Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01678/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01678-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Kenneth Brazier, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, 

et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 04-1678-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 19).

The Court now rules on the motion. 

I. Background

The Plaintiff in this case, Thomas Kenneth Brazier, is incarcerated by the Maricopa

County Sheriff's Office ("MCSO"). The Plaintiff files this action pro se pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Count One of the Plaintiff's Complaint is the sole remaining claim in this

action. Count One alleges that the Defendants failed to protect the Plaintiff from injury by

other inmates in violation of the Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that he informed the Defendants that he was "having

problems in his assigned pod" but that the Defendants, in deliberate indifference to his safety,

refused to move the Plaintiff to another location. The Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the

Defendants' inaction, he was beaten by four inmates and sustained injuries. 

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The Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that the Plaintiff failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this action. Alternatively, the Defendants

move for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the Plaintiff has not alleged facts

amounting to deliberate indifference; and (2) a cause of action for negligent failure to protect

is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II. Discussion

The standard for summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Under this rule, summary judgment is properly granted when: (1) no

genuine issues of material fact remain; and (2) after viewing the evidence most favorably to

the non-moving party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). The court must

resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996). 

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) states that “[n]o action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other federal law, by

a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement

applies to all inmate suits concerning prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122

S.Ct. 983, 992 (2002). The inmate must complete the administrative procedure, regardless

of the relief available. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001). 

The Defendants have raised the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies

through a motion for summary judgment. Technically, the defense of failure to exhaust

should have been raised as a non-enumerated Rule 12(b) motion. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, this Court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of

fact. Id. Therefore, the Court can consider the documents attached to the parties' pleadings.

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However, if the Court determines that the Plaintiff has not exhausted his non-judicial

remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice. Id.

 When a defendant raises the issue of failure to exhaust in a motion for summary

judgment, the district court bears the responsibility of assuring that a pro se prisoner litigant

receives fair notice of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Id. at 1113.

On September 13, 2005, this Court issued an Order specifically advising the Plaintiff of his

rights and responsibilities under Rule 56. The Plaintiff subsequently filed a Response to the

Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff also attached evidence in

opposition to summary judgment including exhibits and affidavits. Therefore, the Court

finds that the Plaintiff received fair notice of the requirements of Rule 56 and had sufficient

opportunity to develop the record. 

 The PLRA's exhaustion requirement creates an affirmative defense. Id. Therefore,

the Defendants have the burden of proving that the Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. Id. If they succeed, the burden then shifts to the Plaintiff to show

that he did in fact exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. at 1119-20.

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants have provided the

Court with the following: (1) copies of the MCSO Inmate Grievance Procedures and Rules

and Regulations for Inmates; (2) a copy of the sole grievance form filed by the Plaintiff; (3)

an affidavit from a relevant employee avowing that the Plaintiff did not file any additional

grievances; (4) an affidavit from a relevant employee avowing that the Plaintiff did not file

any external appeals or grievances. 

 Pursuant to MCSO Policy DJ-3, inmates must file an institutional appeal as well as

an external appeal. According to the evidence presented by the Defendants, the Plaintiff in

this case filed a single grievance. (Grievance No. 7241; Affidavit of Sergeant Amy Grimm).

 This grievance does not allege that the Defendants failed to protect the Plaintiff from his

fellow inmates. (Grievance No. 7241). Rather, it requests that the Defendants remove the

Plaintiff from segregation and return him to the general population. (Grievance No. 7241).

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Therefore, it appears that Grievance No. 7241 is unrelated to Count One of the Plaintiff's

Complaint.

Even assuming that Grievance No. 7241 could be construed to encompass the claims

asserted in Count One of the Plaintiff's Complaint, the Defendants have provided evidence

that the Plaintiff failed to file an external appeal with respect to that grievance. (Affidavit

of Sergeant Amy Grimm). In fact, the Defendants have provided evidence that the Plaintiff

failed to file any grievances or external appeals with respect to the claims alleged in Count

One of his Complaint. (Grievance No. 7241; Affidavit of Sergeant Amy Grimm). Therefore,

the Court is satisfied that Defendants have carried their initial burden of showing that the

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. The burden

now shifts to the Plaintiff to present evidence showing otherwise. 

