Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-47/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated and all 

aggrieved employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL 

ARBITRATION OF PLAINTIFF 

HARPER’S PAGA CLAIM AND 

DISMISS REMAINING COUNT TEN 

CLAIMS

----oo0oo----

This putative wage-and-hour class action, which has an 

extensive history before this court, includes claims under 

California’s Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”), Cal. Lab. 

Code §§ 2698 et seq., based on alleged labor code violations by 

defendant Charter Communications. The court previously ruled on 

a motion by Charter to compel arbitration of all claims brought 

by plaintiffs Harper, Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal, except for 

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plaintiff Harper’s PAGA claims, deciding the motion in Charter’s 

favor. (Docket No. 202.) The court subsequently stayed the 

action in its entirety, in part because of a case that was then 

pending before the United States Supreme Court, Viking River 

Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, which had the potential to impact the 

PAGA claims in this action. (Docket Nos. 261, 288.) The Supreme 

Court has since issued a decision in that case, and the court has 

partially lifted the stay of this action to consider, among other 

things, a motion by Charter based on Viking River Cruises. 

(Docket No. 292.) That motion, through which Charter seeks to 

compel arbitration of a portion of Harper’s PAGA claims and to 

dismiss the remainder, is now before the court. (Mot. (Docket 

No. 293).)

I. Legal Background

Specifically, Charter seeks to compel Harper to 

arbitrate his “individual” PAGA claims, as distinct from his 

“representative” PAGA claims. (See id.) A brief review of PAGA, 

Viking River Cruises, and California Supreme Court precedent will 

clarify the significance of these concepts, in part because, as 

the Supreme Court has explained, PAGA claims are considered 

“representative” in two distinct senses.

“PAGA authorizes any ‘aggrieved employee’ to initiate 

an action against a former employer ‘on behalf of himself . . .

and other current or former employees’ to obtain civil penalties”

that otherwise can be “recovered only by the State” in an 

enforcement action brought by California’s Labor and Workforce 

Development Agency (LWDA). Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. 

Moriana, 142 S. Ct. 1906, 1914 (2022) (quoting Cal. Lab. Code 

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Ann. § 2699(a)). “Although the statute’s language suggests that 

an ‘aggrieved employee’ sues ‘on behalf of himself or herself and 

other current or former employees,’ California precedent holds 

that a PAGA suit is a ‘representative action in which the 

employee plaintiff sues as an agent or proxy’ of the State.” Id.

(quoting Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 2699(a); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. 

L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348 (2014)). That any PAGA claims an 

aggrieved employee brings are asserted on behalf of the state is 

the first sense in which PAGA claims are “representative.” See

id. at 1916. That the aggrieved employee may, on the state’s 

behalf, assert those claims based not only on labor code 

violations he personally suffered, but also on violations “other 

current or former employees” suffered, is the second sense in 

which PAGA claims are “representative.” Id.

In Iskanian, the California Supreme Court held that 

waivers of employees’ right to bring “representative” PAGA 

claims, in the first sense, are barred under California law. See

Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 383-84. The Supreme Court termed this 

“Iskanian’s principal rule.” Viking River Cruises, 142 S. Ct. at 

1916. Iskanian further held that agreements to “arbitrate or 

litigate ‘individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that 

an employee [personally] suffered,’” separately and apart from 

representative PAGA claims in the second sense -- i.e., PAGA 

claims for labor code violations suffered by other current and 

former employees -- are invalid. Id. at 1916-17 (quoting 

Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 383) (other citation omitted).1 The 

1 In other words, Iskanian held “that PAGA claims cannot 

be split into arbitrable individual claims and nonarbitrable 

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Supreme Court termed this Iskanian’s “secondary rule.” Id.

In Viking River Cruises, the United States Supreme 

Court overturned Iskanian’s secondary rule, holding that it was 

preempted by the FAA. See id. at 1923-24. However, the Court 

upheld Iskanian’s first rule, concluding that the FAA did not 

preempt California’s bar on waivers of employees’ ability to 

represent the state in PAGA actions. See id. at 1924-26; People 

v. Maplebear Inc., 81 Cal. App. 5th 923, 2022 WL 2981169, at *6 

n.4 (4th Dist. 2022) (recognizing same). Accordingly, under 

Viking River Cruises, employees may waive the right to bring PAGA 

claims that are specifically premised on labor code violations 

they have personally suffered, but “waivers of the right to 

assert . . . claims [on the state’s behalf] under PAGA” remain 

invalid. MacClelland v. Cellco P’ship, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2022 

WL 2390997, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 2022); see Viking River Cruises, 142 

S. Ct. at 1923-26; Shams v. Revature LLC, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2022 

WL 3453068, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2022).

