Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01035/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01035-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ART ATTACKS INK, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

MGA ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,

Defendants.

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Civil No: 04 CV 1035-B(BLM)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND

DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION IN THE ALTERNATIVE

TO CERTIFY THE ISSUES FOR

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants MGA Entertainment, Inc. and Issac Larian (collectively “MGA” and

“Defendants”) move for reconsideration of the Court’s Order of October 31, 2006, denying

MGA’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Art Attacks Ink, LLC’s (“Art Attacks”)

claims for copyright, trademark and trade dress infringement, and move in the alternative to

certify the issues for interlocutory appeal. For the reasons herein, the Court DENIES the

motion for reconsideration and additionally, DENIES the motion to certify for

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interlocutory appeal. 

II. BACKGROUND

In the first quarter of 2006, MGA brought motions for summary judgment on Art

Attacks Ink, LLC’s copyright, trademark and trade dress infringement claims and on Art

Attacks’ defamation claims. After considering the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, the

Court denied the motions on the copyright, trade dress and defamation claims. With respect

to trademark, the Court granted-in-part MGA’s motion as to no infringement of the marks

“BRAT” and “BRATS” and denied-in-part the motion as to no infringement of Art

Attacks’ “SPOILED BRAT” mark.

The instant motion for reconsideration contends that the Court ‘s rulings constitute

clear error on three points pertaining to copyright infringement: access, defects in copyright

registration and the application of the intrinsic test for substantial similarity. MGA’s

motion also argues that the Court’s ruling was in error on the issue of secondary meaning

as it pertains to the trademark claim. Finally, MGA moves in the alternative that the Court

certify these issues for interlocutory appeal. The parties fully briefed the issues and the

Court considered the instant motions on the papers.

III. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF LAW

“[T]he interlocutory orders and rulings made pre-trial by a district judge are subject

to modification by the district judge at any time prior to final judgment.” Amarel v.

Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see also Credit Suisse

First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing “the

well-established rule that a district judge always has power to modify or to overturn an

interlocutory order or decision while it remains interlocutory”). A district court may

reconsider a previous interlocutory decision where it “(1) is presented with newly

discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust,

or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah

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County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). However, a court should

generally leave a previous decision undisturbed absent a showing that it either represented

clear error or would work a manifest injustice. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating

Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988). 

B. ANALYSIS

1. Copyright infringement - Access

The Court’s Order on MGA’s motion for summary judgment (hereinafter “Order”)

analyzed access under the prevailing Ninth Circuit standard that access requires “an

opportunity to view or copy plaintiff's work.” See e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton,

212 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 2000). The opportunity to view or copy must be a reasonable

one, not simply a bare possibility based on “mere speculation or conjecture.” Id. An

inference of access, however, may be predicated based on wide dissemination of a work.

Id. Applying these standards, the Court found that Art Attacks’ had met its burden to

defeat summary judgment because there remained a reasonable possibility that MGA

viewed Art Attacks’ website, given the prevalence of web access in general. MGA now

argues that the Court committed clear error when it found that there was a possibility of

access based on this standard, because Art Attacks had not demonstrated that anyone at

MGA had ever visited the website. 

Access based on wide dissemination of a work is a circumstantial argument. Three

Boys Music., 212 F.3d at 482. It is based simply on the reasonable opportunity for a party

to have seen the work, not proof that the party in question actually viewed the work. See id.

see also Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 2006 WL 3804685 at *5 (D. Haw.

2006) (circumstantial evidence of access shown through wide dissemination of photograph

sold in stores and published in magazines and newspapers); ABKCO Music, Inc. v.

Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2nd Cir. 1983) (popularity of a song in the

United States and England for a span of 5-7 weeks was sufficient to create a possibility of

access).

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While MGA now offers examples where courts have not found dissemination of a

work to be sufficient for access, the Court does not find these persuasive in the instant case. 

