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Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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1 

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 16a0096p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

LYDIA DONATI, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, GENERAL RETIREMENT 

PLAN, RETIREMENT COMMITTEE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 15-1600 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. 

No. 2:13-cv-14496—Robert H. Cleland, District Judge. 

Argued: January 27, 2016 

Decided and Filed: March 1, 2016*

 Before: BOGGS, GIBBONS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Sarah S. Prescott, DEBORAH GORDON LAW, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for 

Appellant. Eugene Scalia, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sarah S. Prescott, DEBORAH GORDON LAW, Bloomfield Hills, 

Michigan, for Appellant. Eugene Scalia, Jason C. Schwartz, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, 

LLP, Washington, D.C., Julia Turner Baumhart, KIENBAUM OPPERWALL HARDY & 

PELTON, P.L.C., Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellee. 

 *

This decision was originally issued as an “unpublished decision” filed on March 1, 2016. The court has 

now designated the opinion as one recommended for full-text publication. 

>

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No. 15-1600 Donati v. Ford Motor Co. Page 2 

_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

BOGGS, Circuit Judge. When Ford offered to cash out Lydia Donati’s retirement 

benefits for a lump sum, she accepted the opportunity. A few months later, Ford told Donati that 

it had miscalculated the size of her lump sum. Donati died shortly thereafter, and her daughter 

sued the Retirement Committee on behalf of her estate for the money Ford originally promised. 

The district court granted the Committee judgment on all claims and, for the reasons discussed 

below, we affirm. 

I 

 Lydia Donati and her husband worked for Ford Motor Company and participated in 

Ford’s General Retirement Plan. After the couple divorced, a Michigan court ordered Donati’s 

ex-husband to redirect a portion of his retirement benefits to her. This was a Qualified Domestic 

Relations Order (QDRO), as defined by 26 U.S.C. § 414. Donati received those benefits along 

with her own benefits in the form of a single monthly payment of $1,184.91 from the General 

Retirement Plan. 

 In 2012, Ford offered retirees an opportunity to cash out their retirement benefits for a 

single lump-sum payment. This allowed Ford to reduce its financial volatility and administrative 

costs, while giving retirees flexibility in managing their retirement funds. In November, Ford 

sent Donati a letter stating that if she chose to cash out her retirement benefits, her lump-sum 

payment would be $230,361.49. 

 After reading the letter, Donati decided to cash out her benefits. In January 2013, Ford 

sent Donati a letter acknowledging her selection of the cash-out option. In February and March, 

Ford sent her additional letters stating that her last monthly payment would arrive in April and 

that her lump-sum payment would arrive the following month. 

 When April arrived, Ford told Donati that her lump sum had been improperly calculated. 

Ford claimed that, under the terms of the General Retirement Plan, Donati was entitled to cash 

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No. 15-1600 Donati v. Ford Motor Co. Page 3 

out her own retirement benefits, but not those derived from her ex-husband’s benefits. In its 

prior calculation, Ford had mistakenly used both income streams. According to Ford, the correct 

lump sum for Donati, based on her retirement benefits alone, was $38,840.34. 

Less than a month after Ford informed Donati of this mistake, Donati died of cancer. 

Ford revised the General Retirement Plan in August to include an express provision authorizing 

people similarly situated to Donati to cash out benefits derived from an ex-spouse under a 

QDRO. But because Donati passed away in April, her rights were governed by an earlier version 

of the Plan, dated March 2013. 

Donati’s daughter filed a benefits claim with the Retirement Committee for $230,361.49, 

the amount Ford promised Donati. The Committee denied her claim, so she sued the Committee 

on behalf of her mother’s estate, asserting wrongful denial of benefits, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), 

breach of fiduciary duty, id. § 1132(a)(3), and equitable estoppel, Bloemker v. Laborers’ Local 

265 Pension Fund, 605 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2010). The district court granted the Committee’s 

motions for judgment on the pleadings on the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim and summary 

judgment on the claims for wrongful denial of benefits and equitable estoppel. Donati’s daughter 

appealed and we now review those orders of the district court de novo. See JPMorgan Chase 

Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007); Trs. of Mich. Laborers’ Health Care 

Fund v. Gibbons, 209 F.3d 587, 590 (6th Cir. 2000). 

II 

Wrongful Denial of Benefits. On the wrongful-denial-of-benefits claim, the Committee is 

entitled to summary judgment if its decision is unambiguously required by the Plan. If the Plan 

is ambiguous, we ask whether the Committee’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, because 

the Plan gives the Committee discretion to interpret its terms. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 

v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Arbitrary-and-capricious review is “extremely deferential” 

and the “least demanding form of judicial review.” McClain v. Eaton Corp. Disability Plan, 

740 F.3d 1059, 1064 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1107 

(7th Cir. 1998)). The Committee’s decision must be upheld if it results from a deliberate 

principled reasoning process and is supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1065. 

