Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02042/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02042-31/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

L.H., A.Z., D.K., and D.R.,

on behalf of themselves and

all other similarly 

situated juvenile parolees

in California,

NO. CIV. S-06-2042 LKK/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, 

Governor, State of 

California, et al,

Defendants.

 /

This is a class action brought by a class of juvenile parolees

in California who claim that defendants’ policies and practice deny

them their constitutional rights to due process, equal protection,

and assistance of counsel. They also allege violation of their

statutory rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,

29 U.S.C. § 794. Defendants include the Governor of the State of

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 All facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

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California and various persons and entities administering

California’s juvenile parole system. 

Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on two

alternative grounds. First, plaintiffs seek that the Court find,

as a matter of law, that defendants violate plaintiffs’ due process

rights by failing to conduct two hearings prior to revocation of

parole. Alternatively, plaintiffs move for partial summary

judgment on the grounds that, if a single hearing is sufficient to

revoke plaintiffs’ parole, defendants violate plaintiffs’ due

process rights by failing to hold such a hearing promptly.

Plaintiffs 

seek an injunction requiring that defendants hold probable cause

hearings for all juvenile parolees within ten calendar days of the

parolee being taken into custody for revocation proceedings. The

court grants the plaintiffs’ motion on the issue of whether the

defendants violate the plaintiffs’ due process rights, but the

court denies the motion as to injunctive relief.

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS1

Currently, there are approximately 2,775 juveniles on parole

in California. Decl. of Maria Morris (“Morris Decl.”) Ex. L, ¶ 4.

The certified plaintiff class consists of juvenile parolees in or

under the jurisdiction of California, including all juvenile

parolees with disabilities as defined in section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, who are

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(1) in the community under parole supervision or are at large, or

(2) in custody in California as alleged parole violators and who

are awaiting revocation of their parole, or (3) in custody after

having been found in violation of their parole and returned to

custody. Order Granting Class Certification, Feb. 28, 2007.

A juvenile parolee may have his parole revoked based on the

determination that he has committed a new crime or that he has

failed to abide by the other terms and conditions of parole. Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4982. Prior to revocation, the parolee can

be arrested and detained pending the Juvenile Parole Board’s

determination that there is probable cause to believe that the

parolee has violated the conditions of parole, or “when a violation

of parole has been established.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

4978(b)(1).

A. Current Process for Parole Revocation When the Parolee Is Not

Accused of a New Crime

A parolee may have his parole revoked based upon his having

violated the terms of his parole, even when the parolee has not

been accused of a new crime. California regulations refer to this

as a “technical violation” of parole. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

4982(a)(2). The defendants’ regulations do not provide for a

hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe

that the conduct comprising the technical violation did in fact

occur. SUF ¶ 10; Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Request for

Admissions 14:16-15:16, Exh. C, Decl. of Sarah Laubach (“Laubach

Decl.”) (admission of defendant Division of Juvenile Justice). 

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Once a parolee has been taken into custody for a technical

violation, California regulations require that a hearing occur

within sixty days to determine whether the parolee has violated a

condition of his or her parole. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

4978(c)(1); SUF ¶ 13. This 60-day period can be extended upon

written justification. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4978(c)(2); SUF

¶ 15; cf. Decl. of Gay Grunfeld (“Grunfeld Decl.”) Exh. A, B, F,

G, L. 

More than half of all juvenile parole revocation proceedings

in recent years have been for technical violations. SUF ¶ 6. From

2004-2006, approximately 75 percent of parole revocation

proceedings for technical violations resulted in the parolee being

continued on parole or discharged from parole; in other words,

technical violations led to a parolee’s parole being revoked in

only one-fourth of the cases. SUF ¶ 9. 

B. Current Process for Parole Revocation When the Basis of the

Revocation is the Parolee’s Having Been Charged With a New

Crime 

When the parolee faces revocation based on new criminal

charges, defendants’ regulations provide for a preliminary hearing

to determine that there is probable cause to believe that the

parolee committed the crime. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4981. The

juvenile parolee may be detained while this determination is made.

SUF ¶ 1. After the parolee is detained, the parolee’s parole agent

prepares a detention report, which identifies the reasons for the

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2

 Marco Reyna is one of the persons designated by the

defendants as most knowledgeable of juvenile parole hearings. 

