Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-02674/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-02674-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

JEDIDIAH SHOEMAKER, 

 Petitioner, 

 vs. 

ERIC ARNOLD, Acting Warden,1

 Respondent. 

Case No: C 11-2674 SBA (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

In 2008, Petitioner Jedidiah Shoemaker was convicted following a jury trial in the 

Contra Costa County Superior Court of voluntary manslaughter, Cal. Penal Code § 192(a).2

 

The jury found true a firearm allegation and the trial court found true an allegation that 

Petitioner had suffered a prior strike conviction under California’s Three Strikes law. 

This matter is now before the Court for consideration of Petitioner’s amended 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Amended Petition”). 

Petitioner asserts the following claims: (1) the trial court violated Cunningham v. 

California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007), by imposing an upper term sentence; (2) the prosecutor 

committed prejudicial misconduct; and (3) the trial court improperly denied his motion 

under People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530 (1996) (“Romero”), and 

abused its discretion in sentencing him under California’s Three Strikes law. Dkt. 16 at 7.3 

 1 Eric Arnold, the current acting warden of the prison where Petitioner is 

incarcerated, has been substituted as Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

2 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the California Penal 

Code. 

3 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case 

management filing system and not those assigned by Petitioner. 

Case 4:11-cv-02674-SBA Document 29 Filed 01/20/16 Page 1 of 19
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GROUND 

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A. Prosecut

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Point on the

people were

Clay Ward,

after dinner

atmosphere

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defendant d

been friendl

others bega

him. As the

his shirt, too

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about who w

testified tha

testified tha

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that he was 

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of his shoes

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February 20

red the pape

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ts are taken 

peal” or “sta

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endant was 

e evening o

e also there

 and Migue

r and having

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e people the

did not “fit i

ly, he becam

n rapping, a

e group was

ok out a gun

he ran out o

other peopl

was in the r

at Asidanya

at he was ou

g. Ward als

d Asidanya, 

cigarette wh

eryl Herron

rd told her t

ng to music, oting Herron

e others “too

ot them as w

present wh

nd started sh

idn’t see it c

face, and th

s. 

ron was take

on the follo

d four sepa

and respect

Contra Cos

nt, and even

007. 

2

ers filed in c

S the Amend

S

from the un

ate appellat

at the home

f Novembe

, including 

el Plaza. So

g a good tim

se as “a littl

ere had “a re

in,” and tha

me quiet an

although no

s writing ra

n, and shot 

of the house

le at the hou

room when 

a was in the 

utside smok

so testified, that “[w]e 

hen it happe

n, testified th

that as the g , defendant 

n, that he h

ok off runni

well. Asidan

hen Herron w

hooting, fir

coming,’” t

hat Asidany

en to the ho

owing day. 

arate gunsho

tively. 

sta County S

ntually foun

connection 

ded Petition

npublished 

te court”): 

e of Kinara 

er 27, 2006.

Herron, Ri

ome of them

me. Plaza d

le dangerou

eputation.” 

at although h

nd had a “na

o one had b

ap lyrics, de

Herron in t

e. 

use gave co

defendant 

room at the

king a cigar

, apparently

was outsid

ened.” How

hat several 

group was w

suddenly p

had a “weird

ing” for fea

nya also tol

was killed, 

ring more th

that defenda

ya ran away

ospital, whe

An autopsy

ot injuries, t

Sheriff’s D

nd and arre

with this m

n for the rea

d opinion of

Herron in B

 Several ot

chie Asidan

m were “rap

described th

us,” and said

 Plaza noti

he had orig

asty face” a

een arguing

efendant pul

the head. 

onflicting te

shot Herron

e time; Asid

rette and did

y referring t

de the house

wever, Herr

months afte

writing rap 

pulled out a 

d look on hi

ar that defen

ld Herron’s

that defend

han once, th

ant had a str

y so fast he 

ere he died, 

y revealed t

to his head,

epartment s

ested him in

matter and b

asons set fo

f the Califor

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ther 

nya, 

pping” 

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d that 

ced that 

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after the 

g with 

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estimony 

n. Plaza 

danya 

d not see 

to 

e

ron’s 

er the 

songs 

gun and 

is face,” 

ndant 

s mother 

dant took 

hat 

range 

ran out 

that he 

, chest, 

searched 

n

being fully 

orth below. 

rnia Court 

 

Case 4:11-cv-02674-SBA Document 29 Filed 01/20/16 Page 2 of 19
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B. Defense Case 

