Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-35257/USCOURTS-ca9-15-35257-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEFF BOARDMAN; DENNIS RANKIN;

ROBERT SEITZ; TODD L. WHALEY;

SOUTH BAY WILD, INC.; LLOYD D.

WHALEY; MISS SARAH, LLC; MY

FISHERIES, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP; OCEAN

GOLD HOLDING CO., INC.; DULCICH

INC.; FRANK DULCICH; PACIFIC

SEAFOOD GROUP ACQUISITION

COMPANY, INC.; PACIFIC SEAFOOD

WASHINGTON ACQUISITION CO.,

INC.; BANDON PACIFIC, INC.; BIOOREGON PROTEIN, INC.; PACIFIC

CHOICE SEAFOOD COMPANY;

PACIFIC COAST SEAFOODS

COMPANY; PACIFIC GARIBALDI,

INC.; PACIFIC GOLD SEAFOOD

COMPANY; PACIFIC PRIDE SEA FOOD

COMPANY; PACIFIC SEA FOOD CO.;

PACIFIC SURIMI CO., INC.; PACIFIC

TUNA COMPANY, LLC;

WASHINGTON CRAB PRODUCERS,

INC.; PACIFIC ALASKA SHELLFISH,

INC.; SEA LEVEL SEAFOODS, LLC;

ISLAND FISH CO., LLC; PACIFIC

RESURRECTION BAY; PACIFIC

Nos. 15-35257

15-35504

D.C. No.

CV 15-0108 MC

OPINION

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2 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

CONQUEST, INC.; CALAMARI, LLC;

JO MARIE LLC; LESLIE LEE, LLC;

MISS PACIFIC, LLC; PACIFIC

FUTURE, LLC; PACIFIC GRUMPY J,

LLC; PACIFIC HOOKER, LLC;

PACIFIC HORIZON, LLC; PACIFIC

KNIGHT, LLC; PRIVATEER LLC; SEA

PRINCESS, LLC; TRIPLE STAR, LLC;

PACIFIC FISHING, LLC; PACIFIC SEA

FOOD OF ARIZONA, INC.; STARFISH

INVESTMENTS, INC.; DULCICH

SURIMI, LLC; BIO-OREGON

PROPERTIES, LLC; PACIFIC GROUP

TRANSPORT, CO.; PACIFIC

MARKETING GROUP, INC.; PACIFIC

RUSSIA, INC.; PACIFIC RUSSIA

VENTURES, LLC; PACIFIC TUNA

HOLDING COMPANY, INC.; POWELL

STREET MARKET, LLC; PACIFIC

FRESH SEA FOOD COMPANY;

SEACLIFF SEAFOODS, INC.; COPPER

RIVER RESOURCE HOLDING CO.,

INC.; PACIFIC COPPER RIVER

ACQUISITION CO., INC.; SEA LEVEL

SEAFOODS ACQUISITION, INC.;

ISLAND COHO, LLC; S&S SEAFOOD

CO., INC.; PACIFIC SEAFOOD DISC.,

INC.; DULCICH REALTY, LLC;

DULCICH REALTY ACQUISITION,

LLC; DULCICH JET, LLC; OCEAN

COMPANIES HOLDING CO., LLC,

Defendants-Appellants.

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 3

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Owen M. Panner and Michael J. McShane, District Judges,

Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 13, 2015—Portland, Oregon

Filed May 3, 2016

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Ronald Lee Gilman,*

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Gilman

* The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, Senior United States Circuit Judge

for the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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4 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

SUMMARY**

Antitrust

The panel affirmed the district court’s orders granting a

preliminary injunction and denying a motion to compel

arbitration in an antitrust action brought by a group of West

Coast fishermen against seafood processors.

A previous antitrust action—brought by another group of

fishermen against Frank Dulcich, seafood processor entities

owned by Dulcich (“Pacific Seafood”), and Ocean Gold

Seafoods, Inc.—was settled. Pacific Seafood subsequently

announced that it was planning to acquire Ocean Gold. The

current group of fishermen then brought claims under the

Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, alleging monopolization

and unlawful merger.

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of

defendants’ motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the

settlement agreement in the first action. Applying the Federal

Arbitration Act, the panel held that the fishermen’s claims did

not fall within the scope of the purported arbitration provision

in the settlement agreement.

The panel also affirmed the district court’s preliminary

injunction against Pacific Seafood’s acquisition of Ocean

Gold. The panel held that the fishermen showed a sufficient

likelihood of success on the merits because they did not

release their claims in the previous settlement agreement, and

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 5

they adequately demonstrated that the proposed transaction

could substantially lessen competition. The fishermen also

demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the balance

of the equities tipped in favor of the fishermen. In addition,

the preliminary injunction was in the public interest, and it

was not overbroad.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Gilman

agreed with the majority’s holding that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminaryinjunction. 

Judge Gilman also agreed with the majority’s framework for

analyzing motions to compel arbitration, but he dissented

from the majority’s conclusion that the fishermen’s claims

clearly and unambiguously fell outside the scope of the

settlement agreement. Judge Gilman would hold that the

scope of the language in the agreement was at best

ambiguous, and he would resolve this ambiguity in favor of

arbitration.

COUNSEL

TimothyW. Snider (argued), Rachel C. Lee, and Randolph C.

Foster, Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, Oregon; Michael J. Esler,

John W. Stephens, and Kim T. Buckley, Esler, Stephens, &

Buckley, Portland, Oregon, for Defendants-Appellants.

Michael E. Haglund (argued), Michael K. Kelley, Shay S.

Scott, and Sara Ghafouri, Haglund Kelley LLP, Portland,

Oregon, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

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6 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated appeals arise out of an antitrust action

brought by a group of West Coast fishermen against Frank

Dulcich, the West Coast seafood processor entities owned by

Dulcich (collectively, “Pacific Seafood”), and Ocean Gold

Seafoods, Inc. (“Ocean Gold”), another West Coast seafood

processor, which was commenced in 2010 and settled in

2012. Their settlement is documented in a Resolution

Agreement.

In December 2014, Pacific Seafood informed the other

parties to the Resolution Agreement, including several who

are now plaintiffs in the instant action, that Pacific Seafood

was planning to acquire Ocean Gold. Plaintiffs, a second

group of West Coast fishermen,1then filed the present action

against Dulcich, Pacific Seafood, and an Ocean Gold entity

(collectively, “Defendants”), alleging antitrust claims under

the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.

Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the

acquisition pendente lite, which the district court granted. 

