Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01051/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01051-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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' FILED ls 

United States ~rt ~f Appea 1'enth C,rcu,t 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 17 199 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LEVI MARTINEZ, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

STATE OF COLORADO; SUPREME ) 

COURT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO; ) 

CHIEF JUSTICE JOSEPH R. QUINN; ) 

JUSTICE GEORGE E. LOHR; JUSTICE) 

WILLIAM H. ERICKSON; JUSTICE ) 

MARY J. MULLARKEY; JUSTICE ) 

HOWARD K. KIRSHBAUM; JUSTICE ) 

LUIS D. ROVIRA; JUSTICE ) 

ANTHONY F. VOLLACK, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1051 

(D.C. No. 89-Z-1453) 

(D. Colorado) 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App . P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1051 Document: 010110040920 Date Filed: 08/17/1990 Page: 1 
' 

Levi Martinez brought this action after he was disbarred by 

the Supreme Court of Colorado. In his amended complaint, Martinez 

requested declaratory judgment in the form of a declaration that 

the disciplinary proceedings against him were the product of unconstitutional procedural rules and that the disbarment in his 

case is therefore null and void. Specifically, Martinez asserted 

that pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, he was not 

appointed counsel to represent him, an indigent attorney, during 

the trial proceedings before the Grievance Committee of the 

Supreme Court of Colorado. The district court dismissed the 

action and this appeal followed. We affirm. 

United States district courts "do not have jurisdiction 

over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege 

that the state court's action was unconstitutional." D.C. Court 

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); see Razatos v. 

Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1432-33 (10th Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985); Phelps v. Kansas Supreme 

Court, 662 F.2d 649, 651 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 

944 (1982); Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596, 597 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1976). The relief sought by Martinez, 

"although couched in terms of a general challenge to the 

constitutionality of the state rules, was in reality an attempt to 

obtain reversal of the state court judgment which disbarred him." 

Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1428 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 

Stern v. Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1051 Document: 010110040920 Date Filed: 08/17/1990 Page: 2 
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77 (1988)). The district court has no jurisdiction over Martinez' 

challenge to the state court disbarment. 

Martinez also requested, in very general terms, relief 

declaring the Colorado Rules unconstitutional as they pertain to 

attorney discipline. 1 Martinez alleges a violation of equal 

protection in that indigent attorneys facing disciplinary proceedings are not appointed counsel unlike attorneys who face disability proceedings. He also contends that the constitutional 

right to due process is denied attorneys who must represent 

themselves before the Grievance Committee. Martinez' attack on 

the rules is meritless. 

As an indigent, Martinez does not present an issue involving 

any suspect classification. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 

1 Since his disbarment, Martinez is no longer a licensed 

attorney subject to such disciplinary rules. The district court 

has no jurisdiction to alter the Colorado Supreme Court's final 

decision of disbarment or to otherwise reinstate Martinez. As a 

non-attorney at the time of his original complaint, Martinez has 

failed to demonstrate that he has standing to challenge the rules 

in the district court. Cf., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 

(1984) ("plaintiff must allege personal injury ... likely to be 

redressed by the requested relief"); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare 

Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976) ("The necessity that the 

plaintiff who seeks to invoke judicial power stand to profit in 

some personal interest remains an Article III requirement."); 

Schepp v. Fremont County, Wyo., 900 F.2d 1448, 1452-53 (10th Cir. 

1990) (mere desire for vindication or "guidance" to state courts 

insufficient grounds for standing). But cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 

268, 271-72 (1979) (where state may respond voluntarily to 

declaratory relief arising out of equal protection attack on state 

statute, thereby alleviating ongoing burden on plaintiff, standing 

to sue exists). Of course, Martinez would be free to appeal his 

own disbarment, and thereby attack the constitutionality of the 

rules as they affected his case, by directly petitioning the 

United States Supreme Court. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486 (review of state court proceedings may be 

had in Supreme Court). The record before us contains no 

indication that Martinez exercised this right. Regardless, even 

if Martinez has standing to sue for declaratory relief, his suit 

is meritless for the reasons we discuss. 

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J 

Nor does the right to counsel attach as a "fundamental right" in 

the preliminary stages of disbarment proceedings. See Razatos v. 

Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d at 1435 (The "due process rights 

of an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding 'do not extend so far 

as to guarantee the full panoply of rights afforded to an accused 

in a criminal case.'"). Therefore, the government need only 

demonstrate that it has a rational basis for discriminating 

between attorneys being disciplined and those facing a disability 

hearing, and that refusing to appoint counsel to represent 

indigent attorneys bears some rational relation to a legitimate 

governmental purpose. See,~, Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 

U.S. 1 (1988); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982). 

The reasons for these procedural rules are evident. An 

attorney facing disability hearings may obviously require some 

assistance due to the condition that prompted the hearing in the 

first place; an attorney being disciplined has no such need, 

especially if the attorney is assumed to be competent. Providing 

for attorney discipline while avoiding the cost and administrative 

delay of appointing counsel to represent licensed attorneys is an 

obviously legitimate goal properly achieved through the rules as 

they exist in Colorado. The procedural safeguard of a plenary 

review by the Colorado Supreme Court is adequate protection 

against any errors which may occur in the preliminary hearing 

before the Grievance Committee. See,~, Razatos v. Colorado 

Supreme Court, 746 F.2d at 1434-37 (reviewing the procedural 

safeguards encompassed in Colorado's attorney discipline scheme). 

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... 

For the reasons set out above we AFFIRM. The mandate shall 

issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-1051 Document: 010110040920 Date Filed: 08/17/1990 Page: 5