Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00191/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Racketeering (RICO) Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

WALTER BUSSEY, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

v. ) CASE NO. 3:10-CV-191-WKW [WO]

 ) 

MACON COUNTY GREYHOUND )

PARK, INC., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Seven Plaintiffs bring this putative class action, pursuant to § 8-1-150 of the Alabama

Code, seeking to recoup the money they lost playing electronic bingo machines at

Victoryland in Macon County, Alabama. Plaintiffs contend that the electronic bingo

machines, although held out as legitimate charity bingo operations under Amendment No.

744 to the Alabama Constitution, were, in fact, illegal gambling devices under Alabama law.

Defendants, consisting of the owner and operator of Victoryland and the machine

manufacturers, call Plaintiffs’ bluff in Rule 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) motions to dismiss,

contending that the legal odds are on their side. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) & (6).

Before the court are seven motions to dismiss filed by Defendants (1) Cadillac Jack,

Inc. (Doc. # 74), (2) IGT (Doc. # 75), (3) Macon County Greyhound Park and Milton E.

McGregor (Doc. # 76), (4) Multimedia Games, Inc. (Doc. # 77), (5) Bally Gaming, Inc.

(Doc. # 82), (6) Nova Gaming, LLC (Doc. # 83), and (7) Miami Tribe of Oklahoma Business

Case 3:10-cv-00191-WKW-WC Document 98 Filed 03/31/11 Page 1 of 27
Development Authority (“Tribe”) (Doc. # 86).1

 The collective grounds for dismissal raised

by Cadillac Jack, IGT, Macon County Greyhound Park, Milton McGregor, Multimedia

Games, Inc., Bally Gaming, Inc., and Nova Gaming, LLC, are that the § 8-1-150 claim is not

ripe or, alternatively, is not supported by sufficient factual allegations to meet the pleading

standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiffs

filed a consolidated response opposing those grounds. (Doc. # 58; see also Doc. # 94.) 

Reply briefs followed. (Docs. # 62-66.) The Tribe contends that it is a political subdivision

of an Indian tribe and, thus, has sovereign immunity from suit. Opposing the Tribe’s motion,

Plaintiffs desire to conduct discovery on the issue of whether there is a contractual waiver

of immunity. (Doc. # 96.) After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the law

and the allegations of the operative Complaint, the court finds that all motions are due to be

denied.2

1

 An order ruling on Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss also has been entered

this date in a case of a similar nature. See Adell v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., No. 3:10cv122

(M.D. Ala. filed March 31, 2011). In Adell, as here, the plaintiffs lost money playing electronic bingo at

Victoryland, and have sued to recover those losses under § 8-1-150 of the Alabama Code. With the

exception of the Tribe, the named defendants are the same in this action as in Adell. Adell is not an

identical suit, however. Adell was filed as a “mass action” consisting presently of 853 plaintiffs, and an

additional claim alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),

18 U.S.C. § 1961, was at issue in Adell. In Adell, as here, the § 8-1-150 claim survived the motions to

dismiss. Adell’s RICO claim did not.

2

 Given the numerous briefs filed in support of and in opposition to the motions to dismiss, the

filings are cited herein by using the docket numbers assigned to the documents in the court’s electronic

filing system. The operative Complaint, which is the Amended Complaint, is cited as “Am. Compl.” 

(Doc. # 70.)

2

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I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Personal

jurisdiction and venue are not contested, and there are adequate allegations of both.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the

legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When evaluating a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take “the factual allegations in the complaint as true

and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516

F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all

of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

at 1950 (brackets added; citation omitted). “[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The

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standard also “calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will

reveal evidence” of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. While the complaint need not set

out “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide sufficient factual amplification “to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555; see also James River Ins. Co. v.

Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (Twombly formally retired

“the often-criticized ‘no set of facts’ language previously used to describe the motion to

dismiss standard.” (citation omitted)).

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may

assert either a factual attack or a facial attack to jurisdiction. See McElmurray v. Consol.

Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007); accord Lawrence

v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). A factual attack challenges “the

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters

outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Lawrence, 919 F.2d

at 1529 (internal quotation marks omitted). A facial attack, on the other hand, “require[s] the

court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter

jurisdiction.” McElmurray, 501 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529). 

Because the allegations in the “complaint are taken as true” on a facial Rule 12(b)(1) motion,

it provides a plaintiff “safeguards similar to those retained when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is

raised.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)

4

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III. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The relevant facts alleged in the operative Complaint, which are taken as true for

purposes of the motions, are as follows. At all times material to this litigation, Defendant

Macon County Greyhound Park (“MCGP”) offered pay-to-play electronic bingo machines

to the public at its casino in Macon County, Alabama, under the names Victoryland and

Quincy’s 777.3

 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 29.) MCGP is an Alabama corporation. (Am. Compl.

¶ 10.) Its president and chief operating officer is Defendant Milton McGregor

(“McGregor”), who resides in Alabama. (Am. Compl. ¶ 10.) 