Defendants then filed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing

that the dispute should be arbitrated pursuant to a provision

in the Resolution Agreement. The district court denied this

motion.

Defendants now appeal the district court’s decisions

granting the preliminary injunction and denying the motion

1 Plaintiffs here are the second group, if the group of fishermen who

filed the 2010 action is considered the first group.

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 7

to compel arbitration. We have jurisdiction over the appeal

from the order granting the preliminary injunction under

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We have jurisdiction over the appeal

from the order denying Defendants’ motion to compel

arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C). We affirm both

decisions.

I.

A. The 2010 Litigation: Whaley v. Pacific Seafood Group

In 2010, a group of West Coast fishermen (the “Whaley

plaintiffs”) sued Frank Dulcich, Pacific Seafood, and Ocean

Gold in the District of Oregon. The Whaley plaintiffs – and

Plaintiffs here – sell their catch to processors such as Pacific

Seafood and Ocean Gold, and seek to insure competition

between the buyers of their fish. The Whaley plaintiffs

alleged that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to

restrain trade in, as well as monopolization and attempted

monopolization of, multiple West Coast seafood markets.

Within a few months of filing suit, the Whaley plaintiffs

learned that Pacific Seafood was planning to acquire Ocean

Gold and its affiliated companies. They filed for a temporary

restraining order to halt the proposed transaction. Defendants

then represented to the district court and the Whaley plaintiffs

that they had terminated the transaction, and that they would

not pursue it again without prior notice to the plaintiffs and

the Oregon Attorney General.

Throughout the course of the Whaley litigation, Pacific

Seafood and Ocean Gold were parties to an exclusive

marketing contract, under which Pacific Seafood acted as the

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8 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

exclusive marketer and distributor of Ocean Gold’s products. 

This agreement was set to expire in 2016.

The Whaley litigation continued for twentymonths. From

February to March 2012, the parties engaged in settlement

negotiations, mediated by then-Senior District Judge Michael

Hogan. The parties filed a Stipulation and Resolution

Agreement of Class Action Claims (the “Resolution

Agreement”) in April 2012. The district court entered a

Judgment and Order of Dismissal on May 21, 2012.

In the Resolution Agreement, the Whaley defendants

agreed not to renew Pacific Seafood and Ocean Gold’s

exclusive marketing contract when it expired in 2016. 

Additionally, in Paragraph 3(a) of the Resolution Agreement,

defendants agreed that, if Pacific Seafood and Ocean Gold

were to “enter into any new agreement that require[d] Pacific

Seafood Group to act as the exclusive marketer of any

seafood product produced by Ocean Gold Seafoods,” Pacific

Seafood and Ocean Gold would give 60-days’ notice to

plaintiffs’ counsel and the Oregon Department of Justice. 

Objections to the new contractual arrangement were to be

submitted to Judge Hogan, or, if he were unavailable,

Magistrate Judge John Jelderks, for resolution. If Judge

Hogan, or his successor, were to determine that the new

agreement were “pro-competitive . . . it may be approved.”

B. The 2015 Litigation: Boardman v. Pacific Seafood

Group

In December 2014, counsel for Frank Dulcich and Pacific

Seafood informed lead plaintiffs’ counsel in the Whaley

litigation that Pacific Seafood again intended to acquire

Ocean Gold’s stock. Plaintiffs’ counsel then conducted an

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 9

investigation into this proposed acquisition, and learned that

Pacific Seafood and Ocean Gold had been negotiating the

proposed transaction for 15 months. On January 21, 2015,

plaintiffs’ counsel asked defendants’ counsel whether the

transaction was scheduled to close in the near future, and

defendants’ counsel replied that he did not know.

Plaintiffs, a second group of West Coast fishermen,2then

filed this action against Pacific Seafood, an Ocean Gold entity

(Ocean Gold Holding Co., Inc.), and Dulcich (collectively,

“Defendants”) on January 22, 2015, alleging monopolization

and attempted monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act,

and requesting a declaratory judgment that Pacific Seafood’s

proposed acquisition of Ocean Gold violated the Whaley

Resolution Agreement.3 Plaintiffs also applied for a

temporary restraining order to halt Pacific Seafood’s

proposed acquisition of Ocean Gold, which the district court

granted.

Plaintiffs then moved for a preliminary injunction, after

which Defendants filed a stipulation stating that the Oregon

Attorney General had begun an investigation into Pacific

Seafood’s proposed acquisition of Ocean Gold, and that

Defendants agreed that they would not “enter into any

purchase transaction” with respect to Ocean Gold while the

investigation was pending. Further, that Defendants could

2 Several – although not all – of the plaintiffs in the instant action also

were plaintiffs in the Whaley litigation.

3 Plaintiffs dropped this last claim for a declaratory judgment on January

23, and added a claim of unlawful merger under § 7 of the Clayton Act on

February 26.

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10 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

terminate the stipulation “upon 60-days’ prior notice to the

Oregon Attorney General and the Court.”

The district court (Judge McShane) granted Plaintiffs’

preliminary injunction motion. The preliminary injunction

prohibited defendants “from undertaking any further act to

acquire or control any interest in” Ocean Gold’s stock or

assets. Defendants timely appeal from the decision granting

the preliminary injunction.

About a month after the preliminary injunction was

granted, Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration,

arguing that Plaintiffs were obligated to submit their

objection to Pacific Seafood’s proposed acquisition of Ocean

Gold to Magistrate Judge Jelderks, the replacement for nowretired Judge Hogan, for arbitration under Paragraph 3(a) of

the Whaley Resolution Agreement. The district court (Judge

Panner) denied Defendants’ motion, holding that Plaintiffs’

claims did not fall within the scope of Paragraph 3(a). 

Defendants timely appeal the denial of their motion to compel

arbitration.

These consolidated appeals are now before this Court.

II.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to compel

arbitration de novo. See Brown v. Dillard’s, Inc., 430 F.3d

1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2005).

We review a district court’s grant of a preliminary

injunction for an abuse of discretion. Stormans, Inc. v.

Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). A district court

abuses its discretion if it “base[s] its decision on an erroneous

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 11

legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Id.

(quoting FTC v. Enforma Nat. Prods., Inc., 362 F.3d 1204,

1211–12 (9th Cir. 2004)).

III.

A. The Framework for Analyzing a Motion to Compel

Arbitration

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) makes

enforceable a written arbitration provision in “a contract

evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” Chiron Corp.

v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.

2000). When a contract meets this requirement, a court is

“limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to

arbitrate exists [within the contract] and, if it does,

(2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” 

Id. If so, the court must compel arbitration. See id. at 1134.

