Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02629/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02629-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 120
Nature of Suit: Marine Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1333 Admiralty

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- 1 - 06cv2629

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN WHALEN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv2629 WQH (RBB)

ORDER

(Doc. # 7)

vs.

M/V MILUSKA, OFFICIAL NO.

1041971, her engines, tackle, etc., in rem;

and DAVID GEORGE HOPKINS, and

DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Proper Party

Pursuant to Federal Rule Code of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7)” (“Motion to Dismiss”) (Doc. # 7),

filed by Defendant David George Hopkins (“Mr. Hopkins”).

In his Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Hopkins argues that in this action to quiet title and

discharge a maritime lien, Plaintiff has failed to name a necessary party, “Whalen Holdings,

LLC.” In support of this argument, Mr. Hopkins submits a Declaration from his attorney

stating, “I am informed and believe that the Plaintiff John Whalen, entered into an[] agreement

to create an[] LLC, which LLC was to obtain title to the vessel Miluska. . . . Subsequent to the

agreement to set up an LLC, the undersigned is informed and believes that an oral agreement

was reached by John Whalen and David Anthony Hopkins to restore title of the vessel to

refund $200,000 for the vessel.” (Pascoe Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) In his Brief, Mr. Hopkins states:

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1

 Rule 19 provides:

(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of

process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the

subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the

person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already

parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action

and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that

interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial

risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by

reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court

shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a

plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a

proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and

joinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper, that party

shall be dismissed from the action.

(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as

described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall

determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed

among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus

- 2 - 06cv2629

“[T]he LLC was formed and organized under the laws of the State of Oregon, but the

necessary paper work was never completed to transfer title of the vessel to the LLC.” (Mem.

Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 1-2.)

Plaintiff John Whalen, Jr. (“Mr. Whalen”) opposes the motion, submitting evidence that

Whalen Holdings LLC (“Whalen Holdings”) was not used to transfer title of the vessel

Miluska as originally planned, Whalen Holdings never had title to the Miluska (Whalen Decl.

¶ 3), and Whalen Holdings dissolved on May 12, 2006 (Kammer Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1).

Mr. Hopkins brings his motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7),

which provides that a party may bring a motion to dismiss for “failure to join a party under

Rule 19.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 provides a three-step

process for determining whether the court should dismiss an action for failure to join a

purportedly indispensable party. First, the court must determine whether the absent party is

‘necessary’. . . . If the absent party is ‘necessary,’ the court must determine whether joinder

is ‘feasible.’ Finally, if joinder is not ‘feasible,’ the court must decide whether the absent party

is ‘indispensable,’ i.e., whether in ‘equity and good conscience’ the action can continue

without the party.” U.S. v. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

19).1

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regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include:

first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be

prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by

protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other

measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment

rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff

will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.

- 3 - 06cv2629

In this case, there has been no showing that Whalen Holdings satisfies any of the

requirements of Rule 19. For instance, the “first requirement” is that Whalen Holdings is a

“necessary party.” Bowen, 172 F.3d at 688. “Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) provides that a party is

‘necessary’ in two circumstances: (1) when complete relief is not possible without the absent

party’s presence, or (2) when the absent party claims a legally protected interest in the action.”

Id. (citing Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1996)). The undisputed

evidence shows that Whalen Holdings never had title to the vessel at issue, never claimed any

ownership interest in it, has not asserted any maritime lien on it, and is now a dissolved entity.

Even the movant, Mr. Hopkins, concedes that “the necessary paperwork was never completed

to transfer title of the vessel to the LLC.” (Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 2.) Yet Mr. Hopkins

also states that “Whalen Holdings LLC has a colorable claim to the title of the vessel” (Mem.

Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 3), without explaining the legal basis for this “colorable claim.” Mr.

Hopkins, as the movant, bears the burden of proving that dismissal is warranted. See Biagro

Western Sales Inc. v. Helena Chem. Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1141 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (“A

motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party requires the moving party to bear

the burden in producing evidence in support of the motion.”) (citing Citizen Band Potawatomi

Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Collier, 17 F.3d 1292, 1293 (10th Cir. 1994)); Village of Hotvela

Traditional Elders v. Indian Health Serv., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025 (D. Ariz. 1997) (same).

He has failed to meet his burden of showing that Whalen Holdings is either a necessary or an

indispensable party.

Mr. Hopkins also states that dismissal of this action is appropriate because “there is

already pending an action by and between the parties to resolve the financial dispute as to the

equitable and actual lien which was filed to protect the interest of David Hopkins.” (Mem.

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- 4 - 06cv2629

Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 3.) To the extent Mr. Hopkins is moving for dismissal pursuant to an

abstention doctrine, he has failed to identify which doctrine he is invoking, and to adequately

support his motion with facts demonstrating that the requirements of that doctrine are satisfied

in this case. Cf. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976);

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Brillhart

v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942); Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.

496 (1941).

For the reasons discussed above, Mr. Hopkins’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 7) is

DENIED. 

DATED: May 1, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-02629-JLS-RBB Document 15 Filed 05/01/07 Page 4 of 4