Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01958/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01958-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Anthony Hatcher, 

Petitioner,

v. 

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondent. ______________________________________

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CV 07-1958 PHX-SMM (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No.

1] filed under 28 U.S.C. §2254. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States

District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred

to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate

Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the record, deny

and dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By indictment dated September 17, 2003, Petitioner was charged in Maricopa County

with six counts of armed robbery, all class 2 dangerous felonies; seven counts of kidnaping,

all class 2 dangerous felonies; and one count of unlawful flight from a law enforcement

vehicle, a class 5 felony. (Ex. A.) The State further alleged that Petitioner committed the

offenses with two historical prior felony convictions, and that Petitioner committed the

offenses while on release. (Ex. B.) 

On March 16, 2004, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement that provided he would

plead guilty to one count of armed robbery and one count of kidnaping, both class 2

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dangerous felonies, based on the armed robbery of a credit union. (Exs. C & D.) Petitioner’s

counsel summarized the factual basis for both counts:

On September 8, 2003, in both counts, they took place at

2920 North 24th Avenue in Phoenix, which is Maricopa County.

Located at that address is Arizona Grocers Credit Union.

On that day [Petitioner] assisted others in taking property

from the victim in Count I, who is Amber Taylor. The property

was taken from Miss Taylor’s person by the threatened use of a

deadly weapon, a handgun. And she relinquished the property

because of their fears of the threatened use of the handgun.

As to Count III, at the same time, Melanie Garcia was

restrained. She was restrained so that the commission of the

felony, the armed robbery on her and others, could be

accomplished.

She was restrained against her will. She was also

restrained with the threatened use of a handgun that was also

present.

[Petitioner’s] role in this instance was to act as the socalled getaway driver. He provided the means for the codefendants in this case to flee the scene. 

He was later chased by police. There was short flight

from the police, which is actually charged in Count XIV of this

incident and he was arrested immediately thereafter.

(Ex. C, pp. 6-7.) Petitioner agreed that the factual basis was true. (Id., p. 7.)

Under the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to Count 1 and Count 3

and the parties stipulated that he would be sentenced from 10.5 years (the presumptive term)

to 16 years on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. (Ex. E.) The remaining

counts (Counts 2 and 4 through 14) of the indictment were dismissed. (Id.) The plea

agreement also stated that Petitioner waived all motions, defenses, and objections to the

judgment and sentence, and also waived his right to appeal. (Id.) 

On May 3, 2004, before imposing its sentence, the trial court found that “there are

aggravating circumstances. There are multiple victims; seven victims in this case. The crime

was committed for pecuniary gain. There were accomplices involved . . . .” (Ex. F, p. 16.)

The court went on to state: “I also have considered the three prior felony convictions that you

have . . . .” (Id., p. 17.) The court then concluded that, “Based on all that, I do find that the

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 As Respondents indicate in footnote 2 of the Answer, the petition is dated July 4, 2007, but

it was not received and filed by the Court until October 11, 2007. (Doc. No. 1, p. 9.) After

investigation, however, Respondents were unable to obtain documentation establishing when

Petitioner actually mailed the petition to the Court. As such, they do not challenge the timeliness

of the petition. 

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aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances,” and sentenced Petitioner

to 12 1⁄2 years imprisonment on Counts 1 and 3, with the sentences to run concurrently. (Id.,

p. 18; Ex. G.) Finally, the court ordered, as stipulated in the plea agreement, that the

remaining counts be dismissed. (Ex. F, p. 19.) 

Petitioner subsequently, on July 27, 2004, filed a notice of post-conviction relief. (Ex.

H.) In the petition, which was filed on February 4, 2005, Petitioner claimed that the trial

court’s consideration of aggravating factors unconstitutionally increased the statutory

maximum range for Petitioner’s sentences in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004). (Ex. I.) On April 26, 2005, the trial court addressed Petitioner’s claim and

rejected it for lack of merit, stating that the trial courts’ finding of multiple victims was based

upon Petitioner’s plea to two separate counts involving two separate victims, which was

implicit in Petitioner’s plea agreement. (Ex. J.) The court also stated that Petitioner admitted

in his factual basis for the plea that he committed the crimes with accomplices by agreeing

that “[h]e was the getaway driver for his co-defendants who were inside the credit union with

guns and masks putting the victims on the floor.” (Id.) After finding that the Petitioner had

admitted to the “accomplice aggravator and the multiple victim aggravator,” the court

concluded that “both may be considered by the Court as well as all other aggravating

circumstances.” (Id.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which was

denied without comment on February 17, 2006. (Ex. K & L.) Petitioner then sought review

by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on July 7, 2006. (Ex. M.)

