Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-mc-00107/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-mc-00107-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Joe Murdaugh, 

Petitioner-Applicant, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona

Department of Corrections,

Respondent. 

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No. MC-05-107-PHX-CKJ

ORDER

Michael Joe Murdaugh (“Petitioner”) is an Arizona prisoner under sentence of death.

On September 27, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for appointment of counsel pursuant

to 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B). The motion states that, although he has not yet exhausted state

remedies, extraordinary circumstances justify early appointment of federal habeas counsel.

The motion indicates that the Federal Public Defender is available for such appointment. For

the reasons set forth herein, the motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

In 2001, Petitioner pled guilty to kidnapping, robbery and first degree murder. The

trial judge sentenced him to death for the murder. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme

Court affirmed both the conviction and capital sentence. State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19,

97 P.3d 844 (2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1298 (2005). In doing so, the court considered

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 1 Former § 13-4041(B) provided for the appointment of PCR counsel only after “the

mandate affirming a defendant’s conviction and sentence in a capital case is issued.” A.R.S.

§ 13-4041 (B) (West Supp. 1998). Former Rule 32.4(c) provided for appointment of counsel

upon the filing of a “timely notice” of post-conviction relief. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(c) (West

1998). In capital cases, notice of PCR is filed automatically by the Arizona Supreme Court

“upon issuance of a mandate affirming the defendant’s conviction and sentence on direct

appeal.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2005). The amendments to § 13-

4041(B) and Rule 32.4(c) result in immediate appointment of PCR counsel, prior to formal

conclusion of appellate proceedings via issuance of a mandate. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

31.23(b)(1) (West 1998) (providing in capital cases for automatic stay of mandate pending

petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court or the running of time for seeking certiorari).

Ostensibly, these amendments were implemented to provide PCR counsel a “head start” in

preparing for probable PCR proceedings.

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the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),

which invalidated Arizona’s capital-sentencing scheme to the extent that it provided for a

judge, not a jury, to determine capital-eligibility factors. The court determined that

sentencing by a judge in Petitioner’s case was harmless error. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. at 37,

97 P.3d at 862.

In October 2004, the Arizona Supreme Court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner

in state post-conviction-relief (“PCR”) proceedings. This appointment was made pursuant

to Rule 32.4 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was amended in 2000 to

provide for the appointment of PCR counsel “[a]fter the Supreme Court has affirmed a

defendant’s conviction and sentence in a capital case.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(c)(1); see also

A.R.S. § 13-4041(B), as amended by Laws 1999, Ch. 261 § 41 (West 2001) (directing

appointment of PCR counsel after the supreme court “has affirmed” a capital defendant’s

conviction and sentence).1

 Formal notice of PCR with the superior court, as required by

Arizona’s Rule 32.4(a), was initiated by the Arizona Supreme Court in March 2005,

following denial of a petition for certiorari by the United States Supreme Court and issuance

of the appellate mandate. See Ariz. R. Crim. 32.4(a). The PCR court authorized expert

resources to assist counsel, and Petitioner filed a PCR petition in November 2005, which is

still pending before the state court. 

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DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s motion asserts that, although state PCR proceedings are not yet complete,

appointment of federal habeas counsel is necessary because he is uncertain whether the “optin” provisions of Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66, will apply to his case when (and if) he pursues federal

habeas relief. Specifically, Petitioner is concerned that Chapter 154’s six-month statute of

limitations, rather than the one-year limit set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), may apply to the

filing of any habeas application. Consequently, Petitioner argues that “habeas counsel must

begin reviewing state court proceedings, investigating the case, and drafting the petition

before commencement of proceedings in this Court.” (Mot. at 3.)

In support of his motion, Petitioner relies on 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), which provides

for the appointment of counsel in capital habeas cases, the Supreme Court’s decision in

McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994), and two published district court decisions, Death

Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania v. Ridge, 948 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1996), and U.S.

ex rel. Whitehead v. Page, 914 F. Supp. 1541, 1543 (N.D. Ill. 1995). In relevant part, §

848(q)(4)(B) provides:

In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of Title 28,

seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is or

becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation . . . shall be

entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys . . . .

21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B). In McFarland v. Scott, the Court construed this statutory right to

counsel to include the right to legal assistance prior to the filing of a formal habeas corpus

petition and concluded that “a ‘post conviction proceeding’ within the meaning of

§ 848(q)(4)(B) is commenced by the filing of a death row defendant’s motion requesting the

appointment of counsel for his federal habeas corpus proceeding.” 512 U.S. at 856-57.

However, neither the statute nor McFarland address the issue presented here: whether the

right to counsel under § 848(q) attaches prior to the completion of state post-conviction

proceedings. This Court concludes that it does not.

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First, an application for habeas corpus relief may not be granted unless it appears that

all remedies in state court have been exhausted. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This requirement is

premised on the doctrine of comity, which provides that state courts should have the first

opportunity to decide a petitioner’s claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982);

Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528, 1534 (2005) (reaffirming Lundy’s “simple and clear

instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you

first have taken each one to state court”) (citing Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520). One of the

principals underlying the comity doctrine is the recognition that a petitioner may win relief

in state court, thereby mooting any basis for federal habeas relief. Consequently, while a

petitioner’s claims are pending in state court, it is premature to authorize federal resources

to prepare a petition that may not be necessary.

