Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01613/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01613-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Demetrius Antwan Wilson,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV 14-01613-PHX-JAT (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG: 

 Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motions for Leave to Amend (Docs. 143, 146, 

147). This matter is before the undersigned on referral from the District Judge. The 

Court has a continuing obligation to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking 

relief against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The screening requirement extends to proposed amended complaints. Because a 

magistrate judge cannot decide a “matter dispositive of a claim or defense or a prisoner 

petition challenging the conditions of confinement,” Rule 72(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the undersigned recommends as follows. 

I. Background

 Plaintiff filed a prisoner civil rights complaint and a motion for leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis on July 17, 2014. Plaintiff filed a motion (Doc. 5) seeking leave to 

amend his complaint on October 2, 2014. In an order (Doc. 8) entered November 20, 

2014, the Court granted the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed without 

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prejudice Counts One through Seven, Nine, and Eleven through Sixteen of the First 

Amended Complaint lodged at Doc. 5, and dismissed without prejudice Defendants 

Arpaio and Maricopa County Correctional Health Services. On March 2, 2015, Plaintiff 

filed a motion (Doc. 23) seeking leave to further amend his complaint (Plaintiff’s 

“proposed Second Amended Complaint” or “SAC”). On April 20, 2015, the Magistrate 

Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (Doc. 37) with regard to Plaintiff’s proposed 

Second Amended Complaint. On June 30, 2015, the District Judge accepted the Report 

and Recommendation as modified in the Order (Doc. 64). The Court granted Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Leave to Amend (Doc. 23); dismissed with prejudice Counts One, Three, Five, 

Eight, Ten, Eleven, Thirteen, Fifteen, and Seventeen; dismissed with prejudice Defendant 

Maricopa County Correctional Health Services; dismissed with prejudice the claims for 

damages against Defendants “John Doe 2,” “John Doe 4,” “John Doe 5,” B. Piirinen and 

Scott Frye; dismissed Count Four without prejudice; and ordered that Plaintiff be allowed 

to participate in discovery to determine the identities of Defendants “[M]edical [N]urse 

[M]ary,” “Officer A8845,” John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 4, John Doe 5, John Doe 

7, John Doe 8, John Doe 9, John Doe 10, John Doe 12, John Doe 13, John Doe 15, John 

Doe 16, John Doe 17, and thereafter be allowed to attempt service on these Defendants. 

(Doc. 64 at 21–22). 

 On July 21, 2015, the Court entered an Order (Doc. 76) granting Plaintiff until 

August 21, 2015, to file an amended complaint to substitute the names of any defendants 

that he has identified through discovery, including the following: substituting Medical 

Staff Pamela Brooks, LPN, for John/Jane Doe 2 of CH 718; substituting Officer Graciela 

Perez A9647 for Officer Perez A9647; substituting Lois Quaid for Medical RN Lois or 

Graveyard Shift R.[N]. Lois; substituting Teressa DeMille, RN, for John/Jane Doe 4 OF 

H5585; substituting Jeffrey Alvarez, MD, for John/Jane Doe 5 Medical Director 

Administrator; substituting Rita Showalter A8845 for Officer A8845. The Court also 

noted that Defendants had identified John Doe 16 as Deborah Jean Davis (NR851) and 

John Doe 17 as Tatjana Stojikovic, CS993. The Court also denied Plaintiff’s motions to 

the extent Plaintiff sought to add causes of action pursuant to the motions without 

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complying with LRCiv 15.1. 

Instead of filing a proper motion for leave to amend with an attached copy of the 

proposed amended pleading pursuant to the Court’s Order at Doc. 76, Plaintiff filed a 

notice that he was “Amending Count Four” (Doc. 77), and a Motion Under Rule 15(c)(3) 

for the Following Names be Charged to Each Count (Doc. 83). The Court entered an 

Order (Doc. 111) on September 28, 2015, finding that the Court need not address the 

merits of Plaintiff’s amended Count Four at Doc. 77 because Plaintiff failed to file a 

motion for leave to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); and denying Plaintiff’s 

motion at Doc. 83 for failure to comply with LRCiv 15.1. 

