Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05014/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 14, 1995 Decided July 11, 1995

No. 94-5014

CATHERINE COTTON,

APPELLEE

v.

I. MICHAEL HEYMAN, SECRETARY,

THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

91cv02827

Robert L. Shapiro, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the briefs were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John D. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant United States Attorneys.

David C. Vladeck argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Brian Wolfman and

Alan B. Morrison.

Before BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: The Smithsonian Institution (the "Smithsonian") appeals an award

of attorneys' fees under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1994).

Specifically, the Institution argues that the district court erred in holding the Smithsonian an agency

under FOIA. See id. at § 552(f). The appellant also contends that, assuming arguendo that it issuch

an agency, the district court misapplied the public-benefit prong of the four-part test to determine

whether Catherine Cotton, the eligible FOIA plaintiff here, is entitled to attorneys' fees. See Tax

Analysts v. United States Dep't of Justice, 965 F.2d 1092, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1992). For purposes of

this appeal, we accept the district court's holding that the Smithsonian is indeed an agency under

FOIA. However, we agree with the Smithsonian that the district court erred in its application of the

public-benefit prong. Because the district court's award of fees was based entirely on this

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misapplication, we reverse the award.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 18, 1991, plaintiff filed a FOIA request, see 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), with the

Office of GeneralCounsel of the Smithsonian for documents contained in the Office of the Inspector

General regarding the Smithsonian museum shops. Plaintiff had worked as a reorder buyer for these

shops prior to her termination, and she believed these documents would facilitate her preparation of

an employment discrimination suit. The Smithsonian denied plaintiff's FOIA request, asserting it was

not an agency as contemplated by FOIA. Plaintiff then filed this suit to obtain the documents she

requested. The Smithsonian moved to dismiss, again maintaining it was not covered by FOIA.

OnMarch 18, 1992, the district court ruled that the Smithsonian wasin fact an agency subject

to FOIA. The court then directed the Smithsonian to process plaintiff's request and prepare a Vaughn

index for those records it intended to withhold. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.

1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). The Smithsonian complied with the court's instruction.

In addition, the Smithsonian voluntarily released to plaintifftwo ofthe four relevant documentsit had

located.

The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment regarding the Smithsonian's

decision to withhold the two remaining documents pursuant to FOIA privacyexemptions 6 and 7(C),

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C). The Smithsonian also asked the district court to reconsider its

holding that the Smithsonian was an agency subject to FOIA. On June 26, 1992, the court upheld

the Smithsonian's withholding of the documents pursuant to FOIA exemption 6, but not exemption

7(C). The court, however, denied the Smithsonian's motion for reconsideration. The court also

issued an order and judgment dismissing the case.

On July 27, 1992, the Smithsonian filed a notice of appeal from the district court's order and

judgment entered on June 26, 1992. However, the Smithsonian moved to dismiss this appeal on

August 14, 1992, and the motion was granted.

Plaintiffsubsequently sought attorneys' fees. The Smithsonian opposed the request, arguing

that under the four-part test for determining whether a prevailing FOIA plaintiff ought to receive such

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fees, plaintiff was not entitled to an award. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.,

11 F.3d 211, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 315 (1994). On December 14, 1993, the

district court, applying the four-part test, granted the fee applications. The Smithsonian appealed this

fee award, including the determination that it is an agency under FOIA.

II. DISCUSSION

FOIA allows a district court to "assess against the United Statesreasonable attorney fees and

other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under thissection in which the complainant has

substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). In determining whether an eligible FOIA litigant

is entitled to fees, we have held that at least four factors must be considered: 1) the public benefit

derived from the case; 2) the commercial benefit to the plaintiff; 3) the nature of the plaintiff's

interest in the records; and 4) whether the government has a reasonable basis for withholding the

requested information. Chesapeake Bay Found., 11 F.3d at 216. In addition, "although the test of

entitlements involves a balance of several factors, there can be no doubt that a party is not entitled

to fees if the government's legal basis for withholding requested records is correct." Id. (citations

omitted); see also Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 712 n.34 (D.C.

