Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02075/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02075-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 Unless otherwise noted, all referenced exhibits are those attached to Respondent's Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eric Lee Flanders, ) Case No. CV 04-2075-PHX-SMM (JM)

)

Petitioner, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

v. )

)

Ernest Trujillo, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

_________________________________)

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket

No. 1], filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the

United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter

was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below,

the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the

record, dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By Indictment filed December 21, 1999, and numbered CR 99-18091, the State

charged Petitioner with one count each of Theft of Means of Transportation (Count 1),

Unlawful Flight from Law Enforcement Vehicle (Count 2), Resisting Arrest (Count 3), and

Aggravated Assault on a Police Officer (Count 4). (Ex. A.)1

 

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts underlying the indictment as

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 1 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

follows:

On December 13, 1999, at approximately 4:00 a.m.,

Serafin Cabrera started his van in preparation for his drive to

work. In the time it then took Cabrera to get out of his van to

retrieve his lunch from his wife, a man got inside the van and

drove away. Cabrera's wife called the police, and Phoenix Police

Officer Derrick Geisel, who was on patrol in his helicopter,

responded. 

Officer Geisel spotted the van near 51st Avenue and

McDowell Road in Phoenix. He alerted the patrol officers to the

location of the van, and together they followed it into a rural

areas. One of the patrol officers, Officer David Norman, had to

travel at speeds of approximately 100 miles per hour to keep up

with the van.

Near 91st Avenue and Broadway, the van turned onto a

dirt road traveled about a mile and stopped. Officer Geisel saw

an Anglo man wearing a light-blue jacket and jeans jump out of

the van and run south toward a canal. Officer Geisel lost track

of the man for a few seconds after the man ran under trees by a

farmhouse. However, based on information from Officer

Geisel, Officer Norman approached the trees, identified himself

as a police officer and commanded the man to come out. Then,

while crossing a canal, Officer Norman saw the man hiding

underneath a wooden plank that was lying across the canal. The

man started to run but was caught by police officers and taken

into custody. The man was wearing a denim jacket and jeans.

(Exhibit L, pp. 1-2.) 

The State also filed an Allegation of Historical Priors, alleging that Petitioner had four

prior felony convictions and that he committed the offenses while on felony release.

(Exhibits C & D.) On May 23, 2000, the court, upon the State's motion, dismissed without

prejudice Count 3 (Resisting Arrest) and Count 4 (Aggravated Assault) of the indictment.

(Exhibit B.) 

The trial court found Petitioner indigent and appointed defense counsel. (Exhibit E.)

On May 25, 2000, the trial commenced on Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment. (Exhibit F.)

Petitioner was absent the first day of trial, but was arrested and taken into that night by

Officer Norman for trespassing and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Exhibit L, p. 3)

Petitioner was read his Miranda warnings and indicated that he understood them. (Id.)

Petitioner then made mention to Officer Norman that the officer had been upset with

Petitioner the night of the previous arrest for theft and unlawful flight. (Id.) Officer Norman

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 2 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

agreed that he had been upset and indicated that Petitioner was "one hell of a driver." (Id.)

Petitioner responded, "Yeah, I used to race off road." (Id.) Petitioner then asked Officer

Norman why the officer had been so upset, to which Officer Norman relied that it was

because he had run into a barbed-wire fence and torn his uniform. Petitioner responded,

"Yeah, I ran into that same barbed-wire fence." (Id.) 

The trial court conducted a voluntariness hearing to determine whether Petitioner's

statement to Officer Norman the night of the second arrest were admissible. Petitioner

argued that his statements were not admissible because the Miranda warnings read at the time

of the arrest for trespassing were not sufficient as to the statements made about the night of

the previous arrest. (Id.) The court found the statements to be voluntary and that they were

"made in full compliance with Miranda." (Id., p. 4.) 

Officer Norman testified at trial concerning Petitioner's statements the night of his

trespassing arrest. (Id.) Petitioner testified that he had not stolen the van but that he had

been walking from his parents' house to his sister's boyfriend's house when he had seen the

lights from the helicopter and the police cars. (Id.) He further testified that he had hidden

in the canal because he was in violation of parole and thought that the police were searching

for him for that reason. (Id.) 

