Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01144/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01144-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELLY WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-01144-REC-SMS-P

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO FILE

AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

ONLY ON COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Kelly Wilson (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on September 8,

2005. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims

Plaintiff is a state prisoner. The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred in

SutterCounty following plaintiff’s arrest, and at various state prisons following plaintiff’s conviction

and transfer into the custody of the California Department of Corrections. Plaintiff is seeking

monetary and injunctive relief. 

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was arrested in February of 1996 and taken to

Fremont Medical Center for treatment of a severe sinus infection. Plaintiff alleges that a hole was

cut in his left eye to relieve pressure, and that county authorities were informed that plaintiff needed

surgery or he could lose his left eye or die. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Yuba City Police

Department and Sutter County Sheriff’s Department did not provide the treatment, on the stated

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ground that plaintiff would receive surgery in state prison. Plaintiff was convicted five months later

and sent to Deuel Vocational Institution in Tracy. 

Plaintiff alleges that once in state prison, he was transferred six times in three years. Plaintiff

alleges that at each institution, he had to fight to obtain medical treatment and that his condition was

merely maintained at each institution. Plaintiff alleges that he eventually received surgery after

telling a doctor in Bakersfield that he had filed a lawsuit to obtain treatment.

1. Defendants Yuba City Police Department and Sutter County Sheriff’s

Department

Plaintiff alleges a claim for relief against the Yuba City Police Department and the Sutter

County Sheriff’s Department based on events that occurred in 1996. (Comp., Statement of Facts,

p. 1.) Federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues. See Elliott v. City of Union City,

25 F.3d 800, 801-802 (9th Cir. 1994). Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows

or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121,

1128 (9th Cir.1996). At the time plaintiff’s claim accrued, the statute of limitations was one year.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (Cal. Civ. Proc.

§ 335.1, extending the statute of limitations from one year to two years, does not apply to claims that

accrued prior to January 1, 2003). 

In actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitation, the court should also

borrow all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state law. See Hardin v.

Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989). Pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure section 352.1,

a two-year limit on tolling is imposed on prisoners. Section 352.1 provides, in pertinent part, as

follows:

(a) If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3 (commencing with

Section 335), is, at the time the cause of action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal

charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than for

life, the time of that disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement

of the action, not to exceed two years. 

Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time he filed suit and was entitled to application of the two

year tolling provision. The events giving rise to suit against the Yuba City and Sutter County

allegedly occurred in 1996. Therefore, plaintiff had until 1999 within which to file suit. Plaintiff’s

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 Plaintiff first filed suit concerning the lack of medical care at issue in this action on November 16, 2000, in

case number 1:00-CV-F-6977-AWI-LJO-P Wilson v. Terhune. That suit was dismissed based on plaintiff’s failure

to exhaust the available administrative remedies on September 22, 2004. To the extent that equitable tolling may

apply to plaintiff’s claims against CDC personnel, plaintiff’s claims against Yuba City and Sutter County were time

barred by the time plaintiff filed suit in 2000. Further, the suit filed in 2000 was not proceeding against Yuba City or

Sutter County. Accordingly, dismissal of the claims in this suit against Yuba City and Sutter County is proper.

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attempt to impose liability on these entities for events that occurred almost a decade before plaintiff

filed suit fails because the claims are barred by the statute of limitations.1

2. Defendant California Department of Corrections

Plaintiff names the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”) as a defendant. The

Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting

state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation

omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico

Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins.

Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies

as well as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural Resources Defense

Council v. California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053;

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons

was a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community

College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Because CDC is a state agency, it is entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Accordingly, plaintiff may not pursue a claim for relief

in this action against CDC.

3. Defendants Terhune, Adams, Castillo, Nguyen, Pak, and Shedler

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

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a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

The court finds that plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under

section 1983 against defendants Terhune, Adams, Castillo, Nguyen, Pak, and Shedler. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-15 (2002); Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d

1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 2003); Galbraith v. County

of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). Although the court is mindful that a mere

disagreement with treatment provided is insufficient to give rise to a claim for relief under section

1983, Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981), construing plaintiff’s allegations in

the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is alleging that he had a medical need for surgery and

this need was ignored by defendants until he filed suit in 2000, after which time he finally received

surgery. Plaintiff’s alleges that his health was endangered by defendants, and that he suffered severe

pain.

C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint contains cognizable claims for relief against

defendants Terhune, Adams, Castillo, Nguyen, Pak, and Shedler for acting with deliberate

indifference to plaintiffs’ serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However,

the court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any other claims upon which relief may

be granted under section 1983. Although the court does not believe the deficiencies in plaintiff’s

claims against Yuba City, Sutter County, and CDC are curable, in an abundance of caution the court

will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and wishes to proceed only against

defendants Terhune, Adams, Castillo, Nguyen, Pak, and Shedler on his Eighth Amendment claims,

plaintiff may so notify the court in writing. The court will then issue Findings and

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Recommendations recommending that the remaining claims and defendants be dismissed from this

action, and will forward plaintiff six summonses and six USM-285 forms to fill out and return to the

court. Upon receipt of these documents, the court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate

service of process on defendants Terhune, Adams, Castillo, Nguyen, Pak, and Shedler.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule

15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in

this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended complaint

and wishes to proceed only against defendants Terhune, Adams, Castillo,

Nguyen, Pak, and Shedler on his Eighth Amendment medical care claims;

and

///

///

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3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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