Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-00877/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-00877-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DUNG TRAN, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JEFF MACOMBER, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 11-cv-00877-CW 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

INTRODUCTION 

 Petitioner Dung Tran, a prisoner of the State of California, 

filed this pro se action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons discussed below, the Court 

DENIES the amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Procedural History 

 Following a jury trial in Santa Clara County Superior Court, 

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and was found to 

have personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. 

He was sentenced to twenty-nine years to life in prison. 

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Petitioner appealed. The California Court of Appeal 

affirmed the judgment of conviction in an unpublished opinion on 

August 21, 2009. The California Supreme Court denied the 

petition for review on November 19, 2009. 

 Petitioner then filed this action. Within a week of filing 

his petition, Petitioner filed an amended petition. See Dkt. 

Nos. 1 and 3. The Court issued an order to show cause, directing 

Respondent to answer the amended petition. Respondent filed an 

answer on July 21, 2011. At Petitioner's request, this action 

was stayed and administratively closed on August 10, 2012 so that 

he could exhaust state court remedies as to two claims. On 

January 8, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion to lift the stay and 

reopen the action together with a first amended petition for writ 

of habeas corpus. On March 18, 2014, the Court granted the 

motion and ordered Respondent to show cause why the first amended 

petition should not be granted. Later, the Court granted a 

motion to dismiss on the ground that the new claims in the first 

amended petition were procedurally defaulted. Petitioner 

eventually filed his traverse on June 17, 2015. 

II. The Crime 

 The California Court of Appeal described the evidence at 

trial. That lengthy summary is quoted here because Petitioner’s 

claims require consideration of some of the facts. Specifically, 

all of his claims involve evidence regarding his mental state at 

the time of the killing, including provocation and intoxication. 

On December 10, 2003, defendant went to his friend 

Frank Shelton's house, and over the course of several 

hours, they drank beer and smoked crack cocaine. 

Defendant said he was unhappy, sad, and depressed 

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because his wife, Tram Vo, was working in a 

restaurant, and he thought she was seeing another man, 

although she denied it. At one point, defendant spoke 

on the phone to Vo and a man named Son. Defendant 

said that Son challenged him and said that if he 

wanted anything, they would have to meet. According 

to Shelton, defendant sounded shocked and frustrated. 

He said he was upset by the way Son was talking to him 

and wanted to meet him. 

Defendant asked Shelton if he could borrow a gun to 

threaten and scare Son. Shelton suggested a different 

weapon, but ultimately called a friend, who came by 

with a box containing a gun and a loaded clip. 

Shelton knew nothing about guns. Privately, the man 

showed Shelton how to insert and remove the clip and 

use the slide to advance the bullets. He told Shelton 

to be careful because the gun was loaded. Shelton 

then showed defendant how to insert and remove the 

clip. According to Shelton, defendant was nervous 

holding the gun, frustrated, and angry. Defendant 

then put the gun and clip inside his laptop case and 

left, saying he was headed for Vo's restaurant. 

Shelton told him to be careful. Defendant did not 

appear intoxicated when he left. 

Around midnight or shortly thereafter, defendant's 

mother, Nga, heard defendant say, “[M]om, something 

[is] happening to my wife.” Nga woke defendant's 

sister, Lya, and asked her to see what the commotion 

was about. Defendant was rushing around in the 

hallway, very agitated and repeatedly saying to call 

911. Nga told him to call. Nga and Lya saw Vo on the 

bed in the master bedroom. Lya saw blood coming from 

her mouth and tried to wake her up. 

Defendant came into the room. He was on the phone 

with a 911 operator. He was hysterical and screaming 

for help. He gave his address to the operator and 

said that his wife was conscious but bleeding from her 

mouth. He could not tell if she was breathing. He 

said that someone had shot her, but he did not know 

where, when, or how it had happened. The operator 

gave him CPR instructions, which he followed, but he 

could not see or hear any breathing. Defendant then 

gave the phone to Lya, who also tried to revive Vo. 

When defendant was back on the phone, the operator 

asked if there was a gun in the house. Defendant said 

no. Within a short time police and emergency personnel 

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arrived. [Footnote omitted.] 

At that time, defendant was in the driveway holding a 

phone. He was hysterical, and his clothes were 

bloody. Police found Vo on the bed. She was dead. 

Defendant said he did not know what had happened. 

There was a trail of blood from the garage door, 

through a hallway, into the bedroom. There were 

substantial pools of blood in the hallway and two 

bloody handprints on the carpeted areas. According to 

the prosecution's expert, blood had oozed directly 

from the source onto the carpet. The expert opined 

that the bloodstains were consistent with a bleeding 

body being dragged down the hall. 

Officer Jaime Almaraz of the San Jose Police 

Department interviewed defendant at the house. 

Defendant said he had spoken to Vo around 10:00 p.m. 

and expected her home around midnight. He went to 

bed. Later, he woke up, saw blood coming from her 

mouth, and called 911. He tried to resuscitate her 

and then went outside to wait for help. 

Detective Raymond Barrera also interviewed defendant 

at the house. [Footnote omitted.] Defendant cried at 

times. He said that he had spent most of the day and 

evening with Shelton. He said he drank about five 

beers, spoke to Vo around 10:00 p.m., and went home 

around 10:45 p.m.4 He said Vo usually got home around 

12:15 a.m. He got into bed and fell asleep. The next 

thing he knew was that the bed was shaking, and he 

woke up. Vo was next to him. Defendant denied that he 

and Vo were having marital problems. However, 

everyone knew that they had problems, had separated, 

and had reunited during the last two weeks. 

Footnote 4: Nga testified that sometime 

around 10:00 p.m. she heard the garage door 

open. She heard the garage door again 

sometime after midnight. Shortly 

thereafter, she heard defendant yelling 

about Vo. She did not hear any arguing or 

gunshots. 