The remaining Defendants “own[ed] and operat[ed]” the machines “used in whole or

in part by MCGP ” in the operation of electronic bingo gaming at Victoryland. (Am. Compl.

¶¶ 11-16.) Defendant Multimedia Games, Inc. (“MMG”), is a Texas corporation; Defendant

Cadillac Jack, Inc., is a Georgia corporation; the Tribe, doing business as Rocket Gaming

Systems, is an Oklahoma corporation; Defendant Nova Gaming, LLC (“Nova”), is a South

Carolina corporation; and Defendants IGT and Bally Gaming, Inc. (“Bally”), are Nevada

corporations. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-16.)

The seven Plaintiffs, who live in Georgia, played the electronic bingo machines at

Victoryland on “various occasions” during the six-month period preceding the filing of the

original Complaint. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-9, 27.) In particular, they “paid to play and did play”

3

 For ease of reference, Victoryland and Quincy’s 777 are referred to together as “Victoryland.”

5

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electronic bingo machines owned and operated by each Defendant. (Am. Compl. ¶ 42; see

also Am. Compl. ¶ 27.)

B. Amendment No. 744 to the Alabama Constitution

The commencement of electronic bingo at Victoryland has as its origin Amendment

No. 744 to the Alabama Constitution. In 2004, Amendment No. 744 was ratified, having

been approved by a majority of the qualified electors in Macon County. See Ala. Const.

1901 amend. No. 744; see also Ala. Const. 1901 Art. XVIII § 284.01 (Recomp.) (Amend.

No. 425 & Amend. No. 555). The constitutional amendment permits “[t]he operation of

bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or

other lawful purposes,” and requires the sheriff of Macon County to “promulgate rules and

regulations for the licensing and operation of bingo games within the county.” Id.; (see also

Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) 

Plaintiffs allege that the operation of electronic bingo machines at Victoryland

contravenes Amendment No. 744 because the ‘machines are not the game commonly known

as bingo,” are aided by unauthorized “electronic device[s],” and do not “substantially benefit

the nonprofit organizations through which Defendants purport to operate their gaming

machines.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs argue that Amendment No. 744 contemplates the

allowance of only paper, not electronic, bingo. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24.) Plaintiffs aver that

Defendants hide behind the “purported protection” of Amendment No. 744 to operate

electronic bingo machines, which are, in fact, “slot machines” and “games or contests of

chance” that are prohibited under Section 65 of the Alabama Constitution and Alabama’s

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criminal statutes. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30.) These allegations characterize

Plaintiffs’ pivotal legal position, i.e., that the electronic bingo machines they played at

Victoryland are illegal under Alabama law. As legal conclusions, these allegations are not

taken as true for purposes of ruling on the present motions, see Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, but

are noted here to provide context to Plaintiffs’ claims. 

C. The Claims

1. The Original Class Action Complaint

Based upon the premise that Defendants’ “purported legitimate charitable bingo

operation[ ]” at Victoryland was “in fact an illegal operation of electronic bingo gambling

machines” (Doc. # 1, at 1), Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on March 4, 2010. The complaint,

titled “Original Class Action Complaint,” contained two counts. In Count I, Plaintiffs sought

recovery of their gambling losses from Defendants under § 8-1-150 of the Alabama Code. 

(Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 42-46.) In Count II, Plaintiffs sought treble damages from Defendants under

the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et

seq. (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 47-55.) On April 28, 2010, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the

Original Class Action Complaint for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. (Docs. # 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 49); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) & (b)(6). On June 4,

2010, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their RICO claim in Count II. (Doc. # 57.) 

2. The Amended Class Action Complaint

On June 18, 2010, Plaintiffs filed the operative one-count Amended Class Action

Complaint (“Amended Complaint”). It omits the RICO claim, but leaves intact the § 8-1-150

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claim.4

 Count I, the sole count, alleges that Defendants’ electronic bingo machines are

“illegal gambling devices” (Am. Compl. ¶ 41) in violation of Alabama law, that Plaintiffs

“paid to play and did play” those machines during the requisite time period (Am. Compl.

¶ 42), and that Defendants’ “operation of illegal bingo games” proximately caused their

injuries (Am. Compl. ¶ 43.) Plaintiffs seek to recover “all monies they paid to” Defendants

“as wagers on illegal bingo gaming machines” (Am. Compl. ¶ 44) for the six months

preceding the filing of the original Complaint (Am. Compl. ¶ 27).5

 They also request a

declaration that “Defendants’ electronic bingo devices [are] illegal under Alabama law.” 

(Am. Compl., Prayer for Relief, at 11.)

Finally, the Amended Complaint contains class allegations. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-39.) 

Plaintiffs seek class certification, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, on behalf of 

all persons who paid to play “bingo” at Victoryland and Quincy’s 777 casino

on Defendants’ electronic gaming machines and lost money during the six

months prior to the filing of the original complaint, excluding those individuals

who have filed an individual lawsuit on their own behalf concerning these

claims.

