Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07105/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07105-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 13, 2008 Decided April 29, 2008 

No. 07-7105 

AKTIESELSKABET AF 21. NOVEMBER 2001, 

APPELLANT

v. 

FAME JEANS INC., 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 06cv00585) 

 Monica P. McCabe argued the cause for appellant. With 

her on the briefs were Oliver N. Blaise, III and Mary E. 

Gately. 

 Robert L. Byer argued the cause for appellee. With him 

on the brief were Lewis F. Gould, Jr., Barry Golob, Maxim A. 

Voltchenko, and Matthew C. Mousley. 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 1 of 25
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 Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and BROWN, Circuit 

Judges. 

 Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

 BROWN, Circuit Judge: For some reason, a pair of jeans 

labeled Jack & Jones will sell for the equivalent of $96. 

Clearly there is magic in the name, and Fame Jeans tried to 

capture that magic by registering Jack & Jones as a trademark 

in the United States. Aktieselskabet (Bestseller),1 which 

generated the magic by selling Jack & Jones jeans elsewhere 

in the world, opposed Fame’s trademark application. After 

the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) granted 

summary judgment to Fame, Bestseller filed this action in 

district court, alleging several new grounds for its opposition. 

The district court dismissed Bestseller’s complaint, holding 

the new grounds waived because Bestseller failed to present 

them to the TTAB and because Bestseller’s complaint failed 

to meet a new pleading standard the court thought Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), required. 

Bestseller appeals the dismissal. We hold the district court 

should hear new claims in a trademark opposition, and we 

disagree with the district court’s interpretation of Twombly. 

Even so, some of Bestseller’s claims are legally flawed. 

Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part. 

I 

 Bestseller, a Danish corporation, has been selling Jack & 

Jones jeans since 1990. By 2005, its business with the brand 

had expanded to include jeans, T-shirts and jackets, 

distributed in Europe, the Middle East, South America, and 

Asia. In the European Union alone, Bestseller sold nineteen 

 

1

 Throughout its filings, Appellant refers to itself as Bestseller, the 

name of its corporate parent. We follow the same convention. 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 2 of 25
3 

million articles of branded clothing in 2005. It has registered 

Jack & Jones and related marks in forty-six countries, and it 

owns twenty-one domain names incorporating variations of 

the name. 

 In 2003, Bestseller decided to expand into North 

America; its competitor Fame Jeans appears, so far, to have 

stalled that expansion into the United States by assiduous 

effort at the U.S Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). 

Bestseller planned to begin operations in Canada, from which 

it would develop the brand into the United States. 

Accordingly, it applied to register the Jack & Jones mark in 

Canada in August 2004 and in the United States on December 

6, 2004. Unfortunately for Bestseller, Fame had already 

applied to register Jack & Jones in the United States on 

January 9, 2004. As of their respective filing dates, neither 

party had tested the susceptibility of American consumers to 

the allure of Jack & Jones by actually trying to sell any jeans 

under the brand. Fame, therefore, filed its application under 

Lanham Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), avowing its intent to 

use the trademark in commerce. Bestseller, on its part, filed 

under Lanham Act § 44(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e), swearing it 

intended to use the mark and citing its 1990 Danish 

registrations. 

 Nine days after filing its U.S. application to register Jack 

& Jones, Bestseller filed an opposition to Fame’s application 

to register the mark, alleging that Fame’s registration was 

likely to cause confusion with Bestseller’s Jack & Jones mark 

and interfere with Bestseller’s application to register the 

mark. On January 30, 2006, the TTAB granted summary 

judgment on Bestseller’s opposition. First, the TTAB pointed 

out Bestseller had admitted it never used the mark in 

commerce in the United States, and it explained foreign use 

alone gave Bestseller no right of priority here. Second, the 

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TTAB held Bestseller’s December 6, 2004, application junior 

to Fame’s January 9, 2004, application. 

 Bestseller sought district court review of the TTAB 

decision, under Lanham Act § 21(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b). In 

its complaint, Bestseller renewed its allegation that it had 

prior rights to the Jack & Jones mark due to its § 44(e) 

application, and it also claimed to have used the mark in the 

United States. In addition, Bestseller argued the court should 

apply equitable principles to give it rights in the mark, since it 

has used the mark around the world for seventeen years and 

Fame has never used it anywhere. Bestseller also added new 

claims that Fame’s § 1(b) application was void ab initio for 

lack of bona fide intent to use the mark and that Fame 

misrepresented its intent to the PTO. The district court 

dismissed all the claims. The new claims it held waived; it 

agreed with the TTAB that Bestseller’s § 44(e) application 

was too late; and it thought the misrepresentation claim fell 

short of its putative Twombly standard. 

II 

 This Court reviews the dismissal of a complaint de novo. 

Stewart v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). We first discuss two threshold issues on which the 

district court based most of its analysis. 

