Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-07099/USCOURTS-caDC-12-07099-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 21, 2013 Decided April 4, 2014

No. 12-7099

MICHAEL QUEEN,

APPELLANT

v.

ED SCHULTZ,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-00871)

Steven W. Teppler argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the brief was Frazer Walton, Jr.

Jeffrey B. Landa, pro hac vice, argued the cause for

appellee. On the brief was John C. Hayes, Jr. 

Before: GRIFFITH and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: In January 2008, NBC

employee Michael Queen approached then-radio talk show

host Ed Schultz to ask whether Schultz would be interested

in getting into the television business. What happened next

is in dispute. Queen says that he and Schultz verbally agreed

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to become partners in a project to develop a television show

starring Schultz as host. Schultz denies any such agreement. 

Schultz later entered into a contract with the cable television

network MSNBC to host “The Ed Show” on weekday

evenings, and the show has aired on MSNBC in various

timeslots since April 2009. Queen now claims an entitlement

to a portion of Schultz’s income from “The Ed Show” based

on their alleged agreement to co-develop a show. Schultz,

disclaiming any agreement, believes that Queen is entitled to

nothing.

After the relationship between the two men broke down,

Queen sued Schultz in district court, and Schultz responded

with counterclaims against Queen for fraud, slander, and

libel. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district

court ruled that neither Queen nor Schultz was liable to the

other for anything. Queen v. Schultz, 888 F. Supp. 2d 145,

175 (D.D.C. 2012). Queen (but not Schultz) appealed,

arguing that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment to Schultz with respect to Queen’s breach-ofcontract claim and his breach-of-partnership-duties theory. 

We disagree with Queen on the breach-of-contract claim but

agree with him on the partnership theory. We conclude that

there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Queen and Schultz formed a partnership to develop a

television show and, if so, whether Schultz is liable to Queen

for breach of partnership duties. We therefore remand to

enable Queen to present his partnership theory to a jury.

I.

In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment,

our review is de novo, and we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party—here, Queen. 

United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314,

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1318 (D.C. Cir. 2014). According to Queen’s version of

events, in 2007, Queen initially conceived the idea of a

television show starring Ed Schultz. At the time, Schultz

was a radio talk show host based in Fargo, North Dakota, and

had also made guest appearances on various television

networks. Before Queen and Schultz ever met or spoke,

Queen presented the concept for the show to the then-chief of

NBC News’ Washington bureau, Tim Russert, and began

developing a strategy to promote the idea.

In January 2008, Schultz visited NBC’s Washington

office building, and Queen and Schultz spoke for the first

time. While the parties now dispute what was said in their

initial conversation, we must credit Queen’s version at the

summary judgment stage. According to Queen, he asked

whether anyone was working with Schultz “to make a TV

show happen.” Schultz responded: “No. Now you’re it.” 

Beginning in February 2008, Queen worked further on the

show idea “with Schultz’s specific and enthusiastic

approval.” Queen Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 24-3. Queen taped

Schultz’s guest appearances on various television shows in

order to create a demonstration reel, and he enlisted a former

NBC News director, Max Schindler, “to partner with Schultz

and [Queen] in the development of the project.” Id. ¶¶ 5-6. 

Queen, Schindler, and Schultz then engaged in a series of

telephone conversations and e-mail exchanges in which they

discussed “ownership percentages” in “the agreed upon

partnership.” Queen says they “agreed that, in addition to

salaries, I would receive 25%, Schindler would receive 25%,

and Schultz would receive 50% of income realized by the

program after expenses, should it be sold.” Id. ¶ 8.

Queen introduced into the record a series of e-mail

communications with Schultz in which the two men sought

to hammer out the details of their financial arrangement. 

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Schultz does not dispute the authenticity of those e-mails. In

one e-mail, on March 5, 2008, Schultz said to Queen: “I will

agree to a 50-25-25 percentage formula of profits after

expenses of the show. Each of us will have a salary for

working on the show although that needs to be figured out.” 

In a reply five days later, Queen asked Schultz to “take a

look” at the “tentative agreement” that Queen had attached,

adding: “Will this work for you? The sooner we can all

agree the better.” The attachment, entitled “Partnership

Agreement,” provided Queen, Schindler, and Schultz with

equal interests in the partnership (one-third of profits and

losses). The draft agreement also indicated that Queen,

Schindler, and Schultz each would receive salaries from the

partnership, although the salary amounts remained blank.

