Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-md-02670/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-md-02670-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:0001 Antitrust Litigation (Monopolizing Trade)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: PACKAGED SEAFOOD 

PRODUCTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION

Case No.: 15-MD-2670 JLS (MDD)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Presently before the Court are:

(1) Defendant Thai Union Group PCL’s Motion to Dismiss (“TUG MTD”) (ECF No. 

205) all claims asserted against Thai Union in the: (a) Consolidated Amended 

Complaint of Direct Action Plaintiffs (“DAP Compl.”) (ECF No. 152); (b) 

Consolidated Class Complaint of Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs (“DPP Compl.”) (ECF 

No. 147); (c) Consolidated Class Action Complaint of Indirect Purchaser Commercial 

Food Preparers Class (“CFP Compl.”) (ECF No. 153); (d) Amended Complaint of 

Direct Action “Kroger” Plaintiffs (“Kroger Compl.”) (The Kroger Co. et al. v. Bumble 

Bee Foods LLC et al., 16-cv-51-JLS (MDD), ECF No. 19); (e) Amended Complaint 

of Direct Action Plaintiffs Meijer, Inc. and Meijer Distribution, Inc. (“Meijer 

Compl.”) (Meijer, Inc. et al. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, et al., 16-cv-398-JLS (MDD), 

ECF No. 11); (f) Amended Complaint of Direct Action Plaintiff Publix Super 

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Markets, Inc. and Wakefern Food Corp. (“Publix Compl.”) (Publix Super Markets, 

Inc. et al. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC et al., 16-cv-247-JLS (MDD), ECF No. 12); and 

(g) Direct Action Plaintiff Winn-Dixie Stores and Bi-Lo Holding, LLC’s First 

Amended Complaint (“Winn-Dixie Compl.”) (ECF No. 151);

(2) Defendant Dongwon Enterprise Co., Ltd.’s Motion to Dismiss (“Dongwon Enter. 

MTD”) (ECF No. 206) all claims against Dongwon Industries and Dongwon 

Enterprise in the: (a) CFP Complaint; (b) DPP Complaint; (c) Kroger Complaint; (d) 

Meijer Complaint; (e) Publix Complaint; (f) Wegmans Amended Complaint 

(“Wegmans Compl.”) (Wegmans Food Markets, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC et 

al., 16-cv-264-JLS (MDD), ECF No. 11); (g) Affiliated Foods First Amended 

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (“Affiliated Foods Compl.”) (ECF No. 152); 

and (h) Winn-Dixie Complaint;

(3) Defendants StarKist Co.’s, Dongwon Enterprise Co., Ltd.’s, Bumble Bee Foods, 

LLC’s, Tri-Union Seasfoods, LLC’s, Thai Union Group PCL’s, and Del Monte Foods 

Company’s Joint Motion to Dismiss1(“Joint MTD”) (ECF No. 207) without further 

leave to amend the: (a) DPP Complaint; (b) CFP Complaint; (c) Consolidated Class 

Action Complaint of the Indirect Purchaser End Payer Plaintiffs (“EPP Compl.”) 

(ECF No. 149); (d) Affiliated Foods’ Complaint; (e) Wegmans Complaint; (f) Meijer 

Complaint; (g) Kroger Complaint; (h) Publix Complaint; (i) Winn-Dixie Complaint; 

(j) Plaintiff W. Lee Flowers & Co., Inc.’s Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 

(“Flowers Compl.”) (W. Lee Flowers & Co. v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, et al., 16-cv1226-JLS (MDD));

 

1 This Joint Motion to Dismiss is supported by four distinct briefs: (i) Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of Joint Motion to Dismiss All Complaints (“Twombly Br.”) (ECF No. 207-2); (ii) 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

Complaints for Lack of Standing (“Standing Br.”) (ECF No. 207-3); (iii) Memorandum of Point sand 

Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss Various Claims as Time Barred (“SoL 

Br.”) (ECF No. 207-4); and (iv) Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Joint 

Motion to Dismiss the Indirect Purchaser End Payer Plaintiffs’ and Indirect Purchaser Commercial Food 

Preparers’ Consolidated Class Action Complaints (“State Law Br.”) (ECF No. 207-5).

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(4) Defendant Dongwon Industries Co., Ltd.’s Motion to Dismiss (“Dongwon Indus. 

MTD”) (ECF No. 220) the Wegmans Complaint;

(5) DPPs’ Omnibus Opposition to Motions to Dismiss (“DPP Opp’n”) (ECF No. 226) 

above labeled as: (a) Joint MTD regarding the (i) Twombly Brief, (ii) Standing Brief, 

and (iii) SoL Brief; and (b) TUG MTD;

(6) CFPs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Collective Motion to 

Dismiss Complaint (“CFP Opp’n”) (ECF No. 227) above labeled as the: (a) Joint 

MTD regarding the (i) Twombly Brief, (ii) Standing Brief, (iii) SoL Brief, and (iv) 

State Law Brief; and (b) TUG MTD;

(7) Affiliated Foods Plaintiffs’ Opposition to (“Affiliated Foods Opp’n”) (ECF No. 228) 

the above-labeled Motions to Dismiss: (a) Joint MTD regarding the (i) Twombly Brief, 

(ii) Standing Brief, and (iii) SoL Brief; (b) TUG MTD; and (c) Dongwon Enterprise 

MTD;

(8) Certain Direct Action Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to 

Dismiss (“Certain DAPs Opp’n”) (ECF No. 229) above labeled as the: (a) TUG MTD; 

(b) Dongwon Enterprise MTD; (c) Joint MTD regarding the (i) Twombly Brief; and 

(d) Dongwon Industries MTD;

(9) Winn-Dixie Plaintiffs’ Opposition (“Winn-Dixie Opp’n”) (ECF No. 230) to the: (a) 

Joint MTD regarding the (i) Twombly Brief, (ii) Standing Brief, and (iii) SoL Brief; 

and (b) TUG MTD;

(10) EPPs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint 

Motions to Dismiss (“EPP Opp’n”) above labeled as the Joint MTD regarding the (i) 

Twombly Brief, (ii) Standing Brief, (iii) SoL Brief, and (iv) State Law Brief;

(11) Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ Complaints Against Dongwon Industries Co., Ltd. and Dongwon 

Enterprise Co., Ltd. (“Dongwon Reply”) (ECF No. 233);

(12) Defendant TUG PCL’s Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (“TUG Reply”) 

(ECF No. 235);

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(13) Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Joint Motion 

to Dismiss All Complaints (“Twombly Reply”) (ECF No. 236);

(14) Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion 

to Dismiss Various Claims as Time Barred (“SoL Reply”) (ECF No. 237);

(15) Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion 

to Dismiss EPPs’ and CFPs’ Consolidated Class Action Complaints (“State Law

Reply”) (ECF No. 238);

(16) Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaints for Lack of Standing (“Standing Reply”) (ECF No. 

239).

This Order is the first of two addressing the issues raised by these Defendants’ 

motions to dismiss as set forth above. See infra pp. 5–6.

BACKGROUND

In 2015, dozens of actions were instituted in federal district courts across the nation 

seeking various forms of relief relying on the same factual predicate: an alleged antitrust 

conspiracy, in violation of the Sherman Act and state antitrust laws, regarding packaged 

seafood products. See generally Transfer Order (ECF No. 1). On December 9, 2015 the 

United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized pretrial proceedings (“In 

re Packaged Seafoods Antitrust Litigation”) to this Court in the Southern District of 

California. (Id. at 1–2 (“The vast majority of the related actions are already pending in this 

district, most before Judge Janis L. Sammartino, who has the related cases before her.”).)

Several weeks later, the United States Government intervened in the action, noting 

that “[a] federal grand jury empanelled in the Northern District of California is 

investigating potential violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, in the packaged 

seafood industry.” (U.S. Notice of Mot. to Intervene 1, ECF No. 34.) The Court 

subsequently held several status conferences, (ECF Nos. 43, 108), appointed interim lead 

counsel, and set the leadership structure for purposes of pretrial proceedings, (ECF No. 

