Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00411/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00411-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0201fl FLSA: Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VLADIMIR AMARAUT, on behalf of 

himself and all others similarly situated, 

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT 

COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-411-WQH-AHG

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

[ECF No. 64]

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Vladimir Amaraut, Katherine Almonte, Corbin Beltz, 

Kristopher Fox, Dylan McCollum, and Quinn Myers’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) Motion 

for Sanctions and Corrective Measures pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 

and 16 and Local Rule 83.1. ECF No. 64. This matter was referred to the undersigned by 

District Judge William Q. Hayes. ECF No. 86. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion. 

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I. BACKGROUND

On November 1, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Collective and Class 

Action Complaint against Defendant Sprint/United Management Company (“Defendant”). 

ECF No. 45-1. There, Plaintiffs brought a hybrid collective and class action: an “opt-in” 

collective action for FLSA claims and an “opt-out” state-specific class action for state law 

wage and hour claims. Id. The same day, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Conditionally 

Certify the Collective and Facilitate Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). ECF No. 46. 

On November 4, 2019, the Court issued an Order granting the Parties’ Joint Motion. ECF 

No. 48 (hereinafter, “Court’s November 4th Order”). On November 14, 2019, Plaintiffs 

filed their Notice of the Proposed Notice Administrator Selection. ECF No. 49. On 

November 18, 2019, the Court issued an Order appointing Heffler Claims Group for the 

purpose of facilitating notice to the conditionally-certified Collective. ECF No. 51.

On December 17, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Sanctions and 

Corrective Measures. ECF No. 64. Defendant filed a timely Opposition on 

December 27, 2019, and Plaintiffs filed a timely Reply on January 3, 2020. ECF Nos. 72, 

80. On January 23, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Declaration in support of their 

motion for sanctions (ECF No. 98), and on January 24, 2020, Defendant likewise filed its 

own Supplemental Declaration in support of its opposition (ECF No. 101). This order 

follows.

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

“[T]he district court has a broad array of sanctions options at its disposal,” including 

Rules 11 and 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s inherent authority. 

Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Fink v. Gomez, 239 

F.3d 989, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that sanctions may be imposed under the court’s 

inherent authority for “bad faith” actions by counsel, “which includes a broad range of 

willful improper conduct”)). 

By signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating a pleading or motion, an attorney 

has certified that it was not presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 

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unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. FED R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). If 

the Court determines that Rule 11 has been violated, the Court “may impose an appropriate 

sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the 

violation.” FED R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1). “[T]he central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless 

filings in district court.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990), 

superseded by statute on other grounds. Rule 11 “imposes a duty on attorneys to certify 

that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any papers filed 

with the court are well grounded in fact, legally tenable, and not interposed for any 

improper purpose.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Conduct in depositions, discovery meetings 

of counsel, oral representations at hearings, and behavior in prior proceedings do not fall 

within the ambit of Rule 11.” Christian, 286 F.3d at 1131. 

Rule 11 places “stringent notice and filing requirements on parties seeking 

sanctions.” Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F. 3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2005). Rule 11 contains a 

“safe harbor” provision, which requires a party seeking sanctions “to give the opposing 

party 21 days to withdraw or otherwise correct the offending paper” before filing the 

motion for sanctions. Id. at 678 (internal quotations omitted); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A).

The Ninth Circuit has warned that “[w]e enforce this safe harbor provision strictly.” 

Holgate, 425 F. 3d at 677; see Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710–11 (9th Cir. 1998); 

Davis v. San Diego Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, No. 18cv866-WQH-JLB, 2018 WL 3861910, at *4

(S.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2018) (denying motion for sanctions and explaining that “[t]he Court 

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforces the safe harbor provision strictly, and must 

reverse the award of sanctions when the challenging party fails to comply with the safe 

harbor provisions”) (internal quotations and brackets omitted).

Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that “[o]n 

motion or on its own, the court may issue any just orders, including those authorized by 

Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(vii), if a party or its attorney: . . . fails to obey a scheduling or other 

pretrial order.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1)(C). The court “must order” the party “to pay the 

reasonable expenses—including attorney’s fees—incurred because of any noncompliance 

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with this rule, unless the noncompliance was substantially justified or other circumstances 

make an award of expenses unjust.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(2). Rule 16(f) does not apply to 

all court orders; it applies only to a scheduling order or an order issued after a pretrial 

conference that “recit[es] the action taken [and] controls the course of the action.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 16(d); see Canon Solutions Am. v. Gungap, No. SACV 14-1990-JLS-RNBx, 2016 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190647, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016) (explaining that a “pretrial order” 

as defined in Rule 16 is “a specific type of order entered at the close of the pretrial 

conference that defin[es] and clarif[ies] the issues to be tried, limit[s] the trial to those 

contested issues, and limit[s] discovery”).

Under the Court’s inherent power, the court may levy sanctions for “‘willful 

disobedience of a court order’” or when a party has “‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, 

wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’” Fink, 239 F.3d at 991 (quoting Roadway Express, 

Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 776 (1980)); see also CivLR 83.1(a) (“Failure of counsel or of 

any party to comply with these rules, with the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure, 

or with any order of the court may be grounds for imposition by the court of any and all 

sanctions authorized by statute or rule or within the inherent power of the court, including, 

without limitation, dismissal of any actions, entry of default, finding of contempt, 

imposition of monetary sanctions or attorneys’ fees and costs, and other lesser sanctions”).

The Court’s “authority to impose sanctions under its inherent powers is broad, but not 

limitless.” Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008). The 

Court’s inherent power “is ‘both broader and narrower than other means of imposing 

sanctions.’ [] On the one hand, the inherent power ‘extends to a full range of litigation 

abuses.’ On the other, the litigant must have ‘engaged in bad faith or willful disobedience 

of a court’s order.’” Fink, 239 F.3d at 992 (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 

32, 46–47 (1991)). A “willful” violation of a court order “does not require proof of mental 

intent such as bad faith or an improper motive, but rather, it is enough that a party acted 

deliberately.” Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1035 (9th Cir. 2012).

“Before awarding [monetary] sanctions under its inherent powers, however, the court must 

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make an explicit finding that counsel’s conduct ‘constituted or was tantamount to bad 

faith.’” Primus Auto. Fin. Servs. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767). An explicit finding of bad faith “is especially critical 

when the court uses its inherent powers to engage in fee-shifting.” Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., 

115 F.3d at 648 (noting that a “court’s inherent power to impose attorney’s fees as a 

sanction [is limited] to cases in which a litigant has engaged in bad-faith conduct or willful 

disobedience of a court’s orders.”). Bad faith can be established “by ‘delaying or disrupting 

the litigation or hampering enforcement of a court order.’” Id. (quoting Hutto v. Finney,

437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978)). 

III. DISCUSSION

On November 4, 2019, the Court granted the Parties’ Joint Motion to Conditionally 

Certify the Collective and Facilitate Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). ECF No. 48.