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 The parties agree that the following provision in Appendix L, Section 1, of the General 

Retirement Plan governs the calculation of Donati’s lump-sum payout: 

1. A lump sum retirement benefit . . . shall be an amount equal to the Actuarial 

Equivalent lump sum value of the remaining monthly benefits payable, 

including the following, if applicable: 

(i) Life Income Benefit; 

(ii) Supplemental Allowance and/or Temporary Benefit; 

(iii) survivor’s benefit; 

(iv) Special Age 65 Benefit; or 

(v) cancellation of survivorship coverage upon death of spouse. 

 Plaintiff’s first argument is that Donati’s income from her ex-husband was part of her 

“Life Income Benefit.” The Plan defines Life Income Benefit as “the portion of the retirement 

benefits provided in Article VI and in Article VII that continues to be payable, subject to the 

provisions of the Plan, to a Retired Member during the Member’s lifetime.” This definition is at 

odds with Plaintiff’s position in two ways. 

 First, the payments that Donati received from her ex-husband were not provided by 

Articles VI or VII. Rather, they were provided by Article XII, Section 6, which makes benefits 

earned by a Ford employee, but assigned to an ex-spouse through a QDRO, payable to the exspouse (known as the alternate payee). Given that the benefits from Donati’s ex-husband were 

provided by Article XII, rather than Articles VI or VII, they could not have been a part of her 

Life Income Benefit. 

 Second, a retiree’s Life Income Benefit only includes “retirement benefits . . . payable . . . 

to a Retired Member during the Member’s lifetime.” Under Plaintiff’s reading of this provision, 

Donati was the “Retired Member,” and her Life Income Benefit included any benefits payable to 

her during her lifetime. But according to the Plan, the benefits from Donati’s ex-husband’s 

account, including those paid out to Donati, were payable during his lifetime. Therefore, those 

payments were not a part of Donati’s Life Income Benefit. 

 Plaintiff responds by arguing that the definition of Life Income Benefit is made “subject 

to the provisions of the Plan,” which opens the door to additional sources of income, such as 

Article XII income from Donati’s ex-husband. However, the words “subject to” only modify the 

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word “payable” in the definition of Life Income Benefit. They do not contradict the 

unambiguous definition of Life Income Benefit as including only benefits provided by Articles 

VI and VII that are “payable . . . to a Retired Member during the Member’s lifetime.”

 Plaintiff’s next argument is that the phrase “monthly benefits payable” covers the benefits 

from Donati’s ex-husband because those benefits were “payable.” But that argument begs the 

question. This case turns on whether “monthly benefits” is broad enough to cover the payments 

Donati was receiving from her ex-husband. Plaintiff assumes that these payments were among 

the “monthly benefits” that could be cashed out, but that is the very point she seeks to prove. 

 The same problem occurs with Plaintiff’s argument that the phrase “monthly benefits 

payable” “includ[es]” the retiree’s Life Income Benefit, leaving open the possibility that 

unenumerated benefits—such as payments from Donati’s ex-husband—are included. Even if we 

read the word “including” as illustrative, rather than restrictive, that argument does not touch on 

the question of whether “monthly benefits” refers to benefits earned by Donati only, or whether 

it also includes the benefits she received from her ex-husband as an alternate payee. 

 At best, Plaintiff has established that the words “monthly benefits payable” do not 

explicitly foreclose her interpretation. But that does not make Plaintiff’s interpretation 

reasonable or permissible. “[T]he fact that the parties offer competing interpretations does not 

dictate a finding that the provision is ambiguous.” Shelby Cty. Health Care Corp. v. Majestic 

Star Casino, 581 F.3d 355, 370 (6th Cir. 2009). The competing interpretation “must be a 

plausible one.” Zirnhelt v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 526 F.3d 282, 287 (6th Cir. 2008). 

 Plaintiff’s interpretation is not plausible because it potentially subjects the pension plan to 

double liability. Although we do not have the specific terms of the QDRO in the record, a 

hypothetical example illustrates this point.1 Assume that, under the terms of the order, the 

monthly benefits that Donati was receiving from her ex-husband reverted to him upon her death. 