In his own defense, defendant testified that he and 

Herron had known each other since childhood, and he was 

spending Thanksgiving weekend at Herron’s house. While he 

was at the house, he saw “a lot of drugs, a lot of drinking, a lot 

of weed,” and drugs were being sold. He testified that although 

the atmosphere at the Thanksgiving celebration had been 

“cool,” the atmosphere had changed on the evening of the 

Monday after Thanksgiving, the day of the shooting. At that 

time, the atmosphere was “cloudy” and there was “a little 

tension in the air.” He and some of the others played dominoes, 

and Asidanya was talking an “excessive amount,” “talking 

shit,” and defendant “felt kind of weird.” When Asidanya 

started “saying the rap,” he moved toward defendant and was 

“all in [his] face,” saying in his rap, “‘You got guns. We got 

guns too.’” As he did so, Asidanya lifted his coat, and 

defendant saw a gun. Asidanya reached for the gun, then turned 

around and walked back around the table. Defendant looked at 

Herron, as if to ask what was going on, and Asidanya pulled out 

his gun, then sat down, the gun on the table and his hand on the 

gun. Defendant saw Ward and Plaza “reaching and clutching 

like they was going to pull something out,” and Asidanya 

nodded at them. Defendant testified, “[W]here I am from you 

don’t pull guns out and don’t use them,” and he pulled out his 

own gun and started shooting while he ran for cover behind a 

wall, shooting in the general direction of the others. He 

described himself as “spooked,” “shocked,” and “in fear,” and 

he shot because he feared for his life. He stopped shooting 

when the others ran. Herron fell, and defendant ran away. Defendant testified that he carried a loaded gun because 

he had heard that some people in Sacramento wanted to rob 

him, and that in the lifestyle he led “in the streets,” “you never 

know what’s going to happen.” He had gotten $2,500 the day 

he shot Herron, and believed the others might have intended to 

rob him. 

 Defendant introduced evidence that Asidanya had a 

reputation for violence and for carrying a gun; that he had been 

seen with a “silver weapon” that looked like a gun in the past; 

that when a witness had accused him of burglarizing his house, 

Asidanya had told him, “‘I will come back and take care of you 

and [the witness’s family],’” and “‘you better watch your step 

from now on mother fucker,’” and had threatened to shoot him. A former girlfriend, Nicole Singleton, testified that after 

Herron’s death, defendant told her someone had pulled a gun 

out and put it on his lap, and indicated he had reacted by 

shooting a gun. On cross-examination, Singleton testified that 

after a friend of defendant’s named George was murdered, 

defendant’s personality changed, he acted “weird” and was 

“really, really sad,” that he began using drugs, and that on one 

occasion he “‘jumped on [her]’” and beat her up. She 

acknowledged having told an investigator that during a period 

Case 4:11-cv-02674-SBA Document 29 Filed 01/20/16 Page 3 of 19
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Peo

200

volu

sen

the 

in p

fou

term

cou

mis

*1, 

affi

with

pro

for 

Cou

rem

t

“

d

s

h

c

d

s

g

i

k

ople v. Shoe

09) (footnot

B. C

The jury

untary man

ntencing, Pe

court denie

prison, base

ur years for t

m, id. § 667

Petition

urt abused it

sconduct, an

9. In an un

irmed the ju

h the Califo

secutorial m

review on F

On June

urt stayed th

medies as to

that she live “paranoid,” defendant a

surrounding

hurt him or 

cautious.” 

Duri

denied ever

speak to def

gun. I’ve g

it on a table

knowledge 

emaker, No

te omitted).

CASE HIST

y found def

nslaughter u

etitioner file

ed. The tria

ed on the up

the firearm 

7.5. 

ner appealed

ts discretion

nd the trial 

npublished 

udgment. Id

ornia Supre

misconduct 

February 3,

e 3, 2011, P

he instant h

his unexha

ed with defe ” although w

as “not paran

gs, you know

do somethi

ng the defe

r carrying fi

fendant; tha

got a gun too

e on the eve

no one othe

o. A121529,

ORY

fendant not 

under § 192

ed a Romero

al court sent

pper term of

enhanceme

d the judgm

n in sentenc

court abuse

opinion, fil

d. at 10, Re

me Court, r

claims. Re

, 2010. Dkt

Petitioner fi

habeas proce

austed prose

4

endant, in M

when asked 

noid, just c

w, thinking

ing to him, 

ense case, A

irearms. He

at he did no

o’”; that he 

ening of the 

er than defe

, 2009 WL 

guilty of m

(a), and fou

o motion to

tenced Petit

f eleven yea

ent, id. § 12

ment to the C

cing him, th

ed its discre

led on Nove

esp’t Ex. 4. 

