Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-02217/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-02217-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

BERNADINE GOODEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:15-CV-2217-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Bernadine Gooden (“Ms. Gooden”), brings this action seeking judicial

review of a final adverse decision of the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance

benefits (“DIB”). Ms. Gooden filed an application for DIB on July 11, 2013.

Thereafter, Ms. Gooden timely pursued and exhausted the administrative remedies

available before the Commissioner. Accordingly, this case is now ripe for judicial

review pursuant to the provisions of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the

“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The sole function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the

FILED

 2016 Oct-12 PM 04:10

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:15-cv-02217-VEH Document 13 Filed 10/12/16 Page 1 of 18
Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal

standards were applied. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.

1983). To that end this court “must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if

the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”

Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. The court

has carefully reviewed the entire record in this case and is of the opinion that the

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and that proper legal

standards were applied in reaching that decision. Accordingly, the decision of the

Commissioner must be affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Gooden was a 56 years old female at the time of her hearing before the

Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”). (Tr. 122). She has a high school education,

one year of college at Talladega College, and graduated from Ayer State Technical

College with an optical technician certificate. (Tr. 122). Her past work experiences

have been as an optical mechanic (though more than 15 years ago), a top presser at

Anniston Sportswear, and a small arm repairman at Anniston Army Depot (her last

position). (Tr. 122-23). Ms. Gooden claims that she became disabled on June 25,

2013. Ms. Gooden claims her disability arises from a variety of factors, and her

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treating doctor has diagnosed her with coronary artery disease, atherosclerotic

cardiovascular disease, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, and depression. (Tr. 74, 447).

Her last period of work ended on March 30, 2013.

Ms. Gooden filed her application for a period of disability and DIB on July 11,

2013. (Tr. 68, 146). Her date last insured was through December 31, 2017. (Tr. 71).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court’sreview of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed.

The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner

issupported by substantial evidence and whether proper legalstandards were applied.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,

1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine

if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”

Bloodsworth at 1239. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a

scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id.

This court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial

evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no

presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal

standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the

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court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide

the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has

been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d

1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a

period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act

and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.1 The Regulations define “disabled” as

“the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death

or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to

disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence about a “physical or mental

impairment” that “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508. 

TheRegulations provide a five-step processfor determining whether a claimant

1 The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R. Parts

400 to 499, revised as of April 1, 2015. 

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is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in

sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3) whether the claimant’simpairmentmeets or equals an impairment

listed by the [Commissioner];

(4) whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and

(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the

national economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable

C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-

63 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).

The sequential analysis goes as follows:

Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will

automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment.

If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot performher

work, the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant

can perform some other job. 

Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).

The Commissioner must further show thatsuch work exists in the national economy.

FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ made the following findings:

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1. Ms. Gooden met the insured status requirements of the Social

Security Act through December 31, 2017. (Tr. 68, 71).

2. She had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 25,

2013, the alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 71).

3. She had the following severe impairments: hypertension, coronary

artery disease, obesity, and status post perforated gastric ulcer. Id.

2

4. She did not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairmentsin 20 C.F.R.

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 77).

5. She had the residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) to perform

medium work as define in 20 C.F.R. Part 404.1567(c). (Tr. 78).

6. She testified that she has a high school education. Id.

7. She was able to perform past relevant work as a small arms

repairman. (Tr. 82).

8. Ms. Gooden had not been under a disability, as defined in the

Social Security Act, from June 25, 2013, through the date of this

decision. (Tr. 82-83).

ANALYSIS

I. Introduction

The court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is notsupported

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “This does not relieve the court of its

responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial

2

 Ms. Gooden does not contest the ALJ’s finding regarding her severe impairments.

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evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672

F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th

Cir. 1980).3 However, the court “abstains from reweighing the evidence or

substituting its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Id. (citing Laffoon v.

Califano, 558 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1977)).

Ms. Gooden urges this court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision to deny

her DIB. She asserts that the ALJ improperly relied too heavily upon the opinion of

the consultative physician and did not give enough weight to the treating physician’s

opinion. (Doc. 10). She also contends that the consulting physician’s medical source

statement is less than complete. (Doc. 10 at 2-3). Upon review, this court finds that

the ALJ applied the treating physician rule correctly and that the ALJ’s decision was

supported by substantial evidence.

II. The ALJ Properly Applied the Treating Physician Rule and Provided

Good Cause for Assigning Minimal Weight to Dr. Kamran’s Opinion.

Ms. Gooden assertsthat the ALJimproperly established her RFC on the report

of a consultative physician, Dr. Anand Sathyan Iyer (“Dr. Iyer”), giving minimal

weight to the opinion of the treating physician, Dr. Mohammad Kamran (“Dr.

