Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05060/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05060-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT S. KOSLOFF,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WASHINGTON SQUARE ASSOCIATES,

LLC; MAHMOUD I. DABBAS,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-05060 SI

ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY’S

FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs is currently scheduled for hearing on July 13,

2007. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that the matter is appropriate for

resolution without oral argument, and hereby VACATES the hearing. Having carefully considered the

arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court GRANTS IN PART plaintiff’s motion and

awards fees and costs as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, plaintiff Robert S. Kosloff is physically disabled and requires the

use of a wheelchair. Plaintiff visited Essa’s Restaurant (owned at the time by defendant Mahmoud I.

Abbas) in the Washington Square Shopping Center in Petaluma, California in July of 2005. On

December 27, 2005, plaintiff wrote a letter to defendants detailing alleged disability access barriers in

the restaurant and surrounding parking lot. Defendants responded to the letter, stating that they were

in the process of making site improvements to ensure compliance with the ADA. Plaintiff returned to

the Restaurant and Shopping Center on August 19, 2006. Plaintiff was not satisfied by the disability

access provided by defendants and the lack of progress. Consequently, plaintiff filed suit in this Court,

on August 22, 2006, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and various California

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codes. Plaintiff requested injunctive relief, damages, and fees and costs. 

The parties conducted unofficial discovery and light settlement negotiations. No dispositive

motions were filed by the parties. After a single mediation session on May 10, 2007, Washington

Square entered into a settlement agreement with plaintiff; accordingly, the Court dismissed the

injunctive relief and damages aspects of the complaint against Washington Square on June 6, 2007. 

Plaintiff now moves for attorneys’ fees and costs under both federal and state law. Plaintiff requests

an award of fees in the amount of $88,699 and costs of $4,199. Plaintiff also requests a 1.2 multiplier

be applied to the lodestar amount, creating a total requested award for attorneys’ fees and costs of

$110,637.

LEGAL STANDARD

The authority to award attorneys’ fees is derived in part from Section 505 of the ADA, which

provides that “in any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to [the ADA], the court

or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party. . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including

litigation expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Plaintiffs are entitled to fees under the ADA and

similar state statutes using the “lodestar” measure of fees, which is obtained by multiplying the number

of hours reasonably expended on litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. See Jordan v. Multnomah

County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)). In

evaluating what is a reasonable number of hours, the Court must review detailed time records to

determine whether the hours claimed by the applicant were unnecessary, duplicative or excessive.

Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), reh’g denied, amended on other

grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). It is the fee applicant who “bears the burden of establishing

entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. The

applicant should exercise ‘billing judgment’ with respect to hours worked . . . and should maintain

billing time records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims.” Hensley,

461 U.S. at 437 (1983).

In calculating the lodestar, the Court should consider any of the factors listed in Kerr v. Screen

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976), that are relevant. See

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Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1264 n. 11 (noting that the Ninth Circuit no longer requires that the district court

address every factor listed in Kerr). In Kerr, which was decided before the lodestar approach was

adopted by the Supreme Court as the starting point for determining reasonable fees in Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), the Ninth Circuit adopted the 12-factor test articulated in Johnson

v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). This analysis looked to the following

factors for determining reasonable fees: (1) the time and labor required; ( 2) the novelty and difficulty

of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion

of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether

the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the

amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;

(10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the

client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 

To the extent that the Kerr factors are not addressed in the calculation of the lodestar, they may

be considered in determining whether the fee award should be adjusted upward or downward, once the

lodestar has been calculated. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1212. However, there is a strong presumption that

the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262. An upward adjustment of the

lodestar is appropriate only in extraordinary cases, such as when the attorneys faced exceptional risks

of not prevailing or not recovering any fees. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1212. 

Under California law also, the “prevailing party” is entitled to attorney’s fees. Under California

Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, a plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees for enforcing “an important

right affecting the public interest,” if a “significant benefit . . . has been conferred on the general public

or a large class of persons.” Providing access to disabled individuals constitutes an important right

affecting the public interest. California Government Code § 19230. State law also establishes the

lodestar method as the proper method of calculation. Crommie v. State of California, 840 F. Supp. 719,

724-25 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 

DISCUSSION

I. Attorney’s fees

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A. Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees as the prevailing party

Defendants dispute plaintiff’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees under the ADA and the California

“private attorney general” statute. Defendant first argues that plaintiff’s claim was unsuccessful because

there was no judgment on the merits, and no material alteration of the legal relationship between the

parties. Oppo. at 3 (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992)). The Supreme Court held

in Farrar that “to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief

on the merits of the claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant

from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement.” Id. at 111

(citations omitted). The right to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement is a material alteration of

the legal relationship between the parties. Id. at 113. “Under applicable Ninth Circuit law, a plaintiff

‘prevails’ when he or she enters into a legally enforceable settlement agreement against the defendant.”

Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, plaintiff

entered into a legally enforceable settlement agreement against defendant, including injunctive relief

and $14,000 in compensatory damages. This is sufficient to establish plaintiff as the prevailing party

under federal law. Id. at 1135; see also Richard S. v. Dep’t. of Developmental Servs., 317 F.3d 1080,

1087 (9th Cir. 2003). 

B. Joint and Several Liability

Defendant next argues that attorney’s fees should be allocated between both defendants, either

equally or equitably. Defendant claims it should not be held accountable for counsel’s work on claims

against the other defendant, Dabbas. Oppo. at 14:2-3. Defendant offers no authority for this desired

reduction. The express terms of the ADA hold both landlord and tenant liable to third parties for

noncompliance, regardless of allocation of liability as between themselves. See Botosan v. Paul

McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit elaborated on this rule by quoting

from the DOJ’s interpretation of the ADA: 

Both the landlord and the tenant are public accommodations and have full

responsibility for complying with all ADA title III requirements applicable to that

place of public accommodation. The title III regulation permits the landlord and the

tenant to allocate responsibility, in the lease, for complying with particular

provisions of the regulation. However, any allocation made in a lease or other

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 Mr. Cohen’s records do not include any tally of total hours by month or year, except that in the

motion plaintiff claims 36 hours and 35 minutes for 2007, at $450 per hour, for a claimed total of

$37,162. At Mr. Cohen’s established rate of $450 per hour, it would take 82 hours and 45 minutes to

total that amount. The records provided to not establish or support a finding of over 82 hours time. 

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contract is only effective as between the parties, and both landlord and tenant remain

fully liable for compliance with all provisions of the ADA relating to that place of

public accommodation.

Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, defendants Washington Square and Dabbas are joint and severally

liable for all compensation to plaintiff under the ADA, including federally authorized attorney’s fees.

C. Hourly rate

Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees for Sidney Cohen at an hourly rate of $420 for 2005, and $450

for 2006-2007. Plaintiff submits substantial evidence that the claimed fees are reasonable given the

education, skill and experience of counsel, the amount he normally charges for his legal services and

the market rate for attorneys of comparable skill and experience. See Motion at 11-13, and evidence

cited therein. Defendants present no evidence that counsel’s rates are unreasonable. Therefore, the

Court finds that the hourly rates are reasonable. 

D. Reasonable hours expended

Plaintiff requests an award compensating counsel for over 197 hours of attorney time reasonably

spent on litigation. Defendant argues the results could have been achieved with significantly less work

and requests a reduction in the number of hours factored into the lodestar. Additionally, defendant

argues that Mr. Cohen has claimed hours for secretarial and clerical tasks. This Court finds that the fees

requested are, in certain instances, excessive and must therefore be reduced. 

In support of his motion, plaintiff attaches the handwritten time sheets compiled by Mr. Cohen

during the course of the litigation, which the Court has reviewed. See Cohen Decl., Ex. 4; Cohen Reply

Decl., Ex. 8. As an initial observation, the Court notes that the handwritten time sheets are virtually

illegible, and that his calculations were unreliable.1

 As a result, the Court independently calculated Mr.

Cohen’s hours based on the handwritten time sheets, and determines that Mr. Cohen’s records

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 7 hours and 35 minutes in 2005, 53 hours and 35 minutes in 2006, and 73 hours and 35 minutes

prior to June 7, 2007. It appears to the Court that counsel has recorded hours and minutes on his time

sheets, and these figures have been calculated accordingly.

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Mr. Cohen had the burden of clearly and legibly identifying how many hours were spent on

which task, in order to facilitate review by the court. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (1983). Where time

spent on the complaint is blocked with other tasks, the court has included this in the calculation of time

spent on the complaint and reduced the total time accordingly. 

