Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01543/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01543-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gettus Leroy Mintz,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-1543-PHX-SLG (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at San 

Luis, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

on July 29, 2013 (Docs. 1, 4), and an Addendum to Appendix on September 3, 2013 

(Doc. 4). On December 10, 2013, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited Answer”) 

(Doc. 9), a Supplemental Response on February 27, 2014 (Doc. 14), and a Second 

Supplemental Response on May 23, 2014 (Doc. 18). Petitioner filed a Reply on January 

2, 2014 (Doc. 10), a Supplemental Reply on March 19, 2014 (Doc. 15) and a Second 

Supplemental Reply on July 14, 2014 (Doc. 21).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

/ /

/ /

/ /

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II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In resolving Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized 

the factual background as follows:

The following evidence was presented at trial. In the late 

evening of February 9, 2009, Officer R. V. of the Peoria Police 

Department responded to a 9-1-1 hang-up call. As the officer 

approached the area of 82nd Avenue and Yucca, residents directed 

him to a bench in the neighborhood. The officer observed an 

African-American female (P.T.) sitting on a bench “slumped over 

covered with blood.” When Officer R.V. attempted to speak with 

the victim, she was “unresponsive, her eyes were rolled back and ... 

[s]he was gurgling blood.”

Officer R.V. then followed P.T.'s blood trail to a red car 

parked a couple of houses away from the bench, which was later 

determined to be P.T.'s home. The officer observed another AfricanAmerican woman (A.W.) with blood and lacerations on her face and 

arms exit the home. The officer later determined that A.W. was 

P.T.'s mother. A.W. had sustained two injuries to her right shoulder, 

one to her left scapula, and one to the top of her head. Both victims 

were treated at the scene and then transported to John C. Lincoln 

North Hospital.

Doctor M.F. of the Maricopa County Medical Examiner's

Office testified that he observed nine stab wounds to P.T.' s body. 

The doctor further testified that the cause of death was

“complications of the multiple stab wounds.”

A.W. testified that in the evening of February 9, 2009, she 

heard a knock on the door and then "someone using the keys to get 

in the door.” Defendant entered the home and A.W. heard P. T. say 

"Gettus, get what you need.” A few moments later, she heard P.T. 

scream "Mom, Gettus is trying to kill me." A.W. tried to call 9-1-1, 

but defendant knocked the phone out of her hand and "slam dunked" 

her on the floor. Defendant then punched A.W.'s head, back and 

shoulders.

A.W. testified that defendant ran out of the room holding a 

butcher knife. A.W . again heard P.T . say "somebody help me. 

Gettus is trying to kill me.” A.W. later testified that when she was 

trying to get up from, the floor, there was a "blade” on the floor.

(Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 5.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 9, are referenced herein as 

“Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On February 19, 2009, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior 

Court on counts of second degree murder and aggravated assault. (Exhibit B, 

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Indictment.) He proceeded to a jury trial, and was convicted as charged. (Exhibit C, 

Verdicts.) On March 3, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of 22 

years on the murder charge and a consecutive presumptive term of 20 years on the 

assault charge. (Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 4; Exhibit D, R.T. 3/3/10 at 20; Exhibit E, 

Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and related state authorities indicating an inability to 

find an issue for appeal. (Exhibit F.) Petitioner was granted leave to file a supplemental 

brief in propria persona. (Exhibit G, Order 9/17/10.) Petitioner did not file such a brief. 

(Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. at 2.) 

In a decision issued November 30, 2010,1the Arizona Court of Appeals related 

that it had searched the record for “fundamental error” pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). (Exhibit A, 

Mem. Dec. at 2.) Anders provides that an appellate court, faced with appointed counsel’s 

professed inability to find an issue for appeal, should proceed “after a full examination of 

all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 

744. The Arizona Court of Appeals found no “fundamental error,” and affirmed 

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id. at 2, 5.)

Petitioner did not see further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 3.) 

D. FIRST PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On December 22, 2010, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit H), which was dated December 9, 2010. Counsel was appointed, and ultimately 

 

1 Without explanation, Petitioner’s Petition lists the date as December 8, 2010. (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 2.) No support for that date appears from the record other than a date stamp on 

the copy attached by Petitioner to the Petition. (Id. at 2-A.) That copy plainly reflects, 

however, a filing date of November 30, 2010, as does the copy submitted by 

Respondents (Exhibit A). 

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filed a “Notice of Completion” (Exhibit I), evidencing an inability to find a viable issue 

for review. Petitioner was granted leave to file a pro per petition, and counsel was 

directed to remain in an advisory capacity. (Exhibit J, M.E. 6/24/11.) Petitioner did not 

timely file his pro per petition, and the case was dismissed. (Exhibit L, M.E. 10/21/11.) 

Petitioner then wrote a letter to the PCR court, which was filed November 10, 

2011. The PCR court construed this as a timely motion for rehearing under Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(a), arguing that his failure to file his pro per petition 

should be excused because his legal materials had been confiscated. The court found 

that the four months following counsel’s filing of the “Notice of Completion” during 

which Petitioner failed to communicate with the court demonstrate a lack of diligence, 

and denied the motion. (Exhibit L, M.E. 11/17/11.) Petitioner did not seek further

review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.)

E. SECOND PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On November 15, 2011, Petitioner commenced a second PCR proceeding by 

filing his pro per Petition (Exhibit M), marking boxes to assert claims of unlawfully 

seized evidence, ineffective assistance, and conviction by the use of perjured testimony. 

