Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02391/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02391-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM YOUNG SUTHERLAND,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-09-2391 WBS DAD P

vs.

S. HERRMANN, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that the defendants’

failure to adjust his handcuffs, which had been placed too tightly upon him, over a five hour

period violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and

injunctive relief. 

Pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss filed on February 10,

2010. Therein, defendants argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative

remedies prior to filing this action. Plaintiff has opposed the motion, and defendants have filed a

reply. For the reasons set forth below, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion to

dismiss be denied.

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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

I. Defendants’ Motion

Defendants argue that plaintiff submitted his administrative grievance regarding

the overly tight handcuffs to the first level of administrative review, but failed to appeal an

adverse decision on that grievance to the second and third levels of review. (See Mot. to Dismiss

at 2.) In support of their argument, defendants have provided the court with the declarations of

D. Foston, Chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch; G. Duran, Appeals Coordinator at Pleasant

Valley State Prison; and A. Pereira, Appeals Coordinator at California State Prison, Sacramento. 

Each declarant states that they have conducted a grievance search in their respective databases

and were unable to find any record of plaintiff’s initial grievance (Log. No. SAC-08-00705)

being appealed and decided at the second or third levels of review. (A. Pereira Decl. ¶5; D.

Foston Decl. ¶¶ 3-5; G. Duran Decl. ¶ 5.)

II. Plaintiff’s Opposition 

In opposition to the pending motion to dismiss, plaintiff contends that he tried to

exhaust his administrative remedies but his attempt at doing so was hindered by the misdirection

and inaction of prison officials. Plaintiff explains that on March 12, 2008, he filed his grievance

regarding the tight handcuffs at the first level of review. (Opp’n at 1.) Plaintiff notes that he did

not receive a decision until August 1, 2008, 142 days after filing his grievance. (Id. at 2.) On the

inmate appeal form that was eventually returned to him by prison officials, the second level

review box was checked and signed indicating that the appeal had been denied at the second

level of review, albeit with lines crossing out those entries to varying degrees. (Id.) Plaintiff

argues that upon receiving this inmate appeal form following the lengthy delay, he was thus

under the impression that his appeal had been fully reviewed at the first and second levels. (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues that because officials misled him to believe that he had already completed the

second level of review, he filed his next appeal directly to the third level of review on August 6,

2008. (Id. at 3.)

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On October 16, 2008, plaintiff received a third level of review response,

explaining that his appeal was premature because he had not submitted an appeal to the second

level of review. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he took heed of this advice and filed his appeal at

the second level of review on November 12, 2008. (Id.) However, according to plaintiff, he did 

not receive a response to his appeal thereafter, despite his repeated inquiries into its status. (See

id. 3-4.) Plaintiff asserts that it is common for prison officials to delay, disregard, or even lose

inmate grievances and appeals, suggesting that this is what occurred with respect to his appeal

submitted to the second level of review. (Id. at 4, Ex. C.)

Finally, plaintiff contends that his placement in administrative confinement during

the period of time in question added to the difficulty of exhausting his administrative remedies. 

Specifically, plaintiff argues that prison officials granted him access to the law library only six

times during the 289 days he spent in administrative segregation. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff also argues

that he did not have access to his personal property while in administrative segregation. (Id.) 

According to plaintiff, he was thus unable to conduct sufficient research on the procedure to

follow in filing a second level appeal. (Id. at 7.) 

 III. Defendants’ Reply 

In reply, defendants argue that plaintiff’s argument fails to adequately explain why

he failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. While conceding that there was a

delay in processing plaintiff’s first level appeal, defendants argue that prison officials never told

plaintiff that his appeal at the second level would be denied due to untimeliness. (Reply at 3.) 

According to defendants, just the opposite was true: defendants advised plaintiff on two different

occasions that he should file an appeal at the second level of review. (Id.) 

Defendants also challenge plaintiff’s argument that he was misled into believing

that a second level review had already occurred. (Id.) Defendants argue that any belief plaintiff

had that his appeal form had completed the second level of review was unreasonable. (See id.)

Defendants emphasize that the marks made in the second level review box were clearly made in

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error and were conspicuously crossed out. (Id. at 3-4.) 

Next, defendants contest plaintiff’s claim that he filed a second level appeal on

November 12, 2008. (Id. at 4.) Defendants assert that they have no record of this appeal, nor do

they have any record of plaintiff’s alleged inquires into the appeal. (Id.) Moreover, defendants

argue that plaintiff has not submitted any evidence to the contrary. (Id.)

