Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02884/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02884-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARENCE V. KNIGHT,

Petitioner,

v.

RALPH DIAZ,

Respondent.

Case No.: 18CV2884 AJB (BGS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS PETITIONER’S PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Clarence V. Knight (hereinafter “Petitioner” or “Knight”) is a California 

Prisoner proceeding pro se. Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). (ECF 1.) Pending before the Court is 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition (“Motion”). (ECF 15.) Respondent argues 

the Petition should be dismissed because it is untimely under the applicable one-year 

statute of limitations, procedurally defaulted, and fails to allege a federal constitutional 

question. (Id.) Petitioner has filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 

(“Opposition”) and Respondent a Reply. (ECF 22, 23.) 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the Hon. Anthony J. 

Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. The Court has considered 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner’s Opposition, the Petition, and all exhibits 

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and lodgments submitted by Petitioner and Respondent. For the reasons set forth below, 

this Court recommends Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND1

A. Conviction and Sentence

A jury found Petitioner guilty of robbery and first-degree murder in 1979. He was 

sentenced to 12-years for the robbery conviction and a consecutive 25 years-to-life for 

the first-degree murder conviction. 

B. Parole Board’s January 9, 2015 Decision

Petitioner received a Subsequent Parole Consideration Hearing on January 9, 2015.

(Lodgment 3.) Petitioner did not appear for the Hearing.2 (Id. at 5-7, 17.3) The Board 

recounted his background, the circumstances of his crimes, his rules violations in 

custody, work history, and plans if released. (Id. at 8-19.) After hearing from 

Petitioner’s counsel, the Board found Petitioner unsuitable for parole because he posed a 

current risk of danger if released.

4

 (Id. at 20-27.)

The Board calculated his base term under the matrix at 29 years.5 (Id. at 26.) The 

Board then considered how long he should remain incarcerated before another parole 

hearing was held and determined five years was appropriate. (Id. at 26-27.) 

 

1 The procedural history is presented chronologically, although where relevant, the Court 

notes Respondent’s categories (first and second rounds of petitions) to clarify which 

petitions are being summarized. 

2 Respondent’s Motion asserts that Petitioner appeared before the Board for the Hearing.

However, the transcript reflects that Petitioner was not personally present for the Hearing, 

although his counsel was present. (Lodgment 3 at 5-7, 17.) Petitioner refused to 

participate and his counsel’s request for postponement was denied for lack of good cause. 

(Id.) 

3 The Court cites each lodgment’s pagination rather than the CM/ECF pagination unless 

otherwise noted because the lodgments submitted to the Court by Respondent lack the 

CM/ECF pagination.

4 That determination is not at issue in this Petition.

5 As discussed more below, (see infra I.E) Board regulations at the time set out a matrix 

to use in determining a base term for life prisoners found suitable for parole. Cal. Code 

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C. Petitioner’s State Habeas Petitions

1. August 25, 2015 Petition to the Superior Court6

The first state habeas petition filed by Petitioner after the January 9, 2015 Board 

decision was filed in Sacramento County Superior Court on August 25, 2015. (Lodgment 

4.) It appears it was then transferred to San Diego Superior Court where a ruling was 

issued on December 17, 2015. (Lodgment 5.) 

In this petition, Petitioner argues that the 29-year base term the Board calculated

using the matrix was causing him to serve an excessive sentence. (Lodgment 4 at ii.) 

The crux of his argument seems to be that a matrix calculation that can result in a 29-year 

base term for a conviction for which he received 25-to-life cannot be rational and is 

excessive. (Id. at iii.) He argues the 29-year base term resulted in him serving more than

the total amount of time he believes he was sentenced to. (Id. at i-ii, iv (“I’ve served the 

entire sentence imposed by the sentencing court” and “For my term of imprisonment has 

expired.”) After indicating he began serving his life sentence September 3, 1987, 

Petitioner asserts that his “term expired 4/2012 at 33 years.” (Id. at i.) He argues he

 

Regs., tit. 15, § 2403. Although Petitioner was not found suitable for parole, at the time 

of Petitioner’s January 9, 2015 hearing, the Board was also calculating base terms for 

prisoners even when they were found not suitable for parole. See In re Butler, 4 Cal. 5th 

728, 736 (2018) (discussing December 2013 settlement that “required the Board to 

calculate an inmate’s base and adjusted base terms at the inmate’s initial parole hearing 

(or, for inmates who already had their initial hearing, at the inmate’s next scheduled 

parole hearing).”). 

6 Respondent refers to this petition as having been constructively filed on September 27, 

2015, however, the Petition is file stamped August 25, 2015 and November 5, 2015. The 

Court assumes the August 25, 2015 stamp is from the Sacramento Superior Court and the 

November 5, 2015 stamp was applied when the petition was transferred to the San Diego 

Superior Court . The San Diego Superior Court’s decision denying the petition 

references the petition as having been filed on November 5, 2015. (Lodgment 5 at 2.) It 

appears the September 27, 2015 date Respondent references is from a proof of service to 

a later submission of a page that was missing from the original submission. (See ECF 16-

4 at CM/ECF page 118 (August 25, 2015 proof of service for petition) and ECF 16-4 at 

CM/ECF page 125 (September 27, 2015 proof of service for 1-page notice of errata). 

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should have been released at 33 years and has already served more than 37 years and,

with the five years until his next parole hearing, he would not be considered for release 

again until he served 42 years. (Id. at i, iv.) Petitioner attaches the transcript of the 

Subsequent Parole Board Hearing, including the Board decision, his sentencing chart 

from 1979, the transcript of his 1979 sentencing hearing, and a September 2, 1975 

Chairman’s Directive No. 75/30.

The Superior Court denied the petition on December 17, 2015. (Lodgment 5.) The 

court found the Board’s decision to deny parole was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or 

unsupported by facts. (Id. at 4.) As to Petitioner’s argument regarding the 29-year base 

term, the court found his incarceration beyond the 29-year base term was not excessive or 

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment given he was convicted of 

first-degree murder for the shooting of a woman during a robbery. (Id. at 4-6.) The court 

also explained that Petitioner’s assertion the sentence was excessive “ignores the fact that 

the maximum term he could serve based on the sentence imposed by the court is a life 

term.” (Id. at 6.) 

2. January 4, 2016 Petition to the Court of Appeal

Petitioner filed a petition with the Fourth District Court of Appeal on January 4, 

2016. (Lodgment 6 [ECF 16-6].) He asserts largely the same arguments he raised in his

petition to the Superior Court, including that his term expired in April 2012 at 33 years, 

that the new matrix is irrational because its application to him results in him serving at 

least 42 years, and that he has served the statutory maximum sentence. (ECF 16-6 at 19-

20, 22, 27-31.