Only the latter two were addressed in Petitioner’s arguments. The PCR court directed a 

response, but observed that the petition was “untimely and successive.” (Exhibit N, 

M.E. 11/21/01.)

On December 8, 2011, he filed another Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit O). Petitioner characterizes this as a supplement to the November 15, 2011 

petition. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 15 at 5.) In that petition, Petitioner argued that he was 

denied a fair trial by the use of perjured testimony.

Petitioner then submitted a Supplement to his PCR Petition. (Appendix, Doc. 4, 

Exhibit 1.) 

On March 19, 2012, the PCR court consolidated the two PCR petitions for 

hearing, and found Petitioner’s petitions to be successive under Rule 32.1, Arizona Rules 

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of Criminal Procedure, and that they should be summarily dismissed for failing to 

identify an applicable exception to the applicable rule. The court further found that 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance and perjured testimony were not excepted

from the preclusion rule. The court did not explicitly address the unlawful seizure 

allegation. (Exhibit P, M.E. 3/19/12.) 

On March 28, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit Q), raising 

claims of ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct from the use of perjured 

testimony. In an Order filed July 17, 2013 (Exhibit R), the Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarily denied review. Petitioner did not seek further review. (Exhibit S, Order and 

Mandate.)

F. PRIOR FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

On September 4, 2012, during the pendency of his petition for review in his 

second PCR proceeding, Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

the District of Arizona, case number CV-12-1868-PHX-SLG-JFM. On October 15, 

2012, the petition was dismissed without prejudice on screening in light of his then ongoing petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, citing inter alia Sherwood v. 

Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983) and Schnepp v. Oregon, 333 F.2d 288 (9th

Cir. 1964). (Id. at Order 10/15/12, Doc. 4.)

G. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 29, 2013 (Doc. 1), supplemented 

by an Appendix (Doc. 4). Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following four grounds for 

relief:

(1) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel by failure to adequately investigate and to 

challenge perjured testimony;

(2) ineffective assistance of counsel in his first Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding in 

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violation of the Sixth Amendment by failing to raise meritorious arguments;

(3) ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and post-conviction counsel by failing to 

present exculpatory evidence and to challenge false evidence proffered by the 

prosecution;

(4) prosecutorial misconduct in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights by 

presentation of perjured testimony.

On September 3, 2013, Petitioner submitted his Addendum to Appendix (Doc. 4) 

containing additional filings in his second PCR proceeding, submitted in support of 

Ground Four.

Response - On December 10, 2013, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited 

Answer”) (Doc. 9). Respondents argue that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling 

for his second PCR proceeding because it was untimely, and therefore his Petition is 

barred by the habeas statute of limitations. Respondents further argue that to the extent 

that Petitioner presented his claims in his first PCR or second PCR proceeding, they 

were procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground, and to the extent 

not presented they are now procedurally defaulted.

Reply - On January 2, 2014, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 10). Petitioner argues 

that his present Petition is not untimely because he filed his original habeas petition 

within the limitations period, and that he is entitled to statutory and equitable tolling for 

the time between the dismissal of his first habeas petition and the instant petition. (Id. at 

2-6.) Petitioner argues that any procedural default should be excused because the 

“cause” of that default was: (1) his uneducated, pro se status, and the lack of prison legal 

resources; (2) that prisoners are denied due process because court appointed appellate 

and PCR counsel file briefs asserting an inability to find issues for review; and (3) his 

appellate and PCR counsel were ineffective. He further asserts prejudice by arguing the 

merits of his claims.

Order for Supplements - On February 6, 2014, the Court observed that the 

timeliness of the Petition appeared to depend on whether his second PCR proceeding 

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was timely and thus properly filed, and that the PCR court’s actual decision appeared to 

be based on grounds other than timeliness. The Court also observed that Respondents 

procedural default argument was based, in part, on the conclusion that Petitioner’s claims 

had not been the fairly presented to nor decided by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

However, in Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals had conducted a 

review for fundamental error after counsel filed an Anders brief, raising the question 

whether such review resulted in exhaustion. The parties were directed to supplement 

their briefs to address these issues. (Order 2/6/14, Doc. 13.)

Supplemental Response – On February 27, 2014, Respondents filed their 

Supplemental Response (Doc. 14), arguing that the PCR court’s initial characterization 

of the second PCR petition as “untimely” is conclusive, and that the third petition was 

thus necessarily untimely. Respondents further argue that Ninth Circuit precedent and 

precedent from the District of Arizona concludes that a review for fundamental error 

does not result in exhaustion, and that the principles and policies behind the exhaustion 

requirement militate against finding exhaustion from such review following an Anders

brief.

Supplemental Reply – On March 19, 2014, Petitioner filed his Supplemental 

Reply (Doc. 15). Petitioner argues that the dismissal of his first PCR proceeding resulted 

from PCR counsel’s failure to file a brief, and his pro se status, that he diligently pursued 

filing a second PCR proceeding as suggested by the PCR court, and his “third” PCR 

petition was a supplement to his second petition. Petitioner further argues that the 

claims raised in his second PCR proceeding were of the type not waivable but by a 

personal waiver. Petitioner argues that his first federal habeas petition was timely, and 

thus renders the instant petition timely. Petitioner further argues that he fairly presented 

his federal claims in his PCR petitions.

