Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01082/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01082-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM LESSIN, TAMER KAHLIL, 

MARK PREISS, JULIE SNODGRASS, 

JOHN FARLEKAS, WILLIAM 

VINSON, JOYCE JENSEN, DAVID 

MORRIS, and SCOTT BITTNER, on 

behalf of themselves and all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware 

corporation; and Does 1 through 10, 

inclusive,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01082-AJB-AHG

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART FORD MOTOR 

COMPANY’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 17)

Presently before the Court is Defendant Ford Motor Company’s (“Ford”) motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) or in the alternative to strike 

nationwide class allegations. (Doc. No. 17.) Plaintiffs opposed the motion, (Doc. No. 21), 

and Ford replied, (Doc. No. 23.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN 

PART AND DENIES IN PART Ford’s motion to dismiss. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs William Lessin, Mark Preiss, Julie Snodgrass, John Farlekas, William 

Vinson, Joyce Jensen, David Morris, and Scott Bittner bring several causes of action 

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against Ford for alleged latent defects in various 2005-2019 Ford F-250 and F-350 trucks

(“Class Vehicles” or “Vehicle”). (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Doc. No. 11 ¶ 93.)

These alleged latent defects involve abnormal wearing and loosening of the Class Vehicles’ 

suspension components (i.e. track bar bushing, steering dampener, balls joints, control 

arms, and/or struts), resulting in severe shaking and oscillation of the steering wheel. (FAC 

¶¶ 93–95.) Plaintiffs refer to this alleged defect as the “Death Wobble.” Plaintiffs allege 

the shaking causes a loss of handling and control that can only be remedied by a sudden 

reduction of speed, an unsafe reaction on open highways. (Id.) These defects in the Class 

Vehicles purportedly manifest at different mileage periods during the lifetime of the Class 

Vehicles. (FAC ¶¶ 128–29.) Some Class Vehicle owners first experience the alleged defect

as early as ten miles off the lot, at a time when the Vehicle is still covered by Ford’s limited 

warranty, (FAC ¶ 130), while others first experience the shaking after the warranty had 

already expired, (FAC ¶ 130.) In support of their allegations, Plaintiffs point out that the 

National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration’s (“NHSTA”) complaint database 

reveals at least 1,265 complaints about the shaking defect. (FAC ¶¶ 97–98, 107, 112, 129.)

On June 10, 2019, Plaintiff Lessin filed a class action complaint on behalf of himself 

and all others similarly situated. After Ford filed a motion to dismiss the Lessin Complaint, 

Plaintiffs filed the FAC. The FAC sets forth a number of Plaintiffs from various states, and 

claims:

• On behalf of Plaintiffs and a nationwide class, the FAC alleges Ford’s 

violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

• On behalf of Plaintiff Lessin and a class of California residents, the FAC 

alleges violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (or “CLRA”), the 

California Unfair Competition Law (or “UCL”), the California False 

Advertising Law, Breach of Express and Implied Warranty, Fraudulent 

Concealment, and the Song-Beverly Act.

• On behalf of Plaintiff Preiss and a class of Alaska residents, the FAC alleges 

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violations of the Alaska Fair Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 

Act and Breaches of Express and Implied Warranties.

• On behalf of Plaintiff Snodgrass and a class of Arizona residents, the FAC 

alleges violations of Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act.

• On behalf of Plaintiff Farlekas and a class of Connecticut residents, the FAC 

alleges violations of Connecticut’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act and Breach 

of Implied Warranty.

• On behalf of Plaintiff Vinson and a class of Georgia residents, the FAC alleges 

violations of Georgia’s Fair Business Practices Act, its Uniform Deceptive 

Trade Practices Act, and Breaches of Express and Implied Warranties.

• On behalf of Plaintiff Jensen and a class of Florida residents, the FAC alleges 

violations of Florida’s Unfair & Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Breaches 

of Express and Implied Warranties.

• On behalf of Plaintiff Morris and a class of Nevada residents, the FAC alleges 

violations of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Breaches of 

Express and Implied Warranties.

• On behalf of Plaintiffs Bittner, Khalil, and a class of Texas residents, the FAC 

alleges violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act – Consumer Practices 

Act and Breaches of Express and Implied Warranties.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings 

and allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff has failed to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for: “(1) lack of 

cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” SmileCare 

Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation 

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omitted). However, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570(2007).

Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court need not accept legal 

conclusions as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is also improper for the 

court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove [he or she] has not alleged . . . .” Associated Gen. 

Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

On the other hand, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 

assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement 

to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The court only reviews the contents of the complaint, 

accepting all factual allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).

A party alleging fraud must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting 

fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to make more specific allegations 

so a defendant “can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done 

anything wrong.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Bly–Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir.2001)); see also Neubronner v. 

Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 671–72 (9th Cir.1993).

III. DISCUSSION

In the motion to dismiss, Ford seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ (1) express warranty 

claims, (2) Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) claim, (3) implied warranty claims, 

and (4) fraud-based claims. (Doc. No. 17.) The Court will closely look at each argument 

below.

A. Plaintiffs’ Express Warranty Claims

Ford first argues that Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims—under the MMWA and 

the common law of Alaska, California, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, and Texas—all fail

because they do not allege at any point during the warranty period they were refused a free 

repair by a Ford dealer or otherwise experienced multiple unsuccessful repair attempts.

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(Doc. No. 17-1 at 17–20.) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue they can demonstrate from the 

FAC’s allegations that they gave Ford ample opportunity to repair the affected vehicles, 

and that Ford failed to do so within a reasonable time. (Doc. No. 21 at 17.) 

As a preliminary note, Ford’s Limited Warranty provides bumper-to-bumper 

coverage for three years or for 36,000 miles, whichever occurs first. (Doc. No. 17-5, Ex. 

