Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00431/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00431-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID RAY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0431 LKK DAD PS

v.

C.S.P. SOLANO STATE PRISON

MEDICAL STAFF, et al., ORDER

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, proceeding in this action pro se, has requested leave to proceed in forma

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to the undersigned in

accordance with Local Rule 72-302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted an application that makes the showing required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Accordingly, plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis will be

granted.

The determination that plaintiff may proceed with this case in forma pauperis does

not complete the required inquiry. Under § 1915(e)(2), the court is required to dismiss an in

forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if the action is frivolous

or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief

against an immune defendant. A claim is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law

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26 Attachments to plaintiff’s complaint reflect that the correct spelling is “Rohrer.” 1

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or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff

must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, U.S. , , 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as

true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co.

v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245

(9th Cir. 1989). The court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618,

624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Although pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted

by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), even a pro se pleading must contain “(1)

a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a

demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although the

Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give each defendant fair notice

of the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant. The plaintiff must allege with at least some degree

of particularity overt acts which the defendant engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claims. See

Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

Here, plaintiff is a former state prisoner who seeks $15 million in compensatory

damages and $5 million in punitive damages from medical staff at California State Prison -

Solano. Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Practitioner Martin and Drs. Noriega, Naku, Tan, Rohrer

(sued as Rohere), and Traquina showed deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs in 1

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 A court may take judicial notice of court records. See MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 2

803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

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2006. The court’s records reflect that plaintiff has filed numerous suits concerning his medical

care while in state custody.2

Plaintiff previously sued Drs. Noriega, Naku, and Rohrer, along with other

defendants, in case No. CIV S-04-2559 LKK KJM P, which is currently proceeding solely on

plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Rohrer concerning events that allegedly occurred at California State

Prison - Solano in 2003. In addition, plaintiff previously sued Drs. Traquina, Naku, and Rohrer

in case No. CIV S-06-1474 LKK GGH P, in which plaintiff’s first amended complaint

concerning events that occurred at California State Prison - Solano from 2003 through 2005 was

dismissed on October 23, 2007 with thirty days’ leave to file a second amended complaint. On

March 5, 2007, plaintiff filed the present case together with case No. CIV S-07-0432 GEB EFB

PS, in which plaintiff has sued Drs. Rohrer and Traquina, as well as two other medical staff

members, concerning events that occurred between December 2005 and April 2006. On July 31,

2007, plaintiff was ordered to provide the United States Marshal with documents for service on

the four defendants in that case.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires an actual connection or link between the actions of each

defendant and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

“A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

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complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Supervisory

personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory

of respondeat superior and, therefore, if a defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link

between that defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See

Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th

Cir. 1978).

In the present case, plaintiff alleges that six individuals deprived him of his right

to adequate medical care on specific dates in 2006. A prisoner’s claims of deliberate indifference

to medical needs arise under the Eighth Amendment. To state an Eighth Amendment claim, the

prisoner must allege facts showing that objectively he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation

of the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and that subjectively each

defendant had a culpable state of mind when he or she caused or allowed the serious deprivation

to occur. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99

(1991). The culpable state of mind that must be shown is one of deliberate indifference to the

prisoner’s needs. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299. Neither accident nor

negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319

(1986).

To meet the applicable standards, a plaintiff who claims that prison staff denied

medical care or provided inadequate medical care must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently

harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A claim of constitutionally inadequate medical care has two elements: “the

seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that

need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992). A medical need is serious “if

the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” 974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at

104). Indications of a serious medical need include “the presence of a medical condition that

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significantly affects an individual’s daily activities.” Id. at 1059-60. In addition to alleging facts

demonstrating the seriousness of his medical need, the prisoner must allege facts demonstrating

that each defendant responded to the serious medical need with deliberate indifference. 

Allegations demonstrating deliberate indifference are required in order to satisfy the subjective

prong of the two-part test applicable to an Eighth Amendment claim. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged with regard

to medical care, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’

‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter

Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). Deliberate

indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence” and “requires ‘more than

ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835

(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). Mere differences of opinion between a

prisoner and prison medical staff as to proper medical or mental health care do not give rise to a

§ 1983 claim. See Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Oregon, 662

F.2d 1337, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981).

The undersigned has reviewed plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Eighth

Amendment standards set forth above. Plaintiff alleges that he was seen by Nurse Practitioner

Martin on April 14, 2006, for complaints of abdomen, back, and knee pain. He wanted the nurse

to increase the dosage of a medication he was taking, but she prescribed a different medication. 

On May 31, 2006, plaintiff was again seen by defendant Martin and complained of abdomen and

back pain. Plaintiff stated that the new medication was causing pain in his chest area. Defendant

Martin discontinued the new medication. Plaintiff contends that defendant Martin showed

deliberate indifference to his medical condition on April 14, 2006, by taking him off a

medication that “worked,” allegedly “because it would be cheaper to afford when plaintiff

paroled,” and again on May 31, 2006, when she discontinued the new medication but did not

prescribe anything for pain at that time. Although plaintiff alleges that he did not receive

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anything for abdominal pain for 90 days after May 31, 2006, plaintiff’s allegations reveal that he

was seen by two doctors during that period of time and that pain medications were prescribed. 

