Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00241/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00241-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYONG HWA WOLTER, et al.,

NO. CIV. S-07-241 LKK/CMK

Plaintiffs,

v.

O R D E R

PETER D. KEISLER, Acting

Attorney General, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff Gary Wolter is a U.S. citizen who filed an immigrant

visa petition on behalf of his plaintiff wife, Kyong Hwa Wolter.

Defendant, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, denied the

petition on the grounds that Mrs. Wolter previously entered into

a fraudulent marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws.

Plaintiffs challenge that denial under the Administrative

Procedures Act and argue that defendants lacked substantial

evidence to support their decision. Pending before the court are

cross-motions for summary judgment. The court resolves the matters

on the parties’ papers and after oral argument. For the reasons

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26 1 The facts are basically undisputed.

2

explained below, plaintiffs’ motion is granted and defendants’

motion is denied.

I. Facts1

Plaintiff Kyong Hwa Wolter is a South Korean citizen who has

brought suit against defendants U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Services (CIS), Acting Attorney General Peter Keisler, Secretary

of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, and Officer in Charge of the

CIS at the American Embassy in Seoul, South Korea Jose Olivares.

Mrs. Wolter initially entered the U.S. on November 17, 1983.

Administrative Record (AR) 109-10; 121-23. She married a man named

Johnny Ray Rowe in Texas on March 12, 1984, and later divorced him

on February 11, 1985. AR 213; 15. The validity of that marriage

is the central subject of dispute between the parties.

On February 21, 1986, Mrs. Wolter, then 21 years old,

attempted to enter the U.S. at Las Cruces, New Mexico. AR 42. She

was taken into custody and questioned by a Border Patrol agent.

The agent then prepared a written sworn statement for Mrs. Wolter

to sign. AR 34. The statement indicated that the interview was

conducted in English and that no interpreter was used. AR 34-35.

Although she was warned that her admissions could be used against

her in future proceedings, the warning was also in English. AR 34.

According to the statement, Mrs. Wolter admitted that she offered

Mr. Rowe $4,000 to marry her and obtain a green card on her behalf.

AR 35. She allegedly paid him either $1,500 or $2,000 and was

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2 A U.S. citizen may petition for an immigrant visa for an

alien spouse by filing an I-130. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i),

1154(a)(1)(A)(i).

3

planning on paying him the rest after he obtained the green card,

but he never did so. Id. 

Mrs. Wolter was detained and placed in deportation proceedings

for having stayed in the U.S. without authority. AR 143. Through

counsel, she requested release on bond, which was granted, and

indicated that she would seek to adjust her status on the basis

that she was engaged to marry a man named Jerry Hubble. AR 50-52.

The government opposed Mrs. Wolter’s attempt to adjust status,

citing her sworn statement admitting marriage fraud. AR 142.

Although Mrs. Wolter married Mr. Hubble in Nevada on April 18,

1986, AR 216, she failed to submit an application for relief from

deportation or appear at the hearing. On September 2, 1986, the

immigration judge issued an order of deportation in absentia. AR

195-96.

Mrs. Wolter divorced Mr. Hubble on May 2, 1988. AR 214. She

then married plaintiff Gary John Wolter, a U.S. citizen, in South

Korea on March 26, 1993. AR 11. Mr. Wolter has filed a series of

three (ultimately unsuccessful) I-130 immediate relative alien

petitions on behalf of Mrs. Wolter.2 The first filed on October

15, 1993 was granted but revoked when CIS discovered that the

Wolters failed to disclose that Mrs. Wolter had previously been

married and ordered deported. 

The second petition filed on February 4, 1998 properly

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3 Section 204(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

provides that “no petition shall be approved if (1) the alien

[sought] an immediate relative or preference status as the spouse

of a citizen of the United States . . . by reason of a marriage

determined by the Attorney General to have been entered into for

purpose of evading the immigrations laws or (2) the Attorney

General has determined that the alien has attempted or conspired

to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the

immigrations laws.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).

