Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02035/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02035-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IDELFONOSO ESPARZA,

Petitioner,

v.

TIM V. VIRGA, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-02035 LJO MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented by Mark A. Johnson

of the office of the Attorney General.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Madera, following 

his conviction by jury trial on April 20, 2010, for first degree murder, willful discharge of a 

firearm from a vehicle, and various enhancements. (Lodged Doc. 10, Clerk's Tr. at 251-

52.) On October 14, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of life 

without the possibility of parole for murder consecutive to a term of twenty-five (25) years 

to life in state prison for the special allegation of discharging a firearm causing death. 

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(Id.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, which affirmed the judgment on June 11, 2012. (Lodged Docs. 1-3, People v. 

Esparza, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4319 (June 11, 2012).) On September 12, 2012, 

the California Supreme Court denied review. (Lodged Docs. 4-5.) Petitioner did not seek 

collateral review of the conviction in state court.

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on December 12, 2013. (Pet., 

ECF No. 1.) Petitioner presents four claims for relief in the instant petition. Petitioner 

alleges: (1) that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it must find corroborating 

evidence before it could rely on accomplice testimony; (2) ineffective assistance of 

counsel for failing to object to trial testimony; (3) that the trial court erred by failing to sua 

sponte instruct the jury regarding voluntary manslaughter; and (4) cumulative error. (Id.) 

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on April 16, 2014. (ECF No. 16.) Petitioner

did not file a traverse. The matter stands ready for adjudication.

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1

On the afternoon of April 5, 2004, Madera County Sheriff's 

Lieutenant Michael Salvador was driving eastbound on 5th Street 

approaching Gateway Drive in the City of Madera. Lieutenant Salvador 

stopped at the intersection and prepared to turn onto Gateway. He heard 

three gunshots in rapid succession. Salvador looked south and saw two 

individuals run across the street toward a late model Dodge Intrepid 

parked near a feed store.

The two individuals entered the vehicle. One of them, a heavyset, 

bald, Hispanic male, climbed in the window on the passenger side. The 

Intrepid proceeded northbound, and Salvador unsuccessfully attempted to 

pursue the vehicle. He returned to the area where the Intrepid had been 

parked. Several witnesses pointed to a cell phone and a piece of paper on 

the ground and said the items belonged to the car that had just left. 

Salvador contacted the Madera Police Department for assistance.

Madera Police Officer Kristine Sauceda went to the scene shortly 

after Salvador heard the shots. She saw two brass nine-millimeter shell 

casings near the double yellow line on Gateway Drive in front of the feed 

store. The casings were "RP" brand. Sauceda also saw a silver cell phone 

 

1The Fifth District Court of Appeal’s summary of the facts in its June 11, 2012 opinion is presumed correct. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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and two folded pieces of paper on the ground near the southwest corner 

of the feed store. The papers were money order receipts in the sums of 

$175 and $500. Law enforcement officers later determined the victim of 

the shooting had used the money orders to pay rent at a realty office 

across the street.

Madera Police Officer David Herspring spoke with Evie Morfin, an 

employee of a property management firm inside the realty office. Morfin 

said the victim of the shooting, George Ganas, was a tenant of the 

property management firm and had come into the office to pay his rent. 

After he left the office, Morfin heard two gunshots. She looked out the 

window of her office and saw an individual getting into the passenger side 

of a vehicle parked in front of the feed store. The individual was holding 

his hand to his back, and the vehicle left on Gateway and headed towards 

4th Street at a high rate of speed.

At about 1:45 p.m. that day, Madera Police Sergeant Giachino 

Chiaramonte went to Madera Community Hospital to follow up on a 

dispatch about a possible shooting victim. Sergeant Chiaramonte went to 

a room where medical staff members were treating George Ganas, who 

had sustained a gunshot entry wound to his lower back and had large, 

fresh abrasions on his left elbow and palm. Sergeant Chiaramonte saw 

Rick Gallegos pacing in the waiting room.

At about the same time, Madera Police Officer Jason Dilbeck 

received a report that a shooting victim had died. Officer Dilbeck went to 

the crime scene and learned the passenger in the black Dodge Intrepid 

was Rick Gallegos, and Gallegos had gone to Madera Community 

Hospital. Dilbeck went to the hospital, but Gallegos had already departed. 

