Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01616/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01616-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSO BAILEY; 

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv1616 WQH (WVG)

ORDER

vs.

ELDERS, JOHNS, CHIEF OF POLICE

FOR THE CITY OF EL CAJON, ACE

TOWING,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the (1) Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Ace

Towing (ECF No. 9), (2) Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Elders, Johns, and Pat

Sprecco as Chief of Police for the City of El Cajon (ECF No. 10), (3) Motion for Sanctions

filed by Plaintiff Russo Bailey (ECF No. 11), and (4) Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

Plaintiff Russo Bailey (ECF No. 21). 

BACKGROUND

On July 22, 2011, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action

by filing a Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). The Complaint asserts six

“causes of action” and eight “claims for relief” against Defendants Elders, Johns, the Chief of

Police for the City of El Cajon, and Ace Towing. (ECF No. 1). 

On September 19, 2011, Defendant Ace Towing filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.

9) and Defendants Elders, Johns, and Pat Sprecco as Chief of Police for the City of El Cajon

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filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10). The two motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 9, 10) are

identical and both contain a Request for Judicial Notice in Support of the Motion to Dismiss. 

On October 7, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. (ECF No. 12). On October 17, 2011,

Defendants Elders, Johns, and Sprecco filed a Reply (ECF No. 14) and Defendant Ace Towing

filed a reply (ECF No. 15). The two replies (ECF Nos. 14, 15) are identical. 

On October 7, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions. (ECF No. 11).

On February 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 21). 

 On March 14, 2012, Defendants filed an affidavit in opposition. (ECF No. 22).

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

On May 22, 2011, Defendants Elders and Johns searched and seized Plaintiff’s property

without cause or warrant while Plaintiff was inside a nearby McDonald’s restaurant. (ECF No.

1 at ¶ 10). Defendant Elders “violently attacked Plaintiff without provocation, binding the

hands of Plaintiff intentionally to cause an incision and swelling of his right hand.” Id. 

Defendants Elders and Johns committed vandalism and armed robbery of Plaintiff’s vehicle,

taking “government documents, personal papers, garments, art work, electronic equipment,

tools, radio, cameras, bedding, cooking utensils, food, and books.” Id. at ¶ 11. “Plaintiff was

then kidnapped and taken against his will to a jail cell” where he was “held for three days in

jail without cause and never charged with a public offense.” Id. 

On May 26, 2011, Plaintiff was informed by Defendants Chief of Police for the City of

El Cajon and Ace Towing “that he will not regain possession [of] his vehicle” because he

“does not own the vehicle in question,” even though Plaintiff produced the title to the vehicle. 

Id. at ¶ 12. Defendant Ace Towing “did carjack” Plaintiff’s vehicle and “sold the property for

economic gain.” Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.

The Complaint asserts six “causes of action” and eight “claims for relief” against

Defendants, generally alleging the following: robbery of plaintiffs personal property,

carjacking of his vehicle, kidnapping, assault and excessive force by arresting officers during

arrest, false arrest, warrantless search and seizure, and failure to investigate, supervise or

discipline officer misconduct by the City of El Cajon.

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DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a) provides: “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal

theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To sufficiently state a claim for relief and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint

“does not need detailed factual allegations” but the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). When considering a motion to

dismiss, a court must accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). However, a court is not “required to accept as

true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable

inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “In sum,

for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and

reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the

plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations

omitted).

II. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 9, 10)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994), because Plaintiff plead guilty to the conduct which resulted in his arrest,

seizure of property, and imprisonment. (ECF No. 10 at ¶ 5). Plaintiff contends that his

Complaint is not barred by Heck and that Plaintiff has not been accused or convicted of any

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crime. (ECF No. 12 at 4). Plaintiff contends that Heck does not cover claims of theft, kidnap,

carjack, or false imprisonment. Id. 

The Supreme Court has held that if a judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a §1983 claim

would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, then the §1983 claim must be

dismissed. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). The Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit has applied the ruling in Heck to conclude that “if a criminal conviction arising

out of the same facts stands and is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for

which section 1983 damages are sought, the 1983 action must be dismissed.” Smithart v.

Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff seeking damages for an unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment under section 1983 “must prove that the conviction or sentence

has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim for damages that has

not been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question “is not cognizable under

section 1983.” Id. at 487. The doctrine in Heck applies to both pending charges and actual

convictions. Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2000). Heck also applies

to charges of unlawful or false arrest. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380

(9th Cir. 1998).

