Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04223/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04223-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Foreclosure

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Case No. 14-cv-04223-NC 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAN WISKIND,

Plaintiff,

v.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-04223-NC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 25

Before the Court is defendant JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss plaintiff Dan 

Wiskind’s amended complaint. Because Wiskind’s complaint fails to comply with Rules 8 

and 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court grants JPMorgan’s motion to 

dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dan Wiskind purchased a property located in Kelseyville, California, and 

obtained a mortgage for $357,565 from JPMorgan’s predecessor in interest, Washington 

Mutual Bank. Dkt. No. 23 at ¶ 19. The Court will address additional facts as necessary in 

the remainder of this order.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), as all parties have consented 

to proceeding before a magistrate judge. Dkt. Nos. 15, 33.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). On a 

motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the 

Case 3:14-cv-04223-NC Document 39 Filed 01/29/15 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Case No. 14-cv-04223-NC 

light most favorable to the non-movant. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-

38 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court, however, need not accept as true “allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re 

Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need 

not allege detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

If a court grants a motion to dismiss, leave to amend should be granted unless the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Motion to Dismiss

A Court may dismiss a complaint that fails to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Under Rule 8, a pleading stating a claim 

for relief must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The purpose of the complaint is to give the 

defendant fair notice of the claims against him and the grounds upon which the complaint 

stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). A complaint must state 

the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty. 

Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). And while “Rule 8 does not 

require detailed factual allegations,” it “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

This rule requires that each allegation be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(d)(1). Thus, where a complaint’s allegations are “argumentative, prolix, replete with 

redundancy and largely irrelevant,” a court may dismiss the complaint for failure to 

comply with Rule 8. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 

Case 3:14-cv-04223-NC Document 39 Filed 01/29/15 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Case No. 14-cv-04223-NC 

Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming 

dismissal of complaint that was “‘verbose, confusing and almost entirely conclusory’”). 

“Something labeled a complaint but . . . prolix in evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity, 

conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to perform 

the essential functions of a complaint,” and “impose[s] unfair burdens on litigants and 

judges.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179-80.

Significantly, the “propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8 does not 

depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit.” Id. at 1179. Accordingly, 

“even if the factual elements of the cause of action are present, but are scattered throughout 

the complaint and are not organized into a ‘short and plain statement of the claim,’

dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 8 is proper.” Lyshorn v. J.P.Morgan Chase Bank, 

N.A., No. 12-cv-05490 JSW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29099, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2013) 

(quoting McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178). 

Here, Wiskind’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8. The complaint is 

unreasonably lengthy and infused with extraneous statements. For instance, the complaint 

includes irrelevant allegations concerning the banking industry generally, and the impact 

the foreclosure crisis had on the U.S. economy. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 23 at ¶¶10-18 (citing 

and quoting New York Times and Los Angeles Times articles discussing the unemployment 

rate and Attorney General Kamala Harris’ Mortgage Fraud Strike Force). As another 

example, early on in the complaint, Wiskind states “there is a unity between and among all 

Defendants, and each acts as the alter ego of the other.” Id. at ¶ 6. Yet it is unclear which

defendants Wiskind is referring to and what role an alter ego theory plays in this lawsuit, if 

any. At one point, Wiskind also discusses the “policy considerations” underscoring the 

country’s “desperate need” for the “creation and imposition of strict ‘financial product’ 

liability against Defendants,” and declares that the “Defendants and other Big Banks over 

the last third of a century have destroyed the U.S. economy and countless American lives.” 

Id. at ¶ 101. While such vitriol and policy proposals may be appropriate in the op-ed pages 

of the newspapers Wiskind cites to, they add nothing to a complaint before this Court. 

Case 3:14-cv-04223-NC Document 39 Filed 01/29/15 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Case No. 14-cv-04223-NC 

Additionally, Wiskind’s legal theories are unclear, and lack sufficient factual 

allegations. For instance, Wiskind alleges that JPMorgan engaged in “predatory lending 

practices” when it “ignored traditional lending guidelines in providing Plaintiff’s loan, 

despite full knowledge that housing prices were inflated above real value and Defendants 

intended to sell-off loans that had been made to borrowers with substandard credit by 

bundling the substandard loans with creditworthy borrower loans so the entire bundle 

could be characterized as ‘high-quality’ (prime) home mortgages.” Id. at ¶ 91. Wiskind 

does not offer sufficient factual matter to support this allegation and fails to identify the 

statute or common law doctrine that could serve as the basis for relief. 

To the extent Wiskind seeks to hold JPMorgan liable for fraud, Wiskind fails to 

plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b). 

To plead fraud or mistake under Rule 9(b), “a party must state with particularity the 

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “The plaintiff must set 

forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” Vess v. CibaGeigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re GlenFed, Inc. Secs. 

Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994)); see Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 

885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[m]ere conclusory allegations of fraud are 

insufficient.”). “The complaint must specify such facts as the times, dates, places, benefits 

received, and other details of the alleged fraudulent activity.” Neubronner v. Milken, 6 

F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 

Put differently, “a pleading must identify the who, what, when, where, and how of 

the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about [the purportedly 

fraudulent] statement, and why it is false.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 

Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted, 

brackets in original).

Here, Wiskind’s claims fail to identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of 

the false or misleading statements he alleges JPMorgan made. For instance, in describing 

the second cause of action for “Deceit-Intentional Misrepresentation,” Wiskind states that 

Case 3:14-cv-04223-NC Document 39 Filed 01/29/15 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Case No. 14-cv-04223-NC 

“Defendants have suppressed information regarding the terms of the loan, in violation of 

state regulations.” Id. at ¶ 134. The complaint continues, “When Defendants Chase and 

their agents, employees, or representatives and predecessors in interest made these 

representations, they knew them to be false.” Id. at ¶ 135. Wiskind fails to identify—

simply and concisely—what information was suppressed, what representations were made,

and what state regulations were violated. To the extent he alleges that JPMorgan misled 

him, Wiskind must provide more context, such as who communicated the fraudulent 

statement (e.g., a banker, a customer service representative), when, and what the statement 

consisted of. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss 

Wiskind’s complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8. While the Court will provide 

Wiskind leave to amend, the Court cautions Wiskind that any amended complaint must 

comply with this order—it must clearly and simply allege the facts in support of Wiskind’s 

claims. To the extent Wiskind premises his allegations on purported fraud or 

misrepresentations, Wiskind must provide context, and clearly allege what statements were 

made to him by whom and when. 

Wiskind must file an amended complaint within 14 days. If Wiskind fails to file an 

amended complaint by February 12, 2015, or if he files an amended complaint that fails to 

comply with Rule 8, and with Rule 9 to the extent his complaint is premised on fraud, this 

action will be dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41(b). 

Finally, the Court denies JPMorgan’s request for judicial notice; the Court did not 

rely on any of the documents in JPMorgan’s request. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2015

___________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:14-cv-04223-NC Document 39 Filed 01/29/15 Page 5 of 5