Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08153/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08153-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Glen James Cooper,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-08153-PCT-NVW (MTM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Petitioner Glen James Cooper has filed pro se a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1)

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s conviction became final on April 7, 2014. Petitioner’s first postconviction relief proceeding concluded when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied the 

petition for review of the denial of Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief on August 

10, 2017. Petitioner’s habeas Petition was due on or before September 11, 2018 but was 

not filed until May 21, 2019. Because there are no grounds for equitable tolling, the Court 

concludes that Petitioner’s claims are untimely. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling 

because Petitioner has not identified any extraordinary circumstance that prevented him 

from a timely filing of his claims. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Petition 

be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background.

The Arizona Court of Appeals set forth the following facts1in its Memorandum 

Decision affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal: 

On June 27, 2010, S.P. informed her mother that in October 2008, while the 

family was on a camping/quail-hunting trip in Hackberry, Arizona, defendant 

placed his hand down her pants and touched her genitals. S.P. told mother 

about the incident after defendant entered S.P.'s bedroom and asked her to 

“come lay [sic] with [him] ... when everybody else [was] asleep.” S.P. did 

not previously inform mother of the incident because mother had dismissed 

S.P. after reporting another incident during which defendant placed his hand 

inside her bra and touched her nipple, stating that “maybe it was [S.P.]” and 

that “it didn't matter” and that S.P. was “overplaying it.” S.P. decided to 

disclose the 2008 incident because she was “just filled up with it ... it had 

happened enough” and she thought that her mother would do something 

about it “that time.”

S.P. eventually told Detective Earl Chalfant about what happened during the 

camping trip in 2008. She told Detective Chalfant that, while the family 

usually went quail hunting on her grandfather's property in Yucca, Arizona, 

the family went instead to Hackberry, to her Aunt Kelly and Uncle Wade's

property. The molestation occurred while the family was sleeping in a trailer 

located on the property. All of the family members—mother, defendant, S.P., 

and S.P.'s three siblings—all slept “in a very small bed” in the “fold out travel 

trailer.”

S.P. woke up because she “felt something” and realized that defendant had 

“switched” places to where he was lying next to her. She felt defendant 

“walking his hand down” in her pants. She was scared and did not know how 

to confront him, so she pretended to be asleep but kept slapping defendant's 

hand away, “trying to make it look like a gesture that I was still sleeping and 

it wasn't like I was awake doing that.” This behavior continued “for about an 

hour or so;” and, while S.P. would “smack his hand out before he did 

anything,” each time defendant would put his hand back “faster .” Although 

defendant never got “inside” her vagina, one time, when she did not have 

time to slap fast enough, defendant “touched the lips.” After that, defendant 

“kept trying” to put his hand down her pants, but she smacked him away and 

“he never touched the lips again.” S.P. then saw defendant go out the door of 

the trailer, and she seized the opportunity to put her sister next to her. When 

defendant returned to bed, he reached over her sister and tried once again to 

put his hand down her pants, but S.P. “smacked his hand away once more” 

and defendant eventually stopped trying. 

State v. Cooper, No. 1 CA-CR 12-0467, 2013 WL 2446055 *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 4, 

1 See 28 U.S.C § 2254(e)(1) (stating that “a determination of factual issues made by a State 

court shall be presumed to be correct.”); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763 (9th Cir. 

2012) (affording the Arizona Supreme Court’s statement of facts “a presumption of 

correctness that may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence”) (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1) and Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009)).

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2013). Petitioner was charged with one count of molestation of a child, one count of sexual 

abuse with a minor under fifteen years of age, and one count of voyeurism. On May 24, 

2012 the jury convicted Petitioner on the molestation charge but acquitted on the other two 

charges. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. E at 18.) Petitioner was sentenced by the Mojave County Superior 

Court to a term of eleven (11) years in prison, with sixty (60) days of service credit, and 

eighteen (18) months of supervised release. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. G at 26.) 

