Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01779/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01779-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALAN EUGENE BARBEE, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.1

 Case No.: 16-cv-1779-BEN-(DHB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 14, 15) 

On July 9, 2016, Plaintiff Alan Eugene Barbee (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act 

requesting judicial review of the final administrative decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) regarding denial of Plaintiff’s claim for 

Supplemental Security Income benefits. (ECF No. 1.) On October 27, 2016, Defendant 

filed an Answer and the Administrative Record (“A.R.”). (ECF Nos. 11, 12.)

                                               

1

 The Court hereby substitutes Nancy A. Berryhill, the Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, for Carolyn W. Colvin, the former Acting Commissioner of Social 

Security, as Defendant in this suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); ECF No. 

15 at 1, n. 1.

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On January 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment seeking reversal 

of Defendant’s final decision and remand for further administrative proceedings. (ECF 

No. 14.) Plaintiff contends the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) committed reversible 

error by failing to reconcile apparent conflicts between the testimony of the Vocational 

Expert (“VE”) and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). (Id.) On February 9, 

2017, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and a 

cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 15, 16.)2

 On February 23, 2017, Plaintiff 

filed an opposition to Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 17.) 

For the reasons set forth herein, and after careful consideration of the record and the 

applicable law, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 

be GRANTED, Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment be DENIED, and the 

case REMANDED to the ALJ.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On April 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income 

benefits, in which he states his disability began on June 1, 2006.3

 (A.R. 42, 184-198, 280.) 

In his application, Plaintiff alleges his disability is due to seizures, mental illness, back 

problems, and a head injury. (A.R. 185, 300, 302.) Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied 

on August 28, 2012, and upon reconsideration on May 15, 2013. (A.R. 42, 184-231.) 

Thereafter, on July 7, 2013, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. (A.R. 42, 237-

239.) On July 16, 2014, ALJ Paul Coulter held a hearing regarding Plaintiff’s application 

for Supplemental Security Income benefits. (A.R. 60-79.) On August 28, 2014, the ALJ 

                                               

2

 Although filed separately on the docket, Defendant’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment and Defendant’s opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment are identical. 

3

 Prior to Plaintiff’s current application for Supplemental Security Income 

benefits, Plaintiff requested an ALJ hearing for a prior application for Supplemental 

Security Income benefits, and a hearing was held in 2007, as well as a supplemental hearing 

in 2008 regarding Plaintiff’s application. (A.R. 81, 116, 177.) Plaintiff was granted 

disability benefits for that application on April 25, 2008. (A.R. 183.) 

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rendered an unfavorable decision and concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits. 

(A.R. 39-54.) The ALJ’s decision became final on May 11, 2016, when the Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (A.R. 1-5.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a 

complaint in the above-entitled matter. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. Determination of Disability 

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 

demonstrate the following two things: (1) he suffers from a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of twelve 

months or more, or would result in death; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant 

incapable of performing the work he previously performed or any other substantial gainful 

employment which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A). 

A claimant must meet both requirements to be classified as disabled. Id. The 

Commissioner assesses a claim of disability through a five-step sequential evaluation 

process. The five steps are: 

1. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, 

then the claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security 

Act. If not, proceed to step two. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 

416.920(b). 

2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If so, proceed to step three. If not, 

then the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 

416.920(c). 

3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of the list of specific

impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 220, Appendix 1? If so, the 

claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(d), 416.920(d). 

4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has done in the past? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). 

5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If so, then the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 

416.920(f). 

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Bustamonte v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 

F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999)). If the claimant is able to do other work, then the 

Commissioner must “show that the claimant can perform some other work that exists in 

‘significant numbers’ in the national economy, taking into consideration the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”),4

 age, education, and work experience.” Tackett, 180 

F.3d at 1099-00 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(3)). If an applicant is found to be disabled 

or not disabled at any step, there is no need to proceed further. Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 

F.3d 1002, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Schneider v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 

968, 974 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Although the ALJ must assist the claimant in developing the record, the claimant 

bears the burden of proof during the first four steps. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, n.3 (citing 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(d)). The Commissioner bears the burden of proof at the fifth step. 

Id. at 1100. 

B. Scope of Review 

The Social Security Act allows unsuccessful claimants to seek judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The scope of 

judicial review is limited. The Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision unless it 

“is not supported by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error.” Tidwell v. Apfel, 

161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 

F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 

(9th Cir. 2005) (“We may reverse the ALJ’s decision to deny benefits only if it is based 

upon legal error or it is not supported by substantial evidence.”) (citing Tidwell, 161 F.3d 

at 601.) 

                                               

4

 The RFC is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The RFC is “based on all the relevant evidence” in the case 

record. Id.

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“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” 

Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601 (citing Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

“Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a 

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Flaten, 44 F.3d at 

1457 (citing Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993)). In considering the 

record as a whole, the Court must weigh both the evidence that supports and detracts from 

the ALJ’s conclusions. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Vidal 

v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1981); Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1975)). 

The Court must uphold the denial of benefits if the evidence is susceptible to more 

than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision. Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where evidence is susceptible to more than 

one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”) (citing 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995)); Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457 (“If 

the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing of the Secretary’s 

conclusion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary.”) (citing 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 

(9th Cir. 1992)). The “substantial evidence test for upholding factual findings is ‘extremely 

deferential to the factfinder.’” Rhine v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 596 F.3d 1161, 1165 

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 149 (1997)). The 

court’s “‘task is not to reweigh the evidence, but only to determine if substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s findings.’” Id. (quoting Metro. Stevedore Co., 521 U.S. at 149.) 

However, even if the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions, 

the Court must set aside the decision “if the proper legal standards were not applied in 

weighing the evidence and making the decision.” Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 

(9th Cir. 1978) (quoting Flake v. Gardner, 399 F.2d 532, 540 (9th Cir. 1968)). 

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Section 405(g) permits the Court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter may also be 

remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. 

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff alleges he became disabled on June 1, 2006. (A.R. 42, 280.) In his 

application, Plaintiff alleges his disability is due to seizures, mental illness, back problems, 

and a head injury. (A.R. 185, 300, 302.) Prior to his disability, Plaintiff alleges he worked 

as a laborer and a street repairman. (A.R. 196-197, 303.) 

A. Medical Evidence5

1. Treating Physicians 

 a. California Department of Corrections

 The California Department of Corrections/Health Records Center provided 

Plaintiff’s medical records from April 2011 to June 22, 2012. (A.R. 399-414.) Plaintiff 

was incarcerated from 2010 to 2012. (A.R. 645.) Plaintiff saw a doctor on at least two 

occasions in the Telemedicine Mental Health Clinic in 2011. (A.R. 399-414.) On July 6, 

2011, the date of the last reported visit, Plaintiff reported that he was still doing “ok with 

the voices” and doing “ok with the anger.” (A.R. 406.) The doctor stated that Plaintiff 

“reports continued mild depression; otherwise he appears fa[ir]ly stable.” (A.R. 406.) 

Plaintiff was taking Zoloft, but declined antipsychotic medications. (A.R. 406.) 

 b. East County Clinic

The East County Clinic initially provided Individual Progress Notes for Plaintiff 

from June 1, 2012, June 28, 2012, July 30, 2012, September 28, 2012, December 21, 2012, 

and February 14, 2013. (A.R. 415-425, 469-479.) The Clinic subsequently provided 

                                               

5

 Plaintiff does not contest or address the ALJ’s findings with regard to his 

physical impairments or physical functional ability. Therefore, only Plaintiff’s mental 

health evidence is summarized here. 

