Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00270/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00270-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

ROXANNE HERCULES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY, et. al,

Defendants. 

No. C 07-0270 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 20]

REQUEST BEFORE THE COURT

Before the Court is defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) [Docket

No. 20]. Plaintiff Roxane Hercules, is currently a supervisory employee of Customs and Border

Protection (“CBP”), a division of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Plaintiff who

filed unsuccessful Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaints in 2003 and 2004, later

applied for but failed to obtain two promotions. Plaintiff then sued in 2007, claiming defendants’

agents discriminated and retaliated against her, and created a hostile work environment, based on her

race, color, age, and protected activities, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 

The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing, under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 78(b). As discussed below, the Court finds the undisputed evidence shows no

hostile work environment and that defendants’ actions were legitimate, non-discriminatory, and nonretaliatory. Thus, the Court GRANTS the Motion for defendant Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S.

Department of Homeland Security, in his official capacity, and DISMISSES with prejudice the other

defendants Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection.

BACKGROUND

Hercules is an 45-year old African-American female. Docket No. 30 ¶ 1 (Decl. of Roxane

Hercules (“Hercules Decl.”)). She has been employed with CBP, formerly known as the Customs

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1 For simplicity, going forward, the Court uses the term “CBP” to mean “CBP and/or the

Customs Service.”

2 At the time, Vigna and Hercules were both GS-13, but Vigna later became GS-14 and

Hercules’ supervisor. Hercules Decl. ¶ 6; Docket No. 29, Ex. “3,” at 17:8-11 (Dep. Tr. of Richard

Vigna). 

3 Defendants presented no evidence of this EEO complaint, but Hercules did not dispute these

allegations.

4 Defendants alleged Vigna was not Hercules’ supervisor at evaluation time, Mot. at 6 n.4, but

failed to declare this or provide supporting evidence. Hercules, however, did cryptically testify,

“You’re supposed to be under someone 90 days before they can evaluate you. I wasn’t under the

two 90 days, but I was under him for the majority of that year. And I did not receive an evaluation

from him or any of the other ones ....” Hercules Tr. at 60:18-22. Although her statement might

support the inference defendants assert, the Court will not consider undeclared assertions.

2

 Service,1

 for approximately 16 years. Id. She was a Seaport Chief from 2000 to 2002, an Airport

Chief from 2002 to 2004, and a Seaport Chief (Oakland Seaport) from 2004 to 2005. Id. ¶ 10;

Docket No. 29, Ex. “5” at 112-13 (Resume of Roxanne Hercules (“Hercules Resume”)). These are

level GS-13 positions. Hercules Resume at 112-13.

In 2003, Hercules filed an EEO complaint, against co-worker Richard Vigna,2

 and others,

alleging discrimination based on race, gender, and age, after being suspended for four days on the

charge of “failure to comply with policies and procedures on supervisory overtime.” Mot. at 6:6-10;

Hercules Decl. ¶ 1; Docket No. 27, Ex. “A” at 131:11-12 (Dep. Tr. of Roxanne Hercules (“Hercules

Tr.”)). Specifically, she believed Vigna reported her to mar her record and make promotion more

difficult. Hercules Tr. at 61:4-10, Hercules Decl. ¶ 6. The administrative law judge found against

her, and she did not appeal. Mot. at 6:9-10. 

Then, in 2004, she filed another EEO complaint, again against Vigna and others, alleging

race, gender, and age discrimination.3

 Mot. at 6:11-12. Specifically, she claimed Vigna, as her

supervisor, allegedly delayed her evaluation by two months, to prevent the determination of awards

or other matters, costing her an award.4 Id. at 6:11-14; Hercules Decl. ¶ 1; Hercules Tr. at 60:8-

61:10. The administrative law judge found against her, and she did not appeal. Mot. at 6:13-14.

In November 2004, Hercules applied for the position of Assistant Port Director (Passenger

Operations) (“APD Passenger”). Docket No. 26, Exs. “F-6” (Position Description) & “F-11” at 1

(Application of Roxanne Hercules and Notification). She was found one of eight “best qualified”

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5 Defendants presented no evidence to support this allegation, but Hercules did not dispute it.

6 See preceding note. The Court notes Hercules testified in her deposition that she was at the

top of a “Best Qualified List,” created from the applicants’ written applications. Hercules Tr.

at 95:3-23. Defendants alleged, without declaring, this list was not the one which lists the “best

qualified” candidates, but was a list which ranks applicants by their own subjective and

uncorroborated assessment of their qualifications. Mot. at 3 n.1. As the parties did not provide any

documentation or further explanation of this issue, the Court is unable to consider it in disposing of

the Motion. Were these allegations true, however, it would not alter the Court’s holding.

7 The Court has no exact information, as the parties do not discuss Hercules’ exhausting her

administrative remedies, prior to filing suit. They do, however, use portions of Exhibit “F” from the

investigator’s report, as exhibits in this matter. See, e.g., Docket No. 26 and Docket No. 29, Exs.

“4” and “7.”

8 Hercules never mentioned the ADEA in her Complaint, but she claimed age discrimination,

see Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 6, 16 (Compl.). Against a federal employer, the ADEA would be her only

remedy. Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

3

candidates.5

 Mot. at 3:10. In December 2004 or January 2005, she applied for the position of

Assistant Port Director (Trade Operations) (“APD Trade”). Docket No. 31 at 2:26-3:4 (Mem. in

Opp’n to the Mot. (“Opp’n”)); Docket No. 26, Ex. “F-12” (Position Description). She was found

one of eight “best qualified” candidates.6

 Mot. at 3:12. The APD Passenger position, however,

went to Leticia Romero, a 45 year-old Hispanic female, Hercules Tr. at 121:21-122:2; Mot. at 4:17;

Docket No. 29, Ex. “7” at 3, while the APD Trade position went to Dora Baldwin, a 31 year-old

European-American woman, Hercules Tr. at 126:1-3; Mot. at 4:17-18; Docket No. 29, Ex. “7” at 3. 

Nonetheless, In August 2005, Nat Aycox, the San Francisco Director of Field Operations,

appointed Hercules to the newly created post of Public Affairs Officer for the San Francisco Field

Office. Hercules Decl. ¶ 13; Hercules Tr. at 119:11-13; Docket No. 26 ¶ 2 (Decl. of Nat. H. Aycox

(“Aycox Decl.”)). 

At some point in 2005, Hercules filed an EEO complaint with CBP.7 See Docket No. 26 at 1

(Decl. of Lois Hoffman). Subsequently, on January 16, 2007, she sued defendants alleging their

agents discriminated and retaliated against her, and created a hostile work environment, based on her

race, color, age, and protected activities, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the ADEA,

29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.

8

 See Docket No. 1 (Compl.). On March 18, 2008, defendants filed their

Motion. See Mot. at 1. This was followed by Hercules’ Memorandum in Opposition the Motion

(the “Opposition”) along with an Affidavit of Roxanne Hercules (“Hercules Decl.”) [Docket

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4

No. 30], on April 2, 2008, see Opp’n at 1, which was followed by defendants’ Reply Brief in

Support of the Motion (the “Reply”) [Docket No. 32], on April 8, 2008.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate there are

no genuine issues of material fact. See Horphag v. Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035

(9th Cir. 2007). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the non-movant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Rivera

v. Philip Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005). An issue is “material” if its resolution

could affect an action’s outcome. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Rivera, 395 F.3d at 1146. 

In responding to a properly supported summary judgment motion, the non-movant cannot

merely rely on their pleadings, but must present specific and supported material facts, of significant

probative value, to preclude summary judgment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.11 (1986); Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th

Cir. 2002); Federal Trade Comm’n v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 954 (9th Cir. 2001). In determining

whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court views the evidence and draws inferences in

the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Sullivan v. U.S. Dep’t of

the Navy, 365 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2004); Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 362 F.3d 564,

568 (9th Cir. 2004). Other legal standards are discussed below as needed.

ANALYSIS

I. Hercules failed to show any discrimination on the basis of race or color under Title VII.

A. Title VII and the McDonnell Douglas Analysis

Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, states in part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise

to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

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5

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin; or

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for

employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of

employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,

because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Under 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, Title VII covers federal employees.

In cases such as this one, where direct evidence of discrimination is lacking, the analysis

proceeds under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As such:

The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the

statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done

by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was

qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite

his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position

remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of

complainant’s qualifications.

McDonnel Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062

(9th Cir. 2002).

