Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01659/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01659-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Matthew Lazzell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV10-1659-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s application for 

supplemental security income, finding Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the 

Social Security Act. Tr. 23-34. This decision became Defendant’s final decision when 

the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1-3. Plaintiff then brought an action for judicial 

review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 1. The Court reversed Defendant’s decision 

and remanded for an award of benefits. Doc. 26. 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to 

Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Doc. 28. The motion is fully briefed. 

Docs. 28-31, 34. Neither party has requested oral argument. For the reasons that follow, 

the Court will grant the motion and award Plaintiff fees in the amount of $5,140.98. 

 The EAJA “authorizes federal courts to award attorneys’ fees, court costs, and 

other expenses when a party prevails against the United States, although fee-shifting is 

not mandatory.” Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff is a 

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prevailing party because the Court remanded for an award of benefits. See Gutierrez v. 

Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court should award reasonable 

attorneys’ fees under the EAJA unless Defendant shows that his position in this case was 

“substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 

 Defendant does not contend that an award of fees in this case would be unjust. 

Instead, Defendant argues that denial of benefits was “substantially justified.” Doc. 31, 

at 1. To determine if the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified, the Court 

must focus on the reasonableness of that position in this court and consider any 

procedural issues that led to remand. See Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1085 

(9th Cir. 2002); Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1995); Hardisty, 592 F.3d 

1072, 1079 (declining to extend the EAJA to require review of issues raised by the 

plaintiff but not addressed by the district court). To meet the “substantially justified” 

standard, Defendant’s position need not be “justified to a high degree.” Pierce v. 

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Rather, it need only be “‘justified in substance or 

in the main’ – that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Id. 

Here, the ALJ committed a fundamental procedural error by improperly rejecting 

the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Benjamin, without setting forth “specific, 

legitimate reasons for doing so.” Doc. 26, at 3-4 (quoting Embrey v. Bowen, 

849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988)). The only reason the ALJ gave for rejecting Dr. 

Benjamin’s opinions was that they were “not consistent with the weight of the evidence 

record.” Tr. 32. This Circuit has made clear that “conclusory reasons will not justify an 

ALJ’s rejection of a medical opinion” and that the ALJ must set forth its own 

“interpretations and explain why they, rather than [the treating physician’s], are correct.” 

Doc. 26, at 4 (quoting Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 116 F.3d 1294, 1299 

(9th Cir. 1999); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007)). The Court found the 

ALJ’s actions to be “clearly erroneous.” Doc. 26, at 4. “It follows a fortiori the 

government’s defense of the ALJ’s procedural errors was not substantially justified . . . .” 

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Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 The EAJA provides for an upward adjustment of the $125 per hour rate contained 

in the statute, based on cost-of-living increases. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); see

Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendant does not 

dispute Plaintiff’s submitted hourly rate of $175.06 for the 18.6 hours of work performed 

in 2010 or an hourly rate of $179.51 for the 10.5 hours of work performed in 2011. 

Doc. 31, at 14-15; Doc. 30-1, at 2. 

 In addition to the cost-of-living adjustment, Plaintiff asks for a fee enhancement. 

The EAJA allows upward adjustments of the hourly rate for special factors, including 

“the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved . . . .” 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The Ninth Circuit has established a test to determine whether 

enhanced hourly rates may be awarded based on this special factor. “Enhanced hourly 

rates based on the special factor of the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the 

proceedings involved may be awarded under EAJA where the attorneys possess 

‘distinctive knowledge’ and ‘specialized skill’ that was ‘needful to the litigation in 

question’ and ‘not available elsewhere at the statutory rate.’” Nadarajah v. Holder, 

569 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 

 Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing entitlement to higher fees. 

See Natural Res. Def. Council Inc. v. Winter, 543 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff advances the following reasons for a fee enhancement: “Plaintiff’s attorney’s 

work on this case was completed in a timely and efficient manner, requiring substantially 

less time than required by less experienced practitioners in Social Security cases”; 

“Plaintiff’s attorney brought considerable experience to bear in efforts to advance 

Plaintiff’s case”; and “Plaintiff’s counsel faced daunting odds.” Doc. 29, at 7, 10. These 

reasons are insufficient. Plaintiff cites Pirus v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989), as 

an instance where the Ninth Circuit awarded enhanced EAJA fees. Doc. 29, at 9, n.11. 

Pirus is distinguishable because it involved a class action challenging provisions of the 

Social Security Act, whereas the present case is a routine social security disability case. 

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Other Courts of Appeals have held that routine disability law is not a specialized area 

warranting an enhanced rate. See, e.g., Raines v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 1355, 1361 

(7th Cir. 1995) (holding “that the area of social security law cannot in itself be considered 

such a specialized area of law practice as to warrant, as a general rule, payment in excess 

of the [statutory] rate”); Stockton v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 49, 50 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing 

enhancement for an attorney’s expertise in a “straightforward social security disability 

case that did not involve particularly difficult or complex issues”); Harris v. Railroad 

Ret. Bd., 990 F.2d 519, 521 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that “a Social Security specialist 

does not solely by virtue of that expertise fall under the ‘special factor’ exception”). 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected “work and ability of counsel” 

and “the results obtained” as reasons for fee enhancement, noting that “they are little 

more than routine reasons why market rates are what they are.” Underwood, 487 U.S. 

at 573; see also Natural Res. Def. Council, 543 F.3d at 1160 (“‘Producing high-quality 

work on a short deadline hardly satisfies th[e] standard’ in Pierce of ‘work requiring 

specialized skills or knowledge beyond what lawyers use on a regular basis.’”) (citing 

Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). In sum, Plaintiff has 

not met his burden of showing that his attorney’s distinctive knowledge and specialized 

skill were needful to the litigation, and a fee enhancement on this basis is not warranted. 

 The fee agreement between Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel provides that any 

EAJA fees are assigned to the counsel. Doc. 29-1, at 1. Defendant does not oppose 

Plaintiff’s request that the fees be mailed to Plaintiff’s counsel’s office (Doc. 29, at 11), 

but does oppose Plaintiff’s proposed order (Doc. 28-1) stating that any fee award “is 

assigned to Plaintiff’s counsel.” Doc. 31, at 12. The Court agrees with Defendant that 

such an assignment would violate 31 U.S.C. § 3727, which provides that a transfer or 

assignment of any part of a claim against the United States Government “may be made 

only after a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided, and a warrant for 

payment of the claim has been issued. The assignment shall specify the warrant, must be 

made freely, and must be attested to by 2 witnesses.” 31 U.S.C. § 3727(b). Plaintiff’s 

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assignment was executed on August 17, 2010, well before any EAJA claim was allowed 

or the amount decided. The Court will not order that the fees be assigned to Plaintiff’s 

counsel. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees (Doc. 28) is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff is awarded $5,140.98 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 

28 U.S.C. § 2412. 

 Dated this 30th day of November, 2011. 

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