Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-04268/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-04268-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HASAN ARDA AKSU,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, et al.,

Defendants. 

No. C 12-04268 CRB

MITCHELL KATZ, No. C 11-05771 CRB

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

 v. STAY PROCEEDINGS

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, et al.,

Defendants.

Defendant Tanabe moves to stay proceedings pending his appeal of the Court’s denial

of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. See generally Mot. (dkt. 83) in Case no.

12-4268 CRB; Mot. (dkt. 138) in Case no. 11-5771 CRB. As a general rule, a party may not

appeal a denial of summary judgment. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 (9th Cir.

2009); see, e.g., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 

693–94 (9th Cir. 1992). However, the Supreme Court delineated a narrow exception to this 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit “resolve[s] all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff and look[s]

at the purely legal question of whether the defendant’s alleged conduct violated the plaintiff’s clearly

established constitutional rights.” Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802, 807–08 (9th Cir.

2003) (citations omitted). For the purpose of analyzing whether this appeal is frivolous, therefore, this

Court’s analysis resolves all factual disputes in favor of Plaintiffs Katz and Aksu. This Court has not

made any findings of facts for the purposes of trial. 

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rule where a district court denies a claim of qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 530 (1985). Typically, an appeal of a pretrial order denying qualified immunity

divests the district court of jurisdiction. See United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842 (9th

Cir. 1984). But a district court may retain jurisdiction and proceed to trial if the court finds

and certifies in writing that such an appeal is frivolous. See Padgett, 587 F.3d at 985; 

Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992); In re George, 322 F.3d 586, 591 (9th

Cir. 2003) (holding that an appeal is frivolous when “the results are obvious”). 

Government officials are only protected by qualified immunity when “‘their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.’” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

244 (2009) (“The principles of qualified immunity shield an officer from personal liability

when an officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law.”). A right

can be clearly established even if there is “no closely analogous case law” simply “on the

basis of ‘common sense.’” See Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Common sense dictates that a police officer’s paid participation in a private investigator’s

scheme to trick an individual into (1) drinking to excess and then (2) getting behind the

wheel of his car1

 is outrageous conduct in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Cnty.

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998) (“threshold question is whether the

behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said

to shock the contemporary conscience.”). 

No officer who agreed to participate in a scheme to target individuals in dirty DUI

stings in exchange for cash, cocaine, and a Glock handgun, see Gearinger Decl. Ex. A (dkt.

63-1) in Case no. 12-4268 CRB; (dkt. 116-2) at 8–9, 12, 16–17, 27–28, 49–52 in Case no.

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 Indeed, a jury has already found Tanabe guilty of extortion under color of official right for

obtaining a Glock handgun in exchange for the DUI arrests of these same Plaintiffs. See Gearinger

Decl. Ex. F (dkt. 63-2) in Case no. 12-4268 CRB; (dkt. 116-2) in Case no. 11-5771 CRB.

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11-5771 CRB, would reasonably believe that his conduct complied with the law.2 Certainly

Tanabe did not believe that it did: Deputy Howard testified that routine patrol “does not

involve sitting for an hour and a half to two hours awaiting for somebody.” See Gearinger

Decl. Ex. B (dkt. 63-1) in Case no. 12-4268 CRB; (dkt. 116-2) at 79–80 in Case no. 11-5771

CRB. Howard also explained that where an officer receives a tip from someone familiar, as

Tanabe did here, the officer routinely would call dispatch and ask to be dispatched to that

situation. See id. Tanabe did neither, instead laying in wait for at least an hour and

concealing his activities from dispatch. Id. at 67–68, 72. Any reasonable officer would

understand that Tanabe’s conduct was “repugnant to the American system of justice,” in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Shaw v. Winters, 796 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir.

1986). 

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public

officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials

from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Accepting Plaintiffs’ facts, it can hardly be

said here that Tanabe exercised his power responsibly. The results of this appeal are

obvious: Tanabe is not entitled to qualified immunity. See In re George, 322 F.3d at 591. 

Accordingly, this Court certifies Tanabe’s appeal as frivolous, retains dual jurisdiction, and

will proceed to trial. Tanabe’s motion to stay the proceedings is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2015 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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