Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02178/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02178-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LORRAINE FRIAS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

PATRICK A. CORVINGTON, et al,

Defendants.

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Case No. 2:11-CV-02178 JAM-GGH

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Patrick A. 

Corvington and Corporation for National and Community Service’s 

(“CNCS”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #12).1

Plaintiff Lorraine Frias opposes the motion with respect to 

Defendant Corvington, but does not oppose dismissal of CNCS and the 

Doe Defendants (Doc. #16). Defendant Patrick Corvington, Chief 

Executive Officer of CNCS, is designated by CNCS as its 

representative against whom any civil action should be filed. 

Defendants replied to the opposition (Doc. #17). 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was originally 

scheduled on February 8, 2012. 

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action originated when Plaintiff filed a complaint (Doc. 

#2) with this Court on August 16, 2011. The allegations in the 

complaint, which are accepted as true for this motion, focus on two 

interrelated series of events during Plaintiff’s employment with 

Defendant CNCS. First, Plaintiff alleges that she participated in 

an investigation conducted by the Office of the Inspector General 

(“OIG”). Second, Plaintiff alleges that a co-worker, Willie 

Holmes, created a hostile work environment for her during her time 

at CNCS. Plaintiff filed two Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”) complaints concerning Mr. Holmes.

Plaintiff was hired by CNCS on October 16, 2005. She was 

promoted to the position of Resource Manager for the Pacific Region 

campus in June 2006. After October 2009, Plaintiff took a medical 

leave. Plaintiff’s employment was terminated at some point after 

she began medical leave despite providing medical documentation to 

CNCS. 

Plaintiff was involved in several complaints and 

investigations concerning Mr. Holmes and other employees. In March 

2007, Plaintiff participated in an EEOC investigation against CNCS 

initiated by another employee. During that investigation, 

Plaintiff supported allegations of racial preference toward African 

American employees and discrimination within the Pacific Region 

Campus where she worked. In May 2007, Plaintiff reported an 

inappropriate relationship between a co-worker and a Team Leader on 

Campus. 

Then in January 2008, Plaintiff sent a letter concerning Mr. 

Holmes’s conduct to their mutual supervisor, James Phipps. 

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Plaintiff’s complaint states that Mr. Holmes “was allowed, on 

numerous occasions, to create an extremely hostile working 

environment for the Plaintiff. . . .” Compl. ¶ 3. The January 

2008 complaint to Mr. Phipps concerned harassment and hostility 

toward Plaintiff. Shortly afterward, Mr. Holmes allegedly directed 

an expletive toward Plaintiff during a confrontation where she felt 

physically threatened. She also reported this incident to CNCS 

supervisors. 

Plaintiff alleges that no action was taken with regard to her 

complaints about Mr. Holmes, even though Mr. Holmes exhibited 

threatening and aggressive behavior in the presence of supervisors. 

Plaintiff then filed an EEOC complaint against both Mr. Phipps and 

Mr. Holmes on April 14, 2008. On April 18, 2008, Mr. Phipps 

allegedly told Plaintiff that dropping the complaint would be in 

her best interest because the content of the complaint might upset 

Mr. Holmes. On August 19, 2008 Plaintiff filed another EEOC 

complaint concerning Mr. Phipps and Mr. Holmes, but she did not 

follow through with the EEOC and failed to submit required 

paperwork. 

On December 22, 2008, the national director of CNCS suspended 

Mr. Holmes for 30 days. At the end of his suspension, he returned 

to CNCS with a different title but no reduction in salary or 

benefits. Plaintiff sent a letter to the EEOC, the OIG, and the 

Office of Human Capital complaining about Mr. Holmes’s return. 

Next, Plaintiff participated in an OIG investigation that 

determined that Mr. Holmes was involved in operational and fiscal 

improprieties. Mr. Holmes resigned after being issued a Notice of 

Proposed Removal by the then acting national director of CNCS, 

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Mikel Herrington. Then on October 9, 2009, Mr. Holmes returned to 

the CNCS Pacific campus with the permission of Mr. Phipps for the 

day. Shortly after this incident, Plaintiff started the medical 

leave that led to her termination. 

Plaintiff’s complaint contains nine claims. Claims two 

through five and eight were voluntarily dismissed (Doc. #10). 

Plaintiff offers no opposition to dismissal of claims seven and 

nine. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are claim one, Retaliation in 

Violation of 43 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); and claim six, Discrimination 

Based on Race in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The Court has 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the federal claims, 

and jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the remaining 

state law claims.

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

1. Motion to Dismiss

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to dismiss, the 

court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 

322 (1972). Assertions that are mere “legal conclusions,” however, 

are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

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plaintiff needs to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

Dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim 

supportable by a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica 

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 

“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not 

be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 

316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Discussion

1. Defendant CNCS and Doe Defendants

Defendants seek dismissal of CNCS and the Doe defendants, and 

Plaintiff does not oppose this motion. Accordingly, CNCS and the 

Doe Defendants are dismissed with prejudice from this action. 

