Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_03-cv-01223/USCOURTS-almd-3_03-cv-01223-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

 ) 

v ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:03CV1223-MHT

 ) [WO]

GREGORY HOLLIS DAVIS )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court on a motion by federal inmate GREGORY HOLLIS

DAVIS [“Davis”] to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On 12 July 2000, in accordance with a plea agreement, Davis entered a conditional

guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug

trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Davis retained the right to appeal

the district court’s ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence that was seized from his

vehicle following his detention at a roadblock. On 11 July 2001, the district court entered

judgment and sentenced Davis to consecutive sentences of 78 months for the distribution

conviction and 60 months for the firearm conviction.

Davis appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. On

19 April 2002, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court had properly

denied the motion to suppress and affirmed Davis’s conviction and sentence. See United

Case 3:03-cv-01223-MHT-VPM Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 1 of 10
2

States v. Davis, 288 F.3d 1263 (11 Cir. 2002). The United States Supreme Court denied

th

Davis’s petition for a writ of certiorari on 16 December 2002. See Davis v. United States,

537 U.S. 1094 (2002).

On 15 December 2003, Davis filed this § 2255 motion. He later amended the motion

to raise an additional claim. The matter is now before this court on the § 2255 motion, as

amended. Davis asserts the following claims:

1. He is actually innocent of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).

2. His counsel rendered ineffective by advising him to plead guilty

to violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 

3. His counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by

failing to raise a claim under Apprendi v. New Jersey, so that he

might ultimately qualify for relief under United States v.

Booker.

The government responds that Davis’s claims are without merit and entitle him to no

relief. In addition, the government argues that Davis’s claim regarding counsel’s alleged

ineffectiveness for failing to raise Apprendi at sentencing – which Davis first presented in

his amended § 2255 motion – is untimely and should not be considered. Davis was afforded

an opportunity to respond to the government’s submission. After consideration of the §

2255 motion as amended, the submissions supporting and opposing the motion, and the

record in this case, the court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary and that,

pursuant to Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States

District Courts, the motion should be denied.

Case 3:03-cv-01223-MHT-VPM Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 2 of 10
 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) makes it an offense to either (1) use or carry a firearm during and in 1

relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime or (2) possess a firearm in furtherance of

such crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The pre-1998 version of the statute, however, made it an

offense only to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime. The Bailey

decision’s narrow interpretation of “use” under § 924(c)(1) prompted Congress to amend the statute

in 1998 to add language directed to possessing a firearm “in furtherance of” the predicate crime.

See United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11 Cir. 2002). The events that led to the th

charges to which Davis pleaded guilty occurred well after the 1998 revision of the statute.

3

II. DISCUSSION

A. Actual Innocence as to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) Firearm Conviction

Davis asserts that he actually innocent of the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) firearm

conviction. See “Memorandum of Law in Support of § 2255 Motion” (Doc. # 2) at 9-15.

He argues that he merely possessed a firearm while in a vehicle containing drugs and that,

under Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), such actions do not establish criminal

liability under § 924(c)(1). Id. at 10. In Bailey, the Supreme Court held that a conviction

under the “use” prong of § 924(c)(1) requires the government to demonstrate “active

employment” of the firearm, not its mere possession, during and in relation to the predicate

crime. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143-44. 1

To establish actual innocence, a defendant must demonstrate that, “in light of all the

evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.”

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995) (citations omitted). “Actual innocence means

factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 615

Case 3:03-cv-01223-MHT-VPM Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 3 of 10
4

(1998).

Because Davis pleaded guilty to an indictment alleging that he “did knowingly use

and carry a firearm” (emphasis added), the government was only required to prove either

that he used the firearm during and in relation to the drug trafficking crime or that he carried

the firearm during and in relation to that crime, not both. See United States v. Timmons, 283

F.3d 1246, 1252 (11 Cir. 2002); see also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420-21 th

(1970). 

