Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00819/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00819-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

---

1 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

OWEN J. RAMSEY III and DIANE 

RAMSEY, 

 Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-07-0819 RRB EFB 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Defendants Owen J. Ramsey III and Diane Ramsey 

(collectively “Ramseys”) move for sanctions against plaintiff 

Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (“Connecticut 

General”) on the ground that Connecticut General has repeatedly 

sought to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement in federal 

court and enjoin their state action alleging illegal activity 

related to “vanishing premium” insurance policies. For the 

following reasons, the court DENIES the motion.1

 

 

1 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 1 of 15
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In Spitz v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., a class of 

plaintiffs alleged that Connecticut General made improper 

charges to and fraudulent statements regarding certain 

“vanishing premium” or “interest sensitive” policies.2

 See In re 

Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., CV-95-3566, 1997 WL 910387, at 

*22-23 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1997). The Spitz case was 

consolidated with a similar action by the Panel on Multidistrict 

Litigation and transferred to the Central District of 

California. Id. at *2. On September 11, 1996, the parties 

entered into a settlement agreement. Id at *1-2. The agreement 

included an anti-suit injunction under which the class members 

gave up “the right to assert any and all claims, known or 

unknown, that they currently posses, may possess or may have 

possessed against [Connecticut General] . . . relating in any 

 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

2

 The Spitz plaintiffs alleged that Connecticut General 

and/or its agents represented to life insurance purchasers that, 

after a certain date, the income from variable-interest policies 

would be sufficient to cover the cost of premium payments, 

freeing costumers from out-of-pocket premium payments. The 

plaintiffs further alleged that Connecticut General failed to 

disclose that they would be required to make premium payments if 

a policy’s interest income was insufficient to cover its costs. 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 2 of 15
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

way to the life insurance policies that are the subject of this 

lawsuit.” Id. at *25. On February 13, 1997, the Central 

District granted final approval of the class settlement. Id. at 

*1-2. Although a class member challenged the sufficiency of the 

class notice on appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the court’s 

ruling. Spitz v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 876 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

The settlement expressly covered three policies owned by 

the Ramseys, which they purchased in 1986. Connecticut General 

argues that the Ramseys are, therefore, barred under the terms 

of the settlement and anti-suit injunction from bringing any 

claim based upon the polices. The Ramseys, however, allege that 

they never received notice related to the 1997 settlement and 

only learned about it in January 2004, after their policies 

lapsed without prior notice. The Ramseys also allege that, 

following the 1997 settlement, Connecticut General continued 

prior illegal practices and engaged in new ones. 

On June 20, 2005 the Ramseys filed a California state 

action against Connecticut General. In its answer, Connecticut 

General raised defenses based upon the Spitz settlement. On 

January 30, 2006, Connecticut General filed a motion in the 

Central District of California to enforce the Spitz settlement 

against the Ramseys. The court, finding that almost ten years 

had passed since the final order, denied the motion and divested 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 3 of 15
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

itself of jurisdiction over the case. On April 7, 2006, 

Connecticut General filed a motion in California state court to 

enforce the Spitz settlement. The state court denied the motion 

on May 5, 2006, finding that Connecticut General had neither 

complied with the procedural requirements of a res judicata 

defense nor provided sufficient grounds for injunctive relief. 

After conducting discovery in the state action, the Ramseys 

filed an amended complaint on November 3, 2006. On January 26, 

2007, Connecticut General filed another motion in the Central 

District to enforce the Spitz settlement against the Ramseys. 

The Ramseys filed a motion to transfer venue to the Eastern 

District, in which they live. On April 26, 2007 the Central 

District granted the Ramseys’ motion. On May 16, 2007, the 

Ramseys filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On June 27, 

2007, Connecticut General filed a motion to apply the Spitz

anti-suit injunction. On July, 31, 2007, this court declined to 

exercise its discretionary power to enjoin the state court 

action on the ground that the state action was the better forum 

to litigate the enforceability of the Spitz settlement. The 

Ramseys now move for sanctions. 

II. DISCUSSION 

 The Ramseys argue that sanctions are appropriate because 

Connecticut General has: (1) filed frivolous, legally 

unreasonable and/or factually baseless papers in violation of 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 4 of 15
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Rule 11; (2) unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the 

proceedings in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927; and (3) engaged in 

“bad faith” tactics and “willfully disobeyed” a court order. 

These claims are individually addressed below. 

