Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05330/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05330-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 23, 2008 Decided December 30, 2008 

No. 07-5330 

MOHAMMAD S. BALOCH, 

APPELLANT

v. 

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 03cv01207) 

Robert C. Seldon argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs was Molly E. Buie. 

Rhonda C. Fields, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence and Michael J. 

Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

USCA Case #07-5330 Document #1156088 Filed: 12/30/2008 Page 1 of 15
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Before: GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: In 1991, Mohammad 

Baloch joined the Department of the Interior as one of two 

Water Rights Specialists in the Office of Trust 

Responsibilities at the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In the mid1990s, the other Water Rights Specialist departed, leaving 

Baloch as the only employee in that role. For budgetary 

reasons, the Department did not fill the second position for 

several years. In 2001, a second Water Rights Specialist was 

hired, and some of Baloch’s duties were shifted to the new 

Specialist. Baloch was apparently unhappy with the new 

arrangement, and he clashed with his supervisor. Baloch 

eventually sued, raising discrimination, retaliation, and hostile 

work environment claims under Title VII, the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Rehabilitation 

Act. 

On the discrimination and retaliation claims, the District 

Court awarded summary judgment to the Government 

because Baloch failed to show that he had suffered an adverse 

action, an essential element of a discrimination or retaliation 

claim. We affirm the District Court’s judgment on Baloch’s 

discrimination and retaliation claims for two alternative 

reasons. First, as the District Court concluded, Baloch did not 

produce sufficient evidence that he suffered an adverse action. 

Second, he did not produce sufficient evidence that the 

Government’s asserted non-discriminatory reasons for the 

actions were pretextual and that he suffered discrimination on 

account of his race, religion, age, or disability, or retaliation 

on account of his bringing a discrimination complaint. 

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On the hostile work environment claim, the District Court 

ruled that Baloch presented insufficient evidence to support 

such a claim. We affirm the District Court’s judgment on that 

point as well. 

I 

Since 1991, Mohammad Baloch has worked as a GS-14 

Water Rights Specialist in the Natural Resources Division of 

the Office of Trust Responsibilities at the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs. When Baloch began work in his division, there were 

three professionals: a Chief and two Water Rights Specialists. 

In the mid-1990s, the Branch Chief and the other Water 

Rights Specialist departed, leaving Baloch as the only 

professional employee in the division. For about five years, 

those other positions were not filled, primarily for budget 

reasons. In 2000, the Director of the Office of Trust 

Responsibilities, Terrance Virden, appointed Jeffrey Loman 

as the new Chief of the Natural Resources Division, and 

Baloch began reporting to Loman. In May 2001, at Virden’s 

direction, Loman hired Daniel Picard as a second GS-14 

Water Rights Specialist. The hiring of Picard returned the 

office to the same strength it had maintained before 1996 – 

one Chief and two Water Rights Specialists. 

In June 2001, shortly after Picard’s hiring, Baloch filed 

an informal administrative complaint alleging discrimination 

because of race, religion, age, and disability. In August 2001, 

Baloch filed a formal complaint with the Department of the 

Interior. 

In the ensuing months and years, Baloch and his 

supervisor Loman clashed. Loman issued “letters of 

counseling” to Baloch in January 2002 and March 2003 and a 

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“letter of reprimand” in April 2003. He imposed sick leave 

restrictions on Baloch in February 2003 and renewed them in 

August 2003. He proposed that Baloch be suspended for two 

days in September 2003 and for 30 days in January 2004, and 

he assisted a grievance official by drafting a decision on the 

latter proposal. He gave Baloch a performance review of “not 

achieved” in October 2003. The two engaged in verbal 

altercations in February, March, August, and October 2003. 

On one occasion, Loman allegedly threatened to have Baloch 

arrested, led out of the building in handcuffs, and jailed. 

In June 2003, Baloch sued in U.S. District Court for 

discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-16, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 

U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§§ 701 et seq. (Baloch’s administrative complaint was 

subsequently dismissed because the Department of the 

Interior determined that the District Court would address the 

same issues.) 

