Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00430/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00430-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Because the Amended Petition is not consecutively

paginated, the Court will cite to it using the numbers assigned

by the electronic case filing system.

1 08cv430 WQH (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH ALFONSO DURAN,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the

California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 08cv430 WQH (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART AMENDED PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [ECF NO.

15] AND ORDER DENYING

EVIDENTIARY HEARING [ECF NO.

43]

Petitioner Joseph Alfonso Duran, a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on March 6, 2008 [ECF No. 1] and an Amended Petition on

December 9, 2008 [ECF No. 15].1

 Respondent filed an Application

for First Enlargement of Time to File Respondent’s Answer on

January 22, 2009, which was granted [ECF Nos. 22-23]. Respondent

timely filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on

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2 Additionally, the case was transferred to Magistrate

Judge William Gallo on October 21, 2009, and was transferred back

to this Court on April 2, 2010.

3 The Court will also cite the Traverse using the page

numbers assigned by the electronic docketing system.

2 08cv430 WQH (RBB)

March 25, 2009, along with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities

and Notice of Lodgment [ECF No. 24].

Duran filed four motions for an extension of time to file

his traverse, all of which were granted [ECF Nos. 26-33]. He

also filed a Motion entitled, Petitioner Requesting Entire Trial

Transcript and California Court of Appeal Briefs, followed

shortly by another request for an extension of time to file his

traverse [ECF Nos. 35-36]. The Court denied Duran’s request for

copies of his trial transcripts but granted him an additional

sixty days to file his traverse [ECF No. 37]. Petitioner

requested another thirty-day extension because he had recently

been transferred to another prison on October 15, 2009, which was

granted [ECF Nos. 38-39].2 Duran filed his Traverse nunc pro

tunc to November 19, 2009 [ECF No. 43].3

The Court has reviewed the Amended Petition, Respondent’s

Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse, and the lodgments. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court recommends Duran’s Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED

IN PART.

In his Traverse, Duran requested an evidentiary hearing. 

(Traverse 3-4, ECF No. 43.) As explained below, the Court DENIES

Duran’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

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3 08cv430 WQH (RBB)

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On January 11, 2004, Petitioner Joseph Duran went to a

National City car dealership where he met Jose Fernando Garcia, a

car salesman. (Lodgment No. 10, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 6, 449-

52, Feb. 2, 2005.) Duran told Garcia that his mother had given

him $15,000 to buy a car, and he wanted to test drive a Jeep. 

(Id. at 453, 455.) 

Duran also mentioned that he had just had a cast removed

from his right hand. (Id. at 454.) Petitioner lifted his right

sleeve and showed Garcia that one hand was a different color than

the other. (Id.)

Garcia retrieved the keys to the Jeep that Duran had

selected. (Id. at 458.) They got into the car, and Duran drove

out of the dealership. (Id.) After a short distance, Garcia

asked Duran to pull over so he could remove a balloon that was

tied to the right-hand side mirror. (Id. at 459.) Once the Jeep

was stopped, Duran told Garcia, “Why don’t you get the fuck out

of the car.” (Id. at 461.) Duran lifted his shirt and revealed

what Garcia believed to be a gun. (Id.) Garcia was frightened,

so he jumped out of the car and ran back to the dealership. (Id.

at 462.) Duran drove away in the vehicle. (Id. at 463.)

When Garcia returned to the dealership he told his manager,

James Burgess, what happened and Burgess called 911. (Id.) 

Garcia gave the 911 operator a general description of the

carjacker. (Id.) Later, a police officer came to the dealership

and took a more detailed statement from Garcia. (Id. at 463-64.) 

On January 12, 2004, the day after the robbery, Officer

Michael Helms, a San Diego County Sheriff, noticed a Jeep

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speeding out of a local shopping center. (Lodgment No. 11,

Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 7, 528-30, Feb. 3, 2005.) The Jeep ran a

stop sign and made an illegal turn toward oncoming traffic. (Id.

at 530.) Officer Helms stopped the vehicle because of the

traffic violations. (Id. at 531-32.) 

Duran was the driver of the Jeep. (Id. at 533-35.) During

the traffic stop, he explained that he did not have

identification, but Duran gave his name and date of birth to

Officer Helms. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, the officer ran a

check on the vehicle’s license plate and learned that it was

stolen the day before. (Id. at 535-36.) Officer Helms arrested

Duran and contacted National City Police to assist in the

investigation. (Id. at 536, 538.)

National City Police Officers took several photographs of

Duran, including his face, hair, and where his right arm was

slightly deformed and discolored. (Id. at 557-59.) Two days

later, on January 14, 2004, an officer showed a photographic

lineup to Garcia, the car salesman. (Lodgment No. 10, Rep’s

Appeal Tr. vol. 6, 467.) Garcia identified Duran from the

photographic lineup and also identified him during the trial. 

(Id. at 453, 469-70.) 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 4, 2005, the jury convicted Duran of carjacking,

robbery, and the unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 359-61, Feb. 4, 2005.) The

jury found him not guilty of buying, receiving, concealing,

selling, or withholding a stolen vehicle. (Lodgment No. 12,

Rep.’s Tr. Appeal vol. 8, 696-97, Feb. 4, 2005.) Duran waived

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his right to a jury trial on his prior convictions. (Id. at

703.) He admitted convictions for assault with a deadly weapon

on May 26, 1999, and theft of a firearm on March 1, 1991. (Id.

at 704.) He also admitted two strikes and two prison priors,

including one violent prison prior. (Id.) Finally, Duran

admitted that both of his prior convictions were considered

serious. (Id.)

On August 16, 2005, the trial court sentenced Duran to

twenty-five years to life in state prison for carjacking. 

(Lodgment No. 13, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 9, 741-42.) The court

added two consecutive five-year terms for the two serious

felonies, a consecutive three-year term for the violent prison

prior, and two consecutive one-year terms for each of the prison

priors. (Id. at 742.) The sentences for robbery and the

unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle, counts two and three,

were stayed pursuant to California Penal Code section 654. (Id.

at 743.) Petitioner’s total sentence was forty years to life in

state prison. (Id. at 742-43; see also Lodgment No. 2, Clerk’s

Tr. vol. 2, 368.)

Duran appealed his conviction to the California Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment No. 15, Appellant’s Opening Br. at 1, People

v. Duran, No. D047059 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007).) He argued

that the prosecutor violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), as well as California Penal Code section 1054.1, and the

trial court miscalculated his sentence. (Lodgment No. 15,

Appellant’s Opening Br. at 8-24, People v. Duran, No. D047059.) 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed Duran’s conviction but

remanded his case to the trial court with instructions to strike

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the prison term enhancements under California Penal Code sections

667.5(a) and 667.5(b). (Lodgment No. 18, People v. Duran, No.

D047059, slip op. at 11 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan 16, 2007).) 

Duran then filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court and made the same arguments regarding Brady and

California Penal Code section 1054.1 discovery violations. 

(Lodgment No. 19, Pet. for Review at 3, 12) People v. Duran,

[S150297] (Cal. filed Feb. 20, 2007).) The supreme court

summarily denied his petition. (Lodgment No. 20, People v.

Duran, [S150297], order (Cal. Mar. 30, 2007).)

On February 26, 2008, Duran filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 21,

People v. Duran, S161207 (Cal. filed Feb. 26, 2008) (petition for

writ of habeas corpus).) He argued: (1) the trial court abused

its discretion when it did not order a competency hearing and

erred when it took a “Lopez waiver” without evaluating his

competence and informing him of the maximum punishment; (2) he

received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the judge

improperly admitted evidence of a gun. (Id.) The petition was

summarily denied. (Supplemental Lodgment No. 1, In re Duran,

S161207, order (Cal. Oct. 16, 2008).)

On March 6, 2008, Duran filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in this Court and filed an Amended Petition on December 9,

2008 [ECF No. 15]. Respondent filed an Answer on January 22,

2009 [ECF No. 22]. Duran’s Traverse was filed nunc pro tunc to

November 19, 2009 [ECF No. 43].

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Duran filed his Petition after April 24, 1996, it is

subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) of 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006); Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege his conviction was obtained “in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C.A § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d

at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990);

Mannhald v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

 A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding federal courts have no authority to review a state’s

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application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas relief

only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of

state law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation).

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended section 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgement

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A § 2254(d).

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63

(2003), stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas

court to adopt any one methodology in deciding the only question

that matters under section 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court

decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation

omitted). In other words, a federal court is not required to

review the state court decision de novo. Id. Rather, a federal

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court can proceed directly to the reasonableness analysis under

section 2254(d)(1). Id.