To interpret the parties’ contract, a court should look to

“general state-law principles of contract interpretation, while

giving due regard to the federal policy in favor of arbitration

by resolving ambiguities as to the scope of arbitration in

favor of arbitration.” Wagner v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc.,

83 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1996). Under Oregon law, “[t]o

interpret a contractual provision . . . the court follows three

steps. First, the court examines the text of the disputed

provision, in the context of the document as a whole. If the

provision is clear, the analysis ends.” Yogman v. Parrott,

937 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Or. 1997) (en banc). If, on the other

hand, the provision is ambiguous, the court “examine[s]

extrinsic evidence of the contracting parties’ intent.” Id. at

1022. If this step does not resolve the ambiguity, the court

looks to appropriate canons of construction for guidance. Id.

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12 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Within the Scope of

Paragraph 3(a) of the Resolution Agreement

Because Plaintiffs’ claims are not within the scope of the

purported arbitration provision in the Resolution Agreement,

we conclude that the district court did not err in denying

Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.4

Defendants contend that: (1) the FAA applies to the

Resolution Agreement; (2) Paragraph 3(a) of the Resolution

Agreement includes a valid agreement to arbitrate; (3) the

agreement to arbitrate encompasses Plaintiffs’ suit; and

(4) the Court must therefore compel arbitration of the instant

action.

Because the FAA applies only to arbitration provisions in

“contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving commerce,”

see Chiron Corp., 207 F.3d at 1130, we must first determine

whether the Resolution Agreement is such a contract. The

Resolution Agreement settled claims regarding seafood

processors’ purchases of fish from fishermen on the West

Coast;5accordingly, it evidences a transaction involving

4 Because nearly all of the plaintiffs in the instant suit were also

plaintiffs in the Whaley litigation, we analyze the relevant issues

assuming, but not deciding, that all of the current plaintiffs are bound by

the Resolution Agreement. Were we to conclude, as does the

concurring/dissenting opinion, that Plaintiffs’ claims are within the scope

of Paragraph 3(a), see Concur. & Dissent. Op. at 34–37, presumably, we

would have to decide whether Plaintiffs here, who were not plaintiffs in

the Whaley litigation, are bound by the Resolution Agreement, including

Paragraph 3(a).

5 The Resolution Agreement defines “West Coast” as encompassing the

west coast of the continental United States from northern California to the

Canadian border.

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 13

commerce. See generally Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise

Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the

Supreme Court has adopted a broad interpretation of the

phrase “evidencing a transaction involving commerce”).

Thus, the district court would have been obligated to

compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims if the Resolution

Agreement contained a valid agreement to arbitrate, and if

that arbitration provision encompassed this dispute. Chiron

Corp., 207 F.3d at 1130. We need not decide whether

Paragraph 3(a) of the Resolution Agreement constitutes a

valid agreement to arbitrate because we conclude that

Plaintiffs’ claims are not encompassed by Paragraph 3(a)’s

plain language.

Paragraph 3(a) of the Resolution Agreement provides:

The February 9, 2006 Agreement between

Pacific Seafood Group and Ocean Gold

Seafoods, will not be renewed in 2016. In the

event that the [sic] Pacific Seafood and Ocean

Gold intend to enter into any new agreement

that requires Pacific Seafood Group to act as

the exclusive marketer of any seafood product

produced by Ocean Gold Seafoods, Pacific

Seafood and Ocean Gold shall first give 60

days’ notice to class counsel and the Oregon

Department of Justice and an opportunity to

object to the agreement. In the event of an

objection to the new contractual arrangement,

Judge Hogan shall determine whether the

proposed new agreement is pro-competitive

and if so, it may be approved.

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14 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

Because of the federal policy in favor of arbitration,

ambiguities regarding the scope of arbitrable issues are to be

resolved in favor of arbitration. Id. at 1131. At the same

time, arbitration is a matter of contract, and a “party cannot

be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has

not agreed so to submit.” See Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio

Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,

363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).

In Paragraph 3(a) of the Resolution Agreement, the

parties to the Whaley lawsuit agreed to submit to then-Senior

District Judge Hogan, or his replacement, Magistrate Judge

Jelderks, disputes regarding“anynew agreement that requires

Pacific Seafood Group to act as the exclusive marketer of any

seafood product produced by Ocean Gold Seafoods.” The

purchase and sale agreements for stock and other interests

between Pacific Seafood and Ocean Gold that led to the

current suit do not pertain to marketing. They do not deal

with the marketing of Ocean Gold’s products in any explicit

way, exclusive or otherwise. Instead, they detail Pacific

Seafood’s plan to purchase Ocean Gold’s stock and other

interests.

Pacific Seafood argues that the purchase agreements

functionally require it to act as the exclusive marketer of

Ocean Gold’s products, by virtue of its contemplated

ownership of Ocean Gold’s stock and other interests. But the

owner of a company is not necessarily that company’s

exclusive marketer, just as under the former exclusive

marketing agreement, Ocean Gold was not the marketer of its

own products. The owner of a company may have the right

to act as the exclusive marketer of the company’s products,

but there is no requirement that it do so. The parties could

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 15

have drafted the provision more broadly to require any

objections to a proposed merger or other combination of

Pacific Seafood and Ocean Gold, or to any modification of

their relationship, to be submitted to Judge Hogan for

resolution, but they did not. Instead, the provision only

includes objections to a new agreement that requires Pacific

Seafood to act as the exclusive marketer of Ocean Gold’s

products.6 The purchase and sale agreements at issue in this

litigation are thus not fairly encompassed by this provision of

the Resolution Agreement. Regardless of whether the

provision constitutes a valid agreement to arbitrate, Plaintiffs’

claims are not within the scope of Paragraph 3(a). 

Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Defendants’

motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.7

6 The concurring/dissenting opinion argues that the purchase agreements

“authorize” and “permit” Pacific Seafood to act as Ocean Gold’s exclusive

marketer. Concur. & Dissent. Op. at 36. But this argument elides the

clear and unambiguous language of the Resolution Agreement, that

Paragraph 3(a) applies only to agreements that require Pacific Seafood to

act as Ocean Gold’s exclusive marketer.

