Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01303/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01303-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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The factual information is taken from the Board of Prison Terms hearing transcripts of 1

March 13, 2002 and filed with this court in the respondent’s answer as exhibit D, November 1,

2004.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY B. ALLEN,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-04-1303 ALA P 

vs.

THOMAS L. CAREY, Warden, et al., ORDER

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He is currently serving a sentence of fifteen years to life

imprisonment in the California Department of Corrections. Petitioner challenges his 2002 denial

of parole. Petitioner raises two claims in his petition filed July 8, 2004, challenging his denial of

parole. 

I

Petitioner was one of four men involved in a shooting on April 14, 1992. The 1

four men drove to the home of a rival. Each of the four men were armed, exited the vehicle and

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fired at the residence. Over fifty rounds from five different weapons were recovered. Four

victims were struck, one of whom was paralyzed and another fatally wounded. Petitioner was

accused of firing the bullet responsible for the fatal wounding. Petitioner subsequently plead

guilty to second degree murder on January 26, 1994 and received a sentence of 15 years to life

with the possibility of parole.

On March 13, 2002 Petitioner went before the California Board of Prison Terms

(“BPT”), with counsel, and was assessed for suitability for parole. BPT found that Petitioner

would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society and a threat to public safety and therefore

was unsuitable for parole at that time. BPT issued a four year denial, stating that is was not

reasonable to expect that parole would be granted in the next four years. Petitioner then filed

petitions in the Superior Court of California, County of Solano, the California Court of Appeal

for the First District and the California Supreme Court. Each court denied his petition. 

Petitioner now seeks a writ of habeas corpus from this court. 

II

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), “[a] state court decision is “contrary to” ...clearly

established [United States Supreme Court] precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result

differing [its] precedent.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (citing and quoting Williams v.

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Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

court may grant habeas corpus relief if the state court identified the correct governing legal

principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applied that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous’”). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

III

A

There are two possible interpretations of Petitioner’s first claim that his sentence

has been improperly imposed. The first interpretation is that Petitioner was arguing that by

denying his parole, the BPT was changing his sentence of fifteen years to life with the possibility

of parole, to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The second interpretation is that

the BPT, by denying Petitioner’s parole, was changing his sentence from a sentence of fifteen

years to Life, to a sentence of Life with the possibility of parole. 

The first interpretation is based on Petitioner’s argument before the Solano

Superior Court where he contended that the BPT’s denial of his parole amounted to

“misinterpreting a term of 15 years to life, to mean ‘life’ expressed with ‘No’ expectation to

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parol [sic].” Brief of Petitioner at 6, In re. Allen, No. J-06840 (Cal. Superior. Sept. 4, 2003)

(emphasis in original). Petitioner argued that instead of offering him parole upon a finding of

suitability, the BPT should have “fix[ed] the term” of his confinement. However, this argument

is not supported by the record. Petitioner’s first parole hearing, occurred eleven years after his

incarceration. A single denial of parole does not transform a sentence of fifteen years to life into

a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. 

The second interpretation of Petitioner’s first claim appears in the application he

filed in this Court. Petitioner contends that the BPT erred when it “transmogrified his lawfully

imposed sentence against a valid ‘PLEA BARGAIN’ of a Term of 15 years to Life, To Life with

the possibility of parole.” There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the BPT treated

Petitioner’s sentence as life with the possibility of parole. 

Petitioner was properly sentenced to fifteen years to life under his plea bargain. 

The version of California Penal Code § 190 in effect at time of Petitioner’s sentencing explicitly

provided that, “every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall suffer confinement in the

state prison for a term of 15 years to life.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1994). According to

the abstract of judgment, and the BPT hearing transcripts, Petitioner received a sentence of 15

years to life, as prescribed by law. 

The BPT examined Petitioner’s prior record and considered a letter sent by the

police officer who investigated the crimes committed by Petitioner which opposed granting

parole . The BPT found Petitioner unsuitable for parole because of his prior criminal record, his

failure to have adequate parole plans, his failure to complete a vocation while incarcerated, and

because the BPT believed that Petitioner posed an “unreasonable risk of danger to society and a

threat to public safety if released from prison.” The BPT commended Petitioner for the progress

he made during his incarceration. However, the BPT found those positive aspects of his behavior

do not outweigh the factors demonstrating his unsuitability for parole release on that date.. The

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BPT described the steps necessary for Petitioner to obtain a favorable parole decision. The BPT

stated that “[t]his is a four-year denial,” and reminded Petitioner that “the key to getting out of

[prison] is in [his] pocket.” Nothing in the record suggests that the BPT has closed-off all

possibility of future parole. Thus, the BPT’s decision in this case did not alter the sentence

imposed by the trial court.