“The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the employee’s rejection.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see Villiarimo, 281 F.3d

at 1062. “ ‘[T]he defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence,’

reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful

discrimination was not the cause of the employment action.” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 & n.8

(1981)). This is merely a burden of production, not proof, as the ultimate burden of persuasion

resides with the employee. St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 508; Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062. The burden

is also minimal, as the employer need only articulate, not prove, reasons for its actions. Bd. of Trs.

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6

of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 & n.2 (1978). It need not, however, prove a nondiscriminatory intent, id. at 25 n.2, and courts “only require that an employer honestly believed its

reason for its actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial or even baseless.” Villiarimo, 281 F.3d

at 1062 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

If the employer meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the employee to show the

employer’s explanation was merely pretext to cover up discriminatory conduct. McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062. The employees’ burden of proof for this

step is a preponderance. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). The

employee may meet this burden by directly showing the employer was more likely motivated by

discriminatory intent or indirectly showing the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence. 

Reeves, 503 U.S. at 143; Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062. “Although a plaintiff may rely on

circumstantial evidence to show pretext, such evidence must be both specific and substantial.” 

Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062.

B. Hercules has made a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of race or

color.

Hercules’ initial burden is quite minimal, and she meets it quite easily. See St. Mary’s, 509

U.S. at 506; Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062. In this case, the undisputed evidence shows (i) she is

African American; (ii) she applied and was qualified for both APD positions; (iii) she was rejected;

and (iv) the positions did not go to African Americans. Hercules has thus made a prima facie case of

discrimination on race or color.

C. Defendants’ reasons for promoting others were legitimate and nondiscriminatory and Hercules failed to show they were pretext.

In her Complaint, Hercules did not identify any specific actors by name. See Compl. In her

October 29, 2007 deposition, however, she testified four individuals were solely responsible for not

promoting her: Assistant Commissioner Jayson P. Ahern, Field Operations Director Nat Aycox,

Port Director John Leyden, and Assistant Port Director Richard Vigna. Hercules Tr. at 43:10-45:15,

134:3-8. In addition, in her Opposition and declaration she argued her qualifications showed she

should have been promoted, and she attempted to present statistical evidence of racial bias in the San

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9 Leyden apparently passed away, shortly after retiring. Hercules Tr. at 43:15-24.

7

Francisco Field Office. Examining the actions of these four individuals, and their reasons for not

promoting Hercules, as well as her alleged qualification and statistical evidence, the Court finds the

material facts are undisputed and no reasonable jury could find defendants’ agents discriminated

against her based on her race or color. 

1. The undisputed evidence shows Assistant Commissioner Jayson P.

Ahern’s actions were legitimate and non-discriminatory.

The person who made the decision not to promote Hercules was Jayson P. Ahern, then

Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Field Operations, located in the District of Columbia, who

oversaw over 24,000 CBP employees. Docket No. 26 ¶ 2 (Decl. of Jayson P. Ahern (“Ahern

Decl.”)). To make his decisions, Ahern relied on recommendations from Nat Aycox, the San

Francisco Director of Field Operations, and nobody else. Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 9-10. Ahern trusted his local

directors to know their area’s needs and their organization’s dynamics and abilities, better than he. 

Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 9, 11. Ahern did not personally know Hercules, her race, color, age, or that she had filed

EEO complaints. Id. ¶¶ 3, 15-16. In her deposition, Hercules testified she had never spoken to

Ahern about his decisions. Hercules Tr. at 45:5-12. For that matter, in her pleadings, she barely

mentioned him, much less accused him of discriminating against her. Thus, on these undisputed

facts, no reasonable jury could find Ahern’s actions were illegitimate or discriminatory.

2. The undisputed evidence shows Field Operations Director Nat Aycox’s

actions were legitimate and non-discriminatory.

At the time he made his recommendations to Ahern, Aycox, a 57-year old, EuropeanAmerican man, had been the San Francisco Director of Field Operations since 2003, and with CBP,

since 1971. Docket No. 26 ¶ 1 (Decl. of Nat. H. Aycox (“Aycox Decl.”)). He oversaw CBP

activities in Northern California, Guam, and several other western and Pacific states. Id. He was

Hercules’ fourth-level supervisor. Id. ¶ 2. Directly under him were port directors, who managed

activities in the ports. Id. Both APD vacancies were in San Francisco and reported to Port Director

John Leyden,9

 who was Hercules’ second-line supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 

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10 Aycox was most likely referring to the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the

Immigration and Naturalization Service, which were merged to form within DHS: CBP,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS).

8

To make his recommendations, Aycox reviewed the materials submitted by the “best

qualified” candidates, and considered all of them, including Hercules. Id. ¶¶ 3, 4. He did not have

to conduct interviews because he had personal knowledge of the experience and capabilities of the

candidates whom he viewed as most qualified, and whom he was interested in recommending,

compared to the other candidates on the list. Id. ¶ 5. For each position he wanted the candidate with

a high level of technical experience, a proven track record in terms of management and direction of

others, and the ability to take charge and drive change in the organization. Id.

In regards to the APD Passenger position, when Aycox saw Romero’s name on the

candidate’s list, he knew without a doubt he would select her. Id. ¶ 6. She had temporarily served

in the APD Passenger position and had done an outstanding job. Id. She had a good reputation,

worked well with all levels of management, and was taking the lead in the port’s progress. Id. The

position required a person who was proactive, motivated, and with strong leadership skills, to

accomplish the ongoing task of merging the three legacy agencies into one.10 Id. In addition,

Leyden had highly recommended Romero because of her leadership, performance, experience,

knowledge, and strong reputation amongst her peers, subordinates, and senior managers. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.

In regards to the APD Trade position, Aycox recommend Baldwin because of her strong

technical background, having come up through the ranks in Trade, and her proven capabilities as a

supervisor and leader in her field. Id. ¶ 6. The APD Trade position was a very technical position

encompassing many skills that a uniformed officer did not have in approvals, drawbacks, and entry. 

Id. A person with this background would be more successful than one with primarily inspection

skills, and Aycox believed it would be much easier to train Baldwin on the inspection skills, than

vice-versa. Id. In his mind, the person with a Trade background started with a big “leg up,” but

Baldwin’s resume put her on top. Id. She had the education and experience, and she was highly

sought after by “Headquarters.” Id. 

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11 Aycox was referring to Hercules’ four-day suspension for overtime violations. See Mot.

at 15:12-15.

12 The parties do not identify what this means.

9

In addition, APD (Trade) Francean Rible, who was retiring, recommended Baldwin as her

replacement. Id. ¶ 3. In contrast, Leyden recommended Fred Gassert, who was then the Acting

APD (Trade), as Leyden believed Gassert had more supervisory experience than Baldwin. Id. ¶ 7. 

Aycox went with Baldwin, however, because he saw a more proactive leader in her, with a strong

technical background. Id. ¶ 8.

With regards to Hercules, in comparing her to Romero and Baldwin, Aycox concluded she

was much more detached in her dealings with others and often unavailable and reclusive. Id. ¶ 6. 

When she was in Trade it had been alleged she would come to work, close the door, and stay in her

office. Id. Further, she had a “checkered reputation,”11 and was not as technically sound as Romero

or Baldwin in their respective positions. Id. 

At this time, Hercules had been a CBP Supervisor since 2000; had extensive knowledge of

seaport and airport operations, as well as trade and enforcement; had been on various airport teams,

including those sent to Dallas, Cape Verde, Nairobi, and for a one-year tour of the top ten American

airports; had instituted the SEALS program12 at the Oakland Airport; had worked on trade issues;

had a Masters in Science and Information Systems; and, had received many awards and honors. Id.

¶ 9. Aycox believed this was all good experience, but in the end it came down to who he believed

would make the best APD and would be good for the organization. Id. And, he did not believe it

was Hercules. Id.

When he made his recommendation, he knew by sight that Hercules was African-American,

but not her age. Id. ¶ 11. He also knew about her EEO complaints, as his position required he be

kept advised of all EEO matters. Id. ¶ 2. He considered none of this, however, when making his

recommendation. Id. ¶ 13. Thus, on these undisputed facts, Aycox has articulated legitimate and

non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Hercules, shifting the burden to her to prove they were

pretext.

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13 5 C.F.R. § 335.103(a) states:

Merit promotion plans. Except as otherwise specifically authorized by OPM,

an agency may make promotions under § 335.102 of this part only to positions for

which the agency has adopted and is administering a program designed to insure a

systematic means of selection for promotion according to merit. 

10

a. Hercules failed to show Aycox’s reasons were pretext.

In her deposition, Hercules testified she never spoke with Aycox about his decision. 

Hercules Tr. at 44:17-45:4. She also testified she had no direct dealings with him, id. at 84:4-8,

110:7-13, and had no problems with him as far as she knew, id. at 87:5-10. In her Opposition and

declaration, however, she made three attempts to show Aycox’s reasons were without credence.

