Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02359/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02359-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:0227(b)(3) Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER J. REICHMAN, 

Individually and on Behalf of All 

Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 16-cv-2359 DMS (JLB)

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EARLY SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

POSHMARK, INC., a Delaware 

Corporation,

Defendant.

This case comes before the Court on Defendant Poshmark, Inc.’s motion for 

early summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The 

motion came on for hearing on May 5, 2017. David C. Beavans appeared for

Plaintiff, and Laura Alexandra Stoll appeared for Defendant. After considering the 

parties’ briefs, oral argument, the relevant legal authority, and the record, 

Defendant’s motion is granted. 

/ / /

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I.

BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of Plaintiff Christopher J. Reichman’s receipt of two 

text messages containing an invitation to register with Poshmark. Defendant

Psohmark operates a mobile application (“app”) that provides users with a platform 

to sell and purchase used clothing and accessories. (First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”) ¶¶ 7–9.) Users can use the app to list their goods for sale by creating an 

online “closet” and uploading pictures of the items from their mobile devices. (Id.

¶¶ 7, 10–11.) Users can also purchase goods from other users’ closets on their 

mobile devices by using the app. (Id.) Like many other apps, Defendant’s app 

allows users to invite their “contacts” to join Poshmark by text message or other 

means.

1

Plaintiff’s former client, Tricia Tolentino, is a registered user on Poshmark,

with over 14,000 users “following” her closet. (Declaration of John McDonald 

(“McDonald Decl.”) ¶¶ 20, 28.) On January 18, 2015, Ms. Tolentino accessed the 

app and listed several clothing items for sale. (Id. ¶ 21.) Afterwards, she navigated 

to the “Find People” page, which provided her with three options to find her contacts: 

(1) from her contact list stored on her mobile device, (2) from her Facebook account, 

and (3) from her Twitter account. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 22.) Ms. Tolentino selected the first 

option.2

 (Id. ¶ 22.) She was then brought to a screen displaying a list of her contacts, 

including those who have yet to register with Poshmark. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 22.) Displayed 

below each of those contact’s name was his or her phone number or e-mail address.3

 

 1 Contacts include individuals in the users’ list of contacts on their phone or those 

connected to users on social media, such as Facebook and Twitter.

2 Ms. Tolentino previously granted Defendant permission to access her contact list. 

(McDonald Decl. ¶ 12 n.4.)

3 Whether an e-mail address or a phone number was displayed depended upon the

method of contact saved in Ms. Tolentino’s contact list for each individual. 

(McDonald Decl. ¶ 14.)

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(Id. ¶ 14.) On this screen, Ms. Tolentino was provided with two options to invite 

her contacts to join Poshmark: (1) selecting the “Invite All” button to send an invite 

to everyone in her contact list, or (2) individually selecting an invitation button next 

to each contact’s name. (Id. ¶ 15.) Ms. Tolentino chose to send an invitation to all 

of her contacts by selecting the “Invite All” button. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 22.) As a result, 

invitational messages were sent to the invitees according to the contact method 

displayed under their names.4

 (Id. ¶¶ 16, 22.) Because Ms. Tolentino had saved 

Plaintiff’s phone number in her contact list, Plaintiff received a text message, which 

contained an invitation “to view and buy the wares now being sold through 

POSHMARK” and a link to Ms. Tolentino’s closet.

5

 (FAC ¶ 14; Declaration of 

Christopher J. Reichman (“Reichman Decl.”) ¶ 3.) On January 25, 2015, Ms. 

Tolentino again access the app and selected the “Invite All” button, which caused 

Plaintiff to receive another text message. (Reichman Decl. ¶ 5.)

Based on the receipt of two text messages, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated 

the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 

Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of “[a]ll persons and entities located within the 

United States of America to whose mobile phones POSHMARK and/or its agents 

transmitted a text message without prior express written consent anytime from 

September 15, 2012, to the present.” (FAC ¶¶ 6, 36.) Defendant now moves for 

summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of 

§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) because Defendant did not “make” the invitational text message.

