Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00903/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00903-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:0794 Job Discrimination (Handicap)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

LEE R. BOOTH, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:13-CV-903-WKW

 ) [WO]

RANDALL V. HOUSTON, )

19th Circuit District Attorney, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Lee R. Booth suffered damage to her vocal cords after being on a 

ventilator for eleven days during an extended hospitalization in August 2009. 

Upon returning to her job as an assistant district attorney for the 19th Judicial 

Circuit of Alabama, which she had held since August 2004, Plaintiff contends that 

her employer discriminated against her based upon her speech disability, retaliated 

against her for opposing unlawful discrimination, and ultimately constructively 

discharged her in April 2013, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as 

amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. Before the court is Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment (Doc. # 16), which has been fully briefed (Docs. # 17–18, 20–

21, 25). After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, 

and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendant’s motion is due to be 

granted in part and denied in part. 

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I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [he] is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and the 

inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. JeanBaptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010).

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes 

identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute 

of material fact. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Or, the movant can assert, 

without citing the record, that the nonmoving party “cannot produce admissible 

evidence to support” a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the movant 

meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish – with 

evidence beyond the pleadings – that a genuine dispute material to each of its 

claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine dispute of material 

fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a reasonable fact 

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finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 

F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).

III. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s First Five Years as an Assistant District Attorney

On August 16, 2004, Defendant Randall Houston, district attorney for the 

19th Judicial Circuit of Alabama, appointed Plaintiff as a full-time assistant district 

attorney. The 19th Judicial Circuit includes Autauga, Chilton, and Elmore 

counties. Plaintiff began her employment in the Elmore County division, 

prosecuting cases in district court and traffic court, but at some point later, she 

began prosecuting felony cases in circuit court. (Pl.’s Dep., at 16.) 

In September 2008, Plaintiff received a raise, and in April 2009, Defendant 

promoted Plaintiff to senior assistant district attorney. For the first five years of 

her employment, Defendant described Plaintiff as a “loyal and faithful employee” 

who made “conscientious decisions based on her interpretation of [his] 

prosecutorial philosophy.” (Def.’s Aff., at 1.) But Defendant’s opinion of 

Plaintiff’s job performance was soon to change.

B. Plaintiff’s Illness, Vocal Cord Damage, and Return to Work with

Accommodations

In August 2009, after five years serving as an assistant district attorney,

Plaintiff contracted a sepsis infection, requiring hospitalization. While 

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hospitalized, her condition worsened and became critical, and for eleven days, she 

was on a ventilator and in a medically induced coma. Her condition stabilized, but 

important to this litigation, the ventilator caused damage to Plaintiff’s vocal cords. 

Plaintiff returned to work after fifty-two days paid leave. Although Plaintiff

was able to speak, her voice had a low volume, which required “amplification in a 

courtroom.” (Pl.’s Dep., at 36.) To help Plaintiff transition back into her position, 

Defendant assigned an intern to assist Plaintiff with her day-to-day responsibilities. 

Additionally, a speaker system was installed in the courtrooms to accommodate 

Plaintiff’s lack of vocal volume. Plaintiff agrees that the technology in the Elmore 

County courtrooms, which included microphones at counsel’s table, adequately 

accommodated her voice impairment. (Pl.’s Dep., at 36–37.) 

C. Additional Surgeries and Medical Leave

Post-dating her return to work in 2009, Plaintiff has undergone nine

surgeries to help improve her breathing and voice quality. Her speaking 

impairment has improved with each reparative surgery (see Pl.’s Dep., at 35–36); 

however, as of April 2014, as indicated in her medical records, Plaintiff continues 

to have a mildly “low” and “[r]aspy” voice, and her “[v]oice quality [is] abnormal 

for [her] age and gender.” (Apr. 2014 Clinic Notes (Doc. # 21-7, at 4).) Plaintiff’s 

physician notes that, although her voice has improved when “speaking in quiet 

environments,” it “is still very weak” when there is “background noise.” Her 

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physician also rendered the following postoperative diagnoses: “chronic 

hoarseness,” “laryngeal insufficiency,” “right true vocal fold motion restriction,”

“posterior commissure web status post reconstruction,” and “secondary 

laryngomalacia from surgical treatment of #4.” (Apr. 2014 Clinic Notes.)

It is undisputed that Defendant never denied Plaintiff leave or benefits for 

her medical absences. (Pl.’s Dep., at 34; see also Order on Pretrial H’rg, at 6 (Doc. 

# 50), in which Plaintiff stipulates that she “was provided with all the leave she 

requested and was never denied leave.”) Plaintiff also says that, when she took 

leave for additional surgeries, her leave was not “excessive” and that she tried to 

“make sure that [she] either had something continued” or “that the cases were 

worked up, and [that she had] talked to people about the cases that [she] had.” 

(Pl.’s Dep., at 31–32.) 

D. Plaintiff’s Work Performance Issues from Defendant’s Perspective1

Within a few months of Plaintiff’s return to work in 2009 after her initial 

hospitalization, James Houts, who at the time was the chief deputy district attorney 

and Plaintiff’s supervisor, complained to Defendant that Plaintiff was not able to 

“multi-task,” was “not supervising effectively,” “wasn’t doing her work,” and “was 

in and out of the office all the time.” (Def.’s Dep., at 73, 74; see also Def.’s Aff., 

at 1.) Mr. Houts recommended that Defendant terminate Plaintiff based on “her 

 

1

 Although the summary judgment evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable 

to Plaintiff, as discussed infra, Defendant is required to offer legitimate reasons for taking the 

adverse employment actions against Plaintiff of which she complains. 

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inability to do her job effectively and excessive absences from work, which for the 

most part, were due to post medical events.” (Def.’s Aff., at 1.) Defendant did not 

concur with the recommendation and suggested that Mr. Houts discuss these issues 

directly with Plaintiff and give her “an opportunity to correct whatever it was he 

was not happy with.” (Def.’s Dep., at 73–74.) Defendant believed that Plaintiff 

“needed additional time to recover and [that] her inability to multi-task was mostly 

due to the stress of returning to work after her illness.” (Def.’s Aff., at 2.) It is 

unclear from the record whether Mr. Houts discussed his concerns with Plaintiff. 

Defendant says, though, that Mr. Houts removed Plaintiff from assisting with 

scheduling docket events for Elmore County and that he “do[es] not think that [Mr. 

Houts] mentioned [Plaintiff’s performance] to [him] again.” (Def.’s Aff., at 2.) 

During the same time frame, Beverley Stone, Defendant’s chief of staff and 

director of special services, also began receiving complaints on a weekly basis 

from employees in the Elmore County office, primarily from support staff and 

interns. They complained that Plaintiff “was passing off her own work to others to 

complete,” was “frequently leaving the office for unknown reasons,” and generally 

was not available to provide direction to the staff. (Stone’s Aff., at 2.) Because 

these individuals did not want to confront Plaintiff with their concerns and risk 

“hurt[ing] her feelings,” Ms. Stone informed them that “there was nothing [she] 

could do.” (Stone’s Aff., at 2.) 

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At least once, Ms. Stone “casually spoke” with Defendant about some of the 

“morale problems” she believed that Plaintiff’s job performance created in the 

Elmore County office, but Defendant “instructed [Ms. Stone] to try to get everyone 

to work with [Plaintiff] until she got back to 100%.” (Stone’s Aff., at 3.) Ms. 

Stone had at least one meeting with Plaintiff in late 2009 or early 2010 to address 

concerns that her leave resulting from the combination of her and her family 

members’ medical appointments was excessive. Plaintiff “became very 

aggressive” when Ms. Stone suggested that Plaintiff try to find other family 

members or friends to help cover some of her family appointments. (Stone’s Aff., 

at 3.)

Notwithstanding the complaints about Plaintiff’s job performance, and 

Defendant’s concerns about Plaintiff’s steady decline in work performance, in 

March 2011, Defendant awarded a discretionary merit-based pay raise exclusively

to Plaintiff, and a month later, Plaintiff received an additional two-percent, acrossthe-board raise. (Def.’s Dep., at 48–50.) When Plaintiff thanked Defendant by 

email for the merit raise, he replied, “You deserve it, wish it could be much more.” 

(Mar. 23, 2011 email (Pl.’s Ex. 6).) 

E. Plaintiff’s Transfer to the Chilton County Office

Plaintiff worked in the Elmore County office through January 2012. At that 

time, Defendant moved Plaintiff to the Chilton County office and reassigned 

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Assistant District Attorney CJ Robinson from Chilton County to Elmore County.

2

 

Plaintiff was one of two attorneys assigned to the Chilton County office; she 

retained her position as a senior assistant district attorney and had supervisory 

authority over Assistant District Attorney Brandon Bates. Defendant was hopeful 

that Plaintiff’s supervisory abilities would improve if he moved her to the Chilton 

County office “where there is less work, less case load, . . . [and] different people.” 

