Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01685/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01685-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

NANCY E. APPLETON, TRUSTEE OF

THE 4347 VINTAGE OAKS LANE J &

N APPLETON TRUST OF 1999,

CASE NO. CIV. S-05-1685 WBS KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, DISTRICT

ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF

SACRAMENTO, SUPERIOR COURT OF

CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, DAVID L.

RAY, and DOES 1 through 10,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Nancy Appleton’s first amended complaint

seeks an injunction staying the disbursement of funds resulting

from a judicial sale authorized by the Superior Court of

California in and for the County of Sacramento. Plaintiff also

seeks general damages. Defendants County of Sacramento, the

District Attorney of Sacramento County, and court-appointed

receiver David L. Ray move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint,

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pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 11, 2001, the state court found Alden J.

Appleton guilty of fraudulent business practices. State v.

Appleton, No. 99AS00592, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 11,

2001). The court ordered civil penalties in the amount of

$1,250,000 and the appointment of a receiver to accomplish

restitution. Id. at 10. On or about August 14, 2001, the court

appointed defendant David L. Ray to fill the position of

receiver. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) 

In February 2004, over objections that plaintiff lodged

with the court, Ray obtained an order authorizing the sale of the

residence at 4347 Vintage Oaks Lane, Fair Oaks, California (“the

property”). (Id. ¶ 15.) With the help of a real estate agent

and leave from the court, Ray completed the sale of the property

on or about August 23, 2005 for the purchase price of $860,000. 

(Id. ¶¶ 16-18.) 

During the course of these events, plaintiff was not a

party to the state court action. (Compl. ¶ 14.) She never

“intervene[d], move[d] for reconsideration, or appeal[ed] the

court’s decision[s].” (Aug. 24, 2005 Order (per Chief Judge

Levi) (denying plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining

order (“TRO”)).) However, “on August 19, 2005, plaintiff filed

this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal court.” (Id.) As the

sale was still pending, she immediately filed for a TRO, arguing

that “a decision of the state court permitting sale of the

residence [would] violate her constitutional rights because she

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 Defendant Sacramento County, the only defendant in the 1

original complaint, initially moved to dismiss the case on

September 2, 2005 and a hearing was scheduled for October 3rd. 

Because defendants had not yet filed an answer, plaintiff filed

in response a first amended complaint as of right, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (“A

party may amend the party’s pleading once as a matter of course

at any time before a responsive pleading is served . . . .”);

Shaver v. Operating Eng’rs Local 428 Pension Trust Fund, 332 F.3d

1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] motion to dismiss [is] not a

responsive pleading within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a).”).

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[had] not had a sufficient opportunity to participate in the

state court action to defend her property rights.” Id.

Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order

was “denied principally because it [was] untimely.” (Id.) Judge

Levi further explained that

[t]here [was] no reason why this . . . request for stay

should not have been filed [earlier]. By waiting to file

this action until the state court was prepared to issue a

final ruling, plaintiff . . . misused the temporary

restraining order. E.D. Cal. L.R. 65-231(b). 

Furthermore, the showing on the merits [was] not

persuasive. It [was] unclear whether plaintiff ha[d] any

interest in the property. The state court [had] recently

found the claim “meritless” in a tentative ruling.

(Id.) Following suit, this court denied plaintiff’s second

motion for a TRO, which sought to enjoin the disbursement of the

proceeds of the sale. Appleton v. County of Sacramento, No.

S-05-1685, 2005 WL 2643174, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2005).

Presently before the court are defendants’ motions to

dismiss the first amended complaint for failure to state a claim. 

Although these motions were filed and briefed separately, the

court consolidated the motion submitted by the County of

Sacramento and the District Attorney of Sacramento County with 1

defendant Ray’s motion to dismiss on November 18, 2005.

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II. Discussion

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). The court

may not dismiss for failure to state a claim unless it appears

beyond a doubt that the pleader can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim which would entitle him or her to relief. 

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). See also

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (complaint need only

“give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests”).

