Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01920/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01920-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMUL ACTION COMMITTEE, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

JONODEV CHAUDHURI, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-01920-KJM-KJN 

ORDER 

The plaintiffs in this action are a group of individuals, a non-profit association, and 

a community church from Jamul, California. For convenience, in this order the court refers to 

them together as the Jamul Action Committee (JAC), the first plaintiff named in the caption. In 

this lawsuit the JAC asks the court to stop construction of a casino on the Jamul Indian Village’s 

land, among related requests for declaratory relief. In short, the JAC alleges the casino is illegal 

because it is being constructed on land that federal law does not make eligible for gambling. 

The defendants, who include federal officials, members of the Jamul Indian 

Village, and private corporations tasked with the construction and eventual management of the 

casino, move to dismiss the case on a number of jurisdictional and other grounds. The Jamul 

Indian Village itself is not a party. The court held a hearing on April 22, 2016. Kenneth 

Williams appeared for the JAC; Barbara Marvin, Judith Rabinowitz, and Vicki Boesch appeared 

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for the federal defendants; and Frank Lawrence appeared for the defendants associated with the 

Jamul Indian Village. The motions to dismiss are granted in part, as explained below. 

I. ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS 

As a preliminary matter, although the JAC alleges the Jamul Indian Village is not a 

federally recognized Indian tribe, Second Am. Compl. (SAC) ¶ 44, ECF No. 51,1 the court has in 

previous orders decided the opposite is true, Order on Prelim. Inj. at 2, ECF No. 93; Order on 

Mot. Dismiss at 7, ECF No. 50. This court is not the only one to have reached this conclusion. 

See Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 3910597, at *1 (9th Cir. June 9, 

2016); Rosales v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 565, 571–72 & nn.2–3 (2009); Rosales v. United 

States, No. 07-0624, 2007 WL 4233060, at *5 & n.4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2007). The court 

therefore refers to the Jamul Indian Village as “the Tribe” in this order. 

The JAC filed this lawsuit after the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) 

published a notice in the Federal Register in April 2013, which stated that the NIGC would 

prepare a statement on the environmental impacts of an agreement between the Tribe and 

defendant San Diego Gaming Ventures, LLC (SDGV). 78 Fed. Reg. 21,398 (Apr. 10, 2013);2

see 

also SAC ¶ 2. According to the NIGC’s notice, SDGV would manage a casino the Tribe planned 

for construction outside Jamul, California. See 78 Fed. Reg. 21,399. The notice also explained 

that the casino would be constructed “on the Tribe’s Reservation.” Id. In a previous notice 

published in the Federal Register more than a decade earlier, the NIGC and Bureau of Indian 

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 At hearing, the JAC’s counsel argued it would not seek to prove that the Tribe lacks 

federal recognition. This assertion directly contradicts the allegations of the operative complaint. 

See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 31–32 (“In 1978 the DOI adopted regulations outlining ‘Procedures for 

Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe.’ These procedures are 

currently codified at 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.1-83.13. The JIV has not filed a Part 83 petition to become 

a federally recognized tribe. Nor could the JIV meet the requirements of Part 83. . . .”); id. ¶ 44 

(“The JIV is not a federally recognized tribe.”). 

2

 The court takes judicial notice of the NIGC notice and the other entries in the Federal 

Register cited in this order. See 44 U.S.C. § 1507; United States v. Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 1001 

(9th Cir. 2003). A more detailed description of the NIGC’s notice and the relevant statutory and 

regulatory regime may be found in this court’s previous order. See Order on Prelim. Inj. 2–8. 

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Affairs had not referred to this land as the Tribe’s “Reservation.” See Notice of Intent, 67 Fed. 

Reg. 15,582 (Apr. 2, 2002); see also Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. 1,475 (Jan. 10, 2003). 

The JAC understood the NIGC’s April 2013 notice as a formal declaration that the 

Tribe “has a Reservation that qualifies as ‘Indian lands’ eligible for gaming” under the Indian 

Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). SAC ¶ 2. In the JAC’s view, this determination runs counter to 

federal law, because although the Tribe may have a beneficial interest in the land in question, that 

land “is not a reservation or trust land” as defined by IGRA. SAC ¶ 72; see also id. ¶ 35 (citing 

25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)3). Rather, the JAC alleges the Tribe is not a federally recognized Indian 

tribe. See id. ¶¶ 31–38, 40–46. It argues the land the NIGC referred to as a “Reservation” cannot 

be a reservation because it is not one of the few areas so denominated and specifically established 

by federal law, id. ¶¶ 26–28, and an Indian tribe may not unilaterally create a reservation, id.

