Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02334/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02334-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Estate of DOROTHY MARTIN; MARY

MARTIN, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

VETERANS AFFAIRS, et al., 

Defendants. 

 CIV-S-02-2334 DFL-GGH

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Plaintiff Mary Martin, individually and on behalf of the

estate of her mother Dorothy Martin (collectively “Martin”),

brought this suit against the California Department of Veterans

Affairs and various of its officers (collectively “the

Department”) alleging violations of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Plaintiffs claim that the

Department improperly denied Dorothy Martin admission to the

Veterans Home of California (“VHC”) because she suffered from

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 The court’s July 22, 2003 order explains that neither 1

the Department nor its officers are shielded from suit in federal

court under the Eleventh Amendment as to the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act claims. See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d

1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court found that

plaintiffs could not bring ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims

against the Department officers in their individual capacities

because both statutes are directed at the actions of public

entities only. See Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181,

1188(9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the supplemental state law tort

claims were dismissed as to the Department and the defendants in

their official capacities because of the Eleventh Amendment bar. 

These claims were permitted to go forward against the individual

defendants in their individual capacities.

2

Alzheimer’s disease. Martin also asserted a claim under the

equal protection clause and state law claims for negligent and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

1

The case was tried to a jury beginning on October 11, 2005. 

On October 18, 2005, both parties filed motions for judgment as a

matter of law. The court granted the Department’s motion in

part, dismissing: (1) the equal protection and state law tort

claims; (2) Mary Martin’s claims under the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act because she lacked standing; and (3) the

compensatory damages claims for violations of the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act because Martin did not provide evidence of

intentional discrimination. On October 20, 2005, the jury

returned a verdict for the Department finding that Martin did not

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Department

discriminated based on disability. On October 28, 2005, the

Department submitted a bill of costs. On November 4, 2005,

Martin filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and

a motion for new trial. Martin’s motions and the Department’s

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 There has been some inconsistency in Martin’s theory of 2

discrimination. In its ruling on the summary judgment motions,

the court permitted the case to go forward on the view that

Martin was alleging discrimination against persons with a

particular disease, Alzheimer’s, regardless of its severity, as

compared to other eligible veterans with different disabilities. 

It appears that Martin may have abandoned this theory given that

the evidence shows that during the time of her application the

VHCs did not expel veterans already resident in the home who

developed Alzheimer’s. There was some evidence that the Chula

Vista home may have had a policy of excluding applicants with

Alzheimer’s disease, even if the applicant was otherwise able to

function in the residential domiciliary facility (“DOM”). 

However, although the parties disputed the degree of Dorothy

Martin’s disability, the weight of the evidence favored a jury

finding that at no relevant time was she qualified for the DOM. 

 In the reply brief, Martin argues that “all that is 3

required under the ADA is that the disability be a ‘motivating

factor’ in the decision to exclude the plaintiff, rather than the

‘sole’ factor. (Id. (citing Head v. Glacier Northwest Inc., 413

F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005)).) 

This argument is irrelevant for two reasons. First, “[a]

post-trial motion for judgment can be granted only on grounds

advanced in the pre-verdict motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b),

Advisory Committee Notes on the 1991 Amendments; see also Murphy

v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Because Martin failed fairly to raise this argument previously,

the court cannot address it now. Second, even if the “motivating

factor” standard applied, the jury still could have reasonably

concluded that Dorothy Martin’s disability did not “motivate” the

3

bill of costs are the subject of this order. 

I. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Martin raises ten arguments in support of her renewed motion

for judgment as a matter of law. Each argument is addressed

under a separate heading below.

A. Facial Discrimination

 Martin asserts that when compared to similarly-situated

non-disabled applicants to the VHCs, applicants with Alzheimer’s

or dementia are denied admission because of their disability. 2 3

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Department’s decision to exclude her, as discussed below. 

 Martin also asserts that the policies violate state law 4

because they “impermissibly alter and restrict the scope of the

[VHC] eligibility statute (Cal. Mil. & Vets. Code § 1012).” 

According to Martin, § 1012 requires the VHC to admit any

qualified veteran whether or not there is space in the VHC for

that veteran. There are a number of problems with this line of

argument: (1) § 1012 does not say this, (2) it is not reasonable

to interpret the statute in the manner suggested given that the

statute itself envisions that not enough space will be available

for all eligible veterans, see Cal. Mil. & Vets. Code §

1012(b)(1), and (3) plaintiffs did not make a claim under § 1012. 

4

Martin asserts that “[d]efendants’ policies are unnecessary,

facially discriminatory, and therefore invalid and illegal under

the [ADA], the Rehabilitation Act, and the equal protection

clause of the 14th Amendment.” (Mot. at 3-4.) The focus of this 4

attack is on the four different care levels and facilities and,

more particularly, the VHC policy of reserving 25% of the vacant

beds in the higher care levels for existing residents of the DOM. 

The stated reason for the policy is to assure residents of the

DOM that they will not face expulsion if they become infirm and

require a space in one of the higher care levels. The

unfortunate result of this otherwise understandable policy is

that an eligible veteran like Dorothy Martin, not already a

member of a Home, may be denied admission to the higher care

levels even though a bed is open.

Several layers of rules and regulations govern the VHC’s

admission policies. First, California Military & Veterans Code §

1012 enumerates the eligibility requirements for admittance to

one of the VHC homes. According to § 1012, eligible individuals

are those who: (1) served in the U.S. armed forces; (2) were

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 California Military and Veterans Code § 1044 gives the 5

VHCs the authority to adopt their own policies. 

5

honorably discharged from service; (3) are eligible for

hospitalization or domiciliary care in a veterans’ facility in

accordance with the rules and regulations of the U.S. Department

of Veterans Affairs; and (4) are bona fide residents of

California at the time of application. Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code §

1012(a). Dorothy Martin is eligible for admission to a VHC home

under these criteria.

Second, each VHC home has its own admission policies and

rules. The rules of all three VHC homes to which Dorothy applied

refer to Alzheimer’s as a possibly disqualifying condition for

admittance depending on the severity of the condition. For 5

instance, Barstow’s admissions policies state that an applicant

whose medical needs “exceed the reasonable resources of the Home

shall be rejected or referred to the Chief Medical Officer for

further review such as . . . (3) diagnosis of Alzheimer’s related

Dementia.” (Pls.’ Ex. 50.) Similarly, Yountville’s policies

state that “[a]n applicant whose medical needs exceed the

reasonable resources of the Home shall be denied, such as . . .

(4) diagnosis of Alzheimer’s or dementia whose needs exceed

current resources.” (Id. Ex. 52.) Finally, Chula Vista’s

current policies explicitly exclude Alzheimer’s patients, listing

Alzheimer’s disease as a disqualifying condition for admission. 

(Id. Ex. 51.) However, this policy was not created until

December 2001, one month after Dorothy Martin’s death. (Id.)

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6

In addition to the admissions restrictions, the VHC homes

are limited by statute and regulation as to what levels of care

they can provide. All three VHC homes, collectively, offer

admissions to four levels of care: Domiciliary (“DOM”),

Residential Care for the Elderly (“RCFE”), Intermediate Care

(“ICF”), and Skilled Nursing (“SNF”). (Defs.’ Trial Br. at 1-2.) 

