Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00228/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00228-49/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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5:13-cv-00228-RMW

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ADIL HIRAMANEK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

L. MICHAEL CLARK, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:13-cv-00228-RMW 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

AMEND COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 375

On November 7, 2015, plaintiff Adil Hiramanek filed a motion for leave to file an 

amended complaint naming two additional defendants. Dkt. No. 375. On November 23, 2015, 

defendants Daryl McChristian, Bryan Plett, and Timothy Polumbus filed an opposition1to the 

motion. Dkt. No. 387. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate 

for resolution without oral argument and therefore VACATES the hearing set for December 18, 

2015. For the reasons stated below, the court denies the motion to amend.

 

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Plaintiff filed a reply brief, Dkt. No. 397, on December 1, 2015, one day after the due date of 

November 30, 2015. See Civ. L.R. 7-3(c). Because plaintiff did not file a motion to extend the 

reply deadline, the court declines to consider the reply. Much of plaintiff’s reply is directed to 

statute of limitations issues that did not form a basis for plaintiff’s motion, and even if the court 

were to consider the reply, it would not change the court’s ruling.

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5:13-cv-00228-RMW

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

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I. BACKGROUND

Defendants McChristian, Plett, and Polumbus are Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Deputies. 

Dkt. No. 388-1 at 1-2. Claim 17 of plaintiff’s operative complaint, Dkt. No. 94-1, brought under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against McChristian and Plett, is based on allegations that the deputies detained, 

interrogated, and confined plaintiff at the Santa Clara County Superior Courthouse. See Dkt. No. 

94-1 ¶¶ 183, 188-89, 195, 201-03. Plaintiff’s motion claims that in addition to McChristian and 

Plett, two other deputies, Lamond Davis and Michael Low, also participated in an unlawful 

interrogation that allegedly took place on or about June 11, 2012. Plaintiff seeks to substitute

Davis and Low as defendants in this action in place of fictitious Doe defendants mentioned in the 

complaint. See Dkt. No. 375 at 1; Dkt. No. 94-1 ¶ 33.

II. ANALYSIS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), after an initial period in which a party may 

amend its pleading as a matter of course has expired, amendment is permitted only with the 

opposing party’s written consent or leave of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Under Rule 

15(a)(2), “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. Nonetheless, a district 

court may deny leave to amend a complaint due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on 

the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, 

undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of 

amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Of these considerations, “it is the 

consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence 

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). “The party 

opposing leave to amend bears the burden of showing prejudice.” Serpa v. SBC Telecomms., Inc., 

318 F. Supp. 2d 865, 870 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

187 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Hiramanek moves to amend his complaint to add Davis and Low as defendants because, he 

asserts, he only discovered these individuals’ identities when defendants produced an unredacted 

copy of an incident report mentioning their names on October 27, 2015. Dkt. No. 375 at 2. 

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

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Plaintiff asserts that a version of the incident report produced by defendants on July 6, 2015 was 

redacted, obscuring Davis’s and Low’s names. Id.; see also Dkt. No. 375-1 Ex. A (redacted 

incident report); Ex. C (unredacted incident report). Defendants oppose plaintiff’s motion, 

primarily based on asserted undue delay, prejudice, and futility.

Relevant to evaluating delay is whether the moving party knew or should have known the 

facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. 

Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit has previously held that 

an eight-month delay between acquiring the requisite facts and seeking amendment is 

unreasonable. See Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 1991).

Here, defendants argue that plaintiff actually knew of Davis’s and Low’s involvement in 

the alleged unlawful interrogation years before this case reached the formal discovery stage. 

Indeed, plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, filed on August 2, 2013, alleges that “CLARK 

then had MCCHRISTIAN and two other COUNTY employees [L. Davis and one other] detain, 

unlawfully interrogate, and confine ADIL.” Dkt. No. 37 ¶ 138 (emphasis added). These 

allegations are repeated in the operative “Revised Second Amended Complaint” filed May 20, 

2014. Dkt. No. 94-1 ¶ 183. Even plaintiff’s reply does not explain why plaintiff could recite 

Davis’s name in the 2013 amended complaint but not then name Davis as a defendant.

The 2013 amended complaint describes how “ADIL procured the Criminal Incident Report 

later,” Dkt. No. 37 ¶ 145, and goes on to quote portions of the incident report to corroborate 

plaintiff’s version of the events that took place on June 11, 2012. Compare Dkt. No. 37 ¶ 150 with

Dkt. No. 375-1 Ex. C. See also Dkt. No. 94-1 ¶ 195. While the excerpts of the incident report 

quoted in the Second Amended Complaint do not mention Davis or Low by name, the quoted 

excerpts suggest that Hiramanek possessed at least some version of the incident report long before 

October 27, 2015. Moreover, even the redacted version of the incident report purportedly 

produced in July 2015 mentions Low by name: “Deputy Low and I were on one side of the table 

and S01 Hiramanek was on the other side.” Dkt. No. 375-1 Ex. A at ECF p. 7. Plaintiff does not 

explain why this version of the incident report was insufficient to enable plaintiff to name Low in 

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

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July 2015.

2

The court finds that plaintiff unduly delayed in naming Davis and Low as defendants.

Regarding prejudice, even holding plaintiff to his commitment that he would not seek 

discovery from Davis or Low,3it would be impossible for Davis and Low to fairly mount a 

defense under the case schedule that has been in effect for nine months.

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To meet the deadline to 

hear dispositive motions by February 5, 2016, such motions must be filed by December 31, 2015. 

See Civ. L.R. 7-2(a). Even if this court ruled in plaintiff’s favor on the scheduled hearing date and 

he immediately served Davis and Low with the amended complaint, their responses to the 

complaint would not be due until after the summary judgment motion deadline. Thus, the court 

finds that allowing the proposed amendment would unjustifiably prejudice all defendants.

Defendants also argue that because Claim 17 of the operative complaint does not mention 

any involvement by Doe defendants in the alleged June 11, 2012 detention and interrogation, any 

amendment to substitute Low and Davis for the Doe defendants would be futile. See Dkt. No. 387 

at 4-5. On this point, the court finds defendants’ argument unpersuasive because plaintiff proposes 

amendments to the paragraphs of Claim 17 that identify Davis and Low by name and describe 

their individual actions. See Dkt. No. 375 at 6-8. Nevertheless, because the other Foman factors at 

issue strongly favor denying the proposed amendment, the futility factor is of little weight here.

Accordingly, the court denies plaintiff’s motion to add the additional defendants.

III. ORDER

For the reasons explained above, plaintiff’s motion to amend is DENIED.

Dated: December 16, 2015

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

 

2 Defendants also argue that even if plaintiff did not know Low’s name when plaintiff prepared the 

amended complaint, defendants’ May 15, 2015 initial disclosures listed Low as a witness to the 

June 11, 2012 events underlying plaintiff’s allegations. See Dkt. No. 388-1 at 2. Defendants’ 

argument that plaintiff has been aware of Low’s alleged involvement for more than six months 

presents an alternative ground for finding plaintiff’s delay inexcusable.

3

See Dkt. No. 397 at 12.

4

See Dkt. No. 201 (Scheduling Order entered March 17, 2015, setting trial date of March 14, 

2016).

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