Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01760/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01760-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD KEVIN HENRY,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 12-cv-1760-LAB

(WMc)

REPORT &

RECOMMENDATION ON

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary,

California Department of Corrections;

KAMALA D. HARRIS, The Attorney

General of the State of California, 

Respondents.

Introduction

Petitioner, Edward Kevin Henry (“Henry”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming prison

officials at Centinela State Prison denied his due process rights by finding him guilty

of possessing inmate manufactured alcohol without any evidence the substance

found in his possession was actually alcohol. (ECF No. 1). Respondent did not file a

responsive pleading in this action. 

- 1 - 12cv1760 LAB (WMc)

Case 3:12-cv-01760-LAB-WMC Document 9 Filed 04/02/13 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District

Judge Larry A. Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule

H.C.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

After reviewing the petition, the Court recommends the petition be denied. 

Background

In its February 22, 2012 reasoned decision denying the petition, the California

Court of Appeal summarized the facts, to which a presumption of correctness

attaches. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1): 

Edward Henry states he is serving 30 years in prison after being

convicted of multiple counts of robbery in the County of Los Angeles in 2006. On May 13, 2011, Henry was found guilty of possessing

inmate-manufactured alcohol in Centinela State Prison in violation of

California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3016, subdivision (a). As a result, Henry lost 120 days time credit and various privileges. He exhausted his administrative remedies and the Superior Court of Imperial County denied his petition on January 6, 2012. 

Henry challenges the disciplinary finding, claiming he possessed a laxative mixed with juice, not inmate-manufactured alcohol. He

contends the substance should have been tested under section 3290.

“Inmates shall not inhale, ingest, inject, or otherwise introduce into

their body; use, possess, manufacture, or have under their control any

controlled substance, medication, or alcohol, except as specifically

authorized by the institution’s/facility’s health care staff.” (§ 3016, subd. (a).) “The department shall prescribe the products, equipment, and methods for testing suspected controlled substances or for the use

of alcohol. ‘Field’ or on-site testing shall be conducted only by trained personnel.” (§ 3290, subd. (a).) “Field tests may be performed on any suspected substance found on institution property or in the possession

or under the control of any inmate, or in the possession or under the

control of persons other than inmates who come on institution

property.” (Id., subd. (b).)

The record shows on April 26, 2011, Correctional Officer L. Sanchez

conducted a “linen sweep” in the building where Henry was housed. In Henry’s cell Officer Sanchez found a coffee jar three-quarters full or

orange pulpy liquid. The jar was located inside a laundry bag under the lower bunk assigned to Henry. Sanchez searched further and found a

second full jar hidden behind clothing on a shelf assigned to Henry’s cellmate Banks. According to Officer Sanchez, the liquid in the jars had a strong odor of alcohol. Officer Sanchez disposed of the liquid. 

Prison disciplinary findings must be supported by “some evidence.” (In

re Rothwell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 160, 165, citing Superintendent v. Hill, (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 455.) Ascertaining whether the “some evidence” standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or

- 2 - 12cv1760 LAB (WMc)

Case 3:12-cv-01760-LAB-WMC Document 9 Filed 04/02/13 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

weighing of the evidence. Instead the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the prison authorities. (Hill, at pp. 455-456.)

The hidden locations of the jars and the officer’s determination the

liquid was inmate-manufactured alcohol is some evidence to support

the disciplinary finding that Henry possessed alcohol in violation of

section 3016, subdivision (a). Section 3290 authorizes, but does not

mandate, field testing of suspected controlled substances and alcohol. 

The petition is denied.

(ECF No. 1 at pp. 22-23)

Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

codified under 28 USC section 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas

petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when

the [p]etitioner is not challenging his underlying state court conviction.” White v.

Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the AEDPA, the court may

entertain a petition for habeas relief on behalf of a California state inmate “only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 USC § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court's adjudication of any claim

on the merits: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard, federal

habeas relief will not be granted “simply because [this] court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining whether

the state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, the

- 3 - 12cv1760 LAB (WMc)

Case 3:12-cv-01760-LAB-WMC Document 9 Filed 04/02/13 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 USC section

2254(d) rests in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the

time of the state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

A federal district court reviews the last reasoned state court opinion. See Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). Here, it appears the state courts’ last

reasoned decision issued from the California Court of Appeal on February 22, 2012.

(ECF No. 1, p. 22). The Court will review the state appellate court’s decision to

determine if it unreasonably applied controlling federal law. See Delgado v. Lewis,

223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.2000).

Discussion

Henry presents three grounds for federal habeas corpus relief. First, Henry

contends prison officials failed to present “some evidence” at his disciplinary

hearing that a jar found in his possession contained inmate manufactured alcohol.