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apparently reflect a total time of 134 hours and 45 minutes on the date he filed the motion.2

Defendant argues that the time spent on this case was excessive. Defendant requests a 10%

reduction in the hours billed for research to identify the names of defendants, drafting and revising of

the complaint, and preparing plaintiff’s initial disclosures. The Court agrees with defendant that this

case was a typical ADA case that did not involve unique factual or legal issues. This is demonstrated

by the fact that the parties did not file a single substantive motion with the Court. Furthermore,

plaintiff’s Complaint is identical in all substantive respects to complaints used in other ADA lawsuits,

including several other cases Mr. Cohen has brought on behalf of Mr. Kosloff. See Oppo., Exh. 14. The

time sheets reflect, scattered over various entries, that Mr. Cohen spent some 6 hours 5 minutes

drafting, and amending the complaint and identifying the parties. The Court does not accept that it

reasonably took this much time.3

 There are only three paragraphs in the complaint that are at all unique

to this case. The Court therefore awards 1.0 hour for this task. 

Defendant argues that the time Mr. Cohen spent with plaintiff’s expert witness, Mr. Margen,

should be stricken as irrelevant and unnecessary. The Court finds this argument unfounded. 

Defendant requests a reduction in Mr. Cohen’s billable time for secretarial and clerical tasks he

performed. Defendant points to numerous specific instances of time billed by Mr. Cohen that it claims

were for secretarial or clerical tasks. See Oppo. at 15-16. These entries, where legible, include time

spent making and scheduling appointments, leaving messages, preparing billing statements, calculating

fees, faxing, mailing, and e-filing documents. The Court determines that these tasks could easily have

been carried out by persons with less expensive skills than Mr. Cohen, and accordingly should have

been billed at appropriate paralegal or secretarial rates. The Court finds that the following time should

have

 been billed, at most, at a paralegal rate: 15 minutes in 2005, 4 hours and 15 minutes in 2006,

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4 Plaintiff does not identify any contingent risk involved in the case, aside from stating that “[a]ll

cases, no matter how strong on the merits, run the risk of losing.” Mot. at 16. The Court finds that this

is not sufficient to warrant an enhancement.

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and 4 hours and 15 minutes in 2007. The Court awards $110 per hour for the paralegal work. 

 The next problematic request is Mr. Cohen’s claim for over 22 hours for preparing this motion

for attorney’s fees. Mr. Cohen has prepared dozens of similar motions in his career as an ADA attorney,

and this motion raised no new legal issues. The Court finds this time excessive, and reduces the total

time for this motion to 16 hours. Mr. Cohen also claims to have spent 53 hours, almost a third of the

total time he claims to have invested in this case over the course of two years, since June 6, 2007. In

addition to being barely legible, Mr. Cohen’s time sheets for this most recent period consist almost

exclusively of block entries from which the Court cannot determine how much time was spent on any

particular task. See Cohen Reply Decl., Ex. 8. Furthermore, the Court finds 53 hours excessive for

preparing a reply brief to a relatively straightforward motion for attorney’s fees, and accordingly reduces

the time for work done since June 7, 2007 to 10 hours. 

II. Multiplier

Plaintiff also requests that the Court apply a multiplier of 1.2 to the lodestar amount in light of

the results obtained, the importance of the case, and the contingent nature of plaintiff’s fees. The Court

finds that an enhancement to the lodestar amount is not appropriate in this instance. As described above,

this was a straightforward disability case that did not require exceptional work on the part of plaintiff’s

counsel to obtain the Settlement Agreement reached by the parties. Liability was not in question in this

case.4

 Plaintiff and his counsel are well-versed in disability law and are repeat players in disability

litigation. There were no substantive motions filed, nor were there any novel legal issues involved.

Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff should not receive an enhancement on the lodestar amount. 

III. Costs

Plaintiff requests an award of $ 4,199 for costs incurred by attorney Cohen during litigation. See

Reply at 15. Defendant does not contest plaintiff’s costs, and the Court therefore awards the requested

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costs. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART

plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, as follows:

1) Attorneys’ Fees for Sidney Cohen in the amount of:

• 2005: 7 hours, 20 minutes. x $420/hour = $3,080

• 2006: 44 hours, 15 minutes. x $450/hour = $19,912.50

• 2007: 68 hours, 5 minutes. x $450/hour = $30,637.50

3) Paralegal Fees in the amount of:

• 2005-2007: 8 hours, 45 minutes x $110/hour = $962.50

4) Costs in the amount of $4,199.

The total award for attorney’s fees and costs against Washington Square Associates, LLC is

$58,791.50. The hours and costs awarded in this order represent the total amount of compensable

attorney’s fees in this case to date. If plaintiff is the prevailing party on his remaining claims against

defendant Dabbas, only attorney’s fees for time expended after this date, if any, will be compensable.

[Doc. 22]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2007.

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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