Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01630/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01630-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-1630

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Joseph Rosenberg,

Appellant,

v.

Missouri Department of

Corrections,

Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

[UNPUBLISHED]

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Submitted: January 18, 2008

Filed: January 25, 2008

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, HANSEN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Joseph Rosenberg, employed by the Missouri Department of Corrections (the

Department) in a supervisory position as a Correctional Officer III, appeals the district

court's1

 grant of summary judgment to the Department in this Title VII retaliation

action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Rosenberg claimed that the Department

Appellate Case: 07-1630 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/25/2008 Entry ID: 3395194
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suspended and transferred him to another facility in retaliation for opposing

discriminatory practices. The undisputed facts indicate that Rosenberg escorted two

female coworkers to Superintendent Don Roper's office so that they could report their

claims of sexual harassment by a male supervisor and that he sat silently through the

meeting. He had no other involvement in the claims. 

Having conducted a de novo review of the record, see Hughes v. Stottlemyre,

506 F.3d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review), we agree with the district

court's conclusion that Rosenberg failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation

under the opposition clause of § 2000e-3(a), see Brower v. Runyon, 178 F.3d 1002,

1005 n.3 (8th Cir. 1999) (indicating that the opposition clause of § 2000e-3(a) would

require a good faith belief by the plaintiff that the employer had actually engaged in

a discriminatory practice); Evans v. Kansas City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 98, 100 (8th

Cir. 1995) ("[P]rotected opposition [requires] a plaintiff [to] show a good faith

reasonable belief that his employer engaged in a discriminatory employment

practice."), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1104 (1996). The record includes no indication that

Rosenberg believed the substance of the complaints and discloses that his only

involvement was to escort the women to the office and to sit quietly during the

meeting. We decline to address arguments Rosenberg raises for the first time on

appeal regarding the participation clause. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th

Cir. 2004); Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1145 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 872 (1999).

Because an extended opinion would have no precedential value and no error of

law appears, we affirm the well-reasoned judgment of the district court. See 8th Cir.

R. 47B. 

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Appellate Case: 07-1630 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/25/2008 Entry ID: 3395194