Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01353/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01353-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Plaintiff’s opposition and amended opposition do not comply with Local Rule 56-260. 1

Plaintiff did not reproduce and admit or deny each fact itemized in defendants’ statement of

undisputed facts. Nor did plaintiff present his own concise statement of disputed facts, as

permitted. Nevertheless, in the interests of justice, the court has considered plaintiff’s opposition

and amended opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY EDWARDS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1353 LKK DAD P 

vs.

TOM L. CAREY, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an action

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 2, 2007, a motion for summary judgment pursuant

to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was filed on behalf of defendants Blackwell,

Carey, Long, and Fry. On April 10, 2007, plaintiff filed a timely opposition. On April 17, 2007,

plaintiff filed an amended opposition. Defendants have not filed a reply. 

1

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PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that on or about June 18, 2003, he discussed with defendant

Blackwell the potential for him to receive family visitation. (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff further

alleges that defendant Blackwell told him to have his wife send in a copy of their marriage

license. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Blackwell also spoke with plaintiff’s wife and

explained the process for family visitation to her. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that his wife forwarded a copy of their marriage license as

directed, but defendant Blackwell informed them that it was not acceptable because it did not

come directly from a county or city office. (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he told defendant

Blackwell he would direct his wife to have Chicago City Hall send a copy of the license. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Blackwell informed plaintiff that the name on his marriage license

would have to match the name in his central file. (Id. at 3-3b.) Plaintiff alleges, however, that he

explained to Blackwell that his name appears differently on his marriage license but that the

name on his marriage license and the name he is incarcerated under both belong to him. (Id. at

3b.)

Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a CDC 602 grievance requesting family

visitation, but defendants denied his appeal at each level of review. (Compl. at 3b.) Plaintiff

then commenced this action, requesting an order from the court allowing him to participate in the

family visiting program. (Id. at 4.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 19, 2005, this court determined that plaintiff’s complaint appeared

to state cognizable claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four defendants. In due

course, the United States Marshal served plaintiff’s complaint on defendants Blackwell, Carey,

Long, and Fry. On December 29, 2005, defendants filed an answer. On January 9, 2006, the

court issued a discovery order and on July 10, 2006 issued a scheduling order requiring that all

pretrial motions be filed on or before January 5, 2007. On April 2, 2007, defendants filed the

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instant motion for summary judgment, together with a request for leave to act beyond time in

filing the untimely motion. Good cause appearing, the undersigned granted defendants’ request

and ordered plaintiff to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. On April 10, 2007, plaintiff filed a timely opposition. On April 17,

2007, plaintiff filed his amended opposition. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS UNDER RULE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

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1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On October 3, 2005, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

OTHER APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 

I. Civil Rights Act Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

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allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

II. Constitutionality of Prison Regulations

The Supreme Court has declared that a prison regulation that impinges on a

prisoner’s constitutional rights is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Four factors are relevant in deciding whether

a prison regulation withstands a constitutional challenge. The first factor is whether there is a

“‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental

interest put forward to justify it.” Id. The second factor is whether prisoners have alternative

means of exercising the constitutional right that is allegedly impinged on by the regulation. Id. at

90. The third factor is what impact an accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will

have on guards and other prisoners, and on the allocation of prison resources generally. Id. The

fourth and final factor is whether there are alternatives to the challenged regulation. Id. “[T]he

absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation. Id. 

III. California Family Visiting Program

Under the California Code of Regulations and the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation Operations Manual (“DOM”), certain inmates are allowed to

participate in the family visiting program. Family visits are extended overnight visits provided to

eligible inmates and their immediate family members. Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 15 §§ 3000 &

3177. “Immediate family members” is defined to include a “legal spouse.” Id. § 3000. Family

visiting is a “privilege” and is restricted as necessary to maintain order, the safety of persons, the

security of the facility, and required prison activities and operations. Id. § 3177(b).

