Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_02-cv-00199/USCOURTS-azd-4_02-cv-00199-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Michael Riley,

Petitioner,

v.

Terry L. Stewart, et al.,

Respondents.

 

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CV-02-199-TUC-DCB

ORDER

INTRODUCTION

This matter is now before the Court for consideration of Thomas

Michael Riley's (Petitioner) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 concerning his March 1998 jury trial conviction in

the Arizona Superior Court, Pima County, Tucson, Arizona. For the reasons

set forth below, the petition is DENIED as to all claims.

BACKGROUND

I. Case History

On March 26, 1998, a jury found Petitioner guilty of armed robbery

as alleged in Counts One to Six, each offense to be of a dangerous

nature; found guilty of kidnaping as alleged in Counts 7 to 12, each

offense to be of a dangerous nature; and found guilty of aggravated

assault, with the use of a deadly weapon/dangerous instrument as alleged

in Counts 13 to 18, each offense to be of a dangerous nature. 

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Petitioner was sentenced to 21 years on Count 1 to run concurrently

with 21 years on Count 7, and 15 years on Count 13 to run currently with

Counts 1 and 7. Petitioner was sentenced to 21 years on County 2 to run

concurrently with 21 years on Count 8, and 15 years on Count 14 to run

concurrently with Counts 2 and 8. Counts 2, 8 and 14 were to run

consecutively to Counts 1, 7, and 13. Petitioner was sentenced to 21

years on Count 3 to run concurrently with 21 years on Count 9, and 15

years on Count 15 to run concurrently with Counts 3 and 9. Counts 3, 9,

and 15 were to run consecutively to Counts 2, 8, and 14. Petitioner was

sentenced to 21 years on Count 4 to run concurrently with 21 years Count

10, and 14 years on Count 16 to run concurrently with Counts 4 and 10.

Petitioner was sentenced to 21 years on Count 5 to run concurrently with

21 years on Count 11, and 15 years on Count 17 to run concurrently with

Counts 5 and 11. Petitioner was sentenced to 21 years on Count 6 to run

concurrently with 21 years on Count 12, and 15 years on Count 18 to run

concurrently with Counts 6 and 12. Counts 4, 10, 16, 5, 11, 17, 6, 12

and 18 were to run concurrently with all other Counts. 

Petitioner filed a direct criminal appeal, which was denied by the

Arizona Court of Appeals in a published opinion dated June 29, 1999. See

State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40 (Ariz.App. 1999). On January 4, 2000, the

Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment. The Mandate issued

on February 2, 2000. 

On February 16, 2000, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction

Relief with the state trial court. On November 16, 2000, Petitioner

filed a Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief with the trial court

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. On January 16, 2001, the trial court

summarily denied the petition. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review

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On June 10, 2005, this action was transferred to Judge Browning.

On July 20, 2005, this action was transferred to Judge Bury.

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and in a Memorandum Decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief

on June 21, 2001. Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme

Court and the Mandate issued July 31, 2001.

 Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 with this Court on April 23, 2002, CV-02-199-

TUC-RCC.1 This petition was timely filed. 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). On

February 28, 2003, Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus.

Petitioner raises ten habeas challenges to his conviction, as

follows: 

1.Petitioner's rights under the Fourth Amendment were

violated by the stop and seizure in New Jersey;

2.Petitioner's rights under the Confrontation Clause of

the Sixth Amendment were violated when the arresting officer

was permitted to testify telephonically during the

suppression hearing;

3.Petitioner's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of

the Fifth Amendment were violated when the trial court

sentenced him six times for a single offense of robbery;

4.Petitioner's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of

the Fifth Amendment were violated when the trial court

ordered consecutive sentences for offenses that arose out

of a single incident;

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5.Petitioner's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of

the Fifth Amendment were violated when the trial court

enhanced his sentences for the use of a gun;

6.Petitioner was punished in violation of his rights

under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments for failing

to demonstrate remorse prior to his convictions and

sentencing and for invoking his right to silence and to the

presumption of innocence; 

7.Petitioner's right to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment and to be free from Double Jeopardy were violated

when the trial court punished him for "failure to change his

ways";

8.Petitioner's right to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment was violated when the trial court punished him on

Counts 4, 10, and 16 for the impact that the crimes would

continue to have on the victims;

9.Petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of

appellate counsel; and,

 10.Petitioner is entitled to a hearing in federal court.

Claims 1 to 4 were addressed to the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct

appeal. Claims 5 to 10 were raised for the first time in the state postconviction relief proceedings. The state post conviction court summarily

denied post-conviction relief because the claims were procedurally

defaulted. Petitioner appealed. Petitioner cited ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel as cause for the procedural default. The Court of

Appeals found no showing of prejudice as they addressed the postconviction claims on appellate review. Respondents concede that all

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claims have been fairly exhausted with the state courts either by direct

appeal or through post-conviction relief. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d

1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000).