Finally, defendants assert that plaintiff’s limited access to the law library and to

his personal property did not impede his ability to exhaust his remedies. (Id.) In support of their

argument, defendants note that while plaintiff was confined in administrative segregation, he

filed and exhausted a separate grievance. (Id.) According to defendants, the exhaustion of this

unrelated grievance demonstrates that plaintiff fully understood how to navigate the grievance

appeals process. (See id.) 

ANALYSIS

I. Legal Standards Applicable to a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Non-Enumerated Rule 12(b)

In 1995, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which

amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that: “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they

allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the exhaustion of prison

administrative procedures is mandatory, regardless of the relief offered through such procedures. 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). The Supreme Court has also cautioned courts

against reading futility or other exceptions into the statutory exhaustion requirement. Id. at 741

n.6. In addition, because proper exhaustion is necessary, a prisoner cannot satisfy the PLRA

exhaustion requirement by filling an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative

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grievance or appeal. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-93 (2006). 

In California, prisoners may appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition,

or policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). Most such appeals progress from an informal review through three

formal levels of review. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5. A decision at the third formal

level, also referred to as the director’s level, is not appealable and will conclude a prisoner’s

administrative remedy. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a) & 3084.5(e)(2). A California

prisoner is required, for exhaustion purposes, to submit an appeal at the appropriate level and

proceed to the highest level of review available before filing suit. See Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d

1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The PLRA exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but rather creates an

affirmative defense that a defendant may raise in a non-enumerated Rule 12(b) motion. See

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (“[I]nmates are not required to specially plead or

demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117-19 (9th

Cir. 2003). The defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. “In deciding a motion to dismiss for a failure to exhaust nonjudicial

remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. “I[f]

the district court looks beyond the pleadings to a factual record in deciding the motion to dismiss

for failure to exhaust–a procedure closely analogous to summary judgment–then the court must

assure that [the prisoner] has fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record.” Id. at 1120 n.14. 

When the district court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted administrative remedies on

a claim, “the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Id. at 1120. See also

Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005). On the other hand, “if a complaint contains

both good and bad claims, the court proceeds with the good and leaves the bad.” Jones, 549 U.S.

at 221.

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II. Discussion

A. Exhaustion

Here, the record reflects that plaintiff failed to properly appeal his grievance at the

third level of review. Defendants have obtained declarations from the relevant appeals

coordinators asserting that there is no record of plaintiff properly appealing his grievance beyond

the first level of review. (A. Pereira Decl. ¶5; D. Foston Decl. ¶¶ 3-5; G. Duran Decl. ¶ 5.) 

Moreover, plaintiff himself concedes that his grievance was never decided at the second or third

level of review. (Opp’n at 3-4.) Accordingly, unless an exception to PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement applies, plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A

prisoner’s concession to non-exhaustion is [grounds] for dismissal, so long as no exception to

exhaustion applies.”). 

B. Exceptions to Exhaustion

In his opposition, plaintiff argues that an exception to exhaustion applies in this

case because: (1) he lacked sufficient access to the law library and to his personal property; and

(2) he diligently attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies but his efforts were hampered

by the misdirection and inaction of prison officials.

Plaintiff’s argument that he should be excused for failing to exhaust because he

lacked sufficient access to the law library and his personal property is unpersuasive. The inmate

grievance and appeals forms are relatively simple documents that do not require legal research to

complete. See e.g., Cohea v. Jones, No. CIV S-07-0694 FCD DAD P, 2008 WL 114956, at *5

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2008) (finding that the prisoner’s failure to exhaust was not excused by his

lack of access to legal materials). To properly file a second level appeal, plaintiff simply needed

to complete Section F of his appeal form. Section F provides: “If dissatisfied [with the decision

made at the first level of review], explain [your] reasons for requesting a Second-Level Review,

and submit to Institution or Parole Appeals Coordinator within 15 days of receipt of response.”

In this regard, plaintiff fails to explain why he needed additional legal research to comply with

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 Other circuits have reached similar conclusions on this matter. See e.g., Moore v. 1

Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n administrative remedy is not considered to

have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing

himself to it.”); Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (suggesting

that a defect in exhaustion is excused when a prisoner’s failure to exhaust was due to the inaction

of prison officials); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that administrative

remedies are not “available” under the PLRA when prison staff fail to respond to a properly-filed

grievance); Abbey v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[E]xhaustion may be

achieved in situations where prison officials fail to timely advance the inmate’s grievance or

otherwise prevent him from [exhausting] his administrative remedies.”); Foulk v. Charrier, 262

F.3d 687, 698 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court did not err in declining to dismiss

for failure to exhaust when prison officials did not respond to the prisoner’s grievance).

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this rather straightforward process. Nor does he explain why access to his personal belongings

was necessary to complete his appeal. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff should not be

excused from his failure to exhaust due to his limited access to the law library and his personal

belongings. 

