Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01099/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01099-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 1

Participation.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID FABBRINI, )

) 2:07-CV-1099-GEB-CMK

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

CITY OF DUNSMUIR, JOHN FISHER, )

BILL SANFORD, KEITH ANDERSON, and )

DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants seek attorney’s fees and costs incurred in moving

to strike Plaintiff’s defamation claim under California’s Anti-SLAPP

statue. Plaintiff objects to the fee request, arguing (1) the amount 1

of time Defendants spent preparing the motion was unreasonable and (2)

Defendants are not entitled to recover fees incurred drafting portions

of the Anti-SLAPP motion which were intertwined with Defendants’

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unsuccessful motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal malicious

prosecution claim.

“[A] prevailing defendant on a[n] [Anti-SLAPP motion] shall

be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” Cal.

Code Civ. P. § 425.16(c). “An award of attorney fees and costs [under

the Anti-SLAPP statute] must be reasonable,” and the court has “broad

discretion in determining the reasonable amount of attorney fees and

costs to award to a prevailing defendant.” Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v.

Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1221-22 (S.D. Cal. 2002). “[F]ees

incurred in drafting the [Anti-SLAPP motion that] overlap those fees

incurred in drafting the motion to dismiss . . . are recoverable [if]

they were ‘in connection with’ the motion to strike and were

‘necessary to prevail.’” Mory v. City of Chula Vista, 2008 WL 360449,

*11-12 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2008) (quoting Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v.

Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1221-24 (S.D. Cal. 2002)).

I. Anti-SLAPP Portion of Motion

Defendants’ counsel spent 58.2 hours solely on the AntiSLAPP portion of the motion. (See Decl. Cori Sarno in Supp. of Defs.’

Mot. for Atty’s Fees (“Sarno Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-7, Ex. A.) Plaintiff

contends the amount of time Defendants’ counsel spent preparing the

Anti-SLAPP motion was unreasonable since the motion was

“uncomplicated” and Plaintiff indicated in his opposition to the

motion that he intended to withdraw his defamation claim. (Opp’n at

3-4.) However, Defendants argue the motion was fairly complicated

since it involved investigation of the factual basis of Plaintiff’s

defamation claim as well as the issue of whether Plaintiff had

complied with California’s Government Claims Act. (Defs.’ Reply at

6:20-8:28.) Further, Defendants argue they were entitled to

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attorney’s fees under California law even if Plaintiff intended to

withdraw his defamation claim. See eCash Techs., Inc. v. Guagliardo,

210 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Plaintiff has not shown

that the amount of time Defendants spent just preparing the Anti-SLAPP

portion of the motion was unreasonable under the circumstances;

therefore, Defendants are entitled to $8,180.50 in attorney’s fees for

the 58.2 hours spent preparing the Anti-SLAPP portion of the motion.

II. “Inextricably Intertwined” Portions of Motion

Defendants also seek 75.6 hours “incurred with respect to

portions of the Motion to Dismiss/[Anti-SLAPP motion] which, although

common to both motions, were ‘inextricably intertwined with,’ and thus

incurred ‘in connection with,’ Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motion.” (Mot.

at 3:23-27.) Defendants submitted a single memorandum of points and

authorities and a single reply brief to support both their successful

Anti-SLAPP motion and their unsuccessful motion to dismiss.

Defendants’ timesheet identifies entries that Defendants

contend were inextricably intertwined with the Anti-SLAPP motion. 

However, one of these entries was not connected to the Anti-SLAPP

motion: Defendants seek 1.2 hours of attorney’s fees for

“[p]repar[ing] evidence as exhibits to Declaration of Cori Sarno in

Support of Motion to Dismiss/Anti-SLAPP Motion.” (See Sarno Decl. Ex.

A.) This evidence did not relate to the Anti-SLAPP portion of

Defendant’s motion; therefore, this time is not recoverable. (See

Decl. of Cori Sarno in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and Mot. to

Strike.)

