Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02945/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02945-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JESSICA AZAR, on behalf of herself and 

all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

GATEWAY GENOMICS, LLC dba 

SNEAKPEEK; and DOES 1 through 20, 

inclusive, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 15cv2945 AJB (WVG) 

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; AND 

(Doc. No. 34) 

(2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE. 

 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Gateway Genomics, LLC’s 

(“Defendant”) motion to dismiss and motion to strike Plaintiff Jessica Azar’s1

 (“Plaintiff”) 

second amended complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. No. 34.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Doc. 

No. 37.) Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and controlling legal authority and 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1., the Court finds the matter suitable for decision on the 

papers and without oral argument. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court 

DENIES Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s class definition and GRANTS 

                                                                

1

 The initial Plaintiff in the instant matter was Kristine Main (“Ms. Main”), a resident of Ohio. (Doc. No. 

21 ¶ 2.) However, as of August 1, 2016, Ms. Main is no longer a Plaintiff in this lawsuit. (Id.) 

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Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 The following facts are taken from the SAC and construed as true for the limited 

purpose of resolving the pending motion. See Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 

1994). 

 Defendant is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of 

business in La Jolla, California. (Doc. No. 21 ¶ 5.) One of Defendant’s products is 

“SneakPeek,” which is an early detection gender test that sells for $99.00. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 12.) 

Defendant advertises SneakPeek alleging that from a drop of blood, SneakPeek can detect 

a baby’s gender with 99% accuracy from as early as nine weeks into a woman’s pregnancy. 

(Id. ¶ 10.) 

 Based on Defendant’s marketing materials, website, and claims that it could detect 

a baby’s gender earlier than a sonogram and with 99% accuracy, Plaintiff purchased 

SneakPeek on December 9, 2015. (Id. ¶ 11.) At the time Plaintiff took the test, she was 

approximately fourteen weeks pregnant. (Id. ¶ 13.) On December 17, 2015, Plaintiff 

received an email from Defendant stating that she would be giving birth to a baby boy. (Id. 

¶ 14.) However, on February 1, 2016, following a sonogram, Plaintiff’s doctor informed 

her that she was pregnant with a baby girl. (Id. ¶ 15.) On June 10, 2016, Plaintiff gave birth 

to a baby girl. (Id. ¶ 16.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that she is not the only one to have received a false test result. In 

support of this allegation, Plaintiff provides nine online consumer complaints that refer to 

SneakPeek as a “Scam,” allege that SneakPeek is around 60% accurate, and contend that 

SneakPeek is aware of its test’s inaccuracies. (Id. at 7-10.) Plaintiff asserts that 

SneakPeek’s reliability is more akin to a “proverbial coin flip.” (Id. ¶ 20.) 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On December 29, 2015, Ms. Main filed a complaint. (Doc. No. 1.) On February 1, 

2016, Plaintiff and Ms. Main filed an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 7.) On April 22, 2016, 

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, motion to dismiss for failure 

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to state a claim, and a motion to enforce arbitration. (Doc. No. 12.) On August 1, 2016, the 

Court granted in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, dismissed Ms. 

Main’s claim for lack of standing, dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief, denied 

Defendant’s request to compel arbitration, and granted in part and denied in part 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 20 at 32.) 

 On September 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed her SAC. (Doc. No. 21.) Plaintiff brings the 

action on behalf of herself and others similarly situated claiming violations of: (1) the 

California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”); (2) the California False Advertising Law 

(“FAL”); (3) Fraud; (4) Breach of Express Warranty; (5) Breach of Implied Warranty of 

Merchantability; (6) Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness; (7) Unjust Enrichment; and 

(8) California Civil Code §§1750 (“CLRA”). (Id. at 14-24.) On October 14, 2016, the 

parties filed a joint motion to stay the case pending settlement discussions, (Doc. No. 23), 

which was granted on the same day. (Doc. No. 24.) On December 12, 2016, both parties 

filed a joint statement informing the Court that the matter had not settled. (Doc. No. 31 at 

2.) On February 6, 2017, Defendant filed the instant motion, its motion to dismiss and to 

strike Plaintiff’s SAC. (Doc. No. 34.) 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Motion to Dismiss 

 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s 

complaint and allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for (1) lack 

of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.” 

SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(citations omitted). However, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In making this determination, a court reviews the 

contents of the complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true, and drawing all 

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reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l 

League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court need not accept “legal 

conclusions” as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is also improper for a 

court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged.” Associated 

Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 

(1983). 

 B. Motion to Strike 

Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on its own or by motion, the 

court may strike from a pleading an “insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The purpose of Rule 12(f) is to 

“avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues 

by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . . .” Sidney–Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 

F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). The Court must view the pleadings in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, and the information will not be stricken unless it is 

evident that is has no bearing on the subject matter of the litigation. Cal. Dept. of Toxic 

Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002). “Any 

doubt concerning the import of the allegations to be stricken weighs in favor of denying 

the motion to strike.” In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 

609, 614 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citation omitted). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Plaintiff’s Class Definition 

 As an initial matter, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s class definition is overbroad 

and should thus be stricken under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(f). (Doc. 

No. 34-1 at 11.) In opposition, Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s motion is inappropriate at 

this time as Plaintiff has not brought a motion for class certification. (Doc. No. 37 at 11.) 

 While the Court appreciates the ample briefing provided by both parties on this issue, 

the Court agrees with Plaintiff and finds Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s class 

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allegation to be premature. Generally, courts review class allegations through a motion for 

class certification. See Moreno v. Baca, No. CV007149ABCCWX, 2000 WL 33356835, 

at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2000) (finding defendants’ motion to strike the class allegation as 

premature because no motion for class certification was before the court); see also In re 

NVIDIA GPU Litig., No. C 08-04312 JW, 2009 WL 4020104, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 

2009) (“A determination of the ascertainability and manageability of the putative class in 

light of the class allegations is best addressed at the class certification stage of litigation.”); 

In re Jamster Mktg. Litig., No. 05CV0819 JM (CAB), 2009 WL 1456632, at *7 (S.D. Cal. 

May 22, 2009). Accordingly, at this point in the litigation, the Court is not prepared to rule 

on the propriety of Plaintiff’s class allegations. Consequently, Defendant’s motion to strike 

the class allegations is DENIED, but WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Defendant’s ability 

to move to strike or dismiss the class allegations if and when class certification is sought. 

 B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 

 Defendant contends that all of Plaintiff’s claims are incurably deficient and must be 

dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. No. 34-1 at 7, 29.) Specifically, Defendant argues that 

Plaintiff’s nationwide class action asserting only state consumer protection laws should be 

dismissed pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 

F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012). (Id.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that each of her causes of 

action are adequately pled, and that Defendant has not met its burden in proving that 

Plaintiff’s nationwide claims under California state law should be dismissed. (Doc. No. 37 

at 18-30.) 

 i. Plaintiff’s Nationwide Claims under Mazza 

Applying the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in Mazza, Defendant contends 

that Plaintiff’s UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims should be dismissed, because those claims 

should be governed by the consumer protection laws of the jurisdiction in which the 

transaction took place. (Doc. No. 34-1 at 18.) Plaintiff retorts and argues that Mazza is 

inapplicable to the present matter as the court in Mazza was resolving a motion for class 

certification. (Doc. No. 37 at 21.) 

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The Court first notes that courts within this district have declined to apply the type 

of choice of law analysis proscribed in Mazza at the pleading stage, and instead have 

deferred the issue until class certification. See e.g., Doe v. Successfulmatch.com, No. 13-

cv-03376-LHK, 2014 WL 1494347, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2014); Clancy v. The 

Bromley Tea Co., 308 F.R.D. 564, 572 (N.D. Cal. 2013); In re iPhone 4S Consumer Litig., 

No. C 1201127, 2013 WL 3829653, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2013). In coming to this 

conclusion, these courts have reasoned that the choice of law analysis is a fact-specific 

inquiry, which requires a more developed factual record than is available at the motion to 

dismiss stage. 

On the other hand, other cases decided in this district disagree and found that 

although Mazza was decided at the class certification stage, “the principle articulated in 

Mazza applies generally and is instructive even when addressing a motion to dismiss.” 

