Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02622/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02622-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES RAYMOND ACRES,

Plaintiff,

v.

BLUE LAKE RANCHERIA TRIBAL 

COURT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02622-WHO 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 32, 33

INTRODUCTION 

 Plaintiff James Acres seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants Blue Lake 

Casino & Hotel (“BLC&H”), the Blue Lake Rancheria tribal court, tribal judge Lester Marston, 

and Anita Huff (“Clerk Huff”), asserting that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction over him in an

underlying contractual dispute and that the individual court employees exceeded their authority

during the pendency of the tribal action. Defendants move to dismiss to require Acres to exhaust 

his tribal remedies. Mot. [Dkt. No. 32].1

 Because tribal court jurisdiction is at least colorable, not 

futile, and neither motivated by a desire to harass nor conducted in bad faith, Acres is required to 

exhaust his tribal remedies before bringing his lawsuit in federal court, and defendants’ motion is 

GRANTED.

BACKGROUND 

Acres is an employee and president of Acres Bonusing, Inc. (“ABI”), a California 

distributor for Talo, Inc. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 12 [Dkt. No. 1]. BLC&H sued Acres and ABI in Tribal 

Court Case Number C-15-1215LJM, on January 12, 2016. Id., Exh. 5. That case concerns an 

agreement into which ABI and Acres entered with BLC&H for the purpose of providing BLC&H 

 

1

The tribal court, Judge Marston, and Clerk Huff filed a notice of joinder to BLC&H’s motion to 

dismiss. DKt. No. 33. 

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with the iSlot Platform, a casino gaming platform developed by Talo, Inc. (the “iSlot 

Agreement”). Id. ¶¶ 10, 11. BLC&H’s complaint asserts claims for breach of contract, breach of 

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent inducement. 

Id., Exh. 5. 

On January 17, 2016, Acres was served with the summons and complaint in the tribal 

action. Id. ¶ 25. The summons directed Acres to respond within “five (5) days after service under 

pain of Default Judgment.” Id. ¶ 26. On January 22, 2016, Acres went before the tribal court to 

make specially appear for himself and ABI, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed 

with the underlying tribal action. Id. ¶ 28. On January 25, 2016, Clerk Huff notified Acres via 

email that his special appearances were rejected because they did not comply with tribal court’s 

procedural rules. Id. ¶ 29. The next day, Acres resubmitted his special appearances. Id. ¶ 30. On 

February 16, 2016 Judge Marston issued an order rejecting the special appearances and listing the 

ways in which the filings did not conform to the tribal court’s rules. Id. ¶ 33; Exh. 16. The order 

provided Acres with 30 days to file an answer or responsive pleading. Id. ¶ 33. 

On March 9, 2016, Acres and ABI filed the instant action in federal court, alleging that it is 

“not possible for the Tribal Court to provide due process to non-members Acres” and that 

“because the tribal court answers to the Tribe’s Business Council, and the Business Council 

derives significant revenue for the Tribe from BLC&H, it is unreasonable to expect the Tribal 

Court to be an impartial arbiter in [this] dispute.” Id. ¶ 50. Acres also asserts that he never 

consented to tribal jurisdiction and that “[b]y the Tribe’s own rules, [he] is clearly not subject to 

the Tribe’s jurisdiction because he has never done business with the Tribal Court’s territorial 

jurisdiction as a natural person.” Id. ¶¶ 61, 57. 

Acres’s complaint presents five claims for declaratory and injunctive relief: (i) a 

declaration that the iSlot Agreement does not establish tribal jurisdiction over non-members of the 

tribe; (ii) a declaration that the tribal court cannot provide due process in cases involving tribal 

plaintiffs and non-tribal defendants; (iii) a declaration that Clerk Huff exceeded her authority by 

issuing the five-day summons; (iv) a declaration that Judge Marston exceeded his authority by 

issuing the February 24, 2016 order; (v) a declaration that defendants “went outside the bounds of 

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tribal law” by serving the five-day summons and bringing the underlying suit; and (vi) injunctive 

relief prohibiting defendants from continuing the prosecution of the underlying tribal action. Id. 

¶¶ 71-84. Defendants moved to dismiss, and I heard argument on July 20, 2016. 

DISCUSSION 

 Although defendants make several arguments, this Order focuses on whether this court 

lacks jurisdiction because Acres has not exhausted his tribal remedies. On this threshold issue, I 

agree with defendants. 