The Plaintiff argues that he "need not request [a]dministrative [s]egregation, in

accordance with the MCSO Rules and Regulations" in order to sustain this lawsuit. Rather,

the Plaintiff contends, he was only required to request "that he need be moved to protect his

safety." In support of his argument, the Plaintiff relies solely on a provision of the MCSO

Rules and Regulations titled "Housing Units/Living Areas." This provision instructs the

inmates as follows: "If you feel you should be moved from your current housing unit to

protect your safety, tell an officer immediately." 

The Plaintiff misconstrues this provision. The provision, which precedes the section

relating to inmate grievances, merely alerts inmates that they need to provide prison officials

with immediate notice if they feel they should be relocated for safety reasons. There is a

separate provision that governs the administrative procedures the inmates must follow when

they have a complaint. Even assuming the Plaintiff complied with the Housing Units/Living

Areas provision by telling an officer that he wanted to be relocated in order to protect his

safety, the Plaintiff was still required to file a grievance alleging that he suffered injuries

because he was not relocated after informing the Defendants of this threat. 

Our Supreme Court has held that PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate

suits involving all aspects of life in prison. Porter, 534 U.S. at 532, 122 S.Ct. at 992. This

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 A May 24, 2004, consult form indicates that the Plaintiff was taking Darvocet.

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requirement includes the Plaintiff's failure to protect claims. Accordingly, to survive

summary judgment, the Plaintiff must now come forward with some evidence showing that

he exhausted his administrative remedies by availing himself of the MCSO grievance

procedures. 

The Plaintiff's Complaint states, contradictorily: (1) there were not any administrative

remedies available to him; (2) he appealed his request for relief to the highest administrative

level; and (3) the Defendants wrote the Plaintiff a "nongrievable DAR-report." (Count One).

The Plaintiff's Response to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, however, does

not argue that the Plaintiff was told by the Defendants that his claims were not grievable.

(Response p. 1). The plaintiff does not provide any evidence that the Defendants gave the

Plaintiff a "nongrievable DAR-report." (Response p. 1). Additionally, the Plaintiff admits

that he was given the MCSO grievance procedures. (Response p. 1). 

Instead, the Plaintiff argues that due to the severity of the "physical and psychological

damage" that was inflicted upon him, he was "unable to comply with the grievance policy."

(Response p. 1). Subsection 4 of MCSO Policy DJ-3 requires inmates to file a grievance

within 48 hours of the event being grieved. The Plaintiff alleges that he requested to be

placed in another facility because he feared for his safety on April 16, 2004. The Plaintiff

sustained injuries on or about April 23, 2004. The Plaintiff does not dispute that he failed

to file a grievance within 48 hours of these events. He argues that he was physically and

mentally unable to do so because of the severity of the injuries he received. (Response p.

1). In support of his argument, the Plaintiff provides evidence that he suffered a broken nose

and broken left eye socket, both which required surgical reconstruction. (Plaintiff's Exhibit

E - Incident Log; Plaintiff's Exhibit H - Consultation Request; Plaintiff's Exhibits I-J -

Medical Records). 

The medical records submitted by the Plaintiff indicate that the Plaintiff was

discharged after the surgery on his eye socket on June 19, 2004, with pain medication.1

 The

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medical records also indicate that on August 19, 2004, the Plaintiff underwent rhinoplasty

to repair a nasal deformity resulting from a broken nose. The Plaintiff does not, however,

provide discharge or follow up records that discuss his physical condition following surgery.

The Plaintiff does not provide any records, affidavits, or other evidence that would indicate

that the Plaintiff lacked the physical or mental capacity to follow the grievance procedures

following his recovery. 

In fact, the evidence provided by the Plaintiff suggests that the opposite is true. The

Plaintiff has presented evidence that he filed a notice of claim on May 18, 2004. (Plaintiff's

Exhibit L). The notice of claim states that the Plaintiff was beaten and sustained injuries

after the Defendants failed to protect him by moving him to a different facility. Clearly, by

May 18, 2004, the Plaintiff had the ability to articulate his claim in writing and could have

filed a grievance at this time. The MCSO grievance procedure has a provision that states that

its "[t]ime limits may be extended upon request." The Plaintiff has not provided any

evidence that he requested a time extension due to his injuries, or that following his recovery

he attempted to file a grievance with respect to the allegations in Count One of his Complaint

before initiating this lawsuit.

