Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05182/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05182-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT LLOYD MORROW, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

Llnlafd Startt Court or Appeals 

Ttntll Circuit 

AUG 2 3 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. No. 95-5182 

THE HONORABLE DAVID 

WINSLOW; JOHN DOE; and JANE 

DOE, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

CHEROKEE NATION and 

CAROL GRANT, 

Intervenors. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 95-C-429-B) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Chadwick Smith, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Michael E. Yeksavich, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Luke Goodwin, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Intervenor Carol Grant. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Lloyd Morrow appeals from the district court's 

order denying him injunctive and declaratory relief on his complaint challenging 

Oklahoma adoption proceedings concerning his Indian child as violative of his rights 

under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the federal Indian Child 

Welfare Act. Morrow claimed there was subject matter jurisdiction below pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Indian Child 

Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq. (ICWA). 1 

I 

Plaintiff-Appellant Morrow is an "Indian" as defined by 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3) 

(a citizen of the Cherokee Nation) and the biological father of Credence Monroe 

Grant born September 29, 1994 to Carol Grant, a non-Indian and Morrow's former 

wife. The boy Credence is an "Indian Child" as defined by 25 U.S.C. § 1903( 4) of 

the ICWA. Defendant-Appellee David Winslow is an Oklahoma state district judge 

in Tulsa County who presided over adoption proceedings regarding Credence and 

Defendant-Appellees John and Jane Doe, the prospective adoptive parents. 

During the first trimester of her pregnancy (winter 1994) Carol Grant decided 

she wanted to place her unborn child for adoption. She desired an open adoption 

where she and her 15-year-old son could maintain contact with the child. Carol 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. We therefore accept submission on the 

briefs as the parties have suggested. 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 2 
contacted a Cherokee Nation adoption specialist and a private adoption agency for 

help in the adoption process. Through these services Carol decided, prior to the 

birth of Credence, to place her child with the Does. 

In February 1994 and again in June 1994, Morrow was contacted regarding the 

adoption. He told the adoption agency representative that while he did not favor the 

adoption, he would not fight it. Credence was born on September 29, 1994 and was 

placed with the Does. On October 12, 1994, the Does filed their petition to adopt 

Credence in the Oklahoma state district court in Tulsa County. This petition was 

accompanied by an application for a determination that Robert Morrow's consent to 

the adoption was not necessary. 

Also on October 12 Carol Grant gave her consent to the adoption of Credence 

by the Does before defendant Judge Winslow. Plaintiff Morrow never executed a 

written consent to the child's placement. Judge Winslow set a hearing for November 

4, 1994 to determine whether plaintiffs consent was necessary for the adoption. At 

that hearing Morrow for the first time objected to the adoption and termination of his 

parental rights. On November 15, 1994, Morrow filed a counterclaim in the state 

proceeding, requesting custody of Credence. On November 15, 1994, Morrow also 

filed a motion to dismiss the Does' adoption petition on the grounds of failure to 

comply with the federal ICWA and the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act. I App. 

at 91, 95. 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 3 
On December 9, 1994, Morrow filed a motion to transfer the adoption 

proceedings to the Cherokee Nation District Court in Tahlequah. On January 9, 

1995, the Cherokee Nation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted. Carol 

Grant objected to the transfer to the Cherokee tribal court, and the state court 

overruled the motion to transfer on January 25, 1995. 

The original trial date in the state adoption case, December 16, 1994, was 

continued numerous times, but finally reset for May 17, 1995. However, on May 11, 

1995, Morrow filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Oklahoma, and the May 17 trial date for the state adoption case was 

stayed that day by the state judge, pending the federal proceedings. 

In his complaint in federal court, Morrow named as defendants Judge Winslow 

and John and Jane Doe, the prospective adoptive parents. Morrow sought a 

temporary and permanent injunction enjoining the defendants "from continuing their 

policy, practice, custom or usage of non-compliance with the Indian Child Welfare 

Act .... " II App. at 306 (Complaint,~ 7). In addition he sought a declaratory 

judgment on these questions: 

[ 1] Whether the Defendants have violated due process of law by the 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution by failing 

to comply with the ICWA, by denying Plaintiff custody or visitation 

with his minor child, and by denying Plaintiff a timely hearing to 

protect his parental interest and bonding with the minor child. 

[2] Whether the provisions of the ICWA supersede Oklahoma law 

regarding rights of unwed fathers pursuant to 10 O.S.A. § 60.6(3). 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 4 
Id. at~ 8. 

After answers were filed, an evidentiary hearing was held in federal court on 

June 30, 1995, on which date a partial stipulation of facts was filed. On July 31, 

1995, the federal district judge entered an order denying all relief to plaintiff 

Morrow, and granting judgment in favor of defendants John and Jane Doe and Judge 

Winslow and against Morrow and the Cherokee Nation. In that ruling, the district 

judge concluded "that under the ICWA and the OICWA Carol Grant had standing to 

and did timely object to the transfer of this case to the tribal court." Judgment of 

July 31, 1995 at 4, ~ 12. 

