Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00117/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

JEFFERY G. BRASUELL PETITIONER

v. NO. 5:16-cv-00117 DPM-PSH

WENDY KELLEY, Director of the RESPONDENT

Arkansas Department of Correction

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following proposed Findings and Recommendation have been sent to United

States District Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. You may file written objections to all or part of

this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the

factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this

Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may

waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 1 of 14
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

I. STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS. On October 23, 2010, petitioner Jeffery G. Brasuell

(“Brasuell”) signed a document entitled “Notification of Restriction from Property.” See

Brasuell v. State, 2015 Ark.App. 559, 472 S.W.3d 499, 502 (2015). The document

provided, in part, that he was “no longer allowed on Wal-Mart property or in any area

subject to Wal-Mart’s control” until such time as Wal-Mart rescinded the ban. See Id.

On December 5, 2013, Brasuell entered a Wal-Mart store in Van Buren, Arkansas.

See Brasuell v. State, 472 S.W.3d at 501. Jonathan Murphy (“Murphy”), a Wal-Mart assetprotection employee, observed surveillance video from that day, and it revealed the

following: “a man (later identified as Brasuell) going into the store, buying two items,

leaving the store, returning, concealing an air filter in his pants, and leaving the store

without paying for the air filter and a container of oil.” See Id. Murphy recorded the

license plate number of the automobile being driven by the man seen in the surveillance

video, and the incident was reported to the police. See Id. Using that information, the

police were led to Brasuell. See Id.

Brasuell was charged with, and tried for, commercial burglary and theft of

property. During the trial, Joseph Cole (“Cole”), an asset-protection manager at the Van

Buren, Arkansas, Wal-Mart store, was allowed to testify that “on October 10, 12, 25, and

November 11, 2014, surveillance video showed Brasuell shoplifting.” See Brasuell v.

State, 472 S.W.3d at 501. Cole’s testimony regarding the November 11, 2014, shoplifting

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 2 of 14
incident was corroborated by the testimony of Nathan Jones, a Wal-Mart employee who

testified that he saw Brasuell leaving the store without paying for merchandise. See Id.

A Crawford County, Arkansas, Circuit Court jury convicted Brasuell of commercial

burglary and theft of property and sentenced him as an habitual offender to the custody

of respondent Wendy Kelley (“Kelley”).

Brasuell appealed his commercial burglary conviction and advanced two grounds

for reversal.1

 First, he maintained that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction. It was his position that there was “a lack of substantial evidence ... he had

been in Wal-Mart unlawfully.” See Brasuell v. State, 472 S.W.3d at 502. Second, Brasuell

maintained that the trial court erred when it allowed Cole to testify pursuant to Arkansas

Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding the four shoplifting incidents subsequent to the

December 5, 2013, incident. See Id. at 503. It was Brasuell’s position that the subsequent

bad acts were not relevant to issues of preparation, plan, motive, or knowledge of the

December 5, 2013, incident, and the evidence of his subsequent bad acts should have

been excluded. The Arkansas Court of Appeals found no reversible error and affirmed his

commercial burglary conviction.

Brasuell had an opportunity to collaterally attack his convictions by filing a

petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.

He never took advantage of that opportunity.

1

Brasuell did not appeal his theft of property conviction.

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 3 of 14
II. FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS. Brasuell commenced the case at bar by filing

a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 and joining Kelley. In the

petition, Brasuell maintained that his convictions should be set aside and offered what

appear to be four reasons why:

(1) his sentence is illegal because he “only committed [the] crime of shoplifting

or theft of property but was charged with commercial burglary,” see Document 2 at

CM/ECF 4;

(2) his attorneys labored under a conflict of interest because his trial attorney,

Ryan Norris, simply “handed off [the] case” to Lisa-Marie Norris on appeal, see Document

2 at CM/ECF 5;

(3) the state trial court “used video of crimes that [Brasuell] had not been

convicted of at jury trial,” see Document 2 at CM/ECF 6; and

(4) “[p]rior bad acts-character of defendant; did not enter Wal-Mart for [the]

purpose of committing [a] crime,” see Document 2 at CM/ECF 6.

Kelley filed a response to Brasuell’s petition and maintained that the petition

should be dismissed. It was Kelley’s position that the petition should be dismissed

because the claims contained in it were adjudicated on the merits by the state courts of

Arkansas and are due deference, are procedurally barred from federal court review, are

not cognizable, or are otherwise without merit.

Brasuell was accorded an opportunity to file a reply to Kelley’s response. Brasuell

did not take advantage of that opportunity.