A. Rule 11 

 The Ramseys’ move for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 on the 

ground that Connecticut General has repeatedly and unreasonably 

filed papers in federal court seeking to enforce the Spitz

settlement and enjoin their state action. Connecticut General 

argues that sanctions are inappropriate under Rule 11 because 

the Ramseys have failed to meet Rule 11’s safe harbor 

requirement and because a sufficient legal basis exists to seek 

enforcement of the Spitz settlement in federal court. 

 In order to be entitled to sanctions under Rule 11, a party 

must satisfy the strict procedural requirements of Rule 

11(c)(1)(A). Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 788 

(9th Cir. 2001). Rule 11(c)(1)(A) provides in part: “A motion 

for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from 

other motions or requests and shall describe the specific 

conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b).3

 It shall be served 

 

3 Rule 11(b) states, among other things, that a party is 

prohibited from presenting to the court a pleading or motion 

that: (1) is submitted for an improper purpose, such as to harass 

or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost 

of litigation; or (2) contains legal contentions that are not 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 5 of 15
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented 

to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion 

(or such other period as the court may prescribe), the 

challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or 

denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(A) (footnote added). The purpose of this 

provision is to provide a type of “safe harbor” in that a party 

will not be subject to sanctions unless, within 21 days after 

service of the motion for sanctions, it refused to withdraw the 

offending paper and thereby escape sanctions. Barber v. Miller, 

146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original); Retail 

Flooring Dealers of America, Inc. v. Beaulieu of America, LLC, 

339 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003). Where sanctions are 

initiated by motion, the 21 day safe-harbor period before a 

motion for sanctions can be filed with the court is mandatory. 

Truesdell v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, 293 

F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Radcliffe, 254 F.3d at 

789 (emphasizing that a motion for sanctions must be served on 

the opposing party at least 21 days before it is filed with the 

court). 

 

warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for the 

extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the 

establishment of new law.

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 6 of 15
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

In order to comply with Rule 11(c)(1)(A) the Ramseys were 

required to serve the motion for sanctions on Connecticut 

General with a demand to retract the allegedly offending paper 

and then to allow Connecticut General at least twenty-one days 

to retract the paper before filing the motion with the court. 

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(A). The Ramseys did not do this. 

Instead, the Ramseys filed their Rule 11 motion on July 13, 

2007, without serving Connecticut General with the motion in 

advance of such filing. Thus, because the Ramseys failed to 

comply with the twenty-one day advance service provision, they 

are not entitled to sanctions under Rule 11. Moreover, to the 

extent that the Ramseys assert that informal notice, via a 

letter and telephone call is sufficient notice under Rule 11, 

the court rejects this assertion. The “safe harbor” 

requirements of Rule 11 are mandatory as it is the service of 

the motion that gives notice to a party and its attorneys that 

they must retract certain papers or risk sanctions. See Barber, 

146 F.3d at 710-11 (holding that the procedural requirements of 

Rule 11’s “safe harbor” are mandatory, and that informal 

warnings threatening to seek Rule 11 sanctions do not satisfy 

Rule 11 because it is the service of the motion that gives 

notice to a party and its attorneys that they must retract or 

risk sanctions). 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 7 of 15
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

For these reasons, the court DENIES the Ramseys’ request 

for sanctions under Rule 11. 

B. Sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 

The Ramseys’ move pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for 

sanctions on the ground that Connecticut General has 

unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings in bad 

faith by repeatedly filing papers in federal court seeking to 

enforce the Spitz settlement. 

 Sanctions under § 1927 may be imposed when: (1) the 

attorney unreasonably multiplied the proceedings; (2) the 

attorney’s conduct was unreasonable and vexatious; and (3) the 

conduct resulted in an increase in the cost of the proceedings. 

28 U.S.C. § 1927; B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 

1107 (9th Cir. 2002) Because sanctions under § 1927 are 

authorized only for the unreasonable multiplication of 

proceedings, “it applies only to unnecessary filings and tactics 

once a lawsuit has begun . . . [and] cannot be applied to an 

initial pleading.” See In re Keegan Mgmt. Co. Sec. Lit., 78 

F.3d 431, 435 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the filing of a 

complaint may only be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 or the 

court’s inherent power, not § 1927). 

Sanctions under § 1927 require a finding of recklessness or 

bad faith. Pacific Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, 

Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000). An attorney’s bad 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 8 of 15
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

faith is assessed under a subjective standard and knowing or 

reckless conduct meets this standard. Id. (noting that a 

finding of bad faith is critical, because a frivolous argument 

without more is insufficient to justify sanctions under § 1927). 

“A finding of bad faith is warranted where an attorney 

‘knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues 

a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent.’ 

