Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01600/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01600-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jay Lynn Pember, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-11-1600-PHX-SMM (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 4) Respondents have filed an Answer, doc. 14, to which Petitioner

has replied, doc. 21. The Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted in this

case. See Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011) (holding that, when a

petitioner seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal courts are restricted to

the state court record when deciding claims previously adjudicated on the merits by the state

courts.). After consideration, it is recommended that the Petition be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Trial and Sentencing

On August 26, 2005, the State of Arizona filed an indictment, charging Petitioner

and several co-defendants with various felonies arising out of a riot at the Arizona State

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 1 Citations to “Respondents’ Exh.” are to exhibits A-O that appear at docket no. 14, exhibits

P-NN at docket no. 15, and exhibits OO-OOO at docket no. 16. 

 2 The Honorable David R. Cole presided. 

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Prison, Lewis Complex. (Respondents’ Exh. A1) The State further alleged that Petitioner

had seven prior historical felony convictions. (Respondents’ Exh. C) Petitioner’s case

proceeded to trial2

 and, on May 4, 2006, the jury convicted him of the following offenses:

(1) aggravated assault as to Correctional Officer Schwartz (Count 2); (2) prisoner who

commits assault with intent to riot/prisoner who participates in a riot (Count 3); (3)

aggravated assault as to Correctional Captain Yielding (Count 4); and (4) burglary in the

third degree (Count 5). (Respondents’ Exhs. S, W) 

The trial court subsequently conducted a separate jury trial on the State’s allegations that Petitioner committed Counts 2-5 in the presence of an accomplice. (Respondents’

Exh. S, doc. 15-1 at 135-148) The jury found that the State had proved the charges beyond a

reasonable doubt as to Counts 2, 3, and 5, but not as to Count 4. (Respondents’ Exh. S at 22,

doc. 15-1 at 150; Exh. W) On June 6, 2006, the court conducted a combined trial on allegations of prior convictions and sentencing hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. T at 2, doc. 15-1 at

168) Petitioner admitted two of the prior historical felonies. (Respondents’ Exh. T at 3-5,

doc. 15-1 at 169-171) That same day, the court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of

five years in prison on Counts 2 and 4 (aggravated assault), ten years on Count 5 (thirddegree burglary), and twelve years “flat” on Count 3 (riot). The court further ordered that the

riot sentence run consecutively to Petitioner’s existing prison sentence, and that his remaining sentences run concurrently with the riot sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. U at 14-15; doc.

15-1 at 191-192) On February 5, 2007, the trial court entered a minute entry “amending” the

sentencing minute entry to provide that, “following expiration of the sentence imposed in

connection with Count I, defendant is sentenced to a term of community supervision

pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-603.” (Respondents’ Exh. AA, doc. 15-2 at 19) 

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B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner filed a timely appeal asserting the following claims: (1) the trial court

erred by excusing a Michigan resident from the jury pool in Petitioner’s absence before voir

dire; (2) Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s security

precautions, which required that Petitioner and his co-defendants remain in leg and ankle

chains (that were not visible to the jury), and that one time, a juror heard a deputy snap

handcuffs on Petitioner; (3) the court of appeals should: (i) amend the trial court’s

sentencing minute entry to clarify the date of commencement of Petitioner’s 12-year

consecutive sentence for the prison riot and state that Petitioner’s offenses were “repetitive;”

and (ii) remand the matter to allow the trial judge to clarify whether Petitioner’s sentences

for assault and third-degree burglary run concurrently with Petitioner’s sentence for prison

riot. (Respondents’ Exhs. DD, EE, FF) On November 26, 2008, the appellate court found

that trial court did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights by excusing the Michigan

jury-pool member, and any error was harmless; Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was

prejudiced by the security measures, and the fact that the jury inadvertently learned that one

of the defendants was in handcuffs was harmless error; and that the sentencing discrepancies

could, and would, be resolved by the appellate court on the record. (Respondents’ Exh. II,

doc. 15-2 at 167-182)

C. Post-Conviction Review

1. First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

On December 12, 2008, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the

trial court pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Respondents’ Exh. JJ, doc. 15-2 at 184) The court

appointed counsel who informed the court that she could find no claims to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. (Respondents’ Exhs, KK, LL, doc. 15-2 at 188-193) After receiving

several extensions of time, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 

(Respondents’ Exhs. NN, doc. 15-2 at 197-209; Exh. PP, doc. 16 at 4) Petitioner alleged:

(1) a due process violation based on the failure to grant a Rule 11 hearing; (2) ineffective

assistance of trial counsel related to the Rule 11 request; (3) denial of severance from coCase 2:11-cv-01600-SMM Document 23 Filed 06/19/12 Page 3 of 28
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 3 Respondents advise the Court that the Amended Petition appears timely under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d) and do not raise a statute of limitations defense. (Doc. 14 at 13) The Court agrees

that the Petition is timely and declines to address this issue further. 

