Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02093/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K

WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Torrez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Corrections Corporation of America, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 10-2093-PHX-MHM (MHB)

ORDER

Plaintiff David Torrez, a California inmate confined in the La Palma Corrections

Center (LPCC), a Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) facility in Eloy, Arizona, has

filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 1, 3.) The Court will dismiss the Complaint with leave

to amend.

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $8.83. The remainder of the fee will be

collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the amount

in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate

Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according

to the statutory formula. 

///

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K - 2 -

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951. But as the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue

to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 611 F.3d 1202, 1202 (9th Cir. 2010).

A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam)).

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K - 3 -

If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts,

a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court

should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of advice “would

undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225,

231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to decide whether the court was

required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for

failure to state a claim with leave to amend because the Complaint may possibly be saved by

amendment.

III. Complaint

Plaintiff alleges three counts for denial of access to the courts and due process.

Plaintiff sues CCA and the following LPCC employees: Captain Mark Reed; Unit Manager

June Horrisberger; and Grievance Co-ordinator Ruth Allridge-Williams. Plaintiff seeks

declaratory, compensatory, and punitive relief. 

Plaintiff alleges the following facts: On March 14, 2007, CCA established

Inmate/Resident Grievance and Inmate/Resident Property Policies, Policy 14-5 and Policy

14-6, respectively. Each policy became effective on June 1, 2008. 

On July 8, 2008, Plaintiff was transferred by the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to Arizona pursuant to a contract between CDCR and CCA. On

September 8, 2008, Plaintiff’s property, which had also been transferred, was inventoried.

On September 13, 2008, Plaintiff was transferred to LPCC with his property. On October

15, 2008, Plaintiff was transferred to “Compound 2 TEWA Alpha” of LPCC. The next day,

Plaintiff reported to Case Manager Hicks to retrieve his property. Plaintiff discovered that

some of his property, apparently consisting solely of legal documents and records, was

missing. Hicks was unable to locate the documents despite repeated attempts. Plaintiff filed

grievances and a lost property claim against “the defendant” in an attempt to recover his

property or its value. However, the grievance and lost property claim were repeatedly lost

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K - 4 -

by Grievance Co-ordinator Allridge-Williams. She also failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s

grievances under prison policy. 

Plaintiff filed a “LOST/DAMAGED/STOLEN PERSONAL PROPERTY CLAIM”

form (14-6D) on December 10, 2008. On November 9, 2009, a CDCR official, J. Hirai,

advised Plaintiff that he could petition the sentencing court directly for recall consideration.

Plaintiff contends that he is unable to seek recall consideration because the documents that

must be submitted to the court were among those lost. On July 15, 2010, Cathy Dreyfuss of

the California DNA Project sent Plaintiff a letter and asked him to send a number of

documents, apparently all of which were part of the documents lost. 

Plaintiff contends that “Defendant(s)” have acted with indifference to his rights by

failing to follow CCA policies regarding Lost/Damaged/Stolen Personal Property. Further,

he contends the loss of his documents has violated his constitutional right of access to the

courts. He also alleges that “Defendant(s)” have imposed an atypical hardship on him by

failing to ensure adherence with policies and procedures regarding grievances and inmate

property. In addition, he alleges that despite established procedures, Defendants Reed,

Horrisberger, and Alldridge-Williams have imposed an atypical hardship on him by failing

to adhere to those policies and procedures. 

IV. Failure to State a Claim

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v.

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he

suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must

allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).

To state a claim against a defendant under § 1983, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not

simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation

of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). For an

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K - 5 -

individual to be liable in his official capacity, a plaintiff must allege that the official acted

as a result of a policy, practice, or custom. See Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d

1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983,

so a defendant’s position as the supervisor of a someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s

constitutional rights does not make him liable. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

691 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor in his

individual capacity, “is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to

act to prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. In addition, where a defendant’s only

involvement in allegedly unconstitutional conduct is the denial of administrative grievances,

the failure to intervene on a prisoner’s behalf to remedy the alleged unconstitutional behavior

does not amount to active unconstitutional behavior for purposes of § 1983. Shehee v.

Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999); accord Mintun v. Blades, No. CV-06-139-BLW,

2008 WL 711636 at *7 (D. Idaho Mar. 14, 2008); Stocker v. Warden, No.

1:07-CV-00589LJODLBP, 2009 WL 981323 at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009). 

