Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07293/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07293-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 30, 1997 Decided November 28, 1997 

No. 95-7293

RICHARD W. BEEBE,

APPELLANT

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94cv01567)

Richard W. Beebe, appearing pro se, argued the cause and 

filed the briefs.

Bruce P. Heppen argued the cause for appellees. With 

him on the briefs were Carol B. O'Keeffe and Robert J. Kniaz. 

David R. Keyser, Gerard J. Stief and Robert L. Polk entered 

appearances for appellees.

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Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, GINSBURG and TATEL, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: In this tort and contract action, we 

again examine the scope of WMATA's sovereign immunity, as 

well as the immunity of its employees. Because the torts 

alleged here arose from policy decisions made during the 

reorganization of a WMATA department, we agree with the 

district court that WMATA is protected by sovereign immunity. Applying federal common law, we also hold that WMATA 

officials, when exercising discretionary functions and acting 

within the scope of their official duties, enjoy immunity from 

tort liability. We agree with the district court that the 

contract claims lack merit.

I

In 1966, acting pursuant to the Compact Clause of the 

Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, Congress approved the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 

Compact between Maryland, Virginia, and the District of 

Columbia to deal with growing traffic problems in the Washington area. See Pub. L. No. 89-774, 80 Stat. 1324 (1966) 

(codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2431 (1992)); 

H. REP. NO. 89-1914, at 5-6 (1966). Responsible for creating 

a coordinated public transportation system for the region, 

WMATA now operates an extensive Metrobus and Metrorail 

system running throughout Northern Virginia, the District, 

and two Maryland counties. We have summarized WMATA's 

history and its relationship to Congress in earlier decisions. 

See, e.g., Dant v. District of Columbia, 829 F.2d 69, 71, 74 

(D.C. Cir. 1987); Morris v. WMATA, 781 F.2d 218, 219, 222 

(D.C. Cir. 1986).

Appellant Richard W. Beebe works for WMATA as an 

attorney, having served in both the Office of General Counsel 

and the Office of Procurement. In 1989, he became a Construction Engineer Negotiator in what was then the Office of 

Procurement's Final Decisions and Disputes Section, headed 

by appellee Narinder Kumar. In that job, Beebe investigated 

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and analyzed contract claims and drafted final contracting 

decisions.

In 1992, by which time Beebe had reached a rank of TA-24, 

WMATA's Board of Directors approved a reorganization of 

the Office of Procurement, appointing appellee Robert Bearinger to oversee its implementation. The reorganization 

shrank the Final Decisions and Disputes Section from thirteen to six positions and transferred it to a new Construction 

Contract Management division. In this new office, Beebe's 

duties expanded from managing a single stage of the contracting process to "cradle-to-grave" contract administration.

During several personnel policy meetings with Bearinger 

and others and in a separate memorandum to Bearinger, 

Kumar criticized Beebe's performance, suggesting that he 

was unqualified for his broader responsibilities and that 

Beebe should return to the Office of General Counsel. Bearinger then abolished Beebe's job, replaced it with a new 

TA-24 Contract Administrator position, and appointed Kumar 

to head a selection committee to fill the new position. Beebe 

applied, but the committee selected him instead for a TA-22 

Contract Administrator position.

In July, 1994, Beebe filed a ten-count complaint in the U.S. 

District Court for the District of Columbia, asserting claims 

for breach of contract/promissory estoppel (count 1); constructive discharge (count 2); misrepresentation (count 3); 

fraud (count 4); gross negligence in the formulation and 

implementation of the selection process for the TA-24 Contract Administrator position (count 5); negligent entrustment 

(count 6); defamation of character (count 7); wrongful interference with employment relationship (count 8); breach of the 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count 9); and intentional infliction of emotional harm (count 10). Beebe named 

WMATA and Bearinger in counts one, two, three, four, five, 

nine, and ten; he named Kumar in counts two, seven, eight, 

nine, and ten; and he named only WMATA in count six.

