Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01922/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01922-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SHEILA BLACKMAN-BAHAM, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SALLY JEWELL, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 15-cv-01922-JSW 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND 

Re: Dkt. No. 8 

Now before the Court is the motion of Defendant Sally Jewell, Secretary, Department of 

Interior (“Defendant”) to dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Sheila Blackman-Baham 

(“Plaintiff”) (Docket No. 8). The Court has considered the parties’ papers, relevant legal 

authority, and the record in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the 

motion to dismiss, with leave to amend.1

BACKGROUND 

For the purposes of this motion to dismiss, the Court takes the factual allegations in the 

Complaint as true. Plaintiff is a former Contract Specialist for the National Park Service, United 

States Department of the Interior. (Compl. ¶ 6(b), (e).) She began working at the National Park 

Service in November 2005. (Id. ¶ 6(b).) Her employment was terminated in April 2009. (Id. ¶ 

6(x).) 

 

1

 Additionally, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the Complaint, two 

Orders, and the Judgment filed in Blackman-Baham v. Salazar, No. C 10-02656 JSW (N.D. Cal.) 

(Docket No. 8-2). See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Court does not reach Plaintiff’s objection to the 

Declaration of Karen Glasgow in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, because the Court 

does not rely on the Glasgow declaration in ruling on the motion to dismiss. 

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Plaintiff’s work was initially evaluated as “superior.” (Id. ¶ 6(d).) However, in April 

2008, Plaintiff attended a two week training course. (Id. ¶ 6(g).) When she returned, various 

circumstances led her to believe that the Lead Contract Specialist and/or her First Line Supervisor 

had improperly accessed the agency’s electronic contracting database using Plaintiff’s login 

credentials, without her consent. (Id. ¶¶ 6(g)-(l).) She reported this to the Agency’s Inspector 

General, Information Security Office, and Manager of Information Systems. (Id. ¶ 6(m).) The 

Information Security Officer determined that “several rules and regulations were broken” and 

required Plaintiff’s supervisor to document his actions while using Plaintiff’s login credentials. 

(Id. ¶ 6(n).) 

After this incident, Plaintiff’s supervisor began to take punitive personnel actions towards 

Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 6(p).) He criticized her via email and verbally in front of other employees, and 

encouraged others to criticize her; reprimanded her; lowered her rating in her performance 

evaluation, an action with consequences to her compensation and potential promotions; and 

threatened her with suspension. (Id. ¶¶ 6(p)-(s), (v)-(x), (aa).) He employed another employee to 

review Plaintiff’s work, and this employee harassed Plaintiff and altered her timecards. (Id. ¶¶ 

6(t)-(u).) Plaintiff’s supervisor also began to deny her accommodations that she had previously 

been granted due to her own physical and mental health conditions and her caregiving 

responsibilities for her mother and grandmother. (Id. ¶¶ 6(b)-(c), (w), (y)-(z), (bb)-(gg.) Finally, 

Plaintiff was suspended for two weeks, and then her employment was terminated. (Id. ¶ 6(x), 

(hh)-(ii).) 

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the agency failed to accommodate her physical health 

conditions, even prior to her alleged whistleblower activities. “When first reporting to the 

Agency,” Plaintiff informed her supervisor that she had an injury. (Id. ¶¶ 6(b).) She alleges that 

this injury was due to right knee surgery in 1999, which led to hip and back problems. (Id.) She 

requested accommodation for her injury in May 2006, after her doctor told her to avoid prolonged 

sitting and suggested an ergonomic review. (Id.) She alleges that she did not receive an 

ergonomic review and a standup desk for approximately two years. (Id.) She further alleges that 

the delay caused her “to suffer additional health issues, like depression and sciatica.” (Id.) 

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On April June 17, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court alleging employment 

discrimination against Kenneth L. Salazar, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior. See 

Blackman-Baham v. Salazar, No. 10-cv-02656 (N.D. Cal. 2010). In the 2010 action, Plaintiff 

alleged discrimination on the basis of her disabilities, sex, whistleblower activity, and race or 

color; failure to accommodate her disabilities; retaliation for her whistleblower activity; and 

unlawful termination of her employment on the same bases and while she was sick with an on-thejob injury. (Id. Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleged that the discrimination occurred on or about April 

11, 2009, the date of her termination. (Id.) 