119). In so doing, the Court divided the Plaintiffs into four groups:

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 Direct Action Plaintiffs (“DAPs”), who are direct purchasers proceeding 

against Defendants individually;

 Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs (“DPPs”), who are direct purchasers 

proceeding on behalf of a putative class;

 Indirect Purchaser Commercial Food Preparer Plaintiffs (“CFPs”), 

who are indirect purchasers proceeding on behalf of a putative class; and

 Indirect Purchaser End Payer Plaintiffs (“EPPs”), who are indirect 

purchasers proceeding on behalf of a putative class.

(Order Appointing Interim Lead Counsel 1–2, ECF No. 119.) 

Several months later, Plaintiffs, Defendants, and the United States entered into a 

joint stipulation regarding a limited stay of discovery, in effect until December 31, 2016, 

(Joint Stipulation re: Limited Stay of Discovery 1–3, ECF No. 130), which the Court 

approved, (ECF No. 137). Despite this limited stay, both Plaintiffs and Defendants agreed 

to the filing of amended complaints and motions to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 138, 142.) On 

November 21, 2016, Plaintiffs, Defendants, and the United States entered into a second 

joint stipulation regarding a limited day of discovery, in effect for many factual matters 

until March 31, 2017, and in effect for all party depositions until September 30, 2017. 

(Joint Stipulation re: Second Limited Stay of Discovery 1–3, ECF No. 256.) The Court 

and the parties conferred at a November 29, 2016 Status Conference, (ECF Nos. 257, 262),

and decided to bifurcate oral argument on the Motions to Dismiss according to the 

classification of “federal” versus “state” issues. The federal issues—which are the subject 

of this Order—encompass (1) the sufficiency of all relevant Plaintiffs’ allegations under 

the Sherman Act for monetary damages; (2) the sufficiency of all relevant Plaintiffs’ 

allegations under the Sherman Act for injunctive relief; (3) all relevant Plaintiffs’ standing 

to prosecute non-tuna claims; and (4) all statue-of-limitations issues related to the Sherman 

Act claims. The state-law issues—which will be the subject of the subsequent oral 

argument and corresponding Order—encompass (1) the sufficiency of all relevant 

Plaintiffs’ allegations under the various state-law causes of action; (2) the legal 

permissibility of all relevant Plaintiffs’ attempt to bring claims on behalf of a nationwide 

California class; (3) all relevant Plaintiffs’ lack of standing under various state-law 

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standards; (4) all statute-of-limitations issues related to the various state-law causes of 

action; and (5) the sufficiency of relevant Plaintiffs’ allegations of Defendants Dongwon’s 

and TUG’s (a) direct participation in the alleged conspiracy, or (b) alter ego or agency 

liability under the alleged conspiracy.

Six days prior to the scheduled hearing on the federal issues, the United States 

submitted a filing to “inform[] the Court that the first criminal case in the packaged-seafood 

investigation has been filed in the Northern District of California.” (U.S.’ Status Report re 

Information Filed in N.D. Cal. 1, ECF No. 268.) 

The Court held oral argument concerning the federal issues on December 13, 2016, 

(Tr. of Mot. Hr’g (“Hr’g Tr.”), ECF No. 276), and thereafter took the matters under 

submission. After considering all parties’ arguments and the law, the Court rules as 

follows. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint 

states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Nor does 

a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

/ / /

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“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 

when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not 

to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that 

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

557). Further, the Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained in the 

complaint. Id. This review requires context-specific analysis involving the Court’s 

“judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted). “[W]here the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, 

the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” 

Id. 

Where a complaint does not survive 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court will grant leave to 

amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent with the challenged 

pleading . . . [will] cure the deficiency.” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 

658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schriber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 

1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)).

ANALYSIS

Defendants effectively assert three overarching arguments relevant to the federal 

issues addressed in this Order: (1) all Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible conspiracy claim 

under relevant Sherman Act provisions, as to (a) packaged seafoods generally; (b) tuna 

specifically; and (c) an entitlement to injunctive relief; (2) CFPs, DPPs, EPPs, and various 

DAPs all fail to adequately establish Article III standing regarding their “packaged

seafood” (i.e., non-tuna-based) claims; and (3) all Plaintiffs’ claims that accrued prior to 

2011 are time barred because (a) in the Ninth Circuit the injury, rather than discovery, rule 

applies to Sherman Act claims, and (b) no Plaintiffs’ allegations are saved by the tolling 

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doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Analysis here follows the above outline, addressing 

in each corresponding section the various sub-arguments raised by the above overarching 

arguments.

I. Twombly/Iqbal and Failure to Adequately Plead a Plausible Conspiracy Under 

the Sherman Act

Plaintiffs together claim various violations of section one of the Sherman Act, which 

declares illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 

conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1. 

The essential elements of such a cause of action are: “(1) an agreement among two or more 

persons or distinct business entities; (2) which is intended to harm or unreasonably restrain 

competition; and (3) which actually causes injury to competition.” Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. 

v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 844 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Defendants StarKist Co., Dongwon Enterprise Co., Ltd., Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, 

Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, Thai Union Group PCL, and Del Monte Foods Company 

(together, “Twombly Defendants”) move to dismiss all Plaintiffs’ Complaints under 

Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a plausible conspiracy under the 

Sherman Act. (Twombly Br. 1–2.) Specifically, the Twombly Defendants argue that 

Plaintiffs have failed to show the required element of an agreement. (See Twombly Br. 5–

6; Codding, 615 F.2d at 844.) The Twombly Defendants—except for Tri-Union Seafoods, 

LLC and Thai Union Group PCL, (Joint Notice of Mot. and Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Compls. 

1 n.1, ECF No. 207)—argue that Plaintiffs fail to prove either (a) a packaged seafood 

conspiracy or (b) a tuna-only conspiracy; additionally, all Twombly Defendants argue that 

(c) Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege entitlement to injunctive relief. (See Twombly Br. i.) 

The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Failure to Plead a Packaged Seafood Conspiracy

The DPP, EPP, CFP, and DAPs Affiliated Foods, Winn-Dixie, and Flowers 

Complaints allege that Defendants conspired to “raise, fix, stabilize, or maintain prices in 

the market for shelf-stable packaged seafood” within the United States. (Affiliated Foods 

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¶ 1; see DPP Compl. ¶ 1; EPP Compl. ¶ 2; CFP Compl. ¶ 1; Winn-Dixie Compl. ¶ 1; 

Flowers Compl. ¶ 1.) EPP and Affiliated Foods Plaintiffs more specifically define the 

market for shelf-stable packaged seafood as including tuna, clams, crab, mackerel, oysters,

salmon, sardines, and shrimp, (see EPP ¶ 1; Affiliated Foods ¶ 1); the remaining Plaintiffs 

merely note that the market includes shelf-stable seafood products 

(predominately/specifically/principally tuna) that are sold in cans, pouches, or ready-to-eat 

serving packages, (see DPP Compl. ¶ 1 (“principal[ly]”); CFP Compl. ¶ 1 

(“predominately”); Winn-Dixie Compl. ¶ 1 (“predominately”); Flowers Compl. ¶¶ 1–2 

(“specifically”)).

