Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-00172/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-00172-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CORA MADRID, )

) No. CIV 03-172 PCT RCB

Plaintiff, ) 

) O R D E R

vs. ) 

)

APACHE COUNTY, et. al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

On May 20, 2003, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging

that (1) her former employer, Apache County (the "County"), had

impermissibly retaliated against her for having filed a sexual

harassment complaint and (2) her former supervisor, Melody Capps,

had intentionally interfered with her employment relationship with

the County. Am. Compl. (doc. # 5). On July 6, 2005, the Court

issued an order granting in part Defendants' motion for summary

judgment (doc. # 43) and disposing of Plaintiff's Title VII claim

against the County. Order (doc. # 57). Plaintiff's intentional

interference claim of against Capps is the only remaining claim. 

See id. A trial before this Court is scheduled to begin on June 

Case 3:03-cv-00172-ECV Document 94 Filed 05/09/06 Page 1 of 16
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12, 2006. Currently pending before the Court are Capps's four

motions in limine (doc. ## 71-74), Plaintiff's motion in limine

(doc. # 75), and Capps's motion for leave to file a sur-reply (doc.

# 85) opposing Plaintiff's motion in limine. All motions have been

fully briefed. Having carefully considered the arguments raised,

the Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff worked for the County from 1985 until her

termination on February 23, 2001. Pl.'s Statement of Facts (doc. 

# 48) ("PSOF") ¶ 1. In February of 1997, Plaintiff complained to

the County Manager that she had been sexually harassed by the

County Human Resources Director. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Thereafter, she was

denied a position with the County's Adult Probation Department and

instead was transferred to the County Assessor's Office. Id. ¶ 3. 

On March 7, 1997, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination

against the County alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. Id.

¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that the County Assessor retaliated against

her further by taking such actions as instructing other employees

not to talk with or help Plaintiff and assigning her menial duties. 

Id. ¶ 5. In February of 1998, the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission ("EEOC") issued Plaintiff a reasonable cause

determination letter and a notice of right to sue. Id. ¶ 6. 

However, she did not bring suit within the ninety-day time limit. 

Defs.' Statement of Facts (doc. # 44) ("DSOF") ¶ 4.

Plaintiff alleges that in November of 2000 she ran against

Defendant Capps for the position of County Assessor. PSOF ¶¶ 7-8. 

Prior to the election, Capps exhibited hostility toward Plaintiff. 

Id. ¶ 9. Capps told others that if she was successful in the

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election she would terminate Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 10. Capps was

elected and took office in January of 2001. Id. ¶¶ 7, 11-14. On

February 23, 2001, Capps terminated Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 15.

Plaintiff appealed her termination pursuant to County policy. 

See Resp. (doc. # 76), Ex. B. On July 24, 2001, hearing officer

Donna Grimsley, who has since become a Superior Court judge in

Apache County, issued a report upholding her termination. Id. The

hearing officer's report sets forth "factual findings" as well as

"conclusions of law" in support of the decision. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Capps intentionally interfered with her

contractual relationship with the County by terminating her in

2001. Am. Compl. (doc. # 5). A jury trial on this claim is set to

commence on June 12, 2006. In addition to her own testimony,

Plaintiff expects to call former County employee Randy Andrews as a

fact witness. Pretrial Order (doc. # 69). Andrews had apparently

maintained a romantic relationship with Capps while he was employed

by the County and, following his resignation, filed an EEOC claim

against the County. Andrews Dep. at 8:18-9:12, 101:23-102:7. In

addition to her own testimony, Capps expects to call Clarence

Bigelow, Anna Prentice, and Doug Muell, Ph.D., an employee of the

Arizona Counties Insurance Pool. Pretrial Order (doc. # 69).

Capps has filed four motions in limine to preclude Plaintiff

from eliciting testimony regarding, or making any reference to, the

following matters: Andrews's EEOC claim (doc. # 71), the romantic

relationship between Capps and Andrews (doc. # 72), Plaintiff's

1997 EEOC complaint and the circumstances surrounding her transfer

to the County Assessor's Office (doc. # 73), and Arizona Counties

Insurance Pool or the fact that defense witness Doug Muell, Ph.D.,

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works for the insurance pool (doc. # 74). Plaintiff opposes only

the latter two of these motions. Resp. (doc. ## 77-80).

