Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-03414/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-03414-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AND REQUESTING ADDITIONAL BRIEFING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

No. 11-cv-03414-RMW

EDM

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

DON BERNARD, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT DONAT, DOES 1-5, individuals,

Defendants.

No. 11-cv-03414-RMW

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE

AND REQUESTING ADDITIONAL

BRIEFING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Re Docket Nos. 13, 21]

Defendant Robert Donat ("defendant"), proceeding pro se, moves to dismiss plaintiff Don

Bernard's ("plaintiff") First Amended Complaint ("FAC") under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2),

and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff moves to strike defendant's reply brief in its entirety. The court finds the

instant motions appropriate for resolution without oral argument, and VACATES the motion hearing

set for January 6, 2012. For the reasons below, the motion to strike is DENIED. Plaintiff is given

ten days from the date of this order to respond to the arguments raised in defendant's reply brief. 

After plaintiff has filed a response, the court will determine whether it can properly assert

jurisdiction over this case. 

Case 5:11-cv-03414-RMW Document 28 Filed 01/02/12 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AND REQUESTING ADDITIONAL BRIEFING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

No. 11-cv-03414-RMW

EDM 2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is an independent business consultant in the "energy/power and hunting/fishing

industries" who resides in the state of Montana. FAC ¶ 2. Defendant is also a Montana resident. Id.

¶ 3. 

In or about October 2010, defendant published the blog "Donald Ray Bernad, Glacial

Energy, Gemico Mining" (the "Blog") through the website blogspot.com. FAC ¶ 12. The Blog

contained statements indicating that plaintiff, who is apparently also an attorney, had been convicted

of violating certain Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. In early 2011, defendant posted

comments on two additional websites, complaintsboard.com and pissedconsumer.com, stating that

plaintiff had been found guilty of fraud in Texas. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s

statements are false and defamatory, and that he "resigned in lieu of discipline from the State Bar of

Texas." Id. ¶ 18. 

On June 27, 2011, plaintiff was named in a lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of Texas alleging RICO violations and other Texas state law claims (the "Texas

Matter"). Id. ¶ 20. Subsequently, defendant allegedly sent "numerous emails" regarding the Texas

Matter to business associates of plaintiff "in an attempt to damage plaintiff's business relationships." 

Id. ¶ 21. In addition, defendant uploaded documents related to the Texas Matter to the Internet

document repository scribd.com under the user name "evildragonslayer9." Id. ¶ 23. According to

the FAC, defendant's conduct is part of an "Internet campaign to disparage [plaintiff] with false and

malicious statements and cause damage to his reputation." Id. ¶ 11.

B. Procedural Background and Jurisdictional Allegations

On October 18, 2011, plaintiff filed a FAC in this court asserting claims for False

Advertising under the Lanham Act, 15, U.S.C. § 1125(a), defamation and intentional interference

with prospective economic advantage. The FAC alleges that subject matter jurisdiction is proper on

diversity grounds, and because the Lanham Act claim presents a federal question giving rise to

supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims. FAC ¶¶ 5-7. The FAC further alleges

Case 5:11-cv-03414-RMW Document 28 Filed 01/02/12 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AND REQUESTING ADDITIONAL BRIEFING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

No. 11-cv-03414-RMW

EDM 3

that this court can assert personal jurisdiction over defendant because he has "conducted business in

this District" and "committed acts that avail [himself] of California law." Id. ¶ 8-9.

On November 2, 2011, defendant, who is pro se, filed a motion to dismiss. While the motion

is primarily dedicated to criticisms of plaintiff's conduct, defendant also challenges the allegations

regarding personal jurisdiction, arguing that he has never conducted business in California. 

Furthermore, he contends that because both parties are Montana residents, subject matter jurisdiction

is not proper on diversity grounds. Defendant additionally requests that plaintiff be sanctioned for

filing this action in the Northern District of California despite knowing that defendant lives in

Montana. 