The court now turns to plaintiff’s argument that he should be excused from his

failure to exhaust because he diligently attempted to exhaust but was thwarted from doing so by

the misdirection and inaction of prison officials. Recently, in Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217,

1224 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a prisoner’s failure to exhaust

may be excused when the prisoner “took reasonable and appropriate steps to exhaust . . . [but]

was precluded from exhausting, not through his own fault but by [a prison official’s] mistake.” 

Id. at 1224. In other words, a prisoner cannot be faulted when he makes “every effort to make

full use of the prison grievance process, but [is] stymied by the error” of prison officials. Id. at

1226. See also Ngo v. Woodford, 539 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that a

prisoner is excused from PLRA’s exhaustion requirement when “prison officials obstruct[] his

attempts to exhaust” or when “procedures for processing grievances weren’t followed by prison

officials”).1

In this case, the court is confronted with two differing versions of events. On one

hand, defendants concede that there were delays in processing plaintiff’s grievance but argue that

prison officials took several steps to preserve plaintiff’s right to appeal at the second level of

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 Plaintiff’s opposition to the pending motion has been verified and must be treated as a 2

declaration to the extent that it sets forth facts which are admissible and which are within

plaintiff’s personal knowledge. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1398, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998).

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review. (Reply at 3.) According to defendants, plaintiff nonetheless failed to file an appeal at the

second level of review. (Id.) In support of their argument, defendants have provided the sworn

declarations of three appeals coordinators affirming that there is no record of plaintiff filing an

appeal at the second level of review. (A. Pereira Decl. ¶5; G. Duran Decl. ¶ 5; D. Foston Decl.

¶¶ 3-5.) On the other hand, plaintiff argues that he did file an appeal at the second level of

review on November 12, 2008. (Opp’n at 3.) In addition, plaintiff asserts that he diligently

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attempted to inquire as to the status of his second level appeal. (Id. at 3-4.) In plaintiff’s view,

prison officials have either disregarded or lost his appeal at the second level of review. (See id.

at 4, Ex. C.) 

“Under these circumstances, in which the parties offer competing declarations

setting forth differing versions of events, the court cannot make the necessary credibility

determination to resolve the exhaustion issue on a motion to dismiss.” Barretto v. Smith, No.

CIV S-07-1544 FCD DAD P, 2009 WL 1271984, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2009). See also

Roberts v. Salano, No. 1:08-cv-00162 LJO-GSA PC, 2009 WL 1514440, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May

27, 2009) (“While the Court may resolve disputed issues of fact on an unenumerated 12(b)

motion, it cannot assess the credibility of the parties’ differing versions of what occurred.”)

(citations omitted); see also Bradley v. McVay, No. 1:04-cv-06128-AWI DLB PC, 2008 WL

495732, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2008) (same). Accordingly, for this reason alone, defendants’

motion to dismiss should be denied. 

Moreover, to the extent that the court is able to harmonize the competing versions

of the events, defendants’ reliance on the declarations of the prison appeals coordinators appears

to be misplaced. If prison staff have disregarded or lost plaintiff’s appeal, as plaintiff claims,

then there would be no record of plaintiff’s appeal in the databases on which defendants rely. 

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See Buchanan v. Santos, No. 1:08-cv-01174-AWI-GSA PC, 2010 WL 1267353, at *5 (E.D. Cal.

Mar. 31, 2010) (“[W]hile the absence of evidence that a grievance was officially filed may

indicate [that] Plaintiff never submitted the grievance, it may also indicate that the grievance was

discarded or ignored by staff, as Plaintiff contends.”). In this regard, defendants have not

squarely refuted plaintiff’s claim that he did in fact file an appeal on November 12, 2008. As

noted above, defendants carry the burden of raising and proving the affirmative defense of failure

to exhaust. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. Accordingly, for this reason as

well, defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies

should be denied. See Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1226.

In sum, the court is unable to definitively conclude that plaintiff did not file a

second level appeal or that plaintiff’s appeal was not disregarded or lost by prison officials. 

Because defendants carry the burden of raising and proving that plaintiff did not exhaust

available administrative remedies, the court recommends that defendants’ motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust be denied. 

OTHER MATTERS

Also pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis

filed May 24, 2010. By order filed September 4, 2009, the court granted plaintiff’s first request

to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff’s pending motion as

moot.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The court’s March 23, 2010 order to show cause (Doc. No. 20) is discharged;

and

2. Plaintiff’s May 24, 2010 motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 28) is

denied as moot.

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Also, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit

be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 4, 2010.

DAD:sj

suth2391.57

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