Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00223/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00223-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0423 Social Security Act (Disability Insurance Benefit Payments)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARY ELAINE ZARATE, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:18-cv-00223-WQH-JLB 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 12, 16) 

 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable William Q. Hayes, 

United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

 On January 31, 2018, plaintiff Mary E. Zarate (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner 

of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1.) 

 Now pending before the Court and ready for decision are the parties’ cross-motions 

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court recommends that 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the 

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decision of the Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative 

proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On June 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed concurrent applications for a period of disability 

and disability insurance benefits and SSI under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security 

Act, respectively, alleging disability beginning October 1, 2009. (Certified Administrative 

Record (“AR”) at 225-31, 232-37.) After her applications were denied initially and upon 

reconsideration (AR 160-64, 169-74), Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before 

an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 175-76.) An administrative hearing was held 

on September 15, 2016. (AR 64-95.) Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with counsel, and 

testimony was taken from her, as well as from a vocational expert (“VE”). (AR at 64-95.) 

As reflected in his November 7, 2016 hearing decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from October 1, 2009 

through the date of his decision. (AR 41-63.) The ALJ’s decision became the final decision 

of the Commissioner on December 6, 2017, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 

request for review. (AR 1-6.) This timely civil action followed. 

II. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 1, 2009, the 

alleged onset date. (AR 46.) 

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe medically 

determinable impairments: degenerative disc disease of the back; inflammatory arthritis; 

scoliosis; and obesity. (AR 46.) 

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 48.) 

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Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

“to perform light work” with the following limitations: Plaintiff “could occasionally climb 

stairs, but never ladders, scaffolds, or ropes; [and] she could occasionally balance, stoop, 

crouch; [but] never kneel or crawl.” (AR 48.) In addition, Plaintiff could not “have 

concentrated exposure to unprotected heights, dangerous or fast moving machinery; and 

no concentrated exposure to cold temperatures.” (AR 48.) 

For purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s 

testimony that a hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC would be 

unable to perform her past relevant work as a boatloader. (AR 56.) 

The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. Based on 

the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC 

could perform the requirements of occupations that existed in significant numbers in the 

national economy (i.e., sub assembler, hand packager, ticket taker), the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff was not disabled under the law from October 1, 2009 through the date of decision. 

(AR 57-58.) 

III. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS OF ERROR 

 As reflected in Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the disputed issues that 

Plaintiff is raising as the grounds for reversal and remand are as follows: 

1. Whether the ALJ failed to properly consider Plaintiff’s borderline age 

situation when he categorized Plaintiff as “young.” (See ECF No. 12-1 at 13-15.) 

2. Whether the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinions of Dr. Tew, 

Plaintiff’s treating physician, and Dr. Dolnak, a consulting psychiatrist. (See id. at 15-20.) 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

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Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 

(9th Cir. 1984). In reaching his findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences which 

logically flow from the evidence. Id.

V. DISCUSSION 

A. The ALJ Committed Reversible Error by Failing to Consider Plaintiff’s 

Borderline Age Situation 

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ, in determining Plaintiff’s age group category, 

erred by failing to properly consider Plaintiff’s fast approaching borderline age when he 

categorized her as “young.” (ECF No. 12-1 at 13-15.) 

1. Applicable Law 

A claimant makes a prima facie showing of disability where, as here, the claimant 

has established that she suffers from a severe impairment that prevents her from doing past 

work. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). At this point—step five—

the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that “significant numbers” of other work 

exists in the national economy which an individual with the same RFC, age, education, and 

work experience as the claimant could perform. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) & (g), 404.1560(c); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v) & (g), 416.960(c); 

Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461-62 (1983); see also Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100-01 

(describing legal framework for step five). The Commissioner may satisfy this burden 

either (1) by referring to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 2 (commonly referred to as “the Grids”); or (2) by obtaining testimony from 

a VE. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 

F.3d at 1100-01). 

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The Grids are matrices of the “four factors identified by Congress—physical ability, 

age, education, and work experience—and set forth rules that identify whether jobs 

requiring specific combinations of these factors exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy.” Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Heckler, 461 U.S. at 461-62 (1983)); see also Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 

1111, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2006). For purposes of applying the Grids, there are three age 

categories: younger person (under age 50), person closely approaching advanced age (age 

50-54), and person of advanced age (age 55 or older). Id. at 1071 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1563(c)-(e)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c)-(e). However, these age categories are 

not applied in a rigid manner. Section 404.1563(b) provides: 

We will not apply the age categories mechanically in a borderline situation. 

