Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00971/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00971-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN DIMMICK,

Plaintiff, No. C 04-4965 PJH

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA, ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; 

FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS RE:

C 04-4965 PJH

Defendant.

_______________________________/

KEVIN DIMMICK,

No. C 05-0971 PJH

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Before the court is the government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to

Plaintiff Kevin Dimmick’s (“Dimmick”) first amended complaint (“1AC”), as supplemented

by plaintiff’s more definite statement (“MDS”), and also for dismissal or amendment of the

plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b). These motions

pertain to case number 05-971 PJH only. Having read the papers and carefully considered

the relevant legal authority, the court GRANTS both motions in part and DENIES them in

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part for the reasons that follow. 

BACKGROUND

Dimmick is a disabled veteran with AIDS who sought to enroll in an

investigational drug study at the Veterans’ Administration Medical Hospital of San

Francisco (“VA Hospital”). He claimed that the VA Hospital and other organizations

affiliated with the VA Hospital, including the Regents of the University of California (“the

Regents”) and Northern California Institute for Research and Education (“NCIRE”),

conspired to deny him medical care and forced him to take medications which had

previously caused negative side effects. Dimmick also claimed that Dr. Lampiris of the VA

Hospital failed to obtain a proper informed consent from him, and that Dr. Marmar of the VA

Hospital defamed him to third parties by referring to him as mentally ill. Lampiris and

Marmar are both members of NCIRE’s board of directors. 

Dimmick sued the Regents and private companies NCIRE, Boehringer-Ingleheim

(“BI”), and Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) in the C 04-4965 PJH action, and the government

in the C 05-0971 PJH action. These two cases have had a complex procedural history. 

Dimmick originally filed one consolidated case in San Francisco Superior Court against all

these parties and various federal employees of the VA Hospital. The government removed

the case entitled Dimmick v. Volberding, C 04-1480 PJH, to federal court. This court then

dismissed the federal defendants in case number C 04-1480 PJH, because Dimmick had

not exhausted his administrative remedies against them, and remanded the remaining

claims against the non-federal defendants to state court. 

Dimmick then filed a second amended complaint in state court, which did not

explicitly name any federal employees but which contained claims against private parties

for the actions of VA employees. The government then removed the case a second time,

at which point it became Dimmick v. NCIRE, C 04-4965 PJH. Dimmick moved to remand

the case, but at the hearing on the motion, he withdrew his motion to remand and agreed to

proceed on those claims in federal court. 

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Dimmick then filed a third amended complaint (“3AC”) in C 04-4965 PJH and, after

exhausting administrative remedies as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),

filed a third lawsuit, this time against the government, Dimmick v. U.S., C 05-0971 PJH. 

The two cases have been related but not consolidated on this court’s docket. 

All parties moved to dismiss the 3AC complaint in Dimmick v. NCIRE, C 04-4965

PJH. The court granted the motion to dismiss but also granted leave to amend one last

time. Additionally, at Dimmick’s request, the court granted Dimmick leave to amend the

complaint in Dimmick v. US, C 05-0971 PJH. Order Dismissing TAC (“May 23, 2005

Order”). 

Dimmick then filed a fourth amended complaint (“4AC”) in case number 04-4965

PJH and a first amended complaint (“1AC”) in case number 05-0971 PJH in June 2005. 

After the filing of the 4AC, BI and Abbott settled their claims with Dimmick and were

dropped from Dimmick v. NCIRE, C 04-4965 PJH. 

In September 2005, this court granted NCIRE’s motion to dismiss the claims against

it in 04-4965 PJH, and judgment was entered as to NCIRE on October 19, 2005. The

court, however, denied the Regents’ motion to dismiss in 04-4965 PJH. Accordingly, the

only claims that remained in 04-4965 PJH after this court’s September 2005 order were the

seventh and eighth claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment against the

Regents. The Regents subsequently filed an answer to the 4AC in 04-4965 PJH on

October 19, 2005, and there have been no further motions in that case.

In the September 2005 order, the court also denied the government’s motion to

dismiss the single negligence claim asserted under the FTCA in Dimmick v. U.S., 05-0971. 

