Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08070/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08070-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2674 Federal Tort Claims Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ruby Gatling, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

United States of America, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-15-08070-PCT-SMM

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Defendant United States of America’s Motion to 

Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Doc. 45), Motion to Strike Answer to Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 42), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to File 

Response/Reply (Doc. 48). Plaintiff has responded and the matter is fully briefed. (Docs. 

45, 49.) After carefully considering the briefing, the Court makes the following ruling. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 A. Statutory Background 

 In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education 

Assistance Act of 1975 (“ISDEAA”), Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (Jan. 4, 1975). “The 

ISDEAA created a system by which tribes could take over the administration of 

Programs operated by the [Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”)].” Shirk v. U.S. ex rel. 

Dep’t of Interior, 773 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Los Coyotes Band of 

Cahuilla & Cupeno Indians v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 2013)) (internal 

quotations omitted). Under the ISDEAA, a tribe “receiving a particular service from the 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 1 of 14
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

BIA may submit a contract proposal to the BIA to take over the program, operate it as a 

contractor, and receive the money that the BIA would have otherwise spent on the 

program.” Shirk, 773 F.3d at 1001.

 B. Factual Background 

 Ruby Gatling brought the present action on April 30, 2015 and amended her 

complaint on April 1, 2016. Under to the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1346(b), 2674, et seq., she alleges claims of negligence, assault, battery, and false 

imprisonment. (Doc. 39.) Plaintiff alleges that on March 15, 2014, she was arrested 

without probable cause. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff states that while incarcerated, Defendants 

April Ashley and Eric Williams, both Navajo tribal correctional officers, hit her in the 

face, fractured her arm, kicked her multiple times, and threw her to the ground causing a 

severe head injury. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Delores 

Greyeyes or Carlos Yazzie participated in the alleged assault and battery, but rather 

“confined Plaintiff without any legal right to do so.” (Id. at ¶ 29.) Furthermore, Plaintiff 

alleges that the United States was negligent on a theory of vicarious liability, or negligent 

hiring and supervision for the “failure of Individual Defendants [Ashley, Williams, 

Greyeyes, and Yazzie] to conform to their legal duty of care.” (Id. at ¶ 14.) 

 At the time of the alleged incident, the Navajo Nation had a contract pursuant to 

the ISDEAA with the Secretary of the Interior to provide “Law Enforcement-Patrol” and 

“Adult Detention” services to the Navajo Nation. (Docs. 45-2, 45-3.) The United States’ 

Attorney for the District of Arizona submitted certifications that Defendants Ashley, 

Williams, Greyeyes, and Yazzie were engaged in the performance of functions covered 

by this contract and were acting within the scope of their employment as employees of 

the United States through its agency, the Bureau of Indian Affairs. (Docs. 18-1; 44-1.) 

The United States contends that upon this certification, the employees are dismissed from 

the action, and the United States is substituted as defendant in place of the employees. 28 

U.S.C. § 2679 d(1),(2); (Doc 45 at 4-6). 

/// 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 2 of 14
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 The defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by the 

parties or the Court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3). Plaintiff, as the party 

seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, bears the burden of establishing subject 

matter jurisdiction. See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182–

83 (1936); Fenton v. Freedman, 748 F.2d 1358, 1359 (9th Cir. 1994). A Rule 12(b)(1) 

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either be a facial or a factual 

challenge. When the moving party facially challenges jurisdiction based on the 

allegations in the complaint, the court must consider all the allegations in the complaint 

as true, and will not look beyond the face of the complaint to determine jurisdiction. See 

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). On the other hand, 

when a court reviews a complaint under a factual challenge, the allegations have no 

presumptive truthfulness, Ritza v. International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s 

Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation omitted), and the court is not 

limited to the allegations in the pleadings if the “jurisdictional issue is separable from the 

merits of [the] case.” Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Rather, 

the court that must weigh the evidence has discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and 

even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts. See Valdez v. 

United States, 837 F.Supp. 1065, 1067 (E.D. Cal. 1993), aff’d, (9th Cir. 1995); 

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. 

III. DISCUSSION 

 First, Plaintiff alleges that the United States is vicariously liable for the failure of 

Individual Defendants to conform to their legal duty of care in their treatment of her. 

