Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05170/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05170-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 7, 2002 Decided March 22, 2002

No. 01-5170

Association of Civilian Technicians, Inc.,

Appellant

v.

Federal Labor Relations Authority,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv02562)

Daniel M. Schember argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

William E. Persina, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations

Authority, argued the cause for the appellee. With him on

the brief were David M. Smith, Solicitor, and William R.

Tobey, Deputy Solicitor.

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Before: Tatel and Garland, Circuit Judges, and Williams,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: This case presents a straightforward

question of statutory interpretation: Does the statute that

gives federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to review decisions

of the Federal Labor Relations Authority "other than ...

order[s] ... involving an appropriate unit determination,"

leave district courts free to review such determinations pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act? Answering no, we

affirm the district court's dismissal of this challenge to an

appropriate unit determination.

I.

National Guard "dual status technicians" (mechanics, machinists, and supply technicians) are federal employees who,

pursuant to the National Guard Technicians Act (NGTA), 32

U.S.C. s 709, are separately employed and supervised by the

Adjutant General of their respective State Guards. As a

condition of employment, they must maintain membership in

the state unit of the National Guard for which they work. Id.

s 709(b). For collective bargaining purposes, dual status

technicians are represented by appellant, the Association of

Civilian Technicians. Though a national union, the Association bargains separately on behalf of each state-based unit.

This case began when the Association filed a petition with

the Federal Labor Relations Authority seeking to have dual

status technician bargaining units consolidated into a single,

national unit. The Federal Labor Relations Act (FLRA)

directs the Authority to determine whether unit determination petitions are "appropriate," based on such factors as

whether the determination "will ensure a clear and identifiable community of interest among the employees in the unit

and will promote effective dealings with, and efficiency of the

operations of the agency involved." 5 U.S.C. s 7112(a). Applying these standards, the Authority's Regional Director

denied the petition. On review, the Authority acknowledged

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cians among State Guards--supported the appropriateness of

the proposed national unit. The Authority, however, affirmed

the Regional Director's conclusion that more evidence justified maintaining state-based units: Each National Guard

state unit has "an individual mission unique to its state or

territory"; the NGTA invests Adjutants General with "overall

authority over all personnel and labor relations matters in

their respective State Activities"; and national collective bargaining would be ineffective because "authority over the dayto-day employment of the technicians ... is designated by

statute to the states." The Association urged the Authority

to consider the increased bargaining rights that consolidation

would purportedly bring to union members, but the agency

declined to do so, agreeing with the Regional Director that

the statutory obligation to "ensure employees the fullest

freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed under this chapter," id., applies only to units already determined to be

appropriate. On the basis of this analysis, the Authority

denied the petition for review.

Invoking section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act--

"[a] person ... aggrieved by agency action ... is entitled to

judicial review thereof," id. s 702--the Association sued the

Authority in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, arguing that the unit determination was "arbitrary [and] capricious," id. s 706(a)(2)(A). The district court

dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, relying on FLRA

section 7123: "Any person aggrieved by any final order of the

[Federal Labor Relations] Authority other than an order

under ... section 7112 of this title (involving an appropriate

unit determination), may ... institute an action for judicial

review of the Authority's order in the [appropriate] United

States court of appeals." Id. s 7123(a) (emphasis added).

The district court concluded that this exception deprives not

just courts of appeals, but all federal courts, of jurisdiction to

review appropriate unit determinations.

The Association appeals. Our review is de novo. Nat'l

Taxpayers Union v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1432 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) ("In a case ... involving a District Court's dismissUSCA Case #01-5170 Document #666647 Filed: 03/22/2002 Page 3 of 9
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al of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, our

standard of review is de novo.").

II.

Notwithstanding eighty-two pages of briefing, this case is

not difficult. FLRA section 7123 gives courts of appeals

jurisdiction to review Authority decisions "other than ...

order[s] under ... section 7112 of this title (involving an

appropriate unit determination)." 5 U.S.C. s 7123(a). The

APA expressly provides that its general review provisions,

pursuant to which the Association filed this suit, do not apply

where "statutes preclude judicial review." Id. s 701(a)(1); cf.

id. s 702 ("Nothing herein ... confers authority to grant

relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief ... sought."). Because

FLRA section 7123 "precludes judicial review" of appropriate

unit determinations, the district court properly held that it

lacked jurisdiction to hear this case.