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detention. Depo. of Marco Reyna2

 (“Reyna Depo.”) 31:1-31:5, Exh.

E, Laubach Decl. This report is then reviewed by a Supervising

Parole Agent. Reyna Depo. 31:8-31:12, Exh. E, Laubach Decl. If the

Supervising Parole Agent decides to place a parole-hold on the

parolee, within forty-eight hours the parolee is given notice of

the allegation against him. Defendant’s Reponse to Plaintiff’s

Request for Admissions 4:19-4:20, Exh. C, Laubach Decl. (admissions

of defendant Division of Juvenile Justice). The parolee is able to

waive his appearance at the probable cause hearing. Reyna Depo.

25:2-25:17, Exh. E, Laubach Decl. 

When the parolee is given notice of the allegation of the law

violation, the parolee is also given a “Parolee Probable Cause/

Violation Detention Hearing Waiver Feedback” form. Defendant’s

Reponse to Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions 16:9-16:11, Exh. C,

Laubach Decl. (admissions of defendant Division of Juvenile

Justice). This form presents the parolee with two options: that the

parolee waives “a probable cause/detention hearing and a timely

violation hearing for any law violations,” stating that the parolee

understands the waiver is not an admission of guilt.

Alternatively, the parolee can request a detention hearing before

the Youth Authority Board. Decl. of Maria Morris (“Morris Decl.”)

Exh. D. Parolees are not represented by counsel when given this

form. Reyna Depo. 70:10-70:12, Exh. E, Laubach Decl. If the waiver

form is not returned postmarked within five calendar days, the

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parolee is deemed to have automatically waived his right to appear

at the probable cause hearing. Morris Decl. Exh. D.

If the parolee waives his appearance at the probable cause

hearing, a hearing officer from the Juvenile Parole Board

determines whether the parolee should be detained pending

adjudication of the new crime with which the parolee has been

charged. Reyna Depo. 31:16-31:24, Exh. E, Laubach Decl. The hearing

officer bases his determination on the report offered in support

of the parole-hold. Id. Defendant concedes that in these

situations, where the parolee has waived his appearance at the

probable cause hearing, “California . . . does not conduct an

actual hearing.” Defs.’ Opposition at 10; cf. Reyna Depo. 25:2-

25:6, Exh. E, Laubach Decl. (stating that if the parolee signs the

waiver, he is “waiving [his] rights to a . . . probable cause

detention hearing”).

Very rarely does a juvenile parolee invoke his right to appear

at the probable cause hearing; as defendants concede, only when the

parolee invokes this right does the hearing actually occur. SUF ¶

18; Defs.’ Opposition at 10. Neither party has described for the

court in detail the process and procedures that exist at these

probable cause hearings.

After the parolee has been detained for a law violation,

California regulations allow sixty days for a probable cause

hearing. SUF ¶ 12; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 4978(c)(1)(B). This

period may be extended upon written justification being presented

to the hearing officer. SUF ¶ 14; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

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4978(c)(2); cf. Decl. of Gay Grunfeld Exh. H, I. 

III.

STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER 

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

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renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before

the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of

summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id.

at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in

the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir.

1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass’n of

Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and that the dispute is

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

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return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-

49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200

F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of

fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.

Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine

need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see

also Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No.

20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 1093

(9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to be

believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court

must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962) (per curiam)); See also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County

of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless,

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inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602

F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Evidentiary Issues

1. Plaintiffs’ Objections to Defendants’ Declarations in

Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) mandates that affidavits

supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment “set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Competence to testify requires that the

witness have personal knowledge of the facts comprising his

testimony. Fed. R. Evid. 602. An affiant whose statements rely on

hearsay clearly does not meet this standard. Block v. City of Los

Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2001). 

An affiant who has not established the basis of his or her

knowledge has also failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule

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of Civil Procedure 56(e). In such a situation, as the Ninth Circuit

explained, “it is impossible to evaluate potential hearsay

implications of [the] statements [in the affidavit] without the

required personal knowledge foundation.” Norita v. N. Mariana

Islands, 331 F.3d 690, 697 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the affiant

may have based his or her statements on personal knowledge, the

affiant also could have based the statements on business records

he or she read, conversations with others who did have personal

knowledge, or even double hearsay. Id. at 697-98. These

possibilities justify strict adherence to the directives of Rule

56(e).