II. Facts

The following is a synopsis of the facts developed during

Petitioner's criminal jury trial. On December 12, 1996, the Bank One

branch at Swan and Sunrise in Tucson, Arizona, was robbed. As employees

were entering to open the bank office, an armed gunman pushed one

employee, a teller, into the building, pointing his gun at her and

ordered her and the manager to lie on the floor. After they complied,

another armed man came into the bank and tied their hands behind their

backs. The first gunman, identified as Petitioner, pointed his gun at

another employee and ordered her on the floor. The second gunman, codefendant Donald Malone (Malone), grabbed her and told her to get on the

floor. Malone pointed his gun at another teller and escorted him to

where the other employees were lying face down and bound his hands behind

his back. When another manager arrived, Malone pulled her inside and

forced her lie face down on the floor while he tied her hands behind her

back.

Petitioner held his gun to an employee's head and asked if she had

keys to the automatic cash machine. She said that she did not. He asked

her who had the combination. A manager said that she did and Petitioner,

while pointing a gun at her, ordered her to open the machine. When she

was unable to unlock the vault, she asked another employee to help her,

who also had the combination. The vault opened and Petitioner made the

two lie down again while he packed cash into a duffel bag. Petitioner

and Malone then left the bank. Approximately $245,000 was taken in

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bundles of cash, each bundle with a purple wrapper bearing the bank's

markings, a date stamp of December 11, 1996 and a manager's initials.

Later, in January 1997, Petitioner and Malone were arrested for

illegal possession of firearms after being stopped for speeding in South

Brunswick, New Jersey, by police officer Frank Lombardo (Officer

Lombardo). Malone, the driver, had approximately $4000 cash in his

pocket, including a stack of fifty-dollar bills wrapped in a purple bank

wrapper, date stamped December 11, 1996. Petitioner, the sole passenger

in the front seat, had two guns tucked in his waistband. After obtaining

a search warrant, the South Brunswick police discovered $160,000 in cash

bundled in bank wrappers in Petitioner's and Malone's hotel room.

Petitioner and Malone were returned to Arizona for prosecution on

the bank robbery. Federal prosecution was initially commenced, but after

the State of Arizona requested that the federal government defer

prosecution of the case, the State of Arizona commenced prosecution.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

 Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court on April 23, 2002. Accordingly, this case is governed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which

imposes a "new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant

a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus." Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Under the AEDPA, a district court may

entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted

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with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court

proceedings unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the Untied

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

 "Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States" refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the

dicta, of the [Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant

state court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Alvarado v. Hill, 252

F.3d 1066, 1068-9 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 2254(1) "restricts the source

of clearly established law to the [Supreme] Court's jurisprudence."

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by the [Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than the [Supreme] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 412-13. "Under the

'reasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 412-13.

"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at

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411. A federal habeas court may also grant the writ if it concludes that

the state court's adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). An unreasonable determination of the facts occurs where the

state court fails to consider and weigh highly probative, relevant

evidence, central to petitioner's claim, that was properly presented and

made part of the state-court record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1005

(9th Cir.), cert.denied, 125 S.Ct. 809 (2004). A district court must

presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state

court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by

clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption

is not altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of

appeals, rather than by a state trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S.

539, 546-47 (1981).

Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at

issue is structural error or had a "substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict." Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S.

782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)).

Under this standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of

their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief

based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in

"actual" prejudice. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

Where, as in this action, the Arizona Supreme Court denies review

of Petitioner's claims without explanation, the Court looks to the last

reasoned state court decision in conducting habeas review. See

Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.

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denied, 354 U.S. 944 (2001) (the district court "looks through" the

unexplained state supreme court decision to the last reasoned state court

decision). The Arizona Court of Appeals rendered the last reasoned state

court decisions both on direct criminal appeal and on the post-conviction

relief proceedings in Petitioner's case.

II. Legal Claims

 A. Petitioner's rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated

by the stop and seizure in New Jersey

Petitioner argued that after Petitioner and Malone were stopped in

New Jersey for speeding, the detention and search that followed were

conducted without probable cause. Malone was stopped for speeding and

no other offense. Once he produced the driver's license and insurance

papers, there was no longer any reason to detain the driver and his

passenger, Petitioner. The car was not listed as stolen when it was

called in. Petitioner claimed that after "[h]aving concluded that there

was no reasonable suspicion to detain the driver beyond the need to issue

the speeding citation, the purpose of the stop ended and the police

office was duty bound to send the two on their way." Petitioner goes on

to explain that there was no reason to believe there was any other

criminal activity afoot. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the

illegal search after the stop, the bundles of cash and guns, as well as

the evidence obtained from the search at the hotel room, should have been

suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. For this reason alone, the

writ should enter and the convictions should be reversed.

Respondents argue that Petitioner was afforded a full and fair

hearing during the state court hearing on this issue. Pretrial motions

and briefs were filed and a hearing with witnesses conducted.