2. Claims Seven and Nine

Defendants argue that these claims should be dismissed because 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust agency remedies as required by the 

Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Plaintiff does not 

oppose Defendants’ motion with regard to these claims. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims seven and nine is

granted with prejudice. 

3. Plaintiff’s Title VII Retaliation Claim

Defendants move for dismissal of the first claim on the 

grounds that Plaintiff has not stated a Title VII retaliation 

claim. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege the 

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necessary elements of 1)engaging in protected activity, 2) 

suffering an adverse employment action, and 3) a causal nexus 

between the adverse employment action and the protected activity. 

Plaintiff responds that all three elements are sufficiently pled. 

Absent allegations of direct discrimination, a Title VII 

retaliation claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3, is analyzed 

according to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting standard. 

Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations 

omitted). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing 

“that (1) he engaged or was engaging in activity protected under 

Title VII, (2) the employer subjected him to an adverse employment 

decision, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected 

activity and the employer's action.” Id. (citations omitted). 

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, a pleading does not 

need to contain all of the facts necessary to show a prima facie 

case. See Washington v. Certainteed Gypsum, Inc., No. 2:10–cv–

00204–GMN–LRL, 2011 WL 3705000, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 24, 2011). The 

relevant standard requires that the allegations in the complaint 

give fair notice of the nature of the claim to the opposing party, 

and that the factual allegations in the complaint, taken as true,

plausibly suggest entitlement to relief. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 

1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). While facts supporting all of the 

elements of a prima facie case are not required in a Title VII 

complaint, “those elements are nonetheless relevant to the court's 

analysis of the sufficiency of the complaint.” Sablan v. A.B. Won 

Pat Int'l Airport Auth., Guam, No. 10-00013, 2010 WL 5148202, at *4 

(D. Guam Dec. 9, 2010).

(a) Plaintiff’s Alleged Protected Activity

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Title VII retaliation claims only apply to activity protected 

by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting discrimination 

against an employee who makes charges, testifies, participates, or 

assists in Title VII enforcement proceedings); Vasconcelos v. 

Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990) (The purpose of section 

2000e-3's participation clause “is to protect the employee who 

utilizes the tools provided by Congress to protect his rights.”) 

(quoting Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th 

Cir.1978)). Thus, Plaintiff meets this burden if the complaint 

contains allegations that she participated in activity protected by 

Title VII.

First, Plaintiff alleges that she participated in an 

investigation conducted by the OIG. This activity is directly 

analogous to the Vasconcelos case. 907 F.2d 111. In that case, 

the plaintiff had no claim because he was fired for making 

statements during the course of an internal affairs investigation, 

not during an investigation pursuant to a Title VII complaint. Id.

at 113. Plaintiff’s allegation in this case that she participated 

in the OIG investigation and was subject to adverse employment 

action for doing so is not “protected activity” for Title VII 

purposes because Title VII only applies to investigations about

discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, religion, and 

color.

Next, Plaintiff relies on her participation in EEOC 

proceedings based both on complaints she made to the EEOC and 

complaints made by co-workers. Defendants concede in their reply 

that EEOC activity is protected by Title VII. Reply, at 3. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged protected activity consisting of 

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her involvement with the EEOC. 

(b) Adverse Employment Action

“[A]n adverse employment action is one that materially affects 

the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of . . . 

employment.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 

1126 (9th Cir. 2000). An adverse employment action is one that “is 

reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected 

activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated during 

a medical leave despite providing documentation to support her 

medical problems. Termination is an adverse employment action. 

Plaintiff also argues that by alleging that Mr. Holmes’s

behavior created a hostile work environment, she has satisfied the

adverse employment action element. 

“For an atmosphere of . . . harassment or hostility to be 

actionable . . . the offending behavior must be sufficiently severe 

or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and 

create an abusive working environment.” Pa. State Police v. 

Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2004) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, 

FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). A hostile work environment 

creates a constructive discharge amounting to an adverse employment 

action when a reasonable person in the same circumstance would feel 

forced to resign. Id. at 147 (citing Breeding v. Arthur J. 

Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1160 (C.A.8 1999)).

Plaintiff fails to meet the requisite pleading standard on 

this aspect of adverse employment action. The complaint repeatedly 

alleges that Mr. Holmes’s conduct was pervasively harassing, 

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aggressive, and threatening, but it provides no indication as to 

what that behavior actually was. Rule 8 requires not just a 

recitation of legal characterizations or labels, but the rule also 

requires pleading facts sufficient to bring the allegations from 

the realm of the speculative to the plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570. The only fact alleged is that Mr. Holmes directed a single 

expletive toward Plaintiff in February, 2008. Compl. ¶ 14. This 

single allegation does not meet the requirement that the “offending 

behavior be . . . sufficiently severe or pervasive.” Suders, 524 

U.S. at 146-47. 

(c) Causal Nexus

Causation “may be inferred from proximity in time between the 

protected action and the allegedly retaliatory employment 

decision.” Ray, 217 F.3d at 1244 (internal quotations omitted). 

