Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-02451/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-02451-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Tony Cruz, Sr., 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV 17-02451-PHX-DJH (DMF) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Tony Cruz, Sr. (“Petitioner”), who is confined in the Arizona State 

Prison Complex Florence, filed his federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(“Petition”) in July, 2017, challenging his convictions entered by the Gila County 

Superior Court (Doc. 1) in case numbers CR2011-00461 and CR2011-00434. The Court 

ordered that Respondents answer the Petition (Doc. 6). Respondents filed a Limited 

Answer with exhibits (Docs. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 

25). This matter is ripe for decision. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned 

Magistrate Judge recommends that this Court deny and dismiss the Petition with prejudice 

as untimely filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and deny a certificate of appealability. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 A. Convictions and Sentences 

 Petitioner was convicted in Gila County Superior Court, case numbers CR2011-

00461 and CR2011-00434, of one count of burglary, three counts of aggravated assault, 

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one count of weapons misconduct, one count of criminal damage, and one count of 

cruelty to animals, and was sentenced to a 32-year term of imprisonment. 

 More specifically, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial in Gila County 

Superior Court, case number CR2011-00461, of burglary in the third degree and was 

sentenced to an enhanced, maximum 12-year term of imprisonment (Doc. 18-1). In Gila 

County case number CR2011-0434, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial on three 

counts of aggravated assault, as well as one count each of misconduct involving 

weapons, criminal damage, and cruelty to animals (Doc. 19-1). The trial court sentenced 

Petitioner to a combination of concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest of which 

was 20 years, on the charges of aggravated assault and misconduct involving weapons, 

as well as time served on the charges of criminal damage and cruelty to animals (Doc. 

19-1). The trial court ordered that Petitioner’s sentences in CR2011-0434 run 

consecutively to the sentence imposed in CR2011-0461 (Doc. 19-1). In CR2011-0434, 

after sentencing, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to set aside the convictions pursuant to 

Rule 24.2 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the State responded, and 

following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion (Docs. 19-2, 19-3, 19-

4, 19-5). 

B. Appeals 

 On appeal of CR2011-0461, Petitioner’s appellate counsel, who was not the same 

attorney who represented Petitioner at trial, filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that she reviewed the record, but found “[n]o 

arguable question of law” to raise (Doc. 18-2). Petitioner filed a supplemental brief, 

asserting that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, that a witness 

committed perjury, and that he was convicted of a crime “not brought by the Grand Jury” 

(Doc. 18-3). On October 30, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction 

and sentence (Doc. 18-4). Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the Arizona 

Supreme Court; on April 22, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate 

(Doc. 18-5). 

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 On appeal in CR2011-0434, represented by different counsel from his trial 

counsel, Petitioner challenged the trial court’s order which denied his Rule 24.2 motion 

(Doc. 19-6), the State responded (Doc. 20-1), and on March 5, 2013, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s Rule 24 motion (Doc. 20-2). 

Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court; on August 

1, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate (Doc. 20-3). 

C. PCR Proceedings 

 On April 17, 2014, beyond the thirty day required timeframe set forth under 

Arizona Criminal Rules of Procedure1

, Petitioner filed an untimely notice of postconviction relief pertaining to both Gila County cases, CR2011-00461 and CR2011-

00434, claiming he wanted to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, actual 

innocence, and that his failure to timely seek post-conviction relief was without fault on 

his part (Doc. 20-4). Post-conviction counsel, who was the same as appellate counsel in 

both cases, then filed a notice of completion of post-conviction review, stating that she 

could find “no viable legal issues which could be raised under Rule 32” (Doc. 20-5). On 

May 11, 2015, the post-conviction court dismissed Petitioner’s pending Rule 32 

proceeding because Petitioner failed to file a supplemental pro se Rule 32 Petition by 

April 30, 2015 (Doc. 20-6). Petitioner’s motion for re-hearing was denied on July 1, 

2015 (Doc. 20-7). 

