Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00560/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00560-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Derrick Samuel Champa,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-15-0560-PHX-ROS (JFM)

Report & Recommendation

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Yuma,

Arizona, filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on May 13, 2015 (Doc. 5). On September 18, 2015 Respondents filed their 

Limited Answer (Doc. 12). Petitioner filed a Reply on October 22, 2015 (Doc. 14).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Presentence Investigation report provided the following factual summary of 

police reports:

On January 29, 2004, officers received information that the 

defendant was interested in hiring somebody to carry out a murder. 

A meeting location was established and undercover officers 

contacted the defendant on January 30, 2004. The defendant stated 

he wanted [RD], [BD] and [JD] murdered because they were former 

business partners and they had "screwed" him over by taking a large 

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portion of his business away from him. The defendant wanted [RD]

killed first and then [BD] and [JD] killed approximately eight to ten 

months later. The defendant was willing to pay $10,000.00 to have 

[RD] murdered and he wanted it to appear as though [RD] had 

overdosed on drugs. The defendant agreed to make a $2,000.00 cash 

down payment on February 2, 2004.

Undercover officers met with the defendant on February 2, 

2004, and the defendant expressed a desire to change the order of 

the killings. The defendant was willing to pay $5,000.00 to have 

[BD] killed first and then he wanted [RD] killed for the sum of

$10,000.00. The defendant was hopeful [JD] would die of natural 

causes after his two sons were murdered because he was in poor 

health. The defendant provided the undercover officer with 

$2,000.00 in cash and handwritten notes containing personal 

information on [RD] and [BD].

(Exhibit F, Present. Invest. at 1.)1 (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 12, are referenced 

herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On February 11, 2004, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior 

Court on charges of conspiracy to commit murder and attempted first degree murder. 

(Exhibit A, Indictment.) On March 25, 2004, an Amended Indictment (Exhibit B) was 

filed, adding separate attempted first degree murder charges, one for each of the 

purportedly intended victims.

Petitioner eventually entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit D) wherein 

he agreed to plead guilty to the three counts of attempted first degree murder, with an 

agreement to consecutive terms of 8, 7 and 7 years, for an effective term of 22 years in 

prison, and dismissal of the conspiracy charge. Petitioner entered a plea pursuant to the 

agreement, which was accepted. (Exhibit E, M.E. 12/3/4; Exhibit KK R.T. 12/3/4.) 

A Presentence Investigation report (Exhibit F) was prepared, recommending 

presumptive, consecutive sentences. On January 7, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced to the 

agreed upon prison terms.

 

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The defense’s Settlement Conference Memo related the planned murders to a dispute 

over the sale of land grading business, and asserted that the agreement was limited to two 

victims (RD and BD), and the murder of the third victim (JD) was discussed but deferred 

to sometime in the future. (Exhibit C at 2-3.)

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C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Amend. Pet., Doc. 1 at 2.) Moreover, as a 

pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 614, 616 (1995).

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

1. First PCR Proceeding

On April 1, 2005, Petitioner commenced his first PCR proceeding by filing his 

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit H), requesting appointment of counsel. The 

Court declined to appoint counsel due to the failure to provide an affidavit of indigency, 

and set a deadline for a PCR petition of 60 day. (Exhibit I, M.E. 4/8/5.) Petitioner failed 

to meet the deadline, and the PCR proceeding was dismissed. (Exhibit J, M.E. 6/27/5.) 

Petitioner then filed on July 7, 2005, a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit K), dated June 15, 2005. The state responded, urging a summary dismissal on 

the merits. (Exhibit L, Response.) Petitioner then filed a Motion to Continue (Exhibit 

M), seeking appointment of counsel. In ruling on the motion, the PCR court noted 

“Defendant was ordered to represent himself in this Rule 32 proceeding because his 

indigency was not established at trial, and he did not submit an affidavit of indigency 

with his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief.” (Exhibit N, M.E. 9/22/05 at 1 (emphasis 

added).) The PCR court then described the proceeding as “defendant’s first Rule 32 ofright proceeding,” and thus proceeded to grant the request for appointment of counsel, 

and set a briefing schedule. (Id.)

