Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02240/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02240-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE ESTATE OF ANGEL LOPEZ by

and through its successor in interest,

LYDIA LOPEZ; LYDIA LOPEZ;

ANGEL LOPEZ, JR. and HECTOR

LOPEZ, by and through their guardian

ad litem, LYDIA LOPEZ,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v. [Dkt. No. 48.]

CITY OF SAN DIEGO;

KRISTOPHER MICHAEL WALB

AND DOES 2-30,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

Defendants City of San Diego and Kristopher Walb (“Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 48.)

The Parties have fully briefed the motion. (Dkt. Nos. 50, 52.) Pursuant to Civil Local

Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the matter suitable for adjudication without oral

argument. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES

IN PART Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises fromthe shooting death of AngelLopez (“Lopez”) by San Diego

Police Officer Kristopher Walb on January 17, 2013. Except where noted, the

- 1 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

following factual background is undisputed.

1

At the time of the subject incident, Lopez was on parole after serving a sentence

for felon in possession of a firearm. (Dkt. No. 48-3, Torres-Skerett Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)

Following violations of his parole, a warrant was issued for Lopez’s arrest and listed

Lopez as armed and dangerous. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 15.)

On the morning ofJanuary 17, 2013, Parole Agent Lou Torres(“Agent Torres”),

who was Lopez’s case agent, received a call from a person named Alec who inquired

if Agent Torres was the parole agent for Angel Lopez aka Necio. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 16.) The

caller stated that Lopez and his father, Alex Lopez, were at 5444 Reservoir Drive,

Apartment #58. (Id. ¶ 17.) The caller was aware that the father was also a parolee at

large, was a member of the “Sherman” gang, and went by the name Conejo (Rabbit). 

(Id.) Agent Torres was able to confirm the information with respect to the father. (Id.

¶ 18.) In addition, the caller stated that Angel Lopez was left handed and would be

carrying a .25 caliber pistol in his left pocket. (Id. ¶ 19.) The caller indicated that the

father had a sawed-off shotgun and an AK-47 at Apartment #58. (Id. ¶ 20.) The caller

identified two vehicles to look for, one a rented Ford Focus and the other a 1999 Ford

Explorer, license number 4HCL80, a known vehicle driven by Angel Lopez’s wife,

Lydia Lopez. (Id. ¶ 21.) Agent Torres and the caller Alec then exchanged phone

numbers. (Id. ¶ 22.)

Agent Torres met with Captain Andrew Mills (“Captain Mills”) of the Eastern

Division San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”) and passed on the information given

to him by the caller Alec. (Id. ¶ 23.) Based on that information, Captain Mills directed

various SDPD personnel to confirm the caller’s information and collect background on

Angel Lopez.

One of the assigned officers was Sgt. Steve Riddle (“Sgt. Riddle”), who was a

gang detective who specialized in Hispanic gangs. (Dkt. No. 48-4, Riddle Decl. ¶ 3.)

1To the extent that the Court relied upon evidence to which the parties objected,

the objections are overruled. To the extent the Court did not rely on evidence to which

the parties objected, the objections are overruled as moot.

- 2 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Angel Lopez was a member of one of the targeted gangs, Sidro, and therefore Sgt.

Riddle was familiar with Lopez and his past gang activities. (Id. ¶¶ 4-9.) Sgt. Riddle

met with Captain Mills, Agent Torres, and others, and provided information about

Lopez, his father, and the Sidro gang. (Id. ¶¶ 10-30.) For example, Sgt. Riddle

informed them that Lopez had a history of gun violence, must be considered to be

armed, was unpredictable, and had a number of gang tattoos, including on his neck.

(Id. ¶¶ 14, 20, 22, 24.) 

Two undercover officers, acting Detective Paul Tom and Detective Brad Elow

(“Detective Elow”), were sent to 5444 Reservoir Drive and located in the parking lot

a burgundy four-door hatchback Ford Focus, license number 5UNK285 CA. (Dkt. No.

48-5, Elow Decl. ¶ 7.) A patrol officer, at Detective Elow’s direction, ran the plate and

determined that it was registered to a rental car company. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

At approximately 10:33 a.m., January 17, 2013, Detective Tim Williams

contacted the rental car company. (Dkt. No. 48-6, Williams Decl. ¶ 6.) The rental

agreement indicated that the burgundy Ford Focus was rented on January 10, 2013, to

Xavier Lenyoun. (Id. ¶ 7.) Xavier Lenyoun also rented Apartment #58 at 5444

Reservoir Drive. (Id. ¶ 8.)

Detective Dean Way obtained a photo of Angel Lopez, and confirmed its

authenticity with Agent Torres. (Dkt. No. 48-7, Way Decl. ¶ 5.) The photo was then

distributed to members of the SDPD involved in the operation. (Id. ¶ 6.)

A Special Response Team (“SRT”) unit, and two Primary Response Team

(“PRT”) units, undercover officers and uniformed officers were deployed to the

Reservoir Drive area. (Dkt. No. 48-9, Ramsay Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) SRT Sgt. Mike Ramsay

informed the SRT Unit, which included Officers Kristopher Walb (“Officer Walb”),

Brad Pickett (“Officer Pickett”), and Jason Scott (“Officer Scott”), “all the information

he had been provided, which included background from Eastern Division, as well as

radio transmissions.” (Id. ¶ 5.)

