Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01520/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01520-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NORA LAVERY-PETRASH,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL;

JAMES (JIM) HEARD; DAVID

WITTHAUS; ARTHUR DEWSEN;

ANNALISE O’CONNOR, 

 Defendants.

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2:11-cv-1520-GEB-DAD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants moves for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), and in the alterative

for a more definite statement of Plaintiff’s intentional tort claim

under Rule 12(e). (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff Nora Lavery-Petrash (“LaveryPetrash”) filed an opposition brief. (ECF No. 13.) 

Lavery-Petrash sues Defendants Catholic Healthcare West

(argued by Defendants to have been erroneously sued as Sierra Nevada

Memorial Hospital), James Heard, David Witthaus, Arthur Dewson and

Annalise O’Connor, alleging the following claims in her Complaint: (1)

“Employment Discrimination”; (2) “Intentional Tort”; (3) “General

Negligence”; and (4) “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress”

(“IIED”). This is an employment discrimination case in which

Lavery-Petrash alleges sex and age discrimination claims, and that she

was subjected to a hostile work environment, and to retaliation. 

Case 2:11-cv-01520-GEB-DAD Document 23 Filed 12/13/11 Page 1 of 11
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For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

granted in part and denied in part. Since Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Lavery-Petrash’s intentional tort claim is granted, Defendants’ motion

for a more definite statement of this claim need not be addressed.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the

complaint either 1) lacks a cognizable legal theory, or 2) lacks factual

allegations sufficient to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri

v. Pac. Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To avoid

dismissal, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, the material

allegations of the complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable

inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft,

580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). However, “the tenet that a court must

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is

inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’

Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid

of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555, 557). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the

nonconclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff

to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th

Cir. 2009).

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II. ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT

Lavery-Petrash alleges in a conclusory manner that each

Defendant discriminated against her based on her sex and age by

“treating [her] differently from that of male employees and younger

female employees, in retaliation for Plaintiff’s involvement as a union

steward, and [because] Plaintiff[] fil[ed] . . . grievances to

Defendants for their discriminatory treatment of her.” (Compl. p.6.) 

Further, Lavery-Petrash alleges in her Complaint: she was

“required to continue working with a co-worker [after she] . . .

report[ed] his harassment of her (yelling and screaming); [b]eing

threatened [with] insubordination, and then written up in July, 2009,

for ‘spreading malicious gossip’[;]” she was given her “first negative

performance evaluation in seven years;” she received a written warning

for failure to use a laboratory machine when none of the other employees

who experienced the same problem received such a warning; she received

a second “negative performance evaluation;” and she was denied “the

opportunity to interview for [a] new position” as a supervisor even

though she “applied and believed [she was] qualified[.]” Id. p.10.

Lavery-Petrash further alleges “Defendants’ intent, by reason of the

ongoing harassment and refusal to take any action to relieve Plaintiff

of same, was to pressure her to resign from her position of employment.”

Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII/Age Discrimination/FEHA Claims

1. Individual capacity claims 

Defendants argue that since “individuals cannot be held liable

for discrimination under either Title VII or the FEHA, Plaintiff’s

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claims against Defendants Heard, Witthaus, Dewson and O’Connor should be

dismissed without leave to amend.” (Mot. 6:7-9.) 

Lavery-Petrash’s Title VII and federal age discrimination

claims against each individual defendant are dismissed since there is no

personal liability for employees, including supervisors, under these

statutes. Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th

Cir.1993)(“This circuit . . . protect[s] supervising employees from

liability in their individual capacities” from Title VII and ADEA

claims). Further, Lavery-Petrash’s Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”) claim against each individual defendant is dismissed since

“individuals who do not themselves qualify as employers may not be sued

under the FEHA for alleged discriminatory acts.” Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal.

4th 640, 663 (1998). This dismissal is with prejudice since it is clear

“any amendment would be futile, [and] there [is] no need to prolong the

litigation by permitting further amendment.” Lipton v. Pathogenesis

Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). 

2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants also argue even though “Plaintiff generally pleads

that she filed a timely charge of sex and age discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and received a right to sue ‘in

a state court pursuant to the provisions of the California Fair

Employment and Housing Act and Title VII’ and attaches this alleged

right to sue letter to her complaint as Exhibit ‘A’”, this exhibit “does

not constitute a right to sue letter under Title VII”; and therefore,

“Plaintiff’s pleadings fail to establish that she exhausted her

administrative remedies under Title VII.” (Mot. 4:22-27, 5:4-5.)

Defendants further argue that “a charge must be filed with the EEOC

office within 180 days of the alleged violation, and a Title VII suit

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cannot proceed where a filing is untimely[,]” and “Plaintiff fails to

plead when she filed her complaint with the EEOC[.]” Id. 5:7-13.

