Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-02762/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-02762-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE R. FERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Defendant. /

No. C 09-2762 CRB

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff has brought suit seeking review of the Social Security Administration’s

(“SSA”) determination that he is not entitled to disability benefits. The ALJ concluded that

although Plaintiff is disabled, his disability does not qualify him for benefits. The Social

Security Appeals Council then denied his request for review, and this proceeding followed. 

As explained below, the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. On the

contrary, the ALJ’s decision discredits certain evidence without explaining why, sets out a

assessment of disability that is inconsistent otherwise credited record evidence, and entirely

fails to address other evidence of disability. Because it is possible that the ALJ could have

sufficiently explained his decision, but simply failed to do so, and because the ALJ failed to

develop the record as to certain evidentiary questions, this Court REMANDS this case for

further proceedings.

//

 

Case 3:09-cv-02762-CRB Document 18 Filed 08/12/10 Page 1 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Background

Plaintiff was both on October 22, 1972, and was 34 years old when he because

disabled. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 10. He has a high school education with some

college, and has worked as a delivery person, salesperson, file clerk, reservation clerk, and

waiter. Id. He alleges that he is unable to work because of injuries to his back, kidney

problems, incontinence, and limping. Id. The medical evidence reflects that Plaintiff fell

from a 30-foot-high patio and fractured a portion of his spine. Id. at 171. Plaintiff has had

two surgeries, has constant back pain, and must use the bathroom 15-20 times a day. Id. at

10. He testified that he has numbness in his left leg and right foot and uses a cane for

balancing and walking. Id. Finally, he also testified that he has been depressed since hurting

his back, and that at the time of the hearing he was being treated for clinical depression. Id. 

At the request of the Social Security Administration, Plaintiff saw Dr. Frank Chen for

a consultative examination. Dr. Chen diagnosed “left foot drop,” chronic back pain, and

urinary and stool incontinence secondary to back injury.” Id. at 173. He concluded that

Plaintiff “can stand and walk in an eight-hour workday [for] two to four hours with

intermittent breaks” and that “there are no restrictions on sitting in an eight-hour workday.” 

Id. Plaintiff also saw Dr. Ronald F. Johnson for a consultative psychiatric examination at the

request of the Social Security Administration. Dr. Johnson concluded that Plaintiff “would

have moderate difficulties maintaining pace and persistence in ordinary work tasks” and

“moderate difficulties concentrating and focusing on sustained, productive, timely work tasks

in the normal course of a full 8-hour workday or full 40-hour workweek in a competitive

work environment. “ Id. at 203.

A hearing was held on November 12, 2008. Plaintiff testified that he cannot work

because he has continuous lower back pain, constant depression, uses a catheter for his

incontinence, and has difficulty keeping up with the pace of a job. Id. at 30-33. If he does

not catheterize himself, Plaintiff testified that he would need to use the restroom 15 to 20

times per day. Id. at 33. 

Case 3:09-cv-02762-CRB Document 18 Filed 08/12/10 Page 2 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

A Vocational Expert (“VE”) also testified at the hearing. The ALJ posed a series of

hypothetical scenarios and asked whether an individual suffering from the stated disabilities

would be employable. First, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person who requires a cane,

is moderately impaired for social functioning, is mildly impaired in terms of concentration,

persistence, and pace, and has difficulty with detailed and complex instructions. Id. at 47-48. 

The VE testified that, given those limitations, “I would eliminate all [medium level] work

because of the issue of this cane.” Id. at 48. Next, the ALJ asked the VE whether someone

who is similarly disabled would be able to do “light” work. Id. at 49. The VE responded

that while the use of the cane eliminates many of the otherwise available jobs, Plaintiff

would still be able to perform the job of reservation clerk. Id. The ALJ’s final hypothetical

asked the VE to assume a moderate impairment as to social functioning, moderate (as

opposed to mild in the previous hypotheticals) impairment as to concentration, persistence,

and pace, in addition to a 40-50% limitation as to his ability to follow instructions. Id. at 50. 

The VE testified that “[t]he part of your hypothetical which moderately impairs

concentration, pace and persistence, even at the simple, repetitive level would render this

person unemployable.” Id.

The ALJ issued his decision on December 2, 2008. Id. at 4. The ALJ concluded that

Plaintiff “has mild restriction of activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining

social functioning, mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence and pace . . . .” 