raising his c

esp’t Ex. 5. 

t. 16 at 64.

iled his orig

eedings to a

ecutorial mi

May 2006, d

to elaborat

autious, cau

g maybe peo

but not, no

Asidanya tes

e also testif

ot say to him

did not tak

 shooting; a

endant had 

4190182, *

murder, but 

und true a fi

o dismiss hi

tioner to a t

ars, doubled

2022.5(a); a

Court of Ap

he prosecuto

etion in den

ember 25, 2

 Petitioner

claims on d

 The state 

ginal Petitio

allow Petiti

isconduct c

defendant w

te, she descr

utious of hi

ople might 

ot paranoid, 

stified again

fied that he 

m, “‘You’ve

ke out a gun

and that to h

a gun that e

*1-2 (Cal. C

guilty of th

firearm alleg

s prior strik

total term o

d pursuant t

and one yea

ppeal conten

or committe

nying his Ro

2009, the st

then filed a

direct appea

supreme co

on. Dkt. 1. 

ioner to exh

claims. Dkt

was 

ribed 

is 

want to 

just 

n, and 

did not 

e got a 

n and put 

his 

evening. 

Ct. App. No

he included 

gation. Prio

ke convictio

of twenty-se

to § 1170.1

ar for a prio

nding that t

ed prejudic

omero moti

ate appellat

a petition fo

al, except fo

ourt denied 

 On May 4,

haust state j

t. 13. This

ov. 25, 

offense of 

or to 

on, which 

even years 

2(c)(1); 

or prison 

the trial 

ial 

on. Id. at 

te court 

or review 

or the 

the petition

, 2012, the 

udicial 

case was 

n

Case 4:11-cv-02674-SBA Document 29 Filed 01/20/16 Page 4 of 19
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administratively closed pending Petitioner’s receipt of a final decision from the highest 

state court. He then moved to re-open the action, lift the stay, and amended the stayed 

petition to add the newly-exhausted prosecutorial misconduct claims. 

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s state habeas petition on June 27, 

2012. Dkt. 16 at 65. Thereafter, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition. Dkt. 16. The 

Court granted Petitioner’s implied motion to lift and amend the stayed petition to add his 

newly-exhausted prosecutorial misconduct claims. Dkt. 25. On February 22, 2013, the 

Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the writ should not be granted. Dkt. 22. 

Respondent has answered the Amended Petition. Dkt. 26. Although he was given an 

opportunity to do so, Petitioner has failed to file a Traverse. Briefing is now closed and the 

petition is ripe for adjudication. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The instant Amended Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under AEDPA, a federal court cannot 

grant habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in a state-court 

proceeding unless the proceeding “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state 

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or 

if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] 

precedent.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause is appropriate “if the state 

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. Habeas 

petitioners bear the burden of showing that a state court’s decision applied some Supreme 

Case 4:11-cv-02674-SBA Document 29 Filed 01/20/16 Page 5 of 19
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Cou

19, 

unr

the 

reas

Tho

issu

the 

28 U

“su

Joh

(19

eva

of t

In a

dec

The

issu

III.

by i

jury

cou

sen

urt preceden

25 (2002) (

In deter

reasonable a

decision of

soned decis

ompson, 21

ue made by 

burden of r

U.S.C. § 22

If const

ubstantial an

hnson, 532 U

93)). 

On fede

aluating stat

the doubt.” 

applying the

cision” by th

e last reason

ued on Nov

. DISCU

A. C

Petition

imposing th

y. The Cali

urt explaine

ntence: 

nt in an obj

(per curiam

rmining wh

application 

f the highes

sion. See Y

7 F.3d 663

a State cou

rebutting th

254(e)(1). 

titutional er

nd injurious

U.S. 782, 79

eral habeas 

te-court ruli

 Renico v. 

e above stan

he state cou

ned decision

ember 25, 2

USSION 

CUNNINGH

ner claims th

he upper ter

ifornia Cou

d its reason

ectively un

m). 

hether a state

of, clearly 

st state cour

Ylst v. Nunn

, 669 n.7 (9

urt shall be p

he presumpt

rror is found

s effect or in

95 (2001) (

review, AE

ings” and “

Lett, 559 U

ndards on h

urt. See Rob

n in this cas

2009. 