A 

 Although a district court owes a certain degree of 

deference to the TTAB’s findings of fact, both parties may 

introduce new evidence in a § 21(b) action. Material Supply 

Int’l, Inc. v. Sunmatch Indus. Co., 146 F.3d 983, 989 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998) (citing 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 

TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21:20 (1997)). 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 4 of 25
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The question before us is whether a party may also introduce 

new issues not brought before the TTAB. We join several of 

our fellow circuits in allowing new issues in § 21(b) actions. 

See, e.g., PHC, Inc. v. Pioneer Healthcare, Inc., 75 F.3d 75, 

80 (1st Cir. 1996); CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 

F.3d 660, 674 (7th Cir. 2001). 

 District courts have broad authority to review trademark 

decisions by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), 

both before and after the registration of a mark. They may 

order the PTO to cancel a registration “in whole or in part” or 

to restore a canceled registration, Lanham Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1119, and during a civil action for infringement, a 

registration is only prima facie evidence that the registrant 

owns a valid mark, Lanham Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a); 

Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 817–18 (4th 

Cir. 2001). In addition, district courts may authorize the PTO 

to register or to deny registration to a pending mark. 15 

U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1). Courts use this power to remedy 

erroneous decisions of the TTAB in any of the various kinds 

of proceeding committed to it, including oppositions, 

cancellation petitions, and interferences. For a person 

challenging a TTAB decision, a civil action in district court is 

an alternative to review by the Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit. Id. 

 The proceedings differ in important ways, with Federal 

Circuit review taking the form of an appeal and the district 

court alternative being an ordinary civil action. In a Federal 

Circuit appeal, the PTO transmits its record to the court, 

which “shall review the decision from which the appeal is 

taken on the record.” 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4). In an ex parte

case, the PTO must also explain the grounds for its decision, 

“addressing all the issues involved in the appeal.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1071(a)(3). By contrast, in a § 21(b) action, the PTO does 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 5 of 25
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not automatically transmit its record to the court; rather, any 

party may, on its own motion, enter the record into evidence. 

Once entered, “[t]he testimony and exhibits” of the PTO 

record “have the same effect as if originally taken and 

produced in the suit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3). The district 

court then decides de novo whether the application at issue 

should proceed to registration, or the registration involved 

should be canceled, or “such other matter as the issues in the 

proceeding require, as the facts in the case may appear.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1); see Material Supply, 146 F.3d at 990. 

 Fame presses the general rule that judicial review of 

agency action is limited to the issues presented before the 

agency. But this rule usually arises from statutes providing 

for judicial review, Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107–08 

(2000), and it is certainly subject to statutory modification, 

Time Warner Entm’t, Co. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 75, 79 n.5 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998); cf. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 153–54 

(1993) (APA governs exhaustion). Just so here: the Lanham 

Act directs a district court to conduct a new trial to decide 

whether an applicant is entitled to a registration. In that 

proceeding, the court may consider both new issues and new 

evidence that were not before the TTAB. This statutory 

mandate becomes clear from a comparison of § 21(b), 

containing the “issues in the proceeding” language, with the 

analogous provision in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 145, which 

lacks that phrase. Both statutes direct a district court to 

decide “as the facts in the case may appear.” The “case” in 

question refers to the district court action, not the prior events 

at the PTO, with the consequence that the court should decide 

on the facts before it, even though they were not before the 

PTO. Accordingly, in both patent and trademark cases, a 

party may introduce new evidence. Am. Steel & Wire Co. of 

N.J. v. Coe, 105 F.2d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (patent); 

Material Supply, 146 F.3d at 989 (trademark). While new 

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issues, on the other hand, are barred in a patent case, 

DeSeversky v. Brenner, 424 F.2d 857, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 

under § 21(b), the district court is also to decide “as the issues

in the proceeding may require.” 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) 

(emphasis added). Like “case,” the word “proceeding” refers 

to the district court action. Thus, in a § 21(b) action, a district 

court should decide on the issues before it, including new 

issues. 

 Indeed, this conclusion seems unavoidable, since a 

district court does not necessarily receive the TTAB record. 

Rather, the record “shall be admitted on motion of any party.” 

15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3). By comparison, in judicial review 

under the Administrative Procedure Act, a court shall “review 

the whole record,” which of course the court receives as a 

matter of course. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also CHARLES A.

WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 

PROCEDURE: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 

§ 8306, at 73 (2006) (“It is black letter law that . . . review in 

federal court must be based on the record before the agency 

. . . .”). If, in an inter partes matter like an opposition, in 

which the PTO may choose not to participate, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1071(b)(2), no party introduced the TTAB record, a district 

court would not even be able to identify the issues raised 

before the TTAB, much less hold other issues waived. 

 Moreover, the Lanham Act establishes a fluid 

relationship between the TTAB and the courts, in which the 

TTAB does not have the authority of an ordinary agency. 

