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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-2910 

REBECCA RIKER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

BRUCE LEMMON, in his official 

capacity, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:13-cv-00571-TWP-DML — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 13, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 14, 2015 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and RIPPLE, Circuit 

Judges. 

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. While working as an employee of a 

contractor at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, 

Rebecca Riker engaged in a romantic relationship with 

inmate Paul Vest. When the relationship became known, her 

employment ended. She later requested that she be allowed 

to visit Vest, but prison officials denied those requests as 

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2 No. 14-2910 

forbidden by the institution’s inmate visitation policy. 

Ms. Riker and Vest later submitted an application to marry, 

which prison officials also denied. 

Ms. Riker then brought this action against several 

individual officials of the Indiana Department of Corrections 

(“the Department” or “IDOC”), in their official and 

individual capacities, challenging the denials of her requests 

to visit and to marry Vest. She sought damages against the 

individual defendants as well as declarative and injunctive 

relief. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. It concluded that prohibiting Ms. Riker 

from visiting Vest was reasonable and that this restriction 

did not unconstitutionally burden her right to marry. The 

court also granted the individual defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 

In this appeal, Ms. Riker limits her challenge to the 

district court’s determination that, based on the summary 

judgment record, the defendants’ refusal to permit the 

marriage does not violate Ms. Riker’s rights guaranteed by 

the Constitution. We respectfully disagree with the district 

court and conclude that, on this record, the defendants have 

failed to justify adequately the denial of Ms. Riker’s 

marriage request. We accordingly reverse the judgment of 

the district court and remand the case for further 

proceedings. 

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No. 14-2910 3

I 

BACKGROUND 

A. 

From December 2007 through April 2008, Ms. Riker was 

employed by Aramark Correctional Services, Inc. 

(“Aramark”). Aramark contracted with the Department to 

operate and manage food services in the Department’s 

correctional facilities. Ms. Riker worked at the Wabash 

Valley Correctional Facility (“WVCF”), a level-four 

maximum security correctional facility in Carlisle, Indiana. 

She supervised approximately twenty inmates in preparing 

and serving meals. As part of her job training, the 

Department gave her instruction in security, first aid, and 

personal protection skills. She also received training on 

WVCF emergency security procedures, including 

procedures for evacuation, riots, bomb threats, escape 

prevention, security sweeps, hostage scenarios, and 

emergency transport. 

Ms. Riker met Vest, an IDOC inmate serving a fifty-year 

sentence for robbery, while working as his supervisor in the 

kitchen at the WVCF. After a couple of months, they began a 

romantic relationship, which included sexual intercourse in 

a walk-in cooler at the facility. In April 2008, another 

Aramark employee witnessed Ms. Riker and Vest kissing in 

the walk-in cooler and reported the incident to Ms. Riker’s 

supervisor. Ms. Riker quit her job later that day; Vest later 

was disciplined by the Department. 

After Ms. Riker left her job with Aramark, she 

maintained contact with Vest through letters and phone 

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calls. In May 2008, she submitted an application for visiting 

privileges with Vest. The WVCF denied the application 

because Ms. Riker had “worked at [the] facility.”1 In 2008 

and 2009, Ms. Riker wrote letters to the Department’s 

commissioner and the facility superintendent requesting 

visitation privileges with Vest. Both letters met the same 

response: the Department’s policy clearly states that “exemployees shall not be permitted to visit an offender if the 

relationship between the offender and the ex-employee 

started ... during the ex-employee’s period of employment 

with the Department.”2 

In 2010, Ms. Riker accepted a proposal of marriage from 

Vest. They completed an application to marry, and Vest 

submitted that application to the chaplain at the WVCF. The 

application was denied because Ms. Riker was not on Vest’s 

list of approved visitors.3

Formal IDOC and WVCF policies specifically addressed 

staff/inmate relationships. Ms. Riker’s relationship with Vest 

during her employment at WVCF violated IDOC policy 04-

03-103, which prohibits staff-persons from having “any 

personal contact with an offender ... beyond that necessary 

 

1 R.44-3 at 2. She submitted additional applications in February 2011, 

December 2012, and January 2013, all of which likewise were denied. 

