Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-04323/USCOURTS-ca2-14-04323-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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14‐4323

Holick v. Cellular Sales of New York, LLC

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

  

August Term, 2014

(Argued: June 4, 2015          Decided: September 22, 2015)

Docket No. 14‐4323

  

JAN P. HOLICK, JR., STEVEN MOFFITT, JUSTIN MOFFITT, GURWINDER

SINGH, JASON MACK, TIMOTHY M. PRATT, and WILLIAM BURRELL, on

behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs‐Appellees,

‐v.‐ 

CELLULAR SALES OF NEW YORK, LLC, CELLULAR SALES OF KNOXVILLE,

INC.,

Defendants‐Appellants.

1

Before: WESLEY, HALL, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.   

                                                            

1 The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption to conform to the

above.

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Plaintiffs‐Appellees Timothy Pratt and William Burrell are two of the

named plaintiffs in this putative class action lawsuit against Defendants‐

Appellants Cellular Sales of New York, LLC and its parent company Cellular

Sales of Knoxville, Inc.  In their suit brought under state and federal labor laws,

Plaintiffs allege that, during 2010 and 2011, they were unlawfully denied various

forms of compensation and benefits because Defendants improperly classified

them as independent contractors rather than employees.  Defendants moved to

compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in Plaintiffs’

subsequent employment agreements.  The district court denied the motion to

compel arbitration, finding that another contract that was in effect during the

time when Plaintiffs’ claims arose supported a finding of non‐arbitrability.  

Defendants now pursue this interlocutory appeal.  We AFFIRM.

C. LARRY CARBO, III, Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams &

Aughtry, Houston, TX (Julie R. Offerman, Chamberlain, Hrdlicka,

White, Williams & Aughtry, Houston, TX; Joseph M. Dougherty,

Hinman Straub, P.C., Albany, NY, on the brief), for Defendants‐

Appellants.

RONALD G. DUNN (Daniel A. Jacobs, on the brief), Gleason, Dunn,

Walsh & O’Shea, Albany, NY, for Plaintiffs‐Appellees.

WESLEY, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs‐Appellees Timothy Pratt and William Burrell are two of the

named plaintiffs in this putative class action lawsuit against Defendants‐

Appellants Cellular Sales of New York, LLC (“Cellular Sales”) and its parent

company Cellular Sales of Knoxville, Inc. (“Cellular Sales of Knoxville”).  In their

suit brought under state and federal labor laws, Plaintiffs allege that, during 2010

and 2011, they were unlawfully denied various forms of compensation and

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benefits because Defendants improperly classified them as independent

contractors rather than employees.  Defendants moved to compel arbitration

based on an arbitration clause contained in Plaintiffs’ subsequent employment

agreements.  The United States District Court for the Northern District of New

York (Mordue, J.) denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that another

contract that was in effect during the time when Plaintiffs’ claims arose

supported a finding of non‐arbitrability.  Defendants now pursue this

interlocutory appeal.  

For the reasons stated below, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

BACKGROUND2

Cellular Sales is in the business of selling Verizon Wireless cellular service

plans and merchandise.  Plaintiffs‐Appellees Timothy Pratt and William Burrell

both began their relationship with Cellular Sales in 2010.  At that time, Cellular

Sales required Plaintiffs to form a corporate entity (such as a limited liability

company) and sign a “Non‐Exclusive Independent Sales Agreement” (“Sales

                                                            

2 The facts are drawn from the district court’s memorandum, supplemented as

necessary by the record.  The facts provided relate only to Pratt and Burrell because

Defendants Cellular Sales and its parent company have appealed the district court’s

denial of the motion to compel arbitration only as to those Plaintiffs.

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Agreement”) in order to be sales representatives.  Joint App. 231, 241.3  Each

Plaintiff signed a Sales Agreement as the representative of his respective

company; the Sales Agreements established a formal relationship between

Cellular Sales and Plaintiffs’ companies.  Relevant for this appeal, each Sales

Agreement stated that the respective Plaintiff’s company was an “independent

contractor” of Cellular Sales.  Joint App. 233.  In turn, each Plaintiff was an

employee of his own company (referred to as a “Sales Company”): “Each person

who is engaged by the Sales Company to render services with respect to those

activities for which Sales Company receives Sales Commissions shall be an

employee of the Sales Company and not of [Cellular Sales].”  Id. (emphases added).   

The Sales Agreements went on to state that Cellular Sales would not

withhold taxes on the commissions Plaintiffs earned and that Plaintiffs were not

entitled to “any compensation, benefits, vacation or vacation pay, sick leave,

participation in a retirement program, health insurance, disability insurance,

unemployment benefits or other benefits from [Cellular Sales].”  Joint App. 234.  

