Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_05-cv-00572/USCOURTS-almd-1_05-cv-00572-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

AMY FORREST, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 1:05cv572-MHT

) (WO)

WAFFLE HOUSE, INC. and )

GARY BRACKIN, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Amy Forrest brought this lawsuit against

defendants Waffle House, Inc. and Gary Brackin in June

2005, asserting federal claims and various state-law

torts. The court subsequently granted the defendants’

motion to compel arbitration, which commenced in November

2010. The arbitrator found in favor of Forrest on her

state-law claims, awarding her $ 500,000 in damages, and

in favor of the defendants on the federal claims. Now

before the court is the defendants’ motion to vacate that

award pursuant to § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act

(“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 10, and Forrest’s motion to confirm.

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For the reasons that follow, the defendants’ motion to

vacate the award will be denied, and Forrest’s motion to

confirm granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Forrest brought this action against her former

employer (Waffle House) and her former supervisor

(Division Manager Brackin), alleging numerous instances

of sexual harassment and inappropriate touching. The

defendants insisted that an arbitrator, rather than this

court, resolve the merits of Forrest’s claims and moved

to compel arbitration. Although Forrest resisted, the

defendants prevailed and arbitration commenced on June 7,

2010. 

The arbitration proceedings included nearly three

days of witness testimony and all parties submitted

written briefs. After reviewing the evidence and

considering the parties’ arguments, the arbitrator issued

a well-reasoned 16-page award. He determined that

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Forrest’s federal claims (charging employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982a, 2000e

through 2000e-17) were time-barred, but nevertheless

found in her favor on her state claims of invasion of

privacy, assault and battery, and outrage and awarded her

$ 250,000 in “economic damages” and $ 250,000 for

“emotional distress.” Interim Award 16, attachment to

Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate (Doc. No. 18). 

In reaching that conclusion, the arbitrator found

that Forrest suffered “mental distress, shame, and

humiliation” as a result of “Brackin’s[] conduct during

her employment.” Id. at 15. That conduct included,

among other things, inappropriate and unwelcomed touching

of a sexual nature. When Forrest tried to end this

harassment by complaining about Brackin’s conduct through

the appropriate channels, “those efforts went for naught

with [Waffle House] management” and the harassing and

assaultive behavior continued. Id.

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Although the defendants moved to compel arbitration,

helped select the arbitrator, and prevailed on Forrest’s

federal claims, they remain unhappy with the arbitrator’s

decision and have asked this court to vacate the award.

In support of that request, they raise two separate

grounds for vacatur. First, they argue that the

arbitrator exceeded his authority under the arbitration

agreement and therefore the award should be vacated

pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). Second, they submit

that the award was issued with “manifest disregard of the

law” and should therefore be vacated pursuant to Montes

v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th

Cir. 1997). Forrest has responded by asking the court to

confirm the arbitral award and sanction the defendants

for making frivolous contentions. 

II. ANALYSIS 

Much has been written about the role of courts in

policing arbitral awards. The common theme in all recent

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1. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) states that a district court may

vacate an arbitral award:

“(1) where the award was procured by

corruption, fraud, or undue means;

“(2) where there was evident partiality

or corruption ... ;

“(3) where the arbitrators were guilty

of misconduct in refusing to postpone

the hearing[;] ... or in refusing to

(continued...)

5

opinions is that a federal court’s role is “narrowly

limited.” Booth v. Hume Publ’g, Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 932

(11th Cir. 1990). This preserves one of the key benefits

of arbitration: allowing parties to avoid litigation

costs by resolving their disputes outside of the courts.

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123

(2001). 

The limited scope of judicial review is embodied in

the FAA, which “presumes that arbitration awards will be

confirmed” and directs courts to do so unless one of the

“four narrow bases” for vacatur enumerated in 9 U.S.C.

§ 10(a) applies.1

 Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnses,

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(...continued)

hear evidence pertinent and material to

the controversy; or of any other

misbehavior by which the rights of any

party have been prejudiced; or

“(4) where the arbitrators exceeded

their powers, or so imperfectly executed

them that a mutual, final, and definite

award upon the subject matter submitted

was not made.”

2. The three non-statutory grounds permit vacatur if

(1) the award is “arbitrary and capricious,” (2) it

(continued...)