The “novelty” in section 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to

‘Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.’” Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en

banc), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis in

original deleted). Section 2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies

only the Supreme Court as the font of ‘clearly established’

rules.” (Id.) “[A] state court decision may not be overturned

on habeas corpus review, for example, because of a conflict with

Ninth Circuit-based law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may

issue only when the state court decision is ‘contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of,’ an authoritative

decision of the Supreme Court.” Id. (citing Childress v.

Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1224-26 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v.

DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996); see Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the

trial court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant

to the judgement of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed

to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

IV. DISCUSSION

Duran asserts four main grounds and multiple subclaims for

habeas relief. (Am. Pet. 10, ECF No. 15; id. Attach. #2, 34, 67;

id. Attach. #3, 37; see also Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 10,

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17, 32, 40, ECF No. 43.) In ground one, Petitioner claims the

prosecutor failed to disclose material, exculpatory evidence in

violation of his discovery obligations, and the trial judge

abused his discretion by denying Duran’s motion for a new trial. 

(Am. Pet. 10, ECF No. 15.)

In ground two, Petitioner argues that the trial judge abused

his discretion by failing to order a competency hearing after

expressing doubt about Duran’s mental status. (Id. Attach. #2,

34.) The judge is alleged to have erred in allowing him to

complete a Lopez waiver, People v. Lopez, 71 Cal. App. 3d 568,

138 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977), without evaluating Duran’s competence,

and his waiver was not knowing and intelligent because he was not

informed of his maximum punishment. (Id.)

In ground three, Petitioner claims that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel prior to, and after, his selfrepresentation. (Id. at 67.) Petitioner argues that his counsel

failed to investigate Duran’s mental capacity. (Id. at 68.) At

the time Petitioner waived his right to counsel, his attorney

failed to inform him of the correct maximum penalty. (Id. at

70.) In addition, Duran contends that the trial court erred by

failing to address his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

raised in his motion for a new trial. (Id. at 72.)

Finally, in ground four, Petitioner argues that the trial

judge improperly admitted evidence regarding the personal use of

a firearm, when that allegation had previously been dismissed

from counts one and two. (Id. Attach. #3, 37-38.)

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4

 Initially, Duran moved to have the document and its

contents suppressed, but the court denied his motion. (Lodgment

No. 11, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 7, 505, 507-08.) 

11 08cv430 WQH (RBB)

A. Ground One: Whether the Prosecution Failed to Disclose

Material, Exculpatory Evidence

On November 24, 2004, Duran filed an informal request for

discovery pursuant to California Penal Code section 1054.5 (West

2008). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 21-28). On December

10, 2004, he filed a motion for discovery pursuant to Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83; People v. Wheeler, 4 Cal. 4th 284, 841

P.2d 938, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418 (1992); and California Penal Code

section 1054(e) (West 2008). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol.

1, 29-30); see also Cal. Penal Code § 1054(e) (“[N]o discovery

shall occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter,

other express statutory provisions, or as mandated by the

Constitution of the United States.”)

On February 3, 2005, as Duran’s trial entered its third and

final day, the prosecution turned over a “police follow-up

report.” (Am. Pet. 10, ECF No. 15.) Petitioner argues the late

delivery of the report violated the prosecution’s discovery

obligations under Brady.4

 (Id. at 13; Traverse Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 13, ECF No. 43.) He further asserts that his conviction

should be reversed because the report was favorable to his

defense, it contained material, exculpatory information, and it

was suppressed by the prosecution. (Am. Pet. at 13-15, ECF No.

15.) “Any information casting doubts on [the victim’s]

identification [of Duran] would undermine the prosecution and aid

the defense.” (Id. at 19.) Petitioner concludes by arguing that

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the evidence “call[ed] into question the accuracy of [the

victim’s] identification of [Duran and] rais[ed] a reasonable

probability of a different result . . . .” (Id. at 20.)

Respondent contends that the California Court of Appeal

considered these claims and properly rejected them. (Answer

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6, ECF No. 24.) Respondent argues that

“[t]he Court of Appeal reasonably concluded the information about

[the undisclosed witnesses] was not material because . . . the

information in no way undermined confidence in the jury’s

verdict.” (Id. at 10.) Furthermore, “[t]he Court of Appeal’s

decision was consistent with Brady and reasonable under the facts

of this case.” (Id. at 11.) 

“[T]he suppression . . . of evidence favorable to an accused

violates due process where the evidence is material either to

guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith of the

prosecutor.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. In Brady, the Supreme Court

recognized a prosecutor’s obligation to disclose exculpatory

evidence, whether substantive or for impeachment purposes, when

such evidence is “material” to the defense. See id. Evidence is

material “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley,

473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). The mere possibility an item of

undisclosed information might have helped the defense or affected

the outcome of the trial does not establish materiality. See

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976).

Habeas corpus relief is only granted if the state court

adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

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involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court.” 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). A Brady violation will not result in

habeas relief unless the improperly withheld evidence “could

reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different

light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).

To establish a Brady violation, Petitioner must show three

things. Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). First,

the evidence was favorable to him, either because it is

exculpatory or because it is impeaching. (Id.) Second, the

evidence must have been willfully or inadvertently suppressed by

the prosecution. (Id.) Third, the defendant was prejudiced by

the failure to disclose. (Id.) 

The follow-up police report contained statements by two

witnesses: Raquel Martinez Robinson and Oscar Ochoa. (Lodgment

No. 2, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 252.) Robinson stated that she spent

no more than ten minutes with the suspect, and Ochoa indicated he

had only observed the suspect from afar. (Id.) Both witnesses

described the carjacker as a Hispanic male who was roughly thirty

years old. (Id.) Robinson added that the carjacker had short

black hair, a pocked face, and identified himself as “Joseph.” 

(Id.) Both witnesses stated they would be unable to identify the

carjacker. (Id.) Neither Robinson nor Ochoa was able to

identify Duran from a photo lineup. (Id.)

Duran presented this claim to the California Court of Appeal

and California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 15, Appellant’s

Opening Br. at 1, People v. Duran, No. D047059; Lodgment No. 19,

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Pet. for Review at 3, 12, People v. Duran, [S150297].) The state

supreme court summarily denied the petition for review. 

(Lodgment No. 20, People v. Duran, [S150297], order.) Because

the appellate court issued the last reasoned state court

decision, this Court will look through the state supreme court’s

summary denial. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991).

The California Court of Appeal stated, “[I]f the information

in the police report was material to [Duran’s] defense, it would

be difficult for us to find that the prosecution met its

discovery obligations.” (Lodgment No. 18, People v. Duran, No.

D047059, slip op. at 9.) The court continued:

However, on this record we cannot find that the

information in the police report would have been of any

material assistance to Duran. The day after the

carjacking he was stopped driving the stolen car. In

general he matched the description given by Garcia and

in particular had a discolored right hand similar to

the one Garcia had reported. Garcia talked to Duran

directly and drove for a short while in the car with

him. Thus Garcia had an excellent opportunity to

recognize Duran and was able to pick him out of a

photographic lineup.

In contrast, the witnesses disclosed in the report

had not been in a car with Duran and in fact apparently

wanted nothing to do with him while he was at the car

dealership. Importantly, unlike Garcia, none of the

undisclosed witnesses had been the victim of a

harrowing carjacking. Under these circumstances a jury

would not find their failure to identify him at all

surprising or inconsistent with Garcia’s testimony. 

Indeed, given the undisclosed witnesses’ casual

opportunity to observe him, had Duran called them and

had them testify about their inability to pick him out

of the photographic lineup, Duran would have

established in a fairly conclusive fashion that the

photographic lineup was not in any manner suggestive. 

Thus the witnesses’ entirely explicable failure to

identify Duran could have easily been used to support

the validity of Garcia’s positive identification.

(Id. at 10-11.) Thus, the appellate court found that the

undisclosed information was not material because there was no

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reasonable probability that the result would have been different

had it been disclosed. (See id.)

The court of appeal reasoned that the victim’s

identification of Petitioner was persuasive because Garcia had

ample opportunity to observe the carjacker, but the undisclosed

witnesses did not. Duran matched the general description of the

carjacker, and Garcia was able to pick Petitioner out of a photo

lineup. Petitioner was apprehended shortly after the crime, in

the stolen vehicle. The court explained that the witnesses in

the report were distinguishable from Garcia because they had

little contact with the carjacker. Their failure to identify

Petitioner from the photo lineup would not contradict Garcia’s

testimony and would be understandable to the jury. The

California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (citing Weeks, 528 U.S. 225).