Here, portions of the declaration by Shelley Jones that

defendants offer in support of their opposition to summary judgment

purport to explain how the regulations for revoking the parole of

a juvenile are in fact carried out. See Decl. of Shelly Jones

(“Jones Decl.”) ¶ 3 (describing how parole agents “often”

investigate the circumstances of a law violation and when the

Juvenile Parole Board “usually” holds probable cause hearings), ¶

4 (describing how the Supervising Parole Agent decides whether to

issue a parole-hold), ¶ 5 (stating that “occasionally” the

revocation hearings do not occur within the typical timeline), ¶

6 (averring “upon information and belief” that there are

educational and work opportunities for juvenile parolees in DJJ

facilities). In her April 11, 2007 deposition, Ms. Jones identified

her job duties, which include scheduling hearings; drafting changes

to regulations, policies, and procedures; training hearing officers

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 It may be that the defendants sought to tender Jones as an

expert, which might justify reliance on otherwise impermissible

matters. The defendants, however, failed to seek a determination

of that status or actually even notice such a status.

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and parole agents; analyzing appeals from wards; and analyzing

legislation. Depo. of Shelly Jones, Exh. F, Laubach Decl. This

being the case, the court concludes that the above-referenced

portions of the Jones declaration fail to comply with Rule 56(e),

because the basis of Ms. Jones’ knowledge is neither stated nor

apparent to the court. Therefore, the court sustains the

plaintiffs’ objection with regards to the factual averments

contained in these portions of her declaration.3

The declaration from Allen Wilcher that defendants offer in

support of their opposition to summary judgment is similarly

flawed. In his declaration, Mr. Wilcher described what occurs after

a juvenile parolee has been arrested on a new charge or when he is

believed to have committed a technical violation of the terms of

his parole. Decl. of Allen Wilcher (“Wilcher Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3.

Although Mr. Wilcher identified himself as a Parole Agent III at

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, a position

he has held since 1997, he has not explained how he is aware of the

steps that actually occur when a parolee is suspected to have

violated the terms of his parole. See Wilcher Decl. ¶ 1. Mr.

Wilcher has not declared that his statements are based on his

personal knowledge and observations. Because the statements in Mr.

Wilcher’s declaration may very well be based on business records

Mr. Wilcher read, conversations with others who did have personal

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 Again, the defendants have failed to even seek to have

Wilcher declared an expert.

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knowledge, or even double hearsay, the declaration does not satisfy

Rule 56(e).4

Accordingly, the court sustains plaintiffs’ objections to

defendants’ declarations in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment.

2. Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiffs request the court take judicial notice of Senate

Report number 94-369, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335. This report describes

the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act. Plaintiffs have

provided a copy of this report to the Court as Exhibit K to the

Declaration of Maria Morris in Support of Plaintiff’s Motions for

Partial Summary Judgment.

A court may take judicial notice of a fact not subject to

reasonable dispute, either because the fact is generally known

within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or because

the fact is capable of accurate and ready determination from

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R.

Evid. 201(b). A court shall take judicial notice of a judicially

noticeable fact “if requested by a party and supplied with the

necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). 

Here, the Senate Report is a public record, and therefore the

court is able to accurately and readily determine its contents.

Furthermore, the contents of the Report derive from a source whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Finally, plaintiffs have

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complied with Federal Rule of Evidence 201(d) by requesting

judicial notice and supplying the court with a copy of the Report.

Therefore the court takes judicial notice of Senate Report

number 94-369, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335. 

B. Framework for Analysis of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary

Judgment

Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on two

alternative grounds. First, plaintiffs argue that, as a matter of

law, defendants violate plaintiffs’ due process rights by failing

to conduct two hearings prior to revocation of parole, one of which

being a preliminary hearing. Second and alternatively, plaintiffs

move for partial summary judgment on the grounds that, if a single

hearing is sufficient to revoke plaintiffs’ parole, defendants

violate plaintiffs’ due process rights by failing to hold such a

hearing promptly. Plaintiffs seek an injunction requiring that

defendants hold probable cause hearings for all juvenile parolees

within ten calendar days of the parolee being taken into custody

for revocation proceedings. 