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Respondents maintain that Petitioner's constitutional rights were not

violated during the stop and detention nor during the suppression

hearing. In any event, Respondents rely on Stone v. Powell, that a

state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the

ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure

was introduced at trial. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).

The Arizona Court of Appeals specifically addressed this issue on

direct appeal. The Court looked in detail at the facts surrounding the

stop, including the fact that Malone was driving in excess of 110 miles

per hour, slowed down and sped up, before finally stopping in an

extremely dark area, rather than a well lit area. After the stop, the

Petitioner/passenger ignored the police officer and kept his hand tucked

under his jacket, even though the officer repeatedly asked him to keep

his hands in view. Initially, Malone could not produce a vehicle

registration or proof of insurance and there were temporary tags on the

car. The officer then noticed a bulge in Malone's right pocket. After

a pat down, he found the bundle of cash. He then separated the driver

from the passenger. 

Petitioner was not responsive at first to questioning and was asked

to exit the vehicle. At that time, the officer saw a bulge in the

Petitioner's pants. The officer then conducted a pat down at which point

the officer found two handguns in the Petitioner's waistband. The

Arizona Court of Appeals, based on the above recitation of facts, found

that, "[t]he trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that

Lombardo had 'reasonable suspicion' to detain and question Malone and

Petitioner and that the subsequent searches were justified by 'reasonable

safety concerns.'"

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The Arizona Court of Appeals went on to conclude that, 

Here, [the police officer] had reasonable grounds to

continue his investigation. Notwithstanding Malone's

explanation that he had won the money in Atlantic City, the

cash the officer discovered pursuant to a lawful pat-down

search was still bound in a bank wrapper . . . Thus, the

stop's purpose had not concluded when the police officer

asked Malone to wait in the back of the patrol car. See

United States v. Baron, 94 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir.),[

cert.denied, 519 U.S. 1047 (1996)].

The Court of Appeals additionally found that, when Petitioner reached for

his waistband in response to the police officer's question about weapons,

the officer had reasonable concern for his safety which justified the

patdown search. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, "[i]n Maryland v.

Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), the Supreme Court held that a police officer

may, as a matter of course, order a passenger in a lawfully stopped

vehicle to exit the car 'pending completion of the stop.'" 

Petitioner was afforded a motion to suppress hearing before the

state trial court and submitted a brief in support. On March 11, 1998,

the trial court issued a written ruling. The trial court specifically

addressed the evidence surrounding circumstances of the stop. Based on

all of the suspicious behavior, Office Lombardo took safety precautions

and conducted two patdown searches, which resulted in a bundle of cash

and weapons. He arrested Petitioner at the scene for the unlawful

possession of two handguns. After that he saw the butt of a shotgun

underneath Malone's seat and he arrested him as well. The trial court

found that based on the facts surrounding the stop and the totality of

the evidence, see United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), Officer

Lombardo did not need a search warrant prior to looking inside of the

vehicle, based on reasonable suspicion and safety concerns. The trial

court ruled, after hearing all of the evidence, that "[t]he detention of

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the suspects was not unlawful and the search was justified by reasonable

safety concerns." The trial court applied Chimel v. California, 395

U.S. 752, 763 (1969), in support of its ruling on the issue of the right

of an officer to search a vehicle without a search warrant. The Court

of Appeals later relied on Maryland, 519 U.S. at 414, to affirm that

trial court's ruling.

 Petitioner has not raised any questions which would lead this Court

to question the factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the

state appellate court. Petitioner received a full and fair opportunity

to convince the trial court to suppress the evidence obtained after this

vehicle stop. Further, there is no unreasonable application of federal

law, specifically Chimel, Cortez, and Maryland. In Stone, 428 U.S. at

484, the Supreme Court stated "we conclude that where the State has

provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth

Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas

corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional

search or seizure was introduced at his trial." "Under Stone, a federal

district court may not relitigate a fourth amendment issue tried fully

and fairly in a state court, regardless of its view of the correctness

of the state decision." Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1977).

The record of the state proceedings compels the conclusion that

Petitioner received a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth

Amendment claims. The identical claims addressed here were squarely

rejected by the Arizona Court of Appeals. The transcript of the

evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress alone consists of 92

typewritten pages. The issues were thoroughly briefed at the trial level

and rejected. The briefs on appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals are

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substantial. The opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals is lengthy, and

it indicates that Petitioner's contentions were carefully considered. 

It is clear to this Court, therefore, that Petitioner was afforded

a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims in

the state court, Sumner, 449 U.S. at 546-47, and that there was no

unreasonable application of federal constitutional law. Accordingly,

Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas relief

on this claim.

