Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08070/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08070-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Jackson Ellsworth, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CV-11-8070-PCT-RCB-MEA

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Prison Health Services, )

Inc., et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

Currently pending before the court is plaintiff pro se

James Jackson Ellsworth’s “Motion for District Court’s

Reconsideration of Magistrate[’]s Denial of Plaintiff’s

Motion to Appoint Counsel” (Doc. 131) and his “Motion to

Expand the time to File a Joint Proposed Pre-Trial Order”

(Doc. 132). Both motions were filed on February 20, 2013. 

Because this court did not order the filing of a response

to the reconsideration motion, defendants did not file one. 

See LRCiv 7.2(g)(“No response to a motion for reconsideration

. . . may be filed unless ordered by the Court[.]”) Although

defendants could have responded to the motion to expand, they 

Case 3:11-cv-08070-JAJ Document 133 Filed 03/20/13 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Actually, that denial was on February 23, 2012. Ord. (Doc. 56).

- 2 -

did not, and the time to do so has passed. See LRCiv 7.2(b)

(allowing 14 days after service in which to serve and file a

responsive memorandum). Thus, having considered the pending

motions, and based upon its familiarity with the history of

this litigation, for the reasons set forth below, the court

DENIES the motion for appointment of counsel, but GRANTS the

motion to expand.

I. “Motion for Reconsideration”

On January 10, 2013, less than a week after the denial of

defendants’ summary judgment motion, plaintiff filed a motion

for appointment of counsel. Plaintiff sought such

appointment explaining that he “has never been to trial and

is very limited” in his ability to conduct a trial. Mot.

(Doc. 128) at 1-2. Further, plaintiff found “overwhelming”

trial preparation and the related decisions. Id. at 2. In

addition to being “unsure” of what trial preparation entails,

plaintiff Ellsworth noted that his “health” was “a factor” in

his request, but he did not elaborate. Id. at 2. 

Stating that on February 7, 2012,1 this court previously

denied a motion for appointment of counsel by plaintiff, the 

defendants deemed his January 10, 2013, motion as one for

reconsideration. Thus, preliminarily, the defendants

asserted that plaintiff’s more recent motion was untimely

because it was not brought within “fourteen (14) days after

the date of the filing of the Order that is the subject of

the motion[,]” as LRCiv 7.2(g)(2) requires. The defendants

Case 3:11-cv-08070-JAJ Document 133 Filed 03/20/13 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

further argued that plaintiff failed to make the requisite

showing of “exceptional circumstances” to warrant appointment

of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 

On February 14, 2013, the Hon. United States Magistrate

Judge Mark E. Aspey (“the Magistrate Judge”) simply denied

plaintiff’s motion. Ord. (Doc. 130) at 1. Now plaintiff is

seeking “reconsider[ation]” of that denial primarily because

he lacks both formal legal education and trial experience. 

Mot. (Doc. 131) at 3. Plaintiff posits that the foregoing

means that the trial time could be doubled, resulting in

increased costs and a waste of “valuable judicial time[.]”

Id.

As this court has previously recognized, “‘[m]otions for

reconsideration are disfavored and should be granted only in

rare circumstances.’” Morgal v. Maricopa County Bd. of

Sup’rs, 2012 WL 2368478, at *1 (D.Ariz. June 21, 2012)

(quoting U.S. v. Vistoso Partners, LLC, 2011 WL 2550387, at

*1 (D.Ariz. June 27, 2011 (citation omitted)). Consistent

with that view, LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) unequivocally states, in

part:

The Court will ordinarily deny a motion 

for reconsideration of an Order absent 

a showing of manifest error or a showing 

of new facts or legal authority that 

could not have been brought to its attention 

earlier with reasonable diligence. 

LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) (emphasis added). Plaintiff Ellsworth’s

reconsideration motion is completely devoid of that requisite

showing. 

Further, in direct contravention of LRCiv 7.2(g)(1), in

Case 3:11-cv-08070-JAJ Document 133 Filed 03/20/13 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

his reconsideration motion, plaintiff Ellsworth merely

reiterates his prior argument to the Magistrate Judge that he

is seeking appointment of counsel because of his lack of

experience in preparing for and participating in a trial. 

