Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02070/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHN COBB, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

ALAN DYEMARTIN, et. al., 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 11cv02070 JAH - JLB 

ORDER DISMISSING 

DEFENDANTS AND CLAIMS AND 

DIRECTING SERVICE OF THE 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff originally filed a complaint on September 8, 2011. Finding Plaintiff failed 

to state a claim, this Court dismissed the action. Plaintiff filed an appeal, and the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order dismissing the action in part and vacated in 

part. The Ninth Circuit determined the Court properly dismissed the claims against 

Defendants William Lansdowne, Steven Hansen, Jan Goldsmith, the City of San Diego, 

the San Diego Police Department, the San Diego County District Attorney, and the San 

Diego County Sheriff’s Department with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit also upheld the 

Court’s dismissal of the federal and state law claims for retaliation, suppression of free 

speech, conspiracy, denial of equal protection, discrimination and violations of 42 U.S.C. 

sections 1985 and 1986 against Alan Dyemartin and Chris Cummings. However, the court 

vacated the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against Dyemartin and Cummings, 

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and the state law claims against those defendants related to the alleged reasonableness of 

the traffic stop, search and arrest at issue. 

 This Court reopened the matter and directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint which the Court reviewed pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. section 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court dismissed Defendants Lansdowne, City of San 

Diego and San Diego Police Department, and Plaintiffs claims for failure to properly train, 

failure to supervise and discipline, the Monell claim, conspiracy in violation of the second 

clause of section 1985(2), for violation of section 1986, and for violation of Plaintiff’s 

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process with prejudice. The Court also dismissed all 

claims against Defendants Jeffrey Peterson and Daniel Christman with prejudice with the 

exception of the claims for violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, 

conspiracy under section 1983, abuse of process and negligence which were dismissed with 

leave to amend. The Court also dismissed the claims for negligence and intentional 

infliction of emotional distress without prejudice as to Defendants Dyemartin and 

Cummings. The Court directed Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint addressing 

the deficiencies for the claims dismissed without prejudice or notify the Court of his 

intention to proceed against Defendants Dyemartin and Cummings on the first, second, 

third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eight causes of action only. 

 In response, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) asserting claims 

for false arrest/false imprisonment, battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress and 

conspiracy, violations of California Civil Code section 52.1, violation of 42 U.S.C. section 

1983, conspiracy in violation of section 1983, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, 

negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy. Plaintiff names 

Dyemartin, Cummings, Peterson, Christman, Chief William Lansdowne, the City of San 

Diego, San Diego Police Department and Does 1 through 20 as defendants. 

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DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Standard 

 This Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915. A complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed 

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and 

dismissal by the court to the extent it is “frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such 

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). This Court must rule on its own motion 

to dismiss before directing the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to Rule 

4(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez, 203 F.3d 

at 1127. 

II. Analysis 

A. Claims against Defendants Lansdowne, City of San Diego and San Diego Police 

Department 

 In its previous order, this Court dismissed Defendants Lansdowne, City of San Diego 

and San Diego Police Department with prejudice. Plaintiff may not reassert claims against 

these defendants in this action. 

B. Claims against the Remaining Defendants 

1. First Cause of Action – False Arrest/False Imprisonment

 Plaintiff asserts a claim for false arrest and false imprisonment against Defendants 

Dyemartin and Cummings. Under California law, false arrest and false imprisonment are 

the same tort. See Collins v. City and County of San Francisco, 50 Cal.App.3d 671, 673 

(1975). False arrest is “one way of committing a false imprisonment.” Id. To state a claim 

for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the nonconsensual, intentional 

confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of 

time, however brief.” Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496 (2000). 

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 Plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully detained and arrested and falsely imprisoned by 

Defendants Dyemartin and Cummings. SAC ¶ 88. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges 

Defendant Dyemartin “spotlighted” him while he was driving lawfully without his 

headlights on, and, in response, Plaintiff put on his headlights. Id. ¶ 52. He further alleges 

Defendants Dyemartin and Cummings stopped him, searched him, arrested him and placed 

him in the back of their patrol car after handcuffing him. Id. ¶¶ 53, 58. Plaintiff asserts he 

was driving lawfully within the one-half hour period after sunset, and Defendants recorded 

a false later time to prosecute him. Id. ¶¶ 47, 48, 50, 62. 

 The Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim for false arrest/imprisonment 

against Defendant Dyemartin and Cummings. 

2. Second Cause of Action – Battery

 Plaintiff seeks relief from Defendants Dyemartin and Cummings for battery. The 

elements of a claim for battery in California, are “(1) the defendant intentionally did an act 

that resulted in harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person, (2) the plaintiff did 

not consent to the contact and (3) the contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to the 

plaintiff.” Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 855 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 Plaintiff alleges the defendants committed battery by putting him in handcuffs and 

putting him in the back of the police car. SAC ¶ 100. He further alleges he did not consent 

to the conduct, and he suffered physical harm, emotional distress, anxiety, depression, 

humiliation, loss of sleep and fear of the police. Id. ¶¶ 101, 103, 104. Plaintiff sufficiently 

alleges a claim for battery against Defendants Dyemartin and Cummings. 