Frezza v. Google Inc., No. 5:12-cv-00237-RMW, 2013 WL 1736788, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 

22, 2013). Moreover, courts have held that even at the pleading stage, Mazza is “not only 

relevant but controlling . . . .” Id. at 5. Thus, California district courts have applied Mazza

at the motion to dismiss stage. See Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., No. C 11-05403-JW, 2012 

WL 2847575, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012). 

In light of the legal principles established in Mazza, the Court agrees that Mazza can 

be applied at the motion to dismiss stage. However, in the circumstances of this case, the 

Court concludes that it is appropriate to delay the Court’s analysis of the choice of law 

issue until Plaintiff files a motion for class certification. First, the Court notes that there 

exist factual differences between Mazza and Plaintiff’s Complaint that preclude the Court 

from applying Mazza’s fact specific inquiry in the present motion.2

 For example, the Court 

highlights that the transaction that caused the alleged injury in Mazza, (i.e., the lease or 

purchase of a Honda automobile), did not occur in California for the majority of the class 

                                                                

2

 Defendant argues that because Mazza encompasses the same claims Plaintiff asserts in her SAC that 

Mazza is controlling authority and Defendant need not provide an analysis demonstrating that California 

consumer laws differ from other states. (Doc. No. 38 at 9.) 

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members. Mazza, 666 F.3d at 590. Additionally, the plaintiffs purchased their vehicles in 

Orlando, Florida, and Gaithersburg, Maryland. Id. at 587. In comparison, Plaintiff 

purchased SneakPeek while in California, lives in California, and the resulting alleged 

injury happened in California. (Doc. No. 21 ¶¶ 4-5, 11.) Second, the Court does not find 

that this case is so clear that deferring a choice of law analysis until class certification 

would be unconstructive. See Frenzel v. AliphCom, 76 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 

2014) (holding that deferring choice of law issues until class certification is unwarranted 

in cases where the plaintiff in the case is a nonresident who did not purchase the defendant’s 

product in California) (emphasis added). 

Furthermore, the Court finds the case law cited by Defendant to be inapplicable to 

the present matter. For instance, in Route v. Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., No. CV 12-7350-

GW (JEMx), 2013 WL 658251, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2013), defendant’s request to 

strike plaintiff’s request for certification of a nationwide class was granted because 

California had no connection to the case other than its interest in product sales. 

Accordingly, the court held that deferring the choice of law issue until the motion for 

certification would be a waste of judicial resources as the Court could not see how plaintiff 

could ever demonstrate that California’s choice of law rules as set forth in Mazza could be 

certified in California. Id. at *9. In comparison, the instant case has significant ties to 

California, as the product was purchased in California, and Plaintiff is a resident of 

California. (Doc. No. 21 ¶¶ 4-5, 11.) Moreover, in Horvath v. L.G Elec. Mobilecomm 

U.S.A., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-01576-H-RBB, 2012 WL 2861160, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 

2012), the court only dismissed claims of the named plaintiffs that were nonresidents of 

California. 

Ultimately, the Court finds that a choice of law analysis must be conducted on a case 

by case basis that requires “analyzing various states’ laws under the circumstances of the 

particular case and given the particular [legal] issue in question.” See Bruno v. Eckhart 

Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 545 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Accordingly, the Court is unable to determine 

at this stage whether California’s choice of law rules apply to bar all, some, or none of 

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Plaintiff’s claims. See Forcellati v. Hyland’s Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 

2012) (concluding that Mazza did not purport to create a bright line rule that nationwide 

classes are “as a matter of law, uncertifiable under California’s consumer protection 

laws.”). Consequently, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s nationwide claims under 

California Consumer State Law is DENIED. 

 ii. Plaintiff’s Claims under UCL, FAL, and CLRA 

 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims fail pursuant to 

FRCP 83

, as Plaintiff’s use of nine online consumer complaints does not adequately support 

her allegations. (Doc. No. 34-1 at 23.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the consumer 

complaints are sufficient evidence that Defendant knew or should have known that it was 

presenting false, misleading, or omitted material on the reliability of the SneakPeek test. 

(Doc. No. 37 at 25.) 

 The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 

practices in transaction for the sale or lease of goods to consumers.” Cal. Civ. Code § 

1770(a). California’s FAL makes it unlawful for a business to disseminate any statement 

“which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable 

care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” Cal. Bus & Prof. Code 17500. 

