Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01918/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01918-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Pointe Educational Services,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

A.T., et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-01918-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court are Pointe Educational Services’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 33), the response (Doc. 40), and the reply (Doc. 42); and Pointe’s Motion for Partial 

Remand of Certain Issues (Doc. 39), the response (Doc. 45), and the reply (Doc. 46). The 

parties also presented oral argument on August 6, 2014. The Court addresses the Motion 

for Summary Judgment first and the Motion for Partial Remand second. For the following 

reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted and the judgment of the 

administrative law judge reversed, and the Motion for Partial Remand will be denied. 

I. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 A. Background 

A.T. is an eight-year old autistic student who qualifies for special education under 

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The IDEA 

“seeks to ensure that ‘all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate 

public education[.]’ Under IDEA, school districts must create an ‘individualized education 

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program’ (IEP) for each disabled child.” Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005) (quoting 

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). 

 In the 2012–13 academic year, A.T. attended first grade at a school within Pointe 

Educational Services’ school district. His school developed an IEP, which included “goals 

and services in academics, speech and language, Occupational Therapy . . . and 

social/emotional/behavior supports.” Doc. 1-1 at 4; Doc. 41 at 11. 

 A.T. exhibited disruptive behavior during the academic year. The parties offer 

competing characterizations, but the behavior itself is undisputed: A.T. whined, cried, 

yelled, argued, disrupted class, was noncompliant, and walked into the wrong classrooms. 

See Doc. 34 at 2; Doc. 41 at 2–3. His most physically aggressive behavior involved 

“removing a teacher’s hand from his arm.” Doc. 1-1 at 6. His behavior problems 

culminated in a Manifestation Determination Review and IEP meeting in January 2013, in 

which his IEP team determined that A.T. “would benefit from placement in a private day 

school as the interventions implemented to address his behaviors have not been successful.” 

Id. The IEP team concluded that private day placement would address both behavioral and 

academic needs. See Doc. 34 at 3; Doc. 41 at 5. 

 Pointe selected the Austin Center for Exceptional Students (ACES) and provided 

written notice to A.T.’s parents on January 17, 2013. A.T.’s father responded the same day 

and expressed concern over the logistics of his son attending ACES. A.T.’s mother would 

be unable to pick up A.T. from ACES and A.T.’s brother from a different school, Gateway 

Academy, because of the release time at ACES. On January 21, Pointe informed A.T.’s 

father that placement decisions are based on services provided rather than schedules. See 

Doc. 34-1 at 61. The next day, A.T.’s father again emailed Pointe to express concern over 

whether the placement would meet A.T.’s IEP needs. He informed Pointe he would visit 

ACES, and he asked Pointe to consider and tour two other schools: Gateway Academy and 

New Way Learning Academy. Id. at 57. The IEP team met in early February to discuss 

placement at ACES, Gateway, and New Way. Pointe maintained its decision to send A.T. 

to ACES. Doc. 1-1 at 20. 

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 Perceiving IDEA violations, A.T.’s parents filed a due process complaint. Among 

other claims, they challenged Pointe’s decision to place him at ACES. Because A.T.’s 

family sought relief from Pointe’s decision, they bore the burden of persuasion at the due 

process hearing. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 51. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held a 

two-day evidentiary hearing and invited post-hearing briefs. She subsequently issued a 21-

page order concluding, in relevant part, that Pointe violated the IDEA because placement at 

ACES did not provide a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) as required by 20 

U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The ALJ made explicit that she had “considered the entire record, 

including the testimony and Exhibits,” in finding facts and making conclusions of law, and 

noted that she had “read and considered each admitted Exhibit, even if not mentioned in this 

Decision. The Administrative Law Judge has also considered the testimony of every 

witness, even if the witness is not specifically mentioned in this Decision.” Doc. 1-1 at 4 & 

n.5. 

 The ALJ reached the following conclusions regarding A.T.’s placement: 

 24. After the IEP Team determines the educational placement, the 

school district may select the location at which the services will be provided. 

“[C]hoosing which school the student will attend is an administrative 

decision.” [Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 942 F. Supp. 2d 880, 887 

(D. Ariz. 2013)]. While it is an administrative decision, the location must still 

be appropriate for Student in that it provides the individualized educational 

services necessary to provide a FAPE to Student. 

 25. The Administrative Law Judge concludes ACES is not an 

appropriate location because of the excessive transitions, the inclusion of 

significantly older students for academic classes, and the severe behavior 

issues prevalent in other students. At ACES, Student would be expected to 

transition approximately half the day. More significantly, those transitions 

would include students up to five years older than Student transitioning into 

Student’s academic classes. These significantly older students exhibit more 

severe behavior issues than Student has been described as having including 

physical aggression, sexual acting out, and drug issues. 

