Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00250/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00250-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHAD RUDOLPHO ANGLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALAMEDA COUNTY 

MEDICAL CENTER; et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-250 SI

ORDER GRANTING JUDGMENT ON

THE PLEADINGS TO MENTAL

HEALTH DEFENDANTS 

INTRODUCTION

This action began in state court and was later removed to federal court because claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 raised federal questions. Plaintiff, Chad Angle, initially was represented

by counsel but counsel later withdrew from representing him and Angle’s efforts to find

replacement counsel were unfruitful. Angle now represents himself from the confines of

Atascadero State Hospital, where he is incarcerated as a mentally disordered offender.

This matter is now before the court for consideration of a motion for judgment on the

pleadings filed by Alameda County Medical Center and Mohammed A. Hyderi, M.D. (the

"mental health defendants"). After numerous extensions of the deadline, Angle finally filed an

opposition to the motion. For the reasons discussed herein, the motion will be granted. 

BACKGROUND

There are two groups of defendants in this action: the mental health defendants and the

law enforcement defendants. Angle's complaint alleges claims based on two basic events. First,

he claims he did not receive adequate psychiatric care from the mental health defendants when

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Although the mental health defendants' brief suggests otherwise, the complaint does not

allege that Angle received medication at JGPP and then it was stopped when he was put in

isolation. His complaint makes the simpler assertion that he did not receive medication when

in isolation at the jail.

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he was taken to the John George Psychiatric Pavilion ("JGPP") following his arrest for assaulting

two women in Oakland on October 17, 2005. He asserts that the mental health defendants failed

to keep him at the facility and failed to treat him – both decisions being motivated by improper

financial incentives. Second, plaintiff claims that he was subjected to excessive force by the law

enforcement defendants who beat him up on October 21, 2005, when he became agitated after

not receiving medication and spit on one of them at the county jail. 

The mental health defendants' motion to dismiss focuses largely on a causation issue, with

the gist of their argument being that Angle's injuries suffered during the beating by deputies was

unconnected to their alleged acts. The court therefore describes the allegations of the complaint

relevant to that issue in more detail. The complaint alleges the following:

Angle has bipolar disorder with frequent psychotic episodes. Complaint, ¶ 11. Angle

requires medication to control his symptoms, including violent psychotic episodes. Id.

On October 17, 2005, Angle was taken by the Oakland police to the JGPP for psychiatric

evaluation after an altercation with two strangers at a bus stop. Id. at ¶ 10. He was held at JGPP

for three days. Id. Angle had been to the JGPP on involuntary commitments 28 times before

this occasion. Angle received inadequate care at the JGPP on this occasion and, when released

from the JGPP, he was still a danger to himself and others. Complaint, ¶ 14. The mental health

defendants did not believe that Angle was no longer a danger to himself an others, and they

based their decision to release him on improper reasons, including financial incentives. Id. 

On October 19, 2005, Angle was discharged from JGPP into the care of the Alameda

County Sheriff's office and taken to the Santa Rita jail. While at the jail as a pre-trial detainee,

Angle was involved in an altercation with another inmate and was placed in isolation. He did

not receive any of his medication while in isolation. Id. at ¶ 15.1

 

On October 21, 2005, Angel became agitated and spit on deputy Van Dicken. Several

deputies "staged a retaliatory attack on Plaintiff, beating him severely, which resulted in

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numerous injuries to Plaintiff, including a broken jaw, broken nose, fractured orbital lobe,

dislocated finger, and contusions and abrasions all over his body." Id. at ¶ 16. 

As a result of the foregoing, "Angle suffered pain and physical injuries including, but not

limited to, a broken jaw, broken nose, fractured orbital lobe, dislocated finger, and contusions

and abrasions all over his body, . . . severe emotional and mental distress, fear, terror, anxiety,

humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of security and dignity." id. at 18-19. 

As to the mental health defendants, Angle alleges six causes of action: (1) a claim against

Dr. Hyderi under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of his right to due process, (2) a Monell claim

against the Alameda County Medical Center under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (3) a claim under

California Civil Code § 52.1, (4) a claim for medical negligence, (5) a claim for failure to

discharge statutory duties under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5150.3, 5150.4 and

5152, and (6) a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The mental health

defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on all six causes of action. 

DISCUSSION

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) filed

by a defendant is basically the same as the more well-known Rule 12(b)(6) motion, except that

a Rule 12(c) motion is filed after the pleadings are closed rather than before an answer is filed.

For purposes of such a motion, the allegations of the complaint are accepted as true. See Hal

Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990).

"Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of

the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Id. No outside materials (such as declarations and documents)

are considered, or the motion must be converted to a summary judgment motion. See id. 

A pro se complaint must be liberally construed and “‘may be dismissed for failure to state

a claim only where “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”’” Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th

Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). The complaint here was drafted by counsel; therefore, the usual

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rationale for the liberal construction rule – to avoid penalizing unskilled litigants for failure to

comply with technical requirements – is absent. Nonetheless, the court will construe the

complaint liberally because to do otherwise might result in the inefficiency of dismissing a

lawyer-drafted complaint only to have the exact same document resubmitted by a nowunrepresented plaintiff, and then have it be sufficient or at least in need of a second examination

under the liberal construction rule. Whether the complaint is liberally construed or not does not

really matter here because of the nature of defendants' motion which focuses on the causation

problem rather than any pleading defect. 

A. Claims With Causation Problems

1. Section 1983 Claims

Defendants argue that the first two causes of action fail to state a claim because Angle's

allegations fail to show that the mental health defendants' alleged actions were the legal cause

of Angle's injury. They assert that the alleged mistreatment and early discharge cannot be said

to have legally caused Angle to suffer the beating he did at the hands of the deputies. 

Angle's opposition asserts there was a causal connection. Importantly, however, he does

not dispute that the injuries he complains of are those suffered in the alleged beating by the

deputies. See Opposition, pp. 2-3. Angle argues that (1) had he received proper care, he would

not have been a danger to himself or others "which is what lies at the heart of the point of the

argument," (2) had he remained at JGPP, "events would have turned out much differently and

less to my detriment likely avoiding the injury that has left part of my face permanently numb,"

(3) had he received proper care he could have used the time to mentally prepare for jail and be

stabilized on medication which takes longer than 36 hours to achieve, and (4) had he received

proper treatment, he would not have spit on the deputy or attacked the inmate at the jail. Angle

also argues that the "danger to self" may be "from an outside source, i.e., A cliff, a fire, a group

of rogue deputies." Id. p. 3. 

In order to be liable under § 1983, a defendant must cause the deprivation of one or more

of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 836-37

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Monell liability refers to the liability of municipalities, who are "persons" subject to

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort, see

Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 

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(9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997). "Traditional tort law defines intervening

causes that break the chain of proximate causation." Id. "The causation requirement of sections

1983 and 1985 is not satisfied by a showing of mere causation in fact. See W. Prosser, Law of

Torts § 41 at 238-39 (4th ed. 1971). Rather, the plaintiff must establish proximate or legal

causation." Arnold v. International Business Machines Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir.

1981). Liability can attach whether the defendant directly or indirectly causes the deprivation,

but the defendant's acts must be the proximate cause of the injury. See id. 

An unforeseen and abnormal intervention can break the chain of causation, such that the

defendant's conduct is not considered the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury and the

defendant does not have § 1983 liability. See Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 837. In Van Ort, the court

ruled as a matter of law that there was no Monell liability2

 for hiring a deputy who assaulted and

robbed homeowners in his off-duty time after seeing their valuables during a search of their

home he conducted as a sheriff's deputy. Although the deputy had a considerable disciplinary

record and bad work evaluations in the sheriff's department, those facts did not show that the

county could have foreseen the deputy's actions, which would have established the necessary

causal link between the county's hiring and supervision policy and the homeowners' injuries.

The county may have been alerted to the fact that the deputy would be a bad deputy, but "the

County could not reasonably have foreseen that [the deputy] would become a free-lance criminal

and attack the [homeowners] as he did. . . . His unforeseeable private acts broke the chain of

proximate cause connecting the County's alleged negligence to the [homeowners'] injuries.

[Citation] Without proximate cause, there is no section 1983 liability." Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 837.

Another case supporting the mental health defendants' contention is Martinez v.

California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980). In Martinez, the survivors of a girl who was murdered by

a parolee five months after he was granted parole sued the parole board under § 1983 for

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negligently paroling the murderer. The Court held that the parole board could not be said to

have deprived the decedent of her life. The "decedent's death is too remote a consequence of

the parole officers' action to hold them responsible under the civil rights law." Id. at 285.

Although Martinez was determining whether there was state action, its reasoning has been relied

upon by courts deciding causation questions. See Arnold, 637 F.2d 1356; Van Ort, 92 F.3d at

837. Here, the causal connection was even more remote than that in Martinez, and would be

like the murderer suing the parole board for injuries he sustained at the hands of the decedent.

