Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03891/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-03891-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLIE D. MOWER,

Petitioner,

 v.

PAUL COPENHAVER, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 07-3891 CW

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent Paul Copenhaver moves to dismiss Petitioner Leslie

Mower’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that it

is moot and that Petitioner has not exhausted her administrative

remedies. Petitioner opposes Respondent’s motion. The matter was

taken under submission on the papers. Having considered all of the

papers submitted by the parties, the Court grants Respondent’s

motion.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently serving a term of twenty-seven months

of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, on

a conviction for tax evasion and conspiracy to defraud the United

States government. She is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional

Institution in Dublin, California, where Respondent is warden. She

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CCCs were formerly known as halfway houses. Respondent uses

the term “residential reentry center” to refer to the same type of

institutional setting.

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filed this petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging a Bureau of

Prisons (BOP) regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 570.21, that denies inmates

placement in a community corrections center (CCC)1 until the last

ten percent or six months of their sentence, whichever is shorter. 

Petitioner claims that this policy is contrary to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3621(b), which governs the placement of inmates in BOP custody.

On April 6, 2007, Petitioner’s attorney wrote to Respondent,

asking him to consider Petitioner for transfer to a CCC in Salt

Lake City, Utah, despite the BOP regulation that would otherwise

limit her placement there to the last ten percent of her sentence. 

On April 24, 2007, Respondent informed Petitioner’s attorney by

letter that federal regulations did not permit him to submit a

request for a transfer on behalf of his client. The letter stated

that Petitioner could file her own transfer request through the

administrative process provided by 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq.

Petitioner does not claim to have pursued this potential avenue of

relief.

 On July 26, 2007, Petitioner began participating in the BOP’s

Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (RDAP). This program

involves nine months of treatment during which participants are

housed in a specific RDAP unit, followed by six months of treatment

during which participants live in a CCC. Inmates who successfully

complete the RDAP may receive a reduction in their sentence. On

September 19, 2007, the BOP recommended Petitioner for CCC

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2

Subsequent to Judge Hamilton’s order, the action was

transferred to this Court.

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placement during the second phase of her participation in the RDAP. 

Assuming she successfully completes the first phase, she will be

transferred to a CCC on April 28, 2008, and will serve the

remainder of her sentence there. She will also receive a sentence

reduction of approximately four months.

DISCUSSION

I. Appropriateness of Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

On August 8, 2007, Judge Hamilton ordered Respondent to file

an answer showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

granted.2 Instead of answering the petition, Respondent filed this

motion to dismiss. Petitioner argues that the motion is an

improper delay tactic; she asks the Court to consider Respondent in

default and deem him to have admitted the allegations in the

petition.

In White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989), the

Ninth Circuit held that a motion to dismiss may be a proper means

of responding to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the

rules governing habeas proceedings. The court found that such a

motion is appropriate when, as here, the respondent wishes to raise

procedural grounds for dismissing the petition. Although Judge

Hamilton directed Respondent to file an answer, the Court considers

the motion to dismiss a good faith response to the order to show

cause. As another court in this district has noted:

The court is receptive to a respondent raising threshold

problems (such as lack of jurisdiction, failure to

exhaust, improper venue, lack of custody, mootness, and

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untimeliness) by motion rather than in the answer. When

the court sees a procedural problem in its initial review

of a habeas petition, it often invites a motion to

dismiss rather than an answer. However, as here, there

often is not enough information in the petition to alert

the court to the existence of a potential procedural

problem and the court issues an order to show cause why

the writ should not be granted. By doing so, the court

does not intend to preclude respondent to move to dismiss

the petition for a threshold procedural problem.

White v. Ayers, 2007 WL 1655618, at *7 (N.D. Cal.). The Court

adopts this reasoning, and declines to consider Respondent in

default or otherwise penalize him for filing a motion to dismiss in

lieu of an answer.

II. Mootness

Respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed as

moot because Petitioner is now participating in the RDAP program

and, consequently, has been approved for six months in a CCC and an

early release date. However, Petitioner contends that she is

eligible for a CCC placement of greater than six months, and

requests consideration of her appropriateness for placement in a

CCC notwithstanding the six-month limit imposed by the BOP

regulation. In addition, Petitioner has only been granted

“provisional eligibility” for transfer to a CCC. While

Petitioner’s argument that the BOP may abruptly terminate the RDAP

program is unconvincing, it is still possible that Petitioner will

not complete the program due to an unforeseen reason, or may choose

to withdraw from the program if she is granted an earlier transfer

to a CCC. It is true that Respondent may conclude that a CCC

placement of more than six months is not appropriate given

Petitioner’s participation in the program. However, the Court

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3Because exhaustion is required under this authority, the

Court need not consider Respondent’s argument that the Prison

Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, also requires exhaustion

of administrative remedies in this case.

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cannot assume that such a decision is certain. Thus, a live

controversy still exists and the petition is not moot. See Murphy

v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (a petition is moot if “the

issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally

cognizable interest in the outcome”).

III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Ninth Circuit requires, “as a prudential matter, that

habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative

remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez v.

INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001).3 The requirement may be

waived in limited circumstances, including when pursuit of

administrative remedies would be futile. See Laing v. Ashcroft,

370 F.3d 994, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2004) (listing circumstances when

waiver of the exhaustion requirement may be appropriate).

Petitioner argues that pursuing administrative remedies would

be futile here because the BOP promulgated the challenged

regulation under a categorical exercise of its discretion, and the

regulation does not permit exceptions for individual inmates. 

However, Petitioner’s unsupported contention that administrative

remedies would be futile does not persuade the Court to waive the

exhaustion requirement. As Petitioner notes, all four of the

circuit courts that have considered the validity of the BOP’s

policy have found it invalid. Wedelstedt v. Wiley, 477 F.3d 1160

(10th Cir. 2007); Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006);

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Fults v. Sanders, 442 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2006); Woodall v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005). Several district

courts in the Ninth Circuit have also found the policy contrary to

18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). See Whistler v. Wrigley, 2007 WL 1655787, at

*3 (E.D. Cal.) (listing cases).

Recent actions of the BOP suggest that it may be reconsidering

its policy in response to the numerous cases rejecting its

regulation as contrary to statute. For instance, in Whistler, the

BOP informed the court that it had evaluated the petitioner’s

request for administrative relief without reference to the time

constraints imposed by 28 C.F.R. § 570.21 and had transferred him

to a CCC, leading the court to dismiss the petition as moot. Id.

at *6-*7. Consequently, it is not clear that Petitioner’s pursuit

of administrative remedies would be futile; there is a possibility

that BOP officials will provide her the relief she seeks. Multiple

courts in this district have recognized this possibility, and have

required other habeas petitioners challenging the BOP regulation to

exhaust their administrative remedies. See, e.g., Carrillo v.

Clark, 2007 WL 3026674 (N.D. Cal.); Rojero v. Clark, 2007 WL

3026415 (N.D. Cal.); Espinoza v. Clark, 2007 WL 2990157 (N.D.

Cal.); Cristobal v. Clark, 2007 WL 2746742 (N.D. Cal.); Zavala v.

Clark, 2007 WL 2705216 (N.D. Cal.); Reyna v. Copenhager, 2007 WL

2504983 (N.D. Cal.); Felty v. Clark, 2007 WL 2438337 (N.D. Cal.). 

The Court agrees with the reasoning of these decisions, and

concludes that waiver of the exhaustion requirement is not

warranted in this case.

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CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s

motion and dismisses the petition for a writ of habeas corpus

without prejudice to Petitioner filing a new petition after

exhausting the BOP’s administrative appeals process. The clerk

shall close the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 12/14/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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