Lya too did not hear any arguing or gunshots 

before she heard defendant yelling for help 

After these interviews, defendant went to the police 

station and was interviewed again. [Footnote 

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omitted.] For over half the interview, defendant 

reiterated his previous story, acting as if he did not 

know how Vo was injured or killed and claiming that he 

simply woke up and found her bleeding from the mouth. 

However, at one point, he said he would tell the truth 

if he could go home. Defendant said he was depressed. 

He said that Shelton told him that he had just bought 

a gun, and defendant asked to borrow it. Shelton 

tried to dissuade him but brought it out and gave it 

to defendant. Defendant said he tested the gun, 

cocking it with the clip out and pulling the trigger 

until he heard it click. He put the gun into his 

laptop case and then left. He said that at home, he 

put the gun on a table in the bedroom and went to bed. 

When Vo came home, he woke up, and they argued about 

her calling a man on her phone. Defendant said that 

Vo saw the gun and grabbed it. He grabbed it back, 

and they struggled for it back and forth. He said he 

removed the clip, and they continued to struggle for 

it. Vo said that if he could not put the past behind 

him, she wanted to die. He then pushed her back onto 

the bed. At that point, he lost control. Thinking 

that the gun was empty because he had removed the 

clip, he pulled the trigger, and it fired. He then 

left the house, tossed the gun into his neighbor's 

yard, and called the police. He claimed it was all an 

“accident.” He did not know where the shell casing 

was. He said that the pools of blood in the hallway 

came from his hands and pants. 

During the interview, police located the gun in the 

backyard of a house across the street from defendant's 

house. The clip was in it, but no bullet was in the 

chamber. The prosecution's gun expert testified that 

normally, if a clip is in a gun when it is fired, a new 

bullet would automatically enter the chamber. . . . 

An examination of Vo's body revealed gunshot residue 

on her hand, indicating that it was as close as six 

inches away from the gun when it was fired. Vo died 

from a close-range gunshot to her head, which would 

have immediately incapacitated her. 

The Defense 

Defendant testified that in the fall of 2003, he and 

Vo were having marital problems and argued. Both had 

lost their jobs and were having financial 

difficulties, they had two small children, and 

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defendant was using crack cocaine on a daily basis. 

They separated and lived apart for a few months. He 

started seeing a woman, with whom he had sex and took 

drugs, and remained in touch with her up to the time 

of the shooting. In November 2003, he and Vo 

reunited, and she took a job at a restaurant to help 

support the family. 

A few days before he shot Vo, defendant discovered 

that one night, Vo had called a man named Son Nguyen 

on her cell phone, and they spoke for three hours. He 

became angry and jealous. He argued with Vo about the 

call and threw the bedroom phone against the wall, 

breaking it. Vo said that she and Son were just 

friends, but defendant did not believe her. By this 

time, defendant had started a new job but was spending 

$200 a week on drugs. He also wanted Vo to quit her 

waitress job, which had made him feel unhappy and 

ashamed. 

The day of the shooting, defendant told Vo he was 

going to work, took the money she had earned the night 

before, and left with his laptop. However, he went to 

Frank Shelton's home to drink beer and smoke crack. 

Although he told Vo he had quit taking drugs, he 

continued to do so, and his habit and financial 

situation made him sad and depressed. Around 8:00 

p.m., he used his laptop to check Vo's cell phone 

records. He remembered her call to Son, and it 

rekindled his anger and jealously [sic]. Around 9:00 

p.m., he called Vo at the restaurant and reminded her 

to quit. She agreed to do so. They also spoke again 

about the call to Son. She told him that they were 

just friends. She said that Son was there if 

defendant wanted to talk to him. Defendant felt that 

Son was challenging him, and when he got off the 

phone, he immediately asked Shelton for a gun so that 

he could confront and scare Son away from Vo. 

Shelton tried to dissuade defendant for a while, but 

ultimately Shelton's friend came over with a gun. 

Defendant had no experience with guns, and Shelton 

showed him how to remove and load the clip, saying the 

gun was safe when the clip was out. Defendant 

inserted the clip into the gun, put the gun in his 

laptop case, and left. He testified that he headed 

for the restaurant to confront Son with the gun, but 

he changed his mind and went home because he “was a 

coward and [had] chicken[ed] out.”6

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Footnote 6: Defendant later backtracked, 

testifying that he did not intend to 

initially confront or scare Son with the 

gun. He said he planned to leave the gun in 

his car, confront Son, and retrieve the gun 

only if Son did something. Defendant knew 

nothing about Son but nevertheless felt he 

needed a gun because Son might be a gang 

member. 

At home, defendant remained angry and jealous. He 

brought the laptop case into the bedroom. Initially, 

he testified that he intended to confront and scare Vo 

with the gun so she would stop seeing Son. He wanted 

her to know he was serious. However, defendant later 

testified that he intended to talk to Vo without the 

gun and use it only if Vo escalated the argument. He 

went to bed with his clothes on and fell asleep. 

Vo came home later that night after her shift at the 

restaurant. Defendant woke and asked her about 

quitting and Son. When Vo said she did not want to 

talk, defendant became enraged, retrieved the gun, 

removed the clip, and threatened to confront Son with 

it if she did not talk. Defendant said that Vo 

panicked and lurched for the gun, and they struggled 

for it back and forth. At one point, defendant pushed 

her back onto the bed and fell on top of her. They 

were yelling at each other. Vo was upset and asked, 

“You want me to die ... ?” Defendant then snatched 

control of the gun. His finger was on the trigger. 

He did not intentionally pull the trigger. It fired 

accidentally. He did not know that there was a bullet 

in the chamber and did not think it was loaded. He 

thought it was safe. He did not intend to kill or 

harm Vo.7 

Footnote 7: Defendant denied telling police 

that he was trying to scare Vo or that he 

intentionally pulled the trigger. He 

acknowledged that during his interview, he 

indicated that he might have pulled the 

trigger on purpose, but he did not mean that 

he had done so. He said the police forced 

him to say that. He meant only that he did 

not intentionally pull the trigger. 

