Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04374/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04374-70/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CELERITY, INC.,

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant

 v.

ULTRA CLEAN TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS

AND SERVICE, INC.

Defendant/Counterclaimant

and

ULTRA CLEAN HOLDINGS, INC.

Defendant /

No. C-05-4374 MMC

(Consolidated with C-05-3560 MMC)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND TO

AMEND JUDGMENT; VACATING

HEARING

Before the Court is Ultra Clean Technology Systems and Service, Inc. and Ultra

Clean Holdings, Inc.’s (collectively, “Ultra Clean”) “Motion for a New Trial and to Amend

Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) and (e),” filed December 14, 2007. Celerity,

Inc. (“Celerity”) has filed opposition, to which Ultra Clean has replied. Having read and

considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court deems

the matter suitable for decision thereon, VACATES the hearing scheduled for January 25,

2008, and rules as follows:

1. Contrary to Ultra Clean’s argument, the jury’s findings that Ultra Clean infringed

Claims 1 and 6 of U.S. Patent 6,435,215 (“‘215 Patent”) and that the ‘215 Patent is valid

Case 3:05-cv-04374-MMC Document 609 Filed 01/25/08 Page 1 of 5
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Moreover, Ultra Clean makes no showing as to how such limitation could have

prejudiced Ultra Clean, even if the Court had so construed the ‘215 patent.

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were not “contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.” See Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481

F. 3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth grounds on which motion for new trial may be

granted). To support its positions, Celerity offered substantial evidence in the form of

expert testimony, which the jury was entitled to credit; such testimony constituted, at a

minimum, a “reasonable basis” for the jury’s findings as to infringement and validity. See

id. (holding denial of motion for new trial proper where “reasonable basis” for verdict exists).

2. Contrary to Ultra Clean’s argument, the Court did not, in construing the term

“common surface” in Claims 1 and 6 of the ‘215 Patent, improperly limit the scope of the

claims to a preferred embodiment.1 Rather, as Celerity points out, and as set forth in the

Court’s order of June 1, 2007, the Court construed “common surface” in a manner broad

enough to encompass each preferred embodiment. Further, contrary to Ultra Clean’s

additional argument, Ultra Clean fails to demonstrate the timing of such construction

prejudiced Ultra Clean in any cognizable manner, cf. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v.

Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F. 2d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1980) (setting forth, for purposes of

laches, types of circumstances constituting prejudice by reason of delay, e.g., loss of

witnesses or relevant documents), and, in any event, the Court was not asked to construe

said term until shortly before trial. (See Slenkovich Decl., filed December 29, 2007, Ex. B

at 47:15-23.)

3. Ultra Clean has failed to show the Court erred in its construction of the term

“manifold” in Claims 1 and 6 of the ‘215 Patent. Ultra Clean fails to point to any language in

the specification and/or prosecution history by which Celerity made a “clear disavowal of

claim scope,” thereby limiting the scope of the claims. See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North

America Corp., 299 F. 3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding claim terms are given

“ordinary and accustomed meanings” unless patentee describes invention in intrinsic

record “using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear

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As Ultra Clean prevailed on the issue of infringement with respect to U.S. Patent

6,394,138, the Court finds its unnecessary to consider Ultra Clean’s argument that the

Court erred in construing the term “manifold block” as used in said patent.

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disavowal of claim scope”).2

4. Ultra Clean fails to show the Court’s decision to allow Celerity to present its

infringement case before Ultra Clean presented its invalidity case deprived Ultra Clean of

any substantive right, let alone that such decision resulted in a “miscarriage of justice.” See

Molski, 481 F. 3d at 729 (setting forth grounds on which motion for new trial may be

granted).

5. Ultra Clean fails to show the Court erred in correcting the word “second,” as found

in the paragraph of Claim 6 of the ‘215 Patent beginning “a first manifold,” to read “first.” 

Specifically, Ultra Clean fails to show the Court erred in finding such “correction [was] not

subject to reasonable debate based on consideration of the claim language and the

specification.” See Novo Industries, L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F. 3d 1348, 1357 (Fed.

Cir. 2003). Further, Ultra Clean fails to show the Court erred in finding Ultra Clean was not

prejudiced by the timing of said correction, particularly given that Ultra Clean’s defense with

respect to the alleged infringement of Claim 6 was not based on the claim’s use of the word

“second,” but, rather, on the accused device’s asserted lack of any “bridging components

whatever.” (See Transcript of Jury Trial Proceedings (“TT”) at 1458:1-6.)

6. Ultra Clean correctly observes that Celerity was unsuccessful in its attempt to

elicit from Celerity’s expert witness Alexander D. Glew, Ph.D. (“Dr. Glew”) testimony to

support a finding that the item depicted in Exhibit 109 was a product offered for sale or sold

by Ultra Clean, and, consequently, that the testimony offered by Dr. Glew in response to

such questioning ultimately was irrelevant. Contrary to Ultra Clean’s argument, however,

such testimony did not result in a miscarriage of justice, particularly given the Court’s ruling

that testimony provided by Ultra Clean employee Matthew L. Milburn was sufficient to

support a verdict in favor of Celerity on the issue. (See TT 832:1-23 (stating customers at

trade show were given Ultra Clean brochure listing subject item); see also TT 1306:2-

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1312:9 (setting forth Court’s analysis).)

7. Contrary to Ultra Clean’s argument, the instruction given to the jury on the issue

of obviousness did not advise the jury that a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine

must be found “in” the prior art. Rather, the instruction stated that a teaching, suggestion,

or motivation “may be derived from the prior art itself, from the knowledge of one of

ordinary skill in the art, or from the nature of the problem to be solved,” (see TT 1715:22-

1716:7), which instruction comports with the Supreme Court’s directive not to apply the

“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test in a “rigid” manner. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex

Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739-45 (2007) (holding “in many cases a person of ordinary skill will

be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle”; further

holding “any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and

addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner

claimed”). Moreover, contrary to Ultra Clean’s argument that the jury would have inferred

that a person of ordinary skill must possess an “extraordinary” level of skill, neither said

instruction, nor any other instruction, included language to suggest the jury should

understand the phrase “a person of ordinary skill in the art” to be “a person of extraordinary

skill in the art,” nor did Celerity so argue to the jury.

8. Contrary to Ultra Clean’s argument, Ultra Clean is not a prevailing party entitled

to recover its costs from Celerity. Where, as here, a plaintiff prevails on only some of its

infringement claims against a defendant, the plaintiff nonetheless is the “prevailing party.” 

See Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A. De C.V., 464 F. 3d 1339,

1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding plaintiff to be prevailing party, even though plaintiff

“prevailed on only one of its two infringement claims”).

//

//

//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for a new trial and to amend the

judgment is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 25, 2008 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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