Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02167/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02167-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Benjamin Lloyd Johnson,

Petitioner

-vsIvan Bartos, et al.,

Respondents

CV-08-2167-PHX-MHM (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Buckeye, Arizona,

filed through counsel a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on

November 24, 2008 (Doc. 1). On May 12, 2009 Respondents filed their Response (Answer)

(Doc. 13). Petitioner filed a Traverse (Reply) on July 10, 2009 (Doc. 17), and a Submission

on April 6, 2010. Respondents filed a Supplemental Response (Doc. 20) on April 20, 2010..

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner’s first direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals

summarized the underlying facts as follows:

Phoenix police officers Jeffrey Dauer and Robert Handy made

a traffic stop in a residential Phoenix neighborhood during the evening

of November 12, 1994. Onlookers from a nearby house gathered as the

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officers were speaking with the occupants of the automobile. Both the

onlookers and the occupants of the vehicle were being cooperative.

Without warning, defendant -- who was in a residential yard

approximately 325 feet down the street -- fired a shot from his scoped,

30.06 caliber rifle, striking Officer Dauer in the back of his left leg and

inflicting serious, permanent injuries.

(Pet. Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 2.) (Exhibits to the Petition (Doc. 1) are referenced herein as

“Pet. Exhibit ___; Exhibits to the Answer (Doc. 13) are referenced herein as “Resp. Exhibit

___.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST TRIAL

Petitioner was indicted on: (1) one count of attempted murder as to Officer Dauer,

(2 and 3) two counts of aggravated assault related to the two police officers, (4 thru 9) 6

counts of aggravated assault with regard to bystanders, and (10) one count of criminal

trespass. Allegations were included that the offenses constituted a “dangerous felony,”

calling for increased punishment. (Pet. Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 3, 17; Resp. Exhibit E,

Indictment.) 

Petitioner proceeded to trial. 

Jury Instructions - 

General Instruction on Intent - The trial court issued Recommended Arizona Jury

Instruction (RAJI) criminal instruction 1.056(a)(1) to the jury, which provided:

"Intentionally" or "with intent to" as used in these instructions means

that a defendant's objective is to cause that result or to engage in that

conduct.

(Pet. Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 17; Resp. Exhibit F, R.T. 9/25/96 at 82.) 

Intent on Dangerous Offense - The Court provided an overarching instruction as to

the findings required to determine “whether or not the offense was a dangerous offense.” (Id.

at 84.)

An offense is a dangerous offense if it involved the intentional or

knowing infliction of serious physical injury or the use or exhibit of a

deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.

(Id.) 

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Count 3 Aggravated Assault on Officer - As to Count 3, the court instructed:

The crime of Aggravated Assault as to Count 3 - - that’s the

count involving Sergeant Handy as the victim - - requires proof of the

following two things:

1. The defendant committed an assault, which requires

proof that:

The defendant intentionally put another person, that the

defendant knew or had reason to know was a police officer, in

reasonable apprehension of immediate physical injury: and

1. The assault was aggravated by the following factor:

The defendant used a deadly weapon.

(Id. at 85 (emphasis added).) 

Counts 4 thru 9 Aggravated Assault on Bystanders - As to Counts 4 through 9, the

court instructed:

The crime of Aggravated Assault as to Counts 4 through 9

requires proof of the following two things:

1. The defendant committed an assault, which requires

proof that:

The defendant intentionally put another person in

reasonable apprehension of immediate physical injury; and

2. The assault was aggravated by the following factor:

The defendant used a deadly weapon.

(Id. at 86.) Thus the only distinction between Counts 3 and 4 through 9 was the additional

requirement with regard to Count 3 that the defendant have knowledge that the victim was

a police officer. 

Jury Question and Response - During deliberations, the jury presented a note to the

trial court stating:

We are confused on the word intentionally as it refers to counts 4

through 9 - - is intent to use a weapon the same as intent to do bodily

harm. Please expand on Doc. 3 of page 3. 

(Pet. Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 18) The jury’s page number reference was to the general

definition of “intentionally.” (Id.) The trial court responded, over Petitioner’s objection,

with a note stating:

intentionally means to do the act that you do

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1

 In chambers, the trial court evidenced an intent to provide a broader response: “My

answer to this question would be that intentionally means intent to do the act that you do,

because that’s the intent that the statute refers to. It’s not to cause a particular result to

occur.” (Resp. Exhibit F, R.T. 9/25/96 at 91-92.) 

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(Id. (emphasis in original).) 1

Result - The trespass count was dismissed at trial, and Petitioner was convicted on

all remaining counts. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 132 years

in prison, including consecutive 21 year sentences as to Counts 2 and 3(the assaults on the

two officers). (Id. at n. 4.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal arguing inter alia that “the trial court committed

reversible error by incorrectly defining “intentionally” in response to a jury question”. (Pet.

Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 4.) Petitioner argued that all convictions should be reversed on

the basis of the error. The Arizona Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that the trial court’s

response to the jury’s note was erroneous under state law as to the aggravated assault counts

because state law required “ a defendant must intend both conduct (using a deadly weapon

or dangerous instrument) and a result (placing another person in reasonable apprehension of

imminent physical injury).” (Id. at 19.) The appellate court found that the trial court’s

instruction resulted in permitting the jury “to apply the intent element only to the conduct,

i.e., the firing of the rifle or ‘the act that you do.’” (Id.) On this basis, the appellate court

reversed Petitioner’s convictions on Counts 4 through 9.

The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim that the erroneous instruction also

corrupted the verdict on the other counts, arguing that they all required proof of intent to

cause a specific result. The appellate court noted that the jury’s question was specifically

limited to Counts 4 through 9, and found that there was “nothing in the record to suggest that

the jury was confused as to the intent element of Counts I through III, and there is no reason

to assume that the court’s response affected the verdicts on those counts.” (Id. at 20.) 

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Ultimately, the appellate court reversed Petitioner’s convictions on all but the two

counts of aggravated assault related to the two police officers, and modified the sentencing

minute entry, but not the actual sentence, on those counts. (Id. at 24.) Thus, at the

conclusion of these proceedings, Petitioner stood sentenced on two, consecutive, 21 year

sentences.

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review.

(Pet. Exhibit B, Docket.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON SECOND TRIAL

On remand, the state dismissed the attempted murder charge, and Petitioner again

proceeded to trial on the aggravated assault charges related to the bystanders, and was

convicted on 5 of the 6 counts. (Pet. Exhibit C, Mem. Dec. 6/17/03 at 1-2.)

E. PROCEEDINGS ON SECOND DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal challenging his convictions as to the bystanders. The

Arizona Court of Appeals reversed his convictions, finding that the trial court improperly

instructed the jury that they could transfer Petitioner’s intent to harm the police officers to

the bystanders, in order to find the elements of aggravated assault. (Id. at 18-19.)

