Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00169/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00169-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\MMA\11cv0169-Dismiss FAC.wpd 1 11cv0169 MMA (PCL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES E. MOSES, JR.,

CDCR # K-65174 Civil

No. 

11cv0169 MMA (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

LINDSEY KRAUSE,

Defendant.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 25, 2011, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a

civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

On February 4, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and sua sponte

dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim and for seeking monetary damages against

an immune Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). See Feb. 4, 2011 Order

at 4-5. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the

Case 3:11-cv-00169-MMA-PCL Document 6 Filed 03/18/11 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\MMA\11cv0169-Dismiss FAC.wpd 2 11cv0169 MMA (PCL)

deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. at 5. On March 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed his

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

As the Court stated in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s

amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility

[and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP

complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which

seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A;

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

First, as was the case with Plaintiff’s original Complaint, he appears to be seeking to have

his criminal conviction overturned due to the “malicious acts by the deputy district attorney

Lindsay Krause.” (FAC at 7.) These claims amount to an attack on the constitutional validity

of an underlying state criminal proceeding, and as such, may not be maintained pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 unless and until he can show that conviction has already been invalidated. Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir.

2003) (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state

remedies has no cause of action under § 1983....’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489). 

“In any § 1983 action, the first question is whether § 1983 is the appropriate avenue to

remedy the alleged wrong.” Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (en

banc). A prisoner in state custody simply may not use a § 1983 civil rights action to challenge

the “fact or duration of his confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). The

prisoner must seek federal habeas corpus relief instead. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78

(2005) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489). Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 action “is barred (absent

Case 3:11-cv-00169-MMA-PCL Document 6 Filed 03/18/11 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\MMA\11cv0169-Dismiss FAC.wpd 3 11cv0169 MMA (PCL)

prior invalidation)--no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target

of his suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)--if success in that

action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson,

544 U.S. at 82. 

In this case, Plaintiff’s claims that he was denied due process in his criminal trial

“necessarily imply the invalidity” of his criminal proceedings and continuing incarceration.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. In creating the favorable termination rule in Heck, the Supreme Court

relied on “the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging

the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Heck, 511 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added). This

is precisely what Plaintiff attempts to accomplish here. Therefore, to satisfy Heck’s “favorable

termination” rule, Plaintiff must first allege facts which show that the conviction and/or sentence

which forms the basis of his § 1983 Complaint has already been: (1) reversed on direct appeal;

(2) expunged by executive order; (3) declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

a determination; or (4) called into question by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512

U.S. at 487 (emphasis added).

Once again, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges no facts sufficient to satisfy

Heck. Thus, because Plaintiff seeks damages for allegedly unconstitutional criminal proceedings

in a San Diego Superior Court criminal case, and because he has not shown that his conviction

has been invalidated, either by way of direct appeal, state habeas or pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, a section 1983 claim for damages cannot be maintained, see Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90,

and his Complaint must be dismissed without prejudice. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49

F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that an action barred by Heck has not yet accrued and

thus, must be dismissed without prejudice so that the plaintiff may reassert his § 1983 claims if

he ever succeeds in invalidating the underlying conviction or sentence); accord Blueford v.

Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-00169-MMA-PCL Document 6 Filed 03/18/11 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\MMA\11cv0169-Dismiss FAC.wpd 4 11cv0169 MMA (PCL)

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must be

dismissed sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 5] is DISMISSED without prejudice for

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)

and § 1915A(b). The Court finds further amendment would be futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of

discretion where further amendment would be futile); see also Robinson v. California Bd. of

Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Since plaintiff has not, and cannot,

state a claim containing an arguable basis in law, this action should be dismissed without leave

to amend; any amendment would be futile.”) (citing Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th

Cir. 1996)).

DATED: March 18, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00169-MMA-PCL Document 6 Filed 03/18/11 Page 4 of 4