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Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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P L ·~ D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

United Stite!i Court "f Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

DONALD L. DARNELL, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

JESSIE L. CABALLERO; NATIONAL INDEMNITY) 

COMPANY; THOMAS AND WATSON TRUCKING ) 

COMPANY, INC., ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants, ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

APR 2 51991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-3128 

(D.C. No. C-88-1003) 

(D. Kan.) 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable John L. 

District Court for 

designation. 

Kane, Senior District Judge, United States 

the District of Colorado, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-3128 Document: 010110105157 Date Filed: 04/25/1991 Page: 1 
Defendants, Jessie L. Caballero, National Indemnity Company, 

and Thomas and Watson Trucking Company, Inc., appeal from a 

judgment based on an adverse jury verdict rendered in this civil 

diversity action. Plaintiff Donald L. Darnell brought suit 

following an automobile accident in which his vehicle collided 

with a semitruck driven by Caballero. The single issue on appeal 

is whether the district court erred in admitting certain testimony 

of the investigating police officer. We conclude there was no 

abuse of discretion and consequently affirm the district court 

judgment. 

I. 

On September 29, 1986, Caballero was driving a semitruck to 

Texas from Kansas following a load pick up.

1 While still in 

Kansas, Caballero missed an exit and determined he would need to 

turn around. He stopped his eighteen wheel semitruck at the 

intersection of a county road and Highway 183 near Greensburg, 

Kansas. While he was turning around on the highway, Darnell's 

vehicle struck his trailer. The accident occurred at 

approximately 9:00 p.m. Witnesses testified there was lessened 

visibility due to fog and mist. 

The investigating police officer at the scene following the 

accident was patrolman James Brooks. He arrived approximately one 

hour and twenty minutes after the accident occurred. His 

1 Defendant Thomas and Watson Trucking Company owned the truck 

and employed Jessie Caballero. National Indemnity Company is the 

insurer of the vehicle. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-3128 Document: 010110105157 Date Filed: 04/25/1991 Page: 2 
investigation included measuring the location of the vehicles and 

speaking with eyewitnesses. He filed a multipage report outlining 

his findings. 

Neither party disputes that prior to the time of the 

accident, Donald Darnell had consumed two or three bourbon drinks. 

Darnell and his passengers were returning home from a football 

game when the accident occurred. Officer Brooks' report noted a 

strong smell of alcohol in plaintiff's car, as well as on his 

breath. Later that night, Darnell's blood registered .17 percent 

alcohol content. 

At trial, the following colloquy took place during direct 

examination of officer Brooks: 

Q. At the conclusion of your investigation, and at the 

present time, do you think that there is anything that 

Mr. Darnell could have done to have avoided this truck 

even if he hadn't had a drink? 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS: Your Honor, I have to 

object to that question. That's going into cause, 

and he is not qualified to talk about causes and 

factors. And especially even if he had a drink, 

that part of it, he should say especially if he had 

a .17 blood test, and not talking about a drink. 

That's misleading to the jury. 

THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection. 

The witness can answer and you can cross examine on 

it. 

Q. Do you have an opinion? 

A. Would you repeat the question, sir? 

* * * * 

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS: I'll modify the question, 

because I didn't intend to imply one drink. 

Q. Had anything to drink? 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-3128 Document: 010110105157 Date Filed: 04/25/1991 Page: 3 
A. Well, sir, it's my opinion, I don't know if anybody 

could have done anything or not. That's my opinion. 

Q. Whether they had had anything to drink or not? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And you're aware that, at least at some point, there 

was a return of a toxicology report from Topeka that 

showed a .17 in relation to blood taken from Mr. Darnell 

at a later time? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Rec. Vol. I at 227-28. During cross-examination, officer Brooks 

testified that he took the effect of the alcohol into 

consideration when giving his opinion. Rec. Vol. I at 243. 

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Darnell, assessing 

sixty-five percent fault to Jessie Caballero and thirty-five 

percent fault to Donald Darnell. After reducing the verdict to 

account for Darnell's negligence, the court entered judgment in 

the amount of $319,800. The only issue raised on appeal is the 

admissibility of officer Brooks' opinion. It is a close question 

whether this issue has been preserved for appeal, since the 

transcript is ambiguous as to the exact grounds for and meaning of 

defendants' objection to this testimony at trial. Because it is 

ambiguous, however, we will address the admissibility question. 2 

2 In their appellate brief, defendants contend this testimony 

is inadmissible opinion evidence going to cause. See Appellants' 

Brief at 6. At trial, however, defense counsel objected to the 

testimony on the basis that officer Brooks was not qualified to 

talk about cause. Taken at face value, these are two different 

objections. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-3128 Document: 010110105157 Date Filed: 04/25/1991 Page: 4 
II. 