¶ 73. It also alleges the federal government never took the land into trust for the Tribe’s benefit 

under the procedures adopted by the United States Department of the Interior. See id. ¶¶ 27–38. 

In July 2013, Tracie Stevens, the NIGC’s chairperson at the time, approved a 

gaming ordinance for the Tribe’s proposed casino that allowed “Class III” gaming, i.e., casino 

gambling. Id. ¶ 67; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (IGRA provisions on the approval of an Indian 

tribe’s gaming ordinances); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 

2028–29 (2014) (describing Class III gaming under IGRA). NIGC also allegedly approved a 

contract between the Tribe and SDGV before January 2014, SAC ¶ 68, and construction began in 

January 2014, id. ¶ 69. In fact, however, it appears a gaming management contract still has not 

been approved. See Order on Prelim. Inj. at 7–8; Status Order Nov. 4, 2015, at 7, ECF No. 115. 

The JAC asserts six claims for relief. First, it challenges the casino’s construction 

because the Tribe is not a federally recognized Tribe and the real property on which the casino 

will sit is not “Indian lands.” SAC ¶ 75. The JAC’s briefing and argument at hearing clarified 

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 This subsection defines “Indian lands” as “(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian 

reservation; and (B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the 

benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to 

restriction by the United States against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises 

governmental power.” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4). 

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this first claim is asserted against NIGC under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Opp’n 

Tribe Defs.’ Mot. 7, ECF No. 143; Opp’n Fed. Defs.’ Mot. 4, ECF No. 144. It claims the NIGC 

arbitrarily and capriciously (1) defined the Tribe’s land as a “Reservation” or land otherwise 

designated “Indian lands,” (2) approved the gaming ordinance, and (3) approved the gaming 

management and other contracts. It seeks an order enjoining construction of a casino on the 

Tribe’s land. SAC ¶¶ 83–84. It asks the court to reverse the NIGC’s approvals. Id. ¶ 85. 

In its second claim, the JAC asserts construction of a casino will violate the Indian 

Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) because the Tribe did not exist in 1934 when that legislation 

was passed. See id. ¶ 91. In its opposition briefing and at hearing, the JAC clarified that it brings 

this claim against the U.S. Department of the Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs under the 

APA. See Opp’n Tribe Defs.’ Mot. at 8–9; Opp’n Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 5. It claims these agencies’ 

“efforts and actions” to take the land into trust were arbitrary, capricious, and illegal, Opp’n Tribe 

Defs.’ Mot. at 8–9; Opp’n Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 5, and requests an order enjoining the casino’s 

construction. 

Third, the JAC asserts a constitutional claim, alleging the various defendants’ 

collective decision to approve construction of a casino and begin construction “is an 

unconstitutional infringement on private land titles and on [California’s] plenary power to 

regulate its citizenry.” SAC ¶ 106. It also alleges the defendants give unconstitutional preference 

to the Tribe and its members without justification. See id. ¶112. In its opposition briefing, the 

JAC clarified this claim is founded on principles of federalism and the Equal Protection Clause. 

Opp’n Tribe Defs.’ Mot. at 9–10; Opp’n Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 6. 

Fourth, the JAC alleges the casino’s construction violates the California 

constitution and public nuisance law, which permits gambling operations only by federally 

recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands. SAC ¶¶ 117–23. The JAC asserts this claim against the 

individual defendants and the three corporate defendants affiliated with the Tribe. Id. ¶ 116. 

In its fifth claim, the JAC alleges that by deciding the Tribe’s land was a 

“Reservation” and approving the gaming ordinance and the management and development 

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contracts without first preparing an environmental assessment, the defendants violated the 

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. SAC ¶ 127. 