F. PROCEEDINGS ON THIRD TRIAL

Petitioner then proceeded again to trial on the five counts of aggravated assault for

which he had been convicted in his second trial. 

Evidence - The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized evidence related to Petitioner’s

gang involvement:

The trial court admitted evidence of membership in gang enforcement

units or task forces of the two Phoenix Police detectives who conducted

the, traffic stop' where the shooting occurred, and the Phoenix detective

and the Department of Public Safety ("DPS") detective, who arrested

[Petitioner]. The trial court, also allowed testimony from the three

Phoenix detectives (the two who conducted the traffic stop, and one of

the arresting officers) that they had encountered [Petitioner] in the past

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and that [Petitioner] had not fled from them on those occasions.

(Pet. Exhibit D, Mem. Dec. 2/22/05 at 4.) Petitioner had objected to this testimony “on the

ground that such testimony unfairly prejudiced him by suggesting that he was a gang

member.” (Id. at 3.) 

Jury Instructions - In disposing of Petitioner’s PCR petition, the trial court

summarized events at the third trial concerning the instruction on transferred intent:

In the present case, when Defendant's attorney expressed concern about

this Court's transferred intent instruction, this Court suggested that he

provide this Court with a proposed instruction. The next day,

Defendant's attorney conceded that he was unable to do so:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I noted on the record yesterday that I

think it's-that there should be further clarification to describe the

scenario discussed by the Court of Appeals in which intent

could not transfer to Mr. Johnson, which is a situation where he

intended to injure Detective Dauer and had no other intent to

place anyone in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical

injury. I drafted a number of different versions of the

instructions. And, frankly, I came up with the same scenario that

the court surmised yesterday. I don't think there is a way to do

that without creating more problems than it solves.... I can't

come up with anything that doesn't create more confusion and

more potential to mislead the jury than the court has presented.

(Pet. Exhibit F, Order 6/21/06 at 1-2 (quoting R.T. 11/26/03, at 19-20).) The trial court

ultimately instructed the jury:

The crime of Aggravated Assault requires proof of the following three

things: (I) The defendant's actions placed a person in reasonable

apprehension of imminent physical injury; and (2) the defendant

intended to place that person in reasonable apprehension of imminent

physical injury, and (3) the defendant used a deadly weapon.

* * * 

Intended to place a certain person in reasonable apprehension of

imminent physical injury is an element of the offense of each separate

count. If the defendant placed a certain person in reasonable

apprehension of imminent physical injury, but the defendant did not

intend to place that certain person in reasonable apprehension of

imminent physical injury, the element of intended to place that certain

person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury is

established if (I) the defendant's actions also placed a different person

in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury, and (2) the

defendant intended to place that different person in reasonable

apprehension of imminent physical injury.

(Id. at 3.)

Result - Petitioner was again convicted on the five counts of aggravated assault. (Pet.

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Exhibit D, Mem. Dec. 2/22/05 at 1.) 

As a result of his convictions, Petitioner is serving consecutive 21 years sentences on

Counts 2 and 3 from the first trial, and consecutive 15 years sentences on the five bystander

assault counts from his third trial (a total of 75 years), for an aggregate of 117 years.

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 6; Answer, Doc. 13 at 3.) 

G. PROCEEDINGS ON THIRD DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner then appealed his convictions from the third trial, challenging the admission

of the gang related evidence pursuant to Arizona Rule of Evidence 403. (Resp. Exhibit C,

Opening Brief.) The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the appeal, finding that the evidence

was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. (Pet. Exhibit D, Mem. Dec. 2/22/05 at 5-6, 10.)

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Resp. Exhibit D,

Pet.Rev.), arguing inter alia that the admission of the gang related evidence violated his right

to due process under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Resp. Exhibit

D, Pet. Rev. At 10-11.) That petition was summarily denied (Pet. Exhibit E, Order 8/3/5).

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner then filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Resp. Exhibit A), and a PCR

Petition (Resp. Exhibit B), arguing that appellate counsel in the third direct appeal had been

ineffective for failing to challenge the transferred intent instruction, and that the instruction

was erroneous. 

The trial court rejected Petitioner’s claim on the instruction, finding that the failure

to proffer an alternative instruction limited review of the instructional error to a fundamental

error review, that there was no fundamental error from the instruction. The trial court also

found that the instructional error claim was precluded for failure to raise it on direct appeal.

(Resp. Exhibit B, order 6/21/6 at 2.) 

The trial court also rejected the ineffective assistance claim, finding that appellate

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counsel could have a made a reasonable tactical judgment to not pursue the instructional

error, and that there was no prejudice because the instruction given was correct. (Id. at 3-4.)

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, who summarily denied

review. (Pet. Exhibit G, Order 7/12/7.) He also sought review by the Arizona Supreme

Court, which was also summarily denied. (Pet. Exhibit H, Order 12/17/07.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 24, 2008 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s

Petition asserts the following three grounds for relief:

(1) “Petitioner was denied his constitutional right to due process

of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution when the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the

mental element of aggravated assault, requiring that [P]etitioner’s

21-year prison sentence on Count Three, imposed on December 6,

1996, be vacated”;

(2) “Petitioner’s appellate counsel was constitutionally

ineffective under the Sixth Amendment of the United States

Constitution for failing to challenge a flawed transferred interest

instruction on appeal when the error had been preserved at trial,

requiring that the five consecutive sentences for aggravated assault

imposed on December 19, 2003, be vacated”; and

(3) “Petitioner was denied due process of law when the trial

court admitted, at [P]etitioner’s third trial, prejudicial and irrelevant

evidence against him, consisting of [P]etitioner’s prior contacts with the

Phoenix Police Department’s Gang Task Force.” 

(Order 12/8/8 Doc. 5 at 2 (quoting Petition, Doc. 1).)

Response - On May 12, 2009, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 13).

Respondents contend that the petition is timely, but that the Third Ground for relief is

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. (Id. at 4-10.) Respondents argue the remaining

claims are without merit. (Id. at 10-17.) 

Reply - On July 10, 2009, Petitioner filed a Traverse (Doc. 17 ). Petitioner argues that

his Ground Three was fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme

Court in his third direct appeal. (Id. at 18-22.) He argues the merits of all three claims.

Supplements - On March 25, 2010, the parties were directed to supplement the record

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to include portions of the transcript and jury instructions relevant to Ground 1 of the Petition.

On April 6, 2010, Petitioner filed his Submission (Doc. 19), including as exhibits portions

of the transcript. On April 20, 2010, Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 20), referencing

the transcript attached as Exhibit F to the Answer (Doc. 13). 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUND ONE: DUE PROCESS - JURY INSTRUCTION

For his Ground One, Petitioner argues that he was denied his constitutional right to

due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution when the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the mental element of

aggravated assault, requiring that Petitioner’s 21-year prison sentence on Count Three,

imposed on December 6, 1996, be vacated. 