4

 Of course, this statement is hearsay. In the opposition to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Mrs. Wolter submitted an

4

disclosed the prior marriages and deportation. Nevertheless, CIS

issued a notice of intent to deny the petition on the basis that

Mrs. Wolter previously entered into a fraudulent marriage and

conspired to do so for purposes of evading immigration laws.3

Plaintiffs responded that Mrs. Wolter’s English skills were very

poor at the time the sworn statement was taken and that she had

been merely told to sign off on the statement. AR 23. 

She also submitted two supporting letters. One was from a

friend who had known Mrs. Wolter since 1980 and stated that Mrs.

Wolter “didn’t have any command or understanding of English . . .

at the time of her signing the [sworn statement].” AR 27. The

second was from a friend who also knew Mrs. Wolter from South Korea

and maintains that when she met with Mrs. Wolter in the U.S., Mrs.

Wolter still did not know English; indeed, the letter states that

Mrs. Wolter did not take English language classes until after the

incident in New Mexico when she was detained. AR 29. This second

friend also maintains the Border Patrol agents told Mrs. Wolter

that if she signed at the places they pointed to on the statement,

she could leave.4 Id.

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affidavit indicating the same facts. Aff. of Kyong Hwa Wolter at

1 (“[The Border Patrol agent] said that if I would just initial

where he pointed, I could go. I couldn’t understand what he was

saying, so he showed me what initials were by writing my initials

and telling me to do the same. I was coerced into signing my name,

and he never showed me what he was writing on paper.”).

Nevertheless, in adjudicating the pending motions, the court has

not relied upon the affidavit, which was not part of the

administrative record before the agency and therefore is not

properly before the court now.

5

 The second petition was denied on April 18, 2000. Finally,

on August 17, 2004, plaintiffs filed their third petition. AR 183-

84. On September 19, 2004, CIS issued a notice of intent to deny

the I-130 for the same reasons as the second petition, which became

final on November 5, 2004. AR 180-81. Mr. Wolter appealed the

denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals, who denied the appeal

on October 2, 2006. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this action,

which seeks declaratory relief.

II. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

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6

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before

the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of

summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id.

at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in

the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

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support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir.

1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass’n of

Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and that the dispute is

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-

49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200

F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of

fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.

Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine

need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see

also Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No.

20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

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8

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th

Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed,

see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that

may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn

in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587

(citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)

(per curiam)); see also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of

Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless,

inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602

F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

Plaintiffs challenge the denial of the I-130 petition for

alien relative pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act

(APA). The APA permits courts to set aside agency action that

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9

is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706. The

underlying laws at issue here include the statute providing that

spouses of U.S. citizens may be issued immigrant visas, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1151, and the statute directing that visa petitions be denied

for fraudulent marriages, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).

Applying this standard to the facts of this case,

defendants must have had substantial evidence that Mrs. Wolter

previously entered into a fraudulent marriage. See Nakamoto v.

Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that

whether marriage fraud has been committed is "an intrinsically

fact-specific question, which we review under the substantial

evidence standard"); Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v.

Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984) (the "Service

retains at least the burden of producing substantial evidence

supporting its determination"); see also 8 C.F.R. §

204.2(a)(1)(ii) (directing denial of visa petitions upon

"substantial and probative evidence" of marriage fraud). The

agency ordinarily "should not give conclusive effect to

determinations made in a prior proceeding" but may, if extant,

rely upon "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that

[the] beneficiary [of the petition] became a party to a

fraudulent marriage." Matter of Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166

(BIA 1990).

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency, even if it might arrive at a different conclusion. 

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10

Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Rather, when reviewing for sustantial

evidence, the duty of the court is to determine whether there is

"such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison v. NLRB,

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 

A.

Defendants raise essentially two arguments: one procedural

and one substantive. Turning first to the procedural argument,

defendants argue that plaintiffs’ present action amounts to an

impermissible collateral attack on the deportation proceedings. 