The PLRA only requires exhaustion of those administrative remedies that are

available. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). The Plaintiff has provided evidence that

suggests that he may not have been physically or mentally able to comply with Policy DJ-3

within 48 hours of the events giving rise to Count One of his Complaint. However, the

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that he lacked access to administrative remedies

following his recovery, or was in any other way prevented from complying with Policy DJ-3

prior to filing this action. 

Although the grievance procedures may not have been available to the Plaintiff during

his time of incapacity, he had access to them once he recovered. The PLRA's exhaustion

requirement is mandatory. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524, 122 S.Ct. at 988. The Plaintiff is not

relieved from the exhaustion requirement just because he could not comply with the 48 hour

time limit due to incapacity. The Plaintiff was still required to exhaust his administrative

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remedies prior to filing this lawsuit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir.

2002). 

The Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that he filed an internal or external

grievance with respect to the claims alleged in Count One of his Complaint. In opposition

to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff did provide the Court with

a copy of a letter that the Plaintiff wrote on October 6, 2005, requesting: (1) copies of any

prior grievances and responses; (2) three grievance appeal forms; and (3) three external

grievance appeal forms. (Plaintiff's Exhibit K). The Plaintiff also provided the Court with

copies of three partially filled out grievance forms dated October 6, 2005. (Exhibit K).

The first grievance form alleges that on April 14, 2004, the Plaintiff told the

Defendants that he "feared for his life," and that he was placed back in the Tower he asked

to be removed from in "deliberate indifference to [his] safety." (Exhibit K). The resolution

requested is relocation to administrative segregation or a different facility. (Exhibit K). The

second grievance form alleges that the Plaintiff was beaten on April 23, 2004, but not

discovered until April 25, 2004. (Exhibit K). The resolution requested is "Train D.O.'s

Better." (Exhibit K). The third grievance form complains that the Plaintiff was given a

"disciplinary report" on April 17, 2004, for asking to be moved from Tower 2 "because [he]

feared for [his] life." (Exhibit K). The resolution requested is relocation to administrative

segregation or a different facility. (Exhibit K). The "received by" section of all of these

grievance forms are blank. They do not contain a grievance number or a date stamp. The

Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that he ever filed these grievance forms as required

by the MCSO Inmate Grievance Procedures and Rules and Regulations for Inmates.

The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 12, 2004. The Defendants filed their Motion

for Summary Judgment on August 26, 2005. The partially filled out grievance forms were

all signed and dated by the Plaintiff on October 6, 2005. (Exhibit K). The grievance forms

were created after the Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit and were submitted in response to the

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Even assuming that the Plaintiff actually did

file these documents during the pendency of this lawsuit, the Plaintiff's Complaint would still

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be subject to dismissal. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199 (holding that a district court must

dismiss without prejudice an action involving prison conditions when the plaintiff fails to

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit but provides proof that he is in the

process of doing so after a motion to dismiss was filed). 

The Defendants provided evidence that the Plaintiff failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies prior to filing this action. (MCSO Inmate Grievance Procedure;

Affidavit of Sergeant Amy Grimm; Grievance No. 7241). The Plaintiff has failed to provide

any contradictory evidence. Accordingly, the Defendants' motion is granted.

Alternatively, the Court finds that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment

on Count One of the Plaintiff's Complaint for the reasons set forth below.

B. Failure to Allege Facts Constituting Deliberate Indifference

 Section 1983 merely provides a cause of action, the Court looks to the underlying

state of mind requirement of the constitutional violations alleged. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 841, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1981 (1994). Count One of the Plaintiff's Complaint alleges

that the Defendants violated the Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by

"refusing to move" the Plaintiff after the Plaintiff informed the Defendants that he was

"having problems in his assigned pod." The Plaintiff was subsequently assaulted by four of

his fellow inmates. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants' refusal to move him to

another location was in "deliberate indifference" to the Plaintiff's safety.