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Individual Progress Notes for Plaintiff from April 22, 2013, July 8, 2013, August 5, 2013, 

September 9, 2013, October 7, 2013, November 4, 2013, January 13, 2014, March 10, 

2014, and May 15, 2014. (A.R. 524-525, 597-628.) 

On June 1, 2012, Plaintiff, accompanied by his girlfriend, was given an initial Mental 

Status Exam and seen by a doctor and a nurse. (A.R. 418-420.) The nurse noted that 

Plaintiff was prescribed Thorzine and Zoloft while in prison, from which he was released 

two weeks earlier, and was seeking continued medication management and to change his 

antipsychotic medication because of the side effects. (A.R. 420.) Plaintiff represented he 

still hears voices and has paranoia that people are watching him. (A.R. 420.) Plaintiff’s 

subsequent Individual Progress Notes indicate that Plaintiff was responding well to 

medication. (A.R. 422, 469, 472.) On December 21, 2012, Plaintiff requested that his 

doctor complete a form so that his social security benefits could be continued. (A.R. 476.) 

Plaintiff produced a list of his medications being prescribed by the Family Health Centers 

of San Diego. (A.R. 476.) 

In early 2013, Plaintiff reported that he was doing “okay” and that his medications 

were helping him. (A.R. 478, 524.) In February 2013, Plaintiff reported that his sister was 

helping him because of his seizures and because he could not cook. (A.R. 478.) He also 

asked about his social security form. (A.R. 478.) In April 2013, Plaintiff reported side 

effects for the first time to his medications. (A.R. 524.) He added that he was sleeping 

excessively. (A.R. 524.) In mid-2013, Plaintiff reported a lot of anxiety about his social 

security benefits, due to his financial and physical health. (A.R. 606-615.) 

In early 2014, Plaintiff’s doctor, Vijay Chennamchetty, M.D., started noting that it 

was unclear whether Plaintiff’s behavior at his appointments was due to claimed psychotic 

symptoms or malingering, as a result of Plaintiff applying for social security benefits. 

(A.R. 597-604.) On May 14, 2014, Plaintiff’s doctor stated: “Due to inconsistency of 

endorsed sx and their incongruence with objective presentation, author of this note is 

suspicious that pt might be exaggerating for his sx for secondary gain, possibly to support 

his application for federal security benefits.” (A.R. 597.) The doctor noted that, in the 

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past, Plaintiff’s symptoms and side effects appeared to get worse when he specifically 

asked about them. (A.R. 597.) The doctor also noted that Plaintiff had lived with his lady 

friend for over fifteen years and his sister is his current caregiver. (A.R. 597.) The doctor 

further noted that Plaintiff’s psychosis reportedly started when he had five people he knew 

die in one month. (A.R. 597.) Plaintiff later noted that Plaintiff’s behavior “has usually 

been inconsistent with and unrelated to stated symptoms,” and that Plaintiff appears to be 

malingering. (A.R. 598.) 

 c. Lemon Grove Family Health Centers of San Diego 

The Lemon Grove Family Health Centers of San Diego initially provided medical 

records from July 18, 2012 and August 2, 2012. (A.R. 426-434.) The records were later 

updated to include visits on September 4, 2012, November 5, 2012, December 20, 2012, 

January 28, 2013, and February 14, 2013. (A.R. 482-508.) The records were updated again 

to include visits on February 28, 2013, April 25, 2013, May 9, 2013, September 4, 2013, 

October 24, 2013, and February 20, 2014. (A.R. 538-544, 555-567.) 

Plaintiff primarily saw the doctors at the Family Health Centers of San Diego to 

obtain medication refills. (A.R. 431, 428, 482, 494, 538.) Plaintiff also saw the doctors 

for his blood pressure, hypertension, vision, physical ailments, including his back and leg 

pain, and referrals. On July 18, 2012, Plaintiff saw Young Sik Lee, M.D., to follow up on 

lab results and renew prescriptions. (A.R. 431.) At the time, Dr. Lee noted Plaintiff was 

“alert, coherent, [and in] no acute distress.” (A.R. 431.) On September 4, 2012, Plaintiff 

saw Yuhee Ki, M.D., and reported recurrent seizures, with the last seizure occurring a week 

prior to the visit. (A.R. 494.) Plaintiff reported that he had never been seen by neurology. 

(A.R. 494.) Plaintiff further reported taking medication for schizophrenia, but did not 

know the name or dose. (A.R. 494.) Dr. Kim ordered a neurology consult with Dr. 

Khamishon. (A.R. 496.) As of November 5, 2012, Plaintiff had not yet seen neurology. 

(A.R. 490.) 

On May 9, 2013, Plaintiff requested a new referral to neurology for seizures. (A.R. 

555.) Plaintiff reported a past history of seizures, which were being controlled by 

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medication prescribed by his psychiatrist. (A.R. 555.) His last reported seizure was the 

day before, and Plaintiff reported getting them twice per week. (A.R. 556.) Plaintiff was 

referred to neurology and an MRI was ordered. (A.R. 556.) 

On July 29, 2013, Plaintiff had an MRI. (A.R. 567.) The MRI concluded that 

Plaintiff had deep and cortical atrophy, moderately prominent for Plaintiff’s age, but 

otherwise it was an unremarkable brain MRI without and with contrast. (A.R. 567.) 

On October 24, 2013, when Plaintiff appeared for a physical, he reported that he had 

been taking all medications as prescribed, that he sees a psychiatrist every six weeks, and 

is under the care of neurology for seizures. (A.R. 561.) Plaintiff also reported that he last 

had a seizure three weeks prior to the visit. (A.R. 561.) Plaintiff’s reports in February 

2014 were similar to his October 2013 visit. (A.R. 563.) 

 d. Dr. Boris Khamishon, M.D. 

On December 10, 2012, Plaintiff saw Dr. Boris Khamishon, M.D., for a Neurologic 

Evaluation. (A.R. 462-465, 577-579.) Plaintiff informed Dr. Khamishon that he began 

experiencing seizures approximately eight years prior, after head trauma. (A.R. 462.) 

Plaintiff reported the seizures occurred every day, until medication reduced the frequency 

to once per week. (A.R. 462.) Plaintiff reported the seizures are usually nocturnal, but 

occur during the day as well. (A.R. 462.) Plaintiff further reported he has had grand mal 

seizures with convulsions, loss of consciousness, and rare urinary incontinency, along with 

complex partial seizures that are not accompanied by full loss of consciousness. (A.R. 

462.) The seizures are characterized by staring episodes. (A.R. 462.) Plaintiff had no 

focal weakness, numbness, double vision, or difficulty swallowing. (A.R. 462.) 

Dr. Khamishon reviewed Plaintiff’s systems and stated that Plaintiff had no weight 

changes, fevers, chills, or sweats. (A.R. 462.) He further stated that Plaintiff had no recent 

changes to the eyes and no double vision, as well as no chest pain or palpitations, and no 

shortness of breath with exertion or cough. (A.R. 462.) Plaintiff also had no rash, itching, 

or burning, and no joint pain, cramping, abdominal pain, or issues with his appetite and 

digestion. (A.R. 462.) Dr. Khamishon noted a history of depression; but no history of 

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anxiety or schizophrenia. (A.R. 462.) Dr. Khamishon noted that Plaintiff appeared well 

nourished, well groomed, and had no history of mood disorder. (A.R. 463.) In regards to 

Plaintiff’s mental status, Dr. Khamishon found that Plaintiff was alert and oriented, with 

intact language, concentration, and attention span. (A.R. 463.) Dr. Khamishon further 

found that Plaintiff was following commands and his speech was fluent, with a normal 

vocabulary and fund of knowledge. (A.R. 463.) Dr. Khamishon diagnosed Plaintiff with 

a seizure disorder that began eight years prior after head trauma and recommended a change 

in medication and a brain MRI. (A.R. 464.) Plaintiff’s EEG taken the same day was 

normal. (A.R. 464.) 

