Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00450/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00450-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

FREDRICK BENARD MOSLEY, )

AIS #233819, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

 v. ) CASE NO. 2:13-CV-450-MHT 

 ) (WO) 

 )

SGT. DOMINIC JONES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Fredrick Benard 

Mosley, a state inmate. In the instant case, Mosley challenges the constitutionality of force used 

against him on April 6, 2013 by officers at the Easterling Correctional Facility and the failure of 

other officers to protect him from this use of force. Mosley also alleges that the defendants violated 

his right to due process in actions charging him with violations of institutional rules, conspired 

against him, deprived him of due process in determining his classification level, failed to 

investigate his claims, subjected him to unconstitutional conditions and violated an administrative 

regulation. Mosley names as defendants in this cause of action Dominic Jones, Nathaniel Lawson, 

Shawn Logan, Larry Peavy, Derrick Carter, Christopher Scott, Kelvin Teal, Bobby Lingo, Marvin 

Scaife and Timmy Adkinson, correctional officials at Easterling; Brian Mitchell, a psychologist;

Sherry A. Lightner and Larry W. Anglin, classification personnel; and the Central Review Board 

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of the Alabama Department of Corrections.

1

 He seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief 

and monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at 4. The 

defendants filed an answer, special report and supporting evidentiary materials, including 

affidavits and certified prison records, addressing Mosley’s claims for relief. In these documents, 

the defendants deny the they acted in violation of Mosley’s constitutional rights. 

After receiving the defendants’ special report, the court issued an order directing Mosley 

to file a response to the report, including affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury 

and other evidentiary materials. Doc. 25 at 2. The order specifically cautioned Mosley that “unless 

within fifteen (15) days form the date of this order a party . . . presents sufficient legal cause 

why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the 

time for the plaintiff filing a response] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special 

report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and (2) after 

considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in 

accordance with the law.” Doc. 25 at 2–3. Pursuant to this order, the court deems it appropriate to 

treat the defendants’ report as a motion for summary judgment. 

Upon consideration of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the evidentiary 

materials filed in support thereof, the sworn complaint, and the plaintiff’s response in opposition 

to the report, the court concludes that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be 

DENIED as to the plaintiff’s allegations of excessive force and failure to protect lodged against 

defendants Jones, Peavy, Scott, Adkinson, Teal and Scaife in their individual capacities. The 

motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in all other respects. 

 1 Mosley initially identifies Larry Peavy as “Larry Peavey” but thereafter does not dispute that this individual’s true 

last name is “Peavy” and utilizes the correct spelling in his later filings. For purposes of this Recommendation, the 

court will therefore use the correct spelling for this defendant’s surname except when quoting from the complaint.

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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine 

[dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). 

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the 

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including 

pleadings, discovery materials, affidavits and statements made under penalty of perjury], which it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) 

(holding that moving party has initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of material 

fact for trial). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no 

dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present appropriate 

evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–24. 

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff 

to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his 

case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593–94 (holding that, once the moving party meets 

its burden, the opposing “party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or 

statements made under penalty of perjury], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

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admissions on file,” demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact). This court will 

also consider “specific facts” pled in a plaintiff’s sworn complaint when considering disposition 

of a case on summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th 

Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when a party produces evidence that would 

allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor such that summary judgment is not 

warranted. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Public Educ. for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 

1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). 

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and 

pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden 

of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. See Beard v. Banks, 548 

U.S. 521, 525 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s 

pro se status alone does not compel this court to disregard elementary principles of production and 

proof in a civil case. 

The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained 

in the record. After this review, the court finds that Mosley, through the submission of his sworn 

complaint, the evidentiary materials submitted in support thereof and his responses to the 

defendants’ report, has demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry 

of summary judgment on his excessive force and failure to protect claims presented against 

defendants Jones, Peavy, Scott, Adkinson, Teal and Scaife in their individual capacities. The 

defendants, however, are entitled to summary judgment on Mosley’s remaining claims for relief. 

 

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Relevant Facts2

On April 6, 2013, Mosley finished eating the mid-day meal and complained to defendant 

Bobby Lingo that he was still hungry. Lingo granted Mosley permission to receive extra food and 

he obtained the same from the kitchen staff. Mosley then concealed a bologna sandwich in his 

clothing and exited the dining hall. Food taken from the dining hall without permission is 

considered contraband. Because of information provided by Lingo, correctional officers 

confronted Mosley, counseled him about his violation of the rules and advised him that he would 

be moved to Dorm C1, the Restricted Privileges Dorm. Mosley refused orders to enter Dorm C1 

and grabbed a table to prevent his placement in this dorm. A struggle ensued with defendants 

Jones and Peavy. As best the court can discern, Mosley alleges that “[Dominic] Jones grabbed me 

[by] my neck, start[ed] [choking] me. . . . Officer Scott . . . ran over there pull me to the ground. 

