Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00401/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00401-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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11cv0401 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRIN ARMSTRONG,

Plaintiff,

v.

LARRY SMALLS, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 11-0401-WQH-WVG

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS 

(DOC. ## 12, 14)

I

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Darrin Armstrong (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), a state

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Civil

Rights Complaint (hereinafter “Complaint”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants Larry Smalls, et al., (hereinafter “Defendants”) filed an

Amended Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter “Motion to Dismiss”)and a

Wyatt Notice pursuant to Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2003). On June 6, 2011, the Court also provided Plaintiff with

a Notice pursuant to Wyatt.

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11cv0401 2

The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, hereby finds that Plaintiff is not

entitled to the relief requested and therefore RECOMMENDS that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and that Plaintiff’s

Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

II

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

This statement of facts is based, in large part, upon the

allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint and upon the facts described in

the Rules Violation Report (hereinafter “RVR”) and subsequent

administrative appeals that were attached to the Complaint as

exhibits.

Plaintiff was a state prisoner at Calipatria State Prison at

the time of the events herein. (Complaint at 3). He has since been

moved to Centinela State Prison. (Id. at 2).

On March 20, 2010, Plaintiff and eight other African-American

prisoners were exiting the prison cafeteria when they were attacked

by ten Caucasian prisoners. (Id. at 3). During the altercation,

Plaintiff was cut or stabbed on the right side of his face,

specifically, on the mouth and right cheek. (Id. at 4). This wound

required medical attention, including stitches, from a hospital

outside the prison. (See id., Attachment A, “Inmate Appeal for

Director’s Level Review.”) 

At the hospital, the treating physician, Dr. Michael H.

Bishop, noted lacerations to Plaintiff’s face and a contusion to his

chest. (See id., Attachment A, “Medical Report of Injury - Darrin

Armstrong”). In the section of the Medical Report of Injury titled

“STATEMENT IN SUBJECT’S WORDS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INJURY,”

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1/ Although not explicitly stated, the record clearly indicates that, at the

time of the events herein, Plaintiff was assigned to the lower bunk in cell 235

in facility C. (RVR at 1). This fact is not contested.

2/ Inmate T. Brady, CDCR #P-64982.

11cv0401 3

Plaintiff stated that he had a “laceration to [right] side of the

face after I got into a fight on the yard.” (Id.).

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants had been informed

by “2 or more reliable sources that white inmates were going to

attack, and try to kill some black prisoners, on C-facility.”1/

(Complaint at 3). At the time of the events of this case, Defendants

were all employees of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (hereinafter “CDCR”). 

Plaintiff identifies one of the informants as a Caucasian

inmate named T. Brady.2/ (Id.) Inmate Brady allegedly knew of the

planned attack, did not want to participate, and therefore informed

the defendant guards in order to be placed in protective custody.

(Id. at 3-4). Plaintiff does not identify which Defendants were

informed by Inmate Brady.

After Brady allegedly informed the defendant guards of the

planned attack, Plaintiff’s housing assignment was changed to the

Administrative Segregation Unit (hereinafter “ASU”) based on his

“identification by Staff as an active participation [sic] in this

Riot...” (Id., Attachment A, “Administrative Segregation Unit

Placement Notice”).

III

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains two causes of action. First,

he alleges that his Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to

cruel and unusual punishment was violated by Defendants’ failure to

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3/ Plaintiff is precluded from obtaining an award of attorney’s fees due to his

pro se status. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438 (1991) (Pro se litigants are

not entitled to attorney fees awards).

11cv0401 4

protect him from substantial risk of serious harm. Second, Plaintiff

alleges a state law tort claim of negligence against Defendants for

failure to exercise due care.

Both of Plaintiff’s claims are brought against former Warden

Larry Smalls, Associate Warden S. Anderson, Correctional Officer M.

Whitman, Correctional Officer J. Montano, Correctional Officer P.

Zills, and other Correctional Officers identified as Does 1-5. All

Defendants are named in their individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff’s claims allege that, despite prior warning,

Defendants took no preventative action and were therefore deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s health and safety. He further

claims that Defendants allowed the attack to occur as planned “for

training purposes ... to allow rookie Correctional officers to gain

experience” in dealing with such violent situations. (See Complaint

at 4).

