Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00258/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00258-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: Disability Act of 1990

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PATRICK DUNN, )

)

 Plaintiff,1 )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. 15-00258-KD-N

)

PHOENIX WEST II, LLC, PHOENIX )

WEST II OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC, )

and BRETT ROBINSON GULF CORP., )

)

 Defendants. )

ORDER

This action is before the Court on the Defendants Phoenix West II, LLC, Phoenix West II 

Owners Association, Inc., and Brett/Robinson Gulf Corporation’s motions to dismiss the first 

amended complaint and memoranda in support (Docs. 38-41, 43-44, 46), Plaintiff’s responses

(docs. 47, 48, 52), Defendants’ replies (Docs. 49, 50, 54), the Report and Recommendation 

entered by the Magistrate Judge, Defendants’ objections (Docs. 63-65), Plaintiff’s objections

(Doc. 66), and Defendants’ responses to Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. 67, 68). The Court heard 

the parties’ respective oral arguments on January 26, 2016. 

After due and proper consideration of the issues raised, and a de novo determination of 

those portions of the recommendation to which objection is made, the Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 62) of the Magistrate Judge dated November 9, 2015, and made under 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and S.D. Ala. GenLR 

72(a)(2)(S), is ADOPTED, in part, as follows, as the opinion of this Court.

 1 Amanda Northrup is no longer a plaintiff in this action. (Doc. 56) 

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I. Factual allegations and claims

Dunn resides in Andalusia, Alabama. As a result of an automobile accident in 2001, 

Dunn is paralyzed, is permanently confined to a wheelchair, and is restricted in his ability to use 

his hands, arms, and legs. Dunn and his family planned a vacation at the Phoenix West II 

condominium facility in Orange Beach, Alabama (hereinafter, “the Facility”), in April 2015. 

In March 2015, Dunn called the Facility to inquire about accessible rooms. Dunn spoke 

with an employee of Brett/Robinson, who informed Dunn that the Facility did not provide ADAaccessible rooms and that the only ADA accessible rooms Brett/Robinson offers are located at 

another facility, the Phoenix All Suites Hotel. Further inquiring about the accessibility at the 

hotel and the size of the rooms, Dunn was informed by the Brett/Robinson employee that the 

rooms available had bunk beds in the hall. Upon this information, Dunn went online to determine 

if the hotel would meet his accessibility needs but was unable to because Brett/Robinson did not 

sufficiently identify and describe the accessible features on the website. As a result, Dunn went 

to the Facility’s website to determine if it had any accessible features at all and to assess whether 

the Facility would be large enough for him to make do. His review of the Facility’s website was 

inconclusive because the website lacked sufficient information.

Ultimately, Dunn decided to go to the Facility, made reservations, and went there with 

his family and friends. During Dunn’s visit he went from the parking lot to the entranceways, 

from the parking lot to and throughout the Facility, including his rented condominium, the 

services areas, bathrooms, pool area, the pier, paths of travel, common areas, recreational areas, 

the fitness center, and the men’s sauna. The kitchen, bedroom, bathroom, balcony, and seating 

area in Dunn’s rented condominium were not accessible to him, and Dunn encountered 

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architectural barriers to accessibility in other common areas of the Facility that he visited. 

“Mr. Dunn not only intends to return to [the Facility] in the future, but also has concrete 

and realistic plans to do exactly that. Generally, Mr. Dunn visits Orange Beach frequently 

because of its proximity to his home. Specifically, Mr. Dunn will definitely return in Spring 2016 

for a similar vacation as his 2015 visit ... It is a virtual certainty that he will return again in 

Spring 2017 for a similar vacation visit. Moreover, Mr. Dunn will absolutely continue to return 

at least once a year as necessary to verify that [the Facility] is ADA-compliant to his 

satisfaction.” (Doc. 61). 

Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq.

(hereinafter, “Title III”), concerning “Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private 

Entities,” generally provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 

disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 

or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or 

leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 

Dunn’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 33) asserts six counts against the Defendants, 

alleging various violations of Title III:

Count 1 (against all Defendants) – Unlawful discrimination under § 12182(a) for 

“failure to remove architectural barriers ... in existing facilities, where such 

removal is readily achievable[,]” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) or, “where an 

entity can demonstrate that the removal of a barrier under [§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)] 

is not readily achievable, a failure to make such goods, services, facilities, 

privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative methods 

if such methods are readily achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v).

