Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00377/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00377-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARQUES PHILLIPS and CYNTHIA

PHILLIPS,

NO. CIV. S-04-0377 FCD PAN

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF FAIRFIELD, CHIEF OF

POLICE WILLIAM GRESHAM,

OFFICER MARK SCHRAER, OFFICER

CHAD TIGERT, OFFICER STEVE

TROJANOWSKI, JR., OFFICER MIKE

BEATTY, OFFICER MATTHEW

THOMAS, OFFICER STEPHEN RUIZ,

OFFICER TROY OVIATT, OFFICER

JEREMY NIPPER, OFFICER FRANCO

CESAR, OFFICER CADE BECKWITH,

and DOES 1 through 13,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs Marques

Phillips’ and Cynthia Phillips’ (collectively, “plaintiffs”)

motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedures and motion for relief from judgment pursuant 

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Neither plaintiffs nor defendants requested a

transcript of the jury trial in this case. As such, none has

been prepared or filed in this action. Therefore, the court does

not cite herein to the transcript, and the findings are based

upon the court’s recollection of the evidence and argument

presented at trial, as refreshed by its review of a rough draft

of the transcript provided by the court reporter.

2

to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the

reasons set forth below, plaintiffs’ motions are DENIED.

BACKGROUND1

This case arises out of the arrest of plaintiff Marques

Phillips on February 1, 2003. Plaintiffs contend that defendants

City of Fairfield and individual Fairfield police officers

arrested Marques Phillips without probable cause and used

excessive force in executing the arrest. This matter was

presented before a jury on October 31, 2006. Marques Phillips

asserted federal claims for violations of his Fourth Amendment

based upon defendants’ alleged false arrest, excessive force, and

unreasonable search and asserted state claims for false arrest,

assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Cynthia Phillips, Marques Phillips’ mother, asserted a

state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

based primarily on her proximity and observation of the arrest of

Marques Phillips. After a seven day jury trial, the jury

returned a verdict for defendants. 

Plaintiffs’ objections to the trial and jury verdict is

based upon alleged inconsistencies between sworn declarations

submitted by defendant Trojanowski and defendant Schraer in

support of their motion for summary judgment and the testimony

presented by defendants at trial. The declarations provide that

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Specifically, Ms. Colwell stated that defendant

Trojanowski would testify that Marques Phillips approached his

car, pointed at him, stared him in the eyes and then said very

loudly: “Five-o, five-o, motherfucking five-o.” 

3 Outside the presence of the jury, the court asked Ms.

Colwell about the content of the declarations. Ms. Colwell

stated that the declarations were crafted for defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, and thus all papers associated with the

motion took plaintiffs’ facts to be true for the purposes of the

(continued...)

3

defendant Trojanowski was “concerned that [plaintiff] would

identify [him] as a police officer to the rest of the individuals

present in the parking lot” where the officers were conducting a

buy/bust operation. (Am. Decl. of Officer Steven Trojanowski Jr.

(“Trojanowski Decl.”), filed Oct. 18, 2005, Docket # 118, ¶ 10);

(Am. Decl. of Sergeant Mark Schraer (“Schraer Decl.”), filed Oct.

18, 2005, Docket # 120, ¶ 10). During opening statement,

defendants’ attorney, Kimberly C. Colwell, stated that the

evidence would show that plaintiff Marques Phillips identified

defendant Trojanowksi by pointing at him and yelling “five-o.”2

Defendants Trojanowski and Schraer testified that plaintiff

Marques Phillips identified Trojanowski in this manner. 

Plaintiffs’ attorney, Mister Phillips, cross-examined

defendants about the statements made in their declarations, which

only addressed concerns about identification, and their testimony

that plaintiff Marques Phillips actually identified defendant

Trojanowski as a police officer. Subsequently, upon examination

by Ms. Colwell, defendants Schraer and Trojanowski testified that

Ms. Colwell wrote their sworn declarations in support of their

motion for summary judgment and that these declarations were

never meant to be the entire truth.3 Mister Phillips moved

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

(...continued)

motion only. Ms. Colwell explained that the declarations

included only those facts that plaintiffs alleged and that the

officers could testify to as true.