Respondents argue that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ finding that the trial court’s

response to the jury’s question as to Counts 4 to 9 did not affect Count Three is a factual

finding entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). (Answer,

Doc. 13 at 12-13.) Respondents further argue that the factual distinctions between Count 3

(aggravated assault on police officer adjacent to officer shot) and Counts 4 though 9

(aggravated assault on bystanders), provided the jury a sufficient basis to find the requisite

intent to harm the other officers, and thus reflected that their concerns (and thus the Court’s

response) were limited to the bystander counts. (Id. at 13-14.) Respondents also argue that

the trial court’s original instructions on “reasonable apprehension” were correct and would

have cured any misdirection. (Id. at 14.) 

Petitioner replies that the facts were not sufficiently distinguishable to provide a basis

to find that the jury’s deliberations on Count Three were not affected by the erroneous

instruction. (Traverse, Doc. 17 at 6-7.) Petitioner further argues that it is the trial court’s

response, not the jury’s question which provides the proper focus in ascertaining whether the

jury was misled by the instruction, and attempting to distinguish based on the status as a

police officer of the victim in Count Three is simply speculation as to what the jury may have

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2

 The Arizona Court of Appeals harmlessness decision extended to Counts I and II,

the charges for attempted murder and aggravated assault on the officer struck by the bullet.

(Pet. Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 12/7/98 at 20.) The conviction on Count I was vacated on other

grounds. (Id. at 24.) The conviction on Count II was sustained, but Petitioner’s challenge

in Ground One is explicitly limited to Count III. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 4, n.1, and 22.)

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done. (I.d at 7.) Petitioner further argues that the presumption should be that the jury

followed the Court’s final instruction on the requisite intent, which was the erroneous one.

(Id. at 8-9.) 

Nature of State Court’s Determination - Respondents cast as a factual finding the

state appellate court’s determination that the jury’s verdict on Count Three was not affected

by the erroneous instruction.2

 (Answer, Doc. 13 at 12-13.) 

However, harmlessness is not a factual question. Rather, the determination whether

an instructional error “was merely harmless error or an impermissible violation of due

process is a mixed question of law and fact not controlled by section 2254(d). Only the facts

which underlie this ultimate conclusion are governed by the statutory presumption.” Hunt

v. State of Oklahoma, 683 F.2d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 1982). See Herd v. Kinchloe, 800 F.2d

1526, 1528 (9th Cir. 1986) (harmlessness of instructional error “is a mixed question of law

and fact”); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (“determination of

whether an error was harmless is a mixed question of law and fact”). 

However, to the extent that the state court made findings of historical fact in the

course of reaching its harmlessness conclusion, those findings are entitled to a presumption

of correctness. See Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (1987). 

Limitation on Habeas Relief - “A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus

based on a claim adjudicated by a state court if the state-court decision ‘was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state court's decision

is ‘contrary to ... clearly established Federal law’ ‘if the state court applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases,’ or ‘if the state court confronts facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a

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3

 The same is not true of instructions which do not pertain to an individual element

of an offense but to the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a whole.

In such an instance, the defective instruction leaves nothing for the reviewing court to

evaluate, but “vitiates all the jury’s findings.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 19 (quoting Sullivan v.

Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993)). Thus, such errors are deemed structural and are not

subject to harmless error analysis. Id. Here, however, the erroneous instruction simply

affected the required proof on the element of intent. Accordingly, only harmful error

required reversal.

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result opposite to ours.’” Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 452-453 (2005) (citations omitted).

Appropriate Standard - “It is a violation of due process for a jury instruction to omit

an element of the crime.” Evanchyk v. Stewart , 340 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2003). A judge’s

response to a mid-deliberation inquiry is treated as a jury instruction. Belmontes v.

Woodford, 350 F.3d 861, 900, n. 16 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds Brown v.

Belmontes, 544 U.S. 945 (2005). 

Harmlessness on Direct Review - When a jury has been incorrectly instructed in a way

that relieves the prosecution of its burden of proof on an element of the crime, the error is

subject to a harmless error analysis. A reviewing appellate court is obligated to reverse

unless “the facts found by the jury were such that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that

if the jury had never heard the impermissible instruction its verdict would have been the

same.” Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503, n..6 (1987).3

In reviewing for harmlessness, the reviewing court need not conclude that the jury did

not have the impermissible instruction “in mind” when they determined guilt, nor need the

court “retrace the jury’s deliberative processes.” Id. However, if after reviewing the record,

“the court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been

the same absent the error--for example, where the defendant contested the omitted element

and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding--it should not find the error

harmless.” Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999).

In reviewing for harmlessness on direct review, the court must presume that the error

resulted in harm, and place the burden on the prosecution and not on the defendant, in

addressing the issue. 

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. . . the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the

beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to

suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment . . . the

beneficiary of a constitutional error [must] prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict

obtained. We[hold] that before a federal constitutional error can be held

harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). See also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 630 (1993) (“The State bears the burden of proving that an error passes muster under

[the Chapman] standard.”).

Harmlessness on Habeas - However, in the context of collateral review (e.g. by a

habeas court), as opposed to direct review on appeal, the presumption no longer applies. In

such collateral review, to determine whether a state court error was harmless, the

presumption is in favor of the judgment and must be overcome by a showing that, in light of

the record as a whole, the error has a “substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict.

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. Under this more stringent standard, petitioners “are not entitled to

habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual

prejudice.’” Id. at 637. 

When reviewing a harmlessness decision, under the limitations on habeas relief in 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a habeas court must first find that the state court applied an incorrect

harmlessness standard, or applied the Chapman standard unreasonably. However, even after

making such a determination, the habeas court must still evaluate whether the error meets the

more rigorous harmlessness standard under Brecht. Medina v. Horning, 386 F.3d 872, 876

(9th Cir. 2004). (For a discussion of the alternative approaches utilized among the circuits

in coordinating Chapman and Brecht, see Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d 300, 304, n.3 (2nd

Cir. 2004).) In the habeas context, an instruction is harmful, and a petitioner has met his

burden of proving actual prejudice, if he shows that the erroneous instruction “‘had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.’” Clark v.

Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 916 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Brecht, 532 U.S at 637). 

In making that determination, however, the habeas court does not apply any

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presumption for or against harmlessness (as opposed to the presumption in favor of the state

court’s judgment). Rather, the habeas judge must answer whether “I, the judge think that the

error substantially influenced the jury’s decision.” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437

(1995). “It must do so without benefit of such aids as presumptions or allocated burdens of

proof that expedite fact-finding at the trial.” Id. (quoting R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless

Error 26 (1970)). 

State Court Decision Contrary to Federal Law - Here, the Arizona Court of

Appeals concluded that the trial court’s response to the jury’s question resulted in an

erroneous instruction. That determination is a matter of state law and is unassailable in this

proceeding. However, the Arizona Court of Appeals failed to apply the presumption in favor

of the defendant in determining the harmlessness of that error as it related to Count Three,

as mandated by Chapman. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 630. The Arizona Court

of Appeals neither acknowledged nor applied the Chapman presumption. 

