Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05450/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05450-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1,

2006, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal

Code § 5075(a).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENNIE BLANKENSHIP,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE, Acting Warden and ARNOLD

SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor,

Respondents. /

No. C 04-5450 CW

ORDER GRANTING

MOTION FOR RELIEF

FROM JUDGMENT 

Petitioner Bennie Blankenship, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 

7-9, applies for a modification of the judgment entered by the

Court on April 12, 2007. The Court construes this as a motion for

relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 

Respondent A.P. Kane opposes the request. Having considered all of

the papers filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS the motion.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are explicated in the April 12, 2007

Order Granting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The facts

relevant to this motion are as follows. On August 10, 1983,

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. After

approximately twenty years in custody and his eleventh parole date

denial by the Board of Parole Hearings (Board)1

, Petitioner filed a

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petition for writ of habeas corpus in state superior court. The

superior court concluded that nothing in the record supported the

Board’s finding that Petitioner presented an unreasonable risk of

danger to the public and ordered the Board to conduct a new hearing

within sixty days of receipt of its order. On May 23, 2003, at a

rehearing, the Board found Petitioner suitable for parole. On

October 20, 2003, former Governor Gray Davis reversed the Board’s

decision, finding that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole on the

ground that he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety. On

December 24, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in state superior court challenging Governor Davis’

decision. Even though the state court disagreed with many of the

Governor’s findings, it upheld the Governor’s decision, concluding

that his findings as to the nature of the commitment offense were

supported by a “modicum” of evidence. Petitioner’s subsequent

petitions to the California appellate court and Supreme Court were

denied. On December 27, 2004, Petitioner filed a federal petition

for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. 

In its April 12, 2007 Order, the Court concluded that Governor

Davis’ decision to reverse the Board based on Petitioner’s

commitment offense and past substance abuse was not supported by

“some evidence” and the state court’s decision affirming the

Governor was an unreasonable application of federal law. Based on 

In re Capistran, 107 Cal. App. 4th 1299, 1302 (2003), the Court

granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus, reinstating the

Board’s decision granting parole, and remanded to present Governor

Arnold Schwarzenegger to determine whether to issue a new decision

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or to allow the Board’s decision to stand. On May 11, 2007,

Governor Schwarzenegger issued a decision reversing the Board’s

decision to grant parole to Petitioner. 

Petitioner now argues that the Court’s judgment remanding the

case back to Governor Schwarzenegger to issue a new decision or to

permit the Board’s decision granting release to stand is improper

under the reasoning of McQuillon v. Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir.

2003) (McQuillon II) and California case law.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates

the following six grounds upon which a motion for relief from an

order or judgment may be made: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise

or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due

diligence could not have been discovered before the court's

decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) any other reason

justifying relief.

For the purposes of subparagraph (1), “mistake” includes legal

error by the Court. Yniques v. Cabral, 985 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th

Cir. 1993) (“[A] district court’s erroneous reading of the law is a

‘mistake’ sufficient to require reconsideration of an order.”).

"`[T]he major grounds that justify reconsideration involve an

intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new

evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest

injustice.'" Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882

F.2d 364, 369 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Desert

Gold Mining Co., 433 F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir. 1970)). 

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Respondent argues Petitioner’s motion should be denied because

it is improperly brought under Civil Local Rule 7-9. In the

interests of justice, the Court has construed Petitioner’s brief as

a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 

Respondent argues that even if the Court considers

Petitioner’s request to be a motion, it should be rejected because

it does not comply with the requirements for filing a motion under

Civil Local Rule 7-2 which requires a noticed hearing date and

time, a proposed order and affidavits or declarations. The Court

will not deny Petitioner’s motion based on this procedural

deficiency. Respondent has had an adequate opportunity to oppose

it and the Court does not find a hearing is necessary. The Court

now addresses the merits of Petitioner’s motion.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues that this Court committed legal error by

following In re Capistran and remanding the case to the Governor

rather than following McQuillon v. Duncan and the majority of

California cases which have ordered the immediate release of the

petitioner in similar circumstances. Respondent does not address

to Petitioner’s specific substantive arguments.

