Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01950/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01950-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ISAIAH JOEL PETILLO, 

CDCR #T-44601, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

SCOTT KEARNAN, et al. 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:16-cv-01950-MMA-JMA 

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b) 

I. Procedural History 

On August 1, 2016, Isaiah Joel Petillo (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner incarcerated in 

Corcoran State Prison located in Corcoran, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil 

rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleged 

that prison officials at five separate prisons violated his constitutional rights when they 

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classified him with an “R” suffix1

. (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 1, 10.) Plaintiff has named 

thirty one (31) defendants in this matter. (Id. at 1-9.) Plaintiff did not prepay the civil 

filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a 

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 

4). 

On October 24, 2016, Plaintiff’s IFP motion was granted but his Complaint was 

simultaneously dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

(Doc. No. 7 at 15-16.) On November 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed his First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) and later filed a “Declaration in Support of Complaint.” (Doc. Nos. 

8, 10.) However, the Court once again found that Plaintiff’s FAC failed to state a claim 

upon which relief could be granted and dismissed his FAC. (Doc. No. 11 at 9-10.) 

Plaintiff was again granted leave to file an amended pleading in order to correct the 

deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id.) On March 9, 2017, 

Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. No. 12.) 

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) 

 A. Standard of Review 

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his SAC requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

                                               

1

 Pursuant to Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3377.1(b), “[a]n ‘R’ suffix shall be affixed to an inmate’s 

custody designation to ensure the safety of inmates, correctional personnel, and the general public by 

identifying inmates who have a history of specific sex offenses as outlined in Penal Code (PC) section 

290.” 

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Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). 

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009). 

B. Rule 8 

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to comply with 

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure provides that in order to state a claim for relief in a pleading it must contain “a 

short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(1) & (2). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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Here, Plaintiff’s SAC offers far less factual allegations than his Complaint. Instead 

of setting for specific factual allegations to support his claims, Plaintiff cites to his 

original Complaint. (See SAC at 2-6). However, Plaintiff was instructed by this Court 

that if he elected to “file an Amended Complaint, it must be complete by itself without 

reference to his original pleading.” (Doc. No. 11 at 9-10 citing S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; 

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 

F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which 

are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

Plaintiff failed to follow this instruction in both his FAC and SAC. 

In addition, throughout his SAC, Plaintiff simply lists a number of Defendants 

without connecting them to any specific factual allegation. (See SAC at 6-8.) “The 

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it 

demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC plainly falls short of complying with 

Rule 8 and the Court’s local rules, and for that reason alone, requires dismissal.

 D. Fourteenth Amendment due process claims

Throughout Plaintiff’s SAC, he alleges that he has been housed at a number of 

different institutions under the jurisdiction of the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). The only allegations regarding Defendants at Calipatria 

State Prison (“CAL”) involve the CAL institutional classification committee’s (“ICC”) 

decision to apply an “R” suffix to Plaintiff in 2010. (See SAC at 2-3.) The Due Process 

Clause protects prisoners against deprivation or restraint of “a protected liberty interest” 

and “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents 

of prison life.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Although the level of the hardship must be determined in a case-by-case 

determination, courts look to: 

1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed 

upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus 

comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; 2) the duration of the 

condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3) whether the state’s 

action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence. 

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87). Only if an inmate has 

alleged facts sufficient to show a protected liberty interest does the court next consider 

“whether the procedures used to deprive that liberty satisfied Due Process.” Ramirez, 334 

F.3d at 860. 

 As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s SAC fails to allege facts which show that having 

an “R” suffix subjected him to any “atypical and significant hardship in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 584. Plaintiff claims that he 

has suffered “atypical and significant hardship” because “parole board members will be 

reluctant to give Plaintiff a parole date based on the “R” suffix classification.” (SAC at 

9.) However, this is purely speculative on his part and he provides no factual allegations 

as to whether he is eligible for parole or that there is any date for a parole hearing. 

In addition, Plaintiff claims that the “R” suffix “restricts Plaintiff from enjoying the 

privilege regular prisoners receive in regard to [conjugal] visitations with family & 

friends.” (Id. at 10-11.) However, it is “well-settled that prisoners have no constitutional 

right while incarcerated to contact visits or conjugal visits.” Gerber v. Hickman, 291 

F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corrs v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 

454, 460 (1989)). 

 Based on these claims alone, the Court finds his pleading contains no “factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 

that Defendants’ actions “presented a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of 

[Plaintiff’s] indeterminate sentence,” or caused him to suffer an “atypical” or “significant 

hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 584-85. 

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However, even if Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to invoke a protected liberty 

interest under Sandin, he fails to plead facts to plausibly show he was denied the 

procedural protections the Due Process Clause requires. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; 

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860 (citations omitted); see also Brown v. Oregon Dep’t of Corr., 

751 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2014). Those procedures include: (1) written notice of the 

charges at least 24 hours before the disciplinary hearing; (2) a written statement by the 

fact-finder of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) the right 

to call witnesses and present documentary evidence if doing so will not jeopardize 

institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) the right to appear before an impartial body; 

and (5) assistance from fellow inmates or prison staff in complex cases. Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72 (1974); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1079-80 

(9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff offers no factual allegations to support a finding that he was 

denied his due process rights during his 2010 classification hearing. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a procedural due 

process claim as to any Defendant; therefore, his Fourteenth Amendment claims are also 

subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

§ 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. 

D. Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims 

Plaintiff also alleges that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in 

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by having the “R” suffix classification. The 

Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee 

the safety and well-being of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994); 

Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). To state an Eighth Amendment 

failure to protect claim, however, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to plausibly show 

that (1) he faced conditions posing a “substantial risk of serious harm” to his health or 

safety, and (2) the individual prison officials he seeks to hold liable were “deliberately 

indifferent” to those risks. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 

1150 (9th Cir. 2010). To demonstrate deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must show that the 

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defendant both knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to his health 

and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, Plaintiff must allege “the official [was] both 

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exist[ed], and [that] he . . . also dr[e]w that inference.” Id. 

 There are no facts from which the Court could conclude that any Defendant acted 

with “deliberate indifference” to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not 

allege, in any way, that apart from having the “R” suffix that any named Defendant was 

actually aware of any known, specific threats to Plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff does not 

allege that any of the named Defendants were aware that other inmates allegedly knew of 

Plaintiff’s classification status.2

 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to allege that any Defendant was aware of 

any facts demonstrating an “obvious” risk and failed to take any action. Farmer, 511 U.S. 

842; see also Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Much like 

recklessness in criminal law, deliberate indifference . . . may be shown by circumstantial 

evidence when the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a 

risk of harm.”). 

For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s failure to protect claims against all 

Defendants also must be dismissed for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 

1004. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

                                               

2

 Plaintiff does allege Correctional Officer Gonzalez “told another correctional officer that “that dude 

[Plaintiff] there is a rapist.” (SAC at 4.) However, Plaintiff indicates that Gonzalez is not a defendant in 

this action and the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff is already bringing a separate action against 

Gonzalez for claims he refers to in this action. See Petillo v. Peterson, et al., E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

1:16-cv-00488-MJS. 

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 E. Leave to Amend 

 Finally, while Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “[t]he court should give leave [to amend] 

freely when justice so requires,” the Court further finds that amendment under the 

circumstances of this case would be futile. See Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 

1246, 1258 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 

279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis 

for dismissal without leave to amend)). 

III. Conclusion and Order

 Good cause appearing, the Court: 

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim 

upon which § 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

1915A(b)(1) and DENIES leave to amend as futile. 

The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: April 26, 2017 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

 

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