Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01942/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01942-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD SANSONE, 

 Plaintiff,

 v.

J. C. THOMAS, 

 Defendant.

1:13-cv-01942-DAD-EPG-PC

 

ORDER FINDING COGNIZABLE 

CLAIMS 

ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO EITHER:

 (1) FILE SECOND AMENDED

 COMPLAINT, OR

 (2) NOTIFY COURT OF HIS

 WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

 ONLY WITH EXCESSIVE

 FORCE CLAIMS AGAINST

 DEFENDANTS THOMAS AND

 JOHN DOE #1

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Richard Sansone (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed an original Complaint 

commencing this action on December 2, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) The Court1previously found on a 

screening order that Plaintiff stated a claim against Defendant Thomas for excessive force in 

 

1 The prior sceening order was issued by Magistrate Judge Gary Austin.

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violation of the Eighth Amendment. In that prior complaint, Plaintiff had asserted an unrelated 

claim that was dismissed by the Court with leave to amend.

Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint reasserts his excessive force claim against 

Defendant Thomas, and the Court affirms that Plaintiff states a claim against Defendant 

Thomas. Plaintiff‟s amended complaint also asserts claims against various Doe defendants. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff states a claim for excessive force against Defendant John Doe #1, 

but fails to state any other claim against any of the other Doe defendants. Additionally, 

Plaintiff‟s amended complaint includes a cause of action for violation of due process on the 

ground that prison officials failed to adequately address his prison grievances. The Court finds 

that Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim against any of the defendants.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 

(2007)). While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken as true, courts Aare not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.@ Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual 

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matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id. 

III. SUMMARY OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR), brings this civil rights action against Defendant Correctional Officer 

J.C. Thomas, an employee of the CDCR at Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff also names five

unnamed Doe defendants: a dental assistant, a correctional officer, a correctional sergeant, an 

appeals coordinator, and a warden. The events at issue in this lawsuit occurred while Plaintiff 

was housed at Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Thomas subjected him to 

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition on cruel and unusual 

punishment. He also claims that a dental assistant failed to provide him with medical care, that 

a correctional officer and correctional sergeant subjected him to excessive force, and that the 

appeals coordinator and warden violated his rights to due process.

Plaintiff alleges that on October 22, 2013, he was escorted to the Dental Clinic by 

Defendant Thomas. Plaintiff alleges that he was irritated with the dental assistant because she 

was asking him questions that he had already answered. In particular, the dental assistant 

allegedly asked questions “such as why plaintiff was convicted of, the reason for his housing, 

and why he felt he was entitled to any dental care and treatment.” (ECF No. 27, at p. 4.) 

Plaintiff became irritated and the questions and asked to be returned to his cell.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Thomas then approached Plaintiff and “grabbed 

Plaintiff‟s shirt and state[d] „I‟m gonna fuck you up!‟” (ECF No. 27, at p. 4.) Defendant 

Thomas then forceably pulled Plaintiff to his feet and “then threw Plaintiff to the floor in a 

unprovoked attack and hit Plaintiff with full force with his fist to the jaw.” (ECF No. 27, at p. 

5.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Doe #1 then “pounced on Plaintiff‟s neck with his 

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knee while Thomas drove his knee with his full weight to Plaintiff‟s back causing shooting pain 

from the neck to lower back.” (ECF No. 27, at p. 5.) Plaintiff did not receive emergency 

medical care for approximately three hours “until after repeated pleas for help to Defendant 

John Doe #2.” 

Plaintiff next alleges that the appeals coordinator and warden denied him due process 

and blocked his access to the courts. In particular, he states that he filed an administrative 

appeal on October 26, 2013. (ECF No. 27, at p. 6.) Plaintiff received no response. He then 

submitted the appeal directly the the warden, but again received no response. 

IV. EXCESSIVE FORCE

The Eighth Amendment prohibits those operating our prisons from using “excessive 

physical force against inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Hoptowit v. Ray, 

682 F.2d 1237, 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982) (prison officials have “a duty to take reasonable 

steps to protect inmates from physical abuse”); see also Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 741 

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 (1989). “Being violently assaulted in prison is 

simply not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”' 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

The Court‟s prior screening order concluded that Plaintiff set out a claim for excessive 

force against Defendant Thomas. (ECF No. 9, at p. 3.) (“The Court finds that Plaintiff has 

alleged facts that state a colorable claim for relief against Defendant Thomas for excessive 

force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”). This Court affirms this decision and holds that 

Plaintiff‟s Amended Complaint states a claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment against Defendant Thomas.

The Court finds that Plaintiff‟s complaint also states a claim for excessive force against 

Doe Defendant #1. Plaintiff alleges “Defendant John Doe #1 then pounced on Plaintiff‟s neck 

with his knee while Thomas drove his knee with his full weight to Plaintiff‟s back causing 

shotting pain from the neck to lower back.” (ECF No. 27, at p. 5.) While much of the context 

is missing and the Doe defendant is not identified, the Court finds that taking Plaintiff‟s 

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allegations as true and liberally construing Plaintiff‟s complaint, Plaintiff states a claim against 

John Doe #1 for excessive force. 

V. INDIFFERENCE TO MEDICAL NEEDS

A prison official's deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical need constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976); Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1398 

(9th Cir. 1998). To state a deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner plaintiff must allege both 

that the deprivation of medical care in question was objectively serious and that the defendant 

official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 

111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991). A “serious” medical need arises if the failure to 

treat the plaintiff could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.” Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104 (internal quotation omitted); Wilhem v. Rotman, 

680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012).