The federal judge's order addressed the merits of plaintiff Morrow's 

constitutional claims and held that "there has been no showing that the state court 

proceeding, and the Honorable David Winslow presiding, has and/or have denied 

Plaintiff Robert Lloyd Morrow and the Plaintiff/Intervenor, Cherokee Nation, due 

process in the adoption matter of minor child Credence Monroe Grant, nor is there 

any showing that such a denial of due process in [sic] imminent." The court 

therefore denied all relief. Morrow appeals from this judgment. The Cherokee 

Nation does not appeal. 

After the instant appeal was commenced, the state adoption court considered 

the matter of whether Morrow's consent to the adoption was necessary. A trial on 

this issue was held on October 16, 1995. On December 1, 1995, the state adoption 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 5 
judge entered an order discussing Morrow's contentions and concluding that his 

consent was not necessary for the adoption. After submission of this appeal on the 

briefs in March 1996, on June 27, 1996, on our own motion, we ordered the parties 

to submit supplemental memoranda advising us of the current status of the state 

adoption proceeding and addressing two questions: (1) if an adoption order has 

been entered in that proceeding, what are the positions of the parties as to whether 

dismissal of this federal suit should be ordered under the doctrine of Rooker v. 

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Doe v. Pringle, 550 F .2d 596 (1Oth Cir. 1976), 

cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977); and (2) if the state adoption proceeding is still 

pending, whether we should vacate and remand, directing abstention by the federal 

district court under the rationale of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and 

Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979). 

The supplemental memoranda ofthe parties were filed in July 1996 and we are 

advised that following the state adoption judge's December 1, 1995 order finding that 

plaintiff-appellant Morrow's consent was not necessary for the adoption, the second 

stage of the state adoption proceeding was completed on December 16, 1995. The 

appellees' memorandum says that the state judge resolved the second stage of the 

adoption against Morrow, determining that the adoption was in the best interest of 

the child and should be finalized on December 13, 1995; that no written 

6 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 6 
memorialization of this ruling has been filed; and that there is a pending motion to 

settle the terms of the order so that the actual decree of adoption had not been 

entered when appellees' supplemental memorandum was filed July 17, 1996. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Morrow's supplemental memorandum filed July 19, 1996, 

essentially agrees on the status of the state adoption case, but adds that it was 

Morrow who on April 19, 1996 filed the motion to settle the journal entry of 

judgment and that a hearing on this matter was set for July 19, 1996. The clerk of 

the state district court informs us that no judgment has been entered as of August 12, 

1996. 

We have considered the parties' memoranda and their previously submitted 

briefs. For reasons that follow, we conclude that we should direct abstention. 

Because we conclude that abstention is appropriate we do not reach the 

Rooker-Feldman question. See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Moran, 959 F.2d 

634, 635 (7th Cir. 1992) (rather than attempting "a problematic application of the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine," the court applied abstention principles and refused to 

issue an injunction to enjoin pending state litigation on the grounds that principles 

of federalism and comity would be upset). 

II 

A 

A threshold question we face is whether we may raise the abstention issue 

7 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 7 
ourselves since it was not raised below. Of course, abstention has now been 

addressed in the parties' supplemental memoranda filed in July 1996 as our order of 

June 27, 1996 directed. Plaintiff-Appellant Morrow's supplemental memorandum 

argues that abstention should not be applied because the state adoption case here is 

private litigation, with neither the State nor any State agencies being parties. The 

Defendants-Appellees' supplemental memorandum says that if the case is not to be 

dismissed under the Rooker principle, which appellees first favor, abstention under 

Younger v. Harris and Moore v. Sims should be applied since otherwise Morrow 

would be permitted to pursue a second avenue of review and litigation he already has 

pursued in the state proceeding, producing chaos. 

We are persuaded that we correctly raised the abstention question sua sponte 

and that we should weigh carefully the considerations relevant to abstaining. We are 

mindful that the Supreme Court has held that abstention may be waived. In Ohio 

Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools. Inc., 4 77 U.S. 619, 626 ( 1986), 

the Court said: 

A State may of course voluntarily submit to federal jurisdiction even 

though it might have had a tenable claim for abstention. See Brown v. 

Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 500, n. 9 (1984); Ohio Bureau of 

Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471,479-480 (1977); Sosna 

v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396-397, n. 3 (1975). But in each ofthese cases 

the State expressly urged this Court or the District Court to proceed to 

an adjudication of the constitutional merits. We think there was no 

similar consent or waiver here, and we therefore address the issue of 

whether the District Court should have abstained from deciding the 

case. 

8 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 8 
Our court has also said that the Younger abstention argument may be waived. 

In Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Municipality of 

Golden. Colorado, 744 F.2d 739 (lOth Cir. 1984), we concluded that under the 

circumstances of that case we should not invoke the Younger doctrine: "We 

conclude that the City of Golden has voluntarily submitted to a federal forum, and 

therefore 'principles of comity [underlying the Younger abstention doctrine] do not 

demand that the federal court force the case back into the State's own system."' 744 

F .2d at 742-43 n.2 (citation omitted).2 

During the state court hearing on May 17, 199 5 in the instant case, the date on 

which the state trial was set, Morrow's attorney advised the state judge that he had 

on file a motion to stay the state proceedings. Counsel for the intervening natural 

mother then stated he was ready for trial, but that he understood the court's logic in 

not commencing any trial at that time and in passing the case to a date subsequent 

to the federal court's review. I App. at 294. Counsel for the adoptive parents said 

2See also Walnut Properties. Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1106 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (declining to address abstention issue because issue was not raised until 

second appeal from district court and after earlier remand from Supreme Court), cert. 

denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989); Shannon v. Telco Communications. Inc., 824 F.2d 

150, 151-52 (1st Cir. 1987) (because state did not press the abstention issue before 

court of appeals, court addressed merits of appeal); Universal Amusement Co. v. 

Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 163 n.6 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[a]ppellant did not raise the question 

of Younger abstention, and that issue, being non-jurisdictional, is thus not before this 

court."), aff'd, 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam); but see Federal Express v. 

Tennessee Public Service Comm'n, 925 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir.), (noting in dictum 

that the Supreme Court has indicated that abstention may be raised by the court sua 

sponte), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 812 (1991). 

9 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 9 
that he was in the same position as the mother's counsel; that he was torn by the 

wisdom of going to trial in the state court; and that he would just as soon dispose of 

the federal case as a practical matter before returning to state court. Id. 

Nevertheless, we feel we should address the abstention issue sua sponte. 

In Belloti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.1 0 ( 1976), the Court noted "the fact 

that the full arguments in favor of abstention may not have been asserted in the 

District Court does not bar this Court's consideration of the issue. "3 The Court also 

stated: "Indeed, it would appear that abstention may be raised by the court 

sua sponte." Id. at 144 n.10. In addition, the Court recently noted that "federal I 

courts have the power to refrain from hearing cases that would interfere with a 

pending state criminal proceeding, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), or with 

certain types of state civil proceedings, see Huffman v. Pursue. Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 

3

The strongest statement suggesting that a party must raise abstention is found 

in Winston v. Children and Youth Services, 948 F.2d 1380 (3rd Cir. 1991), cert. 

denied, 504 U.S. 956 (1992). There the majority concluded that "[a]bstention, unlike 

mootness, does not present a jurisdictional issue. A party who wishes a federal court 

to abstain from deciding a live controversy in deference to a pending state action 

must preserve its claim in both the district court and the court of appeals." I d. at 

1384. The majority concluded that the abstention issue was not preserved properly 

and therefore was waived. Id. at 1385. 

Judge Garth, in dissent, concluded that the majority ignored circuit precedent 

in refusing to reach the merits of the abstention issue in the absence of a proper 

cross-appeal. Id. at 1397-98 (Garth, J., dissenting). He concluded that the federal 

court should have abstained in light of the ongoing state custody proceedings. I d. 

at 1398 ("Under the circumstances present here, a federal court should not intrude 

in the state processes involving family custody issues, but rather, should abstain."). 

We disagree with the Winston majority opinion and are persuaded by Judge Garth's 

cogent dissent. 

10 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 10 
(1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) .... " Quackenbush v. Allstate 

Insurance Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1721 (1996). In Quackenbush the Court noted that 

"it has long been established that a federal court has the authority to decline to 

exercise its jurisdiction when it 'is asked to employ its historic powers as a court of 

equity' .... " Id. (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n. Inc. v. McNary, 454 

U.S. 100, 120 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The Court went on to say: 

Though we have thus located the power to abstain in the historic 

discretion exercised by federal courts "sitting in equity," we have not 

treated abstention as a "technical rule of equity procedure." [Citation 

omitted]. Rather. we have recognized that the authority of a federal 

court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to all cases in 

which the court has discretion to grant or deny relief. 

Quackenbush, 116 S. Ct. at 1721-22 (emphasis added). 

We are convinced that we have properly raised the abstention issue sua sponte. 

Therefore, we will consider whether abstention is appropriate in these circumstances. 

B 

Younger v. Harris involved the indictment of Harris in a California state court 

for alleged violations of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. After his 

indictment, Harris filed suit in federal district court to enjoin the state district 

attorney from proceeding with the prosecution on the ground that the California act 

violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and press. A 

three-judge district court found that the California act violated Harris's constitutional 

rights and enjoined his prosecution. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that 

11 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 11 
the injunction violated "the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin 

pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances." 401 U.S. at 41. 

The Court said: 

This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering 

with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital 

consideration, the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state 

functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of 

a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief 

that the National Government will fare best if the States and their 

institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their 

separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to 

describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar 

with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into 

existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and 

dreams of "Our Federalism." 

