Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01621/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01621-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER SELDON,

Plaintiff,

v.

7-ELEVEN INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-1621-PJH 

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

Before the court is the motion of plaintiff Christopher Seldon for attorney’s fees 

and costs. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and 

the relevant legal authority, the court hereby GRANTS the motion in part and DENIES it 

in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this disability access case on April 9, 2014, asserting violations at a 

7-Eleven store located at 2350 Harrison Street in Oakland, California. Named as 

defendants were 7-Eleven Inc.; Dhingra, Inc. and Parminder Dhingra (store franchisees); 

and the Richard G. Burge Family Trust, owner of the property where the store is located. 

Plaintiff claims he encountered the denials of access on eight occasions when he visited 

the store in November and December 2013, and in particular, that on several of those 

occasions, a vehicle without a disabled placard was parked in the disabled parking spot. 

A site visit was conducted on July 17, 2014. Plaintiff's access consultant prepared 

a report, which was provided to defendants in September 2014. On December 22, 2014, 

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plaintiff received defendants' Rule 68 Offer of Compromise, in which defendants offered 

injunctive relief in the form of remediating the access barriers (which defendants claim 

had already been completed), but with (according to plaintiff) no agreement as to "future 

maintenance," and also offered $8,001 in damages, with fees and costs to be negotiated 

or set by the court. 

In March 2015, the parties stipulated to the filing of a first amended complaint 

("FAC"). The parties also engaged in discovery during this period. On April 15, 2015, 

plaintiff demanded $16,000 in damages, plus $35,510 in fees and $7,212 in costs 

incurred as of April 10, 2015. In an effort to settle the case, plaintiff offered to take 10% 

less in fees, for a total of $31,959, which when added to the $7,212 in litigation expenses, 

would have resulted in fees and costs in the amount of $39,171. 

As of October 2015, defendants were still offering $8,001 in damages, per their 

Rule 68 offer, and plaintiff was still demanding $16,000. On October 21, 2015, 

defendants’ counsel Michael S. Orr asked Cat Cabalo, counsel for plaintiff, to advise as 

to "the fees and costs you would anticipate asking the court for if we resolved damages at 

this point in the case so that I can fully advise my client." The following day, Ms. Cabalo 

responded that "[t]he parties are so far apart on these numbers [referring to damages] 

that we will not make a demand for attorney fees, litigation expenses, and costs at this 

time," adding that as of October 21, 2015, "our total fees/expenses/costs were $55,778." 

On October 30, 2015, Mr. Orr offered on behalf of defendants to settle the case for 

payment of $12,000 to plaintiff, "with any attorney's fees and costs being determined by 

motion to the court if we cannot subsequently reach agreement of such fees and costs." 

On October 30, 2015, Mr. Orr confirmed in an email that "we have reached a tentative 

settlement in the above case for the payment of $12,000 to Mr. Seldon and your office 

pursuing attorney's fees and costs by motion to the court." Following this, the parties 

continued finalizing the settlement agreement and consent decree.

On January 12, 2016, defendants’ counsel sent Ms. Cabalo an email saying that 

7-Eleven had asked him to "obtain your attorney's fees to see if we can resolve all 

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issues." Ms. Cabalo responded with a "summary of our fees, litigation expenses, and 

costs to date" (which apparently did not include a total amount). 

On January 27, 2016, Ms. Cabalo sent an email asking Mr. Orr to "let me know if 

you're close to giving us a number on attorney fees." On January 28, 2016, Mr. Orr 

responded, "We will need to speak directly about attorney's fees." On January 29, 2016, 

Ms. Cabalo sent final versions of the settlement documents, adding, "Let's touch base re:

attorney fees soon. It would be nice to wrap up this entire case, if possible, and avoid 

fees on fees." On February 1, 2016, Mr. Orr emailed Ms. Cabalo "the final signature 

copy of the settlement documents."

On February 26, 2016, the parties filed the proposed consent decree and order 

resolving the injunctive relief claims against Dhingra, Inc., and Parminder Dhingra only; 

and a stipulated court-enforceable settlement agreement providing for payment of 

$12,000 in damages, plus a release of claims, between the plaintiff and 7-Eleven Inc. and 

the Burge Family Trust. The parties filed an amended stipulation on February 29, 2016, 

and the court entered both the proposed consent degree and the proposed settlement 

agreement. In the settlement agreement, the parties stated that they had not resolved 

any claims for fees and costs, and they agreed that the court would not dismiss the action 

in its entirety until after the issue of fees and costs had been resolved. 