6

Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 778-79 (11th Cir. 1993). At issue

here is 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). That provision permits

courts to vacate an arbitral award if the arbitrator

exceeds the authority delegated to him by the arbitration

agreement.

In addition to those four statutory grounds for

vacatur, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals previously

“recognized three non-statutory bases for vacating an

arbitration award.” Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,

Fenner & Smith Inc., 431 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir.

2005).2

 While Forrest questions the continuing vitality

Case 1:05-cv-00572-MHT-CSC Document 34 Filed 05/22/12 Page 6 of 30
(...continued)

“evinces a manifest disregard of the law,” or (3) its

enforcement would be “contrary to public policy.”

Peebles, 431 F.3d at 1326. 

7

of that jurisprudence, the defendants submit that the

award should be vacated on the non-statutory ground that

it evinces a “manifest disregard of the law.” See

Montes, 128 F.3d at 1462.

A. Scope of the Arbitrator’s Authority

The arbitrator’s role is “to interpret and enforce”

the arbitration agreement. Stold-Nielsen S.A. v.

AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 557 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct.

1758, 1767 (2010). When the arbitrator rejects that role

and refuses to comply with the agreement’s provisions,

the award must be vacated. Cat Charter, LLC v.

Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 843 (11th Cir. 2011).

The defendants identify two provisions of the

arbitration agreement with Forrest that they insist were

not followed. They argue that the arbitrator (1) ignored

the requirement that he apply Alabama law to Forrest’s

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3. The arbitrator was formerly a Florida state-court

judge and so the defendants assume that he applied

Florida law, presumably out of habit.

8

state-law claims; and (2) failed to “render an award and

opinion in the form typically rendered in labor

arbitrations.” Arb. Agreement 2, attachment to Defs.’

Mot. to Vacate (Doc. No. 18). The court will address

those arguments in turn.

First, the defendants surmise that the arbitrator

applied Florida (rather than Alabama) law to this

dispute.3

 Were the defendants able to make such a

showing, this court would arguably have no choice but to

vacate the award. But they have only the most

circumstantial of evidence to support their theory, and

that evidence is wholly undermined by the arbitrator’s

own words.

The arbitral award itself demonstrates both that the

arbitrator understood that Alabama law governed Forrest’s

tort claims and that he applied that law to the best of

his ability. The arbitrator’s decision begins by

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explaining that Forrest raised both “Federal claims ...

for relief under Title VII and State claims for invasion

of privacy under Alabama law, sexual conduct constituting

the tort of outrage and a claim against ... Gary Bracken,

for assault and battery.” Interim Award 2, attachment to

Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate (Doc. No. 18) (emphasis added).

This clearly demonstrates that the arbitrator knew that

Alabama law applied. Nowhere does the award mention

Florida, cite Florida law, or otherwise imply that

anything other than Alabama law governed Forrest’s tort

claims. 

Indeed, the arbitrator cited only Alabama case law in

support of his decision on the state-law claims. He

expressly relied on Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of

Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2007), to resolve

Forrest’s claim for invasion of privacy. Baldwin

requires “a plaintiff in Alabama [to] show that the

defendant’s conduct was so outrageous that it caused the

plaintiff mental suffering, shame, or humiliation” in

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10

order to prevail on an invasion of privacy claim. 480

F.3d at 1308. Relying on that standard, the arbitrator

specifically found that Forrest “suffered mental

distress, shame, and humiliation” as a result of

Brackin’s conduct. Interim Award 15, attachment to

Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate (Doc. No. 18). Given that the

arbitrator specifically stated that Alabama law governed

Forrest’s tort claims, cited only to cases applying

Alabama law in reaching his decision on those claims,

explicitly referenced the appropriate state-law standard

on Forrest’s invasion of privacy claim, and never once

mentioned the substantive law of any other State, there

can be no doubt that he applied Alabama law in reaching

his decision. 

For their part, the defendants cite to cases

(presumably the same ones they cited in their submissions

to the arbitrator) that they argue require a different

result from the one announced in the arbitral award.

Forrest counters those cases with citations of her own,

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4. Even though the precise contours of Alabama law

are immaterial, it is worth pausing for a moment to

highlight the manner in which the defendants chose to

brief this case. In a subsection of their motion to

vacate entitled “Alabama Does Not Recognize Harassment

Torts,” they quote Machen v. Childersberg Bancorp., 761

So.2d 981, 983 n.1 (Ala. 1999), for the proposition that

“Alabama ‘does not recognize an independent cause of

action for sexual harassment.’” Defs.’ Mot to Vacate 8

(Doc. No. 18). They then argue that the arbitrator

“based his award on such a claim even though it does not

exist under the law the agreement directs him to apply.”

