Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00029/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00029-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACK MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CERES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

SCOTT SIEGEL, in his official capacity, 

LINDA STUBBS, in her official capacity, 

SHAWNA NUNES, in her official 

capacity, MICHAEL PHIPPS dba RIVER 

OAKS GOLF COURSE, and DOES 1 

through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 1:15-CV-00029-TLN-BAM

ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants Shawna Nunes, Scott Siegel, Linda 

Stubbs and Ceres Unified School District’s (“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff Jack Miller (“Plaintiff”) has filed an 

opposition to Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 34.) The Court has carefully considered the 

arguments raised in Defendants’ motion and reply, as well as Plaintiff’s opposition. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff first filed his Complaint on January 6th, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff then filed 

his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against all Defendants on March 19th, 2015. (ECF No. 

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13.) Plaintiff claims Defendants, either individually or collectively, violated (1) Title III of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), (2) the Unruh Civil Rights Act, (3) the California 

Disabled Persons Act, (4) Title II of the ADA, and (5) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 

1972 (“Section 504”). (ECF No. 13.) Only the fourth and fifth causes of action in the FAC are 

stated against the Defendants at issue here. 

On April 7, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff subsequently filed an Opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on May 21st, 2015. (ECF No. 34.) Defendants filed a Reply to 

Plaintiff’s Opposition on May 28th, 2015. (ECF No. 35.)

Plaintiff is a disabled parent of a high school athlete. (ECF No. 13 at 2.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff has a medical condition which confines him to a wheelchair, and is therefore a “person 

with disability” and a “physically handicapped person” as defined under the ADA, 42 U.S.C §

12102, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code §§ 51 and 54. (ECF No. 13 at 3.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied full and equal access to a public accommodation by Ceres 

Unified School District while attempting to attend his daughter’s athletic event. (ECF No. 13 at 

2.) 

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to attend his daughter’s event and use the 

services of River Oaks Golf Course on September 11th, 2014. (ECF No. 13 at 6.) However, 

Plaintiff was unable to properly access the golf course’s facilities and denied the ability to watch 

his daughter’s event due to barriers to access found in the parking lot, bathrooms, and the golf 

course itself. (ECF No. 13 at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that these barriers prevented him from future 

visits and use of the golf course, thus precluding Plaintiff from attending his daughter’s future 

athletic events. (ECF No. 13 at 7.) Plaintiff further alleges, on information and belief, that 

Defendant knew that such barriers existed. (ECF No. 13 at 7.) Thus, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff by not removing the barriers. (ECF No. 13 

at 7.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant intentionally discriminated against him by 

failing to create policies and procedures to ensure that all school functions, programs, services, 

and activities were accessible to those who are disabled. (ECF No. 13 at 7.) Finally, Plaintiff 

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alleges that Defendants had the power to readily remove the barriers, or redirect the school 

functions, services, programs, or activities to another location without much difficulty or expense. 

(ECF No. 13 at 8.)

II. STANDARD OF LAW

a. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A party may move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(1). “When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Federal Rule of [Civil] 

Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the 

motion.” Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010)). “‘Unless the 

jurisdictional issue is inextricable from the merits of a case, the court may determine jurisdiction 

on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)[.]’” Robinson v. U.S., 586 

F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). If the court determines at any time that 

it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, “the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

“A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the 

allegations of the complaint or may be made as a ‘speaking’ motion attacking the existence of 

subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter 

jurisdiction in fact, no presumption of truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations. Id. 

“[T]he district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, 

such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of 

jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff bears the 

burden to prove existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Thornhill Publ’g Co., 594 F.2d at 733.

b. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim ... is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. v. 

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). “This simplified notice 

pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define 

disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 

534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true.

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of every 

reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 

Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n. 6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 

“‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 

relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 

factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n. 2 (9th Cir.

1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 

unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 

pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove 

facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the ... laws in ways that have not 

been alleged[.]” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 

459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff has failed to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims ... 

across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680.

While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than 

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“a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is 

“a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. at 679.

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 

see also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 

denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 

freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 

deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its 

complaint[.]” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir.

2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)).

III. ANALYSIS

a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief and damages against Defendants for discrimination 

against the disabled with respect to their receiving equal access to programs, services, activities, 

and facilities as other able-bodied persons. (ECF No. 13 at 22.) Defendants move to dismiss 

claims for damages under Title II of the ADA, on the basis that the Eleventh Amendment 

precludes a suit against Defendants since Ceres School District is an agency of the state. (ECF 

No. 19-1 at 2.) Plaintiff responds that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because Title II of 

ADA broadly abrogates sovereign immunity. (ECF No. 34.)

The question before the Court is whether Title II of the ADA broadly abrogates sovereign 

immunity or only when one’s fundamental rights are violated. The Eleventh Amendment of the 

Constitution of the United States states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State.” 

U.S. Const. Amend. XI. “The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonCase 1:15-cv-00029-DAD-BAM Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 5 of 9
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consenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.” Bd. of Trs. of the 

Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). Sovereign immunity also extends to an 

agency of the state. Durning v. Citibank, 950 F.2d 1419, 1423 (9th Cir. 1991). School districts in 

California are “state agencies” and protected by the Eleventh Amendment. Belanger v. Madera 

Unified School Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 251 (Cal. 1992). 

However, “Congress may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it 

both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” 

Garett, 531 U.S. at 356. The ADA provides: “A State shall not be immune under the eleventh 

amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of 

competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12202. “The Ninth Circuit has 

repeatedly found that Congress validly abrogated state immunity when it enacted Title II of the 

ADA.” Video Gaming Technologies, Inc. v. Bureau of Gambling Control, 621 F. Supp. 2d 918, 

920 (E.D. Cal. 2008); see also Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999); Clark v. 

