Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02116/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02116-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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15-CV-2116-AJB-JMA 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE HARRINGTON,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVE DAVYS; SCOTT KERNAN, 

Secretary of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, 

Respondents.

Case No.: 15-CV-2116-AJB-JMA

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, (Doc. No. 22);

(2) GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS, (Doc. No. 15);

(3) DISMISSING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, (Doc. 

No. 7); AND

(4) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

On September 21, 2015, Petitioner Steve Harrington (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

(Doc. No. 1), which he amended on February 19, 2016 (“Petition”), (Doc. No. 7). The 

Petition challenges Petitioner’s state court conviction for burglary. On July 13, 2016, 

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition. (Doc. No. 15.) Petitioner filed an 

opposition on August 18, 2016. (Doc. No. 20.) 

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15-CV-2116-AJB-JMA 

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Magistrate Judge Jan M. Adler issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) 

recommending Respondent’s motion be granted and the Petition be dismissed. (Doc. No. 

22.) On January 23, 2017, Petitioner filed timely objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 28.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R, (Doc. No. 22), 

OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections, (Doc. No. 28), DISMISSES the Petition WITH 

PREJUDICE, (Doc. No. 7), and DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

BACKGROUND

I. California State Court Proceedings

On May 28, 2009, Petitioner was convicted of one count of burglary in violation of 

California Penal Code section 459 in San Diego Superior Court, Case No. SCD216977. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 1–2; Lodgment No. 1 at 1.) Petitioner directly appealed his conviction to the 

California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the trial court’s conviction on March 15, 2011. 

(Lodgment No. 1 at 2.) On May 18, 2011, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s 

petition for review, thus affirming his conviction. (Doc. No. 1 at 2; Lodgment No. 2 at 3.) 

Petitioner did not seek review with the United States Supreme Court. (See Doc. No. 1 at 

3.)

On December 1, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the 

California Supreme Court, challenging his 2009 burglary conviction. (Lodgment No. 5 at 

2–3.) He argued his 14th Amendment right to due process was violated, asserting there was 

insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that his prior out-of-state 

burglary conviction was a serious felony. (Id.) On March 28, 2012, the California Supreme 

Court denied that petition. (Lodgment No. 6 at 1.)

II. Federal Court Proceedings

On August 31, 2011, Petitioner filed Harrington v. Neotti, No. 11-CV-2016-HMDD, another petition for writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, Petitioner challenged his 

2009 burglary conviction and sentence, arguing he was entitled to relief due to juror 

misconduct. (See Lodgment Nos. 2, 3.) District Judge Marilyn L. Huff issued an order 

denying that petition on the merits on September 13, 2012. (See Lodgment No. 2 at 6–7.)

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Petitioner instituted the instant Petition on September 21, 2015 (Doc. No. 1.) The 

Petition was dismissed without prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to satisfy the filing fee 

requirement. (Doc. No. 2.) Proceeding in forma pauperis, Petitioner filed a first amended 

petition on February 19, 2016. (Doc. No. 7.) In this Petition, Petitioner argues his Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in SCD216977 by the trial court illegally 

enhancing his sentence and relying upon insufficient evidence in determining his prior outof-state burglary conviction was a serious felony. (Id. at 6–7.) 

On July 13, 2016, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the Petition is time 

barred and successive under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”). (Doc. No. 15.) Petitioner opposed the motion on August 18, 2016. (Doc. No. 

20.) On November 8, 2016, Magistrate Judge Adler issued an R&R in which he 

recommends the motion be granted and the Petition denied for being both time barred and 

successive. (Doc. No. 22.) Petitioner objected to the R&R on January 23, 2017, arguing 

only that the instant Petition has nothing to do with his prior federal petition. (Doc. No. 

28.) This order follows.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Petition is governed by the AEDPA, applying a “‘highly deferential standard 

for evaluating state-court rulings,’ which demands that state-court decisions be given the 

benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 & n.7 (1997)). Federal habeas relief may be granted 

if the state court (1) applied a rule different from the governing law provided by the United 

States Supreme Court; or (2) correctly identified the governing legal principle, but 

unreasonably applied it to the facts of the case. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).

The duties of the district court with respect to a magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court must “make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the report . . . to which objection is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, 

in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); United 

States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617–18 (9th Cir. 1989).

As to portions of the report to which no objection is made, the Court may assume 

the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the 

applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson 

v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such circumstances, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that a failure to file objections only relieves the district court of its 

burden to give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed 

de novo. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007).

DISCUSSION

I. Petitioner’s Objection

Petitioner’s sole objection to the R&R is that the Magistrate Judge misconstrued the 

subject of the Petition, namely, that the instant Petition “has no connection with the out-ofstate prior conviction for [b]urglary that was filed in 2009, and was denied on March 28, 

2012.” (Doc. No. 28 at 2.) The Court construes Petitioner’s objection as asserting that this 

federal Petition is not second or successive. 

