Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00668/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00668-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY McCORVEY )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

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PROBATION DEPARTMENT, )

)

Respondent. )

)

)

___________________________________ )

1:07-CV-0668 LJO WMW HC

ORDER DISMISSING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS FOR

FAILURE TO EXHAUST

STATE JUDICIAL REMEDIES.

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition, Petitioner challenges a decision by the

Probation Department that he violated probation and seeks a court order regarding the

crediting of the time he has spent in a substance abuse program.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction

by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state

court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. 

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Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state

court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal

court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given th

a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court

with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887,

888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992)

(factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he

was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888;

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to th

claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must say so, not only in federal

court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a

constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a

state court. See, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion

requirement not satisfied circumstance that the "due process ramifications" of an argument

might be "self-evident."); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996)

(“a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional

guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

In this case, there is no indication that Petitioner has presented his claims to the

California Supreme Court. Petitioner’s claims are therefore unexhausted. The court must

dismiss a petition that contains unexhausted claims, even if it also contains exhausted claims. 

Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22, 102 S.Ct. at 1205; Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Gordon),

107 F.3d 756, 760 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 265 (1997); Guizar v. th

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Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9 Cir.1988). th

In 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.

Pub.L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under the AEDPA, exhaustion can be waived by

Respondent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(C). The court can also excuse exhaustion if “(I) there is an

absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such a

process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). In this

case, Respondent has not waived exhaustion. In addition, California provides avenues for

Petitioner to pursue state claims. For example, these claims could have been presented in a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. See, Cal. Penal Code §§ 1473 - 1475. Finally, there are

not sufficient circumstances in this case for the court to ignore the United States Supreme

Court’s admonishment that comity demands exhaustion and find that California’s corrective

processes are ineffective to protect Petitioner’s rights.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus currently before this court contains only

unexhausted claims. As such, the petition must be dismissed. See, Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22,

102 S.Ct. at 1205; Gordon, 107 F.3d at 760; Guizar 843 F.2d at 372.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to

exhaust state judicial remedies; and

2) the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 31, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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