Unlike an ordinary agency, whose decisions we would review 

under the deferential standards of APA § 706, the PTO’s 

decision to register a trademark is subject to later collateral 

attack during which registration is only prima facie evidence 

of the mark’s validity, rebuttable by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See Colt Def. LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 

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486 F.3d 701, 708 (1st Cir. 2007); Tie Tech., Inc. v. Kinedyne 

Corp., 296 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2002); Am. Online, 243 

F.3d at 817.2 Further, whereas ordinarily parties must exhaust 

their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review 

of agency decisions, the Lanham Act provides an independent 

civil action to cancel a completed trademark registration 

without first petitioning the PTO. 15 U.S.C. § 1119; Ditri v. 

Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 

873 (3rd Cir. 1992); Windsurfing Int’l Inc. v. AMF Inc., 828 

F.2d 755, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In addition, two of our sister 

circuits have even interpreted § 21(b) as allowing a court, in 

appropriate circumstances, to adjudicate a registration while 

the application is still pending at the PTO. Pioneer 

Healthcare, 75 F.3d at 80–81; Goya Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana 

Prods., Inc., 846 F.2d 848, 854 (2d Cir. 1988). When the 

statute does not require exhaustion of the administrative 

procedure itself, it would be odd to require exhaustion on 

particular issues during that procedure. 

 Nor does Wilson Jones Co. v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. 

Co., 332 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1964) (as amended), persuade 

us to the contrary. That case relied on Gold Seal Co. v. 

Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 937 (D.D.C. 1955), which itself 

mistook this circuit’s existing rule against considering new 

 

2

 We do not mean to suggest that we would not defer to the 

TTAB’s findings of fact during § 21(b) review. After Dickinson v. 

Zurko, which prescribed “substantial evidence” review of the 

PTO’s fact-finding in patent examinations, 527 U.S. 150 (1999), 

some courts have applied that standard in trademark cases as well, 

e.g. On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 

1085 (Fed. Cir. 2000), in place of the older “thorough conviction” 

standard. We need not address this issue, because the TTAB 

granted summary judgment, making no findings of fact, and 

therefore the district court owed it no deference at all. Material 

Supply, 146 F.3d at 990. 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 8 of 25
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patent claims, Cherry-Burrell Corp. v. Coe, 143 F.2d 372, 

373 (D.C. Cir. 1944), for a rule against new issues. In any 

case, Gold Seal arose under a previous version of § 21. At 

the time, the Lanham Act cross-referenced 35 U.S.C. § 145 to 

provide the procedure for trademark review, but the modern 

statute prescribes its own procedures, including the “issues in 

the proceeding” language. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1071 

(1952), amended by Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 12, 76 Stat. 769, 

771 (1962), with § 1071(b)(1) (2000). Wilson Jones

postdated the amendment, but it relied on Gold Seal without 

discussing the change. Section 21(b) in its current form limits 

a district court to evaluation of “the application involved” in 

the TTAB’s decision but directs the district court to consider 

all the relevant issues brought by either party, regardless of 

whether those issues were before the TTAB. 

B 

 In addition, this case questions how much detail 

Bestseller must allege to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court 

performed such an analysis only for Bestseller’s third claim, 

for fraudulent misrepresentation, because it dismissed 

Bestseller’s claim to have made prior use of the mark in the 

United States and its claim that Fame’s application was void 

ab initio as waived. Since we have concluded § 21(b) does 

not provide for issue waiver, our de novo review must 

proceed to the adequacy of Bestseller’s allegations. 

 Ordinarily a sufficient complaint “contain[s] a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief,” enough to give a defendant “fair notice of 

the claims against him.” Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–

70 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)). In 

deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, a court “constru[es] the complaint 

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liberally in the plaintiff’s favor,” “accept[ing] as true all of 

the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Kassem v. 

Wash. Hosp. Ctr., No. 06-7161, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1174, 

at *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 2008), “with the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged,” 

Stewart, 471 F.3d at 173. However, the district court 

interpreted Twombly as establishing a new threshold for 

complaints: enough facts to “clarify the grounds” on which 

each claim rests and “nudge[] their claims across the line 

from conceivable to plausible.” Aktieselskabet AF 21. 

November 2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18–

19 (D.D.C. 2007). Many courts have disagreed about the 

import of Twombly.

3

 We conclude that Twombly leaves the 

long-standing fundamentals of notice pleading intact. 

 

3 See, e.g., ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 58 

(1st Cir. 2008) (Twombly gave 12(b)(6) “more heft”); Iqbal v. 

Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–59 (2d Cir. 2007) (“requiring not a 

universal standard of heightened fact pleading” but a “flexible 

‘plausibility standard’” under which “a conclusory allegation might 

. . . need to be fleshed out . . . [in] response to a defendant’s motion 

for a more definite statement”); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 

515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (no probability requirement at the 

pleading stage); Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Mem’l 

Inst., No. 07-1084, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1916, at *9 (4th Cir. 

