Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00236/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00236-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983bv Bivens Non-Prisoner

---

– 1 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALMA ROSA GODINEZ,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-0236 BAS-NLS

ORDER: 

(1)GRANTING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT FOR 

DEFENDANT LOPEZ 

AND

(2)GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

FOR DEFENDANT 

MALENA HUERTA

[ECF No. 23]

v.

JORGE MALENO HUERTA, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Alma Godinez brings this §1983 action against Deputies Maleno 

Huerta (“Maleno”) and Lopez alleging: (1) unlawful entry without a warrant, (2) 

illegal search, (3) excessive force, (4) wrongful arrest, (5) wrongful detention, (6) 

violations of California Civil Code §52.1 and (7) malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 

1.) Defendants move for summary judgment arguing: (1) plaintiff is collaterally 

estopped by findings at her preliminary hearing and probation revocation hearing; (2) 

insufficient evidence supports any cause of action for excessive force; (3) Defendants 

are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) insufficient evidence supports any causes 

of action against Deputy Lopez. (ECF No. 23 (Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 16
– 2 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Judgment (“MSJ”)).) Ms. Godinez has opposed Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 25 

(Response in Opposition to the MSJ (“Opp’n”)).) 

For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees that there is insufficient 

evidence to support Ms. Godinez’s claims against Deputy Lopez, and that both 

officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the initial entry. The Court, however, 

denies Defendants’ motion in all other respects as to Defendant Maleno. 

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Deputy Maleno

On February 2, 2015, Deputy Maleno responded to a call at Ms. Godinez’s 

home. (ECF No. 29 ¶2 (Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (“JSUF”)).) Kevin

Thornton was outside the home and told Deputy Maleno that he lived at the home 

with his girlfriend Ms. Godinez. (MSJ, Ex. A at 75:18–21, 75:23–76:12 (Excerpts 

of Dep. Tr. of Deputy Maleno (“Maleno Dep.”)).) Mr. Thornton told Deputy Maleno 

he had gotten into an argument with his girlfriend, Ms. Godinez, and that he needed 

to retrieve his belongings from the residence. (MSJ, Ex. B at 45:6–8 (Excerpts of 

Dep. Tr. of Angela Lopez (“Lopez Dep.”)).) Mr. Thornton said the keys to his truck, 

which was parked outside the residence, were inside Ms. Godinez’s apartment and 

he could not leave because Ms. Godinez had his truck keys. (MSJ, Ex. C ¶8 (Decl.

of Michael David Blaylock (“Blaylock Decl.”)).)

Deputy Maleno did nothing else to confirm that Mr. Thornton lived at the 

house. (Maleno Dep. at 77:17–20.) And, in fact, during an earlier dispatch call, Mr. 

Thornton had denied living with Ms. Godinez at this residence. (Opp’n, Ex. 13.)1

Mr. Thornton and Dep. Maleno knocked at the front door, yelling that deputies 

were present and that Thornton only wanted to retrieve some belongings he had left 

 

1 A neighbor, retired police officer Michael Blaylock, states that he too 

believed Mr. Thornton lived with Ms. Godinez at the residence. (Blaylock Decl. ¶¶2, 

5.) However, Ms. Godinez denies living with Mr. Thornton and denies that he was 

ever her boyfriend, stating that he was only her employer, and that she had recently 

quit her job with him. (Godinez Decl. ¶2.)

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 16
– 3 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at the home, but no one responded. (Lopez Dep. at 50:4–9, 50:24–25.) Deputy 

Maleno asked Mr. Thornton what he wanted to do next. Mr. Thornton asked if he 

could force his way in, and Deputy Maleno said he could if that was in fact his 

residence. (MSJ, Ex. D at 14:13–19 (Preliminary Hearing Transcript (“PH”)).) Mr. 

Thornton went around back, and Deputy Maleno accompanied him to make sure 

there were no arguments or physical violence. (Maleno Dep. at 76:16–18.)

Mr. Thornton forced his way into the residence with his shoulder. (Id. at 85:2–

3.) When Mr. Thornton forced in the door, Ms. Godinez, who was right behind the 

door, was knocked to the ground. (Opp’n, Ex. 1 ¶9 (Decl. of Alma Godinez 

(“Godinez Decl.”)).) Deputy Maleno followed Mr. Thornton into the residence. 