The court, however, granted the government’s motion for a more definite statement

(“MDS”), and stated as follows:

The 1AC is not a model of clarity and is at times internally inconsistent. The

cause of action for negligence is found at ¶ 51 (A)-(C). Dimmick alleges in

section (A) that the U.S. owed no fewer than a dozen duties to him under

federal and state laws and regulations, and under “their own standard of care

documents.” However, no regulations are cited, no VA standard of care

documents are referenced, and the only law cited is California Health &

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Safety Code § 24173 or 24178. It is not clear to the court whether Dimmick is

claiming that each of the listed duties owed to him are derived from the cited

provisions of California law, or from some other unidentified source. With

regard to sections (B) and (C), no source is provided at all. The U.S. is

correct that the complaint is vague and ambiguous. Frankly, it is impossible

to determine whether Dimmick has stated a cause of action for negligence

based on the breach of a duty whose origin has not been specified. While

these three sections of ¶ 51, clearly set forth the conduct of the U.S. at issue,

it is impossible for the defendant to frame a response to the pleading because

it does not put them or the court on notice as to why the alleged conduct

amounted to negligence. 

The court concluded in the September 2005 order:

Because the court cannot find that Dimmick has or has not stated a claim for

negligence against the U.S., the motion to dismiss is DENIED. However, the

motion for a more definite statement is GRANTED. Because Dimmick’s

pleadings have been a moving target, with the theories and wrongdoers

changing in every iteration, Dimmick shall not file a fifth amended complaint. 

Rather he shall file a document entitled simply, “More Definite Statement,” in

which he shall provide the origin of the duties he alleges were owed to him by

the U.S. as set forth in ¶ 51 § (A) - (C). Dimmick may not take this

opportunity to again change or enlarge upon his allegations. The statement

must simply track and explain the allegations already set forth in the 1AC at ¶

51. Even though the 1AC is Dimmick’s third attempt at pursuing a proper

action against the U.S., he is being afforded this opportunity because with a

statement of the origin of the duties he alleged were breached, the U.S.

should be able to frame a responsive pleading. The statement shall be filed

within fifteen days of the date of this order. The U.S. shall thereafter answer

the 1AC as amplified by the more definite statement, within twenty days of the

filing of the statement.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Rule 10(b) 

FRCP 10(b) provides in pertinent part that:

Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence . . . shall be

stated in a separate count . . . whenever a separation facilitates the clear

presentation of the matters set forth.

“Separate counts will be required if necessary to enable the defendant to frame a

responsive pleading or to enable the court and the other parties to understand the claims.” 

Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 2 Moore’s

Federal Practice § 10.03[2][a]). “Courts have required separate counts where multiple

claims are asserted, where they arise out of separate transactions or occurrences, and

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where separate statements will facilitate a clear presentation.” Id.

2. Rule 12(c)

The standard applied on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is the

same as that applied to 12(b)(6) motions: judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when,

even if all material facts in the pleading under attack are true, the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co, 896

F.2d 1542, 155 (9th Cir. 1989). As with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b), a motion for

judgment on the pleadings ordinarily may not be based on matters outside the pleadings. 

However, if extrinsic evidence is presented and the court is willing to consider it, then the

motion is “converted” to one for summary judgment. See id. at 1550.

B. Government’s Rule 10(b) Motion

Dimmick’s 1AC asserts a single negligence claim. The government argues that this 

claim should be broken down into four separate claims pursuant to FRCP 10(b). According

to the government, these separate occurrences or transactions include:

(1) the VA doctors’ failure to obtain plaintiff’s informed consent prior to

prescribing him drugs;

(2) the VA doctors’ failure to obtain plaintiff’s informed consent prior to performing

human experiments on him;

(3) the government’s failure to establish and implement complaint procedures

without reprisal or retaliation; and

(4) the VA’s failure to “treat plaintiff with dignity, compassion and respect” and to

protect him from harm.

The government also argues that this court should dismiss Dimmick’s claims based on his

failure to set them out separately as required by Rule 10(b).

Dimmick responds that his claims arise from essentially the same occurrence. He

argues that “[w]hile there may be nuances that are distinct to each claim, the basic

elements are the same.” He concedes that the only claim that might be considered a

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separate transaction would be the allegation that the defendant failed to investigate. 

Dimmick further argues that if the court determines that there should be separate claims

pursuant to Rule 10(b), he should be given the opportunity to amend the complaint.

The court, however, concludes that pursuant to Rule 10(b), Dimmick has asserted

three – not four – claims. Those claims include:

(1) the government’s alleged negligence in failing to obtain Dimmick’s written

informed consent prior to (a) prescribing drugs, and/or (b) performing human

experiments on him;

(2) the government’s alleged negligence in failing to establish complaint

procedures, communicate them to Dimmick and to conduct a meaningful

investigation [into] Dimmick’s complaints without reprisal or retaliation against

him; and

(3) the government’s alleged negligence in failing to treat Dimmick with dignity,

compassion, and respect, and to protect him from harm.