Each Sales Agreement included a dispute resolution mechanism that required

the parties to submit “a dispute aris[ing] under th[e] Agreement . . . to

                                                            

3 For convenience, we cite to the contracts Burrell signed.  The contracts Pratt signed

contain contractual provisions that are identical to the provisions cited in this opinion.  

See Joint App. 225–28 (Sales Agreement); Joint App. 211–17 (Compensation Agreement).   

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mediation.”  Joint App. 235.  Should mediation fail to resolve the dispute, the

parties retained “the right to pursue any appropriate legal actions against the

other Party in a court of competent jurisdiction.”  Joint App. 235–36.     

   In 2011, Cellular Sales offered Plaintiffs‐Appellees full‐time employment.  

On or about January 1, 2012, both Pratt and Burrell signed Compensation

Agreements with Cellular Sales that, in contrast with the prior Sales Agreements,

contained an arbitration clause.  This provision states, in relevant part: “All

claims, disputes, or controversies arising out of, or in relation to this document or

Employee’s employment with [Cellular Sales] shall be decided by arbitration . .

. .”  Joint App. 219.  The first paragraph of the Compensation Agreement

provides for an at‐will employment relationship, stating that “[Cellular Sales]

has employed you (‘Employee’) to sell [Verizon Wireless services and related

equipment].”  Joint App. 218.  Plaintiffs‐Appellees allege that, after the

Compensation Agreements were signed, Cellular Sales began to treat them

differently by, inter alia, directly paying commissions to Plaintiffs‐Appellees and

withholding federal taxes from those commissions.    

Plaintiffs‐Appellees have temporally confined their claims to events that

transpired prior to January 1, 2012.  They allege that before the execution of the

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Compensation Agreements, Cellular Sales misclassified them as independent

contractors when they were actually employees (within the meaning of various

labor laws) because Cellular Sales controlled their work performance.  As a

result, Plaintiffs‐Appellees were allegedly deprived of, among other things,

overtime compensation and minimum wage.  Plaintiffs‐Appellees seek

compensation owed under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29

U.S.C. § 201 et seq., New York common law, and various provisions of New

York’s Labor Law, N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 190 et seq., 650 et seq. (McKinney).   

DISCUSSION4

Defendants‐Appellants Cellular Sales and Cellular Sales of Knoxville, Inc.

argue that the denial of their motion to compel arbitration “conflicts with long‐

standing federal precedent under which all doubts as to the intent of the parties

and the scope of an arbitration clause must be resolved generously in favor of

arbitration.”5  Appellants’ Br. 10.  Plaintiffs‐Appellees Pratt and Burrell respond

that this Court need not reach Defendants‐Appellants’ argument because the

Compensation Agreement is unambiguous.  Under Plaintiffs‐Appellees’ view,

                                                            

4 This Court reviews de novo the district court’s decision to deny a motion to compel

arbitration.  Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 49 (2d Cir. 2004).

5 We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C).   

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the plain language of the contract reveals that the parties did not intend the

arbitration clause to have a retroactive scope because Plaintiffs‐Appellees’

employment started the day the Compensation Agreements were signed.   

“In deciding whether a dispute is arbitrable, we must answer two

questions: (1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and, if so, (2) whether the

scope of that agreement encompasses the claims at issue.”  Bank Julius Baer & Co.

v. Waxfield Ltd., 424 F.3d 278, 281 (2d Cir. 2005) (alteration and internal quotation

marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Granite Rock Co. v. Intʹl Bhd. of

Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010).   In this case, the parties agreed in the

Compensation Agreement to arbitrate.  Thus, our discussion focuses on the scope

of that agreement.  The district court correctly determined that the arbitration

clause at issue here is broad because it applies to “[a]ll claims, disputes, or

controversies arising out of, or in relation to this document or Employee’s

employment with [Cellular Sales],” Joint App. 219.  See JLM Indus. v. Stolt‐Nielsen

SA, 387 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2004).  Further, since the arbitration clause has no

explicit temporal limitation, our task is to analyze whether the claims “aris[e] out

of, or [relate] to . . . Employee’s employment with [Cellular Sales],” Joint App.

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219.6  See Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, 198 F.3d

88, 99 (2d Cir. 1999).   

“[I]n light of the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, the existence

of a broad agreement to arbitrate creates a presumption of arbitrability which is

only overcome if it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration

clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.  

Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.”7  Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).  However, the Federal Arbitration Act’s8 liberal policy in favor of

                                                            

6 We do not analyze the portion of the arbitration agreement that references “disputes

. . . arising out of, or in relation to this document,” Joint App. 219, because Defendants‐

Appellants have not argued that Plaintiffs‐Appellees’ claims arose out of the

Compensation Agreements.   

7 Plaintiffs‐Appellees contend that a recent Second Circuit decision, Lloyd v. J.P. Morgan

Chase & Co., 791 F.3d 265, 269–70 (2d Cir. 2015), undermines prior cases in which this

Court has required positive assurance to rebut the presumption of arbitrability.  The

Lloyd Court labeled the presumption of arbitrability “soft,” and, in Plaintiffs‐Appellees’

view, discarded the requirement for positive assurance to rebut the presumption of

arbitrability.  Id. at 270.  We find Plaintiffs‐Appellees’ argument unpersuasive for two

reasons.  First, since “one panel of this Court [typically] cannot overrule a prior decision

of another panel,” Gelman v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted), we are bound by this Circuit’s cases that require positive assurance to

rebut the presumption of arbitrability.  Second, the analysis in Lloyd did not turn on the

presumption of arbitrability, see 791 F.3d at 270–71, making its characterization of the

presumption dicta.    

8 The Federal Arbitration Act provides: “A written provision in any . . . contract

evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy

thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole

or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing

controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,

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arbitration is limited by the principle that “arbitration is a matter of consent, not

coercion.  Specifically, arbitration is a matter of contract, and therefore a party

cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which [it] has not agreed

so to submit.”  JLM Indus., 387 F.3d at 171 (alteration in original) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).  It is axiomatic that “[w]hether enforcing an

agreement to arbitrate or construing an arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators

must give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties.  In this

endeavor, as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control.”  Stolt‐

Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intʹl Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

When considering whether claims fall within the scope of an arbitration

clause, therefore, we analyze the factual allegations made in the plaintiff’s

complaint.  Smith/Enron, 198 F.3d at 99.  “If the allegations underlying the claims

touch matters covered by the parties’ . . . agreements, then those claims must be

arbitrated, whatever the legal labels attached to them.”  Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).9   

                                                                                                                                                                                               

irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the

revocation of any contract.”  9 U.S.C. § 2.

9 “When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . , courts

generally . . . apply ordinary state‐law principles that govern the formation of

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To support their argument that the Compensation Agreement’s arbitration

clause applies only prospectively, Pratt and Burrell rely heavily on an

unpublished opinion in which the Fourth Circuit interpreted an arbitration

agreement in a context quite similar to this case.  See Newbanks v. Cellular Sales of

Knoxville, Inc., 548 F. App’x 851(4th Cir. 2013).  As newly hired employees of the

defendants (one of which was Cellular Sales of Knoxville, Inc.), the Newbanks

plaintiffs signed compensation agreements that contained an arbitration clause.  

Id. at 852.  As in this case, the plaintiffs had previously been employees of their

own sales companies, which, in turn, were independent contractors for the

defendants pursuant to a sales agreement between the sales companies and the

defendants.  Id. at 852, 855.  Also similar to our case, the execution of the new

compensation agreements was the first time the plaintiffs had bound themselves

individually in a contract with the defendants.  Id.

                                                                                                                                                                                               

contracts.”  First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).  We interpret

a contract “to give full meaning and effect to all of its provisions.”  LaSalle Bank Nat’l

Ass’n v. Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 424 F.3d 195, 206 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation

marks omitted).  On appeal, both parties cite to New York law, and neither party has

argued that the law of any other state applies to this dispute.  In New York, a contract’s

clauses “should be read together contextually in order to give them meaning.”  Diamond

Castle Partners IV PRC, L.P. v. IAC/InterActiveCorp, 82 A.D.3d 421, 422 (N.Y. App. Div.

2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “It is a fundamental principle of contract

interpretation that, in the absence of ambiguity, the intent of the parties must be

determined from their final writing and no parol evidence or extrinsic evidence is

admissible.”  Int’l Klafter Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 869 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1989).   

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Based on the contract’s plain language, the Newbanks court determined

that “th[e] arbitration requirement only applies to causes of action accruing from

the execution of the [c]ompensation [a]greements and onward.”  Id. at 855.  The

Fourth Circuit grounded its analysis in the compensation agreements’ first

paragraph, which “informed the signer that he or she had become an at‐will

employee of Cellular Sales.”  Id.  The court went on to support its conclusion by

noting that the plaintiffs had limited their claims to the time period prior to when

they signed the compensation agreements and that, during that period, the

plaintiffs “did not have any formal or contractual relationship with Cellular Sales

at all.”  Id.  Although acknowledging that the compensation agreements did not

reference the prior sales agreement, the court nevertheless deemed the sales

agreement the “only relevant document” that existed during the time period to

which the plaintiffs had confined their claims.  Id.  