3

Strickland is binding precedent in this Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decision of the former Fifth

Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981). 

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Kamran”). (Doc. 10 at 2). Within the Eleventh Circuit the opinion of a treating

physician “must be given substantial or considerable weight unless good cause is

shown to the contrary.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440

(11th Cir. 1997)). 

Good cause for affording onlyminimal weight to a treating physician’s opinion

exists when:

(1) the treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence;

(2) the evidence supported a contrary finding; (3) or the treating

physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with his or her own

medical records.

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241 (citing Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440). “The ALJ must clearly

articulate the reasonsfor giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician, and

the failure to do so is reversible error.” Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440 (citing MacGregor

v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11thCir. 1986));see also 20C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)

(“We will always give good reasonsin our notice of determination or decision for the

weight we give your treating source’s opinion.”). However, when the ALJ adequately

states specific reasons for doing so, and those reasons are supported by substantial

evidence, there is no such error. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir.

2005) (per curiam).

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On December 3, 2013, Dr. Kamran provided an opinion that Ms. Gooden can

only sit as well as stand/walk for less than 2 hours during an 8-hour workday (Tr.

443). Dr. Kamran further opined that “[i]n [his] professional opinion, [Ms. Gooden]

is permanently and totally disabled!” (Tr. 445). If fully credited, Dr. Kamran’s

opinion would preclude Ms. Gooden from performing her past relevant work as a

small arms repairman. 

In assigning only minimal weight to this treating source evidence, the ALJ

found that “Dr. Kamran’sstatementsregarding the claimant’s physical limitations are

inconsistent with his own medical findings.” (Tr. 81). More specifically, the ALJ

pointed out that while Dr. Kamran reports in his cardiac RFC questionnaire that Ms.

Gooden suffers from a litany of cardiovascular-disabling symptoms, including chest

pain, angina equivalent pain, shortness of breath, fatigue, weakness, edema,

palpitations, and dizziness (Tr. 441), these symptoms are controverted by Dr.

Kamran’s underlying treatment records. (Tr. 81-82). 

In particular, on multiple visits to Dr. Kamran, Ms. Gooden denied having

cardiovascular pain, shortness of breath, or other heart-related symptoms. (See, e.g.,

Tr. 368 (“The patient denies chest pain at rest, chest pain with exertion, chest pain at

night, and shortness of breath.”) (office visit dated June 25, 2013)); (Tr. 373 (same)

(office visit dated April 8, 2013)); (Tr. 431 (“Patient denies shortness of breath with

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Case 1:15-cv-02217-VEH Document 13 Filed 10/12/16 Page 9 of 18
exertion, swelling of hands or feet, leg cramps with exertion, bluish discoloration of

lips or nails, chest pain or discomfort, difficulty lying down, racing/skipping

heartbeats.”) (office visit dated November 1, 2013)); (Tr. 436-37 (“Patient denies

shortness of breath with exertion, swelling of hands or feet, leg cramps with exertion,

bluish discoloration of lips or nails, chest pain or discomfort, difficulty lying down,

racing/skipping heartbeats.”) (office visit dated December 31, 2013)). Further, on the

visit that immediately proceeded Dr. Kamran’s filling out the cardiac questionnaire,

he reports that Ms. Gooden’s condition is “unchanged” and indicates, without any

urgency, that she should schedule a return visit in 4 months. (Tr. 435).

None of the foregoing treatment recordsreflects a worsening of Ms. Gooden’s

condition caused by her coronary artery disease. If anything, these notes show that,

under Dr. Kamran’s care, Ms. Gooden has been able to effectively manage her

subjective symptoms attributable to this impairment within her applicable disability

period. Likewise, these same treatment records undermine the conclusion reached by

Dr. Kamran on his cardiac questionnaire that the severity of Ms. Gooden’s anginal

pain “is 10 out of 10” with the “frequency . . . sometimes at rest, when doing normal

routine during day. Pain in chest.” (Tr. 441).

The ALJ did not completely disregard Dr. Kamran’s opinion. If he had, then

the ALJ would not have found Ms. Gooden’s coronary artery disease to be a severe

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impairment. (Tr. 71). Instead, the ALJ reasonably found Dr. Kamran’s cardiac RFC

relied too much on Ms. Gooden’s “subjective allegations as opposed to his own

objective findingsin forming his assessment” and that “there exist legitimate reasons

to question the reliability of [Ms. Gooden’s] statements.” (Tr. 82). A claimant’s

subjective complaints are not an acceptable basisfor a medical opinion. See 20C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(c); Lacina v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 606 F. App’x 520, 528 (11th Cir.

2015) (holding that the ALJ properly gave little weight to the examining physician’s

opinion for several reasons, including that the doctor relied heavily on the claimant’s

subjective report of symptoms and limitations). Thus, the ALJ committed no error in

his application of the treating physician rule as his reasons to give only minimal

weight to Dr. Kamran’s cardiac RFC are supported by substantial evidence.