Dr. Khamishon continued to see Plaintiff from at least March 13, 2013 to March 20, 

2014. (A.R. 568-579.) On June 18, 2014, Dr. Khamishon filled out a Seizure Disorder 

and Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire. (A.R. 652-655.) Dr. Khamishon stated 

that Plaintiff was diagnosed with a seizure disorder and that he has grand mal and complex 

partial seizures. (A.R. 652.) Dr. Khamishon stated Plaintiff has seizures approximately 

twice per week and they last, on average, three minutes. (A.R. 652.) Dr. Khamishon found 

that Plaintiff’s seizures would likely disrupt the work of co-workers and that he needs more 

supervision at work than an unimpaired worker. (A.R. 654.) Dr. Khamishon further found 

that Plaintiff cannot work at heights, cannot work with power machines that require an alert 

operator, and cannot operate a motor vehicle, but can take the bus alone. (A.R. 654.) Dr. 

Khamishon stated that Plaintiff would likely be absent from work more than four days per 

month. (A.R. 654.) 

 2. Examining Physicians 

On July 12, 2013, Joann Scott, LCSW, from the County of San Diego Mental Health 

Services filled out a Behavioral Health Assessment. (A.R. 629-651.) Plaintiff reported 

hearing voices telling him he is worthless and seeing white shadows. (A.R. 629.) Plaintiff 

reported that the voices prevent him from thinking clearly or making decisions, and that 

his back pain interferes with his daily living. (A.R. 629.) Plaintiff reported that his 

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girlfriend and sister assist him in daily tasks, including bathing, dressing, transport, and 

cooking. (A.R. 629, 637.) Plaintiff reported that he lives with his girlfriend. (A.R. 632.) 

Plaintiff was diagnosed with a psychotic disorder that began on July 16, 2008, and a 

mood and personality disorder that began on June 1, 2012. (A.R. 648.) The Assessment 

also noted Plaintiff’s diabetes, seizures, and hypertension, which began on June 1, 2012. 

(A.R. 648.) 

 3. Non-Examining Physicians 

Two State agency mental medical consultants, Harvey Bilik, Psy.D. and Phaedra 

Caruso-Radin, Psy.D., reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and provided a Mental 

Residual Capacity Assessment on August 14, 2012 and May 14, 2013, respectively, for 

Plaintiff’s disability determinations. (A.R. 194-196, 212-214.) In their findings, both State 

agency mental medical consultants opined that Plaintiff’s ability to understand and 

remember very short and simple instructions was not significantly limited, and Plaintiff’s 

ability to understand and remember detailed instructions was only moderately limited. 

(A.R. 194, 213.) The consultants further opined that Plaintiff “can understand and 

remember simple and some detailed – but perhaps not complex – instructions,” and “carry 

out simple and some detailed – but perhaps not complex – instructions over the course of 

a normal workweek.” (A.R. 195, 212-213.) The consultants also opined that Plaintiff’s 

ability to interact with the general public is moderately limited and that Plaintiff can act 

appropriately with others. (A.R. 195-196, 213.) 

B. The Hearing 

At the hearing on July 16, 2014, Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified, 

along with the Gregory Jones, the VE. (A.R. 60-79.) Their testimony is summarized 

below. 

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

On July 16, 2014, Plaintiff testified at a hearing before ALJ Coulter in San Diego, 

California. (A.R. 60-79.) Plaintiff stated he was 52 years old and has a high school 

education. (A.R. 63-64.) He stated that he lives with a friend in an apartment and has no 

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driver’s license. (A.R. 64.) In regards to daily activities, Plaintiff stated that he does not 

help clean the apartment, or help with grocery shopping and cooking, and he does not do 

his own laundry. (A.R. 64.)

Plaintiff further stated that he can sit for about fifteen minutes and stand for about 

ten minutes at a time. (A.R. 64.) Plaintiff stated that he can walk about a block and uses 

a cane. (A.R. 65.) He added that he has had the cane for ten years and uses it for balance. 

(A.R. 65, 71.) He stated that the last time he had any kind of alcohol was about ten years 

prior to the hearing. (A.R. 65.) 

Plaintiff testified that the last time he worked was twenty years ago. (A.R. 65.) He 

further testified that what keeps him from working are his seizures, and his psychiatric 

medications and back issues. (A.R. 66-67.) He stated that the last time he had a seizure 

was on the way to the ALJ hearing, and that he has tremors approximately two to three 

times each day, and grand mal seizures sometimes twice a week, as well as at night and 

occasionally during the day. (A.R. 66, 68-70.)

In regards to his medications, Plaintiff testified that he takes about ten psychiatric 

medicines for schizophrenia, which he was diagnosed with ten years prior. (A.R. 67.) 

Because of the schizophrenia, he sees things and hears voices that he cannot understand. 

(A.R. 67-68.) He also stated that he takes insulin every morning for his diabetes. (A.R. 

68.) He further testified that the side effects of the medications cause him to cry a lot, and 

cause slowing in his legs and arms, and shaking in his head. (A.R. 71.) Plaintiff stated he 

sees a psychiatrist once a month. (A.R. 73-74.) He also stated that he believes the 

medications make it difficult for him to focus or concentrate. (A.R. 75.) 

In regards to his back, Plaintiff testified that his sister soaks him in a bathtub for his 

back problem. (A.R. 68.) He stated the pain goes from his back down to the right side of 

his groin area. (A.R. 70-71.) For the pain, he takes Gabapentin. (A.R. 71.) 

Plaintiff testified that his sister is his caregiver and comes to get him out of bed, feed 

him, bathe him, dress him, give him his medications, and take him outside or to other 

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places. (A.R. 72-73.) He also stated that he is scared to go outside of the house alone, has 

panic attacks, and has trouble being around people. (A.R. 74.)

2. Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

Gregory Jones, a VE, also testified before the ALJ on July 16, 2014. (A.R. 62, 75-

79.) The ALJ asked Mr. Jones two hypotheticals. (A.R. 76-78.) First, the ALJ asked Mr. 

Jones to consider a hypothetical individual with the same age, education, and work 

experience as Plaintiff, who can: (i) lift, carry, push, or pull 20 pounds occasionally, 10 

pounds frequently; (ii) stand and walk for about six hours out of eight; (iii) sit for about six 

hours out of eight; (iv) climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl on a frequent basis; 

(v) understand, remember, and carry out simple job instructions; (vi) maintain attention 

and concentration; (vii) perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks in a work environment 

free of fast paced production requirements; (viii) have occasional interaction with 

coworkers and supervisors; and (ix) work in an environment with occasional changes to 

the work setting and occasional work related decision making. (A.R. 76-77.) 

This hypothetical individual cannot, however: (i) have concentrated exposure to 

irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts, and gases; (ii) be exposed, even moderately, to hazards 

such as machinery and heights; (iii) drive as a job; (iv) work near large open bodies of 

water; (v) perform work that would require directing others, abstract thought, or planning; 

(vi) have direct interaction with the public; or (vii) use ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (A.R. 

76-77.) 

The ALJ then asked whether, using this hypothetical, there would be any jobs 

available in the national economy for such a hypothetical individual. (A.R. 77.) Mr. Jones 

responded there would be jobs available for such a hypothetical person. (A.R. 77.) Mr. 

Jones further stated that a hypothetical person could perform the occupation of three 

different jobs: a cafeteria attendant, a routing clerk, and a mail clerk. (A.R. 77-78.) 

