Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05025/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05025-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated. 

1

 

2 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIAN JESUS REYNOSO and JOHN

PAUL REYNOSO

Petitioners,

v.

JAMES E. HALL, and G.J. GIURBINO,

WARDENS

Respondents.

 /

1:04-CV-5025 LJO DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioners are state prisoners proceeding in a habeas corpus action pursuant to28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Petitioners are represented by Federal Defender, David M. Porter. 

 BACKGROUND

Following a joint jury trial, in the Tulare County Superior Court, Petitioners were

convicted of first degree murder (Cal. Pen. Code § 187(a)), and other related offenses. 1

Petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal. In November 2001, the Court of Appeal for

the Fifth Appellate District reversed the judgment for Batson error. (Lodged Doc. 3.) 2

On January 3, 2002, the People filed a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court. (Lodged Doc. 4.) On February 20, 2002, the California Supreme Court granted review. 

(Lodged Doc. 5.) 

On August 25, 2003, after briefing by the parties, the California Supreme Court reversed

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 The proceedings on this petition were stayed pending the Supreme Court’s ruling on John Paul’s 3

certiorari petition. 

 On August 16, 2005, the Court granted Respondent’s request for a protective order and directed the 4

transcript of the jury selection be filed under seal. (Court Doc. 26.) 

 The following summary of facts are taken from the opinion of the California Supreme Court, Lodged 5

Document No. 10. The Court finds the state Court of Appeal’s summary is a correct and fair summary of the facts of

the case. 

2

the appellate court’s opinion and remanded the case. (Lodged Doc. 10.) On March 29, 2004, the

remittitur issued affirming the judgment. 

On December 19, 2003, Petitioner, Julian Jesus Reynoso, filed the instant petition for writ

of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California,

Sacramento Division. By order of January 8, 2004, the action was transferred to the Fresno

Division. (Court Doc. 3.) 

3

Petitioner, John Paul Reynoso, filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme

Court, which was denied, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005). On June 12, 2006, John Paul, filed a petition

for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, in case number CV-F-06-00757 OWW TAG HC. 

By order of February 13, 2004, the Court directed Respondent to submit a response to the

petition, in Julian Jesus’s case. (Court Doc. 5.) 

On August 4, 2005, Respondent filed an answer to the petition for writ of habeas corpus.4

(Court Doc. 22.) Petitioner, Julian Jesus Reynoso, did not file a traverse. 

On September 27, 2006, the Court directed Respondent to submit supplemental briefing

in light of recent case authority. The Court also appointed the Office of the Federal Defender to

represent Petitioner, Julian Jesus Reynoso. 

On November 13, 2006, the Court consolidated the instant case with John Paul Reynoso

v. G.J. Giurbino, 06-CV-00757 OWW TAG HC, and counsel was appointed to represent both

Petitioners. 

On January 2, 2007, Respondents filed a supplemental brief. Petitioners filed their

supplemental brief on April 16, 2007. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS5

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3

John Reynoso and his brother Julian were at a residence with several

others, including the murder victim, Mario Martinez. John Reynoso and Martinez

got into an argument, which culminated in Reynoso fatally shooting Martinez in

the chest at point-blank range with a shotgun. Reynoso admitted shooting

Martinez, but claimed he did so because he was in fear of his brother Julian’s life. 

Julian’s defense was that he did not aid or abet his brother and had no prior

knowledge that John was going to shoot Martinez. Julian himself was armed with

a handgun and threatened one of those present with it as the brothers fled. Both

defendants were convicted of first degree murder. John Reynoso was found to

have used a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of the

murder within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d). 

Julian Reynoso was also convicted of assault with a firearm, knowingly and

maliciously dissuading a witness, and being an accessory after the fact.

Jury Selection

The facts relevant to the Batson/Wheeler claim are as follows. Jury

selection lasted less than one day. At the start of voir dire, the trial court excused

a total of 53 prospective jurors on the basis of claims of hardship, without

objection from the defense. More than one-quarter of those excused for claimed

hardship (at least 14 prospective jurors, and perhaps as many as 17) were of

Hispanic ancestry. The People exercised a total of four peremptory challenges,

the last two of which were to Hispanic Prospective Jurors Mary L. And Elizabeth

G. Defendants are Hispanic. So, too, was the murder victim. The final jury

sworn to hear defendants’ case contained no Hispanic jurors.

The trial court conducted the voir dire and initially asked each prospective

juror to answer nine questions posted on a board in the courtroom, which asked

for his or her name, general address, occupation and length of occupation,

spouse’s occupation and length of occupation, marital status, prior jury service, if

any (type of case, how long ago, whether a verdict was reached), past involvement

in a criminal case (as a charged suspect, victim, or witness to a crime), legal or

medical training, if any, past involvement in law enforcement, if applicable, and

whether they had any close friends or relatives in law enforcement.

Mary L. gave the following response to the court’s general inquiry: ‘My

name’s [Mary L.]. I live in Earliment, California. I’ve lived there most of my

life. I’m a case manager for at-risk youth. My husband is a foreman for farm

labor. I’ve never been selected for jury. I’ve never been involved in a criminal

case or victim. I have no legal or medical training. Never been involved in law

enforcement. And I do have relatives that are in law enforcement.’

