Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01361/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01361-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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 These requested amounts are based on Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207 (9 Cir. 1998), 1 th

which is a 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) case, and does not apply to EAJA fee cases. Plaintiff has

requested fees in the amount of $7,969.81 if Widrig is found to be not controlling.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DALE ALLIO,

Plaintiff, CIV NO. S-05-1361 LKK GGH

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of 

Social Security, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendant.

__________________________________/

Before the court is plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees under the Equal Access

to Justice Act (EAJA), filed March 28, 2007. The Commissioner asserts that the amount of fees

claimed is not reasonable. Counsel requests attorneys’ fees in the amount of $8,478.75 and costs

in the amount of $148.20, for a total of $8,626.95. In the order entered on March 13, 2007, this 1

court granted plaintiff’s motion for remand or summary judgment in part, and remanded the

matter under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for a computation of benefits. As explained

hereafter, the court will recommend that plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees be granted in part

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and denied in part.

An applicant for benefits receiving a remand pursuant to sentence four of § 42

U.S.C. S 405(g) is a prevailing party, regardless of whether the applicant later succeeds in

obtaining the requested benefits. Schaefer v. Shalala, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S. Ct. 2625, 2631-32 

(1993). After Schaefer, pursuant to a sentence four remand, an applicant can recover attorneys’

fees incurred in proceedings before the district court. Plaintiff has moved for an award of

attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $8,478.75 for 12.25 hours of work at $156.99/hour for work

in 2005, 28.7 hours of work at $166.98/hour for work in 2006, 7.5 hours of work at $166.98/hour

for work in 2007, and costs in the amount of $148.20, pursuant to The Equal Access to Justice

Act, (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1). Plaintiff seeks a cost of living adjustment (“COLA”) to

the statutory cap on attorneys’ fees of $125/hour.

The EAJA provides that the prevailing party in a civil action against the United

States may apply for an order for attorney fees and expenses within 30 days of final judgment in

the action. “The EAJA was enacted to reduce the chance that ‘the expense of litigation involved

in securing the vindication of . . . rights’ would deter ‘defen[se] against unreasonable

governmental action.’” Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580, 582 (9th Cir. 1984), quoting

H.R.Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Cong. & Ad. News 4984. 

The court must allow the fee award unless it finds that the position of the United States was

“substantially justified” or “special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(A). 

The Commissioner does not argue that the fees should not be granted because the

position of the United States was justified or because other special circumstances make an award

unjust. The Commissioner, however, argues that the amount of fees requested is unreasonable

because the claim of hours expended is excessive, and because the requested hourly rate exceeds

the hourly rate permitted under the EAJA.

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 Although plaintiff’s counsel’s statement of services included February and March, 2

2007, for the sake of simplicity the court has used the CPI for February, 2007, of 203.499 and

rounded up. The year 2005 is not included in the calculation as plaintiff represented himself that

year. See discussion infra. 

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The EAJA directs the court to award a reasonable fee. In determining whether a

fee is reasonable, the court considers the hours expended, the reasonable hourly rate, and the

results obtained. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990); Hensley

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986 (9th Cir.

1998). Taking a reasonable rate and multiplying it by a reasonable amount of expended hours is

not the only task left to the district court under the EAJA. Atkins, 154 F.3d at 989. The court

must also consider the results obtained. Id. 

In considering a reasonable rate for attorneys’ fees, an increase in the statutory

rate of $125 may be justified to account for inflation. See Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 863 F.2d

1458, 1463- 64 (9th Cir.1988) (adding inflationary adjustment to statutory maximum). The

COLA adjustment to the statutory cap is computed by multiplying the cap by the consumer price

index for urban consumers for the year in which the fees were earned, then dividing by the

consumer price index figure on the date that the cap was imposed by Congress. Russell v.

Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1991). The national, rather than local change in cost of living,

should be applied to adjust the EAJA rate cap because “if Congress had wanted to allow for cost

of living adjustments in a particular region or city, it could have done so in the statute.” Stewart

v. Sullivan, 810 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Haw. 1993). The court will apply the formula using the

March 1996 national CPI of 157.3, the national CPI for 2006 of 201.6, and the national CPI for

February, 2007 of 203.5. See U.S. v. Real Property Known as 22249 Dolorosa Street, 2

Woodland Hills, Cal., 190 F.3d 977 (9th Cir.1999); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1148-49

(9 Cir. 2001) (fees based on date legal services performed, not current date). Accordingly, the th

court finds a reasonable hourly rate for attorney time, adjusted for inflation, to be $160/hour for

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 2006: $125 x 201.6 ÷157.3 = $160.20; 2007: $125 x 203.5 (February) ÷ 157.3 = 3

$161.71.

 Counsel’s statement of services states a total of 48.45 hours of attorney time, and 13.15 4

hours for 2005.

 Counsel would be advised to substitute in sooner rather than later if counsel is actually 5

doing the work for a pro se plaintiff.

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2006, and $162/hour for 2007.3

Counsel requests a total fee in the amount of $8,478.75. Counsel has submitted

an affidavit documenting 49.05 hours of attorney time, of which 12.25 hours were expended in

2005. The Commissioner objects to billing for services in 2005 as plaintiff represented himself 4

in this case during that year. The docket indicates that Mr. Peasley filed a motion for substitution

on October 12, 2005, and it was granted on October 28, 2005. The services for which counsel

seeks compensation are dated as having been rendered from May 9, 2005 to September 29, 2005. 

Attorneys’ fees are not awardable under the EAJA for work done by pro se litigants. Merrell v.

Block, 809 F.2d 639, 641-42 (9 Cir. 1987). Therefore, fees for work done in 2005 will not be th

awarded.5

The Commissioner also claims that the 35 or 36 hours claimed for work done in

2006 and 2007 are excessive. The Commissioner cites to Patterson v. Apfel, 99 F. Supp. 2d

1212 (C.D. Cal. 2000), wherein the court conducted a survey indicating that the average number

of hours claimed in EAJA fee petitions is 37.3. Here, the Commissioner argues, the number of

hours claimed is excessive in light of the fact that plaintiff was not represented by counsel at the

time he filed his complaint. The Commissioner also asserts that plaintiff’s claims on summary

judgment were mostly denied, except for the issue of a closed period of disability which was not

raised by the parties’ briefs. In this regard, the court finds that counsel’s requested fee is not

excessive. Eighteen hours to prepare the 19 page memorandum in support of the summary

judgment motion seems reasonable under Patterson. See also Mendoza v. Bowen, 701 F. Supp.

1471 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (finding fifty hours reasonable despite lack of novel issues); Walton v.

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Massanari, 177 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364-65 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (permitting fees for 53.6 hours spent on

a 27 page brief). Although plaintiff did not receive results from the arguments he raised, those

arguments did cause the court to review the record for a closed period of disability, and plaintiff

did receive benefits for a closed period. Accordingly, the court finds 34.45 hours to be a

reasonable amount of time expended. Multiplied by the reasonable rates of $160 per hour for

27.35 hours in 2006, and $162 per hour for 7.1 hours in 2007, a total attorneys’ fee award in the

amount of $5526.20 is a reasonable fee award. The government does not object to the claimed

costs in the amount of $148.20.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s request for EAJA fees be

granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff should be awarded $5526.20 in attorneys’ fees and

$148.20 in costs.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten

(10) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 12/4/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

_______________________________________

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:076

Allio1361.eaja.wpd

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