On May 16, 2006, trial counsel filed a Notice of Completion of Review (Exhibit 

O), evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. Petitioner filed a pro se Request 

for Information (Exhibit P), seeking copies of affidavits in support of a warrant, and 

identification of aggravating factors. The PCR court denied Petitioner’s request, but 

granted an extension of time for him to file a pro per PCR petition. (Exhibit R, M.E. 

6/29/06.) 

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Petitioner failed to do so, and on September 1, 2006, the PCR court dismissed the 

proceeding. (Exhibit S, Order 9/1/6.)

Petitioner did not seek review of this proceeding.

2. Second PCR Proceeding

Over four years later, Petitioner commenced his second PCR proceeding on 

August 10, 2011, by filing his second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit T). On 

August 26, 2010, the PCR court denominated this as “defendant’s second Rule 32 

proceeding,” and dismissed the proceeding as untimely, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 

32.4(a). (Exhibit U, Order 8/26/10.)

Almost 18 months later, on February 13, 2012, Petitioner filed a “Notice of 

Appeal” (Exhibit V). Construing this as a petition for review, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals dismissed the matter as untimely. (Exhibit W, Order 2/27/12.) 

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit 

X) on April 23, 2012. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on 

October 4, 2012. (Exhibit Y, Order 10/4/12.) 

3. Third PCR Proceeding

A month later, on November 5, 2012, Petitioner commenced his third PCR 

proceeding by filing another Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Exhibit Z.) Petitioner 

asserted inter alia claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel and newly discovered 

facts showing actual innocence. On November 15, 2012, the PCR court denominated 

this as “defendant’s third Rule 32 proceeding,” found the claim of actual innocence 

unsupported, and dismissed the proceeding as untimely, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 

32.4(a). (Exhibit AA, Order 11/15/12.)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the PCR court summarily 

denied on December 13, 2012. (Exhibit BB, M.E. 12/13/12.) 

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit CC). The Arizona Court of 

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Appeals granted review, but denied relief, finding that Petitioner was precluded from 

raising his claims by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 because he “has raised or 

could have raised all of the issues in his petition for review in a prior petition for postconviction relief proceeding.” (Exhibit DD, Mem. Dec. 3/25/14.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review of this proceeding.

4. Fourth PCR Proceeding

Over seven months later, on November 5, 2012, Petitioner commenced his fourth 

PCR proceeding by filing another Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Exhibit EE.) 

Petitioner asserted inter alia claims of actual innocence and lack of benefit under the 

plea agreement. On March 13, 2014, the PCR court denominated this as “defendant’s 

fourth Rule 32 proceeding,” found the claim of actual innocence unsupported, and 

dismissed the proceeding as untimely, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.4(a). (Exhibit 

FF, Order 3/13/14.)

Petitioner did not seek further review of this proceeding.

5. Fifth PCR Proceeding and First Special Action Proceeding

On January 16, 2015, Petitioner filed in the Maricopa County Superior Court a 

Petition for Special Action (Exhibit GG) asserting a variety of extra judicial actions by 

the trial judge in accepting Plaintiff’s guilty plea and sentencing Petitioner to consecutive 

sentences. The Petition was filed in both the original criminal action, and in a separate 

special action proceeding. 

On March 2, 2015, the special action proceeding was dismissed on the basis that 

the petition challenged actions of a judge of the superior court, and the superior court had 

no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition. (Exhibit R-L, M.E. 3/2/15.) (Exhibits to the 

Reply, Doc. 14, are referenced herein as “Exhibit R-____.”)

On March 9, 2015, the PCR court construed the filing in the criminal case as a 

notice of post-conviction relief, and dismissed it as untimely. (Exhibit HH, Order 

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3/9/15.)

Petitioner did not seek direct review of this proceeding.

