Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03005/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH .l'.PR 8 1991 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSQ 

A BERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

E. JEAN (CALLOWAY) CARTER, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS; THE BOARD 

OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SEDGWICK 

COUNTY and MICHAEL R. BRAND, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

JON R. CAMERON; DONALD E • GRAGG; 

TOM SCOTT; BERNARD HENTZEN and 

TIMOTHY WITSMAN, 

Defendants. 

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No. 89-3005 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 87-1114-K) 

~an L. Rupe, of Kahrs, Nelson, Fanning, Hite & Kellogg (Edward L. 

Keeley, of Crockett, Keeley & Gilhousen, with him on the briefs), 

Wichita, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellants. 

Beverly Dempsey (J. Greg Kite, with her on the brief), Wichita, 

Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ARDERSOR and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and CBRISTERSER, Senior 

District Judge.* 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, of the United States 

District Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

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Defendants-appellants appeal from the district court's 

judgment entered against them for discriminating against 

plaintiff-appellee E. Jean (Calloway) Carter on the basis of her 

race, in violation of Title VII and S 1981. In light of the 

Supreme Court's -interpretation-of S-1981 .in Patterson v. McLean 

Credit Union, 109 s. Ct. 2363 (1989) and our recent holding in 

Truiillo v. Grand Junction Regional Center, No. 89-1376 (lOth Cir. 

March 25, 1991), we reverse the district court's determination of 

liability under S 1981, and we reverse the award of punitive and 

consequential damages. We remand for clarification of the 

district court's ruling on plaintiff's cla~ of racial 

discrimination under Title VII. Finally, we affirm the award of 

attorney's fees in the event that plaintiff is awarded relief 

under Title VII for racial discrimination. 

Facts 

Plaintiff E. Jean Carter is a black female. On June 23, 

1983, she was hired to work as an office associate for the 

Sedgwick County Community Corrections Department. Defendant Jon 

Cameron, the director of the Community Corrections Department, was 

plaintiff's direct supervisor. Defendant Michael Brand was the 

assistant director-of the Department. 

According to plaintif·f, Brand frequently directed racial 

slurs at her, and Cameron sexually harassed her. On February 22, 

1985, Cameron left his position as director of the Department, and 

Brand succeeded him. Although plaintiff had consistently received 

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favorable job evaluations, on Brand's first day as director, he 

fired plaintiff without any hearing. 

Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit. Her complaint alleged 

race-based discrimination, in violation of Title VII and 42 u.s.c. 

SS 1981 _and -1983, .. and .. gender~based discrimination, . in violation of 

Title VII and 42 u.s.c. S 1983. Plaintiff later raised a 

procedural due process claim under S 1983, but the district court 

dismissed that claim prior to trial because it had not been 

included in either the pleadings or the pretrial order. 

Following a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of 

plaintiff on her charges of racial discrimination. The district 

court in its written order held that 11 the sole cause of 

plaintiff's termination was by reason of her race, in violation of 

42 u.s.c. S 1981 ... Dist. Ct. Op. at 11. Previously, however, in 

its oral ruling from the bench, the district court expressly 

premised liability for racial discrimination against defendant 

Sedgwick County on Title VII. R. Vol. III at 1086-87. The 

district court specifically stated that its written order 

"incorporate[d] in full its previous ruling from the bench." Dist. 

Ct. Op. at 1. 

After finding defendants liable, the district court entered 

judgment against Brand in his official capacity in the amount of 

$100,000, along with punitive damages of $10,000. Dist. Ct. Op. 

at 11. The district court also entered judgment against the 

"Sedgwick County Commission" for lost income in the amount of 

$10,748.05 and directed the Commission to reinstate plaintiff to 

her former position, or to a position with a commensurate job 

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rating, within 45 days. Dist. Ct. Op. at 12. The court further 

ordered that if the Commission decided not to rehire plaintiff 

within 45 days, the Commission would have to pay plaintiff her 

previous salary, including all benefits • 

. The district_court .. ..denied _relief to_ plaintiff for her genderbased discr~ination cla~ under Title VII and S 1983. The court 

dismissed her Title VII gender-based discr~ination cla~ because 

plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The 

court denied relief for plaintiff's gender-based discr~ination 

claim under S 1983 (based on the Equal Protection Clause) because 

plaintiff failed to prove that defendants intended to discriminate 

against her on the basis of her sex. 

Discussion 

I. The Applicability of S 1981 to Cla~s of Race-Based Discharge 

After the district court rendered its decision, the Supreme 

Court clarified the scope of 42 u.s.c. S 1981 in Patterson v. 

