Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01996/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01996-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California

DAVID FRANKLIN BARGHOORN,

Petitioner,

v.

KEN CLARK, Warden,

Respondent.

CIV S-07-1996 TJH

Order

Petitioner was found guilty of two counts of forcible lewd conduct upon a child

under fourteen years of age and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under

fourteen years of age. The jury found petitioner guilty on all three counts. Petitioner had

two previous serious felony convictions. He was sentenced to eighty-five years to life

in state prison.

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the

judgment. Subsequently, he petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, which

was which denied. Respondent admits Petitioner exhausted his claims for relief. 

Petitioner, pro se, filed this federal writ for habeas relief on the following grounds:

1. The trial court erred in giving instructions that allowed the jury to convict

petitioner of continuous sexual abuse of the alleged victim based on one act of

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alleged abuse;

2. The trial court improperly instructed the jury to consider California Penal

Code section 803(g), which violatesthe Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States

Constitution;

3. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to exclude or limit the

evidence of his prior sexual misconduct;

4. The trial court erred in instructing the jury to consider evidence of

petitioner’s other sexual offenses and petitioner’s trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to this jury instruction; and

5. Petitioner’s appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for

failing to object to the jury instruction that allowed the jury to convict petitioner

of continuous sexual abuse of the alleged victim based on one act of alleged

abuse.

A writ of habeas corpus may only be granted if the Petitioner’s state court

judgment wasin violation of “clearly established federal law, as decided by the Supreme

Court” or was based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” based on the

evidence before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1-2). Factual decisions made by

that state court are presumed to be correct and the Petitioner has the burden of proof to

show the state court made a factual mistake by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1). 

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by giving the jury two sets of conflicting

unanimity instructions: California Jury Instructions(“CALJIC”)Nos. 10.42.6 and 17.01.

CALJIC No. 10.42.6 statesthe requisite elements ofCalifornia PenalCode section 288.5

and instructs the jury that it must find that the defendant committed three or more acts

of substantial sexual conduct to convict him of that offense. CALJIC No. 17.01

instructed the jury that it must find “any one or more of the acts” and to “agree that

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[defendant] committed the same act or acts.”

A claim for instructional error under state law is not a basis for federal habeas

relief. Indeed, federal courts do not grant relief simply because the instruction may have

been deficient. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S. Ct. 475, 482, 116 L. Ed. 2d

385, 398 (1991). Instead, the only question for federal review is “whether the ailing

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71. Additionally, the instruction “may not be judged in

artificial isolation,” but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole

and the trial record. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. 

In the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, CALJIC Nos.

10.42.6 and 17.01 were not inconsistent. When read together, as the jury was told to do,

CALJIC No. 17.01 did not alter the requirement stated in CALJIC No. 10.42.6 that the

jury must find that the defendant committed three or more acts. While CALJIC No.

10.42.6 broke down the requisite elements for the specific charge of continuous sexual

abuse of a child, CALJIC No. 17.01 was given in connection with all three counts. 

Specifically,CALJIC No. 17.01 requiresthat all jurors, to return a verdict of guilty,must

agree that the defendant committed the same act although the prosecution had introduced

evidence for the purpose of showing that there was more than one act upon which a

conviction may be based. These two instructions did not infect the entire trial or create

a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have applied the instructions in a way that

prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Because Petitioner

failed to establish that the trial court’s decision was objectively unreasonable,

petitioner’s claim fails.

Petitioner contendsthat California Penal Code section 803(g) violatesthe Ex Post

Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, thereby infringing upon his due process

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rights. Under California Penal Code section 800, the general statute of limitations for

child sexual abuse, as prescribed by sections 288 and 288.5, is six years. Section 803

specifies the circumstances which toll the general statutory period of limitations. The

legislature added subdivision (g) to section 803, effective on January 1, 1994, to extend

the period of limitationsfor violations ofsections 288 and 288.5. Section 803(g) permits

charges to be brought in cases where the statute of limitations had expired if the

prosecution followed within one year of a complaint made to the police. (Section 803(g)

has been amended several times since its original enactment and has most recently been

renumbered subdivision (f.)) When petitioner was charged in 2003, section 803(g)stated

that it applied “to a cause of action arising before, on, or after January 1, 1994, the

effective date of this subdivision, and it shall revive any cause of action barred by

Section 800 or 801 under specified conditions.” 

“A law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period

violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred

prosecution.” Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2461, 156 L.

Ed. 2d 544, 565 (2003). The Ex Post Facto Clause does not prohibit extending a statute

of limitations that has not yet expired. Stogner, 539 U.S. 618. 

Petitioner relies on Stogner, which held that a statute enacted after the expiration

of a statute of limitations and that revives prosecution is a classic ex post facto law. 

Stogner, 539 U.S. at 614-15. However, because the statute of limitations under section

800 had not expired when section 803(g) became effective on January 1, 1994, section

803(g) permitted the state to commence prosecution for the offenses within one year after

the filing of the victim’s report, notwithstanding the limitation period in section 800. 

Unlike in Stogner, section 803(g) was enacted while the limitations period was still

running on the charges against petitioner. Since the six year statute of limitations had

not expired when subdivision (g) went into effect, his defense was never perfected or

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valid. As a result, Petitioner’s claim fails.

