Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02179/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02179-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION 

EDNA MAY RICHARDS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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Case No. 2:14-CV-2179-MHH 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1383(c), plaintiff Edna May Richards seeks judicial 

review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The 

Commissioner denied Ms. Richards’s claim for supplemental security income. 

After careful review, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Ms. Richards applied for supplemental security income on September 8, 

2011. (Doc. 7-6, pp. 2-8). Ms. Richards alleges that her disability began 

September 8, 2011. (Doc. 7-6, p. 2). The Commissioner initially denied Ms. 

Richards’s claim on January 25, 2012. (Doc. 7-5, p. 3). Ms. Richards requested a 

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (Doc. 7-5, pp. 10-12). The 

FILED

 2016 Jun-30 PM 07:08

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-02179-MHH Document 13 Filed 06/30/16 Page 1 of 15
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Administrative Law Judge (i.e., the ALJ) issued an unfavorable decision on May 

10, 2013. (Doc. 7-3, p. 17). On September 9, 2014, the Appeals Council declined 

Ms. Richards’s request for review (Doc. 7-3, p. 2), making the Commissioner’s 

decision final and a proper candidate for this Court’s judicial review. See 42 

U.S.C. § 1383(c). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 The scope of review in this matter is limited. “When, as in this case, the 

ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review,” the Court must 

“review the ALJ’s ‘factual findings with deference’ and [his] ‘legal conclusions 

with close scrutiny.’” Riggs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 522 Fed. Appx. 509, 510-11 

(11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)). 

 The Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the 

administrative record to support the ALJ’s factual findings. “Substantial evidence 

is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). When evaluating the administrative record, 

the Court may not “decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence,” or substitute its 

judgment for that of the ALJ. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 631 F.3d 

1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted). If 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual findings, then the Court “must 

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affirm even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings.” 

Costigan v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 603 Fed. Appx. 783, 786 (11th Cir. 2015) 

(citing Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158). 

 With respect to the ALJ’s legal conclusions, the Court must determine 

whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. If the Court finds an error in 

the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide 

sufficient reasoning to demonstrate that the ALJ conducted a proper legal analysis, 

then the Court must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 

1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991). 

III. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S DECISION 

To determine whether a claimant has proven that she is disabled, an ALJ 

follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. The ALJ considers: 

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or 

equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of 

Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past 

relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are 

significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant 

can perform given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work 

experience. 

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178. 

 In this case, the ALJ found that Ms. Richards has not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since September 8, 2011, the alleged onset date. (Doc. 7-3, p. 22). 

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The ALJ determined that Ms. Richards suffers from the following severe 

impairments: bilateral osteoarthritis of the knees, obesity, hypertension, carpal 

tunnel syndrome of the right upper extremity, major depressive disorder with 

psychotic features, and borderline intellectual functioning. (Doc. 7-3, p. 22). The 

ALJ also found that Ms. Richards suffers from right upper extremity acromial 

bursitis, but the impairment is not severe. (Doc. 7-3, p. 22). Based on a review of 

the medical evidence, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Richards does not have an 

impairment or a combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the 

severity of any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. (Doc. 7-3, p. 23). 

 Given Ms. Richards’s impairments, the ALJ evaluated Ms. Richards’s 

residual functional capacity. The ALJ determined that Ms. Richards has the RFC 

to: 

perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 416.967(b) except that she 

can no more than occasionally climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She 

can frequently climb ramps or stairs, balance and stoop, and no more 

than occasionally crouch, kneel, or crawl. She should avoid any 

exposure to unprotected heights. From a non-exertional mental 

perspective, she is limited to carrying out, understanding, and 

remembering simple instructions. She can do so for 8 hours with 

normal and customary two hour periods of time between breaks. The 

setting should have no more than occasional, gradually introduced, 

well explained changes, with occasional interaction with the public 

and coworkers, and no tandem tasks. As it relates to the learning of 

the job or performance of the job, no reading or writing should be 

required; the tasks must be able to be demonstrated so that the 

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individual can learn them without any reading of instructions or 

writing. 