Plaintiff claims that, as a “direct result of the defendants

[sic] failure to protect” him, he received a stab wound to his face.

Furthermore, he claims that this wound has resulted in permanent

disfigurement, permanent nerve damage, migraine headaches, insomnia,

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, paranoia of being in crowds, and

paranoia of people approaching him from behind. As a result, he

claims that he “lives in a constant state of fear.” (Id.).

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, compensatory damages of

$50,000 from each defendant, punitive damages of $100,000, costs and

expenses, and attorney fees.3/

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4/ This code citation appears to be in error. 15 C.C.R. § 3005(d)(2) refers to

encouraging a riot; “Inmates shall not, with the intent to cause a riot, willfully

engage in conduct that urges a riot, or urges others to commit acts of force or

violence at a time and place under circumstances that produce a clear and present

and immediate danger of acts of force or violence or the burning or destroying of

property.” Actual participation in a riot is proscribed by 15 C.C.R. § 3005(d)(3),

which reads “Inmates shall not participate in a riot, rout, or unlawful assembly.”

11cv0401 5

IV

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 25, 2010, Plaintiff was issued an RVR as a result of

the fight. Specifically, the RVR charged him with “willfully

participating in a racial riot” pursuant to 15 Cal. Code of Regs. §

3005(d)(2).4/ (See Complaint, Attachment A, “Rules Violation

Report”).

A. FIRST LEVEL HEARING

On April 23, 2010, Plaintiff appeared before Correctional

Lieutenant H. Drake, who served as Senior Hearing Officer (hereinafter “SHO”). The SHO determined that, despite Plaintiff’s selfdefense claim, Plaintiff was guilty of violating 15 C.C.R. §

3005(d)(2). The SHO specifically relied upon the statement made in

the RVR noting that the Reporting Employee observed “Inmate

ARMSTRONG ‘fighting back’ as she responded” to the altercation.

Consequently, Plaintiff forfeited 90 days of good time credit and 10

days loss of yard privileges. Plaintiff’s request to have his

Segregated Housing Unit term revoked, included in his Second Level

Appeal, indicates that he was likely still housed in the ASU and not

returned to General Population following the hearing.

B. SECOND LEVEL APPEAL

On May 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed an appeal regarding the

First Level decision. He argued that the Caucasian inmates were

identified as the aggressors and had attacked or ambushed Plaintiff

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5/ 15 C.C.R. § 3300: “It is the duty of every employee to do everything

possible to prevent disorders. Each employee must be trained to be familiar with

the procedures for handling disorders. Disorders and other emergencies must be

reported to supervisory staff at the earliest possible moment. Whenever a disorder

occurs, a prompt investigation will be made by the warden.”

6/ The terms “C-file” and “270 design institution are not defined in the

Complaint, Motion to Dismiss, or associated filings. However, “[t]he ‘180’ design

is considered the ‘most secure prison design’ because it ‘gives control-booth

officers a straight-on look at prisoners.’ In contrast, the ‘270’ design ‘with

portions of the house reaching back behind the blind side of the booth’ is

considered less secure.” See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

California_State_Prison,_Sacramento>.

11cv0401 6

and the other African-American inmates from behind. Furthermore,

Plaintiff argued that his participation had not been intentional,

deliberate, or premeditated; therefore, he had not “willfully”

participated in the riot. Plaintiff pointed to the language of the

RVR (that Plaintiff was observed “fighting back”) as proof that his

participation was limited to self-defense.

Plaintiff’s appeal also stated that he was seeking to obtain

legal counsel in order to proceed with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil suit

and a gross negligence tort class action claim against the

Calipatria State Prison administration. Specifically, he alleged

that the guards had prior knowledge of this riot and that their

failure to attempt to prevent the riot was a violation of 15 C.C.R.

