Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00029/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00029-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS REDDICK,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16-cv-29-BTM-BLM

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY’S FEES

[ECF No. 22]

Plaintiff’s attorney, Brian C. Shapiro (“Counsel”), moves for an award of 

attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Counsel asks the Court to award 

$43,000 in attorney’s fees from Plaintiff’s recovery of $221,000 in past-due social 

security benefits, and to order Counsel to refund Plaintiff the $3,850 in fees 

Plaintiff has already paid under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). The 

Social Security Administration Commissioner filed a brief as a “trustee” but takes 

no position on the Motion. Plaintiff has not responded to Counsel’s request. For 

the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

the motion for attorney’s fees.

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. 

I. BACKGROUND

On July 15, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, denied Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and 

remanded this action for further administrative proceedings. (ECF No. 17). The 

Court also granted the parties’ motion for attorney’s fees under the EAJA in the 

amount of $3,850. (ECF Nos. 20, 21). 

On remand, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Plaintiff was 

disabled and awarded Plaintiff past-due disability benefits. (ECF No. 22-3) The 

Notice of Award informed Plaintiff that he was entitled to monthly benefits from 

January 2011 onward, and that $55,250 of those past-due benefits would be 

withheld in the event that Counsel requested attorney’s fees for work performed 

before this Court. (ECF No. 22-4). 

Counsel now requests $43,000 in attorney’s fees pursuant to a contingentfee agreement in which Plaintiff agreed to give Counsel 25% of any past-due 

benefits award. (ECF No. 22-2). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) provides:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this 

subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the 

court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee 

for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the 

past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such 

judgment . . . . 

When evaluating a request for a contingent fee under § 406(b), courts must 

first look to the contingent-fee agreement, then test it for reasonableness. 

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002). The following factors, alone or 

in combination, may warrant a reduction: (1) the result achieved; (2) 

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“substandard representation”; (3) delay by counsel; and (4) whether “the benefits 

are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case,” 

thereby resulting in a windfall. Id. at 805; see also Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 

1142, 1151–53 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Courts may request “a record of the 

hours spent representing the claimant and a statement of the lawyer’s normal 

hourly billing charge for noncontingent fee cases,” to aid in assessing a fee’s 

reasonableness. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808; Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. 

Counsel bears the burden of establishing that the requested fee is reasonable. 

Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149. 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff signed a 25% contingent fee agreement, the maximum allowed by 

406(b). Nothing in the record suggests that the agreement is invalid. Turning to 

the reasonableness of the requested $43,000 award, the Court finds that the 

result was successful and that there is no evidence of substandard 

representation or delay. The only issue before the Court is the fourth Gisbrecht

factor, i.e., whether “the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time 

[C]ounsel spent on the case” thereby resulting in a windfall. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. 

at 805.

Counsel submits that his office expended 21.6 hours of attorney and 

paralegal time, 18.2 hours and 3.4 hours respectively, on the case. (ECF No. 22-

1 “Shapiro Decl.” ¶ 5; ECF No. 22-5). Counsel requests $43,000, or 19% of the 

award, which is less than the maximum $55,250 that the Commissioner withheld 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 406(b). (See ECF No. 22-4). Counsel did not submit his 

typical billing rate, but presented evidence that the 95th percentile hourly rate for 

all attorneys is $700 and that he has practiced social security law for 22 years.

(Shapiro Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8; ECF No. 22-5). The effective hourly rate for work 

performed here is approximately $1,990. Counsel asserts that this hypothetical 

rate is proportionate to the time spent on the case and is not a windfall. (ECF No. 

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22-1 at 5). The Court disagrees.

It is the attorney’s buden to “show that the fee is reasonable based on the 

facts of the particular case.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152-53. Crawford requires 

courts to “look at the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue to 

determine how much risk the firm assumed in taking the case.” Id. Here, 

Counsel makes no argument as to the facts, complexity, or risk involved in 

Plaintiff’s case. 

Upon review, the Court concludes that this case was not so complex, and 

the risk assumed was not so extraordinary as to merit such a departure from 

average or even high-end contingent-fee awards in other social security cases. 

See Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (listing postGisbrecht cases in which maximum contingent-fee awards ranged from 

hypothetical rates of $187.55 to $694.44 per hour); Palos v. Colvin, 2016 WL 

5110243 at *2 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2016) (awarding fees that translated to a 

$1,546.39 hourly rate and citing cases permitting awards not exceeding 

$1,433.12 per hour); Thomas v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1529331 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 

2015) (holding 40.8 hours of attorney and paralegal time merited hypothetical 

$1,093 hourly rate and noting plaintiff submitted declaration supporting award); 

cf. Kazanijan v. Astrue, 2011 WL 2847439 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 201) (considering 

the complexity of an administrative record that covered three administrative 

hearings and counsel’s “captivating” and “focused briefing” before awarding a 

hypothetical $2,100 per hour rate for 19.75 hours of work, when “forty hours or 

even more would not have been too much for the level and quality of productivity 

presented”). Here, the Complaint was boiler-plate (ECF No. 1), and the briefing, 

though effective, was neither time-intensive or complex. (ECF Nos. 13, 16).