It is true that “Federal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply

with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation.” Bell v.

Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005). See also Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (§2254(d)(1)

“does not require citation of our cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of our

cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts

them”). Indeed, so long as an equivalent state standard is applied in finding harmlessness,

the Constitution will be satisfied. Medina v. Horning, 386 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“The California Court of Appeal's harmless error determination in this case was not

“contrary to” established federal law. Although the Court of Appeal did not identify

Chapman as the guiding point of its harmless error analysis, it applied a state-law “harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt” standard that comports with federal law.”).

Here, however, the Arizona court did not merely fail to acknowledge Chapman, or to

expressly apply its standard. Nor did it apply a comparable state standard. Instead, it applied

an antithetical presumption that the error was harmless and rejected the claim when Petitioner

failed to prove to the contrary:

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4

 There is nothing in the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision which would suggest

that they implicitly applied the Chapman standard. Although that court vacated the

conviction on the other assault charges based on the instruction error, the court did not

reference nor explicitly apply any harmlessness standard in doing so. (See Pet. Exhibit A,

Mem. Dec. 12/7/98 at 17-20.) Likewise, in vacating the attempted murder conviction based

on an erroneous instruction, the court did not rely upon any harmlessness standard, but

instead relied on a “fundamental error” standard because of Petitioner’s failure to object at

trial. (Id. at 14.) Even if this were the equivalent of the Chapman standard, the court would

not have had reason to apply it to the intent instruction, to which Petitioner objected at trial.

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There is nothing in the record to suggest that the jury was confused as

to the intent element of Counts I through III, and there is no reason to

assume that the court’s response affected the verdicts on those counts.

(Pet. Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 20.)4

 Rather than being free to simply find “no reason to

assume” a harmful effect, the state court was required to assume that it was harmful, and to

look to the prosecution to establish otherwise. By failing to do so, “the state court applie[d]

a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases.” Bell, 543

U.S. at 452-453. Cf. Samuel v. U.S., 169 F.2d 787, 794 (C.A.9 1948) (a pre-Chapman case)

(“We are not at liberty to assume that the instruction as given was favorable to appellants

and, therefore, nonprejudicial.”).

Harmfulness of Instructional Error - However, as discussed above, Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief merely because the decision of the state court was erroneous. That

is so even if that error rises to the level mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). To the

contrary, in this habeas proceeding, Petitioner is not entitled to relief unless this Court is

convinced, or is at least in grave doubt, that the error was indeed harmful. 

State Court Findings - In discussing the harmfulness of the instruction, the Arizona

Court of Appeals reached several conclusions on state law and made several findings of

historical fact which are binding on this Court, including:

1. All of the charges against Petitioner required proof of intent not only to

perform the act, but intent to cause a specific result. (Pet. Exhibit A, Mem.

Dec. at 20.)

2. The jury’s note did not refer to Count Three, but referred to Counts 4 through

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5

 Even if this were a finding of historical fact, it would relate solely to the jury’s state

of mind prior to the erroneous instruction, and not after.

6

 The Arizona Court of Appeals referenced the limitation in the jury’s question to find

no error. Had the state court’s decision not been “contrary to” federal law, this Court would

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9. (Id. at 18, 20.)

3. The note went on to ask the trial court if “intent to use a weapon [is] the same

as intent to do bodily harm,” and then asked the court to expand on the general

definition of “intentionally”. (Id. at 18.) 

3. The trial court’s response was not limited to any specific counts, but simply

directed that “intentionally means intent to do the act that you do.”. (Id. at 18,

20.)

The Arizona court went on to opine that “there is nothing in the record to suggest that

the jury was confused as to the intent element of Counts I through III.” (Id. at 20.) However,

that is not a factual finding, but a summary conclusion by the state court.5

 

Unified Intent Instruction - In instructing the jury, the trial court provided a general

instruction on intent (Resp. Exhibit F, R.T. 9/25/96 at 82), and an overarching instruction as

to the findings required to determine “whether or not the offense was a dangerous offense.”

(Id. at 84.) The only distinction in the specific instructions give on Counts 3 and 4 through

9 was the additional requirement with regard to Count 3 that the defendant have knowledge

that the victim was a police officer. No separate or special instruction was given on Count

3 with regard to the intent to cause an apprehension of harm.

Jury Question Focused on Dangerousness Allegation - There was no reason for the

distinction between the counts expressed in the jury’s question. 

We are confused on the word intentionally as it refers to counts 4

through 9 - - is intent to use a weapon the same as intent to do bodily

harm. Please expand on Doc. 3 of page 3. 

(Pet. Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 18) Although the jury’s question referenced Counts 4 through

9, they then asked two general questions about the meaning of “intentionally”, including a

specific reference to the general definition of “intentionally” given by the court.6

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be obligated to evaluate that decision under the “unreasonable application of “ standard. See

Medina v. Horning, 386 F.3d 872, 877-878 (9th Cir. 2004). The undersigned would still find

that a decision to rely upon the limited nature of the question, as opposed to the general

nature of the trial court’s response, was objectively unreasonable given: (1) the presumption

that the jury carefully applied the instructions actually given by the court, see Richardson v.

Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987); (2) the apparent actual intent of the jury to reference the

dangerous offense instruction (see note 3, infra, and surrounding text); and (3) the

requirement that the prosecution show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,”

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

7

 The Arizona Court of Appeals did not correlate the jury’s note to the dangerous

offense allegation, but focused instead upon the intent for the basic aggravated assault

conviction. (Pet. Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 20-21.)

8

 The focus on Counts 4 through 9 may have resulted from the a distinction between

bystanders and police officers. The jury may have been satisfied that Petitioner’s

overarching intent was to shoot at and either harm or scare away police officers, but that he

may have had no such intent with regard to bystanders. Thus, they would have been left to

resolving whether the simple intent to use the gun was sufficient to eliminate the need to find

an intent to cause bodily harm.

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The specific intent matters referenced did not correlate to the elements of Counts 4

through 9 (or Count 3). None of these counts mandated a finding of “intent to use a weapon”

or “to do bodily harm.” Rather, the requisite intent on all of these counts was to “put another

person . . .in reasonable apprehension of immediate physical injury.” On the other hand, the

dangerous offense designation required such a finding.7

 Thus, the substance of the jury’s

question was not directed at specific elements unique to Counts 4 through 9, but evidenced

a misunderstanding as to the nature of the intent proof required under the dangerous offense

allegation.8

They concluded by focusing on the general instruction on “intentionally.”