§ 3300.5/

In the section of the appeal form labeled “Action Requested,”

Plaintiff listed five items: 1) a reversal of the guilty finding, 2)

restoration of his good time credits, 3) removal of the RVR from his

“C-file”, 4) revocation of his SHU placement, and 5) transfer to

“another 270 design institution (Preferably Centinela)”.6/ Notably,

this section of the Second Level Appeal omits the relief requested

in the case now before the Court.

On June 6, 2010, the Chief Disciplinary Officer elected to

dismiss the RVR and wrote on the RVR “Dismiss in interest of justice

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7/ Plaintiff’s Director’s Level Appeal request appears to be timely even though

six months elapsed. Plaintiff claims that he was transferred to Centinela State

Prison immediately after receiving the Second Level Appeal response. However, the

placement notice provided by Plaintiff as proof of this transfer gives the date

of transfer as August 21, 2010, six weeks after the response.

Upon arrival at Centinela, Plaintiff was placed in the ASU. The placement

notice gives conflicting reasons for this placement. The narrative portion

describes the placement as a result of a lack of General Population bed space.

However, the check box for lack of bed space is not checked; instead the check

boxes for immediate threat and institutional security risk are checked.

As a result of Plaintiff’s placement in the ASU, his property was withheld

from the date of his arrival to one and a half weeks after his eventual move to

the General Population. Although not specifically alleged, this Court reasonably

assumes that the inaccessibility of Plaintiff’s paperwork excusably precluded him

from filing his Director’s Level Appeal request.

Furthermore, a December 6, 2010, response to Plaintiff’s request asking him

to sign and date a section clearly indicates that Plaintiff attempted to file his

request at some point between August 21 and December 6, 2010.

11cv0401 7

- (self defense.)” Consequently, Plaintiff was informed that his

appeal was “Partially Granted” and was further advised that “this

issue may be submitted for a Director’s Level of Review if desired.”

Notably, it does not appear that Plaintiff was informed which of the

five actions he requested were granted.

C. DIRECTOR’S LEVEL REVIEW

On December 24, 2010, Plaintiff appealed the Second Level

Response, noting that it was “unclear as to what relief is available

through the department or if [his] actions requested were fully

exhausted.”7/

 On February 10, 2011, D. Foston, Chief of the Inmate

Appeals Branch, declined to review the Second Level Appeal response.

Chief Foston wrote that Plaintiff’s “appeal was granted at the

institutional level. There is no unresolved issue to be reviewed at

the Director’s Level of Review.” As a result, Plaintiff was not

given clarification as to which of his five requested action items

were granted.

D. CURRENT CASE

On February 25, 2011, Plaintiff filed the suit now before

this Court. Plaintiff claims to have exhausted all available

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11cv0401 8

administrative remedies. Plaintiff has served all the named

Defendants.

V

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims

in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2) requires only “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of

what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct.

2197, 2200 (2007). Dismissal of a claim is appropriate only where

the complaint lacks a cognizable theory. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at

553-565. The court must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from

them, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. N.L. Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898

(9th Cir. 1986); Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). The court does not consider whether

the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S.Ct.

1683, 1686 (1974).

“If a complaint is accompanied by attached documents, the

court is not limited by the allegations contained in the complaint.

These documents are part of the complaint and may be considered in

determining whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts in

support of the claim.” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1

(1991) [quoting Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267

(9th Cir.1987)]. "[W]hen the allegations of the complaint are

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refuted by an attached document, the Court need not accept the

allegations as being true." Roth, 942 F.2d 625 n.1 [citing Ott v.

Home Savings & Loan Ass'n, 265 F.2d 643, 646 n.1 (9th Cir.1958)].

“The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, when resolving a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may not generally

consider materials outside the pleadings. Id. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d

232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.34[2]

(Matthew Bender 3d ed.) [“The court may not . . . take into account

additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the motion to

dismiss, because such memoranda do not constitute pleadings under

Rule 7(a).”]).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

show: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person

acting under color of state law; and, (2) that the conduct deprived

the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d

1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Vicarious liability does not exist

under § 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009); Jones

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

To hold a person “liable under section 1983 there must be a showing

of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation.” Id. A

supervisory official may be liable only if he or she was personally

involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful

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11cv0401 10

conduct and the constitutional violation. See Redman v. County of

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). Causation may be

established only by showing that the supervisor set in motion a

series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably

should have known would cause others to inflict the injury. Watkins

v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998).