Relying on a magistrate judge's recommendations, the district court dismissed the tort claims against WMATA and the 

individual defendants on sovereign immunity grounds. The 

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district court also granted summary judgment for defendants 

on the breach of contract/promissory estoppel claim, and 

dismissed the remaining contract claims. In this appeal by 

Beebe, we review the dismissal of counts two through ten, as 

well as the summary judgment on count one de novo, applying the same standards used by the district court. Wilson v. 

Peña, 79 F.3d 154, 160 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Claims are not 

to be dismissed " 'unless it appears beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 

his claim which would entitle him to relief.' " Alicke v. MCI 

Communications Corp., 111 F.3d 909, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(c).

II

Before considering the merits of Beebe's appeal, we must 

deal with WMATA's assertion that Beebe failed to exhaust 

his administrative remedies. The Compact requires employees to submit all unresolved "labor disputes" to arbitration. 

D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2431(66)(c). Employees must exhaust 

these procedures before filing suit. Sanders v. WMATA, 819 

F.2d 1151, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Employees like Beebe who 

are members of the Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local No. 2, can satisfy this requirement by 

exhausting the grievance procedures contained in the union's 

collective bargaining agreement with WMATA.

Before filing his complaint in this case, Beebe initiated the 

collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedures, progressing through the first two of its four steps. Not until 

four days after filing suit, however, did he initiate a "step 

three" grievance. While this would ordinarily bar Beebe 

from pursuing this litigation, WMATA does not contest 

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ing agreement's requirement that it respond to a step three 

grievance within ten days, Article XX, Agreement Between 

WMATA and the Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local No. 2, it has never answered his step 

three filing. Under these circumstances, WMATA has 

waived its exhaustion defense. Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 

171, 185 (1967) ("[W]hen the conduct of the employer amounts 

to a repudiation ... the employer is estopped by his own 

conduct to rely on the unexhausted grievance and arbitration 

procedures as a defense to the employee's cause of action.") 

(citations omitted). We thus turn to Beebe's tort claims.

III 

In signing the WMATA Compact, Maryland, Virginia, and 

the District of Columbia conferred upon WMATA their respective sovereign immunities. Morris, 781 F.2d at 219; see 

also Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 

49-50 (1994). Section 80 of the Compact waives this immunity for torts "committed in the conduct of any proprietary 

function," while retaining immunity for torts committed by its 

agents "in the performance of a governmental function." 

D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2431(80).

To distinguish governmental from proprietary functions, we 

ask whether the activity amounts to a "quintessential" governmental function, like law enforcement. Burkhart v. 

WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1997). If so, the 

activity falls within the scope of WMATA's sovereign immunity. Id. (citing Dant, 829 F.2d at 74). Because it is difficult to 

distinguish between public and private sector functions with 

any precision beyond obviously public activities like law enforcement, Dant, 829 F.2d at 74, the immunity question often 

turns on whether the activity is "discretionary" or "ministerial," a dichotomy employed by the Federal Tort Claims Act. 

Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1216. To determine whether a function is discretionary, and thus shielded by sovereign immunity, we ask whether any " 'statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.' " 

Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting 

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United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991)). If no 

course of action is prescribed, we then determine whether the 

exercise of discretion is "grounded in 'social, economic, or 

political goals.' " Id. (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323). If 

so grounded, the activity is "governmental," thus falling within section 80's retention of sovereign immunity.

Although employment decisions are not quintessential governmental functionsafter all, private entities also hire and 

fire employeeswe held in Burkhart that "decisions concerning the hiring, training, and supervising of WMATA employees are discretionary in nature, and thus immune from judicial review." Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1217. The Compact 

confers broad powers on WMATA to "[c]reate and abolish 

offices, employments and positions ... provide for the qualification, appointment, [and] removal ... of its ... employees, 

[and][e]stablish, in its discretion, a personnel system based on 

merit and fitness." D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2431(12)(g) and (h); 

see Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1217. Employment decisions require "consideration of numerous factors, including budgetary 

constraints, public perception, economic conditions, 'individual 

backgrounds, office diversity, experience and employer intuition.' " Id. (quoting Tonelli v. United States, 60 F.3d 492, 

496 (8th Cir. 1995)).