Finally, in its sixth claim, the JAC alleges the defendants’ actions violated the 

compact between the Tribe and the State of California. Id. ¶¶ 144–51. Under IGRA, a tribe may 

conduct gaming on Indian lands only under a compact it has negotiated with the surrounding 

State. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2028–29 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C), among other 

provisions). The JAC alleges that under the compact, the Tribe may not construct a gaming 

facility on its lands after January 1, 2005. SAC ¶ 148. It alleges that despite California’s request, 

the compact was not amended, the 2005 date was unchanged, and therefore the casino’s 

construction violates the compact. Id. ¶ 149. In addition, the compact authorizes gaming on only 

“Indian lands” as defined by IGRA, so the JAC alleges that because the land in question does not 

qualify as “Indian lands,” the casino’s construction would violate the compact regardless of any 

amendment. Id. ¶ 150. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The JAC’s original complaint was filed in September 2013. ECF No. 1. The 

federal defendants moved to dismiss in February 2014, ECF No. 12, and the JAC filed an 

amended complaint in response, ECF No. 15. The defendants, including Raymond Hunter, the 

Tribe’s chairman, moved to dismiss again, ECF Nos. 20, 23, and the Tribe requested leave to file 

an amicus curiae brief in support of those motions, ECF No. 22. 

In August 2015, the court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and granted 

the Tribe’s motion to file an amicus brief. ECF No. 50. As noted above, the court found “[t]he 

Jamul Indian Village is a federally recognized tribal entity entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.” 

Id. at 7. The court granted defendant Hunter’s motion to dismiss because the JAC had not alleged 

any facts to show he acted in an individual capacity rather than in his capacity as the Tribe’s 

chairman, and in his capacity as chairman, he was entitled to sovereign immunity. Id. at 20. In 

addition, the court found the doctrine described by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Young, 209 

U.S. 123 (1908), did not apply because the plaintiffs had not alleged adequately that Hunter 

violated any federal law. Id. Similarly, the court found the plaintiffs had stated no cognizable 

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APA claim against him. Id. at 20–23. As for the federal defendants, the court concluded the case 

could not proceed without the Tribe, whose property and contract interests the JAC directly 

attacked. Id. at 23–27.4 Because the Tribe’s sovereign immunity prevented its joinder, and 

because the complaint stated no claim against Hunter, the complaint was dismissed. Id. The JAC 

was allowed leave to amend. Id. at 28. 

The JAC filed the Second Amended Complaint, which remains operative. ECF 

No. 51. In January 2015 it moved for a preliminary injunction and a writ of mandate on its NEPA 

claim. ECF No. 60. It sought an order enjoining construction of the casino until the defendants 

completed a review under NEPA. Id. The court denied the motion in May 2015. ECF No. 93. It 

found (1) the JAC had not identified a “major agency action” to set any NEPA process into 

motion, id. at 9–12; (2) the JAC did not have standing because it was unclear whether the 

defendants would have authority to comply with the order the JAC sought, which would have 

directed the defendants to halt construction of the casino, id. at 13–14; and (3) none of the four 

factors identified by the Supreme Court in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7 (2008), supported the JAC’s motion for a preliminary injunction, id. at 14–18. 

The JAC filed an interlocutory appeal. ECF No. 94. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, 

on grounds different in part than those this court had relied on, holding (1) the defendants did not 

violate NEPA when they approved the Tribe’s gaming ordinance without preparing an 

environmental impact statement because NEPA’s provisions are fundamentally irreconcilable 

with IGRA, Jamul Action Committee, supra, 2016 WL 3910597; and (2) the plaintiffs had not 

otherwise shown they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, Jamul Action 

Committee v. Chaudhuri, ___ F. App’x ___, 2016 WL 3219593 (9th Cir. June 9, 2016) 

(unpublished). 

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 At hearing, the JAC’s counsel asserted incorrectly that this court had not previously 

found the Tribe to be necessary and indispensable. See Order on Mot. Dismiss 25–27 (finding (1) 

“[t]he Tribe is a necessary party to this action”; (2) “it is not feasible to join the Tribe in this 

action”; and (3) the four factors identified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) resolved in 

favor of dismissal). 

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The defendants moved to dismiss in December 2015. See Tribe Defs.’ Mot. 

Dismiss, ECF Nos. 123 & 125; Fed. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 127. They challenge the 

court’s jurisdiction, argue the Tribe is a necessary and indispensable party that cannot be joined, 

and argue the JAC lacks standing. Because the JAC’s interlocutory appeal was pending at the 

time the motions were filed, it argued this court lacked jurisdiction to address them. The 

resolution of their appeal makes this argument moot. The JAC has otherwise opposed both 

defense motions, ECF Nos. 143, 144, and the defendants have replied, Tribe Defs.’ Reply, ECF 

No. 145; Fed. Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 146. 

