Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01514/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01514-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Torts to Land

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONG JACQUELINE NGUYEN 

GARDNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHEVRON CAPITAL CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-01514-JD 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 10

In this action involving claims for relief under the Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and other state law torts, defendant

Chevron Capital Corporation moves to dismiss, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement. 

Dkt. No. 10. The Court grants the motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Although the complaint in this matter is rather vague, plaintiff Hong Jacqueline Nguyen 

Gardner, who is proceeding pro se, alleges that she has incurred costs of approximately 

$200,282.91 stemming from the removal of underground fuel storage tanks located on her 

property at 7600 MacArthur Blvd. in Oakland. Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A (“Compl.”). Gardner alleges

that the tanks were removed in 2007 and that the property has been continuously “reviewed for 

contamination of the soil and water.” Id. ¶¶ 5, 7. As a result of this alleged contamination, 

Gardner claims that she was fined by the City of Oakland and that she incurred expenses from an 

Alameda County Environmental Health (“ACEH”) case. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7. Gardner also alleges that the 

tanks are connected to “Chevron Oil Company’s Former Station 373378” that was located on the 

property. Id. ¶ 4.

Gardner’s complaint sets forth claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613 as well as state law 

claims of negligence and ultra hazardous activity, naming Chevron Capital Corporation dba 

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ChevronTexaco Capital Corporation (“Chevron”) as the sole defendant. Id. ¶¶ 9-24. Chevron 

moves to dismiss all of Gardner’s claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 10. Chevron alternatively moves for a more definite statement 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Id.

DISCUSSION

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume that the plaintiff’s factual allegations 

are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828

F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 

(internal citations omitted). While the Court must construe pro se complaints liberally, a plaintiff 

is still required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). If the Court dismisses a complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to 

amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured 

by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s complaint is too vague to meet these standards. It consists almost entirely of 

indeterminate factual allegations and broad legal conclusions, and consequently fails to provide 

defendant with the notice it is entitled to receive under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

To be more specific, the Court finds plaintiff’s factual allegations are lacking on these 

points, among others:

a) How or when the property at issue qualified as a “facility” under CERCLA;

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b) When (or if) Chevron operated a former station at the property and Chevron’s 

relationship to the property in general;

c) When (or if) Chevron installed the tanks at issue and Chevron’s relationship to the 

tanks in general;

d) What hazardous substance was allegedly released from the tanks, and if plaintiff 

intends to take advantage of the discovery rule for statute of limitations purposes, specific facts 

supporting (i) the time and manner of her discovery of the alleged release, and (ii) her inability to 

have made the discovery earlier despite reasonable diligence;

e) How the costs she details in her complaint were “necessary” response costs or 

consistent with the National Contingency Plan;

f) What duty Chevron owed her, other than under CERCLA itself;

g) How storing petroleum at the property constitutes an ultra hazardous activity;

h) How or why Chevron is responsible for the release of hazardous substances from 

the tanks; and

i) To the extent she seeks to rely on it, more details regarding her Alameda County 

Environmental Health Agency case.

These deficiencies support granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff will, however, 

be given leave to amend her complaint. Plaintiff is urged to add the types of factual details listed 

above, should she choose to file an amended complaint.

CONCLUSION

The Court grants Chevron’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, and its motion for a more 

definite statement is denied as moot. Plaintiff may, if she chooses to do so, file an amended 

complaint by September 28, 2015, that is consistent with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 27, 2015

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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