On March 2, 2016, plaintiff’s counsel Paul L. Rein provided Mr. Orr with a 

summary of fees and expenses – $59,161 in fees and $7,620 in litigation expenses 

(including $4,339 for the access expert). Mr. Rein added that "litigation of these issues 

. . . may result in additional attorney fees of $15,000 to $20,000 recoverable by plaintiff." 

He stated that "[t]o encourage a prompt settlement, we will offer your clients a 5% 

reduction of our attorney fees (but not our out-of-pocket costs) provided that this case is 

settled for that amount . . . by our receipt of defendants' written acceptance by Friday, 

March 11, 2016." He added, “After that, I must prepare the attorney fees motions . . . ." 

On March 10, 2016, Mr. Orr requested a "detailed fee statement showing the work 

done so that we can provide to our client for review." On March 11, 2016, Mr. Rein's 

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office responded with "itemized summaries by task of the work performed on this case, 

including an overall summary and by each attorney . . . and paralegal." The amount 

requested in fees per that summary was $59,353 for all attorneys and paralegals. It was 

also broken down by individual, although the work was summarized by categories, such 

as "analysis/strategy/research," "client communications," "defendant communications," 

"fact investigation/development," "motions," and "pleadings." 

Mr. Rein states in his declaration that as no response had been received by March 

15, 2016, "we continued preparation of the fees motion." On March 17, 2016, Mr. Orr 

sent an email thanking Mr. Rein for the information, but stating that "the documentation 

did not provide a detailed breakdown of the tasks performed by the billing individuals that 

would allow my client to see what actual work was done" and that "[a]s a result, my 

clients cannot evaluate the reasonableness of the claimed fees." 

Mr. Orr added that at the time defendants made the Rule 68 offer of $8,001, 

"[p]laintiff's fees and costs could not have been more than $20,000," which meant that 

plaintiff had incurred over $30,000 in additional fees to obtain an additional $4,000 in 

damages. He asserted that "[w]e believe a court will find this highly unreasonable," and 

offered to pay the fees incurred prior to the Rule 68 offer, estimated at $20,000 for all 

fees and costs. Mr. Rein states in his declaration that this response, which defendants 

submitted just five court days before the fees motion was due, necessitated the present 

motion, which was filed on March 23, 2016. Following the filing of the motion, defendants 

increased the offer from $20,000 to $40,000.

In the moving papers, plaintiff seeks a total of $74,683 in fees for work performed 

by two attorneys and three paralegals from the Law Offices of Paul L. Rein: $31,799 for 

Mr. Rein (49.3 hours at $645/hr.); $39,188 for Ms. Cabalo (82.5 hours at $475/hr.); 

$1,691 for Aaron Clefton, Senior Paralegal (8.9 hours at $190/hr.); $1,721 for Emily 

O'Donohoe, Paralegal (11.1 hours at $155/hr.); and $284 for Holly Jaramillo, Paralegal 

(2.1 hours at $135/hr.). In addition, plaintiff seeks $14,021 in additional fees for work 

done on the reply to defendants’ opposition (20 additional hours, or $12,900 for Mr. 

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Rein,1and 5.9 additional hours, or $1,121 for Mr. Clefton). Plaintiff also seeks $8,029 in 

litigation expenses and costs. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

In determining a reasonable fee award, the court calculates the “lodestar figure” by 

taking the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, and multiplying it by a 

reasonable hourly rate. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). 

There is a “strong presumption” that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable 

fee and that adjustment upward or downward is “the exception rather than the rule.” 

D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 904 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1990); see 

also Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010); City of Burlington v. 

Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992). However, in “appropriate cases” the court may 

enhance or reduce the lodestar figure based on an evaluation of the factors set forth in 

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir.1975), that were not taken 

into account in the initial lodestar calculation. Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int'l, Inc., 6 F.3d 

614, 622 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The plaintiff bears the burden of submitting detailed records documenting “the 

hours worked and rates claimed.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The court may reduce 

those hours if the documentation is inadequate, the submitted hours are duplicative or 

inefficient, or the requested fees appear excessive or otherwise unnecessary. Id.; see 

also Chalmers v. L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir.1986).

B. Plaintiff's Motion

Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney's fees incurred in connection with successfully 

prosecuting this action under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 

 

1

 Mr. Rein states that he spent 22.2 hours on the reply, but that he has voluntarily 

deducted 10% from his fees, and that he is also not seeking fees for the time spent 

attempting to settle the fees issue after plaintiff filed the motion.

