Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00149/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00149-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CITY OF GRASS VALLEY, )

) 2:04-cv-00149-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

NEWMONT MINING CORPORATION, a )

corporation; NEWMONT USA LIMITED, )

a corporation; NEWMONT NORTH )

AMERICAN EXPLORATION LIMITED, a )

corporation; NEW VERDE MINES LLC, )

a limited liability company; )

NEWMONT REALTY COMPANY, a )

corporation, )

 )

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move for partial summary judgment under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 56(b). Plaintiff (“the City”) asserts in its

complaint, inter alia, that Defendants are liable under section 107(a)

of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act (“CERCLA”), codified at 42 U.S.C. 9607(a), as owners or

operators of a facility from which there has been a release of

hazardous substances. (Pl.’s Third Amended Compl. ¶¶ 43-51.) 

Case 2:04-cv-00149-DAD Document 382 Filed 11/26/07 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Defendants seek partial summary judgment that would have the court (1)

defining the facility at issue in this suit to be the Massachusetts

Hill Mine Workings, (2) holding the City liable as a present owner

under CERCLA section 107(a), and (3) holding that the Newmont entities

are not liable as past (as opposed to present) owners or operators of

the Massachusetts Hill Mine workings. (Defs.’ Mot. at 2.) Plaintiff

opposes the motion. Defendants’ motion is denied for the reasons that

follow. 

I. Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate if, when viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is

no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The moving party has

the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). There is no

genuine issue of fact if, on the record taken a a whole, a rational

trier of fact could not find in favor of the party opposing the

motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 586 (1986). The evidence of the non-moving party is to be

believed and all justifiable inferences are drawn in his favor. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

II. Defining the Facility as the Massachusetts Hill Mine Workings

In its Compliant, the City defines the facility at issue as

“mines, mining waste, minerals, mine workings and other materials

which are one or more of the mining features which connect to a mining

feature known as Drew Tunnel. . . .” (Pl.’s Third Amended Compl. ¶¶

45, 16.) Defendants assert that undisputed evidence “establishes that

Case 2:04-cv-00149-DAD Document 382 Filed 11/26/07 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The parties submitted sealed documents in support of and in 2

opposition to this motion. See Barkdwick Decl.; Eickmeyer Decl.; Thayer

Affi. This order quotes some of these documents. Although the parties

stipulated in a February 24, 2005 protective order that certain

documents or discovery responses may be labeled as confidential and

filed under seal, (Stipulation and Protective Order, Docket No. 152 ¶¶

4, 6) that order concerned discovery, under which a document may be

sealed if a “good cause” standard is met. Kamakana v. City and County

of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(c)). But the issue of whether matters discussed in this order are

sealed is governed by a “compelling reasons” standard under which a

party must show “compelling reasons supported by specific factual

findings . . . that outweigh the general history of [public] access” to

a judicial record shedding light on the judicial process. Id. (internal

quotations and citations omitted). Since sufficient reasons justifying

sealing any part of this order have not been presented, all aspects of

this order are made public. 

3

the Massachusetts Hill Mine workings, including the Drew Tunnel, are

not connected to any other mine workings or drainage tunnels in the

area” and therefore, “there is no basis for expanding the geographic

scope of . . . the ‘facility’ beyond the Massachusetts Hill Mine

workings.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 8:13-9:3.) Plaintiff rejoins that defining

the facility at issue is not a proper basis for summary judgment. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 4:11-23.) 

Assuming Defendants’ motion on this issue is proper, the

City has presented evidence that establishes a triable issue of fact

exists as to whether the Massachusetts Hill Mine is connected to other

mines in the area, especially through a hydraulic connection.2

(Eickmeyer Decl., Exh. 2, at 5 (“The [Drew] tunnel is heavily stoped

and in an area of heavily fractured host rock. These conditions would

make it more likely that there are hydraulic connections between the

workings of the different mines.”)); (Eickmeyer Decl., Exh. 1, at 3 

(“The draining adit [Drew Tunnel] is currently the hydraulic low point

in the mine workings. . . .”)); (Bardwick Decl., Exh. 3 [Versar

Case 2:04-cv-00149-DAD Document 382 Filed 11/26/07 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Report], at 1 (“The Empire Star Mine consists of 15 mines which were

originally isolated from each other, but are now joined by over 370

miles of adits, shafts, drifts, and crosscuts. The Empire, North

Star, . . . Massachusetts Hill, and Gold Hill Mines were the principal

mines merged into the Empire Star Mine.”))

Since evidence in the record reveals a genuine issue of

material fact exists as to whether the Massachusetts Hill Mine is

connected to other surrounding mines, Defendants’ motion on this issue

is denied. 