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defendants; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move to sever Petitioner’s

trial; (5) prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error for showing photographs of tattoos;

(6) ineffective assistance of trial counsel related to photographs of tattoos; (7) the trial court

erred for failing to grant a mistrial when some jurors heard Petitioner being handcuffed; and

(8) denial of “right to be present twice on resentencing” as a result of the superior court’s

minute entry adding community service and the court of appeals’ rulings concerning

Petitioner’s sentences. (Respondents’ Exh. PP, doc. 16 at 5) 

On January 19, 2010, the trial court denied Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction

relief. (Respondents’ Exh. VV, doc. 16-1 at 2) The court found claims 1, 3, 5 and 8 precluded and rejected the remaining claims on the merits. The court further noted that

Petitioner’s reply brief attempted to allege “neglect and error” by appellate counsel, but

found that issue “waived” by Petitioner’s failure to include it in his original petition. (Id.) 

On March 26, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals which was summarily denied on August 4, 2011. (Respondents’ Exh. WW, doc.

16-1 at 6; Exh. AAA, doc. 16-1 at 84) 

2. Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

On March 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Respondents’ Exh. BBB, doc. 16-1 at 88) On March 24, 2010, the trial court dismissed the

petition. (Respondents’ Exh. CCC, doc. 16-1 at 92) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona

Court of Appeals, which was denied on December 6, 2011. (Respondents’ Exhs. DDD, doc.

16-1 at 95; Exh. GGG, doc. 16-1 at 157) 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On August 15, 2011, Petitioner filed a timely3

 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 1, and an Amended Petition on October 23, 2011, doc. 4. 

Petitioner raises the following claims for relief: 

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Ground One: Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an

impartial jury, to be present at critical stages of the case, and to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment were violated when the court conducted portions of jury selection in the

absence of Petitioner and his attorney. 

Ground Two: Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated by the trial court’s security precautions, which required that Petitioner and his codefendants remain in leg and ankle chains, and the fact that, on one occasion, a juror heard a

deputy snap handcuffs on Petitioner.

Ground Three: Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated based on appellate counsel’s representation and the Court of Appeals’ rulings

regarding his sentence. 

Ground Four: Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated because the trial court amended its sentencing minute entry to require Petitioner to perform community service following his release, without notice to Petitioner or

Petitioner’s presence in the courtroom. (Doc. 4) The Petition is fully briefed. For the reasons

set forth below, the Petition should be denied. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

Respondents argue that portions of Grounds One and Two, and all of Grounds

Three and Four are procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review because they

were not fairly presented as federal claims to the state court, and because the State court

denied those claims on an adequate and independent state-law ground. (Doc. 14 at 14) The

Court will consider the procedural bar issue below. 

A. Applicable Law 

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless

the petitioner has exhausted the state remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). When

seeking habeas relief, the petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has properly

exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (per

curiam). The exhaustion inquiry focuses on the availability of state remedies at the time the

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petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed in federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838 (1999). The prisoner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(c). In other words, proper exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state

courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete

round of the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.

“One complete round” includes filing a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review

is part of the ordinary appellate review procedure in the State.” Id. 

To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity

to rule upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s

“highest” court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349

(1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the State with

the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate

state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”). In Arizona,

unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if

the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. Crowell v. Knowles , 483 F.Supp.2d

925 (D.Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

In addition to presenting his claims to the proper court, a state prisoner must fairly

present his claims to that court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. A claim is “fairly

presented” in state court only if a petitioner has described both the operative facts and the

federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28. It is not enough that

all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state court or that a

“somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Id. (stating that a reference to ineffective

assistance of counsel does not alert the court to federal nature of the claim). Rather, the

habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the specific constitutional guarantee upon which

he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

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protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a

federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended

on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th

Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner to have made “a general appeal to a constitutional

guarantee,” such as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a

“fair trial”). Likewise, a mere reference to the “Constitution of the United States” does not

preserve a federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). Even if the

basis of a federal claim is “self-evident” or if the claim would be decided “on the same

considerations” under state or federal law, the petitioner must make the federal nature of the

claim “explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the federal courts . . . .” Lyons,

232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim to the state court if the court

must read beyond the pleadings filed in that court to discover the federal claim. Baldwin,

541 U.S. at 27. 

In sum, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2)

through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds such as

waiver or preclusion. See Beard v. Kindler, ___ U.S.___, 130 S.Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009); Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Thus, a

petitioner may be barred from raising federal claims that he did not preserve in state court by

making a contemporaneous objection at trial, on direct appeal, or when seeking postconviction relief. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that failure to

raise contemporaneous objection to alleged violation of federal rights during state trial

constitutes a procedural default of that issue); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th

Cir. 1991) (finding claim procedurally defaulted where the Arizona Court of Appeals held

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that habeas petitioner had waived claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal or in first

petition for post-conviction relief.). If the state court also addressed the merits of the underlying federal claim, the “alternative” ruling does not vitiate the independent state procedural

bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Carringer v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333

(9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court found ineffective assistance of counsel claims “barred

under state law,” but also discussed and rejected the claims on the merits, en banc court held

that the “on-the-merits” discussion was an “alternative ruling” and the claims were procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review). A higher court’s subsequent summary

denial of review affirms the lower court’s application of a procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. at 803. However, “in order to constitute adequate and independent grounds sufficient to

support a finding of procedural default, a state rule must be clear, consistently applied, and

well-established at the time of Petitioner’s default.” Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010

(9th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court had held that “a discretionary state procedural rule can

serve as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas review,” and that “a discretionary rule can

be ‘firmly established’ and ‘regularly followed’ - even if the appropriate exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases but not in others.” 