Counsel made two relatively straightforward arguments: (1) that the ALJ 

improperly rejected the opinion of a treating physician, and (2) that the ALJ erred 

by neglecting to include evidence of mental limitations. (ECF No. 13, 16). The 

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Motion for Summary Judgment was thirteen pages, and the Reply was six pages. 

(ECF Nos. 13, 16). In the absence of any argument about the risk of this case, 

the Court finds it was a case of average risk. 

The Court further notes that the effective rate sought falls outside the range 

of fees previously awarded by the Ninth Circuit in Crawford, to which Counsel 

was a party-in-interest. See, e.g., Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153 (Clifton, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting majority approved awards of 

$519, $875, and $902). $1,990 also falls outside the range of effective rates that 

courts in this district regularly approve of. See, e.g., Iler v. Berryhill, No. 14-CV2026-MMA (BGS), 2018 WL 3969182, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2018) (approving 

effective hourly rate of $341); Richardson v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-1456-MMA-BLM, 

2017 WL 1683062, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 2, 2017) (approving effective hourly rate 

of $770); Likens v. Colvin, No. 11-CV-0407-LAB (BGS), 2014 WL 6810657, at *2 

(S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2014) (approving effective hourly rate of $666.68); Nash v. 

Colvin, No. 12-CV-2781-GPC (RBB), 2014 WL 5801353, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 

2014) (approving effective hourly rate of $656 per hour); Sproul v. Astrue, No. 

11-CV-1000-IEG (DHB), 2013 WL 394053, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30 2013) 

(approving effective hourly rate of $800). Counsel has not argued that his law 

office was extraordinarily efficient, or that he or others with commensurate 

experience have previously received a de facto hourly rate of $1,990. See 

Harrell v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4075883 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018)

(considering whether attorney “has ever actually been awarded a de facto hourly 

rate in the $1,213 neighborhood”). Counsel provides no cases demonstrating his 

typical rate, and a review of Counsel’s recent cases suggests Counsel is typically 

awarded no more than $1,000 as a de facto hourly rate. See, e.g., Johnson v. 

Berryhill, No. 15-cv-1959-JEM, 2017 WL 5891671, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 

2017) (awarding effective hourly rate of $333.37 per hour for 23.7 hours); 

Richardson v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-1456-MMA-BLM, 2017 WL 1683062, at *2 (S.D. 

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Cal. May 2, 2017) (awarding effective hourly rate of approximately $770); Likens 

v. Colvin, No. 11-CV-0407-LAB BGS, 2014 WL 6810657, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 

2014) (awarding effective hourly rate of $666.68); Martinez v. Berryhill, No. 13-

CV-272 JLS (JLB), 2017 WL 4700078, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2017) (awarding 

de facto hourly rate of $886.52 per hour for 28.2 hours); Truett v. Berryhill, No. 

13-CV-2742 W (BLM), 2017 WL 3783892, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2017) 

(awarding de facto hourly rate of $1,788.62 for 12.3 hours of work); Shubin v. 

Colvin, No. SACV 13-0146-DTB, 2015 WL 233243, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 

2015) (awarding hourly rate of $1,020.40); Lule v. Berryhill, No. 1:15-CV-01631-

JLT, 2017 WL 1881390, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2017) (awarding hourly rate of 

$190.89); Martinez v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-01491-BAM, 2016 WL 1600184, at *2 

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2016) (awarding hourly rate of $652.41); Rangel v. Colvin, No. 

12-CV-01169-JLT, 2014 WL 6390864, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014) (awarding 

effective hourly rate of $365.29 for 30.4 hours of work); Buchanan v. Astrue, No. 

CV 05-6146 AJW, 2009 WL 113866, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2009) (awarding

effective hourly rate of $527.50). Apart from outlier rates of $1,788.62 and 

$190.89, Counsel’s de facto hourly rates range from $333.37 to $1,020.40. 

Including both outlier rates, Counsel’s average de facto rate is $720.17. 

Given the amount and complexity of the work performed, the limited risk 

assumed, and the typical effective hourly rates courts approve, the Court finds it 

appropriate to exercise its discretion and reduce this award. However, the Court 

also considers the successful result Counsel achieved for Plaintiff, and the extent 

to which Counsel’s 22 years of experience enabled him to work efficiently. In the 

absence of any uniform, specific methodology for reducing an unreasonable fee 

to a reasonable one, the Court uses Counsel’s average de facto rate of $720.17 

as a baseline, and then multiplies it by 1.5 to arrive at a de facto rate that reflects 

the risk Counsel took in Plaintiff’s specific case, which required Counsel to make 

nuanced arguments about mild mental restrictions. See Harrell v. Berryhill, No. 

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16-CV-02428-MEJ, 2018 WL 4075883, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018)

(deploying similar methodology); Edwards v. Berryhill, No. ED CV 14-1798-E, 

2017 WL 3913209, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2017) (acknowledging “the 

regrettable imprecision of the analysis through which the Court has determined a 

‘reasonable’ fee”). The resulting de facto hourly rate is $1,080.26. Thus, for 21.6 

hours of work, the total fee award is $23,333.51.

IV. CONCLUSION

The motion for attorney’s Fees is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART. The Court awards attorney’s fees to Brian C. Shapiro in the amount of 

$23,333.51. Counsel must reimburse Plaintiff $3,850, the amount paid by the 

government under the EAJA.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2019

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