Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01112/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01112-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON BERG, 

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

I. GUERRA, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01112-DAD-EPG-PC

 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30) 

DAYS

(ECF No. 10)

Jason Berg (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights action 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on July 16, 

2014. (ECF No. 1.) On September 28, 2015, the Court screened Plaintiff’s Complaint and 

found that he had stated a single claim for violation of due process. (ECF No. 10.) In the

screening order, Plaintiff was provided the option of proceeding on his due process claim or 

filing an amended complaint to address the deficiencies in the Complaint. Plaintiff elected to 

file an amended complaint (the “FAC”). (ECF No. 12.) The FAC is now before the Court for 

screening. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

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The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)). 

While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken as true, courts Aare not required to indulge unwarranted 

inferences.@ Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id. 

II. SUMMARY OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison in Delano, California in 

the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). The 

events at issue in the Complaint allegedly occurred at the California Correctional Institution 

(“CCI”) in Tehachapi, California when Plaintiff was incarcerated there. Plaintiff names as 

defendants I. Guerra (RN), A. Salzman (RN), Dr. Michael Vuong Vu, J. Schneider, Kim 

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Holland (Warden, CCI), and a Doe Defendant (RN) (“Defendants”). All of the Defendants

were employed by the CDCR at CCI at the time of the events at issue. 

On or about June 21, 2012, Plaintiff was treated at U.C. Davis. He told the medical 

staff he believed he had been poisoned. Plaintiff began to think the medical staff was holding 

back information about his medical condition; one nurse would start to cry when she looked at 

him. He asked everyone there what was wrong with him and they claimed they did not know. 

On at least two occasions, after he had tests taken, he heard the nurses asking the medical staff, 

“Did they tell him, did they tell him?” and the response was “no.” (FAC at 4, ECF No. 12.) 

They gave him an injection of water to “flush [his] system,” which Plaintiff alleges was to 

“shut [him] up.” Id. He later requested that U.C. Davis send him his medical records, but they 

sent the records to CCI. The records do not reflect Plaintiff’s statements to medical personnel 

that he believed he had been poisoned.

On or about June 28, 2012, Plaintiff met with Dr. Bobbala (who is not named as a 

defendant). Dr. Bobbala told Plaintiff that he had tested positive for emphysema at U.C. Davis. 

Plaintiff’s blood was drawn for testing, but now the results and all records of the blood test are 

“missing.” Id. at 5. On November 14, 2012, Dr. Bobbala ordered an EKG for Plaintiff. On 

November 24, 2012, an unknown R.N. gave Plaintiff an EKG and told him that the nerves in 

part of his heart are “dead or not working.” Id.

On or about August 20, 2013, Defendant Vu ordered Oxcarbazepine for Plaintiff, 

despite the fact that Plaintiff had told Vu that he did not want to take any medications to treat 

psychological conditions. Plaintiff complained of pain and Vu suggested a pain medication 

that is also indicated for the treatment of psychological conditions, but Plaintiff refused. Vu 

then proceeded to suggest three different medications that doubled as pain and psychiatric

medications and Plaintiff refused each time. Vu informed Plaintiff that he would find him a 

suitable medication and returned Plaintiff to his cell. 

Eventually, Plaintiff was given Oxcarbazepine, which Plaintiff took because he did not 

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realize what it was. The medication caused Plaintiff to feel tired and sleepy—at one point, he 

was sleeping 23 out of 24 hours per day. On October 15, 2013, Plaintiff met with Vu and told 

him he thought he was depressed from the Oxcarbazepine because he was sleeping so much. 

Vu did not change Plaintiff’s medication, so Plaintiff refused to take the medication any longer. 

Plaintiff’s symptoms improved thereafter. 

At one of Plaintiff’s medical appointments, one of the medical staff showed Plaintiff a 

document in his medical records. The document stated that Plaintiff had consented to 

participate in an experimental drug program involving Oxcarbazepine, even though Plaintiff 

had not so consented. At some point, Plaintiff asked Defendant Schneider to pull the document 

from his records, but Schneider refused to look for the document. She also informed Plaintiff 

that she had spoken to Vu and that Vu had told her that there was no such document. One 

week later, Schneider acquiesced and looked in Plaintiff’s medical records for the document. 

No such document was found. 