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After the shooting, defendant tried to call 911, but 

the phone was broken. He screamed for Nga to call 

911. He then put the clip back into the gun, left to 

throw the gun into his neighbor's yard, and returned 

to call 911. He followed CPR instructions from the 

operator and got blood all over his hands and 

clothing. He did not know how so much blood got into 

the hallway but said he made some trips through the 

hallway. He denied moving Vo's body. 

Concerning the gun, defendant did not know whether 

Shelton had recently bought the gun, and he could not 

recall whether he told police that Shelton had just 

bought it. Defendant also denied that he tested the 

gun at Shelton's by removing the clip, cocking the 

gun, and pulling the trigger until he heard it click. 

He said he lied about doing so because he wanted to 

make the police think that he had done everything he 

could to make sure the gun was safe. He also said 

that after the shooting, he put the clip back in the 

gun because he did not want the police to find 

evidence of the gun in the house. 

Defendant admitted that he lied to the 911 operator 

and the officers who first spoke to him at his home. 

He said he lied to the operator because he was afraid 

to admit the shooting. He said he lied to the 

officers at his home because he wanted to avoid going 

to jail. Defendant also said that he initially lied 

to the officers at the station and delayed telling 

them the truth because he thought he would be able to 

go home. 

A defense expert opined that the blood pools in the 

hallway were consistent with defendant's story about 

performing CPR and traveling back and forth down the 

hallway. 

People v. Tran, No. H031840, Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2009 opinion 

(hereinafter, Tran) at 2-8 (footnotes omitted where noted). 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state 

prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation 

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

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Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, a district court may not grant 

habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: 

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

 A federal court on habeas review may not issue a writ 

“simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment 

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. 

Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to 

support granting the writ. Id. at 409. The factual 

determinations by state courts are presumed correct unless there 

is “clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

 If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted 

only if the error had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 638 (1993)). 

 When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state 

court to consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the 

last reasoned opinion of the highest court to analyze whether the 

state judgment was erroneous under the standard of § 2254(d). 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). In the present 

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case, the California Court of Appeal is the highest court that 

addressed Petitioner’s claims in a reasoned opinion. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

 Petitioner contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 

right to effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 

to request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of 

heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter. 

 A. Heat-of-passion Voluntary Manslaughter 

 In California, the crime of voluntary manslaughter is a 

lesser included offense of the crime of murder. People v. 

Beltran, 56 Cal. 4th 935, 942 (2013). “Murder is the unlawful 

killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.” Cal. 

Penal Code § 187(a). “Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a 

human being without malice.” Id. at § 192. If the killing 

without malice is done “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of 

passion,” it is voluntary manslaughter. Id. at § 192(a). 

Voluntary manslaughter based on a heat-of-passion theory has both 

a subjective and an objective component. See People v. Cole, 33 

Cal. 4th 1158, 1215–16 (2004). For the subjective component, 

“[t]he defendant must actually, subjectively, kill the victim in 

the heat of passion, that is, anger, rage, or any violent, 

intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion, except revenge, 

including fear of death or bodily harm.” Tran at 9. The 

objective component requires that the defendant’s passion have an 

objectively reasonable basis. Id. That is, “[t]here must be 

evidence that the victim provoked the defendant, and that 

provocation must be sufficient to cause an “‘“‘ordinary [person] 

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of average disposition . . . to act rashly or without due 

deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than 

judgment.’”’” Id. (omissions and second alteration in original). 

The provocation need not be such that it would prompt an ordinary 

person of average disposition to kill someone, but only that it 

“would render an ordinary person of average disposition ‘liable 

to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and 

from this passion rather than from judgment.’” Beltran, 56 Cal. 

4th at 957 (quoting People v. Logan, 175 Cal. 45, 49 (1917)). 

 Under California law, the state of the evidence determines 

whether the jury must be instructed on a lesser-included offense. 

An instruction is required “‘whenever evidence that the defendant 

is guilty only of the lesser offense is “substantial enough to 

merit consideration” by the jury.’” Tran at 10 (citation 

omitted). The evidence is substantial when it is evidence from 

which a jury could conclude “‘that the lesser offense, but not 

the greater, was committed.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

 B. State Court Decision 

 The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim 

that counsel was ineffective in not seeking a heat-of-passion 

jury instruction, and gave two reasons. First, there was neither 

deficient performance nor prejudice in the failure to request a 

heat-of-passion instruction because the evidence did not warrant 

such an instruction. Although there was sufficient evidence, if 

believed, to establish the subjective component of a heat-ofpassion voluntary manslaughter, i.e., that Petitioner acted under 

heat of passion, there was not sufficient evidence to establish 

the objective component, i.e., that there was provocation 

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sufficient to cause an ordinary person to act rashly and from 

passion rather than judgment. Tran at 10-11. 

[T]he only evidence of provocation is that in the days 

before the shooting, defendant discovered that Vo had 

had a long telephone call at night with Son. Although 

defendant suspected an affair, Vo denied it and said 

she and Son were just friends. On the day of the 

shooting, defendant spoke to Vo from Shelton's house. 

She reiterated that she and Son were just friends and 

invited defendant to come to the restaurant to talk to 

Son himself. Later that night, when she got home from 

work, she did not want to discuss her job or Son. 

. . . That Vo had once spoken to Son on the phone and 

perhaps saw him at the restaurant and did not want to 

discuss her job or Son when she got home from work 

late at night would not, in our view, cause an 

ordinarily reasonable person to believe that Vo was 

having an affair or otherwise arouse the passions of a 

reasonable person and cause him to act rashly from 

passion rather than judgment. This is especially so 

because Vo had repeatedly denied that she was having 

an affair. 