C.) The Limited Warranty promises that a Ford dealer would repair, replace, or adjust a 

covered part only if a vehicle that malfunctions “during normal use during the applicable 

coverage period” is “taken to a Ford dealership for a warranted repair during the warranty 

period.” (Id. at 16.) Under Ninth Circuit authority, “[a] repair or replace remedy fails of its 

essential purpose only if repeated repair attempts are unsuccessful within a reasonable 

time.” Philippine Nat’l Oil Co. v. Garrett Corp., 724 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1984). The 

Court will proceed to analyze each Plaintiff’s claim, in turn. 

1. Plaintiff Lessin (California)

The FAC provides that Plaintiff Lessin brought his Vehicle to Mossy Ford of San 

Diego “on three occasions within a period of less than three months to correct the Defect 

without success. On each occasion, Ford has failed to provide an adequate remedy to [the] 

Death Wobble, denied the existence of the Defect, and has refused to provide repair [of] 

Plaintiff’s vehicle under warranty.” (FAC ¶ 22.) The FAC further states that “[o]n April 

24, 2018, Plaintiff William Lessin brought the Vehicle to Mossy Ford of San Diego to have 

the service department address the Death Wobble” to no avail. (Id. ¶ 23.) Ford points out

Plaintiff Lessin purchased his truck in July 2010 but did not present it to a Ford dealer for 

a suspension repair until nearly eight years later, in April 2018. While Plaintiffs argue 

“Lessin had taken his vehicle three separate times to Ford’s certified dealer prior to April 

2018, and each time attempted to have the defect corrected,” (id. ¶ 22), it is unclear when 

these attempted repairs occurred, and whether these attempts fell outside of the warranty 

period, which would be fatal to Plaintiff Lessin’s express warranty claim. See Clemens v. 

DaimlerChrysler, 534 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of express 

warranty claims where repairs were sought after warranty period expired). As such, this 

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claim is DISMISSED with LEAVE TO AMEND for more detail as to when these 

purported repairs occurred. 

2. Plaintiff Khalil (Texas)

Plaintiff Khalil owns a 2013 Ford F-350, which was purchased in 2016. (FAC ¶ 86.) 

Soon after purchasing the Vehicle, Plaintiff Khalil sought repair, which “redress[ed] the 

Death Wobble,” but by July 2019, Plaintiff Khalil again experienced the shaking defect. 

(Id.) Plaintiff Khalil returned the Vehicle to the dealership again, but this time was told no 

defect existed and no repairs could be made. (Id. ¶ 87.) Here, Plaintiff Khalil admits the

requested warranty repair “was able [to] redress” the suspension problem. (Id. ¶ 86.) And,

it was not until more than two years later, after the expiration of the warranty period, that 

Plaintiff Khalil requested his next repair. (Id. ¶ 87.) As it currently stands, the FAC does 

not show how Plaintiff Khalil was either refused a repair or that “repeated repair attempts” 

were unsuccessful. The Court also DISMISSES this claim, and GRANTS Plaintiff Khalil 

LEAVE TO AMEND to cure the aforementioned deficiencies. 

3. Plaintiff Preiss (Alaska)

Next, Plaintiff Preiss owns a 2011 Ford F-250, purchased from an authorized Ford 

dealership located in Anchorage, Alaska. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff Preiss first experienced the

shaking issues when the truck had less than 15,000 miles on the odometer. (Id. ¶ 30.) Soon 

thereafter, Plaintiff Preiss presented the Vehicle to a Ford dealership for an inspection and 

to redress the problem with the shaking. (Id.) The technicians represented to Plaintiff Preiss 

that the “Death Wobble” was the result of under-inflated tires. (Id.) Presently, Plaintiff 

Preiss experiences the alleged defect anywhere from four to five times a month. (Id.) 

Although Plaintiff Preiss claims the problems persists, there are no allegations that the 

Vehicle was ever brought back for more repairs. Plaintiff Preiss raises for the first time in 

the opposition brief that when he brought his Vehicle into the dealership, technicians

explained that the “Death Wobble” did not result from a defect and was not subject to 

recall. (Doc. No. 21 at 17–18.) However, “[a] Complaint cannot be amended through 

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allegations made in an opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Remington v. Mathson, 42 F. 

Supp. 3d 1256, 1278 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 575 F. App’x 808 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Accordingly, the Court cannot consider these new facts outside of the FAC. See Schneider 

v. California Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining the 

propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a 

plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss.”). Therefore, the FAC does not explain how Plaintiff Preiss was either refused a 

repair or that “repeated repair attempts” were unsuccessful. The Court DISMISSES this 

claim, and GRANTS Plaintiff Preiss LEAVE TO AMEND to cure the deficiencies stated 

herein.

4. Plaintiff Jensen (Florida)

Plaintiff Jensen owns a 2005 Ford F-250. (Id. ¶ 62.) Plaintiff Jensen first experienced 

the alleged shaking defect when the “Vehicle had less than 30,000 miles on the odometer.” 

(Id. ¶ 66.) On or around August 20, 2007, Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to Ford of 

Claremont for inspection. (Id.) Claremont Ford’s technicians attempted to remedy the 

defect but Plaintiff Jensen alleges that none of the repairs solved the problem. (Id.)

Following the repairs, Plaintiff Jensen made several complaints to Claremont Ford about 

the existence of the defect. (Id. ¶ 67.) However, Defendant Ford, and Claremont Ford, 

denied that the problem stemmed from any defect. (Id.) 

The problem with Plaintiff Jensen’s claim, however, is that it is time-barred. Florida 

provides a five-year statute of limitations for breach of express warranty claims. See Fla. 

Stat. § 95.11(2)(b); Speier–Roche v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., No. 14–20107, 

2014 WL 1745050, *1 (S.D. Fla. April 30, 2014). Plaintiff Jensen’s claim was not filed 

until twelve years after Plaintiff Jensen presented her Vehicle to Ford in 2007 and was 

aware that Ford could not remedy the issues. Therefore, Plaintiff Jensen’s express warranty 

claim must be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as time-barred.

