Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-01014/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-01014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Constitutionality of State Statute(s)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES, )

on behalf of its patients, physicians and )

staff, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:14-cv-1014-SRW

)

LUTHER STRANGE, in his official )

capacity as Attorney General of the )

State of Alabama, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Since 1973, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that “[a]

woman’s decision to conceive or to bear a child is a component of her liberty that is 

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434 (1990) (citations omitted); see also Roe v. Wade, 

410 U.S. 113, 152–66 (1973) (a pregnant woman has a constitutional right, under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to choose to terminate her pregnancy before 

viability.). That clause, as interpreted by the Court, protects a woman's right to make such 

decisions independently and privately, free of unwarranted government intrusion. 

Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted).

Nearly forty years ago, the Supreme Court extended this liberty interest to minors 

in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (Bellotti II), and Planned Parenthood of 

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Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). The Court determined that “‘the 

potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman ... is not mitigated by her minority. 

Indeed, considering her probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and 

emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor. 

In addition, the fact of having a child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for 

parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional criteria for the 

termination of the legal disabilities of minority. In sum, there are few situations in which 

denying a minor the right to make an important decision will have consequences so grave 

and indelible.’” Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted).

A. Parental consent and judicial bypass

For minors, however, this liberty interest has significant limits. “‘[P]arental notice 

and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the State on a minor's right 

to make important decisions. As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully 

informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences, a State 

reasonably may determine that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best 

interest of the minor.’” Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 458 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting 

Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 640-41). Thus, states are permitted to pass laws that require a minor 

to have the consent of her parent or legal guardian prior to having an abortion. 

However, a state’s requirement of parental consent cannot be absolute. To safeguard 

the best interests and constitutional rights of a minor who decides to terminate her 

pregnancy, the Court has held that, if a state elects to enact a parental consent statute, it is 

constitutionally obligated also to enact a judicial bypass law that affords a pregnant minor 

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the opportunity to obtain a court’s permission to have an abortion without her parent’s or 

legal guardian’s consent. See Bellotti II, supra. The State of Alabama has enacted such 

laws; the constitutionality of certain recent amendments to Alabama’s parental consent and 

judicial bypass statutes (“the Act”) is the subject of this litigation. See Ala. Code, §§ 26-

21-1, et seq.; H.B. 494, 2014 Leg. Sess. (Ala. 2014) (enacted; effective July 1, 2014); Ala. 

Code, § 26-21-4 (judicial bypass provision).

B. The 2014 amendments

Prior to the 2014 amendments, Alabama’s judicial bypass statute allowed for an ex 

parte hearing which included as participants, in almost all instances, only the judge, the 

minor applicant, and her attorney. The new Act substantially alters the former bypass 

scheme; it is allegedly unique among all other states’ judicial bypass laws. (Doc. 3 at 8). 

Under Alabama’s former judicial bypass law, which was enacted in 1987 and 

remained substantively unchanged for 27 years, the only necessary party to the bypass 

proceedings identified by statute was the minor petitioner. See Ala. Code 26-21-4 (2013). 

At his or her discretion, the presiding judge also could use a provision of the Alabama 

Rules of Civil procedure to appoint a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to represent the interests 

of the “infant unborn,” but the judicial bypass law did not independently permit the 

appointment of a GAL or vest that person with the same rights as a party to the bypass 

proceedings. See Ala. R. Civ. P. 17(c); cf. Ala. Code § 26-21-4 (2013), Ala. Code § 26-21-

4. A minor petitioner was entitled to a decision from the reviewing court within 72 hours 

after filing her petition, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, unless the 

petitioner requested an extension of time and the court permitted the delay. See Ala. Code 

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§ 26-21-4(e) (2013). The minor was the only person with standing to appeal the decision 

of the reviewing judge. Ala. Code § 26-21-4(h) (2013). “If notice of appeal [were] given, 

the record of appeal [was to] be completed and the appeal [was to be] perfected within five 

days from the filing of the notice of appeal.” Id.

The 2014 Act expands the number of potential parties to a judicial bypass 

proceeding, and makes the inclusion of some of those parties mandatory. See Ala. Code § 

26-21-4. Those additional parties are either required or permitted to “examine” the 

petitioner and to represent interests in addition to those of the petitioner, including the 

interests of the State of Alabama, the unborn child, and the minor’s parent(s) or legal 

guardian. See id. For example, when a minor files a judicial bypass petition, the court now 

must immediately notify the district attorney (“DA”) of the county in which the petition is 

filed or in which the petitioner resides, and the DA is then automatically joined as a 

necessary party to the bypass proceedings. Ala. Code § 26-21-4(i). The 2014 Act also 

allows the minor’s parent(s) or legal guardian to be joined as parties if those individuals 

learn of the existence of the proceedings. Ala. Code § 26-21-4(l). The new law contains a 

statutory provision independent of Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) which allows 

the reviewing court to appoint a GAL to represent “the interests of the unborn child[.]” Ala. 

Code § 26-21-4(j). The powers of the GAL are expansive, and that person also is joined as 

a party once appointed by the court. Id. 

In addition, the 2014 Act codifies the rights and obligations of the DA, GAL, and 

the parent(s) or legal guardian in their capacities as parties. The DA and the GAL are 

statutorily mandated to “participate as [advocates] for the state to examine the petitioner 

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and any witnesses[.]” Ala. Code § 26-21-4(i), (j). Alabama’s interests, as explained by the 

Act, include “protecting minors from their own immaturity” and “protect[ing] the state’s 

public policy to protect unborn life[.]” Ala. Code § 26-21-1(d). The minor’s parents, once 

joined as parties, have the same rights as the DA, GAL, and the minor petitioner. See Ala. 

Code § 26-21-4(l). All parties may be represented by an attorney, appeal the hearing 

judge’s decision, request extensions of time, and have access to subpoena powers to compel 

witnesses to testify. 

Moreover, the 2014 Act replaces the requirement in the former law that the hearing 

judge must issue a decision within 72 hours and the appeal must be “perfected” within five 

days. Ala. Code § 26-21-4(h) (2013). The law permits discretionary delays by the 

reviewing judge, either sua sponte or upon request by any party, “subject to the time 

constraints of the petitioner related to her medical condition.” Ala. Code § 26-21-4(k).

C. Parties

Plaintiff Reproductive Health Services (“RHS”) is a licensed abortion facility in 

Montgomery, Alabama. Plaintiff June Ayers, a registered nurse, is its owner and 

administrator. The defendants are Luther Strange, in his official capacity as Attorney 

General of the State of Alabama, and Daryl D. Bailey, in his official capacity as the District 

Attorney for Montgomery County, Alabama (hereafter, “the DA”). (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 8-11). 

D. Motion to dismiss

This action is presently before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant 

to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 30). Defendants contend 

that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs’ claims or, 

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alternatively, that the court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction. Defendants also 

maintain that plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim for relief. (Docs. 30, 31). Upon 

consideration of the motion to dismiss, the court concludes that it is due to be denied for 

the reasons set forth below. 

II. Standards of review

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Another judge of this court recently summarized the appropriate standard of review 

for a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(1). See McCoy v. Mallinckrodt Pharm., Inc., No. 

2:15CV00723-MHT-PWG, 2016 WL 1544732, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 23, 2016), report 

and recommendation adopted, No. 2:15CV723-MHT, 2016 WL 1465967 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 

14, 2016) (quoting Greenwell v. University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees, 2012 WL 

3637768, at *5 (N.D. Ala. 2012)). The court explained:

Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure can exist in two substantially different forms: facial 

attacks and factual attacks. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 

1260 (11th Cir. 2009). When presented with a facial attack on the complaint, 

the court determines whether the complaint has sufficiently alleged subjectmatter jurisdiction. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1260. The court proceeds as if it 

were evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; that is, it views the complaint in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts all well-pled facts alleged in 

the complaint as true. Id.

On the other hand, factual attacks question “the existence of subject matter 

jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the 

pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Id. (citing 

Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). When a court 

is confronted with a factual attack, the standard of review diverges 

considerably:

[T]he trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) 

or Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) 

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motion is the trial court's jurisdiction—its very power to hear 

the case—there is substantial authority that the trial court is 

free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence 

of its power to hear the case. In short, no presumptive 

truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence 

of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from 

evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.

Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981)). When a district court has 

pending before it both a 12(b)(1) motion and a 12(b)(6) motion, the generally 

preferable approach, if the 12(b)(1) motion essentially challenges the 

existence of a federal cause of action, is for the court to find jurisdiction and 

then decide the 12(b)(6) motion. Jones v. State of Ga., 725 F.2d 622, 623 

(11th Cir. 1984).

Id.

This is a facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1). Therefore, the court considers only 

the pleadings in reaching a decision. 

B. Rule 12(b)(6)1

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the 

legal standard set forth in Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

In evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take “the 

factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). However, “the 

 1 The parties merged their briefing on the motion to dismiss with briefing on plaintiffs’ motion for a 

preliminary injunction; they also argued the merits of both motions interchangeably at a hearing held on 

March 28, 2015. (Doc. 31, 38). In addition, the parties have filed and referred to evidence and matters 

outside of the pleadings. The court has not considered matters outside of the pleadings in ruling on the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Accordingly, the motion is not converted to one 

for summary judgment. See id.

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tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is 

inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). “[A] 

plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Determining whether a complaint states a 

plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 663 (alteration in original) 

(citation omitted). “[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While the complaint need not 

set out “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide sufficient factual amplification “to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555.

“So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of 

entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum 

expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. 558 

(quoting 5 Wright & Miller § 1216, at 233–34 (quoting, in turn, Daves v. Hawaiian 

Dredging Co., 114 F.Supp. 643, 645 (D. Haw. 1953)). “[O]nly a complaint that states a 

plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

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III. Plaintiffs’ claims and defendants’ motion to dismiss

The plaintiffs advance several theories of relief. They argue (1) that the Act’s

judicial bypass provisions violate plaintiffs’ patients’ rights to liberty and privacy as 

guaranteed by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide 

an adequate judicial bypass to the parental consent requirement (Count I); (2) that the Act’s 

judicial bypass provisions violate plaintiffs’ patients’ rights to liberty and privacy as 

guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by permitting adverse 

parties and the court to disclose deeply sensitive, private information about the minor to 

others, including any potential witnesses (Count II); (3) that the Act’s provision limiting 

access to the judicial bypass to Alabama residents only violates out-of-state minors’ 

fundamental right to interstate travel as guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities clause 

by impairing the right of minors living outside of Alabama to travel to Alabama to obtain 

abortion services (Count III); and (4) that the Act’s provision limiting access to judicial 

bypass to Alabama residents only violates out-of-state minors’ rights to equal protection as 

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by treating 

minors differently based on their states of residence and whether they have traveled to 

Alabama to obtain an abortion, thereby creating classifications that penalize the exercise 

of the fundamental right to interstate travel (Count IV) (Doc. 1 at 13-14). 

Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the court’s subject matter jurisdiction

to entertain these claims. Specifically, defendants contend that plaintiffs lack standing or 

third party standing to bring this lawsuit. Second, defendants argue that, should this court 

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find that it has subject matter jurisdiction, it nevertheless should abstain from deciding this 

case on its merits. Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion argues that none of plaintiffs’ claims

can survive as a matter of law and, therefore, the case fails on its merits. 

Each of defendants’ arguments is addressed in turn.

IV. Discussion

A. Justiciability

“Before Article III authorizes a court to decide a case, there must be a justiciable 

case or controversy. ‘Perhaps the most important of the Article III doctrines grounded in 

the case-or-controversy requirement is that of standing.’” Alabama Power Co. v. U.S. Dept. 

of Energy, 307 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). To satisfy the 

requirements for Article III standing to challenge the judicial bypass statute, as amended,

plaintiffs must establish that “(1) [they have] suffered, or imminently will suffer, an injuryin-fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the operation of the [statute]; and (3) a favorable 

judgment is likely to redress the injury.” Harrell v. The Florida Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1253 

(11th Cir. 2010). Defendants maintain that the complaint fails to demonstrate that the 

plaintiffs satisfy any of the three elements required for constitutional standing.