Plaintiff has filed one motion in limine (doc. # 75) to

preclude Capps from making any reference to her appeal of her

termination or to the hearing officer's determination with regard

to that appeal. Mot. (doc. # 75). Capps has requested leave to

file a sur-reply opposing this motion. Mot. (doc. # 85). The

Court considers each of these motions in turn.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Testimony Regarding Andrews's EEOC Claim

Capps contends that testimony regarding Andrews's EEOC claim

would not be relevant to Plaintiff's claim of intentional

interference with employment relations and, therefore, should be

excluded at trial. Mot. (doc. # 71). Plaintiff does not oppose

this motion. Resp. (doc. # 80). Accordingly, Capps's motion will

be granted. Plaintiff may not elicit testimony regarding Andrews's

EEOC claim.

B. Romantic Relationship Between Capps and Andrews

Capps argues that evidence of her romantic relationship with

Andrews would also be irrelevant to the pending dispute and that

Plaintiff should therefore be precluded from eliciting testimony

regarding, or making any reference to, that relationship. Mot.

(doc. # 72). As Plaintiff has no objections, see Resp. (doc. 

# 79), this motion will also be granted.

C. Plaintiff's 1997 EEOC Complaint and the Circumstances 

 Surrounding Her Transfer to the County Assessor's Office

Capps claims that evidence of Plaintiff's 1997 EEOC complaint

and the circumstances surrounding her transfer to the Assessor's

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Office will be irrelevant to the sole issue proceeding to trial--

whether Capps intentionally interfered with Plaintiff's employment

relationship with the County. Mot. (doc. # 73). Alternatively,

Capps argues that the evidence should be excluded because its

probative value will be substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice. Id.

1. Relevance

Relevant evidence is presumptively admissible. Fed. R. Evid.

402. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401.

Plaintiff maintains that evidence of her 1997 EEOC complaint

and transfer to the Assessor's Office will be relevant for two

purposes. First, it will explain why she was working in the

Assessor's Office at the time she was terminated. Second, she

expects to demonstrate that defense witnesses Clarence Bigelow and

Anna Prentice were hostile toward her as a result of her having

filed an EEOC complaint, thereby establishing bias to challenge the

witnesses' credibility. Resp. (doc. # 77) at 2. Capps contends

that the evidence must still be excluded because (1) the background

information Plaintiff hopes to provide will not be relevant to any

of the elements of the tort of intentional interference with

employment relations and (2) "Plaintiff's desire to challenge the

credibility of two witnesses does not make the subject evidence

'relevant.'" Reply (doc. # 81) at 2.

To establish a prima facie case of intentional interference

with business relations under Arizona law, Plaintiff must prove

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1

 Capps's motion (doc. # 73) only mentions the first four of

these elements.

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that she had a valid contractual relationship, that Capps had

knowledge of that relationship, that Capps intentionally interfered

inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship,

and that she was damaged as a result. See Wagenseller v.

Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025, 1041 (1985)

(citation omitted), superseded in part by Ariz. Rev. Stat. §

23-1501 (2003). In addition, Plaintiff must show that Capps

interfered with an improper motive as determined in consideration

of the following seven factors:

(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,

(b) the actor's motive,

(c) the interests of the other with which the

actor's conduct interferes,

(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the

actor,

(e) the social interests in protecting the

freedom of action of the actor and the

contractual interests of the other,

(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's

conduct to the interference and

(g) the relations between the parties.

See id. at 1042-43 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767)

(1979). Finally, as the Court previously noted, Plaintiff must

prove that Capps acted outside the course and scope of her

employment with the County.1

 See Order (doc. # 57) at 11-13.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's background purposes are

relevant because a meaningful presentation of the facts will

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require context. Moreover, evidence of bias to attack a witness's

credibility is also relevant.

Evidence helpful in evaluating the credibility

of a witness is of consequence to the

determination of the action. Evidence is

relevant to a matter of consequence to the

determination of the case if it has a mere

tendency to impeach a witness' credibility by a

showing of bias or coercion.

United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000); see

also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.)