On December 10, 2010, this Court denied Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma 

pauperis and dismissed the complaint in the 2010 action with leave to amend. (Id. Dkt. No. 7.) In 

the 2010 action, Plaintiff alleged that she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), but alleged that she did so almost a year after her 

employment was terminated. (Id.) Because, in general, a charge must be filed with the EEOC 

within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), the 

Court found that the complaint was untimely, and that Plaintiff had not shown equitable tolling. 

(No. 10-cv-02656, Dkt. No. 7.) However, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend, and referred 

her to the Legal Help Center in the courthouse. (Id.) The Court warned Plaintiff that failure 

timely to file an amended complaint would result in dismissal with prejudice. (Id.) Plaintiff did 

not file an amended complaint or any other filing in response to the Court’s order, and, on January 

28, 2011, the Court dismissed the 2010 action with prejudice and entered judgment. (Id. Dkt. Nos. 

8, 9.) Plaintiff did not appeal. 

Plaintiff filed this action on April 29, 2015. In Plaintiff’s Complaint, she asserts claims 

pursuant to: (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., (“Title VII”); (2) the 

Whistleblowing Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2012); (3) “Disability Discrimination”; 

and (4) the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq (“FMLA”). 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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ANALYSIS 

A. All Claims in the Complaint Are Barred by Res Judicata. 

Defendant moves for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on the basis of res judicata. In 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Defendant contended that Plaintiff’s termination and 

whistleblower claims are precluded by res judicata. (Dkt. No. 8.) In reply to Plaintiff’s 

opposition, however, Defendant contended that the opposition brief combined with the Complaint 

in this action and the 2010 action made clear that all of Plaintiff’s claims barred by res judicata. 

(Dkt. No. 18.) The Court therefore gave the parties the opportunity to file supplemental briefs so 

that Plaintiff would have a full opportunity to respond to Defendant’s contention that the entire 

case should be dismissed on the basis of res judicata. The supplemental briefs have now been 

filed and considered. 

“Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars litigation in a subsequent action of any 

claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action.” Owens v. Kaiser 

Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Western Radio Servs. 

Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir.1997)). “To trigger the doctrine of res judicata, the 

earlier suit must have (1) involved the same ‘claim’ or cause of action as the later suit, (2) reached 

a final judgment on the merits, and (3) involved identical parties or privies.” Sidhu v. Flecto Co., 

279 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“The central criterion in determining whether there is an identity of claims between the 

first and second adjudications is whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus 

of facts.” Owens, 244 F.3d at 714 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Newly 

articulated claims based on the same nucleus of facts may still be subject to a res judicata finding 

if the claims could have been brought in the earlier action.” Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 

Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). If the earlier 

action was resolved on the merits, res judicata bars all grounds of recovery in the later action that 

could have been asserted in the earlier action. Id. The relevant inquiry is not whether the claims 

being asserted actually were pursued in the earlier action, but whether they could have been 

pursued. Id. In determining whether two claims are the same, the Ninth Circuit employs the 

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following criteria: “(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be 

destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same 

evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the 

same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” 

Nordhorn v. Ladish Co., 9 F.3d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 

1. The Two Actions Involve the Same Parties or Privies. 

There is no dispute that the two cases involve the same parties or privies. In each case, 

Plaintiff has sued the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, although the individual holding 

that office has changed. 

2. The Two Actions Involve the Same “Claims” or Causes of Action. 

The 2010 action involved the same “claims” or cause of action as this action. Although set 

forth in more detail in the current complaint, Plaintiff’s claims for employment discrimination, 

retaliation, and termination on the basis of her race, sex, disability, and whistleblower activity, as 

well as her claim of failure to accommodate her disability, not only could have been, but actually 

were, alleged in the 2010 action. 

Plaintiff’s FMLA claim in the current action presents a closer question. No FMLA claim 

was alleged in the prior action. It plainly could have been, however. The FMLA arises arise “out 

of the same transactional nucleus of facts” as the other claims that were included in the 2010 

action and again in the present action. Nordhorn, 9 F.3d at 1405. 

