Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07107/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07107-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 14, 2012 Decided February 15, 2013 

No. 11-7107 

FRAZIER CAUDLE ET AL., 

APPELLEES

v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:08-cv-00205) 

Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the 

cause for the appellant. Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General, 

Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, 

Deputy Solicitor, were on brief. 

Jennifer I. Klar argued the cause for the appellees. 

Megan Cacace and John P. Relman were on brief. 

Before: HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

USCA Case #11-7107 Document #1420749 Filed: 02/15/2013 Page 1 of 16
2 

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellees 

Frazier Caudle, Nikeith Goins, William James, Sholanda 

Miller and Donald Smalls (collectively, appellees) sued the 

District of Columbia (District), their employer, for retaliation 

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 2000e et seq. (Title VII). During closing argument, their 

counsel made four inappropriate statements—the last three of 

which occurred after the district court had sustained 

objections to the earlier iterations. The jury found in favor of 

the appellees and awarded compensatory damages to each 

except Miller. The district court subsequently denied the 

District’s post-trial motions, including those seeking a new 

trial and/or remittitur. The District argues on appeal, inter 

alia, that it is entitled to a new trial because of the improper 

closing argument. We agree and reverse the district court’s 

judgment, remanding for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.1

I. 

In 2005, the appellees worked for the First District of the 

District’s Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). Goins 

worked in the MPD’s Auto Theft Unit (ATU) and the other 

appellees (FMU appellees) worked in MPD’s Focus Mission 

Unit (FMU). At that time, Commander Diane Groomes 

(Groomes) oversaw MPD’s First District. 

 

1

 The District also argued that the district court erred (1) in not 

granting judgment as a matter of law on Goins’s retaliation claim 

because Goins did not engage in protected activity known to his 

supervisor at the time he allegedly suffered retaliation; (2) in not 

granting a new trial because of unduly harsh spoliation sanctions it 

imposed on the District and (3) in not granting a new trial because 

it improperly excluded certain evidence that the District treated the 

appellees favorably in other respects. We do not reach these issues. 

USCA Case #11-7107 Document #1420749 Filed: 02/15/2013 Page 2 of 16
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Beginning in late 2005, Lieutenant Ronald Wilkins 

(Wilkins) became the appellees’ supervisor. The appellees 

began to believe that Wilkins was discriminating against them 

on the basis of race. On June 16, 2006,2 the FMU appellees 

sent an anonymous letter to Groomes complaining about 

Wilkins’s alleged discrimination. On June 20, Groomes called 

a meeting of all FMU officers and asked whether they could 

“work together.” Joint Appendix (JA) 270, 624. The meeting 

was tense and, afterward, FMU officers generally had trouble 

getting along. Around the same time, Goins (who did not join 

in the June 16 anonymous letter) complained to Wilkins about 

“unfair treatment.” JA 459, 477-80. 

By the end of July or the beginning of August, Groomes 

decided to reorganize FMU and ATU. On August 14 she 

posted vacancy announcements for FMU and ATU, 

instructing applicants to apply by August 18. Additionally, 

officers who wished to stay in FMU or ATU had to reapply to 

keep their jobs. Appellees Caudle, James, Smalls and Goins3

all reapplied.4

On August 24, the appellees drafted and signed a 

complaint that alleged retaliation and discrimination by the 

MPD based on, inter alia, the August 14 vacancy 

announcements. They sent the letter to the District Office of 

 

2

 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates are in 2006. 

3

 The parties dispute whether Goins applied to FMU or ATU. 

4

 Miller did not submit a reapplication. She had sought a transfer 

from FMU to patrol so she could work a day shift. She was 

transferred to patrol but not to the day shift. By the time she was 

notified of her transfer, it was too late for her to apply to stay with 

FMU. 

USCA Case #11-7107 Document #1420749 Filed: 02/15/2013 Page 3 of 16
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Human Rights and to the United States Department of Justice 

(DOJ) but did not inform anyone at the MPD about it. 

On September 27, Groomes posted her selections for 

FMU and ATU officers. Instead of being assigned to their 

former positions, Goins, James and Smalls were assigned to a 

new Intel Unit,5

 while Caudle and Miller were assigned to 

patrol. Smalls worked in the Intel Unit from approximately 

October 2006 until February 2008, when he was promoted to 

sergeant and left the Intel Unit. Eventually, the MPD 

disbanded the Intel Unit and assigned Goins and James to 

patrol. On February 5, 2008—after filing charges of 

retaliation with the United States Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission and the District Office of Human 

Rights—they sued the District. 