A prison official's "deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk of serious harm to an

inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 1974. An

inmate can sustain an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim by showing the following.

First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, "sufficiently serious." Id. at 834, 114

S.Ct. at 1977. The alleged deprivation is "sufficiently serious" if the inmate can show that

he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. Second, the

prison officials must have acted with deliberate indifference. Id. "Deliberate indifference,"

means that the official acted or failed to act despite knowledge of the risk to the inmate. Id.

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at 842, 114 S.Ct. at 1981. Allegations of mere negligence are insufficient to sustain an

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. Id. at 835, 114 S.Ct. at 1978.

 With respect to the Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim, a violation for failure to

protect is actionable where a plaintiff can show: (1) an injury was caused by a state created

danger; (2) the danger was known by the responsible official; and (3) there was deliberate

indifference on the part of the responsible official to the safety of inmates in the presence of

the known danger. L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the Due

Process Clause is not implicated by the lack of due care of an official causing unintended

injury to life, liberty or property. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347, 106 S.Ct. 668,

670 (1986). In other words, allegations that a government official is negligent in causing an

injury to an inmate are insufficient to support a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.

at 347, 106 S.Ct. at 670.

The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because the acts

alleged by the Plaintiff, as a matter of law, do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.

The Court agrees. The evidence provided by the Plaintiff and the Defendants indicates the

following. The Plaintiff was booked into Maricopa County Jail on April 3, 2004. The

Plaintiff was placed in "the Towers," a secure facility, because he was an escape risk due to

a prior escape in Minnesota in 2003. (Affidavit of James Coffman). The Plaintiff was

housed in Tower 2. (Plaintiff's Response; Disciplinary Action Report ("DAR")). 

On April 16, 2004, the Plaintiff asked to be placed in another facility. (Count One;

DAR). The Plaintiff contends that he told the Defendants that he was afraid he would be

"beat-up if [he] stayed," because he was told by the inmates he was housed with that he had

to "roll up or get beat up." (Plaintiff's Affidavit). The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff

told them that he was having problems in his pod and wanted to be relocated, but was not

specific about what kind of problems he was having. (Affidavit of Adam Joseph Aguirre).

 The parties agree that, at a minimum, the Plaintiff told the Defendants that he was

"rolling up" and that he was "having problems in the pod and wanted to live somewhere

else." (Count One; DAR; Affidavit of James Coffman; Affidavit of Adam Joseph Aguirre).

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The parties also agree that the Defendants told the Plaintiff that no other medium security

housing was available and that his choice was to stay in his assigned pod or go to "lockdown." (Plaintiff's Affidavit; DAR). The parties agree that the Plaintiff requested to be put

in lock-down. (Plaintiff's Affidavit; DAR). The Plaintiff was placed in lock-down from

April 16-19, 2004. (Affidavit of Adam Joseph Aguirre). The Plaintiff was given a

"disciplinary report" on April 17, 2004, for disrupting security by refusing to go back to his

cell. (Count One; DAR; Affidavit of James Coffman). 

On April 20, 2004, the Plaintiff was removed from lock-down and placed in Tower

6. (Plaintiff's Affidavit; Affidavit of Adam Joseph Aguirre). On April 22, 2004, he was

returned to Tower 2. (Plaintiff's Affidavit, Affidavit of Adam Joseph Aguirre). However,

the Plaintiff was placed in a different "pod" within Tower 2 where he was unable to associate

with the individuals he was housed with on April 16, 2004, when he requested to be relocated

because he was "having problems in the pod." (Affidavit of Adam Joseph Aguirre).