In general, the court may not consider material other

than the facts alleged in the complaint when deciding a motion to

dismiss. Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“A motion to dismiss . . . must be treated as a motion for

summary judgment . . . if either party . . . submits materials

outside the pleadings in support or opposition to the motion, and

if the district court relies on those materials.”). However,

reliance on matters of public record “does not convert a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment.” Mack v. S. Bay

Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on

other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501

U.S. 104 (1991). Both plaintiff and defendants have submitted

for the court’s consideration several orders issued by the state

court, including those entering judgment against Mr. Appleton and

authorizing the actions of the court-appointed receiver. Because

these documents are matters of public record, the court can

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consider them in deciding the instant motions. See Kent v.

Daimlerchrysler Corp., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1219 (N.D. Cal.

2002) (“[L]egal decisions by California courts . . . are matters

of public record . . . .”). 

A. District Attorney of Sacramento County

“[P]rosecutors, both state and federal, are absolutely

immune from section 1983 damage suits challenging conduct

‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.’” Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.

1984) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). The acts of which

plaintiff complains, “authorizing and permitting the sale of the

Subject Property,” flowed from the claims filed by the attorney

and those claims were undeniably “associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss First Am. Compl. at 5.) Accordingly, plaintiff has not

alleged facts that support a cognizable legal theory for the

District Attorney’s liability for damages. 

This leaves the possibility of injunctive relief

against the District Attorney. The Eleventh Amendment does not

bar such claims, and a prosecutor’s absolute immunity does not

protect her from suits for prospective injunctive relief. Ex

Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Roe v. City & County of San

Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 586 (9th Cir. 1997). The complaint does

not state how the District Attorney is still involved in this

case or what exactly the court might enjoin her from doing. 

However, assuming that there is some action by the District

Attorney that the court might enjoin, dismissal of plaintiff’s

claims for injunctive relief against the District Attorney is

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 Although not a model of clarity, plaintiff’s brief does 2

argue that Younger abstention is not warranted because she is

“not seeking to stay the State Court Action.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) This claim is inconsistent with

her request for injunctive relief in this action and ignores the

reality that interference with the acts of the receiver, an agent

of the state court, constitutes interference in the state court

action. 

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nevertheless warranted under the Younger abstention doctrine. 

See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 

Based on comity and federalism interests, Younger

abstention “counsel[s] federal courts to abstain from

jurisdiction whenever federal claims have been or could be

presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern

important state interests.” Lebbos v. Judges of Superior Court,

883 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Haw. Housing Auth. v.

Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237 (1984)). The Ninth Circuit has

identified three requirements that must be satisfied before the

doctrine can be invoked: “(1) ongoing state judicial proceedings;

(2) implication of an important state interest in the

proceedings; and (3) an adequate opportunity to raise federal

questions in the proceedings.” Id. at 814 (quoting World Famous

Drinking Emporium, Inc., v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082

(9th Cir. 1987)). If these requirements are met, federal court

interference is inappropriate unless “bad faith, harassment, or

other exceptional circumstances dictate to the contrary.” 

Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S.

423, 437 (1982); Drinking Emporium, 820 F.2d at 1082.

Plaintiff does not argue that the preliminary

requirements of Younger abstention have not been met here.2

Indeed, the court doubts whether she could credibly make such an

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argument. State receivership activities are still ongoing, an

important state interest in effectuating the consequences of a

criminal conviction exist, and plaintiff, who did not intervene,

move for reconsideration, or appeal the state court orders, had

an adequate opportunity to make her due process claims in state

court and simply failed to take action. See Juidice v. Vail, 430

U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (failure to avail oneself of procedural

opportunities in state court “does not mean that the state

procedures were inadequate”); Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd.,

332 F.3d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Younger abstention applies

even if the constitutionality of the pending proceedings is at

the heart of Plaintiff’s claim.”). 

Plaintiff argues instead that this case falls under

either the “bad faith” or “exceptional circumstances” exceptions

to the Younger doctrine. To invoke the bad faith exception,

however, “plaintiff must show that the state proceeding was

initiated with and is animated by a retaliatory, harassing, or

other illegitimate motive.” Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan,

282 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2002). “A state proceeding that is

legitimate in its purposes, but unconstitutional in its

execution--even when the violations of constitutional rights are

egregious--will not warrant the application of the bad faith

exception.” Id. The situation before the court does not meet

this standard. 