Finally, where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a

civil rights case, the Court must be careful to construe the

pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt.

See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th

Cir. 1988); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027, n.1 (9th Cir.

1985). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly important

in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th

Cir. 1992); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)

(“Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is far more

prone to making errors in pleading than the person who benefits from

the representation of counsel.”) In giving liberal interpretation to

a pro se civil rights complaint, however, a court may not “supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey

v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to

withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Sherman v. Yakahi, 549

F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts, [will be] rejected as insufficient to state a claim

under the Civil Rights Act.”). Thus, at a minimum, even the pro se

plaintiff “must allege with at least some degree of particularity

overt acts which defendants engaged in that support [his] claim.”

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Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984).

VI

DISCUSSION

Defendants raise four grounds in support of their Motion to

Dismiss. First, they contend that they are immune from suits for

money damages when sued in their official capacities as agents or

representatives of the CDCR. Second, they argue that Plaintiff has

not exhausted his administrative remedies and thus has yet to

satisfy the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(hereinafter “PLRA”). Third, Defendants claim that Plaintiff has

failed to state facts sufficient to support his claim of deliberate

indifference constituting an Eighth Amendment violation. Fourth,

Defendants claim that Plaintiff has likewise failed to state facts

sufficient to overcome their immunity in regards to his state law

torts claims.

A. DEFENDANTS, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, ARE IMMUNE TO SUITS

FOR DAMAGES

Under the Eleventh Amendment, states are immune from private

damage actions brought in federal court. Henry v. County of Shasta,

132 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999). Such immunity flows to state

officials, barring suits for damages against them in their official

capacities. Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S.

425, 429 (1997).

In this case, Plaintiff seeks $50,000 in compensatory damages

from each defendant and $100,000 in punitive damages. Insofar as he

seeks these damages from Defendants in their official capacity, his

suit is barred. Even assuming all his contentions to be true, and

considering Plaintiff’s arguments in the light most favorable to

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11cv0401 12

him, Plaintiff cannot overcome this Constitutionally-imposed

limitation.

However, the Court notes that Plaintiff also names the

Defendants in their individual capacities and seeks declaratory

relief; the Eleventh Amendment presents no bar to those aspects of

his suit.

Consequently, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss be GRANTED as to the monetary damages sought by Plaintiff

from Defendants named in their official capacity.

B. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

Under PLRA, an inmate who wishes to bring an action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 regarding prison conditions must first exhaust the

available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (although exhaustion of

administrative remedies is not ordinarily a prerequisite for suits

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to

all inmate suits about prison life...”). Exhaustion of the available

administrative remedies is determined by examining the relevant

administrative appeal system. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218

(2007) (“The prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, ... define the

boundaries of proper exhaustion.”).

Here, the applicable requirements are those governing the

California State Prison system. Specifically, in order to exhaust

his administrative remedies, an inmate of this system must proceed

through four levels: (1) informal resolution, (2) first formal level

appeal, (3) second formal level appeal to the institution head, and

(4) third level appeal to the Director of the California Department

of Corrections. 15 C.C.R. § 3084.5, 3084.7; Parmer v. Alvarez, 2010

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WL 4117465, *2 (S.D. Cal. 2010). These steps must be completed

before the inmate files a claim in federal court. Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to show that he completed the 

four steps with regard to his current claims as pled in his

Complaint. Plaintiff’s central claim is that Defendants failed to

heed warnings of an imminent planned attack upon Plaintiff. This

issue is separate and distinct from his claim that the RVR was

“blatantly erroneous”. (See Complaint, Attachment A, “Inmate/Parolee

Appeal Form” at 4).

The Court notes that Plaintiff did complete the steps to

exhaust his RVR claim. However, his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim has not

proceeded through these steps. Therefore, the only matter which has

been administratively exhausted is the dismissal of the RVR.

