Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00578/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00578-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PATENT TECHNOLOGY, LLC,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

LAWRENCE WOODMAN, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 15-cv-00578-DMR 

ORDER ON ASSORTED MOTIONS 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, 34 

Plaintiff Patent Technology LLC1 has filed an assortment of motions. [Docket Nos. 17, 

18, 20, 24, 25.] Although the motions present a confusing array of requests, what emerges is that 

Plaintiff seeks early discovery of third-party information in order to discover the true identities and 

contact information for the named Defendants as well as potential Defendants so that Plaintiff may 

serve them with this lawsuit. Plaintiff also moves to seal certain information associated with its 

request for early discovery, and for an extension of the deadline by which to serve certain 

Defendants with the pleadings. The court finds that these matters are appropriate for resolution 

without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Allegations 

This lawsuit stems from Plaintiff’s attempts to ship a trunk believed to contain $1.2 million 

in cash from Malaysia to the United States. 

 

1

 Michael Klicpera is the principal officer of Plaintiff. Am. Compl. [Docket No. 7] at ¶ 4. 

Klicpera is also an attorney and is representing Plaintiff in this lawsuit. 

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1. Initial Contact with Marry Juliet Smith 

On April 5, 2013, Plaintiff and a person named Marry Juliet Smith2

 communicated via 

Skype, a video chat platform. Plaintiff alleges that Smith was born in Las Cruces, New Mexico, 

and currently resides in Malaysia. Id. at ¶ 10. During this initial communication, Plaintiff agreed 

to be paid $20,000 in exchange for receiving and becoming the claimant of a trunk containing $1.2 

million that allegedly belonged to Smith and would be shipped from Malaysia to the United 

States. Am. Compl. at ¶ 17. 

2. Payments to Various Individuals and Entities 

From April until August 2013, numerous individuals and entities ostensibly associated 

with the shipment of the trunk requested money from Plaintiff for the purposes of enabling the 

shipment, and Plaintiff sent money to various bank accounts in various amounts. Plaintiff became 

“significantly concerned that this was a scam operation,” but despite this concern continued to 

send money toward the payment of fees and taxes associated with the shipment of the trunk. See, 

e.g., id. at ¶¶ 70, 76, 80, 82. The transactions described below represent only a sample of the 

payments that were requested and that Plaintiff made. 

 Initial Request for Payment from Smith. Around April 5, 2013, 

Smith requested that Plaintiff send her $2,500 for an “anti-Terrorist 

Certificate” and $8,600 for a “Malaysian Tax needed for transporting 

the trunk to the United States.” Id. at ¶¶ 17. 

 Initial Request for Payment from GT. On April 16, 2013, Plaintiff 

was contacted by Defendant GT Express and Security Company 

(“GT”), the company shipping the trunk. GT informed Plaintiff that the 

shipment was delayed because GT required the trunk to be insured at 

the cost of $9,720. Id. at ¶ 20. 

 Initial Request for Payment from PT. On April 18, 2013, Plaintiff 

was contacted by someone from Defendant PT Express and Security 

(“PT”),3

 apparently a courier service based in Kuala Lumpur and 

London. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 25. PT informed Plaintiff that it required $23,000 

to deliver the trunk. 

 

2

 Smith is not named as a Defendant, but Plaintiff notes that she is a “potential Defendant.” Id. at 

¶ 11. The early discovery requested by Plaintiff is in part directed toward uncovering the true 

identity of and contact information for Smith. 

3

 Plaintiff alleges that GT is “a[n] agent or service provide[r] associated with PT.” Am. Compl. at 

¶ 6. Both are named as Defendants. 

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 Payment to Smith and/or PT’s Maybank Account. On April 18, 

2013, Plaintiff sent $11,500 to Smith and/or PT Express from its Wells 

Fargo account to a Maybank4 account. Id. at ¶ 26. 

 Payment to Smith’s Maybank Account. On April 22, 2013, Plaintiff 

sent another payment of $11,500 to Smith from its Wells Fargo account 

to a Maybank account. Id. at ¶ 28. 

