Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02879/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02879-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 18, 2016*

Decided August 18, 2016

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐2879

EDDIE L. PATTON, JR.,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JENNIFER KESTEL, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 15‐C‐1273

Harold A. Baker,

Judge.

O R D E R

Eddie Patton, Jr., an Illinois prisoner, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claiming that Lutheran Social Services and several of its caseworkers, supervisors, and

therapists were interfering with his parental rights. According to the complaint, the

defendants had refused to allow Patton’s children to visit him in prison, blocked the

children from communicating with him, and withheld information about the children’s

health and welfare. He asked that Lutheran “be investigated” and that his children be

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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“returned home” to relatives. At screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court

addressed Patton in open court and announced that his suit was being dismissed for

lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction because a “custody fight” was ongoing in state court.

A later written decision attributes the dismissal, however, to a failure to state a claim as

well as a lack of jurisdiction. Patton appeals the dismissal.   

Parents enjoy a substantive right, grounded in the Due Process Clause, to

associate with and direct the upbringing of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,

65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (discussing historical recognition of right); Brokaw v.

Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1018–19 (7th Cir. 2000). But Patton’s complaint was

deceiving, and the district court’s characterization of the state‐court litigation as a

“custody fight” does not tell the whole story. What Patton did not disclose is that before

he filed this action in federal court, the State of Illinois had initiated proceedings to have

him declared an unfit parent due to depravity. Patton had been sentenced to 15 years in

prison on two counts of aggravated child battery, and by orders of a state circuit judge,

he was not permitted to see his children (who by then were wards of the court) or to

communicate with them unless authorized by their therapist. And after he filed this

action in August 2015, Patton affirmatively misled the district court by repeatedly

asserting in increasingly urgent filings that his “parental rights have not been

terminated” while omitting that the State was seeking to do so and already had been

empowered to prevent Patton’s children from having contact with him.   

Patton lost that battle when two months after the district court dismissed the

present suit the state court permanently terminated his parental rights. Yet in this court

Patton disingenuously continues to blame Lutheran and its employees for his inability

to see or communicate with his children. As we have emphasized, a plaintiff who seeks

relief based on information known to be false is subject to sanctions, including

dismissal, for abusing the judicial process. See Salmeron v. Enter. Recovery Sys., Inc., 579

F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 2009); Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 306,

308 (7th Cir. 2002).

Putting aside his dishonesty, Patton faced a more fundamental problem: His

lawsuit did not belong in federal court given the ongoing proceedings in state court.

The “domestic relations exception” exempts from federal jurisdiction disputes related to

child custody, divorce, and alimony. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992);

Struck v. Cook Cnty. Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 859–60 (7th Cir. 2007); Allen v. Allen,

48 F.3d 259, 261 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1995); Congleton v. Holy Cross Child Placement Agency, Inc.,

919 F.2d 1077, 1078–79 (5th Cir. 1990). Patton’s attempt to embroil the district court in

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ongoing litigation to protect his children and decide his fitness as a parent fell within

the domestic relations exception and, thus, outside the court’s jurisdiction.

Patton has filed a frivolous appeal of a frivolous suit, see Alpern v. Lieb, 38 F.3d

933, 934 (7th Cir. 1994), and thus he has incurred two strikes under the Prison Litigation

Reform Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A further strike will bar him from bringing suits

in forma pauperis. See id.   

The district court appeared to recognize that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction

over Patton’s lawsuit, even though the court’s written decision and judgment include

references to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and failure to state a claim. To

eliminate any ambiguity, we MODIFY the judgment to reflect a dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction rather than on the merits, and as modified the judgment is AFFIRMED.

See Travelers Prop. Cas. v. Good, 689 F.3d 714, 716, 726 (7th Cir. 2012); Garry v. Geils, 82

F.3d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir. 1996).

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