Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00748/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00748-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The caption in the docket indicates that Mr. Ornosai is the

named Defendant in his capacity as warden of San Quentin

Prison. Steve Ornoski, whose name appears to have been

misspelled in the docket, served as the warden at San

Quentin Prison from July, 2005 to March, 2006. The Clerk of

the Court shall substitute Robert Ayers as the warden of San

Quentin. See Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure (if the public officer who is a party to a lawsuit

ceases to hold office or resigns, the officer's successor is

automatically substituted as a party).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY BEDFORD,

Petitioner,

 v.

ROBERT AYERS, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-0748 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Gregory Bedford, an inmate incarcerated at San

Quentin State Prison, asks pro se for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent Robert Ayers, Warden of

San Quentin Prison, opposes the petition.1 Petitioner has filed a

traverse. Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties

and the state court trial record, the Court DENIES the petition for

a writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

In May, 2001, a Santa Clara County jury found Petitioner

guilty of resisting or deterring an executive officer in violation

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 1 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

 Petitioner does not bring this claim in his federal habeas

petition. 

2

of California Penal Code § 69. On June 1, 2001, in a separate

bench trial, the court found true Petitioner's four prior strike

allegations. The Court sentenced him to state prison for twentyfive years to life pursuant to California's Three Strikes law. On

direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court committed

instructional error by using California Jury Instructions Criminal

(CALJIC) No. 17.41.1. On August 29, 2002, the California Court of

Appeal wrote a reasoned decision rejecting Petitioner's argument

and affirming his conviction. On November 13, 2002, the California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review.

On May 20, 2003, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in

the Santa Clara County superior court raising two claims: (1) his

sentence under California's Three Strikes law was unconstitutional

because one his prior convictions was invalid2 and (2) ineffective

assistance of counsel (IAC) based on his trial counsel's failure to

elicit exculpatory testimony from defense witness Chika Ugbaja. On

July 21, 2003, the superior court denied both claims, his second

claim without prejudice, because he had not included with his

petition all transcripts relating to Ms. Ugbaja's testimony at

trial. Petitioner then filed an amended state habeas petition,

which included all portions of the trial transcript relevant to his

second claim. On October 8, 2003, the superior court denied

Petitioner's second claim on its merits. 

On October 30, 2003, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 2 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner did not base

the IAC claim on his counsel's failure to request that the

conviction be treated as a misdemeanor.

3

in the California court of appeal, raising the two claims

previously raised in superior court. The appellate court summarily

denied the petition on January 14, 2004. On February 2, 2004,

Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme

Court raising the same two claims. On December 1, 2004, the state

supreme court summarily denied the petition.

On January 7, 2005, Petitioner filed a second state habeas

petition in the California Supreme Court raising two new claims:

(1) insufficiency of the evidence because Petitioner's level of

intoxication at the time of the incident showed that he lacked the

requisite mens rea to commit the crime charged and (2) IAC based on

his trial counsel's failure to move for a new trial under

California Penal Code § 1181(6) and failure to request that the

conviction be treated as a misdemeanor pursuant to California Penal

Code § 17(b).3

On January 27, 2005, while his second state habeas petition

was pending, Petitioner filed his first federal habeas petition. 

In it, he raised two of his claims: (1) the trial court erred in

instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1 and (2) IAC based on

his trial counsel's failure to elicit exculpatory testimony from a

defense witness. Petitioner also indicated that he had pending a

state habeas petition, which included the two other claims relating

to insufficiency of the evidence. 

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 3 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 In his traverse, Petitioner presents, for the first time,

a claim that there was insufficient evidence demonstrating

that he had the "ability to commit violent injury" when he

allegedly threatened Officer Granado. Because he failed to

raise this claim in any of his state habeas petitions, it is

unexhausted. Petitioner may not raise a claim for the first

time in his traverse. Therefore, this claim will not be

considered. The Court notes nonetheless that Petitioner was

convicted of attempting to resist or deter an executive

officer, a crime which does not require the immediate

ability to commit violent injury.