Petitioner claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to exclude or

limit the evidence of his prior sexual misconduct. In particular, petitioner argues that the

trial court did not give careful consideration to California Evidence Code section 352,

which states that a court, in its discretion, may exclude evidence if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue

consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, or confusing the

issues, or of misleading the jury. California Evidence Code section 1101 provides that

evidence of a person’s character or trait of his or her character (whether in the form of

an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her

conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified

occasion. However, there are exceptions, one of which is section 1108. Section 1108

states, “[i]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense,

evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not

made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to

Section 352.” 

The prosecution moved in limine to admit evidence of three prior acts of sexual

misconduct with three other victims, namely evidence that defendant pled guilty to

committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of fourteen years against

two young children, “M” in 1988 and “H” in 2001. After considering the factors

required by section 352, the trial court admitted evidence involving M and H, finding

that such evidence was very similar to the allegations in counts one and two, and

excluded the evidence involving petitioner’s stepson, finding the evidence inflammatory

and unnecessary in light of the evidence of the other uncharged offenses. The trial court

found that, because defendant admitted those two incidents, the purpose of the statute

was served. 

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Federal courts do not review questions of state evidence law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at

67. In relation to federal habeas review, federal courts must only consider whether the

petitioner’s conviction violated constitutional norms. Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d

918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the relevant inquiry is whether the admission of

the evidence so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them arbitrary and

fundamentally unfair. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. Only if the jury can draw no permissible

inferences from the evidence can its admission violate due process. Jammal, 926 F.2d

at 920. Even then, however, the evidence must “be of such quality as necessarily

prevents a fair trial.” Henry v. Estelle, 33 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1994). 

The trial court’s decision to admit evidence of petitioner’s prior sexualmisconduct

was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair as to violate petitioner’s due process

rights. Admission of propensity evidence will only sometimes violate the constitutional

right to a fair trial, such as when it is of no relevance, or if its potential prejudice far

outweighs what little relevance it might have. United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018,

1027 (9th Cir. 2001). As a result, propensity is a constitutionally permissible inference.

LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1026. In addition, “the trial court in the exercise of its discretion

is more competent to judge the exigencies of a particular case.” LeMay, 260 F.3d at

1034. The trial court weighed the probative value and any undue prejudice, and, then,

reasonably concluded that the evidence of the two prior sexual assaults was relevant to

petitioner’s propensity to molest young children. Specifically, the trial court gave

consideration to the requirements under section 352, finding that, for the purposes of the

corroboration requirement, to prove intent and lack of mistake, and to prove propensity,

the incidents involving victims M and H are “very similar” to the allegations in counts

one and two. Therefore, the trial court’s admission of evidence of petitioner’s prior

sexual misconduct was not fundamentally unfair. 

. . . . . . .

Also, petitioner’s trial was not made fundamentally unfair when the trial court

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instructed the jury on his propensity to commit sexually violent offenses. The trial court

instructed the jury, with CALJIC No. 2.50.01, that the jury may infer from the evidence

of petitioner’s prior sexual misconduct that he had a disposition to commit offenses. 

Further, the court instructed the jury that if the jury did infer that petitioner had a

disposition to commit offenses, this inference is simply one item to consider, along with

other evidence, in determining whether the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of the charged crime. As stated above, propensity is a constitutionally

permissible inference. United LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1026. Further, CALJIC No. 2.50.01,

which instructed the jury that it could not rest a conviction solely on evidence of prior

offenses, had probative value that was not outweighed by any undue prejudice. Thus,

this jury instruction did not infect the proceedings as to make the trial fundamentally

unfair.

Furthermore, neither petitioner’s trial counsel nor appellate counsel failed to

provide effective assistance by not objecting to, or raising on appeal, the jury instruction

issues. Review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by a two-prong

test: Petitioner must show that counsel’s advice fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, petitioner would have prevailed. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L. Ed. 3d 674, 693 (1984). Regarding trial

counsel, while raising objections at trial to the jury instructions would not have been

frivolous, neither would it have led to a reasonable probability of petitioner prevailing

either under either the federal or California constitution. Petitioner did not suffer any

prejudice due to counsel’s performance. For the reasons stated above, CALJIC Nos. 

17.01 and 2.50.01 were objectively reasonable and did not infect the proceedings as to

make the trial fundamentally unfair. 

. . . . . . .

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Appellate counsel, in many instances, will fail to raise an issue because there is no

likelihood of success on that particular issue; “the weeding out of weaker issues is

widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.” Miller v.

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Petitioner’s argument, that appellate counsel ineffectively failed to raise on appeal

issues regarding CALJIC Nos. 17.01 and 10.42.6 fails because, as noted above, when

reviewed together as a whole, the instructions were not objectively unreasonable. The

instructions did not infect the entire trial or create a reasonable likelihood that the jury

would have applied the instructions in a way that prevents the consideration of

constitutionally relevant evidence. Thus, appellate counsel would not have had a

reasonable probability of success had it been raised on appeal. Petitioner suffered no

prejudice on account of appellate counsel’s performance. Accordingly, petitioner was

not denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel.

It is Ordered that the petition be, and hereby is, Denied.

Date: October 3, 2012

__________________________________

_ Terry J. Hatter, Jr.

Senior United States District Judge

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