Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02150/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02150-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v.

C.M. HARRISON, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 05CV2150 J (CAB)

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PETITIONER’S

APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY [DOC. NO.

65];

(2) GRANTING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

IN FORMA PAUPERIS [DOC. NO.

66]; AND

(3) GRANTING IN PART

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR

COPIES [DOC. NO. 67].

The matters before the Court are Petitioner Keith Williams’ Application for a Certificate

of Appealability (“Application”) (doc. no. 65), Motion for Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis

(doc. no. 66), and Motion for Copies. [Doc. No. 67.] Petitioner filed the Application on the

grounds that (1) failure to provide the jury with written instructions on duress was

unconstitutional; (2) the prosecutor unconstitutionally used peremptory challenges to dismiss

jurors based on race and gender; (3) the magistrate judge erred in failing to appoint counsel; and

(4) the Court erred in denying Petitioner an opportunity to amend the Petition.

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Background

On October 7, 2002, Petitioner was charged with: 1) murder in violation of California

Penal Code § 187; 2) carjacking in violation of Pen. Code § 215(a); and 3) robbery in violation

of Pen. Code § 211. (Clerk’s Trans. at 212-13.) Several special circumstances were also

alleged, including a gun allegation. (Id.) On October 23, 2002, Petitioner was convicted of firstdegree murder, among other crimes. (Id. at 150-55.) On December 12, 2002, Petitioner was

sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the first-degree-murder conviction

and the other sentences were stayed pursuant to California sentencing rules. (Id. at 166-67, 217.) 

On November 18, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). [Doc. No. 1.] On May 10, 2007, Petitioner filed a Traverse to

the Petition (“Traverse”). [Doc. No. 56.] On April 14, 2008, Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo filed

a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Petition be denied. [Doc. No.

60.] On May 19, 2008, Petitioner timely filed an Objection to the Report and Recommendation

(“Objection”). [Doc. No. 61.] On August 21, 2008, the Court issued an Order Adopting the

Report and Recommendation (“Order”) and denying the Petition. [Doc. No. 62.]

Legal Standard

A state prisoner may not appeal the denial of a § 2254 habeas petition unless he or she

obtains a certificate of appealability from a district or circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A);

see also United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that district

courts have authority to issue certificates of appealability pursuant to AEDPA). In deciding

whether to grant a certificate of appealability, a court must either indicate the specific issues

supporting a certificate or state reasons why a certificate is not warranted. See Asrar, 116 F.3d

at 1270. A certificate of appealability is authorized “if the applicant has made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253©)(2). To meet this standard,

petitioner must show that: (1) the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; (2) that a court

could resolve the issues in a different manner; or (3) that the questions are adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1024-25 (9th Cir.

2000) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) and Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880

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(1983)). Petitioner does not have to show “that he should prevail on the merits. He has already

failed in that endeavor.” Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1025 (citing Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n.4). 

Discussion

I. Claim 1 - Lack of Written Jury Instruction

Petitioner first argues that the California Superior Court violated his due process rights

when it refused to provide the jury with a written instruction on duress. (Application at 5.) In

order for the Court to certify an appeal on this issue, Petitioner must establish that reasonable

jurists could debate whether the omission of the written instruction violated his due process

rights. Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1025.

Petitioner points out in the Application that the trial court told the jury to “go by what you

read here in the written jury instructions.” (Application at 6.) None of the prosecution’s

requested instructions were omitted from the written instructions. (Application at 6.) In sum,

Petitioner argues that, when viewed together, the omission of a written duress instruction and the

inclusion of all the prosecution’s requested written instructions, in addition to the trial court’s

admonition, could have led the jury to disregard the oral instruction on duress. (Application at

7.) In the Order, the Court noted that the trial court gave the jury a correct oral instruction on

duress. (Order at 5-6.) Furthermore, the Court found that the instruction adequately covered the

defense theory of the case. (Order at 6); see Ragsdell v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 688 F.2d 1281,

1282 (9th Cir. 1982). 