 26. Also of note was that ACES was at capacity at the time 

Respondent Pointe proposed to enroll Student. Therefore, even if ACES had 

been appropriate in terms of meeting Student’s needs, ACES was not 

appropriate at the time because it was not an available option. 

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Id. at 20–21 (footnote omitted). She then concluded Pointe must place A.T. at 

Gateway Academy. 

 27. The evidence submitted by Petitioners establishes that Gateway 

Academy is an appropriate location for Student. The classmates, curriculum, 

and structure are appropriate for him to make progress towards the IEP goals. 

Student would only be with other students his age. Its focus on autism 

spectrum students ensures that Gateway Academy can address Student’s 

behavioral and emotional needs. While there are transitions, there are fewer 

transitions and the transitions are used as teaching opportunities. Student 

attended Gateway Academy for a half day and was deemed eligible for 

admission by the staff. 

 28. Based on the IEP, the Administrative Law Judge Concludes the 

appropriate location is Gateway Academy. 

Id. at 21. 

 B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“A party aggrieved by the findings and decision of an ALJ in a due process hearing 

may seek review through a civil action in United States district court.” L.M. v. Capistrano 

Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)). 

“Though the parties may call the procedure a ‘motion for summary judgment’ in order to 

obtain a calendar date from the district court’s case management clerk, the procedure is in 

substance an appeal from an administrative determination, not a summary judgment.” 

Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 1995). The IDEA 

provides three specific instructions to reviewing district courts. They “(i) shall receive the 

records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request 

of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant 

such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). 

 Notably, however, “judicial review in IDEA cases differs substantially from judicial 

review of other agency actions, in which courts generally are confined to the administrative 

record and are held to a highly deferential standard of review.” Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. 

Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit has construed 

§ 1415(i)(2)(C) “as calling for de novo review of the state hearing officer’s findings and 

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conclusions,” but also as impliedly instructing district courts to give “due weight” to the 

administrative proceedings. Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J., 588 F.3d 1004, 

1008 (9th Cir. 2009). This requires giving “deference to the state hearing officer’s findings, 

particularly when they are thorough and careful, and avoid[ing] substituting its own notions 

of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which it reviews.” Id. at 

1008–09 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see also L.M., 556 F.3d at 

908 (“A district court shall accord more deference to administrative agency findings that it 

considers thorough and careful.”) (quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, however, the 

Court “is free to determine independently how much weight to give the state hearing 

officer’s determinations.” Ashland, 588 F.3d at 1009. 

 

 C. ANALYSIS 

 A.T.’s placement at ACES provides a FAPE—and thus satisfies the IDEA—if it 

“(1) addresses his unique needs, (2) provides adequate support services so he can take 

advantage of the educational opportunities and (3) is in accord with the individualized 

education program.” Park v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 464 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 

2006). Notably, a free appropriate public education “does not mean the absolutely best or 

potential-maximizing education for the individual child. The states are obliged to provide a 

basic floor of opportunity through a program individually designed to provide educational 

benefit to the handicapped child.” Jackson, 4 F.3d at 1474 (alterations and quotation marks 

omitted). The educational benefit must be “meaningful.” N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. 

Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1212–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Under the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, 

a school must provide a student with a ‘meaningful benefit’ in order to satisfy the 

substantive requirements of the IDEA.”). 

 Pointe contends that the ALJ lost sight of her primary inquiry—whether ACES could 

provide a FAPE—and impermissibly compared ACES with Gateway Academy, the school 

she and A.T.’s parents perceived as superior. See Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 

F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987) (Review “must focus primarily on the District’s proposed 

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placement, not on the alternative that the family preferred. Even if the tutoring were better 

for Gregory than the District’s proposed placement, that would not necessarily mean that the 

placement was inappropriate.”). Although the ALJ did in fact conclude Gateway was a 

better placement, she began with the conclusion that ACES was not appropriate. The 

question is whether that conclusion was correct. 

 As the excerpted decision above reflects, the ALJ rejected ACES based on its 

excessive transitions, the inclusion of significantly older students for academic classes, and 

the severe behavior issues prevalent in other students. Finally, she concluded that in any 

event ACES could not provide a FAPE because it was at capacity when Pointe selected it. 

Pointe objects to each of these explanations. This case posed difficult challenges both to 

this Court and the ALJ. That Gateway Academy appears to be a better fit for A.T. quite 

reasonably affects evaluation of Pointe’s placement. Despite the better fit, however, A.T. 

did not prove that ACES’s perceived shortcomings precluded it from providing a FAPE. 