What transpired next varies drastically depending upon whose testimony is found to 

be credible. 

Deputy Maleno testified that he initially saw Ms. Godinez on the floor with a 

bat near her. He asked if she was okay, approached her and offered to help her up. 

(Maleno Dep. at 85:11–15.) In response, she jumped to her feet, raised the bat up 

and yelled “get out.” (Id. at 86:11–13.) She then got into a “fighting stance” with 

the bat. (Id. at 90:16–18.) Deputy Maleno drew his Taser and demanded that she 

drop the bat several times. (Id. at 19:13, 19:19-20.) Ms. Godinez started a swinging 

motion with the bat and, in response, he fired his Taser. (Id. at 93:16–19.) The shock 

of the Taser shocked her enough so that she dropped the bat, but was not effective at 

penetrating her thick bathrobe so she did not drop to the ground the way he 

commanded. (PH at 19:5–9.) Because she refused his command to get down on the 

ground, he used his Taser again in “drive-stun mode” to get her to the ground so he 

could handcuff her. (Maleno Dep. at 99:18–20.)

Ms. Godinez, on the other hand, states that after she was knocked to the floor 

by the forced entry, she remained on the floor. She denies standing up or grabbing 

the bat. (Godinez Decl. ¶10.) She states that she was “crab-walking” backwards 

with her bottom on the floor when Deputy Maleno fired the Taser at her. (Id.) 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 16
– 4 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ms. Godinez was subsequently arrested and charged with (1) resisting or 

obstruction a police officer under California Penal Code §148(a)(1), and (2) assault 

on a peace officer with a deadly weapon, other than a firearm, by means likely to 

produce great bodily injury, pursuant to California Penal Code §245(c). According 

to Ms. Godinez, after her arrest, and while she sat in a patrol car outside her home, 

she saw Deputy Maleno go in and out of her house several times without her consent. 

(Godinez Decl. ¶18.)

B. Deputy Lopez

Deputy Lopez arrived on the scene after Deputy Maleno. (Lopez Dep. at 43:2–

3.) She overheard Mr. Thornton tell Deputy Maleno that he had gotten into an 

argument with his girlfriend, and that he needed to get his stuff out of the residence 

he shared with her. (Id. at 45:6–8.) Deputy Lopez stood with Deputy Maleno and 

Mr. Thornton as they knocked at the front door and shouted out that they merely 

wanted to retrieve belongings. 

When Deputy Maleno and Mr. Thornton went around back, Deputy Lopez 

waited by the front door until she heard Deputy Maleno yell, “Put the bat down” 

several times. (Id. at 52:16–18.) Deputy Lopez then ran around to the back of the 

house, but by the time she saw Ms. Godinez for the first time, Deputy Maleno had 

already fired his Taser. (Id. at 57:7–8.) She did not witness any of the Tasing or the 

events immediately leading up to the Tasing. (Id. at 59:23–24.) 

Deputy Lopez assisted Deputy Maleno in handcuffing Ms. Godinez. (Id. at 

60:8–12.) Deputy Lopez testified that Ms. Godinez was not cooperating. (Id.) Ms. 

Godinez states that she did nothing to resist or fight the deputies. (Godinez Decl. 

¶10.) Ms. Godinez states that, in applying the handcuffs, “Deputy Lopez dug her 

nails into my arms and roughly forced my arms behind my back, causing me a great 

deal of pain.” (Id.)

C. Preliminary Hearing/Probation Revocation Hearing

Ms. Godinez was on probation for a previous conviction. (PH at 1:10–12.) 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 16
– 5 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Therefore, the court jointly held a probation revocation hearing with the preliminary 

hearing on her charges for assault on a peace officer and resisting. After the 

evidentiary hearing, at which Ms. Godinez did not testify, the judge found there was 

sufficient probable cause to bind Ms. Godinez over on the charges for trial, although 

the judge repeatedly made reference to the fact that “this is a preliminary exam and 

the standard is so low.” (Id. at 46:6–18.) The judge also revoked Ms. Godinez’s 

probation based on the evidence presented, finding that Ms. Godinez had failed to 

remain law-abiding “although not on a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, 

certainly.” (Id. at 52:27–28.) 