McLean Credit Union, 109 s. Ct. 2363 (1989). 1 In Patterson, the 

Court was faced with the issue of whether racial harassment 

occurring in the course of employment was actionable under S 1981. 

The Court held that harassment occurring after the formation of an 

employment contract is not actionable, stating that the right "to 

1 Section 1981 provides, in relevant part: 

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States 

shall have the same right in every State and Territory 

to make and enforce contracts • • • as is enjoyed by 

white citizens •.•• 

42 u.s.c. s 1981. 

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make ••• contracts" under S 1981 "extends only to the formation 

of a contract, but not to problems that may arise later from the 

conditions of continuing employment." Patterson, 109 s. Ct. at 

2372. 

Patterson-..did.-not __ settle the issue.of .whether S 1981 applies 

to a race-based discharge. Indeed, the Court subsequently has 

expressly noted that it left that issue open. See Lytle v. 

Household Mfg., Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1331, 1336 n.3 (1990); id. at 

1338-39 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, the logic of the 

Court's opinion in Patterson indicates that a cla±m of discr±minatory discharge does not implicate the right "to make • 

contracts" protected by S 1981 because a discharge occurs after 

the employment contract has been formed. Thus, in the recent case 

of Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Center, No. 89-1376 (lOth 

Cir. March 25, 1991), this court held that S 1981 did not apply to 

racially discriminatory discharge cases. Many other courts that 

have addressed this issue agree. See Williams v. First Union Nat'l 

Bank, 920 F.2d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 1990); Prather v. Dayton Power & 

Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1256-58 (6th Cir. 1990); Thompkins v. 

Dekalb County Hasp. Auth., 916 F.2d.600, 601 (11th Cir. 1990); 

Gonzalez v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F. 2d 716, 722 ( 2d Cir. 1990) .; 

McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 108-09 (7th Cir. 

1990); Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental. Inc., 899 

F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1990); Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & 

Auto Repair, 897 F.2d 805, 807-08 (5th Cir. 1990). Therefore, we 

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must reverse the district court's determination of liability under 

s 1981. 2 

Plaintiff argues that her termination did in fact implicate 

her right to make a contract because she was prevented from 

entering into a.new arrangement to work as an office associate 

under defendant ~chael Brand. However, that argument is 

inconsistent with the finding of the district court that plaintiff 

was hired by Sedgwick County, not by Jon Cameron individually. 

Dist. Ct. Op. at 2. Thus, although plaintiff was denied the 

opportunity to remain in her present position as an office 

associate with the Corrections Department, she was not denied any 

opportunity to enter into a new contract for a new position. As a 

result, plaintiff was not denied her right "to make • • • 

contracts" under S 1981. 

Plaintiff also was not denied her right to "enforce 

contracts" within the meaning of S 1981. The Supreme Court in 

Patterson held that "[t)he right to enforce contracts does 

not • • • extend beyond conduct by an employer which impairs an 

employee's ability to enforce through legal process his or her 

established contract rights." Patterson, 109 s. Ct. at 2373. We 

note that plaintiff has not alleged that defendants interfered 

with her legal rights of enforcement of her contract by, for 

2 We apply Patterson retroactively to this case. See Hill v. 

Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Inc., 918 F.2d 877, 880 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

We also note that in this instance retroactive application of 

Patterson does not produce inequitable results because nothing 

suggests that plaintiff would have acted any differently had she 

known how the Supreme Court would rule in Patterson and because 

Title VII still enables plaintiff to be made whole for her 

injuries resulting from defendants' discrimination. 

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instance, ~peding her access to the courts or to nonjudicial 

methods of dispute resolution. 

Although plaintiff's claim of discriminatory discharge is not 

covered by § 1981, it is covered by Title VII. In its written 

order and judgment, -.the district. court .based its ultimate holding 

exclusively on § 1981. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 11. However, 

plaintiff alleged that defendants' racial discrimination also 

violated Title VII, and the court's factual finding of racial 

discrimination under § 1981 applies fully to plaintiff's 

discrimination claims under Title VII. See Skinner v. Total 

Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1444 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Moreover, the district court's written order was expressly 

intended to "incorporate in full its previous ruling from the 

bench," Dist. Ct. Op. at 1. The district court, in its ruling 

from the bench, premised liability against defendant Sedgwick 

County on Title VII. 3 R. Vol. III at 1086-87. Thus, the district 

court orally found a sufficient basis for liability under Title 

VII. In light of the fact that the order was issued prior to 

Patterson, plaintiff should not be held accountable for any 

imprecision in the order. Prior to Patterson, plaintiff had 

3 The district court stated in its written Memorandum and 

Journal Entry of Judgment that "[a]t the close of trial, the court 

ruled from the bench in favor of plaintiff on her S 1981 claim, 

and against plaintiff on her Title VII and §1983 claims." Dist. 

