms of employment.” (Id. at 

235.) The ALJ further mentioned the opinion of Dr. Becker, who evaluated that Rosales 

could tolerate full-time “work at the Light to Medium Level” on May 5, 2009. (Id. at 

423.) The ALJ also discussed the fact that, for five months during Rosales’s alleged 

disability period, he worked as a volunteer building houses for twenty hours a week. (Id.

at 43–45, 419.) 

Finally, as pointed out by the Commissioner, the ALJ’s ultimate RFC 

determination comports with the limitations set out by Dr. Horowitch. In opining that 

Rosales was likely to be “temporarily totally disabled” after his surgery, Dr. Horowitch 

also stated that Rosales would likely be permanently restricted from “[h]eavy lifting with 

repetitive lifting, bending, twisting, and stooping.” (Id. at 393.) Accordingly, the ALJ 

found that Rosales could perform sedentary work, which only occasionally requires 

lifting of no more than ten pounds at a time, does not require bending or twisting, and 

Case 2:12-cv-01550-GMS Document 17 Filed 04/08/13 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

only occasionally requires stooping. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567; Ownbey v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 

342, 344 (8th Cir. 1993). 

The ALJ’s determination that Rosales could perform the full range of sedentary 

work is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Though she erred in failing to 

discuss Dr. Horowitch’s opinion in making the RFC determination, she would have 

reached the same result absent the error. Thus, because the error was “inconsequential to 

the ultimate nondisability determination,” it is harmless and does not warrant vacating the 

ALJ’s decision. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. 

B. Failure to Consider a Closed Period of Disability 

Rosales contends that the ALJ erred in failing to consider his eligibility for a 

closed period of disability from May 16, 2007 to January 1, 2009. (Doc. 12 at 6.) Rosales 

asserts that the opinions to which the ALJ assigned significant weight were all dated after 

January 2009, when Rosales started volunteering to build houses on weekends. (Id.) 

The ALJ is required to consider a closed period of disability if evidence in the 

record supports a finding that a person is disabled for a period of not less than twelve 

months. See Reynoso v. Astrue, No. CV 10-04604-JEM, 2011 WL 2554210 at *3 (C.D. 

Cal. June 27, 2011); Johnson v. Astrue, No. CV07-7263SS, 2008 WL 5103230 at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2008). Here, Rosales does not affirmatively set forth any evidence that 

supports a finding that he was disabled for at least twelve months. Instead, he simply 

points out the fact that the evidence on which the ALJ relied occurred after a point in 

time that could be considered the end of a closed period of disability. 

In fact, the ALJ’s decision that Rosales was not impaired for a period of at least 

twelve months is supported by substantial evidence. As noted above, Dr. Horowitch 

opined in October and December of 2007 that any inability to work by Rosales should 

last no longer than a month or several weeks. (R. at 391, 393.) He also stated in 

September 2007 that Rosales should be able to do deskwork. (Id. at 390.) By September 

2008, Dr. Horowitch concluded that Rosales’s arm pain was gone and that he was only 

suffering from “a little neck pain.” (Id. at 379.) In addition, the ALJ considered evidence 

Case 2:12-cv-01550-GMS Document 17 Filed 04/08/13 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

from Dr. Zonis, who evaluated Rosales on July 25, 2007, and opined that Rosales could 

return to regular work in three to four weeks’ time. (R. at 249.) The ALJ also relied on 

evidence from Rosales’s physical therapist, who indicated in February and March of 

2008 that Rosales was continually showing “subjective and objective improvement.” (Id.

at 294, 297.) 

Thus, the ALJ did not err in failing to consider a closed period of disability. The 

evidence in the record does not support a conclusion that Rosales was disabled from May 

16, 2007 to January 1, 2009. The ALJ’s decision that Rosales was not disabled is 

supported by substantial evidence. 

CONCLUSION

 The ALJ made no error of law and there is substantial evidence to support the 

ALJ’s denial of benefits.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to 

TERMINATE this action and enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 8th day of April, 2013. 

Case 2:12-cv-01550-GMS Document 17 Filed 04/08/13 Page 8 of 8