Court Provided General Response - The trial court responded, over Petitioner’s

objection, with a note stating:

intentionally means to do the act that you do

(Pet. Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 18 (emphasis in original).) As the state court found, the

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9

 The trial court’s issuance of its general instruction despite trial counsel’s objection

that it eliminated that requisite intent such that “reckless would be all the requisite state of

mind,” (Resp. Exhibit F, R.T. 9/25/96 at 92), suggests that the trial court understood and

intended that the response be read as a general refinement on the definition of intent, and not

limited to the dangerousness issue actually raised by the jury. 

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judge’s response was not limited to a specific count or issue. (Id.)

9

Instead the trial court simply undertook to redefine “intentionally.” Thus, through its

response, the trial court rewrote it’s general definition of intent, which was applicable to all

counts, including Count 3. No separate instruction on “intent” was given with regard to

either Count 3, Counts 4 through 9, or the dangerous offense designation. And, the

elements of proof of intent were the same between Count 3 and Counts 4 through 9 (with the

exception that Count 3 required proof of Petitioner’s knowledge that the victim was a police

officer). Thus, the jury would have had no basis to limit the trial court’s response to Counts

4 through 9 (or even the dangerous offense designation). 

"[It is] the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their

instructions." Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987). "[We] presum[e] that jurors,

conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the particular language of the trial court's

instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the

instructions given them." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324, n. 9 (1985). 

Therefore, the trial court’s erroneous rewriting of the general definition of intent

would have impaired the jury’s determination on any count or charge which drew upon that

general definition.

Factual Distinctions in Count 3 - Nonetheless, Respondents argue that the factual

distinctions between Count 3 (aggravated assault on police officer adjacent to officer shot)

and Counts 4 though 9 (aggravated assault on bystanders), provided the jury a sufficient

basis to find the requisite intent to harm the other officers, and thus reflected that their

concerns (and thus the Court’s response) were limited to the bystander counts. (Answer,

Doc. 13 at 13-14; Supplement, Doc. 20 at 3.) While that may have provided a basis for the

jury’s distinction in their question, it would not overcome the general nature of the trial

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court’s response. 

Nor does the existence of sufficient evidence to support the conviction render the trial

court’s elimination of an intent requirement harmless. See U.S. v. Seymour, 576 F.2d 1345,

1349 (9th Cir. 1978) (“the mere fact that the evidence was overwhelming is not a justification

for classifying the error as harmless, under the Chapman standard”). If the jury followed the

instructions they were left with, namely that “intentionally” related only to conduct and not

effect, then they could have convicted Petitioner without having to find any evidence of the

requisite intent to create an apprehension. 

It is true that “where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the

omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the

jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly

found to be harmless.” Neder v. U.S. 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999). Here, however, the existence

of intent was contested (see Resp. Exhibit F, R.T. 9/25/96 at 33), and the only evidence of

such intent was the implication from Petitioner having fired the gun (see Pet. Exhibit A,

Mem. Dec. 12/7/98 at 22). 

We are not authorized to look at the printed record, resolve conflicting

evidence, and reach the conclusion that the error was harmless because

we think the defendant was guilty. That would be to substitute our

judgment for that of the jury and, under our system of justice, juries

alone have been entrusted with that responsibility.

Weiler v. U.S., 323 U.S. 606, 611 (1945). 

Instructions as a Whole - Respondents also argue that the “trial court’s final

instructions to the jury on the ‘reasonable apprehension of ‘ harm theory of aggravated

assault were correct.” (Answer, Doc. 13 at 14.) Indeed, this Court is obligated to examine

the instructions as a whole, and not in isolation. “It is well established that the instruction

‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the context of the

instructions as a whole and the trial record.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 u.S. 62, 72 (1991)

(quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)).

Presumably Respondents reference the jury instructions given immediately prior to

commencing deliberations. Those were not, however, the court’s truly “final instructions.”

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10 A similar distinction in the intent underlying the various charges was recognized

by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Petitioner’s appeal from his second trial, when they

observed that “[b]ased on the instructions given and the verdicts rendered, we cannot

determine whether the jury found that (1) Johnson intended only to frighten the officers or

others at the scene or (2) Johnson intended both to shoot a person and to frighten one or

more of the people present or (3) Johnson intended only to shoot a person and not to scare

anyone.” (Pet. Exhibit C, Mem. Dec. 6/17/03 at 11-12.) 

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Rather, the last instruction given was the erroneous instruction on the meaning of

“intentionally,” which contradicted the prior proper definition. 

To the extent that last instruction conflicted with those given earlier, the jury could

be expected to give greater weight to the latter instruction. “Particularly in a criminal trial,

the judge's last word is apt to be the decisive word. If it is a specific ruling on a vital issue

and misleading, the error is not cured by a prior unexceptionable and unilluminating abstract

charge.” Bollenbach v. U.S., 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946).

Defense Theory - Finally, Respondents argue that any error was irrelevant because

Petitioner’s defense at trial was that he was not the shooter. To the contrary, Petitioner

specifically argued that there was a failure to establish intent on the aggravated assault

charges. Petitioner argued that the asserted intent to shoot Detective Dauer precluded an

intent to cause “reasonable apprehension of physical injury” in Officer Handy and the other

victims in the aggravated assault counts. “You can’t have it both ways.” (Resp. Exhibit F,

R.T. 9/25/96 at 33.)10 

In contrast, in arguing on Counts 3, and 4 through 9, the prosecution offered no

argument of evidence on the state of mind of Petitioner. With regard to Count 3, the

prosecution instead focused on the state of mind and the reaction of the victim, officer

Handy. (Resp. Exhibit F, R.T. 9/25/96 at 10-11.) With regard to Counts 4 through 9, the

prosecution again focused on whether it was “reasonable for them to feel threatened.” (Id.

at 11.) Thus, the prosecution’s arguments, if accepted, effectively vitiated any requirement

of Petitioner’s intent to cause apprehension, and would have made the occurrence of that

apprehension sufficient. In essence, the prosecution’s argument was in line with the

erroneous instruction that intent “to do that act that you do” is sufficient. See Boyde v.

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11 Respondents were encouraged to supplement the record on the evidence before the

jury. (See Order 3/25/10, Doc. 18 at 4 (“Here, the parties have not supplied copies of

transcripts or the jury instructions given so as to permit this Court to evaluate whether the

jury, particularly in light of the other related offenses on which they convicted, necessarily

found the required elements to convict on Count Three notwithstanding the erroneous

instruction.”).) In response, Respondents did not submit any additional transcripts. (See

Response, Doc. 20.) Consequently, the undersigned must presume that the balance of the

transcript would not further Respondents’ arguments beyond the descriptions of the evidence

in the state courts’ rulings.

12 Indeed, on retrial on Counts 4 through 9, the prosecution was ultimately required

to rely upon a transferred intent instruction to supply the requisite intent as to the bystanders.

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California, 494 U.S. 370, 384-385 (1990) (discussing propriety of considering prosecutorial

arguments in determining effect of jury instructions). 