The DOM provides the lowest level of care and does not

provide nursing services. (Defs.’ Ex. 20 at 1.) Residents must

be entirely independent and able to perform all of the activities

of daily living (“ADLs”). (Id.) The DOM is a group home that

provides a social community and activities for independent

elderly veterans in a dormitory setting. The RCFE is the next

level of care and provides medication assistance and stand-by

assistance for bathing. (Id. at 2.) The ICF provides more

assistance than the RCFE, but only admits residents who need

assistance with no more than two ADLs. (Id.) Finally, the SNF

provides 24-hour in-patient care, including medical, nursing,

dietary, and pharmaceutical services. (Id.) Not all four levels

of care are offered at all three VHC homes at all times. (Id. at

2-3.) To be eligible for state and federal funding, each VHC

home must obtain a separate license issued by the California

Department of Health Services for each level of care at that VHC

home. (Id. at 4, 7, 8.) CDVA regulations define what services

can be provided in each level of care. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 12,

§ 503. Additionally, during the relevant time period, CDVA

regulations required that “[n]o direct admission to the [SNF

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level of care] is allowed from outside sources except when the

[SNF] occupancy rate is below 75%.” Id. § 501.2. 

These policies are not facially discriminatory as a matter

of law. First, the ADA does not force a health care provider “to

provide extraordinary services which it is not set up to

deliver.” Alexander v. Pathfinder, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 502, 507

(E.D. Ark. 1995), judgment aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 91 F.3d

59 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that discharging a disabled

individual from a residential intermediate care facility is not

discriminatory if the individual required considerably more

medical care than the facility could provide). As the Alexander

court noted,

[t]he ADA was never intended to prevent a facility,

whose ‘customers’ are all disabled, from limiting the

scope of the services it provides to the disabled. 

Surely all facilities cannot be required to serve

disabled individuals with every degree of disability. 

If that were the case, it would require abandonment of

designations such as “intermediate care” and “total

care.” As noted, federal regulations are replete with

such distinctions; it cannot have been the intent of

Congress to prohibit the specialization of facilities

which care for the disabled. 

Id. at 508. Therefore, the CDVA’s policy to limit the services

it provides and to create specialized units of care based on

severity of disability is not facially discriminatory under the

ADA. Otherwise, most, if not all healthcare facilities would be

facially discriminatory –- a physical rehabilitation center for

not offering chemotherapy, a retina institute for not offering

hearing aids, a residential nursing facility for not offering an

intensive care unit. Furthermore, the jury could also find from

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 If one were to follow plaintiffs’ argument to its logical 6

conclusion, these discharged residents could also claim that they

were excluded “on the basis of disability” in violation of the

ADA. To prevent such claims, the Department would be forced to

provide care to all Alzheimer’s patients who either resided in

the homes or applied for admission to the homes, or shut the

homes entirely. Given the extraordinary growth of Alzheimer’s in

the veteran and general population, it is likely that the VHCs

would be forced to close. The ADA does not require such a

counter-productive result. 

8

the record that the policy of all the various homes was not to

exclude an eligible veteran with a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s but

only to exclude a veteran with such a diagnosis if her condition

was such that the Home could not properly treat it or if the

condition required placement in a care level that was

unavailable. 

The Department’s 75% rule is also not discriminatory as a

matter of law. As plaintiffs acknowledge, the VHCs serve to

provide long-term care for aged and disabled veterans. (Mot. at

6.) Thus, the VHCs have a long-term obligation to their members

and may ensure that those members have access to sufficient care

throughout their lives. It was up to the jury to decide whether

the 75% rule was a reasonable way to protect existing residents

from eviction or was instead a cover for discrimination. 

Defendants introduced evidence that if the VHCs were forced to

accept every new Alzheimer’s applicant the Homes would run out of

room for existing residents that later develop the disease.6

Therefore, a jury could conclude that the Department’s decision

to save room for existing residents rather than to admit new

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 The analysis under the Rehabilitation Act is the same. 7

9

residents was not discriminatory under the ADA. 

7

For these reasons, the court denies plaintiffs’ motion for

judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that the Department’s

regulations are facially discriminatory under the ADA or the

Rehabilitation Act. 

B. “Qualified Individual with a Disability”

Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he evidence presented at trial

conclusively established that Dorothy Martin was a ‘qualified

individual with a disability’ under the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act.” (Mot. at 8.) 

A. Qualified Individual

A person is “qualified” if she satisfies all of a program’s

requirements other than those that are unreasonable and

discriminatory. Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202,

1205 (9th Cir. 1984). As discussed above, a reasonable jury

could determine that the Department’s requirements were not

unreasonable or discriminatory. Therefore, the jury had the

responsibility to evaluate whether Dorothy Martin was “qualified”

at the time she applied based on these requirements. Dorothy

Martin also would have qualified for a certain level if the

Department could have made reasonable accommodations to enable

her to qualify for that level at the time she applied. 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.130(b)(7). 

At trial, defendant introduced Dorothy Martin’s medical

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records and her VHC application to demonstrate that she required

assistance with at least 5 ADLs, including bathing, grooming,

dressing, medication, and toileting. (Def.’s Exs. 1-13, 17.) 

From this evidence, the jury could conclude that Dorothy Martin

was only qualified for the SNF facility. 

Defendants also presented evidence to show that, at the time

she applied for admission, none of the facilities had SNF beds

available. The Chula Vista facility was under construction and

the SNF was not yet completed. (Def.’s Ex. 36.) Barstow had

lost its certification for its SNF and could not legally receive

government funds for new admissions. (Def.’s Trial Br. at 2.) 

Finally, defendants presented evidence that Yountville was not

accepting outside applicants because the occupancy rate of the

SNF was 81.5% when Dorothy Martin applied in November 2000 and

there were already 45 people on the waiting list for the SNF. 

(Pls.’ Ex. 37.) By October 24, 2001, when Mary Martin renewed

her inquiry, the situation had worsened; by then the occupancy

rate was at 75.6% and there were 99 people on the waiting list. 

(Def.’s Ex. 37.) 

Plaintiffs produced calculations at trial to show that the

actual occupancy rate of the SNF never came close to 75% from

1994 through 2003, given the number of residents at each level of

care and the licensed capacity of the SNF. (Reply at 8.) 

However, defense witness Marcella McCormack testified that

plaintiffs’ calculations were incorrect because the licensed beds

were unfunded and could not be used. (Surreply at 5.) Moreover,

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 Although Zukle and Henrietta deal with reasonable 8

accommodations under Title III rather than Title II, the burden

is the same under both titles. See McGary v. City of Portland,

386 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Although Title II of the

ADA uses the term ‘reasonable modification,’ rather than

‘reasonable accommodation,’ these terms create identical

standards.”)

11

even if the beds could have been used, Yountville would likely

have admitted the dozens of people already on the waiting list

before it would have admitted Dorothy Martin. 

Given this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that

none of the VHCs had room for Dorothy Martin at the time she

applied, and that she was otherwise unqualified for admission.