Orders for Second Supplemental Responses – On April 28, 2014, the Court 

ordered (Doc. 16) Respondents to supplement their response and the record to address: 

(a) whether a failure by the Arizona Court of Appeals to conduct a review pursuant 

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Anders v. Califoria, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) established cause for Petitioner’s failure to 

properly exhaust his state remedies on Ground Four of the Petition; and (b) whether 

ineffective assistance of PCR counsel would establish cause for failure to exhaust claims 

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in Ground Three. 

On May 9, 2014, the Court ordered (Doc. 17) Respondents to supplement their 

response to address whether the dismissal without prejudice of Petitioner’s first federal 

habeas petition for failure to exhaust state remedies was proper given that the only 

proceedings then pending were PCR proceedings, and if so whether Petitioner would be 

entitled to equitable tolling for the intervening time between his two federal habeas 

petitions. 

Leave was granted to combine the two supplements.

Second Supplemental Response – On May 23, 2014, Respondents filed their 

second Supplemental Response (Doc. 18). Respondents argue that: (1) none of 

Petitioner’s claims in his first federal habeas petition were exhausted when the petition 

was dismissed, and consequently Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling for the 

pendency of that petition until the filing of the instant petition (id. at 4-5); (2) the 

Arizona Court of Appeals complied with Anders, Petitioner failed to assert cause to 

excuse his procedural default in his habeas petition, an insufficient Anders review would 

not establish cause, and Petitioner’s Anders claim is procedurally defaulted (id. at 5-8); 

(3) the Martinez exception for claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel as cause 

only applies to failures to assert the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, and not to the claim 

of prosecutorial misconduct in Ground Four (id. at 8-12).

Second Supplemental Reply – On July 14, 2014, Petitioner filed his second 

Supplemental Rely (Doc. 21). Petitioner argues that: (1) he is entitled to equitable 

tolling from the time of the filing of his first federal habeas petition (id. at 1-3); (2) the 

state appellate court’s limited review for fundamental error was improper and thus his 

state remedies should be deemed exhausted (id. at 4); and (3) his claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct have substantial merit.

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Conviction Final - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions 

generally begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A).2 

Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal remained pending through November 30, 2010, 

when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied his Petition for Review. (Exhibit A, Mem. 

Dec.) Thereafter, Petitioner had 30 days to seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) He did not do so. Accordingly, his conviction became final 

on December 30, 2010, 30 days after the Arizona Court of Appeals denied his appeal.

Conclusion re Commencement - Therefore, Petitioner’s one year began running 

on December 31, 2010, and without any tolling expired on December 31, 2011, making 

his July 29, 2013 Petition almost 18 months delinquent.3

 

2

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no 

argument that any of these apply.

3

Petitioner’s habeas Petition is dated July 25, 2013. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.) Even if this 

Court were to find that the Petition should be deemed filed as of that date rather than 

July 29, 2013, the four days would not be sufficient to make Petitioner’s Petition timely.

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3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Tolling for First PCR Proceeding - Petitioner’s limitations period commenced 

running on December 31, 2010. However, Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was

commenced on December 22, 2010, before his limitations period began running. It 

remained pending until October 21, 2011, when the PCR court dismissed the proceeding. 

(Exhibit K, M.E. 10/21/11.) 

Thereafter, Petitioner submitted a letter on November 10, 2011, which the PCR 

court construed as a “motion for reconsideration” (or rehearing) “pursuant to Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.9(a).” (Exhibit L, M.E. 11/17/11 at 1.) The PCR court found the “motion” 

“timely,” but ultimately denied it, concluding that the opposition to the court’s dismissal 

of the proceeding for failure to timely file a pro per petition was untenable, because 

Petitioner “did not pursue his post-conviction relief rights diligently.” (Id. at 2.) 

Although dated November 17, 2011, that “minute entry” ruling was not filed until 

November 22, 2011. There is no indication that the ruling was made in open court or 

was otherwise issued prior to its filing on November 22, 2011. Thus, because it does not 

affect the outcome, the undersigned presumes that Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding 

remained pending through November 22, 2011.

Thus, without additional tolling, Petitioner’s one year would have commenced 

running no later than November 23, 2011, and would have expired one year later, on 

November 22, 2012.4 Without further tolling, his July 29, 2013 petition would have 

been over eight months delinquent.

Tolling for Second PCR Proceeding - Respondents argue that Petitioner is not 

entitled to any tolling for his second PCR proceeding, asserting that it was dismissed as 

 

4 Respondents calculate the expiration as October 28, 2012 by tolling for the additional 

seven days between Petitioner’s filing his PCR notice and when his conviction became 

final. The limitations period cannot be tolled when it is not yet running.

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untimely, and thus was not “properly filed” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). It is true that a state petition dismissed as untimely is not “properly filed,” 

and thus does not toll the habeas statute of limitations. Pace v. DiGugliellmo, 544 U.S. 

408, 417 (2005). 

No Final Ruling of Untimeliness - It is also true that the PCR court initially 

described the second petition as “untimely and successive” in its order requiring the state 

to respond. (Exhibit N, M.E. 11/21/11.) However, a preliminary determination by the 

Arizona PCR court that a petition is “untimely” is not a finding that the petition is not 

properly filed. Rather, Arizona’s Rule 32.4 adopts a series of primary deadlines (e.g. 30 

days after direct appeal for non-pleading defendants). The rule then goes on to except 

from those time limits petitions which raise claims of particular types or on particular 

bases (i.e. under Arizona “Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h)”). Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). 