For purposes of § 924(c)(1), the phrase “carries a firearm” applies “to a person who

knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove

compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies.” Muscarello v. United States,

524 U.S. 125, 126-27 (1998); see also United States v. Frye, 402 F.3d 1123, 1128 (11 Cir.

th

2005) (“A defendant carries a firearm if it is carried directly on his person or carried in his

vehicle.”). To prove the “in relation to” requirement, the government must demonstrate that

the firearm had “some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its

presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence.” Smith v. United

States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993). “The gun at least must facilitate, or have the potential of

facilitating, the drug trafficking offense. Id. (citations and internal punctuation omitted). See

also Frye, supra, 402 F.3d at 1128.

The record reflects that Davis was arrested on the charges to which he pleaded guilty

after his vehicle was stopped at a Lee County roadblock set up by an inter-governmental

Case 3:03-cv-01223-MHT-VPM Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 4 of 10
 In assessing Davis’s actual innocence claim, this court considers all evidence in the record, and 2

not merely the evidence presented during the plea colloquy. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.

614, 624-25 (1998).

5

drug enforcement task force. At the guilty plea colloquy, Davis admitted that he had a

distributable quantity (69.53 grams) of methamphetamine in his possession at the time of his

arrest; he also acknowledged that he was carrying a twelve-gauge shotgun in his vehicle at

the same time. See “United States’ Response to § 2255 Motion” (Doc. # 15) Exh. B, Plea

Transcript, at 21-22. 

Evidence presented at Davis’s suppression hearing established that the shotgun, which

was found on the front seat of his vehicle, was loaded and had been fitted with a collapsible

stock, pistol grip, and laser sight. See Crim. Case No. 3:00CR70-MHT: Suppression 2

Hearing (21 June 2000) at 7 & 16-20; see also United States v. Davis, 143 F.Supp.2d 1302,

1304 n.3 (11 Cir. 2001). In the opinion of one officer, the shotgun, though legal, had been th

modified for personal protection. See Suppression Hearing at 20; Davis, 143 F.Supp.2d at

1304 n.3. Testimony further indicated that the methamphetamine recovered during Davis’s

arrest was packaged in plastic bags that officers found protruding from the pockets of a

leather jacket folded across the shotgun on the front seat of Davis’s vehicle. See Suppression

Hearing at 7-9 &14-16; Davis, 143 F.Supp.2d at 1304. Officers also recovered from inside

the vehicle two propane tanks and some plastic tubing of the sort commonly associated with

the manufacture of methamphetamine. See Suppression Hearing at 9-10; Davis, 143

F.Supp.2d at 1304.

Case 3:03-cv-01223-MHT-VPM Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 5 of 10
 Because, for purposes of § 924(c)(1), Davis “carried” the firearm by conveying it in his vehicle, 3

see Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126-27; Frye, 402 F.3d at 1128, the interpretation of “use” set forth in

Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143-44, is arguably beside the point in an assessment of Davis’s actual innocence

claim. 

6

Because of all the facts established at the guilty plea colloquy and the suppression

hearing, Davis is unable to demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable

juror would have convicted him” of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug

trafficking crime. Schlup, supra, 513 U.S. at 327-28. Davis carried a loaded, modified

shotgun on the front seat of his vehicle while transporting a distributable quantity of drugs.3

A reasonable inference would be that the gun at least had the potential of facilitating the drug

trafficking offense. Accordingly, Davis is not entitled to relief based on his claim that he

actually innocent of the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) firearm conviction.

B. Counsel’s Ineffectiveness for Allowing Guilty Plea to § 924(c)(1) Charge

Davis alleges that his counsel rendered ineffective by advising him to plead guilty to

violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) when he was actually innocent of that offense. See

“Memorandum of Law in Support of § 2255 Motion” (Doc. # 2) at 15-18. However, because

this court has rejected the substantive claim underlying this allegation, Davis’s argument that

counsel was ineffective in this regard is futile. Because Davis fails to show that counsel’s

performance was deficient or that he suffered resulting prejudice with respect to this

allegation of ineffective assistance, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89

(1984), he is not entitled to any relief based on this claim.

