Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00597/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00597-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.; David

Goldfarb, M.D., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., 

Defendant. _________________________________

W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc.,

Counterclaimant,

vs.

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.,David

Goldfarb, M.D., and C.R. Bard, Inc.,

Counterdefendants.

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No. CV 03-0597–PHX-MHM

ORDER

On October 22, 2007, Plaintiffs, Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc., and David Goldfarb,

M.D. (“Plaintiffs” or “Bard”), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Matsumoto Ruling

the Court issued during the October 10, 2007 Final Pretrial Conference Hearing. Plaintiffs

request reconsideration of the Court’s ruling that granted W. L. Gore & Associates, Inc.’s

(“Gore”) Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs from Offering Evidence Contradicting

Case 2:03-cv-00597-MHM Document 610 Filed 11/02/07 Page 1 of 6
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Admissions that the Matsumoto Prior Art Discloses Distances Between Nodes Within the

Claimed Ranges (Doc. 446). 

In granting Gore’s Motion in Limine, the Court ruled that Plaintiffs should be bound

to their specific factual matters about the Matsumoto prior art made during the prior PTO

proceedings. In support of its ruling, the Court relied on the Gore-cited cases of Proctor &

Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 711 F.Supp. 759, 770 (D. Del. 1989) (finding that any

representations by a patent applicant or patentee as to the content or scope of prior art should

be accepted as a binding admission as to that prior art), and In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 571

(C.C.P.A. 1975) (to determine the scope of an application or patentee’s admission, “[i]t is

necessary to consider everything appellants have said about what is prior art”). 

Plaintiffs assert that the Court should reconsider its ruling because the doctrine of

judicial estoppel should not act to bind them to losing arguments Dr. Goldfarb made to the

Patent Office that the Patent Office did not adopt when it granted the ‘135 patent to Dr.

Goldfarb. 

In its Court-directed Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration, Gore argues

that Bard did not distinguish or even cite the cases having to do with the prior admission

doctrine that the Court relied on when making its ruling, instead Plaintiffs’ brief focuses on

the judicial estoppel doctrine. Nor did Plaintiffs refer to the public policy considerations

driving the case law i.e., that a patent applicant’s statements regarding the content and scope

of the prior art during the prosecution of the patent application are binding admissions upon

which the public is entitled to rely in considering the ultimately-issued patent. 

A motion for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) may be granted for the

following reasons: (1) to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is

based; (2) the moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence;

(3) as necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) there is an intervening change in

controlling law. Turner v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063

(9th Cir. 2003). “A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present

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evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the

litigation.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003).

As the parties will recall, the Court has previously discussed the doctrine of judicial

estoppel in its Order denying Gore's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 163 at

15-16) and its Order denying Bard’s Motion to Narrow the Issues (Doc. 311 at 11-13). In

its Order denying Gore’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court indicated that it

was not convinced by Bard’s argument that judicial estoppel precluded Gore from raising the

invalidity defenses it previously asserted during the PTO proceedings, finding the issue

inadequately briefed at that time. In its Order denying Bard’s Motion to Narrow the Issues,

the Court found that judicial estoppel does not preclude Gore’s affirmative defenses of

inequitable conduct and anticipation based on prior art because the positions Gore took

before the PTO were not “irreconcilably inconsistent with the invalidity defenses Gore now

asserts” (Id. at 12). The Court found that a question of fact for the jury remained as to Gore’s

defenses. 

In those Orders, the Court cited the following case authority: 

When deciding a non-patent issue such as application of judicial estoppel,

regional circuit law applies. See Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products,

Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Wang Labs. Inc. v. Applied

Computer Science, Inc., 958 F.2d 355, 358 (Fed. Cir. 1992). A party is

judicially estopped from asserting a position in the course of litigation only if

that position is inconsistent or incompatible with an earlier position. Rissetto

v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1996).

The doctrine applies where a litigant "is playing fast and loose with the court."

See Yanez v. United States, 989 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1993). The doctrine

precludes a party from gaining an advantage in litigation by initially taking one

position and then seeking a second advantage by later taking an incompatible

position. Rissetto, 94 F.23d at 600. Judicial estoppel should not be applied if

the party's change in position was justified. See Morris v. State of California,

966 F.2d 448, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiffs have stated that the impetus for filing the instant Motion for Reconsideration

is a section Gore included in its Memorandum Regarding the Admission of Evidence on the

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Issue of Patentability entitled “Special Comment on the Matsumoto Invalidity Issue.” In this

section of its Memorandum (which did not address the relevant topic of bifurcation), Gore

requested that the Court determine the validity of claims 20 through 25 and 27 as a matter

of law based on Dr. Goldfarb’s admissions to the PTO about the Matsumoto prior art and,

therefore, the Court need not submit the issue of validity of these claims (20-25 and 27) to

the jury. In Plaintiffs’ responsive Trial Brief on Bifurcation, Plaintiffs assert that Gore's

argument in support of judgment as a matter of law as to the validity of claims 20 through

25 and 27 is an attempt to have the Court reconsider its Partial Summary Judgment Order.