At the end of a three-week trial and during closing 

arguments, the appellees’ counsel made four statements to 

which the District objected and now challenges on appeal. 

First, she stated: 

You heard [the] plaintiffs explain that they felt 

humiliated, berated, and isolated at the [June 

20] meeting listening to their supervisors and 

peers comment on their discrimination 

complaint. Now, ask yourself, would you

hesitate to speak up if you knew that speaking 

 

5

 Before posting her decision, Groomes offered Goins, James and 

Smalls positions in the Intel Unit, which they accepted (they 

testified that they did so only because Groomes told them they 

would not be returning to their former positions). The parties 

dispute whether assignment to the Intel Unit was a demotion or a 

promotion. 

USCA Case #11-7107 Document #1420749 Filed: 02/15/2013 Page 4 of 16
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up would mean that your boss would call a 

meeting with your entire office . . . . 

JA 589 (emphases added). The District objected and the trial 

court sustained the objection but denied its request for a 

curative instruction. 

Almost immediately after the court sustained the first 

objection, the appellees’ counsel stated: “Ask yourself this: 

Wouldn’t you think twice about complaining about workplace 

discrimination . . . .” JA 590 (emphasis added). Once again, 

the court sustained the District’s objection but did not give a 

curative instruction. 

The appellees’ counsel then argued: 

Now, in the end it is your job to determine how 

to make [the] plaintiffs whole for what they 

have had to endure. As you make those 

decisions, we ask yourselves [sic] to put 

yourselves in the plaintiffs’ shoes. What would 

it do to you to have your complaint broadcast 

to your entire office, to be the only one 

excluded . . . . 

JA 591 (emphases added). After the District objected, the 

district court sustained the objection and instructed the jury: 

“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this is what is called a 

golden rule argument, asking you to place yourself in the 

position of the plaintiffs. You should not consider such an 

argument.” JA 591-92. 

Finally—shortly after the district court sustained the last 

objection—the appellees’ counsel concluded: 

By protecting plaintiffs’ right to complain 

about unlawful conduct without reprisal, you 

preserve the rights not just of plaintiffs but of 

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everyone. By ensuring that plaintiffs are made 

whole for what they have endured, you ensure 

that others will be free to exercise their rights 

without fear. Yours is an important job and we 

trust that you will [do what] is right and 

ensure that justice is done.

JA 593 (emphases added).6

 The jury returned verdicts for the appellees and awarded 

a total of $900,000 in compensatory damages; $250,000 to 

Smalls, $250,000 to James, $200,000 to Caudle, $200,000 to 

Goins and $0 to Miller. The court then awarded back pay and 

prejudgment interest in the amount of $14,399 to Smalls, 

$51,666 to James, $36,454 to Caudle, $36,785 to Goins and 

$0 to Miller. The court also enjoined the District from 

engaging in further retaliation and awarded the appellees their 

litigation costs. 

II. 

The district court “may, on motion, grant a new trial on 

all or some of the issues . . . after a jury trial, for any reason 

for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action 

at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). We 

review the district court’s denial of a new trial motion for 

abuse of discretion. See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 

F.3d 433, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A new trial is unwarranted if 

 

6

 The District did not contemporaneously object to the fourth 

statement, nor mention the fourth statement in its post-trial motion, 

although it did raise the issue when it moved for a mistrial 

immediately after the appellees’ closing argument. We conclude 

that the fourth statement is properly before us in view of the three 

earlier objections, the thrust of the entire closing argument and the 

contemporaneous mistrial motion. 

USCA Case #11-7107 Document #1420749 Filed: 02/15/2013 Page 6 of 16
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the trial error is harmless. See United States v. Whitmore, 359 

F.3d 609, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

A. 

A new trial may be granted based on improper jury 

argument. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill 

Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 608 F.3d 871, 897-98 (D.C. Cir. 

2010) (per curiam) (“[A]rguments to the jury about a 

defendant’s wealth are grounds for new trial.”); see also

Wash. Annapolis Hotel Co. v. Riddle, 171 F.2d 732, 740 (D.C. 

Cir. 1948)). The jury may not return a verdict based on 

personal interest, bias or prejudice and an argument asking it 

to do so is improper. See, e.g., Miller, 608 F.3d at 897-98 

(references to defendant’s wealth improper because “[t]he 

only way the information could have affected the jury was to 

prejudice it”); Riddle, 171 F.2d at 740 (jury argument “that 

justice should be administered unequally as between the rich 

and the poor” warranted mistrial). 

