Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02274/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02274-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CHARLES M. FERRANTE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-2274 PHX MEA

)

JOANNE BARNHART, Commissioner )

of Social Security, ) MEMORANDUM & ORDER

)

Defendant. )

________________________________)

The parties have consented to have all proceedings in

this case conducted before a United States Magistrate Judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff, Mr. Charles Ferrante, brought this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the

final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration, Defendant Joanne Barnhart (the “Commissioner”),

denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) pursuant to Title II of the

Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. 

I Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance

benefits and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits on or

about August 13, 2002. Administrative Record on Appeal (“R.”)

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 1 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-2- 

(Docket No. 6A) at 20, 78-80, 81-84. Plaintiff’s application

for benefits was denied initially and on appeal. Id. at 20.

Plaintiff requested a hearing regarding his eligibility for

benefits, which was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) on October 8, 2004. Id. At the hearing Plaintiff,

represented by counsel, amended the alleged onset of disability

date to April 27, 2002. Id. 

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled as that

term is defined by the federal Social Security statutes and

denied Plaintiff benefits. Id. at 30. The Social Security

Appeals Council denied review of this decision, rendering the

ALJ’s decision the final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration, for purposes of judicial

review. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (2005).

Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Judicial Review of

Administrative Determination of Claim for Social Security

Disability Benefits on July 29, 2005. Plaintiff alleges the ALJ

erred in his findings of fact and application of the law when

concluding Plaintiff was not disabled as that term is defined by

the Social Security statutes.

II Standard of review

The Court’s jurisdiction extends to reviewing the final

decision of Defendant denying Plaintiff’s application for Social

Security disability and Supplemental Security benefits pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Plaintiff and Defendant have filed

motions seeking judgment as a matter of law. See Docket No. 11

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 2 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

“Although the parties and the District Court refer to the District Court’s

disposition as ‘summary judgment,’ such terminology is most inaccurate.”

Shafer v. Barnhart, 120 Fed. App. 688, 691 (9th Cir. 2005).

-3- 

& Docket No. 15.1

Judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner is

based upon the pleadings and the record of the contested

decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2003 & Supp. 2006). The

scope of the Court’s review is limited to determining whether

the Commissioner, i.e., the ALJ, applied the correct legal

standards to Plaintiff’s claim and whether the record as a whole

contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of

fact. See id. § 423; Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953

(9th Cir. 2001); Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir.

2001). However, if an ALJ’s legal error was harmless, i.e.,

there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s

conclusion on the challenged issue absent the legal error, the

case need not be remanded for further proceedings. See Batson

v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th

Cir. 2004); Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.

1990); Booz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 734 F.2d

1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Satisfying the substantial evidence standard requires

more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of

evidence. See, e.g., Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953. Substantial

evidence has been defined as the amount of relevant evidence a

reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. See, e.g., Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113

(9th Cir. 1999). Evidence is insubstantial if it is

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 3 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-4- 

overwhelmingly contradicted by other evidence in the

administrative record. See Threet v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 1185,

1189 (10th Cir. 2003); Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d

Cir. 1983); Robison v. Barnhart, 316 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163 (D.

Del. 2004); Rodriguez v. Barnhart, 252 F. Supp. 2d 329, 332

(N.D. Tex. 2003); Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F. Supp. 2d 496, 501

(M.D. Pa. 2000). If the evidence with regard to an issue is in

equipoise, the Court must affirm the decision of the ALJ. See,

e.g., Gathney v. Chater, 104 F. 3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1997);

Books v. Chater, 91 F. 3d 972, 977-78 (7th Cir. 1996).

Because the ALJ is responsible for weighing the

evidence, resolving conflicts, and making independent findings

of fact, the Court may not decide the facts anew, re-weigh the

evidence, and decide whether a claimant is or is not disabled.

See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001); Powers v.

Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434-35 (7th Cir. 2000). As stated supra,

if the evidence can support either outcome, the reviewing court

may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, but must

affirm the ALJ’s decision. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,

679 (9th Cir. 2005); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201

(9th Cir. 2001); Casey v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,

987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993).

III Statement of the Law

Title II of the Social Security Act provides for the

payment of benefits to individuals who suffer from a

“disability.” See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D) (2003 & Supp. 2006).

To be eligible for disability benefits, the claimant must

demonstrate they were “disabled” on or before the date they are

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 4 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-5- 

or were “last insured” for disability benefits. See, e.g.,

McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1077 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002);

Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2001).

To establish eligibility for disability benefits under

the Social Security Act, the claimant must show: (1) he suffers

from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

twelve months, see 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)(2003 & Supp. 2006);

and (2) the impairment renders the claimant incapable of

performing the work he previously performed and incapable of

performing any other substantial gainful employment existing in

the national economy. See id. § 423(d)(2)(A). If a claimant

meets both of these requirements, he is by definition

“disabled.” See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. 

The Social Security Administration regulations

prescribe a five-step sequential process for determining whether

a claimant is “disabled.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2005). The

burden of proof is on the claimant throughout steps one through

four. See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. If a claimant is found

to be “disabled” or “not disabled” at any step in the sequential

process, there is no need to proceed to the subsequent step(s).

See id.

First, the claimant must establish he is not gainfully

employed at the time of his application. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(i) (2005). Next, the claimant must be suffering

from a “medically severe” impairment or “combination of

impairments.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The third step is to

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 5 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-6- 

determine whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one

of the “listed” impairments included in Appendix 1 to this

section of the Code of Federal Regulations. See id. §

404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments meet or

equal one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, the claimant

is conclusively “disabled.” See id. The fourth step of the

process requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant can

perform work similar to work he has performed in the past. A

claimant whose “residual functional capacity” allows him to

perform “past relevant work” despite his impairments, will be

denied benefits. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant

cannot perform his past relevant work, at step five the burden

shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate the claimant can

perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the

national economy, given his residual functional capacity. See

id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098.

When assessing a claimant’s residual functional

capacity, the Commissioner must consider the record opinions of

physicians pursuant to the Social Security regulations. Title

II’s implementing regulations distinguish among the opinions of

three types of physicians regarding a claimant’s residual

functional capacity: (1) those who treat the claimant (the

“treating” physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat

the claimant (the “examining” physicians); and (3) those who

neither examine nor treat the claimant, but who review the

claimant’s file (the “nonexamining” or “reviewing” physicians).

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2005); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995).