The consideration of access is closely tied to the facts, and as the Ninth Circuit has

explained, “[a]t times, distinguishing a ‘bare’ possibility from a ‘reasonable’ possibility

will present a close question.” Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 482 (quoting 4 Nimmer, §

13.02[A], at 13-20). The evidence the Court considered at summary judgment taken in a

light most favorable to the non-moving party, Art Attacks, was sufficient to raise a genuine

issue of facts as to whether there was a reasonable opportunity for MGA to have viewed

Art Attacks work based on its dissemination on the website. Therefore, MGA’s motion for

reconsideration on this ground is DENIED.

2. Copyright Infringement - Registration Requirements

MGA argues that the Court was in error when it allowed Art Attacks to maintain the

instant copyright infringement action in light of the deficiencies in Art Attacks’ 1996

copyright registration: (1) only one copy instead of the required two copies was deposited;

(2) the works were designated as unpublished even though they had been previously sold

and thus “published” according to the Copyright Act. MGA further contends that under

Ninth Circuit precedent Art Attacks’ failure to meet the statutory requirements deprives the

Court of jurisdiction over the infringement action.

The arguments and cases cited in MGA's motion for reconsideration are no different

from those raised in MGA’s motion for summary judgment. The Court considered the

cases but found them inapplicable because, unlike the proffered examples, the instant

circumstances of Art Attacks’ 1996 registration do not concern the failure to deposit

complete and original works with the Copyright office. Moreover, the one 

 district court case on which MGA relies, Determined Productions., Inc. v. Koster, 1993

WL 120463 (N.D. Cal. 1993), departs significantly from Ninth Circuit precedent as well as

the precedents of other circuits. See Cooling Systems & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator,

Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1985) ( “Absent fraud, a misstatement or clerical error in

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1 A complete copy of the work was submitted with the registration. Although the work was

incorrectly designated as “unpublished,” there appears to be no other consequence to this designation

other than a requirement for a second copy to be submitted with the application. MGA has made no

showing that the mistakes were anything other than inadvertent error, based on the inexperience of

Art Attacks’ principals, the Maucks. Moreover, MGA also has not made any showing that MGA was

prejudiced in any way by these errors.

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the registration application . . . will not invalidate the copyright nor render the registration

certificate incapable of supporting an infringement action.”); Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d

at 486 (finding that although a deposit that may have differed somewhat from the recorded

version of the song, it was sufficient because “(1) there was no intent to defraud and

prejudice and (2) any inaccuracies in the deposit copy were minor and do not bar the

infringement action”); Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 36 F.3d

1147, 1161-63 (1st Cir. 1994) (substantial compliance with application and deposit

requirement is sufficient for a valid copyright); Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique

Industries, Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 668 (3rd Cir. 1990) (failure to show articles to copyright

office in a manner to demonstrate their function did not deprive plaintiff of copyright

protection or the right to pursue an infringement suit).

In sum, the great majority of cases agree that where there is substantial compliance

in the absence of a showing of any fraud, inadvertent and immaterial errors do not

invalidate copyright protection nor the right to maintain a suit for infringement. Here, the

Court found the 1996 registration by Art Attacks was in substantial compliance with the

requirements.1

 Therefore, MGA has not met its burden to demonstrate a clear error of law;

the motion for reconsideration is DENIED on this ground.

3. Copyright - the extrinsic test

The Ninth Circuit uses a two part test to evaluate substantial similarity between a

copyrighted and an accused work. The first step is an extrinsic test that involves an

objective comparison of specific expressive elements of the works. Cavalier v. Random

House, 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002). The second step is an intrinsic test, a subjective

comparison which asks whether the ordinary reasonable audience would find the total

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concept and feel of the works substantially similar. Id. at 822 MGA urges that the Court

improperly applied the extrinsic test because it left this issue to the trier of fact. MGA

argues that because the extrinsic test is an objective examination, it remains in the province

of the Court to make this determination. MGA also contends the Court erred when it

declined to apply the intrinsic test. 

The extrinsic test “stand[s] for the unremarkable proposition that when objectively

speaking a triable case of expressive similarity exists, the case must be sent to the trier of

fact; but when no such objective argument is possible, summary judgment will lie.” Brown

Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Shaw v.

Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Once a court has established that a triable

question of objective similarity of expression exists, by analysis of each element of the

extrinsic test, its inquiry should proceed no further.”). Thus, the test on this issue is no

different from the standard applied under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56. Summary judgment is

appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and where the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the party bearing the burden of

proof at trial has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its claim. 

Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1359.

Here, the Court concluded that Art Attacks had proffered sufficient evidence at

summary judgement to raise a triable issue of fact that its images contain protectable

elements, alone or in combination, that are shared by MGA’s accused images. Therefore,

under the Rule 56 standard, the question of substantial similarity must go to the jury. 

Therefore, the Court’s ruling denying summary judgment on this ground stands and MGA’s

motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

4. Trademark - Secondary Meaning

In the instant motion for reconsideration, MGA argues that the Court was incorrect

to find secondary meaning associated with “SPOILED BRATS” because the evidence

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 At summary judgment, the Court found that Art Attacks' marks, "BRAT," "BRATS," and "SPOILED

BRAT" were descriptive marks and therefore to acquire trademark protection, the marks must have acquired

secondary meaning. 

7 04cv1035

presented by Art Attacks’ was insufficient as a matter of law.2 MGA argues that there is no

evidence whether anyone ever visited the website and no indication of how many images

(such as on products or at booths) were labeled with “SPOILED BRAT.” In support, MGA

analogizes to several cases where secondary meaning was not found.

Having considered MGA’s arguments and cited case law, the Court is not persuaded

that there has been an error of law. While this Court noted in its Order that Art Attacks’

evidence of secondary meaning is by no means overwhelming, this does not mean that Art

Attacks’ failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding this issue. As Art Attacks

points out, its case is premised on “reverse confusion,” where a lesser evidentiary burden

exists with regard to secondary meaning and a minimal showing may be sufficient. Cohn

v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 842 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002); Commerce Nat. Ins. Services, Inc.

v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 444 (3rd Cir. 2000) (reasoning that

“[o]therwise, a larger company could with impunity infringe the senior mark of a smaller

one”). Therefore, MGA’s motion for reconsideration on this ground is DENIED.

5. Certification for Interlocutory Appeal under §1292(b)

MGA moves, in the alternative to reconsideration, for certification for interlocutory

appeal on four issues:

1. Whether a showing of a mere possibility of access is sufficient to create a

triable issue on Art Attacks’ copyright claims;

2. Whether Art Attacks’ failure to meet the statutory deposit and registration

requirements invalidates Art Attacks’ purported copyright registrations

and/or deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over Art Attacks’

copyright claims;

3. Whether the Court failed to apply or misapplied the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic

and intrinsic tests in evaluating Art Attacks’ copyright infringement claims;

4. Whether a theoretical possibility of secondary meaning, unsupported by

specific factual evidence, is sufficient to create a triable issue on Art Attacks’

trademark and trade dress claims.

28 U.S.C. §1292(b) permits a district judge to certify an issue for interlocutory

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appeal where the issue (1) involves a controlling question of law; (2) as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) an immediate appeal may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. An exceptional circumstances standard

applies to interlocutory orders, the circumstances must “justify a departure from the basic

policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.” In re

Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Coopers &

Lybrand, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978)). Interlocutory appeal “[is] not intended merely to

provide review of difficult rulings in hard cases.” U. S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d

784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966); see also Hansen v. Schubert, 459 F. Supp. 2d 973, 1000 (E.D.

Cal. 2006) (noting that mere disagreement with the Court is insufficient grounds for

interlocutory appeal). 

MGA has not met the burden to show exceptional circumstances or even to

convincingly demonstrate that any of its four issues requested for certification meet all of

the §1292(b) requirements. The issues stated are generally misstated and/or overblown

from the Court’s Order. MGA has not demonstrated “substantial ground for difference of

opinion,” but simply mere disagreement with the Court’s rulings. Therefore, MGA’s

motion to certify the issues for interlocutory appeal is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein, MGA’s motion for reconsideration and its motion in the

alternative to certify the issues for interlocutory appeal are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: March 5, 2007

Hon. Rudi M. Brewster

United States Senior District Judge

cc: Hon. Barbara L. Major

 United States Magistrate Judge

 All Counsel of Record

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