Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-01126/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-01126-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JESUS GARCIA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF KING CITY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-01126-BLF 

ORDER 

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT 

BOBBY CARRILLO’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; 

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO STRIKE CLASS 

ALLEGATIONS, WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND; AND 

(3) GRANTING IN PART 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY

THE LITIGATION AGAINST HIM

[Re: ECF 61, 62]

Defendant Bobby Carrillo brings three motions before the Court: (1) a motion to dismiss 

counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII(b) of the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) for failure to 

state a claim against him; (2) a motion to strike Plaintiffs’ class allegations; and (3) a motion to 

stay the litigation pending the resolution of a parallel criminal case against him. See ECF 61, 62.

The parties appeared for oral argument on April 2, 2015. The Court sets forth its rulings on each 

of Mr. Carrillo’s motions below. 

I. BACKGROUND

For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the SAC are presumed to 

be true. See Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2008).

This proposed class action involves an alleged conspiracy to target Hispanic and Latino 

drivers in King City, California, and wrongfully tow and impound their automobiles. The SAC 

alleges that several King City police officers, including Mr. Carrillo, conspired with the owner of 

a local towing company, Miller’s Towing, to create a towing scheme: an officer would pull over 

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an automobile driven by a Hispanic or Latino individual, would order the vehicle be towed or 

impounded without legal justification, and then a tow truck from Miller’s Towing would arrive 

within minutes to tow away the car. See SAC ¶¶ 21-25, 27-28. The conspirators (referred to 

throughout the SAC as “the Crew”) would then sell the victim’s vehicles and retain the proceeds 

from the sale, misappropriate the vehicles for their personal use, or require the victims to pay 

exorbitant fees in order to recover their vehicles. See SAC ¶¶ 29-32.

Mr. Carrillo served as a police officer and patrol supervisor in the King City Police 

Department. SAC ¶ 13. The SAC alleges that he was the leader of the Crew. SAC ¶ 21. The SAC 

further alleges that Mr. Carrillo stopped one of the named Plaintiffs, Maria Solis, for a minor 

traffic violation. SAC ¶ 54. Shortly after the traffic stop, Mr. Carrillo made a telephone call from 

his patrol car, and a tow truck arrived on the scene. SAC ¶ 55. At Mr. Carrillo’s direction, the 

truck towed and impounded Ms. Solis’ vehicle. Id. Mr. Carrillo told Ms. Solis, without legal 

justification, that she needed to wait thirty days to recover her vehicle. SAC ¶ 57. Later that same 

day, Mr. Carrillo saw Ms. Solis on the street and told her that she could recover her vehicle 

immediately if she paid all fees and charges at Miller’s Towing. SAC ¶ 58. Ms. Solis paid $400 to 

Miller’s Towing to recover her vehicle. SAC ¶ 59.

 II. DISCUSSION

A. The Motion to Dismiss

A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A plaintiff must therefore “plead enough facts to 

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007), which requires a plaintiff to plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). For causes of action sounding in fraud, a plaintiff must “state with 

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud and mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Any 

complaint that fails to meet these requirements may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

The SAC alleges seven counts against Mr. Carrillo. At the motion hearing on April 2, 

2015, the Court discussed the deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ pleadings with regard to several of these 

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counts. It outlines below which counts require further amendment so as to comply with Twombly

and Iqbal and give Mr. Carrillo fair notice of Plaintiffs’ claims against him. 

1. Counts I and III

Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Carrillo violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (count I) and 1985(3) (count 

III). To allege a violation of Section 1981, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant engaged in

“intentional discrimination on account of race.” Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 

1989). Allegations of racial animus are similarly necessary to state a claim under Section 1985(3). 

See id. at n.3 (“As with section 1981, sections 1985(2) and (3) require a plaintiff to plead racial 

animus.”) (citing Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

Plaintiffs’ SAC does not plead facts to show that Defendant Carrillo acted with the intent 

to discriminate against any person, including Ms. Solis, due to his or her race. Plaintiffs in fact 

plead that King City is 87.5 percent Hispanic or Latino. See SAC ¶ 26. Plaintiffs must plead some 

facts to show a causal link, rather than mere correlation, between Defendant’s acts and the race of 

the individuals allegedly targeted by the scheme. They have not done so. Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss as to Counts I and III is therefore granted, with leave to amend.1 

2. Counts IV, V, and VI

Plaintiffs allege three state law claims against Mr. Carrillo: conversion (count IV), 

trespass to personal property (count V), and fraud (count VI). 