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 4 of 14
III. BRASUELL’S FIRST CLAIM. Brasuell first maintains that his sentence is illegal

because he “only committed [the] crime of shoplifting or theft of property but was

charged with commercial burglary.” See Document 2 at CM/ECF 4. Kelley construes the

claim to be a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Brasuell’s conviction

of commercial burglary, noting that he maintains there is no evidence he unlawfully

entered the Wal-Mart store on December 5, 2013. Kelley’s construction of the claim is

reasonable, and the Court will construe it likewise.

“Constitutionally, sufficient evidence supports a conviction if, ‘after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” See

Garrison v. Burt, 637 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original) [quoting Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)]. If, in addressing such a claim, the state appellate

court made findings of fact, they are accorded deference. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).2

Additionally, a state appellate court’s conclusion will not be disturbed unless it was

“both incorrect and unreasonable.” See Garrison v. Burt, 637 F.3d at 855 [quoting Cole

v. Roper, 623 F.3d 1183, 1187 (8th Cir. 2010)].

2

28 U.S.C. 2254(d) provides that a petition for writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted “with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication

of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 5 of 14
Brasuell was charged, in part, with commercial burglary in violation of Ark. Code

Ann. 5-39-201. A person commits that offense if he “enters or remains unlawfully in a

commercial occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing in the

commercial occupiable structure any offense punishable by imprisonment.” See Ark.

Code Ann. 5-39-201(b)(1). The phrase “enter or remain unlawfully” is defined as entering

or remaining “in or upon premises when not licensed or privileged to enter or remain in

or upon the premises.” See Ark. Code Ann. 5-39-101(2)(A).

The state Court of Appeals summarized the evidence of Brasuell’s guilt in affirming

his commercial burglary conviction. See Brasuell v. State, 472 S.W.3d at 501-503. It is not

necessary to repeat the summary, save to note the following facts. Surveillance video

from the Van Buren, Arkansas, Wal-Mart store showed a man later identified as Brasuell

taking property from the store without paying for it. See Document 13, Exhibit 3 at

CM/ECF 152-165. He was in the store despite having signed the “Notification of

Restriction from Property.” See Document 13, Exhibit 3 at CM/ECF 166-170. Brasuell did

not testify at trial and offered no evidence during the guilt phase of the trial. See

Document 13, Exhibit 3 at CM/ECF 225-229. His defense was that he had simply shoplifted

merchandise from Wal-Mart. The jury rejected the defense and convicted him of, inter

alia, commercial burglary. Brasuell maintained on appeal that Wal-Mart had rescinded

the ban when it allowed him to enter its stores on numerous occasions after he had

signed the “Notification of Restriction from Property.” The state Court of Appeals

rejected that contention, finding the following:

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 6 of 14
... There is no evidence on this record that Wal-Mart rescinded the ban on

Brasuell. And simply because [he] was able to enter the store and buy

things is not evidence that Wal-Mart rescinded the ban. Murphy testified

that Wal-Mart cannot track every person who has been banned from WalMart. He said that Wal-Mart does not train its employees to look out for

those banned from stores. However, he added that Wal-Mart can–and did

in this case–file charges against those who have been banned from the store

by reviewing surveillance video and credit-and debit-card information.

Because there is no evidence that Wal-Mart expressly or implied rescinded

the notification banning Brasuell from its property, we hold that there was

substantial evidence to demonstrate that Brasuell entered or remained

unlawfully on Wal-Mart property and affirm the commercial burglary

conviction.

See Id. at 502-503.

Brasuell has not shown that the state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of his

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Although the

appellate court did not specifically cite federal law, its failure to do so is not problematic

for two reasons. First, the substantial evidence standard used by the appellate court is

not inconsistent with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Dansby v. Norris, 682

F.3d 711, 717-718 (8th Cir. 2012) [reversed on other grounds, Dansby v. Hobbs, — U.S. —,

133 S.Ct. 2767, 186 L.Ed.2d 215 (2013)].3

 Second, neither the appellate court’s reasoning

nor result contradict federal law.

3

The state Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence

is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. ... Evidence is

substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and

pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. ... On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the State, considering only that evidence that supports the verdict ...” See Brasuell v. State, 472 S.W.3d

at 501-502.

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 7 of 14
Brasuell has also not shown that the state Court of Appeals’ adjudication of his

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of commercial burglary beyond a reasonable doubt.

