Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00161/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00161-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID LASIC, JR., an

individual,

2:05-cv-0161-MCE-JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DANA MORENO; UNITED STATES

POSTAL SERVICE;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; and

DOES 1 through 10 inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff David Lasic, Jr.

alleges his civil rights were violated when he was seized and

maliciously prosecuted by Defendant Dana Moreno (“Moreno”) and

Defendant United States of America in violation of the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant Moreno is

now moving for Summary Judgment as to all claims against her.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Moreno’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

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BACKGROUND

The events giving rise to the present action occurred while

Plaintiff David Lasic, Jr. (“Lasic”) was acting as a manager for

the United States Postal Service. It was in that capacity that

Lasic first interacted with Defendant Dana Moreno, a United

States Postal Service Inspector (“Moreno”). Moreno became

engaged in an investigation of one of Lasic’s subordinates, Jay

Austin (“Austin”). During the course of that investigation,

Moreno requested copies of certain invoices relevant to the

Austin case. Initially, Moreno sought the documents from Lasic.

Sometime thereafter, contention arose between Moreno and Lasic

with respect to the Austin investigation and Moreno began

requesting information and documents from one of Lasic’s

investigators, Wes Lilly. After one particular conversation

between Moreno and Lilly, Lasic directed that Lilly “should not

speak with Moreno or action will be taken against [Lilly].” This

comment was recorded by Lilly on his desktop calendar and

overheard by a co-worker, Barry Ward (“Ward”). Later, two

similar directives were made to Lilly that he should not be in

contact with Moreno.

While the exchanges between Lasic and Lilly seemed to imply

Lasic was impeding Moreno in conducting her investigation, Lasic

was simultaneously sending Moreno emails pledging his full

cooperation. Despite these emails, Moreno advanced her

recommendation to the United State’s Attorney’s Office (“USAO”)

that Lasic be charged with obstruction of justice.

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Moreno alleges her decision to recommend prosecution was based

both on the threat recorded on Lilly’s calendar and eye witness

testimony of that threat provided by Lilly’s co-worker, Ward.

The USAO adopted Moreno’s recommendation to prosecute Lasic

but elected to charge him with witness tampering rather than the

obstruction of justice charge suggested by Moreno. Assistant

United States Attorneys (“AUSA”) Samantha Spangler (“Spangler”)

and Andrew Cheng (“Cheng”) were assigned the Lasic case. In

turn, Spangler and Cheng delegated the matter to certified law

student, Kristin Odom (“Odom”) under their direct supervision.

There is evidence in the record that Moreno was not as

candid with the results of her investigation as is generally

expected from a Postal Service Investigator. In fact, the

Parties concede that the emails pledging Lasic’s cooperation were

not produced during the preparation of the trial. Instead, those

emails were only discovered days before the trial was to begin. 

Nonetheless, Spangler and Cheng chose not to drop the charges

but, rather, proceeded to bring the witness tampering charge to

trial. Ultimately, the jury acquitted Mr. Lasic of all charges. 

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of

factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Twp. of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323(quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

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In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20

L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

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6

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

1. Biven’s Action for Malicious Prosecution

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for

damages against federal officials who violate constitutional or

statutory rights under color of federal law. 403 U.S. 388

(1971). Plaintiff is here seeking redress for malicious

prosecution under the authority of Bivens. In order “to

establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution of either a

criminal or civil proceeding, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘that

the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the

defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his,

plaintiff's, favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and

(3) was initiated with malice.’” Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert &

Oliker, 47 Cal.3d 863, 871, 254 Cal. Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498

(1989). 

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While proof of the foregoing constitutes a prima facie case of

malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must first overcome the

presumption that the prosecutor exercised independent judgment in

prosecuting the criminal charge. In the event a plaintiff fails

to rebut this presumption, summary judgment is appropriate. 

Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A. Prosecutorial Immunity

The Ninth Circuit has long recognized that “[f]iling a

criminal complaint immunizes investigating officers ... from

damages suffered thereafter because it is presumed that the

prosecutor filing the complaint exercised independent judgment in

determining that probable cause for an accused’s arrest exists at

that time.” Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1981)

(Smiddy I). The plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence

to rebut such presumption. Newman v. County of Orange, 457 F.3d

991, 993-995 (9th Cir. 2006).

The prosecutorial presumption of independent judgment was

first identified in Smiddy I. 665 F.2d at 266. In that case, an

individual cleared of a murder charge brought suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers responsible for his arrest. 

Smiddy I, 665 F.2d at 263-64. The Smiddy jury found for the

plaintiff and the officers appealed, claiming that they were not

liable for damages suffered after the formal complaint was filed. 

Id. at 266. The Ninth Circuit agreed and created a rebuttable

presumption that a prosecutor exercises independent judgment in

deciding to file charges.

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The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent

with the presumption approach.

On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in

favor of the plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit again reversed holding

that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of rebutting the

presumption. Smiddy II, 803 F.2d at 1471. (Smiddy II). The

court found that the plaintiff failed to produced evidence “that

the district attorney was subjected to unreasonable pressure by

the police officers, or that the officers knowingly withheld

relevant information with the intent to harm [him], or that the

officers knowingly supplied false information.” Id. The court

further held that “the presumption was sufficient to require

summary judgment” for the defendant officers. Id.

In considering the types of evidence necessary to overcome

the presumption, the Ninth Circuit has explained that when a

prosecutor bases her decision to prosecute solely on the

information contained in the investigating officers’ reports,

striking omissions and conflicting stories will entitle the jury

to find that the complaint was procured by misrepresentation. 

Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1988). In

such cases, the plaintiff can be said to have properly rebutted

the presumption of independent judgment. Id.