If you are within a few days to a few months of reaching an older age category, 

and using the older age category would result in a determination or decision 

that you are disabled, we will consider whether to use the older age category 

after evaluating the overall impact of all the factors of your case. 

Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b) (emphasis added)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(b) 

(same). Pursuant to this regulation, “an ALJ is not required to use an older age category, 

even if the claimant is within a few days or a few months of reaching an older age 

category,” but should consider it. Id. (citing Bowie v. Comm’r, 539 F.3d 395, 399-401 (6th 

Cir. 2008) (holding that section 404.1563(b) “does not impose on ALJs a per se procedural 

requirement to address borderline age categorization in every borderline case”)); see also

Burkes v. Colvin, No. CV 14-07130-DFM, 2015 WL 2375865, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 

2015) (“While the ALJ is required to consider use of an older age category in a borderline 

situation, the ALJ does not need to explain in a written decision why an older age category 

was not used.”) (citing Lockwood, 616 F.3d at 1070, 1072-74). 

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 2. Analysis 

Here, the ALJ did not satisfy the requirement that he consider whether to use the 

older age category. Although the ALJ cited 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563 and 416.963 and 

determined based on Plaintiff’s birthdate that she was 47 years old and a younger 

individual,1

 he made this calculation based “on the alleged disability onset date” and not 

based on the date of his decision. (See AR 56.) A claimant’s age should be considered at 

the time of the ALJ’s decision. See Lockwood, 616 F.3d at 1071-72; see also Russell v. 

Bowen, 856 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1988) (using the date of the Commissioner’s final decision, 

which was the ALJ’s hearing decision, to determine whether a borderline situation was 

presented in a social security disability case); Little v. Berryhill, 690 F. App’x. 915, 917 

(9th Cir. 2017) (“A claimant’s age should be considered at the time of the ALJ’s 

decision.”). 

On the date of the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff was 54 years, 11 months, and 13 days, 

or mere days away from age 55, which would place her in the category of “person of 

advanced age.” See AR 56; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(e), 416.963(e). If the ALJ had 

considered Plaintiff a person of advanced age at the time of his decision, taking into 

consideration her RFC, education, and work experience, the Grids may have directed a 

finding of disabled. See 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 202.06;2

 20 C.F.R. 

                                               

1

 See Lockwood, 616 F.3d at 1071-72 (finding the ALJ satisfied the requirement 

that she consider whether to use the older age category when she mentioned in her decision 

the claimant’s date of birth and found that she was 54 years old and, thus, a person closely 

approaching advanced age on the date of the ALJ’s decision, and cited to 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1563, thus indicating the ALJ was clearly aware that the claimant was just shy of her 

55th birthday, at which point she would become a person of advanced age). 

2

 The Grids may also have directed a finding of not disabled, depending on 

whether the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s previous job skills were transferrable. See id.

at Rule 202.07. Here, because the ALJ based his analysis on Plaintiff as a “younger” 

person, he did not explicitly determine whether Plaintiff’s job skills were transferable. (AR 

57.) 

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§ 416.969; see also Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1115-16 (“[W]here application of the grids 

directs a finding of disability, that finding must be accepted by the Secretary . . . whether 

the impairment is exertional or results from a combination of exertional and non-exertional 

limitations.” (quoting Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

As the ALJ failed to appropriately calculate Plaintiff’s age category on the date of 

his decision, the Court finds that the ALJ necessarily failed to consider whether to place 

Plaintiff within the “advanced age” bracket. See Hardin v. Colvin, No. EDCV 15-02596-

JEM, 2016 WL 6155906, at *4-6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2016) (finding the ALJ failed to 

consider whether to use the next higher age category when the ALJ relied on the alleged 

onset date rather than the date of decision). This failure constitutes reversible error.3

 See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b); Lockwood, 616 F.3d at 1071-72 (holding that “an ALJ does not 

commit reversible error as long as she considers whether to use the older age category”); 

Little, 690 F. App’x at 917 (finding the ALJ erred when she calculated the claimant’s age 

at the time of her application, rather than at the time the ALJ made her decision, and also 

erred when the ALJ failed to show that she considered placing the claimant in a higher age 

category). 

