Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35666/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35666-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALASKA OIL AND GAS

ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN

PETROLEUM INSTITUTE; STATE OF

ALASKA; ARCTIC SLOPE

REGIONAL CORPORATION; THE

NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH; NANA

REGIONAL CORPORATION, INC.;

BERING STRAITS NATIVE

CORPORATION; CALISTA

CORPORATION; TIKIGAQ

CORPORATION; OLGOONIK

CORPORATION, INC.; UKPEAGVIK

INUPIAT CORPORATION; KUUKPIK

CORPORATION; KAKTOVIK

INUPIAT CORPORATION; THE

INUPIAT COMMUNITY OF THE

ARCTIC SLOPE,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

 v.

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the

Interior; DANIEL M. ASHE,

Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE

SERVICE,

Defendants-Appellants,

No. 13-35619

D.C. Nos. 

3:11-cv-00025-RRB

3:11-cv-00036-RRB

3:11-cv-00106-RRB

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2 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

and

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY; DEFENDERS OF

WILDLIFE; GREENPEACE, INC.,

Intervenor-Defendants.

ALASKA OIL AND GAS

ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN

PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

STATE OF ALASKA; ARCTIC SLOPE

REGIONAL CORPORATION; THE

NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH; NANA

REGIONAL CORPORATION, INC.;

BERING STRAITS NATIVE

CORPORATION; CALISTA

CORPORATION; TIKIGAQ

CORPORATION; OLGOONIK

CORPORATION, INC.; UKPEAGVIK

INUPIAT CORPORATION; KUUKPIK

CORPORATION; KAKTOVIK

INUPIAT CORPORATION; THE

INUPIAT COMMUNITY OF THE

ARCTIC SLOPE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

No. 13-35662

D.C. Nos. 

3:11-cv-00025-RRB

3:11-cv-00036-RRB

3:11-cv-00106-RRB

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ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL 3

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the

Interior; DANIEL M. ASHE,

Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE

SERVICE,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY; DEFENDERS OF

WILDLIFE; GREENPEACE, INC.,

Intervenor-Defendants.

ALASKA OIL AND GAS

ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN

PETROLEUM INSTITUTE; STATE OF

ALASKA; ARCTIC SLOPE

REGIONAL CORPORATION; THE

NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH; NANA

REGIONAL CORPORATION, INC.;

BERING STRAITS NATIVE

CORPORATION; CALISTA

CORPORATION; TIKIGAQ

CORPORATION; OLGOONIK

CORPORATION, INC.; UKPEAGVIK

INUPIAT CORPORATION; KUUKPIK

CORPORATION; KAKTOVIK

INUPIAT CORPORATION; THE

INUPIAT COMMUNITY OF THE

ARCTIC SLOPE,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

No. 13-35666

D.C. Nos.

3:11-cv-00025-RRB

3:11-cv-00036-RRB

3:11-cv-00106-RRB

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4 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

v.

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the

Interior; DANIEL M. ASHE,

Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE

SERVICE,

Defendants,

and

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY; DEFENDERS OF

WILDLIFE; GREENPEACE, INC.,

 Intervenor-DefendantsAppellants.

STATE OF ALASKA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

ALASKA OIL AND GAS

ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN

PETROLEUM INSTITUTE; ARCTIC

SLOPE REGIONAL CORPORATION;

THE NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH;

NANA REGIONAL CORPORATION,

INC.; BERING STRAITS NATIVE

CORPORATION; CALISTA

CORPORATION; TIKIGAQ

CORPORATION; OLGOONIK

No. 13-35667

D.C. Nos. 

3:11-cv-00025-RRB

3:11-cv-00036-RRB

3:11-cv-00106-RRB

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ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL 5

CORPORATION, INC.; UKPEAGVIK

INUPIAT CORPORATION; KUUKPIK

CORPORATION; KAKTOVIK

INUPIAT CORPORATION; THE

INUPIAT COMMUNITY OF THE

ARCTIC SLOPE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the

Interior; DANIEL M. ASHE,

Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE

SERVICE,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY; DEFENDERS OF

WILDLIFE; GREENPEACE, INC.,

Intervenor-Defendants.

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6 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

ARCTIC SLOPE REGIONAL

CORPORATION; THE NORTH SLOPE

BOROUGH; NANA REGIONAL

CORPORATION, INC.; BERING

STRAITS NATIVE CORPORATION;

CALISTA CORPORATION; TIKIGAQ

CORPORATION; OLGOONIK

CORPORATION, INC.; UKPEAGVIK

INUPIAT CORPORATION; KUUKPIK

CORPORATION; KAKTOVIK

INUPIAT CORPORATION; THE

INUPIAT COMMUNITY OF THE

ARCTIC SLOPE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

ALASKA OIL AND GAS

ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN

PETROLEUM INSTITUTE; STATE OF

ALASKA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the

Interior; DANIEL M. ASHE,

DIRECTOR, U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE

SERVICE,

Defendants-Appellees,

No. 13-35669

D.C. Nos. 

3:11-cv-00025-RRB

3:11-cv-00036-RRB

3:11-cv-00106-RRB

OPINION

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ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL 7

and

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY; DEFENDERS OF

WILDLIFE; GREENPEACE, INC.,

Intervenor-Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted 

August 11, 2015—Anchorage, Alaska

Filed February 29, 2016

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, and

Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Schroeder

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8 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

SUMMARY*

Endangered Species Act

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment vacating

the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (“FWS”)

designation of critical habitat in Alaska for the polar bear, a

species listed as threatened under the Endangered Species

Act; affirmed the district court’s denial of cross-appeal

claims; and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of FWS.

FWS proposed to designate an area of Alaska’s coast and

waters as critical habitat for the polar bear: Unit 1, the sea ice

habitat; Unit 2, the terrestrial denning; and Unit 3, the barrier

island habitat. Oil and gas associations, several Alaska

Native corporations and villages, and the State of Alaska

(“plaintiffs”) challenged the designation under the

Endangered Species Act and the Administrative Procedure

Act. The district court denied the majority of the claims, but

granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on two grounds. 

FWS and intervenor environmental groups appealed, and

plaintiffs cross-appealed.

The panel held that the FWS’s designation of polar bear

habitat was not arbitrary, capricious or otherwise in

contravention of applicable law. The panel held that the

district court held the FWS to a standard of specificity that

the Endangered Species Act did not require. The panel held

that the standard that FWS followed, looking to areas that

contained constituent elements required for sustained

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL 9

preservation of polar bears, was in accordance with statutory

purpose.

