Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00557/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00557-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

Claims against two other defendants, J. Marshall and H. McEnroe, were dismissed

for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief.

2

The United States Marshal (“Marshal”) successfully served seven defendants, who

jointly filed the present motion; for the sake of simplicity, said parties are collectively

referred to herein as “defendants,” except where otherwise indicated. As discussed in greater

detail, infra, the Marshal was not able to serve the other five defendants.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERNANDO GUIZAR,

Plaintiff,

 v.

J. WOODFORD, et al., 

 Defendants.

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No. C 05-0557 MMC (PR) 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

REFERRING CASE TO PRO SE PRISONER

MEDIATION PROGRAM; DIRECTING

PLAINTIFF TO EFFECTUATE SERVICE

UPON OR PROVIDE COURT WITH

LOCATION INFORMATION FOR

UNSERVED DEFENDANTS; LIFTING

STAY OF DISCOVERY; INSTRUCTIONS

TO CLERK

(Docket No. 19)

On February 7, 2005, plaintiff, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at

Corcoran State Prison (“Corcoran”) and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that prison

officials violated his constitutional rights by placing him in administrative segregation and,

eventually, the secured housing unit (“SHU”) after he was validated as a gang associate. On

July 26, 2005, the Court found the complaint, liberally construed, stated cognizable claims,

and ordered the complaint served upon twelve defendants.1

 Now before the Court is

defendants’ motion for summary judgment.2

 Plaintiff has filed an opposition, to which

defendants have filed a reply.

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The following facts are undisputed and are derived from the parties’ exhibits.

2

BACKGROUND3

On July 18, 1996, plaintiff arrived at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). On

February 11, 1998, SVSP’s Institutional Gang Investigator (“IGI”), defendant M. Coziahr

(“Coziahr”), ordered plaintiff placed in administrative segregation based on evidence of

plaintiff’s gang affiliation and his participation in a conspiracy to assault inmates of other

races. (Cattermole Decl. Ex. I at AGO-67, Ex. D at AGO-06.) On March 5, 1998, plaintiff

appeared at a hearing before SVSP’s Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”), at

which defendants P. Tingey (“Tingey”), J. Basso (“Basso”), and non-defendant R. Dansby

decided to retain plaintiff in administrative segregation pending investigation of the evidence

of plaintiff’s gang affiliation and violation of prison rules. (Id., Ex. I at AGO-68, Ex. D at

AGO-06.) Subsequently, on March 31, 1998, and again on April 28, 1998, plaintiff appeared

at ICC hearings at which defendants A. Alexander (“Alexander”), A. Godfrey (“Godfrey”),

Tingey, and Basso decided to keep plaintiff in administrative segregation pending the

investigation into plaintiff’s gang activities, as well as into three Rules Violation Reports

(“RVRs”) charging plaintiff with, respectively, “conspiracy to commit murder,” “mutual

combat,” and participation in a “melee.” (Id., Ex. D at AGO-07 - AGO-08.) 

On May 5, 1998, Coziahr and defendant G. Virrueta (“Virrueta”), a staff investigator

for the IGI, sent to the Law Enforcement and Institutions Unit (“LEIU”) in Sacramento a

“gang validation package” containing three items of evidence of plaintiff’s gang

membership. (Id., Ex. E at AGO-52, 26.) The three items of evidence consisted of: (1) a

letter written by plaintiff to another inmate, in which plaintiff stated he had permission from

the “Mexican Mafia” to assault other inmates; (2) a letter from a member of the Mexican

Mafia at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), requesting that plaintiff be placed in a

leadership position with the “Border Brothers” gang; and (3) a letter from an associate of the

Mexican Mafia at PBSP, indicating that plaintiff had the authority to do business with the

Mexican Mafia. (Id., Ex. L at AGO-99.) On May 13, 1998, based on this evidence,

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4

Although plaintiff was validated as an “associate” of a gang, the parties indicate no

distinction between such validation and validation as a “gang member.” 

5

Such hearings were held approximately once a month.

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defendant S.C. Wohlwend (“Wohlwend”), a staff member of the LEIU, validated plaintiff as

an “associate” of the Mexican Mafia. (Complaint, Ex. A at 6.)