HAM CLAIM

hat the trial

rm for his o

urt of Appea

ns for impos

6

nreasonable 

e court’s de

established

rt to address

nemaker, 50

9th Cir. 200

presumed t

tion of corre

d, habeas re

nfluence in 

(quoting Bre

EDPA “imp

demands th

U.S. 766, 77

habeas revie

binson v. Ig

se is the Co

M

l court viola

offense on th

al rejected P

sing the upp

manner. W

ecision is co

d federal law

s the merits

01 U.S. 797

00). Moreov

to be correc

ectness by c

elief is warr

determinin

echt v. Abr

poses a high

hat state-cou

73 (2010) (in

ew, this Cou

gnacio, 360

ourt of Appe

ated Cunnin

he basis of 

Petitioner’s 

per term, w

Woodford v

ontrary to, o

w, courts in 

s of the peti

7, 803-804 (

ver, “a dete

ct,” and the 

clear and co

ranted only 

ng [the] jury

rahamson, 5

hly deferent

urt decision

nternal quo

urt reviews

0 F.3d 1044

eal’s unpub

ngham and 

facts found

claim, con

which was su

v. Visciotti, 

or involves 

this Circui

tioner’s cla

(1991); LaJ

ermination o

petitioner “

onvincing e

if the error

y’s verdict.”

507 U.S. 61

tial standard

ns be given 

otation mark

s the “last re

4, 1055 (9th

blished disp

abused its d

d by a judge

cluding tha

ufficient to 

537 U.S. 

an 

t look to 

aim in a 

Joie v. 

of a factual 

“shall have 

evidence.” 

r had a 

” Penry v. 

9, 638 

d for 

the benefit 

ks omitted)

easoned 

h Cir. 2004)

position 

discretion 

e and not a 

at the trial 

support the

. 

. 

e

Case 4:11-cv-02674-SBA Document 29 Filed 01/20/16 Page 6 of 19
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The trial court explained its reasons for exercising its 

sentencing discretion in this manner as follows: “From my 

perspective the crime did involve great violence with four shots 

having been fired. Actually, more than four shots, but four 

from my perspective directed at a single person, undermining a 

representation that a person of Mr. Shoemaker [sic] was acting 

in self-defense against other people in the household at that 

time. [¶] . . . [¶] And his very possession of the firearm is 

suggestive of an intent which arose before the firing of the 

shots. [¶] In other words, that it was not the actions of the 

other people in the household that at that moment provoked Mr. 

Shoemaker to act.” (Italics added.) As additional bases for its 

decision to impose the upper term, the trial court indicated that 

the crime showed sophistication, that defendant’s convictions as 

an adult were numerous and of increasing seriousness, that he 

was on probation at the time of the crime, and that his 

performance on probation was unsatisfactory. The court stated 

that it would impose the upper term on the basis of any one of 

these factors. 

 

Shoemaker, 2009 WL 4190182, *7 (italics in original). The state appellate court further 

stated that the jury’s verdict did not imply rejection of the evidence that Petitioner had not 

acted in imperfect self-defense or under provocation, but only that those facts had not been 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at *9. Thus, the court determined that, under the 

circumstances, the trial court “could properly take into account the evidence related to the 

shooting when selecting the appropriate sentence.” Id. The court concluded that “[t]he 

presence of a single proper aggravating circumstance is sufficient to support the imposition 

of the upper term.” Id. 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal 

defendant the right to a trial by jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court’s Sixth 

Amendment jurisprudence was significantly expanded by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 

U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, which extended a defendant’s right to trial by jury to the 

fact finding used to make enhanced sentencing determinations in addition to the fact 

finding on the actual elements of the crime. “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any 

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 

be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. In Blakely v. 

Washington, the Supreme Court held the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is 

Case 4:11-cv-02674-SBA Document 29 Filed 01/20/16 Page 7 of 19
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the maximum sentence a judge could impose based solely on the facts reflected in the jury 

verdict or admitted by the defendant; that is, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the 

sentence the judge could impose after finding additional facts, but rather is the maximum 

he or she could impose without any additional findings. 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004). In 

Cunningham, the Supreme Court held California’s determinate sentencing law (“DSL”), 

which authorized a judge, rather than a jury, to find facts exposing a defendant to an 

enhanced sentence, violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 549 U.S. 

at 288-89. In so concluding, the Supreme Court relied on its previous decision in Apprendi. 