 Plaintiff then filed a Motion for the Court to Accept the Supplement Filed June 22, 

2015 (Doc. 94); Plaintiff’s Motion Amending his Second Amended Complaint with 

Supplement and New Information Under Rule 15-D with Count 23–24 (Doc. 97); 

Plaintiff’s Motion Under Rule 15(c)(3) to Change John Doe 9 C.H.S. Provider to 

Provider Matt for Count 4 (Doc. 103); Plaintiff’s Motion to determine whether the Court 

accepted the names or whether Plaintiff needs to rewrite the complaint (Doc. 120); and 

Plaintiff’s Motion Under Rule 15(c)(3) to Correct John Doe 9 C.H.S. Provider Matt to 

His Real Name Matthew Barker for Count Four and Fourteen (Doc. 129). The Court’s 

November 19, 2015 Order (Doc. 138) denied these motions, finding that they were: 

further attempts to amend Plaintiff’s complaint without complying with 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) and LRCiv 15.1. Therefore, the motions must be 

denied. However, the Court will give Plaintiff a final opportunity to amend 

his Second Amended Complaint at Doc. 23, to substitute the names of the 

defendants as set forth above, including any new defendants Plaintiff has 

identified, and to include all of Plaintiff’s claims. 

(Doc. 138 at 3.) The Order at Doc. 138 further provides that “Plaintiff must submit a 

proper motion for leave to amend and attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading 

pursuant to LRCiv 15.1(a) by December 7, 2015. The Court will then screen the 

amended complaint and issue an order setting forth the claims for which an answer will 

be required.” (Id. at 4.) 

 Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend at Doc. 143 was filed on December 4, 2015. On 

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December 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed another Motion to Amend (Doc. 146) which includes 

the previous proposed amended complaint at Doc. 143, with the addition of a Count 

Fifteen. On January 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed another “Motion for Leave to Amend,” 

(Doc. 147) which does not include an amended complaint, but rather attaches four 

grievance forms. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints: 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Although a plaintiff’s specific 

factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess 

whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 

 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts 

“construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A 

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“complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007) (per curiam)). Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support 

a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 

Cir. 1982). In such circumstances, even a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint 

may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

III. Third Amended Complaint

 Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 143) includes a proposed amended complaint 

that Plaintiff designates as his second amended complaint. Because Plaintiff has 

previously filed a second amended complaint, the Court will refer to the instant proposed 

complaint at Doc. 143 as Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). 

 Plaintiff’s TAC includes fourteen counts. Counts One through Eleven are the 

same counts in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) that the Court previously 

screened in its Order at Doc. 64, with the inclusion of the identity of some of the 

previously unnamed defendants. Therefore, the Court does not need to rescreen those 

counts and recommends as follows: 

A. Counts One through Eleven

 Count One of Plaintiff’s TAC (designated as Count Two in Plaintiff’s SAC) states 

a valid claim against Provider Balaji (previously named John Doe 1 Provider). (See Doc. 

64 at 12.) 

Count Two of Plaintiff’s TAC (designated as Count Four in Plaintiff’s SAC) 

alleges that he only received two pairs of gloves from Defendant P.A. Matthew Barker 

(previously named John Doe 9 CHS Provider). The Court previously dismissed this 

count without prejudice, finding that “[e]ven assuming that two pairs of gloves were 

insufficient to maintain sanitary conditions under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff 

has not alleged that Defendant ‘John Doe 9 CHS Provider’ was subjectively aware of 

such insufficiency.” (Id.) In his proposed TAC, Plaintiff has added that P.A. Barker 

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should know through his medical training that two pairs of gloves every other day is 

insufficient for his ongoing colostomy. Plaintiff still fails to cure this deficiency by 

failing to allege that Defendant Barker was subjectively aware that two pairs of gloves 

were insufficient to maintain sanitary conditions under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Therefore, the Court recommends that Count Two be dismissed without prejudice. 

