Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01460/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01460-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:0701 Maritime Subsidy Board

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1The facts ofthis matter are set out in more detail in this Court’s two prior summary judgment orders.

2Localizing sound is “the ability to identify the direction and distance of a sound source outside the

head.” Decl. of Edith J. Benay in Opp. to Def. Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Benay Decl.”), Exh. Z, at

USA000571. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NAOMI WALTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-01460 SI

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT

On November 4, 2005, the Court heard argument on plaintiff’s motion to alter judgmentunderFederal

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed forfourteenyears as a courtsecurityofficer(“CSO”) by AkalSecurity (“Akal”),

a company that contracts with the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) to provide security at federal

courthouses in the Ninth Circuit.1 In November 2001, plaintiff underwent audiological testing in connection with

her job. After taking two hearing tests, plaintiff was diagnosed with having an impaired ability to localize sound2

due to a hearing disparity between her right and left ears. Based on these test results, plaintiff was determined

to be unqualified to work as a CSO, and her employment with Akal was terminated.

Plaintiff then filed this action against a number of individuals and federal agencies under the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3As discussed in this Court’s prior summary judgment orders, the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) defines “disability” as “(A) a physicalor mentalimpairment thatsubstantially limits one or more ofthe

majorlife activities of[an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such

an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). “The standards used to determine whether an act of discrimination

violated the RehabilitationAct are the same standards applied underthe [ADA].” Coons v. Sec. of U.S. Dept.

of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794.

2

Plaintiff’s RehabilitationAct claims alleged thatshe had been discriminated against because she was disabled,

or, in the alternative, thatshe was not actually disabled and had been discriminated against because defendants

regarded her as disabled.3 Pl. Third Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 54-55.

In early 2005, plaintiff moved forsummary judgment. She did not argue that she was actually disabled;

instead, she maintained that defendants regarded her as disabled. See Order Denying Pl. Mot. for Summary

Judgment, dated January 24, 2005 (“Jan. 24 Order”), at 3-4. After the Court denied plaintiff’s motion,

defendants brought a motion for summary judgment. Once again, in opposing defendants’ motion, plaintiff did

not contend thatshe was actually disabled. Instead, she argued that she was discriminated against because she

was regarded as disabled. See Order Granting Def. Mot. for Summary Judgment, dated September 13, 2005

(“Sept. 13 Order”), at 5-6. The Court held that plaintiff had provided no evidence that defendants regarded

her as disabled, and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court entered judgment in favor

of defendants the same day.

Plaintiff now moves to alter the judgment. She claims that the Court clearly erred by failing to consider

her evidence in resolving defendants’ motion for summary judgment. She also claims that the law controlling

her case has changed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides that motions to alter or amend the judgment may be

brought within ten days of the entry ofjudgment. The rule provides no standard to guide district courts faced

with a motion to alter judgment. Courts, however, have made clear that such motions should be granted only

in exceptional circumstances: “[T]he rule offers an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests

offinality and conservation ofjudicial resources.’” Kona Ent., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890

(9th Cir.2000) (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 59.30[4] (3d ed. 2000)).
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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4Plaintiff also challenges the Court’s conclusion that she did not have a “record of a disability.” See

Sept. 13 Order, at 5. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, however, admits that her opposition on this point

was “very brief.” Pl. Mot. to Alter Judgment, at 14. Indeed, plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment included only the following paragraph on this point:

With regard to the Plaintiff having a record of a disability, Plaintiff’s audiological testing results

establish that record. Plaintiff’s unilateral hearing loss of more than 25db difference between

the hearing in her right and left ears, when considered on its own, constitutes a record of ear

differences that are “. . . likely to severely/significantly restrict an individual’s ability to localize

sound relative to the normal hearer.” (Supp. Simmons Decl., Exh. 1, p. 1,2).

Pl. Opp. to Def. Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Pl. Opp. Br.”), at 15.

Given the brevity ofher opposition on this point, it is apparent thatplaintiffnow seeks nothing more than

to have a second bite at the apple. Accordingly, the Court will not consider her argument. See Carroll v.

Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir.2003).

3

“Under Rule 59(e), a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances,

unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an

intervening change in the controlling law.” 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir.