The mental health defendants' alleged misconduct was not the proximate cause of Angle's

injuries. The deputies' intervening alleged criminal conduct or at least intentional tortious

conduct severed any causal chain between the mental health defendants' alleged misconduct and

Angle's injuries. Spitting on a guard is a not uncommon vulgarity in jails and prisons, and by

no means is it something that is unique to mentally ill inmates. That a former patient later will

be intentionally beaten by his jailers is simply not a foreseeable consequence of failing to

provide adequate mental health care to that person when he is a patient. Angle's allegations

show a beating completely out of line with the alleged provocative act of spitting: broken bones,

a dislocated finger, contusions and abrasions all over the body, and mental injuries such as fear

and terror. Complaint ¶ ¶ 18-19. Regardless of the care or length of his stay at JGPP, the parties

agree that Angle's proper destination thereafter was the county jail due to his altercation at the

bus stop. It is not reasonably foreseeable that a patient being discharged from a psychiatric

facility will be subject to excessive force. Angle's claim is not that he spit and received a rational

punishment, but rather is that he spit and was severely beaten by numerous law enforcement

officers.

The parties are in agreement that the injuries Angle suffered and complains of are those

he received when the deputies allegedly beat him. Angle does not request leave to amend, nor

does he argue that he claims that he suffered any other injuries beyond those received at the

hands of the deputies. 

Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Angle, there is no causal connection

between the alleged premature/wrongful discharge of Angle from the JGPP and the injuries of

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which he complains. The mental health defendants' alleged acts of releasing Angle too soon and

without proper treatment simply were not a cause in fact of the beating he received. The

intentional tortious or criminal beating was an unforeseeable intervening event that broke any

causal chain. The mental health defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on the first

and second causes of action in the complaint. 

2. Medical Negligence

As with the § 1983 claims, the mental health defendants argue that the medical negligence

claim falters on the causation element. The court agrees.

Under state law, a defendant's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm if the conduct

is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm and there is no rule of law relieving the

defendant from liability. See Anaya v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 971, 973-74 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2000). If an intervening act occurs that is highly unusual or extraordinary and therefore

not foreseeable, it is a superseding cause, and the defendant is not liable. Vasquez v. Residential

Investments, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 4th 269, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). "To show [an] act was a

superseding cause, [the defendant] must establish as a matter of law that the intervening act was

so highly unusual or extraordinary that the occurrence was not likely to happen and therefore

was not foreseeable." Id.

 The mental health defendants' alleged inadequate treatment and release was not the legal

cause of the injuries Angle alleges. Angle does not dispute defendants' assertion that he did not

suffer initial injuries as a result of his allegedly premature release from JGPP and that his injuries

were those suffered when he allegedly was beaten by deputies. That beating was completely

outside the reasonable chain of causation. Moreover, between Angle's release from the JGPP

and the beating, several other events outside the mental health defendants' control further

disrupted any causal chain: Angle attacked another inmate, Angle was put in isolation, and

Angle was deprived of his medication in jail. Only after these events did Angle spit on a deputy.

And only then the deputies inflicted the beating. That deputies would severely beat an inmate

who had been released from mental health care was so extraordinary that it was not a foreseeable

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Even if this claim was liberally construed to be one for negligent infliction of emotional

distress, the causation problem would be fatal to that claim also. See Ess v. Eskaton Properties,

Inc., 97 Cal. App. 4th 120, 126 (2002) ("Negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an

independent tort; it is the tort of negligence to which the traditional elements of duty, breach of

duty, causation, and damages apply.") 

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consequence of the decision to release the inmate from mental health care – whether it was done

prematurely or without adequate care having been given. The intentional tortious or criminal

beating was an unforeseeable intervening event that broke any causal chain. The mental health

defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on the fourth cause of action in the complaint.

3. Intentional Infliction Of Mental Distress

The elements of California's tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are

(1) extreme or outrageous conduct; (2) with the intention to cause or in reckless disregard of the

probability of causing; (3) and proximately causing; (4) severe emotional distress. See

Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593 (1979). 

Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings on this claim because of the same

proximate cause problem discussed above. That is, the release of Angle from the JGPP was not

the proximate cause of the later beating by deputies at the county jail. The mental health

defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings in their favor on the sixth cause of action.3

B. Claim Under Civil Code § 52.1

California Civil Code § 52.1(b) provides for a private cause of action against a person

who, "whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion,

or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by

any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,

or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state." Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). 