Dilbeck contacted dispatch and learned the shooting victim was the 

registered owner of a Dodge Intrepid. Dilbeck broadcast a " 'be on the 

lookout' " request for the vehicle. A short time later, the sheriff's 

department reported that Rick Gallegos and the Intrepid were located 

behind a music store.

Dilbeck went to the location and saw the car with the driver's door 

open. A small amount of blood was present in the middle of the backseat. 

Lieutenant Salvador identified the vehicle as the one he observed leaving 

the scene. Officer Herspring noticed blood on the bottom portion of the 

back of the front passenger seat. He also noticed blood on the seat itself. 

He said the stains were consistent with someone bleeding from the back 

and sitting on the seat.

Herspring located a live nine-millimeter bullet wedged in the front 

passenger seat. He also saw an April 5, 2004, rent receipt from the realty 

office in the sum of $675, the total of the two money order receipts found 

at the shooting scene. In the backseat of the Intrepid, officers found a car 

seat, a television, and a prescription bottle containing marijuana. 

Herspring determined that George Ganas was the registered owner of the 

vehicle.

Stephen Avalos, M.D., a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy 

on the body of George Ganas on April 9, 2004. He said the cause of death 

was "a gunshot wound of his trunk, which perforated his liver and grazed 

his lung and penetrated the left side of his heart." Avalos recovered the 

bullet from the victim's heart. Officer Dilbeck said the bullet was too 

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deformed for testing, but its diameter was consistent with a nine-millimeter 

bullet.

On the afternoon of April 5, 2004, California Highway Patrol Officer 

Mark McAdams was driving westbound on 4th Street in Madera when he 

located a vehicle heading northbound on G Street at a high rate of speed. 

Officer McAdams slowed down to avoid a collision with the gray compact 

vehicle, which ran a stop sign at 45-50 miles per hour. McAdams activated 

his lights and siren and pursued the vehicle. The vehicle turned and 

accelerated as he approached.

Officer McAdams saw two individuals in the front seat and three in 

the back. The latter three appeared to be males with shaved heads. The 

vehicle went through a stop sign at Gateway Avenue and continued 

eastbound. McAdams slowed his patrol vehicle but continued in pursuit. 

The suspect vehicle stopped near an alley between D and E Streets. 

Three people exited the suspect car and ran down the alley. Officer 

McAdams did not have a clear view of them. McAdams drew his weapon 

at the middle rear passenger, C.A., and the driver of the vehicle, Rafael 

Rodriguez.

Officer Dilbeck went to the scene of the stop and obtained a 

statement from C.A., who Dilbeck said was 13 years old. C.A. said the 

shooter of George Ganas was known as "Poncho," "Bashful," and "Bash." 

He gave a physical description of Poncho and showed officers where the 

shooter lived. Officers compiled a photographic lineup that included 

appellant's picture. C.A. identified appellant as the shooter.

On April 9, 2004, Madera police officers executed a search warrant 

at the address on Cross Street that C.A. had tied to the shooter. Officer 

Dilbeck found an empty box of nine-millimeter shells and appellant's social 

security card in the home. On April 22, 2004, Madera police officers went 

to Rafael Rodriguez's home, searched the premises, and seized four live 

nine-millimeter rounds. They also seized a photograph of gang members 

throwing gang signs and bearing gang writing. They also seized a letter 

written by a Vatos Locos Surenos (VLS) gang member form a prison in 

San Luis Obispo.

In July 2008, the Madera Police Department ran a "Crime 

Stoppers" advertisement in the Madera Tribune newspaper about 

appellant's arrest warrant. The advertisement included a photograph of 

appellant. In response to the ad, Virginia Yrigollen contacted Madera 

Police Detective Robert Hill and Detective Sergeant Robert Salas and 

provided information about appellant's current whereabouts, including a 

possible address for him. The address was located in Mexico. Detective 

Hill made a map of the area and faxed the information to the U.S. Marshal 

in San Diego. The Marshal Service apprehended appellant at the address 

supplied by Yrigollen and returned him to Madera on July 23, 2008.