Applying these standards, we think WMATA's appointment 

of Bearinger to oversee the reorganization of the Office of 

Procurement as well as later actions by Bearinger and Kumar 

in the course of the reorganization were discretionary activities. Beebe does not allege that Bearinger or Kumar were 

told precisely how to structure the new department, which 

positions to create or abolish, or whom to hire or retain. Of 

course, not every action connected in some way to an employment decision amounts to a discretionary function. But all 

actions challenged by Beebe involved a large measure of 

choice, and we perceive no distinction between the discretion 

here and the hiring, training, and supervision of bus operators at issue in Burkhart. If anything, the activity in this 

casereorganizing an entire officeinvolved even greater 

degrees of political, social and economic considerations. 

Agreeing with the district court that WMATA is therefore 

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immune from Beebe's tort claims, including the alleged intentional torts, cf. Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 

(barring intentional tort claim because conduct fell within 

discretionary function exception), we affirm the dismissal of 

counts three through six, and ten against WMATA.

IV 

Because Beebe also asserts tort claims against Bearinger 

and Kumar in their individual capacities (counts 3-5, 7, 8, and 

10), we must determine whether, as the district court held, 

they too have immunity from suit. The scope of immunity of 

WMATA employees for torts committed in the course of 

governmental or discretionary functions is a road not well 

traveled. 

Section 80 of the Compact provides that the "exclusive 

remedy" for any action for which WMATA is liable "shall 

be by suit against the Authority." D.C. CODE ANN. 

§ 1-2431(80). In other words, for torts committed in the 

course of proprietary or ministerial functions, WMATA is 

liable and its employees immune. The Compact is silent on 

the question this case presents: whether WMATA employees 

have immunity from suit where WMATA itself has immunity 

because the alleged torts occurred in the exercise of governmental or discretionary functions. 

To resolve this issue, we must first determine which law to 

rely onthose of the three signatories or federal common 

law? Where Congress wanted state law to govern a question 

under the WMATA Compact, such as in proprietary 

tort actions, it said so explicitly. See D.C. CODE ANN. 

§ 1-2431(80) ("The Authority shall be liable for ... torts ... 

committed in the conduct of any proprietary function, in 

accordance with the law of the applicable signatory...."). 

Where Congress has not so provided, federal law governs the 

interpretation of Compact terms. Culyer v. Adams, 449 U.S. 

433, 440 (1981) ("[W]here Congress has authorized the States 

to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject 

matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the 

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States' agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause 

[of the Constitution]."). We thus regularly look to federal law 

when distinguishing between governmental and proprietary 

functions. See, e.g., Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1216; Sanders,

819 F.2d at 1154. Although the issue in this case requires us 

to interpret no specific Compact terms, but rather to fill in a 

gap left by those terms, we think the issue remains essentially federal, resolvable pursuant to federal common law. Cf. 

Old Town Trolley Tours v. WMATC, No. 96-1069, slip op. at 

6 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 1997).

While perhaps not the proper standard for interpreting 

every interstate compact, federal common law is particularly 

appropriate in WMATA's case. Not only does the Compact 

have its roots in congressionally authorized studies, see H.

REP. NO. 89-1914, at 3-4 (1966), but "Congress played a 

particularly active role" in WMATA's creation, Morris, 781 

F.2d at 222. From the very outset, the federal government 

has contributed significantly to the construction and operation 

of WMATA's transportation system. Id. at 225. Moreover, 

although WMATA operates in three jurisdictions, it runs its 

core policy-making functions in one central District of Columbia headquarters. Resorting to the laws of the individual 

signatories could expose WMATA policymakers to different, 

possibly inconsistent immunity rules, a result that would run 

counter to the uniform interpretation of WMATA's governmental immunity, a uniformity which results from our reliance on federal law. Although Dant's discussion of official 

immunity refers by analogy to District of Columbia cases, 

nothing in that decision conflicts with the proposition that 

federal common law determines whether WMATA officials 

have immunity when exercising governmental functions.

For the appropriate federal common law standard, we look 

to Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988). There, the Supreme Court held that federal officials enjoy absolute immunity from state-law tort actions when the conduct at issue 

falls "within the scope of their official duties and the conduct 

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is discretionary in nature." Id. at 297-98. Congress has 

since overturned Westfall as it applies to federal employees, 

see Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified 

at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1994)), but Westfall remains the 

common law rule, see Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 

F.3d 1442, 1447 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[a]t federal common law, 

absolute official immunity" still governed by Westfall).

