Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05063/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05063-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

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1Superior Court Rule 16(b) provides in part: "At [the initial scheduling and settlement]

conference the judge will ... explore the possibilities for early resolution through settlement or

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 12, 1994 Decided July 15, 1994

No. 93-5063

JEROME S. WAGSHAL,

APPELLANT

v.

MARK W. FOSTER, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia

(92cv02072)

Jerome S. Wagshal argued the cause and filed the briefs pro se.

CharlesB. Wayne argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Charles R. Donnenfeld

and Jeffery A. Tomasevich.

Before: SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: This case presents the issue of whether a court-appointed mediator

or neutral case evaluator, performing tasks within the scope of his official duties, is entitled to

absolute immunity fromdamagesin a suit brought by a disappointed litigant. The district court found

such immunity and we agree.

* * *

In June 1990, appellant Jerome S. Wagshal filed suit in D.C. Superior Court against Charles

E. Sheetz, the manager of real property owned by Wagshal. In October 1991 the assigned judge,

JudgeRichard A. Levie, referred the case to alternative dispute resolution pursuant to SuperiorCourt

Civil Rule 161and the Superior Court's alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") program. While the

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alternative dispute resolution techniques...." 

2We use the terms "case evaluator" and "mediator" interchangeably in this opinion. Each acts

as a neutral third party assisting the parties to a dispute in exploring the possibility of settlement,

the principal difference being that implicit in the name: the case evaluator focuses on helping the

parties assess their cases, while the mediator acts more directly to explore settlement possibilities. 

See Melinda Ostermeyer, Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs 6 (Superior Court of the

District of Columbia, Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Division 1992). 

program does not bind the parties (except when they agree to binding arbitration), participation is

mandatory. See Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 16(j).

Judge Levie chose "neutral case evaluation" from among the available ADR options, and

appointed Mark W. Foster as case evaluator.2 Pursuant to the order of appointment, the parties

signed a "statement of understanding" providing (among other things) that the proceedings would be

confidential and privileged, and that the evaluator would serve as a "neutral party". Moreover, the

parties were not allowed to subpoena the evaluator or any documents submitted in the course of

evaluation, and "[i]n no event [could the] mediator or evaluator voluntarily testify on behalf of a

party." Wagshal signed in January 1992 (under protest, he alleges).

After Foster held his first session with the parties, Wagshal questioned his neutrality. Foster

then asked that Wagshal either waive his objection or pursue it; if Wagshal made no response

waiving the objection, Foster would treat it as a definite objection. Receiving no response by the

deadline set, and later receiving a communication that he regarded as equivocal, Foster wrote to

Judge Levie in February 1992, with copies to counsel, recusing himself. The letter also reported to

the judge on his efforts in the case and recommended continuation of ADR proceedings. In

particular, Foster said that the case was one "that can and should be settled if the parties are willing

to act reasonably", and urged the court to order Wagshal, "as a pre-condition to any further

proceedings in his case, to engage in a good faith attempt at mediation." He also urged Judge Levie

to "consider who should bear the defendant's costs in participating" in the mediation to date.

Judge Levie then conducted a telephone conference call hearing in which he excused Foster.

Wagshal's counselvoiced the claimthat underliesthissuitthat he thought Foster's withdrawalletter

"indicates that he had certain feelings about the case. Now, I'm not familiar with the mediation

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process but as I understood, the mediator is not supposed to say, give his opinion as to where the

merits are." On that subject, Judge Levie said, "I don't know what his opinions are and I'm not going

to ask him because that's part of the confidentiality of the process." Neither Wagshal nor his counsel

made any objection or motion for Judge Levie's own recusal.

Judge Levie soon after appointed another case evaluator, and Wagshal and the other parties

settled the Sheetz case in June 1992. In September 1992, however, Wagshal sued Foster and sixteen

others (whom he identified as members of Foster's law firm) in federal district court, claiming that

Foster's behavior as mediator had violated hisrightsto due process and to a jury trial under the Fifth

and Seventh Amendments, and seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Besides the federal claims, he threw in a variety of local law theories such as defamation, invasion of

privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. His theory is that Foster's conduct as case

evaluator forced him to settle the case against his will, resulting in a far lower recovery than if he had

pursued the claim.

The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice, holding that

Foster, like judges, was shielded by absolute immunity. We affirm.

