Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02487/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02487-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Mirisa Ajanovic, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

O.F.F. Enterprises, Ltd., 

Defendant.

No. CV10-02487-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Mirisa Ajanovic commenced this action by filing a pro se complaint 

against Defendant O.F.F. Enterprises, Ltd., on November 17, 2010. Doc. 1. The original 

complaint was dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on 

February 25, 2011. Doc. 4. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on February 28, 

2011. After a lengthy delay during which Plaintiff did not serve Defendant, and on 

Defendant’s motion after Defendant was served, the Court dismissed the first amended 

complaint for failure to state a claim. Doc. 17. The Court found that Plaintiff failed to 

file a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”), a prerequisite to asserting a claim under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Doc. 17 at 2-3. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend, 

and Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on February 22, 2012. Doc. 18. 

 Defendant now moves to dismiss the second amended complaint pursuant to 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Doc. 19. Plaintiff has filed a 

document captioned “Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 19),” 

which the Court construes as a response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Doc. 21. 

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Defendant has filed a reply. Doc. 22. The parties have not requested oral argument. For 

the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss. 

I. Legal Standard. 

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) can 

be either a facial or factual attack on the allegations. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & 

Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). A facial attack occurs when the moving 

party asserts that the allegations contained in the complaint are “insufficient on their face 

to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 

(9th Cir. 2004). In a factual attack, the moving party “disputes the truth of the allegations 

that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. If the attack on 

jurisdiction is facial, the complaint’s factual allegations are taken as true and construed in 

favor of the non-moving party. Jacobson v. Katzer, 609 F. Supp. 2d 925, 930 (N.D. Cal. 

2009) (citing Fed’n of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 

(9th Cir. 1996)). If the attack is factual, the plaintiff’s allegations are not entitled to a 

presumption of truthfulness, a court may look beyond the pleadings to resolve factual 

disputes, and the plaintiff has the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. Safe Air for 

Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

 Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where the plaintiff fails to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Legal conclusions 

couched as factual allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the complaint 

must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 

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 A court should apply less stringent pleading standards to pro se plaintiffs, such 

that inartful pleadings are still considered by the court. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972); Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Pro se

complaints are to be construed liberally and ‘may be dismissed for failure to state a claim 

only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’”) (citations omitted). 

II. Discussion. 

 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint explains that she is experiencing financial 

difficulty due to loss of income and is concerned about housing and rent payments. 

Doc. 18 at 2. She appears to have lost custody of her child, and worries about her child’s 

safety and education. Id. The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s concerns. 

 Pursuant to federal statutes, however, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction 

only over cases that present federal questions, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or diversity of 

citizenship among the parties where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, 28 

U.S.C. § 1332. The second amended complaint asserts no federal claim, nor does it 

purport to assert diversity jurisdiction. Indeed, Plaintiff’s the complaint does not assert 

any cognizable legal claim. Plaintiff clarifies that she does not allege a violation of the 

ADA. Id. She claims that Defendant did not provide her with a disability form,1

 and that 

Defendant denied her the right to work. Id. 

 Defendant argues that even if a basis for federal jurisdiction were stated, any claim 

that Plaintiff may be trying to state is now time-barred. Doc. 19 at 2. Plaintiff’s prior 

complaints indicate that she was terminated from employment on November 16, 2006 

(Doc. 1 at 2), November 1, 2006 (Doc. 5 at 1), or January 11, 2006 (id.). Even assuming 

the latest alleged date is accurate, Plaintiff waited four years before filing this action on 

 

1

 To the extent that Plaintiff references the Court’s prior order, which dismissed the first amended complaint due to Plaintiff’s failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter (Doc. 17 at 3), Plaintiff was required to obtain this letter from the EEOC by filing a charge with that agency within 180 days of the date of the alleged discrimination. See 42 

U.S.C. § 12117(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), (f). Defendant is not responsible for issuing a right-to-sue letter. 

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November 17, 2010. Arizona statutes impose a two-year statute of limitations for tort 

actions, A.R.S. § 12-542, and a one-year statute of limitations for breach of employment 

contract and wrongful termination actions, A.R.S § 12-541. 

 In response to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff explains that she did not become 

aware of a possible claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 

(“ERISA”) until April 27, 2012. Doc. 21 at 1. She asserts a right to benefits or a right to 

work. Id. But there is no ERISA claim in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, and a 

response to a motion to dismiss is not the proper venue for Plaintiff to assert new claims. 

See Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In 

determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the 

complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a 

defendant’s motion to dismiss.”) (emphasis in original). Even if the Court were to 

consider Plaintiff’s ERISA claim, Plaintiff has not alleged in her second amended 

complaint or in her response that she was a participant in or a beneficiary of a benefit 

plan during her employment by Defendant. 

 The Court will grant the motion to dismiss because the allegations in Plaintiff’s 

second amend complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction, and 

because Plaintiff has not stated any cognizable claim for relief.

III. Leave to Amend. 

 The Court recognizes its obligation to give leave to amend a pleading freely when 

justice requires, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, and to “ensure that pro se litigants do not unwittingly 

fall victim to procedural requirements,” Waters v. Young, 100 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 

1996). But the Court has twice granted Plaintiff leave to amend, and she has failed in the 

two resulting complaints, as well as her first complaint, to state a claim within the 

jurisdiction of this Court. Having considered the allegations in Plaintiffs’ various 

complaints, it is clear to the Court that additional opportunities to amend would be futile. 

See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a 

pro se litigant in this Circuit must be given leave to amend “unless it is absolutely clear 

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that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment”); see also 

Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. Of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 

that “futility of amendment alone can justify the denial of [leave to amend]”). The Court 

will grant the motion to dismiss without leave to amend. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 19) is granted. 

 2. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 18th day of June, 2012. 

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