Since the parties’ interpretations of the Court’s November 4th Order are at issue in the 

instant motion, the Court will set forth the relevant portions of the order here:

Within fourteen (14) days of this Order, Defendant shall provide the Notice 

Administrator with a computer-readable data file containing the names, job 

titles, last known mailing addresses, personal e-mail addresses on file with the 

company at sprint.com/careers (to the extent available), and social security 

numbers (last four digits only) of all Collective members . . . . This 

information is subject to the Protective Order entered in this action . . . .

. . .

The Court will appoint a third-party notice administrator (“Administrator”) to 

mail and email the proposed Notice and Opt-In Consent Form to all persons 

identified in Defendant’s list. Plaintiffs shall propose the Administrator to the 

Court within five (5) days of the date of this Order and shall meet and confer 

with Defendant regarding the selection before then . . . . The Notice and OptIn Consent Form shall be sent by the Administrator via: (1) first class mail, 

and (2) email . . . .

. . .

The Notice and Opt-In Consent Form will not be sent to any individuals who 

are otherwise within the proposed Collective definition set forth herein who 

(1) have opted into other FLSA actions encompassing the same claims and 

time period as in this case; and/or (2) have fully released their FLSA claims 

as part of class or collective action settlements (“excluded individuals”). 

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Defendant will identify to Plaintiffs each action in which excluded individuals 

have opted in and/or released claims, along with the number of excluded 

individuals per each lawsuit identified.

Id. at 5–6. 

A. Rule 11 Sanctions

Plaintiffs allege that, by certifying that “Defendant shall provide the Notice 

Administrator with . . . personal e-mail addresses on file with the company at 

sprint.com/careers (to the extent available)” in its Joint Motion for Conditional 

Certification (ECF No. 46 at 4), Defendant presented a motion to the Court for an improper 

purpose, in violation of Rule 11. ECF No. 80 at 11. However, the Court need not decide 

the merits of Plaintiffs’ allegations because Plaintiffs have failed to show that they 

complied with Rule 11’s safe harbor provision. See ECF No. 64-1 at 29 (certificate of 

service indicating that the motion was served on Defendant on the same day it was filed).

On November 22, 2019, when Defendant had not yet provided the contact 

information to the Notice Administrator, Plaintiffs’ counsel warned Defendant’s counsel: 

“[i]f Sprint commits any additional violations of [the Court’s November 4th] Order, 

Plaintiff will seek sanctions.” ECF No. 64-3 at 368. Plaintiffs’ counsel further warned: 

“based on your email, Plaintiff anticipates seeking monetary and corrective sanctions.” Id. 

On Tuesday, December 10, 2019, Plaintiffs’ counsel again emailed Defendant’s counsel: 

“We are finalizing our moving papers in seeking corrective and monetary 

sanctions for Sprint’s refusal to abide by the Parties’ stipulation on conditional 

certification and the Court’s Order thereon. We expect to file by no later than 

close of business on Friday. Before we do, we would like to offer you one 

final opportunity to resolve the matter informally and without the Court’s 

intervention. By no later than close of business on Thursday, December 12, 

2019, let us know whether you will agree to the following corrective 

measures: . . .” 

Id. at 402. These informal warnings do not satisfy Rule 11’s safe harbor provision. Barber, 

146 F.3d at 710–11 (reversing an award of sanctions and concluding that, although a 

defendant had given informal warnings to the plaintiffs threatening to seek Rule 11 

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sanctions, these warnings did not satisfy the strict requirement that a motion be served on 

the opposing party twenty-one days prior to filing); see also Wild Game NG, LLC v. Wong’s 

Int’l (USA) Corp., 329 Fed. App’x 131, 131 (9th Cir. 2009) (summarily reversing an award 

of sanctions because “[i]nformal warnings threatening to seek Rule 11 sanctions are not 

enough” to comply with Rule 11’s safe harbor provision); Heredia v. Allstate Indem. Co., 

No. 15cv1642-WQH-RBB, 2015 WL 6828682, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2015) (denying 

motion for sanctions filed on August 25 because, though the defendant’s counsel sent a 

letter on August 13 stating that if plaintiff didn’t act by August 18, defendant could move 

for Rule 11 sanctions, the twelve-day notice via informal letter did not meet the “strict” 21-

day safe harbor service requirement).

Thus, regardless of whether Defendant filed any paper with the Court that was 

baseless or filed for an improper purpose, Rule 11 sanctions do not apply. See, e.g., 

Holgate, 425 F. 3d at 677 (reversing an award of sanctions because the movant failed to 

comply with the safe harbor provision, even though the respondent’s filing was frivolous 

and otherwise sanctionable); cf. Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (reversing an award of sanctions because the movant failed to comply with the 

safe harbor provision, and the fact that three months passed between the motion and the 

Court’s Order was insufficient to provide the notice and opportunity to withdraw that Rule 

11 requires). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions is DENIED.

B. Rule 16 Sanctions

Plaintiffs allege that Rule 16 sanctions are warranted because Defendant violated the 

Court’s November 4th Order, which conditionally certified the collective. ECF No. 48.

That Order was issued in response to the Parties’ Joint Motion to Conditionally Certify the 

Collective and Facilitate Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). See ECF Nos. 46, 48. 

Thus, it is not a scheduling order or pretrial order. See Canon Solutions Am., 2016 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 190647, at *11 (explaining that a “pretrial order” as defined in Rule 16 is “a 

specific type of order entered at the close of the pretrial conference”). Accordingly, Rule 

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16 does not apply and Plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 16 sanctions is DENIED. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 16(d) (applying to only scheduling orders or pretrial orders). 

C. Inherent Authority to Issue Sanctions

Plaintiffs requests that the Court utilize its inherent authority to issue sanctions 

because Defendants failed to comply with the Court’s November 4th Order in two ways: 

(1) Defendants failed to comply with the timing requirements of the order in not producing 

personal email addresses to the Notice Administrator by November 18, 2019; and (2) 

Defendants failed to comply with the substantive requirements of the order and did not 

produce the personal email addresses “to the extent available.” The Court will address these 

in turn. 

1. Failure to Comply with Timing Requirements of Court Order

Defendant produced personal email addresses to the Notice Administrator on 

December 6, 2019. ECF No. 72 at 17. Plaintiffs argue that this action alone warrants 

sanctions because the email addresses were to be produced to the Notice Administrator by 

November 18, 2019. ECF No. 64-1 at 17–18. The Court disagrees.

Both Plaintiffs and Defendant failed to comply with the Court’s November 4th 

Order. The first step in the notice-dissemination process, after the Court issued its 

November 4th Order, was for Plaintiffs to meet and confer with Defendant regarding 

selection of the notice administrator and to propose the notice administrator to the Court 

by November 9, 2019. ECF No. 48 at 6. Plaintiffs failed to comply. Plaintiffs did not 

propose the notice administrator to the Court until November 14, 2019. ECF No. 49. With 

no opposition from Defendant, the Court approved Heffler Claims Group as notice 

administrator on November 18, 2019 (ECF No. 51), the same day the Defendant was 

required to provide personal email addresses of Collective members, among other contact 

information, to the Notice Administrator. ECF No. 48 at 5. Defendant failed to comply, 

and did not provide any contact information to the Notice Administrator until 

December 4, 2019, and did not provide email addresses until December 6, 2019. ECF 

No. 72 at 17.