Because the issues presented in the present case present a

legal analysis similar to that which the court undertook in

Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (E.D. Cal. 2002), the court

recreates the relevant portions of that opinion here. 

In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Supreme Court

established a three step balancing test to resolve procedural due

process claims. While Mathews did not involve claims arising in a

parole context, that fact does not appear significant. Indeed,

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5 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the seminal parole

violation case preceded Mathews. It cited to Mathews’ “direct

ancestors in reaching its conclusions”. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at

481(citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263(1970); Fuentes v.

Shevin, 407 U.S. 67(1972)). Moreover, Mathews, while involving a

property interest in Social Security disability benefits, cited to

cases in the prison context, as well as Morrissey, to develop its

test for determining the process due before deprivation of a

constitutionally protected interest. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at

333-34 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58(1974);

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481)

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procedural due process jurisprudence appears to employ the same

three part test irrespective of the context in which the claim

arises. See Greenholtz v. Inmates, Nebraska Penal & Correctional

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 18,(1979).5 Of course to recognize that the

same standard applies, is not to say that context is irrelevant.

On the contrary, as explained below, context is one of the elements

to be considered in arriving at a conclusion as to what process is

due. I turn to the three part test.

The first criteria in assessing the process due is the value

of the liberty interest and the degree of potential deprivation.

 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341. (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471).

 As the Court in Morrissey noted, “consideration of what procedures

due process may require under any given set of circumstances must

begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government

function involved as well as of the private interest that has been

affected by the governmental action.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481

(quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.

886, 895 (1961)). After identifying the nature of the right at

issue, the court must consider “the fairness and reliability of the

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6 The Court explained that:

“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he [the parolee] can be

gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and

to form the other enduring attachments of normal life ...”

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. While juveniles may not all be seeking

gainful employment, they may be enrolled in school, an equally

important opportunity.

7 Just ask any defendant in a criminal trial whether he wants

probation or imprisonment.

8 Since the liberty interest of those persons outside the

prison is far greater then those who are imprisoned, cases such as

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existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any,

of additional procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343.

Finally, the court must consider the administrative burden and

other societal costs, or benefits, which might be associated with

requiring more process as a matter of constitutional law. Id. at

347.

As Morrissey noted, the liberty interest at stake in cases

such as the one at bar, is a parolee's interest in retaining the

“enduring attachments of normal life” so long as he or she does not

violate the conditions of parole. 408 U.S. at 482.6 While there

may be no constitutional right to parole and while the conditions

of parole may significantly restrict a parolee's freedom, it is

self-evident that the liberty interest of a parolee is quite

significant, and much greater than the liberty interest of a

prisoner still confined within the prison system. See id.7

(“Though the State properly subjects [a parolee] to many

restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is

very different from that of confinement in prison.”).8

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Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), and Meachum v. Fano, 427

U.S. 215 (1976), which involve asserted rights within prison, do

not inform what weight is to be accorded the liberty interest at

stake in the parole context. See also Young v. Harper, 520 U.S.

143, 147-48(1997).

17

Under the rationale of Morrissey, the “fairness and

reliability” of the existing procedures should then be measured by

determining how effective the procedures are in assuring a

factually accurate statement of (1) whether there is probable cause

to believe that the parolee violated parole (procedures during

preliminary stage), and (2) whether the parolee did in fact violate

parole (procedures during revocation hearing). As the High Court

explained, “[i]n analyzing what [process] is due, we see two

important stages in the typical process of parole revocation ...

The first stage occurs when the parolee is arrested and detained,

usually at the direction of the parole officer. The second occurs

when parole is formally revoked.” 408 U.S. at 485. The first stage

is to insure that the parolee's life is not disrupted by an

unjustified parol hold, while the second stage requires reliable

information justifying the parolee's long term reincarceration. Id.

Fundamentally, the process due must include procedures which will

prevent parole from being revoked because of “erroneous information

or because of an erroneous evaluation.” Id. at 484.