Mary L. was thereafter excused as a result of the prosecutor’s exercise of

his third peremptory challenge, after he had passed and accepted the jury four

times while she was seated in the jury box.

Elizabeth G. gave the following response to the court’s general inquiry:

“My name is [Elizabeth G.]. I just moved to Porterville for four months. My

occupation I’m a customer service rep. I’ve been there for eight and a half years. 

My spouse, he’s a construction supervisor. And he’s been that for over 18 years. 

I’ve never served on a jury before. I’ve never been involved in any criminal [sic]

or been a victim. I don’t have any legal or medical training. Never been involved

in any law enforcement. As far as a friend, I have a friend who’s an officer in

Porterville. As far as the relative, he’s a brother who is a correctional officer.”

Elizabeth G. was thereafter excused as a result of the prosecutor’s exercise

of his fourth and final peremptory challenge, after he had passed and accepted the

jury 14 times while she was seated in the jury box.

After the jury selection was completed but before the jury and alternatives

were sworn, defendant Julian Reynoso made a Batson/Wheeler motion arguing

that the peremptory challenges to Mary L. and Elizabeth G. were made solely out

of group bias, i.e., on racial grounds, in violation of his constitutional rights,

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rather than for proper reasons specific to the challenged prospective jurors . . . . ¶

Counsel articulated the basis for his motion as follows: ‘The [prosecutor]

kept passing and passing and saying that they were happy with the jury, happy

with the jury. [¶] Of the only juror they excused initially was the one gentleman

who knew me from [a local tennis club], and then after that the only two other

jurors that were dismissed [by the prosecutor] were Hispanics, [Elizabeth G.] and

[Mary L.] [¶] I would take note of the fact that the jury as it’s constituted now has

twelve Whites as the twelve jurors and three White alternates. I think it was a

deliberate attempt by the prosecution to eliminate the two Hispanics that made it

to the jury panel [sic: box] from the jury panel. The two defendants in this case

are both Hispanic. I believe that that’s a violation of Wheeler, your Honor.’

Codefendant John Reynoso joined in the motion.

The trial court indicated that ‘because the People did only exercise . . . four

[peremptory] challenges and two of those were Hispanic, I’m going to ask that the

People give their reasons why they excused those two.’ The prosecutor sought

clarification as to whether the court was ruling that a prima facie case (of

systematic exclusion for group bias) had been shown. The court replied, ‘Yes.’ 

The prosecutor proceeded to give his reasons for excusing Mary L. and Elizabeth

G.

The prosecutor’s reasons for exercising his third peremptory challenge to

excuse Prospective Juror Mary L., were these: ‘Your Honor, the People dismissed

[Mary L.] based upon her being a counselor for at-risk youth. The People feel that

[Mary L.] would have an undue sympathy for both defendants in this case because

they are young and definitely if not at risk, past risk. [¶] The People feel that she

would associate with the people she works with and she would probably would

[sic] have pity on them.’

The prosecutor’s reasons for exercising his fourth peremptory challenge to

excuse Prospective Juror Elizabeth G., were as follows: ‘In terms of [Elizabeth

G.], the People dismissed [Elizabeth G.] because she was [a] customer service

representative. In terms of that, we felt that she did not have enough education

experience. It seems like she was not paying attention to the proceedings and the

People felt that she was not involved in the process. The People felt she would

not be a good juror.’

The trial court responded, “And I accept those reasons as being not based

upon race or ethnicity. And I don’t find that there has been a violation of Wheeler

and that the - there was not systematic exclusion of a recognized ethnic group, i.e.,

Hispanics in this case. So the motion is denied.” 

Counsel for defendant Julian Reynoso asked if he could make a couple of

points for the record, and the court permitted him to do so. The following

colloquy then took place:

“[Counsel for Julian]: And a couple of points for the record is that counsel

for the People passed on [Elizabeth G.] about seven or eight times. Then when I

think he sensed that the defense was getting ready to pass, then it [sic: he] excused

[Elizabeth G.] There’s nothing about what [Elizabeth G.] said in terms of her

background that would make her be sympathetic to the defendants in this case. 

When she said she was a customer service rep. Her husband is a construction

supervisor. [¶] She’s got friends in the Porterville [Police Department], her

brother or brother-in-law works for the California Department of Corrections.

There was nothing in her responses or her demeanor that would justify just

excusing her other than it being a race-based exclusion is our position.” 

“The Court: And I believe that there was another Hispanic that was

excused not by the People, but by the defense, and that was [Carolyn G.].”

“[Counsel for Julian]: That was a legitimate reason. I didn’t excuse her.”

“The Court: I’m not saying it wasn’t legitimate. You just brought up - I’m

not arguing with you, but I want the record to be clear, you argued that even a

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 “In context, it is clear that ‘the other person’ the court was not referring to was Elizabeth G., whom the 6

People had excused with their final peremptory challenge.” 

 “Again, in context, it is clear counsel is here referring to Elizabeth G.” 7

5

person who the People should want to have on, namely law enforcement

background, may still kick off [sic: be kicked off] because of being Hispanic. I’m

just pointing out that [Carolyn G.] was another person that is [of] Hispanic

background but they did not kick [her] off and I believe her background was that

she had been the one who had been kidnaped.”

