Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01654/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01654-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

KEITH CHANDLER,

NO. CIV. S-05-1654 WBS PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

PETE WILSON, Governor of the

State of California, In His

Official and Individual

Capacities; the STATE OF

CALIFORNIA; the CALIFORNIA

YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL

AGENCY; JOE SANDOVAL,

Secretary, Youth & Adult

Correctional Agency, In His

Official and Individual

Capacities; the CALIFORNIA

BOARD OF PRISON TERMS; TED

RICH, Chief Executive Officer,

California Board of Prison

Terms, In His Official and

Individual Capacities; THOMAS

GIAQUINTO, Commissioner,

California Board of Prison

Terms, In His Official and

Individual Capacities; CAROL

BENTLEY, Commissioner,

California Board of Prison

Terms, In Her Official and

Individual Capacities; and

DOES 1-25,

Defendants.

 ----oo0oo---- 

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1 The complaint does not specify which constitutional

rights were allegedly violated.

2 The other defendants do not join in the motion. At

least two of these defendants, Governor Wilson and Joe Sandoval,

have not been served. (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at

6 n.1.) 

2

Plaintiff’s complaint contains six causes of action

against defendants: (1) violation of plaintiff’s constitutional

rights1; (2) “abuse of process”; (3) false imprisonment; (4)

malicious prosecution; (5) intentional infliction of emotional

distress; and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

(Compl.) The first cause of action is brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. The other causes of action are brought pursuant

to California state law.

Defendants California Board of Prison Terms (now called

California Board of Parole Hearings), Ted Rich, Thomas Giaquinto,

and Carol Bentley move to dismiss.2

I. Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff was convicted in the Superior Court of the

State of California, in and for the County of Yolo, of the crime

of second degree murder, and was sentenced to 15 years to life on

June 7, 1985. (Compl. ¶ 16.) On July 31, 1991, plaintiff was

granted parole. (Id. ¶ 17.) The complaint alleges that Governor

Wilson decided to run for the Republican party nomination for

president in 1996 and made it known to subordinates that some

existing grants of parole should be rescinded. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) 

Subsequently, “[d]efendant Rich . . . took steps to ensure that

defendant Wilson’s desire to have existing parole dates rescinded

be followed.” (Id. ¶ 22.) On September 13, 1994, defendant

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3

California Board of Prison Terms met for an en banc hearing and

voted to schedule a parole rescission hearing. (Id. ¶ 24.)

On April 12, 1995, Plaintiff appeared before Defendant Board

of Prison Terms for a Parole Rescission Hearing. At this

Hearing, Plaintiff’s 1991 grant of parole was rescinded by

Defendants Giaquinto and Bentley. At this hearing no new

evidence was introduced and the hearing was nothing more

than a second guessing of the decision to grant Plaintiff

parole in 1991. Plaintiff so objected multiple times during

the hearing and was personally ridiculed by Defendants

Giaquinto and Bentley for doing so.

(Id. ¶ 25.) On June 3, 2004, the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California, per Judge Singleton

(sitting by designation), granted plaintiff’s petition for habeas

corpus, holding that defendant Board of Prison Terms had no legal

authority to revisit the 1991 decision to grant petitioner parole

on April 12, 1995. (Id ¶ 29); Chandler v. Mueller, No. Civ. 99-

1284, slip op. (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2004). Plaintiff was released

from state prison on June 5, 2004. (Id. ¶ 30.) On April 14,

2005, defendant Board of Prison Terms officially discharged

plaintiff from parole. (Id. ¶ 35.) 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages of $3,000,000,

punitive damages in the amount of $9,000,000, costs and fees, and

any other relief the court should deem just. (Id. at 10 (Prayer

for Relief).) 

II. Discussion

A. Standard For Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the

plaintiff must be taken as true and read in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492

U.S. 229, 249 (1989); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 

The court may not dismiss for failure to state a claim unless it

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4

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of the claim which entitle him or her to relief. 

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). Dismissal is

appropriate only when the plaintiff fails to put forth either:

(1) a cognizable legal theory, or (2) sufficient allegations of

fact under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

B. Defendants California Board of Prison Terms, Rich,

Giaquinto, and Bentley Are Absolutely Immune to Suit

Section 1983 of Title 42 United States Code provides,

in pertinent part: “Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or

Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable . . . .” (emphasis

added). Neither a state nor persons acting in their official

capacity are “persons” within the meaning of section 1983. Will

v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). State

agencies are also not “persons” under section 1983. Ceballos v.

Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1183 n.11 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore,

plaintiff’s section 1983 cause of action against defendant Board

of Prison Terms, as well as his section 1983 causes of action

against defendants Rich, Giaquinto, and Bentley in their official

capacities, must be dismissed.

Plaintiff also cannot state a claim against defendants

Rich, Giaquinto, and Bentley in their individual capacities. See

Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1302 (9th Cir. 1981). 

