Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-04469/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-04469-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1For simplicity, and unless otherwise indicated, the petition

and supplemental petition are referred to in this order

collectively as “the petition.” 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFF J. HANCOCK, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

 v. )

)

D. SEDLEY, Warden, )

)

Respondent. ) )

No. C 07-04469 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Jeff J. Hancock, a prisoner of the State of

California who is incarcerated at the California Medical Facility

in Vacaville, filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Thereafter, Petitioner filed

another petition in a new case, Case No. 07-4664 CW, that was

deemed a supplemental petition and refiled in the instant case.1

 

The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the petition

should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer and two

supplemental answers, along with supporting memoranda and exhibits. 

Petitioner has filed traverses to the answer and to each

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2The California Supreme Court’s June 14, 2006 denial of the

petition for review in Petitioner’s direct appeal does not appear

(continued...)

2

supplemental answer.

For the reasons outlined below, the Court DENIES the petition

for a writ of habeas corpus on all claims.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 24, 2004, a jury in Santa Clara County Superior Court

found Petitioner guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, and found

true the allegations that Petitioner personally used a deadly

weapon (a knife) and inflicted great bodily injury. (Resp’t Ex. A

(Clerk's Transcript) (“CT”) at 211.) Petitioner admitted to having

suffered a prior felony conviction for robbery that qualified as

both a "serious" felony conviction and as a “strike” under

California Penal Code sections 667(a)-(i) and 1170.12. (Id.) On

July 22, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of

eleven years in state prison. (Id. at 283-84.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal and a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus to the California Court of Appeal. (Resp’t Exh. C,

L.) On March 24, 2006, the Court of Appeal denied the direct

appeal in an unpublished opinion, and summarily denied the petition

for a writ of habeas corpus in a separate opinion. (Att. to Resp’t

Ex. C; Pet. Ex. I.) Petitioner filed separate petitions for review

challenging each of these decisions. (Resp’t Exh. F, I.) On June

14, 2006, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the

petition for review of the denial of his direct appeal, and on July

19, 2006, denied the petition for review of the denial of his

habeas petition. (Pet. Ex. J.)2

 Two subsequent petitions for a

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2(...continued)

to have been included in the parties’ exhibits, but it is not in

dispute. 

3

writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court were

summarily denied on July 25, 2007. (Pet. Exh. 12, 13.) 

Petitioner filed the original petition in this matter on

August 28, 2007, raising seven claims. On September 10, 2007, he

filed what has been deemed a supplemental petition containing one

additional claim. The somewhat convoluted briefing on Petitioner’s

eight claims is as follows. 

On March 10, 2008, Respondent filed a “supplemental” answer

and supporting memorandum denying the claim in the supplemental

petition that the flight instruction was improper. On June 9,

2008, Petitioner filed a “supplemental” traverse addressing this

claim.

On October 22, 2008, Respondent filed an answer and supporting

memorandum opposing six of the seven claims in the original

petition, to wit: (1) a violation of Petitioner’s right to counsel

based on the admission of the audiotape recording of his interview

with Officer Craig Anderson on August 12, 2003; (2) prosecutorial

misconduct based on the failure to disclose statements made by

Petitioner to prosecution witness Peter Craven; (3) prosecutorial

misconduct based on the knowing use of perjured testimony from the

victim; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on

"cumulative errors of counsel" at trial; (5) ineffective assistance

of trial counsel for failing to present mitigating evidence at

sentencing; and (6) violation of Petitioner’s due process rights

based on the prosecutor's failure "to allow the defence [sic]

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inspection of evidence relevant, material, and favorable to

defense," including the audiotape recording of the interview with

Officer Anderson. Petitioner filed a traverse to this answer on

November 20, 2008, which he entitled “Denial and Exception to the

Return to the Order to Show Cause.” 

On December 10, 2008, Respondent filed a second supplemental

answer and supporting memorandum opposing the seventh claim in the

original petition, i.e. that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing adequately to investigate and present

exculpatory and mitigating evidence at trial. In response,

Petitioner filed a “Supplemental Supplemental Traverse” on January

5, 2009.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In its written opinion, the California Court of Appeal

summarized the factual background as follows:

Craig Davis testified that he and defendant had been

good friends. Davis had been staying at defendant’s

apartment at the time of the stabbing incident but Davis

did not have his own key. Davis testified that he was

“out of work” and “wasn’t paying rent” but defendant was

letting him stay in the apartment “out of the goodness of

his heart . . . .” 

Davis and defendant had been hanging out with

others at a nearby park earlier in the day. Davis

recalled returning to defendant’s apartment from the

park before defendant arrived and sitting on the walkway

in front of the apartment and waiting for defendant’s

return. 

Both men had been drinking that day. Davis

acknowledged that he was an alcoholic. Davis typically

woke up and began drinking almost immediately. He

admitted that on a few occasions he has been intoxicated

to the point of falling down. He admitted that he may

have fallen and slammed into the countertop in the

apartment’s bathroom about three days before the

stabbing incident. Davis acknowledged that he had

testified at the preliminary hearing to drinking three

quarters of a fifth of vodka the day of the incident. 

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He thought he also had a couple of beers at the park.

Davis recalled that, after defendant returned, they

had a verbal altercation, which turned physical. Davis

testified that defendant was upset about some comment

Davis had made to “some ladies” at the park. Davis

acknowledged that he could have said something out of

line at the park, which is what defendant indicated to

him. The confrontation had escalated. Defendant had

punched and kicked him and had dragged him away from the

front door of defendant’s apartment across the concrete

walkway. Davis could not recall whether or not he had

gone into the apartment before he was beaten. 

Davis indicated defendant reentered the apartment

after the beating. Davis crawled toward the front door

because he could not get up. He managed to sit up on

the walkway. A minute or so later, defendant came back

out of the apartment. Davis thought that defendant then

stabbed him in the back and, when he tried to defend

himself, defendant also stabbed him in the hand. He

denied hitting defendant with a frying pan. 

Davis indicated that his memories of what happened

next were “kind of vague.” He recalled a neighbor,

Peter Craven, coming over to help. The paramedics came. 

Davis recalled talking to Officer Kim before he was

taken to the hospital. Davis had not wanted to get

defendant in trouble and had lied that he “got jumped in

the park.” 

Peter Craven testified that, on the date of the

incident, he lived in apartment number six and knew his

neighbor who lived in apartment number seven, identified

as defendant at trial, by first name. Sometime after

work on that date, that is sometime after 4:30 or 5:00

p.m., he stopped by defendant’s apartment. He observed

a male named Duncan treating Davis, who “had been beat

up pretty seriously.” Davis’s “face was very badly

swollen,” he had cuts and bruises on his body, and a

stab wound to his lower back. Although Davis said he

had been “rolled in the park,” Craven did not believe

Davis because defendant’s “hands were swollen and cut

up” and Davis “was very dependent on [defendant], so he

would cover for [defendant] in a situation like that.” 