The Court further notes that, prior to filing his claim in

federal court, Plaintiff’s sole notice to the CDC of a 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claim was his Second Level Appeal. (See Complaint, Attachment

A, “Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form” at 1). Specifically, Plaintiff

therein stated:

“Due to [the] deliberate violation [Plaintiff] along

with 8 other Black ‘VICTIMS’ are seeking to obtain

legal counsel to prepare a 42 USC 1983 civil suit and

Tort claim based on the gross negligence of Calipatria

State Prison Administration. This civil suit will be

litigated as a class action suit on behalf of the

Black inmates who were attacked when it could have

been prevented.” [Id. (emphasis original)].

These sentences are insufficient to establish that Plaintiff

attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies relating to his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim because they merely state that Plaintiff was in

the process of obtaining counsel. Furthermore, in the section of the

same appeal form titled “Action Requested,” Plaintiff did not list

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any relief related to his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Instead, all five

of his requested actions related to his RVR claim.

Even assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations and

considering Plaintiff’s arguments in the light most favorable to

him, it is clear that Plaintiff has not exhausted the administrative

remedies available to him in relation to his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Consequently, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss be GRANTED as to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

2. State Law Tort Claim

Plaintiff’s second claim is brought under California state

law. As a result, this Court applies California law regarding

exhaustion of administrative remedies rather than the PLRA. See Bass

v. First Pac. Networks, Inc., 219 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000)

(law of forum state applies to claims over which federal court has

supplemental jurisdiction). However, California law is similar to

the PLRA in requiring administrative exhaustion; “California's state

courts specifically [apply] the general exhaustion requirement to

prisoner suits, requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative

remedies before seeking judicial relief.” Wright v. State of

California, 122 Cal. App. 4th 659, 665 (2004). Furthermore, under

California law, “inmates are required to exhaust administrative

remedies, even when seeking money damages unavailable in the

administrative process.” Id. at 668.

As explained supra, Plaintiff’s Second Level Appeal was

limited to his RVR claim. The mere mention of a prospective state

law tort claim in the description of the problem is insufficient to

establish that Plaintiff attempted to exhaust his administrative

remedies in that regard.

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Even assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations and

considering Plaintiff’s arguments in the light most favorable to

him, it is clear that Plaintiff has not exhausted the administrative

remedies available to him in relation to his tort claim.

Consequently, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s tort claim.

3. Conclusion

Plaintiff has not shown that he has exhausted the administrative remedies available to him as required by the PLRA (with regard

to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim) or equivalent state law (with regard

to his tort claim). Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to both these claims.

C. PLAINTIFF SUFFICIENTLY STATES A COGNIZABLE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

CLAIM

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a

cognizable Eighth Amendment claim because he does not allege

deliberate indifference by Defendants. Specifically, Defendants

argue that, although prison officials have a duty to protect

prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners, a violation

of this duty may only be found when those officials display

“deliberate indifference.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833

(1994) (“A prison official's ‘deliberate indifference’ to a

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth

Amendment.”).

Under Farmer, “[t]o properly allege a claim based on a

failure to prevent harm, a prisoner needs to allege (1) that

conditions of his imprisonment objectively posed a “substantial risk

of serious harm” and (2) that prison officials subjectively acted

with “deliberate indifference” to his safety.” Id. at 834. In order

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11cv0401 16

to establish the second element of the Farmer test, a defendant must

know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.

Id. at 837.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Inmate Brady informed Defendants

of the planned attack and that Defendants’ failure to act was caused

by their deliberate indifference. Plaintiff is a non-moving party

here because Defendants moved for dismissal of his case. Therefore

the Court must assume the truth of the facts which are presented and

construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.

2002). Furthermore, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his

pleadings should be liberally construed. Id.

However, Plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A court is not

“required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory,

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.

2001); Ramirez v. Giurbino, 2011 WL 2669484, *2 (S.D. Cal. 2011).

Furthermore, a court may not “supply essential elements of the claim

that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.

of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); Ramirez, 2011 WL

2669484 at *2.