 Payment to PT’s Bank of America Account. On April 22, 2013, PT 

sent an email to Plaintiff requesting a $11,500 “demurrage fee” and 

instructing Plaintiff to deposit the money directly into PT’s Bank of 

America account; Plaintiff then paid $11,500 to the Bank of America 

account. Id. at ¶ 29; Compl. [Docket No. 1] at Ex. 12 (email from PT to 

Plaintiff instructing Plaintiff to send money to Bank of America account 

#483042739956). 

 Payment to AIG’s Wells Fargo Account. On May 2, 2013, Defendant 

Lawrence Woodman, acting as PT’s agent, sent Plaintiff an email 

purporting to charge $23,100 for a “dumurrage [sic] fee” that had to be 

paid to an entity called AIG Imports and Exports (“AIG”), which is not 

named as a Defendant in this action.5

 The following day, Plaintiff sent 

payment of $23,000 from Plaintiff’s Wells Fargo account to AIG’s 

Wells Fargo account. Id. at ¶¶ 41-42; Compl. at Ex. 24 (Wells Fargo 

transaction receipt a withdrawal from an unspecified account to an 

account ending -4938). 

 Payment to PT’s Sovereign/Santander Bank Account. On May 28, 

2013, Plaintiff sent $28,455 USD to a Sovereign Bank6 account that 

Plaintiff believed to belong to PT. Id. at ¶ 61; Compl. at Ex. 40 (transfer 

slip showing transfer of money from Plaintiff’s Wells Fargo account to 

PT’s Sovereign Bank account). 

 Payment to Tao A. Olagoke’s Wells Fargo Account. On July 18, 

2013, PT told Plaintiff that a “bullion” van would be necessary to 

deliver the trunk and that additional money was required to secure the 

bullion van. On July 23, 2013, Plaintiff tendered payment of $38,000 to 

the bank account of Defendant Tao A. Olagoke, who is alleged to be an 

agent for PT. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 87; Compl. at Ex. 57 (Wells Fargo deposit 

slips showing withdrawal from Plaintiff’s account and deposit into 

Wells Fargo account for Tao Olagoke). 

Eventually, Plaintiff refused to make any additional payments associated with the delivery of the 

trunk. Id. at ¶ 108. The trunk was never delivered to Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff brings three causes of action against Defendants GT, PT, Woodman, and Olagoke: 

 

4

 “Maybank” is not defined in the Amended Complaint. Based on exhibits attached to the 

original Complaint, it appears that Maybank is the Malaysian bank to which Plaintiff wired money 

from Plaintiff’s Wells Fargo account. 

5

 Plaintiff alleges that AIG Imports and Exports is a “potential defendant” in this case. Am. 

Compl. at ¶ 5. 

6

 Plaintiff alleges that Sovereign Bank is now known as Santander Bank. Docket No. 18 at 4. 

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(1) breach of contract; (2) money had and received; and (3) fraud. Id. at ¶¶ 119-135. The total 

amount paid by Plaintiff for the delivery of the trunk is not clearly explained in the Amended 

Complaint. However, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim alleges that Defendants PT and 

Woodman became “indebted to Plaintiff in the sum of $470,000 USD plus allowable interest for 

breaching their written promises to deliver the consignment trunk,” that GT owes $9,720 to 

Plaintiff, and Olagoke owes $38,000 to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 119-121. 

3. Involvement of “Mr. McCandles” 

The Amended Complaint also alleges the involvement of a person named “Mr. 

McCandles,” whom Plaintiff believes to be the property lawyer for Smith’s deceased father. Id. at 

¶ 45. 