SRT was deployed in an unmarked van on the eastside parking lot of the target

- 3 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

apartment on Reservoir Drive. (Id. ¶ 6.) The PRT officers were in marked SDPD

vehicles deployed in the immediate area. (Id. ¶ 7.) The initial plan called for PRT

officers to conduct a vehicle hot stop of Angel Lopez and his father if they were in a

vehicle. (Id. ¶ 8.) SRT was to deploy to the target apartment, 5444 Reservoir Drive,

#D58, lock the exterior of the apartment down and conduct containment and call out

if there were subjects in the apartment. (Id. ¶ 9.) Undercover officers were acting as

the “eyes,” attempting to spot the suspect. (Id. ¶ 10.)

Uniformed Officers Nicholas Ketchum (“Officer Ketchum”) and Christopher

Luth (“Officer Luth”) received information via radio that two Hispanic males walked

out of the apartment complex towards the burgundy Ford Focus. (Dkt. No. 48-10, Luth

Decl. ¶¶ 3, 8.) The officers drove over to the Ford in a marked vehicle. (Id. ¶ 8.)

Officers Ketchumand Luth exited the vehicle with their weapons aimed at the suspects

and ordered them to the ground. (Id. ¶ 9.) Officer Luth shouted “Stop! Get on the

ground!” several times. (Id.) Both suspects turned around and ran back toward the

apartment complex. (Id.)

The SRT officers responded to a radio report that the suspects had fled on foot.

(Dkt. No. 48-11, Walb Decl. ¶ 14.) Officers Walb, Pickett, and Scott entered the

apartment complex through the west entrance with the thought of reaching Apartment

#58 on the third floor. (Id. ¶ 15.) As Officer Walb approached the third floor landing,

he could hear someone running in the third floor hallway. (Id. ¶ 16.) Officer Walb

waited a few seconds anticipating the person to come through the door at the stairwell.

(Id. ¶ 17.) Within seconds, the door flew open as a Hispanic male matching Lopez’s

description opened the door. (Id. ¶ 18.) The individual appeared to match the weight,

height, and age of Lopez, and the tattoos on his neck were consistent with what Officer

Walb had seen on the photo of Lopez. (Id. ¶ 19; Dkt. 50-11, Walb Dep. 128:8-22.

2

)

Officer Walb issued commands in a loud, clear voice: “Police,” “Don’t move.” (Walb

2Deposition page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers

reflected on the reporter’s transcript and not to the page numbers assigned by the

Court’s CM/ECF system.

- 4 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Decl. ¶ 21.)

Lopez spun around and ran back down the hallway. (Id. ¶ 22.) Officer Walb

opened the door, turned to the right, and continued forward in the hallway. (Walb Dep.

129:7-9.) There was no ambient light or windows, so Officer Walb turned on the

flashlight on his MP-5 weapon, which clearly illuminated the scene. (Walb Dep.

27:22-28:8; Walb Decl. ¶ 25.) All three officers moved down the hallway in a diagonal

echelon formation with their MP-5 machine guns pointed at Lopez. (Walb Decl. ¶ 26.)

The parties dispute Lopez’s next movements before Officer Walb shot him.

According to Officer Walb, he shouted several times at Lopez at the top of his lungs

“get down” and “take your hands out of your pockets.” (Walb Dep. 28:9-29:16,

129:24-130:2, 138:5-22;Walb Decl. ¶ 27.) Officer Walb never saw Lopez’s left hand

come out of his pocket. (Walb Dep. 29:17-22, 130:8-22, 148:16-25.) Lopez proceeded

down the hall until he reached Apartment #58 and turned away from Officer Walb, but

Lopez could not get in the door. (Walb Dep. 130:23-131:3; Walb Decl. ¶¶ 28-30.)

Officer Scott shouted “left hand, left hand.” (Walb Decl. ¶ 32; Walb Dep. 135:11-13.)

Officer Walb told Lopez to put his hands up. (Walb Dep. 131:6-7.) Lopez’s left hand

remained in his pocket, and Lopez raised his right hand up, but not completely and still

guarded it towards his body. (Walb Dep. 131:8-12; Walb Decl. ¶¶ 35-37.) Lopez

started slowly kneeling down as Officer Walb was coming toward him. (Walb Dep.

131:18-22; Walb Decl. ¶ 37.) However, Lopez was not going to the ground as ordered.

(Walb Decl. ¶ 37.) Lopez suddenly turned his body and head slightly to the right. (Id.

¶ 39.) 

According to Officer Pickett, he entered the third floor hallway after Officer

Walb, and Officer Scott was behind him. (Dkt. No. 50-12, Pickett Dep. 9:13-10:5.)

Officer Picketsaid “Police. Stop.” two or three timesin a loud and commanding voice,

and also heard Officer Walb tell Lopez “Police. Stop.” (Pickett Dep. 14:5-15:21; Dkt.

No. 48-12, Pickett Decl. ¶¶ 27-28, 30-31.) Officer Pickett saw Lopez’s left hand in his

left front shorts pocket as Lopez was just beginning to step away from the door of

- 5 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Apartment #58. (Pickett Dep. 18:2-7.) He also saw Lopez make an exaggerated move

with hisleft hand into his left frontshorts pocket. (Pickett Dep. 25:10-16; Pickett Decl.

¶¶ 33-36.) Officer Scott was shouting “Left hand! Left hand!” (Pickett Decl. ¶ 37.) 