* * *

We mayquicklydispatchWagshal's claimto injunctive relief. While such a claim is not barred

by judicial immunity, Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 528-43 (1984), Wagshal lacksstanding to seek

such an injunction on behalf of others, see, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108-09 (1983),

and has alleged no likelihood whatever that he himself will again suffer the alleged injury, id. at 105-

10.

Foster's first line of defense against the damages claim was the assertion of quasi-judicial

immunity. The immunity will block the suit if it extends to case evaluators and mediators, so long

as Foster's alleged actions were taken within the scope of his duties as a case evaluator.

Courts have extended absolute immunity to a wide range of persons playing a role in the

judicial process. These have included prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976);

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law clerks, Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); probation officers, Turner v.

Barry, 856 F.2d 1539, 1541 (D.C. Cir. 1988); a court-appointed committee monitoring the

unauthorized practice of law, Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 779-82 (D.C. Cir. 1980); a

psychiatrist who interviewed a criminal defendant to assist a trial judge, Schinner v. Strathmann, 711

F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1989); persons performing binding arbitration, Austern v. Chicago Bd.

Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990); and a psychologist performing dispute

resolution services in connection with a lawsuit over custody and visitation rights, Howard v.

Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 905 (Ct. App. 1990). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has

rejected absolute immunity for judges acting in an administrative capacity, Forrester v. White, 484

U.S. 219, 229 (1988), court reporters charged with creating a verbatimtranscript oftrialproceedings,

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2167 (1993), and prosecutors in relation to legal

advice they may give state police, Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). The official claiming the

immunity "bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question."

Antoine, 113 S. Ct. at 2169-70 n.4 (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. at 486).

We have distilled the Supreme Court's approach to quasi-judicial immunity into a

consideration of three main factors: (1) whether the functions of the official in question are

comparable to those of a judge; (2) whether the nature of the controversy is intense enough that

future harassment or intimidation by litigants is a realistic prospect; and (3) whether the system

contains safeguards which are adequate to justify dispensing with private damage suits to control

unconstitutional conduct. Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d at 778 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.

478, 512 (1978)).

In certain respectsit seems plain that a case evaluatorin the Superior Court'ssystemperforms

judicial functions. Foster's assigned tasks included identifying factual and legal issues, scheduling

discovery and motions with the parties, and coordinating settlement efforts. These obviously involve

substantial discretion, a key feature of the tasks sheltered by judicial immunity and the one whose

absence wasfatal to the court reporter's assertion ofimmunity in Antoine. See 113 S. Ct. at 2170-71.

Further, viewed as mental activities, the tasks appear precisely the same as those judges perform

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going about the business of adjudication and case management.

Wagshal protests, however, that mediation is altogether different from authoritative

adjudication, citing observations to that effect in radically dissimilar contexts. See, e.g., General

Comm. of Adjustment v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R., 320 U.S. 323, 337 (1943) ("The concept of

mediation is the antithesis of justiciability."). However true his point may be as an abstract matter,

the general process of encouraging settlement is a natural, almost inevitable, concomitant of

adjudication. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, institutionalizes the

relation, designating as subjects for pre-trial conferences a series of issues that appear to encompass

all the tasks of a case evaluator in the Superior Court system: "formulation and simplification of the

issues", "the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents", "the control and

scheduling of discovery", and a catch-all, "such other matters as facilitate the just, speedy, and

inexpensive disposition of the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c). Wagshal points to nothing in Foster's

role that a Superior Court judge might not have performed under Superior Court Rule 16(c), which

substantially tracksthe federalmodel. Although practice appears to vary widely, and some variations

raise very seriousissues, see, e.g., G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th

Cir. 1989) (en banc), it is quite apparent that intensive involvement in settlement is now by no means

uncommon among federal district judges. See, e.g., Robert J. Keenan, Rule 16 and Pretrial

Conferences: Have We Forgotten the Most Important Ingredient?, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1449 (1990);

Symposium, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 203 (1976).

Wagshal does not assert that a case evaluator is performing a purely administrative task, such

as the personnel decisionsdemotion and discharge of a probation officerat issue in Forrester v.

White. Because the sort of pre-trial tasks performed by a case evaluator are so integrally related to

adjudication proper, we do not think that their somewhat managerial character renders them

administrative for these purposes.

Conduct of pre-trial case evaluation and mediation also seems likely to inspire efforts by

disappointed litigants to recoup their losses, or at any rate harass the mediator, in a second forum.

Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 512 ("The loser in one forum will frequently seek another,

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charging the participants in the first with unconstitutional animus."). Although a mediator or case

evaluator makes no final adjudication, he must often be the bearer of unpleasant newsthat a claim

or defense may be far weaker than the party supposed. Especially as the losing party will be blocked

by judicial immunity from suing the judge, there may be great temptation to sue the messenger whose

words foreshadowed the final loss. Cf. Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d at 1461 (noting that loser may

turn on clerks because unable to reach the judge).

The third of the Supreme Court's criteria, the existence of adequate safeguards to control

unconstitutional conduct where absolute immunityis granted, is also present. Here, Wagshal was free

to seek relieffrom any misconduct by Foster by applying to Judge Levie. Alternatively, if he thought

Foster's communications might prejudice Judge Levie, he could have sought Levie's recusal under

Superior Court R. Civ. P. 63-I, Bias or Prejudice of a Judge. The avenues of relief institutionalized

in the ADR program and its judicial context provide adequate safeguards.

Wagshal claims that even if mediators may be generally entitled to absolute immunity, Foster

may not invoke the immunity because his action was not taken in a judicial capacity, see Mireles, 112

S. Ct. at 288 (citing Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227-29; Stump, 435 U.S. at 360), and because he acted

in complete absence of jurisdiction, see id. (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57; Bradley, 13 Wall. at

351). Neither exception applies.

Wagshal's argument that the actsfor which he hassued Foster are not judicial(apart from the

claim against mediators generally) restssimply on his claimthat Foster'sletter to Judge Levie,stating

that he felt he "must recuse" himself and giving histhoughts on possible further mediation efforts and

allocation of costs, breached Foster's obligations of neutrality and confidentiality. We assume such

a breach for purposes of analysis. But "if judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge

"will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error ... or was in excess of his

authority.' " Mireles, 112 S. Ct. at 288 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356). Accordingly we look to

the particular act'srelation to a generalfunction normally performed by a judge". Mireles, 112 S. Ct.

at 288-89. Applying the same principle to case evaluators, we have no doubt that Foster's

announcing his recusal, reporting in a general way on the past course of mediation, and making

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suggestions for future mediation were the sort of things that case evaluators would properly do.

Wagshalfinallyarguesthat Foster cannot be immune for the statementsin hisletter made after

he stated that he "must recuse" himself. This is frivolous. Even if the letter alone effected a recusal

(which is doubtfulJudge Levie clearly saw himself as later excusing Foster from service), the

simultaneous delivery of an account of his work was the type of act a case evaluator could properly

perform on the way out. In fact, we doubt very much if a modest gap in time between effective

recusal and recounting of the events would take the latter out of the immunity.

Nor were Foster's actions "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Wagshal's claim

to the contrary rests primarily on the theory that, although Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure

16(j) requires parties to "attend ... any alternative dispute resolution session ordered by the court",

there is no explicit authority to appoint case evaluators. This contrasts, says Wagshal, with explicit

District law authorizing appointment of masters and hearing commissioners. See, Superior Court R.

Civ. P. 53(a) & (b) (masters); D.C. Code § 11-1732(a) (hearing commissioners).

Whatever merit this claimmay have under District law, it does not come within a countrymile

of showing complete absence of jurisdiction. For such a showing, the judicial officer must "know[

] that he lacksjurisdiction, or act[ ] despite a clearly valid statute or case law expressly depriving him

of jurisdiction." Mills v. Killebrew, 765 F.2d 69, 71 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing Rankin v. Howard, 633

F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1980)). Similarly, in White by Swafford v. Gerbitz, 892 F.2d 457, 462 (6th

Cir. 1989), the court held that a judge enjoyed judicial immunity when, despite procedural defects in

his appointment, he "possessed the office of SpecialCity Judge and was discharging the duties ofthat

position under color of authority." Foster was similarly discharging the duties of case evaluator under

color of authority.

At no point does Wagshal develop his constitutional attacks on Foster's jurisdiction, which

evidently rest on the theory that the District's use of case evaluators for mandatory but non-binding

dispute resolution violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the right to jury trial

guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. We do not normally pass upon claims that a party fails to

articulate intelligibly. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

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* * *

We hold that absolute quasi-judicialimmunityextendsto mediators and case evaluatorsin the

Superior Court's ADR process, and that Foster's actions were taken within the scope of his official

duties. The judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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