The mental health defendants argue that the complaint fails to state a claim for a violation

of California Civil Code § 52.1. The court agrees. The complaint alleges that the mental health

defendants "as described herein interfered with Plaintiff's exercise and enjoyment of his civil

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rights, as enumerated above, including deprivation of substantive due process rights to physical

security." Complaint, ¶ 31. For recovery under § 52.1, there must be an attempted or completed

act of interference with a legal right plus coercion, intimidation or threat. See City and County

of San Francisco v. Ballard, 136 Cal. App. 4th 381, 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Venegas v.

County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 843 (Cal. 2004). Even construed liberally, the

complaint simply is not susceptible to an interpretation that there was conduct by the mental

health defendants that interfered with Angle's civil rights by coercion, intimidation or threat.

Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on the second cause of action in the complaint.

C. Claim Under Government Code § 815.6

The mental health defendants contend that Angle's cause of action under California

Government Code § 815.6 must be dismissed because the statutes allegedly violated were not

intended to protect from the risk of injury Angle sustained and/or the violations were not the

proximate cause of his injury. 

"Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is

designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for

an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public

entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty." Cal. Gov't Code

§ 815.6. To state a claim under § 815.6, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) the statute violated

imposed a mandatory, not discretionary, duty, (2) the statute was intended to protect against the

kind of risk of injury suffered by the plaintiff, and (3) the breach of the mandatory duty was the

proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See State of California v. Superior Court, 150 Cal.

App. 3d 848, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 

The statutes allegedly violated pertained to involuntary 72-hour detentions. The mental

health defendants allegedly breached their statutory duties under California "Welfare and

Institutions Code sections 5150.3, 5150.4, and 5152 to provide appropriate evaluation, treatment,

and care to those detained and/or admitted to a facility under Welfare and Institutions Code §

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5150." Complaint, ¶ 38. 

Three of the four statutes cited clearly have no applicability. Section 5150.3 has no

applicability because Angle alleges he was admitted to the facility and that section only applies

to patients who are not admitted to a mental health facility. Section 5150.4 imposes no duties

but merely defines the term "assessment." Section 5150 cannot support the claim because it

permits, but does not require, certain persons to place in a mental health facility for 72-hour

treatment and evaluation a person who, as a result of a mental disorder, is a danger to others or

to himself or is gravely disabled. Angle's claim hinges on the applicability of the fourth cited

section, § 5152. 

California Welfare and Institutions Code § 5152 requires the evaluation and admission

of persons admitted for 72-hour holds, provides procedures for regular release and early release,

and provides procedures regarding information regarding medications. As relevant here, the

section provides:

Each person admitted to a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation under the

provisions of this article shall receive an evaluation as soon as possible after he or she is

admitted and shall receive whatever treatment and care his or her condition requires for

the full period that he or she is held. The person shall be released before 72 hours have

elapsed only if the psychiatrist directly responsible for the person's treatment believes,

as a result of the psychiatrist's personal observations, that the person no longer requires

evaluation or treatment.

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5152(a). Section 5152 was designed to protect against injury to the

committed individual and the public as a result of the individual's mental condition and also to

protect against indefinite confinements to mental hospitals. See Bragg v. Valdez, 111 Cal. App.

4th 421, 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).

Although the duty to hold mental patients for 72 hours is for the protection of them and

others, that duty is in relation to their mental illness, i.e., to prevent them from harming

themselves or other people because of their mental illness. It is not enough to show only that

the injury occurred after an alleged early release. As with the negligence claims, the

unforeseeable event of deputies allegedly beating Angle after he was released to jail and after

he spit on one of them is not the kind of injury against which the statute is designed to protect.

Furthermore, the alleged improper early release was not the proximate cause of Angle's injuries

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as explained in the preceding sections. In sum, even if Angle could show that the mental health

defendants violated a mandatory duty under § 5152, the problems remain that (1) § 5152 was

not intended to protect a former patient against the risk of being subjected to an extreme beating

by deputies in the county jail and (2) the failure to provide the treatment and full 72-hour

detention was not the proximate cause of the injuries he suffered when beaten by the deputies.

The defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings on the fifth cause of action.

CONCLUSION

The mental health defendants (i.e., the Alameda County Medical Center and Mohammed

A. Hyderi, M.D.) have demonstrated their entitlement to judgment on the pleadings in their favor

on all six claims alleged against them. The mental health defendants' motion to dismiss is

GRANTED. (Docket # 49.) The court will wait until the conclusion of this case to enter a

judgment so that a single judgment may be entered resolving all claims against all defendants

together. The court does, however, contemplate that this order ends the involvement of the

mental health defendants in this action

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2008 ______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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