Id. at 10. The ALJ appeared to credit the diagnoses of both Dr. Chen and Dr. Johnson, but he

concluded that “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting

effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above

residual functional capacity assessment.” Id. at 12. In support of this adverse credibility

finding, the ALJ explained that although the claimant reported back pain, “progress notes fail

to show persistent abnormalities of gait, restriction in back motion or significant neurological

deficits.” Id. The ALJ further noted that the claimant was able to work for a number of

years after his back injury, which he concluded reflects the fact that his disability “would not

currently prevent work.” Id. As for the alleged psychological difficulty, the ALJ noted that

Case 3:09-cv-02762-CRB Document 18 Filed 08/12/10 Page 3 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

while the psychiatrist reported “some moderate difficulty with concentration, persistence and

pace, . . . there is no evidence of any treatment.” Id. The ALJ also explained that Plaintiff

had ended his treatment with psychiatrists, and for a portion of the treatment period, Plaintiff

had failed to take the prescribed medication. 

Legal Standard

The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the Social Security

Administration’s denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence in the administrative

record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court may overturn a decision to deny benefits only if

it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is a decision based on legal error. See

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallenes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d

747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. The decision of the ALJ must be upheld if

the evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Id at 1040. 

The claimant is “disabled” for the purpose of receiving benefits under the Social

Security Act (“Act”) if she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to an

impairment which has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least twelve

months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a).

“The claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability.” Roberts v.

Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied. 517 U.S. 1122, 116 S.Ct. 1356, 134

L.Ed.2d 524 (1996); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir.1996); see also Valentine

v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir.2009) (“To establish eligibility for

Social Security benefits, a claimant has the burden to prove he is disabled.”).

The Commissioner has promulgated regulations establishing a five-step sequential

evaluation process for the ALJ to follow in a disability case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920. In the First Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently

engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, in the

Second Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or

Case 3:09-cv-02762-CRB Document 18 Filed 08/12/10 Page 4 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic work activities. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the Third Step, the ALJ must determine

whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals

the requirements of the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”), 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App.

1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, in the Fourth Step, the ALJ must determine

whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity despite the impairment or

various limitations to perform her past work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not,

in Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant can perform other

work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g),

416.920(g). Moreover, where there is evidence of a mental impairment that may prevent a

claimant from working, the Commissioner has supplemented the five-step sequential

evaluation process with additional regulations addressing mental impairments. Maier v.

Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 154 F.3d 913, 914-15 (9th Cir.1998) (per curiam).

The ALJ in this case rejected Plaintiff’s claim at step four, concluding that “claimant

is capable of performing past relevant work as a food delivery . . . , waiter . . . , retails [sic]

sales.” AR at 13.

Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Motion

Plaintiff attacks the ALJ’s decision on various grounds. First, he argues that the

ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity is not supported by substantial

evidence. Second, he argues that the ALJ’s finding that he could perform his past work is

not supported by substantial evidence. Third, he argues that the ALJ committed legal error

by failing to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion. Fourth,

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting his testimony. 

This Court addresses Plaintiff’s first, second, and fourth arguments. Because those

arguments necessitate a remand, it is not necessary to reach the third..

//

//

Case 3:09-cv-02762-CRB Document 18 Filed 08/12/10 Page 5 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

1. Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was capable of “light work” and has “mild

restriction of activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning,

[and] mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence and pace . . . .” AR at 10. 

The regulations provide that walking and standing form the primary difference between

sedentary and light work. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a), (b) (indicating that “sedentary work”

requires “a certain amount of walking and standing,” while “light work” requires “a good

deal of walking or standing”). Social Security Ruling 83-10 reflects that light work requires

standing or walking for a total of six hours in an eight-hour day. See SSR 83-10 (1983); see

also Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1204 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that

although Social Security Rulings do not have the force of law, they “are binding on all

components of the SSA” and are given “some deference”). However, Dr. Chan, an

examining physician in this case, opined that Plaintiff would be able to stand and walk for

only two to four hours in an eight-hour workday. The ALJ never addressed the fact that, as

diagnosed by Dr. Chan, Plaintift was not capable of performing light work, even though he

appears to accept Dr. Chan’s diagnosis in his decision. See A.R. at 11. His decision cites no

evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Plaintiff can stand for six hours in an

eight hour day. On the contrary, while the ALJ lists a series of possible jobs that clearly

involve a great deal of standing and walking (e.g. food delivery, waiter, and retail sales), he

never addresses the evidence in Dr. Chan’s report that Plaintiff would not be capable of

standing for such a long period. Therefore, substantial evidence does not support the

conclusion that Plaintiff is capable of work that involves at least six hours of standing and

walking.