Around May 8, 2013, Smith informed Plaintiff that she had rights to real property in Las 

Cruces, New Mexico and in Maumee, Ohio, but that the Ohio properties were under the control of 

McCandles. Id. Plaintiff asked Smith to request help from McCandles for the payment of some of 

the assorted fees and taxes that Plaintiff had been asked to provide to PT, but Smith stated that 

McCandles could not help. Id. at ¶ 100. Some time later, Plaintiff persuaded Smith to allow 

Plaintiff to contact McCandles to resolve the delivery of the trunk. On July 1, 2014, McCandles 

“contacted Michael Klicpera by email and confirmed that he sent $10,000 USD to Ms. Mary Juliet 

Smith but cannot help her any more without her presence in the United States.” Id. at ¶ 113. The 

email does not indicate the identity of the sender: it is addressed from “propropertieschamber@outlook.com” to Klicpera, and signed by “PROPROPERTY 

LAWCHAMBER.” See Compl. at Ex. 73. 

B. Motions 

Plaintiff has filed six motions that are pending before the court. Docket Nos. 17, 24, and 

25 regard Plaintiff’s request that certain portions of its other two motions be filed under seal and 

Docket No. 34 is Plaintiff’s motion to extend the period for service of process; these motions will 

be addressed at the end of this order. The court first addresses Docket Nos. 18 and 20, in which 

Plaintiff moves the court for an order requiring Santander Bank, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, 

Microsoft, and the State of New Mexico to provide Plaintiff with information to assist it in 

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identifying and locating Defendants and potential Defendants for service. 

II. MOTIONS FOR EARLY THIRD-PARTY DISCOVERY 

A. Legal Standards 

Generally, a party may not initiate discovery before the parties have met and conferred 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). However, a court may authorize earlier 

discovery “for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26(d). Courts have permitted “limited discovery ... after [the] filing of the complaint to 

permit the plaintiff to learn the identifying facts necessary to permit service on the defendant.” 

Columbia Ins. Co. v. seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999). See also Gillespie v. 

Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (when true identity of defendant is not known before 

complaint is filed, a plaintiff “should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the 

unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the 

complaint would be dismissed on other grounds”); Zoosk Inc. v. Doe 1, No. C 10-04545 LB, 2010 

WL 5115670, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2010) (permitting plaintiff to serve early discovery on 

third-party internet service providers to discover identity of unknown Internet communicators). 

The plaintiff must demonstrate good cause for earlier discovery. See Semitool, Inc. v. 

Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002). In evaluating whether a plaintiff 

establishes good cause to learn the identity of the defendants through early discovery, courts 

examine whether the plaintiff (1) identifies the unknown party with sufficient specificity that the 

court can determine that the party is a real person who can be sued in federal court, (2) recounts 

the steps taken to locate and identify the party, (3) demonstrates that the action can withstand a 

motion to dismiss, and (4) demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that the discovery will lead to 

identifying information that will permit service of process. Columbia, 185 F.R.D. at 578-780. 

B. Docket No. 20: Discovery from Microsoft Corporation 

In Docket No. 20, Plaintiff moves the court for an order requiring non-party Microsoft 

Corporation to produce information regarding the Yahoo, Skype, and/or Outlook7

 accounts 

 

7

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However, Plaintiff’s request for an order requiring Microsoft to produce information about a 

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associated with Smith and McCandles. Specifically, Plaintiff requests the accountholder’s name, 

address, phone number, birth date, other known email addresses, profile URL, driver’s license 

number, and Social Security number for the Skype accounts “juliet.smith85” and “marry.juliet33” 

and the Outlook account “proproperty-lawchamber@outlook.com.” See Docket No. 20-2. The 

court finds that Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to establish good cause to permit this early 

discovery. 

First, Plaintiff has identified Smith and McCandles with sufficient specificity that the court 

can determine that they are real people who can be sued in federal court. Specifically, Plaintiff 

has demonstrated that Smith and McCandles communicated with Plaintiff through various means, 

including email and Skype, requesting payment of fees associated with the delivery of the trunk. 

Plaintiff identifies Smith as the owner of the Skype accounts (“juliet.smith85” and 

“marry.juliet33”) through which Smith and Plaintiff communicated and McCandles as the owner 

of the Outlook account “proproperty-lawchamber@outlook.com” that sent messages to Klicpera’s 

email address. Plaintiff has therefore accused Smith and McCandles of “specific acts of 

misconduct that could only have been perpetrated by actual people, as opposed to a mechanical 

process.” G.N. Iheaku & Co. Ltd. v. Does 1-3, No. C 14-02069 LB, 2014 WL 2759075, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. June 17, 2014). Accord Zoosk, 2010 WL 5115670, at *2 (“Zoosk identified the 

possible Doe defendants with sufficient specificity by identifying the eight IP addresses using the 

Twitter account ‘Squirrel Juice’”). 