Brasuell was inside the Van Buren, Arkansas, Wal-Mart on December 5, 2013, in violation

of the “Notification of Restriction from Property, and he took merchandise without

paying for it. His defense that he simply shoplifted and never planned to steal anything

was a question for the jury. It rejected the defense and could properly do so given the

evidence presented at trial. The appellate court could properly reject his contention that

Wal-Mart had rescinded the ban when it allowed him to enter its stores on numerous

occasions and purchase merchandise. As the appellate court noted, Wal-Mart cannot

track every person who has been banned from its stores, and its employees are not

trained to be on the watch for individuals who have been banned.

IV. BRASUELL’S SECOND CLAIM. Brasuell’s second claim is a challenge to his

attorneys’ representation. He maintains that his attorneys labored under a conflict of

interest because his trial attorney, Ryan Norris, simply “handed off [the] case” to LisaMarie Norris on appeal. See Document 2 at CM/ECF 5.

Kelley maintains that Brasuell’s claim is procedurally barred from federal court

review. Rather than enter the morass of the procedural bar issue, the undersigned will

simply reach the merits of the claim.

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 8 of 14
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), typically governs a challenge to an

attorney’s representation. The standard articulated in that case requires the petitioner

to make a two-part showing, First, he must show that counsel’s performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness. See White v. Dingle, 757 F.3d 750 (8th Cir.

2014). Second, the petitioner must show prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different. See Id.

There are instances, though, in which the prejudice prong of Strickland v.

Washington is inapplicable to a challenge to an attorney’s representation. A claim that

counsel was ineffective because he acted under a conflict of interest is judged under

“several different standards depending on the circumstances of the representation.” See

Henderson v. United States, 2015 WL 667938 (E.D.Mo. 2015). In Henderson v. United

States, the district judge observed the following with respect to the different standards:

... According to the Supreme Court, counsel is ineffective where “the

defendant's attorney actively represented conflicting interests.” Mickens,

535 U.S. at 166. Prejudice is presumed and reversal is automatic, where

the trial court forces defense counsel “to represent codefendants over his

timely objection” without determining that no conflict of interest exists.

Id. at 167-68 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978)). In

other words, if an objection is raised regarding joint representation at the

trial level, the defendant need only prove an actual conflict of interest and

reversal follows automatically upon such a showing. Id. If a defendant does

not object to counsel representing a co-defendant, he or she “must

demonstrate that ‘a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of

his representation.’” Id. at 168 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,

348-49 (1980)). A defendant who makes such a showing “need not

demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-

50. (citation omitted).

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 9 of 14
These standards, however, do [not] apply to all conflicts of interest.

Noe v. United States, 601 F.3d 784, 790 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that the

Supreme Court has not extended the Cuyler standard that presumes

prejudice to conflicts other than those arising from situations in which an

attorney represents more than one defendant) (citing Mickens, 535 U.S. at

174-75). Without squarely deciding the issue, the Eighth Circuit has argued

that Strickland is the appropriate standard for alleged conflicts involving

ethical issues other than multiple or serial representation. Morelos v.

United States, 709 F.3d 1246, 1252 (8th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (“[W]e

have expressly refrained from deciding whether the lowered burden in

establishing prejudice applies to actual conflicts of interest which did not

arise out of multiple representation.”); Caban v. United States, 281 F.3d

778, 783 (8th Cir. 2002) (“We believe there is much to be said in favor of

holding that Cuyler's rationale favoring the ‘almost per se rule of prejudice’

does not apply outside the context of a conflict between codefendants or

serial defendants.”). See also Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 (noting that “the

language of [Cuyler v.] Sullivan itself does not clearly establish, or indeed

even support, such [an] expansive application” of the automatic reversal

standard to other types of ethical conflicts). ...

See Id.

Given Brasuell’s claim, it is likely that the appropriate standard is the Strickland

v. Washington standard. It is not necessary to decide that question, though, because

Brasuell has not met his burden under any standard.

The record reflects that Ryan Norris entered an appearance as the attorney of

record for Brasuell prior to trial. See Document 13, Exhibit 4 at CM/ECF 21. Ryan Norris

represented Brasuell through the conclusion of the trial. At some point after the

conclusion of the trial, Ryan Norris was allowed to withdraw, and Lisa-Marie Norris was

appointed to represent Brasuell. The undersigned assumes for purposes of the Findings

and Recommendation that Ryan Norris and Lisa-Marie Norris were married at the time.