A claim for conversion requires a plaintiff to allege three things: (1) plaintiff’s ownership 

or right to possession of the property at the time of conversion, (2) defendant’s conversion by 

wrongful act or disposition of the property rights, and (3) damages. See, e.g., Fortaleza v. PNC 

Fin. Servs. Grp. Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not pled facts to show that he personally converted 

any property, and that any interference with Ms. Solis’ property was de minimis. See Mot., ECF 61 

 

1

Plaintiffs also allege that the conspiracy was designed to target “low-income” drivers. SAC ¶ 21. 

Neither Section 1981 nor Section 1985(3) prohibits discrimination based on class or income. At 

the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that Plaintiffs were not alleging a 

claim of discrimination sounding in economic discrimination, but instead were merely illustrating 

the types of individuals targeted by Defendants’ purported scheme. 

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at 20. This argument is unpersuasive, for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Carrillo 

unlawfully caused Ms. Solis’ car to be towed, and then personally told her that she could retrieve 

the car if she paid $400 to Miller’s Towing. See SAC ¶¶ 55, 58. The SAC further alleges that Mr. 

Carrillo and his fellow members of the Crew received the money paid by victims to recover their 

wrongfully towed cars. SAC ¶ 25. These facts alone are sufficient to state a claim for conversion

under California law. Second, Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim in count VII imputes the conversion of 

any of Plaintiffs’ vehicles by any other Defendant to Mr. Carrillo. See, e.g., Applied Equipment 

Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 511 (1994). The SAC alleges that another named 

Plaintiff, Sergio Munoz, was instructed after his car was towed to bring a $200 money order to the 

police station, with the payee left blank, in order to get information as to how he could retrieve his 

car. SAC ¶ 51 (alleging that Mr. Munoz was forced to give the $200 money order to the officer 

who ordered the car towed). Defendant’s motion to dismiss count IV is therefore denied. 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action for trespass to personal 

property fails because, under California law, trespass to personal property is designed to permit a 

Plaintiff to recover for “interferences with possession of personal property not sufficiently 

important to be classed as conversion.” Intel v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1350 (2003). A plaintiff

must plead only that defendant intentionally interfered with plaintiff’s personal property in a 

manner that caused injury. See id. at 1350-51. Causing Ms. Solis’ vehicle to be impounded for up 

to thirty days constitutes trespass to property, as it interfered with her personal property in a 

manner that caused injury. See SAC ¶ 55; see also Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 

1093 (9th Cir. 2008). Defendant’s motion to dismiss count V is therefore denied.

Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for fraud is subject to the heightened pleading requirements 

of Rule 9(b). A claim for fraud under California law requires a plaintiff to plead five elements: (1) 

a misrepresentation, concealment, or nondisclosure, (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter), (3) 

intent to defraud, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. See, e.g., Lazar v. Superior 

Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996). 

Defendant is correct that Plaintiffs’ pleadings are deficient with regard to their claim for 

fraud against Mr. Carrillo. Though Plaintiffs make general allegations regarding the unlawful 

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impoundment of individual vehicles, see SAC ¶ 94, and though Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Carrillo 

was responsible for the impoundment of Ms. Solis’ vehicle, see SAC ¶¶ 53-59, they do not allege 

particularized facts regarding the interaction between Mr. Carrillo and Ms. Solis sufficient to meet 

Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements, including failing to allege the specific 

misrepresentation(s) Defendant made and his knowledge of falsity. Because this deficiency could

be cured through amendment, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss count VI, with 

leave to amend. 

3. Count VII

Plaintiffs allege a civil conspiracy among the Defendants to commit conversion, trespass, 

deceit and fraud. To state a cause of action for conspiracy, Plaintiffs must plead three elements: (1) 

the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct by defendant in furtherance 

of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Craigslist, Inc. v. 

3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (noting that the first element itself has three 

subparts: “(i) knowledge of wrongful activity, (ii) agreement to join in the wrongful activity, and 

(iii) intent to aid in the wrongful activity”). 

Having reviewed the entirety of Plaintiffs’ SAC, the Court was able to piece together 

allegations that could state a claim for civil conspiracy. To give fair notice to Mr. Carrillo, 

however, of the factual allegations giving rise to Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim against him, the 

Court finds that Plaintiffs must amend the SAC in order to clearly state, in one location, the facts 

which they contend give rise to a civil conspiracy under California law. Cf. ATS Prods., Inc. v. 

Champion Fiberglass, Inc., 2013 WL 6086924, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2013). Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss count VII is therefore granted, with leave to amend. 