2 Id. at 4; accord id. at 5. 

3 The letter denying the marriage application, which was addressed to 

Vest, stated: “Your fiancée would need to be on your approved visiting 

list in order for you to be able to be married. Ms. Riker is not on your 

list.” R.56-3. 

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No. 14-2910 5

for the proper supervision and treatment of the offender.”4

The policy provides several examples of inappropriate 

contact, including: “[m]arriage to an offender,” “[s]ocial 

relationship of any type with an offender,” and “[p]hysical 

contact beyond that which is routinely required by specific 

job duties.”5

 The policy also notes that “[s]exual contact with 

an offender is a criminal offense under IC 35-44-1-5.”6 

Under the IDOC and WVCF offender visitation policies, 

former employees must make a written request to visit an 

offender.7 Former employees generally “shall not be allowed 

to visit an offender who has been housed in the same facility 

in which the ex-employee was employed and who was 

incarcerated at the facility during the time the ex-employee 

was employed there.”8 The superintendent of the facility 

reviews the ex-employee’s “request and recommend[s] 

whether the visit is in the best interest of the facility and the 

individuals involved.”9 Absent special circumstances, an exemployee must wait until one year after her employment 

has ended before she can visit an offender. However, exemployees never are “permitted to visit an offender if the 

 

4 R.44-6 at 19. 

5 Id. 

6 Id. 

7 Because the WVCF and IDOC visitation policies are fundamentally the 

same with only minor stylistic differences, we discuss them in tandem. 

8 R.44-11 at 3. 

9 Id. 

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relationship between the offender and the ex-employee 

started or resulted from contact between the ex-employee 

and the offender during the ex-employee’s period of 

employment with the Department.”10 

The Department also maintains a marriage policy, which 

“recognizes that marriage may serve as a rehabilitative tool 

which may assist an offender during the community re-entry 

process.”11 The policy states that “[t]he approval of an 

offender’s request to marry shall be based upon the legality 

of the proposed marriage and the safety and security of the 

facility and the individuals involved.”12 Notably, the 

 

10 Id. The visitation policy also provides that if “an ex-employee has been 

terminated from employment or allowed to resign prior to termination, 

or during an investigation arising from a violation of department rules or 

procedures involving an offender, ... the ex-employee shall be denied 

visitation privileges permanently from all department facilities.” Id. at 4. 

11 R.44-7 at 1. The policy provides that a request to marry may be denied 

because: 

A. The offender is not legally eligible to marry; 

B. The offender is requesting to marry another 

offender; 

C. The offender is requesting to marry either a staff 

member or former staff member of the department; 

or, 

D. The requested marriage would endanger the safety 

and security of the facility, the department, the 

individuals involved or the public. 

Id. at 4. 

12 Id. at 1. 

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Department did not reference its marriage policy when 

denying Ms. Riker’s marriage application. 

B. 

In April 2013, Ms. Riker filed this action against several 

IDOC officials, including Bruce Lemmon in his official 

capacity as commissioner of the Department, challenging the 

denials of her requests to visit and to marry Vest. In due 

course, the defendants filed a motion for summary 

judgment. The officials submitted that the Department’s 

refusal to permit Ms. Riker to marry Vest “did not violate 

[Ms.] Riker’s qualified constitutional right to marry.”13 They 

contended that “the same security principles and concerns 

apply to the consideration of [Ms.] Riker’s request for 

marriage as it does her request for visitation” and that 

allowing “[v]isitation between a former staff member and an 

offender that developed an inappropriate relationship 

during the course of the former staff member’s employment 

inside the facility would threaten the security of the 

facility.”14 They maintained that, because Ms. “Riker was 

working inside the [WVCF] and was trained by the [IDOC] 

in security protocols, defense, and emergency security 

procedures,” “[i]t was reasonable for [the prison officials] to 

conclude that [Ms. Riker] would know the security details of 

the [WVCF]” and that “a former staff person in a romantic 

relationship with an incarcerated individual might divulge 

 

