Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-01117/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-01117-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

STEVEN MCARDLE, an individual, on

behalf of himself, the general public and those

similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

AT&T MOBILITY LLC; NEW CINGULAR

WIRELESS PCS LLC; NEW CINGULAR

WIRELESS SERVICES, INC., and Does 1-50

_____________________________________/ Defendants.

No. C 09-1117 CW (MEJ)

ORDER RE: DISCOVERY DISPUTE

(DKT. #91)

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is the joint discovery dispute letter (“Joint Letter”) filed by Plaintiff Steven

McArdle (“Plaintiff”), and Defendants AT&T Mobility LLC, New Cingular Wireless PCS LCC, and

New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., (collectively, “Defendants”) on February 25, 2010. (Dkt.

#91.) After consideration of the parties' papers, relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing,

the Court ORDERS as follows.

II. BACKGROUND

On February 10, 2009, Plaintiff filed the present action against Defendants in the Superior

Court for the State of California, County of San Francisco, seeking compensatory damages and

restitution for international-roaming fees charged. (Removal Pet. Ex. A, Dkt. #1-1.) Plaintiff filed

his complaint to include a purported class action on behalf of similarly situated customers. Id. 

Plaintiff claims that while traveling outside of the United States, he incurred international-roaming

charges for several voicemails that he did not check and telephone calls that he did not place and/or

answer. Id. at 7:5-10. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not adequately disclose their practice of

assessing international-roaming charges on unanswered incoming or outgoing calls. Id. at 5:5-12;

10:2-11.

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On March 13, 2009, Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1441 and 1332(d)(2)(A). (Removal Pet. 1:7-9, Dkt. #1.) On February 2, 2010, the Honorable

Claudia Wilken, the presiding judge in this matter, referred the case to the undersigned for resolution

of discovery disputes. (Dkt. #6.) The parties met and conferred on this dispute and subsequently

filed the present Joint Letter. 

III. DISCUSSION

 Plaintiff has two specific discovery requests at issue here. First, he seeks customer

complaints and inquiries, and the contact information for those customers, regarding the assessment

of international-roaming charges where the customer claims he or she did not place or answer the

call. (Joint Letter at 1.) Second, Plaintiff seeks the contact information for all of Defendants’

California customers who incurred international-roaming fees for one-minute incoming or outgoing

calls but did not complain or inquire about the charges. Id. Plaintiff argues that the contact

information should be produced because other similarly situated class members will benefit as a

result of Plaintiff's contact, claiming that he already has “thousands” of redacted customer

complaints produced by Defendants in his possession. Id. Plaintiff also argues that the requested

information will be relevant to class certification issues under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

(“Rule”) 23, and that the Court is obligated to permit discovery of information that may be necessary

in determining whether to certify a class. Id. at 2.

 In response, Defendants state that they are willing to produce customer complaints and call

logs where personal information such as customer names and phone numbers has been redacted,

arguing that this is adequate to satisfy Plaintiff’s request while also protecting the privacy interests

of their customers. Id. at 1, 5. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s request is “massively

overbroad” because he seeks contact information for any California customer who incurred roaming

charges on a one-minute call, regardless of whether the customer complained. Id. at 5.

A. Legal Standard

Prior to class certification under Rule 23, discovery lies entirely within the discretion of the

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Court. Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Our cases stand

for the unremarkable proposition that often the pleadings alone will not resolve the question of class

certification and that some discovery will be warranted.”). The plaintiff has the burden to either

make a prima facie showing that the Rule 23 class action requirements are satisfied, or to show “that

discovery is likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations.” Manolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d

1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985). A court must determine whether the action may be maintained as a class

action as soon as is practicable after the action is filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). Thus, discovery is

warranted where it will resolve factual issues necessary for the determination of whether the action

may be maintained as a class action, such as whether a class or set of subclasses exists. Kamm v.

California City Development Co., 509 F.2d 205, 210 (9th Cir. 1975). To deny discovery where it is

necessary to determine the existence of a class or set of subclasses would be an abuse of discretion. 

Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Kamm, 509

F.2d at 210). 

The disclosure of names, addresses, and telephone numbers can be permitted in the precertification class action context. See, e.g., Sanbrook v. Office Depot, 2009 WL 840019, at *1 (N.D.

Cal. 2009); Salazar v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., 2007 WL 2990281, *1 (S.D. Cal.,2007). However,

the right of privacy in Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution “protects an individual’s

reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” Crab Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court,

169 Cal. App. 4th 958, 966 (2008) (internal citation and quotations omitted); Hill v. National

Collegiate Athletes Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 36-37 (1994). Thus, courts must balance the right of privacy

asserted against the need for discovery. Pioneer Electronics v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.4th 360, 372

(2007). 

B. Application to the Case at Bar

As stated above, in determining whether to permit disclosure of putative class members’

contact information, the Court must weigh Plaintiff’s need for disclosure against Defendants’

privacy concerns in their customers' information. Defendants, as custodians of the relevant

information, have standing to assert the privacy interests of their customers. Pioneer Electronics

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(USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.4th 360, 368 (2007) (citing Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior

Court, 15 Cal.3d 652, 658 (1975)). In Pioneer, the potential class members were all Pioneer

customers who had purchased and complained to Pioneer about a defective DVD player. Pioneer,

15 Cal.3d at 364. The Court permitted disclosure of contact information regarding Pioneer's

complaining customers unless, following proper notice to them, they registered a written objection. 

Id. at 374. In determining whether to permit disclosure of the customers’ contact information for a

potential class action, the Court employed a balancing test first set out in Hill v. National Collegiate

Athletic Assn., 7 Cal.4th 1, 35-38 (1994). The Court shall state each factor below and address how it

applies to the present case.

1. Legally Protected Privacy Interest

First, the claimant must possess a “legally protected privacy interest.” Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at

370; Hill, 7 Cal.4th at 35. An interest in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and

confidential information is a legally protected interest. Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at 370 (internal citation

and quotations omitted). In Pioneer, the Court found that Pioneer's customers might reasonably

expect to be notified of, and given an opportunity to object to, the release of their identifying

information to third persons. Id. at 372. However, the Court also found it unlikely “that these

customers, having already voluntarily disclosed their identifying information to that company in the

hope of obtaining some form of relief, would have a reasonable expectation that such information

would be kept private and withheld from a class action plaintiff who possibly seeks similar relief for

other Pioneer customers, unless the customer expressly consented to such disclosure.” Id. (italics

omitted). “If anything, these complainants might reasonably expect, and even hope, that their names

and addresses would be given to any such class action plaintiff.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff seeks contact information both from Defendants’ customers that complained

about international-roaming fees and Defendants’ customers that did not complain. Under Pioneer,

the Court finds that this first factor weighs in favor of disclosure of the former group but not the

latter. Further, as discussed below, it is not clear that Plaintiff needs the contact information of

customers that have not complained, especially at this early stage in the litigation, given that

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Plaintiff already has “thousands” of customer complaints in his possession. 

2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Second, the privacy claimant must possess a reasonable expectation of privacy under the

particular circumstances, including “customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular

activities. . . .” Id. at 370 (quoting Hill, 7 Cal.4th at 36). As Hill explains, “A reasonable

expectation of privacy is an objective entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted

community norms.” Id. at 370-71 (internal citation and quotations omitted). In Pioneer, the Court

found that no serious invasion of privacy would ensue “if release of complaining customer

identifying information was limited to the named plaintiff in a class action filed against Pioneer,

following written notice to each customer that afforded a chance to object.” Id. at 372. The Court

recognized that “the proposed disclosure was not ‘particularly sensitive,’ as it involved disclosing

neither one’s personal medical history or current medical condition nor details regarding one's

personal finances or other financial information, but merely called for disclosure of contact

information already voluntarily disclosed to Pioneer.” Id. The Court noted that contact information

regarding the identity of potential class members “is generally discoverable, so that the lead plaintiff

may learn the names of other persons who might assist in prosecuting the case,” and that such

disclosure “involves no revelation of personal or business secrets, intimate activities, or similar

private information, and threatens no undue intrusion into one's personal life, such as

mass-marketing efforts or unsolicited sales pitches.” Id. at 373. The Court also noted that the order

issued by the trial court required written notice of the proposed disclosure to all complaining Pioneer

customers and gave them the opportunity to object to the release of their own personal identifying

information. Id. Thus, the Court found no serious invasion of privacy.

