Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01119/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01119-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Benny Genaro Trejo,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-01119-PHX-SPL (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Benny Genaro Trejo’s (“Petitioner”) “Petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1). For the reasons 

explained herein, it is recommended that the Court deny the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND 

On November 5, 2013, a jury sitting in the Superior Court of Arizona in and for 

Maricopa County found Petitioner guilty of discharging a firearm at a residential 

structure, a class 2 felony. (Doc. 7-4 at 4). Petitioner had two prior felony convictions. 

(Id.). On January 17, 2014, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to thirteen years in prison. 

(Id. at 8).

Petitioner filed a direct appeal. On April 28, 2015, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction, but modified Petitioner’s sentencing order to reflect that 

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Petitioner was sentenced to a mitigated term as a repetitive offender, not a dangerous 

offender. (Id. at 14-16). Petitioner did not seek further review by the Arizona Supreme 

Court. 

On January 4, 2016, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). 

(Id. at 20-23). The trial court appointed counsel, who could not find a colorable issue to 

raise. (Id. at 25-29). On June 16, 2016, Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Petition. (Id. at 31-

44). On August 22, 2016, the trial court dismissed the PCR proceeding. (Id. at 68). 

Petitioner sought further review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which granted review, 

but denied relief. (Id. at 72). Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for 

review.

On February 15, 2019, Petitioner timely initiated this federal habeas proceeding. 

(Doc. 1). As detailed in the Court’s March 11, 2019 Screening Order, the Petition 

presents two grounds for habeas relief:

In Ground One, [Petitioner] claims his Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel was violated because the trial court denied his 

motion to change counsel and, after Petitioner began 

representing himself, denied Petitioner’s motion for a 

continuance. In Ground Two, Petitioner contends his 

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated and 

he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Doc. 3 at 1). On April 19, 2019, Respondents filed an Answer. (Doc. 7). Petitioner has 

not filed a Reply. Respondents concede that the Petition is timely and do not allege that 

any of Petitioner’s habeas claims are procedurally defaulted. As explained below, the 

undersigned concludes that all of Petitioner’s claims are without merit.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Reviewing Habeas Claims on the Merits

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, the Anti-Terrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts to defer to the last 

reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state 

prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or her claims either:

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1. [R]esulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or

2. [R]esulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 

As to the first entitlement to habeas relief as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 

above, “clearly established federal law” refers to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme 

Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the relevant state court decision. Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state 

court decision is “contrary to” such clearly established federal law if the state court (i) 

“applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] 

cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision 

of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. 

Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). 

As to the second entitlement to habeas relief as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) 

above, factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct unless the petitioner 

can show by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see 

also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 

628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 

federal habeas relief so long as “fair-minded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of 

the state court’s decision. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his Sixth 

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Amendment right to counsel in two ways: (a) by denying Petitioner’s motion for change 

of counsel and (b) by denying Petitioner’s motion to continue the trial after Petitioner 

began representing himself. (Doc. 1 at 100). Respondents concede that Petitioner 

presented these claims in his direct appeal. (Doc. 7 at 5-13). The last reasoned state 

court decision regarding Grounds 1(a) and 1(b) is the April 28, 2015 Arizona Court of 

Appeals decision affirming Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Doc. 7-4 at 14-16). To 

prevail on Grounds 1(a) and 1(b), Petitioner must show that the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision “(1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d).

1. Ground 1(a): Claim that the Trial Court Erred by Denying 

Petitioner’s Motion for Change of Counsel

Although the Sixth Amendment requires that a criminal defendant be provided 

with competent counsel, the “Supreme Court [has] specifically rejected the argument that 

the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a defendant a ‘meaningful relationship’ with his 

lawyer.” LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Morris v. 

Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983)). “However, forcing a defendant to go to trial with an 

attorney with whom he has an irreconcilable conflict amounts to constructive denial of 

the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 

2007) (citing Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970)). “An irreconcilable 

conflict in violation of the Sixth Amendment occurs only where there is a complete 

breakdown in communication between the attorney and client, and the breakdown 

prevents effective assistance of counsel.” Id. (citing Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 

1026 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Disagreements over strategical or tactical decisions do not rise to 

level of a complete breakdown in communication.” Id. 