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Defendant argues that it did not violate the Court’s November 4th Order. Defendant 

contends that the Court’s November 4th Order required Defendants to produce the contact 

information to the Notice Administrator within fourteen days after two conditions 

precedent had been satisfied: (1) appointment of the Notice Administrator, and (2) entry of 

a protective order. ECF No. 72 at 13–17. Defendants argue that, since the Notice 

Administrator was appointed on November 18, 2020 (ECF No. 51), and the protective 

order was entered on November 26, 2019 (ECF No. 54), its production of contact 

information on December 6, 2019, ten days after the protective order was entered, was well 

within the Court’s deadline.1 ECF No. 72 at 15–17. The Court disagrees. The issuance of 

a protective order was not a precondition to Defendant providing the Notice Administrator 

with the Collective data. ECF No. 48 at 5 (implementing requirements of how, not when,

the Collective data would be used, i.e., pursuant to a protective order and used only by the 

Notice Administrator for dissemination of notice).

 

1 The Court notes that Defendant has held inconsistent positions on this issue. In a 

November 20, 2019 email to Plaintiffs’ counsel, Defendant’s counsel stated: 

Based on the Joint Motion [for conditional certification] the parties filed, it 

was our understanding that the 14‐days to produce the collective list would be 

triggered from the day the Court appoints an Order assigning the Notice 

Administrator. The term “Order” was not defined, and due to the structure of 

the paragraphs, we scheduled our timeline based on this understanding. This 

logically makes sense, as we can’t produce a collective list to a Notice 

Administrator if there is no Notice Administrator assigned. Accordingly, we 

are operating on a production deadline of December 2, 2019 (e.g., 14 days 

from the November 18 order date).

ECF No. 64-3 at 369 (emphasis added). Defendant later noted that it “will need [a 

protective order] filed and granted by the Court before anything is produced.” Id. at 370. 

That protective order was entered on November 26, 2019, well before their envisioned 

deadline. See ECF No. 54.

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However, based on Plaintiffs’ delay in proposing the notice administrator to the 

Court, and Defendant’s production of the Collective data shortly after the protective order 

was in place, the Court cannot determine that Defendant acted with “bad faith” in providing 

the Collective data to the Notice Administrator on December 4 and 6, 2019. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions regarding Defendant’s delayed production of personal 

email addresses to the Notice Administrator is DENIED.

2. Failure to Comply with Substantive Requirements of Court Order

By ordering Defendant2to produce personal email addresses “to the extent 

available,” the Court required Defendant to produce personal email addresses in its 

possession, custody, or control, not just those that were readily accessible. To have 

possession, custody, or control does not require actual possession, custody, or control. See

TetraVue, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 14cv2021-W-BLM, 2017 WL 

1008788, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2017); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 619–

20 (N.D. Cal. 1995). “Property is deemed within a party’s possession, custody, or control 

if the party has . . . the legal right to obtain the property on demand.” Stone v. Vasquez, No. 

05cv1377-JAT, 2009 WL 2581338, at *1–*2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2009) (quoting Thomas 

v. Hickman, No. 06cv215-AWI-SMS, 2007 WL 4302974, at *13–*14 (E.D. Cal. 2007)); 

see United States v. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1450, 

1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Control is defined as the legal right to obtain documents on 

demand”); Goolsby v. County of San Diego, No. 17cv564-WQH-NLS, 2019 WL 3891128, 

 

2 The Court notes that in its November 4th Order, it ordered production of personal email 

addresses “to the extent available” to Defendant, not to Defendant’s counsel. ECF No. 48. 

Thus, any argument that personal email addresses were unavailable because telephone 

numbers were not provided to Defendant’s counsel will not be considered. See, e.g., ECF 

No. 101 at 2 (representing that “[p]rior to the production of telephone numbers [on January 

16, 2020, in response to the Court’s order granting Plaintiffs’ motion to compel], 

Defendant’s counsel only had employee ID numbers, names, and last known addresses 

from the Collective List to match personal emails from the sprint.com/career repository.”) 

(emphasis added).

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at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2019) (same). For example, “[a] party may be ordered to produce 

a document in the possession of a non-party entity if that party has a legal right to obtain 

the document or has control over the entity who is in possession of the document.” 

TetraVue, Inc., 2017 WL 1008788, at *2 (quoting Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 619–20). 

Moreover, “the fact that Defendant may have to expend time and energy to retrieve 

the documents does not make the documents inaccessible or outside of Defendant’s 

control.” Nutrition Distrib. LLC v. PEP Research, LLC, No. 16cv2328-WQH-BLM, 2018 

WL 1245052, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018). A party “is under an affirmative duty to seek 

that information reasonably available to [it] from [its] employees, agents, or others subject 

to [its] control.” A. Farber & Ptnrs., Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 189 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

By December 6, 2019, Defendant provided the Notice Administrator personal email 

addresses for 7,983 of the over 33,000 Collective members. ECF No. 98 at 3. Before the 

Parties filed the Joint Motion to Conditionally Certify the Collective and Facilitate Notice 

(ECF No. 46), counsel for Plaintiffs made clear that notice by either email or text message 

is “non-negotiable.” ECF No. 64-3 at 243 (stating that “[i]f there are email addresses for 

the Collective, we will agree to mail and email notice, and forego text message notice. If 

there are not sufficient email addresses for the Collective as you say, or for some reason 

Sprint will have difficulty obtaining this information, then notice must go out by mail and 

text message. But we require either text or email notice”). Counsel for Defendant 

confirmed “that [Defendant] can obtain personal emails from sprint.com/careers 

repository,”3and Defendant would “agree to produce those e-mails to the Notice 

 

3 The Court notes that Defendant originally held a hardline position, now proven false, that 

it did not have personal email addresses. On October 10, 2019, in negotiations over 

conditional certification, counsel for Defendant told counsel for Plaintiffs that “Sprint does 

not ask for or have personal e-mail addresses.” ECF No. 64-3 at 143. On October 17, 2019, 

counsel for Plaintiffs responded: “[w]e know this is incorrect. Sprint’s standard 

employment application, available on Sprint’s main webpage, asks for [personal email 

addresses].” Id. at 156. In response, counsel for Defendant reiterated that, “[b]ased on our 

understanding, Sprint does not keep track of employee’s personal e‐mail addresses.” Id. at 

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Administrator.” Id. On December 3, 2019, however, counsel for Defendant told counsel 

for Plaintiffs that Defendant would likely be able to produce personal email addresses for 

a “severely limited” number of Collective members, for reasons including that “[t]he 

sorting process has proven to be very cumbersome, as there is no unique identifier to match 

the applicant with the putative collective member[.]” Id. at 391. Defendant represents that, 

at the time of the November 4th Order, Defendant’s counsel only had access to employee 

ID numbers, names, and last known addresses from the Collective List. ECF No. 101 at 2. 

