Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02440/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02440-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHERMAN MANNING and

PETER ANDRIST,

Plaintiffs, No. 2:12-cv-2440 GGH P

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiffs are proceeding through counsel with a civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. The lead plaintiff is a state prisoner and his co-plaintiff is his publisher, a citizen

of Switzerland. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 26, 2012, and paid the filing fee.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

1

Case 2:12-cv-02440-MCE-AC Document 9 Filed 10/16/12 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). 

“The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure 1216, pp. 235-235 (3d ed. 2004). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127

S.Ct. 1955). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id.

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct.

1843 (1969). 

This complaint is not a model of either clarity or coherence, and while the

allegations of this pro se complaint are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), no such deference

2

Case 2:12-cv-02440-MCE-AC Document 9 Filed 10/16/12 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

is due here. In the first place, on a most basic level, plaintiffs fail to enumerate in the case

caption all the defendants who are named in the body of the complaint. For example, while

defendants Bunnell, Sanders, Spearman and May are referenced in that portion of the complaint

wherein party defendants are identified, those names are not encompassed within the case

caption. Further, plaintiffs fail to include a number of the defendants named within the

allegations either in the case caption or in that section of the complaint purporting to identify the

party defendants, i.e., defendants Colby Comptom, Mrs. Culver, Goldsmith, Lieutenant Detwiler,

Sgt. Erin Walls. The complaint will be dismissed but plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend.

Moreover, plaintiffs also name the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) as a defendant. The Eleventh Amendment serves as a jurisdictional bar

to suits brought by private parties against a state or state agency unless the state or the agency

consents to such suit. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781

(1978)( per curiam); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1982). In the

instant case, the State of California has not consented to suit. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims 

against the CDCR are frivolous and must be dismissed. In any amended complaint, allegations

against this defendant should not be renewed.

As to defendants T. Virga and James Walker, these defendants are named only in

the context of their supervisory function. Complaint, p. 2. The Civil Rights Act under which

this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

3

Case 2:12-cv-02440-MCE-AC Document 9 Filed 10/16/12 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). Plaintiffs make no allegations with regard to defendants Virga and Walker that

purport to implicate them in any other than a supervisory capacity, and, in fact, reference their

conduct generally in a favorable light, i.e., “to his credit, it was warden Virga who ultimately

discovered and attempted to correct problems with the mailroom at CSP, Sacramento.” 

Complaint, p. 2; and see, id., at 3 (defendant Schroeder’s alleged attempt to transfer plaintiff

Manning “was disallowed by defendant J. Walker”); see also, id., at 11 (Warden Virga “took

steps...to help avoid continuing problems in the mailroom....”). Plaintiffs’ claims against

defendants Virga and Walker each in his individual capacity will be dismissed. Plaintiffs will

have leave to amend. 

The gravamen of this complaint, seeking both money damages and injunctive

relief for having allegedly engaged in various forms of misconduct to interfere with plaintiffs’

mail, appears to be claimed violations of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. However, in listing

the separate causes of action, while setting forth as a second claim for relief a violation by

defendants of plaintiffs’ free speech rights, plaintiffs do not make a separate claim for relief for

retaliation in violation of the First Amendment although they make general allegations of

retaliation throughout the complaint. In fact, other than the second claim for relief, the remaining

4

Case 2:12-cv-02440-MCE-AC Document 9 Filed 10/16/12 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

six claims come under the rubric of supplemental state law claims. Thus, even while alleging

that plaintiff Manning was transferred to Pleasant Valley State Prison for the very purpose of his

exposure to Valley Fever even though he was known to be asthmatic and did subsequently

contract Valley Fever and even while calling this an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment,

this claim is not designated as one brought under the Eighth Amendment but rather as “First

Claim for Relief - - Valley Fever allegations for intentional torts in personal injury and/or

negligence.” Complaint, p. 11. This complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend.

Finally, plaintiffs make a number of allegations within the body of the complaint

(although not set forth as a separate claim for relief) of conspiracy among various defendants. To

make colorable claims of conspiracy, plaintiffs must plead some acts showing of an agreement or

a meeting of the minds on the part of defendants to violate his constitutional rights. Woodrum v.

Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435

(9th Cir. 1983). Conspiracy allegations must be supported by material facts and not be merely

conclusory statements. Lockary v. Kayfetz, 587 F. Supp. 631 (N. D. Cal. 1984). See also Inage

Warehousing etc. v. Credit Suisse etc., 270 Fed. Appx. 670 (9 Cir. 2008). This complaint will th

be dismissed but plaintiff will have leave to amend. 

 If plaintiffs choose to amend the complaint, plaintiffs must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore,

vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

\\\\\

5

Case 2:12-cv-02440-MCE-AC Document 9 Filed 10/16/12 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

In addition, plaintiffs are informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiffs’ amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiffs file an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed for the

reasons discussed above, with leave to file an amended complaint within twenty-eight days from

the date of service of this order. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in a

recommendation that the action be dismissed.

DATED: October 16, 2012

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

mann2440.b

6

Case 2:12-cv-02440-MCE-AC Document 9 Filed 10/16/12 Page 6 of 6