Second, Plaintiff has recounted the steps it has taken to locate and identify Smith and 

McCandles. All of the communications between Plaintiff and Smith and McCandles are alleged to 

have occurred via email or Skype. Plaintiff states that it requested identifying information from 

Smith, including her driver’s license and passport information but she refused to provide the 

information. Plaintiff also contacted McCandles for information about McCandles and Smith, but 

McCandles “was vague or protective and would not provide any specific information.” Docket 

 

Yahoo email account is plainly deficient. Plaintiff does not explain why Microsoft would have 

information about another company’s accounts. 

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No. 20 at 4-5. Plaintiff states that it “never could completely verify the true identification” of 

Marry Juliet Smith nor “property attorney Mr. McCandles” and requires the requested information 

from Microsoft in order to identify them. Id. at 3. 

Third, Plaintiff has also pleaded at least its fraud claim with sufficient particularity. “A 

cause of action for fraud [under California law] requires the plaintiff to prove (a) a knowingly 

false misrepresentation by the defendant, (b) made with the intent to deceive or to induce reliance 

by the plaintiff, (c) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff, and (d) resulting damages.” Glenn K. 

Jackson Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Wilkins v. Nat’l Broadcasting Co., 

Inc., 71 Cal.App. 4th 1066, 1082 (1999)). The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that the 

named and unknown defendants (including potentially Smith and McCandles) made 

misrepresentations to Plaintiff, “had no intention to deliver the consignment trunk[,] and created a 

scheme to defraud the Plaintiff,” causing Plaintiff to be injured through the loss of his money. 

Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 127-135. 

Finally, information about the true names and contact information for the owners of the 

Skype and Outlook accounts ostensibly belonging to Smith and McCandles could lead to 

identifying information that will permit service of process. 

For the above reasons, the court finds that good cause exists to permit some limited early 

discovery of that information, and grants Plaintiff’s motion for an order permitting Plaintiff to 

serve early discovery on Microsoft. Plaintiff may serve a third-party subpoena on Microsoft for 

the accountholder’s name, address, phone number, birth date, other known email addresses, profile 

URL, or other information that identifies the accountholder for the Skype accounts 

“juliet.smith85” and “marry.juliet33” and the Outlook account “propropertylawchamber@outlook.com.” 

C. Docket No. 20: Discovery from New Mexico 

Also in Docket No. 20, Plaintiff moves the court for an order directing the New Mexico 

Department of Health to provide information about Smith’s birth and family records. 

While the first three factors in the Columbia standard are satisfied for the above-stated 

reasons, Plaintiff has not met the fourth factor by demonstrating that discovery from the State of 

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New Mexico is likely to lead to identifying information about Defendants or the unknown 

defendants. Plaintiff’s motion is disjointed and incomplete, and contains almost no information 

justifying the discovery sought. For example, Plaintiff believes that Smith was born in Las Cruces 

on February 10, 1981, but gives no explanation or basis for this belief. Docket No. 20-4 at 2. Nor 

has Plaintiff explained why a subpoena directed to the State of New Mexico is the proper means 

through which to discover information regarding Plaintiff’s birth records. Without more, the court 

cannot conclude that there is good cause to permit early discovery. The court therefore denies

Plaintiff’s motion for an order permitting Plaintiff to serve early discovery on the State of New 

Mexico. 

D. Docket No. 18: Discovery from Banks 

In Docket No. 18, Plaintiff moves the court for an order requiring the banks involved in 

transactions with Defendants Woodman and PT to provide information about accounts believed to 

be associated with those Defendants. Docket No. 18 at 1. Plaintiff also seeks information from 

Wells Fargo in order to identify and contact AIG. Docket No. 18 at 3. 