(Doc. 38 at 3-4.) Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ashley and Williams are liable 

for battery and assault. (Doc. 39 at 5-6.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

Greyeyes and Yazzie are liable for false imprisonment. (Doc. 39 at 6.) In response, the 

United States argues that under the FTCA, the Court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction over the claims of (1) assault and battery against Defendants Ashley and 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 3 of 14
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Williams, (2) false imprisonment against Defendant Greyeyes, (3) negligent supervision 

against Defendant United States arising out of the battery and assault allegedly 

committed by Defendants Ashley and Williams, and (4) negligent supervision against 

Defendant United States arising out of the false imprisonment allegedly committed by 

Defendant Greyeyes. The Court must consider whether jurisdiction exists under the 

FTCA and whether the claims should be dismissed. 

 Further, in considering a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the Court “is not restricted to 

the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, 

to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United 

States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988).

 A. Defendant United States of America’s Substitution for Individual 

 Defendants

 Under the ISDEAA, 25 U.S.C. § 450f, tribes and tribal organizations may enter 

into contracts with the federal government, commonly referred to as “638 contracts.” 

These contracts allow tribes to receive funding for programs such as education and law 

enforcement if they adhere to federal requirements and guidelines. The employees of the 

federally funded programs created by these 638 contracts are considered employees of 

the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 25 U.S.C. § 450f (note). Congress has explained that: 

with respect to claims resulting from the performance of functions...under 

a contract authorized by the [ISDEAA], an Indian tribe, tribal organization, 

or Indian contractor is deemed hereafter to be part of the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs...while carrying out any such contract...and its employees are 

deemed employees of the Bureau or Service while acting within the scope 

of their employment in carrying out the contract. 

Id. Employees of a tribe, tribal organization, or contractor are considered federal 

employees when working within the scope of their employment in carrying out the 

contract. Id.; (Doc. 45-2 at 16) (“For purposes of FTCA coverage, the Navajo Nation and 

its employees are deemed to be employees of the Federal Government while performing 

work under this contract”). 

 If the tribe, tribal organization, or contractor is covered by this provision, any civil 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 4 of 14
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

action brought against their employees “shall be deemed to be an action against the 

United States and will be defended by the Attorney General and be afforded the full 

protection and coverage of the Federal Torts Claim Act.” Pub. L. No. 101–121, § 315, 

103 Stat. 701, 744 (1989); Pub. L. No. 101–512, tit. III, § 314, 104 Stat. 1915, 1959–60 

(1990). This waiver of sovereign immunity applies only where those tribes, tribal 

organizations, or contractors were acting within the scope of their employment while 

carrying out a 638 contract. Id.; Shirk v. United States, 773 F.3d 999, 1003-1007 (9th Cir. 

2014). 

 Under the Westfall Act, the Attorney General or her designee is empowered to 

certify that a federal employee who is sued for negligent or wrongful acts “was acting 

within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the 

claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), (2). After this certification, the employee is 

dismissed from the action, and the United States is substituted as defendant in place of 

the employee. Id. Thereafter, the case is governed by the FTCA and is “subject to the 

limitations and exceptions applicable to those actions.” United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 

160, 166 (1991) (emphasis in original); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(4). 

 When the United States is a defendant for an FTCA claim, the FTCA provides 

that: 

[t]he remedy against the United States...for injury or loss of property, or 

personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful 

act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the 

scope of his office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action or 

proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter 

against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or 

against the estate of such employee. 

28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (emphasis added). 

 Here, Defendants Wilson, Ashley, Greyeyes, and Yazzie were clearly acting 

within the scope of their employment, namely “Law Enforcement-Patrol” and “Adult 

Detention” services as specified in the relevant 638 contracts, No. A13AV00222 and No. 

A13AV00207, between the Navajo Nation and the United States Department of the 

Interior. (Docs. 45-2, 45-3.) Therefore, Defendants Wilson, Ashley, Greyeyes, and 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 5 of 14
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Yazzie are federal employees. The United States’ Attorney certified that these individual 

Defendants, as federal employees, were acting within the scope of their employment, 

pursuant to their 638 contracts. (Docs. 18, 44.) Accordingly, upon this certification, 

Defendants Ashley, Williams, Greyeyes, and Yazzie are dismissed from this action and 

the United States is substituted in place of them for each of their alleged actions. The 

only proper party defendant is the United States. 