B. Petitioner's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment were violated when the arresting officer was permitted to

testify telephonically

Petitioner argues that his rights under the Confrontation Clause

were violated when the primary witness, the arresting police officer,

Officer Lombardo, testified by telephone during the motion to suppress

hearing. Petitioner argues that he was deprived of a "face to face"

confrontation and the Court was deprived of the opportunity to assess the

demeanor and credibility of the witness. In addition, the state

demonstrated no compelling necessity for the telephonic procedure, which

was not adequate due to technical difficulties. Finally, the Petitioner

argues that the appellate court was "terse" in its review of this issue

and applied an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law to reach its conclusion.

Respondents take the position that a defendant's right to confront

an accusatory witness may be satisfied absent a physical, face to face

confrontation at trial. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990).

Further, the interests at stake during a suppression hearing are less

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than those in a criminal trial. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.

667, 679 (1980).

 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in

criminal cases the accused has the right to "be confronted with witnesses

against him." U.S. Const., Amend. VI. The federal confrontation right

applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pointer v.

Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). The ultimate goal of the Confrontation

Clause is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural

rather than a substantive guarantee. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

36(2004). The Confrontation Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only

about the desirability of reliable evidence, but about how reliability

can best be determined. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. Confrontation Clause

claims are subject to harmless error analysis. United States v. Nielsen,

371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 2004). For purposes of federal habeas corpus

review, the standard applicable to violations of the Confrontation Clause

is whether the inadmissible evidence had an actual and prejudicial effect

upon the jury. See Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir.),

cert.denied, 537 U.S. 851 (2002).

The Arizona Court of Appeals noted that Petitioner and his attorney

were present when the police officer testified telephonically and

subjected him to thorough cross examination. In addition, the police

officer testified in person at the trial. Petitioner did not again

reassert any objection to the motion to suppress hearing during trial.

The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that "any infringement on

Petitioner's confrontation rights was minimal and consequently could not

say the trial court erred in permitting the telephonic testimony during

the suppression hearing." The Court went on to reason, that if a

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Confrontation Clause violation had occurred, it was subject to the

harmless error analysis, relying on Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673

(1986) and Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972). The police officer

testified during the jury trial. The Court of Appeals finally reasoned

that "[m]oreover, the evidence against Petitioner was overwhelming. All

six victims positively identified him as the first armed gunman, and bank

security cameras photographed him during the robbery. Thus, even if the

trial court erred in allowing telephonic testimony at the suppression

hearing, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the lack of face-to-face

confrontation with the arresting officer."

Officer Lombardo was subjected to cross-examination during the

suppression hearing and again when he appeared in person to testify

during the trial. His testimony was the same in both proceedings. At

trial, Petitioner did not again raise any questions regarding the

Confrontation Clause. This Court finds no unreasonable application of

federal constitutional law or actual prejudice to Petitioner.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim

that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated during the

suppression hearing.

C. Petitioner's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the

Fifth Amendment were violated when the trial court sentenced him six 

times for a single offense of robbery

 Petitioner argues that it was preposterous that he was sentenced

six times for one offense, robbery. As such, his constitutional right

against Double Jeopardy was violated. In addition, this sentence

violated Arizona precedent found in State v. Strong, 185 Ariz. 248

(Ariz.App. 1995). The Court of Appeals in Petitioner's direct criminal

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appeal declined to follow Strong. Petitioner claims that "[t]he taking

of the property was effectuated by the concurrent commission of the

aggravated assaults and the kidnapings perpetrated on the persons present

in the bank. The very acts of aggravated assault and the kidnapings were

the added elements that made the theft of the money an armed robbery."

Relying on United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), Petitioner urges

the Court to find that multiple punishments based on the same conduct are

only permissible if each offense contains proof of one separate element

and no such separate elements were found here.

Respondents maintain that it is up to the legislature to authorize

cumulative punishments and that a federal court must accept a state

court's interpretation of legislative intent for multiple punishment

purposes, citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983). The

Arizona Court of Appeals that reviewed Petitioner's conviction rejected

his statutory interpretation. The reviewing court found that the plain

language of A.R.S. §13-1902(A), made robbery a crime against a person,

not against property. The evidence at trial showed that Petitioner and

Malone held guns on the six bank employees during the robbery, sufficed

for finding robbery under the statute six times - one act of robbery for

each bank employee. Respondents explain that, in doing so, the Arizona

Court of Appeals, Div. II, took a different view of the statute than a

panel of Div. I. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the Div. II decision

without comment. 

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees

that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const., Amend. V. The Double Jeopardy

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Clause protects against a second prosecution, and multiple punishments,

for the same offense. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 396 (1995);

United States v. Wolfswinkel, 44 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1995). 

As a matter of clearly established federal law, the United States

Supreme Court has regularly deferred to state court interpretations of

state statutes. "A State's highest court is the final judicial arbiter

of the meaning of state statutes." Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208

(1975). When a state court has made its own definitive determination as

to the meaning of a state statute, federal courts give this finding great

weight in determining the natural effect of a statute, and if it is

consistent with the statute's reasonable interpretation, it will be

deemed conclusive. Id. If the claim is solely based on the incorrect

application of state law, that alone cannot support federal habeas

relief. See Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir.1994); see

generally Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)("A federal court may

not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.")