In his brief to the California Court of Appeal, Duran argued

that a third witness, Jose Morales, had been discovered as a

result of interviewing Robinson and Ochoa. (See Lodgment No. 15,

Appellant’s Opening Br. at 7, People v. Duran, No. D047059.) 

Morales was not interviewed by the police. (Id.) Morales, like

Robinson and Ochoa, saw the carjacker for a limited amount of

time; however, Morales believed he could identify the carjacker. 

(Id.) The court of appeal did not discuss Morales in its

opinion; the trial court, however, did have an opportunity to

review and rule on this claim. (See Lodgment No. 18, People v.

Duran, No. D047059, slip op. at 1-11; Lodgment No. 13 Rep.’s

Appeal Tr. vol. 9, 726-28.) 

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The trial court heard Duran’s motion for a new trial based

on the alleged Brady violation. (Lodgment No. 13 Rep.’s Appeal

Tr. vol. 9, 708.) The motion was based on potential testimony

from all three witnesses -- Robinson, Ochoa, and Morales. 

Duran’s attorney argued, “It is . . . obviously very significant

. . . that information also led to a third witness, who was not

mentioned in the report, who was also an eyewitness, Mr. Moreno

[sic] . . . .” (Id. at 722.) He asserted that the interview

with Robinson and Ochoa lead to “that third individual [Morales]

who was an eyewitness and also gave an indication about his

ability to identify the individual.” (Id. at 723.)

The motion for a new trial was supported by a declaration

from an investigator who had spoken with Morales. (See Lodgment

No. 2, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 262-63.) Judge Edwards stated that

even if the three individuals appeared at the trial, it “would

not lead to a different result.” (Lodgment No. 13, Rep.’s Appeal

Tr. vol. 9, 731.) The trial court commented:

[T]he evidence in this case against [Duran] was strong. 

Mr. Garcia identified [Duran], and the very next day

the defendant was found in possession of the vehicle. 

So you have eyewitness testimony corroborated by the

physical evidence.

And this is not the kind of case where the issue

of cross-racial identification is a matter which might

lead to misidentification. The fact that the defendant

was found in possession of the vehicle the very next

day and was identified by the person from whom the

vehicle was taken, in this court’s view, mitigates

against the finding that a different trier of fact

would reach a different conclusion.

(Id. at 730.)

Judge Edwards continued:

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Although [the nondisclosed individuals] had not been

able to identify [Duran] in a photo spread, looking at

him in true life might have resulted in them

identifying him. And rather than having the one

witness identify him and then having him be in the

position to argue that this one witness was wrong,

producing the other two witnesses who perhaps would

have identified him would then have made that task

impossible.

When you take that with the fact that he was found

in the vehicle a day later, you have no chance.

(Id. at 730-31.)

This Court gives deference to the last reasoned state-court

opinion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 804. The court of

appeal did not discuss whether Morales’s testimony would have

yielded a different result. As a result, this Court looks to the

trial court’s discussion.

The identification of Morales stemmed from interviewing

witnesses listed in the follow-up report, and the court of appeal

found that the report was Brady material. The Supreme Court has

held, “The reviewing court may consider directly any adverse

effect that the prosecutor's failure to respond [to a request for

Brady material] might have had on the preparation or presentation

of the defendant's case.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683 (emphasis

added). Here, the belated disclosure of the follow-up report

hampered Duran’s ability to discover, interview, and call Morales

to testify.

Still, Duran must show that Morales’s testimony was material

to his defense. Evidence is material when “its suppression

undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 678. 

Petitioner must demonstrate that Morales’s testimony would have

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changed the result of his trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. He

cannot meet this burden.

The trial court’s analysis applies to Robinson, Ochoa, and

Morales. Morales saw the carjacker for a limited amount of time. 

(See Lodgment No. 2, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 263-64 (Decl. Frank C.

Griffin).) Although he believed he “could still possibly

identify” the carjacker, Morales was never shown a lineup or

photo array, and he had not indicated that Duran was not the

carjacker. (Id. at 264.) Duran’s defense was that Garcia

misidentified him. The trial judge noted that “it’s not that

[the newly discovered witnesses] picked someone different or said

that [Duran] was not the person.” (Lodgment No. 13, Rep.’s

Appeal Tr. vol. 9, 731.) The court concluded that earlier

disclosure of the follow-up report would not have changed the

result in Petitioner’s case. (Id. at 728-31.) Given the

strength of the case against Duran, uncertain testimony from

Morales would not have altered the course of the proceedings. 

The trial court’s analysis was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

law.

Duran also argues that the trial judge abused his discretion

in denying Petitioner’s motion for a new trial. He claims the

judge did not “explicitly address” Duran’s Brady claim and

applied the wrong legal standard. (Am. Pet. 21-26, ECF No. 15.) 

Petitioner raised these arguments in the court of appeal. (See

Lodgment No. 15, Appellant’s Opening Br. at 15-17, People v.

Duran, No. D047059.) Regardless of how the trial court handled

the Brady claim, the California Court of Appeal addressed the

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claim and applied the legal standard Duran believes was ignored

by the trial judge. (See Lodgment No. 18, People v. Duran, No.

D047059, slip op. at 6-11.) Because there was no constitutional

violation, and the state courts correctly applied Supreme Court

law, the district court should DENY Duran habeas relief based on

the first ground raised in his Amended Petition. 

B. Ground Two: Whether the Trial Court Erred in Failing

to Conduct a Competency Hearing and Allowing Petitioner

to Complete a Lopez Waiver and Whether His Waiver Was

“Knowing and Intelligent”

1. Sua Sponte Competency Hearing

Duran claims “the trial court abused its discretion in not

ordering a competency hearing under [California Penal Code

section] 1368 upon expressing that it entertained doubt of

appellant’s competence.” (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 34, ECF No. 15;

Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 17, ECF No. 43); see also Cal.

Penal Code § 1368 (discussing the procedure for a competency

hearing). Petitioner explains that the trial judge observed his

behavior and heard his attorney’s description of multiple

difficulties during his office’s representation of Duran. (Am.

Pet. Attach. #2, 35, ECF No. 15.) 

On August 20, 2004, after the preliminary hearing but before

trial, Duran perceived that he had problems with his appointed

counsel. (Id. at 46-48.) The trial court held a hearing

pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84

Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970). (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 46, ECF No. 15);

see also Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d at 126, 465 P.2d at 49, 84 Cal. Rptr.

at 161 (holding that a defendant is deprived of his

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel where

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a trial court denies a motion to substitute new counsel without

giving the defendant an opportunity to state the reasons for his

request).

Duran complained that he was being sexually harassed by his

appointed attorney. (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 47-49, ECF No. 15.) 

During the hearing, the judge asked, “So it is not really

anything to do with the quality or the nature of the

representation that he’s giving you or the legal advice he’s

giving you?” (Id. at 48.) Petitioner added that there was a

problem with representation. (Id.) He and his counsel had a

disagreement over obtaining discovery from the district attorney. 

(Id.) The court began to question whether there was a breakdown

in communication when the attorney stated:

Let me interrupt, your honor. I am going to cut

it short, and I’m going to ask you to relieve my

office. I am the third lawyer in my office that this

case has been with. Mr. Duran has had the same

attitude with everyone in my office, and I would assume

everyone in the public defender’s office, the same kind

of nonsense over and over again. Let me just be frank. 

I don’t have time for it, and I would ask you to find

that there is a breakdown in the attorney-client

relationship and relieve my office.

(Id. at 50.)

The trial judge commented that Duran might seek to relieve

the next attorney appointed to represent him and stated, “He’s

getting frustrated with any attorney. Have we thought about

1368?” (Id.) Duran tried to assuage the judge’s concern by

explaining that two of his prior counsel were relieved for

reasons other than a conflict with Duran. (Id.)

Counsel stated that his caseload did not permit him to

handle Petitioner’s case. (Id. at 51.) He added, “We just ran

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out of people that could deal with Mr. Duran . . . .” (Id.) The

attorney described Duran as difficult and explained that his

office interviewed many witnesses for Petitioner, but “[h]e sent

us on one wild goose chase after another.” (Id.)

Duran responded, “They have no time for a technical case

like mine.” (Id. at 52.) According to Petitioner, there was

circumstantial evidence to assemble, and his attorney failed to

ask the proper questions of the people who were interviewed. 