“[Counsel for Julian]: Right. I would say she would want to be kept on by the People

because she’s been a victim of a violent crime at gunpoint.”

“The Court: But your agreement was that so should the other person6

because they had law enforcement background.”

“[Counsel for Julian]: I didn’t say she was law enforcement background.”

“The Court: I thought you said”

“[Counsel for Julian]: I was looking over my notes in terms of what she7

said in answer to the nine questions that are up on the little poster. She responded

that she had friends in the Porterville [Police Department].”

“The Court: Right. Law enforcement people.”

“[Counsel for Julian]: And a brother who works for California Department

of Corrections. So I’m just saying that based on those responses, there’s no

legitimate reason to exclude her based on those responses other than the fact that

she has her - she’s Hispanic. I’m trying to make that for the record. [¶] [The

prosecutor] argued that [Mary L.] would be sympathetic because she works with

at risk youth. That’s his reasons for excusing her. But for the record also the

reason [Carolyn G.] was excused as I understand it from [counsel for John

Reynoso,] is because she was a victim of violent crime where guns were involved. 

That’s what we have here.”

“The Court: Okay. Thank you.”

“[The Prosecutor]: I’d like the record to reflect that defense counsel also

challenged to [Mrs. T.], [who] seemed and looked Hispanic to me and I think they

exercised or kicked off her as well.”

“The Court: All right. We’ll see you tomorrow morning at 9:45.”

(Lodged Doc. 10 at 3-9 (footnotes in original).)

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Tulare County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

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On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

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criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Batson Challenge

Petitioners contend that their constitutional rights were violated by the prosecutor’s

actions in exercising two peremptory strikes to excuse two Hispanic jurors, one of which is at

issue in the instant petition. More specifically, Petitioners contend that the California Supreme

Court misapplied the third Batson step because (1) the trial court erred by immediately accepting

the prosecutor’s stated reasons without “critical assessment,” and (2) the prosecutor’s reasons

were vague, implausible, or irrelevant to the case and unsupported by the record. (Petition, at 1,

5.) 

1. State Court Proceedings

a. Trial Court

After the jury was selected, but before they were sworn, defense counsel made a motion

under Wheeler, arguing that the prosecutor had systematically excluded Hispanics from the jury. 

The following exchange occurred:

Of the only juror they excused initially when he got into the box was the

one gentleman who knew me from the Visalia Racquet Club, and then after that

the only two other jurors that were dismissed were Hispanics, [Elizabeth G] and

[Mary L]. 

I would take note of the fact that the jury as it’s constituted now has twelve

whites as the twelve jurors and three white alternates. I think it was a deliberate

attempt by the prosecution to eliminate the two Hispanics that made it to the jury

panel from the jury panel. The two defendants in this case are both Hispanic. I

believe that that’s a violation of Wheeler, your Honor. 

THE COURT: I don’t think it’s timely. It needs to be made at the time

you believe it’s occurring. Having said that, because it puts the Court in a very

awkward position now that we’ve got all 15. But I’m going to - - I’m going to

have - - because the People did only exercise apparently three challenges, three or

four challenges and two of those were Hispanic, I’m going to ask that the People

give their reasons why they excused those two. 

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MR. JACKSON: So your Honor, you are ruling there was a prima facie case?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, I believe the People that I dismissed were

... [Mary L] and [Elizabeth G]. 

THE COURT: That’s correct, four.

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, you want the reason for the two Hispanic

surnames or all four?

THE COURT: Just the Hispanic surname.

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, the People dismissed [Mary L] based upon

her being a counselor for at risk youth. The People feel that [Mary L] would have

an undue sympathy for both defendants in this case because they are young and

definitely if not at risk, past risk.

The People feel that she would associate with the people she works with

and she would probably would have pity on them.

In terms of [Elizabeth G], the People dismissed [Elizabeth G] because she

was customer service representative. In terms of that, we felt that she did not have

enough educational experience. It seemed like she was not paying attention to the

proceedings and the People felt that she was not involved in the process. The

People felt she would not be a good juror.

THE COURT: And I accept those reasons as being not based upon race or

ethnicity. And I don’t’ find that there has been a violation of Wheeler and that the

- - there was not a systematic exclusion of a recognized ethnic group, i.e.

Hispanics in this case. So the motion is denied.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can I make a couple points for the record?

THE COURT: You can.

[MR. TERRELL/DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Also for the record I’ll join in

the motion.

[MR. RUMERY/DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And a couple points for the

record is that counsel for the People passed on [Elizabeth G] about seven or eight

times. Then when I think he sensed that the defense was getting ready to pass,

then it excused [Elizabeth G]. There’s nothing about what [Elizabeth G] said in

terms of her background that would make her be sympathetic to the defendants in

this case. When she said she was a customer service rep. Her husband is a

construction supervisor.

She’s got friends in the Porterville PD, her brother or brother-in-law works

for the California Department of Corrections. There was nothing in her responses

or her demeanor that would justify just excusing her other than it being a racebased exclusion is our position.

THE COURT: And I believe that there was another Hispanic that was

excused not by the People, but by the defense and that was . . . .

MR. RUMERY: That was a legitimate reason. I didn’t excuse her.