See Ramirez-Juarez v. I.N.S., 633 F.2d 174, 175-76 (1980) (“an

alien cannot collaterally attack an earlier exclusion or

deportation at a subsequent deportation hearing, in the absence

of a gross miscarriage of justice at the prior proceedings”);

Tejeda-Mata v. I.N.S., 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980) (“There

is nothing in the record . . . suggesting that petitioner, who

has at all times been represented by counsel, raised the

question . . . before either the Immigration Judge or the

Board.”).

The argument is without merit. Plaintiffs are not

challenging -- either directly or indirectly -- the 1986 order

of deportation. Based on the record in existence at the time,

and Mrs. Wolter’s failure to appear at the deportation hearing,

the immigration judge had ample grounds to issue the deportation

order, and plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. Instead, what

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plaintiffs challenge is the factual predicate that underlies

both the deportation proceedings and her I-130 petition: the

sworn statement purporting to admit marriage fraud. Although

plaintiffs did not challenge the admissibility or reliability of

that statement in the deportation proceedings, they did

challenge the statement in the I-130 proceedings, as reflected

in the record. AR 23-30 (plaintiffs’ response to notice of

intent to deny petition). Accordingly, any suggestion that

plaintiffs failed to raise this argument earlier before the

agency is incorrect.

 Defendants’ reliance on Eide-Kahayon v. I.N.S., 86 F.3d

147 (9th Cir. 1996), is also misplaced. There, the petitioner

attempted to dispute the allegedly false testimony that she

provided at an earlier proceeding. The Ninth Circuit held that

she was “collaterally estopped from raising this issue.” Id. at

149. Crucially, however, the court noted that it had previously

ruled on this issue in a separate appeal, which found that

“[t]he BIA’s decision [involving her false testimony] [was]

supported by substantial evidence.” Eide-Kahayon v. I.N.S., 5

F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, as explained below, CIS’ denial

of the I-130 was not supported by substantial evidence. 

Moreover, the agency should generally make fresh determinations

based on the evidence before it, rather than give conclusive

effect to determinations made in prior proceedings. Matter of

Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 168.

////

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5

 That the I-213 Record of Deportable Alien form prepared by

the border patrol agent mirrors the facts set forth in the sworn

statement is hardly surprising. AR 42. The I-213 is essentially

a recorded recollection of the agent’s conversation with the alien.

Espinoza v. I.N.S., 45 F.3d 308, 309 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). If the

agent misunderstood Mrs. Wolter, that misunderstanding would be

evident both in the statement prepared for Mrs. Wolter and in the

agent’s own summary of the conversation; to construe these as two

separate pieces of evidence would be double-counting.

Moreover, “[a] petitioner who produced probative evidence that

contradicts anything material on the I-213 would cast doubt upon

its reliability. In that case, the factfinder would be hard put

to find the I-213 clear and convincing evidence of alien status

without the government's producing evidence to show the reliability

of the information on the I-213.” Id. at 311. Here, plaintiffs

have done precisely that. AR 23-30.

Aside from the I-213, defendants also argue that the agency

may rely on the inferences of marriage fraud that may be drawn from

a sequence of events. In Roe v. I.N.S., 771 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.

1985), for example, the court found substantial evidence of

marriage fraud where the petitioner had gotten divorced and

remarried on the same day. Although Mrs. Wolter may have had a

series of unsuccessful marriages -- which is hardly unusual even

among American citizens -- the facts of this case do not begin to

approach those of Roe.

6 The agency's statement that Mrs. Wolter "[did] not state

that the contents of the sworn statement were untrue," AR 132,

relies on an overly-technical reading of her letter. It is obvious

that even at the time she wrote the letter in 1998, her English

skills were still only rudimentary; accordingly, she simply asked

that the agency "[r]emove the sworn statement." AR 25. Even if

12

B.