Id. This argument is frivolous for two reasons, either

one of which would be sufficient to raise suspicion that

the defendants are primarily motivated by the improper

purpose of causing unnecessary delay. 

First, the defendants misrepresent Machen. The

(continued...)

11

which she says prove that the awarded damages are

rightfully hers. 

That debate is immaterial: “It is not enough for [the

defendants] to show that the [arbitrator] committed an

error--or even a serious error.” AnimalFeeds, 130 S. Ct.

at 1767. As long as he intended to apply Alabama law and

made a reasonable effort in doing so, it simply does not

matter whether this court agrees with the manner in which

he applied it.4

 See White Springs Agric. Chems., Inc. v.

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(...continued)

entire paragraph to which they cite states: “Alabama does

not recognize an independent cause of action for sexual

harassment. Instead, claims of sexual harassment are

maintained under common-law tort theories such as assault

and battery, invasion of privacy, ... and outrage.”

Machen, 761 So.2d at 983 n.1 (emphasis added). Far from

precluding Forrest’s state-law claims, which were based

solely on assault and battery, outrage, and invasion of

privacy, Machen makes clear that Alabama law embraces

tort damages for the precise claims raised in this case.

Machen therefore stands for the opposite of what the

defendants allege, and the quotation provided in their

brief appears to have been manipulated in order to

conceal that fact from the court.

Second, the award was not based on a

sexual-harassment claim. The arbitrator identified the

claims on which Forrest prevailed in the final two

paragraphs of his award where he states: “Having

previously determined that Claimant cannot recover under

Title VII EEOC claims, the Arbitrator turns his attention

to the State claims of Claimant, to-wit: invasion of

privacy, outrage, and assault and battery.” Interim

Award 15, attachment to Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate (Doc. No.

18). Nowhere in this portion of the award does the

arbitrator so much as mention “sexual harassment.”

Instead, he based his award on the very torts Machen

identifies as the appropriate avenues for relief under

Alabama law. This makes sense, since Forrest’s complaint

did not even allege a state-law harassment claim. 

12

Glawson Invs. Corp., 660 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2011)

(“To the extent White Springs contests the panel’s

interpretation of Florida law, the FAA does not empower

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13

us to review these allegations of legal error.”).

Otherwise, every time a party disagreed with the

arbitrator’s interpretation of the governing law (and

could convince a court it was right), it would have a

valid claim for vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). That

would wholly undermine “the promise of arbitration,”

which relies on “the arbitrator being the last decision

maker in all but the most unusual cases,” B.L. Harbert

Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 913 (11th

Cir. 2006), and blatantly contradict the Eleventh

Circuit’s admonishment that arbitrators “do not act as

junior varsity trial courts where subsequent appellate

review is readily available to the losing party,” Cat

Charter, 646 F.3d at 843 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

If the defendants actually believed that the

arbitrator “cho[se] not to apply Alabama law” and

“instead applied Florida law,” Mot. to Vacate 8 (Doc. No.

18), then they should have pointed this out to the

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arbitrator. The arbitration agreement (which Waffle

House drafted) permits a party to “file with the

Arbitrator a motion to reconsider” and requires the

arbitrator to “reconsider the issues raised by the motion

and, promptly, either confirm or change the decision.”

Arb. Agreement 3, attachment to Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate

(Doc. No. 18). Had the arbitrator simply “chosen” the

wrong law, he could have corrected that error. Instead,

unhappy with the result of the arbitration, the

defendants have moved for what amounts to a second

adjudication of Forrest’s claims. But the defendants

previously insisted that an arbitrator, not this court,

should decide the merits of this dispute, and it must now

live with that decision.

Second, the defendants argue that the arbitrator

failed to “render an award and opinion in the form

typically rendered in labor arbitrations.” Arb.

Agreement 2, attachment to Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate (Doc.