Tran at 11. Based on the evidence at trial regarding the 

victim’s conduct, “defense counsel reasonably could have thought 

that there was insufficient evidence to establish the objective 

component for heat of passion.” Id. 

 Second, the California Court of Appeal determined that trial 

counsel may have chosen not to pursue a heat-of-passion theory 

for the separate reason that such a theory had the potential to 

weaken the defense of involuntary manslaughter based on an 

accidental shooting. See Tran at 14. The defense of an 

accidental shooting was consistent with Petitioner’s testimony 

that the gun fired by accident, rather than that he had shot his 

wife in an impassioned state due to her alleged infidelity. 

Defendant’s credibility already was questionable due to 

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inconsistencies between his trial testimony and the statements he 

made at the time of the shooting. “Under the circumstances, 

defense counsel could have reasoned that any marginal benefit 

from asserting an additional but factually weak theory was 

outweighed by its potential to undercut defendant’s testimony 

that the shooting was unintentional and accidental and thereby 

undermine his claim of involuntary manslaughter.” Id. 

 C. Analysis of Federal Habeas Claim 

 The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel guarantees not only 

assistance, but effective assistance, of counsel. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for judging 

any claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel’s conduct so 

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that 

the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. 

Id. In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must establish two 

things. First, he must demonstrate that counsel’s performance 

was deficient and fell below an “objective standard of 

reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-

88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by 

counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The relevant 

inquiry under Strickland is not what defense counsel could have 

done, but rather whether his choices were reasonable. See 

Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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 A “doubly deferential” standard of judicial review is 

appropriate in analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

under § 2254. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 202 

(2011). The “question is not whether counsel's actions were 

reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential 

standard.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). 

 The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. That court correctly 

identified the standard and reasonably applied it.1 

 

1

 In the part of its opinion describing the deficient performance 

prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 

California Court of Appeal stated, “Where the record on direct 

appeal ‘does not show the reason for counsel’s challenged actions 

or omissions, the conviction must be affirmed unless there could 

be no satisfactory explanation.’” Tran at 8 (quoting People v. 

Anderson, 25 Cal. 4th 543, 569 (2001), overruled on other grounds 

in People v. Berryman, 6 Cal. 4th 1048, 1081 n.10 (1993)). This 

statement was not a modification of the Strickland standard. The 

statement instead reflects the limitations of California 

appellate review and applies when an ineffective assistance claim 

is made on direct appeal rather than in a habeas petition. That 

it is an appellate review standard can be discerned from 

Anderson’s citation to People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 426 

(1979), overruled on other grounds in Berryman, 6 Cal. 4th 1048, 

in support of the proposition. Pope explained that, where the 

record on direct appeal sheds no light on the reason for 

counsel’s conduct, “unless counsel was asked for an explanation 

and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no 

satisfactory explanation, these cases are affirmed on appeal” to 

avoid a reversal simply due an incomplete record where there may 

be legitimate reasons for counsel’s conduct. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d at 

426. Pope further explained that “[w]here the record does not 

illuminate the basis for the challenged acts or omissions, a 

claim of ineffective assistance is more appropriately made in a 

petition for habeas corpus,” where evidence can be developed as 

to counsel’s reasons. Id. 

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 This was not a case in which trial counsel simply overlooked 

the possibility of a voluntary manslaughter theory. After the 

jury instruction conference, the trial judge memorialized that he 

and counsel “had lengthy discussions regarding any lesserincluded offenses.” RT 906. Although defense counsel had 

requested instructions on involuntary manslaughter, “[b]oth 

parties also agreed that there is no evidentiary basis to warrant 

an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.” Id. 

Although provocation takes center stage in Petitioner’s 

habeas action, it played just a bit part at the trial and no role 

in explaining how the fatal bullet exited the gun. Defense 

counsel reasonably could have chosen not to request a jury 

instruction for which there was weak or an inadequate evidentiary 

basis. It was not an unreasonable application of the Strickland 

standard for the state appellate court to conclude that counsel 

had not performed deficiently in not requesting a jury 

instruction that was unsupported by the evidence. The Supreme 

“Court has never required defense counsel to pursue every claim 

or defense, regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic 

chance for success.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 

 

Here, had Petitioner desired to present evidence outside the 

appellate record to prove ineffective assistance of counsel at 

trial, he could have filed a state court petition for writ of 

habeas corpus asserting that claim and presenting the evidence. 

He did not do so. The California Court of Appeal’s statement 

about direct appeal review of ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims did not render its decision contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of Strickland, which itself recognized that reviewing 

courts “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.” 466 U.S. at 689. 

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(2009). 

Petitioner argues strenuously that the evidence did show 

heat of passion so that counsel should have argued for the 

instruction to be given. Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade 

because the state appellate court determined that the evidence 

was insufficient to warrant an instruction on heat-of-passion 

voluntary manslaughter as a matter of state law. This Court 

could not grant habeas relief for a state law error, even if 

there was one. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011). 

In any event, almost all the testimony Petitioner identifies in 

support of his argument that there was substantial evidence of 

provocation pertains to the subjective component rather than the 

objective component of heat of passion. See Dkt. No. 1 at 22. 

The state appellate court reasonably determined that the limited 

part of the cited testimony that actually pertains to the 

objective prong does not show provocation sufficient to cause an 

ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without 

due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather 

than judgment. Petitioner’s friend Shelton testified that 

Petitioner did not tell him that Petitioner’s wife admitted 

having an affair, RT 380; instead, Petitioner told him his wife 

had denied having an affair and had invited Petitioner to “come 

down and see” if Petitioner did not believe her. RT 380-81. 

Petitioner’s own testimony does not show provocation by his wife, 

and instead suggests efforts to avoid provoking him: days before 

the shooting, his wife told him that Son was just a friend, RT 

750; in a phone call on the day of the killing, his wife told him 

that he could come to the restaurant to talk to Son, RT 763; and, 

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just before Petitioner shot her, his wife said she did not want 

to talk about things, RT 773. Petitioner’s testimony also does 

not show any provocation by Son. Petitioner never talked to Son 

and did not know anything about him. RT 762, 765-66. 