First, she alleged Aycox could not have had personal knowledge of her work product, as he

claimed, as he was never her first-line supervisor nor had he interviewed her for the APD positions. 

Hercules Decl. ¶ 2. Defendants did not directly address this argument. The Court notes, however,

with regards to Hercules’ level-of-supervision argument, it is consistent for Aycox to claim he had

personal knowledge of Hercules’ experience and capabilities, without being her immediate

supervisor. While her immediate supervisor might have had a more detailed personal knowledge

than Aycox did, this would not have deprived Aycox of having some level of personal knowledge. 

As for Hercules’ interview argument, it is not reasonable to infer that had Aycox interviewed all the

candidates, he would have gained the level of personal knowledge Hercules seems to believe he

should have had before deciding whom to promote.

Second, and continuing with Hercules’ interview argument, she alleged Aycox’s failure to

interview all candidates violated chapter 33 of title 5 of the United States Code, 5 C.F.R. § 300 and

§ 335, and the Tri-Bureau Merit Promotion Plan (the “Plan”). Opp’n at 4 n.4, 10:7-9. Taking these

in order, the Court notes chapter 33 has 33 sections, to which Hercules failed to specifically cite. 

The Court is thus unable to address her statutory concerns. Turning to her regulatory concerns, part

300 of title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations contains 35 regulations, while part 335 has 6

regulations, to which Hercules failed to specifically cite. Defendants claim 5 C.F.R. § 335.301

provides CBP may establish the Plan if it accords with the provisions of section 335.301.13 Reply

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14 Hercules’ implied in her deposition, that after she filed her EEO complaints, she was denied

opportunities for advancement. Hercules Tr. at 131:8-21. Defendants claim Hercules is arguing she

was denied “leadership” opportunities, which claim is rebutted by her Public Affairs positions. Mot.

at 14:22-28, 15:18-25. Hercules argued her current position has no subordinates, and is thus not a

“leadership” position. Opp’n at 15:9-15. The Court merely notes Hercules has not produced any

evidence she was denied any opportunities, except for the two promotions at issue in this matter.

11

at 8:5-8. Defendants also correctly noted that section 5.10 of the Plan provides interviews are held

at the selecting official’s discretion. Reply at 8:10-20; Docket No. 29, Ex. “8” § 5.10.

Third, Hercules alleged it was inconsistent for Aycox to appoint her as Public Affairs

Officer. As previously noted, in August 2005, Aycox appointed her to the newly created post of

Public Affairs Officer (“PAO”) for the San Francisco Field Office. As such, she reports directly to

him. Aycox Decl. ¶ 2. Hercules claimed the position called for an articulate, professional, and

intelligent person. Hercules Decl. ¶ 13. Therefore, she argued, if she were as detached or reclusive

as Aycox alleged, then it was illogical for him to appoint her to a position dealing with the media. 

Opp’n at 9:14-19, 14:16-23. She also argued it was not a substitute for APD, as she did not advance

to GS-14, which would allow advancement to GS-15, and, because even though it was a chief

supervisory position, it had no subordinates.14 Hercules Decl. ¶ 13; Hercules Tr. at 119:11-120:12. 

In his EEO declaration, prepared well before Hercules prepared hers, Aycox testified he had

appointed Hercules to this post, to maximize her contribution to the organization, and to maximize

her strengths, as she was articulate and presented well, Aycox Decl. ¶ 18, two skills in which she

considers herself strong. As defendants noted in their Reply, the PAO and APD positions are at

different levels with different skill sets. Reply at 4:1-9. The Court notes it is not reasonable to infer

a person detached from their subordinates, would be detached in their dealings with the media. 

Thus, given Aycox’s concerns with Hercules’ interpersonal supervisory skills, moving her to

position less dependent on them, and more dependent on her stronger skills, was consistent with his

reasons for not promoting her. Also, as defendants noted, that Aycox took her under his wing, does

not support an inference of discrimination on his part. See Mot. at 18:18-16:3; Reply at 14:10-12. 

In conclusion, on these undisputed facts no reasonable jury could find Aycox’s reasons for not

recommending Hercules for promotion were pretext, rather than legitimate and non-discriminatory. 

///

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15 Baldwin’s resume shows she came up through the ranks in Trade as an Import Specialist,

Import Specialist Team Leader, and Supervisory Import Specialist. Docket No. 26, Exs. “F-15” &

“F-16.”

12

3. The undisputed evidence shows Port Director John P. Leyden’s

actions were legitimate and non-discriminatory.

At the time Leyden made his recommendations to Aycox, he had been the San Francisco Port

Director since 2002, and with CBP for 34 years in several management positions. Decl. of John P.

Leyden ¶ 1 (“Leyden Decl.”)). He was also a 57-year old, European-American man. Id. From 2002

through 2005, he was Hercules’ second-level supervisor. Id. ¶ 2. In making his recommendations,

he reviewed the materials submitted by all candidates, as he was looking for a high level of

leadership skills, work ethic, reliability, initiative, attitude, and performance. Id. ¶¶ 3-5. 

With regards to the APD Passenger position, he recommended Romero, as she had been by

far his best manager, and this was one of the toughest jobs at the port. Id. ¶ 6. The hours are around

the clock. Id. She was also well respected by her peers, senior management, and most importantly,

by her subordinates. Id. She had worked in and with all areas of the Port, pertaining to passenger

operations, enforcement, and trade. Id. She had a comprehensive background and was a solid

manager. Id. Leyden felt he could put her anywhere and she would be able to lead and get the job

done because of her management and leadership skills. Id.

For the APD Trade position, he recommended Gassert, while Rible recommended Baldwin. 

Id. His concern with Baldwin was that she did not have second-level supervisory experience. Id.

She did, however, have what they were looking for, the traditional value and classification skills of

an Import Specialist. Id.

Turning to Hercules, Leyden believed she had comparable knowledge and experience as

Romero and Baldwin, but that Hercules did not compare to their leadership skills, management

skills, work ethic, attitude, reliability, or actual performance. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. Also, Baldwin had come

up through the ranks and had a solid background, versus Hercules who had never worked as an

Import Specialist.15 Id. ¶ 6. And, many of the accomplishments for which Hercules took credit were

not directly attributable to her input, but rather while she was on a team or supervised a team that did

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16 The parties do not identify what this means. 

13

the actual work. Id. ¶ 9. Being on a management inspection team does not necessarily mean

someone is the best in a field. Id. It just means they understand enough of the policies and

regulations to go to a port and evaluate if it is following them. Id. 

Leyden also knew Romero had as much, if not more international experience, as Hercules,

having served as a subject-matter expert for the Container Security Initiative. Id. During this time

she conducted port security assessments in Spain, Argentina, Sweden, and England, and met with

high-level members of these governments. Id. Headquarters continued to request her for TDYs16

and other special assignments. Id. She had also received many awards and recognitions, including

the Change Agent Award, and was a Bay Area Federal Manager of the Year finalist. Id. She had

also worked and/or supervised the Contraband Enforcement Team (CET), Manifest Review Unit

(MRU), Passenger Analysis Unit (PAU), Rover Team, Post Audit, Document Analysis Unit (DAU),

Cargo, Outbound, Trade Team, and Passenger Operations. Id.

When he made his recommendations, he knew Hercules was African American, and had

been “involved” in her EEO complaint regarding her performance awards. These issues, however,

did not figure at all in his recommendations. Id. ¶¶ 11-13. Thus, on these undisputed facts, Leyden

has articulated legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Hercules, shifting the

burden to her to prove they were pretext.

a. Hercules failed to show Leyden’s reasons were pretext.

In her deposition, Hercules testified she never spoke with Leyden about his recommendation. 

Hercules Tr. at 43:15-44:3. She also testified she saw him in meetings, but did not have a lot of

contact with him. Id. at 84:84-9-18. And, she testified she had no problems with him as far as she

knew, id. at 87:11-16, nor was she aware of any discriminatory or retaliatory statements by him

directed at her, id. at 102:22-103:1. And, she testified that other than Vigna, she knew of nobody

else who had made any discriminatory or retaliatory statements. Id. at 103:2-7. Nonetheless, in her

Opposition and declaration, she attempted to provide direct evidence of Leyden’s animus, and she

attempted to provide indirect evidence by showing his reasons lacked credence.

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28 17 The Court also notes these allegations of public “excoriation” are surprisingly vague in

content and lack details regarding the time, place, or witnesses.