II. The ALJ’s Disability Determination Is Otherwise Supported by

Substantial Evidence.

The ALJ considered Ms. Gooden’s own testimony and the testimony of the

consulting physician, Dr. Iyer, in concluding that Ms. Gooden was not disabled and

retained a RFC to perform medium work. 

A. The ALJ properly discounted the credibility of Ms. Gooden’s

subjective statements regarding her limitations.

In order to establish the credibility of her subjective complaints of pain and

other symptoms, Ms. Gooden must prove “evidence of an underlying medical

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condition and (1) objective medical evidence that confirmsthe severity of the alleged

pain arising from that condition or (2) that the objectively determined medical

condition is of such severity that it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the

alleged pain.” Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Hand

v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1985)). “The claimant’s subjective

testimony supported bymedical evidence thatsatisfiesthe standard isitself sufficient

to support a finding of disability.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.

1991) (citing Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987)).

In Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 2002), the Eleventh

Circuit reversed the district court’s decision that the ALJimproperly applied the pain

standard and found that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence

because “the ALJmade a reasonable decision to reject Wilson’ssubjective testimony,

articulating, in detail, the contrary evidence as his reasons for doing so.” Wilson, 284

F.3d at 1226. “The standard also applies to complaints of subjective conditions other

than pain.” Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223 (citing Jackson v. Bowen, 873 F.2d 1111, 1114

(8th Cir. 1989)). 

Here, the ALJ found that Ms. Gooden’s statements regarding the disabling

level of her limitations were inconsistent with other parts of the record. (Tr. 80). For

example, the ALJ explained:

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Although Ms. Gooden indicated in the disability report that she stopped

working because of her conditions and other reasons [Tr. 287], she

testified [instead] . . . that Anniston Depot terminated her in March

2013.

(Tr. 80).

The ALJ also found contradictions with Ms. Gooden’s claim that she

experienced frequent pain, had to elevate her legs 4 to 6 hours a day, that she was

unable to walk more than 10 minutes daily, and that she was unable to exercise. (Tr.

81). These subjective allegations were at odds with Dr. Kamran’s records which

contrastingly report that Ms. Gooden walks “7+” times a week for exercise. (See, e.g.,

Tr. 374 (notes from April 8, 2013, visit)); (Tr. 369 (notes from June 25, 2013, visit)).

The ALJ also emphasized that Ms. Gooden’s self-reported exertional activities of

“watering her flowers, shopping for groceries, and attending church” were

inconsistent with having only a minimal ability to walk and the need to elevate her

legs for an extended period of time on a daily basis. (Tr. 81); (see also Tr. 289, 290

(Ms. Gooden’s describing her activities on her Adult Function Report)).4 Thus, the

ALJ reasonably rejected the extent to which Ms. Gooden claimed her subjective

symptoms were disabling.

4 Ms. Gooden’s statements about the numerous household chores she is able to do such as

“cleaning, laundry, dishes, changes [the] bed, dust, clean mirror” (Tr. 288) also undermine her

walking and leg elevating limitations. (Tr. 79).

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B. The ALJ’s Reliance Upon Dr. Iyer’s Opinion Is Not Grounds

for Reversible Error.

Ms. Gooden argues that the ALJ failed to construct a full and fair record, on

the basis that the ALJ only considered the opinion of Dr. Iyer and that his opinion

was incomplete, due to the omission of Ms. Gooden’s heart disease as a diagnosed

impairment. (Doc. 10 at 2-3, 8); (see also Tr. 424 (“There is no past history of heart

disease.”)). Ms. Gooden also argues that Dr. Iyer’s opinion was incomplete because

of its generalized structure as compared to the more specific cardiac RFC completed

by Dr. Kamran. (Doc. 10 at 3); (see also Tr. 425 (“In the current condition, the patient

does not have significant limitation of functions involving: standing, walking,

handling, bending, lifting, twisting, hearing, or speaking.”)). 

The ALJ has the obligation to establish a fair and full record. A developed

record not only ensures that the ALJ has fulfilled his “duty. . . to scrupulously and

conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts,” but it

also enables the reviewing court “to determine whether the ultimate decision on the

merits is rational and supported by substantial evidence.” See Welch v. Bowen, 854

F.2d 436, 440 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cowart

v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981)). 

As the undersigned has previously observed regarding this duty:

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[A]n ALJ is ultimately responsible for the RFC, which is an

administrative finding, not a medical evaluation. See 20 C.F.R §

404.1527(e)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources

on issues such as . . . your [RFC] . . . the final responsibility for deciding

these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”). Although medical

evaluations about a claimant’s RFC are often valuable, they are not

required when making an RFC finding. See Langley v. Astrue, 777 F.

