Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01139/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01139-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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06cv1139

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK DARULIS,

Petitioner,

v.

VINCENT J. IARIA,

Respondent.

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Civil No. 06cv1139-L(CAB)

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND

DENYING PETITION WITH

PREJUDICE

Petitioner Mark Darulis, proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). The case was referred to United States Magistrate

Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(d). Respondent filed a response and Petitioner filed a

traverse. The Magistrate Judge initially issued a Report and Recommendation recommending to

deny the Petition. Upon consideration of Petitioner’s objections, the court adopted the Report

and Recommendation in part and remanded it to develop the record regarding one of Petitioner’s

theories of his due process claim. Having developed and considered the record, the Magistrate

Judge recommended denying the Petition and imposing sanctions on Petitioner pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3) for factual misrepresentations to the court. Petitioner

timely objected. Respondent did not respond. For the reasons which follow, the Report and

Recommendation is ADOPTED IN PART. The Petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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Petitioner pled guilty to driving under the influence. In his Petition, he alleged ineffective

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment and violation of his due process rights

in that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Initially, the Magistrate Judge

recommended denying all of Petitioner’s claims. This court adopted the Report and

Recommendation with respect to the ineffective assistance claims and certain aspects of the due

process claim, but remanded with respect to Petitioner’s argument, raised for the first time in his

objections, that the trial court failed to conduct a colloquy to ensure a voluntary and knowing

plea and that the trial court altered the plea form after Petitioner had signed it. (See Objections

filed Apr. 2, 2008 at 3-4.) Upon obtaining the audio tape of the change of plea hearing, the

Magistrate Judge recommended denying this claim and imposing Rule 11 sanctions because

Petitioner’s representations to the court about the plea hearing and alteration of the plea form are

negated by the audio tape of the hearing. 

In reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court “shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,”

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, “the district judge must

review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but

not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc)

(emphasis in original); see Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225-26 & n.5 (D. Ariz.

2003) (applying Reyna-Tapia to habeas review). 

First, Petitioner objects by stating that he “stands by” his due process claim that the trial

judge abused discretion when he denied his request for a continuance of trial. (See Objections at

1-2.) This claim was addressed in the initial Report and Recommendation and denied by this

court on August 26, 2008. Accordingly, the time to move for reconsideration has long passed. 

Even if Petitioner had timely moved to reconsider this issue, upon review of his arguments, the

court finds they would not warrant reconsideration.

Second, Petitioner asserts his due process rights were violated because the trial judge

“never interrogated him about his plea.” (Objections at 2.) However, rather than basing his

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argument on the prior theory that no colloquy took place, Petitioner has changed it to argue that

the colloquy was insufficient. (See Objections at 2-5 (“There is nothing in the transcript that the

court interrogated petitioner of [sic] the ‘consequences of his plea;” “The Court Gave Petitioner

False Information Concerning His Sentence;” and “The Courts [sic] Recitation Of Constitutional

Rights Is A Sham”).) 

This is the second time in this proceeding that Petitioner has changed the legal theory of

this due process claim. In the Petition and Traverse, Petitioner’s theory was that his guilty plea

was coerced because the trial judge denied his request for a continuance of trial. In his April 2,

2008 objections to the recommendation to deny this claim, Petitioner argued that his plea was

involuntary because “the judge never interrogated him” and altered the plea form without

Petitioner’s consent ( see Objections filed Apr. 2, 2008 at 3, 4-5). Because of the seriousness of

the allegations and lack of record on point, this court remanded the case for development of the

record.

The audio tape of the change of plea hearing contradicted in all respects Petitioner’s

representations regarding what transpired. The trial court conducted a thorough colloquy and

informed Petitioner of all the constitutional rights he would be waiving by his guilty plea. 

(Lodgment no. 17, lodged Nov. 12, 2008 (certified copy of the audio recording of proceedings in

San Diego County Superior Court case no. S181754, People v. Darulis, on Apr. 28, 2004).) 

Furthermore, the audio tape shows that Petitioner consented to the judge’s amendment of the

plea form to conform it to Petitioner’s oral statement of the factual basis for the plea. (Id.) 

Petitioner’s assertion in his Objections that he did not mean what he said at the hearing is

unavailing.

Upon being confronted with this record and the Magistrate Judge’s renewed

recommendation to deny the Petition, Petitioner again changed the theory of his claim. His latest

argument is that the colloquy was insufficient. This argument is rejected for several reasons. 

