Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03301/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03301-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YOLANDA MITCHELL,

Plaintiff,

 v

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, a judicial

branch entity,

Defendant.

 

IRMA TOLENTINO,

Plaintiff,

 v

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, a judicial

branch entity,

Defendant.

 /

No C 04-3135 VRW

No C 04-3301 VRW

 ORDER

Defendant Superior Court of the State of California, in

and for County of San Mateo (Superior Court) has moved for summary

judgment in its favor on all claims in these two consolidated

actions. C 04-3135 Doc #35 and 04-3301 Doc #32. The actions are

consolidated by stipulation pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. C 04-3135 Doc #22 and C 04-3301 Doc #20. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plantiffs Yolanda Miller and Irma Tolentino were cosupervisors formerly employed by Superior Court. In these actions,

they allege that their terminations were motivated by unlawful

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 USC § 2000e et seq. In addition, both Mitchell and

Tolentino allege retaliation, defamation and intentional infliction

of emotional distress (IIED). 

For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS Superior

Court’s motions for summary judgment in each of these consolidated

actions. 

I

As a preliminary matter, Superior Court has filed

objections (C 04-3301 Doc #48) to the declaration (C 04-3301 Doc

#38) and supplemental declaration (C 04-3301 Doc #47) of Tolentino

submitted in opposition to Superior Court’s motion to dismiss. 

Superior Court objects that some statements in Tolentino’s initial

declaration vary materially from Tolentino’s deposition testimony

and that some of those same statements lack any foundation

establishing personal knowledge.

 Tolentino’s supplemental declaration purports to explain

the discrepancies between her deposition and declaration testimony

based on having consulted “notes” in the interim that she had not

consulted prior to the deposition. To this argument, Superior Court

counters that the notes were not —— but should have been ——

disclosed in response to a March 25, 2005 document request that

sought, inter alia, “[a]ll diaries, calendars, notes or other

memoranda or documents kept by plaintiff which relate * * * to any

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of the allegations contained in the Complaint or to events occurring

during Plaintiff’s employment with the Superior Court.” Wiley Decl,

C 04-3301 Doc #49 Ex A at 3. 

In response, Tolentino submits a declaration by her

current counsel, John Kelley, reciting difficulties obtaining a

complete and orderly hand-over of documents and files from

Tolentino’s prior counsel, Stephine Wells. Kelly Decl, C 04-3301

Doc #51. That declaration attaches a letter dated November 11, 2005

from Superior Court’s counsel refusing Tolentino’s request for a

copy of the documents she had previously disclosed to Superior

Court, citing attorney time and cost and that “it does not appear

that Plaintiff has taken any action against her former counsel to

enforce that counsel’s obligation to provide complete files to your

firm.” Id Ex 2. The Kelley declaration admits, however, that

Superior Court’s counsel had alerted him at Tolentino’s August 2005

deposition to missing documents in the document production (¶ 8) and

that on December 20, 2005, he visited the offices of prior counsel

and obtained a complete set of all case documents, including those

Superior Court’s counsel had told him were missing (¶¶ 11-12). It

appears that Tolentino’s counsel, once satisfied that he had

obtained all documents, took no steps to supplement or simply re-do

the incomplete document production in order to rectify the errors of

former counsel and give Superior Court a fair opportunity to view

Tolentino’s evidence as the discovery rules require. Id. 

Superior Court properly relies on Cleveland v Policy

Management Systems Corp, 526 US 795, 806 (1999), which noted that

“with virtual unanimity” courts have held that statements in a

declaration submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment

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may not contradict prior testimony without explaining the

contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity. Tolentino’s

attempt to avoid responsibility for her inconsistent statements by

blaming the attorneys who no longer represent her is unavailing. 

The federal discovery rules and the state rules governing attorney

conduct are designed, respectively, as relevant here, to ensure

complete, early disclosure of relevant evidence and to prevent the

loss of, or inadvertent failure to disclose, such evidence in the

event of a change of counsel. FRCP 26(a)(1)(B) (requiring initial

disclosure of all documents “that the disclosing party may use to

support its claims or defenses”); California Rule of Conduct 3-

700(D) (requiring prompt release to client by withdrawing counsel of

“all client papers and property”). Superior Court is entitled to

the protection of those rules. Moreover, Tolentino’s new counsel

was made aware in August 2005 of gaps in the document disclosure,

yet declined to err on the side of caution by making the complete

set of documents available to Superior Court upon obtaining them in

December 2005. For these reasons, Superior Court’s objections to

pages 10:16-18, 11:1-3, 13:19-25 and 19:8-24 of the initial

Tolentino declaration and 2:11-18, 2:24-28, 3:1-4, 3:11-21 are

SUSTAINED. 

Furthermore, Superior Court correctly points out that

Tolentino’s attempt, in her supplemental declaration, to cure the

manifest lack of foundation for statements regarding the job

performance of other court employees made at page 18, paragraph 54

of her initial declaration, is ineffectual. The statements continue

to lack foundation and do not constitute probative evidence relevant

\\

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to any issue in these motions. The objections to pages 4:1-28 and

5:1-10 of the supplemental declaration are therefore SUSTAINED. 

II

A

The following unified factual chronology sets forth events

relevant to the motions in both cases. Although some portions are

relevant only to one motion or the other, a single chronology favors 

the interests of clarity and economy.

Mitchell was employed by Superior Court from 1984 until

her termination effective February 20, 2004. Complaint ¶¶ 4, 9 (C

04-3135 Doc #1). Her last position was court services co-supervisor

(together with Tolentino) for the criminal division of the court’s

North County branch. Complaint ¶ 4. Peggy Thompson, then Court

Administrator for the Municipal Court of the County of San Mateo,

approved Mitchell’s promotion to supervisor in 1990. Thompson Decl

at 1:20-21, 25-27 (C 04-3135 Doc #36 Att #6). Before the events of

2003 that culminated in Mitchell’s termination in February 2004,

Mitchell had been subject to two prior disciplinary actions: a

three-day suspension for misconduct in February 2000 and a proposed

ten-day suspension in 2003 for reasons including dishonesty,

insubordination and misuse of position. The latter was never

carried out due to intervening events. Mitchell Depo 165:7-25,

166:1-24 (C 04-3135 Doc #35 Att #1 Ex A); Thompson Depo 64:10-18 -

65:3-7 & Ex 9 (C 04-3135 Doc #35 Att #1 Ex B. 

Tolentino was employed by Superior Court from 1988 until

her termination effective February 20, 2004. Complaint ¶ 9, C 04-

3301 Doc #1. She last served as court services co-supervisor,

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together with Mitchell, for the criminal division of the North

County branch. Complaint ¶ 8. Peggy Thompson approved Tolentino’s

promotion to supervisor in 1991. Thompson Decl at 1:20-21, 25-27, C

04-3301 Doc #32, Att 6.

In the spring of 2003, Superior Court undertook a hiring

process to fill deputy clerk positions. One of the applicants was a

personal acquaintance of Mitchell’s, one Marvin Warren, who was not

offered the job despite Mitchell’s efforts. On May 21, 2003,

Mitchell filed an EEO complaint against Thompson, who by then had

been promoted to Court Executive Officer, and Deputy Court Executive

Officer Rodina Catalano alleging “harassment, retaliation, disparate

treatment and discrimination against Yolanda Mitchell.” Mitchell

Decl at 4 & Ex 1, 04-3135 Doc # 42. That complaint set forth a

detailed narrative of the course of the recruitment process that had

resulted in two candidates other than Warren being selected. Among

the specific grievances expressed in Mitchell’s EEO letter were: 

(1) Mitchell had received second-hand information that Catalano had

told another manager that Mitchell had intentionally maintained a

backlog “to justify getting positions” and (2) Mitchell’s various

disagreements and conflicts with her superiors about the hiring

process for the deputy clerk positions. Mitchell did not refer to

Warren by name or include any specifics about him, nor did she

assert that Superior Court’s failure to select him was due to racial

bias. On the last page of this letter, Mitchell wrote: “During my

course of employment with the courts under the leadership of Ms

Peggy Thompson, I have experienced many forms of harassment,

disparate treatment, retaliation, discrimination by management. I

have filed complaints with the EEOC & FE&H and feel that because I

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have filed with these agencies I am continually experiencing these

forms of harassment.” Id at 5. 

