Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00683/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00683-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346t Tort Claim

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

K.C., a minor,

Plaintiff,

v.

MELANIE VEJMOLA, et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17cv683-LAB (NLS)

ORDER SUMMARILY DENYING 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

AMEND

After the Court issued an order (Docket no. 36) dismissing the first amended 

complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff filed her motion for leave to amend (Docket no. 37), 

attaching her proposed second amended complaint (“SAC”) as an exhibit. For 

reasons discussed in this order, the SAC does not correct the defects the Court’s 

earlier order identified, and it is apparent the SAC would not survive a motion to 

dismiss. In the interests of saving time and resources, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, the 

motion is being summarily denied, and Plaintiff will be given another opportunity to 

seek leave to amend. The pleading standard and other applicable law are 

discussed in the Court’s earlier order and are not repeated here except as needed.

Plaintiff’s Claims

The FAC brought a claim against Melanie Vejmola for negligence and 

battery, and against all other Defendants for negligence. It sought to hold the 

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United States liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). It also sought to 

hold various property management companies liable under a negligence theory. 

The FAC alleged that Vejmola, who was operating an unlicensed daycare center 

in her home, she shook the child K.C., causing injury. It claimed that the 

organizations could and should have taken action to prevent this. 

Both the FAC and SAC allege jurisdiction only loosely. The FAC described 

Vejmola as acting in her individual capacity,1 so claims against her must arise 

under California state law. Claims against the property management companies 

also apparently arise under state law, though this is never very clearly stated. The 

Court can exercise only supplemental jurisdiction over these, because they do not 

present a federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The Court’s jurisdiction over 

this case depends on the existence of a federal question, namely the FTCA claim 

against the United States.

In several ways, the SAC is even less specific than the FAC. The SAC

proposes to drop the battery claim and omit allegations that Vejmola shook K.C., 

and to hold all Defendants liable only under a negligence theory for a non-specific 

“childcare incident” (SAC, && 20, 47), that resulted in K.C.’s “sustaining injury to 

her body and shock and injury to her nervous system” and likely permanent 

disability. (Id., & 56.) Apparently something has prompted Plaintiff to withdraw 

the earlier allegation. But whatever that may be, the nature of the incident is never 

explained. This is a serious flaw, particularly when it comes to the property 

 

1 In a purely conclusory fashion, the SAC alleges that Vejmola and the property 

management companies were operating as employees and agents of the United 

States. (SAC, && 15–16.) But the factual allegations make plain that in offering 

childcare in her own home, Vejmola was acting in her own capacity. (See SAC, 

& 20 (alleging that the childcare program was unauthorized); & 26 (alleging that 

Vejmola was a resident in military housing); & 34 (alleging that Vejmola operated 

the childcare program as a business in her own home).)

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companies’ and the United States’ liability. Without some factual allegations to 

show how the injury occurred or even what the injury was, it is impossible to say 

whether it was foreseeable, whether it was caused by the property companies’ and 

the United States’ breach of some duty, or whether it would have been preventable 

by any precaution these Defendants might have taken. Even assuming, arguendo, 

that these Defendants were obligated to ensure that Vejmola was trained and 

licensed, no factual allegations suggest this would have prevented whatever 

happened to K.C. 

Another of the SAC’s defects is that it fails to plead any facts showing that 

the property companies or the United States had a duty to protect K.C. from 

whatever the incident was. The United States can be liable under the FTCA under 

circumstances where local law would make a private person liable in tort. See 

United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44–45 (2005). The Court looks to state law 

governing the liability of private persons, not public entities, when assessing 

liability under the FTCA. Id. at 46 (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 

U.S. 61, 64 (1955)). The function performed by the United States must be 

analogous to that performed by private persons. Olson at 46–47. The Court’s 

earlier order analogized the United States’ role here to that of a landlord or property 

manager (Docket no. 36 at 5:12–14), and Plaintiff does not challenge that.

In California, the general rule is that the negligence of a tenant is not imputed 

to the landlord. See Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Mgt., 143 Cal. App. 4th 1360, 

1375 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2006). There are some exceptions, such as where the 

landlord knows that a tenant is creating or maintaining a dangerous condition (e.g., 

threatening other tenants or keeping a vicious dog) that the landlord has 

knowledge of and the power to cure it. See Salinas v. Martin, 166 Cal. App. 4th

404, 412 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2008) (citing Stone v. Center Trust Retail Properties, 

Inc., 163 Cal. App. 4th 608, 612 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2008)). But in general, because 

the landlord has handed over possession of the premises to the tenant, the 

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landlord’s duty is attenuated, and a duty will be imposed only after the weighing of 

a number of considerations. Id. These include, among other things, the 

foreseeability of harm, and the degree to which the landlord would be burdened. 

