Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04471/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04471-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dr. ANNA VERTKIN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL VERTKIN, and Does 1-20,

Defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 07-4471 SC

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on pro se Defendant

Michael Vertkin's Motion to Dismiss ("Motion"). See Docket No. 3. 

Plaintiff Dr. Anna Vertkin filed an Opposition and Defendant

submitted a Reply. See Docket Nos. 9, 11.

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and

DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion.

II. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the ugly disintegration of a 30-

year marriage. Through August 2006, Plaintiff and Defendant were

married and residing in the same house in Mill Valley, California. 

Compl., Docket No. 1, ¶ 2. On September 20, 2006, a restraining

order was issued by the Marin County Superior Court against

Defendant, directing that he was not to remove, transfer, or

Case 3:07-cv-04471-SC Document 22 Filed 12/06/07 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Although Plaintiff pleads this cause of action as arising

under "42 U.S.C. 1301, PART C § 1177," Compl. § 24, such a statute

does not exist. However, Plaintiff also references the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") under this

cause of action. HIPAA is Public Law 104-191 and contains Part C,

Section 1177, which is titled "Wrongful disclosure of individually

identifiable health information." Pub. L. 104-191, Part C, Sec.

1177. This section was codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6. The Court

therefore interprets Plaintiff's fourth cause of action as alleging

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, not § 1301. 

2

otherwise alter any financial accounts held between him and

Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 9. On September 26, 2006, Defendant filed a

petition for dissolution of marriage. Mot. ¶ 1. This petition is

still pending in the Marin County Superior Court due to numerous

motions, petitions and delays, none of which is relevant to the

issue at hand. Id.

On August 29, 2007, Plaintiff filed the present Complaint in

this Court. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant installed various

types of tracking software on Plaintiff's computers and

subsequently interfered with Plaintiff's email accounts. Compl.

¶¶ 10-14. Plaintiff raises seven causes of action: (1)

intentional disclosure under 18 U.S.C. § 2511; (2) intentional use

under 18 U.S.C. § 2511; (3) falsification of Plaintiff's mailing

address under 18 U.S.C. § 1001; (4) obtaining individually

identifiable health information under false pretenses, under 42

U.S.C. § 1320(d)(6);1 (5) violations of California Business and

Professions Code § 22947.2(b)(1); (6) trespass to chattel under

California tort law; and (7) invasion of privacy and intrusion of

solitude under California tort law. See Compl. 

Defendant has moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim and res

Case 3:07-cv-04471-SC Document 22 Filed 12/06/07 Page 2 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

judicata.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) states that a motion

to dismiss may be granted if the plaintiff fails "to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the facts

as stated by the nonmoving party and draws all inferences in its

favor. Everest & Jennings, Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 23

F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, courts must assume

that all general allegations "embrace whatever specific facts

might be necessary to support them." Peloza v. Capistrano Unified

Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994). At the pleading

stage, the plaintiff "need only show that the facts alleged, if

proved, would confer standing upon him." Warren v. Fox Family

Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Several of Plaintiff's causes of action are brought under

statutes that provide no private right of action and must

therefore be dismissed. 

Plaintiff's third cause of action alleges that Defendant

violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by falsifying a change in Plaintiff's

mailing address. Section 1001 provides, in pertinent part:

[W]hoever, in any matter within the

jurisdiction of the executive,

legislative, or judicial branch of the

Case 3:07-cv-04471-SC Document 22 Filed 12/06/07 Page 3 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

Government of the United States,

knowingly and willfully -- (1) falsifies,

conceals, or covers up by any trick,

scheme, or device a material fact; [or]

(2) makes any materially false,

fictitious, or fraudulent statement or

representation . . . shall be fined under

this title [or] imprisoned not more than

5 years . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Nowhere does the statute provide a private

right of action. The few other courts to have addressed this

issue have also failed to uncover a private right of action under

this statute. See, e.g., Williams v. McCausland, 791 F. Supp.

992, 1001 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that "[n]o private right of

action is provided under this statute"). Plaintiff's Third Cause

of Action is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.

Plaintiff's fourth cause of action alleges that Defendant

violated Plaintiff's rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 by

"obtaining individually identifiable health information under

false pretenses" of Plaintiff's patients. Compl. ¶ 28. Section

1320d-6 states, in relevant part:

A person who knowingly . . . obtains

individually identifiable health

information relating to an individual . .

. shall be . . . fined not more than

$50,000, imprisoned not more than 1 year,

or both . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6. The Court discerns no private right of

action under this statute. Other courts that have examined this

issue have found the same. See, e.g., Johnson v. Quander, 370 F.

Supp. 2d 79, (D.D.C. 2005) (finding no private right of action

under § 1320d-6 and stating that "[w]hile only a handful of courts

have examined whether a private right of action is implied under

HIPAA, each court has rejected the position"); see also id.

Case 3:07-cv-04471-SC Document 22 Filed 12/06/07 Page 4 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

(listing decisions by other courts finding no private right of

action). Therefore, Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action are brought

under criminal statute 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Although § 2511 itself

does not provide a private right of action, courts have found that

§ 2520(a) "expressly allows private civil suits by any person

whose electronic communication is intercepted in violation" of §

2511. DirectTV, Inc., v. Bennet, 470 F.3d 565, 567 (5th Cir.

2006); see also DirectTV, Inc. v. Nicholas, 403 F.3d 223 (4th Cir.