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§§ 12181, et seq.; California Health & Safety Code §§ 19955, et seq.; California Civil 

Code §§ 51, 52, and 54, et seq.; and California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et 

seq. Plaintiff also seeks to recover costs and litigation expenses. 

Plaintiff argues that as the prevailing party, he is entitled to receive his attorney's 

fees and litigation expenses under the above cited disability rights statutes. He contends 

that his counsel's hourly rates are moderate and justified by counsel's education, 

demonstrated skills, and specialized experience; and that the requested hourly rates 

have previously been approved by other judges in cases pending in this district, and are 

in fact lower than rates approved in this judicial district for attorneys with similar or even 

less experience. He also asserts that his out-of-pocket litigation expenses and costs are 

reasonable and should be fully compensated. 

The ADA provides for an award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation 

expenses, and costs,” to the prevailing party in actions under ADA Titles II and III. 42 

U.S.C. § 12205; 28 C.F.R. § 36.505. Under federal law, the amount of an attorney’s fees 

award under the ADA is left to the court’s discretion. A prevailing plaintiff under the ADA 

“should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render 

such an award unjust.” Barrios v. Calif. Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429).

Additionally, California Civil Code § 55 provides attorney fees and costs for 

obtaining injunctive relief (as does California Health & Safety Code § 19953), and Civil 

Code § 54.3 provides attorney fees and costs for recovery of plaintiff’s civil rights 

damages. These California statutes are intended to enforce the “full and equal access” 

rights guaranteed to disabled persons by Civil Code § 54.1. Hankins v. El Torito 

Restaurants, Inc., 63 Cal. App. 4th 510 (1998); Donald v. Café Royale, 218 Cal. App. 3d 

168 (1990). 

In this case, plaintiff obtained both an agreement that defendants would pay 

$12,000 in damages, and a Consent Decree re injunctive relief. Defendants argue that 

plaintiff is not the prevailing party on the federal claim for injunctive relief, as the 

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remediation of the violations had already occurred prior to the parties' negotiation of the 

Consent Decree. They claim that the Consent Decree itself simply provided that the 

store franchisee would continue its policy of calling a tow company when it became 

aware that someone was illegally parked in the accessible parking spot; and also 

provided that if plaintiff in the future encountered a barrier, he would notify the store 

manager and request that the violation be remedied. 

The court finds that plaintiff was the prevailing party on the injunctive relief claim. 

The access violations were in evidence at the time plaintiff filed the original complaint. 

The Consent Decree benefitted not only plaintiff, but all people with disabilities who use 

or wish to use the store owned and operated by defendants. Defendants’ assertion that 

the “policy” of calling a tow truck predated plaintiff’s first visit to the store is not entirely 

credible, given that plaintiff visited the store on a number of occasions and found the 

disabled parking spot blocked by a vehicle without a disabled parking placard. 

Defendants also contend that the billing rates are excessive, that the amount of 

hours claimed is excessive, and that the costs claimed are excessive. In addition, they 

seek an across-the-board reduction of 10% of the fees for failure to exercise billing 

judgment. The court briefly addresses those arguments.

a. Billing rates

Reasonable hourly rates are calculated by reference to “prevailing market rates in 

the relevant community,” with a special emphasis on fees charged by lawyers of 

“comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Davis v. City & Cnty of S.F., 976 F.2d 

1536, 1546 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345. The fee 

applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence “that the requested rates 

are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of 

reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 

886, 895 n.11 (1984). 

“Affidavits of the plaintiff['s] attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees 

in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate 

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for the plaintiff['s] attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” 

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Courts also may rely on decisions by other courts awarding similar rates for work in the 

same geographical area by attorneys with comparable levels of experience. See, e.g., 

Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Based on the declarations submitted, plaintiff contends that the rates requested in 

this case by Mr. Rein and Ms. Cabalo for work performed in 2014-2016 are below those 

awarded by judges in this district in 2009 and 2011 for attorneys with less experience, 

and are at or near the median rates charged by other law firms in the San Francisco Bay 

Area. Plaintiff also provides declarations from each of the attorneys and paralegals 

involved in the case, setting forth their experience and qualifications, and summarizing 

the work they performed on the case, along with detailed time sheets. 

Plaintiff cites a number of cases in which hourly rates that are higher than the 

rates requested here were approved for attorneys with less experience than Mr. Rein and 

Ms. Cabalo. Plaintiff cites Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 2009 WL 2390261 at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2009), where the court set the rates for attorneys ranging from 

$745/hr. for a senior partner to $285/hr. for first-year associate, based on a market 

survey of fees in the Northern District of California for period 2005-2008, conducted by 

attorney and fees expert Richard Pearl, per a November 3, 2008, declaration filed by Mr. 

