Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00097/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00097-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNEST L. HALES, CASE NO. CV F 10-0097 LJO SMS

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’

F.R.Civ.P. 12 MOTION TO DISMISS

vs. (Docs. 5, 17.)

MATTHEW CATE, et al,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendants California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) officials and

employees seek to dismiss as legally barred and incognizable former inmate and pro se plaintiff Ernest

L. Hales’ (“Mr. Hales”) due process and equal protection claims arising from denial of Mr. Hales’ visit

of an inmate at California State Prison – Corcoran (“Corcoran”). Mr. Hales responds that his operative

Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief, and Monetary Damages (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

(“complaint”) adequately pleads due process and equal protection claims arising from defendants’

misapplication of prison regulations. This Court considered defendants’ F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss on the record and VACATES the May 24, 2010 hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For 1

the reasons discussed below, this Court DISMISSES this action against defendants.

Mr. Hales filed timely opposition to the initial motion to dismiss filed by one of the five defendants. Mr.

1

Hales did not file timely opposition to the second motion to dismiss filed by the remaining defendants. Since the two motions

to dismiss raise nearly identical points, this Court applies Mr. Hales’ timely opposition to all defendants.

1

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

BACKGROUND2

Summary

Mr. Hales is a formerCDCR inmate and registered sex offender. Mr. Hales was paroled in 1996

and discharged from parole in 1999. Mr. Hales holds himself out as an “independent paralegal” in

association with Visalia attorney Marianne Gilbert (“Attorney Gilbert”).

Defendants are:

1. CDCR Secretary Matthew Cate (“Secretary Cate”);

2. Corcoran Warden Derral Adams (“Warden Adams”);

3. Corcoran Chief Deputy Warden – Administration R. Lopez (“Chief Deputy Warden

Lopez”);

4. CDCR Correction Counselor II D. Lee (“Counselor Lee”); and

5. Warden Adams’ assistant Sabrina Johnson (“Ms. Johnson”).3

The complaint arises out of “refusal of defendants to allow plaintiff to visit and conduct business

with an inmate under defendants’ custody and control at Corcoran.”

Denial Of Request To Visit Inmate

On January 3, 2009, Mr. Hales submitted a written request to Warden Adams to visit Corcoran

inmate John Martinez (“inmate Martinez”) as “an attorney representative” in association with Attorney

Gilbert. In September 2007, Mr. Hales had been approved to visit another Corcoran inmate as an

attorney representative. On January 8, 2009, Ms. Johnson informed Mr. Hales by telephone that his

“request had been denied by ‘someone in administration’ at the institution” and “made some factually

incorrect statements regarding [Mr. Hales’] previous criminal record.” Chief Deputy Warden Lopez’

January 8, 2009 letter denied Mr. Hales’ request based on “documented history and utilizing the

California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (i.e., warrants, convictions, etc.) and being

a registered sex offender.”

Mr. Hales submitted February 1, 2009 letter addressed to the CDCR director and Warden Adams

The factual recitation is derived generally from Mr. Hales’s complaint, the target of defendants’ challenges.

2

Secretary Cate, Warden Adams, Chief Deputy Warden Lopez, Counselor Lee and Ms. Johnson will be

3

referred to collectively as the “CDCR defendants.”

2

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to appeal the denial. Counselor Lee’s April 30, 2009 letter upheld the denial given “[t]here was a clear

objection to you gaining entrance into a correctional facility due safety and security concerns.”

Mr. Hales followed up with a claim to the California Victim Compensation and Government

Claims Board, which denied Mr. Hales’ claim.

Mr. Hales’ Claims

The complaint alleges against each CDCR defendant nearly identical Fourteenth Amendment

claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983"), that each CDCR defendant violated Mr. Hales’

due process and equal protection rights by:

1. “[D]enying plaintiff the right to visit and conduct business with an inmate” to preclude

“plaintiff from earning a living as a paralegal”; and

2. “[F]ailure to adequately supervise and train” subordinate correctional staff and wardens.

The complaint accuses each CDCR defendant of creating “a longstanding practice and custom

of denying former inmates the right to visit current inmates as an attorney representative.” The

complaint alleges that SecretaryCate, Warden Adams, Chief DeputyWarden Lopez and Counselor Lee

have ratified “this longstanding practice and custom” because they have “final policymaking authority”

either within CDCR or at Corcoran. The complaint attributes to Ms. Johnson the creation or allowing

“a longstanding practice and custom of denying former inmates the right to visit current inmates as an

attorney representative.”