No. 18). They suggest that, to comply with that

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requirement, the arbitrator should have “explain[ed] how

[Forrest] suffered ‘mental distress, shame and

humiliation from the Respondent, Gary Brackin,’ when the

alleged conduct occurred months before the alleged

consequences,” and made an explicit finding “that Waffle

House was responsible for this conduct” before holding it

liable for Brackin’s wrongful behavior. Defs.’ Mot. to

Vacate 10 (Doc. No. 18) (emphasis and internal citation

removed). That argument is without merit. 

Generally speaking, “an arbitrator need not explain

her decision; thus, in a typical arbitration where no

specific form of award is requested, arbitrators may

provide a ‘standard award’ and simply announce a result.”

Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 844 (citing United Steelworkers

v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).

However, the parties “may contractually limit or alter

... the form of the award,” and an arbitrator exceeds her

authority by failing to heed any such limitation. Id. at

843. 

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Here, the agreement required the arbitrator to issue

an award “in the form typically rendered in labor

arbitration cases.” Arb. Agreement 3, attachment to

Defs.’ Mot to Vacate (Doc. No. 18). Whether the

arbitrator exceeded his authority therefore depends on

the meaning of that phrase. Unfortunately, the agreement

leaves it undefined, and the defendants have not bothered

to offer evidence regarding the standard practice among

arbitrators in this field. The court must therefore

decipher that phrase on its own.

The arbitration agreement offers some assistance. It

requires the arbitrator to comply with the

employment-arbitration procedures of the American

Arbitration Association (“AAA”). Those procedures

instruct arbitrators to “provide the written reasons for

the award.” AAA Employment Arbitration Rules and

Mediation Procedures 39(c) (2009). The court can

identify no reason why the AAA’s standard would be any

different from the form typically rendered in labor

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5. This holding defeats the defendants’ attempt to

equate “the form typically rendered in labor arbitration

cases” with a requirement that the arbitrator make

specific findings on every element of every one of

Forrest’s claims.

17

arbitrations, and neither party argues that it is. The

court therefore finds that the phrase “in the form

typically rendered in labor arbitration cases” requires

the arbitrator to provide “written reasons for the

award.”

In Cat Charter, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a

provision requiring a “reasoned award,” 646 F.3d at 843,

which is no doubt akin to an award containing “written

reasons.” The court noted that the requirement sat

somewhere between the “standard award” typically

permissible in arbitration disputes and the more exacting

requirement that “the arbitrators make ‘findings of fact

and conclusions of law.’” Id. at 844.5

 Relying on the

dictionary definition of “reasoned,” the court concluded

that such an award is “marked by the detailed listing or

mention of expressions or statements offered as a

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justification of ... the decision.” Id. (emphasis in

original).

With that definition in hand, the appellate court

turned to the arbitral award itself, the relevant part of

which covers only one column of one page of the federal

reporter and looks more like a bulleted list than a

judicial opinion. See id. at 841. For the vast majority

of claims, the arbitrator identified only the parties and

stated which one prevailed. For example, one bullet

reads, “On the claim of the Claimant, CAT CHARTER, LLC,

for breach of contract by Respondent MTI, we find that

Claimant, CAT CHARTER, LLC has proven its claim against

MTI by the greater weight of the evidence.” Id. No

further explanation is given. Another bullet simply

states that “All other claims of the Claimants are hereby

denied. All counter-claims of the Respondents, MTI and

SCHURTENBERGER, are denied.” Id. Only on the issue of

attorney’s fees did the arbitrators provide anything

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resembling reasoning in support of their decision,

stating: 

“the Arbitrators find that Claimants

raised a claim that had substantial fact

and legal support pursuant to Fla. Stat.

§ 772.104(3). More specifically, we

find that the issues relating to missing

resin and the cost of the skiff

presented substantial fact issues raised

by Claimants, justifying denial of any

attorney’s fees for Respondents.”

Id. On every other issue, the arbitrators simply

announced the winner.

Despite the paucity of findings, the Eleventh Circuit

had no trouble confirming the award. It explained that

“the controversy ... turned primarily upon credibility

determinations made by the Panel” and therefore the

panel’s finding regarding the weight of the evidence was

sufficient to make “the reason for the Plaintiffs’

victory ... plain[].” Id. at 844-45. The panel had

“found the Plaintiffs’ witnesses to be more credible,”

and that was enough to rule in their favor. Id. at 845.

As for the fee issue, the arbitrators’ brief statements

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“clearly provide[d] more than a simple result, and g[a]ve

ample justification for the decision of the Panel.” Id.