Jan. 29, 2008) (unpublished) (pleading only needs to give “fair 

notice”); Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 440 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(concluding only that Twombly did not overrule Swierkewicz); 

Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 499 F.3d 

663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Twombly did not signal a switch to factpleading”); Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521 

(8th Cir. 2007) (plaintiff must allege facts “that affirmatively and 

plausibly suggest” he has the claimed right, not just “facts that are 

merely consistent with such a right”); Skaff v. Meridien N. Amer. 

Beverly Hills, L.L.C., 506 F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 

Twombly as instructing courts “not to impose such heightened 

[pleading] standards”); Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 10 of 25
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 “Rule 8 is the keystone of the system of pleading” in 

federal procedure, and “the functioning of all the procedures 

in the federal rules . . . are intertwined inextricably with the 

pleading philosophy embodied in Rule 8.” 5 CHARLES A.

WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 

PROCEDURE § 1202, at 87–88 (3d ed. 2004). The pleadings 

serve specific functions of giving notice of “the general 

nature of the case and the circumstances or events upon which 

it is based,” so the parties can prepare and the court can 

dispose of the case properly. Charles E. Clark, Simplified 

Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 457, 460 (1943). Accordingly, Rule 

8 requires, not a specific quantity of facts, but simply “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also Richard L. 

Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 

(1986). 

 Over the years, courts have tended to drift away from this 

standard by imposing various requirements of particularity. 

See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 

81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002). The Supreme Court has 

continually pruned back such requirements, with the 

admonition that we are not to impose heightened pleading 

requirements. See, e.g., Swierkewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 

 

Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008) (courts must “tak[e] as 

true all well-pled (that is, plausible, non-conclusory, and nonspeculative) facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint”); Watts v. Fla. 

Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2007) (courts may 

not assess the probability of facts, but a plaintiff must “allege[] 

enough facts to suggest, raise a reasonable expectation of, and 

render plausible” his claim); McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 

F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (plaintiff need only “place [a 

defendant] on notice as to what he must defend”). 

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U.S. 506, 511–12 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County 

Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 

164 (1993); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249–50 (1974). 

After decades of such consistency, we will not lightly assume 

the Supreme Court intended to tighten pleading standards. 

 Indeed, the Court has indicated quite clearly that it meant 

no such thing. Twombly itself reiterated that a complaint 

“does not need detailed factual allegations.” 127 S. Ct. at 

1964. Further, the Court denied “apply[ing] any ‘heightened’ 

pleading standard,” because any heightened standard would 

have to arise from an amendment of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Id. at 1973 n.14 (citing Swierkewicz and 

Leatherman). Rule 8(a), as the Court reminded, contains only 

“the threshold requirement” that the statement of a claim 

“show that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 1966. As 

the Court said, Twombly’s complaint failed that basic 

requirement, not any higher requirement for allegations that 

were “[]sufficiently particularized.” Id. at 1973 n.14. If, 

despite this clear language, Twombly itself left any doubt, the 

Court subsequently emphasized the continuation of the prior 

Rule 8(a) standard: “[S]pecific facts are not necessary,” and a 

complaint need only give the defendant fair notice of the 

claims. Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) 

(per curiam). 

 The forms accompanying the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure illustrate the concept of fair notice with numerous 

exemplary complaints that “suffice under these rules.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 84; see also Clark, 2 F.R.D. at 464 (“[Q]uite 

essential . . . are the illustrative forms.”). In general, a 

complaint should simply identify the “circumstances, 

occurrences, and events” giving rise to the claim, Twombly, 

127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.3 (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, 

§ 1202, at 94, 95), or “inform the opponent of the affair or 

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transaction to be litigated,” Clark, 2 F.R.D. at 460–61.4

 For 

example, Form 11, the example complaint for negligence, 

says that defendant drove a car against the plaintiff at a 

certain time in a certain place. Form 10, for suing on a note, 

cites the date of the note, the sum promised, and the interest 

rate imposed. Form 18, for patent infringement, recites the 

number of the patent allegedly infringed and explains what 

product of the defendant’s infringes. Twombly observed that 

a direct allegation of conspiracy analogous to the forms 

would say who conspired, at what time, to do what. 127 S. 

Ct. at 1970 n.10. 

 Of course, these forms illustrate details that are 

sufficient, not necessary. Thus, in Twombly, although the 

complaint provided only a conclusory allegation of 

conspiracy, the plaintiff could have made out the claim in 

other ways. 127 S. Ct. at 1970 (“[T]he complaint leaves no 

doubt that plaintiffs rest their § 1 claim on descriptions of 

parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of 

actual agreement.”). To the extent direct allegations are 

missing, “a complaint must contain . . . inferential 

allegations.” Id. at 1969. Twombly determined that a certain 

set of factual allegations did not support an inference that the 

defendants conspired in violation of the Sherman Act: 

“Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest 

conspiracy,” and “nothing contained in the complaint invests 

 

4

 Since a complaint has always had to meet this standard, it has 

never been literally true, as Twombly noted, that a complaint is 

adequate unless “no set of facts” consistent with the complaint 

could support a claim. 127 S. Ct. at 1968–70 (citing Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). We have never accepted 

“legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations,” Kowal v. 

MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994), 

because a complaint needs some information about the 

circumstances giving rise to the claims. 

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either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible 

suggestion of conspiracy.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966, 

1971. 

 In sum, Twombly was concerned with the plausibility of 

an inference of conspiracy, not with the plausibility of a 

claim. A court deciding a motion to dismiss must not make 

any judgment about the probability of the plaintiff’s success, 

for a complaint “may proceed even if it appears ‘that a 

recovery is very remote and unlikely,’” Id. at 1965 (quoting 

Scheuer); a complaint “may not be dismissed based on a 

district court’s assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find 

evidentiary support for his allegations,” id. at 1969 n.8. 

Further, the court must assume “all the allegations in the 

complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact),” Twombly, 127 

S. Ct. at 1965 (citing Swierkewicz), and the court must give 

the plaintiff “the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived 

from the facts alleged,” Stewart, 471 F.3d at 173. 

III 

 Bearing in mind these general considerations, we turn to 

the claims at issue in this appeal. Bestseller contests Fame’s 

pending trademark application on three grounds, and the 

district court rejected most of Bestseller’s arguments on the 

improper ground that Bestseller failed to raise them before the 

TTAB. Nevertheless, we may affirm the dismissals for any 

reason properly raised by the parties. Barr v. Clinton, 370 

F.3d 1196, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

A 

 First, Bestseller opposes Fame’s application based on 

Lanham Act § 2(d), under which a mark may not be 

registered if it is “likely . . . to cause confusion” with respect 

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to “a mark . . . previously used in the United States.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1052(d). An opposer under § 2(d) must show “it 

ha[s] priority and that registration of the mark creates a 

likelihood of confusion.” Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, 

Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (cancellation 

proceeding under § 2(d)). The parties do not dispute that 

Bestseller has sufficiently alleged likelihood of confusion, 

since Bestseller and Fame want to use the same trademark on 

the same product. See Am. Comp. ¶ 18.5

 As to priority, 

Bestseller asserts prior rights to the Jack & Jones mark on the 

basis of its December 6, 2004, § 44(e) application and on the 

basis of its alleged use in the United States. Because Fame 

filed its intent-to-use application on January 9, 2004, 

Bestseller must be able to claim priority earlier than that date. 

 Bestseller disputes even this point, pointing to Lanham 

Act § 7(c), which establishes a trademark application as 

constructive use “[c]ontingent on registration of a mark.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1057(c). An intent-to-use application cannot mature 

into a registration before the applicant actually uses the mark 

in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d). Therefore, according to 

Bestseller, an intent-to-use application, by itself, earns no 

trademark rights, and no priority attaches before the intent-touse applicant engages in actual use of the mark. Until that 

point, the intent-to-use applicant would continue to be 

vulnerable to rival users, even those who begin use after the 

intent-to-use filing date or, like Bestseller, file a later 

application. 

 

5

 Although Fame does not dispute the sufficiency of Bestseller’s 

allegations of confusion, it does argue Bestseller fails to bring a 

§ 2(d) claim at all because Bestseller failed to cite § 2(d). But so 

long as the basis for a claim is clear, a complaint need not “plead 

law” in specific detail. Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000). 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 15 of 25
16 

 While an intent-to-use application does not, by itself, 

confer any rights enforceable against others, it does give an 

applicant the right to engage in the statutorily prescribed 

application procedure. See WarnerVision Entm’t Inc. v. 

Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1996) 

(because an intent-to-use applicant has the right to engage in 

use so as to complete registration, a court may not enjoin that 

use to protect the rights of a rival who began use after the 

intent-to-use filing date). Bestseller may only contest Fame’s 

application within the confines of that scheme. A trademark 

opposition must be based on “a statutory ground”—such as a 

legal defect or deficiency in the application—“which negates 

the appellant’s right to the subject registration.” Young v. 

AGB Corp., 152 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 3 

MCCARTHY, supra, § 20:13, at 20–28. Section 7(c) is a 

potential source of rights for a trademark registrant, not a 

requirement for or a source of defects in an application. 

Bestseller mistakes § 7(c) for the true ground for its 

opposition, which is § 2(d). See TTAB Op., Am. Compl. 

Exh. 1, at 3; Am. Comp. ¶ 18 (alleging likelihood of 

confusion). 

