Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00548/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00548-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONNY E. MAXWELL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

M. C. KRAMER, et al., )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:07-cv-00548-OWW-TAG HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 

FOR VIOLATION OF THE ONE-YEAR

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LACK

OF EXHAUSTION

ORDER TO FILE RESPONSE WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

March 23, 2007. (Doc. 1). A preliminary review of the Petition, however, reveals that the petition

may be untimely and that Petitioner has not fully exhausted his state court remedies. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

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The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). The instant petition was filed on March 23, 2007, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of

the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See, Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9 Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus th

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See, id. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner was convicted on March 1, 2004. (Doc. 1, p. 1). The

petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court on May 18, 2005 in the direct state

review of Petitioner’s conviction. (Id. at p. 2). Thus, direct review would have concluded on

August 16, 2005, when the ninety day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court

expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th

Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). Petitioner would have one year th

from August 16, 2005, or until August 16, 2006, absent applicable tolling, within which to file his

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

As mentioned the instant petition was filed on March 23, 2007, over seven months after the

limitations period expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, the

petition is untimely and must be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 1 th

(2000); see, also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321,

1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a

petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all

claims to the state courts first and will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern

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that the limitation period will end before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at

1005. However, the limitations period is not tolled for the time such an application is pending in

federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001). 

Petitioner asserts that he filed a state habeas petition in the Kings County Superior Court,

which was denied in June 9, 2006. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Although Petitioner claims to have filed a habeas

petition in the highest state court, he provides no information or support that he ever filed such a

petition in the California Supreme Court subsequent to June 9, 2006. It appears from the foregoing

that Petitioner would be entitled to some statutory tolling under the AEDPA during the pendency of

his state petition in the Kings County Superior Court. However, Petitioner has not provided the

Court with the date on which that petition was filed, which would be the effective date on which the

statutory tolling would have commenced. Thus, without more information, the Court cannot

determine the amount of statutory tolling to which Petitioner would be entitled or make a preliminary

determination whether the instant petition is in fact timely. As indicated above, the petition appears

to be untimely by seven months. Unless the state court petition was pending in the Kings County

Superior Court for an equal amount of time, the instant petition will be untimely.

However, in an excess of caution, Petitioner will be afforded the opportunity, in his

response to this Order to Show Cause, to provide additional information regarding when and where

he filed his state habeas petition in the Kings County Superior Court. If Petitioner filed additional

state petitions, he should provide information regarding the dates during which those other petitions

were pending, if he believes that the instant petition is timely and that he is entitled to statutory

tolling under the AEDPA. 

 ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of service

of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In his response, Petitioner should provide

the dates on which he filed any state habeas petitions, the names of the courts in which he

filed those petitions, the results, if any, of those petitions, and the dates the results were

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issued. Petitioner should provide, where possible, copies of all petitions filed as well as

copies of the rulings by the state courts.

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in a

Recommendation that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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