Since using names and last known addresses did not yield “certainty” in matching personal 

email addresses to the appropriate individual, the “employee IDs were the only unique 

identifier in both datasets that guaranteed the correct email address was being matched to 

the appropriate individual.” ECF No. 101 at 3. Thus, in December 2019, Defendant’s data 

analytics team prepared the personal email list for the Notice Administrator pursuant to the 

Court’s November 4th Order, using employee ID numbers to match personal emails from 

the sprint.com/careers repository. Id. at 2–3.

However, there was another way that Defendant could have matched the applicant 

with the putative collective member: using employee ID numbers and telephone numbers. 

Defendant represents that, in January 2020, by using telephone numbers in addition to 

employee ID numbers, it was able to match an additional 18,962 personal email addresses. 

Id. at 3. Defendant contends that the telephone numbers had not been pulled in December 

because “they were not required to be provided to the Notice Administrator,” and the 

corresponding personal email addresses found using those telephone numbers were 

therefore “not available.” Id. at 2–3. The reason these telephone numbers were pulled in 

 

218. However, a few days later, “[a]fter additional scrutiny regarding the issue, Sprint 

confirmed that it can obtain personal emails from sprint.com/careers repository. We will 

agree to produce those e‐mails to the Notice Administrator.” Id. at 214. As discussed 

below, this conduct, combined with its representations regarding its production of 26,945 

personal email addresses in compliance with the Court’s order granting Plaintiff’s motion 

to compel, demonstrates a desire to avoid or delay production of personal email addresses.

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January was because the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel and ordered Defendant 

to produce them. Id. at 2; ECF No. 91.

The Court finds that the additional personal email addresses were, in fact, available 

to Defendant. First, in ordering Defendant to produce personal email addresses to the 

Notice Administrator “to the extent available,” the Court ordered Defendant to make a 

reasonable inquiry to locate information in its possession, custody, or control. See A. 

Farber & Ptnrs., Inc., 234 F.R.D. at 189 (concluding that the defendant had not made a 

reasonable inquiry and therefore had not produced all documents in his possession, 

custody, or control). It is clear that Defendant did not make a reasonable inquiry. The Court 

ordered Defendant to provide the Notice Administrator with personal email addresses 

within fourteen days. ECF No. 48. However, it only took two days to pull telephone 

numbers for the entire Collective List, and another four days to use those telephone 

numbers to match personal email addresses. ECF No. 101 at 2–3 (pulling telephone 

numbers on January 16, 2020 after being ordered to on January 14, 2020, and matching 

email addresses on January 21, 2020 after giving those telephone numbers to the data 

analytics group on January 17, 2020). Therefore, it only took six days, less than half of the 

fourteen days allowed by the Court, to match the personal email addresses. This shows that 

the personal email addresses were reasonably accessible, relatively easy to locate, and fell 

within the Court’s “to the extent available” caveat. 

Second, Defendant’s argument that these additional personal email addresses were 

“newly acquired” is unavailing. Because the telephone numbers had not been pulled as of 

December 2019,4 does not make the matching personal email addresses unavailable. 

 

4 Plaintiffs propounded discovery requests for, among other things, telephone numbers on 

June 25, 2019. ECF No. 69-1 at 3. In its order compelling production, finding that 

Defendant had no legal basis to have withheld production, the Court stated that Defendant’s 

failure to demonstrate how Williams was distinguishable from this case “le[ft] the Court 

with the distinct impression that Defendant’s objection was based on a desire to delay 

production, and not a good faith belief or argument that Williams can in fact be 

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Nutrition Distrib., 2018 WL 1245052, at *6 (“the fact that Defendant may have to expend 

time and energy to retrieve the documents does not make the documents inaccessible or 

outside of Defendant’s control”). Even had the Court not ordered Defendant to produce the 

telephone numbers to Plaintiffs in its order granting Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, the 

telephone numbers (and by proxy, the personal email addresses) were still available, and 

were within Defendant’s possession, custody, or control. See Int'l Union of Petroleum &

Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d at 1452 (“Control is defined as the legal right to obtain 

documents on demand.”). Here, Defendant’s January 21, 2020 production of 26,945 

personal email addresses on from members of the Collective shows that these email 

addresses were in its control. See, e.g., Nutrition Distrib., 2018 WL 1245052, at *6

(concluding that the defendant’s representation that it was “engaged in the process of 

obtaining additional information it can from third parties” indicated “that there are 

responsive documents over which Defendant has control or legal right to access”). Though, 

at that time, Defendant had not been ordered to provide telephone numbers to the Notice 

Administrator, it could have easily used them to provide the required email addresses. 

Here, by failing to make a reasonable inquiry to find personal email addresses clearly 

within its possession, custody, and control, Defendant failed to comply with that portion 

of the Order. The next point in the Court’s analysis is whether Defendant’s failure is 

sanctionable.

The “court has the inherent power to sanction for: (1) willful violation of a court 

order; or (2) bad faith. A determination that a party was willfully disobedient is different 

from a finding that a party acted in bad faith. Either supports the imposition of sanctions.”

Evon, 688 F.3d at 1035.

 

distinguished.” ECF No. 91 at 12, 15 n.5. Additionally, the Court notes that using the

telephone numbers to obtain personal email addresses does not require production of those 

telephone numbers to Plaintiffs or the Notice Administrator.

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Defendant cites Korff v. City of Phoenix for the proposition that “sanctions are 

inappropriate where—as here—a party’s actions were based on a reasonable interpretation 

of a court order.”5 ECF No. 72 at 26 (citing Korff v. City of Phoenix, No. 13cv2317-PHXESW, 2016 WL 1242523, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2016)). There, a party misinterpreted 

the court’s scheduling order, which allowed for updating and supplementing expert reports, 

and attempted to secure additional discovery from a non-party after the deadline to conduct 

discovery had passed. Id. The Court gave the party “the benefit of the doubt as to her 

interpretation of the Court’s Order[,]” and did not award attorney fees sanctions. Id. 

However, Korff is distinguishable from the case at bar and thus is not persuasive to this 

Court. First, and most importantly, the sanctions at issue in Korff were based on Rule 16, 

the failure to comply with a scheduling order, and not the Court’s inherent authority, as is 

the case here. Id. at *3–*4. Second, though Defendant’s late production may have been

based on a reasonable interpretation of the Court’s November 4th Order, its failure to 

produce personal email addresses that were clearly available to Defendant via reasonable 

inquiry was not.

Defendant also cites Gomez v. Vernon for the proposition that the Court’s “inherent 

authority applies only in cases of ‘willful disobedience of a court order or when the losing 

 

5 Similarly, Defendant cites SolarCity v. Doria for the proposition that “denying sanctions 

where ‘Plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant Doria’s 

disclosure was not based on a good faith interpretation of the Protective Order.’” ECF No. 

