Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00271/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00271-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Sergio Mendez, 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-12-0271-PHX-RCB (MHB)

 O R D E R 

 Plaintiff Sergio Mendez, who is a prisoner in the custody of the Arizona 

Department of Corrections (ADC) at the maximum-custody Browning Unit in Florence, 

Arizona, brought this civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various ADC 

employees regarding his classification as a Security Threat Group (STG) member. (Doc. 

1.) The remaining Defendants—Director Ryan; STG Committee members Freeland, 

Mendoza, McCarville; and Appeals Officer Herman—move for summary judgment, 

which Plaintiff opposes.1

 (Docs. 36, 39.) 

 The Court will grant the motion and terminate the action. 

I. Background 

 Plaintiff alleges that the conditions of his confinement in the STG unit are atypical 

and, therefore, they require due process for placement and that his due process rights 

were violated during his STG validation proceedings because his validation was based 

 

1

 The Court provided notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), regarding the requirements of a response. (Doc. 38.) 

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entirely on hearsay evidence lacking indicia of reliability. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Ryan establishes STG validation policy for ADC, that Freeland, Mendoza, and 

McCarville are responsible for validating him based on unreliable evidence, and that 

Herman denied his appeal of the validation. (Id.) 

II. Motion for Summary Judgment 

 A. Legal Standards 

 1. Summary Judgment 

 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 

(1986). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial 

responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the 

record, together with affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the 

burden then shifts to the opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a factual 

dispute and that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 250; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed 

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing 

versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 

253, 288-89 (1968). 

 When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits or declarations, if any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At summary judgment, the 

judge=s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine 

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whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of 

the non-movant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 

favor.” Id. at 255. But, if the evidence of the non-moving party is merely colorable or is 

not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 248-49. 

Conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). See

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (A[c]onclusory, 

speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine 

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment@). 

 2. Due Process and Maximum Custody 

 It is well-settled that placement in maximum security segregation units implicates 

a liberty interest requiring due process protections. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 

224 (2005). An inmate may be deprived of his liberty interest as long as he is accorded 

the proper procedural protections. For the initial decision to place an inmate in maximum 

custody, due process is generally satisfied by notice of the factual basis for the placement 

and an opportunity to be heard, as these procedural mechanisms serve to avoid the risk of 

erroneous deprivation. Id. at 224-26; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983), 

overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 

 The validation as an STG member must be supported by some evidence in the 

record. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Cato v. Rushen, 

824 F.2d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying the “some evidence” standard of 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).) In Hill, the Supreme Court stated that 

“the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support 

the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. When 

examining the record, the court is not to make its own assessment of the credibility of 

witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. at 455. But the evidence must have some indicia 

of reliability. Cato, 824 F.2d at 705 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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After an inmate is placed in maximum security segregation, he is entitled to “some 

sort” of periodic review of his status. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477, n. 9 (“administrative 

segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Prison 

officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such 

inmates”). To determine whether the annual reviews afforded an STG-validated inmate 

conform to due process requirements, the Court must consider the Mathews factors. 

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224-25 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 

 B. Background Facts2

 1. ADC Process 

Plaintiff is serving a life sentence for First Degree Murder, in addition to two 

sentences for Assist. Criminal Syndicate/Lead Gang. (DSOF ¶ 2.) 

 In 1991, ADC established an STG policy dedicated to controlling prison-gang 

activity in Arizona’s prisons. (Id. ¶ 4.) An STG is any organization, club, association or 

group of individuals, including traditional prison gangs, whose members engage in 

unlawful acts or acts that would violate ADC policies. (Id. ¶ 12.) The STG policy is to 

minimize the threat that inmate-gang or gang-like activity poses to the safe, secure, and 

efficient operations of institutions and to decrease violence, intimidation, and harassment 

of other inmates. (Id. ¶ 4-5.) The Policy provides for the identification and certification 

of prison gangs. (Id. ¶ 7.) ADC has certified nine STGs, including the Mexican Mafia 

(a.k.a. “New Mexican Mafia”). (Id. ¶ 19). The Policy also provides for the identification 

and validation of inmates involved with or who are members of an STG. (Id. ¶ 7.) 