The California Court of Appeal’s separate determination that 

the deficient performance prong had not been established because 

there was a strategic reason to forego the jury instruction also 

was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. Foregoing 

pursuit of a theory that was inconsistent with Petitioner’s 

testimony was a reasonable strategy. Had a heat-of-passion 

theory been pursued, counsel would have been in the position of 

urging that the shooting was an accident but, if not an accident, 

then the victim provoked it. Making such an argument would have 

made both theories -- the shooting was an accident and the victim 

provoked Petitioner’s rash conduct -- less believable to the 

jury. And, although provocation and accident were not mutually 

exclusive, the more the defense emphasized that Petitioner was 

provoked to act rashly, the less likely it was that the jury 

would have believed that a subsequent rash act was an accident. 

Arguing that Petitioner had acted due to provocation also had the 

potential to make the jury think Petitioner was blaming the 

victim, which easily could have alienated the jury in light of 

the evidence that she denied having an affair and that he shot 

her in the face at very close range. See RT 678 (gun was fired 

from a distance of six inches); RT 712-14 (bullet entered at 

corner of her mouth and lodged at the back of her brain). 

Counsel already had a difficult task of dealing with his client’s 

significant credibility problems caused by Petitioner having 

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denied being the shooter when he spoke to the 911 operator as 

well as when he first spoke to police. It would have been 

reasonable for counsel to devote his efforts to convincing the 

jury that Petitioner was truthful at trial when he said the 

shooting was an accident, and forego a heat-of-passion theory for 

which there was so little evidentiary support. See Knowles, 556 

U.S. at 122, 124 (abandoning a defense that has “almost no chance 

of success” is reasonable, even if there is “nothing to lose” by 

preserving the defense). 

Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable probability of a 

different outcome if counsel had requested a jury instruction on 

the lesser included offense of heat-of-passion voluntary 

manslaughter. The evidence that, days earlier, his wife had a 

three-hour telephone conversation with a man (who she said was 

just a friend), and her statement that she did not want to talk 

about Petitioner’s accusations that she was having an affair 

(when he raised them for the third time as she arrived home from 

work after midnight) did not provide evidence substantial enough 

to merit consideration of heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter 

by the jury. Counsel’s failure to request the instruction did 

not result in any prejudice because Petitioner was not entitled 

to the instruction as a matter of state law. Moreover, even if 

counsel had requested the instruction and even if the court had 

instructed the jury on heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter, 

there is no reasonable probability that it would have altered the 

outcome of the proceedings in light of the weakness of the 

evidence of heat of passion. 

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 Petitioner argues that the trial court recognized that there 

was enough evidence of provocation to warrant an instruction, as 

shown by the fact that the trial court instructed on provocation 

as it relates to first and second degree murder. See Dkt. No. 3 

at 24. Petitioner confuses concepts. The instruction given on 

provocation as it relates to first and second degree murder, 

CALCRIM 522, is not identical to the provocation required for 

heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter. Unlike the heat-ofpassion provocation, CALCRIM 522 “does not reasonably imply that 

there is an additional requirement that the provocation must also 

be enough to cause a reasonable person to act rashly.” Tran at 

16. Petitioner acknowledges that they are two different kinds of 

provocation elsewhere in his brief. See Dkt. No. 3 at 27 

(“[t]here are, of course, two distinct legal definitions of 

provocation under California law”); id. (the provocation that 

reduces first degree to second degree murder “contains only a 

subjective component”). 

Taking a “‘highly deferential’ look at counsel’s 

performance” though § 2254(d)’s “‘deferential lens,’” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 190 (citations omitted), it cannot be 

said that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of 

Petitioner’s claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application 

of Strickland. The California Court of Appeal’s analysis 

presents a “reasonable argument that counsel satisfied 

Strickland’s deferential standard,” and that is sufficient to bar 

relief under § 2254(d). See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. at 

105. Petitioner is not entitled to the writ on this claim. 

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II. Instructional Error Claim: Failure to Define Provocation 

At Petitioner’s trial, the jury was instructed on first and 

second degree murder, as well as involuntary manslaughter. The 

court also instructed the jury that “[p]rovocation may reduce a 

murder from first degree to second degree. The weight and 

significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to decide. 

[¶] If you conclude that the defendant committed murder, but was 

provoked, consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime 

was first or second degree murder.” CT 806 (see CALCRIM No. 

522.) 

Petitioner contends that the trial court’s failure to 

further define the term “provocation” violated his rights to due 

process and to present a defense. Petitioner asserts that a 

definitional instruction was necessary to inform the jury that 

the defendant need only have been subjectively provoked -- even 

if a reasonable person would not have been provoked -- for a 

killing to be reduced from first to second degree murder. He 

urges that, without a definition of provocation, his “jury never 

knew that provocation could reduce a homicide to second degree 

murder even if not objectively sufficient to provoke a reasonable 

person.” Dkt. No. 3 at 28. 

 A. State Court Decision 

The California Court of Appeal rejected the claim of 

instructional error. The California Supreme Court had previously 

determined that, “as used in the instruction concerning the 

reduction of murder from first to second degree, provocation bore 

its ‘common meaning’ and ‘required no further explanation in the 

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absence of a specific request.” Tran at 16 (quoting People v. 

Cole, 33 Cal. 4th 1158, 1217-18 (Cal. 2004)). Following that 

binding precedent, the state appellate court concluded that, as a 

matter of state law, the instruction was sufficient and the term 

“provocation” needed no further definition. Tran at 16. 

The court continued: 

Moreover, when we analyze a claim that an instruction 

was inadequate, we focus on the entire charge to the 

jury in light of the evidence and the arguments of 

counsel and determine whether there is a “reasonable 

likelihood” that the jury misunderstood the challenged 

instruction in the manner suggested by the defendant. 