72 at 26 (quoting SolarCity Corp. v. Doria, No. 16cv3085-JAH-RBB, 2018 WL 4204024, 

at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2018)) (emphasis added). Though terminating sanctions, Rule 11, 

and Rule 30 sanctions were denied in that case, they were not denied because of the 

defendant’s good faith interpretation of a protective order. SolarCity Corp., 2018 WL 

4204024, at *2–*6, *9–*10, *13. The quotation used by Defendant was instead taken from 

the court’s denial to find the defendant in contempt of court, which requires satisfying three 

elements: (1) the contemnor violated a court order, (2) the contemnor did not substantially 

comply with the order, and (3) the contemnor’s conduct was not the product of a good faith 

or reasonable interpretation of the violated order. Id. at *9. As with Korff, the sanctions at 

issue in SolarCity are distinguishable from the sanctions based on the Court’s inherent 

authority in the instant case, and thus SolarCity is not persuasive to this Court.

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party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, as well as for 

willful abuse of the judicial processes.’” ECF No. 72 at 26 (quoting Gomez v. Vernon, 255 

F.3d 1118, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added). However, this is not entirely 

correct. In Gomez, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sanctions imposed by the district court 

and went on to explain “that inherent-power sanctions [must] be preceded by a finding of 

bad faith, or conduct tantamount to bad faith. [] Under this standard, although recklessness, 

of itself, does not justify the imposition of sanctions, sanctions are available when 

recklessness is ‘combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or 

an improper purpose.’ [] Sanctions, then, are justified ‘when a party acts for an improper 

purpose—even if the act consists of making a truthful statement or a non-frivolous 

argument or objection.’” Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1134 (quoting Fink, 239 F.3d at 992–94). 

Here, the Court finds that, in blatantly failing to comply with the Court’s November 4th 

Order, Defendant acted recklessly. Further, the record indicates that Defendant’s failure to 

make a reasonable inquiry and provide personal email addresses that were within its 

possession and control was done for an improper purpose: to delay proceedings and gain a 

tactical advantage over Plaintiffs with regard to the Navarette Settlement. For example, 

Defendant’s misrepresentations regarding ability to produce personal email addresses (see

supra n.3), combined with its representations regarding its production of 26,945 personal 

email addresses in compliance with the Court’s January order granting Plaintiff’s motion 

to compel, demonstrates a desire to avoid or delay production of personal email addresses. 

The Court finds that Defendant’s reckless disregard for the Court’s Order and improper 

purpose are tantamount to bad faith. Therefore, sanctions are appropriate. 

Alternatively, even if the Court had not found that Defendant’s actions were 

tantamount to bad faith, sanctions would still be appropriate because Defendant violated 

the Court’s November 4th Order willfully. “[I]t is clear that a ‘willful’ violation of a court 

order does not require proof of mental intent such as bad faith or an improper motive, but 

rather, it is enough that a party acted deliberately.” Evon, 688 F.3d at 1035 (finding that 

sanctions were appropriate because the party acted willfully: “Dahlberg knew that the 

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protective order was in place . . . Dahlberg, himself, sought the protective order . . . 

Dahlberg characterizes the failure to comply with the sanctions order as ‘inadvertent’ but 

what he really means is that on the day of the filing, he realized that compliance with the 

protective order would cause him additional time and work, and he chose not to comply”).

Here, as in Evon, Defendant negotiated with Plaintiffs to craft their joint motion for 

conditional certification and thus the terms were of its own making. However, when faced 

with difficulty, Defendant deliberately chose not to provide all the personal email addresses 

in its possession, custody, or control by using telephone numbers it had access to. 

Further, it is clear from the record that Plaintiffs held a hardline position that either 

personal email notice or text message notice was mandatory, and in accepting Defendant’s 

offer of providing personal email addresses, it would forgo requesting text message notice.

ECF No. 80 at 5. While negotiating the terms of the joint motion for conditional 

certification, Defendant confirmed that it could obtain personal email addresses, so 

Plaintiff withdrew their request for text message notice. ECF No. 64-3 at 214 (on October 

23, 2019, Defendant’s counsel represented that, “[a]fter additional scrutiny regarding the 

issue, Sprint confirmed that it can obtain personal emails from sprint.com/careers 

repository. We will agree to produce those e‐mails to the Notice Administrator”). However, 

after the Court conditionally certified the Collective based upon the parties’ negotiated 

joint motion, Defendant willfully tried to delay notice dissemination by withholding 

personal email addresses, which would force notice to be disseminated only by U.S. Mail. 

For example, on December 3, 2019, counsel for Defendant explained to counsel for 

Plaintiffs that the reason Defendant would only be able to produce personal email addresses 

for a “severely limited” number of Collective members was because “there is no unique 

identifier to match the applicant with the putative collective member[.]” ECF No. 64-3 at 

391; see also ECF No. 64-3 at 377 (on November 20, 2019, Defendant’s counsel also 

represented that “[d]ue to the repository not assigning a unique identifier to applicants 

when they apply for a position, Sprint cannot use an EE ID# [] to pull personal e‐mails”).

This representation was false: there were at least two ways to match personal email 

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addresses with certainty. First, Defendant’s counsel’s own declaration to the Court states 

that “employee IDs were the only unique identifier in both datasets that guaranteed the 

correct e-mail address was being matched to the appropriate individual.” ECF No. 101 at 

3. Second, Defendant’s counsel also declared that “by using both employee IDs and 

telephone numbers, Defendant’s counsel was able to match . . . personal e-mails with 

certainty.” Id. at 3. The Court finds that Defendant’s behavior was willful, and thus 

sanctionable, but also as noted above, its actions were for an improper purpose of delaying 

notice. 

Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions regarding Defendant’s failure to 

produce personal email addresses “to the extent available” is GRANTED.

3. Sanctions and Corrective Measures

Since the Court has deemed that sanctions are appropriate regarding Defendant’s 

willful defiance of a Court Order and failure to produce personal email addresses “to the 

extent available,” the Court will next address the type of sanctions to be imposed. “Under 

their inherent authority, courts have broad discretion to ‘fashion an appropriate sanction 

for conduct which abuses the judicial process.’” Voskanyan v. L.A. Sheriffs Dep’t, No. 

15cv62559-MWF-KES, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108106, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2019) 

(quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45). Though “it is important for courts to have 

sufficient tools to control the behavior of litigants[,] . . . ‘[b]ecause inherent powers are 

shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and 

discretion.’” Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764).

Therefore, the Court will narrowly tailor its corrective measures to the Defendant’s 

sanctionable conduct. 

