Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00432/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00432-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL ALLEN, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0432-WS-B

 )

BALDWIN COUNTY COMMISSION, )

 et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by defendant James

B. Johnson. (Doc. 11). The parties have filed briefs in support of their respective

positions, (Docs. 11, 15, 18, 20, 21), and the motion is ripe for resolution. After carefully

considering the foregoing and other relevant materials in the file, the Court concludes that

the motion is due to be granted.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff’s complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges in pertinent

part as follows: that the plaintiff was an inmate at the Baldwin County Corrections

Center (“the Jail”) in August 2004; that portions of the Jail’s ceiling were then being

painted by correctional officers with a product capable of causing respiratory, nervous,

digestive and other disorders; that the plaintiff was required to scrape and sand old paint,

and perform other work in connection with the painting process, in confined areas in

which the paint was being used; that the plaintiff requested and was denied a respirator or

other protective equipment; that he was hospitalized as a result of his exposure to the

paint’s fumes; and that he continues to experience physical issues as a result of the

exposure. (Doc. 1 at 3-8).

Johnson is the Sheriff of Baldwin County. The complaint alleges that the Jail is

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“under the general supervision of Johnson, who supervises all personnel and who

establishes and promulgates all policies and procedures.” (Doc. 1 at 3). The complaint

describes the painting as a maintenance function and alleges that Johnson and codefendant John Henry carried out this function on behalf of the County. (Doc. 1 at 9). 

The complaint alleges that Johnson: (1) “failed and neglected to use qualified personnel

to plan and perform the painting work at the jail”; (2) “failed and neglected to provide

adequate ventilation or personal protective gear”; and (3) “failed and neglected to provide

Plaintiff access to Material Safety Data Sheets [“MSDS”].” (Id.). The complaint further

alleges that Johnson “confined Plaintiff and all other inmates in constitutionally deficient

conditions, to wit: in the presence of toxic chemicals against which no protection was

provided” and that he “refused to provide adequate ventilation for the jail.” (Id. at 11). 

The complaint alleges that Johnson “was deliberately indifferent to the substantial

dangers faced by Plaintiff.” (Id. at 10). 

Johnson argues that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. He argues in the alternative that he is entitled to qualified immunity. 

DISCUSSION

“A motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim] may be granted only when a

defendant demonstrates beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Kirwin v. Price Communications

Corp., 391 F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotes omitted). “When

considering [such] a motion to dismiss, all facts set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint are to

be are to be accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and the

exhibits attached thereto.” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th

Cir. 2000) (internal quotes omitted). Moreover, “all reasonable inferences drawn from

those [well-pleaded] facts are taken as true.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th

Cir. 2003).

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Defendants capable of asserting qualified immunity can claim the additional

benefit of a “heightened pleading” standard, e.g., Swann v. Southern Health Partners,

Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 836-38 (11th Cir. 2004), which requires that “the complaint must

allege the relevant facts with some specificity.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d at 996. 

Thus, for example, an allegation that the Attorney General knew and intended that law

enforcement officers would commit constitutional violations against individuals

protesting the seizure of Elian Gonzalez was inadequate, given the “fail[ure] to allege any

facts in support of this allegation.” Id. at 996-97. Likewise, allegations that the Attorney

General and others “personally participated” in the officers’ alleged constitutional

violations and that there was a “causal connection” between their acts and the alleged

violations failed to satisfy the heightened pleading requirement, because the plaintiffs “do

not allege any facts to suggest that the defendants did anything more than personally

direct and cause the execution of valid search and arrest warrants.” Gonzalez v. Reno,

325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003). 

A complaint against one capable of asserting qualified immunity must meet the

heightened pleading standard with respect to the allegation of a basis for supervisory

liability. Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d at 1235-36. Supervisory liability requires one of the

following: (1) personal participation by the supervisor in the constitutional violation; (2) a

history of widespread abuse ignored by the supervisor; (3) a custom or policy instituted

by the supervisor that results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; (4) a

direction from the supervisor to subordinates to act unlawfully; or (5) the supervisor’s

failure to stop subordinates from acting unlawfully when he knows they will do so. Id. at

1234-35. The complaint patently does not invoke any basis other than the third, and the

plaintiff does not argue otherwise. He does insist, however, that his complaint alleges

that Johnson established a policy, the execution of which violated his constitutional

rights. (Doc. 15 at 1; Doc. 20 at 4).

The plaintiff argues that Johnson established policy resulting in constitutional

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The assumption is a generous one, given the complaint’s allegations. The complaint

traces the plaintiff’s injuries, not to the painting process in general, but to two discrete instances,

in both of which the plaintiff experienced reactions to the fumes when he was forced by

defendant Henry to work in a confined space while the paint was being applied. (Doc. 1 at 5-7). 

As Johnson notes, (Doc. 21 at 2), the complaint does not allege that he approved his

subordinate’s practice of compelling inmates to be trapped in small, unventilated rooms without

protective gear while the ceilings of those rooms were painted. 

2

The Court generously assumes that the complaint’s allegations of the defendants’ failure

to use qualified personnel, provide adequate ventilation and protective gear, or provide MSDS,

(Doc. 1 at 9), incorporates allegations of Johnson’s approval of these failures.