Unlike the Fourth Circuit, we are not persuaded that this case begins and

ends with the plain language of the Compensation Agreements.  The first

paragraph of the Compensation Agreement states in full:

Cellular Sales (“Company”) is in the business of retail sales of

Verizon Wireless services and related equipment and accessories

(“Products”). Company has employed you (“Employee”) to sell the

Products. Employee’s employment with Company is, and shall

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remain at all times, “at‐will,” and Company may terminate

Employee’s employment at any time for any reason or for no reason,

and Employee may terminate employment at any time for any

reason or for no reason.

Joint App. 218 (emphases omitted).  Neither this paragraph nor any other

provision of the contract states that the employer‐employee relationship

commenced with the execution of the Compensation Agreement or otherwise

uses language stating that the employment relationship replaced a prior

contractual arrangement.  The use of the phrase “has employed you” does not

indicate specifically when the employment relationship commenced.  Although

contractual language referring to the payment of commissions “beginning on the

third month after commencement of employment” and an example concerning

January sales commissions might suggest an understanding that the contractual

employment relationship began in January 2012, Joint App. 219, they are not

determinative of the start date for Plaintiffs‐Appelleesʹ employment.  Instead, it

is only through parol evidence that we know that the employer‐employee

relationship commenced when Pratt and Burrell signed the Compensation

Agreements.  Solely reading within the four corners of the contract, we cannot

discern whether the parties intended for the arbitration agreement’s scope to

cover the current dispute.  Since the plain language of the Compensation

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Agreement is ambiguous, we turn to whether parol evidence sheds light on the

parties’ intent.

Defendants‐Appellants contend that the arbitration clause here is

susceptible of an interpretation that covers the dispute at issue here because Pratt

and Burrell allege that they were Cellular Sales employees prior to signing the

Compensation Agreements.10  In response, Plaintiffs‐Appellees contend that the

prior Sales Agreements and the conduct of the parties reveals positive assurance

that the parties did not intend for the arbitration agreement to apply to claims

that arose during the time period when Defendants‐Appellants affirmatively

labeled Plaintiffs‐Appellees as non‐employees.11   

                                                            

10 Defendants‐Appellants also submit that Pratt and Burrell have not proffered forceful

evidence that supports a finding of non‐arbitrability.  Their argument is rooted in a line

of Supreme Court cases that relate to arbitration clauses in collective bargaining

agreements.  See United Steel Workers Local 4‐5025 v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 565

F.3d 99, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see, e.g., AT&T Techs. v. Commc’ns Workers of

Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986).  As the Supreme Court has noted, “arbitrators are in a

better position than courts to interpret the terms of a [collective bargaining agreement].”  

Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78 (1998) (emphasis omitted).  Although

this Court has also required forceful evidence to rebut the presumption of arbitrability

in the context of international arbitration agreements, we reasoned that such an

approach was correct because “[t]he policy in favor of arbitration is even stronger in the

context of international business transactions” than the typical case.  David L. Threlkeld

& Co. v. Metallgesellschaft, Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1991).  Defendants‐Appellants

have not persuaded us that the forceful evidence requirement should be extended to the

contract presently before us.      

11 In the alternative, Plaintiffs‐Appellees submit that we can affirm based on the alleged

unconscionability of certain aspects of the arbitration agreement.  Our resolution of the

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Defendants‐Appellants are correct that this Court has held that broad

arbitration provisions that contain no express temporal limitation can apply to

claims that arose prior to the execution of the arbitration agreement.  For

example, in Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972), the

plaintiff had signed an arbitration agreement as part of his application for

membership in the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”); it provided that the

parties agreed to arbitrate “[a]ny controversy between . . . members . . . .”  Id. at

1211–12 (alteration in original).  The plaintiff subsequently brought claims

against another NYSE member named Pressprich.  See id.  The plaintiff argued

that he should not be required to arbitrate because the claim predated the

arbitration agreement; this Court disagreed.  See id.  We reasoned that, even

though the claim predated the arbitration agreement, the plaintiff had signed it

“with full knowledge that he had a claim against Pressprich and that Pressprich

was a Stock Exchange member.”  Id. at 1212.12  Unfortunately for the Defendants‐

                                                                                                                                                                                               

arbitrability issue in Plaintiffs‐Appellees’ favor makes it unnecessary for us to evaluate

the merits of their unconscionability arguments in the first instance.   

