Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00239/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00239-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MARVIN R. SWICHTENBERG, JR.,

Petitioner, 

vs.

 DORA B. SCHRIRO, ET AL., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-239-PHX-ROS (BPV)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

On January 19, 2006, Marvin R. Swichtenberg, Jr., (“Petitioner”), an inmate

confined by the State of Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by

a Person in State Custody, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). Named as Respondent in the

Petition is Dora B. Schriro. The Attorney General of the State of Arizona is named as

an additional Respondent. Respondents filed an Answer (“Answer”) to the Petition on

March 8, 2006, with exhibits A through S attached. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent

review of the record, enter an order dismissing the Petition.

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1 All exhibit references are references to the exhibits attached to the

Government's Answer to the Petition unless otherwise indicated. 

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Trial court proceedings

On March 27, 1995, a grand jury in the Superior Court of the State of Arizona,

Maricopa County, indicted Petitioner, Marvin Richard Swichtenberg, Jr., on two counts

each of sexual abuse, a Class 2 felony, and molestation of a child, a Class 3 felony.

(Ex. A.)1

 All four counts were charged as “dangerous crimes against children.” (Id.)

Petitioner entered a plea agreement with the State on June 6, 1995. Petitioner

agreed to plead guilty to Amended Counts I and II, attempted sexual abuse and

attempted molestation of a child, both Class 3 felonies, dangerous crimes against

children, and nondangerous, nonrepetitive offenses. The State agreed to dismiss Counts

III and IV. (Ex. B.) 

The parties further agreed to a stipulated sentence of 15 years in the Department

of Corrections (“DOC”) on Count I and lifetime probation on Count II. The parties also

stipulated that Petitioner would abide by all sex offender terms and conditions of

probation, and would have no contact with the victim unless approved by the Adult

Probation Department. (Id.) 

The plea was entered and accepted before the trial court on June 6, 1995. (Ex.

C, D.) On August 4, 1995, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to the stipulated sentence

of fifteen years in DOC on Count 1, with 140 days credit for presentence incarceration.

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to lifetime supervised probation on Count II, to

begin running upon his release from DOC. (Ex. F, G.) The trial court informed

Petitioner at the time of sentencing that he had ninety days with which to file for postconviction relief. (Ex. F, p. 8.) 

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2 It is not clear if the trial court was not aware of Petitioner's Motion to

Appoint Counsel, or misconstrued the motion. 

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First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Petitioner filed a pro per petition for post-conviction relief in state court on April

30, 1996. (Ex. H.) Petitioner also moved for the appointment of counsel on the

petition. (Petitioner's Motion to Show Equitable Tolling, Ex. A, B.) The trial court

noted that the petition was untimely, but ordered that the petition be processed on the

issues of whether the failure to file a timely petition was without fault on Petitioner's

part. (Ex. I.) The trial court further ordered granting the Petitioner's request to proceed

pro se2

, and was advised that an amended petition, if any, was to be filed within sixty

days. (Id.) 

On August 13, 1996, the trial court granted Petitioner an additional 30 days to

fil an amended petition. (Ex. J.) On October 9, 1996, the trial court considered

Petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File an Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief and entered an order granting the motion and granting the Petitioner's

request for preparation of the record. (Ex. K.) On November 26, 1996, the trial court

ordered the court reporters to prepare transcripts of the change of plea hearings and

sentencing hearings. (Ex. L.) 

On September 25, 1997, the trial court noted that seven months had elapsed since

the transcripts had been prepared and filed and no amended Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief had been filed. (Ex. M.) The trial court dismissed the post-conviction relief

proceeding for failure of Petitioner to prosecute. (Id.) 

Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief on August 10, 2001. (Ex. N.)

On August 27, 2001, the trial court dismissed the successive notice, stating that all of

Petitioner's claims should have been raised in the prior post-conviction relief

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proceeding, and Petitioner is therefore precluded from further relief pursuant to Rule

32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Ex. O.) 

Petition for Review

 Petitioner's Petition for Review was denied without opinion on September 11,

2002. (Ex. P.) 

Third Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Petitioner filed a third petition for post-conviction relief in state court on October

15, 2005. (Ex. Q.) 

The trial court dismissed the petition, finding the claims precluded from relief

pursuant to Rule 32.2(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, because the claims

either were or should have been raised in the first Rule 32 of-right proceedings. (Ex.

R.) 

Second Petition for Review

 Petitioner's Petition for Review of the trial court's denial of the third petition for

post-conviction relief was denied without opinion on January 28, 2005. (Ex. S.) 

Petitioner filed the present Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 19,

2006 (Document # 1). Respondents filed an Answer on March 8, 2006. (Document #

7.) On May 1, 2006, Petitioner submitted a Motion to Show Equitable Tolling and

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Non-Applicability" (Document # 10),

construed by this Court as a Reply. 

