Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01986/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01986-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

O’KEEFE’S, INC,

Plaintiff,

v

JOHN MORIARTY & ASSOCIATES OF

FLORIDA, INC,

Defendant. /

No C 07-1986 - VRW

ORDER

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of contract

suit for lack of personal jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(2) and

improper venue under FRCP 12(b)(3). Because the court finds these

matters suitable for determination without oral argument, the

hearing scheduled for July 12, 2007, is VACATED. See Civ LR

7-1(b). For the following reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss

(Doc #5) is DENIED in its entirety. 

//

//

Case 3:07-cv-01986-VRW Document 20 Filed 07/23/07 Page 1 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The parties dispute a number of facts pertinent to the

present motion. The immediately following facts are not in

dispute. Plaintiff is a California corporation with headquarters

in San Francisco, California. Doc #1 at ¶1; Doc #14 (Heagney decl)

at ¶2. Plaintiff develops and manufactures fire and safety glazing

for a range of glass products. Doc #14 at ¶2. On October 26,

2005, plaintiff entered into a contract to produce glass and

glazing for windows at the Las Olas Beach Club (a building project

in Fort Lauderdale, Florida) for defendant, a general contracting

and construction management company specializing in luxury highrise buildings. Doc #1 at ¶ 2. Defendant is a Massachusetts

corporation with its principal place of business in Hollywood,

Florida. Id. 

The parties’ relationship went sour. Defendant installed

plaintiff’s glass and claims to have “discovered defects in

[plaintiff’s] products in the form of obstructions in the glass

portions of the assemblies,” Doc #5 at 3, which may affect “the

Florida hurricane wind criteria and fire rating of the assemblies.” 

Doc #6 at ¶ 15. Defendant ceased making payments to plaintiff for

the glass, leaving an outstanding balance of $165,698.50. Doc #1

at ¶ 13. In response, plaintiff brought the present suit.

Here the disputes begin. Plaintiff relies on a sales

order purportedly accepted by defendant’s Matthew Rier. Doc #1, Ex

A. The sales order attaches “Standard Terms and Conditions” that

apply California law. Id. According to plaintiff, defendant’s

vice president, Malcolm MacInnes, visited plaintiff’s San Francisco

office to discuss the products involved and thereafter traveled to

plaintiff’s Merced workshop to review specifications and product

Case 3:07-cv-01986-VRW Document 20 Filed 07/23/07 Page 2 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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testing. Doc #14 (Heagney decl) at 2-3. The project manager

working with defendant allegedly traveled to California at least

twice to consult about the products and their design and testing. 

Id at 3. Rier denies signing the sales order, Doc #17 (Rier decl)

at 2, and claims to lack authority to bind defendant. The only

California trip, defendant asserts, was prior to the first shipment

when “a representative” of defendant visited to discuss the

products. Doc #6 (Leete decl) at 3. Plaintiff shipped unfinished

products to Florida where they were installed. Id at 3. 

I

A

FRCP 12(b)(2) governs motions to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff has the burden of establishing

that the court has personal jurisdiction over defendant. Gator.com

Corp v LL Bean, Inc, 341 F3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir 2002); Doe v

Unocal Corp, 248 F3d 915, 922 (9th Cir 2001) (citing Cubbage v

Merchent, 744 F2d 665, 667 (9th Cir 1984), cert denied, 470 US 1005

(1985)). In assessing plaintiff’s showing, the court may consider

evidence presented in affidavits and other evidence procured

through the discovery process. But when the court acts on the

motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, plaintiff need only

make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the

motion to dismiss. Unocal, 248 F3d at 922; AT&T v Compagnie

Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F3d 586, 588 (9th Cir 1996). If not squarely

controverted, plaintiff’s version of the facts must be taken as

true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’

affidavits should be resolved in favor of plaintiff. Unocal, 248

Case 3:07-cv-01986-VRW Document 20 Filed 07/23/07 Page 3 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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F3d at 922; AT&T, 94 F3d at 588. For this reason, most of the

factual disputes defendant raises afford little or no support for

its motion. 

To exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant, the court must first determine that “‘a rule or statute

potentially confers jurisdiction over the defendant and then

conclude that asserting jurisdiction does not offend the principles

of Fifth Amendment due process.’” Unocal, 921-22 (9th Cir 2001),

quoting Go-Video, Inc v Akai Electric Co, Ltd, 885 F2d 1406, 1413

(9th Cir 1989). This means that the court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over a party when such jurisdiction comports with the

law of the state in which the court sits and when such jurisdiction

comports with the requirements of due process. Lee v City of Los

Angeles, 250 F3d 668, 692 (9th Cir 2001); Alexander, 939 F2d at

850; see Unocal, 248 F3d at 922. California law permits the court

to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party on any basis not

inconsistent with the constitutions of California or the United

States. Cal Code Civ Proc § 410.10. Hence, California law permits

the court to exercise jurisdiction “to the full extent permitted by

due process.” Gator.com, 341 F3d at 1076 (internal quotations and

citation omitted). Due process requires that defendant have

certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that maintenance

of the suit will not offend “traditional conceptions of fair play

and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co v Washington, 326

US 310, 320 (1945). Defendant’s “conduct and connection with the

forum state” must be such that defendant “should reasonably

anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen v

Woodson, 444 US 286, 297 (1980). 

Case 3:07-cv-01986-VRW Document 20 Filed 07/23/07 Page 4 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.

General jurisdiction exists if “there are substantial or continuous

and systematic contacts with the forum state, even if the cause of

action is unrelated to those contacts.” Gator.com, 341 F3d at 1076

(internal quotations and citation omitted). The standard for

establishing such general jurisdiction is “‘fairly high.’” Id,

quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc v Augusta Nat'l, Inc, 223 F3d 1082,

1086 (9th Cir 2000). Even if such substantial and continuous

contacts exist, the court must also determine that the exercise of

jurisdiction is reasonable. Gator.com, 341 F3d at 1077; see

Glencore Grain Rotterdam BV v Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co, 284 F3d

1114, 1125 (9th Cir 2002). 

In the absence of general jurisdiction, plaintiff may

assert personal jurisdiction over defendant by proving specific

jurisdiction. Under this test, plaintiff need not establish

substantial and continuous contacts with the forum state; rather,

plaintiff need only establish that defendant had some contact with

the forum state. See Unocal, 248 F3d at 923. The critical

question for specific personal jurisdiction is “‘whether the cause

of action arises out of or has a substantial connection with that

[contact].’” Unocal, 248 F3d at 923, quoting Hanson v Denckla, 357

US 235, 250-53 (1958). As with general jurisdiction, the court

must also determine that the exercise of jurisdiction is

reasonable. Glencore, 284 F3d at 1125; Alexander, 939 F2d at 850. 

In its motion to dismiss, defendant contends that it is

not amenable to either general or specific jurisdiction due to its

lack of physical presence in California and lack of significant

forum-related activities. Doc #5 at 3-5. Given that the extent of

Case 3:07-cv-01986-VRW Document 20 Filed 07/23/07 Page 5 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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defendant’s contacts with California appears to be related to the

contract at issue, it is reasonable to assume that defendant lacks

the kind of substantial and continuous contacts necessary to

sustain a finding of general jurisdiction. See Gator.com, 341 F3d

at 1076. 

Rather than contest the general jurisdictional issue,

plaintiff instead contends that specific jurisdiction is proper

over defendant in this case. See Doc #13 at 4:15-7:25. The Ninth

Circuit has developed a three-factor test in evaluating specific

jurisdiction: (1) whether defendant has purposefully availed itself

of the privileges of conducting activity in the forum; (2) whether

the claim arises out of or results from defendant’s forum-related

activities; and (3) whether the exercise of jurisdiction is

reasonable. Glencore, 284 F3d at 1123; Unocal, 248 F3d at 923;

Haisten v Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd, 784 F2d

1392, (9th Cir 1986). 

With respect to the first requirement, the court must

engage in a “‘qualitative evaluation of the defendant's conduct

with the forum state.’” Core-Vent Corp v Nobel Industries, AB, 11

F3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir 1993), quoting Lake v Lake, 817 F2d 1416,

1421 (9th Cir 1987). This purposeful availment inquiry “ensures

that a nonresident defendant will not be haled into court based

upon ‘random, fortuitous or attenuated’ contacts with the forum

state.” Panavision Int'l LP v Toeppen, 141 F3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir

1998), quoting Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 475

(1985). 