The panel held that FWS’s designation of Unit 2 as

critical denning habitat was not arbitrary and capricious

where Unit 2 contained areas requiring protection for both

birthing and acclimation of cubs, and FWS adequately

explained its treatment of the relatively few areas of known

human habitation. The panel also held that FWS drew

rational conclusions from the best available scientific date, as

required by the Endangered Species Act, in its designation of

both Unit 2 and Unit 3 as critical habitat for the polar bear.

The panel held that FWS provided adequate justification

to Alaska pursuant to Endangered Species Act Section 4(i). 

Concerning plaintiffs’ cross-appeal claims, the panel held

that the district court correctly upheld the “no-disturbance

zone” around the barrier islands in Unit 3 because it provided

refuge from human disturbance. The panel also held that

FWS’s assessment of the potential economic impacts was not

arbitrary and capricious. Finally, the panel held that Section

7 of the Endangered Species Act did not create an additional

duty for FWS to consult with states on critical habitat

designations.

COUNSEL

Jeffrey W. Leppo (argued), Ryan P. Steen, Stoel Rives LLP,

Seattle, Washington for Plaintiffs-Appellees/CrossAppellants Alaska Oil and Gas Association and the American

Petroleum Institute.

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10 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

Matthew A. Love (argued), Van Ness Feldman LLP, Seattle,

Washington; Tyson C. Kade, Van Ness Feldman LLP,

Washington, D.C. for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant

North Slope Borough.

Bradley E. Meyen (argued), Senior Assistant Attorney

General, Andrew Naylor, Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Alaska

Department of Law, Anchorage, Alaska; MurrayD. Feldman,

Holland & Hart LLP, Boise, Idaho; Christina F. Gomez,

Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, Colorado for PlaintiffAppellee/Cross-Appellant State of Alaska.

Kevin M. Cuddy (argued), Stoel Rives LLP, Anchorage,

Alaska for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants Arctic

Slope Regional Corporation, NANA Regional Corporation,

Bering Straits Native Corporation, Calista Corporation,

Tikigaq Corporation, Olgoonik Corporation, Inc., Ukpeagvik

Iñupiat Corporation, Kuukpik Corporation, Kaktovik Iñupiat

Corporation, and The Iñupiat Community of the Arctic Slope.

Sam Hirsch, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Andrew C.

Mergen, Jennifer Scheller Neumann, Clifford E. Stevens, Jr.,

Meredith L. Flax, David C. Shilton, Robert P. Stockman

(argued), Environment & Natural Resources Division, U.S.

Department of Justice; Kenneth M. Lord, Of Counsel, Office

of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior, Washington,

D.C., for Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees Sally

Jewell, Secretary of the Interior, Daniel M. Ashe, Director,

U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service.

Rebecca Noblin, Center for Biological Diversity, Anchorage,

Alaska for Intervenor-Defendants/Appellants Center for

Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, Greenpeace, Inc.

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ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL 11

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

INTRODUCTION

This case is about polar bear habitat in Alaska. The polar

bear population has been declining for many years, and in

2008, the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (“FWS”)

listed the species as threatened under the Endangered Species

Act (“ESA” or “Act”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. After

challenges from all sides, the D.C. Circuit upheld the

designation. In re Polar Bear ESA Listing & Section 4(d)

Rule Litig., 709 F.3d 1, 2–3 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

Within a year of listing a threatened species, the Act

requires FWS to designate habitat critical to the conservation

of the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i), (b)(6)(C). In

2009, FWS proposed to designate an area of Alaska’s coast

and waters as critical habitat for the polar bear. The

designation contained three “units.” Unit 1, the sea ice

habitat, comprised 95.9% of the total designation, while Units

2 and 3, the terrestrial denning and barrier island habitats,

made up the final 4.1%. Only the designations of Units 2 and

3 are disputed here.

The proposal drew fire from oil and gas trade

associations, several Alaska Native corporations and villages,

and the State of Alaska (“Plaintiffs”), all of which seek to

utilize the natural resources in Alaska’s waters and North

Slope that make up much of the designated habitat. After

FWS granted final approval to the proposed designation, the

objecting parties filed this action challenging the designation

under the ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act

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12 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

(“APA”). 5 U.S.C. §§ 706 et seq. They principally argued

that the habitat designation was unjustifiably large, and also

claimed that FWS had failed to follow ESA procedure.

The district court denied the majority of the claims, but

granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs on two grounds. 

Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Salazar, 916 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D.

Alaska 2013). Substantively, the district court faulted FWS

for failing to identify specifically where and how existing

polar bears utilize the relatively small portion of critical

habitat designated as Units 2 and 3. Id. at 999–1003. 

Procedurally, the district court faulted FWS for failing to

provide the State of Alaska with adequate justification for

adopting a final rule not fully consistent with the State’s

submitted comments. Id. at 1003–04. The district court

vacated the entire designation. Id. at 1004. FWS, joined by

several defendant-intervenor environmental groups, appeals,

and Plaintiffs cross-appeal.

In its appeal, FWS contends that the district court

misconstrued the ESA’s requirements by holding FWS to

proof that existing polar bears actually use the designated

area, rather than to proof that the area is critical to the future

recovery and conservation of the species. FWS stresses that

it utilized the best available technology as statutorily

required. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). FWS also contends

that there was no meaningful deficiency in the manner in

which it provided written justification to the State for its final

action. We conclude that these contentions have merit, and

reverse the district court’s judgment vacating the designation.

Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal revives the arguments that the

district court rejected. We affirm the district court’s denial of

these claims. We therefore hold that the designation was not

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ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL 13

arbitrary, capricious or otherwise in contravention of

applicable law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). That is the

standard we must apply to decisions involving listings under

the ESA. See In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 8. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Endangered Species Act

The purpose of the ESA is to ensure the recovery of

endangered and threatened species, not merely the survival of

their existing numbers. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 1532(3)

(emphasizing species and habitat conservation, and the “use

of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring

any endangered species or threatened species to the point at

which the measures provided pursuant to [the ESA] are no

longer necessary”). The Supreme Court has recognized that

the goal of species recovery is paramount. The Court said in

Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978):

“The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to

halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever

the cost.”

To accomplish this goal, the Act directs the Secretaries of

Interior and Commerce to list endangered and threatened

species for federal protection. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1), (2). 

The Secretary of Interior must also designate the habitat that

is critical to each species’s conservation. Id.

§ 1533(a)(3)(A)(i). The Secretary of Interior has delegated to

FWS the authority to administer the ESA. 50 C.F.R.

§ 402.01(b).