As negotiations dragged on, Schindler decided to leave

the project. Schindler says in an affidavit that he thought

Schultz “would not honor any verbal agreements” because

Schultz refused to sign a written contract. Schindler Decl. ¶

3, ECF No. 24-1. Schindler also states that he “warned

[Queen] that . . . he should abandon this project with Schultz

or he would regret it.” Id. Queen disregarded Schindler’s

advice. Instead, Queen brought his “concerns of trust” to

Schultz, and on April 5, 2008, Schultz sent an e-mail to

Queen apparently intended to assuage those concerns. 

Schultz wrote:

I understand your concern about a financial

arrangement moving forward. I can’t give you

specifics at this time. We do not know what we are

dealing with at this point and what kind of

opportunity may present itself. However, any TV

deal will obviously involve you. I will not do a TV

deal without your involvement and that includes a

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financial involvement. Rest assured, we are together

on this. I hope this works for you at this point.

 

Queen says he continued to pitch the idea of a television

show starring Schultz to executives at NBC and MSNBC, but

neither network decided to hire Schultz that spring. Queen

also continued to correspond with Schultz and Schultz’s

attorney, Jeffrey Landa, about the terms of a partnership

agreement. In an e-mail to Landa on May 29, 2008, Queen

set forth his latest set of requests: (i) Queen, Schultz, and

Landa would each own a one-third interest in the partnership;

(ii) Schultz “would have total control of content, hiring, [and]

production decisions”; (iii) Queen “would receive an amount

equal to 10% of [Schultz’s] television salary for the duration

of any TV production formed from this agreement”; and (iv)

Queen “would be included in any television enterprise.” 

Landa responded that it was “out of the question” for Queen

to possess an ownership interest in the 30% to 40% range. 

Landa also told Queen that Schultz “is not interested in

having your ‘salary’ based on his ‘salary’ and he is not

interested in having a salary allotted to you without ongoing

responsibilities (to be negotiated) on your part.”

Even as the parties argued over the terms of the business

arrangement, Queen arranged for the availability of an NBC

studio in Washington for the production of a pilot episode of

the show. The recording of the pilot episode took place on

June 26, 2008. Schultz told Queen that he and Landa would

pay for production of the pilot, but Queen says that he ended

up paying the $11,000 studio rental fee from the proceeds of

a personal home equity loan, and also bore other unspecified

pilot-related expenses.

According to Queen, he then sent a copy of the pilot to

Alan Horlick, the general manager of CBS’s Washington

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affiliate, WUSA. Queen says that he and Horlick eventually

struck a deal under which WUSA would broadcast a show

starring Schultz in the 7:30 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. timeslot on

Sunday mornings. The deal provided that Queen and Schultz

would pay a fixed fee to WUSA and would themselves own

the half-hour timeslot on Sunday mornings; if the show

proved successful after six months or a year, WUSA would

have an opportunity to negotiate an ownership interest in the

show. As plans for the WUSA show moved forward, Queen

contends that he located and rented an apartment for Schultz

and Schultz’s wife in Washington, D.C., helped furnish the

apartment, and provided Schultz and Schultz’s wife with car

rides. In March 2009, however, just weeks before Queen and

Schultz were to begin production on the WUSA show,

Schultz backed out of the project and accepted an offer from

MSNBC to host “The Ed Show.”

After the launch of “The Ed Show,” Queen says he

contacted Schultz, Schultz’s attorney, and the parent

company of MSNBC and asserted an entitlement to

compensation under his agreement with Schultz. Schultz

sent Queen a $12,000 check as reimbursement for the NBC

studio rental fee plus interest, although Queen contends that

Schultz has yet to reimburse him for other pilot-related

expenses. Schultz denies Queen’s entitlement to any further

payment.

In May 2011, Queen sued Schultz in the district court,

alleging breach of contract, fraud in the inducement, tortious

interference with business relationships, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Queen invoked the district

court’s diversity jurisdiction, as Queen is a resident of

Maryland, Schultz is a resident of Minnesota, and the amount

in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Schultz responded with

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counterclaims against Queen for fraud, slander per se, and

libel per se.

In August 2012, the district court granted summary

judgment to Schultz on Queen’s claims and to Queen on

Schultz’s counterclaims. Queen, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 175. Of

particular salience, the court considered (and rejected)

Queen’s breach-of-contract claim under two distinct

frameworks: first, the court examined the claim as an

ordinary breach-of-contract action independent of any

allegation that Queen and Schultz had formed a partnership,

see id. at 159-64; and second, the court considered the claim

“under a partnership theory,” see id. at 164-67.

II.