Id. at 44. 

Younger abstention has also been applied in cases involving state civil 

proceedings. In Huffman v. Pursue. Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), the Court vacated a 

federal injunction against enforcement of a state judgment insofar as it closed a 

theater as a nuisance for showing obscene films which had not been adjudged 

obscene in prior adversary hearings. The Court held that Younger principles applied 

even though the state proceeding was civil in nature; it said the state procedure there 

was more akin to a criminal prosecution than most civil cases; and the Court said 

that federalism considerations, if anything, weighed more heavily toward federal 

restraint where injunctive relief was sought against state judicial proceedings than 

where relief against executive officers was sought. Id. at 603-04. The Court also 

12 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 12 
held that the federal plaintiff should not be permitted the luxury of federal litigation 

of issues presented by ongoing state proceedings. Id. at 605. The court said that a 

party must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking a federal injunction 

unless he can bring himselfwithin one ofthe exceptions in Younger. Id. at 609, 611. 

Those exceptions are ( 1) if the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or 

is conducted in bad faith; (2) if the challenged statute is flagrantly violative of 

express constitutional prohibitions in every clause and paragraph thereof, or (3) if 

extraordinary circumstances exist. Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1063-64 (lOth 

Cir. 1995). We find that from the record before us, and in the supplemental 

memoranda of the parties addressing Younger abstention, none of these Younger 

exceptions is shown to exist here. 

We are mindful, however, that the Supreme Court itself has cautioned that 

Younger abstention is the exception rather than the rule: 

"When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it 

has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction . . . . The 

right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a 

choice cannot be properly denied." Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 

212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (citations omitted). 

New Orleans Public Service. Inc. v. Council ofNew Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-59 

( 1989) (hereinafter NO PSI). 

We must be observant of these teachings in NOPSI. We nevertheless do not 

feel that they require that we dismiss the forceful reasoning and applications of 

13 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 13 
Younger. The Court has instructed us that "Younger ... and its progeny espouse a 

strong federal policy against federal court interference with pending state judicial 

proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. 

v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) (emphasis added). In 

Middlesex the Court also made it clear that the "policies underlying Younger are 

fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests 

are involved." I d. at 432. It cannot be gainsaid that adoption and child custody 

proceedings are an especially delicate subject of state policy, the Court stating that 

"[f]amily relations are a traditional area of state concern." Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 

415,435 (1979). The Court further noted in Moore that the doctrine of Younger, 

"which counsels federal court abstention when there is a pending state proceeding, 

reflects a strong policy against federal intervention in state judicial processes in the 

absence of great and immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff." Moore, 

442 U.S. at 423. 

In Moore the Texas Department of Human Resources had instituted a suit for 

emergency protection of three children under the Texas Family Code. After various 

state proceedings, the children's parents brought suit in federal district court where 

a three-judge court held part of the Texas Family Code unconstitutional and enjoined 

the pending state proceedings under the Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding 

that Younger abstention was appropriate because of the traditional area of state 

14 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 14 
concern for family relations. 442 U.S. at 434-435. 

In sum, there are persuasive reasons for applying abstention in this case under 

the Supreme Court's precedents. There do remain, however, some additional 

questions which we should address before reaching a conclusion on applying 

abstention here. We turn now to these questions. 

c 

1 

First, Morrow claims federal court jurisdiction under § 104 of the Indian Child 

Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1914. Section 1914 provides: 

Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster care 

placement or ter~ination of parental rights under State law, any parent 

or Indian custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and 

the Indian child's tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction 

to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any 

provision of sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 ofthis title. 

Section 1914 appears to authorize the type of suit Morrow brought in the 

federal district court; and thus the statute arguably conflicts with the application of 

abstention by evincing a policy for federal adjudication of Morrow's case. We must 

therefore look to the intent and purpose of the ICWA to determine the scope of 

§ 1914. 

In the first section ofthe ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1901, Congress found 

(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued 

existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the 

United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian 

15 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 15 
children who are members of or are eligible for membership m an 

Indian tribe; 

( 4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are 

broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from 

them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly 

high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and 

adoptive homes and institutions; and 

(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over 

Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial 

bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of 

Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian 

communities and families. 

The declared policy of the ICWA is set forth in 25 U.S.C. § 1902: 

The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation 

to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the 

stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment 

of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from 

their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive 

home which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by 

providing assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family 

service programs. 

The Supreme Court has noted that the ICWA "was the product of rising 

concern in the mid-1970's over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, 

and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of 

large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or 

foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes." Mississippi Band of Choctaw 

Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989). Evidence presented in Senate hearings 

showed that 25 to 3 5% of all Indian children had been separated from their families 

16 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 16 
and placed in adoptive families, foster care, or institutions. Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 

95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531 

(hereinafter "House Report"). In Holyfield the Court said: 

The ICWA thus, in the words of the House Report accompanying 

it, "seeks to protect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the 

rights of the Indian community and tribe in retaining its children in its 

society." House Report, at 23. It does so by establishing "a Federal 

policy that, where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian 

community," ibid., and by making sure that Indian child welfare 

determinations are not based on a "white middle-class standard which, 

in many cases, forecloses placement with [an] Indian family." !d., at 

24. 