2 However, 

 2 Defendants contend that the plaintiffs lack standing under Article III to pursue the claims now before the 

court because the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to demonstrate (1) an injury sufficient to 

confer Article III standing on RHS and Ayers (Doc. 31 at 11-17, 25-27); (2) causation, because neither the 

Attorney General or the District Attorney “cause the pregnant girl’s asserted injury” from some of the 

challenged subsections of the judicial bypass provision (id. at 27); and (3) redressability, because (a) an 

injunction against the Attorney General or the District Attorney would not address “that injury” – i.e., “the 

pregnant girl’s asserted injury” arising from the procedures authorized by the challenged subsections of the 

judicial bypass provision – and (b) because the actions permitted by the challenged subsections “can be 

accomplished by existing authority” independently of the judicial bypass provision (id. at 27-28). 

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as set forth below, the court concludes that plaintiffs have established standing as to all 

claims before the court.

i. Injury in fact

To satisfy the first element of Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish that she 

has suffered an “injury in fact” – that is, “an invasion of a legally protected interest which 

is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation 

marks, citations, and footnote omitted). On a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, 

“general factual allegations of injury ... may suffice,” as general allegations are presumed 

to “‘embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim,’” id. at 561 

(citation omitted), and the court “must accept as true all material allegations of the 

complaint and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Warth v. 

Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 

In their complaint, plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that (1) Ayers “is a registered nurse, 

and has been the owner and Administrator of Plaintiff RHS for the past 30 years” (Doc. 1, 

¶ 9); (2) RHS provides reproductive health care services, including abortion services, “to 

adults and minors, including minors who require a judicial bypass from the requirement of 

parental consent” (id., ¶ 8); (3) legal abortion is one of the safest medical procedures in the 

United States, and RHS’s rate of complications requiring hospitalization is lower than the 

0.3% overall percentage of abortion patients having such complications (id., ¶ 26); (4) 

Alabama law previously prohibited performing an abortion on an un-emancipated minor 

unless the physician or his or her agent first obtained the consent of a parent or legal 

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guardian of the minor, and provided a constitutionally-required judicial bypass process that 

mandated expressly that the court ensure that the minor’s identity be kept confidential (id., 

¶¶ 12, 13); (5) the 2014 Act amended the judicial bypass process in specified respects such 

that, in violation of minors’ constitutional rights, it “no longer provides an effective, 

confidential, and expeditious alternative to parental consent” (id., ¶¶ 16-24); (6) because 

the amendments establish a process that fails to protect the minors’ confidentiality, minors 

in need of judicial bypass may be deterred from seeking court approval, and some will 

resort to extreme measures, including obtaining an illegal or self-induced abortion (id., ¶¶ 

30-32, 35-38); (8) RHS performs abortions only up to 14 weeks, measured from the date 

of the last menstrual period, and the delays to resolution of minors’ petitions permitted by 

the Act will increase the medical risks of the procedure for them and – for some minors –

push them past the point at which they can obtain an abortion (id., ¶¶ 41-42); (9) the Act 

provides that “[a]ny person who intentionally performs or causes to be performed an 

abortion in violation of the provisions of this chapter or intentionally fails to conform to 

any requirement of this chapter, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor” (id., ¶ 25); and

(10) RHS’s physicians and Ayers “also face potential suspension and/or permanent 

revocation of their professional licenses for failure to comply with the Act” (id.). 

Defendants contend that the complaint fails to identify an injury to plaintiffs RHS 

and June Ayers that is sufficient to sustain Article III standing. They argue that (1) neither 

plaintiff has alleged a direct injury or an invasion of its or her own legally protected interest; 

(2) plaintiffs’ injury cannot rest on the statute’s alleged effect on minors who may be 

deterred from seeking a judicial bypass, because plaintiffs’ standing cannot be based on a 

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“‘chilling effect’ that result[s] from a governmental policy that does not regulate, constrain, 

or compel any action on their part” (Doc. 31 at 15)(citation omitted); and (3) plaintiffs’ 

claims are “not ripe in the Article III sense because the complaint fails to identify any 

imminent injury” (id. at 16)(emphasis in original).

3 Defendants maintain that RHS and 

Ayers “amount only to concerned bystanders who seek to use this Court simply as a vehicle 

for the vindication of value interests.” (Doc. 31 at 18) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

Defendants urge the court to “‘focus on what the challenged statute seeks to 

regulate’” in analyzing whether plaintiffs have alleged a direct injury, suggesting that what 

the law seeks to regulate is only the mechanics of the judicial bypass procedure, which do 

not “‘actually’ or ‘directly’” affect the defendants. (Doc. 31 at 12-13) (citations and internal 

quotation and alteration marks omitted). However, such an inquiry leads inescapably to the 

conclusion that the statute seeks to regulate abortion providers, to the extent that they 

provide abortions to minors. 

 3 “The standing question bears close affinity to questions of ripeness – whether the harm asserted has 

matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention[.]” Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 n. 10. While defendants 

contend that the claims are not “ripe,” they do so within a subsection of their brief bearing the heading, “No 

imminent injury” (Doc. 31 at 16, section I(A)(1)(d) of argument), which is contained within their larger 

argument that “RHS and June Ayers lack an Article III injury of their own” (id. at 12, section I(A)(1)). The 

court considers this contention as defendants have presented it – i.e., as directed to the “imminence” prong 

of the injury in fact inquiry. See National Organization for Marriage v. Walsh, 714 F.3d 682, 688 (2nd Cir. 

2013) (“Often, the best way to think of constitutional ripeness is as a specific application of the actual injury 

aspect of Article III standing. ... [T]o say a plaintiff’s claim is constitutionally unripe is to say the plaintiff’s 

claimed injury, if any, is not ‘actual or imminent,’ but instead ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’”) (citations 

omitted); National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[I]f 

a threatened injury is sufficiently ‘imminent’ to establish standing, the constitutional requirements of the 

ripeness doctrine will necessarily be satisfied.”).

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The chapter of the Code of Alabama at issue, “Parental Consent to Performing 

Abortion Upon Minor,” determines the circumstances under which a provider may perform 

an abortion on a minor, and makes performing such an abortion – or causing such an 

abortion to be performed, or intentionally failing to conform to any requirement of the 

chapter – a criminal offense, as well as grounds for professional discipline and civil 

liability. See Ala. Code, Title 26, Chapter 21. The fact that the particular subsections of 

the statute claimed by plaintiffs to be unconstitutional, when read in isolation, pertain 

specifically to the judicial bypass process through which a minor may obtain a waiver of 

the parental consent requirement is insufficient to persuade this court that the Act does not 

“seek to regulate” those who provide abortions to minors. In the absence of parental 

consent or medical emergency, the judicial bypass process is a statutory prerequisite to a

providers’ performing an abortion on a minor lawfully, without which those who either 

perform an abortion on a minor or cause it to be performed are subject to criminal 

prosecution, civil liability, and professional discipline. The court declines to adopt the 

myopic view that the “challenged statute seeks to regulate” only the mechanics of the 

judicial bypass process itself; that process does not stand alone but, instead, is a crucial 

element of the Act’s overall scheme regulating abortions provided to minors.4

 4 As noted above, a state may require parental consent for minors’ abortions only if it also provides an 

expeditious alternative procedure in which the minor’s anonymity is assured, and in which she is entitled 

to show either sufficient maturity to make the decision independently or that an abortion would be in her 

best interests. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44; see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 

Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992)(“Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a 

minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate 

judicial bypass procedure.”)(citations omitted); Planned Parenthood Association of the Atlanta Area, Inc. 

v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1467 (11th Cir. 1991)(noting that “[t]he Supreme Court subsequently adopted the 

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a. Plaintiff Ayers

Having determined that the statute seeks to regulate those who provide abortion to 

minors, the court must address whether plaintiff Ayers – a registered nurse and RHS’s 

owner and administrator – is subject to its regulation. It concludes that she is. The criminal 

enforcement provision of the parental consent chapter, by its express terms, is not limited 

to physicians who perform abortions. This chapter states instead that “[a]ny person who 

performs or causes to be performed an abortion in violation of the provisions of this chapter 

or intentionally fails to conform to any requirement of this chapter, shall be guilty of a 

Class A misdemeanor.” Ala. Code, § 26-21-6(a)(1) (emphasis added). Ayers alleges –

immediately after she quotes this criminal enforcement language from the statute – that 

“Plaintiff RHS’s physicians and Plaintiff Ayers also face potential suspension and/or 

permanent revocation of their professional licenses for failure to comply with the Act.” 

(Doc. 1, ¶ 25) (emphasis added). The “also” is superfluous unless paragraph 25 is 

understood to allege that RHS’s physicians and Ayers are subject to prosecution under the 

criminal enforcement provision quoted in the immediately preceding sentence. As the 

owner and administrator of a clinic that “provides abortion services to ... minors, including 

minors who require a judicial bypass from the requirement of parental consent” (id., ¶¶ 8, 

9), Ayers clearly is in a position to facilitate or “cause[] to be performed” (Ala. Code, § 26-

21-6) an abortion at RHS in violation of the Act – or intentionally to “fail to conform to 

any requirement of [Chapter 21]” id. – as to a minor who requires, but fails to obtain, a 

 

Bellotti II plurality opinion as controlling precedent”)(citing City of Akron v. Akron Center for 

Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (“Akron I”), overruled on other grounds by Casey).

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court order through the allegedly unconstitutional judicial bypass process established by 

the Act.5 Ayers’ factual allegations establish the possibility that she may be held criminally 

liable under the Act. (See Doc. 31 at 13-14).6

The existence of an injury is not alone sufficient to establish standing. The plaintiffs’ 

injury also must be “imminent.” In this case, the material allegations of Ayers’ complaint 

 5 The Act also contemplates that criminal liability may be imposed on someone other than the physician, 

as it provides for immunity from such criminal liability to “[a] physician or his or her agents who 

demonstrates compliance with the requirements of this chapter” for the actions of a minor or other person 

in presenting falsified documents to satisfy the parental consent requirement. See Ala. Code, § 26-21-7 

(emphasis added; error in original).

6 Defendants contend that “it is ... plausible that an abortion clinic owner or administrator cannot violate [§ 

26-21-6(a),]” in view of the provision of the Alabama Administrative Code “‘making the “physician 

performing the procedure’ ‘responsible for the procedure[.]’” Id. (citing Ala. Admin. Code § 420-5-1-.03). 

The administrative code language on which defendants rely – which is contained within an Alabama 

Department of Public Health administrative code provision relating to “Patient Care” in abortion clinics –

states, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll patient care must be rendered in accordance with all applicable federal, 

state, and local laws, these rules, and current standards of care, including all professional standards of 

practice. As with any surgical procedure, the physician performing the procedure is responsible for the 

procedure and for ensuring that adequate follow-up care is provided.” Ala. Admin. Code § 420-5-1-.03(1). 

Read in context, the cited language does not speak to the issue of whether Ayers is subject to prosecution 

under § 26-21-6 of the Alabama Code, nor does it appear to offer Ayers any defense to criminal liability 

under that section. Indeed, the quoted administrative code provision is promulgated by the Alabama 

Department of Public Health’s Division of Licensure and Certification, within the chapter devoted to 

“Abortion or Reproductive Health Centers.” See Ala. Admin. Code, Ch. 420-5-1. Even assuming that this 

provision addresses the physician’s responsibility in the context of criminal liability, it cannot be read to 

exclude RHS or Ayers from such liability; that very provision includes language imposing duties on the 

abortion facility and “agents” of the physician to comply with state law. See Ala. Admin. Code § 420-5-1-

.03(2) (requiring that “[t]he facility ... develop and follow detailed written policies and procedures that are 

consistent with all applicable federal, state and local laws”) (emphases added); id. at § 420-5-1-.03(4)(f)(8)

(requiring that “[p]rior to performing an abortion on a minor, ... the physician or his or her agents shall 

obtain and complete all legally required forms for consent and attach supporting documentation”) (emphasis 

added).