(Compl. at 2-3.)

The undersigned assumes for screening purposes that plaintiff’s pain constituted a

serious medical need on April 14, 2006, and May 31, 2006. The undersigned finds that

plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate deliberate indifference by defendant Martin on either

date. Although plaintiff now claims that the first medication “worked,” that assertion is

inconsistent with plaintiff’s allegation that he was seen on April 14, 2006, for complaints of

abdomen, back, and knee pain. Similarly, plaintiff claims that defendant Martin acted with

deliberate indifference on May 31, 2006, when she discontinued the new medication, but she did

so after plaintiff complained that the medication caused chest pain. Defendant Martin’s alleged

failure to prescribe pain medication for 90 days after May 31, 2006, is contradicted by the fact

that plaintiff was seen in June and July 2006 by doctors who prescribed medication. Plaintiff’s

allegations suggest, at most, a mere difference of opinion between plaintiff and defendant Martin

concerning his medication. 

With regard to Drs. Noriega, Naku, Tan, and Rohrer, plaintiff alleges that all four

physicians showed deliberate indifference to his need for pain medication for his knee, although

one doctor ordered medication for plaintiff on June 30, 2006 and another doctor re-ordered the

medication on July 25, 2006 after plaintiff reported that he had not received it. Plaintiff

“allege[s] and accuse[s]” all four doctors “of not signing and or making sure that the farmacy

[sic] did there [sic] job.” Plaintiff contends that the doctors acted with deliberate indifference. 

(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff has sued the doctors on the basis of their alleged supervisory capacity relative

to pharmacy staff, but plaintiff has not alleged a specific causal link between any doctor and

pharmacy staff. Moreover, plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that each defendant had a

culpable state of mind when he caused or allowed a constitutional deprivation to occur.

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Plaintiff further alleges that Drs. Noriega, Naku, and Rohrer were deliberately

indifferent to plaintiff’s back pain on July 25, 2006, and July 28, 2006, “because plaintiff [sic]

back pain and problems were never mention [sic] and or addressed” in the first level response to

his inmate appeal. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff’s complaint includes a copy of his inmate appeal, in which

he asked to “be put back on Neorontin [sic] and that I see a neorologist [sic] to see what he can

give me for the constant lower back pain.” (Id., Ex. at 3.) The first level response reflects that

plaintiff requested “to be placed back on Neurontin [sic] and . . . to be referred to a neurologist,

who can help alleviate your pain.” (Id., Ex. at 8.) Plaintiff was interviewed by Dr. Rohrer, and

an inquiry was conducted, including a review of plaintiff’s health record. (Id., Ex. at 9.) Plaintiff

was receiving Prilosec and was to begin receiving Etridolac, a non-steroidal medication

recommended by a surgical consultant. A determination was made that a referral to a neurologist

was not medically indicated. The appeal was partially granted in that plaintiff was prescribed 

Neurontin, as he requested. (Id.) According to Dr. Naku, plaintiff indicated that he was satisfied

with the response to his appeal. (Id.) Plaintiff’s allegations do not support his claim that the first

level appeal response failed to mention or address the problems identified in his inmate appeal

and fall far short of demonstrating a serious deprivation of the right not to be subjected to cruel

and unusual punishment. Furthermore, plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that any defendant

had a culpable state of mind with regard to the first level response to the inmate appeal. 

Finally, plaintiff alleges that Chief Medical Officer Traquina violated plaintiff’s right to

due process, was deliberately indifferent, and attempted to manipulate the facts about documents

and testing performed in July 2006 when he did not allow “plaintiff [sic] right knee to be fixed

before he paroled, and just to aleviate [sic] the pain.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff has not alleged any

facts that suggest a violation of due process, and the vague references to documents and testing

do not demonstrate deliberate indifference by Dr. Traquina. In the second level response to

plaintiff’s inmate appeal, Dr. Traquina advised plaintiff concerning the procedure for obtaining a

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surgery referral. Plaintiff has not alleged that he submitted a Form 7243 to his primary care

physician for evaluation or that the physician recommended surgery.

The undersigned finds that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable Eighth

Amendment claim against any defendant. Plaintiff’s own allegations and exhibits show that

medical staff addressed his medical needs continuously during the months at issue. Plaintiff,

who is not a physician, merely disagrees with the treatment provided. In the absence of a

cognizable claim, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. While it does not appear likely that plaintiff can state a cognizable claim, the

court will grant plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he must allege facts demonstrating

that the defendants’ conduct violated the Eighth Amendment standards set forth in this order. 

The amended complaint must show how each named defendant’s acts or omissions resulted in a

deprivation of the right to constitutionally adequate medical care. There can be no liability under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 absent an affirmative link between each defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th

Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations will not suffice. See Ivey v. Board of

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be complete in

itself without reference to his original pleading, and the original complaint will be superseded by

the amended complaint. See Local Rule 15-220; Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s March 5, 2007 application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

3. Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days from the date of service of this order to

file a first amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the first amended complaint

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must bear the case number assigned to this case and must be labeled “First Amended

Complaint”; failure to file a first amended complaint that complies with this order will result in a

recommendation that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted.

DATED: November 20, 2007.

DAD:kw

Ddad1\orders.prose\williams0431.ifpgr.lta

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