Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06152/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06152-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

ROLANDO O’BIGGS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

C. WILLIAMS, et.al., )

) 

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F- 04-6152 OWW DLB P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro per and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s complaint, filed August

24, 2004. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

"frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend

may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). th

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U.S. District Court

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In the instant case, plaintiff brings action against Captain Williams, Captain Beuhler and

M.C. Davis. Plaintiff alleges that on October 15, 2002, he was placed on lock-down status until

January 17, 2003, which plaintiff contends was cruel and unusual punishment. 

Plaintiff alleges that he filed inmate appeals regarding the “unlawful” placement in

administrative segregation but he has not received a response. 

Plaintiff contends that his 90 days on lock down status, his additional 16 days on modified

program status and the refusal to process his inmate appeals violated his constitutional rights.

I. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action

for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause

itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). The Due Process Clause

itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population

instead of administrative segregation. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68. With respect to liberty

interests arising from state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is

determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84

(1995). Liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint which

“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Id. at 484. 

Plaintiff is not entitled to procedural due process protections in a vacuum. In order to be

entitled under federal law to any procedural due process protections, plaintiff must first have a liberty

interest at stake. Plaintiff has alleged no facts that establish the existence of a liberty interest in

remaining free from “lock-down” or modified program status. Id.; see also May v. Baldwin, 109

F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate’s due process claim fails because he has no liberty

interest in freedom from state action taken within sentence imposed and administrative segregation

falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted);

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U.S. District Court

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Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s placement and retention in the SHU

was within range of confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of

prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free from confinement in

the SHU) (quotations omitted). Because plaintiff has not established the existence of a liberty

interest in remaining free from lock-down, plaintiff may not pursue a claim for relief under section

1983 for deprivation of procedural due process. The court will grant plaintiff an opportunity to

amend the complaint to allege facts establishing a liberty interest in remaining free from lock-down,

if he can do so. Further, even if plaintiff had a liberty interest in remaining free from lock-down,

plaintiff must allege facts to support his claim he was deprived of the procedural due process

protections he was due. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986). Due

Process does not require that plaintiff be provided with “detailed written notice of charges . . .” or “a

written decision describing the reasons for placing the prisoner in administrative segregation,” and

“due process does not require the disclosure of the identity of any person providing information

leading to the placement of a prisoner in administrative segregation.” Id.

Moreover, prisoners have no constitutional right to a particular classification status, see

Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88, n.9 (1976), and prisoners have no constitutional right to be

incarcerated at a particular correctional facility. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976). 

II. Inmate Appeals

As discussed, the Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty

without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a

cause of action for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection is sought. “States may under certain circumstances create liberty

interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84

(1995). Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint which

“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive

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right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th

Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance

procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure

confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence,

it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F.

Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Actions in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve

as the basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

Defendants’ actions in connection with plaintiff’s appeal, alone, cannot give rise to any

claims for relief under section 1983 and plaintiff has not alleged any other facts that demonstrate that

defendants violated his rights under federal law. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state any claims upon

which relief may be granted under section 1983. 

III. Eighth Amendment

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must

provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.;

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246

(9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement,

prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk

of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Thus, “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

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conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 

Prison officials may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or

by presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

844-45. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but

rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Frost v. Agnos, 152

F.3d at 1128; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-32 (1986). 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.” 

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part of

the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of

an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme deprivations

are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9

(1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The temporary denial of outdoor exercise

with no medical effects is not a substantial deprivation. May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir.

1997). 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the conditions of his lock down are insufficient to state a

claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. Although he has described some discomfort from his

conditions, the conditions, as described do not rise to the level required to state a claim under the

Eighth Amendment. In addition, he has failed to allege that the conditions were caused by the

deliberate indifference of a named defendant. The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to

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be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . .

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell

v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In

order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with

some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights. 

IV. Leave to Amend

In summary, the Court finds it necessary to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The Court

will grant plaintiff an opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies of this complaint. Failure to cure

the deficiencies will result in dismissal of this action without leave to amend.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d

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55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint,

each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed; and

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket

number assigned this case and must be labeled "Amended Complaint"; plaintiff must file an original

and two copies of the amended complaint; failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with

this order will result in dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim and failure to comply with

the court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 5, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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