Craven testified that he was concerned whether an

ambulance should be summoned and tried to determine the

depth of the stab wound. The wound was not bleeding

badly but some blood was pumping out of the wound every

second or so. Craven inquired how deep Davis had been

stabbed. Defendant went to the kitchen, returned with a

knife, indicated a depth of three to four inches using

his thumb and said “‘I stabbed him this deep.’” Craven

thought an ambulance should be called but both Davis and

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defendant were “adamantly opposed.” Duncan and he

convinced them that Davis needed medical attention and

the paramedics were called. 

Craven testified that both Duncan and he suggested

that defendant leave before the paramedics arrived. 

Craven testified that the suggestion was made because

defendant might get in trouble. Defendant did not want

to leave. They suggested that defendant “wait in the

bedroom and close the door, and he agreed to do that.” 

Defendant went into the bedroom and closed the door

behind him. 

Kirk Kim, a public safety officer with the City of

Sunnyvale, testified that, on August 8, 2003, at

approximately 8:23 p.m., he was dispatched to an

apartment unit to investigate a possible stabbing. 

Officer Kim proceeded to that apartment and spoke with

Craig Davis, who was sitting in a chair just inside the

doorway. Steve Duncan was attending to Davis and

“holding some sort of bandage on Mr. Davis’s back.”

After entering the apartment, Officer Kim heard

noises in the back room. Officer Kim testified that

“the door started to come open” and he “blocked the door

from opening up onto [them] with [his] foot.” “[A] male

voice from behind the door” “yelled something like ‘What

the fuck?’” Officer Kim identified himself as Sunnyvale

Police and continued to block the door from opening. 

“The door closed and then seconds later slammed open

again . . ..” Keeping the door open about four inches,

Officer Kim instructed an individual, who was identified

as defendant at trial, to step away from the door. 

Officer Kim and another officer entered the bedroom and

directed defendant to sit down on the bed.

Officer Kim testified that defendant appeared to be

under the influence of alcohol and a strong odor

emanated from him. In addition, he appeared to have

“just been in an altercation” because he had a black and

blue eye and had blood on him. Defendant likewise

appeared intoxicated to Officer Andrew Zarriello, who

also had responded to the dispatch. He stated that

defendant “smelled strongly of alcohol,” “[h]is speech

was thick and slurred,” and he “was very defensive.” 

Defendant did not give direct answers to the

officers’ questions and he did not volunteer any

information. When asked how his eye was injured,

defendant denied any injury to his eye. He indicated

that he did not know what Officer Kim was talking about

when the officer asked about blood on defendant’s sock

and a pair of underwear in the bedroom. Defendant

denied being injured. When questioned about Davis,

defendant “Said something to the effect of [Davis] must

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have beat himself up.” Defendant was placed under

arrest.

Davis initially told Officer Kim that he had been

jumped and stabbed at Fair Oaks Park but the officer did

not believe him. Officer Kim was familiar with Davis

from previous encounters and sensed Davis was not

telling the truth. Later at the hospital, Davis told

Officer Kim that defendant had beaten him up and told

him to leave the apartment. Davis had explained that

defendant let him in to retrieve some articles but then

pushed him out the door and caused defendant to hit his

head on a post. Davis reported that defendant had

repeatedly gone into the apartment and then returned to

rough him up. Eventually, defendant had helped Davis

back into the apartment. Davis told Officer Kim that he

may have blacked out and he also told the officer that

he may have “socked” defendant in the eye. Officer Kim

testified that Davis appeared to have been drinking. 

Dr. Gregory Gilbert, an emergency physician at

Stanford University, saw Davis when he came into the

emergency room on August 8, 2003 at about 2100 or 9:00

p.m. Dr. Gilbert testified that Davis’s external

injuries included multiple abrasions and contusions, a

laceration near his face, and a stab wound and his

internal injuries included rib fractures and a very

small pneumothorax. A pneumothorax is a condition in

which “air . . . gets trapped between the chest wall

cavity and the cavity [sic] lung and the lung deflates.” 

The doctor explained that the pneumothorax meant that

the stab wound went “all the way through to the pleural

cavity.” The doctor acknowledged that it was not

possible to determine whether the rib fractures were two

to three days old.

In photographs of Davis, Dr. Gilbert identified

fresh contusions and abrasions to Davis’s face and a

puncture wound below Davis’s left shoulder blade. The

number of contusions on Davis’s body indicated he had

been hit and struck. Dr. Gilbert acknowledged that the

medical records did not note any injury to Davis’s hands

but he stated that a photograph suggested that a

contusion might have been missed.

On August 12, 2003, Officer Craig Anderson

interviewed Davis at the hospital. Davis told Officer

Anderson that he had been staying at defendant’s

apartment and, during the previous few weeks, they had

argued repeatedly regarding “Davis’s failure to help out

with some of the costs such as rental and food.” Davis

remembered that defendant had confronted him about

comments he had made at the park and the argument had

led to defendant beating him up. Davis was unable to

recall being stabbed specifically or much about the

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altercation.

Officer Anderson also interviewed defendant in jail

and recorded the interview. Defendant told Anderson

that he had been supporting Davis for the past nine

months and they were “best friends.” He stated that

Davis was an alcoholic and drank every single day. 

Defendant had been helping Davis with housing, rather

than letting him sleep in the park, and most everything

else, including food, clothing and tobacco.

Defendant explained that about a week before the

stabbing incident, the apartment owner had received a

complaint that someone was urinating in the front yard

and throwing up outside defendant’s unit at about 10:00

p.m. The owner had spoken with defendant’s mother and

informed her that defendant would have to move if there

were another incident. Defendant told Officer Anderson

that he kicked Davis out of his apartment on the day of

the stabbing because he did not want another incident. 

A short time after ejecting Davis, defendant went out to

check if Davis had passed out on the front lawn. 

Defendant told Officer Anderson that he found Davis

passed out in front of his door and he “tried to wake

him up or shoved him away.” He said he “slapped him

around” but he “wouldn’t wake up.” He admitted slapping

Davis in the face a few times, kicking and dragging him. 

He indicated that he “ended up having to smack him a

little bit harder” because Davis was not waking up. 

According to defendant’s interview statements,

Davis finally woke up and defendant brought him into the

house. Davis had “a little bit of blood on him.” 

Defendant told Davis to take a shower and gave him a

wash cloth to clean himself up. Defendant indicated

that, after Davis was cleaned up, Davis was not

listening or cooperating with defendant’s efforts to get

Davis to leave and they had “a little tango,” “a little

confrontation.” 

Defendant recalled that he had been drinking and

Davis “was pretty much drunk.” Defendant agreed that he

was thinking that he had “to get this guy out of here”

or he was going to “get kicked out” of his apartment and

be “homeless” again. Defendant was “trying to drag him

out” but Davis was not going. Defendant recalled trying

to explain to Davis that he did not want another

incident but it was “going in one ear and out the

other.” Defendant said he grabbed Davis and was

struggling to get Davis to leave his house. Defendant

indicated that he had been at the end of his rope for

weeks. 

In the interview, defendant admitted that, while

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struggling to get Davis out, he had grabbed a knife

lying on the counter and jabbed Davis in the back one

time. He had said, “now will you get out of here?” 