Second, the ALJ asked Mr. Jones to assume the same hypothetical as the first, except 

to add that the person is going to be absent more than four times per month due to various 

impairments. (A.R. 78.) The ALJ asked whether there would be jobs available in the 

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national economy for that hypothetical individual. (A.R. 78.) Mr. Jones testified that there 

would be no jobs available for such a person. (A.R. 78.) 

The ALJ then asked Mr. Jones if his testimony had been according to the DOT. 

(A.R. 78.) Mr. Jones testified that his testimony had been according to the DOT concerning 

the first hypothetical, but the second hypothetical was predicated on his knowledge and 

experience. (A.R. 78.) 

C. The ALJ’s Findings 

On August 28, 2014, the ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision regarding Plaintiff’s 

application for disability benefits. (A.R. 39-59.) The ALJ followed the five-step, 

sequential evaluation process in rendering his decision. At step one, the ALJ concluded 

that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 30, 2012, the 

application date.” (A.R. 44.) 

At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: 

lumbar spine degenerative disc disease; seizures disorder (post head trauma); diabetes 

mellitus; hypertension; sciatica; headache; obesity; gastroesophageal disease (“GERD”); 

asthma; schizophrenia; and depressive disorder. (A.R. 44.) 

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or equals the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in the Listing of Impairments, found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416,.925, 

416.926. (A.R. 44.) The ALJ did note that obesity, although not listed as an impairment, 

could have potential effects causing or contributing to Plaintiff’s impairment, and was 

considered. (A.R. 44.) 

In regards to Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ considered the severity of 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments singly and in combination, and found that they do not meet 

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or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.046

 and 12.06.7 (A.R. 45.) In order to satisfy 

“paragraph B” criteria,8

 the ALJ noted that the mental impairments at issue “must result in 

at least two of the following: marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked 

difficulties in maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of decompensation, each of 

extended duration.” (A.R. 45.) 

In regards to activities of daily living, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had mild 

restriction and no limitation because he is “capable of performing numerous adaptive 

activities independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis despite his 

alleged mental impairments.” (A.R. 45.) Although Plaintiff testified that he needs a 

caregiver to help him bathe and shower, the ALJ found that the evidence from the record 

did not support this need. (A.R. 45.) The ALJ noted that in Plaintiff’s function report from 

July 2, 2012, Plaintiff “reported activities such as getting up and brushing his own teeth, 

making his own meals, cleaning, and going shopping with another person, . . . which 

suggests greater activities than alleged.” (A.R. 45.)9

                                               

6

 Listing 12.04 relates to “[d]epressive, bipolar and related disorders.” 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 at § 12.04. 

7

 Listing 12.06 relates to “[a]nxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders.” 20 

C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 at § 12.06. 

8

 Listings 12.04 and 12.06 have three paragraphs, designated A, B, and C. A 

claimant’s “mental disorder must satisfy the requirements of both paragraphs A and B, or 

the requirements of both paragraphs A and C.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. 

Paragraph A requires medical documentation of certain conditions. See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App. 1 at §§ 12.04(A), 12.06(A). Paragraph B requires extreme limitation 

of one, or marked limitation of two, of the following areas of mental functioning: (1) 

understand, remember, or apply information; (2) interact with others; (3) concentrate, 

persist, or maintain pace; (4) adapt or manage oneself. See id. 9

 On July 2, 2012, Plaintiff’s sister filled out a Third Party Function Report, and 

a Function Report on behalf of Plaintiff. (A.R. 321-328, 350-357.) Plaintiff also filled out 

a Seizure Questionnaire. (A.R. 343-345.)

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In regards to social functioning, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had moderate 

difficulties. (A.R. 45.) The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s history of schizophrenia with reported 

difficulties with others. (A.R. 45.) However, the ALJ also noted that Plaintiff 

acknowledged going to the store, going to church, and spending time with family, friends, 

neighbors, and others, and getting along with them. (A.R. 45.)

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties with regard to 

concentration, persistence, or pace. (A.R. 45.) The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s reported 

problems concentrating, paying attention, following instructions, hearing voices, and 

seeing things. (A.R. 45.) The ALJ also noted, however, that Plaintiff’s treatment records 

show a generally normal thought process and average intellect. (A.R. 45.) 

Lastly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had experienced no episodes of decompensation 

that have been of extended duration. (A.R. 45.) Because he found Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments “do not cause at least two ‘marked’ limitations or one ‘marked’ limitation and 

‘repeated’ episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration,” the ALJ held that the 

“paragraph B” criteria was not satisfied. (A.R. 45.) 

The ALJ also considered whether the “paragraph C” criteria of Listing 12.04 and 

Listing 12.06 were satisfied, and found that the evidence failed to establish the presence of 

the criteria.10 (A.R. 45-46.) 

Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform less than the full range of 

light work, as light work is defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). (A.R. 46.) Specifically, the 

ALJ stated: 

                                               

10 See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00(a)(2)(c), (G). A mental 

disorder in Paragraph C is considered “serious and persistent” if the claimant has a 

“medically documented disorder over a period of at least 2 years, and there is evidence of 

both: 1. Medical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly 

structured setting(s) that is ongoing and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of [the 

claimant’s] mental disorder []; and 2. Marginal adjustment, that is, [the claimant] ha[s] 

minimal capacity to adapt to changes in [his] environment or to demands that are not 

already part of [his] daily life [].” Id. at § 12.04(C); see also § 12.06(C). 

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the claimant can lift, carry, push or pull twenty pounds occasionally and ten 

pounds frequently; the claimant can stand and/or walk six hours out of an 

eight-hour workday; the claimant can sit six hours out of an eight-hour 

workday; the claimant can climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl on 

a frequent basis, but the claimant cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; the 

claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to irritants such as fumes, odors, 

dusts, and gases; the claimant must avoid even moderate exposure to hazards, 

such as machinery and heights; the claimant cannot drive as a job or work near 

large open bodies of water; the claimant can understand, remember, and carry 

out simple job instructions, but would be unable to perform work that would 

require directing others, abstract thought, or planning; the claimant can 

maintain attention and concentration to perform simple, routine and repetitive 

tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements; the 

claimant can have occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors, but 

no direct interaction with the general public; and the claimant can work in an 

environment with occasional changes to the work setting and occasional 

work-related decision making. 

(A.R. 46.) 

In reaching this determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff made inconsistent 

statements regarding matters relevant to the issue of disability. (A.R. 47.) Specifically, 

the ALJ noted that Plaintiff gave inconsistent testimony regarding the frequency of his 

seizures and how controlled they were. (A.R. 47-48.) The ALJ further stated that even 

though Plaintiff testified he had used a cane for the past ten years, Plaintiff was noted to 

have a normal gait with normal strength, and no weakness or deficit on September 4, 2012 

and December 20, 2012. (A.R. 48.)

The ALJ further considered how Plaintiff’s reports on the voices he hears and his 

visual hallucinations differed from his testimony, and concluded that he “may have been 

less than entirely candid.” (A.R. 48.) The ALJ noted a prior report suggesting Plaintiff 

may have been exaggerating his symptoms for secondary gain due to the discrepancy 

between Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the objective medical evidence. (A.R. 48.) 

Additionally, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff testified he had difficulty concentrating, 

throughout the hearing, Plaintiff did not demonstrate or manifest difficulty in 

concentrating, as he paid attention and appeared to be able to answer questions without 

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difficulty, and responded appropriately, without delay. (A.R. 48.) The ALJ next reviewed 

Plaintiff’s work history, which showed that Plaintiff worked only sporadically prior to his 

alleged disability onset date, which the ALJ stated raises the question as to whether 

Plaintiff’s continuing unemployment is due to his medical impairments. (A.R. 48.) Lastly, 

the ALJ found the statements of Plaintiff’s sister, which parrot Plaintiff’s statements, to be 

not credible to the extent her statements are inconsistent with the ALJ’s determination. 