Pointing out that FLRA section 7123 mentions only "courts

of appeals," the Association insists that the provision does not

bar district courts from reviewing appropriate unit determinations. Like the district court, we disagree. We cannot

imagine that Congress, having vested in courts of appeals

exclusive jurisdiction to review all Authority decisions except

those relating to appropriate unit determinations, would have

intended that such determinations could nevertheless be reviewed by district courts. See Columbia Power Trades

Council v. United States Dep't of Energy, 671 F.2d 325, 327

(9th Cir. 1982) ("At no point does the Act entitle a party to

petition a district court for relief. Given the broad purpose of

the Act[,] ... and the limited role of the judiciary in this

statutory scheme, it is manifestly the expressed desire of

Congress to create an exclusive statutory scheme.") (footnote

omitted).

Although FLRA section 7123's clarity makes resort to

legislative history unnecessary, we think it worth noting that

the Joint Committee Report on the bill that became the

FLRA declared: "As in the private sector, there will be no

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judicial review of the Authority's determination of the appropriateness of bargaining units." H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717, at

153 (1978). The Report does not say that there will be "no

circuit court review"; it says there will be "no judicial review." Moreover, the Joint Committee's comparison to the

"private sector" demonstrates that Congress had in mind a

review scheme identical to the NLRB's, and the Supreme

Court has determined that the National Labor Relations Act's

preclusion of direct court of appeals review of certain matters

also bars district court APA review. See NLRB v. United

Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112,

133 (1987). "It would be absurd," the Supreme Court declared, to allow district court review of settlement determinations when the NLRA expressly precludes direct review of

such determinations in courts of appeals. Id.

In holding that FLRA section 7123 precludes direct review

of Authority appropriate unit determinations, we emphasize

that the Association remains free to obtain indirect judicial

review by refusing to bargain, drawing an unfair labor practice charge, and appealing that charge to the Authority and

then to a court of appeals. See, e.g., Dep't of Energy v.

FLRA, 880 F.2d 1163, 1163-65, 1164 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989)

(reviewing the Authority's unit determination in the context

of an unfair labor practice proceeding). It is in this way, as

the Joint Committee indicated, see supra at 4-5, that the

FLRA parallels the NLRA. The Association claims that the

existence of this indirect method of review implies that direct

review should be available as well, but we rejected a virtually

identical argument in Physicians National House Staff Ass'n

v. Fanning, where a union sought APA review of an NLRB

denial of a certification petition. 642 F.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir.

1980). Pointing out that the denial occurred in the course of

an unreviewable representation proceeding, we rejected the

union's argument that the district court nevertheless had

jurisdiction because the union's only other means of review

was through an onerous unfair labor practice proceeding.

Our analysis in Fanning applies here as well:

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[I]t may be unlikely that the correctness of these decisions may be tested in an unfair labor practice proceeding reviewable in a court of appeals, but we think this is

not a reason to permit District Court review. Congress

has considered the likelihood that some Board decisions

in representation proceedings may evade all judicial review. Nevertheless, it has rejected attempts to provide

review in such cases.

Id. at 499.

Undeterred by all this "clear and convincing evidence" of

Congressional intent to preclude judicial review, Abbott Labs.

v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted), the Association offers four unpersuasive arguments in support of its belief that the district

court nevertheless had jurisdiction to entertain its challenge

to the appropriate-unit determination in this case. Citing a

Supreme Court case, McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center,

Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991), and a decision of this circuit,

Crowley Caribbean Transportation, Inc. v. PeNa, 37 F.3d 671

(D.C. Cir. 1994), the Association first argues that two aspects

of the Authority's decision amount to "broad legal interpretation[s]" that the district court had jurisdiction to review even

though they were embedded in an otherwise unreviewable

decision. Appellant's Opening Br. at 24. The "broad legal

determinations" the Association has in mind are the Authority's holding that the NGTA invests Adjutants General with

responsibility for personnel and labor relations matters in

their respective state activities, and the agency's finding that

an increase in employee rights resulting from consolidation is

not a relevant factor in appropriate unit determinations. The

Supreme Court, however, has generally rejected "the principle that if the agency gives a reviewable reason for otherwise

unreviewable action, the action becomes reviewable." Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482