Plaintiff alleges only her conclusion that the state

court proceedings were “arbitrary and capricious,” (compl. ¶¶ 20-

21) which hardly equates to retaliatory, harassing, or otherwise

illegitimate. As discussed below, the state proceedings involved

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 Plaintiff’s claims against Ray appear to be in his 3

individual, rather than official, capacity and are thus assumedly

for damages. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm’n,

Idaho, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Where state officials

are named in a complaint which seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, it is presumed that the officials are being sued in their

individual capacities” if “the complaint is silent as to capacity

. . . .”). Regardless, Younger abstention, as discussed above,

would lead to the dismissal of any claims against Ray for

injunctive relief, even if he was not protected from the claims

against him by the cloak of judicial immunity.

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here were legitimate and followed the California state law that

authorized them. Thus, even if their execution resulted in, as

alleged, a denial of due process, this is not evidence of bad

faith. See id. Additionally, allegations of capriciousness are

also unextraordinary. Appellate courts daily face challenges to

allegedly arbitrary government decisions. The proper remedy in

such situations, as here, is an appeal.

Because plaintiff has not raised legally cognizable

claims against the District Attorney for damages or injunctive

relief, dismissal of the claims against her is warranted.

B. State Court Receiver David L. Ray

Like the District Attorney, defendant Ray also claims

immunity from suit. He bases this argument on the doctrine of 3

“derivative judicial immunity,” which is applicable to courtappointed receivers. New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869

F.2d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Davis v. Bayless, 70

F.3d 367, 373 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing with approval cases in the

First, Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, all of which

extended a judge’s absolute immunity to court-appointed

receivers); Smith v. Martin, 542 F.2d 688, 690-91 (6th Cir. 1976)

(same). “[A]bsolute judicial immunity generally immunizes

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persons . . . who, pursuant to court appointment, administer the

affairs of litigants.” New Alaska Dev. Corp., 869 F.2d at 1302. 

Because a receiver “functions as an arm of the court by making

decisions . . . the judge otherwise would have to make,” he is,

like a judge, entitled to immunity when he performs an act that

is judicial in nature and he does not act in the clear absence of

all jurisdiction. Id. at 1302, 1303 n.6. Additionally,

“[m]alice or corrupt motive in the performance of judicial tasks

is insufficient to [defeat] absolute immunity.” Id. at 1304.

In sum, court-appointed receivers enjoy absolute

immunity when they act in accordance with valid orders issued by

a judge. Prop. Mgmt. & Invs., Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599, 602

(11th Cir. 1985). As evidenced by the state court orders

submitted in this case for judicial notice, the receiver’s

actions complained of here were all authorized by court orders. 

The state court exercised jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the

property at issue, empowered defendant Ray to take the necessary

steps to sell the property, and ultimately approved the sale

orchestrated by Ray. See State v. Appleton, No. 99AS00592 (Cal.

Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2001) (interim order establishing plaintiff

and the property at issue here as “receivership entities” subject

to defendant Ray’s control); State v. Appleton, No. 99AS00592

(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2001) (appointing defendant Ray as the

receiver in the Appleton action); State v. Appleton, No.

99AS00592 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2005) (authorizing the sale

of the property); (Compl. ¶ 18 (sale approved by state court on

August 23, 2005)). In addition, the court issued these orders

pursuant to powers granted to the state courts by California law. 

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See Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 564 (authorizing state courts to

appoint receivers); Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 568 (empowering

receivers “to do such acts respecting the property as the Court

may authorize”); Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 708.205 (allowing state

courts to enforce turnover orders against third parties in

possession of property subject to a money judgment). 

Therefore, because defendant Ray acted within the scope

of his authority, as provided by valid court orders, he is

entitled to derivative judicial immunity based on the facts

before the court. Cf. Davis, 70 F.3d at 374 (upholding decision

that a receiver who searched and seized the property of a third

party pursuant to a Texas state court order was immune from a §

1983 suit). Plaintiff claims to be capable of “alleg[ing]

additional facts which show that Defendant has committed wrongdoings” and requests leave to file a second amended complaint. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Ray’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) However, given

the state court orders submitted for judicial notice, the court

doubts that plaintiff can muster the factual support “to allege

that the [receiver’s] ultimate actions were not judicial or

beyond the scope of the court’s jurisdiction . . . .” New Alaska

Dev. Corp., 869 F.3d at 1303.

