Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00094/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00094-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Hostnut.Com, Inc.,

Plaintiff,

v.

Go Daddy Software, Inc., et al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV 05-0094 PHX DGC

ORDER

Third-party Defendant John La Tour has filed a M otion to Dismiss the third-party

complaint. See Doc. #17. Defendants/Count er-Plaintiffs have filed a response. See

Doc. #23. No reply has been filed.

La Tour argues that the third-part y complaint should be dismissed because he has

not ent ered into a contract with the third-party plaintiff and, although the third-party

complaint alleges t hat he and Defendant Hostnut.com have so intermingled their activities

as to justify a merger of ident ities, the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support such

an allegation.

A court may not dismiss a complaint for failure t o st at e a claim "unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would ent itle him to relief." Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994); see Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Moreover, in determining whether a complaint adequately

states a claim, it must be remembered that "[t]he federal rules require only a 'short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Gilligan v. Camco

Case 2:05-cv-00094-DGC Document 29 Filed 10/19/05 Page 1 of 3
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Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). "The Rule 8

standard contains a powerful presump t ion against rejecting pleadings for failure to state

a claim." Id. at 249 (quotation marks omitted). "All that is required are sufficient

allegat ions to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them." McKeever v .

Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). 

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim, "[a]ll allegations of material

fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable t o t he non-moving party."

Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, the Court must assume that

all general allegations "embrace what ever specific facts might be necessary to support

them." Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations

omitted).

 The third-party complaint alleges, upon informat ion and belief, that "La Tour has

disregarded the corporate form and relationship between himself and Hostnut by, among

other things, failing to adequately capitaliz e the company and/or impermissibly intermixing

personal and corp orate funds. Moreover, La Tour has so closely intermixed his actions

with those of Hostnut and t he Infringing Domain Names as to justify finding of a merger

of identities." See Doc. #10 at 5, ¶ 6. These allegations sufficiently allege that Hostnut is

an alter-ego of La Tour and that the corporate form should be disregarded for purposes of

this litigation. La Tour clearly is on notice of the nature of t hese claims, as demonstrated

by arguments made in his motion to dismiss. Moreover, under Rule 8 it is not necessary

for a third-party plaintiff to allege detailed facts in support of its claim. 

The motion to dismiss includes a number of factual exhibits designed to

demonstrate that La Tour and Hostnut have not intermingled their affairs. The Court's

focus in ruling on a mot ion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), however, is on the face of the

complaint. The Court will not, at this early stage of the litigation, consider these factual

mat ters and convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment. La Tour may file such

a motion after sufficient discovery has been completed.

Case 2:05-cv-00094-DGC Document 29 Filed 10/19/05 Page 2 of 3
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #17) is denied.

DATED this 19th day of October, 2005.

Case 2:05-cv-00094-DGC Document 29 Filed 10/19/05 Page 3 of 3