7 Because we conclude that paragraph 3(a) of the Resolution Agreement

does not encompass the acquisition by Pacific Seafood of Ocean Gold’s

stock, we need not decide the other issues tendered by the parties,

including whether Paragraph 3(a) is an agreement to arbitrate or whether

Judge Hogan or Magistrate Judge Jelderks, consistent with the legal and

ethical obligations that bind federal judges, could serve as a privatelyappointed arbitrator. The concurring/dissenting opinion concludes that

“Plaintiffs’ argument that magistrate judges may not serve as arbitrators

is therefore without merit in light of Congress’s specific language to the

contrary.” Concur. & Dissent. Op. at 32. The authorities relied on,

however, in support of the argument that there is no impediment to

Magistrate Judge Jelderks, Judge Hogan’s designated replacement, acting

as an arbitrator are inapposite. Even assuming that the Federal

Magistrates Act and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, on

which the concurrence/dissent relies, see id. at 30–32, grant to district

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16 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

IV.

A. The Framework for Analyzing Preliminary

Injunctions

To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that: (1) it “is likely to succeed on the merits”;

(2) it “is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief”; (3) “the balance of equities tips in [its]

favor”; and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

finding that Plaintiffs satisfied each of these requirements and

granting their motion for a preliminary injunction.

courts the authority to designate magistrate judges to serve as arbitrators

as part of a court’s alternative dispute resolution program, nothing in the

record demonstrates that magistrate judges were so authorized by the

District of Oregon. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act plainly

requires the authorization to come from the “United States district court

. . . by local rule,” not from a single judge of that court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 651(b) (“Each United States district court shall authorize, by local rule

adopted under section 2071(a), the use of alternative dispute resolution

processes in all civil actions . . . .”). The concurring/dissenting opinion

insists “that the authorization here is based on the District of Oregon’s

local rules. The local rule in question specifically permits an individual

judge—‘on his/her own motion or at the request of a party’—to assign the

case to arbitration.” Concur. & Dissent. Op. at 32 (quoting D. Or. Civil

Local Rule 16-4(e)(4)(A)). But nothing in Local Rule 16-4(e) speaks to

who may be appointed as an arbitrator and certainly does not authorize

that judge to appoint an active magistrate judge to act as an arbitrator in

such a case.

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 17

B. Plaintiffs Have Shown a Sufficient Likelihood of

Success on the Merits

1. Plaintiffs Did Not Release Their Claims in the

Prior Settlement

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot show a likelihood

of success on the merits of their monopolization and unlawful

merger claims because they released these claims in the

Resolution Agreement. When settling the Whaley lawsuit,

Plaintiffs agreed to release the following:

Any and all claims for monopolization,

attempted monopolization or conspiracy to

restrain trade under Sections 1 and 2 of the

Sherman Act that relate to the delivery of

trawl-caught groundfish, whiting or pink

shrimp to West Coast processors from Ft.

Bragg, California north to the Canadian

border between June 21, 2006 and December

31, 2011 and specificallyincluding any claims

for damages and/or injunctive relief related to

those claims.

As required by Oregon contract law, we interpret the above

provision by examining its text; if the provision is clear, its

plain text governs. See Yogman, 937 P.2d at 1021. Plaintiffs

argue that the entire release is temporally limited (that is, only

claims arising between June 21, 2006 and December 31, 2011

were released), while Defendants argue that the last clause of

the provision (“including any claims for damages and/or

injunctive relief related to those claims”) is not so limited,

and thus encompasses the claims at issue in this case. We

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18 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

agree with Plaintiffs and conclude that they did not release

their current claims when they settled the Whaley lawsuit.

Defendants read the last clause of the release expansively

to mean that the Whaley plaintiffs released all claims for

damages or injunctive relief related to – which Defendants

define to mean “logically or causally connected to” – the

claims asserted in Whaley. By this logic, the Whaley

plaintiffs released their antitrust claims against Defendants

that arose between June 21, 2006 and December 31, 2011,

and any related claims for damages or injunctive relief arising

at any time before or after. This construction would render

the temporal limitation in the first clause meaningless.

We decline to reach this illogical result, and we instead

read the second clause in the context of the provision as a

whole. The release states that the claims in the first clause,

which are temporally limited, “specifically includ[e]” the

claims in the second clause – the “related” claims for

“damages and/or injunctive relief.” Thus, the claims in the

second clause are a smaller subset of the temporally limited

claims in the first clause. See, e.g., Ariz. State Bd. for

Charter Sch. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 1007–08

(9th Cir. 2006) (“Using a common-sense construction . . . ,

the term ‘including’ indicates that [which follows] is an

illustrative subset of the preceding principle . . . .”). The

release in the Resolution Agreement is clear: the Whaley

plaintiffs released their antitrust claims against Defendants

that arose between June 2006 and December 2011, which

specifically included plaintiffs’ claims for damages and

injunctive relief that arose during the specified time period. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the release in the Resolution

Agreement has no bearing on Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 19

on the merits of their claims in this case, which arose after the

Resolution Agreement was executed.

2. Plaintiffs Have AdequatelyDemonstratedThatthe

Proposed Transaction Could Substantially Lessen

Competition

To prove an unlawful merger claim under § 7 of the

Clayton Act, a plaintiff must show that the effect of the

challenged acquisition “may be substantially to lessen

competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 18. The plaintiff need not prove that a merger or

acquisition has altered prices in the relevant market; rather,

“[a]ll that is necessaryis that the merger create an appreciable

danger of such consequences in the future.” Saint Alphonsus

Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd.,

778 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hosp. Corp. of

Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986)).

This Court evaluates § 7 claims “under a burden-shifting

framework.” Id. at 783. “A prima facie case can be

established simply by showing a high market share” would

result from the proposed merger, although plaintiffs often put

forth other evidence as well, because market share statistics

do not conclusively prove harm to competition. Id. at 785. 

The burden then shifts to the defendant to “cast doubt on the

accuracy of the [plaintiff’s] evidence as predictive of future

anticompetitive effects.” Id. at 788 (quoting Chi. Bridge &

Iron Co. N.V. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 423 (5th Cir. 2008)).

Plaintiffs have adduced evidence that, if Pacific Seafood

were to acquire Ocean Gold, Pacific Seafood’s market power

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20 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

in seafood input markets8on the West Coast would increase

significantly, to the point that the markets would become

“highly concentrated.” To support their argument, Plaintiffs

have utilized the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is “[a]

commonly used metric for determining market share,” Saint

Alphonsus Med. Ctr., 778 F.3d at 786, as well as the U.S.

Department of Justice’s and Federal Trade Commission’s

Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Radtke,

also submitted a declaration explaining that there were

“multiple barriers to entry in the West Coast seafood market.”

