Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-05181/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-05181-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PERFECTO B. AQUINO, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 15-cv-05181-JSW 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND CONTINUING CASE 

MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE 

Re: Docket Nos. 7, 22 

Now before the Court for consideration is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants U.S. 

Bank, National Association as Trustee for the Banc of America Funding 2006-J Trust (“U.S. 

Bank”) and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) (collectively “Defendants”). The Court has 

considered the parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and it HEREBY 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion, GRANTS leave to amend, and CONTINUES the case 

management conference scheduled for February 12, 2016 to April 1, 2016 at 11:00 a.m.. 

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND BACKGROUND 

A. Evidentiary Issues. 

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the deeds of trust on the Property, 

various documents recorded in connection with the foreclosure proceedings, and various court 

documents. (Docket No. 8, Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”).) Plaintiffs, Perfecto B. Aquino 

and Zenaida Aquino (the “Aquinos”), do not contest the authenticity of those documents. The 

Court can take judicial notice of the existence of public records or court documents, but it may not 

take judicial notice of disputed facts in those documents. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 

F.3d 668, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2001); Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Local 2 v. Vista Inn 

Management Co., 393 F. Supp. 2d 972, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Fed. R. Evid. 201. The Court 

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GRANTS, IN PART, the request to take judicial notice, and it takes judicial notice of Exhibits 1-

12 and 19-21. 

According to the record, the Aquinos filed three prior lawsuits relating to the non-judicial 

foreclosure proceedings on property described in the following section. Because the first two 

lawsuits did not raise the same claims at issue in this case, the Court was not required to consider 

them to resolve this motion. Therefore, the Court DENIES, AS MOOT, the request to take 

judicial notice of Exhibits 13-18.

Defendants also move to incorporate by reference the Settlement Agreement and two 

letters dated July 21, 2015. (Docket No. 22, Motion for Incorporation by Reference (“MIBR”).) 

The incorporation by reference doctrine “permits a district court to consider documents ‘whose 

contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not 

physically attached to the [plaintiff’s] pleading.’” In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 

970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999)) (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994), overruled 

on other grounds, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)); see 

also Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). The Aquinos do not 

oppose the request to consider the letters date July 21, 2015, and those letters are central to the 

negligence claim. Accordingly, the Court shall consider those documents under the incorporation 

by reference doctrine. 

The Aquinos do not dispute that the Settlement Agreement submitted by Defendants is 

authentic. In addition, contrary to their arguments, they do refer to the Settlement Agreement and 

a portion of its contents in paragraph 28, but it is not clear that the Settlement Agreement is central 

to the negligence claim. However, the Aquinos have asked for leave to amend to include claims 

for “intentional and negligent misrepresentation and breach of the implied covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing, based on Defendants’ wrongful conduct in inducing Plaintiffs to enter a sham 

settlement agreement....” (Opp. Br. at 10:22-24.) Accordingly, the Court shall consider the 

Settlement Agreement solely for purposes of evaluating whether to grant leave to amend. 

B. Factual Background. 

In October 2006, the Aquinos obtained two loans secured by deeds of trust for property 

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located at 35979 Bronze Street, Union City, California (the “Property”). The first loan (“First 

Loan”), which is the loan at issue here, was in the amount of $860,000. (Compl. ¶ 10; RJN, Ex. 

1.) At some unspecified point, the Aquinos defaulted on the First Loan, a notice of default was 

recorded in December 2009, and a notice of trustee’s sale was recorded on March 10, 2010. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 11-12; RJN Exs. 3-4.) 

On or about May 24, 2010, an assignment of deed of trust was recorded, by which Wells 

Fargo assigned all beneficial interest in the First Loan to U.S. Bank. (Compl. ¶ 13; RJN Ex. 5.) 

Thereafter, the notice of default recorded in December 2009 was rescinded, and in December 2011 

a second assignment of deed of trust was recorded, in which Wells Fargo again assigned U.S. 

Bank all beneficial interest under the First Loan. (RJN Exs. 6-7.) In January 2012, First 

American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC recorded a new notice of default on U.S. Bank’s 

behalf. (Compl. ¶ 14; RJN, Ex. 8.) A notice of trustee’s sale was recorded on April 12, 2012. 