B. Direct Appeal.

In a timely, direct appeal filed on July 18, 2012, Petitioner raised one issue: whether 

the trial court abused its discretion by granting Mojave County’s motion amending the 

indictment to change the location the incident allegedly occurred in. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals discussed the pertinent facts surrounding the motion:

In July 2010, the state charged defendant with Count 1, molestation of a 

child, alleging that “[d]uring the month of October 2008, in the vicinity of 

4025 East Mountain View Road, Yucca, Mohave County, Arizona,” 

defendant “intentionally or knowingly engaged in sexual contact with S.P., a 

person under 15 years of age.” On the day prior to the start of jury selection, 

defendant filed a motion in limine in which he moved to preclude the victim's 

statements regarding the molestation incident that she alleged occurred in 

Hackberry. According to defendant, “the alleged victim's statement and 

[defendant's] statement discuss[ed] two different acts which they claim 

occurred at two different locations.” Therefore, because the victim's 

statements involved “an uncharged sex act” and because the state had not 

alleged an intent to use them as Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c) propensity 

evidence, the victim's statements about the Hackberry incident were 

precluded by State v. Ferrero, 229 Ariz. 239, 274 P.3d 509 (2012), because 

evidence of the Hackberry incident was not “intrinsic” to the actual offense 

charged.

The state responded that the evidence supported only “one incident” of 

molestation that occurred in October 2008 during a “camping/quail-hunting 

trip” when defendant touched S.P.'s genitals one time. The fact that the victim 

and defendant disputed the location where the incident occurred—with the 

victim being adamant that it occurred on her aunt's property in Hackberry, 

and defendant being equally adamant that it occurred in Yucca—did not 

“mean that two events were created.” The state also noted that it need only 

have alleged that the incident occurred in Mohave County as all parties 

agreed. Consequently, the state simultaneously filed a motion to amend 

indictment to delete the specific address and indicate only that the offense 

“occurred in Mohave County.”

At the hearing, the prosecutor explained that the state had decided to use the 

Yucca address based on its surmise that defendant, being older than the 

fourteen-year-old victim, “was able to describe the property better.” 

Regardless, defendant could cross-examine witnesses and argue the 

inconsistencies to his advantage. Defense counsel maintained that changing 

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the location in the indictment to Mohave County was “not sufficient notice 

... as to the location [of the offense] for [the defense] to form any sort of 

defense” to the charge. He also argued that, because defendant and the victim 

were each adamant as to the location, and because the evidence showed that 

the family went camping fifteen times in three different locations that year, 

it was important to identify precisely where the offense occurred. 

Consequently, defense counsel argued that amending the indictment to state 

simply “Mohave County” was not made to correct a mistake of fact because 

it was “entirely possible we're talking about two different incidents.”

The trial court noted that the “only discrepancy” was where in Mohave 

County the offense had occurred because “everyone agrees that every one of 

these three locations is somewhere in Mohave County.” The trial court also 

noted that the alleged date of the incident was the same and that “the 

description [of the incident] by the alleged victim and the defendant seem to 

be describing the same incident.” The court granted the state's motion to 

amend the indictment pursuant to Rule 13.5(b) of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure based on what it found to be a mistake of fact, striking 

“4025 East Mountain View Road, Yucca” and leaving only “Mohave 

County” as the designated location in the document. The trial court 

accordingly denied defendant's motion in limine, finding that the “two 

differing dueling versions of the camping trip incident” described an incident 

that only “happened once” with simply “a disagreement as to where it took 

place.”

Cooper, 2013 WL at *2-3. On June 4, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected 

Petitioner’s argument, and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Petitioner sought review 

in the Arizona Supreme Court, which summarily denied review on January 7, 2014. (Doc. 

9-2, Ex. Q at 22.) Petitioner’s conviction became final on April 7, 2014, after the 90-day 

window to seek certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States expired. 

C. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings.