Pearl in that case. Plaintiff notes that in Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F.Supp. 2d 1068, 1084 

(N.D. Cal. 2010), the court cited the same survey by Mr. Pearl, for comparison in setting 

the rates for the Rein Law Offices for 2007-2009 work (including $495/hr. for Mr. Rein).

Mr. Rein asserts in his declaration that his requested rate of $645/hr. is well below 

the average rate for Bay Area attorneys with his experience and qualifications. He also 

cites cases in which his rate of $645/hr. was approved by judges in this judicial district. 

For example, in Lemmons v. Ace Hardware Corp., 2015 WL 435462 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 

1, 2015), the court approved Mr. Rein’s requested rate of $645/hr., and noted that in the 

previous two years, the $645/hr. rate had been approved by several judges in this district 

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“in light of Rein’s skill, reputation, and extensive experience.” Mr. Rein also provides a 

copy of a declaration filed by attorney Lawrence Paradis in another case in this district in 

October 2012, in which he and Mr. Rein were co-counsel, in which Mr. Paradis supports 

Mr. Rein's request to be compensated at $645/hr. and also states that $645/hr. is below 

median Bay Area market rates for attorneys with comparable experience.

Ms. Cabalo similarly details her education and experience, and the work she 

performed on this case. She argues that her requested rate of $475/hr. is reasonable for 

an attorney with her level of experience, and was previously approved in February 2015 

in the Lemmons case (cited above). She asserts that her requested rate is consistent 

with the average market rate for attorneys with her years of experience, and cites four 

cases approving rates ranging from $390/hr. to $535/hr. for work done during 2009-2015. 

Defendants do not oppose the billing rates claimed for the work performed by Rein 

Law Office's paralegals. As for the rates claimed by Mr. Rein and Ms. Cabalo, 

defendants argue generally that this case was a standard ADA action that did not involve 

any significant discovery, depositions, or motion practice. Defendants claim that clients 

pay skilled and experienced attorneys for services associated with these types of cases a 

fee more in the range of $375 to defend such claims. However, defendants' only support 

for this assertion is the declaration of Michael Orr, who states that he has been practicing 

for more than 19 years. His office is in Newport Beach – not in the Bay Area – and he 

states that his current billing rate is $375/hr. Apart from that, defendants do not 

specifically challenge the billing rate claimed for work performed by Ms. Cabalo. 

The only billing rate defendants directly oppose is Mr. Rein's, which they assert is 

excessive and unreasonable. They argue that the Paradis declaration does not establish 

that Mr. Rein's claimed rate is reasonable, as Mr. Paradis does not lay a foundation that 

he has any personal knowledge of rates charged in the Bay Area, and provides no 

information as to what other similarly-situated practitioners in the Bay Area charge; that 

the cases cited by Mr. Rein in which his current hourly rate was approved are all cases 

where the billing rate was not disputed, and that in at least one case where Mr. Rein's 

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claimed rate was disputed, the court reduced it to $375/hr.; that plaintiff provides no 

evidence showing that this case required any special attorney skill or that there was any 

significant relief sought or obtained; and that much of the attorney work for which plaintiff 

seeks fees could have been performed by a paralegal or a lower-level associate billing at 

a lower rate. 

The court finds that plaintiff has adequately established that the rates claimed for 

work done Mr. Rein and Ms. Cabalo, and by the three paralegals, are reasonable, as 

they are within the range of rates approved in other recent cases in this district. The 

evidence presented shows that Ms. Cabalo – whose hourly rate is not challenged – billed 

more than 2/3 of the attorney hours claimed in the motion. Moreover, the only rate as to 

which there is any real dispute is the $645/hr. rate for Mr. Rein. 

“The fee applicant has the burden of producing satisfactory evidence, in addition to 

the affidavits of its counsel, that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the 

community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and reputation.” 

Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty, 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United 

Steelworkers, 896 F.2d at 407 (evidence can include affidavits of attorneys regarding 

prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly 

those setting a rate for the plaintiff's attorney). 

It is true that plaintiff has provided somewhat limited support for the rate requested 

for Mr. Rein's work. The only declaration, apart from Mr. Rein's own declaration, is the 

October 2012 declaration by Mr. Paradis filed in another case in this district, in which he 

described his experience and background in litigating disability rights and access cases, 

and discussed his own hourly rate ($800/hr. at that time). Mr. Paradis also stated, based 

on his familiarity with billing rates for attorneys with similar years of experience, and 

based on his knowledge of Mr. Rein and his experience and background, that his 

requested rate of $645/hr. was below the market rate in the Bay Area for attorneys with 

similar experience and expertise. 

