Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01499/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01499-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKELLDRICK WHITE,

CDCR #BA-7413,

Plaintiff,

vs.

I. PEREZ, Correctional Officer; 

L. RODRIN, Correctional Officer; 

O. QUIONEZ, Correctional Officer; 

D. COLEMAN, Correctional Officer; 

S. CHAT, Correctional Officer; 

Q. JACKSON, Corrections Sergeant; 

V. ABDI, Corrections Sergeant; 

M. GONZALEZ, ISU Officer; 

BRADLEY, Registered Nurse,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01499-WQH-AHG

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE OF 

COMPLAINT, EXHIBITS AND 

SUMMONS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

Plaintiff Rickelldrick White, a transgender prisoner1currently incarcerated at 

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and 

proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

 

1 Because Plaintiff identifies as a transgender woman, the Court will use feminine pronouns

when referring to her. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6; see also Pl.’s Ex. B (“Meraz Decl.”), 

ECF No. 4 at 6-7.

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Plaintiff claims various prison officials at RJD violated her Eighth Amendment rights and 

intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her during an October 2, 2018, incident 

that resulted in multiple fractures to her left leg. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1-6; Ex. A 

(“Pl.’s Decl.”), ECF No. 4 at 3-4.

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when 

she filed her Complaint; instead, she has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). However, 

prisoners who are granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in 

“increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether their action is 

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) also requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . 

the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

 

2

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which her account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of her IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of her CDCR Inmate

Statement Report as well as a Prison Certificate completed by a trust account official at 

RJD. See ECF No. 3 at 1-3; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 

F.3d at 1119. These documents show Plaintiff carried an average monthly balance of 

$59.90 and maintained $29.67 in average monthly deposits to her trust account for the 6 

months preceding the filing of this action; but they also show she had an available 

balance of zero at the time of filing. See ECF No. 3 at 1, 3.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and 

assesses her initial partial filing fee to be $11.98 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The 

Court will direct the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect this initial filing 

fee only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s account at the time this Order is 

executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be 

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment 

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial 

partial filing fee”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case 

based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case must 

be collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to the Clerk of 

the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

///

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II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, her Complaint also requires a 

pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct,” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s],” fall short of meeting

///

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this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009).

Finally, in deciding whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief, the 

Court may consider exhibits attached, referred to, or incorporated by reference to her

Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to 

a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. 

v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[M]aterial which is properly 

submitted as part of the complaint may be considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss.)).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

In her Complaint, as well as in separate sworn declarations submitted in support, 

Plaintiff claims that on October 2, 2018, while she and her cellmate George Meraz were 

about to enter the dayroom of RJD’s Facility B at approximately 10:10 a.m., Plaintiff was 

stopped by Officer Perez, who informed her he was going to conduct a random clothed 

body search. See Pl.’s Decl., ECF No. 4 at 3. Plaintiff claims she complied with Perez’s 

instructions, turned, faced and placed her hands on the wall, and spread her legs. Id. Both 

Plaintiff and Meraz claim Perez began searching her by patting her down starting from 

her shoulders and working his way down to her ankles. Id.; see also Meraz Decl., ECF 

No. 4 at 6. Plaintiff contends Perez then repeated the search a second time, but “more 

aggressively,” before telling her he wanted to conduct a third unclothed body search in 

the unit sally port. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6; Pl.’s Decl., ECF No. 4 at 3.

Because she is transgender, Plaintiff “felt uncomfortable” and requested that a 

correctional sergeant supervise. Id. Instead, Plaintiff claims Perez “became very angry 

and hostile,” restrained her hands behind her back, and began to “man handle” her while 

leading her toward the sally port. Id. Once inside, Plaintiff contends Perez “slammed” her 

against the wall, “roughly twisted [her] from side to side,” “bear hug[ged]” her, then 

“slammed” her to cement ground, “causing a spiral fracture” in her left leg. See Compl., 

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ECF No. 1 at 5; Pl.’s Decl., ECF 4 at 3. Plaintiff began to scream and cry that her leg was 

broken, but Perez “continued to physically assault [her],” and “punched [her] in the back 

of [her] head and pull[ed] her hair,” while telling his partner, Officer Rodrin, to “call[] in 

a staff assault over his radio,” and activating his personal alarm. See Pl.’s Decl., ECF No. 

