Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01863/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01863-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GLENN R. HARTLEY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-01863-AC 

ORDER 

This matter is before the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(15). Plaintiff filed a 

complaint on January 22, 2014, seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under 

Title XVI of the Act. ECF No. 1. On June 4, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion for summary 

judgment. ECF No. 14. The Commissioner then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on 

June 23, 2014. ECF No. 16. On November 12, 2014, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. ECF 

No. 18. 

 On December 4, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration based on a recent 

addition to the SSA's Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”). ECF No. 20 at 3–4. 

Plaintiff argues that this change in the law requires the reconsideration of summary judgment in 

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favor of the Commissioner. Id. In light of plaintiff’s motion, the court directed the 

Commissioner to file an opposition. ECF No. 21. The court also directed plaintiff to file a 

subsequent reply to that opposition. Id. On December 9, 2014, the Commissioner filed an 

opposition, arguing that (1) a change in POMS is not a change in intervening law for the purposes 

of a motion for reconsideration; (2) the POMS section at issue is not retroactive; and (3) 

application of the POMS section at issue would not have resulted in a different result in this 

matter. ECF No. 22 at 3. On December 18, 2014, plaintiff filed a reply, arguing that (1) POMS 

is entitled to a level of deference that makes it law for the purposes of a motion for 

reconsideration; (2) changes in POMS are retroactive; and (3) application of the POMS at issue 

here would mandate a different result in this case. ECF No. 23 at 2–3, 8–9, 9–10. 

DISCUSSION 

The court finds that a change in POMS does not constitute a change in law under Federal 

Rule 59(e), and accordingly denies plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. “Reconsideration of an 

order granting summary judgment pursuant to a 59(e) motion requires new evidence, a change in 

the law, or a clearly erroneous decision.” Lopes v. Astrue, 277 F. App'x 757, 761 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff argues that POMS DI 25015.017, which was effective on October 6, 2014, constitutes a 

change in the law requiring the reconsideration of the disposition of this matter. ECF No. 20 at 

3–4, 9–12. POMS DI 25015.017 provides detailed guidance to Social Security Administration 

employees on how to make a finding on the transferability of skills. POMS DI 25015.017(D), 

available at https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.NSF/lnx/0425015017. Plaintiff argues that the court 

would have granted his motion for summary judgment had it considered this regulation. ECF No. 

20 at 4–9. 

The problem with plaintiff’s argument is that POMS is not a “law” for the purposes of 

motions for reconsideration. The Ninth Circuit has said the following regarding the legal effect 

of POMS: 

POMS may be “entitled to respect” under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 

323 U.S. 134, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944), to the extent it 

provides a persuasive interpretation of an ambiguous regulation, see 

Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587–88, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 

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146 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2000), but it “does not impose judicially 

enforceable duties on either this court or the ALJ.” Lockwood v. 

Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2003)) 

(holding that ALJ was not required to explain decision to use 

claimant's actual age for purposes of determining whether claimant 

could work, where regulation only required ALJ to consider using 

older age category); see also Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 868–69 

(9th Cir. 2000) (declining to review allegations of noncompliance 

with internal agency manual because such a manual “does not carry 

the force and effect of law.”). 

Carillo-Yeras v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 2011). In light of this authority, the court 

finds that POMS DI 25015.017 does not constitute an intervening change in the law. 

Accordingly, the court declines to reach the Commissioner’s remaining arguments regarding the 

retroactivity of POMS and the effect of POMS DI 25015.017 had it been applied in this matter. 

Plaintiff does not argue, much less establish, that reconsideration is appropriate because of either 

(1) the discovery of new evidence; or (2) a clearly erroneous decision. 

In accordance with the foregoing, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that plaintiff’s 

motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 20, is DENIED. 

DATED: March 4, 2015 

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