The appellees’ counsel made four inappropriate 

statements during her closing argument. The first three are 

“golden rule” arguments. A golden rule argument—which 

asks “jurors to place themselves in the position of a party,” 

see, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 870 F.2d 

148, 154 (4th Cir. 1989)—is “universally condemned because 

it encourages the jury to depart from neutrality and to decide 

the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than 

on evidence.” Granfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 597 F.3d 474, 

491 (1st Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted); see also

Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 199 (4th Cir. 1982) 

(“The Golden Rule and sympathy appeals are . . . obviously 

improper arguments . . . . Having no legal relevance to any of 

the real issues, they were per se objectionable . . . .”); HarPen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705, 714 (5th Cir. 

1967) (“The real danger is that the sympathy and the feelings 

USCA Case #11-7107 Document #1420749 Filed: 02/15/2013 Page 7 of 16
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of the jury will be encouraged and aroused so that the jury 

will decide the case and award damages out of relation to 

actual fault and actual damage.”). For example, it is 

impermissible (1) to ask jurors how much the loss of the use 

of their legs would mean to them, Leathers v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 546 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (4th Cir. 1976); (2) to tell 

jurors “do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” 

Klotz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 F.2d 53, 54 (7th Cir. 

1959); or (3) to tell jurors, in a reverse golden rule argument, 

“I don’t want to ask you to place yourself in [the plaintiff’s] 

position,” Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 

496 (5th Cir. 1982). 

While all circuits that have considered the issue have held 

a golden rule argument improper if made with respect to 

damages, there appears to be, as the district court noted, a 

circuit split regarding whether such argument is improper if 

made with respect to liability. At least four circuits have 

found such a golden rule argument permissible. See, e.g., 

McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1071 n.3 

(11th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 

1289 (2d Cir. 1990); Shultz v. Rice, 809 F.2d 643, 651-52 

(10th Cir. 1986); Burrage v. Harrell, 537 F.2d 837, 839 (5th 

Cir. 1976). On the other hand, the Third Circuit has rejected 

the liability-damages distinction. Edwards v. City of Phila., 

860 F.2d 568, 574 n.6 (3d Cir. 1988) (“We see no rational 

basis for a rule that proscribes the ‘Golden Rule’ argument 

when a plaintiff argues damages, but permits it when the 

defendant argues liability . . . . [because the] same concerns 

are present in both situations—the creation of undue 

sympathy and emotion” (quotation marks and brackets 

omitted)); see also Ins. Co. of N. Am., Inc., 870 F.2d at 154 

(suggesting but not holding that defense counsel’s opening 

statement—“asking the jurors to consider whether any of 

them would like to be accused of fraud based upon the 

evidence which they were about to hear”—was improper); 

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Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 

1985) (“[The Plaintiff] urges that the Golden Rule argument 

is not objectionable when it refers only to the assessment of 

credibility. There is no reason for such a distinction because 

the jury’s departure from its neutral role is equally 

inappropriate regardless of the issue at stake.”). 

We join our sister circuits and hold that a golden rule 

argument is improper and may thus serve as the basis for a 

new trial.7

 Further, we do not recognize a per se distinction 

between a golden rule argument relating to damages and the 

same argument regarding liability. Courts forbid golden rule 

arguments to prevent the jury from deciding a case based on 

inappropriate considerations such as emotion. See, e.g., Stokes 

v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The 

rule’s purpose is to reduce the risk of a jury decision based on 

emotion rather than trial evidence.”). It is no more appropriate 

for a jury to decide a defendant’s liability vel non based on an 

improper consideration than to use the same consideration to 

determine damages. Accordingly, we agree with the Third 

Circuit that a golden rule argument made with respect to 

liability as well as damages is impermissible.

We conclude that the appellees’ counsel’s first three 

above-quoted statements are golden rule arguments. The third 

statement, addressed to damages, is plainly improper; she 

asked the jury to “put yourselves in the plaintiffs’ shoes” in 

“determin[ing] how to make plaintiffs whole.” JA 591. This is 

a quintessential invocation of the golden rule and the district 

court was correct to sustain the objection and instruct the jury 

 

7

 We explain infra that the district court may grant a new trial only 

if the golden rule argument affects substantial rights, see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 61. 

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to disregard it. While the propriety of the first two statements 

is a closer question, we nonetheless conclude that they also 

constitute golden rule arguments addressing liability. The 

appellees’ counsel stated, inter alia, “would you hesitate to 

speak up if you knew that speaking up would mean that your 

boss would call a meeting,” JA 589 (emphases added), and 

“[w]ouldn’t you think twice about complaining about 

workplace discrimination.” JA 590 (emphasis added). The 

appellees argue that the statements are permissible because 

they explain the legal standard for retaliation under 

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 

U.S. 53 (2006). But the Burlington Northern standard—which 

forbids “employer actions that would have been materially 

adverse to a reasonable employee”—is an objective standard. 