In support of their Joint Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that in each complaint 

the above packaged seafood allegations stand alone; i.e., “not a single Plaintiff has even 

attempted to allege any collusive conduct regarding any type of packaged seafood product 

other than tuna.” (Twombly Br. 1; see Twombly Reply 8.) In response, Plaintiffs first frame 

the inquiry with generous legal statements, urging that “there simply is no requirement that 

an antitrust plaintiff draw the boundaries of the alleged conspiracy (or conspiracies) in a 

complaint with the precision of a diamond cutter.” (DPP Opp’n 10 (quoting In re 

Capacitors Antitrust Litig. (“Capacitors”), 106 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2015)); 

Winn-Dixie Opp’n 15 (quoting same Capacitors language); Affiliated Foods Opp’n 12 

(also quoting Capacitors); CFP Opp’n 10–12 (“Though the complaint focuses on tuna, it 

contains sufficient allegations to create an inference of a larger conspiracy.”).) Factually, 

Plaintiffs argue that (1) Defendant Bumble Bee, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the 

DOJ at times refer to “the packaged seafood industry” or “shelf-stable seafood products” 

as a category (of which canned tuna is a segment of that category);2(2) Defendant TUG, 

 

2 At the hearing, several Plaintiffs noted that the United States’ communication regarding the recent 

criminal filing—and, indeed, the criminal filing itself—describes the first criminal case as concerning “the 

packaged-seafood industry . . . .” (E.g., Hr’g Tr. 18:7–12; see also U.S.’ Status Report re Information 

Filed in N.D. Cal 1; Notice of Suppl. Information Relevant to Defs.’ Joint Mots. to Dismiss and Pls.’ 

Opp’ns to Same, Ex A, 2–4, ECF No. 269-1.) However, as Defendants noted, a plea in that case has not 

yet been finalized and, more importantly, relying on any aspect of the criminal filing would be external to 

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both in a letter to the Bangkok stock exchange and in the September 16, 2015 minutes of 

an Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders held by TUG, noted that the DOJ was 

investigating the “packaged seafood industry” as a whole; (3) that DOJ investigator Bauer, 

in announcing the abandonment of Defendants CotS’s and Bumble Bee’s merger, noted 

that the DOJ “investigation convinced [the DOJ]—and the parties knew or should have 

known from the get go—that the market is not functioning competitively today[;]” (4) the 

economic data which analyze “tuna together with other shelf-stable seafood show[]

suspicious price fluctuations that occurred across these other products[;]” and (5) the entire 

packaged seafood industry was vulnerable to collusion, and no complaints reveal any 

“reason to segregate tuna from an overall market that bears all the hallmark features of one 

that is vulnerable to collusion.” (E.g., DPP Opp’n 10; CPP Opp’n 11–12.)3 

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Capacitors as a framing device is 

misplaced. At issue in the specific Capacitors order cited by Plaintiffs, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 

1061, were the defendants’ motions to dismiss both the direct and the indirect purchaser 

plaintiffs’ complaints, in part due to the disparate “one vs. two conspiracy theories” 

respectively alleged in the DPP and IPP complaint. However, those partially dissonant 

complaints overlapped in many of their allegations—including identifying the same 

alleged key players—regardless whether the ultimate allegation was that the key players 

engaged in one overarching conspiracy or instead two smaller conspiracies. Id. at 1063–

64. Further, the “diamond cutter” line several Plaintiffs cite is supported by a sole citation 

to In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litigation (“Batteries I”), No. 13–MD–2420 YGR, 

 

the complaints currently before the Court and therefore improper within the context of the pending 

12(b)(6) motions.

3 Plaintiffs also note the purported leniency applicant in the DOJ investigation and “that the issuance of 

criminal subpoenas by the DOJ will normally be authorized ‘if a grand jury investigation developed 

evidence concerning the alleged anticompetitive conduct.’” (DPP Opp’n 12 (quoting DPP Compl. ¶ 66.)) 

As the Court later addresses, the DOJ investigation and the purported leniency applicant support only the 

inference of a general conspiracy, and thus has no bearing on analysis here regarding the specifics of a 

packaged seafood conspiracy. See infra Section I.B.ii.

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2014 WL 309192, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (“The question in this case is not whether 

any conspiracy existed, only how far it reached. That question is ultimately one of fact, and 

cannot be resolved in the present procedural posture, where the Court tests only the 

sufficiency of the pleadings.”), a case where the plaintiffs’ pleadings specifically alleged 

“certain defendants’ actual agreements to refrain from competing on price[,]” and the Court 

had the benefit of documents “produced to the grand jury and then turned over to Plaintiffs” 

and “criminal guilty pleas entered by two defendants . . . .” Id.

In the present case, there is no question that the factual circumstances are 

distinguishable. True, like Capacitors, here there are disparate conspiracy allegations 

(some complaints encompass only tuna and other complaints the entire collection of 

packaged seafood products). However, unlike Capacitors, where there were specific 

allegations regarding the defendants’ participation in both disparate conspiracies, here 

Plaintiffs have put forth specific allegations almost principally regarding tuna and ask the 

Court to draw the inference that there is no reason to segregate tuna from the overall 

packaged seafood market. This is improper. A conspiracy requires an agreement, and 

Plaintiffs have not alleged any agreement—inferential or direct—between the Defendants 

to fix prices across the entire packaged seafood industry. The DOJ investigation and 

alleged leniency applicant have no bearing on this inquiry, see infra Section I.B.ii, and 

Plaintiffs’ remaining allegations simply do not hurdle the Twombly bar to alleging a 

packaged-seafood-wide conspiracy. The economic data analyzing packaged seafood price 

fluctuations are insufficient standing on their own to suggest collusion (and furthermore

includes tuna within their calculations, thus further attenuating any alleged inference of 

packaged-seafood-wide collusion). (See DPP Compl. ¶¶ 58–59.) And sufficient 

allegations of a tuna-specific conspiracy, even taken with Plaintiffs other packaged seafood 

allegations, do not therefore suggest an agreement encompassing all of the products within 

the packaged seafood classification. Unlike capacitors, which in any form are fundamental 

to almost all manufactured electronics, packaged seafood as a category includes many 

different types of sea creatures which vary—non-exhaustively—in price, availability, taste,

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and potential for consumer allergies. 4 In short, sufficient allegations of a tuna-specific 

conspiracy do not on these facts therefore create a correspondingly viable conspiracy 

encompassing the entire packaged seafood product category.

Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that no Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a 

packaged-seafood conspiracy as to Defendants StarKist Co., Dongwon Enterprise Co., 

Ltd., Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, and Del Monte Foods Company. However, because 

Defendants Thai Union Group and Tri-Union Seafoods did not bring a motion to dismiss 

on this ground, all Plaintiffs claims of a packaged-seafood conspiracy relating to these two 

Defendants are still live pending resolution of the second-half of the pending motions to 

dismiss.5

B. Failure to Plead a Tuna-Specific Conspiracy

Defendants move to dismiss all Plaintiffs’ Complaints for failure to state a plausible 

tuna-specific conspiracy. (Twombly Br. 11.) Defendants broadly assert that (1) Plaintiffs’ 

allegations amount to “nothing more than parallel conduct[;]” (2) opportunities to collude 

do not support an inference of conspiracy; (3) allegations that an industry is conducive to 

 

4 At oral argument Plaintiffs also suggested In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litigation (“Airline 

Travel”), __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2016 WL 6426366 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2016), bolsters the proposition that 

Plaintiffs’ packaged-seafood allegations are sufficient. (See Hr’g Tr. 21:22–26:13.) However, despite 

being external to our circuit, Airline Travel serves as an excellent example of why Plaintiffs’ complaints 

here fail to state a valid industry-wide conspiracy. The Airline Travel plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy 

regarding “air passenger transportation services within the United States, its territories, and the District of 

Columbia . . . .” Id. at *2. As factual support, the plaintiffs alleged that airline industry leaders had 

“discussed the importance of focusing on capacity within the industry[,]” that despite the economy 

improving and jet-fuel cost falling the defendants “made a conscious, joint decision not to return to the 

previous industry practice of adding airline capacity and decreasing fares,” and that ultimately the 

conspiracy “resulted in a 10% reduction in capacity by United States airlines in 2009.” Id. at *7 (emphases 

added). The Airline Travel Court thus concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims were “not limited to certain 

routes or city-pairs[,]” id., but instead alleged “a system-wide conspiracy to limit capacity in order to drive 

up fares within the nationwide air passenger transportation market[,]” id. at 12. And in so concluding the 

Airline Travel Court relied on precisely the type of industry-wide allegations Plaintiffs’ complaints here 

lack. 