(Id.) He explained, “I needed my parole officers’ photo copies

of my automobile registration and insurance to show there was no

motive for a carjacking.” (Id.) 

The trial judge again asked, “Have you looked at 1368,

considered it at all?” The attorney replied, “I am not aware of

any mental health history, and for that reason I have not

considered it.” (Id.) Duran volunteered, “Your honor, I am

completely capable of understanding, and I am not asking for

self-representation. I think that would be a poor choice.” 

(Id.) The trial judge told Petitioner that his trial date was

approaching and changing attorneys may prevent him from being

able to make another Marsden motion. (Id. at 53-54.) He also

explained that Duran could hire his own attorney. (Id. at 53.) 

Ultimately, the court relieved the alternate public defender and

appointed private conflicts counsel. (Id. at 54.)

Just over two months later, on October 28, 2004, Duran

decided to represent himself. (Id. at 41.) He told the court

that he was a high school graduate with no legal education. 

(Id.) The judge asked why he wanted to represent himself, and he

explained, “The complications of the case, the attorney doesn’t

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seem to understand them. I’m the one who understands them.” 

(Id.) Duran claimed to understand the evidence code and when

asked if he understood the penal code, he said, “If you give me

the opportunity to represent myself, I can always do the research

on it.” (Id. at 42.) 

The judge advised Petitioner that he had a right to

represent himself but that didn’t make self-representation a good

idea. (Id.) Duran countered, “I just think your honor, that I

could get the right information that I need that I haven’t been

able to get from several attorneys . . . .” (Id.) Duran

confirmed that he understood opposing counsel went to law school,

college, and had tried other cases. The judge asked Petitioner

if he thought that was unfair. (Id.) Duran responded, “I think

it’s unfair that I have not had a proper defense.” The judge

analogized Duran’s self-representation to him “stepping into a

ring with a heavyweight fighter.” (Id.) When asked if he

thought he stood a chance, he responded, “Rocky won.” (Id.)

Next, the judge asked Duran to complete the Lopez waiver and

recessed to give him time to do so. (Id. at 43.) When the case

was re-called, Duran had not initialed one paragraph on the form

because he wanted more time to prepare for trial. (Id.) 

Petitioner asked for a ninety-day continuance, but the judge

said, “I’m not here to sit here and negotiate with you as to the

terms of your pro per status.” (Id. at 44.)

Duran was asked, “Is there anything on the form you don’t

understand?” (Id.) He responded, “I need time.” (Id.) The

judge explained that he would give Duran time, just no more time

than he would give a lawyer. (Id.) Duran asked for advisory

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counsel; the judge denied the request. (Id.) Petitioner asked

for a legal runner; the judge again stated he would not negotiate

with Petitioner, but he would appoint a legal runner and

investigator. (Id. at 44-45.) At that time, Duran agreed that

he understood everything on the form. (Id. at 45.)

Petitioner argues that this exchange shows that the court

doubted Duran’s competency to represent himself. (Id. at 35.) 

Specifically, the court “heard [Duran’s] counsel’s observation of

appellant’s behavior with prior appointed counsel and [counsel’s

reference to the] ‘same kind of nonsense over and over again.’” 

(Id.) Petitioner concludes, “In effect, counsel stated defendant

was incapable of cooperating with counsel in his own defense

. . . .” (Id.) Duran argues that the trial judge should have

ordered a competency hearing. (Id.) He also contends it was

error for the trial court to take his People v. Lopez waiver

without first evaluating his competency. (Id. at 37.)

Respondent asserts there was no real doubt about

Petitioner’s competence; rather, “Duran was simply a malcontent

whose dissatisfaction with multiple counsel smacked not of mental

problems but of the sociopathology his long criminal record

suggested.” (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 12, ECF No. 24.) 

Respondent adds, “Duran himself represented that he was capable

of understanding.” (Id. at 18.) Respondent also alleges that

Duran understood the Lopez waiver; thus, there was no

constitutional error. (Id. at 14, 21.) 

Duran included this issue in the petition for writ of habeas

corpus he submitted to the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment

No. 21, People v. Duran, S161207 (petition for writ of habeas

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corpus).) The court summarily denied the petition. 

(Supplemental Lodgment No. 1, In re Duran, S161207, order.)

“[W]hen the state court reaches a decision on the merits but

provides no reasoning to support its conclusion[,] . . . [the

federal habeas court] independently review[s] the record to

determine whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of Supreme Court law.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d

1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). “Federal habeas review is not de

novo when the state court does not supply reasoning for its

decision, but an independent review of the record is required to

determine whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of controlling federal law.” Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

Due process dictates that a trial court conduct a hearing to

determine a defendant’s competence to stand trial when confronted

with evidence that raises a bona fide doubt as to mental

competence. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). “A

bona fide doubt exists if there is substantial evidence of

incompetence, or substantial evidence that the defendant lacks

‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding’ or ‘a rational as

well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” 

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 604 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).) 

Relevant factors include “evidence of a defendant’s irrational

behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on

competence to stand trial.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180

(1975). The same competency standard applies when a defendant

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seeks to waive his right to the assistance of counsel. See

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-402 (1993) (distinguishing

between competence and making a knowing and voluntary waiver).

 From the exchanges described above, there is no doubt

Petitioner was a demanding client. But there is no indication he

lacked “‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer

with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and [that]

he [lacked] a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against him.’” See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.

During the August 20, 2004 Marsden hearing, Duran distinctly

described his personal and professional problems with his prior

attorneys. (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 46-50, ECF No. 15.) Petitioner

understood the difference between seeking new counsel and

representing himself. (Id. at 52.) He comprehended the facts of

his case and described the circumstantial evidence that he wanted

to show that he had no motive for carjacking. (Id.) Moreover,

Duran’s behavior at the Marsden hearing was appropriate, his

counsel expressed no doubt as to his client’s competence, and

Duran made no statements that would raise a bona fide doubt as to

his mental competence. (Id. at 52-55.)

Although the trial judge asked defense counsel whether he

had considered a competency hearing, the record does not contain 

substantial evidence of incompetence or show that the court had a

bona fide doubt as to Duran’s mental competence. Defense counsel

was “not aware of any mental health history,” and Duran assured

the judge that he was “completely capable of understanding.” 

(Id. at 52.)

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Under the circumstances, the trial judge’s failure to sua

sponte conduct a competency hearing did not violate Duran’s

constitutional right to due process. In the end, the court

granted Duran’s Marsden motion and also granted the alternate

public defender’s request to be relieved as counsel for Duran

because of “irreconcilable differences” between defendant and

counsel.

The trial court proceedings were not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 180-82; Pate v.

Robinson, 383 U.S. 385-86; Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. at

402. Therefore, the district court should DENY Duran’s claim for

habeas relief on this subclaim in ground two.

2. Whether Duran’s Waiver of Counsel Was “Knowing and

Intelligent”

A related subclaim is Petitioner’s assertion that his waiver

of the assistance of counsel was not knowing and intelligent

because he was misinformed of the maximum penalties. (Am. Pet.

Attach. #2, 39, ECF No. 15.) Two months after his last attorney

was relieved, Duran sought to represent himself. (Lodgment No.

5, Rep.’s Augment[ed] Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 1, Oct. 28, [2004].) 

The court asked Duran to fill out a waiver pursuant to People v.

Lopez, 71 Cal. App. 3d 568, 138 Cal. Rptr. 36. (Id. at 2-3;

Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 19-20, Oct. 28, 2004); see

also Lopez, 71 Cal. App. 3d at 571, 138 Cal Rptr. at 38 (holding

that for a waiver of counsel to be knowing and intelligent the

court must advise the defendant, on the record, of the dangers

and disadvantages of self-representation).

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5

 Duran was originally sentenced to forty years to life,

but the court of appeal reduced the sentence to thirty-five years

to life on direct review. (Lodgment No. 18, People v. Duran, No.

D047059, slip op. at 11.) 

27 08cv430 WQH (RBB)

Duran claims he did not understand the “true nature and

consequences of the maximum punishment as explained to him in the

Lopez waiver.” (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 39, ECF No. 15.) He points

to paragraph two, which states, “The maximum punishment(s) that

can be imposed upon conviction for the offense(s) . . . .” 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 19-20.) Although the

prosecutor, defense counsel, Duran, and trial judge were all at

the hearing where Petitioner sought to waive the assistance of

counsel, the maximum penalties for this four-count case, alleging

two prison prior convictions, a violent felony prison prior

conviction, and a prior strike conviction were uncertain and

ranged from nine to twenty years. 