Here, like in Pioneer, release of the customer identifying information would be limited 

to Plaintiff and his counsel in this case. Further, it involves disclosure of contact information

already voluntarily disclosed to Defendants. This information will help Plaintiff learn the names of

other persons who might assist in prosecuting this case, and it involves no revelation of personal or

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business secrets, intimate activities, or similar private information. 

As to providing a written notice to the customers, the Court finds such notice unnecessary. 

First, Pioneer does not impose a notice requirement. Second, notice would make no sense here, as

witnesses cannot choose to “opt out” of civil discovery. Tierno v. Rite Aid Corp., 2008 WL

3287035, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2008). “Generally, witnesses are not permitted to decline to participate in

civil discovery, even when the information sought from them is personal or private.” Puerto v.

Superior Court, 158 Cal.App.4th at 1242, 1256-57 (2008). The Court notes that the minimal

information Plaintiff requests is indeed contemplated under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as

basic to the discovery process. Specifically, Rule 26(a)(1)(A) requires each party to disclose before

formal discovery begins “the names, addresses and telephone numbers of each individual likely to

have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses.” 

Here, many of Defendants’ complaining customers may be considered percipient witnesses to the

relevant issue - international-roaming charges, and could therefore be considered persons having

discoverable knowledge and proper subjects of discovery. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. 

3. Whether the Invasion of Privacy is Serious in Nature 

Third, the invasion of privacy complained of must be “serious” in nature, scope, and actual

or potential impact to constitute an “egregious” breach of social norms, for trivial invasions afford

no cause of action. Id. at 371; Hill, 7 Cal.4th at 37. In Pioneer, the Court does not address this

factor directly, but does state that the “limited disclosure to plaintiff of mere contact information

regarding possible class action members would not appear to unduly interfere with privacy

[interests], given that the affected persons readily may submit objections if they choose,” and that

“Pioneer never suggested that plaintiff threatens to engage in any abusive conduct, or otherwise

misuse the information it sought.” Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at 372.

In this case, Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff threatens to engage in abusive conduct or

otherwise misuse the information sought. In fact, the information before the Court tends to show

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that Plaintiff intends to use the customers’ contact information regarding possible class members and

certification. Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of Plaintiff.

4. Balancing Test

Assuming that a claimant has met the foregoing criteria for invasion of a privacy interest,

that interest must be measured against other competing or countervailing interests in a “balancing

test.” Id. at 371; Hill, 7 Cal.4th at 37. Thus, “[c]onduct alleged to be an invasion of privacy is to be

evaluated based on the extent to which it furthers legitimate and important competing interests.” 

Hill, 7 Cal.4th 38. Protective measures, safeguards and other alternatives may minimize the privacy

intrusion. “For example, if intrusion is limited and confidential information is carefully shielded

from disclosure except to those who have a legitimate need to know, privacy concerns are

assuaged.” Id. In Pioneer, the Court found that many of Pioneer's complaining customers would be

percipient witnesses to relevant defects in the DVD players, and could therefore be considered

persons having discoverable knowledge and proper subjects of discovery. Pioneer, 40 Cal.4th at

374. The Court also found that, from the standpoint of fairness to the litigants in prosecuting or

defending the class action, Pioneer would possess a significant advantage if it could retain for its

own exclusive use its customers’ contact information.” Id. “Were plaintiff also able to contact these

customers and learn of their experiences, he could improve his chances of marshalling a successful

class action against Pioneer, thus perhaps ultimately benefitting some, if not all, those customers.” 