Defendants argue that corrective or coercive measures are unnecessary. ECF No. 72 

at 27. Plaintiffs request the Court order that (1) Defendant immediately provide the Notice 

Administrator with all personal email addresses in its possession; (2) Defendant 

immediately provide the notice administrator with work email addresses for current 

employees for whom Defendant does not have personal email addresses; (3) all Collective 

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members receive text message notice, or that notice be given via text message to all 

individuals that are not current employees and for whom Defendant does not have personal 

email addresses; (4) the claims of Collective members are tolled from the date full notice 

was to be disseminated, on November 25, 2019, until the date that email and/or text notice 

is completed; (5) the opt-in period for Collective members does not begin until email and/or 

text notice is completed; (6) Defendant is deemed to have waived any argument that any 

Collective members should be excluded from receiving notice as a result of a prior 

settlement and must immediately provide the notice administrator with contact information 

for the 2,121 excluded individuals; (7) Defendant bear any additional costs of notice 

administration authorized by the Court; and (8) monetary sanctions be imposed against 

Defendant, comprised of attorney fees and costs. ECF No. 64-1 at 27–28. The Court will 

address these in turn.

a. Plaintiffs’ Request that Defendant Immediately Provide the Notice 

Administrator with all Personal Email Addresses in its Possession

For the reasons set forth above, to facilitate complete compliance with the Court’s 

November 4th Order, the Court ORDERS Defendant to produce all personal email 

addresses within its possession, custody, or control (including, but not limited to, the 

26,945 personal email addresses produced to Plaintiff pursuant to the Court’s order 

granting Plaintiffs’ motion to compel) to the Notice Administrator by April 6, 2020. In 

accordance with the Court’s November 4th Order, the Notice and Opt-In Consent Form 

shall be sent by the Notice Administrator via these personal email addresses “within seven 

(7) days of receipt of the [contact information], or as soon thereafter as practicable. The 

Notice shall provide a website address where persons identified in Defendant’s list may 

obtain an electronic version of the Notice and submit an electronic version of the Opt-In 

Consent Form.” ECF No. 48 at 6.

/ /

/ /

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b. Plaintiffs’ Request that Defendant Immediately Provide the Notice 

Administrator with Work Email Addresses for Current Employees 

for whom Defendant does not have Personal Email Addresses

On December 20, 2019, days after the instant motion was filed, Defendant produced 

work email addresses for current employees within the Collective to the Notice

Administrator. ECF No. 80 at 6. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request is DENIED AS MOOT. 

On December 30, 2019, the Notice Administrator disseminated notice to 32,976 

work email addresses provided by Defendant. ECF No. 98 at 4. However, of those 

produced, 8,408 were delivered, while 24,568 were undeliverable. Id. Currently, Defendant 

has produced 26,945 personal email addresses to Plaintiffs out of the 35,000-member

Collective, excluding 2,121. ECF No. 98 at 4; ECF No. 64-1 at 17. This leaves 

approximately 5,934 Collective members for whom notice will potentially only be 

achieved through U.S. Mail. Plaintiff failed to provide information with regard to whether 

the 8,408 operating work email addresses gave notice to the 5,934 potentially-left-out 

Collective members. Without more, the Court declines to grant this corrective measure, 

and instead denies it as moot without prejudice.

c. Plaintiffs’ Request that all Collective Members Receive Text Message 

Notice, or that Notice be Given via Text Message to All Individuals 

that are not Current Employees and for whom Defendant does not 

have Personal Email Addresses

“The FLSA requires the Court to provide potential class members ‘accurate and 

timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective action, so that they can make 

informed decisions about whether to participate[,]’” using “the best notice practicable 

under the circumstances.” Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 474, 492

(E.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989)); 

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). “The Court has authority and discretion to monitor the 

preparation and distribution of the notice[.]” Cuevas v. ConAm Mgmt. Corp., No. 

18cv1189-GPC-LL, 2019 WL 5320544, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2019) (quoting 

Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 493 U.S. at 172).

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“Now, email [is] regularly utilized by the masses, and may, in fact, be more reliable 

than mailing addresses, particularly for former employees who may have moved 

residences.” Knight v. Concentrix Corp., No. 18cv7101-KAW, 2019 WL 3503052, at *5

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019). Accordingly, courts are increasingly requiring an alternative 

method of notice to U.S. Mail. Id. at *5–*6 (ordering that notice “be disseminated using 

both U.S. Mail and e-mail” and noting call center employees’ transient nature); Deatrick 

v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, No. 13cv5016-JST, 2014 WL 5358723, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

20, 2014) (“The Court is persuaded that notice by mail, including the issuance of reminder 

postcards and telephone numbers to facilitate tracing potential class members if mailings 

are returned as undeliverable, is the most appropriate method to effectuate notice in this 

case”); Benedict v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 13cv1119-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

18594, at *60, *63 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014) (ordering that notice be disseminated “via 

first-class mail and email,” rejecting the defendant’s argument that “anyone who wanted 

to join or be contacted could have done so or could do so in response to a mailed notice”).

However, not all courts require email or alternative notice. See, e.g., Shaia v. Harvest 

Mgmt. Sub LLC, 306 F.R.D. 268, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (ordering that notice be provided 

by U.S. Mail, and not via email, because “mailing addresses will provide the best means 

of contact”); Hart v. U.S. Bank NA, No. CV 12-2471-PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 5965637, at *6

(D. Ariz. Nov. 8, 2013) (“the Court sees no reason why sending notice exclusively via U.S. 

mail (and not also by email) would not be appropriate in this case. . . . Here, the best 

practicable notice is first class mail. The Court sees no reason why such notice is 

inadequate. . . . As a result, the Court does not authorize Plaintiff to send notice via email, 

as Plaintiff requests”). 

In light of the Court’s order above that at least 18,962 more Collective members be 

notified via their personal email address (26,945 in total), the Court finds that sending text 

messages to all Collective members would be duplicative and not narrowly tailored. The 

standard is to provide “the best notice practicable under the circumstances,” and Plaintiff 

does not argue that text messages are better than personal emails, in fact, Plaintiffs 

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considered them interchangeable. See, e.g., ECF No. 64-3 at 345 (stating that “[i]f Sprint 

agrees to notice by e‐mail, we will not seek notice by text message”). Thus, Plaintiff’s 

request all Collective members receive text message notice is DENIED.

The parties extensively negotiated their joint motion for conditional certification. 

See ECF No. 64-3. Though email or text message notice was a “non-negotiable” for 

Plaintiffs, they did not include any backups or alternatives in the joint motion should the 

personal email addresses not be available. See e.g., Deatrick, 2014 WL 5358723, at *5

(fashioning notice to be “by mail, including the issuance of reminder postcards and 

telephone numbers to facilitate tracing potential class members if mailings are returned as 

undeliverable”). However, the Court appreciates Plaintiffs’ argument that “it would not 

[have] ma[d]e the concessions it made with Defendant in the stipulation to conditional 

certification if notice would not be given via either personal email or text message.” ECF 

No. 64-1 at 21–22; see ECF No. 64-3 at 243 (stating that “[i]f there are email addresses for 

the Collective, we will agree to mail and email notice, and forego text message notice. If 

there are not sufficient email addresses for the Collective as you say, or for some reason 

Sprint will have difficulty obtaining this information, then notice must go out by mail and 

text message. But we require either text or email notice”). Given Defendant’s evasive 

tactics regarding email notice (see, e.g., ECF No. 64-3 at 143, 156, 214, 218) and willful 

behavior in withholding personal email addresses within its possession, custody, and 

control, Plaintiffs’ request that notice be given via text message to all individuals that are 

not current employees and for whom Defendant does not have personal email addresses is 