Of course, as with all due process considerations, the balance

which the court strikes in the parole revocation context is

informed by an understanding that “due process is flexible and

calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation

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9 Defendants appear to suggest that the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), has altered the

values to be balanced requiring the court to afford “substantial

weight” to any adverse impact upon public safety or the operation

of the criminal justice system. I cannot agree. By its terms,

Section 3626(a)(1)(A) applies to any “civil action with respect to

prison conditions.” Here, plaintiffs do not challenge prison

conditions. Rather, plaintiffs challenge quite a different subject,

parole violation procedures. As noted supra, the Supreme Court has

long recognized different issues are at stake when addressing

parolees as contrasted with those who are imprisoned. Young v.

Harper, 520 U.S. 143(1997). While considerations of public safety

and the impact on the criminal justice system are proper factors

to weigh in determining the process due, the weight to be accorded

those factors is unaffected by PLRA.

18

demands.” Id. at 481. Put bluntly, however, flexibility is not a

shibboleth permitting something less than what the particular

situation does demand.

Given all the above, I now consider the process that is due

specifically when a parolee's liberty interest is endangered by a

claimed violation of the terms of parole.9

To assess the validity of plaintiffs' claim, the court must

first determine whether there is controlling precedent speaking to

the particular procedures due at the initial stage of the parole

revocation process. Obviously where binding precedent requires

particular procedures, the pertinent question is whether defendants

are providing those required procedures. In the absence of such

controlling precedent, the task is to apply the Mathews process to

the procedures at issue. As I now observe, the courts by which I

am bound have spoken with less than perfect clarity on the issues

before me.

C. Due Process Requirements for Pre-Revocation Hearings

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10 Defendants concede that, when a juvenile parolee waives his

appearance at the preliminary hearing, the State then does not hold

“an actual hearing.” Defs.’ Opposition at 10. Instead, a hearing

officer makes a probable cause determination based on the

information provided by the Supervising Parole Agent. Reyna Depo.

31:16-31:24, Exh. E, Laubach Decl.

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Plaintiffs argue that due process requires, alternatively, a

bifurcated process that includes a preliminary hearing before the

revocation hearing, or a single revocation hearing held promptly.

This court concludes that because neither a preliminary hearing is

held promptly nor a single revocation hearing held promptly, the

defendants’ policies and practices violate the plaintiffs’ due

process rights. 

Plaintiffs’ first alternative claim is that they are being

denied due process because defendants do not afford juvenile

parolees preliminary hearings to verify the existence of probable

cause prior to the revocation hearing. Defendants acknowledge that

juvenile parolees accused of technical violations do not receive

preliminary probable cause hearings. SUF ¶ 10. Defendants contend,

however, that all juvenile parolees accused of law violations are

entitled to preliminary hearings, although many choose to waive

their appearance at them. Defendants argue that the resulting

“hearing”10 that occurs in the parolee’s absence satisfies the

demands of due process. 

Plaintiffs’ second alternative claim is that if a distinct

probable cause hearing is not required, defendants nevertheless

violate plaintiffs’ due process rights by failing to hold a hearing

in a sufficiently timely manner. Whether a juvenile parolee is

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taken into custody for an alleged technical violation or a law

violation, the State has sixty days (or more, upon written

explanation) to hold any hearing. SUF ¶¶ 12-15. This includes the

single revocation hearing for alleged technical violators and the

probable cause determination for law violators. SUF ¶¶ 12-13. 

As the court explains below, because for neither technical nor

law violators does the State make a prompt probable cause

determination, the defendants’ parole revocation process for

juvenile offenders violates the latter’s due process rights. Even

if there is some question as to whether a separate preliminary

hearing must be held in order to satisfy the demands of due

process, it is clear that the law requires that a probable cause

determination be made promptly.

1. Defendants Are Required to Provide Plaintiffs With a

Prompt Probable Cause Determination

In Morrissey, the Supreme Court appeared to determine that the

Constitution requires a two stage process. 408 U.S. at 485, (“[W]e

see two important stages in the typical process of parole

revocation,” the first being the “arrest and preliminary hearing”

stage, and the second, “when parole is formally revoked.”). The

Court explained that the initial “inquiry should be seen as in the

nature of a ‘preliminary hearing’ to determine whether there is

probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested

parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of

parole conditions.” Id.