5. Plaintiff Morris (Nevada)

Plaintiff Morris owns a 2017 Ford F-350. (Id. ¶ 70.) Plaintiff Morris first experienced 

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the defect when the Vehicle had less than 7,000 miles on the odometer. (Id. ¶ 73.) On 

January 31, 2019, Plaintiff Morris presented the Vehicle to Capital Ford for a multi-point 

inspection. (Id.) It was determined there that the defect stemmed from a “dead spot” on the 

steering dampener and Capital Ford’s technicians replaced the truck’s steering dampener 

under warranty. (Id.) This failed to resolve the Death Wobble from occurring again, and 

the defect recurred six months later. (Id. ¶ 74.) The Vehicle was repaired yet again, but the 

repairs did not resolve the issues. Thus, construing the allegations in the FAC in the light 

most favorable to Plaintiff Morris, the Court determines that there are enough allegations 

in the FAC to state a plausible claim for breach of express warranty given the multiple 

failed attempts at remedying the alleged defect. Thus, Ford’s motion to dismiss this claim 

is DENIED.

6. Unconscionability

Ford argues these express warranty claims cannot be saved by Plaintiffs’ arguments 

that Ford’s Limited Warranty is unconscionable under Alaska, California, Florida, Nevada, 

and Texas law. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 20.) In response, Plaintiffs argue the Limited Warranty 

is indeed unconscionable because Ford continues to issue the warranty with a durational 

limit even though it manufactures the Vehicles with a defect “Ford not only knows about, 

but that it knows is very likely to occur (and recur) outside of the warranty period.” (Doc. 

No. 21 at 19.)

a) Alaska, California, Florida, Nevada, and Texas

Unconscionability Law

Under California, Florida, Nevada, and Texas law, “both procedural and substantive 

unconscionability must be present for the contract to be declared unenforceable.” Aron v. 

U–Haul Co. of Cal., 143 Cal. App. 4th 796, 808 (2006); Ski River Dev., Inc. v. McCalla, 

167 S.W.3d 121, 136 (Tex. App. 2005).

1 A contract or contractual clause is invalid as 

 

1 Because the unconscionability law is the generally the same in California, Florida, Nevada, and Texas, 

the Court cites to only California law on unconscionability.

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unconscionable only if both elements are present, “although the degree to which each must 

exist may vary.” Aron, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 808. Procedural unconscionability exists when 

a contract reflects “an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation 

and an absence of meaningful choice.” Seifi v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2013 WL 

2285339, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2013) (citing A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 

Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (1982)). The substantive element of unconscionability focuses on 

the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create “‘overly harsh’ or ‘onesided’ results as to ‘shock the conscience.’” Seifi, 2013 WL 2285339, at *5 (citing Aron, 

143 Cal. App. 4th at 808). 

Plaintiffs allege that given Ford’s awareness of these defects, the durational limits 

of the warranty are unconscionable. (Doc. No. 21 at 20.) However, California courts have 

rejected the exact argument Plaintiffs now make. See Aberin v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 

No. 16-CV-04384-JST, 2018 WL 1473085, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) (“[E]ven a 

manufacturer’s awareness of a latent defect cannot make an express warranty’s duration 

unconscionable.”). For example, in Seifi, the court held that even accepting as true the 

plaintiffs’ allegation that the car manufacturer knew about the car’s defective gears, 

plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that the warranty durational limits (i.e., either 48 

months or 50,000 miles) were unconscionable since these limits did not “on their face 

shock the conscience.” Seifi, 2013 WL 2285339, at *5. 

In any event, any argument of procedural unconscionability is unavailing based on 

these facts. Plaintiffs here have not alleged that the manufacturer failed to offer any 

extended warranty options. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 980, 994 (N.D.

Cal. 2010) aff’d, 462 F. App’x 660 (9th Cir. 2011) (procedural unconscionability is not 

established if the manufacturer offered extended warranty options). Nor have Plaintiffs

alleged that they and other class members had no meaningful alternatives in the form of 

other vehicles that they could have selected. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 

211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 771 (1989) (noting the existence “of meaningful alternatives 

available to such contracting party in the form of other sources of supply tends to defeat 

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any claim of unconscionability.”).

Any argument as to substantive unconscionability fares no better. California courts 

have held that “a three-year, 36,000 mile warranty does not, on its face, create one-sided 

results.” Fisher v. Honda N. Am., Inc., No. LA CV13-09285 JAK, 2014 WL 2808188, at 

*9 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2014); Baranco v. Ford Motor Co., 294 F. Supp. 3d 950, 975 (N.D. 

Cal. 2018) (rejecting argument that a Ford 3–year/36,000 mile coverage period was 

unconscionable). Thus, nothing about the Limited Warranty strikes this Court as “overly 

harsh” or “one-sided” under California, Florida, Nevada, and Texas law.

b) Alaska Law

Likewise, Plaintiffs cannot establish unconscionability under Alaska law. Under 

Alaska law, a contract term may be unconscionable “where . . . circumstances indicate a 

vast disparity of bargaining power coupled with terms unreasonably favorable to the 

stronger party.” Municipality of Anchorage v. Locker, 723 P.2d 1261, 1265–66 (Alaska 

1986). But for the same reasons Ford’s Limited Warranty is not unconscionable under 

California, Florida, Nevada, and Texas law, under Alaska law, the FAC does not allege 

any “unreasonable terms” when Plaintiff Preiss purchased his Vehicle. 

The FAC simply does not allege any facts showing that Ford’s Limited Warranty is 

unconscionable. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim of unconscionability fails and the terms of the 

warranty control. 

* * *

In sum, the Court DISMISSES California Count IV, Alaska Count III, and Texas 

Count III (as to Plaintiff Khalil) WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

7. Pre-Suit Notice

Next Ford asserts that the express warranty claims of Plaintiffs Jensen (FL), Vinson 

(GA), Bittner (TX), and Khalil (TX) fail for the additional, independent reason that “the 

FAC does not allege that they provided Ford with the required individualized pre-suit 

notice of the alleged breach of express warranty.” (Doc. No. 17-1 at 22.)

Pursuant to Florida, Texas, and Georgia law, a buyer need only allege that the seller 

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received some form of notice of a breach of express warranty claim; issues regarding the 

timeliness and sufficiency of the notice are questions fact. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. 

Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1102 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Where the buyer 

gives some notice of the breach, the issues of timeliness and sufficiency are questions of 

fact.”); see also Gordon v. Sig Sauer, Inc., No. CV H-19-585, 2019 WL 4572799, at *13 

(S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2019) (holding that a general expression of the buyer’s dissatisfaction 

with the product may be sufficient to satisfy Texas’s pre-suit notice requirement at the 

pleading stage); Martinelli Ginetto SpA v. Sample Dyeing Serv., Inc., No. 4:09-CV-0046-

HLM, 2010 WL 11505451, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2010) (“As the Georgia Court of 

Appeals noted . . ., the issue of reasonableness of notice is ordinarily for the factfinder.”).

The Court finds that these four Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims survive this 

challenge. Here, Plaintiffs brought their trucks to Ford dealerships on several occasions for 

repairs to address their problems. (FAC ¶¶ 54–59, 66–67, 80, 86–87.) Furthermore, 

Plaintiff Vinson alleges he directly contacted Ford’s customer service line after his 

experience. (FAC ¶ 55.) At this early stage of the proceedings, these alleged 

communications suffice as allegations of notice. If this case proceeds, Plaintiffs will have 

the burden of proving that they actually provided notice as required by state law. 

B. Plaintiffs’ Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) Claim

1. Informal Dispute Resolution Requirement

Ford next argues Plaintiffs’ MMWA claim should be dismissed because they have

not complied with the statute’s exhaustion requirement for informal dispute resolution. 

(Doc. No. 17-1 at 23.) Plaintiffs do not provide any opposition to this argument.

The MMWA “encourage[s] warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer 

disputes are fairly and expeditiously settled through informal dispute settlement 

mechanisms.” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1). If the warrantor establishes such a procedure, the 

procedure meets certain requirements established by the Federal Trade Commission, and 

the warrantor “incorporates in a written warranty a requirement that the consumer resort to 

such procedure before pursuing any legal remedy under this section respecting such 

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warranty,” then “a class of consumers may not proceed in a class action except to the extent 

the court determines necessary to establish the representative capacity of the named 

plaintiffs, unless the named plaintiffs (upon notifying the defendant that they are named 

plaintiffs in a class action with respect to a warranty obligation) initially resort to such 

procedure.” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3). “[F]ailure to participate in [the warrantor’s] informal 

dispute settlement procedure is an affirmative defense–subject to waiver, tolling, and 

estoppel, that [the warrantor] may raise, not that Plaintiff must negate in [his or] her 

Complaint.” Maronyan v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 658 F.3d 1038, 1040, 1042, 

1043 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that § 2310(a) is a prudential, not a jurisdictional bar to 

filing an MMWA claim and that failure to exhaust under § 2310(a) is an affirmative 

defense).

Here, Ford’s Limited Warranty contains a dispute resolution mechanism: “You are 

required to submit your warranty dispute to the BBB AUTO LINE before exercising rights 

or seeking remedies under the Federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.” (Doc. No. 17-5, 

Ex. C at 14.) The FAC contains no allegations about the BBB AUTO LINE or any other 

informal dispute resolution procedure. However, at this juncture, Plaintiffs are not required 

to negate anticipated affirmative defenses in their complaint. Thus, Ford may assert its 

affirmative defenses later on in the litigation. For now, the Court DENIES Ford’s request 

to dismiss Plaintiffs’ MMWA claim on this ground.

2. Ford’s Motion to Dismiss or Strike Plaintiffs’ MMWA 

Nationwide Claim

Ford asks the Court to dismiss or strike under Rule 12(f) Plaintiffs’ nationwide 

MMWA class claim and other nationwide class claims under California law. Ford, relying 

on Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012), challenge 

Plaintiffs’ efforts to assert claims under state law on behalf of a nationwide class. In Mazza, 

the Ninth Circuit held that the district court “abused its discretion in certifying a class under 

California law that contained class members who purchased or leased their car in different 

jurisdictions with materially different consumer protection laws.” 666 F.3d at 590. 

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Although Plaintiffs contend that the Court should defer assessing the viability of the 

nationwide class until the class certification stage, many district courts have applied Mazza

at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Glenn v. Hyundai Motor Am., SACV 15-2052 DOC (KESx), 

2016 WL 3621280, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 24, 2016) (“The Court notes that while Mazza

was decided at the class certification stage, the decision ‘applies generally and is instructive 

when addressing a motion to dismiss.’”) (quoting Frezza v. Google, Inc., CV 5:12-237 

RMW, 2013 WL 1736788, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013)). Applying the Mazza principles 

and California’s choice-of-law analysis to the facts of this case, it is readily apparent that 

Plaintiffs’ claims based on California’s consumer protections laws cannot support a viable 

nationwide class. The Court therefore STRIKES the nationwide class claims based on 

California’s consumer protection laws. 

As to the MMWA nationwide claim, whether a warrantor has committed a breach

under the MMWA is governed by state law. See Clemens, 534 F.3d at 1022. Here, it is 

unclear which state’s warranty law Plaintiffs seek to apply to the nationwide MMWA class 

claim. Thus, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ MMWA nationwide claim WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND to address this deficiency. 

C. Plaintiffs’ Implied Warranty Claims

Next, Ford asserts various arguments explaining why the Court should dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ breach of implied warranty claims. In particular, Ford argues (1) Plaintiffs’ 

claims fail as a matter of law because the Class Vehicles are fit for their ordinary purpose, 

(2) Plaintiffs’ lack of privity bars their California, Connecticut, Florida, and Georgia 

implied warranty claims, (3) Plaintiffs failed to provide pre-suit notice of the implied 

warranty claims, and (4) the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff Lessin’s implied warranty 

claim under California law. 