A party also demonstrates bad faith by ‘delaying or disrupting 

the litigation or hampering enforcement of a court order.’ ” 

Primus Automotive Financial Services, Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 

644, 649 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see New Alaska 

Development Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 

1989) (tactics undertaken with the intent to increase expenses 

or delay may also support a finding of bad faith, even if such 

arguments are meritorious); see B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1307 (“if a 

filing is submitted recklessly, it must be frivolous, while if 

it is not frivolous, it must be intended to harass.... Reckless 

nonfrivolous filings, without more, may not be sanctioned”). 

Because “forceful and effective representation often will call 

for innovative arguments[,] . . . sanctions should be reserved 

for the ‘rare and exceptional case where the action is clearly 

frivolous, legally unreasonable or without legal foundation, or 

brought for an improper purpose.’ ” Primus, 115 F.3d at 649. 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 9 of 15
10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

“The bad faith requirement sets a high threshold” for sanctions 

under § 1927. Id.

As an initial matter, the court concludes that it cannot 

sanction Connecticut General under § 1927 for the filing of its 

complaint in federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive 

relief because “[t]he filing of a complaint may be sanctioned 

pursuant to Rule 11 or a court’s inherent authority, but it may 

not be sanctioned pursuant to § 1927.” In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., 

Securities Litigation, 78 F.3d at 435. This is so because § 

1927 “applies only to unnecessary filings and tactics once a 

lawsuit has begun.” Id. Thus, the question becomes whether 

Connecticut General’s motion seeking to enforce the Spitz

settlement is subject to sanctions. 

In this regard, the Ramseys argue that sanctions are 

warranted because Connecticut General’s underlying theory 

supporting that motion, (i.e., the Spitz settlement precludes 

the Ramseys’ pending state action), has already been rejected by 

several courts. The Ramseys argue that Connecticut General has 

been unambiguously instructed by both federal and state judges 

to resolve this issue in the state action. As such, the Ramseys 

argue that Connecticut General has unreasonably and vexatiously 

multiplied the proceedings by filing another motion seeking to 

enforce the Spitz settlement. In short, the Ramseys argue that 

sanctions are appropriate because Connecticut General has filed 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 10 of 15
11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

its settlement enforcement motion in bad faith for the improper 

purpose of harassment, which has resulted in increased costs. 

The court disagrees. 

A review of the relevant evidence reveals that, to date, no 

court has determined the merits of whether the Spitz settlement 

precludes the Ramseys’ state court action. For instance, on 

January 30, 2006, Judge Walter of the Central District simply 

divested himself of jurisdiction over Connecticut General’s 

motion to enforce the Spitz settlement because he concluded that 

the Ramseys’ state court action raised issues outside the 

settlement and because the settlement enforcement issue was 

already pending in the state action in the form of a res 

judicata defense. Exh. L, attached to Decl. of Craig Farmer 

(“Farmer”), In Support of Defendants’ Mtn. for Sanctions at 

34:23-25; 35:1; 36:1-7, 21:25; 37:1-11. Judge Walter, however, 

did not find that Connecticut General’s motion lacked merit; 

rather, he denied the motion as moot so it could be raised in 

the state action. Id. at 37:9-11. Additionally, on April 26, 

2007, following Connecticut General’s second attempt to enforce 

the Spitz settlement in the Central District,4 the action was 

transferred to the Eastern District without a determination 

 

4 On January 26, 2007, Connecticut General sought to enforce 

the Spitz settlement in the Central District for the second 

time, via a declaratory relief action, after the Ramseys’ 

amended their complaint in the state action on November 3, 2006. 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 11 of 15
12 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

regarding the enforceability of the Spitz settlement. Exh. U, 

attached to Decl. of Farmer.5 Finally, on May 5, 2007, Judge 

Chang of the Sacramento County Superior Court denied Connecticut 

General’s motion to enforce the Spitz settlement on the ground 

that it was procedurally improper, not because it lacked merit. 

Exh. P, attached to Decl. of Farmer. 

Based on the foregoing the court concludes that sanctions 

are not warranted under § 1927. While the court recognizes that 

Connecticut General has sought to enforce the Spitz settlement 

in federal court after being advised by Judge Walter to litigate 

this issue in state court, the court finds that Connecticut 

General’s conduct in this regard was not frivolous, reckless, in 

bad faith, or motivated by an improper purpose.6

 Therefore, the 

 

5

 In that order Judge Real also denied the Ramseys’ motion to 

dismiss without prejudice. Exh. U, attached to Decl. of Farmer. 