(A.R. 48.) The ALJ found that the sister’s repetition of Plaintiff’s complaints, which he 

found highly suspect, did not make them any more credible. (A.R. 48.) 

After consideration of the evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; 

however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting 

effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible.” (A.R. 48.) The ALJ further reviewed, 

considered, and discussed Plaintiff’s complete medical history, including evidence from 

the time prior to his eligibility for benefits. (A.R. 48-52.) The ALJ accorded weight to the 

various medical opinions. (A.R. 48-52.) The ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Dr. 

Khamishon. (A.R. 50-51.) In determining Plaintiff’s mental RFC, the ALJ gave great 

weight to the opinions of the State agency mental medical consultants. (A.R. 52.) 

The ALJ then proceeded with step four of the sequential evaluation process. At this 

step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (A.R. 52.) Finally, at 

step five, the ALJ determined that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 

national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (A.R. 53-54.) The ALJ determined that the 

VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could perform the requirements of “representative 

occupations such as cafeteria attendant, routin[g] clerk, and mail clerk,” was consistent 

with the information contained in the DOT. (A.R. 53.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that 

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Plaintiff had not been disabled, as defined by the Social Security Act, since April 30, 2012, 

the date the application was filed.11 (A.R. 54.) 

IV. DISCUSSION 

The sole issue in this case is whether the ALJ committed legal error at step five of 

the sequential evaluation process. (See ECF No. 14-1 at 6.) The parties do not dispute the 

ALJ’s findings at steps one through four, and therefore, the Court does not address them. 

At step five, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in adopting, without explanation, the 

testimony of the VE, which he alleges conflicted with the DOT. (Id.) In response, 

Defendant argues that by failing to cross-examine the VE on any potential conflict with the 

DOT at the ALJ hearing, Plaintiff waived the issue on appeal. (ECF No. 15-1 at 5-6.) 

Defendant further argues that the ALJ met his burden of resolving any apparent conflict 

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT by simply asking the VE whether his testimony 

conforms to the DOT and receiving an unchallenged affirmative response. (Id. at 5.) 

Lastly, Defendant argues that an RFC limiting a claimant to “simple job instructions” is 

consistent with a Reasoning Level 2; thus, the ALJ’s RFC finding and the jobs identified 

by the VE and adopted by the ALJ were appropriate. (Id. at 6-7.) 

A. Waiver

1. Legal Standard 

When social security claimants are represented by counsel, the Ninth Circuit has 

determined “they must raise all issues and evidence at their administrative hearings in order 

to preserve them on appeal.” Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999). In so 

holding, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he ALJ, rather than th[e] [c]ourt, [i]s in the 

optimal position to resolve the conflict between” the evidence provided. Id. The failure to 

comply with this rule may only be excused when necessary to avoid manifest injustice. Id.

                                               

11 The ALJ considered whether Plaintiff had been deprived of the ability to 

perform work subject to his RFC for any 12-month period after the application date. (A.R. 

52.) 

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However, the Ninth Circuit has also held that if an argument raised for the first time 

on appeal is a pure question of law and the Commissioner would not be unfairly prejudiced 

by the plaintiff’s failure to raise the issue below, it may nevertheless be considered by the 

court. Silveira v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. 

Thornburg, 82 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

2. Analysis 

In reliance on Meanel, Defendant argues Plaintiff should have cross-examined the 

VE and raised the issue of conflict before the ALJ, in order to preserve the issue on appeal. 

(ECF No. 15-1 at 6.) In Meanel, the ALJ determined the plaintiff was not disabled because 

she could perform two occupations other than her past work. Meanel, 172 F.3d at 1113. 

After the district court upheld the ALJ’s denial of benefits, the plaintiff appealed to the 

Ninth Circuit and argued there were insufficient numbers of those jobs in the local area. 

Id. at 1115. In support of her argument, the plaintiff relied on new statistics, which she 

failed to raise at the ALJ hearing and before the Appeals Council. Id. The Ninth Circuit 

held the argument was waived, stating that the ALJ was in “the optimal position to resolve 

the conflict between [the plaintiff]’s new evidence and the statistical evidence provided by 

the VE.” Id. The court then found manifest injustice would not occur if it did not consider 

the new evidence. Id.

In response, Plaintiff relies on Silveira and Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000), to 

argue the issue has not been waived. (ECF No. 17 at 4.) In Silveira, the plaintiff was 

denied benefits and requested an Appeal’s Council review, which was denied. Silveira, 

204 F.3d at 1259. The district court upheld the Commissioner’s denial of benefits and the 

plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing there should have been a finding of 

disability because he had no transferable skills and thus his work history is equivalent to 

an unskilled work history. Id. at 1259-60. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the issue was 

raised for the first time on appeal, but nevertheless considered the issue because it was a 

pure question of law and the Commissioner would not be unfairly prejudiced by the 

plaintiff’s failure to raise the issue below. Id. at 1260, n.8. The Ninth Circuit distinguished 

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the case from Meanel because the plaintiff was not presenting new evidence for the first 

time on appeal, “thus depriving the Commissioner of an opportunity to weigh and evaluate 

the evidence.” Id. 

In Sims, the Supreme Court considered, in the context of Social Security benefits, 

“whether a claimant pursuing judicial review has waived any issues that he did not include 

in [his or her] request” for review to the Social Security Appeals Council. Sims v. Apfel, 

530 U.S. 103, 104-05 (2000). The Supreme Court held that “[c]laimants who exhaust 

administrative remedies need not also exhaust issues in a request for review by the Appeals 

Council in order to preserve judicial review of those issues.” Id. at 112. 

Here, the Court finds the issue raised by Plaintiff to be a pure question of law and 

no new evidence is before the Court. The Court further finds the Commissioner would not 

be unfairly prejudiced by Plaintiff’s failure to raise the issue before the ALJ or the Appeals 

Council, as the Commissioner has had an opportunity to address the issue. See Silviera, 

204 F.3d at 1260 n. 8. Thus, under Silveira, the Court finds the issue has not been waived 

and the Court may consider the claim. 

Moreover, although the Supreme Court expressly stated in Sims that “[w]hether a 

claimant must exhaust issues before the ALJ is not before us,” Sims, 530 U.S. at 107, 

district courts in the Ninth Circuit, and at least one other circuit court, have cited Sims as 

providing the basis for holding that plaintiffs need not preserve all issues in proceedings 

before the Commissioner. See Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005) 

(finding that even though there was nothing in the record to indicate the conflict was raised 

until the district court proceedings, pursuant to Sims, a plaintiff “need not preserve issues 

in the proceedings before the Commissioner or her delegates”); Brewer v. Colvin, No. ED 

CV 15-2219-E, 2016 WL 4491498, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2016) (finding, in reliance 

on Sims, that a plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to raise inconsistencies at the administrative 

hearing does not waive the issue); see also Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1160 n. 9 

(9th Cir. 2001) (finding that Sims forecloses the argument that a failure to raise an issue 

before the Appeals Council waives the issue).

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Lastly, district courts in the Ninth Circuit frequently distinguish Meanel, finding that 

it does not apply in cases where the plaintiff’s attorney failed to raise a conflict between 

the VE’s testimony and the DOT at the ALJ hearing, because the ALJ bears the burden of 

proof at step five and is under an obligation to clarify any apparent conflict before making 

a finding. See e.g., Brewer v. Colvin, No. ED CV 15-2219-E, 2016 WL 4491498, at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2016) (declining to apply Meanel because the administration has the 

burden of proof at step five, and the court did not need to review new evidence to determine 

the ALJ erred); Murry v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-01349-JLT, 2016 WL 393859, at *5 (E.D. 

