Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05265/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05265-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN M. MITCHELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

T. FOSS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-05265-JD 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff has filed an amended 

complaint.

DISCUSSION

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se 

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed 

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factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations 

omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face” 

standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement 

to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by 

the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was 

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

LEGAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff states that he tripped in a pot-hole on the prison yard and received inadequate 

medical care for a broken foot. The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but 

neither does it permit inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The 

treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to 

scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). In its 

prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment,” the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison 

officials, who may not, for example, use excessive force against prisoners. See Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who 

must provide all prisoners with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter, 

sanitation, medical care and personal safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. A prison official 

violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must 

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be, objectively, sufficiently serious, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson 

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)), and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable 

state of mind, id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX 

Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of 

“deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the 

prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need. Id. at 1059. 

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. The existence of 

an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or 

treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 

activities, or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a 

prisoner has a serious need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate 

it. Farmer at 837. The prison official must not only “be aware of facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but also “must also draw the 

inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but did not actually know, 

the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. 

County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A difference of opinion between a 

prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 

claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). In addition, “mere delay of 

surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference.... 

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[Prisoner] would have no claim for deliberate medical indifference unless the denial was harmful.” 

Shapely v. Nevada Bd. Of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985).

Plaintiff states that on September 12, 2017, while on the prison yard he stepped into a pothole and fell breaking his foot. Plaintiff first argues that several defendants are liable for creating 

an unsafe environment by being aware of the pot-hole and failing to fix it. Plaintiff has failed to 

present a constitutional violation. While plaintiff may be able to demonstrate negligence, he has 

not shown that the pot-hole was sufficiently serious and that defendants possessed a sufficiently 

culpable state of mind to state an Eighth Amendment violation. This claim is dismissed with 

prejudice.

Plaintiff was scheduled for surgery at an outside hospital, Natividad Medical Center, on 

October 26, 2017, approximately six weeks after the injury. Plaintiff states that Dr. Kushiba, a 

doctor at Natividad Medical Center, postponed the surgery until November 21, 2017, and then 

until December 22, 2017. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Kushiba and several unidentified defendants 

were deliberately indifferent by delaying the surgery. However, plaintiff has failed to identify any 

defendants at the prison or specifically describe how the delay violated his constitutional rights. 

The Court notes that “mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of 

deliberate medical indifference.... [Prisoner] would have no claim for deliberate medical 

indifference unless the denial was harmful.” Shapely, 766 F.2d at 407. 

The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information concerning 

why the delay was harmful and how it violated his Eighth Amendment rights. In addition, 

plaintiff must specifically identify the defendants at the prison and describe how they violated his 

constitutional rights. Finally, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that 

the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. Dr. 

Kushiba appears to be a private citizen doctor employed at Natividad Medical Center. Plaintiff 

must present allegations that this defendant was acting under the color of state law. Plaintiff also 

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states that unidentified defendants took him off pain medication within two weeks of them being 

prescribed. He must also identify these defendants and describe how their actions were 

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

CONCLUSION

1. The amended complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. The second 

amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this order is filed and 

must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces 

the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik 

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the 

original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the 

dismissal of this case.

2. It is the plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 

Court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice 

of Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to 

do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2019

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN M. MITCHELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

T. FOSS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-05265-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on April 16, 2019, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing 

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Ruben M. Mitchell ID: BB-7076

CSP- Lancaster

P.O. Box 8457

Lancaster, CA 93539 

Dated: April 16, 2019

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

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