Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01525/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01525-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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WO JKM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph Anderson, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Katrina Kane, 

Respondent.

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No. CV 08-1525-PHX-MHM (MEA)

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Joseph Anderson’s (A35-189-461), Motion to

Reconsider. (Doc. #5.) The Court will grant the motion, vacate the judgment, and require

Respondent to answer the Petition. 

I. Background

On January 6, 2008, an Immigration Judge (IJ) entered an order for Petitioner’s

removal to the Phillippines. On July 14, 2008, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

remanded to the IJ to permit Petitioner to present DNA evidence in support of his claim that

Harold Anderson, a United States citizen, is his biological father. On August 5, 2008, the

IJ again entered an order for Petitioner’s removal from the United States. Petitioner’s appeal

to the BIA was dismissed on January 21, 2009. Petitioner’s petition for review is still

pending with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Anderson v.

Mukasey, No. 09-70249 (9th Cir. pet. filed Jan. 26, 2009). In his petition for review,

Petitioner claims that the BIA erred in referring to the law of the Phillippines to determine

whether he was legally legitimated by his father.

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In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner claimed that his detention is

unlawful because he is a citizen of the United States. Specifically, Petitioner challenged the

IJ’s determination that he did not acquire citizenship at birth pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g)

and 1409. On September 18, 2008, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881,

889 (9th Cir. 2007) (challenge to removal orders, based on a claim to citizenship must be

brought in a petition for review), the Court dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction.

II. Motion for Reconsideration

On January 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, presumably under

Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner notes that less than two

months after this Court dismissed his Petition, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit held that where a habeas corpus petitioner challenges his detention – rather

than his removal order – on the grounds that he is a citizen of the United States, 8 U.S.C. §

1252 does not deprive the district courts of jurisdiction. Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d

708 (9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing Iasu as involving a challenge only to a removal order, not

to detention). Under Flores-Torres, a petitioner with a non-frivolous claim to United States

citizenship need not wait until his removal proceedings are completed before he can seek

habeas corpus review of his claim that his citizenship bars his detention. Petitioner argues

that because he presented a non-frivolous claim that his citizenship precludes his detention,

the Court should vacate the judgment and allow his habeas corpus case to proceed. The

Court agrees.

When a habeas corpus petitioner seeks Rule 60(b)(6) relief based on an intervening

change in the law, the court should balance six factors. Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120,

1135-40 (9th Cir. 2009). The first factor is whether “the intervening change in the law . . .

overruled an otherwise settled legal precedent.” Id. at 1135. This factor favors

reconsideration because the question of whether the district courts retain jurisdiction to

entertain a habeas corpus petitioner’s claim that his citizenship precludes his detention was

not settled in the Ninth Circuit. Compare Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 889 (9th Cir. 2007)

(challenge to removal orders, based on a claim to citizenship must be brought in a petition

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for review), with Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006) (“the

jurisdiction stripping provision [of the REAL ID Act] does not apply to federal habeas corpus

petitions that do not involve final orders of removal”). 

The second factor, whether the petitioner was diligent in raising the issue, also favors

reconsideration because Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition less than a month after the

IJ made his second finding that Petitioner was not a United States citizen.

The third factor is whether “the final judgment being challenged has caused one or

more of the parties to change his position in reliance on that judgment.” Phelps, 569 F.3d

at 1138. Here, neither party relied on the judgment to their detriment. In fact, Respondent

had not yet even been served with the Petition when it was dismissed. Accordingly, the third

factor also favors reconsideration.

The fourth factor is the “‘delay between the finality of the judgment and the motion

for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.’” Id. (quoting Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1402 (11th Cir. 1987)).

As in Phelps, Petitioner filed his Motion to Reconsider about four months after the judgment

was entered. Accordingly, the fourth factor also favors reconsideration.

The fifth factor is the similarity of the issues involved in the original judgment and

in the subsequent decision that changed the law. Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1138-39. Because

Flores-Torres directly overruled the basis for the judgment in this case, the fifth factor also

favors reconsideration.

The final factor considered in Phelps is the “need for comity between the

independently sovereign state and federal judiciaries.” Id. at 1139. Here, the underlying

decision in question was made by a federal administrative agency, not a sovereign state.

Accordingly, reconsideration would not offend the principle of comity between the state and

federal judiciaries.

Having considered the factors set forth in Phelps, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s

Motion for Reconsideration demonstrates the extraordinary circumstances necessary to grant

relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Accordingly the Motion will be granted, the judgment will be

vacated, and Respondent will be required to answer the Petition.

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III. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Petitioner must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

B. Copies

Petitioner must serve Respondent, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a

copy of every document that he files. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d). Petitioner also

must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. LRCiv 5.4. Failure to

comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Petitioner.

C. Possible dismissal

If Petitioner fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court may dismiss action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #5) is granted and the Judgment

(Doc. #4) entered on September 18, 2009, is vacated.

(2) The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of the Summons, Petition (Doc. #1) and

this Order upon the United States Attorney for the District of Arizona by certified mail

addressed to the civil process clerk at the office of the United States Attorney pursuant to

Rule 4(i)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk of Court also must send

by certified mail a copy of the Summons, Petition and this Order to the United States

Attorney General pursuant to Rule 4(i)(1)(B) and to Respondent pursuant to Rule 4(i)(2).

(3) Respondent must answer the Petition within 20 days of the date of service.

Respondent must not file a dispositive motion in place of an answer without first showing

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cause as to why an answer is inadequate. Petitioner may file a reply within 20 days from the

date of service of the answer.

(4) The matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey pursuant to Rules

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings and a report and

recommendation.

DATED this 21st day of September, 2009.

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