Kindler, 130 S.Ct. at 618. Likewise, occasionally excusing non-compliance with a

procedural rule does not render a state procedural bar inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489

U.S. 401, 410-12 n. 6 (1989). 

Arizona courts have been consistent in their application of procedural default

rules. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Arizona Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural bar); Cook v. Schriro,

538 F.3d 1000, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[p]reclusion of issues for failure to present

them at an earlier proceeding under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) ‘are

independent of federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling

on the merits.’”) (footnote omitted) (quoting Smith, 536 U.S. at 860); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149

F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that Arizona courts have not “strictly

or regularly” followed Rule 32). 

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The second procedural default scenario arises when a petitioner failed to present

his federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the

state courts’ procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the

previously unraised claims. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v.

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d

1035, 1048-53 (Ariz. 1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3)

(post-conviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must

be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state post-conviction action is futile

where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th

Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Az.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of

an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)).

This type of procedural default is known as “technical” exhaustion because although the

claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an available state

remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal

claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no remedies

any longer ‘available’ to him.”).

 In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004); Hughes, 800 F.2d at 907-08. To establish “cause,” a

petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following objective factors may

constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal

basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance

of counsel. Id. Ordinarily, the ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings

does not constitute cause because “the right to counsel does not extend to state collateral

proceedings or federal habeas proceedings.” Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301,

1306 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a habeas

petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

constitutional dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v.

Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the

court need not reach the prejudice prong. 

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. To satisfy the fundamentalmiscarriage-of-justice standard, a petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Id. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). Even if a petitioner asserts a claim of actual

innocence to excuse his procedural default of a federal claim, federal habeas relief may not

be granted absent a finding of an independent constitutional violation occurring in the state

criminal proceedings. Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94. 

B. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts various constitutional theories based on the trial

court’s pre-voir dire exclusion of a prospective juror based on her representation that she

was from Michigan, paid taxes in Michigan, had a Michigan driver’s license, and did not

consider herself an Arizona resident. The Court agrees with Respondents that, only the same

factual and legal theories that Petitioner presented to the states courts are properly before

this Court. To the extent that Petitioner attempts to expand his claim regarding the exclusion

of the Michigan juror to include an Eighth Amendment claim, such claim is procedurally

barred because it was not presented to the State courts on direct appeal or post-conviction

review. 

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C. Ground Two

In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts various constitutional theories based on the fact

that he was restrained with a leg and ankle chain during trial, and that a juror heard a guard

put handcuffs on a defendant when they were leaving the courtroom. The Court agrees with

Respondents that only the facts and legal theories that Petitioner presented to the State courts

are properly before this Court on habeas corpus review. To the extent Ground Two expands

on the claims raised in the State courts - to assert an Eighth Amendment claim - such a claim

is procedurally barred. 

D. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that (i) he received ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel based on counsel’s request that the court of appeals clarify Petitioner’s

sentence, and counsel’s failure to raise the “many issues” that Petitioner claims he requested

counsel to raise on direct appeal; and (ii) the court of appeals’ ruling on Petitioner’s

sentences violated Petitioner’s rights to due process and counsel, and to be free from double

jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment. Respondents argue that these claims are

procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

First, Respondents assert that Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel are procedurally defaulted and barred from review because Petitioner did

not raise a federal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the State courts. 

Alternatively, Respondents argue that federal review of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel are barred by the State courts’ denial of such claims based on

an adequate and independent state law ground. The Court agrees. Although Petitioner’s first

petition for post-conviction relief mentions his dissatisfaction with appellate counsel’s

request that the court “correct” his sentence, Petitioner did not allege that counsel was

ineffective, let alone that he was ineffective under the Sixth Amendment. (Respondents’

Exh. PP at 8-9, doc. 16 at 15-16) Although Petitioner’s reply referred to “neglect and error

by incompetent appellate counsel,” Respondents’ Exh. UU, doc. 16 at 176- 216, the Superior

Court found that any claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was waived

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because Petitioner raised that issue for the first time in his reply. (Respondents’ Exh. VV,

doc. 16-1 at 1-5) Consequently, the State court rejected that claim on adequate and

independent state law grounds. Further, although Petitioner’s second petition for postconviction relief also complained that “direct appeal counsel would not raise issues on

appeal,” and “issues were precluded because counsel was ineffective, and did not raise them,

after ask[ed] many times,” Petitioner did not cite the Sixth Amendment or federal law. 

