Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02310/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02310-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Frederick Larry St. Clair, 

Petitioner, 

v.

Charles L. Ryan, et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV08-2310-PHX-DGC (MHB)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Petitioner Frederick Larry St. Clair’s petition for writ

of habeas corpus, United States Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns’s Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”), and Petitioner’s objections to the R&R. Dkt. ##1, 14, 15. The

R&R recommends that the Court dismiss the petition as untimely under the AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations. Dkt. #14 at 10. Petitioner makes two objections to the R&R:

(1) that the one-year statute of limitations amounts to an unconstitutional suspension of the

writ of habeas corpus, and (2) that the statute of limitations has not run because the State

illegally prevented (and continues to prevent) Petitioner from filing an application by failing

to provide notice of the AEDPA to Petitioner. Dkt. #15. The Court finds neither objection

persuasive. The Court will accept the findings of the R&R and dismiss the petition. 

I. R&R Review Standard.

Petitioner filed timely objections to the R&R. The Court must undertake a de novo

review of those portions of the R&R to which specific objections are made. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United States

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/07/09 Page 1 of 4
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v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

II. Background.

Petitioner was indicted on September 2, 2003 on multiple counts of dangerous crimes

against children, sexual abuse, and sexual conduct with a minor. Dkt. #12, Ex. A. Petitioner

entered into a plea agreement with the State on January 26, 2004, in which he agreed to plead

guilty to one count of sexual conduct with a minor, one count of attempted sexual conduct

with a minor, and one count of attempted molestation of a child. Dkt. #12, Ex. D. Petitioner

was sentenced on April 5, 2004, to a term of 20 years in prison and lifetime probation.

Dkt. #12, Exs. G, H.

While in prison, Petitioner filed two Rule 32 notices of post-conviction relief, both

of which were dismissed. On December 18, 2008 – four years after being sentenced –

Petitioner filed the present habeas petition. Dkt. #1. Petitioner admits that his petition is

untimely under the AEDPA.

III. The one-year statute of limitations is not unconstitutional.

The Constitution provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not

be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require

it.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Congress has authority to determine the “proper scope of

the writ” by restricting it in constitutionally allowable ways. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,

664 (1996). Congress exercised this authority in the AEDPA and determined that a one-year

statute of limitations was an appropriate restriction. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The statute of limitations is not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. Tinker v.

Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2001); Wyzykowski v. Dep’t of Corrections, 226 F.3d

1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000). To be unconstitutional, the statute of limitations would have

to bar relief entirely or render habeas relief “ineffective or inadequate to test the legality of

detention.” Wyzykowski, 226 F.3d at 1217. The statute of limitations restricts the time period

for filing a habeas corpus petition, but it does not render habeas relief ineffective. The

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AEDPA also allows an “equitable tolling” exception when a movant “untimely files because

of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with

diligence.” Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000); see Frye v. Hickman, 273

F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001). Other than arguing that the State did not apprise him of the

AEDPA, Petitioner does not attempt to show that his filing was untimely because of

extraordinary circumstances.

IV. The State did not prevent Petitioner from filing an application.

Petitioner argues that the limitations period has not yet run because the State

prevented him from filing by not providing him notice of the AEDPA. Petitioner notes that

the period of limitation does not begin to run until any “impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(B). Petitioner argues that the State never provided him with a copy of the

AEDPA, but there were three different sources of the AEDPA at Petitioner’s disposal in the

prison library. Dkt. #1, Ex. C. The statute was found within larger legal publications, but

that fact does not make the prison library inadequate or a denial of meaningful access.

Petitioner argues that the title of the AEDPA (The Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act) is so vague that he, as a non-capital, non-terrorist inmate, was prevented from

filing a habeas corpus petition. But statutes often contain provisions not described in their

titles. The title of the AEDPA did not prevent Petitioner from filing this petition, nor has it

prevented thousands of other inmates from filing habeas corpus petitions since the AEDPA

was passed in 1996. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Petitioner St. Clair’s objection (Dkt. #15) to the R&R is denied.

2. Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns’s R&R (Dkt. #14) is accepted.

3. Petitioner St. Clair’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. #1) is denied and

dismissed.

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4. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action.

DATED this 7th day of October, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-02310-DGC Document 16 Filed 10/07/09 Page 4 of 4