(Def.’s Dep., at 121–22.) In his affidavit, Defendant explains that “the stress level 

for [Plaintiff] would be much less in Chilton County,” in part, because “Chilton 

County only has Grand Jury twice a year and the number of felony cases in Chilton 

County is substantially less than in Elmore or Autauga.” (Def.’s Aff., at 4–5.) He 

further says:

I also believed this would give [Plaintiff] the opportunity to run an 

office on her own without me there to interfere with her supervisory 

style. I told [Plaintiff], when I reassigned her to Chilton County, that I 

expected her to take control of the situation and run the office like she 

knew I expected it to be run. When I moved Robinson to Elmore 

County[,] I also made him [Plaintiff’s] . . . supervisor; however, he 

did not hold the title of Chief Deputy until several months later.

(Def.’s Aff., at 4–5.) 

Plaintiff recalls that, after the fact, Defendant’s Chief Investigator Ray 

Puckett told her that Defendant transferred her to Chilton County because Mr. 

Robinson and Mr. Bates “didn’t get along” and that Defendant believed that, based 

 

2 Mr. Robinson’s reassignment was in anticipation of his promotion to chief deputy upon 

Mr. Hout’s departure from the office. (Def.’s Aff., at 4.)

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upon her experience and age, Mr. Bates “may respect” her more than he respected 

Mr. Robinson. (Pl.’s Dep., at 42.) Later, Plaintiff also learned that Defendant 

transferred her to Chilton County because the work was “easier.” (Pl.’s Dep., 

at 43.) Plaintiff felt, though, that the work was not easier in Chilton County 

because “[t]here was a lot more courtroom work” in district court and traffic court, 

and there were only two assistant district attorneys assigned to that office. (Pl.’s 

Dep., at 43.)

F. Microphone Accommodations in the Chilton County Courtrooms

At the time of Plaintiff’s reassignment to Chilton County, the courtrooms in 

that county did not have any type of sound system. (Pl.’s Dep., at 37; Def.’s Aff., 

at 5.) At Plaintiff’s request, Defendant purchased Plaintiff a portable amplification 

system that included a microphone for her use in the courtroom in Chilton County. 

Plaintiff has conceded that Defendant provided the “accommodation [she] 

needed.” (Pl.’s Dep., at 39–40, 45, 53.)

G. Plaintiff’s Work Performance in Chilton County

Between January 2012 and May 2012, Mr. Robinson, at Defendant’s 

request, monitored Plaintiff’s performance in the Chilton County office. Mr. 

Robinson describes in detail myriad problems he observed. He attests that, during 

her first grand jury in Chilton County, where the docket consisted of approximately 

300 cases, Plaintiff was “disruptive and ill prepared to present cases from multiple 

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officers and seemed ill equipped to steer the questions asked by grand jurors.” 

(Robinson’s Aff., at 2.) In his affidavit, Mr. Robinson does not indicate if he 

discussed with Plaintiff his concerns about her grand jury conduct. 

Mr. Robinson also believes that Plaintiff repeatedly acted in a manner that 

suggested problems with her memory. According to Mr. Robinson, Plaintiff 

negotiated a plea agreement with terms that were contrary to multiple discussions 

he had had with her concerning proper handling of that particular case. She also 

either “disregard[ed]” office policy or forgot the policy when, in a different case, 

she negotiated a plea agreement that inappropriately included the defendant’s

waiver of potential civil claims. (Robinson’s Aff., at 4.) Mr. Robinson further 

believes that Plaintiff forgot the policy requiring the physical presence of an 

attorney at all times in the office because “on more than one occasion,” she left the 

Chilton County office without an attorney present. (Robinson’s Aff., at 3.) These 

and other alleged deficiencies were the catalyst behind the convening of a meeting 

in May 2012. 

H. The May 2012 Meeting

The May 2012 meeting, which Plaintiff secretly recorded, was held at the 

Elmore County office. Present for the meeting were Plaintiff, Ms. Stone, Mr. 

Puckett, and Mr. Robinson. The meeting occurred at Defendant’s direction. 

(Def.’s Dep., at 116–17; Robinson’s Aff., at 4.) 

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As the first order of business at the meeting, Plaintiff was “taken off” one 

capital murder case, not assigned to another, and given a limited role in a third 

capital murder case. Mr. Robinson says that Plaintiff was told only that these 

prosecutorial assignments were for “logistical reasons,” which Mr. Robinson says 

was “true,” but that Plaintiff’s lack of “memory recall” also was an undisclosed

“motivating factor.” (Robinson’s Aff., at 4.) 

Ms. Stone then expressed “concerns” with Plaintiff’s alleged “lapses in 

memory,” which Ms. Stone categorized as the “only issue” impeding Plaintiff’s job 

performance. Ms. Stone gave some illustrations of what she said demonstrated a 

“pattern” of memory loss that had developed since Plaintiff’s hospitalization in 

August 2009, including: (1) Plaintiff’s apparent failure to remember Defendant’s 

directive that Plaintiff have no involvement in the criminal cases her husband, a 

police officer, had investigated; (2) Plaintiff’s inability to recall a conversation 

with an investigator about rescheduling a case due to the impending birth of his 

child; and (3) Plaintiff’s request to participate in a capital murder trial when in fact

she previously had negotiated a plea agreement that had been accepted by the 

court. Ms. Stone explained that these and other incidents “as a whole” gave her a 

“real” concern “about [Plaintiff’s] memory loss” in both administrative and 

substantive matters. The conversation then turned to Plaintiff’s voice after

Plaintiff asked several times, “What else is there?” (May 2012 Meeting (audio 

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recording) (Ex. 3 to Doc. # 21); see also Robinson’s Aff., at 5 (“We relayed to Ms. 

Booth that her voice was an issue, but that was not the purpose of the [May 2012] 

meeting.”).)

Ms. Stone said, “[I]f you cannot remember, if you cannot speak where 

people can understand you on the phone and we’ve had two complaints . . . about 

the fact that ‘I can’t talk to her, I cannot understand her.’ A lawyer is an actor; 

[she] ha[s] to talk and [she] ha[s] to remember . . . .” (May 2012 Meeting (audio 

recording).) During that conversation, Ms. Stone also said, “It’s about your health, 

which is your memory and your voice.” Ms. Stone told Plaintiff that she was not 

being terminated, but that “there [were] some problems” that “ha[d] to be fixed.” 

Plaintiff responded that she was not certain what else she could do “about her 

voice.” Ms. Stone reiterated that “[a] lawyer has to have a voice to work,” and

that, if Plaintiff felt that there was nothing she could do, then she “should check 

into some type of disability.” Ms. Stone then relayed to Plaintiff her belief that 

Plaintiff was “unable to do the job that [Defendant] hired [her] to do ten years 

ago.” The meeting concluded with Ms. Stone stating, “[Y]ou are not willing to try 

to work with us, alleviate any of our concerns, or even accept the fact that there

might be a problem.” (May 2012 Meeting (audio recording).) Plaintiff describes 

Ms. Stone’s overall tone as “screaming.” (Pl.’s Dep., at 49.)

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After the May 2012 meeting, Ms. Stone and Mr. Robinson recommended 

Plaintiff’s termination to Defendant. Defendant refused and said he wanted to give 

Plaintiff time to “get through this.” (Def.’s Dep., at 117.)

I. Plaintiff’s Post-May 2012 Job Performance 

Mr. Robinson attests that, after the May 2012 meeting, Plaintiff’s 

performance problems continued. It was in January 2013, however, that Mr. 

Robinson says he witnessed “a level of incompetence leading up to th[e January 

2013] grand jury that,” in his opinion, “[was] unequaled . . . by any attorney” with 

whom he has worked. (Robinson’s Aff., at 9.) He explains that Plaintiff

neglected her duties, failed to meet communicated deadlines, 

submitted inadequate and incomplete files, and passed-off 

responsibilities (many of which only attorneys are qualified to make 

and she passed them off onto support staff and interns), and then 

failed to correct the problems when she was sent home from the 

winter conference.

(Robinson’s Aff., at 9.) The grand jury coordinator, Micke Arant Evans, had to 

step in and attempt to rectify these shortcomings. (Evans’s Aff., at 1.)

J. The January 30, 2013 Meeting

On January 30, 2013, Mr. Robinson, accompanied by Mr. Puckett, met with 

Plaintiff and explained to her that “her reassignment to Chilton County was not 

working out the way [they] hoped it would.” (Robinson’s Aff., at 10.) He did not 

“cover the same issues” that were covered in the May 2012 meeting. He did bring 

up her voice, though, because he “had received additional complains about 

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[Plaintiff’s] voice from judges, court staff, attorneys, and victims.” In his affidavit, 

Mr. Robinson paraphrases: “Despite the usage of a microphone and 

amplifier[, Plaintiff] was difficult to hear and even more difficult to understand.” 

(Robinson’s Aff., at 10.) The audio recording of the January 30, 2013 meeting, 

which Plaintiff again surreptitiously recorded, reveals to the extent audible, the 

specifics of Mr. Robinson’s statements to Plaintiff:

It’s just not working out very well with you in Clanton. Now, there 

have been some stuff that has been little and there’s been some stuff 

that is bigger stuff. Even some of the judges right now have concerns 

about your voice and some other things in court. I know everybody 

was hopeful that it was going to get better and continue to get better. 