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) Again, he appears to think that his indeterminate sentence of 25 yearsto-life was somehow capped at 25 years and the Board’s determination of a 29-year base 

term that resulted in him serving more than 25 years for the first-degree murder 

conviction was excessive. (Id. at 32 (arguing the Determinate Sentencing Law “put[] a 

 

7 The Court references the CM/ECF pagination for Lodgment 6 [ECF 16-6].

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lid on the 25-to-life”), 35, 38 (“Determinate Sentencing Act enacted . . . to dispel 

indeterminate sentences, fix terms for parole/release . . .”).) Petitioner includes the same 

set of attachments included with his petition to the Superior Court. 

The Court of Appeal denied this petition on January 14, 2016. (Lodgment 7.) The 

court found Petitioner’s continued incarceration was not arbitrary or unreasonable given 

he was convicted of first-degree murder for fatally shooting the victim during the course 

of a drug related robbery. (Id. at 2-3.) The court then directly addresses Petitioner’s 

argument regarding the Determinate Sentencing Law, explaining that his reliance on it 

was misplaced because he received an indeterminate sentence that does not have a fixed 

term or duration. (Id. at 3 (emphasis added).) The court goes on to explain that his 

maximum term was life and the Board denying parole or setting his base term at 29 years 

is not imposing a new or additional punishment. (Id.) Rather, the Board was “simply 

declin[ing] to exercise its ameliorative power to set a lesser term” than the life term 

imposed. (Id.)

3. February 11, 2016 Petition to California Supreme Court

Petitioner filed a petition with the California Supreme Court on February 11, 2016. 

(Lodgment 8 [ECF 16-8].) He asserts the same arguments he raised in his prior petitions 

to the Superior Court and Court of Appeal, including that the new matrix is irrational 

because its application to him results in him serving at least 42 years, that his 

indeterminate sentence was fixed at 25 years, and the 29-year base term calculated on the 

matrix results in him serving an excessive sentence. (Id. at 8, 12, 16-18, 21-22, 24-25, 

32-37.8) In addition to the same attachments he submitted with his Superior Court and 

Court of Appeal petitions, Petitioner also includes the Superior Court and Court of 

Appeal decisions. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on April 

27, 2016. 

 

8 The Court references the CM/ECF pagination for Lodgment 8 [ECF 16-8].

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4. April 22, 2018 Petition to Superior Court

Petitioner’s next petition is not filed until April 22, 20189and he files it with the 

San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment 10 [ECF 16-10].) Respondent refers to this 

petition as the first in Petitioner’s second round of petitions. 

In this petition, he states that he is “challeng[ing] the constitutionality of exceeding 

the fixed base term and adjusted base term of life serving Petitioner which continues 

confinement in violation of the” 14th Amendment and the constitutionality of the “limits 

of the [B]oard’s purview beyond the fixing of the base and adjusted base terms of 

indeterminate term serving prisoners.” (Id. at 4, 9.

10) He explains that his base term was 

fixed at 29 years and that base term has expired. (Id.) Although not entirely clear, it 

appears he is again arguing that he was entitled to a fixed sentence under the Determinate 

Sentencing Law and that sentence was the maximum period of time that was 

constitutionally proportionate to his crime. (Id. at 5-6.) However, he does assert at one 

point that he “is not challenging how the base term was fixed, although the rationale of its 

fixing by the new matrix does not reflect what the statute provides.” (Id. at 7.) He seems 

to again be arguing that a fixed term for his crime is required under the Determinate 

Sentencing Law and that the Board is exceeding its jurisdiction by keeping him in 

custody beyond that fixed term. (Id. at 6-7.) He again attaches as an exhibit, and he 

references in the petition, the September 2, 1975 Chairman’s Directive No. 75/30 he 

attached to his prior petitions. (Id. at 15-27.)]

The Superior Court denied the petition on May 30, 2018. (Lodgment 11.) The 

court found these were the same claims raised in his prior petitions and denied it on that

basis. (Id. at 1-2.) The court explains that it is the policy of the court to deny new habeas 

 

9 The Superior Court’s file stamp on this petition lacks any date, but the petition and 

proof of service are both dated April 22, 2018. (Lodgment 10.) 

10 The Court references the CM/ECF pagination for Lodgment 10 [ECF 16-10].

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applications based on the same grounds absent a change in the law or facts warranting 

reconsideration. (Id. at 2.) 

5. June 17, 2018 Petition to the Court of Appeal

Petitioner’s June 17, 2018 petition to the Court of Appeal is largely a duplication 

of his April 22, 2018 petition to the Superior Court. (Lodgment 12.) It varies only in that

it includes a document titled Judicial Notice followed by a copy of the Superior Court’s 

May 30, 2018 denial. Petitioner states in the Judicial Notice document that his 

“challenge to the constitutionality of exceeding a fixed base term established by the 

Board has not been alleged nor heard on the merits by this Petitioner,” presumably to 

address the Superior Court’s determination that he previously raised this challenge. (ECF 

16-12 at 3.

11) Like his Superior Court petition, he argues the Board is exceeding its 

jurisdiction or authority in violation of Due Process by holding him beyond the 29-year 

base term set by the Board. (ECF 16-12 at 8-15.) However, like the Superior Court 

petition, he repeats arguments made in all his earlier petitions, arguing he was entitled to 

a fixed sentence that could not be “refixed upwards” by the Board under the Determinant 

Sentencing Law. (ECF 16-12 at 10.) Again, like the Superior Court petition, he seems to 

attempt to disavow any challenge to the fixing of the 29-year base term, presumably to 

distinguish this petition from his prior petitions on this issue, briefly stating that he “is not 

challenging how the base term was fixed,” but he goes on to state, “the rationale of its 

fixing by the new matrix does not reflect what the statute provides.” (ECF 16-12 at 11.) 

The Court of Appeal denied this petition on June 27, 2018. (Lodgment 13.) The 

court noted Petitioner’s prior habeas filings with the Court of Appeal, the January 4, 2016 

petition (Lodgment 6, see supra I.C.2) and another petition.12 As relevant to this case, 

 

11 The Court references the CM/ECF pagination for Lodgment 12. 

12 The other petition referenced by the Court of Appeal (Case No. D070041), was a 

challenge to the Board’s determination that Petitioner was not suitable for parole based 

on dangerousness. Petitioner specifically indicates in his Petition before this Court that 

the present Petition has nothing to do with that petition challenging the denial of parole. 

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the court explained that his January 4, 2016 petition challenged his confinement for a 

period longer than the 29-year based term calculated by the Board as violating federal 

and state due process rights. (Id. at 1.) The court explicitly rejected his claim that his 

challenge to exceeding the fixed base term had not been alleged or heard before and 

found the petition was a repetitious “abuse of the writ” in denying it. (Id. at 2.) The 

court cites In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 769 (1993), In re Martin, 44 Cal. 3d 1, 27 n.3 

(1987) and In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 428, 496-97 (2012). 

6. July 3, 2018 Petition to the California Supreme Court

The July 3, 2018 petition filed with California Supreme Court duplicates the April 

22, 2018 petition to the Superior Court and June 17, 2018 petition to the Court of Appeal. 