Because Pointe did not violate the IDEA, the decision below will be reversed. 

 1. Transitions

 A.T.’s IEP reflects challenges with transitions between classes. Although not a 

separate, explicit focus, the transition goal was “embedded in other things.” Reporter’s 

Transcript of Proceedings, April 2, 2013, at 114:23-24 [hereinafter “AR029, 4/2/2013”]; see 

also id. at 121:3-6, 123:17-23. Pointe believes the ACES approach to transitions provides a 

FAPE, and it makes two arguments in support. 

 First, most ACES students also struggle with transitions. Pointe offers testimony of 

Gay Hardy, school psychologist at ACES, that “90 percent of [ACES] kids have difficulty 

transitioning from class to class. That’s just kind of a given with students who come to the 

ACES.” Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, April 1, 2013, at 26:9-11 [hereinafter 

“AR029, 4/1/2013”]. Second, ACES helps students manage transition problems. Pointe 

offers Hardy’s testimony affirming that “ACES is designed to help students with 

[transitions].” Id. at 29:8-10. She elaborated, “The students, when they changes classes, are 

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taken in line with staff. So there’s the teacher, teaching assistant, and behavior coaches 

escorting students to classes in a line.” Id. at 29:10-13. Indeed, relying on the testimony of 

Katie Sprouls, a school psychologist “who contracts with Pointe to perform evaluations for 

its students” and who was added to A.T.’s IEP team just before Pointe selected ACES, Doc. 

42 at 3, 6, Pointe argues that ACES is appropriate because it confronts and works on 

transition issues rather than minimize them. Indeed, Sprouls testified that “for all skill 

development in the schools, especially students with special education needs, that you want 

to make sure you have your end all goal but have your small objectives of how you’re going 

to build up to that. So if transitioning is the overall goal, then you’re going to continue 

doing activities to increase ability their [sic] achieve that.” AR029, 4/2/2013, at 102:23–

103:4; see also id. at 103:5–14 (Sprouls affirming she would not “just leave [a student] in 

one classroom all day long” because he “has difficulty transitioning”). 

 In contrast, A.T. offered testimony from Kim Yamamoto, who does not have 

academic training in special education but nonetheless has served as an advocate for 

students with special needs for 15 years. See AR029, 4/1/2013, at 177:3-13. A.T.’s parents 

hired Yamamoto in January 2013 to help them navigate the special education world. See 

AR029, 4/2/2013, at 25:18-20; AR029, 4/1/2013, at 177:24-25. After meeting with A.T. 

and his parents, familiarizing herself with his IEP, sitting in on IEP meetings, and visiting 

ACES with A.T.’s father, Yamamoto flagged the transitions at ACES as particularly 

alarming: 

Having lots of transitions, he would transition for every academic period they 

said to where the other kids in the school were functioning at his academic 

level. So that would be reading; math; language arts, . . . ; and then back to 

his classroom for science, and then back out to another setting for the 

reflection time, the emotional reflection time that they have. They do that in 

combination so they transition to another class. 

 Transitions are the toughest things for kids with autism, and putting 

them through all those transitions was a red flag for me. You know, that is not 

something that you would do in an autism program. Or that is not something 

that would be typically set up. 

AR029, 4/1/2013, at 196:18–197:7. 

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 Confronted with conflicting evidence, the ALJ made the following findings to 

support her conclusion regarding transitions: 

 3. Student began exhibiting problem behaviors [in the fall of 2012]. These 

behaviors included . . . wandering into other classrooms during transitions. 

 . . . . 

 22. The September 25, 2012, IEP included a notation that Student “has a sweet 

disposition and has a deep desire to please. . . . [He] often struggles with transitions (40% of 

the time).” 

 . . . . 

 27. During the February 6, 2013, IEP meeting, Parent A.T. also requested that a 

goal addressing transitions be included in the IEP. While the IEP team agreed transitions 

were an issue for Student, as had been noted in the September 25, 2012, IEP, Petitioners’ 

requested goal addressing transitions was not adopted. 

 . . . . 

 33. For reading, writing, and math, Students at ACES spend “about half of the 

day . . . changing classes for those academic subjects.” 

Doc. 1-1 at 5, 8, 9, 11. Although the ALJ “considered the testimony of every witness,” id.

at 4 n.5, she did not make specific credibility determinations. She did not explicitly 

compare the testimony of Yamamoto to Sprouls and Hardy and explain why she 

presumably found the former more convincing than the latter two. 