4

 By separate order, the motions to dismiss the Original Class Action Complaint were denied as

moot based upon the filing of the Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 97.)

5

 In paragraph 44 of the Amended Complaint, as pointed out by IGT (Doc. # 75, at 2), Plaintiffs

allege that they are seeking to recover money paid as wagers “during the past six months prior to the

filing of this complaint.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 44.) IGT suggests that the phrase “this complaint” logically

refers to the Amended Complaint, rather than to the original Complaint, but says that under § 8-1-150,

“the six month period began to run from the time of the filing of the original complaint, not the filing of

the Amended Complaint.” (Doc. # 75, at 2); see Ala. Code § 8-1-150 (permitting recovery of lost wagers

“by an action commenced within six months from the time of such payment or delivery”). IGT does not

urge dismissal on this ground. The potential pleading inconsistency is merely noted here.

8

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(Am. Compl. ¶ 32.)

IV. DISCUSSION

Alabama has had in place for more than 150 years a statute prohibiting the

enforcement of a contract giving rise to a gambling debt. See Ala. Code § 8-1-150. Section

8-1-150(a), which is titled, “Contracts founded upon gambling consideration void; recovery

of money paid or things of value delivered,” provides: 

All contracts founded in whole or in part on a gambling consideration are void. 

Any person who has paid any money or delivered any thing of value lost upon

any game or wager may recover such money, thing, or its value by an action

commenced within six months from the time of such payment or delivery.

Id. Defendants move for dismissal, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). The arguments are

addressed below.

A. The Motions to Dismiss Filed by Cadillac Jack, IGT, MCGP, Mr. McGregor,

MMG, BGI and Nova

Cadillac Jack, IGT, MCGP, Mr. McGregor, MMG, BGI and Nova contend that the

§ 8-1-150 claim is not ripe or, alternatively, is not supported by sufficient factual allegations

to be “plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As discussed below, not all arguments are

asserted by all Defendants, and some Defendants make their arguments through

incorporation of co-Defendants’ briefs.

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1. Ripeness6

Cadillac Jack, Mr. McGregor, Victoryland and MMG7 contend that Plaintiffs’

§ 8-1-150 claim is not ripe because it is contingent on an event that may never occur, that

event being a final adjudication from an Alabama state court that electronic bingo in Macon

County is illegal under Alabama’s criminal statutes and/or its constitution. They contend

that, “to date, no Alabama Court has made any determination regarding the legality of

electronic bingo in Macon County” (Doc. # 42, at 4), or that the electronic bingo machines

Plaintiffs played at Victoryland “are, in fact, ‘illegal’” (Doc. # 38, at 15; see also Doc. # 78,

at 10-12.) Until an Alabama court decides that issue, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’

§ 8-1-150 claim fails for want of ripeness. (Doc. # 38, at 15, 28; Doc. # 42, at 4.) At the

same time, Defendants represent that the “potential legality of the electronic bingo machines

operated at Victoryland” is currently pending in “Jones, et al. v. Macon County Greyhound

Park, Inc., Macon County Circuit Court, Case No. CV-2010-016.” (Doc. # 42, at 5-6; Doc.

# 78, at 11-12.) Citing Jones as support for dismissal for lack of ripeness, Defendants assert

that this action is “wholly dependent upon the outcome of other litigation that is presently

pending in another court [i.e., in Jones].” (Doc. # 42, at 75.) Defendants argue that, “[i]f

electronic bingo is determined to be legal in Macon County [by the Jones court],” they will

6

 Because ripeness pertains to federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, it is properly raised in a

Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d

800, 807 (11th Cir. 1993). Here, Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion poses a facial, rather than a factual,

attack on the allegations of the Amended Complaint. See McElmurray, 501 F.3d at 1251. The analysis

is, thus, similar to that under Rule 12(b)(6). See id.

7

 In this section on ripeness, collective references to “Defendants” include Cadillac Jack, Mr.

McGregor, Victoryland and MMG.

10

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be shielded from liability as to Plaintiffs’ § 8-1-150 claim. (Doc. # 42, at 7; see also Doc.

# 78, at 11.)

Plaintiffs contend that the fact that the same legal issue is pending in state court

litigation does not mean that the legal issue is “premature for this Court’s jurisdiction” (Doc.

# 58, at 8), “that this case must be dismissed or that this Court must wait on the Macon

County case to be appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court” (Doc. # 58, at 12 n.8). Plaintiffs

argue that this court is free to forge ahead and decide the legality of Defendants’ machines

under Amendment No. 744 (Doc. # 58, at 11-12). Plaintiffs point out as alternatives the

potential use of certification procedures to the Alabama Supreme Court or a stay pending

resolution of the state court case. (Doc. # 58, at 12 n.8.) Plaintiffs also acknowledge that

Defendants “may present a defense to the Section 8-1-150 claims that their machines were

not illegal and/or that the Plaintiffs have not yet proved their illegality,” but they contend that

this defense does not justify dismissal of the Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 58, at 8-9.) 