III. DISCUSSION 

The JAC’s first, second, third, fourth, and sixth claims must be dismissed because 

the Tribe is a necessary party and has not been joined. The JAC’s fifth claim must be restricted to 

its allegation that the federal defendants approved the Tribe’s gaming ordinance without 

conducting the review procedure required by NEPA. 

A. Required Joinder: Rules 12(b)(7) and 19 

Rule 12(b)(7) allows a litigant to request dismissal for “failure to join a party 

under Rule 19.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).5 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 imposes a three-

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 Rule 19 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible. 

(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder 

will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if: 

(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among 

existing parties; or 

(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 

situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may: 

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the 

interest; or 

(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 

multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. 

. . . 

(b) When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person who is required to be joined if feasible 

cannot be joined, the court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the 

action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed. The factors for 

the court to consider include: 

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step inquiry:” (1) “Is the absent party . . . required to be joined if feasible . . . under Rule 19(a)?” 

(2) “If so, is it feasible to order that the absent party be joined?” (3) “If joinder is not feasible, can 

the case proceed without the absent party, or is the absent party indispensable such that the action 

must be dismissed?” Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist. v. Lee, 672 F.3d 1176, 1179 

(9th Cir. 2012) (footnote and citation omitted omitted). At the third step, the court considers the 

demands of “equity and good conscience.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). 

The inquiry is fact-specific and practical. N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 

466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986); Camacho v. Major League Baseball, 297 F.R.D. 457, 460–61 (S.D. Cal. 

2013). For this reason, it may be necessary to review evidence beyond the pleadings. Camacho, 

297 F.R.D. at 461 (quoting McShan v. Sherrill, 283 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1960)). The 

defendants, who are the moving parties, “bear the burden in producing evidence in support of the 

motion.” Id. (quoting Biagro W. Sales Inc. v. Helena Chem. Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1141 

(E.D. Cal. 2001)). 

Here, the defendants argue the Tribe is a necessary party because the JAC alleges 

(1) the Tribe is not a federally recognized Indian tribe and enjoys no sovereign immunity; (2) the 

lands the Tribe purports to hold in beneficial interest are not “Indian lands” as defined by IGRA; 

and (3) the Tribe’s state compact is invalid. See Tribe Defs.’ Mot. at 18–29; Fed. Defs.’ Mot. 

at 26. Defendants argue the Tribe cannot be joined because it has not waived its sovereign 

immunity, and this case cannot be litigated in the Tribe’s absence, in equity and good conscience. 

The court reached the same conclusion in its previous order, Order on Mot. Dismiss at 23–27, and 

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(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might prejudice 

that person or the existing parties; 

(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: 

(A) protective provisions in the judgment; 

(B) shaping the relief; or 

(C) other measures; 

(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would be adequate; and 

(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed 

for nonjoinder. 

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makes the same decision now in light of the parties’ current arguments and the pleadings 

articulated in the complaint. 

1. Whether the Tribe Is Necessary 

“[A] person is necessary if he has an interest in the action and resolving the action 

in his absence may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.” Salt 

River, 672 F.3d at 1179 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i)). Here, the JAC challenges the 

Tribe’s identity, its immunity, its sovereignty, and the extent of its interest in real property. These 

are “legally cognizable interests” or “legally protected interests” within Rule 19’s scope. See

Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 880, 882–83 (9th Cir. 

2004); Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990). If this action were to 

proceed in the Tribe’s absence, including if based on the Tribe’s independent decision not to seek 

intervention, it would not be in a position to file motions or take discovery to protect its 

sovereignty and property interests. 

In addition, the JAC attempts to prove in this action that gaming on the Tribe’s 

land would violate its tribal-state compact, a contract between the Tribe and the State of 

California. The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that ‘[n]o procedural principle is more deeply 

imbedded in the common law than that, in an action to set aside a lease or a contract, all parties 

who may be affected by the determination of the action are indispensable.’” E.E.O.C. v. Peabody 

W. Coal Co., 610 F.3d 1070, 1082 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 

1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in Peabody); see also Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project 

Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] party to a contract is 

necessary, and if not susceptible to joinder, indispensable to litigation seeking to decimate that 

contract.”); Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A] district court cannot 

adjudicate an attack on the terms of a negotiated agreement without jurisdiction over the parties to 

that agreement.”). 