548 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added). Because it is objective, “[i]t 

avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can 

plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual 

subjective feelings.” Id. at 68-69. As the district court 

necessarily found in sustaining the objections, however, the 

appellees’ counsel’s statements did not describe an objective 

standard. Rather, they asked the jurors to decide how each of 

them—not a reasonable person—would feel if he were in the 

appellees’ situation. 

The fourth statement, while not a golden rule argument, 

is also inappropriate. The appellees’ counsel stated: 

By protecting plaintiffs’ right to complain 

about unlawful conduct without reprisal, you 

preserve the rights not just of plaintiffs but of 

everyone. By ensuring that plaintiffs are made 

whole for what they have endured, you ensure 

that others will be free to exercise their rights 

without fear. Yours is an important job and we 

trust that you will [do what] is right and ensure 

that justice is done.

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JA 593. This is a so-called “send a message” argument that, 

alone, might not be grounds for reversal, Carter v. District of 

Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 138–39 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Here, 

given the fact that the appellees’ counsel made this argument 

after the district court had sustained three objections to golden 

rule arguments—her send a message argument was also 

inappropriate because, like the golden rule arguments, it 

diverted the jury’s attention from its duty to decide the case 

based on the facts and the law instead of emotion, personal 

interest or bias. 

 We next address whether the improper statements 

warrant a new trial. 

B. 

The district court concluded that a new trial was 

unnecessary because “any minimal prejudice that might have 

arisen from counsel’s comments” was cured by the fact that 

(1) the court sustained prompt objections to the three golden 

rule arguments; (2) after the third iteration, the court 

instructed the jurors to disregard it and (3) in its general jury 

instructions, the court directed the jurors to “decide the facts 

of this case only from a fair evaluation of all of the evidence 

without prejudice, sympathy, fear, favor, or public opinion.” 

Caudle v. District of Columbia, 804 F. Supp. 2d 32, 53 

(D.D.C. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). 

In determining whether a new trial is warranted, we must 

determine whether the error is harmless. We do so by 

measur[ing] the harm in terms of whether the 

error had substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict, not 

merely whether the record evidence is 

sufficient absent the error to warrant [the jury 

verdict]. Consequently, an evidentiary error is 

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harmless if (1) the case is not close, (2) the 

issue not central, or (3) effective steps were 

taken to mitigate the effects of the error. 

Ashcraft & Gerel v. Coady, 244 F.3d 948, 953 (D.C. Cir. 

2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The appellees’ 

counsel’s improper argument was not harmless. First, this was

a close case. Like many retaliation cases, it hinged on a 

determination of motive based on circumstantial evidence. 

Their claims also had serious evidentiary weaknesses that the 

jury resolved in their favor. 

For example, at trial, the appellees presented two 

alternative theories to support Goins (to whom the jury 

awarded $236,785) having engaged in protected activity that 

was known to Groomes at the time she allegedly retaliated 

against him. See Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 313 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011) (retaliation claim fails if employee does not engage 

in protected activity known to supervisor). First, they argued 

that Goins engaged in protected activity by complaining about 

“unfair treatment” to Wilkins; however, Goins’s testimony on 

this point was equivocal at best. Goins stated that he 

complained to Wilkins by “tell[ing] him certain things I didn’t 

agree with . . . . [w]henever I felt unfair treatment.” JA 459. 

He admitted, however, that he never referred to racial 

discrimination. On cross-examination, the District’s counsel 

asked Goins: “[Y]ou never complained of unfair treatment 

based upon your race, correct?” to which he responded: “I 

never said directly, but, indirectly, within my complaint, it 

was voiced, yes, sir.” JA 478. When pressed on the point, he 

admitted “I might not have said it directly that it was racial 

treatment.” JA 479. Goins also stated that he complained 

about “unfair treatment” at staff meetings, but the District’s 

counsel’s cross-examination confirmed that he “never said . . . 

that race discrimination was at play” or that “white officers 

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are being treated one way and black officers are being treated 

another way.” JA 479-80. 

Alternatively, the appellees argued that Groomes knew—

at the time she allegedly retaliated against Goins—that Goins 

engaged in protected activity by signing the August 24, 2006 

complaint. The appellees testified, however, that they did not 

send the August 24 complaint to the MPD or inform anyone 

at the MPD about the letter; rather, they sent the letter to DOJ 

and the District Office of Human Rights. Groomes and others 

testified that they were unaware of the letter at the time of the 

alleged retaliation. 