B. Reasonable Accommodations

Dorothy Martin is also a “qualified individual” if the

Department could have made reasonable modifications to enable her

to qualify. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). The initial burden is on

plaintiffs to establish the existence of reasonable

modifications. Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041,

1047 (9th Cir. 1999). This burden is “not a heavy one.”

Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 280 (2d Cir. 2003). 

“[I]t is enough for . . . plaintiff[s] to suggest the existence

of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do

not clearly exceed its benefits.” Id. Once the plaintiff has

done this, “[t]he burden shifts to the [Department] to produce

evidence that the . . . accommodation would require a fundamental

or substantial modification of its programs or standards.” 

Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1047. 

8

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In analyzing whether an accommodation would be a

“fundamental alteration,” the financial and other logistical

limitations on a state’s capacity to provide such services must

be considered, Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511, 519-20 (9th Cir.

2003), as well as whether the modification would alter the

essential nature of the program or impose an undue burden or

hardship in light of the overall program. Easley v. Snider, 36

F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 1994). The analysis looks not simply at

the cost of accommodating the specific plaintiff but rather to

whether “immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be

inequitable, given the responsibility the State has undertaken

for the care and treatment of a large and diverse population of

persons with mental disabilities.” Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S.

581, 604, 119 S.Ct. 2176 (1999). The jury was so instructed. 

Plaintiffs suggested at trial that the Department could

have: (1) used all licensed beds or created more; (2) provided

dementia care in the lower levels; (3) admitted to the SNF

without certification; (4) ignored or eliminated the 75% rule;

(5) admitted to a “crowded” SNF on a conditional basis; (6) paid

for the care of all eligible veterans at private facilities; or

(7) built fences, installed alarms or re-hung gates to make the

RCFE suitable for Alzheimer’s and dementia patients. (See Mot.

at 12.) 

The Department introduced evidence that these suggested

accommodations would create an undue hardship because the costs

of implementing them would financially cripple the Department and

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prevent it from maximizing the number of veterans it could

assist. A reasonable jury could conclude from the testimony

that: (1) the VHCs could not reasonably use all licensed beds or

create more beds because they could not afford the nurses to care

for the people who would occupy them; (2) the VHCs could not have

provided dementia care in the lower levels because doing so would

effectively turn those units into SNF units, which require

separate licenses and increased staffing; (3) the VHCs could not

admit to the SNF without certification, because to do so would

violate the law; (4) ignoring or eliminating the 75% rule would

leave current members without beds once their needs increased, as

would admitting to a “crowded” SNF on a conditional basis; (5)

the cost of paying for every disabled veteran’s private care

would be prohibitive; and (6) building restrictive structures

like fences would psychologically harm veterans who experienced

the shock of battle and may have been prisoners of war. In sum,

from this evidence the jury could conclude that the Department

was not able to make any reasonable accommodations to admit

Dorothy Martin. Judgment as a matter of law for plaintiffs is

not possible.

C. Exclusion Because of Disability

Plaintiffs next argue that they are entitled to judgment as

a matter of law because “[t]he evidence presented at trial

conclusively established that Dorothy Martin was excluded from

receiving the benefits of the VHC because of her disability.” 

(Mot. at 9.) However, as discussed in subsection A above, a

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reasonable jury could conclude that she was not excluded because

of her disability but because of policies that were not

discriminatory. 

D. “Fundamental Alteration” Defense

Plaintiffs assert that the “fundamental alteration” defense

does not apply in cases of facial discrimination. (Mot. at 6

(citing Bay Area Addiction Research & Treatment, Inc. v. City of

Antioch (“BAART”), 179 F.3d 725, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1999); Lovell

v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002).) Even if this

were a case of facial discrimination, plaintiffs cannot raise

this argument now because they did not raise it in their preverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

50(b), Advisory Committee Notes on the 1991 Amendments; see also

Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In their original motion, plaintiffs merely stated that “[t]he

evidence presented at trial also conclusively proved that

Defendants’ anticipated defenses of undue burden or fundamental

alteration are not applicable.” (Pre-verdict Mot. at 5.) 

Plaintiffs did not argue that they were inapplicable because the

Department’s policies were facially discriminatory. Moreover,

plaintiffs included the defense in their proposed jury

instructions ## 30 and 31. Although the court does not have a

transcript of the jury instruction proceedings, it has no

recollection of any objection by plaintiffs to the court’s

inclusion of the defense in the final jury instructions. The

Ninth Circuit has assumed that the defense applies when

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plaintiffs fail to challenge its use. Townsend, 328 F.3d at 518. 

Plaintiffs also argue that the defense does not apply here

because “the necessary factual findings were not made, in

writing, by the head of a public agency or their designee.” 

(Mot. at 10 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149, 35.150).) This argument

is equally unavailing. Section 35.150(a)(3) may create a

procedural requirement that the head of a department make written

findings that a change would result in a fundamental alteration. 

However, there is no indication that a department head's failure

to do so harms particular disabled individuals, in a way that

Title II aims to prevent or redress. See Ability Ctr. of Greater

Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 913-15 (6th Cir. 2004)

(holding no private action exists to enforce § 35.150(d)). 

E. Dorothy Martin’s Emotional Distress Damages

Plaintiffs assert that “Dorothy Martin may recover for her

own emotional distress suffered during her lifetime, because the

California law extinguishing emotional distress damages is

inherently hostile to the remedial and deterrent policies

underlying § 1983.” (Mot. at 12.) However, the court entered

judgment for defendants on the § 1983, equal protection claim. 

As discussed below, the court declines now to reverse course and

enter judgment for plaintiff Dorothy Martin on this claim. This

issue therefore is moot. Moreover, were it not, and as the

parties are well aware, the court has previously addressed this

precise issue in another case and found that the remedies

provided by California law are not contrary to the purposes of 

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§ 1983. Venerable v. City of Sacramento, 185 F.Supp.2d 1128,

1133 (E.D. Cal. 2002).

F. Mary Martin’s Financial and Emotional Distress Damages

Plaintiffs argue that “Mary Martin may also recover for her

own financial damages and emotional distress under the ADA and

the Rehabilitation Act.” (Mot. at 13.) Mary Martin asserts that

she has “been directly and personally aggrieved and damaged by

Defendants’ conduct.” (Pls’ Compl. ¶ 33.) According to Mary

Martin, she was financially and emotionally burdened with the

care of her ailing mother because the VHCs would not admit her. 

In certain limited circumstances, non-disabled individuals

may claim “associational” discrimination, giving them standing to

sue under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Innovative Health

Sys. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1997)

(overruled on other grounds). However, a non-disabled plaintiff

must still show that she “suffered a specific, separate, and

direct injury to [herself] caused by defendant’s actions.” Glass

v. Hillsboro Sch. Dist., 142 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1288 (D. Or. 2001). 

Although there are few opinions on this issue, it appears that

courts do not permit a caretaker or relative to bring a claim on

his or her own behalf because of discomfort, distress, or loss

due to the denial of benefits to some dependent loved one. See,

e.g, Simenson v. Hoffman, 1995 WL 631084 (N.D. Ill. 1995)(no

separate claim where doctor “yelled that he would not treat ‘that

sick child’” in presence of parents); Niemeier v. Tri-State,

2000 WL 1222207 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (husband may not claim damages

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because of denial of fertility treatment to wife). Though Mary

Martin allegedly suffered financial loss and emotional distress,

she did not have a separate right to CDVA’s services. Her

attempt to gain access to the VHC related solely to her mother’s

care. Therefore, the court finds that she does not have

independent standing to sue under the ADA and the Rehabilitation

Act. 