The Court’s finding of reversible error, however, is limited to Plaintiff’s application 

for SSI. As both parties acknowledge, Plaintiff’s application for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits can only be claimed through December 31, 2014—the date 

that Plaintiff’s coverage expired. See ECF Nos. 12-1 at 15, 16-1 at 4; AR 44; see also 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.131, 404.321; Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *8 

(“When the person last met the insured status requirement before the date of adjudication, 

the oldest age to be considered is the person’s age at the date last insured.”). Plaintiff had 

just turned 53 when her coverage expired. As such, taking into consideration Plaintiff’s 

                                               

3

 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s and the Commissioner’s arguments concerning 

HALLEX and POMS and whether the ALJ is required to explain his findings are not 

implicated here because the ALJ did not even consider the correct borderline age situation. 

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RFC, education, and work experience, the Grids would direct a finding of not disabled. 

See 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, Appendix 2, Rules 202.14 and 202.15. Thus, any 

reversible error based on the ALJ’s failure to consider Plaintiff’s borderline age situation 

is limited to Plaintiff’s application for SSI. 

B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Rejecting the Opinions of Dr. Dolnak and Dr. 

Tew 

Plaintiff’s second and third claims of error address whether the ALJ, in determining 

Plaintiff’s RFC, failed to properly consider the opinions of Dr. Tew, Plaintiff’s treating 

physician, and Dr. Dolnak, a consulting psychiatrist. (ECF No 12-1 at 15-18.) 

1. Applicable Law 

Medical opinions are among the evidence that the ALJ considers when assessing a 

claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(b). Three types of physicians may offer opinions 

in Social Security cases: (1) those who directly treated the claimant, (2) those who 

examined but did not treat the claimant, and (3) those who did neither. Lester v. Chater, 

81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). A treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to 

more weight than an examining physician’s opinions, and an examining physician’s 

opinion is generally entitled to more weight than a nonexamining physician’s opinion. Id. 

“If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s 

opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are 

supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 

(9th Cir. 2005)); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[The] 

reasons for rejecting a treating doctor’s credible opinion on disability are comparable to 

those required for rejecting a treating doctor’s medical opinion.”). 

Additionally, “[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute 

substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining 

physician or a treating physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831 (emphasis in original). Opinions 

of a nonexamining, testifying medical advisor may serve as substantial evidence when they 

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are supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent with it. Andrews v. 

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). 

“The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of 

the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 

findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Cotton v. 

Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)). “When an examining physician relies on 

the same clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, 

the conclusions of the examining physician are not ‘substantial evidence.’” Orn v. Astrue, 

495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). 

2. Analysis 

a. Dr. Dolnak 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Dolnak’s opinions in 

determining Plaintiff’s RFC. (ECF No. 12-1 at 15.) Plaintiff saw Dr. Dolnak for a 

comprehensive psychiatric evaluation on August 8, 2014. (See AR 54, 498-504.) After 

administering a series of tests on Plaintiff, Dr. Dolnak diagnosed Plaintiff with “major 

depressive disorder, recurrent, current episode moderate severity” and gave her a GAF 

score of 55. (AR 502.) 

Dr. Dolnak also issued a “Functional Assessment” based on his examination. (AR 

at 503.) Dr. Dolnak opined that Plaintiff would be able to “understand, remember, and 

carry out simple one or two-step job instructions.” (AR 503.) He further opined that 

Plaintiff would have moderate difficulty with the following: (1) detailed and complex 

instructions secondary to moderate difficulty with attention and concentration related to 

depression and anxiety; (2) being able to relate and interact with co-workers and the public 

related to social withdrawal, fatigue, and depressed mood; (3) maintaining concentration, 

attention, persistence, and pace related to periods of distractibility, fatigue, social 

withdrawal, and poor attention associated with depression and anxiety; and (4) being able 

to perform work activities without special or additional supervision regarding depression, 

fatigue, social withdrawal, and poor attention and concentration with her depression. (AR 

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503.) In addition, Dr. Dolnak opined that Plaintiff would have mild difficulty being able 

to associate with day-to-day work activity, including attendance and safety, and to accept 

instructions from supervisors. (AR 503.) Lastly, Dr. Dolnak opined that Plaintiff could 

not “maintain regular attendance in the workplace or complete the normal work day routine 

without interruptions from her psychiatric disorder at this time of Major Depressive 

Disorder, recurrent.” (AR 503.) 