4. Count VIII(b)

Finally, Plaintiffs allege a negligence claim against Mr. Carrillo. A claim for negligence 

requires that Plaintiffs plead (1) a duty, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causation, (4) resulting injury, 

and (5) damages. See, e.g., Ladd v. Cnty. of San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913 (1996). Plaintiffs allege 

that Mr. Carrillo breached his legal duty as a police officer to comply with the law regarding the

seizure and impoundment of vehicles. They allege specifically that Plaintiffs’ automobiles were 

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towed despite only being pulled over for minor traffic violations. Plaintiffs need not plead in the 

SAC the exact violations for which each individual was pulled over – factual pleading that 

individuals were subjected to a stop for a “minor traffic violation” but nonetheless had their cars 

towed and impounded is sufficient to state a claim for negligence. See SAC ¶¶ 54-55. Defendant’s

motion to dismiss count VII(b) is therefore denied. 

B. The Motion to Strike 

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ class allegations pursuant to Rule 12(f).2 Defendant 

alleges that Plaintiffs’ proposed class is unascertainable and overbroad, and that the proposed 

representative class members’ claims do not meet the commonality or typicality requirements of 

Rule 23(b)(3). See Mot., ECF 61 at 8. The Court finds that these questions, generally, are more 

appropriately determined through briefing on a motion for class certification. See, e.g., Clerkin v. 

MyLife.com, 2011 WL 3809912, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011). But at the hearing on the 

motion, the Court indicated to Plaintiffs that the proposed class definition is in tension with 

Plaintiffs’ Section 1981 and 1985(3) allegations, because Plaintiffs have not proposed a class or

subclass of individuals who were targeted because they were Hispanic or Latino. See SAC ¶ 117. 

In response, Plaintiffs agreed to amend their class definition. The Court therefore grants

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ class definition, with leave to amend. 

 C. The Motion to Stay 

Defendant has been charged in a pending criminal action by the Monterey County District 

Attorney’s Office. These charges arise out of the same factual nexus as Plaintiffs’ civil case 

against him. Defendant’s criminal trial is scheduled to begin on June 1, 2015. Defendant moves 

the Court to stay this action against him until the criminal case is resolved. 

In this circuit, a court must consider six factors when determining whether a stay is 

 

2

There is a split in this district as to whether a motion to strike class allegations may be 

entertained at the motion to dismiss stage: “several judges have held that they may not be. . . . 

Other judges have held that a motion to strike class action allegations may be brought (but granted 

only rarely) at the motion to dismiss stage.” Ogola v. Chevron Corp., 2014 WL 4145408, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014). The courts that have entertained such motions limit granting those 

motions to circumstances where the court is “convinced that any questions of law are clear and not 

in dispute, and that under no set of circumstances could the claim or defense succeed.” See id.

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appropriate in such a circumstance: (1) the extent to which Defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights 

are implicated, (2) the plaintiff’s interest and any prejudice to plaintiff of a delay, (3) the burden 

on defendant, (4) the efficient use of judicial resources, (5) the interests of nonparties to the civil 

suit, and (6) public interest in the civil litigation. See Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 

F.3d 322, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the first and third factors weigh heavily in favor of a stay, 

as courts have repeatedly held that Fifth Amendment concerns are greatest where the factual nexus 

of the criminal and civil cases are substantially similar. See, e.g., Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. 

Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1989). In contrast, the second, fifth, and sixth factors 

weigh against a stay because the named plaintiffs and absent class members have a substantial 

interest in complete adjudication of their civil claims against Mr. Carrillo and the other 

Defendants. The fourth factor is neutral, as this case is in its early stages. 

Having considered the Keating factors, the Court determines that a partial stay of the case 

with regard to Mr. Carrillo, including discovery as to his personal involvement in the alleged 

conspiracy, is warranted. As Mr. Carrillo’s criminal case is scheduled to go to trial on June 1, 

2015, the Court hereby stays this action against Mr. Carrillo, including propounding discovery 

to him personally, until July 1, 2015. If Defendant’s trial is delayed, Defendant may request that 

the Court further extend the stay.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss counts I, III, VI, and VII is granted, with leave to 

amend. 

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss counts IV, V, and VIII(b) is denied. 

3. The motion to strike Plaintiffs’ class allegations is granted with leave to amend. 

4. The Court stays the litigation against Mr. Carrillo until July 1, 2015. 

5. Plaintiffs must file a Third Amended Complaint no later than April 29, 2015. 

Dated: April 8, 2015

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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