Case 3:03-cv-01223-MHT-VPM Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 6 of 10
 Davis appears to concede that he would not have been entitled to any relief under Apprendi 4

itself.

7

C. Claim Raised in Amendment to § 2255 Motion

On 22 June 2005, Davis filed an amendment to his original § 2255 motion. See

“Supplement to Pending 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion” (Doc. # 8). The amendment contains

an additional claim for relief. Specifically, Davis contends that his counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim at sentencing under Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), so that Davis might ultimately qualify for relief under United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 

In this regard, Davis maintains that if counsel had raised Apprendi at his sentencing,

the appeal in his case would have been prolonged long enough to prevent finalization of his

conviction for another two years, so that he might ultimately benefit from Booker’s remedial

holding that the Sentencing Guidelines must be considered as advisory rather than

mandatory. 

4

The government’s response argues that this claim fails to relate back sufficiently to

the claims raised in Davis’s original § 2255 motion and is, as a consequence, untimely under

the one-year period of limitation provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The government also

argues that the claim lacks merit.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) provides that “[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the

Case 3:03-cv-01223-MHT-VPM Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 7 of 10
8

date of the original pleading when ... the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading

arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in

the original pleading.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2). “‘Relation back’ causes an otherwise

untimely claim to be considered timely by treating it as if it had been filed when the timely

claims were filed.” Davenport v. United States, 217 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11 Cir. 2000).

th

 Davis’s conviction became final on 16 December 2002 – the date on which the

Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. See Washington v. United States,

243 F.3d 1299, 1300-01 (11 Cir. 2001) (a conviction is final on the day the Supreme Court th

denies a convicted defendant’s certiorari petition or renders a decision on the merits). 

Accordingly, Davis had until 16 December 2003 to file a § 2255 motion that was

timely under § 2255’s one-year period of limitation. He filed his § 2255 motion on 15

December 2003. Therefore, the claims in his original § 2255 motion were timely raised. His

amended motion, however, was filed on 22 June 2005 – more than 18 months after § 2255’s

one-year deadline had expired. Thus, his new claim is untimely under the one-year period

of limitation and is barred unless it “relates back” under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c).

Davis’s new claim – that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

raise an Apprendi claim at sentencing and prolonging his appeal so that he might later benefit

from Booker – bears no legal or factual relationship to any of the claims contained in his

original § 2255 motion. “Congress did not intend rule 15(c) to be so broad as to allow an

amended pleading to add an entirely new claim based on a different set of facts.” Pruitt v.

Case 3:03-cv-01223-MHT-VPM Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 8 of 10
9

United States, 274 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11 Cir. 2001). Thus, Davis’s new claim does not th

“relate back” under Rule 15(c) and is barred because it is untimely under § 2255’s one-year

period of limitation. See Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1215-16 (11 Cir. 2003);

th

Pruitt, 274 F.3d at 1319.

As the government also correctly argues, in addition to being time-barred, Davis’s

new claim lacks merit, because there is obviously no certainty that raising an Apprendi claim

would have prolonged the appeal process and delayed a final ruling on Davis’s conviction

– long enough for him to benefit from the Booker decision.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion filed by Davis be denied, as the claims therein entitle him to no relief.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before 7 June 2006. A party must specifically identify the findings in the Recommendation

to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be

considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings

and recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court

of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal

factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error

Case 3:03-cv-01223-MHT-VPM Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 9 of 10
10

or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v.

th

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

th

661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en banc). th

Done this 24 day of May, 2006. th

/s/ Vanzetta Penn McPherson

VANZETTA PENN MCPHERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 3:03-cv-01223-MHT-VPM Document 19 Filed 05/24/06 Page 10 of 10