When an inmate is suspected of being an STG member, a Suspect File is initiated 

and compiled; the file typically contains an STG Worksheet and STG Identifying 

 

2

 In support of their motion, Defendants submit their Statement of Fact (Doc. 37, Defs.’ 

Statement of Facts (DSOF)), and exhibits, including the declarations of Jerry Dunn and 

George Herman (id., Exs. B, C) and Plaintiff’s ADC Validation packet (id., Ex. D). 

Plaintiff submits his Statement of Facts (Doc. 39 (PSOF)), and exhibits, including the 

Herman declaration and grievance or appeal documents. 

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Questionnaire. (Id. ¶ 31.) When there is sufficient evidence to meet validation criteria, a 

Validation Packet is prepared. The Validation process is based on a point system, using 

the Federal Bureau of Prisons point system. (Id. ¶¶ 34-36.) 

 To validate an inmate requires ten points from two or more types of sources. (Id.

¶ 37.) An STG Validation Committee evaluates the evidence and determines whether the 

evidence supports validation. (Id. ¶ 39.) The inmate is provided notification of the 

hearing at least 10 days in advance, he chooses whether he will appear at the hearing and 

whether he will request witnesses to respond to written questions. (Id. ¶ 41.) 

Validated inmates are reclassified to maximum custody. (Id. ¶ 50.) Inmates may 

become eligible for classification to a lower custody level—close custody—by either 

renouncing membership in or affiliation with an STG and debriefing or participating in a 

Step-Down Program, which requires inmates to complete specific programming, shun 

gang activity and affiliation, and remain disciplinary free. (Id. ¶ 52.) Each year that an 

inmate does not renounce and debrief, he receives an annual review of his placement; the 

review consists of a determination of whether he has renounced his gang affiliation. (Id.

¶ 49.) 

 Although an inmate’s confinement in Browning is reviewed only annually, 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff can secure his release from administrative detention by 

separating himself from the STG either through renunciation and debriefing or the stepdown process. (Id. ¶ 52.) Renunciation is the process by which a validated STG member 

agrees to admit STG membership, renounces or disavows STG affiliation, successfully 

completes a debriefing, and is considered to be a former STG member. (Id. ¶¶ 54-54.) 

Debriefing is the process in which an STG Unit staff member documents the claim of a 

validated STG member that he is no longer a member of an STG. (Id. ¶ 54.) The primary 

objective of debriefing is to learn enough about the validated STG member and the STG 

to convince ADC that the inmate has withdrawn from the STG; provide additional 

information regarding the STG’s structure, activity and membership that would adversely 

impact the STG and assist in management of the STG population; and provide 

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information to determine if the inmate may require protection from other STG members. 

(Id. ¶ 55.) 

 The ADC’s Step-Down Program began in March 2006 and was restarted in 

November 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 65, 83.) The Program provides validated STG members a way 

to leave Browning Unit without renouncing and debriefing; the inmate is given an 

opportunity to remove himself from STG activity and to demonstrate to the ADC that he 

is no longer involved in an STG. (Id. ¶ 65.) It does not require the inmate to admit to 

being an STG member or require the inmate to provide information about the STG that 

would adversely impact the STG, thereby eliminating an inmate’s concern that debriefing 

could result in retaliation by the inmate’s STG. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff requested to participate in the Step-Down program in July 2012. (Id.

¶ 116.) There is no record that he ever requested to renounce or debrief. (Id. ¶ 115.) 

 2. Plaintiff’s Validation

Defendants assert that Plaintiff had notice of the categories of evidence against 

him, as well as the evidence itself, advance notice of the STG validation hearing, and had 

the opportunity to appear and call witnesses. (Id., Ex. C, Herman Decl. ¶¶ 9-11.) 

Plaintiff elected not to present witnesses in his defense. (Id. ¶ 11.) Lieutenant Reyna 

presented the Validation Packet to the Committee, which included evidence in Categories 

G (Court Records), J (Contacts), and L (Membership Information) as well as the STG 

Identifying Questionnaire. (DSOF ¶ 101.) Court records and Membership Information 

(Categories G and L) carry 9 points each. (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff was assessed twenty points 

from three sources. (Id. ¶ 104.) 