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violations if he “approved the use of the toxic materials in the jail, approved their use

without adequate ventilation, approved their use by nonprofessional personnel, and

refused to provide sufficient protective clothing and devices to the inmates who were

exposed to the toxic materials.” (Doc. 20 at 3). In proper circumstances, a “single

decision by an official policymaker can establish the existence of an unconstitutional

municipal policy.” Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 713 (11th Cir. 1992). 

Thus, the Court assumes for purposes of argument that the conduct quoted above could

constitute the establishment of policy resulting in the violation of the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights under the prevailing standard.1

 The issue becomes whether the

complaint adequately alleges such conduct. 

The complaint makes no such allegations expressly.2

 The plaintiff argues that,

because Johnson “is in charge” of the Jail, a “presum[ption]” arises that he approved use

of the paint by unqualified personnel and without protective gear or warning. (Doc. 20 at

3). A presumption, of course, is not required, but a reasonable inference from wellpleaded facts is necessary. 

The complaint alleges that the Jail “is under the general supervision of Johnson.” 

(Doc. 1 at 3). The adequacy of the complaint thus hinges on whether Johnson’s “general

supervision” of the Jail, of itself, raises a reasonable inference that he — as opposed to

any other Jail personnel — decided to paint without providing inmates with protective

equipment, ventilation, or warning of the paint’s dangers. That is certainly an inference

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A minimum of three correctional officers were present at the same time on August 28,

2004, plus defendant Henry. (Doc. 1 at 7, ¶ 45). Either these officers or others responded when

the plaintiff collapsed later that day. (Id., ¶¶ 50-51). A jail nurse was also present at the time. 

(Id., ¶ 52). 

4

(Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 16). The complaint professes ignorance of Henry’s job title. (Id.). Were

Henry a correctional officer, he would have been identified as such, as so many other

correctional officers were identified in the complaint.

Although not part of the complaint, and so not anything on which the Court can rely on

motion to dismiss, Johnson identifies Henry’s job title as “Maintenance Engineer.” (Doc. 18 at

4). 

5

The plaintiff admits Johnson was absent. (Doc. 20 at 4). While, as discussed in text,

Johnson’s physical presence may not be a necessary legal predicate to liability, his absence

throughout the period at issue further suggests that he was distanced from the decisions the

plaintiff challenges.

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that could be drawn, but without additional facts it is not a reasonable one. A hospital is

under the general supervision of an administrator, and a bank is under the general

supervision of a branch manager, but it does not follow that decisions on painting

products and procedures are made by them. In short, information about the structure,

hierarchy and division of duties of an organization would be required to transform a

possible inference about a supervisor’s connection to painting decisions into a reasonable

one. 

The complaint does provide some such information, but all of it weakens, rather

than strengthens, the plaintiff’s proposed inference. First, the complaint makes plain that

a substantial number of employees work at the Jail,3

 increasing the probability that there

is a significant distribution of duties. Second, the complaint alleges that “[t]he Jail’s

maintenance is under the direct supervision of” co-defendant John Henry, greatly

increasing the probability that he rather than Johnson made the decisions at issue.4

 Third,

the complaint fails to place Johnson at the Jail at any point during the events in question.5

The pleading in this case is as weak as, if not weaker than, that in the Eleventh

Circuit’s Elian Gonzalez cases. There, at least, the plaintiffs were able to allege the

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The case foundered for lack of additional facts from which to draw the reasonable

inference that the Attorney General’s involvement included not only seizing Elian but assaulting

protesters in the neighborhood. Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d at 996-97; Gonzalez v. Reno, 325

F.3d at 1235-36. 

7

Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Industries America Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002)

(en banc). The two-year statute of limitations expired on or about August 28, 2006. (Complaint,

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Attorney General’s involvement in the plans for the seizure of Elian from his relatives.6

Here, there is neither a specific allegation that Johnson was involved in the challenged

decisions nor a general allegation from which Johnson’s involvement can be reasonably

inferred, and the complaint contains allegations affirmatively rendering any such

inference unreasonable. 

The heightened pleading requirement applies as well to the essential element that

Johnson acted with deliberate indifference. Maldonado v. Snead, 168 Fed. Appx. 373,

379-80 (11th Cir. 2006). The complaint alleges that Johnson was deliberately indifferent

to an unreasonable risk of harm but, without allegations raising a reasonable inference

that Johnson made the challenged decisions, there likewise can be no reasonable

inference that Johnson acted with deliberate indifference in making those decisions.

The plaintiff pleads for an opportunity to conduct discovery, (Doc. 15 at 4), but a

motion under Rule 12(b)(6) must be resolved before, not after, discovery. E.g.,

McReynolds v. Alabama Department of Youth Services, 2006 WL 3147283 at *1 (11th Cir.

2006).

Because the complaint fails to allege against Johnson a claim upon which relief

can be granted, dismissal is required on that ground alone, and it is unnecessary to

consider his qualified immunity arguments. E.g., Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d at 997;

accord Behrens v. Regier, 422 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2005). 

For the reasons set forth above, Johnson’s motion to dismiss is granted. Because

the plaintiff is represented by counsel yet failed to seek leave to amend his complaint to

address the deficiencies pointed out by Johnson, dismissal is without leave to amend.7

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¶ 31). Thus, even were the Court to grant leave to amend, any amendment would be time-barred.

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DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of December, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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