Lt. Larry Peavey put his boots on my neck. Sgt. Jones Dominic put me [in] handcuffs[,] tighten 

them up so tight bend my arm up . . . [then] jerk[ed] [on the] handcuffs. . . . When I get [to] SegB-B door, Jones . . . running, rammed my head [in] the door [4 or 5] times. I was [being] kick[ed] 

in thigh by Larry Peavey. . . . Jones slapping [me] in back of my head about 26x time[s], Larry 

Peavey [was] kicking my arm. They pick me up took me in the segregation room [where] Jones 

start punch[ing] me in my chest [until I was out of breath gasping] for air. Larry Peavey pull[ed] 

out his stick put [it] in back [of] me between my handcuffs [and] jerk[ed] on handcuffs.” Doc. 1 

at 10–11. During various periods of the alleged assault, defendants Scott, Adkinson, Teal and 

 2 The facts are gleaned from the complaint, the attachment to the complaint, and the undisputed evidentiary materials. 

At this stage of the proceedings, the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Adickes v. S. H. Kress 

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970) (holding that all evidence “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing 

party” when addressing a party’s motion for summary judgment). 

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Scaife observed the acts of physical abuse but failed to intervene on Mosley’s behalf. Doc. 1 at 

8–10. 

Mosley incurred disciplinary charges for failure to obey a direct order and assault on a 

correctional officer for his actions related to the altercation on April 6, 2013. Doc. 23-15 at 10–20. 

Correctional officials also issued a behavior citation to Mosley for possession of contraband due 

to his exiting the dining hall with a sandwich. Doc. 23-15 at 8–9. On April 7, 2013, Officer 

Munchie Keaton served Mosley with notice of the disciplinary charges and the scheduled date for 

the disciplinary hearings related to these charges. Keaton provided Mosley the opportunity to 

identify witnesses but Mosley signed the form indicating that he did not desire any witnesses. Doc. 

23-15 at 10 & 18. Mosley signed the materials acknowledging receipt of service of the disciplinary 

charges. At this same time, Keaton also served Mosely with notice of the behavior citation. 

During the disciplinary hearings, Mosley provided the hearing officer, defendant Shawn 

Logan, with a list of potential questions addressing the assault charge. Logan asked the questions 

he deemed relevant to the charge pending against Mosley. Mosley also posed questions to the 

arresting officer, Dominic Jones, and was given the opportunity to testify on his own behalf and 

present evidence. Doc. 23-15 at 10–20. Upon completion of the disciplinary hearings, Logan

found Mosley guilty of failing to obey a direct order and assault on a person associated with the 

Department of Corrections. Doc. 23-15 at 12 & 20. The sanctions imposed upon Mosley for these

disciplinary infractions consisted of the loss of canteen, telephone and visitation privileges for 

forty-five days. Doc. 23-15 at 12 & 20. With respect to the behavior citation, defendant Nathaniel 

Lawson approved the citation and imposed the recommended sanctions of a thirty-day loss of 

canteen, telephone and visitation privileges. Doc. 23-15 at 8. 

Mosley complains that he was denied due process both during the proceedings related to 

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these actions and when classification personnel increased his classification level to close custody 

due to his violations of institutional rules. Mosley also makes conclusory allegations regarding 

use of heaters in the facility from the date of the incident until sometime in July of 2013, the 

presence of rats in all areas of the prison, and perceived oil in the water. Mosley further complains 

that defendants Carter and Lawson failed to properly investigate his altercation with correctional 

officers and denied him the opportunity to make a written statement on the date of the incident in 

violation of Administrative Regulation No. 403, which governs procedures for rule violations. 

Finally, Mosley alleges that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to conceal their violations of 

his constitutional rights. 

B. The Central Review Board

Mosley names the Central Review Board of the Alabama Department of Corrections as a 

defendant in this cause of action. The claims against the Central Review Board relate to the 

increase in his classification level. 