Right now even some of the judges, they have major concerns and 

don’t feel like [inaudible]. A big part of what we do is in the 

courtroom. I mean you’ve been doing this for a long time; I know 

you know all that. Also, the problems with some of the people, and 

I’m not just talking about the stuff last week with Micke [the Grand 

Jury Coordinator]. Obviously, . . . you and Micke have had 

longstanding problems that none of us are going to fix . . . [,] not just 

that . . . . other things with people in the office . . . .

(Jan. 30, 2013 meeting (audio recording) (Ex. 4 to Doc. # 21).) Mr. Robinson 

further explains that “[t]he weakness of her voice remained unchanged for the last 

couple years, but the deterioration of her ability to competently execute even the 

most basic duties [for which] she was responsible was the catalyst for the meeting 

on January 30, 2013.” (Robinson’s Aff., at 11.)

At this meeting, Mr. Robinson, at Defendant’s directive, gave Plaintiff two 

alternative employment options. The first option was that she could work partCase 2:13-cv-00903-WKW-SRW Document 51 Filed 11/03/14 Page 14 of 56
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time in juvenile court at approximately half her pay with benefits until her 

retirement in the state system vested (approximately eighteen or nineteen months). 

The second option was that she could “work whenever [she was] needed . . . and 

have more hours with a little more pay.” (Pl.’s Dep., at 53–54.) The second 

option, which also was considered part-time, would include no benefits for the 

purpose of permitting Plaintiff, if she desired, to obtain additional employment

outside the state system. (Pl.’s Dep., at 54–55.) Neither option included 

supervisory responsibilities, and Plaintiff says that, under either option, it “was 

[her] understanding that [her] job would end after retirement vested.”3 (Pl.’s Dep.,

at 53.) 

Plaintiff rejected both options because she was “absolutely humiliated” that 

Defendant, for whom she had worked for ten years, “didn’t give [her] the courtesy 

of presenting those options . . . to [her] himself.” (Pl.’s Dep., at 57.) She also was

“devastated [and] embarrassed.” (Pl.’s Dep., at 59.) Plaintiff’s lifelong dream was 

to be a “career prosecutor” and a reassignment to “juvenile court [would have 

been] just a complete humiliation” when for the past decade she had “prosecute[d] 

felony cases” and “had had a very good track record.” (Pl.’s Dep., at 57.) 

 

3 Defendant’s testimony differs as to the nature of the two options. Defendant says that

the first option was for full-time employment with a reduced salary until Plaintiff vested in the 

state retirement system and that, under the second option, Plaintiff could have worked in the 

part-time position “for as long as she wanted.” (Def.’s Dep., at 111–13; see also Robinson’s 

Aff., at 11 (same).) At the summary-judgment phase, Plaintiff’s account, which finds support in 

the January 2013 audio recording, is presumed true. 

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About an hour after the meeting, Plaintiff texted Mr. Robinson proposing a 

third option. She asked Mr. Robinson “if she could clean out her office 

immediately and remain on the payroll until the end of March” 2013. (Robinson’s 

Aff., at 11.) Defendant accepted Plaintiff’s proposal, and Plaintiff’s employment 

ended on April 1, 2013. 

K. This Lawsuit

In December 2013, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Liberally construed, the 

Complaint contains the following claims in violation of the Rehabilitation Act: 

(1) denial of a reasonable accommodation; (2) constructive discharge; (3) 

disability-based hostile work environment; (4) retaliation; and (5) retaliatory

hostile work environment. 

L. Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affidavit

Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all claims. In his affidavit 

submitted in support of the pending summary judgment motion, he says that he 

“would never have allowed for [Plaintiff] to be terminated simply because of her 

vocal issues.” (Def.’s Aff., at 6.) Defendant offers numerous reasons unrelated to 

her voice for his decision in January 2013 to relieve Plaintiff of her supervisory 

responsibilities and demote her to part-time status. He provides a detailed list of 

what he contends were Plaintiff’s myriad post-August 2009 job deficiencies, 

including the following: (1) a conflict Plaintiff had with a case agent concerning 

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her handling of the case; (2) Plaintiff’s apparent memory loss about Defendant’s

long-time policy on prosecuting “one pill” felony cases4; (3) instances where 

Plaintiff allowed her husband, a police officer, to sleep in her office on days when 

he was the investigator on cases being presented to the grand jury; (4) Plaintiff’s 

improper participation in her husband’s presentation of cases to the grand jury; 

(5) Plaintiff’s unexpected absences to deal with “personal issues with family”; 

(6) the fact that Plaintiff brought her child to the office for extended periods of 

time and occasionally had him hide under her desk; (7) her poor decision-making 

(such as allowing her husband, a police officer, to attend a crime scene on a case 

worked by another agency); (8) her violation of policy forbidding an assistant 

district attorney from offering a criminal settlement that included the settlement of 

a condemnation case; (9) allowing an intern to cover the office without attorney 

supervision; (10) her failure to attend planned meetings with victims and law 

enforcement officers; and (11) her failure to prepare grand jury files adequately. 

(See Def.’s Aff., at 2–8.)

Defendant says that some of these deficiencies suggested a 2009 posthospitalization loss of memory and that other of Plaintiff’s “memory issues” are 

 

4 As explained by Defendant, a “one pill” felony case is a case where “the primary felony 

charge is based on the possession of a single pill constituting a felony possession of controlled 

substance charge” and the remaining counts are non-felony charges. Defendant says that in a 

“one pill” case, “it is the general policy of th[e] office not to indict it as a felony and remand the 

case back to district court for prosecution on the misdemeanor counts and recharge the felony as 

something else.” (Def.’s Aff., at 2.) 

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“covered by affidavits from the individual employees” who had personal 

knowledge of those occurrences. (Def.’s Aff., at 2.) These affidavits total nine, 

and Plaintiff emphasizes that the affidavits are the culmination of Mr. Robinson’s 

post-litigation email to staff dated July 8, 2014, requesting “summaries of 

individual dealings with” Plaintiff. (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s 2d Request for Prod., at 2 

(Doc # 21-5).)

Defendant did not document Plaintiff’s performance issues in her personnel 

file or otherwise create a contemporaneous written record of the issues, and he did 

not have a progressive discipline policy. Defendant also did not have a policy 

requiring performance evaluations, and presumably for that reason, there are no 

written performance evaluations of Plaintiff in the summary judgment record. 

(Def.’s Dep., at 22, 32, 37, 126.)

IV. DISCUSSION

As grounds for summary judgment, Defendant contends that under the 

burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 

(1973), Plaintiff’s claims cannot survive summary judgment. He contends that 

Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation 

and that, even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, she fails to rebut 

Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for his 

actions. More specifically, Defendant argues that he undisputedly fulfilled 

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Plaintiff’s requests for amplification technology in the courtrooms, that Plaintiff 

cannot show that he subjected her to an adverse employment action or that she 

engaged in protected activity, and that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate severe or 

pervasive harassment to support her claims for hostile work environment under the 

Rehabilitation Act’s anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions. Plaintiff 

opposes summary judgment. 

The claims are addressed in the following order: (1) disability 

discrimination alleging the denial of a reasonable accommodation; (2) disability 

discrimination alleging constructive discharge; (3) retaliation; and (4) hostile work 

environment (disability- and retaliatory-based). For the reasons that follow, the 

disability discrimination claim alleging constructive discharge survives summary 

judgment, but the remaining claims do not.

A. Disability Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation Act

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794, provides 

that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . 

shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, . . . be subjected to discrimination 

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”5 

 

5

“[C]ases involving the ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act] are precedent for those 

involving the Rehabilitation Act.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005). The 

ADA and Rehabilitation Act are not identical, however. One difference important to this case 

lies in the causation standard. The Rehabilitation Act requires that the discrimination occur 

“solely by reason of her or his disability.” § 794(a). In contrast, the ADA’s “prohibition of 

discrimination . . . ‘by reason of’ disability establishes a motivating factor causal standard for 

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§ 794(a). The Rehabilitation Act permits more than one type of claim for proving 

disability discrimination. Three types of claims are relevant here: (1) denial of a

reasonable accommodation; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) hostile work

environment. The first claim is where the employee contends that he or she is a 

qualified individual who, “with reasonable accommodation, can perform the 

essential functions of the position in question.” Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In these cases, 

the employer “will usually contend that no reasonable accommodation is 

available.” Id. The second claim is when an employee contends that he or she 

suffered an adverse employment action solely because of his or her disability, and 

the employer defends the action on grounds that it took an adverse employment 

action against the employee for reasons that are not related to the individual’s 

disability. See id. The third claim is where the employee alleges that he or she 

was subjected to a hostile work environment. See Burgos v. Chertoff, 274 F.

 

liability when there are two or more possible reasons for the challenged decision and at least one 

of them may be legitimate.” K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 

1099 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Schwarz v. City of 

Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that “plaintiffs claiming 

intentional discrimination under the RA [Rehabilitation Act] must show that they were 

discriminated against ‘solely by reason of [their] disability,’ but the ADA requires only the lesser 

‘but for’ standard of causation” (internal citation omitted)). 