The next day, May 22, 2003, Mitchell sent her immediate

supervisor, Court Services Manager Iracema Carranza, a memorandum

complaining that she and Tolentino were not included in the

recruitment process. Mitchell Decl ¶ 4 and Ex B. The memorandum

noted that Mitchell and Tolentino had met with Carranza already to

discuss the matter. Id. It did not mention any candidate, directly

or indirectly, and did not allege racial or other bias in the

selection of the candidates hired. 

On June 19, 2003, Mitchell filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment and

Housing (DFEH). Mitchell Decl ¶ 5 and Ex C. In that document,

Mitchell wrote, among other things, “I complained on or about May

17, 2003 to Court Services Manager Nicole McKay and Ms Catalano that

a particular applicant was not hired because he is a Baptist pastor,

is over the age of 40 and an African-American male.” She also

complained that she was not “allowed to hire any applicant” and that

Thompson and Catalano “have also stopped communicating with me.” 

Id. In closing, Mitchell’s DFEH charge stated “I believe that I

have been discriminated against on the basis of my race, AfricanAmerican * * *. I have also been retaliated against for engaging in

protected activity in violation of the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act * * * and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id. 

 Superior Court retained an outside consultant, Gail

Schino, to conduct an investigation into Mitchell’s conduct in

connection with the recruitment process. Thompson Depo at 36-37, C

04-3135 Doc #41 Ex 1; Catalano Depo at 79-81, C 04-3135 Doc #41 Ex

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2. Superior Court decided to hire an outside investigator “because

there had been a EEO complaint filed that was being investigated by

the county.” Thompson Depo at 38. 

At a July 2003 pre-termination hearing for Dorothy Faalau,

one of Mitchell’s and Tolentino’s subordinate employees who had been

notified of her proposed termination, court management heard a

number of allegations about Mitchell and Tolentino as supervisors in

the criminal division. Thompson Depo 32:12-24, 33:2-11, C 04-3135

Doc #35 Att #1 Ex B. Although similar allegations had been raised

in the past, prior attempts to investigate had been unsuccessful

because employees were unwilling to come forward for fear of

retaliation by Mitchell and Tolentino. Id at 51:19-23, 52:5-25,

53:1-10, 54:9-25, 55:1-25, 56:1-11. Because of this past experience

and the gravity of the new allegations, Thompson authorized Superior

Court to hire an outside employment law firm to conduct an

independent investigation of the allegations against Mitchell and

Tolentino. Id at 45:5-8, 48:25, 49:1-25, 50:1. 

On August 4, 2003, following the completion of the Schino

investigation, Carranza sent Mitchell a six-page letter styled as a

notice of intent to “issue you a non-punitive disciplinary letter

that equates to a 10-day suspension.” The letter listed dishonesty,

insubordination, disrespectful or discourteous conduct, misuse of

position, failure to follow policies, procedures or work rules or

negligence in the performance of duties and violations of code of

ethics tenets requiring personal integrity, professionalism and the

safeguarding of confidential information. Thompson Depo Ex 9, C 04-

3135 #35 Att #1 Ex B. 

\\

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Most of the August 4 letter expressed displeasure with

Mitchell’s conduct as a voluntary participant in the recruitment

panel for the deputy court clerk position. It focused on (1)

Mitchell’s alleged failure to disclose critical facts about her

relationship with candidate Warren, who was the pastor of the church

at which she served on the board of trustees and had listed Mitchell

as a reference, (2) her alleged disclosure of confidential

information about the hiring process to the applicant ——

specifically, that the panel did not plan to hire him because it had

not received responses from his references, and (3) her failure to

comply with a direct order not to solicit specific information from

other supervisors about the candidates they had chosen. Id. The

letter concluded: “I believe that on several occasions as these

events unfolded, you failed to meet the expectations of a Court

Services Supervisor.” Id. The suspension was never carried out,

apparently due to the intervening investigation prompted by the

Faalau disclosures. Thompson Depo at 64:10-18, 65:3-7, C 04-3135

Doc #35 Att #1, Ex B).

Meanwhile, Superior Court hired Richard Curiale, a partner

with a San Francisco-based employment law firm, to investigate the

allegations of misconduct that had arisen in the Faalau hearing. 

Curiale interviewed nineteen witnesses over the five-week period

from August 27 to October 3, including long-term Superior Court

employees as well as recently-hired and former employees in

Mitchell’s and Tolentino’s department. The witness group also

included management representatives, human resources personnel and a

union representative. Curiale Depo 29:12-25, 30:18-25, 31:1-12 &

Exs 2 and 3 at 2, C 04-3135 #35 Att #1 Ex C. After completing his

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interviews, Curiale drafted detailed investigation reports

summarizing witness interviews and setting forth his findings

regarding the Mitchell’s and Tolentino’s performance as cosupervisors.

At some point before October 11 during the pendency of the

Curiale investigation, Mitchell was directed to work at home. E g,

Catalano Depo at 121, 107, 109 (C 04-3135 Doc # 41 Ex 2). 

Curiale’s report regarding Mitchell, dated November 3,

2003, ran to fourteen single-spaced pages and included numerous

direct quotations from the witness interviews. Curiale Depo Ex 3, C

04-3135 Doc #35 Att #1 Ex C. Specific and detailed, it amounted to

a scathing review of Mitchell’s performance in her position. The

report recited that Curiale had told Mitchell she did not have to

answer any question and was free to leave at any time, but that he

“stressed to Mitchell that it was important that she be truthful in

the interview [and] that being untruthful could result in her

termination.” Id at 4. The report related that Mitchell was

nonetheless untruthful in the interview: “[o]ne of the most

disturbing things I found in my interview with Mitchell was her

willingness to misrepresent the truth when we discussed any issue

which she found uncomfortable or threatening.” Id at 5. Such

issues were, according to the report, numerous. 

The Curiale report described finding a consensus that

Mitchell “managed by fear” by targeting employees who questioned

her, used demeaning language toward co-workers and subordinates and

attempted to undermine senior management and foster division by

strongly urging people to file union grievances and EEO complaints. 

Id at 3. The report also made particular note of Mitchell’s

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practice of sending employees out from the court to buy food and

asking them to spend time during the workday cooking, apparently to

provide her with foods that she desired. Two anonymous quotations

from interviewees are illustrative: 

Food is important to Yolanda. If she wants to eat

cake during the day, she has people bake a cake. 

During work time, she sends people to Costco or

Albertsons to get food. 

Food is an outlet for Yolanda. Some people spend

the whole morning cooking and shopping.

Id at 8. 

 The concluding paragraph summarized the report’s

findings: 

Mitchell has regularly and consistently engaged in

conduct which would reasonably be expected to

violate her obligation as a supervisor to create a

workplace environment which is conducive to

employees feeling free to bring to management’s

attention problems or concerns they have regarding

their treatment or which would reasonably cause

them to feel that they are being treated in less

than a professional matter and with little

courtesy, dignity and respect. In addition, she

has created an environment which engenders

fractionalism [sic] and mistrust and has

consistently abused her position as a supervisor by

having employees cook and/or leave the premises to

get food during working hours. Finally, * * *

Mitchell knowingly and consistently misrepresented

the truth to me in this investigation [although]

she was clearly advised on the potential

consequences of doing so.