490 U.S. at 37. 

Thus, both the Court and Congress have made clear that the ICWA is intended 

to protect the rights of Indian children and tribes. As part of this protection, § 1914 

allows a petition to invalidate a state court foster care placement or termination of 

parental rights action on the grounds that it violated§§ 1911, 1912, or 1913, to be 

brought in any court of competent jurisdiction. We have held that federal district 

courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over complaints in which a plaintiff 

alleges a violation of§§ 1911, 1912, or 1913. Roman-Nose v. New Mexico Dep't of 

Human Services, 967 F.2d 435, 437 (lOth Cir. 1992). Morrow alleged violations of 

§ § 1912 and 1913, and therefore, under § 1914 and Roman-Nose, we believe there 

is jurisdiction to hear Morrow's claims in either federal or state court since those 

17 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 17 
courts fall within the definition of"any court of competent jurisdiction" in§ 1914. 4 

This does not answer our abstention question, however, because it is not clear 

from the language of§ 1914 that Congress intended to allow federal courts to enjoin 

ongoing state adoption proceedings. Because of this uncertainty, it is appropriate to 

look to the legislative history of the ICWA. See United States v. Abreu, 962 F .2d 

4We note that some state courts have held that § 1914 provides a cause of 

action only for parents from whose custody the child is removed. See In the Matter 

of the Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 935-36 (N.J. 1988); In 

re Adoption of Baby Boy L, 643 P.2d 168, 175-76 (Kan. 1982); In Interest of 

S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). These courts have read the 

phrase "from whose custody such child was removed" as modifying both the phrase 

"Indian custodian" and "any parent." Under this interpretation of§ 1914, the Indian 

child's parent could bring a suit only if the child was removed from the parent's 

custody. Some of these courts have also held that "custody" refers to physical rather 

than legal custody. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy L, 643 P .2d at 175-76 

(suggesting that "custody" in § 1914 means physical control); In Interest of S.A.M., 

703 S.W.2d at 608 (same). We believe these cases incorrectly interpret§ 1914 in 

light of the ICWA's broad purpose to protect the rights of Indian children, parents 

and tribes. 

It is unclear whether the phrase "from whose custody such child was removed" 

modifies "any parent." Therefore, we look to the legislative history. In its 

section-by-section analysis, the House Report notes: "Section 104 [25 U.S.C. 

§ 1914] authorizes the child, parent, or Indian custodian, or the tribe to set aside any 

foster care placement or termination of parental rights on the grounds that the rights 

secured under [25 U.S.C. §§ 1911, 1912, or 1913] were violated." House Report at 

23, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7546. This statement does not indicate whether "from 

whose custody such child was removed" is intended to modify "any parent." 

However, because the purpose of the statute is to protect the rights of Indian parents, 

children and tribes, we believe the interpretation which is more protective of those 

rights is the more appropriate interpretation. The more restrictive interpretation that 

"from whose custody such child was removed" modifies "any parent" is contrary to 

this protective purpose, so we reject that interpretation and conclude that "any 

parent" stands alone, unmodified by the phrase "from whose custody such child was 

removed." Therefore, § 1914 provides a cause of action for Morrow without regard 

to whether or not Credence was removed from his custody. 

18 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 18 
1447, 1450 (lOth Cir. 1992) ("[w]hen the plain language of [a] statute does not 

unambiguously reveal its meaning, we turn to the legislative history"), vacated on 

other grounds, 508 U.S. 935 (1993) (mem.). 

The House Report notes: 

While the committee does not feel that it is necessary or desirable 

to oust the States of their traditional jurisdiction over Indian children 

falling within their geographic limits, it does feel the need to establish 

minimum Federal standards and procedural safeguards in State Indian 

child custody proceedings designed to protect the rights of the child as 

an Indian, the Indian family and the Indian tribe. 

House Report at 19, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7541 (emphasis added). This statement 

indicates that "the ICWA establishes 'minimum Federal standards and procedural 

safeguards in State Indian child custody proceedings designed to protect the rights 

of the child as an Indian, the Indian family and the Indian tribe."' Kiowa Tribe of 

Oklahoma v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587, 590 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 

872 ( 1986); it does not indicate, however, that the ICW A intended to allow federal 

court interdiction of ongoing state custody disputes involving Indian children. 