Cir. 1977) ("Certainly where the government can show that information disclosed after initial

resistance was nonetheless exempt from the FOIA a plaintiff should not be awarded attorney fees

under section 552(a)(4)(E)").

Relying on this quoted language, the Smithsonian believes we must undertake a de novo

review of the district court's determination that the Smithsonian is an agency under FOIA.

Accordingly, ifwe conclude the lower court erred, and thusthe Smithsonian'slegalposition is correct

as to its right to withhold the documents, we must reverse the award of attorneys' fees. Plaintiff

responds that we cannot reexamine this particular issue because it is moot. Specifically, she argues

the Smithsonian released all non-exempt documentsresponsive to her request after the district court

ruled the Smithsonian was subject to FOIA. The Smithsonian allegedly did so only because of the

district court's ruling that it was subject to FOIA. Consequently, no justiciable controversy remains

regarding this point. Plaintiff maintains that the Smithsonian, to preserve its right to appeal, should

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1Direct estoppel, as opposed to collateral estoppel, governs the preclusive effect of a litigated

issue in a separate proceeding within a single suit. See 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR A.

MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE and PROCEDURE, § 4418 (1981). 

have sought a stay in the district court to permit it to withhold the disputed records until the

conclusion of appellate review.

Alternatively, plaintiff argues the appeal of this issue is untimely because it was not filed

within 60 days of the district court's final order and judgment on June 26, 1992, disposing of the

merits. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). Rather, the notice of appeal was filed on January 13, 1994,

subsequent to the attorneys'fees proceeding. In support of this latter argument, plaintiff relies on the

Supreme Court case, Budinich v. Bechton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202-03 (1988), holding

that once a final decision on the meritsis entered, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the losing party

has no option to postpone its appeal, regardless of whether a pending request for attorneys' fees

exists. Id.

While we believe plaintiff misunderstands the subtle issues involved here, we agree that we

should not conduct a de novo review of the Smithsonian's agency status. Theories of mootness and

untimeliness do not, however, guide our decision. Rather, we find the issue precluded by the doctrine

of direct estoppel.

1 Plaintiff's argument that the Smithsonian's release of the two non-exempt

documents moots the issue has potential force only insofar as the original proceeding on the merits

was concerned. If the Smithsonian desired to appeal the district court's determination of its agency

status, it could have asked for a stay to permit it to withhold the non-exempt documents until the

conclusion of appellate review. See Constangy, Brooks &Smith v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 839, 841-42 (6th

Cir. 1988) (because all documents subject of the appeal have been released, appellate court is unable

to grant relief).

Plaintiff's mootness argument has no applicability to this proceeding, however, because we

are asked to address the correctness of the Smithsonian's position regarding its agency status in the

context of an attorneys' fees examination, rather than in the original context of document disclosure.

If we were to examine the correctness of the Smithsonian's position, we could still potentially grant

relief in the form of denying attorneys' fees. Consequently, for purposes of plaintiff's mootness

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argument, it isimmaterial that the Smithsonian released its non-exempt documents during the merits

phase.

Similarly, plaintiff's timeliness argument has no bearing on the facts of this case. The

Smithsonian was incapable of appealing its status under FOIA at the close of the merits proceeding

because it had won a favorable judgment regarding the two remaining documents. See Showtime

Networks, Inc. v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("It is the general rule that a party may not

appealfroma disposition in itsfavor"). The district court upheld the Smithsonian's position that these

two documents fell within a FOIA exemption. Because the Smithsonian had already mooted the

court's adverse agency ruling, see supra, there was nothing left to appeal. Plaintiff's reliance on

Budinich in support of her timeliness argument is inapplicable. In that case, the appellant brought

an action to recover employment compensation allegedly due. While a jury awarded him

compensation, the appellant was dissatisfied with the size of the verdict. Budinich, 486 U.S. at 197.