Count 2 (against all Defendants) – Unlawful discrimination under § 12182(a) for 

“failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a 

disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently 

than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services...” 42 

U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 

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Count 3 (against all Defendants) – Unlawful denial of the opportunity to 

participate, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(C) (“Notwithstanding the 

existence of separate or different programs or activities provided in accordance 

with this section, an individual with a disability shall not be denied the 

opportunity to participate in such programs or activities that are not separate or 

different.”) – specifically, “the opportunity to participate equally in the rental 

program for the condominiums at Phoenix West II condominiums at Phoenix 

West II because Defendants do not maintain any accessible condominiums and/or 

facilities at Phoenix West II[,]” and “the opportunity to participate at each and 

every program and activity at Phoenix West II, because the defendants do not 

maintain any accessible condominiums and/or facilities at Phoenix West II.” 

(Doc. 33 at 25, ¶¶ 56 – 57).

Count 4 (against all Defendants) - Unlawful discrimination under § 12182(a) for 

“the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to 

screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with 

disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, 

privileges, advantages, or accommodations...” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) –

specifically, “Defendants utilize the reservation system to screen out disabled 

individuals, so that they do not come to Phoenix West II. The screening out 

process specifically involves directing disabled individuals away from Phoenix 

West II to a hotel alleged by the reservation system to be ADA compliant, but that 

in reality is not ADA compliant.” (Doc. 33 at 27, ¶ 66). 

Count 5 (against all Defendants) - Unlawful discrimination under § 12182(a) for 

“failing to ensure that individuals with disabilities can make reservations for 

accessible guest rooms during the same hours and in the same manner as 

nondisabled individuals, pursuant 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1)(i), and by failing to 

describe the accessible features in the hotel and guest rooms offered through its 

reservations’ service both in advertisements and online in enough detail to 

reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether 

the condominium meets their accessibility needs, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 

36.302(e)(1)(ii).”2 (Doc. 33 at 28, ¶ 77) – specifically, “Dunn could not determine 

from the existing systems and advertisements whether his condominium was 

accessible.” (Id. at 28 – 29, ¶ 78). 

Count 6 (against Phoenix West II only) - Unlawful discrimination under § 

12182(a) for “failure to design and construct facilities for first occupancy later 

than 30 months after July 26, 1990, that are readily accessible to and usable by 

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individuals with disabilities...” 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1).

II. Standing

The Court adopts the recommendation as to Plaintiff’s standing to bring this action. (Doc. 

62, Report and Recommendation, Section A., p. 10-20) Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of standing are DENIED. 

III. Phoenix West II, LLC

The Court adopts the recommendation as to Counts 2 and 4 of the first amended 

complaint. (Doc. 62, p. 34-37 through the second paragraph) Accordingly, Phoenix West II, 

LLC’s motion to dismiss as to Counts 2 and 4 is GRANTED. 

The Court declines to adopt the recommendation as to Counts 1, 3, 5, and 6 as it relates to 

Phoenix West II. (Doc. 62, p. 25-29 (Counts 1, 3, and 6); p. 37-39 (Count 5)) These counts are 

premised upon factual allegations that Phoenix West II failed to provide ADA accessible rental 

units in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). This section addresses “Public Accommodations and 

Services Operated by Private Entities” and provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated 

against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment” of the facilities of “any place of 

public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of 

public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support his

allegation that Phoenix West II “owns . . . a place of public accommodation”. The alleged place 

of accommodation is the Phoenix West II Facility. Plaintiff relies on the condominium 

documents to support his allegation that Phoenix West II owns the Facility at issue. In that 

regard, the Declaration of Condominium states that Phoenix West II owns a fee simple interest in 

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the property and improvements that are Phoenix West II condominiums.

2 However, that 

statement simply describes Phoenix West II’s status and authority to submit the property and 

improvements to condominium ownership under the Alabama Uniform Condominium Act of 

1991 (“AUCA”).

The AUCA provides for creation of a condominium and states in part, that a 

“condominium may be created pursuant to this chapter only by filing a declaration executed in 

the same manner as a deed ...”. Ala. Code § 35-8A-201. The “Declaration” is defined as “[a]ny 

instruments, however denominated, that create a condominium, and any amendments to those 

instruments.” Ala. Code § 35-8A-103. The Declaration defines “Condominium Property” or the 

“Property” as “all property, both real, personal or mixed, which is submitted to the 

Condominium form of ownership as provided for herein and includes the Real Property and all 

improvements . . .” (Doc. 44-1, ¶ 1.13). As to ownership, the Declaration states that “[e]ach 

owner shall be entitled to exclusive ownership and possession of his unit” and that “[e]ach owner 

shall be entitled to an undivided interest in the common elements in the percentages expressed in 

this Declaration[.]” (Doc. 44-1, ¶ 9.01) The Declaration also provides a “schedule setting forth 

the percentage of undivided interest of each unit in the common areas[.]” (Doc. 44-1, ¶ 7.01) In 

sum, by this Declaration Phoenix West II relinquished its fee simple ownership in favor of 

condominium ownership. Thus, the Declaration does not support Plaintiff’s claim that Phoenix 

West II owns the Facility. 