To “cast doubt” on Plaintiffs’ “evidence as predictive of

future anticompetitive effects,” Defendants respond that

Pacific Seafood and Ocean Gold have been cooperating for

nearly 15 years, with Pacific Seafood acting as the sole buyer

of Ocean Gold’s seafood output, using Ocean Gold’s seafood

processing assets, and offering marketing and distribution

services to Ocean Gold in return. According to Defendants,

the companies’ joint efforts have improved the industry by

increasing ex vessel prices9and expanding the market. In

other words, Defendants claim that Pacific Seafood’s

acquisition of Ocean Gold would merely continue the

companies’ joint efforts and not change the current market

structure. Defendants argue that, as a result, the proposed

acquisition poses no danger to competition.

Plaintiffs respond that Pacific Seafood’s acquisition of

Ocean Gold would indeed change the relevant market

8

“Input market” signifies seafood processors’ purchase of fish from

fishermen, such as Plaintiffs.

9

“Ex vessel prices” are those prices paid to fishermen for their catches

at the point of delivery.

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 21

structure, which is that of input markets on the West Coast. 

In West Coast input markets for trawl-caught groundfish,

Pacific whiting, and Pacific coldwater shrimp, Ocean Gold

and Pacific Seafood are currently competitors, though they

cooperate in other respects. Thus, according to Plaintiffs,

Pacific Seafood’s acquisition of Ocean Gold would

substantially decrease competition in multiple seafood input

markets.

The district court found convincing Plaintiffs’ showing

that Pacific Seafood’s acquisition of Ocean Gold would

substantially reduce competition in multiple buyers’ input

markets, and it found that Defendants had not sufficiently cast

doubt on Plaintiffs’ evidence to meet their burden. This

conclusion is supported by the evidence in the record

summarized above, and it was not implausible in light of the

record as a whole. The district court thus did not abuse its

discretion in finding that the effect of the challenged

acquisition could be to lessen competition substantially; thus,

that Plaintiffs had adequately demonstrated a likelihood of

success on the merits.

C. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Suffer Irreparable Harm in

the Absence of Preliminary Relief

Next, a plaintiff must show that she “is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” See

Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. This Court has ruled that

“[s]peculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury

sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction. A

plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm

sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate

immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary

injunctive relief.” Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v.

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22 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations

omitted).

Plaintiffs argue that Pacific Seafood’s acquisition of

Ocean Gold would create a monopsony in multiple seafood

input markets on the West Coast. A monopsony occurs when

there is “market power on the buy side of the market” and

buyers consequently pay suppliers less than they would in a

competitive market. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons

Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312, 320–22 (2007). 

As noted above, Plaintiffs support their argument with market

concentration statistics and expert declarations. A lessening

of competition constitutes an irreparable injury under our

case law. See United States v. BNS Inc., 858 F.2d

456,464–66 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Koppers has demonstrated that

serious questions exist regarding the possibility of irreparable

harm to competition in the Irwindale aggregate market if the

tender offer is consummated . . . .”). Thus, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs

adequately demonstrated a threatened irreparable injury.

Defendants argue that there is no immediate danger of

irreparable harm because they have terminated the proposed

acquisition that led to this suit, and they have stipulated with

the Oregon Attorney General that they would not enter a

purchase transaction with Ocean Gold entities while the

Attorney General’s investigation is pending. Defendants,

however, may terminate the stipulation with 60-days’ notice

to the Oregon Attorney General and the district court.

Defendants’ argument is unavailing. A threat of

irreparable harm is sufficiently immediate to warrant

preliminary injunctive relief if the plaintiff “is likely to suffer

irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 23

rendered.” See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (quoting 11A Charles

A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995)). Given: (1) the limited

nature of Defendants’ proposed stipulation (not to enter a

“purchase transaction,” when a deal with Ocean Gold could

take on many different structures); (2) the expiration of

Pacific Seafood and Ocean Gold’s exclusive marketing

agreement in February 2016; (3) Defendants’ history of

negotiating an acquisition for many months in secret before

notifying Plaintiffs; and (4) the fact that Defendants may

terminate their stipulation with 60-days’ notice, Plaintiffs

have established a sufficient likelihood that, in the absence of

preliminary injunctive relief, they would suffer irreparable

harm before a trial on the merits could be held. Thus, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that

Plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated a threat of irreparable

harm.

D. The Balance of Equities Tips in Plaintiffs’ Favor

The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion in

finding that the balance of equities tips in favor of Plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs have demonstrated a reasonable probability that

Pacific Seafood’s acquisition of Ocean Gold would

substantially lessen competition in the relevant input markets

on the West Coast. This decrease in competition would

injure Plaintiffs, who sell fish in these markets. Defendants,

on the other hand, have not established how maintaining the

status quo while the district court decides the case on the

merits will injure them. Accordingly, the district court’s

finding as to the balance of equities in this case was not an

abuse of discretion.

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24 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

E. A Preliminary Injunction Is in the Public Interest

A district court should consider whether a preliminary

injunction would be in the public interest if “the impact of an

injunction reaches beyond the parties, carrying with it a

potential for public consequences.” Stormans, Inc., 586 F.3d

at 1138–39. This Court has said that “the central purpose of

the antitrust laws, state and federal, is to preserve

competition. It is competition . . . that these statutes

recognize as vital to the public interest.” Knevelbaard

Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.

2000) (emphasis added). Again, Plaintiffs have demonstrated

a reasonable likelihood that Pacific Seafood’s acquisition of

Ocean Gold could substantiallylessen competition in relevant

input markets. Thus, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that a preliminary injunction is in the

public interest.

F. The Preliminary Injunction Is Not Overbroad

Finally, Defendants argue that the district court abused its

discretion by granting an overly broad preliminaryinjunction. 

“An overbroad injunction is an abuse of discretion.” LambWeston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th

Cir. 1991).

The preliminary injunction provides, as follows:

Defendants, their subsidiaries, affiliates,

owners, officers, employees, and agents and

all persons acting on their behalf are

prohibited, through contractual or any other

means, from undertaking any further act to

acquire or control any interest in the stock,

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 25

capital assets, real property, quota, or fishing

permits of Ocean Gold Seafoods, Inc. or its

affiliated companies including but not limited

to Ocean Gold International, Inc.; Ocean

Protein, LLC; Ocean Cold, LLC; Ocean Cold

Transport, LLC, and Hoquiam Riverview

Properties, LLC, or their shareholders or

members until further order of this Court.