The ALJ gave Dr. Dolnak’s opinion “little weight” for the following reasons: 

This opinion is given little weight as there is little evidence in the record that 

supports a finding of severe restrictions. The claimant has not alleged any 

difficulty in social functioning, and her mental health treatment has been 

minimal. At the hearing she denied having any further mental health 

treatment and did not allege any further symptoms of affective disorder 

(Test.). 

(AR 54.) 

Because Dr. Dolnak’s opinion was contradicted by state agency consultants Dr. 

Hurwitz (AR 105-06, 120-21) and Dr. Caruso-Radin (AR 137-39, 152-54), who opined 

that Plaintiff’s mental impairment was non-severe and “posed no functional limitations,” 

the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Dolnak’s 

opinion. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. The Court will address each of these reasons in turn. 

i. Minimal Health Treatment 

The first reason proffered by the ALJ for giving little weight to the opinion of Dr. 

Dolnak was that Plaintiff’s mental health treatment had been minimal. (See AR 54.) In 

according great weight to the opinions of the state agency consultants, the ALJ noted that 

the record was “scant as to mental health treatment aside from a prescription of 

Bupropion,” and added that “the claimant did not allege any further mental health treatment 

at the hearing.” (AR 55.) 

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An ALJ may discredit physicians’ opinions that are unsupported by the record as a 

whole. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); see 

also Louie B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:17-CV-00267-MKD, 2018 WL 4387625, at 

*7 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2018) (finding that the ALJ’s rejection of an examining 

physician’s opinion based on plaintiff’s minimal mental health treatment was a specific 

and legitimate reason for rejecting her opinion). 

Here, as noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff informed Dr. Dolnak that she was on Bupropion 

100mg for her depression, and reported mild improvement of her depressive symptoms 

with current treatment. (See AR 54, 499-500.) Plaintiff also informed Dr. Dolnak that she 

was currently seeing a primary physician at the American Indian Medical Clinic in the San 

Diego area. (See AR 499.) However, other than medication, there was no indication that 

Plaintiff was receiving any specific mental health treatment at that time.4

 

The record also reflects that Plaintiff’s Bupropion prescription dosage was increased 

to 300mg on January 5, 2015, and that she was still taking 300 mg once a day for depression 

in August 2016. (AR 317, 592.) However, at the hearing before the ALJ just a month 

later, Plaintiff testified that she was not seeing a psychiatrist or psychologist at that time, 

and the last time she had seen one was approximately three years earlier. (AR 83.) The 

record indicates no additional treatment for depression on a regular basis. See Rollins v. 

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that a physician’s prescription of a 

conservative course of treatment may constitute substantial evidence to reject a treating 

physician’s opinion). 

                                               

4

 The Court notes that Plaintiff also informed Dr. Dolnak that she had 

experienced episodes of depression beginning in her late teenage years. (AR 499.) 

Plaintiff’s current episode of depression started approximately a year prior. (Id.) Plaintiff 

also noted that she had one psychiatric hospitalization several years prior with suicidal 

thoughts, and another episode of depression in 2011 that was treated with Fluoxetine. (Id.) 

Plaintiff reported moderate improvement with that treatment. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff relies on Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996) for the 

proposition that “[w]hether a claimant receives the mental health treatment, or exercises 

poor judgment to not received [sic] mental health treatment, is not a basis for rejecting the 

presence of a mental impairment diagnosed by the consultative psychiatrist.” (See ECF 

No. 12-1 at 17-18.) However, Nguyen advises that it is a “questionable practice to chastise 

one with a mental impairment [e.g., depression] for the exercise of poor judgment in 

seeking rehabilitation.” Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1465 (quoting Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 

F.2d 1116, 1124 (6th Cir. 1989)). Here, there is no suggestion here that Plaintiff failed to 

seek needed treatment; simply that her prescribed treatment was minimal. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s first proffered reason was a 

specific and legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence in the record to reject Dr. 

Dolnak’s opinion. 

ii. No Allegations of Difficulty in Social Functioning 

The second reason proffered by the ALJ for giving little weight to the opinion of Dr. 