California Dep't of Corrections, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997); Hason v. Medical Bd., 279 

F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002); Thomas v. Nakatani, 309 F.3d 1203, 1209 (9th Cir.2002); Lovell 

v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002).

Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s Title II 

claim because Defendants did not violate a fundamental right, and state sovereign immunity is 

only abrogated upon a violation of a fundamental right. (ECF No. 34 at 3.) For this proposition, 

Defendants cite Talevski v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 2013 WL 4102202 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 

13, 2013), which examined the precedent in other Circuits: “[o]ther circuits, however, have 

concluded that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is only abrogated in fundamental 

constitutional rights cases. Klingler v. Director, Dept. of Revenue, State of Mo., 455 F.3d 888, 

893–94 (8th Cir. 2006) (discriminatory surcharges on the disabled do not implicate a fundamental 

constitutional right warranting the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of 

a damages claim); Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1122–23 (10th Cir. 2012) (‘there is a trend 

of courts holding that, absent the need to vindicate a fundamental right or protect a suspect class, 

Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity’); Toeller v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., 461 

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F.3d 871, 876–880 (7th Cir. 2006) (the Eleventh Amendment bars suit for money damages in 

federal court because the self-leave provision of the Family Medical Leave Act does not implicate 

a fundamental right).” Id. at *3. See also Chadam v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist., 2014 WL 

325323 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2014).

Talevski also relied in part upon Judge O’Scannlain’s concurrence in Phiffer v. Columbia 

River Corr. Inst., 384 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2004). The majority decision in Phiffer simply held that

“the State is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title II of the ADA.” Judge

O’Scannlain reasoned, however, that it remained “open to question” whether Title abrogated state 

sovereign immunity where a “fundamental right” was not at issue. Id. at 793. However, 

O’Scannlain further acknowledged that absent en banc Ninth Circuit review, Clark and Dare, 

which straightforwardly held that Title II abrogated sovereign immunity, remained this Circuit’s 

binding precedent. Id. 

In summary, Defendants urge this Court to engage in a case-specific analysis of whether 

the ADA’s abrogation of sovereign immunity constitutes a valid exercise of Congressional power, 

when viewed in light of whether a plaintiff has identified a fundamental right. However, the 

Ninth Circuit has not expressly called for this “nuanced, case-by-case analysis” to occur. Id. In 

consideration of the specific facts of this case, the lack of Ninth Circuit authority specifying a 

framework for analysis, and the few district court authorities undertaking that analysis, the Court 

simply follows those decisions in this Circuit which have upheld the ADA’s mandate that a state 

shall not be immune from suit under Title II of the ADA.1 See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (“A State shall 

not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an 

 

1

The Court notes that the Phiffer decision was issued on remand from the Supreme Court under 

the directive to consider that case in light of Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). Lane

undertook a specific analysis into that plaintiff’s fundamental right to access to courts; that 

analysis is what Defendants urge this Court to undertake now. On remand, Phiffer declined to 

undertake a specific “fundamental rights” analysis and did not disturb the Ninth Circuit precedent 

which calls for the broad abrogation of state immunity under Title II of the ADA. As noted 

above, even Judge O’Scannlain’s concurrence acknowledged that the broad holdings in Dare and 

Clark remained binding. More clear authority from the Ninth Circuit, or in the absence of that, a 

distinct and strong trend in the district court case law may require the Court to revisit this issue in

future cases. 

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action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter”); Dare, 

191 F.3d at 1173 (“This Circuit has held that in enacting Title II of the ADA, Congress validly 

abrogated state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers”); Clark, 123 

F.3d at 1270–71 (“We reject California’s argument that Congress’s power must be limited to the 

protection of those classes found by the Court to deserve ‘special protection’ under the 

Constitution”); Phiffer, 384 F.3d at 792 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Our precedent clearly commands the 

conclusion that the State is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title II of the 

ADA”); D.K. ex rel. G.M. v. Solano Cnty. Office of Educ., 2008 WL 5114965 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 

2008). Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

b. Adequate Facts Pleaded

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for failure to state a claim as required 

by FRCP 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 19 at 7.) The question before the Court is whether Plaintiff’s 

complaint contained sufficient facts to plead a prima facie case.

To plead a prima facie Title II or Section 504 case, Plaintiff must prove as follows: (1) he 

is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the 

benefit of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) he is either excluded from 

participation in, or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities or 

were otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of 

benefits, or discrimination was solely by reason of his disability. Sheehan v. City & Cnty. Of 

S.F., 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014). Additionally, with respect to the Section 504 claim, 

Plaintiff must plead that the program at issue receives federal assistance. Duvall v. County of 

Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir.2001). Plaintiff does allege, and Defendants do not dispute, 

that Ceres School District receives federal funding for its sports related activities. (ECF No. 13 at 

20.)

Plaintiff has pleaded a prima facie case by meeting the four requirements stated in 

Sheehan. Plaintiff’s FAC states as follows: (1) he is a person with disability because he is 

confined to a wheelchair; (2) he is eligible to attend his daughter’s athletic events otherwise; (3) 

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he was excluded from attending this particular event; (4) this exclusion was due to inadequate 

accommodations for the disabled. (ECF No. 13 at 3–8.) These facts both sufficiently show 

Plaintiff is entitled to relief, and give Defendants fair notice of what the claim is. Thus, Plaintiff 

has alleged sufficient facts to support a Title II and Section 504 claim.

Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to Dismiss for failure to state sufficient 

facts as required by FRCP 12(b)(6).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) is DENIED.

Dated: October 27, 2015

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