 Because defendant has not squarely controverted facts

showing that defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege

Case 3:07-cv-01986-VRW Document 20 Filed 07/23/07 Page 6 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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of conducting business in California, the motion must be denied, at

least on the present record. Defendant acknowledges that “the

architect’s plans specified [plaintiff] as the supplier for these

glass and metal assemblies to be installed in the project.” Doc #6

at ¶11. In compliance with this requirement, defendant contacted

plaintiff in San Francisco, California to seek its participation in

the building project. Id. Defendant does not controvert that it

negotiated terms and communicated with employees of plaintiff by

telephone, email and facsimile. Doc #14 at ¶3. Defendant’s vice

president, Malcolm MacInnes, executed a purchase order for the

product in question. Doc #18 (Leete decl), Ex A. Defendant does

not deny visiting plaintiff’s manufacturing plant in Merced,

California. Doc #14 at ¶5; Doc #6 at ¶14. Taken together, these

facts demonstrate that defendant’s alleged breach of contract is

directed at California in “more than a random, fortuitous, or

attenuated way.” ESAB Group, Inc v Centricut, Inc, 126 F3d 617,

625 (4th Cir 1997). 

 The parties wage a battle of declarations over whether 

“Standard Terms and Conditions” that plaintiff contends governs

their relationship is a forgery. But this is a dispute the court

need not evaluate; plaintiff has established without dispute enough

facts to support specific jurisdiction. Unocal, 248 F3d at 922;

AT&T, 94 F3d at 588. 

Next, plaintiff must demonstrate that the claim it

asserts in this litigation arises out of defendant’s forum-related

activities. Glencore, 284 F3d at 1123; Panavision, 141 F3d at

1322. This inquiry requires that plaintiff establish that its

injury would not have occurred “but for” defendant’s conduct

Case 3:07-cv-01986-VRW Document 20 Filed 07/23/07 Page 7 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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directed toward plaintiff in California. Glencore, 284 F3d at

1123; Panavision, 141 F3d at 1322. In the case at bar, this

requirement is easily satisfied. Defendant’s alleged breach of

contract caused plaintiff injury in California, and this particular

injury would not have occurred “but for” defendant’s alleged

breach. 

The final step in the specific jurisdictional inquiry is

whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Gator.com, 341

F3d at 1077; see Glencore, 284 F3d at 1125. When defendant has

been shown purposefully to have directed its activities toward the

forum state, “‘there is a presumption of reasonableness * * *

[that] the defendant bears the burden of overcoming by presenting a

compelling case that jurisdiction would be unreasonable.’” 

Columbia Pictures, 106 F3d at 289, quoting Haisten, 784 F2d at

1397. While there is no precise or mechanical method to determine

whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, the Ninth

Circuit has instructed that the district court assess the following

factors: 

 (1) the extent of defendant’s purposeful interjection into

the forum state’s affairs; 

(2) the burden on defendant of litigating in the forum; 

 (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of

defendant's home state; 

 (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; 

 (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the

controversy; 

 (6) the importance of the forum to plaintiff's interest in

convenient and fair relief; and 

Case 3:07-cv-01986-VRW Document 20 Filed 07/23/07 Page 8 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 (7) the existence of an alternate forum. 

Glencore, 284 F3d at 1125; see also Olsen v Gov't of Mexico, 729

F3d 641, 649-51 (9th Cir 1984). 

 The court’s determination that defendant has

purposefully directed its activities toward California is

sufficient to resolve the first factor in favor of jurisdiction. 

Haisten, 784 F2d at 1400-01; MGM, 243 F Supp 2d at 1092. 

 In connection with the second factor – the burden on

defendant in litigating in California – defendant argues that it is

a small company with no contacts in California. While it is true

that these facts cut against jurisdiction, it is also true that

“‘modern advances in communications and transportation’” have

significantly reduced the burden of litigating outside one’s home

state. MGM, 243 F Supp 2d at 1093, quoting Sinatra v Nat'l

Enquirer, Inc, 854 F2d 1191, 1198-99 (9th Cir 1991 ); see also

Panavision, 141 F3d at 1323. This is especially true given that

defendant is a resident of the United States, as opposed to a

resident of a foreign country. This factor thus presents a weak

basis for declining jurisdiction. 