Thus, the court is unpersuaded by defendant’s contention that, because defendants are “unaware of 

any authority conferring upon abortion providers their own right to perform abortions on minors without 

parental consent,” plaintiffs must be seeking to vindicate only the rights of their minor patients. (Doc. 31 at 

15). Ayers’ allegations clearly implicate her own interest in being free from criminal prosecution – or the 

threat of prosecution – under an allegedly unconstitutional statute, while continuing to provide legal 

abortion services through RHS to the full extent that her minor patients’ right to choose such services is 

protected by the U.S. Constitution. 

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permit a reasonable inference that Ayers’ injury is “imminent.” She alleges that she is the 

owner and administrator of a clinic that “provides” (in the present tense) abortions to 

minors who require a judicial bypass, and that the Act introduces constitutional infirmities 

into the process that will deter some minors – including plaintiffs’ minor patients – from 

seeking a judicial bypass, will delay others beyond the gestational period during which 

RHS can perform an abortion, and will exclude non-resident minors from the judicial 

bypass alternative to parental consent entirely (see Doc. 1, ¶¶ 2-3, 8-9, 24, 25, 32, 35, 38, 

41 (the latter three paragraphs under the section entitled, “The Effect of the Act on 

Plaintiffs’ Patients”)). In short, construed in her favor, Ayers’ complaint alleges that the 

clinic she owns will lose minor patients as a result of the allegedly unconstitutional 

provisions of the Act – patients to whom Ayers must refuse services due to the threat of 

criminal prosecution. Ayers’ allegations suffice to demonstrate that her injury is 

“imminent.” See Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 916-17 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (physician who intended “to continue to perform abortions for his patients, of 

whom some are minors” alleged a “sufficiently concrete and imminent injury – possible 

prosecution and imprisonment – to challenge the provisions that ban abortion providers 

from performing abortions on minors except in accord with the statutory requirements” 

and concluding that the plaintiff-physician’s “liberty will be affected” whether he 

“continues to perform abortions subject to the statute, desists from performing them to 

avoid the statute’s penalties, or violates the statute”); see also MedImmune, Inc. v. 

Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128-29 (2007) (describing the Court’s standing 

jurisprudence as to pre-enforcement challenges to threatened government action and noting 

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that “[t]he plaintiff’s own action (or inaction) in failing to violate the law eliminates the 

imminent threat of prosecution, but nonetheless does not eliminate Article III jurisdiction” 

because “the threat-eliminating behavior was effectively coerced” – i.e., “the plaintiff had 

eliminated the imminent threat of harm by simply not doing what he claimed the right to 

do”)(citations omitted).7

Indeed, because the statute regulates Ayers’ conduct, and would subject her to 

criminal prosecution for violating its provisions, Ayers is in a position not meaningfully 

distinguishable from that of the physician-plaintiffs who were before the Supreme Court 

in Danforth, 428 U.S. at 59, and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and before the 

Eleventh Circuit in Miller, 934 F.2d at 1467. The critical factor conferring standing on the 

physician-plaintiffs in these cases was that the criminal enforcement provisions of the 

abortion statutes at issue operated directly against them. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 59, 62; 

Bolton, 410 U.S.at 1888; and Miller, 934 F.2d at 1465 n. 2 (in which the Eleventh Circuit 

 7 The First Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Planned Parenthood of Northern New England v. Heed, 

390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2004), judgment vacated and remanded on other grounds, Ayotte v. Planned 

Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006), which involved a challenge to a parental 

notification statute that included no exception for abortions necessary to preserve the minor’s health. The 

court discussed and rejected the contention of amici “New Hampshire Legislators” that the abortion 

providers lacked standing because the injury in question was speculative; the legislators had argued that it 

was “‘not sufficient to merely show that some unknown medical conditions exist that may at some unknown 

future date be suffered by some unknown minors.’” Heed, 390 F.3d at 56 n. 2 (citation omitted). The First 

Circuit concluded that the “abortion providers themselves face an imminent injury – civil or criminal 

prosecution for performing an abortion in violation of the Act – sufficient to confer on them Article III 

standing.” Id.

8 The Georgia statutes at issue in Bolton made performing an abortion a crime, except under specified 

circumstances. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 182-84. The injury alleged by the nine physician-plaintiffs was that the 

criminal statutes “‘chilled and deterred’ them from practicing their ... professions[.]’” Id. at 185-86. The 

Court concluded that “the physician-appellants, who are Georgia-licensed doctors consulted by pregnant 

women, also present a justiciable controversy and do have standing despite the fact that the record does not 

disclose that any one of them has been prosecuted, or threatened with prosecution, for violation of the 

State’s abortion statutes.” Id. at 188. The Court reasoned:

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observed, “Certainly when a physician faces criminal penalties if he violates the statute, ... 

he suffers sufficient threat of injury in fact to satisfy the constitutional standing 

requirement.”). The same is true as to Ayers, and the court has before it no reason to doubt 

that the defendants or the State of Alabama will enforce the current parental consent law. 

Thus, the complaint sufficiently alleges a credible threat of prosecution as to Ayers. See

Virginia v. American Booksellers Association, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) (“We are 

not troubled by the pre-enforcement nature of this suit. The State has not suggested that the 

newly enacted law will not be enforced, and we see no reason to assume otherwise. We 

conclude that the plaintiffs have alleged an actual and well-founded fear that the law will 

be enforced against them.”); Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of 

Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2012) (“When, as here, plaintiffs file a preenforcement, constitutional challenge to a state statute, the injury requirement may be 

satisfied by establishing a realistic danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the 

statute’s operation or enforcement. A plaintiff may meet this standard in any of three ways: 

(1) the plaintiff was threatened with application of the statute; (2) application is likely; or 

(3) there is a credible threat of application. While it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to expose 

 

The physician is the one against whom these criminal statutes directly operate in the 

event he procures an abortion that does not meet the statutory exceptions and conditions. 

The physician-appellants, therefore, assert a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment. 

They should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means 

of seeking relief.

Id. at 188. In Danforth, the Court quoted this reasoning in concluding that “the physician-appellants clearly 

have standing[,]” except as to a provision of the Missouri law “pertaining to state wardship of a live-born 

infant.” Danforth, 428 U.S. at 62 (quoting Bolton, 410 U.S. at 188); id. at 62 n. 2.

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himself to actual arrest or prosecution to challenge a statute, we will not accept as plaintiffs 

persons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or 

speculative[.]”)(internal quotation marks, alteration brackets, and citations omitted).9

Ayers alleges a realistic danger that the operation or enforcement of the statute will cause 

her injury; thus, she satisfies the “injury in fact” requirement for Article III standing.

b. Plaintiff RHS

While defendants argue that RHS, as a corporate entity, is not itself subject to 

prosecution under the statute (see Doc. 31 at 13), they agree that the physicians it employs 

 9

		The physicians’ allegations that the criminal statutes “chilled and deterred” their practice sufficed to 

establish standing in Bolton. See n. 8, supra. Thus, the court cannot agree with defendants that Ayers must 

allege that she intends to violate the parental consent law or to behave in a way that would arguably violate 

the law to establish that injury is “imminent.” Ayers’ allegation that she owns and operates a clinic that 

presently provides abortions for minors requiring judicial bypass orders is sufficient, since – as discussed

above – the complaint sufficiently alleges that she will lose some minor patients if she complies with the 

law, and is subject to prosecution if she does not. 

The two abortion cases that defendants cite in support of their argument are not to the contrary. See

Cleveland Surgi-Center, Inc. v. Jones, 2 F.3d 686, 687 (6th Cir. 1993)(finding no standing due to plaintiffs’ 

failure to establish redressability, but rejecting the district court’s reasoning that plaintiffs lacked standing 

because they had not alleged an intent to violate the statute; noting that “[t]he United States Supreme Court 

has held that a physician’s potential for criminal liability under similar [parental involvement] laws asserted 

a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment to confer standing to challenge the facial validity of the 

abortion laws”)(emphasis in original; citations omitted); Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City 

of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1200-01, 1210-11 (6th Cir. 1981)(physician who did not perform abortions after 

the first trimester and “had never even expressed a desire to perform a post-viability operation” lacked 

standing to challenge a provision relating to post-viability abortions; however, this same physician had 

standing to challenge a parental notification and consent provision because he “performed first trimester 

abortions ... and expected to continue to do so”), affirmed in part, reversed in part, 462 U.S. 416 

(1983)(“Akron I”). On appeal of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Akron, the Supreme Court concluded that 

“the physician plaintiff, who is subject to potential criminal liability for failure to comply with the 

requirements of § 1870.05(B) [prohibiting physician from performing an abortion on a minor without the 

consent of a parent or guardian or a judicial bypass order] has standing to raise the claims of his minor 

patients.” Akron I, 462 U.S. at 439, 440 n. 30, overruled on other grounds by Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-82. 

While alleging an existing intent to violate a statute regulating abortion or to behave in a manner that 

arguably violates the statute is one way to establish an Article III “injury in fact” for purposes of a preenforcement challenge, Bolton, Danforth, Akron I, and Miller make clear that it is not the only way. 

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to perform abortions (i.e., to act as RHS’s agents for purposes of providing services) may 

be prosecuted for violating the statute. (Id.). Thus, RHS is itself injured by the imminent 

threat – explained at length above – that defendants or the State of Alabama will criminally 

charge its employees and/or agents, who either risk prosecution by performing abortions 

in violation of the allegedly unconstitutional statute or are constrained to comply with it to

avoid such prosecution. RHS would also suffer injury in fact from the potential suspension 

and/or permanent revocation of its agents’ professional licenses.

10 Accordingly, RHS also 

satisfies the “injury in fact” requirement for Article III standing.

ii. Causation

To satisfy the second element of Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish that 

the injury is “fairly traceable to the operation of the [statute].” Harrell, 608 F.3d at 1253 

 10 RHS not only would face possible economic injury if its agents were prosecuted or threatened with 

prosecution for performing abortions in violation of the Act, or lost the professional licenses necessary to 

conduct the business of the corporation. It also could be subject to civil liability for any criminal act of its 

agent – that is, the performance of an abortion prohibited by the Act – to the extent that the agent's act was

undertaken in the line and scope of her employment to further the business of the employer. See, e.g., United 

Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009) (employer may be held liable for the tortious 

or criminal acts of an employee if the acts were committed during the course of the employment to further 

a purpose or interest of the employer); Meyer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 813 So. 2d 832, 838 (Ala. 2001) 

(An employer may be liable for the intentional torts (including the criminal acts) of its agent if the agent's 

wrongful acts were in the line and scope of his employment or in furtherance of the business of the 

employer, or the employer participated in, authorized, or ratified the wrongful acts.).

However, the court notes that even if RHS did not have standing to bring this lawsuit on its own 

behalf, Ayers’ standing alone is sufficient. The law is clear that “if the Court finds that one of the named 

plaintiffs has standing to pursue all of the asserted claims, it need not find that the other plaintiffs have 

standing for those plaintiffs to remain in the suit.” Public Citizen, Inc. v. Miller, 992 F.2d 1548, 1552 (11th 

Cir. 1993); accord Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 n. 9 

(1977) (“Because of the presence of [one] plaintiff [with standing], we need not consider whether the other 

individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit.”); Miller, 934 F.2d at 1465 (“Since 

[the doctor] has standing, we need not consider the standing of the other parties.”).

