Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-02961/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-02961-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATALIE MARTEL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of

Social Security

Defendant. /

No. CV 11-02961- CRB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

 In this Social Security case, Plaintiff Natalie Martel seeks attorneys’ fees under the 

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Specifically, Plaintiff moves the Court to

compel the Commissioner of Social Security to certify, withhold from Plaintiff, and pay

directly to both deceased counsel of record Ian M. Sammis and current counsel of record

Robert C. Weems 25% of the total past-due benefits to which Plaintiff is entitled–a sum of

$14,114.75. See generally Mot. (dkt. 46). 

The retainer agreements between Plaintiff and both Mr. Sammis and Mr. Weems

entitle counsel to up to 25% of total past-due benefits following a favorable decision. 

See Exs. C, D. Subsection 406(b) provides that, following a favorable decision, a court may

allow a reasonable attorney’s fee for such representation, “not in excess of 25 percent of the

total of the past-due benefits.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The Supreme Court has held that, 

Case 3:11-cv-02961-CRB Document 48 Filed 01/30/15 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 See also Response (dkt. 47) at 2 (“The Commissioner takes no position on whether the gross

fee . . . that Counsel requests under the Social Security Act is reasonable under the case law.”).

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in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee under section 406(b), courts are to give

primacy to contingent fee agreements. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807-08

(2002) (adding that “[w]ithin the 25 percent boundary . . . the attorney for the successful

claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.”). The Ninth

Circuit has instructed that in assessing reasonableness in this context, courts are to weigh

“the character of the representation and the results the representative achieved.” See

Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Court finds that the amount sought by Plaintiff’s counsel is reasonable.1

 Counsel

achieved a fully favorable decision with an onset of SSI disability back to June 22, 2004. 

See Ex. A. Moreover, the representation here appears to have been both good and efficient. 

See Mot. at 7 (discussing time and attention spent on case). An award of 25% of past due

benefits equates to a rate of only about $187/hour using the loadstar method, a reasonable

rate given counsels’ experience. Id.

The Court notes that Plaintiff characterizes the fee award under subsection 406(b) as

“distinct and separate from fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(1)(A).” Id. at 3. While the two sets of fees of course have different bases,

Plaintiff fails to mention the relationship between them. As the Commissioner notes, “[t]he

amount of section 406(b) fees requested must be reduced by the $11,611.80 in fees this Court

already awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.” Response at 2. 

See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (explaining that the EAJA award “offsets” a 406(b)

award–“Fee awards may be made under both prescriptions, but the claimant’s attorney must

‘refun[d] to the claimaint the amount of the smaller fee.”). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion, ordering the Commissioner to

pay Plaintiff’s counsel $14,114.75, with the understanding that that award will be offset by 

//

//

Case 3:11-cv-02961-CRB Document 48 Filed 01/30/15 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The parties have not informed the Court of whether the EAJA award in this case went to

counsel or, as in Boissiere v. Astrue, No. 09-2081, 2011 WL 1045170, at * 2 (N.D. Cal. March 22,

2011), directly to Plaintiff. If the EAJA award did not go to counsel, then an offset is not required, as

counsel would not have “received fees for the same work.” Id. at *4, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 note.

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the $11,611.80 EAJA award.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2015 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:11-cv-02961-CRB Document 48 Filed 01/30/15 Page 3 of 3