The complaint seeks to recover for Mr. Hales’ “financial, emotional, mental and other injuries”

as well as punitive damages. The complaint seeks declaratory relief that the CDCR defendants’ action

constitute a violating “underground regulation.” The complaint seeks an injunction to prohibit “denying

plaintiff permission to visit any inmate at any CDCR facility in plaintiff’s capacity as an attorney

representative and/or an inmate visitor, absent articulation of specific evidence and proof that such

a visit would constitute a legitimate safety and security concern.” (Bold in original.)

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion Standards

The CDCR defendants seek F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal in that Mr. Hales’ “constitutional

rights were not violated” given that “California law prohibits former prisoners from entering prison

3

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

property without the specific consent of the warden.” The CDCR defendants also fault the complaint’s

failure to allege that they “personally participated” in the decision to deny Mr. Hales’s visitation with

inmate Martinez.

Mr. Hales responds that despite inmate Martinez’ “security risk, he is entitled to direct, personal

visit with counsel and counsel’s representatives.” Mr. Hales contends that the CDCR defendants are

“responsible under the facts and the law for denying Plaintiff permission to visit Mr. Martinez.”

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set

forth in the complaint. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiencyof a complaint, before the reception

of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco

Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where

th

there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling th

v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). th

In resolving a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required “to accept as

true allegations that aremerelyconclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”

In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9 Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court th

need not permit an attempt to amend if “it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by an

amendment.” Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9 Cir. 2005). th

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 

Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to

4

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing

Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under

some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.

Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7 Cir. 1984)). th

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court recently

explained:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” . . . A

claim has facial plausibilitywhen the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

. . . The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.) 

After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized: “In sum, for a complaint

to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 989 (9 Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). th

The U.S. Supreme Court applies a “two-prong approach” to address a motion to dismiss:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in

a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Second,

only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . .

. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not

“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can

choose to begin byidentifying pleadings that, because theyare no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, theymust be supported by factual allegations. When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950.

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to the CDCR defendants’ challenges to the claims

against them.

5

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Section 1983 Requirements

“Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632-633 (9 Cir. 1988). th

“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807,

811 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694, n. 3 (1979)). 

Section 1983 and other federal civil rights statutes address liability “in favor of persons who are deprived

of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured’ to them by the Constitution.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.

247, 253, 98 S.Ct. 1042 (1978) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 996

(1976)). “The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of

a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Baker, 443 U.S. at 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689. Stated

differently, the first step in a section 1983 claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly

infringed. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271, 114 S.Ct. at 811. “Section 1983 imposes liability for violations

of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.” Baker,

443 U.S. at 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689.

With the section 1983 requirements in mind, this Court next will address due process and equal

protection rights.

Due Process

The CDCR defendants attack the due process claims in the absence of a property or liberty

interest subject to due process.

“The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against the deprivation of liberty or property

by the government without due process.” Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9 Cir. th

1993). “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents of

State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972). A Fourteenth Amendment due process

claim under section 1983 may address “procedural rights” of “guarantee of a fair procedure” to address

6

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

deprivation of a “life, liberty or property” interest “without due process of law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494

U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (1990). To state a section 1983 claim based on procedural due process, a

plaintiff must allege: (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of

the interest by the government; and (3) lack of process. Wright v. Riverland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9 Cir. th

2000).

Once it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, “the question remains what process

is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972). An essential principle of

due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property “be preceded by notice and opportunity for

hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.

306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976). 

“To withstand Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, a statute is required to bear only a rational

relationship to a legitimate state interest, unless it makes a suspect classification or implicates a

fundamental right.” Nat’l Assoc. for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228

F.3d 1043, 1049 (9 Cir. 2000). “In applying the rational basis test, we presume the constitutionality

th

of the classification.” Nat’l Assoc. for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1050.

The United States Supreme Court has explained that prison officials’ judgment is entitled to

deference:

Prison officials must be free to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of

inmates and corrections personnel and to prevent escape or unauthorized entry.

Accordingly, we have held that even when an institutional restriction infringes a specific

constitutional guarantee, such as the First Amendment, the practice must be evaluated

in the light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional

security.

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); see Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133,

123 S.Ct. 2162 (2003) (prison “regulation prohibiting visitation by former inmates bears a self-evident

connection to the State's interest in maintaining prison security and preventing future crimes”).

Moreover, states are authorized to regulate businesses and professions: “General statutes within

the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of

7

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they can

be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.”

Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445, 36 S.Ct. 141, 142, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915).