The parties agree that for Plaintiffs to prevail on their § 8-1-150 claim, Plaintiffs must

demonstrate that the relevant electronic bingo machines at Victoryland are illegal under

Alabama’s constitution or statutes. If the machines are legal under Alabama law, there is no

dispute that § 8-1-150 has no application. But if the machines are illegal, redress could be

appropriate if the other prerequisites of § 8-1-150 are satisfied. As expected, Plaintiffs and

Defendants take opposing positions on the issue of the machines’ legality. Plaintiffs contend

that Amendment No. 744 does not permit bingo to be played electronically. (Doc. # 58, at 4;

Am. Compl. ¶ 31.) On the other hand, Defendants contend that the machines are legal under

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the rules and regulations promulgated by the sheriff of Macon County, pursuant to the

authority given him by Amendment No. 744. Those rules and regulations, according to one

Defendant, define “bingo” to include “electronic, computer, or other technologically-aided

bingo games.”8

 (Doc. # 38, at 14.)

The ripeness doctrine, one of the “several strands of justiciability,” goes “to the heart

of the Article III case or controversy requirement.” Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 618

F.3d 1279, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[R]ipeness concerns the timing of the suit,” id., and “protects federal courts from engaging

in speculation or wasting their resources through the review of potential or abstract disputes,”

Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir.1997). Two factors

govern the analysis of ripeness: “(1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the

hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of

Miami, 402 F.3d 1335, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Defendants’ argument goes to the “fitness” prong. “A case meets the first prong if it

does not involve uncertain or contingent events that may not occur at all (or may not occur

as anticipated).” Chavez ex rel. M.C. v. N. M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, 621 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th

Cir. 2010); see also Muhall, 618 F.3d at 1291 (“The fitness prong is typically concerned with

questions of finality, definiteness, and the extent to which resolution of the challenge

8

 These rules and regulations are not part of the record.

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depends upon facts that may not yet be sufficiently developed.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)). 

The outcome of Defendants’ argument no doubt is appealing – promotion of comity

between state and federal judicial tribunals and avoidance of federal intrusion into matters

of state law not yet reviewed by the state’s highest court. But, Defendants do not persuade

the court that their ripeness argument is the right path for reaching the requested end. It may

be true that whether the electronic bingo machines at issue are legal under Alabama law

presents a novel or unsettled issue of state law, but that novelty does not mean that the claim

is not ripe. Defendants, in effect, ask this court to find that a federal court is prohibited on

ripeness grounds from deciding a novel issue of state law and must dismiss an action when

asked to do so. No authority has been cited, and the court is aware of none, that holds that

a federal action is unripe merely because there exists an uncertainty about state law that is

material to providing relief in a federal action. To the contrary, the obligation of a federal

court to adjudicate claims which fall within its jurisdiction is “virtually unflagging.” New

Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989). And,

it is well established that when a federal court applies a state’s substantive law and the state’s

highest court has not spoken on the issue at hand, the federal court “must predict how the

highest court would decide [the] case.” Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, Nos.

09-11153, 09-12587, 2011 WL 651996, at *12 (11th Cir. 2011) (published); see also

Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cutler Presbyterian Church, Inc., 420 F.3d 1317, 1326 n.5

13

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(11th Cir. 2005) (“A lack of explicit [state] case law on an issue does not absolve us of our

duty to decide what the state courts would hold if faced with it.”). 

 Defendants intermingle ripeness with abstention principles. As stated, Defendants’

premise rests principally on considerations of comity to Alabama state courts. Ripeness

“may involve prudential considerations of ‘comity to state institutions,’” but when it does it

becomes “‘closely mingled’” with abstention principles. Crane v. Fauver, 762 F.2d 325, 328

(3d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). In Crane, it was not necessary to “untangle th[e] doctrinal

knot,” id. at 328; the proper end was achieved by requiring the district court to stay, rather

than dismiss, the claims that were not cognizable in the related state court proceedings, id.

at 329; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. N. J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 148 n.11 (3d

Cir. 2000) (A contention that a “matter is not ripe for review because a federal court should

not attempt to decipher a state statute without the benefit of interpretation by the state courts

is better framed as an argument for abstention.”). It would be premature to till the different

fields of abstention at this time. First, no argument for application of any of the abstention

doctrines has been made; hence, the record is devoid of legal analysis. Second, Defendants

provide no pleadings or other information about the Jones case upon which they rely as the

alleged parallel state court litigation. Given these dual reasons, there is an insufficient

foundation to decide whether the interest of comity would be served by abstaining for a

period of time.

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc. v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406 (11th Cir.