Contrary to the sole-causation standard under the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint and summary judgment brief erroneously presume that Plaintiff can prevail at trial if 

her disability was “a substantial and/or motivating factor” in Defendant’s alleged adverse 

treatment of her. (See Pl.’s Summ. J. Resp., at 14; see Compl., at 11.) Plaintiff is forewarned 

that such proof at trial will not suffice to establish a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. 

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App’x 839, 842 (11th Cir. 2008) (analyzing a hostile-work-environment theory 

under the Rehabilitation Act). 

1. Reasonable Accommodation

As to the first claim, in her summary judgment response, Plaintiff says that 

she “is not claiming at summary judgment that she was not provided her required 

accommodation of a microphone.” (Pl.’s Summ. J. Resp., at 1–2 (Doc. # 20).) 

Plaintiff’s statement comports with the evidence. Namely, at her deposition, 

Plaintiff conceded that the only accommodation she requested was amplification

equipment in the courtrooms and that Defendant provided the requested

accommodation. (See Pl.’s Dep., at 39–40, 45, 53.) It appears, though, that 

Plaintiff is attempting to forego reliance on her reasonable accommodation claim

only for purposes of summary judgment. To the extent that Plaintiff intends to 

resurrect this claim at trial, she cannot do so for the following reason. 

Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the reasonable

accommodation claim, relying primarily on Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, and

has met his burden of showing that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact” and that he “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

By failing to submit evidence that raises a genuine dispute of material fact for trial,

Plaintiff’s claim fails at the summary-judgment phase. The claim cannot be raised 

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anew at trial, and summary judgment is due be entered in Defendant’s favor on this 

claim.

2. Adverse Action (Constructive Discharge)

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant “forc[ed] her to resign” (Compl. 

¶ 66(e)) will be analyzed as a constructive discharge claim. Plaintiff can prove this 

claim through circumstantial or direct evidence of discrimination. See Curry v. 

Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 518 F. App’x 957, 963 (11th Cir. 2013) (a case 

decided under the Rehabilitation Act). Where there is no direct evidence of 

discrimination in an action brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the Eleventh 

Circuit has used the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas, 411

U.S. at 792. See Curry, 518 F. App’x at 963; Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-12692, 

2007 WL 2404705, at *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 24, 2007); Boone v. Rumsfeld, 172 F. 

App’x 268, 270 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Discrimination claims brought under the 

Rehabilitation Act . . . are analyzed under the three-part test outlined in McDonnell 

Douglas.”).

6

 

Under this paradigm, the plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of 

discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds, “the burden shifts to the defendant to 

articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Chapter 7 Trustee 

 

6 While the cited decisions are unpublished, there are ample published opinions of the 

Eleventh Circuit permitting plaintiffs to prove disability discrimination under the ADA “through 

circumstantial evidence using the familiar burden-shifting analysis employed in Title VII 

employment discrimination cases.” Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th 

Cir. 2001).

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v. Gate Gourmet, 683 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012). If the defendant proffers a 

nondiscriminatory reason, the burden returns to the plaintiff, who must show that 

the proffered reason is a ruse for the real, discriminatory reason. Id. “It is at this 

stage that the plaintiff’s ‘burden . . . merges with the ultimate burden of persuading 

the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination.’” 

Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). “[I]f a jury 

reasonably could infer from the evidence presented that the employer’s legitimate 

justification is pretextual, the question becomes whether the evidence, considered 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, yields the reasonable inference that the 

employer engaged in the alleged discrimination.” Id.

“Provided that the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable 

employer, [the employee] must meet that reason head on and rebut it.” Chapman 

v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000). The employee does not rebut 

the reason “by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason,” id., but by 

exposing “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies[,] or 

contradictions” in the employer’s reasoning. Springer v. Convergys Customer 

Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 

1279 (11th Cir. 2008) (To show pretext, the employee must “demonstrate 

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24

weaknesses or implausibilities in the proffered legitimate reason so as to permit a 

rational jury to conclude that the explanation given was not the real reason, or that 

the reason stated was insufficient to warrant the adverse action.”). “A reason is 

not pretext for discrimination,” however, “‘unless it is shown both that the reason 

was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’” Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n 

of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting St. Mary’s 

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)).

Both parties proceed under the circumstantial evidence framework. The 

court will do the same.

(a) Prima Facie Case

For purposes of the prima facie case of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, 

Plaintiff can make out a § 504 disability discrimination claim by showing that 

(1) she has a disability, (2) she was otherwise qualified for her job as an assistant 

district attorney, (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and 

(4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances that raise a 

reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination solely on the basis of Plaintiff’s 

disability. See Ward v. United Parcel Serv., ___ F. App’x ___, 2014 WL 4452960, 

at *4 (11th Cir. 2014) (“To establish a prima facie case [under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act], a plaintiff may show that (1) he was disabled, (2) he was 

qualified to perform the job, and (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment 

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action because of his disability.” (citing Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, 

Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004)); Tarmas v. Sec’y of Navy, 433 F.

App’x 754, 761–62 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that under the Rehabilitation Act to 

establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “[i]t is not 

enough for a plaintiff to demonstrate that an adverse employment action was based 

partly on his disability,” but instead, “a plaintiff must prove that he suffered an 

adverse employment action ‘solely by reason of’ his handicap”).7 Defendant 

challenges all four elements.

8

(i) Whether Plaintiff Has a Disability

The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the Americans with Disabilities Act’s 

(“ADA”) definition of a “disability.” See 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (providing that 

 

7

 The term “prima facie” has two meanings. See Collado v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 

419 F.3d 1143, 1153 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that a “source of confusion stems from the fact 

that the term ‘prima facie case’ has two meanings” and explaining how “prima facie” is used in 

an ADA discrimination case). “Prima facie” traditionally refers to the “‘quantum of evidence 

needed to create a jury question.’” Id. (quoting Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1292 

(11th Cir. 1999)). “In the McDonnell Douglas context, however, the term relates to a step in the 

analytical framework.” Id. Here, the term “prima facie” is used to describe the first step of the 

McDonnell Douglas framework and is not used in the traditional sense as the “‘quantum of 

evidence needed to create a jury question.’” Collado, 419 F.3d at 1153 n.3 (quoting Wright, 187 

F.3d at 1292). 

The parties rely on Jackson v. Veterans Administration, 22 F.3d 277, 278 (11th Cir. 

1994). (See, e.g., Def.’s Summ. J. Br., at 9.) Jackson, which was an appeal after a bench trial, 

recites the prima facie elements in the traditional sense, not as part of the McDonnell Douglas

framework. But admittedly, as touched on later in this opinion, it is difficult to discern how the 

two prima facie standards differ in this circuit.

8 Under the Rehabilitation Act, to establish a prima facie case, the employee also must 

show that he or she “worked for a program or activity that received federal financial assistance.” 

Jackson, 22 F.3d at 278. Defendant does not dispute that his agency receives federal financial 

assistance. (See Order on Pretrial H’rg, at 6 (Stipulations).)

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the term “disability” for purposes of § 794 has “the meaning given it in” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102. Under the ADA, “disability” means “with respect to an individual – (A) 

a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 

activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being 

regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); see generally 

Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing the definition of a 

disability in the context of the Rehabilitation Act). “[M]ajor life activities include 

. . . speaking.” § 12102(2)(A). 

In 2008, “Congress made significant changes to the ADA by enacting the 

ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (the ‘ADAAA’), which became effective on 

January 1, 2009,” Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1267 

(11th Cir. 2014), and prior to the initial injury to Plaintiff’s vocal cords. “Through 

the ADAAA, Congress broadened the definition of ‘disability,’ thereby broadening 

that term’s coverage, so that the definition of disability under the ADA would be 

interpreted consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a 

handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”9 Borwick v. Univ. 

of Denver, 569 F. App’x 602, 604 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted); see also Pub. L. No: 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 § 2(a) (3) (“[W]hile 

Congress expected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be 

 

9

The Rehabilitation Act, which was passed in 1973, used the term “handicap,” not 

“disability.” The 1992 amendments to § 794(a) substituted “disability” in place of “handicap.” 

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interpreted consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a 

handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation has 

not been fulfilled.”). In his arguments, Defendant has not acknowledged the 

ADAAA; however, given its stated purpose to expand the ADA’s coverage so as to 

align with that afforded under the Rehabilitation Act, the court finds that the 

ADAAA and its interpretative regulations are persuasive authority for defining 

“disability” for purposes of Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act discrimination claim. 

The ADAAA provides that the “definition of disability . . . shall be 

construed in favor of broad coverage.” § 12102(4)(A). Additionally, the

interpretive regulations set out that “the threshold issue of whether an impairment 

‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.” 

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii). Instead, “‘the primary object of attention in cases 

brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered by the ADA have 

complied with their obligations[.]’” Mazzeo, 746 F.3d at 1268 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12101 note).

The determination of whether “an individual is substantially limited in a 

major life activity” encompasses a “condition, manner, or duration” analysis:

[I]n determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a 

major life activity, it may be useful in appropriate cases to consider, as 

compared to most people in the general population, the condition 

under which the individual performs the major life activity; the 

manner in which the individual performs the major life activity; 

and/or the duration of time it takes the individual to perform the major 

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life activity, or for which the individual can perform the major life 

activity.