14

i. Leyden’s and Vigna’s Alleged Conspiracy

In her declaration, she accused Leyden of conspiring with his allegedly close friend Vigna to

retaliate against her by denying her promotion. Hercules Decl. ¶ 1. The Court addresses this

allegation in part I.C.4 infra.

ii. Leyden was not hostile to Hercules.

In her declaration, Hercules accused Leyden of harassing her, behaving in a hostile manner,

and embarrassing her in front of peers and subordinates. Hercules Decl. ¶ 1. Specifically, she

alleged he “aggressively and unduly excoriated me and threatened disciplinary action against me. 

He did so in front of my peers at a meeting that I attended for managers, offering gratuitously

negative comments about me.” Hercules Decl. ¶ 6. Defendants apparently missed this issue, but the

Court observes that “sham” declarations do not create a genuine issue of material fact. See

Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806-07 (1999); Block v. City of Los Angeles,

253 F.3d 410, 419 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001). In her October 29, 2007 deposition, Hercules testified she

knew of no racial or retaliatory animus on Leyden’s part, towards her, and testified Vigna was the

only person she knew of who made improper statements. She cannot then in her April 2, 2008

declaration disagree with herself to create a material factual dispute.17 The Court thus disregards

these “new” allegations.

iii. Leyden had personal knowledge of Hercules’ work

product.

In her declaration, Hercules also alleged Leyden could not have had personal knowledge of

her work product, as he had never been her first-line supervisor, and as he had only been in San

Francisco for three years. Hercules Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7, 23. With regards to the first argument, as

discussed in part I.C.2 supra, the Court already held Leyden’s superior, Aycox, could use the terms

“personal knowledge” to describe his level of knowledge of Hercules’ work, without contradicting

Hercules’ assertion that his knowledge might not be as detailed or in-depth as her first-line

supervisor’s would be. This same reasoning applies to Leyden, who is one level closer to Hercules

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28 18 For example, Hercules does not allege Vigna was unqualified for a supervisory position, or

whether anyone else was available with comparable or superior qualifications.

15

than Aycox. With regards to the second argument, it is unsupported speculation to allege Leyden

could not acquire personal knowledge of Hercules’ work product over a three-year period. Thus, on

these undisputed facts regarding Leyden’s position and time in it, no reasonable jury could find his

reasons for recommending Romero and Gassert were pretext.

iv. Leyden properly had Vigna supervise Hercules.

Hercules claimed a jury could infer pretext, because Leyden knew about her EEO complaints

involving Vigna, but still made Vigna her supervisor, even though she and Vigna were the same GS

grade. Hercules Decl. ¶ 6. This allegedly created a “conflict of interest” as she and Vigna were

competing for the same positions. Opp’n at 10:2-3. Defendants argue Hercules failed to show

Leyden did this out of racial animus. Reply at 2:23-28. The Court first notes, Hercules did not

explain what she meant by a “conflict-of-interest” was created, who it involved, or how, for

example, making her a supervisor over Vigna would have somehow avoided it. 

Turning to her first argument, Hercules cannot expect this Court to find that an employee

who is the target of an unsuccessful EEO or EEOC complaint can never later supervise the

complainant. That said, however, the Court finds, in a vacuum, Hercules might have raised an issue. 

But, without more evidence, she had merely made a prima facie argument, and not provided specific

or substantial evidence of pretext.18 Thus, on the undisputed fact that Leyden made Vigna a

supervisor over Hercules, despite her prior EEO complaints, taken alone or with the other

undisputed facts of this matter, no reasonable jury could find Leyden’s reasons for recommending

Romero and Gassert were pretext.

v. Romero was not “pre-selected.”

Hercules alleged Leyden illegally pre-selected individuals for promotion, by giving them

interim appointments, then promoting them without a competitive process or interviews. Opp’n

at 5:7-10; Hercules Tr. at 127:13-21. She claimed Romero was thus illegally pre-selected by

appointment to the interim APD Passenger position for 120 days, which instead should have been

open to all applicants. Hercules Tr. at 89:1-90:19, 91:3-5.

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19 As the parties drew the Court’s attention to 5 C.F.R. § 335.103, governing merit plans for

federal employees, see part I.C.2.a supra, the Court notes it states in part that agencies may at their

discretion except from competitive procedures a “temporary promotion, or detail to a higher grade

position or a position with known promotion potential, of 120 days or less[.]” 5 C.F.R.

§ 335.103(c)(3)(iii).

16

///

Aycox declared, during the EEO investigation in this matter, that they “try to be fair and give

people opportunities to further their careers when it is deserved. [Hercules] can’t expect to be given

these opportunities at the next level, if she is not performing in an outstanding manner at her current

level.” Aycox Decl. ¶ 10. 

Leyden testified there had been several Acting APDs besides Romero. Leyden Decl. ¶ 10. 

He said he placed persons in this position based on the agency’s needs and mission. Id. For

example, Vigna and T. Welte had been Acting APDs and they had entirely different skill sets. Id.

He indicated when he assigned them to be an Acting APD, it was to fulfill a purpose based on their

ability to perform and their particular skill set. Id. 

Nor was being an Acting APD a guarantee of a job. Romero testified the use of temporary

interim appointments was common, with Hercules having been one in Fines and Penalties, Gassert

having been one, and Fred Ho having been Acting APD Passenger before Baldwin was, but these

three did not keep these positions permanently. Docket No. 26, Ex. “C,” at 35:9-36:1 (Dep. Tr. of

Leticia Romero (“Romero Tr.”)). Leyden also pointed out Baldwin was never an Acting APD, yet

she was promoted to APD Trade Operations. Leyden Decl. ¶ 10. As he testified, “[I]t’s all a matter

of who’s best for the job at the time.” Id. 

Lastly, defendants noted Appendix 1 of the Tri-Bureau Merit Promotion Plan provides that

temporary promotions which last for 120 days or less do not automatically require open

competition.19 Reply at 8:21-9:2; Docket No. 29, Ex. “8” at 226. Thus, on these undisputed facts,

that Leyden appointed Romero as Acting APD Passenger, no reasonable jury could find Leyden’s

reasons for recommending Romero and Gassert were pretext.

///

///

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20 Hercules testified Kenny Lakes was standing with her when Vigna used the term “bitch,” and

made this derogatory inference, and would validate her testimony. Hercules Tr. at 132:14-19. No

such witness was produced.

17

///

4. The undisputed evidence shows Assistant Port Director Richard Vigna’s

actions were legitimate and non-discriminatory.

Hercules’ allegation regarding Vigna is that after she filed her 2003 and 2004 EEO

complaints against him, he and Leyden, who were allegedly close friends, retaliated against her by

creating a hostile work environment. As such, “Vigna tried to withhold me from being elevated to a

higher position and he influenced Leyden not to recommend me for any promotion.” Hercules Decl.

¶ 1. She also claimed he “manipulated” the selection process through his “historic actions,”

Hercules Tr. at 63:5-8, 132:1-4, or by “influencing everything all over the place, as an assistant port

director,” id. at 118:25-119:5. And, she claimed she had a “sterling career,” until he decided he did

not want an African-American woman as his superior. Id. at 131:17-21. 

As discussed below, construing all reasonable inferences in Hercules’ favor, the evidence

shows Vigna’s conduct was inappropriate at unspecified times and frequencies. Nonetheless,

Hercules’ evidence does not show he discriminated against her based on her race or color, or had

anything to do with her not being promoted. Nor would it not allow a reasonable jury to find that

Leyden’s or Aycox’s reasons for their actions in filling the APD positions were pretext.

a. Vigna made derogatory “inferences” regarding Hercules and

called her a “bitch.”

In her deposition, Hercules testified Vigna called her a “bitch” and said she would “not ever

be a port director or anything of that nature.” Hercules Tr. at 56:1-20. She also said, around his

subordinates, he allegedly would “continuously” remark, “ ‘Look at her. She’s not going nowhere. 

She’s not going to do anything,’ blah, blah, blah ....”20 Id. at 132:14-19. 

Supervisory CBP Officer Nina Grass, Hercules’ only witness, testified she had worked in

CBP for 20 years, and immediately under Vigna, from around 1993 through around 2003. Docket

No. 26, Ex. “E” at 17:14-18:5 (Dep. Tr. of Nina Grass (“Grass Tr.”)); Docket No. 29, Ex. “2” at 6:

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9-10, 8:7-10:9 (Dep. Tr. of Nina Grass). During this time, she could not recall his exact words, but

he made comments with a “derogatory inference,” directed at Hercules, sometimes during group

meetings or to Grass while alone with her. Id. at 10:10-11. She could not recall how often he made

them, though she knew “it was more than twice,” but was unsure if it were five or even ten times, as

she just did not know for certain how any times he made them. Id. at 11:12-12:7. She was certain,

however, when he made these comments, Ahern, Leyden, and Rible were not present. Grass Tr.

at 17:3-13. She did recall he “several times” referred to women as “bitches” or something of that

nature. Docket No. 29, Ex. “2” at 13:14-19. 