At the time plaintiff applied for family visits, inmates were assigned a correctional

counselor who was responsible for determining the inmate’s eligibility to participate in the

family visiting program. (Compl. Ex. C (DOM § 54020.33.2).) However, it was an inmate’s

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 The current DOM similarly states that “[a] certified copy of the marriage certificate 2

shall be presented to the coordinator prior to each visit by the inmate’s spouse.” DOM §

54020.33.10. 

7

responsibility to ensure that his correctional counselor received a certified copy of his

marriage certificate which the counselor would validate. (Id.) 2

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

I. Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts and Evidence

Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts is supported by a declaration by

plaintiff’s former correctional counselor, defendant R. Blackwell; a declaration by D. Blackwell,

a visiting Lieutenant overseeing the visiting program for inmates; and copies of records from

plaintiff’s central file. 

The undersigned finds that defendants’ evidence establishes the following facts:

Plaintiff is a California prisoner who was sentenced in 1998 to a term of imprisonment of 17

years to life for burglary in the first degree, burglary in the second degree and attempted burglary

in the second degree with enhancements. Plaintiff was arrested and booked under the name Jerry

Williams, aka Tyrone Davis, true name Larry Edwards. The probation report in plaintiff’s case

did not state his marital status, but the report does reflect that he had a sixteen-year-long

relationship with a Christine Shelton. The couple had two children at the time plaintiff was

imprisoned. Plaintiff transferred to CSP-Solano on June 13, 2003. His earliest possible release

date is April 21, 2011.

There are eight family visiting units at CSP-Solano. Four are on side A and four

are on side B of the institution. Approximately 140 to 150 inmates at CSP-Solano have

requested and been found eligible for family visits. Family visits at CSP-Solano take place six

days a week and the units are generally full. Each of the eligible inmates receives a family visit

approximately once every three months. Allowing prisoners who are not eligible to participate in

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family visiting would necessarily reduce the family visiting time available to those eligible

inmates. 

In July 2003, correctional counselor Blackwell received a telephone call from a

woman who identifying herself as Mrs. Sharpe, plaintiff’s wife. The woman indicated that she

lived in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and wanted to come to California for a “family visit” with her

husband. Counselor Blackwell informed the woman that she was required to send in an

authenticated copy of their marriage certificate and to obtain approval for a family visit. 

Counselor Blackwell also informed her that, effective May 1, 2003, CDCR policy had changed

and there were several other factors that might effect approval of family visits.

A week later, Counselor Blackwell received in the mail a photocopy of a marriage

license and a birth certificate. Blackwell noticed that the documents came directly from Mrs.

Sharpe, not the County Clerk’s Office. As a result, the documents were unacceptable because

they were not authenticated and could have been altered. In addition, the information reflected in

the documents did not match the information contained in plaintiff’s central file. Specifically,

plaintiff’s name and date of birth did not match those appearing in his central file. Based on

these factors, Blackwell returned the documents to plaintiff with instructions regarding the

documentation required, where the documents had to come from, and in what condition they had

to appear in order to start the approval process for family visits. 

Approximately three weeks later, Blackwell received an envelope from the Cook

County Clerk’s Office. Blackwell noticed that the envelope had been folded in three places and

that the postmark on the envelope was from Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Suspicious, Blackwell

contacted the Cook County Clerk’s Office and was told that if the envelope had come from that

office, it would bear a postmark from Chicago, Illinois. Blackwell believed that the documents

may have been altered and denied plaintiff’s request for family visits on that basis.

On August 11, 2003, plaintiff filed an administrative grievance, alleging that he

had discussed family visits with Blackwell, who nonetheless rejected the documents his wife

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sent. Plaintiff attached copies of the documents to the grievance, including a birth certificate

bearing the name “Larry Donramon Sharpe” and a marriage certificate bearing the name

“Lorenzo L. Sharpe.” Both of the documents bear the phrase “VOID WITHOUT

WATERMARK OR IF ALTERED OR ERASED.” Based on these documents, plaintiff

requested that he be found eligible to receive family visits. 