Queen confines his appeal to his breach-of-contract

claim and his breach-of-partnership-duties theory, arguing

that the district court should have allowed Queen to present

them to a jury. We reverse the grant of summary judgment

“‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Steele v. Schafer, 535

F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). We may affirm the

grant of summary judgment on any ground supported by the

record, even if it differs from the theory applied by the

district court, “provided that the opposing party has had a fair

opportunity to dispute the facts material to that ground.” 

Washburn v. Lavoie, 437 F.3d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see

also Wash.-Balt. Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Wash. Post,

959 F.2d 288, 292 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Queen and Schultz

both accept the lower court’s conclusion that District of

Columbia law governs, and we follow the decisions of the

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District of Columbia Court of Appeals with respect to local

law. See Burke v. Air Serv Int’l, Inc., 685 F.3d 1102, 1105,

1107 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Applying District of Columbia

law, we conclude that Queen should be permitted to present

his breach-of-partnership-duties theory to a jury.

A.

We initially consider Queen’s ordinary breach-ofcontract claim—i.e., without regard to any partnership

theory. Under District of Columbia law, a valid and

enforceable contract requires “both (1) agreement as to all

material terms; and (2) intention of the parties to be bound.” 

Duk Hea Oh v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 7 A.3d

997, 1013 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Queen, as the party asserting the existence of a contract,

bears the burden of proof on both issues. See Jack Baker,

Inc. v. Office Space Dev. Corp., 664 A.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C.

1995). And for purposes of surviving summary judgment,

Queen must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as

to both prongs. Because we conclude that Queen fails to

make the requisite showing with regard to an “agreement as

to all material terms,” we need not consider whether the

parties intended to be bound. See Malone v. Saxony Coop.

Apartments, Inc., 763 A.2d 725, 729-30 (D.C. 2000).

The “material terms” of a contract generally include

“subject matter, price, payment terms, quantity, quality, and

duration.” Rosenthal v. Nat’l Produce Co., 573 A.2d 365,

370 (D.C. 1990). A contract’s material terms must be

“‘sufficiently definite’ so that each party can be ‘reasonably

certain’ about what it is promising to do or how it is to

perform.” Dyer v. Bilaal, 983 A.2d 349, 356 (D.C. 2009)

(quoting Rosenthal, 573 A.2d at 370). While the terms of the

agreement “need not be fixed with complete and perfect

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certainty for a contract to be enforceable,” the contract terms

“must be clear enough for the court to determine whether a

breach has occurred and to identify an appropriate remedy.” 

EastBanc, Inc. v. Georgetown Park Assocs. II, L.P., 940 A.2d

996, 1002 (D.C. 2008) (alterations and internal quotation

marks omitted).

The district court determined that Queen and Schultz

“never agreed with reasonable certainty on several material

terms of the alleged agreement, most notably the amount of

compensation that would be paid to the plaintiff.” Queen,

888 F. Supp. 2d at 160. Compensation constitutes a

“material term” of the contract, and Queen does not contend

otherwise. Instead, Queen argues that he, Schindler, and

Schultz agreed that he and Schindler would each receive 25%

of the show’s profits and Schultz would receive 50%. The

district court rejected that argument, concluding that “the

50/25/25 figure was never finalized as a term of any

agreement and was in fact superseded by other proposals and

counter-proposals regarding compensation structures.” Id. at

161.

As the district court observed, none of the e-mails in the

record demonstrate finalization of the 50/25/25 allocation. 

But that alone would not necessarily defeat Queen’s breachof-contract claim because he argues that the parties verbally

agreed to a 50/25/25 split in March 2008. That Queen and

Schultz subsequently discussed other compensation

structures likewise would not necessarily disprove Queen’s

claim that the parties had initially reached agreement on a

50/25/25 split. If the parties had in fact agreed to a 50/25/25

formula, Queen’s later proposals for a one-third/onethird/one-third split would not invalidate the already-existing

contract. See 1 Corbin on Contracts § 3.31 (Matthew Bender

& Co. 2013) (“exact and unconditional acceptance of an

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offer” not vitiated by “one party’s attempt to alter the terms

of the contract in some respect”).

Yet even when we credit Queen’s claim of a verbal

agreement to a 50/25/25 split, Queen still cannot carry his

burden to demonstrate that the parties agreed to all material

terms of the contract. Queen states in his affidavit that the

50/25/25 split of “income realized by the program after

expenses” was “in addition to salaries.” Queen Decl. ¶ 8. 

