Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01236/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01236-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The Supreme Court, in Miller, recognized for the first time that sentencing juvenile

offenders to life without parole, without consideration of certain factors relating to youth, is

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jonathan Andrew Arias, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-15-1236-PHX-GMS (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before this Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Authorization to Represent

Petitioner in State Postconviction Proceedings; Motion to Stay Federal Proceeding

(hereinafter “motion”) (Doc. 20). Respondents do not object to the requested stay. (Id. at

3.) 

Petitioner filed his habeas petition on July 2, 2015, raising two claims: (1) his sentence

to natural life for offenses committed when Petitioner was a juvenile violated the United

States Constitution as set forth in Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)1

,

and (2) he was not sentenced in accordance with the provisions of his plea agreement. (Doc.

1 at 6-7.) Petitioner raised a claim pursuant to Miller in state court post-conviction

Case 2:15-cv-01236-GMS Document 23 Filed 03/16/16 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The trial court assumed retroactivity in its analysis, although that had not yet been

decided. Subsequently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016),

the Supreme Court, on January 25, 2016, made the constitutional right recognized in Miller

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. 

3

The trial court ruled similarly on Petitioner’s petition and on motion for

reconsideration.

4

GVR orders are “premised on matters that [the Supreme Court] has reason to believe

the court below did not fully consider.” Lawrence on Behalf of Lawrence v. Chater, 516

U.S. 163, 168 (1966) (per curium).

- 2 -

proceedings, and the state court found Miller inapplicable to Petitioner2, as his natural life

sentence was not statutorily mandated, and the court considered the age of Petitioner (16 at

the time of the offenses) to be a mitigating factor. (Doc. 1 at 51-54.)3

 The Arizona Court of

Appeals granted review and affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the merits of Petitioner’s

claim. (Doc. 1 at 48-50.) Respondents assert that claim one was procedurally defaulted by

Petitioner in state court proceedings because Petitioner’s claim was presented untimely and

in a successive post-conviction petition. (Doc. 17 at 20.) 

Petitioner asserts in his motion that the Arizona state courts “should have the

opportunity to reconsider [Petitioner]’s Miller claim in light of the permanent-incorrigibility

standard announced in Montgomery.” (Doc. 20 at 1.) Petitioner requests the opportunity to

petition the United States Supreme Court for a GVR4

 (grant certiorari, vacate and remand),

directing that the Arizona state court reconsider Petitioner’s case in light of the Montgomery

decision.

 In Montgomery, however, the Supreme Court did not announce a new standard of

“permanent-incorrigibility,” as Petitioner suggests. The Court, in its discussion of the

substantiveness of Miller’s holding (for retroactivity purposes) referenced language from its

decision in Miller that a life-without-parole sentence should be reserved for “all but the rarest

of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” Montgomery,

136 S.Ct. at 734. The Montgomery Court used interchangeably concepts such as

“irretrievable depravity,” “ irreparable corruption,” and “permanent incorrigibility” in its

Case 2:15-cv-01236-GMS Document 23 Filed 03/16/16 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

discussion of the retroactivity of Miller, but ultimately concluded that Miller “did not require

trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility.” Id., at 735. The

Court noted that “[w]hen a new substantive rule of constitutional law is established, this

Court is careful to limit the scope of any attendant procedural requirement to avoid intruding

more than necessary upon the States’ sovereign administration of their criminal justice

systems.” Id. In the end, the Court’s discussion of the holding in Miller was in the context

of determining if that holding should be given retroactive effect under Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288 (1989), with the Court ultimately holding that “Miller announced a substantive rule

of constitutional law,” and thus should be given retroactive effect. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct.

at 736. 

It is in this context that this Court decides whether to grant Petitioner’s request to stay

and abey his proceedings.

Habeas relief is unavailable to a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment,

unless the applicant “has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28

U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A). Generally, “a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing

both unexhausted and exhausted claims.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982).

Subsequent to Rose, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposed

a one-year statute of limitations for filing federal habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court recognizes that if a petitioner files a petition in federal

court containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, in other words a mixed petition,

the combined effect of Rose and the statute of limitation could result in the loss of all claims,

including those already exhausted, because the limitations period could expire while a

petitioner returned to state court to present his unexhausted claims. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S.

225, 230-31 (2004). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the district court has limited

discretion to hold in abeyance a habeas petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted

claims, to permit a petitioner to return to a state court to exhaust additional claims while the

federal proceedings are stayed. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). 

In Rhines, the Supreme Court held that a stay and abeyance is appropriate when (1)

Case 2:15-cv-01236-GMS Document 23 Filed 03/16/16 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

there is good cause for petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court; (2) the

unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious; and, (3) there is no indication that the

petitioner has engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. 544 U.S. at 277-78.