A. CCA

Plaintiff sues CCA, a private corporation. Claims under § 1983 may be directed at

“bodies politic and corporate.” Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 686,

688-89 (1978). Under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress intended municipal

corporations and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom

§ 1983 applies. Id. at 2035. That proposition has been extended to corporations that act

under color of state law. See Sable Commc’s of Cal. Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel Co., 890 F.2d

184, 189 (9th Cir. 1989) (willful joint participation of private corporation in joint activity

with state or its agent taken under color of state law). 

There are four ways to find state action by a private entity for purposes of § 1983: (1)

the private actor performs a public function, (2) the private actor engages in joint activity

with a state actor, (3) a private actor is subject to governmental compulsion or coercion, or

(4) there is a governmental nexus with the private actor. Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088,

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K - 6 -

1093 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the public function test, “the function [performed by the private

actor] must traditionally be the exclusive prerogative of the state.” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc.

v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995); see Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1093; Lee v. Katz,

276 F.3d 550, 554-555 (9th Cir. 2002). A privately owned corporation that operates prisons

pursuant to a contract with a state performs a public function that is traditionally the

exclusive prerogative of the state. Further, to state a claim under § 1983 against a private

entity performing a traditional public function, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his

constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated

or endorsed by the private entity. See Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997);

Street v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Wall v. Dion, 257 F.

Supp.2d 316, 319 (D. Me 2003); see also Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727

(4th Cir. 1999); Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 1990);

Lux by Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989); Iskander v. Village of Forest

Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). 

CCA performs a traditional public function, i.e., operating a prison. Plaintiff alleges

that under the contract with CDCR, CCA must allow Plaintiff to possess personal property

and ensure that he has access to the courts. Plaintiff appears to contend that due to the loss

of his property and the failure of “defendant(s)” to comply with the “CCA Corporate and

Facility Policy,” he has been denied access to the courts and due process. These allegations,

absent more, are insufficient to state a claim against CCA. Plaintiff does not allege facts to

support that CCA’s policy has resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. Rather, he

alleges that the individual Defendants’ non-compliance with the policy has denied him access

to the courts and due process. Accordingly, CCA will be dismissed as a Defendant.

B. Count I

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that the loss of his property has denied him access to the

California state courts to obtain a reduction of his sentence. Specifically, he alleges that he

obtained documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) “throughout the

years” concerning involuntary intoxication due to medication with which he intended to

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K - 7 -

support a state post-conviction review petition. (Doc. 1 at 3A.) Due to the loss of his

documents, he is unable to lay the foundation for such relief. (Id.) Further, the loss of the

documents prevents him from providing requested documents to the California DNA Project.

(Id. at 3B.) 

The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits state officials from actively

interfering with an inmate’s attempt to prepare or to file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). That right, however, only encompasses the right to bring a

petition or complaint to federal court and not to discover or even effectively litigate claims

once filed with a court. Id. at 354; see Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1995)

(“The right of access is designed to ensure that a habeas petition or civil rights complaint of

a person in state custody will reach a court for consideration.”) The right “guarantees no

particular methodology but rather, the conferral of a capability--the capability of bringing

contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.”

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. Moreover, the right of access to the courts is only a right to bring

complaints to federal court and not a right to the discovery of such claims or to litigate them

effectively once filed with a court. See Id. at 354-55. Further, an inmate must establish that

he suffered an “actual injury.” Id. at 351-53; see Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 797 (9th

Cir. 1994). An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing

litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S.

at 348. In other words, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that a defendant’s conduct

prevented him from bringing to court a non-frivolous claim that he wished to present. Id. at

351-53. As explained by the United States Supreme Court: 

Whether an access claim turns on a litigating opportunity yet to be gained or

an opportunity already lost, the very point of recognizing any access claim is

to provide some effective vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek

judicial relief for some wrong. However unsettled the basis of the

constitutional right of access to courts, our cases rest on the recognition that

the right is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot

have suffered injury by being shut out of court. We indicated as much in our

most recent case on denial of access, Lewis v. Casey, supra, where we noted

that even in forward-looking prisoner class actions to remove roadblocks to

future litigation, the named plaintiff must identify a “nonfrivolous,” “arguable”

underlying claim, id., at 353, and n. 3, 116 S.Ct. 2174, and we have been given

no reason to treat backward-looking access claims any differently in this

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K - 8 -

respect. It follows that the underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or

lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as

allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation. It follows,

too, that when the access claim (like this one) looks backward, the complaint

must identify a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not otherwise

available in some suit that may yet be brought. There is, after all, no point in

spending time and money to establish the facts constituting denial of access

when a plaintiff would end up just as well off after litigating a simpler case

without the denial-of-access element.