With regards to his language, Vigna testified he might have used the term “bitch” in

connection with a work assignment, but not directed at a person. Docket No. 29, Ex. “3,” at 28:19-

29:12 (Dep. Tr. of Richard Vigna). He also said it was a term he used rarely, but he tried very hard

to avoid its use at work or in general. Id. With regards to comments regarding Hercules, Vigna

testified it could have been possible he expressed disdain for Hercules in Grass’ presence, but he had

no specific recollections, and it would not have been his regular practice. Id. at 31:18-32:24.

As for Aycox and Rible, they never heard Vigna say anything discriminatory about anyone’s

race, color, sex, age, or prior EEO activities, including Hercules. Docket No. 20, Attach. 2 ¶¶ 5-6

(Aycox); Docket No. 20, Attach. 2d, ¶¶ 5-6 (Decl. of Francean Rible (“Rible Decl.”)). And, neither

Romero nor Baldwin ever heard him use the terms “bitch,” “nigger,” or make any discriminatory

statements. Romero Tr. at 33:11-15; Docket No. 26, Ex. “D” at 26:11-14 (Dep. Tr. of Dora

Baldwin (“Baldwin Tr.”)). 

The Court first notes for the most part these statements as to what people heard or not, are

consistent, as there is no evidence they were all around Vigna or each other 24 hours a day. 

Regarding the inconsistencies, Hercules contradicted her own witness and Vigna, on the issue of

whether he directed the term “bitch” at her. Regardless, this is not a genuine dispute, as it is

reasonable to infer he could have used the term without intending to direct it at Hercules, even

though she reasonably perceived it so directed. Thus, reasonably construing all the evidence in

Hercules’ favor, over a ten-year period, Vigna called her a bitch several times, or less than once a

year, some of those times alone with Grass, and some with others present. 

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21 The lack of detail regarding these statements, and absence of other witnesses, tends to

suggest Vigna did not often repeat them.

22 There is also no evidence as to when Vigna allegedly made these statements, i.e., in the

1990s, in the early 2000s, evenly over time, et seq. If they were only made in the 1990s, then

arguably it is unclear how they would have impacted Hercules’ 2005 job application.

19

///

The situation is different with regards to Vigna’s derogatory inferences. Grass testified he

only made them two to ten times, over a ten-year period, while Vigna said he did not make them

regularly, while Hercules’ said he made them continuously. As there is no evidence Grass was

around Hercules all the time, to hear what Hercules heard, Grass’ testimony is consistent with

Hercules’. Nonetheless, despite the vagueness of the terms “continuously” and “regular,” Hercules’

and Vigna’s testimony could be viewed as inconsistent. Any genuine dispute, however, would be

over immaterial facts. This is because Hercules’ claim is essentially that Vigna continuously

impugned her initiative or future prospects, in the presence of others.21 Hercules failed to produce,

however, any evidence of racial animus in these statements.

While the undisputed use of the term “bitch” and the disputed use of the “derogatory

inferences” were inappropriate, they were not discriminatory on the basis of race or color, nor do

they support such an inference regarding Vigna’s behavior. Further, as the undisputed evidence

showed Aycox, Leyden, and Rible were unaware of any of these undisputed or disputed statements,

it is unclear how they would have impacted Hercules’ application for the APD positions.22 Thus, in

regards to the undisputed statements, no reasonable jury, based on them, could find Aycox’s or

Leyden’s reasons for their actions in filling the APD positions were pretext. And, in regards to the

disputed statements, they are immaterial regarding discrimination on the basis of race or color, and

thus do not defeat summary judgment.

b. Vigna uttered one racial slur over ten years.

In her deposition, Grass recalled Vigna once, and she emphasized “once,” used the term

“nigger.” Id. at 12:24-13:6. In his deposition, Vigna did not recall using the term in the workplace. 

Docket No. 29, Ex. “3,” at 29:24-30:4. These statements are consistent, in that Vigna did not deny

using the term. The Court notes Grass was very clear about the term and its frequency, but failed to

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note whether it was even directed at anyone in particular. The Court also notes Hercules failed to

mention this incident in her deposition. Reasonably construing the evidence in her favor, over a tenyear period, Vigna once used this term in the workplace, but not directed at any specific person, and

not within hearing range of Hercules, Aycox, or Leyden. While the use of the term was

inappropriate, no reasonable jury could find such behavior racially discriminatory, nor adversely

connected to Hercules’ application for the APD positions. Likewise, based on these undisputed

facts, no reasonable jury could find Aycox’s or Leyden’s reasons for their actions in filling the APD

positions were pretext.

c. Vigna made no informal or formal recommendations regarding

the APD positions.

In her deposition, Hercules admitted she knew of no involvement Vigna had, id.

at 11:25-119:10, or any comments or input he provided to anyone, regarding her application for the

APD positions, id. at 63:17-23, 134:3-25. Likewise, in his deposition, Vigna testified he was not

involved with, nor made any formal or informal positive or negative recommendations to anyone

regarding the APD positions. Docket No. 26, Ex. “B,” at 35:23-36:23 (Dep. Tr. of Richard Vigna);

Docket No. 29, Ex. “3,” at 19:21-20:23, 25:13-20, 35:23-36:23. Likewise, Aycox testified he

received no input from Vigna regarding filling the APD positions. Aycox Decl. ¶ 14; Docket No.

20, Attach. 2d ¶¶ 3-4. And, Rible, Romero, Baldwin, and Grass all testified they knew of no input

Vigna had into the selection process. Rible Decl., ¶¶ 3-4; Romero Tr. at 33:3-10; Baldwin Tr.

at 26:3-10; Grass Tr. at 17:14-18:5; Docket No. 29, Ex. “2” at 6:9-10. On this undisputed evidence,

no reasonable jury could find Aycox’s or Leyden’s reasons for their actions in filling the APD

positions were pretext.

d. Vigna and Leyden were not close.

In order to establish a connection between Vigna and Leyden, in her declaration, Hercules

testified “Leyden and Vigna were close friends who socialized outside of work.” Hercules Decl. ¶ 1. 

She also declared:

Both Vigna and Leyden were from the Northeastern part of the U.S. and

shared common ground and were socially connected. Leyden had only been at the

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port three (3) years total was not as familiar with everyone as was Vigna and Leyden

relied on him. It was apparent to the other Chiefs that Vigna had developed a very

close relationship with Leyden.

Id. Decl. ¶ 7.

She did not mention this relationship in her deposition, when discussing either of these individuals. 

In his deposition, Vigna testified he and Leyden “were not very close.” Docket No. 29,

Ex. “3,” at 19:3. And he testified, he saw Leyden outside of work “not very often,” because during

the three years Leyden was Port Director, he and others went out with Leyden as a group only “a

half dozen times.” Id. at 18:6-9, 18:16-19:1. He also recalled when he was promoted, Leyden took

him and one or two others out to dinner, though he could not remember their names. Id. at 19:1-3. 

Defendants noted in their Reply that Hercules has presented no evidence to support her

allegations regarding Vigna’s and Leyden’s allegedly close relationship. Reply at 2:8-22. The

Court agrees and notes she never even explained why she believed they were both from the

northeast. It is also telling that Hercules failed to come forward with any witnesses on this issue, not

even the chiefs who allegedly perceived the close relationship. On this undisputed evidence, no

reasonable jury could find Vigna and Leyden had a close relationship, nor as a result, that Aycox’s

or Leyden’s reasons for filling the APD positions were pretext.

e. Vigna showed no racial bias in his recommendations.

In his March 10, 2008 deposition, Hercules’ counsel asked Vigna if he had recommended

any African-American women for a GS-14 or -15 position, in the past two years. Docket No. 29,

Ex. “3,” at 1, 30:25-31:2. In response, he testified he did not believe so as there were none on the

qualified lists for him to recommend. Id. at 31:6-7. In her Opposition, Hercules claimed this was a

lie as shown by Exhibit “7” to her counsel’s declaration. Opp’n at 11:12-14. Hercules, however,

failed to explain her conclusion. 

The Court notes Exhibit “7” consists of an e-mail and two spreadsheets. Docket No. 29,

Ex. “7” at 2-6. Apparently, during Hercules’ EEO investigation in this matter, a CBP EEO

Specialist requested a list of all GS-13 employees in the San Francisco Field Office, which included

San Jose and Honolulu, who comprised the applicant pool in November 2004 for the APD positions. 