1. Whether Plaintiffs’ Vehicles Are Fit For Their Ordinary Purpose

Ford argues Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims fail because under the California 

Song-Beverly Act, and under Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, 

and Texas common law, Plaintiffs’ Class Vehicles are fit for their ordinary purpose—

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namely, Plaintiffs have driven, and still drive their vehicles. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 24.) In 

opposition, Plaintiffs assert that an implied warranty of merchantability may be breached 

even if a vehicle is technically operable, because it may still be unsafe and dangerous to 

drive. (Doc. No. 21 at 22–24.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on this basis is not warranted. The ordinary purpose 

of a car is not simply to provide transportation but rather, safe and reliable transportation. 

See, e.g., Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 155 Cal. App. 4th 19, 27 (2007) (“We reject 

the notion that merely because a vehicle provides transportation from point A to point B, 

it necessarily does not violate the implied warranty of merchantability. A vehicle that 

smells, lurches, clanks, and emits smoke over an extended period of time is not fit for its 

intended purpose.”). Here, it is a question of fact as to whether the alleged shaking issues

posed enough of a safety risk that the Vehicles could not be said to provide safe, reliable 

transportation. Thus, at this early stage, the Court may not conclude whether the Vehicles 

are fit for their ordinary purpose. See, e.g., Barakezyan v. BMW of N. Am., 715 F. App’x 

762, 763 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiff had plausibly plead a safety hazard when 

he alleged that his vehicle emitted loud, long, high-pitched noise that distracted him, other 

drivers, and nearby pedestrians); Aguilar v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 13–cv–00437–LJO–

GS, 2013 WL 5670888, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2013) (taking note of plaintiff’s allegation 

that a steering defect could “result in potential failure of power steering, pulling to the left 

and right, and loss of steering control during the normal course of driving[;] [s]uch a defect 

would render a vehicle unfit for driving”). The motion is DENIED as to this ground. 

2. Whether Lack of Privity Bars Plaintiffs’ California, Connecticut, 

Florida, and Georgia Implied Warranty Claims

Next, Ford argues that the common law implied warranty claims of Plaintiffs Lessin 

(CA), Farlekas (CT), Jensen (FL), and Vinson (GA) all fail because state law requires 

contractual privity between a plaintiff and Ford. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 26.) Ford argues that 

the aforementioned plaintiffs did not purchase their Vehicles from Ford but instead from 

various dealerships. (Id.)

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As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Plaintiff Farlekas (CT) and 

Plaintiff Jensen (FL) lack privity required for their implied warranty claims because they 

did not purchase their Vehicles from Ford. See Padilla v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 391 

F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1117 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (“Consistent with Florida law, and this Court’s 

application thereof, because Plaintiffs did not purchase their used vehicles directly from 

Porsche, they lack contractual privity with Porsche and their implied warranty claim 

necessarily fails as a matter of law.”); Kahn v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., No. 

FSTCV075004090S, 2008 WL 590469, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2008) (lessor of 

vehicle not in privity with manufacturer). As such, the Court GRANTS Ford’s motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs Farlekas (CT) and Plaintiff Jensen’s (FL) implied warranty claims.

The next question is whether Plaintiffs Lessin (CA) and Vinson’s (GA) claims

survive. As to Plaintiff Lessin’s claim, under California law, “a plaintiff asserting breach 

of warranty claims must stand in vertical contractual privity with the defendant.” Clemens 

v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008). A buyer and seller stand 

in privity if they are adjoining links of the distribution claim. Id. (citing Osborne v. Subaru 

of Am., Inc., 243 Cal. Rptr. 815, 820 n.6 (Ct. App. 1988)). Accordingly, an end consumer 

who buys from a retailer, rather than directly from the manufacturer, is not in privity with 

the manufacturer. Id. Here, Plaintiff Lessin does not dispute that he lacks privity with Ford 

but instead argues the third-party beneficiary exception provides that a consumer may 

assert an implied warranty claim as a third-party beneficiary of agreements between the 

manufacturer and the retailer. (Doc. No. 21 at 24–25.) In reply, Ford relies on Clemens v. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2008) to argue that California does not 

apply a third-party beneficiary exception to the privity requirement. 

However, the Ninth Circuit in Clemens did not expressly address the third-party 

beneficiary exception, but rather, dismissed an implied warranty claim for lack of privity, 

noting that “California courts have painstakingly established the scope of the privity 

requirement under California Commercial Code [§] 2314, and a federal court sitting in 

diversity is not free to create new exceptions to it.” 534 F.3d 1017, 1024; In re MyFord 

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Touch Consumer Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 936, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Although Clemens, 

like this case, involved a plaintiff who bought a car from a dealership and then sued the 

manufacturer for a defect with the car, it is not clear whether the plaintiff argued for 

application of the third-party beneficiary exception specifically.”). Following Clemens, 

“California district courts are split on the application of the third party beneficiary 

exception to the rule of privity.” Snyder v. TAMKO Bldg. Prod., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-01892-

TLN-KJN, 2019 WL 4747950, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2019) (citations omitted). “Some 

courts have declined to recognize the third-party beneficiary exception because Clemens

did not expressly recognize it and refused to create any new exceptions to privity.” Bhatt 

v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 16-03171-TJH (RAOx), 2018 WL 5094932, at *2–

3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2018) (citations omitted). But “the clear weight of authority compels 

a conclusion that where plaintiffs successfully plead third-party beneficiary status, they 

successfully plead a breach of implied warranty claim.” In re Toyota Motor Corp. 

Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 

1145, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citations omitted).

Here, the Court joins with many other courts in the Ninth Circuit concluding that 

where a plaintiff sufficiently pleads that he or she is a third-party beneficiary to a contract 

that gives rise to the implied warranty of merchantability, he or she may assert a claim for 

the warranty’s breach. Having reached this conclusion, the Court moves to determine 

whether Plaintiffs Lessin and Vinson may assert their claims despite a lack of privity. 

Plaintiff Lessin alleges he purchased his Vehicle “new from Mossy Ford—an authorized 

Ford dealership located in Poway, California.” (FAC ¶ 18.) However, short of this 

allegation, there are no additional facts in the FAC tending to support that Plaintiff Lessin 

is a third-party beneficiary to a contract that gives rise to the implied warranty. See 

Shamamyan v. FCA US LLC, No. CV195422DMGFFMX, 2020 WL 3643481, at *6 (C.D. 