Thus, without addressing the nature of the claims submitted, or the reasons for its late 

submission, the Arizona PCR court cannot determine whether the petition has been 

properly filed. Denomination of the petition as “untimely” is nothing more than an 

observation that it has been filed outside the normally applicable deadline. Thus, as in 

this instance, the PCR court faced with a filing outside the timeline, may denominate the 

filing “untimely”, and yet proceed to direct briefing to assist in resolving whether the 

claim is nonetheless properly filed. (See Exhibit N, M.E. 11/21/11.)

Here the PCR court did not ultimately dismiss Petitioner’s second PCR 

proceeding as untimely, but on the basis that the claims were precluded. (See Exhibit P, 

M.E. 3/19/12.) The PCR court referred to the petition as “successive” and referenced the 

waiver bar in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3), and the allowance of exceptions in Rule 

32.2(b). 

In contrast, the PCR court’s dismissal order made only four references to 

timeliness: (1) that the first PCR notice was “timely,” but his first pro per petition was 

filed after the granted extension of “time” expired (Exhibit P, M.E. 3/19/12 at 1); (2) in 

quoting the requirement of specific pleading of an exception in Rule 32.2(b) for a 

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“successive or untimely post-conviction relief proceeding” (id. at 3); (3) in again noting 

that Petitioner had failed “to timely file” his first PCR petition (id. at 3); and (4) noting 

his failure to show “good cause for failing to timely file his first petition” (id.). All but 

the second reference were addressed to his delinquent petition in his first PCR 

proceeding, not his petitions in the second PCR proceeding. The second reference is not 

a finding that the second proceeding was untimely, but merely a quotation from 

Arizona’s preclusion rule, Rule 32.2, which the court was explicitly applying. 

In Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006), the Court considered the import of a

summary decision by the California courts rejecting review of a post-conviction petition. 

That analysis was somewhat complicated by the indeterminate, “reasonable time” 

standard applicable in California to such petitions. However, the Court rejected the 

Ninth Circuit’s determination to always treat such silent decisions as a decision on the 

merits, and instead instructed that the federal habeas court should “examine the delay in 

each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness.” 

Id. at 852. Similarly, in Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the Court found that a 

ruling “on the merits and for lack of diligence” might or might not signal a finding of 

untimeliness of the California petition, and directed the Ninth Circuit to evaluate the 

relevant considerations to determine whether the reference to “lack of diligence” was a 

finding of untimeliness. 

Here, of course, the PCR court’s decision is neither silent nor ambiguous for its 

basis for disposing of Petitioner’s petition. It plainly found only that the petition was 

successive, and made no finding of untimeliness. 

PCR Actually Untimely - But the instruction of Saffold and Evans is that a ruling 

on the timeliness issue by the state court is not required. Indeed, in Saffold ̧ the Court 

concluded that a ruling stated to be “on the merits” is not conclusive that the petition was 

deemed timely. 

A court will sometimes address the merits of a claim that it believes 

was presented in an untimely way: for instance, where the merits 

present no difficult issue; where the court wants to give a reviewing 

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court alternative grounds for decision; or where the court wishes to 

show a prisoner (who may not have a lawyer) that it was not merely 

a procedural technicality that precluded him from obtaining relief. 

Given the variety of reasons why the California Supreme Court may 

have included the words “on the merits,” those words cannot by 

themselves indicate that the petition was timely. 

Saffold, 536 U.S. at 225-26. Thus, in Evans the Court concluded that “[i]n the absence 

of...clear indication that a particular request for appellate review was timely or untimely, 

the Circuit must itself examine the delay in each case and determine what the state courts 

would have held in respect to timeliness.” 546 U.S. at 198. (Of course, a clear direction 

or explanation from the state court that it had found the application timely or untimely 

“would be the end of the matter.” Evans, 546 U.S. at 205 (quoting Saffold, 536 U.S. at 

226.).)

Thus, faced with the absence of a clear ruling by the Arizona court that the 

petition was timely or untimely, this Court must “itself examine the delay...and 

determine what the state courts would have held with respect to timeliness.” That 

question is simplified by the rulings that the PCR court did make. 

First, the PCR court did find, in its initial evaluation, that the second PCR petition 

was “untimely,” that is outside the normal time limits. (See Exhibit N, M.E. 11/21/11.) 

As Respondents point out, if the second PCR petition was outside the normal time limits, 

then the later filed third Petition would be as well. Petitioner argues that the third 

petition was really just a supplement to his second petition. (Supplemental Reply, Doc. 

15 at 5.) If this construction were adopted, then the one petition, his second, would be 

subject to PCR court’s preliminary determination of untimeliness.

Second, in deciding that the combined petitions did not meet the requirements for 

a successive petition, the PCR court determined that the petitions did not present claims 

covered by Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h). These are the same exceptions 

under which an otherwise untimely claim may be brought under Rule 32.4(a). The PCR 

court summarized Petitioner’s claims into claims of ineffective assistance and use of 

perjured testimony. The court found “ineffective assistance of counsel does not fall 

within any of the Rule 32.1 exceptions.” (Exhibit P, M.E. 3/19/12 at 3.) It further found 

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the perjury claims outside the exceptions:

Similarly, defendant's claim that the State secured his conviction by 

perjured testimony does not fall within any exception. It is not 

newly discovered evidence because the defendant knew about the 

alleged perjury at the time of trial.

