Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_04-cv-03261/USCOURTS-alnd-2_04-cv-03261-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD WILSON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JRHBW, INC., d/b/a

REALTYSOUTH and USS

REAL ESTATE, a Division of

UNITED STATES STEEL

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:04-CV-3261-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

This lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff Edward Wilson (“Wilson”) on November

18, 2004. (Doc. #1). Subsequently, Wilson filed two amended complaints. (Doc. #5;

Doc. #11). The undersigned inherited this case by way of reassignment on February

15, 2005. (Doc. #15). As a result of prior rulings, the sole claim remaining in this

case is one for discriminatory discharge on the basis of race in violation of Title VII

and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Doc. #22; Doc. #23).

The court has before it Defendant JRHBW, Inc. d/b/a RealtySouth’s

(“RealtySouth”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #37) and Defendant United

States Steel Corporation’s (“USS”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #39), both

FILED

 2006 Dec-01 AM 09:01

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 1 of 16
Also pending before the court are Defendants’ Motion to Strike Entire 1

Summary Exhibit (Doc. #55), Motion to Strike Additional Affidavits (Doc. #57), and

Defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Summary Judgment Evidence (Doc. #58), all

of which were filed on October 13, 2006. The nature of the court’s decision on

summary judgment does not turn upon the evidence challenged in these motions.

Accordingly, and for the purposes of summary judgment only, they are due to be

denied as moot. 

2

of which were filed on July 17, 2006. Both motions have been fully briefed and are 1

ripe for a decision. For the reasons explained below, the court concludes that

RealtySouth’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be denied, and that USS’s

Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R .CIV. P.

56(c). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved

in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th

Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). 

A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case maintains the ultimate burden

of proving that the adverse employment decision was made because of intentional

discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 2 of 16
3

(2000); St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-12 (1993);Nix v. WLCY

Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1984). Although the

Supreme Court previously established the basic allocation of burdens and order of

proof in a disparate treatment case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), as

modified by Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), that allocation scheme

applies only in cases where there is no direct evidence of discrimination. Grigsby v.

Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine scheme, a plaintiff first has the burden

of proving by a preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.

Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the

defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment

decision. Finally, if the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must either prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the

defendant are merely a pretext for discrimination or present sufficient evidence, of

any type, for a reasonable jury to conclude that discrimination was a “motivating

factor” for the employment action, even though defendant’s legitimate reason may

also be true or have played some role in the decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411

U.S. at 802-05; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54; Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02.

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 3 of 16
These are the facts for summary judgment purposes only. They may not be the 2

actual facts. See Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400

(11th Cir. 1994) (“‘[W]hat we state as ‘facts’ in this opinion for purposes of

reviewing the rulings on the summary judgment motion [ ] may not be the actual

facts.’”) (citation omitted).

The designation “AF” stands for admitted fact and indicates a fact offered by 3

RealtySouth that Wilson has admitted in his written submissions on summary

judgment, in his deposition testimony, or by virtue of any other evidence offered in

support of his case. Whenever Wilson has adequately disputed a fact offered by

RealtySouth, the court has accepted Wilson’s version. The court’s numbering of

admitted facts (e.g., AF No. 1) corresponds to the numbering of RealtySouth’s

Statement of Facts as set forth in Doc. #38 and responded to by Wilson in Doc. #47.

A number following a decimal point corresponds to the particular sentence within the

numbered statement of facts. For example, (AF No. 3.2) would indicate that the

second sentence of paragraph 3 of RealtySouth’s Statement of Facts is the subject of

the court’s citation to the record. Similarly, the designation “AAF” stands for

additional admitted fact and corresponds to Wilson’s Statement of Facts contained

in Doc. #47 and responded to (or deemed admitted due to the failure of RealtySouth’s

to specifically respond to them) in Doc. #53. Any other facts referenced by the

parties that require further clarification are dealt with later in the court’s opinion. 

4

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS2

RealtySouth has “corporate” brokerage arrangement with USS in which

RealtySouth’s independent contractor agents are given all of the listings for homes

to be sold at USS’s development in Hoover, The Preserve. AF No. 2. Three (3) 3

RealtySouth agents made up the “sales team” who staffed the sales center at The

Preserve and worked to sell the listed homes. AF No. 3.1. Originally, the three (3)

members of this team were Kathy Bryant (“Bryant”) (formerly Lansden), Julie Lucas

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 4 of 16
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(“Lucas”), and Wilson. AF No. 3.2. These agents began their work as the sales team

for The Preserve in the summer of 2001. AF No. 3.3. Wislon was the only

African-American applicant for a place on the sales team at The Preserve. AF No.

