Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02393/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02393-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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ORDER * 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SACRAMENTO DIVISION

JERALD RANDALL,

Plaintiff,

v.

O. SMITH, D. VanLEER, T.

ROBERTSON, MD McDONALD, T.

FELKER, and N. GRANNIS,

Defendants.

NO. CV-08-2393-EFS (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL, GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS, AND CLOSING

FILE

Before the Court, without oral argument, are Plaintiff Jerald

Randall’s Ex Parte Motion for Assignment of Counsel (Ct. Rec. 16) and

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Ct. Rec. 18). After reviewing the

submitted materials and relevant authority, the Court, as explained

below, denies Plaintiff’s motion and grants Defendants’ motion.

A. Assignment of Counsel 

Section 1915 does not provide a court with authority to require an

attorney to represent a plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1915; Mallard v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). A court

may, however, request that an attorney represent a pro se plaintiff under

exceptional circumstances. Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th

Cir. 1997). In determining whether “exceptional circumstances exist, the

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ORDER * 2

district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on the merits

[and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in

light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

The Court concludes that exceptional circumstances do not exist to

request that an attorney represent Plaintiff. The alleged facts and

legal issues involved are relatively straight-forward. Also, as set

forth below, the Court determines that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed

because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff’s

motion to appoint counsel is denied.

B. Failure to Exhaust

Plaintiff asserts two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims: 1) Defendant Smith

required Plaintiff to room with an inmate, who was allegedly an adverse

gang member, and 2) Defendant VanLeer denied Plaintiff access to the yard

in contravention of physician orders – an action that was brought to the

attention of Defendants Robertson, McDonald, Felker, and Grannis.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42

U.S.C. § 1997e. As to Plaintiff’s first claim, Defendants submit that

Plaintiff failed to pursue it at the third and final administrative

grievance level. As to Plaintiff’s second claim, Defendants contend that

Plaintiff failed to grieve it entirely.

The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect

to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] . . . by a prisoner . . .

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42

U.S.C. § 1997e. Exhaustion is mandatory. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.

731, 741 (2001). Exhaustion also must be proper. Woodford v. Ngo, 548

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26 Plaintiff had a fair opportunity to develop a record by filing a 1

response and a surreply.

ORDER * 3

U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (holding that an inmate’s exhaustion must be in

compliance with applicable grievance procedures, specifically deadlines,

because “no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing

some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings”). Strict

exhaustion requirements promote judicial efficiency and allow “prison

officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of

their responsibilities before being haled into court.” Jones v. Block,

549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). 

The PLRA exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional; rather, it

creates an affirmative defense that a defendant may raise in a nonenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. See id. at 199 (“[I]nmates are not

required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their

complaints.”); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117-19 (9th Cir. 2003),

cert. denied sub nom. Alameida v. Wyatt, 540 U.S. 810 (2003). The

defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of

exhaustion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. While a district court may look

beyond the pleadings in deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, it must assure itself that the prisoner

has fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record. Id. at 1120

n.14.1

It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed a grievance challenging

Defendant Smith’s order to room him with an inmate of a competing gang,

and that he pursued this grievance at the second level. Plaintiff also

appealed the second-level decision to the third and final level – the

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ORDER * 4

Director’s level; however, the appealed grievance was returned because

it was incomplete. Plaintiff contends that he resent his grievance to

the Director’s Level, alleging that he “enclosed the document [the

Director] asked for and mailed the grievance back to [the Director] on

or around July 15th 2008 [sic]. I still have not received or had my

grievance returned to me. . . . The Department of Corrections has a long

and consistent history of ‘misplacing’ inmate grievances in an attempt

to block access to the courts.” There is no evidence that it was

received by the Director. 

Although Plaintiff may have attempted to send the completed

grievance appeal to the Director, it is undisputed that the Director had

not addressed Plaintiff’s third-level appeal before this lawsuit was

filed on October 9, 2008. When Plaintiff did not hear from the Director,

Plaintiff’s recourse was to inquire as to the appeal’s status with the

Director, rather than file this lawsuit. Such an inquiry would have

disclosed to Plaintiff that the Director had not received the complete

grievance appeal and thereby ensured that the PLRA’s purpose of allowing

prison officials to resolve this dispute was met. Because Plaintiff’s

third-level appeal was not complete before this lawsuit was filed,

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See also Veloz

v. New York, 339 F. Supp. 2d 505, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[P]laintiff’s

allegation that these particular grievances were misplaced or destroyed

by correctional officers ultimately does not relieve him of the

requirement to appeal these claims to the next level once it became clear

to him that a response to his initial filing was not forthcoming.”);

Nunez v. Goord, 172 F. Supp. 2d 417, 428-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that

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ORDER * 5

prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he failed to

followup his alleged letter to the superintendent).

Plaintiff failed to rebut Defendants’ documentation that he failed

to administratively grieve his second denial-of-yard-access claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s second § 1983 claim is also dismissed for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

C. Conclusion

For the above-given reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for Assignment of Counsel (Ct. Rec.

16) is DENIED.

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Ct. Rec. 18) is GRANTED.

3. Judgment is to be entered in Defendants’ favor.

4. This file shall be CLOSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to enter

this Order and provide a copy to Plaintiff and counsel.

DATED this 19 day of February 2010. th

 S/ Edward F. Shea 

EDWARD F. SHEA

United States District Judge

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