At some point in October or November 2013, Plaintiff was prescribed physical therapy 

by an unnamed doctor. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Guerra and Salzman falsified a 

document stating that Plaintiff refused physical therapy on November 21, 2013, however, and 

Plaintiff did not receive the prescribed therapy. Plaintiff did not discover the document until 

January 3, 2014 and immediately requested physical therapy from Vu. Because his records 

stated that he had refused therapy before, his name was placed at the bottom of the physical 

therapy waiting list. Plaintiff had to wait many months for his therapy because of this delay 

and was in great pain. Plaintiff has now started physical therapy and the pain has resolved.

On January 21, 2014, Plaintiff was given an EKG by an unknown nurse. The week 

after that, he was given another EKG by Defendant Guerra, who told him that his “heart has not 

gotten worse.” When Plaintiff checked his medical records, however, there was no record of 

the first EKG and the date on the second EKG had been changed. Plaintiff alleges that, as a 

result of this oversight, he is “being refused proper medical treatment” and his “heart pain is 

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getting worse and worse.” Id. at 8.

Plaintiff alleges that several other records are also missing from his medical file, 

including the results of a blood test from June 28, 2012 and an x-ray from August 20, 2013. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have refused to provide him additional medical diagnostic 

tests, including chest x-rays, EKGs, stress tests, or lung tests. They also refuse to check his 

moles for malignancies. He asserts that they are not managing his pain correctly.

Plaintiff requests damages (compensatory and punitive), declaratory relief, injunctive 

relief, and costs of suit.

III. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress.

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. ASection 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal 

Constitution and laws.@ Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(internal quotations omitted). ATo the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the 

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal 

Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.@ Id.

A. Involuntary Medication – Due Process Claim

The decision to forcibly medicate an inmate implicates both substantive and procedural 

due process. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990). Inmates have “a significant 

liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” U.S. v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 744 (9th Cir.

2012), quoting Washington, 494 U.S. at 221-22. The liberty interest “must be ‘defined in the 

context of an inmate’s confinement.’” Loughner, 672 F.3d at 745, quoting Washington, 494 

U.S. at 222. Prison officials have an obligation to provide prisoners with medical treatment and 

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have a duty to take reasonable measures to ensure an inmate’s safety. Washington, 494 U.S. at 

225. 

There are three factors that are “particularly relevant in the context of involuntary 

medication: (1) ‘there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and 

the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it’; (2) ‘a court must consider the 

impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other 

inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally’; and (3) ‘the absence of ready 

alternatives.’” Id. (internal punctuation and citations omitted). “Forced medication can only be 

justified by a determination by a neutral fact-finder that the antipsychotic drugs are medically 

appropriate and that the circumstances justify their application.” Hawes v. Breiner, Case No. C 

12-2024-WHA (PR), 2013 WL 6073389, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013), citing Kulas v. 

Valdez, 159 F.3d 453, 455-56 (9th Cir. 1998).

In addition to the substantive requirements, involuntary medication “cannot withstand 

challenge if there are no procedural safeguards to ensure the prisoner’s interests are taken into 

account.” Id., quoting Washington, 494 U.S. at 233. Due process is satisfied if the inmate is 

provided with “notice, the right to be present at an adversary hearing, and the right to be 

present and cross examine witnesses.” Washington, 494 U.S. at 235. 

Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a violation of his rights to both substantive and 

procedural due process. Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendant Vu he did not want to take any 

psychiatric medications. Vu then tricked him into taking Oxcarbazepine, a psychiatric 

medication, by telling Plaintiff that he was only taking a pain medication. Based on these 

allegations, Plaintiff has stated a claim for due process violations against Defendant Vu. 

B. Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Schneider conspired with Vu to violate his 

constitutional rights. In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant to section 1983, a 

complaint must Aallege [some] facts to support the existence of a conspiracy among the

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defendants.@ Buckey v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Karim-Panahi 

v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must allege that 

“defendants conspired or acted jointly or in concert and that some overt act [was done] in 

furtherance of the conspiracy.” Sykes v. State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974). 

As with all other section 1983 claims, a plaintiff must also allege facts that show that 

“defendants have deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States.” Id.

A conspiracy claim brought under section 1983 requires proof of A>an agreement or 

meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,=@ Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th 

Cir. 2001), quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-

41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted), and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights, Hart v. 

Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006), quoting Woodrum v. Woodward Cnty., Oklahoma, 

866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). A>To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not 

know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common 

objective of the conspiracy.=@ Franklin, 312 F.3d at 44, quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d 

at 1541.

Plaintiff has not stated a claim for conspiracy. Plaintiff alleges that Schneider failed to 

look into Plaintiff’s medical records after Vu told her that the document that Plaintiff was 

seeking was not in the records. One week later, however, she complied with Plaintiff’s 

requests and looked in Plaintiff’s records. It is not clear from Plaintiff’s allegations what “overt 

act” Schneider committed to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights—she did accede to his 

request to look into his medical records, even if she did it one week later than he would have 

liked. Nor is it evident that her failure to check Plaintiff’s records advanced or furthered any 

violation of constitutional rights. It does not advance Plaintiff’s due process claims because 

Schneider did not play any role in the involuntary administration of Oxcarbazepine to Plaintiff. 

And it does not advance any inadequate medical care claim under the Eighth Amendment 

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because such actions fall short of demonstrating “deliberate indifference.” Wood v. 

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (erroneous transfer of medical records, 

which lead to confiscation of sling that prisoner was entitled to, while “inexcusable, did not 

amount to deliberate indifference”). Plaintiff fails to state a claim for conspiracy. 

C. Medical Claim – Eighth Amendment

A[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 

inmate must show >deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.=@ Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006), quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976). 

The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show: (1) A>a serious 

medical need= by demonstrating that >failure to treat a prisoner=s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,=@ and (2) Athe 

defendant=s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.@ Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096, quoting 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX 

Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

Deliberate indifference is shown by Aa purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner=s pain or possible medical need, and harm caused by the indifference.@ Id., citing 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Deliberate indifference may be manifested Awhen prison officials 

deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in 

which prison physicians provide medical care.@ Id. Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in 

receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm for the prisoner to make a 

claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin 974 F.2d at 1060, citing 

Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm=rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

ADeliberate indifference is a high legal standard.@ Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). AA showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to 

establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1060. A[E]ven gross 

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negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.@ Id., citing Wood v. 

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). AA difference of opinion between a 

prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a '

1983 claim.@ Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation 

omitted). To prevail, plaintiff Amust show that the course of treatment the doctors chosen was 

medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . . that they chose this course in 

conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff=s health.@ Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 

330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a variety of medical symptoms, including constant 

and debilitating pain. He also alleges that his medical providers falsify and otherwise tamper 

with his medical records, fail to adequately communicate with him, and refuse to schedule 

medical tests. Plaintiff alleges that he was prescribed physical therapy, but that Defendants 

Guerra and Salzman falsified a document saying he refused physical therapy, causing his 

therapy to be delayed by several months. 

With respect to Plaintiff’s medical records and Defendants’ refusals to schedule medical 

tests, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any of the Defendants acted with deliberate 

indifference. Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that any of the Defendants knew about and 

consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff, causing him to suffer 

pain or injury. While a failure to maintain accurate medical records falls short of medical best 

practices, it does not demonstrate significant injury in and of itself. Defendant may believe that 

he requires additional medical tests and examinations, but a difference of opinion between he 

and his providers does not establish deliberate indifference. Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344.

The delay in providing Plaintiff physical therapy is a closer question. There is some 

case law that suggests that a delay in providing physical therapy or even a failure to provide 

sufficiently aggressive physical therapy can, under some circumstances, constitute deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs. See, e.g., Morgan v. Halbesein, Case No. CV 12-3594-

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PA MAN, 2012 WL 5830003, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012) (“Failure to provide physical 

therapy can be a basis for an Eighth Amendment claim.”); Jackson v. Rallos, Case No. 2:09-cv3234 KJN P, 2012 WL 1037937, at *31 (E.D. Cal. March 27, 2012) (“the failure to provide 

plaintiff with ‘more aggressive’ physical therapy . . . could support a claim of deliberate 

indifference”); Lancaster v. Valdez, Case No. CV 09-683-S-CWD, 2011 WL 2470680, at *5 

(D. Idaho June 20, 2011) (“Though delays in medical treatment alone do not support a 

deliberate indifference claim, the undisputed facts support a reasonable inference that the 

failure to provide timely physical therapy, both before and after transfer to the ICC, could have 

resulted in further injury to plaintiff, unnecessary pain, and the necessity of an additional 

surgery to correct the injury”); but see Mayer v. Redix, Case No. EDCV 12-515-DMG OP, 

2014 WL 4258704, at *10-11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2014) (“Plaintiff cannot show that 

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s need for physical therapy” based on 

delay that resulted because of “Plaintiff’s changed medical condition”).

