Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01607/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01607-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Steve J. Longariello, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Gompers Rehabilitation Center, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-1607-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Three motions are pending before the Court: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #

9), Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Dkt. # 11), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment by Default

(Dkt. # 11). For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with

leave to amend and denies both of Plaintiff’s motions.

BACKGROUND

In March 2009, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against Defendant, alleging discrimination based on sex,

age, and disability. On May 15, 2009, the EEOC was “unable to conclude that the

information obtained establish[ed] violations of the [applicable discrimination] statutes[,]”

and the EEOC informed Plaintiff of his right to sue. (Dkt. # 11, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff filed the

instant lawsuit on August 4, 2009, appearing to allege claims under six statutes: (1) Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), (2) Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(“ADEA”), (3) Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), (4) Arizona Civil Rights Act

Case 2:09-cv-01607-GMS Document 15 Filed 01/05/10 Page 1 of 7
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(“ACRA”), (5) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”), and (6) “Federal and Arizona State

Blacklisting Laws.”

LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations

. . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent

with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal citations omitted).

Similarly, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of

truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient

to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Furthermore, “[a]lthough [the Court] construe[s] pleadings liberally in their favor, pro

se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (citing

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986). Even “a liberal interpretation of a . . .

complaint may not supply [the] essential elements of [a] claim that were not initially pled.”

Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations

omitted).

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DISCUSSION

I. The Court Grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is insufficient to survive dismissal. Instead, the Complaint relies

on legal conclusions without providing relevant factual support. The Complaint begins by

listing several statutes as the bases for jurisdiction. Aside from asserting facts about his right

to sue and to amend, the Complaint states only the following, “By failing to hire the most

qualified applicant, Plaintiff, Steve J. Longariello, a[n] Arizona certified, highly qualified .

. ., 53 year old disabled male master level teacher of Special Education, the Defendant,

Gompers Rehabilitation Center, on one or more occasion[s], violated his civil rights pursuant

to the laws (mentioned above) to which this court has jurisdiction.” (Dkt. # 1.) This is a legal

conclusion that merely recites some (but not all) of the claims’ elements, without providing

enough factual support to make any of the claims plausible. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;

Pareto, 139 F.3d at 699. 

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Title VII Claim.

“Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on account of race, sex, religion, and

national origin.” Gay v. Waiters’ and Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531,

536 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment

practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]”)). To establish a prima facie case

of discrimination, Plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was

qualified for the position, (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (4)

similarly situated persons were treated more favorably. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air,

Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing sex discrimination against women).

Plaintiff alleges that he is male, but he does not allege that Defendant refused to hire him

because of he is male, but does not allege facts showing Defendant’s treatment of other

similarly-situated individuals. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

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B. Plaintiff Fails to State an ADEA Claim.

The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire . . . or

otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to [his or her] compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 623(a)(1). A prima facie case of disparate treatment requires the following: (1) the plaintiff

was a member of the protected class (over the age of 40); (2) the plaintiff applied for and was

qualified for the position; (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, such as

denial of a position; and (4) the employer hired substantially younger applicants with equal

or inferior qualifications instead. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1280–81

(9th Cir. 2000) (discussing elements in the context of termination); see also Lindahl v. Air

France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the test is flexible and adaptable

to each case’s unique facts). In this case, the Complaint mentions that Plaintiff is fifty-three

years old, but it does not explain any other surrounding facts. For instance, the Complaint

does not explain whether Plaintiff applied for any position, what the position was, and who,

if anyone, was hired instead. Thus, the Court dismisses the ADEA claim.

C. Plaintiff Fails to State an ADA Claim.

The American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq.,

“prohibits an employer from discriminating ‘against a qualified individual with a disability

because of the disability.’” Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1480 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). A prima facie ADA claim requires alleging that the Plaintiff

(1) is a disabled person within the meaning of the statute; (2) is a qualified individual with

a disability; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.” Hutton

v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2001).