As to the discrimination and retaliation claims, the 

District Court granted the Government’s motion for summary 

judgment, concluding that Baloch failed to show that he had 

suffered adverse actions as required to bring a claim under 

those employment discrimination laws. The District Court 

also concluded that Baloch had not produced sufficient 

evidence of an objectively hostile work environment for 

purposes of that claim. Baloch appeals, and our review is de 

novo. 

II 

We first address Baloch’s discrimination claim. Under 

Title VII, the ADEA, and the Rehabilitation Act, the two 

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essential elements of a discrimination claim are that (i) the 

plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because 

of the plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, 

or disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 

et seq.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.; Adeyemi v. District of 

Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Brady v. 

Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 

2008); see also Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 

1999) (race discrimination under Title VII); Barnette v. 

Chertoff, 453 F.3d 513, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (age 

discrimination under the ADEA); Breen v. Dep’t of Transp., 

282 F.3d 839, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (disability discrimination 

under the Rehabilitation Act). A plaintiff must prove both 

elements to sustain a discrimination claim. 

A 

In most employment discrimination cases that reach 

federal court, there is no dispute that the employee has 

suffered an adverse employment action, and the sole question 

is whether the action occurred because of discrimination. See 

Adeyemi, 525 F.3d at 1227; Brady, 520 F.3d at 493, 494 n.2. 

In this case, however, the employer also contests whether 

Baloch suffered an adverse action. 

Baloch alleges that the change in his substantive duties 

after another Water Rights Specialist was hired constituted an 

adverse employment action. The initial problem for Baloch’s 

legal argument is that he was not fired or denied a job or 

promotion, and he did not suffer any reductions in salary or 

benefits, which are the typical adverse actions in employment 

discrimination cases. See, e.g., Brown, 199 F.3d at 455-56. 

To be sure, in Czekalski v. Peters, this Court said that an 

adverse employment action need not entail a loss of salary, 

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grade level, or benefits if the plaintiff has “raised a genuine 

issue as to whether the reassignment left [the employee] with 

‘significantly different’ – and diminished – supervisory and 

programmatic responsibilities.” 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 

2007) (emphasis added).1 Czekalski, for example, produced 

evidence that she went from overseeing 260 federal 

employees, 700 contractors, 50 programs, and a $400 million 

budget, to overseeing fewer than 10 employees and one 

program with a minimal budget. She also went from 

reporting directly to the FAA’s Associate Administrator for 

Research and Acquisitions to reporting to a former peer. Id.

at 364-65. This was enough for her to overcome a summary 

judgment motion and proceed to trial. Cf. Bibbs v. Bd. of 

Trustees for Univ. of Ill., No. 98-3029, 1999 WL 569028, at 

*2 (7th Cir. July 30, 1999) (finding significantly diminished 

responsibilities where plaintiff lost supervisory and 

coordination responsibilities and was left with phone, filing, 

and scheduling duties). 

Unlike in Czekalski, however, Baloch’s duties in the 

wake of Picard’s hiring did not constitute qualitatively 

inferior work requiring any less skill or knowledge. Cf. 

Currier v. Postmaster General, 304 F.3d 87, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 

2002). It is true that some of Baloch’s previous 

responsibilities were no longer his. But that occurred because 

another Water Rights Specialist had been hired, returning the 

unit to the same strength it once had. An adverse employment 

action does not occur merely because an employer adds more 

people to the team assigned to a particular task, particularly 

 1

 Some courts of appeals have interpreted the adverse action 

requirement more narrowly than Czekalski. See, e.g., Grayson v. 

City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 2003); Kocsis v. MultiCare Mgmt., 97 F.3d 876, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1996). Even under the 

more generous interpretation in Czekalski, however, Baloch still has 

not sufficiently shown an adverse employment action. 

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when the addition simply brings the team back to its former 

numbers. Indeed, we have previously underscored our 

hesitancy to engage in “judicial micromanagement of 

business practices” by second-guessing employers’ decisions 

about “which of several qualified employees will work on a 

particular assignment.” Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 

116 F.3d 1549, 1556 (D.C. Cir. 1997). So too here. Any 

reassignment of Baloch’s duties that occurred upon Picard’s 

hiring did not itself constitute an adverse employment action 

for purposes of a discrimination claim. 