4

On October 12, 2005, this Court dismissed the petition for

failure to exhaust state judicial remedies and granted Petitioner

leave to file an amended petition within thirty days. On December

1, 2005, the Court dismissed the petition without prejudice after

Petitioner failed to file an amended petition within the thirty-day

deadline. On December 14, 2005, the California Supreme Court

summarily denied Petitioner's second state habeas petition. On

February 2, 2006, Petitioner filed the present federal habeas

petition, raising four claims: (1) the trial court erred in

instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1, (2) IAC based on his

trial counsel's failure to elicit exculpatory testimony from a

witness, (3) insufficient evidence demonstrating that Petitioner

had the specific intent to deter or resist an officer,4

 and (4) IAC

based on his trial counsel's failure to move for a new trial due to

insufficiency of the evidence.

On October 26, 2006, this Court ordered Respondent to show

cause why the petition should not be granted. On May 29, 2007,

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. On

March 19, 2008, this Court denied the motion and ordered Respondent

to file an answer within ninety days. On May 6, 2008, Respondent

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 4 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

filed an answer and, on July 9, 2008, Petitioner filed a traverse. 

II. Factual History

At approximately four a.m. on May 27, 2000, Petitioner was

arrested for allegedly assaulting someone with a metal pipe. State

Court Reporter's Transcript (RT) 242, 251, 254. The arresting

officer, Richard Granado, placed handcuffs on Petitioner and

transported him to the San Jose Police Department pre-processing

center. RT 254. Officer Granado testified that Petitioner used

insults and profanity on the drive to the police station. RT 255,

257. He also testified that Petitioner accused him of having

"something against black people, and that that was why he had been

placed under arrest." RT 258.

At 5:25 a.m., while being processed at the San Jose Police

Department, Petitioner had a blood sample drawn. CT 30, RT 530. 

This sample was then tested by analyst David Chen, who determined

that, at the time of the draw, Petitioner had a blood alcohol level

of .14. RT 519. Mercy Cardema, an expert criminalist from Santa

Clara County Crime Laboratory, testified that, at an alcohol level

of .14, "a person who has no tolerance to alcohol will exhibit

gross signs of intoxication such as loss of fine muscular

coordination and also some large muscle coordination like arms and

legs." RT 524-25. She also testified that the effects of alcohol

consumption on a person can differ according to genetic make-up,

tolerance levels, and the food contents in the person's stomach. 

RT 521-22. She attested that, in general, "the highest peak

alcohol concentration can be reached in about thirty to ninety

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 5 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

minutes after the last drink," and that thereafter, the alcohol

concentration in the blood begins to fall. RT 522. 

After completing pre-processing at the San Jose Police

Department, Officer Granado took Petitioner to the Santa Clara

County Department of Correction lower booking area. State Court

Clerk's Transcript, Preliminary Examination (CT), 24. Officer

Granado testified that, as he and Petitioner approached the medical

detectors located just outside the medical screening room,

Petitioner said to him, "[Y]ou'll see." RT 261. When Officer

Granado asked what he meant, Petitioner answered, "[Y]ou have a

family don't you. I wonder how you are without that badge." RT

261. Officer Granado asked if that statement was a threat, and

Petitioner answered that he should take it anyway he wanted. RT

261. Petitioner then repeated, "[Y]ou'll see. Just wait. You'll

see[.]" RT 262, 265, 266. At the trial, Officer Granado testified

that, when Petitioner made these remarks, his voice was "stern,

cold, angry . . . [n]ot raised in volume, but stern and serious." 

RT 265. He also stated that Petitioner's "eyes seemed wider." RT

265. 

Officer Granado removed Petitioner's handcuffs before he went

through the metal detectors. RT 266. Petitioner was then taken

into a small holding room where "prisoners are asked medical

questions for screening," and the arresting officers "fill out

paperwork." RT 262. The paperwork that Officer Granado filled out

while he and Petitioner were in the room indicated that the time

was 6:25 a.m. RT 272. Officer Granado also noted in his paperwork

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 6 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

the comments Petitioner had made while being escorted to the metal

detectors. RT 264. 

Officer Granado testified that, when they entered the holding

room, another police officer, Officer Smith, was exiting the room. 