Furthermore, despite the fact that the appellees’ damages 

evidence was tenuous at best, the jury awarded almost one 

million dollars. See Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 

163 F.3d 265, 278 (5th Cir. 1998) (“That the awards were 

improperly influenced by passion and prejudice is indicated 

by their size.”).8

 

8

 The damages evidence was less than compelling. Smalls—who 

was ultimately promoted to sergeant—testified that his “blood 

pressure went up,” he “couldn’t sleep” and the events “just 

consumed [his] thoughts.” JA 550. James testified that he cried, felt 

depressed and humiliated and had “headaches, stomach pains, [and] 

verbal altercations with [his] wife.” JA 140. Caudle testified that 

“certain colleagues [ ] stare at me funny and some of them . . . 

question your work ethic,” he was “humiliated” and “[i]t was 

difficult trying to rest, you know, the more you think about it—you 

get headaches, but it was very hard, though.” JA 515; see also JA 

524 (Caudle admitting he never saw a doctor about headaches and 

lost sleep). Goins testified he got “a lot of headaches,” “went to 

[his] doctor . . . to make sure there wasn’t nothing besides maybe 

just stress” and that talking about the case “is like opening up an 

old wound.” JA 473-74; see also JA 489-90 (Goins admitting he 

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14 

 Second, the appellees’ counsel’s comments went to 

central issues in the case. See Carter, 795 F.2d at 132 (issue 

central because “whether the defendants engaged in 

misconduct with respect to their arrest of the plaintiffs was . . 

. the overarching question in the case”). There was only one 

theory of liability in this case—retaliation—and the first two 

comments were directed at a contested element of retaliation. 

The third comment went to damages—central to the verdict—

and the fourth comment went to both damages and liability. 

 Third, while the district court attempted to mitigate the 

prejudice by sustaining objections and giving a curative 

instruction, we do not believe the prejudice was so easily 

removed. This is not a case in which counsel made a single

misstatement and ceased further misstatements after the 

district court sustained an objection. Compare Stokes, 710 

F.2d at 1128 (no plain error because “no repeated 

impermissible use of the argument technique”), with 

Whitehead, 163 F.3d at 277-78 (multiple improper arguments, 

including golden rule argument, warranted new trial). Instead, 

the appellees’ counsel made four impermissible statements—

each escalating from the last—three of which came after the 

district court had sustained the District’s objections. In a 

similar context, we stated: 

Evidence need not be reinforced and reiterated 

again and again for it to be prejudicial enough 

to warrant a new trial. Here, it is enough that 

there were several inappropriate references to 

multiple different companies’ wealth, 

especially given that the Government’s counsel 

 

had headaches periodically for non-work reasons). Nevertheless, 

the issue of damages is not before us. 

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emphasized the wealth of the Harbert 

companies in his closing statement and 

insinuated that the money would be in better 

hands if it were taken from the defendants. 

Miller, 608 F.3d at 898. 

Nor do we agree that the district court’s general jury 

instruction—to decide the case without prejudice, sympathy, 

fear, favor or public opinion—eliminated the unfair prejudice 

to the District caused by the appellees’ counsel. This 

instruction is given in virtually every trial; it was not in any 

way directed at her argument. See, e.g., 3 KEVIN F.

O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS:

CIVIL § 103:01 (6th ed. 2011) (including, as a pattern jury 

instruction: “The law does not permit you to be controlled by 

sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion.”). As the conduct of 

the appellees’ counsel in this case was egregious, we conclude 

that the generic instruction did not sufficiently counter the 

prejudice.9

* * * * 

Counsel has an obligation—as Justice Holmes put it—to 

“play the game according to the rules.”10 Here, the appellees’ 

 

9

 We fear that the denial of the District’s mistrial motion in the 

jury’s presence may have lessened the likelihood that the jury took 

seriously either the district court’s curative instruction or its general 

jury instruction. We therefore suggest that it might have been better 

had it been done outside the jury’s presence. 

10 I said to [Justice Holmes]: “Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!” 

 He turned quite sharply and . . . . replied: “That is not my job. 

 My job is to play the game according to the rules.” 

Judge Learned Hand 

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counsel did not. She made four inappropriate arguments; three 

after the district court had sustained objections. As the district 

court’s efforts to cure the resulting prejudice were, in our 

view, insufficient, we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered. 

 

Michael Herz, “Do Justice!”: Variations Of A Thrice-told Tale, 82 

VA. L. REV. 111, 111 (1996) (quoting Learned Hand, A Personal 

Confession, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 302, 306-07 (Irving Dilliard 

ed., 3d ed. 1960)). 

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