Lopez began turning towards the officers, to the right. (Pickett Dep. 30:12-18; Pickett

Decl. ¶ 38.)

According to Officer Scott, in the third floor hallway, he was behind Officer

Pickett, who was behind Officer Walb. (Dkt. No. 48-13, Scott Decl. ¶¶ 21-22.) Officer

Scottsaw Lopez step out of the alcove of Apartment #58, and begin moving away from

the officers. (Dkt. No. 50-13, Scott Dep. 36:12-23; Scott Decl. ¶ 24.) Officer Scott

shouted, “Don’t move! Get down! Get down!” and he also heard Officer Walb say

“Get down.” (Scott Dep. 37:24-38:7; Scott Decl. ¶ 25.) Officer Scott saw Lopez’s

hand, which had nothing in it, go into his pocket or the front of his waistband. (Scott

Dep. 46:20-25; Scott Decl. ¶ 26.) Officer Scott yelled “Left hand! Left hand! Watch

his left hand!” (Scott Decl. ¶ 29.) Lopez had his right side facing Officer Scott, but

Officer Scott could not give an exact angle. (Scott Dep. 35:12-24.) 

Officer Walb then shot Lopez, from a distance of 15 to 20 feet, at 12:59 p.m. on

the afternoon ofJanuary 17, 2013. (Walb Dep. 6:18-7:8, 131:23-132:2.) Officer Walb

fired two, three-round burstsfromhis MP-5 weapon. (Walb Dep. 7:9-8:13; Walb Decl.

¶ 43.) The second burst was directly after the first. (Walb Dep. 8-13.) According to

all three officers, Lopez wasstanding when Officer Walb shot him. (Walb Dep. 11:19-

12:21; Pickett Dep. 29:9-31:3; Scott Dep. 38:11-21.) Officer Walb stated that Lopez

was turning towards him, so that the right side of Lopez’s body was facing him, when

he fired his weapon. (Walb Dep. 10:10-11:1.) At the time he shot Lopez, the angle of

Officer Walb’s weapon was parallel or just slightly lower than parallel to the ground.

(Id. 132:6-14.) Three of the six bullets hit Lopez: one to the back of the head, one to

the lower right back, and one to the right side of the upper-mid back. (Dkt. 50-10 at

- 6 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2-3.3) After he was shot, Lopez immediately fell forward and was pronounced dead at

the scene. (Walb. Decl. ¶ 44.)

The parties’ ballistics experts agree that, based on the gun shot wound paths,

Lopez could not have been either standing or fully prone when the shots impacted

Lopez. (Dkt. No. 50-14, Martini Dep. 76:1-22; Dkt. No. 50-17, Martini Report at 38;

Dkt. No. 52-5, Haag Decl. ¶¶ 8, 19.) Rather, Lopez was in a forward descending

motion at the time the bullets struck him. (Dkt. No. 50-15, Martini Dep. 136:22-137:1;

Dkt. No. 50-17 at 38; Haag Decl. ¶ 18(f).) Plaintiffs’ ballistic expert concluded that

when he was shot Lopez was either transitioning from a standing to a kneeling

position, in a kneeling position, or transitioning from a kneeling position into a prone

position. (Dkt. No. 50-17 at 38-39.)

Plaintiffs’ ballistics expert also concluded that the wound paths are inconsistent

with Lopez turning to his right when he was shot by Officer Walb. (Dkt. No. 50-17 at

40.) However, Defendants’ ballistics expert concluded that the wound paths are not

inconsistent with Lopez turning to his right when Officer Walb decided to fire because

Lopez could have changed positions immediately before and while being struck. (Dkt.

No. 52-8, Kapelsohn Decl. ¶¶ 5-7.) 

After the shooting, officers searched Lopez’s body. (Luth Decl. ¶¶ 12, 15.) 

Lopez’s left hand was concealed underneath his chest area on the left side. (Dkt. No.

50-19, DeWitt Report at 3). Officers did not find a gun on Lopez. (Luth Decl. ¶¶ 12,

15; Walb Dep. 138:23-25.) However, officers did find on Lopez one syringe loaded

with a dark brown liquid, one blue balloon wrapped in a napkin, three “bindles,” and

another “bindle” held in a metal container. (Luth Decl. ¶ 15.) The blue balloon and

“bindles” all contained apparent narcotics. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) The autopsy toxicology

report revealed the testing of peripheral blood detected methamphetamine (1.1 mg/L),

amphetamine (0.07 mg/L), trace ephedrine and morphine (0.23 mg/L). (Dkt. No. 48-

3Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the

Court’s CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

- 7 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15.) 

The day after Officer Walb shot and killed Lopez, Officers Walb, Pickett, and

Scott attended a debriefing with three “peersupport officers” and a psychologist. (Dkt.

No. 52-1 at 37).4 At this debrief, “each person tellstheir side of what happened.” (Id.)

On the advice of counsel, Officers Walb and Scott refused to answer further deposition

questions concerning this debriefing. (Id. at 38-39; Walb Dep. 74:17-76:25, 78:16-

79:14; Scott Dep. 22:6-24:10; Dkt. No. 52-4, Scott Dep. 18:9-13.) 

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed this action on September 18, 2013. (Dkt. No. 1.) On March 11,

2014, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against

Defendants City of San Diego, Kristopher Michael Walb, Mark Hanten, and William

Landsdowne. (Dkt. No. 18.) The latter two defendants were later dismissed. (Dkt.