RT 267. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Granado testified that

at this point only he and Petitioner were in the room. CT 31. 

Officer Granado also testified that, while they were alone in this

room, he tried to "calm the situation" by telling Petitioner that

"he was upset because he had been arrested and . . . not [to] talk

about my family." CT 27. Officer Granado testified that

Petitioner then looked at him and "with his left hand made a

slashing motion across his neck from . . . left to right . . . and

made a noise." CT 27. Petitioner then "opened his eyes wider and

with his right hand punched his open left hand and told [Officer

Granado] that [he] was a[n] . . . 'asshole,' and that [he] would

see." CT 29. Officer Granado testified that he stopped doing his

paperwork and told Petitioner that "what he had done was just a

threat and that [he] was going to add that on the booking charges." 

CT 29. Petitioner stated, "I don't know what you're talking

about." CT 29. 

In his testimony at trial, Officer Granado described the above

conversation and stated that, at the time Petitioner made these

comments and gestures, "his eyes seemed wider, his jaw was

clenched, his teeth were showing as he made the motion with his

thumb slashing across the throat [and] [h]is voice was stern." RT

269, 270. Officer Granado did not specify at trial the exact

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 7 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

location where Petitioner made these threatening gestures, only

that they were made "prior to taking him to the processing area." 

RT 267. Officer Granado also stated that, after completing his

paperwork in the small booking room, it took "a couple of minutes"

to "pass through into the processing area." RT 272.

The processing area is the main booking room where medical

personnel screen prisoners to determine whether they are injured,

or have any allergies or other medical conditions. RT 436-37. At

approximately 6:30 a.m., a nurse at the Santa Clara County jail,

Chika Ugbaja, interviewed Petitioner in this main processing area

and filled out two medical evaluation forms. RT 431. At the

trial, Ms. Ugbaja testified that it takes about five minutes to

fill out these forms. RT 432. She testified that she remembered

interviewing Petitioner and that, during the time she filled out

the forms, she did not witness him making any threats or acting in

an uncooperative manner to her or to Officer Granado. RT 432-433. 

She also testified that there were approximately three rooms

between the room where she examined Petitioner and the "little

rooms where incoming police officers with arresting persons can

stop to begin doing their part of the booking." RT 437.

Keith Norman, an investigator at the Santa Clara County Public

Defender's Office, interviewed Ms. Ugbaja by telephone on February

23, 2001. Mr. Norman's report states the following:

Chika said that she was working at the main jail

when [Petitioner] was brought in. She stated

that while she saw [Petitioner], he was

"cooperative. She stated at no point did

[Petitioner] say anything threatening to an

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 8 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 California Evidence Code section 356 states, in relevant

part, "when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or

writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration,

conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it

understood may also be given in evidence."

9

officer or employee of the jail while she was

with him. She did hear an officer who was with

[Petitioner] say "he threaten[ed] me." She said

she never hear[d] any threats. She then heard

[Petitioner] say, "I know what you are going to

do to me." She then said she remembers

[Petitioner] telling her that she was going to

be his witness. She did state that the officer

that was with [Petitioner] seemed already upset

with [Petitioner] as they entered the booking

area.

First Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in California

Supreme Court, Pet.'s Ex. B.

At the trial, Petitioner's counsel did not ask Ms. Ugbaja

whether Petitioner had told her that she would be his witness. RT

442. Defense counsel also did not ask Mr. Norman about his

interview with Ms. Ugbaja. The trial judge had previously ruled

that if defense counsel introduced any of Petitioner's statements,

the prosecution could use Petitioner's prior convictions for

impeachment purposes. RT 15-26. Moreover, the court ruled that

testimony regarding Petitioner's statement to Ugbaja was not

admissible under California Evidence Code section 3565 because it

"was [not] necessary for the trier of fact to understand the

witness's offered statement of what either the officer said or that

she didn't see a threat." RT 438-39. Thus, Petitioner's counsel

decided not to ask any questions that would elicit Petitioner's

statements, noting for the record that he did not want evidence of

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 9 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Petitioner's prior convictions prejudicing the jury. TR 441.

