Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01803/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01803-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Plaintiff, Leo Evans, is a prisoner in the custody of North Kern State Prison. On December 

30, 2019, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

alleging one claim for excessive force against Defendants “Madera County Police Department,”

“R. Mahoney 4536,” “C. Robertson 519,” “R. Vasquez 4263,” “Grijalva,” “Garcia,” and “Vang.” 

(Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleges each individual defendant is employed as an “SIU Officer” at Madera

Police Department. (See id. at 3–4.) Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma 

pauperis, which was granted on January 29, 2020. (Docs. 3, 6.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint is now before the Court for screening. As discussed below, 

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief as currently pled. 

Plaintiff is granted leave to file a first amended complaint and is provided the pleading 

LEO EVANS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MADERA POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:19-cv-01803-DAD-SKO

FIRST SCREENING ORDER

(Doc. 1)

21-DAY DEADLINE

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requirements and legal standards under which his claims will be analyzed.

B. Screening Requirement and Standard

In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen 

each case, and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of 

poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that a complaint fails to state a claim, 

leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by 

amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

The Court’s screening of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is governed by the 

following standards. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim 

for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable 

legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff 

must allege a minimum factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each 

defendant fair notice of what plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, 

e.g., Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 

F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

C. Summary of the Complaint

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in the complaint:

On 9/19/2019 at [a]pp[r]oximately 1652 hours [Plaintiff] was apprehended by SIU 

Officers R. M[a]honey 4536, C. Robertson 519, R. Vasquez 4263, Grijalva, Garcia 

and Vang during the time of [Plaintiff] being apprehended SIU Officers began 

striking me in my back and stomach causing me pain and swelling and also brusing 

[sic] that lasted a couple of weeks. 

(Doc. 1 at 5.) Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges a single claim for excessive force. (Id.)

D. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In 

determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, allegations of 

material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Love 

v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, since Plaintiff is appearing pro 

se, the Court must construe the allegations of his complaint liberally and must afford Plaintiff the 

benefit of any doubt. See Karim–Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 

1988). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual 

allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a 

civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” 

Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of 

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Further, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”) (internal citations 

omitted).

2. § 1983

§ 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other 

federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 

1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive 

rights but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Crowley 

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v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It states in relevant

part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts from which 

it may be inferred (1) he was deprived of a federal right, and (2) a person or entity who committed 

the alleged violation acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 

Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1976).

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff appears to assert a claim for excessive force in connection with an out-of-custody 

interaction with law enforcement and subsequent arrest. Thus, the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution applies to his claim—not the Eighth Amendment.1

A. Legal Standards

1. Fourth Amendment—Excessive Force

Claims asserting officers used excessive force during the course of an investigatory stop, 

or other seizure are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 

seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). To prevail on a § 1983 excessive force 

claim, a plaintiff must show that the officer’s actions were objectively unreasonable under the 

circumstances. Id. at 388. Officers may only use such force as is objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances. Id. at 397; see also Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 

2001).

In assessing reasonableness, the court should consider “the severity of the crime at issue, 

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether 

 1 The Eighth Amendment applies only to inmates’ claims of cruel and unusual punishment by use of excessive force, 

not to claims of excessive force related to an unreasonable seizure by law enforcement. See Clement v. Gomez, 298 

F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Blanford v. Sacramento 

Cty., 406 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “A police officer may not seize an 

unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead,” but if “there is probable cause to believe 

that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not 

constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 

U.S. 1, 11 (1985).

2. Failure to Intervene

Claims of excessive force are not limited to claims against the officer or officers who 

actually used excessive force, but may also be brought against officers who were present during 

the use of excessive force but failed to intervene. Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 

(9th Cir. 2003); Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Cuff v. 