At oral argument, Plaintiff relied on the Baldwin County property tax records to show 

that Phoenix West II still owns at least ten condominium and thus owns the Facility. A “unit

 2 “Developer [Phoenix West II] is the fee simple owner of that certain parcel of real property ...” 

(Doc. 44-1, p. 6)

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owner” is defined in Ala. Code § 35-8A-103: “Unit owner. A declarant or other person who 

owns a unit . . . In a condominium, the declarant is the initial owner of any unit created by the 

condominium”. However, initial ownership of condominium units does not make Phoenix West 

II the owner of the Facility. 

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Phoenix West II “owns” the Facility is insufficient 

and without factual support. Accordingly, since an entity must be an owner to be liable under 

the relevant ADA provisions,3 Phoenix West II’s motion to dismiss Counts 1, 3, 5, and 6 is 

GRANTED.

IV. Phoenix West II Owners Association, Inc.

The Court adopts the recommendation as to Count 2 of the first amended complaint.

(Doc. 62, p. 34-35) Accordingly, the Association’s motion to dismiss as to Count 2 is 

GRANTED. 

The Court declines to adopt the recommendation to deny the Association’s motion to 

dismiss as to Count 4 (doc. 62, p. 37).4 The Association objects to the recommendation and 

argues that the same rationale that resulted in the recommendation to dismiss this count as to 

Brett/Robinson and Phoenix West II, should apply to the Association (doc. 65, p. 7, 20-21). The 

Court agrees. Accordingly, the Association’s motion to dismiss as to Count 4 is GRANTED.

 3

 Counts 2 and 4 are also subject to dismissal on this basis as well as that delineated by the 

Magistrate Judge. 

4

 The Magistrate Judge found that the Association argued only that it did not own or operate the 

rental reservation system (doc. 62, p. 37). However, the Association also argued that it did not 

own units or rent units to third parties, in addition to arguing that it did not maintain a rental 

reservation system. The Association also argued that “[m]any individual unit owners do not rent 

their units, but those who choose to do so may rent them directly or use a rental agency such as 

Brett Robinson.” (Doc. 44, p. 11) 

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The Court declines to adopt the recommendation to deny the motion to dismiss as to 

Counts 1 and 3, as it relates to the Association. (Doc. 62, p. 25-29 (Counts 1, 3) Counts 1 and 3 

allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) of the ADA, which prohibits any person who owns or 

operates any place of public accommodation from discriminating against disabled individuals in 

the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities. In that regard, Plaintiff alleges that the 

“Association [both] ‘operates’ the condominiums and ‘owns’ the condominiums.” (Doc. 33, p. 8) 

However, no facts are alleged which support Plaintiff’s allegation that the Association “owns” 

the Facility, any condominium unit, or the common areas. (Doc. 33, ¶ 10) Instead, Plaintiff only 

alleges that the Association has control and dominion over the condominiums and the authority 

to “maintain and operate all aspects of the condominiums and in particular the maintenance and 

operation of the common elements and any and all rules and regulations for the condominiums.” 

(Doc. 33, p. 8)5

However, there are no plausible facts alleged that the Association operates or controls the 

individually-owned condominium units. Plaintiff alleges that the Association “exercises full 

regulatory control over the actions of condominium owners in relation to their condominiums 

and is able to take remedial actions in relation to owners.” (Doc. 33, p. 8) But this conclusory 

statement appears to be speculative and not supported by any fact. Specifically, the Plaintiff fails 

to allege facts to support the contention that the Association has authority to require any control 

over condominium unit owners to alter the interiors of the units to make the units accessible. 

Even assuming for purpose of the motion to dismiss that the interiors of the individual 

 5 The Declaration defines the “common elements of the condominium” to include “all parts of 

the condominium property not located within the perimeter boundaries of the apartment units” 

and lists items such as balconies and decking, “attics, foundations, columns, girders, beams, and 

support of building and such component parts of walls, roofs, floors and ceilings as are not 

located within the units.” (Doc. 44-1, p. 12, ¶ 6.03) 

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condominium units could possibly be a place of public accommodation,6 there are no facts to 

support that the Association “operates” the interiors such that relief could be granted. Steelman v. 