While § 1914 grants "any court of competent jurisdiction," and thus a federal 

as well as state court, authority to consider a challenge to foster care placements and 

terminations of parental rights, we do not believe that preemptive federal collateral 

attacks, such as Morrow's, are what Congress intended to permit in§ 1914.5 Instead, 

5

The dissent concludes that in the circumstances of Morrow's case, § 1914 

permits his collateral attack in federal court against the ongoing state adoption 

(continued ... ) 

19 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 19 
we believe that § 1914 and related provisions of the ICW A do not preclude our 

consideration of abstention. 6 Younger's principles of comity and federalism would 

5( ••• continued) 

proceeding and prevents application of abstention principles by us. As noted in 

Part I, supra, in November 1994 Morrow alleged, in the state proceeding, failure of 

the state adoption petition to comply with the federal and state Indian Child Welfare 

Acts and thus he was there pressing his ICWA claims well before bringing his 

second front attack on May 11, 1995, in federal court by the instant suit, which also 

alleged his ICWA claims. II App. at 306. We do not believe the ICWA supports 

such a proliferation of litigation which would run counter to the purpose of 

expeditious determination of Indian child custody that Mississippi Band of Choctaw 

Indians v. Holyfield favors. 490 U.S. at 53-54. 

In the circumstances before us, we are persuaded that the federal ICWA should 

be construed as providing its minimum federal standards, as § 1902 notes, but that 

the statute does not indicate "that it is necessary or desirable to oust the states of 

their traditional jurisdiction over Indian children," in the words of the House Report. 

Where the Indian parent's ICWA claims have already been asserted in the state court 

of competent jurisdiction, they can be vindicated there and we need not disregard the 

policy of abstention which can also be accommodated so as to avoid duplicitous and 

protracted litigation. 

6

These statutory provisions provide a broad spectrum of protective measures 

for the benefit of Indian children, their parents, and the tribes: 

Section 1911 provides for exclusive tribal jurisdiction over child custody 

proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the tribal 

reservation (except where such jurisdiction is vested in the state by existing federal 

law) (§ 1911(a)); transfer of foster care placement or termination of parental rights 

proceedings from state to tribal court under certain circumstances for Indian children 

not domiciled or residing within the reservation (§ 1911 (b)); the right of the tribe, 

parent, custodian, or child, to intervene in state court foster care or termination 

proceedings(§ 1911(c)); and full faith and credit to the public acts, records and 

judicial proceedings of any Indian Tribe applicable to Indian child custody 

proceedings to the extent provided in § 1911 (d). 

Section 1912 provides for notice by the state court in an involuntary 

proceeding to the tribe, and the parent or custodian(§ 1912(a)); appointment of 

counsel to indigent parents or custodians in removal, placement, or termination 

(continued ... ) 

20 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 20 
be disregarded by allowing federal court intervention into ongomg state court 

proceedings here. And, if federal court intervention was allowed it could result in 

numerous delays as multiple, piecemeal federal litigation worked its way through the 

federal courts. Here, the state proceedings were stayed by the state judge pending 

the federal district court proceedings. Since the state proceedings resumed, there 

have been a number of substantial developments in the state case. We do not believe 

that Congress envisioned § 1914 to authorize the type of federal court supervision 

into ongoing state adoption proceedings that Morrow asks us to impose. 

Thus we are persuaded that § 1914 does not prevent full consideration of the 

6 ( ••• continued) 

proceedings ( § 1912(b) ); right of access to reports and documents filed with the court 

( § 1912( c)); that the party seeking to effect foster care placement or termination of 

parental rights satisfy the court that remedial and rehabilitative efforts to prevent the 

breakup of the Indian family have been made and that those efforts proved 

unsuccessful ( § 1912( d)); that no foster care placement may be ordered in the 

absence of clear and convincing evidence, including expert testimony, that the 

continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 

serious emotional or physical damage to the child ( § 1912( e)); that no termination 

of parental rights may be ordered in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 

including expert testimony, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or 

Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the 

child(§ 1912(f)). 

Section § 1913 provides minimum standards for obtaining valid voluntary 

consent of a parent or Indian custodian to a foster care placement or to termination 

of parental rights(§ 1913(a)); that withdrawal of consent to foster care placement 

may be made at any time(§ 1913(b)); that withdrawal of consent to termination of 

parental rights may be made at any time prior to entry of a final decree of 

termination or adoption(§ 1913(c); that withdrawal of consent to termination of 

parental rights up to two years after an adoption decree (and longer if allowed by 

state law) may be made if the consent was obtained through fraud or duress 

(§ 1913(d)). 

21 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 21 
abstention doctrine. 

2 

Second, Morrow argues that abstention 1s inappropriate because the state 

adoption case is private litigation, with neither the State nor any of its agencies being 

a party. Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum at 6. Morrow relies on Miofsky v. 

Superior Court, 703 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983), inter alia. 

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco. Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), is pertinent to the argument 

Morrow makes because there the Court applied Younger abstention in a case where 

the state was not a party. Pennzoil brought suit in Texas state court and recovered 

a total judgment which, with prejudgment interest, would exceed $11 billion. Under 

Texas law Pennzoil would have been able to commence enforcement of the judgment 

unless Texaco could post a bond of more than $13 billion, which was not possible. 