THE COURT: I’m not saying it wasn’t legitimate. You just brought up - -

I’m not arguing with you, but I want the record to be clear, you argued that even a

person who the People should want to have on, namely law enforcement

background, may still kick off because of being Hispanic. I’m just pointing out

that Mrs. . . . was another person that is Hispanic background but they did not kick

off and I believe her background was that she had been the one who had been

kidnapped.

MR. RUMERY: Right. I would say she would want to be kept on by the

People because she’s been a victim of a violent crime at gunpoint.

THE COURT: But your argument was that so should the other person

because they had law enforcement background.

MR. RUMERY: I didn’t say she was law enforcement background.

THE COURT: I though you said - - 

MR. RUMERY: I was looking over my notes in terms of what she said in

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28 “RTA” refers to Reporter’s Redacted Transcript on Appeal, which is sealed with this Court. (Court Doc. 8

27.) 

9

answer to the nine questions that are up on the little poster. She responded that

she has friends in the Porterville PD.

THE COURT: Right. Law enforcement people.

MR. RUMERY: And a brother who works for California Department of

Corrections. So I’m just saying that based on those responses, there’s no

legitimate reason to exclude her based on those responses other than the fact that

she has her - - she’s Hispanic. I’m trying to make that for the record.

Counsel’s argued that Miss Mary L... would be sympathetic because she

works with at risk youth. That’s his reason for excusing her. . . . 

(RTA 113-118.) 8

b. Court of Appeal

The state appellate court found that the trial court erred by failing to engage in a “sincere

and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s justification for challenging [Elizabeth G]. 

First, as previously discussed, the initial reason given by the prosecutor [Elizabeth G was a

customer service representative with a lack of educational experience] was not supported by the

record and lacked any content related to the case being tried. Second, the demeanor reason given

by the prosecutor, which is not reflected with the cold record on appeal, was disputed by the

defense yet not clarified in any way by the court. Finally, in rejecting defendant’s argument,

rather than focusing on the question of validity of the People’s justifications, the trial court

attempted to buttress its finding by analyzing a Hispanic juror not challenged by the People but

excused by the defense.” (Lodged Doc. 3, Opinion, at 21.) 

c. California Supreme Court

In a published opinion, People v. Reynoso, 31 Cal.4th 903 (2003), cert. denied 125 S.Ct.

2929 (2005), the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal holding, in relevant

part:

We acknowledge that, when viewed objectively, the notion that all

persons employed as customer service representatives would have insufficient

“educational experience” to effectively serve on juries is of questionable

persuasiveness. But the proper function of the reviewing court in a case such as

this is not to objectively validate or invalidate such a broadly stated premise. The

proper function on review in this case was to determine whether the trial court’s

conclusion— that the prosecutor’s subjective race-neutral reasons for exercising

the peremptory challenges at issue here were sincere, and that the defendants

failed to sustain their burden of showing “from all the circumstances of the case”

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 Indeed, an attorney could peremptorily excuse a potential juror because he or she feels the potential 9

juror’s occupation reflects too much education, and that a juror with that particularly high a level of education would

likely be specifically biased against their witnesses, or their client’s position in the case. As long as such a

peremptory challenge was nondiscriminatory and “legitimate” in the sense that it does not deny equal protection of

the law (Purkett, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 769), it would be lawful and valid. 

10

(Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280) a strong likelihood that the peremptory

challenges in question were exercised on improper grounds of group bias—is

supported by the record when considered under the applicable deferential standard

of review.

Here, at a bare minimum, Elizabeth G.’s occupation as a customer service

representative was confirmed by her answers to the general questions, as were the

additional circumstances that she had no prior jury experience and no past contact

with the criminal justice system in any capacity. If a prosecutor can lawfully

peremptorily excuse a potential juror based on a hunch or suspicion, or because he

does not like the potential juror’s hairstyle, or because he observed the potential

juror glare at him, or smile at the defendant or defense counsel, then surely he can

challenge a potential juror whose occupation, in the prosecutor’s subjective

estimation, would not render him or her the best type of juror to sit on the case for

which the jury is being selected. As the Court of Appeal itself observed, this was 9

a murder case, with two codefendants whose roles in the criminal episode were

distinct. A prosecutor arguably could conclude in sincerity that a prospective

juror employed in customer service, with no prior jury experience, no prior

contact with the criminal justice system, and who further appeared to be

inattentive and uninvolved in the jury selection process, would not be the best

type of juror for the case. Such a determination might further be supported by a

myriad of factors readily observable by those present in the courtroom, but not by

those who are reviewing the case from the cold transcribed record on appeal.

The trial court was obligated to evaluate “all the circumstances of the

case” in the step three evaluation of whether the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons

for peremptorily excusing Hispanic jurors Mary L. and Elizabeth G. were sincere

and credible, or whether the defendants instead had sustained their burden of

proving unlawful discriminatory intent in the exercise of the peremptory

challenges. (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280.) With regard to the first reason

given in justification of the peremptory challenge of Elizabeth G., the question for

the trial court was not whether, objectively speaking, all customer service

representatives lack sufficient “educational experience” to sit on a jury (a dubious

notion when viewed in isolation) or even whether, subjectively speaking,

Elizabeth G., who was employed as a customer service representative, herself had

insufficient “educational experience” to sit on the jury. The question for the trial

court was this: was the reason given for the peremptory challenge a “legitimate

reason,” legitimate in the sense that it would not deny defendants equal protection

of law (see Purkett, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 769), or was it a disingenuous reason for

a peremptory challenge that was in actuality exercised solely on grounds of group

bias?

