Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01310/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01310-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL AARON WITKIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. THOMAS, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-01310-DJC-DB-P

ORDER

Plaintiff Michael Aaron Witkin, a former state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed 

this civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Chief 

Deputy Warden R. Thomas, Warden L. Bird, K. Johnson, Lieutenant Hughes, Sergeant 

N. Martinez, and Does 1–20 (together, “Defendants”) have violated Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights by denying him exercise opportunities during the COVID-19 

pandemic and by retaliating against Plaintiff for filing complaints related to these 

alleged violations. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 

On February 13, 2024, the Magistrate Judge filed Findings and 

Recommendations herein which were served on all parties and any objections to the 

Findings and Recommendations were to be filed within fourteen days. (See ECF No. 

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32.) The Magistrate Judge recommended granting Defendants’ Motion to Revoke 

Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis or “IFP” status. (See ECF No. 23.) For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court rejects the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations, 

concluding that Plaintiff’s allegation of poverty was true at the time he made the 

statement and that Plaintiff did not make any statements in his application in bad faith. 

As a result, Plaintiff’s case is not dismissed, but Plaintiff is required to pay the filing fee 

within 30 days. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on July 25, 2022. (See ECF No. 1.) At the same 

time, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, claiming that he had no 

sources of income in the past twelve months. (See ECF No. 2 at 1.) Under a question 

asking about “[a]ny housing, transportation, utilities, or loan payments, or other 

regular monthly expenses[,]” Plaintiff stated that he was “paroled by [the California 

Division of Adult Parole Operations] as a ‘transient’ with an ‘alternate’ address at the 

mailing address on the front of the Complaint.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff signed the 

declaration attached to his IFP Motion on July 7, 2022. (See id.; also ECF No. 6 

(providing Plaintiff’s IFP Motion filed on 7/28/2022 that states the same and was also 

signed on 7/7/2022).) The Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis on February 28, 2023. (See ECF No. 9.) 

Following screening by the Magistrate Judge and the removal of a First 

Amendment claim, the Complaint was served on Defendants. (See ECF No. 11.) On 

September 11, 2023, Defendants filed the Motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status. (See

ECF No. 23.) The Magistrate Judge subsequently ordered Plaintiff to complete a form 

to proceed without prepaying fees or costs. (See ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff then filed a 

Notice regarding his IFP status on January 16, 2024, stating that “[b]ecause of 

plaintiff’s full-time employment, he is able to pay such fees and cannot assert 

otherwise.” (See ECF No. 31 at 1.) As a result, Plaintiff stated that there was no need 

for him to file another notice regarding his IFP status. (See id.) 

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On February 13, 2024, the Magistrate Judge issued the Findings and 

Recommendations regarding the Motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status. (See ECF No. 

32.) The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with 

prejudice, finding that Plaintiff fabricated the allegations of poverty and that Plaintiff 

made these allegations in bad faith. (See id. at 4–7.) The parties timely filed their 

objections and response. (See ECF Nos. 33–34.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

When a party objects to a portion of a magistrate judge’s findings and 

recommendations, the court must review those portions de novo. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). A district judge need not re-consider those portions of the Findings and 

Recommendations to which there is no objection. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 

65 F.4th 427, 433 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003)). After conducting de novo review, the district court “may accept, 

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations made by the 

magistrate judge.” Ramos, 65 F.4th at 433 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)). “In 

providing for a de novo determination . . . [,] Congress intended to permit whatever 

reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on 

a magistrate[ ] [judge’s] proposed findings and recommendations.” Id. (quoting 

United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)) (omission included; alterations 

added). In contrast, where no objection is made, that portion of the findings and 

recommendations are only reviewed for clear error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

II. Analysis 

A plaintiff may proceed in federal court without paying filing fees if the plaintiff 

is sufficiently poor, which requires the plaintiff to submit an affidavit in support under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that” the allegation of poverty is untrue, that the action is frivolous or 

malicious, that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or that 

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action seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.

§ 1915(e)(2). Thus, there are four independent reasons for dismissing a complaint. 