Cal. Feb. 2, 2016) (declining to apply Meanel, in part, because it is the ALJ’s obligation to 

clarify the record, especially with such an apparent inconsistency in the VE’s testimony, 

and the ALJ bears the burden at step five); Gonzales v. Astrue, No. 1:10-cv-01330-SKO, 

2012 WL 2064947, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2012) (finding that the plaintiff’s 

representative’s failure to challenge inconsistencies between the VE’s testimony and the 

DOT at the time of the hearing does not constitute a waiver of the argument). 

Based on all of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim has not been 

waived, and addresses the claim below. 

B. The ALJ’s Burden to Reconcile Conflicts Between the VE’s Testimony 

and the DOT 

1. Legal Standard 

At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the Commissioner has the burden 

“to identify specific jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that [a] 

claimant can perform despite [his] identified limitations.” Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 

845 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)); see 

also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). In making a disability determination after this step, the ALJ 

relies primarily on the DOT for “information about the requirements of work in the national 

economy.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007). “The DOT describes 

the requirements for each listed occupation, including the necessary General Education 

Development (‘GED’) levels; that is, ‘aspects of education (formal and informal) . . . 

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required of the worker for satisfactory job performance.’” Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846 

(quoting DOT, App. C, 1991 WL 688702 (4th ed. 1991)). “The GED levels includes the 

reasoning ability required to perform the job, ranging from Level 1 (which requires the 

least reasoning ability) to Level 6 (which requires the most).” Id. (citing DOT, App. C, 

1991 WL 688702). 

In addition to the DOT, the ALJ “also uses testimony from vocational experts to 

obtain occupational evidence.” Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153; see also Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 

846. Generally, the VE’s testimony should be consistent with the DOT. SSR 00-4P at *2 

(S.S.A. Dec. 4, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1898704;12 Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153. 

However, when conflicts occur, neither the DOT, nor the VE’s evidence automatically 

trumps. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153-54 (citing SSR 00-4P at *2). “Thus, the ALJ must 

first determine whether a conflict exists.” Id. 

“When there is an apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and 

the DOT—for example, expert testimony that a claimant can perform an occupation 

involving DOT requirements that appear more than the claimant can handle—the ALJ is 

required to reconcile the inconsistency.” Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846 (citing Massachi, 486 

F.3d at 1153). The ALJ must ask the VE whether his or her testimony conflicts with the 

DOT. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153-54; SSR 00-4P at *4. If it does conflict, “the ALJ must 

then determine whether the vocational expert’s explanation for the conflict is reasonable 

and whether a basis exists for relying on the expert rather than the [DOT].” Id. at 1153. A 

failure to ask the VE whether his or her testimony conflicts with the DOT may be harmless 

error if there is no conflict, or if the VE provides “sufficient support for [his or] her 

                                               

12 “[Social Security Rulings] reflect the official interpretation of the [Social 

Security Administration] and are entitled to ‘some deference’ as long as they are consistent 

with the Social Security Act and regulations.” Avenetti v. Barnhart, 456 F.3d 1122, 1124 

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1005 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

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conclusion so as to justify any potential conflicts.” Id. at 1154, n. 19; see also Hann v. 

Colvin, No. 12-CV-06234, 2014 WL 1382063, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014). 

2. Analysis13

Plaintiff contends the VE’s testimony is a deviation from the DOT because 

Plaintiff’s RFC to “understand, remember, and carry out simple job instructions” conflicts 

with the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could perform the job of a mail clerk with a 

Reasoning Level 3, or a routing clerk or a cafeteria attendant with a Reasoning Level 2. 

(ECF No. 14-1 at 6-8.) Plaintiff further contends the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could 

perform the work of a cafeteria attendant conflicts with the RFC that Plaintiff cannot have 

“direct interaction with the general public.” (Id. at 8-10.) Because the VE’s testimony 

conflicts with the DOT, Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have given an explanation for 

that deviation, but failed to do so. (Id. at 6.) 

In response, Defendant argues, in reliance on an unpublished Ninth Circuit decision, 

Wentz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 401 Fed. App’x. 189 (9th Cir. 2010), that when the 

ALJ asked whether the VE’s testimony was consistent with the DOT, and the VE 

confirmed that it was consistent, and Plaintiff’s attorney did not “challenge that 

representation,” there was no apparent conflict. (ECF No. 16-1 at 5.) Thus, Defendant 

contends the ALJ met his obligations to resolve apparent conflicts under Massachi and 

SSR 00-4p. (Id.) For the following reasons, the Court disagrees. 

In line with the decisions of several other district courts, the Court does not interpret 

Wentz to hold that an ALJ’s duty to reconcile conflicts between the VE’s testimony and 

the DOT is satisfied when an ALJ simply asks the VE whether there is a conflict and the 

VE says there is none. See e.g., Norris v. Colvin, No. EDCV 12-1687 RNB, 2013 WL 

5379507, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2013) (finding that the Commissioner’s contention 

                                               

13 Plaintiff does not argue that the hypotheticals posed by the ALJ to the VE 

were incomplete or otherwise erroneous. As this issue is not before the Court, the Court 

does not address it in its analysis. 

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that the ALJ may rely solely on the VE’s unsupported conclusion that there is no conflict 

between her testimony and the DOT cannot be reconciled with the Ninth Circuit precedent 

requiring that the record clearly show how the ALJ resolved apparent conflicts); Marquez 

v. Astrue, No. CV 11-339-TUC-JGZ, 2012 WL 3011779, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. July 23, 2012) 

(holding that an ALJ cannot simply rely on the VE’s testimony that no such conflicts exist); 

Gonzales, 2012 WL 2064947, at *2-4 (declining to apply Wentz because it does not 

interpret Wentz as holding that “whenever a VE states that there is no conflict between the 

VE’s testimony and the DOT, that testimony must be accepted by the ALJ regardless of 

whether there is an unexplained apparent conflict”). 

The ALJ has a duty to reconcile conflicts between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, 

and the ALJ cannot simply rely on the VE’s unsupported testimony that no such conflict 

exists, when there is an apparent unresolved conflict. See SSR-004p at *2 (“When there is 

an apparent unresolved conflict between VE . . . evidence and the DOT, the adjudicator 

must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying on the VE . . . evidence 

to support a determination or decision about whether the claimant is disabled.”); see also

Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846 (citing Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153); Marquez, 2012 WL 3011779, 

at *3; Gonzales, 2012 WL 2064947, at *4; Norris, 2013 WL 5379507, at *3. 

The Court further finds Wentz to be distinguishable. In Wentz, the Ninth Circuit did 

not address a situation involving an apparent conflict. Instead, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 

the district court’s finding of no apparent conflict because there was persuasive evidence 

the plaintiff’s limitations still allowed her to perform the jobs the VE testified to at the 

hearing. See Wentz, 401 Fed. App’x at 191; Wentz v. Astrue, No. CIV. 08-661, 2009 WL 

3734104, at *13-14 (D. Or. Nov. 4, 2009).14 There is no indication in Wentz that the 

holding was intended to apply to situations in which there is an apparent conflict. 

                                               

14 Other district courts have similarly factually distinguished Wentz. See 

Gonzales, 2012 WL 2064947, at *3; Norris, 2013 WL 5379507, at *3. 

