Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06855/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06855-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHANNON MAURICE LEE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

 A. LAMARQUE, )

)

Respondent. )

)

___________________________________ )

CV F 03-6855 AWI WMW HC

FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 19]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 7, 2002, Petitioner was convicted in Madera County Superior Court of

second degree burglary and resisting or deterring an officer in the performance of his duties. 

The court sentenced Petitioner to state prison for twenty-five years to life with the possibility

of parole on count one, plus a consecutive twenty-five years to life on count two.

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Petitioner filed a direct appeal from his judgment of conviction. On July 10, 2003,

the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District (“Court of Appeal”) issued an

unpublished decision in case no. F039958 reversing the conviction as to count two, and

otherwise upholding the decision. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court, which denied the petition on September 17, 2003.

Petitioner has not filed any petitions for writ of habeas corpus with the state courts. 

Petitioner filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 16, 2003. 

Although the petition originally contained an unexhausted claim, on July 12, 2004, Petitioner

filed a first amended petition, deleting the unexhausted claim. 

FACTS

The court finds the Court of Appeal correctly summarized the facts in its July 10,

2003 opinion. Thus, the court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the Court of Appeal.

STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams

v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of

his rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction

challenged arises out of the Madera County Superior Court, which is located within the

jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the court has

jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after

its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9

th Cir. 1997)

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(quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107,

117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117

S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed on December 16, 2003, after the enactment of the AEDPA,

thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply

with respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court.

Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for

habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123

S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). 

“A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather, that

application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

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criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the

state court’s factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must

accept all factual findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,

116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9

th Cir. 1997). 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his

conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives

the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9

th

Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state

court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal

court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). When the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in

nature, however, this court "looks through" that decision and presumes it adopted the

reasoning of the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on

habeas review, "look through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's

reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217

F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9th Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court

opinion in determining whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or

an unreasonable application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

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DISCUSSION

Admission of Hearsay Statements

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements of the

victim, Ruiz. In making this contention, Petitioner relies on Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36 (2004), in which the Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) and held

that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of out-of-court statements by witness that

are testimonial in nature unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior

opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether such statements are deemed

reliable by the court.

In Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005), the Court of Appeal for the

Ninth Circuit held that the decision in Crawford applies retroactively. It is undisputed that

Petitioner did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine Ruiz, because the prosecution

failed to find him. Accordingly, under Crawford, the trial court erred in admitting the

hearsay statements of Ruiz at Petitioner’s trial. The issue, therefore, is whether admission of

these hearsay statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bockting, 399 F.3d

at 1022.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s finding of due diligence by the

government in trying to find Ruiz, the victim, was patently erroneous. Unpublished opinion

in case number F039958, 5. It was this finding of due diligence that permitted the admission

of the hearsay statements. Therefore, the Court of Appeal analyzed the record to determine if

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, explaining as follows:

The crux of the bystander’s statement to the officer was that an adult Black

male whom Ruiz did not know walked up to him, hit him in the face with his fist, and

knocked him down. As he lay face down on the ground, his assailant punched him in

the back of the head with a closed fist, took a wallet out of his pocket, and left. Ruiz

later identified Lee as his attacker, the wallet the police showed him as his, and

papers the police found on him inside the back bedroom of the nearby apartment of

Lee’s cousin as his. He said he was “100 percent sure” of his identification of Lee.

Our analysis continues with the evidence of Lee’s guilt entirely apart from the

officer’s testimony. One eyewitness, Jose M., saw a Black male take a wallet from a

Hispanic male after punching him in the back of the head as he lay on the ground. 

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Another eyewitness, Lee’s cousin Robert Davis, saw a “Mexican guy laying on the

ground” on the other side of the street and heard neighbors screaming and pointing at

Lee as he ran towards Davis’s apartment. Yet another eyewitness, Davis’s niece, saw

Lee run into Davis’s apartment with a wallet, empty the wallet in the back bedroom

closet, throw the wallet into her brother’s bedroom, and hide in the closet of the back

bedroom.

Jose M. Pointed out Davis’s apartment to an officer at the scene as the place

where the robber lived. Davis answered a knock at the door of his apartment and told

the officer Lee was inside the back bedroom. Lee emerged from the back bedroom

and told the officer, “I was hiding in the closet.” Jose M. identified Lee as the robber.

After his arrest, Lee made incriminatory statements to the booking officer. 

“Man, this is fucked up, that Spic, mother fucker ain’t even going to show up in

court.” “That fuckin wetback ain’t never going to court.” “That mother fucker won’t

be able to ID me, I will shave my mustache, I will grow hair on my head, that mother

fucker won’t be able to ID me in court if that non English speakin’ bitch even shows

up.” “That fucker can’t even talk English.” The booking officer testified he never

told Lee if Ruiz could speak English.

On that record of abundant evidence of Lee’s guilt entirely apart from the

officer’s testimony about the bystander’s translation of Ruiz’s hearsay statements, we

hold that the erroneous finding of due diligence leading to the admission of the

officer’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California

(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; see Lilly v. Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. 116, 139-140 [applying

Chapman standard of review to confrontation clause violations].)

