Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-08081/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-08081-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Housing Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Burton and Barbara Gammons,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Real Property Investment Services, Inc.,

an Arizona Corporation, doing business as

RPI Services, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-10-8081-PCT-LOA

ORDER

This case arises on Defendant’s Motion to Sever Plaintiffs’ Claims. (Doc. 10)

Plaintiffs filed a response opposing the Motion, doc. 20, to which Defendant replied, doc.

22. After considering the briefings, the relevant case law, and the August 4, 2010 oral

arguments, the Court will grant the Motion to ensure that the employer receives a fair trial,

sever the claims, and order each Plaintiff to prosecute a separate lawsuit.

I. Background

On May 20, 2010, Plaintiffs Michael Burton and Barbara Gammons

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this Title VII discrimination action, alleging separate claims

of hostile work environment for racial harassment and sexual harassment, and retaliation by

their former employer, Defendant Real Property Investment Services, Inc., doing business

as RPI Services (“RPI”), in connection with their employment in maintaining and cleaning

RPI’s residential apartments in Flagstaff, Arizona. (Doc. 1) Plaintiffs seek compensatory

Case 2:10-cv-08081-LOA Document 26 Filed 08/09/10 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 On July 28, 2010, the Court granted RPI’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Sixth Cause

of Action, dismissing Plaintiffs’ State pendent claims of negligent hiring, supervising and

retaining as barred by Arizona’s workers’ compensation scheme. (Doc. 24)

- 2 -

and punitive damages for violations of Title VII, the Fair Housing Act, and request awards

for their attorneys’ fees and court costs.1

 (Id. at 9-10) Prior to filing an answer and before the

Court set the Rule 16 scheduling conference, RPI filed the pending Motion on June 28, 2010,

requesting severance of Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs and Defendant have consented to

magistrate-judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). (Docs. 6, 17)

Plaintiff Gammons alleges that while employed in RPI’s housekeeping

department, she was subjected to “sexual harassment [that] was both severe and pervasive

in that it happened on a near daily basis.” (Doc. 1 at 3) The Complaint alleges specific

incidents allegedly committed by Bruce Trease, a co-worker. She alleges “much of the

sexual harassment occurred in the presence of Dina Samora, manager, who did nothing to

stop the conduct . . . [and] sexually offensive and hostile comments were also made in front

of Amy Smith, operations manager, and Gary Wilcox, facilities manager, and nothing was

ever done to stop the severe and pervasive sexual harassment.” (Id.) Further, when she

complained about the sexually hostile work environment, RPI allegedly retaliated by

reducing her pay and reassigning her to work and live at a less desirable property. (Id. at 4)

Plaintiff Michael Burton, an African-American formerly employed by RPI as

a maintenance technician, alleges “he was subjected to unwanted and offensive racial

harassment that was both severe and pervasive,” with specific factual examples set forth in

the Complaint. (Id. at 5) He alleges he “was subjected to severe and pervasive racial

discrimination from residents of the property at which he worked and Gary Wilcox, facilities

manager, and Plaintiff’s direct supervisor.” (Id.) He alleges “Mr. Wilcox often made racially

offensive remarks on a near daily basis about African-American employees always being

sick and other types of racial stereotypes.” (Id.) He alleges that when he “complained about

the harassment he suffered retaliation by being denied sick and bereavement time of (sic)

comparable to other employees, being given poor evaluations and ultimately terminated.”

Case 2:10-cv-08081-LOA Document 26 Filed 08/09/10 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The pattern-or-practice method of proving discrimination, in which the plaintiff

shows that the employer had a policy of discriminating against a protected class, is not

usually available to individual plaintiffs in a non-class action. Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling

Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 969 (11th Cir. 2008); Bacon v. Honda, 370 F.3d 565, 575 n. 30

(6th Cir.2004); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760-61 (4th Cir.1998),

vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706,

711 (2d Cir. 1998)).

- 3 -

(Id. at 5-6) Plaintiffs, however, do not argue, nor does the Complaint allege, that RPI

engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination.2

II. Defendant’s Motion to Sever

Defendant RPI contends that Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of, nor are they

related to, the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences, there

is no question of fact or law common to Plaintiffs’ claims, and failure to sever Plaintiffs’

claims will result in undue prejudice and confusion to Defendant before the same jury.