On May 31, 2000, the jury found Petitioner guilty on both Count 1 (Theft of Means

of Transportation) and Count 2 (Unlawful Flight from Law Enforcement Vehicle). (Exhibit

F, p. 3.) On June 2, 2000, the court found that Petitioner had been convicted on three prior

felony offenses. (Exhibit G.) On July 7, 2000, the court sentenced Petitioner to 11.25 years

imprisonment for Count 1, and 5 years imprisonment for Count 2. (Exhibit H.) The court

ordered that the sentence be served concurrently. (Id.)

On July 12, 2000, Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (Exhibit I.) In his

Opening Brief filed in the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner, who was represented by

counsel, framed the issues as follows:

Issue One

Officer Norman interrogated [Petitioner] regarding this

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 3 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

case after his arrest on unrelated charges, and after [Petitioner]

had been indicted for, and appointed counsel in, this case.

[Petitioner] then made incriminating statements regarding this

case that contradicted his previous, exculpatory statements.

Should [Petitioner] receive a new trial because this violated his

federal and Arizona constitutional rights to counsel?

Issue Two

Should [Petitioner] receive a new trial because the

incriminating statements that he made to Officer Norman

regarding this case, which were made after his arrest for

unrelated charges, were involuntary?

(Exhibit J, p. 1.) Addressing Issue One, the Court of Appeals determined it had not been

raised at trial and was therefore waived absent fundamental error. (Exhibit L, p. 5.) The

court proceeded to find that admission of the disputed statements as harmless in light of other

evidence that Petitioner was in fact the driver of the van. (Id., pp. 5-6.) Issue Two was

resolved similarly, with the court finding that any error was harmless in light of the other

evidence presented at trial. (Id., p. 6.) On August 23, 2001, the Court of Appeals, noting that

neither a motion for reconsideration nor a petition for review had been filed and that the time

for doing so had expired, issued its order and mandate. (Exhibit M.) 

On July 2, 2001, Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief ("PCR").

(Exhibit N.) On July 17, 2001, the court found Petitioner indigent and appointed PCR

counsel. (Exhibit O.) On October 24, 2001, Petitioner's PCR counsel filed a notice with the

court indicating that she had "corresponded with petitioner, conferred with former trial

counsel, and reviewed the court's file, the opening and answering appellate briefs, and all

relevant transcripts," but was "unable to find a tenable issue to submit to the court pursuant

to Rule 32 . . ." and would not be filing a petition for PCR. (Exhibit P.) 

On November 30, 2001, Petitioner filed a pro se Supplemental Petition for PostConviction Relief. (Exhibit Q.) In response, on December 28, 2001, the State filed a Motion

to Dismiss Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings Without Prejudice based on Petitioner's

failure to certify pursuant to Rule 32.5 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure that the

PCR petition included every ground known to him for vacating or otherwise changing his

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 4 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

judgment or sentence. (Exhibit R.) Petitioner opposed the motion and requested sanctions.

(Exhibit S.) The trial court ordered Petitioner to submit the required certification or face

dismissal of the petition. (Exhibit T.) On February 19, 2002, Petitioner filed the required

Rule 32.5 certification "under duress." (Exhibit U.) The trial court did not find the

"certification filed under duress to comport with the spirit and letter of Rule 32.5," and

granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition without prejudice. (Exhibit V.) Then, on

March 22, 2002, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit

W), which the court denied as moot based on the dismissal of Petitioner's previous petition

(Exhibit X). Petitioner then submitted a Request for Judicial Notice/Request for

Rehearing/Review of the March 22, 2002 order, noting that the dismissal was without

prejudice and requesting that the court accept the Supplemental Petition for filing. (Exhibit

Y.) The trial court denied the request without comment. (Exhibit Z.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the trial court's dismissal of his PCR petition.