Cal. Apr. 1, 2020) (“[E]ven courts that apply the third-party beneficiary exception in the 

implied warranty context require that a plaintiff plead more than the legal conclusion that 

they purchased a vehicle from a manufacturer’s ‘authorized agent’ to establish third-party 

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beneficiary status.”). Thus, Plaintiff Lessin’s claim is DISMISSED, WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND to address this deficiency.

Turning to the Plaintiff Vinson’s claim under Georgia law, Georgia law generally 

requires direct privity between the seller and buyer of goods for the implied warranty of 

merchantability to apply. See Keaton v. A.B.C. Drug Co., 266 Ga. 385, 467 S.E.2d 558, 

560–61 (1996). Privity exists between a buyer and manufacturer if the manufacturer 

extends an express warranty to the buyer. See Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., Inc., 

132 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 321, 323 (1974) (“However, where an automobile 

manufacturer, through its authorized dealer issues to a purchaser of one of its automobiles 

from such dealer admittedly as a part of the sale a warranty by the manufacturer running 

to the purchaser, privity exists.”). In this case, because Plaintiffs have alleged that Ford 

provided a Limited Warranty, Plaintiff Vinson can proceed with his breach of implied

warranty claim despite failing to allege contractual privity between him and Ford. See

Chrysler Corp., 208 S.E.2d at 323; see also McQueen v. Minolta Bus. Sols., Inc., 620 

S.E.2d 391, 393 (Ga. App. Ct. 2005) (indicating continued approval of Chrysler’s rule). 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Ford’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Vinson’s claim for 

breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

3. Pre-Suit Notice

Ford argues the implied warranty claims of Plaintiffs Farlekas (CT), Jensen (FL), 

Vinson (GA), Bittner (TX), and Khalil (TX) fail because they do not allege they provided 

Ford pre-suit notice of an alleged breach of implied warranty. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 28.) This 

argument fails for the same reasons as noted above by the Court regarding pre-suit notice

for the breach of express warranty claims. (See Part III.A.7.) As such, Ford’s motion to 

dismiss is DENIED as to this argument. 

4. The Statute of Limitations As To Plaintiff Lessin’s Implied 

Warranty Claim Under California Law

Ford also moves to dismiss Plaintiff Lessin’s (CA) implied warranty claims under 

the Song-Beverly Act and the California Commercial Code as time-barred. (Doc. No. 17-

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1 at 28.) Plaintiff Lessin does not advance an argument in response. The Court agrees with 

Ford. Under California law, the statute of limitations to bring an implied warranty claim 

under both the Song-Beverly Act and the California Commercial Code is four years after

tender of delivery of the product. See Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 174 Cal. App. 4th 1297, 

1305–06 (2009) (“California courts have held that the statute of limitations for an action 

for breach of warranty under the Song–Beverly Act is governed by the same statute that 

governs the statute of limitations for warranties arising under the Uniform Commercial 

Code: section 2725 of the Uniform Commercial Code.”). Because Plaintiff Lessin 

purchased his F-250 in July 2010 and did not bring his implied warranty claims until June 

2019, Plaintiff Lessin’s implied warranty claim is clearly time-barred. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 

29.) Ford’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Lessin’s implied warranty claims under California 

law is GRANTED. 

D. Plaintiffs’ Fraud-Based Claims

Lastly, the Court addresses whether Plaintiffs have adequately pled their fraud 

claims based on state law. The fraud-based claims are either claims for fraudulent 

concealment (common law) or claims for fraud based on a state consumer protection 

statute. With respect to the fraud claims, Ford makes the following arguments: (1) that 

Plaintiffs have failed to plead with sufficient particularity any affirmative 

misrepresentation by Ford, and that Plaintiffs have not alleged Ford knew a material fact 

about their Vehicles that it failed to disclose before Plaintiffs’ purchases; (2) that the 

Alaska, Connecticut, and Florida consumer protection claims are time-barred; and (3) that 

certain state claims fail for individualized reasons. The Court will address each argument 

in turn. 

1. Whether Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Alleged Ford’s Failure to 

Disclose

To start, Plaintiffs concede their theory for their fraud-based claims is not based on 

affirmative statements, but instead on an omissions-based theory that: (1) Ford failed to 

disclose that the Vehicles are subject to a dangerous latent suspension defect; and (2) Ford 

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actively concealed the defect by misrepresenting the cause of the symptoms it manifests. 

(Doc. No. 21 at 27.)

As a preliminary matter, to survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), allegations of fraud must meet the heightened pleading requirements 

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). As applied to Plaintiffs’ claim for fraud, a fraud 

by omission or fraud by concealment claim “can succeed without the same level of 

specificity required by a normal fraud claim.” Baggett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 582 F. 

Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (C.D. Cal. 2007). When a claim rests on allegations of fraudulent 

omission, the Rule 9(b) standard is somewhat relaxed because “a plaintiff cannot plead 

either the specific time of [an] omission or the place, as he is not alleging an act, but a 

failure to act.” Asghari v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 3d 1306, 1325 (C.D. 

Cal. 2013) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, a plaintiff alleging fraudulent 

omission or concealment must still plead the claim with particularity. See Bias v. Wells 

Fargo & Co., 942 F. Supp. 2d 915, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Marolda v. Symantec Corp., 672 

F. Supp. 2d 992, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“The Ninth Circuit has recently clarified that 

claims of nondisclosure and omission, as varieties of misrepresentations, are subject to the 

pleading standards of Rule 9(b)”)). As such Plaintiffs are still required to plead the “what,” 

“why,” and “how” to establish a claim based on fraud. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. 

Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 

1145, 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2010).

Turning to the substance, the dispute distills down to whether Plaintiffs adequately 

alleged Ford knew a material fact about their vehicles that it failed to disclose before 

Plaintiffs’ purchases. Pursuant to Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, 

Georgia, Nevada, and Texas law, a party cannot have a duty to disclose facts that it did not 

know, and a party is only obligated to disclose known facts material to a consumer’s 

purchase decision. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 

2012). The gravamen of Ford’s argument is that Plaintiffs have not pled facts showing that 

at the time of each of their purchases, Ford had knowledge of a specific material fact 

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establishing a suspension defect in the relevant Class Vehicle. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 33–34.)