Yrigollen testified that she lived with her boyfriend, Felipe Franco, 

near Mexicali, Mexico in 2004. Their residence was about three and onehalf miles from the U.S. border. She said her son, Michael Lopez, visited 

occasionally and that Franco was appellant's uncle. Both Yrigollen and 

Lopez testified that appellant goes by the nickname "Poncho." Yrigollen 

said appellant arrived at her home in June 2004 and stayed about a 

month. Appellant would also stay at his aunt's house in the Mexicali area. 

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Yrigollen said appellant's mother, Maria de La Luz Perez, would come to 

Mexicali and leave money and groceries for appellant.

Yrigollen said she was a close friend of the mother of George 

Ganas. Yrigollen had known Ganas his entire life and knew he had been 

shot in Madera. In June 2004, Yrigollen asked appellant about the Ganas 

shooting, but appellant said he did not remember much. Appellant claimed 

he had been at home when some friends stopped by to pick him up. 

Yrigollen said she stopped appellant from giving an explanation because 

she had a hard time believing his version of events. Yrigollen said she was 

shocked and upset and really did not want to know what had happened to 

Ganas. Yrigollen said appellant was making himself look bad by running 

and told him he should go back and clear matters up. Although appellant 

did not respond to her advice, Yrigollen said appellant looked at her and 

"he knew it needed to be done."

Michael Lopez said he knew appellant as the nephew of Yrigollen's 

onetime boyfriend, Felipe Franco. Lopez saw appellant in Mexico in June 

2004. Lopez had known appellant for about 12 years and had been good 

friends with George Ganas since they were children. Lopez knew that 

Ganas had been shot and killed. Lopez testified, "My brother told me the 

story [of the homicide] when I was in Turlock, you know, and just pieces of 

it, but not the whole ... no one knows the whole story, so he just told me 

what he knew."

In June 2004, Lopez and appellant had a fight after appellant made 

some comments about the Ganas shooting. Lopez said he and appellant 

were drunk on tequila at the time. Lopez did not think that appellant was 

aware of his friendship with Ganas. Lopez was under the impression that 

appellant was visiting in Mexico, but appellant said he had done 

something wrong. Appellant went on to tell Lopez "[t]hat it was a car full of 

guys and then [appellant] shot, and that was it." Lopez began to argue 

with appellant and Yrigollen and Franco came outside to intervene in the 

fight. Lopez told his mother, "He killed George."

At trial, C.A. testified on behalf of the prosecution. C.A. said he was 

15 years old in 2004 and had known appellant several years. C.A. met 

appellant at appellant's house at least an hour before 1:30 p.m. on April 5, 

2004. Rafael Rodriguez and two other individuals picked up appellant and 

C.A. from the house. Appellant got into the front passenger seat and C.A. 

got into the rear, middle seat. The group left appellant's house and went to 

a mini-mart at the intersection of Gateway and Yosemite Avenues to buy 

gasoline.

At the mini-mart, C.A. saw two individuals he had never seen 

before. C.A. said he was affiliated with the VLS gang at that time. C.A. 

believed the two individuals at the mini-mart were members of the rival 

Norteno street gang, based on the way they looked at the occupants of 

Rodriguez's car and the music they played. C.A. said the two groups 

exchanged "bad looks" but no derogatory words. One of the individuals 

who sat in the rear seat with C.A. was a gang member known as 

"Calacas." C.A. described Calacas's gang affiliation as "southerner." 

Calacas went inside the mini-mart to pay for the gas, returned to the car, 

and said the two individuals were Nortenos. As the two individuals left the 

mini-mart, they displayed a Norteno hand sign with four fingers spread 

out.

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C.A. said he was seated behind Rodriguez and appellant but did 

not remember hearing them say anything or see them make gestures. A 

few minutes later, the group in Rodriguez's car departed the store. 

Surveillance videos at the store depicted Rodriguez, Calacas, and George 

Ganas, along with the vehicles of Rodriguez and Ganas. The videos were 

filmed at about 1:40 p.m. on April 5, 2004. Appellant and C.A. did not get 

out of Rodriguez's vehicle while it was stopped at the store. When the car 

departed, appellant was still seated in the front passenger seat.

