Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00454/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00454-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PROTECT LAKE PLEASANT, LLC, )

an Arizona limited liability )

company, et al., ) No. CIV 07-454 PHX RCB

)

Plaintiffs, ) O R D E R

)

vs. ) 

) 

ROBERT W. JOHNSON, in his )

official capacity as )

Commissioner, United States )

Bureau of Reclamation, et al.,)

)

Defendants. ) )

In this action for declaratory and injunctive relief,

Plaintiffs allege that the United States Bureau of Reclamation

("BOR"), by authorizing Maricopa County (the "County") to proceed

with the development and construction of the proposed Scorpion Bay

Marina & Yacht Club ("Scorpion Bay Marina") at Lake Pleasant

Regional Park ("LPRP"), violated, inter alia, the National

Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., and

the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. Am. Compl. (doc. # 4)

¶¶ 57-117. On May 18, 2007, the Court issued an order (doc. # 40) 

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denying Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (doc. # 12). 

Plaintiffs have appealed that decision (doc. ## 43, 45, 49), and

have filed a motion (doc. # 47) asking this Court to stay its

previous order denying injunctive relief, or, in the alternative,

to issue an injunction pending appeal. The matter has been fully

briefed. See Resp. (doc. # 56); Reply (doc. # 58). Having

carefully considered the arguments raised, the Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

Lake Pleasant was originally formed in the 1920s when the

Waddell Dam was built by a company that is now the Maricopa

Municipal Water Conservation District ("Water District"). In 1969,

the Water District and the County entered into an operating

agreement requiring the County to manage Lake Pleasant as a

regional park.

Under the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, Congress

authorized BOR to develop and build the Central Arizona Project. 

Pursuant to this authority, BOR proposed the construction of a new

dam in the 1980s. In 1984, BOR prepared a final environmental

impact statement ("EIS") for the CAP storage division which

included the New Waddell Dam. Because water levels were to

increase significantly with the construction of the New Waddell

Dam, submerging the then existing public marina, the 1984 EIS

included a recreational development plan for the enlarged lake

resulting from the new dam.

Construction of the New Waddell Dam was commenced in 1985 and

completed in 1992. In 1990, BOR and Maricopa County entered into a

50-year Recreation Management Agreement ("RMA") under which the

County, through its Parks and Recreation Department, would manage

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recreation in LPRP. Under the RMA, the County is authorized to

enter into third-party concession agreements for recreational

services and facilities subject to BOR approval. The County

subsequently developed a Master Recreational Plan ("MRP") based on

the conceptual plan described in the 1984 EIS. In 1997, BOR

prepared an environmental assessment ("EA") comparing the impacts

of the MRP with the impacts of the recreational plan discussed in

the 1984 EIS. The 1997 EA determined that a Finding of No

Significant Impact ("FONSI") was appropriate for the MRP. However,

the 1997 EA stipulated that any proposed concession and

recreational development at LPRP was required to be consistent with

the overall recreational management plans and goals for Lake

Pleasant identified in Appendix C of the 1984 Final EIS, and would

be subject to BOR review for site-specific NEPA compliance.

In 2005, the County issued a request for proposals ("RFP") for

development of the marina project on Lake Pleasant. The RFP

expressly precluded any party possessing any commercial interest

adjacent to or near the lake from bidding. Intervenor-Defendant

Lake Pleasant Marina Partners, LLC ("Marina Partners") submitted

the only bid for the project, and BOR subsequently approved the

Proposed Use Management Agreement between Marina Partners and the

County. The County then entered into a final Use Management

Agreement with Marina Partners.

On March 1, 2006, BOR issued a notice of public scoping for

the proposed marina, and, on July 28, 2006, issued a draft EA for

public comment. After public comment, a revised draft EA was

released for further comment in October of 2006. Plaintiffs MauleFfinch and Pensus Group, LLC submitted comments on the draft EA.

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On February 27, 2007, BOR issued the final EA and FONSI,

determining that the construction and operation of the proposed

Scorpion Bay Marina would not significantly impact the environment. 

Plaintiffs filed this action and motion for preliminary injunction

shortly thereafter.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory judgment denying

preliminary injunctive relief, a district court may still issue an

injunction pending appeal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62©); Fed. R. App. P.

8(a)(1)©); Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir.

2001). In deciding whether to grant an injunction pending appeal,

courts apply the standard employed when considering a motion for a

preliminary injunction, Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 859 F.2d

662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988), and may issue such an injunction if the

moving party demonstrates (1) a probability of success on the

merits and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) that the

lawsuit raises serious questions and the balance of hardship tips

sharply in the movant's favor. Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers,

408 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). "These two formulations

represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required

degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success

decreases. They are not separate tests but outer reaches of a

single continuum." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs have asked the Court to stay its prior order (doc.