Critical habitat is defined in the statute as the specific

areas “within the geographical area occupied by the species”

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14 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

that the species needs for recovery and that therefore should

be protected. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i). The statute

describes the areas to be protected as those areas containing

the physical and biological features (1) essential for the

species’s success, such as space for growth and normal

behavior, food, breeding sites, and habitats protected from

disturbance, and (2) which may require special management

or protection. Id.; 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b). The Secretary

designates critical habitat “on the basis of the best scientific

data available” after taking into consideration the probable

economic, national security, and other relevant impacts. 16

U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).

During this process, the Secretary must provide notice of

any proposed designation of critical habitat to impacted states

and solicit their feedback. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(A)(ii). If the

approved final designation conflicts with the state’s

comments, the Secretary must provide the state with written

justification for its action. Id. § 1533(i). Once an area is

designated as critical habitat, federal agencies are required to

consult with the Secretary before taking any action that may

negatively impact the habitat. Id. § 1536(a)(2).

B. Polar Bear Listing and Critical Habitat Designation

Polar bears (Ursus maritimus) are scattered throughout

the ice-covered waters of the Arctic Circle. Two relatively

distinct polar bear populations occur within the United States:

the southern Beaufort Sea population, which extends into

Canada, and the Chukchi-Bering Seas population, which

extends into Russia.

The bears spend the majority of their lives on sea ice,

which provides a platform for essential life functions such as

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ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL 15

hunting, seasonal movements, resting, and mating. Female

polar bears, however, particularlyon Alaska’s northern coast,

will come ashore to den and to acclimate their cubs before

returning to the sea ice.

Because of global climate change, the extent and quality

of Arctic sea ice is declining, and the polar bear population is

declining with it. On May 15, 2008, FWS listed the polar

bear as a threatened species under the ESA. FWS highlighted

concerns over climate change and discussed the major

negative impacts that declines in sea ice would have on the

species, including nutritional stress caused by diminished

numbers of ice-dependent prey, decreased access to the prey

that remain, shorter hunting seasons and longer periods of

fasting onshore, higher energetic demands for travel and

obtaining food, and more negative interactions with humans. 

See In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 4–6. FWS found that such

factors would likely result in the decline in the physical

condition and reproductive success of polar bears, which

would ultimately lead to population level declines. Id.

FWS did not designate polar bear critical habitat at the

same time it listed the species as threatened, citing the

difficulty of determining at that time which areas within the

polar bear’s extraordinarily large and dynamic range were

essential for conservation. Instead, FWS undertook a

thorough evaluation of the available science and consulted

with polar bear experts. FWS issued a proposed rule on

October 29, 2009, designating polar bear critical habitat, and

on May 5, 2010, the agency issued a draft analysis of the

probable economic impacts of the designation. This was

within the one-year period permitted for designation of the

areas containing features termed “primary constituent

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16 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

elements” necessary for a threatened species’ conservation. 

16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b).

FWS held two comment periods and multiple public

hearings to solicit feedback on the proposed rule and

economic analysis. During this time, FWS received over

100,000 comments, ranging from suggestions for

dramatically expanding the habitat designation, to assertions

that no designation was necessary at all.

On December 7, 2010, FWS published the Final Rule

designating critical habitat for the polar bear. The Final Rule

designated an area of approximately 187,000 square miles as

critical polar bear habitat, broken down into three parts. Unit

1, the sea ice habitat, included the sea ice that polar bears use

as a platform for hunting, resting, short- and long-distance

movements, and denning. Unit 1 comprised 95.9% of the

total area designated as critical habitat, reflecting both the

polar bears’ large range and the primacy of sea ice to the

species’ success.

The remaining 4.1% of the critical habitat designation

consisted of Unit 2, the terrestrial denning habitat, and Unit

3, the barrier island habitat. FWS, in the Final Rule,

described the terrestrial denning habitat as areas with steep,

stable slopes, access to the coast, proximity to sea ice, and

freedom from human disturbance. It went on to explain that

this habitat contains essential physical or biological features,

and that the habitat requires protection, given the polar bears’

slow reproductive rate and sensitivity to human disturbance

during denning. Relying on radio-telemetry data collected on

certain denning female bears over several years, FWS defined

Unit 2 as covering approximately 95% of known and

potential den sites on Alaska’s northern coast.

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ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL 17

FWS similarly explained that it considered Alaska’s

coastal barrier islands and their surrounding waters to have

the essential physical and biological features for polar bears,

because the bears regularly use the islands as places to feed,

den, rest, and migrate along the coast without undue human

disturbance. Accordingly, FWS designated the barrier

islands, and the spits and waters within one mile of them (the

“no-disturbance zone”), as Unit 3.

The ESA requires designation as critical habitat of areas

that may require special management or protection. 16

U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i)(II). FWS found that both Units 2 and

3 may require special management considerations or

protection because of the potential negative impacts on the

designated areas caused by climate change, oil and gas

operations, human disturbance, and commercial shipping.

After identifying the essential physical and biological

features of polar bear habitat that may need special

management or protection, the Final Rule considered the

probable economic and other relevant impacts of designating

those areas as critical habitat. Under the ESA, FWS must use

the best scientific data available and take into consideration

the economic, national security, and other relevant impacts of

designating a particular area as critical habitat before making

its final designation. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). FWS may then

exclude an area from the final designation if it determines

that the benefits of excluding the area outweigh the benefits

of including it, unless excluding such area would result in the

extinction of the concerned species. Id.

After weighing the costs and benefits of inclusion versus

exclusion in accordance with Section 4(b)(2), FWS decided

to exclude the Native villages of Barrow and Kaktovik from

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18 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

the critical habitat designation, along with all man-made

structures within the critical habitat, because they did not

contain the physical and biological features essential to the

polar bear. FWS chose not to exclude any other areas of the

original designation on the basis of the probable economic

impact, see id., finding that the probable economic impact

was negligible.

Following issuance of the Final Rule in December of

2010, three groups filed complaints in district court in 2011

pursuant to the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 706 et seq., challenging the

Final Rule: (1) the Alaska Oil & Gas Association and the

American Petroleum Institute, trade associations representing

the Alaska oil and gas industry; (2) the State of Alaska; and

(3) a coalition of Alaska Native corporations, an Alaska

Native tribal government, and the North Slope Borough, a

local native government with jurisdiction over a large swath

of territory in northern Alaska. Defendant FWS was joined

by three intervenor environmental groups (Center for

Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, Inc., and

Greenpeace, Inc.) defending the designation. The district

court consolidated the three cases for summary judgment

proceedings.

Plaintiffs charged FWS with numerous errors in the

critical habitat designation, both substantive and procedural. 

