Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01105/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01105-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE BIRKS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1105 LKK EFB P

vs.

C. A. TERHUNE, et al.,

ORDER AND FINDINGS

Defendants. AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on plaintiff’s April 24, 2006,

amended complaint. On November 3, 2006, defendants Runnels and Cummings filed an

unenumerated 12(b) motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative

remedies prior to filing suit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. On January 10,

2007, plaintiff filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to provide

plaintiff with access to the law library and sanctions against defendants pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11. The latter motions claims that law librarian Cobbs has

impaired plaintiff’s ability to comply with a court-ordered deadline for filing an opposition to

defendants’ motion to dismiss. He states that he is being denied access to the C-Yard law library

and cannot make necessary copies for filing his opposition. However, plaintiff has since filed on

Case 2:05-cv-01105-LKK -EFB Document 121 Filed 08/22/07 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 Wyatt is clear that regardless of nomenclature, a motion attacking failure to exhaust is

not a challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint. It is a motion in which defendant must raise

and prove by evidence the absence of exhaustion. Id. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit in Wyatt

provides further guidance. It recognizes that when the district court looks beyond the pleadings

to a factual record in deciding the exhaustion motion it necessarily does so under “a procedure

closely analogous to summary judgment.” Id., n.14

2

January 26, 2007, his opposition to that motion and it has been considered by the court in its

resolution of the merits of the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for a

preliminary injunction is moot. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions will likewise be denied.

Sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 11 are applicable only in situations where a

pleading is deficient for lack of proper signature or is misleading in that it contains information

presented for improper purpose, in contradiction to existing law, or lacking evidentiary support. 

Even if plaintiff were entitled to a preliminary injunction, his request for Rule 11 sanctions

would be without merit as plaintiff has failed to allege facts for which Rule 11 sanctions would

be appropriate.

The court now addresses the motion to dismiss.

I. Standards Applicable to This Motion

Defendant’s motion to dismiss challenges whether plaintiff has met the requirement of

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that “[n]o action shall be brought” until available

administrative remedies are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Defendant seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

While the Ninth Circuit has stated that Rule 12(b) is the proper mechanism for resolving

questions arising under 42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(a), Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003),

the reason underlying that decision has been undermined. The Ninth Circuit found that failure to

exhaust was a matter in abatement which should be raised in a motion made under

“unenumerated Rule 12(b).”1

 Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. However, the United States Supreme

Court recently clarified that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense which defendant has the

burden of pleading and proving. Jones v. Bock, U.S. , 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007). Federal

Case 2:05-cv-01105-LKK -EFB Document 121 Filed 08/22/07 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

 On October 5, 2004, the court expressly informed plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). Pursuant to Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1120, n.4, that order also expressly informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a failure

to exhaust motion that is supported by affidavits or declarations and exhibits.

3

courts appropriately consider affirmative defenses on summary judgment. Here, defendant’s

motion necessarily requires the court to consider the affidavits and exhibits presented for the

purpose of proving the absence of exhaustion. Accordingly, the court finds that a motion for

summary judgment is the proper mechanism for resolving the question of whether plaintiff

satisfied the exhaustion requirement. 

II. Rule 56 Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).2 As explained by the Ninth Circuit, the utility of Rule 56 to

screen which cases actually require resolution of disputed facts over material issues (through

presentation of testimony and evidence at trial) has been clarified and enhanced.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party’s claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

Case 2:05-cv-01105-LKK -EFB Document 121 Filed 08/22/07 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

“genuine issue as to material fact,” if the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

III. Plaintiff’s Alleged Failure to Exhaust

A prisoner may bring no action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law until he

has exhausted available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is

mandatory. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). A prisoner seeking leave to proceed in

forma pauperis in an action challenging the conditions of his confinement brings an action for

purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e when he submits his complaint to the court. Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.2d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a prisoner must exhaust available

administrative remedies before filing any papers in federal court and the prisoner is not entitled

to a stay of judicial proceedings in order to exhaust. Id. at 1051; McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198 (9th Cir. 2002). Defendant has the burden of proving that plaintiff did not exhaust. Brown

v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2005); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119.