 (Doc. 7-3, pp. 24-25) The ALJ also found that Ms. Richards’s past work as a 

housekeeper did not rise to the level of earnings necessary to qualify as past 

relevant work. (Doc. 7-3, p. 30). Relying on testimony from a vocational expert, 

the ALJ concluded that jobs exist in the national economy that Ms. Richards can 

perform, including cleaner/housekeeper, label marker, and automatic car wash 

attendant. (Doc. 7-3, p. 31). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Ms. Richards 

has not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

(Doc. 7-3, p. 31). 

IV. ANALYSIS 

Ms. Richards argues that she is entitled to relief from the ALJ’s decision 

because the ALJ’s residual functional capacity findings for light work are not 

consistent with the evidence in the administrative record concerning severe and 

non-severe impairments and because the ALJ erred by giving little weight to an 

opinion from Ms. Richards’s treating psychiatrist. The Court examines each issue 

in turn. 

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Determination 

that Ms. Richards Can Perform Light Work. 

 When an ALJ makes a residual functional capacity or RFC assessment, the 

ALJ evaluates an applicant’s ability to perform work activities on a sustained basis 

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despite the limitations that the applicant’s impairments create. Mafa v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 291 Fed. Appx. 261, 263 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R § 404.1545 

(a)). An ALJ must “consider[] all of the evidence in the record in determining the 

claimant’s RFC.” Himes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 585 Fed. Appx. 758, 764 (11th 

Cir. 2014). Here, the ALJ found that Ms. Richards has the RFC to perform light 

work with a number of postural and non-exertional limitations. (Doc. 7-3, pp. 24-

25). 

 Light work is defined as “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with 

frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds...a job is in this 

category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves 

sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). Light work also requires that a claimant stand or walk for 

up to 6 hours and sit for up to 2 hours in an 8-hour workday. SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 

31251, at * 6. 

 Ms. Richards contends that the evidence in the administrative record is not 

sufficient to support the ALJ’s conclusion that she has the residual functional 

capacity to perform light work because the ALJ did not account for the findings of 

consultative examiner Shabrez Tariq. (Doc. 11, p. 6). On October 29, 2011, Dr. 

Tariq performed a consultative examination at the request of the Social Security 

Administration. (Doc. 7-10, pp. 32-35). Under the heading “General Findings,” 

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Dr. Tariq noted: “[Ms Richards] has right-sided Phalen’s test and right hand is 

positive. Tinel was equivocal. She had bilateral crepitus in her knees, left knee 

more severe that the right one. She has medial joint line tenderness.” (Doc. 7-10, 

p. 35). Dr. Tariq made the following diagnoses: “1. Bilateral knee osteoarthritis 

and severe crepitus with medial join line tenderness, left worse than right. 2. 

Right carpal tunnel syndrome with positive right Phalen’s test. 3. Left shoulder 

pain.” (Doc. 7-10, p. 35). 

 As the ALJ recognized, Dr. Tariq found that Ms. Richards’s impairments do 

not limit her activity significantly. (Doc. 7-3, p. 26). The ALJ explained that Dr. 

Tariq noted that despite her complaints about pain, Ms. Richards could walk to the 

exam room without assistance, “sit comfortably in a chair,” and “get on and off the 

examination table without difficulty.” (Doc. 7-3, p. 26). Dr. Tariq’s written report 

supports the ALJ’s finding. (See Doc. 7-10, p. 33). Moreover, notwithstanding 

complaints about knee and shoulder pain (for which, Dr. Tariq noted, Ms. Richards 

had no had history of injury or trauma), the ALJ explained that Dr. Tariq found 

that Ms. Richards had full range of motion in her shoulders and knees. (Doc. 7-3, 

p. 26). Again, Dr. Tariq’s report substantiates the ALJ’s finding. (See Doc. 7-10, 

pp. 32-35). 