(Exhibit AA.) The State filed response and Petitioner replied. (Exhibits BB & CC.) The

Court of Appeals found that Petitioner's Rule 32.5 certification complied with the rule's

requirements even though filed "under duress." (Exhibit DD, p. 1.) On April 29, 2003, the

Court of Appeals issued the Order and Mandate reinstating the petition for PCR. (Exhibit

EE.) Accordingly, the trial court accepted Petitioner's February 8, 2002 verification and

reinstated his petition for PCR. (Exhibit FF.) 

In the petition for PCR, Petitioner raised numerous claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel and also alleged that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury during voir dire.

(Exhibit Q.) On June 30, 2003, the State filed a response to Petitioner's petition for PCR.

(Exhibit GG.) On July 10, 2003, Petitioner filed his reply. (Exhibit HH.) The trial court

held that Petitioner's did not present a colorable claim for post-conviction relief, found he

was not entitled to a hearing, and summarily dismissed the petition. (Exhibit II.) 

Petitioner sought review of the decision at the Court of Appeals and claimed that he

was:

1. Denied effective assistance of trial counsel;

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 5 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

2. Denied access to exculpatory evidence;

3. Denied a fair trial by the court due to its failure to inform

him of counsel's ineffective assistance;

4. Denied a fair trial due to the court's improper jury

instruction;

5. Denied a fair trial because counsel did not inform him

when waiving his constitutional rights;

6. Denied a fair trial because his trial and appellate counsel

failed to object to improper jury instructions.

(Exhibit JJ, pp. 2-3.) The State responded to the Petition for Review (Exhibit KK), and

Petitioner replied (Exhibit LL.). The Court of Appeals considered the petition and denied

review. (Exhibit MM.) Petitioner did not seek review from the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Exhibit NN, p. 3.)

On October 4, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(Exhibit NN.) He has identified seven grounds (many of which overlap) for relief:

1. The court erroneously instructed the jury during voir

dire;

2. He was denied of effective assistance of counsel at trial;

3. He was denied of his right to counsel during questioning;

4. The court erroneously admitted involuntary statements at

trial;

5. The trial court failed to take corrective action to insure

effective assistance of counsel;

6. He was denied effective assistance of counsel in

preparing for trial and at trial; and

7. He was denied effective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel.

(Id., pp. 5-11.) Petitioner alleges that each of these grounds violated his "due process, equal

protection, fourth, sixth, fourteenth amendment rights, [and] state created liberty interests."

(Id.) 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. The Petition is timely under the AEDPA

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 6 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The petition

must be filed within the applicable statute of limitations or it will be dismissed. The statute

of limitations was created by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

which reads in pertinent part as follows: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

***

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the statute of limitations on Petitioner's federal habeas

petition was tolled while he completed "one full round" of state collateral review. Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222 (2002). Petitioner's state conviction became final on August 23,

2001, the date on which the Arizona Court of Appeals filed its order and mandate. (Exhibit

M.) However, Petitioner had previously, on July 2, 2001, filed a notice of post-conviction

relief, thereby tolling the one-year statute of limitation. (Exhibit N.) The Arizona Court of

Appeals denied Petitioner's PCR petition on August 5, 2004, and the statute remained tolled

for an additional 30 days until the expiration of the time for filing a petition in the Arizona

Supreme Court. (Exhibit MM.) Accordingly, Petitioner had one year from September 5,

2004 within which to timely file his federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The petition

was filed on October 4, 2004, and is therefore timely.

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal court may

consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). Exhaustion occurs either when a claim has

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 7 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

been fairly presented to the highest state court, Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971),

or by establishing that a claim has been procedurally defaulted and that no state remedies

remain available, Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his claims to the

state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these claims. See

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A claim has been “fairly presented” if the

petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories on which the claim is based.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir.

1995). The operative facts must be presented in the appropriate context to satisfy the

exhaustion requirement. The fair presentation requirement is not satisfied, for example,

when a claim is presented in state court in a procedural context in which its merits will not

be considered in the absence of special circumstances. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351, 109 S.Ct.

at 1060. An exact correlation of the claims in both state and federal court is not required.

Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403. The substance of the federal claim, however, must have been fairly

presented to the state courts. Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations

omitted).

A petitioner may also exhaust his claims by either showing that a state court found his

claims defaulted on procedural grounds or, if he never presented his claims in any forum, that

no state remedies remain available to him. See Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir.

1982). "To exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the

claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

1. Petitioner's claims are exhausted even though

he did not present the claims to the Arizona

Supreme Court.

Respondents initially contend that Petitioner did not exhaust any of his claims because

he never sought review from the Arizona Supreme Court. Answer, pp. 15-16. In explaining

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 8 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

why he did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner cites Swoopes v. Sublett, 196

F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999). In Swoopes, the Ninth Circuit held that, in cases not carrying a life

sentence or the death penalty, "claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes

of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them." Swoopes, 196 F.3d

at 1010. There is no dispute that Petitioner met the exhaustion requirements, at least insofar

as the claims raised in his respective appeals, described in Swoopes by appealing the trial

court's adverse ruling on his PCR petition to the Arizona Court of Appeals. However,

Respondents submit that this was insufficient under the United States Supreme Court's

decision in Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004). 

In Baldwin, which was a case appealed from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court

addressed the question of what constitutes notice of the federal nature of a claim sufficient

to satisfy the fair presentment requirement found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). In laying the

groundwork for its decision, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]o provide the State with the

necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state

court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting

that court to the federal nature of the claim." 541 U.S. at 29 (citations omitted). Apparently

seizing on this general statement of the law of exhaustion, Respondents contend Baldwin

supports a finding that Swoopes, at least insofar as it addresses the need for habeas petitioners

to seek review in a the highest state court, is no longer valid. However, an examination of

the rationale employed in the Swoopes decision readily distinguishes that case from the

general statement of law cited by the Respondents.

Swoopes was decided on remand to the Ninth Circuit for consideration in light of the

Supreme Court's decision in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). In Swoopes, the

Ninth Circuit, just like the Baldwin court, began by reiterating the general rule stated in

O'Sullivan that, "in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement for federal habeas relief, state

prisoners must file for discretionary review in a state supreme court when that review is part

of ordinary appellate review." Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009, citing O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847.

The court recognized, however, that the Supreme Court in O'Sullivan had "acknowledged

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 9 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

an exception to the exhaustion requirement," by making it clear the "'the creation of a

discretionary review system does not, without more, make review' in a state supreme court

'unavailable.'" Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009, quoting O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848 (emphasis

added in Swoopes). The Ninth Circuit proceeded to review Arizona's discretionary review

system and found considerations that compelled a finding that, in other than capital cases,

appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court was unnecessary. Specifically, the court found that two

Arizona cases, State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 684 P.2d 154 (1984), and State v. Sandon,

161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989), made it clear that, "in cases not carrying a life sentence

or the death penalty, review need not be sought before the Arizona Supreme Court in order

to exhaust state remedies." Swoopes, 196 Ariz. at 1010. Thus, the court concluded, "postconviction review before the Arizona Supreme Court is a remedy that is 'unavailable' within

the meaning of O'Sullivan. There is nothing in Baldwin that suggests, implicitly or explicitly,

that this analysis is flawed or that the holding has been overruled. 

Also strongly suggestive of the continued vitality of Swoopes is that the Ninth Circuit

continues to cite the case for the very proposition Respondents suggest was overruled. In

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2005), the court stated as a matter of fact that

"[i]n cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 'claims of Arizona state prisoners

are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled

on them.'" Id. at 998 n. 3, quoting Swoopes, 196 Ariz. at 1010. At least one other circuit has

also cited Swoopes for this proposition without questioning its continuing validity. See

Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210 (3rd Cir. 2004). These considerations make clear that

Respondents' interpretation of Baldwin is incorrect.

2. Ground I is not exhausted.

In Ground I of the Petition, Petitioner asserts that the trial court "gave an improper and

highly prejudicial jury instruction during voir dire . . . ." Petition, p. 5. Specifically, he

alleges that the trial court instructed the jury that "any evidence presented by the defense or

testimony by the defendant, is not to be considered in making a determination in the case."