G. Equal Protection

Plaintiffs claim that they are “entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on their § 1983 claims because the policies are

irrational and facially discriminatory, and were applied (or at

least sanctioned) knowingly and intentionally by the individual

Defendants, with (at least) reckless disregard. Facially

discriminatory admissions per se have no rational basis, and thus

cannot pass muster in the Court’s equal protection analysis.” 

(Mot. at 13-14.) The court granted judgment to defendants on the

equal protection claim before the case was submitted to the jury. 

As already discussed above, a reasonable jury could conclude

that the Department’s policies were not facially discriminatory. 

Even if they were, disability does not constitute a suspect

classification under the Equal Protection Clause. Does 1-5 v.

Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996). Review is under

the rational basis standard, a highly deferential standard that

puts the burden on the plaintiff to negate every conceivable

basis that might support the action. Rui One Corp. v. Berkley,

371 F.3d 1137, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004). As discussed above, the

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Department has presented evidence that it denied admission to

Dorothy Martin because it did not have the resources to care for

her. A reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiffs did not

present sufficient evidence to negate this assertion. Therefore,

the court denies plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on this issue.

H. Mary Martin’s Standing under § 1983

Plaintiffs claim that “Mary Martin also has standing to

bring her own claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Mot.

at 15.) However, this issue is moot given the discussion above. 

I. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)

Plaintiffs claim “that they are entitled to recover under a

theory of [IIED], because Defendants’ facially discriminatory

policies were, by definition, intentional discrimination.” (Mot.

at 16.) The court granted judgment to defendants on the IIED

claim before the case was submitted to the jury. 

The elements of an IIED claim in California are: (1)

“[e]xtreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the

intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the potential for

causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe

or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous

conduct.” KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.App.4th 1023,

1028 (1995). “Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to

exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized

community.” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiffs assert that

intentional discrimination is per se outrageous conduct. (Mot.

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at 16.) 

As discussed above, the Department introduced sufficient

evidence at trial that it did not discriminate, intentionally or

otherwise, against Dorothy Martin based on her disability. A

jury could reasonably find that the Department’s decision to deny

admission to Dorothy Martin was not outrageous or extreme. 

Indeed, a jury could find that the Department’s decision was

reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the court denies

plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on this claim.

J. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (“NIED”)

Plaintiffs claim that they “are also entitled to judgment as

a matter of law under a theory of negligent infliction of

emotional distress.” (Mot. at 16.) The court also granted

judgment to defendants on this claim before the case was

submitted to the jury. 

“The traditional elements of duty, breach of duty,

causation, and damages apply” to an NIED cause of action. 

Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal.3d

583, 588 (1989). “Whether a defendant owes a duty of care . . .

depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and upon a weighing

of policy considerations for and against imposition of

liability.” Id. In general, friends and family members may not

bring an NIED claim because of the emotional suffering they incur

as a result of injury to another. Such a claim “has been

permitted in two types of situations, referred to as ‘bystander’

and ‘direct victim’ cases.” Ess v. Eskaton Props., Inc., 97

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Cal.App.4th 120, 126-27 (2002) (citing Burgess v. Superior Court,

2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072 (1992)).

Recovery in a bystander case requires Mary Martin to prove

that she: (1) is closely related to the victim; (2) was present

at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it

occurred and knew that the victim was being injured; and (3)

suffered emotional distress beyond what a disinterested witness

would likely suffer. Thing v. la Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 647

(1989). 

In typical bystander cases, the plaintiff has suffered a

contemporaneous awareness of a sudden accident or injury-causing

event. See e.g., Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.3d 695, 706

(1983) (son recovers when seated next to mother who was shot). 

Mary Martin has not alleged that she suffered a similar type

of contemporaneous awareness of an injury-causing event. She has

not produced evidence that her mother’s health deteriorated

suddenly because she was not admitted to one of the VHCs. 

Rather, Mary Martin claims that she suffered emotional distress

because she “was left with the responsibility of locating,

obtaining, overseeing and paying for alternative care for

Dorothy.” (Pls.’ Trial Br. at 20.) This is not the type of

emotional distress claim permitted under a bystander theory of

recovery. Therefore, the Department did not owe Mary Martin a

duty under the bystander theory of liability. 

To recover as a direct victim, the plaintiff must be a

patient of the defendant caregiver. Ess v. Eskaton Props., Inc.,

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97 Cal.App.4th 120, 128 (2002). A familial relationship with the

injured party alone is not sufficient to support a claim. Id. 

(sister of injured nursing home patient has no cause of action

even though sister was responsible for the placement). The

Department owed a duty to Dorothy Martin, not to her daughter. 

Even if the Department owed Mary Martin a duty, the jury

could have concluded based on the evidence presented that the

Department did not breach that duty. As discussed previously,

defense witnesses testified repeatedly that the VHCs only denied

Dorothy Martin admission because they did not have the resources

to care for her. A reasonable jury could conclude from that

testimony that the Department’s actions were unavoidable and not

negligent. Therefore, plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on this

claim is denied.

II. Motion for New Trial

Plaintiffs raise twenty-two arguments in support of their

motion for new trial. Each argument is discussed under a

separate heading below.

A. Instruction #14: “Lowest Level of Care”

Plaintiffs claim that: 

[t]he Court committed a prejudicial error of law in

instructing the jury in its instruction #14 that “You

should determine the lowest level of care, if any, for

which Dorothy Martin was a ‘qualified individual.’ She

would have qualified for a certain level of care if she

met the essential eligibility requirements for that

level of care at the time she applied.” 

(Mot. at 19.) 

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rely on its recollection of whether objection was made at the

jury instruction conference. 

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This instruction was not erroneous. In an ADA and

Rehabilitation Act claim, the jury must determine whether the

individual “satisfies all of a program’s requirements other than

those that are unreasonable and discriminatory.” Jacobson v.

Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1984). The

levels of care were included among the VHCs’ requirements. 

(Pls.’ Exs. 50-52.) The VHCs had the authority to create these

requirements under Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code § 1044. Furthermore, as

discussed previously, a reasonable jury could have determined

that these requirements were not unreasonable or discriminatory. 

Therefore, consideration of the levels of care was necessary in

determining whether Dorothy Martin was a “qualified individual.” 

See Grubbs v. Med. Facilities of Am., Inc., 879 F.Supp. 588, 591

(W.D.Va. 1995) (holding that, when plaintiff could not meet the

requirements for the level of care she required, she was not

“otherwise qualified”). Moreover, instructing the jury to

consider the lowest level of care for which Dorothy Martin was

eligible was an instruction that favored plaintiff’s contention

that she was qualified for the RCFE with modest accommodations.

Presumably this is why plaintiffs did not object to the

instruction at trial and should not be heard to do so now.9

B. Instruction #14: “Reasonable Accommodation or Modification”

Plaintiffs assert that: 

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[t]he Court committed a prejudicial error of law in

instructing the jury in instruction #14 that “A

reasonable accommodation or modification may include 

. . . minor alterations to physical facilities.” This

instruction misstated the applicable law, because

reasonable accommodations are not limited to minor

alterations to physical facilities. 