The Arizona Court of Appeals found that "Petitioner and Malone used

deadly force against all six bank employees in order to prevent their

resistance to the taking of money from the immediate presence of two

employees, who had opened the vault and were still in it while Petitioner

removed cash. Consequently, we conclude the trial court did not err in

denying Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal, Rule 20, Ariz.

R. Crim. P., 17 A.R.S. on five of the armed robbery counts. See State

v. Sullivan, 187 Ariz. 599 (Ariz.App. 1996)." The Arizona statute in

question and applied here was §13-1902(A), which provides:

A person commits robbery if in the course of taking any

property of another from his person or immediate presence and

against his will, such person threatens or uses force against

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any person with intent either to coerce surrender of property

or to prevent resistance to such person taking or retaining

property.

The Arizona Supreme Court has held that robbery requires "only that force

be used 'against any person,' not necessarily only against the person

dispossessed of the property." State v. McGuire, 131 Ariz. 93, 96 (1981)

(upholding robbery conviction as to wife who was tied up in order to

allow defendant to steal husband's property); see also State v. SotoFong, 187 Ariz. 186, 200 (1996) (use of force against three store

employees to prevent defendant's taking of store property supported

robbery counts as to all three, despite lack of evidence as to two

employees that property was taken "from [their] person or immediate

presence"), cert.denied, 520 U.S. 1231 (1997).

Petitioner relies on State v. Strong, 185 Ariz. 248 (App.1995).

In that case, the defendant stole money from a restaurant, and was

charged with theft and two counts of armed robbery. That panel of the

Arizona Court of Appeals held that, because "there was only one theft

committed by defendant, i.e., the taking of the money from the restaurant

safe," only one armed robbery occurred, regardless of the number of

people threatened in the course of the robbery. Id. at 252. On the

contrary, relying on Arizona Supreme Court cases, McGuire and Soto-Fong,

the Riley Court declined to follow Strong. Riley, 196 Ariz. at 45. The

Arizona Court of Appeals, Div. I, in State v. Rutledge, 197 Ariz. 389

(Ariz.App. 2000), also declined to follow Strong. 

 Petitioner's claim is purely a matter of state court application

and interpretation of its own state sentencing statute. Missouri, 459

U.S. at 368. The highest court in Arizona has interpreted and applied

Section 13-1902(A) in the same manner and with the same result as the

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Riley court. This application is conclusive for purposes of federal

habeas review. Gurley, 421 U.S. at 208. Accordingly, Petitioner has

failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas relief on his claim

that his sentences violated the constitutional prohibition against Double

Jeopardy.

D. Petitioner's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the

Fifth Amendment were violated when the trial court ordered consecutive

sentences for offenses that arose out of a single incident

Petitioner maintains that the consecutive sentences imposed by the

trial court amounted to a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause and a

violation of A.R.S. §13-116. To support this position, Petitioner relies

on the application of State v. Williams, 182 Ariz. 548 (Ariz.App.1995).

Respondents argue that the Arizona statute in question, Section 13-

116, draws no distinction between single victims and multiple victims.

See State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 313 (1989). The state trial court

found it proper to impose separate consecutive sentences for acts

committed upon multiple victims on the theory that one taking of property

in while six victims were held at gunpoint meant that a separate armed

robbery was committed as to each victim. Consequently, Respondents

argue that ordering the sentences for the offenses against each named

victim be served concurrently, with one another, but consecutively to

sentences involving other victims was proper. Finally, Respondents argue

that this issue is solely one of application of state law, a matter not

generally within the province of a federal habeas court.

 As a matter of clearly established federal law, the United States

Supreme Court has regularly deferred to state court interpretations of

state statutes. "A State's highest court is the final judicial arbiter

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of the meaning of state statutes." Gurley, 421 U.S. at 208. When a state

court has made its own definitive determination as to the meaning of a

state statute, federal courts give this finding great weight in

determining the natural effect of a statute, and if it is consistent with

the statute's reasonable interpretation, it will be deemed conclusive.

Id. The United States Supreme Court has held double jeopardy

implications inapplicable to sentencing proceedings because the

determinations at issue do not place a defendant in jeopardy for an

offense. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 726 (1998). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals found that Petitioner's argument on

appeal was without merit, "because only one armed robbery occurred, into

which all the aggravated assault and kidnaping counts merged." Arizona

state law requires that §13-116 is not applied to sentences imposed for

a single act that harms multiple victims. See State v. Gordon, 161

Ariz. 308, 314 (1989). "Petitioner committed multiple acts upon

multiple victims; accordingly, the trial court did not err in imposing

consecutive sentences." Arizona law clearly supports this position.