California prisoners may appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy

which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.1(a). The regulations require the use of specific forms but contain no guidelines for

grievance content. Id., at §§ 3084.2, 3085. Prisoners ordinarily must present their allegations on

one informal and three formal levels of review, although the informal and the first formal levels

may be bypassed. Id., at § 3084.5. A division head reviews appeals on the first formal level, see

id., at § 3084.5(b)(3) (authorizing bypass of the first formal level when the division head cannot

resolve it), and the warden or a designee thereof reviews appeals on the second formal level. See

Id., at § 3084.5(e)(1). Generally, completion of the third level, the Director’s Level of Review,

Case 2:05-cv-01105-LKK -EFB Document 121 Filed 08/22/07 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

 Unless otherwise specified, the facts are taken from defendants’ November 3, 2006,

motion to dismiss. Citations to plaintiff’s amended complaint refer to pagination assigned by the

Case Management – Electronic Case Filing system. 

4

 Defendant McGuire has not joined in the motion to dismiss. 

5

exhausts the remedy. Id., at § 3084.1(a).

IV. Summary of Facts3

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) and is currently incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (HDSP) in

Susanville, California. Defendants Runnels, McGuire4

, and Cummings are employees of the

CDCR, and work at HDSP as Warden, correctional officer, and chief psychologist, respectively. 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when, on

March 3, 2004, defendant McGuire attacked plaintiff while he was in waist-hand restraints and

caused his back to be re-injured. Plaintiff also contends that after the attack, defendant McGuire

denied him a confidential medical examination. Amended Complaint (AC), at 5, 7, 10.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Cummings, a chief psychologist, denied plaintiff mental

health medication and conspired with other correctional staff to deny plaintiff mental health

housing and a transfer to the California Medical Facility in Vacaville. Plaintiff contends that the

medication and housing transfer were necessary to address his extensive and untreated symptoms

of mental illness. Id. 

Plaintiff contends that defendant Runnels, the Warden at High Desert State Prison, did

not stop the alleged civil rights violations from the March 3, 2004, incident, and from the denial

of medical treatment, medication, and mental health housing. Id. 

Plaintiff filed suit on June 3, 2005.

V. Analysis

Defendants contend that there is no record of any Director’s Level decisions regarding

plaintiff’s claims against defendant Cummings having been issued before plaintiff filed his

Case 2:05-cv-01105-LKK -EFB Document 121 Filed 08/22/07 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

original complaint on June 3, 2005. Defs.’ Mot. to Dism., Ex. B, Decl. of N. Grannis (Grannis

Decl.), at ¶ 10. Defendants also argue that there is no record of plaintiff having filed a grievance

regarding plaintiff’s claims against defendant Runnels in this lawsuit. Defs.’ Mot. to Dism., Ex.

A, Decl. of S. Babich (Babich Decl.), at ¶ 9; Ex. B, Grannis Decl., at ¶ 14. Examination of the

records supports defendants’ contentions. Plaintiff’s opposition does not adduce any evidence to

the contrary. Plaintiff instead cites Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999), for the

proposition that exhaustion is not mandated in federal civil rights suits seeking only money

damages because money damages are normally not available through the CDC administrative

appeal process. That holding was specifically overruled by Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731

(2001). 

VI. Conclusion

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff’s January 10, 2007, motion for

sanctions is denied.

Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ November 3, 2006, motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies be granted and this case be dismissed as to all defendants save and

except defendant McGuire; and 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief to enable him to file an opposition brief be

denied as moot.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

////

////

Case 2:05-cv-01105-LKK -EFB Document 121 Filed 08/22/07 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 22, 2007.

Case 2:05-cv-01105-LKK -EFB Document 121 Filed 08/22/07 Page 7 of 7