The first figure that appeared in paragraph two of the

waiver form was “9y.” (Id.) That was crossed out and replaced

with “18 years.” (Id.) The “18" was crossed out and replaced

with “20.” (Id.) The final version, which Duran signed, stated

“20 years.” (Id.) Judge Jeffrey Fraser approved the waiver. 

(Id.) Petitioner proceeded to represent himself at trial and was

convicted. He was ultimately sentenced to thirty-five years to

life.5

 (Lodgment No. 13, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 9, 741-42.) 

Duran asserts that he was not made “aware of the risks and

consequences of the maximum penalties involved in signing the

Lopez waiver . . . .” (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 39-40, ECF No. 15;

see also Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 17, ECF No. 43.)

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Respondent acknowledges that Ninth Circuit case law holds

that “advice as to the possible penalties is required before a

waiver of counsel can be accepted as ‘knowing and intelligent’

. . . .” (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 19, ECF No. 24 (citing

United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999);

United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987)).) 

He nevertheless argues “that advice as to penalty is not a

requirement imposed by any United States Supreme Court decision.” 

(Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 19, ECF No. 24.) “The court

must ensure the defendant is aware of the dangers and

disadvantages of self-representation, but this requirement does

not clearly extend to information about potential penalties.” 

(Id.)

In his Petition, Duran cites no case law to support the

contention that he should have been advised of potential

penalties. (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 39-40, ECF No. 15.) In his

Traverse, however, Duran cites several Ninth Circuit cases that

support his claim. He quotes United States v. Crowhurst, 596

F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1979), which cites multiple Ninth Circuit

cases and concludes: “No decision of our court that has

addressed the waiver of counsel issue has held that the District

Court may dispense with the requirement that an accused

individual must specifically be made aware of the charges and

their possible penalties and sanctions.” (Traverse Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 23, ECF No. 43.)

Even so, “a state court decision may not be overturned on

habeas corpus review . . . because of a conflict with Ninth

Circuit-based law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264; (see also Traverse

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Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 22-31, ECF No. 43.). “[A] writ may issue

only when the state court decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, an authoritative decision of the

Supreme Court.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264) (citations and internal

quotations omitted). Duran cites no Supreme Court precedent that

specifically supports his subclaim. Consequently, the Court must

determine whether clearly established federal law supports his

argument. (See Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 39-40, ECF No. 15; Traverse

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 22-31, ECF No. 43.)

Duran submitted this issue to the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment No. 21, People v. Duran, S161207 (petition for writ of

habeas corpus).) The court summarily denied his habeas corpus

petition. (Supplemental Lodgment No. 1, In re Duran, S161207,

order.) “[W]hen the state court reaches a decision on the merits

but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion[,] . . . [the

federal habeas court] independently review[s] the record to

determine whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of Supreme Court law.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; see

Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982.

Petitioner signed a Lopez waiver and initialed twelve separate paragraphs. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 19-20.) 

Paragraph two stated that his maximum exposure was twenty years. 

(Id. at 19.) As described above, the trial judge engaged in a

colloquy with Duran to be certain he knowingly and intelligently

waived the assistance of counsel. (Lodgment No. 5, Rep.’s

Augment[ed] Appeal Tr. vol. 1, 1-7.) Finally, the court asked

Duran if there was anything on the Lopez waiver that he did not

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understand. (Id. at 4.) His only question was regarding a

continuance to prepare for trial. (Id.)

On the date set for sentencing, Duran discussed the Lopez

waiver he signed before proceeding to trial. (Lodgment No. 14,

Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 3, 42, Mar. 8, 2005.) Petitioner told the

sentencing judge that “[t]he last attorney I had, Mr. Lee

Plummer, there was a conflict of interest with him.” When the

court asked Petitioner about the conflict, Duran answered, “Well,

actually, it was kind of personal. He [Plummer] didn’t want to

bring that up but he did mention it when he gave up representing

me and I signed the Lopez waiver.” (Id.)

The form, Acknowledgment Concerning Right of SelfRepresentation, listed the charged offenses. (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. vol 1, 19.) It warned Duran that he would not

receive special treatment. (Id.) Petitioner was advised that he

would be subject to all substantive and procedural rules without

help from the judge. (Id.) He was warned that opposing counsel

knew the rules and is experienced in litigation. (Id.) He was

informed of his right to a court-appointed attorney. (Id.) He

was told that he would not get extra library privileges, extra

time, or extra assistance. (Id.) Petitioner was also warned

that his self-representation would be revoked if he was

disruptive in court, and he could not claim incompetency on

appeal. (Id. at 20.)

The Lopez waiver form described, generally and specifically,

the risks of self-representation. The admonition regarding the

maximum punishment was one item on the detailed form. Yet, it is

clear that the number of years he faced was a significant

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consideration for Petitioner. On August 20, 2004, when Duran was

seeking to relieve the alternate public defender representing

him, Petitioner was concerned about his maximum exposure. He

sought another attorney to devote more time to his case because

“there is [sic] a lot of years to be considered here.” (Am. Pet.

Attach. #2, 52.) Duran now argues that the incorrect penalty

nullifies his waiver.

[I]t’s a defendant’s choice, not respondent’s theory,

to intelligently choose to represent himself on a 20

year maximum penalty, or representation for a 40 to

life penalty. Under the agreement in the Lopez waiver,

if convicted, he would have “paroled” in a little over

18 years. There is no guarantee of parole for any

sentence ending with life . . . . When the information

is misleading, or in this instant case, completely

false, then that’s not an intelligent waiver, that’s

being hoodwinked.

(Traverse Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A. 29-30, ECF No. 43.)

Duran maintains that if he had been informed that the

maximum punishment was forty years to life, instead of twenty, he

would not have wanted to represent himself. He also asserts that

the miscalculation requires that habeas relief be granted.

a. Clearly Established Federal Law

This Court must decide what is clearly established Supreme

Court law -- not an easy task. “[Clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States]

refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the Court’s

decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), is widely

regarded as the touchstone of a criminal defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right of self-representation. See United States v.

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Vas, No. 04-489, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34863, at *28 (E.D. Pa.

May 31, 2006). But even before Faretta, the Supreme Court had

outlined the requirements for a valid waiver of the right to

counsel. 

In Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 720 (1948)

(plurality), the Court concluded that “when petitioner pleaded

guilty, she did not have that full understanding and

comprehension of her legal rights indispensable to a valid waiver

of the assistance of counsel.” Justice Black wrote:

To be valid such waiver must be made with an

apprehension of the nature of the charges, the

statutory offenses included within them, the range of

allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to

the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof,

and all other facts essential to a broad understanding

of the whole matter.

Id. at 724 (emphasis added). Because the quoted language in Von

Moltke is from the plurality opinion, this Court must determine

whether it is part of the holding of the Supreme Court and is

clearly established law.

Von Moltke applied Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),

in coming to its conclusion that a remand was necessary to decide

whether Von Moltke intelligently and competently waived her right

to counsel. See Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 726 nn.6-7, 727. 

Faretta also relied on Johnson v. Zerbst, which held that

“whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to

counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and

circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,

experience, and conduct of counsel.” Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464. 

If the language from Von Moltke, requiring that defendants

be informed of the range of allowable punishments, is not part of

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a majority opinion, it may still influence the scope of the

Faretta inquiry. In Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193

(1976), Justice Powell explained: “When a fragmented Court

decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result

enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may

be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred

in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” Id. (quoting

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of

Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).

In Duran’s case, the Respondent argues that “advice as to

penalty is not a requirement imposed by any United States Supreme

Court decision.” (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 19, ECF No.

24.) The argument requires this Court to find that neither

Faretta or Von Moltke is clearly established law requiring the

accurate disclosure of maximum penalties.

The Eighth Circuit, in Shafer v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 637, 651

(8th Cir. 2003), rejected an argument “that Von Moltke does not

qualify as clearly established federal law because it is an old

plurality decision with unusual facts.” Shafer noted that “the

facts of the case have not limited the impact of Von

Moltke, . . . for the Supreme Court has cited Von Moltke in a

number of subsequent cases.” Id. Shafer continued:

In Wilkins v. Bowersox, 145 F.3d 1006, 1013 n.5 (8th

Cir. 1998), we observed that in Von Moltke “the Supreme

Court established the requirement that a judge’s

inquiry regarding waiver of counsel must be

comprehensive and probing.” Moreover, there are other

Supreme Court precedents which clearly established the

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent rule.

