Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02295/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02295-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mason Kent McEntire, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Deputy Warden White, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-09-2295-PHX-JAT (MEA)

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc.

#1). On June 4, 2010, Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that this Court deny and dismiss the Petition with

prejudice. (Doc. #13). On June 18, 2010 Petitioner filed written objections to the R&R.

(Doc. #14). 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The R&R provides a detailed report of Petitioner’s procedural history. (Doc. #13 at

1-6). Petitioner has not objected to the procedural history. (Doc. #14). Therefore, the Court

adopts the procedural history as written in the R&R, section I. (Doc. #13 at 1-6). 

II. Standard of Review 

The duties of a District Court in connection with a R & R are set forth in Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or

in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. §

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The Court notes that Petitioner did not raise the Eighth Amendment violation in his

original Petition. Petitioner only included the Eighth Amendment violation in his reply to

the State’s Response. (Doc. #12). Nonetheless, because the R&R addressed the Eighth

Amendment argument, the Court will treat Petitioner’s reply as supplement to his Petition.

2

When applying federal law the state courts only need to act in accordance with

Supreme Court case law. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9thCir. 2003).

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Neither Respondents nor the R&R discuss Petitioner’s failure to exhaust. Therefore,

this Court will consider the Petition on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“[a]n

application for writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure

of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”). 

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636(b)(1). If objection is made, the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s

findings and recommendations de novo. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,

589 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (the district court “must review de novo the portions of

the [Magistrate Judge’s] recommendations to which the parties object.”). Accordingly, the

Court reviews Petitioner’s grounds for his substantive objections de novo. 

III. Analysis 

Petitioner raises two theories for habeas relief: (1) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment

rights to a fair trial and (2) Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment rights to be free from a cruel and

unusual punishment. (Doc. #14). In his Petition, Petitioner argues that his sentence is

inconsistent with the statute he was convicted under.1

 (Doc. #1). 

Petitioner files this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because he is incarcerated based on

a state conviction. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must deny any claims

that Petitioner exhausted before the state courts, unless “a state court decision is contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”2

 or was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts.3

 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71

(2003).

A state prisoner may obtain a writ of habeas corpus only upon a showing that he is

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being held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S 107, 119 (1982). “[A] mere violation of

state law is not the automatic equivalent of a violation of the federal Constitution.”

Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); Lewis v. Jeffers,

497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“Federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”).

Upon de novo review of the portions of the R & R to which Petitioner has objected,

the Court concludes that Petitioner’s objections are not cognizable habeas claims. 

A. Petitioner’s Grounds for Habeas Relief

Petitioner asserts that his sentence violates the Eight Amendment, the Sixth

Amendment and due process of law. He argues that his ten-year sentence is “illegal” because

“attempted molestation of a child” does not appear within the statute Petitioner was

sentenced under, A.R.S. § 13-604.01. (See Doc. #1). However, Petitioner’s objections to

his sentencing procedure do not warrant federal habeas review because: (1) the trial court

correctly applied Arizona law for Petitioner’s sentence and (2) even if the trial correct

incorrectly applied Arizona law, Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable as a federal habeas

claim.

State law application errors are not cognizable as federal habeas claims. Moor v.

Palmer, 603 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th

Cir. 1996)); see Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (holding that federal habeas relief

is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state law, including

a state’s statutes regarding the imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences). Rather,

the interpretation of state law needs to have “so fatally infected the proceedings as to render

them fundamentally unfair” in order to violate the petitioner’s rights to due process. Jammal

v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991); see Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41-42

(1984) (holding that a state court’s decision must be so fundamentally unfair or unjust as to

violate due process, a condition rarely satisfied). 

Petitioner asserts that the state trial court violated federal law by incorrectly

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sentencing him under a statute that did not apply to his crime. However, Petitioner

misunderstands the trial court’s sentencing. 

1. State Sentencing

The State of Arizona classifies the completed crime of molestation of a child as a firstdegree dangerous crime against children under A.R.S. § 13-604.01(M)(1)(d), and establishes

a presumptive term of seventeen years imprisonment for this Class 2 felony. See A.R.S. §

13-604.01(D). 