# 40) denying their motion for preliminary injunction (doc. # 12),

or, in the alternative, to issue an injunction pending their appeal

of that order. Mot. (doc. # 47). As an initial matter, the Court

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confesses that it is unclear what Plaintiffs would hope to achieve

by having the Court stay its prior order denying injunctive relief. 

A stay pending appeal would accord relief if the Court had granted

Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, and had been

asked by Defendants to stay that injunction pending appeal, but

that is not the case here. Because Plaintiffs’ request for a stay

would not provide any relief, the Court will focus instead on

Plaintiffs’ more substantive request for injunctive relief pending

appeal.

A. Success on the Merits/Serious Legal Question

Under NEPA all federal agencies must prepare an EIS for all

“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)©). Procedurally, the

decision as to whether an EIS is required is made by evaluating the

collected data, analysis, and discussion in the agency's EA. See

40 C.F.R. §§ 6.105(d), 1508.9. If the EA establishes that a

proposed action will not have a significant effect on the

environment, the agency may issue a FONSI presenting convincing

reasons “why an action . . . will not have a significant effect on

the human environment and for which an environmental impact

statement therefore will not be prepared.” Native Ecosystems

Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.3); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.

Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

“NEPA ‘does not mandate particular results,’ but ‘simply

provides the necessary process’ to ensure that federal agencies

take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of their

actions.” Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1050

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1

 The regulations set forth a number of additional factors

relevant to determining the intensity or severity of impact

contemplated by a proposed action:

(1) Impacts that may be both beneficial and

adverse. A significant effect may exist even if

the Federal agency believes that on balance the

effect will be beneficial.

(2) The degree to which the proposed action

affects public health or safety.

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(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens

Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)). The “hard look” requires an

agency to “undertake a thorough environmental analysis before

concluding that no significant environmental impact exists.” 

Native Ecosystems Council, 428 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation

omitted). In determining whether an agency undertook the requisite

“hard look,” courts apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of

review. Id. In making this factual inquiry, the court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Navajo Nation, 479

F.3d at 1050. Rather, the purpose of the court's narrow review is

to consider whether the agency's decision was based on a

consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a

clear error of judgment. Id.; see also Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau

of Land Mgmt., 914 F.2d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 1990).

With respect to the threshold decision of whether a proposed

federal action will so significantly affect the quality of the

human environment as to require an EIS, the implementing

regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality

identify two broad factors that the agency must consider: “context

and intensity.”1 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.

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(3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area

such as proximity to historic or cultural

resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands,

wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically critical

areas.

(4) The degree to which the effects on the

quality of the human environment are likely to be

highly controversial.

(5) The degree to which the possible effects on

the human environment are highly uncertain or

involve unique or unknown risks.

. . .

(7) Whether the action is related to other

actions with individually insignificant but

cumulatively significant impacts. Significance

exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a

cumulatively significant impact on the

environment. Significance cannot be avoided by

terming an action temporary or by breaking it

down into small component parts.

. . .

. . .

(10) Whether the action threatens a violation of

Federal, State, or local law or requirements

imposed for the protection of the environment.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b).

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Plaintiffs previously took the position that “BOR ha[d] failed

to satisfy its NEPA obligations in several ways,” but, for purposes

of their original motion for preliminary injunctive relief, opted

to focus only on the “most glaring failures.” Mot. (doc. # 12) at

7, n.4. Plaintiffs thus argued that BOR violated NEPA by (1)

failing to conduct a study of Lake Pleasant's carrying capacity,

id. at 8-14, (2) overestimating the lake’s usable surface area and

underestimating daily watercraft counts, id. at 14-17, and (3) not

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adequately considering alternatives to the Marina. Id. at 17-19. 

The Court denied that motion, explaining that Plaintiffs had not

raised any serious legal question or demonstrated any reasonable

probability of success on the merits of those claims. Order (doc.

# 40) at 10-28.

Plaintiffs now seek an interim injunction pending their appeal

of that decision. Mot. (doc. # 7). Although they have since had

ample opportunity to scour the record produced by BOR following

their first motion for preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs have not

based their present motion on any of the “several” other NEPA

violations alluded to in their original motion. Instead,

Plaintiffs rely principally on the same arguments that have already

been rejected, apparently to substantiate their apparent perception

that “the efficacy of arguing the probability of success on the

merits [of these claims] to this Court may be dubious.” Mot. (doc.