 In his Complaint, Plaintiff also alleged that he could not “fairly” appeal his STG 

validation because the reasons found were “not included in the result documents.” (Doc. 

1 at 10.) 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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C. Sufficiency of the Evidence3

The Court finds that Plaintiff creates no triable issue of fact regarding the 

adequacy of the evidence used to validate him as an STG member. 

 Reliability of evidence can be established by: 

(1) the oath of the investigating officer appearing before the committee as to the truth of his report that contains confidential information, (2) corroborating testimony, (3) a statement on the record by the chairman of the committee that 

he had firsthand knowledge of sources of information and 

considered them reliable based on the informant’s past record, or (4) an in camera review of the documentation from which 

credibility was assessed. 

Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186-87 (9th Cir. 1987). In Zimmerlee, the court 

upheld a disciplinary committee’s finding of guilt based on an unidentified informant’s 

eyewitness account; the committee had a state police report of the investigation, the 

informant’s polygraph, a memorandum from a prison official with the informant’s 

verbatim statement, and evidence of prior instances of the informant’s reliable 

information. Id. at 187. 

 Although most of the Memorandum presented to the STG Validation Committee 

is not included with Defendants’ exhibits and many exhibits are heavily redacted, the 

Court finds there is sufficient evidence submitted for review to determine that the “some 

evidence” standard was met in Plaintiff’s validation process. (See e.g., Doc. 37, Ex. D 

Bates 0004 (Doc. 37-4 at 14).) Defendants argue that Lt. Reyna’s Memorandum and 

Validation Packet themselves are a record that (i) sets out the Special Security Unit 

(SSU’s) activities, and involves (ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report; 

or (iii) factual findings from a legally authorized investigation and are admissible 

 

3

 PSOF, which contains legal argument, does not address the sufficiency of the evidence. 

Rather, Plaintiff argues that the periodic review and Step-Down Program do not comport 

with due process. (Doc. 39.) The Court finds that this latter issue is beyond the scope of 

the Complaint, but because both parties brief the issue, the Court will address it. (Doc. 1, 

Doc. 3 (Screening Order).) 

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hearsay. (Doc. 36 at 6, citing Fed. R. Evid. 803.) They assert that Lt. Reyna and the SSU

are responsible for investigating STG suspects and are legally obligated to report. (Id.) 

 Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was convicted of two criminal syndicate 

felonies; these are public records. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s history with 

organized crime stands on its own, requiring no support from the presentencing report. 

Presumably the convictions were pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2308, Participating in 

or assisting a criminal syndicate; classification. But because Defendants do not submit 

the indictment and plea and the Court is unable to otherwise locate it, the Court will not 

consider these convictions as evidence of gang activity. 

 The Validation Packet refers to a review of court documents and the presentence 

report is included in the packet. (DSOF, Herman Decl., Ex. D, Bates 0004.) The Court 

finds that the presentence report is reliable and corroborates gang membership. See 

United States v. Romero-Rendon, 220 F.3d 1159, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2000) (generally 

presentence reports are sufficiently reliable to establish the nature of an underlying 

conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement). Plaintiff’s Probation Department 

Report states, for example, that the Phoenix Police Department Gang Enforcement Unit 

was investigating activities of the New Mexican Mafia and refers to someone’s 

conversation with Plaintiff about a hit and that Plaintiff tried to set up a three-way call to 

further a plot. (DSOF, Ex. D, Bates 0028-0032.) The Presentence Recommendation 

refers to Plaintiff’s membership in a criminal street gang. (Id., Bates 0033.) 

In addition, the Validation Packet contains items that Defendants describe as 

membership lists with the names of inmates identified as members of the Mexican Mafia. 

Plaintiff challenges the lists as hearsay without any indicia of reliability. Citing Lira v. 

Cate, 2010 WL 727979 (N.D. Cal. 2010), he argues that so-called “laundry lists” of STG 

membership are ineligible for validation purposes. (Doc. 1 at 8.) Defendants argue that 

Lt. Reyna and the Committee corroborated the two separate STG membership lists with 

other documentation—including court records, his presentence report, his two felony 

convictions, and a letter to Plaintiff. (DSOF ¶ 102.) 