Id. (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. at 400; Faretta, 422 U.S.

at 835-36). The Eighth Circuit concluded that “in Faretta and

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Von Moltke [the Supreme Court] clearly established inquiry and

warning requirements” applicable to a defendant who wished to

waive counsel and plead guilty. Id. But see United States v.

Kiderlen, 569 F.3d 358, 367 (8th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing

Wilkins v. Bowersox, 145 F.3d 1006).

The admonition in the Von Moltke plurality opinion -- that

the defendant be advised of the “range of allowable punishments”

-- is not the holding of the case. The narrower rationale is

that the voluntariness of Von Moltke’s waiver depended on the

totality of circumstances and a remand was necessary. Compare

Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 723-24 (plurality opinion), with id. at

727-32 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion, joined by Jackson,

J.).

Thus, a Supreme Court opinion has never held that knowledge of a

defendant’s maximum exposure is a prerequisite to a knowing and

intelligent waiver of his right to counsel or the assertion of

his right to represent himself. Nor has the Supreme Court held

that an incorrect statement of a defendant’s maximum exposure

invalidates an otherwise knowing and intelligent waiver.

Nevertheless, Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, cites Von Moltke and

may state a rule of general application sufficiently clear to

dispose of Duran’s claim. In Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143,

1157 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds), the Ninth

Circuit illustrated the difficulty of determining clearly

established law.

Suffice it to say that we must refrain from applying

too narrow or too specific a standard when determining

the substance of the law the application of which we

must assess. The adoption of too limited a scope for

the definition of “clearly established law” would

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collapse the various parts of the analysis we must

perform and prevent a proper application of the

Williams mandate.

The Court, in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000),

sought to describe when a holding is a rule of “general

application.”

[A]s our precedent interpreting Teague has

demonstrated, rules of law may be sufficiently clear

for habeas purposes when they are expressed in terms of

a generalized standard rather than as a bright-line

rule. As Justice Kennedy has explained:

“If the rule in question is one which of

necessity requires a case-by-case examination

of the evidence, then we can tolerate a

number of specific applications without

saying that those applications themselves

create a new rule . . . . Where the

beginning point is a rule of this general

application, a rule designed for the specific

purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual

contexts, it will be the infrequent case that

yields a result so novel that it forges a new

rule, one not dictated by precedent.” Wright

v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-309 (1992)

(opinion concurring in judgment.)

More recently, in Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006), the

Supreme Court illustrated this principle. On appeal, the Ninth

Circuit stated that Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), and

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986), “clearly established the

test for inherent prejudice applicable to the spectators’

courtroom conduct [family members sat in the courtroom wearing

buttons with a photo of the murder victim].” Carey, 549 U.S. at

74. Estelle v. Williams dealt with compelling a defendant to

“‘stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison

clothes,’” and Holbrook v. Flynn discussed “seating ‘four

uniformed state troopers’ in the row of spectators’ seats

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immediately behind the defendant . . . .” Id. at 75 (citations

omitted). In this context, the Carey Court wrote:

[A]lthough the Court articulated the test for inherent

prejudice that applies to state conduct in Williams and

Flynn, we have never applied that test to spectators’

conduct. Indeed, part of the legal test of Williams

and Flynn -- asking whether the practices furthered an

essential state interest -- suggests that those cases

apply only to state-sponsored practices.

Id. at 76. The Supreme Court held that because it had not

addressed “the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators’

courtroom conduct of the kind involved [spectators wearing

buttons], it cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonabl[y]

appli[ed] clearly established Federal Law.’” Id. at 77.

Faretta announced a “generalized standard.” In Faretta, 422

U.S. at 835 (citations omitted), the Court concluded:

[I]n order to represent himself, the accused must

“knowingly and intelligently” forgo those relinquished

benefits [associated with the right to counsel]. 

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S., at 464-465. Cf. Von

Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 (plurality

opinion of Black, J.) Although a defendant need not

himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in

order competently and intelligently to choose selfrepresentation, he should be made aware of the dangers

and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the

record will establish that “he knows what he is doing

and his choice is made with eyes open.” Adams v.

United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S., at 279.

The Court has stated that “[w]arnings of the pitfalls of

proceeding to trial without counsel . . . must be ‘rigorous[ly]’

conveyed.” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 89 (2004) (citing

Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988)) (quotations

omitted). In Tovar, the Supreme Court noted that there are no

“scripted admonitions . . . necessary in every guilty plea

instance;” yet, it quoted Johnson v. Zerbst’s admonition that

“the information a defendant must have to waive counsel

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intelligently will ‘depend, in each case, upon the particular

facts and circumstances surrounding that case.’” Tovar, id. at

92 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464).

Cases since Faretta have continued to hold that to waive the

constitutional right to counsel, a criminal defendant must be

competent to stand trial, and “a trial court must satisfy itself

that the waiver . . . is knowing and voluntary.” Godinez, 509

U.S. at 400. “[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing,

intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully

understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply

in general in the circumstances -- even though the defendant may

not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.” 

United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). “When a

defendant appreciates the risks of forgoing counsel and chooses

to do so voluntarily, the Constitution protects his ability to

present his own defense even when that harms his case.” Indiana

v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2391 (2008). At the

same time, “[i]f [the defendant] . . . lacked ‘a full and

complete appreciation of all of the consequences’ flowing from

his waiver, it does not defeat the State's showing that the

information it provided to him satisfied the constitutional

minimum.” Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. at 294. Here, the

Respondent has not attempted to show that the material

understatement of penalties Duran faced satisfied that

constitutional minimum.

AEDPA “‘does not, however, purport to limit the federal

courts’ independent interpretive authority with respect to

federal questions.’” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 382

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(quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d at 869. The Supreme Court has

not decided whether the failure to accurately advise a defendant

of the potential penalties he faces invalidates his waiver of the

assistance of counsel. Still, evaluating “a novel factual

situation may nonetheless be dictated by Supreme Court

precedent.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1057 (9th Cir.

2004).

In Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc), a case brought under § 2254, the court construed

Faretta as a rule of general application. The Ninth Circuit

stated that “[n]either the Constitution nor Faretta compels the

district court to engage in a specific colloquy with the

defendant.” Id. Instead, federal courts examine the “record as

a whole.” Id. at 1118. Lopez held that the colloquy suggested

by the Ninth Circuit in Balough, which included informing the

defendant of possible penalties, is not “constitutionally

required.” Id. at 1117. The court treated Faretta as a

generalized standard. It found no Faretta violation but observed 

that “Lopez was informed of the nature of the charges and

proceedings against him, the possible sentences that might be

imposed (including possible sentence enhancements), and the

dangers of self-representation.” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has frequently interpreted Faretta. In a

recent habeas corpus proceeding, the court discussed the validity

of the petitioner’s Faretta waiver and reiterated, “[W]e require

only that a defendant be made aware of three ‘critical elements’

of self-representation: (1) ‘the nature of the charges against

him’; (2) ‘the possible penalties’; and (3) ‘the dangers and

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disadvantages of self-representation.’” McCormack v. Adams, No.

09-15546, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18452, at *15 (9th Cir. Sept. 3,

2010) (quoting United States v. Keen, 104 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th

Cir. 1996); accord United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d at 1167

(quoting United States v. Balough, 820 F.3d at 1487). Other

district courts ruling on § 2254 petitions have interpreted

Faretta and Ninth Circuit case law as prescribing the threefactor test. See Gassoway v. Mendoza-Powers, No. 2:08-cv-0652-

JFM(HC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92158, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13,

2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Spencer v.

Runnels, No. CIV S-03-0376 GEB KJM P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3092,

at *30 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2006).

Williams v. Taylor, Carey v. Musladin, and Van Tran v.

Lindsey convince this Court that Respondent’s contention that

“advice as to penalty is not a requirement imposed by any United

States Supreme Court decision” (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

19, ECF No. 24), interprets Faretta too narrowly. Duran’s case

is not one where potential penalties were not addressed. Here,

there was a material misstatement of the penalties. Forty years

to life is qualitatively different from twenty years with the

possibility of parole.

The validity of a defendant’s waiver of the assistance of

counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. United States v.

Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 2044). This Court’s

independent review of the record compels the conclusion that

because of the material understatement of the maximum penalties

he faced, Duran’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to the

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6 In an analogous setting, the Supreme Court held that a

guilty plea is not voluntary and intelligent unless the defendant

is “fully aware of the direct consequences” of his plea. See

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). Direct

consequences include “the maximum punishment provided by law.” 

Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing

United States ex rel. Pebworth v. Conte, 489 F.2d 266, 267 (9th

Cir. 1974); accord Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th

Cir. 2006).