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(11th Cir. 2010). Although defendants appear to contend otherwise,11 the injury pertinent 

to the Article III standing inquiry is the litigant’s injury in fact – in this case, the threat that 

Ayers and the agents (that is, physicians) employed by RHS will be prosecuted under the 

statute. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (“The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or 

otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court’s 

judgment may benefit others collaterally.”) (emphasis added). In the context of this preenforcement challenge to a legislative enactment, the causation element does not require 

that the defendants themselves have “caused” Ayers’ and RHS’s injury by their own acts 

or omissions in the traditional tort sense; rather, it is sufficient that the “injury is directly 

traceable to the passage of [the Act.]” Georgia Latino Alliance, 691 F.3d at 1260. 

Plaintiffs sue the DA and the Alabama Attorney General because, inter alia, the 

former is responsible for criminal enforcement of the parental consent statute within 

Montgomery County – the location of plaintiffs’ clinic – and the latter has statutory 

authority to “superintend and direct” criminal prosecutions statewide and the responsibility 

to instruct the DAs. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 8-11; see Ala. Code, §§ 36-15-1(2), 36-15-14, 36-15-15,

12-17-184(2)). Defendants have the authority to enforce the parental consent law, and they 

do not contend otherwise. The court is satisfied that the plaintiffs’ realistic danger of 

 11 Defendants’ contention that plaintiffs have not alleged facts to support causation focuses on whether the 

Attorney General or Montgomery County District Attorney – the defendants before the court – are the cause 

of injury to the pregnant minor and whether an injunction against them would redress the minor’s injury. 

They contend that the causation problems are “perhaps most apparent” as to the provisions (1) allowing the 

court to appoint a GAL, call witnesses, and continue the proceedings; (2) allowing the parents to appear; 

and (3) allowing any GAL and the parents to appeal. (Doc. 31 at 27). Defendants notably omit from their 

causation argument the provisions relating to the district attorney’s participation in the proceedings.

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sustaining direct injury as a result of the defendants’ enforcement of the Act is fairly 

traceable to the operation of the statute.

iii. Redressability 

The third element of standing is redressability. A plaintiff must establish that a 

favorable judgment is likely to redress the injury.” Harrell at 1253 (11th Cir. 2010).

Defendants contend that the claimed injury is not redressable because “many of the 

challenged provisions can be accomplished by existing authority.” (Doc. 31 at 28). They 

cite the bypass court’s authority under Rules 17(c) and 24 of the Alabama Rules of Civil 

Procedure to appoint GALs and permit intervention of interested parties, its authority 

pursuant to Rule 614(a) of the Alabama Rules of Evidence to call witnesses, and its inherent 

authority to “continue the proceedings to obtain more evidence (and possibly, even, to 

require DA participation).” (Id. at 28). 

Once again, these arguments relate to the redressability of the minor patients’ 

purported injuries from enforcement of the Act, not to the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. As to 

the latter, the court is satisfied that an order can be fashioned to declare the challenged 

portions of the Act unconstitutional and/or enjoin the defendants from criminal 

enforcement of the parental consent statute against the plaintiffs in such a way as to redress 

the plaintiffs’ injuries, if they prevail in this lawsuit.12

 12 To the extent that defendants intend to argue that non-plaintiff minors – whose rights plaintiffs seek to 

assert by means of third party standing (see infra) – cannot demonstrate causation and redressability relating 

to their own claims against the Act, defendants’ arguments also are unavailing. As to causation, plaintiffs 

allege an injury to their minor patients that arises from the Act’s creation of a judicial bypass option that 

they maintain does not assure those patients that the proceeding will be expeditious and confidential. (See

Doc. 1, ¶¶ 30-32, 35-42). They argue that the procedure established by the Act does not pass constitutional 

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For the reasons set forth above, the court concludes that the allegations of the 

complaint suffice to establish standing and support an injury in fact as to both Ayers and 

RHS, and also suffice to show causation and redressability. Accordingly, plaintiffs meet

the constitutional requirements for standing as to all claims before the court. See Wasden, 

376 F.3d at 917 (“Weyhrich’s potential punishment for violating the parental consent 

statute extends to all of the challenged provisions. As his complaint notes, should any 

aspect of the bypass provisions, including those not on their face directed toward 

physicians, prevent or chill a minor from seeking an abortion she would otherwise seek, 

she will not seek his care.”). 

The court also finds defendants’ argument that plaintiffs lack standing under the 

Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be without merit. 

See Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. et al. v. Strange, et al., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1279

n. 4 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (rejecting defendants’ arguments that these same plaintiffs lacked 

 

muster, as it fails to provide these assurances ex ante. That injury is fairly traceable to the passage of the 

Act, which amended the prior judicial bypass procedure.

As to redressability, for purposes of the standing inquiry the court must assume that the judicial 

bypass procedure established by the Act is constitutionally deficient, as plaintiffs allege. See Warth, 422 

U.S. at 499 (“[S]tanding in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct 

is illegal[.]”). Defendants contend – in essence – that a judgment declaring the challenged provisions to be 

facially unconstitutional and/or enjoining the defendants from enforcing the statute would fail to redress 

the injury giving rise to standing because bypass court judges might apply general rules of court procedure 

and evidence in an unconstitutional manner and/or exercise their inherent authority unlawfully. However, 

the possibility of unconstitutional conduct under other authority does not render plaintiffs’ injury 

unredressable. As noted previously (see n. 4, supra), the state’s ability to impose a parental consent 

requirement depends on the existence of a constitutionally adequate judicial bypass procedure. Assuming 

the substantive merit of plaintiff’s claims, adequate relief in this case may include a declaration that 

Alabama’s parental consent requirement has been rendered unconstitutional by the Alabama Legislature’s 

creation of a judicial bypass procedure that is inadequate to support that requirement. The court cannot 

conclude, at this juncture, that it will be unable to fashion appropriate relief that will redress the asserted 

injuries to plaintiffs’ minor patients if plaintiffs prevail.

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standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act and § 1983) (“Strange I”); see also Ayotte v. 

Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 324, 331 (2006) (doctor and clinic 

sued on patients’ behalf under § 1983; declaratory judgments are appropriate under those 

circumstances). Thus, to the extent that defendants’ motion to dismiss is based on lack of 

standing, it is due to be denied. 

B. Prudential considerations

i. Third Party Standing

In addition to the constitutional requirements for standing, the Supreme Court has 

recognized certain rules of self-restraint justified by the prudential concern that courts 

should not adjudicate constitutional rights unnecessarily. One such rule is that, “even when 

the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the ‘case or controversy’ requirement, ... 

the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his 

claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. “This 

rule is not absolute, however; if the party asserting the right has a close relationship with 

the person who actually possesses the right, and if the possessor of the right is somehow 

hindered in his ability to protect his own interests, then courts may grant a third party 

standing.” In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 780 F.3d 1031, 1038 (11th Cir. 

2015) (citing Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129-30 (2004)). Defendants contend that 

the complaint fails to demonstrate that RHS and Ayers satisfy the requirements for third 

party standing and, therefore, that plaintiffs’ claims for relief cannot rest on the alleged 

infringement of their patients’ rights. Doc. 31 at 19. However, the court concludes that,

under applicable precedent, the circumstances alleged in the complaint satisfy the criteria

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for third party standing; thus, both RHS and Ayers may assert the constitutional rights of 

the clinic’s minor patients in their challenge to the Act. 

In Bentley, another judge of this court determined that these very plaintiffs – Ayers 

and RHS – had standing to assert the claims of their patients. The court explained as 

follows: 

As to [whether plaintiffs have a close relationship with their patients 

and whether there is an obstacle or hindrance to the patients’ ability to bring 

the claims on their own behalf], federal courts routinely recognize an 

abortion provider’s standing to assert the claims of its patients. See, e.g.,

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000) 

(adjudicating challenge to abortion statute brought by abortion provider on 

his patients’ behalf); Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 353 (5th Cir. 1999) 

(same); vacated on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 

2001). In Singleton v. Wulff, the Supreme Court recognized that the 

closeness of the relationship between an abortion physician and his patients 

is “patent.” 428 U.S. at 117, 96 S.Ct. 2868 (“Aside from the woman herself 

... the physician is uniquely qualified to litigate the constitutionality of the 

State’s interference with, or discrimination against, th[e] decision” to have 

an abortion.). The court also identified two obstacles to the patients’ litigation 

of their rights: aversion to have personal reproductive choices made public 

and “imminent mootness” of any one woman’s claim. Id. These 

considerations are equally applicable to the case at hand. Plaintiffs assert the

right of their patients to have an abortion free of undue burden; abortion 

providers are inextricably entwined in the exercise of this right. And while 

one might expect the public opprobrium leveled at women who have 

abortions would have softened since the Court decided Singleton in 1976, 

the plaintiffs’ evidence, at this time, demonstrates that this is not the case. 

Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ assertion of their patients’ claims is proper.

951 F. Supp. 2d at 1284-85 (Thompson, J.). The following year, the court held yet again 

that these same plaintiffs had standing to assert the claims of their patients. See Strange I, 

9 F. Supp. 3d at 1279 n. 4. It explained: “The State also argues that the plaintiff clinics 

have no standing to assert the rights of their patients. It is well established that abortion 

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doctors and clinics have standing to bring this type of suit.” Id. (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 

428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976)).

This court is similarly persuaded that the plaintiffs in this case have third party 

standing to assert the claims of their minor patients through this lawsuit. See also, e.g.,

Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2296 (2016) (assuming

without discussion that physicians and clinics had third party standing to assert patients'

right to abortion); Casey, 505 U.S. at 851(same); Planned Parenthood of Cent. New Jersey 

v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 147 (3d Cir. 2000) (determining that abortion clinic and 

physicians had third party standing to challenge constitutionality of state statute barring 

partial birth abortions, based in part on Casey); Miller, 934 F.2d at 1465 n. 2 (deciding that 

physician had third party standing to challenge an abortion statute on behalf of his minor 

patients); Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 332-4 (5th 

Cir. Unit B Nov. 13, 1981) (finding that individuals and medical center had standing to 

challenge an abortion statute on behalf of their patients).13

a. Close relationship

Defendants maintain that in Miller, “the Eleventh Circuit granted a physician thirdparty standing” and “expressly reserved judgment on ‘the standing of the other parties,’ 

thus leaving open the standing question as to plaintiffs like RHS and June Ayers in this 

case.” (Doc. 31 at 21-22) (citations omitted). However, no physician was a party to the 

 13		Deerfield Medical Center is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 

1375, 1378 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1982) (as Deerfield Medical Center was decided by a Unit B panel of the former 

Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit “‘regards the decision as binding precedent ...’”) (quoting Stein v. 

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982)).

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appeal in Deerfield Medical Center, and the court there held that the abortion clinic 

owner/operators – i.e., plaintiffs holding the same relationship to potential patients as do 

RHS and Ayers – had third party standing to assert the constitutional rights of those 

patients. Deerfield Medical Center, 661 F.2d at 330, 330 n. 1, 334.14 Thus, circuit precedent 

 14 In concluding that the physician would be an effective advocate for his minor patients, the Miller court 

quoted the Singleton plurality’s observations that “[a] woman cannot safely secure an abortion without the 

aid of a physician” and that the closeness of the relationship between the abortion patient and her physician 

is “patent.” Miller, 934 F.2d at 1465 n. 2 (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117-18). The same may be said 

for plaintiffs like Ayers (and the individual plaintiffs in Deerfield Medical Center), who operate licensed 

medical facilities within which physicians provide abortions. See Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. 

Bentley, 951 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1285 (M.D. Ala. 2013)(“Plaintiffs [abortion facility operators] assert the 

right of their patients to have an abortion free from any undue burden; abortion providers are inextricably 

entwined in the exercise of this right.”); see also Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114-15 (“If the enjoyment of the 

right is inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue, the court at least can be sure 

that its construction of the right is not unnecessary in the sense that the right’s enjoyment will be unaffected 

by the outcome of the suit. Furthermore, the relationship between the litigant and the third party may be 

such that the former is fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right as the latter.”).