It is unclear from Plaintiff’s allegations how much of the delay in his treatment was the 

result of Defendants’ actions as opposed to normal delays associated with assignment to a 

physical therapy waiting list. Plaintiff has alleged, however, that approximately two or three 

months passed before he noticed that he was not on the physical therapy waiting list, even 

though he had been prescribed physical therapy. He also alleges specific symptoms that have 

been alleviated by physical therapy including, for example, neck pain at the base of his skull, 

pain across his left shoulder, and pain between his shoulder blades. Plaintiff has thus plausibly 

alleged an Eighth Amendment claim based on the delay in providing him physical therapy

against Defendants Guerra and Salzman.

D. Defendant Warden Kim Holland – Supervisory Liability

Previously, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Holland was liable for violations against 

him solely because she “is responsible for Plaintiff’s well-being because she’s the Warden.” 

(Complaint at 8, ECF No.1.) Plaintiff was previously advised that “[l]iability under [§] 1983 

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arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is only 

liable for the constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in or 

directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. There is no 

respondeat superior liability under [§] 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 

1989) (citations omitted). In the FAC, Plaintiff has removed any allegations about Holland’s 

conduct. Plaintiff has not stated any claim against Holland.

E. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

In addition to monetary damages, Plaintiff requests injunctive and declaratory relief. 

Any award of equitable relief is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which provides 

in relevant part, “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall 

extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular 

plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the 

court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the 

violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation 

of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Based on the nature of the claims at issue in 

this action, which involve past conduct, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief and is 

therefore confined to seeking money damages for the violations of his federal rights.

At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief

must also be denied. “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is 

likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the 

public interest.” Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2010), quoting 

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24-25 (2008). Plaintiff cannot show that 

he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief. As he notes in the FAC, he is 

already receiving the physical therapy he requests. Thus, a failure to order physical therapy at 

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this point would not cause him harm. Nor has he shown that a failure to administer any of the 

variety of tests that he requests will cause him any harm.

With regard to declaratory relief, A[a] declaratory judgment, like other forms of 

equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public 

interest.@ Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). ADeclaratory 

relief should be denied when it will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the 

legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty and 

controversy faced by the parties.@ United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 

1985). In the event that this action reaches trial and the jury returns a verdict in favor of 

Plaintiff, that verdict will be a finding that Plaintiff=s constitutional rights were violated. A 

declaration that defendants violated Plaintiff=s rights is unnecessary.

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

With respect to the claims that the Court has found not cognizable, Plaintiff was 

previously granted leave to amend with ample guidance by the Court. Plaintiff has been unable 

to remedy the defects or state a claim even after receiving guidance from the Court—indeed, as 

noted above, he has actually removed allegations or references to some defendants in the FAC. 

There is thus little reason to believe that providing Plaintiff further opportunities to amend his 

complaint would serve any useful purpose. The Court finds that the deficiencies outlined 

above are not capable of being cured by amendment and further leave to amend should not be 

granted as to the claims that the Court has found not congizable. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 

(9th Cir. 1992) (upholding dismissal of second amended complaint without leave to amend 

after plaintiff failed to make appropriate changes to amended complaints). Leave to amend, of 

course, is unnecessary for the claims that the Court has found cognizable and that the Plaintiff 

is now free to pursue in litigation.

///

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V. CONCLUSION

The Court has found that the FAC states two § 1983 claims against Defendant Vu and a 

§ 1983 claim against Defendants Guerra and Salzman. However, as explained above, Plaintiff 

does not state any claims against Defendants Holland or Schneider. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Holland and Schneider be dismissed with 

prejudice; 

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Vu under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on 

violations of substantive and procedural due process be allowed to proceed; and,

3. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Guerra and Salzman under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 based on a failure to provide medical treatment be allowed to proceed.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to this case pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code 

section 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after being served with these findings and 

recommendations, the parties may file written objections with the Court. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties 

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 

the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-01112-DAD-EPG Document 16 Filed 07/29/16 Page 13 of 13