At a later date, the District Attorney dismissed the charges against Ms. 

Godinez and proceeded to sentencing only on the probation revocation. (MSJ, Ex.

F.) The court reinstated Ms. Godinez on probation on the same terms and conditions. 

(Id. Exs. E, F.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party 

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to 

judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, 

it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248. 

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

The moving party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence 

that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by 

demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to 

establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that party will bear the 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 16
– 6 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322–23. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts 

will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. 

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). “The district court may limit 

its review to the documents submitted for the purpose of summary judgment and 

those parts of the record specifically referenced therein.” Carmen v. San Francisco 

Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the court is not 

obligated “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Kennan v. 

Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Richards v. Combined Ins. Co. of 

Am., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)). If the moving party fails to discharge this 

initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the 

nonmoving party’s evidence. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 

(1970).

If the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot 

defeat summary judgment merely by demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical 

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 

1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support 

of the nonmoving party’s position is not sufficient.”) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

242, 252). Rather, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and by “the 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). When making this determination, the court must 

view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. “Credibility determinations, the 

weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are 

jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] is ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 16
– 7 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. DISCUSSION

A. Collateral Estoppel under California Law

Under California law, collateral estoppel or “issue preclusion” directs that “an 

issue necessarily decided in a prior litigation may be conclusively determined as 

against the parties . . . in a subsequent lawsuit on a different cause of action.” People 

v. Quarterman, 202 Cal. App. 4th 1280, 1288 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (quotations 

omitted). “Federal courts must give ‘preclusive effect to state-court judgments 

whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so.’” 

Wige v. City of Los Angeles, 713 F.3d 1183, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Allen v. 

McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980)).

In California, issue preclusion applies when: “(1) the issue sought to be 

relitigated [is] identical to the issue decided in the earlier action, (2) the issue [is]

actually litigated and (3) necessarily decided in the earlier action, (4) the earlier 

decision [was] final and made on the merits, and (5) the party against whom the issue 

preclusion is asserted [was] a party to the earlier action.” Wige, 713 F.3d at 1185 

(citing Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335, 341 (Cal. 1990)). Even when these 

threshold requirements have been met, however, “policy considerations” may limit 

the use of issue preclusion when the “underpinnings of the doctrine are outweighed 

by other factors.” Quarterman, 202 Cal. App. 4th at 1288. Thus, a court should first 

consider whether the threshold considerations are met, and then analyze whether 

public policy is served by applying the doctrine. Id.

Although, as a general rule, issue preclusion applies after a preliminary hearing 

probable cause determination is made to bar a subsequent civil action for false arrest 

and malicious prosecution, “issue preclusion should be denied ‘where the plaintiff 

alleges that the arresting officer lied or fabricated evidence presented at the 

preliminary hearing.’” Wige, 713 F.3d at 1186 (quoting McCutcheon v. City of 

Montclair, 73 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)). If there are questions 

of fact as to whether the officer lied or fabricated evidence, this generally cannot be 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 16
– 8 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

resolved on summary judgment by using the doctrine of issue preclusion. Id. 

Defendants argue the Superior Court’s findings at the preliminary 

hearing/probation revocation hearing preclude relitigating the issues pertaining to 

Ms. Godinez’s arrest now in this §1983 action. However, with respect to the probable 

cause determination made at the preliminary hearing, a material question of fact now 

remains as to whether Deputy Maleno lied at the preliminary hearing. Because 

plaintiff raises a legitimate question of fact on this issue and presents examples of 

contradictory testimony supporting her claim, (Compare Opp’n at 6–7 with id. at 10–

11), the Court declines to grant summary judgment based on the Superior Court’s 

determination of probable cause.

With respect to the findings resulting in the probation revocation, the Court 

finds that the first threshold requirement has not been met. Although the Superior 

Court found that Ms. Godinez had failed to remain law-abiding, (see PH 46:6–18), 

the basis for this conclusion is not clear from the record. Nor does it preclude a 

finding that the officers illegally entered, searched or used excessive force against 

her. The second requirement for application of collateral estoppel has also not been 

met. Ms. Godinez did not actually litigate the issues during the hearing. The hearing 

was held before Ms. Godinez’s attorney had an opportunity to explore her allegations. 

