Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02693/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02693-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BERIHU HADERA FKADU,

Petitioner,

v.

LINDA PERSONS, Director,

Atascadero State Hospital,

Respondent.

 

 

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Case No. 13-CV-2693-LAB (JMA)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Berihu Hadera Fkadu

(“Petitioner”) be DENIED. 

I. Introduction

Petitioner, currently committed at Atascadero State Hospital (“ASH”)

and proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court has considered the

Petition, Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities

in support thereof, and all the supporting documents submitted by the

parties. Based upon the documents and evidence presented in this case,

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and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition

be DENIED. 

II. Factual and Procedural Background

In 1995, after Petitioner waived his right to a jury, the trial court found

Petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGI”) as to two counts of a

forcible lewd act with a child in violation of California Penal Code section

288(b) and three counts of felony assault in violation of Penal Code section

245(a)(1). (Lodgment No. 2; Lodgment No. 9 at 2; see also Pet. at 2.) The

trial court subsequently found that Petitioner had not recovered his sanity

and committed Petitioner to the State Department of Mental Health for

treatment. (Lodgment No. 9 at 2.) Petitioner was on outpatient status

during a period in 1998 and 1999, but otherwise has been confined since

his trial. (Id.) 

 On June 5, 2012, the San Diego County District Attorney (“D.A.”)

filed a petition to extend Petitioner’s commitment pursuant to Penal Code

section 1026.5. (Lodgment No. 4 at 1-19.) According to the petition,

Petitioner’s commitment was originally set to expire on October 3, 2004,

based on a maximum term of commitment set by the Community Release

Board of 6 years, 10 months, and 16 days. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner’s

maximum term of confinement had previously been extended by two years

pursuant to section 1026.5 on four separate occasions, extending

Petitioner’s maximum date of commitment to October 3, 2006, October 3,

2008, October 3, 2010, and October 3, 2012, respectively. (Id.) The D.A.’s

petition alleged that Petitioner was “still suffering from a mental disease,

defect, or disorder and by reason of such mental disease, defect, or

disorder represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (Id. at

2-3.) 

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Both Petitioner and the People waived the right to a jury trial. (Id. at

58, 75.) At the conclusion of the trial, on October 3, 2012, the trial court

found that Petitioner was still suffering from a mental disorder to such a

degree that he remained a substantial danger to himself and others. (Id. at

56, 57-58.) The court committed Petitioner for an additional two years to

October 3, 2014. (Id.) 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, arguing there

was insufficient evidence that he remained a threat to others because of

his mental illness. (Lodgment No. 6.) On April 5, 2013, in an unpublished

opinion, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. (Lodgment

No. 9.) Petitioner then filed a series of Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in the California Supreme Court in which he set forth claims that varied

from the claim he had presented to the Court of Appeal. In the first habeas

petition, he argued that (1) his trial counsel and interpreter never advised

that his commitment term could be extended beyond his maximum

sentence and (2) he was the victim of false charges. (Lodgment No. 10.) 

The petition was denied without comment on May 22, 2013. (Lodgment

No. 11.) Petitioner then filed another habeas petition in the California

Supreme Court, in which he argued that (1) his trial counsel and interpreter

never advised that his commitment term could be extended beyond his

maximum sentence, and (2) he had been denied his right to a jury trial at

each of his extension proceedings. (Lodgment No. 12.) The petition was

denied on September 18, 2013 with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750,

767-69 (1993); People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995); In re Dixon, 41

Cal. 2d 756, 759 (1953); In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949); and In re

Miller, 17 Cal. 2d 734, 735 (1941). (Lodgment No. 13.) Petitioner then

filed a third habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, in which he

argued the same two grounds as in his second petition. (Lodgment No.

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14.) The petition was denied without comment on November 26, 2013. 

(Lodgment No. 15.) 

On October 30, 2013, Petitioner constructively filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court, setting forth

four claims: (1) the charges brought against him in 1994 were false; (2) his

trial counsel never advised him that his maximum term of commitment

could be extended; (3) he would not have pled NGI had he known of

“indefinite extensions”; and (4) he was denied the right to a jury trial at each

of his extension proceedings. (Pet. at 6-9.) Respondent filed an Answer

on March 4, 2014. (Doc. No. 6.) Petitioner did not file a Traverse. 

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Habeas corpus is a "'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state

criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction

through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786

(2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)). A

federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only

on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas courts

may not "reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S.

74, 76 (2005) ("[A] state court’s interpretation of state law, including one

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal

court sitting in habeas corpus.") 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")

governs review of Petitioner's claims because he filed his federal habeas

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petition after that statute's 1996 effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 322-23 (1997). AEDPA imposes a "'highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings,'” requiring "that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24

(2002) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7). "AEDPA prevents

defendants–and federal courts–from using federal habeas corpus review

as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." 

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). "As a condition for obtaining

habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the

state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. 