Defendant agreed that he had felt remorseful because

Davis was his friend. Defendant stated that he had

“never done that to anybody” in his life and he “could

have killed him.” Defendant indicated that when he saw

that Davis had “a little puncture wound,” he tried to

stop the bleeding. 

Defendant told Officer Anderson that he thought the

police had been called because someone had seen him

trying to wake up Davis while Davis was passed out in

front of his apartment.

At trial, defendant conceded that he drinks a lot

and is an alcoholic. Defendant recalled that, after the

events in the park, he returned to his apartment before

Davis. When Davis arrived, defendant invited him in and

they shared a pint of vodka. Defendant then asked Davis

to leave. Davis left but, when defendant went outside a

short time later, defendant found Davis passed out in

front of the door. Defendant testified, “I had to slap

him to try to wake him up. First, I shoved him, [he]

wouldn’t wake up. I slapped him. So I did hit him.” 

Defendant helped Davis back inside the apartment because

Davis “was extremely drunk” and urged him to take a

shower and clean up. Defendant acknowledged that Davis

had “a small trickle of blood on his face.”

After Davis had changed clothes, defendant again

told Davis that he could not stay and he had to go. 

When Davis did not respond to defendant’s requests to

leave, defendant tried to direct Davis toward the door

by pushing “lightly” but Davis resisted going. 

According to defendant, Davis suddenly turned and hit

defendant with a frying pan and defendant was “stunned

and frightened.” Defendant then grabbed a knife off the

counter and stabbed Davis. 

Defendant admitted, however, that Davis was no

longer facing him and Davis’s back was “almost directly”

toward defendant when the stabbing occurred. The

prosecutor inquired, “you reach back, turn, saw a knife,

grabbed it, lash out, saw Mr. Davis. Now you’re

standing there with a knife that you just stabbed him

with?” Defendant replied, “Right.” The prosecutor then

asked, “Is Mr. Davis holding the pan?” Defendant

answered, “No.” Defendant also testified that

immediately after stabbing Davis with a knife, he

“pull[ed] it out real quick, realizing what had

happened, turned around and rinsed the knife off.” At

trial, defendant’s explanation for not mentioning the

frying pan during the jail interview was that he was

“under the impression that [Officer Anderson] was there

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to wrap things up,” he believed he was merely facing

limited jail time on a battery charge, and he wanted to

protect Davis from getting in trouble too. 

Defendant recalled that Steve Duncan dropped by

five to 10 minutes later and then his next door

neighbor, Peter Craven, came over. Defendant admitted

that Craven suggested calling 911 and, after 911 was

called, he went into his room and closed the door. At

trial, he maintained that he simply went into his

bedroom to use the bathroom there. 

Defendant testified that he was aware of an

accident about three days earlier in which Davis “would

have injured his ribs.” Davis had fallen in the

apartment bathroom and smashed into the bathroom sink. 

Defendant recalled hearing a crashing sound and figuring

that Davis had fallen down before. Defendant discovered

Davis on the floor and the vanity countertop had been

jarred loose. 

People v. Hancock, No. H027917, slip op. at 2-9 (Cal. Ct.

App. Mar. 24, 2006) (attached to Resp't Ex. F) (hereinafter

“Slip Op.”).

LEGAL STANDARD 

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state

prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA), a district court may not grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim

that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2254(d). 

A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if

it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it

applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th. Cir. 2003). 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “[A]

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. The

reasonableness inquiry under the “unreasonable application”

clause is objective. Id. at 409.

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is the holdings of the Supreme Court as

of the time of the relevant state court decision. Id. at 412.

Even if the state court's ruling is contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, that error

justifies habeas relief only if the error resulted in "actual

prejudice." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).

To determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

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law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state

court that addressed the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a

reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2000). If the state court only considered state law, the

federal court must ask whether state law, as explained by the state

court, is "contrary to" clearly established governing federal law. 

Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In this case, the first seven claims in the original petition

were raised in the state courts in habeas petitions and were

summarily denied. In such a case, where the state court gives no

reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner's federal

claim and there is no reasoned lower court decision on the claim, a

review of the record is the only means of deciding whether the

state court's decision was objectively reasonable. Plascencia v.

Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2006). When confronted

with such a decision, a federal court should conduct “an

independent review of the record” to determine whether the state

court’s decision was an objectively unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. Id. at 1198. "[W]hile we are not

required to defer to a state court's decision when that court gives

us nothing to defer to, we must still focus primarily on Supreme

Court cases in deciding whether the state court's resolution of the

case constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law." Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Petitioner’s eighth claim challenging the instruction

regarding flight was raised on direct appeal. The last explained

decision to address this claim was by the California Court of

Appeal and, consequently, under Lockhart, that is the state court

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3Respondent’s Exhibit G herein is the tape recording of the

interview. The transcript of the interview is included in the

Augmented Clerk’s Transcript, which is included with the Clerk’s

Transcript in Respondent’s Exhibit A. 

13

decision that is reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. MIRANDA VIOLATION

Petitioner claims that the admission of his interview with

Officer Anderson at the jail violated his constitutional right to

counsel because Officer Anderson did not adhere to the requirements

of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that

a person subjected to custodial interrogation be advised prior to

the interrogation that he has the right to remain silent, that

statements made can be used against him, that he has the right to

counsel, and that he has the right to have counsel appointed. Id.

at 444. 

Both the tape recording and a transcript of the interview with

Officer Anderson were admitted into evidence. (Resp’t. Ex. G;

Augmented CT at 2-44).3 At the beginning of the interview, Officer

Anderson identified himself as a police officer, made some

introductory remarks and read Petitioner his Miranda warnings

before asking questions. (Augmented CT at 2-3; RT at 223). 

Petitioner does not dispute that Officer Anderson read the

proper Miranda warning, but he contends that Anderson violated

Miranda by making remarks prior to reading the warning. The

following remarks were made prior to the Miranda warning:

Anderson: (Inaudible voices in background) Hey.

Hancock: (Hey)

Anderson: It was pretty much, it was, I’m a Sunnyvale

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police (inaudible). And I’m a Sunnyvale police

(inaudible). And ah, um, ah, I went up and ah, visited

ah, you’re buddy ah, up in (inaudible), ‘cause it was 

. . . 

Hancock: Craig.

Anderson: (Inaudible), yeah, Craig. Um, he’s doing okay. 

Um, you know, he could be, you got the better of him, but

(inaudible), he’s fine. They’ll probably release him

today or tomorrow or something like that. But he’s, he’s

gonna make it. Um, talked to him a little bit. He, he

didn’t really want to say what, what really went down. 

It sounds more like two buddies kind of got in an

argument and ah, they they’re, and ah, the officers, when

they responded, they really had to pry it out of him to

tell them what really happened. Ah, basically kind of

what he told me is that you guys have been having a

little few little squabble[s] about ah, finances. You

both are looking for work, having some problems. You got

Thursdays or Friday night, whatever it was. And ah, and

you guys both have been drinking a little bit that night. 

