Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01327/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ISAIAH ISAAC WOOTEN, 

Petitioner,

v. 

STU SHERMAN, Warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 16-cv-1327-JAH-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE RE: MOTION TO 

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[ECF No. 14] 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge John A. Houston pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS

Respondent’s motion to dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus be GRANTED. 

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

1. Federal Proceedings 

Petitioner Isaiah Isaac Wooten (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 11). On March 1, 

2016, Petitioner filed his operative federal habeas Petition raising three 

claims: (1) Petitioner’s abstract of judgment should be amended to remove the 

“25-years to life” sentence, (2) the Court should order an immediate parole 

hearing, and (3) the Court should grant 1465 days of credits towards 

Petitioner’s sentence. (ECF No. 1). 

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that this Petition should 

be dismissed because (1) Petitioner’s first claim is untimely and moot, and (2) 

Petitioner failed to exhaust his second and third claims through state court 

remedies. (ECF No. 14). 

2. State Proceedings 

On January 20, 2006, Petitioner was found guilty of attempted murder 

(Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)) (count one) and the discharge of a firearm from a 

motor vehicle at a person (Cal. Penal Code § 12034(c)) (count two). (ECF No. 

1 at 29). 1 As to both counts, the jury found that Petitioner had intentionally 

discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 

12022.53(d)). (Id.). 

On May 17, 2006, the Riverside County Superior Court sentenced 

Petitioner to a “life term” for attempted murder, an enhancement of “25 to 

life” for the discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury, and five years 

for the discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle. (ECF No. 15 at 22). 

                                                                

1 Pincites refer to the automatically-generated CM/ECF pagination, not the 

pagination in the native document.

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Further, an additional 25 to life enhancement for the discharge of a firearm 

was added to the sentence on count two, to be permanently stayed upon 

successful completion of the term in count one. (Id.). 

On May 24, 2006, Petitioner received an abstract of judgment that 

reflected a sentence of: (1) life with the possibility of parole on count one, (2) a 

25-year enhancement on count one, (3) a 5-year determinate term on count 

two, and (4) a stayed enhancement on count two. (ECF No. 1 at 18). 

Additionally, the box for Cal. Penal Code § 667.61 (habitual sex offender) was 

checked. (Id. at 29). Petitioner was not convicted of being a habitual sex 

offender. (Id.). 

On December 7, 2006, Petitioner received a second abstract of judgment 

that reflected a sentence of: (1) life with the possibility of parole on count one, 

(2) 25-years to life on count one, (3) a 5-year determinate term on count two, 

and (4) a stayed enhancement on count two. (ECF No. 1 at 23-25). The box 

for Cal. Penal Code § 667.61 (habitual sex offender) remained checked. (Id.). 

On April 10, 2008, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California 

Court of Appeals and the court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction in full. 

(Appellate Courts Case Information (Oct. 28, 2016, 02:32 PM), 

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/trialCourt.cfm?dist=0&doc_i

d=1895324&doc_no=S163646). 

On July 9, 2008, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California 

Supreme Court, and the court denied direct review of Petitioner’s conviction. 

(Appellate Courts Case Information (Oct. 28, 2016, 02:32 PM), 

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist=0

&doc_id=1895324&doc_no=S163646). 

From September 23, 2014 to November 19, 2015, Petitioner filed 

grievances to Calipatria State Prison three times, contending that the Board 

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of Prison Terms should have conducted a parole hearing, and failed to do so 

because of an invalid sentence imposed by the sentencing court. (ECF No. 1 

at 36). The prison directed Petitioner to address the issue with the Riverside 

County Superior Court in order to correct the alleged error. (Id. at 42). 

On April 3, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion to correct an unauthorized 

sentence with the Riverside County Superior Court. (Id. at 46). Petitioner 

argued that the incorrect habitual sex offender charge caused an additional 

25-years to life enhancement to be added to his sentence. (Id.). The court 

found a “typographical error in the abstract” which incorrectly stated that 

Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 667.61 (habitual sex 

offender). (Id. at 50-51). However, the court found there was no 

“unauthorized sentence.” (Id. at 51). 

On April 14, 2015, Petitioner received a third abstract of judgment, 

which reflected that he was sentenced to: (1) life with the possibility of parole 

on count one, (2) a 25-year enhancement on count one, (3) a 5-year 

determinate term on count two, and (4) a stayed enhancement on count two. 

(ECF No 1. at 52). The box for Cal. Penal Code § 667.61 (habitual sex 

offender) was not checked. (Id.). 

On June 11, 2015, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition to the 

California Supreme Court alleging that the sentence remained incorrect and 

the “25-year enhancement” should be removed. (ECF No. 15-1 at 9). On 

September 16, 2015, the California Supreme Court denied the petition 

without analysis or citation to legal authority. (ECF No. 17-6). 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides the scope of review for federal 

habeas corpus claims: 

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The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the grounds that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 

As amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

provides: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 

As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”) of 1996, title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides a one-year limitations 

period for a state prisoner to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

pursuant to the judgment of the State court. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) states 

that the limitation period runs from the latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented 

from filing by such State action; 

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has 

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006). 

