Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00665/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00665-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FREDERICK JONES, SR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN BURK, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-00665-LJO-YNP PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DENIAL OF MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Doc. 59)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS

Plaintiff Frederick Jones, Sr. (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On June 23, 2009, Defendants filed

a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) based on Plaintiff’s failure

to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Docs. #59-62.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on July 23,

2009. (Doc. #63.) Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition on July 27, 2009. (Doc. #64.) 

Plaintiff filed an “affidavit . . . in support of . . . opposition” on August 14, 2009. (Doc. #66.) This

action proceeds on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint filed on September 8, 2006. (Doc. #14.)

I. Background

This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s September 8, 2006 second amended complaint. On July

24, 2008, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On March 26, 2009, the Court partiallygranted the motion

and ordered that this action proceed on Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against Defendants for the

violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the First 

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Amendment byinterferingwith Plaintiff’sfree exercise of hisreligion. Defendants denied Plaintiff’s

requests for various religious items. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Merced County Jail.

In their second motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Notice of Mot. and Unenumerated Rule 12(b) Mot. to

Dismiss Second Am. Compl. 1:24-27.) Defendants argue that the Merced County Sheriff’s Office

has an administrative grievance system for prisoner complaints. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of

Unenumerated Rule 12(b) Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl. 3:14-16.) Prisoners must first raise

their complaints with the “line staff member.” (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 3:16-

17.) If the problem is not resolved at the staff level, the inmate must submit a written grievance. 

(Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 3:17-19.) If the grievance is not resolved at the staff

level, it is forwarded to the sergeant. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 3:19-20.) The

sergeant may forward the grievance to the commander. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to

Dismiss 3:22.) The commander, who may or may not conduct additional investigation of the

grievance, issues a response. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 3:22-25.) If the inmate

wishes to appeal the commander’s decision, he/she must submit a letter to the undersheriff. (Mem.

of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 3:25-28.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not comply with the inmate grievance process because

Plaintiff’s grievance was processed by the commander but only partially granted. (Mem. of P. & A.

in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 4:1-8.) Plaintiff’s requests for prayer oil, prayer beads, and prayer clay

were denied. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 5-8.) Defendants claim that Plaintiff

did not appeal the commander’s decision by submitting a letter to the undersheriff. (Mem. of P. &

A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 4:8-10.) Defendants conclude that Plaintiff did not exhaust all of his

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 4:11-12.)

Plaintiff filed an opposition on July 23, 2009. Plaintiff argues that he did exhaust because

he did not have a copy of the regulations detailing the Merced County Sheriff’s Office’s

administrative grievance system. (Reply to Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss 2.) Plaintiff claims that

he was not told that he had to abide by the jail’s regulations and was unaware of the existence of any

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regulations detailing the administrative grievance system. (Reply to Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss

2.)

In Defendants’ reply to Plaintiff’s opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s opposition

was untimely and should be disregarded. (Reply to Opp’n to Unenumerated Rule 12(b) Mot. to

Dismiss Second Am. Compl. 1:25-21.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s opposition was mailed on

July 20, 2009, though the proof of service states that it was placed in the mail on July 16, 2009. 

(Reply 1:27-2:1.) By Local Rule, Plaintiff’s opposition was due 21 days after Defendants’ motion

was filed and served. (Reply 2:19-20.) Defendants’ motion was filed and served on June 23, 2009. 

(Reply 2:19.) Plaintiff’s opposition was due on July 14, 2009. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s

ignorance of the jail’s administrative grievance system should not excuse Plaintiff’s failure to pursue

his appeal to the highest levels.

On August 14, 2009, Plaintiff filed an “Affidavit of Fred Jones in Support of 1st Opposition

& Affidavit to Defendant’s 2nd Motion to Dismiss.” Plaintiff’s pleading is a response to

Defendants’ reply. Plaintiff argues that his opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed in a timely

fashion and that he should be excused for being unaware of the jail’s administrative grievance

procedures.

II. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Untimely Opposition

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s opposition should be disregarded because it was filed in an

untimely manner. Defendants’ motion to dismiss was filed and served on June 23, 2009. The local

rules state that an opposition to a motion in a prisoner case must be served and filed “not more than

eighteen (18) days, plus three (3) days for mailing or electronic service.” Local Rule 230(l). 

Plaintiff’s opposition was thus due on July 14, 2009. Plaintiff’s opposition was placed in the mail

on July 16, 2009, making it untimely. However, the Court is unaware of any rule or law that requires

the Court to disregard untimely pleadings. The local rules provide that the failure to file an

opposition or statement of no opposition “may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting

of the motion and may result in the imposition of sanctions.” Local Rule 230(l) (emphasis added). 