 

Unpublished opinion in case number F039958, 5 - 7.

Petitioner has argued nothing to indicate that this analysis by the Court of Appeal

concluding that the erroneous finding of due diligence (and impliedly the admission of the

hearsay statements themselves) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This court finds, therefore,

that Petitioner has failed to make the showing necessary to support the grant of habeas

corpus relief.

CALJIC No. 17.41.1

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to

CALJIC 17.41.1, which instructed the jury to report to the trial court instances of juror

misconduct during deliberations. Petitioner claims that the instruction improperly

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compromises the private and necessarily uninhibited character of jury deliberations and also

constitutes an “impermissible anti-nullification.” He argues that the instruction violated the

jurors’ right to freedom of speech and association and his own right to due process.

The Court of Appeal, relying on People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 442-445,

concluded that the instruction did not result in a violation of Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth or

Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial. It also found that Petitioner had

cited nothing in the record showing any actual interference by CALJIC 17.41.1 with the

jury’s deliberative process and held that error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.

In Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim that

 the trial court's use of CALJIC 17.41.1 denied the petitioner his constitutional right to a jury

trial and due process because it improperly allowed the trial court to intrude into the jury's

deliberations. In addressing the Court of Appeal’s rejection of this claim, the Ninth Circuit

held in part: “[i]t is clear, however, that the California appellate court's holding was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent,

because no Supreme Court case establishes that an instruction such as CALJIC 17.41.1

violates an existing constitutional right.” Id. at 955-56. 

In light of this holding in Brewer, this court must conclude that Petitioner has failed

to carry his burden of showing that the Court of Appeal’s rejection of his claim “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This court finds, therefore,

that Petitioner has failed to make the showing necessary to support the grant of habeas

corpus relief.

//

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Cumulative Error

Petitioner contends that cumulative error in his case deprived him of his right to due

process and a fair trial. He does not, however, identify which errors he is referring to. 

Because the sole error established before this court has been found to be harmless, Petitioner

cannot show cumulative error of any kind, much less cumulative error to the degree that he

was deprived of any Constitutional right. Accordingly, this claim presents no basis for

habeas corpus relief.

Refusal to Dismiss Strikes

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss any of his prior

convictions or strikes because it did not have any of the facts regarding those strikes, thereby

violating his right to due process. In addressing this claim, the Court of Appeal held:

Lee argues that the lack of “meaningful information” about his criminal

background made the court’s refusal to strike any of his strike priors an abuse of

discretion that violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and

effective assistance of counsel. The Attorney General argues the contrary. Lee’s

request, the prosecutor’s opposition, and the probation officer’s report all set out facts

about Lee and his criminal background. The court heard argument from both counsel

before ruling. Apply the abuse of discretion standard of review, we hold there was no

error. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 152; People v. Superior Court

(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504.).

Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court's misapplication of its own

sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief. Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88

(9th Cir.1993). The misapplication of state law results in a due process violation only if the

sentence is arbitrary and capricious. Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992). Petitioner

has not claimed that the sentence is arbitrary and capricious. Thus, Petitioner’s claim of

error does not present a federal question and provides no basis for habeas corpus relief. 

Imposition of Strike Based on Juvenile Conviction

Petitioner contends that the imposition of a strike based on a prior juvenile conviction

sustained without a jury trial and made without a jury determination that the prior offense

was a felony violated his rights under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the

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United States Constitution. Petitioner relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), in which the Court held that other than the fact of the prior conviction, any fact that

increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to jury

and proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In rejecting this claim, the Court of Appeal held:

Lee argues that Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 precludes the use

of his prior juvenile adjudication of robbery as a strike under the three strikes law

since he had no jury at his prior juvenile adjudication. The Attorney General argues

the contrary. The argument “that because a person previously tried as a juvenile had

no right to a jury trial in juvenile court, the prior juvenile adjudication cannot

constitutionally be treated as a prior conviction for the purpose of the Three Strikes

law” has “no merit.” (People v. Bowden (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 391; People v.

Fowler (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 581, 584-587.

Unpublished opinion in case number F039958, 13.

The court finds that the Court of Appeal’s decision on this issue was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Boyd v. Newland, 393 F.3d

1008, 1017 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the “use of [a] juvenile adjudication as a sentencing

enhancement was [neither] contrary to,” nor did it “involve[ ] an unreasonable application of,

Supreme Court precedent.”). Accordingly, the court must conclude that this contention

provides no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Independent Review of Efforts to Locate Witness

Petitioner contends that under Crawford, appellate courts should independently

review a trial court’s determination that the prosecution’s failed efforts to locate an absent

victim witness are sufficient to justify an exception to the defendant’s constitutional right of

confrontation. As Respondent argues, this claim is moot in light of the finding that the

admission of Ruiz’s statements against Petitioner was harmless. Accordingly, this

contention provides no basis for habeas corpus relief.

In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED and that judgment be entered for Respondent.

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These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the

objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by

mail) after service of the objections. The court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s

ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2006 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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