In particular, the FMLA claim is inextricably intertwined with Plaintiff’s claim of 

retaliation for her whistleblower activity, which was asserted in both actions. In the current 

complaint, Plaintiff alleges that her supervisor provided “reasonable accommodations” to permit 

her to care for her mother and her grandmother “until she made a disclosure to the agency’s 

[Inspector General]. After the disclosure [her supervisor] harassed plaintiff and denied her leave 

for her care giving responsibilities.” (Compl. ¶ 6(c).) Plaintiff also alleges that the absence from 

work that led to Plaintiff’s suspension and termination was due, in part, to the fact that Plaintiff 

“was still dealing with her mother’s critical care needs.” (Id. ¶ 6(gg).) With such factual 

allegations, substantially the same evidence would need to be presented for Plaintiff’s claims 

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relating to whistleblower protection, retaliation, and her termination as for her FMLA claim. See 

Nordhorn, 9 F.3d at 1405. 

The fact that Plaintiff now “seek[s] new remedies under a new legal theory” does not mean 

that her FMLA claim involves infringement of a different right. Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. 

Codispoti, 63 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying Washington law). Plaintiff “cannot avoid 

the bar of res judicata merely by alleging conduct by the defendant not alleged in [the] prior action 

or by pleading a new legal theory.” McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1986); 

see also Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that ERISA claim 

was barred where the plaintiff’s prior action had been dismissed because his state law claim was 

preempted by ERISA and he had failed to amend the prior complaint to state a valid ERISA 

claim). A judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on her FMLA claim in the present action would impair the 

judgment in Defendant’s favor in the 2010 action on the closely intertwined claims relating to 

retaliation for whistleblower activity and Plaintiff’s termination. Defendant is entitled to repose 

on those issues. 

3. The 2010 Action Resulted in a Final Judgment on the Merits. 

Proceedings in the 2010 action reached a final judgment on the merits. The action was 

dismissed with prejudice when Plaintiff failed timely to file an amended complaint. (No. 10-cv02656, Dkt. No. 8.) A dismissal for failure to prosecute constitutes an adjudication on the merits 

for the purpose of res judicata. Owens, 244 F.3d at 714. Plaintiff’s contention that res judicata 

may not be applied because no evidence was presented in the 2010 action, which was dismissed at 

the pleadings stage, is contrary to Ninth Circuit law. See id. 

Plaintiff contends that she could not have brought her Title VII claims in the previous 

action because she had not yet received a necessary “right to sue” letter from the EEOC. Id. at 

714-15. Therefore, she says, the 2010 action cannot be a final adjudication of those claims. 

However, Plaintiff could have sought a stay of the 2010 action for the purpose of pursuing Title 

VII administrative remedies, or could have sought leave to amend the 2010 action to include the 

Title VII claims. Id. at 715. She failed to exercise either option. Therefore, her Title VII claims 

are not exempt from the doctrine of res judicata in this subsequent action. Id. 

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Plaintiff also contends that this Court should not treat the judgment in the 2010 action as a 

final judgment on the merits for the purpose of res judicata because to do so would be a violation 

of due process. The Court denied Plaintiff’s application to file her complaint in the 2010 action in 

forma pauperis, in the same order dismissing her complaint with leave to amend. At the time, she 

contends, she could not afford the filing fee. She argues that denial of leave to file a complaint in 

forma pauperis should be without prejudice to the filing of a paid complaint. However, the 2010 

action was not dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee. It was dismissed for failure to file an 

amended complaint. Plaintiff was granted leave to amend, and could have filed an application for 

leave to file the amended complaint in forma pauperis. The Court warned Plaintiff that failure to 

file an amended complaint would result in the dismissal of her action with prejudice. Yet she did 

not file an amended complaint. Nor did she file an amended motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis; a request for a stay of proceedings; a request for reconsideration of the order that 

dismissal would be with prejudice; or even a notice of appeal. Id.; see also Stewart, 297 F.3d at 

959 (noting that in first action, the plaintiffs “did not seek leave to amend or dismiss ‘without 

prejudice’”). She filed nothing, and a final judgment with prejudice was, accordingly, entered. 

