Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01099/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01099-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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1 Defendants filed four separate motions to dismiss. Due

to the overlapping facts and issues presented by these motions,

the court addresses all defendants’ motions together.

2 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DEBORAH HENSON, 

Plaintiff,

NO. CIV. 05-1099 FCD KJM

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

LASSEN COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants’1 motions to

dismiss plaintiff Deborah Henson’s second amended complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 In

addition, plaintiff moves to amend her second amended complaint

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3 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,

the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

pursuant to Rule 15(a). For the reasons set forth below,

defendants’ motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and

plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.3 

BACKGROUND

In April of 2003, plaintiff submitted her resume to the

California Merit Systems Board for consideration for the position

of supervisor or director of a Child Protective Services (“CPS”)

division. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl., filed August 2, 2005, at ¶

15). Thereafter, plaintiff was contacted by defendant Crosby to

interview for the position of CPS Supervisor in defendant Lassen

County (“County”). (Id. at ¶ 16). After plaintiff interviewed

for the position, she was offered the job by defendant Crosby.

(Id. at ¶¶ 17-18). Before accepting the position, plaintiff

informed defendant Crosby that she was in remission from

panic/anxiety disorder and that such condition could recur if

more than ordinary levels of stress were involved in her position

at CPS. (Id. at ¶ 18). 

Plaintiff commenced employment on May 12, 2003, relying on

defendant Crosby’s assurances that CPS was in good order and

provided health insurance benefits to its managerial employees

while on disability leave. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 25, 29). However,

plaintiff later learned that CPS was subject to a grand jury

investigation and was in a state of non-compliance with the

California Department of Social Services. (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 32). 

This was not disclosed to plaintiff during her interview process;

rather defendants Crosby and Margolies intentionally kept this

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information from plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-24). Plaintiff also

learned that CPS was understaffed by more than half of its

required full-time employees, which dictated that plaintiff work

between 70 and 80 hours per week. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-31). 

Plaintiff was promoted to Director of CPS in November 2003,

at which time she was informed that, as a Director, she was

subject to termination only for cause. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-34). 

Shortly after she was promoted, a female-on-female sexual

harassment complaint was lodged against plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 35). 

During this time, plaintiff became the subject of sexuallyorientated slurs by members of CPS staff. (Id. at ¶ 36). In

early January 2004, plaintiff demanded that action be taken

regarding the allegedly false sexual harassment claim filed

against her. (Id. at ¶ 40). Although this allegation was

recanted, no action was taken to remedy such accusations or clear

plaintiff’s name. (Id. at ¶¶ 41-44). In addition, these

allegations were investigated by Jim Jackson in March and April

2004. (Id. at ¶ 53). Mr. Jackson found that plaintiff was

injured by the false allegations and that disciplinary action

should be taken against the complainant. (Id.) However, no

action was taken in response to Mr. Jackson’s report. (Id. at ¶

54).

In early 2004, plaintiff sought to hire a CPS social worker. 

(Id. at ¶ 45). After plaintiff refused to hire defendant

Mannel’s wife because she did not apply for the position through

the proper channels, plaintiff offered the position to Bill

Snitkin. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-39, 45). Defendant Margolies directed

plaintiff to rescind the job offer to Mr. Snitkin, or in the

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alternative, prepare for his termination by “starting a paper

trail,” because Mr. Snitkin was HIV positive. (Id. at ¶¶ 46). 

In March 2004, plaintiff sought medical care for anxiety

induced chest pains after defendants Whiteman and Mannel were

abusive to plaintiff in connection with plaintiff’s second

refusal to hire defendant Mannel’s wife. (Id. at ¶ 51). 

Thereafter, plaintiff believes that defendants Whiteman, Mannel,

and others attempted to solicit negative information about

plaintiff, which may have resulted in the filing of a second

female-on-female sexual harassment complaint against plaintiff. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 51-52, 55). Again, the complaint was later recanted. 