"By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on

the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1)

and (d)(2)." Id. at 784. Federal habeas relief is available under the first

exception if the state court result "was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1);

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-76 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (distinguishing the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

"contrary to" test from its "unreasonable application" test). To be found an

"unreasonable application" of the precedent, the state court decision must

have been "more than incorrect or erroneous"; it "must have been

'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003)

(citations omitted); Renico, 559 U.S. at 779. A lack of holdings from the

Supreme Court on the issue presented precludes relief under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1). Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006); see also Moses v.

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Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[W]hen a Supreme Court

decision does not 'squarely address[] the issue in th[e] case’ . . . it cannot

be said, under AEDPA, there is 'clearly established' Supreme Court

precedent addressing the issue . . .," and a federal habeas court "must

defer to the state court's decision.") (citations omitted). Section "2254(d)

mandates that only Supreme Court precedential holdings clearly establish

a right, [but] our circuit precedent may provide persuasive authority for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent." Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d

757, 767 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Under the second AEDPA exception, habeas relief is available only if

the state court based its result "on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)

("Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear

and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision

adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court

proceeding, § 2254(d)(2)"). The question "is not whether a federal court

believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that

determination was unreasonable–a substantially higher threshold." Schriro

v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).

Federal courts apply AEDPA standards to the "last reasoned

decision" by a state court. Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.

2005); see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) ("Where

there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim

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[are presumed to] rest upon the same ground."). Federal habeas courts

reviewing prisoners' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 "must assess the

prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under

the 'substantial and injurious effect' standard set forth in" Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121

(2007); see also Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000)

(stating that the Ninth Circuit applies the Brecht harmless error standard

"uniformly in all federal habeas corpus cases under § 2254"). Thus, even if

constitutional error occurred, the petitioner must still demonstrate actual

prejudice, that is, that the error "had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38.

B. Petitioner’s Claims are Not Cognizable in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings 

Plaintiff asserts the following four claims in his federal petition: 

(1) the charges brought against him in 1994 were false; (2) his trial counsel

never advised him that his maximum term of commitment could be

extended; (3) he would not have pled NGI had he known of “indefinite

extensions”; and (4) he was denied the right to a jury trial at all of his

extension proceedings. (Pet. at 6-9.) Petitioner provides virtually no

argument or authority supporting his claims; instead, his petition is replete

with references to “abusive” and “dangerous” conditions of confinement,

and includes as exhibits two pages of biblical references and a fourteenpage personal history which may at some point have been provided to the

Los Angeles Times. (Id. at 15-16, 17-30.)

1. Petitioner Does Not Allege Any Violation of Federal Constitutional Rights

Only claims which allege a violation of the federal constitution, laws

or treaties are cognizable on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. §

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2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Petitioner makes no allegations

connecting his claims to any violations of his federal constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable on

federal habeas review, and recommends the petition be denied.

2. Petitioner’s Claims are Unexhausted

“The exhaustion of available state judicial remedies is ordinarily a

prerequisite to obtaining federal habeas corpus relief.” Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion

requirement if (1) he has “fairly presented” his federal claim to the highest

state court with jurisdiction to consider it, or (2) he demonstrates that no

state remedy remains available. Id. “To fairly present a federal claim, a

state prisoner must present to the state courts both the operative facts and

the federal legal theories that animate the claim.” Arrendondo v. Neven, ---

- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 4056516, at *12 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 

That is, if a state court is to be given the opportunity to correct an alleged

violation of a prisoner’s federal constitutional rights, it must be alerted that

the prisoner is asserting a claim under the U.S. Constitution. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S.

152, 162-63 (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to

a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the

facts that entitle the petitioner to relief”). “If a petitioner fails to alert the

state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his

federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised

in state court.” Johnson, 88 F.3d at 830. 

Here, Petitioner’s filings before the California Supreme Court (and,

for that matter, before the California Court of Appeal), focused exclusively

on state law. He failed to present any of the claims raised before the state

courts as federal claims. Indeed, in his state habeas petitions, Petitioner

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provided only a single citation to any legal authority. (See Lodgment No.

12 at 3 & Lodgment No. 14 at 3.) The case cited, In re Robinson, 216 Cal.

App. 3d 1510 (1990), a California state case, does not analyze a federal

issue. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005)

(stating that for purposes of exhaustion, a citation to state authority

analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same purpose as a

citation to a federal case analyzing the issue). Because Petitioner did not

“fairly present” any federal claims in state court, and thus never apprised

the state court that his claims were at all federal in nature, any purported

federal claims he asserts in his federal petition are unexhausted. See, e.g.,

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding federal

habeas claim procedurally barred because although petitioner had

presented his claim to the Washington Supreme Court, he had presented

the claim on state law grounds only). 

Petitioner can also satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

demonstrating that no state remedy remains available. Johnson, 88 F.3d

at 829. He has not done so here. “When a prisoner has deprived the state

courts of a fair opportunity to pass on his claim and state procedural rules

bar him from returning to state court, he has procedurally defaulted and is

ineligible for federal habeas relief unless he can show ‘cause and

prejudice.’” Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner has made no attempt to demonstrate cause or prejudice for any

procedural default in state habeas proceedings. 