5 Specifically, Thai Union Group has separately moved for dismissal as to all complaints under Federal 

Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) because “Thai Union is not sufficiently alleged to have actually conspired or 

otherwise violated the antitrust laws.” (TUG MTD 1.) 

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collusion do not support a conspiracy claim; (4) a conspiracy cannot be inferred from a 

DOJ investigation; and (5) references to prior unrelated litigation and foreign antitrust 

violations do not support an inference of conspiracy. (Id. at i.) All Plaintiffs oppose these 

arguments, often asserting that Defendants lump all of Plaintiffs’ Complaints together and 

that the Court instead must consider each Plaintiff’s Complaint on its own merits. (See, 

e.g., DPP Opp’n 14, 14 n.9; Affiliated Foods Opp’n 1–2, 2 n.5; Certain DAPs Opp’n 2; 

Winn-Dixie Opp’n 3, 3 n.3; EPP Opp’n 2, 11–12.) However, common to all complaints 

except the Flowers Complaint are the following allegations: (1) the pending DOJ 

investigation and (2) the purported leniency applicant; and that Defendants colluded 

regarding (3) tuna can-size changes and tuna list-price increases; (4) the scope of tunarelated promotional activity; and (5) a joint refusal to offer FAD-free tuna for sale under 

their respective brands. (DPP Compl. ¶¶ 56–84; EPP Compl. ¶¶ 98–119; CFP Compl. 

¶¶ 58–73; Affiliated Foods Compl. ¶¶ 58–83, 90–94; Wegmans Compl. ¶¶ 60–73; Meijer 

Compl. ¶¶ 59–73; Kroger Compl. ¶¶ 63–77; Publix Compl. ¶¶ 60–74; Winn-Dixie Compl. 

¶¶ 44–54, 30–38.) Accordingly, if these allegations together are sufficient to suggest a 

plausible tuna-specific conspiracy, the Court may deny almost in total Defendants’ Joint 

MTD on this point. The Court therefore considers these allegations first.

(i) Pending DOJ Investigation

The Court first addresses Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the pending DOJ 

investigation and purported leniency applicant. (E.g., DPP Compl. ¶¶ 60–68.) As an initial 

matter, Defendants argue that “[i]t is undisputed that government investigations ‘carr[y] no 

weight in pleading an antitrust conspiracy claim.’” (Twombly Br. 32 (quoting In re 

Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig. (“GPU”), 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1024 (N.D. 

Cal. 2007) (second alteration in original)).) Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that at the very 

least government investigations may bolster the sufficiency of additional conspiracy 

allegations. (E.g., DPP Opp’n 12.) The Court recognizes the limitations of and caution 

required in relying on a pending investigation to support the validity of an alleged

/ / /

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conspiracy, but nonetheless agrees with Plaintiffs that a pending investigation may bolster 

additional allegations.

There are problems with relying solely or too heavily on pending government 

investigations in analyzing the sufficiency of a conspiracy complaint. “It is unknown 

whether the investigation will result in indictments or nothing at all. Because of the grand 

jury’s secrecy requirement, the scope of the investigation is pure speculation. It may be 

broader or narrower than the allegations at issue.” GPU, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 1024. 

However, this does not mean that any pending government investigation always has zero 

bearing on a corresponding civil conspiracy allegation. See In re Tableware Antitrust 

Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“A plaintiff may surely rely on 

governmental investigations, but must also, under FRCP 11, undertake his own reasonable 

inquiry and frame his complaint with allegations of his own design.”); Starr v. Sony BMG 

Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 324 (2d Cir. 2010) (considering “a pending investigation by 

the New York State Attorney General and two separate investigations by the Department 

of Justice” in holistic analysis of the sufficiency of a corresponding civil complaint). 

In the present case, as noted by Plaintiffs, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division Manual 

explicitly states that prior to requesting a grand jury investigation “staff should consider 

carefully the likelihood that, if a grand jury investigation developed evidence confirming 

the alleged anticompetitive conduct, the Division would proceed with a criminal 

prosecution.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. MANUAL § F.1 (5th ed. Apr. 2015), 

available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761141/download. This includes a 

requirement that staff “prepare a memorandum on behalf of the section or field office chief 

to the DAAG [(Deputy Assistant Attorney General)] for Operations, the Criminal DAAG, 

and the Director of Criminal Enforcement detailing the information forming the basis of 

the request.” Id. Within the context of a motion to dismiss, the inquiry is whether a 

Plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual material to “unlock the doors of discovery . . . .” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, it would be improper to draw a conclusion that a 

pending government investigation on its own supplies sufficient factual material to survive 

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a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. However, it is perfectly permissible to take as true the fact

that a government investigation has been instituted, and that therefore at least several 

individuals within the governmental chain of command thought certain facts warranted 

further inquiry into a potential criminal conspiracy. Framed in this manner, and here 

supported by the additional allegations that several Defendants have admitted to receiving 

criminal subpoenas, (e.g., DPP Compl. ¶¶ 62–63), and of a DOJ press release regarding an 

abandoned merger between CotS and Bumble Bee which noted that the Antitrust 

Division’s “investigation convinced us—and the parties knew or should have known from 

the get go—that the market is not functioning competitively today, and further 

consolidation would only make things worse[,]” Chicken of the Sea and Bumble Bee 

Abandon Tuna Merger After Justice Department Expresses Serious Concerns, DEP’T OF 

JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Dec. 3, 2015), 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chicken-sea-and-bumble-bee-abandon-tuna-merger-afterjustice-department-expresses-serious, the Court thus may validly consider the pending 

DOJ investigation in concert with Plaintiffs’ other allegations.

(ii) Purported Leniency Applicant

Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree as to whether the existence of a purported 

leniency applicant may properly be considered by the Court in evaluating the sufficiency 

of Plaintiffs’ complaints. (Compare, e.g., DPP Opp’n 12–14, with, e.g., Twombly Br. 33.) 

However, the Court need not determine this issue. Plaintiffs have not identified a single 

news source detailing the existence of a leniency applicant that actually provides any proof 

of such applicant. In fact, the first report of a leniency applicant in this case came directly 

from counsel for one of the Plaintiffs. Hausfeld Partner Christopher Lebsock on Criminal 

Price Fixing in the Tuna Industry, CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER (Sept. 29, 2015 7:10 AM) 

(counsel noting “[o]ften in criminal antitrust cases, one of the companies will come in as 

an amnesty applicant,” and saying “I have a feeling, and this is just my speculation, that 

Tri-Union is the amnesty applicant”), 

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on-criminal-price-fixing-in-the-tuna-industry; see also Tom Seaman, Lawyer in Tuna 

Price Fixing Suits: DOJ Focuses on “Most Culpable” Execs, UNDERCURRENT NEWS (July 

25, 2016 5:21 PM) (“The complaint for the direct buyers’ section of the class action, which 

Lebsock’s firm Hausfeld are representing, indicates the DOJ likely has an amnesty 

applicant.” (emphasis added)), https://www.undercurrentnews.com/2016/07/25/lawyer-intuna-price-fixing-suits-doj-focuses-on-most-culpable-execs. The only news story 

Plaintiffs identify that does not directly rely on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s or complaints’ 

assertion of a leniency applicant is an October 13, 2015 article6—fourteen days after

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s assertion of a leniency applicant—that substantiates its leniencyapplicant claims by saying the publication “has learned” and that “[i]t is understood . . . .” 

Joshua Sisco and Leah Nylen, Chicken of the Sea Applies for Leniency in DOJ Packaged 

Seafood Probe, MLEX MARKET INSIGHT (Oct. 13, 2015), 

http://mlexmarketinsight.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/MLex_The-Best-of-2015-

Reduced-Size2.pdf.