They argued that the entire designation was substantively

improper, contending the designation was unsupported by the

administrative record because FWS arbitrarily designated

large land and sea ice masses, but did not identify specific

areas containing the physical and biological features essential

for polar bears. Plaintiffs also claimed several procedural

errors in FWS’s rulemaking, including a contention that FWS

did not adequately consult with the State of Alaska, and that

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ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL 19

FWS violated ESA Section 4(i) by failing to give Alaska

adequate justification for not incorporating the State’s

comments into the Final Rule.

The district court rejected all of Plaintiffs’ claims except

two. The district court found that while the record supported

the designation of Unit 1, the largest unit, the sea ice habitat,

it did not support the designation of Units 2 and 3. The

district court said those designations were unsupported

because “[FWS] has not shown, and the record does not

contain,” evidence that Units 2 and 3 contain all of the

required features of terrestrial denning and barrier island

habitats. The district court also held that FWS failed to

follow the ESA Section 4(i) procedure because the agency

provided an inadequate justification for why it did not

incorporate all of the State’s comments into the Final Rule. 

The district court vacated and remanded the Final Rule in its

entirety, notwithstanding its determination that the

designation of Unit 1 was proper. FWS now appeals and

Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the district court’s summary

judgment order.

FWS’s principal contention on appeal is that the district

court erred in holding that the record contained insufficient

evidence of the essential physical or biological features in

Units 2 and 3. FWS says it reasonably relied on the best

scientific data available in making the designation. See 16

U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). It urges that the ESA does not require

more specific information. FWS also contends that it

complied with the procedural requirements of ESA Section

4(i) by sending a letter to the State of Alaska, which fully

addressed the State’s comments on the proposed rule. 

Finally, FWS contends that even if Plaintiffs’ arguments had

some merit, the district court erred by vacating the entire

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20 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

Final Rule despite finding no substantive error with more

than 95% of the designation.

In their cross-appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the district

court erred by rejecting their other claims. Plaintiffs

principally challenge the holdings that FWS’s designation of

the “no-disturbance zone” in Unit 3 was reasonable; that

FWS sufficiently explained its finding that the essential

features of the critical habitat may require special

management; that FWS adequately considered the economic

impacts of designation under ESA Section 4(b)(2); and that

under ESA Section 7(a)(2), FWS had an additional duty to

consult with the State of Alaska.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Purpose of Habitat Designation and the

Applicable Standard

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo to determine whether FWS’s actions were “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Ariz. Cattle

Growers’ Ass’n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir.

2010). The Supreme Court has described in general terms

how the standard operates:

[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and

capricious if the agency has relied on factors

which Congress has not intended it to

consider, entirely failed to consider an

important aspect of the problem, offered an

explanation for its decision that runs counter

to the evidence before the agency, or is so

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implausible that it could not be ascribed to a

difference in view or the product of agency

expertise.

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

This court has been careful to adhere to a narrow

application of the standard, while ensuring that the agency’s

action is considered and rational. We have described the

arbitrary and capricious standard as deferential and narrow,

establishing a “high threshold” for setting aside agency

action. River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d

1064, 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). A court must not substitute

its judgment for that of the agency, but also must not

“rubber-stamp” administrative decisions. Ariz. Cattle

Growers’ Ass’n v. FWS, 273 F.3d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Instead, the action is presumed valid and is upheld if a

reasonable basis exists for the decision. Nw. Ecosystem All.

v. FWS, 475 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007). We have

explained that so long as the agency “considered the relevant

factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts

found and the choices made,” the court should defer to the

agency’s expertise and uphold the action. Id. (citation

omitted). FWS’s designation of Units 2 and 3 more than

satisfies that standard.

Under the ESA, once it had designated the species as

“threatened,” FWS had to determine where, within the polar

bears’ occupied range, the physical or biological features

essential to polar bear conservation are found, and it was

required to designate these areas as critical habitat. See 16

U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i); id. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i). The ESA

guidelines explain that these physical and biological elements

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essential to the species, known as “primary constituent

elements” or PCEs, are at the heart of the critical habitat

designation:

When considering the designation of critical

habitat, the Secretary shall focus on the

principal biological or physical constituent

elements within the defined area that are

essential to the conservation of the species. 

Known primary constituent elements shall be

listed with the critical habitat description. 

Primaryconstituent elements mayinclude, but

are not limited to, the following: roost sites,

nesting grounds, spawning sites, feeding sites,

seasonal wetland or dryland, water quality or

quantity, host species or plant pollinator,

geological formation, vegetation type, tide,

and specific soil types.

50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(5). FWS identified three areas

containing PCEs essential to polar bear conservation: sea ice

habitat, found in Unit 1; terrestrial denning habitat, found in

Unit 2; and barrier island habitat, found in Unit 3.

The district court concluded that, although FWS properly

identified the PCEs, it had failed to show specifically where

within Units 2 and 3 those PCEs were located, as required by

the ESA. FWS argues on appeal that the district court erred

because the ESA does not require the level of specificity that

the district court insisted upon. In addition, FWS argues it

reasonably designated Units 2 and 3 as areas containing PCEs

based on the best scientific data available as required by the

Act.

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At the outset, we agree with FWS that the district court

held it to a standard of specificity that the ESA does not

require. The district court asked FWS to identify where each

component part of each PCE was located within Units 2 and

3, and to do so, with accurate scientific data, by establishing

current use by existing polar bears. For illustration, with

respect to terrestrial denning habitat, the court suggested that

FWS could designate only areas containing actual den sites,

as opposed to designating areas containing habitat suitable for

denning. No such limitation to existing use appears in the

ESA, and such a narrow construction of critical habitat runs

directly counter to the Act’s conservation purposes. The Act

is concerned with protecting the future of the species, not

merely the preservation of existing bears. And it requires use

of the best available technology, not perfection. See San Luis

& Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 602

(9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the best scientific data

available does not mean the best scientific data possible); see

also Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal. v. Norton, 247 F.3d

1241, 1246–47 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same). The D.C. Circuit

stressed that while the agency “may not base its listings on

speculation or surmise” where there is no superior data,

“occasional imperfections do not violate [the ESA].” Bldg.

Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal., 247 F.3d at 1247 (internal

citations omitted).

The ESA thus requires FWS, when designating critical

habitat, to focus on the PCEs essential to protecting the polar

bear. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b). By requiring proof of

existing polar bear activity, the district court impermissibly

shifted the focus of the critical habitat designation away from

the PCEs. See id. Since the point of the ESA is to ensure the

species’ recovery, it makes little sense to limit its protections

to the habitat that the existing, threatened population

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currently uses. The district court’s construction of the critical

habitat requirementsthus contravenes the ESA’s conservation

purposes by excluding habitat necessary to species recovery. 