(Lodgment 14.) It varies only in that the exhibits attached to it include the state court 

decisions issued on his April 22, 2018 and June 17, 2018 petitions, (ECF 16-14 at 37-38, 

41-50, 76-77, and 80-9113), and declarations14 from Petitioner. (ECF 16-14 at 39-40, 78-

79.) In the declaration, he asserts that the fixing of the base term and exceeding that base 

term are wholly separate matters and argues that he has never challenged exceeding the 

base term. (ECF 16-14 at 39-40 and 78-79.) 

The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on November 14, 

2018 without citation to any cases. (Lodgment 15.) 

D. Federal Petition

The Petition currently before the Court was filed on December 20, 2018. (ECF 1.) 

Although discussed more fully below in analyzing the issues raised in the Motion to 

Dismiss, in short, Petitioner challenges “exceeding the base term and continued 

 

(Petition at 5.) Additionally, neither Respondent nor Petitioner has relied on that petition 

here with regard to the statute of limitations and, as noted below, (see infra II.A.3), the 

period this petition was pending before the Court of Appeal would have no effect on the 

calculation of the statute of limitations because it had already expired. 

13 The Court references the CM/ECF pagination for Lodgment 14. 

14 Two copies of the same undated declaration are attached.

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retention” beyond the 29-year base term set by the Board. (Id. at 4-21.) He appears to 

argue he was entitled to release at the conclusion of his 29-year base term because

indeterminate sentences are prohibited under the Determinate Sentencing Law. (Id. at 4-

6, 10-11, 16-23.) In essence, he argues that at some point his indeterminate 25-to-life 

sentence for first-degree murder became a determinate sentence of either 25 years or 29-

years and he has been in custody more than 29 years. (Id.) 

Respondent characterized the Petition has containing two challenges, one based on 

Petitioner being in custody more than the base term and one challenging the calculation 

of Petitioner’s base term to be 29 years.15 This is understandable because, although the 

Petition disavows any claim based on the calculation it also states the calculation was 

wrong. However, as explained below, Petitioner’s Opposition makes clear he is not 

claiming in this Petition that his base term calculation was wrong, only that he is entitled 

to a determinate sentence, at the latest, the 29-year base term. (Opp’n at 2, 4-6, 8.)

E. Base Terms

As summarized above, Petitioner’s base term was set at 29 years at his Hearing

even though he was found not suitable for parole. “[T]he base term is established ‘solely 

on the gravity of the base offense, taking into account all of the circumstances of that 

crime.’” Pearson v. Muntz, 639 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Cal. Code Reg. 

tit. 15 § 2282(a)). At the time of Petitioner’s Hearing,16 the Board used a matrix in the 

regulations to calculate a prisoner’s base term. See In re Butler, 4 Cal. 5th 728, 734-736, 

734 (2018) (citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2403(a)); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 

 

15 Mot. at 5-7 (addressing untimeliness of challenge based on calculation of 29-year base 

term), 8-9 (addressing lack of federal habeas jurisdiction for challenge base on 

calculation of 29-year base term under California law), 7-8 (addressing untimeliness of 

challenge based on being held beyond base term) and 9-10 (addressing procedural default 

of challenged based on being held beyond the base term).

16 “[B]ase terms no longer play a defined role in determining the release day for any 

inmate sentenced to an indeterminate sentence.” In re Butler, 4 Cal. 5th at 738, 742 

(2018). 

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2403(b). For those convicted of murder, like Petitioner, the matrix provided causes of 

death on one axis and descriptions of the relationship to the victim on the other with the 

base term based on the intersection of the two. Id; see also § 2403(b). The intersection 

then provided an upper, middle, and lower term with the middle as the default, upper for 

aggravating circumstances and lower for mitigating circumstances. Id. at 734-35. The 

Hearing transcript reflects the Board looked to the first-degree murder matrix with no 

prior relationship with the victim and no aggravation or mitigation in calculating a base 

term of 29 years. (Lodgment 3 at 26.) 

At the time of Petitioner’s January 9, 2015 hearing, California regulations only 

required the Board to determine a base term for a prisoner that had been found suitable

for parole, but under a December 2013 settlement agreement, the Board was calculating 

base terms even for inmates, like Petitioner, that had not been found suitable for parole. 

In re Butler, 4 Cal. 5th 728, 734-736, 742 (2018) (citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 

2403(a)). An inmate was still not entitled to release at the conclusion of the base term 

unless the inmate had already been found suitable for parole. “[B]ase term calculations 

were designed to set forth an inmate’s minimum sentence.” Id. at 746. For those, like 

Petitioner, that had not been found suitable for parole, the base term “had the salutary 

rehabilitative effect of informing each inmate of his or her earliest possible release date, if 

found suitable for parole.” Id. at 742 (emphasis added). Inmates remained ineligible for 

release until found suitable for parole. Id. at 745 (“The Board may not . . . release an 

inmate until the individual no longer poses a threat to ‘public safety’ regardless of any 

base term calculation.”); see also Pearson, 639 F.3d at 1188 n. 3. 

II. DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss the Petition arguing it is untimely, procedurally 

defaulted, and fails to allege a federal constitutional question. The Court addresses each 

below.

///

///

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A. One-Year Statute of Limitations

1. Applicable Law

The federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“ADEPA”) 

establishes a one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus petition. 28 

U.S.C. §2244(d)(1). There are four possible start dates for ADEPA’s statute of 

limitations under § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States 

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.

§ 2241(d)(1) (emphasis added). As explained below, (II.A.3), Petitioner’s claim is 

subject to subsection (D). 

The statute of limitations may also be subject to both statutory and equitable 

tolling. § 2244(d)(2); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (finding AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling). 

a) Statutory Tolling

Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending shall not be 

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

State habeas petitions filed after the statute of limitations period ends do not revive a 

limitations period that has already ended before the state petition was filed. See Ferguson 

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v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”) 

b) Equitable Tolling

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland, 560 

U.S. at 645. “To be entitled to equitable tolling, [Petitioner] must show, ‘(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way’ and prevented him from filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 

(2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)) Equitable tolling is 

unavailable in most cases, and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling is very 

high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th 

Cir. 2002). 

2. Parties’ Positions

In the Motion to Dismiss, Respondent addresses two different issues as separate 

claims: (1) a challenge to the Board’s calculation of a 29-year base term and (2) a 

challenge to remaining in custody beyond that 29-year term. Respondent argues both 

claims were filed beyond AEDPA’s statute of limitations – 751 days late for a claim 

based on the calculation of the base term and 471 days late as to incarceration beyond the 

29-year base term. However, because Petitioner’s Opposition to the Motion explicitly 

indicates that Petitioner is not challenging the calculation of the base term, only being 

held beyond that term, (Opp’n. 2, 4-6, 8), the Court only summarizes Respondent’s 

calculation of the statute of limitations for a claim based on being in custody beyond the 

29-year base term.17 As to this issue, Respondent argues the statute of limitations started 

on September 5, 2016, the day after Petitioner had served 29 years on his life term, and 

 

17 The Court notes however that any claim based on the Board decision, including the 

calculation of the 29-year base term, is clearly also barred by AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations because it would have started on May 9, 2015 and expired in 2017 even with 

the benefit of statutory tolling; and the Petition was not filed until December 24, 2018. 