Count Three of Plaintiff’s TAC (designated as the first incident in Count Six in 

Plaintiff’s SAC) states a valid claim against Officer Rita Showalter A8845 (previously 

named Officer A8845) and Medical Nurse Mary. (See id. at 12–13.) 

Count Four of Plaintiff’s TAC (designated as the second incident in Count Six of 

Plaintiff’s SAC) states a valid claim against Jane Doe 7 Medical Staff (previously named 

John Doe 7 Medical Staff). (See id. at 13.) 

Count Five of Plaintiff’s TAC (designated as Count Seven in Plaintiff’s SAC) 

states a valid claim against 1st Shift Medical Samantha Perez (previously named 1st Shift 

Medical Staff Samantha) and John Doe 8 Staff. (See id. at 14.) 

Count Six of Plaintiff’s TAC (designated as Count Nine in Plaintiff’s SAC) states 

a valid claim against Graveyard Shift R.N. Lois Quaid (previously named Graveyard 

Shift R.N. Lois) and John Doe Officer 9. (See id.) 

Count Seven of Plaintiff’s TAC (designated as Count Twelve in Plaintiff’s SAC) 

states a valid claim against Jane Doe 10 Medical Staff (previously named John Doe 10 

Medical Staff), John Doe 11 Officer, and John Doe 12 Medical Staff. (See id. at 15.) 

Count Eight of Plaintiff’s TAC (designated as Count Fourteen in Plaintiff’s SAC) 

states a valid claim against John/Jane Doe 13 Medical Staff (previously named John Doe 

13 Medical Staff) and P.A. Matthew Barker (previously named John Doe 1 Provider). 

(See id.) 

Count Nine of Plaintiff’s TAC (previously Count Sixteen of Plaintiff’s SAC) 

states a valid claim against Jane Doe 15 Medical (previously named John Doe 15 

Medical) and Medical Deborah Jean Davis (previously named John Doe 16 Medical). 

(See id. at 16.) 

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Count Ten of Plaintiff’s TAC (previously the first incident in Count Eighteen of 

Plaintiff’s SAC) states a valid claim against Medical Tatjana Stojikovic CS993 

(previously named John Doe 17 Medical). (See id.) 

Count Eleven of Plaintiff’s TAC (previously the second incident in Count 

Eighteen of Plaintiff’s SAC) states a valid claim against Officer Graciela Perez A9647 

(previously named Officer Perez A9697). (See id. at 17.) 

B. Count Twelve 

 In Count Twelve, Plaintiff alleges that on April 16, 2015, Officer Watzek A8993 

interfered with Plaintiff’s prescribed treatment by taking away Plaintiff’s colostomy 

supplies when Plaintiff returned from court. Plaintiff alleges that Erika Medical P.A. 

gave incorrect medical information about Plaintiff to Officer Watzek A8993, who is not 

medical staff, without Plaintiff’s consent. Plaintiff alleges that he believes incorrect 

information was given as retaliation for Plaintiff filing this lawsuit against medical staff. 

Plaintiff also claims that P.A. Erika and Officer Watzek A8993 were deliberately 

indifferent to his medical needs and violated his right to privacy. 

 A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) 

that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of 

his First Amendment rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) 

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 

559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(retaliation claim requires an inmate to show (1) that the prison official acted in 

retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, and (2) that the action 

“advanced no legitimate penological interest”). The plaintiff has the burden of 

demonstrating that his exercise of his First Amendment rights was a substantial or 

motivating factor behind the defendants’ conduct. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of 

Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 

1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). 

To the extent Plaintiff claims false information was given as a retaliatory act, 

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Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants acted in retaliation for his exercise of a 

constitutionally protected right or that their actions did not advance a legitimate 

penological interest. 