C. County of Sacramento

Finally, the County of Sacramento also cannot be held

responsible for plaintiff’s alleged injuries based on the facts

alleged. The County argues persuasively that it is powerless to

interfere with the state court’s proceedings. In particular,

defendant County points out “that papers filed in the name of the

People of the State of California were filed by the District

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 This argument was actually made in the County’s first 4

motion to dismiss, filed on September 2, 2005 and corrected on

September 6, 2005. Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint

in response on September 27th. Although typically, an amended

complaint moots all pending motions, “the [c]ourt may exercise

its discretion to consider a motion to dismiss the original

complaint where the amended complaint fails to cure the defects

of the original complaint.” Fitzgerald v. State, No. Civ.

96-2077, 1997 WL 579193, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 9, 1997); see also

Datastorm Techs., Inc. v. Excalibur Commc’ns, Inc., 888 F. Supp.

112, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F. Supp.

343, 347 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Plaintiff’s amended complaint, which

sought to (1) add new parties over which the County had already

argued it had no control, (2) request damages in addition to

injunctive relief, and (3) update the facts on which relief is

sought, did not cure the defects identified in the County’s

original motion to dismiss. The arguments made in that motion

are, therefore, still unresolved.

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Attorney for the County of Sacramento and the Attorney General of

the State of California. None of the acts complained of by

plaintiff were authorized or performed by Sacramento County.” 

(Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss the First Am. Compl. at 2.) 

Additionally, none of the actors identified by name in

the complaint are subject to defendant County’s control. 

Sacramento County does not control the actions of the Superior

Court of California, regardless of the court’s physical location. 

See Cal. Const. art. VI, § 1 (“The judicial power of this State

is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and superior

courts, all of which are courts of record.”). By extension, the 4

receiver appointed by the state court to effectuate its judgment

also cannot represent the County or fall under its control. See

also Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 568 (power of the receiver is “under

the control of the Court”). Similarly, a District Attorney, when

acting in a prosecutorial capacity on behalf of the state, is not

under the County’s command. Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d

1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a county cannot be sued

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 The Ninth Circuit has held, based on a detailed analysis 5

of state law, that California District Attorneys, despite being

named for particular counties, are actually state officers when

prosecuting individuals in the name of the people of the state. 

Weiner, 210 F.3d at 1031. 

 The court notes that on October 6, 2005, plaintiff filed a 6

document claiming to amend the complaint by substituting actual

people for unnamed Doe defendants. The document identifies these

individuals by name only, with no indication as to how they

relate to this case. If plaintiff still wants to bring suit

against these individuals, she can file a separate action against

them or a proper motion to amend the complaint to join them in

this action. 

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under § 1983 for the alleged prosecutorial misconduct of the

District Attorney). 

5

In response to these arguments, plaintiff again seeks

leave of the court to file a second amended complaint. (Pl.’s

Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 5-6.) She makes this request

in hopes of establishing a Monell claim against the County, which

would allow her to sue a local government entity based on the

individual actions of its agents. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (concluding that a

local government entity can be held responsible under § 1983 for

the individual actions of its agents only when the agent acted

pursuant to the government’s policy or custom). The court cannot

imagine a set of facts in this case capable of supporting

allegations that a local policy, custom, or practice of the

County resulted in plaintiff’s deprivation of due process when no

agent or representative of the County capable of carrying out

this policy has been identified.6

III. Conclusion

The actions taken by the District Attorney and the

court-appointed receiver that form the basis for plaintiff’s

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complaint were all intimately associated with the judicial

process and did not exceed the state court’s authority. These

actors are consequently immune from § 1983 liability. 

Additionally, defendant County had no authority, direct or

otherwise, over the state court proceedings that resulted in the

sale of the property. The County is therefore also not a proper

party to this action.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motions of the County

of Sacramento, the District Attorney of the County of Sacramento,

and David L. Ray to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED.

Plaintiff is given 30 days from the date of this order

to file an amended complaint consistent with this order. 

DATED: December 23, 2005

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