“Non-Indians may bring a federal common law cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to 

challenge tribal court jurisdiction.” Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842, 

846 (9th Cir. 2009). However, as a matter of comity, before bringing suit in federal court nonIndians must generally first exhaust tribal remedies. Id. at 846. The Supreme Court recognizes 

four exceptions to this requirement: “(1) when an assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is motivated 

by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith; (2) when the tribal court action is patently 

violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions; (3) when exhaustion would be futile because of the 

lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction; and (4) when it is plain 

that tribal court jurisdiction is lacking, so that the exhaustion requirement would serve no purpose 

other than delay.” Id. at 847 (internal quotation marks, citations and modifications omitted). As 

to the fourth exception, if the tribal court’s jurisdiction is “colorable” or “plausible,” the district 

court is required to dismiss or abstain. See Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court Assiniboine, 513 

F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Acres asserts that because the first, third, and fourth exceptions apply he is not required to 

exhaust tribal remedies. Oppo. 12 [Dkt. No. 40]. I consider each argument in turn.

I. BAD FAITH 

Acres rests his arguments concerning the tribal court’s bad faith on: (i) issuance of the 

initial summons that incorrectly provided him with only five days to respond; (ii) Judge Marston’s 

joinder in the present motion to dismiss; and (iii) an “ambiguously scheduled” case management 

conference. Oppo. at 16-17. His arguments are not well taken. 

The mistaken five day summons was not issued in bad faith, even though one can see why 

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Acres got frustrated. Clerk Huff’s declaration explains that she incorrectly applied the standard 

for unlawful detainer matters rather than the timeline for standard civil litigation. Huff Decl. ¶ 8 

[Dkt. No. 32-4]. Acres attempted to respond within the five day deadline by emailing a pleading 

entitled “Special Appearance” to the court on January 22, 2016, but Clerk Huff replied via email 

explaining that his filings did not conform to the tribal court local rules. Compl., Exh. 13. Acres 

then followed up by emailing another “Special Appearance” filing which attempted, but failed to 

address the identified errors. Compl., Exh. 14. The court responded to his secondary filings in its 

February 16, 2016 order that described why the tribal court rejected the documents and provided 

him with thirty days from the issuance of the order to respond in a manner that was compliant with 

the court’s rules. Compl., Exh. 16. Id. Acres then filed documents entitled “Joint Request for 

Clarification Regarding Feb 16 Order by Judge Marsten [sic]” and a “Notice of Jurisdiction 

Barrier to Co-operation with Case Management Statement and Conference,” Dkt. No. 11, Exh. 7, 

which the tribal court accepted despite their procedural deficiencies. Id. On the same day, Clerk 

Huff notified the plaintiffs in the tribal court action that the five day summons was issued in error 

and instructed them to serve Acres with a corrected, 30-day summons. Dkt. No. 11, Exh. 8. 

Considering the court’s acknowledgement of its mistake, the guidance it provided to Acres, the 

extensions of time it granted, and its acceptance of documents despite their procedural 

deficiencies, a finding of bad faith based on the five day summons is unwarranted. 

Acres’s other claims do not support a finding of bad faith either. Acres named Judge 

Marston as an individual defendant in this lawsuit. The judge’s joinder in BLC&H’s motion to 

dismiss does not, as Acres argues, demonstrate his belief that Acres or ABI are at fault in the 

underlying tort action. No view on the underlying action is expressed in either the joinder or the 

motion to dismiss. And, even assuming there was some ambiguity as to the date of a case 

management conference scheduled in the tribal court action, Acres offers no reason to believe the 

ambiguity arises from bad faith. See Dkt. No. 20, Exh. 3 (continuing the May 13, 2016 conference 

to the “first Friday at least fourteen (14) calendar days following the date an order is issued” in the 

district court case); Dkt. No. 21 (issuing the order on a Friday). 

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II. FUTILITY

A party is excused from exhausting claims in tribal court when exhaustion would be futile 

because of the lack of adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction. Grand Canyon 

Skywalk Dev., LLC v. ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013). This exception is 

generally applied in only the most extreme cases. Id. This is not one of those cases. 

Acres asserts that the tribal court is “incapable” of providing due process and that 

challenging jurisdiction in that court is futile considering that he has already made “strenuous 

good-faith efforts to make Special Appearance.” Compl. at ¶¶ 67-69. But Acres’s special 

appearance and pleadings did not conform to the procedural rules of the court. The tribal court 

issued several orders, including on February 16, 2016 and March 25, 2016, that provide in lengthy 

detail how his filings were defective. Compl., Exh. 16; Dkt. No. 11, Exh. 7. Despite the 

deficiencies of his filings, Acres was provided with extensions of time and his filings were 

ultimately accepted despite their defects. Id. The tribal court’s initial refusal to accept noncompliant filings does not demonstrate futility. Based on the record before me, there is no reason 

to question defendants’ representation that “Acres and ABI have a full and fair opportunity to 

challenge the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction before the Tribal Court[] itself.” Mot. at 18. 

