Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-00628/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-00628-30/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY GRANT FRYE,

NO. CIV. S-99-628 LKK/KJM 

Petitioner,

v.

 O R D E R

WARDEN, San Quentin State 

Prison,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner has moved for reconsideration of three rulings made

by the magistrate judge: (1) the exclusion of a Strickland expert

who would testify as to the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct,

(2) the denial of a protective order barring respondent from

interviewing a juror without the presence of petitioner’s counsel,

and (3) the scope of a separate protective order that was issued.

For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied.

A. Standard

“The district court must defer to the magistrate judge’s

orders unless they are clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”

Grimes v. San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1991).

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 Indeed, upon receipt of this briefing, the magistrate judge 1

decided to admit Professor Levenson’s declaration. See Williams,

384 F.3d at 607 (“[A] district court in a habeas corpus proceeding

has the discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing by choosing

a middle path that includes documentary evidence, but excludes oral

testimony. A district court must only give the petitioner full

opportunity to present the relevant facts.”) (citations omitted).

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Under this standard, the magistrate judge’s decision is affirmed

unless “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 

B. Analysis

1. Strickland Expert

Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s exclusion of

Professor Laurie Levenson’s testimony concerning the ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. Expert testimony is admissible if

it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue. Fed. R. Evid. 702. A judge is

“qualified to understand the legal analysis required by

Strickland.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 838 (9th Cir. 1995)

(finding no abuse of discretion in district court’s refusal to

permit testimony by Strickland expert). Accordingly, the

magistrate judge could reasonably conclude that Professor

Levenson’s live testimony in this case would not be helpful,

particularly given that she nevertheless permitted petitioner to

present through briefing the underlying authorities relied upon by

the expert. See Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 590 (9th Cir. 1

2004) (“[A] district court in a habeas corpus proceeding need not

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conduct full evidentiary hearings, but may instead expand the

record . . . with discovery and documentary evidence.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The magistrate judge’s decision is not

contrary to law merely because other courts have arrived at a

different decision on receiving the testimony of Strickland

experts. See United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1409-10 (9th

Cir. 1993) (decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is within

the court’s discretion).

2. Denial of Protective Order

Petitioner also argues that the magistrate judge erred in

refusing to impose a protective order barring the state from

conducting interviews with Juror Shelby Fairfield and her minister

without the presence of petitioner’s counsel. Petitioner claims

that Juror Fairfield committed misconduct during the trial by

discussing the case with her minister. 

The purported reasons for the protective order are twofold.

First, petitioner alleges that respondent failed to fully disclose

important information that Juror Fairfield provided to a state

investigator.

Petitioner’s declaration from Ms. Fairfield indicated that she

spoke with her minister between the guilt and penalty phases about

the difficult decisions she had made in finding the petitioner

guilty and would have to make in deciding whether he should be

sentenced to death. The state submitted a responsive declaration

from an agent who had previously interviewed Ms. Fairfield

regarding claims raised in petitioner’s state habeas petition.

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That declaration stated that Ms. Fairfield asked her minister what

the Bible had to say about the death penalty and her minister gave

a written response, “which in summary said that the people voted

to enact laws to determine what crimes are and what the penalties

should be.” The state also submitted a declaration from Ms.

Fairfield in which she state she was unsure about the timing of her

conversation with her minister.

The agent’s investigative notes (which the court found good

cause for petitioner to discover, based on the conflicts between

the declarations) indicated that the minister’s response included

quotations from the Bible. In addition, Fairfield told the agent

that, in her opinion, the minister would have given an individual

the death sentence if the individual was found guilty and the death

penalty statutes applied. Petitioner argues that these omissions

show that the agent’s declaration was misleading (and by virtue

thereof, constitutes misconduct by the deputy attorney general who

filed it). 

As the magistrate judge ruled, however, petitioner inflates

the importance of this information. The statement regarding

quotations from the Bible is in line with the agent’s declaration,

which stated that Fairfield asked the minister, “what the Bible

said about the death penalty” and her minister gave her “a written

response.” That the written response included Bible quotations is

not inconsistent with the agent’s declaration. In addition, the

statement by the minister that he would give the death penalty if

the individual was guilty, and if the death penalty laws applied,

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 Similarly, while petitioner argues that the magistrate judge 2

denied him due process by not permitting him to submit the evidence

referenced above, it is clear that the magistrate judge took his

representations of that evidence at face value but nevertheless

concluded that a protective order would not be appropriate.

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simply indicates that the minister would follow the law. The

magistrate judge’s ruling was not clearly erroneous.

Second, petitioner argues that a protective order should be

issue based on events that occurred in another capital habeas case

in this district, Stanley v. Ayers, CV 95-1500. According to

petitioner, declarations submitted in that case indicate that the

conduct of the deputy attorney general during the interview

comported with office policies. This misconduct, which took place

eight years ago in the context of a different case, is simply too

attenuated to warrant the extraordinary relief requested here.

Again, the court finds that the magistrate judge’s ruling was not

clearly erroneous.2

3. Scope of Protective Order

Petitioner also argues that the protective order issued by the

magistrate judge is deficient because it does not expressly

encompass experts who worked with defense counsel. As the

magistrate judge noted, however, “such [specific] coverage is not

necessary, as this court concluded following the parties’ last

appearance.” In addition, respondents indicate that they had

already felt bound by the protective order so construed.

Petitioner also argues that the order should have included an

express prohibition on indirect use of privileged material (as

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opposed to merely direct use) but this too appears unnecessary, as

it may be reasonably inferred. Particularly where the protective

order in this case closely mirrors that approved by the Ninth

Circuit in Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003) and

Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002), the court finds

that the protective order entered by the magistrate judge was not

clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the motion for

reconsideration is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 14, 2008.

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