4

defendant Trojanowski and Schraer’s declarations into evidence,

published them to the jury, and used them extensively during his

closing argument to argue, among other things, that defendants

did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff Marques Phillips. 

Ms. Colwell moved into evidence portions of defendant Trojanowski

and Schraer’s police report, which provided that Marques Phillips

identified Trojanowski as a police officer, and used it in her

closing argument to argue that defendants had probable cause to

arrest plaintiff Marques Phillips. Plaintiff contend that this

police report was fabricated. Plaintiffs also contend that Ms.

Colwell improperly bolstered the credibility of defendants

Trojanowski and Schraer in her closing arguments to the jury.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion for a New Trial

Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that “[a] new trial may be granted to all or any parties an on

all or part of the issues . . . in an action in which there has

been a trial by jury . . . for any of the reasons for which

rehearings have heretofore been granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

(2007). A trial court may only grant a new trial if “the verdict

is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon

evidence which is false, or to prevent, in the sound discretion

of the trial judge, a miscarriage of justice.” Hansen v. Shell

Oil Co. 541 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting Moist Cold

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson, 249 F.2d 246, 256 (9th Cir.

1957); see Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products, 212

F.3d 493, 510 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“While the trial court may weigh the evidence and

credibility of the witnesses, the court is not justified in

granting a new trial ‘merely because it might have come to a

different result from that reached by the jury.’” Roy v.

Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 896 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1990)

(quoting Wilhelm v. Associated Container Transp. (Australia)

Ltd., 648 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1981). “[I]f the jury’s

verdict is not clearly against the weight of the evidence, the

trial court abuses its discretion in ordering a new trial.” Id.

However, “[i]f having given full respect to the jury’s findings,

the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” a new trial

should be granted. Landes Const. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of

Canada, 883 F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1987). 

When the motion is based upon the alleged misconduct of

parties, counsel, or witnesses, the Ninth Circuit has held that a

new trial is properly granted where a party can:

(1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

verdict was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation,

or other misconduct [and]

(2) establish that the conduct complained of prevented

the losing party from fully and fairly presenting his

case or defense.

Wharf v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 60 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir.

1995). 

Plaintiffs move for a new trial on grounds that (1) the

verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence; (2) the

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

verdict is based on false or perjurious evidence; (3) the verdict

is a miscarriage of justice; and (4) defendants’ attorney, Ms.

Colwell, engaged in misconduct which permeated the entire

proceeding.

1. Clear Weight of the Evidence

Plaintiffs argue that the jury verdict is against the clear

weight of the evidence. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that

defendant Trojanowski’s and defendant Schraer’s declarations are

“insurmountable evidence” that defendants did not have probable

cause to arrest Marques Phillips. After weighing the evidence

and assessing the credibility of the witnesses, the court

disagrees.

Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to California Health and

Safety Code Section 11532 and California Penal Code § 148. Any

alleged inconsistencies between defendant Trojanowski’s and

defendant Schraer’s declarations and their trial testimony

relates to the issue of whether defendants were merely concerned

that plaintiff would identify them and compromise the buy/bust

operation or whether plaintiff actually identified them in an

attempt to obstruct the operation. This “inconsistency” would

apply only to whether there was probable cause to arrest pursuant

to § 148, which provides that “[e]very person who willfully

resists, delays or obstructs any public officer” in the execution

of his duties shall be fined and or imprisoned. Cal. Pen. Code §

148. The thrust of plaintiffs’ argument is that the court should

only consider the declarations of defendant Trojanowski and

defendant Schraer, which addressed concerns about identification.

///// 

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 Plaintiffs also assert that the verdict is against the

clear weight of the evidence because Sergeant Grace, the officer

who conducted the internal affairs investigation of the incident,

testified at trial that defendant Trojanowski was not working

undercover. The court does not recollect hearing such testimony,

nor can it find any such testimony in the transcript. Rather,

(continued...)

7

At trial, both plaintiffs and defendants presented

substantial evidence regarding the issue of probable cause to

arrest under California Penal Code § 148. Defendants presented

evidence that plaintiff Marques Phillips identified Officer

Trojanowski during an undercover operation by yelling “five-o.” 