IV. DISCUSSION

1. Claim One Is Untimely and Not Cognizable 

a. Timeliness 

AEDPA applies to all § 2254 habeas corpus petitions filed after April 25, 

1996. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 268 (2000). Because Petitioner filed 

his federal Petition on March 1, 2016, his Petition is governed by AEDPA. In 

deciding whether the Petition is untimely, the first issue for this Court is to 

determine when AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations began to run. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Where a state prisoner has sought direct review of a conviction in the 

state’s highest court but does not file a petition for certiorari with the United 

States Supreme Court, the one-year limitations period for seeking federal 

habeas review begins to run 90 days after the state court entered judgment. 

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999); see U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a), the statute of limitations 

under § 2254 ordinarily begins to run on the date subsequent to the date the 

judgment became final, unless an exception applies. Patterson v. Stewart, 

251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244 delineates only three possible exceptions to the 

general rule regarding when the statute of limitations begins to run in a case: 

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(1) petitioner was impeded by the state from seeking further relief; 

(2) petitioner’s claims rely on a newly recognized constitutional right; and (3) 

the factual predicate for petitioner’s current claim(s) was not known, or could 

not have been known, by the time his conviction became final. 

Respondents argue that Petitioner “knew or should have known of the 

challenged amendments to his abstract of judgment by at least 2007.” (ECF 

No. 14 at 2). Therefore, Respondents argue, Petitioner should have known 

the factual predicate for claim one since 2007, and hence the statute of 

limitations on this claim expired, at the latest, in 2008. (Id. at 3). 

Petitioner argues that he only knew about the significance of the 

alleged sentencing error when he unsuccessfully requested a parole 

suitability hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 12). The Ninth Circuit has held that the 

statute of limitations “begins when the prisoner knows the important facts, 

not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 

254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001). By Petitioner’s own admission, he 

received his first abstract of judgment on May 24, 2006, and Petitioner had 

the opportunity to discover the relevant facts since 2006. (ECF No. 1 at 12). 

The triggering of AEDPA’s statute of limitations may be delayed if a 

new judgment was later created. Ferreira v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 494 F.3d 

1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2007) (“AEDPA’s statute of limitations runs from the 

date the judgment . . . becomes final, which is the date both the conviction 

and the sentence the petitioner is serving become final.”). However, a 

correction of clerical error does not create a new judgment when the 

underlying sentence has not changed. See In re Stansell, 828 F.3d 412, 420 

(6th Cir. 2016). 

Petitioner’s third amended abstract of judgment, received on April 14, 

2015, is not a new judgment because the amendment was purely clerical. 

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(ECF No. 1 at 50). The Riverside County Superior Court indicated that the 

correction of error (unchecking the box for Cal. Penal Code § 667.61) was 

“typographical” in nature, and that Petitioner’s sentence has not changed. 

(Id.). Therefore, the state court merely made a clerical amendment in 

Petitioner’s abstract of judgment and the triggering of AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations was not delayed by the typographical correction. 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on October 7, 2008, 90 days after 

the California Supreme Court denied direct review. Because there is nothing 

to suggest that the other two exceptions apply, Petitioner’s one-year statute 

of limitations began to run on October 8, 2008, and lapsed on October 7, 2009. 

Petitioner filed his federal Petition on March 1, 2016. Absent statutory or 

equitable tolling, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations lapsed in 

Petitioner’s case. 

AEDPA’s limitations period is subject to statutory tolling for periods of 

time during which there is a properly filed application for post-conviction 

relief pending in the state court. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 221-223; see

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The Supreme Court has held that in the absence of a 

clear indication that a petition was untimely, “the federal court must itself 

examine the delay in each case and determine what the state courts would 

have held in respect to timeliness.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 

(2006). The Evans Court gave some guidance in making that determination: 

(1) the phrase “on the merits” in the state order does not indicate by itself a 

timely filing; (2) absence of those words makes it less likely the petition was 

timely filed; (3) federal courts must assume that California law regarding 

timeliness does not differ significantly from other states which use 30 or 60 

day rules for untimeliness; (4) a 6-month unexplained delay is presumably 

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presumptively unreasonable; and (5) California’s capital case presumption of 

timeliness is not relevant to non-capital cases. See id. 

Here, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition raising this claim in the 

California Supreme Court, but the state court did not indicate if the petition 

was timely. (ECF No. 17-6). The habeas petition was filed on June 11, 2015, 

almost eight years after the conclusion of direct review. (Id.). It is unlikely 

that the California state court found the petition to be timely filed because 

Petitioner’s delay was far longer than the 30 or 60 day rules for untimeliness 

typical in other states. Statutory tolling requires the Petitioner to timely file 

his petition; as a result, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling because 

his petition was not timely filed. 