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expired one year later on September 4, 2017, more than a year before the federal Petition 

was filed. Respondent explains that Petitioner knew on May 9, 2015, when the January 

9, 2015 Board decision became final, that the Board was applying a 29-year base term. 

Respondent argues that at that point, Petitioner simply had to add 29 years to September 

4, 1987 (the date he began serving his life sentence for first-degree murder) to discover 

he would serve 29 years on his life sentence on September 4, 2016. AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations began running the next day and expired on September 4, 2017. Respondent 

argues there is no statutory tolling for the later state petitions, filed in 2018 (see supra

I.C.4-6), because the statute of limitations had already expired, and there is no basis for 

equitable tolling. 

In his Opposition, Petitioner asserts “there are no statutory or other specific time 

limits for filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus” and there is “no AEDPA statute of 

limitations.” (Opp’n at 5, 7.) He also appears to argue the statute of limitations was not 

triggered until the 29-year base term was exceeded by a full year. Petitioner agrees that 

he “began serving his 25 years to life term of imprisonment on or about September 4, 

1987” and that “the 29th year was September 4, 2016.” (Opp’n at 6.) However, he 

seems to assert that the statute of limitations was not triggered until “Sept. 3, 2017 one 

day before the 30th year began which is when the 29th year exceeded.” (Opp’n. at 6.) 

In Reply, Respondent notes there is no authority supporting Petitioner’s claim that 

the statute of limitations did not start until he had served 30 years in prison rather than 29 

years. (Reply at 2-4.) Respondent reiterates that one day after Petitioner served 29 years, 

his incarceration exceeded the base term and he knew on that date that his incarceration 

exceeded the 29-year base term. Additionally, Respondent explains that even if the 

statute of limitations was not triggered until Petitioner was incarcerated for 30 years as he 

argues, his federal Petition was still untimely because a year passed before he filed his 

federal Petition and he was not entitled to statutory tolling for any of the 2018 state court 

petitions because all of them were denied as successive. (Reply at 3 (citing Porter v. 

Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010).) 

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3. Analysis

Petitioner’s assertion that there is no AEDPA statute of limitations is wrong. As 

set forth above, there is a one-year statute of limitations applicable to the Petition. “[T]he 

one-year limitations period applies to ‘all applications for writ of habeas corpus’ under 

§ 2254, including those challenging state administrative actions.” Mardesich v. Cate, 668 

F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The start date for the statute of limitations for this Petition is governed by 

§ 2244(d)(1)(D). Id. at 1171-72 (citing Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 

2004) and discussing Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003)). “[W]hen a 

habeas petitioner challenges an administrative decision affecting the ‘fact or duration of 

his confinement,’ AEDPAs one-year statute of limitations runs from when the ‘factual 

predicate’ of the habeas claims ‘could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.” Id. (quoting § 2244(d)(1)(D)). A challenge based on exceeding the proper 

term of confinement is subject to §2244 (d)(1)(D) with the factual predicate being not 

being released when they allege they should have been.18 See Murphy v. Espinoza, 401 

F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Under Section 2244(d)(1)(D), petitioner was, 

or with the exercise of due diligence, should have been aware of the factual predicate of 

this claim no later than . . . the date he believes his sentence should have expired”). 

Section 2254(d)(1)(D) applies to Petitioner’s claim that he is being incarcerated in excess 

of the 29-year base term. 

Under § 2254(d)(1)(D), the factual predicate of Petitioner’s claim is his 

incarceration in excess of the 29-year base term. AEDPA’s statute of limitations began 

when he was in custody in excess of 29 years. See Hudson v. Curry, Case No. 06-03716 

SI, 2007 WL 1430031, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2007) (statute of limitations was 

triggered when petitioner remained in custody beyond date he alleged he should have 

 

18 To the extent it could be construed as a challenge to the Board’s decision, it is also 

subject to § 2244(d)(1)(D). Redd, 343 F.3d 1084-85.

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been released); Lang v. Hernandez, Case No. CV 06-4927 RGK (JC), 2008 WL 8114263,

at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. March 31, 2008) (same); Butler v. Hill, Case No. 2:13-cv-00567 LKK 

KJN P, 2013 WL 5799016, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2013) (same); Singleton v. Curry, 

Case No. C 06-6234 SI, 2007 WL 1068227, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. April 10, 2007) (“The 

limitations period clock starts ticking when the breach occurs, and here that was when the 

allegedly agreed-upon date for release arrived and [the petitioner] remained in prison”); 

Lara v. Curry, Case No. C 06-7149 MHP, 2010 WL 986625, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. March 

17, 2010) (“The limitations period clock started ticking when . . . the allegedly agreedupon date for release arrived . . . and [the petitioner] remained in prison). Although this 

issue arises more commonly when petitioners assert they have completed a specific

sentence they were promised at sentencing,

19 as in the cases cited above, the same 

reasoning applies to Petitioner’s challenge based on being incarcerated in excess of the 

29-year base term. Petitioner knew the factual predicate of his claim no later than the day

he remained in custody beyond 29 years. 

Petitioner asserts that the 29-year base term was not exceeded until September 3rd 

or 4th of 2017 because that was the day before the 30th year began. (Opp’n at 3 (“His 29 

year base term would expire on or about September 4, 2017”), 6.) However, there is no 

dispute that Petitioner’s 25-to-life term for first-degree murder commenced on September 

4, 1987. Petitioner’s Legal Status Summary indicates that his life term start date was 

September 4, 1987. (Lodgment 2.) Petitioner indicates the same in his Opposition to the 

Motion. He states that he “began serving his 25 years to life term of imprisonment on or 

 

19 Petitioner’s claim is unique in that it challenges not being released at the end of a base 

term even though he was not entitled to release at the end of that base term because he 

was not found suitable for parole. As explained above, completion of a base term is not 

itself sufficient for release. (See supra I.E.) Rather, to be eligible for release, a person in 

custody must have completed the base term for their particular offense and be found 

suitable for parole. See Pearson, 639 F.3d at 1188 n. 3 (“a prisoner may end up serving 

more than the term calculated by the Board once he is found suitable for parole.”). 

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about September 4, 1987.” (Opp’n at 6.20) The statute of limitations ran one year later 

on September 4, 2017. Petitioner does not cite, and the Court can find no authority for,

delaying the start of the statute of limitations an additional year, as Petitioner asserts. 

Additionally, to the extent Petitioner is attempting to calculate the start of the statute of 

limitations from the date he exhausted his claim in state court, (ECF 22 at 11), that 

assertion is also without merit. Redd, 343 F.3d at 1083 (quoting Burger v. Scott, 317 

F.3d 1133, 1138(10th Cir. 2003) (“Congress did not draft the federal limitations period to 

begin running only at the end of a particular state’s exhaustion process. Instead, the 

statute is clear that the limitations period starts from the latest of four specific dates.”). 