1999). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff bases her motion forreconsideration on two primary arguments.4 First, plaintiff argues that the

Court committed clear error by failing to consider evidence thatshe presented inhersummaryjudgmentmotion.

Second, plaintiff argues that a Ninth Circuit decision filed three days after judgment in this case has changed

the relevant law.

Plaintiff’s second argument is easily disposed of. The case plaintiff cites, EEOC v. United Parcel

Service, 424 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2005), was a case that involved California’s Fair Employment and Housing

Act (“FEHA”), not federal law. See id. at 1068 (“The principalquestions thatwe will address in this opinion,

all pertaining to FEHA only, are . . . .”). Although the court discussed the ADA, it was only to the extent

necessary to illustrate the difference between federal and California law. Id. at 1072. As the Ninth Circuit’s

discussion of the ADA was nothing more than dicta, plaintiff’s claims that United Parcel Service constituted

an intervening change in controlling law fails.

Plaintiff’s other argumentis premised on the notion that the Court disregarded evidence that defendants

regarded her as disabled. In support ofthis argument, plaintiff pointsto four pieces of evidence thatshe claims
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5Plaintiff also claims that it was clear error for the Court to rely on the declarations of Judge Roth and

Marc Farmer, both of which state that the hearing requirements for the CSO position solely relate to the

essentialfunctions of the position and do not reflect any opinion about an individual’s ability to engage in other

life activities. See Declaration of Judge Jane R. Roth, at 4-7;Declaration of Marc A. Farmer, at 6-18. The

Court continuesto believe that this evidence is relevant to whether or not defendants believed that plaintiff had

a disability. 

4

the Court did not consider. First, plaintiff relies on a stipulation thatstates in relevant part, “[p]laintiff does not

concede that she cannot localize sound, only thatshe has a hearing deficit in one ear.” Stipulation dated April

25, 2005 (Docket No. 186). Second, plaintiff relies on results of her audiological test, which she claims show

that she passed defendants’ “speech recognition” standard in her impaired ear. Benay Decl., Exhs. O, U.

Third, plaintiff relies upon the declaration of her expert, which states in a conclusory fashion that the inability

to localize sound “severely/significantly restricts one’s hearingas compared to how unimpaired people normally

hear in everyday life.” Supp. Decl. of Abraham A. Simmons in Support of Def. Mot. for Summary Judgment,

Exh. 1, at 1-2. Finally, plaintiff relies on a draft report prepared by an audiologist, which states that difficulties

in localizing sound would be “inconvenient.”5 Benay Decl., Exh. Z, at USA 000573.

As an initialmatter, none of the evidence plaintiff presents in support ofher motion forreconsideration

is new. All of the evidence plaintiff cites was in existence at the time of her opposition to defendants’ motion

forsummary judgment. Yet the only evidence that her opposition relied upon was the declaration of her expert,

Dr. Robert Sweetow. See Pl. Opp. Br. at 13-15. Thus, the evidence plaintiff’s current motion relies on is

simply notan appropriate basis for a motion forreconsideration. See Carroll, 342 F.3d at 945 (“A Rule 59(e)

motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably

have been raised earlier in the litigation.”). Nor is the evidence plaintiff highlights particularly probative. Thus,

the Court cannot find that any failure to address the evidence was clear error.

In connection with the evidence that plaintiff claims the Court did not consider, plaintiff also raises

another issue. She claims that it is not clear whether the Court used an “objective” or a “subjective” analysis

to determine whether defendants regarded her as disabled. This argument refers to a discussion in the Court’s

January 24, 2005, order denying plaintiff’s motion forsummary judgment. See Jan. 24 Order at 4-6. In short,

the objective test focuses on the defendant’s understanding of a plaintiff’s impairment, and asks whether that

impairment would objectively constitute a substantial limitation on a major life activity. The subjective test, in
United States District Court

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6Thus, under the objective test, the perceived impairment must necessarily be a “substantial limitation

on a major life activity” to give rise to liability under the ADA. Under the subjective test, an impairment that

in fact does not amount to a disability may nonetheless give rise to liability if the defendant believes that it

imposes limitations more substantial than it actually does. Compare Thomp-son v. Holy Family Hospital,

121 F.3d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1997) (where employee was fired because employer incorrectly believed she

could not lift 25 pounds, employer did not regard employee as disabled because inability to lift 25 pounds is

not a disability), withEEOC v. United Parcel Service, 306 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) (although inability

to see out of one eye did not constitute a disability, it could nonetheless give rise to liability depending upon the

defendant’s perception of the limitations it causes).