Defendants criticize the jus tertii holding of Miller as “supported only by a scant analysis,” as 

“wrongly attributing [the Singleton plurality opinion] to the Supreme Court,” and as irreconcilable “with 

the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Kowalski requiring strict adherence to the ‘hindrance’ and 

‘close relation’ criteria.” (Doc. 31 at 21-22). Defendants maintain that this court is “obligated to follow 

Kowalski and reject [plaintiffs’] bid to stand in their patients’ shoes.” (Id. at 22). In Kowalski itself, 

however, the Court noted examples of circumstances in which it has applied the jus tertii criteria “quite 

forgiving[ly]”: 

We have been quite forgiving with these criteria in certain circumstances. “Within 

the context of the First Amendment,” for example, “the Court has enunciated other 

concerns that justify a lessening of prudential limitations on standing.” Secretary of State 

of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., [467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984)]. And “[i]n several cases, this 

Court has allowed standing to litigate the rights of third parties when enforcement of the 

challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation of third 

parties’ rights.” Warth v. Seldin, supra, [422 U.S. ] at 510, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (emphasis 

added)(citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973); Griswold 

v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 

346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953)); see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 

S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). 

Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130 (emphasis in original). Before proceeding to its analysis of the “close 

relationship” and “hindrance” criteria, the Kowalski Court observed that none of these examples was 

implicated in the case before it. Id. The facts of the present case, in contrast, are in line with Kowalski’s 

second example of “quite forgiving” application of the two criteria. See Deerfield Medical Center, 661 F.2d 

at 333 (relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Craig, Barrows and Griswold in reaching its third party 

standing holding).

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29

does not limit jus tertii standing on behalf of patients to their physicians alone. See also

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972) (“As the Court’s discussion of prior authority 

in Griswold indicates, the doctor-patient and accessory-principal relationships are not the 

only circumstances in which one person has been found to have standing to assert the rights 

of another.”) (citation omitted). 

Defendants further contend that RHS and Ayers do not satisfy the “close 

relationship” requirement “because in this case – unlike, say, in a challenge to abortion 

funding restrictions, Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) – the providers’ interests 

diverge from those of their patients.” (Doc. 31 at 20). Defendants argue that it “would be 

inappropriate ... to allow abortion providers to challenge [parental consent] laws on behalf 

of the very class the legislation seeks to protect.” (Id. at 21). However, whether there is a 

divergence of interest depends on which interests of the plaintiffs and the minor patients 

are selected for comparison. While the particular interest of the minors sought to be 

advanced by the legislature may be relevant to the analysis (see Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 

1118, 1123 (11th Cir. 1994)), the “close relationship” required for third party standing does 

not depend on plaintiffs’ interests matching this interest. The third party interest of 

significance to the jus tertii relationship analysis is the third party’s interest in exercising 

the right that the litigant seeks to assert; in a case such as this, the relationship between the 

litigant and the third party must be such that the challenged statute’s regulation of or 

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enforcement against the litigant would affect the third party’s enjoyment of its asserted

right adversely.15

The fact that this is so is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s jus tertii analysis in 

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The statutory provisions at issue in Craig prohibited 

the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Id. 

at 191-92. On the merits of the equal protection challenge before it, the Supreme Court 

accepted the district court’s identification of the objective of the legislation; the district 

court had concluded that “‘a major purpose of the legislature was to promote the safety of 

the young persons affected and the public generally.’” Id. at 199, 199 n. 7 (emphasis added; 

citation to district court’s opinion omitted). Despite the obvious divergence between the 

safety interest of “the young persons affected” and the vendor’s interest in selling beer to 

this very class of people, the Supreme Court did not ask if these interests aligned in its jus 

 15 The holding in Harris is not to the contrary. In that case, the Department of Corrections policy at issue 

prohibited ‘individual employee recommendations to the Parole Board in behalf of inmates[.]’” Harris, 20 

F.3d at 1120 n. 2 (citation to record omitted). The Eleventh Circuit found no “congruence of interests” 

between the pro se prisoner litigant and the prison guards whose First Amendment rights the litigant sought 

to assert in challenging the policy. The court considered the litigant’s relationship with the third parties 

insufficient to support third party standing because, in part, of “the adversarial nature of the relationship 

between prisoners and prison guards and the differing interests of the two groups[.]” Id. at 1123-24. As to 

the latter point, the court acknowledged that a “primary purpose of the policy ... is to protect the prison 

guards from any threats, coercion, or retaliation that could result if the guards were allowed to communicate 

directly with the parole board with respect to individual prisoners.” Id. at 1123. However, the court’s 

analysis of the congruence of interests did not stop with the DOC’s stated purpose of protecting the guards; 

the court noted further that “one of the primary reasons that the prison guards do not challenge the policy 

themselves may be, simply, that they like it.” Id.; see also id. at 1123 n. 9 (noting a scholar’s opinion that a 

court should not permit third party standing if “‘it believes that third parties oppose the result sought by the 

litigant, or that the litigant may not adequately press for a desirable result for third parties.’”) (citation 

omitted). Thus, the Harris court’s finding of incongruent interests depends on its conclusion that, in view 

of the adversarial nature of their relationship with the litigant, the third parties themselves might oppose the 

result sought by the litigant. Here, the court has no basis for concluding that plaintiffs’ relationship with 

minors seeking abortions is similarly adversarial in nature, or that those minors who wish to obtain abortions 

without parental consent would themselves oppose the result that plaintiffs pursue in this action.		

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tertii analysis. Instead, it focused on the equal protection right of the vendor’s potential 

male customers, 18-20 years of age, and whether that interest would be diluted or adversely 

affected by the challenged legislation’s regulation of the vendor’s operations:

As a vendor with [Article III] standing to challenge the lawfulness of 

§§ 241 and 245, appellant Whitener is entitled to assert those concomitant 

rights of third parties that would be “diluted or adversely affected” should 

her constitutional challenge fail and the statutes remain in force. Otherwise, 

the threatened imposition of governmental sanctions might deter appellant 

Whitener and other similarly situated vendors from selling 3.2% beer to 

young males, thereby ensuring that “enforcement of the challenged 

restriction against the (vendor) would result indirectly in the violation of third 

parties’ rights.” Accordingly, vendors and those in like positions have been 

uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting 

as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or 

function. 

429 U.S. at 195 (citations omitted) (parenthetical alteration in original). Comparing the 

case before it to Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, the Court explained that “[d]eemed crucial to 

the decision to permit jus tertii standing [for Baird to assert the privacy interests of third 

parties] was the recognition of ‘the impact of the litigation on the third-party interests.’ Just 

as the defeat of Baird’s suit and the ‘(e)nforcement of the Massachusetts statute will 

materially impair the ability of single persons to obtain contraceptives,’ so too the failure 

of Whitener to prevail in this suit and the continued enforcement of §§ 241 and 245 will 

‘materially impair the ability of’ males 18-20 years of age to purchase 3.2% beer despite 

their classification by an overt gender-based criterion.” Craig, 429 U.S. at 196 (emphasis 

added) (internal citations to Baird omitted). 

In short, to satisfy the “close relationship” requirement, the litigant’s interest in 

redressing her own injury must be aligned with the third party right she seeks to assert, 

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such that the litigant is “‘fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right’” as the 

third party. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991)(quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115); 

see Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1042-43 (11th Cir. 

2008)(acknowledging that “the interests of this landlord and its tenants are not identical” 

and finding “some merit in Jupiter’s warning that a landlord should not be permitted to 

attack a town housing ordinance on behalf of its tenants, when such ordinances are 

generally intended to protect the health and safety of tenants against unscrupulous 

landlords,” but holding, nevertheless, that the litigant-landlord could assert the equal 

protection rights of its tenants, and finding the “close relationship” requirement satisfied 

because “the interests of Young Apartments and its tenants are sufficiently aligned to 

ensure that Young Apartments will properly frame the issues in this dispute” and “will be 

a zealous advocate of the legal rights at issue”). Thus, the court finds defendants’ 

contention that Ayers has a conflict of interest with her minor patients that renders third 

party standing inappropriate without merit. See Bentley, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 1285 n. 3 

(rejecting defendants’ contention that “it is improper for the plaintiffs to litigate the 

substantive-due-process claims of their patients because the economic and liberty interests 

of the plaintiffs conflict with their patients’ interests in a safe, healthy abortion,” an interest 

that the defendants argued was advanced by the challenged staff-privileges statute, and 

concluding “that the test for third-party standing already protects against a ‘wolves ... 

guard[ing] the sheep’ scenario”)(citation omitted).16

 16 U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990) is another case in which the Supreme Court allowed 

third party standing despite a conflict between the litigant’s interest and an interest of the third party that 

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The Supreme Court has found the “close relationship” criterion to be satisfied in 

cases in which “[the Court has] permitted litigants to raise third-party rights in order to 

prevent possible future prosecution.” Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (citing Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 

(1973)). In the present case, “the relationship between the state enforced measure, the 

injury to the litigant and the purpose or effect of the measure naturally compels the litigant 

to fully and aggressively assert the constitutional claims of the third persons” (Deerfield 

Medical Center, 661 F.2d at 333); Ayers’ interest in eliminating the threat of prosecution 

compels her to “aggressively assert” the rights of her minor patients to make abortion 

decisions without undue burden, to the full extent of that right as set forth in Bellotti. Thus, 

Ayers satisfies the “close relationship” prong of the third party standing inquiry.

b. Hindrance

Defendants contend that the complaint fails to establish that plaintiffs’ minor 

patients face a hindrance in asserting their own rights that is sufficient to support third party 

 

the challenged regulation sought to protect. At issue were the attorney fee provisions of the Black Lung 

Benefits Act and the DOL’s implementing regulations, which prohibited attorneys representing black lung 

claimants “from receiving a fee – whether from the employer, insurer, or [Black Lung Disability] Trust 

Fund, or from the claimant himself – unless approved by the appropriate agency or court” and which 

invalidated contractual agreements for fees. Id. at 717-18. Analyzing the merits of the constitutional 

challenge to the fee provisions, the Court found that “[t]he regulation of attorney’s fees payable by 

claimants themselves is designed to protect claimants from their ‘improvident contracts, in the interest not 

only of themselves and their families but of the public.’” Id. at 722 (citation omitted). In defending against 

the imposition of discipline by his state bar for collecting a 25% fee from his clients’ black lung 

compensation awards, pursuant to his fee agreement with them and without the required approval, the 

attorney-litigant before the Court sought to assert the black lung claimants’ due process rights to obtain 

legal representation. Id. at 718, 720. Without discussing the black lung claimants’ interest in being protected 

from improvident contracts – and focusing, again, on the third party right that the litigant sought to assert 

– the Court allowed him to do so. Id. at 720. It reasoned that “[w]hen ... enforcement of a restriction against 

the litigant prevents a third party from entering into a relationship with the litigant (typically a contractual 

relationship), to which relationship the third party has a legal entitlement (typically a constitutional 

entitlement), third-party standing has been held to exist. ... A restriction on the fees a lawyer may charge 

that deprives the lawyer’s prospective client of a due process right to obtain legal representation falls 

squarely within this principle.” Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added).

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standing, because (1) these patients can raise objections in the judicial bypass proceedings; 

(2) if they prefer to litigate in federal court, they may do so using pseudonyms; (3) their 

claims will avoid mootness as “‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’”; and (4) “there 

is a documented history” of minors’ asserting claims on their own behalf. (Doc. 31 at 20-

21).17 In Miller, as noted above, the Eleventh Circuit quoted the Singleton plurality’s 

discussion of obstacles to a woman’s assertion of her own rights in the context of abortion, 

including the fact that “‘she may be chilled from such assertion by a desire to protect the

very privacy of her decision from the publicity of a court suit’”; the “‘imminent mootness, 

at least in a technical sense, of any individual woman’s claim’”; and the fact that “‘these 

obstacles are not insurmountable’” because “‘[s]uit may be brought under a pseudonym, 

as so frequently has been done’” and because such woman’s claim is not rendered “moot” 

in the constitutional sense even after she is no longer pregnant. Miller, 934 F.2d at 1465 n. 