DISCUSSION

The writ of habeas corpus is available to “a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The District

Courts’s standard of review is described as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted

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with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Timeliness

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1).

The running of this one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state

convictions is tolled during any period when "a properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending" in any state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, the statute of

limitations is tolled during the pendency of a state court action for post-conviction

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Equitable tolling may be available even after the statute of limitations period has

expired if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible

to file a petition on time." Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,

1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.,

163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)(en banc). The Ninth Circuit has noted that determinations

of "whether there are grounds for equitable tolling are highly fact dependent."

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000)(en banc). 

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3 Although Respondents concede that the first petition for postconviction relief tolled the statutory limitations period, the trial court

found the petition “untimely,” although the trial court ultimately

dismissed the petition for “failure to prosecute.” Because this Court

finds that, even if the petition were not “properly pending” for

purposes of statutory tolling of the limitations period, the period

would be equitably tolled for the grounds set forth in Petitioner's

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Equitable tolling is appropriate only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time, and is unavailable in

most cases. Miranda v. Castro 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999) and Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288). The

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under the AEDPA is very high.

Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1066 (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th

Cir. 2000)). 

Analysis

The Magistrate Judge finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the Petition filed in

this Court is untimely. Petitioner had until one year after his conviction became final

to file his federal petition. 

Petitioner's conviction became final on August 4, 1995, the day Petitioner was

sentenced by the trial court. See Ariz.R.Cri.P. 17.1(e); Isley v. Arizona Dept. of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th cir. 2004) (Conviction becomes final at

sentencing because entry of guilty plea waives right to appeal under Arizona law.) 

For petitioners whose convictions became final before passage of the AEDPA,

the one-year period began running on April 25, 1996, the day after the statute's effective

date, and expired on April 24, 1997, unless it was tolled. See Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 217 (2002). 

The limitations period began running on April 25, 1996 and ran for 4 days until

it was tolled on April 30, 1996, when Petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction

relief3

. The tolling period ended when the petition was denied on September 25, 1997,

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reply, this Court does not address the issue of whether the

Respondents correctly calculated the period as statutorily tolled. 

4 Because Petitioner's subsequent petition was not limited to an

elaboration of the facts related to the claims in the first petition, the

second petition for post conviction relief constitutes a new round, and

the gap between the denial of the first petition and the new petition

is not tolled. See King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (New

petition construed as part of the first full round if the petitioner is

simply attempting to correct deficiencies attendant to the first

petition.) 

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and the limitations period began running on September 26, 1997.4

 The limitations

period ended 361 days later, on September 21, 1998. 

The second petition for post-conviction relief was filed on August 10, 2001, after

the limitations period had already lapsed. The filing of the second petition could not

restart the statute of limitations because it had already lapsed. Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner argues as grounds for equitable tolling that the trial court failed to

appoint counsel or rule on the merits of Petitioner's first petition for post-conviction

relief. 

Petitioner does not make a sufficient showing that these are “extraordinary

circumstances” that caused the untimely filing of his Petition. Petitioner filed his

federal Petition more than seven years beyond the limitations period. The record

indicates that Petitioner was in possession of his legal files and the court ordered

transcripts. Petitioner failed to challenge the trial court's failure to appoint counsel, and

although the trial court was willing to consider and address the untimeliness issues

surrounding the first petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner, after requesting

motions for extension of time to submit documents, failed to do so. Had Petitioner

believed the trial court failed to appoint counsel in error, or even dismissed the petition

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in error, the time for Petitioner to raise those concerns was at the time the trial court

ruled, not eight years later before the District Court. 

Even if Petitioner requested counsel to file a notice of post-conviction relief, and

even if the trial court failed to appoint counsel for the purposes of filing a petition for

post-conviction relief, and this would constitute extraordinary circumstances; the record

demonstrates that Petitioner did not act with reasonable diligence during the entire

period that he wishes to have tolled. 

This Court finds equitable tolling appropriate for the four days that elapsed

between April 24, 1996 and April 30, 1996, and, further, throughout the period in which

his first petition for post-conviction relief was pending, thus extending the limitations

period until September 25, 1998. Petitioner has failed to make a sufficient showing,

however, that “extraordinary circumstances” and reasonable diligence warrant further

equitable tolling of AEDPA's statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that the Petition is time-barred. The

Magistrate Judge does not reach the Petitioner's or Respondent's alternate arguments

concerning procedural default or the merits of this case. 

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order DISMISSING the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(B), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the

parties should use the following case number: CV 06-0239-PHX-ROS.

DATED this 14th day of September, 2006.

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