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not describe which Defendants by Inmate Brady were informed of the impending attack, when he

informed them, or with what degree of specificity he informed them.

However, to survive a Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s claim must be

weighed with the assumption that the facts pled are true and that

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all inferences from those facts are drawn in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party.

Defendants argue that the elements of the Farmer test have

not been met because Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants had

actual knowledge of the time, place, and attackers in advance of the

attack. However, if the facts are as Plaintiff pleads them, it may

very well be that Defendants had that knowledge. Plaintiff’s

contentions are something more than the conclusory and unwarranted

deductions of fact contemplated by Bell because Plaintiff identifies

one of the informants by name and CDCR number and explains this

individual’s motivation in becoming an informant. Whether Inmate

Brady’s words were sufficient to put Defendants on notice is a

question of fact, not of law.

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s claim against

Defendants in their supervisory role is precluded. Under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, there is no respondeat superior liability. Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A supervisor is only liable

for the constitutional violations of his subordinates if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them.”). However,

Defendants’ argument in this regard is predicated upon the assumption that Plaintiff’s claim names certain Defendants solely due to

their supervisory roles. Plaintiff may in fact be naming those

Defendants as parties who had actual knowledge of the attack via

Inmate Brady. If Inmate Brady somehow informed the Warden directly,

no respondeat superior theory is necessary to support naming the

Warden as a defendant. As noted above, details of what Inmate Brady

said and to whom are critical questions of fact, not of law.

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11cv0401 18

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents’ admonition against creating essential

elements that were not actually pled is not at issue here. Ivey, 673

F.2d at 268. Plaintiff’s factual assertions, as pled, when construed

liberally and in the light most favorable to him, may support the

argument that all the Defendants had actual prior knowledge of the

attack and failed to act. Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently

stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.

 Consequently, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss be DENIED in this regard.

D. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT PROVEN THEIR IMMUNITY FROM SUIT UNDER

STATE LAW

Defendants argue that, as to Plaintiff’s negligence claim,

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to satisfy the heightened pleading

standard against public employees. Defendants raise three arguments:

(1) heightened pleading standard under California Government Code §

951 (hereinafter “§ 951"), (2) immunity under California Government

Code § 820.2 (hereinafter “§ 820.2"), and (3) with regard to former

Warden Smalls and Associate Warden Anderson, immunity under

California Government Code § 820.8 (hereinafter “§ 820.8").

1. Heightened Pleading Standard under § 951

Defendants contend that a heightened pleading standard exists

for prison officials. They note that “any complaint for damages in

any civil action brought against a publicly elected or appointed

state or local officer, in his or her individual capacity... shall

allege with particularity sufficient material facts to establish...

individual liability...” Cal. Gov’t Code § 951 (West 2009). However,

Defendants do not support their position that the term “publicly

elected or appointed state or local officer” includes CDCR employCase 3:11-cv-00401-WQH-WVG Document 16 Filed 08/22/11 Page 18 of 23
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8/ Defendants cite Lavine v. Jessup, 161 Cal. App. 2d 59 (1958) (appellant’s

complaint did not allege “how and in exactly what manner the alleged facts rebut

the existing presumption of regularity”). Lavine was a taxpayer action against a

county board of supervisors rather than a suit by a prisoner against prison

guards. Furthermore, the relevant portion of Lavine interprets a statute that was

subsequently repealed in 1967. Defendants do not explain how this is relevant to

the statute at issue here, which was enacted in 1996. Finally, some of the quotes

in the Motion to Dismiss attributed to Lavine are not found within that case.

Defendants also cite Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit District,

40 Cal. 3d 780 (1985). That case likewise predates the statute at issue as raised

in the Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, Lopez was a action by bus passengers

against a public corporation rather than a suit by a prisoner against prison

guards.

11cv0401 19

ees. While the term may extend to some Defendants, it does not

clearly apply to all Defendants in this case.8/

Therefore, since Defendants have not proven that this

heightened standard requirement is applicable to them, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in this regard be

DENIED.

2. Immunity under § 820.2

Defendants argue that § 820.2 immunizes them from this suit.