Specifically, Ford argues its internal records are too speculative and vague to support an 

inference of knowledge. (Id. at 34.) Additionally, Ford contends the thousands of consumer 

complaints filed with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) 

cannot establish Ford’s knowledge of an alleged defect because the complaints by other 

drivers were either submitted after each plaintiff’s purchase date or involved older vehicle 

models that did not share the same design. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 34.) In opposition, Plaintiffs 

argue that Ford conflates factual matters of causation and proof with the lower pleading 

standard requiring only that Plaintiffs plead Ford’s knowledge of potential defects. (Doc. 

No. 21 at 34.)

With Rule 12 and Rule 9(b) in mind, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have pled enough 

to survive Ford’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims. It would strain credulity 

to say that Plaintiffs have not pled knowledge on the part of Ford when from March 10, 

2005 to February 6, 2019, a staggering 1,265 consumer complaints were submitted to the 

NHTSA with consumers experiencing the alleged violent shaking defect of their Vehicles. 

(FAC ¶ 97.) Ford argues Plaintiffs improperly lump together complaints from 15 different 

model years. (Doc. No. 23 at 18.) Thus, Ford seeks for the Court to focus on each individual 

model year. Specifically, for example, Ford argues Plaintiffs Farlekas (CT) and Jensen 

(FL) purchased a Model Year 2005 vehicle new, but yet only one of the cited NHTSA 

complaints were submitted in 2005 on December 6. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 36.) As another 

example, Ford argues Plaintiffs Morris (NV) and Bittner (TX) presumably purchased their 

new Model Year 2017 vehicles in 2017, while the first cited complaint were not submitted 

until 2018. Ford also asserts that the relevant vehicles “underwent numerous redesigns” 

through the years and so, Plaintiffs cannot rely on any post-purchase complaints. (Doc. No. 

17-1 at 35.)

It is true that generally post-purchase complaints cannot serve as a basis for the 

inference of a defendant’s knowledge about an alleged defect. See Philips v. Ford Motor 

Co., No. 14-CV-02989-LHK, 2015 WL 4111448, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2015). Thus, the 

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Court agrees that Plaintiffs Farlekas (CT) and Jensen’s (FL) fraud-based claims fail. But 

for the other Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs are not alleging that the NHTSA complaints themselves 

prove that the Vehicles are defective. Instead, the NHTSA complaints—as a whole—

suggests Ford would have at least some knowledge of the alleged defect. Furthermore, at 

this juncture of the litigation, Ford’s contention about its redesigns are not enough to 

warrant dismissal of the fraud-based claims. Construing the pleadings in a light most 

favorable to Plaintiffs, the redesigns do not necessarily indicate that Ford was unaware of 

the alleged defect, and could also plausibly support the inference that Ford was aware that 

problems existed in its vehicles. See, e.g, Falco v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. CV 13–00686 

DDP (MANx), 2013 WL 5575065, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2013) (stating that, where 

defendant issued the first of several TSBs in July 2007 and further did a redesign in 2006 

or 2007, that “permit[s] plausible inferences that [defendant] was aware of the defect at the 

time they sold the vehicles in 2005 and 2006”). 

Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not rest their theory of knowledge on just the NHTSA

complaints alone. In addition to the NHTSA complaints, Plaintiffs point to (1) Ford’s own 

records of customers’ complaints, (2) dealership repair records, (3) warranty and postwarranty claims, and (4) pre-sale durability testing and part sales as grounds to infer 

knowledge. (FAC ¶ 102.) For example, Plaintiffs highlight a Technical Service Bulletin 

(“TSB”) issued by Ford on June 17, 2011, which stated that “some 2011 F-250, F-350, and 

F-450 vehicles equipped with 4x4 and built 2/5/2010 through 8/1/2010 may exhibit a 

steering wheel oscillation after hitting rough pavement or an expansion joint during a slight 

left turn 50-55 mph.” (FAC ¶ 117.) Therefore, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to 

plausibly allege that Ford had knowledge of the shaking defect at the time of Plaintiffs’ 

purchases of their Vehicles. See Philips v. Ford Motor Co., No. 14-CV-02989-LHK, 2015 

WL 4111448, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2015) (“Here, California Plaintiffs’ allegations, 

which include internal testing, dated internal communications, dated customer complaints, 

and dated TSBs, are sufficient to plausibly allege that Ford had knowledge of the EPAS 

system defect at the time California Plaintiffs purchased their vehicles.”); MacDonald v. 

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Ford Motor Co., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (identifying “a number of 

facts” that support plaintiffs’ knowledge allegations, including internal data, NHTSA 

complaints, and TSBs). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Ford’s 

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims.

2. Alaska, Connecticut, and Florida Consumer Protection Claims

Ford next argues Plaintiffs’ Alaska, Connecticut, and Florida consumer protection 

claims are barred by the state’s respective statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 38.) 

First, Plaintiff Farlekas’s Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”) claim is 

time-barred because a CUTPA claim must be brought within “three years of the occurrence 

of a violation.” Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204, 216, 541 A.2d 472, 477 (1988). 

Plaintiff Farlekas purchased a 2005 F-250 new but did not file suit until fourteen years later 

in September 2019. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 38.) Plaintiff Farlekas does not dispute this. As such, 

Plaintiff Farlekas’s CUTPA claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as 

time-barred.

Second, the statute of limitations for bringing an Alaska consumer protection claim 

is “two years after the person discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the loss 

resulted from an act or practice declared unlawful.” Alaska Stat. § 45.50.5321(f). Plaintiff 

Preiss (AL) purchased a 2011 truck and experienced issues under warranty. Ford points 

out because Ford’s Limited Warranty extends for a maximum of three years, Plaintiff 

Preiss’s claim arose by 2014. Plaintiff Preiss argues that under Alaska law, the statute of 

limitations period is tolled for consumer protection claims with fraudulent concealment 

allegations. However, the Alaska UTPA statute of limitations begins to run “when 

[plaintiff] purchased the vehicle” and Alaska authority cited by Plaintiff Preiss states that 

it is “immaterial” when a plaintiff discovered the alleged unlawful business practice. See

Weimer v. Cont’l Car & Truck LLC, 237 P.3d 610, 615 (Alaska 2010). Accordingly, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff Preiss’s consumer protection claim is time-barred. 