The law is well-established that a state agency, department or internal board thereof, as an 

extension of the State, is absolutely immune from suit. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986) 

(holding that unless the State, its agency, or board consents to suit, the plaintiff cannot proceed 

against the respective defendant because the action is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment, and 

“[t]his bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable”). In addition, an internal 

department board is “not a ‘person within the meaning of § 1983,” and therefore is not subject to 

liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65

(1989). Moreover, as determined herein, Mosley has no constitutional right to a particular custody 

classification. Any claims lodged against the Central Review Board of the Alabama Department 

of Corrections are therefore frivolous as they are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” 

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

C. Absolute Immunity

With respect to those claims lodged against the individual defendants in their official 

capacities, they are immune from monetary damages. Official-capacity lawsuits are “in all 

respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 

159, 166 (1985). “A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has 

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity. 

Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Congress has not abrogated 

Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from claims brought against 

them in their official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 

1997) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Seminole 

Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996); and Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th 

Cir. 1990)). 

In light of the foregoing, the defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity under the 

Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official capacities. 

Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994); 

Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989).

D. Due Process

Mosley challenges the due process afforded him during the proceedings related to the 

disciplinary actions and behavior citation. For instance, Mosley alleges that (1) Officer Munchie 

Keeton, the serving officer, did not allow him to list witnesses; (2) Lieutenant Shawn Logan, the 

hearing officer, found him guilty despite his presentation of evidence contradictory to that of the 

arresting officer; and (3) Warden Derrick Carter approved the disciplinary findings without a 

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proper investigation. Under the circumstances of this case, Mosley’s due process claims entitle 

him to no relief. 

Determining whether an inmate has been “deprived of ‘liberty’ within the” scope of the 

Due Process Clause “is often a difficult determination . . . because prisoners have already been 

deprived of their liberty in the ordinary sense of the term.” Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1318 

(11th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has nevertheless identified two circumstances in which a 

prisoner can be further deprived of his liberty such that due process is required. 

The first is when a change in a prisoner’s conditions of confinement is so severe 

that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by the court. Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); see, e.g., Vitek v. 

Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492–93, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1263–64, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) 

(holding that a prisoner is entitled to due process prior to being transferred to a 

mental hospital). The second is when the state has consistently given a certain 

benefit to prisoners (for instance, via statute or administrative policy), and the 

deprivation of that benefit “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate 

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 

S.Ct. at 2300; see, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 

2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (prisoners may not be deprived of statutory “goodtime credits” without due process); cf. Dudley v. Stewart, 724 F.2d 1493, 1497–98 

(11th Cir. 1984) (explaining how the state creates liberty interests). In the first 

situation, the liberty interest exists apart from the state; in the second situation, the 

liberty interest is created by the state. 

Bass, 170 F.3d at 1318. 

 

The Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more 

adverse conditions of confinement. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485–86 (noting temporary confinement of 

inmate in disciplinary segregation does not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest); 

Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The punishments [the plaintiff-inmate] 

suffered because of his disciplinary conviction (demotion in status, segregation, and transfer) raise 

no due process concerns.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (holding no liberty 

interest arising from Due Process Clause itself in transfer from low-to maximum-security prison 

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because “[c]onfinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of 

custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose”); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 

238, 245–46 (1983) (holding prisoner has no constitutional right to be confined in a particular 

institution). Moreover, an inmate in the Alabama prison system has no constitutionally protected 

interest in the privileges bestowed upon him or confinement in the least restrictive prison 

environment because the resulting restraints are not so severe that they exceed the sentence 

imposed upon him. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485 (“Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide 

range of misconduct falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of 

law.”). In addition, a temporary denial of privileges does not impose an “atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. Thus, the 

deprivations imposed upon Mosley based on the challenged disciplinary actions and behavior 

citation did not “exceed the sentence [imposed by the trial court] in such an unexpected manner as 

to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force.” Id. 

This court must therefore determine whether the actions about which Mosley complains 

involved the deprivation of a state-created liberty interest as defined by the standard set forth in 

Sandin. As the Supreme Court later opined,

Sandin involved prisoners’ claims to procedural due process protection 

before placement in segregated confinement for 30 days, imposed as discipline for 

disruptive behavior. Sandin observed that some of our earlier cases, Hewitt v. 

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), in particular, had 

employed a methodology for identifying state-created liberty interests that 

emphasized “the language of a particular [prison] regulation” instead of “the nature 

of the deprivation.” Sandin, 515 U.S., at 481, 115 S. Ct. 2293. In Sandin, we 

criticized this methodology as creating a disincentive for States to promulgate 

procedures for prison management, and as involving the federal courts in the dayto-day management of prisons. Id. at 482–83, 115 S. Ct. 2293. For these reasons, 

we abrogated the methodology of parsing the language of particular regulations. 