On May 27, 1998, plaintiff appeared at another ICC hearing before defendants

Tingey, G. Harris (“Harris”), and certain officials not named as defendants herein, at which

hearing plaintiff’s stay in administrative segregation was extended pending the investigation

of his gang affiliation and adjudication of the three RVRs. (Cattermole Decl., Ex. D at AGO09.) On May 29, 1998, Coziahr received notice of plaintiff’s validation as an “associate” of

the Mexican Mafia. (Id., Ex. E at AGO-52.) On June 23, 1998, plaintiff appeared at another

ICC hearing, at which defendants Tingey, R. Pottieger (“Pottieger”), and S. James (“James”),

as well as R. Ceyzyk, an official not named herein, decided to send plaintiff to the SHU for

an indeterminate term based on his validation as a gang associate.4

 (Id., Ex. D at AGO-11.) 

Thereafter, plaintiff was retained in administrative segregation until his transfer to the SHU

at Corcoran on March 31, 1999. (Id., Ex. B at AGO-02.) Meanwhile, between July 1998 and

March 1999, plaintiff appeared at periodic ICC hearings at SVSP5

 before defendants Tingey,

Pottieger, James, Harris, and Godfrey as well as various ICC officials not named herein. (Id.,

Ex. D at AGO-11 - AGO-26.) At those hearings, plaintiff requested a copy of the gang

validation package, an opportunity to refute the gang allegations and designation, and a

further review by the ICC of the documents relied upon to validate him as a gang member;

plaintiff’s requests were denied. (Complaint at 6-7.) 

On May 23, 2001, plaintiff submitted an administrative grievance at Corcoran,

alleging that the evidence used to validate him as a gang member was unreliable. 

(Cattermole Decl., Ex. M at AGO-102.) On or about October 1, 2001, in response to that

grievance at the First Level Review, defendant H. McEnroe (“McEnroe”), the Corcoran IGI,

interviewed plaintiff, explained to him the nature of the evidence relied upon, answered

questions plaintiff had posed, and denied the grievance. (Id., Ex. L at AGO-99.) On

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6

Plaintiff does not name the IGI investigator as a defendant herein.

7

Plaintiff does not name the LEIU official who made this finding as a defendant

herein.

8

Plaintiff does not name this IGI staff member as a defendant herein.

9

Both of plaintiff’s grievances subsequently were denied at higher levels of review,

and no exhaustion argument is raised herein.

4

January 3, 2002, the grievance was denied at the Second Level Review by defendant J.

Marshall (“Marshall”), the Chief Deputy Warden at Corcoran. (Id., Ex. L at AGO-100 -

AGO-101.) On September 30, 2002, an investigator with the Corcoran IGI unit6

 received

information from a confidential informant that plaintiff was participating in the trafficking of

drugs in prison for the benefit of the Mexican Mafia. (Id., Ex. L at AGO-63.) This

information was sent to the LEIU, and, on January 9, 2004, the information was found

sufficiently reliable to support plaintiff’s continued validation as a Mexican Mafia

“associate.”7

 (Id., Ex. E at AGO-57.) On July 16, 2004, in response to plaintiff’s

administrative grievance challenging the reliability of that evidence, he was interviewed at

the First Level of Review by an IGI staff member,8

 who explained the evidence to plaintiff

and denied the grievance. (Id., Ex. M. at AGO-105 - AGO-106.)9

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show there

is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those that may affect the

outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.

The court will grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof

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10In his complaint, plaintiff also claims a violation of “Federal Due Process.” To the

extent plaintiff means to claim his placement in administrative segregation violates the Due

Process Clause itself, such a claim is not cognizable. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d

1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Toussaint I”) (finding hardship associated with

administrative segregation not so severe as to violate Due Process Clause itself). 

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concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248 (holding fact is material if it might affect

outcome of suit under governing law; further holding dispute about material fact is genuine

“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party”). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record

that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to

the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the

‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)). 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; if, as to any given fact, evidence produced

by the moving party conflicts with evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court

must assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that

fact. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). The court’s function on

a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

B. Analysis

Plaintiff claims his placement in administrative segregation, and subsequent indefinite

placement in the SHU based on his validation as a gang associate, violates a state-created

liberty interest protected by due process.10 

Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from the

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laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Changes in

conditions of confinement may amount to a deprivation of a state-created and

constitutionally-protected liberty interest, provided the liberty interest in question is one of

“real substance,” see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477, 484-87 (1995), and, in particular,

where the restraint “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life,” see id. at 484. In Toussaint I, the Ninth Circuit held that

California statutes and prison regulations create a liberty interest in freedom from

administrative segregation, and spelled out the process due before a prisoner may be

segregated for administrative reasons. 801 F.2d at 1098, 1100. Toussaint I was decided

before Sandin, however, and thus did not consider whether such liberty interest was one of

