Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02931/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02931-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD ARMENTA,

CDCR #G-39318,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D. PARAMO, Warden, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02931-BTM-KSC

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

2) DENYING MOTION TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL 

[ECF No. 3]

AND

3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

RICHARD ARMENTA (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner at California State Prison, 

Sacramento (CSP-SAC) in Represa, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil 

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Together with his 

Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a) (ECF No. 2), as well as a Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3).

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Background

Plaintiff claims prison officials at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility 

(“RJD”) in San Diego, California, violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

while he was incarcerated there in 2015 by charging him with, finding him guilty of, and 

punishing him for use of a controlled substance in violation of CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 

§ 3016(a). Plaintiff claims Defendants did so with “deliberate indifference” to medical 

evidence showing he had been prescribed Tylenol with codeine, which he contends 

explained the positive urinalysis results that initiated his disciplinary proceedings. (ECF 

No. 1 at 8-15.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief re-instating his visitation 

privileges in addition to compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 16.)

Discussion

A. IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (U.S. 2016); Williams v. Paramo, 

775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report and a certificate issued by a CSP-SAC accounting clerk attesting to his 

balances and deposits over the 6-month period preceding the filing of his Complaint. 

(ECF No. 2 at 3-5); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 

1119. These documents show that while Plaintiff has had a monthly average of $94.17 

deposited to his account, and has carried an average balance of $28.12, his available 

balance at the time of filing was zero (ECF No. 2 at 5). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

(providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action 

or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no 

assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 

630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” 

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to 

the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, declines to exact the 

$18.83 initial filing fee assessed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) because his trust 

account statement shows he “has no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629; 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915(b)(4), and directs the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 

28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment 

payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). See id.

B. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff also asks the Court to appoint counsel for him because he is indigent, 

incarcerated, “unable to read or write,” and because “a trial in this case will likely involve 

conflicting testimony,” and he believes “counsel would better enable [him] to present 

evidence and cross examine witnesses.” (ECF No. 3 at 1.)

However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. 

of Social Servs, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 

2009). And while 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) grants the district court limited discretion to 

“request” that an attorney represent an indigent civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of 

America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), this discretion is exercised only in 

“exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th 

Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional circumstances requires the Court “to consider 

whether there is a ‘likelihood of success on the merits’ and whether ‘the prisoner is 

unable to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’”

Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299, 1309 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Palmer, 560 F.3d 

at 970).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice at this time because nothing 

in either his Complaint or his Motion to Appoint Counsel demonstrates an inability to 

“read or write” or suggests he is incapable of articulating the factual basis for his claims, 

which appear “relatively straightforward.” Id. In fact, the Court finds, based on its 

screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint and applying the liberal standards of construction 

required in pro se cases, see Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010)

(noting court’s “obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, 

to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt”),

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that Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient factual content to state a plausible claim for relief. 

At the same time, and at this initial stage of the case, Plaintiff’s Complaint, by 

itself, while sufficient to state a claim, does not yet demonstrate a “likelihood” of success 

on the merits. Id. Therefore, the Court finds no “exceptional circumstances” exist to 

justify the appointment of counsel at this time. See, e.g., Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 

1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of counsel where prisoner was able to articulate 

his inadequate medical care claims in light of the complexity of the issues involved, but

found unlikely to succeed on the merits).

C. Screening of Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint also requires a 

sua sponte pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). 

Under these statutes, the Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

As noted above, Plaintiff claims Defendants charged, tried, and found him guilty of 

a serious rules violation in March and April 2015 after his urine tested positive for 

morphine and despite having knowledge that he possessed a valid prescription for 

Tylenol with codeine, which he claims caused a “false positive.” As a result, Plaintiff 

forfeited 90 days of behavioral credits,2 90 days loss of quarterly packages, special 

purchases, canteen, and dayroom privileges, was placed on “C” status, lost 180 days of

contact visits, was restricted to only non-contact visitation for the next 180 days, and was 

 

2 Plaintiff admits his credits have been restored in response to a petition for habeas corpus 

he filed in San Diego Superior Court in Case No. HSC 11448—which appears to challenge 

the same disciplinary conviction at issue in this case. See ECF No. 1 at 9-10, 48-55. Thus, 

the Court finds Plaintiff’s § 1983 suit does not appear precluded by Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477, 483, 486-87 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644 (1997)). 

“[W]here ... a successful § 1983 action would not necessarily result in an earlier release 

from incarceration ... the favorable termination rule of Heck and Edwards does not apply.” 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 2003); Coleman v. Peery, No. 2:16-CV0652 AC P, 2016 WL 6094422, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2016). Plaintiff’s § 1983 suit 

may, however, be subject to dismissal on grounds of claim preclusion if Defendants can 

demonstrate this “second suit involves: the (1) same cause of action (2) between the same 

parties [or parties in privity with them] (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first 

suit.” Furnace v. Giurbino, 838 F.3d 1019, 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing DKN 

Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 61 Cal. 4th 813, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 51 P.3d 378, 386 (2015)); 

see also Clements v. Airport Auth. Of Washoe Cnty, 69 F.3d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(“Claim preclusion is an affirmative defense.”).

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required to submit to one year of mandatory random drug testing four times per month. 

(ECF No. 8-16, 20-25.) Plaintiff further claims he was “confined for 24 hours a day for 

10 days in [his] cell,” deprived of “entertainment appliances,” denied the ability to work, 

attend yard, participate in education or vocation programs, and to attend religious 

services. (Id. at 16-17.)

Based on these allegations, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint contains factual 

content sufficient to survive the “low threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte 

screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at

1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners against deprivation or 

restraint of “a protected liberty interest” that may be demonstrated by a showing of 

“‘atypical and significant hardship’ on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life.”) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).

Accordingly, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon the 

Defendants on Plaintiff’s behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall 

issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED. R. CIV. P.

4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or 

deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915.”).

Conclusion

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

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PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3).

5. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF

No. 1) and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each 

named Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of 

this Order, a certified copy of his Complaint and the summons so that he may serve the 

Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the Form 285s 

as completely and accurately as possible, and return them to the United States Marshal 

according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP 

package.

6. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon the named Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to 

him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3).

7. ORDERS the served Defendants to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within the 

time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to “waive the 

right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte 

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a 

preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a 

“reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant is required to respond); 

and

8. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon the named Defendants, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon 

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Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document 

submitted for the Court’s consideration pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must 

include with every original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a 

certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been 

was served on Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. CAL.

CIVLR 5.2. Any document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with 

the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon Defendants may be 

disregarded. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 5, 2017

HON. BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ

United States District Judge

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