1. First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On March 5, 2014, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure with the Mojave County Superior 

Court. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. R at 24.) Petitioner was assigned an attorney and filed a timely 

petition on February 8, 2016. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. T at 31.)2 On July 22, 2016, the Mojave County 

Superior Court denied relief. (Doc. 9-2, Ex. W at 103.) Petitioner sought review by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied relief on August 10, 2017. (Doc. 9-3, Ex. EE at 

2 The approximate two-year gap between when the Notice of Post-Conviction Relief was 

filed versus when the Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief was filed was not explained. 

The reviewing court considered the petition on the merits, as did the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. 

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23.) Petitioner did not appeal the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision to the Arizona 

Supreme Court. (Doc. 9-3, Ex. FF at 25.) 

2. Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On December 8, 2017, Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

with the Mojave County Superior Court. (Doc. 9-3, Ex. GG at 31.) The reviewing court 

dismissed the petition as untimely on March 13, 2018. (Doc. 9-3, Ex. HH at 47.) Petitioner 

sought review of the dismissed petition with the Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied 

review on June 14, 2018. (Doc. 9-3, Ex. KK at 67.) Petitioner did not appeal to the Arizona 

Supreme Court. 

III. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On May 15, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1.) 

This Court summarized his claims as follows:

In Ground One, he claims that his due process rights were violated when the 

trial court allowed the state to amend the indictment to conform to the 

evidence. In Grounds Two through Four, Petitioner alleges that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to: file a motion 

to preclude other-act evidence (Ground Two), “complete” his impeachment 

of the victim’s testimony (Ground Three), or object to the amended 

indictment on grounds that it was duplicitous (Ground Four). 

(Doc. 3 at 1-2.) 

On October 4, 2019, Respondents filed a Limited Response. (Doc. 9.) On October 

21, 2019, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. 11.)

IV. DISCUSSION

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

Whether a petition is barred by the statute of limitations is a threshold issue that must be 

resolved before considering other procedural issues or the merits of individual claims.

The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review 

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or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

Here, on June 4, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

conviction. On January 7, 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied the petition 

for review. Petitioner’s conviction thus became final 90 days later on April 7, 2014, when 

the period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United 

States expired.

Petitioner states in his Reply that the one-year limitations period of the AEDPA 

began to run only after the second post-conviction relief proceeding was concluded on July 

30, 2018 and asserts that the deadline to file his federal petition was July 30, 2019. (Doc. 

11 at 2-3.) From that date, Petitioner’s May 21, 2019 filing in this Court would be timely. 

However, the AEDPA’s limitations period begins to run upon the conclusion of “direct 

review” of the conviction. Petitioner’s first and second PCR proceedings are considered 

“collateral review” proceedings instead of “direct review” proceedings, and therefore at 

best only entitle Petitioner to tolling of the limitations period. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 

495 F.3d 1069, 1075 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007).

a. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction review 

is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona Dep’t of 

Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“A 

proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the court 

in which the conviction occurred.”). 

Because Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief, he is entitled to 

statutory tolling of the first PCR proceeding. Petitioner filed the first notice of postconviction relief on February 2, 2014. Because the notice of post-conviction relief was 

filed before the time to seek certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States expired, 

the one-year limitation period of the AEDPA did not begin to run until after the proceedings 

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in Petitioner’s first notice of post-conviction relief concluded. Petitioner’s first PCR 

proceeding concluded on August 10, 2017, when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied the 

petition for review of the denial of Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition. See

Hemmerle 495 F.3d at 1074–76. Therefore, the one-year period was tolled until at least 

September 11, 2017, and Petitioner was required to file his Petition in this Court by 

September 11, 2018 at the latest.

3

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling while his second post-conviction relief 

proceeding was pending. A state petition that is not filed within the state’s required time 

limit is not “properly filed,” and therefore not entitled to statutory tolling. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is untimely 

under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Allen v. 

Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 (2007) (finding that inmate’s untimely state post–conviction petition 

was not “properly filed” under the AEDPA’s tolling provision). 

Petitioner filed his second PCR proceeding on December 20, 2017. (Doc. 9-3, Ex. 

HH at 47.) Petitioner acknowledged in his second PCR petition that his petition was 

untimely but argued the trial court should excuse his untimely filing. (Doc. 9-3, Ex. GG at 

40-44.) However, the Mojave County Superior Court rejected this argument. (Doc. 9-3, 

Ex. HH at 47-48.) Even when Petitioner brought the timeliness issue to the attention of the 

Arizona Court of Appeals (see doc. 9-3, Ex. JJ at 53-54), the court affirmed dismissal. 

(Doc. 9-3, Ex. KK at 67.) Therefore, Petitioner’s second PCR petition was untimely as a 

matter of state law, and therefore not eligible for statutory tolling under the AEDPA.4

3 The Ninth Circuit in Hemmerle stated that the tolling period lasted “at least” until the first 

PCR notice was summarily dismissed, but did not address whether tolling terminates on 

the exact day the reviewing court issues its decision, or if tolling continues until the period 

to seek review of the adverse decision elapses. At least one court in this District has 

highlighted the discrepancy. See Holemen v. Ryan, No. CV-12-02350-PHX-SRB, 2013 

WL 3716603 *4-9 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2013). In this case, the question is not outcome 

determinative, but the Court affords Petitioner the benefit of the doubt and uses the date 

when the opportunity to seek review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision expired.

4

Insofar as Petitioner contends that the finding of untimeliness by the Mojave County 

Superior Court under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32 was mistaken, that contention does not entitle 

Petitioner to relief. Even assuming one occurred, federal courts do not grant relief for errors 

by state courts in interpreting state law. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011). 

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b. Gap Tolling

The Petitioner is not entitled to toll the time gap between the two PCR proceedings. 

King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). As set forth by the Ninth Circuit, the twopart “gap tolling” test reads as follows:

First, we ask whether the petitioner’s subsequent petitions are limited to an 

elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition. If not, these 

petitions constitute a “new round” and the gap between the rounds is not 

tolled. But if the petitioner simply attempted to correct the deficiencies, then 

the petitioner is still making “proper use of state court procedures,” and his 

application is still “pending” for tolling purposes. We thus construe the new 

petitions as part of the first “full round” of collateral review. We then ask 

whether they were ultimately denied on the merits or deemed untimely. In 

the former event, the time gap between the petitions is tolled; in the latter 

event it is not.

King, 340 F.3d at 823 (citations omitted); see also Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1075. Here, the 

first prong of the King test is not satisfied. The first ground for relief stated in Petitioner’s 

second PCR proceeding is that trial counsel in Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding “fail[ed] 

to investigate and preserve specific claims made by Cooper in written communications to 

Mojave County Legal Defender Eric Devany [...] in Cooper’s ‘Rule 32 of-right’ 

proceeding.” (Doc. 9-3, Ex. GG at 32.) Petitioner reiterates in his Reply that his second 

PCR proceeding “was done to address a constitutional violation that had not been factored 

into the original PCR filing.” (Doc. 11 at 2.) The second PCR petition is therefore not 

merely “an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition” within the 

meaning of King, because it presented entirely new grounds for relief. Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to toll the time gap between the two PCR proceedings.5

c. Equitable Tolling 

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he has not shown extraordinary 

circumstances. “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one–year filing 

deadline must show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing 

on time, and (2) he has diligently pursued his rights.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

5 Even assuming the first prong of King is satisfied, the second is not. Petitioner’s second 

PCR was dismissed as untimely by the trial court and affirmed by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 9-3, Exs. HH, KK at 47, 67.) Because at least one PCR petition was not 

decided on the merits, Petitioner does not satisfy the second prong of King.

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649 (2010); Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2015). Petitioner bears the burden 

of showing that equitable tolling should apply. Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 

1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external forces, 

rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely habeas 

action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling is to be 

rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron–Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 

2009). Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 

untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a petition 

on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the threshold 

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions 

swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation 

omitted).