Id. Respondents assert that a federal basis for this claim was never identified in Petitioner's

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 10 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

state court briefs. 

A review of Petitioner's briefs filed in support of his direct appeal and PCR petition

supports the Respondents' position. Ground I was not raised in Petitioner's direct appeal of

his conviction. (See Exhibit J.) It was raised by Petitioner in his PCR petition. (See Exhibit

Q, pp. 7-8.) As Respondents point out, however, Petitioner did not identify a federal basis

for the claim. 

Exhaustion required that the Petitioner apprise the State that he was making a claim

under the United States Constitution and describe “both the operative facts and the federal

legal theory on which his claim is based” so that the state courts could have a fair opportunity

to apply controlling legal principles to those facts. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th

Cir.2003). Petitioner must have referenced specific provisions of the federal constitution or

cited to federal or state cases involving the legal standard for a federal constitutional

violation. Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir.2005). In Castillo, the Ninth

Circuit reiterated that exhaustion requires petitioners to delineate a relationship between a

particular federal citation and the claim being alleged. Id. at 1002-03 (“Exhaustion demands

more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an underlying federal theory”).

The Ninth Circuit held that a petitioner's citation to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution in the parting sentence of his brief to the

Court of Appeals was insufficient to support a finding of fair presentation. Id. at 1002. The

Court explained that Castillo's “conclusory, scattershot citation of federal constitutional

provisions, divorced from any articulated federal legal theory . . . left the Arizona Court of

Appeals to puzzle over how the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments might relate” to

Castillo's claims. Id. 

The shortcomings identified in Castillo are also present in this case. Here, Petitioner

stated in the closing of his PCR petition that all of the issues raised "are structural defects

within the case that have denied me my federal and state constitutional rights," and that "[a]ll

of the issues are raised as federal constitutional violations." (Exhibit Q, p. 11.) In the body

of the argument related to the issue raised in Ground I, Petitioner merely argued that the

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 11 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

alleged error by the trial court "nullified any defense I or my attorney presented." (Id., p. 8.)

The vagueness of these assertions left the state court, as was the case in Castillo, to puzzle

over the federal constitutional basis for his claim. In fact, the only indication of a federal

basis of this claim would have to be divined based on the bald reference to "federal

constitutional rights." Such vague presentation is inadequate to constitute the fair

presentation required to find that the claim was exhausted.

3. Grounds II and VI are not exhausted.

Grounds II and VI of the Petition suffer from the same shortcomings ascribed to

Ground I. In Ground II, the Petitioner alleges he was denied effective assistance of counsel

based on his trial attorney's "ignorance of the laws, ignorance of the procedures to obtain

evidence, his failure to do the research needed to learn and obtain that which was needed for

my defense . . . ." Petition, p. 6. Similarly, in Ground VI, the Petitioner alleges that his

attorney's "actions had no reasonable basis or tactical advantage to them for the defense."

Id., p. 10. In both Grounds, Petitioner includes a list of purported errors committed by

counsel. As respondents contend, these grounds for relief were not properly presented to the

state court and are unexhausted.

As with Ground I, the issues raised in Grounds II and VI were not raised in

Petitioner's brief on direct appeal, (see Exhibit J), but were partially raised in his PCR

petition, (see Exhibit Q, pp. 2-11.) Again, however, Petitioner did not identify a federal basis

for the claims, indicating only that the alleged omissions constituted a violation of his

"federal constitutional rights." Beyond this conclusory statement, Petitioner failed to

articulate any federal legal theory that could be interpreted as constituting the fair

presentation required to find these grounds properly exhausted. The argument in the PCR

petition amounts to a lengthy laundry list of alleged error, but fails to identify a federal or

constitutional basis for relief. As such, these grounds are not exhausted.

4. Grounds III and IV contain exhausted and unexhausted

claims.