The statute of limitations under 2244(d)(1)(D) was triggered as soon as Petitioner 

was in custody beyond the date he argues he should have been released. Section 

2244(d)(1) requires the statute of limitations run from “the date on which the factual 

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.” “[T]he ‘factual predicate’ of a petitioner’s claims constitutes 

the ‘vital facts’ underlying those claims.” McAleese v. Brennan, 483 F.3d 206, 214 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Here, the vital facts were: (1) setting the 29-year base term—known to 

Petitioner when the Board’s decision became final; and (2) remaining in custody—known 

to Petitioner when he remained in custody after serving 29 years.21 When Petitioner 

 

20 Although there is some variation in the date Petitioner asserts he began his life term in 

various filings in the record, he consistently indicates his life term for first-degree murder 

began in September 1987. (Pet. at 2 (“25 years to life term started September 9, 1987”), 

4 (“indeterminate term of imprisonment began approximately September 9, 1987”). 

Given the Petition was filed well beyond the statute of limitations, this variance by a few 

days is of no consequence to the Court’s determination the Petition is untimely.

21 Arguably, Petitioner knew the factual predicate even earlier because he knew when the 

Board issued its decision that his base term was set at 29 years and he knew he would not 

be released after serving 29 years because he had been found unsuitable for parole and 

the Board determined he would not receive another hearing for five years. Five years 

after the January 9, 2015 denial was well beyond 29 years. However, the Court relies on 

the later start date because, as explained above, it is in line with claims similar to 

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knew he was still in custody after 29 years on the first-degree murder conviction, he 

knew the vital facts for his claim that he was being held beyond the base term. 

Accordingly, he knew the factual predicate of his claim on September 5, 2016 and that is 

when AEDPA’s statute of limitations started under § 2244(d)(1)(D). Absent statutory or 

equitable tolling, it expired on September 4, 2017. 

Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory or equitable tolling. As described in detail 

above, Petitioner had no state petitions pending during this period. (See supra I.C.3-4.) 

Petitioner’s first three state petitions had all been denied by the time AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations started, (see supra I.C.1-3), and the three later state petitions, (see supra

I.C.4-6), were filed after the statute of limitations has expired. Petitioner’s final three 

state petitions were filed in 2018, the earliest more than seven months after AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations had already expired. Because they were all filed after the statute of 

limitations has already expired, they do not toll or restart AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823 (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the 

limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed”); see also Ford v 

Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230 1237 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823 to 

conclude a federal petition was time-barred despite the filing of a state petition after 

expiration of AEDPA’s statute of limitations). Petitioner is not entitled to statutory 

tolling.

Respondent has asserted in the Motion that Petitioner is also not entitled to 

equitable tolling and Petitioner has not provided any basis for equitable tolling in his 

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. This alone is sufficient to preclude equitable 

tolling. Additionally, there is no basis in the Petition to suggest Petitioner is entitled to 

equitable tolling at any point, but certainly not during the period the statute of limitations 

 

Petitioner’s that involve an anticipated date of release (even when incorrect) and it is the 

latest possible start date for the statute of limitations. In this respect, it gives Petitioner 

every benefit of the doubt and the Petition is still time barred.

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was running.22 Given the absence of any basis for it in Petitioner’s Opposition to the 

Motion to Dismiss, particularly when it was specifically raised by Respondent, or in his 

Petition, the Court finds Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling either.

“[T]he factual predicate of the claim . . . could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence” no later than September 5, 2016. § 2254(d)(1)(D). On that 

date Petitioner knew, or through the exercise of due diligence should have known, that he 

was in custody in excess of the 29-year base term. AEDPA’s statute of limitations began 

on September 5, 2016 and expired on September 4, 2017. Petitioner did not file his 

federal Petition until December 20, 2018, more than 15 months later. 

The Court RECOMMENDS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and 

the Petition23 dismissed as barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

B. Procedural Default

The Court need not reach the procedural default argument because the Petition is 

time-barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations and should be dismissed on that basis.24 

 

22 The Petition does mention Petitioner was receiving care in 2015, but there is nothing 

suggesting this would have justified equitable tolling even if it had occurred during the 

relevant time period.

23 The only claim asserted in the Petition is based on Petitioner being held in excess of the 

29-year base term. (Opp’n at 2 (disclaiming any other basis), 4 (“Petitioner has made 

only one claim for relief for exceeding the base term and continued retention”), 8.) As 

set forth above, Petitioner has explicitly disclaimed any claim based on the calculation of 

the 29-year base term. Accordingly, the only claim in the Petition is based on being held 

in excess of the 29-year base term and any claim on that basis is time-barred.

24 The Court additionally notes that if the district judge does not dismiss the Petition as 

time-barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations, the procedural default issue could be 

deferred and considered in conjunction with a merits review. See Franklin v. Johnson, 

290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Procedural bar issues are not infrequently more 

complex than the merits issues presented by the appeal, so it may well make sense in 

some instances to proceed to the merits if the result will be the same.”); see also Newsom 

v Yates, No. 10cv746 WQH-BGS, 2011 WL 1004705, at *3 (“[R]eserving decision on 

Respondent’s procedural default contentions until after Respondent answers the 

petition.”); but see Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (explaining that 

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However, should the district court elect to additionally, or in the alternative, reach the 

issue, the Petition should also be dismissed as procedurally defaulted.25 

1. Applicable Law

“A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a state court ‘if the 

decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal 

question and adequate to support the judgment.” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 315

(2011) (citing Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 55 (2009)). “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause 

and prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court has 

declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’” Id. at 316 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 

72, 84-85 (1977) and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991) modified on 

other grounds by Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012)) (internal citations omitted). 

2. Parties’ Positions

Respondent argues Petitioner’s claim challenging being held in excess of the 29-

year base term should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted because the California 

Supreme Court decision relied on an adequate and independent state procedural ground in 

denying relief. Specifically, the court denied relief based on the petition being 

successive. (Mot. at 9-10; Reply at 5-6.) Petitioner does not challenge the adequacy or 

independent of the bar and does not seem to argue cause or actual prejudice to excuse the 

bar, although he seems to argue the procedural default resulted from a 

 

while procedural default issue must not “invariably be resolved first” ordinarily they 

should be). Respondent has preserved the procedural default by raising it at the earliest 

possible time and, Respondent could renew this basis for dismissal to allow the court to 

decide if a decision on the merits or the procedural default analysis provide will be most

efficient.

25 In this respect, if either party objects to the undersigned recommendation, those 

objections should be filed as dictated below. (III.) 

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mischaracterization of his claim in the Superior Court’s December 17, 2015 decision. 

(Opp’n at 8-9.) He states that denial of his claim based on procedural default will result 

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Id. at 10.) Additionally, Petitioner argues the 

California Supreme Court did not clearly and expressly rest its judgment on a state 

procedural bar. (Id. at 10.) 

3. Analysis

a) State Procedural Bar Applied

The opinion of the last state court rendering a judgment in the case must “‘clearly 

and expressly’ state that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Thomas v. 