5.2.

Lucas did not remain on the sales team. AF No. 6.1. Lucas was replaced by

another agent, Merry Leach (“Leach”). AF No. 7.1. Leach came on as a team

member and the sales manager at The Preserve. AF No. 7.4.

On November 18, 2003, Richard Grimes (“Grimes”), RealtySouth’s Regional

Vice President of New Home Sales, removed Wilson from the sales team at The

Preserve. AF No. 18.1; AAF No. 6. Grimes made this decision based upon feedback

and information he received from, primarily, the other sales team members, including

the sales manager, Leach. AF No. 18.2. 

Three (3) days prior to his removal, Wilson expressed a strong interest in

purchasing a home at The Preserve. AAF No. 7.1. Three weeks prior to his

separation, Wilson sold a home to his son, who was the first African-American to

purchase a home in The Preserve. AAF No. 7.2. Wilson was replaced on the team

by a Caucasian man, Ty Elliott (“Elliott”) on December 3, 2003. AF No. 32.1; AAF

No. 15. 

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 5 of 16
Wilson offers no evidence that would support a “direct evidence” claim of 4

racial discrimination. 

6

IV. ANALYSIS

A. RealtySouth’s Motion for Summary Judgment

In a circumstantial evidence case alleging discrimination, the four prima facie 4

elements that Wilson must establish are: (1) he belongs to a protected category; (2)

he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he was treated less favorably than

other similarly situated employees outside of his protected class; and (4) he was

qualified for the position. See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561-62 (11th

Cir. 1997) (outlining prima facie elements for race discrimination claim). Therefore,

the initial inquiry for the court is whether Wilson has adduced sufficient evidence of

a prima facie case of discrimination.

1. Wilson can establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination because he was replaced by a

Caucasian sales agent.

For the purposes of summary judgment, Wilson has shown that he is a member

of a protected racial class, that he suffered an adverse employment action, and that

he was qualified for the position that he held—an original member of the sales team

at The Preserve. However, RealtySouth maintains that Wilson’s proof is lacking as

to prima facie element number 3—evidence of similarly situated employees outside

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 6 of 16
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of his protected category (i.e., non-minorities, who were treated more favorably than

he). 

However, RealtySouth’s analysis of the relevant comparative evidence ignores

the undisputed fact that Wilson was replaced by Elliott, a Caucasian male. As

recognized in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993), Wilson’s

replacement by a non-minority is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of

discriminatory discharge. See id. (“Petitioners do not challenge the District Court's

finding that respondent satisfied the minimal requirements of such a prima facie case

(set out in McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824-1825) by proving (1)

that he is black, (2) that he was qualified for the position of shift commander, (3) that

he was demoted from that position and ultimately discharged, and (4) that the position

remained open and was ultimately filled by a white man.”) (citation omitted);see also

Coutu v. Martin County Bd. of County Com’rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073 (“Absent direct

evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff in a termination case establishes a prima facie

case by showing (1) that she is a member of a protected class, (2) that she was

qualified for the position held, (3) that she was terminated, and (4) that she was

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 7 of 16
Surprisingly, RealtySouth cites to the Coutu decision as support for its

5

position that Wilson has failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.

(Doc. #38 at 16). The other Eleventh Circuit opinions relied upon by RealtySouth

similarly lend no credibility to its argument that Wilson has failed to make out a

prima facie case. See, e.g., Krieg v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 998, 999

(11th Cir. 1983); Walker v. NationsBank of Florida N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1556 (11th

Cir. 1995).

8

replaced by a person outside the protected class.”) (footnote omitted); Conner v. Fort 5

Gordon Bus Co., 761 F.2d 1495, 1498 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985) (same) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, RealtySouth’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be denied on

the basis that Wilson can establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. 

2. Wilson has adduced sufficient evidence from

which a reasonable jury could conclude the

existence of pretext in RealtySouth’s articulated

rationale for discharging him.

RealtySouth alternatively maintains that even if Wilson is able to establish a

prima facie case of race discrimination, judgment as a matter of law is still

appropriate because of his inability to show pretext in the decision to discharge him.

More specifically, RealtySouth’s articulated explanation for firing Wilson relates to

certain criticisms presented to Grimes of Wilson’s performance-related issues,

including paperwork questions, lack of necessary computer skills, and attendance

problems. (Doc. #38 at 22).

In addressing the issue of pretext, the Supreme Court has stated: 

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 8 of 16
RealtySouth unconvincingly attempts to cast this case as one in which 6

Wilson’s testimony provides the only basis for creating material factual issues. 