B. Plaintiff’s Claim for Assault (Claim 2), Battery (Claim 3), and False 

 Imprisonment (Claim 4). 

 Pursuant to the Westfall Act, when the United States is substituted for the 

individual defendants, Plaintiff’s claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment are 

barred by the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity. When the United States is a 

defendant, the provisions of the FTCA will not apply to: “[a]ny claim arising out of 

assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest” and other enumerated intentional torts. 

28 U.S.C. § 2680. This is subject to an exception regarding intentional torts committed by 

federal law enforcement officers: 

with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers

of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 

1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising...out of assault, 

battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious 

prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law 

enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States who is 

empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make 

arrests for violations of Federal law. 

28 U.S.C. § 2680 (emphasis added). Section 2680(h) waives sovereign immunity for suits 

against the United States arising out of intentional torts committed by its law enforcement 

officers acting within the scope of their employment. See Trujillo v. United States, 313 F. 

Supp. 2d 1146, 1149 (D.N.M. 2003). 

 Tribal officers are deemed employees of the BIA for the limited purpose of FTCA 

coverage, subject to their actions falling “within the scope of their employment in 

carrying out the contract or agreement.” Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 6 of 14
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Appropriation Act, Pub.L. 101-512, § 314, 104 Stat. 1915 (1990).1 However, “[t]ribal law 

enforcement officers operating under a BIA contract or compact are not automatically 

commissioned as federal officers” within the meaning of § 2680(h). 25 C.F.R. § 2680(h). 

Rather, a tribal officer requires a special law enforcement commission (“SLEC”) issued 

by the BIA before qualifying as a federal law enforcement officer under § 2680(h). See 

id. Accordingly, the FTCA federal law enforcement officer exception to the intentional 

tort exception does not apply to tribal officers not in possession of an SLEC. Therefore, 

sovereign immunity is not waived and subject matter jurisdiction does not exist. See 

Trujillo, 313 F. Supp. at 1151; Henin v. Cancel, 708 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 

2010); Williams v. Naswood, No. CV-10-8080-PCT-FJM, 2001 WL 867520, at *1 (D. 

Ariz. Mar. 14, 2011). 

 Typically, intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement officers are not 

barred by sovereign immunity under the statutory regime. Here, however, the federal 

employees did not have SLEC’s. (Docs. 12-1 at ¶ 4; 45-1 at ¶ 5.) In his declarations, 

Assistant Special Agent John R. Burge asserted that the BIA has not issued an SLEC to 

Defendants Ashley, Williams, or Greyeyes (Docs. 12-1 at ¶ 4; 45-1 at ¶ 5.) Because 

Defendants Ashley, Williams, and Greyeyes did not have SLECs, they will not be 

considered federal law enforcement officers and the “intentional torts” exception in § 

2680(h) cannot apply to them.2

 

 Accordingly, the United States does not waive its sovereign immunity for 

Plaintiff’s claims against the United States for assault, battery, and false imprisonment 

allegedly committed by those BIA contract employees that did not have an SLEC, 

namely Ashley, Williams, and Greyeyes. Therefore, the Court concludes that it does not 

have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for assault, battery, and false 

imprisonment against the United States for the actions of Ashley, Williams, and Greyeyes 

 

1

 Often referred to as “§ 314 claims.” See Shirk, 773 F.3d at 1003. 

2

 Defendant Yazzie did have an SLEC. (Doc. 45-1.) The United States is not 

seeking to dismiss the portion of the false imprisonment claim for the actions allegedly committed by Defendant Yazzie. (Doc. 45 at 6, n.3.) 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 7 of 14
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and dismisses them. 

 Defendant Yazzie was issued a SLEC before the incident involving Plaintiff. 