Id. 

At the time Cunningham was decided, California’s DSL, pursuant to former 

California Penal Code § 1170, provided a determinate sentencing scheme comprised of a 

lower, middle and upper term, with a required imposition of the middle term unless the 

court found aggravating or mitigating factors. Cunningham deemed the middle term the 

“statutory maximum” term, and it proscribed a sentencing scheme that permitted a court to 

impose a higher sentence based upon a fact, other than a prior conviction, not admitted by 

the defendant nor found true by the jury. 549 U.S. at 288. Essentially, Cunningham 

applied Blakely to strike down California’s DSL. See Creech v. Frauenheim, 800 F.3d 

1005, 1015 (9th Cir. 2015). 

 On March 30, 2007, in response to the Supreme Court’s suggestion in 

Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 293-94, that California could cure any constitutional defect in 

§ 1170(b) by leaving the selection of an appropriate sentence to the judge’s discretion, the 

California Legislature enacted Senate Bill 40, which amended § 1170(b). See Cal. Stats. 

2007, ch. 3 (S.B. 40), § 3, eff. Mar. 30, 2007. Under amended § 1170(b), a trial court still 

exercises its discretion in selecting among the upper, middle or lower terms, but no 

additional fact finding is required to impose an upper or lower term. See Butler v. Curry, 

528 F.3d 624, 652 n.20 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Here, the trial court sentenced Petitioner in 2008—after the May 30, 2007 effective 

date of the amendment to § 1170(b). The applicable law at sentencing therefore was 

Case 4:11-cv-02674-SBA Document 29 Filed 01/20/16 Page 8 of 19
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Cal

Cun

ame

imp

now

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to t

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pose the upp

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Petition

mischaract

mended sen

as applied t

70(b), the tr

per term sen

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pper term at

aning of Cu

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girlfriend, Nicole Singleton, about the death of his friend, George; (3) cross-examining 

Petitioner regarding his failure to discuss his defense prior to the trial; and (4) appealing to 

the jury’s sympathy for the victim and his family. The state appellate court rejected all the 

aforementioned claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Shoemaker, 2009 WL 4190182, *3-

*6. 

A claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus 

proceedings unless the misconduct renders the trial “fundamentally unfair.” Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). “[U]nder Darden, the first issue is whether the 

prosecutor’s remarks were improper and, if so, whether they infected the trial with 

unfairness.” Tak Sun Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). But “[a] 

determination that the prosecutor’s questioning was improper is insufficient in and of itself 

to warrant reversal.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). “The touchstone 

of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the 

trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). 

Additionally, under AEDPA, a federal habeas court examines only whether the state court’s 

application of these principles was unreasonable. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 143 

(2005). In the event a constitutional error occurred, habeas relief will be denied unless the 

error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Johnson v. 

Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1995). 

1. Background 

a) Mischaracterization of Petitioner’s Testimony 

Petitioner’s first prosecutorial misconduct claim stems from his testimony that on or 

after January 15, 2007, while he was still evading the police, he called his girlfriend 

Singleton a number of times and asked to meet her at a park, then stayed with her for a few 

days. During Petitioner’s cross-examination by the prosecutor, the following exchange 

took place: 

Q. Now, Mr. Shoemaker, Ms. Singleton was afraid of you, 

 correct? 

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A. No. 

Q. No, she wasn’t afraid of you? 

A. No. 

Q. She wasn’t afraid of you because of your past violent 

 behavior with her? 

A. No. 

Q. She wasn’t afraid of you because you would get weird 

 and paranoid when you were using drugs? 

A. No. I’ve always been like that. You got to be cautious 

 when you are out there on the streets. I’m always like 

 that. 

Q. I mean, not to make light of what you’ve just said, so, 

 “I’ve always been weird and paranoid,” not just when 

 you are using drugs? 

A. Not paranoid, I’ve been cautious. 

Shoemaker, 2009 WL 4190182, *3. Petitioner contends the prosecutor mischaracterized 

this testimony later in the cross-examination: 

In questioning him about the events immediately before the 

shooting, the prosecutor said, “Q. You are standing there just 

watching Kinara as he’s hanging out with his guys having a 

good time, just rapping and you’re getting mad. Just like you 

said earlier, even if you are not doing drugs you get paranoid 

and weird? [¶] . . . [¶] Q. And you stood there watching these 

friends having fun.” The trial court overruled an objection, and 

Petitioner answered, “No, . . . I wasn’t mad at that time. No.” 