Thus, Pennzoil would have been able to commence enforcement of the judgment 

before Texaco's appeal was resolved. Texaco brought suit in the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the Texas 

proceedings would result in violation of the federal Constitution and various federal 

statutes. The district court issued the injunction, which the Second Circuit affirmed. 

The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Younger abstention was 

required. The Court pointed out that it did not hold that Younger abstention is 

22 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 22 
always appropriate when civil proceedings were pending in a state court; 7 the Court 

said that as in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), it relied on the State's interest 

in protecting the authority of the judicial system so that its orders and judgments 

were not rendered nugatory. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14 n.12. The Court added that 

both Juidice and Pennzoil involved challenges to the processes by which the state 

compels compliance with the judgments of its courts. ld. at 13-14. While private 

litigation was involved, due to such interest of the state in the litigation, abstention 

was applied, the injunctive order was reversed and the case was remanded for 

dismissal. 

7 In Schall v. Joyce, 885 F .2d 101 (3d Cir. 1989), the Third Circuit applied 

Younger to a constitutional challenge to Pennsylvania's confession of judgment 

procedures. At the time of the federal suit, the plaintiff was also involved in state 

proceedings to set aside a judgment entered against her by confession. The federal 

district court stayed the federal suit pending the resolution of the state proceedings. 

The Third Circuit affirmed, applying Younger. The majority concluded that 

Pennzoil applied, and that abstention was therefore appropriate because of the state's 

interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts. 885 F.2d at 109-10. The 

court concluded that although the state judgment at issue was ex parte, this was no 

basis for concluding that the state interest was any weaker than it was in Pennzoil. 

I d. at 109. The majority in Schall stated, however, that "the state's interest in 

litigation between private persons is less weighty than other state interests protected 

by Younger," and, therefore, "federal courts may, in an appropriate case, interfere 

with an ongoing privately initiated state proceeding in which the state court has not 

yet rendered judgment even if Younger would preclude such interference in a case 

in which the state has already entered a judgment." 885 F .2d at 109. 

We must follow Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432 which 

instructed that "policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal 

judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved." We believe that, 

under Middlesex County and Pennzoil, Younger is applicable when important state 

interests are involved even if there is no state court judgment whose enforcement is 

sought. 

23 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 23 
We are satisfied that the circumstances before us demonstrate a sufficient state 

interest that here also the abstention doctrine should be applied. The Supreme Court 

has made emphatically clear its recognition that "[f]amily relations are a traditional 

area of state concern." Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 435. The state judge who was 

presiding in the adoption proceeding was named as a defendant. It is that judge who 

has a special obligation in connection with the judicial administration of the 

proceeding in the best interest of the child. The state, although not a party, 

obviously has an interest in the orderly conduct of the proceedings in its courts in a 

manner which protects the interests of the child and the family relationship. In 

Huffman v. Pursue. Ltd., the Court said that interference with the state judicial 

proceeding prevented effectuation not only of state substantive policies, "but also 

[prevented the state] from continuing to perform the separate function of providing 

a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional objections interposed against those 

policies." 420 U.S. at 604. We feel these factors demonstrate that here abstention 

is clearly favored, and that we should not permit "the luxury of federal litigation of 

issues presented by ongoing state proceedings," Huffman, 420 U.S. at 605, which 

involve family relations, a traditional area of state concern. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 

at 435. 

We are not persuaded that Miofsky v. Superior Court, 703 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 

1983), supports Morrow's objection to abstention here. In Miofsky, an 

24 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 24 
anesthesiologist was a defendant in numerous civil actions filed by former patients. 

The plaintiffs in those actions scheduled depositions of psychiatrists who had 

examined Miofsky in connection with state criminal proceedings. Miofsky moved 

for a protective order to prohibit the witnesses from disclosing information about him 

in their depositions. After the California trial and appellate courts denied the relief 

sought by Miofsky, he brought a § 1983 action in a federal district court, alleging 

unconstitutional infringement of his privacy interests, inter alia. The Ninth Circuit 

held that federal jurisdiction did exist and that Younger did not require dismissal on 

abstention grounds, noting the unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise 

their jurisdiction. 

We are satisfied that the state interest in the underlying civil litigation in 

Miofsky was substantially less than it is here where a traditional area of state 

concern for family relations is implicated. We do not find Miofsky persuasive on the 

Younger question before us. 

In sum, we reject the contention that the absence of the state as a formal party 

justifies disregarding the abstention doctrine where the recognized state interest in 

the state's adoption proceeding is apparent. 