The applicable statute in Arizona is Section 13-116, as follows:

An act or omission which is made punishable in different

ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under

both, but in no event may sentences be other than

concurrent. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under

either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission

under any other, to the extent the constitution of the

United States or of this state require.

The trial court applied this statute and the appellate courts affirmed

the application in upholding Petitioner's sentence. Ordering that the

sentences for the offenses against each named victim be served

concurrently with one another, but consecutively to sentences involving

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other victims, was proper under Arizona law. See Gordon, 161 Ariz. at

312 (citing State v. Tinghitella, 108 Ariz. 1, 3 (1971)).

Petitioner's "same-transaction" analysis, as employed in Dixon, 509

U.S. at 696, is without merit. Respondents correctly assert that the

basis of Petitioner's claim is not that his consecutive sentences were

improper under the Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304

(1932), same-elements test. In Missouri v. Hunter, the Supreme Court

reiterated its long-held position that where the legislature clearly

intended "to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences

does not violate the Constitution." 459 U.S. at 368, quoting Albernaz v.

United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981). "[S]imply because two criminal

statutes may be construed to proscribe the same conduct under the

Blockburger test does not mean that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes

the imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative punishments pursuant to

those statutes." Id. at 368. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded, where the

legislature has made its intent clear, the legislature, not the courts,

"prescribe the scope of punishments." Id. Here, the interpretation of

the robbery statute is that the focus of the offense is the use or

threatened use of force against a person. 

In sum, this issue is purely one of the interpretation and

application of well-settled state law. The appellate court here,

nevertheless, did not commit constitutional error in applying the Gordon

test to determine that the Petitioner's sentence complied with state law.

Missouri, 459 U.S. at 368-69. Consequently, habeas relief is not

available on this claim.

E. Petitioner's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the

Fifth Amendment were violated when the trial court enhanced his sentences

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for the use of a gun

Petitioner charges that the trial court double counted and double

charged the use of a gun during the offense, such that Double Jeopardy

was violated, because aggravated assault and armed robbery both contain

the necessary element of use of a deadly weapon.

Respondents argue that this claim is not cognizable in a federal

habeas action because the decision rests on a state court interpretation

of state law that is independent of the federal question under Coleman,

501 U.S. at 731-32. Further, Respondents argue that this claim is

procedurally defaulted with no showing of cause and prejudice, because

it was first raised with the trial court during the course of postconviction relief proceedings. The Arizona Court of Appeals also denied

the claim as precluded under Rule 32.2, Ariz. R. Crim. P. On June 21,

2001, the Arizona Court of Appeals filed a Memorandum Decision addressing

the points raised with the state post-conviction court. 

In contrast to the factual allegations made by Petitioner, the

appellate court found that the trial court during sentencing expressly

found six factors to support aggravation: severe emotional trauma to the

victims; the high value of the property taken; petitioner's commission

of the offenses while on probation; petitioner's prior criminal history;

his failure to benefit from prior rehabilitative efforts and indications

that he was a dangerous person. At the same time, during the sentencing

hearing, the trial judge mentioned the use of a weapon during the course

of the crime. The Court of Appeals resolved that upon post-conviction

relief, the trial court had the opportunity to reconsider its sentencing

decision but found that the sentences imposed were not based on

inappropriate factors. There were many other aggravating factors that

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did support the sentence, such that eliminating the consideration of the

use of a gun, even though not specifically listed as an aggravating

factor, was harmless. The appellate court found no reason to remand to

reduce the petitioner's sentence, because it has properly considered all

relevant factors and not acted arbitrarily or capriciously. State v.

Fatty, 150 Ariz. 587 (Ariz.App.1986).

 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees

that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const., Amend. V. In Benton v. Maryland,

395 U.S. 784 (1969), its protections were held applicable to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment. The guarantee against double jeopardy

protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after

acquittal or conviction, and (2) multiple punishments for the same

offense. See Witte, 515 U.S. at 395-96; United States v. DiFrancesco, 449

U.S. 117, 129(1980); Staatz v. Dupnik, 789 F.2d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 1986).

The trial court did not list the Petitioner's use of a gun during

sentencing as a factor to impose an aggravated sentence. The judge

mentions the use of a gun during the sentencing phase, but it is at the

same time as he is describing the fear and trauma experienced by the

victims; that it will be a "memory that they carry with them" and that

they are not soldiers who take a job expecting risk of loss of life.

Petitioner was convicted of armed robbery, but it is not listed by the

trial court as a basis for aggravating the sentence. 

The trial judge mentioned the use of a gun when he sentenced

Petitioner, but to assert that use of the gun was a factor in aggravating

the sentencing takes the comment out of context. There is no factual

basis for the claim that the Court applied the use of a gun as a separate

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factor to impose an aggravated sentence. Therefore, this claim fails for

lack of a factual basis. 