 

6 While the court recognizes that sanctions are warranted on 

the basis of harassment where a party files successive motions 

based on propositions of law clearly rejected, (see G.C. & K.B. 

Investments, Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2003)), it does not find that sanctions are warranted under the 

circumstances. Connecticut General’s motion seeking to enforce 

the Spitz settlement has never been clearly rejected by any 

court. Rather, Judge Walter of the Central District simply 

divested himself of jurisdiction over the matter because he 

concluded that the state action included claims outside the 

scope of the Spitz settlement and that the state court could 

resolve the Spitz settlement issue since it was raised as a 

defense in that action. As such, Judge Walter concluded that 

the state action was the better forum to resolve the Spitz

settlement enforcement issue, not that the Spitz settlement 

lacked merit as a viable defense to the Ramseys’ state action or 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 12 of 15
13 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

court concludes that sanctions are not warranted because this is 

not the rare and exceptional case where the conduct is clearly 

frivolous, legally unreasonable, or motivated by an improper 

purpose. 

For these reasons, the court DENIES the Ramseys’ motion for 

sanctions under § 1927. 

C. Inherent Authority 

 The Ramseys’ move pursuant to the court’s inherent 

authority for sanctions on the ground that Connecticut General 

has engaged in bad faith tactics and willfully violated Judge 

Walter’s order by seeking to enforce the Spitz settlement in 

federal court. The Ramseys argue that sanctions are appropriate 

because Connecticut General’s conduct in this regard was 

motivated by the improper purpose of harassment, which has 

resulted in increased costs. 

“A court has the inherent power to sanction a party or its 

lawyers if it acts in “willful disobedience of a court order ... 

 

that there was no legal basis to seek enforcement of the 

settlement in federal court. Therefore, because Connecticut 

General had a legal basis to seek enforcement of the Spitz

settlement in federal court, (see Adams v. Southern Farm Bureau 

Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 2119182 (11th Cir. 2007) (defendant who 

entered into a class-action settlement, release and judgment was 

entitled to enforce that judgment in federal court and enjoin 

former class members from re-litigating claims in state court 

falling within the scope of that settlement and release), the 

court concludes that sanctions are not warranted. The court 

does not find that Connecticut General’s conduct has exceeded 

the bounds of zealous advocacy. 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 13 of 15
14 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

or when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, 

wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,’ as well as for ‘willful[ ] 

abuse [of the] judicial processes.’ ” Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 

1118, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. 

Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980)). Awarding sanctions under the 

court’s inherent power requires a finding of bad faith, or 

conduct tantamount to bad faith. Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1134; 

Thomas Kinkade Co. v. Hazlewood, 2007 WL 1655846, *5 (N.D. Cal. 

2007). “Under this standard, although recklessness, of itself, 

does not justify the imposition of sanctions, sanctions are 

available when recklessness is ‘combined with an additional 

factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper 

purpose.’ Sanctions, then, are justified ‘when a party acts for 

an improper purpose-even if the act consists of making a 

truthful statement or a non-frivolous argument or objection.’ ” 

Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1134 (citing Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 

992-94 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original)). “For purposes 

of imposing sanctions under the inherent power of the court, a 

finding of bad faith does not require that the legal and factual 

basis for the action prove totally frivolous; where a litigant 

is substantially motivated by vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala 

fides, the assertion of a colorable claim will not bar the 

assessment of attorney’s fees.” Fink, 239 F.3d at 992 

(quotation marks omitted). 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 14 of 15
15 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Here, sanctions are not warranted under the court’s 

inherent authority because the Ramseys failed to demonstrate 

that Connecticut General acted in bad faith or for the improper 

purpose of harassment. There is no evidence in the record that 

Connecticut General’s conduct was substantially motivated by 

vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala fides. Therefore, as 

discussed above, because Connecticut General was entitled to 

seek enforcement of the Spitz settlement in federal court, and 

because Judge Walter’s divestment of jurisdiction was not a 

clear rejection of Connecticut General’s right to seek such 

relief, sanctions are not warranted under the circumstances. 

For these reasons, the court DENIES the Ramseys’ motion for 

sanctions under the court’s inherent authority. The court 

however cautions Connecticut General that it has now been 

directed by this court to resolve the Spitz settlement 

enforcement issue in the state action. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For these reasons, the court DENIES the motion for 

sanctions. The court also DENIES Connecticut General’s countermotion for sanctions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2007. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 2:07-cv-00819-RRB-EFB Document 45 Filed 09/19/07 Page 15 of 15