Florida, 2013 WL 1104746, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2013) report and recommendation 

adopted, 2013 WL 1104256 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2013) (“To ‘operate’ a place of public 

accommodation means to exercise control over the alleged discriminatory action and to have the 

authority to take remedial measures.”) (citing Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F. 3d 

1063, 1067 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the relevant inquiry is whether defendant according 

to the terms of the franchise agreement “controls modification of the San Antonio Stores to cause 

them to comply with the ADA.”); Lemmons v. Ace Hardware Corp., 2014 WL 3107842, at *7 

(N.D. Cal. July 3, 2014) (“Lemmons points to no evidence to show that Ace retained the 

authority under the agreement to dictate the physical layout of the store, or that [it] otherwise 

participated in the alleged acts of discrimination against Plaintiff. In the absence of such 

evidence, the Court cannot conclude that Ace had control over the store such that it could ensure 

nondiscrimination against the disabled.”).

Moreover, the common elements are owned by the individual unit owners and are for 

exclusive use of the owners, their guest and tenants. Thus, although the Association controls the 

common elements, they are amenities for the unit owners and are not “public accommodations”. 

The only possible exception is the rental office that is located on the premises. Plaintiff has 

 6

 However, see Mabson v. Ass’n. of Apt. Owners of Maui Kamaole, 2007 WL 23633349, *10 

(D. Hi. Aug. 13, 2007) (finding that residential condominiums were not a place of public 

accommodation and “[t]hat there may be some short-term rental units within the condominium 

would not change that result. Even for short-term rental situations, the owners still would have a 

choice as to whether or not to rent the unit and to whom to rent the unit.”) (citing Thompson v. 

Sand Cliffs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 1998 WL 35177067, at *3 (N.D.Fla. March 30, 1998) (noting 

that even if an owner were to rent a unit, that owner “is still free to use his condominium at 

anytime, and he may also decide not to rent it out at all,” and “when the units are not being 

rented, there is no question that they remain the owners' residences”).

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alleged that there is an office in the Facility where the public may walk in and make a reservation 

to rent a condominium unit. If true, this part of the Facility would be required to be ADA 

compliant. Sapp v. MHI P'ship, Ltd., 199 F. Supp. 2d 578, 586-87 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (A model 

home that is also used as a sales office is subject to ADA requirements.) However, the Plaintiff 

has failed to make any allegations to support that the rental/sales office was not ADA compliant. 

Accordingly, the Association’s motion to dismiss as to Counts 1 and 3 is GRANTED

The Court declines to adopt the recommendation to deny the Association’s motion to 

dismiss as to Count 5 (doc. 62, p. 38). In Count 5, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated 

the ADA “by failing to ensure that individuals with disabilities can make reservations for 

accessible guest rooms during the same hours and in the same manner as nondisabled 

individuals” and “by failing to describe the accessible features in the hotel and guest rooms 

offered through its reservations’ service both in advertisements and online in enough detail to 

reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether the condominium 

meets their accessibility needs[.]” (Doc. 33, p. 28) In relevant part, the regulation provides for 

“[r]eservations made by places of lodging” and states that 

a public accommodation that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of 

lodging shall, with respect to reservations made by any means . . . or through a 

third-party –

(i) modify its policies, practices or procedures to ensure that individuals with 

disabilities can make reservations for accessible guest rooms during the same 

hours and in the same manner as individuals who do not need accessible rooms; 

(ii) identify and describes accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms 

offered through its reservations service in enough detail to reasonably permit 

individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether a given hotel or 

guest room meets his or her accessibility needs. 

28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1)(i)(ii). 

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Plaintiff alleges that Brett/Robinson as the rental management agent for the individual 

condominium unit owners operates the reservation system. See Section V. Plaintiff has failed to 

allege sufficient facts to show how the Association owns or operates or has any control or 

authority over the descriptions of the accessible features within the individual condominium 

units, i.e., the alleged “guest rooms”, rented through Brett/Robinson. (Doc. 33, p. 7-8)

Accordingly, the Association’s motion to dismiss as to Count 5 is GRANTED. 