 A finding of disability hinges on the functional limitations that accompany a 

condition, not the existence of the condition itself. See Obsborn v.Barnhart, 194 

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Fed. Appx. 654, 667 (11th Cir. 2006) (“the ‘severity’ of a medically ascertained 

disability must be measured in terms of its effect upon ability to work, and not 

simply in terms of deviation from purely medical standards of bodily perfection or 

normality”); Wind v. Barnhart, 133 Fed. Appx. 684, 690 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting 

that a diagnosis alone does not constitute a limitation); see also 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1521(a) (“An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it 

does not significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work 

activities”). Because Dr. Tariq’s records do not indicate that he found that Ms. 

Richards’s knee and shoulder pain and carpal tunnel syndrome significantly 

limited her functioning, it was within the ALJ’s province, when considering the 

entire record, to determine that despite Ms. Richards’s physical impairments, Ms. 

Richards could perform light work with various postural limitations. 

 Reports from other examining physicians are consistent with Dr. Tariq’s 

assessment. Dr. Ashima Malik examined Ms. Richards on July 19, 2012. (Doc. 7-

10, p. 94). During this visit, Ms. Richards complained about pain in her right 

shoulder and neck pain. (Doc. 7-10, p. 94). Ms. Richards denied tingling or loss 

of sensation in her hands, and Dr. Malik noted 5/5 strength in Ms. Richards’s upper 

right extremity with pain present past 90 degrees of movement. Dr. Malik treated 

Ms. Richards’s right arm acromial bursitis with Solu-Medrol and a lidocaine 

injection. (Doc. 7-10, p. 95). 

Case 2:14-cv-02179-MHH Document 13 Filed 06/30/16 Page 8 of 15
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 When Ms. Richards saw Dr. Vyjayanthi Ganga a few months later on 

November 6, 2012, Ms. Richards reported that the injection that she received from 

Dr. Malik helped her shoulder pain improve, but she stated that she still 

experienced shoulder pain and bilateral knee pain. Dr. Ganga made no 

examination findings or diagnoses concerning Ms. Richards’s shoulder pain, and 

Ms. Richards declined Tramadol or Ultram as treatment for her osteoarthritis. 

(Doc. 7-10, p. 100). When Ms. Richards saw Dr. Ganga again on December 11, 

2012, Ms. Richards again refused Tramadol or Ultram for her osteoarthritis. 

Instead, she continued using Celebrex and Tylenol to treat her pain. (Doc. 7-10, 

pp. 104-105). 

 When Ms. Richards saw Dr. Malik and Dr. Ganga in 2012, she described no 

symptoms resulting from her carpal tunnel syndrome, and she has not reported 

symptoms since October 29, 2011 when she was initially diagnosed. (Doc. 7-10, 

pp. 94, 97-98). 

 Accordingly, the ALJ’s residual functional capacity findings are consistent 

with the medical evidence in the record. 

 Ms. Richards argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by 

substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly account for Ms. Richards’s 

obesity. (Doc. 7, pp. 6-7). The Court disagrees. 

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 Social Security Ruling 02-1p states that an ALJ must assess the impact that a 

claimant’s obesity will have on her ability to work and must recognize specifically 

the limitations in functions such as climbing, balancing, stooping, or crouching that 

a claimant may experience because of her obesity. See SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 

34686281, at *5. In his opinion, the ALJ discussed Ms. Richards’s obesity.1

 At 

the outset of his opinion, the ALJ found that Ms. Richards’s obesity is a severe 

impairment. (Doc. 7-3, p. 22). Later in the opinion, the ALJ explained: 