The prosecutor also gave as his second, demeanor-based reason for

excusing Elizabeth G., that it appeared to him she was not paying attention to the

proceedings, and that he felt she was not sufficiently involved in the jury selection

process to make a good juror. Here again, at a bare minimum, the record of

Elizabeth G.’s answers to the questions posed to all the prospective jurors reflects

that she had no prior jury experience and no prior contact with the criminal justice

system in any capacity. Unlike the reasons given by the prosecutor in Silva, the

prosecutor’s reasons given in this case for peremptorily excusing Elizabeth G.

were neither inherently implausible, nor affirmatively contradicted by anything in

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the record. 

The Court of Appeal focused, in particular, on this second, demeanorbased justification given for the excusal of Elizabeth G., and found it significant

that the trial court made no attempt to clarify or probe the prosecutor’s reasons for

finding Elizabeth G.’s demeanor while in the jury box unsuited to jury service. 

But the trial court did expressly accept the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for

the peremptory challenge to Elizabeth G., finding them sincere and genuine. 

Since the trial court was in the best position to observe the prospective jurors’

demeanor and the manner in which the prosecutor exercised his peremptory

challenges, the implied finding, that the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing

Elizabeth G., including the demeanor-based reason, were sincere and genuine, is

entitled to “great deference” on appeal. (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p.98, fn. 21;

Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1221.) Nor have we found anything in the record

to directly contradict the trial court’s express findings to that effect, in contrast to

the facts of Silva. To the contrary, the prosecutor passed and accepted the jury 14

times with Elizabeth G. seated in the jury box (on four of those occasions, a

second Hispanic prospective juror, Carolyn G., was also seated on the jury when

the prosecutor passed and accepted it). Although not a conclusive factor, “the

passing of certain jurors may be an indication of the prosecutor’s good faith in

exercising his peremptories, and may be an appropriate factor for the trial judge to

consider in ruling on a Wheeler objection . . . .” (People v. Snow (1987) 44

Cal.3d 216, 225.) If the prosecutor’s occupation-and demeanor-based reasons for

excusing Elizabeth G. were indeed pretextual, and he was in actuality bent on

removing her from the jury because of her Hispanic ancestry,[footnote omitted]

his acceptance of the jury 14 times with Elizabeth G. seated in the jury box, on

four such occasions with a second Hispanic prospective juror also seated on the

jury, was hardly the most failsafe or effective way to effectuate that

unconstitutional discriminatory intent.

................................................................................................................................

Where, as here, the trial court is fully apprised of the nature of the defense

challenge to the prosecutor’s exercise of a particular peremptory challenge, where

the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing the juror are neither contradicted by the

record nor inherently implausible (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 386), and where

nothing in the record is in conflict with the usual presumptions to be drawn, i.e.,

that all peremptory challenges have been exercised in a constitutional manner, and

that the trial court has properly made a sincere and reasoned evaluation of the

prosecutor’s reasons for exercising his peremptory challenges, then those

presumptions may be relied upon, and a Batson/Wheeler motion denied,

notwithstanding that the record does not contain detailed findings regarding the

reasons for the exercise of each such peremptory challenge. 

Having considered all the circumstances of this case (Wheeler, supra, 22

Cal.3d at p. 280), we find nothing in the record to contradict the trial court’s

determination that no Wheeler error occurred, nor any reason to deviate from the

customary “great deference” normally afforded such rulings. (Batson, supra, 476

U.S. at p.98, fn. 21.) 

(Lodged Doc. 10, Opinion, at 25-33, footnote in original.) 

2. Analysis of Claim

Evaluation of allegedly discriminatory peremptory challenges to potential jurors in federal

and state trials is governed by the standard established by the United States Supreme Court in

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Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). In Batson, the United States Supreme Court set out

a three-step process in the trial court to determine whether a peremptory challenge is race-based

in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995). First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised a

peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Id. That is, the defendant must demonstrate that the

facts and circumstances of the case "raise an inference" that the prosecution has excluded venire

members from the petit jury on account of their race. Id. 

If a defendant makes this showing, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to provide a

race-neutral explanation for its challenge. Id. At this step, "the issue is the facial validity of the

prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's

explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.

352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (1991). Finally, the trial court must determine if the defendant has

proven purposeful discrimination. Id. at 359. The Supreme Court has made clear that “the

ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from the

opponent of the strike.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S.

333, 126 S.Ct. 969, 974 (2006). 

“When there is reason to believe that there is a racial motivation for the challenge, neither

the trial courts nor we are bound to accept at face value a list of neutral reasons that are either

unsupported in the record or refuted by it.” Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1331 (9 Cir. th

1993). The court must consider the record as a whole and each explanation in order to determine

whether an invidious discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality of the relevant

facts of the case. Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 360 (9 Cir. 2006) th (citing Hernandez, 500

U.S. at 363.) 