“[T]he search for a negative implication from mandatory language in 

prisoner regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty 

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protected by the Due Process Clause. The time has come to return to the due 

process principles we believe were correctly established in and applied in Wolff and 

Meachum. Following Wolff, we recognize that States may under certain 

circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process 

Clause. But these interests will generally be limited to freedom from restraint 

which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give 

rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes 

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents 

of prison life.” Id. at 483–84, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (citations and footnote omitted). 

After Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence 

of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of 

confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the 

nature of those conditions themselves “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life.” Id. at 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293.

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222–23 (2005). More specifically, “[w]ith respect to 

[Plaintiff’s] loss of canteen, telephone, and visiting privileges, a liberty interest is not implicated 

either under the Constitution or by the State’s creation. The Court finds the Constitution does not 

grant an inmate a right in visitation, canteen, and telephone privileges.” Bass, 2015 WL 4742473, 

at *5 (citations omitted).

Applying the Sandin inquiry, it is clear that the temporary loss of canteen, telephone and 

visitation privileges “though concededly punitive, do[] not represent a dramatic departure from the 

basic conditions” of the sentence imposed upon the plaintiff. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. In light of 

the foregoing, the court concludes that the aforementioned sanctions fail to “impose[] atypical and 

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. 

Consequently, due process did not attach to the disciplinary or behavior citation proceedings and 

summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants on the due process claims. 

E. Classification

Mosley challenges his placement in close custody. This claim, however, provides no basis 

for relief. An inmate in the Alabama prison system has no constitutionally protected interest in 

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the procedure affecting his classification because the resulting restraint, without more, does not 

impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (holding that 

inmate has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in a particular custody classification). 

Thus, Mosley has no constitutionally protected interest in remaining in a particular custody 

classification, and any claim to the contrary is without merit. 

F. Conditions

Mosley makes a number of allegations with respect to the conditions at Easterling. 

Specifically, Mosley alleges that the heating system operated during the summer months, the water 

contained oil, and rats roamed all areas of the prison. The defendants respond that Mosley “has 

failed to show an ‘objective’ violation of the Eighth Amendment. He has failed to allege the 

deprivation of a single identifiable [essential] need[.] The Plaintiff’s claims do not rise to the level 

of a constitutional violation.” Doc. 23 at 22. 

Only actions that deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” are 

grave enough to establish constitutional violations. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). 

Specifically, the Eighth Amendment is concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical 

care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Id. at 348 (citation 

omitted). As the Supreme Court has held:

The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 

452 U.S. 337, 349, . . . (1981), but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is 

now settled that “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions 

under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment,” 

Helling [v. McKinney], 509 U.S. [25], 31 [1993]. In its prohibition of “cruel and 

unusual punishments,” the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, 

who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners. . . . The 

Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane 

conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive 

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adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must “take reasonable 

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates,” Hudson v. Palmer, 466 U.S. 517, 

526-527. . . (1984).

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 

If prison conditions are merely “restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that 

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Generally,

prison conditions rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation only when they “involve the 

wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Id.; Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th 

Cir. 2004). “[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . which 

house persons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349. 

“[A] prisoner’s mere discomfort, without more, does not offend the Eighth Amendment.” Crosby, 

379 F.3d at 1296. 

To demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation regarding conditions of confinement, a 

prisoner must satisfy both objective and subjective elements. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. With 

respect to the requisite objective elements, an inmate must first show “an objectively substantial 

risk of serious harm . . . exist[ed]. Second, once it is established that the official is aware of this 

substantial risk, the official must react to this risk in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Marsh

v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028-29 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds 

by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). As to the subjective elements, “a prison 

official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane 

conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . . The Eighth 

Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual 

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‘punishments.’ . . . [A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 

perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as 

the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–38 (internal citations omitted); Campbell 

v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1370 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[P]roof that the defendant should have perceived 

the risk but did not is insufficient.”). 

The living conditions within a correctional facility will constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment only when the conditions involve or result in “wanton and unnecessary infliction of 

pain, [or] . . . [are] grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment.” 

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. “Conditions . . . alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Such conditions could be cruel and unusual under 

the contemporary standard of decency. . . . But conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and 

unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional.” Id. at 347. In determining

whether conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the court must look 

to the effect the condition has upon the inmate. Id. at 366. In a case involving conditions of 

confinement generally or several different conditions, the court should consider whether the claims 

together amount to conditions which fall below constitutional standards. Hamm v. De Kalb County, 

774 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1096 (1986); see also Chandler v. Baird, 

926 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1991). 

