Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01873/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01873-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 462
Nature of Suit: Naturalization, Petition For Hearing of Denial
Cause of Action: Review of denial of an application for naturalization

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HASAN SHEIKH,

Plaintiff,

v.

LORETTA LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01873-YGR 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 31

On December 1, 2015, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 30.) On December 29, 2015, by the prescribed deadline, plaintiff filed a 

motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing the 

Court “committed clear error” in its December 1, 2015 Order. (Dkt. No. 31 at 3.)1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a court may alter or amend a judgment 

where: “1) the motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the 

judgment is based; 2) the moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable 

evidence; 3) the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or 4) there is an intervening 

change in controlling law.” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Rule 59(e) is generally seen as “an ‘extraordinary 

remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.’” 

Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). A motion under Rule 59(e) “should not be 

granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly 

 

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The Court has determined that the motion is appropriate for decision without oral 

argument, as permitted by Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. See 

also Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

Case 4:15-cv-01873-YGR Document 38 Filed 01/26/16 Page 1 of 2
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling 

law.ˮ 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). Rule 59(e) “may not 

be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been 

raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008)

(quoting 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, pp. 127-128 (2d ed.

1995)); see also Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A district 

court does not abuse its discretion when it disregards legal arguments made for the first time on a 

motion to amend.”). A district court enjoys considerable discretion in granting or denying a 

motion to amend or alter a judgment under Rule 59(e). See McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 

1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

In his motion, plaintiff largely restates his earlier arguments regarding the appropriate 

method by which to calculate an absence of more than sixth months, which the Court rejected in 

granting defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff also raises new arguments based on Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 6(a) and Minasyan v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1224, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff 

does not explain why he failed to raise these authorities and arguments previously. The Court 

therefore may properly decline to consider them at this juncture. Nevertheless, having reviewed 

the newly cited authorities, the Court finds that they do not clearly call for a contrary result. 

Indeed, in Minasyan, the Ninth Circuit specifically references and distinguishes Lagandaon v. 

Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2004), one of the cases relied upon by the Court in its December 

1, 2015 Order. Lagandaon is more closely analogous than Minasyan to the statute at issue here, as 

both the statute at issue here and the one at issue in Lagandaon do not include a “within x days

after” formulation but instead merely call for a determination of the length of a period of time 

measured in “months” or “years.” The motion is DENIED.

This Order terminates Docket Number 31.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 26, 2016

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case 4:15-cv-01873-YGR Document 38 Filed 01/26/16 Page 2 of 2