 We conclude that under § 2(d), an intent-to-use applicant 

prevails over any opposer who began using a similar mark 

after the intent-to-use filing date. Covering applications of all 

types, including § 1(b) applications, § 2(d) simply says a 

mark is invalid if there is a likelihood of confusion with a 

mark “previously used.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). “Previously 

used” must mean used before some date, and for a pending 

§ 1(b) application, there is only one date that could apply: the 

filing date. Perhaps one could argue that a § 1(b) applicant 

will eventually use the mark in commerce; § 2(d) might refer 

to the date of that use. However, the Lanham Act does not 

require an intent-to-use applicant to begin using his mark 

until he receives a notice of allowance, which can happen 

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17 

only after the end of all opposition proceedings on the 

application. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(d), 1063(b). Given the 

sequence of events established by statute, we must assess 

Bestseller’s claim to priority in opposition without asking 

whether Fame has used the mark, relying only on Fame’s 

filing date as an intent-to-use applicant. 

 Holding to the contrary, as Bestseller urges, would not 

only make nonsense of § 2(d) but would also vitiate the 

intent-to-use application system itself. Congress created the 

intent-to-use application in the 1988 amendments to the 

Lanham Act with the goal of eliminating the need to use a 

mark before applying to register it. See S. Rep. No. 100-515, 

at 6 (1978), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5582. 

Congress regretted the “unnecessary legal uncertainty” caused 

by the use requirement, since a business might adopt a mark 

and invest in product development and marketing without 

being sure its use had earned it rights to the mark. Id. at 5. 

Constructive use, as codified in § 7(c), was a central element 

of the system: “Without constructive use, the certainty 

envisioned by the intent-to-use application system would not 

be achieved; an intent-to-use applicant would be vulnerable to 

pirates and to anyone initiating use after it files its 

application.” Id. at 29 (emphasis added). Bestseller, as an 

applicant claiming priority from December 5, 2004, stands in 

exactly the position of a rival starting use after an intent-touse filing.6

 Allowing priority to Bestseller would devalue 

Fame’s application on the assumption Fame had not made 

actual use by that date, precisely the result Congress wanted 

 

6

 If anything, Bestseller’s argument is even weaker, since a second 

main motivation for the 1988 amendments was to eliminate the 

perceived unfairness of the § 44(d) and § 44(e) applications. Since 

foreign applicants were able to claim priority from their filing dates 

without actual use, Congress wanted domestic applicants to be able 

to do the same. S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 4–5. 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 17 of 25
18 

to avoid. Thus, the legislative history supports our 

conclusion, based on the text of § 2(d), that an intent-to-use 

applicant may rely on his filing date to establish priority 

during an opposition proceeding. The TTAB has consistently 

maintained the same position, and other courts have 

ordinarily assumed this interpretation as well. Zirco Corp. v. 

AT&T Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542, 1544 (T.T.A.B. 1992); see 

also, e.g., Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 186 

F.3d 311, 315 (3rd Cir. 1999). 

B 

 Since Fame Jeans filed its application on January 9, 

2004, Bestseller must establish use, either actual or 

constructive, before that date.7

 Constructive use can arise 

under § 7(c), which grants priority, based on filing date, to a 

U.S. application or to a foreign application that was followed 

by a timely U.S. application under § 44(d). Bestseller filed a 

U.S. application on December 6, 2004, based on its 1991 

Danish registration. It neither complied with the six-month 

timeliness requirement of § 44(d) nor even filed its 

application under § 44(d). Therefore, Bestseller cannot 

demonstrate any constructive use prior to Fame’s filing date. 

However, Bestseller has adequately alleged actual use. 

Although the complaint does not set forth trademark use to 

earn Bestseller rights in the Jack & Jones mark, an opposer 

who has made enough “analogous” use can still defeat a 

registration. See Malcolm Nicol & Co. v. Witco Corp., 881 

 

7

 Bestseller also demands priority as a matter of equity. Courts 

have no power to deny a pending trademark registration on this 

basis, because the registration procedure is a statutory construct. In 

the cases on which Bestseller relies, equity was a defense to 

infringement liability. E.g. Manhattan Indus., Inc. v. Sweater Bee 

by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1980). 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 18 of 25
19 

F.2d 1063, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting 3 MCCARTHY, 

supra, § 20:4 (1984)). 

 First, Bestseller fails to allege actual use in the most 

straightforward way, by showing its own protectible right to 

the Jack & Jones trademark in the United States. At common 

law, “prior ownership of a mark is only established as of the 

first actual use of a mark in a genuine commercial 

transaction.” Allard Enters., Inc. v. Adv. Programming Res., 

Inc., 146 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir. 1998). The 1988 

amendments to the Lanham Act codified a standard of “use in 

commerce,” necessary for a valid trademark registration, 

which means “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary 

course of trade,” including, for a trademark, attaching the 

trademark to goods. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. In any case, 

“sporadic or minimal” sales are not sufficient. Allard Enters., 

146 F.3d at 359; see also Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 

F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A few bottles sold over the 

counter . . . and a few more mailed to friends” are not 

sufficient use.). While a single sale may indicate the first use 

of a mark, it must be the beginning of “continuous 

commercial utilization.” Allard, 146 F.3d at 358. Obviously, 

as § 1052(d) requires, such use must also be “in the United 

States.” See Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 

1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (T-shirt sales in Japan are not “use 

in United States commerce”). 

