Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00207/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00207-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 49:1471 Federal Aviation Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TOD SANTEE and 

SHERRY SANTEE, husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

MESA AIRLINES, INC., a corporation or

other business entity; AMERICA WEST

AIRLINES, INC., a corporation or other

business entity; XYZ CORPORATIONS

1-6, corporations or other business entities;

JOHN DOE 1-3 and JANE DOE 1-3,

individually and as husband and wife,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-09-207-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

On July 13, 2009, Magistrate Judge Thomas D. Ferraro issued a Report and

Recommendation [Doc. #27] in which he recommended that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand

[Doc. #19] be denied. On July 30, 2009, Plaintiffs Tod and Sherry Santee filed Objections

to Report and Recommendation on Motion for Remand [Doc. #28]. On August 4, 2009,

Defendants filed their Response to Plaintiffs’ Objections to Magistrate Ferraro’s Report and

Recommendation [Doc. #29]. Plaintiffs’ subsequently filed their Reply to Response to

Objections to Report and Recommendation [Doc. #32].

 . . .

 . . .

Case 4:09-cv-00207-CKJ Document 34 Filed 02/05/10 Page 1 of 6
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Magistrate Judge’s Recitation of the Procedural and Factual History

No objections having been made to the magistrate judge’s recitation of the procedural

and factual history, the Court adopts those recitations.

Analysis

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. U.S. Const. art. III; Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d

391 (1994). As such, there exists a “‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction

[which] means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is

proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc. 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The

removal statute is to be strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Id. (citations

omitted). As such, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right

of removal in the first instance.” Id.

As an initial matter, this Court must consider whether it has jurisdiction to hear

Plaintiffs’ claims. “The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of

the Constitution.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 20 L.Ed. 947

(1968). Additionally, jurisdiction may be conferred upon the federal courts by statute.

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. at 1675. The United States Supreme Court also

recognizes several doctrines which define the constitutional and prudential limitations on the

federal courts’ power to hear cases. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315,

3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Prior to invoking the power of the federal court, it must be

determined “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute

or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d

343 (1975).

It is well established that “parties cannot . . . create federal court subject matter

jurisdiction by stipulation.” Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agency, 994 F.2d 666, 668 n.1 (9th Cir.

1993) (citing Neirbo Company v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 60 S.Ct. 153,

84 L.Ed. 167 (1939)). Therefore, an agreement between the parties to submit to federal

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jurisdiction is insufficient to confer the same upon this Court. Section 1441, 28 U.S.C.,

delineates which actions are removable. “Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of

Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United

States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants to the

district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such

action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). As such, federal jurisdiction exists only where

there is either diversity of citizenship or federal-question jurisdiction. Caterpillar, Inc. v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a).

“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘wellpleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal

question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar,

Inc., 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. at 2429 (internal citations omitted). A corollary to the wellpleaded complaint rule is the doctrine of complete preemption. Id. at 393, 107 S.Ct. at 2430.

While removal based upon the defense of federal preemption is impermissible, if “the preemptive force of a statute is so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common-law

complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposed of the well-pleaded complaint rule’”

removal is proper. Id.

As noted in Magistrate Judge Ferraro’s Report and Recommendation, complete preemption is very rare. “The test [for complete preemption] is whether Congress clearly

manifested an intent to convert state law claims into federal-question claims.” Wayne v.

DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Holman v. LauloRowe Agency, 994 F.2d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 1993)). In Wayne, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals considered whether the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) provides a basis

for federal jurisdiction under the complete preemption doctrine and unequivocally held that

it does not. Id. at 1184. Thus, this Court must look to the face of Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded

complaint to determine whether or not federal-question jurisdiction exists.