/ / /

 4 Within minutes of sending the invitational messages, two of Ms. Tolentino’s

contacts accepted her invitation and joined Poshmark. (McDonald Decl. ¶ 22.) Each 

time Ms. Tolentino received a notice that her contacts had joined Poshmark, she 

“followed” them on the app. (Id.) 5 In addition to the invitational messages sent on January 18 and 25, 2015, Ms. 

Tolentino sent invitational messages to 110 individually selected contacts on January 

19, 2015 and to one contact on May 8, 2015. (McDonald Decl. ¶¶ 24, 29.)

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II.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is 

proper. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party 

must identify the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, or other evidence that it 

“believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “A material issue of fact is one that 

affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties’

differing versions of the truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th 

Cir. 1982).

The burden then shifts to the opposing party to show that summary judgment 

is not appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The opposing party’s evidence is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, to avoid summary 

judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v. 

Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, it must designate specific 

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; see also Butler v. San Diego 

Dist. Attorney’s Office, 370 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating if defendant 

produces enough evidence to require plaintiff to go beyond pleadings, plaintiff must 

counter by producing evidence of his own). More than a “metaphysical doubt” is 

required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

B. TCPA Claim

Defendant contends it cannot be liable under the TCPA because Plaintiff 

cannot establish it made the calls, i.e., that Defendant sent the challenged text 

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messages. The TCPA makes it unlawful “to make any call (other than a call ... made 

with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone 

dialing system ... to any telephone number assigned to a ... cellular telephone 

service[.]” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). A text message is a “call” within the 

meaning of the TCPA. Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th 

Cir. 2009). The TCPA, however, does not define the term “to make any call[.]” 

Congress has delegated to the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)

the authority to make rules and regulations to implement the TCPA. Satterfield, 569 

F.3d at 953 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)). Pursuant to this authority, the FCC issued 

a Declaratory Ruling and Order, providing guidance for determining who makes or 

initiates a call, in light of the “changes in calling technology.” See In the Matter of 

Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30 FCC 

Rcd. 7961, 7978–84 (2015) (“FCC Order”). In determining whether an app or its 

user is the maker of a call, the FCC explained that it looks to “the totality of the facts 

and circumstances surrounding the placing of a particular call to determine: 1) who 

took the steps necessary to physically place the call; and 2) whether another person 

or entity was so involved in placing the call as to be deemed to have initiated it, 

considering the goals and purposes of the TCPA.” Id. at 7980. Because the TCPA 

does not define the term “to make any call” and the FCC’s interpretation of the 

TCPA is reasonable, the Court uses the FCC Order to inform its analysis. See 

Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 953; see also Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847

F.3d 1037, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding reasonable the FCC’s interpretation of the 

TCPA in the 2015 FCC Order). 

Of particular relevance to this case, the FCC determined whether two app 

providers, Glide and TextMe, “make” calls for purposes of the TCPA. The FCC 

used Glide to illustrate when an app provider is a maker of a call. Glide was a video 

messaging service that automatically sent “invitational texts of its own choosing to 

every contact in the app user’s contact list” unless the user affirmatively opted out. 

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FCC Order at 7982–83. The FCC found “the app user plays no discernible role in 

deciding whether to send the invitational text messages, to whom to send them, or 

what to say in them.” Id. at 7983. Given these facts, the FCC concluded “Glide 

makes or initiates the invitational text messages by taking the steps physically 

necessary to send each invitational text message or, at a minimum, is so involved in 

doing so as to be deemed to have made or initiated them.” Id. 