# 47) at 7. Plaintiffs maintain that they have raised serious

legal questions, and believe that the Court has “substantially

deviate[d] from established NEPA law.” Id. For the same reasons

set forth in its previous order, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’

claims fail to raise any serious legal questions or demonstrate any

reasonable probability of success with regard to BOR’s alleged NEPA

violations. See Order (doc. # 40) at 10-28. Nevertheless,

Plaintiffs raise a few new arguments and differences with the

Court, which deserve special attention.

Plaintiffs’ position essentially remains that BOR cannot

possibly satisfy its NEPA obligation to take a “hard look” at the

environmental consequences of the proposed Scorpion Bay Marina

without conducting a new study of the lake’s carrying capacity

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prior to issuing its FONSI. It is not enough in Plaintiffs’ view

that the EA discusses numerous factors including the number of

public boat ramps, park visitors, and daily watercraft counts, as

well as an estimated increase in daily watercraft counts that would

be attributable to the proposed marina. It seems to be plaintiffs’

position that if they operated the agency, they would have

conducted a carrying capacity study in place of, or in addition to,

the information reviewed in the EA. Of course, this fact alone

does not establish arbitrary or capricious conduct on the part of

BOR. As the Court has previously explained, NEPA does not require

an agency to carry out every conceivable study before an action may

be taken. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275,

1280 (9th Cir. 1973). Indeed, the District of Columbia Circuit, in

a recent decision by then Judge Roberts, rejected a nearly

identical claim regarding the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission’s (“FERC”) failure to conduct a carrying capacity study

prior to approving the expansion of an existing marina, explaining

that “the concept of ‘carrying capacity’ does not present the sort

of bright-line limit that would mandate a particular finding.” 

Brady v. FERC, 416 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Similarly, in this case, the concept of carrying capacity has

never been, and still does not, reflect the sort of bright-line

rule that Plaintiffs seem to perceive. Appendix C to the 1984 EIS

clearly explained that the carrying capacity figure of 546 boats,

on which Plaintiffs hang much of their case, “is an average,” and

that “it should be remembered that the lake can safely accommodate

more boats early in the recreation season and fewer boats as autumn

approaches and the combined CAP-MCMWCD drawdown becomes greater.” 

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Admin. R., Vol. 8 ("Appendix C") at 80 (emphasis added).

In spite of the flexible nature of the 1984 carrying capacity

figure, Plaintiffs previously argued that the Lake’s carrying

capacity has already been exceeded. See Mot. (doc. # 12) at 15

(arguing that “[t]he current usage of the Lake substantially

exceeds the carrying capacity of 546 [boats] from the 1984 EIS. 

That fact alone raise [sic] substantial questions as to whether the

[proposed marina] may significantly impact the environment.”). 

Based on their idiosyncratic extrapolations from usage data for the

July 4th weekend, and assumptions of daily boating turnover rates

from the 1984 study, Plaintiffs derived a figure of 830 boats that

may possibly have been present on the lake at any one time during

that weekend. Id. Plaintiffs press the same argument in the

present motion. See Mot. (doc. # 47) at 8 n.3. By transmuting the

1984 carrying capacity figure of 546 boats from a flexible figure,

as it was intended to be, into an absolute cap, they surmise that

the lake’s capacity has already been exceeded even before the

addition of the proposed marina. Id. Plainly, where a federal

agency has taken a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of

a proposed action, as BOR has in this case, it cannot be found to

have acted arbitrarily or capriciously simply by virtue of the

gloss a litigant would place on the same information through selfserving assumptions and manipulations of the data.

Perhaps aware that this argument is questionable, Plaintiffs

now maintain that the key inquiry under NEPA is not whether the

1984 capacity is currently being exceeded-- even though they have

argued this point thoroughly and repeatedly in this and their

previous motion-- but whether BOR properly evaluated the lake’s

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carrying capacity prior to issuing the FONSI. Plaintiffs’ central

claim that “BOR failed to provide any assessment of the Lake’s

carrying capacity,” see Mot. (doc. # 47) at 7, is not accurate. 