Nos. 30, 38.)

In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege nine claims: (1) excessive force under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983; (2) wrongful death under § 1983; (3) right of association under § 1983;

(4) failure to properly train under § 1983; (5) failure to properly supervise under

§ 1983; (6) wrongful death under California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60;

(7) battery;(8) negligence; and (9) violation of California Civil Code § 52.1. (Dkt. No.

18.)

On October 10, 2014, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Dkt. No. 48.) On November 14, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their response. (Dkt.

No. 50.) On November 17, 2014, Defendants belatedly filed their separate statement

of undisputed material facts.5(Dkt. No. 51.) On November 28, 2014, Defendants filed

4Some of Plaintiffs’ cited portions of the Walb and Scott depositions (i.e., Walb

Dep. 72:19-25; Scott Dep. 17:10-14, 20:21-25) are not included in the record, but the

parties do not dispute these facts. (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 37-39.)

5Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment should be

denied because Defendants failed to include a separate statement of undisputed

material facts, in violation of the Court’s Chamber Rules. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 7.)

Defendants subsequently filed a late separate statement of undisputed material facts,

- 8 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

their reply.6 (Dkt. No. 52.)

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary

judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just,

speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325, 327 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue asto any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact

is material when it affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any

genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can

satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a

showing sufficient to establish an element of his or her claim on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. If the moving party fails to bear the

initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the

nonmoving party’s evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60

(1970).

Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest

on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings

and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

in which they contend that there is no prejudice to Plaintiffs asto the late filing because

the facts contained in the separate statement mirror the facts in their Motion for

Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 51.) While the Court reminds Defendants of the need

to follow Chambers Rules, the Court declines to deny Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment on this ground.

6Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have waived all of their claims by failing to

adequately address them. (Dkt. No. 52 at 10.) While it would have been helpful for

Plaintiffs to separately address each claim, the Court declines to grant Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment on this ground.

- 9 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient

showing of an element of its case, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Id. at 325. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In

making this determination, the court must “view[ ] the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir.

2001). TheCourt does not engage in credibility determinations, weighing of evidence,

or drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts; these functions are for the trier of

fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

V. DISCUSSION

1. Excessive Force Under the Fourth Amendment

Plaintiffs assert that Officer Walb’s use of deadly force was excessive under the

Fourth Amendment. (Dkt. No.18 ¶¶ 20-28.) Defendants move for summary judgment

on the ground that Officer Walb is entitled to qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 48-1 at

15.)

Section 1983 provides plaintiffs with a cause of action when a person acting

underthe color ofstate law deprivesthemof any federal constitutional right. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement may use “objectively

reasonable” force to carry out seizures, and objective reasonableness is determined by

an assessment of the totality of the circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

397 (1989). An officer’s use of deadly force is reasonable only if “the officer has

probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious

physical injury to the officer or others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).

The NinthCircuit has repeatedly noted thatsummary judgment in excessive force cases

should be granted “sparingly” because the reasonableness standard “nearly always

requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions.” Torres v. City of Madera,

- 10 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

648 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In the deadly force context, courts cannot “simply accept what may be a

self-serving account by the police officer.” Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir.

1994). “Because the person most likely to rebut the officers’ version of events – the

one killed – can’t testify, ‘[t]he judge must carefully examine all the evidence in the

record . . . to determine whether the officer’s story is internally consistent and

consistent with other known facts.’” Cruz v. City of Anaheim, 765 F.3d 1076, 1079

(9thCir. 2014) (quoting Scott, 39 F.3d at 915). “Thisincludes‘circumstantial evidence

that, if believed, would tend to discredit the police officer’sstory.’” Id. (quoting Scott,

39 F.3d at 915).

“An officer using deadly force is entitled to qualified immunity, unless the law

was clearly established that the use of force violated the Fourth Amendment.”

Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 2010). Qualified immunity involves

a two-part inquiry: (1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . or shown . . .

make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the right at issue was

‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001)).

A. Violation of the Fourth Amendment

Defendants contend that, based on the totality of the circumstances, it was

objectively reasonable for Officer Walb to perceive that Lopez posed an imminent

deadly threat. (Dkt. No. 48-1 at 15-19.) Defendants argue that Officer Walb was

aware that Lopez was a parolee at large and a violent gang member who would be

carrying a weapon in his pocket, that Lopez had fled to avoid arrest, and that Lopez had

refused to follow commands to get down and take his hand out of his pocket with three

machine guns pointed at him. (Id. at 17, 19.) 

Plaintiffs dispute the officers’ account of Lopez’s actions and rely heavily on the

Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Cruz. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 4-7.) Defendants argue that

- 11 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cruz is distinguishable because here the officers’ version of the events is not

inconsistent with the known facts. (Dkt. No. 52 at 2.) 

In Cruz, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in a deadly force case alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims,

as well as wrongful death under California law, because there was “circumstantial

evidence that could give a reasonable jury pause” regarding whether officerssaw Cruz

reach for his waistband before they shot and killed him. Cruz, 765 F.3d at 1079. The

officers had executed a traffic stop on Cruz, a discharged parolee whose prior

convictions included a felony involving a firearm, after a confidential informant

reported that Cruz was a gang member who sold drugs, that he was carrying a gun in

his waistband, and that he had made it clear that he was not going back to prison. Id.

at 1077-78. After Cruz unsuccessfully tried to escape in his vehicle, the police drew

their weapons and shouted at him to get on the ground as he was emerging from his

vehicle. Id. at 1078. According to four of the five officers, Cruz ignored their

commands and instead reached for the waistband of his pants. Id. Fearing that he was

reaching for a gun, all five officers opened fire, killing Cruz. Id. Officers did not find

a gun on Cruz, but did recover a loaded gun from the passenger seat. Id.

