Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01101/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01101-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN ROETTGEN,

CDCR #V-05142,

Civil No. 13cv1101 GPC (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,

IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE AND GARNISHING

$350.00 BALANCE FROM INMATE’S

TRUST ACCOUNT; and

(2) DISMISSING ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILING TO STATE A 

CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b)

vs.

D. FOSTON; R. BRIGGS; G. HERNANDEZ;

C. DAVIS; M.L. LEE; PICKET; I. BRAVO;

P. SMITH; MUECA; McDANIELS; J.L.

TOLBERT; C. RAMOS; R. DAVIS; D.

SMITH; L. HINKLE; J. MERCHANT;

E. GARZA; W.J. SULLIVAN; CAPT. T.

KABBAN-MILLER,

Defendants.

John Roettgen, (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has

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submitted a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has filed

a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 6].

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP [ECF No. 6]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to prepay the entire fee only

if that party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however,

remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their action is

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847

(9th Cir. 2002). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement indicates

that he has insufficient funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil

action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no

assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”). Therefore, the Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 6] and assesses no initial partial filing

fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated

shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

II.

SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires courts to review complaints filed by prisoners against officers

or employees of governmental entities and dismiss those or any portion of those found frivolous,

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malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief

from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213

F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Prior to the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only

frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing a prisoner’s suit make and rule

on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires

a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). The district court should grant leave to

amend, however, unless it determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the

allegation of other facts” and if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the

defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 (citing Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.

1995); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while liberal

construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases,” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1261 (9th Cir. 1992), the court may nevertheless not “supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). 

As currently pleaded, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cognizable

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a

claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and

(2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.

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527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986);

Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

A. Rule 8

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with

Rule 8. Specifically, Rule 8 provides that in order to state a claim for relief in a pleading it

must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P.

8(a)(1) & (2). Plaintiff has filed an eighty one (81) page Complaint against nineteen (19)

Defendants in which he unnecessarily sets forth legal standards and arguments that are best

reserved for future motions should this action survive the screening process. If Plaintiff chooses

to file an Amended Complaint, he need only set forth the causes of action he is pursing, the

necessary factual allegations to support those causes of action and identify the Defendants he

seeks to hold liable for each of the alleged constitutional violations. 

B. Surviving claims

The Court does find that some of Plaintiff’s claims survive the sua sponte screening

process. Specifically, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants 

C. Davis and M. Lee and his First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants P. Smith, 

Davis and Bravo. However, the Court finds that as to all the remaining claims, Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted for the reasons set forth below. 

Plaintiff will be given leave to file an Amended Complaint in which he can re-allege the causes

of action that the Court found to survive the screening process or he may attempt to correct the

deficiencies of pleading identified in this Order. Regardless, Plaintiff is once again cautioned

that he must comply with Rule 8.

C. Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff alleges, in very conclusory terms, that he was retaliated against by a number of

Defendants. Prisoners have a fundamental “right[s] to file prison grievances,” Bruce v. Ylst, 351

F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003), and to “pursue civil rights litigation in the courts.” Schroeder

v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995). “Without those bedrock constitutional

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guarantees, inmates would be left with no viable mechanism to remedy prison injustices.” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). “And because purely retaliatory actions

taken against a prisoner for having exercised those rights necessarily undermine those

protections, such actions violate the Constitution quite apart from any underlying misconduct

they are designed to shield.” Id. (citing Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 & n.4 (9th Cir.

1995)); see also Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that because

retaliation by prison officials may chill an inmate’s exercise of his legitimate First Amendment

rights, such conduct is actionable even if it would not otherwise rise to the level of a

constitutional violation). “[A] viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68 (footnote omitted) (citing Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.

1994)).

Plaintiff’s allegations with regard to his specific claims of retaliation are very convoluted

and often fail to connect any specific Defendant with claims of retaliation. In order to prevail

on a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must show that his “protected conduct was a ‘substantial’ or

‘motivating’ factor” behind the defendants conduct.” Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874

F.2d 1310, 1314 (1989). Here, there are no facts that show retaliatory actions on the part of

many of the Defendants due to their specific knowledge of Plaintiff’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights. In addition, Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks clarity as to which Defendants he

is seeking to hold liable for alleged retaliatory actions. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended

pleading alleging retaliatory actions by Defendants other than Smith, Davis and Bravo, he must

plead facts sufficient to support each element of a retaliatory claim against each Defendant. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Therefore, the Court must sua sponte dismiss Plaintiff’s

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retaliation claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

C. Conspiracy claims

Throughout Plaintiff’s Complaint, he alleges that Defendants acted in a conspiracy to

violate his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). “To state a cause of action

under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any person or a class

of persons the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws,

(3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury,

property damage or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” 

Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403

U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). 

“[T]he language requiring intent to deprive equal protection . . . means that there must be some

racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the

conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536.

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege membership in a protected class and fails to allege that any

Defendant acted with class-based animus, both of which are essential elements of a cause of

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02; Schultz v. Sundberg, 759

F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that conspiracy plaintiff must show membership in a

judicially-designated suspect or quasi-suspect class); Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995

F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993). Therefore, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims must be dismissed for

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

D. Fourteenth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment when they found him guilty of “resisting staff resulting in the use of force.” (ECF

No. 58 at 81.) “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of

interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” 

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may

grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections. Meachum v. Fano,

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427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly limited the

instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and

significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations

omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of his disciplinary hearing which show “the type of atypical, significant

deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For example, in

Sandin, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff

possessed a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus

discretionary nature of the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s

confinement and whether they amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when

compared to those shared by prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibility of

whether the prisoner’s sentence was lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the deprivation

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the

Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of

the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions”

of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due

process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege a liberty interest in remaining free of Ad-seg, and thus, has failed to state a due process

claim. See May, 109 F.3d at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (holding that

placing an inmate in administrative segregation for thirty days “did not present the type of

atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.”).

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Accordingly, the Court finds that a majority of Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a

section 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an

opportunity to amend his pleading to either plead only those claims the Court found survive the

sua sponte screening process or he may attempt to also cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff

is warned that if his amended complaint fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above

and fails to comply with Rule 8, those claims found deficient may be dismissed with prejudice

and without leave to amend.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 6] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey Beard,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSEDwithout prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). However,

Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which

to file a First Amended Complaint which sets forth only those claims that survive the sua sponte

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screening process or attempts to cure all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. 

See S.D.CAL.CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended

Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). 

5. The Clerk ofthe Court is directed to mail a formcivil rights Complaint to Plaintiff.

DATED: September 23, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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