4 at 3; Meraz Decl., ECF No. 4 at 6. Both Plaintiff and Meraz claim she “fully complied” 

and “was not fighting back []or resisting in any way.” See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5; Meraz 

Decl., ECF No. 4 at 7. 

Afterwards, while Plaintiff was handcuffed, placed in leg irons, and lay prone on 

the ground with an “obviously swollen, painful, and deformed” leg, Sgt. Abdi asked 

Plaintiff if she could walk to an emergency transport vehicle (“ETV”). Plaintiff replied, 

“No!” and “continued to cry and scream that [her] leg was broken.” Compl., ECF No. 1 

at 7; Pl.’s Decl., ECF No. 4 at 4. Officer Chat then “picked [Plaintiff] up,” pulled and 

“thr[ew] [her] to the wall,” while repeatedly ordering her to “walk to the ETV on her own 

accord.” Id. Plaintiff claims she begged the other responding officers (Rodrin, Quionez, 

Coleman, Jackson, Abdi, Gonzalez, and RN Bradley) for help, but they “all just stood by 

and watched [her] drag [her] leg to the ETV in pain and tears.” See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 

7; Pl.’s Decl., ECF No. 4 at 4. After Plaintiff was unable to lift her leg into the rear of the 

ETV, Officer Gonzalez “grabbed the back of [her] shirt collar” and “drag[ged] her into 

the rear of the vehicle and onto [a] stretcher.” Id.

Plaintiff was then taken to the “T.T.A.” where a doctor ordered transfer to the 

emergency room for x-rays. See Pl.’s Decl., ECF No. 4 at 4. After the x-rays revealed 

“three separate fractures in [her] left leg,” Plaintiff was hospitalized and underwent 

emergency surgery during which a 10” metal plate and thirteen pins were implanted 

“throughout [her] left leg to hold it in place.” See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5; Pl.’s Decl., 

ECF No. 4 at 4. Plaintiff was subsequently housed in the prison infirmary for 31⁄2 months, 

and had her anti-depressant medication “increased to the max.” Id.

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint, together with the 

sworn declarations she has offered in support, contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted 

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as true,” to state Eighth Amendment claims for relief that are “plausible on [their] face,” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and therefore sufficient to survive the “low threshold” set for sua 

sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) 

(unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 

Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per 

curiam) (for claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the issue is 

“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7); United States 

v. Williams, 842 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016) (the Eighth Amendment “requires that 

prison officials ‘must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates’”); 

Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] prison official can violate a 

prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to intervene.”); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain”

or serious medical need may violate the Eighth Amendment if that indifference is alleged 

to have caused harm).

Therefore, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service of summons and 

Plaintiff’s Complaint on her behalf.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court 

shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or 

deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915.”).

///

///

 

3 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative 

of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may 

choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 

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III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $11.98 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available 

at the time this Order is executed, and to forward whatever balance remains of the full 

$350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s 

account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE 

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS 

ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph 

Diaz, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF 

No. 1) and to forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each 

named Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with certified copies of this 

Order, her Complaint, the exhibits she filed in support (ECF No. 4), and the summons so 

that she may serve the Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must 

complete the USM Form 285s as completely and accurately as possible, include an 

address where each named Defendant may be found and/or subject to service pursuant to 

S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1c., and return them to the United States Marshal according to the 

instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying her IFP package.

5. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon the Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to her. All 

costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).

///

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6. ORDERS Defendants, once they have been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s 

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be 

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has 

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), 

and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone 

that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendant is 

required to respond).

7. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendants, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ 

counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 

Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 

original document she seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the 

manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been was served on 

Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any 

document received by the Court that has not been properly filed with the Clerk or that

fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, or their counsel, may be 

disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 2, 2019

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