V. Brett/Robinson Gulf Corporation

The Court adopts the recommendation as to Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4. (Doc. 62, p. 29-33

(Count 1 and 3); p. 34-35 (Count 2); p. 36-37 through the second paragraph (Count 4)) 

Accordingly, Brett/Robinson’s motion to dismiss as to Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 is GRANTED. 

The Court declines to adopt the recommendation as to Count 5. (Doc. 62, p. 37-39) The 

statute provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability . . . 

by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12182(a). Count 5 is premised on the regulation that states that a “public 

accommodation that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of lodging shall, with respect 

to reservations...” make modifications to its policies, procedures and practices to comply with 

the ADA. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1)(i)(ii). Thus, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to render 

plausible that Brett/Robinson owns, leases or operates a place of public accommodation. 

The Plaintiff alleges only that Brett/Robinson is a third-party entity that provides a rental 

management program for the individual condominium owners. (Doc. 62, p. 30)7 Specifically, 

 7

 Plaintiff alleges that “. . . Brett Robinson is the rental management entity for the individual 

property owners of the condominiums. In ADA terms, Brett Robinson “operates” the transient 

lodging rental program at the condominiums and “leases” or “leases to” the short term renters of 

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Plaintiff has pled that Brett/Robinson is the “rental management entity for the individual 

property owners of the condominiums” that “offers to the individual property owners of the 

condominiums” a range of services for the condominiums leased through Brett/Robinson. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Brett/Robinson “is the rental agency responsible for maintaining and 

providing opportunities for guests to make reservations to the Phoenix West II via the internet.” 

(Id.) However, Plaintiff has not alleged plausible facts to support that Brett/Robinson owns, 

leases or operates the Facility at issue. 8

Also, Plaintiff has not alleged plausible facts to support that Brett/Robinson, as a rental 

management service or rental agent for the individual property owners, has any authority to take 

remedial measures to modify the Facility. Steelman, 2013 WL 1104746, at *2 (“To ‘operate’ a 

place of public accommodation means to exercise control over the alleged discriminatory action 

 

the condominiums. 42 U.S.C. § 12182. Brett Robinson’s responsibilities include promoting the 

property, finding customers for the rental program, and providing excellent service during the 

renters stay. Brett Robinson offers to the individual property owners of the condominiums a 

strategic marketing program; specialized reservations training; a website with interior and 

exterior photos and virtual tours; an owners website with a list of booking, work orders, and 

financial statements; annual property inspections and recommendations; provide the owners 

information and address service requests; maintenance service available 24 hours; commercial 

laundry and linen services; individual monthly accounting with direct deposit service available; 

storm recovery assistance; constant review of industry trends to remain competitive and 

maximize rentals; a 22% management fee; provide blankets, mattress pads, pillows, pillow 

protectors, potholders, shower linens, towels, and linen; limit the number of guests in the unit to 

the bedding and inspect properties between guests stays. Brett Robinson is the rental agency 

responsible for maintaining and providing opportunities for guests to make reservations to the 

Phoenix West II via the internet.” (Doc. 33, p. 6-7). 

8

 Additionally, the individually-owned condominiums do not appear to be subject to the ADA. 

See 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(c)(2) (“Alterations to guest rooms in places of lodging where the guest 

rooms are not owned or substantially controlled by the entity that owns, leases, or operates the 

overall facility and the physical features of the guest room interiors are controlled by their 

individual owners are not required to comply with § 36.402 or the alterations requirements in 

section 224.1.1 of the 2010 Standards.”); 28 C.F.R § 36.406(c)(3), applicable to “transient lodging 

guest rooms” in “Places of lodging” subject to the ADA, provides that in “[f]acilities with residential 

dwelling units and transient lodging units”, the “[r]esidential dwelling units that are designed and 

constructed for residential use exclusively are not subject to the transient lodging standards.” 

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and to have the authority to take remedial measures.”) (citing Neff, 58 F. 3d at 1067 (explaining 

that the relevant inquiry is whether defendant according to the terms of the franchise agreement 

“controls modification of the San Antonio Stores to cause them to comply with the ADA.”); 

Lemmons, 2014 WL 3107842, at *7 (“Lemmons points to no evidence to show that Ace retained 

the authority under the agreement to dictate the physical layout of the store, or that [it] otherwise 

participated in the alleged acts of discrimination against Plaintiff. In the absence of such 

evidence, the Court cannot conclude that Ace had control over the store such that it could ensure 

nondiscrimination against the disabled.”). Accordingly, Brett/Robinson’s motion to dismiss as to 

Count 5 is GRANTED. 

DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of February 2016. 

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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