Goldsmith, 979 F. 2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 

(1989)). “Where . . . the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a 

procedural default, we will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not 

silently disregard that bar and consider the merits.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

803-04 (1991); see also Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, the California Supreme Court’s November 14, 2018 denial states only that 

the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied without citation to any cases. 

Accordingly, the Court looks through the California Supreme Court’s silent denial to the 

California Court of Appeal’s denial as the last reasoned decision. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804 

(explaining that courts should “look through” unexplained orders “to the last reasoned 

decision.”); see also Curiel v. Miller, 830 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 

(quoting Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802-06) (“When at least one state court has rendered a reasoned 

decision, but the last state court to reject a prisoner’s claim issues an order ‘whose text or 

accompanying opinion does not disclose the reason for the judgment,’ we ‘look through’ 

the mute decision and presume the higher court agreed with and adopted the reasons 

given by the lower court.”) and Bucci v Busby, No. 2:11-cv-3147 GEB KJN P, 2014 WL 

4249669, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2014) (looking through California Supreme Court’s 

silent denial to Court of Appeal’s application of successive bar). There is also nothing in 

the record indicating that the Supreme Court silently ruled on the merits rather than the 

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procedural bar imposed by the Court of Appeal. As noted above, the petition to the 

California Supreme Court largely duplicates the petition to the Court of Appeal. (See 

supra I.C.6.) Additionally, there were no orders for additional briefing or any indication 

from the Supreme Court that they elected to take up and silently deny the petition on the 

merits rather than agreeing with the Court of Appeal’s denial based on a procedural bar.

There is no question that the Court of Appeal’s November 14, 2018 decision rests 

on California’s state procedural bar on successive petitions. (Lodgment 13.) After 

summarizing Petitioner’s prior state habeas petitions filed with the Court of Appeal, the 

opinion is explicit in finding “[h]is repetitious presentation of claims is an abuse of the 

writ.” (Id. at 2 (citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 769 (1993).) To the extent the court’s 

explicit statement that the petition is repetitious is not in itself sufficient to convey the 

court is relying on this state bar, the court’s citation of In re Clark makes it clear. The 

cited portion of Clark addresses successive petitions and, as explained in more detail 

below, citation to this portion of Clark is an imposition of California’s bar on successive 

petition. (see infra II.B.3.b).) It is clear that the Court of Appeal declined to address 

Petitioner’s claim because he failed to meet a state procedural requirement.

b) State Bar is Independent and Adequate

As noted above, “[a] federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a 

state court ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is 

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Walker, 562 

U.S. at 315. 

Once the state asserts a state procedural bar, as Respondent has done here, the 

burden shifts to Petitioner “who must assert ‘specific factual allegations that demonstrate 

the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating 

inconsistent application of the rule.’” Williams v. Filson, 908 F.3d 546, 577 (9th Cir. 

2018) (quoting Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Trieu v. 

Fox, No. 17-55265, 764 Fed Appx 624, 624 (9th Cir. March 2, 2019) (“[B]ecause the 

state properly raised this affirmative defense and [the petitioner] did not put its adequacy 

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at issue, the bar applies to this case.”). The burden shifts back to the state if the petitioner 

meets this burden. Williams, 908 F.3d 546, 577. Here, Respondent has clearly asserted 

the state procedural bar on successive petitions and Petitioner has failed to put the 

adequacy of the bar at issue. 

Respondent has identified Petitioner’s multiple state petitions and the state court’s 

orders on those petitions, including the Court of Appeal’s June 27, 2018 denial that 

specifically invokes California’s well-established bar on successive petitions with citation 

of In re Clark. (Lodgment 13 at 2.) “To qualify as an ‘adequate’ procedural ground, a 

state rule must be ‘firmly established and regularly followed.’” Walker, 562 U.S. at 316 

(quoting Kindler, 130 S. Ct. at 618); see also La Crosse, 244 F.3d at 704 (“To be 

‘adequate,’ the state procedural rule must be ‘strictly or regularly followed’ and 

‘consistently applied’”). As discussed briefly above, the citation of In re Clark is an 

indication the court is imposing the state’s bar on successive petitions. Additionally, 

numerous district courts to consider the issue have found the same as to this citation. 

Trieu, 764 Fed. Appx. at 624 (recognizing In re Clark citation as state’s procedural bar 

against successive petitions); Almeida v. Lewis, No. 1:12-cv-00793 MJS (HC), 2014 WL 

2979458, at *12-13 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2014) (relying on citation of In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 

750, 767-69 as successive petition bar that is firmly established and regularly followed); 

Briggs v. State, Case No. 15-cv-05809-EMC, 2017 WL 1806495, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 

2017) (finding In re Clark citation is “rejection of the state habeas petition as 

successive.”); Bucci, 2014 WL 4249669, at *12 (finding In re Clark successive bar 

independent and adequate state procedural bar). 

This shifts the burden to Petitioner to place the defense at issue. Petitioner has not 

challenged the adequacy or independence of the successive bar. Accordingly, the Court 

“finds that In re Clark’s bar on successive petitions constitutes an independent and 

adequate state procedural ground.” Bucci, 2014 WL 4249669 at *12. Although the 

Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue in a published decision, numerous 

district courts have concluded it is an independent and adequate bar. Bucci, 2014 WL 

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4249669, at *12 (citing Arroyo v. Curry, No. C 07-03718 SBA (PR), 2009 WL 723877, 

at *5 (N.D. Cal. March 18, 2009) and Rutledge v. Katovich, No. C 08-5738 MMC (PR), 

2012 WL 2054975, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2012)); Flowers v. Foulk, No. C 14-

0589CW, 2016 WL 4611554, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2016 (collecting cases) 

(“California’s bar against successive petitions is also adequate and independent.”); 

Briggs, 2017 WL 1806495, at *6; Almeida, 2014 WL 2979458, at *13 (finding 

procedural bar on successive petitions firmly established and regularly followed and 

upholding procedural bar); Bigg v. Ylst, No CIV S-04-2667-MCE-CMK-P, 2006 WL 

3001175, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2006) (finding Clark’s bars independent since In re 

Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770 (1998) and successive petition bar well established and 

consistently applied) (citing Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1318 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

Additionally, in this case, the independence of the bar is clear. “A state procedural 

rule constitutes an ‘independent’ bar if it is not interwoven with federal law or dependent 

upon a federal constitutional ruling.” Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 924 (9th Cir. 

2007). “A state law ground is so interwoven if the state has made application of the 

procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law such as the determination 

of whether federal constitutional error has been committed.” La Crosse, 244 F.3d at 704 

(citations omitted). The decision explicitly invokes the rule as an independent basis for 

its decision and it in no way depends on federal law. There is nothing in the decision 

suggesting the ruling is interwoven or related to any federal or constitutional ruling. In 

this respect, the imposition of the procedural bar is independent. 

The state bar is independent and adequate. Absent an exception, the state 

procedural bar applies. 

c) Cause and Prejudice

“In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court 

pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of 

the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to 

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consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750; see also Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017) (“[A] federal court 

may not review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court—that is, 

claims that the state court denied based on an adequate and independent state procedural 

rule.”). Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice.