Lavery-Petrash alleges she “filed a timely charge of sex

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

[(“EEOC”)] and received a notice dated March 4, 2010, of the right to

sue in state court[.]” (Compl. p.6.) Attached to Lavery-Petrash’s

Complaint is a copy of a right-to-sue letter issued by the California

Department of Fair Employment and Housing. Id. Ex. A. Lavery-Petrash

attached to her opposition brief her EEOC Intake Questionnaire, dated

February 13, 2012, and her Charge of Discrimination, filed with the EEOC

on March 4, 2012. Id. Ex. A. Defendants respond, arguing that “[b]ased

on Plaintiff’s own evidence, the face of her Charge of Discrimination

indicates that her complaint was not timely filed with the EEOC.” (Reply

4:23-24.) 

However, Defendants have not shown that the letter Plaintiff

received from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing

is insufficient satisfaction of her EEOC claim filing requirement. Where

“a plaintiff is entitled to receive a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC,

a plaintiff may proceed absent such a letter, provided she has received

a right-to-sue letter from the appropriate state agency.” Surrell v.

Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2008). Further,

since Plaintiff’s EEOC charge alleges a continuing violation, Defendants

have not shown that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge was untimely. See National

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 118 (2002) (“In order for

the [hostile work environment] charge to be timely, the employee need

only file a charge within 180 . . . days of any act that is part of the

hostile work environment.”). Therefore, this portion of Defendants’

motion is denied.

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3. Harassment Claim for Hostile Work Environment

Defendants argue Lavery-Petrash fails to state a claim for

harassment since she “failed to plead that she was subjected to

harassment based on a particular characteristic[,] . . . that anyone

engaged in conduct [related to] . . . . her protected characteristic[,]”

or “any facts that establish she was subjected to prohibited harassment

by any of the individual Defendants.” (Mot. 8:14-17, 24-25.)

Lavery-Petrash responds: 

Plaintiff argues that the personnel actions to

which she was subjected by the Defendants were not

common, but personal to her. For example, in her

complaint to the EEOC Plaintiff stated that

Defendant Arthus Dewson had told her to quit and

get another job. When Plaintiff questioned said

defendant why he was harassing her, his response

was “because I can”. Further, after attending a

meeting as a union steward on behalf of a coworker, Defendant David Witthaus threatened

Plaintiff of insubordination unless she answered

his question about alleged inappropriate behavior

of another employee. Her refusal to respond to the

threat resulted in a negative performance

evaluation not at all related to her job duties -

the first in her seven years of employment with

Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital.

(Opp’n 3:26-4:7.) 

“To prevail on a hostile workplace claim premised on . . .

sex, a plaintiff must show: (1) that [s]he was subjected to verbal or

physical conduct of a . . . sexual nature; (2) that the conduct was

unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive

to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an

abusive work environment.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642

(9th Cir. 2003). “California courts have adopted the same standard in

evaluating claims under the FEHA.” Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System,

Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 130 (1999). 

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Lavery-Petrash’s factual allegations do not plausibly suggest

a claim for a hostile work environment since what is alleged is not

“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the

plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive work environment.” Vasquez,

349 F.3d at 642. Therefore, Lavery-Petrash’s hostile work environment

claim is dismissed. 

4. Retaliation Claim

Defendants seek dismissal of Lavery-Petrash’s retaliation

claim arguing Lavery-Petrash’s allegations are “insufficient to

establish that Plaintiff engaged in any conduct protected under either

Title VII or the FEHA[.]” (Mot. 10:4-5.) Lavery-Petrash does not respond

to this argument in her opposition brief. 

To allege a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII,

a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show: “(1) involvement in a

protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal

link between the two.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928

(9th Cir. 2000). Under FEHA: “Employees may establish a prima facie case

of unlawful retaliation by showing that (1) they engaged in activities

protected by the FEHA, (2) their employers subsequently took adverse

employment action against them, and (3) there was a causal connection

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”

Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 36 Cal. 4th 446, 472 (2005). 

Lavery-Petrash alleges “Defendants have discriminated against

[her] on the basis of sex and age . . . in retaliation for [her]

involvement as a union steward, and in retaliation for [her] filing of

grievances to Defendants for their discriminatory treatment of her.”

(Compl. p.6.) However, Lavery-Petrash’s factual allegations in her

Complaint are not “plausibly suggestive of a [retaliation] claim

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entitling [her] to relief.” Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Therefore,

Lavery-Petrash’s retaliation claim is dismissed. 

B. Intentional Tort Claim

Defendant seeks dismissal of Lavery-Petrash’s intentional tort

claim, arguing Lavery-Petrash’s intentional tort claim is “vague,

ambiguous, and unintelligible” since “[a]n ‘intentional tort’ is a

category of causes of action that involve intentional acts[,] rather

than a cause of action in and of itself.” (Mot. 7:1, 6:20-22.)