(Id.) 

Even if this Court could avoid those determinations, Petitioner fails to show that 

the claims asserted in his second and third PCR petitions fit within any applicable 

exception. 

Rule 32.1(d) governs claims of custody after expiration of a sentence. That does 

not apply to Petitioner’s PCR claims.

Rule 32.1(e) governs claims of newly discovered material facts which would have 

changed the verdict or sentence. The claims of ineffective assistance did not involve 

such facts. The claims of perjury were, as determined by the PCR court “not newly 

discovered evidence because the defendant knew about the alleged perjury at the time of 

trial.” (Exhibit P, M.E. 3/19/12 at 3.) 

Rule 32.1(f) only applies to a failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief of 

right, following a guilty plea, or a notice of appeal. Petitioner did not plead guilty, and 

his appeal was timely filed.

Rule 32.1(g) does not apply because the claims in the second and third PCR 

petitions were not founded upon a “significant change in the law.”

Rule 32.1(h) does not apply because Petitioner’s second and third PCR petitions 

were not founded upon a claim that “no reasonable fact-finder would have found 

Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Thus, none of the exceptions would have applied, and the second and third PCR 

petitions would have been ruled untimely by the Arizona courts had they addressed the 

issue.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling for the pendency of 

his second and third PCR petitions.

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Federal Habeas Petition – Petitioner filed his first federal Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus on September 4, 2012, during the pendency of his petition for review in 

his second PCR proceeding. On October 15, 2012, the petition was dismissed without 

prejudice on screening on the basis that in light of his then on-going petition for review 

to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner’s state remedies were unexhausted. (Id. at 

Order 10/15/12, Doc. 4.) 

Petitioner argues that the dismissal of his habeas petition was “without prejudice.” 

(Supp. Reply, Doc. 15 at 11.) The case was, nonetheless, dismissed and no longer 

remained pending after October 15, 2012. The lack of prejudice left open the 

opportunity for Petitioner to re-file, but it did not leave the case pending in the interim.

Moreover, the statutory tolling provision under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) only applies 

to state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 

(2001). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the pendency of 

that federal proceeding. 

Summary re Statutory Tolling - Taking into account the available statutory 

tolling, Petitioner’s one year habeas limitations period commenced running on 

November 23, 2011, and expired on November 22, 2012, making his July 29, 2013 

Petition over eight months delinquent. 

4. Equitable Tolling

a. Applicable Standard - "Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 

28 U.S.C. § 2244 is available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances 

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 

351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

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extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

b. Untrained, Pro se Status – Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable 

tolling because he was proceeding pro se and was untrained in the law. (2nd Supp. Reply, 

Doc. 21 at 3.) 

“It is clear that pro se status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable 

tolling.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). A prisoner's “proceeding 

pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of those bringing 

a § 2254 claim.” Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000).

With regard to Petitioner’s lack of legal prowess, “a pro se petitioner's lack of 

legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable 

tolling.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). "[I]gnorance of the 

law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing." 

Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir.1999). 

c. Dismissal of First Habeas Petition Not a Basis for Equitable Tolling -

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling for the time between the dismissal 

of his first habeas petition, on October 15, 2012, for failure to exhaust state remedies,

and the instant petition. (Reply, Doc. 10 at 5.) 

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Dismissal as Unexhausted Would Have Been Proper - The Ninth Circuit has 

recognized grounds for equitable tolling when the district court dismisses a first, timely, 

habeas petition on the basis of failure to exhaust, where the petition was a “mixed” 

petition that contained both properly exhausted claims and unexhausted claims, and the 

petitioner was not granted leave to amend his petition to omit the unexhausted claims. 

See e.g. Butler v. Long, 752 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2014). 

But here, Petitioner has proffered nothing to show that his first habeas petition 

was a “mixed” petition, requiring the option of an amend-and-stay procedure, such as 

that discussed in Henderson, supra. Indeed, ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court 

remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or 

collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 

32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). “In cases not carrying a life 

sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for 

purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 

196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). Petitioner had not had any claims ruled on by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals at the time his first habeas petition was dismissed.

In fact, the only ruling by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Petitioner’s case was 

the determination that, after a review for fundamental error following an Anders

appellate brief, the court found no such error. (Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 11/30/10.) 

Anders Review Did Not Exhaust – The Arizona Court of Appeals’ search for 

error pursuant to Anders in Petitioner’s direct appeal did not result in exhaustion. 

It is true that the Ninth Circuit has held that the federal habeas petitioner has 

exhausted his state court remedies when the state court can be presumed to have 

considered his constitutional claims as part of a mandated review for specified error, 

even if the petitioner failed to raise the claims before the state court. Beam v. Paskett, 3 

F.3d 1301 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1631 (1994), overruled on other 

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grounds, Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 1999).

5

In their Supplemental Response, Respondents address this issue by arguing that 

an Anders brief cannot be a fair presentation of an issue. (Doc. 14 at 4.) However, the 

prerequisite to habeas review is not “fair presentation,” but that “the applicant has 

exhausted the remedies available.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Fair presentation is but 

one, albeit the most common, means to exhaust state remedies. Actual consideration by 

the state court is another. See Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1206 (11th 

Cir.1984) (“[t]here is no better evidence of exhaustion than a state court's actual 

consideration of the relevant constitutional issue”); see also Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 

1352, 1356-57 (8th Cir.1990) (state court's sua sponte consideration of an issue satisfies 

exhaustion). 