(Respondents’ Exh. BBB, doc. 16-1 at 89) Accordingly, Petitioner did not fairly present a

federal claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to the State courts. 

In summary, Petitioner did not exhaust a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel in the State courts and such claim is procedurally barred from 

federal habeas corpus review. 

In Ground Three, Petitioner further argues that his constitutional rights were

violated because the court of appeals’ ruling concerning Petitioner’s sentence (the

“clarification” claim) were unwarranted and erroneous and constituted a new sentence (the

“new sentencing” claim) at which Petitioner was not present. Petitioner did not properly

exhaust these claims. Petitioner did not present the clarification claim to the State courts,

thus it is procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review. Although Petitioner raised

his new sentence claim in his first petition for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction

court rejected that claim as precluded pursuant to an adequate and independent State law

ground, and therefore is it procedurally barred. (Respondents’ Exhs. PP, VV) 

E. Ground Four

In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that the trial court’s post-sentencing minute

entry imposing a “community supervision” component to Petitioner’s sentence on Count I

violated various constitutional rights. Although Petitioner arguably presented this as a

federal claim in his first petition for post-conviction relief, the claim is procedurally defaulted and barred from review because the post-conviction court rejected the claim based

on an adequate and independent state law ground, specifically, that Petitioner failed to raise

the claim on appeal. (Respondents’ Exh. VV) 

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F. Overcoming the Procedural Bar

As set forth above, portions of Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds One and

Two, and all of Grounds Three and Four are procedurally defaulted and barred from review

unless Petitioner demonstrates “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50; Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). 

1. Cause and Prejudice

To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external

to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Murray, 477

U.S. at 488-492. The following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by

state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably

available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Prejudice is actual

harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby, 741 F.2d at 244. Where a

petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, the court need not consider

whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional

violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

Petitioner does not assert any basis which is sufficient to overcome the procedural

bar. Because Petitioner offers no legitimate “cause” which precluded him from properly

exhausting his State remedies, the Court need not reach the issue of prejudice. Engle, 456

U.S. at 134 n. 43. 

2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that failure to consider his defaulted claims

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A federal court may review the merits of

a procedurally defaulted habeas claim if the petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider

the merits of his claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup, 513

U.S. at 327. A “fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation

has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. 

This gateway “actual innocence” claim differs from a substantive actual innocence

claim. Smith v. Baldwin, 466 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court

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described the gateway showing in Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-16, as a less stringent standard

than a substantive claim of actual innocence. See also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463,

476 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a “habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence

claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt and must affirmatively prove that

he is innocent.”). If Petitioner passes through the Schlup gateway, a court is only permitted

to review his underlying constitutional claims. Smith, 466 F.3d at 807. The fundamentalmiscarriage-of-justice exception applies only to a “narrow class of cases” in which a

petitioner makes the extraordinary showing that an innocent person was probably convicted

due to a constitutional violation. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 231. To demonstrate a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, Petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation has resulted in

the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id. at 327. To establish the requisite

probability, Petitioner must prove with new reliable evidence that “it is more likely than not

that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

New evidence presented in support of a fundamental miscarriage of justice may include

“exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324; see also, House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518

(2006) (stating that a fundamental miscarriage of justice contention must involve evidence

that the trial jury did not have before it). 

Petitioner has not established that, in light of newly discovered evidence, “it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327.

III. Standard of Review 

Respondents concede that Petitioner’s remaining claims are properly before the

Court on habeas corpus review. Respondents, however, argue that Petitioner is not entitled

to habeas corpus relief because he has not established that the Arizona courts’ resolution of

his claims was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts; or that the Arizona

courts’ determination was either contrary to, or based upon an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 

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This Court’s consideration of the merits of Petitioner’s claims is constrained by the

applicable standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended in 1996 by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The ADEPA “modified a

federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent

federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the

extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). The standard in 

§ 2254(d) is “meant to be” “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S., ___ , 131

S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Section “2254 stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal

court relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings.” Id. (citations

omitted). “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme

malfunction in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error

correction through appeal.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 (1979)).

Federal habeas relief may not be granted for claims subject to § 2254(d) unless it is

shown that the earlier state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law then clearly

established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); or that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such

law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in

light of the record before the state court, § 2254(d)(2). Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785; see also

Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). To determine whether a state court

ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable application” of federal law, federal

courts look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court which existed at the time of the

state court’s decision. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ___ , ___,

130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866 (2010)). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that it cannot reverse a

state court decision merely because that decision conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on a

federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004); Clark v.