With respect to the first Columbia factor, Plaintiff has demonstrated that Woodman and PT 

are real individuals or entities that can be sued in federal court. Plaintiff has alleged that 

Woodman and PT communicated with Plaintiff regarding the shipment of the trunk. They 

provided Plaintiff with information about requested payments, responded to his inquiries, and 

accepted the payments that Plaintiff sent. See, e.g., Compl. at Ex. 10 (email from Lawrence 

Woodman from PT updating Plaintiff on the shipment of the trunk and giving instructions for 

payment of customs fees). Plaintiff has also demonstrated that AIG is a real entity that can be 

sued in federal court, as Plaintiff has alleged that he completed a payment to a Wells Fargo 

account owned by AIG. 

Second, Plaintiff has recalled the steps it has taken to locate Woodman and PT. Plaintiff 

hired a British process server who attempted to serve Woodman and PT at the British address 

provided by Woodman in his emails with Plaintiff, and attempted to contact those Defendants 

using the email addresses through which Plaintiff communicated with them and using the British 

phone numbers listed in Woodman’s emails. Docket No. 18 at 4-5. The process server was 

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unable to locate Woodman or PT using any of these means, and in fact found that the email 

addresses and phone numbers were no longer in use and the address led to residential flats that 

were not connected to Woodman or PT. Id. at 5. 

However, Plaintiff has not sufficiently recounted the steps it took to locate and identify 

AIG. Plaintiff explains that it searched publically-available documents and discovered that “a 

company listed as AIG Imports and Exports was established in February 22, 2013 in Bronx, New 

York.” Docket No. 18 at 3. Plaintiff attaches to its motion an unverified, unexplained document 

that appears to be a printout from the New York State Department of Corporations database 

showing an address at 3673 3rd Avenue in the Bronx for “AIG Imports & Exports Corporation.” 

Docket No. 18 at Ex. A. Plaintiff states that it needs early discovery “to establish a connect [sic] 

between the bank deposit tendered and this potential defendant.” Id. at 3. But Plaintiff has a 

corporate address for AIG Imports that is ostensibly registered with the State of New York. The 

second Columbia factor is “aimed at ensuring that plaintiffs make a good faith effort to comply 

with the requirements of service of process and specifically identifying defendants.” Columbia, 

185 F.R.D. at 579. Plaintiff has not met this factor because it has not attempted to serve AIG at 

this address, or explained why it is not possible to serve AIG at this address. The court therefore 

finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause to subpoena Wells Fargo for information 

about AIG’s location in order to serve AIG, because Plaintiff may be able to serve AIG without 

this discovery. 

As to the third Columbia factor, as discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded at 

least its fraud claim against PT, Woodman, and the unknown Defendants. 

Analysis of the fourth Columbia factor—i.e., whether the discovery requested is likely to 

lead to identifying information that will permit service of process—requires the court to decipher 

the disorganized statements in Plaintiff’s numerous filings. The motion for early discovery does 

not specify the banks from which Plaintiffs intends to seek early discovery. However, attached to 

the motion are three proposed orders directing Santander Bank, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America 

to provide documents to Plaintiff. See Docket Nos. 18-1 to 18-3. See also Docket Nos. 17-2 to 

17-7 (redacted and unredacted copies of same proposed orders). The court therefore understands 

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Plaintiff to be requesting early third-party discovery from only these three banks, for one account 

number per bank. Plaintiff’s motion does not connect these three banks accounts to the allegations 

in the Amended Complaint, but the court has reviewed the Amended Complaint and finds that the 

allegations therein sufficiently draw a nexus between the three banks, the listed account numbers, 

and the named Defendants or unknown Defendants in this action: 

 PT’s Bank of America Account. On April 22, 2013, Plaintiff paid 

$11,500 to Bank of America account #483042739956, which 

purportedly belonged to PT. Am. Compl. at ¶ 29. 

 PT’s Santander (Sovereign) Bank Account. On May 28, 2013, 

Plaintiff paid $28,455 to Sovereign Bank account #23110098934, 

purportedly belonging to PT. Am. Compl. at ¶ 61; Compl. at Ex. 40 

(Sovereign Bank account number ending -8934); Docket No. 17-2 at ¶ 1 

(requesting information for Santander/Sovereign bank account number 

23110098934). 