(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72; Boyde v. 

California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 378–381; People v. Holt 

(1997) 15 Cal. 4th 619, 677; People v. Clair (1992) 2 

Cal. 4th 629, 663; People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal. 

App. 4th 266, 276.) 

CALCRIM No. 522 invites the jury to decide whether the 

defendant was provoked and allows the jury to consider 

the fact that the defendant was provoked in determining 

the degree of murder. The instruction does not 

reasonably imply that there is an additional 

requirement that the provocation must also be enough to 

cause a reasonable person to act rashly. 

Moreover, in closing arguments, neither party suggested 

such a requirement. Indeed, as the Attorney General 

accurately observes, provocation was not a particularly 

critical issue for the prosecution or the defense. Both 

parties noted that defendant was angry and jealous. 

However, the prosecutor argued that those emotions 

motivated defendant to plan the murder and lie in wait 

for his victim. Defendant’s mental state was also the 

key to his defense. However, contrary to defendant’s 

claim, he did not assert a “provocation defense” or 

argue that provocation prevented him from forming the 

mental state needed for murder or reduced the murder to 

second degree murder. The defense was that there was no 

murder because he did not harbor express malice, intend 

to kill, or consciously disregard a dangerous risk. 

Rather, he thought a gun was safe once the clip is 

removed; he believed the gun was unloaded because he 

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had taken the clip out; he did not know that there was 

a bullet in the chamber; he did not intend to shoot Vo 

or even pull the trigger; and the gun fired 

accidentally as they struggled for it. This is not a 

provocation defense; it is mistake of fact and 

accident. 

Under the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely 

that jurors would (or did) misinterpret CALCRIM No. 522 

and erroneously think that to reduce murder from first 

to second degree, provocation had to be objectively 

reasonable. 

Tran at 16-17. 

 B. Analysis of Federal Habeas Claim 

To obtain federal habeas relief for an error in the jury 

instructions, a petitioner must show that the error “so infected 

the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 

process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). “‘A 

single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial 

isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall 

charge.’” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004)(quoting 

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 378 (1990)). “Even if there 

is some ‘ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency’ in the 

instruction, such an error does not necessarily constitute a due 

process violation.” Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190 

(2009) (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004)). 

Where an ambiguous or potentially defective instruction is at 

issue, the court must inquire whether there is a “reasonable 

likelihood” that the jury has applied the challenged instruction 

in a way that violates the Constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 

& n.4; Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. 

Due process includes a requirement that a defendant “be 

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afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); cf. Holmes v. 

South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (whether grounded in the 

Sixth Amendment right of compulsory process or the constitutional 

guarantee of due process, “the Constitution guarantees criminal 

defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 

defense’”). The right to present a defense includes adequate 

instructions on the defense theory of the case. See Conde v. 

Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2000). Petitioner does not 

suggest that his right to present a defense claim is any more 

expansive than a general due process claim. The alleged 

violation of his right to present a defense argument is therefore 

considered as part of the due process analysis. 

If a constitutional error is found in the jury instructions, 

the federal habeas court also must determine whether that error 

was harmless by looking at the actual impact of the error. 

Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1998). The habeas 

court must apply the harmless error test set forth in Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), and determine whether the error 

had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.’” Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 

57, 58 (2008) (per curiam) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). 

 The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s 

claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law. Petitioner has failed to show a 

reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to 

mean that the jury had to find that the provocation was such as 

would cause an objectively reasonable person to act rashly before 

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considering whether that provocation should reduce the murder 

from first degree to second degree. He suggests that it is 

possible that the jury understood the instruction to require 

provocation that was objectively reasonable, but “it is not 

enough that there is some ‘slight possibility’ that the jury 

misapplied the instruction.” Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. at 

191 (quoting Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 236 (2000)). The 

California Court of Appeal explained that, as a matter of state 

law, there was no need to further define the provocation that 

could reduce murder from first to second degree because 

“provocation bore its ‘common meaning.’” Tran at 16. The Ninth 

Circuit has similarly held that there is no duty to define terms 

that are concepts “within the jury’s ordinary experience.” 

United States v. Tirouda, 394 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2005); see, 

e.g., id. at 689 (failure to define “accomplice” was not plain 

error); United States v. Dixon, 201 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 

2000) (district court did not err in failing to define 

“commercial advantage” and “private financial gain” because the 

terms are within the comprehension of the average juror); United 

States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 210 (9th Cir. 1990) (district 

court did not err in failing to define “violence” because it is a 

concept within the ordinary experience of a jury); Walker v. 

Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1987) (no habeas relief for 

failure to define “recklessness”; under Alaska law, criminal 

recklessness “relates essentially to the common-sense definition 

of recklessness, which the average juror could understand and 

apply without an instruction”). 

Petitioner also does not identify any other jury instruction 

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that would have led the jury to believe that there had to be 

provocation that would make a reasonable person act rashly before 

the jury could consider whether the provocation could reduce the 

murder from first degree to second degree. The instructions 

given covered first and second degree murder. The jury was 

instructed with a modified version of CALCRIM 520, which stated 

the elements of murder and explained malice aforethought. CT 

804-05. The jury also was instructed with a modified version of 

CALCRIM 521, which instructed the jury to decide whether it was 

first or second degree murder. CT 805-06. CALCRIM 521, as 

modified, described the requirements for the prosecutor’s two 

theories of first degree murder, i.e., premeditated murder and 

murder committed by lying in wait; after describing those 

requirements for first degree murder, the instruction informed 

the jury that “[a]ll other murders are of the second degree. [¶] 

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser 

crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the 

defendant not guilty of first degree murder.” CT 806. Nothing 

in those instructions suggested that provocation had to be 

sufficient to provoke a reasonable person before it could reduce 

the degree of a murder. 