2 (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117-18). The Eleventh Circuit held that the physicianlitigant, in his challenge to Georgia’s parental involvement statute, had standing to assert 

the rights of his minor patients. In the instant case, plaintiffs aver that their minor patients 

wish to protect the privacy of their abortion decisions and are fearful that others, including 

their parents, may learn of their pregnancies and decisions; they further note the condensed 

time frame during which abortion remains an option for their patients. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 27, 

30-32, 37, 41). The court finds that the present complaint alleges a “hindrance” sufficient 

 17 On the latter point, defendants again invoke Kowalski, maintaining that “the Kowalski Court treated even 

a less extensive judicial track record as defeating any claim of hindrance.” (Id.) (citing Kowalski, 543 U.S. 

at 132). The present case, as indicated above, falls within the circumstances in which, according to the 

Kowalski Court, the criteria for third party standing is applied “quite forgivingly.” Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 

130.

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to support an exception to the prudential limitation on third party standing. See Carey, 431 

U.S. at 684 n. 4 (“Indeed, the case for the [contraceptive] vendor’s standing to assert the 

rights of potential purchasers of his product is even more compelling here than in Craig, 

because the rights involved fall within the sensitive issue of personal privacy.”). 

ii. Prudential ripeness 

In the concluding section of their argument that plaintiffs “lack an Article III injury 

of their own[,]” defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claims are “at least not ripe in the 

prudential sense that they could benefit from maturation without undue hardship to the 

parties.” (Doc. 31 at 17). In assessing ripeness, the court must evaluate the fitness for 

judicial resolution of plaintiff’s claims – including whether further factual development of 

the issues would be beneficial – and must also determine whether delayed review would 

cause hardship to the parties. Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster, 454 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th 

Cir. 2006)(citations omitted).18 Defendants’ argument as to Counts I and II is, in essence, 

that the constitutionality of the judicial bypass provision would be better litigated with the 

concrete factual context provided by an “as applied” challenge, and that withholding 

judgment now will not burden the plaintiffs. However, in Counts I and II, plaintiffs lodge 

a “facial” challenge to the statute, claiming that the provision is unconstitutional because 

it permits the disclosure of sensitive, private information about the minor to others and 

otherwise fails to provide a constitutionally adequate judicial bypass to the parental consent 

 18 See National Treasury Employees Union, 101 F.3d at 1427-28 (explaining that “[i]t is only the prudential 

aspect of ripeness – where a court balances ‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship 

to the parties of withholding court consideration’ – that extends beyond standing’s constitutional core”)

(citation omitted).

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requirement. Whether the statutory judicial bypass procedure is facially valid under the 

standard set forth in Bellotti is exclusively a legal issue that does not require factual 

development. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 623-51 (measuring challenged provisions against 

Bellotti requirements); Miller, 934 F.2d at 1475-82 (using the same method of analysis).19

Additionally, the threat of prosecution alleged by plaintiffs suffices to show, at this stage 

of the proceedings, that delaying resolution of the constitutionality of the statute subjects 

Ayers and RHS to an undue burden. 

As to Counts III and IV, while defendants do not expressly exclude those counts 

from their prudential ripeness objection, defendants do not explain how the statute’s 

allegedly categorical exclusion of non-resident minors from a judicial bypass option would 

benefit from “maturation” or factual development.20 Indeed, as discussed infra, the parties 

appear to agree on the meaning of the statutory language at issue in Counts III and IV, and 

no factual development is needed to resolve the matter of pure statutory interpretation that 

arises from those counts. Thus, the court will not decline to exercise its jurisdiction on 

“prudential ripeness” grounds.

 19 See also Doc. 31 at 36 (defendants’ contention that “most of the complaint’s ‘factual allegations’ are 

simply irrelevant” because, inter alia, “the Supreme Court has already held that application of the Bellotti

II standards (the plaintiffs’ principal claim) is an issue of ‘purely statutory construction.’”) (citing Planned 

Parenthood Ass’n. of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491 (1983) (opinion of Powell, J., in which 

the Chief Justice joined)).

20 Defendants argue that the fact that plaintiffs’ minor patients can raise objections in bypass proceedings 

“counsels dismissal on prudential ripeness grounds, as giving ‘the state courts further opportunity to 

construe [the challenged provisions]’ may ‘materially alter the question to be decided.” (Doc. 31 at 18)

(alteration in original; citations omitted). Defendants present the same argument in urging Pullman

abstention, and the court considers it in that context. See Farmer, 220 F.3d at 148 n. 11 (a “contention that 

the matter is not ripe for review because a federal court should not attempt to decipher a state statute without 

the benefit of interpretation by the state courts is better framed as an argument for abstention”).

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iii. Younger abstention21

Defendants contend that this court is required to abstain under the doctrine of 

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), from exercising jurisdiction. (Doc. 31 at 31-33). 

In Green v. Jefferson County Commission, 563 F.3d 1243, 1245 (11th Cir. 2009), the 

Eleventh Circuit described the Younger doctrine as an “extremely narrow exception[] to 

the federal courts’ ‘virtually unflagging’ duty ‘to adjudicate claims within their 

jurisdiction” (id. at 1245 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of 

New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (“NOPSI”)); it cautioned that “a district court 

should not lightly shirk” its obligation to exercise its jurisdiction (id. at 1251 (citation 

omitted). The court observed that the doctrine “applies most often in cases involving 

pending state criminal prosecutions” – such as the Younger case itself – but that “[e]arly 

on, the Court expanded Younger abstention to apply to pending civil proceedings that are 

‘akin to a criminal prosecution’ ... and, more recently, in strictly civil proceedings which 

implicate state courts’ ‘important interests in administering certain aspects of their judicial 

systems.’” Id. at 1250-51(citations omitted). 

In their initial brief, defendants argue that this court must abstain from exercising 

its jurisdiction because Younger abstention is required “when (1) the requested relief will 

interfere with pending state-court proceedings; (2) the federal-court proceedings implicate 

important state interests; and (3) state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity for 

raising the federal constitutional claims[.]” (Doc. 31 at 31; id. at 31-33) (citing 31 Foster 

 21 “The question of abstention, of course, is entirely separate from the question of granting declaratory or 

injunctive relief.” Lake Carriers’ Association v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 n. 13 (1972).

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Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Middlesex County 

Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). As plaintiffs 

note, the Supreme Court recently has made it clear that the threshold question is whether 

the state court proceeding at issue is within one of the three “‘exceptional circumstances’ 

identified in NOPSI” and, if not, that the Younger doctrine does not apply. Sprint 

Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 584, 593-94 (2013) (“[T]o guide 

other federal courts, we today clarify and affirm that Younger extends to the three 

‘exceptional circumstances’ identified in NOPSI, but no further.”). Unless the state court 

proceedings at issue are within the three types of cases identified in NOPSI, the three 

Middlesex County factors argued by the defendants are irrelevant. Id.; Dandar v. Church 

of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., 551 F. App’x. 965, 966-67 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 

Supreme Court clarified that these three factors are ‘not dispositive’ they [are], instead, 

additional factors appropriately considered by the federal court before invoking Younger,’ 

which itself sets forth only three limited circumstances in which abstention is appropriate. 

If a district court in its discretion decides that none of these circumstances is present, 

Younger abstention is inappropriate regardless of what the Middlesex County factors 

indicate.”) (citing and quoting Sprint Communications, 134 S.Ct. at 593); see also NOPSI, 

491 U.S. at 367-68 (“NOPSI’s challenge must stand or fall upon the answer to the question 

whether the Louisiana court action is the type of proceeding to which Younger applies.”). 

Thus, the court must first determine whether the state court proceedings at issue are: (1) 

“ongoing state criminal prosecutions”; (2) “certain ‘civil enforcement proceedings’”; or (3) 

“pending ‘civil proceedings involving certain orders ... uniquely in furtherance of the state 

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courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.’” Sprint Communications, 134 S. Ct. at 

591 (citing NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368).

In their reply, defendants maintain that Younger applies to judicial bypass 

proceedings because these are civil proceedings “to enforce Alabama’s parental consent 

policy against those minors for whom it may constitutionally do so,” they operate in aid of 

Alabama’s criminal parental consent statute, and they “seek to ‘protect the very interests 

which underlie [Alabama’s] criminal laws and to obtain compliance with precisely the 

standards which are embodied in [Alabama’s] criminal laws.’” (Doc. 39, at 15-16)

(alterations in original) (quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 591, and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 

420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)). Defendants contend that bypass actions “bear numerous 

characteristics of a ‘civil enforcement proceeding’ for Younger purposes”; specifically, (1) 

“[t]hey effectively are initiated by the State in its sovereign capacity as presumably no 

abortion-seeking minor is a voluntary participant”; (2) “[t]hey involve, and amount to, 

investigations of the minor”; and (3) “a state actor is routinely party to the state 

proceeding.” Id. at 16 (internal quotation marks and alteration brackets omitted) (citing 

Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 591, 592).

The court cannot agree that a judicial bypass proceeding is a civil enforcement 

proceeding that is “‘akin to a criminal prosecution’ in ‘important respects’” so as to 

implicate Younger. Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 592 (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604). In Sprint, 

the Supreme Court explained:

Our decisions applying Younger to instances of civil 

enforcement have generally concerned state proceedings “akin 

to a criminal prosecution” in “important respects.” Such 

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enforcement actions are characteristically initiated to sanction 

the federal plaintiff, i.e., the party challenging the state action, 

for some wrongful act. In cases of this genre, a state actor is 

routinely a party to the state proceeding and often initiates the 

action. Investigations are commonly involved, often 

culminating in the filing of a formal complaint or charges.

Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 592 (citations with parenthetical summaries omitted). Contrary to 

defendants’ argument, a judicial bypass proceeding is neither actually nor “effectively” 

initiated by the State of Alabama, nor is its purpose to “enforce” the parental consent 

requirement. According to the statute, the proceeding is initiated by a petition filed by a 

minor who seeks a waiver of the parental consent requirement. See Ala. Code, § 26-21-

4(a) (providing that “[a] minor ... may petition” the court “for a waiver of the consent 

requirement”). The statute’s requirement that the DA participate in judicial bypass 

proceedings does not render those proceedings “‘akin to a criminal prosecution’” for 

purposes of a Younger analysis, even if – as defendants maintain – judicial bypass 

proceedings amount to “investigations” of the petitioning minors.

iv. Pullman Abstention/Certification

Defendants contend that, if this court does not dismiss this action, it should abstain 

on Pullman grounds and/or certify relevant questions to the Alabama Supreme Court. 

(Doc. 31 at 33) (quoting Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000)). 

Under the Pullman abstention doctrine, a federal court 

will defer to “state court resolution of underlying issues of state 

law.” Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 

1181, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965). Two elements must be met for 

Pullman abstention to apply: (1) the case must present an 

unsettled question of state law, and (2) the question of state law 

must be dispositive of the case or would materially alter the 

constitutional question presented. See id. at 534, 85 S.Ct. at 

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1182. ... Because abstention is discretionary, it is only 

appropriate when the question of state law can be fairly 

interpreted to avoid adjudication of the constitutional question. 

See id. at 535, 85 S.Ct. at 1182.

Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1174. “If the state statute in question, although never interpreted by a 

state tribunal, is not fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or 

substantially modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of the federal court 

to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction.” Harman, 380 U.S. at 534-35. “Absent 

ambiguity, [Pullman] abstention lacks utility and thus is improper.” Scheinberg v. Smith, 

659 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (declining to abstain because the Florida judicial 

bypass statute before the court was not ambiguous and, even if it were, the “ambiguity 

would be insufficient to trigger abstention” because under either of the two possible 

constructions, the statute “vest[ed] the Florida courts with constitutionally impermissible 

discretion to ignore a minor’s maturity in determining whether to authorize her abortion”); 

see also id. at 481 (“Uncertainty is a prerequisite to certifying a question of law to a state’s 

highest court, just as it is a prerequisite to invocation of the Pullman doctrine.”) (declining 

to certify the question for interpretation by the Florida Supreme Court). 