First, Plaintiff fails to allege how he is disabled. The ADA defines a “disability” as

“physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of

such individual[,]” “a record of such an impairment[,]” or “being regarded as having such

an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Merely labeling himself as “disabled” in the

Complaint is insufficient to explain what physical or mental disability he has. Plaintiff’s

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Response contends that he has a psychological disability, but this allegation was not in the

Complaint. Second, Plaintiff has not alleged any causal connection between any purported

disability and Defendant’s refusal to hire Plaintiff. Thus, the Court dismisses the ADA

claim.

D. Plaintiff Fails to State an ACRA Claim.

ACRA makes it unlawful for an employer “[t]o fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual

. . . with respect to the individual’s compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of

employment because of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, age, disability or national

origin.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1463(B)(1). Plaintiff’s ACRA claim fails for the same reasons

that his Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims fail. First, Plaintiff does not allege discrimination

based on race, color, religion, or national origin. And although the Complaint mentions

Plaintiff’s sex and age in passing, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that he has a

disability. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to allege why his race, color, religion, sex, age,

disability or national origin caused an adverse employment action. Plaintiff’s passive

insinuation of discrimination is insufficient. The Court, therefore, dismisses the ACRA

claim.

E. Plaintiff Fails To State a Section 1981 Claim.

To survive a motion to dismiss on a Section 1981 claim, a Complaint must “allege that

plaintiff suffered discrimination . . . on the basis of race.” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff provides no authority holding that

a Section 1981 applies to sex, age, or disability discrimination. Because Plaintiff has not

alleged racial discrimination, the Court dismisses the Section 1981 claim.

F. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for “Blacklisting Laws.”

Plaintiff does not specify what “Federal and Arizona State Blacklisting Laws”

Defendants allegedly violated. The Complaint is thus insufficient to create a reasonable

inference that Defendant is liable under any such statute. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Even

so, the Court cannot discern any facts from the Complaint that relate to anything resembling

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1

 Plaintiff analogizes Defendant’s actions with a hypothetical attempt to buy groceries

with counterfeit bills. According to Plaintiff, both Defendant’s counsel and the counterfeiter

tried to achieve something without legally signing their names. Defendant’s counsel,

however, behaved not like a person trying to buy groceries with counterfeit bills, but instead

like a person buying groceries with a debit card. No handwritten signature was required for

the electronic transaction, and no handwritten signature is required here. 

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blacklisting, and the Court will not speculate as to what those facts might be. The Court thus

dismisses the blacklisting claim.

II. The Court Denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike.

Plaintiff contends that the Court should strike Defendant’s Motion and other filings

because they do not include a handwritten signature. Arizona Local Rule of Civil Procedure

5.5(g), however, provides, “The log-in and password required to submit documents to the

ECF System constitute the Registered User’s signature on all electronic documents filed with

the Court for purposes of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Consistent with

this rule, Defendant’s counsel electronically filed Defendant’s documents and signed her

name using the notation “s/ Stephanie R. Leach.” Plaintiff contends a handwritten signature

is required because this Court issues orders with handwritten signatures and because various

documents were filed electronically, but served by mail. Plaintiff also contends that

Defendant was required to mail separate copies of each document to the Court. Plaintiff

offers no authority for these propositions.1

 Therefore, denies the Motion to Strike.

III. The Court Denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment.

Plaintiff requests a default judgment, contending that Defendant’s Motion is meritless

and unsigned. For the reasons already stated, however, Defendant’s counsel properly signed

Defendant’s Motion and the Court finds the Motion persuasive. Furthermore, an entry of

default is appropriate only when “a party . . . has failed to plead or otherwise defend” the

action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Plaintiff has not explained how Defendant has failed to defend

the action given that Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The Court thus denies the Motion

for Default Judgment.

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IV. Dismissal Is Without Prejudice.

Defendant contends dismissal should be with prejudice because amendment would

be futile. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure15(a), however, “declares that leave to amend

‘shall be freely given when justice so requires’; this mandate is to be heeded.” Foman v.

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). The Court finds that

amendment may cure some of the Complaint’s defects.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 9) is

GRANTED with leave to file an amended complaint on or before January 19, 2010.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to dismiss this action

without further notice if an amended complaint is not filed on or before January 19, 2010.

DATED this 5th day of January, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-01607-GMS Document 15 Filed 01/05/10 Page 7 of 7