On the other hand, plaintiff has cited to a number of cases upholding Mr. Rein's 

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requested rate in this judicial district, as well as to cases approving rates (for other 

attorneys) well in excess of $645/hr. He also has cited to National Federation of the Blind

and Blackwell cases, in which the court relied on the Pearl declaration and survey of Bay 

Area rates. Mr. Rein has successfully represented plaintiffs in disability access cases in 

this judicial district for many years, and the court finds that based on the above, plaintiff 

has adequately established that $645/hr. is within the accepted and approved range for 

an attorney with Mr. Rein's experience and qualifications.

b. Hours billed

Defendants contend that Mr. Rein and Ms. Cabalo failed to exercise billing 

judgment, and that many of the hours claimed appear to be for work that was duplicative 

or unnecessary, or for work that in defendants' view could have been performed by 

paralegals, secretaries, or lower-level associates. As to specific tasks, defendants argue 

that many of the hours claimed by plaintiff are unreasonable, including hours spent 

preparing for and attending the General Order 56 site visit, hours spent after plaintiff 

rejected defendants' Rule 68 offer, hours spent preparing plaintiff’s "stock fee motion,"

hours spent in inter-office conferencing, hours expended in preparing the amended 

complaint are unreasonable, and hours expended in repeatedly formulating discovery 

plans and strategies. In addition, defendants assert that the court should impose a 10% 

reduction on the lodestar. 

With regard to defendants’ argument that many of the tasks performed by Mr. Rein 

and Ms. Cabalo could have been assigned to a paralegal, secretary, or junior associate, 

the court notes that it is not required to scrutinize the time sheets to weed out tasks that 

may have just as easily have been performed by someone who billed at a lower rate. 

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that the court need not award different fees for 

different tasks. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1451 (9th Cir. 1994); Davis, 976 

F.2d at 1548. 

Many of the tasks defendants are complaining about consumed relatively small 

amounts of time, and all appear to the court to qualify as attorney work. In any event, 

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defendants have not explained why they believe certain tasks should have been 

performed by a paralegal or a secretary, so it is not clear how the court would go about 

making such a determination, even were it appropriate. 

With regard to the argument that the two hours billed by Mr. Rein to attend the 

General Order 56 site inspection is unreasonable, the court finds that time spent at the 

required site inspection qualifies as attorney work, and that defendants have not provided 

any substantive reason that lead plaintiff’s counsel should not be permitted to bill for this 

time.

With regard to the hours spent after plaintiff rejected the Rule 68 offer, the court 

finds nothing improper per se in billing for that time. Defendants provided plaintiff with 

their Rule 68 offer on December 22, 2014, and their argument appears to be that plaintiff 

should recover no fees (or only limited fees) for any work after that date. The submitted 

time records show that up to December 19, 2014, the fees incurred totaled $29,581.50. 

Defendants contend that plaintiff incurred $45,101.50 in fees following the Rule 68 offer, 

yet obtained only $4,000 in additional statutory damages (beyond the original $8001.00 

offer). 

The court finds defendants’ argument unpersuasive. It is true that plaintiff did not 

accept the Rule 68 offer, but defendants ultimately offered more. Taken to its logical 

conclusion, defendants' argument would mean that a defendant in a disability access 

case could make an absurdly low offer bearing no relationship to the amount of statutory 

damages permitted, and that if the plaintiff did not accept the low offer and ended up 

recovering more than the original amount offered, the plaintiff would not be able to seek 

fees for any work done after the date of the Rule 68 offer. 

Plaintiff is not barred from seeking fees for the post-offer period, simply because 

he did not accept the offer. Even defendants ultimately conceded that plaintiff could have 

held out for $32,000 in damages ($4,000 x 8 incidents). Thus, it was clearly not 

unreasonable for the plaintiff to turn down the initial $8,000 offer that defendants made in 

December 2014 – particularly given that defendants ended up offering $12,000 (an 

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increase of 50% over the original offer). 

With regard to the argument that plaintiff is not entitled to fees for the work done 

on the fee motion, because the motion should not have been filed and/or because his 

counsel commenced work on the motion while the parties were exchanging drafts of 

settlement documents, the court agrees that the parties were discussing settlement of 

fees during that time period. However, defendants’ position that $20,000 was a 

reasonable settlement of the fees and costs at that point is not supported by the 

evidence. 