Defendants take issue with the fact that the district court

prohibited them “from undertaking any further act to acquire

or control any interest in” Ocean Gold. Defendants argue that

the preliminary injunction is overbroad because it prohibits

not only Pacific Seafood’s ultimate acquisition of Ocean

Gold, but also any lawful preparatory conduct (such as

negotiating an acquisition, signing a letter of intent, or

entering into an agreement contingent on resolution of

Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims). According to Defendants, such

preparatory conduct was specifically contemplated by the

Resolution Agreement, which states that Pacific Seafood may

enter new contractual arrangements with Ocean Gold.

“District courts have broad latitude in fashioning

equitable relief when necessary to remedy an established

wrong.” Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 475 (9th

Cir. 2010) (quoting Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell,

390 F.3d 630, 641 (9th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The “purpose of a preliminary injunction is to

preserve the status quo ante litem pending a determination of

the action on the merits.” Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey,

577 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting L.A. Mem’l

Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197,

1200 (9th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Status quo ante litem” refers to “the last uncontested status

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26 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

which preceded the pending controversy.” GoTo.com, Inc. v.

Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d

804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963)).

By prohibiting Pacific Seafood from undertaking any

further act to acquire Ocean Gold’s stock or assets, the

district court effectively preserved the parties’ last

uncontested status, prior to Pacific Seafood’s attempt to

acquire Ocean Gold. Pacific Seafood and Ocean Gold could

combine their operations in a number of ways to lessen

competition, and the district court thus did not abuse its

discretion by prohibiting Pacific Seafood from undertaking

any further acts to acquire Ocean Gold’s stock or assets, as

opposed to prohibiting only an actual acquisition.

• ! •

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in

finding that Plaintiffs had satisfied the Winter requirements,

we affirm the district court’s order granting Plaintiffs’ motion

for a preliminary injunction.

V.

We hold that the district court did not err in concluding

that Plaintiffs are not required to arbitrate their claims. We

further hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. 

Accordingly, both orders of the district court are

AFFIRMED.

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 27

GILMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part:

I agree with the majority opinion’s holding that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the

Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly,

I concur in Part IV. of the opinion. I further agree with the

majority’s framework for analyzing motions to compel

arbitration as described in Part III.A. But I respectfully

disagree with the majority’s conclusion in Part III.B. that the

Plaintiffs’ claims clearly and unambiguously fall outside the

scope of Paragraph 3(a) of the Resolution Agreement. Such

a conclusion strikes me as contrary to well-established circuit

precedent and contravenes the “emphatic federal policy in

favor of arbitral dispute resolution.” See Mitsubishi Motors

Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631

(1985).

Reading Paragraph 3(a) in the context of this particular

dispute, I believe that the scope of the language is at best

ambiguous. And because this court’s long-standing precedent

requires that any ambiguity regarding the scope of an

arbitration agreement be resolved in favor of arbitration, I

would hold that the Plaintiffs’ claims are arbitrable. I would

therefore grant Pacific Seafood’s motion to compel

arbitration.

1. Paragraph 3(a) is a valid arbitration agreement

The majority states that it “need not decide” whether

Paragraph 3(a) is a valid arbitration agreement because,

notwithstanding such a determination, the Plaintiffs’ claims

“are not encompassed by Paragraph 3(a)’s plain language.” 

(Maj. Op. 13.) In other words, the majority bypasses the first

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28 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

step of the Chiron analysis and addresses only the second. 

But because I would hold that the dispute at issue is fairly

encompassed within the scope of Paragraph 3(a), I will first

consider whether Paragraph 3(a) constitutes a valid

arbitration agreement. See Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic

Sys., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). I believe that it

does.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not specifically

define the term “arbitration.” See 9 U.S.C. § 2. But in

Wolsey Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir.

1998), this court adopted the reasoning of two other courts in

determining what constitutes an arbitration agreement within

the meaning of the FAA. The Wolsey court first relied on the

Eastern District of New York’s rather straightforward

definition, which stated: “If the parties have agreed to submit

a dispute for a decision by a third party, they have agreed to

arbitration.” Id. at 1208 (emphasis omitted) (quoting AMF

Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y.

1985)). The Wolsey court also observed that the Third

Circuit, in a case decided the year before, had narrowed the

definition to require that “the parties must . . . also agree not

to pursue litigation ‘until the process is completed.’” Id.

(quoting Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 350

(3d Cir. 1997)). In applying Harrison, the Wolsey court

reasoned that if the agreement in question does not “explicitly

permit one of the parties to seek recourse to the courts”

before an arbitrator makes a decision, then the agreement is

arbitrable. Id. at 1209 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A “final factor weighing in favor” of arbitration, Wolsey

emphasized, is the “presumption in favor of arbitrability

created by the FAA.” Id.(noting that the FAA “was designed

to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 29

agreements to arbitrate” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)). The Wolsey court concluded that the dispute

in question satisfied both the Eastern District of New York’s

and the Third Circuit’s criteria; it did not endorse one court’s

definition over the other. Id. at 1208–09.

Here, Paragraph 3(a) of the Resolution Agreement would

likewise satisfy both definitions of an arbitration agreement. 

Pacific Seafood and the West Coast fishermen, in adopting

the Resolution Agreement, agreed to submit any objection to

a “new agreement that requires Pacific Seafood Group to act

as the exclusive marketer of any seafood product by Ocean

Gold Seafoods” to a named third party (District Judge Hogan

or his replacement, Magistrate Judge Jelderks) for a decision

to “determine whether the proposed new agreement is procompetitive.” This satisfies the Eastern District of New

York’s broader definition of arbitration. In addition,

Paragraph 3(a) does not “explicitly permit” either party to

pursue litigation before the named third party renders a

decision. See id. at 1209. It therefore satisfies the Third

Circuit’s narrower definition. So according to either

criterion, and in light of the “presumption in favor of

arbitrability,” see id., Paragraph 3(a) should properly be

considered as an arbitration agreement.

The Plaintiffs do not contest the fact that the West Coast

fisherman had agreed to submit any dispute regarding a new

exclusive marketing agreement to a third party for a decision. 

But they challenge the validity of Paragraph 3(a) on three

alternate grounds. For the reasons discussed below, I believe

that each challenge is without merit.

First, the Plaintiffs argue that Paragraph 3(a) is not an

arbitration agreement because its language does not contain

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30 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

the word “arbitrate.” But such an argument was

unequivocally rejected in Wolsey. Id. at 1208 (noting that

“[n]o magic words such as ‘arbitrate’ or ‘binding arbitration’

or ‘final dispute resolution’ are needed” to invoke the FAA)

(quoting AMF, 621 F. Supp at 460)). The argument therefore

has no merit.