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Moreover, in a subsequent unpublished opinion,15 the Ninth Circuit, consistent with the 

Court’s analysis above, stated as follows: 

The Commissioner’s argument that the ALJ was entitled to rely on the VE’s 

response that there was no conflict is unavailing. ALJs have an affirmative 

responsibility to resolve apparent conflicts, see SSR 00-4p, and a VE’s answer 

that there is no conflict does not eliminate that duty where, as here, the record 

evinces a potential conflict. 

Tester v. Colvin, 624 F. App’x 485, 487 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2015). 

In this case, the ALJ asked the VE whether his testimony was according to the DOT, 

and the VE replied that it was as to the first hypothetical, without any further explanation, 

but it was based on his knowledge and experience as to the second hypothetical. (A.R. 78.) 

In the ALJ’s findings, he stated that based on the VE’s testimony, a finding of “not 

disabled” was appropriate, and made no further explanation for his reliance on the VE’s 

testimony. (A.R. 53-54.) Because there is no other evidence that the ALJ considered any 

potential conflict between the VE and the DOT, the Court now considers whether the 

record evinces an apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT that the ALJ 

should have identified and reconciled before relying on the VE’s testimony for a disability 

determination. 

C. DOT Findings 

1. Legal Standard 

“Social Security Regulations separate a claimant’s ability to understand, remember, 

and concentrate into just two categories: ‘short and simple instructions’ and ‘detailed’ or 

‘complex’ instructions.” Meissl v. Barnhart, 403 F. Supp. 2d 981, 984 (C.D. Cal. 2005) 

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.969a(c)(1)(iii)). The DOT, however, employs a graduated measure 

starting at “simple one- or two-step instructions” at level one, up to the most complex, 

“applying principles of logical or scientific thinking,” at level six. Id. A DOT reasoning 

                                               

15 Although unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions are not binding precedent, they 

may be cited as persuasive authority. See Ninth Cir. Rule 36-3(a). 

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level applies to a person’s ability by assessing whether that person can “apply increasingly 

difficult principles of rational thought and deal with increasingly complicated problems.” 

Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 847 (citing DOT, App. C, 1991 WL 688702). 

 2. Analysis 

Plaintiff contends that his RFC limitation to understanding, remembering, and 

carrying out “simple job instructions” is not compatible with Reasoning Level 2 or Level 

3, but rather is only consistent with Reasoning Level 1. (ECF No. 14-1 at 6-7.) As such, 

Plaintiff argues that he does not retain the ability to perform the occupation of mail clerk, 

which requires Reasoning Level 3, or the occupations of cafeteria attendant or routing 

clerk, which require Reasoning Level 2. (Id. at 7-8.) 

According to the DOT, Reasoning Levels 1 through 3 are defined as follows: 

Level 1: Apply commonsense understanding to carry out simple one- or 

two-step instructions. Deal with standardized situations with occasional or 

no variables in or from these situations encountered on the job. 

Level 2: Apply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but 

uninvolved written or oral instructions. Deal with problems involving a few 

concrete variables in or from standardized situations. 

Level 3: Apply commonsense understanding to carry out instructions 

furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form. Deal with problems 

involving several concrete variables in or from standardized situations. 

DOT, App. C, 1991 WL 688702 (emphasis added); see also Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 847; ECF 

No. 14-3. 

In response, Defendant does not contend that Plaintiff’s limitations are compatible 

with Reasoning Level 3. (ECF No. 15-1 at 6.) Instead, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s 

RFC limiting him to understanding, remembering, and carrying out “simple job 

instructions” is compatible with Reasoning Level 2, which is the level required for the 

occupations of cafeteria attendant and routing clerk. (Id.) 

Although Defendant does not address Plaintiff’s argument that his limitations are 

incompatible with Reasoning Level 3, which is the level required for a mail clerk, the Court 

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finds there was an apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could 

perform the occupation of mail clerk and the DOT, which the ALJ failed to address. In 

Zavalin, the Ninth Circuit held that “there is an apparent conflict between the residual 

functional capacity to perform simple, repetitive tasks, and the demands of Level 3 

Reasoning.” Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 847. In this case, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is 

limited to “simple, routine and repetitive tasks” and “simple job instructions.” (A.R. 46.) 

Based on the reasoning of Zavalin, the Court finds there was an apparent conflict between 

the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could perform the job of mail clerk and the DOT, which 

the ALJ failed to address. See also Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1176 (holding that the plaintiff’s 

limitations to “simple and routine work tasks” seems inconsistent with the demands of 

Reasoning Level 3 and reversing and remanding to allow the ALJ to address the apparent 

conflict); Simpson v. Colvin, No. SACV 15-01122, 2016 WL 3091487, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. 

May 31, 2016) (“The reasoning level three requirement conflicts with the ALJ’s limitation 

that plaintiff could only perform simple, repetitive tasks”); Bagshaw v. Astrue, No. EDCV 

09-1365, 2010 WL 256544, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2010) (holding that a mail clerk’s 

requirement of Reasoning Level 3 is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s RFC to simple, routine 

work). 

However, the Court declines to extend this finding to Reasoning Level 2, as urged 

by Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that his RFC limiting him to “simple job instructions” is 

similarly incompatible with a Reasoning Level 2. (ECF No. 14-1 at 7-8.) The Court 

disagrees. Courts have consistently held that RFC limitations to “simple, routine and 

repetitive tasks” and “simple job instructions” are compatible with Reasoning Level 2. See

e.g., Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846-47 (stating that Reasoning Level 2 is “at least as consistent” 

with the plaintiff’s RFC limitation to “simple, routine, and repetitive work” as Reasoning 

Level 3, “if not more so.”); Lara v. Astrue, 305 Fed. App’x. 324, 326 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“[S]omeone able to perform simple, repetitive tasks is capable of doing work requiring 

more rigor and sophistication [than Reasoning Level 1 jobs]—in other words, Reasoning 

Level 2 jobs.”); Abrew v. Astrue, 303 Fed. App’x 567, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding “there 

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was no conflict between the ALJ’s step five determination that [the plaintiff] could 

complete only simple tasks and the vocational expert’s testimony that [the plaintiff] could 

do jobs that the U.S. Department of Labor categorizes at ‘Reasoning Level 2.’”); Moore v. 

Astrue, 623 F.3d 599, 604 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding there is no direct conflict between 

“carrying out simple job instructions” and occupations involving Reasoning Level Two); 

Money v. Barnhart, 91 Fed. App’x. 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that “[w]orking at 

reasoning level 2 would not contradict the mandate that [the plaintiff’s] work be simple, 

routine and repetitive”); Coleman v. Astrue, No. CV 10-5641 JC, 2011 WL 781930, at *5 

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2011) (“The Court recognizes . . . that the weight of prevailing authority 

precludes a finding of any inconsistency between a reasoning level of two and a mere 

limitation to simple, repetitive tasks or unskilled work.” (collecting cases)); Xiong v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 1:09-cv-00398-SMS, 2010 WL 2902508, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 

2010) (“Courts within the Ninth Circuit have consistently held that a limitation requiring 

simple or routine instructions encompasses the reasoning levels of one and two.”) 

(collecting cases)); Watkins v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 6:15-cv-01539-MA, 2016 WL 

4445467, at *7, n. 2 (D. Or. Aug. 22, 2016) (“The District of Oregon repeatedly has held 

that the limitation to perform simple and routine tasks is not inconsistent with Reasoning 

Level 2 jobs.”); Gilbert v. Colvin, 6:14-cv-00394-AA, 2015 WL 1478441, at *6-7 (D. Or. 

Mar. 31, 2015) (collecting cases). 

