Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01758/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01758-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOE LENZIE TURNER, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

FELICIA PONCE, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:15-cv-01758-GGH 

ORDER 

Petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus, purportedly pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This matter is before the undersigned 

in accordance with the consent of both parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Currently pending before 

the court is respondent’s motion to dismiss. After careful consideration, the undersigned 

concludes that this court lacks jurisdiction to proceed in this case. However, rather than dismiss, 

the more appropriate outcome is a transfer of this case to the sentencing court which has 

jurisdiction over a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Petitioner filed the petition on August 19, 2015. ECF No. 1. On October 7, 2015, 

petitioner was directed to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court found that the petition was challenging 

the terms and conditions of plaintiff’s confinement, not its fact or duration. Because such claims 

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are more properly brought as Bivens actions, the court ordered petitioner to show cause why the 

petition should not be dismissed without leave to amend. On November 2, 2015, petitioner filed a 

response explaining that the petition was meant to include two claims. First, petitioner claims 

that his custody classification score was calculated in error. And second, petitioner claims that 

his sentence was miscalculated under the Sentencing Guidelines. Both of plaintiff’s claims 

revolve around two separate previous convictions in 2005 and 2006, one in state court and the 

other in federal court. ECF No. 8 at 3. Petitioner alleges that these convictions were essentially 

for the same crime and accordingly, should not be counted twice for the purposes of his custody 

classification score or most recent sentencing. ECF No. 1 at 3, 43. 

In light of this explanation of his claims, the court discharged its order to show cause and 

directed respondent to file a response. ECF No. 10. On March 11, 2016, respondent filed a 

motion to dismiss the petition arguing that the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate either 

of plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 18. On March 28, 2016, petitioner filed a traverse, which the court 

will construe as an opposition to respondent’s motion. See ECF No. 19 at 2 (“Petitioner brings 

this traverse in response to respondent’s motion to dismiss.”). 

BACKGROUND 

Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury in the Eastern District of Missouri in a narcotics 

case in August 2011. United States v. Turner, 1:11-cr-103-JAR-1 (ECF No. 1). On April 2, 

2012, petitioner entered into a plea agreement. ECF (Missouri)No. 608. Under the plea 

agreement petitioner agreed to plead guilty to Count I of the indictment, which charged him with 

violating 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms 

or more of cocaine hydrochloride. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the remaining 

counts of the indictment and instead to file a sentence enhancement for one of the defendant’s 

prior convictions in an earlier federal case. Based on the allegation of a single prior offense, the 

statutory minimum for petitioner’s offense of conviction was 240 months. 21 U.S.C. § 

841(b)(1)(A). If petitioner had been found to have two priors, the statutory minimum would have 

been life imprisonment. § 841(b)(1)(A). Petitioner also agreed that he met the definition of a 

career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. 

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On April 5, 2012, petitioner entered a guilty plea in accordance with his plea agreement. 

ECF (Missouri) No. 607. Prior to sentencing petitioner was evaluated by the U.S. Probation 

Office for the Eastern District of Missouri. The Pre-Sentencing Report (PSR) included 

information on two prior convictions: (1) a Missouri state case for which petitioner was sentenced 

in June 2006; and (2) a July 2005 conviction in a prior federal case, for which he was sentenced 

in November 2005. The PSR concluded that petitioner was a career offender, and since a career 

offender’s criminal history category is VI in every case, the PSR calculated that to be defendant’s 

criminal history category. The sentencing court adopted the findings of the PSR without change 

and found the petitioner’s criminal history score to be VI. ECF (Missouri) No. 1316-2. 

Petitioner was then transferred to the BOP, which began the custody classification 

process. This process involves assigning a prisoner a security point score, which is used to 

identify the type of institution required to house a particular inmate: low, medium, high, or 

administrative security. The point score takes a number of factors into account, including the 

inmate’s offense, prior criminal history, and institutional adjustment. In addition to its initial 

determination the BOP periodically and systematically reviews inmates’ custody classification. 

