Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03870/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03870-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERNANDO G. LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SERGEANT CLOUS, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 13-3870 CRB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS 

Plaintiff Fernando Lopez has alleged that several Santa Clara County police officers

used excessive force against him during his arrest. See Summary Judgment Order (dkt. 35).

Defendants have moved to dismiss portions of Lopez’s First Amended Complaint, arguing

that it raises claims barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Motion (dkt. 58). For

the following reasons, the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral

argument under Civil Local Rule 7–1(b), agrees that Lopez’s claims against the County are

time-barred, and GRANTS the motion to dismiss as to those claims. 

Lopez filed his initial complaint pro se in August 2013. See Complaint (dkt. 1). 

Lopez subsequently obtained counsel, and the parties agreed to his filing a First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”). See FAC (dkt. 49). The FAC added Santa Clara County as a defendant

and brought failure to train and Monell causes of action against the County. See FAC at 3–4. 

Defendants move to dismiss these new claims against the County as time-barred, see Motion

(dkt. 58); Memorandum of Points and Authorities (dkt. 57), arguing that the applicable two

year statute of limitations has run. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir.

2004); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. 

Lopez responds that the claims against the County should “relate back” to the date

that Lopez filed his initial complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). He argues that although his

initial complaint did not name the County as a defendant, he sued the individual officers

Case 3:13-cv-03870-CRB Document 65 Filed 04/18/16 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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“individually and in their official capacities” and requested declaratory relief against those

officers’ “acts policies, and practices.” See Compl. at 4. Lopez argues that his

pleadings—construed liberally given that he was pro se at the time they were filed—placed

the County on notice that Lopez intended to bring Monell and failure to train claims against

it. See Opp’n (dkt. 62) at 4–5. Lopez’s arguments fail for the following reasons.

Although “we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are bound by the

rules of procedure.” See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Pena v. Gardner,

976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Oct. 9, 1992) (“[A] liberal interpretation of a [pro

se] civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially

pled.”). Lopez has not established under Rule 15(c) that the County “must or should have

known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought

against it.” See Butler v. Nat'l Cmty. Renaissance of California, 766 F.3d 1191, 1202 (9th

Cir. 2014). On the contrary, although Lopez named the Santa Clara County Police

Department as a defendant in an earlier state suit, he chose not to name the County or the

Police Department as a defendant in the action now before the Court. See Opp’n at 5. 

Furthermore, Lopez’s initial complaint did not challenge any specific County policies—it

exclusively addressed the actions of the named officers who he alleged used excessive force

against him during his arrest. See generally Complaint. The County thus had no reason to

know “that it would have been named as a defendant but for an error.” See Krupski v. Costa

Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 548 (2010).

The Court concludes that Lopez has not satisfied the requirements of Rule 15(c), his

claims against the County do not relate back to the filing of his initial complaint, and thus the

Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the claims outlined in Lopez’s second cause of action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2016 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:13-cv-03870-CRB Document 65 Filed 04/18/16 Page 2 of 2