Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00617/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00617-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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1 08cv617 BTM(NLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATTI DIRKSEN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08cv617 BTM(NLS)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

Plaintiff and Defendant have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the

reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED and Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2005, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and

disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleged that she became

disabled on April 30, 2004, due to bilateral shoulder fractures, bilateral knee arthritis, gout,

pain, depression, and anxiety. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on March 14, 2005, and

upon reconsideration on May 12, 2005. 

On November 28, 2006, Plaintiff’s claim was heard by Administrative Law Judge Peter

J. Valentino (the “ALJ”). On December 11, 2006, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits.

Plaintiff filed a request for review with the Appeals Council, which was granted. In an order

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1

 Under the Social Security Regulations, the determination of whether a claimant is

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is a five step process. The five steps

are as follows: (1) Is the claimant presently working in any substantially gainful activity? If

2 08cv617 BTM(NLS)

dated June 18, 2007, the Appeals Council remanded the case for further consideration and

evaluation of certain medical opinions and other evidence.

Upon remand, the ALJ held a second hearing on September 18, 2007. Plaintiff

appeared and testified. George Weilepp, M.D., a medical expert, and Mary Jesko, a

vocational expert (“VE”) also testified at the hearing.

In a decision dated November 30, 2007, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled.

Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which was denied. The ALJ’s

decision then became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Plaintiff

seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. ALJ’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: status post left

shoulder fracture with residual pain and limited range of motion; status post right shoulder

fracture without significant residuals; bilateral knee arthritis; depressive disorder NOS;

generalized anxiety disorder versus anxiety disorder NOS; possible pain disorder; and

substance abuse disorder. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s impairment or combination of

impairments do not meet or equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to do sedentary

exertional work with no work at or above shoulder level, no work operating industrial vehicles,

no work at unprotected heights or around dangerous machinery, and unskilled work with

limited public contact due to her mental condition. Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ

concluded that although Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, there are jobs that

exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform – specifically,

bench hand assembler (“Bench Hand”- DOT 715.684-026), stuffer filler (“Stuffer” - DOT

731.685-014), and final assembler (“Final Assembler” - DOT 713.687-018).1

 

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so, then the claimant is not disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step two. (2) Is

the claimant’s impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is not disabled. If so, then the

evaluation proceeds to step three. (3) Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of

specific impairments set forth in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404? If so, then the

claimant is disabled. If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step four. (4) Is the claimant

able to do any work that she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is not disabled.

If not, then the evaluation proceeds to step five. (5) Is the claimant able to do any other

work? If not, then the claimant is disabled. If, on the other hand, the Commissioner can

establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant

can do, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. See also Tackett v. Apfel, 180

F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999). 

3 08cv617 BTM(NLS)

 III. STANDARD

The Commissioner’s denial of benefits may be set aside if it is based on legal error

or is not supported by substantial evidence. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th

Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Id.

Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Flaten v. Secretary

of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision must be vacated because the ALJ failed to ask

the VE whether her testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupation Titles (“DOT”) and,

if so, whether there was a reasonable explanation for the conflict. The Court agrees.

Under SSR 00-4p, the ALJ has an affirmative duty to ask about “any possible conflict”

between the VE evidence and information provided in the DOT. The ALJ must (1) ask the

VE if the evidence he or she provided conflicts with information provided in the DOT; and (2)

if the VE's evidence appears to conflict with the DOT, must obtain a reasonable explanation

for the apparent conflict. A reasonable explanation for a conflict may be based on

information that is not included in the DOT – e.g., information obtained directly from

employers or other publications about a particular job's requirements or information based

on the VE’s own experience in job placement or career counseling. SSR 00-4p. 

In Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit held that the

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4 08cv617 BTM(NLS)

ALJ must perform the inquiries under SSR 00-4p before relying on a VE’s testimony

regarding the requirements of a particular job. If the ALJ fails to do so despite a potential

conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, the Court cannot determine whether the

ALJ’s decision that the plaintiff can perform other work was supported by substantial

evidence and, therefore, must remand the case. Id. at 1154.

In this case, the ALJ never asked the VE whether her testimony was consistent with

the DOT - the ALJ just assumed that it was. In fact, there is a question whether the VE’s

testimony conflicted with the DOT. The DOT descriptions for the jobs identified by the VE

require “reaching frequently” or “reaching constantly.” “Reaching,” as defined by the

Selected Characteristics of Occupations (DOT’s companion volume), involves “extending

hand(s) and arm(s) in any direction.” Selected Characteristics of Occupations, App. C.

The Government argues that the VE “presumably took into account” Plaintiff’s

limitation regarding reaching at or above the shoulder level and that there is no conflict

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT information because the DOT “lists the maximum

requirements of occupations as generally performed, not the range of requirements of a

particular job as it is performed in specific settings.” SSR 00-4p. However, the Court cannot

presume that the VE gave consideration to whether the reaching required in the jobs she

identified entail reaching at or above the shoulder. Although it is possible that the jobs

identified by the VE do not, in certain settings, require reaching at or above the shoulder, no

such testimony was elicited by the ALJ.

The Court finds the case of Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2006), to

be instructive. In Prochaska, the plaintiff argued that the jobs identified by the VE required

specific physical capabilities that were beyond her limitations. Although the ALJ asked the

expert about work that could be done by someone who could only “occasionally reach above

shoulder level,” the VE testified that the plaintiff could perform the job of cashier, which,

according to the DOT, involves “reaching frequently.” The Seventh Circuit vacated the

district court’s judgment upholding the Commissioner’s decision and remanded the case to

the ALJ, explaining:

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5 08cv617 BTM(NLS)

It is not clear to us whether the DOT's requirements include reaching above

shoulder level, and this is exactly the sort of inconsistency the ALJ should have

resolved with the expert's help. We cannot determine, based on the record,

whether the expert's testimony regarding . . . reaching was actually

inconsistent with the DOT. That determination should have been made by the

ALJ in the first instance, and his failure to do so should have been identified

and corrected by the Appeals Council. We will defer to an ALJ's decision if it

is supported by “substantial evidence,” but here there is an unresolved

potential inconsistency in the evidence that should have been resolved. 

Id. at 736.

As in Prochaska, here there was a potential inconsistency between the VE’s testimony

and the DOT. It was the ALJ’s affirmative duty to ask whether there was a conflict and, if so,

whether there was a reasonable explanation for it. Because the ALJ failed to perform the

appropriate inquiries under SSR 00-4p, the Court cannot determine whether substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can perform other work. Therefore, the

Court remands the case so that the ALJ can comply with SSR 00-4p’s requirements. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Court

REMANDS this case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 18, 2009

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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