40 08cv430 WQH (RBB)

assistance of counsel was not voluntary and intelligent.6 As a

result, the Faretta waiver was ineffective.

A waiver of the right to counsel that is not knowing and

intelligent is a violation of the Sixth Amendment and Faretta,

and a “harmless error analysis does not apply.” See United

States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509 (9th Cir. 2007); accord

United States v. Chamberlain, 326 F. App’x 640, 642 (3d Cir.

2009) (“[A] Faretta-type error is structural, and requires

automatic reversal.”). “A court’s failure to secure a valid

Faretta waiver, which includes an accurate advisement as to

maximum penalties, constitutes per se prejudicial error, and the

harmless error standard is inapplicable.” Gassoway v. MendozaPowers, No. 2:08-cv-0652-JFM(HC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92158, at

*16 (citing Erskine, 355 F.3d at 1167.)

For all these reasons, the trial court’s decision to accept

Duran’s Faretta waiver as knowing and intelligent was contrary

to, and an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. 

The district court should GRANT this claim for habeas relief.

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C. Ground Three: Whether Duran Received Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel

In his third claim for habeas relief, Duran argues that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel on two separate

occasions. (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 67, ECF No. 15; Traverse

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 32, ECF No. 43.) First, Duran states,

“Counsel was ineffective in that he failed to conduct a careful

investigation concerning the mental capacity of [petitioner].” 

(Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 68, ECF No. 15.) Second, Duran contends,

“During the signing of the Lopez waiver appointed counsel did not

inform [petitioner] of the maximum penalties upon conviction.” 

(Id. at 70.) Finally, “[Petitioner] sought a ruling on

ineffective assistance of counsel, which the trial court did not

rule on.” (Id. at 72.)

Respondent argues, “None of the alleged inadequacies Duran

asserts truly demonstrate that Duran’s counsel was ineffective.” 

(Answer Mem. P. & A. 24, ECF No. 24.) First, “Duran’s counsel

had no cause to move for the court to conduct a competency

hearing.” (Id.) Therefore, Duran’s attorney’s failure to do so

cannot be the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. Second, “it was not necessary under Faretta for Duran to

have been informed of a specific maximum sentence. All that was

required was that Duran understand the serious consequences of

his decision to represent himself.” (Id.) Finally, Respondent

argues that there was no prejudice from the court failing to rule

on an ineffectiveness claim, because the claimed ineffectiveness

stemmed from Duran’s self-representation. (Id.) 

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For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a basis for

habeas relief, Duran must successfully meet a two-prong test. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, he

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 687. 

“This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. “Review of counsel’s

conduct is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable

representation.” Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th Cir.

1995) (citation omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Second, Petitioner must establish that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

This requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious

they deprived Duran “of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable.” Id. To satisfy the test’s second prong, Petitioner

must show a reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have been different but for the error. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 406; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A

reviewing court "need not decide whether counsel’s performance

was deficient when the claim of ineffectiveness may be rejected

for lack of prejudice." Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155

n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

Duran raised these issues in the petition for writ of habeas

corpus he filed with the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No.

21, People v. Duran, S161207 (petition for writ of habeas

corpus).) The California Supreme Court summarily denied his

petition. (Supplemental Lodgment No. 1, In re Duran, S161207,

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order.) Here again, because “the state court reach[ed] a

decision on the merits but provide[d] no reasoning to support its

conclusion[,] . . . [the federal habeas court] independently

review[s] the record to determine whether the state court clearly

erred in its application of Supreme Court law.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d

at 1167.

1. Failure to Investigate Competency

“[S]trategic choices made after less than complete

investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that

reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on

investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. “[C]ounsel has

a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Id.

at 691. “The court must then determine whether, in light of all

the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside

the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at

690.

Duran claims that after first-hand observation, and the

trial court’s questions regarding competency, his attorney should

have requested a competency hearing. (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 69,

ECF No. 15; Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 37, ECF No. 43.) In

a similar factual setting, the Third Circuit concluded that the

petitioner had not established ineffective assistance of trial

counsel.

Counsel’s failure to request a competency hearing

would give rise to an ineffective assistance claim if

there were “sufficient indicia of incompetence to give

objectively reasonable counsel reason to doubt the

defendant’s competency, and there is a reasonable

probability that the defendant would have been found

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incompetent to stand trial had the issue been raised

and fully considered.”

Karenbauer v. Beard, No. 09-1770, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16858, at

**19-20 (3d Cir. Aug. 12, 2010) (quoting Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d

416, 438 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Duran’s attorney stated he was “not aware of any mental

health history . . . .” (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 52, ECF No. 15.) 

The Court has found that, given the information before the trial

court, its failure to sua sponte order a competency hearing did

not constitute a constitutional violation. Counsel’s decision

not to request a competency hearing was objectively reasonable in

light of the circumstances. See Karenbauer, No. 09-1770, 2010

U.S. App. LEXIS 16858, at *20. Duran cannot satisfy the first

prong of the two-prong test in Strickland.

Duran argues that counsel’s failure to investigate his

mental health history “deprived [him] of a clearly available

avenue of defense.” (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 69, ECF No. 15;

Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 37, ECF No. 43.) Petitioner

does not identify the defense, and he does not allege that he was

mentally incompetent. He merely contends his attorney was

ineffective for failing to investigate Duran’s mental history. 

(Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 69, ECF No. 15.)

Even if the failure to request a competency hearing or

further investigate Petitioner’s mental history was not

objectively reasonable, Duran has not established ineffective

assistance of counsel. “[He] has failed to show prejudice under

Strickland’s second prong because he cannot demonstrate a

reasonable probability that he would have been found incompetent

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if only his attorney had asked for a hearing.” Karenbauer, No.

09-1770, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16858, at *20 (citing Taylor v.

Horn, 504 F.3d at 439); accord Grant v. Brown, 312 F. App’x 71,

73 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (“Because

we conclude that Grant has not been shown to be incompetent at

the time of trial, Grant has failed to demonstrate a ‘reasonable

probability’ that the ‘result of the proceedings’ would have been

different but for his attorney’s purported failures.”).

After an independent review of the record, the Court

concludes that Duran has not shown that he suffered any

prejudice. As a result, Petitioner’s counsel was not

constitutionally ineffective, and the California Supreme Court’s

decision denying habeas relief was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697. The district court should DENY

this aspect of Duran’s ineffective assistance claim.

2. Ineffective Assistance in Connection with the

Lopez Waiver

The Court has already concluded that Petitioner’s Faretta

rights -- requiring a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver

of the assistance of counsel -- were violated in connection with

his Lopez waiver. The application of Faretta to Duran’s waiver

of the assistance of counsel is distinct from the application of

Strickland to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

This subclaim of ineffective assistance of counsel focuses

on the maximum punishment misstated on the People v. Lopez waiver

form. (Am. Pet. Attach. #2 Mem. P. & A. 70, ECF No. 15.) On

October 28, 2004, Duran signed a waiver form that stated maximum

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prison terms of nine years, eighteen years, and twenty years. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 19-20.) Nine and eighteen

were crossed out, leaving the maximum punishment described as

“twenty years.” (Id. at 19.) Yet, on August 16, 2005, Duran was

sentenced to forty years to life in prison. (Am. Pet. Attach.

#2, 70, ECF No. 15.) Petitioner complains that his attorney’s

failure to inform him “that he was facing 40 years to life, as

opposed to only 20 years” constitutes ineffective assistance. 

(Id. at 70-71.)

Assuming the misstatement of penalties is performance below

an objective standard of reasonableness, Petitioner must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 687-88, 693-94. “The

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. at 694.

Duran’s claim is similar to one made in Koon v. Rushton, No.

8:05-2533-RBH-BHH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76613 (D. S.C. Aug. 7,

2007) (report and recommendation), adopted by 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 73347 (D. S.C. Sept. 30, 2007), aff’d, 364 F. App’x 22 (4th

Cir. 2010). In Koon, the petitioner stated two related claims: 

first, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a

hearing on Koon’s motion to proceed pro se under Faretta. Koon,

8:05-2253-RBH-BHH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76613, at **47-48. 

Second, by not sua sponte conducting a hearing on Koon’s request

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to represent himself, the trial court violated Faretta. Id. at

*48.