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Even if the state court neither explains its

ruling nor cites United States Supreme Court authority, the reviewing federal court must

nevertheless examine Supreme Court precedent to determine whether the state court

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reasonably applied federal law. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784 (citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3,

8 (2003)). The Supreme Court held in Early, and recently reaffirmed in Richter, that citation

to federal law is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute “does not even

require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts them.” Early, 537 U.S. at 8; Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784. “Where a

state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden

still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state to deny relief. This

is so whether or not the state court reveals which of the elements in a multipart claim it

found insufficient, for § 2254(d) applies when a ‘claim’, not a component of one, has been

adjudicated.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784.

Under § 2254(d), a state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a

rule of law “that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme

Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.”

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted); Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. A

state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court identifies

the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular case. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An incorrect

application of federal law does not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.

652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state

court's decision is objectively unreasonable.”). “A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on

the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. 786 (citing Yarborough,

541 U.S. at 664). “‘[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires

considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in

reaching outcomes in case-by-case determination.’” Id. (citing Yarborough, 541 U.S. at

664). 

The habeas court presumes that the state court’s factual determinations are correct

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and petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (stating that “a determination of factual issues made by a

State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting

the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); Williams v. Rhoades,

354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Where a state court decision is deemed “contrary to” or an “unreasonable

application of” clearly established federal law, the reviewing court must next determine

whether it resulted in constitutional error. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n. 6 (9th

Cir. 2002). On habeas review, the court assesses the prejudicial impact of most

constitutional errors by determining whether they “had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623

(1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Fry v.

Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007) (the Brecht standard applies whether or not the state court

recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). The Brecht harmless error analysis

also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a

“substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141,

145-57 (1998) (holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on constitutional error in

capital penalty phase, error must have had substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s

verdict in the penalty phase.); Hernandez v. LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441 (N.D.Cal. Aug.

18, 2006) (finding that even if the evidence of three of petitioner’s prior convictions was

insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by the court’s consideration of those convictions

because the trial court found four other prior convictions which would have supported

petitioner’s sentence.) The Court will review Petitioner’s claims under the applicable

standard of review.

IV. Analysis

A. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that his constitutional rights were violated when

the trial court excused a prospective juror outside of Petitioner’s presence. As set forth

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below, this claim lacks merit.

On April 10, 2006, before any prospective jurors were sworn in, the trial court

conducted a pre-trial conference, which defendants and their attorneys attended. (Respondents’ Exh. G, doc. 14-1 at 85) During the conference, the judge informed the parties that

he was going to speak with the prospective jurors, and direct them to report back the

following day. (Respondents’ Exh. G at 18, doc. 14-1 at 102) After counsel and the

defendants left, the prospective jurors were brought into the courtroom. On the record, the

trial court informed the 65 prospective jurors that they should return the following day to

start jury selection. (Id. at 19-21; Id. at 103-05) The court then answered administrative

questions concerning child care, the trial schedule, payment and the like. (Id.) During that

time, prospective Juror Number 8 advised the court that she was not a full-time resident of

Arizona, but only spent three months of the year in Arizona. (Respondents’ Exh. G at 24-25;

doc. 14-1 at 108-109) In response to the court’s questions, Juror Number 8 stated that she

paid taxes only in Michigan, had a Michigan driver’s license, and considered herself a

Michigan resident. (Id.) The court excused Juror Number 8 and stated that it would “give her

number to somebody else tomorrow, along with the other additional prospective jurors we’ll

have tomorrow.” (Id.) The next day, 78 prospective jurors reported, were sworn in, and the

jury selection began. (Respondents’ Exh. H at 24, doc. 14-1at 135) 

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court violated his due process

rights by conducting a stage of jury selection in his absence. (Respondents’ Exh. DD at 20,

doc. 15-2 at 39) The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim. Although the court

recognized that a criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to be present at all stages of

the criminal proceedings, including jury selection,” it held that exclusion from a “minor

portion” of the selection process was “harmless error.” (Respondents’ Exh. II, doc. 15-2 at

169) The appellate court explained that the trial court excused the juror for a “neutral”

reason based on her qualification to serve, and the juror was excused “before the jury panel

was actually sworn in or seated and before voir dire began to uncover any prejudices that

jurors might have brought to this specific case.” (Id. at 5, Id. at 171) The appellate court

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further emphasized that, although Petitioner had a right to a “fair trial and an impartial jury,”

he did not have a right to be tried by “any particular jury,” and that he had not claimed that

“the jury he received was not fair and impartial.” (Id. at 6, Id. at 172)

Petitioner has not shown that the State courts’ rejection of Petitioner’s due process

claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). “The Constitution . . . does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only

that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury.” Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729

(1992). To determine whether the manner in which voir dire was conducted afforded a

criminal defendant his due process rights, the reviewing court inquires whether the alleged

restriction on voir dire interfered with the trial court’s ability to remove prospective jurors

who would not be able to impartially follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the

evidence. Id. at 729-30. Here, as the appellate court found, the trial court’s actions did not

interfere with that process. 

In Morgan, which Petitioner cites in support of his claim, the trial court restricted a

capital defendant from inquiring into the prospective juror’s views on capital punishment,

including whether the prospective juror would automatically vote for the death penalty. 504

U.S. at 729. Unlike Morgan, the trial court did not impose such a restriction in this case.