Id. 

Curiale’s report on Tolentino, dated November 4, 2003,

concluded that even though she and Mitchell were nominally peers,

Tolentino was “completely deferential” to Mitchell, would “never

disagree with Mitchell or challenge her in any way” and, moreover,

conveyed all information received from subordinates directly to

Mitchell. Curiale Depo Ex 2, C 04-3301 Doc #32 Att #1 Ex C. Thus,

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an employee who approached Tolentino about unwanted attention from a

co-worker “in confidence,” stating that she was not comfortable

telling Mitchell, soon found herself angrily confronted by Mitchell. 

Id at 3. The seven-page report concluded that Tolentino “has

regularly and consistently engaged in conduct which would reasonably

be expected to violate her obligation as a supervisor to create a

work environment wherein employees feel free to raise issues and

concerns” and that she “ratified” Mitchell’s “indefensible

behavior.” Id at 6-7. Curiale also found that Tolentino’s

unqualified endorsement of an abusive lower-level manager that the

interviewees had unanimously condemned established “just how

divorced [she] is from the reality that is her department.” Id.

After receiving Curiale’s reports, Catalano conducted

follow-up interviews with certain of the witnesses as part of

Superior Court’s internal investigation into Faalau’s allegations. 

Catalano Depo 115:18-22, 116:4-20, C 04-3135 #35 Att #1 Ex D. 

On December 19, a letter was hand-delivered to Tolentino

from Catalano directing her to work at home “pending the outcome of

the disciplinary action proposed against you.” Tolentino Decl Ex

26, C 04-3301 Doc #38. It directed her to remain at her home during

work hours and “not to appear at or call the Court and not to access

the computer system while on this temporary assignment without

receiving advance permission from [Catalano].” A second letter by

Catalano of the same date was also hand-delivered to Tolentino. 

That letter, which ran to over six single-spaced pages, began:

“Please take notice that it is the intent of this office to dismiss

you from your position of Court Services Supervisor effective

January 9, 2004.” Tolentino Decl Ex 27, C 04-3301 Doc #38. 

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The court assumes that Superior Court delivered a similar

notice-of-intent-to-terminate letter to Mitchell on the same date,

although it appears that neither party included this letter in the

record.

On January 27, 2004, Mitchell and Tolentino, together with

their union representatives, met with a hearing officer and

responded to the charges set forth in the notice-of-termination

letters. Mitchell Depo Ex 17 (C 04-3135 Doc #35 Att 1 Ex A);

Tolentino Depo Ex 17 (C 04-3301 Doc #32 Att 1 Ex A). 

On February 19,2004, Thompson issued separate termination

letters to Mitchell and Tolentino. Thompson Depo 69:5-22, 70:1-4 &

Ex A, C 04-3135 #35 Att #1 Ex B, Mitchell Depo Ex 17, C 04-3135 #35

Att #1 Ex A. In the letter to Mitchell, which ran to eleven singlespaced pages, Thompson recited the grounds for termination:

dishonesty; unacceptable performance; willful misconduct causing

damage to public property; disrespectful or discourteous conduct and

sexual harassment and/or discrimination toward a county officer or

official, another employee or a member of the public; and misuse of

position and violations of seven of the tenets of the code of ethics

for California court employees. Mitchell Depo Ex 17 at 1. 

Specific bases for termination set forth in the

termination letter to Mitchell included: regularly sending

employees to purchase food for meals or snacks and cooking and

preparing food on court time; being untruthful during the interview

with Curiale; undermining management; advising employees to go to

the union or file charges with EEOC so that “someone would get

fired”; making derogatory and untruthful comments about Catalano

such as that Catalano “hates us” and “is not very smart”;

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intentionally allowing work to pile up in order to create a backlog

to justify hiring more staff; encouraging Faalau’s spouse to go to

the union regarding Faalau’s adverse employment action, asserting

that “[w]e’re all backing her up” even though the proposed dismissal

was in fact based on Mitchell’s negative assessments of Faalau’s

performance; making inappropriate and insulting comments to and

about subordinate employees; making inappropriate and insulting

comments to a woman who was pregnant, thus providing grounds for a

formal complaint with EEOC or DFEH; sexually harassing and

discriminating against a subordinate by making jokes and

inappropriate comments regarding sexual orientation; neglecting her

duty as a supervisor by failing to respond appropriately to a

complaint from an employee regarding sexual harassment; misusing her

position and authority by requesting that staff bring her gifts and

food; intimidating and “targeting” employees who questioned her, her

co-supervisor or her deputies; failing to supervise adequately two

of the deputies under her supervision by failing to address

performance deficiencies and/or workplace misconduct; giving

fundamentally inaccurate information about Faalau to court

management, prompting management to initiate termination

proceedings; being insubordinate and disrespectful toward her

manager, Irasema Carranza, and toward human resources personnel who

attempted to contact her about leaves of absence. Id.

Interlineated with the specific accusations were summaries

of Mitchell’s responses to the charges at her Skelly hearing and

Thompson’s comments on those responses, highlighting factual issues

about which Mitchell had changed her story between speaking to

Curiale and addressing the hearing officer and/or offered

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explanations that were irrelevant or incomplete. The letter did not

find that Mitchell had satisfactorily addressed any of the nineteen

specific allegations that were presented as bases for her proposed

termination. In conclusion, the letter noted Mitchell’s nearly

twenty years of experience with Superior Court stressing that she

had received considerable training and coaching and understood the

expectations of a supervisor. It stated:

I find your actions to be egregious, extremely

serious and injurious to the Court and the

employees under your supervision. This is not a

case of an act of minor misconduct. Nor is it a

case of an isolated incident of misconduct. 

Rather, employees reported an ongoing pattern of

repeated harassment, intimidation and other

behaviors that had a severe impact on their

morale and ability to perform successfully. * * *

Staff consistently described an atmosphere of

supervisor against employee where you and your

co-supervisor “ganged up on” employees.

Id at 11. The letter also quoted Mitchell’s response to the hearing

officer when asked what she would do differently if she went back:

“Nothing, I thought things were fine,” which Thompson stated “shows

that you are completely out of touch with what is appropriate

conduct and performance.” Id. The letter notified Mitchell that

she was dismissed from her position effective February 20, 2004. 

The letter to Tolentino, also dated February 19, 2004, ran

to nine single-spaced pages. Tolentino Depo Ex 15, C 04-3301 Doc

#32 Att #1 Ex A. It gave as grounds for termination: dishonesty;

unacceptable performance; willful misconduct causing damage to

public property or waste of public supplies or time; disrespectful

or discourteous conduct toward a county officer or official, another

employee or a member of the public; and violations of three tenets

of the code of ethics for California court employees —— those

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concerning impartial and evenhanded treatment of all persons,

personal integrity and treating others with respect and courtesy. 

Id at 1. The letter expanded on the Catalano letter by discussing

and addressing relevant information obtained at Tolentino’s Skelly

hearing. As with the letter to Mitchell, Thompson’s letter

highlighted inconsistent statements Tolentino had made to Curiale,

Catalano and/or the hearing officer at the Skelly hearing. For

example, regarding Tolentino’s responses to the allegation that she

had condoned employees’ shopping for food and cooking during

business hours, Thompson wrote that Tolentino had told the hearing

officer that she did not know that the employees used court time for

this purpose because she allowed them to combine breaks and did not

keep track of their time, then added: 

This statement is contrary to what you told the

investigator which was that you knew the employees

went on Court time and that you knew it was wrong.

