Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03008/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03008-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Sanchez, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-3008 PHX ROS (VAM)

)

Dora B. Schriro, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Anthony Sanchez ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner

raises nine grounds for relief in the petition. (Doc. 1 at pp. 5-

13 and Attachments).

I. BACKGROUND

The record establishing the state procedural history of

petitioner's convictions and sentences filed by respondents is

confusing and disorganized. To the best the Magistrate Judge is

able to discern, it is as follows. Petitioner was convicted of

one count of theft (a class 6 felony), four counts of aggravated

assault (class 3 dangerous felonies), four counts of intimidating

(class 1 misdemeanors), one count of attempted second-degree

murder (a class 2 dangerous felony), and once count of attempted

first-degree murder ( a class 2 dangerous felony) on August 2,

1993. (Doc. 12, Exhibit A, Vol. 1 at 120-29, Vol. 2 at 232). As

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a result of these convictions petitioner received prison terms

totaling 30 years. (Id. at 232). 

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the

Arizona Court of Appeals. The appeal in this case was

consolidated with petitioner's conviction in another case. 

Petitioner raised the following claims for relief:

ARGUMENT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED A

PRE-SCREENING FOR COMPETENCE UNDER RULE 11, ARIZONA

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

ARGUMENT II.

IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT BOBBY V.'S TESTIMONY TO BE READ

TO THE JURY WHEN THE STATE HAD NOT MADE A SHOWING THAT

BOBBY V. WAS "UNAVAILABLE" FOR PURPOSES OF USING HIS

PRIOR RECORDED TESTIMONY.

ARGUMENT III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DEFINITION OF "REASONABLE DOUBT" SO

INFECTED THE PROCEEDINGS WITH FUNDAMENTAL ERROR AS TO

REQUIRE REVERSAL.

ARGUMENT IV.

[PETITIONER] SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO

CONSECUTIVE TERMS ON COUNTS II AND X, AND III AND XI. 

IF NOT PRESERVED, THE ERROR WAS FUNDAMENTAL.

(Doc. 12, Exhibit B at pp. i,7,9,11 and 14).

On January 9, 1996, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a

memorandum decision affirming all his convictions but vacating the

consecutive sentences he received on Counts II, III, X and XI. 

(Doc. 12, Exhibit A, Vol. 2 at 232 (p. 12)). The Arizona Supreme

Court dismissed a petition for review without comment on September

17, 1996, and the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its order and

mandate on October 11, 1996. (Doc. 12, Exhibit A, Vol. 2 at 232). 

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After he was re-sentenced, petitioner appealed his new sentences

but the appeal was dismissed at petitioner's request on April 4,

1997. (Doc. 12, Exhibit A, Vol. 2 at 260). 

On November 4, 1996, petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. Counsel was

appointed, after investigation counsel moved to withdraw and

petitioner was permitted time to file a pro se petition for Rule

32 relief. In his petition, petitioner raised numerous claims. 

(Doc. 12, Exhibit A, Vol. 2 at 282). The trial court denied the

petition. (Id.). Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court

of Appeals, but the court denied review on March 22, 2000. (Doc.

12, Exhibit A, Vol. 3 at 316). The Arizona Supreme Court also

denied review without comment on February 26, 2001. (Doc. 12 at

Exhibit G).

On April 17, 2001, petitioner filed a second Notice of PostConviction Relief in the trial court. (Doc. 12, Exhibit A, Vol. 3

at 319). On April 23, 2001, the trial court dismissed the Notice

as untimely. (Doc. 12 at Exhibit H). On May 4, 2001, petitioner

filed his second Rule 32 petition contending that he had newly

discovered evidence showing his innocence. (Doc. 12, Exhibit A,

Vol. 3 at 324). The trial court construed the filing as a motion

for reconsideration of the dismissal of the Notice and denied the

petition on June 14, 2001. (Id. at Exhibit I).

On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed for review in the Arizona

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 12 at Exhibit I). The Arizona Court of

Appeals denied the petition on April 3, 2002. (Doc. 12, Exhibit

A, Vol. 3 at 337). On July 17, 2002, the Arizona Supreme Court

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also denied review. (Doc. 12 at Exhibit M).

On March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a third Rule 32 petition

in the trial court (petitioner failed to first file a Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief). (Doc. 12, Exhibit A at 343 and Exhibit

N). The trial court denied the petition on April 4, 2003, holding

that state law precluded granting petitioner pre-sentence

incarceration credit toward the second of two consecutive prison

terms. (Doc. 12 at Exhibit P). Petitioner sought review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals and, although no record of that decision

is included in the record, relief must have been denied because

petitioner ultimately appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which

denied review on November 23, 2004. (See Doc. 12, Exhibits P, Q

and R). 

On September 19, 2005, petitioner filed a federal habeas

corpus petition raising the following grounds:

GROUND I: Appeals counsel ... rendered on the direct appeals, 

"INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL."

GROUND II: Trial counsel ... rendered during his trial

representation "INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL."