Rather, the trial court simply excused an individual who was not qualified to serve under

State law. 

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s exclusion of the Michigan juror may have

prejudiced him because, if Petitioner “and his counsel had been present, they might have

been able to influence the jury selection process,” making it “impossible at this time to

qualify the resulting harm.” (Respondents’ Exh. DD at 21-22) Petitioner’s argument is

speculative and, even if the trial court erred in excusing the Michigan juror, such error

would not satisfy the Brecht standard which requires federal habeas corpus petitioners to

demonstrate that the alleged error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 623; see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22

(2007) (holding “that in § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of

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constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial and injurious effect’

standard set forth in Brecht . . . whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error

and reviewed it for harmlessness. . . .”). 

B. Ground Two

In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that his constitutional rights were violated by the

trial court’s security measures, which required Petitioner and his three co-defendants to

remain in leg and ankle chains (“leg restraints”), and because on one occasion, a juror heard

a deputy snap handcuffs on Petitioner. As discussed below, this claim lacks merit.

1. Relevant Facts

a. Facts related to leg restraints 

On April 11, 2006, the day scheduled for voir dire, counsel for co-defendant

Jiminez, Mr. Beresky, informed the court that he had just learned that his client and his codefendants, including Petitioner, would be kept in leg restraints during trial. (Respondents’

Exh. H at 12-13; doc. 14-1 at 123-24) Mr. Beresky raised an objection, in which Petitioner’s

counsel joined. (Id. at 15, Id. at 126) Counsel stated that “visible leg chains under the tables

and especially under the two tables . . . that don’t [have] any sort of covering around them

would prejudice . . . my client.” (Respondents’ Exh. H at 13, doc. 14-1 at 124) The court

responded that the problem could be resolved by rearranging the tables so the defendants sat

at tables with solid fronts. (Id.) Counsel further objected to the leg restraints, arguing that,

when the defendants moved, the jurors would likely “hear the chains rattling under the

table.” (Id. at 13-14, Id. at 124-25) The court stated that he would do his best to make sure

the jurors did not hear or see anything they shouldn’t. Sergeant Lewis advised the trial court

that the size of the tables and the fact that the defendants’ chains were underneath their socks

should limit the sound of the restraints. (Respondents’ Exh. H at 14-18, doc. 14-1 at 125-

129) The court stated that, to further consider the issue, they should listen to the defendants

as they walked into the courtroom, outside of the jurors’ presence, and also advise the

defendants of the concerns raised regarding the leg restraints. (Id.) 

After Petitioner and his co-defendants were brought into the courtroom, outside of

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the jurors’ presence, the court instructed the defendants:

I want to tell these three gentlemen that we have gone to great lengths

to make sure that nobody sees or hears anything that they should not 

hear or see. I think you gentlemen know what I am talking about. We

will not be seating anybody in [the] row directly behind you. And . . . I’m 

hoping counsel talked to you about any unnecessary noise that [you] might

make that might . . . tip any member of the prospective jury off to something

they shouldn’t know. Do you need additional [time] to speak to your client

before I call the panel in?

(Respondents’ Exh. H at 23, doc. 14-1 at 23) Petitioner’s counsel responded that he wanted

a few minutes with his client, which the court allowed. (Id.) Thereafter, Petitioner did not

object to any of the measures taken by the court to ensure the jurors would not learn that

Petitioner and his co-defendants were in leg restraints. During trial, outside of the jury’s

presence, the court made the following comment:

There’s one more thing I’m going to make this as clear as I can to all defendants

right now, and, make no mistake about this, I’ve been advised by two members of 

the court staff that [Petitioner] has attempted on more than one occasion to let 

the jury know as they’re passing by right here that he is, in fact, in custody. Now,

whether he’s doing it or not, I haven’t seen it, but I better not see it, and I better 

not see any more note passing between the defendants in this case. 

(Respondents’ Exh. Q at 4, 10; doc. 15 at 179, 185)

b. Facts related to handcuffing incident

During the seventh day of trial, when the jury was leaving for a break, Deputy

Sheriff Armendariz - whose back was to the departing jurors, prematurely snapped a handcuff on Petitioner’s wrist. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 56-64; doc. 15 at 57-65) Eight or nine of

the jurors were still in the courtroom. (Id. at 63-64, Id. at 64-65) Petitioner moved for a

mistrial. (Id. at 62, Id. at 63) Before ruling on Petitioner’s motion, the trial court interviewed the jurors, one at a time, to determine what they had seen or heard. (Id. at 67-96, Id.

at 68-97) The court generally inquired whether, when exiting the courtroom, the jurors had

seen or heard anything out of the ordinary, or whether any other jurors had mentioned seeing

or hearing anything. If a juror responded affirmatively, the court followed up. The court

concluded that no juror saw the handcuffing; the only juror who heard anything was Juror

Number 3 who heard a “clicking sound,” guessed it was handcuffs, and had mentioned what

he heard when he entered the jury room. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 70-72, Doc. 15 at 71-73)