Moreover, the suggestion that plaintiffs are not entitled to fees because this fees 

motion resembles fees motions Mr. Rein has filed in other cases borders on nonsensical. 

Defendants appear to be arguing that the court should compare every such motion to 

motions filed by the same attorney in other cases, to see whether any of the arguments 

are repeated, and if they are, should then somehow make a determination as to how to 

reduce the claimed fees based on that comparison. That is not the standard for 

evaluating attorney’s fees motions.

Also unpersuasive is defendants’ assertion that plaintiff’s counsel “jumped the 

gun” by beginning work on the fees motion before the parties had even completed 

finalizing the settlement documents. The evidence shows that while the parties did 

attempt to negotiate the amount of the fees, they also repeatedly confirmed in their 

communications with each other that if the negotiation was unsuccessful, plaintiff would 

bring the matter to the court via a fees motion. In particular, the email strings in October 

2015 clearly show that both sides were contemplating that plaintiff would file a motion for 

attorney's fees. Thus, it is a bit disingenuous for defendants to now argue that the fees 

motion was "unnecessary." 

Moreover, plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly encouraged defendants to settle the fees 

dispute, emphasizing that the fees would only go up if it became necessary to file a fees 

motion. In April 2015, when plaintiff submitted the demand for $16,000 in damages, 

plaintiff’s counsel advised defendants that the fees amounted to $35,510, plus $7,212 in 

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costs – although plaintiff’s counsel also stated at that time that they would take 10% less 

on their fees – $31,959 plus the $7,212 in costs – in order to settle the matter. As of 

October 2015, the amount of the fees had risen to $55,778, and as of March 11, 2016, it 

had increased to $59,353, plus the costs. 

Thus, by March 17, 2016, when defendants finally made their offer of $20,000, 

they clearly were aware the fees had been climbing and that they were well in excess of 

$20,000. Their argument – essentially that plaintiff should accept $20,000 because in 

defendants’ view, that was the amount of the fees incurred as of the date of defendants’ 

Rule 68 offer – is without support or any legal basis. Also without support is their 

argument that plaintiff was required to provide them with detailed time sheets in support 

of their fees request. Defendants' "offer" of $20,000, which was based on their 

unsupportable view that plaintiff could not possibly have accrued more than that in fees 

and costs as of the time of the Rule 68 offer, could have reasonably been interpreted by 

plaintiff's counsel as an indication that there was no point in further negotiations. 

Defendants claim that they would have offered more than $20,000 in fees and 

costs had plaintiff responded to their request for a detailed fees statement, rather than 

simply providing the "categories" statement. However, there is no evidence that 

defendants requested an itemized statement at any time prior to March 10, 2016 – which 

was more than four months after the parties had agreed to settle the damages portion for 

$12,000. And even after plaintiff filed the fees motion, defendants offered only $40,000, 

which is a little over 53% of the amount plaintiff requested in the motion, and which can 

hardly be considered a product of good-faith negotiation. 

With regard to defendants’ argument that the hours billed on “inter-office 

conferences” are unreasonable and should be disallowed or severely reduced, the court 

notes only that there may be innumerable reasons for an "inter-office conference," and 

that there is no bar to seeking fees for relatively limited amounts of time spent on 

discussion about the case by attorneys. While there may well be some duplicative work 

involved here, the court has no way to accurately separate out the duplicative from the 

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necessary. 

With regard to defendants’ argument that the time claimed for time spent preparing 

and filing the amended complaint is unreasonable ($346), the court finds nothing clearly 

improper in this small amount of time. In addition, defendants have not pointed to the 

specific time entries that involve preparation of the FAC – it is not even clear whether it 

was Mr. Rein or Ms. Cabalo who was involved. The burden should not be placed on the 

court to parse the original complaint and the FAC in an effort to determine whether the 

FAC was "necessary." 

As for the argument that hours spent on formulating discovery plans and strategies

are unnecessary, the court agrees that – as it turned out – the case did not require 

extensive discovery. The only access claims alleged in the complaint were the lack of 

designated accessible parking, the lack of clear path of travel from the parking into the 

store, and the heavy front door. 

On the other hand, while defendants were relatively quick to correct the access 

violations (at least according to their account), they were not quick to resolve the 

damages portion of the case, and delayed resolving the issue of fees and costs. Given 

defendants' intransigence, and the fact that a case management and pretrial order was in 

place, which set deadlines for discovery cut-off and dispositive motions, as well as the 

pretrial conference and the trial, it was not unreasonable for plaintiff's counsel to 

anticipate a need for discovery during the period from December 2014 to October 2015. 

