Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00949/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00949-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EL DORADO IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-949 LKK GGH

vs.

TRAYLOR BROS., INC., et al.,

Defendants. ORDER (after in camera review)

 /

On April 7, 2005, the court ordered El Dorado Irrigation District (EID) to present

for in camera review production of those documents which EID withheld as privileged and

related to Traylor Bros.’ (TBI) subpoena on Owen Engineering & Management Inc. (Owen). 

Owen contracted with EID for the purpose of restoring (or building anew)

Spillway 20. The precise function of the spillway is not germane to this discovery dispute. 

However, EID asserts that it had to restore the Spillway in order to assist in its operation of the

water tunnel (Mill-Bull Tunnel) at the heart of this lawsuit—in essence a mitigation of damages

measure. EID states that it would not have had to restore the Spillway if the Tunnel had been

constructed properly. TBI counters with its belief that EID had plans, regardless of the Tunnel

operation, to restore or build anew the Spillway that it may have been ill advised to destroy in the

first place.

At hearing, the undersigned mentioned, with tongue only half-in-cheek, that it

appeared everyone who did business with EID automatically became a litigation consultant. 

Case 2:03-cv-00949-LKK -GGH Document 199 Filed 04/20/05 Page 1 of 6
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And, indeed, the discovery controversy centers about EID’s contention that Owen was its

“litigation consultant.” However, the undersigned stated that Owen could only be a litigation

consultant if EID had specifically retained them to consult on some aspect of the lawsuit. EID’s

mere hiring of a contractor to assist in mitigation of damages, i.e., to do the planning, design

and/or construction of Spillway 20, did not turn that contractor into a litigation consultant.

The documents presented by EID confirm the court’s impression for the most part. 

Owen was simply a hired contractor to assist EID’s mitigation of harm efforts much like a

physical therapist might be hired only to get an injured person back to work. 

When Owen was hired, EID gave instructions to Owen that it was to hold all

documents in confidence. However, at the start, that was the sum total of EID’s evidence that

Owen was supposed to be a litigation consultant. If only it were so easy to unilaterally

manufacture privileged documents—just tell the hired contractor to keep them confidential. In

fact, at one point, Owen was asked to look at a TBI/URS proposal to renovate the Spillway;

Owen quasi-complained in October 2004 that “as you are aware, the review is not in the scope of

our engineering agreement.” (Document 83) (This document will be produced as it does not

relate privileged information). It was not until November 12, 2004, that documentation exists

demonstrating that Owen was “on board” as a litigation consultant. (Document 81). Thus,

documents that Owen generated or received prior to this time, or on a basis different than review

of TBI proposals, cannot possibly be immunized from discovery by a consultant status. 

Although it is not completely clear, it does appear that EID and Owen did set up a separate

account for review of TBI information. To this extent, Owen does have the capacity of a

litigation consultant, and it could easily separate the two functions—contractor and consultant.

The privilege log and associated documents can be roughly broken into three

categories, (1) a dispute which occurred between builders of the Spillway and proximate

homeowners over noise; (2) the negotiations, meetings, investigation and environmental

compliance for Spillway 20 reconstruction involving Owen and EID, (3) Owen’s review work

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with EID regarding the TBI proposal to do the Spillway 20 work. Only the first and last category

are privileged under attorney-client or work product.

California law, the law which governs privilege matters in this diversity litigation,

fully supports the undersigned’s viewpoints. First, privileges in California law are narrowly

construed in California as their invocation tends to impair the search for the truth. McKesson

HBOC, Inc v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App.4th, 1236, 9 Cal. Rptr.3d 812, 817 (2004). And, the

party claiming a privilege shoulders the burden of showing that the evidence it seeks to suppress

falls within the terms of an applicable statute. HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.4th

54, 59, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 202 (2005).

Second, simply because counsel’s name is attached to a document in some

capacity does not render it privileged. 

The privilege does not protect “independent facts related to a

communication; that a communication took place, and the time,

date and participants in the communication.” (State Farm Fire &

Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 625, 640, 62

Cal.Rptr.2d 834.) Further, the privilege “does not protect

disclosure of underlying facts which may be referenced within a

qualifying communication” (id. at p. 639, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 834), and

it does not extend to individuals who are no more than witnesses to

the matter at issue in the litigation. (Martin v. Workers’ Comp.

Appeals Bd. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 333, 345, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 138.)

“‘Knowledge which is not otherwise privileged does not become

so merely by being communicated to an attorney....” While the

privilege fully covers communications as such, it does not extend

to subject matter otherwise unprivileged merely because that

subject matter has been communicated to the attorney.’”

(Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 397, 15

Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266.) “[T]ransmission alone, even where

the parties intend the matter to be confidential, cannot create the

privilege if none, in fact, exists.” (Suezaki v. Superior Court (1962)

58 Cal.2d 166, 176, 23 Cal.Rptr. 368, 373 P.2d 432.) Documents

that are independently prepared by an attorney “do not become

privileged communications ... merely because they are turned over

to counsel.” (Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court

(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 119, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 (Wellpoint ).) 