We review a trial court decision to admit evidence only for 

an abuse of discretion. Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 

1452, 1459 (10th Cir. 1987). Using this standard, 

[A] trial court's decision will not be disturbed 

unless the appellate court has a definite and firm 

conviction that the lower court made a clear error of 

judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in 

the circumstances. When we apply the "abuse of 

discretion" standard, we defer to the trial court's 

judgment because of its first-hand ability to view the 

witness . . . . 

United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986). 

We are therefore bound to afford the district court's ruling great 

deference. It is with these principles in mind that we consider 

defendants' arguments. 

At the outset, we must determine whether officer Brook's 

statement was, in fact, an opinion. Both parties appear to 

acknowledge it as such. However, we do not believe that is an 

obvious conclusion. Officer Brooks specifically stated he didn't 

"know if anybody could have done anything or not." This is an 

equivocal statement. Defendants have mischaracterized the nature 

of this testimony as pure opinion evidence. We note, however, 

that in context, at trial, the statement could have appeared more 

forceful. Therefore, while we hold this is not a true opinion 

subject to the restrictions set forth under the evidentiary rules, 

we will consider the testimony in the alternative as opinion 

evidence. 

Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the 

admissibility of opinions by lay witnesses. It states: 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-3128 Document: 010110105157 Date Filed: 04/25/1991 Page: 5 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the 

witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences 

is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 

rationally based on the perception of the witness and 

(b) helpful to clear understanding of the witness' 

testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 

In this case, officer Brooks was testifying as a lay witness. 3 

Therefore, we review his testimony under the restrictions set 

forth in Rule 701. 

"The primary purpose of Rule 701 is to allow nonexpert 

witnesses to give opinion testimony when, as a matter of practical 

necessity, events which they have personally observed cannot 

otherwise be fully presented to the court or the jury." Randolph 

v . Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844, 846 (10th Cir. 1979). The 

rule is designed to provide the district court wide latitude in 

allowing lay opinion testimony. Krueger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co., 707 F.2d 312, 317 (8th Cir. 1983). We hold the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony. 

Officer Brooks testified during direct examination that his 

opinion was based on his own investigation at the accident scene. 

Rec. Vol. I at 227. Therefore, his statement was rationally based 

on his own perceptions, as is required under Fed. R. Evid. 701. 

See Randolph, 590 F.2d at 847 ("There is uniformity among the 

courts that the testimony of witnesses ... is admissible if 

predicated upon concrete facts within their own observation and 

recollection . . . ") 

3 Defendants assert officer Brooks may have been testifying as 

an expert. We disagree. He was not offered as an expert nor was 

a complete foundation laid as to expert qualifications. He did 

not testify to matters outside the facts surrounding his personal 

investigation of the accident scene. He stated his opinion was 

based on his own observations. See Rec. Vol. I at 227. 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-3128 Document: 010110105157 Date Filed: 04/25/1991 Page: 6 
Moreover, the testimony also satisfies the second prong of 

the Rule 701 test because the opinion was helpful to the jury. 

Much of the testimony in this case centered on the visibility of 

the roadway at the time of the accident. Officer Brooks was at 

the scene, albeit later, and observed the conditions. He also 

spoke to or received reports from various witnesses. His 

testimony went to aid the jury in its understanding of the weather 

conditions on the night in question. See Fullerton v. Sauer, 337 

F.2d 474, 478-79 (8th Cir. 1964)(under former Rule 43(a) of 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, expression of witness as to 

whether vehicle could have stopped to avoid collision "could well 

be helpful to the jury in determining the ultimate facts"). 

Defendants assert officer Brooks' opinion was inadmissible 

because it amounted to a conclusory statement regarding fault. We 

disagree. The opinion did not impermissibly tell the jury what 

conclusion to reach. See Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228, 1231 

(10th Cir. 1971). In fact, the statement is equivocal at best. 

It did not direct a conclusion regarding fault. See id. In 

addition, the opinion did not speak specifically to the cause of 

the accident or to the fault of the parties. · Rather, the 

testimony went to whether, under the circumstances, Darnell's 

drinking could have affected his driving. Considering the broad 

discretion given the district court, we cannot disturb the court's 

conclusion as to the admissibility of this evidence. In light of 

our disposition, we need not address the other issues which 

Darnell raises. 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-3128 Document: 010110105157 Date Filed: 04/25/1991 Page: 7 
• 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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