13 R.45 at 24. 

14 Id. at 15, 26. 

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8 No. 14-2910 

security information to that incarcerated individual or assist 

him in other inappropriate ways.”15 

The district court granted the defendants’ motion. With 

respect to Ms. Riker’s right-to-marry claim, the court 

concluded “that the burden on Ms. Riker’s right to marry 

was not substantial or direct, but was light or at most 

moderate.”16 In support of its conclusion, “the [c]ourt note[d] 

that Ms. Riker ha[d] not made a formal request to marry Mr. 

Vest” and that “Ms. Riker ha[d] not been absolutely 

prevented from marrying a large portion of the eligible 

population of spouses.”17 The court then decided that 

“[a]llowing Ms. Riker, and other former employees, to visit 

inmates is a legitimate security risk” and that, under the 

rational-basis standard of scrutiny, it would “not second 

guess the security concerns expressed by the correctional 

authorities.”18 

Ms. Riker appeals only the district court’s decision that 

the defendants did not unreasonably burden her 

constitutional right to marry. 

 

15 Id. at 16.

16 R.62 at 13. 

17 Id. 

18 Id. at 14. 

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No. 14-2910 9

II 

DISCUSSION 

Ms. Riker contends that the Department’s decision 

preventing her from marrying Vest is unconstitutional. She 

submits that prohibiting her marriage to Vest is an 

exaggerated response to the prison’s security objectives and 

that the prohibition is unnecessary for the maintenance of a 

safe and orderly institution. She emphasizes that she seeks 

only “a single visit to the institution, of a short duration, for 

the limited purpose of marrying her fiancé.”19 She maintains 

that “[i]t is implausible to insist that this brief ceremony may 

not be accommodated without threatening institutional 

security and without imposing more than a de minimis 

impact on prison resources.”20 

We review a district court’s decision granting summary 

judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Carman v. Tinkes, 762 F.3d 

565, 566 (7th Cir. 2014). “Summary judgment is appropriate 

when no material fact is disputed and the moving parties are 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. 

A. 

1. 

We begin by setting forth the overarching substantive 

principles that must guide our analysis. The Supreme Court 

 

19 Appellant’s Br. 19; accord Reply Br. 1–2. 

20 Appellant’s Br. 19–20. 

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has held “that federal courts must take cognizance of the 

valid constitutional claims of prison inmates. Prison walls do 

not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the 

protections of the Constitution.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 

84 (1987) (citation omitted). The Constitution protects a 

prisoner’s fundamental right to marry; individuals do not 

lose this constitutional protection simply because they are 

imprisoned. See id. at 94–96; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 

S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (recognizing that “[o]ver time and in 

other contexts, the Court has reiterated that the right to 

marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause”). That 

protection, however, “is subject to substantial restrictions as 

a result of incarceration.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 95. 

Under the principles articulated by the Supreme Court, 

“a prison regulation [that] impinges on inmates’ 

constitutional rights...is valid if it is reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89. The Supreme 

Court repeatedly has reaffirmed this standard.21 See Florence 

v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 

1510, 1515 (2012); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003); 

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223–24 (1990); O’Lone v. 

Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). Although 

Ms. Riker is not a prisoner, “so far as challenges to prison 

 

21 The parties agree that we must proceed under the analysis set forth in 

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The district court got off on the wrong 

foot when it did not realize that the Supreme Court has held squarely 

that when prisoners’ rights or, as here, the rights of prisoners and 

outsiders are implicated, the proper analysis is found in Turner. See 

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131–32 (2003); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 

U.S. 401, 410 n.9 (1989). 

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No. 14-2910 11

regulations as infringing constitutional rights are concerned, 

the standard is the same whether the rights of prisoners or of 

nonprisoners are at stake.” Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 581 

(7th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 410 

n.9 (1989)). In determining a regulation’s reasonableness, we 

must balance the constitutional right asserted against the 

legitimate penological goals of the prison. See Maddox v. 