Mosley has failed to present any evidence that the conditions about which he complains 

presented a severe or extreme condition that posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to either 

his health or safety. See Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a 

prisoner must prove that the prison condition he complains of is sufficiently serious and “extreme” 

to violate the Eighth Amendment). In addition, Mosley has not alleged that he suffered any 

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specific harm as a result of the conditions referenced in the complaint. Mosley’s mere subjective 

beliefs and conclusory allegations regarding the constitutionality of these conditions do not create 

a genuine dispute of material fact, and “are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.” 

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the court concludes that 

the alleged unconstitutional conditions do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. 

Alfred v. Bryant, 378 F. App’x 977, 980 (11th Cir. 2010) (“‘Inmates cannot expect the amenities, 

conveniences and services of a good hotel.’”) (quoting Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 

(7th Cir. 1988)). 

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the challenged conditions though potentially 

uncomfortable, inconvenient, unpleasant or objectionable were not so extreme as to violate the 

Eighth Amendment. Even when viewing the totality of the allegations made by Mosley, these 

claims do not amount to conditions that fall below applicable constitutional standards since Mosley

fails to demonstrate that the challenged conditions had “a mutually enforcing effect that produce[d] 

the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304. Consequently, 

summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants on the conditions claims. 

To the extent the allegations set forth in the complaint can be construed to allege a claim 

of deliberate indifference to Mosley’s health or safety arising under the Eighth Amendment, this 

claim likewise fails. Mosley sets forth only conclusory allegations regarding conditions at 

Easterling and fails to identify any particular incident or condition of which the defendants were 

aware and from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed. 

Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350 (“Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Defendant[s] had a subjective 

awareness of a substantial risk of serious physical [harm] to Plaintiff; thus, Plaintiff has failed to 

establish a required element of this claim.”). Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence 

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showing that the defendants drew the requisite inference and thereafter ignored the risk. Mosley

has therefore failed to establish each of the requisite elements of deliberate indifference. 

Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants on any claim of 

deliberate indifference. 

G. Violation of Administrative Regulation

Insofar as Mosley asserts that the defendants violated Administrative Regulation No. 403

with respect to the proceedings surrounding the disciplinary actions and behavior citation, he is 

entitled to no relief. As previously determined, due process did not attach to the disciplinary or 

citation proceedings. Infringements of agency rules, regulations or procedures simply do not, 

without more, amount to constitutional violations. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484–86; United States v. 

Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 751-752 (1979) (holding that mere violations of agency regulations do not 

raise constitutional questions); Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1279 n. 7 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(holding that mere fact governmental agency’s regulations or procedures may have been violated 

does not, standing alone, raise a constitutional issue); Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th 

Cir. 1996) (holding that claim that prison officials have not followed their own policies and 

procedures does not, without more, amount to a constitutional violation). For these reasons, the 

defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

H. Lack of Adequate Investigation

Mosley maintains that defendants Carter, Lawson and Logan deprived him of due process 

when they failed to investigate adequately the actions of correctional officers underlying the 

disciplinary charges and behavior citation lodged against him. This allegation, however, fails to 

state a claim cognizable in this cause of action. 

“It is well-settled that § 1983 does not create a federal right or benefit; it simply provides 

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a mechanism for enforcing a right or benefit established elsewhere.” Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 

U.S. 808, 816 (1985). “The Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to 

governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property 

interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.” DeShaney v. Winnebago 

County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). “The law is clear that inmates do not 

enjoy a constitutional right to an investigation of any kind by government officials.” Banks v. 

Annucci, 48 F. Supp. 3d, 394, 414 (N.D.N.Y. 2014); Wilkins v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 2009 

WL 1904414, *9 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (“Because inmates do not have a due process right to [an 

investigation] at all, an allegation that any investigation which is actually conducted by prison 

officials was ‘inadequate’ or ‘improper’ does not state a constitutional claim.”); see also Torres v. 

Mazzuca, 246 F. Supp. 2d 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that prisoners do not have a due 

process right to an investigation of grievances). Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that 

the alleged lack of an adequate investigation does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation,

and therefore this claim provides Mosley no basis for relief.

I. Excessive Force and Failure to Protect

1. Qualified Immunity. 

With respect to Mosley’s excessive force and failure to protect claims against defendants 

Jones, Peavy, Scott, Adkinson, Teal and Scaife in their individual capacities, the defendants argue 

they are entitled to qualified immunity. The basic framework for the court’s analysis of these 

claims is well established: 

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, if the defendant establishes that he was 

acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the alleged excessive 

force occurred, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not 

entitled to qualified immunity. Skop [v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136–37 

(11th Cir. 2007)]. To defeat qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show both that a 

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constitutional violation occurred and that the constitutional right violated was 

clearly established. Fennell [v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2009)]. In 

Eighth Amendment excessive force cases, however, “the subjective element 

required to establish [the constitutional violation] is so extreme that every 

conceivable set of circumstances in which this constitutional violation occurs is 

clearly established to be a violation of the Constitution.” Johnson v. Breeden, 280 

F.3d 1308, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2002).