Defendants also presented evidence that Marques Phillips did not

get down on the ground immediately when ordered to do so, and

that he fought and struggled with defendant officers. Plaintiffs

presented evidence that Marques Phillips did not identify the

undercover officers and that the prior sworn declarations of

defendants Trojanowski and Schraer did not provide that an

identification was made. Plaintiffs also presented evidence that

Marques Phillips did not resist arrest. Vigorous crossexamination was performed by plaintiffs’ counsel, including

vehement probing of the veracity of defendants Trojanowski and

Schraer. The verdict hinged on the jury’s evaluation of the

credibility of plaintiffs’ witnesses and defendants’ witnesses. 

Apparently, the jury found defendants’ witnesses to be more

credible. After a review of the trial testimony, the court is

not left “with the definite and firm conviction” that the jury

made a mistake in making this determination. See Landes Const.

Co., Inc., 833 F.2d at 1372. Rather, the jury’s verdict is

supported by substantial evidence.4

 

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4(...continued)

plaintiffs’ counsel asked the witness about this issue, defense

counsel objected before an answer was given, and a side bar

conference was held. After discussion, the question was

abandoned, and no testimony was given on this issue. Therefore,

plaintiffs’ argument is without merit.

5 Plaintiffs assert that the court’s ruling on summary

judgment held that defendants did not have probable cause to

arrest plaintiff Marques Phillips under § 11532 as a matter of

law. This misstates the court’s ruling. The court found that,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, the evidence was insufficient to find probable cause

as a matter of law; therefore, defendants’ motion for summary

(continued...)

8

Further, defendants also asserted that they had probable

cause to arrest plaintiff Marques Phillips pursuant to § 11532 of

the California Health and Safety Code. Section 11532 sets forth

the guidelines for unlawful loitering in a public place with the

intent to engage in narcotics related activity. Specifically, §

11532(b)(10) provides that a factor “in determining whether a

person has the requisite intent to engage in drug-related

activity” is whether that person has engaged “in any other

behavior indicative of illegal drug-related activity” in the past

six months. Id. Defendants presented evidence that the parking

lot where plaintiff was arrested was known for high crime and

high levels of narcotics sales. Defendants also presented

evidence that Marques Phillips had been involved in drug related

activity within the prior 24 hours and that Officer Trojanowski

was aware of these incidents. The evidence at trial demonstrated

that Marques Phillips’ activity in the parking lot appeared to

defendant officers to violate § 11532. Therefore, evidence

presented by defendants at trial also demonstrated that the

officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff under § 11532.5

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5(...continued)

judgment was denied. The court found that there was a triable

issue regarding probable cause to arrest Marques Phillips under §

11532. The court did not grant summary judgment for plaintiffs

on this issue, nor could it, as plaintiffs did not file a motion

for summary judgment. 

6 Further, plaintiffs’ counsel vigorously challenged the

credibility of defendants Trojanowski and Schraer based upon the

significant omission in their prior sworn declarations. These

declarations were also admitted into evidence for consideration

by the jury. Despite plaintiffs’ counsel’s best efforts, the

jury apparently believed defendants’ testimony.

9

2. False or Perjurious Evidence/Miscarriage of Justice

Plaintiffs also argue that the verdict is based upon false

or perjurious evidence and is a miscarriage of justice because

plaintiffs contend that defendant Trojanowski’s and defendant

Schraer’s testimony is contrary to their prior sworn

declarations. Defendants’ prior declarations do not directly

contradict the testimony at trial. While the significant fact of

actual identification of Officer Trojanowski by Marques Phillips

was omitted from the declarations, nothing in the declarations

provided that such identification did not occur. Rather,

evidence was presented at trial that defendants tailored their

versions of the events at issue to include only those facts that

plaintiffs alleged and that the officers could testify to as

true, in an attempt to show that summary judgment could be

granted even if the court accepted plaintiffs’ version of the

facts. While the court does not comment on the propriety or

effectiveness of employing this litigation strategy, it does not

constitute falsification of evidence or perjury.6 Therefore, the

verdict was not based on false or perjured evidence and did not

constitute a miscarriage of justice. 