Presumably, that means “salaries” would count as

“expenses” and would be subtracted from the amount to be

apportioned according to the 50/25/25 formula. Queen,

however, never suggests that the parties agreed upon salary

numbers, and he never explains how salaries were to be

calculated. That is no minor matter. If, for instance, we

were to look to the market value of Schultz’s services as a

proxy for the missing salary term, cf. Zeige Distrib. Co. v. All

Kitchens, Inc., 63 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 1995) (“missing

price term” may be “deducible from the market rate”), the

salary payable to Schultz under the contract would equal the

compensation he receives from MSNBC under his

employment contract. Subtraction of that salary expense

would in turn leave nothing for Queen, Schindler, and

Schultz to divide according to the 50/25/25 formula.

Perhaps Queen would say that Schultz’s “salary” under

the verbal agreement should be pegged to some metric other

than Schultz’s MSNBC compensation. But Queen makes no

such suggestion in his submissions. Rather, Queen states

only that he, Schindler, and Schultz agreed to a 50/25/25 split

of the show’s income after subtracting salaries and other

expenses, without any effort to identify the amount of

salaries and other expenses. Queen, in short, has told us that

the parties agreed to a 50/25/25 split, but has not told us what

they agreed to split. As a result, even viewing the evidence

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in the light most favorable to him, Queen fails to demonstrate

that the compensation terms of the alleged contract are “clear

enough for the court . . . to identify an appropriate remedy.” 

EastBanc, 940 A.2d at 1002 (internal quotation marks

omitted). We thus affirm the district court’s conclusion that

Queen has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact

concerning the existence of a valid and enforceable contract

between himself and Schultz (at least apart from Queen’s

partnership theory, which we take up next).

B.

Queen argues that he, Schindler, and Schultz formed a

partnership under District of Columbia law, and that the

partnership continued to exist even after Schindler’s

departure. Cf. D.C. Code § 29-606.03(a) (one partner’s

dissociation does not necessarily result in dissolution of

partnership); Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385, 392-93 & nn.4-5

(Md. 1999) (noting that Revised Uniform Partnership Act,

unlike the earlier version of the Act, “allows for the

partnership to continue even with the departure of a

member,” and noting that District of Columbia is among

jurisdictions to have adopted the new rule). Queen further

argues that Schultz owed a duty of loyalty to the partnership

and to his fellow partner under District of Columbia law, and

that Schultz breached that duty by competing with the

partnership in the conduct of partnership business. Schultz

responds that he and Queen never formed a partnership. The

district court agreed, concluding that Queen had failed to

show a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the

formation of a partnership. Queen, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 167. 

We pause at the outset to note that Queen’s complaint

contains no assertion of a breach of partnership duties, and in

fact nowhere uses the word “partnership.” Queen

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nonetheless argued at the summary judgment stage that he,

Schindler, and Schultz had “entered into an oral agreement to

establish a partnership,” that they “agreed that the partners

would share the profits from such a venture based upon a 50-

25-25 split,” and that he and Schultz “agreed to continue the

partnership” after Schindler’s departure. Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 24; Mem. in Supp. of Pl’s 2nd

Opp. to Def.’s 2nd Mot. for Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 32. Citing

Queen’s scattered references to a “partnership,” the district

court decided that it not only would consider Queen’s

breach-of-contract claim independent of any partnership

overlay, but would “also analyze the plaintiff’s breach-ofcontract claims under a partnership theory.” Queen, 888 F.

Supp. 2d at 164. Schultz now concedes in this court that the

district court correctly chose to assess Queen’s contract claim

under a partnership theory. Because Schultz has disclaimed

any waiver argument, we have no occasion to consider

whether a plaintiff who makes no mention of any partnership

in the complaint might thereby waive an argument premised

upon a breach of partnership duties.

A partnership arises under District of Columbia law

when “two or more persons . . . intend to associate together

to carry on as co-owners for profit.” Beckman v. Farmer,

579 A.2d 618, 627 (D.C. 1990); accord D.C. Code § 29-

601.02(9). The “customary attributes” of a partnership

include “profit and loss sharing,” “joint control of

decisionmaking,” and “capital contributions.” Beckman, 579

A.2d at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted). But those

“customary attributes” only form “guidepoints of inquiry.” 

Id. “[W]hether a partnership exists is an issue of fact, turning

less on the presence or absence of legal essentials than on the

intent of the parties gathered from their agreement, conduct,

and the circumstances surrounding their transactions.” Id. at

628 (citation omitted). When a trial court “must resort to

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inferences from extrinsic evidence of the parties’ conduct

and course of dealings to determine their legal relationship,”

a “court’s conclusion that the issue of partnership vel non

could be resolved as a matter of law bears a heavy burden of

justification.” Id. at 630.