2005) (holding the same). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction

over these causes of action and will therefore analyze them

pursuant to Defendant's Motion for failure to state a claim and

res judicata.

B. Failure To State A Claim

1. First and Second Causes of Action

Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action are brought

under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 and allege that Defendant used software to

track Plaintiff's keystrokes on her computer and then used the

information obtained from this software for various financial

gains. 

Section 2511 states, in part:

[A]ny person who . . . intentionally

discloses . . . the contents of any . . .

electronic communication, knowing or

having reason to know that the

information was obtained through the

interception of a[n] . . . electronic

communication in violation of this

subsection . . . or intentionally uses .

. . the contents of any . . . electronic

Case 3:07-cv-04471-SC Document 22 Filed 12/06/07 Page 5 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

communication . . . shall be punished as

provided in subsection (4) or shall be

subject to suit . . . by the Federal

Government.

18 U.S.C. § 2511.

Plaintiff has satisfied the pleading requirements for these

claims and Defendant's Motion to dismiss Plaintiff's First and

Second Causes of Action for failure to state a claim is DENIED. 

2. Fifth Cause of Action

Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action alleges violations of

California Business and Professions Code section 22947.2(b)(1). 

Section 22947.2 states, in part: 

A person or entity that is not an

authorized user . . . shall not,

with actual knowledge, . . . cause

computer software to be copied onto

the computer of a consumer . . . and

use the software to do any of the

following: . . . (b) Collect,

through intentionally deceptive

means, personally identifiable

information that meets any of the

following criteria: (1) It is

collected through the use of a

keystroke-logging function that

records all keystrokes made by an

authorized user who uses the

computer and transfers that

information from the computer to

another person.

Cal. Bus. and Profs. Code § 22947.2(b)(1). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant installed 'keystroke'

software on the home and office computers of Plaintiff and

obtained Plaintiff's personal financial information from this

software. Plaintiff, therefore, has alleged a cause of action and

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Fifth Cause of Action is DENIED.

///

///

Case 3:07-cv-04471-SC Document 22 Filed 12/06/07 Page 6 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

3. Sixth Cause of Action

Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action is a California tort law

claim for trespass to chattel. Plaintiff alleges that by

installing computer programs onto Plaintiff's computer in order to

obtain personal information, Defendant intermeddled with

Plaintiff's property. "Short of dispossession, personal injury,

or physical damage . . ., intermeddling is actionable [as trespass

to chattels] only if the chattel is impaired as to its condition,

quality, or value, or the possessor is deprived of the use of the

chattel for a substantial time. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal.

4th 1342, 1357 (2003) (internal quotations marks omitted). 

In the present case, Plaintiff's allegations fall short of

what is required to state a colorable trespass to chattels claim. 

The only harm alleged by Plaintiff was a result of the information

that Defendant allegedly procured from Plaintiff's computers. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege that her computers were impaired as

to their condition or quality or that she was unable to use these

computers for a substantial period of time. Accordingly,

Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action for trespass to chattel is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

4. Seventh Cause of Action

Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action is for invasion of

privacy and intrusion of solitude under California tort law. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's installation of

software on Plaintiff's computers with the intent of obtaining

information from these computers was an offensive invasion and

therefore actionable as a tort.

Case 3:07-cv-04471-SC Document 22 Filed 12/06/07 Page 7 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

Intrusion into solitude or seclusion requires allegations

that "one intentionally . . . intrudes, physically or otherwise,

upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs

or concerns . . . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a

reasonable person." Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 724 (2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The action for intrusion has

two elements: "(1) intrusion into a private place, conversation or

matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person." 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must

demonstrate that "the defendant penetrated some zone of physical

or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to

data about, the plaintiff." Id. at 725. Plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged this cause of action and Defendant's Motion

to Dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action is DENIED.

C. Res Judicata

"In order to bar a later suit under the doctrine of res

judicata, an adjudication must (1) involve the same claim as the

later suit, (2) have reached the final judgment on the merits, and

(3) involve the same parties or their privies." Nordhorn v.

Ladish Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1993). Defendant

bases his Motion to Dismiss for res judicata on the dismissal, by

the Marin County Superior Court, of the temporary restraining

order that had been imposed against Defendant. Such an action,

however, is not a final judgment on the merits and, as far as this

Court can tell, did not involve the same claims presented here. 

Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for res judicata is

DENIED.

Case 3:07-cv-04471-SC Document 22 Filed 12/06/07 Page 8 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 It is the Court's understanding that the divorce

proceedings between Plaintiff and Defendant are still pending in

Marin County Superior Court, more than one year after they were

initiated. It is also the Court's understanding that these

proceedings are, at best, less than cordial. With this backdrop,

the Court reminds the parties that representations to the Court,

including pleadings and motions, may not be made for any improper

purpose, including harassment, unnecessary delay, or needless

increase in the cost of litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

9

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART

and DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES

Plaintiff's Third, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action with

prejudice.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 6, 2007 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-04471-SC Document 22 Filed 12/06/07 Page 9 of 9