The third factor is the potential for conflicts with the

sovereignty of another state. Unlike a situation in which the

defendant is from a foreign nation, the sovereignty barrier is not

particularly high when the defendant is merely from another state. 

Cf Amoco Egypt Oil Co v Leonis Navigation Co, 1 F3d 848, 851 (9th

Cir 1993). Forcing a Florida resident such as defendant to

litigate in California, poses little threat to Florida’s

sovereignty. 

// 

Case 3:07-cv-01986-VRW Document 20 Filed 07/23/07 Page 9 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 With respect to the fourth factor, “California maintains

a strong interest in providing an effective means of redress for

its residents who are * * * injured.” Core-Vent, 11 F3d at 1489.

As California is plaintiff’s primary place of business, this factor

weighs in favor of jurisdiction.

 The fifth factor – the interest of judicial efficiency – 

requires the court to evaluate where the witnesses and evidence are

likely to be located. See Core-Vent, 11 F3d at 1489. The court

may also compare the relative efficiency of alternative forums. It

is likely that witnesses and evidence will be located both in

California and Florida, given that witnesses and evidence regarding

plaintiff’s products and manufacturing facilities and defendant’s

work relating to the Las Olas Beach Club project are likely

relevant to resolving this case. This factor is therefore neutral

and favors neither side. 

 The sixth factor — plaintiff's interest in convenient

and fair relief — weighs in favor of jurisdiction. California is a

convenient forum for plaintiff, as plaintiff’s principal place of

business is located here. And given the frequency with which

California courts are faced with breach of contract claims,

California is certainly well-suited to providing plaintiff with

appropriate relief for its injuries, should such relief be

warranted. 

 The final factor regarding the existence of an

alternative forum fails to cut in plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff

bears the burden of proving the unavailability of an alternative

forum. Core-Vent, 1 F3d at 853; see Panavision, 141 F3d at 1324. 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated the unavailability of an alternative

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United States District Court

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forum, such as defendant's home state of Florida. Plaintiff's

failure to meet this factor, however, would be significant only if

other factors weighed against jurisdiction. MGM, 243 F Supp 2d at

1094 (citing, for example, Corporate Inv Business Brokers v

Melcher, 824 F2d 786, 791 (9th Cir 1987). Given that none of the

other factors tilts significantly in defendant’s favor, the

availability of Florida is not of much consequence in this case. 

 In sum, the court finds that defendant has failed to

make a compelling showing that jurisdiction would not be reasonable

in this case. Accordingly, the court concludes that personal

jurisdiction over defendant is appropriate and reasonable and thus

DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) (Doc

#5). 

B

Defendant also argues that venue is improper in this

district and that the case should therefore be dismissed pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(3). Under 28 §§ 1391©, “[a] defendant that is a

corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in

which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action

is commenced.” Because this court has personal jurisdiction over

the defendant, venue is proper in this district. Further, the

basis for personal jurisdiction is the effects of defendant’s

actions on plaintiff in San Francisco, California - a city located

within this district. Accordingly, venue in this district is

proper, and the court must DENY defendant's Rule 12(b)(3) motion to

dismiss as well. 

//

Case 3:07-cv-01986-VRW Document 20 Filed 07/23/07 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Finally, defendant urges the court to transfer this case

to the Southern District of Florida, even if jurisdiction and venue

are proper, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and

the interest of substantial justice. As noted above, however, many

of the events relevant to this case took place in California and

several key witnesses reside in California. Plaintiff, a

California corporation whose facilities are located in California,

has all documents concerning its manufacturing process and sales

information in this district. Transfer to Florida would prove

inefficient and the burden on defendant to litigate here is not

undue. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to transfer under 28 USC §

1404(a) is DENIED. 

III

 For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES defendant’s

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper

venue (Doc #5). The court also VACATES the July 12, 2007, hearing

on these motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:07-cv-01986-VRW Document 20 Filed 07/23/07 Page 12 of 12