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The court also found that Jurors Number 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, and 14 had either heard Juror

Number 3’s comment, or other jurors’ subsequent reference to handcuffs. (Respondents’

Exh. P at 75-78, 80-84, 89-91, 93-95) Juror Number 13 provided a detailed description of

the jurors’ discussion, and testified that a male juror had indicated that he thought he heard

“cufflinks” being snapped on one of the defendants. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 90, doc. 15 at

91) The trial court brought those jurors who had made or heard the comments about handcuffs back to the courtroom one at a time and inquired whether anything they had seen or

heard would impair their ability to sit fairly and impartially. The court also reviewed the

State’s burden of proof and the presumption of innocence, and all the jurors affirmed that

they were willing to following those principles, could decide the case based on the evidence,

and were not prejudiced in any way. (Respondents’ Exh. P at 98-108, doc. 15 at 99-109) 

Thereafter, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial, stating that any

prejudice was “attenuated somewhat, more than it would be in a normal case, because of the

nature of the case . . . by the fact that these crimes, if they occurred at all, occurred while the

defendants were in custody.” (Id. at 116-17, Id. at 117-18) 

2. Analysis 

a. Leg Restraints

As stated above, Petitioner argues that his constitutional rights were violated by

the

trial court’s security measures, which required that Petitioner and his three co-defendants

remain in leg and ankle chains (“leg restraints”), and, because on one occasion, a juror heard

a deputy snap handcuffs on Petitioner. On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that his rights had

been violated by the trial court’s failure to make a particularized inquiry into whether it was

necessary for Petitioner to wear leg restraints, and by the court’s denial of his motion for a

mistrial after the handcuffing incident. The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims. 

(Respondents’ Exh. II, doc. 15-2 at 167) Petitioner has not shown that the State courts’

rulings were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). The presumption of innocence, although not

articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of

criminal justice. The Supreme Court has stated:

The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is

the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the

foundation of the administration of our criminal law.

Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).

“To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts

must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by

probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-

05 (1976) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).

Petitioner “is correct that a defendant has the right to be free of shackles and handcuffs in the presence of the jury, unless shackling is justified by an essential state interest.”

Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing, inter alia, Holbrook v.

Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1986)). “In order for a defendant to prevail on a claim of this

nature, a court must find that the defendant was indeed physically restrained in the presence

of the jury, that the shackling was seen by the jury, and that the physical restraint was not

justified by state interests. Then, in order for the unjustified shackling to rise to the level of a

constitutional error, the defendant must make a showing that he suffered prejudice as a

result.” Id. Petitioner’s argument that he is excused from establishing prejudice because the

trial court did not “make a record” regarding why Petitioner and his co-defendants were

restrained is not supported by the relevant law. 

In support of his Fifth Amendment claim, Petitioner cites Deck v. Missouri, 544

U.S. 622 (2005). In Deck, the Supreme Court held that court-ordered shackling - which was

visible - during the penalty phase of a capital trial, without a case-specific finding that

security needs justified the shackling, violated a defendant’s due process rights. Id. The

Court stated that, the Constitution does not permit a state to use “visible shackles routinely in

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the guilt phase of a criminal trial,” and that, “where a court without adequate justification,

orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by a jury, the defendant need not

demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation. The State must prove

‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the

verdict obtained.’” Deck, 544 U.S. at 633-35 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 12,

24 (1966)) (emphasis added). 

The holding in Deck does not apply here because the leg restraints were not visible

to the jury. Moreover, even if Petitioner established a violation of his due process rights

under Deck, because this is a § 2254 proceeding, Petitioner must show that the constitutional

error resulted in “actual prejudice,” i.e, it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623; Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d

1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that petitioner failed to show that “wearing the leg brace

for the first two days of a six-day trial had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.”) (internal citations omitted). Petitioner has not met the

Brecht standard. Here, there is no evidence that the jury was aware that Petitioner was

wearing leg restraints. Additionally, the evidence against Petitioner at trial was substantial,

including eyewitness testimony that Petitioner had assaulted Officer Schwartz and Captain

Yielding, and eyewitness and videotaped evidence that captured Petitioner’s participation in

the burglary of the prison store. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 7-12, 25, 37, 42, doc. 14-4 at 8-13,

26, 38, 43; Exh. P at 134-35, doc. 15 at 136-37; Exh. J at 101-02, doc. 14-2 at 240-42; Exh.

M at 61-64, doc. 14-3 at 218-19; Exh. L at 48-49, doc. 14-3 at 107-08; Exh. J at 44-46, doc.

14-2 at 183-85); also see Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959, 965-66 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that

even though defendant, who represented himself, was “forced to make his case in front of

the jury while shuffling about the courtroom due to leg irons restricting his movement,”

error in failing to document the reasons for the restraints was harmless because “the

evidence of guilt [wa]s overwhelming.”); Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d at 883, 891 (9th Cir. 2010)

(stating that “we have held that the unconstitutional shackling of a defendant results in

prejudice only if the evidence of guilt is not overwhelming.”) (internal citations omitted). 