The court declines to break down the first claim into two separate claims, as

suggested by the government, because contrary to the other claims which do appear to

involve separate occurrences, this claim involves the same facts and the same underlying

transactions.

Dismissal, however, is not appropriate. See, e.g., Bautista, 216 F.3d at 841-42

(district court’s “sudden death” dismissal of plaintiff’s 2AC under Rule 10(b) for failure to

separate out claims was abuse of discretion even though “plaintiff’s [2AC] frustrate[d] the

aim of the federal rule to bring about the just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of cases”

because complaint’s “deficiencies were readily curable [under Rule 10(b)] with some

guidance from the court”); 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 10.03[4] (2005 ed.). 

The court therefore considers the government’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings in light of the above three claims. No further amendment of plaintiff’s complaint

is required or permitted. 

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 The government does not move for judgment on the pleadings based on plaintiff’s

claim one (a) that the government failed to obtain written informed consent prior to prescribing

medication. See Government’s Motion at 9-10 (stating that it will instead move for summary

judgment on the issue). In fact, neither party has addressed the specific issue of whether

defendant’s prescription of medication in anticipation of potential participation in a human

experimentation study required Dimmick’s informed consent.

2

The federal regulations relied on by the court in its September 26, 2005 order, 21

C.F.R. §§ 312.3(b) and 56.102(e), provide that:

Subject means a human who participates in an investigation either as a recipient

of the investigational new drug or as a control. A subject may be a healthy

human or a patient with a disease.

21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b).

Human subject means an individual who is or becomes a participant in research,

either as a recipient of the test article or as a control. A subject may be either

a healthy individual or a patient.

21 C.F.R. § 56.102(e).

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C. Government’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

1. Claim One (b) Must be Dismissed Because Dimmick was not a 

Human Experimentation Subject1

Claim one (b), that the government was required to obtain Dimmick’s informed

because of his status as a human experimentation subject, must be dismissed for the

reasons stated by this court in its prior September 26, 2005 order and those advanced by

the government.

The court’s prior order concluded that, as a matter of law, Dimmick would not have

become a subject in a human research study until he was the recipient of the actual drug

being investigated in the study.2

 Based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the court held

that Dimmick was barred by statements in his pleadings from asserting that he was a

subject in a human research study.

Because Dimmick was never a human experimentation subject as defined in the

regulations, the government was not required to obtain his informed consent. The court’s

previous conclusion remains the law of the case. See Richardson v. United States, 841

F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[u]nder the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, a court is ordinarily

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precluded from reexamining an issue previously decide by the . . . court”). Accordingly, the

court GRANTS the government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to claim one (b).

2. Claims Two and Three Must be Dismissed Based on Governmental

Immunity

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) waives sovereign immunity for specified torts

of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment “in the same manner and

to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances” would be liable under

the law of the state “where the act of omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674. 

The FTCA applies only if state law would impose liability on a private person. United

States v. Olson, 126 S.Ct. 510, 511-12 (2005) (reversing line of Ninth Circuit precedent

allowing “waiver simply on a finding that local law would make a state or municipal entity

liable,” and instead holding that waiver exists only where private person would be liable).

In Delta Savings Bank v. United States, the Ninth Circuit rejected two of the plaintiff’s

arguments that are pertinent to the case at hand. 265 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2001). The court

rejected the plaintiff’s argument that an “FTCA claim can be brought for violations of federal

statutes that provide private federal causes of action, even if there is no analogous state

law.” Id. at 1024. 

Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the state tort of

negligence per se satisfied the FTCA requirements regarding state law liability. The Delta

plaintiffs had argued “that if the forum state recognizes a claim for negligence per se for the

violation of a federal statute, then the local law requirement is satisfied.” Id. at 1026. The

Ninth Circuit held that such reasoning “conflate[d] two elements of tort law: duty and the

standard of care.” Id. It held that “any duty that the United States owed to the plaintiff must

be found in California state tort law,” id. at 1025, and that California’s “negligence per se

doctrine does not do away with the requirement in FTCA cases that the duty must be

created by state law.” The “duty cannot spring from a federal law.” Id. Instead, “[t]he duty

must arise from state statutory or decisional law, and must impose on the defendants a

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38 C.F.R. sections 16.116(a)(6)-(8) repeat verbatim plaintiff’s alleged duties regarding

complaint procedures. Those sections include requirements that a subject be advised re: “any

medical treatments . . . available if injury occurs. . . where further information may be

obtained,” and “whom to contact in the event of a research-related injury.”