However, the appellant waited until completion of the attorneys' fees proceeding to appeal the

verdict. Id. at 198. The Court held the original decision on the merits was final, and thus the appeal

ofthe verdict subsequent to the district court's attorneys'fees determination was untimely. Id. at 202.

Budinich is distinguishable from this case on two grounds. First, unlike the case at bar, the

appellant in Budinich waslegally able to appeal the original verdict when it was delivered, but instead

waited untilthe resolution ofthe attorneys'fees proceeding to appealit. Second, the appeal regarding

the size of the verdict could in no way implicate the outcome of the fee award. In contrast, the issue

of the Smithsonian's agency status may directly affect the award of attorneys' fees if we were to

examine the correctness of the Smithsonian's position, as suggested by Chesapeake Bay.

While we find plaintiff's arguments meritless, we nevertheless conclude the doctrine of issue

preclusion leads us to reject an independent examination regarding the correctness of the

Smithsonian'slegalposition. Generally, issue preclusion bars the relitigation of specific issues decided

in a prior proceeding between the same parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27

(1982). In this case, the district court determined the Smithsonian was an agency under FOIA during

the merits proceeding. Under principles of issue preclusion, the Smithsonian could not relitigate this

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2We stress, however, that the district court's determination regarding the Smithsonian's status

under FOIA is binding only between these two parties. The Smithsonian is free to relitigate the

issue against another party in a separate proceeding. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees,

Council 214 v. FLRA, 835 F.2d 1458, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (issue preclusion will apply against

the government only if mutuality of parties exists). 

issue at the district court level during the attorneys' fees proceeding. The Smithsonian argues,

however, that this court should not be bound by the original district court holding because the

Smithsonian, as a prevailing party, was unable to appeal it. We are indeed mindful that under settled

law, "a prevailing party is not allowed standing to appeal unfavorable findings, and the findings do

not preclude later litigation of the same issues." 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR A. MILLER, &

EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE and PROCEDURE § 4433. See also White v. Elrod, 816

F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987) ("The idea is that the finding is not

sufficiently reliable, without the opportunity for appellate review of it, to be made incontestable in

a subsequent suit").

Nevertheless, we find the Smithsonian's argument a red herring. The Smithsonian was unable

to appeal the agency issue in the original proceeding not only because it was a prevailing party, but

more importantly, because it voluntarily released the non-exempt documents to plaintiff after the

district court's preliminary ruling. The Smithsonian was a prevailing party primarily because it

voluntarily mooted the agency issue in the interim. In so doing, it had failed to preserve its appeal.

If the Smithsonian had sought a stay, allowing it to keep possession of the documents until the

conclusion of appellate review, this court could have already decided that issue on the merits. See

18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR A. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE and

PROCEDURE § 4418 (failure to appeal part of the proceeding may defeat an appeal of the remainder

by issue preclusion so long as it is clear that the appealing party has failed to preserve the common

issue). Furthermore, the attorneys' fees proceeding should have been entirely foreseeable on the part

ofthe Smithsonian. The Smithsonian made the legal choice to release its two non-exempt documents.

It cannot now cry foul at the consequence of its own conduct.2

In sum, this case is an appealfromthe fee award, not fromthe order directing the Smithsonian

to process plaintiff's FOIA request as to the non-exempt documents, nor from the order denying

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plaintiff's request as to the other documents. While the Smithsonian cannot appeal the latter orders,

its appeal of the fee award is neither untimely nor moot: The notice of appeal from the December

14, 1993 fee award was filed January 13, 1994; and, should we find reversible error in the district

court's fee award, we can grant appropriate reliefdenial of attorneys' fees.