Id. Thus, the Court found that “[i]t makes little sense to make it more difficult for plaintiff to

contact them by insisting they first affirmatively contact Pioneer as a condition to releasing the same

contact information they already divulged long ago.” Id. Finally, the Court noted that a rule

requiring an affirmative waiver from persons whose personal identifying information is sought by

others “could have potentially adverse effects in cases brought to redress a variety of social ills,

including consumer rights litigation.” Id. Thus, on balance, the Court determined that discovery of

Pioneer’s complaining customers’ contact information was permissible. Id.

Here, too, the Court finds that the balance of factors addressed in Pioneer weighs in favor of

disclosure. Many of Defendants’ complaining customers would be proper subjects of discovery

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given that it’s possible their complaints regarding international-roaming fees are the same as

Plaintiff’s. Further, Defendants would possess a significant advantage if the Court allowed them to

retain the contact information for their own exclusive use and benefit. On the other side, if Plaintiff

were able to contact these customers, he could improve his chances of marshalling a successful class

action, thus potentially benefitting some, if not all, of Defendants’ customers. Finally, as stated

above, many of Defendants’ complaining customers would be percipient witnesses to the relevant

issue - international-roaming charges, and could therefore be considered persons having

discoverable knowledge and proper subjects of discovery. Thus, one would reasonably expect

Defendants to have identified at least one complaining customer in the prospective class. That

Defendants have not identified these potential class members suggests a possible divergence

between the interests of Defendants and the interests of its complaining customers. This divergence

further suggests that Defendants’ concern about the privacy rights of the potential class members is

actually driven more by their own self-interest.

Thus, in balancing the competing interests present here, the Court finds that the balance

weighs in favor of disclosure.

5. California Public Utilities Code §2891

In the parties’ letter, Defendants argue that the proper standard under which the Court must

address this dispute is under California Public Utilities Code section 2891 (“section 2891"). Section

2891 provides that no telephone corporation shall make available certain information without first

obtaining the customer’s written consent. Cal. Pub. Util. Code §2891. However, section 2894 of the

utilities code provides an exception to this rule for court orders. Cal. Pub. Util. Code §2894. 

Moreover, Defendant’s reading of section 2891 is not in line with the California Supreme Court’s

decision in Pioneer. Specifically, the Pioneer court noted that a rule requiring an affirmative waiver

from persons whose personal identifying information is sought by others “could have potentially

adverse effects in cases brought to redress a variety of social ills, including consumer rights

litigation.” Id. Thus, the Court finds that section 2891 does not prohibit the disclosure of

Defendants’ customers’ contact information under a court order, and there is no requirement that the

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Court require an affirmative waiver from any such persons.

6. Summary

Based on this analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s need for Defendants’ customers’

contact information outweighs Defendants’ privacy concerns. However, the Court does find that

Plaintiff’s request is overbroad, especially at this early stage in the litigation. By Plaintiff’s own

admission, he is currently in possession of thousands of redacted customer complaints produced by

Defendants. (Joint Letter at 1.) Plaintiff has not shown why these complaints will not provide

enough contacts from whom he can obtain the necessary information for class certification. Further,

Plaintiff’s request potentially sweeps far broader than potential class members. His request seeks

contact information for any California customer who incurred roaming charges for any one-minute

call, (Id. at 5), yet this does not even exclude customers who purposefully made or received oneminute calls. Accordingly, the Court finds that any disclosure of contact information should be

limited to the contact information for those customers that submitted complaints or inquiries

regarding the assessment of international-roaming charges where the customer claims he or she did

not place or answer the call.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on this analysis, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for Defendants’

customers’ contact information is GRANTED. However, the request is deemed limited to customers

who complained or inquired about international-roaming charges on unanswered incoming or

outgoing calls. Defendants shall provide the contact information within 14 days from the date of

this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2010

_______________________________

Maria-Elena James 

Chief United States Magistrate Judge 

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