The JAC does not actually argue the Tribe has no legally protected interests in this 

litigation; instead it argues these interests are adequately represented by others. See Opp’n Tribe 

Defs.’ Mot. at 17–19; Opp’n Fed. Defs.’ Mot. at 24–26. The JAC suggests that the individually 

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named tribal officials would adequately represent the Tribe’s interests in this litigation, citing the 

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Salt River, see 672 F.3d at 1181–82, and the Ex Parte Young doctrine, 

see 209 U.S. 123. In this respect, the JAC’s arguments are nearly identical to those it advanced in 

opposition to the defendants’ previous motions under Rule 12(b)(7). See Opp’n Fed. Defs.’ Mot. 

Dismiss at 15–17, ECF No. 31. As before, having carefully reviewed the instant record, the court 

concludes these authorities do not apply to this case: 

The Ex parte Young doctrine “permits actions for prospective nonmonetary relief against state or tribal officials in their official 

capacity to enjoin them from violating federal law, without the 

presence of the immune State or tribe.” In other words, in cases 

where courts found Tribal officials were not immune, the officials 

themselves engaged in acts that violated federal law. 

Order on Mot. Dismiss 26, ECF No. 50 (quoting Salt River, 672 F.3d at 1181). Here, although 

the JAC characterizes its case as one against the Tribal officials in their individual capacities, the 

JAC targets actions the defendants undertook in their official capacities: planning, approving, and 

initiating construction of the casino. “Tribal sovereign immunity ‘extends to tribal officials when 

acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their authority.’” Cook v. AVI Casino 

Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 727 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Linneen v. Gila River Indian Cmty., 276 

F.3d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2002)). “[A] plaintiff cannot circumvent tribal immunity by the simple 

expedient of naming an officer of the Tribe as a defendant, rather than the sovereign entity.” Id.

(citation and quotation marks omitted). The second amended complaint does not allow the court 

to draw a reasonable interference that the tribal officials themselves violated federal law. See

Order on Mot. Dismiss at 22–23. 

2. Whether the Tribe Can Be Joined and Whether the Tribe Is Indispensable 

The Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe entitled to sovereign immunity. It 

has not waived that immunity. Its joinder is therefore not feasible. See, e.g., Santa Clara 

Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58–59 (1978); Cook, 548 F.3d at 727; Order on Mot. Dismiss 

at 25. 

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Rule 19 lists several specific considerations the court should weigh when joinder 

of a necessary party is not feasible: 

(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence 

might prejudice that person or the existing parties; 

(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided 

by: 

(A) protective provisions in the judgment; 

(B) shaping the relief; or 

(C) other measures; 

(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would be 

adequate; and 

(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the 

action were dismissed for nonjoinder. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). The court’s decision on this question is an exercise of discretion. Salt 

River, 672 F.3d at 1179. 

The court once again concludes this action cannot proceed in the Tribe’s absence. 

See Order on Mot. Dismiss at 25–27. First, the Tribe’s interests in its status, its sovereignty, its 

beneficial interests in real property, and its contractual interests cannot be adjudicated without its 

formal presence. Any ruling in the JAC’s favor would also practically impair the Tribe’s 

sovereign power to negotiate a compact with California. See Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 

305 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002). Second, the court cannot lessen prejudice to the Tribe by 

customizing relief, receiving amicus briefs, or allowing the Tribe’s officials to litigate on its 

behalf. It is impossible, for example, for the JAC to prove the Tribe is not entitled to sovereign 

immunity without depriving the Tribe of a central aspect of that sovereignty, immunity from suit, 

regardless of any caveat or limitation this court might impose. No party has proposed any such 

limitation. Third, a judgment would also prove inadequate. Whatever this court were to order, 

given the Tribe’s likely continued assertions of immunity in any future litigation or actions to 

enforce, the conflict would be unchanged, if not more chaotic. Fourth, the “lack of an alternative 

forum does not automatically prevent dismissal of a suit.” Makah, 910 F.2d at 560. “[T]his result 

is a common consequence of sovereign immunity,” and as applicable here, “the [Tribe’s] interest 

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in maintaining [its] sovereign immunity outweighs the [JAC’s] interest in litigating [its] claims.” 

Am. Greyhound, 305 F.3d at 1025. 

