Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_09-cv-01045/USCOURTS-almd-1_09-cv-01045-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 _____________________________

MALCOLM SANDERS, #251 043 *

Plaintiff, *

 v. * 1:09-CV-1045-MEF

 (WO)

LEARY, STAFF, et al., *

Defendant. *

 _____________________________

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff filed the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action with the court on November 12,

2009. He complains that he was subjected to discriminatory treatment and required to pay

for necessary hygiene items while incarcerated at the Houston County Jail in Dothan,

Alabama. Named as defendants are Sheriff AnyHughes, Commander Keith Reed, and Staff

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Leary, Moon, Trawick, and Champion. Plaintiff seeks an award of damages. 

Pursuant to the orders of this court, Defendants filed an answer, written report and

supporting evidentiary materials addressing the claims for relief raised in the complaint. In

this report, Defendants assert that Plaintifffailed to properlyexhaust administrative remedies

available to him while he was confined in the Houston County Jail. Based on the orders

entered in this case and governing case law, the court deems it appropriate to treat

When he filed the instant complaint Plaintiff was an inmate at the Houston County Jail. During the 1

pendency of his action he was transferred to the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections.

Case 1:09-cv-01045-MEF-WC Document 25 Filed 10/27/11 Page 1 of 14
Defendants’ report as a motion for summary judgment. Doc. No. 21; Bryant v. Rich, 530

F.3d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir. 2008) (Although an exhaustion defense “is not ordinarily the

proper subject for . . . summary judgment[,]” the defense is appropriate for summary

judgment when the evidence demonstrates administrative remedies “are absolutely time

barred or otherwise clearly infeasible.”). The court explained to Plaintiff the proper manner

in which to respond to a motion for summary judgment. This case is now pending before the

court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s opposition thereto. Doc.

Nos. 20, 23. Upon consideration of the motion, the evidentiary materials filed in support

thereof, and Plaintiff’s opposition, the court concludes that Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is due to be granted

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.

2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Fed. R.Civ.P.Rule 56(c) (Summaryjudgment “should

be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the 2

Effective December 1, 2007, “[t]he language of Rule 56 [was] amended . . . to make the rule[] more

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easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes . . . are

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initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying

those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discoverymaterials and affidavits], which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant maymeet this burden by presenting evidence

which would be admissible at trial indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by

showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element

of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24. 

Defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond

the pleadings, that a genuine issue material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc.,

929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)

(“When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party

may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must

. . . set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.”). A genuine issue of material fact

exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

To survive Defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff

stylistic only.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic

changes, itssubstance remainsthe same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior rule remain equally applicable to

the current rule.

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is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” establishing proper exhaustion of

administrative remedies. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “If the

evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly

probative, . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of

evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of

a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911

F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are

likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice

to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc.,

276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir.

1997) (plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions . . ., in the absence of [admissible] supporting

evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912,

916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces

nothing beyond “his own conclusory allegations”); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557

(11th Cir. 1984) (“mere verification of party’s own conclusory allegations is not sufficient

to oppose summary judgment”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts

supported byappropriate evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary

judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322

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(“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 814

F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (if on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents

insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of

summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. 

United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363

F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law

applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children

&Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only factual disputes that are material

under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary judgment.”). 

“The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that

factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City

of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate

a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court, which is admissible on

its face or which can be reduced to admissible form, indicates that there is no genuine issue

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of material fact and that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter

of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (summary judgment

appropriate where pleadings, evidentiarymaterials and affidavits before the court show there

is no genuine issue as to a requisite material fact); Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (to establish

a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a

reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a

pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

issue of material fact. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906

F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this

court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this

case, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine issue of material fact in order to

preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff complains that he was subjected to racial discrimination while incarcerated

at the Houston County Jail. Specifically, he alleges that a sprinkler head in his cell was 

intentionally broken, which caused some flooding in the cell as well as the release of

hazardous fumes. When jail personnel arrived at the scene, Plaintiffstates that staff removed

a white inmate from the cell but directed Plaintiff and another cellmate, who are both black,