II. Analysis

Based on Viking River Cruises and an arbitration 

agreement into which Harper and Charter entered, titled the 

“Solution Channel Agreement,” Charter now seeks to compel 

Harper’s “individual” PAGA claims -- i.e., only those premised on 

alleged labor code violations he personally suffered -- to 

arbitration. (See Mot.) Charter also asks that the court 

dismiss Harper’s remaining PAGA claims -- i.e., those premised on 

alleged labor code violations suffered by other employees -- for 

‘representative’ claims.” Id. at 1916.

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lack of standing. (See id.); see also Viking River Cruises, 142 

S. Ct. at 1925 (“[A]s we see it, PAGA provides no mechanism to 

enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an 

individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding. 

. . . When an employee’s own dispute is pared away from a PAGA 

action, the employee is no different from a member of the general 

public, and PAGA does not allow such persons to maintain suit. 

As a result, [the employee] lacks statutory standing to continue 

to maintain [his] non-individual claims in court, and the correct 

course is to dismiss [his] remaining claims.”). Viking River 

Cruises referred to this manner of separating PAGA claims into 

“individual” and “non-individual” claims as “split[ting]” the 

claims. Id. at 1916.

This court has previously enforced the Solution Channel 

Agreement against Harper as to other claims asserted in this 

action. (See Docket No. 202; see also Docket No. 288 (denying 

reconsideration of order compelling arbitration).) In so doing, 

the court held that the Agreement was not unconscionable. (See

Docket No. 202 at 17-20.) Although plaintiffs now reassert the 

same arguments they previously presented as to why the Agreement 

is unconscionable, none appear to be new, (see Opp. at 26-42 

(Docket No. 294)), and the court declines to revisit its previous 

conclusion. Plaintiffs also reassert arguments the court 

previously rejected as to why the Agreement does not apply to the 

claims Charter seeks to arbitrate, (see id. at 23-26; Docket No. 

202 at 9-12, 14-17), and the court likewise declines to revisit 

its conclusion as to those arguments.

The question thus becomes whether the Solution Channel 

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Agreement provides for the splitting of PAGA claims into 

“individual” and “non-individual” claims, as discussed in Viking 

River Cruises, such that the individual PAGA claims may be 

compelled to arbitration and the non-individual claims dismissed. 

In Viking River Cruises, the Court described the operative 

arbitration agreement as follows:

The agreement contained a “Class Action Waiver” 

providing that in any arbitral proceeding, the parties 

could not bring any dispute as a class, collective, or 

representative PAGA action. It also contained a 

severability clause specifying that if the waiver was 

found invalid, any class, collective, representative, 

or PAGA action would presumptively be litigated in 

court. But under that severability clause, if any 

“portion” of the waiver remained valid, it would be 

“enforced in arbitration.”

142 S. Ct. at 1916.

After holding that “the FAA preempts the rule of 

Iskanian insofar as [Iskanian] precludes division of PAGA actions 

into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to 

arbitrate,” id. at 1924 -- Iskanian’s secondary rule -- the Court 

explained the effect of that holding on the applicability of the 

arbitration agreement’s representative PAGA waiver and 

severability clause:

The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to 

waive “representative” PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, 

this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale 

waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that 

aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the 

agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted 

in that manner. But the severability clause in the 

agreement provides that if the waiver provision is 

invalid in some respect, any “portion” of the waiver 

that remains valid must still be “enforced in 

arbitration.” Based on this clause, Viking was 

entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it 

mandated arbitration of Moriana’s individual PAGA 

claim. The lower courts refused to do so based on 

[Iskanian’s] rule that PAGA actions cannot be divided 

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into individual and non-individual claims. Under our 

holding, that rule is preempted, so Viking is entitled 

to compel arbitration of Moriana’s individual claim.

Id. at 1924-25. Thus, although the agreement’s waiver of 

“representative PAGA” claims was ambiguous as to the sense in 

which the term “representative” was used -- i.e., representative 

of the state, or representative of other employees -- the 

severability clause’s provision requiring enforcement of “any 

‘portion’ of the waiver that remains valid” required the Court to 

interpret the “representative PAGA” waiver as using the term 

“representative” in the second sense. See id.