("[I]it is permissible to impeach a witness by showing his bias

under the Federal Rules of Evidence just as it was permissible to

do so before their adoption.").

2. Unfair Prejudice

Even if relevant, Capps argues that evidence of Plaintiff's

1997 EEOC claim and her transfer to the Assessor's Office may be

excluded at trial "if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury." Fed. R. Evid. 403. Capps's

motion relies solely on the assumption that "such testimony is not

germane to the determination of the necessary elements," and does

not mention which Rule 403 concerns are to be averted See Mot.

(doc. # 73) at 2-3. In her reply, she explains for the first time

that the EEOC's reasonable cause determination could confuse the

issues and mislead the jury by drawing attention to the allegations

of sexual harassment which are not at issue in this case. Reply

(doc. # 81) at 2-3. The Court agrees. In the absence of an

evidentiary link between Capps's conduct and the fact of the EEOC's

reasonable cause determination as to Plaintiff's 1997 claim, the

probative value of the determination would be so slight as to be

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2

 The Court is aware that in Title VII cases the Ninth Circuit

has considered the EEOC's reasonable cause determinations to be per

se more probative than prejudicial, essentially precluding Rule 403

balancing in most instances. See Plummer v. W. Int'l Hotels Co.,

Inc., 656 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Michael D. Moberly,

Admission Possible: Reconsidering the Impact of EEOC Reasonable Cause

Determinations in the Ninth Circuit, 24 Pepp. L. Rev. 37, 44-49

(1996) (reviewing Ninth Circuit law regarding admissibility of EEOC

reasonable cause findings). However, the Court concludes that it has

discretion in this case to exclude the EEOC's reasonable cause

determination under Rule 403 notwithstanding Plummer, because this is

no longer a Title VII action. See Order (doc. # 57) at 15 (granting

summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff's Title VII claim against

the County). The only claim proceeding to trial is for intentional

interference with employment relations, making the narrow rule set

forth for Title VII claims in Plummer inapplicable. See id.

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substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. 

Capps's motion in limine (doc. # 73) will be granted in part

and denied in part. Plaintiff will be precluded from introducing,

or making any reference to, the EEOC reasonable cause

determination.2

 For background purposes, the Court will allow a

brief indication of the fact that (1) charges of sexual harassment

and retaliation, apparently unrelated to Capps, were filed with the

EEOC on March 7, 1997 in connection with alleged conduct occurring

in the County's Human Resources Department, (2) in February of

1997, Plaintiff complained to the County Manager regarding that

alleged conduct, and (3) following her complaint to the County

Manager, Plaintiff applied for and was denied a position with the

County's Adult Probation Department and was subsequently

transferred to the County Assessor's Office, apparently by decision

of the County Board of Supervisors. No extensive discussion of the

EEOC claim will be permitted for background purposes. The parties

may wish to consider a stipulation to be read to the jury. Any

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further elaboration of these circumstances, which may be admitted

for impeachment purposes against Clarence Bigelow and Anna

Prentice, will be subject to a limiting instruction pursuant to

Rule 105 that the evidence relates only to the witnesses'

credibility and may not be considered in determining Plaintiff's

claim against Capps. The parties shall have until the close of the

first day of trial to submit a proposed limiting instruction.

D. Arizona Counties Insurance Pool and Its Employment 

 of Doug Muell, Ph.D.

Based on Rules 401, 402, and 403, Capps also seeks to preclude

Plaintiff from eliciting testimony about, or making any reference

to, Arizona Counties Insurance Pool or the fact that defense

witness Dr. Muell works for the insurance pool. Mot. (doc. # 74)

at 2-3. Plaintiff responds that any such reference would not be

for a prohibited purpose, but for the purpose of proving bias to

attack the witness's credibility in a manner permitted by Rule 411. 

Resp. (doc. 78) at 2.