See Castaneda v. Olsher, 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213–14 (2007). 

The existence of a landlord’s duty to protect against harm by a third party 

(including a fellow tenant) is a legal question for the Court. Id. at 1214. The 

analysis requires that the plaintiff identify specific measures the landlord could 

have taken that would have prevented the harm. Id. at 1214. The Court must 

determine how financially and socially burdensome it would be to require the 

landlord to take those measures. Id. The Court must also identify the nature of the 

conduct that caused the harm, and determine how foreseeable it was. Id.

The only facts the SAC alleges that could potentially be used to support 

Plaintiff’s side in this analysis are reports by one of Vejmola’s neighbors to the 

property companies, and an agreement that the tenants had to sign. Neither the 

SAC nor Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend acknowledge or address any of the 

other factors, such as the cost and burden on the property companies and the 

United States. See Castaneda, 41 Cal.4th at 1216–18 (analyzing social cost and 

burden on landlord of refusing to rent to suspected gang members and declining 

to impose a duty).

The SAC alleges that Vejmola’s neighbor twice reported to the property 

companies that Vejmola was operating an unlicensed childcare program. (SAC, 

&& 36, 39.) It also alleges that the neighbor observed seven or eight children in 

Vejmola’s home, found the home “in disarray with chaotic and neglected children,” 

noted that Vejmola was “very aggressive with the children,” saw choking hazards 

on the ground, and witnessed Vejmola’s husband yelling at one of the children. 

(Id., & 40.) It alleges that the neighbor reported this to both the property companies 

and the military police. (Id., && 41–42.) It also alleges that the property companies 

and military police were “notified on several occasions” about these things, and 

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warned that they were a danger. (Id., && 43–44.) It does not allege how often 

Vejmola provided childcare, how long the children were in her care, or whether any 

of the children were Vejmola’s own. It also does not mention how much time 

passed between the reports and the incident.

The SAC fails to allege any facts that would connect K.C.’s injury to any of 

the conditions that were reported to the property companies or to the military 

police. For example, the SAC does not allege that Vejmola’s aggressiveness, the 

chaotic condition of the home, the choking hazards, or anything else mentioned in 

the reports led to K.C.’s injury. While the SAC’s allegations point to the possibility 

that one or more of these facts were the cause, the pleading standard is not 

satisfied by showing a mere possibility. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). Given that the SAC does not allege anything specific about K.C.’s injury or 

what caused it, it is impossible to link the injury to anything the United States or 

the property companies did, or to identify what they could have done to prevent it.

This also leaves open the distinct possibility that K.C. would have been injured 

regardless of any precautions those Defendants might have taken. 

The SAC also alleges that the United States and property companies 

required Vejmola and her husband to sign an agreement regarding certified child 

care (the “CCC Agreement”). (SAC, & 27.) This required certification through a 

program affiliated in some way with the Marine Corps.2 (Id.) It also required 

submission of a form and application to the Family Child Care office. (Id., & 30.) 

Licensing under the federal program involved attendance at orientation, familiarity 

with the federal program’s licensing laws and regulations, a home inspection, and 

a background check. (Id., & 31.) 

/ / /

 

2 The SAC appears to describe the program as run by both the federal government 

and the state. (See SAC, && 27, 29, 32.) 

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The SAC concludes that under the CCC, Defendants were obligated to 

investigate the provision of unauthorized childcare for the benefit and protection of 

children. (SAC, && 29, 32, 46, 51.) But the SAC does not attach the CCC, nor 

allege what it says. Instead, it relies on its own conclusions about the meaning and 

effect of this agreement, implying that it imposed a duty on Defendants and existed 

for the benefit of third parties such as K.C. 

The interpretation and legal effect of an agreement such as the CCC is a 

question of law. See Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 135 

F.3d 658, 664 (9th Cir. 1998). The asserted meaning and effect of the CCC is 

purely a conclusory allegation, and as such need not be accepted as true at this 

stage. See Bhattacharya v. Ariz. State Univ., 627 Fed. Appx. 636, 637 (9th Cir. 