Supp. 2d 1250, 1258 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (“[T]he court concludes that the

law of this circuit does not required [sic] an RFC from a physician.”);

see also Green v. Social Security Admin. 223 Fed. Appx. 915, 922-24

(11th Cir. 2007) (ruling that an ALJ’s RFC can be substantially

supported when it disregards the only medical evaluation made by a

doctor); Castle v. Colvin, 557 Fed. Appx. 849, 853 (11th Cir. 2014)

(“The ALJ discredited [claimant’s subjective complaints of pain] by

explaining that this pain had not require[d] routine or consistent

treatment, and [the claimant] often went for months or years between

complaining of this pain to his physicians.”) (citing Dyer v. Barnhart,

395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005))).

The Eleventh Circuit has afforded significant latitude to the ALJ

in determining whether additional medical evidence is needed to make

an informed RFC determination: the ALJ “has a duty to develop the

record where appropriate but is not required to order a consultative

examination as long as the record contains sufficient evidence for the

[ALJ] to make an informed decision.” Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Doughty v. Apfel,

245 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted))). The ALJ is

thus expected to interpret the totality of the record, including any

available medical information, and may use her judgment as to whether

an additional medical examination is required.

Tucker v. Colvin, No. 2:15-CV-0629, 2016 WL 3519391, at *8 (N.D. Ala. June 28,

2016) (emphasis added). Therefore, because Tucker indicates that an ALJ can

appropriately formulate an administrative RFC without relying upon any medically15

Case 1:15-cv-02217-VEH Document 13 Filed 10/12/16 Page 15 of 18
based RFC, he can similarly rely upon a medically-based RFC that omits a reference

to severe impairment so long as his decision is otherwise supported by substantial

evidence. 

The ALJ found that Ms. Gooden had the severe impairments of hypertension,

coronary artery disease, obesity, and status post perforated gastric ulcer. (Tr. 71).

While the ALJ afforded greater weight to Dr. Iyer’s medical opinion in terms of

formulating Ms. Gooden’s RFC, he did not fully discount the opinions of Ms.

Gooden’s treating physicians, including her cardiologist, Dr. Kamran (Tr. 81-82).

This is reflected in the ALJ’s inclusion of Ms. Gooden’s coronary artery disease as

one of her severe impairments. 

Further, “[i]t is clear from this record that the ALJ did not engage in reversible

error here because []he looked at the totality of the evidence in making h[is] RFC

determination.” Tucker, 2016 WL 3519391, at *8. More specifically, the ALJ

assessed Ms. Gooden’s complete medical history, including the underlying treatment

notes from Dr. Kamran that demonstrate no significantly disabling heart-related

symptoms during Ms. Gooden’s claimed period of disability. 

TheALJ also appropriatelyrelied upon Ms. Gooden’s self-reporting statements

that confirmed the absence of physical limitations that would preclude her from

performing medium work. In sum, “due to the relative simplicity of [Ms. Gooden]’s

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medical record, additional medical testing was not needed and, thus, no reversible

error occurred.” Id. (citing Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 76

F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[W]here the medical evidence shows relatively little

physical impairment, an ALJ permissibly can render a commonsense judgment about

functional capacity even without a physician’s assessment.”)). 

The court similarly rejects Ms. Gooden’s argument that the ALJ incorrectly

relied on Dr. Iyer’s vocationally-related opinion because of its more generalized

format. Ms. Gooden citesto no case law thatsupportsthis curious contention and this

court is unaware of any such binding requirement. Thus, Ms. Gooden’s position that

the ALJ committed reversible error for thisreason is underdeveloped and unavailing.

See Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. v. Fulton County, Ga., 242 F.3d 976, 987 n.16 (11th Cir.

2001) (holding that a party waives an argument if the party “fail[s] to elaborate or

provide any citation of authority in support” of the argument); Ordower v. Feldman,

826 F.2d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that an argument made without citation

to authority is insufficient to raise an issue before the court). 

Moreover, as discussed above, theALJ did notsolely base hisRFC formulation

on the consultative report provided by Dr. Iyer and a totality of the record

substantially supports the ALJ’s disability determination. Therefore, a remand is

simply not warranted. See Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995) (per

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Case 1:15-cv-02217-VEH Document 13 Filed 10/12/16 Page 17 of 18
curiam) (“In evaluating the necessity for a remand, we are guided by ‘whether the

record reveals evidentiary gaps which result in unfairness or ‘clear prejudice.’”

(quoting Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 413 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981))).

CONCLUSION

Based upon the court’s evaluation of the evidence in the record and the

submission of the parties, the court finds that the Commissioner’s final decision

applies the proper legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed by separate order.

DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of October, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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