In contrast, the FCC reached the opposite conclusion with TextMe. Unlike 

Glide, users had to take several affirmative steps for TextMe to send invitational text 

messages. Users had to “(1) tap a button that reads ‘invite your friends’; (2) choose 

whether to ‘invite all their friends or [] individually select contacts’; and (3) choose 

to send the invitational text message by selecting another button.” FCC Order at 

7983–84. Although the FCC expressed concern that TextMe controlled the content 

of the messages, the affirmative choices by users led the FCC to conclude the user, 

not TextMe, was the maker of the text message. Id. at 7984. The FCC reasoned 

“the app user’s actions and choices effectively program the cloud-based dialer to 

such an extent that he or she is so involved in the making of the call as to be deemed 

the initiator of the call.” Id.

Defendant argues its app functions just like TextMe, and therefore, Ms. 

Tolentino made the calls within the meaning of the TCPA. In support, Defendant 

has offered evidence that, as was the case with TextMe, it requires users to take 

affirmative steps to determine whether to invite a contact, to whom to send an 

invitational message, and when that invitational message is sent. For example, Ms. 

Tolentino caused a text message to be sent to Plaintiff by (1) granting the app 

permission to access her contact list, (2) tapping on the “Find People” button, (3) 

choosing the “Find friends from your contacts” option, (4) determining whether to 

invite all her contacts or select contacts, and (5) choosing to send the invitational 

message by selecting the “Invite All” button. Based on these affirmative steps, it is 

apparent Ms. Tolentino, not Defendant, took the action necessary to send the text 

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messages. Had Ms. Tolentino decided not to take any of these steps, a text message 

would not have been sent to Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff has not offered any evidence in dispute, and in fact, does not appear 

to dispute Defendant’s showing as to the affirmative steps users must take to cause 

invitational messages to be sent. Rather, Plaintiff argues there are genuine issues of 

material fact that preclude summary judgment, such as whether Defendant 

adequately informed its users of the method in which invitational messages will be 

sent. Defendant, however, has offered evidence demonstrating that the app indicates 

to users whether invitees will receive the invitational message by text or e-mail. 

Under each contact’s name, either a telephone number or an e-mail address appears 

based on the method of contact saved in the user’s contact list. As a result, it is 

apparent to users that if they decide to invite a contact whose telephone number 

appears, then an invitation will be sent by text message rather than by e-mail. In any 

event, whether Defendant informed its users regarding the method of invitation (text 

or e-mail) is not material to determining who “makes” a call under the TCPA. “The 

goal of the TCPA is to prevent invasion of privacy, and the person who chooses to 

send an unwanted invitation is responsible for invading the recipient’s privacy even 

if that person does not know how the invitation will be sent.” Cour v. Life360, Inc., 

No. 16-CV-00805-TEH, 2016 WL 4039279, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2016) (internal 

citation omitted).

Plaintiff further argues summary judgment is not appropriate because whether 

Defendant “had ‘knowledge’ that Tolentino was violating the TCPA” is a genuine 

issue of material fact that “can only be determined by [the] finder of fact.” (Mem. 

of P. & A. in Opp’n to Mot. at 22.) In support, Plaintiff relies on a portion of the 

FCC Order stating, “whether a person who offers a calling platform service for the 

use of others has knowingly allowed its client(s) to use that platform for unlawful 

purposes may also be a factor in determining whether the platform provider is so 

involved in placing the calls as to be deemed to have initiated them.” FCC Order at 

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7980–81. The FCC explained this factor applies when a platform provider is notified 

“that its service is being used unlawfully by its clients and ... then allows such usage 

to continue after this warning.” Id. at 7981 n.110. In such a situation, the Court 

considers “the fact that the platform provider allowed such usage to continue after 

having actual notice of the unlawful activity to be a possible indicator that the 

platform provider is actively participating in the making or initiating of the calls at 

issue.” Id. Here, however, the undisputed record demonstrates the platform 

designed by Defendant requires the user to navigate a number of prompts to 

“effectively program the cloud-based dialer to such an extent that he or she is so 

involved in the making of the call as to be deemed the initiator of the call.” FCC 

Order at 7984. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations to the contrary are therefore

insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

Based on the undisputed record, the Court finds that Ms. Tolentino, not 

Defendant, made the calls within the meaning of the TCPA. Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment is therefore granted.