The Court notes, sua sponte, that there were facts which Plaintiff could have brought to the 

attention of the Court in the 2010 action, had she filed an amended complaint when given leave to 

do so, which might possibly have prevented dismissal based on statute of limitations and 

administrative exhaustion grounds in that action. In her complaint in the 2010 action, Plaintiff 

alleged that she had filed an EEOC complaint on March 21, 2010. The Court found that this was 

more than 180 days after the termination of her employment on April 11, 2009, and therefore 

untimely. (No. 10-cv-02656, Dkt. No. 7.) The attachments to the Complaint in this action, 

however, indicate that Plaintiff also filed two other, prior complaints with the EEOC: one on 

August 5, 2008 and another after her termination in April 2009. Even if this means that Plaintiff 

timely exhausted her administrative remedies for at least some of her claims before filing the 2010 

action, however, the Court can grant no relief from the operation of res judicata in the present 

action. Plaintiff did not amend her complaint in the 2010 action to allege these facts, nor has she 

filed a motion for relief from the judgment in the 2010 action to attempt to present these facts to 

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the Court.2 In the 2010 action, the Court ruled based on the facts presented to it at that time. That 

“new evidence might change the outcome of the case does not affect application of” the doctrine 

of res judicata. Saylor v. United States, 315 F.3d 664, 668 (6th Cir. 2003). Indeed, the “res 

judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits” would not even be “altered 

by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong.” Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 

452-U.S. 394, 398 (1981). 

Because the facts of Owens are so closely aligned to those in this case, the Court is bound 

by that decision. All claims in this action are barred by res judicata. The 2010 action involved 

identical parties or privies; involved the same ‘claim’ or cause of action as the present case; and 

reached a final judgment on the merits. See Sidhu v. Flecto Co., 279 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

B. Plaintiff’s FMLA Claim Also Is Time-Barred. 

Additionally, the only claim in this action not actually included in the 2010 action, 

although it could have been included, was Plaintiff’s FMLA claim. The Court dismisses this 

claim for the additional reason that it is time-barred. An action for violation of the FMLA must be 

brought “not later than 2 years after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation for 

which the action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1). Plaintiff does not allege the specific dates 

upon which her supervisors harassed her about her caregiving responsibilities to her mother and 

grandmother in violation of the FMLA. However, it is evident from the Complaint that these 

events occurred prior to the termination of Plaintiff’s employment on April 11, 2009. 

Accordingly, the “date of the last event constituting the alleged [FMLA] violation,” is, at the very 

latest, April 11, 2009. Id. Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action on April 29, 2015, more than 

six years after her termination and more than four years after the statute of limitations expired. 

 

2

 Cf. In re Williams, 298 F.3d 458, 461-462 & n. 3 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The fact that a judgment may 

be subject to a motion for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) does not affect the finality of the 

judgment. If the debtors wish to move for relief from the district court’s [prior] order under Rule 

60(b) on the ground that it was based on a mutual mistake, the debtors must do so in the district 

court that issued the order.”). Of course, such a motion might be untimely. The Court does not, in 

the present action, address whether a motion in the 2010 action under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(1) would be timely or whether Plaintiff could meet the stringent standard for 

relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) or any other provision. 

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Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss indicates that she contends that equitable 

tolling may be available during this time because she was complying with the requirements of 

administrative exhaustion, but she provides no legal authority to support the position that her 

FMLA claims, which were not part of the EEOC proceedings, were equitably tolled for this 

reason. (Dkt. No. 15, at 11-12.) Nor does she plead, in her Complaint, any facts to support her 

suggestion that Defendant’s deceptive conduct should provide a basis for tolling. (Id.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s FMLA claim is dismissed as time-barred in addition to being barred by 

res judicata. 

C. The Court Grants Leave to Amend. 

Where the Court grants a motion to dismiss, the Court grants leave to amend, unless 

amendment would be futile. See, e.g., Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 

1990); Cook, Perkiss & Lieche, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th 

Cir. 1990). The rule favoring liberality in amendments is particularly important for pro se 

litigants. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). An “amended 

complaint may only allege ‘other facts consistent with the challenged pleading,’” Reddy, 912 F.2d 

at 297 (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 

1986)). Here, it is not “absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect.” Lucas v. Dep’t 

of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Accordingly, the Court grants leave to 

amend. 

The Court does not reach Defendants’ remaining arguments for dismissal. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s 

Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff may file an amended complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order and 

consistent with the allegations of her original Complaint in this action by April 5, 2016. 

Defendants shall have 21 days thereafter to file their response thereto. 

/// 

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pre

Da

If no am

ejudice. 

IT IS S

ated: March 1

mended com

SO ORDER

15, 2016 

mplaint is file

RED. 

10

d by April 5, 2016, this 

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Un

case shall b

FFREY S. W

ited States D

e dismissed 

HITE 

istrict Judg

with 

e 

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