(Id. at ¶ 58). Plaintiff believes that defendants Whiteman,

Chapman, and possibly Bixby, met with Woody Morgan, managing

editor of the Lassen County News. (Id. at ¶ 56). Plaintiff also

believes that these defendants made defamatory statements and

provided false and misleading information to Mr. Morgan regarding

plaintiff’s professionalism and management of CPS. (Id. at ¶¶

56-57). Thereafter, plaintiff was “shocked and humiliated” by

the call for plaintiff’s termination in Mr. Morgan’s article

published in the Lassen County News on May 11, 2004. (Id. at ¶¶

59-60).

Plaintiff believes that, as a result of her complaints

regarding the allegedly false sexual harassment claims, her

refusal to hire defendant Mannel’s wife, her refusal to rescind

the job offer to Mr. Snitkin, and her refusal to engage in

discriminatory conduct toward Mr. Snitkin, defendants Whiteman,

Chapman, Mannel, and others conspired to create intolerable

working conditions and to interfere with her civil rights so as

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to cause her to quit her job or take a disability leave. (Id. at

¶¶ 47-50). 

On June 1, 2004, defendant Bixby informed plaintiff by

memorandum that he was placing the operations of CPS under the

control of defendant Mannel. (Id. at ¶ 61). On that same date,

plaintiff began a medical leave as a result of work-related

stress. (Id. at ¶ 62). Subsequently, plaintiff sought the care

of a psychiatrist, who diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from post

traumatic stress disorder. (Id. at ¶ 63). As a result of her

mental and emotional condition, plaintiff has been unable to seek

suitable re-employment. (Id. at ¶ 66). 

After plaintiff took medical leave, defendant Bixby

demanded, by letter on June 15, 2004, that plaintiff refrain from

contacting any member of the staff at CPS. (Id. at ¶ 64). This

action effectively ended plaintiff’s authority over CPS. (Id.) 

In November 2004, plaintiff received a letter from Ronald

Vossler, Lassen County Human Resources Director, notifying

plaintiff that her health care benefits had been discontinued

effective mid-August 2004. (Id. at ¶ 68 and Ex. 14). 

Plaintiff filed a claim for damages with the County on

December 10, 2004. (Id. at ¶ 70). Plaintiff’s claim alleged

that plaintiff was wrongfully terminated on December 1, 2004. 

(Id. at Ex. 15). Plaintiff’s claim also alleged that plaintiff

was subjected to a hostile work environment, which caused her to

have an emotional breakdown and to suffer from post traumatic

stress disorder. (Id.) In addition, plaintiff’s claim included

allegations of malicious acts by County officials, slander and

retaliation for whistle blowing. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that

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4 The court declines to consider the extrinsic evidence

provided by Henson in support of her oppositions to defendants’

motions to dismiss. In considering a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6), the court should look only to the pleadings. 

Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925

6

John Kettleson, all Supervisors of Lassen County, William Bixby,

Margaret Crosby, and others caused her injuries. (Id.) The

County denied plaintiff’s claim on January 11, 2005. (Id. at ¶

71). 

Subsequently, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination

with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing

(“DFEH”) on June 22, 2005. (Id. at ¶ 72). The DFEH issued a

right-to-sue notice on June 27, 2005. (Id. at ¶ 73). Plaintiff

then filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on July 12, 2005. (Id. at ¶ 74). 

The EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice on September 1, 2005. 

(Pl.’s P. & A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to Am., filed

October 14, 2005, at 2).

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint includes claims for:

(1) fraud, (2)intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3)

libel, (4) conspiracy, (5) tortious interference with contractual

relations, (6) violations of the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act (“FEHA”) for sexual orientation harassment and

retaliation, and (7) violations of her First Amendment and Due

Process rights under to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants

subsequently brought motions to dismiss plaintiff’s second

amended complaint.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true.4 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

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(9th Cir. 2001). 

7

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

A complaint need not plead all elements of a prima facie

case in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Swierkewicz v.

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-512 (2002) (rejecting a heightened

pleading standard for employment discrimination and civil rights

cases). Fair notice of the grounds for relief along with a short

and plain statement of the claim are all that is required. Id.

at 508 (citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)).