We have said that the Smithsonian lost its opportunity to dispute the district court's legal

conclusion that the Smithsonian is not an agency, as that issue was decided in the merits proceeding

that the Smithsonian voluntarily mooted. The district court's decision in the properly appealed fee

award proceeding, however, rests on a four-prong test that includes a determination regarding the

reasonableness of the Smithsonian's decision to withhold the documents. The Smithsonian did not

forfeit itsright to argue the reasonableness ofits position that it is not an agencythe basis on which

it withheld the non-exempt documentseven though it forfeited its right to appellate review of the

correctness of that position; and its various arguments as to the error of the district court's decision

that it is an agency are necessarily also argumentsthat its position on that issue is at least reasonable.

With this in mind, we turn to the district court's December 14, 1993 decision. The

Smithsonian arguesthat the district court erred as a matter oflaw in applying the public-benefit prong

of the four-part balancing test in determining whether plaintiff was entitled to attorneys' fees under

FOIA. The court found the public benefit derived from the case substantial. The court asserted its

holding that the Smithsonian is an agency subject to FOIA would "greatly increase the amount of

information available to the public." The court did not evaluate the value of the particular documents

released, but focused solely on the precedential value of its holding.

We hold that the district court misapplied the public-benefit prong, interpreting it far too

broadly. Because the district court's misinterpretation is as to a matter of law and not a finding of

fact, our review is de novo. In Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1979), we observed

that the release of any government document benefits the public by increasing its knowledge of its

government. However, we held that Congress did not have this broadly defined benefit in mind when

it amended FOIA to authorize attorneys' fees for those who substantially prevailed under 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(E). Id. The public-benefit prong "speaks for an award of [attorney's fees] where the

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complainant's victory is likely to add to the fund of information that citizens may use in making vital

political choices." Id. (quoting Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1978)). The

only way to comport with this directive is to evaluate the specific documents at issue in the case at

hand.

Plaintiff'sreliance on Halperin v. Dep't of State, 565 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1977), is misplaced.

Plaintiff asserts that we held in Halperin that even where a FOIA plaintiff does not succeed in

obtaining records, the plaintiff may be entitled to fees if the suit compels an agency to comply with

FOIA. While this characterization of our dicta is on one level correct, see id. at 706 n.11, we only

addressed the issue of whether Halperin was a "prevailing party" under FOIA, and thus potentially

eligible to collect fees. Id. We never engaged in the four-factor balancing test at issue here to

determine whether Halperin was actually entitled to fees, and hence did not even consider the

public-benefit element.

The district court'sinterpretation presupposesthat a public benefit exists by sole virtue of the

potentialrelease of present and future information as a result of the precedent set in the present case.

Such an inherently speculative observation is contrary to our position in Fenster, and inconsistent

with the structure of FOIA itself. FOIA contains several exemptions from disclosure, requiring a

balance of the public interest in disclosure with the government's interest in withholding the

information. Thus, FOIA recognizes the public interest, whatever its weight, must at times bow to

other interests, such as privacy concerns. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).

In this case, no evidence exists that the release of the two non-exempt documents will

contribute to the public's ability to make vital political choices. Plaintiff does not even argue this

point. Rather, she sought these documents for the sole purpose of facilitating her employment

discrimination suit.

Because the district court found the public benefit in this case so great, the court spent little,

if any, time analyzing the remaining parts of the test. The second and third parts focus on the

"commercial benefit" to the plaintiff and the "plaintiff's interest." These two factors are "closely

related and often considered together." Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 1095. When a litigant seeks

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disclosure for a commercial benefit or other personal reasons, an award of fees is usually

inappropriate. Id. Regarding these two criteria, the district court simply asserted plaintiff did not

receive a direct commercial benefit from the disclosure of the documents. In addition, the district

court did not even attempt to analyze the fourth prong of the attorneys' fees test: the reasonableness

of the government's position. The court simply assumed that regardless of the position's

reasonableness, the weightiness of the public benefit of the court's ruling that the Smithsonian was

subject to FOIA directed the court to award attorneys' fees.

