Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01422/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01422-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLEN RICHARDSON, CASE NO. CV-F-05-1422 FVS LJO

Plaintiff, AMENDED FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION

vs.

B. GARCIA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Allen Richardson (“plaintiff”) proceeds pro se in this action. The United States District

Court, District of Maryland transferred to this Court this action in which plaintiff filed “civil complaints”

against five defendants. This Court issued its November 22, 2005 order (“November 22 order”) to sever

plaintiff’s claims against defendants B. Garcia and R. Soltero from plaintiff’s claims against defendants

Eric Christianson, Heather Robinson Daniels and B. O’Neill. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Eric

Christianson, Heather Robinson Daniels and B. O’Neill proceed in this Court’s case number CV F 05-

1478 FVS LJO. 

The November 22 order required plaintiff, no later than December 7, 2005, to the pay the $250

filing fee for this action or to submit a fully completed in forma pauperis application to demonstrate he

is entitled to proceed without prepayment of fees. This Court issued its December 9, 2005 findings and

recommendations to dismiss this action without prejudice on groundsthat plaintiff failed to comply with

the November 22 order and failed to timely submit the $250 filing fee or an application to proceed

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without prepayment of fees. On December 12, 2005, plaintiff belatedly filed his application to proceed

without prepayment of fees. This Court overlooks plaintiff’s delay to file his application, vacates its

December 9, 2005 findings and recommendations, and by separate order, grants plaintiff’s application

to proceed without prepayment of fees for this action only.

In his complaints in this action, plaintiff attempts to allege claims against defendants B. Garcia

and R. Soltero (collectively “defendants”) who apparently appeared as public defenders for plaintiff in

connection with his March 21, 2003 charge of solicitation of prostitution. Plaintiff appears to take issue

with defendants’ advise to plead guilty.

DISCUSSION

Standards For Screening

“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). . . . Such dismissal

may be made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.” Omar v. Sea-Land Service,

Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9 Cir. 1987); see Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-362 (9 Cir. 1981). Sua th th

sponte dismissal may be made before process is served on defendants. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 324 (1989) (dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) are often made sua sponte); Franklin v. Murphy,

745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9 Cir. 1984) (court may dismiss frivolous in forma pauperis action sua sponte th

prior to service of process on defendants). 

Since plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, this Court, notwithstanding any filing fee that may

have been paid, shall dismiss a case at any time iftheCourt determines the action is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune

defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); 2 Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, California Practice Guide:

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (2005) Attacking the Pleadings, para. 9:226.1, pp. 9-65. A court

need not accept as true factual allegations in in forma pauperis complaints and may reject “completely

baseless” allegations, including those which are “fanciful,” “fantastic” or “delusional.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-1228 (9 Cir. 1984). A th

frivolous claim is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a fanciful factual allegation. Neitzke, 490

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U.S. at 324. A federal court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

The test for maliciousness is a subjective one and requires the court to “determine the . . . good

faith of the applicant.” Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915); see Wright v.

Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968, n. 1 (11 Cir. 1986). A lack of good faith is found most commonly in th

repetitive suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of cost-free filing to file a multiplicity

of suits. A complaint is malicious if it suggests an intent to vex defendants or abuse the judicial process

by relitigating claims decided in prior cases. Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981);

Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 209 (10 Cir. 1981); Ballentine v. Crawford, 563 F.Supp. 627, 628-629 th

(N.D. Ind. 1983); cf. Glick v. Gutbrod, 782 F.2d 754, 757 (7 Cir. 1986) (court has inherent power to

th

dismiss case demonstrating “clear pattern of abuse of judicial process”). A lack of good faith or malice

also can be inferred from a complaint containing untrue material allegations of fact or false statements

made with intent to deceive the court. See Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

A complaint, or portion thereof, may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond

doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to

relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. th

1981). “[W]hen a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any

evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether

a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support

claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1688 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco Development

Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). th

Plaintiff’s complaints against defendants reflects deficiencies to prevent plaintiff from offering

evidence to support claims.

Jurisdictional Deficiencies

F.R.Civ.P. 8 establishes general pleading rules and provides in pertinent part:

(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall

contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction

depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds

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of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader

seeks.

. . .

(e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Consistency. 

(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct.

A pleading may not simply allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief. The

underlying requirement is that a pleading give “fair notice” of the claim being asserted and the “grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957); Yamaguchi v.

United States Department of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9 Cir. 1997). Although a complaint need

th

not outline all elements of a claim, “[i]t must be possible . . . for an inference to be drawn that these

elements exist.” Walker v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5 Cir. 1990); Lewis th

v. ACB Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-406 (6 Cir. 1998). Despite the flexible pleading th

policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements

of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9 Cir. th

1984). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt facts which defendant

engaged in to support plaintiff’s claim. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649. 