Bowden v. Stokely, 576 F. App’x 951, 954-55 (11th Cir. 2014). “Moreover, an officer who is 

present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s 

use of excessive force can be held personally liable for his nonfeasance.” Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 

F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2002). “While . . . there is no per se rule barring qualified immunity in 

Eighth Amendment cases, where the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged or shown a material dispute 

of fact as to an excessive force claim, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is not 

appropriate.” Bowden, 576 F. App’x at 956 (citing Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301). Accordingly, this 

court will consider whether the plaintiff’s allegations that Jones and Peavy maliciously and 

sadistically used excessive force against him while Scott, Adkinson, Teal and Scaife witnessed the 

attack and failed to intervene—which the court must take as true for purposes of summary 

judgment—sets forth a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

2. Excessive Force and Failure to Protect 

Claims of excessive force by correctional officials against convicted inmates are governed 

by the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Campbell v. Sikes, 

169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). The standard applied to an Eighth Amendment excessive 

force claim contains both a subjective and objective component. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. The 

subjective component requires that prison “officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of 

mind.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). With respect to the objective component, a plaintiff must 

show that “the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional 

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violation.” Id. In addition, “the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute 

cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury.” Id. at 4. 

“Injury and force . . . are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An 

inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force 

claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 

559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010). However, 

[t]his is not to say that the “absence of serious injury” is irrelevant to the Eighth 

Amendment inquiry. [Hudson, 503 U.S.] at 7, 112 S. Ct. (1992). “[T]he extent of 

injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of force 

could plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a particular situation.” Ibid. 

(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S. Ct. 1078). The extent of injury may also 

provide some indication of the amount of force applied. 

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. Moreover, “the relatively modest nature of [an inmate’s] alleged injuries 

will no doubt limit the damages he may recover [if ultimately successful on his claims].” Id. at 40. 

In this context, not every use of force will support a cause of action, as “force is deemed 

legitimate in a custodial setting as long as it is applied ‘in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline [and not] maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1300

(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986). “To determine if an application of force 

was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, a variety of factors are considered 

including: ‘the need for the application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount 

of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to 

temper the severity of a forceful response.”” Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1300 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 

7–8). 

Mosley alleges that on April 6, 2013 defendants Jones and Peavy used excessive force 

against him. In support of this claim, Mosley contends that after he refused several orders to enter 

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Dorm C1 and grabbed a table to prevent placement in this dorm, defendant Jones began choking 

him for no reason. Mosley further complains that after he assumed a defenseless position 

defendant Peavy kicked him several times. Mosley also asserts that defendant Jones, while 

escorting him to the segregation dorm, continuously struck him in the back of the head and 

repeatedly rammed his head into the outside door of Dorm B causing white paint marks to appear 

on his forehead. Finally, Mosley complains that when the officers placed him in a room in the 

segregation unit Jones continually punched him in the chest until he could not breath while Peavy 

placed a baton between his handcuffs and applied immense pressure. 

Within minutes of the incident, Officer Jimmy Wilson escorted Mosley to the Health Care 

Unit for evaluation. Nurse Mayrena Junghans examined Mosley and obtained his vital signs which 

included a blood pressure (“B/P”) reading of 170/130. Doc. 23-15 at 6. She determined that 

Mosley appeared alert and oriented to person, place and time. Doc. 23-15 at 6. Nurse Junghans 

also noted “2 white areas . . . to [left] side of [Mosley’s] forehead. [No] redness or bruises noted. 

Denies injuries. B/P check ordered [due to elevated] B/P.” Doc. 23-15 at 6. Nurse Junghans found 

no injuries in need of treatment and released Mosley to correctional officials for his return to the 

dorm. Photographs taken of Mosley immediately after the incident do not indicate any visible

physical injury but do depict the white marks on the left side of Mosley’s forehead. Doc. 23-15 at 

4. 