Moreover, based on the ALJ’s findings, there is substantial evidence in the record 

that demonstrates Plaintiff retains the capacity to do Reasoning Level 2 jobs.16 See Tidwell, 

161 F.3d at 601; Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457. The requirements of Reasoning Level 2 are not 

in conflict with the limitations described by the opinions of the State agency medical 

                                               

16 Although the ALJ does not explicitly state what he relied on in determining 

that Plaintiff had the capacity to do Reasoning Level 2 jobs, the Court reviewed the ALJ’s 

opinion and the record to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support his 

findings. 

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consultants, whose opinions the ALJ gave great weight. (See A.R. 52.) The ALJ noted 

that “[t]he State agency mental medical consultants opined the claimant would have 

moderate limitations with detailed instructions, maintaining attention and concentration for 

extended periods, interacting appropriately with the general public, maintaining socially 

appropriate behavior to adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness, and 

responding appropriately to changes in the work setting.” (A.R. 52.) In their findings, 

both State agency mental medical consultants opined that Plaintiff’s ability to understand 

and remember very short and simple instructions was not significantly limited, and 

Plaintiff’s ability to understand and remember detailed instructions was only moderately 

limited. (A.R. 194, 213.) The consultants further opined that Plaintiff “can understand and 

remember simple and some detailed – but perhaps not complex – instructions,” and “carry 

out simple and some detailed – but perhaps not complex – instructions over the course of 

a normal workweek.” (A.R. 195, 212-213.) 

Based on a comparison of the language, this testimony is consistent with the 

limitations of Reasoning Level 2. See DOT, App. C, 1991 WL 688702 (Reasoning Level 

2 requires an ability to apply “commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but 

uninvolved written or oral instructions”). Given the foregoing, the Court does not find 

there was any apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could perform 

Reasoning Level 2 work and the DOT that the ALJ failed to address. 

The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s reliance on Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 807 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2015), is misplaced. In Rounds, the Ninth Circuit, relying 

on Zavalin, held that an RFC limiting the plaintiff to “one- to two-step tasks” was in 

apparent conflict with the demands of Reasoning Level 2, which requires a person to “carry 

out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions.” Id. at 1003 (“Only tasks with 

more than one or two steps would require ‘detailed’ instructions.”); see also Tester, 624 

Fed. App’x at 487-88 (finding that the plaintiff’s RFC for “simple, 1-2 step work” is in 

apparent conflict with Reasoning Level 2). In making this determination, the Ninth Circuit 

relied on the close similarity in language between Reasoning Level 1, which includes the 

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limitation to carrying out “simple one- or two-step instructions,” and the plaintiff’s RFC 

limitation to “one to two step tasks.” Id. at 1003. That same limitation is not present in 

this case. 

Here, Plaintiff is not limited to “one- to two-step” tasks or instructions,17 but rather 

“simple job instructions.” In Rounds, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged these two are not 

one and the same. Id. at 1004 (distinguishing between the two by stating that “the ALJ did 

not merely restrict [the plaintiff] to ‘simple’ or ‘repetitive’ tasks[,] [i]nstead, he expressly 

limited her to ‘one or two step tasks”) & n. 6 (distinguishing Rounds, which involves an 

RFC limitation to “one to two step tasks,” from cases involving an RFC limitation to simple 

or repetitive tasks); see also Garcia v. Colvin, CV 16-00652-JEM, 2016 WL 6304626, at 

*6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2016) (recognizing the distinction courts have made between 

“simple, repetitive tasks” and “easy 1, 2 step directions”). Thus, the Court declines to apply 

Rounds to the facts of this case. 

Plaintiff further contends the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could perform the job of 

a cafeteria attendant is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s RFC, because Plaintiff’s limitation to 

“no direct interaction with the general public” is not compatible with the cafeteria attendant 

occupation, which is described as carrying trays for cafeteria patrons and circulating among 

diners serving coffee. (ECF Nos. 14-1 at 8-9, 14-2 at 6; A.R. 46 (“the clamant can have 

occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors, but no direct interaction with the 

general public”). 

The Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the conflict between a cafeteria 

attendant and an RFC limitation to no public contact, but several district courts in this 

Circuit have held that an occupation involving service to patrons conflicts with an RFC 

                                               

17 District courts in this Circuit frequently use the terms “tasks” and 

“instructions” interchangeably. See Myers v. Colvin, No. 1:12-CV-00378, 2013 WL 

3481689, at *16 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2013); Whitaker v. Astrue, 1:09–CV 0975, 2010 WL 

1444659, at *4-6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010).

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limitation to no interaction with the public. See e.g., Norris, 2013 WL 3676661, at *3 

(finding the VE’s testimony that the plaintiff could perform the occupation of a 

cleaner/housekeeper, which requires personal assistance to patrons, to be in conflict with 

the plaintiff’s RFC limitation to no contact with the public); Barton v. Astrue, No. EDCV 

12-1013, 2012 WL 5457462, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2012) (same); Pardue v. Astrue, No. 

EDCV 10-1830, 2011 WL 5520301, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011) (same); see also

Bradshaw v. Colvin, 642 Fed. App’x 677, 679 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating that the cafeteria 

attendant position requires “at least some interaction with other people”); Hackett, 395 F.3d 

at 1175-76 (using the DOT’s description of a particular job to assist in determining whether 

there is a conflict with the VE’s testimony). In line with these cases, the Court finds there 

was an apparent conflict between the RFC to “no direct interaction with the general public” 

and the occupation of cafeteria attendant, which the ALJ failed to explain. 

D. Remand is Appropriate 

Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse and remand for further proceedings. If the ALJ’s 

decision “is not supported by the record, ‘the proper course . . . is to remand to the agency 

for additional investigation or explanation.’” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004)). “If additional 

proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceedings, a social security 

case should be remanded. When however, a rehearing would simply delay receipt of 

benefits, reversal [and an award of benefits] is appropriate.” Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 

631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the ALJ committed legal error by failing to 

resolve the apparent conflict between two of the three jobs the VE testified Plaintiff could 

perform and the DOT. Defendant argues that the ALJ’s failure constitutes harmless error 

because Plaintiff could still perform the occupation of routing clerk. (A.R. 15-1 at 7.) 

However, although the Court does not find any apparent conflict between the VE’s 

testimony that Plaintiff could perform the occupation of routing clerk and the DOT, it is 

reluctant to find harmless error, because the ALJ failed to explain at step five why he 

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disregarded the VE’s testimony that no jobs exist in the national economy for a person who 

would be absent more than four times per month due to various impairments. (See A.R. 

78.) Dr. Khamishon, Plaintiff’s treating physician, opined that Plaintiff was likely to be 

absent more than four times per month. (A.R. 654.) The VE testified there would be no 

jobs available in the national economy for an individual with Plaintiff’s limitations who 

would be absent more than four times per month. (A.R. 78.) Yet, the ALJ did not expressly 

address why he disregarded the VE’s testimony in response to his second hypothetical.18 

Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to remand this case to the ALJ for further 

proceedings. 

V. CONCLUSION 

After a thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing 

analysis, this Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be 

GRANTED and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment be DENIED, and the 

case be REMANDED for further proceedings. 

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted 

to the United States District Judge assigned to his case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(c). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than August 2, 2017, any party may file 

and serve written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The documents 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

/// 

/// 

/// 

                                               

18 Although the ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Dr. Khamishon and 

great weight to the opinions of the State agency mental medical consultants, he did not 

expressly address Dr. Khamishon’s opinion that Plaintiff would be absent more than four 

times per month, and the State agency mental medical consultants did not expressly opine 

on the issue. (See A.R. 50-52.) 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and 

served no later than August 9, 2017. The parties are advised that failure to file objections 

within the specific time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 18, 2017 

 _________________________ 

 LOUISA S PORTER 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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