First, a complaint may be dismissed where the plaintiff made false allegations of 

poverty. See, e.g., Witkin v. Lee, No. 2:17-CV-0232-JAM-EFB-P, 2020 WL 2512383, at 

*5–7 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2020), R and R adopted, 2020 WL 4350094 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 

2020). Second, a complaint may be dismissed where the action is frivolous, that is, 

where the action “is ‘of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact.’” 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (first quoting Webster’s Third 

International Dictionary 913 (1993); and then citing Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d 

1247, 1258 (9th Cir. 1990)). Third, a complaint may be dismissed “if it was filed with 

the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary 1367 (1993)). Finally, a complaint may be dismissed if the 

action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and would thus fail under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 

1109 (9th Cir. 2013). 

As a fellow judge on the Eastern District has observed regarding dismissal for 

making false allegations of poverty: “Courts have not been totally uniform in their 

application of § 1915(e)(2)(A), but a close reading of the cases applying the statute 

reveals consistent considerations guiding the courts’ analyses.” Witkin v. Lee, No. 

2:17-CV-0232-JAM-EFB-P, 2020 WL 2512383, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2020), R and R 

adopted, 2020 WL 4350094 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2020). “Consistent with [the Ninth 

Circuit’s approach in Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 n.8 (9th Cir. 2015)], 

other courts have concluded that, where the allegation of poverty is untrue but there 

is no showing of bad faith, the court should impose a lesser sanction than outright 

dismissal with prejudice . . . .” Id. [F]or example, revoking IFP and provid[ing] a 

window for the plaintiff to pay the filing fees, or dismissing without prejudice[ ]” are 

appropriate sanctions in the absence of bad faith. Id. “On the flip side, courts 

routinely dismiss with prejudice cases upon finding that the plaintiff has intentionally 

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withheld information that may have disqualified plaintiff from obtaining IFP status or 

has otherwise manipulated his finances to make it appear that a plaintiff is poorer than 

he actually is . . . .” Id. In a good number of cases finding bad faith, prisoner-plaintiffs 

have diverted funds in the period leading up to their IFP application to others, usually 

family members. Id. at *4 (collecting cases). In total, “[t]hese cases reveal that the 

essential questions before the court are: (1) was plaintiff’s allegation of poverty untrue 

and, if so, (2) did plaintiff submit the untrue IFP application in bad faith?” Id. at *5. 

A. The Allegation of Poverty Was True at the Time of the Application

1. Changes That Occurred After Plaintiff Filed Are Irrelevant 

First, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge findings of fact, arguing that “the 

Magistrate draws all the purported facts from the defendants’ motion instead of the 

record.” (ECF No. 33 at 5 (citing ECF No. 32 at 6–8).) However, the Magistrate Judge 

properly took judicial notice of prior filings involving Plaintiff and only took judicial 

notice of those facts not subject to reasonable dispute. See, e.g., Harris v. Cnty. of 

Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the court “may take judicial 

notice of undisputed matters of public record . . . including documents on file in 

federal or state courts” (citations omitted)). Accord Karas v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and 

Rehab., No. 21-15905, 2023 WL 8889552, at *1 n.3 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2023) (citing 

Harris and taking judicial notice of the plaintiff’s prior habeas petition in state court 

and the related dockets and orders while affirming the district court’s dismissal of the 

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). Thus, even under a de novo review, there was 

no error here in relying on material subject to judicial notice. 

However, based on the undisputed evidence on record, the Court disagrees 

with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff fabricated his impoverished status. Indeed, 

although Plaintiff submitted two IFP applications on July 25, 2022 and July 28, 2022 

that stated that he was “transient” and that he had no money available, Plaintiff 

disclosed all the information required by the application. (See ECF No. 2 at 2; ECF 

No. 6 at 2.) That, as Defendants and the Magistrate Judge pointed out, Plaintiff did 

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not disclose his employment status in his August 18, 2022 Notice is irrelevant to 

whether the allegation of poverty was true on July 7, 2022, when Plaintiff signed the 

declaration supporting his IFP Motion. (See ECF No. 23 at 2, 7–8; ECF No.32 at 7–8.) 