Dolnak was that Plaintiff had not alleged any difficulty in social functioning.5

 (See AR 

54.) Inconsistency between a physician’s opinion and the claimant’s daily activities 

suffices as a specific and legitimate reason for discounting a physician’s opinion if 

supported by substantial evidence from the record as a whole. See Morgan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600-02 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In his decision, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff reported to Dr. Dolnak being able to do 

“Activities of Daily Living” and being able to do chores, such as go to the grocery store, 

see her doctors independently, and drive short distances in the area. (AR 54.) He further 

noted that she reported to Dr. Dolnak some “social withdrawal.” (AR 47.) However, he 

                                               

5

 The ALJ also stated in his decision that Plaintiff “experiences mild restrictions 

in . . . social functioning.” (AR 47.) Thus, the Court construes this proffered reason to 

mean that Plaintiff has not alleged more than mild difficulty in social functioning. 

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added that her mental status examination was unremarkable, and her memory and cognition 

were intact. (AR 47.) 

During her psychiatric evaluation, the Court notes that Plaintiff specifically 

informed Dr. Dolnak that she had “some social withdrawal” and “stays home a lot.” (AR 

499-01.) She further informed him that she used to enjoy working, exercising, cooking, 

socializing more with family and friends, but that she had not been doing those activities 

in the prior year because of depression, anxiety, fatigue, and chronic pain. (AR 499.) 

However, despite these representations, Dr. Dolnak noted in his assessment that Plaintiff 

had arrived at the appointment with a friend. (AR 500.) He further noted that Plaintiff was 

“[p]leasant, cooperative, [and] not agitated,” and denied having “panic attacks.” (AR 501.) 

Other than a depressed mood and “[m]ild anxiety,” Dr. Dolnak did not indicate any other 

difficulty in social functioning. (See AR 501.) 

During the hearing, the ALJ asked Plaintiff about her social life. (AR 83.) Plaintiff 

responded that she does not have any friends with whom she does things, such as go to the 

movies or out for a meal. (AR at 83–84.) However, Plaintiff also reported living with and 

taking care of family and occasionally spending a couple of hours at the casino. (See AR 

80-86.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ reasonably determined that Dr. 

Dolnak’s opinion that Plaintiff would have moderate difficulty in maintaining attention and 

concentration and working with co-workers and the public, and would not be able to 

maintain regular attendance, was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s reported social functioning. 

Moreover, although Dr. Dolnak noted Plaintiff’s reported social withdranwal and anxiety, 

he does not explain how these symptoms precluded work activity in Plaintiff’s case. See 

Morgan, 169 F.3d at 601. Thus, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s determination that Dr. Dolnak’s evaluation does not show how Plaintiff’s symptoms 

translated into specific functional deficits which precluded work activity. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s second proffered reason 

was a specific and legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

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Accordingly, the Court further finds that the ALJ did not improperly reject the opinion of 

Dr. Dolnak. 

b. Dr. Tew 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of Dr. Tew, a treating 

physician, in determining her RFC. (ECF No. 12-1 at 15-17.) Dr. Tew began treating 

Plaintiff in approximately 2009 on an “as needed” basis. (AR 554.) As of July 2016, Dr. 

Tew had seen Plaintiff approximately twenty times. (See AR 554, 662.) Dr. Tew 

completed two physical residual functional capacity questionnaires for Plaintiff, one in 

September 2014 and another in July 2016. (AR at 554-57, 662-65.) In her motion for 

summary judgment, Plaintiff only addresses the September 2014 questionnaire. (See ECF 

No. 12-1 at 15-17.) 

In the September 2014 questionnaire, Dr. Tew diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic back 

pain and lupus erythematosus, and opined that Plaintiff had the following limitations: (1) 

Plaintiff’s pain or other symptoms were severe enough to “constantly” interfere with the 

attention and concentration needed to perform even simple work tasks; (2) Plaintiff could 

walk only half a city block without rest or severe pain; (3) Plaintiff could only sit for 15 

minutes and stand for 10 minutes at one time; (4) Plaintiff could sit and stand/walk less 

than 2 hours in an 8-hour work day; (5) Plaintiff usually required a cane or other assistive 

device to walk or stand; (6) Plaintiff could never lift or carry 20 pounds or more, and never 

stoop/bend or climb ladders; (7) Plaintiff could rarely lift 10 pounds or twist; (8) Plaintiff 

could occasionally lift less than 10 pounds and crouch/squat or climb stairs; (9) Plaintiff 

had significant limitations in reaching due to back pain and some limitation in grasping, 

turning, or twisting objects and fine finger manipulations; and (10) Plaintiff was likely to 

be absent from work more than four days per month. (AR 554-57.)