 Nonetheless, the ALJ’s decision implicitly turned on favoring Yamamoto’s 

testimony. This was not reasonable. Both Yamamoto and Sprouls had very limited 

experience with A.T., particularly in the classroom. Sprouls testified she had never met 

A.T, spoken to his parents, see AR029, 4/2/2013, at 101:1-4, 105:12-13, or “issue[d] any 

kind of report on Student.” Id. at 113:15-17. Instead, she “came in entirely as an interpreter 

of evaluations.” Id. But similarly, Yamamoto testified she “really couldn’t judge on [the 

appropriateness of A.T.’s Statement of Behavior Plan] because I couldn’t see him in the 

classroom.”1

 AR029, 4/1/2013, at 186:2-3. She also conceded her “opinion of [A.T.] is 

very limited . . . .” Id. at 195:4. And aside from her experience as a student advocate, 

Yamamoto possesses no academic background in special education, school psychology, or a 

relevant field. Moreover, her concerns about ACES reflect global opinions about students 

 

1

 Pointe refused to allow Ms. Yamamoto to observe A.T. in the classroom. See 

AR029, 4/1/2013, at 35:13-16. 

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with autism. See id. at 197:3-7 (“Transitions are the toughest things for kids with 

autism. . . . You know, that is not something that you would do in an autism program.”). 

Although the value of Yamamoto’s testimony derives from her familiarity with A.T.’s 

unique needs, her testimony on this point does not reflect such particularized knowledge. 

 The question of whether the ACES approach to transitions would accord with A.T.’s 

IEP may be the kind of “educational policy” election the district court should be careful not 

to second guess. Cf. Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314 (“The ‘due weight’ that courts must give 

to the state education agency’s findings on matters of educational policy should prompt 

courts in the future to provide a more thorough explanation when reversing an agency’s 

ruling on the appropriateness of a special education placement.”). But Arizona employs a 

central panel of administrative law judges utilized by various state agencies. See A.R.S. 

§ 41-1092.01. The practice promotes neutrality, but it trades off with agency expertise. 

This in turn decreases the institutional competency gap between the Court and the ALJ, and 

thus the extent to which concerns about institutional competency motivate deference to her 

findings on matters of educational policy. 

 Moreover, the due weight afforded an ALJ decision varies with the thoroughness of 

analysis. See Wartenberg, 59 F.3d at 891 (“When exercising its discretion to determine 

what weight to give the hearing officer’s findings, one criterion we have found useful is to 

examine the thoroughness of those findings. The amount of deference accorded the hearing 

officer’s findings increases where they are thorough and careful.”) (quotation marks 

omitted). Aside from noting A.T.’s struggles with transitions and reciting the amount of 

transitioning at ACES, the ALJ did not undertake any analysis of why the ACES approach 

is not appropriate as Hardy and Sprouls testified. Hardy testified that ACES serves many 

students who struggle with transitions and that the school provides the support system 

necessary to help students overcome those challenges. Moreover, Sprouls testified that this 

approach promotes skill development. Notably, the ALJ’s conclusion that Gateway 

Academy would provide a FAPE turned in part on finding that its fewer transitions “are 

used as teaching opportunities.” Doc. 1-1 at 21. But beyond the difference in volume, the 

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ALJ did not explain why ACES’s instructive approach to transitions failed to meet A.T.’s 

needs where Gateway’s succeeded. 

 With only limited testimony that the ACES approach to transitions would not 

address A.T.’s unique needs—and contrary testimony that the approach is pedagogically 

sound—A.T. did not meet his burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the ACES approach would not provide the meaningful benefit the IDEA requires. 

 

 2. Older students in classes 

 The ALJ determined that the ACES transitions would inappropriately bring students 

up to five grade levels ahead of A.T. into half of his classes. The presence of older students 

in A.T.’s academic classes partly motivated her conclusion that ACES would not provide a 

FAPE. She made the following finding in support: 

 32. Typically, ACES classes “have at least two grade levels 

together, no more than three.” Therefore, kindergarten and first grade 

students may be in a class together with some second grade students, third 

and fourth grade students may be in a class together, and fifth and sixth grade 

students may be in a class together. However, for the academic subjects of 

reading, math, and writing, students are grouped according to ability. 

Therefore, a sixth grade student who cannot read may be in a class with 

kindergarten and first grade students of the same reading level. 

Id. at 10–11 (footnotes omitted). 