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 The reported decision in Lira addresses only attorneys’ fees and merely states that 

the court had found that the inmate’s due process rights were violated because the 

evidence used to validate him lacked indicia of reliability; the decision does not state 

what that evidence was. Lira, 2010 WL 727979, at *2. In Escalante v. Lewis, however, 

the district court discussed Lira stating that in Lira, that court concluded that the 

plaintiff's inclusion on a “laundry list” of gang members given by an informant to a 

correctional officer as part of debriefing did not meet the Hill standard because there was 

no attempt to corroborate this information and no way to determine when such lists were 

compiled or by whom, as such lists are passed around within the prison system from gang 

member to gang member. Escalante, 2012 WL 215253, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012). 

But in Escalante, the district court found such a membership list to be reliable evidence 

because it could “reasonably be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the seizure 

of the document that it was prepared secretly and for use by gang affiliates,” not for 

prison officials. In other words, the membership list was not prepared by a confidential 

informant to give to a prison official. 

 In Plaintiff’s case, a November 16, 2009 Memorandum states that the SSU 

conducted a search of an unidentified inmate’s property and found a list containing 

names, numbers and monikers of Mexican American inmates; the SSU identified the list 

as a membership list. (DSOF, Herman Decl., Ex. D, Bates 0050.) This Memorandum 

and list was part of Plaintiff’s Validation Packet. Defendants argue that STG lists do not 

have a title with the name of a gang underlined at the top, nor do STG members write 

lists of fellow gang members and then admit that the lists are membership lists. (Doc. 36 

at 7-8.) They point out that Plaintiff offers no alternative explanation as to why his name 

appeared alongside other (New) Mexican Mafia validated members. The Court finds that 

given the circumstances regarding seizure of the document, the membership-list 

documentation was reliable and properly considered by the Committee. 

 The record here is far more complete and reliable than the record in Cato, on 

which Plaintiff relies. In Cato, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the only 

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evidence implicating inmate Cato was another inmate’s statement that was given to 

prison officials through a confidential informant who had no first-hand knowledge of any 

relevant statements or actions by Cato; in addition, the polygraph test of the inmate who 

made the statement was inconclusive. The court found this uncorrobotated hearsay 

insufficient to meet the Hill standard. Id. The some evidence rule does not preclude the 

use of hearsay; it requires only that evidence be reliable, which can mean that it is 

corroborated by other evidence in the record. Here, a probation report documents gang 

activity and at least one membership list shows Plaintiff’s membership in a gang. 

 Thus the Court finds that the Validation Packet contains at least two reliable items 

supporting Plaintiff’s validation as an STG member and because these items are from two 

different categories, each carrying nine points, Plaintiff’s validation does not constitute a 

due process violation. 

 As to Plaintiff ability to appeal the validation, the record shows that Plaintiff 

signed for a notice on June 17, 2010, “Result of STG Validation Hearing.” (Doc. 36, 

Bates 0068 (Doc. 37-5 at 33).) It noted the Committee’s reliance on court records and the 

SSU Memorandum. He submitted an appeal on June 23, 2010. (Doc. 39 at 26.) The 

Committee’s Memorandum sets out the basis of Plaintiff’s appeal and notes that he 

appealed the items in categories “court records,” “contacts,” and “membership.” (Doc. 

37, Bates 0071 (Doc. 37-5 at 36).) These are the three categories of information on 

which Defendants relied for validation. Plaintiff does not explain why he was unable to 

appeal an issue and so creates no triable issue of fact as to due process in the appeal. 

 D. Periodic Review 

The Court finds that Plaintiff creates no triable issue of fact regarding the 

adequacy of the STG periodic review. 

The reason for an inmate’s retention in administrative segregation must be 

reviewed periodically. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n. 9. In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court 

evaluated the due process required to place inmates in the Ohio supermax prison for an 

indefinite period and the placement was reviewed at least annually. 545 U.S. at 215-16. 