Id. § 1630.2(j)(4)(i).

Plaintiff contends that, because of the damage to her vocal cords caused by 

the ventilator, she is substantially limited in the major life activity of speaking. See

§ 12102(1)(A). To summarize, under subsection (A), an individual has a 

qualifying disability if he or she has (1) an impairment (2) that affects a major life 

activity and (3) substantially limits that major life activity. Defendant does not 

challenge that Plaintiff has a physical impairment that affects the major life activity 

of speaking. Accordingly, this portion of the definition of a disability is deemed 

satisfied.

Rather, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s impairment does not pose a 

substantial limitation on her ability to speak. Defendant categorizes Plaintiff’s 

asserted disability as a temporary condition, analogous to a spasm in a back muscle

or an operable knee injury, and argues that a temporary impairment does not 

qualify as one that is substantially limiting. Defendant focuses on Plaintiff’s 

testimony that her speaking ability has continued to improve as a result of the nine 

surgeries she has undergone over the course of nearly five years and on her 

admission that, during her employment, several judges could hear her in the 

courtroom without the aid of the amplification system. 

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To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must produce evidence from which 

a reasonable jury could find that her vocal cord damage substantially limited her

ability to speak. For the reasons that follow, she meets this threshold in light of the 

ADAAA’s broad construction of the phrase “substantially limits.” 

First, Plaintiff has presented medical evidence, although she is not required 

to do so, see § 1630.2(j)(1)(v), that the ventilator caused damage to her vocal cords

in August 2009, and that she remains under a doctor’s care for treatment of her 

persistent vocal cord injury. (See Pl.’s Medical Records (Ex. 7 to Doc. # 21).) 

Plaintiff further has testified that she has undergone nine surgeries over the course 

of her treatment, and her medical records reflect that, as of April 2014 (almost five 

years after the initial injury), (1) she still has multiple postoperative diagnoses

including “laryngeal insufficiency” and “chronic hoarseness,” (2) her voice 

remains “low,” “[r]aspy, and “still very weak” when there is “background noise,”

and (3) her “[v]oice quality [is] abnormal for patient’s age and gender.” (Apr.

2014 Clinic Notes.) The medical records indicate that for more than five years, 

Plaintiff’s voice has been affected detrimentally by the damage to her vocal cords 

caused by the ventilator, and a reasonable jury could find that nine surgeries later, 

Plaintiff’s voice still is not of the same volume or quality as that of the average 

person in the general population. See § 1630.2(j)(4)(i).

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Second, although Defendant focuses on Plaintiff’s testimony that at times 

the judges could understand Plaintiff in the courtroom when her microphone was

turned off, there is conflicting evidence. Prior to her alleged constructive 

discharge, both Mr. Robinson and Ms. Stone told Plaintiff that her voice “was an 

issue,” and Mr. Robinson told Plaintiff that some judges had a problem with her 

voice in the courtroom. (Jan. 30, 2013 meeting (audio recording).) Defendant also 

admits that Plaintiff’s voice posed “some degree of inconvenience” in that “[it] 

was at times difficult to hear her.” (Def.’s Aff., at 5.) Overall, the evidence 

creates a genuine dispute for trial as to whether Plaintiff’s speech was difficult to 

understand, particularly in the courtroom.

Third, there is evidence that contradicts Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff 

has suffered only a temporary impairment to her speaking ability. The evidentiary 

record tracks Plaintiff’s nearly five-year struggle with her voice difficulties. 

Although her voice quality has improved, the most recent clinical notes, as 

discussed, indicate that her voice remains impaired. Moreover, Defendant’s focus

on a temporal requirement loses efficacy in light of the ADAAA. Defendant relies 

on pre-ADAAA case law to argue that temporary impairments do not qualify as 

disabilities, but the ADAAA recognizes that “transitory and minor” impairments 

may constitute disabilities. See § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (“[T]he six-month ‘transitory’

part of the ‘transitory and minor’ exception to ‘regarded as’ coverage . . . does not 

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apply to the definition of ‘disability’ under . . . the ‘actual disability’ prong.”). The 

revised regulations interpreting the ADAAA also do not define “duration” in terms 

of the permanency of the impairment and, thus, call into question the continuing 

validity of pre-ADAAA case law focusing on the long-term effects of the 

impairment. See Moore v. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 979 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1261

(N.D. Ala. 2013) (concluding that by enacting the ADAAA, “Congress no longer 

intends for temporary impairments to be excluded from the definition of 

‘disability’”); see also § 1630.2(j)(4)(i) (defining “duration” not in terms of 

permanency of disability but in terms of the “duration of time it takes the 

individual to perform the major life activity, or for which the individual can 

perform the major life activity”). For these reasons, Defendant’s temporal 

arguments against a finding of a substantially limiting impairment are rejected.

In sum, the evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact whether 

Plaintiff’s voice is impaired to the extent that it substantially limits her ability to 

speak. Accordingly, whether Plaintiff is an individual with a qualifying disability

is for the jury to decide.10

(ii) Whether Plaintiff Is a Qualified Individual

“The term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with or without 

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment 

 

10 In light of this finding, it is unnecessary to address Plaintiff’s alternative argument that 

she is disabled because Defendant regarded her as having a speaking impairment. 

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position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The 

Eleventh Circuit has held that the inquiry of whether an individual is “qualified” 

for a job entails a two-step process. First, the individual must demonstrate 

“sufficient experience and skills, an adequate educational background, or the 

appropriate licenses for the job . . . .” Gary v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 206 F. 

App’x 849, 851–52 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 

1062 (11th Cir. 2000)). Second, the individual must show that he or she can 

perform the essential functions of the job, either with or without reasonable 

accommodations. See id.

Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff’s educational degrees, skills, and 

experience made Plaintiff a qualified assistant district attorney when he appointed 

her in 2004. He also confirms that Plaintiff performed her work satisfactorily as an 

assistant district attorney for the nearly five years preceding her hospitalization in 

August 2009. Defendant contends, however, that, after Plaintiff’s return to work in 

2009, her performance began to suffer and steadily deteriorated to the point that 

she no longer satisfied the minimum job requirements. Specifically, Defendant 

points to evidence of Plaintiff’s alleged shortcomings in “remembering significant 

events, following directions, organization, calendaring, preparation, attentiveness, 

and professionalism.” (Def.’s Summ. J. Br., at 17 (Doc. # 17).) Defendant 

contends, therefore, that, even if it is assumed that Plaintiff is disabled for purposes 

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of the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff is not qualified to perform “the basic tasks 

required for any [assistant district attorney]” (Def.’s Summ. J. Br., at 17) and, thus, 

is not a qualified individual within the meaning of § 12111(8). 

Although not addressed by the parties, a preliminary issue is whether the 

prima facie case should include an evaluation of Plaintiff’s qualifications. The 

Eleventh Circuit has observed that “the qualifications and experience that get a 

candidate hired for a job and the performance that is satisfactory enough for her to 

keep it are two different things.” Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., 610 F.3d 1253, 1265 

(11th Cir. 2010). When, as here, the employee’s performance “is bound up in the 

inquiry into whether [his or employer]’s proffered reason . . . was a pretext for 

discrimination,” the court may defer consideration of the employee’s performance 

until the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See id.; see also 

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 n.3 (11th Cir. 1997) (deferring 

consideration of plaintiff’s job performance to pretext stage of litigation). The 

court will exercise the deferral option here. 

(iii) Whether Plaintiff Was Constructively Discharged

The third element of the prima facie case requires the employee to show that 

he or she “has suffered an adverse employment action.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 

1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005). An adverse employment action is one that a 

reasonable person would find causes a “serious and material change in the terms, 

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conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 

1232, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Defendant does not dispute that had Plaintiff accepted one of the two 

employment options he offered her in January 2013, she would have suffered a 

loss in pay, benefits, and responsibilities. (See Def.’s Dep., at 125 (confirming that 

each option was a “demotion”)); see also Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970–

71 (11th Cir. 2008) (“An adverse employment action may be an ultimate 

employment decision, such as ‘termination, failure to hire, or demotion.’”

(emphasis added)). But, as Defendant points out, she accepted neither option. 

Defendant argues that instead, Plaintiff voluntarily resigned because she knew that 

she no longer fulfilled “the basic requirements of an [Assistant District Attorney]” 

and that a voluntary resignation is not an adverse employment action. (Def.’s 

Summ. J. Br., at 18.) Plaintiff disagrees, contending that she was forced to resign 

because the two options presented to her for part-time, non-supervisory

employment were degrading and humiliating. 

The issue is whether Plaintiff’s resignation was voluntary or tantamount to a 

constructive discharge. A constructive discharge occurs when working conditions 

are “so intolerable that a reasonable person in [the employee’s] position would 

have been compelled to resign.” Fitz v. Pugmire Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 348 F.3d 

974, 977 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The 

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Eleventh Circuit has observed that “[e]mployees may be constructively discharged 

by a demeaning demotion or transfer.” Stamey v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 859 F.2d 

855, 860 n.11 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 

134 (2004) (“[A]n employer-sanctioned adverse action,” such as a “humiliating 

demotion,” can qualify as a constructive discharge.). 