Love, 655 F.3d 709, 719 (7th Cir. 2011). 

2. 

The Supreme Court also has given us explicit guidance 

on the implementation of the substantive principles 

articulated in the cases that we have just discussed. It has 

identified four factors that we must consider in determining 

the reasonableness of a prison regulation that restricts the 

right to marry: 

(1) whether a valid, rational connection exists 

between the regulation and a legitimate 

government interest behind the rule; (2) 

whether there are alternative means of 

exercising the right in question; (3) what 

impact accommodation of the asserted 

constitutional right would have on guards, 

other inmates, and on the allocation of prison 

resources; and (4) what easy alternatives exist 

to the regulation because, although the 

regulation need not satisfy a least restrictive 

alternatives test, the existence of obvious 

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alternatives may be evidence that the 

regulation is not reasonable.[22]

 

22 Although the language used by the Supreme Court in setting forth the 

reasonableness test appears similar to the “rational-basis test” used in 

other contexts, see Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (noting “that the 

section is valid if it is rationally related to furthering a legitimate state 

interest” (internal quotation marks omitted)), the “reasonableness 

standard” applied in this context is more demanding, see Thornburgh, 490 

U.S. at 414 (“We adopt the Turner standard in this case with confidence 

that, as petitioners here have asserted, a reasonableness standard is not 

toothless.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The test for whether a 

prison regulation impermissibly burdens a prisoner’s constitutional 

rights requires a more searching inquiry into the justifications 

supporting the regulation. Compare Turner, 482 U.S. at 97–98 (noting that 

the regulation “represents an exaggerated response to such security 

objectives”), with FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) 

(noting that, under traditional rational-basis review, “those attacking the 

rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to negative 

every conceivable basis which might support it” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). The court also must determine if there are alternative 

means of accommodating the prisoner’s rights. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–

91; see also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 n.2 (1987) (noting 

that “the presence or absence of alternative accommodations of 

prisoners’ rights is properly considered a factor in the reasonableness 

analysis rather than a basis for heightened scrutiny”). We also recognize, 

however, that the reasonableness “test is less restrictive than that 

ordinarily applied to infringements on constitutional rights in 

consideration of the need to give appropriate deference to prison 

officials, avoiding unnecessary judicial intrusion into security problems 

and other prison concerns.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 719 (7th Cir. 

2011); accord Spavone v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 

136 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that “[t]he standard adopted by the Supreme 

Court was a compromise between the strict scrutiny standard that 

usually would apply to such constitutional claims and the inordinately 

(continued...) 

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Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing 

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90); accord Van Den Bosch v. Raemisch, 

658 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 2011). Although all four factors are 

important, “the first one can act as a threshold factor 

regardless which way it cuts.” Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 

529, 534 (7th Cir. 2010). “[A] regulation cannot be sustained 

where the logical connection between the regulation and the 

asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or 

irrational.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. Although “the burden 

of persuasion is on the prisoner to disprove the validity of a 

regulation,” prison officials “must still articulate their 

legitimate governmental interest in the regulation” and 

provide some evidence supporting their concern. Van Den 

Bosch, 658 F.3d at 786; accord Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 

643, 647 (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“Once the prison gave 

its explanation for denying the supplements, the burden 

shifted to Mays to present evidence to call that explanation 

into question.”); Shimer, 100 F.3d at 509 (“The prison 

administration must proffer some evidence to support its 

restriction of prison guards’ constitutional rights.”); see also

Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002) (“In 

order to warrant deference, prison officials must present 

credible evidence to support their stated penological goals.” 

(emphasis in original)). “The prison administration cannot 

avoid court scrutiny by reflexive, rote assertions.” Shimer, 

100 F.3d at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the 

same time, we recognize that “[w]e must accord substantial 

 

(...continued) 

difficult undertaking of running a prison” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

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14 No. 14-2910 

deference to the professional judgment of prison 

administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for 

defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for 

determining the most appropriate means to accomplish 

them.” Singer, 593 F.3d at 534 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

3. 