The CDCR defendants argue that the complaint fails to allege a due process claim. The CDCR

defendants point to California Penal Code section 4571 which renders as a felony a convicted felon’s

entry onto prison property without warden permission. The CDCR defendants note that prison

restrictions “grounded upon policy considerations of institutional security and internal order” have been

upheld. See Department of Corrections v. Superior Court, 131 Cal.App.3d 245, 253, 182 Cal.Rptr. 294

(1982); see also Morris v. Superior Court, 145 Cal.App.3d 561, 567, 193 Cal.Rptr. 496 (1983) (“great

weight and respect is due the Department's [CDCR’s] administrative expertise in judging the security

risks involved” with paralegal visits).

The CDCR defendants argue denial of Mr. Hales’ visitation of inmate Martinez “was not

arbitrary considering the security risks that Mr. Martinez presents to Corcoran” given inmate Martinez’

gang affiliation. The CDCR defendants continue that Mr. Hales’ permitted entry into another prison “as

part of a prison ministries program” or approval “for attorney representative visits” with another inmate

“does not render the denial of confidential visits with inmate Martinez arbitrary and unreasonable.” The

CDCR defendants further argue that denial to enter Corcoran to visit inmate Martinez “does not trigger

any due process liberty interest” given that Mr. Hales lacked a “lawful right to enter prison property” and

would commit a felony if he entered Corcoran without warden permission.

Mr. Hales “does not dispute the validity or applicability of Pen.C. § 4571 to his circumstances.”

Mr. Hales relies on a CDCR regulation which permits an “institution head” to “deny visiting by a former

prison inmate for reasons that would apply to anyother person” if the formerinmate has been discharged

for more than a year from an institution or from parole. See 15 CCR § 3172.1(b)(4). Mr. Hales claims

that the CDCR defendants applied a standard beyond “any other person” to preclude Mr. Hales from

“engaging in his common occupation of life.” Mr. Hales relies on the following from Roth, 408 U.S.

564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701: “ Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they

are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an

independent source such as state law – rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that

8

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Mr. Hales concludes that he “was treated as a former

inmate, and disapproved solely on that basis, which is prohibited by the codified regulation.” 

The complaint identifies no liberty or property interest subject to due process protection. As a

convicted felon, Mr. Hales has no right to enter Corcoran – end of story. California Penal Code section

4571 does not purport to limit a warden’s discretion to deny felon access. Mr. Hales appealed his denial

through the prison process, which sustained denial of his entry of Corcoran. Denial of prison entry by

convicted felons serves vital penal and security interests. 

Moreover, denial of Corcoran entry does not deprive Mr. Hales of his livelihood. He is free to

pursue is paralegal vocation in other avenues. A plaintiff's “liberty interest is implicated only when the

state makes a charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his

community.” Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 365 (9th Cir.1976). Due process

protections apply if “there is some public disclosure of the charge,” but “[w]ithout a disclosure that is

public, there is no violation of due process as ‘the reasons stated to him in private [would have] no

different impact on his reputation than if they had been true.’” Llamas v. Butte Community College

Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9 Cir. 2001) (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349, 96 S.Ct.

th

2074(1976)). The complaint alleges no public disclosure of Mr. Hales’ denial of Corcoran entry and

reflects that the matter was private to demonstrate no serious damage in Mr. Hales’s standing or

association to implicate a liberty interest.

The CDCR defendants correctly note the absence of facts to support a policy to prohibit felons

from visiting Corcoran inmates. The complaint’s allegation that Mr. Hales had a confidential visit with

another inmate contradicts such purported policy. The CDCR defendants are correct that the complaint

lacks facts that the decision to deny visitation with inmate Martinez “was anything other than a singular

decision, related solely to inmate Martinez.”

The due process claims fail and cannot be resurrected by an attempt to amend.

Equal Protection

The CDCR defendants contend that the complaint’s allegations fail to invoke equal protection

to doom the equal protection claims against the CDCR defendants.

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall ‘deny

9

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that

all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,

473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985). The “purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary

discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through

duly constituted agents.” Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445, 43 S.Ct. 190

(1923).

A section 1983 plaintiff alleging an equal protection violation must prove that: (1) the defendants

treated plaintiff differently from others similarly situated; (2) the unequal treatment was based on an

impermissible classification; (3) the defendants acted with discriminatory intent in applying this

classification; and (4) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the discriminatory classification. Moua v.