The ALJ’s RFC also indicated that Plaintiff had “mild difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence and pace.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). However, Dr. Johnson

concluded that Plaintiff would have “moderate difficulties maintaining pace and persistence

in ordinary work tasks.” Id. at 203 (emphasis added). Dr. Johnson went on to conclude that

Plaintiff “would have moderate difficulties concentrating and focusing on sustained,

Case 3:09-cv-02762-CRB Document 18 Filed 08/12/10 Page 6 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

productive, timely work tasks in the normal course of a full 8-hour workday . . . .” Id.

(emphasis added). This distinction between “mild” and “moderate” is pivotal here because,

as recounted above, the VE testified that an individual who is moderately impaired in this

way would be unemployable. Again, while the ALJ appeared to credit Dr. Johnson’s report

and in no way sought to reject his findings, his functional capacity assessment is simply

irreconcilable with Dr. Johnson’s report. An ALJ is not permitted to substitute his own

medical conclusion for the findings and opinions of physicians. The uncontradicted opinion

of a medical expert can only be rejected for clear and convincing reasons. Day v.

Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975). 

2. Plaintiff’s past work

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that Plaintiff was capable of

performing his past work. First, Plaintiff makes the same argument explained above:

according to the VE’s testimony, Plaintiff’s “moderate” disability—discussed more

thoroughly above—made him categorically unemployable. While this argument remains

persuasive, its use in this section of the brief merely identifies the same error discussed above

in a different way.

However, Plaintiff also notes in this section that the ALJ failed to include all of

Plaintiff’s physical limitations in the hypothetical questions posed to the VE. An ALJ can

only rely on VE testimony if the hypothetical questions posed to the VE include all the

claimant’s functional limitations. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff notes that the ALJ failed to include any reference to Plaintiff’s limitations related to

his incontinence. Incontinence has been recognized in this circuit as a disorder that can give

rise to a finding of disability. See Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The ALJ was presented both with testimonial and medical record evidence relating to

Plaintiff’s incontinence, but he failed to include the related limitations in the hypotheticals

posed to the VE. It is easy to imagine how the need to use the restroom 15 to 20 times a day

may limit an individual’s employability.

//

Case 3:09-cv-02762-CRB Document 18 Filed 08/12/10 Page 7 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

3. Plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony

The Ninth Circuit has held that where the record includes “objective medical evidence

of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or

other symptoms alleged[,] . . . the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity

of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not cite any clear and convincing reason to disregard his

testimony regarding his pain. 

The ALJ relied on six supposedly clear and convincing reasons to disregard Plaintiff’s

testimony: (1) it was inconsistent with the medical evidence; (2) Plaintiff could walk after his

back surgery, (3) Plaintiff’s testimony was incomplete and inconsistent, (4) medications had

been relatively effective in controlling his symptoms, (5) Plaintiff did not appear to be in

pain at the hearing, and (6) Plaintiff’s daily activities are inconsistent with disabling pain. 

Although this is a long list of reasons, even considered together they do no amount to a clear

and convincing justification for disregarding Plaintiff’s pain testimony. 

First, an ALJ is not permitted to disregard pain testimony simply because no specific

clinical finding supports the severity of pain reported in the testimony. See Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). Second, much of the evidence cited by the ALJ is

not, in fact, inconsistent with the medical evidence. For example, the ALJ notes that

“progress notes fail to show persistent abnormalities of gait, restriction in back motion or

significant neurological deficits.” AR at 12. But this says very little regarding whether the

evidence supports Plaintiff’s subjective reports of pain. In fact, the record is replete with

evidence of Plaintiff’s complaints about pain, as the ALJ elsewhere recognizes. Whether or

not there is evidence inconsistent with testimony regarding Plaintiff’s abnormal gait does not

amount to a clear and convincing reason to disregard testimony regarding pain. The ALJ’s

comment that there “is no MRI of back to determine objective signs to determine low back

pain” is similarly unpersuasive. The fact that an MRI was not done is not evidence, let alone

clear and convincing evidence, that Plaintiff is not in pain.

Case 3:09-cv-02762-CRB Document 18 Filed 08/12/10 Page 8 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Second, evidence that Plaintiff could work for a number of years after surgery is also

of minimal evidentiary value. As Plaintiff testified, his ailments had progressed since his

original surgeries. AR at 30-32. The ALJ fails to address this explanation, and cites to no

evidence that would undermine this testimony. 

Third, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s testimony was incomplete and inconsistent is

not a clear and convincing reason to reject his testimony. First, the ALJ failed to explain

what was incomplete or inconsistent. Second, this Court’s review of the hearing transcript

has not revealed any inconsistencies or apparent omissions. An ALJ’s conclusory statement

that a claimant’s testimony was incomplete and inconsistent, without citation to the record,

does not meet the clear and convincing standard. In any event, even had there been an

important inconsistency, an “ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and

to assure that the claimant’s interests are considered.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288

(9th Cir. 1996). If the ALJ felt that there was some inconsistency or omission that should be

addressed, he should have asked Plaintiff to clarify. Id. (“If the ALJ thought he needed to

know the basis of [a doctor’s] opinion in order to evaluate them, he had a duty to conduct an

appropriate inquiry . . . .”). The record reflects that he did not do so.