Nor are we without precedent on the application of this 

methodology. In Turner, the Supreme Court applied the 

factors that it had articulated to hold that the challenged 

prison regulation, which permitted an inmate to marry only 

after the superintendent found a compelling reason to grant 

the prisoner permission, placed an unconstitutional burden 

on the prisoner’s right to marry. See 482 U.S. at 96–99. There, 

the prison officials had provided two justifications for the 

regulation: “[t]he security concern...that ‘love triangles’ 

might lead to violent confrontations between inmates,” and 

the rehabilitative goal of allowing women prisoners, who 

“often were subject to abuse at home or were overly 

dependent on male figures,” to “develop[] skills of selfreliance.” Id. at 97. The Court determined that the regulation 

was “not reasonably related to these penological interests.” 

Id. 

The Court explained that the regulation “represent[ed] 

an exaggerated response to [the state’s] security objectives” 

and that there were “obvious, easy alternatives to the 

[challenged] regulation that accommodate[d] the right to 

marry while imposing a de minimis burden on the pursuit of 

security objectives.” Id. at 97–98. The Court remarked that it 

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was “aware of no place in the record where prison officials 

testified that such ready alternatives would not fully satisfy 

their security concerns.” Id. at 98. 

The Court then decided that the “marriage restriction 

[was not] reasonably related to the articulated rehabilitation 

goal.” Id. at 98. The Court pointedly noted the disparity 

between the prison administrators’ justification for the 

prohibition and its application: the regulation swept “much 

more broadly than can be explained by petitioners’ 

penological objectives.” Id. at 98. Therefore, “the almost 

complete ban on the decision to marry [was] not reasonably 

related to legitimate penological objectives.” Id. at 99. 

We also have had occasion to address the contours of an 

inmate’s right to marry. In Keeney, a prison regulation 

prohibited current employees from “becom[ing] involved 

socially with inmates in or out of the [jail].” Keeney, 57 F.3d 

at 580 (second alteration in original). The plaintiff, an 

employee at the correctional facility, claimed that by 

“forcing her to choose between her job and marriage to the 

man of her choice, the defendants infringed her 

constitutional right to marry.” Id. We first noted that, “[a]s 

long as the concerns expressed by correctional authorities 

are plausible, and the burden that a challenged regulation of 

jail or prison security places on protected rights a light or 

moderate one, the courts should not interfere.” Id. at 581. We 

then decided that the anti-fraternization rule at issue did not 

violate an individual’s right to marry under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. See id. at 581–82. Our decision largely rested on 

the relatively minimal burden placed on the plaintiff’s right 

to marry. The defendants had not forbidden the employee 

from marrying her fiancé; instead, they simply forbade her 

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16 No. 14-2910 

from continuing to work in the prison system in which her 

spouse was incarcerated. See id. at 580–81. Preventing the 

transfer of unlawful communication between the inmate and 

others as well as preventing favored treatment, we 

explained, justified the minimal burden on the plaintiff’s 

rights.23 See id. at 581–82. Because the administrators had a 

reason clearly related to prison security, they could forbid 

the plaintiff’s marrying the inmate and remaining a prison 

guard. 

We also addressed a prisoner’s right to marry in Martin 

v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2003). There, we recognized 

that qualified immunity was appropriate when a prison 

official relied on the institution’s visitation policy to postpone

an inmate’s marriage. In that case, an inmate was prohibited 

from marrying because his fiancée had been placed on a 

restricted list, which prevented her from visiting the prison. 

See id. at 920. The district court dismissed the inmate’s 

complaint after concluding that there was no independent 

right to visitation. On appeal, we acknowledged that, after 

the district court had issued its decision, the inmate had 

been allowed to marry after a twelve-month deferral. See id. 