Evidence - The jury was faced with evidence that Petitioner fired one shot and struck

one police officer. 

Without warning, defendant - - who was in a residential yard

approximately 325 feet down the street - - fired a shot from his scoped,

30.06 caliber rifle, striking Officer Dauer in the back of his left leg and

inflicting serious, permanent injuries.

(Pet. Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 12/7/98 at 2.)11 There has been no suggestion that any evidence

of intent to cause apprehension existed apart from the firing of the shot and the proximity

of Officer Handy and the bystanders.12

As the Arizona Court of Appeals explained in Petitioner’s second direct appeal, from

the evidence of Petitioner having fired the shot in the direction of the crowd the “jurors could

permissibly infer that Johnson intended to place the bystanders in reasonable apprehension.”

(Pet. Exhibit D, Mem. Dec. 6/17/03 at 12 n.7.) However, that evidence was not sufficient

to allow the court to presume that the jury must have found the intent necessary to support

the aggravated assault charges:

we cannot rule out that Johnson may have intended only to shoot

Officer D and not to place Officer D or anyone else in apprehension.

It cannot be presumed from the act of firing a shot at Officer D that

Johnson also intended to scare Officer D or any of the bystanders.

While common sense suggests that a person who shoots at one person

likely knows that bystanders will be frightened by the shot, the

apprehension form of assault requires proof of intentionally placing a

person in apprehension. Knowingly placing a person in apprehension

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is a less culpable mental state and is not sufficient for this crime.

(Id. at 12 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).)

Grave Doubt - At best then, this Court is left with an erroneous and generally

applicable definition of intent, rendered in response to a jury question originally directed at

Counts 4 through 9, and evidence which arguably could have supported a finding of intent

on Count 3, but did not compel such a finding. If applied to Count 3, the erroneous

instruction left the jury free to sidestep the careful weighing of evidence required to find the

requisite subjective intent necessary to convict on Count 3, just as it had done on Counts 4

through 9. “The trial court’s response to the jury’s inquiry specifically and erroneously

directed them to apply the intent element only to the conduct, i.e. the firing of the rifle or ‘the

act that you do.’” (Pet. Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 12/7/98 at 19 (referencing Counts 4 though 9).)

Under these circumstances, the undersigned concludes that the jury’s verdict was

substantially influenced by the erroneous instruction, and thus the error was not harmless.

See O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995) (“Normally a record review will permit

a [habeas corpus] judge to make up his or her mind about the matter. And indeed a judge has

an obligation to do so.”)

Even if not so convinced, the balance between presuming that the jury relied upon the

specificity of their question rather than presuming that they relied upon the generality of the

trial court’s response, “is so evenly balanced that [the undersigned would at most feel]

himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.” O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 435.

In the face of such “grave doubt,” the undersigned must “treat the error, not as if it were

harmless, but as if it affected the verdict.” Id. See also Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047,

1051 (9th Cir. 2000) (“If we are in grave doubt as to whether the error had such an effect, the

petitioner is entitled to the writ.”).

Summary - Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner was

denied due process when the trial court’s erroneous, and not harmless, instruction permitted

Petitioner to be convicted on Count 3 in his first trial without proof of the intent element of

the crime.

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Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend that Petitioner be issued a writ of

habeas corpus directing his release from all custody as a result of his conviction on such

Count 3, which represents 21 years of Petitioner’s 117 year combined sentence, unless within

90 days the State of Arizona retries and convicts him on such charge.

B. GROUND TWO: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

For his Ground Two for relief, Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was

constitutionally ineffective under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution for

failing to challenge a flawed “transferred intent” instruction on appeal of his conviction in

his third trial for aggravated assault as to the bystanders. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 27-38.)

Respondents contend that the PCR court determined that the instruction was correct under

Arizona law, and thus argue that Petitioner cannot show deficient performance in failing to

raise the meritless claim. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 16-17.) Petitioner replies by arguing that the

instruction was incorrect, a challenge would have been successful, and thus appellate counsel

was deficient in failing to pursue it. (Traverse, Doc. 17 at 9-18.)

Ineffective Assistance Standard - Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order

to prevail on such a claim, Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s

representation fell below the objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove

both elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

A deficient performance is one in which counsel’s errors were so great he or she was

not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d

861, 864 (9th Cir. 1986). The failure to take futile action can never be deficient

performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996). “The failure to raise

a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann

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13 Because the Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court issued summary

denials of review of the PCR court’s decision, this habeas court looks through to the “last

reasoned decision,” and thus reviews the PCR court’s decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker , 501

U.S. 797, 804 (1991). 

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v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

State Law Determinations - A state court determination of state law is not subject

to review in a federal habeas court. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2000)

("federal court is bound by the state court's interpretations of state law"). That principle

applies to a state court’s analysis of jury instructions under state law. See Waddington v.

Sarausad, 129 S.Ct. 823, 832 n 5 (2009) (“The Washington Supreme Court expressly held

that the jury instruction correctly set forth state law, and we have repeatedly held that ‘it is

not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on

state-law questions.’” ).

Application - Here, the PCR court concluded that under the state law of Arizona, the

transferred intent instruction “was a proper instruction.” (Pet. Exhibit F, Order 6/21/6.)13.

This habeas court cannot revisit that decision. Thus, this Court must accept the PCR court’s

conclusion that had appellate counsel raised a challenge to the transferred intent instruction,

that challenge would have been unsuccessful. 

Petitioner attempts to now avoid that determination by arguing that the transferred

intent instruction may have been technically correct, but required augmentation “to make

clear the limitations on this theory of intent.” (Travers Doc. 17 at 12-15.) Petitioner argues

that the instruction permitted the jury to convict without finding the requisite intent by

implying that the jury could “transfer Petitioner’s apparent intent to shoot Officer Dauer to

supply the intent to cause reasonable apprehension in the bystanders.” (Travers, Doc. 17 at

13.) 

However, the PCR Court identified three elements required by its instructions: 

(1) intend to place some other person in reasonable apprehension of

imminent physical injury, and (2) actually placed that other person in

reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury, and (3) actually

placed the named victim in reasonable apprehension of imminent

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physical injury.

(Pet. Exhibit F, Order 6/21/06 at 3.) The intent with respect to the direct object was not

limited to a simple intent to shoot at them. Instead, it required an intent “to place [them] in

reasonable apprehension.” (Id.) 

Petitioner points out a series of federal cases where clarifying instructions were

required, despite the fact that the instructions given were correct. (Traverse, Doc. 17 at 15-

16.) However, each of those cases were federal prosecutions, and thus did not require the

federal courts to reject a state court’s finding on a matter of state law. See United States v.

Negrete-Gonzalez, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gee, 226 F.3d 885,

895 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thomas, 150 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 1998); United

States v. Mims, 92 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1996); and United States v. Corrigan, 548 F.3d

879, 883 (10th Cir. 1977). 