Acknowledging Plaintiffs were employed by the same company and both filed Title VII

discrimination claims, Defendant argues “[t]he differences between the two Plaintiffs,

including the basis for their claims, their jobs, their work history and performance, the

alleged adverse actions, and the alleged decision-makers involved in their matters, weigh far

more heavily in favor of severance. Plaintiff’s claims are not properly joined and should be

severed.” (Doc. 22 at 2)

Plaintiffs disagree and request the Court deny Defendant’s Motion. (Doc. 20)

Advancing five arguments against severance, Plaintiffs argue first, 

Plaintiffs both allege violations of Title VII. Second, both Plaintiffs were

employed by the same company working at similar properties owned by the

Defendant. Third, both Plaintiffs are witnesses for each other and about the

facts and circumstances surrounding each other’s cases. Fourth, both Plaintiffs

had the same reporting chain of command. Fifth, the Defendant’s failure to

properly investigate and take prompt remedial measures will apply equally and

to both Plaintiffs with the same individuals involved. Finally, the EEOC also

adjudicated these claims together and issued right to sue letters on the same

date. 

(Id. at 2) Plaintiffs cite Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 28 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir. 1991) in support of

joinder of their claims, arguing that giving the jury separate verdict forms and appropriate

Case 2:10-cv-08081-LOA Document 26 Filed 08/09/10 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(1) provides:

(a) Persons Who May Join or Be Joined.

 (1) Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: 

 (A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative

with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or

series of transactions or occurrences; and 

(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the

action. 

- 4 -

instructions, including perhaps a limiting instruction, “could easily [] cure[]” any prejudice

to Defendant. (Id. at 3) Finally, Plaintiffs conclude that “Defendant has done nothing more

than make naked and unsupported allegations of prejudice and jury confusion. The

Defendant’s arguments are not supported by the facts of this case nor the applicable case

law.” (Id. at 4) 

In rebuttal, Defendant points out that the “Court is not bound by an

administrative agency’s handling of Plaintiffs’ claims” and disagrees with Plaintiffs’ factual

representation that the EEOC adjudicated these claims together. (Doc. 22 at 3) Defendant

claims “the EEOC treated Plaintiffs’ administrative charges as separate, including separate

charge numbers and investigative files, and it issued separate right to sue letters.” (Id.)

Finally, Defendant argues each Plaintiff’s claims involve highly inflammatory allegations,

citing, as an example, “Plaintiff Burton’s claim that the word ‘nigger’ and other racial

stereotypes were used in the workplace [which have] no evidentiary relationship to Plaintiff

Gammons’ sexual harassment claim [and] if these matters are not severed, the jury will hear

evidence regarding Plaintiff Burton’s racial allegations in Plaintiff Gammons’ case.” (Id. at

3-4). 

III. Joinder or Severance of Plaintiffs

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) permits the joinder of plaintiffs in one

action if: (1) the plaintiffs assert any right to relief arising out of the same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) there are common questions of

law or fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 203

; Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Case 2:10-cv-08081-LOA Document 26 Filed 08/09/10 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Fed.R.Civ.P. 20.

4

 Rule 21, Fed.R.Civ.P., states that “[m]isjoinder of parties is not a ground for

dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add

or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.” (Emphasis added)

- 5 -

“The purpose of Rule 20(a) is ‘to promote judicial economy, and reduce inconvenience,

delay, and added expense.’” Corona v. Knowles, 2009 WL 3698510 (E.D.Cal. 2009)

(quoting Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1351).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 authorizes the Court to drop parties and

sever claims “on just terms.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 214

; Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,

623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980) (even if the specific requirements of Rule 20 may be

satisfied, a trial court must examine other relevant factors to determine if joinder of a party

will comport with principles of fundamental fairness); Garcia v. GMAC Mortg., 2009 WL

1212279, * 1 (D.Ariz. 2009) (citing 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 1657, at 428 (2d ed. 1990) (“More commonly, Rule 21 has been invoked

to sever parties improperly joined under Rule 20.”)). Even if the requirements of Rule 20(a)

are satisfied, a district court may properly sever the plaintiffs to avoid prejudice to the parties

or confusion to the jury. Montgomery v. STG Intern., Inc., 532 F.Supp.2d 29, 35 (D.D.C.

2008) (citing M.K. v. Tenet, 216 F.R.D. 133, 138 (D.D.C. 2002)). District courts have broad

discretion to sever under Rule 21. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1297 (9th

Cir. 2000). In a misjoined case, “[t]he court can generally dismiss all but the first named

plaintiff without prejudice to the institution of new, separate lawsuits by the dropped

plaintiffs ‘against some or all of the present defendants based on the claim or claims

attempted to be set forth in the present complaint.’” Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350 (citation

omitted). Significantly, Rule 1, Fed.R.Civ.P., mandates that Rules 20 and 21 “be construed

and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”

Rule 1, Fed.R.Civ.P. 

IV. Discussion

Case 2:10-cv-08081-LOA Document 26 Filed 08/09/10 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 To present a prima facie case for a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that

(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) after doing so, s/he was subjected to

adverse employment action by the employer, and (3) a causal connection exists between the

two events. Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982); Kitchen v. WSCO

Petroleum Corp., 481 F.Supp.2d 1136, 1143-1144 (D.Or. 2007).

