Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01536/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01536-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARREN SANDERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARTIN BITER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01536-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS PETITION AS UNTIMELY; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Re: Dkt. No. 12

Petitioner, a pro se prisoner, has filed this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition as untimely.1Petitioner has not

filed an opposition, and the deadline to do so has long since passed.

BACKGROUND

On January 7, 1999, in Santa Clara County Superior Court, a jury found Petitioner guilty 

of two counts of first-degree burglary. Docket No. 1 (“Pet.”) at 1 and Docket No. 12 at 5–6. In 

March 1999, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to nineteen years and eight months in state prison.

Docket No. 12 at 9–10. 

On June 9, 2000, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s judgment on appeal 

in an unpublished decision. Docket No. 12 at 5–21. On August 23, 2000, the California Supreme 

Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Id. at 23.

 

1

Petitioner initially named Martin Biter as the respondent in this action. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases 

Under Section 2254, Christian Pfeiffer, the current warden of Kern Valley State Prison, where 

Petitioner is incarcerated, is hereby SUBSTITUTED as Respondent in place of the previously 

named respondent.

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On June 25, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Santa Clara

County Superior Court, Docket No. 16, Ex. 1, which was denied on July 29, 2014, id., Ex. 2. On 

September 10, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court 

of Appeal, id., Ex. 3, which was denied on October 30, 2014, id., Ex. 4. On January 5, 2015, 

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, id., Ex. 5,

which was denied on January 21, 2015, id., Ex. 6.

The instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed on March 17, 2015.2 

Docket No. 1-3 at 43. Petitioner raises five claims for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of both trial 

counsel and appellate counsel; (2) suggestive lineup violated his due process rights; (3) mistaken 

identity / actual innocence; (4) insufficient evidence of intent; and (5) insufficient evidence of 

burglar’s identity.

DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposed for the 

first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 

As a general rule, petitions filed by prisoners challenging noncapital state convictions or sentences 

must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which the judgment became final after the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). “Direct review” includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for 

a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually 

files such a petition. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, if a 

petitioner fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, AEDPA’s oneyear limitations period begins to run on the date the ninety-day period defined by Supreme Court 

 

2 Although the petition was stamped “filed” at the Court on April 3, 2015, the petition has a 

signature date of March 17, 2015, Docket No. 1 at 17, and the proof of service also has a signature 

date of March 17, 2015, Docket No. 1-3 at 43. As a pro se prisoner, Petitioner receives the benefit 

of the prisoner mailbox rule, which deems most documents filed when the prisoner gives them to 

prison officials to mail to the court. See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 

2003). The Court will assume he gave the petition to prison officials for mailing on the date he 

signed the proof of service, and deem the federal petition filed as of that date.

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Rule 13 expires. See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (where petitioner 

did not file petition for certiorari, his conviction became final 90 days after the California Supreme 

Court denied review); Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1159 (same). 

Here, because Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme 

Court, Petitioner’s judgment became final on November 21, 2000, ninety days after the state 

supreme court denied review on August 23, 2000. Petitioner therefore had one year, or until 

November 21, 2001, to file his federal habeas petition. The instant petition was filed March 17, 

2015, nearly thirteen years and four months after the limitations period expired. The instant 

petition is therefore untimely unless Petitioner is entitled to either (1) statutory tolling of the oneyear limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); (2) delayed commencement of the 

limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D); (3) equitable tolling of the 

limitations period; or (4) the “miscarriage of justice” exception.

1. Statutory Tolling

Section 2244(d)(2) provides for tolling of the one-year statute of limitations for the “time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, Petitioner 

has filed habeas petitions in state court. 

However, a state habeas petition filed after AEDPA’s statute of limitations ended cannot 

toll the limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before 

the state petition was filed,” even if the state petition was timely filed) (holding that Oregon’s twoyear limitations period for the filing of state habeas petitions does not alter the operation of 

AEDPA, even though prisoners who take full advantage of the two-year period will forfeit their 

right to federal habeas review); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). In 

other words, Section 2244(d)(2) cannot “revive” the limitations period once it has run (i.e., restart 

the clock to zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. See, e.g., Rashid v. 

Khulmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Once the limitations period is expired, 

collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid the statute of limitations.”). 

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Petitioner’s state habeas petition was filed on June 25, 2014, over thirteen and a half years 

after the limitations period expired. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to statutory tolling of the 

limitations period under section 2244(d)(1).

2. Delayed Commencement

Section 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) allows for delayed commencement of the limitations period to 

the date when (B) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action 

was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (C) the constitutional right asserted 

was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court 

and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual predicate of the claim could 

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). 