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 In the federal case of In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation, 214 F.R.D. 178, 186 (2003),

the common sense rule concerning business communications with counsel was stated even more

clearly applicable to the instant situation: “Non-privileged communications or documents

forwarded or Cc’d to an attorney: If documents are created for routine business purposes, by

non-attorneys, they do not fall within the purview of the work product privilege. Forwarding an

e-mail or other such document that fits this description to an attorney does not transform it into

the attorney’s work product-i.e. a reflection of his ‘mental impressions,’ or ‘legal strategy,’and

such documents are not ‘created in anticipation of litigation’. Neither can it be said that

communications between clients, unrelated to legal issues or advice, fall under the attorney client

privilege. Including an attorney on the distribution list of an interoffice memo, Cc’ing numerous

people who are ancillary to the discussion, one of whom happens to be an attorney, or forwarding

an e-mail several times until it reaches an attorney does not amount to ‘attorney client

communication.’”

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2,022 Ranch L.L.C. v. Superior Court , 113 Cal. App.4th 1377, 1388, 7 Cal. Rptr.3d 197, 205

(2003).1

Third, “It is settled that the attorney-client privilege is inapplicable where the

attorney merely acts as a negotiator for the client, gives business advice or otherwise acts as a

business agent.” Chicago Title Ins. v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. App.3d 1142, 1151, 220 Cal.

Rptr. 507, 514 (1985). The courts have found that the attorney-client privilege did not apply

without qualification where the attorney was merely acting as a negotiator for the client

(Montebello Rose Co. v Agri. Labor rel. Brd, 119 Cal.App.3d 1, 32-35, 173 Cal.Rptr. 856, 873-

875 (1981), or merely gave business advice (Estate of Perkins v. Bigelow, 195 Cal. 699 710, 235

P. 45(1925). In addition, it has been held that the work product privilege does not apply when an

attorney merely acts as a business agent for a client by conveying the client’s position to a

contracting party. Watt Industries v. Superior Court, 115 Cal.App.3d at 802, 171 Cal.Rptr. 503

(1981).

Having in mind the above principles, the court orders that the documents related

to the noise complaint remain undisclosed on account of their work product nature. For part of

the documents listed on the privilege log, EID was taking action to ward off possible homeowner

controversies, even lawsuits, in connection with the re-building of Spillway 20. The documents

were created, and actions referenced therein, in anticipation of possible litigation. Aside from

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 The court assumes that documents initially listed as privileged, but were then labeled

“produced” were indeed produced. Those documents are not listed here.

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that, the relevancy of such documents to the current lawsuit is highly questionable. Thus,

documents on the privilege log designated 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, and 20 may

remain undisclosed.2

The court comes to an opposite conclusion for documents 1, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,

37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 73, 75 76, 83, 84,

86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91.

These documents pertain to the investigation, technical research, progress reports,

design information and information regarding what might satisfy governmental agency concerns. 

The latter numbers also pertain to how Owen should respond to TBI’s subpoena because of

contractual concerns. These documents reflect only contractual back-and-forth between or

among Owen and EID and other interested persons. That EID counsel was involved (most of the

time simply as a “cc” recipient) does not imbue this contractual relationship with a “litigation

consultant” overlay. Nor did EID counsel create any attorney client relationship with Owen. At

all times EID counsel were EID counsel. Moreover, although the information received or given

to third party Owen may have been useful in some sense to EID’s counsel’s advice to EID in

anticipating potential legal snafus, e.g., regulatory concerns, the type of information arriving or

being disseminated was not privileged, and did not become so simply because EID’s counsel was

copied or even a sender or primary addressee. None of these documents reflect privileged

information, i.e., documents which request advice from or give information to an attorney who

has an attorney-client relationship with the sender/receiver. Nor will the court absurdly paint

with such a broad brush that every contact a lawyer has with outside contractors is deemed for

the benefit of his client such that the client-lawyer and contractor are all working in a confidential

setting. If such were the case, all documents associated with every business contract could be

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3This includes documents where the contractor is asking for advice from EID counsel

concerning how to respond to a subpoena because of the contractual requirement for

confidentiality.

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 absolutely shielded because an attorney was placed on the “cc” list or attended a meeting.3

The court finds the following documents shielded from discovery because of

work-product concerns. These documents reflect Owen’s advice (including handwritten notes on

TBI documents made either by Owen or by counsel) concerning TBI/URS proposals to

reconstruct Spillway 20. Documents 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96.

Conclusion

EID shall disclose and withhold Owen documents as set forth above. The

disclosures shall take place within fifteen days of the filed date of this order. EID shall make

arrangements to pick up the in camera documents 

TBI’s Motion for sanctions is denied as EID was sufficiently justified, albeit

partially in error, in this discovery dispute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 4/20/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:gh:035

EID949.ord

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