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to remain therein because they believed the two inmates created the problem and deserved

to suffer. Doc. Nos. 1 & 23. Plaintiff further complains that jail officials charged him for

hygiene articles when he has a constitutional right to be provided with necessary hygiene

items during the entire time he is incarcerated at the facility. In response to the complaint,

Defendants maintain this case is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff failed to properly

exhaust the administrative remedy provided at the Houston County Jail prior to filing this

complaint as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act [“PLRA”] compels exhaustion of available

administrative remedies before a prisoner can seek relief in federal court on a § 1983

complaint. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) states that “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” “Congress has provided in § 1997(e)(a) that an

inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through

administrative avenues.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). “[T]he PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve

general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or

some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of all available

administrative remedies is a precondition to litigation and a federal court cannot waive the

exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325

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(11th Cir. 1998); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006). Moreover, “the PLRA exhaustion

requirement requires proper exhaustion.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93 (emphasis added). 

“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical

procedural rules [as a precondition to filing suit in federal court] because no adjudicative

system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the courts of its

proceedings. . . . Construing § 1997e(a) to require proper exhaustion . . . fits with the general

scheme of the PLRA, whereas [a contrary] interpretation [allowing an inmate to bring suit

in federal court once administrative remedies are no longer available] would turn that

provision into a largely useless appendage.” Id. at 90-91, 93. The Court reasoned that

because proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary, an inmate cannot “satisfy

the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement . . . by filing an untimely or

otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal[,]” or by effectively

bypassing the administrative process simply by waiting until the grievance procedure is no

longer available to him. Id. at 83-84; Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir.

2005) (inmate who files an untimely grievance, or simply spurns the administrative process

until it is no longer available, fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA). 

The record in this case establishes that the Houston County Jail provides a grievance

procedure for inmate complaints. Doc. No. 20, Exs. A-K. This administrative remedy is

available to all Houston County Jail inmates, including Plaintiff at the time of his

incarceration there. Id. Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

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remedies with respect to the claims he presents against them in this action. Id. The

declarations and evidentiary material offered by Defendants in support of their exhaustion

defense show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the claims he presents in the instant complaint

in accordance with the Houston County Jail’s administrative remedy procedures. Id. at Reed

Aff. & Ex. A-K. Specifically, the undisputed records before the court reflect that Plaintiff

did not file any grievance related to his hygiene claim. Further, while the evidentiary

material before the court reflects that Plaintiff initiated the administrative grievance process

with regard to his discrimination claim, he has provided nothing to refute Defendants’

evidence showing that he failed to properly exhaust this claim through the county jail’s

grievance process. Id. Plaintiff admits that he did exhaust his discrimination claim but

contends that his failure to do so should be excused because he was transferred during the

middle of the grievance process. Doc. No. 23.

The undersigned findsthere is no dispute that Plaintifffailed to exhaust administrative

remedies with respect to his claim concerning the provision of hygiene items. The unrefuted

evidence in this case reflects that Plaintiff never filed a grievance about being required to pay

for his own hygiene articles, and Plaintiff does not dispute that he did not exhaust available

remedies with regard to this claim. See Doc. No. 20, Reed Aff. & Exs. A-K; Doc. No. 23. 

The court further concludes that it need not determine whether Plaintiff’s transfer from the

Houston County Jail excuses his failure to exhaust the available grievance process with

respect to his discrimination claim inasmuch as it is clear from the evidence in this case that

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his failure to properly exhaust available administrative remedies occurred prior to that time. 

Specifically, the evidence of record shows that Plaintiff filed this federal action while

simultaneously pursuing the administrative grievance process at the county jail with respect

to his discrimination claim. The evidence shows that on October 26, 2009, Plaintiff initiated

the administrative remedy process at the county jail with regard to his grievance that he and

another cellmate were left in a cell being doused with water and hazardous fumes from a

broken sprinkler head while their white cellmate was removed and given dry clothes. Doc.