Your statement to the Hearing Officer constitutes

further dishonesty. * * *

Id at 2. The concluding section of the letter drew particular

attention to Tolentino’s statements that she did not understand what

she had done wrong and that she viewed the office “to be one big

happy family” and that she seemed unaware that Mitchell had done

anything inappropriate. Id at 8. The letter notified Tolentino

that she was dismissed from her position effective February 20,

2004.

On August 4, 2004, Mitchell filed her complaint initiating

this action. On August 13, 2004, Tolentino followed suit. Superior

Court moves for summary judgment in its favor on all causes of

action in both cases.

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III

A

A principal purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and

dispose of factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp v Catrett,

477 US 317, 323–24 (1986). A party moving for summary judgment who

does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial (here,

Superior Court) has the initial burden of producing evidence

negating an essential element of the non-moving party’s claims or

showing that the non-moving party does not have enough evidence of

an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance Co v Fritz Cos, 210 F3d 1099,

1103 (9th Cir 2000). Where the party moving for summary judgment

would bear the burden of proof at trial (here, the plaintiffs), it

has the initial burden of producing evidence which would entitle it

to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. 

CAR Transportation Brokerage Co, Inc v Darden, 213 F3d 474, 480 (9th

Cir 2000). 

If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden,

the non-moving party has no obligation to produce anything and

summary judgment must be denied. If, on the other hand, the moving

party does satisfy its initial burden of production, then the

non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of

the adverse party's evidence, but instead must produce admissible

evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for

trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Insurance Co, 210 F3d at 1102. A

genuine issue of fact is one that could reasonably be resolved in

favor of either party. A dispute is “material” only if it could

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 affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. Anderson

v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 US 242, 248–49 (1986).

 

B 

Title VII prohibits covered employers from discriminating

against a protected individual based on race, color, religion, sex

or national origin. 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)-(d). In a Title VII case,

the plaintiff carries both the initial burden of establishing a

prima facie case and the ultimate burden of proving discrimination. 

St Mary’s Honor Center v Hicks, 509 US 502, 506-07 (1993). Under

the allocation of the burden of production and the order for the

presentation of proof established by the Supreme Court for

discriminatory-treatment cases, a plaintiff must first establish, by

a preponderance of the evidence, a “prima facie” case of

discrimination. Id. “The ultimate burden of persuading the trier

of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the

plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Texas

Department of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 253 (1981). 

If a plaintiff is unable to adduce direct evidence of

discriminatory motive, she may make out a prima facie case of

discrimination by establishing: (1) plaintiff was a member of a

protected class; (2) plaintiff was competently performing in the

position held —— that is, satisfying the employer’s legitimate

expectations; (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action

(refusal to hire or promote, demotion, discharge, etc); and (4) the

adverse action occurred under circumstances suggesting a

discriminatory motive, such as that employees outside the protected

class received better treatment. M Chin, D Cathcart, A Exelrod & R

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Wiseman, California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation ¶ 7:392

(The Rutter Group 2005). An employee’s subjective personal

judgments of her competence alone do not raise a genuine issue of

material fact. Schuler v Chronicle Broadcasting Co, Inc, 793 F2d

1010, 1011 (9th Cir 1986). The burden of establishing a prima facie

case is “minimal,” requiring only that the evidence give rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination. Chin, et al, Employment

Litigation ¶ 7:393. 

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the

burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a

non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment decision. Id; 

St Mary’s Honor Center, 509 US at 509. This burden, like the prima

facie case, is not onerous. Chin et al, Employment Litigation ¶

7:416. The determination that the employer has met its burden of

production (and thus rebutted any presumption of discrimination)

involves no credibility assessment. Id. Because the ultimate issue

is whether the employer had a discriminatory motive, the employer’s

reasons, if nondiscriminatory on their face, may preclude a finding

of discrimination even if they are “foolish or trivial or even

baseless.” Villiarimo v Aloha Island Air, Inc, 281 F3d 1054, 1063

(9th Cir 2002).

The employer’s proof of legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its action dispels the inference of discrimination

raised by plaintiff’s prima facie case, leaving plaintiff with the

ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant

intentionally discriminated against her. Plaintiff may do so by

proving that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were

false, creating an inference that those reasons were merely a

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pretext and that the true reason for the adverse action was

intentional discrimination. Reeves v Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc, 530 US 133, 142 (2000). 

On a summary judgment motion by the employer, plaintiff

must create a genuine issue of material fact by adducing (1)

evidence that the nondiscriminatory reasons given by the employer

are factually untrue; and (2) evidence in support of the prima facie

case. Reeves, 530 US at 148. A plaintiff may either meet the

burden to show pretext using either direct or circumstantial

evidence. Direct evidence typically consists of clearly sexist,

racist or similarly discriminatory statements or actions by the

employer. Godwin v Hunt Wesson, Inc, 150 F3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir

1998)(supervisor stated he “did not want to deal with a female”). 

Circumstantial evidence is that which requires an additional

inferential step to demonstrate discrimination and may take one of

two forms: (1) it can make an affirmative case of employer bias,

such as through statistical evidence pointing to bias; or (2)

establishing that the proffered explanation for the adverse action

is unworthy of credence. Coghlan v American Seafoods Co, LLC, 413

F3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir 2005). As the Ninth Circuit explained in

Coghlan, 

The distinction between direct and

circumstantial evidence is crucial, because it

controls the amount of evidence that the

plaintiff must present in order to defeat the

employer’s motion for summary judgment. * * *

[W]hen the plaintiff relies on circumstantial

evidence, that evidence must be “specific and

substantial” to defeat the employer’s motion

for summary judgment.

Id. 

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Defendant Superior Court seeks to invoke the “same-actor”

doctrine, which provides that “where the same actor is responsible

for both hiring and firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both

actions occur within a short period of time, a strong inference

arises that there was no discriminatory action” and summary judgment

is appropriate for the employer on this ground alone. Bradley v

Harcourt Brace & Co, 104 F3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir 1996). More

specifically, the same-actor doctrine acknowledges that “an

individual who is willing to hire and promote a person of a certain

class is unlikely to fire them [sic] simply because they [sic] are a

member of that class.” Id at 271, quoting Buhrmaster v Overnite

Transportation Co, 61 F3d 461, 464 (6th Cir 1995). The Ninth

Circuit has since suggested that the same-actor inference need not

be limited to cases in which the favorable and the adverse

employment actions took place “within a short period of time” per

Bradley, finding, for example, a three-year lapse of time no bar to

application of the inference. Coghlan, 413 F3d at 1097.

B

To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under

Title VII, plaintiff must establish that (1) she engaged in a

protected activity; (2) the employer subjected plaintiff to an

adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the

protected activity and the employer’s action. Passantino v Johnson

& Johnson Consumer Products, Inc, 212 F3d 493, 506 (9th Cir 2000). 

If a prima facie case has been established, the employer must

articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the action

taken. Stegall v Citadel Broadcasting Co, 350 F3d 1061, 1066 (9th

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Cir 2003). Next, plaintiff must prove the employer’s reason is a

pretext. Id. 

