Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01612/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01612-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTATE OF FINAU TAPUELUELU, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-01612 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs, the estate of Finau Tapueluelu, his wife and minor children, brought this

action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and state law against the City and County of San

Francisco and certain individual officers of the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department arising

out of the events surrounding the death of Finau Tapueluelu (“decedent”). Now pending

before the Court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. After carefully considering

the briefing papers, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Court hereby GRANTS the

motion as to the federal causes of action. The Court declines to invoke pendent jurisdiction

on the state law causes of action, which are DISMISSED without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

I. Undisputed Facts

On April 26, 2003, San Francisco Sheriff’s Department officers responded to a call at

the residence of decedent. Defendant Stephen Bucy arrived first and observed decedent

standing on the outside ledge of a fifth-floor apartment building. After the arrival of

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additional officers at the scene, defendant Bucy stayed below in an attempt to engage

decedent in a conversation while defendants Westbrook, Cesari and Butherus ascended to

decedent’s apartment. In the apartment, the officers observed many broken items, scattered

clothing and debris, and also suspected that decedent was under the influence of alcohol or

narcotics. The officers soon discovered that decedent was suffering from an asthma attack

and called an ambulance. Defendants Westbrook and Cesari placed decedent in handcuffs

without incident and subsequently escorted him downstairs to wait for the ambulance in front

of the building. 

While waiting for the ambulance outside the building, an altercation developed

between decedent and the officers. By all accounts, decedent became unruly and tried to pull

away from the grasp of defendant Westbrook. Additional officers, most notably defendant

Bucy, came to the assistance of defendant Westbrook during the struggle. Defendant Bucy

performed a rear leg sweep to place decedent on the ground. After being placed on the

ground, decedent continued to struggle and began to throw his head back, smashing it into

the cement sidewalk. Defendant Westbrook assisted defendant Bucy in holding decedent to

the ground to prevent him from further injuring himself. In addition, defendants Lyons,

Tittel and Cesari attemped to gain control of decedent’s lower body by tying a nylon strap

around his legs to keep him from kicking. 

While the officers were holding decedent on the ground, decedent stopped breathing. 

The officers rolled decedent onto his back and, after obtaining a face mask, defendant Bucy

began performing CPR. The ambulance arrived shortly thereafter and the paramedics took

over administering CPR. Yet all attempts to revive decedent were unsuccessful. The San

Francisco Medical Examiner’s Office found that decedent died of acute and sub acute

bronchial asthma and ingestion of methamphetamine. 

II. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on April 8, 2005, alleging several state law

torts and claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments based on the use of excessive force on decedent against the individual officers

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and the City under Monell. Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment that was

denied on July 15, 2005. Defendants now move for summary judgment as to all claims. 

Notably, defendants do not argue that qualified immunity applies to the individual officers.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). In applying this standard,

the Court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Diruzza v. County of Tehama, 323 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003). 

A principle purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to isolate and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A

party moving for summary judgment that does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial has the initial burden of producing evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claims or showing that the non-moving party does not have enough evidence

of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. See Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 

If the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production, Rule 56(e) “requires

the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by affidavits or by the ‘depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

The non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s

evidence, but instead must produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue

of material fact for trial. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102. A genuine

issue of fact is one that could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is

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“material” only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). 

DISCUSSION

I. Excessive Force by Individual Defendants

A. Legal Standard

Plaintiffs’ claim of excessive force arises under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). A claim of excessive force is

analyzed under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386 (1989). The analysis requires balancing the “nature and quality of the intrusion” on

the person’s liberty with the “countervailing governmental interests at stake” to determine

whether the use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 396. In

Graham, the Supreme Court explained that the governmental interest must be examined in

light of three factors: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of

Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). This

determination “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 1058 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at

396). Although it may be true that police officers “are often forced to make split-second

judgments,” and that therefore “not every push or shove, even if it may seem unnecessary in

the peace of a judge’s chambers” is a violation of the Fourth Amendment, id., it is also

equally true that even where some force is justified, the amount actually used may be

excessive. P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1996). 

B. Analysis

As a threshold matter, defendants have satisfied their burden of production by

submitting a number of declarations and other supporting evidence illustrating that the

behavior of the officers on the scene was reasonable under the circumstances. As best as the

Court can decipher, plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition contends that defendants used

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Plaintiffs also argue that defendants’ failure to provide CPR violates the Fourth

Amendment. To the extent that failure to provide CPR could violate the Constitution, it is only

in the context of the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792, F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986). Since

there is no claim under the Eighth Amendment or Due Process Clause here, the Court finds they

are improperly alleged and are thus disregarded.

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excessive force in executing a leg sweep to place decedent on the ground and by using a

“chicken wing” hold to keep him on the ground. Furthermore, plaintiffs’ hinge Monell

liability on a finding that the City was “deliberately indifferent” in its failure to train its

officers on how to treat intoxicated individuals. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378

(1989).1 Of particular note, plaintiffs do not contest the propriety of handcuffing decedent or

of any activity that occurred prior to the leg sweep, nor do plaintiffs allege that the apartment

search or seizure of decedent was unreasonable. Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded in open court

that the use of illegal drugs and breathing problems caused the death; nonetheless, plaintiffs

claim that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by exacerbating decedent’s situation

through the use of excessive force.