That was sufficient for the appellate court to find that

the award “was a reasoned one.” Id.

Cat Charter commands the same result in this case.

Here, too, the primary issue before the arbitrator was

one of credibility. Forrest alleged numerous instances

of inappropriate conduct, most of which the defendants

denied. Because there were several witnesses on each

side, the “ultimate decision” was based on “whether the

greater weight of the evidence support[ed] the

allegations of the Claimant or whether the greater weight

of the evidence support[ed] the assertions of the

Respondents.” Interim Award 5, attachment to Defs.’ Mot.

to Vacate (Doc. No. 18). The arbitrator described the

various evidence put forward during the arbitration and

ultimately concluded that “the greater weight of all the

evidence” supported Forrest’s version of the events. Id.

at 15. For the most part, no further explanation was

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needed: the arbitrator simply believed Forrest’s

witnesses. When it was required, however, the arbitrator

fleshed out his reasoning with specific findings, such as

“Brackin touched [Forrest] in such a manner that amounts

to assault and battery,” and Forrest “suffered mental

distress, shame, and humiliation” because of “Brackin’s[]

conduct during her employment.” Id. at 15. 

When considered in its entirety, the arbitrator’s

thorough 16-page award detailing Forrest’s claims,

summarizing the evidence, and explaining his reasoning is

far more comprehensive than the bulleted points discussed

in Cat Charter. There can therefore be no doubt that his

award constitutes “more than a simple result” and easily

meets Cat Charter’s standard for a reasoned opinion.

This court therefore declines “to narrowly interpret what

constitutes a reasoned award to overturn an otherwise

apparently seamless proceeding.” Cat Charter, 646 F.3d

at 846. 

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B. Manifest Disregard of the Law

In what amounts to little more than a rehashing of

the same arguments they put forth in support of vacatur

under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), the defendants submit that the

arbitrator’s decision demonstrates a manifest disregard

of Alabama law. Specifically, they argue that (1) their

wrongful acts were insufficiently severe to constitute

outrage under Alabama law and the arbitrator therefore

erred in finding in favor of Forrest on that claim; (2)

Forrest failed to demonstrate causation between the

complained of behavior and her emotional distress and so

no damages should have been awarded; and (3) Waffle House

should not have been held liable for Brackin’s wrongful

conduct. According to the defendants, those purported

legal errors require that the award be set aside. The

court disagrees. 

The seminal case in this circuit on manifest

disregard of the law is Montes v. Shearson Lehman

Brothers, which held that vacatur is appropriate when the

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arbitrator is “conscious of the law and deliberately

ignore[s] it.” 128 F.3d at 1461. This exacting standard

requires “something more than a misinterpretation,

misstatement, or misapplication of the law,” Peebles, 431

F.3d at 1326; there must be “clear evidence” that the

arbitrator consciously decided not to follow it, Hercules

Steel, 441 F.3d at 910. Put another way, “even a showing

of a clear error on the part of the arbitrator is not

enough. The arbitration loser must establish ... that

the arbitrator actually recognized a clear rule of law

and deliberately chose to ignore it.” Id. at 911-12. 

Recent cases strongly suggest that courts should

vacate an award only if four factors are present: (1) the

arbitration winner conceded that the law favored the

other side, but urged the arbitrator not to follow it;

(2) that appeal was noted in the arbitrator’s final

award; (3) the record reveals no indication that the

arbitrator disapproved of the suggestion; and (4) there

was only weak factual and legal support for the award

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issued. See Montes, 128 F.3d at 1464 (Carnes, J.,

concurring); Hercules Steel, 441 F.3d at 913. That is

precisely what occurred in Montes, which stands as the

only Eleventh Circuit opinion vacating an arbitral award

for manifest disregard of the law.

Forrest points out that intervening decisions have

called into question the continuing vitality of this

already-narrow ground for vacatur. In March 2008, the

Supreme Court decided Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,

Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). The parties in that case had

contractually agreed to permit a more searching review of

the arbitrator’s decision than would otherwise be

available under the FAA, and the district court had

invoked that standard in vacating the arbitral award.

Id. at 579-80. The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to

decide whether the grounds for vacatur and modification

provided by §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA are exclusive.” Id.

at 581. The Court answered that question in the

affirmative, but left open the possibility of “more

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6. The panel’s reasoning is somewhat strained, given

that, three days before, the Supreme Court noted that it

had yet to “decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives

[its] decision in Hall Street ... as an independent

ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the

enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C.