Third, a Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”) claim is to 

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be brought within four years, and accrues “at the time of purchase or lease of a product, 

not upon discovery of an alleged defect.” Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f). While Plaintiff Jensen 

does not provide the date of when she purchased her 2005 Model Year, it is likely she 

purchased it no later than August 2007, the date of when she presented the car for the first 

repair. (FAC ¶¶ 62, 66.) However, she did not file suit until September 2019—at least 

twelve years after her purchase. Her claim is therefore time-barred as well.

Accordingly, the Alaska, Connecticut, and Florida consumer protection claims are 

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

3. Plaintiff Snodgrass’s Consumer Fraud Act Claim

Ford seeks to have Plaintiff Snodgrass’s Arizona Consumer Fraud Act claim 

dismissed because Arizona does not recognize a cause of action for “subsequent 

purchasers” like Plaintiff Snodgrass. Ford points out Plaintiff Snodgrass purchased a used 

2014 F-230 in June 2019, (FAC ¶ 33), and thus, she is not the “original consumer 

purchaser.” (Doc. No. 17-1 at 38.) Plaintiff Snodgrass responds that the subsequent 

purchaser doctrine does not prohibit a purchaser from bringing suit against a manufacturer 

whose misrepresentations proximately caused the alleged injuries. (Doc. No. 21 at 38–39.)

However, Plaintiffs have already conceded that their fraud-based claims are not based on 

affirmative misrepresentations, but instead on the failure to disclose. Thus, Plaintiff 

Snodgrass’s consumer fraud claim fails and must be DISMISSED.

4. California & Georgia Equitable Claims

Ford next attacks the California and Georgia equitable claims under California’s 

UCL and FAL, and Georgia’s UDTPA because Plaintiffs cannot recover equitable 

remedies permitted under those laws without demonstrating that they lack any legal 

remedy. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 39.) Plaintiffs disagree, contending that those equitable claims

survive when a plaintiff alleges a specific equitable remedy that cannot be obtained through 

legal remedies—even where plaintiffs had other legal claims and potential legal remedies.

(Doc. No. 21 at 37.) Plaintiffs argue the equitable remedies they seek under state law are 

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different than the restitution they seek for breach of warranty because Ford was able to 

overcharge for its vehicles by concealing information. (Id.) 

Several district courts have held that a plaintiff may not seek equitable remedies 

under these consumer protection laws when an adequate remedy at law is available. See, 

e.g., Philips v. Ford Motor Co., No. 14-CV-02989-LHK, 2015 WL 4111448, at *16–17 

(N.D. Cal. July 7, 2015) (dismissing UCL claim and CLRA claim for injunctive relief 

because plaintiffs had adequate remedy at law in the form of their claim for fraudulent 

concealment and complaint contained no allegations of inadequate legal remedy). Here, 

Plaintiffs are already seeking legal damages on their other claims for breach of warranty, 

and do not explain how these damages would somehow be inadequate. As such, the Court 

agrees with Ford and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ UCL and FAL, and Georgia’s UDTPA

claims WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

5. Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (“FBPA”) Claims

Finally, Ford moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ class-wide Georgia FBPA claim. (Doc. 

No. 17-1 at 40.) Ford argues that under Georgia law, the claim cannot be asserted on behalf 

of a class, and that this substantive prohibition is not displaced by Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23. (Id.) Plaintiffs cite Eleventh Circuit authority holding that Rule 23 displaces

Alabama’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act’s prohibition on class claims. (Doc. No. 21 at 39 

(citing Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving, LLC, 792 F.3d 1331, 1335–37 (11th Cir. 

2015)).)

Generally, class actions may continue even if a state consumer protection statute 

precludes them, so long as applying Rule 23 does not abridge, enlarge or modify any 

substantive right. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 

393 (2010). Under the controlling Shady Grove opinion, the inquiry is on whether the state 

law had a substantive purpose. While a state law rule may be procedural, it may be so 

bound up with the state-created right or remedy that it defines the scope of that substantive 

right or remedy, and should not be preempted by a conflicting federal rule. See Shady 

Grove, 559 U.S. at 420. Having considered the relevant authority, the Court declines to 

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follow Plaintiffs’ cited case law regarding the inapposite Alabama consumer protection 

law. Instead, the Court will join with numerous other district courts, which have found that 

the class action prohibition in Georgia’s FBPA is substantive, and thus not displaced by 

Rule 23. Matanky v. Gen. Motors LLC, 370 F. Supp. 3d 772, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2019) 

(“Applying this approach, this Court finds that the class action prohibitions set forth in the 

GFBPA and TCPA define the scope of the state-created rights and are therefore substantive 

and not displaced by Rule 23.”); Delgado v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 

13CV4427NGGST, 2017 WL 5201079, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2017) (finding that the 

class action bar in the Georgia consumer protection statute demonstrates a “substantive 

policy choice . . . to limit not only the form of the action but also the remedies available,” 

such that they apply over Rule 23); In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp.

3d 1154, 1165 (D. Minn. 2014) (holding that “[p]laintiffs cannot maintain a class action as 

to the alleged consumer-protection statutory violations in [] Georgia” because their 

statutory prohibitions of class actions define the scope of the state-created rights and are 

therefore substantive in nature). Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot maintain their class action 

under the Georgia FBPA. The Court GRANTS Ford’s motion on this basis and 

DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ class claims under the Georgia FBPA.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN 

PART Ford’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC. (Doc. No. 17.) Should Plaintiffs choose

to do so, where leave is granted, they must file an amended complaint curing the 

deficiencies noted herein within 21 days of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 5, 2020

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