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.

1986). Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.

California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

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5 Plaintiff’s counsel admitted that this claim was

erroneously brought as a libel claim when it should have been

brought as a slander claim and has requested leave to amend. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 16). Plaintiff’s

request for leave to amend is addressed in Section D of this

Order.

8

Cir. 1986).

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. Of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 

ANALYSIS

In response to defendants’ motions to dismiss, plaintiffs do

not oppose defendants’ motions with respect to the following

claims: (1) all of plaintiff’s claims against defendants Pyle,

Keifer, Dahle, and Hanson in their official capacities as members

of the Board of Supervisors of Lassen County; (2) plaintiff’s

claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against

defendants County, Mannel, Whiteman, Bixby, and Chapman; (3)

plaintiff’s claims of libel5 against the County, Mannel, Whiteman,

Bixby, and Chapman; (4) plaintiff’s claims of civil conspiracy

against defendants County, Crosby, Margolies, Mannel, Bixby,

Whiteman, and Chapman; and (5) plaintiff’s claim of tortious

interference with contractual relations against defendant County. 

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are (1) claims for fraud

against defendants County, Crosby, Margolies, and Chapman; (2)

claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against

defendants Crosby and Margolies; (3) claims of tortious

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interference with contractual relations against defendants

Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and Chapman; (4) claims for sexual

orientation harassment and retaliation in violation of FEHA

against defendants County, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and Chapman;

and (5) claims for First Amendment and Due Process violations

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants County, Margolies,

Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and Chapman.

A. State Tort Claims

1. Fraud

Defendants County, Crosby and Margolies argue that

plaintiff’s fraud claim is barred because plaintiff failed to

comply with the requirements of the California Tort Claims Act

(“CTCA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 900, et seq. Specifically,

defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim filed with the County did

not contain any factual correlation to the fraud claim asserted

in the complaint. Pursuant to Cal. Government Code § 945.4,

no suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is

required to by presented in accordance with Chapter 1

(commencing with section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing

with section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a

written claim therefore has been presented to the

public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or

has been deemed to have been rejected by the board.

 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4 (West 2005). Moreover, any suit against

a public employee is barred in cases where a plaintiff’s action

against the agency is barred for failure to present a claim. 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2 (West 2005). The 1965 Amendment to §

950.2 makes it clear the “the presentation of a claim to the

employing public entity is a prerequisite to suit against an

employee.” Id. Therefore, in order to state a tort claim

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against a public entity and its employees, plaintiff must first

present a claim to the government entity for money or damages,

with few exceptions. Cal. Gov’t Code § 905 (West 2005). Tort

claims such as the instant claims for fraud, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, libel, conspiracy, and tortious

interference with contractual relations are not listed among the

exceptions to § 905. Id. 

Plaintiff has the burden of pleading compliance with the

CTCA in her complaint. Wood v. Riverside General Hospital, 25

Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1119 (1994). Moreover, compliance with the

CTCA is mandatory. City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.

3d 447, 454 (1974). Federal courts have recognized these

requirements. See Ortega v. O’Connor, 764 F.2d 701, 707 (9th

Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987)

(failure to comply with claim-filing requirements imposed by CTCA

bars pendent state claims). Finally, where employees of the

agency in question act within their express or implied authority,

despite the wrongful nature of their actions, a complaint based

on the employees’ actions may be properly dismissed for failing

to allege proper filing of the claim with the employing

government entity. Neal v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 877-78

(1973).

The purpose of the CTCA is to “provide the public entity

with sufficient information to enable it to adequately

investigate the claims and to settle them, if appropriate,

without the expense of litigation.” City of San Jose, 12 Cal. 3d

at 455. Pursuant to Cal. Gov’t Code § 910, a claim must state

“the date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or

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transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted” and provide

“[a] general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury,

damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of

presentation of the claim.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 910 (West 2005). 