Petitioner's counsel also objected to the trial court's use of

jury instruction CALJIC No. 17.41.1, which states:

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors at all

times during their deliberations conduct themselves as

required by these instructions. Accordingly, should it

occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses

any intention to disregard the law or to decide the case

based on penalty or punishment or any other improper

basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to

immediately advise the court of the situation.

Counsel argued that the instruction improperly infused an

"adversarial atmosphere" in the jury in violation of appellant's

right to a fair trial. (RT 577-578). However, his objection was

overruled, and the instruction was given. (RT 612-613)

LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA), a district court may grant a petition challenging a state

conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on

the merits in state court only if the state court's adjudication of

the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

"Clearly established federal law" refers to "the holdings, as

opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the

time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams (Terry) v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-04, 412 (2000). A state court's decision

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 10 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

is "contrary to" Supreme Court law if the state court "arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a

question of law," or reaches a different conclusion based on facts

indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case. Williams, 529 U.S. at

412-13. A state court's decision constitutes an "unreasonable

application" of Supreme Court precedent if the state court "either

(1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to

a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or

(2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal

principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable." Id. at 407. An “unreasonable application” of

federal law is different from an incorrect or erroneous application

of federal law. Id. at 412. 

In determining whether the state court's decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of

its decision on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no

reasoned lower court decision on the claim, a review of the record

is the only means of deciding whether the state court's decision

was objectively reasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003). When confronted with such a decision, a federal

court should conduct "an independent review of the record" to

determine whether the state court's decision was an unreasonable

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 11 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

application of clearly established federal law. Id.

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted

only if the error had a "'substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson,

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 638 (1993)).

DISCUSSION

I. Jury Instruction No. 17.41.1

Petitioner argues that the trial court's use of CALJIC No.

17.14.1 violated his rights to due process and a unanimous verdict

as well as the free speech rights of the jurors. In a reasoned

decision, the California court of appeal denied this claim, citing

People v. Engelman, 28 Cal. 4th 436, 443 (2002), for the

proposition that there is no federal constitutional right to

"absolute and impenetrable secrecy for jury deliberations in the

face of juror misconduct." 

In Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth

Circuit rejected a petitioner's constitutional challenge to CALJIC

No. 17.41.1, holding:

It is clear . . . that the California appellate court's

holding was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, because no Supreme Court case establishes that

an instruction such as CALJIC No. 17.41.1 violates an

existing constitutional right.

Id. at 955-56. 

When the court of appeal denied Petitioner's claim in 2002,

Brewer had not yet been decided. However, Brewer merely

substantiated the state court's conclusion that there is no

established federal constitutional right to absolute secrecy among

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 12 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

jurors. Here, as in Brewer, Petitioner has pointed to no Supreme

Court precedent clearly establishing that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 --

either on its face or as applied to the facts of his case --

violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 957. 

Therefore, the appellate court's denial of this claim was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law, and does not provide grounds for granting Petitioner

federal habeas relief.

II. Insufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner argues that the lab report's finding that his blood

alcohol level was at .14 shortly after his arrest establishes that

he could not have formed the requisite specific intent to commit

the crime of resisting or deterring an executive officer under

California Penal Code § 69. Because there is no reasoned state

decision addressing this claim, the Court will conduct "an

independent review of the record" to determine whether the state

court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Therefore, a state

prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his state

conviction is not sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact

to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt states a constitutional

claim, which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas relief. 

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 13 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321, 324 (1979). However, a

federal court reviewing a habeas petitioner's claim that the

evidence was not sufficient to support the state court conviction

does not determine whether the evidence established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir.

1992). Rather, the federal court "determines only whether, 'after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id.

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). 

If confronted by a record that supports conflicting inferences,

a federal habeas court "must presume –- even if it does not

affirmatively appear on the record –- that the trier of fact

resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must

defer to that resolution." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. A jury's

credibility determinations are therefore entitled to near-total

deference. Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004). 