 However, Bestseller need not “meet the technical 

statutory requirements to register . . . [a mark] to have a basis 

for objection to another’s registration.” Nat’l Cable 

Television Ass’n v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 

1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Section 2(d) requires only “use[] in 

the United States,” and adoption of the mark by use 

analogous to strict trademark use will therefore suffice. 

T.A.B. Sys., Inc. v. Pactel Teletrac, 77 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 19 of 25
20 

Cir. 1996). An opposer may rely on myriad forms of activity 

besides sales themselves, including, among others, regular 

business contacts, after-sales services, advertising of various 

forms, and marketing. First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. 

First Niagara Fin. Group, 476 F.3d 867, 868–69 (Fed. Cir. 

2007); Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 188 

F.3d 427, 434 (7th Cir. 1999); Malcolm Nicol, 881 F.2d at 

1064. Even marketing of a trademarked product before the 

product is ready for sale has the potential to defeat a rival’s 

registration. See Old Swiss House, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, 

Inc., 569 F.2d 1130, 1133 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Still, desultory 

marketing such as sending out occasional press releases is not 

enough. Id. Analogous use must be “of such a nature and 

extent as to create public identification of the target term with 

the opposer’s product.” T.A.B. Sys., 77 F.3d at 1375. 

 

 Bestseller’s allegations fall short of showing a sale, 

whether in the United States or to an American abroad, as the 

beginning of a continuous commercial exploitation of the 

Jack & Jones mark in the United States; but they do give fair 

notice of a claim to analogous use. While Bestseller clearly 

sells millions of dollars worth of Jack & Jones branded 

clothing elsewhere in the world, it fails to allege any sales in 

the United States or to Americans. The closest Bestseller 

comes is saying this clothing “has been available to U.S. 

consumers through Bestseller’s foreign customers and stores 

as well as through re-sales on eBay.com.” Am. Compl. ¶ 14. 

This allegation does not imply any American sales at all, 

much less continuous commercial sales. 

 By contrast, Bestseller actually does say it conducted 

“research and marketing for use of the mark within the United 

States.” Am. Compl. ¶ 29.8

 The complaint does not say this 

 

8

 We continue to construe complaints liberally by interpreting 

ambiguous text in the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 20 of 25
21 

marketing was sufficiently extensive to create an awareness 

of the Jack & Jones brand among American consumers, but it 

is reasonable to infer such an awareness from Bestseller’s 

other allegations. Presumably, Bestseller will need to 

produce more substantial evidence if Fame contests this 

conclusion. In light of our conclusion that Twombly did not 

tighten the requirements for pleading, we need not consider 

whether it is convincing or plausible that Bestseller adopted 

the Jack & Jones mark in the United States. Simply put, the 

allegation of marketing in the United States, together with the 

inference of public association, is enough to give Fame fair 

notice of what it must contest. No more is required of a 

complaint. 

C 

 Second, Bestseller claims Fame’s application was void 

ab initio for lack of a bona fide intent to use the Jack & Jones 

mark in commerce. A bona fide intent is a statutory 

requirement of a valid trademark application under § 1(b), 

and the lack of such intent is therefore a ground on which 

Bestseller may oppose Fame’s application. MCCARTHY, 

supra, § 20:21, at 20-60; see also Lipton Indus., Inc. v. 

Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1982) 

(“Standing having been established, petitioner is entitled to 

rely on any statutory ground which negates [applicant’s] right 

to the subject registration.”). 

 The TTAB has held § 1(b) to require both actual intent to 

use a mark in commerce and evidence, contemporary with the 

 

plaintiff. E.g. ACLU Found’n of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 472 

(D.C. Cir. 1991) (“The allegations . . . although not framed in 

precisely these terms, could be interpreted to support such a cause 

of action.”). Here, we take Bestseller to mean marketing in the 

United States. 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 21 of 25
22 

application, that objectively demonstrate such an intent. Wet 

Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1633 

(T.T.A.B. 2007) (actual intent); Commodore Elecs. Ltd. v. 

CBM Kabushiki Kaisha, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1503, 1507 (T.T.A.B. 

1993) (objective standard). We agree with this interpretation. 

The provision says “[a] person who has a bona fide intention, 

under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, 

to use a trademark in commerce” may apply to register the 

mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1). The phrases “bona fide” and 

“good faith” ordinarily refer to a person’s actual, subjective 

state of mind. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 177 (6th ed. 1990); 

see Howard v. SEC, 376 F.3d 1136, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

Certainly a person will fail to have a “bona fide” intent to use 

a trademark if his actual intent is otherwise. In addition, 

“bona fide” means not fraudulent or feigned, BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY, supra, at 177, and in some circumstances, 

showing a “bona fide” intent will actually require proving 

certain objective facts, e.g. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 

U.S. 400, 412–14 (1985) (under ADEA, a “bona fide 

occupational qualification” must be reasonably necessary). 

