Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00304/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00304-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12181 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

BARBARA ARNOLD, )) Plaintiff, ) 2:12-cv-00304 JWS ) vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION ) KRAF, INC., ) [Re: Motion at Docket 14] ) Defendant. ))

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 14, defendant Kraf, Inc. (“defendant” or “Kraf”) moves pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss plaintiff’s Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) claim for lack of standing. Plaintiff Barbara Arnold (“plaintiff” or “Arnold”)

opposes the motion at docket 15. Defendant’s reply is at docket 16. Oral argument

was requested but would not assist the court.

II. BACKGROUND

Arnold is disabled after suffering a stroke. She requires a walker or wheelchair

for mobility. Kraf owns and operates three Burger King restaurants in Mesa, Arizona,

one at 9154 East Apache Trail, one at 5859 East McKellips Road, and one at 6820

Superstition Springs Blvd. Arnold maintains that architectural features at each

restaurant have denied her full and equal enjoyment of the services there in violation of

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the ADA.1 Arnold has asserted one claim for injunctive relief under the ADA and one

claim for compensatory damages under the Arizonans with Disabilities Act.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal of an

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In order to survive a defendant’s motion to

dismiss, the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction.2 Where the defendant brings

a facial attack on the subject matter of the district court, the court assumes the factual

allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor.3 The court does not, however, accept the truth of legal conclusions cast

in the form of factual allegations.4

IV. DISCUSSION

Although defendant correctly identifies that Article III standing must be raised via

a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), and not a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), defendant at times confuses the applicable

standard.5

 “While review for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) is generally confined

to the contents of the complaint, . . . in determining constitutional standing, ‘it is within

the trial court’s power to allow or to require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the

complaint or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed supportive of

plaintiff’s standing.’”6

 Therefore, even though standing must be pleaded in accordance

1

See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).

2

Tosco v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2000).

3

Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009).

4

Id.

5

E.g., doc. 14 at 5, 7.

6

Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).

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with the Iqbal7 and Twombly8 standards,9 and even though defendant’s challenge is

“facial,” the court is not limited to the allegations in the complaint in determining whether

plaintiff actually has standing.10 Moreover, the availability of amendment means that an

initial failure to adequately plead standing would not be fatal, provided that amendment

would be curative. 

To demonstrate Article III standing, Arnold must show 1) an injury in fact, 2) that

is fairly traceable to Kraf’s challenged actions, and 3) that her injury would likely be

redressed by a favorable decision.11 “In addition, to establish standing to pursue

injunctive relief, which is the only relief available to private plaintiffs under the ADA,

[s]he must demonstrate a real and immediate threat of repeated injury in the future.”12 A

plaintiff can establish the threat of repeated injury in the future “either by demonstrating

deterrence, or by demonstrating injury-in-fact coupled with an intent to return to a noncompliant facility.”13 

A. Injury

A barrier interferes with a disabled person’s access to a public accommodation if

it affects the person’s full and equal enjoyment of the facility in the context of the

person’s specific disability. If a barrier does not conform to ADA standards, and if the

barrier relates to a plaintiff’s disability, the plaintiff’s full and equal enjoyment is impaired

7

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

8

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

9

See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, 631 F.3d 939, 954–55 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2011). 

10Seldin, 422 U.S. at 501.

11Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

12Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946 (footnote and internal quotation omitted).

13Id. at 944.

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and that constitutes discrimination under the ADA.14 “That discrimination satisfies the

‘injury-in-fact’ element of Lujan.”15

Defendant argues that plaintiff has not alleged that the architectural barriers

identified in her complaint actually impeded her access to defendant’s restaurants or

“her ability to enjoy the goods and services provided” there.16 However, plaintiff need

only show that she encountered a non-compliant barrier that relates to her disability. 

“Actual impediment” is immaterial because it is presumed that a disabled person’s full

and equal enjoyment is impaired if the person encounters a non-compliant barrier.

The court agrees with defendant that many of the allegations in the complaint are

formulaic recitations of various elements of an ADA claim or Article III standing.17 The

complaint describes non-compliant architectural barriers, but there is no allegation that

Arnold encountered them. Arnold has not adequately pled injury-in-fact under the ADA. 

However, Arnold attached a declaration to her response to defendant’s motion. In the

declaration, plaintiff states that a non-compliant access aisle at one of Kraf’s restaurants

“has made maneuvering into the restaurant. . . difficult for me.”18 Arnold also declares

that she has encountered a non-compliant toilet stall and non-compliant parking spaces

at the other locations, each of which have impaired her full and equal access to the

restaurant.19

“Once a disabled individual has encountered . . . alleged ADA violations that

deter his patronage of or otherwise interfere with his access to a place of public

accommodation, he has already suffered an injury in fact traceable to the defendant’s

14Id. at 947.

15Id.

16Doc. 14 at 8.

17See, e.g., doc. 1 ¶¶ 10–13 (elements of standing).

18Doc. 15-1 at 3.

19Cf. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 954–55.

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conduct and capable of being redressed by the courts, and so he possesses standing

under Article III.”20 Therefore, the only remaining question is whether Arnold has been

deterred or whether she has indicated an intent to return to defendant’s restaurants.

B. Intent to Return

Arnold’s complaint states only that she “plans to return to the Property to enjoy

the goods, services, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered to nondisabled members of the public, but is deterred from returning because of discriminatory

conditions.”21 That allegation falls short of the federal pleading standard. Arnold’s

declaration, however, states that she intends to return to each of defendant’s

restaurant’s monthly and more frequently if the alleged violations are cured.22 In

addition, Arnold’s declaration states that she has “visited each restaurant numerous

times–at 9154 East Apache Trail about once per month, at 5859 East McKellips Road

about once every two months, and at 6820 East Superstition Springs Blvd. about once

every three months.”23 Arnold has therefore established that she visited Kraf’s

restaurants regularly and that she will continue to do so in the future. Arnold has

therefore demonstrated an intent to return to Kraf’s restaurants sufficient to confer

Article III standing.

Because Arnold has shown at this preliminary stage an injury-in-fact under the

ADA and an intent to return to the allegedly non-compliant establishments, Arnold has

20Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1042 n.5 (2009).

21Doc. 1 ¶ 9.

22Doc. 15-1 at 3–4.

23Id. at 2.

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demonstrated Article III standing.24 However, standing has not been adequately

pleaded, and Arnold’s complaint must therefore be amended.25

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, defendant’s motion at docket 14 is GRANTED, and

plaintiff’s ADA claim is dismissed. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 14

days from the date of this order.

DATED this 12th day of June 2012.

 /s/ 

JOHN W. SEDWICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

24Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944.

25See id. at 954, 955.

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