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Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 2005 Decided November 4, 2005

No. 03-5077

THE FUND FOR ANIMALS, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

MATTHEW J. HOGAN, ACTING DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES

FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with

04-5077

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv02078)

Jonathan R. Lovvorn argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was Eric R. Glitzenstein.

R. Justin Smith, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

Andrew C. Mergen and John A. Bryson, Attorneys. David C.

USCA Case #03-5077 Document #929889 Filed: 11/04/2005 Page 1 of 12
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Shilton and Greer S. Goldman, Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and TATEL and BROWN,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: The Fund for Animals petitioned

the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to list as endangered or

threatened the trumpeter swans inhabiting Wyoming, Montana,

and Idaho. The Service denied the petition and thereafter

authorized a limited “take” of trumpeter swans incidental to the

2001 and 2002 hunting seasons for tundra swans in Utah and

Nevada. The Fund sued the Service, claiming these decisions

variously violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the

Adminstrative Procedure Act (APA), the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Migratory Bird

Treaty Act (MBTA). The district court rejected the Fund’s

claims, see Fund for Animals v. Williams, 311 F. Supp. 2d 1

(D.D.C. 2004) (ESA claim); Fund for Animals v. Williams, 246

F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2003) (NEPA and MBTA claims); Fund

for Animals v. Williams, 245 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2003)

(APA claim), and the Fund now appeals. 

The Service contends all the Fund’s claims are now moot

and we agree. We therefore affirm the district court’s order

dismissing as moot the Fund’s claim under the ESA, and we

dismiss as moot the Fund’s claims under the APA, the NEPA,

and the MBTA. Finally, we vacate the orders under review

pursuant to United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40

(1950). 

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I. Background

The trumpeter swan is the world’s largest waterfowl. In the

19th century hunters nearly eliminated the trumpeter swan

population in the United States but, pursuant to a treaty between

the United States and Canada, the swans have been protected for

nearly 80 years. See Convention for the Protection of Migratory

Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit. (acting for Canada), Aug. 16, 1916, 39 stat.

1702, 1702 (1916) (bilateral treaty generally prohibiting the

hunting of “Anatidae,” the family to which the trumpeter swan

belongs); 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (implementing the treaty). For

the purpose of managing trumpeter swans in the United States,

the Fish and Wildlife Service divides them into “Pacific Coast,”

“Rocky Mountain,” and “Interior” populations. In 2000 there

were an estimated 3,975 trumpeter swans in the Rocky

Mountain population, of which fewer than 400 inhabited the

Greater Yellowstone “tri-state area” of Wyoming, Montana, and

Idaho.

Until recently, the tri-state trumpeter swans were largely

nonmigratory. In 1992, however, after one particularly harsh

winter caused a significant number of deaths, the Service began

facilitating their seasonal migration to warmer climes via the

Pacific Flyway. Unfortunately, however, trumpeter swans

migrating through the Pacific Flyway are easily mistaken for

tundra swans, a physically similar but vastly more populous

species. Because the hunting of tundra swans is legal in several

of the States in the Pacific Flyway, the Service anticipated that

each year hunters of tundra swans would accidentally kill a

certain number of trumpeter swans. 

In 1995 the Service launched a five-year experiment with

the aim of fostering migration by trumpeter swans while

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simultaneously reducing the risk posed by hunters: Hunting

trumpeter swans would remain illegal, but the Service would

accept a certain “take,” or number of accidental deaths, among

trumpeter swans in Utah and Nevada; if and when the specified

number of trumpeter swans was killed, the Service and the State

would terminate the hunting of tundra swans for that season. 

A. The Fund’s Listing Petition

 

Any “interested person” may petition the Secretary of the

Interior to list a “species” as endangered or threatened. 16

U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14; see also 16 U.S.C.

§ 1532(16) (“species” may be a “distinct population segment”).

“To the maximum extent practicable, within 90 days after

receiving [a] petition,” the Service must “make a finding as to

whether the petition presents substantial scientific or

commercial information indicating that the petitioned action

may be warranted.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. §

424.14(b)(1). If the Service concludes in its 90-day finding that

the action requested in the petition may be warranted, then it

must “promptly commence a review of the status of the species

concerned.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A). Separately the ESA

authorizes the Secretary immediately to list a species facing

“any emergency posing a significant risk to the well-being of

[that] species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7). 