In its April 28, 2015 decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion for new counsel, 

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explaining that:

In asking for a new appointed lawyer, Trejo told the court that 

he had “no confidence in [his attorney] whatsoever.” But “[a] 

single allegation of lost confidence in counsel does not 

require the appointment of new counsel.” State v. Cromwell, 

211 Ariz. 181, 186, ¶ 29, 119 P.3d 448 (2005). Trejo also 

complained that his attorney had not shown him any 

discovery. He did not explain, however, what kinds of 

evidence in particular his lawyer had not shared with him, and 

did not tell the court when he had asked to see the evidence or 

why he needed to see it. Trejo told the court that his attorney 

had not “filed any motions.” But she had filed several 

motions, including a successful motion to sever the firearms 

charge from other charges. Trejo also complained that his 

attorney had not “seen [him] in a month.” Given, however, 

that his attorney had represented several times that she was 

prepared for trial, the court could conclude she had sufficient 

contact and communication with her client. See Paris–

Sheldon, 214 Ariz. at 507, ¶ 19, 154 P.3d 1046 (no 

irreconcilable conflict where, among other things, “[the 

defendant's] attorney avowed he was prepared for trial and 

expressed no animosity toward his client or unwillingness to 

proceed as her attorney”); see also Hernandez, 232 Ariz. at 

318, ¶ 15, 305 P.3d 378. Finally, in his subsequent written 

motion for new counsel, Trejo asserted that his lawyer had 

disregarded his “wishes and opinions concerning case 

direction,” but he offered no specifics.

(Doc. 7-4 at 15) (footnote omitted). In support of Ground 1(a), Petitioner alleges that his 

trial counsel

was not consulting with him about decisions in his case, she 

disregarded his wishes and concerns about how the case 

should proceed, she ignored his requests to review the 

evidence against him, and she failed to communicate with 

him as to the status of his case and proceedings. Trejo 

asserted that he had an irreparable conflict with his attorney 

and did not have confidence in her.

(Doc. 1 at 101). These statements do not establish that there was a complete breakdown 

in communication between Petitioner and his trial counsel that prevented effective legal 

representation. Petitioner does not persuasively argue that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ 

decision rejecting Ground 1(a) is (i) contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

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established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court or (ii) is based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. The undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed 

to meet his burden of establishing entitlement to habeas relief. Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25; 

Bell, 535 U.S. at 698–699. It is therefore recommended that the Court deny Ground 1(a).

2. Ground 1(b): Claim that Trial Court Erred by Denying Motion to 

Continue

The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he matter of continuance is traditionally 

within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more 

time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to 

defend without counsel.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 

921 (1964) (citing Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940)). “There are no mechanical 

tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due 

process.” Id. “The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, 

particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” 

Id. The Supreme Court has also held that “only an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence 

upon expeditiousness in the fact of a justifiable request for delay’ violates the right to the 

assistance of counsel.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (citing Ungar, 376 

U.S. at 589). Additionally, even if the continuance was improperly denied, habeas relief 

is not available unless there is a showing of actual prejudice to petitioner’s defense 

resulting from the refusal to grant a continuance. See Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 

1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 1997).

Here, public defender Lindsay Abramson was appointed to represent Petitioner at 

trial. Ms. Abramson made several motions to continue the trial date, which the trial court 

granted. (Doc. 7-1 at 44-45, 47-48, 50-51). On October 10, 2013, the trial court granted 

Petitioner’s request to represent himself and appointed Ms. Abramson to serve as 

advisory counsel. (Id. at 64-65). Petitioner later moved to continue the trial date, which 

the trial court denied. (Id. at 172-74, 80). Petitioner then moved to withdraw his pro se 

status and the trial court re-appointed Ms. Abramson as Petitioner’s trial counsel. (Id. at 

80).

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In rejecting the claim that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s motion to 

continue the trial, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated:

[N]othing in our record reveals that Trejo requested a 

continuance in conjunction with his request to proceed in 

propria persona. See id. at 438, ¶ 33, 72 P.3d 831. Nothing 

in the record demonstrates that, at the hearing at which the 

court granted Trejo’s self-representation request, Trejo 

objected to the court’s affirming the “firm trial date” or 

otherwise indicated he needed more time to prepare for trial. 

According to our record, he did not ask for a continuance 

until four days later, on the day trial was to begin. Thus, 

Trejo’s decision to proceed in propria persona was not 

made contingent upon the grant of a continuance.

¶ 13 More broadly, Trejo has not demonstrated that, under the 

circumstances, the superior court abused its discretion or 

acted arbitrarily in denying his request for a continuance. He 

argues he required a continuance because he had not seen the 

evidence but does not specify what trial tactics he would have 

been able to employ had he been familiar with the evidence 

and does not otherwise contend he was prejudiced by the 

court's denial of his request. See State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 

543, 555, ¶ 18, 315 P.3d 1200 (2014) (“We review a trial 

court's denial of a motion to continue for an abuse of 

discretion, which we will find only if the defendant 

demonstrates prejudice.”) (citations omitted). For these 

reasons, the superior court did not abuse its discretion or 

violate his right to self-representation when it denied his 

motion to continue.

