Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01806/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01806-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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3:18-cv-01806-GPC-MDD 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHN DAVID HERBAUGH, 

Booking No. 18120621, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

3970 ARJIS; 7374 ARJIS; 6096 ARJIS; 

5131 ARJIS, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:18-cv-01806-GPC-MDD 

ORDER: 

1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

[ECF No. 4] 

AND 

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 

John David Herbaugh (“Plaintiff”), currently housed at the George Bailey 

Detention Facility (“GBDF”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 

instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a) (ECF No. 4). 

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3:18-cv-01806-GPC-MDD 

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP 

 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, 

“face ... additional hurdle[s].” Id. 

Specifically, in addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing 

fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3)(b), Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP: 

. . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The 

objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner 

litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both 

before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311. 

 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 

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action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008); see also El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(noting that when court “review[s] a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, 

the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central 

question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure 

to state a claim.’”) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is simply prohibited by section 

1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he 

alleges he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP 

complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger 

of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”). 

II. Application to Plaintiff 

 As an initial matter, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and has 

ascertained that it does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced 

‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 

While Defendants typically carry the burden to show that a prisoner is not entitled 

to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in some instances, the district court docket 

may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria under 

§ 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. 

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452–MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. 

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 

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n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council 

v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Thus, this Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff, John David Herbaugh, has had 

at least three prior prisoner civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were 

frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. They 

are: 

1) Herbaugh v. Cohen, et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-01580-WQHWVG (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2018) (Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and 

Dismissing Civil Action for failing to state a claim without leave to amend) 

(strike one); 

2) Herbaugh v. 3970 ARJIS, et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-01316-AJBBLM (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2018) (Order Dismissing Civil Action for failing 

to state a claim and for Failing to Prosecute in Compliance with Court Order 

requiring amendment) (strike two); 

3) Herbaugh v. San Diego Sheriffs Dep’t, et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-cv01748-BAS-WVG (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2018) (Order Dismissing Complaint 

for failing to state a claim and as frivolous without leave to amend) (strike 

three). 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than 

three “strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he 

faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is 

not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1055; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes 

prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while 

enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”). 

/ / / 

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III. Conclusion and Order 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 4] as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g); 

2) DISMISSES this action without prejudice for failure to pay the full statutory 

and administrative $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if 

appeal would not be frivolous); and 

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 9, 2018 

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