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 6 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-7- 

Additionally, the Social Security Administration

regulations instruct adjudicators to give greater weight to

opinions that are explained than to those that are not

explained, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) (2005), and to the

opinions of specialists concerning matters relating to their

specialty over those of nonspecialists. See id. §

404.1527(d)(5). See also Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195,

1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001). See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522

(9th Cir. 1996) (“We have held that the findings of a

nontreating, nonexamining physician can amount to substantial

evidence, so long as other evidence in the record supports those

findings.”).

IV Statement of Facts

At the time of the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff

was 49 years old. R. at 56 & 495. Plaintiff was “last insured”

for Social Security disability payments through December 31,

2003. Id. at 21, 87. Plaintiff previously worked as a

restaurant cook and as a motel maintenance worker. Id. at 93.

Plaintiff did not complete high school, but did earn a GED

certificate. Id. at 98 & 495.

Plaintiff completed an application for disability

benefits on August 9, 2002, alleging he was unable to work as of

September 30, 1998. Id. at 81-84. This onset of disability

date was amended in 2004 to April 27, 2002. Plaintiff alleged

he was unable to work due to chronic pulmonary insufficiency,

hepatitis C, upper and lower back problems, chronic pain, and

vision problems. Id. at 81. 

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 7 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Elavil is a tricyclic anti-depressant medication, a serotoninreuptake inhibitor, with potentially serious side-effects, including

increased symptoms of psychosis, heart block, stroke, tremors or

seizures.

-8- 

Plaintiff previously filed an application for

disability benefits in January of 1999, alleging disability

since September 30, 1998. Id. at 20. The application was

denied initially and upon reconsideration, and on May 22, 2000,

Plaintiff’s request for a hearing regarding this decision was

withdrawn. Id. at 42. Plaintiff, however, did subsequently

request and receive a hearing regarding this decision. Id. at

42. The application for benefits was denied by an ALJ after a

hearing, in April of 2002, which decision was not appealed by

Plaintiff to the United States District Court. Id. This

application for benefits did not allege Plaintiff suffered from

depression or other mental ailments.

Plaintiff’s physical ailments include hepatitis C,

chronic pulmonary disorders, vision disorders, and back pain.

See Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts, para. 5. Because Plaintiff

challenges only the ALJ’s decision regarding disability with

regard to his mental impairments, the Court will not discuss the

record with regard to Plaintiff’s physical ailments in detail.

In October of 1998, Plaintiff experienced marital

problems, called a poison control center, and went to the

hospital emergency room, stating he had taken 12 Elavil2 pills.

R. at 213. Plaintiff stated he had not wanted to commit

suicide, but that he was “pretty agitated.” Id. The doctor

noted: “apparently, he does not have any psychiatric history in

the past.” Id. at 214. Plaintiff was examined by a

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 8 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-9- 

psychiatrist, advised to make a follow-up appointment with the

psychiatrist, and refused marital counseling. Id. at 214-24.

In April of 2000, a physician noted Plaintiff was

unhappy with his physician’s opinion regarding his disability

status, and that Plaintiff was “feeling mildly depressed.” Id.

at 243-45.

In a disability report completed by Plaintiff on August

9, 2002, Plaintiff indicated he suffered from chronic pulmonary

trouble, hepatitis C, upper and lower back problems, a hole in

his left eye and possible cataracts in his right eye. Id. at

92. Plaintiff indicated these problems limited his ability to

work due to poor vision, shortness of breath, back pain, and

fatigue. Id. At that time, Plaintiff was taking Albuterol,

Nasacort and prednisone for his breathing ailments. Id. at 97.

In an activities of daily living report completed by

Plaintiff on November 19, 2002, Plaintiff indicated each day he

fixed his son breakfast and got his son off to school. Id. at

109. Plaintiff stated he would then “go back to bed, sometimes,

have morning coffee try to straighten up house, wait on the

mailman eat lunch if I am hungry and wait on son to get home.”

Id. Plaintiff stated he was on oxygen and took Albuterol and

Nasacort daily. Id. Plaintiff stated he cooked dinner for his

son, did laundry, and cleaned his house “as needed.” Id. at

110. Plaintiff stated he tired easily and lacked energy. Id.

Plaintiff averred he shopped twice a month with his son’s

assistance. Id. Plaintiff alleged he got along well with other

people, but did not often visit with friends or relatives due to

a lack of transportation. Id. Plaintiff stated he was not

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 9 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Dysthymia is defined as a chronic mood disorder manifested as

depression for most of the day, more days than not, accompanied by

some of the following symptoms: poor appetite or overeating, insomnia

or hypersomnia, low energy or fatigue, low self-esteem, poor

concentration, difficulty making decisions, and feelings of

hopelessness. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 556 (27th ed. 2000). See

also Lee v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 927, 1998 WL 39695, at *4 n.5 (9th

Cir.).

4

 The GAF is one of the five axes of the diagnostic system

described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

(4th edition), the “DSM-IV”, and considers psychological, social, and

occupational functioning. A GAF score is a subjective determination

which represents “the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall

level of functioning.” DSM-IV at 30. A GAF score of 21-40, on a 100

point scale, indicates multiple symptoms affecting all levels of

functioning and a GAF score of 41-70 indicates severe symptoms or

serious impairments in social or occupational functioning. 

-10- 

active in any religious organization or club, and that he

watched television during the day. Id. at 111. Plaintiff

averred he could drive, run errands, and manage his bills and

other business matters by himself. Id. 

In November of 2002, a disability claims case manager

noted “references to depression & an Elavil OD on file. A psych

CE is needed.” Id. at 125. Plaintiff was referred for a

psychiatric evaluation on January 9, 2003. Id. at 296.

Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Doss, a psychologist, by the

Arizona Department of Security Disability Determination

Services, for a mental-health evaluation. Id. at 295. Dr. Doss

holds a doctorate degree in education. Id. On February 17,

2003, Dr. Doss interviewed and examined Plaintiff. Id. 

Dr. Doss diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from anxiety

disorder (not otherwise specified) and late-onset dysthymic

disorder.3 Id. Dr. Doss assessed Plaintiff as having a Global

Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”)4 score of 56, indicating

Plaintiff suffered “moderate symptoms.” Id.