U.S. 270, 283 (1987) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Although the cases the Association cites reveal

limited exceptions to this principle, those exceptions are

inapplicable here. In McNary, the Supreme Court held that

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a district court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction over

a general due process challenge to the Immigration and

Naturalization Service's administration of "Special Agricultural Worker" status, even though the controlling statute made

individual status determinations unreviewable. 498 U.S. at

494. Just because district courts may in some cases review

generic, constitutional challenges to otherwise unreviewable

agency actions hardly means that the district court in this

case had jurisdiction over the Association's non-constitutional,

individualized claim. Nor does our assumption in Crowley

that a district court might have jurisdiction over an agency's

articulation of its general enforcement policy, 37 F.3d at 677,

support the Association's argument that district courts may

review any agency legal interpretation made in the context of

otherwise unreviewable individual adjudications. On the contrary, Crowley echoes the Supreme Court's "square[ ] reject[ion of] the notion of carving reviewable legal rulings out

from the middle of non-reviewable actions." Id. at 676 (citing

Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 283).

The Association next argues that the Authority's findings

regarding the scope of Adjutant General responsibility and

the relevance of increased employee rights are reviewable

pursuant to the "rule" giving federal courts authority to

review agency decisions that "erroneously disclaim jurisdiction to enforce the law[.]" Appellant's Opening Br. at 33. In

support of this proposition, the Association cites a Ninth

Circuit decision, Montana Air Chapter No. 29 v. FLRA, 898

F.2d 753 (1990). That case, however, as well as a similar

decision of this circuit, International Longshoremen's Ass'n

v. National Mediation Board, 785 F.2d 1098, 1100 (D.C. Cir.

1986), held that agency nonenforcement decisions, normally

unreviewable, see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985),

may be reviewed if they rest on the agency's erroneous belief

that it lacks jurisdiction. That rule does not apply here, for

the Authority neither disclaimed jurisdiction nor declined to

enforce the FLRA. On the contrary, the agency affirmatively exercised its statutory jurisdiction, evaluated the merits of

the consolidation petition, and concluded that the proposed

unit was not appropriate.

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Third, the Association attempts to bring this case within

the ambit of Adams v. Richardson, which held that district

courts may exercise jurisdiction over agency action that

amounts to "an abdication of ... Congress' clear statement of

an affirmative enforcement duty." 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C.

Cir. 1973). Citing the agency's same two rulings about

Adjutant General responsibility and the relevance of increased bargaining rights, the Association argues that the

Authority abdicated its responsibility "to determine appropriate bargaining units" and "to enforce [the] mandate of [section 7112 of the Act]." Appellant's Opening Br. at 34-35. In

our view, these two rulings do not come close to the "abdication" that justified district court jurisdiction in Adams. In

that case, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

declined to enforce an entire statutory scheme, Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964. Adams, 480 F.2d at 1161. The

evidence showed that the Secretary, in violation of an unambiguous statutory directive that HEW "effectuate the provisions of ... this title," 42 U.S.C. s 2000d-1, failed to take

appropriate action to terminate federal funding to segregated

school systems, a failure we called "a dereliction of duty,"

Adams, 480 F.2d at 1163. The record in this case reflects no

such dereliction. As we indicated above, the Authority exercised jurisdiction over the consolidation petition and ruled

against the Association. The Association's claim that the

agency abdicated its enforcement responsibility represents

nothing more than substantive disagreement with the agency's legal rulings.

Finally, the Association argues that the Authority's ruling

amounts to the kind of "open violation of statutory authority"

that the Supreme Court found reviewable in Leedom v. Kyne,

358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958). "The invocation of Leedom jurisdiction," we have emphasized, "is extraordinary; to justify such

jurisdiction, there must be a specific provision of the Act

which, although it is clear and mandatory, was nevertheless

violated by the [agency]." Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d 1497, 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). In this case, the Association

points to no clear violation of an unambiguous statutory

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provision. Instead, its arguments--that the Authority openly

violated the clear mandate of the Act by determining that the

NGTA prohibits nationwide consolidation of bargaining units

and (again) by failing to include increased bargaining rights

as a factor in its decision--merely repeat its disagreement

with the agency's ruling. This falls well short of the requirements for Leedom jurisdiction. "That the [agency] may have

made an error of fact or law is insufficient; the [agency] must

have acted without statutory authority." Fanning, 642 F.2d

at 496.

The dismissal of this case for want of jurisdiction is affirmed.

So ordered.

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