Although Westfall places the burden of establishing immunity on the official, Westfall, 484 U.S. at 299, Beebe has failed 

even to allege that Bearinger and Kumar acted outside the 

scope of their official duties, Westfall's first prong. By 

Beebe's own account, all actions he challenges related directly 

to the office reorganization, thus lying at the core of Bearinger and Kumar's official responsibilities. Even the alleged 

intentional torts (fraud and intentional infliction of emotional 

harm) as well as those Beebe alleges were motivated by 

personal animus (defamation and interference with his employment relationship) occurred in the course of the reorganization. Cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) (plurality 

opinion) ("The fact that the action here taken was within the 

outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to 

render the privilege applicable, despite the allegations of 

malice in the complaint."); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 

498 (1896) (Harlan, J.). To be sure, not all intentional or 

malicious torts committed in the normal course of employment necessarily fall within the scope of official duties. Officials "exceed the outer perimeters of their responsibilities, 

and act manifestly beyond their line of duty," for example, 

"when they resort to physical force to compel the obedience 

of their managerial subordinates," McKinney v. Whitfield,

736 F.2d 766, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984), or when they use false 

threats of criminal charges to coerce an employee into resigning, Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349, 359 (8th Cir. 1980). None 

of Beebe's allegations come even close to these extremes. He 

alleges nothing more than that Bearinger implemented the 

reorganization improperly. His allegations about Kumar's 

personal animus are conclusory.

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Because we have already determined that Bearinger and 

Kumar were engaged in discretionary functionsWestfall's 

second prongthey enjoy immunity from Beebe's tort allegations. We thus affirm the district court's dismissal of counts 

three through five, seven, eight, and ten against Bearinger 

and Kumar.

V 

This brings us finally to Beebe's claims for breach of 

contract/promissory estoppel (count 1), constructive discharge 

(count 2), and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing (count 9), asserted against WMATA, Bearinger, and 

Kumar. Section 80 of the Compact waives WMATA's sovereign immunity for contractual disputes. D.C. CODE ANN. 

§ 1-2431(80). Because the Compact makes WMATA the 

exclusive defendant where WMATA is liable, id., Bearinger 

and Kumar cannot be sued for any contractual claims. As for 

WMATA, we find no basis for questioning the district court's 

grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract/ 

promissory estoppel count or its dismissal of the remaining 

counts.

Beebe claims that WMATA is contractually bound by statements in its personnel manual. Although like any District of 

Columbia employer WMATA can bind itself contractually in a 

personnel manual, see Sisco v. GSA Nat'l Capital Fed. Credit 

Union, 689 A.2d 52, 55 (D.C. 1997) (holding that "assurances 

by an employer in a personnel or policy manual distributed to 

all employees that are clear enough in limiting the right to 

terminate to specific causes or events will overcome the 

presumption of at-will employment"), Beebe points to no 

statement of policy in WMATA's manual that could possibly 

create such a contract. He cites policies 1.2 and 2.1, which 

encourage internal promotion and responsible supervision, 

but neither is "clear enough" to overcome the presumption 

that he was employed at-will, Sisco, 689 A.2d at 55.

Beebe's remaining contract claims also fail: his covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing claim, because it depends upon the 

existence of an enforceable contract; and his constructive discharge claim, because he makes no allegation that 

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WMATA made working conditions so onerous that he had to 

quit, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. District of Columbia Comm'n 

on Human Rights, 515 A.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C. 1986) (constructive discharge occurs "when the employer deliberately makes 

working conditions intolerable and drives the employee into 

an involuntary quit"). Indeed, Beebe told us at oral argument that he remains employed by WMATA. Failing to 

pursue his claim of promissory estoppel in this court, Beebe 

has waived it. Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 

1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2431 (1997).

VI 

We affirm the district court's grant of appellees' motion for 

summary judgment on the breach of contract/promissory 

estoppel count and of their motion to dismiss the remainder 

of Beebe's complaint.

So ordered.

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