The Morrissey Court's explanation of the requirements for a

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preliminary procedure plainly suggests that it contemplated a

“hearing” rather than some ex-parte process, for confirming

probable cause. For instance, in describing the “preliminary

hearing,” the Court stated that “the parolee should be given notice

that the hearing will take place and that its purpose is to

determine whether there is probable cause to believe he has

committed a parole violation.” Id. at 486-87. The Court added

that “[a]t the hearing, the parolee may appear and speak in his own

behalf; he may bring letters, documents, or individuals who can

give relevant information to the hearing officer.” Id. at 487.

Moreover, on request of the parolee, the “person who has given

adverse information on which parole revocation is to be based is

to be made available for questioning in his presence.” Id.

Finally, the Court required that the determination of reasonable

grounds “should be made by someone not directly involved in the

case.” Id. at 485.

Despite the fairly detailed description of a constitutionally

sufficient preliminary determination, it remains true that the

Court has repeatedly taught, and not just in Morrissey, that the

requisites of due process are flexible. As will be seen, this

teaching has suggested to some that Morrissey did not command two

hearings under all circumstances. As I now explain, that

conclusion, while plausible, is difficult to maintain in light of

the Supreme Court's next discussion of the issue.

A year after Morrissey, the Court explained that in that case

“we held that a parolee is entitled to two hearings, one a

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preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and detention to

determine whether there is probable cause to believe that he has

committed a violation of his parole, and the other a somewhat more

comprehensive hearing prior to the making of the final revocation

decision.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82, (1973); see

also id. at 786(“Morrissey mandated preliminary and final

revocation hearings.”). The Gagnon Court again emphasized that

“[a]t the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is entitled

to notice of the alleged violations ... an opportunity to appear

and to present evidence on his own behalf, a conditional right to

confront adverse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a

written report of the hearing.” 411 U.S. at 786. Observing no

difference between parole revocation and probation revocation, the

Court stated that “we hold that a probationer, like a parolee, is

entitled to a preliminary and final revocation hearing.” Id. at

782.

While it would appear that, without more, Morrissey and Gagnon

are dispositive, this court is also bound by the Ninth Circuit's

interpretation of the teachings of the High Court. I thus turn to

the Circuit's cases.

Nine years after Gagnon, the question of hearings under

Morrissey was discussed in Pierre v. Washington State Board of

Prison Terms and Paroles, 699 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1983). There, a

habeas petitioner, after having his parole revoked, claimed that

the State did not adhere to its own guidelines for determining his

minimum prison term. The petitioner also claimed that he was denied

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11 Given that anyone may waive a constitutional claim, the

Pierre court's assertion is indeed puzzling

12 In Morrissey, the Court explained the importance of a

prompt preliminary hearing noting that because “there is typically

a substantial time lag” between arrest and the final revocation

determination, and since “it may be that the parolee is arrested

at a place distant” from the place where the final revocation

hearing will take place, “due process would seem to require that

some minimal inquiry be conducted at or reasonably near the place

of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as

convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are

available.” 408 U.S. at 485.

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due process because the State did not provide him with a

preliminary hearing prior to his revocation hearing. On appeal, the

petitioner abandoned his claim regarding the preliminary hearing.

Nonetheless, after rejecting his claim concerning State guidelines,

the Circuit panel stated that “[a]lthough appellant abandoned his

contention that failure to hold a preliminary hearing prior to the

formal on-site revocation hearing violated his due process right,

we believe the issue is before us.” Pierre, 699 F.2d at 472.11 The

Pierre court then opined that the Supreme Court did not intend to

require two hearings in every case, but only in cases with a fact

pattern similar to the one before it in Morrissey. See Pierre, 699

F.2d at 472-73.12 Emphasizing the language in Morrissey abjuring

formalism in the revocation process, Pierre then declared that

“[u]nder the facts of Morrissey, the two-hearing system requirement

was just one way to satisfy minimum due process; it is not the

only way in every case.” Id. The Circuit panel failed to discuss

Gagnon's explanation that in Morrissey the Court had held that,

indeed, two hearings were required.