Rodriguez made a right turn and drove northbound on Gateway. As 

they drove up Gateway, C.A. saw one of the individuals who had been at 

the store. The man was crossing the street in front of them and walking 

toward the same dark vehicle C.A. had seen at the store. The car was 

parked in front of a feed store, and the man appeared to see them. He 

slowed down his pace while he was in front of Rodriguez's car. Rodriguez 

slowed his vehicle to avoid hitting the man. The man started to run from 

the front to the rear of Rodriguez's car and appeared to be "scared for his 

life." Appellant looked at Rodriguez, as if to obtain permission to shoot the 

man.

When the man was to the right of Rodriguez's car, he put his hands 

in the waistband of his pants, as if he were going to pull a weapon. A few 

seconds later, appellant began shooting. C.A. did not know where 

appellant got the gun because C.A. had not seen it before. C.A. said it 

looked like a semiautomatic nine-millimeter handgun. C.A. said appellant's 

entire arm was extended out of the window of Rodriguez's car. C.A. said 

the shooting victim was standing about 10 feet away from Rodriguez's car. 

He ran between Rodriguez's car and the side of the street toward his own 

car. C.A. said appellant fired as the individual ran past him. Appellant's 

arm was pointed to the side and back while he fired multiple shots. C.A. 

said he did not hear any shots other than those fired by appellant.

C.A. said the shooting victim ran from the front to the back of 

Rodriguez's car and was behind Rodriguez's car when C.A. heard the last 

shot. C.A. said the victim fell to the ground behind his own car. C.A. said 

Rodriguez's car was stopped during the shooting and there was traffic in 

front of his vehicle. After appellant fired the last shot, Rodriguez pulled his 

vehicle into the oncoming traffic lane and drove away.

After Rodriguez drove away, C.A. noticed a law enforcement car 

following them. Rodriguez stopped in an alley and the two passengers 

seated in the rear with C.A. ran away. C.A. and Rodriguez stayed in the 

car until an officer ordered them out. C.A. said he spoke with officers, told 

them what happened, and identified where appellant lived. C.A. said he 

was concerned about retaliation against his family. C.A. also said he 

received no promises from the office of the district attorney in exchange 

for his testimony.

Officer Dilbeck testified he was a member of the Madera 

Community Response Unit and qualified as a criminal street gang expert 

without objection. Dilbeck said the VLS criminal street gang is a subset of 

the Surenos, who operate under the direction of the Mexican Mafia prison 

gang. Officer Dilbeck described four predicate offenses committed by VLS 

members. In his opinion, the conviction of VLS members for these 

predicate offenses demonstrated a pattern of violent gang conduct by the 

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Surenos. Dilbeck also concluded that appellant is a member of the VLS 

criminal street gang. He based his opinion on the facts of this case and 

police reports relating to appellant's participation in previous gang-related 

altercations, such as gang-related fights in September 1998, February 

1999, and October 1999.

Officer Dilbeck also described a number of gang-related criminal 

offenses involving appellant, including a November 1999 petty theft 

accusation; an April 2001 traffic stop; a February 2003 traffic stop in which 

appellant fled and was caught in possession of methamphetamine; a 

March 29, 2004, traffic stop; and an undated incident in which he and 

another gang member were assaulted by perpetrators dressed like 

Nortenos.

Officer Dilbeck also based his opinion about appellant's gang 

membership on appellant's self-identification as a VLS gang member. 

During his July 23, 2008, booking in this case, appellant indicated he was 

a "southerner from VLS" and said his moniker was "Little Bashful." 

Appellant also identified himself as a Sureno gang member during a 2003 

custodial classification.

In Dilbeck's opinion, George Ganas was a Norteno gang member 

who associated with other Nortenos on a regular basis. Dilbeck said 

Ganas had problems with VLS members prior to April 2004. The VLS 

members had chased Ganas on several occasions and on one occasion 

the VLS members "jumped" Ganas at a park. He concluded "there was a 

rivalry between them."

Defense Evidence

Appellant testified on his own behalf and said he did not shoot or 

kill George Ganas. Appellant said he was at his mother or girlfriend's 

home on April 5, 2004. In 2004, he lived in Susanville with his sister and 

brother-in-law. Appellant said he stayed with them for several months 

while he attended a semester of college. Appellant said his goal was to 

become a mechanic. Appellant said he held a part-time job at a fast food 

store and played soccer.