§ 10.” AnimalFeeds, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3. 

25

searching review based on authority outside the statute.”

Id. at 590. 

One month later, in Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp.,

a panel of the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the

“judicially-created bases for vacatur are no longer valid

in light of Hall Street.” 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir.

2010).6

 That conclusion was recently reinforced in

Glawson Investments Corp., which cited Frazier for the

proposition that the grounds for vacatur enumerated in

the FAA “are the exclusive means for upsetting an

arbitration award.” 660 F.3d at 1280.

While those two panels appear intent on eliminating

the non-statutory grounds for vacatur, “[t]he law of this

circuit is ‘emphatic’ that only the Supreme Court or [the

circuit] court sitting en banc can judicially overrule a

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prior panel decision.” Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366,

1386 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Woodard,

938 F.2d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Hercules

Steel, 441 F.3d at 914 (noting that “prior panel

precedent trumps later decisions”). In this case, the

Supreme Court has expressly refrained from ruling on the

continued vitality of the manifest disregard of the law

standard, see AnimalFeeds, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3, and

the Eleventh Circuit has yet to overrule Montes en banc.

Therefore, “to make assurance double sure,” William

Shakespear, Macbeth, Act. 4, sc. 1, the court will assume

that the manifest-disregard-of-law standard is still

applicable and address the defendants’ contention on its

merits.

The defendants will find no comfort in this court’s

abundance of caution. Despite having the burden of

persuasion, Peebles, 431 F.3d at 1326, they do not even

attempt to show that any, let alone all, of the four

factors present in Montes apply to the facts of this

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case. Had they tried, they would have found each of them

inapplicable. The arbitration award does not report that

Forrest urged the arbitrator to abandon Alabama law and

apply instead his own brand of justice. Nor do the

defendants even allege that Forrest so much as implied

that something other than Alabama law governed this

dispute.

Instead, the defendants point to a few instances

where the arbitrator may have gotten the law wrong. This

ignores Peebles’s admonition that “there must be some

showing in the record, other than the result obtained,”

that the arbitrator decided not to follow the law before

a court can vacate an arbitral award for manifest

disregard of the law. 431 F.3d at 1326. The defendants’

argument “is simply another way of saying that the

arbitrator clearly erred” and “errors of law are not

enough to justify setting aside an arbitration award.”

Hercules Steel, 441 F.3d at 911-12; see also Montes, 128

F.3d at 1462.

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C. Sanctions

Forrest has moved for sanctions against the

defendants, alleging that they lacked an objectively

reasonable belief that they would prevail on its motion

to vacate. Pl.’s Reply 40 (doc. No. 27). While Forrest

offers substantial evidence in support of that motion,

the court finds that sanctions are unwarranted at this

time because, when the defendants filed their briefs in

this case, the Eleventh Circuit had not yet decided Cat

Charter. However, with the benefit of that decision, the

court can see no legal basis for further delay: the

defendants should promptly pay Forrest the money that she

is owed. 

The defendants are reminded that courts “can and

should insist that if a party on the short end of an

arbitration award attacks that award in court without any

real legal basis for doing so, that party should pay

sanctions.” Hercules Steel, 441 F.3d at 913. By

continuing to press its claims without a good basis in

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29

the law, the defendants would deprive Forrest of the

benefits she bargained for when signing the arbitration

agreement: this dispute is rapidly becoming more costly,

complicated, and time consuming than it would have been

if it had been handled by the judiciary in the first

instance. “If arbitration is to be a meaningful

alternative to litigation, the parties must be able to

trust that the arbitrator’s decision will be honored

sooner instead of later.” Id. Sooner, in this case,

means now. 

* * *

The defendants insisted on arbitration and received

precisely what they had asked for: a speedy and fair

resolution of this case embodied in a reasoned decision.

To now vacate that award and remand for an entirely new

proceeding would “insufficiently respect the value of

arbitration and inject the courts further into the

arbitration process than Congress has mandated.” Cat

Charter, 646 F.3d at 846. That is something the court

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simply will not do. The defendants’ motion to vacate the

arbitral award will therefore be denied, Forrest’s motion

to confirm granted, and the arbitral award issued in this

case confirmed. 

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 22nd day of May, 2012.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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