In Nuno v. County of San Bernardino, the plaintiff alleged that defendants detained and

arrested him without cause, falsely accused plaintiff of committing a crime, and committed

assault and battery upon him without justification. 58 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 

The plaintiff also alleged that the County had unconstitutional customs and practices in

employing the police officers pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658 (1978). The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Heck,

because the plaintiff entered a plea of no contest to California Penal Code §148, resisting an

officer, and §12025(a), carrying a concealed firearm. Nuno, 58 F.Supp.2d at 1132. The court

also dismissed the action under Monell because of plaintiff’s plea, holding that plaintiff’s

allegations, if proven, would imply the invalidity of his conviction. Id. The court noted that

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the plaintiff’s allegations of excessive force during his arrest, if proven, would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his resisting arrest conviction. Id. at 1132.

A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias

v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285

F.3d 801, 803 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Court takes judicial notice that, on May 25, 2011,

Plaintiff was charged in San Diego Superior Court with violations of California Penal Code

§148(a)(1), resisting an officer and § 647(e), unauthorized lodging, in connection with

Plaintiff’s May 22, 2011 arrest. (Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit 1; ECF No.

9-2 and 10-2 at 4-5). The Court takes judicial notice that, on May 25, 2011, Plaintiff plead

guilty to the charge of California Penal Code §148(a)(1) and admitted that, on May 22, 2011,

he “resisted an officer in the performance of his duty.” (Id., Exhibit 2; 9-2 and 10-2 at 7-10). 

Plaintiff’s claims arise from his lawful arrest on May 22, 2012 and the subsequent

impound of the vehicle he alleges to own. Plaintiff’s lawful arrest on May 22, 2012, resulted

in conviction on May 25, 2012, for resisting arrest and illegal lodging. This conviction has

not been reversed, expunged, declared invalid or called into question by a writ of habeas

corpus. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. The Court finds that Heck bars Plaintiff’s claims for

kidnapping, assault, excessive force and false arrest, along with Plaintiff’s claims for robbery,

carjacking, warrantless search and seizure, and failure to supervise. Any judgment in favor of

Plaintiff in this matter would imply the invalidity of his conviction. Plaintiff’s claims under

§ 1983 must be dismissed according to Heck v. Humphrey.

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 11)

Plaintiff contends that Defendants rely on “false pretense and false documents” in

moving to dismiss the Complaint and that the Motion to Dismiss is frivolous. (ECF No. 12 at

2, 10). Defendants contend that the Motion for Sanctions fails to establish that Defendants

brought the Motion to Dismiss for an improper purpose. (ECF No. 14 at 2).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) provides that by presenting a “pleading, written

motion, or other paper,” an attorney or party certifies the following:

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(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing

law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing

existing law or for establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so

identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for

further investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if

specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

Rule 11 places “stringent notice and filing requirements on parties seeking sanctions.” 

Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2005). A motion for sanctions must “describe

the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Additionally,

Rule 11 contains a “safe harbor” provision which requires the party seeking sanctions to give

the opposing party 21 days notice to withdraw or otherwise correct the offending paper before

filing the motion for sanctions. Id. at 678; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). The Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit enforces the safe harbor provision “strictly” and will reverse any award

of sanctions when the moving party fails to comply with the safe harbor provisions “even when

the underlying filing is frivolous.” Id. at 678; see also Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254

F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that plaintiff’s informal warnings did not satisfy the

“strict requirement that a motion be served on the opposing party twenty-one days prior to

filing.”).

Plaintiff served Defendants with the Motion for Sanctions on October 5, 2011 and filed

the Motion for Sanctions with the Court on October 7, 2011. (ECF Nos. 13, 11). Only two

days elapsed from the time Plaintiff served Defendants with the Motion for Sanctions and the

time Plaintiff filed the Motion for Sanctions with this Court. Plaintiff’s motion consists of two

sentences that reference the Court to Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss

as support for the motion for sactions. (ECF No. 11). The Motion for Sanctions fails to 

“describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b)” and fails to comply with the

safe harbor rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Accordingly, the Motion for Sanctions is denied

///

///

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CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Ace Towing

(ECF No. 9) and Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Elders, Johns, and Chief of Police for

the City of El Cajon (ECF No. 10) are GRANTED. The Complaint is dismissed pursuant to

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff

Russo Bailey (ECF No. 21) is DENIED as moot. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Sanctions filed by Plaintiff Russo

Bailey (ECF No. 11) is DENIED. 

DATED: March 22, 2012

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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