Given the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ leniency-applicant allegation ultimately amounts 

only to an unsubstantiated conclusion that there has been a leniency applicant in the present 

case. The Court need not accept this conclusion as true, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and 

therefore need not consider whether the actual existence of a leniency applicant would 

affect the Court’s analysis as to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ conspiracy allegations.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

 

6 Several Plaintiffs noted this article in their complaint (DPP Compl. ¶ 66; Winn-Dixie Compl. ¶ 36), and 

counsel for DPPs additionally flagged the article at oral argument in response to one of the Court’s 

questions. (Hr’g Tr. 27:24–28:14.) At oral argument, counsel for DPPs additionally noted that subsequent 

to the relevant filings “we have been provided information. That information has been provided to us in 

a way that we agreed to take some information without disclosing it publicly, but — so that information 

confirms our belief and the information that we had previously received that Chicken of the Sea or TriUnion is the leniency applicant.” (Id. at 28:8–14.) However, the Court—without more—declines to 

accept counsel’s assertion as established for purposes of this 12(b)(6) motion.

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(iii) Collusion Regarding Tuna Can-Size Changes & Tuna List-Price 

Increases

Plaintiffs allege that on approximately May 30, 2008 Bumble Bee President and 

CEO Chris Lischewski gave a speech at a conference attended by StarKist, Bumble Bee, 

and CotS urging “global tuna industry leaders” to develop “sustainable tuna management 

practices.” (E.g., DPP Compl. ¶ 70.) In the wake of this speech, and over the course of 

the coming year, these three major brands lowered the standard tuna can size from 6 ounces 

to 5 ounces without any corresponding change in price. (E.g., EPP Compl. ¶¶ 102–106.) 

Next, Plaintiffs allege that from approximately December 2011 to January 18, 2012, 

senior sales and management personnel for these three brands engaged in communications 

ultimately resulting in an agreement to increase list prices “for the products sold at retail in 

the United States . . . and by the same amount.” (E.g., id. ¶¶ 107–10.) Price increases 

pursuant to the alleged agreement were (1) announced on January 13, 2012, effective 

March 26, 2012 for StarKist; (2) announced January 17, 2012, effective April 1, 2012 for 

Bumble Bee; and (3) announced January 18, 2012, effective April 1, 2012 for CotS. (E.g., 

id. ¶ 110.)

These two sets of allegations nicely illustrate the contours Twombly and Iqbal define 

regarding the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s allegations. The policy behind Twombly’s and 

Iqbal’s distinction between plausibility and mere possibility is largely grounded in 

ensuring the burdens of often costly and time-consuming discovery are taken into account 

when a court considers a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. Twombly, itself 

an antitrust case, discusses in great specificity the incredibly high cost and extensive scope 

of antitrust discovery. Id. Iqbal reaffirmed these overarching discovery-based policy 

considerations, noting further that “the question presented by a motion to dismiss a 

complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls placed upon the discovery 

process.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685.

In the present case, Plaintiffs’ first set of allegations are precisely the type which 

Twombly and Iqbal proscribe. Plaintiffs’ allegations set forth a possibility that Lischewski 

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carefully chose the words of his speech to suggest to StarKist and CotS that they should 

together lower can sizes, and that the plan was then ultimately accomplished by each

company lowering can sizes over the course of a year, rather than all companies doing so

at once. However, it is equally as possible that Bumble Bee thought it could make more 

money by lowering can sizes, and StarKist and CotS, not wanting to lose profits or seem 

the odd ones out, thus followed suit. Further, because there are no allegations of particular 

agreements or communications leading to the can-size decreases, Defendants are left with 

little notice as to what Plaintiffs might seek in discovery. The Court thus finds no support 

for the ultimate plausibility of Plaintiffs’ overall conspiracy allegations in these specific

allegations.

By contrast, Plaintiffs’ second set of allegations set forth a specific set of 

communications between defendants over the course of at most forty-nine days, ultimately 

resulting in an agreement between the companies to raise prices. To be sure, standing alone 

the alleged implementation of the agreement looks much the same as Plaintiffs first set of 

allegations—industry competitors adopting similar policies over a short period of time. 

But in this case the similarity, and corresponding equipoise between innocuous and 

conspiratorial inferences, is partially removed by the alleged agreement and tighter 

timeline during which the relevant communications occurred. Within the context of 

Plaintiffs’ other allegations this may well “nudge[] their claims across the line from 

conceivable to plausible . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. 570. Accordingly, the Court accepts 

Plaintiffs’ second set of allegations as relevant to whether Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged 

an overarching conspiracy. 

(iv) Collusion Regarding the Scope of Tuna-Related Promotional Activity

Plaintiffs allege that for at least a year from 2012, and perhaps longer, there were 

email and telephone communications involving executives at each company where “one 

company executive would call another about what was perceived to be an aggressive 

promotion and was assured that it was limited in nature and was not intended to upset 

agreed-upon market prices.” (DPP Compl. ¶ 80; e.g., EPP Compl. ¶¶ 111–12; CFP Compl. 

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¶¶ 67–68; Affiliated Foods Compl. ¶ 83.) Defendants argue that these allegations are “not 

indicative of a conspiracy to fix prices,” and that “there are alternative non-collusive, procompetitive reasons why Defendants would monitor each other’s promotions with 

customers, including ensuring that each Defendant’s products remain competitive.” 

(Twombly Br. 17.)

While Defendants are correct that these allegations, standing alone, are equally 

suggestive of conspiracy as they are of rational business behavior, Defendants fail to place 

these allegations in the context of Plaintiffs’ other allegations. As discussed in the previous 

subsection, supra Section II.B.iii, the Court accepts as weighing in favor of a plausible 

conspiracy Plaintiffs’ allegations of an agreement between StarKist, CotS, and Bumble Bee 

to simultaneously raise prices in 2012. And these price-raising allegations in turn inform 

and bolster Plaintiffs’ allegations here that for a year or more, starting in 2012, the 

companies would monitor each other’s pricing and promotional offerings and call each 

other to effectively “check up” on the status of the earlier alleged agreement. Properly 

placed in this context, the Court accepts Plaintiffs’ allegations here as relevant to whether 

Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an overarching conspiracy.

(v) Collusion Regarding a Joint Refusal to Offer FAD-Free Tuna for Sale

Plaintiffs assert that StarKist, Bumble Bee, and CotS each agreed that they would 

not sell any FAD-free products7 under their own labels, despite strong and growing demand 

by consumers. (E.g., DPP Compl. ¶ 83.) Senior executives at each company began 

discussing the agreement in late-2011 emails, reached an agreement by telephone 

conference call during the week of February 6, 2012, and confirmed the agreement in an 

email dated February 17, 2012. (Id.) “By this agreement, the Defendants ensured that they 

did not compete on the dimension of advertising the sustainably . . . caught nature of any 

 

7 FAD is short for “Fish Aggregation Device[,]” which is a “man-made object[] such as [a] float[] or 

buoy[] that [is] used to attract certain fish.” (E.g., Publix Compl. ¶ 39.) “Various organizations . . . have 

been vocal advocates of ‘sustainability’ in fish harvesting[,]” and thus are against excessive use of FADs. 

(E.g., DPP Compl. ¶ 50.)

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of their branded tuna products.” (Id.) For clarity, at oral argument Defendant Bumble Bee 

noted that several of the Defendant companies offer FAD-free products under different 

labels. (See Hr’g Tr. 49:14–51:12.) However, regardless whether or not a particular 

Defendant offers FAD-free products for sale under a different label, Defendants assert that 

the underlying agreement not to sell FAD-free tuna under each company’s flagship label

should be considered under “rule of reason” analysis, (Twombly Br. 22), whereas Plaintiffs 

contend that “per se” analysis is appropriate, (e.g., DPP Opp’n 21).

Although allegedly anticompetitive behavior may implicate distinct categories of 

antitrust analysis—usually either “rule of reason” or “per se”—the Supreme Court has 

noted on several occasions that “there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule 

of Reason analysis.” California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (citing 

National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 

(1984)). The touchstone, if any, is whether the challenged conduct amounts to a “naked 

restraint on price and output . . . .” Id.