9

Thus, a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence

to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the

trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. This

is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate

to sustain a jury’s finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances

where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set

forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant’s explanation, no

rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory.

For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of

law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory

reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak

issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there

was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no

discrimination had occurred. 

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148 (emphasis in original); see also Combs v. Plantation

Patterns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1519, 1532 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[T]his circuit's post-Hicks

decisions uniformly hold that once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case and

has put on sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to disbelieve an employer's

proffered explanation for its actions, that alone is enough to preclude entry of

judgment as a matter of law.”). 

 Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Wilson, multiple material factual

disputes based upon the testimony of not only Wilson, but also other witnesses as 6

well as documentary evidence, establish “weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies and contradictions” in RealtySouth’s articulated

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 9 of 16
Rather than provide an exhaustive discussion of each and every disputed issue 7

of material fact that it found in the record pertaining to pretext, the court highlights

those areas that it finds particularly illustrative.

10

reasons for dismissing Wilson, which preclude the entry of summary judgment in

favor of RealtySouth on Wilson’s race discrimination claim. See Combs, 106 F.3d

at 1538. For example, RealtySouth attempts to characterize Grimes as the sole

7

relevant decisionmaker. However, Grimes admittedly based his decision upon oral

input that he received from various witnesses, includingLeach, the sales manager and

Wilson’s direct supervisor. 

Accordingly, RealtySouth’s contention that Leach’s alleged racially offensive

conduct toward Wilson (see Doc. #38 at 27-28), including (1) calling him the “tissue

man” in front of other people when he brought toilet tissue at her request to the sales

center; (2) asking him to unstop the toilet at the sales center; and (3) stopping at an

openly confederate-friendly barbecue restaurant as part of a group lunch that included

Wilson (see Doc. #47 at Ex. 6; Doc. #42 at Ex. E at 221-22), cannot be relied upon

to show a possible discriminatory motive is without merit. As sales manager for The

Preserve, Leach’s potential racial animus is relevant because she undisputedly

provided key input into (and potentially impermissibly tainted) the overall

decisionmaking process, regardless of whether the cat’s paw doctrine applies to her

discussions with Grimes. (See Doc. #53 at 5).

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 10 of 16
For example, one of the performance areas relied upon by RealtySouth is 8

Wilson’s absenteeism, a problemwhich Grimes did not list during his deposition and

one which Leach, the sales manager, did not recall ever discussing with Grimes or

Wilson. (Doc. #43 at Ex. F at 46-48). Moreover, Bryant’s complaints about Wilson’s

absenteeism to Grimes occurred when the sales team was still in a trailer, and over at

least one (1) year or possible two (2) from Wilson’s removal. (Doc. #42 at Ex. C at

42-43; Doc. #47 at Ex. 7 at 40-42). Additionally, Boyd, the Project Manager for

USS, testified that he saw Wilson on location the same amount of time that he saw

other agents. (Doc. #47 at Ex. 1 at 42-43). Similar discrepancies appear in the record

regarding paperwork problems and lack of computer skills. 

11

Moreover, even treating Grimes as the only relevant decisionmaker, a

reasonable jury could infer, based upon the short elapse of time between (1) Wilson’s

sale of property to his son, the first African-American owner in The Preserve; (2)

Wilson’s expression of an interest in also purchasing a residence in The Preserve; and

(3) Wilson’s dismissal from the sales team, which events all occurred within a period

of one (1) month, could mean that Grime’s decision was racially-motivated.

The lack of any documentation which tends to corroborate any of the

performance-related issues related to Wilson’s dismissal (AAF No. 10;see generally

Doc. #47 at Ex. 5(Wilson’s agent’s file); see also Doc. #43 at Ex. F at 50-51 (“Q. Do

you have records of any of these problems? A. No.”)), while not necessarily

dispositive of pretext, is definitely a piece of circumstantial evidence upon which a

reasonable jury could rely to conclude the existence of pretext, especially given the

scattered testimony concerning Wilson’s purported performance problems.8

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 11 of 16
For example, as it relates to the area of absenteeism, Wilson recalls that Leach 9

would have her daughter come to The Preserve site to cover her shifts. (Doc. #42 at

Ex. E at 245). Leach also appeared three hours late for the opening of the sales

center, for which Grimes was present. (Doc. #42 at Ex. E at 219-220). Similarly,

while the record on summary judgment reflects that Wilson may have had difficulty

completing paperwork at times, there is competing testimony reflecting that most of

his closings were correct, and that he did not experience any greater number of

closing incidents than any other comparable agents. (Doc. #43 at Ex. H at 63). 