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Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges negligent handling of Plaintiff Tod Santee’s custom

wheelchair and negligence by Defendants in their alleged failure to timely replace the custom

wheelchair with another custom wheelchair resulting in physical injury to Plaintiff Tod

Santee. Compl. at 3. Plaintiffs’ Complaint further alleges lost wage, emotional distress and

loss of consortium claims. Compl. at 3-4. The Ninth Circuit has expressly held that the word

“service” in the ADA’s preemption clause “was not intended to include an airline’s provision

of in-flight beverages, personal assistance to passengers, the handling of luggage, and similar

amenities.” Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998)

(emphasis added). The Charas court concluded “that when Congress enacted federal

economic deregulation of the airlines, it intended to insulate the industry from possible state

economic regulation as well. . . . It did not intend to immunize the airlines from liability for

personal injuries caused by their tortious conduct.” Id. at 1266 (emphasis in original). As

such, the face of Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded complaint fails to assert a federal cause of action.

In their Objections to the R& R, Plaintiffs assert that their June 5, 2008

correspondence [Doc. #5, Exh. 2] and Defendants’ June 17, 2008 response [Doc. #19-1, Exh.

2] constitute adequate grounds for demonstrating a federal claim. As Magistrate Judge

Ferraro recognized, whether or not Defendants’ standard of care arises from a federal

standard does not vitiate a state law cause of action. See R & R at 6; Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986).

The Merrell Dow Court discerned that “the presence of the federal issue as an element of the

state tort is not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction would serve congressional

purposes and the federal system.” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814, 106 S.Ct. at 3235

(emphasis added). Furthermore, Defendants’ June 17 response reiterates their position of

defensive preemption, which does not present grounds for removal.

Plaintiffs further assert that their Request for Admissions “made it unequivocally clear

that Plaintiffs were asserting a claim arising out of federal law.” Obj. to R & R at 4.

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ claims, their Request for Admissions seek Defendants’ acquiescence

that they breached a federal standard of care, the claim asserted remains a state law

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The Ninth Circuit recognizes ADA preemption regarding limited liability provisions

of common carriers; however, heretofore Plaintiffs have not alleged a breach of contract

claim. This issue has only arisen in Defendants’ preemption defense.

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negligence cause of action. Plaintiffs also rely on their February 6, 2008 Response to

Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Negligent Claim Handling [Doc. #9-

3] to demonstrate the presence of a federal cause of action. This reliance is misplaced. The

Department of Transportation [DOT] regulations regarding an airlines handling of

wheelchairs as baggage may represent the standard of care to which Defendants were bound

to perform. As noted previously, this is insufficient to sustain federal-question jurisdiction.

Alternatively, the regulations may be relevant in a contractual dispute; however, the United

States Supreme Court has stated that it is not plausible “that Congress meant to channel into

federal courts the business of resolving, pursuant to judicially fashioned federal common law,

the range of contract claims relating to airline rates, routes, or services. The ADA contains

no hint of such a role for the federal courts.” American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S.

219, 232, 115 S.Ct. 817, 825, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995). Accordingly, “The ADA’s

preemption clause, § 1305(a)(1), read together with the FAA’s savings clause stops States

from imposing their own substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or services, but

not from affording relief to a party who claims and proves that an airline dishonored a term

the airline itself stipulated.” Id. at 232-33, 115 S.Ct. at 826. The Court further recognized

that it is improper to “foist on the DOT work Congress has neither instructed nor funded the

Department to do.” Id. at 234, 115 S.Ct. at 826.1

 Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded complaint does not assert an alleged federal cause of action.

Subsequent documents do not assert any federal cause of action either. Defendants have

clearly asserted preemption as a defense, but this is not grounds for removal jurisdiction of

this Court. Moreover, because the parties cannot stipulate to federal jurisdiction, the Court

finds that it is without federal-question jurisdiction and this case shall be remanded.

 . . .

 . . .

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The Report and Recommendation [Doc. #27] is ADOPTED in part and

REJECTED in part.

1. This case is REMANDED to Pima County Superior Court (Cause # CV2007-

3583);

2. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a certified copy of this Order to the Clerk of

the Pima County Superior Court; and

3. The Clerk of the Court shall then close its file in this matter.

DATED this 4th day of February, 2010.

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