(Mot. at 19-20.)

Plaintiffs mischaracterize the instruction. The instruction

included several other possible “reasonable accommodations,” such

as “job restructuring, modifying an application process,

acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, [and]

adjustments to training” (all excluded by plaintiffs’ elipses). 

Moreover, the instruction did not limit it to these possibilities

by using the words “may include,” not “only include.” And,

again, the court recalls no objection to this instruction at

trial on this ground.

C. Instruction #15: Considering the “Level of Care”

Plaintiffs claim that “[t]he Court committed a prejudicial

error of law in instructing the jury in its instruction #15 that

it should consider ‘the Department’s decision to deny admittance

to a level of care, for which Dorothy Martin was qualified . .

.’” (Mot. at 20.) As discussed above, the instructions

regarding the levels of care were proper and necessary for this

claim. 

D. Instruction #15: Disability as a “Motivating” Factor

Plaintiffs claim that “[t]he Court committed a prejudicial

error of law in instructing the jury in its instruction # 15 that

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“ . . . if you find that the Department’s standards promote

another purpose, the standards may not be discriminatory.” (Mot.

at 20.) Plaintiffs assert that “all that is required under the

ADA is that the disability be a ‘motivating factor’ rather than

the ‘sole’ factor.” (JMOL Reply at 3.) However, plaintiffs

never stated this as a ground of objection to the instructions

until its reply brief in support of its renewed motion for JMOL

and new trial. Moreover, in their Proposed Jury Instruction #18,

plaintiffs state that the plaintiff’s disability must be “the

determining factor,” rather than “a” determining factor. Thus,

plaintiffs cannot assert this argument now. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

51(c); Ayuyu v. Tagabuel, 284 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Further, plaintiffs’ Proposed Jury Instruction #36 states that

“plaintiffs claim that Dorothy Martin’s disability was the sole

reason for the defendant’s decision not to provide benefits and

services to Dorothy Martin.” This seemed to be plaintiffs’

theory of the case from the beginning of the litigation. 

Plaintiffs never provided a mixed motive instruction and it would

be unfair to now introduce this new theory that may or may not

apply. Finally, the language under scrutiny does not actually

address the issue because it can be understood consistently with

plaintiffs’ position. This is probably why, to the court’s best

recollection, no specific objection was made to this language at

trial.

E. Instruction #15: “Some Other Non-Discriminatory Reason”

Under the same rationale discussed in Section D, plaintiffs

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assert that “[t]he Court committed a prejudicial error of law in

instructing the jury in its instruction #15: “ . . . if you find

that Dorothy Martin was treated differently for some other nondiscriminatory reason, the defendant did not engage in

discrimination because of her disability and you should find in

favor of defendant.” (Mot. at 20.) For the reasons discussed

above, plaintiffs cannot assert this argument now. 

F. Instruction #17: Defense of Undue Hardship

Plaintiffs claim that “[t]he Court committed a prejudicial

error of law in instructing the jury in its instruction #17 about

the defense of undue hardship, which was not available to

Defendant as a matter of law. (Nor is undue hardship an absolute

defense, as portrayed in the Court’s instruction.)” (Mot. at

20.)

Plaintiffs’ argument is flawed among other reasons because

the jury never had to consider the defense. As demonstrated on

the jury verdict form, the jury concluded that the Department did

not discriminate against Dorothy Martin by reason of her

disability. (Verdict Form, Docket # 155.) The verdict form

specifically stated that if the jury made this finding, it should

not go on to answer question #2 which asked the jury if the

Department had proven any of its defenses. (Id.) Therefore,

even if it were erroneous to instruct on undue hardship, such an

error was harmless and not grounds for a new trial. 

G. Instruction #21: Compensatory Damages

Plaintiffs assert that:

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[t]he Court committed a prejudicial error of law in

instructing the jury in its instruction #21 that “An

award of compensatory damages should be limited to the

net cost of the Estate of Dorothy Martin of any

services she was required to obtain as a consequence of

her denial of admission to a Veterans Home.” 

(Mot. at 21.) However, the jury never considered damages because

it concluded that the Department did not violate the ADA or the

Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, any error would be harmless.

H. Instruction #21: Emotional Distress Damages

Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he Court committed a prejudicial

error of law in instructing the jury in its instruction #21 that

‘you may not award any damages for emotional distress experienced

by Dorothy Martin or Mary Martin.’” (Mot. at 21.) Again,

because the jury never considered damages, any error would be

harmless. Also, as discussed earlier, plaintiffs’ claims for

IIED and NIED were properly dismissed from the case. 

I. Consolidation of Claims Under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

Plaintiffs claim that “[t]he Court committed a prejudicial

error of law by consolidating Plaintiffs’ claims under the ADA

and the Rehab Act, rather than instructing on and submitting each

claim to the jury separately.” (Mot. at 21.) 

The requisite elements of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act

are essentially identical, and the Ninth Circuit has construed

them to be co-extensive. Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1062

(9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, plaintiffs never asserted this

objection when given the opportunity before the jury retired to

deliberate. All parties, particularly plaintiffs, are assisted

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when the jury instructions are as straightforward as possible. 

Thus, consolidating the claims for purposes of instruction was

proper and helped to simplify the jury’s consideration of the

evidence. 

J. Failure to Instruct on § 1983 Claim

Plaintiffs claim that “[t]he Court committed a prejudicial

error of law by refusing to instruct the jury on Plaintiffs’

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Mot. at 21.) As discussed

above, plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to support

a § 1983 claim. Therefore, it was not erroneous to refuse to

instruct the jury on this claim. 

K. Failure to Instruct on State Law Emotional Distress Claims

Plaintiffs claim that “[t]he Court committed a prejudicial

error of law by refusing to instruct the jury on Plaintiffs’

state law emotional distress claims.” (Mot. at 21-22.) As

discussed above, plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence

to support an NIED or IIED claim. Therefore, it was not

erroneous to refuse to instruct the jury on these claims. 

L. Mary Martin’s Standing

Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he Court committed a prejudicial

error of law by not permitting Plaintiff Mary Martin to recover

any damages under any theory alleged in the Complaint or proven

at trial.” (Mot. at 22.) As noted previously, Mary Martin did

not have standing to recover damages. Moreover, even if the

court erred, the jury never reached the issue of damages because

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it found that the Department did not violate the ADA or the

Rehabilitation Act. (See Verdict Form, Docket # 155.) 

M. Removal of Individual Defendants from Consideration

Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he Court committed a prejudicial

error of law by removing individual defendants Bruce Thiesen,

George Andries, Jr., and Marcella McCormack from consideration by

the jury as to their liability.” (Mot. at 22.)

The court already disposed of this issue regarding the ADA

and Rehabilitation Act claims in its July 21, 2003 Order as

follows: 

[p]laintiffs may not bring ADA and Rehabilitation Act

claims against CDVA officers in their individual

capacities, because both statutes are directed at the

actions of public entities only. Miranda B. v.