III. COLORABLE BASIS FOR TRIBAL JURISDICTION 

To determine whether the fourth exception to tribal court exhaustion (whether tribal court 

jurisdiction is plainly lacking) applies, my job is not to conclude with certainty that the tribal court 

has jurisdiction, but only whether jurisdiction is “colorable or plausible.” Elliott, 566 F.3d at 848 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 

(1981), the Supreme Court stated the general rule that, absent congressional direction, the inherent 

sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the conduct of nonmembers of the tribe on 

non-Indian land. But the Court recognized two exceptions: (i) “[a] tribe may regulate, through 

taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 

relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 

arrangements;” (ii) “[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the 

conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some 

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direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” 

Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (citations omitted). 

A colorable or plausible basis for jurisdiction exists in this case based on the first Montana

exception, which “allows a tribe to exercise jurisdiction over the activities of nonmembers who 

enter into a consensual relationship with a tribe.” Big Horn Cty. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Adams, 219 

F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2000). “Deference to tribal courts is required when the disputed issue 

‘arises on the reservation’ or involves a ‘reservation affair’ and no exceptions to the exhaustion 

rule exist.” Landmark Golf Ltd. P’ship v. Las Vegas Paiute Tribe, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1175 (D. 

Nev. 1999) (internal modifications and citations omitted). 

A consensual relationship between Acres and BLC&H was created when the parties signed 

the iSlot Agreement.2 Acres asserts that because the agreement was executed in San Diego 

County, presumably off the reservation, the contract cannot serve as the basis for jurisdiction. 

Oppo. at 14. But beyond a notation in the contract of ABI’s address in Encinitas, California, there 

is no firm indication that the contract was signed by Acres in Encinitas, nor is there any evidence 

of where BLC&H executed the agreement. See Compl., Exh. 7. Defendants assert that Acres was 

present on tribal lands multiple times to negotiate the agreement and discuss payment under the 

contract. Mot. at 22 (citing Frank Decl., Dkt. No. 9-4). Consideration of the other elements of the 

case – including that the iSlot Agreement involved a tribal gaming corporation, it was performed 

in the casino on tribal lands, and it implicated the tribe’s ability to conduct its business affairs –

weigh in favor of a finding of tribal jurisdiction. See Admiral Ins. Co. v. Blue Lake Rancheria 

Tribal Court, No. 5:12-cv-01266-LHK, 2012 WL 1144331, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2012) 

(finding a colorable basis for tribal jurisdiction despite the plaintiff’s arguments that the policy at 

issue was issued and entered into off tribal lands); see also Landmark Golf Ltd. P’ship, 49 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1175 (“The alleged misrepresentations may have occurred off the physical boundaries 

 

2Despite Acres’s arguments to the contrary, there is no requirement that a party must explicitly 

consent to tribal jurisdiction in its contract with the tribe. Montana’s clear wording allows a tribe 

to regulate “nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, 

through . . . contracts.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. If the Supreme Court had desired to require 

parties to explicitly consent to tribal jurisdiction, they would have said so. 

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of the reservation in no way undermines the inescapable conclusion that a decision on the merits 

of this case will have a direct impact on the property interests and future economic activity of the 

Tribe.”). 

To be clear, I am not making a finding that the tribal court has jurisdiction, only that it is 

plausible that it does, and that Acres and ABI must exhaust tribal remedies before seeking to 

litigate in this court. Based on the limited record before me, the tribal court does not “plainly” 

lack jurisdiction so as to excuse Acres from exhausting tribal remedies. Grand Canyon Skywalk 

Dev., LLC, 715 F.3d at 1203. The orderly administration of justice will be served by allowing the 

tribal court to make a decision regarding its jurisdiction on a full record. See Nat’l Farmers Union 

Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985) (“The orderly administration 

of justice in the federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal 

Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed.”). 

Accordingly, because Acres has failed to exhaust tribal remedies, I grant the motion to dismiss.3

CONCLUSION 

 Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter is GRANTED.4 This case is 

DISMISSED and the Clerk shall close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 10, 2016 

______________________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge 

 

3 Because I am granting the motion to dismiss on this basis, I do not address the defendants’ tribal 

sovereign immunity arguments. See Admiral Ins. Co, 2012 WL 1144331, at *2 (denying the 

plaintiff’s temporary restraining order on failure to exhaust grounds and declining to address the 

defendants’ sovereign immunity). 

4 Defendants’ request for judicial notice of documents related to the status of the Blue Lake 

Rancheria is denied as MOOT. Dkt. No. 32-1. 

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