As an initial matter, it appears from the Opposition that Petitioner is not relying on 

a showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default, but instead seeks relief 

based on the miscarriage of justice exception discussed below. (See infra II.B.3.d).) He 

states, “although Petitioner never constructively alleged cause and prejudice, but instead 

contends that denying federal review of his claim (where the state court failed to do) will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” (Opp’n at 10.) Given Petitioner seems to 

concede he is not attempting to show cause and prejudice, the Court finds he has not 

shown either based on that concession. 

However, even if Petitioner is not electing to focus exclusively on the miscarriage 

of justice exception and intended to show cause and prejudice, he has failed to do so. 

(1) Cause

“To establish cause . . . the [petitioner] must ‘show that some objective factor 

external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural 

rule.’” Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2065 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). 

“A factor is external to the defense if it ‘cannot fairly be attributable’ to the prisoner.” Id. 

“For example, ‘a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably 

available to counsel, . . . or that some interference by officials . . . made compliance 

impracticable, would constitute cause under this standard.’” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 

(quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488).

It appears Petitioner may be arguing the Superior Court’s December 17, 2015 

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decision denying him relief is the cause of his procedural default.26 (Opp’n at 8-10.) 

More specifically, Petitioner cites the “December 17, 2015 denial order at [page] 6 lines 

9-11” and argues that this misrepresentation of the fact in the December 17, 2015 

decision is the reason for the Superior Court’s May 30, 2018 denial of relief. (Opp’n at 

8-9.) The cited text reads “The fact that petitioner has served six years beyond his 29-

year base term does not, on its own establish that his continued incarceration is excessive, 

or cruel and unusual punishment under the Eight Amendment.” (Lodgment 5 at 6.) It 

appears Petitioner thinks that because the December 17, 2015 decision indicates that at 

that time he had served six years beyond the 29-year base term, this caused the Superior 

Court to decide his 2018 petition was raising the same grounds as his earlier petitions. 

Assuming a Superior Court decision can be considered the cause of Petitioner’s 

failure to comply with state procedural rules, Petitioner has still failed to show cause for 

the default.

27

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“infected” the “entire process for Petitioner’s sought relief regarding challenge to the 

constitutionality of exceeding the base term” is not persuasive. (Opp’n at 9.) First, even 

if the Court assumes two lines of the Superior Court’s December 17, 2015 decision could 

be considered the reason for the Superior Court’s later May 30, 2018 denial of relief, this 

 

26 As noted above, it appears Petitioner is advancing this argument for purposes of 

showing a miscarriage of justice, however, the Court has analyzed it as to cause out of an 

abundance of caution.

27 If this is a unique attempt to challenge the state court’s determination that the bar 

applies, that is not an argument the Court can consider. See Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 

573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases) (rejecting claim that state court improperly 

applied a state bar and concluding that “[f]ederal habeas courts lack jurisdiction . . . to 

review state court applications of state procedural rules.”); see also Bradford v. Davis, 

923 F.3d 599, 610 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[D]istrict court erred in analyzing whether [the 

petitioner] met the justification requirements pursuant to California law” on timeliness); 

Trieu, 764 Fed Appx at 624-25 (Finding the court could not “review the legitimacy of’ 

the state court’s application of Clark’s procedural bar against successive or piecemeal 

litigation.”). 

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Court is not looking to the May 30, 2018 decision, it is considering the last reasoned 

decision, i.e. the Court of Appeal’s June 27, 2018 decision. (See supra II.B.3.a) (looking 

through to Court of Appeal’s June 27, 2018 denial).) Second, Petitioner’s cause 

argument ignores that Petitioner submitted a petition to the Court of Appeal in which he 

explicitly stated that “Petitioner’s challenge to the constitutionality of exceeding a fixed 

base term established by the Board has not been heard on the merits by this Petitioner.” 

(ECF 16-12 at 3.) And more significantly, the Court of Appeal acknowledges this 

argument and rejects it. (Lodgment 13 at 1.) Third, the Court of Appeal does not discuss 

or rely on either of the Superior Court decisions Petitioner relies on, but instead relies on

Petitioner’s prior petition to the Court of Appeal. (Id.) The Court of Appeal goes on to 

makes its own findings regarding the prior petitions, contravening the idea that the 

Superior Court’s 2015 two-line statement somehow caused the Court of Appeal to 

impose a procedural bar it otherwise would not have imposed. There is simply no basis 

to conclude a Superior Court decision issued in 2015, with three intervening state court 

decisions and four intervening petitions from Petitioner, caused the Court of Appeal to 

impose a procedural bar and that it is the reason Petitioner’s petition was successive. 

Petitioner has not shown cause.

(2) Prejudice

When, as here, a petitioner fails to show cause for the default, the “court need not 

consider whether he suffered actual prejudice.” Roberts v. Arave, 847 F.2d 528, 530 n. 3

(9th Cir. 1988) (citing Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982)); Smith v. Murray, 

477 U.S. 527, 533 (1985). However, should the district judge elect to reach the issue, 

Petitioner has also not shown prejudice. 

Petitioner must show “actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal 

law.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. “‘[P]rejudice’ is actual harm resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violation.” Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 (quoting Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 

F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984)). Showing “actual prejudice” to overcome procedural 

default “requires the petitioner to establish ‘not merely that the errors at trial created a 

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possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Bradford, 923 F.3d at

613 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 494). 

Petitioner has not alleged an underlying federal violation. Although Petitioner 

labels his claim a violation of Due Process, that label alone cannot transform a purely 

state law issue into a federal one. Petitioner claims that he was entitled to release after 

completion of the 29-year base term because indeterminate sentences are prohibited 

under the Determinate Sentencing law. He is essentially arguing that despite the 

imposition of a indeterminate life sentence for first-degree murder, the authority given to 

the Board under California law to determine when or if to grant parole to life serving 

inmates, and the Board’s finding (not challenged here) that Petitioner is not suitable for 

parole), that under California’s Determinate Sentencing Law his indeterminate 25-to-life 

sentence became determinate and he was entitled to release at the end of the base term of 

29 years. This is an issue of California state law. It is not a federal violation.

28

 A 

petitioner cannot transform a state law issue into a federal one by labeling it a due process 

 

28 The Court notes even if it were considered a federal violation, Petitioner has suffered 

no actual harm in not having it heard because it has no basis in fact or law. Because 

Petitioner was sentenced after the passage of the Determinate Sentencing Law, he was 

sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence under the Determinate Sentencing Law. In 

this respect, the passage of it did not convert Petitioner’s indeterminate 25-to-life 

sentence into a determinate one. Additionally, the Determinate Sentencing Law did not 

eliminate indeterminate sentences as Petitioner argues. See In re Butler, 4 Cal. 5th at 745 

(explaining continued use of indeterminate sentences “for a circumscribed group of 

offenders.”). Rather, indeterminate sentences were preserved for a smaller group of

offenses, like Petitioner’s conviction for first-degree murder. See id.; In re Dannenberg, 

34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1096 (2005) (Explaining indeterminate sentences reserved for “a much 

narrower category of serious crimes and offenders.”) And, inmates, like Petitioner, 

serving indeterminate sentences are not entitled to fixed terms. See In re Butler, 4 Cal. 

