Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02119/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02119-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COURTNEY LAMONT COOPER,

CDCR #J-29615,

Civil No. 05-2119 WQH (POR)

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e) 

AND S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1(i)(1)

[Doc. No. 39]

vs.

MARTIN ERICK LEVINE, M.D.,

Defendant.

Hayes, Judge:

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion for Reconsideration” [Doc. No. 39].

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s May 25, 2007 Order granting in part and denying

in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss his Second Amended Complaint and dismissing the

action for failure to state a claim pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 36]. 

The Court has found the matter suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to

S.D. Cal. Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), and for the reasons set forth below, DENIES Plaintiff’s

Motion pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e) and S.D. Cal. Civil Local Rule 7.1(i)(1). 

/ / /

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I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Both Plaintiff’s original civil rights Complaint, filed on November 15, 2005, as well as

his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed on June 22, 2006, alleged Eighth Amendment

violations against Calipatria State Prison Chief Medical Officer (“CMO”) Levine pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on claims he refused to provide Plaintiff with necessary medical

treatment for complications suffered as the result of jaw surgery first performed in March 2001.

On September 8, 2006, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 21]. Specifically, the Court found that while the

allegations Plaintiff set forth in his First Amended Complaint against CMO Levine were not

barred by the statute of limitations, they nonetheless were insufficient to show the deliberate

indifference required to support an Eighth Amendment violation. (See Sept. 8, 2006 Order at 5-

9.) Plaintiff was granted leave to amend, and on November 13, 2006, he filed a Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) [Doc. No. 27]. 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint re-alleged Eighth Amendment inadequate medical

care claims against CMO Levine pre-dating those alleged in his First Amended Complaint. It

also named two additional defendants: Richard Torchia, the doctor employed by Alvarado

Hospital who originally performed Plaintiff’s jaw surgery in 2001 and who treated him

afterward, and Dr. Perry T. Mansfield, another Alvarado doctor who provided Plaintiff postoperative care. (See SAC ¶¶ 7, 8.) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint asserted four

separate causes of action: (1) “malpractice and negligence” on the part of Dr. Torchia, (id. ¶¶ 74-

80); (2) “misrepresentation and fraud” committed by Dr. Mansfield, (id. ¶¶ 81-82); (3)

“deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment by Dr. Torchia and CMO Levine, (id.

¶¶ 83-90); and (4) “retaliation” by Dr. Torchia. (Id. ¶ 91.)

On May 25, 2007, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Drs. Torchia and

Mansfield for failure to serve pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m) and as frivolous pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(i) and 1915A(b), granted CMO Levine’s Motion to Dismiss to the

extent Plaintiff sought damages against him for acts taken in his official capacity pursuant to

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FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6), and denied Levine’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as barred by

the statute of limitations pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). 

Nevertheless, the Court found Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint failed to state an

Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against CMO Levine, granted his Motion to

Dismiss on that basis pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6), and denied Plaintiff leave to amend as

futile. (See May 25, 2007 Order [Doc. No. 36] at 23.) 

II.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

Plaintiff now asks this Court to “accept additional testimony” in the form of several

exhibits which he claims provide supplemental support for his allegations of deliberate

indifference against CMO Levine and then “reconsider the grounds on which the Order

dismissing [his] Complaint were based.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 1.) Defendants have filed an Opposition

[Doc. No. 41], to which Plaintiff has submitted a Reply [Doc. No. 43]. 

A. Standard of Review

Motions for reconsideration filed pursuant to a Court’s Local Rules may be construed as

motions to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Osterneck v.

Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169 (1989). In Osterneck, the Supreme Court stated that “a

postjudgment motion will be considered a Rule 59(e) motion where it involves ‘reconsideration

of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.’” 489 U.S. at 174 (quoting White

v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Employ’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982)). 

