Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00682/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00682-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRENCE BROWNLEE,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

STANLEY A. BOONE, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:16-cv-682-LJO-EPG

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION (Doc. 9)

On June 21, 2016, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and 

dismissed his first amended complaint (“FAC”) without prejudice because he is subject to the “three 

strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Doc. 7. Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of that order. 

Doc. 9.1The Court construes the motion to have been brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“Rule 

59(e)”).

A motion to alter or amend a judgment may be made pursuant to Rule 59(e). A district court 

should not grant a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) “absent highly unusual circumstances.”

McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

A Rule 59(e) motion is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and 

conservation of judicial resources.” Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kona 

 

1 Because in the FAC and his motion for reconsideration Plaintiff names Senior United States District 

Judge Ishii, United States District Judge Drozd, and the undersigned—all of the district judges of this 

Court’s Fresno division—the undersigned need not recuse himself. See Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 

509 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Case 1:16-cv-00682-LJO-EPG Document 12 Filed 08/03/16 Page 1 of 2
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Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). “There are four grounds upon 

which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law 

or fact upon which the judgment is based; 2) the moving party presents newly discovered or previously 

unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or 4) there is an 

intervening change in controlling law.” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 

(9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

None of these circumstances exists here. As explained in the Court’s order dismissing the FAC, 

Plaintiff is not permitted to proceed IFP (and therefore he may not pursue this action until he pays the 

filing fee) unless he demonstrates that, at the time the complaint was filed, he was under the threat of 

imminent danger. Doc. 7 at 2; Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff

failed to allege facts showing that he was (or is) under the threat of imminent danger. Plaintiff’s motion 

for reconsideration, which again asserts in an entirely conclusory fashion that he is under the threat of 

imminent danger, likewise fails to allege that any imminent threat exists. In sum, Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that the Court committed “clear error” in its prior order or that “the initial decision was 

manifestly unjust.” Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sch. Dist. 

No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). Accordingly, the 

Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 9).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 2, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00682-LJO-EPG Document 12 Filed 08/03/16 Page 2 of 2