Plaintiff also claims an invasion of privacy because Erika Medical P.A. gave 

Plaintiff’s medical information to Officer Watzek A8993, who is not medical staff, 

without Plaintiff’s consent. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “prisoners 

do not have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in prison treatment records 

when the state has a legitimate penological interest in access to them.” Seaton v. 

Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit noted that “[p]risons 

need access to prisoners’ medical records to protect prison staff and other prisoners from 

communicable diseases and violence, and to manage rehabilitative efforts.” Id. at 535. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants’ actions did not advance a legitimate 

penological interest. To the extent that Plaintiff’s supplies were taken from his cell, 

“prisoners have no constitutional right to privacy in their cells.” Smith v. Nevens, 486 F. 

App’x 667, 667 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)). 

To the extent Plaintiff is claiming an Eighth Amendment violation, Plaintiff has 

failed to allege that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical 

needs. Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied proper medical care or that he was 

injured when his supplies were taken. The Court recommends that Count Twelve be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

C. Count Thirteen 

Plaintiff alleges in Count Thirteen that he was denied his weekly silver nitrate 

treatments to cauterize his stoma. Plaintiff alleges that when he doesn’t receive this 

treatment he suffers pain due to bumps forming on his stoma. Plaintiff alleges that 

Provider Balaji knew that more bumps would occur without the treatment, but he was 

denied treatment. Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a valid claim of inadequate 

medical care and the Court recommends that Provider Balaji be required to answer Count 

Thirteen of Plaintiff’s TAC. 

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D. Count Fourteen

 In Count Fourteen Plaintiff alleges that on June 25, 2015, he was denied two pairs 

of gloves for his colostomy care. Plaintiff alleges that he showed Medical Staff Myra 

paperwork from the CHS Director and the external referee stating that he should get two 

pairs of gloves, and Medical Staff Myra refused to provide two pairs, stating that 

Provider Balaji said that Plaintiff should only get one pair of gloves per colostomy 

supplies. Liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges that Medical Staff Myra was aware of, and 

disregarded, Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff has stated a valid claim for 

deliberate indifference against Medical Staff Myra, and the Court recommends that 

Defendant Medical Staff Myra be required to answer Count Fourteen of Plaintiff’s TAC. 

E. Grievance Officers

 Plaintiff continues throughout his TAC to make several allegations that 

Defendants Medical Director Jeffrey Alvarez (previously named John Doe 5 Medical 

Director Admin.), Medical Pamela Brooks 718 (previously named John Doe 2 CH 718), 

Medical Supervisor Teressa DeMille (previously named John Doe 4 HS585), and the 

external referees B. Piirinen and Scott Frye violated Plaintiff’s rights by negatively ruling 

on his grievances. The Court previously held that Plaintiff stated a valid claim against 

these Defendants involved in the grievance process, but that these Defendants are 

protected by qualified immunity because it is not “clearly established” whether the 

officers’ conduct was “unlawful in the situation he [or she] confronted.” See Doc. 64 at 

18–20 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 

618 (1999)). The Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims for damages against 

these grievance officers, but allowed Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against these 

Defendants to remain. Likewise, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claims for 

damages against these Defendants be dismissed with prejudice, and recommends that 

these Defendants be ordered to answer Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend at Doc. 146 

 Plaintiff’s motion to amend at Doc. 146 includes his previous proposed amended 

complaint at Doc. 143, with the addition of one additional count—Count Fifteen. 

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A. Count Fifteen

 Plaintiff alleges in Count Fifteen that LT A7994 and Provider Phillip mistreated 

him by taking him out of general population and putting him in a double door close 

custody cell, claiming it was being used to prep Plaintiff for surgery. Plaintiff claims that 

they put Plaintiff in the close custody cell instead of a medical facility. Plaintiff alleges 

that he was “bounced back-and-forth” between holding tanks and got no sleep. 

Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee when the complaint-of violation occurred, 

his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims are evaluated under the standards of the 

Eighth Amendment. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Not every 

claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the 

Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show 

that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. 