The parties have not addressed the cases discussing constructive discharge

as an adverse employment action. Nonetheless, on this record, a reasonable jury 

could find that a demotion to part-time, non-supervisory prosecutorial work in

juvenile court would be demeaning to a supervising assistant district attorney with 

almost a decade of experience prosecuting felony cases. Not only did each option

constitute a loss in pay, benefits, responsibilities, and arguably clout, each option 

also was temporary, ultimately resulting in Plaintiff’s separation from employment. 

A reasonable jury could conclude that the two employment options merely were a 

prologue to termination and that the temporary duration of the employment

options, from a reasonable employee’s perspective, added to the intolerableness of 

the working conditions. 

In sum, the evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

Defendant constructively discharged Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies the 

adverse employment action requirement of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie 

case.

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(iv) Whether Plaintiff Was Constructively Discharged 

Solely Because of Her Disability

Under the Rehabilitation Act, “[i]t is not enough for a plaintiff to 

demonstrate that an adverse employment action was based partly on his [or her] 

disability.” Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326. A plaintiff also must demonstrate that he or 

she “suffered an adverse employment action ‘solely by reason of’ his handicap.”

Id. (quoting § 794(a)). 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff “has failed to show that her claimed 

disability, her voice, was the sole reason for any adverse employment action.” 

(Def.’s Summ. J. Br., at 20.) Defendant’s arguments with respect to whether 

Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action solely because of her

disability again merges with Defendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for Plaintiff’s constructive discharge. As grounds for each, Defendant

contends that Plaintiff’s deteriorating job performance, not her voice, is the reason 

her employment ended, but that, even if the evidence permits the inference that her 

voice and her deteriorating job performance fueled the constructive discharge, 

“even one legitimate reason precludes a finding that the Defendant was motivated 

solely by reason of her disability.” (Def.’s Summ. J. Br., at 19.) 

The tension resulting from the “dovetail[ing]” of the first two stages of the 

McDonnell Douglas framework has been noted by the Sixth Circuit, which does 

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not engraft a causation requirement (i.e., discriminated against solely because of a 

disability) into the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case in ADA cases: 

“[W]hether the employee was, in fact, discharged because of the disability –

requires at the prima facie stage what the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework seeks to uncover only through two additional burden shifts, thereby 

rendering that framework wholly unnecessary.” Whitfield v. Tennessee, 639 F.3d 

253, 259 (6th Cir. 2011). One district court in the Eleventh Circuit also has 

weighed in on this issue. See Brandon v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Sys., 393 

F. Supp. 2d 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2005). The Brandon court concluded that the

formulation of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case in ADA cases in this 

circuit “is incorrect because if a plaintiff has proved that he was discriminated 

against because of his disability, he has actually proved his entire case (and he is 

entitled to have judgment entered in his favor), not simply made a prima facie 

showing.” Id. at 1345. Brandon observed nonetheless that, “[d]espite the way that 

the Eleventh Circuit has articulated this prong of the test, that court has never 

applied the prong as stated. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit has simply required a 

plaintiff to present facts from which an inference of discrimination can be made (as 

is true in all other discrimination cases).” Id. at 1346.

It is unnecessary to delve further into the tension noted by the Whitfield and 

Brandon courts or to decide the type of proof that would be sufficient in this circuit 

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to satisfy the causation element of the prima facie case’s fourth element. That is 

because Plaintiff survives summary judgment no matter at which stage of the 

McDonnell Douglas framework the sole-causation evidence is examined. For

efficiency, the court will examine the evidence one time at the pretext stage. The 

analysis proceeds, therefore, to the next stage of the McDonnell Douglas

framework.

(b) Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons for the Constructive 

Discharge

Defendant contends that it has offered “numerous legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment actions in this case.” 

(Def.’s Summ. J. Br., at 19.) In his affidavit submitted in support of summary 

judgment, Defendant has provided a detailed account of Plaintiff’s myriad postAugust 2009 job deficiencies that he says culminated in his decision to demote her

to part-time, non-supervisory employment. (See Def.’s Aff., at 2–8.) These 

reasons focus on Plaintiff’s perceived memory loss, violations of office policy, 

lack of professional judgment in handling cases with case agents and before the 

grand jury, and ineptness in managing the office. 

These reasons are not based upon Plaintiff’s speaking disability and are 

legitimate and nondiscriminatory. Accordingly, Defendant has satisfied his 

intermediate burden under McDonnell Douglas.

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(c) Pretext

In her summary judgment response, Plaintiff sets out two principal bases for 

establishing pretext. First, she relies on the recording of the January 30, 2013 

meeting, arguing that the chief deputy specifically said that “her voice” was a real 

concern with the judges. (Pl.’s Summ. J. Resp., at 6; Jan. 30, 2013 meeting (audio 

recording).) Second, Plaintiff points to the absence of contemporaneous 

documentation in her personnel file of job performance problems and the absence 

of documentation in her medical records of any memory loss. She contends that

“[t]he only documentation of any such [employment] problems is in affidavits 

created by the Defendant and his witnesses or employees for the purposes of this 

lawsuit and motion for summary judgment.” (Pl.’s Summ. J. Resp., at 13; see also

Pl.’s Summ. J. Resp., at 7 (arguing that there is no “contemporary documentation 

to support Defendant’s alleged legitimate nondiscriminatory [reasons]”).) 

Defendant contends that, at the very least, he has articulated at least one reason for 

constructively discharging Plaintiff that is unrelated to her disability and that, if 

both permissible and impermissible factors motivated the constructive discharge,

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the constructive discharge was “solely by reason 

of” her disability. 

It is true, as stated, that Plaintiff’s claim cannot survive under the 

Rehabilitation Act on proof of dual motives for the adverse employment action, see 

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40

supra note 5. Plaintiff also cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact “by 

simply quarreling” with the wisdom of Defendant’s belief that she no longer 

performed her job competently. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. She can create a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext, though, if she can demonstrate 

weaknesses or inconsistencies in the legitimate reason “so as to permit a rational 

jury to conclude that the explanation given was not the real reason,” Rioux, 520 

F.3d at 1279, but that disability discrimination was the sole reason. Plaintiff meets 

that burden, albeit barely, based on the following evidence demonstrating 

weaknesses and inconsistencies in the proffered legitimate reason focused on 

inferior job performance.

First, “[a] plaintiff may establish pretext by showing that an employer’s 

‘nondiscriminatory reasons were after-the-fact justifications, provided subsequent 

to the beginning of legal action.’” Williams v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 509 F. Supp. 

2d 1046, 1056 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (quoting Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. 

Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 2000)). While Defendant’s affidavit 

compellingly details myriad job performance deficiencies that legitimately would 

warrant Plaintiff’s demotion and ultimate termination, the affidavit, which was

submitted as a summary judgment exhibit, is dated July 14, 2014, and, thus, postdates this litigation. The timing of the affidavit raises a question as to its 

motivation because none of the reasons articulated by Defendant in his postCase 2:13-cv-00903-WKW-SRW Document 51 Filed 11/03/14 Page 40 of 56
41

litigation affidavit were specifically mentioned to Plaintiff in January 2013, as a 

reason for demoting Plaintiff to a temporary, part-time, non-supervisory position.

Additionally, there is evidence pre-dating Plaintiff’s constructive discharge that 

arguably is inconsistent with Defendant’s post-litigation affidavit. Namely, 

Defendant’s affidavit recites a pattern of performance problems beginning not long 

after Plaintiff’s return to work in 2009, and continuing until January 2013, but 

there also is evidence that, during the midst of Plaintiff’s alleged deteriorating job 

capabilities, Plaintiff received a special merit-based pay raise, which Defendant 

told Plaintiff was well deserved. (Mar. 23, 2011 email (Pl.’s Ex. 6).) 

Moreover, Defendant has not pointed to any writing created prior to 

Plaintiff’s constructive discharge that documents concerns with Plaintiff’s job 

performance. (See, e.g., Def.’s Dep., at 126 (admitting that he did not document 

the “things” he “named” that Plaintiff “allegedly had problems with, including 

alleged memory issues”).) Although the lack of contemporaneous documentation 

does not appear to be a procedural irregularity in Defendant’s practices and may 

not be sufficient by itself to establish pretext, it is noteworthy that Defendant’s 

post-litigation affidavit does not find corroboration in the pre-termination written 

record. It is the cumulative effect of the foregoing evidence that reveals 

weaknesses and inconsistencies in the legitimate reasons and creates a jury issue as 

to whether the reasons Defendant articulated in his affidavit about Plaintiff’s 

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performance problems “are the true reasons for the demotion or merely are 

‘pretextual post hoc justifications’ submitted in defense of this litigation.” 

Williams, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 1056 (quoting Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 56).