6

 

                                               

6

 The Court notes that Dr. Tew’s July 2016 questionnaire demonstrated slight 

improvement in Plaintiff’s ability to maintain attention and concentration despite her pain, 

and an ability to sit, stand, and walk for longer periods of time. (See AR 662-65.) 

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Dr. Tew was Plaintiff’s treating physician, so his opinion is normally given 

controlling weight. The law is well established in this Circuit that a treating physician’s 

opinion is entitled to special weight because a treating physician is employed to cure and 

has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. See McAllister 

v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). “The treating physician’s opinion is not, 

however, necessarily conclusive as to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of 

disability.” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The weight given a treating physician’s opinion 

depends on whether it is supported by sufficient medical data and is consistent with other 

evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). When a treating 

provider’s opinion is not entitled to “controlling weight” because of substantial 

contradictory evidence, that opinion is still “entitled to deference” based on factors such as 

the length and nature of the treatment relationship. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632–33; see also 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). 

The ALJ gave Dr. Tew’s opinion “little weight” and relied on a hypothetical that did 

not include Dr. Tew’s restrictions. (See AR 55, 92.) In giving Dr. Tew’s opinion “little 

weight,” the ALJ stated: “This opinion is given little weight as the severe restrictions are 

not supported by the objective medical record. The claimant is able to perform Activities 

of Daily Living, and most recently, reported she sometimes went to casinos to ‘forget 

discomfort.’” (AR 55.) 

Because Dr. Tew’s opinion was contradicted by several doctors – medical consultant 

Dr. K. Vu (AR 337-43 (January 2011)), evaluating physician Dr. Close (AR 344-49 

(September 2011)), state agency consultants Dr. Bitonte (AR 108-10, 123-25 (August 

2014)) and Dr. Rehrig (AR 140-42, 155-57 (January 2015)), and evaluating physician Dr. 

Easley (AR 489-94 (July 2014)) – the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate 

                                               

However, Plaintiff’s ability to move her head, grasp, turn, and twist objects, and ability to 

use fine finger manipulations decreased. (See id.) 

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reasons for rejecting Dr. Tew’s opinion. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. The Court will address 

each of these reasons below. 

i. Not Supported By Objective Medical Record 

 One of the ALJ’s proffered reasons for rejecting Dr. Tew’s opinions was that “the 

severe restrictions are not supported by the objective medical record.” (AR 55.) An ALJ 

may discredit physicians’ opinions that are unsupported by the record as a whole. Batson, 

359 F.3d at 1195. 

Here, the ALJ sets out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

clinical evidence in his decision. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. Specifically, the ALJ’s 

decision lays out the inconsistencies between Dr. Tew’s opinions and the opinions of other 

examining physicians. (See AR 53-55.) On September 6, 2011, Plaintiff saw Dr. Close, a 

Diplomate on the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery, for a consultative orthopedic 

evaluation. (See AR 53, 346-49.) Dr. Close opined that Plaintiff’s limitations were far less 

severe than those determined by Dr. Tew. (See id.) On July 29, 2014, Plaintiff saw Dr. 

Easley, also a Diplomate on the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery, for another 

orthopedic consultation. (See AR 53, 489-94.) Dr. Easley similarly opined that Plaintiff’s 

limitations were far less severe than those determined by Dr. Tew. (See id.) The ALJ gave 

Dr. Easley’s opinion “significant weight,” noting that it was consistent with the medical 

record, Plaintiff’s allegations, and the findings of other consulting doctors such as Dr. Vu, 

Dr. Bitonte, and Dr. Rehrig. (AR 54.) 

Given the foregoing, the Court finds that this was a specific and legitimate reason 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 753 (“To the 

extent that other physicians’ conflicting opinions rested on independent, objective findings, 

those opinions could constitute substantial evidence.”); Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041; see also

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (“When presented with conflicting medical opinions, the ALJ 

must determine credibility and resolve the conflict.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(5) (“We 

generally give more weight to the medical opinion of a specialist about medical issues 

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related to his or her area of specialty than to the medical opinion of a source who is not a 

specialist.”). 

ii. Activities of Daily Living 

The other reason proffered by the ALJ for giving little weight to the opinion of Dr. 