California Penal Code § 69 states, in relevant part, that a

person commits the offense of resisting or deterring an executive

officer if he or she "attempts, by means of any threat or violence,

to deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty

imposed upon such officer by law . . ." The California Supreme

Court held in People v. Gutierrez that violation of this statute

requires specific intent to interfere with the officer's

performance of his or her duties. 28 Cal. 4th 1083, 1272-1275

(2002). "Criminal intent, whether general or specific, may be

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 14 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

established by circumstantial evidence." People v. Patino, 95 Cal.

App. 3d 11, 27-28 (1979).

Petitioner argues that the jury, after being presented with

his involuntary intoxication defense, was irrational in finding him

guilty of this specific intent crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

However, the state court was not unreasonable in finding that the

jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. First, there

is evidence that Petitioner was angry when he was arrested, and

that he accused Officer Granado of racial profiling. RT 258. From

this, the jury may have inferred that Petitioner was purposely

trying to resist what he believed to be an unlawful arrest. The

jury may also have found that Officer Granado's description of

Petitioner's demeanor at the time he made the threats characterized

it as cold and calculating, rather than drunken and belligerent,

behavior.

Moreover, after hearing expert witness Mercy Cardema testify

that alcohol affects different individuals differently according to

genetic make-up, tolerance levels, and the food contents in the

stomach, the jury may have found that, at a .14 blood alcohol

level, Petitioner could still have formed the requisite means rea

to commit this offense. RT 521-22. The jury may have also

considered Ms. Cardema's testimony that blood alcohol levels begin

to fall thirty to ninety minutes after the last drink is consumed,

and therefore concluded that Petitioner's blood alcohol level had

dropped significantly in the hour between his blood being drawn at

the police station and his making the threats at the jail. 

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 15 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

Because the Court must defer to the jury's resolution of any

factual conflict, it accepts as true the jury's determination that

Petitioner had the requisite mens rea to commit this crime. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Thus, the state court was not

unreasonable in denying Petitioner's insufficiency of the evidence

claim.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) Claims

A. IAC for Failing to File § 1181(6) Motion

Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing

to raise a motion for a new trial under California Penal Code 

§ 1181(6), challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the jury's finding that he had the requisite specific intent to

commit the offense. There is no reasoned state decision addressing

this claim. Thus, the Court will conduct "an independent review of

the record" to determine whether the state court's decision was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as

a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having

produced a just result. Id.

 In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 16 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

counsel claim a petitioner must establish two things. First, he

must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, that is,

that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. However, "strategic

choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant

to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable." Id. at 690.

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's

deficient performance, that is, that "there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. 

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. Id. In order to show prejudice under

Strickland from failure to file a motion, a petitioner must show

that (1) had his counsel filed the motion, it is likely that the

trial court would have granted it as meritorious, and (2) had the

motion been granted, it is likely that there would have been an

outcome more favorable to him. Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990

(9th Cir. 1999). 

 In deciding whether to grant a motion under California Penal

Code § 1181(6), a trial court must make an independent evaluation

of the evidence to determine whether that evidence as a whole is

sufficient to sustain a verdict. People v. Robarge, 41 Cal. 2d

628, 633 (1953); People v. Sheran, 49 Cal. 2d 101, 108 (1957). The

trial court should consider the proper weight to be accorded to the

evidence and then decide whether or not, in its opinion, there is

sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict. People v.

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 17 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Risenhoover, 70 Cal. 2d 39 (1968). However, in making its

determination, the trial court is guided by a "presumption in favor

of the correctness of the verdict and proceedings supporting it." 

People v. Davis, 10 Cal. 4th 463, 524 (1995).

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the trial court was

likely to have found insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's

verdict. As discussed above, this Court has conducted an

independent review of the evidence and found that it could

reasonably support a finding of specific intent. Because the trial

court would have presumed the correctness of the verdict, it most

likely would not have granted the motion for a new trial. 

Therefore, Petitioner cannot show that counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a motion for a new trial. Thus, the state habeas

court's denial of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, and this claim does

not provide grounds for granting the petition.

B. IAC for Failing to Elicit Exculpatory Testimony

Petitioner also asserts that defense counsel failed to ask Ms.