Therefore, he will be considered a federal law enforcement officer for the purposes of § 

2680(h) and is subject to the intentional tort exception. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims 

against the United States for the alleged false imprisonment actions of Yazzie will not be 

dismissed. Because the United States is substituted for Yazzie, they are responsible for 

the claims against him for his alleged false imprisonment. 

C. Plaintiff’s Claim for Negligence (Claim 1). 

 In Arizona, as defined by A.R.S. § 13-409, law enforcement officers have a 

privilege to use force to effectuate an arrest: 

A person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another if 

in making or assisting in making an arrest or detention or in preventing or 

assisting in preventing the escape after arrest or detention of that other 

person, such person uses or threatens to use physical force and all of the 

following exist: 

1. A reasonable person would believe that such force is immediately 

necessary to effect the arrest or detention or prevent the escape. 

2. Such person makes known the purpose of the arrest or detention or 

believes that it is otherwise known or cannot reasonably be made known to 

the person to be arrested or detained. 

3. A reasonable person would believe the arrest or detention to be lawful. 

A.R.S. § 13-409. 

 Plaintiff concedes that the officers were privileged to use force to effectuate her 

arrest, but Defendants were negligent when they exceeded this privilege. In support of 

her claim, Plaintiff argues that while the officers were detaining her, they were acting in 

self-defense as opposed to making an arrest or detention pursuant to their statutory right. 

By rooting her excessive force claims in a theory of self-defense, Plaintiff contends that 

“excessive force” is a negligence-based tort, not an intentional tort. First, Plaintiff has not 

provided and the Court cannot find any Arizona authority expressly recognizing that an 

excessive force claim is rooted exclusively in negligence or that self-defense is an 

applicable theory justifying an officer making an arrest. Second, there are no cases or 

applicable statutes that suggest negligent-assault or negligent-battery exist. Finally, the 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 8 of 14
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Court finds that these claims are better suited as 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims. See e.g. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (recognizing §1983 as a cause of action for 

excessive force during an arrest); Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (utilizing §1983 as a cause of action for an alleged unlawful arrest and 

excessive force claim). 

 Furthermore, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has noted that “[i]ntent 

and negligence are regarded as mutually exclusive grounds for liability.” D.C. v. Chinn, 

839 A.2d 701, 706 (D.C. 2003). The Court in Chinn spells out the relationship between 

the privilege of use of force and excessive force: 

[s]trictly speaking, a police officer effecting an arrest commits a battery. If 

the officer does not use force beyond that which the officer reasonably 

believes is necessary, given the conditions apparent to the officer at the 

time of the arrest, he is clothed with privilege. Otherwise, he has no defense 

to the battery, at least insofar as it involves the use of excessive force.” 

Chinn, 839 A.2d at 706. When negligence is pled in a situation involving the intentional 

use of force by police officers, 

that negligence must be distinctly pled and based upon at least one factual 

scenario that presents an aspect of negligence apart from the use of 

excessive force itself and violative of a distinct standard of care. It is 

tautological to speak of the applicable standard of care as being the duty not 

to use excessive force; that is the precise boundary line of the privilege 

itself, and it matters not whether it is exceeded because of the deliberate 

intention of the officer or through a mistake as to the limit of objectively 

reasonable allowable force. Liability is imposed by the very nature of the 

limitation of the privilege itself. So here, where the battery began with the 

clear intent of the officers to initiate a seizure, the battery did not 

transmogrify into negligence by the fact that the officers may have in the 

process mistakenly crossed the line of permissible force. Any “negligence” 

was inherent in the battery itself, which remained a battery but now 

unprivileged. 

Id. at 711. 

 Plaintiff’s claim of negligence is not distinctly pled and based on a situation apart 

from the officer’s alleged use of excessive force. Even if the officers “mistakenly” 

crossed the line into excessive force, the negligence was inherent in the battery itself. 