 Petitioner filed a petitioner for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals, which 

granted review and relief on the issue that “[p]ost-conviction counsel cannot identify and 

argue his or her own ineffectiveness on appeal, and a defendant therefore is entitled to 

different counsel to raise such a claim” (Docs. 20-8, 20-9, 20-10). In doing so, the Court 

of Appeals stated that Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief “was untimely filed” 

and “[a] claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel cannot be raised in an 

untimely proceeding” (Id.). The court noted that Petitioner claimed that his untimeliness 

 

1

 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) requires that “ . . . the notice [of post-conviction relief] must be filed within thirty days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.” 

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in filing his notice was without fault of his own, held that “Cruz is entitled to have new 

counsel evaluate whether he can raise a non-frivolous claim,” and explicitly “express[ed] 

no opinion whether [Petitioner] is eligible for relief from his untimely filing of his notice 

of post-conviction relief” (Id. at Doc. 20-10). 

 New post-conviction counsel filed a notice pertaining to both cases stating that she 

could “find no colorable claims pursuant to Rule 32” (Doc. 21-2). In CR2011-0434, on 

July 14, 2016, the post-conviction court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceedings 

based on Petitioner’s failure to file a supplemental pro se petition (Doc. 21-5). 

 In CR2011-0461, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, to 

which the State responded (Docs. 21-3, 21-4). On October 4, 2016, in CR2011-0461, the 

post-conviction court dismissed Cruz’s petition finding “that all of the allegations made 

in the entirety of the PCR Brief are conclusory and are not supported by new facts or 

evidence” (Doc. 21-6). In CR2011-0461, Petitioner moved for re-hearing at the postconviction court, which was denied, and filed for review with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals (Docs. 21-7, 21-8). After briefing, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review 

and denied relief (Docs. 21-8, 22-1, 22-2, 22-3). The June 20, 2017, opinion held that 

the “claims cannot be raised in an untimely proceeding for post-conviction relief” and 

“the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition” (Doc. 22-3). 

Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, and on 

September 14, 2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate (Doc. 22-4). 

D. Petitioner’s Habeas Claims

 In his Petition for Habeas Corpus filed with this Court in July, 2017, Petitioner 

raises four grounds for relief. In Grounds One and Four, Petitioner alleges that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his 

equal protection rights were violated. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that the trial 

court failed to inquire about a biased juror. Respondents contend that each of Petitioner’s 

grounds for relief fails because the Petition was untimely filed. Respondents also raise 

other defenses, which are not addressed herein because undersigned recommends that the 

Petition be dismissed as untimely. 

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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. AEDPA Statute of Limitations

 A threshold issue for the Court is whether the habeas petition is time-barred by the 

statute of limitations. The time-bar issue must be resolved before considering other 

procedural issues or the merits of any habeas claim. See White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 

921–22 (9th Cir. 2002). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) governs Petitioner’s habeas petition because he filed it after April 24, 1996, 

the effective date of the AEDPA. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 267 n.3 (2000)). 

 Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court 

conviction is required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

 In CR20110461, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on direct appeal on 

October 30, 2012 (Doc. 18-4). In CR20110434, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied 

relief on direct appeal on March 5, 2013 (Doc. 20-2). Petitioner did not seek review of 

these decisions in the Arizona Supreme Court in either case. Thus, Petitioner’s 

convictions became final 35 days after the Court of Appeals denied relief, when the time 

for seeking review by the Arizona Supreme Court expired.2

 

 Thirty-five days from October 30, 2012, was December 4, 2012. Thirty-five days 

from March 5, 2013, was April 9, 2013. Therefore, giving Petitioner every benefit of the 

 

2 See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653–54 (2012) (in cases where a state 

prisoner seeks review by a state intermediate appellate court but fails to seek review by the state’s highest court, AEDPA’s time limit begins when the time for seeking review by the state’s highest court expires); Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 

2007) (same); Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897–99 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); see 

also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court seeking review of an adverse ruling from the Arizona Court of Appeals must be filed within 30 days of the court of appeals’ decision); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a) (providing “five calendar days shall be added to the prescribed period” “[w]henever a party has the right or is required to take some action within a prescribed period after service of a notice or 

other paper and the notice or paper is served by a method [other than same day hand delivery]”); State v. Savage, 573 P.2d 1388, 1389 (1978) (holding Rule 1.3 applies to petitions for review in Arizona post-conviction proceedings). 