With their view of exhaustion limited to “fair presentation,” Respondents point to 

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) for the proposition that “the 

filing of a global request to review the record is insufficient for exhaustion.” (Supp. 

Resp., Doc. 14 at 4.) However, Castillo did not involve a mandated review of the record, 

and the means for exhaustion applicable in that case was fair presentation, not actual 

consideration.

Indeed, it was on actual consideration that Beam turned. Here, if the state court 

applying Anders is deemed to have actually considered the merits of all of the 

 

5

The courts have been reticent to expand Beam. See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 

F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030 (1996) (refusing to extend Beam

to Arizona’s statutory review for fundamental error in death penalty case); Michael 

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 

987 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1057 (9th Cir. 2005); 

Hoffman v. Arave, 973 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 at Note 1 (D. Idaho 1997) (commenting that 

Beam was “wrongly decided”); Sechrest v. Ignacio, 943 F.Supp. 1245, 1249-50 (D. 

Nevada 1996) (characterizing the discussion in Beam on the “exhaustion” effect of the 

state mandatory review statute as obiter dicta); Banks v. Horn, 49 F.Supp.2d 400, 407 

(M.D. Penn. 1999) (declining to apply Beam, and rejecting “the notion that [a reviewing 

court] is responsible for detecting all errors of constitutional magnitude on direct 

appeal”); Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing Beam analysis, 

but avoiding by denying claims on the merits); Wortazeck v. Lewis, 863 F.Supp. 1079, 

1095 (D. Arizona 1994), affirmed on other grounds 97 F.3d 329, cert. denied 520 U.S. 

1173, reh’g denied 520 U.S. 1260 (distinguishing the Idaho statute in Beam from Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. Rule 31.2 mandating review of capital cases).

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petitioner’s potential claims, then his state remedies on those claims are exhausted, 

regardless whether he fairly presented them.

The undersigned is currently aware of only one published decision considering 

the exhaustion effect of a review for error pursuant to Anders. In McCoy v. Newsome, 

626 F.Supp. 374 (M.D. Georgia 1986), the appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw 

as counsel pursuant to Anders. The motion was granted and the conviction affirmed. 

The petitioner subsequently sought habeas relief on a laundry list of issues, and the state 

moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust. After finding that the state appellate court had 

conducted a review of the record for error, the McCoy court concluded: “The state courts 

have thus had the opportunity to review all petitioner’s claims arising from his trial.” 

McCoy, 626 F.Supp. at 376. See McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 

1992) (“the district court found that grounds two through eleven were exhausted when 

the Georgia Court of Appeals conducted an independent examination of the trial record 

for any reversible error pursuant to the Anders petition”).

For the following reasons, the undersigned does not find McCoy persuasive that 

Beam’s finding of exhaustion applies to review under Anders.

In Poland v. Stewart, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Beam in an Arizona case

involving a review for fundamental error in capital cases. 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The Poland court observed that Beam involved an Idaho state which required the state 

supreme court to review capital cases “to determine if certain errors were present,” and 

the Ninth Circuit had simply “presumed that the Idaho court had performed its statutory 

duties,” and considered the specified issues. Id. at 1106. As a result, “claimed errors 

coming within the Idaho statutory command were not procedurally barred though not 

raised in state court.” Id. The Poland court observed that Arizona’s mandate for review 

of capital cases did not specify any particular claims.

Similarly, here, the Arizona Court of Appeals had no duty to review for “certain 

errors.” Rather, it was simply an open-ended mandate to “decide whether the case is 

wholly frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. See also State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 

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P.3d 878 (1969) (applying Anders).

Respondents and apparently some courts have applied a short hand of describing 

review under Anders and Leon as a search for “fundamental error.” (See e.g. Supp. 

Resp., Doc. 14 at 4.) Indeed, Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s Anders brief beseeched the 

appellate court to “search the record for fundamental error.” (Exhibit F, Opening Brief 

at 11.) If such references could be found to be a designation of specific errors to be 

examined, then perhaps Beam would mandate a finding of actual consideration and thus 

exhaustion. However, neither Anders nor Leon used such a term nor employed any 

limitation on the type of error for which a reviewing court should search. 

It appears that this nomenclature derives in part from a now-repealed statute, and 

the Arizona limitation on errors reviewable when no objection has been raised at trial. 

The former was Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4035 which required the Arizona Court of Appeals 

to search every appellate record for “fundamental error.” That requirement was repealed 

in 1995. See State v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 456, 459, 910 P.2d 1, 4 (1996). Perhaps the 

confusion resulted from the tendency of the Arizona Courts to reference review under 

Anders/Leon and § 13-4035 in a single cryptic determination with a finding that there 

was no “fundamental error.” See e.g. State v. Perea, 142 Ariz. 352, 359, 690 P.2d 71, 78 

(1984).

The latter source for the term “fundamental error” is the waiver limitation applied 

by the Arizona appellate courts to objections not raised at trial. Indeed, in denying 

Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated:

We review for fundamental error, error that goes to the foundation 

of a case or takes from the defendant a right essential to his defense. 

See State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424, 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988).

