Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02162/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02162-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-1-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

TORRANCE RAY BUNCH PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-2162 

ERIC WILLIAMS, Detective, Fort

Smith Police Department;

JAMES MARSCHEWSKI, Judge, 

Sebastian County Circuit Court; 

STEPHEN TABOR, Prosecuting 

Attorney, Sebastian County, Arkansas;

and the SEBASTIAN COUNTY 

DETENTION CENTER DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Torrance Ray Bunch, filed this civil rights action on September 7, 2006. He

proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The complaint is before the undersigned for a

determination of whether it should be served on the defendants. 

BACKGROUND

Bunch contends his constitutional rights are being violated in a number of ways in

connection with his prosecution on criminal charges. Bunch indicates he is being charged with

possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Initially, Bunch states he was released

on a $250,000 bond and was informed that he must appear in court on July 26, 2006.

Bunch maintains the charges are based upon information provided by a confidential

informant (CI) who informed Officer Eric Williams that Bunch had sold the CI drugs. Bunch

asserts he has never been caught with any drugs, marked money, or drug paraphernalia. Bunch

Case 2:06-cv-02162-JLH Document 5 Filed 10/17/06 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-2-

indicates the CI has been convicted at least four times and has a prior record of six felony drug

charges.

When Bunch arrived at court on July 26th, he states he was arrested. Bunch contends this

arrest was based on the “raid” of a friend’s house. Bunch asserts that he lives in Spiro,

Oklahoma, but the raid was of a home on Elm Street in Fort Smith. Bunch indicates there was

a picture of his children on the bedroom wall in the Elm Street home. 

Bunch alleges he is currently being held in the Sebastian County Detention Center on a

bond of one million dollars. Bunch requests that he be released based on a lack of evidence. 

DISCUSSION

Bunch’s claims are subject to dismissal. First, James Marschewski, a Sebastian County

Circuit Judge, is immune from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed.

2d 9 (1991)("Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of

damages."). See also Duty v. City of Springdale, 42 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 1994). "Judges

performing judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability." Robinson v.

Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because

the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978). 

Judicial immunityis overcome in two situations: (1) ifthe challenged act is non-judicial;

and (2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. It is clear that neither situation applies here.

In the past, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief “have been permitted under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against judges acting in their official capacity.” Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court

Case 2:06-cv-02162-JLH Document 5 Filed 10/17/06 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-3-

of Com. of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Mass. 2000), aff’d without op., 248 F.3d 1127 (1st

Cir. 2000)(citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984)). 

“However, in 1996 Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act (“FCIA”), Pub. L. No.

104-317, Title III § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853, which legislatively reversed Pulliam in several

important respects.” Nollet, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 210. As amended by the FCIA, §1983 now

precludes injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Bunch does not allege that either of these prerequisites for injunctive relief are met. See

e.g., Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999)(holding injunctive relief against a

quasi-judicial official is barred if the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a declaratory decree

or the unavailability of declaratory relief); Fox v. Lee, 99 F. Supp. 2d 573, 575-576 (E.D. Pa.

2000)(claim for injunctive relief dismissed where plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that either

of the prerequisites to injunctive relief were met); Ackermann v. Doyle, 43 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273

(E.D. N.Y. 1999)(dismissing action against judicial officers because plaintiff failed to allege that

a declaratory decree was violated or the declaratory relief was unavailable). Thus, to the extent

Bunch seeks injunctive relief his claims are subject to dismissal.

Furthermore, to be entitled to equitable relief, “plaintiff must show that he has an

inadequate remedy at law and a serious risk of irreparable harm.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy

Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1987)(citations omitted). Equitable

relief is not appropriate where an adequate remedy under state law exists. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at

542 & n. 22, 104 S. Ct. at 1981 & n. 22. See also Sterling v. Calvin , 874 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.

Case 2:06-cv-02162-JLH Document 5 Filed 10/17/06 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-4-

1989). An adequate remedy at law exists when the acts of the judicial officer can be reviewed

on appeal or by extraordinary writ. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1392 (citation omitted). See also Nelson

v. Com, 1997 WL 793060, 2 (E.D. Pa. 1997)(appellate review of conviction provides plaintiff

an adequate remedy under state law). See also J&M Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Hampton, 347 Ark.

126, 60 S.W.3d 481 (2001)(discussing when a writ of prohibition is appropriate). 