However, it is not necessary that the claim “specify each

particular act or omission later proven to have caused the

injury.” Stockett v. Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers

Insurance Auth., 34 Cal. 4th 441, 447 (2004). The purposes of the

CTCA are met “if the claim gives adequate information for the

public entity to investigate.” Id. at 449. “[A]dditional detail

and elaboration in the complaint is permitted.” Id.

Nevertheless, the facts underlying each cause of action in the

complaint must be reflected in the claim. Id. at 447. The

complaint may be barred where the complaint alleges liability

based on different facts than those provided in the claim. Id.

at 447-448. 

If a claim alerts a public entity to the existence of a

claim for monetary damages and the possibility of a lawsuit, but

does not substantially comply with §§ 910 and 910.2, the claim is

defective and triggers the operation of §§ 910.8, 911 and 911.3.

Phillips v. Desert Hospital District, 49 Cal. 3d 699, 701-702

(1989). Pursuant to these sections, a public entity is required

to “notify the claimant of any insufficiencies of content or

timeliness that prevent a claim as presented from satisfying the

requirements of the [CTCA].” Id. at 702; Cal. Gov’t Code §§

910.8, 911 and 911.3 (West 2005). Failure to provide such notice

waives any defenses based on those insufficiencies. Cal. Gov’t

Code §§ 911 and 911.3. The possibility of waiver encourages the

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6 Plaintiff also asserts her claim of fraud against the

Lassen County Board of Supervisors, in their official capacities. 

Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to dismiss all claims against

defendants Pyle, Keifer, Dahle, and Hanson. However, defendant

Chapman is also a member of the Board of Supervisors. Chapman is

not named as an individual defendant in the fraud claim and it is

unclear from the moving papers if plaintiff did not oppose

dismissal of the fraud claim against Chapman in his official

capacity. However, if plaintiff is asserting a fraud claim

against defendant Chapman, it is also barred for failure to

comply with the CTCA.

12

public entity to promptly investigate claims, which best serves

the purposes of the CTCA. Phillips, 49 Cal. 3d at 705, 711. 

Plaintiff’s claim must reflect facts to support each cause

of action in the complaint. Stockett, 34 Cal. 4th at 447. 

However, plaintiff’s claim failed to mention the

misrepresentations and omissions underlying plaintiff’s fraud

claim. The County was not on notice to investigate plaintiff’s

claim of fraud because plaintiff’s claim lacked any factual basis

to support such a claim. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim did not

trigger the County’s duty to provide plaintiff with notice of

untimeliness or insufficiency of content. Phillips, at 702; Cal.

Gov’t Code §§ 910.8, 911 and 911.3. 

Plaintiff’s fraud claim is barred for failure to comply with

the requirements of the CTCA because there is no factual

correlation between plaintiff’s claim and plaintiff’s allegation

of fraud in the second amended complaint. Accordingly,

defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s fraud claim are

GRANTED with prejudice.6

/////

/////

/////

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

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7 Plaintiff did not oppose defendants County, Mannel,

Whiteman, Bixby, and Champman’s motion to dismiss her claims of

intentional infliction of emotional distress because they were

barred by the exclusivity provisions of California’s Workers’

Compensation laws. However, plaintiff did not address the

applicability of such exclusivity provisions to her claims

against defendants Crosby and Margolies.

8 Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s claim is barred

for failure to comply with the CTCA. For the reasons set forth

herein, the court need not reach the issue of compliance with the

CTCA.

13

Defendants Crosby and Margolies7 argue that plaintiff’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fails because

it does not comply with the CTCA. Plaintiff alleges in her

second amended complaint that she suffers from post traumatic

stress disorder caused by the misrepresentations and omissions as

to the true condition of CPS made by defendants Crosby and

Margolies during plaintiff’s hiring process. (Pl.’s Second Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 20-24, 32, 63, 88-89). However, plaintiff’s claim with

the County did not contain any factual allegations relating to

these omissions and misrepresentations. Therefore, plaintiff’s

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against

defendants Crosby and Margolies is barred for failure to comply

with the CTCA. See Stockett, 34 Cal. 4th at 447. Accordingly,

defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s intentional infliction

of emotional distress claim are GRANTED with prejudice. 

5. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations

Defendants Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and Chapman argue that

plaintiff’s tortious interference with contractual relations

claim fails because plaintiff was not employed pursuant to a

contract.8 The existence of a valid contract is an essential

element of a tortious interference with contractual relations

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claim. Bed, Bath & Beyond of La Jolla, Inc. v. La Jolla Vill.

Square Venture Partners, 52 Cal. App. 4th 867 (1997). 

In California, it is well settled that

public employment is not held by contract but by

statute and that, insofar as the duration of such

employment is concerned, no employee has a vested

contractual right to continue in employment beyond

the time or contrary to the terms and conditions

fixed by law. 

Miller v. State of California, 18 Cal. 3d 808, 813-814 (1977).

See also Keiser v. Lake County Super Court, 2005 WL 3370006 (N.D.

Cal. Dec. 12, 2005); Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d 1 (1990);

Hill v. City of Long Beach, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1684 (1995);

Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426 (1988);

Hinchliffe v. City of San Diego, 165 Cal. App. 3d 722 (1985). 

As a public employee, plaintiff’s employment with the County is

governed by statute and not by contract. Therefore, plaintiff’s

claim fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, defendants’ motion

to dismiss plaintiff’s tortious interference with contractual

relations claim is GRANTED with prejudice.

B. Fair Employment and Housing Act Claims

Defendants County, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and Chapman

argue that plaintiff’s FEHA claims should be dismissed because

they are barred for untimeliness. FEHA provides that “[n]o

complaint may be filed after the expiration of one year from the

date upon which the alleged unlawful practice or refusal to

cooperate occurred.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960 (West 2006). The

filing of a complaint with the DFEH is a prerequisite to bringing

a civil action. Rodriquez v. Airborne Express, 265 F. 3d 890,

896 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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Plaintiff alleges that she filed a complaint with the DFEH

“on or about June 22, 2005, and within one year of the series of

discriminatory actions by the defendants.” (Pl.’s Second Am.

Compl. at ¶ 72). Plaintiff further alleges that the DFEH issued

a right-to-sue notice on or about June 27, 2005. (Id. at ¶ 73). 

Therefore, any offending conduct occurring prior to June 22,

2004, cannot serve as a basis for liability pursuant to FEHA

unless an exception to the statute of limitations applies. 

Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1031, 1040

(2002). 

Plaintiff may be able to establish an equitable exception to

the statute of limitations relating to her FEHA claims. See

Rodriguez, 265 F.3d 890; Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d

1273 (9th Cir. 1993); Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th

798 (2001). Plaintiff addresses the application of the

continuing violation doctrine and implicates other equitable

tolling doctrines in her opposition to defendants’ motion to

dismiss. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 24-26).

However, plaintiff must set forth sufficient facts in her second

amended complaint to support the invocation of such equitable

theories. Plaintiff has failed to do so. As such, the court

cannot consider the possible applicability of such doctrines for

the purposes of this motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

Plaintiff began a work-related medical leave on June 1,

2004, and the majority of plaintiff’s allegations relating to her

sexual orientation harassment and retaliation claims occurred

prior thereto. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 40-62). Therefore,

plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies as to

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these allegations. Accordingly, defendants’ motion as to these

allegations is GRANTED.

Plaintiff alleges that the County sent her a denial of

benefits letter in November 2004. (Id. at ¶ 68). With respect

to this conduct, plaintiff has properly alleged that she timely

filed her complaint with the DFEH and exhausted all

administrative remedies prior to bringing this action. However,

the notice of discontinuance of disability benefits, standing

alone, is insufficient to support plaintiff’s claims of sexual

orientation harassment and retaliation in violation of FEHA. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FEHA

claims is GRANTED.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must

plead facts demonstrating that (1) defendants acted under color

of state law; and (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the

constitution or federal statutes. Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana,

936 F.2d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991).

1. First Amendment Violation

Plaintiff’s alleges that she was deprived of her First

Amendment rights because she was retaliated against for making

complaints regarding sexual harassment and other civil rights

violations. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 133, 135). When an

employer wrongfully retaliates against an employee for speech

protected by the First Amendment, the employer has violated

§ 1983. Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1037. In order to state a claim

against a government employer for a violation of the First

Amendment, plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in protected

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speech; (2) the employer took adverse employment action; and (3)

her speech was the substantial or motivating factor for the

adverse employment action. Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d

968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“An employee’s speech is protected under the First Amendment

if it addresses ‘a matter of legitimate public concern’”. Id.

(quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 US 563, 571 (1968)). The

Ninth Circuit has defined speech of public concern as:

[S]peech that concerns “issues about which information

is needed or appropriate to enable the members of

society” to make informed decisions about the

operation of their government. “This type of speech

merits the highest degree of first amendment

protection.”

McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983)

(citations omitted). 

Moreover, plaintiff must show that she was subjected to

adverse employment action. A government act of retaliation need

not be severe or of a certain kind. Coszalter, 320 F. 3d at 975. 

Even minor acts can infringe on an employee’s First Amendment

rights if they have an impermissible chilling effect. Id. If

plaintiff “can establish that the actions taken by the defendants

were ‘reasonably likely to deter’ [her] from engaging in

protected activity under the First Amendment, [she] will have

established a valid claim under § 1983.” Id. at 976. 

Finally, plaintiff must establish that the protected speech

was a substantial or motivating factor for such adverse action. 

Id. at 977. A plaintiff may establish this element in three

ways. First, plaintiff may introduce evidence relating to “the

proximity in time between the protected action and allegedly

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adverse employment action” from which a jury could infer that the

action was retaliatory in nature. Id. (citations omitted). 

Second, plaintiff may introduce evidence that her “employer

expressed opposition” to her speech. Id. Third, plaintiff may

introduce evidence that her “employer’s proffered explanations

for the adverse employment action were false and pre-textual.” 

Id. 

(a) Defendants Mannel, Whiteman, Bixby, and Chapman

Defendants Mannel, Whiteman, Bixby, and Chapman argue that

plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983 because her

allegations of constitutional deprivation rely entirely on

conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences. 

Plaintiff argues that her speech is protected because she

made statements concerning potential civil rights violations. 

Plaintiff alleges she made statements to defendants concerning

allegedly false sexual harassment claims against her. (Pl.’s

Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 40, 44). Plaintiff also alleges that she

made statements to the defendants regarding her refusal to take

discriminatory action against Mr. Snitkin and rescind his job

offer. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-47 and Exs. 8-9). Information regarding

potential civil rights violations by the County and its officials

is a matter of public concern. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973. 

Therefore, plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to establish

her speech is protected under the First Amendment.

/////

Plaintiff also alleges that she was subjected to adverse

employment action as a result of these statements. Plaintiff

alleges that she was (1) subjected to an intolerable and abusive

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working environment, (2) subjected to defamatory statements

regarding her professionalism and management of CPS, (3) stripped

of her control of CPS, and (4) denied health care benefits while

on disability leave. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 48, 51, 56,

57, 61, 64, 67, 68). Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to

demonstrate adverse employment action. 

Finally, plaintiff alleges facts to support the inference

that plaintiff’s statements were a substantial or motivating

factor for the adverse employment action. Plaintiff first

expressed her concerns regarding possible civil rights violations

in January 2004, and continued to do so through March 2004. 

(Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 44, 47, 51). Plaintiff alleges

that the adverse employment action began in February or March

2004. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶ 48). The proximity in time

between plaintiff’s initial statements concerning potential civil

rights violations and the commencement of adverse employment

action is so close that a jury could infer that plaintiff’s

statements were a substantial or motivating factor for such

adverse action. 

 Accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, plaintiff has

set forth sufficient facts to establish a valid claim under §

1983 for violation of her First Amendment rights against the

individual defendants Mannel, Whiteman, Bixby, and Chapman. 

Therefore, defendants Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and Chapman’s

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for a First Amendment

violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DENIED.