 In August 2000 the Fund petitioned the Service to list, on an

emergency and alternatively on a non-emergency basis, the tristate portion of the Rocky Mountain population as endangered

or threatened. See The Biodiversity Legal Foundation & The

Fund for Animals, “Petition for a Rule to List the Greater

Yellowstone (Tri-state) Breeding Population of the Trumpeter

Swan (Cygnus buccinator) as Threatened or Endangered” (Aug.

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22, 2000). In September the Service replied in a two-page letter

stating, “The birds included in [the Fund’s] petition are not

recognized by the Service as a population,” and adding that the

Service did not “have listing funds currently available to initiate

work on a 90-day finding.”

The Fund then sued the Service in district court, claiming

the letter did not adequately explain why the Service was

denying the Fund’s request for an emergency listing of the tristate population and seeking an order requiring the Service to

fulfill the 90-day finding requirement of the ESA. Finding the

letter provided no “explanation as to why the Service does not

recognize the Tri-State swans as a population separate from the

[Rocky Mountain] swans,” 246 F. Supp. 2d at 36, the district

court entered a summary judgment for the Fund, remanding the

matter to the Service for elucidation. 

 

In January 2003 the Service finally published the requisite

90-day finding in which it detailed why the tri-state trumpeter

swans were not a distinct population segment apart from the

Rocky Mountain population. First, the Service determined that

the tri-state swans were not “markedly separated from other

populations of the same taxon as a consequence of physical,

physiological, ecological, or behavioral factors.” 68 Fed. Reg.

4221, 4223-25 (Jan. 28, 2003). Second, it found they were not

“delimited by international governmental boundaries within

which differences in control of exploitation, management of

habitat, conservation status or regulatory mechanisms exist that

are significant with regard to conservation of the taxon.” Id. at

4223, 4225-26. The tri-state trumpeter swans were therefore

part of the Rocky Mountain population, which had grown on

average by 4.8% per year from 1968 to 2000 and were neither

endangered nor threatened. See id. at 4228. The district court,

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noting that the belated finding had provided “a coherent

statement of reasons for the Service’s conclusion that the TriState Trumpeter swans are not a distinct population segment,”

311 F. Supp. 2d at 8, granted the Service’s motion to amend the

judgment and to dismiss as moot the Fund’s claim under the

ESA. 

 

B. The 2001 Environmental Assessment

 Deeming its experimental migration program of 1995 to

2000 a success, the Service decided to incorporate the program

into the regulations it issues each year to govern the hunting of

migratory birds. In 2001, therefore, the Service did an

environmental assessment (EA), see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b)-(c),

1508.9, “to establish regulatory options and management

direction for Trumpeter and Tundra swans based on past

experience with the authorization of a limited take of Trumpeter

swans in the Pacific Flyway.” U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,

Proposal to Establish Operational/Experimental General Swan

Hunting Seasons in the Pacific Flyway 3 (June 15, 2001).

Although the hunting of trumpeter swans remained illegal, the

2001 EA allowed for an accidental take of up to 15 birds -- five

in Nevada and ten in Utah. As in the experimental program, if

and when a quota was reached the Service and the relevant State

were to terminate the hunting season for tundra swans. The

Service also issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI),

see 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e), and therefore did not develop a fullblown environmental impact statement (EIS) for its proposal.

The Service went on to incorporate the 2001 EA into its annual

migratory bird hunting framework regulations for 2001, see 66

Fed. Reg. 49,478, 49,482-485 (Sept. 27), and again for 2002, 67

Fed. Reg. 59,110, 59,114-115 (Sept. 19). 

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Meanwhile, back in district court the Fund, referring to the

2001 EA, alleged the Service had “decid[ed] to establish a

permanent hunting season for Trumpeter swans,” in violation of

various statutes and treaties. First, the Fund claimed the Service

had violated § 706 of the APA by failing to provide the court

with the “whole record” upon which it had based the 2001 EA.

The district court denied the Fund’s motion to compel because

the Service had submitted “14 volumes containing more than

6,000 pages” and the Fund had failed to establish that “the

adminstrative record was [not] properly designated.” 245 F.