Because we hold that the court misapplied the public-benefit prong, we will address the

reasonableness ofthe government's position ourselves. The government "need only have "a colorable

basis in law' for the court to consider the "reasonable basis in law' factor in determining a FOIA

plaintiff's entitlement to attorney's fees." Chesapeake Bay Found., 11 F.3d at 216 (quoting

Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, 559 F.2d at 712 n.34). See alsoCuneo v. Rumsfield, 553 F.2d 1360,

1366 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("What is required is a showing that the government had a reasonable basis

in law for [its position] and that it had not been recalcitrant in its opposition to a valid claim or

otherwise engaged in obdurate behavior.").

We conclude that the Smithsonian's position regarding its agency status under FOIA is

reasonable. Prior to 1974, the Administrative Procedure Act's ("APA") definition of "agency" applied

to the term "agency" in FOIA, as FOIA was simply a subsection of the APA. The Administrative

Procedure Act defined agency as "each authority of the Government of the United States, whether

or not it is within or subject to review by another agency" with a few exceptions not relevant here.

5 U.S.C. § 551(1). In 1974, however, Congress amended FOIA to include a further definition of

agency. Under the present version of FOIA, the "term "agency' as defined in section 551(1) of this

title includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government

controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including

the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(f).

Congress thus incorporated in FOIA the APA definition, quoted above, and added the FOIA

definition of agency to expand, rather than limit, its coverage. "Congress sought to encompass

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entities that might have eluded the APA's definition in § 551(1), which FOIA had incorporated by

reference." Energy Research Found. v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Bd., 917 F.2d 581, 583

(D.C. Cir. 1990).

In determining whether an entity fits the agency definition under FOIA, we have never

developed bright line rules. Rather, we have generally employed a fact-specific functional approach.

"[A]ny general definition can be of only limited utility to a court confronted with one of the myriad

organizationalarrangementsfor getting the business ofthe government done." Washington Research

Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974),

cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). "The unavoidable fact is that each new arrangement must be

examined anew and in its own context." Id. at 246. Inevitably, such a fact intensive test lacks a

strong predictive element.

We first employed this functional approach in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir.

1971). At issue was whether the Office of Science and Technology ("OST") was an agency under

FOIA. The OST, located in the Executive Office of the President, was authorized to evaluate the

scientific research programs of other agencies. The OST had inherited this evaluative function from

the National Science Foundation. The OST also advised and assisted the President in achieving

coordinated federal policies in science and technology. Id. at 1073-74.

At the time of our decision in Soucie, FOIA still borrowed the general APA definition of

agency. We reasoned in that decision that in the context of entities in the Executive Office of the

President, the APA conferred agency status on any administrative unit with substantial independent

authority in the exercise ofspecific functions. Id. at 1073. Applying that reasoning, we held that the

OST was an agency under FOIA. Id. at 1075. We concluded that if the OST's "sole function" were

limited to advising and assisting the President, the OST would not be an agency. Id. However, the

OST also possessed the independent function of evaluating federal programs, which gave the entity

agency status.

In another case decided prior to the 1974 FOIA amendments, however, we determined the

agency status ofspecific entities existing outside the Executive Office of the President, called initial

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review groups ("IRGs"). Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Education,

and Welfare, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974). These groups evaluated research proposals sponsored

by the NationalInstitute ofMentalHealth, and were comprised of nongovernmental consultants who

functioned inpanels organized around specialized disciplines within the field of biomedicine. Because

these entities existed outside the Executive Office of the President, we did not apply Soucie's sole

function test. Nevertheless, we still employed a functionalist framework, holding that the important

consideration regarding agency status was whether the relevant entity had "any authority in law to

make decisions." Id. at 248. As the IRGs made only recommendations, not final decisions, we found

them not to be agencies.

Subsequent to the 1974 amendments, we have had the opportunity to return to this issue. In

Rocap v. Indiek, we held that the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company ("FHMLC") was a

governmental controlled corporation under FOIA's definition of agency. 539 F.2d 174, 180 (D.C.