City of Chico, 324 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2004); see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,

1194 (9 Cir. 1998) (a section 1983 plaintiff alleging denial of equal protection “must show that the th

defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against plaintiff based on membership in a

protected class.”); Van Pool v. City and County of San Francisco, 752 F.Supp. 915, 927 (N.D. Cal.1990)

(section 1983 plaintiff must prove purposeful discrimination by demonstrating that he “receiv[ed]

different treatment from that received by others similarly situated,” and that the treatment complained

of was under color of state law).

“For statutorychallenges made on Equal Protection grounds, ‘[t]he general rule is that legislation

is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related

to a legitimate [government] interest.’” U.S. v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 412 (9 Cir. 1992) (quoting th

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 (citations omitted)). “When social or economic

legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude . . .” Cleburne, 473

U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254. “For statutory classifications ‘that disadvantage a ‘suspect class,’ or

that impinge upon the exercise of a ‘fundamental right,’ the Supreme Court requires a showing of a

compelling governmental interest.” Harding, 971 F.2d at 412 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,

216-217, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394-95 (1982)). “A law is subject to strict scrutiny if it targets a suspect class

or burdens the exercise of a fundamental right.” U.S. v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 565 (9 Cir. 2000), cert. th

10

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

denied, 532 U.S. 989, 121 S.Ct. 1641 (2001). “However, when no suspect class or fundamental right

is affected, the federal courts ‘properly exercise[ ] only a limited review power over Congress, the

appropriate representative body through which the public makes democratic choices among alternative

solutions to social and economic problems.’” Harding, 971 F.2d at 412 (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson,

450 U.S. 221, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1074 (1981)). A “‘classification neither involving fundamental rights nor

proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity’ and must be upheld ‘if there

is a rational relationship between the disparityoftreatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’”

Aleman v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir. 2000) (quoting Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, th

319-320, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993)).

The CDCR defendants argue that Mr. Hales’ former-inmate status “is not a suspect class.” The

CDCR defendants note that a prison “is not a public place and visitation can be restricted.” See Overton

v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162 (2003). The CDCR defendants point to inmate Martinez’

Mexican Mafia prison gang affiliation as further support to deny Mr. Hales’ visitation. 

The CDCR defendants are correct that Mr. Hales’ former-inmate status does not invoke equal

protection. The complaint fails to allege that Mr. Hales was treated differently from others similarly

situated based on his status. The complaint lacks facts that the CDCR defendants acted with intent or

purpose to discriminate against Mr. Hales based on his former-inmate status. The complaint identifies

neither a suspect class nor a burden on exercise of a fundamental right to support an equal protection

claim. No furtherfacts appear to invigorate the claim which is subject to dismissal, and Mr. Hales offers

nothing to support an equal protection claim to warrant an attempt to amend.

Direct Participation And Supervisory Liability

The CDCR defendants fault the complaint’s failure to allege that “they personally participated

in the decision to deny plaintiff confidential visitation with inmate Martinez.”

Mr. Hales responds that his initial application to visit Corcoran was addressed to Warden Adams

as well as his appeal of denial to visit. Mr. Hales argues that Warden Adams’ delegation “to a

subordinate in the first instance” and failure “to reply to Plaintiff’s appeal in the second instance, does

not relieve him of his duty under the law, nor his culpability in this matter.”

“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault;

11

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional

deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7 Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1230, 117 S.Ct.

th

1822 (1997); see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9 Cir. 1989) (“Liability under section 1983 arises th

only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.”) “The inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or

omissions are alleged to have caused the constitutional deprivation.” Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Section

1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the defendant’s actions and the

deprivation allegedly suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct.

2018 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976). 

A plaintiff cannot hold an officer liable “because of his membership in a group without a

showing of individual participation in the unlawful conduct.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9 Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff must “establish the th

‘integral participation’ of the officers in the alleged constitutional violation.” Jones, 297 F.3d at 935. 

“‘[I]ntegral participation’ does not require that each officer’s actions themselves rise to the level of a

constitutional violation.” Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9 Cir. 2004). Integral th

participation requires “some fundamental involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the

violation.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481, n. 12 (9 Cir. 2007). “A person th

‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he

is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). th

“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was

personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194

(9 Cir. 1998). A section 1983 plaintiff “must state the allegations generally so as to provide notice to th

the defendants and alert the court as to what conduct violated clearly established law.” Preschooler II

v. Clark County School Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9 Cir. 2007). th

In addition, Congress did not intend to “impose liability vicariously on [employers or

supervisors] solelyon the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.”