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23 The remaining employees comprised one Asian-American in San Jose, with the rest in

Honolulu, whose race and ethnicity were coded with letters for which no key was provided. Docket

No. 29, Ex. “7” at 5-6.

24 The title indicates the data should only run to July 29, 2005, but the dates indicated run to

January 31, 2006.

25 Hercules claims, without support, that this person was a lateral transfer, rather than a

promotion from within the San Francisco Field Office. Hercules Decl. ¶ 8. Whether true or not, this

does not alter the low number of African-American women on these spreadsheets.

26 This was Romero.

27 The Court also notes, if in the two-year period in question, there were only three AfricanAmerican women at GS-12, -13, and -14 as possible applicants, then it appears only one or two of

them would be promotable to GS-14. And, while the GS-14 employee would be promotable to GS15, it appears few of these positions exist. Thus, it appears quite possible Vigna could have gone

two years without recommending an African-American woman for a GS-14 or -15 position.

22

Id. at 2. The second attached spreadsheet appears responsive to this request, showing for November

2004, all San Francisco Field Office employees with the rank of GS-13. Id. at 5-6. The sheet lists

44 persons, with no names or sexes indicated. Id. Out of the 44, 32 were in San Francisco. Id. Of

these, only two are indicated as African American.23 Id. 

As for the first spreadsheet, it appears to list persons who were selected by the “DFO,” which

likely refers to Aycox, as Director of Field Operations, for positions at the GS-11 through GS-14

level, from July 1, 2004 through January 31, 2006.24 Id. at 3-4. Of the 81 persons listed, 3 are

indicated as African-American women, one GS-12, one GS-13, and one GS-14. Id. Of the 81

positions filled, only 6 were at GS-14 and only 2 were at GS-15. Id. The GS-14 positions were

filled by one African-American woman,25 one Hispanic-American woman,26 one Asian-/PacificIslander-American man, one European-American woman, and two European-American men. Id.

The two GS-15 positions were filled by European-American men. Id. at 3.

Defendant does not address this issue, but the Court notes neither spreadsheet covers the

two-year period prior to Vigna’s deposition. Also, based on the small number of AfricanAmericans, female or otherwise, indicated in these sheets, no reasonable jury could find Vigna lied

about being unable to recommend for a GS-14 or GS-15 position, an African-American woman

employee, for lack of their appearance on a “qualified” list, in the two years prior to his deposition.27

///

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28 In her Opposition, Hercules argued a genuine dispute of material fact existed, where Vigna

claimed he had no involvement in her application process for the APD positions, but where he also

claimed he had made recommendations to fill other positions. Opp’n at 16:22-24. This is not a

factual dispute. This is not even close to a factual dispute. And, it is not even remotely close to

supporting a reasonable inference of pretext.

29 Hercules indicated 2004 in this paragraph, Hercules Decl. ¶ 6, but she most likely meant

2003, see id. ¶ 1; Hercules Tr. at 131:8-12; Opp’n at 16:21-22. 

23

///

Thus, his testimony is not evidence that Aycox’s or Leyden’s reasons for filling the APD positions

were pretext.28

f. Vigna properly reported Hercules’ overtime violation; There is no

evidence of loss due to her delayed review.

In her declaration, Hercules claimed Vigna contacted Internal Affairs in 2003 to report her

overtime requests were suspect. Hercules Decl. ¶ 6.29 In her Opposition, she stated, “He well knew

by expressing such suspicion that it would taint [my] record, whether true or not, and give him the

lead in competing against [me] since [we] were peers and [I] had already filed an EEO complaint

against the agency indicating Vigna was the discriminatory official.” Opp’n at 5:17-20, see

Hercules Decl. ¶ 6. She then alleged after she filed her EEO complaint, Vigna failed to give her a

timely annual review, so she “missed out on receiving further appropriate awards and monetary

payments because of the extended period in which she was not evaluated, in direct violation of

agency policy and procedure.” Opp’n at 5:21-6:4. 

The Court first notes a timing problem with Hercules first allegation regarding her

suspension. Hercules filed her first EEO complaint in 2003, against Vigna, triggered by her fourday suspension, after which he allegedly delayed her annual review by 60 days, triggering a second

EEO complaint in 2004. It is thus unclear how she could declare she had “already filed an EEO

complaint against the agency indicating Vigna was the discriminatory official,” before he reported

her overtime violations. As she testified in her deposition, she started the EEO process after she was

suspended for four days. Hercules Tr. at 131:8-12. On the other hand, in her Opposition, she stated

without support, that Vigna was the subject of “several” of her EEO complaints. Opp’n at 16:5-7. 

The parties, however, have only mentioned the 2003 and 2004 complaints.

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31 Defendants argued Hercules may not relitigate the underlying facts of her EEO complaints,

as she did not appeal the findings of the administrative law judges, and thus did not exhaust her

administrative remedies. Mot. at 14:22-17. The Court simply notes the fact Hercules litigated these

EEO complaints, does not prevent her from raising them as the elements of claims, such as

retaliation, where the EEO proceedings serve as the triggering element of the claim. That is,

Hercules alleged she was not promoted, in retaliation for filing her EEO complaints. Thus, up to a

certain point, they must be considered as elements of her claim. The Court addresses them here, in

Hercules’ discrimination claim, as she argues Vigna’s history, during and after the EEO complaints

demonstrates pretext.

24

///

With regards to her suspension, the Court notes Hercules did not dispute she was suspended

for four days, nor that she violated CBP’s overtime policy. As such, her argument is that Vigna had

no right to report her violations, if he did so out of racist animus. The Court declines to adopt such

an argument. The Court also notes Hercules raised these issues in her EEO complaint, and lost. As

such, on these undisputed facts regarding her suspension, no reasonable jury could find Aycox’s or

Leyden’s reasons for filling the APD positions were pretext.

With regards to her allegedly delayed review, there is no evidence before the Court regarding

any of her annual reviews or when they were performed. Nonetheless, defendants did not dispute

the delay allegation, though without support, they tried to argue it was not Vigna’s fault.30

Regardless, even assuming a 60-day delay occurred, Hercules may not rest on the mere allegation

she lost awards and monetary payments, in violation of statutes or regulations, but must come

forward with specific and substantial evidence, which she has not. Further, she raised these issues in

her second EEO complaint, and lost. As such, on these undisputed facts regarding her delayed

review, no reasonable jury could find Aycox’s or Leyden’s reasons for filling the APD positions

were pretext.31

5. The undisputed evidence shows Hercules’ qualifications were not clearly

superior to Romero’s or Baldwin’s.

“Under this Court’s decisions, qualifications evidence may suffice, at least in some

circumstances, to show pretext.” Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006). The disparity

in qualifications need not be so “apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face.” 

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32 The undisputed evidence shows Romero earned her Bachelors in Management from

St. Mary’s College of California, in 2005, while working full-time, and raising two children, ages 10

and 14. Romero Tr. at 33:16-34:8. She graduated with honors, having straight As and one B-plus,

due to a work-related travel distraction. Id. Although Hercules referred to St. Mary’s as “an ersatz

25

Id.; Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003). In the

Ninth Circuit, “a finding ‘that a Title VII plaintiff’s qualifications were clearly superior to the

qualifications of the applicant selected is a proper basis for a finding of discrimination.’ Odima v.

Westin Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1492 (9th Cir.1995).” Raad, 323 F.3d at 1194. 

Further, as the Supreme Court has held:

the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided

the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria. The fact that a court may think that

the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose

him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s

reasons are pretexts for discrimination. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. 259.

Lastly, as the Ninth Circuit has held, in jobs which “are primarily physical or mechanical, or

are tangible or objective in nature, as does the job of furniture delivery truck driver,” subjective

criteria are more suspect as possible cover for discrimination.” Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d

1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by, O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas

Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1996). The suspicion lessens, however, as one moves up

into the higher echelons of employment, “the skills for which are necessarily measured in more

subjective terms ....” Id. 

In this case, whether reasonably construing the objective or subjective criteria in Hercules’

favor, no reasonable jury could find she was “clearly” more qualified than either Romero or

Baldwin. Looking first at Romero’s objective criteria, Hercules testified she had never worked with

Romero and knew nothing about her performance or how she related to subordinates, peers, or

management. Hercules Tr. at 89:7-90:2, 91:20-23, 92:1-16, 110:14-111:16, 118:17-19, 122:3-10. 