Although BOR did not conduct a carrying capacity study prior to the

issuance of its FONSI, it has provided ample information from which

an intelligent reader can discern the nature of the recreational

experiences and corresponding carrying capacity that the lake’s

visitors can anticipate upon completion of the new marina. See

Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at 33-34. While the County has

been obliged to conduct a Water Recreation Opportunity Spectrum

(“WROS”) study “within one year of commencement of the marina's

operation" to “establish a numeric range for the purpose of

identifying trigger points for actions and resources,” see id. at

38, H-105, the EA has already indicated that “boater[s] would have

a urban or suburban experience on a Saturday or Sunday during the

peak season.” Id. at 34. Applying the “range of boating

coefficients” for the “urban” and “suburban” WROS classes to the

lake’s surface area, it is readily apparent that BOR has assessed

that the lake’s carrying capacity can accommodate boating densities

higher than those currently experienced on peak weekends, and has

considered the impact on the human environment in light of such

densities. Yet Plaintiffs have not objected to these findings, or

suggested that, in consideration of the proposed mitigation

measures, they would pose a significant impact on the human

environment, nor can they. Given these assessments, and the other

factors considered in the EA, it is evident that BOR has (1) taken

the requisite “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the

proposed marina and (2) reasonably developed mitigation measures to

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be implemented by the County to support its decision to issue the

FONSI. The fact that Plaintiffs would have done differently is not

sufficient to render BOR’s analysis arbitrary or capricious.

Plaintiffs also complain that “[t]he Court has missed the

point [that] . . . BOR failed to undertake any analysis or study of

the amount of boats on the Lake during peak weekends (such as July

4th).” See Mot. (doc. # 47) at 8 n.3 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs

may have overlooked the fact that the EA does discuss the daily

average watercraft counts for those peak weekends in a manner that

is not arbitrary or capricious. See Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final

EA") at 32. This was also mentioned in the Court’s prior order.

Finally, Plaintiffs rely on LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389

(9th Cir. 1988) (hereafter, “FERC I”), for the proposition that the

County’s obligation to conduct a future WROS study is insufficient

to satisfy BOR’s NEPA obligations. As explained below, FERC I is

readily distinguishable from the present case.

In FERC I, it is noteworthy that the primary basis for the

court’s rejection of FERC’s analysis was the fact that FERC had not

even prepared an EA or FONSI as required by 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4. 

See FERC I, 852 F.2d at 399. The court went on to observe that

FERC’s evaluation was also substantively deficient under NEPA for

its failure to reasonably develop the mitigation measures on which

it relied in concluding that the project would not pose any

significant impact on the quality of the human environment. Id. at

400. In addition to criticizing FERC’s reliance on future postlicensing studies, the court noted the fact that no recreational

data had been submitted or evaluated for the specific project site. 

Id. However, in subsequent proceedings, after FERC had prepared an

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EA and FONSI, the Ninth Circuit upheld the agency’s conclusion that

the project would not have any significant impact on the quality of

the human environment, and determined that an EIS was not

necessary. LaFlamme v. FERC, 945 F.2d 1124, 1228-29 (9th Cir.

1991) (hereafter, “FERC II”). More importantly, based on the prelicensing studies underlying the EA and FONSI, the court found no

error in FERC’s reliance on the proposed post-licensing studies and

monitoring. Id. at 1229-30. Finally, the court held that FERC had

properly considered the economic viability of the project,

notwithstanding the plaintiff’s allegations that it had “subrogated

its analysis of the public interest to [the] economic interest” of

its non-federal partner.” Id. at 1130. The present case is more

like FERC II than FERC I. Unlike the agency in FERC I, BOR has

prepared an EA and FONSI discussing studies and recreational data

for the project site, and, as the Court has previously held, has

reasonably developed mitigation measures based on that information

to deal with the effects of boats accessing the lake from the

proposed marina.

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set out in the

Court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary

injunction, see Order (doc. # 40) at 10-28, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated, at this stage, any serious legal

questions or any reasonable probability of success on the merits of

their NEPA claims.

B. Possibility of Irreparable Harm

 “[T]here is no presumption of irreparable harm in procedural

violations of environmental statutes.” See Save Our Sonoran, Inc.,

408 F.3d at 1124-25. Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs maintain that the

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Court “is simply wrong with regard to the showing of irreparable

harm required in this circuit.” Mot. (doc. # 47) at 15. Such

statements will not alter the law. The Court is also not moved by

Plaintiffs’ recharacterizations of its interpretation of the

National Parks case. See Mot. (doc. # 47) at 11-13, 16-17. As the

Court has held before, Plaintiffs have not made a strong showing of

the probability of success on the merits of their NEPA claims, or

the possibility of irreparable harm to the environment that would

result in the absence of an injunction pending appeal. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for stay or injunction

pending appeal (doc. # 47) is DENIED.

DATED this 27th day of July, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

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