Although neither Mitchell nor Tolentino cites 42 USC

2000e-3(a) or otherwise clearly articulate the legal basis for their

retaliation claim, it appears that they seek to establish that their

firings were because they “opposed [a] practice made an unlawful

employment practice made unlawful by [Title VII],” or “made a

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 USC §

2000e-3(a). They appear to be arguing that their complaints and/or

comments to Catalano and others about the hiring process that

resulted in candidates other than Reverend Warren being selected

amounted to such “opposition.” A “causal link” may be established

by an inference from circumstantial evidence such as the employer’s

knowledge that the employee engaged in protected activity and a

proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly

retaliatory employment decision. See, e g, Jordan v Clark, 847 F2d

1368, 1376 (9th Cir 1988). Such proximity must, however, be “very

close.” Clark County School District v Breeden, 532 US 268, 273

(2001). 

C

In order to establish a claim for defamation, a plaintiff

must prove the following essential elements: (1) false nonprivileged publication of a statement of fact that exposes plaintiff

to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be

shunned or avoided or has a tendency to injure him in his occupation

or charges plaintiff with a crime, loathsome disease, impotence or

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want of chastity or tends directly to injure him in his occupation;

(2) actual damage to plaintiff’s reputation; and (3) causation. Cal

Civil Code §§ 44-46; see Gregory v McDonnell Douglas Corp, 17 Cal 3d

596, 600 (1976). 

Communications made in the personnel management context

are generally privileged under California Civil Code § 47(c), which

provides in relevant part that a privileged publication is one made: 

(c) In a communication, without malice, to a

person interested therein, (1) by one who is also

interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a

relation to the person interested as to afford a

reasonable ground for supposing the motive for

the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is

requested by the person interested to give the

information. 

See Kacludis v GTE Sprint Communications Corp, 806 F Supp 866, 872

(N D Cal 1992)(Conti, J)(internal communications about an employee’s

performance presumed to be privileged under § 47(c) absent pleading

of specific facts to defeat the privilege).

D

As for plaintiffs’ claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, they must allege: (1) “extreme and outrageous

conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless

disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress;” (2)

that plaintiff[s] suffered “severe or extreme” emotional distress;

and (3) causation. Christensen v Superior Court, 54 Cal 3d 868,

903 (1991). In order to be “outrageous,” conduct “must be so

extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a

civilized community.” Id. Further, “[i]t is not enough that the

conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed

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at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom

the defendant is aware.” Id. “The only exception to this rule is

that recognized when the defendant is aware, but acts with reckless

disregard, of the plaintiff and the probability that his or her

conduct will cause severe emotional distress to that plaintiff.” Id.

“Where reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s interests is the theory

of recovery, the presence of the plaintiff at the time the

outrageous conduct occurs * * * justifies recovery * * *.” Id at

906.

From this point on, the motions in the Mitchell and

Tolentino cases will be addressed separately. 

IV

A

Mitchell claims both race and national origin

discrimination. Since she testified at deposition that she was born

in the United States, her national-origin theory is essentially

identical to her race theory. Mitchell Depo, C-04-3135 Doc # 35-1

Ex A at 241-42. While Mitchell has satisfied prongs one and three

of the prima facie case, she has not met the second and fourth

prongs. The record contains abundant evidence that her performance

as supervisor was not satisfactory. The Thompson deposition makes

clear that concerns about the management of Mitchell’s department

predated the events that led Thompson to hire Curiale to

investigate. The Curiale investigation confirmed previous reports

that employees in the department were not being treated well and the

department was mismanaged. As regards the fourth prong, Mitchell

has failed to adduce evidence suggesting that the adverse action

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against her was motivated by discriminatory intent. She admitted at

deposition that no one ever made racially discriminatory remarks to

her and she has failed to introduce, as she must in response to

Superior Court’s summary judgment motion, admissible circumstantial

evidence of discriminatory motive. 

Had Mitchell been able to establish a prima facie case of

race discrimination, however, she would nonetheless be unable to

overcome Superior Court’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

firing her. This Title VII case stands out because the employer is

able to adduce in support of its summary judgment motion a body of

extraordinarily persuasive, detailed evidence that the adverse

action against the employee was justified and that discrimination

was not the employer’s motive. Mitchell contends that the Curiale

report is a pretext for her termination by, in essence, nit-picking

the details of the report by faulting Curiale for failing to

interview some employees and stating that it contained “numerous

blatant errors.” Mitchell memo at 21, C 04-3135 Doc #40 at 21. She

submits excerpts of the depositions of three employees who served in

the department with Mitchell and who met with Curiale: Patricia

Courtney, Laura Gonzales and Laura Cuellar. The page reflecting

appearances at Cuellar’s deposition reflects that Mitchell was

present; the other two excerpts do not include the “appearances”

page. Without including any citations to these lengthy excerpts,

Mitchell’s brief contains a rambling series of defensive statements,

of which the following are illustrative: 

Curiale identifies statements from Cuellar and

Courtney, among others, attempting to represent

that they thought Mitchell was abusive. Both

* * * clearly deny ever making such statements

to Curiale and confirm that they expressly told

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him that she was not mistreating them. * * * 

The employees also confirm that Mitchell never

required them to get food; instead, the

employees planned that on their own as part of

their birthday club. Further, according to the

employees, this is still a practice at the

Court. Employees even hold bridal showers at

the Court, which Mitchell had nothing to do

with. The employees also reference the fact

that all the the employees will make use of the

kitchen on their own and cook their meals. 

Mitchell has nothing to do with that and

certainly wasn’t responsible for the decision to

place a kitchen in the department.

Id. 

Mitchell’s quibbles do not amount to “specific and

substantial” evidence sufficient to defeat Superior Court’s motion

for summary judgment. Curiale’s report largely consisted of

lengthy, unattributed quotations from the numerous employees he

interviewed; these could not be refuted by the three deponents

Mitchell offers in opposition. Furthermore, factual errors in the

Curiale report, if any, do not equate to evidence of pretext. 

Finally, the depositions offered do not support Mitchell’s position. 

Among the testimony of Laura Cuellar included in the record are

statements that, for example, characterized the court department

when Mitchell was there as “horrible * * * a bad working environment

* * * I started applying for jobs, and I also asked to be removed

from the department. I didn’t care where they put me. I just

couldn’t stand it anymore.” C 04-3135, Doc #41 Ex 8 at 52-58. 

A document submitted by Tolentino in opposition to

Superior Court’s motion against her further undermines Mitchell’s

contention that the reasons given for terminating her were

pretextual: a memorandum written by John A Wee, former Court

Services Supervisor for the Northern Branch, dated October 10, 1995. 

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C 04-3301 Doc #37 Ex 1. Addressed to then-Deputy Court Executive

Officer John Fitton, the memorandum, written a few months after

Wee’s transfer to the Northern Branch purported to contain “an

overview of the personnel issues at the Northern Branch.” Wee next

set forth a list of issues he was informed of even before

transferring to the Northern Branch. The list, which included low

morale, infighting, communication problems and conflicts between

groups, only included one entry that named a specific individual. 

That individual was Mitchell: 

Personnel problems existed between staff in

the Criminal division and Criminal Supervisor

(One in particular Yolanda Mitchell). 

Id at 1. The memorandum ran to four and one-half single-spaced

pages and touched on a broad array of issues, but nearly two full

pages were devoted to Wee’s efforts over a period of months to

resolve a conflict between Mitchell and Imelda Arbizu, Criminal

Division Lead Municipal Court Clerk. Id at 3-5. Wee’s detailed

analysis of the situation supported Mitchell over Arbizu, but

concluded as follows: 

Yolanda who historically has been known to be a

trouble maker because she is outspoken, direct

and aggressive in her manners, has been pictured

as the instigator of negativity and ill will.

* * * Yolanda has relied so heavily on her

survival instincts that, she portrays herself as

a wounded beast fighting for her own existence

in the environment. The Northern branch has a

lot of wounds that need to heal and a lot of

people that need to feel like they belong.

