Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00494/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00494-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California

ANTHONY MARCELOUS KNOX, SR.,

Petitioner,

v.

M. MARTEL,

Respondent.

CV 08-00494 TJH

Order

(JS-6)

The Court has considered Knox’s petition for habeas corpus, together with the

moving and opposing papers.

Before trial, Knox stipulated that (1) he had sexual intercourse with his sisterin-law, Kayla G., (2) he was 33 years old and she was 14 years old at the time, (3)

Kayla was not his wife, (4) as a result, Kayla gave birth to a child and (5) DNA

testing established that he is the child’s father.

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After waiver of a jury, count 1, forcible rape was dismissed. Knox absconded

from trial prior to the remaining verdicts, and in his absence, was found guilty of

child molestation, sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of sixteen years and

false personation. The court, also, found that Knox had three prior “ strikes,” with

two prior convictions for attempted murder and a prior conviction for residential

burglary. Knox was sentenced to twenty-six years to life.

Knox’s habeas corpus petition was filed after the effective date of, and, thus,

is subject to, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 362 (9th

Cir. 1992). Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be

granted, unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Furthermore, a state court factual determination must be presumed correct unless

rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

A defendant pleading guilty is entitled to be advised by the judge in open court

of his or her constitutional rights (a) against compulsory self-incrimination, (b) to be

tried by a jury, and (c) to confront his or her accusers, and the court has an

obligation to establish on the record that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently

waived these rights. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712,

23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279-280 (1969). Knox merely stipulated to facts, and did not

plead guilty. “A stipulation to facts from which a judge or jury may infer guilt is

simply not the same as a stipulation to guilt or a guilty plea.” Adams v. Peterson,

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968 F.2d 835, 839 (9th Cir. 1992). “A plea of guilty is more than a confession

which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction ... .” Boykin,

395 U.S. at 242, 89 S. Ct. at 1711, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 279. The Supreme Court

recognized the distinction between a plea of guilty and stipulation of facts, thus, a

defendant who stipulates to facts not entitled to the full constitutional protections that

apply to the tendering of a guilty plea. Adams, 968 F.2d at 841. Thus, the trial

court did not unreasonably apply federal law.

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that

the counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). With the evidence of the defendant’s

guilt in mind, if trial counsel’s strategy meets the Strickland standard, then the client

has no claim of ineffective assistance. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 192, 125 S.

Ct. 551, 563, 160 L. Ed. 2d 565, 581 (2004).

Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for attempting to impress the trier of

fact with his candor and unwillingness to engage in a useless charade. Nixon, 543

U.S. at 192, 125 S. Ct. at 563, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 581. Counsel may advise his client

to plead guilty, or to stipulate to facts, if that advice falls within the range of

reasonable competence under the circumstances. Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S.

258, 266-68, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1607-1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243-44 (1973).

Although Petitioner’s counsel advised him to stipulate to facts that resulted in guilty

on several counts, counsel was successful in getting count 1, forcible rape,

dismissed, which carried the possible sentence of life in prison without eligibility of

parole. Thus, trial counsel’s strategy did not breach the Strickland standard.

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It is Ordered that the request for appointment of counsel be, and hereby is

Denied.

It is Ordered that the request for an evidentiary hearing be, and hereby is

Denied.

It is further Ordered, the petition for habeas corpus be, and hereby is, Denied.

Date: March 27, 2012

___________________________________

Terry J. Hatter, Jr.

Senior United States District Judge

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