Moreover, the objective versus subjective nature of 

provocation was not at issue in this case. Neither the 

prosecutor nor defense counsel argued or suggested that the 

provocation necessary to reduce murder from first degree to 

second degree had to be such as to make a reasonable person feel 

provoked. 

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Provocation was not central to the defense. Petitioner 

points out that defense counsel argued in closing that “‘the 

issue [in this case is] what was in Tim’s mind at the time that 

he shot [Vo] Tram and that’s pretty much the only issue in this 

case.’” Dkt. No 3 at 26 (first alteration in original) (quoting 

RT 985). This misunderstands the thrust of defense counsel’s 

argument. On the cited page of the transcript, defense counsel 

was making the point that the shooting was accidental due to 

Petitioner’s mistaken belief that the gun was not loaded: 

Now the key instruction in this particular case is 

when a person commits an unlawful killing but did not 

intend to kill and does not act with conscious 

disregard for human life, then the crime is 

involuntary manslaughter. It’s still taking the life 

of another. It’s still doing an act that can’t be 

undone. But that’s what involuntary manslaughter is. 

And the issue that you have to deal with was what was 

in Tim’s mind at the time that he shot [Vo] Tram and 

that’s pretty much the only issue in this case. 

Now here’s the instruction you are going to be given. 

It’s instruction 3406. It’s in your packet. And it 

pretty much summarizes the essence of this case. If 

the defendant believed that the gun was unloaded, he 

did not have the specific intent or mental state 

required for murder of the first degree or murder of 

the second degree. 

And more aptly put, the only issue that is before you, 

and remember who has the burden of proof, has the 

prosecutor proved beyond any reasonable doubt that Tim 

knew the gun was loaded. 

RT 985 (emphasis added). Defense counsel’s closing argument 

repeatedly referred to the accidental nature of the shooting. 

Counsel emphasized that Petitioner did not know about guns in 

general (RT 989, 1003, 1007); Petitioner removed the clip to make 

the gun safe (RT 998, 1005, 1008, 1016); Petitioner did not think 

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the gun was loaded when he confronted Vo (RT 986, 989-90, 1014); 

and Petitioner did not intend to kill Vo (RT 986). Defense 

counsel did not argue that Petitioner shot his wife because he, 

subjectively, felt provoked to act rashly. And defense counsel 

did not make any effort to distinguish between subjective and 

objective provocation, because provocation was not the theory of 

the defense. 

 The prosecutor referred to provocation in his closing 

argument, but did so to support his theory that Petitioner’s 

emotional state motivated him to plan the murder and lie in wait 

for his victim. The prosecutor did not distinguish between 

objective and subjective provocation. 

 The failure to define a term with a common meaning that was 

not important to the defense theory of the case nor the 

prosecution’s theory of the case did not “so infect[] the entire 

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. 

Having found no error, the Court need not consider whether 

there was harmless error. Petitioner is not entitled to the writ 

on this claim because the state court’s rejection of his claim 

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established law as set forth by the United States Supreme Court. 

III. Instructional Error Claim: Failure to Elaborate on 

Intoxication 

 At trial, the jury was instructed: “You may consider 

evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only 

in a limited way. [¶] You may consider that evidence only in 

deciding whether the defendant acted with an intent to kill or 

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the defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation.” CT 807 

(CALCRIM No. 625).2 

 Petitioner contends that his right to due process was 

violated because the trial court failed to further instruct the 

jury “that it could also consider the intoxication evidence in 

determining the honesty of defendant’s provocation.” Dkt. No. 3 

at 30. According to Petitioner, without further instruction, 

“the jurors received no guidance as to the effect defendant’s 

intoxication had on the assessment of whether he was actually 

provoked.” Id. at 33. 

A. State Court Decision 

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim 

that the trial court erred in failing to instruct further on 

intoxication as it related to provocation. 

With regard to provocation for a heat-of-passion voluntary 

manslaughter theory, there was insufficient evidence of 

provocation to support instructions on the voluntary manslaughter 

theory; it followed, therefore, that the trial court “did not err 

in failing to instruct jurors sua sponte on voluntary 

intoxication as it relates to the subjective component of a heatof-passion theory.” Tran at 18. 

With regard to the provocation that may reduce murder from 

first to second degree, the further instruction would have been 

 

2

 The instruction is based on California Penal Code section 

29.4(b), which provides: “Evidence of voluntary intoxication is 

admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant 

actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with 

murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or 

harbored express malice aforethought.” 

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“a form of pinpoint instruction that the trial court is not 

required to give in the absence of a request.” Id. 

The California Court of Appeal held, 

Moreover, the trial court’s instructions adequately 

covered the issue. The court instructed jurors that to 

convict defendant of murder, the prosecution had to 

prove that defendant caused the death of another 

person and acted with malice—i.e., either an intent to 

kill or conscious disregard for actions that were 

dangerous to human life. (See CALCRIM No. 520.) The 

court instructed jurors that if they found that 

defendant committed murder, they had to decide whether 

it was first or second degree murder. (See CALCRIM No. 

521.) Concerning first degree, the court instructed 

that the prosecution had to prove that the murder was 

committed willfully, deliberately, and with 

premeditation; or the murder was committed by lying in 

wait. (See ibid.) In particular, the court explained, 

“The defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill. 

The defendant acted deliberately if he carefully 

weighed the considerations for and against his choice, 

and knowing the consequences decided to kill. The 

defendant acted with premeditation if he decided to 

kill before committing the act that caused death.” 

(See ibid.) On the other hand, “[a] decision to kill 

rashly, impulsively or without careful consideration 

is not deliberate and premeditated.” (See ibid.) 

Concerning lying in wait, the court explained that 

jurors must find that defendant concealed his purpose, 

waited and watched for an opportunity to act, and 

intended to and did make a surprise attack on the 

person killed. Moreover, the duration of the lying in 

wait “must show a state of mind equivalent to 

deliberation or premeditation.” (See ibid.) 