Further, several timesheet entries contain “block billing”

which consists of multiple tasks entered as a single entry; some of

these tasks are inextricably intertwined with the Anti-SLAPP motion

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and some are not. The timesheet does not explain how much time was

spent on each task within an entry. Defendants seek four hours of

attorney’s fees for “[f]urther drafting of background facts and [the]

Section 1983 section of motion.” (See Sarno Decl. Ex. A.) The

background facts were “inextricably intertwined” with the Anti-SLAPP

motion, but the drafting of the Section 1983 portion of the motion was

not. Defendants also seek 1.6 hours of attorney’s fees for: “Receive

e-mail from [client] regarding opposition and draft response e-mail;

[b]egin research for Reply regarding elements of malicious

prosecution.” (Sarno Decl. Ex. A.) The e-mail from the client was

inextricably intertwined, but the research on Plaintiff’s malicious

prosecution claim was not. Defendants also seek 10.2 hours of

attorney’s fees for: “Supplement research on regarding legislative

immunity, Noerr-Pennington immunity, burdens of proof for immunity,

dismissal with prejudice and research plaintiff’s authority for

malicious prosecution arguments; continue drafting Reply introduction,

argument regarding Noerr-Pennington doctrine and edit and supplement

draft of entire Reply.” (Sarno Decl. Ex. A.) Only the “continue

drafting Reply introduction” and the “edit and supplement draft of

entire Reply” tasks listed in this entry were inextricably intertwined

with the Anti-SLAPP motion.

Defendants as the moving parties have the burden to submit

supporting documentation with their fee motion that provides

“sufficient detail so that the Court can determine ‘with a high degree

of certainty’ that the hours billed were actually and reasonably

expended.” Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified Sch. Dist., 2004 WL 4999156,

*2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2004) (quoting Watkins v. Vance, 328 F. Supp. 2d

27, 31 (D.C.2004)). Courts “frow[n] on block billing where discrete

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and unrelated tasks are lumped into one entry, as the practice can

make it impossible . . . to determine the reasonableness of the hours

spent on each task.” Defenbaugh v. JBC & Assocs., Inc., 2004 WL

1874978, *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004). When a party has used “block

billing,” the court has discretion to deny recovery of attorney’s fees

for the block-billed entry. See Pande v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 2008 WL

906507, *8 n.5 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 2008) (denying recovery of

attorney’s fees for entry which included both recoverable and nonrecoverable tasks); Oberdorfer v. Glickman, 2001 WL 34045732, *4-5 (D.

Or. Sept. 14, 2001) (same); Reyes v. Nations Title Agency of Ill.,

Inc., 2001 WL 687451, *1 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2001) (same); Harper v.

City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 605 (7th Cir. 2000) (“When a

fee petition is vague or inadequately documented, a district court may

. . . strike the problematic entries . . . .”).

 Since the block billing that was used “makes it impossible

to determine how much of the time was spent” on tasks inextricably

intertwined to the Anti-SLAPP motion, “the entire time for these

block-billed entries,” or 15.8 hours, is excluded. See Pande, 2008 WL

906507, *8 n.5. This exclusion plus the non-recoverable time of 1.2

hours which was not connected to the Anti-SLAPP motion, reduces the

75.6 hours in fees Defendants seek, and reveals Defendants are

entitled to 58.6 hours, or $8,374, for this portion of their motion.

II. Attorney’s Fees Motion

Defendants also request attorney’s fees and costs incurred

in connection with their attorney’s fees motion. (Mot. at 4:19-26.) 

“Time spent preparing a motion for attorneys’ fees is generally

compensable.” Cohen v. Williams, 2007 WL 174329, at *4 (E.D. Cal.

Jan. 22, 2007). Defendants counsel spent 32.7 hours preparing their

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attorney’s fees motion, which amounts to $4,006.25 in attorney’s fees. 

(Sarno Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B.) This amount does not include time

Defendants spent preparing their reply brief in support of their

attorney’s fees motion, since Defendants failed to submit

documentation in support of their argument that they are entitled to

these fees. 

IV. Summary

For the stated reasons, Defendants prevail in part on their

attorney’s fees motion, and are granted $20,560.75 in attorney’s fees

($8,180.50 for the Anti-SLAPP portion of their motion, $8,374 for the

inextricably intertwined portions of their motion, and $4,006.25 for

their attorney’s fees motion).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 21, 2008

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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