Second and relatedly, “an employer’s failure to articulate clearly and 

consistently the reason for [the adverse employment action] may serve as evidence 

of pretext.” Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 

(11th Cir. 2006). It is true that Chief Deputy Robinson, whom Defendant tasked to 

inform Plaintiff of her employment fate in January 2013, mentioned that there was 

other “stuff,” but he did not articulate the specifics of that “stuff,” other than to say 

that it was more than Plaintiff’s personality conflict with the grand jury 

administrator. As stated, the chief deputy did not inform Plaintiff that her 

demotion was based upon any of the detailed reasons Defendant subsequently set 

out in his summary-judgment affidavit, nor did the chief deputy mention Plaintiff’s 

alleged memory loss that is emphasized by Defendant, Ms. Stone, and others. The 

vagueness of the other “stuff” Chief Deputy Robinson conveyed to Plaintiff at the 

time of the adverse employment action creates a genuine dispute for trial as to 

whether the other “stuff” encompasses a true reason for Plaintiff’s constructive 

discharge.

Third, there is evidence that Plaintiff’s voice was a consideration in her 

constructive discharge. During the January 2013 meeting, Chief Deputy Robinson 

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devoted substantial discussion to Plaintiff’s voice. The chief deputy emphasized 

the dashed hopes that her voice would “get better” and the judges’ “concerns” 

about her voice, and emphasized that her voice was an impediment to her 

courtroom responsibilities. While Defendant says in his affidavit and confirms in 

his deposition that he “would never have allowed for [Plaintiff] to be terminated 

simply because of her vocal issues” (Def.’s Aff., at 6; Def.’s Dep., at 126–27), he 

does not address the arguable link between the chief deputy’s statements to 

Plaintiff that “[i]t’s just not working out” and that the judges have “concerns about 

your voice.” (Jan. 30, 2013 meeting (audio recording).) The statements made by 

Defendant’s chief deputy to Plaintiff during the January 2013 meeting about her 

voice cannot be ignored; they conflict with Defendant’s attempt to disclaim 

reliance on Plaintiff’s disability and raise a genuine dispute as to whether 

Plaintiff’s disability is the sole reason that prompted Defendant’s decision to 

adversely affect her employment.

The summary judgment record in its totality raises a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether Defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons for 

constructively discharging Plaintiff are false and whether disability discrimination 

is the real and sole reason for Defendant’s decision. See Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163; 

§ 794(a). At the same time, Plaintiff faces a challenging trial burden in light of the 

Rehabilitation Act’s sole-causation standard and the depth of the evidence from 

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multiple individuals recounting Plaintiff’s deteriorating job performance. For now, 

Plaintiff has submitted evidence that precludes summary judgment on her 

disability discrimination claim alleging a constructive discharge. Accordingly, 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is due to be denied.

B. Retaliation Under the Rehabilitation Act

The Rehabilitation Act “incorporates the anti-retaliation provision from 

§ 12203(a) of the ADA.” Morales v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., Div. of Family & 

Children, 446 F. App’x 179, 183 (11th Cir. 2011); see also §§ 791(g), 793(d), 

794(d).11 The ADA’s anti-retaliation provision provides that “[n]o person shall 

discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or 

practice made unlawful by this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). In turn, 

“[r]etaliation claims under the ADA are analyzed under the framework of Title 

VII.” Morales, 446 F. App’x at 183. Accordingly, as the Eleventh Circuit has 

observed, “We assess retaliation claims pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act under 

the framework we use in assessing Title VII retaliation claims.” Burgos-Stefanelli 

v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 410 F. App’x 243, 245 (11th Cir. 2011).

 

11 Section 794(d) provides: 

The standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a 

complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the 

standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 

U.S.C. 12111 et seq.) and the provisions of sections 501 through 504, and 510, of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12201 to 12204 and 

12210), as such sections relate to employment.

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Because the evidence submitted is circumstantial, Plaintiff’s retaliation 

claims also are governed by the McDonnell Douglas tripartite burden-shifting 

framework. Under the first part, a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of retaliation 

by showing that “(1) she engaged in an activity protected under [the Rehabilitation 

Act],” (2) “she suffered an adverse employment action,” and (3) “there was a 

causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment 

action.” Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970. Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot 

demonstrate elements (1) and (2) of the prima facie case. 

1. Protected Activity

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate “a single 

protected activity or expression that she engaged in to serve as the basis for any 

possible retaliation claim.” (Def.’s Summ. J. Reply, at 13 (Doc. # 25); see also

Def.’s Summ. J. Br., at 22–23 (contending that “Plaintiff cannot recall any specific 

complaints that she made”).) Plaintiff responds that she engaged in protected 

activities by (1) “complaining about disability discrimination” and by 

(2) “opposing the harassment [ ] by supervisors about her health.” (Pl.’s Summ. J. 

Resp., at 15.) The evidence upon which Plaintiff relies does not support her broad 

contentions.

Plaintiff provides a string citation to her deposition testimony (three pages of 

it) and the two audio recordings from the May 2012 and January 2013 meetings, 

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but without any analysis. She points to nothing in those evidentiary sources that 

shows that she complained about or opposed discrimination or harassment. The 

deposition transcript pages upon which she relies focus on the January 2013 

meeting and the humiliation she endured when Defendant did not give her the 

“common courtesy” to confront her directly with the two alternative employment 

options for nonsupervisory, part-time employment for a limited duration. (Pl.’s 

Dep., at 57–59.) There is no testimony contained in those three pages where 

Plaintiff said, “‘Stop it.’” (Pl.’s Summ. J. Resp., at 15 (stating that “an employee’s 

exclamation ‘Stop it’ or ‘I oppose it’ when made about discriminatory conduct is 

sufficient to invoke the protections of the ‘Opposition’ clause,” but citing no 

examples in the record where she made similar statements).) In fact, during her 

deposition, Plaintiff was unable to articulate any protected activities in which she 

engaged during her employment. When asked, she merely responded that she was 

a “criminal lawyer,” not a lawyer with expertise in employment law. (Pl.’s Dep., 

at 114.) 

Moreover, Plaintiff does not give one example of when or how she 

complained or opposed unlawful discrimination or harassment during the May 

2012 or January 2013 meetings. Instead, in her brief in the “facts” section, 

Plaintiff recites only what was said to her during these meetings. She does not 

indicate what she said during those meetings that she now contends qualifies as 

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protected activity on her part, and it is beyond the proper role of the court on 

summary judgment to guess what Plaintiff is attempting to argue qualifies as 

protected activity. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 

(11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments [on 

summary judgment].”). Accordingly, the retaliation claims fail because Plaintiff 

has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact that she engaged in any protected 

activity.

2. Adverse Employment Action

Defendant also contends that Plaintiff cannot show an adverse employment 

action to support her retaliation claims. To demonstrate an adverse employment 

action, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the 

challenged action materially adverse,” meaning that the action “might have 

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 

discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 

(2006) (defining adverse employment action under Title VII’s anti-retaliation 

provision). 

The Complaint’s retaliation count (Count II) alleges the following adverse 

employment actions: Defendant (1) “refused to permit [Plaintiff] to take FMLA 

leave” [Family and Medical Leave Act]; (2) “directed [Plaintiff] to continue 

working when he needed to exercise her right to an accommodation”; (3) “denied 

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[Plaintiff’s] accommodation consisting of provision of a microphone; 

(4) “disciplined [Plaintiff] for using medical leave”; (5) “threatened and 

intimidated [Plaintiff] for using medical leave and for requiring an 

accommodation”; and (6) “ended [Plaintiff’s] employment by forcing her to 

resign.” (Compl. ¶ 69; see also Pl.’s Summ. J. Resp., at 15.) Each action in 

(1) through (6) is treated as supporting a separate retaliation claim and is referred 

to as a “claim” below.

Plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment by resting on the allegations of 

her Complaint, but instead she must set forth evidence that shows a genuine 

dispute of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. She has failed to set forth 

such evidence with respect to claims (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) and, thus, for this 

additional reason, those retaliation claims fail.12 

(a) Claim (1)

Claim (1) fails because Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence to 

substantiate the allegation that she was subjected to an adverse employment action.

In the Order on Pretrial Hearing, Plaintiff stipulates that she “was provided with all 

the leave she requested and was never denied leave.” (Order on Pretrial H’rg, 

at 4.) She similarly admitted during her deposition that Defendant never refused 

any of her requests for leave (Pl.’s Dep., at 34), and, additionally, the record shows 

 

12 It is presumed that a constructive discharge qualifies as an adverse employment action 

under the retaliation framework, but Plaintiff points to no protected activity that was the impetus

for the constructive discharge. 

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that Defendant liberally gave Plaintiff leave and benefits to accommodate her

medical appointments and surgeries. Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant 

disallowed her to take FMLA leave are directly refuted by the evidence and her

stipulation. Plaintiff is left with an unsupported allegation and an argument in a 

brief. See United States v. Cardona, 302 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2002)

(“[A]rguments in brief are not evidence.”). Because Plaintiff has not raised a 

genuine dispute of material fact that she was subjected to an adverse employment 

action, claim (1) fails.

(b) Claims (2) and (3) 

Claims (2) and (3) are problematic because Plaintiff has not pointed to any 

evidence raising a genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant denied her 

requested accommodation. To the contrary, Plaintiff concedes that Defendant 

provided her the only accommodation she requested: an amplification system in 

the courtroom. (See Pl.’s Dep., at 39–40 (answering in the affirmative when asked, 

“So the accommodation you needed, which was a microphone and an amplification 

system, he provided; is that correct?”); see also Pl.’s Dep., at 36–37, 45, 53.) 

