Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_14-cv-01230/USCOURTS-almd-1_14-cv-01230-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JERRY RANDOLPH McBEE, # 105694, )

 )

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:14cv1230-MHT

 ) (WO) 

LEEPOSEY DANIELS, et al., )

 )

Respondents. )

 

 

JERRY RANDOLPH McBEE, # 105694, )

 )

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:15cv15-MHT

 ) (WO)

LEEPOSEY DANIELS, et al., )

 )

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is before the court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 filed by state inmate Christopher McBee (“McBee”). McBee challenges his 1972

Houston County murder conviction and the resulting sentence of life in prison.

I. BACKGROUND

McBee was convicted in the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, on the

charge of murder, for which he was sentenced, on August 7, 1972, to life in prison. His

conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See McBee v. State, 50 Ala.App. 622, 282

So.2d 61 (1973). 

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On December 15, 2014, McBee filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 in the Middle District of Alabama challenging his 1972 murder conviction and

life sentence entered by the Circuit Court of Houston County, which is located in this

District. This court docketed the habeas petition as Civil Action No. 1:14cv1230-MHT and

entered orders for the named respondents to file an answer by January 21, 2015. See Civil

Action No. 1:14cv1230-MHT Doc. Nos. 1 & 4.

In June 2014, McBee filed another habeas petition under § 2254, but this time in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. See Civil Action No.

1:15cv15-MHT, Doc. No. 1 (originally Civil Action No. 5:14cv1221-LSB-JHE in U.S.D.C.

for Northern District of Alabama). On December 11, 2014, that court transferred the habeas

petition to the Middle District of Alabama after it became apparent McBee was seeking to

challenge the same 1972 conviction and sentence in Houston County, which, as stated, is in

the Middle District. See Civil Action No. 1:15cv15-MHT, Doc. No. 17. On January 8, 2015,

this court docketed the transferred habeas petition as Civil Action No. 1:15cv15-MHT. Id.,

Doc. No. 18.

Because McBee challenges the same Houston Countyconviction and sentence in both

habeas petitions, this court ordered the consolidation of Civil Action No. 1:14cv1230-MHT

and Civil Action No. 1:15cv15-MHT and designated Civil Action No. 1:14cv1230-MHT as

the lead case. See Civil Action No. 1:14cv1230-MHT Doc. No. 7. The court further ordered

that Civil Action No. 1:15cv15-MHT be closed administratively. Id.

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For purposes of this Recommendation, the court considers McBee’s June 2014 filing

– his earliest filing – as the initiation of this habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Civil

Action No. 1:15cv15-MHT, Doc. No. 1. The court construes the pleadings filed by McBee

after June 2014 to be either amendments to his § 2254 petition or supplemental materials in

support of the claims in his petition. See Civil Action No. 1:14cv1230-MHT, Doc. Nos 1,

14, 17 & 22; Civil Action No. 1:15cv15-MHT, Doc. Nos. 4, 10, 11, 15 & 16. After crossreferencing the claims in McBee’s pleadings and winnowing out extraneous allegations, the

court had determined that McBee asserts the following claims for habeas relief:

1. The prosecution deliberately withheld “hospital evidence” that

it had been told by McBee’s wife that the child victim had a

“heart condition.”

2. Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

present this “hospital evidence” at trial, and he (McBee) “was

not allowed to testify at trial.”

3. The trial court did not “allow a fair trial” after a witness was

“caught in a lie” and the court “whispered something” to the

prosecutor and defense counsel during a bench conference.

4. He was denied a copy of his trial transcript after making

requests for the transcript (apparently, in 2014).

SeeCivil Action No. 1:14cv1230-MHT, Doc. No. 1 at 5-6; Civil Action No. 1:15cv15-MHT,

Doc. No. 15 at 1-2. 

The respondents argue that McBee’s habeas petition is time-barred by the one-year

limitation period applicable to § 2254 petitions, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Civil

Action No. 1:14cv1230-MHT, Doc. No. 8. After reviewing the pleadings, evidentiary

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materials, and applicable law, the court finds that no evidentiary hearing is required and that

the § 2254 petition should be denied as untimely.

II. DISCUSSION

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”) provides the statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions and states:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

McBee was sentenced to life in prison on August 7, 1972. His conviction and

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sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in an opinion issued by the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals on June 29, 1973. McBee v. State, 50 Ala.App. 622, 282 So.2d 61 (1973).

