Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_19-cv-00569/USCOURTS-alnd-5_19-cv-00569-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM JASON PARMLEY,

Petitioner,

v.

DEWAYNE ESTES, et al.,

Respondents.

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Case No.: 5:19-cv-00569-LSC-SGC

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

by William Jason Parmley. (Doc. 1). On February 11, 2020, the magistrate judge 

entered a report recommending the claims presented in this matter be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 12). The magistrate judge further recommended 

denial of a certificate of appealability. (Id. at 15-16). Parmley has filed timely 

objections. (Doc. 15). 

Parmley’s objections essentially reiterate the claims in his habeas petition, 

which challenges his conviction and sentence for attempted marijuana trafficking. 

(Doc. 15; see Doc. 1 at 2). Specifically, Parmley’s objections assert: (1) his 

procedural default should be excused under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012); (2)

the search warrant leading to his conviction was fatally flawed and Alabama law to 

the contrary circumvents the Fourth Amendment; and (3) his plea agreement allowed 

FILED

 2020 Mar-11 AM 11:09

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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for him to go to work release and trial counsel should have objected when the 

Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) refused to honor that agreement.

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(Doc. 15 at 1-3). Each objection is addressed in turn.

A. Martinez v. Ryan

In Martinez, the Supreme Court held a “procedural default will not bar a 

federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial 

if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel . . . 

was ineffective.” 566 U.S. at 17. However, a petitioner must also demonstrate that 

the procedurally defaulted claim “is a substantial one, which is to say . . . the claim 

has some merit.” Id. at 14; see McKinnon v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 777 F. App’x 

368, 370-71 (11th Cir. 2019) (same). 

In spite of his procedural default, the magistrate judge considered Parmley’s 

claims on their merits. Thus, even if Parmley could meet the showing required by 

Martinez, he would receive no more than that already done—consideration of his 

claims on their merits. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17 (“A finding of cause and 

prejudice does not entitle the prisoner to habeas relief. It merely allows a federal 

court to consider the merits of a claim that otherwise would have been procedurally 

 1 Parmley was assigned to Limestone Correctional Facility when he filed this petition. (Doc. 1 at 

1). On August 29, 2019, Parmley notified the court he had been transferred to North Alabama 

Community Work Center. (Doc. 11). 

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defaulted.”). Because Parmley’s defaulted claims are also meritless, they are not 

substantial. Accordingly, Parmley’s claims remain barred from consideration here.

B. Search Warrant

Even if not procedurally defaulted, Parmley’s claim that the search warrant 

contained fatal defects—and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment—has no 

basis in law. The warrant contained Parmley’s address in one location and an 

incorrect address in a second location. (Doc. 1 at 13). This issue was raised in the 

trial court, which found the incorrect address was a typographical error. (Id. at 9). 

Under Alabama law, “[t]ypographical errors or misdescriptions in a search warrant 

do not necessarily render the warrant fatally defective.” Whitehead v. State, 608 So.

2d 423, 426 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). Federal law requires only that the warrant:

describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity to direct 

the searcher, to confine his examination to the place described, and to 

advise those being searched of his authority. An erroneous description 

of premises to be searched does not necessarily render a warrant 

invalid. The Fourth Amendment requires only that the search warrant 

describe the premises in such a way that the searching officer may with 

reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended. 

U.S. v. Harbison, 523 F. App’x 569, 573 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. 

Burke, 784 F.2d 1090, 1092 (11th Cir. 1986)). 

The warrant at issue here sufficiently described the place to be searched—the 

residence and vehicle of Parmley and others. Nothing before the court suggests a 

search of the incorrect address contained in the warrant resulted in Parmley’s arrest. 

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To the extent the Parmley’s repetition of this argument can be construed as an 

objection, it is devoid of merit. 

C. Work Release

 Parmley’s next contention concerns the plea agreement’s inclusion of his 

placement in work release, which was not honored by the ADOC. (Doc. 15 at 3, 6). 