In McQuillon v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002)

(McQuillon I), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Board’s 1994

rescission of its original grant of parole to the petitioner was

not supported by any evidence and granted the petition for habeas

corpus relief. McQuillon II, 342 F.3d at 1014. In McQuillon I,

the Ninth Circuit had remanded the case to the district court with

instructions to “grant the writ.” Id. On remand, the district

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court ordered the immediate release of the petitioner. Id. The

warden asked the district court to order, in lieu of immediate

release, that the Board grant the petitioner a new rescission

hearing. Id. The district court denied the motion, but stayed its

judgment to allow the warden time to appeal. Id. 

In McQuillon II, the Ninth Circuit held that the district

court had properly interpreted the Ninth Circuit’s direction in

McQuillon I. Id. at 1015. The Ninth Circuit rejected the

respondent’s argument that the case should be remanded to the Board

for a new rescission hearing because the question before the Board

at its last decision to rescind the grant of parole was whether in

1979 the Board had improvidently granted a parole date to the

petitioner. Id. The Ninth Circuit explained, “There is no reason

to remand to the Board to reconsider that question, given that the

evidence in the 1994 hearing pertained to the entirely historical

question of what the Board had done in 1979; given that the same

evidence as in 1994 would be before the Board on remand; and given

that we held in McQuillon I that the Board in 1994 had improperly

found, based on that evidence, that the parole date had been

improvidently granted in 1979.” Id.

The McQuillon II court was unpersuaded by the respondent’s

argument that an order of immediate release would deprive the

Governor of his power to review any decision concerning the grant

or denial of parole. The Ninth Circuit cited a California

appellate decision, In re Smith, 109 Cal. App. 4th 489, 507 (2003),

which, in an analogous situation, declined to remand to the

Governor after the court reversed the Governor’s decision finding

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the prisoner ineligible for parole. The Ninth Circuit approved the

California appellate court’s reasoning that “because of the limited

nature of the Governor’s power, a remand would be futile. Although

the Board can give the prisoner a new hearing and consider

additional evidence, the Governor’s constitutional authority is

limited to a review of the materials provided by the Board. Since

we have reviewed the materials that were before the Board and found

no evidence to support a decision other than the one reached by the

Board, a remand to the Governor in this case would amount to an

idle act.” Id. (citing In re Smith, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 507). 

This was the Smith court’s explanation of why it disagreed

with the Capistran court’s decision to remand to the Governor after

it had granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground

that the Governor had improperly reversed the Board’s grant of

parole. Smith, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 507. The Smith court noted

that the Capistran court had determined that, because the Governor

and the Board possess equal discretion in reviewing parole

suitability, the Governor should be allowed, in his discretion, to

issue a new decision. Id.

In other cases, the California appellate courts, after

overturning the Governor’s reversal of the Board’s grant of parole,

have remanded directly to the Board to release the petitioner

immediately. See e.g., In re Gray, 151 Cal. App. 4th 379, 411

(2007); In re Lawrence, 150 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 1562 (2007); In re

Elkins, 144 Cal. App. 4th 475, 503 (2006); and In re Scott, 133

Cal. App. 4th 573, 604 (2005).

The Court is bound by McQuillon and persuaded by Smith that

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the remand of this case to the Governor providing him the

opportunity to re-review the Board’s grant of parole to Petitioner

was not warranted and constituted clear error within the meaning of

Federal Rule of Procedure 60(b).

Therefore, the Court amends its April 12, 2007 Order and the

Judgment issued on the same date. Section III of the April 12,

2007 Order is deleted. The Conclusion of the April 12, 2007 Order

shall now read:

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The

Board’s decision granting parole is reinstated as of the

date of this order. The case is remanded to the Board

which is ordered to release Petitioner pursuant to the

conditions, if any, set forth at its May 23, 2003

hearing.

The amended judgment shall now read:

For the reasons set forth in this Court’s Order Granting

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

That Petitioner Bennie Blankenship’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus is granted. The Board’s decision granting

parole is reinstated as of the date of this order. The

Board is ordered to release Petitioner pursuant to the

conditions, if any, set forth at its May 23, 2003

hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

7/30/07

Dated 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BLANKENSHIP,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DAVIS et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV04-05450 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on July 30, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies)

in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in

the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's

office.

Denise Alayne Yates

Office of the Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Jennifer Lynne Peabody

Marilee Marshall

Marilee Marshall & Associates

523 West Sixth Street

Suite 1109

Los Angeles, CA 90014

Dated: July 30, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:04-cv-05450-CW Document 21 Filed 07/30/07 Page 8 of 8