The Act contemplates the inclusion of areas that contain

PCEs essential for occupation by the polar bear, even if there

is no available evidence documenting current activity.

The issue of whether habitat may be designated without

proof of a species’ activity has been recognized before. In

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Lyder, 728 F. Supp. 2d 1126

(D. Mont. 2010), the court explained that FWS could

rationally conclude that areas with evidence of a species’

reproduction contain essential PCEs, but could not designate

only those areas where there was evidence of reproduction as

critical habitat. Id. at 1134–35. We agree with the court

when it said that “[w]hile it is rational to conclude areas with

evidence of reproduction contain the primary constituent

elements and should be designated as critical habitat, the

Service could not flip that logic so it means critical habitat

only exists where there is evidence of reproduction. Such a

proposition alleviates the need to further consider the actual

physical and biological features of the occupied area.” Id.

The district court also criticized the designation as an

attempt to designate “potential” habitat. We have rejected a

similar criticism by pointing out that the agency must look

beyond evidence of actual presence to where the species is

likely to be found. See Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 606 F.3d

at 1165–67. The focus must be on PCEs, not the current

existence of a species in an area. The standard FWS

followed, looking to areas that contained the constituent

elements required for sustained preservation of polar bears,

was in accordance with statutory purpose and hence could not

have been arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

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We therefore turn to FWS’s application of that standard

to the specific Units that are challenged here.

B. Unit 2: The Terrestrial Denning Habitat

The Final Rule identified terrestrial denning habitat as a

PCE for the polar bear, and it described topographic features

to include coastal bluffs and riverbanks with: (1) steep, stable

slopes for the den sites themselves; (2) access between den

sites and the coast; (3) sea ice in proximity to the denning

habitat prior to the onset of denning season in the fall; and (4)

freedom from human disturbance. FWS harnessed

technology to identify possible denning sites. Using radiotelemetry data collected on female polar bears between 1982

and 2009, FWS identified the areas east of the coastal town

of Barrow where 95% of all confirmed and probable polar

bear dens had occurred.

Some of the sites were along the coast, some farther

inland, and a few as far as 18 miles inland. To capture most

of the sites, FWS designated as critical habitat an area

extending 5 to 20 miles inland from the coast east of Barrow,

and designated this area as Unit 2. Two images in the record

illustrate the scope of the denning habitat designation.

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The left image shows the west area of Unit 2, from

Barrow to the Kavik River. The right image shows the east

area of Unit 2, from the Kavik River to the Canadian border.

Land west of the town of Barrow was not included within

the designation, although it contains some features suitable

for den sites. FWS chose not to include it within the

designation because studies indicated that polar bears rarely

den that far west, likely on account of a lack of access to sea

ice in the fall.

The district court nevertheless held that the designation of

Unit 2 was arbitrary and capricious. The court faulted FWS

for failing to show that the entire Unit 2 area contained all the

requisite physical and biological features. In particular, the

district court found that the denning studies cited by FWS

supported inclusion of the first macrohabitat feature of steep,

stable slopes, but also showed that this feature occurred in

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only 1% of Unit 2. The court also found that the studies

inadequately established the existence of the second (access

between dens and the coast) and fourth feature (absence of

human disturbance) in Unit 2, and the court strongly

questioned whether FWS had sufficiently supported the

existence of the third feature (sea ice in proximity of denning

habitat to provide access). The court thus demanded

scientific evidence of the existence of all of the characteristics

of denning habitat in all of Unit 2.

The district court did not make reference to the radiotelemetry data tracking female bear movements. The court

also did not appear to take into account the need for denning

habitat to include not only the dens themselves, but also

undisturbed access to and from the sea ice. The statute calls

for the best available scientific data, and this FWS utilized.

On appeal Plaintiffs defend the district court’s rejection

of the designation of Unit 2, but on somewhat different

grounds. Plaintiffs contend that FWS acted arbitrarily and

capriciously by mapping Unit 2 using a 5-mile incremental

inland measurement, without identifying specifically where,

within that area, all four elements of the terrestrial denning

habitat PCE were located.

To the extent that Plaintiffs demand greater scientific

specificity than available data could provide, Plaintiffs echo

the district court’s error in demanding too high a standard of

scientific proof. Plaintiffs on appeal concentrate more

heavily on FWS’s choice of a 5-mile increment measurement

inland from the coast to define the area of designation,

essentially claiming it is arbitrary.

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FWS, however, provided a rational explanation for using

the mapping methodology that it did. In the Final Rule, FWS

explained that it viewed the method developed jointly with

the United States Geological Survey (that did the actual

mapping), as the best available choice. The method is

designed to capture a “robust” estimation of the inland extent

of the den use. Polar bears typically den close to the coast,

but some have denned as far as 50 miles inland. The 5-mile

demarcation provides a straightforward, unbiased method for

estimating the inland area in which 95% of the maternal dens

are located. In addition, the demarcation accurately

represents current polar bear denning concentrations in the

zones from Barrow to the Kavik River, and from the Kavik

River to the Canadian border, while allowing FWS to account

for potential changes likely to occur due to coastal erosion

from climate change.

FWS further explained that it rejected restricting

designation to an area covering known denning activity in

favor of the “robust” 5-mile increment because of several

serious data limitations: (1) the uncertainties associated with

fine-scale mapping of potential den site areas; (2) the limited

size of the denning studies, which involved only 20-40 dens

a year, when the total number of females denning in any one

year is approximately 240; and (3) the fact that only a portion

of the North Slope, which contains ample potential denning

habitat, has been mapped. All of the reasons FWS has

provided for use of the 5-mile increment are supported by the

record.

Plaintiffs on appeal attempt unsuccessfully to poke holes

in the analysis. They claim the 5-mile increment does not

accurately represent polar bear denning concentrations,

pointing out that 95% of dens from Barrow to the Kavik

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River occur within 2.8 miles of the coast. This argument,

however, ignores the fact that in the eastern zone of Unit 2

(from the Kavik River to the Canadian border) 95% of dens

occurred within 18.6 miles of the coast, not 2.8 miles. The

area designated as Unit 2 is therefore an appropriate zone for

purposes of site inclusion and administrative convenience and

is not arbitrary or capricious. 

Plaintiffs also assert that future climate change is not an

appropriate consideration under the ESA. Plaintiffs contend

FWS can only designate habitat that contains essential

features at the time the species is listed, not habitat that may

become critical in the future because of climate change or

other potential factors. Plaintiffs argue there is no record

evidence to explain how the proposed critical habitat is

currently eroding due to climate change. They also argue that

FWS failed sufficiently to connect evidence of climate

change to its decision to use a 5-mile increment. Plaintiffs

instead suggest FWS relied on mere speculation that climate

change would cause land with PCEs to erode in the future.