Next, the Plaintiffs argue that Paragraph 3(a) cannot be an

arbitration agreement because it names District Judge Hogan

or his replacement, Magistrate Judge Jelderks, as the thirdparty decisionmaker and, according to the Plaintiffs, federal

district and magistrate judges cannot serve as arbitrators as a

matter of law. Whether a federal district judge may act as an

arbitrator is a question that need not be addressed here

because District Judge Hogan has already retired from the

federal bench. Magistrate Judge Jelderks would therefore

serve as the third-party decisionmaker if Paragraph 3(a) is

enforced. The relevant question is thus whether Magistrate

Judge Jelderks may lawfully act as an arbitrator in the instant

dispute.

Under the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636,

Congress gave federal courts broad discretion to designate

certain duties to magistrate judges. These duties include

conducting hearings, making factual findings, deciding

motions, and rendering judgments in civil and criminal cases. 

See id. § 636(b)–(c). In addition to these specifically

enumerated duties, Congress provided that magistrate judges

“may be assigned such additional duties as are not

inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States.” Id.

§ 636(b)(3). Courts have observed that, over time, “Congress

has encouraged district court judges to experiment in the

assignment of . . . duties to magistrates and to otherwise

engage in innovative experimentation in the use of magistrate

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 31

judges.” Ovadiah v. New York Ass’n for New Americans, No.

95 CIV. 10523(SS), 1997 WL 342411, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June

23, 1997) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 146 F.R.D. 52, 55

(N.D.N.Y. 1993)).

Whether one of the “additional duties” contemplated by

Congress is the power of a magistrate judge to preside over

arbitration proceedings has been a question that a number of

courts have approached with great skepticism. See DDI

Seamless Cylinder Int’l Inc. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp.,

14 F.3d 1163, 1165 (7th Cir. 1994) (avoiding language that

called the procedure at issue an arbitration because federal

statutes “do not appear to authorize or envisage the

appointment of judges or magistrate judges as arbitrators”);

Hameli v. Nazario, 930 F. Supp. 171, 181 (D. Del. 1996)

(“Arbitration is not in the job description of a federal judge,

including a magistrate judge.” (alteration and citation

omitted)); cf. Ovadiah, 1997 WL 342411 at *10

(acknowledging that “arbitration by a magistrate judge, upon

the consent of the parties, may be . . . permissible under the

‘additional duties’ clause” but warning that it “should be

avoided”).

All of the above cases, however, predate Congress’s

adoption of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998

(the Act), which authorizes federal courts to use alternative

dispute resolution processes “in which a neutral third party

participates to assist in the resolution of issues in controversy,

through processes such as . . . arbitration.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 651(a). And in the Act, Congress specifically mentions

magistrate judges as eligible third-party neutrals. Id. § 653(b)

(noting that “the district court may use, among others,

magistrate judges who have been trained to serve as neutrals

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32 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

in alternative dispute resolution processes”); see also

Delaware Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d

493, 502 (D. Del. 2012) (noting that “the Alternative Dispute

Resolution Act . . . seems to allow magistrate judges to serve

as arbitrators,” even though commenting that such an

approach is uncommon).

The Plaintiffs’ argument that magistrate judges may not

serve as arbitrators is therefore without merit in light of

Congress’s specific language to the contrary. But the

majority asserts that these statutes do not apply to the instant

dispute because “[t]he Alternative Dispute Resolution Act

plainly requires the authorization to come from the ‘United

States district court . . . by local rule,’ not from a single judge

of that court.” (Maj. Op. 16 n.7) (ellipsis in original). In

response, I would point out that the authorization here is

based on the District of Oregon’s local rules. The local rule

in question specifically permits an individual judge—“on

his/her own motion or at the request of a party”—to assign

the case to arbitration. D. Or. R. 16.4(e)(4)(A). I therefore

do not believe that the arbitration procedure at issue is in any

way inconsistent with this rule or with the Alternative

Dispute Resolution Act. My conclusion is bolstered by the

District of Oregon’s comments following the local rule,

which specifically state that the rule was clarified to

“[r]einforce[] the assigned judges’ powers” to refer civil

cases to all forms of alternative dispute resolution, including

arbitration. See id. 16.4(e) cmt. on Jan. 1, 2011 amend.

Pursuant to this local rule, the record shows that the

district court overseeing the Whaley litigation adopted and

approved the terms of the Resolution Agreement, which

included the arbitration procedure set forth in Paragraph 3(a). 

In so doing, the district court expressly noted that “the

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 33

District Court of Oregon retains jurisdiction over . . . the

implementation, interpretation and enforcement of the terms

of the Stipulation and Resolution Agreement.”

By the plain language of the District of Oregon’s local

rule as well as its own judgment and order of dismissal, the

district court therefore not only authorized the arbitration

procedure at issue—one in which Magistrate Judge Jelderks

would presently act as the arbitrator—but also retained

jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement. I

accordingly conclude that the parties’ designation of

Magistrate Judge Jelderks does not invalidate the arbitration

procedure set forth in Paragraph 3(a).

Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that Paragraph 3(a) is not an

arbitration clause, but rather an ancillary-jurisdiction clause

in connection with the Whaley litigation. Ancillary

jurisdiction, however, does not extend to “proceedings that

are entirely new and original . . . or where the relief sought is

of a different kind or on a different principle than that of the

prior decree.” Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 358 (1996)

(brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because ancillary jurisdiction is not an “inherent power” of

the federal courts, a court must “explicitly retain[]jurisdiction

over the settlement agreement, or incorporate[] the terms of

the agreement in its dismissal order” to exercise such

jurisdiction. Arata v. Nu Skin Int’l, 96 F.3d 1265, 1268–69

(9th Cir. 1996); see also Fed. Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v.

Ferrante, 364 F.3d 1037, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding

that enforcement of a promissory note was “wholly

unrelated” to a lien for legal services performed in a prior

action and, therefore, the court lacked ancillary jurisdiction

over the subsequent proceeding).

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34 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

The doctrine is not applicable here. Not only does

Paragraph 3(a) relate to disputes that are “wholly unrelated”

to the underlying Whaley litigation, see Ferrante, 364 F.3d at

1041, but it also contemplates arbitration based on “entirely

new and original” facts, Peacock, 516 U.S. at 358. The

language of Paragraph 3(a) explicitly refers to a “new

contractual arrangement” and a “proposed new agreement”

between Pacific Seafood and Ocean Gold that would be

submitted to a third-party decisionmaker. Proceedings under

Paragraph 3(a) would thus necessarily be predicated on

entirely new and original facts and governed under a new

standard of sustainability—i.e., whether the proposed new

agreement between Pacific Seafood and Ocean Gold is “procompetitive.” Because Paragraph 3(a) cannot be fairly read

as an ancillary-jurisdiction clause, the Plaintiffs’ challenge on

this point is without merit.