Here, plaintiff’s complaints against defendants fail to allege a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction

and reveal no grounds to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. Jurisdictional deficiencies prevent this Court

to proceed on plaintiff’s claims.

General Deficiencies As To Claims

F.R.Civ.P. 8(a) requires a short plain statement of plaintiff’s claim. The complaints fail to

identify adequate grounds for relief against defendants to satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaints fail

to provide defendants fair notice and to state elements of a claim plainly and succinctly. The complaints

appear to challenge defendants’ advice to plaintiff to plead guilty to solicitation of prostitution. The

complaints seek no particular relief. The pleading deficiencies prevent this Court from proceeding on

plaintiff’s complaint. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deficiencies

This Court infers that plaintiff attempts to allege claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (“section 1983"),

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which provides:

Every person who, under the color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.

To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead that: (1) defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the complained of act was committed; and (2) defendants deprived plaintiff of rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United

States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. 1986). The complaints fail to state colorable claims (or any claims th

for that matter) by plaintiff against defendants. The complaints fail to allege defendants acted under

color of state law. The complaints point to no constitutional right of which defendants deprived

plaintiff.

Moreover, section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of defendant and deprivation allegedly suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[a]

person ‘subjects’ another to deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983,

if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which

he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). Section 1983 causation is “not to be gauged by the standards of th

ordinary tort law.” Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 755 (5 Cir. 1993) (citing th

Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S.Ct. 553, 559 (1980)). The “requirement of a causal

connection in a § 1983 action often may have the practical effect of imposing a heightened standard of

proximate cause. Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1415 (5 Cir. 1995). “Although th

a section 1983 claim has been described as a ‘species of tort liability,’ it is perfectly clear that not every

injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable under that statute.” Martinez, 444 U.S.

at 285, 100 S.Ct. at 559 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 988 (1976)).

The complaints fail to satisfy the linking requirement as to defendants and to articulate how defendants

deprived plaintiff of constitutional rights and resulting harm.

This Court construes the complaints to attempt to allege that plaintiff was convicted due to errors

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or advice of defendants. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), the U.S.

Supreme Court addressed section 1983 claims arising from an underlying conviction which was not

overturned:

We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that

the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or

called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.

section 2254 [28 USCS section 2254]. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to

a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under section

1983. (Italics in original.)

The complaints fail to allege plaintiff’s conviction has been reversed or called into question.

There is no showing plaintiff either appealed the conviction or petitioned for writ of habeas corpus.

There is neither a showing nor an attempt to show the conviction is improper. Accordingly, the

complaints lack essential elements for a section 1983 claim.

Deficiencies As To “Public Defenders” – No State Actors

Plaintiff is unable to plead a section 1983 claim against defendants as public defenders under the

facts mentioned in the complaints because they needed to have acted under color of state law. When

public defenders act in their role as advocates, they do not act under color of state law for section 1983

purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,

320-325 (1981); Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9 Cir. 1985); see also Cox v. Hellerstein, 685 th

F.2d 1098, 1099 (9 Cir. 1982). The United States Supreme Court has concluded that public defenders

th

do not act under color of state law since their conduct as legal advocates is controlled by professional

standards independent of the administrative direction of a supervisor. See Polk County, 454 U.S. at 321-

322; see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008-1009 (1982) (applying similar rationale to determine

that nursing home administrators were not state actors); Mathis v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 891 F.2d

1429, 1432 (9 Cir. 1989) (applying similar rationale to determine that employees conducting psychiatric th

evaluation were not state actors). The complaints lack sufficient allegations as to defendants to render

fruitless an attempt to amend the complaints.

Malice

This Court is concerned that plaintiff has brought this action in absence of good faith and

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attempts to take advantage of cost-free filing to vex defendants. Such attempt provides further grounds

to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS to DISMISS this action without prejudice on grounds

the complaints fail to satisfy pleading requirements, fail to state viable claims against defendants, and

an attempt at amendment is unwarranted based on the complaints’ deficiencies and plaintiff’s apparent

attempt to vex defendants.

This Court VACATES its December 9, 2005 findings and recommendations in that plaintiff

belatedly filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this action,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and this Court’s Local Rule 72-304. No later than January 24, 2006,

plaintiff may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on the magistrate judge in

compliance with this Court’s Local Rule 72-304(b). Such a document should be captioned "Objections

to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." The district judge will then review the

magistrate judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Plaintiff is advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff is admonished not to attempt to file an amended complaint as plaintiff’s recourse

is to object to these findings and recommendations. Plaintiff is further admonished this Court will

strike any papers to attempt to file an amended complaint unless this Court specifically grants

plaintiff permission to file an amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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