“real substance,” as defined in Sandin. In Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005), the

Supreme Court held indefinite placement in Ohio’s “supermax” facility, where inmates are

not eligible for parole consideration, imposes an “atypical and significant hardship within the

correctional context.” See id. at 223-25. Because, in California, indefinite placement in the

SHU generally renders inmates ineligible for parole consideration, it would appear that

California prisoners have a liberty interest in not being placed indefinitely in the SHU. See

id. at 224-25 (recognizing harsh conditions may be necessary in light of danger posed by

high-risk inmates to prison officials and other inmates, but finding such necessity “does not

diminish [Supreme Court’s] conclusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty interest in

their avoidance”).

Where the deprivation resulting from administrative segregation or indefinite

placement in the SHU is one of “real substance,” prison officials must provide the inmate

with “‘some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present [the inmate’s]

views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer [the inmate] to

administrative segregation.’” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Toussaint I); see also Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 228-29 (determining prisoner constitutionally

entitled to informal, non-adversary procedures prior to assignment to “supermax” facility). 

Due process also requires that a prison official’s decision to place an inmate in segregation

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11The named defendants who were ICC officials at hearings resulting in plaintiff’s

retention in administrative segregation, and later placement in the SHU for an indefinite

term, are: Harris, Tingey, Alexander, Godfrey, Basso, Pottieger, and James. The IGI/LEIU

defendants involved in plaintiff’s gang validation are Coziahr, Virrueta, and Wohlwend. 

12To the extent defendants imply the ICC’s decision for such placement is solely

ministerial in nature, the regulations cited do not mandate such a finding. See, e.g., Cal.

Code Regs. § 3378(d) (providing “an inmate housed in the general populations as a gang

member or associate may be considered for review for inactive status . . . .” (emphasis

added). Further, defendants’ reliance on Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal.

1995), is misplaced. In Madrid, the district court did not find the ICC is essentially required

by regulation, or otherwise, to place an inmate in the SHU whenever validated as a gang

member or associate. Rather, the district court found the ICC is “predisposed” to doing so,

see id. at 1277, thus suggesting the ICC has the discretion to make alternative placements

following validation.

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for administrative reasons be supported by “some evidence.” Toussaint I, 801 F.2d at 1104-

05 (citing test set forth in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985)). 

Here, defendants initially argue that ICC officials did not violate plaintiff’s right to

due process because the ICC is not responsible for validating plaintiff as a gang associate.11

Defendants point out, and plaintiff does not dispute, that IGI and LEIU officials are

responsible for investigating and validating gang members, whereas ICC officials are

responsible only for deciding where prisoners are to be housed. The procedural protections

set forth in Toussaint I, however, apply when a prison official places an inmate in

administrative segregation or the SHU.12 As defendants recognize, and the undisputed

evidence indicates, ICC officials, including those named as defendants herein, were the

individuals responsible for deciding plaintiff would be placed in administrative segregation

and the SHU, and, as such, are liable for any failure to meet the procedural requirements of

due process. The Court now addresses whether any such failure occurred based on the

evidence presented herein.

In its Order of Service, the Court found plaintiff had stated a cognizable due process

claim insofar as he alleged that his gang validation was not supported by “some evidence”

and that he was denied the opportunity to present his views to prison officials regarding his

placement in administrative segregation and the SHU. The “some evidence” standard is met

if there is any evidence in the record from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal

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13Plaintiff argues there is no evidence indicating the letters have any “indicia of

reliability.” While the Ninth Circuit has required that evidence relied upon by prison

disciplinary boards contain “some indicia of reliability,” see Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703,

705 (9th Cir. 1987), there is no authority recognizing a corresponding need for evidentiary

reliability where prison officials segregate an inmate for administrative reasons. Cf.

Toussaint I, 801 F.2d at 1099-1100 (holding process due inmate placed in segregation for

disciplinary reasons greater than where placement for administrative reasons). Moreover, the

authority cited by plaintiff is distinguishable as it concerned information from a confidential

informant. Cf. Zimmerlee, 831 F.2d at 186-87. Here, the evidence relied upon comprises

intercepted correspondence from plaintiff and gang members, and in which plaintiff’s

involvement in gang activity was expressly discussed. Plaintiff cites no authority, and this

Court is aware of none, that such letters are not sufficiently reliable to meet the “some

evidence” standard.

8

could be deduced. See Toussaint I, 801 F.2d at 1105 (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455). 

Ascertaining whether the standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. 