Petitioner alleges that his delay in raising the claims in the instant petition was due to the 

following factors: (1) his lack of education; (2) his unfamiliarity with the legal system; (3) lack of 

funds to hire an attorney; (4) lack of access to the prison law library due to lockdowns; (5) being 

brainwashed into believing that he was guilty; and (6) mental health issues from 1999 to 2009. 

Docket No. 1-1 at 12–13. None of these factors entitle Petitioner to delayed commencement of the 

filing period pursuant to Section 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

Subsections B and C do not apply because Petitioner does not assert that unconstitutional 

state action prevented him from filing or that the constitutional rights asserted in this petition are 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court.

Nor is Petitioner entitled to delayed commencement of the limitations period under 

subsection D. With the exception of his mental health issues, none of these factors prevented 

Petitioner from exercising due diligence and discovering the factual predicate of his habeas claims. 

Indeed, Petitioner was ultimately able to file the instant petition even though there was no change 

in his level of education, his familiarity with the legal system, his financial status, or his access to 

the prison law library. Similarly, Petitioner’s belief that he was guilty, even if mistaken, did not 

prevent him from exercising due diligence to discover the claims alleged in the instant petition. 

The facts supporting his claims — the suggestiveness of the lineup; his purchase of the stolen 

items off the street; his appearance being inconsistent with the description of the burglar given by 

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the witness; the witness’ inconsistent testimony — were all facts known to him at the time of trial. 

In essence, Petitioner is arguing that he was unaware of the significance of these facts until after 

he realized his innocence. However, the limitations period under subsection D begins “‘when the 

prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner 

recognizes their legal significance.’” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000)) (remanding case to district court for 

further factual findings concerning determination of when, with exercise of due diligence, 

petitioner could have discovered facts to support prejudice prong of IAC claim). 

A petitioner’s mental health issues may entitle him to delayed commencement of the 

limitations period under subsection D. Cf. Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(“Although section 2244(d)(1)(D)’s due diligence requirement is an objective standard, a court 

also considers the petitioner’s particular circumstances.”); Moore v. Knight, 368 F.3d 936, 940 

(7th Cir. 2004) (“a due diligence inquiry should take into account that prisoners are limited by 

their physical confinement”). However, Petitioner states that his mental health issues were 

resolved in 2009. Assuming arguendo that Petitioner’s mental health issues entitled him to 

delayed commencement of the limitations period under subsection D and that Petitioner’s mental 

health issues were resolved by June 9, 2009,

3

the limitations period would have started on June 10, 

2009, and expired on June 10, 2010. The instant habeas petition, filed on March 17, 2015, is still 

untimely.4 

3. Equitable Tolling

 

3

Petitioner’s mental health records indicate that on June 9, 2009, Petitioner was discharged from 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Mental Health Services Delivery 

System and, at that time, had been free of psychotropic medications for six months. 

4

The Court notes that Petitioner has only made a conclusory statement that he suffered from 

mental health issues from 1999 to 2009. Although Petitioner has attached some prison mental 

health records to his petition, Docket No. 1-2 at 5–12, these records are inconclusive as to the 

extent of Petitioner’s mental health issues and whether they would have prevented him from 

exercising due diligence to determine the factual predicate of his habeas claims. The records state 

generally that Petitioner met the criteria for mental health treatment; that he was prescribed 

psychotropic medications; and that he was observed for suicide prevention in 2004. See id. But 

the records also indicate that his comprehension was adequate in 2003, which would imply that his 

mental health issues would not have prevented him from exercising due diligence and researching 

his habeas claims. See id. at 6. 

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For similar reasons, the factors cited by Petitioner do not entitle him to equitable tolling 

either. The Supreme Court has determined that § 2244(d), AEDPA’s statute of limitations, is 

subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

However, equitable tolling applies only where a petitioner makes a showing that (1) he has been

pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) “extraordinary circumstances” beyond his control prevented 

him from timely filing. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649; accord Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1153 (9th Cir. 2006). 

As discussed supra in Section A.2, there has been no change in Petitioner’s education

level, his financial situation, his familiarity with the legal system, or his access to the prison law 

library, yet Petitioner was able to file the instant petition in March 2015. Regardless of whether 

these specific factors constitute extraordinary circumstances,5they did not prevent him from 

timely filing. Similarly, Petitioner’s mistaken belief in his guilt did not prevent him from filing 

the instant habeas petition. As discussed supra in Section A.2, Petitioner’s claims for relief are 

not predicated on his innocence.