As discussed above, evidence of bias to attack a witness's

credibility is relevant. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 51; Hankey, 203

F.3d at 1171. While proof of the fact that a party did or did not

have liability insurance is generally inadmissible, it may be

admitted for the limited purpose of proving a witness's bias or

prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 411; see also Conde v. Starlight I, 103

F.3d 210, 214 (1st Cir. 1997) (". . . Rule 411 does permit mention

of insurance coverage, not to prove negligence, but collaterally to

show the possible bias or prejudice of a witness.") (internal

quotations and citations omitted); Charter v. Chleborad, 551 F.2d

246, 249 (8th Cir. 1977) (reversing district court for refusal to

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allow testimony regarding insurance because fact that witness was

employed by defendant's insurer was admissible under Rule 411 to

show witness's possible bias); cf. Zanetti Bus Lines, Inc. v. Hurd,

320 F.2d 123, 129 (10th Cir. 1963) (stating that on crossexamination jury was entitled to hear about interest of person to

whom plaintiff's witness had made a statement, i.e., that listener

of that statement represented an insurance company); but cf. Larez

v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing and remanding

for new trial due to district court's inappropriate instruction

advising jury to consider defendant's indemnification by City

specifically for the purpose of assessing damages).

Plaintiff's purpose in eliciting testimony about Dr. Muell's

employment by Arizona Counties Insurance Pool to establish bias is

highly probative to the witness's credibility. The Court is not

convinced by Capps's unelaborated assertion that the probative

value of this evidence going to the witness's credibility is so

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that it

must be excluded.

Capps's motion in limine (doc. # 74) will therefore be denied. 

Plaintiff may make a limited inquiry into Dr. Muell's employment by

Arizona Counties Insurance Pool for impeachment purposes, subject

to a limiting instruction pursuant to Rule 105 that the evidence

relates only to the witness's credibility and may not be considered

in determining Plaintiff's claim against Capps. The parties shall

have until the close of the first day of trial to submit a proposed

limiting instruction.

. . .

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E. Plaintiff's Appeal of Her Termination and the Hearing 

 Officer's Determination

Plaintiff has filed one motion in limine to preclude Capps

from making any reference to her appeal of her termination or to

the hearing officer's determination with regard to that appeal. 

Her motion is based on the following grounds: (1) the hearing

officer lacks personal knowledge to testify to such matters, Fed.

R. Evid. 602, (2) such testimony will not be relevant to the issues

raised by Plaintiff's claim of intentional interference, Fed. R.

Evid. 401, 402, and (3) the probative value of such evidence will

be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and

confusion of the issues, Fed. R. Evid. 403. Mot. (doc. # 75).

1. Personal Knowledge

"A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is

introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has

personal knowledge of the matter." Fed. R. Evid. 602. On this

foundational issue, Capps argues that it is sufficient for the

hearing officer to have had first hand knowledge of the statements

made by witnesses who in turn had first hand knowledge of the

matters set forth in her report. Resp. (doc. # 76) at 4-5. The

Court accepts Capps's explanation, but takes note that her argument

implicitly acknowledges that the report would constitute hearsay.

2. Relevance

The upcoming trial involves a single claim of intentional

interference with business relations. The elements of that claim

are set forth in Part II.C.1, supra. Plaintiff maintains that the

issues that must be decided in resolving that claim are different

from the issues that were decided on the appeal of her termination. 

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Mot. (doc. # 75) at 3. Capps points out that the evidence will be

probative to the issues of (1) whether she had acted with an

improper motive and (2) whether she had acted outside the course

and scope of her employment. See Resp. (doc. # 76) at 5-6. 

Plaintiff's reply offers no rejoinder on the issue of relevance. 

Reply (doc. # 83). The Court accepts Capps's theory of relevance. 

The fact that the hearing officer did not specifically address a

claim of intentional interference does not dispel the relevance of

her report as it relates to the elements the jury must consider in

evaluating Plaintiff's claim.

3. Unfair Prejudice

Plaintiff urges that, even if the fact of her appeal and the

hearing officer's determination were found to be relevant, such

evidence should be excluded at trial because its probative value

will be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. Mot. (doc. # 75)

at 3-4. Capps raises two arguments in response.

First, Capps invokes the hearsay exception of Rule 803(8)(C)

for public records and reports, apparently in an effort to show

that the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically contemplate and

invite the admission of evidence such as the hearing officer's

report. Resp. (doc. # 76) at 2-4. She suggests that, under

Plaintiff's Rule 403 argument, "no public report would ever come

into evidence, effectively eviscerating Rule 803(8)(C)." Resp.