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doubt, and calculating the AEDPA time limit from the latest date, Cruz was required to 

file his petition for writ of habeas corpus by April 9, 2014. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). See 

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Excluding the day on which 

Patterson’s petition was denied by the Supreme Court [June 19, 1997], as required by 

Rule 6(a)'s “anniversary method,” the one-year [AEDPA] grace period began to run on 

June 20, 1997 and expired one year later, on June 19, 1998”) Yet, Petitioner did not file 

the petition until July, 2017. Consequently, the Petition filed in July, 2017, is untimely 

absent sufficient statutory or equitable tolling or a showing of actual innocence under 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 

B. Statutory Tolling

 The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A state PCR petition not filed 

within the state's required time limit, however, is not “properly filed,” and the petitioner 

is not entitled to statutory tolling during those proceedings. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that 

[is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 

(2007) (finding that inmate's untimely state post–conviction petition was not “properly 

filed” under the AEDPA's tolling provision, and reiterating its holding in Pace, 544 U.S. 

at 414). Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently filed state postconviction proceeding cannot restart the statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the limitations period is not 

reinstated by applications for state post-conviction relief filed after expiration of the 

AEDPA statute of limitations). “A state-court petition . . . that is filed following the 

expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that period because there is no period 

remaining to be tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000). 

Further, a second PCR proceeding that is deemed untimely does not toll the time between 

the first and second PCR proceedings. Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

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Petitioner’s PCR proceedings began as facially untimely, were deemed untimely 

by the state court, and were filed after AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period had expired. 

Therefore, none of Petitioner's PCR proceedings were “properly filed” for statutory 

tolling purposes. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. 

C. Equitable Tolling

 The U.S. Supreme Court has held “that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). 

The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Id. at 645–46. It is a petitioner’s burden to establish 

that equitable tolling is warranted. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits 

equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions, but the 

petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.”). 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “will permit equitable tolling of AEDPA's 

limitations period ‘only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make 

it impossible to file a petition on time.’” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 

1999) (quoting Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), 

abrogated on other grounds by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003) (citations 

omitted)). Put another way, for equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “(1) that 

he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances 

stood in his way” to prevent him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Holland, 

560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). “The 

diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum 

feasible diligence.” Id. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to 

apply the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] 

‘bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews 

v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); see also 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that equitable tolling is 

“unavailable in most cases,” and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling 

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[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations and internal 

emphasis omitted). 

Petitioner does not allege that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Nor does the 

Petition or the record set forth grounds that would justify equitable tolling. As Petitioner 

has not met his burden of showing that extraordinary circumstances made it impossible 

for him to file a timely federal petition, equitable tolling is unavailable. Petitioner has 

also failed to meet his burden of showing reasonable diligence that would justify 

equitable tolling. 

 D. Actual Innocence Exception 

 If a district court finds that a federal habeas petition is untimely, the untimeliness 

may be excused in rare instances by an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 391-396 (2013), the Supreme Court 

held that the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that applies to 

procedural bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 

518 (2006), extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. See Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” 

by “persuad[ing] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). However, 

Petitioner does not argue, let alone meet, this excuse for untimeliness of the Petition. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Petitioner filed the pending Petition after expiration of the AEDPA statute of 

limitations, and statutory and equitable tolling do not render the petition timely; nor has 

Petitioner shown actual innocence to overcome the untimeliness. Accordingly, the 

Petition is untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Magistrate Judge recommends 

that the Petition be denied and dismissed as untimely. 

Assuming the recommendation of denial and dismissal herein is followed in the 

District Judge’s judgment, the District Judge’s decision will be on procedural grounds. 

Under the reasoning set forth herein, reasonable jurists would not find it debatable 

whether the District Judge was correct in its procedural ruling. Accordingly, to the extent 

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the District Judge adopts this Report and Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate 

of appealability should be denied. 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be 

denied because dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and 

reasonable jurists would not find the procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 2nd day of August, 2018. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

 

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