3. Third Cause of Action - Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Conspiracy

 Plaintiff asserts a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against 

Defendants Dyemartin, Cummings, Peterson and Christman. Under California law, “[t]he 

negligent causing of emotional distress is not an independent tort but the tort of 

negligence.” Marlene F. v. Alliance Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583 (1989) 

(quoting 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 838, p. 195). Thus, the 

traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply. Id. 

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 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Dyemartin and Cummings “acted individually and in 

concert to unlawfully detain, search and arrest Plaintiff” and Defendant Peterson and 

Christman had a duty to sustain his Internal Affairs complaint. SAC ¶¶ 107, 108. He 

further alleges Defendants’ conduct had the direct and foreseeable consequence of making 

Plaintiff fearful of the police. Id. ¶ 111. He contends he suffered and continues to suffer 

emotional and mental conditions recognized and diagnosed by trained professionals. Id. ¶ 

113. 

 The Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim for negligent infliction of 

emotional distress against the defendants. 

 To state a claim for civil conspiracy Plaintiff must set forth allegations showing “(1) 

the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the 

conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct.” Kidron v. Movie 

Acquisition Corp., 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581 (1995). Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy 

existed to coerce him into believing he had been driving illegally. SAC ¶ 59. He further 

alleges Defendants Dyemartin and Cummings implemented the conspiracy when they 

wrote Plaintiff a traffic citation even though there was no probable cause for the violations, 

and giving false testimony at a court hearing. Id. ¶ 62. Defendant Peterson entered the 

conspiracy by interviewing Plaintiff and the result was exonerating Defendants Dyemartin 

and Cummings. Id. ¶ 70. He further alleges Defendant Christman entered the conspiracy 

by authoring a letter informing Plaintiff of the exoneration. Id. ¶ 71. 

 The Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim to meet the requirement of 

section 1915. 

4. Fourth Cause of Action – Violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Dyemartin, Cummings, Peterson and Christman 

violated California Civil Code section 52.1 (“Bane Act”) which prohibits a person from 

interfering or attempting to interfere “by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise 

or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws 

of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.” Cal. 

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Civil Code § 52.1(a). “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the 

specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did prevent 

the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force 

the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.” Austin 

B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 883 (2007) (citing Jones v. 

Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329, 334 (1998)). 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Dyemartin and Cummings unreasonably stopped, 

searched, arrested, prosecuted and retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of his rights 

guaranteed by the California Constitution. SAC ¶ 116. He further argues the acts were 

committed for purposes of intimidation and/or coercion. Id. Plaintiff also alleges 

Defendants Peterson or Christman entered into the conspiracy to coerce and intimidate 

Plaintiff and did so by exonerating Dyemartin and Cummings. Id. ¶ 117. Plaintiff 

sufficiently alleges a claim for violation of the Bane Act. 

5. Fifth Cause of Action – Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 Plaintiff asserts a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against Defendants 

Dyemartin, Cummings, Peterson and Christman. To state a claim under section 1983, a 

plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) violation of a right, privilege or immunity 

secured by the constitution of the United States and (2) that the deprivation was committed 

by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 

1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 

(1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 442 U.S. 137, 0144, n. 3 (1979)). 

 Plaintiff fails to clearly allege what rights he is asserting Defendants violated. 

Construing the allegations liberally, he appears to assert two violations within his fifth 

cause of action, for violations of the Fourth Amendment and First Amendment. To state 

a claim under section 1983 for violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that a 

search or seizure occurred and the search or seizure was unreasonable. See Brower v. 

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County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989). Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a Fourth 

Amendment claim against Defendants Dyemartin and Cummings. However, there are no 

allegations to support a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants Peterson or 

Christman. 

 He also appears to be assert a claim for retaliation against Defendants Dyemartin, 

Cummings, Peterson and Christman. To state a claim for retaliation, Plaintiff must allege: 

(1) a state actor took an adverse action against him (2) because of (3) his protected conduct, 

and that the action taken against him (4) chilled the prisoner’s exercise of his First 

Amendment Rights and (5) did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff alleges Defendants 

Defendants Dyemartin and Cummings retaliated against him for complaining to them about 

their unlawful stop by “stopping, searching and prosecuting [him].” SAC ¶ 128. He further 

alleges Defendants Peterson and Christman retaliated against him for his complaint against 

Dyemartin and Cummings by exonerating them after the Internal Affairs investigation. Id. 

¶¶ 129, 130. Plaintiff states a claim for retaliation against Defendants Dyemartin, 

Cummings, Christman and Peterson. 