Local Rule 110 provides that the “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules or

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with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions

authorized by statute or Rule or within the inherent power of the Court.” The rule does not mandate

any particular form of sanction or any sanction at all. Thus, the Court has discretion to disregard

Plaintiff’s opposition. The Court declines to exercise that discretion, given that the opposition was

only a few days late, that Plaintiff’s incarcerated status undoubtedly limits his ability to prepare and

file pleadings, and the fact that the Court grants extensions of time for pro se prisoner litigants

liberally. Sanctioning Plaintiff by disregarding his opposition would be unduly harsh, as it would

effectively result in the dismissal of this action. Therefore, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s

opposition in ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. However, Plaintiff is forewarned that any

further violations of the local rules may result in harsher sanctions.

B. Plaintiff’s Surreply

Plaintiff has filed an affidavit in response to Defendants’ reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. 

Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ reply is a surreply. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

nor the Local Rules explicitly provide for surreplies. The Local Rules only provide for a motion, an

opposition, and a reply. See Local Rule 230. Plaintiff has not requested permission to file a surreply

bymotion and the Court did not requested a surreply. Thus, Plaintiff’s pleading is improper and will

not be considered in ruling on Defendants’ motion.

C. Failure to Exhaust

1. Failure to Exhaust - Legal Standards

Defendants claim that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing

suit. “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The section 1997e(a)

exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S.

516, 532 (2002). The PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion. Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and

other critical procedural rules. . . .” Id. at 90-91. The proper exhaustion requirement serves two

important purposes: 1) it gives an agency the opportunity to correct its own mistakes before it is

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brought into federal court and it discourages disregard of the agency’s procedures; and 2) it promotes

efficiency because claims can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings

before an agency than in litigation in federal court. Id. at 89.

Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of the relief sought

by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the administrative

process can provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741

(2001). Thus, prisoners cannot evade the exhaustion requirement by limiting their request for relief

to forms of relief that are not offered through administrative grievance mechanisms. Id. (prisoners

cannot skip administrative process by simply limiting prayers for relief to money damages not

offered through administrative grievance mechanisms). Further, prisoners may not cease pursuing

administrative appeals simply because the appeal process does not offer the form of relief that they

seek. “All ‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal

standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (citing Booth v.

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 n.5 (2001)). However, “a prisoner need not press on to exhaust further

levels of review once he has either received all ‘available’ remedies at an intermediate level of

review or been reliably informed by an administrator that no remedies are available.” Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2005).

Section 1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement, but rather, is an affirmative

defense which Defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The failure to exhaust nonjudicial administrative

remedies that are not jurisdictional is subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, rather than a

summary judgment motion. Id. at 1119 (citing Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curium)). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed

issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. If the court concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust

administrative remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Id.

The Ninth Circuit has not yet decided whether exceptions to the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement exist. Ngo v. Woodford, 539 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008). However, other circuits

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have held that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied when prison officials prevent exhaustion from

occurring through misconduct, or fail to respond to a grievance within the policy time limits. See,

e.g. Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir.2008) (“[A]n administrative remedy is not

considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from

availing himself of it.”); Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir.2007) (Courts

are “obligated to ensure any defects in exhaustion were not procured from the action of inaction of

prison officials.”); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir.2006) (administrative remedy not

available if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or use affirmative

misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting); Boyd v. Corrections Corp. of America, 380 F.3d

989, 996 (6th Cir.2004) (“administrative remedies are exhausted when prison officials fail to timely

respond to properly filed grievance”); Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2004)

(inability to utilize inmate appeals process due to prison officials’ conduct or the failure of prison

officials to timely advance appeal may justify failure to exhaust); Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d

1030, 1032 (10th Cir.2002) (the failure to respond to a grievance within the policy time limits

renders remedy unavailable); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.2002) (when prison

officials fail to respond, the remedy becomes unavailable, and exhaustion occurs); Foulk v. Charrier,

262 F.3d 687, 698 (8th Cir.2001) (district court did not err when it declined to dismiss claim for

failure to exhaust where prison failed to respond to grievance); Powe v. Ennis, 177 F.3d 393, 394

(5th Cir.1999) (when a valid grievance has been filed and the state’s time for responding has expired,

the remedies are deemed exhausted); Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir.1998) (when

time limit for prison’s response has expired, the remedies are exhausted); see also Mitchell v. Horn,

318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir.2003) (recognizing that a remedy prison officials prevent a prisoner from

utilizing is not an available remedy); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir.2002) (formal

grievance procedure not available where prison officials told prisoner to wait for termination of

investigation before filing formal grievance and then never informed prisoner of termination of

investigation); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (a remedy prison officials prevent

a prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy).