You’re (inaudible) right now. Ah, I don’t know if you

want, basically what the deal is, he’s got court

tomorrow. Okay. Ah, there’s nothing in there as far as

what your side of the story is to this at all in the

report that’s gonna go to the DA, the judge, and all

that. So, this is kind of your last chance to say what

you want to say about the whole thing. I’ll write it

down. I’ll submit the tape today. Hoping the DA can

take a look at it tomorrow (inaudible). If that’s

something you’re willing to do, I can read you the

Miranda [thing], then we can talk. Totally up to you if

you want, if you want to leave your side of the story

here, um, that’s up to you. But ah, that’s just

(inaudible). Ah, let me, let me read this to you. And

then if you want to talk about it, then you can. You

have the right to remain silent. Anything you say may be

used against you in court. You have the right to the

presence of an attorney before and during any

questioning. If you cannot afford to hire an attorney,

one will be appointed to you free of charge before any

questioning. Do you understand all that I read to you?

Hancock: Yeah. 

(Augmented CT at 2-3; Resp’t. Exh. G.)

Petitioner argues that Anderson’s pre-warning remarks caused

the interview to be an impermissible and deliberate “two-step”

interrogation. The “two-step interrogation strategy, termed

‘question-first, warn later’ . . . called for the deliberate

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4Specifically, the interview started at 0:42 of the recording,

the warnings were given at 2:24, and the interview concluded at

42:58. (Resp’t. Exh. G.) 

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withholding of the Miranda warning until the suspect confessed,

followed by a Miranda warning and a repetition of the confession

already given.” United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1154

(9th Cir. 2006) (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611-14

(2004)). If the police deliberately use the “two-step strategy,”

the post-warning statements must be suppressed unless the police

take curative measures to apprise the defendant of his rights; if

the strategy is not deliberate, the post-warning statements are

admissible if voluntarily made. United States v. Mejia, 559 F.3d

1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2009).

The record is clear in this case, however, that there was no

“two-step interrogation” or “midstream” Miranda warning of the kind

addressed in Seibert and its progeny. Cf. Seibert, 542 U.S. at

611-14 (“question first, warn later” procedure consists of police

obtaining confession without giving Miranda warning, then giving

warning and obtaining confirmation a second time). Here,

Petitioner made no confession and Anderson asked him no questions

prior to the Miranda warnings. The Miranda warnings came within

the first two minutes of a forty-one-minute interview.4 The few

remarks by Anderson prior to the warning were introductory in

nature, insofar as he simply introduced himself, gave a brief

summary of what the victim told the police, and informed Petitioner

that he could make a statement if he wished. Under these

circumstances, the Miranda warnings were not issued “midstream,” as

in Seibert, but rather were properly issued prior to any

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28 5Respondent’s Exhibit B is the Reporter’s Transcript.

16

questioning of Petitioner. 

Petitioner also asserts that Officer Anderson did not identify

himself as a police officer and that he falsely told Petitioner

that Petitioner was charged with battery prior to reading the

Miranda warning. Both the tape recording and the transcript of the

interview clearly indicate to the contrary, however. Officer

Anderson identified himself as a police officer at the beginning of

the interview, and did not tell Petitioner that he was charged with

battery prior to the Miranda warning. (See Resp’t. Exh. G;

Augmented CT at 2-3.) 

For the reasons discussed, the interview of Petitioner at the

jail did not violate Petitioner’s Miranda rights. Consequently,

the state courts’ rejection of Petitioner’s Miranda claim was

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT – FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

failing to disclose to him that Peter Craven would testify to

statements Petitioner had made to him after the altercation with

Davis. On the evening before Craven testified, the prosecutor

called him to verify that he would appear, and during that

conversation, Craven told the prosecutor that Petitioner had shown

him the knife and demonstrated how deeply he had stabbed Davis. 

(Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 149.)5 The prosecutor did not

inform the defense that Craven would testify to this effect before

Craven testified at the trial the following day. (RT at 146-47.) 

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When Craven gave this testimony, defense counsel moved for a

mistrial. (Id.) The prosecutor told the trial court that he did

not disclose the conversation because it was not exculpatory and

was consistent with the defense theories of self-defense and mutual

combat. (Id.) The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial. 

(Id. at 195-96.) First, the trial court found that the prosecutor

did not intentionally withhold exculpatory evidence. (Id.) The

trial court further found that there was no prejudice to Petitioner

because he never disputed that he had stabbed the victim. (Id.) 

In addition, learning about Craven’s testimony earlier could not

have affected Petitioner’s decision to testify because Petitioner

learned about Craven’s testimony before Petitioner decided to take

the stand. (Id.) 

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court

held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable

to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence

is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87. The

Supreme Court has since made clear that the duty to disclose such

evidence applies even when there has been no request by the

accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and that

the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory

evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 

Evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that,

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability'

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome." Id. at 682. 

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The failure to disclose Craven’s testimony to defense counsel

did not violate Brady because it was not “favorable” to Petitioner. 

“There are three components of a true Brady violation: [t]he

evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because

it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must

have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or

inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Craven’s testimony that

Petitioner admitted to stabbing Davis was neither exculpatory, nor

was it impeaching. As a result, it was not “favorable” evidence

that must be disclosed under Brady. 

Furthermore, the failure to disclose Craven’s testimony was

not prejudicial. As noted by the trial court, Petitioner did not

dispute that he stabbed Davis. In addition, Craven’s testimony did

not cause Petitioner to admit to the stabbing and pursue a selfdefense theory because Petitioner had already decided to present

that defense theory in opening argument, before Craven testified. 

If anything, learning that Craven would testify that Petitioner

admitted to stabbing Davis would have bolstered Petitioner’s

decision to pursue a self-defense theory. Petitioner’s contention

herein that he would not have testified had he known of Craven’s

testimony is belied by the fact that he testified in this case

after Craven testified. Under these circumstances, there is no

reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have

been different had Craven’s testimony been disclosed to Petitioner

the evening before Craven testified.

Because the failure to disclose Craven’s testimony that

Petitioner admitted stabbing Davis did not violate Petitioner’s

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rights under Brady, the state courts’ rejection of this claim was

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT – PERJURED TESTIMONY

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

knowingly using perjured testimony from the victim, Craig Davis. 

He claims that Davis’s testimony that he did not hit Petitioner

with a frying pan was false, as evidenced by Davis’s poor memory of

the incident and the inconsistencies in his various accounts of the

incident to the police, at the preliminary hearing, and at trial. 

Petitioner claims the prosecutor knew that Davis’s testimony was

“perjured” when he presented it at trial. 

When a prosecutor obtains a conviction by the use of testimony

which he knows or should know is perjured, it has been consistently

held that such conviction must be set aside if there is any

reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the

judgment of the jury. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103

(1976). The same result obtains when the prosecutor, although not

soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it

appears. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). To prevail

on a claim based on Agurs or Napue, a petitioner must show that

(1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the

prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was

actually false, and (3) the false testimony was material. United

States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71). 