One of the classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement 

between competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate 

territories in order to minimize competition. . . . This Court has reiterated time 

and time again that ‘[h]orizontal territorial limitations . . . are naked restraints 

of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition.’ Such limitations are 

per se violations of the Sherman Act.

Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., 

Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)); see also F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 

(1986) (“‘[A]s a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a 

naked restriction on price or output,’ and . . . such a restriction ‘requires some competitive 

justification even in the absence of a detailed market analysis.’” (quoting National 

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984))).

In the present case, the Court is satisfied that the alleged agreement between 

Defendants to completely refuse to offer under their flagship labels a seemingly viable

/ / /

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product constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act.8 Three main market competitors 

entering an agreement to flatly refuse to offer an in-demand product under their primary 

brand evinces no other purpose than to horizontally restrict output in the most extreme 

sense, with an end result of stifling any potential competition between the flagship brands. 

But even if the alleged agreement is examined under the more exacting “rule of reason” 

standard, Defendants do not offer any pro-competitive reason for entering into the 

agreement, instead arguing that they simply each adopted a “common policy” that “had to 

do with product development.” (See Twombly Br. 21–23; Twombly Reply 13–14.) 

Accordingly, the Court accepts Plaintiffs’ allegations here as a relevant factor weighing in 

favor of the plausibility of Plaintiffs’ alleged overarching conspiracy.

(vi) Conclusion

Given the foregoing analysis, the Court is left with the following allegations to be 

considered together: (1) there is a pending DOJ investigation regarding potential antitrust 

violations, the institution of which necessarily required the exercise of judgment by the 

DOJ in expending limited resources; (2) an alleged agreement between StarKist, CotS, and 

Bumble Bee, resulting from a maximum of forty-nine days of communications, that 

ultimately resulted in matching tuna list-price increases announced and implemented by 

each company within days of each other; (3) alleged communications overlapping with and 

following the announcement and implementation of the aforementioned list-price 

increases, in which executives from StarKist, CotS, and Bumble Bee would call to monitor 

and seek assurances regarding newly formulated promotions that might adversely affect 

 

8 The Court does not find persuasive Defendants’ citations to In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 

1101 (9th Cir. 1999), and other cases for the general proposition that “[f]aulting a company for expanding 

too slowly . . . would subject countless strategic business decisions to second-guessing by courts.” But 

see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 (“[F]irms do not expand without limit and none of them enters every market 

that an outside observer might regard as profitable, or even a small portion of such markets.” (quotation 

marks omitted)). Plaintiffs here have alleged an actual agreement, and the corresponding time-frame for 

discussion and memorialization of the same, wherein three Defendants flatly horizontally refused to 

pursue a viable market. That is not slow expansion; it is a complete bar to even considering such 

expansion. 

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the agreed-upon list-price increases; and (4) a joint refusal to offer for sale FAD-free tuna

under each company’s flagship label, agreed to and memorialized over the course of 

approximately eleven days. Taken together, the Court concludes that almost all Plaintiffs 

have alleged sufficient factual material to nudge their overarching allegations of a 

conspiracy over the line from possible to plausible.9

The sole complaint not encompassed by the above discussion is the Flowers 

Complaint, which overall contains fewer allegations than those just discussed. The 

Flowers Complaint alleges (1) the existence of the DOJ investigation, as well as Assistant 

Attorney General Baer’s statements regarding the abandoned Thai Union and Bumble Bee 

merger,10 (Flowers Compl. ¶¶ 20–26); (2) economic factors allegedly suggesting collusion, 

namely that while tuna consumption has decreased the Defendants’ pricing has instead 

increased, (id. ¶¶ 28–31); (3) the above-discussed tuna can-size decrease and tuna list-price 

 

9 At oral argument the parties argued at length over In re Musical Instruments & Equipment Antitrust 

Litigation (“Musical Instruments”), 798 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2015), and its persuasive value to either 

side’s arguments. (Hr’g Tr 70:1–76:17.) Given this spirited debate, the Court is obliged to at least quickly 

distinguish Musical Instruments from the present case. As Defendants note, Musical Instruments holds 

that allegations of mere parallel conduct, or even conscious parallelism, are alone insufficient to allege a 

plausible conspiracy. However, unlike the present case, Musical Instruments involved no specific 

allegations of a horizontal agreement between competitors; instead the plaintiffs relied solely on 

inferences drawn from the overall allegations of vertical agreements and horizontally consistent behavior. 

The very first paragraph of Musical Instruments articulating the question presented on appeal makes this 

clear: 

Where a large musical-instrument retailer pressures individual guitar manufacturers to set 

the lowest prices at which the manufacturers will permit any retailer to advertise the 

manufacturers’ products—and each manufacturer acquiesces—can we infer the 

manufacturers conspired among themselves to fix prices?

Id. at 1189. In stark contrast, Plaintiffs in the present case have presented allegations of several specific 

horizontal agreements—encompassing joint list-price increases and a joint refusal restricting Defendants’ 

FAD-free tuna offerings—where conversations negotiating and memorialization of the agreements took 

place within a very short period of time. To discredit such allegations would both move beyond Musical 

Instruments and effectively transform Twombly’s standard from one of plausibility to one of probability.

10 The Flowers Complaint also discusses the purported leniency applicant. (Flowers Compl. ¶¶ 23–26.) 

However, as previously discussed, supra Section I.B.ii, the purported leniency applicant adds nothing to 

any Plaintiffs’ allegations.

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increase, absent any allegations of a preceding agreement, (id. ¶¶ 32–34); and (4) that 

certain Defendants have copacking agreements and share the same supplier for tuna, (id. 

¶¶ 36–37). 

However, the Flowers Complaint nowhere alleges any particular agreement between 

the Defendants to fix prices, instead relying exclusively on the circumstantial evidence 

catalogued above. This is insufficient to meet Flowers’ Twombly burden because each 

allegation is equally susceptible to non-conspiratorial interpretation. The economic 

factors, can-size decrease, and list-price increase, in the absence of an agreement, merely 

show parallel behavior. See Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1195 (“An action that would 

seem against self-interest in a competitive market may just as well reflect market 

interdependence giving rise to conscious parallelism.”); (Twombly Br. 11–12 (“[W]hen 

allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 [Sherman Act] claim, they 

must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely 

parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.” (alterations original) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)).) Defendants assert many potential justifications for 

these actions and circumstances, such as “rising costs, decreasing supply, and increasing 

global demand,” to name a few. (Twombly Br. 14, 18–23.) And, even assuming that 

Defendants consciously acted in a parallel manner, this shows nothing more than that they 

were “cognizant of—and reacting to—similar market pressures.” Musical Instruments, 

798 F.3d at 1193. Nor do the allegations of copacking agreements or a shared supplier 

carry Flowers’ burden. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 

23 (1979) (“Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also not usually 

unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary 

to market the product at all.”). This leaves only the pending DOJ investigation, and as 

previously discussed, supra Section I.B.ii, the existence of a government investigation 

alone is insufficient to state a plausible conspiracy claim.

Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that Flowers has not alleged a plausible 

tuna-specific conspiracy as to any Defendant except for Thai Union Group and Tri-Union 

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Seafoods who, as discussed above, supra note 5 and accompanying text, have not joined 

in Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground.

C. Failure to Plead an Entitlement to Injunctive Relief

Section 16 of the Sherman Act provides that “[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or 

association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United 

States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation 

of the antitrust laws . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 26. Injunctive relief pursuant to this section must 

accomplish at least one of the following: “(1) putting an end to the illegal conduct, (2) 

depriving violators of the benefits of their illegal conduct, [or] (3) restoring competition in 

the market place.” In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 538 F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 

1976). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs “have not plead facts that plausibly establish the 

continuing risk of threatened injury, which is the essential predicate for such relief.” 