Cir. 1976). While we noted that the presence of a federal charter was not dispositive regarding

whether the FHMLC was a government controlled corporation, the FHMLC was "subject to such

substantial federal control over its day-to-day operations" that it fell under FOIA. Id. at 177. We

rejected the FHMLC's argument that an entity had to receive federal funds to be an agency because

several agencies exist under the Act receiving no appropriated funds. Likewise, we dismissed the

FHMLC's contention that Civil Service Commission jurisdiction is a prerequisite to agency status,

as many recognized agencies fall outside such jurisdiction. Id. at 179.

We have also had recent occasion to apply a functional approach to an entity not within the

President'sExecutive Office, the Defense Nuclear Facilities SafetyBoard, although the approachwas

not controlling in that decision. In Energy Research Found., we held that the Board was an agency

under FOIA. 917 F.2d at 584-85. While specifically disclaiming reliance on Soucie 's sole function

test because theBoard was not within the President's Executive Office, we concluded that even under

the Soucie test, the Board was an agency. The Board "conduct[ed] investigations, which has long

been recognized as an incident of legislative power delegated to agencies by Congress." Id. at 584

(internal quotations omitted). The Board also formally evaluated the Energy Department's standards

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relating to defense nuclear facilities.

Plaintiff presents a litany of arguments in support of her position that the Smithsonian is an

agencyboth as an independent establishment and a government controlled corporation. We need only

highlight her argument. First, she asserts that the Institution is federally chartered and has a staff of

which 70% are federal employees. These employees are subject to civil service laws and regulations.

Also, federal law entitles the Smithsonian to designate its employees as special police to patrol its

buildings and grounds. These police can make arrests for violations committed on the property. 40

U.S.C. § 193t (1994). The Smithsonian, in addition, receives and administers both federal and

non-federal funding. The Smithsonian is also subject to multiple reporting requirements, such as

those found at 20 U.S.C. §§ 57, 58, and 65(a) (1994). Moreover, the Institution exercises power in

setting research priorities. For instance, it has plenary authority over all scientific research conducted

in the Canal Zone Biological area.

While plaintiff is correct that the Institution is federally chartered, receives federal

appropriations, and that manyofits employees are subject to civilservice laws, we observed in Rocap

that these factors, in and of themselves, are insufficient to demonstrate agency status. While Rocap

specifically concerned governmental corporations, the Smithsonian could reasonably interpret this

language to apply to the "independent establishments" provision in FOIA's agency definition, as well.

In addition, the Smithsonian can rationallyargue plaintiff'sreliance on the Smithsonian's abilityto hire

its own police force carries little probative weight in that many private museums employ their own

security personnel. The Smithsonian can also reasonably contend that its power to allocate its own

scarce resources regarding research priorities does not reflect the sort of "substantial independent

authority" discussed in Soucie necessary to obtain agency status. Finally, specifically regarding

plaintiff's contention that the Smithsonian is a governmental corporation, the Smithsonian can argue

it is not listed as one at 31 U.S.C. § 9101 (1994), which enumerates the government-owned

corporations. It can also at least reasonably argue its enabling statute at 20 U.S.C. § 41 (1994) does

not establish a corporation, but rather asserts that certain officials "are constituted an establishment

by the name of the Smithsonian Institution." Id.

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In short, the Smithsonian could reasonably interpret our precedent to support its position that

it is not an agency under FOIA. Thus, even assuming that the Smithsonian is incorrect in asserting

that it is not an agency, as a matter of law, its position is at least a reasonable one.

III. CONCLUSION

Because we conclude that there is no public benefit in a release ofthe Smithsonian documents,

and that the Smithsonian's legal position is reasonable, we have no need to review for an abuse of

discretion the district court's evaluation of the remaining factors: the "commercial benefit" to the

plaintiff and the "plaintiff's interest." Consequently, we reverse the award of attorneys' fees to

plaintiff.

It is so ordered.

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