State habeas petitioners generally may file only one federal habeas petition 

challenging a particular state conviction and/or sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)

(courts must dismiss a claim presented in a second or successive petition when that claim 

was presented in a prior petition); id. § 2244(b)(2) (with several exceptions not applicable 

here, courts must dismiss a claim presented in a second or successive petition when that 

claim was not presented in a prior petition). “A habeas petition is second or successive only

if it raises claims that were or could have been adjudicated on the merits” in an earlier §

2254 petition. McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 2009).

Even when § 2244(b) provides a basis for pursuing a second or successive § 2254 

habeas petition, petitioners seeking relief from the district court must first obtain 

authorization from the Ninth Circuit before filing any such second or successive petition. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). The Ninth Circuit “may authorize the filing of the second or 

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successive [petition] only if it presents a claim not previously raised that satisfies one of 

the two grounds articulated in § 2244(b)(2).” Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007).

Having reviewed the record de novo, it is clear the instant Petition is Petitioner’s

second bite at the apple to collaterally challenge his 2009 burglary conviction. Before 

District Judge Huff, Petitioner challenged the sentence he received in SCD216977, 

asserting jury misconduct, namely, that one of the jurors was sleeping during the trial. 

(Case No. 11-CV-2016-H-MDD, Doc. No. 1 at 6.) In the instant Petition, Petitioner again 

challenges his 2009 burglary conviction by asserting his Fourteenth Amendment rights 

were violated when the trial court “knowingly imposed an illegal sentence enhancement [] 

by going outside and beyond the record” and “deliberately forg[ing] the arrest charge[.]” 

(Doc. No. 7 at 6; see Doc. No. 28 at 2.)1

While the grounds raised in Petitioner’s two federal petitions are not identical, the 

Court finds the instant Petition is second or successive of the first. Both petitions attack the 

burglary conviction and sentence he sustained in 2009. District Judge Huff denied the first 

petition on the merits, presuming the state appellate court’s finding that the juror was not 

sleeping to be correct, and concluding that that court’s determination was not contrary to 

or an unreasonable application of established federal law. (Lodgment No. 2 at 5–7.)

Petitioner does not explain why he could not have alleged the instant claim of illegal 

sentence enhancement in his prior federal habeas petition. Furthermore, the facts upon 

which the instant Petition relies were readily ascertainable at the filing of his first petition.

See Johnson v. Marshall, No. 09cv927 BTM(POR), 2010 WL 753363, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 

Mar. 2, 2010) (“When a federal habeas petitioner proceeds to judgment on the merits of 

claims presented with respect to a particular conviction, any later filed habeas corpus 

 

1 To the extent Petitioner is asserting this Petition has no relation to the petition he filed 

with the California Supreme Court, the Court readily rejects that assertion. Reviewing the 

state habeas corpus petition, that petition raised the ground that there was insufficient 

evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Petitioner’s out-of-state burglary 

prior was a serious felony, thus illegally enhancing his sentence. (Lodgment No. 5 at 3.)

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petition attacking that same conviction is considered a ‘second or successive’ petition.” 

(citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486–88 (2000))).

Petitioner makes no argument that he is entitled to an exemption from § 2244(b)(1)’s 

bar. Even if he did, he does not address the fact that the Ninth Circuit has not authorized 

him to proceed with a second or successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Gonzalez 

v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530 (2005). As such, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to 

entertain the Petition. See Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2001) (per 

curiam) (“the district court may not, in the absence of proper authorization from the court 

of appeals, consider a second or successive habeas application” (quotation omitted)); 

Johnson, 2010 WL 753363, at *2 (same). For the foregoing reasons, the Court 

OVERRULES Petitioner’s objection, ADOPTS the R&R, and DISMISSES the Petition 

WITH PREJUDICE.

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II. Certificate of Appealability

When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas corpus 

 

2 The Court notes that even if the R&R’s analysis and conclusion regarding a second or 

successive petition were unsound, the Court agrees with the R&R that this Petition is time 

barred. (Doc. No. 22 at 3–5.) The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations period 

for prisoners who are “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” to file for 

federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Here, Petitioner’s state judgment became 

final on August 16, 2011, ninety days after the California Supreme Court affirmed 

Petitioner’s conviction on direct review. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 

1158–59 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run the following 

day, on August 17. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The 

limitations period continued to run for 106 days until December 1, 2011, when he filed the 

petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 5.) 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (exempting from the limitations period “[t]he time during 

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending”). The period recommenced after that 

court denied that petition on March 28, 2012. (Lodgment No. 6 at 1.) Accordingly, 

Petitioner had until December 13, 2012, to timely file the instant Petition. This case was 

not filed until September 21, 2015, well after the statute of limitations expired. (Doc. No. 

1.)

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proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 

appeal a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate 

of appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further. Slack, 529 U.S. at 483–84. Here, the Court finds that reasonable jurists could not 

debate the Court’s conclusion to dismiss the Petition and therefore DECLINES to issue a 

certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objection, (Doc. No. 

28), ADOPTS the report and recommendation in full, (Doc. No. 22), GRANTS

Respondent’s motion to dismiss, (Doc. No. 15), DISMISSES the Petition with prejudice, 

(Doc. No. 7), and DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 17, 2017

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