California’s UCL provides a cause of action for business practices that are (1) unlawful, 

(2) unfair, or (3) fraudulent. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. 

Plaintiff predicates her UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims on the allegation that 

Defendant’s knew that SneakPeek was not 99% effective in determining a baby’s gender. 

(Doc. No. 21 ¶¶ 35, 44, 85.) However, the shortcomings of this contention are twofold. 

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not allege where the online complaints were made. 

Thus, the Court is unable to determine if Defendant’s had notice of the complaints. See 

Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s 

                                                                

3

 FRCP 8 states that a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

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use of customer complaints as they did not indicate how the complaints were made; thus 

there was no factual basis to conclude that the manufacturer had knowledge of a defect.) 

Second, and most detrimental to Plaintiff is that some courts have expressed doubt that 

customer complaints by themselves can adequately support an inference that a 

manufacturer was aware of a defect. Id. at 1147; see Baba v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C 

09-05946 RS, 2011 WL 317650, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2011) (“Awareness of a few 

customer complaints, however, does not establish knowledge of an alleged defect.”). For 

this reason, the Court concludes that at best the nine online customer complaints merely 

allege that some consumers were complaining, but do not by themselves impute knowledge 

on Defendant. 

Thus, the Court turns to the rest of Plaintiff’s allegations to determine if Plaintiff has 

sufficiently asserted violations of the UCL, FAL, and CLRA. As currently pled, Plaintiff’s 

SAC in congruence with the nine online customer complaints does not adequately plead 

how and why Defendant knew that SneakPeek was false, misleading, or deceptive. Plaintiff 

repeatedly argues that the result of the test is not 99% accurate, but is much closer to a flip 

of a coin. (Doc. No. 21 ¶ 17.) Plaintiff’s SAC then generically repeats the standard of law 

for each cause of action. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36, 42, 82-85.) However, without more, Plaintiff’s bare 

legal assertions are only “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements. . . .” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover, without 

an underlying factual premise that would justify Plaintiff’s alleged factual conclusion that 

SneakPeek is not 99% accurate and that Defendant was aware of this, the SAC fails to 

assert nothing more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation.” Id. 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims sound in fraud, and are 

therefore subject to the heightened pleading standard under FRCP 9(b). See Kearns v. Ford 

Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that Rule 9(b)’s heightened 

pleading standards apply to claims for violations of the CLRA and UCL). FRCP 9(b) 

requires that the facts constituting the fraud be pled with specificity. Conclusory allegations 

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are insufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc.,

885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A pleading is sufficient under Rule 9(b) if it identifies 

the circumstances constituting fraud so that a defendant can prepare an adequate answer to 

the allegations.”). 

Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court is unable to conclude that 

Plaintiff has sufficiently pled her claims for violations of the UCL, FAL, and CLRA 

pursuant to FRCP 9(b). Plaintiff’s SAC succinctly alleges that Defendant represented that 

the SneakPeek test had characteristics and benefits that it did not have. (Doc. No. 21 ¶ 35.) 

Plaintiff then tersely contends that Defendant knew or should have known that Defendant’s 

advertising was false, misleading, or deceptive. (Id. ¶ 44.) The Court notes that FRCP 9(b) 

“does not require nor make legitimate the pleading of detailed evidentiary matter.” Walling 

v. Beverly Enter., 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973). However, Plaintiff still must allege 

the circumstances constituting the fraud, or the time, place, and specific content of the false 

representations. As currently pled, Plaintiff’s SAC and its limited allegations fails to satisfy 

this burden. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s UCL, FAL, and CLRA causes of action are DISMISSED. 

Compare Eckler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-cv-727-LAB-MDD, 2012 WL 5382218, 

at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2017) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint as plaintiff provided no 

factual support other than her own limited pleadings about her experience with the 

product), with Rosales v. FitFlop USA, LLC, 11-CV-00973 W (WVG), 2012 WL 3224311, 

at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2012) (rejecting defendant’s claim that plaintiffs fail to state a UCL 

claim because “[p]laintiffs point to several studies involving toning fitness shoes that 

support their contention that these shoes have no beneficial effect on exercise, intensity, 

improved muscle strength, or toning.”).4

                                                                

4

 The Court notes that Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s argument that she must provide scientific evidence 

to support her claim. (Doc. No. 37 at 27.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that scientific evidence at the 

pleadings stage is not required. However, despite this, Plaintiff still fails to meet the threshold pleading 

requirements for her causes of action grounded in fraud. 