 Finally, defendants contend that the court should reduce the claimed fees by ten 

percent to account for duplicative and inefficient work. The Ninth Circuit permits the 

district court to “impose a small reduction, no greater than 10 percent – a ‘haircut’ –

based on its exercise of discretion and without a more specific explanation.” Moreno v. 

City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). Such a reduction may be 

applied to the lodestar to account for any overstaffing, excessive billings, review of

routine notices from the court, or other improper or excessive billing practices not already 

addressed in the lodestar calculation. See id.

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As a general rule, “the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional 

judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case.” Moreno, 534 F.3d 

at 1112. Here, the court agrees that there appears to have been some inefficient use of 

time, and some (mild) duplication of effort. However, rather than reduce the lodestar for 

any of the specific reasons argued by defendants, the court will apply a 10% across-theboard deduction to the amounts requested for fees in the original motion. That reduces 

the amount of fees claimed in the original motion from $74,683 to $67,215, which, when 

added to the amount claimed for fees in the reply brief – $14,021 – results in a total fees 

award (minus costs) of $81,236.

3. Application of the Kerr factors

As noted above, there is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a 

reasonable fee, see Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir 1987), 

although the court has discretion to adjust the lodestar upward or downward based on an 

evaluation of the Kerr factors which have not been subsumed in the lodestar calculation. 

Moreover, “[d]istrict courts possess the necessary discretion to adjust the amounts 

awarded to address excessive and unnecessary effort expended in a manner not justified 

by the case.” Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2006); see also

Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he court should exclude 

‘hours that [we]re excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. 

at 433.

Generally, the first through fifth Kerr factors – time and labor required; novelty and 

difficulty of the questions involved; skill required to perform the legal services properly; 

the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; and 

the customary fee – are subsumed in the lodestar calculation. See Morales, 96 F.3d 

359, 364 n.9. The Ninth Circuit has also held that the sixth factor – whether the fee is 

fixed or contingent – may not be considered in the lodestar calculation. See Davis, 976 

F.2d at 1549. 

Of the remaining six factors, defendants refer to only three – the novelty and 

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difficulty of the results obtained; the skill required to properly perform the legal services; 

and the amount involved and the results obtained. They contend that there was nothing 

novel or difficult about this action, as it was a case in which no depositions were taken, 

scant discovery was performed, and minimal motion practice was conducted. They also 

assert that "[a]t most" plaintiff's damage claim was worth $32,000, and they claim that 

"[d]efendants were at all times willing to make appropriate modifications to advance 

[p]laintiff's access." 

Defendants have not met their burden of arguing that the Kerr factors warrant a 

reduction in the lodestar. First, of the twelve factors listed in Kerr, defendants mention 

only three, and of those, two are factors that are considered to be subsumed in the 

lodestar calculation and therefore not to be considered by the court. The only factor 

mentioned by defendants that is not subsumed in the lodestar is the amount involved and 

the results obtained, as to which defendants’ only comment is that plaintiff's damages 

claim was worth "at most" $32,000, and that they (defendants) were at all times willing to 

make appropriate modifications to the property.

Defendants do not explain how this factor warrants a reduction in the lodestar 

calculation. Furthermore, they have cited no authority supporting the application of a 

proportionality rule in disability access cases (i.e., relatively small recovery = relatively 

low award of attorney's fees), and indeed, any such rule would contravene public policy 

because it would discourage attorneys from agreeing to represent plaintiffs in disability 

access cases in which the potential damages award is relatively small. 

In this case, plaintiff was successful in obtaining both injunctive relief and 

damages. The fact that plaintiff obtained $12,000 in damages when he theoretically 

could have obtained up to $32,000 is not a factor that warrants reducing the fee award. It 

is true that one of the Kerr factors is "the results obtained," but in this case, plaintiff's 

success cannot accurately be characterized as "limited," as he achieved statutory 

damages in the amount the parties agreed to settle for, plus the modification of the 

store's parking lot, front door, and interior aisle-width.

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4. Costs

Plaintiff seeks reimbursement of out-of-pocket litigation expenses and costs, in the 

total amount of $8,029. The largest expense is $4,339 for consultant fees for plaintiff's 

access expert Barry Atwood, of Universal Design Associates (“UDA”), which includes 

fees for the pre-litigation investigation, the formal site inspection and subsequent report, 

travel time to the site, and fees for meetings and phone calls with Mr. Rein and Ms. 