Under certain circumstances, mental impairment may render a petitioner eligible for 

equitable tolling. See, e.g., Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099–100 (9th Cir. 2010). However, as 

discussed supra in Section A.2, Petitioner’s alleged mental impairment ended on June 9, 2009, 

which would cause the statute-of-limitations clock to start running on June 10, 2009. See Luna v. 

Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 652 (9th Cir. 2015) (the statute-of-limitations clock stops running when 

extraordinary circumstances first arise, but the clock resumes running once the extraordinary 

circumstances have ended or when the petitioner ceases to exercise reasonable diligence, 

whichever occurs earlier) (citing Gibbs v. LeGrand, 767 F.3d 879, 891–92 (9th Cir. 2014)). The 

statute of limitations therefore expired on June 10, 2010. The instant habeas petition, filed on 

 

5

The Ninth Circuit has held that neither a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication, nor 

“ordinary prison limitations on . . . access to the law library” constitute extraordinary 

circumstances warranting equitable tolling. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154; Ramirez v. Yates, 571 

F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009); cf. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 

1986) (illiteracy of pro se petitioner not sufficient cause to avoid procedural bar); United States v. 

Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1993) (pro se status, illiteracy, deafness and lack of legal 

training not external factors excusing abuse of the writ).

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March 17, 2015, is still untimely. 

4. Actual Innocence Gateway

The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal court may hear untimely claims if 

the failure to hear the claims would constitute a “miscarriage of justice.” See McQuiggin v. 

Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931–32 (2013) (holding that miscarriage of justice (actual innocence) 

showing applies to claims filed after the AEDPA statute of limitations has run, as well as to 

successive, abusive and procedurally defaulted claims); Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 931 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (en banc). By the traditional understanding of habeas corpus, a “miscarriage of justice” 

occurs whenever a conviction or sentence is secured in violation of a constitutional right. See 

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1986). However, the Supreme Court limits the 

miscarriage of justice exception to habeas petitioners who can show that “a constitutional violation 

has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 327 (1995) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)); see Johnson v. Knowles, 

541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[t]he miscarriage of justice exception is limited to those 

extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts his innocence and establishes that the court cannot 

have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt”) (emphasis in original); see id. at 936–37 

(holding miscarriage of justice exception did not apply where petitioner conceded his guilt but 

argued evidence of state’s and attorney’s misconduct resulted in his being held in prison longer 

than he should have been).

Under this “equitable exception,” a petitioner “may pass through the Schlup gateway and 

have his otherwise time-barred claims heard on the merits.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 932. In order to do 

so, “a petitioner must produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring him “within the 

‘narrow class of cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

314–15 (omission in original) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)). The 

evidence of innocence must be “so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of 

the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional 

error.” Id. at 316. A petitioner “must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id. at 327. This exacting standard 

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“permits review only in the ‘extraordinary’ case,” but it “does not require absolute certainty about 

the petitioner’s guilt or innocence.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 327). A petitioner must support his claims “with new reliable evidence—whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—

that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

Petitioner is not entitled to this equitable exception because he has failed to provide new, 

reliable evidence of actual innocence. In support of his claim of actual innocence, Petitioner only 

points out weaknesses in the trial testimony (the witnesses were unable to identify anyone during a 

photo lineup, see id. Docket No. 1-1 at 4; Petitioner did not match the description of the burglar

given by the witness, see id. at 5; and the witness that identified him gave inconsistent testimony, 

see id.); and argues that he is legally not guilty (Petitioner lacked the intent necessary for burglary, 

see id. at 8). These arguments do not involve new evidence, as required by Schlup. Petitioner’s 

remaining assertion in support of his actual innocence is that he purchased the stolen property off 

the street from a person matching the description given of the burglar. See id. at 9. Petitioner 

alleges that his trial attorney was aware of this information but failed to present it at trial. See id. 

Petitioner provides no evidence to support his assertion. Petitioner’s statement, without more, 

does not constitute reliable evidence of actual innocence. See, e.g., Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 

(enumerating three categories of reliable evidence that could provide reliable evidence: 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence); 

Lee, 653 F.3d at 945–46 (Kozinski, J. concurring) (“By enumerating the categories of evidence 

that could prove innocence, the Supreme Court made clear that less reliable kinds of evidence 

cannot support an actual innocence claim.”) (discussing Schlup).

B. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

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certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, Petitioner has not made such a showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability will be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely is 

GRANTED. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED as untimely, and a certificate of 

appealability is DENIED.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

2/16/2016

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