Counselor Blackwell denied plaintiff’s grievance at the informal level of review, 

explaining that the documents had to come directly from the County Clerk’s Office. Dissatisfied,

plaintiff appealed to the next level of review. Plaintiff claimed that the documents were not

copies but originals. On September 8, 2003, Acting Associate Warden Fry denied plaintiff’s

grievance. Fry reiterated the process for submitting legal documents and told plaintiff that the

name and birth date on the documents submitted had to match the name and birth date on

documents in his central file. Still dissatisfied, plaintiff appealed to the second level of review

and subsequently the director’s level of review. At both levels, prison officials denied his

grievance. 

II. Defendants’ Arguments

Based on this evidence, the defendants argue that plaintiff is not entitled to

injunctive relief in the form of a court order requiring that he be found eligible for family

visitation because he has no liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in conjugal visits

with a spouse while incarcerated. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 5.) Defendants contend that in

order to prevail on his request for injunctive relief, plaintiff must show either a likelihood of

success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that some serious question is

raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiff’s favor. (Id.) According to

defendants, in the absence of a showing of non-speculative irreparable harm, the court need not

reach the issue of likelihood of success on the merits. 

Defendants note that incarceration places substantial restrictions on plaintiff’s

First Amendment rights of association, even with his family. (Id.) In addition, defendants

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contend that a court must “accord deference to the professional judgment of prison

administrators” in this area (Id. at 5-6.) They argue that when deciding whether a prison

regulation imposes undue restrictions on a prisoner’s rights, in this case the First Amendment

right of association, the burden is on the inmate to disprove the validity of the challenged

regulation. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.) 

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s claim is based on his mistaken belief that he

has a liberty interest in conjugal visits. (Id.) Defendants argue that prison officials are not

obligated to provide inmates the privilege of receiving overnight family visitation. (Id.) They

contend that the restrictions they have elected to impose on such visits do not impose an atypical

and significant hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. (Id.)

Defendants argue that, while the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “the Constitution

protects certain kinds of highly personal relationships,” the Court has also emphasized that “the

very object of imprisonment is confinement.” (Id.) Defendants assert that the Due Process

Clause does not guarantee any interest in prison visitation, let alone a particular form of

visitation. (Id. at 7.) Rather, they contend, courts have routinely found that contact visiting in

general, and overnight visiting in particular, are not constitutionally required. (Id.) 

Defendants argue that the Supreme Court has found that prison regulations

limiting inmates’ right to intimate association are valid if they bear a rational relationship to

legitimate penological interests. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 7.) Defendants reiterate that the

courts must accord substantial deference to the judgment of prison officials in defining the

legitimate goals of the corrections system and determining the most appropriate means to

accomplish them. (Id.) Thus, defendants contend that restrictions on visiting must be upheld if

the regulation meets the four-part test set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89 (1987). (Id.) 

Defendants contend that the regulation at issue here meets that test and should be upheld. (Id.) 

Defendants note that, although not required to do so, California has elected to

provide overnight family visits to eligible inmates. (Id.) However, the CDCR restricts eligibility

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for such visits to inmates who can obtain the most rapid and tangible benefits from them, i.e.,

those inmates who: (1) will be returning to their families within a known period of time; (2) have

not violated their family’s trust by committing violent acts against them; (3) have not

demonstrated a threat to society by acts of sexual predation; and (4) have not engaged in serious

in-prison misconduct. (Id. at 7-8.)

Defendants note that while plaintiff has failed to satisfy one or more of the

eligibility requirements, the focus of this action is his exclusion based on his failure to establish

that he is legally married. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 8.) Defendants argue that prison officials

have a legitimate interest in using their limited resources to afford the privilege of family visits to

inmates who are married. In addition, defendants argue that prison officials have a legitimate

interest in granting family visits to inmates who are expected to be released to the community

and their families within a known period of time. (Id.) In this case, according to defendants,

plaintiff’s earliest possible parole date is not until April 21, 2011, and there is no evidence

indicating that he will return to his wife and children when released. (Id.) 