Facing serious criminal charges, Ms. Godinez exercised her Fifth Amendment right 

not to testify at the preliminary hearing and relied on her counsel. Ultimately, the 

criminal charges were dismissed and Ms. Godinez was simply reinstated on 

probation. 

To the extent all threshold requirements for application of issue preclusion 

were to exist, the Court would nevertheless decline to hold that Ms. Godinez is 

collaterally estopped from raising her claims under the circumstances of this case. 

Ms. Godinez now alleges that Deputy Maleno lied or fabricated evidence at the 

hearing underlying the judge’s probable cause determination. “Preservation of the 

integrity of the judicial system”, a “fundamental principle” underlying the doctrine 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 16
– 9 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of collateral estoppel, see Quarterman, 202 Cal. App. 4th at 1288, cannot be 

advanced in the face of such allegations. See also Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 343, 350.

B. Lack of Excessive Force

Defendants move for summary judgment on the excessive force cause of action

arguing Deputy Maleno’s “limited use of force was reasonable to end the immediate 

threat of injury.” (MSJ at 10.) “Determining whether the force used to effect a 

particular seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful 

balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 

Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). A court must first consider the nature and quality of the intrusion, 

evaluating the type and amount of force inflicted. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 

441 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (9th Cir. 

2001)); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994). Next, the court must 

determine the government’s interest at stake in the use of force, weighing factors 

“including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate 

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest 

or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Mattos, 

661 F.3d at 441 (citing Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1279–80). “These factors, however, are 

not exclusive. Rather, [courts should] examine the totality of the circumstances and 

consider ‘whatever specific factors may be appropriate in a particular case, whether 

or not listed in Graham.’” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994)).

The reasonableness of a particular use of force requires taking the “perspective 

of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. “The right to make an arrest carries with it the right to 

employ some level of force to effect it.” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 818 (citing Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396). Thus, a “court must consider that the officer may be reacting to a 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 16
– 10 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

dynamic and evolving situation, requiring the officer to make split-second 

decisions.” Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97). “[A]n officer need not have 

perfect judgment, nor must he resort only to the least amount of force necessary to 

accomplish legitimate law enforcement objectives.” Id.

Because the excessive force inquiry ordinarily “requires a jury to sift through 

disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom,” the Ninth Circuit 

has emphasized that “summary judgment . . . in excessive force cases should be 

granted sparingly.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 

Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Torres v. City of 

Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Where the objective reasonableness 

of an officer’s conduct turns on disputed issues of material fact, it is a question of 

fact best resolved by a jury.”). That is particularly true in a case such as this one 

where the issues of fact are very much in dispute. If, in fact, Deputy Maleno used 

his Taser in response to Ms. Godinez’s swinging a bat at him, then his arguments 

might have merit. His counsel ignores, however, that there are facts presented that 

contradict this version of the events. (See Opp’n at 6–7.) Because a material issue 

of fact remains, the reasonableness of his use of force against Ms. Godinez must be 

determined by a jury.

C. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from 

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity shields an officer from liability even if 

his or her action resulted from “‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake 

based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 

551, 567 (2004)). The purpose of qualified immunity is to strike a balance between 

the competing “need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 16
– 11 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and 

liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id.

“Determining whether officials are owed qualified immunity involves two 

inquiries: (1) whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the 

injury, the facts alleged show the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right; 

and (2) if so, whether the right was clearly established in light of the specific context 

of the case.” Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Saucier v. 