(Compl. ¶ 15; RJN, Ex. 9.)1 

In January 2014, the Aquinos attempted to obtain a loan modification from Defendants.2 

On May 7, 2014, Wells Fargo denied the request. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-19.) According to the Aquinos, 

Wells Fargo represented that it was “‘unable to create an affordable mortgage payment that still 

meets the requirement of the program’ through its review of [their] monthly income,” which they 

allege was greater than the amount calculated by Wells Fargo. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21; see also RJN, Ex. 19 

(Aquino v. U.S. Bank, NA, as Trustee for the Banc of America Funding 20060J Trust, Case No. 

RG14740900, First Amended Complaint (hereinafter “Third Action Complaint”), ¶¶ 19-21, Ex. 

B).) 

The Aquinos applied for another loan modification, and Wells Fargo denied that request on 

 

1

 Additional notices of trustee’s sale were recorded in June 2013, July 2014, and September 

2015. (RJN Exs. 10-12.) The trustee’s sale has not occurred. 

2

 The Aquinos do not always clearly distinguish between the two named Defendants in their 

Complaint. Defendants also moved to dismiss collectively. If the Aquinos file the amended 

complaint permitted by this Order, they shall not lump the Defendants together. Rather, they shall 

clearly specify the actions each particular defendant is alleged to have taken. If the Aquinos’ 

theory is that one of the defendants is vicariously liable for the action of the other, they must 

clearly set forth facts showing the basis for that theory of liability. 

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or about August 18, 2014. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-23.) According to the Aquinos, Wells Fargo again 

represented that it was “‘unable to create an affordable mortgage payment that still meets the 

requirement of the program’ through its review of [their] monthly income,” which they allege was 

greater than the amount calculated by Wells Fargo. (Id. ¶¶ 22-25; see also Third Action 

Complaint, ¶¶ 24-27, Ex. D.) 

On November 17, 2014, the Aquinos filed a lawsuit in which they alleged claims against 

the Defendant for negligence, dual tracking in violation of California Civil Code section 

2923.6(c), and injunctive relief under Civil Code Section 2924.12 (“Section 2924.12”), based on 

the alleged dual tracking (the “Third Action”). (RJN, Ex. 19 (Third Action Complaint, ¶¶ 18-27, 

Exs. B, D.) The Third Action was resolved on June 10, 2015, when the parties entered into a 

settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”). (Compl. ¶ 28; RJN, Ex. 21; MIBR, Ex. 22 

(Settlement Agreement).) 

In June 2015, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the Aquinos submitted a new 

application for a non-Home Affordable Mortgage Program (“HAMP”) loan modification to Wells 

Fargo. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-28; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3.4.) Wells Fargo denied the application on 

July 21, 2015. According to the Aquinos, Wells Fargo represented that, “[t]he current unpaid 

principal balance on your loan is higher than the program limit ($729,750 for a one unit property 

...).” (Compl. ¶ 28; see also MIBR, Ex. 23.) The Aquinos also allege that 

Defendants knew that the [Aquinos’] loan balance exceed that 

amount before they began looking at the loan modification request. 

And that this fact was already contained in the parties [sic] 

Settlement Agreement dated June 10, 2015. A second reason for ... 

denying [the Aquinos] the in-house loan modification program was 

the claim that, “At this time, you do not meet the requirements of 

this program because: Based on the documentation you provided, 

we are unable to create an affordable mortgage payment that still 

meets the requirements of the program. We reached this decision by 

reviewing your monthly gross income, which is calculated as 

$10,458.00, along with reviewing the other information you 

provided. Your gross monthly income is your income before taxes 

and other deductions.” 

(Compl. ¶ 28; see also MIBR, Ex. 24.) The Aquinos allege, on information and belief, that “this” 

statement was false and allege that Wells Fargo knew it was false. (Id. ¶ 29.) 

The Court shall address additional facts as necessary in the analysis. 

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ANALYSIS 

A. Applicable Legal Standards. 

A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the 

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court’s “inquiry is limited 

to the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Even under the liberal pleadings standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 

(1986)). 

Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff must not merely allege conduct that is conceivable but 

must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If the allegations are 

insufficient to state a claim, a court should grant leave to amend, unless amendment would be 

futile. See, e.g. Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990); Cook, Perkiss & 

Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). 