Defendants argues “[t]his label fails to identify what ‘legal theory’

[Lavery-Petrash] is suing under or whether the claim is one for

violation of a federal statute, state statute or common law.” Id. 6:23-

24.

Lavery-Petrash’s intentional tort claim lacks “a cognizable

legal theory.” Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699. Since it is unclear what

claim Lavery-Petrash is alleging in her intentional tort claim, this

claim is dismissed.

C. Negligence Claim

Defendants seek dismissal of Lavery-Petrash’s negligence claim

arguing that “a special duty of care does not exist in an employment

relationship[.]” (Mot. 12:17.) Defendants also argue Lavery-Petrash

alleges intentional acts and “[s]uch willful acts are inconsistent with

an allegation of negligence.” Id. 11:18-19. Defendants further argue

that “Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support her negligence

claim against the individual Defendants.” Id. 12:3-4. Lavery-Petrash

failed to respond to Defendants’ arguments in her opposition. 

In her negligence claim, Lavery-Petrash re-alleges the

intentional conduct which forms the basis of her other claims, and

further alleges: 

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Defendants had a duty to act to protect Plaintiff

from harassment. Plaintiff brought the acts of

harassment to the attention of her superiors, as

well as Human Resources, on many occasions.

Defendants were negligent in not exercising due

care to prevent the harassment. They knew, or

should have known, that such failure to exercise

due care would result in harm to Plaintiff.

(Compl. p.11.)

In the employment context, a claim for negligence

requires the existence of a legal duty of care by

an employer to an employee, a breach of that claim,

proximate causation of plaintiff’s damages, and

damages. A negligence claim thus rests on the

breaching of a duty where the defendant knows or

should know of facts which would warn of

wrongdoing, and fails to [warn of wrongdoing]. If

plaintiff alleges that [the named individuals] had

such a duty and that they breached that duty to

warn of wrongdoing, [she] also cannot allege that

these [individual] defendants committed the

wrongdoing which, in this case, are the

discriminatory acts. It simply makes no logical or

factual sense.

Scott v. Solano Cnty. Health and Soc. Servs. Dep’t, 459 F. Supp. 2d 959,

972 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (internal citation omitted). 

Since Lavery-Petrash alleges Witthaus, Dewson, and O’Connor

acted intentionally, her negligence claim against them is dismissed.

Further, Lavery-Petrash’s negligence claim against Heard is dismissed

since she has not alleged any facts related to Heard. Additionally,

since Lavery-Petrash has failed to allege a harassment claim, she cannot

allege a claim for negligence, based on her employer’s alleged failure

to protect her from harassment. Therefore, Lavery-Petrash’s negligence

claim against her employer is also dismissed. 

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Defendants argue Lavery-Petrash has failed to plead an IIED

claim since what is alleged are “examples of petty behavior that amount

to no more than threats, annoyances, or other trivial conduct . . . that

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cannot form the basis of an IIED claim.” (Mot. 13:12-17.) Defendants

also argue that the “personnel actions that Defendants took against”

Lavery-Petrash are insufficient to state an IIED claim since “a simple

pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a

claim of [IIED], even if improper motive is alleged.” Id. 13:18-25.

Lavery-Petrash does not address these arguments in her opposition brief.

“Under California law, to make out a cause of action for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show, in

relevant part, that the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous

conduct that exceeded the bounds of what is generally tolerated in a

civilized society.” Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 220 F.3d

1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Lavery-Petrash alleges

the employment discrimination she experienced and the hostile work

environment created by Defendants “was extreme and outrageous and an

abuse of the authority and position of defendants[.]” (Compl. p.12.)

However, Lavery-Petrash’s allegations of harassment with the intent to

cause her to resign her position do not allege a plausible IIED claim.

See Walker v. Boeing Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2002)

(citing Janken v. GM Hughes Elec., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80 (1996))

(“[t]erminating an employee for improper or discriminatory reasons . . .

is insufficiently extreme or outrageous to give rise to a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); see also Metoyer v.

Chassman, 248 Fed. Appx. 832, 835 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating Plaintiff’s

“allegations that she was improperly terminated [for discriminatory and

retaliatory reasons] simply do not make out a claim of intentional

infliction of emotional distress”). Therefore, Lavery-Petrash’s IIED

claim is dismissed. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Lavery-Petrash’s Complaint is granted in part and denied in part.

Lavery-Petrash is granted ten (10) days from the date on which this

order is filed to file a First Amended Complaint in which she addresses

the deficiencies in any claim not dismissed with prejudice. Further,

Lavery-Petrash is notified that this action may be dismissed with

prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) if she fails to

file an amended Complaint within the prescribed time period.

Dated: December 12, 2011

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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