There is no dispute that the only issue in this case is the trial court’s analysis under step

three of the Batson challenge. Here, as previously stated, the trial court found that Petitioner

made a prima facie case of improper discrimination, and asked the prosecutor to explain his

peremptory challenges as to two Hispanic jurors. In response, the prosecutor stated he excused

Elizabeth G, the only juror at issue here, because of her lack of education and because it seemed

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like she was not paying attention to the proceedings. The trial court accepted those reasons as

not based on race or ethnicity and “there was not a systematic exclusion of a recognized group,

i.e. Hispanics.” (RTA 115.) As previously stated, Petitioners were ultimately tried and

convicted by an all-White jury. 

a. AEDPA Factual Finding Review

As an initial matter, there is a dispute over which state court’s factual finding should be

reviewed under AEDPA. Respondents argue this Court’s review should be limited to the trial

court’s factual finding because this was the only court that engaged in any factfinding. 

Petitioners argue that both the trial court and supreme court decisions must be reviewed because

the reviewing court adopted the trial court’s factual findings. Petitioners are correct. 

This Court can only grant relief under § 2254, if the state court decision was (1) “contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-

(2). The factual findings made by the state court are presumed correct unless the petitioner

presents clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Long

standing precedent establishes that the last reasoned decision of the state court, here California

Supreme Court opinion, is reviewed. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). 

However, where as here, the state court adopted the factual findings of the trial court, the trial

court’s ruling must also necessarily be considered. See Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 829 (“In

this case, the appellate court’s decision is the last reasoned decision, and is thus the decision we

must review. Because that decision affirmed the trial court and adopted one of the reasons cited

by the trial court, however, our analysis will necessarily include discussion of the trial court’s

decision as well.”) (footnote omitted.); see also Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9

th

Cir. 2007 (en banc). “On habeas review, state appellate court findings-including those that

interpret unclear or ambiguous trial court rulings-are entitled to the same presumption of

correctness that we afford trial court findings.” See Palmer v. Estelle, 985 F.2d 456, 459 (9 Cir. th

1993). 

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10

See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1172 (9 Cir. 2001) th (“an opinion of our circuit is binding within our circuit”). 

14

b. Batson Claim

Petitioners contend that “the trial judge unreasonably applied Batson because he failed to

make any findings at all, much less detailed ones, and to undertake any step-three analysis, much

less a meaningful one.” (Court Doc. 42; Supp. Briefing, at 18.) 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). In order for the state court decision

to be an “unreasonable application” it must be “more than incorrect or erroneous.” Id. The state

court decision must be an “objectively unreasonable” application of the law. Id. As recently

stated in Rice v. Collins, “a federal habeas court can only grant [the] petition if it was

unreasonable to credit the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the Batson challenge.” 546

U.S. 333; 126 S.Ct. at 974. This Court looks to the “last reasoned decision” in applying these

standards, here, the opinion of the California Supreme Court. 

As set forth by Petitioners, in Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351 (9 Cir. 2006) th, the Ninth 10

Circuit discussed at length the requirements of the court in analyzing a step-three Batson

challenge:

At this stage, “the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike

has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at

768. Although the burden remains with the defendant to show purposeful

discrimination, the third step of Batson primarily involves the trier of fact. After

the prosecution puts forward a race-neutral reason, the court is required to

evaluate “the persuasiveness of the justification.” Id. To accept a prosecutor’s

stated nonracial reasons, the court need not agree with them. The question is not

whether the stated reason represents a sound strategic judgment, but “whether

counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Hernandez v.

New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion). “It is

true that peremptories are often the subjects of instinct,” and that “it can sometimes be hard to

say what the reason is.” Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2332. “But when illegitimate grounds like race

are in issue, a prosecutor simply has got to state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the

plausibility of the reasons he gives.” Id. “While subjective factors may play a legitimate role in

the exercise of challenges, reliance on such factors alone cannot overcome strong objective

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indicia of discrimination....” Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1429 (9 Cir. 1994) th. 

The trier of fact may not turn a blind eye to purposeful discrimination

obscured by race-neutral excuses. “[T]he prosecutor must give a ‘clear and

reasonably specific’ explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the

challenges.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). “A Batson

challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis.” 

Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2332. Reasons must be “related to the particular case to be

tried.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. “[I]mplausible or fantastic justifications may (and

probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” Purkett,

514 U.S. at 768.

The Court need not accept any proffered rationale. We have recognized

that “[w]hen there is reason to believe that there is a racial motivation for the

challenge, neither the trial courts nor we are bound to accept at face value a list of

neutral reasons that are either unsupported in the record or refuted by it.” 

Johnson, 3 F.3d at 1331. The court must evaluate the record and consider each

explanation within the context of the trial as a whole because “‘[a]n invidious

discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant

facts.’” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,

242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976)); see also Miller-El, 125 S.Ct. at 2324

(noting that Batson requires inquiry into “‘the totality of the relevant facts’ about a

prosecutor’s conduct” (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 94)); Batson, 476 U.S. at 93

(“In deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must

undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent

as may be available.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A court need not find

all nonracial reasons pretextual in order to find racial discrimination. “[I]f a

review of the record undermines the prosecutor’s stated reasons, or many of the

proffered reasons, the reasons may be deemed a pretext for racial discrimination.” 

Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 830 (9 Cir. 2003) th ; see also United States v.

Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 699 (9 Cir. 1989) th (“Thus, the court is left with only

two acceptable bases for the challenges. . . . Although these criteria would

normally be adequately ‘neutral’ explanations taken at face value, the fact that two

of the four proffered reasons do not hold up under judicial scrutiny militates

against their sufficiency.”).

Kessler, 465 F.3d at 359-360. 

At the third Batson step, the trial court must determine whether there has been intentional

discrimination. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. “The decisive question will be whether counsel’s

race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Id. at 365. “The trial

court must not simply accept the proffered reasons at face value; it has a duty to ‘evaluate

meaningfully the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s [race]-neutral explanation[]’ to discern

whether it is a mere pretext for discrimination.” Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9

th

Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9 Cir. 2003).). “Thus, the trial th

court must evaluate the prosecutor’s proffered reasons and credibility under ‘the totality of the

relevant facts,’ using all the available tools including its own observations and the assistance of

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 The case has a rather lengthy procedural history. While the direct appeal was pending before the state 11

appellate court, the United States Supreme Court decided Batson, which resulted in the case being remanded to the

Texas trial court for application of the law as established in Batson, i.e. whether defendant could prove that the

jurors were struck based on race. The trial court denied relief finding that the prosecution’s reasons were raceneutral. 

Defendant then sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district court, which was denied, and the Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals denied a request for a certificate of appealability. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth

Circuit’s denial of a certificate of appealability, and remanded the case back for review on the merits. 537 U.S. 322,

348 (2003). 

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition on the merits, and the Supreme Court granted

certiorari and issued the most recent decision on June 13, 2005. 545 U.S. 231. 

16

counsel.” Mitleider v. Hall, 391 F.3d 1039, 1047 (9 Cir. 2004) th (citing Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d

at 831.)

Here, the trial court recognized its duty under Step-three to make a determination as to

whether purposeful discrimination had been shown, and the trial court made the specific factual

finding that the reasons stated by the prosecution were not based upon race or ethnicity, and there

was no violation of Wheeler because there was not a systematic exclusion of a recognized ethnic

group, i.e. Hispanics. (RTA 115.) 

The California Supreme Court failed to engage in comparative juror analysis at the time

of Petitioner’s appeal because California caselaw prohibited courts from applying comparative

juror analysis. See People v. Johnson, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220-23 (1986); People v. Turner, 8

Cal.4th 137, 169 (1994). However, subsequent federal decisions are to the contrary. For the

following reasons, under current Circuit authority, this Court must conclude that the state courts’

failure to conduct such analysis was contrary to clearly established federal law. 

The California Supreme Court’s decision was issued prior to the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, issued June 13, 2005. There, the

defendant was tried for capital murder. The prosecution exercised peremptory strikes against ten

out of eleven prospective African-American jurors. Id. at 233. Over defendant’s objection that

the strikes were improperly based on race, the trial court denied the motion and he was sentenced

to death for murder. 

11

In addressing the merits of the petition, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution had

engaged in racial discrimination by using the peremptory challenges to excuse ten out of the

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 Because the Court is reviewing the claim de novo, the Court need not and does not consider Petitioner’s 12

claim that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the prosecution’s proffered justification, as

such contention is moot in light of this Court’s de novo review and application of clearly-established Supreme Court

precedent.

17

eleven African-American jurors. In making its finding, the Court utilized comparative juror

analysis, despite the fact that the state appellate courts had not done so, to determine whether the

use of the strikes were motivated by race. Id. at 239-262. In Kesser, the Ninth Circuit applied

comparative analysis for the first time on appeal stating that the California Court of Appeal failed

“to consider comparative evidence in the record before it [which] undeniably contradicted the

prosecutor’s purported motivations, [and] unreasonably accepted his nonracial motives as

genuine.” 465 F.3d at 357. In applying comparative analysis, the Ninth Circuit held that

“comparative analysis is required even when it is not requested or attempted in state court.” Id.

at 361. It went on to state that

The [Supreme] Court in Miller-El applied comparative juror analysis to a

case originally tried in 1986, remanded for a Batson hearing in 1988, and appealed

under AEDPA in 2000. The Court’s holding means that the principles expounded

in Miller-El were clearly established Supreme Court law for AEDPA purposes at

least by the time of the last reasoned state court decision in Miller-El, handed

down in 1992, before Kesser’s 1993 trial. 

Id. at 360. 

Although the state court did not engage in comparative analysis, which was contrary to

now clearly established federal law, the failure to do so does not in and of itself warrant relief in

the action. Rather, the United States Supreme Court has recently confirmed that “when a state

court’s adjudication of a claim is dependent on an antecedent unreasonable application of federal

law,” this Court “must then resolve the claim without the deference that AEDPA otherwise

requires.” Panetti v. Quarterman, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2858 (June 28, 2007). Thus, this

Court simply reviews the claim de novo to determine whether Petitioner has established

purposeful discrimination at step three of Batson. See id. Although the California Supreme 12

Court did not engage in comparative analysis at the time of Petitioner’s appeal, this Court is

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 Ninth Circuit authority is binding on the United States District Court in the Eastern District of California. 