Similarly, the only argument Defendants made regarding the availability of 

assets from Plaintiff’s partner was that “California is a community property state, such 

that all property acquired during the marriage is community property.” (ECF No. 29 at 

3 (citing Cal. Fam. Code § 760).) However, as that definition makes clear, communal 

property only exists after the marriage is consummated and after the property was 

acquired by the married couple. See, e.g., In re Bace, 908 F.3d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 

2018) (explaining that “classification of property as community or separate property 

depends on the time of its acquisition[,]” and that property acquired before the 

marriage is separate property but property acquired during the marriage is 

community property except as provided by statute (collecting sources)). Thus, as of 

July 7, 2022, Plaintiff had no community property and only had separate property, all 

of which he accurately reported. Therefore, Plaintiff did not fail to disclose any 

financial assets acquired as a result of his marriage. 

At base, Defendants seek to discredit Plaintiff’s July 7, 2022 declaration by

relying on information and changes that came after Plaintiff filed his IFP application. 

Thus, that information has no bearing on whether Plaintiff’s allegation of poverty was 

false at the time it was made. And, based on the undisputed record and materials 

submitted with Plaintiff’s applications, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff fabricated 

allegations of poverty. Therefore, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for making untrue allegations of poverty. 

2. Plaintiff Did All That Was Explicitly Required of Him

Moreover, even though Plaintiff is an “experienced litigator,” he should not be 

faulted for failing to disclose the financial status of his then-fiancée and now-wife 

because it was not clear to Plaintiff that he ever had a duty to disclose such 

information. (See ECF No. 23 at 7–8; ECF No. 32 at 8.) Here, Defendants cite cases to 

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argue that “[t]he Court may consider Plaintiff’s spouse’s financial resources in 

determining whether he is entitled to in forma pauperis status.” (ECF No. 23 at 9 

(citing Lafavor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-cv-00745-CDB-SS, 2023 WL 3872172 

(E.D. Cal. May 23, 2023); Calderon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-cv-00890-SAB, 

2022 WL 3088494 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2022); Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1226)).) However, 

Lafavor merely stated, without any support or discussion, the unremarkable 

proposition that the “Court may consider Plaintiff’s spouse’s financial resources in 

determining whether she is entitled to in forma pauperis status.” Lafavor, 2023 WL 

3872172, at *1. Lafavor does not stand for the proposition that the court must

consider the financial resources of a party’s spouse, much less that a plaintiff seeking 

IFP status must disclose their spouse’s financial resources, which is what Defendants 

suggest with their citation and what the Magistrate Judge apparently understood 

those cases to establish. (See ECF No. 32 at 8 (“Plaintiff did not commit a minor 

misstatement or omission; instead, he manipulated his housing status to appear that 

he was homeless, omitted his wife’s income, and deliberately misrepresented his 

employment status to conceal the true facts from the court.”).) 

Furthermore, the form Plaintiff was required to complete makes no mention of 

spouses or partners or people upon whom the plaintiff might be depending upon, but 

it does ask the person to list anyone depending on them for support. (See ECF Nos. 

2, 6.) See also Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or 

Costs (revised July 2010), 

https://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/assets/File/IFP%20Form.pdf. Plaintiff 

cannot be faulted for heeding directions and not doing something he was not told.

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Indeed, the Magistrate Judge cited to Witkin v. Lee, which cited to Kennedy v. Huibregtse, 831 F.3d 

441, 443–44 (7th Cir. 2016), to argue that Plaintiff had notice of the need to provide information on his 

partner’s income, but Kennedy and Witkin both involved plaintiffs who diverted resources to hide assets 

from the court, see Witkin, 2020 WL 2512383, at *5; Kennedy, 831 F.3d at 444, which is not present 

here. Thus, Witkin and Kennedy are better understood for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot hide 

financial assets by diverting resources within its control — not that a plaintiff must disclose every piece of 

financial information, including that of any partners or spouses. 

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3. The Suggestion of Bad Faith Over Allegations of 

Homelessness Are Overstated

Finally, Defendants overstate the inferences that can be drawn from Plaintiff 

disclosing his “transient” status on his IFP applications. (See ECF No. 23 at 7–8; ECF 

No. 33 at 7–8.) While Plaintiff did write that he was released on parole as a “transient,” 

Plaintiff does not state that he is homeless. While the Court has concerns that Plaintiff

may have created a suggestion of homeless that was not true, there is no showing that 

Plaintiff’s inaccuracy foreclosed IFP eligibility and Defendants have not argued 

otherwise. Compare with Witkin, 2020 WL 2512383, at *3 (citing Camp v. Oliver, 798 

F.2d 434, 438–39 (11th Cir. 1986)). Thus, Defendants’ interpretation of Plaintiff’s 

truthful disclosure of his status on parole is not enough to establish bad faith. 