Section 820.2 states, in pertinent part, “a public employee is not

liable for injury resulting from his act or omission where the act

or omission was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in

him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Defendants contend

that, even if they had known about the risk of harm in advance,

their failure to take preventative measures would have been the type

of discretionary act protected by § 820.2. However, “section 820.2

applies to basic policy decisions not operational or ministerial

decisions that merely implement a basic policy decision.” Martinez

v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1998)

(internal quotations omitted); see also George v. Sonoma County

Sheriff’s Dept., 2010 WL 4117381 at *26 (N.D. Cal 2010) (“There is

no basis for immunizing ministerial decisions that merely implement

a basic policy already formulated.”). Therefore, § 820.2 would only

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be applicable if Defendants’ decision not to take preventative

measures was itself a policy decision rather than an operational

decision pursuant to a standing policy.

In support of their argument for § 820.2 immunity, Defendants

point to Taylor v. Buff, 172 Cal. App. 3d 384 (1985). In that case,

a sheriff was found not liable for injuries sustained by prisoners

at the hands of other prisoners even though that sheriff failed to

lock cell doors. The court found that the sheriff’s decision to

leave cells unlocked at night rather than chain them shut (due to

emergency evacuation concerns) was a discretionary one. However, the

case currently before the Court differs for at least two reasons.

First, unlike Taylor, Defendants were allegedly given specific

information about the attack before it occurred. Second, the sheriff

in Taylor made a policy decision in concert with the board of

supervisors. In this case, Defendants do not argue that their

failure to act was the result of a policy decision.

The Court notes that several recent cases have addressed

whether prison guards have immunity under § 820.2. See Allan v.

Ditfurth, 2011 WL 2174892 *11 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (Report and Recommendation adopted denying, in part, summary judgment against a

prisoner’s state law claim because a prison guard’s decision not to

take the prisoner to the infirmary was not a policy decision); see

also Sevey v. Soliz, 2011 WL 2633826 *3 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (Order

denying, in part, defendant prison guards’ motion to dismiss

prisoner’s state law claim because immunity under section 820.2

required fact finding and was not merely a matter of law).

Therefore, since Defendants have not proven that their acts

or omissions were the result of their discretionary decisions, the

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11cv0401 21

Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in this regard

be DENIED.

3. Immunity under § 820.8

Defendants further argue that former Warden Smalls and

Associate Warden Anderson should be dismissed from the lawsuit if

Plaintiff’s allegations against them are predicated on their

supervisory roles. See § 820.8 (“a public employee is not liable for

an injury caused by the act or omission of another person”).

However, the Complaint does not name these Defendants solely in

their supervisory roles. Therefore, construed liberally, the

Complaint alleges acts or omissions by them personally. 

Therefore, absent a showing by Defendants that the relevant

acts and omissions were solely committed by Defendants other than

former Warden Smalls and Associate Warden Anderson, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in this regard be

DENIED.

Defendants have failed to show that the heightened pleading

standard of § 951 or the immunities of §§ 820.2 or 820.8 apply to

the decisions, acts, and/or omissions Plaintiff alleges. Therefore,

the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in this

regard be DENIED.

E. CONCLUSION

The Court RECOMMENDS:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss regarding their immunity

from monetary damages sought against them in their official

capacities be GRANTED.

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss regarding Plaintiff’s

failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under federal and

state law be GRANTED.

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9/ See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv–Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401

(9th Cir. 1986) (“leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines

that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could

not possibly cure the deficiency.”).

11cv0401 22

3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss regarding Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claim be DENIED.

4. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss regarding a heightened

pleading standard noted in California Government Code § 951 and

their immunity from suit under California Government Code §§ 820.2

or 820.8 be DENIED.

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

The Court further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE because Plaintiff may be able to cure the

deficiencies in his Complaint as noted in this Report and Recommendation.9/

VII

RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and that Plaintiff’s Complaint

be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 12, 2011, any

party to this action may file written objections with the Court and

serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the court and served on all parties no later than

September 26, 2011, the parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise 

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 22, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00401-WQH-WVG Document 16 Filed 08/22/11 Page 23 of 23