No. 20, Exh. H. Eleven days later, on November 6, 2009, before jail officials had filed their

response to the October 26 grievance, Plaintiff prepared and submitted the instant complaint

for filing. See Doc. No. 1 at 4; see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988) (A pro se

inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing.). The

court received the complaint on November 12, 2009. On November 18, 2009, jail officials

returned to Plaintiff a copy of his October 26, 2009 grievance, which contained their written

response. Doc. No. 20, Exh. H. Plaintiff filed his first appeal of the grievance on November

19, 2009. Id., Ex. I. A copy of Plaintiff’s first appeal was returned to him with a response

on December 11, 2009. Id. Plaintiff filed his second appeal of the four-step grievance

process on December 12, 2009. Id., Exh. J. Shortly after that submission, Plaintiff was

transferred to state custody before jail personnel could respond to his second appeal. Doc.

No. 13. 

The PLRA requires prisoners to avail themselves of all available administrative

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remedies before filing suit. See Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir.

2000) (per curiam) (because exhaustion of administrative remedies is a “precondition” to

filing an action in federal court, an inmate must complete the administrative process before

initiating suit). While Plaintiff contends that he was transferred from the Houston County

Jail before he could fullycomplywith the institution’s grievance procedures, the undersigned

finds that he initiated the instant complaint while actively engaged in the jail’s grievance

process over his discrimination claim. He, therefore, failed to properly exhaust his

administrative remedies before initiating this federal civil rights action.

The PLRA rule requiring exhaustion would be circumvented by allowing prisoners

to file a federal claim while simultaneously continuing through the administrative grievance

process. In this case, Plaintiff pursued his discrimination claim in this federal action while

simultaneouslypursuing the issue through the administrative remedyprocess provided bythe

county jail. The evidence of record unequivocally shows that Plaintiff sued Defendants just

days after initiating the Houston County Jail’s administrative remedy procedures, and before

jail personnel even filed a response to his initial administrative request. Even assuming,

arguendo, that Plaintiff subsequently exhausted his administrative remedies, that is not

enough to save his suit because he is required to have properly exhausted before filing a

complaint in this court. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 204, 211 (“There is no question that

exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in

court” . . . . in order to give “prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning

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the exercise oftheir responsibilities before being haled into court.”); Higginbottom, 223 F.3d

at 1261; Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Nyhuis v. Reno,

204 F.3d 65, 67 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that the PLRA requires that “inmates first test

and exhaust the administrative [grievance] process, and then, if dissatisfied, take the time

necessary to file a timely federal action”).

Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust the administrative remedies available at the

Houston County Jail prior to initiating suit in this court. The court, therefore, concludes that

the claims presented in this cause of action are subject to dismissal as Plaintiff failed to

properly exhaust the administrative remedy available to him in the Houston County Jail,

which is a precondition to proceeding in this court on his claims. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 87-94.

As noted, Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the Houston County Jail. Thus, the

administrative remedy provided by Defendants is no longer available to him. Under such

circumstances, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1375 n.1;

Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1157; Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Without the

prospect of a dismissal with prejudice, a prisoner could evade the exhaustion requirement by

filing no administrative grievance or by intentionally filing an untimely one, thereby

foreclosing administrative remedies and gaining access to a federalforumwithout exhausting

administrative remedies.”); Berry v. Keirk, 366 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2004) (footnotes omitted)

(Inmate’s “federal lawsuits . . . properly dismissed with prejudice” where previously

available administrative remedies had become unavailable and no special circumstances

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justified the failure to exhaust.). 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 20) be GRANTED to the

extent Defendants seek dismissal of this case due to Plaintiff’s failure to properly exhaust 

an administrative remedy previously available to him at the Houston County Jail; and 

2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice in accordance with the provisions of 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust an administrative remedy available to him

during his confinement in the Houston County Jail. 

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before November 10, 2011, the parties may file objections to

the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that

this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

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Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33

(11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en

banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).

Done this 27th day of October, 2011.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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