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). The Supreme Court has instructed that courts may 

exercise “sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 

immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. If facts 

necessary to decide the issue of qualified immunity are in dispute, then summary 

judgment granting qualified immunity is not proper. LaLonde v. Cty. of Riverside, 

204 F.3d 947, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2000).

For the second step in the qualified immunity analysis—whether the 

constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the conduct—courts ask 

whether its contours were “‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would 

have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S.731, 739 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 

While a case directly on point is not required, “existing precedent must have placed 

the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. The Supreme Court has 

made “clear that officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established 

law even in novel factual circumstances.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 

Courts “are particularly mindful of this principle in the context of Fourth Amendment 

cases, where the constitutional standard—reasonableness—is always a very factspecific inquiry.” Mattos, 661 F.3d at 442. “If qualified immunity provided a shield 

in all novel factual circumstances, officials would rarely, if ever, be held accountable 

for their unreasonable violations of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.; see also Deorle, 

272 F.3d at 1286 (“Otherwise, officers would escape responsibility for the most 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 16
– 12 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

egregious forms of conduct simply because there was no case on all fours prohibiting 

that particular manifestation of unconstitutional conduct.”).

Courts should be “careful, however, to apply the clearly established rule in 

such a way that faithfully guards the need to protect officials who are required to 

exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous 

exercise of official authority.” Id. (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted)). Courts “must also allow ‘for the fact that police 

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are 

tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary 

in a particular situation.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97). While “in an 

obvious case, [the Graham standards for excessive force] can clearly establish the 

answer, even without a body of relevant case law,” the “bar for finding such 

obviousness is quite high.” Id. (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 

(2004)). In al-Kidd, the Supreme Court emphasized that it has “repeatedly told courts 

not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Id. (quoting alKidd, 563 U.S. at 741).

1. Count One: Unlawful Entry without a Warrant

An officer may enter property without a warrant if he has the consent of the 

resident or if he believes there is an emergency at hand and his entry is necessary for 

protection of life or property. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (consent of 

co-occupant); United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(emergency exception). For the former to apply, the police must obtain the voluntary 

consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over 

the residence. Rodiguez, 497 U.S. at 186. For the emergency exception to apply, (1) 

the police must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an emergency at hand and 

an immediate need for their assistance for protection life or property, (2) entrance 

must not primarily be motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence, and (3) the 

police officer must have a reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 16
– 13 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

or place entered or searched. Martinez, 406 F.3d at 1164.

At the time Deputy Maleno entered the property, he was told by Mr. Thornton 

that Mr. Thornton shared the residence with Ms. Godinez. (Maleno Dep. at 75:18–

21.) Furthermore, Mr. Thornton had indisputably knocked Ms. Godinez to the 

ground after forcing his way inside the residence. (Godinez Decl. ¶9; Maleno Dep. 

at 85:11–15.) Under the emergency exception, Deputy Maleno was entitled to enter 

the residence without a warrant to determine whether Ms. Godinez required 

assistance. To the extent Deputy Maleno was already on the property at the time he 

realized Ms. Godinez had been knocked to the ground, he reasonably believed that 

he had permission from Mr. Thornton to be there. There is no evidence to support 

Ms. Godinez’s theory that Deputy Maleno was primarily motivated by an intent to 

arrest her or search the property.

Therefore, the Court finds that at the time Deputy Maleno first entered the 

house, an unconstitutional warrantless entry into the residence did not occur. Ms. 

Godinez argues that Deputy Maleno should have done more to confirm that Mr. 

Thornton actually lived at the house and should not have allowed Mr. Thornton to 

force his way in without more proof about whether Mr. Thornton in fact resided at 

the residence or otherwise had permission to enter. However, when Deputy Maleno

arrived at the scene, the undisputed evidence shows that Mr. Thornton told Deputy 

Maleno that he needed to retrieve his belongings including keys for his truck parked 

outside the residence. (Blaylock Decl. ¶8; Lopez Dep. at 45:6–8.) This statement 

was confirmed for the Deputy Maleno when Mr. Thornton knocked on the front door 

with the Deputy Maleno and yelled out that he just wanted to retrieve his belongings. 

(Lopez Dep. at 50:4–9, 50:24–25.) A neighbor similarly believed that Mr. Thornton 

was living with Ms. Godinez. (Blaylock Decl. ¶¶2, 5.) Even if the deputies violated 

a constitutional right, under the facts of this case, it was not sufficiently clear that a 

reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right. 

The officers responded to a potential domestic violence situation. They were there 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 16
– 14 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to help Mr. Thornton retrieve his belongings without violence. Deputy Maleno told 

Mr. Thornton he could only force his way in if he lived there. In light of all the facts 

of the case, the Court finds that qualified immunity protects Deputy Maleno from 

liability for the initial warrantless entry.