The Chinn Court clarifies the difference between battery and negligence in the situation 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 9 of 14
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of an officer using excessive force: 

While it may be . . . that the officers may have mistakenly believed that 

they needed to exert the amount of force that they did, that does not affect 

the intentionality of the initial action or the objective excessiveness of the 

force. An unwanted touching may in its inception be intentional, a battery, 

or accidental, possibly negligent. But once it is found to be intentional, a 

battery tortfeasor is liable for the full range of consequences, intended or 

not, including harm and transferred liability. Therefore, where the excessive 

force is the product of a battery, an unwanted touching inherent in any 

arrest, which escalates in an unbroken manner into excessive force, the 

cause of action is a battery alone, with the privilege having ended at the 

point where excessive force began. To instruct in such circumstances on a 

separate and distinct tort of negligence is not only doctrinally unsound but a 

potential source of jury confusion. It also raises the risk that even where no 

excessive force is used, the jury will conclude that some undefined 

negligence was present for which relief of some sort is justified. A battery 

was committed and the officer is liable unless and only to the extent that the 

officer is clothed by the privilege. 

Id. at 707 (citations omitted). When an officer is making an arrest, she or he is acting 

intentionally, regardless of whether the force used was excessive or not. The Court agrees 

with the reasoning in Chinn and will summarily deny Plaintiff’s argument. 

 The United States contends that sovereign immunity is not waived for cases 

arising “out of” a battery or assault. The United States therefore requests dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s negligence claims which arise out of battery, assault, and false imprisonment: 

14. The United States is vicariously liable for the failure of the Individual 

Defendants to conform to their legal duty of care. This includes, inter alia, 

the following duties: 

 a. The United States is vicariously liable for the failure of the 

 Individual Defendants to conform to their legal duty of refraining 

 from causing unreasonable physical injuries, where such injuries are

 caused by conduct which goes beyond the real or apparent 

 necessities of his or her own defense. 

 ... 

 d. The United States is vicariously liable for the failure of the 

 Individual Defendants to conform to their legal duty of refraining 

 from holding Plaintiff against her will without proper paperwork, a 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 10 of 14
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 proper arrest or proper just cause.3

(Doc. 39 at 3–4). The United States does not seek to dismiss the claims in subparagraphs 

14(b), 14(c), and 14(e), that the United States is vicariously liable for (b) failing to protect 

Plaintiff, (c) leaving Plaintiff in solitary when she was in need of immediate medical 

attention, and (e) failing to administer aid. Id. 

 The Court previously determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction 

over claims (2), (3), and (4) because Defendants Ashley, Williams, and Greyeyes were 

not federal law enforcement officers pursuant to § 2680(h) and therefore not subject to 

the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Based on that finding, the Court will analyze 

whether Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claims that the United States seeks to dismiss 

arose out of the alleged intentional torts committed by Defendants Ashley, Williams, and 

Greyeyes. (Doc. 39 ¶¶ 14(a), 14(d).) To determine whether a claim “arises out of” one of 

the enumerated torts in the FTCA’s exception, courts “look beyond a plaintiff’s 

classification of the cause of action to examine whether the conduct upon which the claim 

is based constitutes one of the torts listed in § 2680(h).” Sabow v. United States, 93 F. 3d 

1445, 1456 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). In analyzing section 2680(h), the Ninth 

Circuit sorts claims of negligence that arise out of the enumerated intentional torts in two 

distinct categories: 

negligence based entirely on a theory of respondeat superior (which cannot 

give rise to liability on the part of the United States under the FTCA for the 

intentional torts of government employees) and independent negligent acts 

or omissions by the government that are proximate causes of the harm 

(which can give rise to liability on the part of the United States under the 

FTCA for the intentional torts of government employees). 

Senger v. United States, 103 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996). If the negligence action is 

based solely under a respondeat superior theory, it is barred under the intentional torts 

exception. Id.; see also Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1503-04 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(explaining that the policy underlying §2680(h) was to insulate the government from 

 

3

 The United States seeks to dismiss the negligence claim in subparagraph (d) for the actions of Delores Greyeyes only. This leaves the claim arising out of false imprisonment for the actions of Carlos Yazzie. 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 11 of 14
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

liability for acts it was powerless to prevent such as assaults and batteries where there 

was no known history of similar behavior.) 

 Here, Plaintiff’s claims of battery, assault, and false imprisonment were 

intentional torts allegedly committed by employees of the United States, not independent 

acts or omissions by the United States itself. Because the claims of negligence against the 

United States concerning the intentional torts of Defendants Ashley, Williams, and 

Greyeyes are based solely on a theory of respondeat superior and those intentional torts 

were dismissed from the case, they cannot give rise to liability on the part of the United 

States under the FTCA. 