 The ALJ relied on Hardy’s testimony: All ACES classes have “at least two grade 

levels together, no more than three. So [the] elementary kindergarten kids you might have 

kindergarten, first and maybe some second. Then we have second/third, third/fourth, 

fourth/fifth.” AR029, 4/1/2013, at 18:14-17. Hardy testified that A.T. could be in a 

classroom with sixth graders possessing similar academic skills—who read at his level, for 

example—and that, in fact, ACES educated one sixth grader who fit that description when 

Pointe selected it. See id. at 25:5-21, 28:15–29:4. Similarly, Sprouls testified that schools 

commonly mix students of varying ages with similar academic skills. For example, it 

would be appropriate to place A.T. in a class with older students when working on reading 

skills. See AR029, 4/2/2013, at 103:15–104:8. She noted, “if you have an eighth grader 

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reading at a first grade level and you have a third grader reading at a first grade level and 

you have activities that are appropriate for that skill set in that age range then that’s actually 

a fairly common practice you would see in schools.” Id. at 104:21-25. Although Sprouls 

testified that it would not be appropriate to place first and sixth grade students together if 

“you’re working on behavior” or “to develop say social skills business social skills,” id. at 

104:9-11, 104:17-20, she noted that “when it’s academic skills . . . there’s a lot of schools 

actually that do ability level and skill level as opposed to age level.” Id. at 117:9-11. 

 A.T. argues primarily that because all ACES students have behavioral challenges, 

and because Sprouls testified that grouping by skill level rather than age is inappropriate 

when targeting behavior and social skills, the mixed-age academic classes involve de facto 

social skill building and thus are inappropriate. 

 As an initial matter, little evidence supports A.T.’s concern that younger students and 

older students are regularly educated together. Hardy testified that there was one sixth 

grade student with delayed reading skills who could be in A.T.’s class, but there is no 

evidence of other, older students in need of remedial academic skills. The ALJ’s conclusion 

that A.T.’s classes would include “significantly older students”—plural—appears to rest on 

Hardy speculating that such inclusion would be possible. Doc. 1-1 at 20. Additionally, no 

specific evidence supports A.T.’s speculation that “ACES has to be working on behavior 

issues even during academics” because ACES students have behavior challenges. Doc. 40 

at 9. A.T. has not proffered any testimony demonstrating, for example, that academic 

classes routinely devolve into lessons on behavior or social skills. In the absence of any 

such evidence, A.T. has not demonstrated that the potential for mix-aged classrooms fails to 

“(1) address[] his unique needs, (2) provide[] adequate support services so he can take 

advantage of the educational opportunities [or] (3) . . . accord with the individualized 

education program.” Park v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 464 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 

2006). Indeed, the ALJ did not explain how the inclusion of older students, even if likely, 

would suffice to deny a meaningful educational benefit. A.T.’s speculation is insufficient to 

show that mixed-age classes preclude ACES from offering a FAPE. 

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 3. More serious behavioral issues

 The ALJ also expressed concern with the “severe behavior issues prevalent in other 

students” at ACES. Doc. 1-1 at 20. Indeed, her concern about A.T.’s exposure to older 

students reflected her conclusion that “[t]hese significantly older students exhibit more 

severe behavior issues than Student has been described as having including physical 

aggression, sexual acting out, and drug issues.” Id. The ALJ made three specific findings 

to support these conclusions: 

 28. Gay Hardy, School Psychologist at ACES, testified regarding 

the student body, curriculum, and staff at ACES. According to Ms. Hardy, 

ACES is a school that “deals with students with significant behavior 

concerns” and “the students who come to ACES are having difficulty 

managing their behavior in a public school setting, lots of anger management, 

impulse control, that kind of thing.” ACES “work[s] hard on helping our kids 

develop strategies and coping skills to deal with those issues.” 

 29. Ms. Hardy acknowledged that the students who come to ACES 

“have serious issues.” 

 30. ACES has students who have been suspended or expelled from 

public schools for weapons violations, acting out sexually, and drugs. 

Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted). 

 Hardy’s testimony elaborates: ACES educates “some students who have been longterm suspended from public schools because they had a pocketknife in their pocket, that 

kind of thing,” some students who have been suspended for “some sexual acting out,” and 

some students who have been suspended for drugs. AR029, 4/1/2013, at 24:5–25:4. Hardy 

testified that ACES “typically” does not see severe behavior once the students acclimate to 

the school (after transferring from public schools) and that ACES is in fact a “very safe 

place.” Id. at 20:5-13. Pointe proffers Hardy’s testimony that ACES separates its younger 

students from the behavior of its middle and high school students by educating them in 

different parts of the building. See id. at 17:21-25. Still, this does not shield students like 

A.T. from the more severe behavior of his cohorts or any older elementary school students 

who may transition into his academic skills classes. 

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 Consistent with this testimony and the ALJ’s findings, Yamamoto testified that she 

had placed “lots of different kids” at ACES: “kids who are sexual offenders, kids who have 

physically acting out behaviors, kids who have extreme school phobia, lots of different 

emotional behavioral issues that are not necessarily handled in the public school system.” 