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2. Plaintiff Has Exhausted All “Available” Administrative Remedies

Defendants claim that the Merced County Sheriff’s Office has an administrative grievance

system in place, and that completion of the administrative grievance system requires a prisoner to

submit a complaint through multiple levels of appeal, the highest level of appeal being submission

to the undersheriff. The requirements of the Merced County Sheriff’s Office’s administrative

grievance system is undisputed. Defendants further claims that Plaintiff’s grievance was only

partially granted by the commander. Plaintiff’s requests for a prayer rug, a copy of the Koran, and

access to a Muslim cleric were granted. Plaintiff’s requests for prayer oil, prayer beads, and prayer

clay were denied. Defendants allege that Plaintiff could have appealed those denials to the

undersheriff. These facts are also undisputed.

However, Plaintiff argues that he was not given notice of the requirements of the Merced

County Sheriff’s Office administrative grievance system and did not know that he could appeal the

commander’s denial to the undersheriff. Plaintiff argues that his administrative remedies should be

deemed exhausted because he was not informed by jail authorities about the availability of further

levels of appeal.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s administrative remedies with respect to his claims based on

the denial of a prayer rug, a copy of the Koran, and access to a Muslim cleric are exhausted. 

Defendants have not raised any argument that any further relief was available after these requests

were granted. Plaintiff was temporarily denied access to these religious items before the commander

granted Plaintiff’s request for them. At trial, Plaintiff may be able to demonstrate that this temporary

denial was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Thus, Plaintiff mayraise a First

Amendment claim based on the temporary denial of these items.

The remaining issue is whetherfurtherremedies remained “available” to Plaintiff if Plaintiff

was unaware that further levels appeal were available to him with respect to his requests for prayer

oil, prayer beads, and prayer clay. From the Court’s research, this appears to be an issue that has not

yet been explicitly addressed by the Ninth Circuit. However, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “a

defendant must demonstrate that pertinent relief remained available” and that “[r]elevant evidence

in so demonstrating would include . . . information provided to the prisoner concerning the operation

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of the grievance procedure. . . .” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“[I]nformation provided to the prisoner is pertinent because itinforms [the] determination of whether

relief was, as a practical matter, ‘available.’” Id. at 937 (emphasis added). The implication from the

Ninth Circuit’s language is that relief is not “available” if its existence is not reasonably apparent

to the prisoner. 

Defendants have not presented any evidence that suggest that Plaintiff should have known

of the full scope of the Merced Sheriff’s Office’s administrative grievance system. Defendants have

not alleged that Plaintiff received documentation explaining all the levels of appeal, nor is there any

indication that Plaintiff’s response from the commander explicitly informed Plaintiff that he may

appeal the commander’s decision by submitting his grievance to the undersheriff. Defendants have

not alleged that Plaintiff had access to any documentation about the administrative grievance

procedure at all.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ignorance of the law is not an excuse, citing Cheek v.

United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. 404 (1833), and United States

v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2000). However, Plaintiff’s failure to submit his grievance to

the undersheriff was not necessarily the product of his ignorance of the law. The law on exhaustion

requires Plaintiff to exhaust all available administrative remedies. Plaintiff may or may not have

been ignorant of the law on exhaustion. What Plaintiff was ignorant of was whether there existed

a higher level of appeal beyond the commander’s response. The existence of this higher level of

appeal is not an issue of law.

The Court finds that Defendants must demonstrate that the availability of administrative

remedies was reasonably apparent to Plaintiff in order to qualify for the failure to exhaust defense. 

A remedy is not “available” if a prisoner has no reasonable way of knowing about its existence. 

Finding otherwise would encourage corrections officials to deliberately promulgate opaque

procedural requirements for filing administrative grievances, intentionallykeep prisoners in the dark

about those requirements, and then claim those prisoners are thereinafter barred from filing suit due

to their inability to follow obscure grievance procedures. In order to demonstrate the failure to 

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exhaust, Defendants must present evidence that relief was, as a practical matter, available to

Plaintiff. Here, Defendants failed to meet that burden.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

The Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that

Plaintiff has exhausted all available administrative remedies. Plaintiff alleges that he exhausted all

remedies that can reasonably be said to be available. Defendants have not adequately rebutted that

allegation.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed

on June 23, 2009, be DENIED.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty days

after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any partymay file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 4, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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