GRANTED. The Court ORDERS Defendant to produce phone numbers of Collective 

members who are both (1) not current employees and (2) for whom Defendant does not 

have personal email addresses, to the Notice Administrator by April 6, 2020. In accordance 

with the Court’s November 4th Order, the Notice and Opt-In Consent Form shall be sent 

by the Notice Administrator via text message to these phone numbers “within seven (7) 

days of receipt of the [contact information]. The Notice shall provide a website address 

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where persons identified in Defendant’s list may obtain an electronic version of the Notice 

and submit an electronic version of the Opt-In Consent Form.” ECF No. 48 at 6.

d. Plaintiffs’ Request that the Claims of Collective Members are tolled 

from the Date Full Notice was to be Disseminated, on November 25, 

2019, until the Date that Email and/or Text Notice is Completed

The FLSA provides for a two-year statute of limitations for FLSA violations, 

“except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within 

three years after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). In a FLSA collective 

action, statute of limitations runs until a valid consent is filed. 29 U.S.C. § 256(b).

“Equitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is prevented from asserting a claim by 

wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, or when extraordinary circumstances 

beyond the plaintiffs control made it impossible to file a claim on time.” Stoll v. Runyon, 

165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999). “Equitable tolling is extended sparingly[.]” Adams v. 

Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 530, 542 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of 

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). District courts are split on the issue of whether, 

in the context of a FLSA collective-action, a defendant’s refusal to provide contact 

information for potential plaintiffs is a sufficient reason to equitably toll the statute of 

limitations. Compare, e.g., Adedapoidle-Tyehimba v. Crunch, LLC, No. 13-cv-00225-

WHO, 2013 WL 4082137, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (finding that defendants’ refusal 

to provide contact information for potential plaintiffs was not a basis for equitably tolling 

the statute of limitations) with Ribot v. Farmers Ins. Group, No. CV 11-02404-DDPFMOx, 2013 WL 3778784, at *16–*17 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2013) (finding equitable tolling 

appropriate where the defendant refused to provide potential plaintiffs’ contact 

information). “Applying equitable tolling . . . counters the advantage defendants would 

otherwise gain by withholding potential plaintiffs’ contact information until the last 

possible moment. Faultless potential plaintiffs should not be deprived of their legal rights 

on the basis of a defendant’s delay, calculated or otherwise.” Ribot, 2013 WL 3778784, at 

*17 (quoting Adams, 242 F.R.D. at 543). 

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“[T]hose courts that find equitable tolling is appropriate usually rely on the fact that 

potential plaintiffs, through no fault of their own, did not receive notice of the pending 

action as a result of the defendant’s refusal to provide contact information.” Margulies v.

Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., No. 13cv475-PK, 2013 WL 5593040, at *17 (D. 

Or. Oct. 10, 2013). Here, though the majority of potential plaintiffs, through no fault of 

their own, did not receive notice via their personal email addresses, they still received 

notice via U.S. Mail, which was disseminated in December 2019. Thus, the justifications 

that “[t]he potential plaintiffs in this case have yet to receive notice of the action due to 

defendant’s refusal to supply potential plaintiffs’ contact information” do not apply here. 

See Adams, 242 F.R.D. at 543. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request to toll 

the statute of limitations until email or text notice is completed.

e. Plaintiffs’ Request that the Opt-In Period for Collective Members 

does not Begin until Email and/or Text Notice is Completed

In its November 4th Order, the Court ordered that “[e]ligible persons shall be given 

sixty (60) days from the date on which the Notice and Opt-In Consent Form is sent via first 

class mail in which to return their Opt-In Consent Form.” ECF No. 48 at 6. Notice was 

disseminated to the Collective by mail on December 13, 2019. Thus, the 60-day deadline 

has since passed. 

Since the Court is ordering that Defendant provide the Notice Administrator with all

personal email addresses within its possession, custody, or control, and phone numbers of 

Collective members who are not current employees and for whom Defendant does not have 

personal email addresses, in the interests of justice, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request 

and extends the Opt-In Period, but only for those Collective members whose personal 

email addresses or phone numbers were produced to the Notice Administrator pursuant to 

this Order. Given the possibility they were already served via U.S. Mail, the Court 

ORDERS that eligible persons shall be given sixty (60) days from the date on which the 

Notice and Opt-In Consent Form is sent via email or text in which to return their Opt-In 

Consent Form. 

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f. Plaintiffs’ Requests that Defendant is Deemed to have Waived Any 

Argument that Any Collective Members should be Excluded from 

Receiving Notice as a Result of a Prior Settlement and Must 

Immediately Provide the Notice Administrator with Contact 

Information for the 2,121 Excluded Individuals

In its November 4th Order, the Court required that notice would not be disseminated 

to certain members of the collective that opted into certain FLSA actions or fully released 

their FLSA claims. ECF No. 48 at 6. The Court ordered Defendant to “identify to Plaintiffs 

each action in which excluded individuals have opted in and/or released claims, along with 

the number of excluded individuals per each lawsuit identified.” ECF No. 48 at 6. Plaintiffs 

concede that Defendant complied with this order by providing Plaintiffs with a list of the 

names of 2,121 individuals that it excluded from the Collective roster, a list identifying the 

actions the individuals opted into or fully released their claims, and the number of 

individuals in each lawsuit. ECF No. 64-1 at 17, 17 n.1. Upon an in camera review of the 

spreadsheet sent by Defendant, and a review of the record, the Court confirms that 

Defendant adhered to the procedural requirements of the Court’s November 4th Order. See

Email to Chambers, March 9, 2020; ECF No. 64-3 at 381 (on December 4, 2019, 

Defendant’s counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel the total number of excluded individuals 

from four lawsuits and eleven individual settlements, including case name, court, and case 

number); ECF No. 72 at 23–24.

However, Plaintiffs’ main contention is that Defendant did not adhere to the 

substantive requirements of the Court’s order, and improperly excluded “a vast majority” 

of the individuals listed. ECF No. 64-1 at 17 n.1. Plaintiffs surmise that Defendant excluded 

every individual who may have released a portion of their claims, as opposed to their entire 

claims. Id. Notably, Defendant does not dispute whether it properly or improperly excluded 

individuals, and instead focuses its argument on whether its email to Plaintiffs complied 

with the Court’s November 4th Order. ECF No. 72 at 24. However, Defendant does state

that it “is still waiting to meet and confer on this issue, so that the Parties could determine 

the logistics of relaying the information[.]” Id.

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Based on the contentions of both parties, the Court cannot determine whether 

Defendant complied with the substantive requirements of the Court’s November 4th Order. 

ECF No. 48 at 6 (requiring that notice would not be disseminated to certain members of 

the collective that opted into certain FLSA actions or fully released their FLSA claims). 

However, upon a review of the four lawsuits at issue,6the Court has the impression that 

Plaintiffs’ allegations are plausible. 