Henry contends no evidence of alcohol was introduced at the hearing because the

corrections officer who allegedly found the alcohol, Officer Sanchez, immediately

poured the substance down the drain, thus destroying the only evidence of the

alleged rule infraction. Henry contends the destruction of evidence violates his due

process rights. Second, Henry contends Officer Sanchez failure to have another

corrections officer confirm the presence of alcohol also violated his due process

rights. Henry cites Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1987) to support his

contention that the uncorroborated testimony of one prison official is insufficient to

find a prisoner guilty of possessing alcohol. Third, Henry claims Officer Sanchez

failed to test the substance as required by California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation title 15. (ECF No. 1, pp. 1-8). 

On habeas corpus, the Court's inquiry into the sufficiency of evidence to

support a prison disciplinary determination is extremely limited. The Court examines

the record to determine if there is “some evidence from which the conclusion of the

- 4 - 12cv1760 LAB (WMc)

Case 3:12-cv-01760-LAB-WMC Document 9 Filed 04/02/13 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

administrative tribunal could be deduced . . . .” Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985)

(quotation omitted). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at

455–56. Even evidence that is “meager” or indirect may support a prison

disciplinary determination. Id. at 457. 

Here, Henry’s first claim fails because Officer Sanchez’ statement confirming

the jars contained alcohol as well as the location in which Officer Sanchez found the

jars, satisfies the “some evidence” requirement. See Hurd v. Scribner, No.

06CV0413-LAB (JMA), 2008 WL 544265 at 7* (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2008); Barnes v.

Salazar, No. 05-CV-2258 W (JMA), 2007 WL 1110740 at 6* (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6,

2007). Thus, Henry’s argument that Officer Sanchez destroyed the only evidence of

the alleged infraction lacks merit; Officer Sanchez testimony of what he found in

Henry’s cell, where he found it and what it smelled like is evidence of Henry’s

possession of inmate manufactured alcohol. 

Similarly, Henry’s second claim fails because the “some evidence” standard

does not require additional evidence to corroborate a correctional officer’s statement.

See id. Henry’s reliance on Cato, supra, is unavailing because in Cato “the only

evidence implicating [the inmate] was the uncorroborated hearsay statement of a

confidential informant” whereas here the prison’s disciplinary findings relied on the

report of the officer who performed the “linen sweep,” detected the odor of alcohol,

and discovered two hidden jars of alcohol. See Cato, 824 F.2d at 705. Therefore, the

evidence present here, unlike the evidence present in Cato, has an indicia of

reliability sufficient to serve as “some evidence” that Henry possessed alcohol. See

id.

Henry’s third claim also fails. Under 15 California Code of Regulations

section 3000, a “Controlled Substance means any substance, drug, narcotic, opiate,

hallucinogen, depressant, or stimulant as defined by California Health and Safety

Code section 11007.” California Health and Safety Code section 11007, which refers

- 5 - 12cv1760 LAB (WMc)

Case 3:12-cv-01760-LAB-WMC Document 9 Filed 04/02/13 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to schedules contained in Health and Safety Code sections 11054-11058, does not

list alcohol as a controlled substance. “Alcohol is not a controlled substance within

the meaning of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.” People v. Orozco, 209

Cal.App.4th 726, 733 (2012). California law does not require laboratory testing of

confiscated alcohol before disciplinary action for the manufacture or possession of

alcohol resulting in the loss of work/behavior credits. See 15 Cal. Code. Reg. §

3290(e). Although Henry contends California law should require laboratory testing

of confiscated alcohol, California law does not require such testing, and “[a] federal

court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.” Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).

In sum, the disciplinary finding relied on “some evidence” to determine Henry

possessed inmate manufactured alcohol. The court of appeals properly applied

controlling Supreme Court authority and reasonably determined the facts in light of

the evidence presented at the disciplinary hearing. Despite Henry’s perceived

inadequacies in the evidence presented below, the Court concludes Henry received

the process due him under federal law. Accordingly, the Court recommends the

petition be denied and dismissed.

Conclusion and Recommendation

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United State District

Judge Larry A. Burns under 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2

of the United States District court for the Southern District of California. For all the

foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED this habeas Petition be

DENIED in its entirety. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Court issue an

Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation and (2) directing

that judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than April 23, 2013 any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

- 6 - 12cv1760 LAB (WMc)

Case 3:12-cv-01760-LAB-WMC Document 9 Filed 04/02/13 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than April 30, 2013. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 2, 2013

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S.District Court

- 7 - 12cv1760 LAB (WMc)

Case 3:12-cv-01760-LAB-WMC Document 9 Filed 04/02/13 Page 7 of 7