“[E]ven if a petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district court would abuse its

discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.”

Id. The stay-and-abeyance procedure “should be available only in limited circumstances,”

consistent with AEDPA’s twin purposes: “reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and

federal criminal sentences” and encouraging petitioners to seek relief from state courts in the

first instance. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276-77. “Because granting a stay effectively excuses a

petitioner’s failure to present his claims first to the state courts, stay and abeyance is only

appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s

failure to exhaust his claims first in state court. Id.

The Rhines’ standard does not apply neatly here. First, Petitioner asserts that he

exhausted his Miller claim in state court because “he has invoked one complete round of

Arizona’s established review process that is available for such claims, and afforded the

Arizona Supreme Court an opportunity to review that claim.” (Doc. 20 at 2.) The trial court

and the Arizona Court of Appeals decided Petitioner’s Miller claim after assuming, for

purposes of their analysis, that the holding applied retroactively to Petitioner’s case. (Doc.

1 at 48-50, 51-54.) Thus, the Montgomery decision, applying Miller retroactively, will not

likely constitute a basis for the state court’s reconsideration of Petitioner’s claim. And,

although the trial court noted that Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was successive and

untimely (the basis upon which Respondents assert Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted ), the

trial court noted that it was filed pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(g), which provides an

exception to the preclusion rule when “there has been a significant change in the law that if

determined to apply to the defendant’s case would probably overturn the defendant’s

conviction or sentence.” (emphasis deleted) (Doc. 1, at 53). 

Furthermore, it is not only speculative, but unlikely that the United States Supreme

Court will find that the standard for a GVR would by met here, as there is no issue to “flag”

Case 2:15-cv-01236-GMS Document 23 Filed 03/16/16 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

Chater, 516 U.S. at 167.

- 5 -

that the state courts did not “fully consider[].”5

 The Montgomery decision did not alter the

holding of Miller; it made the holding retroactive. And, the state court applied the holding

of Miller in its review of Petitioner’s post-conviction claim.

This Court agrees with Petitioner and rejects Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner

has not exhausted his claim. Before a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief to a state

prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991). The federal court will not entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus

unless each and every issue has been exhausted. Pliler, 542 U.S. at 230; Rose, 455 U.S. at

521-22. To properly exhaust state remedies, the prisoner must have afforded the state courts

the opportunity to rule upon the merits of his federal constitutional claims by "fairly

presenting" them to the state courts in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v.

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that "[t]o

provide the State with the necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' her claim

in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the

claim."). A petitioner must describe both the operative facts and the federal legal theory so

that the state courts have a "fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts

bearing on his constitutional claim. Id., at 33. In cases not carrying a life sentence or the

death penalty, claims are exhausted once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner alerted the state court to the Miller holding in a procedurally appropriate

manner, that is, by filing for post-conviction relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(g), which

provides an exception to the rule against late and successive petitions when “there has been

a significant change in the law that if determined to apply to defendant’s case would probably

overturn the defendant’s conviction or sentence.” Although the trial court noted that

Petitioner’s petition was both “successive and untimely,” it addressed the merits of the claim

Case 2:15-cv-01236-GMS Document 23 Filed 03/16/16 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

pursuant to the rule, and, in doing so, presumed the retroactivity of Miller. (Doc. 1 at 51-54.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals did not address any timeliness issues, and directly addressed

the merits of Petitioner’s Miller claim, also presuming, for the purpose of analysis, the

retroactivity of Miller. (Id. at 48-50.) In determining whether a state court applied a

procedural bar, this court “reviews the “last reasoned opinion” of the state court. Y1st v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). The Arizona appeals court’s decision on the merits

is the last reasoned opinion in Petitioner’s case, as the decision was summarily affirmed by

the Arizona Supreme Court. (17-1 at 69.)

Thus, Petitioner’s claim one is exhausted, and therefore, Petitioner’s habeas petition

is not mixed and a request for a stay and abey should be denied.

 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that Petitioner’s habeas petition is not

mixed, and therefore there is no cause, pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005),

to stay and abey the proceedings, or to authorize the Federal Public Defender to represent

Petitioner in state court post-conviction proceedings. Wherefore, this Court will recommend

that Petitioner’s Motion for Authorization to Represent Petitioner in State Postconviction

Proceedings; Motion to Stay Federal Proceeding, (Doc. 20), be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion for Authorization

to Represent Petitioner in State Postconviction Proceedings; Motion to Stay Federal

Proceeding, (Doc. 20), be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

Case 2:15-cv-01236-GMS Document 23 Filed 03/16/16 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 16th day of March, 2016.

Case 2:15-cv-01236-GMS Document 23 Filed 03/16/16 Page 7 of 7