2015) (affirming dismissal of claim where plaintiff failed to allege facts showing he 

was third party beneficiary of contract). 

Even accepting that the CCC gave the United States and the property 

companies the right to restrict in-home childcare programs, it does not follow that 

these Defendants had the obligation to do so. California courts have been reluctant 

to infer a duty merely from the fact that a landlord or landowner or some analogous 

person had the power to intervene. See Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Mgt., 

143 Cal. App. 4th 1360, 1375–76 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2006) (citing Cody F. v. Falletti, 

92 Cal. App. 4th 1232 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2001)) (holding that although condominium 

covenants, conditions, and restrictions gave lessor the right to exclude dangerous 

dogs, they did not create an obligation to do so). They have also been reluctant to 

import contract-based duties into this area of tort law. See id. at 1376 (expressing 

doubt that, even if restrictions amounted to a contractual promise, they could be 

the basis for expanded vicarious tort liability).

The SAC also repeats several pleading deficiencies the Court pointed out. 

They include wholly conclusory allegations that all the Defendants were each 

other’s agents and employees and all participated in each other’s actions. (SAC, 

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&& 15–16.) The SAC is also partially based on a theory that Defendants should 

have exercised their governmental powers of regulation, inspection, law 

enforcement, and authority to take other official action. (Id., && 51–55). See Indian 

Towing, 350 U.S. at 64 (explaining that the “private person” requirement means 

the United States cannot be liable for “uniquely governmental functions”); Olson, 

546 U.S. at 46 (applying the state law governing the liability of private persons, not 

public entities, to FTCA claim). Furthermore, absent some kind of special 

relationship not alleged here, the right to governmental protection from dangerous 

people or conditions is not an actionable right. See generally, Town of Castle 

Rock, Colo. V. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005); DeShaney v. Winnebago County 

Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).

Finally, the SAC also seems to rest largely on an assumption the Court 

rejected in its earlier order, namely that disobedience to licensing or other 

regulatory laws was itself a danger. The Motion for Leave to Amend mentions this, 

suggesting that unlicensed childcare by an untrained caregiver implied the 

foreseeability of harm. (Mot. (Docket no. 37-1) at 3:18–4:7.) 

The Motion argues that common sense teaches that “watching numerous 

young children (even your own children)” can be so tiring that injury is likely. (Id.

at 3:27–4:1.) Given that the SAC alleges only that Vejmola was caring for seven 

or eight children, this is too much of a stretch. Many people care for seven, eight, 

or more of their own children full-time, and most have no special training at all. This 

does not mean they are unfit parents or that their children are in danger. 

Furthermore, under California law, many small family-based or cooperative 

childcare programs, which can care for up to twelve children, are exempt from 

licensing. See Cal. Health & Safety Code, ' 1596.792(d) and (e); 22 Cal. Code 

Regs. ' 102358. In the judgment of the State of California, then, unlicensed 

/ / /

/ / /

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in-home care for seven or eight children, provided by an untrained caregiver, is not 

necessarily dangerous.3

Conclusion and Order

The motion for leave to amend is SUMMARILY DENIED. Within 14 

calendar days from the date this order is issued, Plaintiff may file a renewed 

ex parte motion for leave to amend (without obtaining a hearing date), that 

complies with Civil Local Rule 15.1(b). If she fails to file the motion within this time, 

this action will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Within 14 

calendar days of Plaintiff’s filing a renewed motion, Defendants may file a 

single joint opposition. No reply is to be filed without leave. 

The proposed second amended complaint must remedy all the defects this 

order and the Court’s previous order have identified. The SAC makes clear that 

K.C. has been receiving medical care, so Plaintiff is likely able to make some kind 

of allegation about the nature of K.C.’s injuries and their apparent cause. Plaintiff 

should also attach the CCC, or at least quote the terms it says amount to 

Defendants’ promise to protect residents from dangerous childcare programs.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

 

3 This is not to say that Vejmola was in compliance with all the requirements. 

Family day care is limited to arrangements in which the operator provides care 

for her own children and for the children of no more than one other family. But 

Cooperative daycare requires sharing of duties among parents, and limitations 

on pay. 

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If the proposed second amended complaint fails to remedy the defects this 

order has identified, the Court may assume Plaintiff cannot amend to remedy these 

defects and the action may be dismissed on that basis. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 4, 2018

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

United States District Judge

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