Supp. 2d at 57-58. 

The Fund also claimed the Service had violated the NEPA

when it set the maximum accidental take of trumpeter swans

without first having compiled an EIS. The district court rejected

the Fund’s NEPA claim because it determined the Service had

in the EA “adequately considered and disclosed the

environmental impact of the Trumpeter swan quota” and

because -- adverting to the criteria set forth in 40 C.F.R. §

1508.27(b)(4)-(9) -- “the quota did not have highly controversial

or uncertain effects and was not likely to cause loss of historic

resources, establish a precedent, or adversely affect a threatened

species.” 246 F. Supp. 2d at 47-48. 

Finally, the Fund claimed the 2001 EA violated the MBTA,

16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712, which implements several treaties

protecting migratory birds. The MBTA, the Fund argued, does

not permit the Service to balance the interests of hunters against

“the specific factors set forth in the MBTA, such as the

‘distribution, abundance, ... [and] breeding habits’ of Trumpeter

swan populations.” Amended Complaint at ¶ 147 (quoting 16

U.S.C. § 704(a)). The district court, upon concluding the

Service had given “due regard to the MBTA factors ... and did

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not exceed [its] statutory authority in considering non-statutory

factors,” 246 F. Supp. 2d at 41, granted summary judgment in

favor of the Service. 

 In 2003, after the district court had disposed of the Fund’s

claims under the APA, the NEPA, and the MBTA, the Service

issued a new EA. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Proposal

to Establish Operational General Swan Hunting Seasons in the

Pacific Flyway (Aug. 5, 2003). The new EA, accompanied by

a new FONSI, became the basis for the provisions of the

framework regulations governing the hunting of tundra swans

during the 2003, 2004, and 2005 seasons. See 68 Fed. Reg.

55,784, 55,787 (Sept. 26, 2003); 69 Fed. Reg. 57,140, 57,149

(Sept. 23, 2004); 70 Fed. Reg. 55,666, 55,678 (Sept. 22, 2005).

Although the 2001 and 2003 EAs specify the same quotas for

Utah and Nevada, the 2003 EA includes data from the 2002

season and newly conditions the authorization of Utah’s tundra

swan hunting season upon a “Memorandum of Agreement”

between the Service and that State “to improve collection of

information on harvested swans.”

II. Analysis

The Service contends all the Fund’s claims, whether they

relate to the Fund’s 2000 listing petition or to the Service’s 2001

EA, are moot. The Fund, for its part, resists on both fronts and

seeks a ruling on the merits of all its claims.

A. The 2000 Listing Petition

The district court amended its judgment and dismissed as

moot the Fund’s claim under the ESA because the finding the

Service issued in January 2003 fully cured the defects of its

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September 2000 letter, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 8. We review the

district court’s determination of mootness de novo. City of

Houston v. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1426

(1994).

The Fund argues the 90-day finding did not supercede or

amend the earlier letter, which addressed the Fund’s petition to

“initiate emergency listing under section 1533(b)(7) of the

ESA.” Under the Fund’s theory, the Service conclusively

decided the issue of emergency listing in 2000, as evidenced by

the letter. The district court, by this account, erred when it

decided “retroactively [to] dismiss [the Fund’s] claim

concerning the Service’s September 2000 decision denying

emergency listing because an extra-record, post-hoc document

issued in January 2003 somehow cured the agency’s failure to

provide a coherent statement of reasons in September 2000.”

Moreover, the Fund points out that on its face the “90-day

finding does not purport to ‘repromulgate,’ ‘revise,’ cancel,

modify, or supercede the September 2000 emergency listing

decision in any way.” 

In response the Service contends that a “negative

determination on the 90-day finding necessarily meant that

emergency listing was not warranted.” In addition, the Service

argues that although it responded promptly to the Fund by letter,

it was under no obligation to respond at all because the

“statutory and regulatory provisions addressing emergency

listing do not provide for petitions.” See 16 U.S.C. §

1533(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14.