The record belies these contentions, as the D.C. Circuit

has recognized. The very climatic factors that Plaintiffs now

criticize are those that the D.C. Circuit took into account in

approving the listing of polar bears as threatened. See In re

Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 4–6. That court reviewed the bases

for listing the polar bear and found that in collecting data on

climate change and sea ice, FWS relied on numerous

published studies and reports describing the effects of climate

change. See id. at 6. FWS explained that the rapid retreat of

sea ice in the summer and the overall erosion of sea ice

throughout the year in the Arctic is “unequivocal and

extensively documented in scientific literature.” Id. FWS

further explained that a majority of state-of-the-art climate

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30 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

models predict sea ice will continue to recede substantially

and that the Arctic will be seasonally ice-free by the middle

of the 21st century. Id. FWS also noted that the

observational record of current sea ice losses indicates that

losses seem to be about 30 years ahead of the modeled values,

which suggests a seasonally ice-free Arctic may come a lot

sooner than expected. Id. FWS properly took all of this

information into account in designating critical polar bear

habitat.

Underlying FWS’s rejection of Plaintiffs’ challenges is

the unassailable fact that bears need room to roam. Dens are

widely dispersed across the North Slope in a nonconcentrated manner. FWS established that polar bears are

highly mobile and spend most of their time on sea ice. In the

North Slope of Alaska, polar bears routinely den on the

coastal plain, which they reach by walking across the

relatively flat topography of that area. The record also

establishes that polar bears are faithful to particular denning

areas, but not to particular den sites. Accordingly, the data

supports FWS’s position that it is difficult (if not impossible)

to predict precisely where they will move within denning

habitat in the future.

Additional studies tracked polar bear activity and showed

that polar bears move through all of Unit 2. For example, a

study that tracked the activity of three polar bears in different

years showed that all three bears moved through large swaths

of Unit 2. The study documented that annually, the active

range of a female polar bear is an average of 92,584 square

miles. The habitat designation of a total of approximately

187,000 miles cannot be legitimately characterized as

“excessive.”

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The remaining dispute about Unit 2 concerns areas

adjacent to Alaska Native villages, industrial facilities, and

other human structures and activities. Plaintiffs argue that

FWS failed to provide a reasonable explanation for including

areas near some human activity in the designation, while

excluding the Native communities of Barrow and Kaktovik

from its final critical habitat designation, as well as all manmade structures such as buildings and paved roads. Plaintiffs

point particularly to the designation’s inclusion of the

industrialized area of Deadhorse, which is where the North

Slope’s principal airport is located. The district court

described Deadhorse as rife with structures and human

activity.

The record reflects, however, that Deadhorse is primarily

an industrial staging area for oil and gas operations, and has

no legally defined boundaries and almost no permanent

residents. Further, the record shows that polar bears routinely

move through Deadhorse, and have been known to den near

there. Thus, it was reasonable for FWS to conclude that

despite some human activity, polar bears could still move

through the Deadhorse area to access and locate den sites free

from disturbance. As the Final Rule explained, FWS retained

areas around Deadhorse because, among other reasons, “polar

bears . . . are allowed to exist in the areas between the widely

dispersed network of roads, pipelines, well pads, and

buildings.”

FWS also sufficiently explained why it did not include

areas in and near the communities of Barrow and Kaktovic. 

FWS carefully distinguished between the towns themselves

and other land just outside their boundaries. FWS, for

instance, decided not to exclude an additional one-mile radius

around Kaktovic from the designation because (1) polar bears

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routinely pass through that area; (2) the developed

communities make up only a small part of the legally defined

boundaries of Kaktovic, so a buffer zone essentially already

existed; and (3) the exclusion of the legally defined

boundaries already eliminated some potential polar bear

denning habitat. Polar bears similarly pass near Barrow. 

FWS explained that the legal boundaries of Barrow

themselves provided a buffer because they are well outside

the developed area of the village. Therefore, FWS did not

include a “buffer zone” around Barrow and several other

native communities west of Barrow; those communities were

already outside of the designated area.

Accordingly, FWS’s designation of Unit 2 as critical

denning habitat was not arbitrary and capricious. Unit 2

contains areas requiring protection for both birthing and

acclimation of cubs, and FWS adequately explained its

treatment of the relatively few areas of known human

habitation.

C. Unit 3: The Barrier Island Habitat

FWS’s Final Rule identified the third PCE for the polar

bear as “barrier island habitat,” consisting of the barrier

islands off the coast and a buffer zone, “used for denning,

refuge from human disturbance, and movements along the

coast to access maternal den and optimal feeding habitat.” 

The Rule defined the area to include “all barrier islands along

the Alaska coast and their associated spits . . . and the water,

ice, and terrestrial habitat within 1.6 km (1 mi) of these

islands (no-disturbance zone).” Thus the entire barrier island

PCE was designated as Unit 3. An image in the record

illustrates the scope of the barrier island habitat designation.

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In criticizing the designation, the district court failed to

take the entirety of the designation into account. As it did

with respect to the terrestrial denning habitat of Unit 2, the

district court faulted FWS for the lack of evidence in the

record showing specifically where on the barrier islands the

uses take place, i.e., where bears move to seek den sites,

refuge, and feeding habitat. The district court held, in effect,

that only such specific areas, which the bears could be shown

to utilize at the present time, could be designated as critical

habitat.

Given the statutory requirements, FWS appropriately

looked to the specific features of the islands that meet the

bears’ critical needs and to the area in which they occur. The

Final Rule defines the barrier island habitat PCE in broad

terms to be the barrier islands and associated spits, and the

water, ice, and any other terrestrial habitat within 1 mile of

the islands. The Final Rule explained the reason for such a

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designation is that bears use the barrier islands, associated

spits, and surrounding water in ways that are essential to their

existence and conservation. The district court erroneously

focused on the areas existing polar bears have been shown to

utilize rather than the features necessary for future species

protection. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(5) (“When considering

the designation of critical habitat, the Secretary shall focus on

the [PCEs] within the defined area that are essential to the

conservation of the species.”); see also Ariz. Cattle Growers’

Ass’n, 606 F.3d at 1167; Alliance for Wild Rockies, 728 F.

Supp. 2d at 1134. 