Second, defendants note that there are alternative means for plaintiff to enjoy

familial association. (Id.) In this regard, defendants take the position that, although plaintiff has

not been allowed overnight conjugal visits, he is not prohibited from all familial contact. (Id. at

9.) For example, he may visit with his family members in the prison’s visiting room or may

communicate with them by letter or telephone. (Id.) Plaintiff does not contend that he is unable

to maintain his family relationships in these ways. (Id.) 

Third, defendants note that allowing ineligible inmates to have family visits would

impact staff, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources by placing additional demands

on use of the limited housing units available for the family visiting program. (Id. at 9.) As it is,

eligible inmates receive family visits only once every three months. (Id.) Defendants argue that

allowing ineligible inmates such as plaintiff to participate in the program would necessarily

require additional funds for a program that is not constitutionally required in the first place. (Id.)

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Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to offer alternatives that would

not impose more than a de minimis cost to serve CSP-Solano’s valid penological interests. 

(Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 9.) Defendants contend that there are no such readily available

alternatives because of the impact on prison resources and on other inmates. (Id.)

Defendants conclude that plaintiff is unlikely to succeed in this action because he

has no liberty interest in family visits. (Id.) Moreover, defendants contend that plaintiff has not

established that he is married and eligible for family visits. (Id.) Based on the undisputed

evidence, defendants request that the court grant their motion for summary judgment, deny

plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, and dismiss this case. 

III. Plaintiff’s Opposition

In opposition, plaintiff argues that Section 3177 of the California Rules and

Regulations permits a prisoner to receive a family visit. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.

at 1.) Plaintiff notes that, although a family visit is a privilege, it stems from the rules and

regulations that the California Department of Corrections has implemented. (Id.) Plaintiff

argues that unless a prisoner violates the relevant rule or regulation, he has acquired the privilege. 

(Id.) He contends that he has not violated any rule or regulation that would make him ineligible

for the family visiting program. (Pl.’s Am. Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.) 

Plaintiff also contends that his new correctional counselor has received a copy of

his marriage license from the Office of the Cook County Vital Statistics. (Pl.’s Am. Opp’n to

Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.) Plaintiff argues that there has never been any reason to deny him

and his family their family visit. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.) He asserts that

defendants’ continued denial of his eligibility for the family visiting violates the First and

Fourteenth Amendments. (Pl.’s Am. Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.) Plaintiff

concludes that the court should grant his request for injunctive relief and deny defendants’

motion for summary judgment.

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 Plaintiff argues in his opposition that his new correctional counselor has now received a 3

copy of plaintiff’s marriage license. However, plaintiff has not provided the court with any

evidence in support of this assertion. Plaintiff has attached to his opposition an affidavit from

“Mrs. Christine Shelton Sharpe-Edwards” in which she states that she has been married to

plaintiff for thirty-five years. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ., Ex. B.) However, the

affidavit does not speak to whether the properly-certified documents have been submitted to

prison officials. In fact, the affiant mentions only the occasion when she, as opposed to the Cook

County Clerk’s Office, sent prison officials a copy of their marriage license. As noted above, an

opposing party to a motion for summary judgment may not rely upon the allegations or denials of

the pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or

admissible discovery material, in support of the contention that a dispute as to a material fact

exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. 

 As defendants note in their motion, even if plaintiff properly establishes that he is 4

legally married, it appears that he may not be eligible to participate in the family visiting

program. CDCR restricts eligibility to prisoners who “(1) will be returning to their families

within a known period of time; (2) have not violated their family’s trust by [committing] violent

acts against them; (3) have not demonstrated a threat to society by acts of predation acts; and (4)

have not engaged in serious in-prison misconduct.” (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B.) Plaintiff’s

earliest possible release date is not until April 21, 2011 and he has not presented evidence

indicating that he will return to Ms. Shelton Sharpe-Edwards and their children upon his release. 