1997), also provides no support for dismissal based upon a lack of ripeness. Mr. McGregor

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and Victoryland cite Nielsen for its statement “that it would be irresponsible . . . not to give

the Alabama Supreme Court an opportunity to decide the difficult, sensitive, and dispositive

Alabama law issues presented in this appeal,” id. at 1413. (See Doc. # 42, at 6.) This

statement has nothing to do with ripeness. Rather, the statement is made in the context of

recognizing that “[c]ertification of state law issues to state supreme courts is a valuable tool

for promoting the interests of cooperative federalism.” Id. In Nielsen, the Eleventh Circuit

certified unsettled issues of state law to the Alabama Supreme Court. See id. at 1414; see

also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997) (“Certification

procedure . . . allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law question to put the question

directly to the State’s highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the

assurance of gaining an authoritative response.”). 

Defendants do not ask this court to certify to the Alabama Supreme Court any issues

of state law which are “determinative” of the § 8-1-150 claim and upon which there are no

“clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of [Alabama].” Ala. R.

App. P. 18(a) (delineating procedures for certifying questions from federal courts). In any

event, even if it had been requested, certification would not be appropriate at this time on

what Plaintiffs say is the “discrete legal issue” – i.e., whether Defendants’ electronic bingo

machines are legal under Amendment No. 744. (Doc. # 58, at 12.) Namely, there is an

absence of an evidentiary or stipulated record as to exactly how the machines operated or the

business arrangements under which they operated. See, e.g., Currie v. Group Ins. Comm’n,

290 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2002) (“On more than one occasion, state high courts have returned

15

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certified questions unanswered, because the factual record was undeveloped on the state law

question or because there was a risk that its opinion would be merely advisory.” (collecting

cases)). Suffice it to say that Nielsen clearly does not support dismissal of Plaintiffs’

§ 8-1-150 count on ripeness grounds.

In further support of their contention that the § 8-1-150 claim nonetheless rests upon

contingent future events, Cadillac Jack, Mr. McGregor and Victoryland cite Lincoln House,

Inc. v. Dupre, 903 F.2d 845 (1st Cir. 1990). (See Doc. # 42, at 6; Doc. # 38, at 14-15.)

Cadillac Jack also cites Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., No.

09-11529, 2010 WL 931864 (E.D. Mich. March 11, 2010). (See Doc. # 38, at 14-15.) In

Jackson, a RICO action, the claims were based upon an employer’s alleged scheme to

wrongfully deny workers’ compensation benefits for on-the-job injuries. See 2010 WL

931864, at *4-5. The court found that the claims were not ripe to the extent that any

plaintiff’s claims for benefits were pending before the state of Michigan’s Workers

Compensation Disability Board. Id. at *21. Jackson is distinguishable because the state’s

Workers Compensation Disability Board had “exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of

entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits.” Id. at *14. Here, exclusive jurisdiction over

the state law claim does not lie with the state court. 

In Dupre, “the only injury alleged by [the plaintiff] [was] its hypothetical inability to

recover from [the defendant], if [the plaintiff] obtain[ed] a judgment, in some amount, in the

pending state court breach of contract action.” 903 F.2d at 847; see also id. at 847 n.2

(noting that there was not an independent claim alleged that the defendant broke the

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contract). Dupre boiled down to an anticipatory indemnification or contribution claim

brought prior to the resolution of the separate suit for liability. It is true that, typically,

contribution and indemnity suits brought in anticipation of liability are not ripe until the

obligation to pay in the underlying separate suit has been established by a judgment or

settlement. At least one court has relied upon Dupre for that very proposition. See Hecht

v. Summerlin Life & Health Ins. Co., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241 (D. Nev. 2008) (citing

Dupre for support that “courts often find claims for indemnification or contribution are not

ripe because the claims are contingent on a finding of liability on the underlying claim”). 

But, it is hard to envision how Dupre and the other similar cases cited by Defendants apply

here. Plaintiffs do not bring an indemnity or contribution action premised on potential

liability in a separate pending state court action, as in Dupre. Defendants also do not

articulate any way in which Dupre is analogous to this case. Indeed, Defendants provide no

analysis whatsoever of Dupre.

No persuasive argument or relevant analogy having been presented by Defendants,

the court declines to dismiss the § 8-1-150 count as not ripe for adjudication.

2. Joint and Several Liability

Some Defendants contend that there is no joint and several liability under § 8-1-150,

relying principally upon Motlow v. Johnson, 39 So. 710 (Ala. 1905). (Doc. # 38, at 31-32;

Doc. # 40, at 9; Doc. # 42, at 7.) They argue or strongly suggest that the entire § 8-1-150

claim is due to be dismissed to the extent that the Amended Complaint alleges joint and

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several liability. (See, e.g., Doc. # 38, at 28 (arguing that Plaintiffs’ § 8-1-150 claim fails

“because § 8-1-150 does not allow for joint liability”).) 

First, and most important, there are no allegations of joint and several liability in the

Amended Complaint. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40-44; see also Doc. # 58, at 7, in which Plaintiffs

provide that the allegations do “not mean that [they] seek to impose joint and several liability

on the Defendants; the words ‘joint and several’ are not alleged in the complaint”).) Second,

even if Plaintiffs expressly had demanded that any § 8-1-150 judgment be paid jointly and

severally by Defendants, Motlow does not stand for the principle that the entire claim would

have to be extinguished. Whether defendants are jointly and severally liable is more

appropriately a question of remedy, rather than an element of the claim. It is notable also that

Motlow stood in a different posture than this case. The holding was made based upon the

evidence underlying the final judgment; it was not based upon the pleadings at the motion

to dismiss stage. For these reasons, Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive as a ground for

dismissal of the Amended Complaint.