 AIG Imports’ Wells Fargo Account. On May 2, 2013, PT’s agent 

Woodman asked Plaintiff to pay a fee to an entity called AIG Imports 

and Exports. The following day, Plaintiff sent payment of $23,000 from 

Plaintiff’s Wells Fargo account to AIG Imports and Export’s bank 

account. Id. at ¶¶ 41-42; Compl. at Ex. 24 (Wells Fargo transaction 

receipt a withdrawal from an unspecified account to an account ending -

4938). It appears that Plaintiff does not have the full account number 

for this account, because even Plaintiff’s proposed order does not 

reference it. 

As discussed above, because Plaintiff has unjustifiably failed to attempt service on AIG on its 

known address in the Bronx, Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for early discovery from 

Wells Fargo for information about AIG.8 However, with respect to Bank of America and 

Santander Bank, Plaintiff has satisfied the Columbia factors and the court finds that good cause 

exists for some early discovery from those banks. 

However, Plaintiff’s requests are overbroad: Plaintiff seeks (1) the personal and/or 

corporate names and the addresses of the owners of the account numbers; (2) names and addresses 

for any accounts “associated with Defendant Lawrence Woodman, PT Express and Security 

 

8

 Even if Plaintiff had established the second Columbia factor for the discovery sought from 

Wells Fargo, Plaintiff would not have established the fourth factor, because Plaintiff’s request for 

information from Wells Fargo identifies only the last four digits of an account number. Without 

more, a subpoena on Wells Fargo associated with the account ending “-4938” is unlikely to lead to 

useful information. 

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Company, and/or AIG”; (3) copies of all statements sent to and received from the owners of the 

identified account number for the period between April 23, 2013 and July 23, 2013; (4) any emails 

or mail sent to or received from the owners of the identified account number; and (5) any 

information regarding the receipt and distribution of $28,455 by the Santander bank account on 

May 30, 2013 and $11,500 by the Bank of America account on April 22, 2013. Only the first and 

fifth category of information is properly requested. Compare G.N. Iheaku & Co. Ltd. v. Does 1-3, 

No. C 14-02069 LB, 2014 WL 2759075, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2014) (in case where plaintiff 

wired $270,000 to bank account of suspected scammer whose true name was unknown, granting 

motion for early discovery in form of subpoena on bank, but noting that plaintiff’s “requests for 

production of documents that are more suited for the merits discovery stage and exceeds the scope 

sufficed for learning the identities of the Doe defendants” and therefore limiting discovery to 

contact information and information about specifically identified money transfers on certain 

dates); Specialized Bicycle Components, Inc. v. Barton, No. C10-05725 HRL, 2011 WL 1599653, 

at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (permitting plaintiff bicycle manufacturer to subpoena website for 

early discovery about contact and sales information for seller of counterfeit bicycle components, 

but not permitting early discovery of bank account information). The other information Plaintiff 

seeks is not directed toward discovering the identities and contact information for the Defendants, 

and is more properly sought in the course of ordinary rather than early discovery. 

The court therefore grants Plaintiff’s motion for early discovery from Santander Bank and 

Bank of America. Plaintiff may serve a third party subpoena on Santander Bank for the following 

information associated with account number 23110098934: (1) documents sufficient to show 

names, addresses, and other contact information of the accountholder; and (2) documents 

sufficient to show any payments or deposits made to the account, include via wire transfer, of 

$28,455 on May 30, 2013. Plaintiff may serve a third party subpoena on Bank of America for the 

following information associated with account number 483042739956: (1) documents sufficient to 

show names, addresses, and other contact information of the accountholder; and (2) documents 

sufficient to show any payments or deposits made to the account, include via wire transfer, of and 

$11,500 on April 22, 2013. Plaintiff’s motion is denied with respect to early discovery from 

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Wells Fargo. 