Moreover, Petitioner’s logic invites this Court to presume that when the PCR court

concluded the instruction was “a proper instruction”, that it was evaluating the language of

the instruction in a vacuum without an eye to its correctness in the context of the trial. That

would require this Court to assume that the PCR court ignored Petitioner’s arguments that

the disputed instruction “correctly stated the law without doing anything to limit the

possibility [that the jury may have applied the instruction too broadly].” (Resp. Exhibit B,

PCR Pet. at 13.) Instead, the PCR Court explicitly rejected such a contention, carefully

evaluating the instructions and their delineation of all the elements required to be found by

the jury, and concluding that the court “must presume that the jurors followed this Court’s

instructions.” (Pet. Exhibit F, Order 6/21/6 at 3-4.) 

Thus, Petitioner fails to proffer any reason to believe that a challenge by appellate

counsel would have had sufficient merit to mandate that he bring such a challenge. Under

these circumstances, the undersigned can find neither deficient performance nor prejudice,

and therefore Ground Two should be denied.

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C. GROUND THREE (GANG EVIDENCE): PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Ground Three is unexhausted, now procedurally

defaulted, and thus barred from habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)

(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104

(9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Proper Forum/Proceeding - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in

Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his

conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be

exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where

alternative avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown

v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death

penalty, ‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once

the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).

Respondents argue (Answer, Doc. 13 at 15) that presentation to the Arizona Supreme

Court (not just the Arizona Court of Appeals) is required for exhaustion, citing Baldwin v.

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 30–33 (1999). The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent reliance on Swoopes

in Castillo, notwithstanding Baldwin, dispels this argument. Moreover, nothing in Baldwin

precludes the reasoning in Swoopes. 

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proper forum, but must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state

courts with a "fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon

his constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277

(1971). A claim has been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has

described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based.

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, Robbins v.

Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

2. Application to Petitioner’s Ground Three

In his third ground for relief, Petitioner challenges the admission of the gang related

evidence in his third trial, arguing that it was irrelevant and prejudicial, and therefore its

admission was a denial of due process. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 39-43.) Petitioner argues that this

claim was presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court in his

third direct appeal. Petitioner interweaves in his arguments the assertion that he presented

his claim “at every level of the State Court.” (Traverse, Doc. 17 at 22; see also id. at 21, 23.)

In particular, Petitioner argues that the claim was fairly presented when he argued 

“that the wrongful admission of this irrelevant and inflammatory evidence was harmful

because it cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the

verdict, citing the federal standard set forth in Chapman v. California, in support.”

(Traverse, Doc. 17 at 20-21 (citing Resp. Exhibit C, Opening Brief at 19).)

Not Presented to Court of Appeals - To be sure, Petitioner did argue the facts of this

claim in his third direct appeal. However, while the petitioner need not recite “book and

verse on the federal constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting

Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the facts

necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat

similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam).

Petitioner concedes that he did not“pronounce the words ‘due process’ in the lower

appellate court.” (Traverse, Doc. 17 at 23.) Moreover, a review of Petitioner’s Opening

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Brief reveals no reference to the Due Process guarantees of the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner

cited no provision of the United States Constitution, and the only reference to any

constitutional provision was to the Arizona State Constitution for purposes of establishing

jurisdiction over the appeal. (Resp. Exhibit C, Opening Brief at 3.) 

It is true that a state court may be found to have been fairly apprised of a federal claim

by the citation of relevant federal authorities. Here, however, the only citation of federal

authority was Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) However, Petitioner only

indirectly cited this case as having been the source of a quotation by the state courts:

This error requires reversal because "upon an examination of the entire

record, it appears reasonably possible that the error might have

materially influenced the jury in arriving at its verdict." State v.

Serrano, 17 Ariz. App. 473, 498 P.2d 547 (App. 1972), quoting

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967).

(Resp. Exhibit C, Opening Brief at 19.) 

The state case cited by Petitioner, Serrano, was not a federal due process case, but

instead turned upon a determination whether evidence improperly admitted under state law

had been prejudicial and thus required reversal. The Arizona court drew upon Chapman

only for a standard for determining whether the improperly admitted evidence required

reversal. However, that did not render Serrano a federal constitutional case. Indeed, in State

v. Fulimante, 161, Ariz. 237, 778 P.2d 602 (1988), the Arizona Supreme Court

acknowledged that the state courts had simply co-opted the harmless error standard from

Chapman, but varied from the federal courts in its formulation and application. Id. at 245,

778 P.2d at 610.

Moreover, Chapman itself was not founded upon a determination that unfairly

prejudicial evidence must be excluded. Nor did it even hold that improperly admitted

evidence which was unfairly prejudicial resulted in a due process violation. Rather,

Chapman was limited to resolving when errors which were themselves a constitutional

violation (in that case, instructions and argument that the defendants’ invocation of their right

to remain silent was evidence of guilt) required reversal. The issues identified by the Court

were “whether there can ever be harmless constitutional error and whether the error here was

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14 Respondents also argue that Petitioner’s due process argument was too vague and

generalized to result in fair presentation. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 9.) However, the Petition for

Review plainly laid out a due process challenge to the admission of unfairly prejudicial

evidence, arguing the evidence was incompetent and resulted in an unfair fact finding

process. "Although evidence questions are questions of state law, improper admission of

evidence can amount to a due process violation if it ‘is clearly prejudicial and 'rendered the

trial fundamentally unfair.' ' " Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 775 (9th Cir. 2002).

It is true that Petitioner relied upon Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), which

involved a defendant’s presentation before the jury in prison garb, rather than any formally

introduced evidence. However, the essence of Estelle was the recognition that due process

prohibits procedures which “undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process . . . [or dilute]

the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable

doubt.” 425 U.S. at 503. Although Estelle may not have been factually on point, the

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harmless.” 386 U.S. at 20. Indeed, the Court first had to resolve whether federal or state law

governed the issue, and opined that “application of a state harmless-error rule is, of course,

a state question where it involves only errors of state procedure or state law.” Id. at 21.

Thus, Petitioner’s citation to Serrano, and his indirect citation to Chapman would not

serve to identify a claim that the admission of the gang related evidence was a violation of

due process. Indeed, the state law nature of Petitioner’s claim was plainly stated in the

conclusion of his Opening Brief: “The Trial Court abused its discretion by admitting

evidence of prior contacts with members of the police gang squad, in violation of Rule

401,402,403, and 404 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence.” (Resp. Exhibit C at 21.)

Presentation to Arizona Supreme Court - Petitioner did fairly present his due

process claim in his Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court. He argued that the

admission of the gang related evidence was unfairly prejudicial and that it impinged upon his

presumption of innocence, that it was a violation of his federal due process guarantee. (Resp.

Exhibit D, Pet. Rev. at 10-11.) 