Id at 5. Although Wee’s memorandum was sympathetic to Mitchell, it

clearly documents that Mitchell had a history of interpersonal

problems in the workplace that were known to Superior Court’s

management years before the events at issue in the instant actions. 

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It therefore buttresses Superior Court’s case that Mitchell was

terminated as part of Superior Court’s effort to deal with

management problems in the Northern Branch and not because of

Mitchell’s race and/or national origin. 

Superior Court wishes to invoke the “same actor” inference

based on Peggy Thompson’s declaration that she knew Mitchell was

African-American and nonetheless, in her capacity as Court Executive

Officer, gave “final approval” to Mitchell’s promotion to supervisor

in 1990. 04-3135 Doc #35, Att #6. Mitchell counters that she was

interviewed by her manager, Dalia Salizar, who “recommended Mitchell

for the position.” 04-3135 Doc #40 at 23:9-10. This statement is

not inconsistent with Thompson’s and therefore does not effectively

refute it; Thompson’s approval presumably was required for Salizar’s

recommendation to be carried out and Mitchell has not even attempted

to establish otherwise. 

The court’s hesitation in invoking the same-actor

inference lies in the fact that, as currently articulated by the

Ninth Circuit, too much time elapsed between the 1990 promotion and

the 2003 termination. In Bradley v Harcourt, Brace & Co, the

inference was held to arise in a case in which the same actor was

responsible for both a favorable and an adverse action involving the

same employee “within a short period of time.” 104 F3d at 270-71. 

More recently, the Ninth Circuit examined the “short period of time”

requirement and held that the inference could arise after a threeyear lapse of time, noting that the “length of time would be

significant only had [plaintiff] proffered evidence suggesting that

[the employer] developed a bias against non-Norwegians during that

period; but he did not.” Coghlan, 413 F3d at 1097. The Coghlan

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opinion included citations to cases in other circuits applying the

inference in cases involving one and three-year lapses of time. 

Here the court is asked to extend the inference to a thirteen-year

lapse of time. 

While the court agrees with the Coghlan opinion’s logic

that evidence that a particular actor has developed a bias during

the interval should be regarded as more relevant than the length of

that interval in defeating the same-actor inference, this court is

not prepared to rest its decision on a legal theory that the Ninth

Circuit has not endorsed for these facts —— that is, a lapse of

thirteen years between favorable and adverse employment actions

involving Mitchell. 

The same-actor inference might be logically helpful, but

is not necessary for Superior Court to prevail on the discrimination

claim on summary judgment. As the court has already noted, Mitchell

has neither established a prima facie case nor introduced “specific

and substantial” evidence that Superior Court’s stated reason for

terminating her is pretextual. Superior Court is therefore entitled

to summary judgment on Mitchell’s Title VII discrimination claim. 

B 

Mitchell’s complaint sets forth two separate retaliation

theories, described in the heading as “RETALIATION UNDER TITLE VII

(and for Union Activities).” Regarding the Title VII claim,

Mitchell’s complaint asserts that she 

engaged in protected activities by challenging

discriminatory hiring practices of defendant by

the Superior Court [sic]. As a result of

protected activities, San Mateo the County

Superior Court [sic] retaliated by fabricating

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charges that would and did support termination. 

But for protecting Warren’s rights and

challenging discriminatory hiring practices,

plaintiff would not have been terminated. * * *

Plaintiff has been subject to unlawful

retaliation * * * because of her complaints and

because she advocated for fair treatment of

African Americans and other minorities. 

Complaint ¶¶ 21-24. 

Regarding the union-activity theory, she alleges that her

termination was “in part retaliation for participating in union

activities in violation activities [sic] of Labor Code §§ 922-23

* * *.” Complaint ¶ 25. Superior Court is entitled to summary

judgment on both claims. 

1

Superior Court argues that, lacking direct evidence of

retaliatory motive, Mitchell must rely on circumstantial evidence to

establish her prima facie case of retaliation in violation of Title

VII. Superior Court argues, however, that Mitchell cannot establish

the causation prong of her prima facie case because there was “a

nine-month lapse,” that is, too little temporal proximity between

Mitchell’s May 2003 complaints about the hiring process and her

February 2004 termination to support an inference of retaliatory

motive. The court finds this reasoning less than fully convincing.

The events that Mitchell contends resulted in retaliatory

adverse employment action against her by Superior Court took place

in May of 2003. Mitchell argues that “she was immediately subjected

to the intent to dismiss —— a suspension in her personnel file —— 

following her complaints of the recruitment of Marvin Warren [sic],

and that suspension (as a past disciplinary action) was directly

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cited as a basis for the termination.” C 04-3135 Doc #40 at 24. 

Moreover, she adds, 

only two months later, in August, 2003, she is

summarily suspended from work; she is

indefinitely sent home, without assignments, and

without even being apprised of the basis of

charges against her, pending the investigation.

The investigation, along with Thompson and

Catalano’s own personal assessments of Mitchell,

lead [sic] directly to her termination. The

evidence clearly shows a direct link of adverse

acts that followed her reports of discrimination

and that led, in fact, to her termination.

Id. 

Contrary to Mitchell’s assertion, there is no evidence in

the record that Mitchell was immediately subjected to any form of

discipline. Rather, there is evidence that Superior Court

investigated Mitchell’s conduct with considerable care before taking

disciplinary action against her. Moreover, the disciplinary action

selected was a ten-day suspension on paper —— that is, an entry in

Mitchell’s personnel records —— that was not intended to result in a

loss of pay or work responsibilities and was, in any event, not

carried out. The notice of intent to suspend was not mailed until

August 4, 2003, more than two months after Mitchell complained to

management about the recruitment process. Thompson Depo Ex 9, C 04-

3135 Doc #35 Att #1 Ex B. Mitchell admits, furthermore, that

“Thompson assigned Schino to investigate * * * Mitchell’s

‘performance issues related to recruitment.’ * * * Notably, * * *

Mitchell’s complaints about the improprieties in the recruitment was

[sic] not the subject of the investigation, but rather ‘[Mitchell’s]

breaking confidentiality of the recruitment process.’” C 04-3135 Doc

#40 at 5:20-24. The record thus establishes that the adverse action

taken against Mitchell stemming from the recruitment process took

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place months after Mitchell’s complaints and did not concern those

complaints. 

Another flaw in Mitchell’s prima facie case of retaliation

is that the documentary record before the court establishes that

Mitchell’s primary complaint with the recruitment process initially

was her sense of being excluded and/or her frustration that the

candidate she favored had not fared well in the process; only later,

when she filed her DFEH charge, did she allege (1) that she had

complained that an applicant had not been hired because of race

discrimination and (2) that she herself had suffered race

discrimination in connection with the matter. Mitchell Decl ¶ 5 and

Ex C, C 04-3135 Doc #42. The other evidence before the court does

not support these statements; moreover, the DFEH charge and other

self-serving, retrospective statements by Mitchell purporting to

establish a basis for a retaliation charge do not suffice to give

rise to an issue of material fact sufficient to defeat Superior

Court’s motion. 

 On the other hand, Superior Court’s argument that the

only discipline that matters for purposes of the retaliation

analysis was Mitchell’s firing in February 2004 is, in the court’s

view, overly technical. According to undisputed evidence in the

record, Mitchell was assigned to work at home at some point during

the Curiale investigation. The Schino investigation and ensuing

notice of intent to suspend overlapped these events to some degree

and cannot simply be ignored. 

The parties offer two contrasting theories. Mitchell

presents the sequence of events from her complaints in May 2003 to

her firing in February 2004 as links in an unbroken causal chain. 