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In view of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on his claim

regarding the use of non-visible leg restraints during trial. 

b. Denial of Mistrial

Petitioner further contends that his constitutional right to a fair trial was violated

by the handcuffing incident described above. The Court of Appeals rejected this claim. 

Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s determination was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, federal law. 

The record reflects that Petitioner was not handcuffed during trial. Rather, the

isolated handcuffing incident occurred when the court was no longer in session and the jury

was leaving the courtroom. Although one juror reported hearing what he assumed was a

handcuff snapping shut, and shared that information with several other jurors, the jurors

avowed that they did not see the handcuffs or know which, if any, defendant had been

handcuffed. Moreover, the fact that Petitioner was, or had been, in custody was information

already known to the jury because the charges stemmed from a prison riot. See Fountain v.

United States, 211 F.3d 429, 434-36 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that “even if we were to assume

that petitioner was shackled during trial and the jury could and did observe his shackles,

such a viewing would not have caused any prejudice . . . because it would have revealed

facts the jury in all probability ascertained from the trial . . . .”). 

This case is distinguishable from Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 722 (9th Cir.

1988), which Petitioner cites in support of his claim. During trial, the defendant in Spain

was subjected to maximum restraints: he wore leg irons, a waist chain to which

each hand was bound by individual chains about eight inches long, and chains

that apparently held him to his chair. Moreover, the shackles were conspicuous;

the jury was able to appreciate the full extent of the chaining. Given the number

of defendants on trial in shackles, the extent of restraints, and the long duration

of the trial, the trial judge was powerless to conceal the chains. In sum,

shackling Spain in this manner exposed him to a serious threat of prejudice.

Id. at 722. This case is also distinguishable from Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636 (9th

Cir. 1999), where the defendant was “shackled during the entire course of his trial . . . and

the shackles were visible to the jury,” and Dyas v. Poole, 317 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2003),

where “at least one juror saw the defendant’s shackles during trial from the jury box” and “it

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is likely that other jurors saw the shackles.” As the Ninth Circuit noted in Dyas, shackling

“during trial” conveys a “more continuous and stronger message to the jury that the defendant is dangerous” than does shackling to and from the courthouse. 317 F.3d at 937. The

same distinction is relevant here, where the handcuffing incident was isolated and occurred

when the jury was leaving the courtroom after court was out of session. 

Petitioner also ignores the role of the presumption of innocence. The Supreme

Court has stated:

The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is

the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the

foundation of the administration of our criminal law.

Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453.

“To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts

must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by

probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504-05 (citing In re

Winship, 397 U.S. at 364). Here, the trial court conducted a thorough examination of the

jurors to determine what each juror had seen and/or heard. With regards to jurors who made

or heard the comments about handcuffs, the court questioned each juror individually to

determine whether anything they had seen or heard would impair their ability to sit fairly

and impartially. The court also reviewed the State’s burden of proof and the presumption of

innocence, and all the jurors affirmed that they were willing to follow those principles, could

decide the case based on the evidence, and were not prejudiced in any way. (Respondents’

Exh. P at 98-108, doc. 15 at 99-109) The trial court’s decision to accept the jurors’ avowals

that they could remain fair and impartial and properly apply the presumption of innocence

was within the trial court’s discretion. The jury is presumed to have followed the court’s

instructions. Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 510 (9th Cir. 2010); Weeks v. Angelone, 528

U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (“A jury is presumed to follow its instructions.”) (citing Richardson v.

Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). 

Even if Petitioner established a violation of his due process rights based on the

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handcuffing incident, he must show that the constitutional error resulted in “actual

prejudice,” i.e, it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623; Larson, 515 F.3d at 1064 (finding that petitioner

failed to show that “wearing the leg brace for the first two days of a six-day trial had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”) (internal

citations omitted). Petitioner has not met the Brecht standard. Here, there is no evidence that

the jury was even aware that Petitioner was wearing leg restraints. Additionally, the

evidence against Petitioner at trial was substantial, including eyewitness witness testimony

that Petitioner had assaulted Officer Schwartz and Captain Yielding, and eyewitness and

videotaped evidence that captured Petitioner’s participation in the burglary of the prison

store. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 7-12, 25, 37, 42, doc. 14-4 at 8-13, 26, 38, 43; Exh. P at 134-

35, doc. 15 at 136-37; Exh. J at 101-02, doc. 14-2 at 240-42; Exh. M at 61-64, doc. 14-3 at

218-19; Exh. L at 48-49, doc. 14-3 at 107-08; Exh. J at 44-46, doc. 14-2 at 183-85) In view

of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on his claim based

on the handcuffing incident. 

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

should be denied because Petitioner’s claims either lack merit or are procedurally barred. 

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, doc. 4, be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have (14) fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. '

636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have (14)

fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file

objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver

of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

Dated this 18th day of June, 2012.

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