Contrary to the Fund’s suggestion, the ESA clearly

establishes but a single petition process for listing a species as

endangered or threatened, see 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A); there

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is no separate process in the ESA or its implementing

regulations for requesting an “emergency listing” as opposed to

a “non-emergency” listing. Although § 1533(b)(7) does permit

the Secretary to list a species based upon an “emergency posing

a significant risk to the well-being of [that] species,” that type of

listing is expressly committed to the Secretary’s “discretion,”

the exercise of which is not structured by any statutorily

prescribed criteria or procedures. The Fund therefore had no

statutory right to petition the Secretary for an emergency listing

under § 1533(b)(7), and no right to a decision meeting any

particular procedural or substantive standards. Insofar as the

Service’s letter of September 2000 addressed the Fund’s petition

for non-emergency listing, the district court did not err in

dismissing as moot the Fund’s claim because the letter was

superceded in full by the belated 90-day finding. This sequence

of events is analogous to the merger of a preliminary injunction

into a permanent injunction, upon which “an appeal from the

grant of [the] preliminary injunction becomes moot.” Grupo

Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527

U.S. 308, 314 (1999). 

B. The 2001 EA 

The Service contends the Fund’s claims under the APA, the

NEPA, and the MBTA are moot because the Service “relied on

the 2001 EA for two hunting seasons -- 2001-02 and 2002-03 --

and has subsequently relied on the 2003 EA.” The Fund

confirmed at oral argument that the “crux of [its] challenge was

to the [2001] EA.” Although the 2001 EA and the regulations

based thereupon are no longer in effect, the Fund argues its

present dilemma is one “capable of repetition, yet evading

review.” So. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515

(1911). In particular, the Fund maintains “the Service’s

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approach virtually guarantees that their EAs will ‘systematically

evade review,’ since at any point in the judicial review process,

the agency can simply issue a new EA and declare ‘moot’ any

legal challenge.”

Under the law of this circuit, regardless whether the present

situation is “capable of repetition,” it is not one “evading

review.” As a general rule, two years is enough time for a

dispute to be litigated. See LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974,

978 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also So. Pac. Terminal, 219 U.S. at

514-16 (duration of less than two years insufficient to litigate

dispute). 

 

The 2001 EA was issued in June of that year and remained

in effect until August 2003, or somewhat more than two years.

The 2003 EA has already been in effect for more than two years

and has served as the basis for the relevant provisions of the

2003, 2004, and 2005 regulations; the 2003 EA will therefore be

in effect for at least three years. Moreover, the Fund has offered

no evidence for its suggestion that the Service is cynically

inclined to “moot any legal challenge” the Fund may mount in

the future. Because the 2001 EA has long since been succeeded

and the situation of which the Fund complains, should it recur,

is not one likely to evade review, we dismiss as moot the Fund’s

claims under the APA, the NEPA, and the MBTA. 

Finally, the Service argues we should not vacate the orders

under review because this case was mooted as a “result of events

within the control of ... the Fund.” In particular, the Service

contends the Fund should have sought expedited review in this

court during the six months between the district court’s ruling

and the issuance of the 2003 EA. Be that as it may, “we have

repeatedly held that we will not consider the possibility of

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expedited review in determining mootness.” Hinckley v. United

States, 163 F.3d 647, 651 n.8 (1999). 

The Service also faults the Fund for not severing its claims

under the ESA from those under the APA, the NEPA, and the

MBTA for purposes of appellate review; the pendency in the

district court of the Service’s motion for reconsideration of the

ESA claim then would not have delayed our consideration of the

Fund’s other claims. As the Fund points out, however, it did

attempt to appeal “the MBTA and NEPA claims that were not

subject to the [Service’s] motion to amend the judgment as to

the ESA claims.” Rather than separately entertain the non-ESA

claims, however, the court held them in abeyance pending

resolution of the Service’s motion. The Fund therefore did not

sit on its hands, as the Service suggests.

 

Because the Service mooted the claims then pending before

us, the Fund should not be prejudiced by orders that have not

been reviewed on their merits. Indeed, vacatur is “commonly

utilized in precisely this situation to prevent a judgment,

unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal

consequences.” Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 41. 

 

III. Conclusion

In sum, none of the Fund’s claims presents a live

controversy. We therefore affirm the order of the district court

amending its judgment and dismissing as moot the Fund’s claim

under the ESA, dismiss as moot the Fund’s claims under the

APA, the NEPA, and the MBTA, and vacate the orders of the

district court relating thereto. 

So ordered.

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