As noted[,] that court instructed jurors that 

provocation may reduce a murder from first to second 

degree and said they could consider provocation in 

determining whether the killing was first or second 

degree. (See CALCRIM No. 522.) The court also 

instructed that the jury could consider evidence of 

voluntary intoxication in determining whether 

defendant acted with an intent to kill, deliberation, 

and premeditation. (See CALCRIM No. 625.) 

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When read and considered together, these instructions 

permitted jurors to consider both voluntary 

intoxication and provocation at the same time in 

determining whether defendant acted with an intent to 

kill, deliberation, and premeditation and thus whether 

the murder was first or second degree. Moreover, 

nothing in the instructions prohibited the jurors from 

considering the connection between voluntary 

intoxication and provocation in determining whether he 

had the requisite mental state for first degree 

premeditated murder. 

Tran at 18-20. 

The California Court of Appeal separately determined that 

the instructional error claim had been forfeited due to counsel’s 

failure to request the further instruction in the trial court. 

Id. at 20. The California Court of Appeal also rejected the 

argument that the forfeiture should be excused due to counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. The record did not disclose why counsel did not 

request the instruction, but counsel “could have concluded that 

an additional instruction was unnecessary” because the other 

instructions “adequately covered the issue.” Id. “This is 

especially so because defendant’s own testimony does not suggest 

that when Vo came home after work, he was still under the 

influence of drugs and alcohol. Indeed, Shelton testified that 

when defendant finally left his house, he did not seem to be 

under the influence.” Id. 

B. Analysis of Federal Habeas Claim 

 As mentioned in Section II, above, to obtain habeas relief 

on the alleged instructional error, Petitioner must show that the 

error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violates due process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. “An 

omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be 

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prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 

431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). 

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s 

instructional error claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. 

Petitioner fails to show that the absence of an instruction that 

intoxication could be considered in deciding whether he actually 

had been provoked “so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. at 72. He does not dispute the state appellate court’s 

determination that the overall charge to the jury “adequately 

covered the issue,” Tran at 20, when one considered the combined 

effect of the general instructions on murder (i.e., CALCRIM Nos. 

520 and 521), the instruction that provocation could reduce 

murder from first to second degree (i.e., CALCRIM No. 522), the 

instruction that evidence of voluntary intoxication could be 

considered in determining intent to kill, as well as the 

instruction on deliberation and premeditation (i.e., CALCRIM No. 

625). As the state appellate court explained, these instructions 

enabled the jury to consider both intoxication and provocation at 

the same time in determining Petitioner’s mental state and the 

degree of murder. Tran at 19. 

 Petitioner also argues that counsel was ineffective in 

failing to seek a further instruction on intoxication. His 

ineffective assistance of counsel subclaim fails because he has 

not shown deficient performance, as the California Court of 

Appeal concluded. The evidence of intoxication was limited and 

equivocal. Although there was evidence that Petitioner had 

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consumed drugs and alcohol earlier in the day, he had last 

consumed alcohol and drugs five hours before the shooting. RT 

805-06, 892. Shelton testified that Petitioner did not appear to 

be intoxicated when he left Shelton at about 11:00 p.m. RT 405. 

Petitioner suggested in his testimony that the effect of the 

drugs had “dissolved” when he arrived home about a half hour 

before his wife. See RT 844, 892. Petitioner also testified to 

his actions showing clear thinking at about the time of the 

shooting: he deliberately removed the clip from the gun allegedly 

to make it safer, and he had the presence of mind to dispose of 

the gun and cartridge in a nearby yard after the shooting. RT 

780, 857-58. Not only was the evidence of intoxication weak, 

encouraging the jury to ponder intoxication also might have 

benefited the prosecution rather than the defense. The 

prosecutor argued that Petitioner felt angry, and that feeling 

prompted Petitioner to get the gun and then to kill with 

premeditation or by lying in wait. RT 957, 961. If intoxication 

helped fuel Petitioner’s festering anger, that feeling might have 

made premeditation and lying in wait more likely. See RT 961-62 

(prosecutor arguing that, after smoking crack all day, Petitioner 

went home and “watched and waited” for his wife to come home and 

then made a “surprise attack”). Further, focusing on 

intoxication undermined the defense theory of an accident, as 

Petitioner testified and defense counsel argued that Petitioner 

had taken specific steps so the gun would not fire. See Knowles, 

556 U.S. at 122-23 (abandoning a defense that has “almost no 

chance of success” is reasonable, even if there is “nothing to 

lose” by preserving the defense). Trial counsel reasonably could 

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have concluded that focusing the jury’s attention on Petitioner’s 

intoxication had more potential to harm than to help the defense. 

Such a strategic decision did not amount to deficient 

performance. 

 Petitioner is not entitled to the writ on his claim that his 

right to due process was violated by the failure to further 

instruct the jury on intoxication, nor on his subclaim that 

counsel provided ineffective assistance in not requesting a 

further instruction on intoxication. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the amended petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case in which “reasonable 

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the 

constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

 Petitioner’s application for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis on appeal is DENIED. Dkt. No. 41. The application is 

deficient in that it is not signed by Petitioner, and does not 

contain an affidavit in which Petitioner “claims an entitlement 

to redress” and “states the issues that the party intends to 

present on appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1). This denial is 

without prejudice to Petitioner filing an application in the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to proceed 

in forma pauperis on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5). 

Petitioner sent letters to the Court indicating his belief that 

the filing fee for an appeal in a habeas action is $5.00. He is 

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incorrect. Although the filing fee for a habeas action in the 

district court is $5.00, the filing fee for an appeal in a habeas 

action is $505.00. 

 Petitioner is reminded that, if he wants to appeal the 

denial of his amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, he must 

file a timely notice of appeal. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 27, 2016 

_______________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge 

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