In this context, the court stated: “But even if the

petitioner could demonstrate that trial counsel’s efforts were

ineffective, he faces the formidable task of showing prejudice

. . . .” Id. at *50. Koon claimed that counsel’s failure to

request a Faretta hearing had an adverse effect on Koon’s right

to represent himself, and this was a structural error, negating

the need to show prejudice. Id. at **50-51. The court rejected

the argument and held that, under Strickland, a showing of

prejudice was still required. Id. at **51-52. Although Koon

complained that he was forced to forgo self-representation, the

court found no prejudice. “There is no reason to believe that

[Koon] would have outperformed trained counsel in the defense of

his case to an extent that he would have been better off without

him.” Id. at *54.

Similarly, even if Duran’s counsel had correctly stated the

maximum penalties and Duran elected not to represent himself, the

evidence against him was substantial. There is no reasonable

probability that the result would have been different. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “An error by counsel, even if

professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the

judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on

the judgment.” Id. at 691. Because Petitioner suffered no

prejudice, the district court should DENY habeas relief based on

this subclaim in ground three of the Amended Petition.

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3. A Ruling on the Ineffective Assistance Claim

After Duran was convicted, he requested appointed counsel to

represent him for the purpose of sentencing. (Lodgment No. 14,

Rep.’s Tr. Appeal-Augment vol. 3, 33, 40-41, Mar. 8, 2005.) 

Duran’s attorney filed a motion for a new trial. (Lodgment No.

2, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 231; Lodgment No. 13, Rep.’s Appeal Tr.

vol. 9, 717, Aug. 16, 2005.) In footnote one to the new trial

motion, Duran’s attorney wrote:

In this motion the Defendant does not waive any

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, despite the

In Pro Per status of the Defendant at the time of

trial, as it pertains to any finding of failure to call

witnesses, or seek a continuance to subpoena witnesses

and alternatively seeks a ruling. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 240.) This footnote is not

entirely clear. It appears that Duran was seeking to preserve an

appellate right to complain that he received ineffective

assistance during the time he represented himself.

If Petitioner’s claim is that the trial court failed to rule

on his argument that Petitioner received ineffective assistance

of counsel as a result of his self-representation, this argument

fails. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 n.46 (noting that when a

criminal defendant elects to represent himself, he waives his

right to complain of ineffective assistance of counsel). Thus,

there is no prejudice to Duran if the trial court failed to rule

on this issue. 

Petitioner also argues that his appellate counsel was

ineffective because she did not raise the trial court’s failure

to rule on the ineffective assistance claim. (Am. Pet. Attach.

#2, 72, ECF No. 15.) As explained above, Duran is precluded from

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arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for the period of selfrepresentation, and he is not entitled to relief for the alleged

ineffective assistance of his appointed counsel. Because there

is no merit to either claim, Duran’s appellate counsel was not

ineffective in choosing not to raise them. See Adams v. Lewis,

42 F. App’x 1, 9 (9th Cir. 2002).

For all these reasons, the district court should DENY the

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims

contained in ground three of Duran’s Amended Petition.

D. Ground Four: Whether the Admission of Dismissed Gun

Allegations Resulted in a Denial of Due Process

Duran contends that “the trial court allowed admission of

dismissed gun allegations over defense protest.” (Am. Pet.

Attach. #3, 37, ECF No. 15; Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 40,

ECF No. 43.) He asserts that his rights were violated by the

admission of Garcia’s testimony that Duran was armed during the

carjacking and the admission of a 911 tape that references a gun. 

(Am. Pet. Attach. #3, 37, ECF No. 15) Petitioner argues that

admission of this evidence violated his “right to due process and

a fair trial.” (Id. at 38.)

Respondent counters that Duran’s argument is a

“mischaracterization as there were no gun allegations charged and

none were ‘admitted.’” (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 25, ECF

No. 24.) “Two witnesses . . . testified about Duran displaying

the handle of a gun during the carjacking as a way of

intimidating the victim to get out of the Jeep.” (Id.) 

Respondent contends, “Because this is a matter of the

admissibility of evidence, its resolution depended on California

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evidence law.” (Id. at 37.) Respondent concludes, “Therefore,

it does not present a federal question for this court to review.” 

(Id.)

“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws or

treaties of the United States.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68; see

also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Habeas relief is not available for an

alleged error in the state court’s interpretation or application

of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Jammal v. Van de Kamp,

926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Dugger v. Adams, 489

U.S. 401, 409 (1989) (“[T]he availability of a claim under state

law does not of itself establish that a claim was available under

the United States Constitution.”). A habeas petitioner “may not

transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by

asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d

1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997). When a habeas claim is predicated on

state law, the petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (holding that admissibility

of evidence is generally a matter of state law and will rarely

support federal habeas corpus relief).

Under narrow circumstances, the misapplication of state

evidentiary rules may violate federal due process safeguards. 

See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). To warrant

federal habeas relief, a state court’s evidentiary ruling must

have “so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them

fundamentally unfair.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919.

Duran submitted this issue to the California Supreme Court

as part of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Lodgment No.

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21, People v. Duran, S161207 (petition for writ of habeas

corpus).) The petition was summarily denied. (Supplemental

Lodgment No. 1, In re Duran, S161207, order.) Here again,

because the state court reache[d] a decision on the merits but

provide[d] no reasoning to support its conclusion[,] . . . [the

federal habeas court] independently review[s] the record to

determine whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of Supreme Court law. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

The criminal complaint charged Duran with carjacking;

robbery; the unlawful taking of a vehicle; and buying, receiving,

and concealing a stolen vehicle. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.

vol. 1, 1.) The complaint also alleged that Duran personally

used a firearm in the commission of a felony and personally used

a deadly or dangerous weapon during the commission of a felony. 

At the preliminary hearing, both firearm allegations were

dismissed for insufficiency of the evidence. (Lodgment No. 2,

Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 325, Apr. 28, 2004.) 

At trial, the victim of the carjacking testified that he

believed Duran was carrying a gun. (Lodgment No. 10, Rep.’s

Appeal Tr. vol. 6, 461-62, 484-86.) The prosecutor played a

recording of the 911 call made shortly after the carjacking where

the caller stated that the perpetrator had a gun. (Id. at 437;

Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 125.)

The California Constitution provides that “relevant evidence

shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding.” Cal. Const.

art. I, § 28. “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including

evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay

declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any

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disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

action.” Cal. Evid. Code § 210 (West 1995).

Duran was charged with robbery. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s

Tr. vol. 1, 71.) “Robbery is the felonious taking of personal

property in the possession of another, from his person or

immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means

of force or fear.” Cal. Penal Code § 211 (West 2008). By

pleading not guilty, Duran placed the use of force or fear in

dispute. Therefore, the prosecutor was required to prove the

“taking was accomplished either by force or fear.” (Lodgment No.

1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 168-69.)

The victim’s belief that Duran was armed during the robbery

is relevant to proving the vehicle was taken by force or fear. 

There is no evidence the prosecution elicited the testimony for

any purpose other than proving the elements of the crimes

charged. The prosecutor did not discuss the elements of personal

use of a firearm allegation during Duran’s trial. The

instructions given to the jury did not include an instruction

relating to a gun allegation. (See e.g., Lodgment No. 1 Clerk’s

Tr. vol 1, 130-208.)

Duran contended that because the court dismissed the gun

enhancement allegations at the preliminary hearing, the

prosecution was barred from introducing any evidence at trial

related to a gun. That argument fails because evidence relating

to the use of a gun was admissible to prove that the taking of

the Jeep was by force or fear, an element of the crime of

robbery. Duran offers no case law to support his contention, and

this Court has been unable to locate any. Thus, there was no

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error, much less an error which “fatally infected the proceedings

[so] as to render them fundamentally unfair.” Jammal, 926 F.2d

at 919.

The district court should DENY Duran’s claim because the

admission of evidence Duran was armed was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (citing Weeks, 528 U.S. 225).

E. Evidentiary Hearing

In his Traverse, Duran requested an evidentiary hearing. 

(Traverse 4, ECF No. 43.) In light of the findings in this

Report and Recommendation, Petitioner’s request for an

evidentiary hearing is DENIED. See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d

1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an evidentiary hearing

is not required on issues which can be resolved on the basis of

the state record).

V. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Duran’s Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED for the claim that he did not

knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel under

Faretta (Am. Pet. Attach. #2, 39, ECF No. 15); all other claims

for habeas relief should be DENIED. Petitioner’s request for an

evidentiary hearing is also DENIED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the

United States District Court judge assigned to this case,

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties on or before November 12, 2010. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any

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reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before

November 29, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 22, 2010 _____________________________

Ruben B. Brooks, Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

cc:

Judge Hayes

All Parties of Record

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