Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02850/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02850-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\DMS\09cv2850-grt IFP & dismiss.wpd -1- 09cv2850 DMS (JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY BOYDEN,

CDCR #G-08675,

Civil No. 09-2850 DMS (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE [Doc. No. 2]; and

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING 

TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO

 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A

vs.

LARRY SMALL, et al., 

Defendants.

Tommy Boyden (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison located in Calipatria, California, proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action filed

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP [DOC. NO. 2]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

Case 3:09-cv-02850-DMS-JMA Document 4 Filed 01/27/10 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\DMS\09cv2850-grt IFP & dismiss.wpd -2- 09cv2850 DMS (JMA)

only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP

remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847

(9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119.

Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows he has insufficient funds with which to pay any initial

partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the

reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial partial filing

fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve”

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack

of funds available.”). 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:09-cv-02850-DMS-JMA Document 4 Filed 01/27/10 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\DMS\09cv2850-grt IFP & dismiss.wpd -3- 09cv2850 DMS (JMA)

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2], and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis is subject to sua sponte

dismissal to the extent it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that

“the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a

district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). However, while liberal construction is “particularly important in

civil rights cases,” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992), the Court may not

“supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents

of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court should grant

leave to amend, however, unless it determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by

the allegation of other facts” and if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the

defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on

Case 3:09-cv-02850-DMS-JMA Document 4 Filed 01/27/10 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\DMS\09cv2850-grt IFP & dismiss.wpd -4- 09cv2850 DMS (JMA)

other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

Plaintiff’s Complaint is far from clear but it appears as though he is alleging that prison

officials have determined that he is required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the

California Penal Code in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (See

Compl. at 3.) The procedural guarantees of due process apply only when a constitutionallyprotected liberty or property interest is at stake. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672

(1977); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d

454, 462 (9th Cir. 1995). Liberty interests can arise from the Constitution or may be created by

state law or regulations. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427

U.S. 215, 224-27 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974); Smith v. Sumner,

994 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff cannot claim any constitutional right to a

particular prison classification arising directly from the Fourteenth Amendment. Moody v.

Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976). 

In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) the Supreme Court “refocused the test for

determining the existence of a liberty interest away from the wording of prison regulations and

toward an examination of the hardship caused by the prison’s challenged action relative to the

‘basic conditions’ of life as a prisoner.” Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902-03 (9th Cir. 2002)

(noting that Sandin abandons the mandatory/permissive language analysis courts traditionally

looked to when determining whether a state prison regulation created a liberty interest requiring

due process protection). 

Thus, after Sandin, a state-created liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment arises only if the prisoner alleges facts which show a change in his

confinement that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d

818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). The Sandin test requires a case-by-case examination of both the

conditions of the prisoner’s confinement and the duration of the deprivation at issue. Sandin,

Case 3:09-cv-02850-DMS-JMA Document 4 Filed 01/27/10 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\DMS\09cv2850-grt IFP & dismiss.wpd -5- 09cv2850 DMS (JMA)

515 U.S. at 486. In short, Plaintiff must allege facts to show “a dramatic departure from the

basic conditions” of his confinement before he can state a procedural due process claim. Id. at

485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 135 F.3d 1318

(9th Cir. 1998). 

The Ninth Circuit has applied Sandin’s procedural due process analysis to a claim similar

to Plaintiff’s. In Neal, the Court considered a due process challenge to Hawai’i’s Sex Offender

Treatment Program (“SOTP”), which labeled all persons in state custody convicted of specified

sex crimes as “sex offenders” and compelled their participation in a psychoeducational treatment

program as a pre-requisite to parole eligibility. Neal, 131 F.3d at 821-22. Applying Sandin, the

district court concluded that the “labeling of [Neal] as a sex offender and any resultant impact

on [his] custody level or eligibility for parole . . . [did] not impose ‘atypical and significant’

hardship” upon him. Neal, 131 F.3d at 828. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, however, finding that

the “stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex offender’ label coupled with the

subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment program whose successful completion

is a precondition for parole eligibility create the kind of deprivations of liberty that require

procedural protections.” Id. at 830 (emphasis added). Here, however, Plaintiff alleges no facts

as to the consequences he faces as a result of being required to register as a sex offender and

unlike Neal, he has not alleged that he was forced to participate in a treatment program.

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment due

process claim upon which relief can be granted.

To the extent that Plaintiff chooses to file an Amended Complaint, the Court cautions

Plaintiff that his entire action may be subject to dismissal on the grounds that he concedes he

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing this action. (See Compl. at 6.)

The PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Once within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in cases

covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). “The

Case 3:09-cv-02850-DMS-JMA Document 4 Filed 01/27/10 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\DMS\09cv2850-grt IFP & dismiss.wpd -6- 09cv2850 DMS (JMA)

‘available’ ‘remed[y]’ must be ‘exhausted’ before a complaint under § 1983 may be

entertained,” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001), and “regardless of the relief offered

through administrative procedures.” Id. at 741. Moreover, the Supreme Court held in

Woodford v. Ngo, 541 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006) that “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with

an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can

function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the court of its proceedings.”

Id. The Court further held that “[proper exhaustion] means ... a prisoner must complete the

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules . . . as a

precondition to bring suit in federal court.” Id.

The plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that no § 1983 action “shall be

brought . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198 (9th Cir. 2002) holds that prisoners who are incarcerated at the time they file a civil action

which challenges the conditions of their confinement are required to exhaust “all administrative

remedies as are available” as a mandatory precondition to suit. See McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1198;

see also Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Congress

could have written a statute making exhaustion a precondition to judgment, but it did not. The

actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to suit.”) (emphasis original). Section 1997e(a)

“clearly contemplates exhaustion prior to the commencement of the action as an indispensable

requirement. Exhaustion subsequent to the filing of the suit will not suffice.” McKinney, 311

F.3d at 1198 (quoting Medina-Claudio v. Rodriquez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2002)).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend

his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint

fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend.

/ / /

Case 3:09-cv-02850-DMS-JMA Document 4 Filed 01/27/10 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\DMS\09cv2850-grt IFP & dismiss.wpd -7- 09cv2850 DMS (JMA)

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 5] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b)and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave

from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all

the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in

itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants

not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been

waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without

further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:09-cv-02850-DMS-JMA Document 4 Filed 01/27/10 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\DMS\09cv2850-grt IFP & dismiss.wpd -8- 09cv2850 DMS (JMA)

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a Court approved form § 1983 complaint

to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 27, 2010

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-02850-DMS-JMA Document 4 Filed 01/27/10 Page 8 of 8