Shortly afterward, in cross-examining defendant about whether 

he took responsibility for his past parole violations and his 

conduct during a previous prison term, the prosecutor asked, 

“And in your own words, you get a little weird and a little 

paranoid and you perceive that you are being disrespected when 

that’s not even happening; isn’t that true?” The trial court 

overruled an objection, and defendant responded, “Not even 

true. It’s not. No.” Finally, challenging defendant on his 

position that the atmosphere in Herron’s house before the 

shooting was tense, the prosecutor asked: “Q. You said that 

everything changed, that it seemed tense in the house after you 

returned the night that Kinara was murdered? [¶] A. Right. 

[¶] Q. Isn’t it true the only thing[s] that changed in that house 

were your perceptions? [¶] A. No. [¶] Q. That you became 

paranoid that you were being disrespected, that people were 

clowning you and that Kinara wasn’t sticking up for you? [¶] 

A. No. [¶] Q. Isn’t it true that the reason your perception 

changed that night from the house being a calm, warm, friendly 

place, that people would come to socialize, isn’t it true that your 

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perceptions changed because you were paranoid either from 

whatever personality issues you have or from doing cocaine? 

[¶] No.” 

Id. 

On appeal, Petitioner did not challenge the prosecutor’s entire line of questioning, as 

set forth above. Instead, Petitioner claimed that the prosecutor improperly mischaracterized 

the above-referenced testimony by indicating that Petitioner had testified that he became 

“weird and paranoid” before the shooting or when using drugs. Id. The state appellate 

court disagreed, finding that “at least one of [Petitioner’s] responses could reasonably be 

interpreted to indicate that he did in fact become ‘weird and paranoid’” during one of those 

instances. Id. For example, “When asked if he got weird and paranoid when using drugs, 

[Petitioner] initially responded, ‘No I’ve always been like that. You got to be cautious 

when you are out there on the streets. I’m always like that.’” Id. The state appellate court 

also found that even if it had agreed with Petitioner, it would have rejected his claim on the 

ground that he failed to show prejudice as “the jury heard other testimony describing [him] 

as both ‘weird’ and ‘paranoid’ and indicating that he used drugs.” Id. 

b) Cross-examination Regarding Previous Events 

Petitioner next contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct while crossexamining Singleton regarding the death of Petitioner’s friend, George. The state appellate 

court summarized the factual background as follows: 

The prosecutor asked Singleton, “Do you remember that a 

friend of Mr. Shoemaker’s knew [sic] George was murdered in 

Sacramento?” Singleton replied, “Yes,” and the prosecutor 

began her next question: “And the word on the street was—” 

Defense counsel objected, and outside the presence of the jury, 

requested a mistrial, contending the prosecutor’s question 

suggested to the jury that defendant had murdered George. The 

trial court denied the motion, concluded the prosecutor had not 

committed misconduct, and refused to admonish the jury. In 

response to the prosecutor’s next reference to the murder of 

George, Singleton testified that she did not know he was 

murdered. The prosecutor went on to elicit testimony that after 

George’s death, Singleton noticed that defendant’s personality 

had changed, that he was acting weird, and that he had begun to 

use drugs. In later argument on the issue outside the jury’s 

presence, the trial court stated, “from the questions that were 

asked, this jury has not received any information from which it 

could come even close to drawing [the] inference” that 

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defendant was responsible for George’s death. 

Id. at *4. The state appellate court agreed with the trial court that the references to 

George’s death did not suggest to the jury that Petitioner murdered him. Id. Thus, the state 

appellate court found there was no basis to conclude the jury would interpret the cryptic 

reference to “the word on the street” to mean that Petitioner had killed George or that 

Petitioner’s behavior after the death of a friend was attributable to consciousness of guilt. 