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 10 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-11- 

Dr. Doss’ notes state:

[Plaintiff] has experienced a number of

psychosocial stressors over the last six

years which have taken an emotional toll on

him. This man is just not happy with life

and is continually anxious.... He exhibited

poor short-term memory and concentration with

suspected low average intelligence. This man

has a history of alcohol and polydrug

dependence with the possibility of some

continual cannabis abuse. He was unable to

recount any coping skills and has no social

support system but is able to maintain and

retain a meaningful daily life activities

because of single parenting his 13-year-old

son. Dysthymia and non-specific anxiety are

present as exemplified in disturbed sleep,

rumination, and an inability to experience

any joy from life.

Id. at 295-96.

The doctor’s notes further state: “Mr. Ferrante was

fully capable of providing background data on himself and did so

in a logical and coherent manner.” Id. at 296. Plaintiff

reported to Dr. Doss he had worked in oil fields, doing

plumbing, cooking, construction, masonry and mining. Id. at

297. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Doss he had worked doing

maintenance for ten years and that he enjoyed this job. Id.

Plaintiff stated he quit this job because his physician

recommended he quit due to his pulmonary problems. Id.

(However, the doctor’s notes also state: “He is not sure if he

got fired or quit the job.”).

The client was asked what currently keeps him

from working to which he replied both

physical and mental problems.... Mentally and

emotionally, he stated he has problems

dealing with all the stressors in his life.

He has nightmares and sleep problems.

However, Charles has no current mental health

treatment and no history of mental health

treatment.

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 11 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 The Court notes that, on September 2, 1992, a physician’s note

stated Plaintiff reported: “Brother got killed few weeks ago.” R. at 149.

The doctor’s notation states: “Also stress at job. Does not feel like

killing himself....[illegible] stress, anxiety” Id.

-12- 

Id. Dr. Doss noted Plaintiff has two adult children who also

resided in Kingman, Arizona. Id. at 297-98. Plaintiff reported

he had been depressed since his brother was murdered in 1997.

Id. at 298.5 

Dr. Doss’ notes further state:

Throughout his assessment, it was hard to get

straight answers from this man. He tended to

mumble and ramble. Perhaps his missing teeth

added to his difficulty in articulating.

Nonetheless, he appeared sincere about

participating in the evaluation. 

The psychologist had to sometimes refocus him

on the task at hand. His answers were

basically logical and coherent. He seemed

grateful for the time given him for this

evaluation.

Id. 

Dr. Doss noted Plaintiff interacted about once per week

with people who came to his home for Bible study. Id.

Plaintiff reported that, in an average day, he drank coffee, got

his son off to school, did the dishes and fed his dogs. Id.

Plaintiff reported he did housekeeping and looked after his own

hygiene, and spent the day and the evening watching television.

Id. at 298-99.

Dr. Doss evaluated Plaintiff as having very poor shortterm memory and low average cognitive functioning. Id. at 299.

Dr. Doss opined that Plaintiff’s concentration was poor. Id.

Dr. Doss noted Plaintiff admitted previously drinking to excess,

but that his drinking issues were in full remission. Id. Dr.

Doss stated:

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 12 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-13- 

This man also appears to be a polydrug

dependent individual in sustained full

remission with the possibility of still some

cannabis use. He was quick to say that he

does not consider marijuana a drug. However,

this man was arrested and served time in

prison for possession of marijuana with

intent to sell.

Charles used cannabis, heroin and LSD on a

regular and excessive basis. When asked for

the last time he used drugs, the psychologist

had to ask the question four times. He

stated his last drug use was 15 years ago,

but bear in mind he does not consider

marijuana a drug.

Id. 

The doctor’s notes further state: 

For physical pain, he does nothing as is also

the case for emotional pain. He has devoid

of coping skills (sic)... This man was asked

directly about depression to which he replied

‘kinda.’ He described himself as bummed out,

more than severely depressed. He has felt

this way for years but could not say when it

started... This man takes no medications for

depression and has never been medicated for

it. He denied any history of severe

depression and appears to be dysthmic rather

than into a severe vegetative state of major

depression. His biggest problem is how he

punishes himself for not being able to work.

Id. at 299-300. The doctor described Plaintiff’s mental

difficulties as being of “equal proportion” to his physical

difficulties at that point in time. Id. at 300. The doctor

opined Plaintiff could not “Be happy. Quit worrying. Be painfree.” Id. at 300-01.

Dr. Doss completed an assessment of Plaintiff’s ability

to do work-related activities on a daily basis in a regular work

situation. Id. at 302. Dr. Doss concluded Plaintiff’s ability

to do work-related activities on a daily basis was “fair,” i.e.,

seriously limited but not precluded, in the areas of dealing

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 13 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-14- 

with the public, maintaining attention or concentration, and

reacting predictably in social situations. Id. at 302-03. Dr.

Doss opined Plaintiff had “poor” or no capacity to deal with

work stress or to behave in an emotionally stable manner. Id.

On March 11, 2003, Dr. Enos, a state-appointed

psychologist, reviewed Plaintiff’s records, including Dr. Doss’

report, and completed an assessment of Plaintiff’s mental

residual functional capacity. Id. at 333 & 337. The doctor

noted Plaintiff suffered from affective disorder, anxietyrelated disorder, and personality disorder. Id. at 337. 

Dr. Enos, a reviewing psychologist, opined Plaintiff

suffered from the medically determinable impairment of

dysthymia. Id. at 340. Dr. Enos also opined Plaintiff was not

moderately or markedly limited with regard to any mental

impairment. Id. at 333. Dr. Enos stated Plaintiff showed signs

of persistent disturbances of mood or affect, and pathological

dependence, passivity or aggressivity. Id. at 344. With regard

to Plaintiff’s functional limitations, the doctor opined

Plaintiff had mild difficulties in maintaining social

functioning, and mild difficulties in maintaining concentration,

persistence or pace, with no episodes of decompensation. Id. at

347.

Dr. Enos concluded Plaintiff was not significantly

limited with regard to working with others and carrying out

short and simple instructions. Id. at 333. Dr. Enos stated

there was no evidence of limitations with regard to the ability

to completely a normal work-day and work-week, and no evidence

Plaintiff’s ability to appropriately interact with the public

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 14 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 Dr. Waldman’s website indicates he holds a Ph.D. in educational

psychology and that he has practiced as a clinical psychologist since 1979.

-15- 

was limited. Id. at 334. The doctor stated: “Claimant can

remember and carry out simple instructions, work cooperatively,

do personal planning, interact with peers, public and

supervisors, work within a routine and a schedule and complete

a routine work week within his physical limitations.” Id. at

335.

