Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LIONEL HARPER, individually and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated and all 

aggrieved employees,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 

and DOES 1 through 25,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: MOTION TO REMAND

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Plaintiff Lionel Harper initiated this putative class 

action against defendants Charter Communications, LLC, and 

Charter Communications, Inc. (collectively “the Charter

defendants”) alleging various violations of the California Labor 

and Business and Professions Codes. The Charter defendants

removed this action from Shasta County Superior Court pursuant to 

the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 

(See Notice of Removal at 2 (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiff now moves 

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to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, contending that Charter 

defendants have not properly plead minimal diversity under CAFA. 

(Docket No. 8.)

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Charter defendants market and sell

telecommunications services nationwide, including in California. 

(Compl. ¶) 9 (Docket No. 1-1.) From approximately September 2017 

to March 2018, plaintiff worked for the Charter defendants as a 

salesperson in California. (Id. ¶ 5.) During that time, 

plaintiff alleges, the Charter defendants violated a variety of 

wage and hour laws by, for example, failing to pay overtime 

wages, failing to pay minimum wage for all hours worked, failing 

to provide rest breaks or pay premium wages in lieu of rest 

breaks, and failing to provide accurate wage statements. (See

Id. ¶¶ 24-26)

Following a ruling from a JAMS arbitrator that 

plaintiff’s claims were not arbitrable, plaintiff filed this 

action in state court. Plaintiff brought the action as a class 

action on behalf of “all nonexempt employees who worked for 

[d]efendants in California within four years from November 19, 

2018.” (Id. ¶ 12.) The Charter defendants then removed the 

action to this court based on alleged CAFA jurisdiction. (See

Notice of Removal.) To establish minimal diversity under CAFA, 

the Notice of Removal alleges that none of the defendants are 

citizens of California (id. at ¶¶ 12-23) and relies on 

plaintiff’s allegations that he is a resident of California who 

worked for the Charter defendants in California from 

approximately September 2017 until March 2018 to support the 

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allegation that plaintiff is a citizen of California. (See Id. ¶

10.) 

II. Discussion

“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which 

the district courts of the United States have original 

jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, 

to the district court of the United States for the district . . . 

where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Under the 

Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), federal courts have original 

jurisdiction over civil class action cases in which the amount in 

controversy exceeds $5,000,000, the parties are minimally 

diverse, and the proposed class has at least 100 members. 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). There is no anti-removal presumption in 

CAFA cases. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. 

Ct. 547, 554 (2014).

In order for the parties to be “minimally diverse” 

under CAFA, there must be at least one class member who “is a 

citizen of a State different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(d)(2)(A). “To show state citizenship for diversity purposes 

under federal common law a party must (1) be a citizen of the 

United States, and (2) be domiciled in the state.” Kantor v. 

Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983).

Plaintiff does not dispute that this is a class action 

with more than 100 class members and that the amount in 

controversy exceeds $5,000,000. Plaintiff’s argument that the 

Charter defendants have not established federal subject matter 

jurisdiction under CAFA rests entirely on the alleged 

deficiencies of the Charter defendant’s Notice of Removal vis-àCase 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 23 Filed 07/31/19 Page 3 of 7
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vis the “minimal diversity of citizenship” element of CAFA 

jurisdiction. Plaintiff contends that Charter’s Notice of 

Removal is inadequate because it merely reproduces the 

complaint’s allegations regarding plaintiff’s residence in 

California and work for the Charter defendants in California 

between September 2017 and March 2018. (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 10-

11.) Specifically, the Notice of Removal states: “At the time 

[p]laintiff commenced this action and at the time of removal, 

[p]laintiff was a citizen of the State of California. In fact, 

[p]laintiff alleges in this Complaint that he ‘is a resident of 

California.’” (Id. ¶ 10.) The parties dispute whether this 

sufficiently alleges that plaintiff is a California citizen for 

purposes of the minimal diversity of citizenship requirement 

under CAFA.

A. Is residency in California prima facie evidence of 

California citizenship? 

The Charter defendants’ contention that it has met its 

jurisdictional pleading burden under CAFA rests in part on the 

claim that a natural person’s residency in a given state gives 

rise to a presumption that he or she is a citizen of that state. 