Id. at 194:17-21. Yamamoto testified that none of the students she had placed at ACES 

paralleled A.T. in terms of disability and behavior. Id. at 194:22-24. Similarly, Faith Thaw, 

an independent contractor and student advocate hired by Pointe to ensure compliance with 

special education law, testified that Pointe “tend[s] to use ACES when we have children 

with severe behavior problems.” Id. at 115:1-3. 

Pointe offers evidence that many ACES students display behavior similar to A.T. 

ACES students begin as “externalizers” who scream, cry, and fail to regulate their behavior. 

Doc. 33 at 10–11 (quoting Hardy). But Hardy also testified, and Pointe does not contradict, 

that ACES students hit, kick, and throw objects. See AR029, 4/1/2013, at 19:17-22. 

Although Pointe emphasizes that A.T.’s IEP had been recently modified to address 

escalating behavior, see, e.g., Doc. 42 at 8 (“[T]he ALJ failed to appreciate Student’s 

significant behavioral issues that he manifested around the time of the IEP.”), there is no 

evidence that his behavior included hitting or kicking, let alone drug use or sexual conduct. 

For example, A.T.’s September 2012 IEP sets the following goal: A.T. “will gain attention 

from others (both staff and students) using positive strategies only (doing well on his work, 

being positive with classmates when in groups) and refrain from gaining attention using 

negative approaches (calling out at inappropriate times, pouting) with others at a mastery 

rate of 80% starting at a baseline of 50%.” Doc. 34-1 at 24. Similarly, the November 2012 

addendum to A.T.’s IEP focusing on behavior identifies intervention strategies for “noncompliance to direction, say[ing] no, crying, yelling, arguing, aggressive in nature 

behavior.” Id. at 33. A.T.’s behavior simply did not rise to the level prevalent at ACES. 

 The question then is whether a school that serves students who enter with more 

serious behavioral challenges can also adequately address A.T.’s IEP-identified needs. See 

Park, 464 F.3d at 1033. Although the ALJ expressed concern about other students’ 

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behavior, she did not explain how those behaviors would preclude ACES from offering 

A.T. a FAPE. 

 The evidence supports the contrary. Hardy testified that students who come to 

ACES have “difficulty managing their behavior in a public school setting, lots of anger 

management, impulse control, that kind of thing. So we work hard on helping our kids 

develop strategies and coping skills to deal with those issues.” AR029, 4/1/2013, at 17:9-

13. In addition, ACES offers a “Jump Start” program specifically for students in the autism 

spectrum. Id. at 18:3-5. Hardy testified that each classroom includes “a certified special ed 

teacher, [a] teaching assistant, and a behavior coach. We also have behavior coaches 

monitoring hallways at all times.” Id. at 19:2-8. According to Hardy, these approaches 

work. Students display fewer behavioral outbursts as they acclimate to ACES, and the 

school returns approximately 20–25 percent of its students to the general educational 

environment each year. See id. at 21:8-14. 

 Moreover, ACES serves students who scream, cry, and display physical aggression. 

Likewise, the evidence demonstrates A.T. yelled, cried, and demonstrated behavior that was 

“aggressive in nature.” Doc. 34-1 at 33. Because ACES serves students who display some 

behavior similar to A.T.—in addition to students who display more serious behavior—and 

because it has a program designed specifically for students with autism, it has the capacity 

and experience to serve the behavioral needs reflected in A.T.’s IEP. As a result, A.T. has 

not met his burden to show ACES cannot provide a meaningful educational benefit with 

respect to his behavior notwithstanding that it also serves students with more severe 

behavioral problems. 

 4. Availability

 Finally, the ALJ concluded that even if the ACES curriculum and pedagogy 

provided a FAPE, it had no room for A.T. when Pointe selected the placement. She based 

this conclusion on Hardy’s testimony. A.T.’s parents toured ACES on January 23. At that 

time the class A.T. would join—the kindergarten through second grade classroom—

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included fourteen children, its maximum capacity. See AR029, 4/1/2013, at 23:2-6. Hardy 

testified that ACES had hired a new teacher who began in January and that this new teacher 

completed her three-to-four week training period and opened her own classroom for A.T.’s 

age group “probably the week after” the tour. Id. at 23:6-11. 