Defendants pose, by way of example, four questions which they contend are 

appropriate for certification because the state court’s answers could reveal that the 

plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Act,22 and five others which they maintain would 

 22 These questions are:

(1) Can an abortion clinic or its administrator “perform[] or cause[] to be performed” an abortion 

within the meaning of Ala. Code § 26-21-6(a)(1)?

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elicit answers from the state court that “would materially alter the complexion of the 

constitutional issues before the court.”23 Id., pp. 34-35. However, none of the questions 

identified by the defendants meets the requirements for Pullman abstention or certification

to the Alabama Supreme Court. Defendants’ proposed questions regarding whether the 

 

(2) Do Alabama courts conducting bypass proceedings have the power – either under Ala. R. Evid. 

614(a) or their inherent power – to call witnesses absent the authority conferred in Ala. Code § 26-21-4(f) 

& (k)?

(3) Do Alabama courts conducting bypass proceedings have the power – either under Ala. R. Civ. 

P. 17(c) or their inherent power – to appoint a GAL for the unborn child absent the authority conferred in 

Ala. Code § 26-21-4(j)?

(4) Do Alabama courts conducting bypass proceedings have the power – either under Ala. R. Civ. 

P. 24 or their inherent power – to allow the intervention of a petitioner’s parents who have “otherwise” 

learned of the existence of the proceedings?

(Doc. 31 at 34).

23 The questions in this latter group are:

(5) Under Ala. Code § 26-21-4(e), (f), & (k), must the district attorney (or his or her representative), 

any GAL, or the minor’s parents, secure court permission before issuing a subpoena to, or otherwise calling, 

their own witnesses to testify?

(6) Do the “unless justice requires” clauses of Ala. Code § 26-21-4(k) dictate any precise, maximum 

period for the court to rule on a minor’s bypass petition? If not, do Alabama courts possess authority to 

answer this question by court rule or order (including under Ala. Code § 26-21-4(n))?

(7) Assuming there is a precise, maximum period for ruling on the petition, would a failure to rule 

within that period constitute a constructive grant or denial of the petition? Do the Alabama courts possess 

authority to answer this question by court rule or order (including under Ala. Code § 26-21-4(n))?

(8) Do the confidentiality provisions of Ala. Code §§ 26-21-4(o) and 8(a) prevent the district 

attorney from prosecuting criminal offenses based on information learned by the district attorney in the 

course of participating in a bypass proceeding?

(9) Alabama’s Parental Consent Law currently provides that “[t]he requirements and procedures 

under this chapter shall apply and are available only to minors who are residents of this state.” Ala. Code § 

26-24-4(a). Are minors who are not residents of this State required to comply with the parental consent 

requirement at all?

(Doc. 31 at 34-35).

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bypass court has the power under state law – independently of the challenged statute’s 

specific grant of such authority – to call witnesses, to appoint a GAL for the unborn child, 

and to allow intervention of the minor’s parents are not dispositive of, or even material to, 

the federal constitutional questions before the court. The constitutionality of the challenged 

provisions specifically authorizing such judicial acts does not depend in any way on 

whether those acts are otherwise allowed or prohibited as a matter of state law. And, as 

noted previously, the existence of alternate state law sources of judicial authority does not 

preclude redress of plaintiffs’ injuries through a favorable judgment on their challenges to 

the Act if they prevail. The remainder of the questions suggested by defendants, relating to 

construction of the challenged statute itself, are also either irrelevant to the claims 

presented in the complaint – i.e., their resolution by the state court would not moot the 

constitutional issues presented by plaintiff’s claims or alter them materially – and/or they 

pertain to statutory provisions that are unambiguous. Only one of these questions – whether 

the statute is ambiguous regarding the applicability of certain provisions to non-resident 

minors – warrants discussion. 

Plaintiffs allege that the Act “restricts the bypass process” to minors who are 

Alabama residents and, in Counts III and IV of their complaint, claim that non-resident 

minors’ exclusion from the judicial bypass process violates those minors’ rights to equal 

protection and their rights under the Privileges and Immunities clause. (Complaint, ¶ 24 

and Counts III and IV). Defendants contend that “the problem with both of these counts is 

that the Act does not say what RHS contends it says. The Act instead appears to exempt 

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out-of-state minors from the parental-consent requirement altogether.” (Doc. 31 at 68). 

Defendants argue:

The statutory language at issue says this: “The 

requirements and procedures under this chapter shall apply and 

are available only to minors who are residents of this state.” 

Ala. Code § 26-21-4(a) (emphasis added). As RHS notes in its 

preliminary-injunction brief, “[t]he chapter in question 

consists of the entire parental consent statute, and so the quoted 

language arguably means that the entirety of the parental 

consent law – including [the] parental consent requirement 

itself – does not apply to non-residents.” Doc. 3 at 5 n. 1.

(Doc. 31 at 68). Plaintiffs counter that “the placement of this language within section 4 of 

Chapter 21, ‘[p]rocedure for waiver of consent requirement,’ suggests that this language is 

meant to apply only to the judicial bypass process.” (Doc. 3 at 5 n. 1). Ultimately, 

defendants contend that this court should (1) construe the statutory language as a complete 

exemption for out-of-state minors from the parental consent requirement; or (2) in the 

alternative, abstain or seek interpretation of the statutory language by the Alabama 

Supreme Court. (Doc. 31 at 69; id. at 35, question 9; see also Doc. 45 at 3 (“The defendants 

reiterate ... that the proper course is for this court to dismiss counts 3 and 4 of the complaint 

under Rule 12(b)(6) – either because the language of Ala. Code § 26-21-4(a) 

unambiguously does not violate out-of-state minors’ rights or under the ... [rule] ... that 

every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save a statute from 

unconstitutionality.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The court now 

considers whether this portion of the statute is ambiguous under the Pullman doctrine. 

The Alabama legislature has specified how references within the Alabama Code to 

the Code’s own internal organization are to be construed. The Code provides that, “[u]nless 

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otherwise indicated in the context, references in this code to titles, subtitles, chapters, 

articles, divisions, subdivisions or sections shall mean titles, chapters, articles, divisions, 

subdivisions or sections of this code.” Ala. Code, § 1-1-15(a)(emphases added). Thus, 

under Alabama law, “chapter” means “chapter,” unless the context indicates otherwise. To 

determine whether the context of the statute before the court should be construed to depart 

from the general rule regarding internal references, the court turns to the language of the 

statute as a whole and to Alabama’s rules of statutory construction. In the case of State 

Superintendent of Education v. Alabama Education Association, 144 So. 3d 265 (Ala. 

2013), the Alabama Supreme Court reiterated Alabama’s “well settled rules of statutory 

construction” as follows:

It is this Court’s responsibility to give effect to the 

legislative intent whenever that intent is manifested. When 

interpreting a statute, this Court must read the statute as a 

whole because statutory language depends on context; we will 

presume that the Legislature knew the meaning of the words it 

used when it enacted the statute. Additionally, when a term is 

not defined in a statute, the commonly accepted definition of 

the term should be applied. Furthermore, we must give the 

words in a statute their plain, ordinary, and commonly 

understood meaning, and where plain language is used we 

must interpret it to mean exactly what it says. In addition, there 

is a presumption that every word, sentence, or provision of a 

statute was intended for some useful purpose, has some force 

and effect, and that some effect is to be given to each, and also 

that no superfluous words or provisions were used. 

Id. at 272-73 (citations and internal quotation and alteration marks omitted). 

The Act’s non-resident minor exclusion is undeniably contained within the “Petition 

for waiver of consent” section of the statute. (See § 26-21-4(a)). However, the Legislature’s 

placement of the exclusion within that section is not evidence that the exclusion applies 

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only to the procedure outlined in that section (i.e., the judicial bypass alternative to parental 

consent) rather than to the chapter as a whole, especially given the Legislature’s explicit 

use of the word “chapter.” Again, the statute states, “The requirements and procedures 

under this chapter shall apply and are available only to minors who are residents of this 

state.” Ala. Code, § 26-21-4(a) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the Act 

excludes non-resident minors only from the judicial bypass alternative to parental consent 

cannot be squared with this statutory language.24

The court could not adopt plaintiffs’ proposed construction of the non-resident 

minor exclusion without ignoring both the legislative pronouncement regarding 

construction of the Code’s internal references (Ala. Code, § 1-1-15(a)) and Alabama’s 

well-settled rules of statutory construction. The fact that one reasonably might surmise 

from matters external to the statute itself that the Legislature perhaps meant to refer to “this 

section” and to portions of the previous section when it used the phrase “this chapter” does 

not render the plain language of the statute ambiguous. The court must presume that the 

legislature knew the meaning of the words that it used in enacting the statute. Absent 

ambiguity, neither Pullman abstention nor certification to the Alabama Supreme Court is 

appropriate.

 24 Indeed, the court would have to conclude that the phrase “this chapter” as used in section 26-21-4(a)(1) 

does not mean “this chapter” – i.e., Chapter 21, the parental consent chapter of the Alabama code, within 

which section 26-21-4 is found – and (2) instead refers, in addition to section 26-21-4 itself, to subsection 

(d) of section 26-21-3 (which grants minors the option to petition for a waiver of the parental consent 

requirement) but not to subsection (a) of that very same section (which imposes the parental consent 

requirement). 

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v. Eleventh Amendment immunity

Defendants contend that the present lawsuit is barred by the state’s Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. They point out that “the Ex parte Young exception [to Eleventh 

Amendment immunity] does not apply ‘where no defendant has any connection to the 

enforcement of the challenged law at issue[,]’” and that the only defendants before the 

court are the Attorney General and the Montgomery County District Attorney. They 

maintain that, accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars this lawsuit except as to the 

challenged provision requiring DA participation in a bypass proceeding. (Doc. 31 at 29)

(citation omitted). 

The court cannot agree. In view of RHS’s location within Montgomery County, the 

criminal enforcement provision of the parental consent statute, and the prosecutorial 

authority of the defendants within their respective jurisdictions, the defendants have the 

requisite connection to enforcement of the challenged law. Thus, defendants have failed to 

establish that the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief against 

them. Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336-41 (11th Cir. 1999)

(concluding that the Eleventh Amendment barred abortions providers’ challenge to the 

private civil enforcement provision of statute regulating abortion, but not their challenge 

to the statute’s criminal liability provision, in abortion providers’ lawsuit against the 

Alabama Attorney General, Governor, and the Montgomery County DA); id. at 1341 

(“[U]nless the state officer has some responsibility to enforce the statute or provision at 

issue, the ‘fiction’ of Ex parte Young cannot operate.”). 

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C. Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

“Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of 

unconstitutionality.” Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 493. Because this case is before the court on a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs allege that the Act places 

unconstitutional barriers in a pregnant minor’s path to an abortion through a judicial 

bypass, the defendants bear the burden to establish the Act’s constitutionality. See

Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 436 (ruling on the constitutionality of a Minnesota parental consent 

law). “Under any analysis, the [Alabama] statute cannot be sustained if the obstacles it 

imposes are not reasonably related to legitimate state interests.” Id. (citations omitted).

As discussed supra, the plaintiffs assert a facial challenge to the Act. In light of the 

parties’ arguments on the instant motion, it is necessary to clarify the standard that this 

court will apply in considering plaintiffs’ claims, both with regard to the motion to dismiss 

and throughout this litigation. The defendants presuppose that, in evaluating a facial attack 

on an abortion statute, the court is obligated to follow the “no set of circumstances” test of 

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“A facial challenge to a legislative Act 

is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must 

establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”).