B 

Even if we were to assume an adverse action, however, 

Baloch did not produce sufficient evidence that his 

employer’s asserted legitimate non-discriminatory reason for 

hiring Picard was not the actual reason and that Baloch 

suffered discrimination on an impermissible ground. See

Adeyemi, 525 F.3d at 1226; Brady, 520 F.3d at 495.2

 

 2

 For purposes of this point, we assume arguendo that Baloch 

has shown an adverse action (a point that, as noted above, is 

uncontested in most discrimination cases). In cases where the 

employee has suffered an adverse action and the employer has 

asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for that action, we 

do not consider the McDonnell Douglas prima facie factors. See 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see 

also U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 

715 (1983); Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. Rather, we ask only whether 

“the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 

find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not 

the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated 

against the employee” on an impermissible ground. Brady, 520 

F.3d at 494; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-16; Adeyemi, 525 

F.3d at 1226.

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In his deposition, Virden testified that there had been two 

Water Rights Specialists before budget cuts in 1996 and that 

Picard’s employment simply returned the office to its 

previous arrangement. Virden also explained that he hired 

Picard because of BIA’s need to strengthen the budget 

justification process and to install someone with a legal 

background. Picard, who had a law degree, filled the gaps 

that had been identified. 

Because the employer asserted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action, we consider only 

whether Baloch “produced evidence sufficient for a 

reasonable jury to find that the employer’s stated reason was 

not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally 

discriminated against [Baloch] based on” his race, religion, 

age, or disability. Brady, 520 F.3d at 495. Baloch has 

produced no direct evidence of discriminatory animus by the 

decisionmaker and failed to produce any other evidence that 

discredits the underlying reason for Picard’s hiring and the 

subsequent shift in responsibilities. Therefore, even assuming 

Baloch had suffered an adverse employment action, he did not 

produce evidence sufficient to overcome summary judgment 

on the question whether he suffered impermissible 

discrimination.3

 

III 

We next consider Baloch’s retaliation claim. Baloch 

contends that the Government illegally retaliated against him 

for filing an administrative complaint. He argues that the 

 3

 With respect to the Rehabilitation Act claim, it is not clear 

that Baloch showed evidence that he was disabled within the 

meaning of the statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B). Because we 

reject Baloch’s claims for other reasons, however, we need not 

further address that issue. 

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District Court erred in holding “that none of the alleged 

[retaliatory] measures were adverse actions.” Baloch v. 

Norton, 517 F. Supp. 2d 345, 354 n.7 (D.D.C. 2007). 

To prove retaliation, the plaintiff generally must establish 

that he or she suffered (i) a materially adverse action 

(ii) because he or she had brought or threatened to bring a 

discrimination claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. 

§§ 621 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.; Burlington N. & 

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (defining “materially adverse” as an 

action that would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from 

making or supporting a charge of discrimination”) (quoting 

Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).4

 

A 

According to Baloch, Loman retaliated against him in a 

variety of ways. Loman imposed sick leave restrictions – 

requiring that a physician certify the problem and date of 

treatment each time Baloch submitted a leave request. Baloch 

asserts that the procedures made it impossible for him to take 

sick leave because his physicians were too busy to write the 

 4

 “Adverse actions” in the retaliation context encompass a 

broader sweep of actions than those in a pure discrimination claim. 

Due to differences in the language and purposes behind Title VII’s 

retaliation and discrimination provisions, the Supreme Court 

clarified in Burlington N., 548 U.S. 53, that the requirements are 

distinct: Retaliation claims are “not limited to discriminatory 

actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment” and 

may extend to harms that are not workplace-related or employmentrelated so long as “a reasonable employee would have found the 

challenged action materially adverse.” Id. at 64, 68; see also 1

BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT 

DISCRIMINATION LAW 1026-27 (4th ed. 2007). 