 Contrary to A.T.’s assertion, that ACES did not have space the day A.T.’s family 

toured does not necessarily make it inappropriate, so long as sufficient information about 

the future setting is available to evaluate fit. See Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 

F.2d 1031, 1039 (3d Cir. 1993). In Fuhrmann, the Third Circuit upheld a student placement 

despite the parents’ protests that the program’s newness precluded observation; it thus could 

not be “reasonably calculated to meet [the student’s] individual needs.” Id. at 1038. The 

court disagreed: 

 The fact that the Jointure program was in its inception when East 

Hanover recommended placement there does not make that placement 

inappropriate. G.F.’s acceptance at Jointure was unconditional. At the time 

of the administrative hearing, Jointure had already accepted four students for 

the 1990–91 school year, ranging in age from five to eight and exhibiting 

approximately the same level of autistic-like behavior as G.F. 

Id. at 1039 (citation omitted). 

 Similarly, an Arizona administrative law judge quoted Fuhrmann in a 2004 decision 

rejecting a district’s proposed placement. There, the administrative law judge reached the 

following conclusion: 

 That the teacher and aide were not hired, nor were the students 

selected for the school program by the August, 2004 IEP meeting does not 

automatically preclude it from being a placement which provides FAPE for 

this child. At any time during the school year a teacher, or an aide or both 

may need to be replaced. A class may start a few days late or may start with a 

substitute, and FAPE may still be provided. 

Phoenix Elementary Sch. Dist., 105 LRP 56677, at 12 (2004) (alterations omitted) (Doc. 40-

1). Like the Third Circuit, the Arizona administrative law judge evaluated appropriateness 

based on what the district knew at the time of placement: 

 Since the teacher, aide and actual class composition at the school were 

unavailable to the IEP team participants, the determination of whether the 

placement provided FAPE is based on what was known at that time. The 

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class size was anticipated to be 20. The percentage of native English speakers 

was anticipated to be 20 to 25% or 4 to 5 students. The remainder of the class 

composition would be children who spoke only or primarily Spanish. The 

teacher and was [sic] anticipated to be bilingual, certified but not in special 

education and was not anticipated to have any particular training in working 

with children with speech language deficits. The regular class aide was 

anticipated to be bilingual. The full time speech aide was anticipated to have 

a two year certificate. It was anticipated that there would be a great deal of 

Spanish spoken in the classroom, particularly among the students. The 

physical setting was known to be a large classroom with multiple activity 

stations all in use at the same time. 

Id. at 12–13. 

 Thus, in Fuhrmann and the Arizona administrative decision, the adjudicators looked 

to those aspects they knew about the nascent programs, such as the number of students, the 

students’ abilities, and the faculty’s qualifications. Courts in this circuit have looked to the 

same factors when evaluating the appropriateness of extant settings. See Union Sch. Dist. v. 

Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1525 (9th Cir. 1994) (inappropriate to place autistic child in setting 

with “no other autistic children” and where “there was no evidence that the teacher had been 

trained to work with autistic children”); Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 942 F. Supp. 

2d 880, 886–87 (D. Ariz. 2013) (inappropriate to place autistic child with IEP-designated 

communication goals in a classroom “with non-verbal peers with whom he cannot 

communicate verbally”). 

 A.T. argues ACES was inappropriate when Pointe offered it because the number of 

students in his eventual class was unknown. Pointe responds that the parties knew the 

following when it selected ACES: the school had 14 students in its kindergarten–second 

grade class, and it had hired a teacher in January who began about one week after A.T.’s 

visit.2

 Pointe deduces that A.T.’s class thus would have served seven or eight students and, 

 

2

 This is only partially correct. Hardy knew ACES hired a new teacher in January and testified that new teachers interned for “three or four weeks” before opening a class. AR029, 4/1/2013, at 23:9-10. But at the time A.T.’s family toured ACES, Hardy testified she did not know the timeline for opening the new class. See id. at 23:12 (Hardy testifying that at the time of the tour she “really did not know that time line”). 

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like its other classes, would have included three staff members: a certified special education 

teacher, a teaching assistant, and a behavior coach. 

 Pointe’s position is more persuasive. First, the ALJ was not precluded from looking 

to the nascent classroom to evaluate its appropriateness. See Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1039; 

see also E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011) (“It is 

true that we have said that actions of the school systems . . . cannot be judged exclusively in 

hindsight. But that exclusive use of hindsight is forbidden does not preclude consideration 

of subsequent events.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Second, A.T. did not show 

that its newness precluded meaningful evaluation for fit. A.T. offered no evidence, for 

example, to contradict the reasonable inference Pointe draws from the school’s student 

composition or to suggest that the pedagogy in the new class (and the qualifications of its 

instructors) would differ in any meaningful way from its current kindergarten–second grade 

class. Because ACES could adequately provide a meaningful educational benefit to A.T., 

the mere fact his class would not have been ready for a week (or two) does not render it an 

inappropriate placement. Neither the law nor the evidence supports the ALJ’s finding on 

this issue. 