(Twombly Br. 34.) In contrast, Plaintiffs argue that “acts in furtherance of the conspiracy 

may well be ongoing,” (DPP Opp’n 23), such as (1) the use of five ounce cans; (2) the nonlabeling of Defendants’ branded tuna products as FAD-free, (id. at 24; Certain DAPs Opp’n 

22–23); and that (3) “[w]ithout injunctive relief, Defendants could readily continue to sell 

and/or resume selling PSPs at higher prices, continually exposing plaintiffs to harm from 

those price increases,” (CFP Opp’n 13; see EPP Opp’n 26). The Court agrees with 

Defendants.

As set forth above, supra Section I.B, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a plausible 

violation of section one of the Sherman Act. However, these same allegations do not 

automatically establish that the violation is ongoing, nor do they obviate the fact that the 

allegedly conspiratorial actions taken—e.g., refusing to develop FAD-free tuna—might 

otherwise be permissibly taken in the absence of an illegal agreement.11 And simply saying 

 

11 At oral argument, Plaintiffs reiterated the aforementioned points and reminded the Court that after the 

Bumble Bee and CotS merger was abandoned last year, Bumble Bee President and CEO Chris Lischewski 

stated that Bumble Bee was continuing to “conduct[] business as usual . . . .” (E.g., DPP Compl. ¶ 68 

n.10.) However, absent further allegations or context, such a statement fails to hurdle the Twombly bar, 

let alone the more stringent standard applied to requests for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Melendres v. 

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that the conspiracy “may” be ongoing and that Defendants “could” continue or resume 

selling PSPs at higher prices are insufficient to carry Plaintiffs’ burden. See, e.g., Winter 

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (allegations of solely speculative 

injury will not support an injunction). Accordingly, the Court concludes that no Plaintiff 

has adequately alleged an entitlement to injunctive relief.

II. Standing to Prosecute Non-Tuna Claims

Defendants argue that Commercial Food Preparers, Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs, EndPayer Plaintiffs, Affiliated Foods, Flowers, and Winn-Dixie lack Article III and prudential 

standing to prosecute non-tuna claims. (Standing Br. 1.) However, because the Court 

concludes that all Plaintiffs’ claims regarding a non-tuna conspiracy should be dismissed, 

supra Section 1.A, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss regarding standing is now moot as to 

all but those Plaintiffs asserting packaged-seafood claims against Thai Union Group and 

Tri-Union Seafoods. Further, the sole reason Plaintiffs’ packaged-seafood claims endure 

against Thai Union Group and Tri-Union Seafoods is because those Defendants did not 

join in the Motions to Dismiss; no Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts any additional packagedseafood allegations against these remaining Defendants that were not already discussed 

and rejected, supra Section 1.A. Among other things, for a Plaintiff to have Article III 

standing she “must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected 

interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not 

“conjectural” or “hypothetical”’ . . . .” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 

In the present case, no Plaintiff alleges a plausible antitrust violation regarding packaged 

seafood; therefore, no Plaintiff adequately establishes antitrust injury for purposes of 

Article III standing.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that no Plaintiff has adequately alleged Article III 

standing to prosecute non-tuna claims.

 

Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1265 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom., Maricopa Cty., Ariz. v. Melendres, 

136 S. Ct. 799 (2016) (“We have long held that injunctive relief ‘must be tailored to remedy the specific 

harm alleged.’” (citing Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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III. Sherman Act Statute of Limitations and Relevant Tolling Doctrines

A. The Discovery Rule

An antitrust action must be commenced within four years from the date when the 

cause of action accrues. 15 U.S.C. § 15b. “Generally, a[n] [antitrust] cause of action 

accrues and the statute begins to run when a defendant commits an act that injures a 

plaintiff’s business.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 

(1971). However, DPPs and CFPs argue that the “discovery rule” applies to antitrust cases, 

such that “the accrual of a cause of action” is postponed “until the plaintiff discovers, or 

has reason to discover, the cause of action . . . .” (DPP Opp’n 24–26 (quoting In re 

Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 654, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2013); CFP 

Opp’n 18–21). Contrastingly, Defendants argue that “the Ninth Circuit has unequivocally 

rejected the application of the discovery rule to Sherman Act Claims . . . .” (SOL Reply 

2–6 (citing Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, Inc., 681 F.3d 1055, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2012).) 

The Court ultimately agrees with Defendants.

In Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, Inc. the Ninth Circuit reviewed a grant of 

summary judgment denying application of the tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment. 

In setting forth the relevant law governing Sherman Act claims generally, the Ninth Circuit 

noted: “We do not require a plaintiff to actually discover its antitrust claims before the 

statute of limitations begins to run.” Hexcel, 681 F.3d at 1060. Although examining this 

quotation in isolation would seem to invoke the injury rule, when it is placed in Hexcel’s 

procedural context then Defendants’ characterization of Hexcel as “unequivocally 

reject[ing] the application of the discovery rule to Sherman Act Claims[,]” (SOL Reply 3), 

is too extreme. The issue of whether the discovery rule or the injury rule applies was not 

squarely before the Hexcel Court.

Nonetheless, the above rule statement in Hexcel suggests that application of the 

discovery rule to Sherman Act claims is inappropriate. Further, the Ninth Circuit has given 

additional indications that it is inappropriate to apply the discovery rule to Sherman Act 

claims. E.g., Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d 271, 274–75 (9th 

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Cir. 1988) (comparatively noting in RICO action that in antitrust actions “the plaintiff’s 

knowledge is generally irrelevant to accrual, which is determined according to the date on 

which injury occurs”). Almost all our sister circuits apply the injury rather than the 

discovery rule. See In re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1209–

10 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (collecting cases). And Zenith Radio itself supports application of the 

injury rather than the discovery rule. 401 U.S. at 338 (“Generally, a[n] [antitrust] cause of 

action accrues and the statute begins to run when a defendant commits an act that injures a 

plaintiff's business.” (emphasis added)).12

Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that the injury, rather than discovery, rule

applies to the present case.

B. Fraudulent Concealment

Although the discovery rule does not apply to Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims, “[a] 

statute of limitations may be tolled if the defendant fraudulently concealed the existence of 

a cause of action in such a way that the plaintiff, acting as a reasonable person, did not 

know of its existence.” Hexcel, 681 F.3d at 1060 (9th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff bears the 

burden of proving fraudulent concealment, and must show (1) the defendant affirmatively 

misled the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the 

facts giving rise to its claim despite its diligence in trying to uncover those facts; and (3) 

the plaintiff acted diligently in trying to uncover the facts giving rise to its claim. Id. A 

plaintiff “must plead with particularity the circumstances of the concealment and the facts 

 

12 At oral argument Plaintiffs strongly urged that because Ninth Circuit law is not totally clear, our 

Circuit’s command that “in general, the discovery rule applies to statutes of limitations in federal 

litigation” should control the instant case. Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d 935, 940 

(9th Cir. 2009); (Hr’g Tr. 57:3–58:7). However, the Supreme Court, in a case discussed at length by 

Mangum, has expressly noted both that (1) “[t]o the extent such a presumption exists. . . the Ninth Circuit 

[has] conspicuously overstated its scope and force[,]” and (2) “beyond doubt, we have never endorsed the 

Ninth Circuit's view that Congress can convey its refusal to adopt a discovery rule only by explicit 

command . . . .” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27–28 (2001). Accordingly, given the foregoing 

analysis of Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit guidance—as well as near circuit-wide consensus—that the 

injury rule applies to Sherman Act claims, the Court here concludes that any presumption of the discovery 

rule applying in the instant case is sufficiently rebutted.

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supporting its due diligence.” Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), 858 F.2d 499, 502 

(9th Cir. 1988). “Conclusory statements are not enough” to carry a plaintiff’s burden. Id.

Defendants move to dismiss many Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims as untimely. 