The BOP’s custody classifications do not affect the length of a prisoner’s sentence. See Vickers 

Declaration, ECF No. 18 at 13 (electronic pagination). 

Petitioner was initially classified in 2013 under the medium category, but the BOP has 

since lowered his classification to low. 

ANALYSIS 

A. Jurisdiction Over Petitioner’s BOP Classification Error Claim 

The court finds that plaintiff’s first claim based on the BOP’s alleged misclassification of 

petitioner is not a proper subject for a habeas corpus action to challenge the fact or duration of his 

confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973); Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 

891-892 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding dismissal of a petition challenging conditions of confinement, 

and noting that the writ of habeas corpus has traditionally been limited to attacks upon the legality 

or duration of confinement). “[H]abeas jurisdiction is absent . . . where a successful challenge to 

a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s sentence. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 

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F.3d 850, 85859 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Here, it is without legitimate dispute that petitioner’s initial, or later modified, 

classification by the BOP does not affect the length of his prison sentence. Hence, there can be 

no habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 2241 for his alleged execution of sentence 

misclassification argument. 

B. Jurisdiction Over Petitioner’s Guidelines Error Claim 

 The undersigned finds that petitioner has not shown that this court in the Eastern District 

of California has jurisdiction over his claim that his 2011 sentence was wrongly calculated. 

Generally, a motion pursuant to § 2255 is the only appropriate vehicle by which to challenge a 

conviction, including the legality of a sentence. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162-63 (9th 

Cir. 1988), (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255); see also Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“In general, § 2255 provides the exclusive procedural mechanism by which a federal 

prisoner may test the legality of detention.”). If the petition is construed as a motion under § 

2255, only the Eastern District of Missouri has jurisdiction. If the petition is correctly brought 

under § 2241 (to attack the execution of sentence as opposed to its legality), the district of 

incarceration, the Eastern District of California, is the proper place to bring the action. 

Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit has also held that 

because of the jurisdictional nature of the § 2255 inquiry, “a court must first determine whether a 

habeas petition is filed pursuant to § 2241 or § 2255 before proceeding to any other issue.” Id. 

No matter how petitioner attempts to frame his argument, he seeks to have modified, 

through a § 2241 habeas proceeding, the 2011 conviction’s imposed sentence. Petitioner alleges 

that in light of the BOP “nunc pro tunc” recognized in 2007, the “imposition of [federal] 

sentence” should have run concurrently with the 2006 state sentence. Petitioner further argues 

that the BOP had the duty to inform the district court in 2011 of this fact. Evidently petitioner 

believes that the 2007 administrative order, assuming that it ever happened and assuming it could 

modify the federal 2005 sentence, somehow effectively expunged his 2005 federal conviction for 

consideration in sentencing actions in 2011. Under petitioner’s interpretation, the “nunc pro 

tunc” order should have reduced his criminal history calculation for purposes of sentencing in 

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2011 from Level VI to Level III , having the effect of potentially reducing his imposed 2011 

sentence by many months. Petitioner does not relate why he did not inform the district court of 

this “fact” during his federal criminal proceedings in 2011; he just blames the BOP. Petitioner 

does not attack the BOP “nunc pro tunc” decision except for this alleged failure to notify in 2011. 

In any event, however argued and whoever’s “fault” it was, petitioner attacks the validity of the 

2011 sentence. Petitioner’s remedy lies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2255 as he attacks the 

validity of the imposed 2011 sentence. 

Thus, jurisdiction does not lie under § 2241, and this action is only properly brought in 

Missouri, unless petitioner qualifies for the sole exception to the rule that § 2241 does not permit 

challenges to a criminal judgment. 

A federal prisoner may contest the legality of his conviction or sentence in a § 2241 

petition only where his remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of 

his detention.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Stephens v. 

Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006). This exception is known as the § 2255 “escape 

hatch.” Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000). Importantly, the remedies 

pursuant to § 2255 are not inadequate simply because the claim would be dismissed under § 2255 

for procedural reasons. Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999). It is a narrow 

exception. Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has held that 

“a motion meets the escape hatch criteria of § 2255 when a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual 

innocence, and (2) has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting that claim.” 

Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 

also Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Petitioner's attempt to seek redress by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 

2241 is fatally flawed based on his failure to show, or even allege, that he is actually innocent of 

the crime of conviction, and did not have an unobstructed procedural opportunity to present his 

claim of innocence. 

“'Actual innocence' means factual innocence, not merely legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. 

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623–24 (1998). To meet this test, the petitioner must show that in 

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light of new and reliable evidence not presented at trial, “it is more likely than not that no 

reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–39 (2006) (prisoner must 

demonstrate that more likely than not, any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt). 

Here, petitioner does not challenge the determination of his guilt. Rather he appears to 

argue that the plea bargain he entered in 2011, and the Missouri court’s sentencing upon its 

receipt, was unlawful because of a prior administrative order affecting the criminal history 

computation for the 2011 sentencing. He has not, therefore, even suggested that his petition 

should be viewed through the prism of an actual innocence standard. 

Moreover, petitioner fails to demonstrate that he did not have an “unobstructed procedural 

shot” at presenting the instant claim. The two factors to consider when assessing whether 

petitioner had an unobstructed procedural opportunity to present his claim of innocence are: (1) 

whether the legal basis for petitioner's claim did not arise until the conclusion of his direct appeal 

and first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the applicable law changed in any relevant 

way after the conclusion of the petitioner's first § 2255 motion. Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 

952, 960 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Thus, because petitioner does not qualify for the escape hatch, this court lacks jurisdiction 

under § 2241 to entertain the petition, and this action must be dismissed. See Stephens, 464 F.3d 

at 899 (affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction where § 2241 petition challenged legality of 

conviction and sentence, and “escape hatch” exception to § 2255 did not apply). The procedural 

relief petitioner seeks must be sought in the court of his conviction, not here.1

 

1

 Petitioner also believes that this court may act pursuant to section 702 of the Administrative 

Procedures Act as he alleges that the BOP acted contrary to law governing its actions. With 

respect to the issue addressed in this section, the court is hard pressed to understand how any 

agency action affected petitioner in some unlawful way. In any event, while the APA may be 

susceptible for consideration in a case whose entire focus is on alleged unlawful agency action, 

see e.g., Kirk v. White, 627 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Va. 1986) (parole issue administered entirely by 

the Parole Commission), it is of no use in an action, seeking a shorter incarceration, whose focus 

is to attack the legality of a court imposed sentence. See United States v. Richardson, 2014 WL 

1371546,*3 W.D. Pa. 2014 (petitioner cannot avoid the proscriptions of § 2255 by labeling his 

action as one under the APA); Perez v. Lappin, 672 F. Supp. 2d 35, 44 (D.D.C. 2009). 

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CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the petition, construed as one made pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255, be transferred2 to the Eastern District of Missouri as the Eastern District of 

California lacks jurisdiction.3

Dated: May 23, 2016 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

/GGH17; turn1758.dism 

 

2

 An improperly brought § 2255 motion may be dismissed or transferred to the district court 

which would have had jurisdiction over the §2255 motion if initially brought there. Diaz v. 

United States, 2009 WL 541573 (E.D. Cal. 2009). The court is not aware that petitioner has filed 

any § 2255 motion previously; thus it appears that the Missouri court may have jurisdiction. In 

any event, if it does not, the Missouri district court can so hold. Moreover, since any AEDPA 

limitations argument is an affirmative defense, the undersigned will not take that into 

consideration here. See Diaz. 

3

 The undersigned expresses no opinion on the validity of petitioner’s arguments, or whether a 

§ 2255 motion would be considered successive or timely. 

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