6. Sixth Cause of Action - Conspiracy in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 In his sixth cause of action, Plaintiff asserts Defendants have conspired and entered 

into express and implied agreements to retaliate against Plaintiff by repeatedly and 

unreasonably detaining him. To sufficiently allege a claim for conspiracy, Plaintiff must 

set forth allegations showing an agreement or “meeting of the minds” to violate his 

constitutional rights. United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 

1539, 1540-41(9th Cir. 1989) 

 Plaintiff alleges Dyemartin and Cummings conspired and entered into express and/or 

implied agreements to implement a plan to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights by 

unreasonably stopping him and retaliating against him. SAC ¶ 44. Plaintiff further alleges 

the defendants engaged in a “pre-arranged plan” and knew the determination of probable 

cause would be rubber-stamped by the magistrate. Id. 145. He also alleges Defendants 

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Christman and Peterson entered into the conspiracy by conducting an internal affairs 

investigation which exonerated Dyemartin and Cummings. Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a 

claim for conspiracy. 

7. Seventh Cause of Action - Malicious Prosecution in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 Plaintiff asserts a claim for malicious prosecution against Defendants Dyemartin and 

Cummings. In order to prevail on a section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, Plaintiff 

must show that Defendants prosecuted him: (1) with malice; (2) without probable cause; 

and (3) “for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional 

right.” See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff must establish 

a termination of the underlying proceedings “in such a manner as to indicate his 

innocence.” Id. 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dyemartin and Cummings wrote a report that falsely 

stated Plaintiff had been driving without headlights at 8:30 p.m. and filed a citation with 

the court based on the false information which resulted in criminal charges. SAC ¶ 157, 

158. He further alleges they gave false testimony at trial. He asserts he proved there was 

no probable cause and was acquitted at trial. Id. ¶ 159. Plaintiff sufficiently asserts a claim 

for malicious prosecution against Defendants Dyemartin and Cummings. 

8. Eighth Cause of Action - Abuse of Process in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 Plaintiff seeks relief for abuse of process as to Defendants Dyemartin and 

Cummings. “To succeed in an action for abuse of process, a litigant must establish that the 

defendant (1) contemplated an ulterior motive in using the process, and (2) committed a 

willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.” 

Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057 (2006) 

Plaintiff alleges City Attorneys Steven Hansen and Shelley Webb authored and filed 

with the court, pleadings designed to mislead Plaintiff into believing that he had been 

lawfully stopped by and prosecuted by Dyemartin and Cummings, to prevent him from 

filing any civil rights case about the incident. SAC ¶ 167. He further alleges Defendants 

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Peterson and Christman entered into this abuse of process conspiracy by exonerating 

Dyemartin and Cummings in a fraudulent Internal Affairs investigation to mislead Plaintiff 

into believing he was lawfully arrested and detained. Id. ¶ 169. 

 Assuming the truth of the allegations, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim for abuse 

of process. 

9. Ninth Cause of Action – Negligence

Plaintiff asserts a claim for negligence against Defendants Dyemartin, Cummings, 

Peterson and Christman based upon Defendants’ failure to properly screen, hire, train, 

retain, supervise, report, discipline, monitor, control and terminate their law enforcement 

officers. The allegations that Defendants Dymartin, Cummings, Peterson or Christman 

had a duty to “properly screen, hire train, retain, supervise, report, discipline, monitor, 

control and terminate (when justified)” are merely conclusory and fail to state a claim for 

negligence. SAC ¶ 174 

10. Tenth Cause of Action - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

 Plaintiff seeks relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress as to all 

defendants. To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a 

plaintiff must allege (1) the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the 

defendant intended to cause or recklessly disregarded the possibility of causing emotional 

distress to the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff actually suffered severe or extreme emotional 

distress; and (4) the outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the 

emotional distress. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (1982). 

Outrageous conduct must “be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated 

in a civilized community.” Id. As alleged, Defendants’ conduct of stopping and arresting 

Plaintiff was neither extreme nor outrageous. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim 

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

C. Leave to Amend

 Because Plaintiff has been provided multiple opportunities to amend his complaint 

to sufficiently allege the claims asserted and has repeatedly failed to allege his claims for 

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negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress as to any defendant and 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against Defendants Peterson and Christman, the 

Court finds further amendment unwarranted. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 

(1962); McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 809 (1988). 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

 1. Defendants Lansdowne, City of San Diego and San Diego Police Department, 

are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

 2. The fifth cause of action under section 1983 for violation of his Fourth 

Amendment rights is DISMISSED as to Defendants Peterson and Christman. 

 3. The ninth cause of action for negligence is DISMISSED in its entirety. 

 4. The tenth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is 

DISMISSED. 

 5. The Clerk of Court shall issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint (Doc. No. 19) and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 

285 for each Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy 

of this Order, a certified copy of his Complaint, and the summons so that he may serve the 

Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the Form 285s 

as completely and accurately as possible, include an address where each named Defendant 

may be served, see S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1.c, and return them to the United States Marshal 

according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package; 

 6. The U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon 

Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285 provided to him. All costs of 

that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED. R. CIV.

P. 4(c)(3); 

 7. Plaintiff shall, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, serve upon 

Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a 

copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the Court’s 

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consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every original 

document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the manner in 

which a true and correct copy of that document has been was served on Defendants or 

Defendants’ counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any document 

received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk, or which fails to 

include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, may be disregarded. 

DATED: March 26, 2018 

 

 _________________________________ 

 JOHN A. HOUSTON 

 United States District Judge 

 

 

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