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38 C.F.R. § 17.33(g) provides that:

Each patient has the right to present grievances with respect to perceived

infringement of the rights described in this section or concerning any other

matter on behalf of himself, herself or others, to staff members at the facility in

which the patient is receiving care, other Department of Veterans Affairs officials,

government officials, members of Congress or any other person without fear of

reprisal.

Section 17.85 provides that:

VA medical facilities shall provide necessary medical treatment to a research

subject injured as a result of participation in a research project approved by a VA

Research and Development Committee and conducted under the supervision of

one or more VA employees.

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duty to refrain from committing the sort of wrong alleged here.” Id.

a. Claim Two

Plaintiff claims that the duty to investigate and to establish complaint procedures, as

set forth by the federal regulations and a VA patient’s “bill of rights,” is also incorporated

into California statutory law. This court has reviewed the regulations and statutory

provisions cited by plaintiff, and concludes that no such duties have been incorporated into

state law.

In asserting that the government owed a duty to investigate his complaints and to

establish a complaint procedure, plaintiff appears to rely on the following regulations: (1)

38 C.F.R. § 16.116, which governs the “general requirements for informed consent” as

pertains to the Department of Veterans Affairs, and which also appears to be the one that

plaintiff refers to as the “VA bill of rights;”3

 38 C.F.R. § 17.33(g), which sets forth

procedures for patients’ grievances with respect to the Department of Veterans Affairs; and 

38 C.F.R. § 17.85 regarding the treatment of research-related injuries to human subjects

within the Department of Veterans Affairs.4

 The other regulations cited by plaintiff

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regarding the Department of Veterans Affairs do not pertain specifically to these duties. 

See 38 C.F.R. § 17.32 (informed consent); 17.34 (tentative eligibility).

However, to the extent that the cited federal regulations contain the duties

articulated by the plaintiff, neither the regulations nor the duties set forth within those

regulations have been adopted or incorporated into California law by any of the California

code sections cited by Dimmick. This includes California H&S Code §§ 24171, 24172,

24173, et seq. Accordingly, because a breach of duty created by federal law is not

actionable under the FTCA, and California law does not create a duty to investigate and to

establish complaint procedures, there is no basis for finding a waiver of sovereign

immunity. See Delta, 265 F.3d 1025-26. The court GRANTS the government’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings as to this claim. 

b. Claim Three

Plaintiff’s MDS and opposition diverge regarding the source of the government’s

alleged duty to treat Dimmick with dignity, compassion, and respect, and to protect him

from harm. His opposition states that the duty to treat plaintiff with respect and protect him

from harm is set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 46.116, which has been incorporated into California

H&S code § 24178(h). This is erroneous. No such duty is set forth by that federal

regulation. 

However, plaintiff’s MDS correctly sets forth the federal regulation pertaining to that

duty. 38 C.F.R. § 17.33(a), regarding patients’ rights within the VA, is apparently the

source of plaintiff’s right to be treated with respect, and provides that: “Patients have a right

to be treated with dignity in a humane environment that affords them both reasonable

protection from harm.”

However, as with claim two, neither this federal regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 17.33(a) nor

the duties set forth in this regulation, have been adopted or incorporated into California law

by any of the California code sections cited by Dimmick, and thus, cannot provide the basis

for waiver of governmental immunity. See Delta, 265 F.3d 1025-26.

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The court GRANTS the government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to

claim three as well.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to Rule 10(b), the court concludes that plaintiff’s 1AC states three claims.

For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS the government’s motion for judgment

on the pleadings as to claim one (b), and claims two and three.

Accordingly, the only remaining claim in 05-0971 PJH is claim one (a), which asserts

that the government was negligent in failing to obtain Dimmick’s written informed consent

prior to prescribing drugs in anticipation of his potential participation in the studies.

FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS RE: 04-4965 PJH

Having reviewed the parties’ January 17, 2006 letter briefs regarding remand of the

case to state court, and noting that the parties were unable to reach a joint proposal

regarding remand of this case, the court will permit the plaintiff to file another formal motion

for remand no later than March 1, 2006. The court additionally orders that any further

remand motion and respective opposition must address the only remaining basis for federal

court jurisdiction: discovery as to federal actors. The court will decide the motion on the

papers.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 3, 2006

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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