12 Defendants‐Appellants also cite Arrigo v. Blue Fish Commodities, 408 F. App’x 480 (2d

Cir. 2011) (summary order), a case in which we stated that an arbitration clause that

applied to “all federal and state statutory claims” covered employment‐based claims

that predated the arbitration clause.  Id. at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted).  

However, in that case, the plaintiff signed a “comprehensive employment agreement”

containing an arbitration clause “three months into his employment.”  Id. We conclude

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Appellants, though, Coenen and cases like it are simply not on point.  We are not

persuaded by Defendants‐Appellants’ argument that we must interpret the

arbitration agreement here to have an expansive temporal scope simply because

this Court has done so in other cases.  Instead, the correct approach is to assess

whether the parties intended for the arbitration clause to cover the present

dispute.  

Based on the parties’ conduct prior to executing the Compensation

Agreements, the presumption of arbitrability is overcome because we find

positive assurance that the arbitration clause’s scope—at least insofar as it

concerns the promise to arbitrate matters arising out of, or in relation to

Employee’s employment—is temporally limited.  We reach this conclusion, in

large part, based on the fact that when the Compensation Agreements were

signed, the parties’ contractual positions changed in a way that impacted

arbitrability.  In the Sales Agreements, Defendants‐Appellants agreed with the

Sales Companies that Pratt and Burrell were not employees of Cellular Sales.  

However, about a year and a half later, Defendants‐Appellants agreed to employ

                                                                                                                                                                                               

that Arrigo is distinguishable because there was no allegation in that case, as there is

here, that the parties’ contractual relationship changed in a way that implicated the

arbitration clause at the time the contract containing the arbitration agreement was

executed.   

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Pratt and Burrell.13  This evolving business relationship is directly relevant to

whether the parties intended to have an employment relationship prior to

executing the Compensation Agreement.  It would be inconsistent with the

parties’ conduct to construe the Compensation Agreement, which referenced

“employment,” to apply to a period when the parties themselves did not

contemplate such a relationship.  See Mehler v. Terminix Int’l Co., 205 F.3d 44, 49–

50 (2d Cir. 2000) (determining scope of arbitration agreement by the contract’s

“language, the timing of its execution, and the conduct of the parties”).  

Defendants‐Appellants’ change in course is just the type of positive assurance

required to show that the parties did not intend for the arbitration clause to cover

the current dispute.   

Our conclusion is confirmed by our examination of the allegations in the

complaint.  To assess whether these allegations touch matters covered by the

arbitration agreement, Defendants‐Appellants would have us look at the

complaint’s allegation that Pratt and Burrell were in fact Defendants‐Appellants’

                                                            

13 As late as December 28, 2011, an office manager at Cellular Sales explained how to fill

out the employment application correctly, clarifying that recipients of her e‐mail were

not employees: “Everyone please make sure you answer the Y/N questions correctly on

the Employment Application.  You are not currently an employee of Cellular Sales‐‐you are

CONTRACTED with Cellular Sales; you are an employee of your own company (LLC or

Corp).”  Joint App. 257 (emphasis added).

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statutory employees prior to executing the Compensation Agreements.  That

argument, although superficially appealing, is wrong.  The complaint’s factual

allegations include the manner in which Pratt and Burrell worked for

Defendants‐Appellants and how Defendants‐Appellants exercised control over

that work.  These factual allegations do not touch matters covered by the

arbitration clause because they do not evince the parties’ intent to enter into an

employment relationship.  Instead, the more salient factual allegation for

assessing the arbitration agreement’s scope is how Defendants‐Appellants labeled

Pratt and Burrell as non‐employees.   

For purposes of the FLSA, a company’s decision to label a worker as an

“independent contractor” or a non‐employee will not carry the day.  See Irizarry

v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013).  Contract law, on the other hand, is

an area of law where labels matter.  The focal point of this dispute is not related

to the Compensation Agreements.  Defendants‐Appellants have maintained

before the district court that Pratt and Burrell were independent contractors, and

they may attempt to use the Sales Agreements to prove that.  This dispute is

about events that transpired when the Sales Agreements were in effect, and these

contracts have their own dispute resolution mechanism.  After Defendants‐

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Appellants affirmatively stated that Pratt and Burrell were not employees for

over a year, it rings hollow for them to now argue that the parties intended the

word “employment” in the Compensation Agreements to apply retroactively as

to this dispute.  Finding positive assurance that the parties did not intend for the

arbitration agreement to be retroactive, we affirm the district court’s denial of the

motion to compel arbitration.   

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  

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