Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00020/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00020-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DEBORAH DECOTEAU, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FCA US LLC (f/k/a/ Chrysler Group 

LLC), a Delaware limited liability 

company, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-00020-MCE-EFB 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Through this class action, Plaintiffs Deborah DeCoteau and Lilliana Navia 

(“Plaintiffs”) bring claims under various consumer protection statutes against Defendant 

FCA US LLC (f/k/a/ Chrysler Group LLC) (“Defendant”). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege 

that they are entitled to declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief because Defendant 

knowingly manufactured and marketed vehicles known as “Dodge Darts” (hereafter, the 

“Dart”) that were equipped with defective transmissions. Presently before the Court are 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for failure to 

state a claim (“Motion to Dismiss”) and Motion to Strike Request for Recall (“Motion to 

Strike”). ECF Nos. 20-21. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs 

must allege specific facts to support their conclusion that their vehicles were defective in 

order to adequately state a claim. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to 

Case 2:15-cv-00020-MCE-EFB Document 29 Filed 11/10/15 Page 1 of 8
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Dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC with leave to amend. As a result, the Court 

need not consider the remaining arguments set forth in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or 

its Motion to Strike.1 

BACKGROUND2

 

Defendant designs and manufactures motor vehicles for sale in the United States 

and throughout the world. One such vehicle is the Dart. In 2012, Defendant began 

manufacturing and marketing Darts that were equipped with Dual Dry-Clutch 

Transmissions (“DDCT”). Defendant characterized the DDCT as a “best of both worlds” 

transmission that combined a manual transmission’s fuel efficiency with an automatic 

transmission’s ease of operation. Traditional manual transmissions require the driver to 

press a foot pedal to manually change gears. Typical automatic transmissions, on the 

other hand, obviate the need for manual shifting by substituting a torque converter for 

the use of a manual clutch. The torque converter transmits power from the engine to the 

transmission through a fluid medium. Since a clutch-operated gearbox transfers power 

from the engine more efficiently than a torque converter, automatic transmissions are 

generally less fuel efficient and slower-shifting than their manual counterparts. The 

DDCT uses two computerized “dry” clutches instead of a torque converter to directly 

engage and disengage the engine from the transmission, theoretically providing both 

greater convenience and increased fuel efficiency. 

Plaintiffs are California citizens, each of whom purchased a Dart equipped with a 

DDCT primarily for personal, family, or household use. Within a year of purchase, 

Plaintiffs noticed that their Darts would sometimes surge forward or hesitate before 

taking off from a stop. Approximately a year and-a-half after she purchased her Dart, 

 1

 Because the Court determined that oral argument would not be of material assistance, it ordered 

the matters submitted on the briefs pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). 

2

 The following recitation of facts is taken from Plaintiffs’ FAC (ECF No. 17). 

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Plaintiff DeCoteau experienced a problem in which the vehicle stopped moving while she 

was driving, as though it was stuck in park or neutral, although the engine continued to 

run. Plaintiff Navia similarly experienced rough and jerking transmission shifts. In 

addition, she contends that when she stopped her Dart, the vehicle would automatically 

move backward. According to Plaintiffs, “one or more design and/or manufacturing 

defects” contained in the DDCT caused these and a host of other problems.3 Because 

these problems severely affect a driver’s ability to control speed, acceleration, and 

deceleration, Plaintiffs contend they present a safety hazard to DDCT-equipped Dart 

occupants. The Transmission Defect also purportedly causes premature wear to the 

DDCT and related components. 

Each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action depends on the existence of the Transmission 

Defect. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is thus GRANTED because that defect is 

inadequately pled.

STANDARD 

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 

detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of 

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

 3

 Plaintiffs refer to the potentially numerous design and/or manufacturing defects as the 

“Transmission Defect.” The Court will adopt Plaintiff’s usage hereafter. 

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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the 

pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a 

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)). 

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 

to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 

the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing Wright & 

Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their 

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” 

Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge 

that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and 

unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

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185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 

“the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, 

Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 

1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 

constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)). 

ANALYSIS 

This case presents a close question regarding the level of factual specificity 

necessary to plead claims based on product defects. Defendant argues that the FAC 

should be dismissed because the conclusory allegation that Plaintiffs’ Darts have 

“defective transmissions” fails to plausibly establish the existence of a defect or connect 

such a defect to the harm Plaintiffs suffered. ECF No. 21 at 8-9. To that end, Defendant 

contends that Plaintiffs have failed to allege how a specific defect within the transmission 

caused the “symptoms” Plaintiffs purportedly experienced. ECF No. 21 at 9. Plaintiffs 

oppose Defendant’s Motion, of course, asserting that they are not required to plead the 

precise mechanical details of an alleged defect in order to state a claim. ECF No. 23 at 

4-6. Plaintiffs further argue that their allegations concerning the Transmission Defect are 

more than sufficient to permit Defendant to effectively defend itself since Defendant has 

superior information regarding the design, manufacturing, and operation of the DDCT. 