In analyzing Petitioner’s claim, the Court must view the jury instructions as a whole and

decide if they would have misled the jury or if they stated the law incorrectly. Reed v. Hoy, 909

F.2d 324, 326 (9th Cir. 1989). To constitute reversible error, such instructions must have

prejudiced the objecting party. Id. Viewing the instructions as a whole, the Court found that no

unconstitutional prejudice occurred (Order at 7). However, reasonable jurists could debate

whether the judge’s instruction that the jury “go by” the written instructions could have caused

them to erroneously disregard the duress instruction. In addition, even though an omitted

instruction is not as likely to be as prejudicial as an erroneous statement of the law, Henderson v.

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977), reasonable jurists could debate whether the omission

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prejudiced Petitioner since the omitted written instruction concerned his only defense. 

Therefore, the Court FINDS that Petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right with respect to this claim and GRANTS a certificate of appealability for this

claim.

II. Claim 2 - Prosecutorial Discrimination

Petitioner next argues that the Superior Court erroneously allowed the prosecution to use

three peremptory challenges to remove African-American prospective jurors. (Application at 8-

9.) Since a trial court’s ruling on discriminatory intent is a factual finding, it is given deference

unless it is clearly erroneous. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1208 (2008); Anderson

v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)

A. Batson Challenge

Petitioner must establish that reasonable jurists could disagree as to whether Petitioner

adequately refuted the state court’s conclusion that the prosecution harbored no discriminatory

intent by clear and convincing evidence. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991);

Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1025. In the trial court’s view, the prosecution gave race-neutral reasons

for the dismissal of all three prospective jurors. (Order at 9.) The Court finds no reason to

disturb the trial court’s findings as they were based on the adequate explanations provided by the

prosecution and were not clearly erroneous. (See Order at 8-9.) 

B. Comparative Analysis

Petitioner can also support his claim if he can establish that reasonable jurists could

disagree as to whether a comparative analysis of the prospective jurors demonstrates the

prosecution’s facially race-neutral explanations were in fact a mere pretext for discrimination. 

Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1025; See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 343 (2003). The analysis

must compare prospective jurors sharing similar attributes in order to be helpful. See Snyder,

128 S. Ct. at 1211-12 (comparing jurors with same or similar concerns). In his Application,

Petitioner merely reasserts the same reasons why he believes a comparative analysis

demonstrates discrimination. (Application at 9-11.) There were significant differences between

the dismissed prospective jurors and the rest of the venire. (See Order at 10-11.) For instance,

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1

 Petitioner once again attempts to argue gender discrimination in dismissing jurors. 

(Application at 11.) This argument was first raised in Petitioner’s Traverse. (Traverse at 16-17.) Courts

must construe pro se pleadings liberally. Abassi v. I.N.S., 305 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Therefore, the Court construes the new argument in Petitioner’s Traverse as a request for leave of court

to amend the Petition. See Fed. Rule Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, as can be understood from the

discussion below, the fact that Petitioner filed the Traverse on May 10, 2007 – well after the limitations

period – makes this attempted amendment untimely. As such, the Court does not consider the gender

discrimination issue at this time.

5 05CV2150 J (CAB)

one prospective juror had served on a hung jury and had friends and family who had been

previously arrested. (Order at 10.) However, the other members of the venire had served on a

hung jury or had family and friends previously arrested, not both. (Id.) Given these kinds of

differences, the trial court’s finding is not clearly erroneous as required by Snyder. As such,

reasonable jurists could not disagree as to whether the prosecution improperly considered race in

exercising its peremptory challenges. Therefore, the Court FINDS that Petitioner has not made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right with respect to this claim and

DENIES a certificate of appealability for this claim.1

 

III. Claim 3 - Appointment of Counsel

Petitioner contends that he should have been granted assistance of counsel for the

purposes of the habeas corpus proceedings. There is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a

habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner. Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th

Cir. 1986). Congress vested appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings within the discretion

of the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). When no evidentiary hearing is held, a

district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to appoint counsel. Knaubert,

791 F.2d at 728. The Court never issued an order requiring an evidentiary hearing on the

Petition. As such, reasonable jurists could not disagree as to whether the Court abused its

discretion in denying Petitioner appointed counsel. Thus, the Court FINDS that Petitioner has

not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right with respect to this claim

and DENIES a certificate of appealability for this claim. 