There is no evidence before this Court that demonstrates a violation of federal law

or of a decision based on an unreasonable application of the facts. Petitioner was properly

sentenced to fifteen years to life, and was subsequently properly denied parole, with clear

instructions on what he could do to increase his chances of a successful parole hearing. 

B

Petitioner’s second claim is that his denial of parole on March 13, 2002 for four

years was excessive. Respondents argue that “it is well settled that Petitioner does not have a

federally cognizable interest in parole.” Answer at 8. Respondents are mistaken. 

Section 3041 of the California Penal Code states that prisoners sentenced in

California to a state prison term that provides for the possibility of parole have “a constitutionally

protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole release date, a liberty interest that is protected

by the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause.” Irons v. Carey, No. 05-15275, _ F.3d

_; 2007 WL 2027359, at *3 (9th Cir. July 13, 2007) (citing Sass v. California Board of Prison

Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir.

2003); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir.2002); and Bd. of Pardons v. Allen,

482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex,

442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979)). California law requires that the BPT “determine whether a prisoner is

presently too dangerous to be deemed suitable for parole based on the ‘circumstances tending to

show unsuitability’ and the ‘circumstances tending to show suitability’ set forth in Cal.Code.

Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c)-(d).” Irons, at *4. The Irons court described the regulations as follows:

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 In Matter of Application of Anthony Allen, Superior Court of California, County of 2

Solano, No. FCR207648 at 2.

Id. 3

6

[T]he circumstances tending to show that a prisoner is unsuitable

include: (1) the commitment offense, where the offense was

committed in “an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner”;

(2) the prisoner's previous record of violence; (3)“a history of

unstable or tumultuous relationships with others”; (4) commission

of “sadistic sexual offenses”; (5) “a lengthy history of severe

mental problems related to the offense”; and (6) “serious

misconduct in prison or jail.” Cal.Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c).

Circumstances tending to show that a prisoner is suitable for parole

include: (1) the prisoner has no juvenile record; (2) the prisoner has

experienced reasonably stable relationships with others; (3) the

prisoner has shown remorse; . . . (6) the prisoner lacks any

significant history of violent crime; . . . (8) the prisoner “has made

realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that

can be put to use upon release”; (9) “[i]nstitutional activities

indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon

release.” Cal.Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(d).

Id. at 663 n.4. 

It has been clearly established by the United States Supreme Court “that a BPT’s decision

deprives a prisoner of due process with respect to this interest if the board’s decision is not

supported by ‘some evidence in the record,’ (Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (citing Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985); see also Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (citing McQuillion, 306 F.3d at

904), or is “otherwise arbitrary,” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457.” Id. at 662. 

The Solano Superior Court’s, ruling on Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under California law, contains the last reasoned state court decision. The Solano Superior

Court found that BPT denied Petitioner’s parole due to his prior criminal record, failure to

participate in a rehabilitation program while incarcerated, lack of adequate post parole plans,

failure to complete vocational training while incarcerated, and the nature of his commitment

offense . The Solano Superior Court found that the BPT decision was supported by some 2

evidence in the record . 

3

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The transcripts of the BPT hearing reflect that it denied Petitioner parole because

he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society and a threat to public safety. BPT based it’s

denial on the “especially cruel manner” of the commitment offense, Petitioner’s criminal history

that includes convictions for the sale of cocaine, auto theft and possession of a weapon, a recent

administrative misconduct and failure to complete programing while incarcerated. BPT hearing

transcripts. at 62-63. These factors correspond to the requirement under California law that BPT

“determine whether a prisoner is presently too dangerous to be deemed suitable for parole based

on the ‘circumstances tending to show unsuitability’ and the ‘circumstances tending to show

suitability’ set forth in Cal.Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c)-(d). Irons, at *4. 

The state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s federal constitutional claims was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling case law of the United States

Supreme Court, nor an unreasonable application of the facts. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

Petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief under § 2254 be denied and that it

be dismissed.

DATED: July 27, 2007

/s/ Arthur Alarcón 

 __________________________________________

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

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