5

contrast, focuses on the defendant’s understanding ofthe limitations an impairment places on the plaintiff. The

differences between the tests are subtle, and courts have not been clear regarding which is appropriate.6

Plaintiff’s motion, however, fails regardless of which test is applied. It is undisputed that plaintiff’s

hearing condition could be corrected with a hearing aid. See, e.g., Pl. Third AmendedCompl. at ¶ 15. Indeed,

plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she “provided defendant USMS with audiological testing results which

identified the kind of hearing aid she was using and demonstrated that with that hearing aid she met and

exceeded the USDHHS medical qualification standards for CSOs.” Id. Thus, it is also undisputed that

defendants knew that plaintiff’s hearing condition was entirely correctable.

The determination whether a physical or mental impairment substantially limits a major life activity,

however, must include an assessment of the impairment in light of the corrective measures used by the

individual. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481-89, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146-49 (1999).

Thus, because defendants knew that plaintiff’s hearing impairment was fully correctable, defendants could not

have regarded plaintiff as “disabled” under either the objective or the subjective test. Under the objective test,

plaintiff’s hearing impairment did notsubstantially limit any majorlife activity, because the impairment could be

corrected with a hearing aid. See id. at 488-89 (individuals who wore glasses to correct poor visionwere not

disabled); Thomspon, 121 F.3d at 541. Similarly, under the subjective test, defendants did notregard plaintiff

as disabled because defendants knew plaintiff’s condition was wholly correctable.

Thus, regardless ofwhether the objective orsubjective testis used, defendants could not have regarded

plaintiff as disabled. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration must therefore be DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s motion to
United States District Court

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alter judgment (Docket No. 221).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1The facts ofthis matter are set out in more detail in this Court’s two prior summary judgment orders.

2Localizing sound is “the ability to identify the direction and distance of a sound source outside the

head.” Decl. of Edith J. Benay in Opp. to Def. Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Benay Decl.”), Exh. Z, at

USA000571. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NAOMI WALTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-01460 SI

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT

On November 4, 2005, the Court heard argument on plaintiff’s motion to alter judgmentunderFederal

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed forfourteenyears as a courtsecurityofficer(“CSO”) by AkalSecurity (“Akal”),

a company that contracts with the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) to provide security at federal

courthouses in the Ninth Circuit.1 In November 2001, plaintiff underwent audiological testing in connection with

her job. After taking two hearing tests, plaintiff was diagnosed with having an impaired ability to localize sound2

due to a hearing disparity between her right and left ears. Based on these test results, plaintiff was determined

to be unqualified to work as a CSO, and her employment with Akal was terminated.

Plaintiff then filed this action against a number of individuals and federal agencies under the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3As discussed in this Court’s prior summary judgment orders, the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) defines “disability” as “(A) a physicalor mentalimpairment thatsubstantially limits one or more ofthe

majorlife activities of[an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such

an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). “The standards used to determine whether an act of discrimination

violated the RehabilitationAct are the same standards applied underthe [ADA].” Coons v. Sec. of U.S. Dept.

of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794.

2

Plaintiff’s RehabilitationAct claims alleged thatshe had been discriminated against because she was disabled,

or, in the alternative, thatshe was not actually disabled and had been discriminated against because defendants

regarded her as disabled.3 Pl. Third Amended Compl. at ¶¶ 54-55.

In early 2005, plaintiff moved forsummary judgment. She did not argue that she was actually disabled;

instead, she maintained that defendants regarded her as disabled. See Order Denying Pl. Mot. for Summary

Judgment, dated January 24, 2005 (“Jan. 24 Order”), at 3-4. After the Court denied plaintiff’s motion,

defendants brought a motion for summary judgment. Once again, in opposing defendants’ motion, plaintiff did

not contend thatshe was actually disabled. Instead, she argued that she was discriminated against because she

was regarded as disabled. See Order Granting Def. Mot. for Summary Judgment, dated September 13, 2005

(“Sept. 13 Order”), at 5-6. The Court held that plaintiff had provided no evidence that defendants regarded

her as disabled, and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court entered judgment in favor

of defendants the same day.