IV. Claim 4 - Renewed Motion to Amend the Petition

A. Background

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2

 Petitioner previously requested a certificate of appealability (doc. no. 48) as to this claim, but

this was denied because the Order Denying the Motion to Amend (doc. no. 45) did not constitute a final

order. [Doc. No. 53 at 2-3.]

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Petitioner’s fourth claim is that the Court improperly denied his Renewed Motion to

Amend the Petition (“Renewed Motion”).2

 On January 26, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to

Enlarge Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition (“Motion to Enlarge”). [Doc. No. 10.] The Court later

construed this as Petitioner’s first attempt to amend the Petition in its Order Denying Petitioner’s

Renewed Motion to Amend the Petition (“Order Denying Amendment”). [Doc. No. 45 at 6.] 

On April 24, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend the Petition. [Doc. No. 21.] The

magistrate denied the request, but included instructions for Petitioner to file a renewed motion to

amend. [Doc. No. 24.] On June 14, 2006, Petitioner filed the Renewed Motion, attempting to

add five claims. [Doc. No. 32.] On March 28, 2007, the Court adopted the magistrate’s Report

and Recommendation (doc. no. 41) and denied the Renewed Motion. [Doc. No. 45.] The Court

found that the statute of limitations expired on December 22, 2005, one year after the date on

which the judgment became final. (Order Denying Amendment at 5.) Additionally, the Court

found that the statute of limitations was not tolled. Thus, the Motion to Enlarge, Petitioner’s

first attempt to amend, was untimely. Therefore, the Court denied the Renewed Motion. (Order

Denying Amendment at 11.)

Petitioner claims that the Court’s ruling that the Renewed Motion was untimely was

erroneous because his Motion to Recall the Remittitur should have tolled the limitations period. 

On September 21, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion to Recall the Remittitur with the California

Court of Appeal. [Doc. No. 38, App. A.] On September 27, 2005, the Court of Appeal denied

that Motion. [Doc. No. 38, App. D.] On October 13, 2005, Petitioner filed the same Motion

with the California Supreme Court. [Doc. No. 38, App. B.] On December 14, 2005, that court

construed the Motion as a petition for review and denied it. [Doc. No. 38, App. C.]

B. Analysis

The Supreme Court has held that when a district court dismisses a petition for habeas

relief on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability should issue (1) where reasonable

jurists could debate whether the petition was actually procedurally barred and (2) where

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reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

In contrast to Slack which dealt with outright dismissal of a petition, this case deals with

denial of amendment of a petition. However, “Congress expressed no intention to allow trial

court procedural error to bar vindication of substantial constitutional rights on appeal.” Id. at

483. Therefore, the Court applies the same analysis for the denial of the amendment of a

petition as was used in Slack. 

1. The Procedural Bar 

Generally, habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year of “the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, “[t]he time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.” Id. at § 2244(d)(2). The time during which such an application is

pending includes the period between a lower court’s adverse decision and the petitioner filing a

notice of appeal, as long as such notice is timely filed under state law. Evans v. Chavis, 546

U.S. 189, 191 (2006). In California, a notice of appeal is timely filed if filed within a

“reasonable time” after the lower court’s adverse ruling. Id. at 192.