During his semester in Susanville, appellant returned to Madera 

periodically and would stay with his mother or his girlfriend, Melissa. 

Appellant said he did not contact Madera friends who were gang members 

because he did not want to get into any more trouble and knew he would 

be in violation of his probation if he associated with them. Appellant said 

on one occasion he was walking from his mother's home to Melissa's 

home and some gang members tried to pick him up. When appellant told 

them he did not want to go with them, the gang members called him 

names.

Appellant said that after gang members knew he was in town, they 

would go to his mother's house to look for him. Appellant said he was 

scared of them because they always traveled in groups. He became angry 

when they arrived at his mother's home, and he told his mother to tell 

them he was not at home. Appellant began to go to his girlfriend's home to 

avoid them.

Appellant said his mother gave him a hard time for associating with 

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gang members. Appellant's mother, Maria de la Luz Perez, testified that 

gang members beat appellant up. After they did so, she decided to take 

appellant to live with her father in Mexico. Appellant did not like the idea, 

but he knew he was in danger in the Madera area, and it would not be 

easy for him to leave the gang.

Mrs. Perez testified she took appellant to his grandfather's home in 

San Felipe, Mexico about one month before police searched her home on 

April 9, 2004. At that time, she did not know anything about the Ganas 

shooting. During the April 9, 2004, search of her home, she told police 

officers that appellant was staying with her father in Mexico. [fn3] After 

appellant lived with his grandfather for about three months, his mother 

took him to live with her brother, Franco, and his girlfriend, Yrigollen. Mrs. 

Perez said she periodically visited Mexico and provided appellant with 

money and a car.

FN3: According to Madera Police Officer Michael Powell, 

one of the officers who conducted the search, Mrs. Perez 

said she did not know appellant's exact whereabouts but 

indicated he had been in New Mexico for about three weeks.

Appellant testified he lived with his uncle for several months. At that 

point, Yrigollen asked appellant, " 'Why are you here [in Mexico] after so 

many months later?' " He said, "I told her that ... because of the gangs 

coming around looking for me, and my mom didn't approve. I obviously 

didn't want to have nothing to do with it." Appellant said Yrigollen always 

cut him off before he could finish his explanation. She would tell appellant, 

" 'No. Stop right there,' " and would not let him finish what he was trying to 

say. Appellant said he did not tell Michael Lopez that he shot George 

Ganas. At one point in time, Lopez got drunk on tequila and began 

accusing appellant of killing Ganas. Appellant said he does not drink 

tequila and did not get "wasted" with Lopez by drinking tequila. However, 

he admitted getting drunk with Lopez on beer.

The victim's sister, Alexandra Ganas, testified for the defense. At 

7:00 a.m. on April 5, 2004, she was at her brother, George's, home. He 

gave her a ride to the convalescent home near the music store where their 

mother worked, so Alexandra could pick up her mother's truck. When they 

arrived at the convalescent home, Alexandra asked her brother for some 

money for gas for the truck. Alexandra said Ganas reached under the seat 

of his car and pulled out a metal box. The box contained rent money, a 

gun, and two bags of marijuana. Ganas removed the gun from the box to 

get access to the money.

Alexandra learned of her brother's death later that day. She 

returned to the convalescent home to pick up her mother, who got off work 

between 2:30 and 3:00 p.m. Rick Gallegos was at the convalescent home 

and "yell[ed] that George had been shot and to get to the hospital."

People v. Esparza, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4319, 1-19 (June 11, 2012).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

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custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. (Pet.) In 

addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Madera County Superior Court, 

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). 

Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the instant action. 

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment 

of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by AEDPA provisions. 

Under AEDPA, a person in custody under a judgment of a state court may only be 

granted a writ of habeas corpus for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 7. Federal habeas corpus 

relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings if the 

state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that [are] materially indistinguishable from [a Supreme Court case] but reaches a 

different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 

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405-06). "AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly 

identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied . . . The statute recognizes . . 

. that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner." Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle' 

or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009) (quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786). 

