Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00414/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00414-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINNIE STAGGS, as Administrator of 

the ESTATE OF ROBERT E. 

STAGGS, Deceased, and MELISSA 

STAGGS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DOCTOR’S HOSPITAL OF 

MANTECA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:11-cv-00414-MCE-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff Linnie Staggs, as administrator of the Estate of Robert E. Staggs, and 

Melissa Staggs (collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring claims against Doctor’s Hospital of 

Manteca, Inc. (“DHM”) and individual defendants (collectively “Defendants”) seeking 

redress for the medical treatment and subsequent death of Robert E. Staggs 

(“Decedent”) while in custody at the Sierra Conservation Center (“SCC”). The individual 

defendants include, among others, Mario Sattah, M.D. (“Sattah”), Lincoln Russin, M.D. 

(“Russin”), and James Owen, M.D. (“Owen”). Plaintiffs allege that defendants DHM and 

Sattah violated Decedent’s Eighth Amendment rights by exhibiting deliberate 

indifference to Decedent’s medical condition. Plaintiffs further claim that defendants 

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Russin and Owen negligently provided medical care to Decedent.

Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motions to Strike the Affirmative 

Defenses of Defendants Sattah and DHM under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).

1

 

ECF Nos. 152, 153. As with Plaintiffs’ previous two Motions to Strike, these Motions are 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

2

DISCUSSION

An affirmative defense is an “assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will 

defeat the plaintiff’s [ ] claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Black’s 

Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). A court may strike an insufficiently pled affirmative 

defense under Rule 12(f). 

District courts in this circuit were previously split on whether the heightened 

pleading standard that the United States Supreme Court announced in Twombly and 

Iqbal applied to affirmative defenses. Some courts, including this Court, concluded that 

affirmative defenses were subject to the heightened pleading standard. See, e.g., Wine 

Group LLC, v. L. and R. Wine Co., No. 2:10-cv-02204-MCE-KJN, 2011 WL 130236, at *2 

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2011); Dodson v. Strategic Rests. Acquisition Co. II, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 

595 (E.D. Cal. 2013). Other courts, however, declined to apply the heightened pleading 

standard to affirmative defenses, citing Wyshak v. City National Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826 

(9th Cir. 1979), for the proposition that the pleadings need only provide the plaintiff “fair 

notice” of the defense. See, e.g., Kohler v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 291 

F.R.D. 464, 468 (S.D. Cal. 2013). 

The Ninth Circuit, however, has resolved the split in the district courts. In Kohler 

v. Flava Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit explained that “the ‘fair notice’ required by the 

pleading standards only require[s] describing [an affirmative] defense in ‘general terms.’” 

 1 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted.

2 Plaintiffs’ Motions were submitted on the briefs in accordance with Local Rule 230(g). ECF No. 

158. 

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779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, 

Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1274 (3d ed. 1998)).3 Accordingly, this Court applies 

the “fair notice” standard, and not the heightened pleading standard identified by 

Twombly and Iqbal, when evaluating motions to strike affirmative defenses. 

As indicated above, Plaintiffs here move to strike various affirmative defenses 

under Rule 12(f). Motions to strike are disfavored in part because of the limited 

importance of pleading in federal practice. Spring v. Fair Isaac Corp., 2015 WL 

7188234, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015). That limited importance—and the difficulty of 

overcoming the fair notice standard—is just as present with respect to Sattah and DHM’s 

affirmative defenses as it was with Plaintiffs’ previous motions to strike. With three 

exceptions, Sattah and DHM assert valid affirmative defenses that provide fair notice to 

Plaintiffs. Sattah’s “Color of Law” defense and DHM’s failure to state a claim defense, 

however, simply attack Plaintiff’s prima facie case and therefore do not qualify as 

affirmative defenses. ECF No. 146 at 8 (citing Zivkovic v. So. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 

1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). Similarly, DHM’s “collateral source” source defense merely 

raises issues regarding the calculation of damages and a possible double recovery. It 

does not qualify as an affirmative defense. See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Estradda, 

No. 1:10-cv-2165-OWW-SKO, 2011 WL 2413257 at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2011)

(“Defendant is free to raise this as a defense during the litigation, but it is not accurately 

characterized as an affirmative defense.”). Accordingly, DHM’s First and Sixth 

Affirmative Defenses are hereby STRICKEN, as is Sattah’s Twelfth Affirmative Defense. 

Having granted Plaintiffs’ Motions as to these affirmative defenses, the Court 

must pause to consider what Plaintiffs have gained by their apparent victory. Obviously, 

the Court’s decision to strike these defenses will not prevent Defendants from contesting 

Plaintiffs’ prima facie case and damages calculations all the way through trial. Nor will 

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 The specific sentence that the Ninth Circuit quoted in Kohler provides: “As numerous federal 

courts have held, an affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and will be held to be sufficient, 

and therefore invulnerable to a motion to strike, as long as it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the nature of 

the defense.” Wright & Miller, § 1274 (footnotes omitted).

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the loss of these paragraphs from Defendants’ answers reduce Plaintiffs’ discovery 

obligations in any way. 

Finally, the fair notice standard for pleading affirmative defenses and the disfavor 

with which courts view these motions limits the likelihood of a successful motion to strike 

affirmative defenses. The Court anticipates that counsel will carefully consider the 

strategic value of motions to strike affirmative defenses in the future.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ Motions to Strike (ECF Nos. 152 and 153) are GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part. Defendant Sattah’s Twelfth Affirmative Defense and Defendant DHM’s 

First and Sixth Affirmative Defenses are hereby STRICKEN. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 26, 2016

 

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