Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-00775/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-00775-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GORDON ANDREW DOUGLAS,

NO. CIV. S-97-0775 FCD GGH P

Petitioner,

v. ORDER

S. CAMBRA, et al., 

Respondents.

_________________________/

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Petitioner, Gordon Douglas (“petitioner”), a state prisoner,

proceeding through counsel, seeks a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On August 18, 2000, this court

dismissed as procedurally defaulted petitioner’s claims that were

raised in his state habeas petition but not in his petition for

review. On July 19, 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

reversed and remanded this order. The Ninth Circuit stated that

petitioner did not have sufficient notice or opportunity to

prepare arguments regarding the adequacy of procedural rules

Case 2:97-cv-00775-KJM-JFM Document 54 Filed 08/26/05 Page 1 of 5
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under the new standard described in Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d

573 (9th Cir. 2003). On October 13, 2004, the court ordered the

parties to file briefing addressing the remaining claims. On

November 8, 2004, respondent filed a supplemental answer. On

March 7, 2005, petitioner filed a supplemental traverse. 

 On June 22, 2005, the magistrate judge issued findings and

recommendations concluding that petitioner’s remaining claims 

be dismissed procedurally barred. These findings and

recommendations were served on the parties and contained notice

to the parties that any objections to the findings and

recommendations were to be filed within twenty days after the

date of service of the findings and recommendations. On June 30,

2005, petitioner filed objections to the findings and

recommendations. On July 14, 2005 respondents filed a reply to

petitioner’s objections. For the reasons set forth below, the

court does not adopt the magistrate’s findings and

recommendations and remands to the magistrate judge for further

proceedings consistent with this order.

STANDARD

When timely objections to findings by a magistrate judge are

filed, the district court must conduct a de novo determination of

the findings and recommendations as to issues of law. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). The district court may adopt, reject, or modify in

part or in full the findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C).

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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ANALYSIS

In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit considered whether

California’s timeliness rule constituted an independent and

adequate state ground barring federal relief. The court found

the timeliness rule to be independent, but remanded the issue of

adequacy to the district court. Id. at 581, 586. The court also

set forth a burdens shifting framework to apply when the state

invokes the affirmative defense of an independent and adequate

state procedural ground: 

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an

independent and adequate state procedural ground as an

affirmative defense, the burden to place that defense

in issue shifts to the petitioner. The petitioner may

satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the

state procedure, including citation to authority

demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule.

Once having done so, however, the ultimate burden is

the state’s.

Id. at 586. 

As Bennett decided that California’s timeliness bar

constitutes an independent ground for dismissal, the question

presented to the magistrate judge was whether it was also

adequate. To be deemed adequate, a state law ground for decision

must be well-established and consistently applied. Bennett, 322

F.3d at 582, citing Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577

(9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner contends that California’s

timeliness bar fails both elements. 

In the findings and recommendations, the magistrate judge

found that “[s]ince In re Clark, it cannot be seriously contended

that California’s timeliness rule for all habeas petitions

—capital and non-capital— is other than well established.” (June

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22, 2005 Findings & Recommendations (“F&R”) at 5 [citing In re

Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993)].) The magistrate judge also

concluded that respondents met their burden to plead the

existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground

as an affirmative defense, but found that petitioner had not met

his burden of persuasion to put in issue inconsistent

application. (F&R at 6-8.) The magistrate judge found the

evidence cited by petitioner to be incompetent, specifically (1)

twelve unpublished “postcard denials” in cases in which the

convictions became final at or before petitioners, where the

California Supreme Court could have, but did not apply the

timeliness bar, and (2) reference to - but not an actual copy of

– a letter sent by the clerk of the California Supreme Court to

California inmates indicating that there was no time limit to

file a habeas petition. 

In rejecting the twelve post-card orders, the magistrate

judge concluded that petitioner may cite only reasoned decisions

because it is impossible to ascertain from an unreasoned postcard denial whether the California Supreme Court considered but

in fact rejected the timeliness defense or decided not to reach

the defense solely because it was more expedient to resolve the

merits than address a complicated timeliness bar question. (F&R

at 6-8.) While there is an appealing logic to this analysis, the

Ninth Circuit nevertheless has relied on such unreasoned postcard denials in the past. Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387 (9th

Cir. 1996). In Morales, the Ninth Circuit cited petitioner’s

evidence of 35 post-card denials in concluding that the

petitioner had demonstrated inconsistent application of

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California’s timeliness bar in a pre-In re Clark capital case. 

The court noted:

It is theoretically possible, we suppose, to reconcile

and explain all of the California Supreme Court

decisions entertaining on the merits or rejecting as

untimely petitions that are three or more years old.

Those divergent decisions may indeed represent

consistent exercises of discretion rather than random

applications of or exceptions to the timeliness rule.

But we have no way of knowing whether that is the case.

The California Supreme Court's denials of habeas

petitions that Morales relies upon were accomplished by

brief minute entries in what has been described as

"post-card denial." We can discern no apparent

relationship between the time of delay and the findings

concerning timeliness. Nor could Morales be expected to

do so.

Id. at 1392. In light of Morales, the court must find that the

post-card denials are competent evidence and are sufficient to

meet petitioner’s burden to put in issue the question of

consistent application. As a result the burden shifts to

respondent to satisfy its ultimate burden to demonstrate

consistency. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586.

CONCLUSION

The findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge as

to the timeliness bar are not adopted and the case is remanded to

the magistrate judge for further proceedings consistent with this

order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 26, 2005.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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