B. The Court Dismisses the Negligence Claim, With Leave to Amend. 

The Aquinos allege that “Defendants failed to exercise the appropriate duty of care in their 

review of [their] loan modification application” and negligently denied that application. (Compl. ¶ 

30; see also id. ¶ 33.) In order to state a claim for negligence, the Aquinos must allege that: (1) 

Defendants owed them a duty of care; (2) Defendants breached that duty; and (3) the breach 

proximately caused their damages or injuries. See Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LLP, 

221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 62 (2013). “The existence of a duty of care owed by a defendant to a 

plaintiff is a prerequisite to establish a claim for negligence.” Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & 

Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096 (1991). The “question of the existence of a legal duty of 

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care . . . presents a question of law which is to be determined by the courts alone.” First Interstate 

Bank of Ariz., N.A. v. Murphy, Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“[A]s a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when the 

institution’s involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role 

as a mere lender of money.” Nymark, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1096. “Liability to a borrower for 

negligence arises only when the lender ‘actively participates’ in the financed enterprise ‘beyond 

the domain of the usual money lender.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). Whether a lender owes a 

duty of care to a borrower in the loan modification context is unsettled, and there is a split in 

authority among California courts. See, e.g., Jolley v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 213 Cal. App. 4th 

872, 901 (2013) (“Nymark does not support the sweeping conclusion that a lender never owes a 

duty of care to a borrower.”); compare Alvarez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, 228 Cal. App. 4th 

941, 945 (2014) (finding facts sufficient to allege claim for negligence claim); with Lueras v. BAC 

Home Loans Servicing, LLP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 62 (2013). Courts within this district also have 

reach different conclusions on this issue. Compare Carbajal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 14-

cv-7851-PSG, 2015 WL 2454054, at *4-7 (N.D. Cal. April 10, 2015) (finding no duty) with 

Rijhwani v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., No. 13-cv-05881-LB, 2014 WL 890016, at *17 

(N.D Cal. Mar. 3, 2014) (finding plaintiffs’ stated claim for negligence based on allegations that 

defendant tricked them into defaulting on a loan and instructed them to ignore notices, while the 

defendant sold their home at a foreclosure sale) 

Some courts have balanced the following six factors: (1) the extent to which the 

transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) 

the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection 

between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the 

defendant’s conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future harm. Nymark, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 

1098 (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 649-50 (1958)). In cases where courts have found 

a plaintiff stated a claim for negligence, the allegations showed that a defendant did more than 

deny a request to modify a loan. Rather, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants mishandled 

documents or engaged in some other form of misconduct. See, e.g., Alvarez, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 

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945 (plaintiff alleged that defendants relied on inaccurate information about plaintiff’s income and 

alleged defendants falsely advised him that documents had not been submitted); Rijhwani, 2014 

WL 890016, at *17 (plaintiffs alleged that the defendant tricked them into defaulting on a loan and 

instructed them to ignore notices, while the defendant sold their home at a foreclosure sale); 

Shapiro v. Sage Point Lender Servs., No. EDCV 14-1591-JGB, 2014 WL 5419721, at *9 (C.D. 

Cal. Oct. 24, 2014) (plaintiff alleged that defendant provided contradictory information about 

status of application and that defendant advised him application had been received but denied 

application on basis that documents were missing); cf. Lueras, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 68 (“a lender 

does owe a duty to a borrower to not make material misrepresentations about the status of an 

application for a loan modification or about the date, time, or status of a foreclosure sale.”).

 Here, contrary to Defendants’ arguments, the Aquinos do not allege that Defendants owed 

them a duty to approve their loan modification. Rather, they allege that Defendants agreed to 

review their application for a loan modification and, having agreed to do so, owed them a duty to 

review it with reasonable care. However, the Court concludes that the Aquinos have not alleged 

sufficient facts to bring the allegations in line with cases such as Alvarez, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 945 

and Rijhwani, 2014 WL 890016, at *17. First, the Aquinos simply state that the various 

statements in paragraph 28 were false, but do not identify how they were false. Therefore, they 

have not alleged facts showing that the Defendants made any material misrepresentations to them.3 

In addition, they do not include any facts to support the allegations that the Defendants relied on 

incorrect information when they conducted the loan review. 

 Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to dismiss the negligence claim. Because the 

Court cannot say it would be a futile act, the Court will grant the Aquinos leave to amend this 

claim. 