We understand that the record contains a confusing use of

the key term “denning habitat,” and this contributed to the

district court’s misdirected focus with respect to both Units

2 and 3. For example, in expressing a general dissatisfaction

with the Unit 2 designation, the district court found that the

record did not support inclusion of more than a tiny fraction

of Unit 2 as “denning habitat.” The district court was looking

at denning studies cited by FWS that indicated that only 1%

of Unit 2 is suitable as “denning habitat.” Those studies used

the term, however, to refer to the habitat suitable for the

building of the actual den itself. Because the average den is

about 20 feet wide (6.4 m), it is unsurprising that actual den

sites themselves would encompass less than 1% of Unit 2. 

FWS identified the habitat necessary for birthing as well as

the post natal care and feeding essential to survival.

In its designation of Units 2 and 3, FWS defined denning

habitat more broadly to include not only the denning site

itself, but also the area necessary for access to the ice from

the den. It considered the denning habitat essential for

protection to encompass the areas where polar bears could not

only successfully build a den, but also travel, feed, and

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acclimate cubs. This was in accord with the statutory

purposes, and thus it was not arbitrary or capricious for FWS

to include areas necessary for such related denning needs.

The administrative record supports the existence

throughout the barrier islands of the features suitable for

denning. As the district court conceded, the record shows

that many barrier islands provide denning habitat, as

historically evidenced by denning polar bears. The record

also demonstrates that the islands and the surrounding spits

and marine environment provide refuge from human

disturbance, and FWS cited evidence showing that polar

bears regularly move across the barrier islands in search of

denning, food, and rest.

In addition, the Final Rule explains that polar bears use

barrier islands as migration corridors, moving between them

by swimming or walking on ice or shallow sand bars. There

are reports in the record of polar bears denning and feeding

on the various barrier islands, and Native Alaskan hunters

reporting polar bears regularly moving along coastal islands. 

The entire barrier island unit thus provides access along the

coast to inland maternal den sites and optimal feeding habitat.

In the final analysis, with respect to both Units 2 and 3,

Plaintiffs disagree with the scope of FWS’s designation of

critical habitat, but Plaintiffs cannot point to evidence that

FWS failed to consider, or demonstrate that FWS’s stated

reasons are irrational or unsupported by the record. FWS

drew rational conclusions from the best available scientific

data, which is what the statute requires. 16 U.S.C.

§ 1533(b)(2).

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D. FWS Provided Adequate Justification to Alaska

Pursuant to Section 4(i)

FWS is statutorily required to give certain state agencies

notice of any proposed regulation to list species or designate

critical habitat. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(A)(ii). This is to enable the

state to provide input. If a state agency files comments

disagreeing with all or part of the proposed regulation and

FWS then issues a final rule which is in conflict with those

comments, FWS must provide the state with an explanation:

“[A] written justification for [its] failure to adopt regulations

consistent with the [state’s] comments or petition.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1533(i). In this case, FWS gave the required notice and

Alaska responded. The issue is whether FWS provided an

adequate justification to the State after adopting a final rule

that was not consistent with all of the State’s comments.

FWS accepted written comments from the public during

two different comment periods and held a number of public

hearings. FWS contacted appropriate Federal, State, and

local agencies; Alaska Native organizations; and other

interested parties and invited them to comment on the

proposed rule to designate critical habitat for the polar bear in

Alaska. During the first comment period, FWS requested

comments on the proposed rule. After considering those

comments, FWS reopened the public comment period and

requested additional comments on the revised proposed rule.

The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (“ADFG”)

submitted detailed comments. After adopting the Final Rule,

FWS responded with a letter to Alaska’s Governor Sean

Parnell, addressing the State’s concerns that were not

addressed in the final designation. FWS also cited to those

sections of the Final Rule which addressed the State’s

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comments. Alaska now contends FWS’s written justification

was insufficient to comply with Section 4(i) on the grounds

that FWS failed to comply with the section’s procedural

requirements, and failed to consider and provide reasoned

responses to several of Alaska’s substantive comments.

As a threshold matter, we address whether the written

justification called for by Section 4(i) is subject to judicial

review. FWS claims it is not, and our circuit has not yet

addressed this question. But the D.C. Circuit has. In In re

Polar Bear, the D.C. Circuit construed Section 4(i) to be a

part of the process that is reviewable when the court reviews

the final agency action. 709 F.3d at 17–19. The court

explained that it is a review only of whether FWS satisfied

the procedural requirements of Section 4(i). Id. The court

said it may not assess the substantive adequacy of the

agency’s responses to the comments because the ESA does

not specify what the substance of a written justification must

be. Id at 18–19. The court analyzed whether FWS was fully

aware of and took into account the commenting parties’

interests and concerns, because that is what is required by the

ESA in requiring a written justification. Id. We now follow

this approach.

The district court found fault with FWS’s justification

because it incorporated by reference its responses to Alaska’s

comments contained in the Final Rule rather than including

all of those responses verbatim in the letter to the Governor. 

The district court held, in effect, that FWS’s justification for

not adopting a final rule wholly consistent with the Alaska’s

comments had to be self contained. Second, the district court

found FWS violated Section 4(i) by sending its response

letter to the Governor rather than ADFG, which had

submitted the comments to FWS.

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We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that the

response was inadequate. There is nothing that we can

perceive in the text of Section 4(i), or its purpose, that

prevents FWS from referencing other publicly-available

documents in support of its justifications. The Supreme

Court recently declined to read a similar “one document”

requirement into a statute that required government entities to

provide reasons for a denial “in writing and supported by

substantial evidence contained in a written record.” T-Mobile

S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 811 (2015)

(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)). In T-Mobile South,

the telecommunications company had argued that a city must

give its reasons for denying permission to build a cell phone

tower in a denial letter itself, and not by referencing a

separate document. Id. at 815–18. In rejecting this approach,

the Supreme Court explained that Congress could have

written such a rule into the statute if it had wanted, but it

chose not to. Id. at 818. Like the statute in T-Mobile South,

the only requirement for the justification in Section 4(i) is

that it be in writing. It does not foreclose cross-referencing

other publicly available documents. The district court

therefore should not have imposed a “one document”

requirement.

Nor was it improper for FWS to mail the response to

Alaska’s Governor instead of ADFG. The comment letters

from Alaska and ADFG specified that they “represent[ed] the

consolidated comments for the State of Alaska based on input

from [ADFGand other departments].” Both letters also noted

that Section 4(i) required FWS to provide written justification

“to the State.” Because the letters appear to be speaking for

the State rather than any of the agencies listed, FWS’s action

was warranted.