Defendants’ substantive argument fares no better. The only

evidence to support the agency’s denial of the petition is Mrs.

Wolter’s sworn statement.5

 As Mrs. Wolter explained to the

agency in a letter, however, her English was very poor at the

time. AR 23. This was corroborated by two other letters from

people who knew Mrs. Wolter in 1986. AR 27-30. Mrs. Wolter

further claimed that the statement was inaccurate, and therefore

disavowed its contents.6 AR 23 (“the ‘admissions’ . . . were

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that request was not enough to show that Mrs. Wolter disputed the

statement's contents (and it was), the letter from her attorney

also indicates that the statement was inaccurate. AR 23.

13

neither informed nor accurate”); AR 25 (requesting that the

agency “remove the sworn statement").

Even under the deferential standard of review this court is

bound to apply in reviewing agency actions, this is not

substantial evidence. The facts of Guzman-Guzman v. I.N.S., 559

F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1977), are instructive. There, the

petitioner was a permanent-resident alien charged with being

deportable for assisting aliens to enter the U.S. illegally. 

Id. at 1150. The petitioner had been detained by a California

Highway Patrol officer while driving a car with four alien

passengers. Id. In due course, all four aliens signed

statements written in English indicating that they each paid

petitioner $50 to help them enter the U.S. Id. None of the

aliens spoke or read English. Id.

At trial, the aliens testified that the statements

reflected a misunderstanding about payment and that any payment

to the petitioner was intended to be voluntary on their part. 

Id. Nevertheless, after viewing the demeanor of the aliens, the

immigration judge found that petitioner had knowingly assisted

the aliens in illegally entering the U.S. Id.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the statements,

“when contradicted by their authors who neither spoke nor read

the language in which they were written,” could not “clear the

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7

 Presumably, then, the presumption that “public officials

perform their duties without motive or interest,” Keith v. Volpe,

858 F.2d 467, 481 (9th Cir. 1988), was also inadequate to shield

the evidence from attacks on its reliability. In any event, one

need not impute improper motives to public officials when it is

just as likely (if not more likely) that a public official simply

misunderstood the non-English speaker.

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[] demanding barrier of ‘reasonable, substantial, and

probative’” evidence.7

 Id. Similarly, here, Mrs. Wolter could

not speak or read English at the time she signed the sworn

statement and she has disavowed its contents. AR 23-30. 

Indeed, her poor command over the English language was

corroborated by Mrs. Wolter’s acquaintances. Id. Moreover,

whereas the immigration judge in Guzman-Guzman at least made a

finding based on the demeanor of the witnesses, here, the

defendants did not even have the benefit of judging Mrs.

Wolter's credibility. Accordingly, like the sworn statements in

Guzman-Guzman, Mrs. Wolter’s sworn statement also fails to clear

the substantial evidence standard.

Although not controlling here, it is also telling that

translation for non-English speakers is key to fundamental

fairness in the deportation context. See Tejeda-Mata v. I.N.S.,

626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1990) (“this court and others have

repeatedly recognized the importance of an interpreter to the

fundamental fairness of [] a [deportation] hearing if the alien

cannot speak English fluently”); Perez-Lastor v. I.N.S., 208

F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000); Matter of Tomas, 19 I. & N. Dec.

464, 465 (BIA 1987) (“The presence of a competent interpreter is

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important to the fundamental fairness of a hearing, if the alien

cannot speak English fluently.”).

In sum, the court concludes that reliance on the sworn

statement -- which was prepared by a third party and then signed

by an alien who neither spoke nor read English and who

subsequently retracted its contents -- does not constitute the

substantial and probative evidence needed to uphold the agency's

finding of marriage fraud.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, plaintiffs' motion for

summary judgment (Doc. No. 18) is GRANTED and defendants' motion

for summary judgment is DENIED (Doc. No. 17). The clerks'

office is directed to enter judgment for plaintiffs and close

the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 15, 2007.

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