In sum, I would hold that Paragraph 3(a) is a valid

arbitration agreement under Chiron’s first prong. See Chiron

Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130

(9th Cir. 2000). This leads me to the second prong of

Chiron—whether Paragraph 3(a) “encompasses the dispute at

issue,” id.,—and I conclude that it does.

2. The dispute falls within the scope of Paragraph 3(a)

The crux of my disagreement with the majority is its

conclusion that the “plain language” of Paragraph 3(a)

precludes the proposed stock acquisition between Pacific

Seafood and Ocean Gold from falling within its scope. (Maj.

Op. 13.) This conclusion rests solely on the majority’s

extended focus on the word “requires” within Paragraph 3(a). 

The majority first states that Paragraph 3(a) applies to

“disputes regarding ‘any new agreement that requires Pacific

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 35

Seafood Group to act as the exclusive marketer of any

seafood product produced by Ocean Gold Seafoods.’” (Id. at

14.) This simply quotes the terms of the agreement, and is

thus undisputed.

But the majoritythen categoricallyconcludes that because

the proposed stock acquisition “detail[s] Pacific Seafood’s

plan to purchase Ocean Gold’s stock” without any “explicit”

language requiring Pacific Seafood to act as the exclusive

marketer, the proposed acquisition does “not pertain to

marketing.” (Id. at 14.) The majority would thus bar the

application of Paragraph 3(a) even if the proposed acquisition

would “functionally require” Pacific Seafood to act as an

exclusive marketer of Ocean Gold’s products, as is argued by

Pacific Seafood. (Id. at 14) (Emphasis in original.) In

response, the majority maintains that “the owner of a

company is not necessarily that company’s exclusive

marketer” because, although it may have “the right” to

market products, “there is no requirement that it do so.” (Id.

at 14) (Emphasis in original.) Solely based on this reasoning,

the majority concludes that the “Plaintiffs’ claims are not

encompassed by Paragraph 3(a)’s plain language.” (Id. at

13.)

I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the majority

reads too much into the word “requires” when neither the

district court nor the parties themselves argue that its usage is

dispositive of the arbitration question. This is especially true

in light of the strong presumption in favor of arbitrability, see

Wolsey Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th

Cir. 1998), and this court’s holding that, “if the purported

agreement is susceptible of an interpretation that would allow

arbitration, any doubts should be resolved in favor of

arbitration.” Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co.,

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36 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

937 F.2d 469, 479 (9th Cir. 1991) (alterations and internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting French v. Merrill Lynch,

784 F.2d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Contrary to the majority’s view, I believe that Paragraph

3(a) is susceptible of an interpretation that would permit the

proposed stock acquisition to fall within its scope. Perhaps

the choice of the word “requires” was simply an oddity of

draftsmanship. One would think that a more appropriate

word would be “permits” or “authorizes.” Pacific Seafood,

after all, presumably desired to be Ocean Gold’s exclusive

marketer; no one would think of Pacific Seafood being forced

to do so.

So what did the parties intend by the word “requires”?

The record is silent on this point, which raises an ambiguity

about the paragraph’s scope. Pacific Seafood argues that the

Plaintiffs “ignore[] the economic reality” of the proposed

purchase of Ocean Gold’s stock, which would have the

“effect” of empowering Pacific Seafood to become the

exclusive marketer of Ocean Gold’s seafood. Even the

Plaintiffs point out that the proposed stock acquisition would

give Pacific Seafood “full authority to make . . . decisions”

related to management and operations. For all practical

purposes, then, the proposed acquisition is a new agreement

that would functionally permit Pacific Seafood to exclusively

market Ocean Gold’s products—rights that were granted to

Pacific Seafood in the February 2006 agreement and are set

to expire in 2016.

This precise scenario, however, is presumably what the

Plaintiffs were seeking to avoid in Paragraph 3(a) of the

Resolution Agreement because they did not want Pacific

Seafood to be in the position of continuing to be the exclusive

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BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP 37

marketer of Ocean Gold’s products. Yet this stock

acquisition would allow Pacific Seafood to do just that. To

prevent such a paradoxical outcome, the proposed agreement

should not be categorically excluded from falling within

Paragraph 3(a)’s scope simply because it lacks express

language specifying an exclusive marketing requirement.

I believe that this is a very plausible argument, an

argument that brings into play the principle that “any doubts

concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved

in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the

construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of

waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” See Chiron

Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1131

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.

Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)).

Pacific Seafood’s argument is all the stronger because the

Plaintiffs themselves initially invoked Paragraph 3(a) when

they brought a breach-of-contract action against Pacific

Seafood for the very transaction in question. The fact that the

Plaintiffs later dismissed this claim in the belief (mistaken,

for the reasons explained above) that magistrate judges

cannot be arbitrators does not diminish the point that even the

Plaintiffs at one point argued that Paragraph 3(a) governs the

current dispute. They now contend the opposite, but this

simply highlights the ambiguity over whether Paragraph 3(a)

requires arbitration.

In any event, to place an outsized emphasis on the one

word “requires,” when its usage and operation is not analyzed

with particularity in either party’s brief, assigns unwarranted

weight to a clause that is arguably unclear. Such ambiguity

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38 BOARDMAN V. PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP

should not bar the applicability of the arbitration agreement

and instead should militate in its favor.

Finally, I reach my conclusion in light of the this court’s

precedent favoring a strong presumption of arbitrability. 

Wolsey, 144 F.3d at 1209; see also Republic of Nicaragua,

937 F.2d at 478 (“[T]he clear weight of authority holds that

the most minimal indication of the parties’ intent to arbitrate

must be given full effect . . . .”); Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc.,

175 F.3d 716, 721 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that disputes

“need only touch matters covered by the contract containing

the arbitration clause and all doubts are to be resolved in

favor of arbitrability” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

This is an instance in which the issues involved in the

proposed stock acquisition—including the practical effect

that it would have on marketing exclusivity—would clearly

“touch matters” contemplated in the Resolution Agreement. 

And because we are constrained byChiron and the FAA from

conducting any further inquiry into the substance of the

agreement and should resolve all doubts in favor of

arbitrability, I would grant Pacific Seafood’s motion to

compel arbitration.

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