The defendants adamantly deny Mosley’s claims regarding the use of excessive force and 

the alleged failure to protect him from such force. Specifically, defendant Jones addresses 

Mosley’s allegations as follows:

On April 6, 2013, I, Sgt. Dominic Jones, was assigned as an Assistant Shift 

Commander for Day A Shift at Easterling Correctional Facility. At approximately 

2:00 PM, I ordered Inmate Frederick Mosley . . . to pack his property and to move 

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to Dormitory C1, Restricted Privileges Dormitory. Inmate Mosley had been caught 

attempting to take a bologna sandwich out of the chow hall. Inmate Mosley refused 

to move to Dormitory C1. Lt. Larry Peavy and I exited the Shift Commander’s 

Office and escorted Inmate Mosley to Dormitory C1 Lobby area. Inmate Mosley 

refused again to enter Dormitory C1. Inmate Mosley stated that he was not going 

to go inside Dormitory C1. I grasped Inmate Mosley by one arm and Lt. Peavy 

grasped his other arm and we escorted Inmate Mosley inside of the dormitory. I 

was attempting to exit Dormitory C1, and I observed Inmate Mosley draw back his 

clenched fist and swing at me. I stepped back to elude his punch. I placed Inmate 

Mosley on the wall, and placed handcuffs on both of his wrists. Lt. Peavy and I 

escorted Inmate Mosley to the Segregation Unit. Inmate Mosley was processed 

into Administrative Segregation, pending disciplinary action for Assault on a DOC 

Official and Failure to Obey a Direct Order. At no time was there any excessive 

force used on Inmate Mosley. 

Doc. 23-5. Defendant Peavy provides the following information in response to Mosley’s excessive 

force claim:

On April 6, 2013, I, Lt. Larry Peavy, was assigned as the Shift Commander for Day 

A Shift at Easterling Correctional Facility. At approximately 2:00 PM, I observed 

Sgt. Dominic Jones order Inmate Frederick Mosley . . . to pack his property and 

prepare to move to Dormitory C1, Restricted Privileges Dorm. Inmate Mosley 

stated that he was not going to move. At this time, Sgt. Jones and I exited the Shift 

Commander’s Office and escorted Inmate Mosley to the lobby area of Dormitory 

C. Once we got to the door of Dormitory C1, Inmate Mosley again stated that he 

was not going to go inside of Dormitory C1. I grasped Inmate Mosley by one arm 

and Sgt. Jones grasped his other arm and we escorted him inside of the dormitory. 

Once we got ready to exit Dormitory C1, Inmate Mosley drew back his fist and 

swung at Sgt. Jones. Sgt. Jones placed handcuffs on Inmate Mosley. Sgt. Jones 

and I then escorted Inmate Mosley to the Segregation Unit. I reported the incident 

to Warden II Kenneth Sconyers, via telephone. Inmate Mosley was examined by 

Nurse Mayrena Junghans, no injuries were noted on the medical chart. Officer 

Kelvin Teal took photographs of Inmate Mosley. Inmate Mosley was processed 

into Administrative Segregation, pending disciplinary action for Assault on a DOC 

Official and Failure to Obey a Direct Order. At no time was any excessive force 

used on Inmate Mosley. 

Doc. 23-3. With respect to Mosley’s failure-to-protect claims, defendants Scott, Adkinson, Teal 

and Scaife aver that they did not witness any improper use of force against Mosley, and thus there 

was no need for their intervention to protect Mosley. Docs. 23-7 to 23-10. 

Even though the defendants dispute the version of events presented by Mosley, the court 

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is required at this stage of the proceedings to view the facts in the light most favorable to Mosley

and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in his favor. Bradley v. Franklin Collection

Service, Inc., 739 F.3d 606, 608 (11th Cir. 2014). Mosley has alleged that defendants Jones and 

Peavy choked, slapped, punched, jerked and kicked him without provocation and while he posed 

no threat to them or the security of the facility. Mosley further asserts that defendants Scott, 

Adkinson, Teal and Scaife witnessed the use(s) of force without intervening to protect him from 

defendants Jones and Peavy. Finally, Mosley contends that the challenged actions caused a 

dangerous elevation of his blood pressure and marks on his arms. In sum, Mosley contends “that 

he was the victim of an unprovoked attack in circumstances that did not [warrant the amount of 

force used]. . . . This version of the events could support an excessive force claim despite the lack 

of serious injuries.” Bowden, 576 F. App’x at 954.