Several circuit courts have explicitly adopted this presumption 

in the context of removal and diversity jurisdiction. See e.g., 

Zoroastrian Ctr. & Darb-E-Mehr of Metro. Washington, D.C. v. 

Rustam Guiv Found. of N.Y., 822 F.3d 739, 750 n.6 (4th Cir.

2016)(“Physical presence coupled with residency is prima facie 

proof of citizenship[.]”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 

Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, 520 (10th Cir. 1994)(“Residence alone is not 

the equivalent of citizenship, but the place of residence is 

prima facie the domicile.”).

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Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit has never adopted 

the presumption that residence in a state is prima facie evidence 

of citizenship in that state. Indeed, in Mondragon v. Capital 

One Auto Finance, 736 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit 

explicitly declined to adopt this presumption. In that case, the 

defendant had removed a putative class action to federal court 

under CAFA jurisdiction. Plaintiff sought to have the case 

remanded pursuant to CAFA’s “local controversy exception,” which 

requires federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction in 

some instances in which more than two-thirds of the members of a 

proposed class are citizens of the state in which the action was 

originally filed. The plaintiff in Mondragon asked the court to 

infer that at least two-thirds of plaintiffs were California 

citizens from the fact that the putative classes were limited to 

consumers who had purchased and registered cars in California. 

The court declined to do so, stating that the mere fact that a 

purchaser has “a residential address in California does not mean 

that person is a citizen of California.” Id. at 884.

The court agrees with plaintiff that the Ninth 

Circuit’s ruling in Mondragon, forecloses a presumption of 

citizenship because of residency. This does not mean, however, 

that evidence of residency is irrelevant to the citizenship 

inquiry. The Ninth Circuit in Mondragon explicitly rejected the 

assertion that “evidence of residency can never establish 

citizenship,” and advised courts evaluating whether evidence of 

residency properly establishes citizenship to consider “the 

entire record.” Id. at 886. Such factual determinations, the 

Ninth Circuit noted, are made using a preponderance of the 

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evidence standard. Id. at 884.

In the instant case, even absent a presumption of 

citizenship, the preponderance of the evidence weighs heavily in 

favor of finding that Harper is a citizen of California for 

jurisdictional purposes. In evaluating whether simple diversity 

has been established by a preponderance of the evidence, the 

court may consider not only the complaint and the Notice of 

Removal, but also other evidence in the record. See Ibarra v. 

Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 

2015)(quotations and citation omitted)(holding that when there is 

a dispute as to whether CAFA’s “amount-in-controversy” 

jurisdictional requirement has been met, “[t]he parties may 

submit evidence outside the complaint, including affidavits or 

declarations, or other summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to 

the amount in controversy at the time of removal.”); Wilkins v. 

Cargill, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-02818-ODW-JEM, 2015 WL 12912329 (C.D. 

Cal. June 4, 2015)(considering evidence submitted by defendant in 

opposition to plaintiff’s motion to remand in evaluating whether 

jurisdiction exists under CAFA).

In the instant case, the Charter defendants have

submitted substantial evidence that plaintiff Harper is domiciled 

in California and is a citizen of the United States. This 

evidence shows that: (1) Lionel Harper owns real property in 

California (Shine Decl., Ex. A (Docket No. 14-2)); (2) he has 

worked in California fairly consistently since 2002 (McCaine 

Decl., Ex. B (Docket No. 14-1)); (3) he has lived in California 

since 1994, with the exception of the 2009-2010 year, when he 

lived in Nebraska (McCaine, Decl., Ex. D (Docket No. 14-1)); and

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(4) he is registered to vote in California (Shine Decl., Ex. A). 

Plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy or credibility of this 

evidence and does not contend that he is not, in fact, a citizen 

of California.

Having scrutinized the entire record, the court thus 

finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Harper is a citizen 

of California. Since neither defendant is a citizen of 

California, there is minimal diversity in this case. Given this, 

and the fact that this is a putative class action with more than 

100 plaintiffs and $5 million dollars in controversy, removal of 

this case was proper under CAFA. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion to 

Remand (Docket No. 8) be, and hereby is, DENIED.

Dated: July 31, 2019

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