Second, Stephen Tabor, a prosecuting attorney, is immune from suit. The United States

Supreme Court, in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128

(1976), established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case." Id., 424 U.S.

at 427. This immunity extends to all acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase

of the criminal process.” Id., 424 U.S. at 430. See also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,

113 S. Ct. 2606, 2615, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993)(Prosecutor acting as an advocate for the state

in a criminal prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity while a prosecutor acting in an

investigatory or administrative capacity is only entitled to qualified immunity). Based on the

allegations of the complaint, it is clear Tabor is entitled to absolute immunity. See also

Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996)(County prosecutors were entitled to

absolute immunity from suit).

To the extent Bunch’s complaint seeks injunctive relief, we find the claim not cognizable.

While the Supreme Court has not held that this immunity insulates prosecutors from declaratory

or injunctive relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984),

a plaintiff must show some substantial likelihood that the past conduct alleged to be illegal will

recur. Bunch can make no such showing here. Further, injunctive relief is not appropriate where

Case 2:06-cv-02162-JLH Document 5 Filed 10/17/06 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-5-

an adequate remedy under state law exists. Id., 466 U.S. at 542 & n.22. See also Bonner v.

Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975). 

Third, to the extent Bunch intends to bring amalicious prosecution claim, the claim fails.

It has been “uniformly held that malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under § 1983

because it does not allege a constitutional injury.” Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753,

758 (8th Cir. 2001). Similarly, a cause of action for defamation is not cognizable under § 1983.

Loftin v. United States, 72 F.3d 133 (8th Cir. 1995); Miner v. Brackney, 719 F.2d 954, 955 (8th

Cir. 1983).

Fourth, the detention center is a building and not a person or a legal entity subject to suit

under § 1983. See e.g., Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992)(“[s]heriff’s

departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit”);

Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1993)(jail not subject to suit); Marsden

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 856 F. Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)(“jail is not an entity that is

amenable to suit”); In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1163 n. 1 (D. Minn.

1987)(sheriff’s department is not a legal entity subject to suit), aff’d, Myers v. Scott County, 863

F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989). 

Finally, Bunch’s claimsthat he has been falsely arrested, improperly charged, and falsely

incarcerated are subject to dismissal. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129

L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages for "allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid" is not cognizable until "the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

Case 2:06-cv-02162-JLH Document 5 Filed 10/17/06 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-6-

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a

federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87. 

The rationale of Heck has been applied to § 1983 complaints filed while the criminal

charges are pending. See e.g., Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996). In Smith, the

Third Circuit stated:

We find that [the Heck] concerns apply equally to claims that, if successful,

would necessarily imply the invalidity of a future conviction on a pending

criminal charge. A claim by a defendant in an ongoing criminal prosecution

which necessarily challenges the legality of a future conviction on a pending

criminal charge lies at the intersection ofthe federal habeas corpus statute and the

Civil Rights Act of 1871. If such a claim could proceed while criminal

proceedings are ongoing, there would be a potential for inconsistent

determinations in the civil and criminal cases and the criminal defendant would

be able to collaterally attack the prosecution in a civil suit. In terms of the

conflicts which Heck sought to avoid, there is no difference between a conviction

which is outstanding at the time the civil rights action is instituted and a potential

conviction on a pending charge that may be entered at some point thereafter.

Smith, 87 F.3d at 113. 

Clearly, Heck bars Bunch’s false imprisonment claims. To the extent Heck would not

bar Bunch’s claims stemming from the currently pending charges, abstention is appropriate. "In

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), the Supreme

Court advanced the position that federal courts should refrain from interfering with pending state

judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Harmon v. City of Kansas City, 197

F.3d 321, 325 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1038, 120 S. Ct. 1534, 146 L. Ed. 2d 348

(2000). Abstention under Younger "is warranted if the action complained of constitutes the basis

of an ongoing state judicial proceeding, the proceedings implicate important state interests, and

Case 2:06-cv-02162-JLH Document 5 Filed 10/17/06 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

-7-

an adequate opportunity exists in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Id.

(citing Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1996)).

Here, Bunch indicates the criminal charges are currently pending. To allow Bunch’s

claims to proceed at this point would require this court to interfere in ongoing state criminal

proceedings, and this court will not do so absent extraordinary circumstances. No such

circumstances exist here and abstention as to these claims is appropriate. 

CONCLUSION

I therefore recommend Bunch’s case be dismissed on the grounds the claims are

frivolous, are asserted against individuals immune from suit, or are not cognizable under § 1983.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)(IFP action, or any portion thereof, may be dismissed on such

grounds at any time). To the extent the claims stemming from the currently pending charges are

not barred by Heck, abstention under Younger is appropriate. 

Bunch has ten days from receipt of this report and recommendation in which to file

written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections

may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. Bunch is reminded that

objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

DATED this 17th day of October 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-02162-JLH Document 5 Filed 10/17/06 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>