(doc. # 76) at 9. The Court disagrees. The balancing test of Rule

403 is well suited to distinguishing between admissible and

inadmissible reports. Indeed, it would be more limiting to allow

the unflinching application of a narrow hearsay exception to

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"eviscerate" the Court's discretionary powers under Rule 403. Cf.

United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1982)

(although otherwise admissible under Rule 803(8)(C), report was

properly excluded where it would confuse the issues and distract

jury from ultimate issue of case).

Second, Capps contends that "Plaintiff's Rule 403 argument

assumes that the Hearing Officer's findings are irrelevant or

marginally relevant." Id. This may be, but does not render

Plaintiff's Rule 403 argument meritless. The evidence may be

probative, but the danger of unfair prejudice is manifest. The

determinative nature of the report greatly increases the

possibility of prejudicing the jury. The jury may find it

difficult to independently evaluate evidence of Capps's conduct

when presented with a report that purports to have examined the

same evidence and found no impropriety. This danger is made more

palpable by the manner in which the report is fashioned in the

style of a judicial opinion, complete with pleading caption,

"findings of fact," and "conclusions of law." See id., Ex. B. 

Finally, the hearing officer's acknowledgment that her findings

were made in the face of "hotly contested facts" further

underscores the importance of preserving those issues for the jury,

untinctured by evidence donning the mantle of judicial authority. 

See id., Ex. B at AC001055.

In light of the foregoing considerations, Plaintiff's motion

in limine (doc. # 75) will be granted in part and denied in part. 

The Court will allow a brief indication of the fact that (1)

Plaintiff appealed her termination pursuant to County policy and

(2) her termination was upheld after a hearing. Again, the parties

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may wish to consider a stipulation to be read to the jury. The

hearing officer may not be called to testify, and any further

elaboration as to the hearing officer's name, title, or the

contents of her report will not be permitted unless, in the context

of the evidence presented at trial, Plaintiff should desire that

the report be admitted.

F. MOTION TO FILE SUR-REPLY

Although Plaintiff's motion in limine (doc. # 75) raises no

hearsay objection, Capps's response relies heavily on the hearsay

exception of Rule 803(8)(C) for public records and reports. Resp.

(doc. # 76) at 2-4. Plaintiff's reply attempts to demonstrate why

Rule 803(8)(C) should not apply. See Reply (doc. # 83) at 1-2. As

a result, Capps now seeks leave to file a sur-reply addressing

Plaintiff's Rule 803(8)(C) arguments. Mot. (doc. # 85).

In the absence of a hearsay objection by Plaintiff, any

consideration of the applicability of a hearsay exception is

premature. Moreover, the hearing officer's report, which would

arguably have constituted hearsay, will be largely excluded for the

Rule 403 reasons set forth in Part II.E.3, supra. Accordingly,

Capps's motion for leave to file a sur-reply (doc. # 85) will be

denied and dismissed as moot.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the forgoing analysis,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's motion in limine to preclude

Plaintiff from eliciting testimony regarding the EEOC claim Randy

Andrews filed (doc. # 71) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion in limine to

preclude Plaintiff from eliciting testimony regarding, or making

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any reference to, the romantic relationship between Melody Capps

and Randy Andrews (doc. # 72) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion in limine to

preclude Plaintiff from testifying about, or making any reference

to, her 1997 EEOC complaint and the circumstances surrounding her

transfer to the Assessor's Office (doc. # 73) is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part. Such evidence may be admitted in a manner

consistent with this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion in limine to

preclude Plaintiff from eliciting testimony, or making any

reference to, Arizona Counties Insurance Pool or the fact that Doug

Muell, Ph.D., works for the insurance pool (doc. # 74) is DENIED. 

Such evidence may be admitted in a manner consistent with this

order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion in limine to

preclude any reference to Plaintiff's appeal of her termination or

the hearing officer's determination (doc. # 75) is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part. Such evidence may be admitted in a manner

consistent with this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion for leave to

file a sur-reply (doc. # 85) is DENIED and dismissed as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall have until the

close of the first day of trial to submit proposed limiting

. . .

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instructions contemplated by Parts II.C and II.D of this order.

DATED this 9th day of May, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record

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