In that case, Plaintiff’s interpretation would require Ford to pay Donati’s estate a lump sum and

 1

Because the QDRO is not in the record, we cannot determine the wording or intent of the Michigan court 

order. If the Michigan court intended for Donati to get her ex-husband’s benefits in perpetuity (that is, even if she 

died, or some other contingency occurred), her estate’s remedy would be in Michigan state court, to the extent that 

Mr. Donati, in effect, got a windfall by retrieving his benefits by the terms of the Plan. 

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pay Donati’s ex-husband the monthly benefits that reverted to him. Even though Donati cashed 

out, Ford’s liability to Donati’s ex-husband would remain unchanged. Rather than “cashing out” 

Donati’s benefits, which implies the substitution of a lump sum for future payments, Ford would 

simply be paying out an extra lump sum to Donati’s estate. In other words, Ford would be 

subject to double liability. Such an unreasonable outcome cannot be the result of a plausible 

interpretation of the Plan. 

 Plaintiff notes that the Plan drafters knew how to use language expressly excluding 

parties to a QDRO because they included such a provision in Appendix L, Section 2, which deals 

with surviving beneficiaries. Plaintiff argues that the lack of such a provision in Section 1 

proves that her interpretation is correct. But the absence of express language negating Plaintiff’s 

position does not make it plausible. Indeed, the absence of such language is entirely consistent 

with the Committee’s interpretation. It suggests that such language was unnecessary because the 

Plan already clearly excluded retirees in Donati’s situation from cashing out alternate-payee 

benefits. 

 Notwithstanding Ford’s unfortunate mistake in promising Donati $230,361.49 as a full 

settlement of her rights under the General Retirement Plan, the terms of the Plan unambiguously 

precluded Donati from cashing out the benefits she was deriving from her ex-husband’s account 

under the QDRO. Because the Plan is unambiguous, we need not reach the question of whether 

the Committee’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. We affirm the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to the Committee on Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful denial of benefits. 

Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in granting the 

Committee judgment on the pleadings on her breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim under 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(a)(3). In reviewing the district court’s decision, we assume all facts in the plaintiff’s 

pleadings to be true, and affirm the district court only if the Committee is clearly entitled to 

judgment on the pleadings. See Winget, 510 F.3d at 581. 

The breach-of-fiduciary-duty provision in ERISA is intended to serve “as a safety net” by 

providing equitable relief for violations that the statute “does not elsewhere adequately remedy.” 

Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996). In Varity, the Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs 

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to bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(3) because they were misled into 

withdrawing from the plan. Id. at 515. The plaintiffs could not sue for wrongful denial of 

benefits because “they were no longer members of the . . . plan.” Ibid. The Court therefore 

allowed them to sue under § 1132(a)(3). Unlike the plaintiffs in Varity, the plaintiff in this case 

can, and has, brought a claim for wrongful denial of benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(b). 

 Since Varity, this court has repeatedly held that beneficiaries can bring a claim under 

§ 1132(a)(3) only if they “may not avail themselves of § 1132’s other remedies.” Wilkins v. 

Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Marks v. Newcourt 

Credit Grp., Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 454 (6th Cir. 2003). In deciding whether a plaintiff may bring a 

claim under § 1132(a)(3), it is essential to look at the “adequacy of relief to redress the 

claimant’s injury, not the nature of the defendant’s wrongdoing.” Rochow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. 

Am., 780 F.3d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc); see also Moss v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 495 F. 

App’x 583, 589–90 (6th Cir. 2012). 

 Here, Plaintiff seeks the exact same relief in both of her claims: the $230,361.49 that 

Ford originally promised Donati. She does not seek any equitable relief in addition to the money 

Ford promised. The only difference between her two claims is the nature of the alleged 

wrongdoing—misrepresenting the cash-out value of her benefits, as opposed to wrongfully 

denying her benefits. Under Rochow, this distinction alone is insufficient to allow a breach-offiduciary-duty claim. 

 Plaintiff argues that she pleaded her breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim as an alternative to 

her wrongful-denial-of-benefits claim, but that fact makes no difference. “The deciding factor” 

in determining whether a plaintiff can state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under 

§ 1132(a)(3) “is not whether a plaintiff has recovered under § 1132(a)(1)(B)” successfully, “but 

rather, whether a plaintiff may recover.” Moss, 495 F. App’x at 589 (emphasis added). Because 

Plaintiff’s two claims are for the same relief, her breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim is barred by our 

precedents in Wilkins, Marks, and Rochow. 

 Plaintiff cites Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 409 F.3d 710, 718 (6th Cir. 