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002) (footnote omitted). 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of access to the courts. As an initial matter,

Plaintiff’s allegations at most reflect that the loss of his documents was the result of

negligence; negligence is insufficient to state a constitutional claim. Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548 (1981)). Second,

Plaintiff fails to allege facts to connect specific Defendant(s) to the alleged denial of access.

Finally, he fails to articulate an arguable, or nonfrivolous, underlying claim. For these

reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim in Count I. 

C. Count II

In Count II, Plaintiff asserts deprivation of property without due process. Due process

claims related to prisoner property commonly arise when property is taken or destroyed by

random and unauthorized conduct of a prison official without an opportunity for the prison

to provide meaningful predeprivation due process. Under Supreme Court doctrine in Parratt

v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984),

neither unauthorized intentional nor negligent deprivations of property give rise to a due

process claim so long as the State provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Thus, the

availability of an adequate state post-deprivation remedy, such as a state tort action, for

unauthorized deprivations precludes a claim for violation of due process. King v.

Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 826 (9th Cir. 1986). 

As explained, where a state makes a meaningful post-deprivation remedy available,

neither a negligent, nor an intentional, unauthorized deprivation of an inmate’s property by

a state employee violates the inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Parratt,

451 U.S. at 541; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. The availability of a common-law tort suit against

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K - 9 -

a private prison employee constitutes an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson, 468

U.S. at 534-35. Because Plaintiff has an available common-law tort remedy against a private

prison employee who deprives him of property, he may not sue under § 1983 for violation

of his due process rights for the loss of his property. 

D. Count III

In Count III, Plaintiff asserts that CCA “failed or refused to ensure” that its policies

and procedures were complied with by the individual Defendants and that the individual

Defendants Reed, Horrisberger, and Aldridge-Williams imposed an “atypical” hardship on

him by failing to so comply. Plaintiff’s allegations against CCA are vague and conclusory.

Plaintiff otherwise fails to allege a constitutional violation against the individual Defendants.

An inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in prison grievance procedures because

there is no free-standing constitutional right to a grievance process. Antonelli v. Sheahan,

81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); Buckley

v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 493 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639,

640 (9th Cir. 1988). Rather, liberty interests that entitle an inmate to due process are

“generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such

an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own

force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (internal

citations omitted). In analyzing whether a hardship is atypical and significant, three

guideposts to consider are: (1) the conditions of confinement; (2) the duration of the

condition and the degree of restraint imposed; and (3) whether the disciplinary sanction will

affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir.

2003); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996). “As long as the conditions

or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed

upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not

in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Montanye

v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). Thus, a claim that prison officials “added things” to

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K - 10 -

an appeal to mask procedural errors does not, for example, meet this standard because

inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860 (citing Mann, 855 F.2d at 640).

Plaintiff alleges that the individual Defendants failed to comply with prison

procedures. Absent more, that is insufficient to state a claim. 

V. Leave to Amend

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a first

amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The Clerk of Court will mail

Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a first amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails

to use the court-approved form, the Court may strike the amended complaint and dismiss this

action without further notice to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “First

Amended Complaint.” The first amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its

entirety on the court-approved form and may not incorporate any part of the original

Complaint by reference. Plaintiff may include only one claim per count.

A first amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542,

1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat an original complaint as

nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised in the original

complaint is waived if it is not raised in a first amended complaint. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

VI. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K - 11 -

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See

LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice

to Plaintiff.

D. Possible “Strike”

Because the Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, if Plaintiff fails

to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this Order, the

dismissal may count as a “strike” under the “3-strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Under the 3-strikes provision, a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil

judgment in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a

court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

E. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the

Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted. (Doc. 3.)

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $8.83.

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

JDDL-K - 12 -

(3) The Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff has

30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a first amended complaint in compliance with

this Order.

(4) If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of

Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice

that states that the dismissal may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

(5) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing a civil

rights complaint by a prisoner.

DATED this 22nd day of November, 2010.

Case 2:10-cv-02093-JWS--MHB Document 5 Filed 11/29/10 Page 12 of 12