[Ms. Richards’s] obesity, while not stated by any physician to be 

disabling, was considered in terms of its possible effects on [her] 

ability to work. Although obesity is no longer a listed impairment, the 

undersigned has considered Social Security Ruling 02-1p, effective 

September 12, 2002, which states that an individual with obesity will 

be found to meet the requirements of a listing if there is an 

impairment that, in combination with obesity, meets the criteria of a 

listing. Obesity may be found medically equivalent to a listed 

impairment if the obesity causes the same functional limitations as 

other impairments. It may also be determined that the combination of 

obesity and other impairments results in signs, symptoms, and 

laboratory findings that are of equal medical significance to one of the 

listings. In the present case, the claimant’s obesity is not so severe as 

to prevent all ambulation, reaching, orthopaedic or postural 

maneuvers. It does, however, in combination with the claimant’s 

bilateral osteoarthritis of the knees, reduce her abilities to climb, 

balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl. A reduction to work with 

light exertional demands and additional appropriate work restrictions 

is therefore warranted, and these limitations are accounted for in the 

residual functional capacity as determined herein. 

 1 According to her medical records, in 2011, Ms. Richards weighed approximately 203 pounds 

and was 5 foot 4 inches tall. (Doc. 7-10, p. 33). Her BMI was 34.8. (Doc. 7-10, p. 46). 

Consequently, she is considered obese based on standards promulgated by the National Heart, 

Lung and Blood Institute. (http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov). 

Case 2:14-cv-02179-MHH Document 13 Filed 06/30/16 Page 10 of 15
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(Doc. 7-3, p. 27). The ALJ properly applied Social Security Ruling 02-1p and 

evaluated Ms. Richards’s obesity. See Castel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 355 Fed. 

Appx. 260, 264 (11th Cir. 2009) (ALJ properly considered claimant’s obesity 

when the ALJ acknowledged the diagnosis of obesity, cited SSR 02-1p, and 

determined that the claimant’s obesity was a severe impairment). 

 Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s residual function assessment for 

Ms. Richards. 

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Decision to Give Dr. 

 Julian’s Opinion Little Weight. 

 Ms. Richards contends that the ALJ did not give adequate weight to the 

opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Rachel Julian. An ALJ must give 

considerable weight to a treating physician’s medical opinion if the opinion is 

supported by the evidence and consistent with the doctor’s records. See Winschel, 

631 F.3d at 1179. An ALJ may refuse to give the opinion of a treating physician 

“substantial or considerable weight... [if] ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” 

Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004). Good cause exists 

when “(1) [the] treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) 

[the] evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) [the] treating physician’s 

opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” 

Id. 1240-41; see also Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159. The ALJ “must state with 

particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons 

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therefor.” Gaskin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 Fed. Appx. 929, 931 (11th Cir. 

2013) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

 In this case, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Julian’s opinion because the 

opinion was inconsistent with Dr. Julian’s treatment notes, treatment notes from 

other physicians, and findings from consultative examiners. The ALJ also found 

that Dr. Julian’s opinion was inconsistent with Ms. Richards’s activities of daily 

living. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. 

Julian’s opinion because the opinion is inconsistent with the evidence in the 

administrative record. 

 In March 2012, Dr. Julian completed a pre-printed questionnaire for Ms. 

Richards. (Doc. 7-10, pp. 73-74). Dr. Julian found marked impairments in all 

areas of functioning: activities of daily living; maintaining social functioning; 

deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace resulting in frequent failure to 

complete tasks in a timely manner (in work setting or elsewhere); ability to 

respond to customary work pressures; ability to understand, carry out, and 

remember instructions in a work setting; ability to respond appropriately to 

supervision and co-workers in a work setting; and ability to perform repetitive 

tasks in a work setting. (Doc. 7-10, p. 73-74). Dr. Julian stated that no 

psychological evaluation was obtained for purposes of the opinion, and Dr. Julian 

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did not express an opinion about whether Ms. Richards’s impairments had lasted or 

could be expected to last for 12 months. (Doc. 7-10, p. 74). 