In explaining our conclusion that the deferment was not 

clearly unconstitutional, we noted that “[r]estrictions on 

visitation, though not enough to justify prohibiting marriage, 

may well justify deferment, so that the sanction for 

misconduct will have some sting.” Id. at 922 (emphasis 

 

23 We noted that without the regulation prisoners would “have an 

enhanced incentive to ‘romance’ their female guards” and that “[j]ust the 

suspicion of favored treatment could create serious problems of morale.” 

Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 1995). 

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No. 14-2910 17

added). Because it was not clearly established “that a year’s 

delay is unconstitutional when the prisoner’s misbehavior 

has led to curtailment of visiting rights,” we held that 

qualified immunity was appropriate. Id.

B. 

Now that we have set forth the substantive principles 

that must control our decision and their application, we turn 

to the situation presented by the present case. 

The defendants submit that the decision to deny 

Ms. Riker’s request to marry Vest furthers the Department’s 

“legitimate interest in maintaining security and institutional 

order.”24 They provide two security-related justifications for 

the decision: first, a former employee who previously 

violated Department policies is more likely to engage in 

other prohibited acts; and second, a former employee may 

share with an inmate confidential information obtained 

while employed at the prison.25 The Department also 

 

24 Appellees’ Br. 19. 

25 Specifically, the superintendent of the WVCF provided the following 

justifications for the ex-employee visitation policy: 

There are a number of security concerns associated with 

a former employee, including contractors and 

volunteers, visiting an offender that developed a 

relationship during the course of the former staff 

members’ employment in the facility, including, but not 

limited to the following: 

[1] A former staff member who willingly violated 

the DOC’s express prohibition against 

(continued...) 

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18 No. 14-2910 

 

(...continued) 

relationships with offenders, may engage in 

other prohibited acts detrimental to the safety 

and security of the facility and its staff if he/she 

were allowed to visit the offender in the facility 

(i.e. trafficking with an offender). The offender 

may have the ability to further influence or 

exploit former staff member [sic] by virtue of 

their relationship. 

[2] A former staff member has been trained in a 

number of security matters which are not 

disclosed to offenders and members of the 

general public. That confidential security 

information could be communicated to the 

offender without the knowledge of custody staff 

if visits were permitted (Note that all incoming 

mail, email and phone calls with offenders are 

monitored and recorded for security). 

[3] A former staff member may be aware of possible 

weaknesses in the security of his/her particular 

job area and the facility generally which could 

be shared with the offender if visits were 

permitted between the former staff member and 

the offender. 

[4] A former staff member had access to 

confidential information such as confidential 

policies and procedures, emergency security 

procedures and confidential information 

contained in other offenders’ packets, which 

could be shared if visits were permitted. 

[5] The former staff member, by virtue of their 

former employment, may have gained 

knowledge regarding other staff members’ 

personal information (such as home address, 

(continued...) 

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No. 14-2910 19

maintains that because Ms. Riker is free to marry anyone but 

Vest, the prohibition imposes a minimal burden on Ms. 

Riker’s right to marry.26

The latter argument can be dismissed quickly. The right 

to marry includes the right to select one’s spouse. See 

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (noting “that the right to 

personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the 

concept of individual autonomy” and that there is dignity in 

individuals’ “autonomy to make such profound choices”).27

 

(...continued) 

personal phone number, names of family 

members), which could be communicated to the 

offender, placing staff and staff family members 

at risk. 

R.44-2 at 2–3; accord Appellees’ Br. 9–11 (citing R.44-2 at 2–3). 

26 The Department similarly contends that Ms. Riker’s ability to marry 

Vest has not been prohibited; instead, the marriage “has been effectively 

deferred” until Vest is released in 2030. Appellees’ Br. 28. Waiting until 

Vest’s release, however, is not a realistic alternative to allowing Ms. 

Riker to exercise her right to marry. Cf. Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919, 

922 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a one-year deferment of an inmate’s 

marriage was not clearly unconstitutional). Many (but not all) prisoners 

someday will be released. That eventuality does not permit prison 

officials to deprive an inmate of their constitutional rights in the interim. 