Id. Therefore, the state appellate court determined that the trial court “properly concluded 

that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in this line of questioning.” Id. 

c) Cross-examination on Pre-arrest Silence 

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor improperly commented on Petitioner’s failure 

to reveal his defense before trial, and more specifically, his prearrest silence. Id. While 

cross-examining Petitioner, the prosecutor asked, “This is the first time that you’ve told this 

story about anyone else in Kinara’s house having a gun.” Id. Petitioner objected, and 

outside the presence of the jury, the trial court overruled the objection. However, the court 

directed the prosecutor to make clear that her line of questioning was limited to the period 

before Petitioner was apprehended. Id. The prosecutor then elicited Petitioner’s testimony 

that he had not called either the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department, a police 

department, or Herron’s family after the shooting to tell them he had acted in self-defense. 

Id. In doing so, Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct. 

In analyzing this claim, the state appellate court noted that in California, a criminal 

defendant’s silence after a Miranda warning may not be commented upon. Id. (citing 

People v. Free, 131 Cal. App. 3d 155, 165 (1982)). However, the state court added: 

“[p]rearrest silence may be commented upon unless the court finds the silence was an 

invocation of Fifth Amendment rights. Prearrest silence in circumstances in which there is 

no inference of a reliance on the right to silence may be used to impeach by way of crossexamination.” Id. (citing Free, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 165) (italics added); People v. Burton, 

117 Cal. App. 3d 382, 385-387 (defendant’s prearrest failure to explain incident in question 

properly used to impeach testimony that he acted in self-defense)). Relying on the 

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aforementioned line of authority, the state appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim upon 

finding that the use of a Petitioner’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is permissible as 

impeachment evidence, stating: 

The issue before us is not a defendant’s right to withhold alibi 

evidence while awaiting trial, but whether his prearrest silence 

may be used to impeach the credibility of his testimony that he 

acted in self-defense. In these circumstances, we conclude that 

the holdings of Free and Burton are applicable, and that the 

prosecutor did not act improperly in impeaching defendant with 

his failure to contact law enforcement officers after the killing 

to tell them he had acted in self-defense. 

Id. at *5 (citing Free, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 165 and Burton, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 385-387). 

d) Appeals to Sympathy for Victim and Family 

Finally, Petitioner contends the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury’s 

sympathy for the victim, Herron, and his family. The state appellate court summarized the 

factual background as follows: 

 A friend of Herron, Steve Serna, testified as a witness for 

the defense that on November 30, 2006, two sheriff’s deputies 

asked him if Herron’s family knew where defendant was, and 

Serna told them the family would not give them any 

information and that it would handle the matter itself. On 

cross-examination, Serna testified that he went to the hospital 

after Herron was shot, and that he saw members of Herron’s 

family there. The prosecutor asked how long Herron had lived 

before being taken off life support, and Serna testified Herron 

had lived “maybe” three or four days. The prosecutor asked 

whether he had had much contact with Herron’s family during 

that time, and he responded in the affirmative, and when asked, 

said he had not heard any family member threaten to kill 

defendant. Asked his opinion of Herron’s family, he testified 

that it was “one of the most loving families” he had ever met. 

Asked his opinion of the suggestion, made in direct 

examination, that Herron’s family planned to have defendant 

killed, Serna testified that it was “far-fetched” and contrary to 

what he knew of the Herron family. 

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Shoemaker, 2009 WL 4190182, *5. The state appellate court disagreed that the prosecutor 

improperly appealed to the jury’s sympathy for Herron and his family in eliciting the 

aforementioned testimony, stating as follows: 

 

In context, this cross-examination was a fair attempt to explore 

the basis for defendant’s suggestion, raised during direct 

examination of Serna, that members of the Herron family did 

not cooperate with law enforcement officers after the shooting 

because they intended to have defendant killed. The 

prosecutor’s questions were directed not at exploiting the jury’s 

sympathy for Herron and his family, but at determining how 

much time Serna had spent with Herron’s family after the 

shooting and whether they had indicated they were likely to act 

as defendant suggested. There was no impropriety. 

 

 We also reject defendant’s challenges to certain 

statements the prosecutor made in her rebuttal argument. 

During defense counsel’s closing argument, she told the jury 

that Herron had been convicted of armed robbery and of being a 

felon with a firearm, that he had served time in state prison, and 

that defendant should not be seen as “a snake that entered the 

[G]arden of Eden and everything was lovely before that.” 