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

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(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85.

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. "This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

‘adjudicated on the merits.'" Id. 

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id.

(emphasis added). To put it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).

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3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984).

IV. REVIEW OF PETITION

A. Claim One: Jury Instructions – Accomplice Testimony

Petitioner claims that the trial court failed to give appropriate jury instructions 

regarding the testimony of Christian Arias, based on Arias being an accomplice to the 

crime. (Pet. at 6.) 

1. State Court Decision

The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the Court of Appeal (People v. 

Perkins, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3735) and in a subsequent petition for review 

filed with California Supreme Court. (Lodged Docs. 4-5.) "[W]here there has been one 

reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding 

that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same grounds." See Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the "look through" 

presumption. Id. at 804. Since the Court of Appeal was the last court to issue a 

reasoned opinion on this issue, this Court “looks through” the California Supreme Court 

decision to the reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeal. In the last reasoned decision 

denying Petitioner's claim, the appellate court explained:

I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 

FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY SUA SPONTE ON WHETHER A 

MINOR TRAVELING IN APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS AN 

ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIMES.

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Appellant contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to 

have every fact determined by the jury when it failed to instruct the jury 

sua sponte that the jury was required to determine whether C.A. was an 

accomplice to the crime.

A. Appellant's Specific Contention

Appellant submits the expert testimony of Officer Dilbeck supported 

the idea that C.A. was an accomplice. Dilbeck testified that on the day of 

the homicide, appellant was in Rodriguez's car with four other gang 

members, implying that C.A. was also a VLS member. Dilbeck said it is 

common for Surenos gang members to commit crimes together because it 

goes to the "fear aspect" of gang mentality. Dilbeck explained that people 

are afraid of gangs because they commit their crimes "in numbers." 

According to Dilbeck, gang members are emboldened to commit crimes of 

violence when they are together in numbers.

On appeal, appellant contends the trial court committed reversible 

error by not instructing the jury to determine whether C.A. was an 

accomplice. In appellant's view, there was evidence from which jurors 

could have found that C.A. was a gang member who knew the criminal 

purpose of the person who fired the shots and who provided 

encouragement and support for the shooting. Appellant further contends: 

"Had appellant's jury been properly instructed on principles for evaluating 

accomplice testimony, jurors would have recognized that there was 

insufficient evidence to corroborate [C.A.'s] claim that appellant was the 

person who fired the fatal shots. Failure to properly instruct the jury on the 

corroboration requirement in section 1111 caused a miscarriage of 

justice."

B. Law of Accomplice Testimony

Penal Code section 1111 defines an accomplice "as one who is 

liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the 

defendant ...." The section further provides: "A conviction cannot be had 

upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it can be corroborated by 

such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the 

commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it 

merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances 

thereof."

"'"[W]henever the testimony given upon the trial is sufficient to 

warrant the conclusion upon the part of the jury that a witness implicating 

a defendant was an accomplice,' " the trial court must instruct the jury, sua 

sponte, to determine whether the witness was an accomplice. [Citation.] If 

the testimony establishes that the witness was an accomplice as a matter 

of law, the jury must be so instructed. [Citation.] In either case, the trial 

court also must instruct the jury, sua sponte, '(1) that the testimony of the 

accomplice witness is to be viewed with distrust [citations], and (2) that the 

defendant cannot be convicted on the basis of the accomplice's testimony 

unless it is corroborated ....' [Citation.]" (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 

929, 982.)

"Whether a person is an accomplice within the meaning of [Penal 

Code] section 1111 presents a factual question for the jury 'unless the 

evidence permits only a single inference.' [Citation.] Thus, a court can 

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decide as a matter of law whether a witness is or is not an accomplice 

only when the facts regarding the witness's criminal culpability are 'clear 

and undisputed.' [Citations.]" (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 

679.)

"[W]hen an accomplice is called to testify on behalf of the 

prosecution, the court must instruct the jurors that accomplice testimony 

should be viewed with distrust. [Citation.]" (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 

Cal.4th 558, 565.) In other words, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to 

instruct with CALCRIM No. 334 when warranted by the evidence. (People 

v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 466.) The corroboration requirement of 

Penal Code section 1111 is a collateral factual issue, not an element of 

the charged offenses that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 967.) "[F]ailure to instruct on 

accomplice liability under [Penal Code] section 1111 is harmless if there 

was adequate corroboration of the witness." (People v. Brown (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 518, 557.)