However, Petitioner presented his claim for the first time to the Arizona Supreme

Court, skipping the intermediate court. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.19(c)(1)

limits review to issues presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Therefore, Respondents

argue, Petitioner’s presentation of this claim for the first time to the Arizona Supreme Court

was not fair presentation.14 

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essential nature of the due process protection, i.e. prejudice to a fair fact-fainting process, is

the same as that relied upon in evaluating the formal admission of evidence.

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In Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989), the Supreme Court was called on

to decide “whether the presentation of claims to a State's highest court on discretionary

review, without more, satisfies the exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 349.

After noting that the petitioner had raised only state law claims to the intermediate state

appellate court, the Supreme Court held that “where the [federal] claim has been presented

for the first and only time in a procedural con text in which its merits will not be considered

unless there are special and important reasons ... [r]aising the claim in such a fashion does

not ... constitute fair presentation.” Id. at 351 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Petitioner offers nothing to suggest that there is anything which would make this

distinguishable from Castille.

To be sure, Petitioner does argue that there are reasons to distinguish the cases relied

upon by Respondents in making their argument. Petitioner distinguishes Roentgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36 (9th Cir. 1994) on the basis that the petitioner there had only submitted

his claims in a state habeas proceeding after the conclusion of his direct appeals and postconviction proceedings. (Traverse, Doc. 17 at 20-21.) However, Roentgen effects no limits

on the holding in Castille. In fact, it is distinguishable to the extent that it involved not a

skipping of an intermediate court, but a presentation in a separate review proceeding, whilst

review was designated by the Arizona Rules to be brought through normal review processes

such as direct appeal or post-conviction remedies under Rule 32. Here, Petitioner’s failure

was not presentation in an extraordinary proceeding, but skipping an intermediate court in

the same proceedings.

Petitioner distinguishes Gunter v. Mahoney, 291 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2002), on the basis

that there was no explicit holding in this case that his claim was procedurally defaulted by

failure to raise it earlier. (Traverse, Doc. 17 at 21-22.) However, as made clear in Casey v.

Moore, this Court is not permitted to find a fair presentation by the absence of clear reliance

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on a procedural default . It is true that there is a presumption from such absence, the Harris

presumption, applicable when determining whether a post-card denial was on the merits or

on a procedural default. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). However, that

presumption is not applicable in cases such as Casey and here, where the question is not

whether a procedural default was applied, but simply whether the claim was fairly presented.

See Casey, 386 F3d at 918, n. 23. “The question in Casey's case is about fair presentation,

not about divining the reasons behind the state supreme court's rejection without comment

of Casey's claims.” Id. Thus, the lack of a clear reliance on procedural default is not

determinative of whether Petitioner’s novel presentation to the Arizona Supreme Court was

a fair presentation.

Petitioner distinguishes State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, 78 P.3d 732 (2003), on the

basis that the defendant in that case attempted to bring a claim for the first time in a

supplemental brief before the Arizona Supreme Court, whereas Petitioner challenged the

admission of the gang evidence in the Court of Appeals, and argued it in his Petition to the

Arizona Supreme Court. (Traverse, Doc. 17 at 21.) However, the Arizona court’s reference

in Sepahi to presentation in the supplemental brief was not the determinative factor, rather

the court concluded that the “ issue was not raised either in the superior court or the court

of appeals, and therefore was not preserved for our review.” Id. at 324, 78 P.2d 736, n.3. In

so finding, the Sepahi court cited State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 480, 917 P.2d 200, 209

(1996), where the Court held that “[a]n issue not raised below is waived absent fundamental

error.” Petitioner offers no basis to avoid the holding of Jones.

Petitioner similarly distinguishes State v. Box, 205 Ariz. 492, 72 P.3d 623 (Ariz. App.

2003) (claim only presented at oral argument) and State v. Kemp, 185 Ariz. 52, 912 P.3d

1281 (1996) (claim only presented in appendix) on the basis that he asserted his federal due

process claim in the body of his petition for review. (Traverse Doc. 17 at 22.) In neither of

these cases, however, was the issue whether skipping a lower court prevented review. Thus,

these cases are not germane to this Court’s determination of whether presentation for the first

time to the Arizona Supreme Court was fair presentation, and distinguishing them does not

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further Petitioner’s case.

Finally, Petitioner distinguishes Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996) on the basis

that Petitioner made his federal claim clear. However, Gray did not concern a failure to

present to an intermediate court, and distinguishing it does not further Petitioner’s case. 

Finding no basis to distinguish Castille, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s

presentation of his federal due process claim for the first time to the Arizona Supreme Court

was not fair presentation, and did not exhaust his state remedies.

.3. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis,

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted"

and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a

procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a

“miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11

(1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims to

the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim.

Proc. 32.2(a), which precludes the presentation of claims (with some exceptions) that could

have been raised in an earlier appeal or PCR proceeding. (Answer, Doc. 13 at 9-10.)

Petitioner does not oppose that conclusion, nor does he assert that Rule 32.2(a) is not an

independent and adequate state ground to bar habeas review. 

The undersigned concludes that Respondents’ argument is persuasive. Accordingly,

the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s Ground Three is not merely unexhausted, but is now

procedurally defaulted.

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, he may not obtain

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to

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excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Failure to establish cause may be

excused “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in

the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496

(1986) Here, Petitioner has offered no explanation to excuse his failure to exhaust. The

undersigned finds none. Nor has Petitioner made any assertion that he is actually innocent.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s unexhausted Ground Three concerning the admission of

gang related evidence must be dismissed with prejudice.

D. SUMMARY

In Ground 1, Petitioner has shown a denial of due process in his conviction on Count

3 in his first trial a result of the erroneous jury instruction on intent. In Ground 2, Petitioner

fails to show the requisite deficient performance and prejudice to show ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel. Petitioner’s federal claims in Ground 3 (gang evidence) are

unexhausted and now procedurally defaulted. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner on two of his three grounds for

relief. Accordingly, a decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

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constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on the merits as to Ground 2 and on procedural

grounds as to Ground 3. 

With regard to the merits determination on Ground 2 (ineffective assistance), under

the reasoning set forth herein, the underlying constitutional claims are plainly without merit.

As to the procedural ruling on Ground 3 (gang evidence),under the reasoning set forth

herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable whether

the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” 

Accordingly, as to both grounds, the certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that as to Ground One (Jury Instruction),

the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed November 24, 2008 (Doc. 1) be

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this Court’s Writ of Habeas Corpus be

issued directing Petitioner’s release from all custody as a result of his conviction in his first

trial on Count 3 (aggravated assault as to Officer Handy), unless within 90 days the State of

Arizona retries and convicts him on such charge.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that as to Ground Two (Ineffective

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Assistance), the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed November 24, 2008

(Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that as to Ground Three (Gang Evidence), the

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed November 24, 2008 (Doc. 1) be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent this Report &

Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or

recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

DATED: December 23, 2010 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\08-2167-001r RR 10 01 19 re HC V2.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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