See id. “In [their] search for some evidence,” courts adhere to the Supreme Court’s

pronouncement that the “‘evaluation of penological objectives is committed to the considered

judgment of prison administrators, who are actually charged with and trained in the running

of the particular institution.’” Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)

(quoting O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 249 (1987) (additional internal quotation and

citation omitted). Here, it is undisputed that the LEIU’s validation of plaintiff as a gang

associate in 1998 was based on the three letters described above, specifically: a letter to

another inmate from plaintiff stating plaintiff had permission from the “Mexican Mafia” to

assault other inmates, a letter from a Mexican Mafia member requesting that plaintiff be

made a leader with the “Border Brothers” gang, and a letter from another Mexican Mafia

member stating plaintiff could “do business” with the Mexican Mafia. From these three

documents, the LEIU could have deduced that plaintiff was himself an “associate” of the

Mexican Mafia.13 Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of fact that his

placement in administrative segregation and the SHU was not supported by “some evidence.” 

By contrast, a reasonable inference could be drawn from the undisputed evidence that

plaintiff was not provided with an adequate opportunity to present his views. “Due process

requires that a prisoner have ‘an opportunity to present his views’ to the official ‘charged

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with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation.’” Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Toussaint II”) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460, 476 (1983)). The officials “charged with deciding” whether plaintiff would be

placed in administrative segregation and the SHU were defendant Coziahr, when he initially

ordered plaintiff to be placed in administrative segregation on February 11, 1998, and the

ICC officials present at the hearings conducted between March 5, 1998 and March 31, 1999,

when they decided to retain plaintiff in administrative segregation and, based on his gang

validation, to send him to the SHU indefinitely. 

Defendants concede plaintiff did not have an opportunity to present his views to any

of these officials. Defendants argue, however, that any failure to provide plaintiff an

opportunity to present his views was “adequately corrected” when Corcoran IGI officials

interviewed plaintiff in response to his two administrative grievances at the First Level

Review, in October 2001 and July 2004. 

In general, violation of procedural due process rights requires only procedural

correction and not a reinstatement of the substantive right. See Raditch v. United States, 929

F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1991). In that regard, defendants are correct that providing plaintiff

with an adequate opportunity to present his views would correct the procedural due process

violation that occurred. As discussed above, however, due process requires providing an

inmate with the opportunity to present his views not simply to any prison official, but rather

“to the official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation.” 

Toussaint II, 926 F.2d at 804 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, even assuming

plaintiff was given the opportunity to present his views during the interviews with the

Corcoran IGI officials, there is no indication that those officials were “charged with”

deciding whether plaintiff would remain in the SHU. Indeed, as noted above, defendants

state it is the ICC officials, not the IGI officials, who have the authority to determine whether

an inmate is housed in the SHU. Moreover, there is an indication in the record that the

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14 Specifically, the official who interviewed plaintiff in connection with his second

administrative grievance stated that the “Corcoran IGI office does not have authority to

vacate plaintiff’s gang validation.” (See Cattermole Decl., Ex. M at AGO-105.)

10

Corcoran IGI officials did not have the authority to vacate plaintiff’s gang validation.14

Consequently, a reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence that the interviews of

plaintiff in response to his administrative grievances did not adequately correct the failure to

allow plaintiff to present his views to prison officials charged with ordering his placement in

administrative segregation and the SHU.

Defendants next argue they are entitled to qualified immunity, on the ground it was

not “clearly established” that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated when officials

placed him in administrative segregation and the SHU. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity is

whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). As discussed above,

Toussaint I clearly announced in 1986, twelve years before the prison officials’ actions at

issue herein commenced, that due process required giving an inmate an opportunity to

present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer the inmate

to administrative segregation. See Toussaint I, 801 F.2d at 1099. Moreover, this

requirement was reiterated by the Ninth Circuit prior to the actions at issue herein, see, e.g,

Barnett, 31 F.3d at 815; Toussaint II, 926 F.2d at 804, and defendants cite no authority that

would have made such requirement unclear to a reasonable prison official. Consequently,

defendants could not have reasonably believed due process did not require their providing

plaintiff with an opportunity to present his views to the officials responsible for placing him

in administrative segregation and the SHU. Under such circumstances, defendants are not

entitled to qualified immunity. 

Lastly, in its Order of Service, the Court found plaintiff stated a cognizable claim that

several defendants had failed to adequately train and supervise the prison officials who

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15The supervisor defendants are J. Woodford (“Woodford”) and E. S. Alameida

(“Alameida”), who were directors of the CDC, as well as Harris, Tingey and Alexander.