 The instant petition was filed on July 4, 2007.1

 (Doc. No. 1.) As he did in his petition

for post-conviction relief, Petitioner alleges that he never waived his right to have a jury find

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the aggravating circumstances that could be used to aggravate his sentence, and that the trial

court’s finding of these aggravating circumstances violated his rights under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 5.)

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state decision

was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision

can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority,

or (2) if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts "materially

indistinguishable" from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result.

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state

court decision is contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision

of a state court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092,

1101 (9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a new set

of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails to extend a

clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner relies on Blakely v. Washington and alleges that he never waived his right

to have a jury find the aggravating circumstances that could be used to aggravate his

sentence, and that the trial court’s finding of these aggravating circumstances violated his

rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Respondents contend that Petitioner’s

claim is procedurally barred by his guilty plea, that the trial court did not misapply Blakely,

and that, even if it did, the error was harmless.

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In deciding Blakely, the Supreme Court made it clear that, “[o]ther than the fact of a

prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)); United

States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court explained in Blakely that

“the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may

impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the

defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (citations omitted). 

The trial court’s ruling on the Petitioner post-conviction petition is the only reasoned

decision addressing Petitioner’s Blakely claim. In finding that the use of aggravating factors

(that the crime was committed with accomplices and against multiple victims) to enhance

Petitioner’s sentence did not violate Blakely, the trial court indicated that:

In [Petitioner’s] case the Court found there were multiple

victims. This was based upon Defendant’s plea to two separate

counts involving two separate victims. This finding was

implicit in [Petitioner’s] plea agreement. In addition,

[Petitioner] admitted in his factual basis that he committed the

crimes with accomplices. He was the getaway driver for his codefendants who were inside the credit union with guns and

masks putting the victims on the floor.

Pursuant to State v. Martinez, 209 Ariz. 280, 100 P.3d 30

(App. 2004), the finding of one aggravating factor opens the

sentencing range to the full range set by law and also allows the

Court to consider all aggravating factors. Since [Petitioner]

admitted to the accomplice aggavator and the multiple victim

aggravator was implicit in [Petitioner’s] plea, both may be

considered by the Court as well as all other aggravating

circumstances.

(Ex. J.) 

Petitioner did not file a reply and had offered no basis for finding that the trial court’s

treatment of his Blakely claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Blakely, or

that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. As block quoted in the

background section above, the factual basis to which Petitioner assented set forth the

identities of two victims and described Petitioner’s participation in the crimes with his two

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accomplices. Based on these admissions, the trial court, as it reasoned in its order denying

post-conviction relief, was permitted to rely on the aggravating factors of multiple victims

and accomplice participation with violating Blakely.

Even if the trial court did error, it was harmless. See Washington v. Recueno, 548

U.S. 212, 221-222 (2006) (holding that Blakely error in failing to submit a sentencing factor

to a jury is subject to harmless error). In addition to the admissions of multiple victims and

to the participation of accomplices, Petitioner also did not object at sentencing when his

counsel stated that he was “aware of the record in this case,” and proceeded to address the

issue of Petitioner’s prior convictions, stating that “The State and the probation officer, quite

frankly, rightfully so, make some note of the fact that [Petitioner] has two prior felony

convictions; one of which was an aggravated assault case.” (Ex. F, p. 6.) Later in the

hearing, the trial court judge states that he “considered the three prior felony convictions .

. . .” (Id., p. 18.) Petitioner also avowed in the Plea Agreement that he “has no more than

two prior felony convictions in any jurisdiction.” (Ex. E, p. 1.) Considering these facts, and

that prior convictions are Blakely exempt, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that without any

purported error, the result in this case would have been the same. See Neder v. United

States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). The trial court simply could have relied on Petitioner’s prior

convictions, which Petitioner does not dispute, and no doubt would have reached the same

sentencing conclusion as it did. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District

Court, after its independent review, deny and dismiss with prejudice Petitioner’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1].

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

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However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 07-1958-PHXSMM. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 8th day of October, 2009.

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