Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00139/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00139-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

PATRICK J. CERQUA, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12cv139-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff, Patrick J. Cerqua, applied for and was denied Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) under sections 216 and 223 of Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 

423, on August 16, 2002 (Tr. 47-49). Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing 

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a 

decision in which Plaintiff was found not disabled at any time through the date of the 

decision. The Appeals Council rejected Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s 

decision. Following a review, this court remanded the case to the Commissioner for 

further administrative proceedings on September 26, 2006 (Tr. 322-23). A supplemental 

hearing was held on May 9, 2007, at which Plaintiff and his legal counsel appeared, as 

well as a vocational expert (Tr. 471-505). The ALJ issued a decision on August 25, 

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2007, that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act (Tr. 296-307). The 

Appeals Counsel denied review. Following another review, this court again remanded 

the case to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings on August 4, 2009 

(Tr. 565-80). A second supplemental hearing was held on February 22, 2010, at which 

Plaintiff and his legal counsel appeared, as well as a vocational expert (Tr. 681-706). The 

ALJ issued a decision on April 29, 2010, that Plaintiff was not disabled within the 

meaning of the Act (Tr. 512-30). The Appeals Council denied review of that decision. 

The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 

1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and 

entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s 

Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 11); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 10). Based on the 

court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court AFFIRMS the decision 

of the Commissioner. 

 

1 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-

296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social 

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when 

the person is unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2006). 

 (1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

 (2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

 (3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

 impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? [the 

 Listing of Impairments] 

 (4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

 (5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the 

 economy? 

 An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to 

the next question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A 

negative answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a 

determination of “not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques. 

3 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income case (SSI). The 

same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately cited 

as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981). 

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 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of 

qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 

4. At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still 

able to do despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other 

evidence. Id. It also can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 

1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines4

 (grids) or call a vocational expert (VE). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 

4 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

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 The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This Court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). See also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff was 37 years of age at the time of his alleged onset date of December 31st 

2002 and had a high school education. Tr. 23 & 61. Plaintiff’s past relevant work 

experience was as a “tire changer,” “laborer, concrete molding,” “automobile mechanic,” 

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and “automobile dealer/wholesaler.” Tr. 528. Following the administrative hearing, and 

employing the five-step process, the ALJ found Plaintiff “did not engage in substantial 

gainful activity during the period from February 1, 2002, his amended disability onset 

date, through his date last insured of December 31, 2002.” (Step 1) Tr. 518. At Step 2, 

the ALJ found that, “through the date last insured,” Plaintiff suffered from the following 

severe impairments: “history of lumbar laminectomy with persistent mild radicular pain 

in the left lower extremity, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar, thoracic, and cervical 

spine, and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.” Id. The ALJ then found that, “through the 

date last insured,” Plaintiff “did not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).” Id. Next, the ALJ found 

that, “through the date last insured,” Plaintiff had the RFC “to perform sedentary work,” 

reduced by limitations from work requiring climbing ropes/scaffolds, balancing, 

crawling, or lifting overhead, and work not allowing periodic alternation between sitting 

and standing. Tr. 523. At Step 4, the ALJ found that “[t]he transferability of job skills 

was not material to the determination of disability.” Tr. 528. After consulting a VE, the 

ALJ determined that “there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national 

economy” that Plaintiff could have performed. Tr. 57. The ALJ identified the following 

occupations as examples: “Bench Assembler,” “Surveillance System Monitor,” and 

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“Order Clerk.” Tr. 529. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not been 

under a disability from February 1, 2002, through December 31, 2002. Tr. 530. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS 

 Plaintiff presents two issues for this court’s consideration in review of the ALJ’s 

decision: 1) “Whether [the] Commissioner erred by failing to base his finding on 

substantial evidence”; and 2) “Whether the Commissioner erred by giving significant 

weight to the non-examining reviewing consultant.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 16) at 1. 

V. DISCUSSION 

A. Whether the Commissioner erred by failing to base his finding on 

 substantial evidence. 

 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in making his credibility determination when 

applying the pain standard. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has articulated 

its “pain standard,” governing the evaluation of a claimant’s subjective testimony about 

pain, as follows: 

 “In order to establish a disability based on testimony of pain and other symptoms, 

the claimant must satisfy two parts of a three-part test showing: (1) evidence of an 

underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming 

the severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition 

can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 

F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). The ALJ evaluates the “claimant’s subjective 

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testimony of pain” only after the claimant satisfies the first and one of the alternate 

portions of the second prong of the pain standard. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 

(11th Cir. 1995). The Eleventh Circuit has also held that, “in certain situations, pain 

alone can be disabling, even when its existence is unsupported by objective evidence.” 