Plaintiff now moves to alter the judgment. She claims that the Court clearly erred by failing to consider

her evidence in resolving defendants’ motion for summary judgment. She also claims that the law controlling

her case has changed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides that motions to alter or amend the judgment may be

brought within ten days of the entry ofjudgment. The rule provides no standard to guide district courts faced

with a motion to alter judgment. Courts, however, have made clear that such motions should be granted only

in exceptional circumstances: “[T]he rule offers an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests

offinality and conservation ofjudicial resources.’” Kona Ent., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890

(9th Cir.2000) (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 59.30[4] (3d ed. 2000)).
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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4Plaintiff also challenges the Court’s conclusion that she did not have a “record of a disability.” See

Sept. 13 Order, at 5. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, however, admits that her opposition on this point

was “very brief.” Pl. Mot. to Alter Judgment, at 14. Indeed, plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment included only the following paragraph on this point:

With regard to the Plaintiff having a record of a disability, Plaintiff’s audiological testing results

establish that record. Plaintiff’s unilateral hearing loss of more than 25db difference between

the hearing in her right and left ears, when considered on its own, constitutes a record of ear

differences that are “. . . likely to severely/significantly restrict an individual’s ability to localize

sound relative to the normal hearer.” (Supp. Simmons Decl., Exh. 1, p. 1,2).

Pl. Opp. to Def. Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Pl. Opp. Br.”), at 15.

Given the brevity ofher opposition on this point, it is apparent thatplaintiffnow seeks nothing more than

to have a second bite at the apple. Accordingly, the Court will not consider her argument. See Carroll v.

Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir.2003).

3

“Under Rule 59(e), a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances,

unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an

intervening change in the controlling law.” 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir.

1999). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff bases her motion forreconsideration on two primary arguments.4 First, plaintiff argues that the

Court committed clear error by failing to consider evidence thatshe presented inhersummaryjudgmentmotion.

Second, plaintiff argues that a Ninth Circuit decision filed three days after judgment in this case has changed

the relevant law.

Plaintiff’s second argument is easily disposed of. The case plaintiff cites, EEOC v. United Parcel

Service, 424 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2005), was a case that involved California’s Fair Employment and Housing

Act (“FEHA”), not federal law. See id. at 1068 (“The principalquestions thatwe will address in this opinion,

all pertaining to FEHA only, are . . . .”). Although the court discussed the ADA, it was only to the extent

necessary to illustrate the difference between federal and California law. Id. at 1072. As the Ninth Circuit’s

discussion of the ADA was nothing more than dicta, plaintiff’s claims that United Parcel Service constituted

an intervening change in controlling law fails.

Plaintiff’s other argumentis premised on the notion that the Court disregarded evidence that defendants

regarded her as disabled. In support ofthis argument, plaintiff pointsto four pieces of evidence thatshe claims
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5Plaintiff also claims that it was clear error for the Court to rely on the declarations of Judge Roth and

Marc Farmer, both of which state that the hearing requirements for the CSO position solely relate to the

essentialfunctions of the position and do not reflect any opinion about an individual’s ability to engage in other

life activities. See Declaration of Judge Jane R. Roth, at 4-7;Declaration of Marc A. Farmer, at 6-18. The

Court continuesto believe that this evidence is relevant to whether or not defendants believed that plaintiff had

a disability. 

4

the Court did not consider. First, plaintiff relies on a stipulation thatstates in relevant part, “[p]laintiff does not

concede that she cannot localize sound, only thatshe has a hearing deficit in one ear.” Stipulation dated April

25, 2005 (Docket No. 186). Second, plaintiff relies on results of her audiological test, which she claims show

that she passed defendants’ “speech recognition” standard in her impaired ear. Benay Decl., Exhs. O, U.