Petitioner does not assert that equitable tolling should apply. In the Petition, 

Petitioner left blank Question No. 16, which requires Petitioner to explain why the 

limitations period of AEDPA does not bar a federal habeas petition “if your judgment of 

conviction became final more than one year ago.” (Doc. 1 at 11.) The standard petition 

form also includes a copy of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which identifies the bases for statutory 

tolling. (Id.) In the Reply, Petitioner also does not address the issue of equitable tolling, 

arguing instead that the Petition was timely filed. (Doc. 11 at 2-3.) It is Petitioner’s burden 

to demonstrate the “extraordinary circumstances” that excuse the untimely filing of the 

Petition. Because Petitioner made no effort to do so anywhere in this proceeding, the 

Petition is not subject to equitable tolling. 

Petitioner’s pro se status and unfamiliarity with the law does not excuse his failure 

to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one-year statute of limitations. See, e.g., Rasberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal 

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable 

tolling.”). Petitioner has failed to meet the “very high threshold,” United States v. Battles, 

362 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004), of establishing that extraordinary circumstances 

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beyond his control made it impossible for him to timely file a habeas petition and that those 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.

d. Actual Innocence

Petitioner could avoid the time bar if he can demonstrate that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice would result from this Court’s failure to reach the merits of the claim. 

“Actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass 

whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . [or] expiration of the statute of limitations.”

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] 

petitioner is actually innocent when he was convicted for conduct not prohibited by law.” 

Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). Actual innocence is 

possible when a petitioner shows “in light of subsequent case law, that he cannot, as a legal 

matter, have committed the alleged crime.” Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th

Cir. 2014).

Here, actual innocence is not one of the four claims presented by Petitioner.

Petitioner challenges the legal sufficiency of the amendment to the indictment and the 

performance of trial counsel, as opposed to the factual sufficiency of the elements 

necessary to obtain a conviction under A.R.S. § 13-1410(A).6 This Court cannot say that 

no juror, acting reasonably, could find Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

e. Martinez

Although Petitioner does not cite to Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the Court 

has considered Petitioner’s general claim that his prior counsel did not pursue his claims. 

Martinez is unavailing because it does not excuse untimeliness. In Martinez, the Supreme 

Court recognized a narrow means by which a prisoner can show “cause” to excuse a state 

procedural default of a claim based upon alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 

See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 7-8. Martinez does not address or create an exception to the 

6 The Arizona Court of Appeals held in Cooper that the location of the alleged molestation 

was not an element of the crime charged. 2013 WL at *4, citing State v. Archer, 603 P.2d 

918, 920 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). Therefore, Petitioner’s assertions that the trial court 

violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments by allowing the state to amend the 

indictment do not establish that “he was convicted for conduct not prohibited by law,” even 

assuming the alleged constitutional violations are proven.

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AEDPA statute of limitations. Federal courts have consistently rejected the argument that 

Martinez provides relief for time-barred petitions in the form of equitable tolling of the 

statute of limitations. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t Corr., 742 F.3d 940, 945 (11th Cir. 

2014) (“Chavez’s initial § 2254 petition was dismissed as untimely because it was filed 

more than one year after his convictions became final on direct review, see 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A), and nothing in Martinez alters that fact.”); See also, Madueno v. Ryan, No. 

CV-13-01382-PHX-SRB, 2014 WL 2094189, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2014) (“Martinez

has no application to the statute of limitations in the AEDPA which governs Petitioner’s 

filing in federal court.”).

IV. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

An evidentiary hearing is not warranted regarding Petitioner’s claims, including 

equitable tolling, because the record is sufficiently developed to resolve the question of 

whether the Petition is timely. A habeas petitioner asserting equitable tolling “should 

receive an evidentiary hearing when he makes ‘a good-faith allegation that would, if true, 

entitle him to equitable tolling.’” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Laws, 351 F.3d at 919). An evidentiary hearing is not mandatory. For the reasons 

outlined above, the Court has thoroughly reviewed the Petition, Reply, and attachments 

and found Petitioner has not made a showing that equitable tolling should be granted in 

this case.

V. CONCLUSION

The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an evidentiary 

hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims 

are untimely. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural 

ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 6th day of April, 2020.

Honorable Michael T. Morrissey

United States Magistrate Judge

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