The conflict between Petitioner’s testimony and Davis’s as to

whether Davis struck Petitioner with a frying pan does not

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establish that Davis’s testimony, as opposed to Petitioner’s, was

false. Prosecutors will not be held accountable for discrepancies

in testimony where there is no evidence from which to infer

prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d

1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct

where discrepancies in testimony could as easily flow from errors

in recollection as from lies); see also United States v. Sherlock,

962 F.2d 1349, 1364 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that mere

inconsistencies in testimony of prosecution witness do not

establish prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony). Davis’s

inconsistent accounts and memory lapses may be cited to urge the

fact-finder not to find Davis credible, but they do not, without

more, establish that Davis’s testimony was false, let alone that

the prosecutor knew it to be false. 

Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor knowingly presented

perjured testimony fails. Accordingly, the state courts’ rejection

of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of federal law, and Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on this claim. 

IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Petitioner raises three claims that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel: (1) that "cumulative errors of counsel" at

trial amounted to ineffective assistance; (2) that counsel was

ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at

sentencing; and (3) that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing adequately to investigate and present “exculpatory and

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6These are the fourth, fifth and seventh claims in the

original petition. 

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mitigating evidence” at trial.6 (Pet. at 8.) 

A. Applicable Law

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as

a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In

order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel

claim, a petitioner must establish two things. First, he must

establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it

fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient

performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome. Id.

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance

of counsel claims is considered to be "clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" for

the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. Williams (Terry) v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000). For a state court’s denial of

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to be an unreasonable

application of federal law, a petitioner must show that the state

court applied Strickland in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

Id. 

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B. “Cumulative Errors”

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel made various errors

that cumulatively amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel

under the Sixth Amendment. 

First, Petitioner complains that counsel failed to move to

suppress Petitioner’s interview with Officer Anderson, described

above. Whether counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress

amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel turns on whether such

a motion would have had merit, because failing to raise a meritless

motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005); Rupe v.

Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Petitioner argues that if his attorney had listened to the

beginning of the taped interview with Anderson, he would have

learned that the tape could have been suppressed on the grounds

that Officer Anderson violated Miranda and “coercively obtained”

Petitioner’s confession. (Pet. at 26.) For the reasons explained

above, Officer Anderson did not violate Petitioner’s Miranda

rights, and consequently a motion to suppress on that basis would

have failed.

The record also would not have supported a motion to suppress

on the grounds that Officer Anderson coerced Petitioner’s

confession. Due process forbids the use of a coerced confession at

trial. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973). 

"The test is whether, considering the totality of the

circumstances, the government obtained the statement by physical or

psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the

suspect's will was overborne." United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847

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7Petitioner also states that his attorney should have pursued

a motion to suppress based on evidence that at the time of the

interview he was taking medication and suffering the after-effects

of a seizure three days earlier. (Pet. at 12.) This is the basis

of Petitioner’s seventh claim in the petition, and is discussed in

detail in Part V.D., below.

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F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988). Petitioner contends that his

confession was coerced because Officer Anderson failed to identify

himself as a police officer and told Petitioner that he would be

charged only with battery. (Pet. at 12.) As discussed above,

however, a review of both the tape recording and the transcript of

the interview clearly indicates that Officer Anderson did in fact

identify himself as a police officer and did not tell Petitioner

that he was charged with battery. (Resp’t. Ex. G; Augmented CT at

2-3.) Consequently, the argument that the confession was coerced

on these grounds was not supported by the record and trial counsel

was not ineffective for failing to file such a motion.7 

Petitioner also claims that his attorney had not familiarized

himself with the preliminary hearing and consequently did not

effectively cross-examine Davis at trial, in particular when Davis

denied hitting Petitioner with a frying pan. (RT at 467.) 

Petitioner’s claim is not supported by the record. Defense counsel

cross-examined Davis in detail about numerous inconsistencies

between Davis’s preliminary hearing and trial testimony, and about

Davis’s poor memory and intoxication when the altercation occurred;

counsel even obtained Davis’s admission to lying at the preliminary

hearing. (RT at 72-114.) Counsel could not have used Davis’s

preliminary hearing testimony to cross-examine Davis about hitting

Petitioner with a frying pan because Davis did not admit to doing

so; Davis simply admitted telling the police that he punched

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Petitioner, and defense counsel cross-examined Davis about that

admission at trial. (CT at 17, 40-41; RT at 96.) In sum, the

record does not support Petitioner’s contention that his attorney

was unfamiliar with Davis’s preliminary hearing testimony or that

he did not properly use such testimony on cross-examination. 

As counsel did not err either in failing to file a motion to

suppress or in cross-examining Davis, Petitioner’s claim that these

were “cumulative errors” fails.

C. Mitigating Evidence at Sentencing

Petitioner claims that the attorney who represented him at

sentencing failed adequately to investigate and present mitigating

evidence at sentencing. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the

attorney should have argued that the sentence should be mitigated

because his prior conviction did not involve a weapon and because

the victim, Davis, had not wanted to press charges and had

described Petitioner as a “good guy” who did not “act violently.” 

(Pet. at 26-27.) 

Based on his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon and

inflicting great bodily injury, as well the finding that he had one

prior that qualified as both a strike and as a serious felony,

Petitioner faced a possible sentence of sixteen years in state

prison. (CT at 232-39.) Such a sentence would have consisted of

the upper term of four years for assault, doubled under the Three

Strikes Law due to the prior strike, an additional five years for

the prior “serious felony” conviction, and three more years based

on the great bodily injury allegation. (Id.)

Prior to sentencing, trial counsel had filed a motion to

dismiss Petitioner’s strike “in furtherance of justice” pursuant to

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California Penal Code section 1385(a), supported by letters from

Petitioner’s family. (Id. at 218-22.) At the outset of the

sentencing hearing, the sentencing attorney, who had substituted in

for trial counsel, and the prosecutor held a brief conference off

the record with the sentencing judge. (RT at 542.) After the

conference, defense counsel withdrew the motion to dismiss the

strike. (Id.) Petitioner states that he agreed to follow the

advice to withdraw the motion because counsel informed him that the

judge had indicated that he would impose a sentence of eleven years

if Petitioner withdrew the motion to dismiss the strike, but

fourteen years if he did not. (Pet. at 27.) Whether or not

Petitioner’s allegations on this point are true, after the motion

to dismiss the strike was withdrawn, the judge indicated that he

was “inclined to follow” the probation report’s recommendation of

eleven years and imposed an eleven-year sentence consisting of the

middle term of three years for the assault, doubled based on the

prior strike, plus five years for the prior “serious felony.” (RT

at 543-44; CT at 239, 283-84.) Although the judge did not dismiss

the strike, he did dismiss the three-year enhancement for great

bodily injury pursuant to California Penal Code section 1385(a). 

(RT at 544.) 

Counsel’s recommendation to withdraw the motion to dismiss the

strike and proceed with sentencing was a reasonable strategic

decision. By withdrawing the motion, he obtained the immediate and

certain benefit of an eleven-year sentence, five years lower than

the maximum sentence Petitioner could have received. If

Petitioner’s allegations are correct, moreover, the judge would

have imposed a longer sentence of fourteen years if counsel had not

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withdrawn the motion to dismiss the strike. Moreover, the success

of the motion to dismiss the strike was far from certain. Under

California law, a prior strike may be dismissed only if the

defendant falls “outside the spirit” of the Three Strikes law. 