There is no bright line amount of time necessary to establish a 

causal connection in a retaliation claim. See Coszalter v. City of 

Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977-978 (9th Cir. 2003) (court rejected a 

bright line rule for establishing causation and found that three to 

eight months is within a time range that can support an inference 

of retaliation). 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that she was unable to return 

to her job because of continued harassment and a hostile working 

environment. Compl. ¶ 29. Plaintiff was then terminated from her 

position. Id. Plaintiff does not directly allege a connection 

between her protected activity and her eventual termination, but 

for the purposes of the present motion to dismiss she does not need 

to. Her burden is to place Defendants on notice as to the nature 

of the claim and to allege facts sufficient to make the allegations 

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plausible. Here, Plaintiff alleges that she complained to the EEOC 

in October and was fired shortly thereafter. These alleged facts 

are sufficient and therefore her first claim survives Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. 

4. Plaintiff’s Racial Discrimination Claim

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s sixth claim, Title VII 

discrimination, on the grounds that the complaint does not contain 

a plausible discrimination claim. Plaintiff responds that there is 

a viable claim, and each element of a prima facie case is met on 

the theory that since Defendants treated Mr. Holmes favorably due 

to his race, Plaintiff was subjected to further harassment from Mr. 

Holmes.

The legal standard for Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim 

is the same as the standard for her retaliation claim except that 

the elements of the prima facie case are different. To establish a 

prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a Plaintiff 

must show “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is 

qualified for his employment; (3) he experienced adverse employment 

action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his 

protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances 

surrounding the adverse action give rise to an inference of 

discrimination. Fonseca v. Sysco Food Services of Arizona, Inc., 

374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 

411 U.S. at 802).

(a) Plaintiff’s Protected Class

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is Hispanic, a class 

protected by Title VII. 

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(b) Plaintiff Was Qualified For Her Position

Defendants argue that the complaint never states that 

Plaintiff was performing according to the employers legitimate 

expectations. Plaintiff concedes the point, but argues in her 

opposition that she can allege facts, if given leave to amend the 

complaint, that she was qualified for her position and performing 

well. Plaintiff states that those facts include allegations about 

positive evaluations and pay increases that she received during the 

course of her employment with CNCS.

(c) Plaintiff Suffered An Adverse Employment Action

For the same reasons discussed supra ̧ Plaintiff sufficiently 

alleges that she suffered an adverse employment action when she was 

terminated after taking medical leave in 2009. Plaintiff does not 

adequately allege a constructive discharge due to a hostile work 

environment. 

(d) Similarly Situated Individuals Were Treated 

More Favorably

“In order to show that the [employees] allegedly receiving 

more favorable treatment are similarly situated . . ., the 

individuals seeking relief must demonstrate, at the least, that 

they are similarly situated to those employees in all material 

respects.” Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(citing Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 

654, 660 (9th Cir.2002)). “[I]ndividuals are similarly situated 

when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct. . . . 

Employees in supervisory positions are generally deemed not to be 

similarly situated to lower level employees.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of 

L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). To meet this element, 

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Plaintiff may also allege that “other circumstances surrounding the 

adverse employment action give rise to an inference of 

discrimination.” Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 

603 (9th Cir. 2004).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Holmes was treated 

more favorably because of his race, which permitted him to continue 

harassing Plaintiff. Mr. Holmes, however, was not similarly 

situated to Plaintiff because the complaint alleges that they 

engaged in very different conduct. Mr. Holmes was allegedly 

hostile, threatening, and aggressive whereas Plaintiff engaged in 

activity protected by Title VII. It is impossible to determine 

whether or not Plaintiff would have been disciplined in the same 

manner as Mr. Holmes if she engaged in similar behavior because 

according to the complaint, Plaintiff never engaged in behavior 

similar to Mr. Holmes. Plaintiff does not allege facts otherwise 

that give rise to a plausible inference of discrimination. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege that similarly situated 

individuals were treated more favorably than she was.

In sum, the Court finds that the complaint places Defendants 

on notice of the nature of the claim against them, but Plaintiff 

fails to allege facts sufficient to make her claim plausible. 

Without facts showing some plausible inference of discrimination, 

related to Mr. Holmes’s behavior or otherwise, Plaintiff’s 

complaint does not meet federal pleading requirements. 

Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed. However, since 

Plaintiff may be able to cure the defects in her complaint through 

amendments, dismissal with leave to amend appropriate. 

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III. ORDER

After carefully reviewing all of the papers filed in relation 

to this motion, the Court rules as follows:

1. All claims against defendant Corporation for National 

Community Service and all Doe defendants are dismissed with 

prejudice;

2. Plaintiff’s Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

and Negligent Supervision, Hiring, and Retention claims are 

dismissed with prejudice;

3. Plaintiff’s Retaliation in Violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-3(a) is not dismissed; and

4. Plaintiff’s remaining claim, Discrimination Based on Race 

in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, is dismissed with leave to 

amend. 

If Plaintiff wishes to file an Amended Complaint that is in 

accordance with this Order, it must be filed within twenty (20) 

days. Otherwise, the suit will proceed only on Plaintiff’s first 

claim for retaliation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2012

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