 Under certain circumstances, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations 

period may be equitably tolled. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court 

(“Beeler”), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds by 

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (“Kelly”), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 

1998)). A litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing 

two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstances beyond the prisoner’s control have made it 

impossible for him to file a timely petition. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408, 418 (2005). Here, Petitioner did not provide any arguments or evidence 

to satisfy the elements required for equitable tolling. Therefore, Petitioner is 

not entitled to equitable tolling. 

b. Cognizability 

Federal habeas review is limited to claims which allege a violation of 

the federal constitution, laws or treaties. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 

2006); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Habeas relief is not 

available for an alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law, 

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unless it involves “fundamental unfairness.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. Federal 

habeas review of a state court's finding is limited, at most, to determining 

whether the state court's finding was “so arbitrary or capricious” as to 

constitute an independent due process violation. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 

764, 780 (1990). 

Petitioner argues that the state court entered an incorrect sentence of 

25-years to life. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner’s first and second abstract of 

judgments incorrectly indicated that Petitioner was a habitual sex offender; 

as a result, Petitioner contends that this incorrect indication added 25-years 

to life to his sentence. (Id.). Petitioner argues that his right to due process 

was violated by the imposition of the sentence. (Id.). 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s first claim is moot because there is 

no controversy to adjudicate. (ECF No. 14 at 3); see Smith v. Univ. Of 

Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mootness is 

like standing, in that if it turns out that resolution of the issue presented 

cannot really affect the plaintiff’s rights, there is, generally speaking, no case 

or controversy for the courts to adjudicate; no real relief can be awarded.”). 

Respondents contend that, by Petitioner’s own admission, the trial court has 

corrected Petitioner’s abstract of judgment by unchecking the box that 

indicated Petitioner was a habitual sex offender. (ECF No. 14 at 3). 

Therefore, Respondents argue, there is no controversy here because relief has 

been granted. (Id.). Respondents failed to address the “25 years to life” 

sentence that Petitioner is challenging. (Id.). 

In the context of Petitioner’s sentencing transcript, it was clear that the 

trial court sentenced Petitioner to a “life term” for attempted murder, and an 

enhancement of “25 to life” for the discharge of a firearm causing great bodily 

injury. (ECF No. 15-1 at 22). Thus, Petitioner would have received the same 

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sentence regardless of the typographical error. The length of the sentence 

imposed by the state court is accurately reflected in Petitioner’s abstract of 

judgments. (ECF No. 1 at 18-26). It appears that Petitioner mistakenly 

believes that the incorrect “habitual sex offender” charge was the reason for 

the “25 years to life” sentence. The record shows otherwise. (ECF No. 15-1 at 

23). Petitioner is unable to show an error in the state court’s application of 

state law that involved “fundamental unfairness.” See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner has not raised an issue that is 

cognizable in federal proceedings. 

Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner’s claim one to be untimely and 

not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. 

2. Claims Two and Three are Unexhausted 

 AEDPA has two main purposes: (1) to "reduce delays in executing state 

and federal criminal sentences," and (2) to "streamline federal habeas 

proceedings by increasing a petitioner's incentive to exhaust all claims in 

state court." Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, 

prisoners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the 

length of their confinement in state prison must first exhaust their state 

judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 

133 (1987) (“[A]s a matter of [federal-state] comity, federal courts should not 

consider a claim in a habeas corpus petition until after the state courts have 

had an opportunity to act.”). 

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must “fairly present 

his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it . . . 

or . . . demonstrate that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v. 

Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 

270, 275 (1971) and Harmon v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir. 1992)). A 

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federal claim is fairly presented if the petitioner has stated the “operative 

facts and the federal legal theory upon which his claim is based so that the 

state courts have a ‘fair opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to 

the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.” Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). 

Here, Petitioner failed to present claims two and three to the California 

Supreme Court and allow the state court a fair opportunity to consider his 

claims. (See ECF No. 1 at 5-6). Petitioner also has not demonstrated that no 

further state remedies are available to him with respect to those claims. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner has not satisfied the exhaustion 

requirements for claims two and three. 

A federal district court has discretion to stay a mixed habeas petition 

containing exhausted and unexhausted claims to allow the petitioner to 

present his unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance, and 

then to return to federal court for review of his perfected petition. See Rhines 

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273 (2005). Here, it would be improper to stay the 

Petition and allow Petitioner the option of forgoing his unexhausted claims 

because Petitioner’s only exhausted claim is untimely and not cognizable. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Petitioner’s claim one 

untimely and not cognizable, and claims two and three to be unexhausted. 

The Court RECOMMENDS Respondent’s motion to dismiss Petitioner’s 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be GRANTED. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 

District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting this Report and 

Recommendation; (2) GRANTING Defendants’ motion to dismiss Petitioner’s 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report 

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

December 9, 2016. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report 

and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection shall be 

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than December 16, 

2016. The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 21, 2016 

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