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13 In White the Ninth Circuit held that the Parole

Commission's refusal to allow plaintiff to confront and

cross-examine adverse witnesses at his parole revocation hearing

violated his right to due process. 925 F.2d at 290. While the case

addressed the final revocation hearing, the White court examined

Morrissey in detail and concluded that “[t]o gather the facts

necessary to make the two-part decision, the Morrissey court

contemplated two hearings.” Id. at 291

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At least one way of reading Pierre so as to be consistent with

Morrissey, is to read it as not departing from an obligation to

provide a preliminary probable cause hearing, but rather, as

concluding no more than that a final revocation hearing occurring

within twenty-one days of the arrest of a parolee was “prompt

enough to qualify as the preliminary probable cause determination

required by Morrissey.” Pierre, 699 F.2d at 473 (italics added).

This reading of Pierre is supported by subsequent Ninth Circuit

cases. In United States v. Stocks, 104 F.3d 308 (9th Cir.1997), a

panel stated that “[a]fter Morrissey, parole may not be revoked

unless the parolee is afforded a hearing as to probable cause and

a final revocation hearing. At the preliminary parole revocation

hearing, a parolee is entitled to notice of the alleged parole

violations, an opportunity to appear and to present evidence, a

conditional right to confront the government's witnesses, an

independent decision-maker, and a written report of the hearing.”

Id. at 311; see also White v. White, 925 F.2d 287 (9th Cir.

1991)(finding that Morrissey contemplated both a preliminary and

a final revocation hearing).13

Whatever else may be said for Pierre, it seems apparent it is

dicta. Moreover, although this court should pay respectful

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14 While Pierre opined that twenty-one days was not

inappropriate, the Seventh Circuit has suggested in dicta that a

ten day delay may violate Morrissey. See Luther v. Molina, 627 F.2d

71, 75, n. 3 (7th Cir.1980)(“Chief Justice Berger [in Morrissey]

seemed to be contemplating an almost immediate hearing.... It is

possible that a ten day delay between detention and the preliminary

hearing does not meet ... constitutional ... requirements.”)

15 It may be of some interest that the United States Senate

has noted relative to preliminary hearings in the federal parole

system, that a two-day detainment could result in a loss of

employment and severe disruption of the reintegration effort. See

S.Rep. No. 369, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1975), reprinted in

1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 347, cited in Ellis v. District of Columbia,

84 F.3d 1413, 1430 (D.C. Cir.1996).

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attention to Circuit dicta, given all the above it would seem the

defendants can only rely on Pierre if their practice of delaying

the revocation hearing for up to sixty days or more meets

Morrissey's requirement that there be a prompt determination of

probable cause. California's time frame for holding a hearing far

exceeds the twenty-one days the Pierre panel thought sufficed. 

Defendants provide no authority to support the proposition

that an delay of sixty days or more is acceptable under Morrissey

and Gagnon.14 While some state courts have held that a preliminary

hearing can occur within thirty days from the date of arrest, see

State v. Myers, 86 Wash.2d 419, 545 P.2d 538 (1976)(en banc), it

does not appear that any court has indicated that a delay of more

than thirty days would be justifiable.15 Indeed, even in Ellis v.

District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413 (D.C.Cir.1996), the D.C. Circuit

case on which defendants rely, the policy required the final

revocation hearing to occur within thirty days from the date the

Board was notified of the execution of a warrant, and regulations

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16 The majority in Ellis, like Pierre, emphasized the flexible

nature of due process and distinguished the facts in the District

of Columbia from those in Morrissey. As the dissent pointed out,

however, that reasoning fails to come to grips with Gagnon's

explanation that two hearings are required by Morrissey. See

Ellis, 84 F.3d at 1429-30 (Tatel, J., dissenting). While the

majority relied on the footnote in Gagnon encouraging the States

to devise “creative solutions” to cope with the practical

difficulties of complying with Morrissey, Ellis, 84 F.3d at 1422

(citing Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782, n. 5), that cannot reasonably be

construed as an invitation to avoid the fundamental requirements

of Morrissey. Whatever “creative solutions” or flexibility the Due

Process Clause permits, it would appear that the Supreme Court has

so far done nothing to indicate a retreat from its previous

position. Finally, for what it is worth, California's situation far

more clearly resembles that found in Morrissey rather than the

situation in the District of Columbia. In sum, then, with all due

respect, I do not find Ellis helpful in resolving the issue before

this court.