GROUND III: FIFTH AMENDMENT - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - The

trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioner

a Rule 11 pre-screening prior to trial.

GROUND IV: SIXTH AMENDMENT, FIFTH AMENDMENT, FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT - Bobby V's and Francisco A, testimony were

illegally read into trial proceedings.

GROUND V: FIFTH AMENDMENT, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - The

trial court definition of "REASONABLE DOUBT" read to the

jury was error and requires reversal.

GROUND VI: FIFTH AMENDMENT, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Joel

Marks testimony against the petitioner should be

reviewed for perjury and reversed for new trial.

GROUND VII: SIXTH AMENDMENT, FIFTH AMENDMENT, FOURTEENTH

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AMENDMENT - Newly discovered was found some evidence

after trial and appeals proceedings.

GROUND VIII: FOURTH AMENDMENT, FIFTH AMENDMENT, SIXTH

AMENDMENT, EIGHTH AMENDMENT, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT -

Direct Appeals lawyer failed to raise key issues grounds

(1-10).

GROUND IX: FOURTH AMENDMENT, SIXTH AMENDMENT, FIFTH

AMENDMENT, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Admission of evidence

of prior bad acts at trial were irrelevant.

(Doc. 1 at pp. 5-13 and Attachments). 

II. DISCUSSION

Respondents first seek denial of the petition on the basis

that all petitioner's claims are barred by the statute of

limitations. (Doc. 12 at pp. 10-16).

A. Statute of Limitations

1. Law Generally

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of

limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and

sentences rendered by state courts. This provision, codified at

28 U.S.C. § 2244, states, in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State

action;

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.

In Calderon v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California ("Beeler")(en banc), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed the new limitations period

contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court noted that prior

to § 2244(d)’s enactment "state prisoners had almost unfettered

discretion in deciding when to file a federal habeas petition" and

that "delays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a

prisoner from seeking relief." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1286.

The Court noted, however, that the provisions of § 2244(d)

"dramatically changed this landscape" and a petitioner was now

"required to file his habeas petition within one year of the date

his process of direct review came to an end." Id. The Court,

following other circuits, also held that the period of limitations

"did not begin to run against any state prisoner prior to the

statute’s date of enactment" of April 24, 1996. Beeler, 128 F.3d

at 1287. 

The Beeler Court also held § 2244(d) established a customary

statute of limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." Id.

at 1288-89. The statute itself provided for tolling the

limitations period when a "properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

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However, the Court cautioned that equitable tolling of the

limitations period "will not be available in most cases but will

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time." 

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United

States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (3rd Cir. 1997)).

2. Application to Facts of the Case

The limitations period was tolled during the pendency of

petitioner's direct appeal proceedings (including action before

and following remand for re-sentencing) and during the pendency of

petitioner's first Rule 32 proceeding (these proceedings

overlapped). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Of these two

proceedings, petitioner's first Rule 32 was the last to end on

February 26, 2001, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied the

petition for review. (Doc. 12 at Exhibit G). 

Petitioner had nothing pending in state court until he filed

a second Rule 32 petition in the trial court on April 17, 2001, a

period of 49 days (February 27 through April 16, 2001). See Dils

v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001) (no tolling in gap

between separate post-conviction proceedings); Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (no tolling between end of direct

appeal and filing of first state collateral proceeding because no

case was "pending" during the interval), cert. denied, 529 U.S.

1104 (2000). The limitations period remained tolled until July

17, 2002, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the

second Rule 32. (Doc. 12 at Exhibit M). 

The statute of limitations re-started and ran from the

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completion of proceedings in the second Rule 32 on July 17, 2002,

until petitioner filed a third Rule 32 petition on March 12, 2003,

a period of 237 days. See Dils, 260 F.3d at 986; Nino, 183 F.3d

at 1006. The limitations period was tolled from March 12, 2003,

through November 23, 2004, when the Arizona Supreme Court again

denied the petition for review. (See Doc. 12 at Exhibits A at

343, N, P, Q and R). The limitations period the re-started and 

ran from that time until petitioner filed his federal habeas

corpus petition on September 19, 2005, a period of 299 days. 

(Doc. 1 at p. 16A). 

As a result, by the time petitioner filed his habeas

petition, 585 days of untolled time elapsed. Thus, the habeas

petition is untimely by 220 days. Unless petitioner has presented

a sufficient basis for equitable or statutory tolling his claims

will be time-barred. 

In his reply, petitioner merely states that his petition is

timely and that since a previous petition filed by him challenging

a different state court conviction was deemed timely this also

must be timely. (Doc. 14 at p. 2). This is insufficient to

establish grounds for either statutory or equitable tolling. 

Because petitioner's claims were not filed within the 1-year

limitations period they are time-barred.

Because the Magistrate Judge believes petitioner's claims are

barred by the statute of limitations, it is not necessary to

address the merits of petitioner's claims or any claims of

procedural default raised by respondents.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

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Habeas Corpus be denied as untimely. 

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

and order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 12th day of January, 2006.

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