13

ANALYSIS

There are no disputed issues of material fact in connection with the pending

motion for summary judgment. Although the parties dispute whether plaintiff is legally married,

there is no legitimate dispute as to the fact that plaintiff has failed to provide prison officials with

a certified copy of his marriage certificate. Thus, plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has a 3

“legal spouse” and meets the eligibility criteria to participate in the family visiting program. See 4

Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3000, 3177; DOM §§ 54020.33.2, 54020.33.10. Below, the court

will address defendants’ motion with respect to each of the constitutional basis for plaintiff’s

claim. 

I. First Amendment Freedom of Association

“[F]reedom of association is among the rights least compatible with

incarceration.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003). In the prison context, some

curtailment of that freedom must be expected. Id.; Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th

Cir. 2002) (“The loss of the right to intimate association is simply part and parcel of being

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imprisoned for conviction of a crime.”). This court need not attempt to determine the extent to

which freedom of association survives incarceration because the family visiting regulation at

issue here bears a rational relationship to legitimate penological interests. See Overton, 539 U.S.

at 132 (“We need not attempt to explore or define the asserted right of association at any length

or determine the extent to which it survives incarceration because the challenged regulations bear

a rational relation to legitimate penological interests. This suffices to sustain the regulation in 

question.”).

Prison officials have a legitimate interest in using their limited resources to restrict

family visits to prisoners who are married and expected to be released to the community and their

families within a determinate period of time. In this regard, the family visiting regulation serves

to maintain family and community connections and prepare inmates for successful release and

rehabilitation. Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 15, § 3170(a). Given the limited facilities available for

family visiting, prison officials have reasonably determined that the eligibility criteria must be

met before prisoners can participate. 

In addition, the rational relationship between this legitimate penological interest

and the regulation in question is demonstrated by the evidence before the court. In this regard,

Lt. Blackwell declares that: “[a]llowing prisoners who are not legally married, and who have not

been approved for family visits, to participate in family visiting would necessarily reduce the

amount of family visiting time available to those inmates who are currently eligible to receive

such visits.” (D. Blackwell Decl. at 2, ¶ 4.) This court cannot say that requiring prisoners to

meet certain eligibility criteria to participate in the family visiting program is unreasonable. 

The second Turner factor requires the court to consider whether other avenues

remain available for exercising the asserted right. In this case, plaintiff has alternative means of

exercising the First Amendment right to association. Even if he cannot participate in the family

visiting program, he can still visit with Ms. Shelton Sharpe-Edwards in the prison visiting room

and by letter and telephone. See Overton, 539 U.S. at 135 (finding such alternatives to be of

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sufficient utility to support a prison regulation limiting visitations). He can also send messages

to his Ms. Shelton Sharpe-Edwards through his other visitors. Id. As the Supreme Court has

held maintained, “[a]lternatives to visitation need not be ideal; however, they need only be

available.” Id. See also Gerber, 291 F.3d at 621-22 (“The fact that California prison officials

may choose to permit some inmates the privilege of conjugal visits is simply irrelevant to

whether there is a constitutional right to conjugal visits . . . .”) 

The third Turner factor concerns the impact accommodation of the asserted right

will have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources. As noted above, there

are limited family visiting facilities. Even prisoners who are eligible to participate in family

visiting are only able to do so once every three months. If plaintiff and all other prisoners who

are ineligible to participate in the program were accommodated, the family visiting program

would likely be overwhelmed. 

Finally, the fourth Turner factor assesses whether there is a lack of ready

alternatives. “Turner does not require a least-restrictive alternative test, but asks instead whether

the prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully accommodates the

asserted right while not imposing more than a de minimis cost to the valid penological goal.” 

Overton, 539 U.S. 136. Plaintiff has not suggested any alternative that would meet this standard.

Accordingly, this court concludes that the family visiting regulation in question is

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests both on its face and as applied in plaintiff’s

case. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should therefore be granted with respect to

plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.

II. Eighth Amendment Freedom from Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Plaintiff has suggested that denying him family visits under these circumstances

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v.