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In Hernandez v. Schriro, the Ninth Circuit found that annual reviews of STG inmates 

housed in the same facility as Plaintiff are insufficient. 357 Fed. App’x 747, 749 (9th Cir 

2009) (citing Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1101 (9th Cir. 1986)). But on 

remand in Hernandez, the district court found that annual reviews combined with the 

option to renounce and debrief at any time satisfy due process. 2011 WL 2910710, at *8 

(D. Ariz. July 20, 2011). 

 As noted, the annual review consists of determining whether the inmate has 

renounced. Plaintiff argues that asking him if he is “still” an STG member results in selfincrimination because it implies an admission. (Doc. 39 at 2.) But this creates no due 

process claim because Plaintiff is not entitled to periodic appeals of his validation. See 

Hewitt, 459 at 477, n. 9 (the requisite periodic reviews “will not necessarily require that 

prison officials permit submission of any additional evidence or statements” as to the 

initial decision). Plaintiff also argues that because inmates who debrief are targeted for 

execution by other gang members and so ADC places inmates who debrief into protective 

custody in an identically restrictive facility, he will remain confined indefinitely. (Doc. 

39 at 3.) But Plaintiff’s hypothetical conditions of confinement in protective custody are 

well beyond the scope of the Complaint, and there is no evidence in the record as to those 

conditions. Finally, Plaintiff complains about the terms of participation in the Step-Down 

program. (Id. at 4-5.) But there is no evidence regarding Plaintiff’s request to participate 

in the program, so Plaintiff creates no due process issue regarding his Step-Down 

application. 

To determine whether the periodic review afforded Plaintiff conforms to due 

process requirements, this Court must consider “(1) the private interest that will be 

affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 

through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 

procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the function involved 

and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 

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requirement would entail.” See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225; see also Mathews v. 

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 

 As to the first prong of Mathews, a prisoner’s private interest in remaining free of 

supermax incarceration is not comparable to “the right to be free from confinement at 

all”; the inmate’s interest must be evaluated “within the context of the prison system and 

its attendant curtailment of liberties.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225. Although the 

differences between Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement and those of other prisoners 

may be substantial or even “atypical and significant,” they are less marked and hence 

require less “process than an initial criminal conviction.” Id.

 Considering the second prong of Mathews, the Court holds that Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that the procedures provided have a significant risk of error and thus 

possibly require added safeguards. The annual review determining whether an inmate 

has renounced and debriefed is an objective factual one; additional procedures would not 

provide safeguards against an erroneous determination. And the Court holds that prison 

officials need not evaluate whether Plaintiff poses an immediate threat to safety; as with 

the initial validation, continued membership in an STG is a sufficient ground for 

retention. Moreover, it appears that renunciation and debriefing are available to all 

validated inmates at any time. It is undisputed that Plaintiff has not asked to renounce 

and debrief; therefore, he points to no specific errors in his renouncing and debriefing 

process. Thus, there is no evidence of a risk of an erroneous result in that process. 

 Regarding the third Mathews factor, the Supreme Court has stated that in the 

context of prison management and the dangers posed by inmates who are, for example, 

gang members, the State’s interest “is a dominant consideration.” Id. at 227. Defendants 

have an obligation to “ensure the safety of guards and prison personnel, the public, and 

the prisoners themselves,” while allocating limited resources and addressing prison 

gangs, “who seek nothing less than to control prison life and extend their power outside 

prison walls.” Id. “It is clear . . . that prisons have a legitimate penological interest in 

stopping prison gang activity.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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 Balancing the factors—the private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, 

and the Government’s interest—the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that the 

process afforded to him in the annual review is inadequate. Because Plaintiff can exit the 

Browning Unit only by ceasing to be an STG member, either through renouncing and 

debriefing or Step-Down, and he can do this at any time, annual reviews are sufficient to 

minimize the risk of improper indefinite confinement. There is no evidence that Plaintiff 

asked to renounce, and there is no evidence regarding his request for step-down, so there 

is no due process claim as to either. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s due process claim regarding continued confinement in the 

Browning Unit. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Ruling (Doc. 43). 

 (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Ruling (Doc. 43) is granted. 

 (3) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) is granted. The 

action is dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 DATED this 4th day of December, 2013. 

Case 2:12-cv-00271-RCB Document 44 Filed 12/09/13 Page 13 of 13