Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05192/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05192-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY BUFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

WASCO STATE PRISON, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:01-CV-5192-REC-SMS-P 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

SEEKING LEAVE TO AMEND TO ADD NEW

CLAIM AND NEW DEFENDANT

(Doc. 135)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK’S OFFICE TO

SCAN LODGED THIRD AMENDED

COMPLAINT TO MAKE RECORD

COMPLETE

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED

UPON PLAINTIFF FOR ACTING IN BAD

FAITH 

(Doc. 135)

I. Order on Motion to Amend and Order to Show Cause

Plaintiff Timothy Buford (“plaintiff”) is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Americans with Disabilities Act). This

action is proceeding on plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed January 8, 2004, against

defendants Carbajal, Bindel, Huertas, Dobbs, Cheatham, Leong, and Songer (“defendants”) on

plaintiff’s ADA claim. On November 14, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to amend to

add a new claim and a new party, along with a proposed third amended complaint. Defendants did

not file a response to the motion. 

Case 1:01-cv-05192-SMS Document 147 Filed 04/20/06 Page 1 of 6
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Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend the party’s

pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Otherwise,

a party may amend only by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave

shall be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a). In this case, plaintiff has

previously amended and a responsive pleading has been served. Therefore, plaintiff may not file a

third amended complaint without leave of the court.

A. Addition of Deliberate Indifference Claim

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to add a deliberate indifference claim. Deliberate indifference

is not a legal claim or cause of action. Rather, it is the legal standard for claims brought for violation

of the Eighth Amendment. The court has reviewed plaintiff’s second amended complaint and

proposed third amended complaint, and the events giving rise to plaintiff’s claims are the same in

both complaints. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims as set forth in the second amended complaint

were dismissed from this action on November 8, 2004, with prejudice. (Docs. 50, 55.) On February

5, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion seeking entry of final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(b) with respect to dismissal of claims and defendants by the court on November 8,

2004. (Doc. 72.) Plaintiff’s motion was denied on February 23, 2005. (Doc. 75.) On October 3,

2005, plaintiff sought clarification of the status of his dismissed claims, and attempted to persuade

the court that the claims should have been dismissed without prejudice and his ability to fully and

fairly litigate his claims was being hampered. (Doc. 124.) On November 2, 2005, the court granted

plaintiff’s motion for clarification, but rejected plaintiff’s position that the court erred in dismissing

his claims with prejudice. (Doc. 133.) The court also ordered that no further motions would be

granted prior to the conclusion of this action with respect to the dismissed claims, including but not

limited to motions for clarification or reconsideration. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed the instant motion

seeking leave to amend, dated by plaintiff on November 9, 2005.

The court has inherent power to sanction parties or their attorneys for improper conduct.

Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,

766 (1980); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001). The imposition of sanctions under

the court’s inherent authority is discretionary. Air Separation, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of

Case 1:01-cv-05192-SMS Document 147 Filed 04/20/06 Page 2 of 6
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 The court takes judicial notice of the order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, filed on

April 19, 2006, in Buford v. Vang. (Doc. 198.)

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London, 45 F.3d 288, 291 (9th Cir. 1995). The court’s “inherent power ‘extends to a full range of

litigation abuses.’” Fink, 239 F.3d at 992 (quotingChambers, 501 U.S. at 46-47). However, in order

to sanction a litigant under the court’s inherent powers, the court must make a specific finding of

“bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith.” Fink, 239 F.3d at 994. Although mere recklessness

is insufficient to support sanctions under the court’s inherent powers, “recklessness when combined

with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose” is sufficient.

Id. at 993-94. A litigant may be sanctioned for acting for an improper purpose, even if the act was

“a truthful statement or non-frivolous argument or objection.” Id. at 992. “[I]nherent powers must

be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims were dismissed from this action with prejudice. The

record in this action amply demonstrates that not only is plaintiff aware of that fact but that plaintiff

attempted more than once to seek one form of relief or another from the court with respect to the

dismissal of the claims. One week after plaintiff’s latest attempt was rebuffed by the court, plaintiff

served a motion seeking leave to amend to add a claim of deliberate indifference, arising out of the

same fact pattern as that of the claims dismissed with prejudice. 