Cabalo. There is no declaration by Mr. Atwood, but a copy of his resume is attached to 

Mr. Rein’s declaration, and a copy of the invoice from Mr. Atwood is also attached. 

In addition, plaintiff seeks to recover $400 for payment of filing fees; $285 for 

service of process and courier services; $119 for FedEx overnight mail services; $1,228 

for copying costs; $1,601 for WestLaw research; and $56 for mediation day expenses 

(includes mileage, bridge toll, parking, and lunch). Invoices are attached for everything 

except the WestLaw research and copying costs, which are supported by declarations by 

Mr. Clefton, Rein Law Office’s paralegal. 

ADA § 505 provides for recovery of costs and “litigation expenses,” including 

expert witness expenses. See DOJ Analysis, 28 CFR Pt. 36, App. B, § 36.505 

(“Litigation expenses include items such as expert witness fees, travel expenses, etc.”) 

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly allowed prevailing plaintiffs to recover non-taxable costs 

(costs that do not qualify as "costs" under 28 U.S.C. § 1920) where statutes authorize 

attorney's fees awards to prevailing parties. See Grove v. Wells Fargo Fin. Cal., Inc., 606 

F.3d 577, 580-81 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Defendants argue that the $4,339 for costs associated with three site visits and 

two expert reports are unreasonable, as are the $1,601 for use of Westlaw and $1,228 

for making copies. First, defendants contend that plaintiff is improperly billing for 

repeated site visits. They argue that the 5.5 hours spent on the preliminary inspection 

was all that was needed for plaintiff to file his complaint and for the parties to negotiate a 

settlement; and that the report generated by UDA following its second inspection covered 

barriers already alleged by plaintiff, but also added barriers that did not impact plaintiff. 

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Defendants contend that this second report did not help with settlement and did not result 

in any relief to plaintiff. They argue that at most, plaintiff should recover only the $1,237.5 

associated with the first inspection and report, because the other work done by UDA was 

unnecessary or duplicative.

As for the WestLaw charges, defendants contend that plaintiff provides no 

explanation as to what research was done in this case that resulted in charges from 

WestLaw. In fact, they assert, Mr. Clefton, Rein Law Office’s paralegal, states in his 

declaration that the firm pays a flat monthly rate for use of the Westlaw service. 

Defendants claim that plaintiff provides no information as to what research tasks 

generated the cost claimed here, and that this cost should not be allowed.

Similarly, defendants contend, plaintiff seeks to recover costs for making 4178 

copies during the pendency of this action. They assert that given the lack of significant 

discovery or motion practice in the case, there is no justification for making of so many 

copies. They contend that 1,000 copies should have been more than sufficient, and 

argue that the court should award plaintiff only $250 for copy costs. 

As noted above, an award of reasonable attorney fees also includes expenses of 

the type normally billed to a fee-paying client as statutory “litigation expenses” per ADA 

§ 505. Defendants have articulated no clear justification for rejecting the costs of the 

work performed by plaintiff's access expert, other than the view, expressed by 

defendants' counsel, that it was "unnecessary" for Mr. Atwood to visit the site three times. 

The court finds, however, that the initial visit was necessary as part of plaintiff's prelitigation investigation; and that the second visit – the "formal site inspection" – was 

required under General Order 56. Further, the third visit, consisting of a brief check by 

Mr. Atwood to determine whether the defendants were maintaining the modifications, was 

reasonable given that the parties were on the verge of agreeing to a settlement.

The expenses of WestLaw research and making copies are costs that would 

normally be charged to a fee-paying client. See, e.g., Trustees of Constr. Indus. and 

Laborers Health and Welfare Tr. v. Redland Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 

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2006); see also Grove, 606 F.3d at 580-81. Mr. Clefton, who states that he is the liaison 

for WestLaw for Rein Law Offices, explains WestLaw’s pricing structure and the method 

he used to calculate the WestLaw charges for this case. As for the copying costs, Mr. 

Clefton provides some explanation of the firm’s practices with regard to making copies of 

documents provided to attorneys for use in the case, and states that he calculated the 

copy costs using the counter function on the firm’s copy machine. 

Plaintiff has made an adequate showing, and the court finds no reason to reduce 

the amount sought by plaintiff for out-of-pocket costs in this case.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the motion for fees is GRANTED, with a ten 

percent reduction, and the motion for costs and expenses is GRANTED. Plaintiff is 

hereby awarded $81,236 in attorney’s fees and $8,029 in costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 5, 2016

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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