The Ninth Circuit explained that for the district court ruling on the officers’

motion for summary judgment, the key question was “Could any reasonable jury find

it more likely than not that Cruz didn’t reach for his waistband?” Id. at 1079. The

Ninth Circuit concluded that, despite the officers’ testimony, there was circumstantial

evidence that could cause a jury to reasonably conclude that the officers lied. Id. at

1079-80. The “[m]ost obvious is the fact that Cruz didn’t have a gun on him, so why

would he have reached for his waistband? . . . [F]or him to make such a gesture when

no gun isthere makes no sense whatsoever.” Id. at 1079. The Ninth Circuit also noted

that there were other aspects of the officers’ story which a jury might find troubling and

implausible. Id. at 1080. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court

erred in granting summary judgment for the officers, and reversed. Id.

- 12 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, the key question is: Could any reasonable jury find it more likely than not

that Lopez didn’t comply with the officers’ orders to remove his hand from his pocket

and get down? As in Cruz, no gun was found on Lopez, which Plaintiffs argue could

give a reasonable jury pause as to whether Lopez did in fact keep his hand in pocket,

despite facing three armed SRT officers who were pointing machine guns at him and

commanding him to get down and take his hands out of his pockets. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at

24-25.) Like in Cruz, “for him to make such a gesture when no gun is there makes no

sense whatsoever.” Cruz, 765 F.3d at 1079. Defendants contend that Cruz is

distinguishable because the evidence supports two possible explanations for Lopez’s

seemingly irrational movements: (1) the drugs found in Lopez’s system, which may

have caused him to behave erratically; and/or (2) the apparent drugs found on Lopez’s

body, which he may have been attempting to discard. (Dkt. No. 52 at 3-4.) However,

while a reasonable jury could believe that Lopez kept his hand in his pocket for

Defendants’ proffered reasons, or some other reason altogether, “the jury could also

reasonably conclude that the officers lied.” Cruz, 765 F.3d at 1080. 

Further, Plaintiffs have submitted other circumstantial evidence that could cause

a reasonable jury to question whether the officers saw Lopez with his left hand in his

pocket at the time Officer Walb shot him. For example, Officers Walb and Scott

testified that Lopez’s right side was facing them at the time Lopez was shot, which

could raise doubts whether they could see Lopez’s left hand due to his body

orientation. (Walb Dep. 10:10-11:1; Scott Dep. 35:12-24.) Also, the officer who

moved Lopez’s body reported that Lopez’s left hand was concealed underneath his

chest area on the left side. (Dkt. No. 50-19 at 3). Moreover, the day after the shooting

Officers Walb, Pickett, and Scott had a debriefing, about which they refused to answer

deposition questions and which might cause a jury to distrust the officers’ accounts.

(Dkt. No. 52-1 at 37-39.) 

In addition, Plaintiffs have submitted circumstantial evidence that could cause

a reasonable jury to question the officers’testimony thatLopez was not complying with

- 13 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

their ordersto get down. Plaintiffs’ ballistics expert concluded that Lopez was moving

downward when he was struck by the bullets, and that Lopez could not have been

standing or turning to the right at that time, as testified by the officers. (Dkt. No. 50-1

at 20-23.) Plaintiffs contend that this supports that Lopez was complying with the

officers’ orders to get down when Officer Walb shot him. (Id. at 25.) Defendants

counter that the officers’ account is not inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ ballistics expert. 

(Dkt. No. 52 at 4-7.) Defendants agree that Lopez wasin a forward descending motion,

and was not standing, when the bullets struck him, but contend that this was due to the

first burst of three bullets missing Lopez, and then Lopez crouching and turning back

to his left in response before he was hit by the second burst of three bullets. (Id.) In

other words, Defendants argue thatLopez could have been standing when Officer Walb

began to shoot at him, even though Lopez was not standing when the bullets actually

hit him. (Id.) It is possible that the jury could believe that the ballistics evidence is

consistent with the officers’ account. However, it is also possible for the jury to

reasonably conclude that it is consistent with Plaintiffs’ version that Lopez was

complying with the officers’ orders to get down. 

At this stage of the proceedings, the Court does not weigh the evidence or make

determinations about credibility. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Cruz, 765 F.3d at 1080.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could

disbelieve the officers’ version of events. See Cruz, 765 F.3d at 1080; Ortega v. San

Diego Police Dep’t, No. 12cv87-LAB (JMA), 2014 WL 6388488, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal.

Nov. 14, 2014) (denying summary judgment on Fourth Amendment claim in deadly

force case because reasonable jury could disbelieve officer’s version of events that

decedent had reached for the officer’s weapon). Therefore, the Court concludes that

there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Officer Walb violated the

Fourth Amendment. 

B. “Clearly Established Right”

Defendants contend that even if Officer Walb violated the Fourth Amendment,

- 14 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

he is still entitled to qualified immunity because the alleged right was not clearly

established. (Dkt. No. 48-1 at 20-22.) 