A sufficiently culpable state of mind exists when prison officials “deny, delay or 

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 

physicians provide medical care.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted); Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 

1988) (citing Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05); see also, e.g., Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 

1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). In either 

case, however, the indifference to the inmate's medical needs must be purposeful and 

substantial; negligence, inadvertence, or differences in medical judgment or opinion do not rise 

to the level of a constitutional violation. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Franklin v. Oregon State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Jane Doe #1 for 

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff‟s medical needs. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jane Doe 

#1, who is a dental assistant, asked Plaintiff questions that had no relation to Plaintiff‟s dental 

care needs, including why plaintiff was convicted. Plaintiff then became irritated and asked to 

be returned to his cell. (ECF No. 27, at 4.) The Court finds that Plaintiff‟s allegations do not 

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amount to an objectively serious level of medical care. Nor do Plaintiff‟s allegations indicate 

that Jane Doe #1‟s failure to treat the plaintiff, at least without further questioning, could result 

in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” While Jane 

Doe #1‟s alleged questioning appears inappropriate and irritating, Plaintiff left after being 

questioned. Defendant Jane Doe #1 did not deny medical care, nor did Plaintiff suffer a serious 

medical injury from failing to receive medical care at that time.

Similarly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant John Doe 

#2 for deliberate indifference. Plaintiff alleges that “though Plaintiff complained of sever [sic] 

pain and immobility, he was denied emergency examination for approximately three hours until 

after repeated pleas for help to defendant John Doe #2.” While the delay in treatment may have 

caused Plaintiff to suffer unnecessary pain, Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind for Defendant John Doe #2.

VI. DUE PROCESS

The Court also finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of due process 

against John Doe #3, the appeals coordinator, or John Doe #4, the warden. Defendants= actions 

in responding to Plaintiff=s appeals, alone, cannot give rise to any claims for relief under section 

1983 for violation of due process. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Ramirez's claimed loss of a liberty interest in the processing of his appeals does not satisfy 

this standard, because inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison 

grievance procedure.”); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (“There is no 

legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure.”).

To state a claim for denial of access to courts under the First Amendment, a plaintiff 

must show that he has suffered an actual injury as a result of the alleged interference. Lewis v. 

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). In other words, the 

plaintiff must be able to show that the deprivation has directly impacted the relevant litigation 

in a manner adverse to him. Id. at 348 (defining “actual injury” as “actual prejudice with 

respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or 

to present a claim.”). Plaintiff has not made such a showing.

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Thus, since he has neither a liberty interest, nor a substantive right in inmate appeals, 

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for the processing and/or reviewing of his 602 inmate 

appeals. The procedural guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments‟ Due Process 

Clauses apply only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. See

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 

(1972); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 

827 (9th Cir. 1997); Erickson v. United States, 67 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1995); Schroeder v. 

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1995); Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 

1993).

Plaintiff‟s allegations may become relevant if and when Defendants choose to challenge 

Plaintiff‟s exhaustion of administrative remedies, but Plaintiff does not set out an independent 

claim for violation of due process. The Court is reviewing Plaintiff‟s complaint and so Plaintiff 

has access to the Court now.

VII. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court finds that Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint states cognizable claims 

against Defendants Thomas and John Doe #1 for excessive force. However, Plaintiff fails to 

state any other claims upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. 

Plaintiff shall be required to either file a Second Amended Complaint, or notify the 

Court of his willingness to proceed only on the excessive force claim against Defendants 

Thomas and John Doe #1 found cognizable by the court. Should Plaintiff choose to proceed 

only on the cognizable excessive force claims, the Court will begin the process to initiate 

service upon Defendant Thomas.2

Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, the Second Amended Complaint 

should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each named defendant did that led to 

 

2 Unidentified, or "John Doe" defendants must be named or otherwise identified before service 

can go forward. AAs a general rule, the use of >John Doe= to identify a defendant is not favored.@ Gillespie v. 

Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff is advised that John Doe or Jane Doe defendants cannot be 

served by the United States Marshal until Plaintiff has identified them as actual individuals and amended his 

complaint to substitute names for John Doe or Jane Doe. For service to be successful, the Marshal must be able to 

identify and locate defendants.

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the deprivation of Plaintiff=s constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones 

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual 

matter . . . to >state a claim that is plausible on its face.=@ Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555). There is no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his 

or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant

personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis 

added). Plaintiff should state clearly, in his own words, what happened and how each 

defendant‟s actions violated the particular right described by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purposes of adding allegations of events occurring or claims arising after the original 

Complaint was filed on December 7, 2013. Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by 

adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 

(7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). In addition, Plaintiff should take care to include 

only those claims that were administratively exhausted before he filed the initial Complaint on 

December 7, 2013. 

If Plaintiff decides to file a First Amended Complaint, he is advised that an amended 

complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F. 3d 896, 907 

n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete in itself without reference to the 

prior or superceded pleading. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is filed, the prior

complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in 

an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled ASecond Amended 

Complaint,@ refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of 

perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk=s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall 

either:

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(1) File a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified in 

this order, or

(2) Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and is instead willing to proceed only on the cognizable 

excessive force claims against defendants Thomas and John Doe #1

discussed above; 

3. Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the 

amended complaint ASecond Amended Complaint@ and refer to the case number 

1:13-cv-01942-DAD-EPG-PC; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action may be dismissed for 

failure to comply with a Court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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