(Exhibit A, Mem. Dec. 11/30/10 at 2.) The referenced decision of the Arizona Supreme 

Court, King, did not concern the mandated review under Anders. Rather, King involved 

the consideration of a raised claim of instructional error which had not been asserted at 

trial. Finding that a failure to object resulted in a waiver, the court found its review of 

the claim limited to a search for “fundamental error,” which it defined:

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Error is fundamental when it reaches “ ‘the foundation of the case or 

takes from the defendant a right essential to his defense,’ ” or is an “ 

‘error of such dimensions that it cannot be said it is possible for a 

defendant to have had a fair trial.’ ” 

King, 158 Ariz. at 424, 763 P.2d at 244 (citations omitted). Thus, King was not a 

limitation on Anders review, and would have no application where, for example, an 

objection had been raised at trial but appellate counsel had not argued the point and 

instead filed an Anders brief.

Thus, the reference to “fundamental error” in the denial of Petitioner’s direct 

appeal cannot be presumed to be the application of a specified list of errors to be 

examined, but rather as a recognition of a limitation on the types of error on which the 

court could grant relief if an objection had not been raised at trial.

The undersigned is not convinced that no Arizona court or litigant has ever 

conflated the King standard with the contours of review mandated under Anders and 

Leon. Nor is the undersigned convinced that the Arizona Court of Appeals did not do so 

in this instance.6 

What cannot be said, however, is that even had the Arizona Court of Appeals 

believed its review was limited to “fundamental error,” that such review was sufficiently 

prescribed and narrow as to create a presumption that the state court actually considered 

any specific constitutional claims. To the contrary, under the King formulation, such 

review is not a search for specific types of claims or errors, but of errors with a certain 

level of prejudicial impact. That left no basis for this Court to have concluded in 

evaluating Petitioner’s first habeas petition that his state remedies on the claims raised in 

that petition were already exhausted.

Thus, the habeas court correctly concluded that Petitioner’s state remedies were 

not properly exhausted as to any of his claims, and the dismissal of his first habeas 

proceeding on that basis was not improper.

 

6

The undersigned observes that although Petitioner complains that counsel was deficient 

in filing an Anders brief (Reply, Doc. 10 at 7-8), he asserts no claim in this proceeding 

that he was denied equal protection under Anders as a result of an improperly limited 

review of his direct appeal by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

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Dismissal on Basis of Pending PCR Proceeding Proper - The federal courts 

have also recognized a basis for equitable tolling where a petitioner’s first federal 

petition is dismissed and the district court has affirmatively misled the petitioner, 

resulting in the intervening incursion of the habeas limitations bar. However, in Ford v. 

Pliler, the Ninth Circuit found that equitable tolling would result only if there was some 

“affirmative misstatement” by the district court which prevented the Petitioner from 

making a timely filing after the dismissal. 590 F.3d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 2009). See also 

Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004) (holding district courts have no obligation to advise 

habeas petitioners on statute of limitations and exhaustion issues at the time of a 

dismissal for failure to exhaust, but remanding for a determination whether the petitioner 

had been affirmatively misled by the court). 

Although, in dismissing his first habeas proceeding the District Court properly 

noticed that Petitioner was required to have exhausted his state remedies, citing inter alia

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), the court also went on to cite two Ninth Circuit cases, Sherwood

(direct appeal pending) and Schnepp (post-conviction proceeding pending), finding that 

the pendency of on-going state proceedings on a conviction meant “the federal 

exhaustion requirement is not satisfied.” (CV-12-1868-PHX-SLG-JFM, Order 10/15/12, 

Doc. 4 at 3.) 

In Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit held that 

“even if the federal constitutional question raised by the habeas corpus petitioner cannot 

be resolved in a pending state appeal, that appeal may result in the reversal of the 

petitioner's conviction on some other ground, thereby mooting the federal 

question...[thus the petitioner’s] claim is premature, and must be dismissed for failure to 

exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 634. 

Similarly, in Schnepp v. Oregon, 333 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964) (per curiam), the 

court held: “According to allegations contained in the application, Schnepp now has a 

post conviction proceeding pending in the courts of Oregon, and therefore has not 

exhausted his presently-available state remedies, this being a condition precedent to the 

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granting, by a federal court, of an application by a state prisoner for a writ of habeas 

corpus.” Id. at 288. 

It is true that in Henderson v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 2013), the 

Ninth Circuit issued a terse opinion distinguishing Sherwood from a case involving a 

pending state habeas petition, and a federal petition containing a mix exhausted and 

unexhausted claims. 

Sherwood is distinguishable, and the district court erred as a matter 

of law by dismissing Henderson's petition. Sherwood stands for the 

proposition that a district court may not adjudicate a federal habeas 

petition while a petitioner's direct state appeal is pending. 716 F.2d 

at 634 (“When, as in the present case, an appeal of a state criminal 

conviction is pending, a would-be habeas corpus petitioner must 

await the outcome of his appeal before his state remedies are 

exhausted....”). Although district courts cannot adjudicate mixed 

petitions, Sherwood does not undermine the important precedent 

requiring district courts first to grant leave to amend and, if 

requested, to consider a petitioner's eligibility for a stay under 

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275–77, 125 S.Ct. 1528 (stay of entire petition), 

or under Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070–71 (stay of exhausted claims 

only). The district court erred by failing to allow Henderson leave to 

amend her petition before dismissal, and by refusing to address 

Henderson's request for relief under Rhines or Kelly.

