Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00086/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00086-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL LEON HILL, : 

Petitioner, : 

v. : CIVIL ACTION 06-0086-KD-M

GRANTT CULLIVER, : 

Respondent. : 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an Alabama

inmate which was referred for report and recommendation pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and Rule 8 of

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. This action is now ready

for consideration. The state record is adequate to determine

Petitioner's claims; no federal evidentiary hearing is required. 

It is recommended that this habeas petition be dismissed as timebarred and that judgment be entered in favor of Respondent Grant

Culliver and against Petitioner Michael Leon Hill pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Petitioner was convicted of attempted murder in the Circuit

Court of Mobile County on April 1, 1997 for which he received a

sentence of life without parole in the state penitentiary (Doc.

1; see also Doc. 11, Exhibit B, p. 1). On appeal, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction (Doc. 11,

Exhibit D). The Alabama Supreme Court denied Hill’s petition for

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January 6, 2003 is the date Hill signed his petition; it was

actually filed in the Mobile County Circuit Court on February 12, 2003

(see Doc. 11, Exhibit Q, pp. 17, 33).

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writ of certiorari and issued a certificate of judgment on April

17, 1998 (see Doc. 11, p. 2 and Exhibit H).

Petitioner filed his first Rule 32 petition on June 12, 1998

(Doc. 11, Exhibit Q, p. 9). That petition was denied on January

22, 1999 (id.); Hill did not appeal that denial (see Doc. 11, p.

3 and Exhibit Q, p. 34). 

On August 29, 2000, Petitioner filed a State habeas corpus

petition which was summarily denied on October 27, 2000 (Doc. 11,

Exhibit I, pp. 10-20). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

affirmed the denial (Doc. 11, Exhibit L). On June 29, 2001, the

Alabama Supreme Court denied Hill’s petition for writ of

certiorari and issued a certificate of judgment (Doc. 11, Exhibit

P). 

Petitioner filed a second Rule 32 petition on January 6,

20031 which was summarily denied on February 18, 2003 (see Doc.

11, p. 3 and Exhibit Q, pp. 17-36). In a memorandum entered on

August 15, 2003, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

the dismissal of the petition (Doc. 11, Exhibit T). On December

12, 2003, the Alabama Supreme Court denied Hill’s petition for

writ of certiorari and issued a certificate of judgment (Doc. 11,

Exhibit X). 

Petitioner filed a third Rule 32 petition on April 21, 2005

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Petitioner initiated this action on February 7, 2006 with the

signing of this habeas petition; it was not actually filed in this

Court until February 13, 2006 (Doc. 1).

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which was summarily denied on June 2, 2005 (see Doc. 11, p. 3 and

Exhibit Y). Hill did not appeal the denial of that petition (see

Doc. 11, p. 3). 

Petitioner filed a complaint with this Court on February 6,

20062 raising the claim that he was improperly sentenced under

the Alabama Habitual Felony Offender Act as he was not properly

notified and because the State did not present proof of his prior

convictions (Doc. 1). 

Respondent has answered the petition, arguing that it should

be dismissed as it was not filed within the one-year statute of

limitations period (Doc. 11, pp. 4-5). Respondent refers to

provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (hereinafter AEDPA) which amended, in pertinent part, 28

U.S.C. § 2244. The specific provision states as follows: 

A 1-year period of limitation shall

apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation

period shall run from the latest of the date

on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking such review.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

The AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996. Goodman v.

United States, 151 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 1998). Hill’s

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conviction became final on April 17, 1998, the day on which the

Alabama Supreme Court issued a Certificate of Judgment (Doc. 11,

Exhibit H). The Court also notes that because Petitioner had

ninety days in which to seek direct review of his conviction in

the U.S. Supreme Court, those ninety days do not count against

him—whether he actually sought review or not. See Coates v.

Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1226-1227 (11th Cir. 2000) cert. denied, 531

U.S. 1166 (2001). When ninety days are added to April 17, 1998

the resulting date is July 16, 1998; therefore, the one-year

statute of limitations clock began running on July 17, 1998.

Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition was not filed in

this Court until February 6, 2006, more than six years after the

grace period had expired (see Doc. 11, p. 4). However, Hill had

filed a Rule 32 petition in State court on June 12, 1998 which is

before the one-year period had expired. The Court notes that

AEDPA states that “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Without counting the total length of time that the

limitations clock was running, the Court notes that a gap of

nearly four years passed between the time that Petitioner’s first

Rule 32 petition came to a close and he filed his second Rule 32

petition (January 22, 1999 through January 6, 2003). Hill’s

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The Court could not readily determine whether or not an Alabama

habeas petition would toll the statute of limitations. Respondent

referred to no specific case which addressed this issue and the Court

was unable to find anything in its own search. However, it makes no

difference in this action, as Petitioner far exceeded the one-year

limitations period even if the State habeas petition is considered to

have tolled the statute.

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State habeas petition was filed during this four-year period, but

its entire life was only ten months (August 29, 2000 through June

29, 2001), leaving a full three-year period of time during which

Petitioner had no pending State court actions challenging this

conviction.3 

Clearly, Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition was filed well

beyond the one-year grace period and filed in violation of 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). However, Petitioner has asserted that he is

actually innocent of the sentence imposed upon him as the State

did not properly invoke use of the Habitual Offender Act in

sentencing him (Doc. 14, p. 3). 

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324

(1995), has stated that, in raising an actual innocence defense

to a procedural bar, a petitioner must “support his allegations

of constitutional error with new reliable evidence--whether it be

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts,

or critical physical evidence--that was not presented at trial.” 

The evidence presented “must show that it is more likely than not

that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. In other

words, Petitioner must persuade this Court, “that, in light of

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the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted

to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S.

at 329. A court can consider constitutional infirmities only

after this threshold has been met.

In this action, the Court notes that Petitioner offers only

assertions of his innocence (Doc. 14). There is no offer of new

evidence. The Court finds that Petitioner has made no showing of

actual innocence and has not overcome the statute of limitations

problem presented. The Court finds that Petitioner has provided

no cause for ignoring the dictates of the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: this action is time-barred.

For the reasoning stated herein, it is recommended that this

habeas petition be dismissed as time-barred and that judgment be

entered in favor of Respondent Grantt Culliver and against

Petitioner Michael Leon Hill pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404

(5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging

the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set

out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which

provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

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magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time

is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to

which objection is made and the basis for the

objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a

brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the

magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de

novo and a different disposition made. It is

insufficient to submit only a copy of the original

brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a

copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred

to and incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the

objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 8th day of August, 2006.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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