Kitzhaber, ---- F.3d ----, 2003 WL 21078049, *5 n.7

(9th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing ADA suits against state

officers in their individual capacities from its

holding that plaintiff could obtain injunctive relief

under ADA against state officers in their official

capacities); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center,

280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[N]either Title II of the

ADA nor § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides for

individual capacity suits against state officials.”);

Alsbrook v. City of Maumell, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8

(8th Cir. 1999) (“[‘Public entity’] as it is defined

within the [ADA], does not include individuals.”). 

(7/21/2003 Order at 7-8). Accordingly, the court dismissed

plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the

CDVA officers named in their individual capacities. (Id. at

8.) 

Thus, at the time of trial, the individual defendants only

remained as to the equal protection and negligence claims. As

discussed above, these claims were properly dismissed as to all

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defendants. 

N. Failure to Give Plaintiffs’ Proposed Instructions

Plaintiffs assert that: 

“The Court committed prejudicial errors of law by

refusing to give the following instructions, as

requested by Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs’ proposed

instructions 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30,

31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 39-52. Plaintiffs’ proposed

instructions (the complete set numbered 1-52),

submitted in a timely manner and accurately stating the

relevant law, were almost completely disregarded by the

Court, who instead substituted its own set of

instructions presented to counsel at the conclusion of

trial, the very morning the jury was instructed.” 

(Mot. at 22.) 

Despite plaintiffs’ assertions, the court did not disregard

plaintiffs’ proposed instructions, as it used much of the

language provided by plaintiffs to create the final instructions

presented to the jury. A fair review of plaintiffs’ instructions

shows that they were not ready for delivery to a jury. It was 

the court’s responsibility to pull together, at considerable

effort, a set of instructions that would make sense to a lay

jury. Also, the court has no current recollection of the parties

protesting that they had inadequate time to review the final

instructions or requesting additional time to review them and

make objection.

Plaintiffs have not presented any persuasive argument as to

why the court’s jury instructions, as a whole, were misleading or

misstate the law. Instruction 10 cited the exact provisions from

the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act which explain the prohibition

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against discriminating on the basis of disability. Instruction

11 listed the four elements that the plaintiff must prove to

establish ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. While plaintiffs

claim that asking the jury to examine the levels of care was

confusing, doing so was necessary to properly evaluate the claim. 

Plaintiffs also argue for the first time in their reply

brief that the instructions should have: (1) distinguished

between levels of care for residents versus applicants; and (2)

used the term “dementia” rather than “Alzheimer’s.” However,

these arguments are untimely and should not and cannot be raised

now. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c).

O. Admitting Dr. Arnott’s Testimony

Plaintiffs claim that “[t]he Court committed prejudicial

errors of law in improperly admitting the testimony of Dr. Arnott

on the matter of Dorothy Martin’s condition and care needs.” 

(Mot. at 23.) 

Plaintiffs first raised this issue in Motion in Limine #1. 

They asserted that Dorothy Martin’s care needs were irrelevant

because this information was not considered by the VHCs at the

time they reviewed Dorothy Martin’s application. The court

denied the motion finding that Dorothy Martin’s medical history

was at least relevant to her claim for damages. This ruling is

correct; her claim for damages would have depended, at least in

part, on what she would have paid for services had she been

admitted to the VHC versus what she paid on the outside. The

parties took very different positions on Dorothy Martin’s precise

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care needs when she applied and thereafter. Moreover, the

testimony was relevant to a central issue in the case: what level

of care was appropriate for Dorothy Martin when she applied? The

subsequent medical history is relevant to an assessment of her

medical condition at an earlier point in time and to the

credibility of witnesses testifying to that condition. 

Accordingly, the decision to admit Dr. Arnott’s testimony was

proper. 

P. Admitting Exhibits 1-18 on Dorothy Martin’s Needs

Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he Court committed prejudicial

errors of law in improperly admitting Defendants’ Exhibits # 1-

18, on the matter of Dorothy Martin’s condition and care needs.” 

(Mot. at 23.) However, the court’s decision was proper for the

reasons discussed in Section O. 

Q. Refusing to Admit Bob Taylor’s Testimony

Plaintiffs claim that “[t]he Court committed prejudicial

errors of law in improperly refusing to admit testimony and

documentary evidence regarding the statements of Bob Taylor to

the effect that the Veterans Home of California did not accept

applicants with Alzheimer’s disease.” (Mot. at 23.) 

Bob Taylor was a County Veterans Service Officer assigned to 

the Yountville VHC in 1998. Mary Martin sought to testify that

Taylor told her in 1998 that “the VHC does not and would not

admit applicants with Alzheimer’s disease.” (Def.’s Mot. in

Limine #3 at 2.) This statement would be offered for the truth

of the matter stated. Defendants moved to exclude any statements

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made by Taylor because the statements were hearsay and not

admissible as party-opponent admissions. (Id.) More

specifically, they asserted that: (1) Taylor was not authorized

by defendants to make statements regarding admissions; and (2)

the statements were not within the scope of Taylor’s agency or

employment. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs had the burden to prove

otherwise. See Brenenman v. Kennecott Corp., 799 F.2d 470, 473

(9th Cir. 1986) (“Rule 801(d)(2)(D) requires the proffering party

to lay a foundation to show that an otherwise excludable

statement relates to a matter within the scope of the agent’s

employment.”). 

In opposition, plaintiffs asserted that Taylor’s statements

were indeed party-opponent admissions. (Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. in

Limine #3 at 2.) They claimed their exhibits showed that the

Department “routinely refers applicants and their families to

[County Veterans Service Officers (“CSVOs”)] (such as Taylor) for

assistance with the admissions process.” (Id. at 3 (citing Pls.’

Exs. 42, 144(f).) Upon hearing these arguments, the court

allowed the Department to submit additional evidence to prove

Taylor was not authorized to discuss admissions, and the court

held an additional hearing on the issue. (10/11/2006 Tr. of

Mots. in Limine at 12.) 

The Department then filed the declaration of Marcella

McCormack, the Administrator of the Yountville Home. (McCormack

Decl. at 2.) McCormack stated that Veterans Services

Representatives like Bob Taylor are not: (1) responsible for

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addressing questions from prospective members regarding

admissions polices; (2) part of the Admissions Screening

Committee; or (3) briefed as to admissions policy. (Id.) 

Attached to her declaration was a duty statement stating that

Taylor’s duties included, among other things: (1) interviewing

and counseling Veterans Home members on federal and state

veterans benefits; (2) assisting in application completion; and

(3) participating in member admissions screening. (Id. Ex. 2.) 

Ultimately, the court decided to exclude the evidence. 

Nevertheless, the court’s current recollection is that much of

the testimony came in anyway without objection. Even if it did

not come in, and the court erred in excluding it, the error would

be non-prejudicial. The parties have agreed that the VHCs did

not admit new Alzheimer’s patients with severe dementia; indeed,

the VHCs did not admit any veterans who required placement in the

SNF. Plaintiffs may have had the theory that the VHCs did not

admit Alzheimer’s patients whose symptoms were so mild that they

would qualify for the RCFE. But Taylor’s cryptic statements were

not sufficiently precise to be probative of this issue.