(b) Defendant County

Defendant County contends that plaintiff fails to set forth

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facts to support municipal liability under Monell v. Dept. of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). To establish municipal

liability, plaintiff must allege one of the following factual

scenarios: (1) that a government employee committed the alleged

violation under a formal government policy, practice, or custom

which is the “standard operating procedure” of the government

entity; (2) that the individual committing the constitutional

tort is an official with “final policy-making authority;” or (3)

“that an official with final policy-making authority ratified a

subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis

for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir.

1992). 

Plaintiff alleges that the customs, practices, and policies

of the County violated her free speech and due process rights. 

(Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 135). Specifically, she alleges

that the customs, practices, and policies of the County are

deliberately indifferent to the rights of persons bringing forth

civil rights concerns. (Id.) Taking all of the evidence and

considering it in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the

court can reasonably infer that plaintiff intends to prove that

the individual defendants committed the alleged violations under

a formal policy, custom, or practice of the County. Accordingly,

defendant County’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim on the

basis of failure to properly allege liability under Monell is

DENIED.

(c) Defendant Margolies

Defendant Margolies argues that plaintiff has failed to

allege facts sufficient to set forth a valid claim against her

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under § 1983 for violation of her First Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff failed to specifically allege that defendant Margolies

acted under color of law. However, plaintiff does allege that at

all times defendant Margolies was acting within the course and

scope of her employment with the County. (Pl.’s Second Am.

Compl. at ¶ 14). Drawing every reasonable inference in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, plaintiff has sufficiently

alleged facts to support her claim that defendant Margolies was

acting under color of law.

Plaintiff alleges that she complained to defendant Margolies

about the allegedly false sexual harassment claims lodged against

plaintiff and the discriminatory conduct taken against Mr.

Snitkin. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40-47). Plaintiff asserts

that defendant Margolies failed to take action regarding the

false sexual harassment claims against plaintiff and ordered

plaintiff to rescind the job offer to Mr. Snitkin. (Id. at ¶¶

43, 46). Plaintiff claims that as a result of defendant

Margolies’ action and inaction, she was subjected to a hostile

work environment. (Id. at ¶¶ 48, 135); See also Coszalter, 320

F.3d at 976-977 (considering factors such as repeated and ongoing

verbal harassment and humiliation, withholding of customary

public recognition, and an unpleasant work assignment in finding

that plaintiff had established a triable issue of fact regarding

adverse employment action). Defendant Margolies’ action and

inaction occurred within weeks of plaintiff’s statements. (Id.

at ¶¶ 40-46). Therefore, the proximity in time between

plaintiff’s statements and defendant Margolies’ conduct support

an inference that plaintiff’s statements were a substantial or

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motivating factor for the adverse employment action. 

Accordingly, defendant Margolies’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

claim for a First Amendment violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 is DENIED. 

2. Due Process Violation

Defendants County, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, Chapman, and

Margolies argue that plaintiff’s due process claim fails because

plaintiff failed to establish that she has a property interest in

her continued employment. “The Due Process Clause provides that

certain substantive rights — life, liberty, and property — cannot

be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate

procedures.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,

541 (1985). Therefore, the due process guarantees of the

Fourteenth Amendment are only implicated when a constitutionally

protected property or liberty interest is at stake. Sanchez v.

City of Santa Ana, 915 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations

omitted). Property interests are not created by the

constitution. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564

(1972)). Rather they are created “by existing rules or

understandings that stem from an independent source such as state

law.” Id. 

 The California Civil Service Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 18500,

et seq., provides that an employee who attains permanent status

has a statutory right to continued employment. Duncan v. Dep’t

of Personnel Admin., 77 Cal. App. 4th 1166, 1175 (2000) (citing

Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975)). This

statutory right constitutes a legitimate claim of entitlement to

continued government employment requiring compliance with

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procedural due process. Id. Permanent status is achieved when

an employee, who is lawfully retained, completes the requisite

probationary period. Cal. Gov’t Code § 18528 (West 2006). 