2005), in which the plaintiffs were allowed to bring claims under both § 1132(a)(1)(b) and 

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§ 1132(a)(3). But in Hill, the claim under § 1132(a)(1)(b) was for the recovery of benefits 

allegedly owed to the plaintiffs, while the claim under § 1132(a)(3) was for an injunction 

mandating the correction of systemic, plan-wide problems. Ibid. The two claims sought 

different forms of relief. Here, Plaintiff does not seek a plan-wide injunction. Both of her claims 

involve her individual claim for benefits. Hill is therefore inapplicable. 

 Plaintiff also cites Gore v. El Paso Energy Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 477 F.3d 

833, 842 (6th Cir. 2007), in which a plaintiff was allowed to sue his plan administrator (Liberty) 

under § 1132(a)(1)(b), and his employer (El Paso) under § 1132(a)(3). While there are 

similarities between this case and Gore, there are also important differences. Gore was allowed 

to sue El Paso for breach of fiduciary duty because: 

El Paso cannot be sued under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) because Liberty was 

solely responsible for the denial of benefits. Moreover, the policy clearly states 

that Liberty is the proper party in a denial of benefits case. The question would 

be different had Gore brought his misrepresentation claim under 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(a)(3) for breach of fiduciary duty based on a misrepresentation by Liberty, 

the fiduciary who controlled the claims. However, in this case the § 1132(a)(3) 

action based on misrepresentation was brought against a fiduciary, El Paso, who 

did not control the claims. Thus, Gore properly brought his claim of 

misrepresentation [against El Paso] under § 1132(a)(3) . . . . 

477 F.3d at 842. Key to the panel’s decision was the fact that the plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciaryduty claim was against a defendant whom the plaintiff could not sue for wrongful denial of 

benefits. If a plaintiff tried to bring a wrongful-denial-of-benefits claim and a breach-offiduciary-duty claim against the same defendant, the outcome “would be different.” Ibid. The 

district court correctly held that Gore does not apply because Plaintiff’s claims are against the 

same defendant for the same relief. Plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim impermissibly 

repackages her wrongful-denial-of-benefits claim, and for that reason, we affirm the district 

court’s grant of judgment to the Committee on Plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. 

Equitable Estoppel. Plaintiff’s estoppel claim runs into difficulty because her claim for 

$230,361.49 is foreclosed by the unambiguous language of the Plan. Principles of estoppel 

“cannot be applied to vary the terms of unambiguous plan documents; estoppel can only be 

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invoked in the context of ambiguous plan provisions.” Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 

388, 404 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

 This court has carved out a narrow exception to the Sprague rule in cases where the 

plaintiff can show “(1) a written representation; (2) plan provisions which, although 

unambiguous, did not allow for individual calculation of benefits; and (3) extraordinary 

circumstances in which the balance of equities strongly favors the application of estoppel,” in 

addition to “the traditional elements of estoppel, including that the defendant engaged in 

intended deception or such gross negligence as to amount to constructive fraud.” Bloemker, 605 

F.3d at 444. 

 The exception established in Bloemker does not apply here because the circumstances are 

not extraordinary. In that case, Bloemker was told that he would get $2,339.47 per month for the 

rest of his life if he retired early. Id. at 439. Bloemker retired early based on this information, 

only to receive a letter stating that his benefits were miscalculated and that he was entitled to 

only $1,829.71 per month. Ibid. Bloemker relied on the larger figure in deciding to retire early, 

and was faced with a very significant decrease in his pension income, as well as a demand for 

repayment of $11,215.16. Ibid. Here, the Committee’s miscalculation of benefits did not 

detrimentally induce Donati to make a decision that she would not have otherwise made. Donati 

was, tragically, dying of cancer, and she probably elected to cash out her benefits because it was 

financially advantageous to do so. That option would have been attractive regardless of whether 

the correct sum was $38,840.34 or $230,361.49. Bloemker is therefore inapplicable. 

 Plaintiff argues that Donati “expended considerable energy evaluating her situation, 

discussing with Ford representatives what her options were, and ensuring that paperwork would 

be completed accurately to ensure her pension would be paid out properly.” However, in 

Haviland v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., this court held that the circumstances were not 

extraordinary when “MetLife falsely promised that [the plaintiffs’] continuing life insurance 

benefits would not be reduced for the rest of their lives, when in fact their benefits were reduced 

to $10,000,” and “these false promises affected the plaintiffs’ retirement and estate planning 

decisions.” 730 F.3d 563, 567, 569 (6th Cir. 2013). Haviland established that mere reliance on 

misinformation in estate planning does not rise to the level of the extraordinary circumstances 

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contemplated by Bloemker. Because the circumstances in this case are not extraordinary, we 

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Committee. 

III 

 We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of judgment to the Committee on all three claims. 

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