Case law makes clear that an officer may not use deadly force to apprehend a

suspect where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer or others. Garner,

471 U.S. at 11; see also Cruz, 765 F.3d at 1078-79 (“[I]f the suspect doesn’t reach for

his waistband or make some similar threatening gesture, it would clearly be

unreasonable for the officers to shoot him after he stopped his vehicle and opened the

door.”). On the other hand, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to use deadly force

“[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of

serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11; see

also Estate of Moppin-Buckskin v. City of Oakland, No. 08cv4328 CW, 2010 WL

147976, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) (holding that deadly force was justified, even

though it turned out that suspect did not have a weapon, where the suspect acted

belligerently, wasreluctant to comply with commands, reached towards his waistband,

and stated that he did not care if the officersshot him because he had been shot before).

Defendants repeat their arguments that the totality of the circumstances would

lead an objectively reasonable officer to believe that Officer Walb faced a life

threatening situation. (Dkt. No. 48-1 at 21.) However, if a jury were to find that

Lopez was getting down and did not keep his hand in his pocket or make some similar

threatening gesture, and that Officer Walb violated his Fourth Amendment rights by

shooting him while he posed no significant threat, the violation would be clearly

established underthe law set forth in Garner governing the use of deadly force to effect

a seizure of a suspect. Therefore, the Court concludes that summary judgment on

qualified immunity against Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is not warranted. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED with

respect to Plaintiffs’ first claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.

2. Wrongful Death Under Section 1983

In their second claim, labeled “Wrongful Death – 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” Plaintiffs

- 15 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

allege that Officer Walb’s use of deadly force “deprived Angel Lopez of his rights

under the United States Constitution to be free from the use of excessive force by law

enforcement and punishment without due process.” (Dkt. No. 18 ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs do

not specify under which constitutional provision this claim arises. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ second claim should be dismissed based on

the same “facts, arguments and reasoning” regarding Plaintiffs’ first claim for

excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 48-1 at 22.) Because the

Court concluded that summary judgment was not warranted on Plaintiffs’ first claim,

Defendants have failed to show that summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiffs’

second claim.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED with

respect to Plaintiffs’ second claim for wrongful death under section 1983.

3. Right of Association Under the Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiffs assert that Officer Walb’s use of deadly force unconstitutionally

interfered with their rights to familial relationships with their husband and father in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 18 ¶¶ 34-38.) Defendants contend

that Officer Walb’s conduct did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 48-1

at 22-24.)

Spouses and childrenmayassert Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process

claims if they are deprived of their liberty interest in the companionship and society of

their spouse or parent through official conduct. See Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. &

Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (children); Morales v.City of Delano, 852

F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1273-74 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (spouse and children). 

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause creates a right to be free from

“executive abuse of power . . . which shocks the conscience.” County of Sacramento

v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). “In determining whether excessive force shocks

the conscience, the court must first ask whether the circumstances are such that actual

deliberation by the officer is practical.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th

- 16 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). If the officer in question was

faced with a time frame where actual deliberation was practical, a plaintiff may

establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation by showing that the officer “acted with

deliberate indifference.” Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008).

Otherwise, if the officer “faced an evolving set of circumstances that took place over

a short time period necessitating ‘fast action,’” a plaintiff must make a higher showing

that the officer “acted with a purpose to harm” the plaintiff. Id. at 1139 (quoting Lewis,

523 U.S. at 853). “[T]he overarching test under either is whether the officer’s conduct

‘shocks the conscience.’” Id.

Defendants contend that the more stringent purpose to harm standard applies

here. (Dkt. No. 48-1 at 23-24.) Plaintiffs do not address this issue. (Dkt. No. 50-1.)

The Court determines that the purpose to harm standard applies here because

Officer Walb faced a fast paced, evolving situation with insufficient time for

deliberation. Under the purpose to harm standard, a plaintiff must show that an

officer’s purpose was “to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest.”

Porter, 546 F.3d at 1140 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It is precisely

“the intent to inflict force beyond that which is required by a legitimate law

enforcement objective that ‘shocks the conscience’ and gives rise to liability under

§ 1983. . . .” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that Officer Walb had any ulterior motive

for firing his weapon at Lopez. See Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 797-

98 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (affirming summary judgment on Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process claim arising from deadly force, even though genuine dispute

regarding Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, because plaintiffs produced no

evidence that the officers had any ulterior motives for using force); Hayes v. County

of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming summary judgment

on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim in deadly force case because

there was no evidence that the deputies fired their weapons for any purpose other than

- 17 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

self-defense). Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact

regarding their substantive due process claim.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with

respect to Plaintiffs’ third claim for right of association under the Fourteenth

Amendment.

4. Failure to Properly Train Under Section 1983

Plaintiffs concede that summary judgment is appropriate on their fourth claim

for failure to properly train, and do not object to the dismissal of this claim. (Dkt. No.

50-1 at 28.) Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED

with respect to Plaintiffs’ fourth claim for failure to properly train.

5. Failure to Properly Supervise Under Section 1983

Plaintiffs also concede thatsummary judgment is appropriate on their fifth claim

for failure to properly supervise, and do not object to the dismissal of this claim. (Dkt.

No. 50-1 at 28.) Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ fifth claim for failure to properly supervise.