It is unclear from plaintiff’s second amended complaint if

she achieved the status of a permanent employee under the

California Civil Service Act prior to taking leave on June 1,

2004. Plaintiff has not pled any facts that establish the level

of service she attained at the time of her leave. Because

plaintiff has failed to plead facts to establish she attained

permanent employee status, plaintiff has not set forth sufficient

facts to establish that she has a property interest in her

continued employment. Accordingly, defendants’ motions to

dismiss plaintiff’s due process claim are GRANTED. 

D. Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to Amend

Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to amend] is to be freely

given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave to amend should be

granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing

party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue

delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

1997). 

Plaintiff requested leave to amend her complaint to add

claims of sexual discrimination pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1), and discrimination and retaliation in violation

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§

12100 et seq. (Pl.’s P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Am. at 3).

Defendants contend that granting plaintiff’s request is futile

because plaintiff failed to timely file a charge of

discrimination with the EEOC. A plaintiff must file a timely

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charge of discrimination with the EEOC as a prerequisite to

maintaining a Title VII or ADA action. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5,

12117(a)(West 2006). A complainant is required to file a charge

with the EEOC within 180 days of the last act of alleged

discrimination, unless the complainant initially institutes

proceedings with a state or local agency, in which case the EEOC

charge must be filed within 300 days. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that she filed her charge of

discrimination with the DFEH, a state agency, and thereafter

filed her charge of discrimination with the EEOC within the

requisite 300-day period. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 72-74). 

Therefore, because plaintiff alleges that she timely filed her

claims with the EEOC, plaintiff’s claims are not futile. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion requesting leave to amend to add

federal claims of discrimination and retaliation is GRANTED.

In addition, in her Opposition to defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, plaintiff requested leave to amend her claim of libel to

a claim for slander. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at

16). Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts in her second

amended complaint to support a claim for slander. (Pl.’s Second

Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 56, 57, 59, 60). Therefore, plaintiff’s request

for leave to amend her libel claim to slander is GRANTED.

In her opposition, plaintiff requests leave to amend if the

court finds that the pleadings were deficient. (Pl.’s Opp’n to

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 34). Because there is no indication

that plaintiff’s amendment is sought in bad faith or is futile,

and because plaintiff’s case is at the early stages of

litigation, plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint to

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correct the deficiencies found in the pleadings. Plaintiff may

not amend her complaint where the court has granted defendants’

motions to dismiss with prejudice because amendment of these

claims would be futile.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court makes the

following orders:

1. Defendants Pyle, Keifer, Dahle, and Hanson’s motion to

dismiss all claims is GRANTED. 

2. Defendant Crosby’s motion to dismiss is:

(a) GRANTED with prejudice as to plaintiff’s fraud

claim;

(b) GRANTED with prejudice as to plaintiff’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim; and

(c) GRANTED as to plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim.

3. Defendant Margolies’ motion to dismiss is:

(a) GRANTED with prejudice as to plaintiff’s fraud

claim;

(b) GRANTED with prejudice as to plaintiff’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim;

(c) GRANTED as to plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim;

(d) DENIED as to plaintiff’s claim of a First

Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and

(e) GRANTED as to plaintiff’s claim of a Due Process

violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

4. Defendants County, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and

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Chapman’s motion to dismiss is:

(a) GRANTED with prejudice as to plaintiff’s fraud

claim;

(b) GRANTED with prejudice as to plaintiff’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim;

(c) GRANTED as to plaintiff’s libel claim;

(d) GRANTED as to plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim;

(e) GRANTED with prejudice as to plaintiff’s tortious

interference with contractual relations;

(f) GRANTED as to plaintiff’s claims of sexual

orientation harassment and retaliation in

violation of FEHA;

(g) DENIED as to plaintiff’s claim of a First

Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and

(h) GRANTED as to plaintiff’s claim of a Due Process

violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is GRANTED. Plaintiff

is granted twenty (20) days from the date of this order to file a

third amended complaint in accordance with this order. 

Defendants are granted thirty (30) days from the date of service

of plaintiff’s third amended complaint to file a response

thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 22, 2006.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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