People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 4th 148, 161 (1998). The judge could

well have viewed Petitioner as having an escalating pattern of

criminal behavior inasmuch as the prior conviction being charged as

a strike was a robbery of a convenience store while in the instant

offense he beat and stabbed his friend to the point of causing

serious injury. Although the strike conviction was eighteen years

old, in the interim Petitioner had a substantial number of other

felony convictions for driving under the influence with priors,

reckless driving while evading the police, possession of a

controlled substance, battery with serious bodily injury,

vandalism, and assault on a police officer. (CT at 232-40.) Given

this record of recidivism and escalating criminal behavior, defense

counsel could reasonably have advised that Petitioner did not have

a good chance of succeeding on his motion to dismiss the strike and

recommended that Petitioner take the lower sentence being offered

instead. 

Because counsel’s advice at sentencing was objectively

reasonable, Petitioner’s claim that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel in this regard fails. 

D. Mitigating Evidence at Trial

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to

investigate and present evidence of his mental impairment. He

argues that such evidence would have enabled counsel to 

(1) argue that Petitioner did not have the mental state necessary

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8The seizure occurred on August 9, 2003 (Hancock Decl. at ¶ 3,

Shields Decl. at ¶ 9), and the interview took place on August 12,

2003 (Augmented CT at 2). 

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for assault; (2) suppress Petitioner’s interview with Officer

Anderson; and (3) support an argument to dismiss his prior strike

or mitigate his sentence. Petitioner raised this claim in a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme

Court. In support of that petition, he included declarations from

himself, his mother, his trial attorney, and Dr. John Shields, a

licensed forensic psychologist. Petitioner has included these

declarations among the exhibits to the instant petition. 

1. Background

Petitioner and his mother state in their declarations that

they informed trial counsel prior to trial that Petitioner has

suffered from seizures for several years, and after a seizure he

does not feel like himself, he feels “groggy,” and his thinking is

confused. (Hancock Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5; Smith Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3, 5.) They

also explained to counsel that three days prior to the interview

with Officer Anderson, Petitioner suffered a seizure in the jail,

was prescribed the wrong medication, and as a result felt “groggy,”

“drowsy,” and “out of it” during the interview.8 (Hancock Decl. ¶¶

4-5; Smith Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) 

Trial counsel did not investigate Petitioner’s medical records

or hire an expert to testify about Petitioner’s medical condition

and its effect on his mental capacity to commit the crime or to

participate in the interview with Officer Anderson. (Kurtzman

Decl. ¶ 3). Counsel explained that he did not believe that

Petitioner’s medical condition was relevant to the crime itself

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Petitioner did not mention to Officer Anderson or to the

officers at the crime scene that Davis hit him with a frying pan,

or that Petitioner stabbed Davis in self-defense. At trial,

Petitioner offered three explanations for failing to mention this

to Officer Anderson: that he was groggy and not lucid during the

interview due to the after-effects of the seizure and medication he

was taking; that because he believed that Officer Anderson was

wrapping up the investigation he only paid “lip service” to the

interview; and that he did not want to get Davis in trouble by

saying that Davis hit him with a pan. (RT at 332-47.)

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because Petitioner had not said that he suffered from any seizure

around the time of the offense and because assault is a general

intent crime. (Id.) He also did not want to use Petitioner’s

medical condition to try to suppress Petitioner’s statements to

Officer Anderson because he wanted the interview to come into

evidence. (Id. at ¶ 4.) He believed that the interview would

garner sympathy for Petitioner because it showed that Petitioner

took care of Davis, paid for his food, gave him a place to stay,

was remorseful for his act, and had not meant to hurt him. (Id. at

¶ 4.) In his judgment, these favorable aspects of the interview

outweighed its negative aspects, particularly because other

evidence would be introduced that Petitioner had beat and stabbed

Davis. (Id.) In addition, Petitioner’s trial attorney did not

want to have an expert testify that Petitioner’s mental impairment

was the reason he did not mention during the interview with Officer

Anderson that Davis had struck him with a frying pan because this

risked that the jury would disregard the entire interview,

including its beneficial aspects described above.9 (Id. at ¶ 7.) 

Dr. Shields reviewed Petitioner’s medical records but did not

interview or examine Petitioner in person. (Shields Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) 

He found that Petitioner had a history of seizures caused by a

blunt head trauma several years earlier, and possibly exacerbated

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by severe alcoholism. (Id. at ¶ 5-7.) He noted a number of

hospital visits due to the severe alcoholism and related

psychiatric problems. (Id. at ¶ 5.) During a period of time when

Petitioner was not taking his anti-seizure medication, Petitioner

showed “symptoms of severe mental illness and/or a severe

compromise in his mental status” requiring involuntary psychiatric

commitment. (Id. at ¶ 8; Pet. Exh. D.) Dr. Shields noted that in

the past it has taken several days for Petitioner to regain his

mental faculties following a seizure. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Dr. Shields

opined that Officer Anderson used suggestive interrogation

techniques to which Petitioner was vulnerable because he “may have

had” impaired mental faculties during the interview as an aftereffect of his seizure approximately three days earlier. (Id. at 

¶¶ 13, 15.) Dr. Shields concluded that trial counsel could have

used Petitioner’s medical records and an expert to raise issues

about Petitioner’s mental capacity to form the “specific intent” to

commit the crime, and whether Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily

waived his rights or was unduly suggestible during the interview

with Officer Anderson. (Id. at ¶ 19.) 

2. Applicable Law

A defense attorney has a general duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes

particular investigations unnecessary. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691. Strickland directs that “‘a particular decision not to

investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the

circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

judgments.’” Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 491). “[W]hen the facts that

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support a certain potential line of defense are generally known to

counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for

further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated

altogether.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.

3. Mental State Defense

Trial counsel reasonably decided not to pursue evidence of

Petitioner’s mental condition for purposes of disproving the

assault charge. Petitioner never indicated, nor is there any

evidence, that he had recently had a seizure or that he was

suffering from any effects of a seizure at the time of the

altercation with Davis. Moreover, assault is a general intent

crime, People v. Williams, 26 Cal. 4th 779, 788 (2001), and

evidence of Petitioner’s mental health was not admissible under

California law to disprove a general intent crime. See People v.

Rathert, 24 Cal.4th 200, 205 (2000) (jury may not consider evidence

of mental disease, defect or intoxication to determine whether

defendant committed a general intent crime); Cal. Penal Code §

25(a) (evidence of mental illness, disease or defect are not

admissible to negate purpose, intent, knowledge or other mental

state); Cal. Penal Code § 28(a) (evidence of mental disease or

defect not admissible to negate purpose, intent, knowledge or other

mental state, only admissible to negate specific intent); Cal.

Penal Code § 29 (expert may not testify whether defendant’s mental

illness, disorder or defect negated defendant’s purpose, intent,

knowledge, or other mental state). Because evidence of

Petitioner’s mental impairment and expert testimony regarding his

condition would not have been admissible to show that Petitioner

did not have the requisite general intent to commit the assault,

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trial counsel reasonably decided not to investigate the condition

further for that purpose. 