On or about April 23, 2004, the Plaintiff was beaten by four other inmates and

sustained injuries including a broken nose and eye socket. (Plaintiff's Affidavit; Plaintiff's

Exhibit E - Incident Log; Plaintiff's Exhibit H - Consultation Request; Plaintiff's Exhibits I-J

- Medical Records). On April 27, 2004, the Plaintiff was placed into "voluntary

administrative segregation" at the Madison Street Jail. (Plaintiff's Affidavit; MCSO

Memorandum dated June 6, 2005). On July 4, 2004, the Plaintiff filed a grievance

complaining that he wanted to return to the "general population." (Grievance No. 7241). On

July 21, 2004, the Plaintiff was returned. (Plaintiff's Affidavit; MCSO Memorandum dated

June 6, 2005). On April 16, 2005, the Plaintiff again requested a return to administrative

segregation saying that his life had been threatened. (MCSO Memorandum dated June 6,

2005). His request was granted and he remained in administrative segregation through June

6, 2005. (MCSO Memorandum dated June 6, 2005). 

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants were "deliberately indifferent" because

they failed to move him to a different location after he allegedly reported that his fellow

inmates posed a threat to his safety. (Count One; Plaintiff's Response). However, in support

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of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants have provided evidence that the

Plaintiff was in fact moved to a different location. (Affidavit of Adam Joseph Aguirre).

Although the Plaintiff was returned to Tower 2, he was placed in a different pod and housed

with different inmates. (Affidavit of Adam Joseph Aguirre). The Plaintiff's Response merely

re-alleges that he was returned to Tower 2. (Plaintiff's Affidavit). The Plaintiff has failed

to provide any evidence that he was placed in the same pod, or had contact with any of the

inmates that the Plaintiff allegedly feared when he made the request to move on April 16,

2004. 

A prison official's duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure "reasonable safety."

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. at 1983. Prison officials who knew of a substantial risk

to inmate health or safety are free from liability under the Eighth Amendment if they can

show that they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was ultimately not averted.

Id. at 844, 114 S.Ct. at 1982-83. Assuming the Plaintiff's allegations are true and the

Defendants were told that the Plaintiff wanted to be relocated because he had been threatened

by inmates where he was housed, the Defendants are not liable under the Eight Amendment

because they acted reasonably by moving the Plaintiff to another pod within Tower 2 where

the Plaintiff would not come into contact with those same individuals. 

Additionally, there is no evidence that the Defendants knew or intended to endanger

the Plaintiff by relocating him to a different pod within Tower 2. The Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated by the lack of due care of an official causing

unintended injury to life, liberty or property. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 347, 106 S.Ct. at 670.

Therefore, the Defendants are not liable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

In this circuit, a prison official cannot be held liable for failure to protect under section

1983 unless there has been a showing of deliberate indifference. L.W., 92 F.3d at 896.

Without such a showing, the case cannot be submitted to a jury. Id. The Plaintiff has failed

to allege any facts that would constitute deliberate indifference. Count One of the Plaintiff's

Complaint and the Plaintiff's Response to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

do allege that the Defendants acted with "deliberate indifference" to the Plaintiff's safety. 

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However, these conclusory statements are insufficient to withstand summary judgment. The

Plaintiff must allege specific facts to support his claim. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Mere allegation and speculation are not sufficient to create a factual

dispute for purposes of summary judgment. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 266 (9th Cir.

1995). 

There is a factual dispute as to whether the Plaintiff told the Defendants that he

wanted to move from his pod because the inmates where he was housed threatened to beat

him up, or whether he merely told the Defendants that he wanted to relocate and "roll up"

because he was "having trouble" but did not specify what kind of trouble or that he feared

for his safety. However, in order to defeat summary judgment, disputed facts must be both

material and genuine. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. A material fact is

one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is only genuine "if the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. The factual

dispute in this instance is not genuine or material. Regardless of whether the Defendants

knew the Plaintiff feared the inmates he was housed with on April 16, 2004, or whether the

Defendants thought the Plaintiff just wanted to be relocated, the uncontradicted evidence

indicates that the Defendants complied with the Plaintiff's request by moving the Plaintiff to

a different pod where the Plaintiff was no longer in contact with the inmates that were the

alleged threat to his safety. Therefore, even taking the Plaintiff's version of the facts as true,

no reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff.

There is no suggestion of deliberate indifference in this case. Summary judgment is

proper where, as here, the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an essential element of his case on which he will bear the burden of proof

at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. 

/ / /

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 Accordingly,

 IT IS ORDERED GRANTING the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (doc.

19). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of

the Defendants and terminate this action.

DATED this 22nd day of March, 2006.

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