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Superior Court presents the August 2003 disciplinary action against

Mitchell and her 2004 termination as entirely unrelated and the

work-at-home order to Mitchell in the fall of 2003 as irrelevant to

the legal issues on this motion. The burden, of course, remains on

Mitchell to present a prima facie case of retaliation. The prima

facie case is doubtful because: (1) the proffered circumstantial

evidence of causation is unconvincing due to lapses of time; (2)

Mitchell’s evidence that she “opposed” a prohibited hiring practice

(race and age discrimination) is unconvincing because the evidence

suggests that these theories were not central to her complaints

about the recruitment process in which Warren was not hired and may

well have been an afterthought; and (3) the intervening events of

the Faalau hearing and management’s response to Faalau’s allegations

against Mitchell interrupted the chain of events and threw a monkey

wrench into Mitchell’s causal-chain theory.

It is not necessary, however, for Superior Court to poke

holes in Mitchell’s prima facie case in order to prevail on summary

judgment; Superior Court has presented legitimate, non-retaliatory

reasons for both the August 2003 disciplinary action and the

February 2004 termination of Mitchell. Mitchell has failed to

adduce evidence, as she must to defeat Superior Court’s summary

judgment motion, that Superior Court’s reasons for the adverse

employment actions against her were pretextual. As stated in part

II, supra, the Curiale report contains an abundance of legitimate

reasons for terminating Mitchell’s employment, none of which have

anything to do with Mitchell’s complaints about alleged bias in the

recruitment process for deputy clerks. Mitchell has been unable to

offer any direct or circumstantial evidence that the conclusions of

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the Curiale report were a mere pretext for terminating her. 

Accordingly, her Title VII retaliation claim cannot withstand

Superior Court’s summary judgment motion. 

2

Superior Court contends that Mitchell’s complaint of

retaliation arising from union activities is subject to the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Employment Relations Board

(PERB) pursuant to Government Code section 71630 et seq, which

provides in pertinent part as follows: 

A complaint alleging any violation of this

article or of any rules and regulations adopted

by a trial court pursuant to Section 71636

shall be processed as an unfair labor practice

charge by the board. The initial determination

as to whether the charge of unfair practice is

justified and, if so, the appropriate remedy

necessary to effectuate the purposes of this

article, shall be a matter within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the board.

Cal Gov’t Code § 71639.1(c).

First, it appears that this claim, if viable, arises

solely under state law and would require the court to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction if Mitchell had a viable federal claim,

which she does not. 

Second, Mitchell has submitted no viable opposition to

Superior Court’s motion to dismiss this claim. She argues that

because she has brought suit under Title VII, the California

Government Code sections in question are “pre-empted,” citing the

Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 04-3135 Doc #40

at 24. Superior Court correctly counters that Mitchell’s claims of

retaliation based on union activity are not within the purview of

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Title VII, whose scope is specifically delineated in the statute and

is the subject of an extensive jurisprudence. 

The court agrees with Superior Court that Mitchell’s

retaliation claim based on union activity is not cognizable by this

court. 

C 

Mitchell’s response to Superior Court’s summary judgment

motion on her IIED claim fares no better. Citing no authority, she

asserts that “discrimination and retaliation constitute the

outrageous conduct element of the [IIED] claims.” Id at 25. 

Superior Court properly cites Janken v GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal

App 4th 55, 80 (1996), for the proposition that 

[m]anaging personnel is not outrageous conduct

beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather

conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity

of society. * * * If personnel management

decisions are improperly motivated, the remedy

is a suit against the employer for

discrimination.

No outrageous conduct is alleged in this case. Superior Court is

entitled to summary judgment as to the IIED cause of action. 

D

As for Mitchell’s defamation claim, Superior Court cites

Mitchell’s own admissions during her deposition that the allegedly

false statements on which she rests her claim (the February 19, 2004

letter of termination and the Curiale report) were not published to

anyone outside Superior Court. C 04-3135 Doc #35 at 19. Superior

Court further argues that these writings were privileged

communications within the meaning of Civil Code § 47(c). 

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When faced with cogent arguments and supporting evidence

in favor of summary judgment against her claim, Mitchell was

required to produce admissible evidence showing that there is a

genuine issue of material fact for trial. Nissan Fire & Marine

Insurance Co, 210 F3d at 1102. Mitchell, however, has not bothered

to offer any opposition to Superior Court’s motion on the defamation

claim whatsoever: her brief does not mention the claim. Superior

Court is therefore entitled to summary judgment. 

V

A

Tolentino’s complaint alleges that the true reason why

Superior Court terminated her employment was because of her national

origin, Filipino. Complaint ¶¶ 21-27. Tolentino, however, has

satisfied only prongs one and three of the prima facie case, but not

the second and fourth prongs. 

The record contains compelling evidence that Tolentino’s

performance as supervisor was not satisfactory. Tolentino counters

that she received many positive performance evaluations and

commendations over the course of her employment with Superior Court. 

C 04-3301 Doc #35 at 2:6-10, 13:20-26 and evidence cited therein. 

The Curiale investigation and report essentially revealed that

Tolentino was not functioning as an effective supervisor. Curiale

described Tolentino as “docile,” “more approachable” than Mitchell,

but “by acquiescence, * * * as responsible for the low morale and

employee turnover in the department as * * * Mitchell.” C 04-3301

#32 Att 1 Ex C Ex 2 at 3-4. Tolentino concedes that “employee

relations in the Northern Criminal Division had been problematic for

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many years,” but seems to contend that this fact —— which Superior

Court does not dispute —— somehow invalidated the Curiale

investigation and report as a basis for terminating her employment. 

E g, C 04-3301 Doc #35 at 1. Rather, the Curiale investigation

confirmed previous reports that, in 2003, employees in the

department were not being treated well and the department was

mismanaged. Tolentino has pointed out that the problems were longstanding and that she was not wholly responsible for them; she has

not, however, effectively disputed the conclusions of the Curiale

report. 

As regards the fourth prong, Tolentino has failed to

adduce evidence suggesting that the adverse action against her was

motivated by discriminatory intent. She has failed to introduce, as

she must in response to Superior Court’s summary judgment motion,

admissible direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory

motive on the part of Superior Court. 

The bulk of Tolentino’s opposition to Superior Court’s

motion on her discrimination claim (and almost one-third of the

entire brief) is devoted to a detailed critique of Catalano’s

December 19, 2003 notice-of-intent-to-terminate letter. Asserting

that “each of Defendant’s proffered reasons for terminating

Plaintiff is unworthy of credence,” id at 14, Tolentino’s brief

contains page after page of argument disputing the factual

statements contained in Catalano’s letter. At least some of these

arguments distort the evidence in the record to a degree that

approaches dishonesty. For example, Tolentino attempts to dispute

the Catalano letter’s assertion that she “[k]new that employees

regularly went to Costco or the grocery store on Court time to

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purchase food for meals or snacks and cooked and prepared food on

County time” and that she “signed timecards attesting that employees

were working during a time when they were in fact shopping or

cooking” by arguing that she did not instruct personnel to do such

shopping and that there was a “longstanding tradition of * * *

employees cooking and shopping during the workday.” Id at 15. Both

points are irrelevant to the point raised in the Catalano letter. 

Worse, she goes on to assert that “Court Executive Officer Peggy

Thompson admitted at deposition that she regularly sent employees

out to shop for Court functions on County time, even though such

tasks were not part of the employees’ job descriptions.” Id. This

misleading statement distorts the evidence: Thompson testified only

that employees were allowed to shop during their work time when

preparing for a court-sponsored employee appreciation picnic. C 04-

3301 Doc #36 Ex F at 127. The Curiale report’s findings focused on

shopping and cooking that was not for court-sponsored events and

contained direct admissions by Tolentino that she had allowed people

to shop for food on court time and that she knew this was wrong. C

04-3301 Doc # 32 Att 1 Ex C Ex 2 at 5.