Finally, trial counsel could have reasonably chosen not to

pursue a mental condition theory in order to avoid a conflict with

the self-defense theory Petitioner chose to advance. Where counsel

reviews the preliminary facts of the case and reasonably decides to

pursue only one of two conflicting defense theories, he need not

investigate the abandoned defense theory further. Williams v.

Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 611-12 (9th Cir. 2004); see Turk v. White,

116 F.3d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir. 1997)(counsel's selection of selfdefense theory obviated his need to investigate defendant's

conflicting mental incompetency defense). If Petitioner had

claimed that his mental disorder prevented him from knowing what he

was doing when he struck and stabbed Davis, such evidence would

have conflicted with his theory of self-defense, which posited that

he acted knowingly. Once Petitioner chose to advance a theory of

self-defense, counsel’s failure to pursue the investigation into

the conflicting mental state defense was reasonable. 

4. Suppression of Interview with Officer Anderson

Trial counsel’s decision not to investigate further

Petitioner’s mental impairment for the purpose of seeking to

suppress Petitioner’s interview with Officer Anderson can also be

found reasonable. Counsel reflected on the decision not to pursue

medical evidence in order to try to suppress the interview with

Officer Anderson. To be sure, Petitioner admitted in the interview

that he stabbed Davis and beat him up. However, counsel indicated

in his declaration that he decided not to move to suppress the

interview because its negative aspects were outweighed by the

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benefit of showing sympathetic aspects of Petitioner, including his

having housed and fed Davis, his concern for Davis, and his regret

for committing the crime. 

The state courts could reasonably decide that counsel’s

tactical choice was reasonable. The evidence that Petitioner was

the perpetrator was very strong. Davis was found bleeding and

beaten up outside Petitioner’s apartment where he had been staying,

and the police found a bloody knife in Petitioner’s kitchen, a

shoe-print in the victim’s blood outside of Petitioner’s apartment,

and blood on the sole of Petitioner’s shoe. (RT at 451-56, 468.) 

In addition, Davis identified Petitioner as the person who

assaulted him. Although Davis had given inconsistent accounts of

the incident and had admitted to not remembering details and being

drunk, his account was corroborated by Peter Craven and the

physical evidence. Davis’s description of the severity of the

beating was also corroborated by hospital records showing that he

had a badly swollen face, fresh scrapes and bruises on his face and

body, a broken clavicle, broken ribs and a stab wound in his back

that punctured his lung. (RT at 131-32, 234-37, 242, 267.) 

Furthermore, when the police arrived at the scene, Petitioner

challenged the officers to a fight and offered the very

unconvincing explanation that Davis had beat himself up. (RT at

160-61, 202, 205.) Lastly, Craven testified that Petitioner

confessed shortly after the incident to stabbing and beating Davis. 

(RT at 137-38.) 

In light of the very strong evidence against Petitioner, his

attorney could reasonably have decided that the jury was very

likely to find that he was the perpetrator even if the interview

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was suppressed, and that the interview would show sympathetic

aspects of Petitioner to the jury. Consequently, the state court

could reasonably conclude that trial counsel’s failure to

investigate Petitioner’s mental condition in order to use it to try

to suppress the interview was objectively reasonable and did not

amount to deficient performance under Strickland. 

In any event, even if counsel had performed deficiently in

this regard, there was no prejudice. First, a motion to suppress

would not have been likely to succeed even with the proffered

evidence of Petitioner’s mental capacity that counsel may have

discovered. To establish that his Miranda waiver was invalid,

Petitioner would have had to show that he did not waive his rights

voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at

475. The voluntariness component turns on the absence of police

overreaching, i.e., external factors, whereas the cognitive

component depends upon the defendant's mental capacity. Cox v. Del

Papa, 542 F.3d 669, 675 (9th Cir. 2008). The tape and transcript

do not indicate overreaching by the police. Petitioner was

properly given Miranda warnings, Officer Anderson did not threaten

or try to intimidate him, and, as discussed above and contrary to

Petitioner’s assertion, Officer Anderson did in fact identify

himself as a police officer and did not state that the only charge

against Petitioner would be battery. (Resp’t. Ex. G; Augmented CT

at 2-44.) Furthermore, the tape and transcript show that

Petitioner’s answers were coherent and responsive, and there is no

indication that he did not understand what he was being asked. 

(Resp’t. Ex. G; Augmented CT at 2-44.) Petitioner’s evident

cognitive ability on the tape and transcript would have likely

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28 10His criminal history is discussed in Part V.C., above.

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outweighed both Petitioner’s post-hoc statements that he was “very

groggy,” “drowsy” and “not completely with it” during the

interview, and Dr. Shields’s statement that Petitioner “may have”

been cognitively impaired from the seizure three days earlier. 

(Hancock Decl. ¶ 5; Shields Decl. ¶ 12.) Trial counsel would not

likely have succeeded in showing that Petitioner’s Miranda waiver

was invalid by investigating and presenting evidence of his mental

condition. 

The totality of the circumstances surrounding the interview

does not indicate that Petitioner’s confession was coerced. 

Officer Anderson interviewed Petitioner in the jail interview room,

the interview lasted less than one hour, Anderson read him his

Miranda rights at the outset, and he told Petitioner that he did

not have to talk and that the decision was “totally up to” him. 

(Resp’t. Ex. G; Augmented CT at 3.) Petitioner did not inform

Officer Anderson of his medical condition or the medication he was

taking, nor is there any evidence Anderson was aware of it. 

(Augmented CT at 2-44; Shields Decl. ¶ 12.) Petitioner was in his

forties and had considerable experience with police interrogations

and procedures from a substantial history of convictions and

arrests.10 There was no conflict or hostility between Anderson and

Petitioner in the interview, and the overall atmosphere of the

interview was friendly. (Resp’t. Ex. G; Augmented CT at 2-44.) 

Such circumstances, even when considered with the proffered

evidence of Petitioner’s mental condition, do not indicate that

Petitioner’s free will was “overborne” so as to render the

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confession coerced. See, e.g., United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d

1108, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting defendant’s argument that

his ingestion of medication rendered his confessions involuntary

where defendant didn’t tell officers that he took medication,

defendant appeared to be alert and able, atmosphere of interview

was friendly and cordial, interview was only two hours long, and

defendant was repeatedly told that he was free to leave);

Cunningham v. Perez, 345 F.3d 802, 810-11 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding

officer did not undermine free will of petitioner taking bi-polar

medication where interrogation lasted for eight hours, and officer

allowed breaks for food and water, suggested cooperation could lead

to treatment rather than prison, stated that he had put people in

prison for similar conduct, and denied petitioner’s request to call

therapist). 

Finally, even if trial counsel had managed to get the

interview suppressed, the outcome of the trial would have likely

been the same. Petitioner argues that if the interview had been

suppressed, he would not have testified. But without his

testimony, there would have been no evidence to support his selfdefense theory. Petitioner’s defense would have rested solely on

challenging the credibility of Davis’s account and the other

prosecution evidence. For the reasons discussed above, while Davis

had given inconsistent statements, had been drunk, and had memory

problems, his account of the incident was largely corroborated by

other, reliable evidence. In addition, Petitioner’s confession to

Craven and the physical evidence would have made conviction likely

even without Petitioner’s confession to Officer Anderson. Under

these circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that, even

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if his interview with Officer Anderson had been suppressed,

Petitioner would have been acquitted. 