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Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). However, neither accident nor negligence constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment, for “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in

good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. To prevail on any claim of cruel and unusual punishment, a

prisoner must satisfy a two-part test. First, the prisoner must prove that objectively he suffered a

sufficiently serious deprivation. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Second, the

prisoner must prove that subjectively each defendant had a culpable state of mind in allowing or

causing the deprivation to occur. Id. at 298-99.

Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence satisfying the first part of the

applicable test. A rule or regulation imposing restrictions or eligibility criteria regarding who

may participate in the family visiting program does not create inhumane prison conditions,

deprive plaintiff of basic necessities, or fail to protect plaintiff’s health or safety. Nor does the

regulation involve infliction of pain or injury or reflect deliberate indifference to the risk that it

might occur. Overton, 539 U.S. at 136 (concluding that restriction on visitation for certain

inmates made the prisoners’ confinement more difficult to bear but did not fall below the

standards mandated by the Eighth Amendment). Accordingly, application of the family visiting

regulation in plaintiff’s case does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

Eighth Amendment.

III. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection

A. Due Process

Although prisoners retain those constitutional rights that are not inconsistent with

their status or with the legitimate penological objectives of the correctional system, they do not

have a right to contact or family visits under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1989)

(holding that the denial of prison access to certain visitors “‘is well within the terms of

confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence, and therefore is not independently

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protected by the Due Process Clause’”); Gerber, 291 F.3d at 621 (holding that the right of

intimate association, which includes cohabitation with one’s spouse, is necessarily abridged

during incarceration and that such loss “is simply part and parcel of being imprisoned for

conviction of a crime”); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96. Although “States may under certain

circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause,” those

circumstances are generally limited to freedom from restraint that “imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). 

In this case, the CDCR’s family visiting regulation does not impose an atypical

and significant hardship on plaintiff. Plaintiff’s inability to visit his family is an ordinary

incident of prison life. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1114 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing

that denial of contact visits “is part of the penalty that criminals pay for their offenses against

society”); see also Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86; Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections, 490 U.S. at 461. 

Accordingly, application of the family visiting regulation to plaintiff does not implicate his due

process rights.

B. Equal Protection

Equal protection is relevant with respect to classifications that impermissibly

operate to disadvantage a suspect class or improperly interfere with an individual’s exercise of a

fundamental right. “[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along

suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319

(1993). Here, the CDCR’s family visiting regulation implicate neither a suspect class or a

fundamental right. Accordingly, the highly deferential rational basis standard applies to any

equal protection challenge to the regulation. 

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence suggesting that he was treated differently

from similarly situated inmates in connection with family visitation. See Fraley v. United States

Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1993); see also City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne

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Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially

a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike”). Moreover, as determined

above, the family visiting regulation at issue is rationally related to legitimate governmental

interests. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984) (“That there is a valid,

rational connection between a ban on contact visits and internal security of a detention facility is

too obvious to warrant extended discussion.”). Accordingly, application of the family visiting

regulation in plaintiff’s case does not violate equal protection principles.

OTHER MATTERS

Both parties have filed requests for judicial notice. Defendants have requested

that the court take judicial notice of copies of the California regulations related to prisoner

visitation attached as Exhibit A to their motion. Plaintiff has requested that the court take

judicial notice of various factual allegations and legal arguments in his opposition to defendants’

motion for summary judgment. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts is appropriate with respect to

matters that are beyond reasonable dispute in that they are either generally known or capable of

accurate and ready determination by resort to a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 and advisory committee notes. Defendants’ request for

judicial notice will be denied as unnecessary. Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice will be denied

because he seeks that judicial notice be taken of matters failing to meet the requirements of the

applicable rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ April 2, 2007 request for judicial notice is denied as unnecessary;

and

2. Plaintiff’s April 13, 2007, April 24, 2007, and May 3, 2007 requests for

judicial notice are denied.

/////

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ April 2, 2007 motion for

summary judgment be granted and that this action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: January 3, 2008.

DAD:9

edwa1353.57

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