Here, the Solution Channel Agreement includes a similar 

waiver of representative claims, although it does not reference 

PAGA by name. The section is titled “Individual Claims 

Limitation and Representative, Collective, and Class Action 

Waiver” and provides:

You and Charter agree that both parties may only bring 

claims against the other party in their individual 

capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any 

purported class or representative proceeding . . . . 

Additionally, the arbitrator shall not be permitted to 

order consolidation of claims or a representative, 

class, or collective, arbitration.

(Aff. of John Fries, Ex. B (“Solution Channel Agreement”) § D 

(Docket No. 293-1).)

Like the arbitration agreement in Viking River Cruises, 

the Solution Channel Agreement also contains a severability 

clause. That clause provides in part:

[I]f any portion or provision of this Agreement 

(including, without implication of limitation, any 

portion or provision of any section of this Agreement) 

is determined to be illegal, invalid, or unenforceable 

by any court of competent jurisdiction and cannot be 

modified to be legal, valid or enforceable, the 

remainder of this Agreement shall not be affected by 

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such determination and shall be valid and enforceable 

to the fullest extent permitted by law, and said 

illegal, invalid, or unenforceable portion or 

provision shall be deemed not to be a part of this 

Agreement.

(Id. § Q.) It goes on to provide:

The only exception to this severability provision is, 

should the dispute involve a representative, 

collective or class action claim, and the 

representative, collective, and class action waiver 

(Section D) is found to be invalid or unenforceable 

for any reason, then this Agreement (except for the 

parties’ agreement to waive a jury trial) shall be 

null and void with respect to such representative, 

collective, and/or class claim only, and the dispute 

will not be arbitrable with respect to such claim(s).

(Id.)

The Solution Channel Agreement’s waiver of 

representative actions, like the “representative PAGA” action 

waiver in the arbitration agreement in Viking River Cruises, is 

ambiguous as to the meaning of “representative” as it applies to 

PAGA actions. (See Solution Channel Agreement § D.) Thus, under 

Viking River Cruises and Iskanian, “this provision [is] invalid 

if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims,” and the 

Agreement “remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that 

manner.” Viking River Cruises, 142 S. Ct. at 1924-25. Because 

basic principles of contract interpretation require the court to 

construe ambiguities against the drafter of the contract,

Sandquist v. Lebo Auto., Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 233, 248 (2016) 

(quoting Pac. Lumber Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm., 22 Cal. 2d 

410, 422 (1943)), including in the context of an arbitration 

agreement, id. (citing Victoria v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. 3d 734, 

739 (1985)), the court interprets the waiver’s prohibition on 

“representative” actions as including a waiver of employees’ 

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right to bring a PAGA action on behalf of the state. 

The waiver provision is therefore invalid under 

Iskanian unless its prohibition on representative PAGA actions 

(in the first sense of the term) can be severed under the 

Agreement’s severability clause, as was the case in Viking River 

Cruises. Like the severability clause in that case, which 

required that “if any ‘portion’ of the waiver remained valid,” 

that portion “would be ‘enforced in arbitration,’” Viking River 

Cruises, 142 S. Ct. at 1916, here the Agreement’s severability 

clause provides that “if any portion or provision of this 

Agreement” is determined to be invalid and “cannot be modified to 

be legal, valid or enforceable,” that portion shall be severed 

and the remainder of the Agreement enforced, (Solution Channel 

Agreement § Q). Unlike the clause in Viking River Cruises, 

however, the Agreement’s severability clause specifically exempts 

the “representative . . . action waiver” from severance, such 

that the Agreement “shall be null and void with respect to such 

representative . . . claim only, and the dispute will not be 

arbitrable with respect to such claim(s).” (Id.)

Because the court has concluded that the Agreement’s 

representative action waiver is unenforceable as to PAGA claims 

as a matter of law, under the Agreement’s severability clause, 

the Agreement is “null and void with respect to” such claims. 

Accordingly, the court concludes that the Solution Channel 

Agreement does not bar any portion of Harper’s PAGA claims or 

require arbitration thereof. The instant motion will therefore 

be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Charter 

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Communications’ motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff 

Harper’s PAGA claims and to dismiss Count Ten of the operative 

complaint (Docket No. 293) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.2

Dated: September 7, 2022

2 Defendant’s motion for leave to file a surreply (Docket 

No. 285) is GRANTED. Defendant’s surreply in response to 

Sinclair’s Reply in Support of Class Certification shall be filed 

within 48 hours of the date of this Order. Plaintiff’s request 

for judicial notice (Docket No. 295) is denied, as consideration 

of the documents for which plaintiff seeks notice is unnecessary 

to the court’s resolution of the instant motion.

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