(Doc. 7-4 at 15-16) (emphasis added). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the state court’s 

findings that Petitioner did not request to represent himself on the condition that the trial 

date be continued is entitled to the presumption of correctness. Petitioner must rebut that 

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Lambert, 

393 F.3d at 976. Petitioner has not presented clear and convincing evidence challenging 

the Arizona Court of Appeals’ factual findings. Thus, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1), the undersigned presumes that the factual findings in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision are correct. Moreover, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of 

Ground 1(b) is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

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federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. The decision is not based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court 

deny Ground 1(b).

B. Ground Two

Ground Two raises an ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim regarding 

Petitioner’s trial counsel. (Doc. 1 at 104). It is undisputed that Petitioner exhausted 

Ground Two in the state court PCR proceeding.

1. Legal Standards

IAC claims are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner arguing an IAC claim must establish that his or her 

counsel’s performance was (i) objectively deficient and (ii) prejudiced the petitioner. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This is a deferential standard, and “[s]urmounting 

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 725 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). In the habeas context, 

the issue is whether there is a “reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist 

could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Hence, a review of Strickland

claims under AEDPA is “doubly deferential.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 

(2011) (“We take a ‘highly deferential’ look at counsel’s performance [pursuant to 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689], through the ‘deferential lens of § 2254(d)’. . . .).

In assessing the performance factor of Strickland’s two-part test, a court must try 

not “to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction.” Clark, 769 F.3d at 725 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To be constitutionally deficient, 

counsel’s representation must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness such 

that it was outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. 

A reviewing court considers “whether there is any reasonable argument” that counsel was 

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effective. Rogovich v. Ryan, 694 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012). 

To establish the prejudice factor of Strickland’s two-part test, a petitioner must 

demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. In other words, it must be shown that the “likelihood of a different result [is] 

substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.

Although the performance factor is listed first in Strickland’s two-part test, a court 

may consider the prejudice factor first. In addition, a court need not consider both factors 

if the court determines that a petitioner has failed to meet one factor. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); 

LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998) (a court need not look at both 

deficiency and prejudice if the habeas petitioner cannot establish one or the other).

Finally, on federal habeas review, the “pivotal question is whether the state court’s 

application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785. And 

“it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the 

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 

19, 25 (2002) (per curium). “Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist could 

disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th Cir. 

2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2. Analysis

As mentioned, Petitioner was convicted of discharging a firearm at a residential 

structure. (Doc. 7-4 at 4). At trial, the State presented evidence that following an 

altercation between Petitioner and his cousin at approximately 2:00 a.m. on September 

22, 2012, Petitioner fired a sawed-off shotgun into the trailer where Petitioner’s cousin

and the cousin’s mother, girlfriend, and children resided. (See, e.g., Doc. 7-2 at 204-05). 

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 

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requesting that the shotgun be tested for DNA evidence. (Doc. 1 at 104).1

Reasonable tactical decisions, including decisions regarding counsel’s presentation 

of a case, are “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90. Disagreement 

with a reasonable tactical decision cannot form the basis of an IAC claim. Wildman v. 

Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001). However, an attorney may provide 

ineffective assistance by failing to conduct a reasonable investigation and present 

mitigating evidence. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383-84 (2005). 

The last state court decision regarding Ground Two is the October 12, 2017 

Arizona Court of Appeals decision that summarily affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of

Petitioner’s PCR Petition. (Doc. 7-4 at 72). The undersigned therefore reviews the trial 

court’s ruling in determining the merits of Ground Two. See Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 

F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Although AEDPA generally requires federal courts to 

review one state decision, if the last reasoned decision adopts or substantially 

incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court decision, [courts] may consider 

both decisions to fully ascertain the reasoning of the last decision.”) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) 

(“Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later 

unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the 

same ground.”). 

In rejecting Ground Two, the trial court stated that “the existence of ‘touch DNA’ 

can establish that a person possessed something, but the lack of ‘touch DNA’ (as well as 

the presence of someone else’s DNA) does not preclude possession.” (Doc. 7-4 at 70). 

The trial court ruled that Petitioner “has failed to articulate any reason to believe the 

 

1 Petitioner also appears to assert that his trial counsel should have moved to 

suppress DNA evidence. In his Petition, Petitioner states that he “advised counsel to 

suppress the DNA evidence . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 104). However, as the trial court explained, 

no DNA evidence was introduced at trial. (Doc. 7-4 at 69). An employee in the City of 

Phoenix crime lab testified that she swabbed the shotgun for DNA, but no evidence was 

introduced as to whether testing was completed. (Doc. 7-2 at 251, 255). Therefore, to 

the extent that Petitioner presents an IAC claim based on an alleged failure to suppress 

DNA evidence, the trial court correctly dismissed the claim as meritless. (Doc. 7-4 at 

70).

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results of his trial would have changed had his counsel . . . pursued further DNA testing. 