In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that a

plaintiff’s account of the incident in question, by itself, does

not overcome the presumption of independent judgment. Sloman v.

Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994).

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In essence, to overcome the presumption of independent judgment,

a plaintiff must show that the prosecutor was subjected to

unreasonable pressure by the investigating officer, or that the

officer knowingly withheld relevant information with the intent

to harm the plaintiff, or that the officer knowingly supplied

false information. Smiddy II, 803 F.2d at 1471. When a

plaintiff can provide no evidence of the foregoing, summary

judgment for the defendant is appropriate. Id.

In the present action, Plaintiff contends that summary

judgment is inappropriate as Moreno withheld the material

evidence of Lasic’s pledge to cooperate when she did not timely

produce the emails memorializing that pledge. As an initial

matter, the emails in question were, in fact, produced in advance

of the initiation of trial. Consequently, it cannot be said that

prosecutors did not have all the information relevant to their

decision to proceed. More importantly, the emails contained

evidence relevant to whether an obstruction of justice charge

would be appropriate. The emails did not resolve whether Lasic

was tampering with a witness in a federal investigation. Lasic’s

email pledge to cooperate in the investigation could quite

comfortably coexist with his directive that Lilly not cooperate

in the investigation. While the Court clearly agrees that Moreno

was not as forthcoming as she should have been, the Court

nonetheless finds that lack of candor insufficient to render the

independent judgment of the prosecutors null.

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In addition, the prosecutor in this case did not rely solely

on the report prepared by Moreno. Rather, certified law student

Odom interviewed witnesses and gathered evidence to support the

prosecution independent of Moreno’s submitted evidence. In cases

where a prosecutor relies solely on the investigator’s report and

that report contains false information or omits relevant

information in a manner calculated to produce injury to the

accused, the Court can look to the investigating officer as the

cause of the prosecutor’s decision. Unlike that case, here

Moreno’s report was but one piece of evidence used by prosecutors

to determine whether to proceed. This further gathering of

independent information fortifies the independence of the

prosecutor’s decision in bringing the case to trial. The report,

together with other relevant evidence, was reviewed by persons

presumably learned in the law and employed to review such reports

for adequacy and probability of success on the merits. Smiddy

II, 803 F.2d at 1472. 

Here, like in Smiddy I and II, the record before the trial

court contained no evidence that the investigation was performed

in a manner that excused the prosecutors from the duty to screen

the case. The prosecutors did screen the case and independently

concluded it should go to trial. Accordingly, the Court

concludes that Moreno is insulated from liability based on the

AUSA’s independent judgment to prosecute.

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B. Probable Cause

Plaintiff also argues that Moreno’s animus requires this

Court to consider whether probable cause existed at the time

prosecutors elected to file charges against Lasic. Plaintiff

raises this argument by relying on a very recent Supreme Court

case entitled Hartman v. Moore. 126 S. Ct. 1695. In Hartman,

the Court was considering whether a showing of probable cause

should be required in seeking to establish the constitutional

tort of retaliatory prosecution. The specific question at issue

in Hartman involved the chain of causation from animus to injury

in cases of retaliatory prosecution.

The present action seeks redress for the common law tort of

malicious prosecution. Both the constitutional tort of

retaliatory prosecution as well as the common law tort of

malicious prosecution raise concern about the causal link between

the investigator’s actions and the ultimate prosecution of the

Plaintiff. In Hartman, the Court elected to require proof that

the prosecution lacked probable cause to bridge the causal gap as

well as rebut the presumption of regularity. In cases of

malicious prosecution, probable cause is an element of the tort,

however, the existence or lack of probable cause has never been

required to rebut the presumption of regularity.

The Court will reserve judgment on the effect of the Hartman

decision on the common law tort of malicious prosecution, for

even on a pragmatic level, Plaintiff’s argument fails as the

Court finds that probable cause did exist in Plaintiff’s

prosecution.

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As an initial matter, California has adopted a definition of

the probable cause element of malicious prosecution that the

California Supreme Court has characterized as a “rather lenient

standard for bringing a civil action.” Wilson v. Parker, 28 Cal.

4th 811, 817 (Cal. 2002) (citations and internal quotations

omitted). Under California’s test, probable cause is satisfied

as long as “any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim

tenable.” Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863,

886 (Cal. 1989).

The issue of probable cause is always one for the court to

decide, and “resolution of that question of law calls for the

application of an objective standard to the facts on which the

[malicious prosecution] defendant acted.” Id. at 878. Only

those actions that “any reasonable attorney would agree [are]

totally and completely without merit” may form the basis for a

malicious prosecution suit. Wilson, 28 Cal. 4th at 817

(citations and internal quotations omitted).

Here, both AUSA Spangler as well as AUSA Cheng agreed to

proceed forward with the prosecution even after the disclosure of

the allegedly exculpatory emails. Not only did one reasonable

attorney agree there was merit, but two agreed. Similarly, the

Court finds that the evidence existing in the form of Lilly’s

written notation regarding the alleged threat made by Plaintiff,

together with the testimony of corroborating witness Ward and

other extrinsic evidence supports the prosecution’s determination

that probable cause existed in this case.

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Accordingly, the Court finds that even in the event probable

cause were relevant to adjudicating the present issue, Plaintiff

would fail to meet his burden. Given the foregoing, the Court

need not address the Parties’ remaining arguments. Summary

Judgment in favor of Moreno is hereby granted. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth fully above, Moreno’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Given the previous settlement by the

United States of America and United States Postal Service, no

claims remain open for resolution by this Court. Accordingly, the

Clerk is directed to close this case and enter judgment in favor

of Moreno. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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