(SOL Br. 2–3.) Specifically, Defendants argue that any pre-2011 conduct is barred under 

the Sherman Act’s four-year statute of limitations, and that Plaintiffs have not adequately 

pled that any tolling doctrine should apply to the claims at issue. (Id.) Given this argument, 

and that four particular Defendants plead that the conspiracy only began in 2011, 

Defendants do not seek to bar Kroger’s, Meijer’s, Publix’s, or Wegmans’ Sherman Act 

claims as untimely. (Id. at 2 n.2.) Defendants assert that the remaining complaints list or 

imply varying potential start dates for the overarching conspiracy claims:

• 2003, (Affiliated Foods Compl. ¶ 79);

• 2008, (Affiliated Foods Compl. ¶ 109–11; DPPs Compl. ¶ 70; CFP Compl. 

¶ 52–53; EPP Compl. ¶ 102–04; Winn-Dixie Compl. ¶ 49);

• 2010, (Flowers Compl. ¶ 32).

Because the Court concludes that the EPPs and CFPs do not plausibly allege an entitlement 

to Sherman Act injunctive relief, supra Section I.C, the Court need only here consider 

Defendants’ arguments that the following allegations of conspiracy are time barred: (1) the 

Affiliated Foods Complaint’s 2003 allegations; (2) the Affiliated Foods Complaint’s, DPP 

Complaint’s, and Winn-Dixie Complaint’s 2008 allegations; and (3) the Flowers 

Complaint’s 2010 allegations. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

(i) 2003 Conspiracy Start Date

Affiliated Foods broadly alleges that “[b]eginning at least as early as January 

2003 . . . Defendants and their co-conspirators conspired to raise, fix, stabilize, or maintain 

prices in the market for Packaged Seafood sold in the United States.” (Affiliated Foods

Compl. ¶ 3.) This manifested in the form of allegedly coordinated price increases despite 

decreased demand, (id. ¶¶ 53–57), such as in 2003–2004, 2008, 2011, and 2012, (id. ¶ 79). 

However, the remainder of Affiliated Foods’ allegations are unclear regarding the timing 

of specific instances of conspiratorial conduct, and lists most actions as occurring “[d]uring 

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the Relevant Period . . . .” (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 65–78.) Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants’ 

many statements attributing similar tuna price increases to varying market and fishing 

conditions were active attempts to conceal underlying communications and agreements to 

raise tuna prices. (See id. ¶¶ 104–17.) In making this argument, Plaintiffs largely rely on 

the assertion that “during the time period of the price increases, the demand for packaged 

tuna was falling steeply, while catch volumes for both Skipjack (the dominant canning light 

grade tuna) and Yellowfin (another popular light grade tuna), were increasing,” and that 

this should have led to lower rather than higher prices. (Id. ¶ 108.)

However, as previously discussed, supra Section I.B (concluding the Flowers 

Complaint fails to state a tuna-specific claim as to most Defendants), in the absence of a 

substantive allegation of an agreement, the seeming disparity between price increases and 

higher fish supply and lower consumer demand may just as easily be explained by factors 

or business decisions that are completely independent of any conspiratorial conduct. And 

Plaintiffs’ further allegations of specific actions taken “during the Relevant Period”—i.e., 

2003 to 2015—is simply far too broad to be considered pled with particularity. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Affiliated Foods fails to allege with sufficient 

particularity fraudulent concealment regarding the 2003 conspiracy claims.

(ii) 2008 Conspiracy Start Date

The Affiliated Foods, DPP, and Winn-Dixie complaints generally allege that (1) 

price-fixing conspiracies are inherently self-concealing and (2) Defendants gave pretextual 

reasons for their price increases in order to conceal their unlawful conduct. For purposes 

of the 2008 conspiracy allegations, DPPs, Winn-Dixie, and Affiliated Foods allege that “in 

connection with the reduction of can sizes in 2008–09, Defendants asserted that it was due 

to high input costs or similar causes.” (DPP Compl. ¶ 121; Winn-Dixie Compl. ¶ 68; see 

Affiliated Foods Compl. ¶ 109.) Affiliated Foods additionally alleges that StarKist, 

Bumble Bee, and CotS announced joint price increases while “falsely cit[ing] increases in 

industry costs,” and Del Monte and its agents and representatives additionally announced

/ / /

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StarKist price increases while falsely attributing the increases to industry, fuel, and fish 

costs. (Affiliated Foods Compl. ¶¶ 110–12.)

As an initial matter, the Court earlier concluded that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding 

the 2008/2009 can-size increase was equally susceptible to non-conspiratorial as to 

conspiratorial inferences. Supra Section I.B.iii. That same conclusion applies here to the 

DPPs’, Winn-Dixie’s, and Affiliated Foods’ characterizations of Defendants’ 2008/2009 

increased-price justifications of “high input costs or similar causes.” Again, there is no 

pleading of a specific agreement or plausible inference of an agreement. And Affiliated 

Foods’ additional allegations fare no better. Although Affiliated Foods specifically alleges 

that Del Monte and its agents falsely attributed the relevant price increase to rising industry, 

fuel, and fish costs, the substance supporting the allegations of falsity comes only from the 

general and “Relevant Period” allegations previously discussed supra Section V.A. Thus, 

as in that previous Section, Affiliated Foods’ allegations are here again insufficient to 

allege fraudulent concealment with particularity.

(iii) 2010 Conspiracy Start Date

The Flowers Complaint alleges that “[b]y July 2010, and reportedly beginning 

earlier,” the Defendants “replaced their 6 oz. cans of tuna with 5 oz. cans” “without also 

decreasing prices[,]” which was “[o]ne method by which the Defendants collusively raised 

prices . . . .” (Flowers Compl. ¶ 32.) Although the Flowers Complaint does not explicitly 

address a theory of fraudulent concealment, it does contain a section entitled “Tolling of 

the Statute of Limitations.” (Id. ¶¶ 41–44.) The allegations in that section with the most 

specificity are that (1) Defendants concealed the conspiracy such that Flowers only learned 

of the conspiracy upon “the public disclosure of the DOJ investigation[;]” (2) Defendants 

concealed the conspiracy such that Flowers “did not know that it was paying artificially 

inflated prices for packaged tuna products during the Relevant Period[;]” and (3) 

“Defendants actively misled the public about the price-fixing scheme by issuing false and 

misleading statements concerning their reasons for price increases . . . .” (Id. ¶¶ 42–44.)

/ / /

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However, as with the just-discussed 2003 and 2008 allegations, such generalized 

statements are insufficient to allege fraudulent concealment with particularity.

(iv) Conclusion

Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that no Plaintiff alleges fraudulent 

concealment with sufficient particularity regarding any pre-2011 Sherman Act claims.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the above analysis, the Court: (1) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss all relevant Plaintiffs’ allegations of a packaged-seafood conspiracy as to all but 

Defendants Thai Union Group and Tri-Union Seafood, pending resolution of the remaining 

motions to dismiss; (2) DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all Plaintiffs’ allegations 

of a tuna-specific conspiracy as to all but the Flowers Complaint, which remaining 

allegations concerning Defendants Thai Union Group and Tri-Union Seafood survive

Twombly analysis, pending resolution of the remaining motions to dismiss; (3) GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all relevant Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief; (4) 

DENIES AS MOOT all Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all relevant Plaintiffs for lack of 

standing to prosecute non-tuna claims against all Defendants except Thai Union Group and 

Tri-Union Seafoods; (5) GRANTS all Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all relevant 

Plaintiffs for lack of standing to prosecute non-tuna claims against Thai Union Group and 

Tri-Union Seafoods; and (6) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss all pre-2011 

conspiracy allegations as time-barred for purposes of any Sherman Act claims. All denials

/ / /

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and dismissals are WITHOUT PREJUDICE. All Plaintiffs are granted LEAVE TO 

AMEND any dismissed claim; however, no Plaintiff may make any such amendment until

after the Court rules on the second half of the pending Motions to Dismiss. All Plaintiffs 

SHALL FILE any amendments within thirty days of the date on which the Order regarding 

the second half of the pending Motions to Dismiss is electronically docketed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2017

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