Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00500/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00500-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Montgomery Chastain, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-13-0500-PHX-NVW (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Robert Montgomery Chastain filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on March

11, 2013, challenging his conviction for theft by means of transportation, and the trial court’s

imposition of an 11.25 year prison term. He raises five grounds for relief. In Ground One,

he contends that judicial interference resulted in the ineffective assistance of counsel. He

claims that the trial court barred evidence at trial that was pertinent to his defense and had

contact with a witness outside the courtroom. Chastain also contends that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel; there was insufficient evidence to proceed to trial; both

defense counsel and the state failed to request a voluntariness hearing regarding his alleged

confession; and the trial court failed to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense.

Respondents contend that the petition is untimely and that Chastain is not entitled to

equitable tolling. The Court agrees and recommends that the petition be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

Case 2:13-cv-00500-NVW Document 13 Filed 01/23/14 Page 1 of 5
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BACKGROUND

The facts supporting the conviction are summarized in the court of appeals

memorandum decision:

JG’s Dodge Ram pickup truck was stolen. Roughly two months later,

Detective Dave Goitia of the Glendale Police Department spotted the truck in

front of a home in Glendale. After a check, Goitia discovered that the license

plate was registered to a 2002 Dodge Ram but was not valid for highway use.

Because this struck him as unusual, Goitia got out of his car to investigate. A

man came out of the house and Goitia asked to speak to the owner of the truck.

After the man returned to the house, Chastain came outside.

In response to a question, Chastain told Goitia the truck was his. Goitia

then asked if Chastain had driven the truck to its current location. After first

saying the truck had been delivered to him, Chastain admitted he had driven

it. Goitia noticed Chastain was holding what appeared to be a registration

document. Using the registration number, a dispatcher informed Goitia that

the truck had been stolen. Chastain offered a key for the truck; Goitia was able

to manipulate the door locks with the key, but only by using force and jiggling

the key.

Goitia testified that the truck had “lots of indicators” of being a stolen

vehicle, including a hole adjacent to the driver’s side door handle apparently

caused by a pry tool, an exterior in bad condition, a license plate attached by

only one bolt, a missing dome light, a missing passenger-side door panel,

weather stripping partially removed from one window and a damaged ignition

that would start without a key.

Chastain’s jacket and backpack were in the truck; there were documents

with Chastain’s name in the backpack. As Goitia began to process the truck,

Chastain repeatedly said he could not believe Goitia was towing his truck.

Chastain was charged with theft of means of transportation in violation of

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-1814 (Supp. 2007). At trial,

Goitia testified to the facts described above. J.G., the owner of the truck,

testified that he did not know Chastain and had never given him permission to

use the truck.

(Doc. 9, Exh D, memorandum decision at 2-4).

On direct review, counsel filed an Anders brief. Chastain subsequently filed a

supplemental, pro se opening brief raising the following issues: (1) counsel rendered

ineffective assistance; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict; (3) the trial

court improperly failed to hold a voluntariness hearing; and (4) the trial court erred by failing

to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense (Id., Exh E, F). On September 30, 2008, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court of appeals ruled

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that (1) under Arizona law, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could only be raised

in a post-conviction proceeding; (2) sufficient evidence supported the verdict; (3) the trial

court did not err in failing to hold a voluntariness hearing because neither Chastain, nor the

evidence, raised a question regarding the voluntariness of his statements; and (4) the trial

court did not commit fundamental error in failing to issue a lesser-included offense

instruction (Id., Exh D). On February 5, 2009, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review

(Id.).

While Chastain’s appeal was pending, he filed a notice of post-conviction relief (Id.,

Exh G). The trial court dismissed the notice without prejudice, and granted Chastain leave

to re-file it 30 days after the issuance of the mandate on direct review (Id., Exh H). He refiled his notice on March 13, 2009 (Id., Exh I). He filed a subsequent petition for postconviction relief and raised three claims. He argued that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to request a voluntariness hearing, present testimony reflecting that he

had been incarcerated on the date the vehicle was reported stolen, object to the trial court’s

order precluding evidence that he was incarcerated when the vehicle theft was reported, call

Chastain as a trial witness, interview witnesses and investigate additional fingerprints found

in the car, file pretrial motions, and offer additional testimony and evidence in his defense.

He also argued that the state presented insufficient evidence to support the verdict; the trial

court erred when it precluded evidence that Chastain was incarcerated at the time the vehicle

was reported stolen; the prosecutor committed misconduct; and the trial court failed to issue

a lesser-included offense instruction (Id., Exh J). On March 23, 2011, the trial court

dismissed the petition, ruling that Chastain had failed to present a colorable claim for relief.

Chastain did not petition for review in the court of appeals (Id., Exh K, L).

DISCUSSION

A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is required

to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during the time in which a

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Chastain’s conviction became final on May 5, 2009, when the period for filing a

petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. See Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). That period was tolled during the time when his postconviction proceeding was pending in state court. The state court dismissed his postconviction petition on March 23, 2011. Because he did not seek review in the Arizona

Supreme Court, the period of limitations began to run on March 24, 2011, and he was

required to file his federal petition on or before March 24, 2012.

Chastain acknowledges that his petition was filed more than one year after the

conclusion of his state post-conviction proceeding. He argues that in his case the one-year

limitations period did not commence until the issuance of the Supreme Court’s decision in

Missouri v. Frye, U.S. , 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012), because it announced a newlyrecognized constitutional right (Doc. 10). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). The Court

disagrees. Frye did not recognize a new constitutional right, it “merely applied the Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel according to the test articulated in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),

and established in the plea-bargaining context in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct.

366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).” Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir.

2012) . “Because the Court in Frye... repeatedly noted its application of an established rule

to the underlying facts, [it] did not break new ground or impose a new obligation on the State

or Federal Government.” Buenrostro, 697 F.3d at 1139 (emphasis added). Therefore, Frye

does not qualify as a “constitutional right ... newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review” under § 2244(d)(1)(C).

Chastain is also not entitled to equitable tolling. He has not demonstrated that he was

pursuing his rights diligently nor the existence of any extraordinary circumstances which

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prevented him from timely filing his petition. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418-19

(2005).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Robert Montgomery Chastain’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 1).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of January, 2014.

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