(See generally Doc. #47 at 10-11). 10

12

Similarly, there is significantly probative evidence that other members of the sales

team may have engaged in similar conduct, but were not fired for any similar

performance issues. Additionally, the numerous awards and recognition that Wilson 9

received as an agent for RealtySouth, including a letter from the President and CEO 10

of RealtySouth, congratulating Wilson for being a “leader among leaders” in the

Birmingham Real Estate Market and commending him for his “success,

professionalism, and outstanding results” less than one (1) month after his separation

(see Doc. #47 at Ex. 3 at 3), also bring into question the validity of any performance

deficiencies as a basis for his dismissal. 

Moreover, RealtySouth’s reliance upon its treatment of Lucas, who is

Caucasian and was purportedly dismissed because she had personality conflicts with

several of the builders on site at The Preserve as a means to affirmatively show a lack

of pretext in its treatment of Wilson is not persuasive. The standard to be applied in

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 12 of 16
For example, Wilson testified concerning Lucas that “we were told that Julie 11

no longer wanted to be a part of The Preserve. And she wanted to get back into

resale. So, I’m not certain that she was removed or if she actually wanted to go back

into resale.” (Doc. #42 at Ex. E at 223). 

13

evaluating whether employees are similarly situated is now a familiar one: 

To show that employees are similarly situated, the plaintiff must show

that the “employees are similarly situated in all relevant respects. . . . In

determining whether employees are similarly situated . . . it is necessary

to consider whether the employees are involved in or accused of the

same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.”

Knight v. Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562). 

Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[t]he comparator must be

nearly identical to the plaintiff to prevent courts from second-guessing a reasonable

decision by the employer.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th

Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted); see also Manicci v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364,

1668-69 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We require that the quantity and quality of the

comparator’s conduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing

employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.”). Wilson and

Lucas are not suitable comparators for at least two reasons: one, there is evidence

that Lucas’s departure from The Preserve was reported by RealtySouth to the sales

team as being a voluntarily move on her part; and two, the reasons offered by 11

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 13 of 16
See also Doc. #53 at 1 n.1 (“Undoubtedly, U.S. Steel is entitled to summary 12

judgment a[s] is demonstrated by Plaintiff’s failure to even argue that it was involved

in his removal from The Preserve sales team.”).

14

RealtySouth for Lucas’s separation were not performance-related, but rather were

personality-related and more subjective. Accordingly, RealtySouth’s reliance upon

Lucas as a means to show an absence of pretext in its treatment of Wilson is

misplaced because the substantially similar standard governing comparator evidence

has not been met.

Therefore, in light of the above analysis, not only has Wilson formulated a

prima facie case of race discrimination, but also he has met his burden of

demonstrating material issues of disputed fact on the question of pretext. As such,

RealtySouth’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be denied on its alternative

pretext argument.

B. USS’s Motion for Summary Judgment

USS bases its Motion for Summary Judgment on the lack of any evidence that

it shared any type of agency or employment relationship with Wilson or that it was

involved in his removal from the sales team at The Preserve. (Doc. #40). Wilson’s

opposition to summary judgment (Doc. #47) is devoid of any challenge to the

substance of USS’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, Wilson has 12

Case 2:04-cv-03261-VEH Document 66 Filed 12/01/06 Page 14 of 16
See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001) 13

(finding claim abandoned when argument not presented in initial response to motion

for summary judgment); Bute v. Schuller International, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1473, 1477

(N.D. Ga. 1998) (finding unaddressed claim abandoned); see also Coalition for the

Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir.

2000) (failure to brief and argue issue at the district court is sufficient to find the issue

has been abandoned); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599

(11th Cir. 1995); Hudson v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1324

(N.D. Ga. 2001). Cf. McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 940-41 (11th Cir.

1999) (claim may be considered abandoned when district court is presented with no

argument concerning a claim included in the plaintiff’s complaint); Road Sprinkler

Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. Independent Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d 1563, 1568

(11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a district court “could properly treat as abandoned

a claim alleged in the complaint but not even raised as a ground for summary

judgment”). 

See n.1, supra. 

14

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abandoned his claims of discrimination against USS, and summary judgment in

13

favor of USS is due to be granted.

V. CONCLUSION

As analyzed above, material issues of disputed fact preclude the entry of

summary judgment in favor of RealtySouth and its Motion for Summary Judgment

is due to be denied. On the other hand, USS’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due

to be granted due to Wilson’s abandonment of any claims asserted against it in filing

his opposition to summary judgment. Because the court’s decision on summary

judgment does not turn upon any of the evidentiary issues raised in Defendants’ three

(3) motions to strike, they are all due to be denied as moot. The court will enter an

14

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order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. 

DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of December , 2006.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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