F. Petitioner was punished in violation of his rights under the

Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments for failing to demonstrate remorse

prior to his convictions and sentencing and for invoking his right to

silence and to the presumption of innocence

Petitioner objects to the trial court referring during sentencing

to Petitioner's lack of remorse. Petitioner surmises that the trial

court assumed there was lack of remorse because the Petitioner wanted to

go to trial and did not testify.

Respondents allege that this claim is factually inaccurate. The

trial court actually recognized Petitioner's remorse during the

sentencing and applied it as a mitigating factor. What the trial court

specifically stated was: "in mitigation, Defendant's demeanor and

attitude today in court with regard to his long overdue apology to the

victims." 

Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the trial court used the

expression of remorse as a mitigating factor on behalf of Petitioner.

In the end, it did not outweigh the aggravating factors. Because this

claim is factually inaccurate and without basis in the record, it lacks

legal merit.

G. Petitioner's right to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment and to be free from Double Jeopardy were violated when the

trial court punished him for "failure to change his ways"

Petitioner claims that his sentence was improperly aggravated

because he was on probation at the time of the offence.

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Respondents argue that this claim is purely a matter of state law

and not a cognizable claim for habeas review.

The trial court found aggravating factors that Petitioner had

committed the offense while on federal probation and had a prior criminal

history, as well as that prior attempts to rehabilitate him had failed.

Petitioner's various probation officers testified during the sentencing

phase. Evidence was submitted that in fact probation had been violated

prior to the December 12, 1996 robbery and a probation violation warrant

had issued for failure to contact the probation officer and to appear in

Court, as well as resigning his job and moving without notifying

probation. In addition, Petitioner had been involved with the Teen

Challenge Program, but had resigned in 1996. The trial court was

informed and understood that the Petitioner's prior conviction was not

of a dangerous nature, but that he committed a dangerous offense while

on probation.

Under Arizona law, failure to reform based on a review of past

criminal activity and/or attempts to rehabilitate is a proper aggravating

factor during the sentencing phase. See §13-702(C)(17)("Any other factors

which the court may deem appropriate to the ends of justice."); State v.

Patton, 120 Ariz. 386 (1978). Consequently, this claim does not present

a cognizable basis for federal habeas relief.

H. Petitioner's right to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment was violated when the trial court punished him on Counts 4, 10,

and 16 for the impact that the crimes would continue to have on the

victims

Petitioner urges that the trial court improperly considered the

impact of the crime on the victims in imposing a sentence. Petitioner

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claims that this consideration is in violation of Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

Respondents note that the trial court listed six aggravating

factors. Respondents take the position that even assuming one factor was

improperly applied, there was no error in applying an aggravated sentence

based on the cumulative consideration of five of the factors. Further,

the Arizona Court of Appeals found that the victims' suffering as a group

amounted to a proper aggravating factor. 

Arizona state law allows the sentencing judge to consider physical,

emotional and financial harm caused to the victim, as follows: 

§13-702C. For the purpose of determining the sentence

pursuant to § 13-710 and subsection A of this section, the

trier of fact shall determine and the court shall consider

the following aggravating circumstances:

1. Infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical

injury, except if this circumstance is an essential element

of the offense of conviction or has been utilized to enhance

the range of punishment under § 13-604.

2. Use, threatened use or possession of a deadly weapon or

dangerous instrument during the commission of the crime,

except if this circumstance is an essential element of the

offense of conviction or has been utilized to enhance the

range of punishment under § 13-604.

3. If the offense involves the taking of or damage to

property, the value of the property so taken or damaged.

* * *

9. The victim or, if the victim has died as a result of the

conduct of the defendant, the victim's immediate family

suffered physical, emotional or financial harm.

The first aggravating factor that the trial judge listed was the

severe emotional trauma caused to the victims. The testimony at trial

from the bank employees who were the victims of the robbery was that they

were forced to lie face down on the floor, were tied up with their hands

behind their backs, and had a 9-millimeter semiautomatic handgun with a

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laser sight pointed at them throughout the robbery. One employee was

pulled by the hair to get keys and threatened that "if you want to spend

fucking Christmas with your fucking family then you will open the ATM."

Prior to the sentencing, one of the bank employee victims testified that

"[w]hen she returned to work after the trial, she was sent home when she

became terrified by the sound of a knock on the back door." 

In sum, a sufficient factual basis existed for the state trial

court to impose an aggravated sentence. Further, the state trial court

properly applied the state sentencing statute, Section 13-702(C)(9).

Consequently, this claim raises no cognizable basis for federal habeas

relief. 

 I. Petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of appellate

counsel

Petitioner maintains that appellate counsel's performance during

the direct criminal appeal was deficient under Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 688 (1984). Petitioner claims that the failure of appellate

counsel to raise sentencing issues in the direct appeal caused prejudice

to Petitioner; if appellate counsel had properly raised those issue on

direct appeal, Petitioner's sentence would be much lighter. Petitioner

takes the position that the "Arizona Court assumed that appellate

counsel's performance was deficient . . . " Petitioner argues that both

the appellate court's resolution of the sentencing and the claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on the failure to raise

those claims in the first instance are flawed. Petitioner further argues

that the failure of the state court to order an evidentiary hearing

during the post-conviction proceedings is further evidence that the state

courts' decisions are flawed. 

