Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01426/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01426-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON HOLLINGSWORTH,

Booking # 15746082,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF 

CORRECTIONS; DANIEL PARAMO

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01426-WQH-BLM

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

Plaintiff, Jason Hollingsworth, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California has filed a civil 

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and a Motion to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). Because Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Proceed IFP complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the Court grants him leave 

to proceed without full prepayment of the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a), but dismisses his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

A. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (U.S. 2016); Williams v. Paramo, 

775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his inmate 

trust account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. His 

trust account statement indicates he has insufficient funds from which to pay a partial 

initial filing fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event 

shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or 

criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to 

pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 

(finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available 

to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and directs the Secretary 

for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to collect the 

entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to 

the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

B. Legal Standards for Screening Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preAnswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

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Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of 

Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

/ / /

/ / /

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2. Representation of other parties

Plaintiff purports to bring this action on behalf of all “current and former inmates” 

of the CDCR. Compl. at 3, 6. However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he has no 

authority to represent the legal interest of any other party. See Cato v. United States, 70 

F.3d 1103, 1105 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 

696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a) (“Every pleading, written motion, 

and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s original 

name, or if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.”). 

3. Eleventh Amendment immunity

In addition, the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff names the CDCR as a 

Defendant in this action, his claims must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to both 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim and for seeking damages 

against a defendant who is immune. The State of California’s Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation and any state prison, correctional agency, sub-division, or department 

under its jurisdiction, are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Hale v. State of 

Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department of 

corrections is an arm of the state, and thus, not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983). 

In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to sue the State of California itself for 

monetary damages, his claims are clearly barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See 

Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (“There can be no doubt . . . 

that [a] suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment, unless [the State] has consented to the filing of such a suit.”). 

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the CDCR, his 

Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

4. “False Incarceration” claims

Plaintiff claims, without specific factual allegations, that the practices of 

correctional officers at RJD have resulted in “inmates getting more time” and he argues 

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that all current disciplinary rules violation reports should be “dismissed” and inmates 

released. Compl. at 2. The United States Supreme Court has “long held that habeas is 

the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of 

habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983 action.” Nettles v. Grounds, __ 

F.3d __, 2016 WL 3997255 *3 (9th Cir. 2016). “Suits challenging the validity of the 

prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within ‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a 

§ 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional 

challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.’” 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003), quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 

U.S. 475, 489-99 (1973) (holding that a writ of habeas corpus is “explicitly and 

historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the “exclusive” means to “attack 

the validity of his confinement” in federal court).

Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks immediate release from incarceration, 

he cannot bring such a claim pursuant to § 1983.

5. Employment claims

Plaintiff also alleges that the CDCR is “making over 2 billion dollars a year 

illegally paying inmate wages less than 10% of state and federal labor minimum wage 

laws.” Compl. at 5. The California Penal Code states, in part, that the “Department of 

Corrections shall require of every able-bodied prisoner imprisoned in any state prison as 

many hours of faithful labor in each day and every day during his or her term of 

imprisonment.” Cal. Penal Code. § 2700. The Ninth Circuit has held that incarcerated 

prisoners who work for “programs structured by the prison pursuant to the state’s 

requirement that prisoners work at hard labor, are not ‘employees” of the state within the 

meaning of the [Fair Labor Standards Act].” Hale, 993 F.2d at 1389. Therefore, inmates 

are not entitled to minimum wage under the FLSA. Id.; see also Burleson v. State of 

Cal., 83 F.3d 311, 313 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims seeking “minimum wage” based on his prison 

employment are dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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6. Housing claims

Plaintiff also argues that he should be allowed to participate in the “Alternative 

Custody Program” which would give him the opportunity to serve his sentence in one of 

the following places: (1) a residential home; (2) a transitional care facility; or (3) a 

residential drug or treatment program. See CAL CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3078.1(b). 

However, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to be housed at a particular 

institution or to receive a particular security classification. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 

U.S. 238, 244-50 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Moody v. 

Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87 n.9 (1976). Thus, Plaintiff’s due process claims are dismissed 

for failing to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted.

7. Respondeat Superior

Finally, Plaintiff names as the only individual Defendant, Warden Daniel Paramo. 

See Compl. at 1. However, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no “factual contact” describing 

Paramo’s direct involvement in the alleged constitutional violations which would “allow[] 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [Warden] is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

“All § 1983 claims must be premised on a constitutional violation.” Nurre v. 

Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009). To state a claim, Plaintiff must 

demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his 

constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 673; Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1070 

(9th Cir. 2014). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the acts or 

omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

672-673; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Instead, supervisors may be held liable only if they 

“participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to 

prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 

625 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011).

Because Plaintiff fails to allege any “factual matter” to suggest how or to what 

extent Defendant Warden personally participated any of the alleged constitutional 

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violations, his Complaint “fails to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045, and his claims against Defendant 

Paramo must be dismissed.

7. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim 

unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 

amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when 

a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the 

plaintiff can correct the defect”). Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint

fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to 

fix the pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 

1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

C. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(Doc. No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS

him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended 

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Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes 

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading 

may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

5. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2016

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