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“[P]arole board officials are entitled to absolute immunity from

suits by prisoners for actions taken when processing parole

application.” Id. “[P]arole board officials perform

functionally comparable tasks to judges when they decide to

grant, deny, or revoke parole.” Id. at 1303 (emphasis added). 

“If an officer has absolute immunity from § 1983 suit, the trial

court must dismiss any civil rights suit filed against that

officer for actions taken within the scope of his or her official

duty.” Id. at 1297 n.4.

Plaintiff makes two arguments for why Sellars should

not control in this case. First he argues that Sellars no longer

applies because California’s Proposition 89 gave the Governor

power to block parole of convicted murderers. (Pl.’s Opp’n to

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 16.) Plaintiff argues that this

change, along with other developments, stripped the parole board

of the independent decision making power they once enjoyed; a

power that led the Sellars court to liken the board members to

judges and grant them similar immunity. (Id. at 16-17.) The

court fails to understand why granting the governor more power

over some parole decisions should subject parole board members to

a heightened liability standard. Their discretionary decision

making power was not diminished when the Governor was given the

power to overturn their decisions any more than the discretion of

a trial judge is diminished simply because an appellate court has

the power to reverse him. Moreover, even if plaintiff’s changed

circumstances argument is correct, this court is still bound by 

Sellars unless and until that decision is overturned by the Ninth

Circuit or the Supreme Court. 

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Plaintiff’s second argument is that the parole officers

abdicated their quasi-judicial role. There are a number of

problems with this argument. First, the complaint does not

indicate that defendants abdicated their role. (See Compl. ¶ 25)

(“On April 12, 1995, plaintiff appeared before Defendant Board of

Prison Terms for a Parole Rescission Hearing. At this Hearing,

Plaintiff’s 1991 grant of parole was rescinded by Defendants

Giaquinto and Bentley.”) Second, if all a plaintiff had to do

was state the conclusion, in an opposition to a motion to

dismiss, that the parole board officials abdicated their role,

absolute immunity would be illusory. See Sellars, 641 F.2d at

1303 (“If parole board officials had to anticipate that each time

they rejected a prisoner’s application for parole, they would

have to defend that decision in federal court, their already

difficult task of balancing the risk involved in releasing a

prisoner whose rehabilitation is uncertain against the public’s

right to safety would become almost impossible.”). 

Even if the parole board officials were malicious or

dishonest toward plaintiff in their decision to revoke his

parole, absolute immunity would still attach. Id. at 1303. 

There is no allegation that the damage allegedly done to

plaintiff by the parole officers was inflicted by the officers’

actions taken outside of their roles as adjudicators. Cf.

Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 1983) (while parole

officers “may claim absolute immunity for those actions relating

to their responsibility to determine whether to revoke parole,

their immunity for conduct arising from their duty to supervise

parolees is qualified”); Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184,

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1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that, in the situation where

a parole agent and a supervising parole agent (not commissioners

of the Board of Prison Terms) investigated plaintiff, seized him,

and requested that the Board of Prison Terms issue an order for a

revocation hearing, the agents were not entitled to absolute

immunity).

Finally, plaintiff’s opposition is not supported by

United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260

(1954). In Accardi, the Court held that the Board of Immigration

Appeals failed to follow its own regulations when it made

decisions pursuant to a “confidential list of ‘unsavory

characters’” issued by the Attorney General, rather than

exercising its own judgment. Id. at 266-67. The discretionary

decision making power delegated to the Board by the Attorney

General needed to be exercised according to each recipient’s “own

understanding and conscience.” Id. at 267. To ensure that

Accardi received the due process required by applicable

regulations, the Court ordered the Board to conduct another

deportation proceeding. Id. at 270.

However, Accardi was not decided under section 1983. 

Consequently, the Court did not address the applicability of

immunity in situations where the discretionary decisions of a

review board were allegedly over-influenced by non-members. 

Plaintiff’s case cannot be saved by case law that did not address

the immunity doctrine, as this defense would exempt defendants

from suit even if they did violate plaintiff’s due process

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3 Moreover, as defendants rightly note, Accardi also

handed down a remedy inapplicable to plaintiff. (Defs.’ Reply to

Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) The new hearing

that the Court granted in Accardi is unnecessary in this case, as

plaintiff has already been released.

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rights.3 Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th Cir. 1988)

(“[A]bsolute immunity . . . preclude[s] section 1983 liability

even if the [defendants] knew or should have known that they were

violating the [plaintiffs’] rights . . . .”); Church of

Scientology Int’l v. Kolts, 846 F. Supp. 873, 888 (C.D. Cal.

1994).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion of defendants

Board of Prison Terms, Rich, Giaquinto, and Bentley to dismiss

the federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against those

defendants be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all supplemental state law

claims against defendants Board of Prison Terms Rich, Giaquinto,

and Bentley be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c).

DATED: November 2, 2005

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