 Defendant Yazzie did have an SLEC and is subject to the exception of United 

States liability for federal law officers. Therefore, the negligence claim arising out of the 

alleged false imprisonment claims concerning him will not be dismissed. 

 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s negligence claim in 14(a) is dismissed. The Court 

also finds that Plaintiff’s negligence claim in 14(d) is dismissed only for the actions of 

Defendant Greyeyes. 

 In summation, all Individual Defendants are dismissed and five claims against the 

United States remain in this case. They are: (1) False Imprisonment for the actions of 

Yazzie; (2) Negligent Supervision for the alleged False Imprisonment committed by 

Yazzie; (3) Negligent Supervision for the failure of the Individual Defendants to protect 

Plaintiff from unreasonable uses of force by other Individual Defendants; (4) Negligent 

Supervision for the negligence of Individual Defendants in leaving Plaintiff in solitary 

confinement when she was in need of immediate medical attention; and (5) Negligent 

Supervision for the failure of Individual Defendants to administer aid to Plaintiff when 

her injuries had been directly caused by the Individual Defendants. 

D. Defendant United States of America’s Motion to Strike Answer 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) permits a pleading to be struck, in whole or in part, for 

advancing “an insufficient defense or” containing “any redundant, immaterial, 

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Such action may be taken either 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 12 of 14
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

on motion or sua sponte. Id. (“The court may act...on its own; or...on motion made by a 

party.”) “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and 

money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues 

prior to trial....” Sidney–Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.1983). 

 Because the Court granted the substitution of the United States for the Individual 

Defendants and dismissed them from this case, there is no longer a need for their 

independent answers. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion to strike the Individual 

Defendants’ answers. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING Defendant United States of 

America’s Notice of Substitution (Docs. 18, 44.) and dismisses the Individual 

Defendants: April Ashley, Eric Williams, Delores Greyeyes, and Carlos Yazzie. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING Defendant United States of 

America’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 45.) Plaintiff Ruby 

Gatling’s claims of (1) assault against Defendants Ashley and Williams (Doc. 39 at 5 ¶¶ 

18-22.); (2) battery against Defendants Ashley and Williams (Id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 23-27); (3) 

false imprisonment against Defendant Greyeyes (Id. at 6 ¶¶ 28-32); (4) negligent 

supervision arising out of the assault and battery allegedly committed by Defendants 

Ashley and Williams (Id. at 3 ¶ 14(a)); and (4) negligent supervision arising out of the 

false imprisonment allegedly committed by Defendant Greyeyes (Id. at 4 ¶ 14(d)) are 

dismissed with prejudice. 

 Left before the Court are five claims against the United States: (1) False 

Imprisonment for the actions of Yazzie (Id. at 6 ¶¶ 28-32); (2) Negligent Supervision for 

the alleged False Imprisonment committed by Yazzie (Id. at 4 ¶ 14(d)); (3) Negligent 

Supervision for the failure of the Individual Defendants to protect Plaintiff from 

unreasonable uses of force by other Individual Defendants (Id. at 4 ¶ 14(b)); (4) 

Negligent Supervision for the negligence of Individual Defendants in leaving Plaintiff in 

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 13 of 14
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

solitary confinement when she was in need of immediate medical attention (Id. at 4 ¶ 

14(c)); and (5) Negligent Supervision for the failure of Individual Defendants to 

administer aid to Plaintiff when her injuries had been directly caused by the Individual 

Defendants (Id. at 4 ¶ 14(e)). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING Defendant United States of 

America’s Motion to Strike Answer. (Doc. 46.) The Clerk of Court is directed to strike 

the Answer filed by April Ashley, Eric Williams, and Delores Greyeyes. (Doc. 42.) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Plaintiff’s Motion for Additional 

Time to File a Response to Motion to Dismiss as moot. (Doc. 48.) 

 Dated this 1st day of July, 2016. 

Honorable Stephen M. McNamee

Senior United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-08070-SMM Document 52 Filed 07/05/16 Page 14 of 14