Without evidence to substantiate these alleged adverse employment actions, 

summary judgment is due to be entered in Defendant’s favor on claims (2) and (3).

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(c) Claim (4)

The adverse employment action underlying claim (4) is that Defendant 

disciplined Plaintiff for using medical leave. In her summary judgment response, 

Plaintiff does not explain or give an example of how she contends she was 

disciplined, nor does she provide any citation to evidence of any disciplinary 

measures imposed against her for using medical leave. Her deposition testimony 

reveals the contrary. When asked about “discipline,” Plaintiff admitted that she 

“never lost pay,” never lost benefits,” “never was asked to take leave without pay,” 

and was “never denied leave.” (Pl.’s Dep., at 111.) Plaintiff fails, therefore, to 

raise a genuine dispute of material fact that she was disciplined for using medical 

leave.

(d) Claim (5)

As grounds for claim (5), Plaintiff alleges that she was “threatened and 

intimidated . . . for using medical leave and for requiring an accommodation.” The 

adverse employment actions underlying claim (5), therefore, are threats and 

intimidation. Plaintiff’s summary judgment response again is bereft of any citation 

to the record of evidence that she contends amounts to threats and intimidation. 

Without providing the nature of the threats and intimidation, Plaintiff fails to 

present a factual foundation for evaluating whether the threats and intimidation 

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would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity.13 See 

Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate an adverse employment 

action to support claim (5).

C. Hostile Work Environment (Disability-Based and Retaliatory-Based)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of a 

disability-based or retaliatory-based hostile work environment claim. In an 

unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit has analyzed a hostile work environment 

claim under the Rehabilitation Act, borrowing the elements from the Title VII 

 

13 Defendant’s summary judgment brief points out that Plaintiff testified at her deposition 

that, although Defendant always granted her leave requests, he used a “tone” when she asked for 

medical leave. (Def.’s Summ. J. Br., at 8 (citing Pl.’s Dep., at 108 (mentioning Defendant’s 

“tone” when asked how she had been “threatened and intimidated and discouraged from using 

medical leave”).) Plaintiff does not rely on this evidence in her summary judgment response. 

She also does not cite any authority that Defendant’s “tone” would be sufficient to demonstrate 

an adverse employment action. The argument is deemed abandoned and, alternatively, lacks 

support in case law.

Plaintiff also contends that Defendant threatened and intimidated her for requiring an 

accommodation. The court is cognizant that, in this circuit, an employee engages in statutorily 

protected activity in requesting an ADA accommodation if he or she “had a good faith, 

objectively reasonable belief that he [or she] was entitled to those accommodations under the 

ADA.” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Kelley 

v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 2013) (“Requesting an accommodation is 

protected conduct under the ADA’s retaliation provision.”). Even if Plaintiff had argued that her 

request for a microphone in the courtrooms was protected activity, Plaintiff points to no factual 

basis, as discussed, that any threats or intimidation followed this request, which Defendant 

undisputedly granted. As to the constructive charge, the sole adverse employment action that 

finds factual support in the record, it occurred on January 30, 2013, almost a year after Plaintiff 

requested a microphone in the courtrooms upon her reassignment to Chilton County in February 

2012. Plaintiff does not attempt to link her request for a microphone to her constructive 

discharge and appropriately so. Under Eleventh Circuit case law, “[e]ven a three-month interval 

between the protected expression and the employment action . . . is too long” to establish

causation for purposes of the prima facie case. Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 

1182 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1221 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(holding that, by itself, three months was insufficient to prove causation on a retaliation claim). 

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playbook. Burgos, 274 F. App’x at 842. The court will do the same. A plaintiff 

makes out a prima facie case of hostile work environment by showing 

(1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she was subjected to 

unwelcome harassment or retaliation; (3) that the harassment or 

retaliation was based upon a protected characteristic . . . ; (4) that the 

harassment or retaliation was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 

the terms and conditions of her employment; and (5) there is a basis 

for holding her employer liable.

Manley v. Dekalb Cnty. Ga., ___ F. App’x ___, 2014 WL 4346815 (11th Cir. 

2014) (citing Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir.

2002)); see also Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding 

as a matter of first impression that “this circuit recognizes a cause of action for 

retaliatory hostile work environment” under Title VII).

1. Disability-Based Hostile Work Environment 

Defendant contends that there is no evidence that he or any of his employees 

were “mean or hostile” to Plaintiff on the basis of her disability (Def.’s Summ. J. 

Br., at 17), and that, when asked at her deposition, Plaintiff could not provide any 

examples of incidents establishing that she was subjected to a hostile work 

environment on the basis of her disability (Def.’s Summ. J. Reply, at 2, 12). 

Defendant’s arguments hammer directly on the fourth element. 

In her summary judgment response, Plaintiff does not address the elements 

of a hostile-work-environment claim based upon a disability or “formulate 

arguments” about this claim, which she is required to do on summary judgment. 

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Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d at 599. Rather, she says in cursory fashion that 

there are audio “recordings of the harassment by supervisors regarding her health.” 

(Pl.’s Summ. J. Resp., at 13; see also Pl.’s Summ. J. Resp., at 3 (facts section) 

(referring generically to the audio recordings of the May 2012 and January 2013 

meetings as revealing the “threaten[ing]” and demeaning workplace to which she 

was subjected).) Elsewhere in her brief, Plaintiff describes the May 2012 meeting 

as a “46[-]minute verbal harassment and rant . . . almost entirely about her health.” 

(Pl.’s Summ. J. Resp., at 5–6.) This evidence fails to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to the severe-or-pervasive element’s objective component.

Under the fourth element of the prima facie case, the plaintiff’s workplace 

must have been “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult 

that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 

employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., 

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 

Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1311 (11th Cir. 2012) (same). The objective 

component of the fourth element takes into consideration the allegedly 

discriminatory or retaliatory conduct’s “frequency; its severity; whether it is 

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”14 Reeves v. C.H. 

 

14 There also is a subjective component, which in light of the court’s findings need not be 

addressed. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (The victimized 

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Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 809 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation 

marks and ellipses omitted). The objective severity or pervasiveness “should be 

judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.” Id.

A review of the audio recordings and the entire summary-judgment record 

points to the conclusion that, from an objective standpoint, no reasonable jury 

could find that Plaintiff’s office environment was saturated with discriminatory 

conduct that was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of 

Plaintiff’s employment and create a hostile working environment. Plaintiff points 

to no evidence that Defendant ridiculed or insulted her based upon her disability or 

that he or his employees physically threatened Plaintiff. Plaintiff focuses on Ms. 

Stone’s comments during the May 2012 meeting and the treatment she endured 

during the January 2013 meeting. While some of the comments made in the May 

2012 and January 2013 meetings plainly were based upon Plaintiff’s disability and 

perhaps were directed toward Plaintiff through “screaming” (Pl.’s Dep., at 101), 

the comments made during these two meetings held eight months apart and over 

the course of Plaintiff’s nearly four-year employment after her August 2009 

hospitalization do not rise to the level of severe or pervasive as a matter of law.

 

employee “must subjectively perceive the harassment as sufficiently severe [or] pervasive to 

alter the terms or conditions of employment, and this subjective perception must be objectively 

reasonable.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

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2. Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment

For at least three reasons, Plaintiff’s retaliatory hostile work environment 

claim fails. First, a retaliatory hostile work environment claim requires evidence 

that the employer subjected the employee to a hostile work environment in 

retaliation for the employee’s protected activity.

15

 See Gowski, 682 F.3d at 1312. 

In Part IV.B.2., the court found that Plaintiff has not shown that she engaged in any 

activity protected by the Rehabilitation Act; therefore, her retaliatory hostile work 

environment claim also must fail. Second, Plaintiff points to no evidence of any 

actions that “were sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions 

of employment,” as discussed above, which is an additional reason why her 

retaliatory hostile work environment claim cannot survive summary judgment. 

Third, the totality of Plaintiff’s argument is that she suffered “a hostile work 

environment as a result of her having complained of disability discrimination.”

(Pl.’s Summ. J. Resp., at 1.) Such a cursory argument cannot support a claim.

3. Summary

It is Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate a prima facie case, see Freeman v. 

City of Riverdale, 330 F. App’x 863, 865 (11th Cir. 2009), and Defendant properly 

has employed the summary judgment procedure to show that Plaintiff “cannot 

produce admissible evidence to support” claims for a retaliatory and disability-

 

15 For purposes of this opinion, it is assumed, without deciding, that a retaliatory hostile 

work environment claim is cognizable under the Rehabilitation Act. 

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based hostile work environment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims cannot survive summary judgment 

under the Rehabilitation Act, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will 

be granted on these claims.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment (Doc. # 16) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as 

follows: 

(1) GRANTED on Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim alleging the 

denial of a reasonable accommodation;

(2) DENIED on Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim alleging 

constructive discharge; 

(3) GRANTED on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims; and

(4) GRANTED on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims 

(disability-based and retaliatory-based). 

DONE this 3rd day of November, 2014.

/s/ W. Keith Watkins

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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