3 

In light of the precedents of the Supreme Court we have reviewed, we are 

convinced that the circumstances before us call for application of the abstention 

25 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 25 
doctrine. Plaintiff-Appellant Morrow participated in the state adoption proceeding 

and continues to participate there. In November 1994, Morrow asserted claims of 

violations of the federal ICWA and the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act. We 

feel that the ongoing state proceeding does "afford an adequate opportunity" to raise 

the ICWA and constitutional claims of Morrow, Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 430, and 

there is no showing of a procedural bar against his assertion of those claims. We are 

persuaded that "Younger ... and its progeny espouse a strong federal policy against 

federal court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent 

extraordinary circumstances." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar 

Ass'n, 457 U.S. at 431. Quackenbush instructs us that the Court has "recognized that 

the authority of a federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to 

all cases in which the court has discretion to grant or deny relief." 116 S. Ct. at 

1722. We are convinced that this is such a case and that the circumstances before 

us counsel abstention. 

Accordingly, we VACATE the district court's judgment on the merits of 

Morrow's claims which denied injunctive and declaratory relief. We REMAND the 

case to the district court with directions to abstain and to dismiss Morrow's case 

without prejudice. 

26 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 26 
No. 95-5182, MORROW v. WINSLOW 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, dissenting: 

I am satisfied that the federal district court correctly resolved the merits of Mr. 

Morrow's claims under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et 

seq., and I would therefore affirm on that basis. For the reasons set out below, I am 

unable to agree with the majority's decision to require abstention under Younger. 

Accordingly, I must dissent. 

I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the State 's interest here is 

sufficient to support abstention in the face of the strong federal interest Congress has 

expressed in the welfare of Indian children. The majority states at page 23 of its 

opinion that family relations are a traditional area of state concern, quoting Moore 

v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979). In Moore, the State was a party, contrary to the 

situation here. Moreover, and more significantly, Moore did not involve an Indian 

child, a distinction that I view as critical given the Congressional statements set out 

in the ICWA. "Because of the unique legal status of Indians in American 

jurisprudence, legal doctrines often must be viewed from a different perspective from 

that which would obtain in other areas of the law." Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. 

Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548,553 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 27 
I do not believe we can assign the State's interest in providing a forum for 

determining the custody of an Indian child the requisite weight for abstention 

purposes in light of the Congressional finding in the ICW A that "the States, 

exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings 

through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the 

essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards 

prevailing in Indian communities and families." 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (5). To remedy 

this failing by the States, Congress declared: 

It is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of 

Indian children and to promote the stability and security of 

Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum 

Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their 

families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive 

homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture." 

Id. § 1902. Congress has thus imposed Federal standards on custody disputes 

involving Indian children which override an otherwise traditional area of state 

concern precisely because the States have not been sensitive to the umque 

circumstances arising when the custody of Indian children is involved. In my 

judgment, these Congressional pronouncements clearly indicate that the federal 

interest is paramount here, and I therefore cannot agree that the State's interest is 

sufficient to support a decision to abstain. 

Because the whole purpose of the ICWA is to set out these standards and 

impose them on the States as a matter of federal law, I must also disagree with the 

-2-

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 28 
majority's statements at page 19 that Congress did not intend section 1914 of the 

ICW A to allow a federal suit challenging the legality of an ongoing state custody 

determination of an Indian child. The majority cites no authority for that proposition 

and it is, of course, directly contrary to the canon of construction that "[ s ]tatutes are 

to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions 

interpreted to their benefit." Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 

766 (1985); see also Native Village of Venetie, 944 F .2d at 548 . Section 1914 

authorizes any competent court to invalidate the custody placement of an "Indian 

child who is the subject of any action for foster care placement or termination of 

parental rights under State law" when the action violates enumerated provisions of 

the ICWA. Removing an Indian child from the custody of a parent or Indian 

custodian frequently occurs during such proceedings and long before a final 

disposition of the case is made. Nothing in the language of the statute or its 

legislative history provides any support for the majority's conclusion that this 

removal cannot be challenged until a final order in the underlying action is entered. 

Indeed, the plain intent of the statute appears to me to be to the contrary. As the 

Supreme Court has pointed out, allowing an expeditious determination of whether 

the required Federal standards have been followed will avoid much potential anguish. 

See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 53-54 (1989). 

Moreover, given our holding in Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587, 590-92 

-3-

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 29 
(lOth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986), that section 1914 may not be 

used to challenge the legality of a state custody determination after a final decision 

has been made in the state courts, the majority's proposal to require abstention until 

that final decision has been made will in essence strip section 1914 of any 

meaningful application whatsoever. 

Abstention is only warranted in civil proceedings when "the State's interests 

in the proceedings are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would 

disregard the comity between the States and the National Government." Pennzoil 

Co. v. Texaco. Inc. 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987). Here, Congress has found that States have 

often failed to recognize federal concerns when conducting the civil proceedings at 

Issue. Congress has therefore mandated Federal standards for use in such 

proceedings. Congress has further provided an enforcement mechanism through 

section 1914 to ensure that the State proceedings comply with these Federal 

standards. Given the clear Congressional statements that federal concerns are 

paramount in these proceedings, we are not at liberty to hold otherwise. 

I would affirm on the basis of the district court's correct resolution of the 

merits. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 95-5182 Document: 01019279715 Date Filed: 08/23/1996 Page: 30