The District of Columbia Code establishes a “statutory

presumption of partnership from evidence that a party shared

in the profits of the business.” Id. at 627 (citing earlier

version of D.C. Code § 29-602.02(c)(3)). The statutory

presumption of partnership does not apply, however, if the

profits were received in payment for “services as an

independent contractor or of wages or other compensation to

an employee.” D.C. Code § 29-602.02(c)(3)(B). Schultz

claims that Queen was his employee, not his partner, and the

district court appears to have credited that claim. See Queen,

888 F. Supp. 2d at 165-66. But Queen maintains that he was

more than an employee or agent of Schultz: Queen says, in a

declaration, that he, Schindler, and Schultz orally agreed to

co-develop and co-own a television show. And the e-mail

correspondence in the record shows that, while Schultz’s

attorney at one point proposed that Queen and Schindler

enter into an “exclusive representation or agency agreement”

with Schultz to negotiate a television deal on Schultz’s

behalf, Queen declined to sign. Although a jury could

nonetheless find that Queen was Schultz’s employee or agent

rather than his partner, the court itself cannot make such a

determination on this record at the summary judgment stage.

Schultz also contends (and Queen does not dispute) that

he now works for MSNBC as an “independent contractor”

under an “employment contract” with the network. Schultz

Decl. ¶ 8-9, ECF No. 31-2. The district court therefore

concluded that Queen’s “claim to a percentage of [Schultz’s]

salary under a partnership theory fails as a matter of law.” 

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Queen, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 166. But Schultz’s status as an

“independent contractor” or “employee” vis-à-vis MSNBC

has little bearing on the viability of Queen’s partnership

theory. Queen’s theory is that a partnership existed between

him and Schultz, not between Schultz and MSNBC, and that

MSNBC’s offer of employment to Schultz was an

opportunity that belonged to the Queen-Schultz partnership. 

Under District of Columbia law, a partner’s duty of loyalty to

the partnership includes a duty “[t]o account to the

partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or

benefit derived by the partner . . . [from] the appropriation of

a partnership opportunity.” D.C. Code § 29-604.07(b)(1). If

one partner receives a salary or fee from a third party in the

course of the partnership business, he may be obligated to

account to his other partners for the salary or fee even though

he was an “independent contractor” with respect to the third

party. See, e.g., Beckman, 579 A.2d at 639 (attorney who

was member of now-dissolved law partnership entitled to

share of other partners’ fees for “work performed on

partnership business unfinished at the date of dissolution”);

cf. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1064 n.10 (10th Cir.

2003) (noting that attorneys generally are “independent

contractors” with respect to their clients); McCarthy v.

Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 853 (3d Cir. 1996) (same). 

Thus, if Queen can show that he and Schultz became partners

in the development of a television show, Queen can

potentially prevail on the claim that he is entitled to a

percentage of Schultz’s compensation from MSNBC for

“The Ed Show,” regardless of whether Schultz was an

independent contractor/employee with respect to MSNBC.

As an alternative ground for granting summary judgment

to Schultz on Queen’s partnership claim, the district court

determined that Queen had “failed to create a genuine issue

of fact regarding whether the parties intended to form a

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partnership.” Queen, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 166. We believe,

however, that a reasonable jury could conclude from the

parties’ conduct and communications that Queen and Schultz

intended to, and did, form a partnership to develop a

television show. Of course, it remains to be seen whether a

jury in fact will find the existence of a partnership. The

question for our purposes is whether Queen made a sufficient

showing to present the matter to a jury, and we conclude that

he did.

First, Queen says he developed the concept for the show,

marketed the show to NBC and MSNBC executives,

arranged for the production of the pilot, and negotiated with

CBS’s Washington affiliate for a Sunday morning timeslot. 

A reasonable jury that credited Queen’s testimony on those

points could conclude that Queen shared in control of

decisionmaking. See Beckman, 579 A.2d at 627 (“joint

control of decisionmaking” is “customary” attribute of

partnership); accord Brown v. 1401 N.Y. Ave., Inc., 25 A.3d

912, 914 (D.C. 2011). Although Queen’s e-mail to Landa on

May 29, 2008 stated that Schultz would have “total control”

of content, hiring, and production decisions, a reasonable

jury could accept Queen’s argument that he nonetheless

retained control over other aspects of the partnership

business (e.g., finances, logistics, and marketing).