See id. (“No motion for reconsideration of an Order may

repeat any . . . argument made by the movant in support of or

in opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order.”) 

Additionally, it is possible to construe plaintiff

Ellsworth’s motion as nothing more than his disagreement or

dissatisfaction with the Magistrate Judge’s order denying

appointment of counsel. As this court has pointed out on

more than one occasion, however, “[s]uch ‘dissatisfaction’ or

disagreement is not ‘a proper basis for reconsideration[.]’”

Morgal, 2012 WL 2368478, at *1 (quoting Spain v. EMC Mortg.

Co., 2008 WL 2328358, at *2 (D.Ariz. June 4, 2008) (internal

quotation marks and other citations omitted); see also Dennis

v. Ayers, 2008 WL 1989304, at *1 (N.D.Cal. May 6, 2008)

(Petitioner’s disagreement “with the Court’s prior resolution

of the claim . . . is, of course, [an] insufficient [basis]

for . . . granting] a motion for reconsideration.”).

Finally, LRCiv 7.2(g)(1), governing the “[f]orm and

content” of motions for reconsideration, expressly provides

that “[f]ailure to comply with th[at] subsection may be

grounds for denial of the motion.” Exercising its discretion

under that Rule, the court denies plaintiff Ellsworth’s

motion for reconsideration because he did not make the

requisite showing thereunder for such relief. See LRCiv

7.2(g)(1).

Case 3:11-cv-08070-JAJ Document 133 Filed 03/20/13 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

The court is compelled to point out that notwithstanding

his failure to comply with LRCiv 7.2(g)(1), still, plaintiff

Ellsworth would not prevail on the merits because he “has not

made the predicate showing of ‘exceptional circumstances’

which the Ninth Circuit requires to warrant appointment of

counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).” See Morgal v.

Maricopa County Bd. of Sup’rs, 2012 WL 3028336, at *1

(D.Ariz. July 24, 2012) (footnote omitted) (quoting Agyeman

v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting, in turn, Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236

(9th Cir. 1984)) . . . (District courts have discretion

pursuant to section 1915(e)(1) to appoint counsel for

indigent civil litigants “ ‘only in exceptional

circumstances.’ ”). Thus, there are both procedural and

substantive reasons for denying plaintiff Ellsworth’s

reconsideration motion.

II. “Motion to Expand”

The scheduling order required, among other things, that

“the parties . . . lodge a joint pretrial statement and

proposed order[,] [(“JPTO”)]” at the latest “within 90 days

of the Court’s ruling on the last dispositive motion that

does not dispose of the case.” Ord. (Doc. 13) at 2:20-24

(emphasis in original). This court’s January 4, 2013, denial

of defendants’ motion for summary judgment constitutes such

an order. Thus, in accordance with the scheduling order, the

parties have 90 days (i.e., by no later than April 4, 2013)

in which to lodge a JPTO. 

As of March 20, no such order has been lodged. Plaintiff

Case 3:11-cv-08070-JAJ Document 133 Filed 03/20/13 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

is requesting an unspecified expansion of time in which to

file the JPTO. There being no prejudice to defendants, and

taking into account, as plaintiff notes, his pro se status

and his incarceration, the court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s

motion to expand. Accordingly, the parties shall have sixty

(60) days from the date of this Order by which to lodge a

joint pretrial statement and proposed order.

As set forth above, the court hereby ORDERS that:

(1) plaintiff’s “Motion for District Court’s

Reconsideration of Magistrate[’]s Denial of Plaintiff’s

motion to Appoint Counsel” (Doc. 131) is DENIED; and 

(2) plaintiff’s “Motion to Expand the Time to File a

Joint Proposed Pre-Trial Order” (Doc. 132) is GRANTED and the

parties shall have sixty (60) days from the date of this

Order by which to lodge a joint pretrial statement and

proposed order.

DATED this 20th day of March, 2013.

Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

Case 3:11-cv-08070-JAJ Document 133 Filed 03/20/13 Page 6 of 6