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

3. Misconduct

Plaintiffs asserts that they are entitled to a new trial

because Ms. Colwell committed misconduct which sufficiently

permeated the entire proceeding. Specifically, plaintiffs

contend that Ms. Colwell committed misconduct by referencing

plaintiff Marques Phillips’ identification of Officer Trojanowski

in her opening statement and eliciting testimony from witnesses

regarding the identification on direct examination. Plaintiffs

assert that this constitutes misconduct because testimony

relating to this identification is false or perjurious. As set

forth above, the court does not find such testimony to be false

or perjurious, and thus, Ms. Colwell’s conduct in referencing it

in opening statements and eliciting it on direct examination did

not constitute misconduct.

Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Colwell committed misconduct by

eliciting questions regarding the circumstances under which the

prior sworn declarations were prepared. Defendants Trojanowski

and Schraer testified that Ms. Colwell wrote their sworn

declarations, that their sworn declarations were never meant to

be the entire truth, and that their testimony at trial is the

entire truth. However, this testimony was elicited by Ms.

Colwell only after vigorous cross-examination by plaintiffs’

counsel about the significant omission in defendants’

declarations relating to the actual identification of Officer

Trojanowski by Marques Phillips. Plaintiffs’ counsel squarely

placed defendant Trojanowski’s and defendant Schraer’s

credibility at issue, and defendants’ counsel had a right to

rehabilitate the witnesses through an explanation of the

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

circumstances which gave rise to the declarations at issue. As

such, Ms. Colwell did not commit misconduct by questioning

defendants Trojanowski and Schraer about their prior sworn

declarations. 

Plaintiffs also contend that Ms. Colwell committed

misconduct by moving into evidence a “fabricated” police report. 

Plaintiffs only basis for asserting that this report is

“fabricated” is that it includes the officers’ account that

Marques Phillips actually identified Officer Trojanowski as a

police officer during an undercover operation, and thus,

allegedly contradicts the prior sworn declarations of defendants

Trojanowski and Schraer. As set forth above, the declarations do

not directly contradict evidence that Marques Phillips identified

Officer Trojanowski. Plaintiffs offer no evidence to support

their conclusory assertion that the police report was fabricated

by defendants. Therefore, Ms. Colwell did not commit misconduct

by moving the police report into evidence.

Further, plaintiffs assert that Ms. Colwell committed

misconduct by arguing to the jury during her closing arguments

that any inconsistencies between defendants’ declarations and

their trial testimony were her fault and that defendants should

not be held liable for her mistakes. Plaintiffs severely

mischaracterize Ms. Colwell’s closing statements. The only

statements that could remotely be identified as the basis for

plaintiffs’ accusations of misconduct were made at the beginning

of Ms. Colwell’s closing argument. In sum and substance, Ms.

Colwell apologized for anything that Ms. Colwell or her cocounsel, Jennifer Adams, did during the trial that distracted the

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

jury from the case or that the jury did not like. Ms. Colwell

asked that any such conduct by counsel during trial not be held

against her clients. Ms. Colwell asked the jury to weigh the

evidence based on what the testimony that they heard from

defendants on the stand and under oath because the jury is the

best judge of their character and how truthful they were being. 

Such statements do not constitute improper vouching or attorney

misconduct. Rather, these statements are similar to portions of

the Ninth Circuit’s Model Jury Instructions, including those

given to the jury in this case. Specifically, the jury was

instructed to follow the law and not be influenced by any

personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices, or sympathy. 

The jury was also instructed that arguments and statements by the

lawyers are not evidence. As such, Ms. Colwell did not commit

misconduct in the delivery of her closing arguments. 

Therefore, because plaintiffs have failed to point to any

misconduct by Ms. Colwell during the trial, plaintiffs have not

met their burden in demonstrating that they are entitled to a new

trial.

B. Motion for Relief from Judgment

Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part that: 

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve

a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the

following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect; . . . (3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or

other misconduct of an adverse party; . . . or (6) any other

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (2007). Relief under rule 60(b) is not a

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

matter of right and rests in the trial court’s sound discretion. 

Martella v. Marine Cooks and Stewards Union, 448 F.2d 729, 730

(9th Cir. 1971); Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Kingsbury, 175

F.2d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 1949). Such relief is an extraordinary

remedy and is granted only in exceptional circumstances. Hunter

v. Underwood, 362 F.3d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 2004); see Russell v.