First, it was not presented to the state court so as to comply with the exhaustion requirements of

28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A). The argument presented to the state court was that the trial judge did

not conduct a colloquy. (See Lodgment no. 10; Ground 5.) Second, Petitioner did not include

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this theory of the claim in the Petition and therefore failed to properly raise it before this court. 

See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioner remained silent

about this theory in his Traverse and the April 2, 2008 objections to the initial Report and

Recommendation. He raised it only when presented with an unfavorable record. Third, upon

review of the audio tape recording of the change of plea hearing, the court finds the colloquy

complies with the federal constitutional requirements. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,

242-44 (1969). 

Last, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to impose sanctions

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3) for making false factual representations to

the court. He claims that he “stands by every word he has written to [sic] an event that happened

years ago and petitioner only had his memory for details.” (Objections at 6.)

Rule 11of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts

(“Habeas Rule 11") applies Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to habeas corpus proceedings “to

the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules.” The Ninth

Circuit has not determined whether Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 11")

is applicable. However, the issue was considered by two other circuits, which concluded that

Rule 11 was applicable in habeas proceedings at least under some circumstances. See Anderson

v. Butler, 886 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Quin, 836 F.2d 654, 656-57 (1st

Cir. 1987). Petitioner was not incarcerated for his crime and the purpose of his petition is to

avoid or ameliorate the judgment’s effect on a collateral matter of a civil nature – his ability to

obtain insurance as commercial driver. (See Traverse at 8). In this regard, Petitioner’s case is

similar to Quin, where the First Circuit found Rule 11 applicable due to analogous

circumstances. Accordingly, the application of Rule 11 in this case would not be inconsistent

with the habeas statute or the rules governing habeas corpus proceedings.

Petitioner’s pro se status does not mitigate his exposure to sanctions for violations of his

duty regarding representations to the court. Rule 11, by express terms, applies to parties like

Petitioner who are proceeding pro se. Fed. R. Civ. P 11(b) (“an attorney or unrepresented

party”). Furthermore, these court’s civil local rules expressly apply to unrepresented litigants,

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and subject them to sanctions for violations of procedural rules. Civ. Loc. R. 83.11(a). A

litigant’s pro se status without more is not a legally sufficient reason to decline imposition of

sanctions. Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1994).

Rule 11(a) mandates that every pleading be signed by the attorney or “by a party

personally if the party is unrepresented.” By filing a pleading with the court, the attorney or

unrepresented party 

certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed

after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the factual contentions

have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have

evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or

discovery . . ..

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). The audiotape of the plea hearing contradicts the representation in

Petitioner’s April 2, 2008 objections that the colloquy did not take place and the suggestion that

the trial judge altered the plea form without consent. Upon review of the record, it is plain that

Petitioner’s representations were false in more than mere “details” (cf. Objections at 6), and that

Petitioner did not perform any type of investigation commensurate with the seriousness of the

representations. Petitioner’s representations were material and alleged grave constitutional

deficiencies. They necessitated a new round of briefing and court review. Petitioner’s

suggestion that the misrepresentations were the product of his faulty memory and not bad faith

are irrelevant. See Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1488 (9th Cir. 1994); Zuniga v. United Can

Co., 812 F.2d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 1987) (litigants can not “avoid the sting of Rule 11 sanctions by

operating under the guise of a pure heart and empty head”). Petitioner violated Rule 11(b)(3)

and his objections present no reason to reject the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.

Typically, Rule 11 sanctions are imposed upon an adversary’s motion. Although the

court has authority to impose them sua sponte, there are procedural limitations to the court’s

exercise of the power. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) & Advisory Comm. Notes, 1993 Amendments;

United Nat. Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2001); Barber v.

Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1998). One of the limitations is that ordering payment to the

adversary of part or all of reasonable attorney’s fees is not authorized sua sponte. Barber, 146

F.3d at 711; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). Another limitation is that sanctions may ordinarily be

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imposed sua sponte “only in situations that are akin to a contempt of court.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(c) Advisory Comm. Notes, 1993 Amendments; United Nat. Ins. Co., 242 F.3d at 1116. 

Contempt of court, other than obstruction of judicial proceedings in the open court, typically

involves a knowing violation of a court order. See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of

Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1994). Although Petitioner’s conduct was not of the

nature of a violation of a court order, and therefore can not be punished sua sponte under Rule

11, the court does not condone it. Petitioner made material misrepresentations to the court and

caused his adversary and the court to needlessly expend time and effort, which could have been

devoted to other cases.

For the foregoing reasons, the Report and Recommendation is adopted in all respects

except the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. The Petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 1, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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