Second, Justice Blackmun, who authored the majority opinion in McFarland v. Scott,

recognized that the right to counsel under § 848(q) generally attaches only after state

remedies have been exhausted. In a dissent from the Court’s order denying certiorari in a

separate petition filed by McFarland, the justice wrote: “The right to qualified legal counsel

in federal habeas corpus proceedings bestowed by § 848(q)(4)(B) is triggered only after a

capital defendant has completed his direct review and, generally, some form of state

postconviction proceeding.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1263 (1994) (Blackmun,

J., dissenting) (emphasis added). This view is supported by the district court decisions relied

on by Petitioner.

In Death Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania v. Ridge, a class of death row prisoners

sought a declaratory judgment that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was not an “opt-in”

jurisdiction and moved for appointment of counsel under § 848(q)(4)(B). The court denied

the appointment of counsel after determining that the statutory right to counsel is triggered

only upon exhaustion of state court remedies. 948 F. Supp. at 1281; accord Moseley v.

Freeman, 977 F. Supp. 733, 734 (M.D. N.C. 1997) (“The statutory procedure of Section

848(q)(4)(B) presupposed that the petitioner has a present right to file a Section 2254 postconviction proceeding. This normally occurs when state post-conviction proceedings have

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been exhausted.”); U.S. ex rel. Whitehead v. Page, 914 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Ill. 1995)

(“[N]othing in McFarland would allow this court to construe 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) so

broadly as to authorize appointment of counsel for Whitehead to prepare a federal habeas

corpus petition for filing in federal court when the state court has the arguments he wishes

to present under advisement. Having yet to exhaust state remedies, Whitehead has no present

need to prepare a federal habeas corpus petition.”).

Petitioner correctly notes these cases recognize an exception to the exhaustion rule for

appointment of counsel in “extraordinary circumstances.” Moseley, 977 F. Supp. at 734;

Death Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania, 948 F. Supp. at 1281 (citing Whitehead, 914 F. Supp.

at 1543). However, the only explanatory reference regarding “extraordinary circumstances”

in these cases is to the separate holding in McFarland v. Scott that a capital prisoner need not

file a formal habeas petition to establish a federal court’s jurisdiction to enter a stay of

execution. For example, in Whitehead, the court noted that, unlike the petitioner in

McFarland, Whitehead was not facing an imminent execution date and had an attorney

representing him in state court. 914 F. Supp. at 1543. In Moseley, the court cited only

McFarland’s “stay of execution” discussion in support of its statement that pre-exhaustion

appointment of counsel may be made in extraordinary circumstances. 977 F. Supp. at 734.

Here, Petitioner does not face imminent execution; indeed, no warrant for execution

has issued from the state court. In addition, Petitioner is represented in his state PCR

proceedings by court-appointed counsel. Petitioner’s claim of exceptional circumstances for

appointment of federal habeas counsel prior to completion of state post-conviction

proceedings rests solely on the “uncertainty as to whether this case will be subject to Chapter

154 of the AEDPA’s abbreviated limitations periods for bringing and processing action in

federal court.” (Mot. at 8.) The fact that Petitioner’s case may be an “opt-in” is itself

insufficient to justify premature appointment of habeas counsel. If that were the case, every

potential opt-in petitioner would be entitled to such counsel, in contravention of the intent

of Congress in creating Chapter 154. See H.R.Rep. No. 23, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1995)

(describing creation of special capital litigation procedures as a “quid pro quo” arrangement

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under which states are accorded stronger finality rules on federal habeas review in return for

strengthening the right to counsel for indigent capital defendants). 

Moreover, both the one-year and 180-day statutes of limitation are tolled during the

pendency of state post-conviction proceedings. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the one-year

limitation period for habeas petitions filed by state prisoners is tolled during the pendency

of a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The abbreviated 180-day limitation period applicable to capital

prisoners in states that have opted in to the provisions of Chapter 154 of Title 28 is tolled

“from the date on which the first petition for post-conviction review or other collateral relief

is filed until the final State court disposition of such petition.” 28 U.S.C. § 2263(b)(2).

Thus, it appears that, under either statute of limitations, Petitioner’s federal filing deadline

is presently tolled. 

CONCLUSION

Under the circumstances of the present case – Petitioner faces no imminent execution

date, he is represented by counsel in state court, and the habeas statute of limitations appears

to be tolled – the Court finds that appointment of federal habeas counsel is not required at

this time. While capital prisoners do have a statutory right to pre-petition appointment of

counsel for habeas proceedings, Petitioner has cited no authority suggesting this right

attaches before state remedies have been exhausted, absent circumstances not present here.

The Court therefore denies Petitioner’s motion for appointment of federal habeas counsel as

premature.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Pro Se Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt.

1) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall administratively

terminate this Miscellaneous Case and shall provide a copy of this Order to: Petitioner

Michael Joe Murdaugh; Dale Baich, Assistant Federal Public Defender; Kent Cattani,

Assistant Arizona Attorney General; and the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W.

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Washington, Phoenix, AZ 85007-3329.

DATED this 15th day of December, 2005.

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