Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01128/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01128-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lezley Marisol Pineda, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-01128-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff brought this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

after her application for disability benefits was denied. Doc. 1. The Court reversed 

Defendant’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Doc. 26. 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to 

Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”). Doc. 28. The motion is fully briefed and no 

party has requested oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the 

motion and award Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,282.69. 

 “The EAJA creates a presumption that fees will be awarded to prevailing parties.” 

Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff is a prevailing party 

because this matter was remanded pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 26; see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 301 (1993);

Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court should award 

reasonable attorney’s fees under the EAJA unless Defendant shows that her position in 

this case was “substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 

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28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. A position is substantially 

justified “if it has a reasonable basis in fact and law.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 

552, 566 n.2 (1988). 

 Defendant does not contend that an award of fees in this case would be unjust. 

Nor has she shown that the positions taken in defense of the ALJ’s erroneous decision 

were substantially justified. The Court found that the ALJ committed legal error by 

relying solely on the medical-vocational guidelines, or “grids,” when a vocational 

consultant should have been consulted. Doc. 26 at 8. “The Commissioner’s need for 

efficiency justifies use of the grids at step five where they completely and accurately

represent a claimant’s limitation.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(emphasis in original). Tackett noted that “significant non-exertional impairments . . . 

may make reliance on the [guidelines] inappropriate,” and that “pain can be a nonexertional limitation.” Id. at 1101-02. The Court found that the ALJ failed to address Dr. 

Varns’ report, which indicated that Plaintiff experiences pain that is “moderately severe,” 

that her pain would “frequently” interfere with attention and concentration, and that she 

would “frequently” experience deficiencies of concentration. The Court concluded that 

Dr. Varns’ report might have affected the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s “additional 

limitations have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work.” Doc. 26 

at 7. Because Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations could have impacted Plaintiff’s ability 

to complete “basic mental work-related activities,” and because the ALJ did not explain 

whether or why he disregarded this portion of Dr. Varns’ report, the Court concluded that 

it was not appropriate for the ALJ to rely solely on the grids and that a vocational expert 

should have been consulted. Id. at 7-8. Because the ALJ’s decision did not comport with 

the Ninth Circuit’s requirement for using the grids, Defendant’s position cannot be said to 

have a “reasonable basis in law” and was not substantially justified. 

 Plaintiff’s counsel, Mark Caldwell, has filed an affidavit (Doc. 30) and an 

itemized statement of fees (Doc. 30-1) showing that he worked 36.7 hours on this case. 

Having reviewed the affidavit and the statement of fees, and having considered the 

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relevant fee award factors, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429-30 & n.3 (1983), 

the Court finds that the amount of the requested fee award is reasonable. Pursuant to 

their request, the Court will also award Plaintiff fees for the time required to prepare a 

reply to the Commissioner’s objection to the EAJA fee motion. Doc. 32 at 4. 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. 28) is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff is awarded $7,282.69 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 

 Dated this 1st day of August, 2014. 

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