Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00706/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00706-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LAURA J. KOLEP,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 04-706-TUC-CKJ 

ORDER

On December 15, 2006, Magistrate Judge Charles R. Pyle issued a Report and

Recommendation [Doc. # 18] in which he recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. # 7] be granted and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.

# 10] be denied. Magistrate Judge Pyle further recommends that decision of the ALJ be

reversed, this matter be remanded to the Social Security Administration, and an award of

benefits be awarded. Defendant Jo Anne Barnhart ("the Commissioner") has filed objections

and Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the objections. This Court has made a de novo review

of those portions of the report and recommendation to which an objection has been made.

28 U.S.C. § 636. For the following reasons, the Report and Recommendation will be

adopted.

Case 4:04-cv-00706-CKJ Document 24 Filed 03/02/07 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

Procedural History

Administrative Law Judge Lauren R. Mathon ("ALJ") issued a written decision in this

matter in which she determined that Plaintiff Laura J. Kolep ("Kolep") was not disabled

under the Social Security Act because she could return to her past relevant work. In reaching

her decision, the ALJ found that Kolep had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

she filed her application. The ALJ further found that Kolep had right knee osteoarthritis and

a dislocated patella, status post eye surgery and glaucoma, borderline intellectual functioning

and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. The ALJ found these were severe

impairments but they did not meet or equal any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpt. P., App. 1. The ALJ found that Kolep retained the residual functional capacity to

engage in a range of sedentary work further restricted by a limitation to standing/walking for

only fifteen minutes at a time, occasional pushing/pulling or repetitive movements with the

right leg, limited visual acuity, the need to avoid even moderate exposure to unprotected

heights and a moderate limitation in the ability to concentrate. The ALJ found that Kolep's

residual functional capacity did not prevent Kolep from returning to her past relevant work

and that Kolep, therefore, was not under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act.

The Appeals Council denied Kolep's request for review. Kolep filed the Complaint

in this case on December 17, 2004. Kolep and the Commissioner have each filed Motions

for Summary Judgment. Magistrate Judge Pyle has issued a Report and Recommendation.

Disability

An insured individual is entitled to disability insurance benefits if he or she

demonstrates, through medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, an

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or metal impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]"

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1) and (2). For a disability to be found, the impairment must be so

Case 4:04-cv-00706-CKJ Document 24 Filed 03/02/07 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

severe that, considering the age, education, and work experience of the claimant, the claimant

cannot "engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); see e.g., Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111 (9th

Cir. 2006). 

A claimant can make a prima facie case for disability if she proves that she is not

presently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the disability is severe, and she is not able

to perform any work she has done in the past. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th

Cir. 2002). If the claimant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id.

"When evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ's decision, [a

reviewing court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ." Batson v.

Commissioner of SSA, 400 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).

Treating Physician 

 In evaluating evidence to determine whether a claimant is disabled, the opinions of

treating physicians are entitled to great weight. Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th

Cir. 1989). Where a treating physician's opinion contradicts the opinion of an examining or

consulting physician, there must be "'specific and legitimate reasons' supported by substantial

evidence in the record" to reject the treating physicians's opinion. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996), quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983).

Where the treating physician's opinion is not contradicted, the opinion may be rejected as

long as clear and convincing reasons are given. Montijo v. Secretary of HHS, 729 F.2d 599,

601 (9th Cir. 1984).

The Commissioner asserts that the magistrate judge erroneously reinterpreted the

record and erroneously concluded that treating physician Dr. R.L. Goedecke's opinion of the

disability was uncontradicted. The Commissioner asserts that the reviewing doctors, Kolep's

treating orthopedic surgeon, and Kolep's emergency room treatment are inconsistent with

the disabling symptoms allegedly observed by Dr. Goedecke. However, Dr. Goedeke's

Case 4:04-cv-00706-CKJ Document 24 Filed 03/02/07 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 4 -

statement of what he based his opinion on (e.g., osteoarthritis of right knee; x-ray revealed

diskogenic disease of the lumbar spine; glaucoma with blindness in left eye; lower back pain;

right knee pain) is consistent with other opinions. For example, Dr. Mark A. Wolfson opined

that Kolep was precluded from doing any prolonged standing and walking due to severe

osteoarthritis of the right knee and Dr. Robert C. Kersey stated that Kolep had significant

advanced right knee osteorarthritis. Dr. Edwin S. Roth found that there was a slight relative

narrowing of the L4/5 interspace which suggested the possibility of diskogenic disease.

Further, Kolep was referred to ophthalmologist Dr. Kristin Carter after she was assessed with

acute glaucoma. Lastly, Kolep has reported pain to numerous physicians. 

The ALJ considered Dr. Goedeke's opinion and rejected it as conclusory, unsupported

by the medical evidence of record, and contrasting sharply with the other evidence of record.