In his opposition motion, plaintiff abandons his allegation that defendant has conducted

business in California and argues instead that defendant consented to personal jurisdiction in this

district because the terms of service of blogspot.com and scribd.com contain forum-selection clauses

requiring litigation "arising" from the use of either service to be brought in Santa Clara County,

California. See Dkt. No. 15 at 3. Plaintiff reasserts the claim that subject matter jurisdiction is

proper based on the Lanham Act claim, and later notes that his allegations regarding diversity

jurisdiction are a mistake. See Dkt. No. 21 at 5 n.3. 

On November 30, 2011, defendant filed a reply asserting additional grounds for dismissal,

including a challenge to the sufficiency of plaintiff’s Lanham Act and defamation claims under Rule

12(b)(6), and what appears to be an invocation of California's Anti-SLAPP provisions. See Dkt. No.

20. Defendant also denies consenting to personal jurisdiction in California, arguing that the venue

"selection clauses contained within the Terms of Use in the website[s] are only for disputes between

users of the websites and the websites themselves, not third party actions." Id. at 8. 

On December 2, 2011, plaintiff moved to strike defendant's reply in its entirety because: (1)

it was filed two days late under Civil Local Rule 7-3; (2) it raises new arguments not included in the

motion to dismiss, and (3) both the motion to dismiss and reply brief are "rife with scandalous

material." See Dkt. No. 21. In response, defendant indicated that he had believed in good faith that

his reply was timely filed, that the timing of his filing was complicated because he has not yet been

granted permission to use PACER, and that he filed his brief "within two hours of being notified of

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AND REQUESTING ADDITIONAL BRIEFING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

No. 11-cv-03414-RMW

EDM 4

the local rules by plaintiff’s lawyer." Dkt. No. 24 at 4. Defendant also argues that he should be

allowed to raise additional arguments in his reply brief because plaintiff included the allegation that

defendant consented to personal jurisdiction for the first time in his opposition brief. 

II. DISCUSSION

Pro se pleadings "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Leniency towards pro se litigants is

particularly warranted in evaluating compliance with the technical rules of civil procedure. Draper

v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986).

Here, it appears that defendant intended in good faith to comply with the Civil Local Rules. 

Furthermore, as plaintiff concedes, only pleadings are technically subject to motions to strike. See

Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Although plaintiff cites a

District of Nevada case in which an opposition to a motion to dismiss was stricken as untimely, that

case is distinguishable because the filing party was represented by counsel and offered no excuse for

the untimely submission. See Metzger v. Hussman, 682 F. Supp. 1109, 1110 (D. Nev. 1988). The

court therefore DENIES plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant's reply brief. 

However, the court agrees with plaintiff that consideration of arguments raised for the first

time on reply would prejudice plaintiff if he is not given an opportunity to respond. See Cal.

Writer's Club v. Sonders, No. C-11-02566, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113699 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011)

(considering reply brief filed seven weeks late by pro se defendant after finding that plaintiff would

not be prejudiced). Therefore, the court will give plaintiff ten days from the date of this order to file

a sur-reply responding to the arguments raised in defendant's motion. Once plaintiff has had an

opportunity to respond, the court will consider whether personal and subject matter jurisdiction are

proper in this case, as well as whether any exhibits attached to the parties' motions can be

considered on a motion to dismiss. 

Finally, the court DENIES defendant's request for sanctions. In addition to the fact that

defendant did not comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, plaintiff's admittedly

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For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AND REQUESTING ADDITIONAL BRIEFING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

No. 11-cv-03414-RMW

EDM 5

erroneous assertion of diversity jurisdiction does not justify an imposition of sanctions at this time,

particularly where there may be other grounds for federal jurisdiction. 

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's reply

brief. Plaintiff has ten days from the date of this order to file a sur-reply. The motion hearing set for

January 6, 2012 is VACATED. 

DATED: January 2, 2012

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:11-cv-03414-RMW Document 28 Filed 01/02/12 Page 5 of 5