Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04308/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04308-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 8:1105(a) Aliens: Habeas Corpus to Release INS Detainee

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOHAMMED SHAMIM,

Petitioner,

 v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security, et al.,

Respondents. /

No. C 07-4308 SI

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS HABEAS

PETITION AS MOOT

Petitioner Mohammed Shamim filed a habeas petition requesting declaratory and injunctive

relief to direct respondents to release him from unlawful custody pending his appeal of an order

removing him from the United States. At the time the petition was filed, petitioner was in the custody

of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”), but

is now released from detention on the Intensive Supervised Appearance Program. Accordingly,

respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition as moot. Having considered the arguments of the

parties and the papers submitted the Court hereby GRANTS respondents’ motion to dismiss as moot.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Mohammed Shamim, a native and citizen of Fiji, had been residing in the United

States as a lawful permanent resident since 1980. Pet. at ¶ 10. On October 17, 2006, respondent DHS

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1

 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs the detention of aliens who are currently in removal proceedings

without a final order of removal.

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 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) governs the detention, release, and removal of aliens who have been

ordered removed, requiring that certain aliens be detained during a 90-day removal period.

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detained petitioner in immigration custody, allegedly under 8 U.S.C. § 12261

 and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).2

Pet. at ¶ 2. On October 19, 2006, an Immigration Judge found petitioner removable under 8 U.S.C. §

1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for committing two crimes of moral turpitude. Petitioner waived his right to appeal.

Pet.at ¶ 10. Petitioner subsequently filed two motions to reopen the case; both were denied by the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and are currently consolidated and pending before the Ninth

Circuit. See Shamim v. Gonzales, Appeal No. 07-70895; Shamim v. Gonzales, Appeal No. 07-72351.

On April 20, 2007, DHS denied his application for release “solely” because of his pending appeal and

stay of removal before the Ninth Circuit. See Nightingale Decl. at Ex. C. The DHS also stated that his

detention would be reviewed again “in one year or when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has made

a decision . . . .” Id.

Petitioner’s habeas petition to this Court alleges violation of the Immigration and Nationality

Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), and Fifth Amendment due process violations. His prayer for relief requests

an order directing respondents to release him from custody because they had detained him beyond a

presumptively reasonable six month period pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Zadyvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) and Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 377 (2005). Respondents filed

a motion to dismiss the petition as moot because they alleged that petitioner would be released from

detention on the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”) by November 21, 2007. Grinberg

Decl. at ¶ 6. Petitioner’s opposition to the motion to dismiss added, to his original petition, a request

for an order to not re-arrest him absent a final determination on his pending appeal. On November 30,

2007, respondents filed a status report supporting the motion to dismiss stating that petitioner’s release

was delayed but that he had been returned to ICE custody on November 28, 2007 and released. Status

Report at 1; Grinberg Supp. Decl. at ¶ 9. Although released on ISAP, petitioner continues to oppose

the motion to dismiss and seeks an order preventing respondent from re-arresting or detaining petitioner

for any reason, including an alleged violation of the ISAP terms of release, before a final determination

on his pending immigration appeal.

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LEGAL STANDARD

As a general rule, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers jurisdiction upon the district court to entertain

petitions for writ of habeas corpus brought by any individual claiming to be held “in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(3). Absent a specific

statutory provision limiting the scope of its habeas jurisdiction, a district court has the authority to

entertain constitutional questions raised by aliens detained by federal immigration officials. See INS

v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001); Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1995).

However, as a prudential matter, the Ninth Circuit generally requires aliens who are detained to exhaust

available administrative remedies before seeking habeas corpus relief. See Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239

F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001).

Article III, § 2, of the Constitution requires the existence of a case or controversy through all

stages of federal judicial proceedings. This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff “must

have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); see

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1998). “At any stage of the proceeding a case becomes moot when

‘it no longer present[s] a case or controversy under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution.’” Abdala v. INS,

488 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)).

DISCUSSION

Respondents argue the habeas petition is moot because petitioner was released from ICE custody

on November 28, 2007 on the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program. In response, petitioner

acknowledges that he is no longer in custody but argues that his habeas petition is not moot because

respondent could still take petitioner into indefinite custody for any reason, including, potentially, an

alleged violation of the terms of the ISAP. Accordingly, he asks this Court to grant his habeas petition

to order that the respondents may not re-arrest or detain him absent a final determination on his pending

immigration appeal.

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An incarcerated convict’s (or parolee’s) challenge to the validity of his conviction satisfies the

case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restrictions imposed by the terms of

the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by the invalidation

of the conviction. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). Once the convict's sentence has expired,

however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole -- some

“collateral consequence” of the conviction – must exist if the suit is to be maintained and not considered

moot. Id. Continuing collateral consequences may be either proven or presumed. Id. at 8.

Courts may presume that a criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences. See

Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8-12 (noting that Supreme Court has been willing to accept hypothetical collateral

consequences for criminal convictions); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 n.4 (1985) (accepting as a

collateral consequence the possibility that conviction may be used in future criminal proceeding to

enhance sentence). In the Ninth Circuit, that presumption is mandatory and irrebuttable. See Wood v.

Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997). A habeas petition that challenges an underlying conviction is

never moot in this circuit simply because, subsequent to its filing, the petitioner was released from

custody. See id.; Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) (once convicted, one remains

forever subject to prospect of harsher punishment for subsequent offense as result of federal and state

laws that either already have been or may be eventually be passed). 

However, as in this case, a habeas petition challenging only the length of the pre-removal

detention, not the lawfulness of the deportation order, becomes moot when the petitioner is removed and

released from custody. See Abdala, 488 F.3d at 1063-1064. Such a petition becomes moot because

there are no remaining collateral consequences that may be redressed by success on the petition. See id.

at 1065. Here, petitioner’s original habeas claims only challenge the length of his detention as being

unauthorized by statute because it was over the six-month presumptively reasonable detention period

that the Supreme Court mandated in Zadvydas, which interpreted the Immigration Nationality Act.

After the mandatory 90-day removal period, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) requires qualified aliens who have

been ordered removed to enter into supervised release (ISAP). Regardless of petitioner’s pending

immigration appeal and stay of removal, as an alien already ordered removed, his release from custody

is subject to the ISAP. There are no collateral consequences that success on his petition can remedy.

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Moreover, this Court will not issue an order that would prevent petitioner’s re-arrest in the event that

he violates the statutory terms of supervised release or any other state or federal law. Therefore,

petitioner is unable to satisfy the requirement of a live case or controversy, rendering his habeas petition

moot.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS respondents’ motion to dismiss the

petition as moot [Docket No. 10].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2008 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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