Without discounting the importance of Herron’s death or his 

family’s suffering, she argued, the jury should consider that 

defendant was “a man among similar men.” In rebuttal, the 

prosecutor argued that defense counsel was “attempting to 

victimize Kinara Herron again,” and asked, “How do you think 

his family has felt sitting through this?” She stated that 

Herron’s character was not at issue, and went on, “Kinara 

Herron never had the opportunity to come into this courtroom 

and testify to you. You have no idea what kind of changes he 

had made in his life, the businesses he had started, the fact that 

he had applied to college. You had no idea of that. You have 

no idea what kind of a person he was. You haven’t even been 

allowed to see a photograph of him.” Defense counsel objected 

to any commentary on the court’s rulings, and the court 

reminded the jury that statements of attorneys were not 

evidence. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor argued, “[N]ot only 

has [Herron’s] family been victimized through this case losing 

him, they’ve had to sit through this trial with character 

assassination of Kinara Herron who wasn’t even allowed to be a 

witness, so please think about the fairness of that.” 

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 Id. The state appellate court further found that, even assuming the prosecutor’s 

commentary improperly appealed to the jury’s sympathy, no prejudice resulted because the 

comments “were relatively brief, and were not inflammatory.” Id. Furthermore, the state 

appellate court noted that the jury was instructed that it should not allow sympathy to 

influence its decision and that statements of counsel were not evidence. Id. The court 

found that, in these circumstances, there was “no basis to conclude the jury would have 

reached a different conclusion in their absence.” Id. (citing People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 

329, 363 (1983) (finding that a graphic description of victim’s sufferings during events 

leading up to murder and invitation for jurors to think of themselves as the victim were 

improper, though not prejudicial when considered in context)). 

2. Analysis 

As discussed above, the state appellate court carefully examined Petitioner’s 

prosecutorial misconduct claims and reasonably determined that there was no misconduct. 

The court also reasonably concluded that any prejudice to Petitioner was harmless. 

Moreover, the Darden factors—which are used to assess whether the prosecutor’s 

misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation—weigh against Petitioner. In 

assessing whether a prosecutor’s misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation, 

courts may consider: (1) the weight of evidence of guilt; (2) whether the misconduct was 

isolated or part of an ongoing pattern, (3) whether the misconduct relates to a critical part of 

the case, and (4) whether a prosecutor’s comment misstates or manipulates the evidence. 

See Darden, 477 U.S. at 182. 

The first Darden factor is not satisfied given the weight of the evidence showing 

Petitioner’s guilt was considerable. See id. Except for Petitioner’s testimony that Asidanya 

was armed, there was no other testimony that anyone other than Petitioner had a gun. 

There is likewise no evidence that the victim, Herron, had a gun. Further, it was undisputed 

that no shots were fired at Petitioner or at anyone other than Herron. Although Petitioner 

insists that he was acting in self-defense, the evidence does not support his claims. To the 

contrary, the evidence shows that Petitioner fired four shots directly towards Herron, ran 

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The state appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows: 

Defendant contends the trial court’s decision not to strike the 

prior conviction allegation was improperly based on its view 

that defendant had not acted in imperfect self-defense or in 

response to provocation. Even assuming the trial court’s 

decision not to strike the prior conviction arose from this view, 

our previous conclusions compel us to reject defendant’s 

argument. As we have discussed, the jury did not find that 

defendant had actually acted in response to provocation or in 

imperfect self-defense, but only that the prosecution had not 

met its burden of proving murder beyond a reasonable doubt, 

and the trial court could permissibly take into account evidence 

related to the crime of which defendant was convicted in 

making its sentencing decision. ([Citation.]) Nothing in this 

record required the trial court to conclude that defendant was 

outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme, and we discern no 

abuse of discretion. 

Shoemaker, 2009 WL 4190182, *9 (citations omitted). 

Whether or not the trial court correctly applied its discretion in denying Petitioner’s 

Romero motion is a matter of state, not federal, law. Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019 (9th 

Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds, 538 U.S. 901 (2003) (a trial court’s refusal to 

exercise its discretion and strike prior felony convictions is not cognizable on federal 

habeas review). State law claims are not remediable on federal habeas review, even if state 

law was erroneously interpreted or applied. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861-

62 (2011). Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s Romero claim is not cognizable, 

and this claim is DENIED. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. For the reasons set forth 

above, jurists of reason would not find this Court’s denial of Petitioner’s claims debatable 

or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not appeal the 

denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court but may seek a certificate from the 

Ninth Circuit under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) 

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, 

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. All claims alleged in the Amended Petition are DENIED, and a certificate of 

appealability will not issue. Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate any pending matters, 

and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 1/20/16 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

P:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.11\Shoemaker2674.denyHC-final_gina.docx 

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