Furthermore, as Superior Court correctly points out,

Tolentino’s lengthy critique of the Catalano letter largely misses

the mark because that letter was followed by a pre-termination

hearing in late January and was effectively superseded by the final

termination letter dated February 4, 2004 from Thompson, which

documented the matters Tolentino raised at that hearing. Tolentino

has not met her burden of adducing evidence that the nondiscriminatory reasons given by Superior Court are factually untrue.

See Reeves, 530 US at 148. 

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Finally, no amount of criticism and nit-picking of

Superior Court’s factual basis and/or process for terminating her

employment can alter the fact that Tolentino’s prima facie case is

deficient. Superior Court is entitled to summary judgment on

Tolentino’s discrimination claim. 

B

Tolentino’s retaliation claim rests on an allegation that

she “supported” Mitchell’s “protest of retaliatory hiring

practices.” Complaint ¶ 15, C 04-3301 Doc #1. Superior Court

contends that Tolentino has failed to make out a prima facie case

because she has adduced no evidence that she engaged in protected

activity as required by Title VII or that Superior Court knew of the

alleged activity, whether or not it could be deemed “protected.” 

Tolentino’s efforts to establish protected activity of

which Superior Court was aware are muddled and ultimately

ineffectual. Her complaint alleges that (1) she “supported cosupervisor [Mitchell’s] protest of discriminatory hiring practices,”

04-3301 Doc #1 ¶ 15, and (2) “but for her support of Mitchell’s

protest of discriminatory practices and Defendant’s refusal to hire

and African American male, she would not have been investigated and

subsequently terminated,” id ¶ 17. Yet at her deposition, when

asked whether she had ever complained to anyone about the fact that

Warren was not hired, Tolentino replied “no.” C 04-3301 Doc #41 Att

1 Ex A at 91:2-5. In her opposition, Tolentino points to deposition

testimony in which Carranza remembered Mitchell and Tolentino being

“pretty persistent that they wanted to hire [Warren],” Carranza Depo

at 70 (C 04-3301 Doc #36 Ex A), and that they complained in some

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fashion about the way the recruitment process was handled. C 04-

3301 Doc #35, evidence cited at 22:5. This kind of evidence,

however, does not establish protected activity. Tolentino does not

contend that she complained to Superior Court that race

discrimination had been a factor in the hiring process. The mere

fact that Warren was an African-American applicant does not give

rise to an inference that Mitchell’s and Tolentino’s disappointment

that he was not hired had anything to do with his race or race

discrimination. This evidence simply does not establish protected

activity under Title VII. 

Next, Tolentino contends that her conversations with the

various individuals who were conducting investigations during the

summer of 2003 —— Gail Schino, San Mateo County EEO Manager Mary

Kabakov and EEOC investigator Scott Doughtie —— were “protected

activity” for Title VII retaliation purposes, citing Yartzoff v

Thomas, 809 F2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir 1987). C 04-3301 Doc #35 at 22. 

Superior Court characterizes this contention as “an eleventh-hour

effort to demonstrate that [Tolentino] engaged in protected

activity,” C 04-3301 Doc #41 at 7:1. While Yartzoff does

characterize as protected activity “filing Title VII grievances

beginning in May 1979 and [] cooperating in investigations,” 809 F2d

at 1375-76, the factual context makes clear that the investigations

at issue concerned Yartzoff’s own complaints; moreover, the record

in that case contained evidence that “Yartzoff’s supervisors were

aware of his Title VII complaints and of his participation in

administrative investigations.” Id at 1376. Tolentino’s deposition

testimony demonstrates, moreover, that she was confused about the

various investigations, remembered little or nothing about her

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conversations with the investigators and did not know whether they

had related anything she said to them to Superior Court. C 04-3301

Doc #41 Att A, Ex A at 91, 208-10. In summary, Tolentino has

offered insufficient legal and factual support for the notion that

her alleged cooperation with investigators constituted protected

activity for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of

retaliation under Title VII. 

Superior Court is entitled to summary judgment on

Tolentino’s retaliation claim. 

C

Tolentino’s opposition does not mention her claim for

IIED, on which Superior Court has moved for summary judgment on the

same grounds as in the Mitchell case (see part IV.C supra). Given

that it is the non-moving party’s obligation under Rule 56(e) to

produce evidence of a genuine issue of material fact, this claim,

which plainly lacks merit on the evidentiary record before the

court, may therefore be deemed abandoned. 

D

Superior Court moves for summary judgment on Tolentino’s

defamation claim on the grounds that Superior Court’s communications

pertaining to Tolentino’s termination contained no false statements,

were privileged under California Civil Code § 47(c) and were not

published to anyone. Superior Court offers excerpts from

Tolentino’s deposition in which she is unable to offer any specifics

in support of her defamation claim. C 04-3301 Doc # 32 Att 1, Ex A

at 229-31. 

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In opposition to Superior Court’s motion, Tolentino

asserts that it is Superior Court’s burden to assert and to provide

evidentiary support for the privilege codified in Civil Code §

47(c). She also asserts that two alleged recipients of the noticeof-intent-to-terminate letter and the termination letter, Mary Welch

and Casey Echarte (both carbon-copy recipients of Catalano’s letter

to Tolentino) might not have been encompassed within the § 47(c)

privilege. 

In reply, Superior Court submits: (1) an excerpt of the

Catalano deposition identifying Casey Echarte as “the analyst in

Employee and Public Services and the Employee Relations Department

* * * at the courts,” C 04-3301 Doc # 41, Att 1 Ex C; (2) an excerpt

of the deposition of Nicole McKay more fully explaining the role of

Echerte and her office, the county Labor and Employee Relations

Division, in the Curiale investigation and report and the ensuing

personnel actions, id Ex D; and (3) an excerpt of the Thompson

deposition identifying Mary Welch as the director of Employee and

Public Services for the county. Id Ex B. Tolentino did not seek

leave to file a surreply or otherwise challenge the authenticity or

relevance of this evidence. It is therefore deemed established that

both of the individuals to whom Tolentino claimed Superior Court

“published” her personnel-related letters were county employees with

direct responsibility for Superior Court’s personnel management. 

These individuals and the communications in question fall squarely

within the scope of Civil Code § 47(c)’s privilege. Kakludis, 806 F

at 872 (N D Cal 1992). 

It is unnecessary to address any other issue relating to

Tolentino’s defamation claim, such as the truth or falsity of the

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challenged communications. Superior Court is entitled to summary

judgment on the ground of privilege alone. 

VI

Superior Court, like any other employer, public or

private, was entitled to take active steps to resolve the widelyacknowledged, serious management problems in one of its divisions by

means of personnel changes —— up to and including the termination of

ineffective managers. This is the story that the evidentiary record

on these motions tells about the job performance of Yolanda Mitchell

and Irma Tolentino. Superior Court’s evidence of legitimate

personnel management activity is extraordinarily strong. Neither

plaintiff has adduced evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination or retaliation and/or to avoid summary

judgment on each of her claims. Given that much of Superior Court’s

evidence was already in plaintiffs’ hands before these lawsuits were

filed and that the discovery process added little to support

plaintiffs’ view of these terminations, this may be an appropriate

case for an award of fees and/or costs under 42 USC § 2000e-5(k),

should Superior Court be inclined to make such a motion. See also

Christiansburg Garment Co v EEOC, 434 US 412 (1977). 

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The clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of

defendant Superior Court and against plaintiffs in both of these

consolidated matters and to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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