Tew was that Plaintiff was able to perform “Activities of Daily Living,” and more recently, 

reported that she sometimes went to the casinos to “forget discomfort.” (See AR 55.) 

Inconsistency between a physician’s opinion and the claimant’s daily activities suffices as 

a specific and legitimate reason for discounting a physician’s opinion if supported by 

substantial evidence from the record as a whole. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600-02; see also 

Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856 (finding the ALJ’s statement that the treating physician’s 

restrictions were “inconsistent with the level of activity [the claimant] engaged in by 

maintaining a household and raising two young children, with no significant assistance 

from her ex-husband” to be a specific and legitimate reason for determining the treating 

physician’s opinion was not controlling). 

However, “[a] claimant need not be completely incapacitated to receive benefits. 

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1284 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1996)). The question is whether the claimant’s daily activities 

are in tension with the opinions of her treating providers. Id. (finding that a holistic review 

of the record does not reveal an inconsistency between the treating providers’ opinions and 

the claimant’s daily activities, because although the claimant “performed some basic 

chores and occasionally socialized, the record also reveals that he relied heavily on his 

caretaker, struggled with social interactions, and limited himself to low-stress 

environments”). 

In a disability questionnaire dated December 23, 2010, Plaintiff reported that she 

lives with her family. (AR 245.) She occasionally babysits her grandchildren for short 

periods of time, and can occasionally prepare food and complete simple tasks, but when 

doing so she experiences pain, fatigue, and anxiety. (AR 245-47.) Plaintiff added that she 

no longer goes shopping or to the grocery store because of pain and anxiety, but she can 

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lift a baby or a bag of groceries. (AR 245-46.) Plaintiff reported being able to drive short 

distances. (AR 246.) She also reported doing a little yard work, such as sweeping the 

walkway. (AR 246.) 

On August 8, 2014, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Dolnak that she could bathe and dress 

herself. (AR 500.) She also reported that she could make a small meal for herself and 

wash a few dishes and clothes, but did not lift heavy loads of laundry or any heavy garbage 

bags. (AR 500-01.) Plaintiff reported going to the store “with whomever twice a month” 

and going to the doctor when she needs to see one. (AR 501.) Plaintiff also reported 

driving short distances, but stated that she does not have any hobbies or regular activities. 

(AR 501.) 

At the administrative hearing on September 15, 2016, Plaintiff reported driving to 

the hearing. (AR 80.) She also reported that she lives with her daughter and her daughter’s 

twin 10-year old daughters. (AR 80-81.) She stated that she cooks simple meals and does 

her own laundry, but her daughter does the grocery shopping. (AR 81-82.) Plaintiff further 

stated that she does not have any difficulty bathing or showering, but occasionally has 

problems dressing (e.g., putting on shoes). (AR 83.) When asked, Plaintiff stated that she 

still goes to a casino if someone else drives. (AR 85.) Plaintiff added that she typically 

spends an hour or two at the casino, but had not been to one for about six months. (AR 85-

86.) 

The Court finds that a holistic review of the record indicates that Plaintiff’s reported 

daily activities are in tension with the opinions of Dr. Tew. As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff is 

able to perform activities of daily living independently, including personal care and 

grooming, chores, preparing simple meals, and driving short distances. (See AR 47.) 

These activities, as well as Plaintiff’s reported ability to occasionally spend an hour or two 

at the casino, are at odds with Dr. Tew’s opinions that Plaintiff has significant limitations 

with reaching, handling, and fine finger manipulations, and cannot sit or stand/walk for 

more than two hours in an 8-hour workday. (See AR 555-57.) In this regard, the Court 

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notes that Plaintiff’s testimony does not suggest that she needs to lie down the majority of 

the day, which is indicated by Dr. Tew’s severe limitations. 

As such, the Court finds that this was also a specific and legitimate reason supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. Thus, the ALJ did not improperly reject the opinion 

of Dr. Tew. 

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

 For the reasons discussed above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion 

for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment be DENIED, and that judgment be entered reversing the 

Commissioner’s decision and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings 

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report and 

Recommendation shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

February 11, 2019. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than February 18, 2019. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 

158 F.3d 449,445 (9th Cir 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 28, 2019 

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