For these reasons, federal review of Petitioner’s claims is barred, and

the Court recommends the petition be denied. 

C. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Habeas Relief

Even if federal review of his claims was not barred, Petitioner would

not be entitled to habeas relief. 

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1. Claims 1 and 2

Claims 1 and 2, in which Petitioner asserts that the charges brought

against him in 1994 were false, and that his trial counsel never advised him

that his maximum term of commitment could be extended, respectively,

both relate to the “original” 1995 trial and judgment against Petitioner. 

a. The Claims Are Time-Barred Under the AEDPA

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA applies to Petitioner’s

presentation of claims in this Court. Calderon v. U.S. District Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended on denial of

rhg. and rhg. en banc, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998), overruled on

other grounds in Calderon v. U.S. District Court, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.

1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1063 (1999). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1): 

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from

the latest of -- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Here, subparagraphs (B) and (C) plainly do

not apply, and Petitioner has provided no argument that they apply. Thus,

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either subparagraph (A) or (D) of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) applies to

Petitioner’s claims. With respect to (A), Petitioner’s 1995 judgment

became final many years ago and, with respect to (D), Petitioner was

presumably aware back in 1995 of both the factual basis for his arrest and

of his trial counsel’s advice at the time of his NGI plea and, further, has

faced recommitment every two years since 2004. In fact, Petitioner

believed that his sentence was supposed to “top out” on January 5, 2003. 

(Pet. at 15.) He was, therefore, aware then, as well as during his biannual

recommitment hearings, that his term of commitment could be extended;

thus, it cannot be said that he just recently learned of the factual predicate

of his second claim. Clearly, the statute of limitations for both of these

claims has long since passed – claim 1, nearly twenty years ago, and claim

2, over a decade ago.

b. Petitioner is Not “In Custody” in Relation to the 1995 Judgment Nor For the Previous Four Judgments of

Recommitment

Additionally, as observed by Respondent, Petitioner is no longer in

custody as a result of the 1995 judgment, nor for the first four subsequent

judgments of recommitment, and thus may not challenge those judgments. 

Rather, he is limited to challenging only his current confinement, which is

the result of the October 3, 2012 judgment in which the trial court found

that Petitioner was still suffering from a mental disorder to such a degree

that he remained a substantial danger to himself and others, and should be

committed for an additional two years to October 3, 2014. (See Lodgment

No. 4 at 56, 57-58.) In Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532

U.S. 394 (2001), the Supreme Court held that “once a state conviction is no

longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the

defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or

because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be

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regarded as conclusively valid.” Id. at 403. “If that conviction is later used

to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge

the enhanced sentence through a petition under [section] 2254 on the

ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.” Id. at

403-04; see also Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989)

(interpreting the “in custody” requirement as “requiring that the habeas

petitioner be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack at

the time his petition is filed.”) (emphasis added). 

The factual basis for both claims 1 and 2 pertain to Petitioner’s

original trial and commitment. Under Lackawanna, he cannot challenge his

current custody, which is the result of the 2012 judgment, by attacking

either his initial conviction or the first four judgments of recommitment. 

Accordingly, these claims should be denied.

2. Claim 3

Claim 3, in which Petitioner alleges, without citations to any facts or

authority, that he would not have pled NGI had he known of “indefinite

extensions,” is conclusory. It is well-settled that “conclusory allegations

which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant

habeas relief.” Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, this claim

should be denied.

3. Claim 4

Petitioner makes a single allegation that can be related to the

October 2012 judgment for recommitment. Petitioner contends that he was

denied his right to a jury trial at all extension proceedings including,

presumably, his 2012 trial. (Pet. at 9.) Nowhere, however, does Petitioner

set forth facts, argument, or authority supporting this contention, nor does

he offer any challenge to or explanation of the trial court’s clear indication

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that both sides waived their right to a jury. (See Lodgment No. 4 at 58, 75.) 

Again, an unsupported conclusory allegation does not warrant habeas

relief. Jones, 66 F.3d at 204. Thus, this claim should be denied.

4. Challenges to Conditions of Confinement

Petitioner’s petition is replete with references to what he alleges are

abusive and dangerous conditions of confinement. (See, e.g., Pet. at 7 (“I

am a victim & witness of abuses,” “Can you please save me from the ASH

unit 17 or program 3 severe & or too dangerous treatments . . . .”).) To the

extent Petitioner is challenging the conditions of his confinement at ASH,

he must do so via an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not through a

habeas petition. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir.

2003) (“Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued

incarceration lie within ‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a [section]

1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a

constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the

fact or length of his custody.”) 

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

magistrate judge finds that Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to

federal habeas relief under the applicable legal standards. Therefore, the

undersigned magistrate judge hereby recommends that the Petition be

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Larry A. Burns, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later

than October 14, 2014, any party may file written objections with the Court

and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

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“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not later than

October 24, 2014. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 23, 2014

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

14 13cv2693

Case 3:13-cv-02693-LAB-JMA Document 8 Filed 09/23/14 Page 14 of 14