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Respondents argue that the Court of Appeals expressly applied the

Strickland standard to Petitioner's allegations of ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel and denied relief. Respondents also argue that

there was no unreasonable application of state law here to reach that

decision. Further, even if appellate counsel had raised the sentencing

issues on direct appeal, the issues are meritless and the failure to do

so did not prejudice Petitioner in the slightest.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a

claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees

not only assistance, but effective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 686. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must

be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having

produced a just result. Id. The right to effective assistance of counsel

applies to performance of both retained and appointed counsel without

distinction. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980).

 In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

Petitioner must establish two elements. First, counsel's performance was

deficient, meaning, that it fell below an "objective standard of

reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687-88. Secondly, Petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by

counsel's deficient performance, meaning that "there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome. Id.

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Under Strickland, "a court need not determine whether counsel's

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the

defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . If it is easier

to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of

sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed." Id. at

697. Under the guidance of these established legal standards, the Court

turns directly to the second prong of the Strickland test.

The Arizona Court of Appeals found no ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel upon review of the post-conviction proceedings. The

Court of Appeals found in its review of the post-conviction proceedings

that, "[b]ecause the record is clear that even if appellate counsel had

made petitioner's sentencing argument in the direct appeal, the result

would have been the same, appellate counsel was not ineffective." It

then approached the issue as "assuming, arguendo, that appellate counsel

fell below a reasonable standard in failing to make petitioner's

sentencing argument, it is clear from this record that Petitioner

suffered no prejudice thereby." Consequently, Petitioner's argument that

the Arizona Court of Appeals assumed ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel is inaccurate and misleading.

Here, after a review of the record and the claims made by

Petitioner, there is no basis for a finding that appellate counsel's

actions undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process.

Petitioner's claims of sentencing error are meritless and any failure to

address those claims on direct appeal resulted in no prejudice to

Petitioner. All of this is relevant since not only must Petitioner

prove his appellate counsel was ineffective, but that he was prejudiced

by such ineffectiveness. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). Of

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particular importance, Petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable

probability that, but for his appellate counsel's failure to appeal the

sentencing issues, Petitioner would have prevailed on his appeal. Id.

Petitioner has offered nothing more than his own conjectures as to the

outcome of the appeal had the sentencing issues been raised. Conjecture

cannot be said to rise to the level of "reasonable probability."

Petitioner's appellate counsel was not ineffective merely because

the sentencing issues were not raised on direct appeal. See Smith v.

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-536 (1986). Indeed, an objective decision by

appellate counsel not to raise a particular issue on appeal falls far

short of meeting the rigorous standard for ineffective assistance of

counsel as established by Strickland. Id. at 536. The process of weeding

out weaker arguments on appeal in order to focus upon those that are more

likely to prevail, "far from being evidence of incompetence, is the

hallmark of effective appellate advocacy." Id. Accordingly, Petitioner

has not shown prejudice under the Strickland standard and has failed to

establish that he is entitled to habeas relief on the basis of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

J. Petitioner is entitled to hearing in federal court

Petitioner argues that the issue of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel (for failure to address sentencing issues on direct

criminal appeal) required a hearing before rendering a decision in the

state post-conviction proceedings. Petitioner posits that the state

trial court completely ignored that claim and never addressed it during

the post-conviction relief proceedings. Then, after concluding that the

sentencing claims were without merit, the Arizona Court of Appeals

summarily found no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in its

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Memorandum Order. Petitioner argues that he was never afforded a hearing

on this issue at any level and should therefore be granted a hearing in

this Court on issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Respondents argue that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254(e), Petitioner

is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Respondents claim that

"[w]hile Petitioner pursued a hearing in state court, he failed to

develop a sufficient claim of ineffective assistance. The state courts

found no colorable factual issues to be resolved."

The standard applied is, as follows:

Section 2254(e)

(1)-In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have

the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear

and convincing evidence.

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis

of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not

hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

Here, Petitioner cited no basis for this Court to conclude that he

raised a claim that relies on a new constitutional rule; or, the factual

predicate could not have been previously discovered and the facts

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underlying the claims would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found the Petitioner guilty. The issue of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was sufficiently addressed

and properly resolved without a hearing during the post-conviction and

appellate proceedings in the state courts. In sum, there are no grounds

or facts asserted now that warrant this Court granting an evidentiary

hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

 CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to show any violation

of his federal constitutional rights in the underlying state criminal

proceedings. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is

DENIED.

DATED this 13th day of December, 2005.

Case 4:02-cv-00199-DCB Document 24 Filed 12/14/05 Page 32 of 32