The conditionally certified FLSA “class period” in the instant case spans from “three 

years prior to the filing of the complaint [i.e., February 28, 2016] until resolution of this 

action.” ECF No. 48 at 3, 5. Upon a cursory review of Drouillard,

7 Oliphant,8 Rubio,9

and

Tharpe,

10 the Court notes that the releases in the three settled cases do not include future 

 

6 The four lawsuits from which Defendant seeks to exclude members from the Collective 

are: (1) Drouillard v. Sprint/United Management Company, No. 16cv624-ADS-ATK 

(E.D.N.Y) (hereinafter, “Drouillard”); (2) Oliphant v. Sprint/United Management 

Company, No. 18cv353-JMG-MDN (D. Neb.) (hereinafter, “Oliphant”); (3) Rubio v. 

Sprint/United Management Company, No. 17cv2231-SVW-GJS (C.D. Cal.) (hereinafter, 

“Rubio”); and (4) Tharpe v. Sprint/United Management Company, No. BC644645 (L.A. 

Super. Ct.) (hereinafter, “Tharpe”).

7

In Drouillard, where plaintiffs alleged FLSA wage-and-hour claims (e.g., failure by 

Defendant to pay wages, minimum wages, or overtime), the lawsuit commenced on 

February 5, 2016, and the class period lasted from February 5, 2010 to March 28, 2019. 

Drouillard ECF No. 114 at 2.

8

In Oliphant, plaintiffs allege FLSA wage-and-hour claims (e.g., unpaid wages and 

overtime pay). Oliphant ECF No. 25 at 3–4. On May 20, 2019, the FLSA collective was 

conditionally certified, to include employees who worked for Defendant beginning in May 

20, 2016. Oliphant ECF No. 46 at 7; Oliphant ECF No. 51.

9

In Rubio, where plaintiffs alleged FLSA wage-and-hour claims (e.g., failure to pay wages, 

minimum wages, or overtime, and off-the-clock work), the lawsuit commenced on 

December 9, 2016, and the class period lasted from December 9, 2012 to March 3, 2017. 

Rubio ECF No. 34 at 3; Rubio ECF No. 27-2 at 34, 37.

10 In Tharpe, the class action complaint, filed in the state court, does not allege any FLSA 

claims; instead it alleges a variety of California Labor Code violations and PAGA claims. 

Tharpe ECF No. 20. The lawsuit commenced on December 22, 2016, and the Class 

Settlement was approved on April 11, 2018. Tharpe ECF No. 3. The Court questions 

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claims, and only include claims during their respective “class periods.” See, e.g, Rubio ECF 

No. 34 at 6; Drouillard ECF No. 114 at 2. As an example, the class period in Rubio only 

overlaps with the instant case for approximately one year. Compare ECF No. 48 at 3, 5 

(February 28, 2016 to present) with Rubio ECF No. 27-2 at 34 (December 9, 2012 to March 

3, 2017). Thus, an employee who released her claim in Rubio but continued to work for 

Defendant would not be excluded from the Collective in this case because she did not fully

release her FLSA claim. Additionally, the Court notes that the FLSA provides for a twoyear statute of limitations (three years for willful violations), which further narrows the 

overlap of the claims here. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Without more, the Court does not reach 

the merits of whether Plaintiffs’ requested sanctions should be imposed. Therefore, 

Plaintiffs’ requests are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

Regarding whether Defendant properly excluded members from the Collective, the 

parties shall meet and confer in an attempt to resolve this issue by March 30, 2020. Should 

the parties not be able to resolve their dispute, they must jointly e-mail chambers at 

efile_goddard@casd.uscourts.gov by April 1, 2020 to schedule a telephonic conference, 

including short, neutral summaries of each party’s position and at least three proposed 

times mutually agreed upon by the parties for the telephonic conference.

g. Plaintiffs’ Request that Defendant Bear Any Additional Costs of 

Notice Administration Authorized by the Court

In its November 4th Order, the Court stated that “Plaintiffs shall pay the costs of the 

[Notice] Administrator, subject to claiming the costs as a reimbursable litigation expense.” 

ECF No. 48 at 6. Had Defendant produced the personal email addresses during the first 

round of notice administration, the costs of notice administration would have been borne 

by Plaintiffs. Thus, the Court finds that ordering the Defendant to bear additional notice 

administrations costs is unnecessary. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request is DENIED.

 

whether a non-FLSA settlement would include terms releasing Defendants from FLSA 

liability.

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h. Plaintiffs’ Request that Monetary Sanctions be Imposed Against 

Defendant

In light of the corrective measures imposed above, the Court declines to issue 

monetary sanctions at this time. Thus, Plaintiff’s request is DENIED. See, e.g., Mendez, 

540 F.3d at 1133 (noting that a court’s inherent powers “must be exercised with restraint 

and discretion”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions is DENIED.

2. Plaintiffs’ motion for Rule 16 sanctions is DENIED

3. Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority, 

regarding Defendant’s delayed production of personal email addresses to the 

Notice Administrator, is DENIED.

4. Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority, 

regarding Defendant’s failure to produce personal email addresses “to the 

extent available,” is GRANTED.

5. The Court ORDERS Defendant to produce all personal email addresses 

within its possession, custody, or control (including, but not limited to, the 

26,945 personal email addresses produced to Plaintiff pursuant to the Court’s 

order granting Plaintiffs’ motion to compel) to the Notice Administrator by 

April 6, 2020. The Notice and Opt-In Consent Form shall be sent by the 

Notice Administrator via these personal email addresses within seven (7) days 

of receipt of the contact information, or as soon thereafter as practicable. The 

Notice shall provide a website address where persons identified in 

Defendant’s list may obtain an electronic version of the Notice and submit an 

electronic version of the Opt-In Consent Form.

6. The Court ORDERS Defendant to produce phone numbers of Collective 

members who are both (1) not current employees and (2) for whom Defendant 

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does not have personal email addresses, to the Notice Administrator by 

April 6, 2020. The Notice and Opt-In Consent Form shall be sent by the 

Notice Administrator via these personal email address within seven (7) days 

of receipt of the contact information, or as soon thereafter as practicable. The 

Notice shall provide a website address where persons identified in 

Defendant’s list may obtain an electronic version of the Notice and submit an 

electronic version of the Opt-In Consent Form.

7. The Court ORDERS that eligible persons (those Collective members whose 

personal email addresses or phone numbers were produced to the Notice 

Administrator pursuant to this Order) shall be given sixty (60) days from the 

date on which the Notice and Opt-In Consent Form is sent via email or text in 

which to return their Opt-In Consent Form. 

8. The Court ORDERS the parties to meet and confer regarding whether 

Defendant properly excluded members from the Collective by 

March 30, 2020. Should the parties not be able to resolve their dispute, they 

must jointly e-mail chambers at efile_goddard@casd.uscourts.gov by

April 1, 2020 to schedule a telephonic conference, including short, neutral 

summaries of each party’s position and at least three proposed times mutually 

agreed upon by the parties for the telephonic conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2020

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