Ct. Op. at 1. However, in its oral rulings from the bench the 

district court stated that "[a]s to the county, through the 

commissioners, per Title 7, given the findings I have announced, 

there is no question but what they also stand liable." R. Vol. III 

at 1086-87. In context it appears that the district court 

intended to rule against plaintiff on her Title VII claim for 

sexual discrimination but to rule in her favor and against the 

county on her Title VII claim for racial discrimination. However, 

we remand for the district court to clarify this matter. 

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little incentive to insist that the district court's written order 

also base liability on Title VII because S 1981 authorizes a 

greater range of remedies than Title VII. We therefore remand for 

the district court to consider whether to amend its written order 

so as to predicate liability of the county under Title VII as was 

the case in its oral rulings from the bench. 

Title VII claims are considered equitable actions, for which 

legal remedies are unavailable. In contrast, S 1981 claims are 

actions at law, and parties prevailing on S 1981 claims are 

entitled to the full panoply of legal remedies, which are broader 

than the remedies under Title VII. See M. Player, Employment 

Discrimination LawS 5.67, at 445 n.42 (1988). See also Patterson, 

109 s. Ct. at 2375 n.4. In light of our conclusion that S 1981 

does not apply to race-based terminations, the district court's 

award of $100,000 against Michael Brand, and the award of $10,000 

in punitive damages, are without statutory authority and should be 

vacated. However, the district court's award of $10,748.05 in 

lost income would be authorized under Title VII as back pay if the 

district court predicates liability of the county under Title VII. 

Defendants also challenge the district court's award of front 

pay and attorney's fees. In order to provide guidance to the 

district court upon remand, those arguments are considered below. 

II. Front Pay 

In its written order, the district court directed defendant 

"Sedgwick County Commission" to reinstate plaintiff to her former 

job or to a position with a commensurate rating within 45 days. 

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Dist. Ct. Op. at 12. The district court further ordered that 

"[i]f, for whatever reason, the commission elects not to accept 

the plaintiff for employment, then on the 45th day [after the date 

of the district court's order] the plaintiff's salary in the 

amount of_ $19,245 .• 00 .. per annum, together .with full benefits, shall 

commence and be payable to her on a monthly basis." Id. 

Decisions concerning front pay under Title VII fall within 

the trial court's discretion. See Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, 

Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (lOth Cir. 1980). Title VII is an 

equitable statute designed only to make vict~s of discr~ination 

whole. In light of the remedial purpose of Title VII, an award of 

front pay should be l~ited to the amount required to compensate a 

victim for the continuing future effects of discr~ination until 

the viet~ can be made whole. See Pitre v. Western Electric Co., 

843 F.2d 1262, 1278 (lOth Cir. 1988). Therefore, a front pay 

award must specify an ending date and must take into account any 

amount that the plaintiff could earn using reasonable efforts. 

See Edwards v. Occidental Chemical Co*P., 892 F.2d 1442, 1449 (9th 

Cir. 1990). 

The district court's failure to specify an ending date and to 

take into account plaintiff's earning capacity amounts to a clear 

abuse of discretion. Therefore, we vacate the award of front pay. 

Upon remand, if the district court predicates county liability on 

Title VII, it should recalculate the award to reflect plaintiff's 

earning capacity and to determine the time period required in 

order to make plaintiff whole. We note that the determination of 

the appropriate cut-off date for a front pay award is within the 

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district court's discretion, but that the determination must be 

based on "more than mere guesswork." Shore v. Federal Express 

Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1160 (6th Cir. 1985). 

III. Attorney's Fees 

Following trial, plaintiff's attorneys filed an application 

for attorney's fees and expenses. In support of their 

application, the attorneys submitted reconstructed (as opposed to 

contemporaneous) time records. The district court granted the 

application and found that all of the hours spent by the attorneys 

were reasonable. However, the court made a 40 percent reduction 

for the time spent in preparing plaintiff's unsuccessful sexual 

harassment and due process claims, which were unrelated to the 

claim of racial discrimination on which she had prevailed. 