1. Defendant Bucy’s Leg Sweep of the Decedent

Defendants assert that defendant Bucy’s decision to use a leg sweep to place decedent

on the ground after a struggle began was reasonable as a matter of law. In this instance it is

undisputed that decedent–who stood around five feet eight inches tall and weighed more than

200 pounds, and whom officers’ suspected of being intoxicated and suicidal–began to

struggle with the officers and refused to follow their instructions when defendant Bucy

decided to place the decedent on the ground with a rear-leg sweep. Bucy Decl. ¶7. 

Defendant Bucy asserts that he was concerned that decedent would pose a danger to

himself and potentially to others if he were to break the custody of the officers. Id.

Plaintiffs also assert that defendant Bucy threw the decedent down to the ground face first,

yet plaintiffs provide no supporting evidence to support that assertion.

The Ninth Circuit has noted that where an individual not under arrest poses a

danger to himself or others, some force is justified in restraining that individual. See

Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1059. Other courts have held that the use of force to restrain

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2To support such a proposition, plaintiffs attach a San Francisco Police Memorandum

from Inspectors Johnson and D’Amico containing a summary of the statement of Tomas

Rapisura. Opp. at 4; Haynes Decl., Ex. 8. This is inadmissible hearsay evidence and the Court

does not consider it.

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erratic individuals also is reasonable as a matter of law. See, e.g., Estate of Phillip v. City

of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 592-93 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that officers who brought a

resisting individual to the ground by taking his legs out and then placing him in a prone

position with his hands and legs restrained for the purpose of protecting the safety of others

used reasonable force as a matter of law). 

Here, the Court finds that it was similarly reasonable under the circumstances for

defendant Bucy to bring the decedent to the ground with a leg sweep. There is no dispute

that a struggle was ongoing, that decedent was under the influence of a foreign substance,

and that decedent could have injured himself or others if he broke free of the control of the

officers. Bucy Decl. ¶ 7. In fact, decedent’s behavior while on the ground–particularly his

thrashing about and slamming his head on the ground–further supports the reasonableness of

the officers’ conduct. Moreover, there is no admissible evidence in the record to support an

assertion that he was violently brought to the ground.2 As a result, no reasonable juror could

find that defendant Bucy’s conduct in using the leg sweep to bring the decedent to the ground

was unreasonable. 

2. Use of Force While Decedent was on the Ground

Plaintiffs’ allegations of excessive force after the decedent was brought to the ground

center primarily around assertions that defendant Bucy used a “chicken wing” hold to subdue

decedent, which further exacerbated his breathing problems and assisted in causing his death. 

Yet plaintiffs provide no admissible evidence supporting this assertion. In fact, plaintiffs’

Opposition concedes that the hold was never used. See Pl. Opp. at 2. Moreover, Bucy stated

in his deposition that he never completed the hold. See Bucy Depo. at 35:23-36:1. The

Court, therefore, has no occasion to address whether such a hold was unreasonable since

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3Because there is no admissible evidence that any officer used a hold or maneuver that

placed additional pressure on the decedent’s chest or torso, plaintiffs’ allegations that the

officers’ conduct was in violation of the San Francisco Police Manual are immaterial. The

Manual states that when a individual is having trouble breathing certain actions acts may

aggravate this impairment. Opp. at 3. But there is no evidence in the record that any such

actions were taken.

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there is no evidence that it was applied.3 Moreover, plaintiffs do not dispute that the force

used by the officers to subdue the decedent, particularly after he was slamming his own head

against the concrete and attempting to kick the officers, was reasonable under the

circumstances.

In this unfortunate situation, the officers responded to the erratic and unpredictable

behavior of decedent in a reasonable manner. Their behavior, and any injuries that may have

stemmed from their behavior, did not cause the death of the decedent. As plaintiffs’ counsel

acknowledged at oral argument, the decedent’s own consumption of illegal narcotics

combined with an asthma attack, perhaps exacerbated by his own decision to struggle with

the attending officers, resulted in his untimely death. While his death was unfortunate

indeed, it did not result from the unreasonable behavior of the officers on the scene, whom

the evidence shows responded with reasonable force under the circumstances. Accordingly,

the motion for summary judgment as to the individual defendants on this claim is

GRANTED.

II. Monell Claims

Plaintiffs cause of action under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), also fails. To establish municipal liability under Monell, courts

must use a two-step process. Plaintiffs must first establish that the officers deprived them of

a constitutional right. Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Second, plaintiffs

must show that an official city policy, custom or practice was the motivating force behind 

the constitutional injury. Monell, 475 U.S. at 694. The Court’s finding above that the

officers did not violate plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights also nullifies any Monell claim. 

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment as to a claim against the City under Monell

is GRANTED.

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G:\CRBALL\2004\1612\order re msj.wpd 8

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the officers’ conduct during this

unfortunate incident was reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, defendants’

motion for summary judgment as to the federal constitutional claims arising under 42 U.S.C.

section 1983 is GRANTED. The Court hereby declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction on

the state law claims. Those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to pursuing them in

state court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 7, 2006

 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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