A treating physician's conclusions that do not have objective support can constitute a

legitimate basis for rejection. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005).

Moreover, a treating physician's opinion which is "brief and conclusionary in form with little

in the way of clinical findings to support its conclusion" need not be accepted by the ALJ.

Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986). However, the ALJ made these findings

without providing any specific reasons for her conclusion, let alone clear and convincing

reasons. In determining whether the medical history as set forth by the ALJ set forth specific

reasons for the ALJ's conclusion, this Court considered that those things relied upon by Dr.

Goedeke in forming his opinion were supported by medical evidence (e.g., x-ray, history of

chronic recurrent lateral patellar dislocation) and were consistent with the opinions of other

physicians. It is difficult to conclude, therefore, that the ALJ's mere recitation of the medical

history sets forth clear and convincing reasons to reject Dr. Goedeke's consistent opinions

or specific and legitimate reasons to reject Dr. Goedeke's contradicted opinions. See Lester,

81 F.3d at 830-31. The Court finds the ALJ, having failed to provide specific reasons for

rejecting Dr. Goedeke's opinion, improperly rejected Dr. Goedeke's opinion. Dr. Goedeke's

testimony, therefore, is credited as a matter of law. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834.

Case 4:04-cv-00706-CKJ Document 24 Filed 03/02/07 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 5 -

Credibility of Kolep's Testimony 

The Commissioner also asserts that the magistrate judge improperly reinterpreted the

evidence. Because medical evidence of Kolep's underlying impairments was produced,

unless "there is affirmative evidence showing that [Kolep] is malingering, the

Commissioner's reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony must be 'clear and

convincing.'" Id. The ALJ referred to Kolep's use of a cane and right knee brace. The ALJ

also referred to Kolep becoming upset and having a panic attack at the hearing; however, the

ALJ was unable to determine if Kolep actually had a panic attack. The ALJ also stated that

Kolep's pain and limitations were not fully supported by the objective medical evidence.

However, once Kolep produced medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the ALJ

could not "discredit [Kolep's] testimony as to subjective symptoms merely because they are

unsupported by objective evidence." Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. The ALJ's conclusion that the

pain and limitations were not fully supported by the objective medical evidence indicates that

the ALJ found that they were partially supported by objective medical evidence. Yet, the

ALJ's reference to the cane, knee brace, and panic attack do not constitute clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting Kolep's testimony. Kolep's testimony, therefore, is credited

as a matter of law. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834.

Past Relevant Work

Kolep's testimony being credited as a matter of law, this Court accepts her testimony

that she was unable to perform her previous jobs without assistance from supervisors and coworkers. Kolep's testimony establishes that she maintained her employment because her

supervisors and co-workers were indulgent and assisted her on the most simple tasks with

the computer. Although the vocational expert testified that Kolep could return to her past

relevant work as a call center telemarketer, the ALJ disregarded the vocational expert's

opinion that Kolep's lack of computer proficiency would make Kolep non-competitive for

her prior work as a telemarketer. See Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 F.3d

Case 4:04-cv-00706-CKJ Document 24 Filed 03/02/07 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006) (in considering hypotheticals posed to a vocational expert, "an ALJ

is not free to disregard properly supported limitations"). The Court finds Kolep does not

have sufficient residual functional capacity to perform past work. 

Further Hearing vs. Award of Benefits

Because the ALJ discredited Kolep's testimony and made her determination that Kolep

had sufficient residual functional capacity to perform past work, the ALJ did not move to the

fifth step of the sequential process which requires consideration of Kolep's residual

functional capacity to perform other substantial gainful work in the national economy in view

of Kolep's age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f).

However, Kolep's credited testimony establishes her as disabled at the fifth step. Kolep is

of an advanced age, she has a limited education, and she has unskilled previous work

experience as performed. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 Table 1. 

In this case, the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr.

Goedeke's opinion and Kolep's testimony. Moreover, Kolep's credited testimony establishes

that she is unable to perform past work. The ALJ would be required to find Kolep disabled

were Dr. Goedeke's opinion and Kolep's testimony credited. The Court finds there are no

outstanding issues to be resolved. Therefore, remand for an award of benefits is appropriate.

Accordingly, after an independent review, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Report and Recommendation [Doc. # 18] is ADOPTED;

2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #7] is GRANTED;

3. Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 10] is DENIED;

4. The decision of the ALJ is REVERSED, and;

5. This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for an award of benefits,

consistent with the findings set forth in the Report and Recommendation and this Order.

6. Judgment is awarded in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant, and;

Case 4:04-cv-00706-CKJ Document 24 Filed 03/02/07 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 7 -

7. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in this case and shall then close

its file in this matter.

DATED this 1st day of March, 2007.

Case 4:04-cv-00706-CKJ Document 24 Filed 03/02/07 Page 7 of 7