To hold otherwise would extinguish an inmate’s constitutional right to 

marry and render futile the analysis set forth in Turner. See Turner, 482 

U.S. at 90 (noting that the appropriate analysis considers “whether there 

are alternative means of exercising the [constitutional] right that remain 

open to prison inmates”). 

27 See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he regulation of constitutionally protected decisions, such as 

where a person shall reside or whom he or she shall marry, must be 

(continued...) 

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20 No. 14-2910 

The proper inquiry, therefore, is whether Ms. Riker was 

prohibited from marrying the spouse of her choosing. 

Because Ms. Riker has not been left with any alternative 

means of exercising her right to marry Vest, it is clear that 

the burden on that right was not minimal. Cf. Turner, 482 

U.S. at 90 (explaining that “where other avenues remain 

available for the exercise of the asserted right, courts should 

be particularly conscious of the measure of judicial deference 

owed to corrections officials...in gauging the validity of the 

regulation” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

We next must decide whether the Department has 

established that its decision barring Ms. Riker from marrying 

Vest was reasonably related to its legitimate penological 

interests. The fundamental infirmity with the Department’s 

position is that it equates Ms. Riker’s one-time request to 

enter the prison to participate in a marriage ceremony with a 

request for general visitation rights. The Department’s 

decision to forbid Ms. Riker’s marriage is premised entirely 

on its ex-employee visitation policy and the security 

 

(...continued) 

predicated on legitimate state concerns other than disagreement with the 

choice the individual has made.”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 

620 (1984) (“[T]he Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the 

State’s power to control the selection of one’s spouse....”); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977) (“[A]mong the decisions that 

an individual may make without unjustified government interference are 

personal decisions relating to marriage....” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides 

with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”). 

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No. 14-2910 21

justifications that support that policy. At bottom, it 

maintains that any effect on Ms. Riker’s right to marry 

simply is incidental to the application of its visitation 

policy.28 Nothing in the record, however, supports equating 

general visitation with a single marriage ceremony, and we 

previously have indicated that a prison’s visitation policy, 

on its own, does not justify prohibiting an inmate’s 

 

28 The Department fundamentally misconceives the issue before the 

court. It contends that “[a]t issue here is the IDOC’s application of its 

policy preventing Ms. Riker, an ex-employee of an IDOC contractor who 

worked the WVCF, from visiting Mr. Vest, who is incarcerated at the 

WVCF, because their relationship began while Ms. Riker was employed 

through the IDOC.” Appellees’ Br. 15; see also id. at 15 (stating that “[a] 

necessary extension of the IDOC’s visitation policy is the IDOC 

administrators’ decision denying Ms. Riker’s request to marry Mr. 

Vest”); id. at 21 (noting that “WVCF administrators identified a number 

of security-related issues that could arise if former employees were 

allowed to visit an offender with whom she or he developed a relationship 

at the same facility where she worked” (emphasis added)); id. at 22 

(noting that “[c]ourts have consistently upheld similar limitations on 

visitation by former staff to correctional institutions” (emphasis added)); 

id. at 25 (noting that “the consequence of [Ms. Riker’s prior] violation 

warrants the existence and the application of the visitation policy” 

(emphasis added)). Instead, we must consider whether the Department’s 

decision preventing Ms. Riker from marrying Vest was justified. 

In accordance with its position, the Department relies entirely on the 

deposition testimony of the WVCF superintendent, which focused on the 

WVCF’s visitation policy. See supra note 25. It also relies on cases such as 

Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989), 

and Bilka v. Farrey, 447 Fed. App’x 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2011), which 

addressed the denial of visitation rights. Because we must focus on the 

Department’s decision to prevent Ms. Riker from marrying, the 

Department’s reliance on those cases is misplaced. 

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22 No. 14-2910 

marriage. See Martin, 329 F.3d at 922 (noting that 

“[r]estrictions on visitation[ are] not enough to justify 

prohibiting marriage”). 