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that 

failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately 

indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 

(1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the 

indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a 

prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the 

way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; 

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

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due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross 

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of Corr., 

220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 

F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical 

malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion does not 

amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v. 

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is 

insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See 

Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The 

indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

Plaintiff does not state how he has been injured from the alleged failure to provide 

him with proper medical care. Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that LT 

A7994 and Provider Phillip were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical 

needs. Because the Court finds that Count Fifteen—the only additional count in 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend at Doc. 146—does not state a valid claim for relief, the 

Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend at Doc. 146 be denied. 

V. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend at Doc. 147 

The Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend at Doc. 147 be denied. 

Plaintiff’s seeks to add four grievance forms to his previously filed complaint, citing 

LRCiv 15.1. The pleading does not comply with LRCiv. 15.1. The Court’s Order at 

Doc. 138 stated that the Court was giving Plaintiff a “final opportunity to amend his 

Second Amended Complaint at Doc. 23, to substitute the names of the defendants as set 

forth above, including any new defendants Plaintiff has identified, and to include all of 

Plaintiff’s claims” by December 7, 2015. Plaintiff filed a motion to amend by the 

December 7, 2015 deadline (Doc. 143), but has filed two additional motions to amend 

after the deadline. In light of the factual background set forth in Section I. above, the 

Court recommends that Plaintiff be admonished that, absent extraordinary circumstances, 

any further attempts to amend by Plaintiff will be viewed unfavorably. 

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VI. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

 The Court recommends that Defendant Provider Balaji be required to answer 

Count One of Plaintiff’s TAC; that Defendants Officer Rita Showalter A8845 and 

Medical Nurse Mary be required to answer Count Three of Plaintiff’s TAC; that 

Defendant Jane Doe 7 Medical Staff be required to answer Count Four of Plaintiff’s 

TAC; that Defendants 1st Shift Medical Samantha Perez and John Doe 8 Staff be 

required to answer Count Five of Plaintiff’s TAC; that Defendants Graveyard Shift R.N. 

Lois Quaid and John Doe Officer 9 be required to answer Count Six of Plaintiff’s TAC; 

that Defendants Jane Doe 10 Medical Staff, John Doe 11 Officer, and John Doe 12 

Medical Staff be required to answer Count Seven of Plaintiff’s TAC; that Defendants 

John/Jane Doe 13 Medical Staff and P.A. Matthew Barker be required to answer Count 

Eight of Plaintiff’s TAC; that Defendants Jane Doe 15 Medical and Medical Deborah 

Jean Davis be required to answer Count Nine of Plaintiff’s TAC; that Defendant Medical 

Tatjana Stojikovic CS993 be required to answer Count Ten of Plaintiff’s TAC; that 

Defendant Officer Graciela Perez A9647 be required to answer Count Eleven of 

Plaintiff’s TAC; that Defendant Provider Balaji be required to answer Count Thirteen of 

Plaintiff’s TAC; that Defendant Medical Staff Myra be required to answer Count 

Fourteen of Plaintiff’s TAC; and that Defendants Grievance Officers (Defendants 

Medical Director Jeffrey Alvarez, Medical Pamela Brooks 718, Medical Supervisor 

Teressa DeMille, and the external referees B. Piirinen and Scott Frye) be ordered to 

answer Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief. The Court recommends that the remaining 

claims and Defendants be dismissed. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend 

(Doc. 143) be granted as set forth herein. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend (Docs. 

146, 147) be denied. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court order the Defendants 

named in Section VI. herein to answer, or otherwise respond to the claims set forth in that 

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section by appropriate motion, within the time provided by the applicable provisions of 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be admonished that, absent 

extraordinary circumstances, any further attempts to amend Plaintiff’s complaint will be 

viewed unfavorably. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. 

 Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length. 

 Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. 

 Dated this 5th day of February, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:14-cv-01613-JAT-DMF Document 150 Filed 02/05/16 Page 13 of 13