Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02163/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02163-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

13-CV-2163 W (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OBIORA JIDEOFOR,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 13-CV-2163 W (JLB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER 42 

U.S.C. § 406(b) [DOC. 24]

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s counsel Roger D. Drake’s (“Counsel”) 

motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §406(b). Counsel requests an order granting 

him $3,548.25 in fees and costs. 

Section 406(b) provides, in relevant part:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this 

subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may 

determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 

representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits 

to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . .

Id. In evaluating a request for attorney’s fees, courts look at the character of the 

representation and the results achieved. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 790 (2002) 

Case 3:13-cv-02163-W-JLB Document 26 Filed 06/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 2
2

13-CV-2163 W (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(reasoning that courts may consider the “character of the representation and the results 

the representative achieved”); see also Rodriquez v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 746–47 (6th 

Cir. 1989) (reasoning that if an attorney is responsible for delay, then the attorney cannot 

profit from the setback, and that the attorney’s compensation should be proportionate to 

the time expended on the case). 

Here, Counsel was awarded EAJA fees in the amount of $4,000, however, those 

fees were garnished under Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521, 2252–53 (2010) and the 

United States Department of the Treasury’s Offset Program. (See EAJA Award [Doc. 

23]; Drake Dec. [Doc. 24-2], ¶ 3, Ex. B [Doc. 24-4].) On remand, the new attorney who 

represented Plaintiff through administrative proceedings received a favorable decision

and the administration withheld 25% of back benefits in the amount of $9,548.25 to pay 

attorney’s fees. (P&A [Doc. 24-1] 2:1–7.) Plaintiff’s administrative counsel was 

awarded $6,000 in attorney’s fees, leaving $3,548.25 remaining to pay attorney’s fees 

incurred in this case. (Id. 2:7–9.) Counsel’s requested fee of $3,548.25 is 9.3 percent of 

back benefits, well under the 25 percent statutory cap. 

Additionally, the Court has reviewed the amount of time spent on this matter, as 

well as Counsel’s hourly rate. (See Drake Dec., ¶ 10, Ex. C [Doc. 24-5].) The Court 

finds the effective hourly rate is consistent with the market and the work on this matter 

reasonable. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees

[Doc. 24] and AWARDS Counsel attorney’s fees of $3,548.25. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2017

Case 3:13-cv-02163-W-JLB Document 26 Filed 06/09/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 2