On July 18, 2003, Dr. Waldman, a non-examining Ph.D.,

completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form and a mental

residual functional capacity assessment regarding Plaintiff’s

condition. Id. at 424.6 Dr. Waldman opined there was

insufficient evidence to support the conclusion Plaintiff

suffered from a severe mental impairment. Id. Dr. Waldman

opined Plaintiff had mild limitations regarding maintaining

social functioning and in maintaining concentration,

persistence, or pace. Id. at 434. This doctor concluded there

was insufficient evidence to determine if Plaintiff suffered

from episodes of decompensation. Id. at 434.

Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified at the

hearing before the ALJ on October 8, 2004. Plaintiff testified

his ability to work was affected by his back pain, his fatigue,

his depression, and his vision problems. Id. at 498. Plaintiff

testified he had trouble sleeping and had little energy or

appetite. Id. at 500. Plaintiff stated he rarely left his home

and that he did not often associate with other people. Id.

Plaintiff stated he was irritable, nervous, and that he cried

often. Id. at 500-01. Plaintiff stated he did not seek

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 15 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 Dr. Barker, an M.D., examined Plaintiff on January 29, 2003, at the

behest of the Arizona Department of Economic Security Disability

Determination Services. R. at 280. Dr. Barker noted Plaintiff reported he

borrowed other people’s cars to do his shopping, banking, and errands, and

that Plaintiff did housework, cooking, and cleaning. Id. Plaintiff told

Dr. Barker he took “early retirement” from his job doing motel maintenance.

Id. at 281. The doctor noted:

No actual fatigue, weakness, fever, night sweats or sleep

disturbance.... He has oxygen use at home. He has not used it

for some time.... No vision problems other than bifocals, that

is he has no cataracts or glaucoma and has good color vision....

He has not had any chest pains, wheezing or asthma history as

stated... It is unknown about depression. There was a statement

about that in the past.

Id. The doctor continued: “He appears to have been doing some weightlifting

from a strong muscle tone...” Id. at 282.

-16- 

professional treatment for his depression because his son had

been treated for psychological problems without success. Id. at

502. 

Plaintiff asserted that, when he got stressed, he

couldn’t catch his breath, which caused him to panic. Id. at

503. Plaintiff testified he did housekeeping, cooking, grocery

shopping, and laundry. Id. at 504.

A neurologist, Dr. Goren, testified at Plaintiff’s

hearing. The doctor did not examine Plaintiff, but reviewed

Plaintiff’s medical records, including Dr. Doss’ report, prior

to the hearing. Id. at 508-09. The doctor opined that

Plaintiff’s problems breathing when stressed “could be anxiety

attacks.” Id. at 509. The doctor stated the breathing problems

could also be due to asthma, but were probably not due to

chronic pulmonary disease. Id. Dr. Goren noted a consultative

evaluation by a Dr. Barker in January of 2003 had produced a

notation that Plaintiff possibly exaggerated his symptoms. Id.

at 509-10.7 

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 16 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-17- 

Dr. Goren, who had not examined Plaintiff but who had

reviewed Dr. Doss’ report in addition to Plaintiff’s other

medical records, questioned whether a GAF of 56 could be aligned

with Dr. Doss’ narrative views on Plaintiff’s ability to do

specific job-related tasks. Id. at 510. Dr. Goren stated:

“Further, I had already independently of what I heard from Mr.

Ober [Plaintiff’s counsel], I had already raised questions in my

own mind about the credibility because in the records claimant

seems to be complaining that he has severe pulmonary disease.”

Id. The ALJ replied: “Well, I’ll determine credibility.” Id.

Dr. Goren opined that, with regard to Plaintiff’s

mental symptoms, Plaintiff could not perform work involving high

production quotas and would be limited to work with “limited

interpersonal interaction.” Id. at 510. Plaintiff’s counsel

asked Dr. Goren if “a current psychiatric or psychological

evaluation [would] help clarify” whether Plaintiff’s breathing

difficulties could be anxiety-related, to which the doctor

replied: “It might...” Id. at 511. In response to another

question by counsel, Dr. Goren indicated Plaintiff might have

difficulty tolerating customary work pressure if he experienced

breathing problems when stressed. Id. Dr. Goren also opined

the relevant issue would be the severity of the problem. Id.

Plaintiff’s counsel requested the ALJ order a

psychiatric consultative examination based on Dr. Goren’s

testimony. Id. at 512. The ALJ took the request “under

advisement.” Id. In his written decision denying benefits the

ALJ indicated he did not order another psychiatric consultative

examination because, at the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 17 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-18- 

not seeking mental health treatment. Id. at 21.

A vocational expert also testified at Plaintiff’s

hearing before the ALJ. The vocational expert testified

Plaintiff could not return to his past relevant work in building

maintenance due to his physical limitations. Id. at 514. The

vocational expert testified an individual who could not perform

work involving high production quotas and who would be limited

to work with limited interpersonal interaction could perform

work as a cashier. Id. at 515-16. The vocational expert

testified an individual with all of the mental limitations

assessed by Dr. Doss would be precluded from working because

they could not deal with work stress or behave in an emotionally

stable manner. Id. at 516-18. 

On October 29, 2004, the ALJ issued a decision finding

Plaintiff was not disabled as that term is defined by the Social

Security Administration. Id. at 20-31. The ALJ’s opinion

states:

In this case, in a hearing decision dated

April 26, 2002[,] Administrative Law Judge

Alden found the claimant was “not disabled”

[]. Thus, Chavez and AR 97-4(9) require

adherence to this finding of nondisability

unless the claimant establishes changed

circumstances. [ALJ Alden] found the

claimant had the following impairments that

are considered severe under the Social

Security Regulations: low back pain,

hepatitis C, limited vision of the left eye

and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.

Review of the new medical evidence of record

submitted after the April 26, 2002 hearing

decision establishes that the claimant has

the following new severe impairments: mild

affective disorder and mild anxiety disorder.

These new impairments are considered “changed

circumstances.” Accordingly, the undersigned

finds the claimant has rebutted the

presumption of continuing nondisability by

showing changed circumstances.

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 18 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-19- 

...

[R]eview of the new medical evidence of

record submitted after the April 26, 2002

decision establishes that the claimant’s left

eye impairment has worsened such that he has

no depth perception in that eye.

Furthermore, the new evidence submitted after

the April 26, 2002 hearing decision

establishes that the claimant’s mental

impairments adversely affect his ability to

deal with the public. ...