6. Second Special Action Proceeding

On March 18, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Special Action with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals (Exhibit II), raising the same claims presented in his special action 

petition to the PCR court. 

On March 20, 2015, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied to accept 

jurisdiction over the petition. (Exhibit JJ, Order 3/20/15.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review.

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his original Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 27, 2015 (Doc. 1). Prior 

to a service order, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 13, 2015 (Doc. 5). Petitioner’s Amended Petition 

asserts the following five grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his due process and equal

protection rights were violated when he was charged for a nonchargeable conspiracy and three counts of premeditated first degree 

murder, which were not cognizable in Arizona. In Ground Two, 

Petitioner alleges that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

were violated when the prosecution substantively amended the 

indictment without reconvening the grand jury. In Ground Three, he 

alleges that he was sentenced to consecutive sentences for “spray 

offenses of the same conspiracy” in violation of the Double

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Ground Four, he 

alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of trial and postconviction counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. In Ground 

Five, Petitioner alleges that he is actually innocent and that his

conviction constitutes a miscarriage of justice.

(Order 6/8/15, Doc. 6 at 2.)

Response - On September 18, 2015, Respondents filed their Limited Answer 

(Doc. 12). Respondents argue the Petition is untimely by over 7 years, waiver by 

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Petitioner’s guilty plea, Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4 are procedurally defaulted, and Ground 5 

(actual innocence) is not cognizable.

Reply - On October 22, 2015, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 14). Petitioner 

argues the merits of his claims (id. at 1, et seq.), that ineffective assistance of PCR 

counsel excuses his procedural defaults (id. at 22, et seq.), his guilty plea did not waive 

his claims (id. at 25), and he is actually innocent (id. at 29, et seq.).

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s conviction became final on October 6, 2006, 

and expired on October 7, 2007, and Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for his 

subsequently filed proceedings, and is not entitled to equitable tolling.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

a) Conviction Final 

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on 

"the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).2 

 

2

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no 

argument that any of these apply.

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For an Arizona noncapital pleading defendant, the conviction becomes “final” at 

the conclusion of the first “of-right” post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32. 

“Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct 

review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 

F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, a pleaconvicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 days of 

conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a Petition for 

Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

Here, the state court recognized Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding as his “first 

Rule 32 of-right proceeding.” (Exhibit N, M.E. 9/22/05 at 1.) That proceeding remained 

pending through September 1, 2006, when the PCR court dismissed the proceeding. 

(Exhibit S, Order 9/1/6.) 

Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c), Petitioner had thirty days 

after the dismissal of his petition to seek review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Moreover, Arizona applies Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3 to extend “the time 

to file an appeal by five days when the order appealed from has been mailed to the 

interested party and commences to run on the date the clerk mails the order.” State v. 

Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 106, 786 P.2d 956, 957 (1990). This rule has been extended to 

post-conviction relief proceedings. See State v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20, 21 n.1, 106 P.3d 

1035, 1036 n.1 (Ct. App. Div. 12005). See also State v. Brock, 163 Ariz. 523, 526, 789 

P.2d 390, 393 (Ct. App. Div. 1 1989) (supplemental opinion), aff'd, 165 Ariz. 296, 798 

P.2d 1305 (1990) (applying to PCR motion for reconsideration of appellate court ruling). 

Here, the PCR court’s ruling was not filed, and presumably thus not mailed, until 

September 11, 2006. (Exhibit S.) Assuming notice was such by mailing, then under Rule 

1.3, Petitioner would have had through Monday, October 16, 2006 to file his petition for 

review. Thus, his conviction would have become final by the conclusion of direct 

review on October 16, 2006.

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b) New Rule 

Petitioner argues that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 

S.Ct. 1376 (2012), Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012), and Martinez v. Ryan, 132 

S.Ct. 1309 (2012) constitute significant changes in the law.3 (Reply, Doc. 15 at 24.)

The habeas limitations statue provides a later commencement date of “the date on 

which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if 

the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). 