However, the “no set of circumstances” analysis is not applicable to abortion cases decided 

after Casey, which held that an abortion law is facially unconstitutional if it places an 

“undue burden” in the path of a “large fraction” of the women the law affects. Casey, 505 

U.S. at 895. In the intervening years since Casey, the Salerno test has been rejected as the 

proper standard for a facial challenge to an abortion statute by nearly every court to 

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consider the question. As another judge of this court recently observed, with the exception 

of the Fifth Circuit, “[s]ince Casey, seven courts of appeals have found that, in a facial 

challenge to an abortion restriction, the appropriate test is whether the restriction acts as an 

undue burden on a woman's ability to obtain an abortion in a ‘large fraction of the cases in 

which [the act] is relevant’; if so, the restriction is facially invalid.” Planned Parenthood 

Southeast, Inc. v. Strange, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2016 WL 1167725, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 

25, 2016), judgment entered, 2016 WL 1178658 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 2016) (“Strange II”) 

(quoting Casey, supra, and citing Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 

914 (9th Cir. 2014); Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 509–

10 (6th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 669 (8th Cir. 

2011), vacated in part on other grounds on reh'g en banc, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011); 

Zbaraz v. Madigan, 572 F.3d 370, 381 (7th Cir. 2009); Heed, 390 F.3d at 58, vacated on 

other grounds sub nom. Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320; Farmer, 220 F.3d at 142–43 (3d Cir. 2000); 

Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996)) (bracketed text in original); 

Cf. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 853, 

588-89 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying Salerno). See also Cincinnati Women's Servs., Inc. v. 

Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 368 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n considering facial challenges to abortion 

restrictions, every circuit, with one exception, has applied Casey’stest rather than Salerno’s

more restrictive ‘no set of circumstances’ test.”); Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1230 

(9th Cir. 2013) (The “no set of circumstances” standard “enunciated in United States v. 

Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ... is applicable except in 

First Amendment and abortion cases[.]”) (italics in original). 

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The Supreme Court’s recent application of the “undue burden” and “substantial 

fraction” analysis of Casey in deciding a facial challenge to Texas abortion statutes in 

Hellerstedt confirms that the Casey standard is applicable here.

25 See Hellerstedt, 136 S. 

Ct. at 2299, 2308-10 (discussing and applying the standard in Casey). While Hellerstedt

does not expressly disavow Salerno, the Court’s invocation of Casey, and the utter absence 

of any mention of the Salerno standard from that decision, counsels that the “undue burden” 

and “substantial fraction” analyses control in the instant case, not the “no set of 

circumstances” test from pre-Casey abortion jurisprudence.

26

Accordingly, because defendants assert that plaintiffs fail to state a claim based on 

the Salerno “no set of circumstances” analysis, and all of defendant’s arguments in favor 

of dismissal are premised upon an incorrect legal standard, the motion to dismiss is due to 

be denied. In addition, under Casey, defendants are not entitled to a dismissal of plaintiffs’ 

 25 In the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court in Hellerstedt, the Fifth Circuit observed that, “[i]n the 

abortion context, it is unclear whether a facial challenge requires showing that the law is invalid in all 

applications (the general test applied in other circumstances) or only in a large fraction of the cases in which 

the law is relevant (the test applied in Casey).” Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 586 (5th 

Cir. 2015), reversed and remanded, Hellerstedt, 136 S.Ct 2292 (applying the Casey standard). The Supreme 

Court responded to the Fifth Circuit’s perception of a lack of clarity concerning the applicable standard by 

evoking and applying Casey. After Hellerstedt, there is no longer anything “unclear” regarding Casey’s 

applicability “in the abortion context.” 

 

26 Defendants’ argument that the court “cannot invalidate a provision ‘based on a worst case analysis that 

may never occur’” also misses the mark. (Doc. 31 at 48 (quoting Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive 

Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990) (“Akron II”). In Akron II, which predates Casey by two years, the court 

applied the “no set of circumstances” standard to a facial challenge to an abortion statute. That standard is 

irreconcilable with the “large fraction” test, a fact which also casts doubt on the “worst case analysis” 

language on which defendants rely. In addition, the “worst case analysis that may never occur” in Akron II

existed because the lower courts incorrectly interpreted the Ohio statute at issue as allowing an extension 

of bypass proceedings for up to 22 days by counting “calendar days” where the statute used the word “days.” 

Id. at 513-14. The Court found that the lower courts substituted language where a term was unambiguous. 

Id. No substitution of language or speculation is necessary to assess the constitutionality of the Act before 

this court.

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lawsuit under the relatively low threshold required for a plaintiff to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss, for the reasons discussed below.

i. Count I – Right to an effective, confidential, and expeditious 

 judicial bypass

The first count of plaintiffs’ complaint is by far the most expansive, as it offers three 

separate arguments – each with subparts – against the constitutionality of each of the nine 

statutory provisions at issue. With respect to the instant motion, the question before the 

court is whether plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their complaint in conformity with Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8 so as to compel defendants to file a responsive pleading in defense of the 

complaint. A cause of action fails on a motion to dismiss only if there is clearly no claim 

as a matter of law. Such is not the case here.

The plain language of the Act allows for parties other than the minor petitioner and 

the court to join the judicial bypass proceedings. Those include the DA, who “shall” appear 

and represent the interests of the State of Alabama,27 a GAL to represent the interests of 

the unborn child, and the petitioner’s parent, parents or legal guardian. See Ala. Code § 26-

21-4. Those parties are vested with the power to subpoena witnesses. Id. They may also 

examine witnesses during the bypass proceeding and present other evidence. Id. The DA 

must examine the petitioner, and other parties are entitled to be represented by an attorney 

and likewise question the minor. Id. In addition, those parties are granted the right to 

petition the court for extensions of time “subject to the time constraints of the petitioner 

 27 As noted supra, the State’s interests are codified; those interests are insuring that the minor’s rights are protected 

and defending the State’s policy of protecting unborn life. See Ala. Code § 26-21-1.

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related to her medical condition.” Ala. Code § 26-21-4(k). The court may sua sponte

continue the proceedings for the same period of time and is empowered to subpoena 

witnesses. All parties have the right to appeal from any final decision on the minor’s 

petition. While the statute contains a provision charging the presiding judge with the task 

of ensuring the confidentiality of the proceedings, the statute itself imposes no limits on 

the parties’ or the court’s ability to investigate for the purpose of gathering witnesses and 

evidence on the ultimate issues of the bypass proceeding: whether the minor is mature 

enough to make the decision to have an abortion, and whether the abortion is in her best 

interests. See Ala. Code § 26-21-4(f, i, g & k).

Plaintiffs’ claims set forth in Count I regarding the constitutionality of the Act under 

Bellotti II are pled sufficiently to state a cause of action to allow this declaratory judgment 

and § 1983 action to proceed beyond the initial pleadings. There are questions of law as to 

whether the Act passes constitutional muster – i.e., whether Casey’s large fraction test is 

satisfied – and defendants have not demonstrated that plaintiffs’ claims in Count I are 

foreclosed as a matter of law.

ii. Count II – Minor petitioner’s right to informational privacy

In Count II, plaintiffs assert that the Act violates a minor petitioner’s “right to liberty 

and privacy as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... by 

permitting” disclosure of “deeply sensitive, private information about the minor to others, 

including to any potential witnesses.” (Doc. 1 at 13). In their brief in support of the motion 

for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs clarify that their “informational privacy” claim is 

derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 529 (1977), in 

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which the Court “referred broadly to a constitutional privacy interest in avoiding disclosure 

of personal matters.” Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 135 

(2011) (internal marks and citation omitted). (Doc. 3 at 38-43). The Supreme Court has 

only twice squarely discussed that particular privacy interest since Whalen, in Nixon v. 

Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457, 97 S.Ct. 2777 (1977) and Nelson, 

supra. The Nelson decision notes that lower state and federal courts vary in their 

interpretations of Whalen; some employ a test balancing the individual’s interests against 

the government’s and, at the other end of the spectrum, one court expresses skepticism 

about the constitutionality of the “right” to informational privacy. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 146 

n. 9 (citing and discussing Barry v. New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983)); J.P. 

v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981); Fraternal Order of Police v. Philadelphia, 

812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987); Woodland v. Houston, 940 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1991) 

(per curiam); American Federation of Govt. Employees v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997) (“express[ing] ‘grave doubts’ about the existence of a constitutional right to 

informational privacy”); In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); State v. Russo, 

259 Conn. 436, 459–464, 790 A.2d 1132, 1147–1150 (2002)). 

Taking its cue from Nelson and its two predecessor decisions, this court declines to 

join the debate on the constitutionality of such a right in ruling on the instant motion to 

dismiss and, instead, assumes – as the parties do – that such a right to informational privacy 

exists and that it is of “constitutional significance.” Nelson, 433 U.S. at 147. The 

defendants argue that the interest in informational privacy is two-fold: an individual 

interest in (1) “avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and (2) “making certain kinds of 

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important decisions free from government interference.” Nelson, 433 U.S. at 145 (quoting 

and paraphrasing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600) (internal marks omitted); see also Doc. 31 

at 76-80.

As to the first interest, defendants attempt to cabin the plaintiffs’ claim to those 

provisions of the Act that allow for witnesses to be called. That limitation is unfounded. 

Plaintiffs also argue that the Act’s inclusion of the DA, a GAL, and the minor’s parents in 

the proceedings touches upon the interest in “avoiding the disclosure of personal matters.” 

(Doc. 37 at 74-75). The point of a judicial bypass is for the minor to obtain an abortion 

lawfully without parental consent and to preserve her anonymity in the process. The bypass 

proceeding must be confidential, and reasonable safeguards must protect the petitioner’s 

anonymity. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 644. Defendants have not offered authority that 

persuades the court that plaintiffs are foreclosed as a matter of law from asserting that 

disclosure of information regarding the bypass proceeding to third parties violates the 

minor’s interest in informational privacy. 

iii. Counts III & IV – Out-of-state minors

As discussed supra, the parties substantively agree on the meaning of § 26-21-4(a) 

– i.e., that it “exempts out-of-state minors from the parental-consent requirement 

altogether.” (Doc. 31 at 80; Doc. 38). Because the parties do not differ in their reading of 

that section, which is the subject of Counts III and IV, the court asked the parties to discuss 

the potential for settlement of that question at the hearing on the instant motion, but the 

parties did not reach an agreement. (Doc. 46, 47). In light of both parties’ positions in this 

lawsuit that § 26-21-4(a) permits a non-resident minor to have an abortion lawfully in 

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Alabama without either parental consent or judicial bypass, defendants’ motion to dismiss 

is due to be denied with respect to plaintiffs’ claims on this point. (Doc. 1 at 13-14). 

V. Conclusion and Order

In this ruling, this court neither implies nor decides which party will prevail when 

these claims are presented to the court for final adjudication. The holding of this decision 

on defendants’ motion to dismiss is simply that this court has subject matter jurisdiction 

over and will adjudicate this lawsuit, and that plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently pled to 

survive a motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, and for the reasons discussed, it is 

ORDERED as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 30) is DENIED. 

2. Defendants shall file their answer to plaintiffs’ complaint on or before 

September 16, 2016. Thereafter, the pleadings are closed.

3. The court DEFERS ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction 

(Doc. 2) until after defendants’ answer is filed.

4. The court construes plaintiffs’ motion for a partial declaratory judgment and for 

entry of a permanent injunction (Doc. 46) as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because the pleadings were not 

closed at the time that plaintiffs filed the motion, it is due to be and hereby is 

DENIED as premature, without prejudice to plaintiffs’ right to reassert a timely 

motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

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5. The stay of these proceedings shall remain in effect until further order of this

court, except to the extent that defendants are granted leave to file an answer in 

accordance with this order.

DONE, on this the 2nd day of September, 2016.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

Susan Russ Walker

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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