Id. at 21-22. 

The ALJ proceeded to the five-step sequential process

for determining if Plaintiff was disabled. The ALJ concluded

Plaintiff had impairments that were severe, i.e., hepatitis C,

history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder, left eye

vision disorder, low back pain, mild affective disorder, and

mild anxiety disorder. Id. at 22. The ALJ concluded that,

based on Dr. Goren’s testimony, none of Plaintiff’s impairments

met or equaled a listed impairment. Id. at 23. The ALJ noted:

“No treating or examining physician has indicated findings that

would satisfy the severity requirements of any listed

impairment.” Id.

The ALJ continued to a recitation of his findings

regarding Plaintiff’s physical residual functional capacity, and

concluded Plaintiff was physically capable of performing light

exertional work. Id. The ALJ further stated, with regard to

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity:

[T]he undersigned does not find the

claimant’s allegations that he is incapable

of all work activity credible because of

significant inconsistencies in the record as

a whole. The course of medical treatment,

minimal objective findings, and minimal

abnormal clinical findings in this case is

not consistent with allegations of disabling

pain and physical symptoms. 

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 19 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-20- 

Id. The ALJ noted that, although Plaintiff stated he had severe

vision problems, he had a driver’s license and drove despite his

limited vision. Id. The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s vision in his

left eye was abnormal but that, despite Plaintiff’s claims to

the contrary, Plaintiff could see 20/20 with his right eye. Id.

at 24. The ALJ further noted the contradiction between

Plaintiff’s claims of chronic pulmonary disease and the lack of

objective clinical findings in the record that Plaintiff

actually suffered from pulmonary disease. Id. The ALJ noted

Plaintiff had been hospitalized twice for an asthma attack and

that Dr. Goren opined Plaintiff’s breathing problems could be

caused by anxiety. Id. The ALJ further noted that the clinical

evidence in the record, or the lack thereof, and Plaintiff’s

daily activities did not comport with Plaintiff’s allegations

that he suffered from disabling back pain. Id. at 24-25. 

The ALJ stated:

Turning to the claimant’s allegations of

mental impairments, the undersigned must

evaluate the severity of the impairments

using the two-pronged analysis outlined in

the Regulations...the undersigned will

determine the degree of functional

limitation, if any, resulting from the

[mental] impairment(s) using four broad

functional areas: activities of daily living;

social functioning; concentration,

persistence, or pace; and episodes of

decompensation []. 

The claimant has had no mental health

treatment. As such, he underwent a

psychological evaluation at the request of

the State agency in February of 2003 with

Minette Nance Doss EdD []....

Dr. Doss opined the claimant’s replies to the

cognition questions suggested lower average

functioning. His immediate memory was good,

but short-term memory was quite poor as he

could not remember any of the three words

after a five-minute interview interval.

In addition, the claimant described himself

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 20 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-21- 

as bummed out rather than as severely

depressed. He said he worried constantly and

excessively. He stated he was worried about

his daily existence. The claimant was

diagnosed with anxiety disorder not otherwise

specified, dysthymic disorder later onset and

history of alcoholic and polysubstance abuse

in full remission. Dr. Doss assessed the

claimant with a Global Assessment of Function

(GAF) score of 56, which is consistent with

moderate symptoms.

On the basis of this evidence, the

undersigned concludes the claimant’s mental

impairments cause only slight limitations in

his activities of daily living and social

functioning. The claimant is able to take

care of his household chores, cook meals, go

grocery shopping and take care of his son as

a single parent. ... In addition, while the

claimant said he had no friends, he

acknowledged that he meets with a Bible study

group once a week. ...

Based on the evidence and giving the claimant

the great benefit of the doubt as there is

little evidence in this area, the undersigned

finds the claimant has moderate limitations

in his concentration, persistence or pace.

On mental status examination in February of

2003 the claimant exhibited poor short-term

memory and concentration with suspected low

average intelligence []. There is no

evidence of any episodes of decompensation in

a work or work like setting....

Therefore, the undersigned finds the claimant

has the following mental limitations. He is

limited to a low stress work without high

production quotas that have a minimal

interaction with the public, coworkers and

supervisors.

Id. at 25-26. 

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not entirely credible

regarding both his physical and mental limitations. Id. at 27.

The ALJ stated: “Regarding his mental health allegations, the

claimant declines to receive mental health treatment in Kingman.

One would expect if one were as disabled as suggested by the

claimant that one would seek mental health treatment.” Id.

With regard to the record regarding Plaintiff’s mental

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 21 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-22- 

impairments, the ALJ stated:

The undersigned concludes that the opinion of

Dr. Goren, the medical expert who testified

at the hearing, is partially persuasive. Dr.

Goren opined the claimant’s mental

impairments would limit him to simple work

without high production quotas and minimal

contact with supervisors, the public, and coworkers. This opinion is well supported by

the medical evidence. ...

Furthermore, the undersigned rejects the

February of 2003 opinion rendered by Dr.

Doss, the consultative evaluator. She opined

the claimant had no ability to deal with work

stresses and behave in an emotionally stable

manner []. She indicated this was because

the claimant was “worn down emotionally.”

However, being worn down emotionally is

certainly not a mental impairment. Moreover,

there is no evidence to support her

conclusion that the claimant can’t handle

stress or behave socially. The claimant’s

activities indicate he is able to grocery

shop and host a weekly bible study meeting in

his home. His performance on the mental

status examination was satisfactory and did

not show any signs of panic or anxiety. The

undersigned also finds that the GAF of 56

assessed by Dr. Goss is not supported by the

evidence. As such, her opinion is rejected

as it is not supported by the significant

weight of the medical evidence when taken as

a whole.

Id. at 27-28 (emphasis added). 

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff retained the physical

residual functional capacity for light work. The ALJ further

concluded Plaintiff’s mental limitations required him to perform

work which was limited to “low stress [] without high production

quotas that have a minimal interaction with the public,

coworkers and supervisors.” Id. at 26-27. The ALJ determined

that Plaintiff could not return to his past relevant work, but

that he could perform a job available in the national and local

economy, i.e., a cashier. Id. at 28.

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 22 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-23- 

V Analysis

A. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to

credit Dr. Doss’ opinion regarding Plaintiff’s work-related

limitations.

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred by not giving

sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Doss’ opinion regarding the

extent of Plaintiff’s functional mental limitations. Plaintiff

further contends the ALJ erred by substituting his opinion

regarding Plaintiff’s mental ailments for those of Dr. Doss, by

stating “[Plaintiff’s] being worn down emotionally is certainly

not a mental impairment.” Docket No. 15 at 4. 