17 Plaintiffs further have argued that the hearing offered to

juvenile parolees accused of law violations is illusory, because

the process by which defendants obtain waivers of the parolees’

appearance at the hearings is unlawful. The court observes that a

waiver of a Constitutional right must be made knowingly and

voluntarily, Ostund v. Bobb, 682 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987),

but the court need not reach the question of whether defendants’

waivers comply with this requirement. 

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mandated a preliminary interview prior to the revocation hearing.

Id. at 1420.16

Given all the above, the court concludes that even if a prompt

unitary hearing would meet constitutional muster, a question I need

not resolve, California’s system allowing a delay of up to sixty

days or more before providing the parolee an opportunity to be

heard regarding the reliability of the probable cause determination

does not.17

2. The Court’s Conclusion is Compelled by Mathews

Even assuming that Morrissey and Gagnon do not compel a

prompt, distinct probable cause hearing, the court's conclusion

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above is necessitated upon application of the Mathews test. In

order to protect a parolee's liberty interest, Morrissey requires

procedures to insure not only that the State does not revoke parole

without an adequate factual basis, but that parolees are not

detained without some sort of assurance that there is probable

cause to suspect a parole violation. The effect of detention

itself, in its disruption of the juvenile parolee's family

relationships, education, job, and life, is sufficiently

significant to require such a procedure.

Moreover, it is clear that the informal probable cause

determination procedures used for technical violations and when a

parolee waives his appearance at the preliminary hearing for a law

violation place a severe strain on an accurate fact-finding

process. In both situations, the decision to hold a juvenile

parolee in custody appears to be based solely on the determination

of the parole officer and Supervising Parole Agent, who appear to

rely solely on the evidence the parole officer has gathered to

support the parole-hold. See Reyna Depo. 31:16-31:24, Exh. E,

Laubach Decl. Such decisions contain few of the hallmarks of a

reliable process as envisioned by the Mathews Court. Because the

conclusion that a parole violation has occurred is one where “a

wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of

witness credibility and veracity are often critical to the

decisionmaking process,” the procedures currently in place for

these groups of alleged parole violators seem only minimally

reliable. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 907. 

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Finally, of course, the court must balance the social interest

in protecting an individual's interest in remaining at large with

the State's interest in protecting the public from parolees who

have violated the conditions of their parole. In seeking to weigh

that interest, however, the court is handicapped, since the

defendants offer no evidence for the proposition that a delay of

sixty days or more is necessary to insure protection of that

interest. Moreover, while administrative inconvenience is a proper

Mathews consideration, the inconvenience occasioned by a prompt

probable cause hearing would not appear to be, in and of itself,

a sufficient justification for the potentially catastrophic

consequences of delay. Indeed, the Supreme Court seems to view with

equanimity the inconvenience that Morrissey engendered. See Gagnon,

411 U.S. at 782, n. 5 (“[s]ome amount of disruption inevitably

attends any new constitutional ruling.”).

For all the above reasons, the court concludes that whether

viewed as compelled by Morrissey or the result of a Mathews

balancing test, the current California parole revocation system

violates the plaintiffs’ due process rights. 

D. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs argue that because the due process violations at

issue in this case are so similar to those in Valdivia, the

Valdivia remedy should equally apply here. Specifically, the

plaintiffs seek this court to order defendants to make probable

cause determinations within ten calendar days of the juvenile

parolee being taken into custody, as the court ordered for adult

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18 Having said as much, the court does not mean to encourage

delay. The defendants have thirty (30) days to tender a plan to

meet constitutional standards.

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parolees in Valdivia. See order.

Such an order, however, is premature for the case at bar.

Although the due process failures that occur for juvenile parolees

are similar to those that the court identified in Valdivia, that

does not necessarily require identical remedies. Indeed, the

Supreme Court in both Morrissey and Gagnon noted that the solutions

to due process violations in the parole revocation context depend

on the demands of the particular circumstances. See Morrissey, 408

U.S. at 481; Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782, n. 5. The touchstone of any

remedy is that the State meet the mandates of Morrissey and Mathews

for guaranteeing due process in the juvenile parole revocation

procedures. The plaintiffs have not shown that there is no genuine

issue of material fact that the circumstances of juvenile parole

revocation require that the probable cause determination be made

within ten calendar days of the parolee being taken into custody.

VI. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED as

to their due process claim, but DENIED as to the issue of

injunctive relief.18

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 18, 2007.

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