3. Failure to Plead a Plausible Claim for Relief Against the Manufacturers

Relying upon Rule 12(b)(6), the manufacturers also attack the adequacy of the

allegations supporting the § 8-1-150 claim.9

 They argue that there are no specific allegations

9

 References to “manufacturers” encompass Cadillac Jack, IGT, MMG, BGI, and Nova. In the

Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to Cadillac Jack, IGT, MMG, BGI and Nova as owners and

operators of the electronic bingo machines. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-13, 15-16.) On the other hand, in a brief,

MMG calls itself a “machine manufacturer.” (Doc. # 78, at 7.) At this stage, there are only allegations,

and the facts are not developed as to the business relationships among the various Defendants or as to the

nature of Cadillac Jack’s, IGT’s, MMG’s, BGI’s and Nova’s activities in connection with the electronic

bingo operations at Victoryland. Accordingly, in this opinion, Cadillac Jack, IGT, MMG, BGI and Nova

are referred to collectively as “manufacturers” for the sake of convenience and not as a term of legal

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that Plaintiffs lost money by playing an electronic bingo machine supplied by any particular

manufacturer. (Doc. # 38, at 29; Doc. # 44, at 6-7; Doc. # 46, at 6-7; Doc. # 78, at 8-10). 

In IGT’s words, “[t]he ultimate deficiency in the Plaintiffs’ complaint is the absence of any

factual allegation that they actually played and lost on IGT machines.” (Doc. # 65, at 3.) 

The manufacturers allege that it is equally plausible or possible that Plaintiffs’ losses

occurred on an electronic bingo machine supplied by another Defendant (Doc. # 38, at 30;

Doc. # 44, at 7; Doc. # 46, at 7; Doc. # 65, at 3), and that Plaintiffs improperly “lump[ ]”

Defendants together (Doc. # 65, at 3; Doc. # 66, at 5; Doc. # 78, at 10). In short, Defendants

contend that under Twombly, the facts pleaded are insufficient to “state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” 550 U.S. at 570.

The manufacturers’ arguments are colorable, but not meritorious. The Amended

Complaint pleads more than collective accusations. There are allegations that Plaintiffs

played electronic bingo machines that were owned and operated by each manufacturer.10

(Am. Compl. ¶ 27 (listing manufacturers).) There also are allegations that Plaintiffs lost

money playing those electronic bingo machines and paid their losses to the manufacturers. 

(See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 44.) Even if the facts fall at the lesser end of the descriptive

continuum, the favorable inferences drawn from the allegations show wagers placed, wagers

lost to the manufacturers, and money paid to the manufacturers. The alternative explanation

significance. 

10 No manufacturer alleges that its electronic bingo machines were not present and available for

play at Victoryland during the relevant time period. 

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offered by each manufacturer (i.e., that the machine played was not “mine”) is not so obvious

and overwhelming as to render the claim no longer plausible. 

Moreover, dismissal is not appropriate based upon the argument that the Amended

Complaint “make[s] no allegation as to how much money was retained by each individual

Defendant from each individual Plaintiff.” (Doc. # 40, at 9 (citations to authority include

Funliner of Ala., L.L.C. v. Pickard, 873 So. 2d 198 (Ala. 2003)). This argument steps into

the realm of proof, not pleading. Funliner supports, rather than contradicts, this point. See

873 So. 2d at 209 (finding class certification inappropriate and observing that under

§ 8-1-150, “in order to recover the plaintiffs must establish, on an individual basis, the

amount they lost to the defendants” (emphasis added)); see also Avitia v. Metro. Club of

Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1226 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A plaintiff is not required to itemize his

damages claims in his complaint.”). Furthermore, at least two manufacturers recognize, and

appropriately so, that the specific amount of the gambling losses attributable to each

manufacturer does not have to be alleged. (Doc. # 63, at 2; Doc. # 64, at 1.) 

Based upon the foregoing, the Amended Complaint pleads a plausible claim for relief

under § 8-1-150. Dismissal for failure to plead a plausible claim is not warranted. 

4. Failure to Allege a Contract Between Plaintiffs and the Manufacturers

MMG also argues that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege the existence of a contract

between any Plaintiff and a manufacturer. (Doc. # 78, at 5-8; see also Doc. # 40, at 9 (IGT’s

brief); Doc. # 38, at 28 (Cadillac Jack’s brief).) MMG contends that the “Alabama Supreme

Court has recognized the existence of a gaming contract only between the patron and the

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casino.” (Doc. # 78, at 7.) For this contention, MMG relies upon Macon County Greyhound

Park, Inc. v. Knowles, 39 So. 3d 100 (Ala. 2009), and Knowles’s observation that “the

general rule is that ‘[c]asino-style wagering is essentially an adhesion contract between the

casino and its patrons,’ that is, ‘the casino defines the terms of the contract (the rules of the

wager) and allows patrons to play the game as-is, with no possibility of changing the rules.’” 