The district court made its award of attorney's fees pursuant 

to 42 u.s.c. S 1988. Section 1988 does not authorize attorney's 

fees for parties prevailing on Title VII claims. However, 

S 706(k) of Title VII provides specific authority for prevailing 

parties to recover attorney's fees. 4 Section 706(k) and S 1988 

"are so similar in language and purpose that in most cases they 

are given similar judicial interpretations." M. Player, 

4 Section 706(k) provides, in relevant part: 

In any action or proceeding under this title the court, 

in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party • • • 

a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs •••• 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, S 706(k), 78 stat. 241, 261 

(1964) (codified at 42 u.s.c. S 2000e-5(k)) 

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Employment Discr~ination Law§ 5.69, at 450 (1988); see also 

Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1499 n.5 (lOth Cir. 1983) (en 

bane) (noting that "Congress intended that 'the standards for 

awarding attorney's fees [under § 1988] be generally the same as 

under the fee.provisions.of the-1964.Civil Rights .Act.'" (quoting 

s. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 u.s. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 5908, 5912)). 

Defendants argue that the district court abused its 

discretion in permitting plaintiff's attorneys to rely upon 

reconstructed time records and in holding that all of the hours 

spent by the attorneys were reasonable. In Ramos v. Lamm, 713 

F.2d 546, 553 (lOth Cir. 1983), we indicated that a party claiming 

attorney's fees must be prepared to establish the hours expended 

by the attorneys by means of contemporaneous time records if 

requested by the trial court. Pursuant to Ramos, it would not be 

an abuse of discretion for a district court to require 

contemporaneous time records, and often contemporaneous time 

records will be necessary in order for "the fee applicant [to 

carry] • • • the burden of establishing entitlement to an award 

and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 u.s. 424, 437 (1983). We did not intend 

to require contemporaneous records, however, as a per se absolute 

requirement. See, ~' MacDissi v. Valmount Industries, 856 F.2d 

1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 1988); Yohay v. City of Alexandria Employees 

Credit Union, Inc., 827 F.2d 967, 974 (4th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. 

University College of the University of Alabama in Birmingham, 706 

F.2d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 u.s. 994 (1983). 

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In this case, the district court determined the number of 

expended attorney's hours by referring to the evidence submitted 

by the plaintiff's attorneys. This evidence consisted of 

extremely detailed itemization of time spent on specific aspects 

of the plaintiff '.s case. Each attorney supported by affidavit 

that the itemizations were accurate and reasonable representations 

of the work done on behalf of the plaintiff. The individual time 

expanded was itemized in quarter-hour increments and each entry 

contained a detailed description of what was done at that time. 

In addition, as to the reasonableness of the itemizations, the 

court consulted the affidavit of Jim Lawing, a litigator who the 

court viewed "as an expert in similar cases." R. Vol. IV at 10. 

Finally, the district court judge found "that drawing from 28 

years of law practice • • • the hours expended • • • [seemed] 

reasonably incurred •••• " Id. 

We review the district court's award of attorney's fees under 

an abuse of discretion standard. See V-1 Oil Co. v. State of 

Wyoming, Dept. of Environmental Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1489 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s.ct. 295 (1990). See also Hensley, 461 

u.s. at 433 ("[D]istrict court to determine what fee is 

'reasonable.'") Given the copious and detailed evidence offered 

in this case, "[t]he district court's finding ••• [of the] hours 

• • • spent on the issues for which fees were awarded is not 

clearly erroneous," V-1 Oil, 902 F.2d at 1489, and comports with 

the assumption that the "court saw the attorney's work first 

hand," Poolaw v. City of Anadarko, Oklahoma, 738 F.2d 364, 368 

(lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985), and has a 

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"superior understanding of the litigation." Hensley, 461 u.s. at 

437. Therefore, provided that the district court upon remand 

predicates liability upon Title VII, we affirm the fee award as 

not an abuse of the district court's discretion. 

Conclusion 

In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson and our 

holding in Trujillo, we REVERSE the district court's determination 

of liability under S 1981. We REMAND for clarification by the 

district court whether liability against any appellant-defendants 

should be premised upon Title VII. We VACATE the district court's 

award of $100,000 against Michael Brand and the $10,000 in 

punitive damages because those awards are not authorized by Title 

VII. We also VACATE the award of front pay, and we REMAND for 

further proceedings pertaining to an award for front pay 

consistent with this opinion. In the event that the district 

court predicates liability upon the county on Title VII, we AFFIRM 

the award for back pay and the award of attorney's fees as within 

the discretion of the district court. 

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