Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-03174/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-03174-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Terrance Andrei Fizer, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-16-03174-PHX-ROS (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Terrance Andrei Fizer has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

 Petitioner was sentenced, after a guilty plea, on June 5, 2015. Petitioner did not 

file a PCR petition within the following 90 days, so his time to file this Petition began 

running on September 4, 2015. The Petition was due on September 4, 2016, but was not 

filed until September 12, 2016. Equitable tolling is not argued by Petitioner, and is not 

merited. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Petition be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

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II. BACKGROUND

a. Indictment, Plea, and Sentencing

 On June 18, 2014, an Indictment charged Petitioner with 14 counts of Sexual 

Conduct with a Minor. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A, at 3-4.) On April 9, 2015, Petitioner pleaded 

guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to three counts of Sexual Conduct with a Minor, and 

a lesser-included offense of Attempted Sexual Conduct with a Minor. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. D, at 

18.) The Presentence Report and plea hearing document that Petitioner had sexual contact 

with three separate underage victims from 2008-2010 and in April 2014. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. 

E, at 23; Doc. 9-1, Ex. F, at 27-29.) 

 On June 5, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment and 

consecutive lifetime probation. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. H, at 51.) 

b. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

 On May 10, 2016, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. 

J, at 60.) On May 19, 2016, the trial court dismissed the petition for post-conviction 

relief. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. K, at 65.) The court found that (1) “the filing deadline for the notice 

was September 3, 2015...[h]is Rule 32 proceeding is thus untimely by eight months,” and 

(2) “it is also devoid of any factual or legal basis for Rule 32 relief....” (Doc. 9-1, Ex. K, 

at 42.) 

 On July 1, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. L, at 67.) On July 6, 2016, the court dismissed the petition for 

review as untimely. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. M, at 71.) The court found that the “petition for 

review was not filed within 30 days of the trial court’s final decision disposing of the 

petition for post-conviction relief proceedings.” (Id.) The court noted that the “trial court 

may, ‘after being presented with proper evidence, allow a late filing’ if it finds that 

petitioner was not responsible for the untimely filing. See State v. Pope, 130 Ariz. 253, 

255, 635 P.2d 846, 848 (1981).” (Id.) 

c. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition

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 On September 12, 2016, Petitioner mailed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

(Doc. 1 at 11.) On September 16, 2016, the Court filed the Petition. (Id.) In the Petition, 

Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief: 

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by a coerced confession. In Ground Two, he 

asserts violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights based on the ineffective assistance of 

counsel. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were “violated by direct exculpatory evidence.” 

(Doc. 5 at 2.) 

 On November 15, 2016, Respondents filed a Limited Answer to the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 9.) Petitioner did not file a reply. 

 

III. THE PETITION 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

a. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY.

i. Time Calculation

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of 

“direct review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Summers v. Schriro, 

481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). The judgment of conviction becomes final after a plea 

of guilty upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that 

proceeding or [upon] the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” 

Id. 

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 Here, Petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced on June 5, 2015. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. 

H, at 51.) “In a Rule 32 of-right proceeding, the notice must be filed within ninety days 

after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the 

final order or mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner’s first petition for postconviction relief proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). Petitioner had 90 days from the 

date of his sentencing to file his PCR petition, which was September 3, 2015. Petitioner 

did not file a PCR petition by September 3, 2015. Petitioner’s AEDPA clock began 

running on September 4, 2015. Thus, Petitioner’s one-year limitation period expired, 

absent tolling, on September 4, 2016. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 

1999). Respondents state that the Petition was filed on September 16, 2016, but the 

Petition was constructively filed when Petitioner signed and mailed it on September 12, 

2016. (Doc. 1 at 11.) See Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“[w]hen a prisoner gives prison authorities a habeas petition or other pleading to mail to 

court, the court deems the petition constructively ‘filed’ on the date it is signed.”). 

 The Petition was due September 4, 2016, but Petitioner did not mail it until 

September 12, 2016. Absent tolling, the Petition is untimely. 

ii. Statutory Tolling 

 The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction 

review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona 

Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“A 

proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the 

court in which the conviction occurred.”). 

 But, Petitioner’s PCR proceeding was not “properly filed” because it was untimely 

by eight months. Petitioner’s untimely PCR action did not toll AEDPA’s one-year statute 

of limitations. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (finding that a state 

court’s rejection of a petition as untimely means that it was not “properly filed,” and the 

petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)). 

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iii. Equitable Tolling 

 “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling AEDPA’s 1-year filing deadline must 

show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and 

(2) he has diligently pursued his rights.” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 

2015) (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). The Petitioner bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 

432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external 

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely 

habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling 

is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron–Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of 

his untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a 

petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citation omitted). 

 Here, Petitioner asserts the “Petition of habeas corpus is timely and [falls] within 

the time frame.” (Doc. 1 at 11.) Petitioner does not argue that equitable tolling applies. 

Petitioner did not respond to Respondents’ argument that the Petition is untimely. The 

Court has also reviewed the record and notes that Petitioner filed his PCR action (on May 

10, 2016) and Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (on July 1, 2016) 

within the time he was required to file the Petition. Petitioner had the option of filing a 

“protective” petition in federal court in order to avoid a potential timeliness bar, but he 

did not do so. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 416. The fact that his PCR Petition was found to be 

untimely did not make it impossible for Petitioner to file a timely petition in this Court. 

Further, Petitioner’s pro se status or “lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an 

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 Petitioner has failed to meet the “very high threshold,” United Sates v. Battles, 362 

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F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004), of establishing that extraordinary circumstances beyond 

his control made it impossible for him to timely file a habeas petition and that those 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness. 

V. CONCLUSION

 The Petition was due on September 4, 2016, but it was not filed until September 

12, 2016. The Petition will be dismissed regardless of the margin of untimeliness. See 

United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas petition 

submitted one day late was properly dismissed as untimely under AEDPA, noting that a 

“missed” deadline “is not grounds for equitable tolling”); Hartz v. United States, 419 Fed. 

Appx. 782, 783 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal of federal habeas 

petition where petitioner “simply missed the statute of limitations deadline by one day”); 

Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[w]e consistently have 

denied tolling even where the petition was only a few days late”); United States v. Locke, 

471 U.S. 84, 100–01 (1985) (“If 1-day late filings are acceptable, 10-day late filings 

might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of exceptions that would engulf the 

rule erected by the filing deadline . . . A filing deadline cannot be complied with, 

substantially or otherwise, by filing late––even by one day.”). 

 The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. The record is sufficiently developed and 

the Court does not find that an evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this 

matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Amended Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not 

find the procedural ruling debatable. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 24th day of February, 2017. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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