Finally, this reasoning applies equally to all claims but the fifth claim against the 

federal defendants under NEPA. In each of the other five claims, the JAC alleges that the Tribe is 

not a federally recognized Indian tribe, that the real property on which the casino will be built is 

not “Indian lands” as defined by IGRA, or that the casino’s construction and operation would 

violate the Tribe’s state compact. See SAC ¶¶ 75, 77, 87, 89, 91–95, 101–06, 118–19, 150. The 

JAC asks the court to declare in effect that the Tribe is not an Indian tribe, that its land is not its 

own, and that it violated its compact with California. The Tribe is a necessary party, it cannot be 

joined, and its absence prevents this case from going forward. 

Because the defects identified in this order are the same as those identified in the 

court’s previous order, the court is not persuaded that plaintiffs should be allowed to amend 

claims one, two, three, four and six. See, e.g., Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 

Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (futility may support a district court’s decision to 

dismiss without leave to amend). Moreover, “the district court’s discretion to deny leave to 

amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Id. (citation, 

quotation marks, and alteration omitted). Leave to amend these claims is denied. 

B. The Fifth Claim under NEPA 

As summarized above, the JAC alleges the federal defendants decided the Tribe’s 

land was a “Reservation” and approved the Tribe’s gaming ordinance and the management and 

development contracts without first conducting the review required by NEPA. SAC ¶ 127. 

First, to the extent the JAC alleges the federal defendants violated NEPA by 

approving the Tribe’s gaming ordinance without preparing an environmental impact statement, 

the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the interlocutory appeal, issued since the hearing in this court, 

requires dismissal. See 2016 WL 3910597, at *6 (“Contrary to JAC’s arguments, NIGC’s 

approval of the Tribe’s gaming ordinance without conducting a NEPA environmental review did 

not violate NIGC’s obligations under NEPA because where a clear and unavoidable conflict in 

statutory authority exists, NEPA must give way.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 

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Second, the Tribe’s construction of a casino on its land is not a major federal 

action. See Order on Prelim. Inj. at 14. Neither was the casino’s construction subject to the 

federal defendants’ approval. See id. at 10; accord 2016 WL 3219593, at *1. The court cannot 

order the federal defendants to halt construction of the casino. See Order on Prelim. Inj. at 14; cf.

Second Am. Compl. at 31 (requesting this relief). 

Third, “[t]o the extent plaintiffs contend that the land on which the Jamul casino is 

being built is not Indian land, circuit precedent forecloses that argument.” 2016 WL 3219593, 

at *1 (citing Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 789 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) 

(“[A] challenge to the BIA’s decision to take land into trust is a garden-variety APA claim. Such 

claims assert merely that the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to take land into trust violates a 

federal statute. . . . [P]arties cannot use a collateral proceeding to end-run the procedural 

requirements governing appeals of administrative decisions.” (citations, quotation marks, and 

alterations omitted))). 

This leaves the JAC’s claim that the federal defendants did not prepare an 

environmental impact statement in compliance with NEPA when they approved the Tribe’s 

gaming management contract. The Tribe is not a necessary party to this claim; it has no legally 

protectable interest in the federal defendants’ execution of a NEPA review. The fifth claim may 

therefore proceed on the JAC’s request for declaratory relief against the federal defendants only. 

When the NEPA question was tested in the context of JAC’s motion for a 

preliminary injunction, the federal defendants responded with evidence showing they had not in 

fact approved a gaming management contract, contrary to the JAC’s allegation. See Order on 

Prelim. Inj. at 7–8. Later, in a status order, the court ordered the parties to give notice within 

seven days of any action by the NIGC Chairman on the Tribe’s gaming management contract. 

Status Order Nov. 4, 2015, at 7, ECF No. 115. No notice has been filed. The court therefore 

gives notice of its intent to convert the federal defendants’ motion with respect to the fifth NEPA 

claim into one for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) and consider 

evidence that a gaming management contract has not in fact been approved. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented 

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to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under 

Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is 

pertinent to the motion.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The tribally affiliated defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED without leave 

to amend. The federal defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART without leave to amend as to 

claims one, two, three, four and six. This order resolves ECF Nos. 123 and 125. 

The court GIVES NOTICE of its intent to convert the federal defendants’ motion 

to dismiss claim five into one for summary judgment on the same claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(d) to allow consideration of evidence on the limited question of whether the 

Tribe’s gaming management contract has been approved. Within thirty days of the date this order 

is filed, any party may file a response addressing whether summary judgment should be granted 

to the federal defendants in this respect. Briefing shall not exceed five pages and may be 

accompanied by any relevant evidence permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56 and 

the corresponding Local Rules of this District. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 5, 2016. 

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