2. Remaining Counts

However, Ms. Godinez then states that Deputy Maleno fired a Taser at her, 

while she was unarmed and trying to get away from him. (Godinez Decl. ¶10.) She 

claims that he manufactured evidence against her to arrest her and cover up his 

unlawful use of the Taser. (Opp’n at 13–16.) And she claims that she saw him going 

in and out of her house searching the house after she was arrested. (Godinez Decl. 

¶18.) Taking these facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Godinez, as the Court 

must do on summary judgment, Ms. Godinez has shown at this stage of the 

proceedings a constitutional violation that would have been clear to any reasonable 

officer. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Gravelet-Blondin, the “right to be free from 

the application of non-trivial force for engaging in mere passive resistance was clear 

prior to 2008.” Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 1093 (citing Nelson, 685 F.3d at 881); 

see also Cordeiro v. United States, No. 11-00413 JMS, 2013 WL 5514504, at *12 

(D. Haw. Oct. 3, 2013) (summarizing case law). Thus, assuming Ms. Godinez’s 

version of the events is correct, she was at most passively resisting Deputy Maleno’s 

command to lie flat on the ground at the time he fired a Taser at her. This is not 

conduct that is entitled to qualified immunity.

D. Deputy Lopez

Defendants argue that insufficient facts support any liability for Deputy Lopez. 

The Court agrees. It is undisputed that Deputy Lopez did not enter the house until 

after the incident occurred. At the time Mr. Thornton was forcing his way into the 

house, Deputy Lopez was in the front of the house. (Lopez Dep. at 52:16–18.) There 

are no facts supporting any claim that she forced entry or searched the premises. 

Furthermore, Deputy Lopez was not present when Deputy Maleno fired his Taser, 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 16
– 15 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

so, to the extent she participated in the detention and arrest, her conduct was based 

on representations by Deputy Maleno that he had acted in self-defense and that Ms. 

Godinez had attempted to hit him with a bat. The evidence shows that any illegal 

entry after Deputy Maleno’s use of a Taser, wrongful arrest, wrongful detention or 

malicious prosecution was based on actions by Deputy Maleno, not Deputy Lopez.

Finally, Ms. Godinez alleges that Deputy Lopez used excessive force during 

her arrest because while applying handcuffs, “Deputy Lopez dug her nails into my 

arms and roughly forced my arms behind my back, causing me a great deal of pain.” 

(Godinez Decl. ¶10.) “When determining whether the force was excessive, courts 

look to the ‘extent of the injury . . . the need for application of force, the relationship 

between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by 

the responsible officials and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful 

response.’” Smith v. Sergent, No. 12:15-cv-0979 GEB DB P, 2017 WL 4284659, at 

*3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2017) (quoting Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).

In this case, Ms. Godinez does not allege any permanent injury. She simply 

claims that Deputy Lopez was rough and dug her nails into her arms when attempting 

to handcuff her. Just before Deputy Lopez entered the residence and handcuffed Ms. 

Godinez, Deputy Lopez heard Deputy Maleno tell Ms. Godinez to drop the bat. Even 

assuming Ms. Godinez’s statements are all true, and she was not resisting at the time 

Deputy Lopez was actually applying the handcuffs, Deputy Lopez reasonably 

perceived that Ms. Godinez was a threat. In light of these facts, the force used by 

Deputy Lopez was not unconstitutionally excessive. To the extent the information 

Deputy Lopez received was incorrect, the force she used in handcuffing Ms. Godinez 

did not violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory right, and, therefore, 

Deputy Lopez is entitled to qualified immunity for her conduct.

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

In light of the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that: 

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23) is 

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 16
– 16 – 16cv236

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

GRANTED on behalf of Deputy Lopez in its entirety and as to Count One with 

respect to Deputy Maleno. 

2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23) is DENIED

on behalf of Deputy Maleno as to all remaining counts. 

3. Deputy Lopez is HEREBY DISMISSED from the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 16, 2017

Case 3:16-cv-00236-BAS-NLS Document 39 Filed 11/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 16