Respondent contends the ALJ could properly discount Dr.

Doss’ opinion based on the opinion of a non-examining medical

source, i.e., the opinion of Dr. Goren. Defendant emphasizes

Plaintiff never sought or received mental health treatment, nor

has he expressed any intention to seek such treatment and yet he

asserts he is completely disabled by his mental condition.

Additionally, Defendant notes the ALJ did not entirely discount

Dr. Doss’ opinion, and that Dr. Doss herself opined Plaintiff

was not completely disabled, i.e., he was capable of taking care

of himself, his teenage son, and managing his household.

Defendant notes that, in addition to the opinion of the

neurologist testifying at the hearing, two state agency doctors

who reviewed Plaintiff’s records concluded Plaintiff was only

“mildly” limited with regard to work because of his mental

impairments. 

An examining physician’s findings can constitute

substantial evidence to establish a claimant’s residual

functional capacity and the ALJ may reject those findings only

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 23 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 In Reddick, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a treating physician’s

opinion which was not contradicted could be discounted only for clear and

convincing reasons. A treating physician’s opinion which was contradicted

may be discounted only for “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by

substantial evidence in the record. See 157 F.3d at 725.

-24- 

for “clear and convincing,” or specific and legitimate reasons,

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Cf. Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998).8 

The ALJ stated “clear and convincing” reasons for

rejecting Dr. Doss’ conclusion Plaintiff would be completely

incapable of working due to his mental impairments.

Additionally, the ALJ’s decision to reject some of the

functional limitations assessed by Dr. Doss is supported by

substantial evidence in the record. 

The ALJ noted internal consistencies between Dr. Doss’

narrative statements about Plaintiff and her conclusions

regarding his mental limitations. Dr. Doss’ opinion Plaintiff

had poor or no ability to behave in an emotionally stable manner

in a work setting was contradicted by the record, which

indicated no such episodes. Plaintiff did not, apparently,

recount to Dr. Doss any episode of emotionally unstable behavior

in a work or social setting. Dr. Doss did not, apparently,

believe Plaintiff’s mental condition was so severe that she

recommended he seek treatment or be prescribed medication for

dysthymia or an anxiety disorder.

The ALJ noted the lack of clinical findings supporting

Dr. Doss’ conclusion Plaintiff was completely unable to function

in a work setting because of his work-related stress, and that

he is completely unstable in a work setting. There was an

absence of clinical findings to support Dr. Doss’ conclusions:

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 24 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-25- 

when asked the clinical basis for her opinion of Plaintiff’s

mental functional capacity, Dr. Doss stated Plaintiff was “worn

down emotionally.” This is not a clinical basis for the

conclusion Plaintiff has little or no ability to function in a

stable manner or that Plaintiff experiences work-related stress

to the extent he is incapable of any gainful employment. An

examining physician’s opinion regarding a claimant’s functional

capacity may properly be discounted if it is not based on

clinical and medical findings in the record. See Batson, 359

F.3d at 1195, Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir.

2001), Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600-02. 

Furthermore, any legal error was harmless, i.e., the

ALJ’s opinion that Dr. Doss’ ultimate conclusions regarding

Plaintiff’s residual mental functional capacity could be

discounted is supported by substantial evidence in the record,

i.e., Dr. Goren’s opinion, Dr. Enos’ opinion, and Dr. Waldman’s

opinion. There is a noted lack of evidence to support Dr. Doss’

conclusion Plaintiff’s mental condition renders him completely

unable to work; the only evidence supporting her conclusion is

Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing, which arguably does not

even support the contention Plaintiff suffers severe workrelated stress and is completely unstable in a work setting. 

Plaintiff’s testimony and Dr. Doss’ unsupported opinion

do not constitute “substantial” evidence to support a finding of

disability. See Bowser v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 121 Fed.

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 25 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 In Bowser, the ALJ determined at step three of the evaluation

that the plaintiff’s depression was not a severe “medically

determinable mental impairment.”

The claimant bears the burden of furnishing evidence of

medically determinable impairments. [] “Medical signs and

laboratory findings, established by medically acceptable

clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, must show the

existence of a medical impairment(s) which results from

anatomical, physiological, or physiological abnormalities

....” § 404.1529(b). ...

***

Regarding Claimant’s alleged depression, Bowser challenges

the ALJ’s determination that her alleged depression does

not constitute a medically determinable mental impairment

which impacts her residual functional capacity. The ALJ

properly found that Bowser’s alleged depression did not

constitute a medically determinable impairment. The ALJ

cited numerous reasons in support of his decision not to

credit Bowser’s allegations of depression. Specifically,

the ALJ noted that Claimant failed to seek treatment for

depression, she was not referred to any mental health

specialist, and the records of treating physician Gregory

White, M.D., do not document any complaints of depression.

... In addition, there is no record evidence of

hospitalizations, she never alleged mental difficulties on

her Disability Report, and she testified that “I’ve ben

[sic] in a state of depression for a while there. I think

I’m getting a little better now”...

Finally, the ALJ observed that the record is devoid of

evidence or testimony that she ever sought assistance from

any other source for depression.

-26- 

App. 231, 237-38 (9th Cir. 2003).9 The evidence in the record

that Plaintiff is disabled is insubstantial because it is

overwhelmingly contradicted by other evidence in the

administrative record, i.e., the opinions of Dr. Enos, Dr.

Walden, and Dr. Goren. See Threet, 353 F.3d at 1189.

B. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by relying on the

testimony of a non-examining neurologist, Dr. Goren, in reaching

his conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments.

At Step 4 of the five-step sequential process used to

determine if a claimant is “disabled,” the ALJ must examine the

claimant’s “residual functional capacity and the physical and

mental demands” of the claimant’s past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(e) & 416.920(e) (2005). To find that the claimant

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 26 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-27- 

is not disabled at Step 4, the claimant must be able to perform,

based on their residual functional capacity: (1) the actual

functional demands and job duties of a particular past relevant

job; or (2) the functional demands and job duties of an

occupation as generally required by employers throughout the

national economy. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 844-45.

In this case, when assessing Plaintiff’s residual

functional mental capacity, the ALJ did not have before him the

opinion of a treating mental health professional. The ALJ had

the opinion of Dr. Doss, an examining psychologist, who

conducted a consultative examination on one occasion and who has

a degree in education, and a nonexamining reviewing physician

with a degree in neurology, i.e., Dr. Goren. The ALJ also had

in the record before him the opinions of Dr. Enos and Dr.