- 6 -

Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the first prong and part of the second prong, common

questions of fact, of Rule 20(a)’s test for permissive joinder. “The first prong, the ‘same

transaction [or occurrence]’ requirement, refers to similarity in the factual background of a

claim.” Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350. While each Plaintiff alleges Title VII discrimination

claims against the same employer, general claims of discrimination are not enough to create

a common transaction or occurrence. According to the Complaint, there are numerous

significant factual differences between Plaintiffs’ claims: (1) different basis for each claim

(Burton alleges racial discrimination-hostile work environment; Gammons alleges sexual

harassment-hostile work environment and Fair Housing Act discrimination; (2) different jobs

(Burton was a maintenance technician; Gammons worked in housekeeping; (3) different

direct supervisors (Burton’s was Gary Wilcox or Christina Montiel; Gammons’ was Dina

Samora (see, affidavit of Amy Smith, Defendant’s current President, Exhibit (“Exh”) 1, Doc.

10-1 at ¶ 3); (4) different principal offenders: (Burton: Gary Wilcox; Gammons: Bruce

Trease); (5) different reasons for leaving Defendant’s employment: (Burton was allegedly

terminated for performance problems; Gammons allegedly voluntarily resigned and moved

to be closer to her family (Exh 1, Doc. 10-1 at ¶¶ 4, 7); and (6) different performance issues:

(Burton allegedly had work performance problems for which he received counseling; RPI

concedes Gammons did not have any performance problems during her employment (Id.

at ¶¶ 6-7). While there may be some overlap of witnesses, each Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim is factually distinct and diverse from the other.

Although each Plaintiff alleges a retaliation claim, the Complaint alleges

different adverse employment actions5

 by the Defendant’s decisionmakers. Burton was

allegedly “denied sick and bereavement time of comparable to other employees, being given

Case 2:10-cv-08081-LOA Document 26 Filed 08/09/10 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

poor evaluations and ultimately terminated.” (Doc. 5-6) Gammons was allegedly “ostracized

from management and some co-workers[,] harassed about going to her doctor’s

appointments that did not happen prior to the complaints of sexual harassment[,] forced to

take a pay cut and sent to a less desirable property. . . .” (Id. at 4) The facts supporting each

retaliation claim are not sufficiently common to justify joinder.

Conversely, the other part of the second prong, common questions of law,

weighs in favor of joinder. The elements to prove a hostile work environment are the same

for both racial harassment and sexual harassment. “To prevail on a hostile workplace claim

premised on either race or sex, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he [or she] was subjected to

verbal or physical conduct of a racial or sexual nature; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome;

and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the

plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive work environment.” Vasquez v. County of Los

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003) (footnotes omitted). The common issues of law

for each Plaintiff’s claim for racial harassment, sexual harassment, and retaliation justify

permissive joinder of their claims.

Construing Rules 20(a) and 21 with the alleged facts of this case against Rule

1’s mandate “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of this action, the

Court is persuaded that to achieve a fair and just trial for Defendant severance of Plaintiff’s

claims is required. Initially there will be greater expense incurred with an additional filing

fee and attorneys’ time incurred filing amended complaints and separate answers. Trying two

separate cases may be more expensive than one but each trial will likely be shorter with

fewer witnesses and less complex than one trial litigating both Plaintiffs’ claims together.

If counsel agree to use common discovery that may be applicable in each case, the cost of

maintaining and defending two lawsuits simultaneously would be substantially reduced.

Moreover, severance will not unduly delay either case, especially if the parties share

common discovery in both cases, the cases track together, and the new case is assigned to

the undersigned Magistrate Judge who is familiar with Plaintiffs’ claims. It is Rule 1’s “just”

prong and Rule 21’s “just terms” standard that tip the scale of justice to severance.

Case 2:10-cv-08081-LOA Document 26 Filed 08/09/10 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 Duke is markedly different than the case at hand. There, both Plaintiffs alleged age

discrimination, were terminated on the same day “as part of the same reduction of force,

. . . under a uniform policy adopted for selecting employees for discharge[,]” and the adverse

actions were implemented by the same decisionmaker. 928 F.2d at 1420. “Plaintiffs’ claims

arise out of the same transaction, a single reduction in force, raising common questions of

law and fact.” Id. at 1421.