The only difference she knew of was she had a masters, while Romero had no post-secondary

degree.32 Id. at 93:12-21. As Aycox declared, however, he compared Hercules’ and Romero’s

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university with online participation and classes held only on Saturday[,]” Opp’n at 3 n.1, she

provided no support for this assertion. Further, the Court cautions against unsupported argument

which tends towards sarcasm.

26

qualifications, and while the former had good experience, Romero did an outstanding job as Acting

APD Passenger, worked well with all levels of management, and was taking the lead in the port’s

progress.

As for Baldwin’s objective criteria, Hercules admitted she had no idea what Baldwin’s

qualifications for the APD Trade position were. Id. at 94:16-95:2, 113:5-12, 118:17-19. 

Nonetheless, Hercules felt she was stronger than Baldwin in more areas, such as having more

supervisory and customs experience, id. at 111:22-112:1, 115:2-4, 118:8-12, but conceded their

trade experience was comparable, id. at 116:18-20. In turn, Aycox declared a trade background was

superior to an inspections background, and technical ability was critical. And, as he further

declared, Baldwin had come up through the ranks in Trade, and had a strong technical background. 

This, as he stated, along with her education, experience, and proven abilities made her the chosen

candidate.

In the declaration attached to her Opposition, Hercules identified a number of objective

criteria, which allegedly made her the better candidate. See Hercules Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5 9-12, 15, 17-22,

25-27, 29-30. Although it is too lengthy, and repetitive in parts, to review all her allegations in

detail here, she failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact for the following five reasons. First,

to a large degree, Hercules merely restated part of her resume in her declaration. See id. ¶¶ 3, 6, 9-

11, 17-22, 26-27, 29; Hercules Resume. Aycox reviewed her resume, as did the Court, attached to

declarations for both the Motion and the Opposition. Merely repeating parts of it in a declaration,

however, does not explain to the Court how her qualifications were clearly superior.

Second, Hercules sometimes declared her qualifications, without comparing them to Romero

or Baldwin. See Hercules Decl. ¶¶ 3, 9-12, 17, 19. For example, she declared all her evaluations

had been “passing.” Id. ¶ 9. Without comparative information, however, the Court cannot tell how

this makes Hercules a clearly superior candidate, relative to Romero or Baldwin. 

Third, when Hercules did compare her qualifications to Romero or Baldwin, she never

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33 Likewise, Hercules made much of having a Masters in Science and Information Systems.

Hercules Decl. ¶ 20. But, she conceded the APD positions did not require a graduate degree, nor

had any specific use for one, but merely argued that having more knowledge is just generally better. 

Opp’n at 14:27-15:1.

34 Aside from the hearsay nature of this sworn statement, Hercules failed to meet her specific

and substantial burden, such as by providing witness statements.

35 If Hercules wished to argue she did not properly receive Veteran’s preference, she should

have properly litigated the issue. She may not back-door this issue into this matter, now, via a

declaration.

36 Some allegations were just confusing, such as that Hercules worked in different positions,

including “Customs Inspector, Supervisory Inspector, Fines, Penalty and Forfeitures Office.” 

Hercules Decl. ¶ 9. Or that she started the SEALS Enforcement Program. Id. ¶ 11. The Court

cannot tell if she held two or five positions, nor does it know what “SEALS” means.

27

explained how they related to either APD position. See id. ¶¶ 5, 18, 22, 25-27; Opp’n at 3:22-4:12,

4:16-5:4. For example, Hercules declared she was a formally trained management/union mediator. 

///

///

Hercules Decl. ¶ 27. She never explained in her Opposition, however, how this was a relevant

qualification for the APD Passenger or Trade positions.33

Fourth, for certain allegations, such as that her evaluations had all been “passing,” her

burden of proof is by a preponderance, and her burden of production is “specific and substantial.” 

She provided no evaluations to the Court, however, and thus failed to meet her burdens for this and

similar allegations. 

Fifth, a number of allegations were bare summaries, conclusions, or speculations. See id.

¶¶ 9 (“My job performance record is outstanding.”); 12 (“I have acquired the technical knowledge,

skills, and experience to perform the duties of an” APD.); 14 (“My qualifications far exceed”

Romero’s or Baldwin’s.); 15 (“I have more experience and education than either Romero or Baldwin

and am more qualified for both jobs ....”); 16 (“I am known as a very active and involved manager

....”);34 21 (“Veterans are supposed to be given first priority ....”).35, 36 Thus, considering all the

undisputed evidence regarding Hercules’, Romero’s, and Baldwin’s objective criteria, and

construing all reasonable inferences in Hercules’ favor, the Court finds no reasonable jury could find

Hercules’ qualifications were clearly superior to Romero’s or Baldwin’s. 

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37 Leyden also testified the position required long hours. In this regard, the Court notes

Romero testified she comes to work every day, puts in her eight hours, and gives “110 percent,” to

do whatever the agency needs her to do. Romero Tr. at 48:3-5. She also does not use her sick leave,

but donates it annually. Id. at 48:6-16.

38 In this regard, the Court notes that Hercules’ only witness, Grass, testified she had worked

with Hercules, Romero, and Baldwin, and was familiar with all of their backgrounds, and in her

opinion, Romero was more qualified than Hercules for the ADP Passenger position, while Baldwin

and Hercules were comparably qualified for the ADP Trade position. Id. at 18:6-20:11.

28

Turning to subjective criteria, the Court notes the APD positions were at a sufficiently high

enough echelon to expect their selection to turn on subjective considerations. In her deposition,

Hercules testified she believed her work ethic, leadership skills, reliability, attitude, and performance

were comparable to Romero’s, but Hercules felt she was stronger than Romero in her leadership

skills and in being proactive and motivated. Id. at Id. at 111:22-113:3, 121:4-19. In turn, the Court

notes Aycox did testify that for the APD Passenger position he wanted someone proactive,

motivated, and with strong leadership skills. He also testified Leyden highly recommended Romero

because of her leadership, performance, experience, knowledge, and strong reputation amongst her

peers, subordinates, and senior managers.37 And, in the end, Aycox went with Romero. 

The Court first notes, an employee’s feelings or subjective beliefs do not qualify as specific

and substantial evidence of pretext. See Schuler v. Chronicle Broad. Co. Inc., 793 F.2d 1010, 1011

(9th Cir. 1986). And, even though Hercules might argue an exception should exist where an

employee and an employer have differing subjective opinions, Burdine and Nanty caution otherwise,

especially where the disagreement concerns a high-level position such as APD with complex and

technical requirements. The Court is reluctant to even consider substituting its judgment for

Aycox’s or Ahern’s, regarding the candidates’ subjective criteria, where it has little or no knowledge

of the CBP’s or the DHS’ practices, operations, or needs, and Hercules has not met her burden to

provide the Court with this knowledge.38 Thus, considering all the undisputed evidence regarding

the candidates’ subjective criteria, and construing all reasonable inferences in Hercules’ favor, the

Court finds no reasonable jury could find Hercules’ qualifications were clearly superior to Romero’s

or Baldwin’s. As such, no reasonable jury could find Aycox’s or Leyden’s reasons for filling the

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39 Having said this, the Court notes all three women, including Hercules, were found “best”

qualified for the APDs for which they applied. Further, as far the Court can tell from their resumes

[Docket No. 26, Exs. “F-11,” “F-10” & “F-16”], and the transcripts from Romero’s and Baldwin’s

depositions [Docket No. 27, Exs. “C” & “D”], all the women appear to have relatively impressive

records, and the CBP is fortunate to have them in its employ.

29

APD positions were pretext.39

///

6. Hercules failed to present any statistical evidence.

A discriminatory pattern of hiring or promotion is probative of motive and can therefore

create an inference of discriminatory intent with respect to an individual’s employment. Obrey v.

Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 2005). In an apparent attempt to show pretext, Hercules swore

in her declaration that the only GS-14 African-American female in the San Francisco Field Office

was not promoted from within, but was a lateral transfer. Hercules Decl. ¶ 8. She did not, however,

provide any evidence to support this allegation. Thus, the Court is unable to consider this evidence. 

But, were the Court to consider it, the Court would note it indicates the San Francisco Field Office

has an African-American woman, serving at the GS-14 level, which in and of itself, would not

suggest racial animus by defendants or their agents.

In another attempt to show pretext, Hercules declared:

No black officers have been promoted in the Port of San Francisco under CBP

or the old U.S. Customs Service to a GS-14 or above position. There is not one

promotion of an African-American woman over forty (or otherwise) at the GS-14 or

above level by CBP senior managers within the San Francisco OFO, even though

their have been several candidates that were quite experienced and more that capable

of filling the position. In fact, there has not been a Black male or female promoted to

a GS-14 position or above even though there are many qualified candidates.