However, none of these cases announced a new rule of constitutional law. See

Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Martinez...did not 

announce a new rule of constitutional law”); Id. at 1140 (“neither Frye nor 

Lafler...decided a new rule of constitutional law”). 

Moreover, even assuming they established a new constitutional right, § 

2244(d)(1)(C) requires that such a new right be made “retroactively applicable to cases 

on collateral review.” Petitioner points to no decision making these cases retroactively 

applicable. The undersigned knows of none.

Thus, Petitioner’s claims in his Petition are not founded on a constitutional right 

within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), and the finality of his conviction 

remains the proper commencement date for his habeas limitations period.

c) Conclusion re Commencement

Therefore, Petitioner’s one year began running no later than October 16, 2006,

and without any tolling expired no later than Monday, October 15, 2007. 

3. Timeliness Without Tolling

Petitioner’s Amended Petition (Doc. 5) was filed on May 13, 2015. 

 

3

It is not clear which claim Petitioner believes was triggered by Lafler and Frye, which 

applied Strickland in the context of a rejected plea offer. Here, Petitioner accepted the 

plea offer. Martinez was limited to ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as cause to excuse a 

procedural default, but declined to find a constitutional right to such counsel.

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However, the Petition includes Petitioner’s declaration that it was “placed in the 

prison mailing system on May 11, 2015.” “In determining when a pro se state or federal 

petition is filed, the ‘mailbox’ rule applies. A petition is considered to be filed on the 

date a prisoner hands the petition to prison officials for mailing.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 

F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010). The undersigned finds that the Petition was delivered to

prison officials for mailing on that date, and that it should be deemed “filed” as of May 

11, 2015.

As determined in subsection (1) above, without any tolling Petitioner’s one year 

habeas limitations period expired no later than October 15, 2007, making his amended 

Petition over seven years delinquent.

Original Petition – Petitioner’s original Petition (Doc. 1) was filed March 27, 

2015, and reflects its placement in the prison mail system on March 25, 2015. (Doc. 1 at 

12.) 

Applications for habeas corpus "may be amended or supplemented as provided in 

the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions." 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Similarly, Rule 11 

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with these rules, may be applied, 

when appropriate, to the petitions filed under these rules." 

Rule 15(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an “amendment of a 

pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . (2) the claim or 

defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” “The central 

policy of Rule 15(c)--ensuring that the non-moving party has sufficient notice of the 

facts and claims giving rise to the proposed amendment” is satisfied where the claims in 

the amended petition were included in the original petition. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 

F.3d 568, 576 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Even assuming that Petitioner’s Amended Petition relates back in time to March 

25, 2015, it still is more than seven years delinquent.

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4. Statutory Tolling 

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Application to Petitioner - Petitioner’s limitations period commenced running 

no later than October 16, 2006 upon conclusion of Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding and 

expired no later than October 15, 2007. Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding was not 

commenced until August 11, 2010, when Petitioner filed his second Notice of PostConviction Relief (Exhibit T).

4

 At that time, his one year had been expired for almost 

three years. Once the statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief 

filing does not reset the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 

482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Accordingly, Petitioner has no statutory tolling resulting from his second PCR 

proceeding, or from his third, fourth, or fifth PCR proceedings, or from his petitions for 

special action, and his limitations period expired no later than October 15, 2007.

Consequently, Petitioner’s habeas petition was over seven years delinquent.

5. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

 

4

That notice was dated August 4, 2010. Even if assumed to be subject to the prison 

mailbox rule and deemed filed on that date, the difference of seven days would render 

Petitioner’s habeas petition timely.

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that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

As a basis for excusing his untimely filing, Petitioner points to the ineffective 

assistance of his PCR counsel, and the erroneous dismissal of his first PCR petition. 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at “11.”)

Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel – Petitioner complains that his PCR 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims eventually asserted by Petitioner, 

and failing to assist Petitioner. (Reply, Doc. 14 at 22, et seq.)

Although an attorney's behavior can establish the extraordinary circumstances 

required for equitable tolling, mere negligence or professional malpractice is insufficient. 

Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001). A “garden variety claim of 

excusable neglect,’ such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a filing 

deadline does not warrant equitable tolling.’ ” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-

652 (2010). Rather, the attorney’s misconduct must rise to the level of extraordinary 

circumstances. Id. Conversely, an attorney’s abandonment of the representation 

resulting in a untimely habeas filing may establish tolling. Id. (concluding that repeated 

failures to respond to a client’s inquiries over a period of years, and demands for timely 

action, might establish equitable tolling). Here, Petitioner simply asserts a garden 

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variety claim of ineffectiveness, i.e. the failure to identify and present claims. Rather 

than abandoning Petitioner, counsel followed the appropriate procedure when counsel 

concludes there are no viable claims to present. (See Exhibit O, Not. Completion at 2 

(citing Lammie v. Barker, 185 Ariz. 263, 915 P.2d 662 (1996), Montgomery v. Sheldon, 

181 Ariz. 256, 889 P.2d 614 (1995), op. sup., 182 Ariz. 118, 893 P.2d 1281

(Montgomery II) ( 1995), and State v. Rodriguez, 183 Ariz. 331, 903 P .2d 639 (App. 

1995)).)

Moreover, Petitioner fails to proffer any argument how PCR counsel’s failings 

resulted in Petitioner’s extensive delay in bringing the instant habeas proceeding. At 

most, Petitioner argues that they establish cause for a failure to fairly present his claims, 

an issue relevant only to Respondents’ procedural default defense, which is not reached 

herein.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel do not 

establish grounds for equitable tolling.

Denial of PCR Petition – Petitioner complains that his PCR petition was 

erroneously dismissed. Assuming that to be the case, Petitioner fails to explain how that 

made it impossible for him to timely file his federal habeas petition.

Conclusion re Equitable Tolling – Petitioner fails to show extraordinary 

circumstances making it impossible for him to timely file the instant petition, and 

therefore he is not entitled to equitable tolling.

6. Actual Innocence 

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

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513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). 

It is unclear whether the actual innocence gateway applies to defendants who 

were not convicted on trial, but pled not guilty or no contest. See Smith v. Baldwin, 510 

F.3d 1127, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007). But see Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998) 

(remanding for development of actual innocence to excuse procedural default of 

pleading federal defendant). For purposes of this Report & Recommendation, the 

undersigned presumes that the actual innocence gateway applies to Petitioner’s guilty 

plea convictions.

Petitioner makes no such claim of actual innocence in this proceeding.

At best, Petitioner argues that there was no evidence to support the conspiracy 

charge which was dismissed as part of the plea agreement, because the only other party 

was the government, and that he has shown a lack of evidence on Count 4 regarding the 

murder of victim JD. (Amended Pet., Doc. 5 at 9A (Ground 5); Reply, Doc. 14 at 29.) 

But, a finding of "actual innocence" is not to be based upon a finding that 

insufficient evidence to support the charge was presented at trial, but rather upon 

affirmative, new evidence of innocence. See U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 

2003) (lack of proof of FDIC insurance in a bank robbery case, without evidence that 

insurance did not exist, not sufficient to establish actual innocence). This principle is 

particularly applicable where a defendant, like Petitioner, was convicted upon his guilty 

plea and not at trial.

Moreover, Petitioner’s theory of innocence on the conspiracy charge is founded 

upon a mistake of law. In State v. Felkins, 156 Ariz. 37, 749 P.2d 946 (1988), Division 1 

of the Arizona Supreme Court construed Arizona’s conspiracy statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 

13-1006, as adopting a “unilateral view of conspiracy.” The Felkins court noted that 

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while other jurisdictions have adopted a bilateral view of conspiracy, “A.R.S. § 13–

1006(A)(3) specifically provides that it is no defense that the other person does not have 

the state of mind sufficient for the commission of the offense. This applies to undercover 

policemen, informants, or other government agents.” 156 Ariz. at 39, 749 P.2d at 948. 