If the Motion to Recall the Remittitur in fact qualified under § 2244(d)(2) as “a properly

filed application for State post-conviction ... review,” the original limitations deadline of

December 22, 2005, (Order Denying Amendment at 6), would have been extended by at least 70

days. The Motion was pending in the California Court of Appeal between September 21, 2005

and September 27, 2005. [Doc. No. 38, App. A & App. D.] The review of the denial of that

Motion was pending in the California Supreme Court between October 13, 2005 and December

14, 2005. [Doc. No. 38, App. B & App. C.] These two periods constitute a total of 70 days. If

the Motion to Recall the Remittitur did toll the limitations period for at least 70 days, the

deadline would have fallen after Petitioner first attempted to amend the Petition on January 26,

2006.

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Though the Ninth Circuit has not passed on whether a motion to recall the remittitur or an

appeal thereof qualifies under § 2244(d)(2), one California federal district court has accepted a

stipulation that the Motion to Recall the Remittitur does in fact toll the limitations period. 

Farquharson v. Adams, No. C 06-07338, 2007 WL 1176630, at *3 (N.D. Cal. April 20, 2007). 

As such, it is certainly debatable among jurists of reason whether Petitioner’s actions concerning

his Motion to Recall the Remittitur constituted applications for State post-conviction review and

whether these actions in fact tolled the limitations period sufficiently to allow Petitioner’s

amendment. Therefore, Petitioner has satisfied the first prong of the Slack analysis.

2. Claims in the Renewed Motion to Amend

Petitioner has provided three potential sets of claims to be added to his Petition. First, in

his Motion to Enlarge, Petitioner included the Motion to Recall the Remittitur (Motion to

Enlarge, Ex. A). The Court later construed this as an attempt to assert five new claims. (Order

Denying Amendment at 6.) Second, in his Renewed Motion, filed on June 14, 2006, Petitioner

asserted the same five claims. (Renewed Motion at 2-3.) Finally, in the First Proposed

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“FPAP”) (doc. no. 32, App. A), which was

attached to the Renewed Motion, Petitioner asserted three claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel. (FPAP at 8-10.) The only claims Petitioner asserted that could possibly be considered

timely are those in the Motion to Enlarge. Reasonable jurists could debate whether the

attempted amendments state claims that demonstrate the denial of a constitutional right. Thus,

Petitioner has satisfied the second prong of the Slack analysis.

On appeal, the question presented is threefold: (1) whether a Motion to Recall the

Remittitur tolls the statute of limitations pursuant to § 2244(d)(2); (2) whether the tolling period

in this case was sufficient to extend the limitations period beyond Petitioner’s first attempt to

amend on January 26, 2006; and (3) whether Petitioner’s claims warrant habeas relief.

Therefore, the Court FINDS that Petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right with respect to the claims Petitioner attempted to add by amendment and

GRANTS a certificate of appealability for this claim.

//

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V. Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

In any case where the plaintiff or petitioner has been granted leave to file the action in

forma pauperis, pauper status automatically continues for the appeal from a subsequent order or

judgment, unless the district court certifies that the appeal is taken in bad faith or finds that the

party is not otherwise entitled to continuing pauper status. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App.

P. 24(a). The Court FINDS no reason to revoke pauper status and therefore GRANTS

Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis.

VI. Motion for Copies

Petitioner has requested copies of five documents previously filed in this case. [Doc. No.

67.] When a court has granted pauper status to a habeas petitioner, that court may order the

clerk of court to furnish the petitioner with certified copies of documents or parts of the record. 

28 U.S.C. § 2250. The Court GRANTS Petitioner’s first four requests and DENIES Petitioner’s

fifth request. Thus, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to furnish Petitioner with one copy

each of Docket Nos. 61, 64, 65, and 66. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Application as to Claim 1,

DENIES Petitioner’s Application as to Claims 2 and 3, and GRANTS Petitioner’s Application

as to Claim 4. The Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis. 

The Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Motion for Copies.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 13, 2008

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: All Parties of Record

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