Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08129/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08129-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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 The Post Office has returned all mail sent by the Court to Plaintiff as undeliverable.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nick Mallas, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.; Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A.; Tiffany & Bosco, P.A.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 11-08129-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Tiffany & Bosco, P.A.’s Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint (Doc. 5), filed on August 18, 2011, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 6), filed on August 22, 2011, Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A.’s Motion for Summary Disposition (Doc. 12), filed on September 16, 2011. Plaintiff

is representing himself and has not filed a response to any of these motions.1

 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 30, 2006, Plaintiff executed a promissory note in the amount of

$236,000.00, in connection with a loan from On Q Financial, Inc. (“On Q”). (Doc. 6, Exhibit

A). The promissory note was secured by a Deed of Trust recorded against the property

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 Plaintiff does not identify which Defendant verbally promised him a loan

modification.

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located at 260 Lake Havasu Avenue North, Lake Havasu City, Arizona 86403 (the

“Property”). (Id. at Exhibit B). The Deed of Trust was executed by Plaintiff, as borrower,

in favor of Capital Title Agency, as trustee for On Q. (Id.). In the Deed of Trust, Mortgage

Electronic Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as nominee for On Q, was named as beneficiary. (Id.).

MERS assigned the Deed of Trust to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) (Id.

at Exhibit C). The Assignment of the Deed of Trust was recorded on February 24, 2009.

(Id.). On March 9, 2011, a Notice of Substitution of Trustee was recorded, in which Wells

Fargo appointed Michael A. Bosco, Jr. (“Bosco”) as the successor trustee under the Deed of

Trust. (Id. at Exhibit D). Immediately, thereafter, Bosco recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale.

(Id. at Exhibit E). The trustee’s sale of the Property was originally scheduled for June 8,

2011. (Id.). On July 9, 2011, the Property was sold at public auction. (Id. at Exhibit F). 

II. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

On July 13, 2011, Plaintiff filed this action in Mohave County Superior Court. On

July 25, 2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. 

In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that none of the “alleged

beneficiaries or representatives of the Beneficiary” have the original Note on the Property

to prove that they were the party authorized to conduct the foreclosure on the Property.

(Doc. 1 at Exhibit A, ¶ 9). Plaintiff alleges that the notices and foreclosure of the Property

failed to conform with the provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes Section 33-811(A) and,

thus, the foreclosure is void as a matter of law. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-12, 31, 32). Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants represented to Plaintiff and third parties that they were the owner of the Trust

Deed and Note as either the Trustee or Beneficiary on the Property and, based on this

representation, they caused a notice of default to be issued in violation of Plaintiff’s rights.

(Id. at 44). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant2

 verbally promised him a loan modification and

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subsequently revoked the offer after Plaintiff complied with Wells Fargo’s requests for

financial information. (Id. at ¶ 21). Plaintiff alleges that he justifiably relied on this promise

to his detriment. (Id. at ¶ 22, 23). Plaintiff alleges that this justifiable reliance resulted in

damages in the form of a higher interest loan, harm to his credit score, and foreclosure of the

Property. (Id.). 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants knew they had no right to foreclose on his

property because they did not possess the original note. (Id. at 25). Plaintiff alleges that all

documents related to his loan were contracts of adhesion. (Id. at 29). Plaintiff alleges that

the type of loan given to him was unconscionable. (Id. at 30). Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants had a duty to prevent such foreclosure, but failed to act. (Id. at 36). Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants have no standing to enforce a non-judicial foreclosure. (Id. at 42).

Plaintiff does not allege that his loan payments were current at the time the power of

sale provisions in the Deed of Trust were invoked by the beneficiary under the Deed of Trust.

On August 15, 2011, Defendants removed this action from Mohave County Superior

Court. On August 18, 2011, Defendant Tiffany and Bosco filed a Motion to Dismiss the First

Amended Complaint arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On August 22, Defendant

Wells Fargo also filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6). After Plaintiff failed to respond to either of these motions, on September 16, 2011,

Wells Fargo filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. 

In its Motion for Summary Disposition, Wells Fargo argues that, pursuant to Local

Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i), Plaintiff’s failure to respond should be considered consent to

its Motion to Dismiss. 

III. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i) provides that if an “unrepresented party or

counsel does not serve and file the required answering memoranda . . . such non-compliance

may be deemed a consent to the . . . granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the

issue summarily.” LRCiv. 7.2(i). Local Rule 7.2(c) requires responsive memoranda to be

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filed within fourteen days after a motion is served. 

“Failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.”

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing U.S. v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474

(9th Cir. 1979)). “Although we construe pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are

bound by the rules of procedure.” Id. at 54 (citing King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987)). “Before dismissing the action, the district court is required to weigh several factors:

‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage

its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the [party seeking dismissal]; (4) the public policy

favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic

sanctions.’” Id. at 53 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)).

“The first two of these factors favor the imposition of sanctions in most cases, while the

fourth cuts against a default or dismissal sanction. Thus the key factors are prejudice and

availability of lesser sanctions.” Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990).

In Ghazali, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld summary dismissal of a 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to follow a Nevada district court local rule. Ghazali, 46 F.3d

at 53. The Nevada rule, like Local Rule 7.2(i), considered failure to file a response to a

motion to “constitute a consent to the granting of the motion.” Id. (quoting D. Nev. R.

140-6). The Court reasoned that the dismissal was proper because the pro se plaintiff was

bound by the rules of procedure, and was given notice of the motion and ample time to

respond. Id. at 54 (citing King, 814 F.2d at 567).

Similarly, in Carey, the Ninth Circuit upheld a dismissal without prejudice of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to follow a Washington district court rule requiring a pro se

plaintiff to keep the court and opposing parties informed of his current address. 856 F.2d

1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule allowed dismissal without prejudice if plaintiff failed

to notify the court and opposing parties of his current address within 60 days of the Court

receiving undeliverable returned mail from the Post Office. Id. The Court reasoned that the

least possible sanction would be dismissal without prejudice because “[i]t would be absurd

to require the district court to hold a case in abeyance indefinitely just because it is unable,

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through the plaintiff’s own fault, to contact the plaintiff to determine if his reasons for not

prosecuting his lawsuit are reasonable or not.” Id. 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to respond to any of the pending three motions that

could determine the merits of his case and all of the motions have been pending for at least

four months. As in Carey, the Court does not know and has no way of determining if

Plaintiff intended to abandon this case or has simply failed to inform the Court and opposing

parties of his current address. Regardless, it would prejudice Defendants and severely

hamper the Court’s ability to manage its own docket to keep this case pending indefinitely.

Although all of Plaintiff’s claims seem to be premised on theories that have consistently been

rejected by the District Court of Arizona and the First Amended Complaint does not contain

one well-pled fact as to why Tiffany and Bosco was named as a Defendant in this action, the

Court finds that the least drastic sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the motions to

dismiss is dismissal of the case without prejudice. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Motion for Summary Disposition

(Doc. 12) is granted to the extent it seeks dismissal and denied to the extent it seeks dismissal

with prejudice as follows:

Tiffany & Bosco, P.A.’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Doc. 5) is granted.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

(Doc. 6) is granted. 

The case is dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

for Defendants accordingly. 

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2012.

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