- 8 -

If the Plaintiffs’ claims are not severed, a single jury will hear the alleged racial

insults that are at the core of Plaintiff Burton’s harassment claim that are so highly offensive

even to non-African-Americans. Insults identified in the Complaint like “stupid

nigger,” “the dark meat,” “shut up you black ass nigger,” offensive remarks about

African-American employees always being sick and other types of racial stereotypes, and

comments allegedly made about particular characteristics of the genitalia of AfricanAmerican men will most certainly be offered in evidence assuming, of course, compliance

with the Rules of Evidence. (Doc. 1 at 5) Without severance, the jury will also hear

allegations that co-employee Trease climbed on top of Plaintiff Gammons and simulated

sexual activity on her, and she was unable to stop him; when Trease walked up to Plaintiff

Gammons and kissed her on her mouth, causing her to jump away shocked and horrified;

and at a birthday party, Trease provided a sexually offensive birthday card and sex toys as

gifts while he complained about his wife not providing him with sex. (Id. at 3-4) The

combined impact of this offensive behavior, all allegedly made in the presence of, or

communicated to, Defendant’s managers and supervisors without corrective action taken,

is unduly prejudicial to RPI because it would be difficult for the jury to consider such

behavior separate as to each Plaintiff despite a limiting instruction to do so. Moreover, a joint

trial would limit the Court’s ability to control the evidence and exclude unduly prejudicial

evidence that outweighs its probative value under Rule 403, Fed.R.Evid.

Unlike Duke, 928 F.2d at 14216

, this Court does not believe that in this case

carefully worded jury instructions which “point out [that] each plaintiff’s claim should be

considered separately and should rise or fall on the evidence with respect to that plaintiff”

will meaningfully mitigate the potential prejudicial impact and jury confusion of joinder. As

Case 2:10-cv-08081-LOA Document 26 Filed 08/09/10 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

the district court expressed in Henderson v. AT & T Corp.,918 F.Supp. 1059, 1063-1064

(S.D.Tex. 1996), “[b]ecause a joint trial would make it extremely difficult for the jury to

keep each Plaintiff’s claim separate and require each Plaintiff to independently prove her

case, the jury may simply resolve the confusion by considering all the testimony to pertain

to all the claims, despite any limiting instructions[,]” quoting Moorhouse v. Boeing Co., 501

F.Supp. 390, 393 n. 4 (E.D.Pa. 1980) (“[e]ven the strongest jury instructions could not have

dulled the impact of a parade of witnesses, each recounting his contention that the defendant

laid him off because of his age.”)).

Other district courts addressing a severance issue with discrimination claims

against the same employer have concluded that severance was appropriate. Henderson, 918

F.Supp. at 1065 (directing in part that the claims of former employees from separate offices,

which alleged various combinations of race, age, and national origin discrimination be

severed because the claims were “highly individualized” and would be “extraordinarily

confusing for the jury”); Johnson v. Indopco, 846 F.Supp. 670, 676 (N.D.Ill. 1994) (denying

joinder where current employee claimed race discrimination in denial of promotion, former

employee claimed that sexual harassment and race motivated denial of promotion, and

claims arose at different times); Weir v. Litton Bionetics, 1996 WL 11608, (D.Md. 1986)

(severing claims of two age discrimination plaintiffs who were terminated at different times

and worked in two divisions that operated independently of one another); Smith v. North

Amer. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515, 521-22 (N.D.Ok. 1970) (the court concluded that

plaintiffs were misjoined in one action under Rule 20(a), noting that plaintiffs “have

attempted to join in one action what are in reality four separate lawsuits arising out of four

separate series of transactions or occurrences involving four disparate sets of facts.”).

Joinder was permitted, however, where 18 plaintiffs sought relief based on the same series

of discriminatory transactions by the same decisionmaker in the same department during the

same short time frame. Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1323-24 (11th Cir.

2000), overruled in part on other grounds, Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1328 n. 52 (11th

Cir. 2003).

Case 2:10-cv-08081-LOA Document 26 Filed 08/09/10 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

V. Conclusion

The Court concludes that Defendant RPI will be unduly prejudiced by a single

trial of Plaintiffs’ claims. The risk of undue prejudice and confusion engendered by a single

jury trial is simply too great, and would substantially threaten RPI’s right to a fair trial.

Balancing the purposes of Rule 20(a), with the goals of Rule 1, and Rule 21’s authorization

to drop parties and to sever claims “on just terms[,]” fundamental fairness warrants granting

RPI’s Motion.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Sever Plaintiffs’ Claims, doc.

10, is GRANTED. The Court finds that this is a case of improper joinder. Each Plaintiff

must proceed in a separate case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall assign a new

case number for Plaintiff Barbara Gammons and assign that case to this Magistrate Judge.

The first-named Plaintiff, Michael Burton, and his lawsuit shall remain with the present case

number.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ counsel shall file Amended

Complaints in the new case and in this case, asserting the claims of each Plaintiff against

Defendant. The Amended Complaints shall be filed on or before Tuesday, September 7,

2010.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Barbara Gammons shall pay the

filing fee in the new case.

Dated this 9th day of August, 2010.

Case 2:10-cv-08081-LOA Document 26 Filed 08/09/10 Page 10 of 10