Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01037/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01037-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1037

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Northern District of Iowa. 

Damon John Torres, * 

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: September 6, 2005

Filed: November 4, 2005

___________

Before COLLOTON, LAY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM. 

In an opinion filed on November 5, 2004, we affirmed an order of the district

court denying a motion filed by Damon John Torres to compel the United States to

file a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

35(b) based on the provision of substantial assistance. Torres then filed a petition for

writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court granted the

petition, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in

light of United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). See Torres v. United States,

125 S. Ct. 2925 (2005). We received supplemental briefs from the parties, and we

now affirm the judgment of the district court.

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Although the parties have briefed whether the district court’s original

imposition of sentence constituted plain error warranting relief within the meaning

of Booker and United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc),

we conclude that there is no appellate jurisdiction to consider that question. Torres

was sentenced on August 1, 2001. He did not file a timely direct appeal from that

sentence. In July 2002, Torres then filed a motion, which was amended in November

2003, to compel the government to file a motion to reduce sentence pursuant to Rule

35(b). The district court denied the motion in December 2003, and Torres filed an

appeal from that order in January 2004. This appeal thus raises the narrow question

whether the district court erred in declining to compel the filing of a substantialassistance motion. For the reasons stated in our opinion of November 5, 2004, we

affirm the district court’s decision to deny the motion. Our jurisdiction to review the

district court’s order of December 2003, however, does not extend to review of the

sentence originally imposed in August 2001. An appeal of that judgment is untimely.

If the original sentence were properly before us, we would conclude that the

district court’s imposition of sentence involved no plain error warranting relief under

Pirani. To obtain relief under the plain-error standard, a defendant must show a

reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable sentence under

the advisory guidelines scheme announced in Booker. In this case, the district court

calculated a sentencing range of 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment under the thenmandatory guidelines, and then sentenced Torres to a term of 150 months’

imprisonment. A sentence in the middle of the advisory guideline range is

“insufficient per se to demonstrate a reasonable probability that a district court would

have imposed a more lenient sentence under an advisory Guidelines system,” United

States v. St. James, 415 F.3d 800, 807 (8th Cir. 2005), and, indeed, it is sufficient

under our precedents to demonstrate that a Booker error is harmless. United States

v. Perez-Ramirez, 415 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2005). We also conclude that a

sentence in the middle of the advisory guideline range is reasonable in this case.

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Accordingly, even were we to consider Torres’s claim based on Booker, there is no

basis for relief.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

LAY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that our court lacks jurisdiction to review

the district court’s order of December 2003. Because the majority has elected to

discuss whether the defendant in this case would have received relief under United

States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), I write separately to express

my dissatisfaction with the inflexible manner in which plain error is used by this court

to review Booker claims. Pirani does not make any sense and puts blinders upon our

review of Booker cases. Even where it is obvious the district court imposed a

mandatory sentence based on facts not admitted to by the defendant or found by a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of the Sixth Amendment, we will not entertain

the possibility of a remedy for this constitutional error if the record is mute on the

issue of whether the district court would have imposed a different sentence if the

Guidelines were merely discretionary. Considering that, at the time of sentencing, the

Guidelines were mandatory, a silent record on this point is to be expected and we

should not fault a defendant for an inability to point to non-existent evidence. While

justice may be blind, I cannot turn a blind eye to injustice. As eloquently stated by

Judge Bye,

The duty of showing prejudice which the [rule of Pirani bestows] on a

defendant is like asking a defendant to prove the existence of a divinebeing or the existence of life on a planet other than our own. The

evidence either does not exist or is beyond the defendant’s mere human

capabilities, thus any attempt to explain how a defendant may meet this

showing, without an explicit statement on the record by the sentencing

judge, is nothing more than an empty exercise in casuistry.

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Id. at 564 (Bye, J., dissenting). 

I suggest the limited remand approach adopted by the Second, Seventh and

Ninth Circuits strikes the correct balance between judicial economy and our duty to

protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. See United States v. Ameline,

409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th

Cir. 2005); United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005). As it is nearly

always impossible for a defendant to demonstrate that the district court would have

imposed a different sentence under a discretionary sentencing regime, a limited

remand to answer this question is both practical and just.

______________________________

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