Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01430/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01430-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KWESI KHARY MUHAMMAD,

CDCR #P-84376, Civil No. 07-1430 IEG (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS, ASSESSING NO

INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE

AND GARNISHING $350 BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT [Doc. No. 2]; AND

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

AND § 1915A(b)(1).

vs.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEP’T, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the California State Prison located in

Vacaville, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Before this Court screened Plaintiff’s Complaint, he filed a First Amended

Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.15(a) [Doc. No. 3]. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing

fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil action; instead, he has filed a Motion

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to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

Effective April 9, 2006, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a

district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a

filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to

prepay the entire fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave

to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of

whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). That institution having custody of the prisoner must

collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month

in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the

entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows that

he has insufficient funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)

(providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or

appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and

no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case

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based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is

ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A; Calhoun v. Stahl, 254

F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited

to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir.

2000) (§ 1915A). 

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court

reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting

service of the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See Calhoun,

254 F.3d at 845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601,

604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur

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1

 California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(3) provides a one-year statute of limitations on any

civil action for “[l]ibel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, seduction, injury or death from

wrongful act or neglect . . . .” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3). On January 1, 2003, this code section

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“before service of process is made on the opposing parties”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); Andrews, 398 F.3d at

1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), which is “particularly

important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In

giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of

the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122

(2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

B. Statute of Limitations 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is subject to sua sponte

dismissal because it appears from the face of Plaintiff’s pleading that his claims are barred by

the statute of limitations. While Congress has provided no federal statute of limitations

governing section 1983 claims, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts should use the

forum state’s single most appropriate statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions

for all section 1983 claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985). Relying on Wilson,

the Ninth Circuit has found that the one-year statute of limitations of California Code of Civil

Procedure § 340(3)1

 is the most appropriate. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 558

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was replaced with § 335.1 which now provides for a two-year statute of limitations for these actions.

However, the longer period found in § 335.1 is inapplicable to Plaintiff’s action. See Maldonado v.

Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that under California law, an extension of a statute

of limitations will not apply to claims already barred under the prior statute of limitations unless the

Legislature explicitly provides for such an extension).

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(9th Cir. 1987); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

Federal law, however, determines when a section 1983 cause of action accrues. Hardin v. Staub,

490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989). Under federal law, a claim generally accrues when the plaintiff

“knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Elliot v. City of

Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when he was arrested and held

in the San Diego County Jail in January 2000. (FAC at 1.) Thus, at the latest, Plaintiff’s claims

arose in 2000. However, Plaintiff filed this action on August 6, 2007, over seven years after he

claims that Defendants violated his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest how or why California’s one-year statute

of limitations might be tolled for a period of time which would make his claims timely. See,

e.g., CAL.CODE CIV.P. § 352.1 (tolling statute of limitations “for a maximum of 2 years” during

a prisoner’s incarceration); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that CAL.

CODE CIV.P. § 352.1 tolls a California prisoner’s personal injury claims accruing before January

1, 1995 for two years, or until January 1, 1995, whichever occurs later, unless application of the

statute would result in a “manifest injustice.”). Due to Plaintiff’s incarceration, pursuant to Fink,

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants, accruing in 2000, would be tolled for two years.

California’s one-year statute of limitations would then begin to run -- requiring Plaintiff to file

this action against these Defendants no later than sometime in 2003 or 2004 if the later statute

of limitations is applied to Plaintiff’s action. However, Plaintiff’s Complaint was not filed until

August 6, 2007.

Generally, federal courts also apply the forum state’s law regarding equitable tolling.

Fink, 192 F.3d at 914; Bacon v. City of Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1988). Under

California law, however, a plaintiff must meet three conditions to equitably toll a statute of

limitations: (1) he must have diligently pursued his claim; (2) his situation must be the product

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of forces beyond his control; and (3) the defendants must not be prejudiced by the application

of equitable tolling. See Hull v. Central Pathology Serv. Med. Clinic, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1328,

1335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal.3d 313, 316-17 (Cal. 1978);

Fink, 192 F.3d at 916. Here, however, Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts which, if proved,

would support the equitable tolling of his claims. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d

1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1993).

C. Municipal Liability Claims

Additionally, Plaintiff has named the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department as a

Defendant in this matter. An agency or department of a municipal entity is not a proper

defendant under § 1983. Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal.

1996). Rather, the county or city itself is the proper defendant. See Id. “[A] municipality

cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality

cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the constitutional deprivation was caused by

the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of

the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997); Navarro v.

Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995).

To establish municipal liability, plaintiff must show: (1) he was deprived of a

constitutional right; (2) the city had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference

to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force behind the

constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); see

Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. at 1388; Trevino v.

Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, in order to state a § 1983 claim against San

Diego County, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that his injury was caused by individual

officers whose conduct conformed to an official city policy, custom or practice. See KarimPanahi, 839 F.2d at 624. 

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Therefore, even were the Court to liberally construe the First Amended Complaint as

attempting to state a claim against San Diego County, Plaintiff has not stated a § 1983 claim

because he has failed to allege that any individual police officer’s conduct conformed to an

official city policy, custom or practice. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failing to state a claim

upon which section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § § 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)(1).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is GRANTED.

(2) The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, is ordered to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing

fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the trust account in an amount equal

to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to the account and forward

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

(3) The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on James Tilton,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 942883,

Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(4) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45)

days leave from the date this Order is stamped “Filed” in which to file a Second Amended

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D.

Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended

Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

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be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted

as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir.

1996). 

(5) The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 Complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 2, 2007

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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