5. Conclusion 

 Both the ALJ and this Court were presented with a close case, which was made more 

difficult by the perception that ACES was less attractive than Gateway Academy. 

Testimony elicited from A.T.’s father reinforced this perception. He recounted a visit to 

ACES: 

 Bars on the outside of the school bent in. To me it looked like the 

last stop before you go to prison, kids up against the wall like they’re ready to 

be patted down by a policeman, with their -- I think they call them minders 

but really they’re their bodyguards in case the kid lashes out to prevent any 

physical harm. But yeah, both times actually kids were outside up against the 

wall, being talked to, things like that. 

 So that’s -- to me in listening to [Hardy]’s description, we talked about 

the different types of kids that come to this school. And when I listened to the 

description of some of the types of kids that go to ACES, that’s not my son. 

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My son does not do that stuff. And I’m just like, as a parent, aside from 

transitions and the reading program and the class size and all of other things, I 

just -- my gut told me this is not the right place. This is not where he belongs. 

AR029, 4/2/2013, at 59:10-25. The Court is sympathetic both to A.T.’s preference and the 

ALJ’s difficult decision. But the IDEA—and not a parent’s gut—supplies the standard by 

which a placement decision is reviewed. Pointe’s decision to send A.T. to ACES 

disappointed his parents but did not violate the law. Summary judgment will be granted to 

Pointe and the ALJ’s decision reversed. 

II. MOTION TO REMAND 

A. Procedural Background 

 On December 13, 2013, before Pointe filed the pending Motion for Summary 

Judgment, the Court remanded this case to the ALJ to clarify her decision regarding tuition 

and transportation costs. In the course of the subsequent January 2014 proceedings, Pointe 

learned A.T.’s parents had applied for and received funds from the Arizona Empowerment 

Scholarship Account (ESA) in 2013. Arizona established the ESA fund “to provide options 

for the education of students in this state.” A.R.S. § 15-2402(A). Essentially, the ESA 

program enables parents of students with disabilities to finance some private school 

education expenses with state funds. 

 In summer 2013, A.T.’s parents withdrew him from his Pointe school pending 

resolution of the due process hearing and enrolled him at Gateway Academy as a private 

student using ESA funds. By statute, receipt of ESA funds “release[s] the school district 

from all obligations to educate the qualified student.” Id. § 15-2402(B)(2). According to 

Pointe, A.T.’s July 2013 receipt of ESA funds discharged its obligation to provide a FAPE. 

Following the January proceedings, Pointe moved the ALJ to reconsider her decision 

regarding placement in light of the ESA issue. She declined, concluding that her August 

2013 order constituted a final decision under state law, that the January proceedings and 

decision served only to clarify that order, and that she lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the 

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substance of Pointe’s motion for reconsideration. Pointe filed the pending Motion for 

Partial Remand (Doc. 39) to press its claim to the ALJ in the first instance. 

 

B. Analysis 

A.R.S. §15-2402(B)(2) releases the school district from its obligation to educate a 

student receiving ESA funds. But Pointe overstates the effect of this release. The statute 

requires only that “students not simultaneously enroll in a public school while receiving 

ESA funds.” Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 233 Ariz. 195, 201, 310 P.3d 983, 989 (App. 2013), 

review denied, (Mar. 21, 2014). Pointe’s obligation is discharged while A.T. receives ESA 

funds, but it is triggered again once A.T. stops receiving them. See id. (“[T]he public school 

is obligated to accept a child that has terminated the ESA contract just as the public school 

would be obligated to accept any other child.”). Because “the ESA does not require a 

permanent or irrevocable forfeiture of the right to a free public education,” id., it does not 

work a permanent or irrevocable discharge of Pointe’s duty to A.T. Thus, A.T.’s receipt of 

ESA funds for some disputed period in 2013 does not permanently release Pointe of its 

obligation to provide a FAPE. 

 Contrary to Pointe’s assertion, the ESA issue does not dispose of the inquiry above. 

Nonetheless, because the Court will reverse the administrative decision on the merits, it will 

deny the motion for partial remand so that Pointe can “address the ESA Issue in a separate 

state administrative proceeding,” Doc. 46 at 1 n.1, as it suggests. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Pointe Educational Services’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 33). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Pointe’s Motion for Partial Remand of 

Certain Issues (Doc. 39). 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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 The Clerk shall enter judgment for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Pointe Educational 

Services and terminate this appeal. 

 Dated this 14th day of August, 2014. 

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