The State also classifies the preparatory crime of attempted molestation of a child as

a Class 3 felony and a second-degree dangerous crime against children. The State does this

in two ways: the general language of the State’s “attempt” statutes, and the specific language

of the dangerous-crimes-against-children statute itself. Compare A.R.S. § 13-1001(C)(2)

(“Attempt is a . . . Class 3 felony if the offense attempted is a [C]lass 2 felony.”) with A.R.S.

§ 13-604.01(M)(1) (“A dangerous crime against children is in the first degree if it is a

completed offense and is in the second degree if it is a preparatory offense.”). 

While Petitioner is correct that the phrase “Attempted Child Molestation” does not

appear in A.R.S. § 13-604.01, the crime is included by reference in § 13-604.01(I) by that

section’s explicit statement:

[A] person who is at least eighteen years of age or who has been tried as an

adult and who stands convicted of a dangerous crime against children in the

second degree pursuant to subsection C or D of this section is guilty of a

[C]lass 3 felony and shall be sentenced to a presumptive term of imprisonment

for ten years.

See also State v. Peek, 195 P.3d 641, 642-44 (Ariz. 2008) (referring to the inclusion of

second-degree, preparatory based offenses in A.R.S. § 13-604.01 as “clear language

subjecting attempt offenses” to its provisions); cf. State v. Carlisle, 8 P.3d 391, 395-96 (Ariz.

App. 2000) (“the legislature specifically classified preparatory offenses such as attempt, other

than attempted first degree murder, as dangerous crimes against children in the second degree

provided the completed offense would have been a dangerous crime against children in the

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first degree.”).

A Class 3 felony that is a second-degree dangerous crime against children–such as the

attempted molestation of a child offense to which Petitioner pled guilty–carries the same

presumptive term of imprisonment to which Petitioner stipulated in his plea agreement. See

A.R.S. § 13-604.01(I). As such, Petitioner is incorrect that he was sentenced to the “wrong”

statute. Therefore, the Court denies Petitioner’s grounds for federal habeas relief for

substantive reasons. Petitioner has not shown he was improperly sentenced under Arizona

law. 

2. Standard for Habeas Relief

Even if the Court were to find that the trial court misapplied Arizona statues,

Petitioner has not stated a claim for federal habeas relief. An error in the application of the

Arizona state law sentencing scheme is not cognizable as a federal habeas claim. See Moor,

603 F.3d at 661. Furthermore, even considering Petitioner’s claims as alleged due process

violations under the Constitution, Petitioner still fails to show he is entitled to federal habeas

relief. 

Specifically, the state court’s decision is not so fundamentally unfair or unjust as to

violate due process. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41-42. Petitioner pled guilty to violation of

A.R.S. § 13-604.01 which designates a presumptive term of ten years imprisonment. See

A.R.S. § 13-604.01(I) (“a person who is at least eighteen years of age or who has been tried

as an adult and who stands convicted of a dangerous crime against children in the second

degree pursuant to subsection C or D of this section is guilty of a [C]lass 3 felony and shall

be sentenced to a presumptive term of imprisonment for ten years.”). Petitioner realized the

possibility of this sentence when he agreed to plead guilty.

Rather than stating a claim for federal habeas relief because of a violation of due

process, it appears that Petitioner is solely arguing that the State violated its own sentencing

statutes. Characterizing a state law claim as a violation of due process does not render

Petitioner’s claim as cognizable under federal habeas review. See Cacoperdo v.

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Demonstethnes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). Similarly, asserting that the State violated

its sentencing statutes with regard to categorization of Petitioner’s crimes does not implicate

the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment or the Sixth

Amendment’s guarantee of a fair trial.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s grounds for federal habeas relief under

the Sixth and Eighth Amendments are denied for two alternative reasons. First, Petitioner’s

claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Second, even considering Petitioner’s

claim under the Sixth or Eighth Amendments, Petitioner has failed to show he is entitled to

relief. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

V. Conclusion

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation is accepted and adopted

(Doc. #13), the objections are overruled (Doc. #14), the Petition in this case is denied, with

prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

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Petitioner cannot take an appeal unless a circuit justice, circuit judge, or district judge

issues a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) of specified issues under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 481-82 (2000). A judge may issue a COA “only if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the

showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate

that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims

debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 483-84. In this case, the Court finds that Petitioner

has not shown the denial of a Constitutional right. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing §

2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a certificate

of appealability because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).4

 

DATED this 23rd day of July, 2010.

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