Cunningham, 279 F.2d 797, 804 (9th Cir. 1960).

1. Surprise

Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to relief from

judgment because they were surprised by defendant Trojanowski and

Schraer’s testimony that plaintiff Marques Phillips actually

identified defendant Trojanowski during the undercover buy/bust

operation. Plaintiffs assert that defendants dropped this

“claim” at summary judgment and surprised plaintiff at trial by

reintroducing this theory of probable cause.

Plaintiffs fail to cite any relevant legal authority for

their argument that by not moving for summary judgment on this

basis, defendants waived their theory of probable cause based

upon actual identification by Marques Phillips. In essence,

plaintiffs’ position is that if a party fails to move for summary

judgment on a certain basis, that basis is waived, even if it is

clear that adjudication based upon that basis would require a

factual determination. Such a position is without merit and

would defeat the purposes of summary judgment.

In this case, defendants moved for summary judgment on

plaintiff Marques Phillips’ Fourth Amendment claim on the basis

that defendants had probable cause to arrest pursuant to § 11532

of the California Health and Safety Code. The defendants did not

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

rely upon actual identification of Officer Trojanowski by Marques

Phillips as probable cause to arrest pursuant to California Penal

Code § 148. As evidenced by the argument at trial, the parties

clearly disputed whether Marques Phillips actually identified

Officer Trojanowski. Therefore, this would not have been an

appropriate basis for summary judgment.

Further, notwithstanding that defendants never abandoned

this theory, plaintiffs should not have been surprised by defense

counsel’s opening statement and the testimony of defendants

Trojanowski and Schraer. The theory of probable cause based upon

actual identification was included in the internal affairs

investigation report. Plaintiffs’ expert was asked questions

about this theory in his deposition. Finally, this theory was

addressed in defendants’ trial brief, filed more than a week

before the start of trial. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not raise

this issue to the court at any of the pre-trial hearings,

including the hearing on the parties’ motions in limine held on

the first day of trial. Therefore, plaintiffs were not unfairly

surprised by the presentation of this theory at trial. 

2. Fraud, Misrepresentation, or Other Misconduct

Plaintiffs contend that they should be relieved from

judgment because defendants engaged in fraud, misrepresentation,

or other misconduct. When a party moves for relief from judgment

on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct,

the moving party must show, by clear and convincing evidence,

that the opponent engaged in such conduct and that the conduct

prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting his

or her case or defense. De Saracho v. Custom Food Machinery,

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 Plaintiffs cite Nguyen v. United States, 792 F.2d 1500,

1503 (9th Cir. 1986) in support of their preclusion argument. 

Nguyen is inapplicable. In Nguyen, the court addressed the

party’s motion for leave to amend to raise new issues after the

(continued...)

15

Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiffs claim that defendants Trojanowki and Schraer

engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct based upon

their allegedly perjurious testimony that Marques Phillips

actually identified Officer Trojanowski on the night of the

incident at issue. As set forth above, there is no evidence that

defendants committed perjury, fraud, or misconduct. Further, as

set forth above, plaintiffs’ counsel vigorously challenged the

credibility of defendants Trojanowski and Schraer based upon

their prior declarations. Therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled

to relief from judgment on this ground.

3. Res Judicata

Finally, plaintiffs claim that they should be relieved from

judgment because res judicata precludes all statements and

evidence that the defendants arrested Marques Phillips because he

actually identified Officer Trojanowski. Again, plaintiffs based

their arguments on a faulty understanding of summary judgment. 

There was no final judgment regarding plaintiffs’ Fourth

Amendment claims prior to the jury verdict in this matter. The

court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these

claims and plaintiffs did not file a motion for summary

judgments. As set forth above, plaintiffs fail to cite any case

law in support of their argument that defense theories may be

precluded if they are not raised on summary judgment.7

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7(...continued)

entry of summary judgment. Id. The court noted that the value

of summary judgment would be diminished if a party could amend

the issues to be decided in the same case after that party lost

on summary judgment. This is not an issue raised in this case. 

16

Therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to relief from judgment on

the basis of preclusion or res judicata. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, plaintiffs’ motion for a

new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedures and motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule

60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 8, 2007

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 334 Filed 03/08/07 Page 16 of 16