He applied for rehearing, which was denied on July 12, 1973. See id. He did not seek

certiorari review in the Alabama Supreme Court. At no time after his conviction did McBee

file with the state courts a petition for writ of error coram nobis, a petition under Rule 20,

Alabama Temporary Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a petition for post-conviction relief

under Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.

Section 2244(d)(1)(A) of the AEDPA provides that the one-year limitation period for

filing a § 2254 petition begins to run on the date when the time for seeking direct review of

the challenged judgment expires. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Under Alabama’s Supreme

Court Rule 39 then in effect, McBee had 15 days in which to file a petition for writ of

certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court following the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’

July 12, 1973, denial of his application for rehearing on direct review. See Trammell v. State,

280 Ala. 31, 189 So.2d 763 (1966). Because he did not file such a petition, his conviction

became final on July 27, 1973. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

The AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996. Thus, McBee’s conviction became

final before enactment of the AEDPA. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “application of the

one-year time bar in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) to petitions of prisoners, like [McBee], whose

convictions became final long prior to the effective date of the AEDPA ... ‘would be unfair,

and impermissibly retroactive.’ [Goodman v. United States, 151 F.3d 1335, 1337 (11 Cir. th

5

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1998)].” Wilcox v. Florida Department of Corrections, 158 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11 Cir. 1998). th

The Court has further held that prisoners in this position must be allowed a reasonable period

of time after enactment of § 2244(d)’s one-year period of limitation to file their § 2254

petitions, and determined that “a reasonable time” is “one year from the AEDPA’s effective

date.” Id. As such, the one-year period for McBee to file a § 2254 petition commenced on

April 24, 1996. Absent a showing of statutory or equitable tolling, the limitation period for

a timely § 2254 petition expired on April 24, 1997. McBee filed his § 2254 petition in June

2014.

Section 2244(d)(2) of the AEDPA provides that “[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this section.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). As noted above, McBee filed no

post-conviction petitions for relief from his conviction and sentence. Therefore, he cannot

avail himself of tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), and it appears the one-year limitation

period for him to file a § 2254 petition expired on April 24, 1997. McBee did not file his

federal habeas petition until June 2014 – over 17 years after expiration of the limitation

period.

The statutory tolling provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) do not provide safe

harbor for McBee such that the federal limitation period commenced on some date later than

April 24,1996. There is no evidence that any unconstitutional or illegal State action impeded

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McBee fromfiling a timely § 2254 petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). McBee presents

no claim that rests on an alleged “right [that] has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(C). Finally, McBee submits no grounds for relief for which the factual predicate

could not have been discovered at an earlier time “through the exercise of due diligence.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

The federal limitation period may be equitably tolled on grounds apart from those

specified in the habeas statute “when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary

circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v.

United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11 Cir. 1999). See Holland v. Fla., 560 U.S. 631 th

(2010). “The burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests

with the petitioner.” Drew v. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11 Cir. 2002). McBee th

fails to set forth any facts that demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” and the exercise

of due diligence to warrant equitable tolling of the limitation period in his case. 

Consequently, he is not entitled to equitable tolling.

Under the circumstances set forth above, it is evident that the one-year limitation

period in § 2244(d) expired on April 24, 1997. Because McBee did not file his § 2254

petition until June 2014, his petition is time-barred and this court may not address the merits.1

In various parts of his pleadings, which are not a model of clarity, McBee appears to present 1

claims attacking proceedings relating to the revocation or denial of his state parole. See, e.g.,Civil

Action No. 1:14cv1230-MHT, Doc. Nos. 13, 14 & 22; Civil Action No. 1:15cv15-MHT, Doc. Nos.

(continued...)

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the petition

for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED with prejudice and this case

dismissed because the petition is time-barred by the one-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d).

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said Recommendation 

on or before July 7, 2015. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in 

the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party objects. Frivolous, 

conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties 

are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order; therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

(...continued) 1

1 & 4. If McBee indeed wishes to challenge the denial or revocation of his parole, he should do so

in a separate habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after properly exhausting his claims in the state

courts. The court takes no position on whether such a challenge would be timely under the

applicable state or federal procedural rules and law.

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Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done this 23 day of June, 2015. rd

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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