Petitioner proffers as the basis for his assertion of actual innocence on Count 4 the 

contents of his Settlement Conference Memorandum (Exhibit C). (Reply, Doc. 14 at 32.) 

In that memorandum, Petitioner argued that no agreement on the murder of JD (father of 

the other two victims) had been reached:

After Gibbs raised [JD]'s name, Champa stated that he hoped he 

would die a natural death given his poor health and after the death 

of his sons. 

At no point did Champa give specific details about the 

murder of [JD] or discuss the amount it would cost. Additionally, in 

an interview with undersigned counsel on October 26, 2004, Officer 

Gibbs agreed that there was never a meeting of the minds between 

Gibbs and Champa as to [JD]. Thus, Champa cannot now be held 

criminally responsible for the attempted murders of all three 

individuals and at the very most, can only be held accountable for

the attempted murder of [BD] and [RD].

(Exhibit C at 4.) This memorandum, written by Petitioner’s counsel, does not constitute 

evidence. 

Moreover, apart from the reference to an interview with the officer, this 

memorandum proffers no evidence of Petitioner’s innocence of Count 4. Even if 

Petitioner could adequately establish that he did not retain the officer to kill JD, the 

arguments in the memorandum reflects that Petitioner was undertaking the murder of RD 

and BD with the intention of indirectly causing the death of JD. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

1105(A)(1) defined murder as “intending or knowing that the person's conduct will cause 

death, the person causes the death of another person.” Here, under Petitioner’s version 

of the facts, he intended to cause the death of JD, albeit indirectly. Cf. State v. Edwards, 

136 Ariz. 177, 186, 665 P.2d 59, 68 (1983) (felony murder supported where victim’s 

death resulted from poor health and stress of robbery). It was unnecessary to show that 

the plan would have worked. “[A]ll that is required to sustain an attempted murder 

conviction is evidence of some overt act or steps taken toward the commission of ... 

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[murder] and an intent to commit the crime.” State v. Cleere, 213 Ariz. 54, 57, ¶ 5, 138 

P.3d 1181, 1184 (App. 2006) (citations and quotations omitted). Petitioner’s intent was 

reflected from his stated desire to cause the death of JD, and his overt act in furtherance 

was the retention of Gibbs to murder RD and BD. 

Further, to the extent that Petitioner asserts his actual innocence on a charge on 

which he was not convicted (the dismissed Count 1 charging conspiracy to commit first 

degree murder) such innocence is necessary, but not sufficient to pass the Schlup

gateway. "In cases where the Government has forgone more serious charges in the 

course of plea bargaining, petitioner's showing of actual innocence must also extend to 

those charges." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 624. Although deciding the issue as “a question of 

first impression,” the Ninth Circuit has concluded “both as a matter of law and of 

common sense, that a demonstration of actual innocence under Schlup cannot excuse a 

petitioner's procedural default for more than the counts as to which he has shown actual 

innocence.” Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014). See Alvarez v. 

Gipson, 2014 WL 1017607, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014) (applying Vosgien to actual 

innocence gateway to statute of limitations). Thus, even if Petitioner could establish his 

actual innocence of dismissed Count 1 and/or Count 4, he would be entitled to no relief 

on counts on which he failed to show his actual innocence.

In sum, Petitioner fails to show his actual innocence so as to avoid the effect of 

his untimely filing.

7. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Taking into account the available statutory tolling, Petitioner’s one year habeas 

limitations period commenced running no later than October 16, 2006, and expired no 

later than October 15, 2007, making the present Petition over seven years delinquent. 

Petitioner has shown no basis for additional statutory tolling, and no basis for equitable 

tolling or actual innocence to avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the Petition 

must be dismissed with prejudice.

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B. OTHER DEFENSES

Because the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s Petition is plainly barred by 

the statute of limitations, Respondents’ other defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

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district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Amended Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed May 13, 2015 (Doc. 5) and this action be DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

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47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: February 2, 2016

15-0560r RR 16 01 26 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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