The court can discern no good faith basis for the attempt to add this claim to the action, and

plaintiff has set forth none in his motion. The filing of the instant motion to amend appears to the

court to be frivolous, abusive, and in bad faith. As plaintiff has demonstrated in this action and in

case number CV-F-00-6496-REC-SMS-P Buford v. Vang,

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 plaintiff is disinclined to accept the

rulings of this court that do not go in his favor, even in the absence of a sound basis for challenging

the orders. Plaintiff repeatedly attempts to make end-runs around the orders of this court, and is

willing to make misrepresentations or omit critical information in his effort to do so. By this order,

plaintiff is placed on notice that his motion seeking leave to amend to add a claim for deliberate

indifference appears to constitute bad faith in light of the dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claim,

with prejudice. Plaintiff shall be provided with the opportunity to be heard and show cause why the

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court should not assess a monetary fine against plaintiff for acting in bad faith, payable to the court

for the waste of its resources.

B. Rehabilitation Act Claim

Plaintiff is well aware that if he wishes to amend or supplement his pleading, he must file

a motion which “state[s] with particularity the grounds therefor,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1), and must

submit a proposed amended or supplemental pleading with his motion, having been placed on notice

via orders of the court in this action. (Docs. 93, 112, 122, 131.) In the instant motion, plaintiff states

that he is seeking to add only the State of California as a defendant and a deliberate indifference

claim. However, review of the proposed third amended complaint reveals that in addition to those

changes, plaintiff included a new claim brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act (29 U. S. C. §

794). Given plaintiff’s awareness of the requirement that he identify in his motion seeking leave to

amend the claims and parties he proposes to add, the court can discern no justification for plaintiff’s

inclusion of a new claim not referenced in his motion. It appears to the court that this is another act

of bad faith by plaintiff. Plaintiff shall be provided with the opportunity to be heard and show cause

why the court should not assess a monetary fine against plaintiff for acting in bad faith, payable to

the court for the waste of its resources.

C. State of California as a Defendant

Finally, construing plaintiff’s motion and proposed third amended complaint liberally,

plaintiff is seeking to add the State of California as a defendant to his ADA claim. However, the

assertion of this claim against a new defendant is barred by the statute of limitations. 

Federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues. See Elliott v. City of Union City,

25 F.3d 800, 801-802 (9th Cir. 1994). Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows

or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121,

1128 (9th Cir.1996). California’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions presumably

applies to ADA claims. Pickern V. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n.2 (9th Cir.

2002); Boyd v. Alameda County, No. C 02-02461 SI, 2005 WL 2171870, *20 (N.D. Cal. 2005). At

the time plaintiff’s claim accrued, the statute of limitations was one year. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

340(3); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (Cal. Civ. Proc. § 335.1, extending the

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 The precise date the statute of limitations ran cannot be identified because the current record does not

allow the court to determine what date plaintiff was released from prison. It is not necessary to pinpoint the exact

date, however, because the statute of limitations ran long before plaintiff attempted to add the State of California as a

defendant. 

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statute of limitations from one year to two years, does not apply to claims that accrued prior to

January 1, 2003). 

In actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitation, the court should also

borrow all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state law. See Hardin v.

Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989). Pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure section 352.1,

a two-year limit on tolling is imposed on prisoners. Section 352.1 provides, in pertinent part, as

follows:

(a) If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3 (commencing with

Section 335), is, at the time the cause of action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal

charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than for

life, the time of that disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement

of the action, not to exceed two years. 

Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time he filed suit and was entitled to application of the two

year tolling provision. However, plaintiff was released from custody at some point between

September 2001 and November 2001. (Docs. 13, 15, 16.) Plaintiff’s release from custody

terminated application of the tolling period and the one year statute of limitations began to run upon

his release. Boag v. Chief of Police, 669 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1982). Subsequent re-incarceration

does not reinstate the tolling period. Id. Therefore, the one year statute of limitations began to run

upon plaintiff’s release from prison between September and November 2001, and plaintiff had until

between September and November 2002 within which to add the State of California as a defendant

to his ADA claim.2 Plaintiff’s motion to amend to add the state as a defendant shall be denied on

the ground that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

D. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to add a deliberate indifference claim and the State

of California as a defendant, filed November 14, 2005, is HEREBY DENIED;

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2. The Clerk’s Office shall scan plaintiff’s lodged proposed third amended complaint

so that the court record is complete;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall show

cause why he should not be sanctioned in the manner set forth in this order for the

conduct set forth in this order;

4. Plaintiff’s response to this order is limited to ten (10) pages, not including exhibits

and plaintiff’s declaration, if any;

5. If plaintiff’s response brief is more than ten pages, not including exhibits and

declarations, only the first ten pages will be read and considered;

6. Defendants have thirty (30) days from the date of service of plaintiff’s response to

this order within which to file their response, if any;

7. Defendants’ response brief is also subject to a ten-page limit, not including exhibits

and declarations, if any; and

8. There shall be no further responses to the order to show cause beyond those provided

for in this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 20, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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