6. Wrongful Death Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60

Defendants move forsummary judgment on Plaintiffs’ state law wrongful death

claim on the grounds that California Government Code § 820.2 immunizes public

officers like Officer from suit for all discretionary acts other than excessive or

unreasonable use of force. (Dkt. No. 48-1 at 27-28.) Under section 820.2, “a public

employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or

omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not

such discretion be abused.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2. “But ‘a police officer does not

have discretionary immunity from liability for the use of unreasonable force in making

an arrest.’” Ortega, 2014 WL 6388488, at *12 (quoting Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal.

App. 2d 256, 267 (1967)). 

Defendants contend that Officer Walb is immune from suit unless he used

excessive force. (Dkt. No. 48-1 at 28.) However, the Court already determined that

- 18 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Officer Walb’s use of

deadly force was excessive. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED with

respect to Plaintiffs’ sixth claim for wrongful death under California Civil Procedure

§ 377.60.

7. Battery

Defendants also move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ battery claim. (Dkt.

No. 48-1 at 28-29.) Under California law, a plaintiff bringing a battery claim against

a law enforcement official has the burden of proving the officer used unreasonable

force. See Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1157 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A prima facie

case for battery is not established under California law unless the plaintiff proves that

an officer used unreasonable force against him to make a lawful arrest or detention.”).

“Because theCourt has already determined that Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim

survives summary judgment, their . . . battery claim is also viable.” Ortega, 2014 WL

6388488, at * 12; see also Nelson v. City of Davis, 709 F. Supp. 2d 978, 992 (E.D. Cal.

2010), aff’d, 685 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because the same standards apply to both

state law assault and battery and Section 1983 claims premised on constitutionally

prohibited excessive force, the fact that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims under the Fourth

Amendment survive summary judgment also mandates that the assault and battery

claims similarly survive.”) A genuine dispute of material fact remains as to whether

Officer Walb used unreasonable force.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED with

respect to Plaintiffs’ seventh claim for battery.

8. Negligence

Plaintiffs allege that Officer Walb was negligent in his use of deadly force. (Dkt.

No. 18 ¶¶ 76-78.) “[I]n order to prove facts sufficient to support a finding of

negligence, a plaintiff must show that [the] defendant had a duty to use due care, that

he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the

- 19 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

resulting injury.” Hayes v. County of San Diego, 305 P.3d 252, 255 (Cal. 2013).

“[P]eace officers have a duty to act reasonably when using deadly force.” Id. at 256. 

“The reasonableness of an officer’s conduct is determined in light of the totality of

circumstances.” Id. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claim that the shooting was negligent fails

because Officer Walb’s actions were reasonable. (Dkt. No. 48-1 at 29-30.) However,

the Court already determined that there is a genuine dispute whether Officer Walb’s

actions were reasonable. 

Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim fails because it rests

on the same facts as their section 1983 claims. (Dkt. No. 48-1 at 29-30.) They cite

Whitefeld v. Tri-Metropolitan Transp. Dist., No. 06-cv-1655-HA, 2009 WL 839484,

at *11 (D. Or. Mar. 30, 2009) for the proposition that “a state common-law claim of

negligence may be maintained separately from a § 1983 claim only when the

negligence claim is based on facts that are different from the facts on which the § 1983

claims are based.” However, Defendants rely only on an Oregon district court case,

which focuses on the “law of th[at] District.” Id. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED with

respect to Plaintiffs’ eighth claim for negligence premised on Officer Walb shooting

Lopez. 

However, Plaintiffs also allege that the City of San Diego was negligent in its

training and supervision. (Dkt. No. 18 ¶¶ 80-83.) Because Plaintiffs’ concede that

summary judgment is appropriate on their separate failure to properly train and failure

to properly supervise claims (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 28), the Court also GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim premised

on training and supervision.

9. Violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 (Bane Act)

Finally, Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for

violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, also known as the Bane Act. (Dkt. No. 48-1

- 20 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at 30-31.) The Bane Act provides a private cause of action against anyone who

“interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by an individual or

individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or laws

and rights secured by the Constitution or laws of California.” Cal. Civil Code

§ 52.1(a). The Bane Act requires “an attempted or completed act of interference with

a legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion.” Jones v. Kmart Corp., 949 P.2d

941, 944 (1998). Although the Bane Act was initially considered to apply only to hate

crimes, the California Supreme Court subsequently broadened its application and held

that “plaintiffs need not allege that defendants acted with discriminatory animus or

intent, so long as those acts were accompanied by the requisite threats, intimidation,

or coercion.” Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 87 P.3d 1, 14 (Cal. 2004) (allowing

Bane Act claim for unlawful seizure). “[T]he elements of the excessive force claim

under § 52.1 are the same as under § 1983.” Cameron v. Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1022

(9th Cir. 2013).

Defendants contend that a ruling in favor of Defendants on the section 1983

excessive force claim precludes Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim. (Dkt. No. 48-1 at 30-31.)

However, this argument is unavailing because the Court already denied summary

judgment on the section 1983 excessive force claim.

Defendants also argue, relying on the California Appeals Court’s decision in

Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, that to sustain a Bane Act claim “‘[t]he act of

interference with a constitutional right must itself be deliberate or spiteful,’” and

“‘[t]he statute requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent

in the wrongful detention itself.’” (Dkt. No. 48-1 at 31 (quoting Shoyoye v. County of

Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 959 (Ct. App. 2012).)7In Shoyoye, a clerical error

resulted in the unlawful detention of a prisoner that had been ordered released, and the

7

In their opposition, Plaintiffs do not offer legal argument regarding their Bane

Act claim, other than listing it among the claims that are “amply supported by the

evidence and should remain for trial.” (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 28.)