R. Refusing to Admit Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 130-135

Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he Court committed prejudicial

errors of law in improperly refusing to admit Plaintiffs’

Exhibits 130-135 . . . after these exhibits had already been

presented during the trial, without objection by Defendants.” 

(Mot. at 23.) 

Plaintiffs’ exhibits 130-135 include legislative history for

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bills AB 324 (1997) and SB 630 (1999). Both of these bills

address the needs of the Veterans Homes. Specifically, AB 324

sets out to ensure that veterans’ homes meet “the staffing,

licensure, and other requirements necessary to provide health

care and related services to members of the home who are

afflicted with Alzheimer’s Disease or other related dementia

diseases.” (Pls.’ Ex. 132.) SB 630 authorizes a financing plan

to fund construction or renovation of the veterans’ homes. 

(Pls.’ Ex. 135.) 

The legislative history for each of the bills states that

the veterans’ homes do not accept new Alzheimer’s patients. 

Hearing notes for AB 324 from the Assembly Committee on

Governmental Organization state that the bill’s author “contends

that ‘If a person is already in a Veterans’ Home and develops

dementia, he/she can stay. But if you have a dementia related

disease and want to get in a Vet home, you cannot.’” (Pls.’ Ex.

132.) The notes also say that, “[a]ccording to the DVA, the

Homes do not currently admit veterans with Alzheimer’s because

they do not have the capacity to adequately provide the

appropriate care.” (Id.) Hearing notes from the Senate

Committee on Veterans Affairs state that “[t]he Veterans

Department does not at present admit veterans with Alzheimer’s

disease to the home at Yountville, stating that they do not

currently have the capacity to provide adequate care.” (Pls.’

Ex. 134.) Finally, the bill text of SB 630 states that “[t]he

general policy of the department is to not accept veterans into

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existing veterans’ homes who suffer from Alzheimer’s disease or

other diseases causing dementia.” (Pls.’ Ex. 135.) 

These exhibits contain inadmissible hearsay. Rule 803(8)

provides an exception for public records and reports. However,

plaintiffs must prove that the facts stated in the documents were

“within the personal knowledge and observation of the recording

official or his subordinates.” Colvin v. United States, 479 F.2d

998, 1003 (9th Cir. 1973)). “Since the official documents are a

substitute for the personal appearance of the official in court,

it is generally held that such documents, to be admissible, must

concern matters to which the official could testify if he were

called to the witness stand.” Indep. Iron Works, Inc. v. U.S.

Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 672 (9th Cir. 1963). “Reports based

upon general investigations and upon information gleaned second

hand from random sources must be excluded.” Id. 

Three of the four statements above state that the

information came from another source - either the Department or

the author of the bill. The fourth statement does not refer to

any source at all. At trial, the Department adamantly denied

that it had the policy it supposedly had admitted to. Because

plaintiffs did not present any evidence or make any proffer

showing that the information was within the recording official’s

personal knowledge, or the source of that knowledge, the court

found that the exhibits were hearsay. On reconsideration, this

ruling appears correct. 

S. Exclusion of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 156

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Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he Court committed prejudicial

errors of law in improperly excluding Plaintiffs’ Proposed

Exhibit 156 and precluding Plaintiffs from eliciting any

testimony about the Department’s change to its 75% restriction.” 

(Mot. at 24.)

Section 503 of the California Code of Regulations governs

admissions to the SNF at Veterans Homes. This section was

amended on February 16, 2005 and changed the standard of

admission. The old version precluded outside admission unless

the occupancy rate fell below 75%. The amended version precludes

direct admission if the admission would prevent a current

resident of the Veterans Homes from entering the SNF. The

Department sought to exclude evidence of the change because it

was: (1) irrelevant since the changes were made long after

Dorothy Martin passed away; (2) an inadmissible subsequent

remedial measure under Rule 407; and (3) prejudicial. (Def.’s

Mot. in Limine #2 at 2.) 

In opposition, plaintiffs asserted that the evidence should

be admitted under the feasibility exception. (Opp’n to Def.’s

Mot. in Limine #2 at 2.) However, Rule 407 states that the

feasibility exception only applies if feasibility is

controverted, which it was not. (Def.’s Mot. in Limine #2 at 2.) 

Alternatively, plaintiffs asserted that the impeachment

exception should apply. (Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. in Limine #2 at

2.) They contended that the Department has repeatedly claimed

that “the 75% restriction was reasonable, necessary, and had a

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rational basis.” (Id.) However, when the Department changed the

law, it stated to the California Office of Administrative Law

that the regulation “is considered by the Department to be

arbitrary and too severe a restriction, and is not in the best

interests of the veterans of California . . . .” (Id.) This,

they argued, could impeach the Department’s previous claims and

demonstrate that the 75% rule was unnecessary and had no rational

basis. (Id.) 

During the motion in limine hearing, the court ruled that

the evidence was: (1) not relevant because of the passage of

time; and (2) barred by the policy of Evidence Rule 407. (Tr. at

4.) 

Rule 407 provides that “evidence of [] subsequent [remedial]

measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct,

a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need

for a warning or instruction.” Fed. R. Evid. 407. This rule

arises from the policy that defendants should be encouraged to

make improvements without being afraid that those improvements

will be used as evidence against them. Albrecht v. Baltimore &

Ohio R.R. Co., 80 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 1987). 

The evidence that plaintiffs’ hoped to introduce regarding

the change in the 75% rule is evidence of a subsequent remedial

measure that does not fall under the impeachment exception. 

The Department may well have believed that the 75% rule was

reasonable and appropriate at the time it reviewed Dorothy

Martin’s application. Evidence that the Department subsequently

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changed its view and decided that the rule was arbitrary and too

severe a restriction does not impeach the Department’s previous

position that the restriction was reasonable. The two views can

co-exist. Furthermore, to permit evidence of policy changes and

the reasons given, under the impeachment exception, would

contradict the policy of Rule 407, particularly as applied to a

public agency which should not be deterred from changing its

policies and explaining those changes to the citizenry. 

Accordingly, the court does not find that it misapplied Rule 407

or abused discretion.

T. Allowing Defense Counsel “to Improperly Joke with the Judge”

Plaintiffs argue that: 

[t]he Court committed a prejudicial error of law by

permitting Defendants’ attorney, Mr. McCardle, to

improperly joke with the judge during his closing

argument. Mr. McCardle was “attempting to curry the

favor of the jury by complimenting them, stating that

they often had more ‘common sense’ than the attorneys

or the judge, specifically referring and gesturing to

the judge.” Instead of rebuking counsel for this

attempt to ingratiate himself with the jury and portray

himself as friendly with the Court, the Court chuckled

and allowed Mr. McCardle to continue his presentation

uninterrupted. This exchange gave the jury the

impression that the Judge and Defendants were on the

same team. 

(Mot. at 24.) 

The court has no recollection of chuckling or smiling but

will assume that it did. Surely the court smiled at plaintiffs’

counsel at some point during the trial and closing arguments. 

Indeed, all counsel treated one another and the court with

unfailing courtesy throughout the trial in the presence of the

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jury. There was no reason to rebuke defense counsel for this

offhand reference to the court.

U. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Plaintiffs assert that:

[d]espite expressing concerns on the record over

fairness and the improper timing of the issues raised

in Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law,

the Court ultimately granted Defendants virtually

everything they requested in their motion. When all

was said and done, the Court failed to give due weight

to the prejudice to Plaintiffs and did not preclude

Defendants from bringing any claim they could think of,

and several arguments actually suggested by the Court,

many for the first time. 

(Mot. at 24.) Plaintiffs claim that this “further reflect[s]

that the Court appeared to craft, and virtually compel, the

conclusion of this case in favor of Defendants.” (Id. at

26.) Plaintiffs also claim that defendants waived their

rights to assert the arguments made in the motion for JMOL

because the arguments were affirmative defenses. (Opp’n to

Def.’s Mot. for JMOL at 3 (citing 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 776

F.2d 866, 871 (9th Cir. 1985); 389 Orange Street Partners v.

Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 663, n.3 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing

Grabner v. Willys Motors, Inc., 282 F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir.

1960)); Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d

1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)). 

Although the Department sought to dismiss several of

plaintiffs’ claims in its motion for JMOL, the court only

dismissed some of the claims. Those are the claims that are

relevant here. The court dismissed: (1) the ADA, Rehabilitation

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Act, and equal protection claims raised by Mary Martin because

she did not have standing; (2) the compensatory damages claims

for violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because

plaintiffs did not provide evidence of intentional

discrimination; (3) the equal protection claim raised by Dorothy

Martin’s estate because plaintiffs failed to show that the

Department had no rational basis for its actions; (4) the

emotional distress claims raised by Dorothy Martin’s estate

because they are barred by California’s survival statute; and (5)

the emotional distress claims raised by Mary Martin because the

Department did not owe her a duty. The court’s dismissal of

these claims was proper. Indeed, the standing issue raised a

question of jurisdiction. While it was unfortunate that the

defendants did not make appropriate pre-trial motions to dismiss,

there was no prejudice to plaintiffs that the motions were made

at trial. There was no waiver by the Department because the

arguments advanced were not in the nature of affirmative

defenses. The court could not permit legally baseless claims to

go to the jury. However, Dorothy Martin’s disability claim,

which is the essence of the case, did go forward and was fully

and fairly presented. 

V. The Verdict

Finally, plaintiffs assert that “[t]he verdict is against

the great weight of the evidence.” However, the discussion above

regarding the motion for JMOL demonstrates that the verdict was

clearly not against the weight of the evidence. 

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III. Bill of Costs

Defendants seek to recover $7,865.91 in costs. Plaintiffs

assert that defendants are barred from recovering their costs

under Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2001). 

For the reasons stated below, the court denies the Department’s

claim for costs for the ADA claim and grants its claim for costs

for the Rehabilitation Act, civil rights, and emotional distress

claims. 

A. ADA

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) provides that a prevailing party is

entitled to recover its costs absent a contrary direction from

the court, the rules, or a federal statute. In Brown, the Ninth

Circuit held that costs should be awarded to a prevailing

defendant in an ADA action only if the action “was frivolous,

unreasonable, or without foundation.” 246 F.3d at 1190 (citing

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1997)). Because this action was not

frivolous, it follows that defendants cannot recover costs

incurred defending against the ADA claim. The Department

concedes this point with regard to Dorothy Martin’s ADA claim. 

However, it asserts that Mary Martin’s ADA claim was unreasonable

and without foundation because she did not have standing. (Reply

at 4.) 

A claim is unreasonable and without foundation if “a

reasonable inquiry into the applicable facts and law before

filing their case they would have discovered the insufficiency of

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their . . . claim.” Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 854 (9th

Cir. 1998). Under this standard, Mary Martin’s ADA claim was not

frivolous. In certain circumstances, non-disabled individuals

may claim “associational” discrimination, giving them standing to

sue under the ADA. Innovative Health Sys. v. City of White

Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other

grounds). In those cases, the non-disabled individual must show

that she “suffered a specific, separate, and direct injury to

[herself] caused by defendant’s actions.” Glass v. Hillsboro

Sch. Dist., 142 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1288 (D. Or. 2001). Plaintiffs’

reasonable inquiry into the facts and law could have led them to

conclude that Mary Martin suffered such an injury because she had

to pay for alternate care for her mother. Although her claim is

ultimately not supportable, “very few published opinions address

this issue,” Glass, 142 F.Supp.2d at 1287 n.2. Therefore, Mary

Martin’s ADA claim was not frivolous. The court notes that

defendants must not have deemed the claim frivolous during the

period for pre-trial motions since no motion to dismiss Mary

Martin’s ADA claim on this ground was made. Accordingly, the

court denies the Department’s request for costs on plaintiffs’

ADA claim.

B. Rehabilitation Act

Plaintiffs claim that the Christiansburg test should also

apply to an award of costs under the Rehabilitation Act since the

Act also treats attorney’s fees and costs as parallel. (Opp’n to

Bill of Costs at 2.) However, plaintiffs point to no precedent,

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nor could the court find any, to support this contention. 

Indeed, the language of the Rehabilitation Act seems to support

the opposite conclusion. The Rehabilitation Act attorney’s fee

provision allows the prevailing party “a reasonable attorney’s

fee as part of the costs,” 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b), whereas the ADA

allows the prevailing party “a reasonable attorney’s fee,

including litigation expenses, and costs.” Thus, under the

Rehabilitation Act, attorney’s fees are considered “part of the

costs” rather than a separate recovery. 

In that regard, the Rehabilitation Act is more similar to

the attorney’s fee provision for Title VII, which also allows the

prevailing party “a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of

the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). In Title VII cases, the

Christiansburg test does not apply to an award of costs, even

though it applies to an award of attorney’s fees. Nat’l Org. for

Women v. Bank of Cal., 680 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982). The

Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[t]here is no express statutory

provision for applying Christiansburg to cost awards, and we see

no reason to impose rigid limitations on the district court's

discretion.” Id. This same reasoning would seem to apply to an

award of costs under Title II, given the similarity of language

between the two statutes. See Halasz v. Univ. of New England,

821 F.Supp. 40, 42 (D. Me. 1993)( “[i]t is clear from the wording

of section 794a(b), which permits attorney’s fees as a

discretionary element of costs, that Congress intended the costs

of litigation to be awarded generally as a matter of course in

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Rehabilitation Act cases as they are under . . . Rule 54.”). 

In light of this case law, the court finds that Rule 54

rather than the Christiansburg test applies to an award of costs

under the Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, the Department’s

request for costs under this claim is granted. 

C. Section 1983 and Emotional Distress Claims

Plaintiffs present no argument why Rule 54 should not also

apply to its civil rights and emotional distress claims. 

Therefore, the court awards costs to the Department for these

claims as well. 

D. Apportionment of Costs

The award of costs “rests within the sound discretion of the

trial judge.” EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 609 (9th

Cir. 1982). This case involved four main claims under the ADA,

the Rehabilitation Act, Section 1983 and California tort law. 

However, the ADA claim was the central claim. Because the

Department cannot recover costs for the ADA claim, and because it

was the focus of the litigation, the court awards 50% of its

total request, or $3,932.95.

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IV.

For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ motions for

judgment as a matter of law and for new trial are DENIED. 

Defendants are awarded costs in the amount of $3,932.95.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/31/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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