5th at 745 (discussing In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1096 finding the same). “[A]

defendant under an indeterminate sentence has no vested right to have his sentence fixed 

at . . . [a] period less than the maximum sentence provided by statute.” In re Dannenberg, 

34 Cal. 4th at 1097. 

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violation. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.1996). Courts “cannot treat 

a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a denial of due process; otherwise, every 

erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come here as a federal 

constitutional question.” Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1083 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Petitioner has not shown prejudice.

d) Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

As noted above, Petitioner states that rather than showing cause and prejudice, he 

“instead contends that denying federal review of his claim (where the state court failed to 

do) will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” (Opp’n at 10.) Petitioner then 

states that he “has demonstrated the unreasonable determinations of fact” in the Superior 

Court’s December 17, 2015 decision. (Id.) 

“[A] petitioner overcomes procedural default if he presents sufficient evidence to 

‘demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage 

of justice.’” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 750). “To make this showing, a petitioner’s case must fall within the ‘narrow 

class of cases . . . involving extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation 

probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime.’” Id. (quoting 

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)). To pass through this “actual innocence 

procedural gateway,” a petitioner “must show that, in light of all available evidence, it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict him of the relevant crime.” 

Id. (citation omitted.) “[T]enable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare. A petitioner 

does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in 

light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2014). 

As is evident from a reading of this standard, this exception does not apply here. 

Petitioner is not attempting to show, based on new evidence, that no reasonable jury 

would convict him of first-degree murder. The claim itself merely asserts that under 

California law his indeterminate life sentence became determinate at some point after he 

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was sentenced, and he should be released. His innocence is not at issue. Even the more 

analogous, but completely inapplicable, standard for death penalty sentences would not 

apply. It requires a petitioner show “by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a 

constitutional error no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the 

death penalty under the applicable state law.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004). 

Even assuming this standard could be extended to a noncapital sentence, it would not 

apply because Petitioner is not challenging the sentence imposed when he was convicted 

of first-degree murder. As explained in more detail below, this exception simply does not 

extend to the type of claim Petitioner is asserting. 

“[A]lthough the actual innocence exception applies in the capital sentencing 

context, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has determined whether that 

exception applies to noncapital sentences” like Petitioner’s 25-to-life sentence. Sivak v. 

Christensen, Case No 1:16-cv-00189-BLW, 2018 WL 4643043, *7 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 

2018) (citing Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94 (2004) and Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 

1195 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also McCutcheon v. Arizona, No CV-15-0512-PHX-PGR, 

2016 WL 8257606, *6 n.10 (D. Ariz. September 29, 2016). In Dretke, the Supreme 

Court declined to reach whether actual innocence could be extended to noncapital 

sentencing, and in Marrero, the Ninth Circuit declined to consider whether a claim of 

actual innocence could be asserted in noncapital sentencing for purposes of the similar 

escape hatch rule of §§ 2241 and 2255. Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94 (declining to decide 

whether actual innocence exception should be extended to challenges of noncapital 

sentencing error because lower court had not addressed other non-defaulted claims first); 

Marrero, 682 F.3d at 1194-95 (noting other circuits’ exceptions to the general rule that a 

petitioner cannot be actually innocent of noncapital sentence, but declining to endorse

any because none are met). Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim is not 

eligible for the miscarriage of justice exception because his claim does not challenge his 

conviction or involve a capital sentence. 

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Even assuming that the actual innocence exception could be extended to noncapital 

sentencing, that is not even the issue asserted here. Petitioner is not claiming his 25-tolife sentence for first-degree murder was improperly imposed based on a constitutional 

violation. He is arguing that as a matter of California law his indeterminate 25-to-life 

sentence became determinate and he is entitled to release. In this respect, the Court 

would not only have to find actual innocence should be extended to noncapital 

sentencing, a position rejected by some courts,29 but also extend it to a challenge alleging 

a change in state law30 that allegedly altered the sentence imposed following conviction. 

The Court declines to make these extensions because a claim of actual innocence does 

not make sense in this context. Unlike a petitioner that might argue that but for a 

constitutional error, he would not have been found eligible for the death penalty or, 

assuming an extension to noncapital sentencing, a sentencing enhancement, there is 

nothing for Petitioner to be actually innocent of that would change his indeterminate life 

sentence to a determinate one. Petitioner is not entitled to relief from the procedural 

default based on the miscarriage of justice exception.31 

Federal habeas relief is unavailable because the state court decision relies on an 

independent and adequate state procedural ground and Petitioner has failed to show cause 

for the default or actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The 

undersigned RECOMMENDS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on this basis be 

 

29 See Sivak, 2018 WL 4643043, *7 (collecting other circuit decisions concluding a 

person cannot be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence).

30 The Court notes, as discussed above, there has been no change in California state law 

that converted Petitioner’s indeterminate life sentence to a determinate one. (II.B.3.c)(2)

at n. 28.)

31 Although “actual innocence, if proved serves as a gateway through which a petitioner 

may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . or . . . expiration of the statute 

of limitations,” Petitioner did not raise this exception with regard to the statute of 

limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). However, the exception 

would fail as an exception to the statute of limitations for the same reason; it simple does 

not extend to this type of claim. 

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GRANTED.

C. Federally Cognizable

As noted above, Respondent’s Motion differentiated between two separate claims 

in the Petition, one based on the calculation of the base term and one based on Petitioner 

being in custody beyond the base term. (See supra A.2.) In the Motion to Dismiss, 

Respondent seeks dismissal of a claim based on the calculation of the 29-year base term 

arguing that it is an issue of state law that does not rise to the level of a federal question. 

(Mot. at 8-9.) As discussed above, Petitioner has clarified in his Opposition that his 

Petition is not asserting a claim based on the calculation of the 29-year base term, and he 

is only pursuing a claim based on being held beyond the 29-year base term. Accordingly, 

like Respondent’s argument regarding the statute of limitations on this issue, the Court 

need not address it. 

In the Reply brief, Respondent argues that because Petitioner’s challenge to his 

continued incarceration beyond the base term is a challenge based solely on the 

application of state law, the allegations are not cognizable on federal habeas review. 

Although Respondent is attempting to address arguments Petitioner made in the 

Opposition, i.e. that the Board has violated state laws by not releasing him, Respondent is 

seeking dismissal on a basis not asserted in the initial Motion at least as to the only claim 

Petitioner is pursuing. For this reason, the Court recommends the Court not reach this 

argument. However, if the Court does address it, it provides an additional ground for 

dismissal because, as discussed above (II.B.3.c)(2), Petitioner raises an issue only of state 

law. 

The Court RECOMMENDS that if the district judge elects to reach this issue, the 

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED on this basis as well.

III. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) 

DISMISSING the Petition.

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IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 19, 2020, any party to his action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties by February 26, 2020.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 29, 2020

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