- 21 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

California Appeals Court rejected the prisoner’s Bane Act claim because “[t]he

apparent purpose of the statute is not to provide relief for an overdetention brought

about by human error” but rather by “intentional conduct.” Shoyoye, 203 Cal. App. 4th

at 959. 

However, after Shoyoye was decided, the same California Court of Appeal

decided Bender v. County of Los Angeles, which held that the Bane Act applied to an

excessive force claim which involved an unlawful arrest, but explicitly left open the

issue of whether the Bane Act would apply in cases involving the alleged use of force

during an otherwise lawful arrest based on probable cause. Bender v. County of Los

Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 978 (Ct. App. 2013). In Bender, the court

distinguished Shoyoye, and determined that “the Bane Act applie[d] because there was

a Fourth Amendment violation – an arrest without probable cause – accompanied by

the beating and pepper spraying of an unresisting plaintiff, i.e., coercion that is in no

way inherent in an arrest, either lawful or unlawful.” Id. The court noted “not every

wrongful detention” and not “every case of excessive force in the effectuation of an

otherwise lawful arrest is a violation of the Bane Act.” Id. at 981. Rather, the court

held that “a wrongful detention that is ‘accompanied by the requisite threats,

intimidation, or coercion’ (quoting Venegas, 87 P.3d at 14) – ‘coercion independent

from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself’ that is ‘deliberate or

spiteful’ (quoting Shoyoye, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 959) – is a violation of the Bane Act.”

Id. 

The federal district courts are splitregarding whether Shoyoye applies to all Bane

Act claims, and whether a plaintiff bringing a Bane Act claim must introduce

independent evidence showing threats, intimidation, or coercion, in addition to

showing a constitutional violation. See Gregory v. City of Vallejo, No. 12-cv-320-

KJM-KJN, 2014 WL 5473075, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014). Some courts,

interpreting Shoyoye narrowly, have held that the essence of Shoyoye is that the Bane

Act “was not intended to redress harms ‘brought about by human error rather than

- 22 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

intentional conduct.’” Bass v. City of Fremont, No. 12-cv-4943 THE, 2013 WL

891090, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2013) (quoting Shoyoye, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 959);

see also D.V. v. City of Sunnyvale, No. 14-cv-2155-RMW, 2014 WL 4072338, at *4-5

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (noting that “the great weight of authority in the Northern

District of California has . . . confined Shoyoye to circumstances involving negligent

conduct”). Based on this reasoning, courts have applied the Bane Act to a claim of

unlawful arrest or excessive force alone. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Oakland, No.

13-cv-3094 DMR, 2014 WL 5600879, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014) (denying

summary judgment on Bane Act claimpremised on unlawful arrest and concluding that

a Bane Act claim “does not require threats, coercion, or intimidation independent from

the threats, coercion, or intimidation inherent in the alleged constitutional or statutory

violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Rodriguez v. City of

Modesto, No. 10-cv-01370-LJO, 2013 WL6415620, at *10-13 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2013)

(denying motion to dismiss because “[a] plaintiff bringing a Bane Act excessive force

need not allege a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the

use of force”). 

Other courts have held thatsomething more than an inherently coercive violation

is required for a claim under the Bane Act, and have rejected Bane Act claims based

on excessive force during or after arrests that were otherwise lawful, where plaintiffs

made no showing of coercion separate from their underlying excessive force claim.

See, e.g., Ortega, 2014 WL 6388488, at *11 (granting summary judgment on Bane Act

claim, even though genuine dispute whether deadly force was excessive, because

plaintiffs made no showing of coercion separate and apartfromtheir underlying Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendment claims); Luong v. City&County of San Francisco, No. 11-

cv-5661 MEJ, 2012 WL 5869561, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2012) (granting summary

judgment on Bane Act claim, even though genuine dispute whether force involving

officers stepping on one arrestee and throwing another arrestee against the wall was

excessive, because plaintiffs made no showing ofindependent coercion outside oftheir

- 23 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

underlying constitutional claims).

In the absence of binding authority, the Court finds persuasive the line of cases

permitting Bane Act claims based on the same conduct as an underlying constitutional

violation. Shoyoye is distinguishable on its facts. There, the plaintiff was lawfully

arrested but detained for much longer than permitted by law because of a negligent

clerical error. Shoyoye, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 951-53. In contrast, here there is a

genuine dispute whether the deadly force was deliberate and “intended to interfere

with the exercise or enjoyment of a constitutional right.” Id. at 957-58.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED with

respect to Plaintiffs’ ninth claim for violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 (Bane

Act). 

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

(1) the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 48.)

(2) the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ third claim for

right of association under the Fourteenth Amendment, fourth claim for

failure to properly train, fifth claim for failure to properly supervise, and

eighth claim for negligence premised on training and supervision 

(3) the Court DENIES summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ first claim for

excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, second claim for wrongful

death under section 1983,sixth claim for wrongful death under California

Civil Procedure § 377.60, seventh claim for battery, eighth claim for

negligence premised on Officer Walb shooting Lopez, and ninth claimfor

violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 (Bane Act)

- 24 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of

 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DATED: December 18, 2014

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

- 25 - 13cv2240-GPC-MDD

Case 3:13-cv-02240-GPC-MDD Document 56 Filed 12/18/14 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of

 25