Henderson, 710 F.3d at 874. At least one court has concluded that Henderson limited 

Sherwood to cases involving pending direct appeals, and excluded it from applying to 

pending post-conviction proceedings. See Smith v. Williams, 2013 WL 1501583, 2 

(D.Nev. 2013) (finding Henderson clarified “that the rule [of] Sherwood applies to 

pending direct appeals, and not to pending state post-conviction proceedings”). And, 

here, at the time Petitioner’s first habeas proceeding was dismissed, his direct appeal had 

long been terminated, and it was only his state post-conviction relief petition which was 

pending.

However, the heart of Henderson was not to discern the type of pending state 

proceedings that would justify a dismissal, but to find that it was improper to dismiss the 

mixed petition without first granting leave to amend and/or considering a request for a 

stay. Viewed in that light, it would make little difference whether the pending 

proceeding were a direct appeal or a post-conviction collateral attack, since either kind of 

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pending proceeding would leave open the potential of an available state remedy which 

would indicate claims were unexhausted.

Similarly, in Phillips v. Vasquez, 56 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1995) the Court treated its 

decision in Sherwood as a matter of jurisprudential concern to not waste judicial 

resources resolving a habeas petition that might be rendered moot by a still pending state 

proceeding.7If Sherwood is thus viewed as a matter of jurisprudential management, the 

nature of the pending state proceeding would be irrelevant.

Moreover, nothing in Henderson explicitly addressed the holding in Schnepp that 

a pending post-conviction proceeding called for a dismissal. 

Respondents argue in their Second Supplemental Response that the controlling 

circumstance is the conclusion that Petitioner’s state remedies on his claims were all 

unexhausted, and thus his petition was not a “mixed” petition. (Doc. 18 at 4-6.) 

But, neither Sherwood nor Schnepp were founded upon a determination that state 

remedies had been exhausted on particular claims. Indeed, the mandate for exhaustion 

of state remedies in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) is not a claim specific mandate, but a blanket 

requirement that any available state remedies be exhausted. It is true that § 2254(c) goes 

on to direct that exhaustion cannot be found if there are state remedies available to 

address “the question presented” in the habeas petition. Similarly, the judicial principle 

of procedural default (barring habeas consideration of claims technically exhausted 

because of a procedural default) is applied on a claim by claim basis. “Only individual 

claims, and not the application containing those claims, can be procedurally defaulted 

under state law.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 424 (2005) (emphasis in original)

(quoting Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9 (2000)). 

But, Sherwood explicitly rejected the contention that exhaustion of state remedies 

on the challenged claims was sufficient:

 

7

The Phillips court also analyzed whether abstention under the doctrine of Younger v. 

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) was required, concluding it was not since relief on the 

conviction in the federal proceeding attacking the conviction would not enjoin the 

ongoing state proceeding on the sentence, even though it might moot it by invalidating 

the conviction. 56 F.3d at 1034.

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However, even were Sherwood to have exhausted all his state 

remedies with respect to the denial of his appointed counsel and free 

transcript request, that would not be enough to satisfy the 

requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b) and (c). When, as in the 

present case, an appeal of a state criminal conviction is pending, a 

would-be habeas corpus petitioner must await the outcome of his 

appeal before his state remedies are exhausted, even where the issue 

to be challenged in the writ of habeas corpus has been finally settled 

in the state courts.

Sherwood, 716 F.2d at 634. 

That is not to say that the presence of properly exhausted claims is irrelevant. 

Indeed, the question addressed by Henderson was whether, even though a dismissal is 

required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) because of a pending state proceeding, the habeas 

court is nonetheless required to consider a stay because state remedies have been 

exhausted on some of the petitioner’s claims. Here, however, Petitioner has proffered 

nothing to show that, at the time of the dismissal of his first federal habeas petition his 

state remedies were properly exhausted as to any of his claims.

Finally, Henderson was not decided until January 3, 2013, more than two months 

after the district court had dismissed Petitioner’s first federal habeas petition on October 

24, 2012. Thus, even assuming Henderson worked a narrowing of Schnepp, that 

decision was unavailable to the district court in dismissing Petitioner’s first habeas 

petition, and thus the court did not affirmatively mislead Petitioner as to the then 

applicable law.

Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the district court affirmatively misled 

Petitioner in relying on Sherwood and Schnepp as part of its decision to dismiss 

Petitioner’s first federal habeas petition. 

Conclusion – Petitioner has failed to show that he is entitled to equitable tolling 

as a result of the dismissal of his first habeas petition.

5. Actual Innocence

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

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petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). 

Petitioner makes no such claim of actual innocence in this proceeding.

6. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Taking into account the available statutory tolling, Petitioner’s one year habeas 

limitations period commenced running on November 23, 2011, and expired on 

November 22, 2012, making his July 29, 2013 Petition over eight months delinquent. 

Petitioner has failed to show grounds for equitable tolling, and makes no claim or 

showing of actual innocence to avoid the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, the Petition must be dismissed with prejudice as barred by the 

habeas statute of limitations.

B. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally defaulted or 

were procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground, and thus are 

barred from federal habeas review. Because the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s 

claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and evaluation of the exhaustion issues, 

including allegations of cause and prejudice involve expansive analysis, including 

consideration of underlying claims of ineffective assistance and the related substantive 

claims, these additional defenses are not reached. 

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IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts the reasoning of this Report & 

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Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed July 29, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing 

recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of Appealability 

be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: October 2, 2014

13-1543r RR 14 09 19 on HC FINAL.docx James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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