As previously explained, the defendants deny Mosley’s allegations regarding the use of 

excessive force and maintain that at no time during the incident was more force used than necessary 

to subdue and gain control of Mosley after he repeatedly refused orders to enter Dorm C1 and 

thereafter attempted to strike defendant Jones with a closed fist. Nevertheless, viewing the facts 

in the light most favorable to Mosley, the court concludes that defendants Jones, Peavy, Scott, 

Adkinson, Teal and Scaife are not entitled to qualified immunity as the plaintiff has alleged facts 

sufficient to survive their motion for summary judgment regarding the excessive force and failure 

to protect claims lodged against them. See Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301. Specifically, disputed issues 

of material fact exist regarding the need for the use of force, the nature of the force used, whether 

defendants Jones and Peavy acted “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm, and whether 

defendants Scott, Adkinson, Teal and Scaife failed to intervene when faced with circumstances 

which warranted intervention. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment with respect to 

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the claims of excessive force and failure to protect lodged against defendants Jones, Peavy, Scott, 

Adkinson, Teal and Scaife is due to be denied. 

J. Conspiracy 

1. Civil Conspiracy Claim 

Mosley makes the specious and unsupported allegation that the adverse actions about 

which he complains resulted from a conspiracy among the defendants to deprive him of his 

constitutional rights. The defendants deny engaging in any conspiratorial acts against Mosley. 

The evidentiary materials filed by the defendants establish that the behavior citation and 

disciplinary actions issued to Mosley resulted from Mosley’s violations of institutional rules—

failure to obey a direct order, assault on a correctional officer and possession of contraband. 

Undeniably, “[c]onspiring to violate another person’s constitutional rights violates section 

1983.” Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

To proceed on a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff ‘must show that the parties 

“reached an understanding” to deny the plaintiff his or her rights [and] prove an actionable wrong 

to support the conspiracy.’ . . . [T]he linchpin for conspiracy is agreement.” Bailey v. Bd. of County 

Comms. of Alachua County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)

(quoting Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 932

(1991)). In order for a plaintiff “to establish the ‘understanding’ or ‘willful participation’ required 

to show a conspiracy, . . . [he] must [produce] some evidence of agreement between the 

defendants.” Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1283-1284. Merely “stringing together” acts of individuals is 

insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy. Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1133 

(11th Cir. 1992).

Other than his conclusory allegation of a conspiracy, Mosley presents nothing to establish 

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an actual conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court concludes 

that Mosley’s bare allegation of a conspiracy is insufficient to support a claim for relief in this 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 action. See Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1133; Fullman, 739 F.2d at 556–57.

2. Potential Claims Under 18 U.S.C. § 241 and § 242

To the extent the complaint can be construed to seek relief for alleged criminal actions 

purportedly committed in violation of his constitutional rights as prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 241 

and § 242, this request for relief is likewise subject to summary dismissal. “Title 18 U.S.C. § 241 

is a statute that criminalizes conspiracies against a person’s rights under the Constitution or laws 

of the United States. There is no private right of action under this criminal statute.” Gipson v. 

Callahan, 18 F.Supp.2d 662, 668 (W.D.Tex 1997) (citations omitted); Rockefeller v. United States 

Court of Appeals Office for Tenth Cir. Judges, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding 

plaintiff foreclosed “from asserting claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 371 because, as 

criminal statutes, they do not convey a private right of action”). Thus, Mosley’s claims arising 

under these criminal statutes provide no basis for relief. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 23) be GRANTED in part 

and DENIED in part, as follows:

a. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s claims 

for monetary damages lodged against them in their official capacities be 

GRANTED and these claims be DISMISSED with prejudice as the defendants are 

entitled to absolute immunity from such damages. 

b. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s due process, 

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classification, conditions, administrative regulation, lack of investigation and

conspiracy claims presented against them in all aspects of their individual capacities 

be GRANTED and these claims be DISMISSED with prejudice.

c. Defendants Nathaniel Lawson, Shawn Logan, Larry Anglin, Derrick Carter, Sherry 

Lightner, Brian Mitchell, Bobby Lingo and the Central Review Board be 

DISMISSED as parties.

d. The motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of defendants Dominic Jones, 

Larry Peavy, Christopher Scott, Timmy Adkinson, Kelvin Teal and Marvin Scaife

with respect to the plaintiff’s excessive force and failure to protect claims lodged 

against these defendants in their individual capacities be DENIED.

2. This case be referred to the undersigned for an evidentiary hearing and other 

appropriate proceedings on the plaintiff’s surviving claims of excessive force and failure to protect 

presented against defendants Dominic Jones, Larry Peavy, Christopher Scott, Timmy Adkinson, 

Kelvin Teal and Marvin Scaife. 

It is further ORDERED that on or before September 5, 2016 the parties may file objections 

to the Recommendation. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or 

general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the proposed 

findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and 

shall “waive the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to 

factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of 

justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 

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(11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989). 

DONE this 15th day of August, 2016.

 /s/ Gray M. Borden 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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