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 10 of 14
Brasuell has failed to show that Ryan Norris and Lisa-Marie Norris actively

represented conflicting interests. Specifically, Brasuell has failed to show what interest,

save his defense, they were representing or how the interests conflicted. He appears to

imply that their martial status gave rise to a conflict, but he has offered nothing to

support the implication.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the undersigned assumes, arguendo, that Ryan

Norris and Lisa-Marie Norris’ marital status somehow caused them to represent Brasuell

less zealously. Brasuell has failed to show, though, that their performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. He has failed to identify a defense, a witness, an

argument, an objection, or any matter Ryan Norris should have, but did not, present at

trial. Brasuell has also failed to identify a ground for reversal that Lisa-Marie Norris did

not advance on appeal or why her performance as his appellate attorney was defective.

V. BRASUELL’S THIRD CLAIM. Brasuell’s third claim is a challenge to the trial

court’s admission of evidence. He maintains that the trial court erred when it allowed

testimony regarding the four shoplifting incidents subsequent to the December 5, 2013,

incident giving rise to the convictions in this case.

Brasuell’s claim appears to be built solely upon a violation of state law. It is

axiomatic, though, that a violation of state law warrants no federal habeas corpus relief.

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for

errors of state law); Evenstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006) (federal courts lack

authority to review state courts’ interpretation and application of state law).

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 11 of 14
To the extent Brasuell’s claim is built upon a violation of federal law, it warrants

no relief for two reasons. First, the claim is not built upon the same legal bases as the

claim he raised on appeal. See Interiano v. Dormire, 471 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2006) (claim

raised in federal habeas corpus petition must rely upon same factual and legal bases as

claim raised in state court). The claim at bar is couched in terms of a due process

challenge; the claim on appeal was couched in terms of a violation of Arkansas Rule of

Evidence 404(b).

Second, notwithstanding the foregoing, Brasuell cannot show that admitting

evidence of the four shoplifting incidents subsequent to the December 5, 2013, incident

was so gross, conspicuously prejudicial, or otherwise of such magnitude that it fatally

infected the trial and failed to afford him the fundamental fairness which is the essence

of due process. See Maggitt v. Wyrick, 533 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1976). Giving the state

Court of Appeals’ findings of fact due deference as required by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), the

evidence of the subsequent bad acts was relevant because it showed his “intent, motive,

opportunity, knowledge, and plan to shoplift from Wal–Mart.” See Brasuell v. State, 472

S.W.3d at503. In that regard, the appellate court could and did find the following:

... [Brasuell] went to Wal–Mart to shoplift and that he knew it was illegal

because he had been arrested and charged for the same conduct in

December 2013. Also, the similarity between the [four incidents in October

and November of 2014] and the December 5, 2013 incident establishes the

independently relevant matters of opportunity and plan. In both sets of

circumstances, Brasuell entered the same Wal–Mart store, selected items,

concealed them either in his pants, his cart, or his bags, did not pay for

them, and left the store.

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 12 of 14
See Id. It is also worth observing that on two separate occasions, the trial court gave the

jury a cautionary instruction regarding the proper application of the four shoplifting

incidents subsequent to the December 5, 2013, incident.

VI. BRASUELL’S FOURTH CLAIM. As Brasuell’s fourth claim, he alleges the

following: “Prior bad acts-character of defendant; did not enter Wal-Mart for [the]

purpose of committing [a] crime.” See Document 2 at CM/ECF 6. Kelley construes the

claim in a two-fold manner: first, as a challenge to the admission of the four shoplifting

incidents subsequent to the December 5, 2013, incident; and second, as a challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Brasuell’s conviction of commercial burglary.

Kelley’s construction of the claim is reasonable, and the Court will construe it likewise.

To the extent Brasuell challenges the admission of the four shoplifting incidents

subsequent to the December 5, 2013, incident, the claim warrants no relief. As the

undersigned found, giving the state Court of Appeals’ findings of fact due deference, the

admission of the evidence was not so gross, conspicuously prejudicial, or otherwise of

such magnitude that it fatally infected the trial and failed to afford him the fundamental

fairness which is the essence of due process.

To the extent Brasuell’s claim challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his conviction of commercial burglary, the claim warrants no relief. As the

undersigned found, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of commercial burglary

beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Case 5:16-cv-00117-DPM Document 15 Filed 09/22/16 Page 13 of 14
VII. CONCLUSION. On the basis of the foregoing, it is recommended that Brasuell’s

petition be dismissed, all requested relief be denied, and judgment be entered for

Kelley. It is also recommended that a certificate of appealability be denied.

DATED this 22nd day of September, 2016.

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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