5. Sentence Mitigation

 There is also no reasonable probability that the evidence of

Petitioner’s mental condition would have caused the sentencing

judge to dismiss his strike or further mitigate his sentence, as

Petitioner argues. As described above, the trial court had already

dismissed the great bodily injury enhancement, and given Petitioner

the middle, as opposed to the aggravated, term. There is no

evidence that Petitioner committed the crime while suffering from a

seizure or any mental impairment resulting from his medical

condition that would warrant further mitigation of his sentence. 

Consequently, Petitioner was not prejudiced at sentencing by his

attorney’s decision not to investigate Petitioner’s mental

condition further. 

6. Summary

For the reasons discussed, Petitioner’s attorney acted

reasonably in declining to investigate Petitioner’s medical

condition further for a mental state defense to the assault charge. 

In addition, the state courts reasonably concluded that counsel

made a reasonable tactical decision not to move to suppress the

confession based on his mental condition, a decision that was also

not prejudicial. Finally, there is no reasonable likelihood that

Petitioner’s sentence was affected by the lack of investigation

into his mental condition. 

Consequently, the state courts’ denial of Petitioner’s claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. Petitioner is not

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entitled to habeas relief on these claims.

V. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT – INSPECTION OF TAPED CONFESSION

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor violated his due process

rights by failing to allow the defense to inspect the tape

recording of Officer Anderson’s interview of him at the jail. 

(Pet. at 7-8.) According to Petitioner, he received a copy of the

taped confession prior to the preliminary hearing, but it was

inaudible. (Pet. at 29.) 

Even if it is true that the copy of the tape Petitioner

received prior to his preliminary hearing was inaudible, this did

not amount to a due process violation. The record is clear, and

Petitioner does not dispute, that he did eventually receive an

audible copy of the taped confession. His counsel listened to the

tape with the prosecutor and made edits the transcript before it

was admitted during the prosecution’s case in chief. (RT at 282.) 

Petitioner has demonstrated no prejudice from the fact that the

first copy of the tape that he received was inaudible. Petitioner

contends that if he had received an audible copy, he would have

been able to demonstrate that the confession was coerced and

violated Miranda, the confession would have been suppressed, and he

would not have testified at trial. For the reasons discussed

above, however, the taped confession did not demonstrate either a

Miranda violation or a coerced confession. Consequently, an

audible tape of the interrogation would not have enabled Petitioner

to file a meritorious motion to suppress. 

Petitioner has shown no prejudice from any inaudible recording

he might have received initially. His due process claim is without

merit. Accordingly, the state courts’ rejection of this claim was

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11In an earlier portion of his brief, Petitioner also argues

that there was insufficient evidence to establish “flight” under

California law. (Br. Attached to Suppl. Pet. at 5-9.) This state

law claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). In addition, the California

Court of Appeal’s rejection of this claim as a matter of state law

(Slip Op. at 10) is binding on this Court. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 & n.3 (1988).

38

neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law,

and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

VI. FLIGHT INSTRUCTION

In his supplemental petition, Petitioner claims that the trial

court violated his federal right to due process by issuing the

following jury instruction pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.52:

The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a

crime or after he is accused of a crime is not sufficient in

itself to establish his guilt but is a fact which, if proved,

may be considered by you in the light of all other proved

facts in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty. 

The weight to which this circumstance is entitled is a matter

for you to decide.

(RT at 477.) According to Petitioner, the instruction lowered the

prosecution’s burden to prove every element of the case beyond a

reasonable doubt because it allowed the jury to infer that his

“flight” –- of which there was insufficient evidence –- reflected

consciousness of guilt. (Br. Attached to Suppl. Pet. at 9-11.)11 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects

the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime

with which he or she is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970). This constitutional principle prohibits the state from

using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the

effect of relieving the state of its burden to prove every

essential element of a crime. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391,

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400-03 (1991)

Petitioner complains that the instruction allows permissive

inferences. An instruction that allows a permissive inference does

not shift the burden of proof, but it nonetheless violates due

process unless it can be said “‘with substantial assurance’” that

the inferred fact is “‘more likely than not to flow from the proved

fact on which it is made to depend.’” County Court of Ulster

County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 167 & n.28 (1979) (quoting Leary v.

United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969)). Courts “determine the

constitutionality of a permissive inference instruction on a caseby-case basis” by reviewing the record evidence to see if the court

can say with substantial assurance that the inferred fact flows

more probably than not from the facts proven in the particular

case. United States v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 898 (9th Cir. 1994). 

First, Petitioner appears to argue that the instruction was

erroneous simply by allowing consciousness of guilt to be inferred

from evidence of flight. The Ninth Circuit has upheld an

instruction allowing such an inference which required, as the

instruction did here, that evidence of the defendant’s flight be

proved. See McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1994);

Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Consequently, the instruction was not erroneous simply because it

allowed the jury to infer consciousness of guilt from evidence of

flight. 

Secondly, Petitioner argues that allowing the jury to infer

consciousness of guilt violated due process in “a case like this

one, where there was no evidence of flight at all.” (Br. Attached

to Suppl. Pet. at 11.) The California Court of Appeal rejected

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this argument, finding that there was “legally sufficient” evidence

of flight in that Craven testified that he talked Petitioner into

retreating from the living room, where Davis was, into the back

bedroom, before the police arrived. (Slip Op. at 10.) Further,

the instruction explicitly stated that the jury could only infer

consciousness of guilt if flight was proved. The jury was

elsewhere told to disregard any instruction which applied to facts

that it determined did not exist. See McMillan, 19 F.3d at 469

(flight instruction proper because it instructed jury it could draw

inference of guilt only if flight was proved). The state appellate

court reasonably concluded that, in allowing the jury to draw a

“permissive inference” of consciousness of guilt from the evidence,

the flight instruction did not violate due process. 

Even if the flight instruction had improperly allowed a

permissive inference in this case, such an error was not

prejudicial under Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38. If, as Petitioner

contends, there was no evidence of flight, there would be no harm

in the instruction, because it simply allowed the jury to consider

such evidence. Moreover, as discussed above, the evidence of

Petitioner’s guilt was very strong. Any evidence of flight found

by the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.52 would have been a

relatively insignificant addition to the strong evidence of his

guilt. 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s

challenge to the flight instruction was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

//

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CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. 

See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll.

§ 2254 (requiring district court to rule on certificate of

appealability in same order that denies petition). Petitioner has

failed to make a substantial showing that any of his claims

amounted to a denial of his constitutional rights or demonstrate

that a reasonable jurist would find this Court's denial of his

claims debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000). 

The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. All

pending motions are terminated. Each party shall bear his own

costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 2/16/10

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFF J HANCOCK,

Plaintiff,

 v.

D SEDLEY et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-04469 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on February 16, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Jeff Jay Hancock V-49474

RB-132L

Correctional Traning Facility - North

P.O. Box 705

Soledad, CA 93960

Dated: February 16, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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