In Grounds III and IV, Petitioner asserts that during his second arrest, Officer Norman

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 12 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

recognized him and was aware that his trial had commenced. Petition, p. 7 & 8. He further

asserts that Officer Norman, despite knowing that Petitioner had appointed counsel, elicited

statements from him about the facts surrounding the first arrest. Id. These statements were

admitted into evidence, Petitioner contends, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel. Id. In Ground III, Petitioner also argues that the statements he made to Officer

Norman at the time of his second arrest were admitted in violation of his due process and

Miranda rights. Id., p. 7. Petitioner specifically alleges that he never made any of the

statements attributed to him, that the statements were not voluntarily made, and that he did

not receive a full and fair opportunity to challenge their admission. Petition, pp. 7 & 8. An

examination of Petitioner's state court briefs and the court orders that followed indicates that

the Sixth Amendment claim was denied on independent and adequate state grounds, but the

Miranda claim was exhausted. 

A habeas court will not review a question of federal law if that question has been

decided by a state court and the court's decision “rests on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th

Cir.2000). 

As a threshold matter, the Supreme Court has indicated that the state law ground may

be substantive or, as is the case here, procedural. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30 (recognizing

that the “independent and adequate state ground” doctrine bars federal habeas corpus review

where a state court “declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had

failed to meet a state procedural requirement”). To be independent, “the state law basis for

the decision must not be interwoven with federal law.” LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702,

704 (9th Cir.2001). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002)(stating that “[I]f the

state court's decision rested primarily on a ruling on the merits . . . , its decision would not

be independent of federal law.”). “To be deemed adequate, the state law ground for decision

must be well established and consistently applied.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583

(9th Cir.2003); see also Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir.1999)(“A state

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 13 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to federal court review if it was ‘firmly

established and regularly followed’ at the time it was applied by the state court”) (quoting

Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)). Moreover, “[A] federal claimant's procedural

default precludes federal habeas review . . . only if the last state court rendering a judgment

in the case rests its judgment on the procedural default.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262

(1989). When a petitioner procedurally defaults his federal claims in state court pursuant to

an independent and adequate state rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless

the petitioner demonstrates cause for the default and actual prejudice from the alleged

violation of federal law, or that failing to review the claims “will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

The Arizona Court of Appeals, addressing the claim of a violation of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, found that Petitioner did not raise the issue at trial and that it

was therefore waived. (Exhibit L, p. 5.) This determination was founded on state law and

clearly constitutes a ground independent of any federal constitutional basis for Petitioner's

claim. See La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2001). The bar is adequate if it is

regularly followed and consistently applied. See Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1392

(9th Cir. 1996). An examination of Arizona decisions establishes that these requirements are

satisfied. See, e.g., State v. Gendron, 168 Ariz. 153, 154 (1991) ("Absent a finding of

fundamental error, failure to raise an issue at trial . . . waives the right to raise the issue on

appeal."); State v. Davis, 205 Ariz. 174, 179 (App. 2002) (same); State v. Williams, 209 Ariz.

228, 232-233 (App. 2004) (same). Petitioner has established neither cause for the failure to

raise this claim nor resulting prejudice. As such, it is procedurally defaulted and not subject

to habeas review. 

On the other hand, an examination of Petitioner's brief before the Arizona Court of

Appeals arguably establishes that a federal basis for his Miranda claim was adequately

raised. Petitioner cited federal authority in support of the standard of review, (Exhibit J, p.

19), cited the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, (id.), and

concluded his argument with citation to Miranda and subsequent United States Supreme

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 14 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

Court authority, (id., p. 22.). These references amount to more than "drive-by citation," see

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005), and are associated with argument

regarding the alleged involuntariness of the statements. In fact, in analyzing the admissibility

of Petitioner's statements, the State court also cited federal authority. (See Exhibit L, p. 6

(citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-312 (1991))). As such, this claim was

exhausted. 