Because Plaintiff’s current Motion seeks reconsideration of the Court’s May 25, 2007

Order, and was signed on June 6, 2007, it is subject to the “mailbox rule” which provides that

a prisoner’s documents are considered “filed” at the time they are deposited into the prison’s

institutional mail delivery system. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-72 (1988) (holding

that a notice of appeal filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed to be “filed” when it is delivered to

prison authorities for forwarding to the district court). Therefore, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e) applies. See FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e) (“Any motion to alter or amend a judgment

shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 6(a) (“When the

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period of time prescribed or allowed [by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] is less than 11

days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the

computation.”); American Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. North Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892,

898-99 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Simmons v. Ghent, 970 F.2d 392, 393 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding

that the Houston’s ‘mailbox rule’ applies equally to other inmate filings, including Rule 59(e)

motions). 

“A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) should not be granted, absent highly

unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence,

committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” McQuillion

v. Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and emphasis omitted). This

type of motion seeks “a substantive change of mind by the court.” Tripati v. Henman, 845 F.2d

205, 206 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 526

(9th Cir. 1983)). 

However, “motions to reconsider are not vehicles permitting the unsuccessful party to

‘rehash’ arguments previously presented.” United States v. Navarro, 972 F. Supp. 1296, 1299

(E.D. Cal. 1997) (rejecting “after thoughts” and “shifting of ground” as appropriate grounds for

reconsideration under FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e)). Similarly, the district court has discretion to decline

to consider an issue raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. Rosenfeld v. U.S.

Dept. of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, the Ninth Circuit has specifically

cautioned that a motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59(e) “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could

reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Bishop, 229 F.3d

877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Beyah v. Murphy, 825 F. Supp. 213, 214 (E.D. Wis. 1993)

(Rule 59(e) “‘cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before

judgment issued.’”) (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986)).

B. Application to Plaintiff’s Case

Plaintiff attaches several new exhibits to his Motion for Reconsideration: 1) a letter from

Dr. Torchia to CMO Levine, dated May 15, 2001; (Pl.’s Ex. 1); 2) two “Inmate Request for

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Interview” Forms, dated January 5, 2002, and February 11, 2003, addressed to Levine, (Pl.’s Ex.

2); and 3) an operative report by Dr. Barsan, dated March 2, 2004 (Pl.’s Ex. 3).

These exhibits provide no “newly discovered evidence” which would undermine or in any

way call into question the reliability or legal validity of the Court’s May 25, 2007 judgment; nor

do they show that the Court committed any “clear error” in dismissing Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment inadequate medical treatment claims against Dr. Levine. McQuillion, 342 F.3d at

1014. Instead, the Court finds Plaintiff’s additional exhibits either “rehash arguments previously

presented,” Navarro, 972 F. Supp. at 1299, or “could reasonably have been raised earlier in the

litigation.” Kona Enterprises, 229 F.3d at 890.

First, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2, two “Inmate Requests for Interview” forms, merely show that

CMO Levine was on notice of Plaintiff’s persistent complaints of swelling. This allegation is

not new–Plaintiff alleged the same in his Second Amended Complaint and the Court found those

allegations sufficient to show that CMO Levine “was aware of Plaintiff’s need for surgery and

post-operative care.” (See May 25, 2007 Order at 21, citing Pl.’s SAC ¶¶ 30-32, 34, 36, 42-43,

47-48.) They do not, however, establish that CMO Levine was deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in light of the fact that Levine arranged for Plaintiff’s transport

to an off-site medical facility on seven separate occasions, (id. at 21, citing Pl.’s SAC ¶¶ 15-16,

25-26, 28, 30-32, 33-34, 37-38, 46, 52), and both Drs. Torchia and Mansfield found Plaintiff’s

swelling was “normal,” “would go away in time,” and that he was “healing fine.” (Id. at 22,

citing Pl.’s SAC ¶¶ 39-41, 47-48.) 