16The served defendants are: Woodford, Alameida, Harris, Tingery, Alexander,

Virrueta and Godfrey.

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placed plaintiff in administrative segregation and the SHU.15 Defendants’ only argument

with respect to these supervisor defendants is that they are not liable because their

subordinates did not violate plaintiff’s right to due process. For the reasons discussed,

however, a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the subordinate prison officials did

violate plaintiff’s right to due process in failing to allow him to present his views to officials

who placed him in administrative segregation and the SHU. 

Accordingly, none of the moving defendants is entitled to summary judgment on

plaintiff’s claims.

C. Unserved Defendants

As noted above, the Marshal was unable to serve five of the twelve defendants against

whom plaintiff stated a cognizable claim for relief. The unserved defendants are: Coziahr,

Basso, Wohlwend, Pottieger and James.16 As to these five defendants, the Marshal returned

the summons unexecuted for the reason they were not located at SVSP, where plaintiff had

indicated they could be found. 

In cases wherein the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the “officers of the court

shall issue and serve all process.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The court must appoint the Marshal

to effect service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2), and the Marshal, upon order of the court, must

serve the summons and the complaint, see Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.

1994). Although a plaintiff who is incarcerated and proceeding in forma pauperis may rely

on service by the Marshal, such plaintiff “may not remain silent and do nothing to effectuate

such service”; rather, “[a]t a minimum, a plaintiff should request service upon the appropriate

defendant and attempt to remedy any apparent defects of which [he] has knowledge.” 

Rochon v. Dawson, 828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987). 

Here, plaintiff’s complaint has been pending for over 120 days, and thus is subject to

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17The Court notes that the unserved defendants and the seven served defendants are

similarly situated with respect to plaintiff’s claims. Under such circumstances, if the parties

choose to do so, plaintiff’s claims against the unserved defendants may be resolved in the

mediation of the claims against the served defendants.

12

dismissal without prejudice as to the unserved defendants, absent a showing of “good cause.” 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Because plaintiff has not provided sufficient information to allow

the Marshal to locate and serve Coziahr, Basso, Wohlwend, Pottieger and James, plaintiff

must remedy the situation or face dismissal of his claims against them. See Walker v.

Sumner, 14 F.3d at 1421-22 (holding prisoner failed to show cause why prison official

should not be dismissed under Rule 4(m) where prisoner failed to show he had provided

Marshal with sufficient information to effectuate service). 

Accordingly, plaintiff must either himself effect service on defendants Coziahr, Basso,

Wohlwend, Pottieger and James, or provide the Court with an accurate current location such

that the Marshal is able to effect such service. Plaintiff’s failure to do so as ordered below

will result in dismissal of the claims against said defendants pursuant to Rule 4(m). 

D. Mediation Program

The court has established a Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program under which certain

prisoner civil rights cases may be referred to a neutral Magistrate Judge for mediation. In

light of the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the existence of a

triable issue of fact as to whether defendants violated plaintiff’s right to due process by not

allowing him to present his views to officials charged with placing him in administrative

segregation and the SHU, the Court finds the instant matter suitable for mediation

proceedings.17 Accordingly, the instant action will be referred to a neutral Magistrate Judge

for mediation under the Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment of defendants J.C.

Woodford, G. Virrueta, ES Alameida, Jr., GE Harris, P.E. Tingey, A. Godfrey, and A.

Alexander, is hereby DENIED. 

If plaintiff fails to effectuate service on defendants Coziahr, Basso, Wohlwend,

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Pottieger and James, or provide the Court with an accurate current location for said

defendants, within thirty (30) days of the date this order is filed, plaintiff’s claims against

said defendants will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Good cause appearing, the instant case is referred to Magistrate Judge Nandor Vadas

for the purpose of conducting mediation proceedings pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner

Mediation Program. The proceedings shall take place within 45 days of the date this order is

filed. Magistrate Judge Vadas shall coordinate a time and date for a mediation with all

interested parties and/or their representatives and, within 5 days after the conclusion of such

proceedings, file with the Court a report reflecting the outcome thereof.

Pursuant to the January 19, 2007 Order, the stay of discovery now in effect pending

the resolution of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, is hereby LIFTED.

The Clerk shall mail a copy of the court file, including a copy of this order, to

Magistrate Judge Vadas in Eureka, California.

This order terminates Docket No. 19.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 27, 2007 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-00557-MMC Document 31 Filed 03/27/07 Page 13 of 13