Hercules Decl. ¶ 31.

First, Hercules does not provide any evidence to support her assertions. The only data she

supplied, as discussed in part I.C.4.e supra, only covers November 2004 and the period from July 1,

2004 to January 31, 2006. It thus does not appear to go back far enough to identify what the

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Customs Service did or did not do, prior to the creation of the DHS, after November 11, 2001. 

Second, as defendants partially noted, see Reply at 10:16-28, Hercules did not identify which

promotions had been available, and when, and which candidates were qualified for them, and who

got them. Without this information, the Court cannot verify whether there were “several” or “many”

qualified candidates, as she alleges. In essence, in this case, Hercules provided neither statistics nor

///

evidence on which any reasonable jury could find Aycox’s or Leyden’s reasons for filling the APD

positions were pretext.

D. Conclusion

Although Hercules has made a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII, on

the undisputed facts of this matter, and construing all reasonable inferences in her favor, no

reasonable jury could find defendants’ agents discriminated against her on the basis of her race or

color, but would find they promoted Romero and Baldwin for legitimate and non-discriminatory

reasons.

II. Hercules failed to show any retaliation under Title VII.

Section 704 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, states in part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate

against any of his employees ..., because he has opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

hearing under this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003).

In analyzing retaliation claims under Title VII, the Court proceeds under the McDonnell Douglas

analysis. Stegall, 350 F.3d at 1065. As such, Hercules must first make out a prima facie case of

retaliation, after which the burden of production shifts to defendants to demonstrate their agents

acted for legitimate and non-retaliatory reasons, which if they do, shifts the burden back to Hercules

to prove their reasons are pretext. Id.

To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, Hercules must demonstrate “(1) she engaged in

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a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal link

between her activity and the employment decision.” Stegall, 350 F.3d at 1065 (quoting Raad, 323

F.3d at 1196-97)). Hercules may establish a causal link by “an inference derived from

circumstantial evidence, ‘such as the employer’s knowledge that the [employee] engaged in

protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly

retaliatory employment

///

decision.’ ” Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809

F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir.1987)).

In this case, Hercules may have made a prima facie case of retaliation. She filed EEO

complaints in 2003 and 2004, then was denied a promotion in 2005 by Aycox, who was aware of her

EEO complaints, and on whom Ahern based his decision not to promote Hercules. See Poland v.

Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2007) (proper to impute subordinate’s alleged bias to superior

where former is basis for latter’s adverse act). What is unclear, however, is whether Hercules has

shown a sufficiently short temporal proximity to support a causal inference, though on these facts,

she probably has. 

The Court need not resolve this issue, however, because reasonably construing the

undisputed facts in Hercules’ favor, no reasonable jury could find Ahern, Aycox, Leyden, or Vigna

retaliated against her. First, Hercules’ only witness, Grass, established Vigna made derogatory

inference towards Hercules and called her a “bitch,” from 1993 through 2003, prior to her 2003 and

2004 EEO complaints against Vigna. Assuming, for the sake of argument, Vigna continued this

behavior into 2005, the fact his conduct remaining consistent, does not suggest his conduct was

retaliatory. 

Second, to the extent Hercules rests her retaliation claim on a conspiratorial social

connection between Vigna and Leyden, as discussed in part I.C.4.d. supra, it is unsupported by the

undisputed evidence. Third and last, for the same reasons defendants’ agents actions were

legitimate and non-discriminatory in denying Hercules a promotion, as discussed in part I supra,

they were legitimate and non-retaliatory. Thus, reasonably construing the undisputed facts in

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Hercules’ favor, no reasonable jury could find for her on her retaliation claim. 

III. Hercules failed to show a racially hostile work environment under Title VII.

Although not expressly mentioned in Title VII, it is violated “[w]hen the workplace is

permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment[.]’ ” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002) (quoting

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)); McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d

1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004). In order to survive summary judgment, a non-movant must show the

existence of a genuine factual dispute regarding whether objectively and subjectively a hostile work

environment existed, and whether their employer failed to take adequate remedial and disciplinary

action. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1112.

Subjectively, “[i]n determining if an environment is so hostile as to violate Title VII, we

consider whether, in light of all the circumstances the harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive

to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” 

McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1112 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). An isolated comment

will not suffice, but neither is psychological injury required. Id. “It is enough ‘if such hostile

conduct pollutes the victim’s workplace, making it more difficult for her to do her job, to take pride

in her work, and to desire to stay on in her position.’ ” Id. (quoting Steiner v. Showboat Operating

Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1462-63 (9th Cir.1994)).

Objectively:

In determining whether an actionable hostile work environment claim exists,

we look to “all the circumstances,” including “the frequency of the discriminatory

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.” 

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23); see McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1113.

The analysis is made from the perspective of a reasonable person belonging to the same racial or

ethnic group as the plaintiff. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116 n.10. “The required level of severity or

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40 Nor may Hercules argue a hostile work environment existed on the basis of age, for the

reasons discussed in this part and in part IV infra.

41 Vigna’s one racial slur over a ten-year period, certainly does not suffice.

42 Another hurdle for Hercules in proving a hostile work environment, would be showing

defendant was liable for Vigna’s actions. “An employer is vicariously liable for a hostile

environment created by a supervisor, although such liability is subject to” two affirmative defenses: 

“1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any invidious harassment, and 2)

that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective

opportunities provided by the employer or avoid harm otherwise.” McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1119 &

n.12. While Vigna was Hercules’ “supervisor,” the alleged harrasser must hold a “sufficiently” high

position to support imputing liability to their employer. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.

775, 789-90 (1998). The parties did not brief whether Vigna was “sufficiently” high in the CBP

hierarchy to support imputation, but the Court need not address this issue, as no hostile work

environment existed.

33

seriousness varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.” McGinest, 360

F.3d at 1113 (quoting Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting

Harris, 510 U.S. at 23)).

In this case, Hercules has not subjectively or objectively shown a racially hostile work

environment. First, she has failed to show any racial animus40 motivated Ahern, Aycox, Leyden, or

Vigna. Second, she failed to show any continuous, pervasive pattern of racial slurs41 and/or physical

contact, which would make it more difficult for a reasonable African American woman to do her

job, take pride in her work, or desire to stay on in her position. In fact, Hercules seems committed to

her work and desires to advance within the CBP. More importantly, while it may have been

inappropriate for Vigna to generically disparage Hercules, or occasionally call her a “bitch,” this is

not evidence of a hostile work environment, racial or otherwise. Nor does Hercules fare any better

by linking Vigna’s comments to the other undisputed evidence, because as just noted, she failed to

produce any evidence of racial animus. Thus, construing the undisputed evidence in Hercules’

favor, no reasonable jury could find subjectively or objectively a racially hostile work environment

existed.42

IV. Hercules failed to show any age discrimination under the ADEA.

The ADEA, in part, makes it unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his

employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment

opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s

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43 The only remaining defendant is Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland

Security, in his Official Capacity. The only actual remaining defendant, however, is the United

States of America. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (suit against person in their

official capacity is actually suit against entity).

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age ....” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2). The act over covers employees at least 40 years of age. Id. §

631(a). And, it covers federal employees. Id. § 633a. Unless a plaintiff has direct evidence of age

discrimination, the court analyzes an ADEA claim under the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Reeves,

530 U.S. at 142. 

In this case, Hercules has made a prima facie case of age discrimination, regarding Baldwin,

but not Romero, in that when she was 40 or over, she applied for a position for which she was

qualified, but she lost out to a 31-year-old and a 45-year-old, respectively. See O’Connor v. Consol.

Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996) (age difference must be “significant”). Nonetheless,

construing all the undisputed evidence in Hercules’ favor, there is even less evidence to support an

inference of age discrimination, than there is to support an inference of racial discrimination, for

which there is little to none. Thus, for the reasons discussed in part I supra, there is insufficient

evidence for any reasonable jury to find Ahern, Aycox, Leyden, or Vigna discriminated against

Hercules on the basis of her age.

V. The proper defendants

When a federal employee alleges employment discrimination, the only proper defendant is

the head of the agency which employs them. Vinieratos v. U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, 939 F.2d

762, 772 (9th Cir. 1991) (Title VII); Romain v. Shear, 799 F.2d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1986) (ADEA),

cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c). As such, the

Court dismisses with prejudice DHS and CBP, from Hercules’ suit brought under Title VII and the

ADEA.43

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) [Docket

No. 20] in favor of defendant Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in

his official capacity. And, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice defendants Department of Homeland

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Security and Customs and Border Protection.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

April 28, 2008 _________________________________

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

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