C. The Court Dismisses the Claim for Injunctive Relief. 

The Aquinos also seek relief under Section 2924.12, which provides, in pertinent part, that 

 

3

 In addition, as Defendants note, the Settlement Agreement provides that Defendants would 

not undertake a HAMP modification review, because the unpaid principal balance on the loan 

exceeded the maximum principal balance set by HAMP guidelines. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 3.4, 

& at p.2, n.1.) 

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“[i]f a trustee’s deed upon sale has not been recorded, a borrower may bring an action for 

injunctive relief to enjoin a material violation of” various provisions of the Civil Code. Cal. Civ. 

Code § 2924.12(a). The Aquinos contend that they are entitled to injunctive relief, because 

Defendants’ conduct is a material violation of Section 2923.6(a). (Compl. ¶ 41.) 

Section 2923.6(a) provides, in part, that “any duty that mortgage servicers may have to 

maximize net present value under their pooling and servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a 

loan pool, or to all investors under a pooling and servicing agreement, ... , and ... a mortgage 

servicer acts in the best interests of all parties to the loan pool or investors in the pooling and 

servicing agreement if it agrees to or implements a loan modification or workout plan for which 

both of the following apply: (1) The loan is in payment default, or payment default is reasonably 

foreseeable. (2) Anticipated recovery under the loan modification or workout plan exceeds the 

anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net present value basis.” 

Section 2924.12(a) clearly gives the Aquinos a right to sue for injunctive relief based on 

material violations of Section 2923.6. In this case, it is evident the Aquino’s loan is in default and 

a trustee’s deed of sale has not been recorded. However there are no facts in the Complaint that 

support the assertion that Defendants materially violated Section 2923.6(a). 

Defendants argue the Aquinos could never make such a claim, because numerous courts 

have held that there is no private right of action for borrowers under Section 2923.6(a), and that 

Section 2923.6(b) does not impose an obligation on lenders or servicers to offer a borrower a loan 

modification. See, e.g., Rockridge Trust v. Wells Fargo, N.A. 985 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1154 (N.D. 

Cal. 2013); Roberts v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 09-cv-01855-LHK, 2011 WL 964949, at 

* 4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011); Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 

1188 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Mabry v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 222 (2010) (“[S]ection 

2923.6 “does not operate substantively. Section 2923.6 merely expresses the hope that lenders 

will offer loan modifications on certain terms.”) (emphasis in original). However, in those cases, 

it appears that the plaintiffs were seeking relief for direct violations of Section 2923.6, rather than 

attempting to state a claim for relief under Section 2924.12(a). 

Section 2924.12 provides that a borrower may bring an action for a material violation of 

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Section 2923.6, and, as it is currently drafted, the statute does not carve out any exceptions for 

subsections (a) and (b) of Section 2923.6. 4 Thus, it is possible that Section 2924.12(a) could be 

construed as courts have construed California Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et 

seq., by which a plaintiff may bring a claim based on unlawful conduct, even if the underlying law 

does not provide for a private right of action. See, e.g., Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 

225 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000); Matoff v. Brinker Rest. Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1038 

(C.D. Cal. 2006). The Court concludes that the parties have not adequately briefed this issue and, 

thus, it cannot determine on the existing record that it would be futile to grant the Aquinos leave to 

amend this claim. 

Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to dismiss the claim for violations of Section 

2924.12, based on the alleged violations of Section 2923.6(a), with leave to amend. In addition, 

the Aquinos can, in good faith and in compliance with their obligations under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure Rule 11 (“Rule 11”), allege facts that may show a material violation of a different 

provision of the Civil Code enumerated in Section 2924.12(a), they may include such a claim in 

the amended complaint permitted by this Order. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and it 

GRANTS the Aquinos leave to amend. Because the Court cannot say with certainty that it would 

be a futile act, and assuming the Aquinos can do so in good faith in in compliance with their 

obligations under Rule 11, the Court also shall grant the Aquinos leave to include claims for 

intentional and negligence misrepresentation as well as a claim for breach of the implied covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing. 

The Aquinos shall file and serve a first amended complaint by no later than February 19, 

2016. Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond twenty-one days after service of the first 

amended complaint. 

 

4

 However, the version of Section 2924.12, which will become effective on January 1, 2018, 

omits any reference to Section 2923.6, and Section 2923.6 will be amended to delete all but 

subsections (a) and (b). 

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