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requisite certifications, and that they amounted to “materially 

adverse” actions. But his claim is not substantiated by 

evidence of any instances when the procedures led him to 

forgo leave. And his leave requests, in fact, were granted 

every time. Baloch thus has not shown that the restrictions 

constituted materially adverse actions. 

Baloch further argues that Loman’s proposed 2-day and 

30-day suspensions were materially adverse actions that 

tarnished his reputation and caused emotional distress. But 

courts have been unwilling to find adverse actions where the 

suspension is not actually served. Cf. Whittaker v. N. Ill. 

University, 424 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] 

suspension without pay that is never served does not 

constitute an adverse employment action.”); see also Gupta v. 

Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 588 n.15 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(“A threatened letter never actually written cannot constitute 

an adverse employment action.”). Similarly, Loman’s 

drafting of a proposed decision on a possible 30-day 

suspension was not materially adverse: The decision was 

reassigned to another official, and Loman’s ex parte 

communications had no actual effects. 

Baloch also alleges that Loman issued a letter of 

counseling, letter of reprimand, and unsatisfactory 

performance review as retaliation for Baloch’s discrimination 

complaints. The letters, however, contained no abusive 

language, but rather job-related constructive criticism, which 

“can prompt an employee to improve her performance.” 

Whittaker, 424 F.3d at 648 (quoting Oest v. Ill. Dep’t of 

Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2001)). As for the 

“not achieved” performance evaluation, performance reviews 

typically constitute adverse actions only when attached to 

financial harms. As the Government points out and Baloch 

does not deny, Baloch had already achieved the highest step 

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for his grade as a GS-14, step 10 employee. Baloch did not 

produce evidence showing that the 2003 negative 

performance evaluation could affect his position, grade level, 

salary, or promotion opportunities. See Weber v. Battista, 494 

F.3d 179, 185-86 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (evaluations were “adverse 

actions insofar as they resulted in her losing a financial award 

or an award of leave”); see also Brown v. Snow, 440 F.3d 

1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2006) (“A lower score on [the 

employee’s] performance evaluation, by itself, is not 

actionable . . . unless [the employee] can establish that the 

lower score led to a more tangible form of adverse action, 

such as ineligibility for promotional opportunities.”); 

Whittaker, 424 F.3d at 648 (evaluations and written warnings 

were not adverse actions because none had “tangible job 

consequences”) (quoting Longstreet v. Ill. Dep’t of 

Corrections, 276 F.3d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 2002)). 

Finally, Baloch points to Loman’s alleged profanityladen yelling as actionable adverse actions. As alleged, 

Loman’s outbursts, though usually preceded by some 

infraction on Baloch’s part, certainly seem disproportionate. 

The Supreme Court, however, has emphasized that sporadic 

verbal altercations or disagreements do not qualify as adverse 

actions for purposes of retaliation claims: “We speak of 

material adversity because we believe it is important to 

separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII, we have 

said, does not set forth ‘a general civility code for the 

American workplace.’” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (emphasis 

in original) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 

Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). The altercations in February, 

March, August, and October 2003 between Baloch and 

Loman did not meet the requisite level of regularity or 

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severity to constitute material adversity for purposes of a 

retaliation claim.5

B 

Even if the alleged retaliatory measures were materially 

adverse actions, the Government asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for each act, and Baloch did not 

produce sufficient evidence that would discredit those reasons 

and show that the actions were retaliatory. See Adeyemi v. 

District of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 

Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008); Vickers v. Powell, 493 F.3d 186, 195 (D.C. Cir. 

2007); Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006). 

The Government asserted that the disciplinary measures 

and comments occurred only after various infractions by 

Baloch. The leave restrictions were imposed because Baloch 

had taken an anomalous total of 276 hours (seven weeks) of 

 5

 In dismissing Baloch’s retaliation claim, the District Court 

also relied on the fact that Baloch continued to file administrative 

complaints in August, October, and November 2003, even after the 

alleged actions occurred. The District Court explained that Baloch 

had not been dissuaded from making charges of discrimination and 

that the alleged actions therefore could not have been materially 

adverse. See Baloch, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 361 (“The filing of a 

complaint after an alleged instance of retaliation militates against a 

conclusion that retaliation occurred, as it demonstrates that the filer 

was not in fact dissuaded from protecting his rights.”). We disagree 

with the District Court’s reasoning on this one point because it 

appears that the court focused on Baloch’s subjective reactions 

rather than on whether the objective “reasonable worker” would 

have been dissuaded from making a discrimination complaint. 

Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68. 

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sick leave, which included 18 days before and after holidays 

and weekends and numerous eight-hour appointments. The 

suspension proposals were based on Baloch’s failure to 

comply with leave restrictions. The letter of counseling, 

reprimand, and “not achieved” evaluation were justified by 

Baloch’s disregard of Loman’s orders for a draft, 

unauthorized travel arrangements, late submission of a report, 

failure to secure recipient funding, unauthorized cancellation 

of a credit card, and emailing of grievances about Loman to a 

colleague. The verbal altercations, meanwhile, were similarly 

preceded by Baloch’s failure to comply with instructions or 

respect Loman’s authority. “[G]ood institutional 

administration” justified disciplining Baloch for these 

breaches of orders and office etiquette. Mitchell v. Vanderbilt 

University, 389 F.3d 177, 182 (6th Cir. 2004). 

Baloch fails to offer evidence rebutting the legitimate, 

non-discriminatory reasons asserted for the various actions 

Baloch complains about. Indeed, Baloch concedes the 

infractions that formed the basis for his employer’s responses. 

For example, Baloch responds to the alleged sick leave 

violations by claiming that he submitted a leave slip that was 

misplaced. He does not, however, deny that Loman never 

received the slip in question, nor does he deny that he failed 

to submit the required certifications on other occasions. 

Similarly, Baloch admits to disregarding Loman’s orders for a 

draft and merely asserts that in his opinion no meaningful 

changes were necessary. Baloch likewise admits that he took 

six months to secure funding for a particular client when 

Loman had instructed him to act promptly and simply points 

to the routine nature of funding delays. Baloch argues that he 

had reasons for committing the infractions. But he did not 

produce evidence sufficient to show that the Government’s 

asserted reasons for the actions (even assuming that each 

alleged act was materially adverse) were so ill-justified as to 

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allow a jury to conclude that they were not the actual reasons 

and that he suffered retaliation for his discrimination 

complaints. 

Baloch separately claims that Picard did not suffer the 

same disciplinary actions or verbal abuse that he did. But 

given the sheer number and willfulness of Baloch’s recurrent 

breaches, Picard was not similarly situated and his allegedly 

disparate treatment does not give way to an inference of 

retaliation against Baloch (or, alternatively, of discrimination 

in the imposition of discipline). 

IV 

We turn finally to Baloch’s hostile work environment 

claim. To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must show that 

his employer subjected him to “discriminatory intimidation, 

ridicule, and insult” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to 

alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an 

abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)); see also Barbour v. 

Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1999). To 

determine whether a hostile work environment exists, the 

court looks to the totality of the circumstances, including the 

frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its 

offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s 

work performance. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 

U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998). 

In this case, none of the comments or actions directed at 

Baloch expressly focused on his race, religion, age, or 

disability – unlike in some hostile work environment cases. 

Moreover, the disciplinary actions and workplace conflicts 

were not so “severe” or “pervasive” as to have changed the 

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conditions of Baloch’s employment. His claims of harm are 

not supported by evidence of tangible workplace 

consequences, whether financial, physical, or professional. 

His allegations of insult are undercut by the legitimate reasons 

and constructive criticism offered in the letters of counseling 

and reprimand. His claims of public humiliation do not match 

the evidence. And his assertion of pervasive and constant 

abuse is undermined by the sporadic nature of the conflicts. 

Baloch clearly had several verbal clashes with his supervisor 

in the workplace. But the totality of circumstances presented 

in this record does not rise to the level necessary to support a 

hostile work environment claim. 

* * * 

We affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

So ordered. 

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