Here, Congress made clear that a “bona fide intent to use” 

also involves an objective standard by specifying there must 

be “circumstances showing . . . good faith.” 

 

 Thus, an opposer may defeat a trademark application for 

lack of bona fide intent by proving the applicant did not 

actually intend to use the mark in commerce or by proving the 

circumstances at the time of filing did not demonstrate that 

intent. To state a claim on the latter ground, an opposer only 

has to notify the applicant of the general “circumstances, 

occurrences, and events” causing the flaw in the application. 

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.3. Although the complaint 

need not go into detail, it must at least notify the applicant of 

how the general circumstances fail to show intent. Cf. 

Commodore Elecs., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1507 (because under the 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 22 of 25
23 

objective standard, “the absence of any documentary evidence 

on the part of an applicant regarding such intent is sufficient 

to prove that the applicant lacks” a bona fide intent, an 

opposer need only allege that absence). 

 Bestseller’s allegations certainly depict circumstances 

that belie Fame’s good faith intent to sell Jack & Jones jeans. 

Bestseller alleges it has used the Jack & Jones mark around 

the world, and it says the mark has become famous. It alleges 

Fame is a rival in the clothing industry around the world and 

particularly in Canada, where Bestseller began its North 

American market entry. Bestseller further alleges Fame knew 

Bestseller was planning to expand in the United States and 

planned to “thwart” that expansion. Finally, Bestseller claims 

Fame “has never used the Jack & Jones mark anywhere in the 

world” and “investigation reveals that it does not intend” to 

use it in the United States. Notably, despite how long 

Bestseller has been selling clothes under the brand, Fame 

filed its U.S. application for the mark immediately after 

Bestseller began preparing to sell its products in Canada. 

 Bestseller’s allegations meet two necessary conditions. 

First, they indicate generally the circumstances that suggest 

Fame lacked a bona fide intent to use Jack & Jones. These 

circumstances do not necessarily indicate a lack of good faith, 

but we need not infer that lack because Bestseller directly 

alleged Fame simply wanted “to interfere with Bestseller’s 

stated intention to use the mark,” Am. Compl. ¶ 39. See, e.g., 

Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(Title VII plaintiff need not “negate the FBI’s alternative 

explanations for its actions,” because the complaint alleged 

“‘the Government retaliated against me because I engaged in 

protected activity’”); Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 

F.3d 1111, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (court must take as true 

employee’s allegation that employer used his convictions as 

USCA Case #07-7105 Document #1113575 Filed: 04/29/2008 Page 23 of 25
24 

“a pretext for termination”). We assume that allegation to be 

true, and thus Bestseller has given Fame adequate notice of 

the claim it must defend. 

D 

 Finally, Bestseller’s third claim rests on Fame’s alleged 

misrepresentation to the PTO that Fame intended to use the 

Jack & Jones mark in commerce. The district court assumed 

this claim rested on District of Columbia law and, having 

dismissed all Bestseller’s Lanham Act claims, dismissed its 

misrepresentation claim as well for lack of supplemental 

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Bestseller 

disputes the dismissal but has consistently agreed the claim 

sounds in common law. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 18–19; Oral 

Argument at 7:50–8:00. As an independent, non-statutory 

claim, it is not a basis for reversing the TTAB’s decision or 

directing the PTO to grant or deny a trademark registration. 

See Young, 152 F.3d at 1378, 1380. 

 A fraudulent misrepresentation claim should meet the 

requirements of particularity of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, but we need not discuss the adequacy of 

Bestseller’s allegations of fraud because Bestseller utterly 

fails to allege, indeed contradicts, the element of reliance. A 

plaintiff may recover for a defendant’s fraudulent statement 

only if the plaintiff took some action in reliance on that 

statement. See Va. Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v. Group 

Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc., 878 A.2d 1226, 1237–38 

(D.C. 2005). Rather than suggesting its own reliance, 

Bestseller says the PTO relied on Fame’s alleged 

misrepresentation. Bestseller’s only action in response to 

Fame’s statement of an intent to use the mark appears to have 

been opposing Fame’s application—an action that hardly 

suggests Bestseller detrimentally relied on that statement. 

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25 

IV 

 In conclusion, the district court erred insofar as it 

dismissed any of the claims because Bestseller failed to raise 

them before the TTAB. Considering the pleadings on the 

merits, Bestseller stated two grounds for opposing Fame’s 

application: likelihood of confusion with respect to the mark 

already used by Bestseller and lack of a bona fide intent to 

use the mark. With respect to the former, Bestseller 

adequately alleged priority only in the sense of its marketing 

of Jack & Jones clothing in the United States. The district 

court was correct to dismiss the third claim for common-law 

fraudulent misrepresentation, because Bestseller did not claim 

to have relied on Fame’s supposedly false statement. 

 For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

So ordered. 

 

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