Id. at 110 (quoting Anthony Cabot & Robert Hannum, Advantage Play and Commercial

Casinos, 74 Miss. L.J. 681, 722 (2005)); (see Doc. # 78, at 7-8.) 

In Knowles, the plaintiff brought a breach of contract claim against MCGP for its

failure to pay her a multimillion dollar jackpot allegedly won playing an electronic bingo

machine at Victoryland. Id. at 106. The issue in Knowles was not who can and cannot be

a party to a casino-style gaming contract. That issue was not explored. Nor was the alleged

manufacturer of the electronic bingo machine even a defendant. See id. at 104, 106. Rather,

the issue was whether the terms of a gambling contract between the sole Defendant, MCGP,

and its patron encompassed the rules of the wager incorporated into the help screens and pay

tables of the electronic bingo machine (as argued by MCGP), or only the sheriff’s regulations

(as argued by the plaintiff).11 See id. at 106. MMG’s reliance on Knowles for the contention

that there are no plausible facts upon which a “machine manufacturer, such as [MMG],” can

be a party to a casino-style wagering contract is not persuasive. (Doc. # 78, at 7.) Here, the

11 In Knowles, “the parties agree[d] that Amendment No. 744 remove[d] impediments to the

enforceability of th[e] contract.” 39 So. 3d at 107 (emphasis in original). Hence, the court “express[ed]

no opinion as to whether Amendment No. 744 actually does authorize the type of activity here involved

[i.e., the play of electronic bingo machines at Victoryland].” Id. at 107 n.1.

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allegations, and favorable inferences derived therefrom, reveal wagers paid to MMG, IGT,

Cadillac Jack, Nova and BGI as consideration for playing Defendants’ electronic bingo

machines and wagers lost playing those electronic bingo machines. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1,

27, 44.) These allegations sufficiently allege wagering contracts with the manufacturers,

money lost as a result of the wagering contracts, and money paid to the manufacturers. 

Absent further legal analysis and given that Plaintiffs allege that the gambling debts they paid

to the manufacturers were wagers, MMG’s argument does not warrant Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal of the § 8-1-150 claim.12

B. The Tribe’s Motion to Dismiss Based Upon Sovereign Immunity

The Tribe asserts that it has sovereign immunity from suit and relies on Rule 12(b)(6)

as the basis for dismissal. (Doc. # 86, at 1.) It says that it is a “political subdivision and

formed by ordinance of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, a federally recognized Indian

government which possesses sovereign immunity from unconsented suit.” (Doc. # 86 at 1;

Doc. # 87, at 1, 2.) Because Plaintiffs fail to plead any explicit waiver of the Tribe’s

12 While the claim is going forward, Plaintiffs’ bifurcated view of § 8-1-150(a) is perplexing. 

(See Doc. # 58, at 5.) Wagers are contracts, and wagers are what are alleged. (Am. Compl. ¶ 44); see

Thornhill v. O'Rear, 19 So. 382, 383 (Ala. 1896) (“A wager is nothing more than a bet, by which two

parties agree that a certain sum of money, or other thing shall be paid or delivered to one of them on the

happening or not happening of an uncertain event.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see

also Black’s Law Dictionary 1091 (6th ed. 1991) (defining “wager” as “[a] contract by which two or

more parties agree that a certain sum of money or other thing shall be paid or delivered to one of them or

that they shall gain or lose on the happening of an uncertain event or upon the ascertainment of a fact in

dispute, where the parties have no interest in the event except that arising from the possibility of such gain

or loss”). Plaintiffs’ assertion that “the existence of a contract between the parties is not an essential

element of a claim under [§] 8-1-150” is wrong. (Doc. # 58, at 6 n.5.) In other words, each Plaintiff has

the burden of proving a wager between he or she and each Defendant. 

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sovereign immunity (Doc. # 87, at 2, 3) or to otherwise address the Tribe’s sovereignty (Doc.

# 87, at 5), the Tribe says that dismissal on the ground of sovereign immunity is mandated.

Tribes are “subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has

waived its immunity.” Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc. 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). 

“When Congress intends to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, it must do so expressly, with

clear and unequivocal language.” Freemanville Water Sys., Inc., v. Poarch Band of Creek

Indians, 563 F.3d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, “to relinquish its immunity, a

tribe’s waiver must be ‘clear.’” C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe

of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001) (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi

Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)).