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 iii. Breach of Express Warranty 

To prevail on a breach of express warranty claim, a plaintiff must allege that the 

seller: “(1) made an affirmation of fact or promise or provided a description of its goods; 

(2) the promise or description formed part of the basis of the bargain; (3) the express 

warranty was breached; and (4) the breach caused injury to the plaintiff.” Rodarte v. Philip 

Morris, Inc., No. 03-0353FMC, 2003 WL 23341208, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2003). 

Additionally, a buyer must also plead that notice of the alleged breach was provided to the 

seller within a reasonable time after discovering the breach. See Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles 

Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 680 (1974) (“The requirement of notice of breach is . . . designed 

to allow the defendant opportunity for repairing the defective item, reducing damages, 

avoiding defective products in the future, and negotiating settlements.”).5

 The parties do not appear to contest that Defendant’s statement that SneakPeek is 

99% effective in determining gender is a warranty that is an affirmation of fact or promise, 

or that it is the basis of Plaintiff’s bargain. The dispute instead focuses on Defendant’s 

contention that part of its express warranty is that a consumer may receive a full refund if 

the test result does not match the gender of his or her newborn baby. (Doc. No. 38 at 11.) 

 As currently pled, Plaintiff’s SAC is devoid of any allegations pertaining to what the 

express warranty of SneakPeek encompassed. For instance, based on the SAC, the Court 

is unsure of whether Defendant’s express warranty included providing a consumer a refund 

if her test provided an erroneous result. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege whether or not 

she requested or received a refund for her allegedly faulty test. Additionally, Plaintiff and 

Defendant’s briefs in support and opposition of the motion further conflate the issue as 

they disagree over the terms of the express warranty. (See Doc. No. 34-1 at 19-20; Doc. 

No. 37 at 22.) Accordingly, as the Court is unable to determine at this time what the terms 

                                                                

5

 The Court takes note that Plaintiff argues that she only need to plead the causes of action for breach of 

express warranty pursuant to California Civil Jury Instruction 1230. (Doc. No. 37 at 21.) Plaintiff is 

mistaken. Though the jury instruction may be helpful in understanding the law, it is not law. Thus, the 

Court declines to use the elements as pled by Plaintiff in her opposition. 

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of the express warranty were, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim for breach of express 

warranty. 

 iv. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability 

 Defendant argues that as there is no privity of contract between Plaintiff and 

Defendant, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability must be 

dismissed. (Doc. No. 34-1 at 20.) Plaintiff retorts that her claim falls under an exception to 

the privity requirement. (Doc. No. 37 at 22.) 

 A plaintiff asserting breach of warranty claims must stand in vertical contractual 

privity with the defendant. Anunziato v. eMachines, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141 (C.D. 

Cal. 2005). A buyer and seller stand in privity if they are in adjoining links of the 

distribution chain. Osborne v. Subaru of Am. Inc., 198 Cal. App. 3d 646, 656 n.6 (1988). 

However, some particularized exceptions to this general rule exists. The exception that 

Plaintiff argues applies is one that arises when a plaintiff relies on written advertisements 

or labels from the manufacturer. (Doc. No. 37 at 22.) 

 Unfortunately for Plaintiff, the exception she wishes to use is not applicable to her 

implied warranty of merchantability cause of action. See Tapia v. Davol, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 

3d 1149, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that the exception where the purchaser of a product 

relied on representations made by the manufacturer applies to an express warranty claim); 

see also Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 696 (1954) (“Another possible 

exception . . . is found in a few cases where the purchaser of a product relied on 

representations made by the manufacturer . . . and recovery from the manufacturer was 

allowed on the theory of express warranty.”). Further, Plaintiff’s SAC is devoid of any 

allegations that she and Defendant are in privity. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for breach 

of implied warranty is DISMISSED. 

 v. Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness 

 Defendant claims that Plaintiff has failed to identify a “particular purpose” necessary 

to sustain her claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness. (Doc. No. 34-1 at 21.) 

Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s contentions. (Doc. No. 37 at 23.) 

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 To state a claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness, a plaintiff must allege: 

“(1) the purchaser at the time of contracting intends to use the goods for a particular 

purpose, (2) the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know of this particular 

purpose, (3) the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish goods 

suitable for the particular purpose, and (4) the seller at the time of contracting has reason 

to know that the buyer is relying on such skill and judgment.” Frenzel, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 

1021. “A particular purpose differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used 

in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business 

. . . .” Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Sup. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1291, 1295 n.2 

(1995). 

 Based on the allegations in the SAC, the Court finds Plaintiff’s alleged particular 

purpose and the ordinary purpose of the SneekPeek test to be one in the same. The Court 

notes that Plaintiff asserts in her SAC that she purchased SneakPeek to determine the 

gender of her baby. (Doc. No. 21 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff’s SAC then alleges that SneakPeek is 

advertised as an early detection gender test. (Id. ¶ 9.)6

 The Court finds no material 

difference between these two purposes. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied 

warranty of fitness is DISMISSED. See Smith v. LG Elec. U.S.A., Inc., No. C 13-4351 

PJH, 2014 WL 989742, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[P]laintiff has identified no 

particular purpose for which she purchased the washing machine. She purchased it to wash 

her laundry, which is the ordinary purpose of the washing machine.”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The Court finds that any further amendment of this claim would be futile. 

Thus, this claim is dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, 

                                                                

6

 Plaintiff in her Opposition argues that the ordinary purpose of SneakPeek is that it is a test with the 

“statistical probability in correctly identifying the gender of a fetus . . . is based on laboratory testing 

using property collected maternal blood samples.” (Doc. No. 37 at 23.) Plaintiff then alleges her 

particular purpose is using this “at home” gender test based on “promised ‘99% accuracy’ of the ‘test’ 

which includes factors such as the portion of the test where the consumer obtains their own blood and 

sends it in for testing.” (Id.) The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument not only nonsensical but also 

unintelligible. 

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Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 vi. Fraud 

 All claims of fraud must satisfy the heightened pleading standard of FRCP 9(b). 

Specifically, the party alleging fraud must include the “who, what, when, where, and how” 

 of the misconduct charged. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Defendant posits that Plaintiff’s claims of fraud are not pled with the particularity required 

by FRCP 9(b). (Doc. No. 34-1 at 27.) The Court agrees with Defendant. 

Under California law, the elements of a fraud claim include: (1) misrepresentation; 

(2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to defraud or induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; 

and (5) resulting damages. Lazar v. Sup. Ct., 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996). 

Here, similar to Plaintiff’s claims of violations of the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, supra

pp. 9-10, Plaintiff’s SAC also fails to plead her fraud claim with sufficient particularity 

pursuant to FRCP 9(b). Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s advertisements about 

the accuracy of the test were false, and that Defendant’s knew it was false, (Doc. No. 21 ¶ 

49, 51), Plaintiff’s SAC fails to allege when she saw the allegedly fraudulent 

advertisements, where she saw them, and under what circumstances. Similarly, Plaintiff 

fails to provide reproductions of Defendant’s advertisements that contain the alleged 

misrepresentations that serve as the basis of her claim. See Rosales, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 

1175–76. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s SAC is devoid of any facts that demonstrate how 

Defendant was aware that SneakPeek did not work as advertised, and why and how 

Plaintiff believes SneakPeek to only be 50% effective. See Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 

356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (“To avoid dismissal for inadequacy under Rule 9(b),” 

a “complaint [must] state the time, place, and specific content of the false representations 

as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation.”) (internal citation omitted). 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s vague and limited pleadings fail to meet her burden in alleging 

fraud with particularity and for this reason, this cause of action is DISMISSED. 

/// 

/// 

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V. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows: 

(1) The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s class definition; 

(2) GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss; and 

(3) DENIES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of implied 

warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 

Plaintiff is granted fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file a third amended 

complaint correcting the deficiencies noted herein. Failure to do so will result in the Court 

dismissing this case with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 25, 2017 

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