5. Grounds V and VII are not exhausted.

In Ground V, Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have taken corrective action

because his counsel was ineffective. In Ground VII, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance

of trial and appellate counsel. The allegations related to ineffective assistance of trial counsel

are addressed in II.B.3, above, and are unexhausted. Ground V and the portion of Ground

VII addressing his appellate representation were not included in Petitioner's appeal of his

conviction or in his PCR petition. In the PCR petition, he did complain of his trial attorney's

alleged shortcomings, but did not allege or argue that the trial court was obligated to take

corrective action. (Exhibit Q, pp. 10.) He also did not claim that appellate counsel was

ineffective. The first time these claims were raised was in the Petitioner's appeal of the trial

court's denial of the PCR petition. (Exhibit JJ, p. 2.) To be properly exhausted, a claim must

be fairly presented in “each appropriate state court," so as to alert the state "to the federal

nature of the claim,” and to give it the “opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged

violations of the petitioner's federal rights. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135,

138 (9th Cir.1992). Ground V and Ground VII (as it relates to the performance of appellate

counsel) were not raised before the trial court and therefore do not satisfy this requirement.

C. Petitioner's unexhausted claims are procedurally defaulted.

If a claim has not been fairly presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may

determine whether state remedies remain available. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-

270 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). When determining whether state remedies remain

available, the court looks to the time of filing of the federal habeas petition. Engle, 456 U.S.

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 15 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

at 125 n. 28. If, at the time the habeas petition is filed, there are no state remedies available

to a petitioner who has failed to fairly present a claim in a procedurally appropriate manner

to the state’s highest court, the petitioner has technically exhausted the claim by procedural

default. Harmon, 959 F.2d at 1460-61. A procedurally defaulted claim is barred from

federal review absent a showing of legitimate cause for the default and actual prejudice

attributable to it, or a demonstration that failure to consider the claim will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S.

333, 338-339 (1992). “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the default and “prejudice” is actual

harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119,

1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To show cause, a petitioner must ordinarily demonstrate that “some

factor external to the defense” impeded efforts to raise the claim in state court. Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is only

available “where the petitioner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing

of factual innocence.” Coley v. Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)). 

Grounds I, II, V, VI, VII, and portions of Grounds III and IV, have not been

exhausted. As Respondents assert, any attempt by Petitioner to now present these

unexhausted claims in state court would be futile. Pursuant to Rule 32.2, ARIZ.R.CRIM.P.,

a petitioner may not be granted state court relief on any claim which could have been raised

in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief. Only if a claim falls within certain

exceptions (outlined in sub-sections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can

justify why the claim was omitted from a prior petition will the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2

be avoided. Here, Petitioner presents no argument addressing the applicability of any

exception provided in Rule 32 and does not attempt to justify his failure to raise (or raise as

a federal issue) any of his unexhausted claims. As such, these claims are procedurally

defaulted.

Thus, in order to obtain federal habeas review of his procedurally defaulted claims,

Petitioner must demonstrate cause for the default and prejudice resulting therefrom.

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 16 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

Petitioner did not reply to the Answer and has made no arguments to establish cause and

prejudice in relation to the defaulted claims. Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine requires that

he first raise such claims in the state court before he can rely on them as a basis as cause for

default. Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988). An examination of the State

court record discloses no such basis. Therefore, review of these claims is unavailable.

D. Merits

As discussed above, Petitioner arguably exhausted the due process and Miranda

claims that can be divined from Grounds III and IV. The merits of that claim can therefore

be addressed. Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision

can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority,

or (2) if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts "materially

indistinguishable" from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result.

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state

court decision is contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision

of a state court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092,

1101 (9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a new set

of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails to extend a

clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002).

Although Petitioner argued in his brief submitted to the Arizona Court of Appeals that

his statements Officer Norman were involuntarily made, the Court did not address the

substance of the claim, but determined only that, "if the court did err in admitting the

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 17 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

statements, the error was harmless." (Exhibit L, p. 6.) Because the Court of Appeals did not

evaluate this claim under a voluntariness standard, the last reasoned decision on the claim

is that of the trial court. 