See id. at 4. 

The Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed the level of detail necessary under 

these circumstances. Nor is there any consensus at the district level. Compare 

Aguilar v. General Motors, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-00437, 2013 WL 5670888 at *7 (finding 

allegation of a “steering defect that can result in potential failure of power 

teering . . . and loss of steering control during the normal course of driving” sufficient to 

survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)), with Fontalvo ex rel. Fontalvo v. Sikorsky Aircraft 

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Corp., 2013 WL 4401437 at *4 (dismissing cause of action because Plaintiff failed to 

allege what particular component was defective or what aspects of the component’s 

design and manufacture made it defective). 

For instant purposes, however, the Court finds the decision in Yagman v. General 

Motors to be the most directly on point. No. CV-14-4696, 2014 WL 4177295 at (C.D. 

Cal. Aug. 22, 2014). In Yagman, a plaintiff alleged that his vehicle’s engine stopped 

running and experienced a complete electrical shutdown. Id. at *2. Testing did not 

reveal any problems, but the engine eventually broke down again. Id. That court 

reasoned that injuries caused by a defect, as alleged in the complaint, are different from 

a defect itself, which was not identified. Id. at 3. According to that court, the fact that the 

vehicle’s engine stopped working and that the vehicle experienced a total electrical 

failure were symptoms of a defect rather than actual defects themselves. Id. at 3. More 

specifically, the fact that the engine failed made it possible that the failure was the result 

of a defect, but the failure itself did not plausibly lead to the conclusion that a defect was 

the cause. Id. The court therefore dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, 

instructing the plaintiff that the amended complaint “should set forth the specific facts on 

which Plaintiff bases his belief that a defect” caused the harm he suffered. Id. 

Here, Plaintiffs’ FAC contains the same infirmities as the complaint in Yagman. 

Plaintiffs allege generally that there must be one or more defects in the DDCT and assert 

that those defects cause various injuries. ECF No. 17 at ¶ 14. Plaintiffs do not, 

however, allege actual facts that make the existence of either a design or manufacturing 

defect plausible. 

The Court does not necessarily expect all plaintiffs to have to “plead the 

mechanical details” of a defect in order to state a claim. See Cholakyan v. MercedesBenz USA, LLC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1237 n.60 (C.D. Cal. 2011). However, the level 

of specificity required appears to directly correlate to the complexity of the machinery in 

question. See, e.g., Yagman, 2014 WL 4177295 at *2 (requiring more detailed factual 

allegations where either engine or electrical system could have possibly been defective); 

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Fontalvo, 2013 WL 4401437 at *4 (allegations about a “wide array of parts” that made 

helicopter defective were insufficient to state claims for strict products liability, 

negligence, and breach of warranty). In a challenge regarding a less complex 

component, allegations similar to Plaintiffs’ might be sufficient. See Aguilar, 2013 WL 

5670888 at *7 (allegation of a “steering defect” was sufficient to survive a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim). In this case, however, Plaintiffs must go further than 

a conclusory allegation that the Transmission Defect exists and is responsible for the 

injuries outlined in the FAC because automatic transmissions, including the DDCT, are 

complicated systems that demand more detailed factual allegations in order to identify a 

plausible defect. Given the complexity of the DDCT, Plaintiffs must allege the specific 

facts that plausibly support their belief in the existence of a defect for which Defendant is 

responsible in order to give Defendant sufficient notice to defend against their claims. In 

doing so, Plaintiffs must also plausibly connect the existence of the alleged defect to the 

injuries they claim to have suffered.4

 Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is 

GRANTED with leave to amend. 

Because Plaintiffs’ failure to plausibly allege the existence of a defect requires 

dismissal of the FAC in its entirety, the Court declines to consider Defendant’s other 

arguments in support of its Motion. For the same reason, the Motion to Strike is 

DENIED as moot. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 21) is 

GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiffs are directed to file an amended complaint no 

/// 

 4

 In amending the FAC, Plaintiffs need not choose between their manufacturing and design defect 

theories of liability. Despite Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs must allege either a design or 

manufacturing defect (ECF No. 26 at 4), the Court is unaware of any authority that would prevent Plaintiffs 

from proceeding on both theories so long as they are plausibly stated. 

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later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order. Defendant’s Motion to Strike (ECF 

No. 20) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 9, 2015 

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