Based upon these principles, Plaintiffs do not dispute that generally the Tribe is

entitled to sovereign immunity. (Doc. # 96, at 3.) Nor do they contend that the Tribe’s

sovereign immunity has been abrogated by any federal statutory directive. They do contend,

however, that the Tribe “likely waived” its sovereign immunity when it contracted with

Alabama parties to provide the electronic bingo machines (Doc. # 96, at 5-6), and that, at a

minimum, they need to conduct discovery to discern whether the Tribe contractually waived

any claim it may have to sovereign immunity (Doc. # 96, at 6). 

A threshold issue is how to treat the Tribe’s motion to dismiss, made pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6). Because sovereign immunity goes to subject matter jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(1), not

Rule 12(b)(6), is the correct procedural device for addressing the Tribe’s challenge. See

Thomas v. U.S. Postal Serv., 364 F. App’x 600, 601 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Bennett v.

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United States, 102 F.3d 486, 488 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, the court will construe

the Tribe’s motion to dismiss as seeking dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), rather than Rule

12(b)(6). 

This does not entirely resolve the threshold issue because a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge

can be either a facial or a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. As stated elsewhere

in this opinion, a facial challenge gives a plaintiff “safeguards similar to those retained when

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is raised.” McElmurray, 501

F.3d at 1251 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That is, the analysis is confined

to the allegations in the complaint, and all well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true. See

id. A factual attack, on the other hand, challenges the substance of the jurisdictional

allegations, and, thus, matters outside the pleadings are considered. See Lawrence, 919 F.2d

at 1529. 

Here, the Tribe in effect renounces reliance on evidence outside the four corners of

the Amended Complaint, by attempting to proceed under Rule 12(b)(6). Additionally, no

extrinsic evidence is relied upon by the parties. The court, therefore, will treat the Tribe’s

motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack and limit the analysis to the four corners of the

Amended Complaint.

In the Amended Complaint, subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(2). Hence, Plaintiffs contend that this is a class action in which the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and minimal

diversity exists (meaning that at least one plaintiff is diverse in citizenship from at least one

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defendant). The Amended Complaint pleads the requisite amount in controversy (Am.

Compl. ¶ 28), and Plaintiffs allege that they are from different states than all but one of the

Defendants. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-8, 11-16.) The amount in controversy and minimal diversity

requirements are not challenged by the Tribe. On its face, the Amended Complaint suffices

to give the Tribe notice of the jurisdictional grounds that are being asserted.

Notwithstanding the Amended Complaint’s jurisdictional allegations, the Tribe

contests the allegation that it is an “Oklahoma corporation.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.) The Tribe

asserts that it is “not a state corporation” at all. (Doc. # 87, at 1.) Rather, it says that it is a

“political subdivision” (Doc. # 86, at 1) and was “formed by ordinance of the federally

recognized Miami Tribe of Oklahoma in 1999 to act as a government branch of the Miami

Tribe and pursue financial opportunities to benefit the Miami Tribe” (Doc. # 87, at 1). The

Tribe does not cite the ordinance upon which it relies or any authority that would permit the

court to ignore the Amended Complaint’s allegations of the Tribe’s corporate status on a

facial Rule 12(b)(1) motion. 

Even if this court were to treat the Rule 12(b)(1) motion as a factual attack, dismissal

would not be appropriate. Although the Tribe is correct that a plaintiff “bears the burden of

proving the court’s jurisdiction,” the general rule is that “the plaintiff should be given the

opportunity to discover facts that would support his allegations of jurisdiction.” Majd-Pour

v. Georgiana Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 724 F.2d 901, 903 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing, among others,

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 414 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he district court must give the

plaintiff an opportunity for discovery and for a hearing that is appropriate to the nature of the

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motion to dismiss” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.)). This is particularly true “where

the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposing party.” Kamen v. Am. Tel. &

Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986).

Plaintiffs contend that, without the benefit of discovery, they cannot ascertain whether

the Tribe “waived sovereign immunity by contract or other agreement” (Doc. # 96, at 3)

because they are not in the possession of any contracts (Doc. # 96, at 6). The court takes no

position on whether, as Plaintiffs assert, discovery “most likely” will prove a contractual

waiver of sovereign immunity as to Plaintiffs’ claim against the Tribe. (Doc. # 96, at 6.) It

is noted, though, that the existence of such a contract is neither admitted nor denied by the

Tribe. All of this is why, without discovery, it would be inappropriate at this time to

determine the issue of sovereign immunity on a factual Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Accordingly,

the Tribe’s motion to dismiss based upon sovereign immunity is due to be denied at this time.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motions to dismiss, filed by Defendants

Cadillac Jack, Inc. (Doc. # 74), IGT (Doc. # 75), Macon County Greyhound Park and Milton

E. McGregor (Doc. # 76), Multimedia Games, Inc. (Doc. # 77), Bally Gaming, Inc. (Doc.

# 82), and Nova Gaming, LLC (Doc. # 83) are DENIED. 

It is further ORDERED that the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma Business Development

Authority’s motion to dismiss based upon sovereign immunity (Doc. # 86) is DENIED

without prejudice, with leave to renew under Rule 12(b)(1), if and when appropriate. 

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DONE this 31st day of March, 2011. 

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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