Second, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, an operative report filed by Dr. Barsan in March 2004

detailing the extraction of two of Plaintiff’s teeth and treatment of the “partially infected fixation

plate” in Plaintiff’s right mandible, provides further evidentiary support for claims previously

alleged in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. However, these allegations were thoroughly

considered by the Court when ruling on CMO Levine’s Motion to Dismiss, see SAC ¶¶ 54-64;

May 25, 2007 Order at 5-6; thus, this exhibit likewise does not constitute “new evidence” or

support Plaintiff’s claim of “clear error.” McQuillion, 342 F.3d at 1014.

/ / /

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Third, Dr. Torchia’s May 15, 2001 letter to CMO Levine also offers no new allegations

or information regarding Plaintiff’s post-operative treatment not previously alleged by Plaintiff

or considered by the Court. (Compare Pl.’s Ex. A with Pl.’s Second Amended Complaint

(“SAC”) ¶¶ 30-41.) In fact, Defendants are correct to note that Dr. Torchia’s letter actually

undermines Plaintiff’s original allegations. (Def’s Opp’n at 4-5.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint alleges Dr. Torchia informed Plaintiff on May 15, 2001 that “he

had no explanation for [Plaintiff’s] swelling,” and that he “wrote CMO Levine a note indicating

that “if [Plaintiff’s] swelling did not subside within (30) days, that a[] Magnetic Resonance

Imaging (“MRI”) would be necessary to determine [its] cause.” (FAC ¶¶ 30-31.) Plaintiff’s

Exhibit 1 now appears to be a photocopy of the “note” Plaintiff referred to in his Second

Amended Complaint; however, while it does corroborate Plaintiff’s claim that Dr. Torchia “d[id]

not have a[n] explanation for [Plaintiff’s] persistent swelling to the right mandible,” it further

opines that 

surgical edema is the most likely reason, and it should resolve with

time. It is not uncommon for edema of this nature to take 6 months

to resolve especially if the lymphatic system was disturbed from the

trauma and the repair. If swelling persists for 6 months an MRI

would be in order to rule out underlying pathology.

(See Pl.’s Ex. 1 (italics added).) Thus, while Plaintiff claimed that Dr. Torchia notified CMO

Levine that an MRI was necessary if swelling did not subside in 30 days, Torchia’s report says

no such thing. Moreover, rather than showing any “clear error,” Plaintiff’s newly provided

exhibit provides additional support for this Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference claims against CMO Levine. See McQuillion, 342 F.3d at 1014. 

Finally, Plaintiff points to no “intervening change in controlling law” since the Court

issued its May 25, 2007 Order, and this Court has independently confirmed there is none. Id.

 At the end of the day, the allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint regarding CMO

Levine’s purported failure to authorize an MRI Plaintiff believed was necessary amount to no

more than a difference of opinion between a prisoner and his physician over a preferred course

of medical treatment. (See May 25, 2007 Order at 19-22.) The Court has found that these

allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, and nothing in Plaintiff’s

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Motion for Reconsideration alters that conclusion. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058

(9th Cir. 2004) (to prevail on a claim involving choices between alternative courses of treatment,

a prisoner must show that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the

circumstances,” and was chosen “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s]

health.”) (citation omitted). 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) does not permit reconsideration merely because

Plaintiff is unhappy with the judgment, frustrated by the Court’s application of the facts to

binding precedent or because he disagrees with the ultimate decision. See 11 Charles Alan

Wright & Arthur R. Miller Federal Practice & Procedure 2d § 2858 (Supp. 2007) (citing

Edwards v. Velvac, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 504, 507 (D. Wis. 1956)). Without more, Plaintiff has failed

to show the clear error Rule 59 requires and has failed to identify intervening changes in

controlling law which would justify a “substantive change of mind.” McQuillion, 342 F.3d at

1014; Tripati, 845 F.2d at 206, n.1. Therefore, his Motion for Reconsideration must be denied.

See FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e).

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s May

25, 2007 Order Granting in part and Denying in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 39] is hereby

DENIED pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1(i)(1).

The docket in this matter shall remain closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 16, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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