And, the Court’s review of the record has revealed no potential basis for an ineffective 

assistance claim related to DNA evidence.” (Id.). 

To reiterate, “it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court 

applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” 

Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-699 (2002) (stating that a 

federal habeas petitioner “must do more than show that he would have satisfied 

Strickland’s test if his claim were being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 

2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent 

judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. . . . Rather, he must 

show that the [state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively 

unreasonable manner.”). The undersigned finds that Petitioner’s trial counsel made a 

reasonable tactical decision not to test the shotgun for DNA evidence. As Respondents 

note (Doc. 7 at 15), the absence of Petitioner’s DNA on the shotgun would not have 

prevented a jury from reasonably concluding that Petitioner possessed the shotgun. 

Petitioner’s aunt, who resided at the trailer at issue, testified at trial that she saw 

Petitioner “cock the gun and shoot it in my house . . . .” (Doc. 7-2 at 59). The State 

presented evidence that a shotgun was found where Petitioner was apprehended and that 

the shotgun was of the same caliber as the firearm used to shoot at the trailer. (Id. at 92, 

196-97, 285). A police officer testified that when Petitioner was apprehended after the 

shooting, Petitioner stated “kill me, just kill me” and “I hope there’s a death penalty for 

me.” (Id. at 77). The State’s already strong case would have been further strengthened if 

Petitioner’s DNA was found on the shotgun. 

By not requesting DNA testing, Petitioner’s trial counsel was able to argue to the 

jury that there was a lack of physical evidence connecting Petitioner to the shooting in an 

attempt to raise reasonable doubt. During her opening statement, Petitioner’s trial 

counsel stated: 

You will hear no evidence at all tying [Petitioner] to the gun 

. . . . The State could have done DNA testing on the gun. 

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You won’t hear any evidence of that. Why? Because they 

didn’t do it. Ballistic testing on the gun, testing that could 

have matched that slug that the prosecutor just went on about 

to the gun. Wasn’t done. The only testing you will hear 

about that was done was fingerprint testing. Fingerprint 

testing was done on the shotgun and it came up with no 

prints. Physical evidence in this case tying [Petitioner] to the 

gun you won’t hear. Because there is none. And this case, it 

is 100 percent the State’s burden to prove [Petitioner] guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Doc. 7-2 at 36). Trial counsel reiterated the lack of physical evidence and the State’s 

burden of proof in her closing argument when she explained to the jury:

So the only evidence that all of you are left with is the bias 

testimony of a liar, a liar under oath, a convicted felon and 

then someone who is off their medication that they need to be 

right in the head. In no world is that beyond a reasonable 

doubt. . . . I anticipate when I sit down in a few minutes the 

prosecutor is going to get back up here and say, well the 

Defense attorney could have DNA [sic]. The Defense 

attorney could have done ballistics testing. Not our job. Not 

what your instructions tell you. The burden of proof is 100 

percent on the prosecutor. It is not our job in any State in this 

country to prove [Petitioner] innocent. So don’t let him 

confuse you that that’s what we should have done.

(Doc. 7-3 at 180). The undersigned concludes that Petitioner has failed to show how trial 

counsel’s performance fell below a standard of reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms. Clark, 769 F.3d at 725. Petitioner also has not satisfied the 

prejudice prong of the Strickland test as Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood 

that he would have been acquitted had his trial counsel pursued DNA testing. 

Accordingly, the state courts did not unreasonably apply Strickland in rejecting 

Petitioner’s IAC claim in Ground Two. The state courts’ rejection of Ground Two was 

not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The undersigned therefore 

recommends that the Court deny Ground Two on the merits.

C. Petitioner’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 1 at 114). Review of Section 

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2254(d) claims “is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated 

the claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. As explained by the U.S. 

Supreme Court, allowing “a petitioner to overcome an adverse state-court decision with 

new evidence introduced in a federal habeas court and reviewed by that court in the first 

instance effectively de novo” would be contrary to the purpose of affording state courts 

the primary responsibility for considering a petitioner’s claims. Id. at 1399 (“It would be 

strange to ask federal courts to analyze whether a state court’s adjudication resulted in a 

decision that unreasonably applied federal law to facts not before the state court.”). 

Here, all of the grounds for relief in the Petition were adjudicated on the merits in 

Arizona state court. The undersigned has recommended that all of Petitioner’s federal 

habeas claims should be denied. Where, as here, “the record refutes the [habeas] 

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not 

required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) 

(a hearing is not required if the allegations would not entitle the petitioner to relief under 

Section 2254(d)); Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n 

evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state 

court record.”) (emphasis in original). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the 

Court deny Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s requests for an evidentiary hearing be 

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his claims for relief.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

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4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. Failure to file 

timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey,

481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated this 27th day of November, 2019.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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