C. Rule 56(d) Request

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) “provides a device for litigants to avoid 

summary judgment when they have not had sufficient time to develop affirmative 

evidence.” Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck 

Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). If a party 

opposing summary judgment “shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified 

reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) 

defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or 

declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(d). To satisfy Rule 56(d), the requesting party “must show: (1) it has set 

forth in affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) 

the facts sought exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to oppose summary 

judgment.” Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 

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F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th 

Cir. 1998)); see Garrett v. City and Cty. of S.F., 818 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(“a party opposing summary judgment must make clear ‘what information is sought 

and how it would preclude summary judgment.’”) (quoting Margolis v. Ryan, 140 

F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Failure to comply with these requirements ‘is a 

proper ground for denying discovery and proceeding to summary judgment.’”

Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc., 525 F.3d at 827 (quoting Brae Transp., Inc. v. 

Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Initially, Plaintiff argues his Rule 56(d) request should be granted because the 

pending motion was brought before he had a “‘realistic opportunity’ to conduct 

discovery.” (Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to Mot. at 12–13.) In support, Plaintiff 

relies on Burlington, where the Ninth Circuit found the district court abused its 

discretion by granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment without first 

allowing the defendant to conduct discovery under Rule 56(d). 323 F.3d at 774–75. 

The plaintiff in Burlington filed suit and moved for summary judgment less than one 

month after filing suit, before any discovery was conducted. Id. at 773. Unlike in 

Burlington, Defendant brought the pending motion approximately six months after 

the filing of the Complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff was afforded adequate opportunity 

to develop discovery to oppose the instant motion. Indeed, Magistrate Judge 

Burkhart actively managed discovery pertaining to the “maker” issue after 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied and before it was permitted to file the 

present motion. Therefore, Plaintiff’s reliance on Burlington is misplaced.

In the declaration filed in support of opposing the motion, Plaintiff contends

he believes there remains undiscovered facts that are essential to the oppose 

summary judgment, which include the following: (1) ownership of the telephone 

numbers (650) 241-4364 and (650) 249-4822, which transmitted the invitational text 

messages to Plaintiff, (2) documents showing “Defendant has knowledge that the 

texts transmitted through their application were in fact unlawful violations of the 

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TCPA and the Defendant continued to transmit these text messages or allow the text 

messages to be transmitted[,]” (3) documents showing “Defendant willfully did not 

inform any of its users that the user could be violating the TCPA by sending 

invitations to friends[,]” (4) documents showing “the level of involvement of 

Twilio[, a third party,] in transmitting spamvite text messages[,]” (5) 

“documentation of the phone call between representatives of Defendant and Ms. 

Tolentino[,]” (6) documents showing “what happens when a client of Defendant uses 

the ‘Invite All’ button[,]” (7) documentation showing “how the selection of an email 

or phone number being placed under a contract’s name in the app is conducted[,]”

and (8) “a log of what information and documents they are withholding based on 

confidentiality of third party information and of their proprietary information.” 

(Declaration of David Beavans ¶¶ 41–50, 53–57, 59–62, 64–70.)

The declaration, however, does not satisfy Rule 56(d). Plaintiff does not 

explain whether the information sought exists, but merely speculates as to its

existence. Even if the requested information exists, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate 

how additional discovery would uncover facts necessary to defeat the motion. As 

Plaintiff acknowledges, the only issue in the present motion is whether Defendant 

made the calls within the meaning of the TCPA. Plaintiff fails to show how the 

requested information is necessary to determine the extent of the app user’s 

involvement in sending text messages. Because Plaintiff has not met his burden, he 

is not entitled to a continuance to conduct additional discovery under Rule 56(d). 

/ / /

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III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 15, 2017

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