The Court denied Gore’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and found that Gore had not shown

that the ‘135 patent was invalid by clear and convincing evidence. The Court finds no reason

to change its original ruling and, hereby, reiterates Gore’s statutory burden to prove

invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. To be clear, Gore is not entitled to judgment

as a matter of law as to validity of claims 20 through 25 and 27. See Am. Hoist & Derrick

Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (deference is owed to patent

examiners “who are assumed to have some expertise in interpreting the references and to be

familiar from their work with the level of skill in the art and whose duty it is to issue only

valid patents”). 

In its Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs cite Impax Lab., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm.

Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that where the “prior art was before the

examiner during prosecution of the application, there is a particularly heavy burden in

establishing invalidity”) to argue that the Court's decision to bind Plaintiffs to their losing

arguments before the PTO violates Impax because it deprives the PTO’s findings of the

requisite deference by preventing Dr. Goldfarb from adopting the PTO’s findings when it

granted the patent to him. 

Gore argues that the relevant doctrine here is the admission doctrine, which, Gore

asserts, binds a patent applicant to statements it made in the prosecution as to the content and

scope of the prior art. In support of its position, Gore cites Proctor & Gamble and In re

Nomiya as guiding case law on this issue. Pursuant to Proctor & Gamble and In re Nomiya,

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Gore asserts that statements made about prior art by or on behalf of a patent applicant during

the prosecution of the subject patent application are binding admissions. Gore further argues

that public policy supports holding Plaintiffs to their assertions to the PTO regarding prior

art. 

In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that no case law exists to bind a party to a statement it

made to the PTO that the PTO rejected during an inter partes proceeding. In response to

Plaintiffs’ inter partes argument, Gore contends that the statements to which Plaintiffs should

be bound were made initially during the inter partes interference but that Plaintiffs did not

correct the statements during the subsequent ex parte proceeding. The Court finds a failure

to correct a losing inter partes argument during a subsequent ex parte proceeding

distinguishable from a binding argument initially made during an ex parte proceeding. See

also, Allied Tube and Conduit Corp. v. John Maneely Company, 125 F.Supp.2d 987, 999-

1000 (D.Ariz. 2000) (declining to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel as a bar because the

party asserting the doctrine had not offered evidence that the court in the prior proceedings

had adopted the prior assertion or conclusions at issue). 

Furthermore, In re Nomiya states that “[i]t is necessary to consider everything

appellants have said about what is prior art to determine the exact scope of their admission.”

509 F.2d at 571. Pursuant to In re Nomiya, the Court finds it appropriate to consider

arguments an applicant presented to the PTO; however, mere consideration of arguments is

different than binding a party to its losing arguments. 

Upon further consideration, the Court is not convinced that Proctor & Gamble and In

re Nomiya act to bind Plaintiffs to their losing arguments regarding prior art made to the

PTO. This is especially true in light of the fact that the Court previously found that

assertions to the PTO regarding Gore’s defenses were a question of fact for the jury to

decide. The Court finds the same is true with regard to Plaintiffs’ previous assertions to the

PTO regarding prior art that the PTO did not adopt. 

Moreover, regarding Gore’s public policy argument, the Court is unaware of the

public policy that would bind a party to arguments it asserted in prior patent litigation that

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were not relied upon by the patent office when granting a patent. On the other hand,

Plaintiffs also present a compelling public policy argument. Plaintiffs assert that if it now

is bound to Dr. Goldfarb’s assertions to the PTO that the PTO rejected when it granted the

patent to him, the patent would be invalid because Plaintiffs would be bound to the

unsuccessful arguments it has made in the past, even though the patent was awarded to them.

There is strong public policy in support of upholding patents issued by the United States

Patent Office. Thus, to bind Plaintiffs to unsuccessful arguments Dr. Goldfarb made during

the patent prosecution when the patent ultimately was issued to him, is contrary to public

policy.

Thus, the Court finds it appropriate to reconsider its previous ruling and hereby finds

that Plaintiffs are not bound to their previous losing arguments before the PTO. Furthermore,

as stated above, Gore is not relieved of its statutory burden to prove invalidity by clear and

convincing evidence. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED granting Bard’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 594). 

DATED this 2nd day of November, 2007.

Case 2:03-cv-00597-MHM Document 610 Filed 11/02/07 Page 6 of 6