III. The City’s Liability Under CERCLA

Defendants also argue that the City is the owner of “the

facility at issue in this litigation,” and request the court to enter

partial summary judgment “holding the City liable as a present owner

under [section 107(a)(1) of] CERCLA.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 2, 10.) The

City responds that “[n]one of the answers filed by the various Newmont

defendants included any claims against the City” and that unpled

claims may not be raised in a summary judgment motion since discovery

has closed. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7:6-7, 8:2-3.) In their Reply,

Defendants’ assert that they “need not have asserted a counterclaim or

defense against the City because two of the City’s causes of action

against Defendants state a claim for contribution” and “Defendants

alleged several defenses in their Answer relating to the City’s

liability.” (Defs.’ Reply at 5:4-6, 6:3-4.)

Defendants’ argument in their Reply that the 107(a)

liability determination relates to asserted claims and defenses was

not raised in their moving papers. New arguments cannot be raised in

a reply brief because it disadvantages the opposing side. State of

Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1560 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

Case 2:04-cv-00149-DAD Document 382 Filed 11/26/07 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

499 U.S. 906 (1991). Therefore, this portion of Defendants’ motion is

denied because it fails to satisfy the notice requirement of Local

Rule 230. 

IV. Defendants’ liability as past owners or operators of Massachusetts

Hill Mine. 

Defendants assert that “no Newmont entity is a past owner or

operator of the Massachusetts Hill Mine workings, nor is any Newmont

entity the successor-in-interest to any company that owned or operated

that facility.” (Def.s’ Mot. at 11:4-6.) The City rejoins that

“Newmont fails to establish this assertion as a matter of undisputed

fact.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 9:13-14.) 

Section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA creates liability for “any

person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or

operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed

of.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). The Supreme Court defines an operator

as 

simply someone who directs the workings of,

manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility. 

To sharpen the definition for the purposes of

CERCLA’s concern with environmental contamination,

an operator must manage, direct, or conduct

operations specifically related to pollution, that

is, operations having to do with the leakage or

disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about

compliance with environmental regulations.

United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1998). 

Defendants argue that since the Massachusetts Hill Mine was

closed in 1901 it was never thereafter operated for the purposes of

CERCLA. Specifically, Defendants contend: “[t]here is no evidence

that the Massachusetts Hill Mine Workings were ever operated after

1901.” (Def.s’ Mot. at 11:13-14, Def.s’ SUF #22.) However, the City

has presented evidence that the Massachusetts Hill Mine was “operated”

Case 2:04-cv-00149-DAD Document 382 Filed 11/26/07 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

after 1901. For example, in a 1975 report entitled “Nevada County,

California: Gold Property: A Summary Report,” the Newmont Mining

Corporation writes that “at the cessation of operations in the mid

1950's, the mine workings were allowed to fill with water.” (Bardwick

Decl. In Opp’n Ex. 2 at 6.) This quote was referring to the Empire

Star Mines, but in the report Newmont also notes that “[t]he Empire

Star section is a consolidation of many of the early operating mines

in the Grass Valley district. Among them being the North Star, . . .

Massachusetts Hill . . . and Wisconsin.” (Id. at 8.) Accordingly, a

trier of fact could reasonably infer that when the Empire Star Mines

were flooded the Massachusetts Hill Mine was also flooded. Further,

flooding Massachusetts Hill Mine with water could be an operation

because it is an “exercise of discretion” “related to pollution” in

that flooding the mine may have caused the pollutants in the mine to

leak into the water. 

Evidence also exists in the record that Newmont Mining

Corporation, a named defendant, is the successor-in-interest to the

company that flooded the Massachusetts Hill Mine. The City proffers

evidence that the Empire Star Mines Company owned and operated the

Empire Star Mines from 1929-1956. (Pl.’s Response to Def.s’ SUF #5

(citing Bardwick Decl. in Opp. Exh. 2 at 3, Exh., 33.)) Defendants

admit that in 1957 Empire Star Mines Company merged into Newmont

Mining Corporation. (Bardwick Decl. Exh. 5, at RFA 12.) “Although

CERCLA does not specifically address the issue of successor liability,

courts have applied general rules of corporate law and found liability

where the successor company expressly assumes the predecessor

company’s liabilities, or the succession happens through mergers or

consolidations, or the successor is a continuation of the predecessor

Case 2:04-cv-00149-DAD Document 382 Filed 11/26/07 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

company.” XDP, Inc. v. Watumull Properties Corp., 2004 WL 1103023,

*4 (D. OR., 2004) (citing Atchison, Topeka and Santa Re Ry. Co. v.

Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis

added). 

Accordingly, the City’s evidence is sufficient for a

reasonable trier of fact to find that Newmont Mining Corporation is

liable as a past owner or operator of the Massachusetts Hill Mine. 

Therefore, Defendants’ motion on this issue is denied. 

V. Summary

For the above stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for partial

summary judgment is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:04-cv-00149-DAD Document 382 Filed 11/26/07 Page 7 of 7