During Petitioner's trial, the court held a hearing to determine whether Petitioner's

statements to Officer Norman were voluntarily made. (Exhibit PP, p. 91.) Officer Norman

was called to testify and explained that just two days prior the hearing, on May 23, 2000, he

and his partner had placed Petitioner under arrest for trespassing. (Id., pp. 97-99.) Petitioner

was placed in the officer's patrol car and he was read his Miranda warnings. (Id., 98-99.)

Officer Norman denied asking Petitioner any questions about the facts of this case, for which

he was then currently on trial. (Id., p. 99.) Nevertheless, he recalled that Petitioner "made

reference to [Officer Norman] being very upset with him the night of that arrest." (Id., p.

100.) Officer Norman stated that he replied, "Yes, I was pretty upset. It was a pretty intense

ordeal." (Id.) Petitioner explained that he had been scared, and Officer Norman told him he

was "one hell of a driver." (Id.) Petitioner told the officer that he used to race off-road.

Petitioner also asked Officer Norman why he had been so upset in light of the fact that he

caught-up and arrested him. Officer Norman told Petitioner that he had run into a barbedwire fence when he was chasing him, and Petitioner admitted that he, too, had run into the

fence. (Id.) Officer Norman also told the court that during this exchange, Petitioner

appeared coherent, was not threatened or coerced, and never asked for an attorney. (Id., pp.

100-101.) 

After Officer Norman was excused, Petitioner's counsel argued to the court that the

statements Petitioner had made were involuntary and inadmissible. Although he did not

dispute that Miranda warnings had been provided, counsel argued that Officer Norman

should also have advised Petitioner of his rights in relation to the first arrest. Without that

warning, Petitioner's counsel asserted, the officer's statements to Petitioner were likely to

elicit incriminating responses. (Id., pp. 106-107.) In response, the State argued that

Petitioner's statements were purely voluntary and were not initiated or elicited by Officer

Norman. (Id., p. 112.) 

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 18 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

Considering the testimony and the arguments of counsel, the trial court concluded that

Petitioner's "statement to Officer Norman was made voluntarily, and that it was made in full

compliance with Miranda." (Id.) The court then concluded:

Miranda is a generalized warning of a right to remain silent, and

to consult with an attorney if the individual would like to. It is

not based on a particular set of facts or circumstance, and in the

absence of anything further, the Court will rule that the

statement is admissible during the State's case-in-chief.

(Id., p. 113.)

This analysis involved neither an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding. First, to the extent that Petitioner now claims he said nothing

to Officer Norman on the night of his second arrest, the trial court was clearly reasonable in

determining otherwise. Officer Norman testified about events that had occurred only two

days before the hearing and was quite specific about the particulars of the second arrest. His

recollection of the exchange between he and Petitioner was also specific and credible. In

sum, there is nothing in the record before the trial court that would suggest the court's finding

was anything but reasonable.

Second, Petitioner has offered no authority, and the Court had been unable to locate

any, that would suggest that Officer Norman, at the time of the second arrest, was required

to provide Petitioner a separate Miranda warning in relation to the first arrest. All that is

required is that the accused affirmatively waive the Miranda rights before custodial

interrogation by law enforcement officers. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 474-75 (1966). A

waiver need not be express so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that the

waiver was knowing and voluntary. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)

("The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and

voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case.”). The trial court determined

that Petitioner initiated the conversation with Officer Norman. Given this reasonable

determination, the court's determination of admissibility was not contrary to clearly

established federal authority. See United States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1313 (9th

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 19 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

Cir.1995) (implying waiver where a defendant did not invoke his rights, then initiated a

conversation, and later did invoke his rights). Accordingly, the Court recommends that the

District Court find that the trial court's conclusion was not a decision that was “contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” as is required

for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

III. RECOMMENDATION

For all of the above reasons, THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE RECOMMENDS that

the District Court, after its independent review, DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Petitioner's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed October 4, 2004 (Doc. # 1)

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 04-2075-PHXSMM. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 21st day of July, 2006.

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 20 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

Case 2:04-cv-02075-SMM Document 14 Filed 08/29/06 Page 21 of 21