 Dr. Julian’s March 2012 assessment is at odds with Ms. Richards’s medical 

records. In August 2011, Dr. Julian noted that Ms. Richards was feeling much 

better, that she was “busy and active [with] family and friends” and “doing OK 

overall.” (Doc. 7-10, p. 4). In December 2011, consultative examiner Dr. Holly 

Deemer evaluated Ms. Richards and found no evidence of psychosis. (Doc. 7-10, 

p. 38). Dr. Deemer found that Ms. Richards was able to perform many of the 

activities of daily living. (Id.). Dr. Deemer diagnosed Ms. Richards with “Major 

Depressive Disorder, recurrent, severe with psychotic features” and “Suspected 

Below Average Intellectual Functioning,” and Dr. Deemer noted that Ms. 

Richards’s “medication regimen is very helpful although she reported difficulty 

getting her medications due to lack of transportation and finances.” (Doc. 7-10, p. 

39). Based on her examination, Dr. Deemer concluded: 

it is expected that Ms. Richards would be able to understand, recall, 

and carry out only simple instructions consistent with the types of jobs 

she has held in the past. She appears able to respond appropriately to 

supervision, coworkers, and work pressures in a work setting with her 

current medication regimen, although it seems her psychiatric status is 

fragile. Her prognosis is stable. 

(Doc. 7-10, p. 39). 

 In January 2012, Dr. Carolyn Horton performed a consultative examination 

of Ms. Richards. (Doc. 7-10, pp. 42-44). Ms. Richards “appear[ed] to be 

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experiencing symptoms of depression which were reported to show improvement 

with her current medication.” (Doc. 7-10, p. 44). Dr. Horton found that Ms. 

Richards was “functioning in the overall borderline range of intelligence” and had 

poor vision “even though she was wearing glasses.” (Doc. 7-10, p. 44). Based on 

her examination, Dr. Horton concluded that Ms. Richards “has the ability to 

understand, carry out and remember simple work instructions consistent with the 

types of jobs she has done in the past. With her current medications, she should be 

able to respond appropriately to supervision and coworkers in a low stress work 

setting.” (Doc. 7-10, p. 44). 

 Dr. Julian’s opinion contradicts not only Ms. Richards’s medical reports but 

also Ms. Richards’s description of her activities of daily living. See Wind v. 

Barnhart, 133 Fed. Appx. 684, 692 (11th Cir. 2005) (ALJ may consider a 

claimant’s daily activities when making a RFC determination). In her adult 

function report, Ms. Richards stated that she cleans her landlord’s home in 

exchange for rent. (Doc. 7-7, p. 15). Ms. Richards testified at her hearing and in 

her adult function report that she does laundry and light cleaning, interacts with 

friends and family, finishes tasks she starts, and follows spoken instructions “pretty 

well.” (Doc. 7-3, pp. 23-24, 50, 52; Doc. 7-7, p. 20). 

 Because substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion 

that Dr. Julian’s opinion is inconsistent with medical evidence in the record and 

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Ms. Richards’s activities of daily living, the Court finds that the ALJ had good 

cause to give the treating psychiatrist’s opinion less weight. See e.g., Crawford,

363 F.3d at 1159-61 (substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to 

discredit the opinions of the claimant’s treating physicians where the physicians’ 

opinions regarding claimant’s disability were inconsistent with the physicians’ 

treatment notes and unsupported by the medical evidence); Good v. Astrue, 240 

Fed. Appx. 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2007) (ALJ identified good cause to reject the 

treating physician’s opinion in part because “the opinion was inconsistent with the 

other evidence in the record from [the claimant’s] own testimony”). 

V. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ applied proper legal standards. 

The Court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner. Accordingly, the Court affirms the Commissioner. The Court will 

enter a separate final judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion. 

DONE and ORDERED this June 30, 2016.

 _________________________________ 

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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