13

See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1172 (9 Cir. 2001) (“an opinion of our circuit is binding within our circuit.”) th

 In their initial answer, Respondents argued that this Court was barred from applying the Supreme Court’s 14

analysis in Miller-El, under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1986). However, in their supplemental brief,

Respondents concede that “Miller-El set[s] forth the proper form of analysis for a federal court reviewing a state

prisoner’s claim that he proved at trial a prosecutor was racially motivated in when [sic] exercising prospective

jurors. The question to be determined is one of pure fact . . . .” (Court Doc. 37; Supp. Briefing, at 2.)

 Any argument by Respondents that the comparative analysis was not raised to the state courts is 15

unfounded. In reviewing the brief submitted to the Court of Appeal, Petitioner, Julian Jesus Reynoso, raised the

argument that other white jurors remained on the jury panel despite their alleged lack of education. (Lodged Doc. 1,

at 26-28.) Again, to the California Supreme Court, Petitioner raised the same argument. (Lodged Doc. 7, at 32.) A

copy of the voir transcript was obviously available to the California Supreme Court. 

18

presently bound by Ninth Circuit authority to conduct such an analysis.

13,14,15

The prosecution’s reasons were race-neutral on their face, and the trial court made the

factual finding that no purposeful discrimination had been shown. The first reason the

prosecutor gave for striking Elizabeth G was her lack of education. RTA 115. The second

reason the prosecutor stated for striking Elizabeth G was that she “seemed” to be inattentive and

was “not involved in the process.” RTA 115. 

Applying the comparative analysis as done in Kesser, Brian O, who served on the jury,

was a shift supervisor for a canning plant and, like Mrs. Guerrero, had never served on a jury

before, never been involved in a criminal case or with law enforcement, and never been a victim. 

RTA 72. Tracy D, who served on the jury, was a full-time mother and housewife. She had

previously served on one jury, and had never been involved in a criminal case or in law

enforcement. RTA 74. Jimmy C, served on the jury and worked for a “dairy products processing

plant.” He had never been on a jury, nor involved in a criminal case or in law enforcement. 

RTA 76. John G, served on the jury and worked as “[f]ield man for a packing house.” He had

never served on a jury, nor been involved in a criminal case, charged with a crime, or involved in

law enforcement. RTA 107-108. Kenny D, served on the jury and stated his occupation was

“Farming.” He had not been involved in a criminal case and, other than being a victim of a theft,

had no involvement with law enforcement. RTA 108. 

Elizabeth G. had been a customer service representative for eight and one-half years with

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the same company, which supports the prosecutions belief that she was lacking in education. 

Although some of the jurors occupations may have arguably suggested to the prosecutor and the

trial court that they too were lacking in education which may undermine the prosecution’s reason,

none of them would necessarily present an impression particularly similar to that which might be

made when a prosecutor observes that a person (Elizabeth G) is a customer service representative

after eight and one-half years with the same company. More importantly, as discussed infra, this

was not the sole reason given by the prosecution for excuse her. 

In looking at the totality of the evidence, the prosecutor accepted Elizabeth G. many times

prior to her excusal, despite the fact of her apparent lack of education. As Respondents submit,

this strongly suggests that the prosecutor only found her lack of education of concern when

combined with the further observation that she was inattentive during the jury selection process. 

The Court agrees with Respondents’ argument the trial judge could have reasonably inferred that

the prosecutor may not have been solely concerned with the lack of education alone, until it was

coupled with Elizabeth G’s observed inattentiveness prompting her excusal. This is

substantiated by the fact that the prosecutor did not state the lack of education would have been

sufficient standing alone. 

Furthermore, the factual circumstances of the present case are much less drastic than

those present in Miller-El and Kesser. Unlike here, in Miller-El, there was evidence of jury

shuffling and disparate questions regarding the ethnicity of the prospective juror. Miller-El, at

253-263. Further, unlike in Miller-El, there is no evidence of a known practice of the Office of

the Tulare County District Attorney, much less at the time of Petitioner’s trial, that Hispanic

jurors are not to be seated on juries. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 253-254. 

In this case, unlike in Kesser, a review of the prosecutor’s justifications were not tainted

with racial demonstration. In Kesser, the prosecutor struck three prospective Native American

jurors, describing one of them as “darker skinned,” stating that Native Americans who worked

for the tribe were “‘a little more prone to associate themselves with the culture and beliefs of the

tribe than they are with the mainstream system.’” 465 F.3d at 357. The prosecutor expressed his

concern about Native Americans resistence to the criminal justice system and belief that they

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escape the criminal justice system may be more tolerant of child molestation because of their

affiliation with the tribe. Id. In addition, the prosecutor struck the one remaining minority

member of unknown heritage whom he described as “‘brown skinned.’” Id. 

To the contrary, in the instant case, no such evidence exists. Although applying

comparative analysis in the instant case may arguably reveal a slight weakness in the

prosecution’s use of its peremptory challenges, a review of the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the prosecution’s use of the peremptory strike of Elizabeth G., simply does not rise

to the level of demonstrating purposeful discrimination based on racial bias or pretext. The

prosecution’s justifications were clearly stated and were race-neutral. On this record, Petitioners

simply have not shown purposeful discrimination under step three of Batson, and the petition

should be denied. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondents.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 22, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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