12

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Monell, 436 U.S. at 692, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. Generally, supervisory personnel are not liable under section

1983 for actions of their employees under a respondeat superior theory, and thus, when a named

defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional

violation must be specifically alleged and proved. See Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9 Cir. th

2001); Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9 Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9 th th

Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941, 99 S.Ct. 2883 (1979). To establish a prima facie case of

supervisor liability, a plaintiff must show facts to indicate that the supervisor defendant either: (1)

personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; (2) knew of the violations and

failed to act to prevent them; or (3) promulgated or implemented a policy “so deficient that the policy

itself ‘is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’”

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9 Cir. 1989); Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. A supervising official is th

liable in his individual capacity if he “set[ ] in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused

to terminate a series of acts by others, which he kn[e]w or reasonably should [have] know[n], would

cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9 Cir. th

1991) (ratification, poor investigation, or failure to terminate series of events may make supervisor

liable).4

“Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266,

268 (1982).

The U.S. Supreme Court has applied an “objective standard” to a claimof deliberate indifference

for failure to train and supervise. See Farmer v. Brennan, 551 U.S. 825, 841, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994). 

“[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more

or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional

rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to

the need." Canton, 489 U.S. at 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals offered alternative elements to impose section 1983 liability on a

4

supervisor: “‘(1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 915 (quoting Redman v.

County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9 Cir. 1991)).

th

13

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The CDCR defendants argue that allegations against Secretary Cate and Warden Adams rest

“solely” on their “supervisory responsibility” and that the complaint fails to allege facts that Secretary

Cate and Warden Adams personally participated in a decision to deny Mr. Hales visitation with inmate

Martinez. The CDCR defendants contend that the complaint lacks facts that Chief Deputy Warden

Lopez “made an unconstitutional decision or that ‘more or different’ training or supervision by

[Secretary] Cate would have resulted in a different decision. The CDCR defendants point to the lack

of allegations of Counselor Lee and Ms. Johnson’s supervisory responsibilities in that they are named

as defendants “solely” because they communicated with Mr. Hales.

The complaint is devoid of allegations of the CDCR defendants’ individual conduct to inflict a

constitutional injury on Mr. Hales. As explained above, the complaint lacks a due process or equal

protection claim. The complaint lacks facts to establish a causal link between anyCDCR defendant and

a cognizable constitutional violation. Secretary Cate and Warden Adams’ delegation of tasks is of no

consequence in absence of a viable claim. The complaint fails to alert the CDCR defendants of conduct

which allegedly violated clearly established law. The complaint rests on passing references of “failure

to adequately supervise and train correctional staff” and ratifying a “longstanding practice and custom

byCDCR employees under his direction and control.” Such vague, conclusoryallegations fail to support

section 1983 liability of any CDCR defendant as a supervisor or direct participant. In the absence of a

viable section 1983 claim, this action is subject to dismissal, and an attempt at amendment would not

resuscitate Mr. Hales’ barred claims. 

Eleventh Amendment Bar

The CDCR defendants contend that the Eleventh Amendment bars this Court’s interference with

CDCR regulations to warrant dismissal of Mr. Hales’ claims that the CDCR defendants “maintained a

practice and custom of denying former inmates visitation as an attorney representative.”

A “federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh

Amendment when – as here – the relief sought and ordered has an impact directly on the State itself.” 

Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117, 104 S.Ct. 900 (1984). The Eleventh

Amendment “bars claims in federal court against state officials based on state law violations.” Air

Transport Ass'n of America v. Public Utilities Com'n of State of Cal., 833 F.2d 200, 204 (9 Cir. 1987). th

14

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The U.S. Supreme Court further explained:

A federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law, whether

prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On

the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when

a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such

a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh

Amendment. 

Halderman, 465 U.S. at 106, 104 S.Ct. 90.

At their essence, Mr. Hales’ claims address state law violations by CDCR officials and

employees. Relief on Mr. Hales’ claims necessarily would impact California through CDCR. The

Eleventh Amendment bar further supports dismissal of Mr. Hales’ claims. Mr. Hales fails to

substantiate his claim of impossibility to sue state officials based on Eleventh Amendment application. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DISMISSES with prejudice this action; and

2. DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment against plaintiff Ernest L. Hales and in favor of

defendants Matthew Cate, Derral Adams, R. Lopez, D. Lee and Sabrina Johnson and to

close this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

15

Case 1:10-cv-00097-LJO -SMS Document 18 Filed 05/13/10 Page 15 of 15