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ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL 39

Even assuming FWS should have sent its letter to ADFG

instead of the Governor, the mistake would have been

inconsequential. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (requiring a court

reviewing agency decisions to take “due account . . . of the

rule of prejudicial error”). It is undisputed that ADFG

received the letter. Moreover, Alaska had previously

accepted Section 4(i) letters from FWS in exactly this

format—a letter sent to the Governor containing responses to

ADFG comments and referencing responses in other

documents—without issue. See In re Polar Bear ESA

Listing, 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 114 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d 709

F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

Finally, we reject Alaska’s claim that FWS’s letter failed

to offer reasoned responses to each of ADFG’s substantive

comments. FWS’s letter highlighted the basis for its

positions on the contested issues and therefore, effectively

addressed ADFG’s comments. See In re Polar Bear, 709

F.3d at 19. It is clear FWS responded, in some way, to each

of ADFG’s substantive comments. Alaska seems to disagree

with the substantive content of those responses. Yet Section

4(i) does not guarantee that the State will be satisfied with

FWS’s response. See id. Because Section 4(i) creates a

procedural requirement, a court will not analyze the

sufficiency of FWS’s responses. Id. FWS provided written

justification showing that it considered ADFG and the State’s

interests and concerns and, thus, satisfied its duties under

Section 4(i). See id.

E. Plaintiffs’ Cross-Appeal

In their cross-appeal, Plaintiffs seek to resurrect the

claims that the district court rejected. We deal with them

summarily because the district court correctly denied them.

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40 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

Plaintiffs argue that the “no-disturbance zone” around the

barrier islands in Unit 3 does not contain an essential physical

or biological feature, and that the evidence does not support

the necessity or purpose of including the zone. The district

court correctly upheld the no-disturbance zone as a part of

Unit 3 because it provides refuge from human disturbance. 

See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(5) (requirements essential to

conservation may include “[h]abitats that are protected from

disturbance”).

Plaintiffs argue that FWS failed to harmonize inconsistent

findings when it determined that the PCEs essential to the

polar bear may require special management considerations or

protection, while also stating that the designation of critical

habitat would not result in changes to polar bear conservation

requirements. The latter statement is from FWS’s economic

impact assessment, and means only that in light of existing

regulatory measures, FWS could not foresee any additional

expense for affected parties. See Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n,

606 F.3d at 1172. In the context of the special management

or protection analysis, the existence of alternative protections

or programs does not excuse FWS from designating critical

habitat. NRDC v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1127

(9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “the existence of such an

alternative would not justify [FWS’s] failure to designate

critical habitat”). To the contrary, the notion that polar bears

are already protected by some regulatory measures in

designated areas is an indication that the habitat is critical. 

See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d

1090, 1099 (D. Ariz. 2003). There is no conflict.

Moreover, even if the designation of critical habitat would

not currently result in changes to polar bear conservation

requirements, it is reasonable for FWS to identify special

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ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL 41

management considerations or protections that may be

required in the future. Nothing in the ESA requires that FWS

determine all possible conditions or protections at the time of

critical habitat designation. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532–1533.

Plaintiffs next contend that FWS’s assessment of the

potential economic impacts was arbitrary and capricious

because it grossly underestimated and excluded the indirect

costs that would result from designation. Specifically,

Plaintiffs maintain that FWS’s economic assessment failed to

fully account for administrative costs, delay costs, and

uncertainty and risk likely to result from critical habitat

designation.

The district court found that FWS did consider all such

impacts, and we agree. The ESA requires FWS to take into

consideration the economic, national security, and other

relevant impacts of specifying an area as critical habitat

before making its final designation. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2);

50 C.F.R. § 424.19(b). With this information, FWS

determines whether the benefits of excluding particular areas

from the designation outweigh the benefits of including those

areas in the designation. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). FWS is

required only to consider the potential economic impacts of

critical habitat designation and has discretion to exclude such

costs from its final estimate. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,

172 (1997).

Here, FWS undertook a formal economic impact

assessment of the proposed critical habitat designation as

required by Section 4(b)(2). FWS considered potential

indirect costs of the designation arising from delay, litigation,

uncertainty and risk, and more. FWS chose to address these

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42 ALASKA OIL AND GAS ASS’N V. JEWELL

impacts qualitatively rather than quantitatively because they

were too uncertain to include in the final calculation.

The Final Economic Analysis thus provided a quantitative

assessment of the likely direct costs of the designation, as

well as a qualitative assessment of the more uncertain and

speculative potential indirect costs. FWS’s decision not to

include those costs deemed too uncertain or speculative in the

total potential incremental cost of the designation was within

its discretion. FWS’s economic impact assessment, therefore,

was not arbitrary and capricious.

Alaska lastly argues that Section 7(a)(2) creates an

independent duty, beyond the requirements of Section 4, for

FWS to engage in consultation with any affected states before

designating critical habitat.

Section 7 outlines the process by which federal agencies

consult with FWS when those agencies take, fund, or

authorize actions that might jeopardize a protected species or

harm critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536. Section 7 provides

detailed instruction and procedures for conducting these

consultations, including substantive requirements, deadlines,

and specific procedures. See id. § 1536(a)(2). The district

court concluded that Section 7(a)(2) did create a duty to

consult, but not one that applied in this case. The district

court noted that Section 7 governs the federal interagency

consultation process, which applies only after an area has

already been designated as critical habitat. It accordingly

held that the statute did not require FWS to consult with the

State during the initial critical habitat designation, but that it

did require consultation with the State when later evaluating

whether federal agency action would be likely to destroy or

harm the designated habitat.

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The district court was correct in denying Alaska’s claim,

although we do not agree with the district court to the extent

that it held that Section 7 creates any independent duty to

consult apart from the requirements of Section 4. In 1982,

Congress added the specific procedures for designating

critical habitat to Section 4, including FWS’s duty to consult

with affected states. Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (Oct.

13, 1982). If such a duty already existed under Section 7,

Congress would not have had to mandate coordination with

the states under Section 4. Furthermore, Section 4 does not

mention any additional duty to consult with affected states or

reference Section 7 to imply that additional procedural duties

can be found there. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533.

Finally, even if Section 7(a)(2) contained additional

processes regarding critical habitat designation, the plain text

of the section indicates that consultation with states is

discretionary, not mandatory. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 

Congress’s use of “as appropriate” language indicates that

consultation with states under Section 7(a)(2) is discretionary

and not a separately enforceable obligation. See, e.g.,

Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th

Cir. 1999) (holding that “as appropriate” language indicates

discretionary authority). We therefore hold that Section 7

does not create an additional duty for FWS to consult with

states on critical habitat designations.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the

case REMANDED for entry of judgment in favor of the

governmental appellants.

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