Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02321/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02321-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 05:704 Labor Litigation

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELLY CARROLL,

Plaintiff,

v.

WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-02321-EMC 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

INTERVENE; AND GRANTING IN 

PART AND DENYING IN PART 

MOTION TO RELATE

Docket Nos. 73, 86

The Court held a hearing on a motion to intervene and a motion to relate on July 21, 2016. 

This order memorializes the Court‟s oral rulings made at the hearing and provides additional 

analysis, as necessary.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Intervene

The motion to intervene is DENIED. Intervention as of right is improper as to seven out 

of the ten proposed intervenors because the seven do not have a significant protectable interest in 

Carroll – i.e., they could not be members of the Carroll class if certified. See Wells Opp‟n at 5 

(noting that seven of the proposed intervenors stopped working for Wells prior to the beginning of 

the Carroll class period, i.e., April 2011). See, e.g., Lee v. The Pep Boys-Manny Moe, No. 12-cv05064-JSC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9753, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016) (indicating that proposed 

intervenor might not have a significant protectable interest in the lawsuit because he “is arguably 

not even a putative member of Plaintiff's proposed UCL class”). 

As for the remaining three, even if they have a significant protectable interest, they are not 

so situated that the disposition of Carroll may as a practical matter impair or impede their ability 

to protect their interest. The three can make objections if and when Ms. Carroll moves to certify; 

Case 3:15-cv-02321-EMC Document 99 Filed 07/22/16 Page 1 of 3
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

they can also object and/or opt out if, e.g., a settlement class is contemplated. See, e.g., Zepeda v. 

Paypal, Inc., No. 10-cv-02500-SBA (JCS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56699, at *20-21 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 23, 2014) (“If the class is certified and Putative Interveners are members of the class, then 

Putative Interveners do have means to protect their interests. That is, they may object to the 

settlement during the hearings on motions for preliminary or final approval, or they may opt out of 

the class and pursue their claims separately.”). Furthermore, the Court orders that counsel for the 

three proposed intervenors be served with all significant motions, including any motion for 

preliminary approval of settlement.

Finally, the Court notes that, at least at this juncture, the three proposed intervenors have 

not shown that Ms. Carroll and/or her counsel cannot adequately represent their interest. Where 

an applicant for intervention and an existing party „have the same ultimate objective, a 

presumption of adequacy of representation arises.‟” Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 

F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 957 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, there is nothing to cast doubt that Ms. Carroll and the proposed intervenors share the same 

ultimate objective. Moreover, nothing shows that Ms. Carroll will not seek the discovery that the 

proposed intervenors have developed or may develop in their cases. 

Although the proposed intervenors have a better case for permissive intervention – there 

appear to be some questions of law or fact in common (e.g., California Labor Code violations 

based on failure to pay for off-the-clock time and meal breaks) – the Court still has discretion to

deny permissive intervention and, here, the adequacy of representation alone is a sufficient ground

to deny permissive intervention.

For the above-stated reasons, the Court denies the motion to intervene. However, the 

Court orders the Carroll parties to keep the proposed intervenors apprised of significant motions 

as noted above.

B. Motion to Relate

The plaintiffs in the two federal cases – Layog v. Wells Fargo, No. C-16-2011 JD (filed on 

April 15, 2016), and Santini v. Wells Fargo, No. C-16-1992 YGR (also filed on April 15, 2016) –

have asked for their cases to be related to Carroll. The Court GRANTS the motion to relate 

Case 3:15-cv-02321-EMC Document 99 Filed 07/22/16 Page 2 of 3
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Layog but DENIES the motion to relate Santini. Because of the overlap in class definitions in 

Layog and Carroll, relation of these cases is sensible. However, there is no such overlap between 

Santini and Carroll; indeed, there seems to be no dispute that the putative class members in 

Santini (phone bankers in Wells Fargo call centers) operate under a different structure than the 

putative class members in Carroll (nonexempt employees who service Wells Fargo customers at 

bank branches).

C. Meet and Confer

Based on the overlap between Layog and Carroll, the Court ordered the parties to meet and 

confer to discuss the possibility of consolidation. In light of this order, the Court defers setting a 

hearing on the motion to dismiss which has been fully briefed in Layog. See generally Layog, 

Docket No. 27 (motion to dismiss). In addition, the Court hereby vacates the class certification 

deadlines previously set in Carroll. During their meet and confer, the parties shall also discuss 

setting new dates for the motion to dismiss (if necessary) and motion for class certification.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to intervene is denied, and the motion to relate is 

granted in part and denied in part.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 73 and 86.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-02321-EMC Document 99 Filed 07/22/16 Page 3 of 3