Third, plaintiff relies upon the declaration of her expert, which states in a conclusory fashion that the inability

to localize sound “severely/significantly restricts one’s hearingas compared to how unimpaired people normally

hear in everyday life.” Supp. Decl. of Abraham A. Simmons in Support of Def. Mot. for Summary Judgment,

Exh. 1, at 1-2. Finally, plaintiff relies on a draft report prepared by an audiologist, which states that difficulties

in localizing sound would be “inconvenient.”5 Benay Decl., Exh. Z, at USA 000573.

As an initialmatter, none of the evidence plaintiff presents in support ofher motion forreconsideration

is new. All of the evidence plaintiff cites was in existence at the time of her opposition to defendants’ motion

forsummary judgment. Yet the only evidence that her opposition relied upon was the declaration of her expert,

Dr. Robert Sweetow. See Pl. Opp. Br. at 13-15. Thus, the evidence plaintiff’s current motion relies on is

simply notan appropriate basis for a motion forreconsideration. See Carroll, 342 F.3d at 945 (“A Rule 59(e)

motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably

have been raised earlier in the litigation.”). Nor is the evidence plaintiff highlights particularly probative. Thus,

the Court cannot find that any failure to address the evidence was clear error.

In connection with the evidence that plaintiff claims the Court did not consider, plaintiff also raises

another issue. She claims that it is not clear whether the Court used an “objective” or a “subjective” analysis

to determine whether defendants regarded her as disabled. This argument refers to a discussion in the Court’s

January 24, 2005, order denying plaintiff’s motion forsummary judgment. See Jan. 24 Order at 4-6. In short,

the objective test focuses on the defendant’s understanding of a plaintiff’s impairment, and asks whether that

impairment would objectively constitute a substantial limitation on a major life activity. The subjective test, in
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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6Thus, under the objective test, the perceived impairment must necessarily be a “substantial limitation

on a major life activity” to give rise to liability under the ADA. Under the subjective test, an impairment that

in fact does not amount to a disability may nonetheless give rise to liability if the defendant believes that it

imposes limitations more substantial than it actually does. Compare Thomp-son v. Holy Family Hospital,

121 F.3d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1997) (where employee was fired because employer incorrectly believed she

could not lift 25 pounds, employer did not regard employee as disabled because inability to lift 25 pounds is

not a disability), withEEOC v. United Parcel Service, 306 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) (although inability

to see out of one eye did not constitute a disability, it could nonetheless give rise to liability depending upon the

defendant’s perception of the limitations it causes).

5

contrast, focuses on the defendant’s understanding ofthe limitations an impairment places on the plaintiff. The

differences between the tests are subtle, and courts have not been clear regarding which is appropriate.6

Plaintiff’s motion, however, fails regardless of which test is applied. It is undisputed that plaintiff’s

hearing condition could be corrected with a hearing aid. See, e.g., Pl. Third AmendedCompl. at ¶ 15. Indeed,

plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she “provided defendant USMS with audiological testing results which

identified the kind of hearing aid she was using and demonstrated that with that hearing aid she met and

exceeded the USDHHS medical qualification standards for CSOs.” Id. Thus, it is also undisputed that

defendants knew that plaintiff’s hearing condition was entirely correctable.

The determination whether a physical or mental impairment substantially limits a major life activity,

however, must include an assessment of the impairment in light of the corrective measures used by the

individual. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481-89, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146-49 (1999).

Thus, because defendants knew that plaintiff’s hearing impairment was fully correctable, defendants could not

have regarded plaintiff as “disabled” under either the objective or the subjective test. Under the objective test,

plaintiff’s hearing impairment did notsubstantially limit any majorlife activity, because the impairment could be

corrected with a hearing aid. See id. at 488-89 (individuals who wore glasses to correct poor visionwere not

disabled); Thomspon, 121 F.3d at 541. Similarly, under the subjective test, defendants did notregard plaintiff

as disabled because defendants knew plaintiff’s condition was wholly correctable.

Thus, regardless ofwhether the objective orsubjective testis used, defendants could not have regarded

plaintiff as disabled. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration must therefore be DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s motion to
United States District Court

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alter judgment (Docket No. 221).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge