Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01376/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01376-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN KELLY; DAVID SINGLETARY;

JON CARPENTER,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 09-CV-1376

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S SPECIAL

MOTION TO STRIKE AND

MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

7-ELEVEN INC.,

Defendant.

Plaintiff David Singletary filed a complaint against 7-Eleven, Inc. (“Defendant”) in

Superior Court of the State of California on May 15, 2009. (Doc. No. 1, Compl.) On June 25,

2009, Defendant filed a notice of removal. (Doc. No. 1.) David Singletary, along with John

Kelly and Jon Carpenter (“Plaintiffs”) filed a first amended complaint on July 1, 2009, and

a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on July 15, 2009. (Doc. No. 7.) The

Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend on August 31, 2009. (Doc. No. 9.) On

September 17, 2009, Defendant filed a special motion to strike and dismiss Plaintiffs’

complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 and Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to

Defendant’s motion to strike and dismiss on October 15, 2009. (Doc. No. 11.) Defendantfiled

a reply on October 20, 2009. (Doc. No. 13.) The Court exercises its discretion to decide this

matter on the papers pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1).

///

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of similarly situated individuals,

allege that Defendant has violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and state law

by engaging in a pattern of discrimination related to parking access barriers. (Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 17.) Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s pattern

of discrimination extends to its use of “attorneys to engage in protracted litigation and

defam[e] Plaintiff ADA bar to avoid ADA compliance.” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege four claims

under the ADA: (1) Denial of full and equal access; (2) failure to make alterations; (3) failure

to remove architectural barriers; and (4) failure to modify practices, policies, and procedures.

Plaintiffs also allege three claims under California law: (1) Denial of full and equal access; (2)

failure to modify practices, policies, and procedures; and (3) violation of the Unruh Act.

Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public

Participation (“SLAPP”) and moves to strike it under California’s Anti-SLAPP provision.

(Doc. No. 10 at 7.) Defendant’s allegation is based on its contention that “Plaintiffs’ claims

arise from 7-Eleven’s retention of attorneys to defend itself in litigation.” (Id. at 8.)

Additionally, Defendant moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ complaint because “Plaintiffs have no facts to support a plausible discrimination

claim.” (Id. at 7.)

DISCUSSION

I. Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike

A. Legal standard

California’s Anti-SLAPP Law was enacted to combat “a disturbing increase in lawsuits

brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech

and petition for the redress of grievances.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a). To prevail on

an Anti-SLAPP motion to strike, a moving party must make a prima facie showing that the

lawsuit arises from “any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free

speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue.”

Id. § 425.16(b)(1); see U.S. v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.3d 963, 971 (9th

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Cir. 1999). Once this showing has been made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a

“reasonable probability” that it will succeed on the merits. See Lockheed Missiles, 190 F.3d

at 971. 

Under section 425.16, there are four categories of protected speech: “(1) any written or

oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any

other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made

in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or

judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral

statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with

an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the

constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a

public issue or an issue of public interest.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e).

B. Federal claims

Plaintiffs argue that an Anti-SLAPP motion to strike cannot be used to dismiss their

claims under the ADA because section 425.16 does not apply to causes of action based on

federal law. (Doc. No. 11 at 3.) In its reply brief, Defendant concedes that California’s AntiSLAPP law does not apply to Plaintiffs’ federal claims. (Doc. No. 13 at 2.) As the Ninth

Circuit recently acknowledged, “a federal court can only entertain anti-SLAPP special motions

to strike in connection with state law claims.” Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 881

(9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs’ first cause of action includes four claims under the ADA. Since

all four claims are based on federal law, the Court may not entertain Defendant’s Anti-SLAPP

motion to strike. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike is denied as to Plaintiffs’ federal

ADA claims.

C. State law claims

With respect to the state law claims, the Court must first determine whether Defendant

has made a prima facie showing that Plaintiffs’ claims arise from Defendant’s “right of petition

or free speech.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1); Lockheed Missiles, 190 F.3d at 971.

Plaintiffs allege a pattern of discrimination based on Defendant’s failure to remove barriers and

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its use of attorneys to engage in protracted litigation. (SAC ¶ 17.) These allegations are

incorporated into each of Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Defendant argues that its use of attorneys

to defend itself in litigation is a protected activity, and that Plaintiffs’ allegations place their

claims squarely within California’s Anti-SLAPP statute. (Doc. No. 10 at 8.) Plaintiffs,

however, argue that their claims are based essentially on nonprotected activity, and that any

allegations based on protected activity are only incidental. (Doc. No. 11 at 7.)

In a cause of action that includes both protected and nonprotected activity, “it is the

principal thrust or gravamen of the plaintiff's cause of action that determines whether the

anti-SLAPP statute applies, and when the allegations referring to arguably protected activity

are only incidental to a cause of action based essentially on nonprotected activity, collateral

allusions to protected activity should not subject the cause of action to the anti-SLAPP statute.”

Martinez v. Metabolife Intern., Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 181, 188 (2003) (citation omitted). This

rule attempts to strike a subtle balance between competing interests. While a defendant should

not be able to take advantage of the anti-SLAPP statute simply because there is some reference

to protected activity in the complaint, a plaintiff should not be able to frustrate the purpose of

the SLAPP statute by combining allegations of protected and nonprotected activity in a single

cause of action. See id. 

The Court concludes that the principal thrust or gravamen of Plaintiffs’ state law claims

focuses on Defendant’s alleged failure to provide accessible parking. Plaintiffs’ first claim in

their state law cause of action focuses on Defendant’s alleged failure to provide full and equal

access to Defendant’s facilities. (SAC ¶¶ 34-5.) While the claim incorporates the references

to litigation practices, the focus of the claim is clearly on Defendant’s alleged failure to remove

physical barriers to access. Plaintiffs’ second claim focuses on Defendant’s alleged failure to

modify practices, policies and procedures. (SAC ¶ 36.) This claim more closely implicates

the allegations regarding Defendant’s litigation practices. However, the Court finds that the

references to protected activity are incidental to the principal thrust of Plaintiffs’ claim. In

detailing the allegedly prohibited practices, policies and procedures, Plaintiffs’ focus on

Defendant’s failure to provide handicapped accessible parking, and not Defendant’s litigation

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practices. (See SAC ¶¶ 19-23.) Plaintiffs’ third state law claim is for alleged violations of

California’s Unruh Act. (SAC ¶¶ 37-9.) As is the case with the first state law claim, the

allegations focus on the existence of physical barriers to entry, and any incorporated references

to litigation practices are merely incidental.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ references to protected activity in their state law claims

are incidental to the principal thrust of their allegations, which focus on unprotected activity.

Defendants have therefore failed to make a prima facie showing that the lawsuit arises from

protected activity. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s special motion to strike as to

Plaintiffs’ state law claims.

II. Motion to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests

the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9th Cir. 2001). A complaint generally must satisfy only the minimal notice pleading

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to evade dismissal under a Rule

12(b)(6) motion. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that

a pleading stating a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The function of this pleading requirement is to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

47 (1957)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement

to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Id. A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 C. Wright &

A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235–36 (3d ed. 2004)). “All allegations

of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

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However, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136,

1140 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Defendant alleges that “[t]he complaint is devoid of any factual allegations that support

a plausible claim of a discriminatory practice.” (Doc. No. 10 at 12.) The Court disagrees.

Plaintiffs allege that they have physical impairments that limit their ability to walk. (SAC ¶

25.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant had substantial control over some or all of the leased

stores, had actual knowledge of the ADA’s requirements, and deliberately failed to remove

architectural barriers. (Id. ¶ 23.) Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that “expert testimony will show

a statistical[ly] valid and reliable sample of the facilities contained inaccessible features.” (Id.)

Beyond these general allegations, Plaintiffs detail specific instances where each named

Plaintiff encountered parking access barriers at one of Defendant’s facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21.)

From these facts and others presented in the complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiffs

have presented far more than “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” with

respect to Defendant’s alleged pattern or practice of discrimination. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion

to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 20, 2009

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record

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