Waldman, both nonexamining reviewing psychiatrists.

The opinion of an examining physician is entitled to

greater weight than that of a nonexamining physician, and, if

contradicted by other medical opinions, can only be rejected for

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211,

1216 (9th Cir. 2005); Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995). The opinion of

non-examining physician, alone, is sufficient to support an

ALJ’s decision finding a claimant not disabled, if the nonexamining physician’s opinion is in accordance with independent

substantial evidence in the record. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at

600; Saelee, 94 F.3d at 522. 

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 27 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-28- 

 The ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons, supported

by substantial evidence in the record, for rejecting Dr. Doss’

opinion that Plaintiff was completely mentally disabled. See

Saelee, 94 F.3d at 522-23 (holding that the “ALJ’s primary

reliance on the findings of ... a medical consultant was not an

abuse of discretion” because other evidence in the record

supported the non-treating, non-examining physicians’ findings);

Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1992)

(treating physician examined claimant only once and offered an

opinion several months later that contradicted the physician’s

clinical evaluation). See also Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577,

579, 580 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that if the evidence supports

more than one rational interpretation, this Court must uphold

the decision of the ALJ and must not second-guess the ALJ’s

choice among conflicting medical opinions). 

Additionally, as stated supra, any legal error in this

regard would have been harmless error, because the Court

concludes there is substantial evidence in the record to support

the ALJ’s conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s residual functional

mental capacity. Because Dr. Goren’s opinion, alone, is

sufficient to support the ALJ’s decision finding Plaintiff not

disabled because it is in accordance with independent

substantial evidence in the record, i.e., the functional

limitations assessed by both Dr. Enos and Dr. Walden, there was

no error in the ALJ’s decision to adopt Dr. Goren’s opinion.

See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600; Saelee, 94 F.3d at 522. 

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 28 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 In Armstrong, the plaintiff alleged the ALJ erred by inferring a

date of onset of disability without calling a medical expert to testify as

to the date of onset of the plaintiff’s disabilities. The Ninth Circuit

concluded the date of onset was unclear and, therefore, that the ALJ erred.

[W]here a record is ambiguous as to the onset date of disability,

the ALJ must call a medical expert to assist in determining the

onset date. ...

The ALJ can fulfill this responsibility by calling a medical

expert or where medical testimony is unhelpful, exploring lay

evidence including the testimony of family, friends, or former

employers to determine the onset date. 

Armstrong v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 160 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir.

1998).

-29- 

C. Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred by failing to fully

and fairly develop the record. Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred

by denying Plaintiff’s request for a psychiatric consultative

examination.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have further

developed the record with regard to the cause of Plaintiff’s

breathing problems when stressed or anxious, based in part on

Dr. Goren’s statement that further inquiry “might” determine the

exact cause of this limitation. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred

by not assisting in developing the record, citing Armstrong v.

Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 160 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 1998),10

and Morgan v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff contends the ALJ abused his discretion “by failing to

follow the regulatory procedures for ordering a consultative

examination.” Docket No. 11 at 10.

[T]he Commissioner has broad latitude in

ordering a consultative examination. The

government is not required to bear the

expense of an examination for every claimant.

Some kinds of cases, however, do normally

require a consultative examination, including

those in which additional evidence needed is

not contained in the records of the

claimant’s medical sources, and those

involving an ambiguity or insufficiency in

the evidence that must be resolved.

Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 2001).

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 29 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-30- 

The burden is on the claimant at steps one through four

to establish that he is disabled. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217.

If the ALJ determines that he has adequate evidence to determine

if the claimant is disabled, he is not required to seek further

evidence of disability. Id. Where there is ambiguity or an

insufficiency of evidence the ALJ should order a “consultative

examination.” Reed, 270 F.3d at 842; Hawkins v. Chater, 113

F.3d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 1997). However, where there is

sufficient evidence in the record for an ALJ to conclude that

the claimant’s alleged incapacitating impairment does not render

them completely disabled, the ALJ does not abuse his discretion

by failing to order further psychological evaluation. See

Hawkins, 113 F.3d at 1165.

The ALJ did not err by rejecting Plaintiff’s request

for additional mental health consultation. The Court notes

that, regardless of the cause of Plaintiff’s breathing problems

when stressed, the ALJ took this limitations into account when

determining Plaintiff’s residual functional mental capacity.

Additionally, both Armstrong and Morgan are distinguishable from

the case before the Court. In Morgan and Armstrong, the Ninth

Circuit found the ALJ erred by determining the onset date of a

claimant’s mental disorder without the assistance of a medical

expert. This matter is also distinguishable from Tonapetyan v.

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001), a case wherein the

testifying medical expert repeatedly stated that a more detailed

record was necessary, the Ninth Circuit also concluded that the

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 30 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 Additionally, in Jackson v. Barnhart, 67 Fed. App. 711 (3d

Cir. 2003), the court concluded the ALJ did not err by failing to

order the claimant to undergo intelligence testing to determine if she

met the listing for mental retardation, where a psychiatric review

identified the impairment of affective disorders, but noted there was

“[no] evidence of a sign or symptom cluster or syndrome” that might

evidence mental retardation.

-31- 

ALJ erred by not further developing the record.11

D. Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred by not determining

Plaintiff’s function-by-function mental residual functional

capacity.

“In order for the testimony of a VE to be considered

reliable, the hypothetical posed must include all of the

claimant’s functional limitations, both physical and mental[,]

supported by the record.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 956

(9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

An “ALJ is not bound to accept as true the restrictions

presented” by the claimant in posing an otherwise legitimate

hypothetical question to a vocational expert. See Roberts v.

Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1995). Additionally, the

“exclusion of some of a claimant’s subjective complaints in

questions to a vocational expert is not improper if the [ALJ]

makes specific findings justifying his decision not to believe

the claimant’s testimony about claimed impairments such as

pain.” Copeland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 540 (9th Cir. 1988);

see also Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756-57 (9th Cir.

1989); Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1988).

The ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s residual

mental functional capacity were sufficiently stated and

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lowe v.

Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2000); Diaz v. Chater, 55

F.3d 300, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1995) (“ALJ need not provide a

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 31 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-32- 

complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and

evidence”). Compare Groeper v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1234, 1239

(8th Cir. 1991). 