Compare with Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 n.8 (describing the defendant’s evidence 

as a “scanty offering” that revealed “[n]o significant misrepresentations” regarding 

expenses). 

B. Plaintiff Did Not Bring This Case Maliciously

Defendants also argue, and the Magistrate Judge concluded, that Plaintiff 

brought this lawsuit in bad faith. (See ECF No. 23 at 9–10; ECF No. 32 at 4–6.) Here, 

both rely on statements Plaintiff apparently revealed indicating that Plaintiff wanted to 

bring the authorities to justice and to “knock down CDCR for about $250,000.” (ECF 

No. 23 at 5–6; ECF No. 32 at 4.) However, before a dismissal can be characterized as 

malicious, the court must specifically find that the complaint was filed with the 

intention or desire to harm another. See Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s 

Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1118). 

Here, the docket reveals that Plaintiff brought a limited lawsuit that was already 

screened as raising legitimate claims. (See ECF No. 11.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims 

are not frivolous based on the Magistrate Judge’s own determination. See Andrews, 

398 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted). This thus cuts against finding that the case was 

brought maliciously or with the intent to harm because, by brining non-frivolous 

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claims, Plaintiff seeks to vindicate his rights, which means that there is a plausible 

reason to bring this suit other than to harm or harass Defendants. 

Moreover, Plaintiff clearly takes the position that he is bringing this lawsuit to 

fight what he perceives to be injustices within the California prison and legal system, 

thus further detracting from a finding that Plaintiff brought this lawsuit to harm or 

harass Defendants. Indeed, although Plaintiff wrote that he hoped to extract $250,000 

from Defendants, that statement does not automatically suggest that Plaintiff intended 

to harm Defendants to the tune of $250,000. Rather, Plaintiff seems to seek such

money to “significantly impact the[ ] perpetual evil practices[ ]” allegedly committed 

by Defendants. (See ECF No. 33 at 3.) That does not suggest an intent to harm or 

harass Defendants. 

Further, almost every plaintiff suing prisons and correctional officials is seeking 

money as compensation, so a stated desire to extract large sums of money from 

defendants cannot — alone — form the basis for a finding of maliciousness, or else 

almost every lawsuit would be dismissed maliciously. And even though the Magistrate 

Judge found malice based on Plaintiff’s litigation history (see ECF No. 32 at 6), that 

history undermines that conclusion because Plaintiff has never had a lawsuit dismissed 

as frivolous in his 15-year litigation history. (See ECF No. 33 at 3.) 

Admittedly, Plaintiff re-asserts claims he has previously litigated against new 

parties now. (See ECF No. 23 at 5, 9–10; ECF No. 32 at 4–6.) But Plaintiff’s denial of 

exercise claim was successful, meaning that it was not frivolous and that it was 

deserving of a remedy, which would suggest that the claim was brought with the 

intent to remedy a real harm. (Compare with ECF No. 32 at 6 (“However, plaintiff’s 

2021 statements that he intended to prosecute 20 cases against CDCR in this district 

court to net $250,000, considered with his litigation history, shows an intent to abuse 

the federal justice system for the purpose of harming or harassing defendants in 

bringing such a claim in the present case.”).) That Plaintiff brings a similar claim 

against other defendants does not detract from the potentially remedial aims of the 

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underlying lawsuit. If anything, the prior success suggests that the subsequent lawsuit 

was brought to “significantly impact the[ ] perpetual evil practices[ ]” allegedly 

committed by Defendants. (See ECF No. 33 at 3.) 

As a result, the Court concludes that there is insufficient evidence to establish 

that Plaintiff brought this lawsuit with the intention to harass or harm Defendants, 

rather than with the intention to ensure compliance with constitutional requirements 

for all incarcerated individuals. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court REJECTS the Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations (ECF No. 32). The Court hereby ORDERS Plaintiff to 

pay the filing fee within 30 days of this Order being docketed. IT IS SO ORDERED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2024 

Hon. Daniel J. Calabretta

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DJC3 – witkin.22cv1310.fnr.jo

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