Fourth, the ALJ’s finding that medications have been relatively effective in

controlling Plaintiff’s symptoms is not supported by substantial evidence. First, Plaintiff

testified that his pain medication, while it did lessen the pain, still left him in serious distress. 

AR 42. The ALJ cites to no evidence undermining this evaluation of Plaintiff’s pain. 

Second, this Court can find no evidence in the record that medications had any significant

success in treating Plaintiff’s incontinence. 

Fifth, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff “betrayed no evidence of pain or discomfort

while testifying at the hearing” is not a clear and convincing reason to discredit Plaintiff’s

testimony. Perminter v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The ALJ’s reliance on

his personal observations of Perminter at the hearing has been condemned as ‘sit and squirm’

jurisprudence.”). 

Case 3:09-cv-02762-CRB Document 18 Filed 08/12/10 Page 9 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Sixth, and finally, the fact that Plaintiff’s household activities included some dish

washing and other tasks is not a clear and convincing reason to reject his testimony. “One

does not need to be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be disabled.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379

F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s testimony that he engages in very limited

household activity is not inconsistent with his other testimony. A plaintiff’s daily activities

can only be grounds for an adverse credibility finding “if the claimant is able to spend a

substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical

functions that are transferable to a work setting.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir.

2007).

For all the reasons listed above, this Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is not

supported by substantial evidence. First, the ALJ’s RFC is inconsistent with the medical

evidence. While the ALJ is entitled to reject evidence offered by an examining physician in

certain circumstances, he gave no justification for such a rejection in this case. On the

contrary, his decision appears to credit the doctor’s evidence in some portions and ignore it

in others, without explanation. Second, the ALJ failed to properly craft the hypotheticals

posed to the VE. In order to rely on a VE’s testimony as to a claimant’s ability, the VE must

be informed of all of a claimant’s limitations. The ALJ in this case failed to refer to

Plaintiff’s incontinence. Third, the ALJ failed to support his rejection of Plaintiff’s pain

testimony with clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED.

B. Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment

As the above analysis requires, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

DENIED. Because the issues are discussed in depth above, Defendant’s arguments will be

addressed with less detail.

First, Defendant argues that the record supported the ALJ’s limitation to light work. 

However, as discussed above, “light work” for purposes of the SSA involves more standing

and walking than Dr. Chan believed Plaintiff to be capable of. The ALJ’s decision fails to

address this discrepancy. The Defendant concedes that “the ALJ chose to give more weight

Case 3:09-cv-02762-CRB Document 18 Filed 08/12/10 Page 10 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

G:\CRBALL\2009\2762\Order.wpd 11

to the longitudinal, objective medical evidence after Plaintiff sought treatment rather than to

Dr. Chen’s initial evaluation.” Defendant’s Mot. at 4. First, despite Defendant’s general

reference to “longitudinal evidence,” the ALJ does not cite any evidence, longitudinal or

otherwise, that reflects the fact that Plaintiff could stand for more than two to four hours. 

Second, regardless of what the rest of the medical record shows, the ALJ failed to explain

why he appeared to credit Dr. Chan’s report, and yet ignored certain parts of it. The opinion

of an examining doctor, even if contradicted by another doctor (which does not appear to

have happened here), can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31

(9th Cir. 1995).

Second, Defendant argues that the ALJ was not required to give proper hypotheticals

to the VE because VE testimony was not required to show that Plaintiff remained capable of

performing his past work. However, Ninth Circuit authority clarifies that “[a]lthough the

burden fo proof lies with the claimant at step four, the ALJ still has a duty to make the

requisite factual findings to support his conclusion. This is done by looking at the [RFC] and

the physical and mental demands’ of the claimant’s past relevant work.” Pinto v. Massanari,

249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir.). In such a context, “[t]he vocational expert merely has to find

that a claimant can or cannot continue his or her past relevant work as defined by the

regulations above.” Id. The ALJ clearly discussed with the VE the demands of Plaintiff’s

past work, and relied on the VE’s testimony in his decision. See AR 49-50, 13. Because the

ALJ relied on the VE’s opinion in his decision, he was obligated to ensure that the

hypothetical questions posed to the VE properly reflected Plaintiff’s limitations. 

For these reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2010 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-02762-CRB Document 18 Filed 08/12/10 Page 11 of 11