Id. at 1561. Importantly, it is only evidence of the underlying condition which could 

reasonably be expected to cause pain, not evidence of actual pain or its severity, which 

must be presented by the claimant to satisfy the “pain standard.” Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 

921 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Foster v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 1125, 1129 

(4th Cir. 1986); Hill v. Barnhart, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1272-73 (N.D. Ala. 2006) 

(quoting Elam, 927 F.2d at 1215). After making these determinations, the ALJ proceeds 

to consider the claimant’s subjective testimony about pain, and the ALJ’s decision to 

reject or discredit such testimony is reviewed for substantial evidence. Marbury v. 

Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992). It is at this point where Plaintiff takes issue 

in the present case. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s credibility determination lack 

substantial evidence. 

 In making the credibility determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective 

testimony of disabling pain was not consistent with treatment notes, or Plaintiff’s 

description of his own activities. Tr. 526. With regard to the treatment notes, the ALJ 

acknowledged Plaintiff’s long history of treatment “with potent pain medications,” but 

noted that the treatment notes from Dr. Farb show that he was having a good response to 

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Oxycontin and that, from January 2001 through March 2002, Plaintiff remained stable on 

Oxycontin therapy. Id. The ALJ noted that there was an increase in the dosage in June 

of 2002 and by August of 2002 Plaintiff reported a “marked improvement” in his pain. 

Id. The ALJ found that these treatment notes were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding that time period. 

 In his brief, Plaintiff challenges these findings by arguing that he did not remain 

stable on Oxycontin therapy, that the records show that the medicine only relieved the 

pain some of the time, and that the increase in medication showed that the medication 

“provided some relief in order for the claimant to minimally function, but did not 

completely resolve the pain.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 16) at 10. With regard to the stability of the 

Oxycontin therapy, as stated above, the ALJ described the period between January 2001 

and March 2002 as stable and then discussed the period when the dosage was increased. 

Plaintiff’s citations to the medical record to show that the treatment was not stable, 

mainly addresses time periods outside the relevant time period. He does not provide 

evidence to refute the stability of the time between January 2001 and March 2002. 

 Moreover, the records reflect that, at the time, Plaintiff described the medications 

as working, specifically describing the Oxycontin therapy during the stable period as 

helping him “feel reasonably good” and helping him “live more normally.” Id. When 

the medication was increased in June 2002, he reported a “marked improvement.” Id. 

The determination here is not whether the medications “completely resolve the pain,” but 

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whether the pain was disabling. The court can find no error with the ALJ’s reliance on 

the treatment notes in making the credibility finding. 

 Similarly, the court finds no error in relying on Plaintiff’s own description of 

activities. As in his arguments regarding treatment notes, Plaintiff does not argue error in 

the process, rather he disagrees with the ALJ’s determination. In so doing, Plaintiff 

argues with each of the ALJ’s determination of daily activities, such as housework, 

grocery shopping, getting dressed, and other minor activities. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 16) at 12. 

The problem for Plaintiff is that the court’s determination here, is to find whether the 

ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and “[e]ven if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.” Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158. 

The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s activities are inconsistent with his subjective 

complaints of disabling pain is supported by substantial evidence, and the court “will not 

substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 

1356, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 1991). 

B. Whether the Commissioner erred by giving significant weight to the non- 

 examining reviewing consultant. 

 Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the consulting review of Dr. 

Lober, and that this review did not constitute substantial evidence. Plaintiff contrasts Dr. 

Lober’s opinion with that of Dr. Farb’s. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 16) at 14. No such conflict in the 

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opinions exists. Basically, Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Farb implicitly opined that Plaintiff 

would be unable to perform work. Id. Plaintiff argues this is in conflict with Dr. Lober’s 

opinion, which was relied on to help formulate the RFC. Id. Plaintiff bases this 

argument on a quote from Dr. Farb’s treatment notes, that Plaintiff “really can’t do any 

other jobs.” The problem, is that this statement was merely a report of Plaintiff’s 

statements, not the doctor’s opinion. See Tr. 146. Dr. Farb did not provide a formal 

report on Plaintiff’s ability to work. Thus, the ALJ properly ordered a consultative 

review by Dr. Lober. The ALJ relied on that review, along with the medical evidence 

from doctors Farb, Gerber, Hawkins, and Guttman in determining the RFC. The RFC is 

supported by substantial evidence and the court will not disturb it. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

 Done this 13th day of September, 2013. 

 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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