III. MOTIONS TO SEAL 

Associated with Plaintiff’s requests for early third-party discovery are several motions to 

seal. [Docket Nos. 17, 20, 24, 25.] Civil Local Rule 79-5(b) states that “no document may be 

filed under seal (i.e., closed to inspection by the public) except pursuant to a court order that 

authorizes the sealing of the particular document, or portions thereof. A sealing order may issue 

only upon a request that establishes that the document, or portions thereof, are privileged, 

protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law (hereinafter referred 

to as ‘sealable’).” “The request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable 

material, and must conform with Civil L.R. 79-5(d).” Id. 

In Docket No. 17, Plaintiff seeks to seal the Sovereign Bank account number, the Bank of 

America account number, and the last four digits of the Wells Fargo account number as they 

appear in the “proposed orders” Plaintiff attached as exhibits to Docket No. 18. However, 

Plaintiff makes no contention that this material is confidential, privileged, protectable as a trade 

secret, or otherwise sealable. Instead, Plaintiff simply notes that the exhibits will “provide 

identification and address information for conduct [sic] process serving.” Docket No. 17-1 at 2. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of showing that the material sought to be sealed is 

sealable, the court denies Docket No. 17. 

Docket No. 20, which is Plaintiff’s motion for third-party early discovery from Microsoft 

and the State of New Mexico, also appears to include a request to seal.9

 The information that 

Plaintiff seeks to seal is the birth date for Marry Juliet Smith. However, as with Docket No. 17, 

Plaintiff makes no contention that Smith’s birth date is confidential, privileged, protectable as a 

trade secret, or otherwise sealable. To the extent that Docket No. 20 contains a motion to seal, it is 

denied. 

Docket Nos. 24 and 25 are styled as “Protection and Document Sealing Orders” purporting 

 

9

 There is no motion to seal associated with Docket No. 20, but Plaintiff has submitted both a 

redacted proposed order and an unredacted proposed order, and in Docket No. 25, Plaintiff moves 

to seal the unredacted proposed order attached to Docket No. 20. 

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United States District Court 

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a

to relate to Plaintiff’s request that the court permit early discovery from third parties. But these 

“motions” are simply the court’s model protective order, followed by Plaintiff’s declaration that it 

“promises” that it will not use material designated as “Confidential” under the protective order for 

inappropriate purposes. See, e.g. Docket No. 24-1 at ¶ 3 (“I promise that I will use any and all 

‘Confidential’ or ‘Confidential - For Counsel Only’ information, as defined in the Protective and 

Document Sealing Order, given to me only in a manner authorized by the Protective and 

Document Sealing Order, and only to assist counsel in the litigation of this matter.”). The model 

protective order is simply an exemplar for parties litigating in this district, not an order with any 

governing authority. Plaintiff’s declaration is meaningless because no documents have been 

designated as “Confidential” or “Confidential - For Counsel Only”—because there is no stipulated 

protective order under which such designations may be made. Furthermore, Docket Nos. 24 and 

25 refer back to Docket Nos. 17, 18, and 20, and seek to seal the same information that Plaintiff’s 

redundant earlier-filed motions to seal covered, i.e., the account numbers for the Santander, Wells 

Fargo, and Bank of America accounts and the alleged birth date of Marry Juliet Smith. As before, 

Plaintiff makes no contention that this material is sealable. Docket Nos. 24 and 25 are therefore 

denied. 

IV. MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR SERVING DEFENDANTS 

Plaintiff moves to extend time for serving Defendants PT and Woodman. [Docket No. 34.] 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides: “If a defendant is not served within 120 days after 

the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must 

dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a 

specified time.” However, “if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend 

the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6(b)(1) (“When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, 

extend the time: (A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, 

before the original time or its extension expires; or (B) on motion made after the time has expired 

if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.”). 

Plaintiff’s motion recounts Plaintiff’s many efforts to serve PT and Woodman using the 

Case 4:15-cv-00578-DMR Document 36 Filed 07/27/15 Page 13 of 14
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Case 4:15-cv-00578-DMR Document 36 Filed 07/27/15 Page 14 of 14