Parmley seems to argue his counsel was ineffective for allowing him to enter this 

plea deal when the ADOC does not allow individuals convicted of attempted

trafficking to participate in work release. (Id. at 3-4). As stated in the report and 

recommendation, failure to satisfy due process is the sole ground on which a federal 

court may set aside a state court guilty plea. Massey v. Warden, 733 F. App’x 980, 

988 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1141 (11th Cir. 

1991). Due process requires a guilty plea be knowing and voluntary. Boykin v. 

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969). A plea is knowing and voluntary if the

defendant understood the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime. 

Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). 

The due process analysis does not consider whether a defendant received the 

precise sentence he expected. Here, Parmley expected to receive—and did 

receive—a sentence of ten years with three years to serve. The problem for Parmley 

is the ADOC’s classification of him based on his trafficking charge. While a 

sentencing court can specify work release, that specification is no more than a 

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recommendation to the state prison system; the Constitution affords no liberty 

interest in a prisoner’s classification. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) 

(“Confinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range 

of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.”); see also

Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1994). 

A federal district court may entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus 

filed by a state prisoner “only on the ground he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 

Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219-20 (2011). The ADOC’s classification of 

Parmley—based on Alabama statutes—is not grounded in federal law and therefore 

cannot form a basis for granting relief. See Curry v. Culliver, 141 F. App’x 832, 834 

(11th Cir. 2005) (citing Carrizales v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 

1983)) (“Curry’s claim on appeal is that he is entitled to a sentence reduction under 

§§ 13A-5-9(c)(3) and 13A-5-9.1. This is purely a question of state law and, as such, 

provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief.”); Waldman v. Curry, 871 F.3d 

1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2017) (prisoner’s challenge to the ADOC’s classification 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it is merely a claim that state officials 

violated state law). “Prison inmates do not have a liberty interest in discretionary 

programs such as prison classifications.” Smith v. Governor for Alabama, 562 F.

App’x 806, 817 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 

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(1976) (rejecting notion that every state action with adverse consequences for 

inmates, such as a prison classification, violates due process)). 

Parmley pleaded guilty in exchange for a ten-year sentence with three years 

to serve.2

 He received that very sentence.3 (See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 22). Parmley’s claim 

that the court rejected part of his plea agreement is refuted by the agreement, the plea 

colloquy, and the Alabama Code. (See, e.g., id. at 19, 22; Doc. 8-4 at 2-3). That 

Parmley’s prison classification does not allow for work release does not raise a 

federal claim. 

Having carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the materials in the 

court file, including the report and recommendation and the defendant’s objections, 

the magistrate judge’s report is ADOPTED and the recommendation is 

 2 As explained by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals:

Parmley was originally indicted for trafficking in marijuana, but pleaded guilty to 

attempted trafficking in marijuana, a Class A felony. See § 13A-12-203(c), 

Ala.Code 1975 (providing that an attempt to commit a controlled substance crime 

“shall be punished the same as the controlled substance crime attempted”) . . . .

Pursuant to § 13A-12-231(1)a., a defendant convicted of trafficking in marijuana 

in excess of 2.2 pounds but less than 100 pounds must be sentenced to “a mandatory 

minimum term of imprisonment of three calendar years,” and pursuant to § 13A12-232(a), Ala.Code 1975, that mandatory minimum may not be suspended. 

(Doc. 8-4 at 5). 

3 Parmley’s objections may attempt to raise a new coercion claim; he states he pled guilty because 

trial counsel told him and his wife they would receive 99 years if he did not accept the plea 

agreement and proceeded to trial. (Doc. 15 at 3). Under Alabama law, a Class A felony is 

punishable by not less than 10 and not more than life or 99 years imprisonment. This was clearly 

marked on the “Explanation of Rights and Plea of Guilty” form Parmley signed on May 15, 2017. 

(Doc. 1 at 19-20). 

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ACCEPTED. Parmley’s objections are OVERRULED. (Doc. 15). Accordingly, 

the petition for writ of habeas corpus is due to be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. A certificate of appealability will be denied. A separate Final Order 

will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED on March 11, 2020.

_____________________________

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

160704

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