Ugbaja or Mr. Norman whether Ms. Ugbaja heard Petitioner make any

threats or whether Petitioner told her that she would be his

witness. This, he argues, constituted IAC because it prevented the

jury from hearing exculpatory evidence. 

The state habeas court denied this claim in a reasoned

decision, finding that "the exculpatory value of the statement was

low [because] Ugbaja apparently was not present when the alleged

threat was actually directed at the officer." Order of Superior

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 18 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

Court Denying Amended Petition at 2-3. 

In his traverse, Petitioner contends that Ms. Ugbaja was

present when he allegedly threatened Officer Granado. Traverse at

11-12. He therefore argues that her testimony that she did not

hear him make any threats was exculpatory evidence that his counsel

should have elicited at trial. However, defense counsel did ask

Ms. Ugbaja whether she heard Petitioner make any threats, and the

witness answered that she did not. RT 432-433.

Therefore, the only testimony that defense counsel failed to

elicit was Petitioner's statement to Ms. Ugbaja that she would be

his witness. However, this statement would have had little impact

on the jury's decision if, as the state habeas court found, Ms.

Ugbaja was not actually present when the threat was made. In that

case, "the offer of proof [would have] indicated that Ugbaja was

only present when Petitioner denied making such a threat." Ex. 9

at 2-3. 

The state court not unreasonably found that Ms. Ugbaja was not

present when the Petitioner threatened Officer Granado. During the

preliminary hearing, Officer Granado testified that Petitioner made

the threats when he and Petitioner were alone in a small booking

room. CT 27. At the trial, Officer Granado testified that the

statements were made "prior to taking [Petitioner] to the

processing area." RT 267. Therefore, Officer Granado's testimony

consistently indicated that Petitioner had already made the threats

by the time they entered the main processing area where Ms. Ugbaja

worked. 

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 19 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

Moreover, although defense counsel noted the short time span

between 6:25 a.m., when Officer Granado noted in his paperwork that

the threats were made, and 6:30 a.m., when Ms. Ugbaja filled out

her paperwork, this is not inconsistent with the prosecution's

theory that these events took place in two different rooms, because

Officer Granado testified that it only took "a couple of minutes 

. . . [to] pass through into the processing area." RT 272, 441. 

Ms. Ugbaja's testimony also supports the state habeas court's

finding that she was not present when Petitioner made the alleged

threats. Ms. Ugbaja testified that there were "about three rooms"

between the small booking rooms where police officers first take

prisoners and the main screening room where the nurses are located. 

RT 437. She also stated in her interview with Mr. Norman that the

officer accompanying Petitioner at the time of her medical

screening "seemed already upset with [Petitioner] as they entered

the booking area," allowing an inference that the threats were made

before they entered the room. Ex. 12, Pet.'s Ex. B. Therefore,

the state habeas court's finding that Ms. Ugbaja was not a

percipient witness to the alleged threat was not unreasonable.

As stated above, if Ms. Ugbaja was not a percipient witness,

her testimony would have revealed only that, after Petitioner had

already committed the alleged offense, he told her that she would

be his witness. It is unlikely that eliciting this evidence would

have changed the jury's verdict. Accordingly, when defense counsel

weighed the exculpatory value of questioning Ms. Ugbaja about

Petitioner's statement, especially considering the prejudice that

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 20 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

may have resulted from the prosecutor's being able to introduce

evidence of Petitioner's priors, he may have reasonably determined

that the testimony would do more harm than good. Thus, his

decision not to elicit this testimony was a reasonable strategic

decision and his performance was not deficient or prejudicial under

Strickland. 

Therefore, the state habeas court's denial of this claim was

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law, and it does not provide grounds for

granting this petition. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus (Docket No. 1). Judgment shall enter

accordingly. The parties shall bear their own costs. The clerk

shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/22/08 ____________________________

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 21 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY L BEDFORD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

S ORNOSAI et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-00748 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on August 22, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Gregory L. Bedford T-22294

San Quentin State Prison

San Quentin, CA 94974

Michele Joette Swanson

CA State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Dated: August 22, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-00748-CW Document 23 Filed 08/22/08 Page 22 of 22