Although a more specific function-by-function analysis

would have been desirable, the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s

residual mental functional capacity was not inadequate as a

matter of law. The ALJ’s failure to enunciate a different

function-by-function evaluation of Plaintiff’s non-exertional

limitations in his written opinion was harmless error because

the ALJ applied the proper legal standard. See Matthews v.

Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1993); Curry v. Sullivan,

925 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1990).

E. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by discounting

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his mental impairments without

providing clear and convincing reasons for rejecting this

testimony.

An ALJ must provide “specific, cogent reasons,”

supported by substantial evidence in the record, for his

disbelief of a claimant’s statements regarding the claimant’s

disability. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345.

See also Jernigan v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir.

1991). Unless there is affirmative evidence indicating that the

claimant is actually malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for

rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.

See Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683,

687 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ must specifically identify what

portion of the testimony in the record is credible and what

testimony undermines the claimant’s complaints. See Lester, 81

F.3d at 834; Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.

1993). “To find the claimant not credible the ALJ must rely

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 32 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-33- 

either on reasons unrelated to the subjective testimony (e.g.,

reputation for dishonesty), on conflicts between his testimony

and his own conduct, or on internal contradictions in that

testimony.” Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th

Cir. 1997). 

To determine whether the claimant’s testimony

regarding the severity of [his] symptoms is

credible, the ALJ may consider, for example:

(1) ordinary techniques of credibility

evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation

for lying, prior inconsistent statements

concerning the symptoms, and other testimony

by the claimant that appears less than

candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately

explained failure to seek treatment or to

follow a prescribed course of treatment; and

(3) the claimant’s daily activities. In

evaluating the credibility of the symptom

testimony, the ALJ must also consider the

factors set out in [Social Security Ruling]

88-13.

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal

citations omitted).

The record contains substantial evidence from which the

ALJ could conclude Plaintiff was not entirely credible in

reporting his mental limitations and in alleging that he could

not work because of his mental condition. Dr. Doss noted

Plaintiff was not completely forthcoming with information about

his mental condition and, potentially, his continued use of

marijuana, and that he was potentially rationalizing his

continued use of marijuana. Dr. Goren testified his review of

the record indicated some of Plaintiff’s physicians did not find

him completely credible. 

Plaintiff’s recitation of his daily activities, i.e.,

that he did not socialize more because of a lack of

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 33 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-34- 

transportation, was not consistent with other evidence in the

record, i.e., his testimony he did not socialize more because of

his mental condition. Plaintiff’s recitation of his mental

problems was not consistent with other evidence in the record;

for instance, Plaintiff alleged in November of 2002 in an

activities of daily living report that he suffered sleep

disturbances but in February of 2003 during a physician’s

examination he denied any sleeping problems. Additionally, the

ALJ could properly consider that Plaintiff had the mental

capacity to take care of his household, his son, and his pets.

The fact that Plaintiff independently handled his financial,

parenting, and household responsibilities, is evidence Plaintiff

was exaggerating when he said his pain and mental impairments

rendered him completely disabled. 

Additionally, as Plaintiff apparently allows by

acceding to the ALJ’s conclusion he is not completely physically

disabled, the objective and minimal clinical findings in the

record do not support Plaintiff’s claims of physical disability,

thereby calling into question Plaintiff’s credibility regarding

his mental limitations. As Defendant notes, although

Plaintiff’s appeal of the ALJ’s decision relates only to the

ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s mental functioning,

Plaintiff initially predicated his claim of disability solely on

physical ailments which are not supported by the record, thereby

minimizing his credibility with regard to his mental

impairments.

Plaintiff’s case is similar to the reported cases in

which the reviewing court held the ALJ’s credibility

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 34 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-35- 

determination was supported by substantial evidence. See Morgan

v. Commissioner of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th

Cir. 1999) (ALJ could properly conclude claimant’s reported

disability was exaggerated where claimant was able to fix meals,

do laundry, work in the yard, and occasionally care for his

friend’s child); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th

Cir. 1995) (upholding ALJ’s credibility determination where

claimant did not receive medical treatment for three years and

did not report any mental limitations resulting from her

condition but then testified that pain and medication interfered

with her ability to think); Orteza, 50 F.3d at 750 (finding ALJ

properly discredited claimant’s testimony because the claimant

regularly performed various household chores such as cooking,

doing the dishes, going to the store, and visiting relatives);

Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679-80 (9th Cir. 1993)

(affirming ALJ’s determination based on claimant’s

housecleaning, light gardening and shopping); Curry v. Sullivan,

925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the claimant’s

testimony that “she was able to take care of her personal needs,

prepare easy meals, do light housework, and shop for some

groceries” was inconsistent with her claimed inability to

perform all work activity). Cf. Meanel, 172 F.3d at 1114

(holding that the ALJ was entitled to reject the claimant’s

testimony regarding pain because he properly considered the

treating physician’s failure to prescribe, and claimant’s

failure to request, any serious medical treatment for the

claimant’s supposedly excruciating pain.); Wheeler v. Apfel, 224

F.3d 891, 895 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding the claimant’s testimony

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 35 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-36- 

was not credible because her complaints of pain were

inconsistent with her failure to see a physician for two years

and her continued cigarette smoking was inconsistent with her

complaints of asthma). Compare Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d

587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044,

1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (“This court has repeatedly asserted that

the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily

activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited

walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her

credibility as to her overall disability. One does not need to

be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be disabled.”); Cooper v.

Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that a

disability claimant need not “vegetate in a dark room” in order

to be deemed eligible for benefits); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d

863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that minimal daily activities

do not establish that a person is capable of engaging in

substantial physical activity); Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75,

81 (2d Cir. 1998).

VI Conclusion

The Court concludes there is sufficient relevant

evidence in the record as reasonable minds might accept as

adequate support for a conclusion Plaintiff is not disabled,

even if it is possible, at best, to draw a contrary conclusion

from the evidence. Therefore, the ALJ’s conclusion Plaintiff’s

mental impairments do not render him completely unable to work

should not be reversed. See Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006,

1011 (9th Cir. 2003).

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 36 of 37
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-37- 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendant’s cross-motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in favor

of Defendant and against Plaintiff with regard to the charges

stated in the complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a result of the Court’s

determination that judgment in favor of Defendant is

appropriate, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 31st day of July, 2006.

Case 3:05-cv-02274-MEA Document 31 Filed 08/03/06 Page 37 of 37