Second, Queen contends that he advanced $11,000 to

rent an NBC studio for the pilot, paid other pilot expenses,

and devoted considerable time and energy to the partnership. 

All of those outlays potentially qualify as capital

contributions to the partnership. See Black’s Law Dictionary

237 (9th ed. 2009) (“capital contribution” defined as “[c]ash,

property, or services contributed by partners to a

partnership”). “[C]apital contributions” are among the

“attributes of co-ownership” to which District of Columbia

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law looks in determining whether parties have formed a

partnership. Beckman, 579 A.2d at 627.

Third, Queen’s claim that he, Schindler, and Schultz

agreed to form a partnership to develop a television show

draws support from Schindler’s sworn statement that he

“agreed to partner in the project” with Queen and Schultz. 

Schindler Decl. ¶ 2. While Schultz dismisses Queen’s

version of events as “self-serving,” that line of attack does

not apply to Schindler, a non-party who seeks nothing from

Schultz in this litigation.

Fourth, although there is no evidence that Queen and

Schultz actually shared profits from the show, Schultz’s

April 5, 2008 e-mail to Queen assured Queen that he would

have “a financial involvement” in any “TV deal.” A

reasonable jury could interpret that assurance as an indication

that Schultz and Queen intended to associate as co-owners

for profit. Of course, a jury might also draw a different

inference, but “summary judgment is not available” when

material facts are “susceptible to divergent inferences.”

Carney v. Am. Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, Queen’s failure to demonstrate an enforceable

agreement with regard to compensation—while fatal to his

ordinary breach-of-contract claim—does not defeat his

argument that he and Schultz formed a partnership under

District of Columbia law. In the context of a partnership

agreement, the default provisions in the District of Columbia

Code can supply certain essential terms to which the parties

never explicitly agreed. See D.C. Code § 29-601.04(a) (“To

the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise

provide, this chapter shall govern relations among the

partners and between the partners and the partnership.”). 

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And the default rule under District of Columbia law holds

that, absent an explicit agreement otherwise, “[e]ach partner

shall be entitled to an equal share of the partnership profits.” 

D.C. Code § 29-604.01(b); see also Robinson v. Nussbaum,

11 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15 (D.D.C. 1997).

It might seem counterintuitive that Queen, having failed

to demonstrate the existence of an enforceable agreement

entitling him to 25% of the income after expenses from “The

Ed Show,” can nonetheless pursue a partnership theory that

could entitle him to a 50/50 split of profits with Schultz. But

the “equal share” allocation under District of Columbia

partnership law applies only as a default matter in the

absence of an explicit agreement between the parties. 

Accordingly, as the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

has explained in a comparable context, insofar as the default

provisions of District of Columbia partnership law might

lead to “harsh results,” the parties could always enter into a

partnership agreement that would supersede the default rules. 

See Beckman, 579 A.2d at 640. 

In any event, any consideration of the amount of

damages payable to Queen would be premature in advance of

a jury verdict on whether the parties formed a partnership in

the first place. And even if Queen were to persuade a jury

that he and Schultz formed a partnership, Queen still would

need to prove that Schultz breached his duty of loyalty under

District of Columbia partnership law. A partner’s duty of

loyalty includes a duty to “refrain from competing with the

partnership in the conduct of the partnership business before

the dissolution of the partnership.” D.C. Code § 29-

604.07(b)(3). Queen submits that Schultz breached the duty

of loyalty when he accepted an offer to host a weekday show

on MSNBC, while Schultz says he worked with Queen solely

to produce a Sunday morning television show. Each party

USCA Case #12-7099 Document #1486971 Filed: 04/04/2014 Page 17 of 18
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cites portions of the record that support his position, but

neither party puts forward incontrovertible evidence that

proves him right. Resolution of that issue therefore will

require “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the

facts,” all of which are “jury functions” and “not those of a

judge at summary judgment.” Barnett v. PA Consulting

Grp., Inc., 715 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

* * * * *

We conclude that the district court correctly granted

summary judgment to Schultz on Queen’s claim that he,

Schindler, and Schultz entered into an enforceable contract to

divide the profits from a potential television show 50/25/25. 

But insofar as Queen claims that he and Schultz formed a

partnership to develop a television show and that Schultz

breached his duty of loyalty under District of Columbia

partnership law, Queen is entitled to present his claim to a

jury. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court

in part, reverse it in part, and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

USCA Case #12-7099 Document #1486971 Filed: 04/04/2014 Page 18 of 18