The Department also submits that the prohibition of 

Ms. Riker’s marriage is necessary to serve as a deterrent to 

current employees. It submits that “[t]he policy 

communicates to IDOC employees that if they begin an 

inappropriate relationship with an offender while working 

at an IDOC facility, they will not only be held accountable 

but also will be prevented from seeing the inmate for as long 

as he or she is incarcerated.”29 The Department has not 

provided any evidence, however, to support its contention 

that prohibiting Ms. Riker’s marriage acts as a deterrent or 

that such deterrence is necessary. 

The Department does not otherwise contend that 

prohibiting Ms. Riker’s marriage satisfies the test set forth in 

Turner. It fails to explain why allowing Ms. Riker to marry 

Vest would pose a security risk or how preventing her 

marriage furthers its security interests.30 There is no evidence 

in the record supporting the Department’s contention that 

prohibiting Ms. Riker’s marriage is necessary to ensure a 

 

29 Appellees’ Br. 25. 

30 The Department maintains that we “must accord substantial deference 

to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear 

significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections 

system and determining the most appropriate means to accomplish 

them.” Id. at 17 (quoting Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 

2010)). Although we agree with that general proposition, the Department 

has not demonstrated that WVCF officials used their professional 

judgment specifically to deny Ms. Riker’s marriage request. 

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No. 14-2910 23

safe and orderly institution. Our case law is clear that the 

invocation of a general security interest, standing alone, is 

insufficient to support the Department’s decision. See Shimer, 

100 F.3d at 510 (refusing to accept prison administration’s 

rote assertions and noting that we were “reduced to 

speculation when not provided with evidence, and, having 

speculated, find it difficult to establish a connection between 

the prison administration’s unsubstantiated justifications 

and its policy”). To satisfy its burden, the Department must 

present evidence demonstrating a specific security concern 

that bears a nexus to the prohibited conduct, here, Ms. 

Riker’s marriage ceremony. The Department has failed to 

provide such evidence. Thus, at this juncture, the 

Department has not established that its decision prohibiting 

Ms. Riker’s marriage has a logical connection to its security 

concerns. 

Notably, the record does not reveal why prison officials 

would have difficulty monitoring the marriage ceremony to 

ensure that Ms. Riker does not violate prison regulations or 

relay sensitive information to Vest. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 

(noting that “the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may 

be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable”). The 

Department offers no explanation for why it could not 

permit Ms. Riker’s marriage request while simultaneously 

maintaining a secure facility. It is implausible to suggest, 

without some supporting evidence, that a brief marriage 

ceremony cannot be accommodated without threatening 

institutional security and without imposing more than a de 

minimis impact on prison resources. Indeed, Ms. Riker 

submits that the ceremony would “last but a brief few 

Case: 14-2910 Document: 29 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pages: 24
24 No. 14-2910 

minutes in a highly regulated setting.”31 The Department 

does not offer testimony or other evidence to refute 

Ms. Riker’s claim. See id. at 98 (noting that the Court was 

“aware of no place in the record where prison officials 

testified that such ready alternatives would not fully satisfy 

their security concerns”). Here, as in Turner, there may well 

be “obvious, easy alternatives to the [prohibition of 

Ms. Riker’s marriage ceremony] that accommodate the right 

to marry while imposing a de minimis burden on the pursuit 

of security objectives.” Id. 

Absent significantly more evidence explaining the 

importance of banning Ms. Riker’s marriage, Turner does not 

allow us to accept at face value the Department’s 

unsubstantiated contentions. The Department therefore has 

not established that it is entitled to summary judgment. 

Conclusion 

The district court erred in granting the Department’s 

motion for summary judgment and concluding that the 

Department’s denial of Ms. Riker’s request for a brief, onetime visit in order to participate in a marriage ceremony did 

not violate her constitutional right to marry. The judgment of 

the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Ms. Riker 

may recover the costs of this appeal. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

 

31 Appellant’s Br. 21. 

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