Department of State Hospitals (Stockton), No. 2:16-cv-1999 MCE DB P, 2017 WL 1179169, at *5 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2017). A failure to intervene claim can be alleged against an officer whether 

or not the officer was in a “supervisor” role at the time of the incident. Cuff, 2017 WL 1179169, 

at *5; Kraft v. Laney, No. CIV S-04-0129 GGH, 2005 WL 2042310, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 

2005) (citing Fundiller v. Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1441–42 (11th Cir. 1985) (“It is not 

necessary that a police officer actually participate in the use of excessive force in order to be held 

liable under section 1983. Rather, an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take 

reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force . . . can be held 

liable for his nonfeasance.”)). 

“To state a claim for failure to intervene, Plaintiff must allege circumstance showing that 

these officers had an opportunity to intervene and prevent or curtail the violation (e.g., enough 

time to observe what was happening and intervene to stop it), but failed to do so.” Gonzales v. 

Cate, No. 1:06-cv-1420-AWI-MJS (PC), 2011 WL 1332174, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2011); 

Lanier v. City of Fresno, No. CV F 10-1120 LJO SKO, 2010 WL 5113799 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 

2010); Claiborne v. Blauser, No. 2:10-cv-2427 LKK EFB P, 2013 WL 1384995, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 

Apr. 4, 2013). 

3. Municipal Liability 

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Municipal departments, such as police departments, are not appropriate defendants in a §

1983 suit. As set forth above, under § 1983 only a “person” acting under color of law may be 

sued for claims. The term “persons” under § 1983 encompasses state and local officials sued in 

their individual capacities, private individuals and entities which acted under color of state law, 

and local governmental entities. Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995–996 

(N.D. Cal.1996). But “persons” does not include municipal departments. Id. “[N]aming a 

municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a [Section] 1983 

action against a municipality.” Stump v. Gates, 777 F. Supp. 808, 816 (D. Colo. 1991). See also, 

e.g., Stoll. v. Cty. of Kern, No. 1:05-CV-01059 OWW SMS, 2008 WL 4218492, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 

Sept. 8, 2008) (dismissing from suit the defendant Kern County Welfare Department, a municipal 

department of the defendant County of Kern). 

Under longstanding Supreme Court authority, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 

1983 simply because it employs an individual accused of, or who has engaged in, illegal or 

unconstitutional conduct. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that 

“[a] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, 

a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory”); see also Bd. 

of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (“[I]t is not enough 

[under Monell ] for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the 

municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the 

municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.”). 

Because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, counties and municipalities 

may be sued under § 1983 only upon a showing that an official policy or custom caused the 

constitutional tort. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. “A local government entity cannot be held liable 

under § 1983 unless the plaintiff alleges that the action inflicting injury flowed from either an 

explicitly adopted or a tacitly authorized [governmental] policy.” Ortez v. Washington Cty., State 

of Or., 88 F.3d 804, 811 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and quotations omitted) (alteration in original). 

“[L]ocal governments, like any other § 1983 ‘person,’ . . . may be sued for constitutional 

deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not 

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received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Monell, 436 U.S. 

at 690–91. A local governmental entity may also “be liable if it had a policy or custom of failing 

to train its employees and that failure to train caused the constitutional violation.” Collins v. City 

of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992). “In particular . . . the inadequate training of 

police officers could be characterized as the cause of the constitutional tort if—and only if—the 

failure to train amounted to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom the police 

come into contact.” Id. (citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a claim of excessive force against Defendants and states

simply that “SIU Officers” struck Plaintiff in his back and stomach after they “apprehended” him.

(See Doc. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff may be able to state a claim for excessive force based on the events 

described in the complaint. Plaintiff does not, however, specifically allege which Defendant 

struck Plaintiff, whether all Defendants actively participated in striking Plaintiff, or whether any 

Defendant was simply present but failed to intervene. Further, Plaintiff does not give the location 

of the events giving rise to the claim or any of the circumstances under which Defendants came 

into contact with Plaintiff and “apprehended” him. Thus, Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient 

to show that Defendants’ use of force was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. See 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. Plaintiff also does not allege sufficient facts to show that any 

Defendant was present during a violation of Plaintiff’s rights by other officers, or that any 

Defendant had an “opportunity to intervene and prevent or curtail the violation (e.g., enough time 

to observe what was happening and intervene to stop it)” as required to state a claim for failure to 

intervene. See Gonzales, 2011 WL 1332174, at *3. In sum, the Court concludes that the facts 

alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint are not sufficient to give Defendants “fair notice” of what 

Plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest, i.e., the conduct Plaintiff claims each 

Defendant exhibited that allegedly subjects each Defendant to liability. See, e.g., Brazil, 66 F.3d 

at 199; McKeever, 932 F.2d at 798. 

Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his complaint to attempt to state a claim against 

the individual Defendants. Plaintiff is advised that if he files an amended complaint, he must 

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provide more than “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56. Any amended complaint must specifically set forth 

the actions of each individual Defendant giving rise to liability and must set forth more facts and 

circumstances surrounding the allegations, as set forth above. 

As to Plaintiff’s claims against “Madera County Police Department,” as stated above, 

municipal departments are not appropriate defendants in a § 1983 suit. See, e.g., Stoll, 2008 WL 

4218492, at *5. Local governments, such as Madera County or the City of Madera, are “persons” 

subject to liability under § 1983 where official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort. See 

Monell 436 U.S. at 690. To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of 

constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right 

of which [he] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving 

force behind the constitutional violation.” See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 Cty. of Yamhill, 130 

F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For municipal 

liability, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts regarding the specific nature of the alleged policy, 

custom or practice to allow the defendant to effectively defend itself, and these facts must 

plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See AE v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 

636-37 (9th Cir. 2012). It is not sufficient to merely allege that a policy, custom or practice 

existed or that individual officers’ wrongdoing conformed to a policy, custom or practice. See id.

at 636–68.

Plaintiff is also granted leave to amend to attempt to allege a § 1983 claim against the 

appropriate municipality. Plaintiff is advised that a conclusory allegation regarding the existence 

of a policy or custom unsupported by factual allegations is insufficient to state a Monell claim. 

See Save CCSF Coalition v. Lim, No. 14–cv–05286–SI, 2015 WL 3409260, at *13 (N.D. Cal. May 

27, 2015) (unspecific allegation regarding municipal defendant’s use of force policy insufficient to 

identify a relevant policy or custom under Monell); Telles v. City of Waterford, No. 1:10–cv–

00982–AWI–SKO, 2010 WL 5314360, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010) (to sufficiently state a 

claim under Monell, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing a policy or establishing a lack of 

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training; it is not enough simply to state that there is a policy or allege a lack of training or 

supervision); Jenkins v. Humboldt Cty., H.C.C.F., No. C 09-5899 PJH, 2010 WL 1267113, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010) (same); Smith v. Cty. of Stanislaus, No. 1:11–cv–01655–LJO–SKO, 

2012 WL 253241, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012) (same). Plaintiff must allege facts setting forth 

the appropriate municipality’s specific policy or custom, how the policy or custom was deficient, 

how it caused the alleged harm, and how the infirmity of the custom or policy was so obvious that 

policymakers were on notice that the constitutional injury was likely to occur. See Flores v. Cty. 

of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1157 n.8 (9th Cir. 2014); Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207–08, 1216–17. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, his complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27; Woldmskel v. Keg N Bottle Liquor Store, No. 

15-CV-2469 WQH, 2016 WL 245850, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016) (dismissing § 1983 claims 

sua sponte against defendants not alleged to have acted under color of state law pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).

As noted above, the Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his claims 

and cure, to the extent possible, the identified deficiencies. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. Plaintiff 

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. 

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

the named defendants did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678–79.

If he chooses to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff should make it as concise as possible

and include relevant dates, names, and locations. Plaintiff should state which of his constitutional 

rights he believes were violated by each Defendant and the specific facts that support each 

contention—i.e., the actions each Defendant took and how they violated his constitutional rights. 

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, his factual allegations will be screened under the legal 

standards and authorities set forth in this order.

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Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Finally, 

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Rule 

220, Local Rules of the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a first amended complaint;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and

3. Within twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order, or a notice of voluntary dismissal.

If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the undersigned 

will recommend to the assigned district judge that this action be dismissed for failure to state 

a claim and to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 2, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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