With respect to the standard of review, appellant initially 

acknowledges: "[T]he California Supreme Court has held instructions on 

the corroboration requirement in section 1111 do not define an element of 

the charged offense and thus do not involve the federal Constitution. 

(People v. Frye[, supra,] 18 Cal.4th [at pp.] 968-969, overruled on other 

grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ...."

Appellant nevertheless contends: "Because accomplice status of a 

prosecution witness is intertwined with proof of the defendant's guilt, error 

in failing to instruct on those principles violates the federal Constitution, 

bringing the Chapman standard of harmless error analysis [Chapman v. 

California (1967) 386 U.S. 18] into play." "[T]he requirement under [Penal 

Code] section 1111 that 'a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of 

an accomplice unless it be corroborated' is a matter of state law, which

does not implicate a federal constitutional right. [Citations.]" (Barco v. 

Tilton (C.D.Cal. 2010) 694 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1136.) If a trial court's alleged 

instructional error violates only California law, the standard is that stated in 

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, which permits the People to 

avoid reversal unless "it is reasonably probable that a result more 

favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence 

of the error." (See People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 506, fn. 11.)

C. Analysis

Here, it is highly questionable whether C.A. was liable to 

prosecution for the identical offense — murder — charged against the 

appellant in count 1. (§ 1111.) Even if C.A. was subject to such 

prosecution, the court's "failure to instruct on accomplice liability ... is 

harmless if there was adequate corroboration of the witness." (People v. 

Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 557.) As noted above, In June 2004, Lopez 

and appellant had a fight after appellant made some comments about the 

Ganas shooting. Lopez said he and appellant were drunk on tequila at the 

time. Lopez did not think that appellant was aware of his friendship with 

Ganas. Lopez was under the impression that appellant was visiting in 

Mexico, but appellant said he had done something wrong. Appellant went 

on to tell Lopez "[t]hat it was a car full of guys and then [appellant] shot 

...." Upon further questioning by the prosecutor, Lopez affirmed that the 

car was full of guys, and that appellant was the one who shot Ganas. In 

addition, Yrigollen immediately notified Madera police that appellant was 

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in Mexico when she saw the advertisement in the Madera Tribune about 

the Ganas murder. The information that Yrigollen provided led to the 

apprehension of appellant.

Even if we assume that C.A. was an accomplice to the murder, the 

testimony of Michael Lopez corroborated the testimony of C.A., and it is 

not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant 

would have been reached had the court instructed sua sponte on the law 

of accomplice testimony pursuant to section 1111.

People v. Esparza, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4319 at 19-26.

2. Analysis

Petitioner claims his conviction cannot stand because it was supported by the 

uncorroborated testimony of accomplice Christian Arias. In federal court "a conviction 

may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." United States v. 

Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 161 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 

470, 495, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917) ("there is no absolute rule of law 

preventing convictions on the testimony of accomplices if juries believe them."); United 

States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The uncorroborated 

testimony of an accomplice is enough to sustain a conviction unless it is incredible or 

insubstantial on its face"). California Penal Code § 1111, which requires corroboration of 

accomplice testimony, is a "state law requirement" which is "not required by the 

Constitution or federal law." Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Petitioner's claim that uncorroborated accomplice testimony was improperly used to 

support his conviction is based solely on a perceived error of state law and is therefore 

not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 

41, 104 S. Ct. 871, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1984) ("A federal court may not issue the writ on the 

basis of a perceived error of state law.").

Because the testimony of Petitioner's co-defendant was neither incredible nor 

insubstantial on its face, Petitioner is only entitled to habeas corpus relief if the state 

court's alleged violation of state law denied him his due process right to fundamental 

fairness. Laboa, 224 F.3d at 979. The evidence introduced at Petitioner's trial, including 

the testimony of his accomplice, was sufficient to support his convictions. See Jackson v. 

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Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) (there is sufficient 

evidence to support a conviction if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.").

Further, "[a] State violates a criminal defendant's due process right to 

fundamental fairness if it arbitrarily deprives the defendant of a state law entitlement." 

Laboa, 224 F.3d at 979 (citing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S. Ct. 2227, 

65 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1980)). State criminal procedures do not violate the Due Process 

Clause unless they "offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 

conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 

U.S. 37, 43, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 135 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1996). The California Court of Appeal 

carefully reviewed the evidence and determined that, under state law, sufficient evidence 

corroborated the accomplice testimony. This determination by the Court of Appeal is 

supported by the facts of this case and does not constitute an arbitrary denial of a state 

law entitlement. Further, the court's ruling does not offend any fundamental principle of 

justice or render Petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair. Petitioner is not entitled to relief 

on his claim that there was insufficient evidence based on the lack of corroboration of 

accomplice testimony to support his conviction.

B. Claim Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner, in his second claim, contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the testimony of Virginia Yrigollen regarding her statements that she 

believed that Petitioner wanted to confess to her. (Pet. at 8.) 

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented his claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claims were denied in a reasoned decision by the 

Court of Appeal (People v. Perkins, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3735) and in a 

subsequent petition for review filed with California Supreme Court. (Lodged Docs. 4-5.) 

Since the Court of Appeal was the last court to issue a reasoned opinion on these 

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issues, this Court “looks through” the California Supreme Court decision to the reasoned 

analysis of the Court of Appeal. 

With regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court of Appeal 

said in its opinion:

III. DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO TESTIMONY OF A 

PROSECUTION WITNESS THAT SHE BELIEVED APPELLANT WAS 

ABOUT TO CONFESS TO HER IN JUNE 2004.

Appellant contends he was denied his constitutional right to the 

effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to object to the 

testimony of Virginia Yrigollen "that she believed appellant was about to 

confess to her when she told him to stop talking."

A. Yrigollen's Testimony

As noted above, Yrigollen testified that she lived with her boyfriend,

Franco near Mexicali, Mexico in 2004. Their residence was about three 

and one-half miles from the U.S./Mexico border. She said her son, Lopez, 

visited occasionally, and that Franco was appellant's uncle. Both Yrigollen 

and Lopez testified that appellant goes by the nickname "Poncho." 

Yrigollen said appellant arrived at her home in June 2004 and stayed 

about a month. Appellant would also stay at an aunt's house in the 

Mexicali area. Yrigollen said appellant's mother would come to Mexicali 

and leave money and groceries for appellant.

Yrigollen said she was a close friend of the mother of Ganas. 

Yrigollen had known Ganas his entire life and knew he had been shot in 

Madera. In June 2004, Yrigollen asked appellant about the Ganas 

shooting, but appellant said he did not remember much. Appellant claimed 

he had been at home when some friends stopped by to pick him up. 

Yrigollen said she stopped appellant from giving a explanation because 

she had a hard time believing his version of events. Yrigollen said she was 

shocked and upset and really did not want to know what had happened to 

Ganas. Yrigollen said appellant was making himself look bad by running 

and told him he should go back and clear matters up. Although appellant 

did not respond to her advice, Yrigollen said appellant looked at her and 

"he knew it needed to be done."

B. Appellant's Motion for New Trial

On September 9, 2010, appellant filed a motion for new trial (§§ 

1179, 1181) and asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 

object on Evidence Code section 352 grounds to the "entirely irrelevant" 

testimony of Virginia Yrigollen. He argued in his new trial motion: "The 

mere fact that [Yrigollen] thought that he was about to confess does not 

make the statement admissible. The meaning of the defendant's 

statement is ambiguous and should have been excluded." The trial court 

denied the new trial motion on that ground stating: "[T]he fact that she 

made a statement and then she said that she stopped, I don't find that to 

be unduly prejudicial, and I don't think that was subject to an objection at 

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that point. She may have had some thoughts about what that meant, but 

the fact that she would not take further information meant that she didn't 

get further information, and that may have actually worked to the benefit of 

the defense. But I don't find prejudice in the statement as made on the 

record."

C. Law of Ineffective Assistance

According to appellant's opening brief, Yrigollen claimed that he 

confessed to her. He maintains that a timely objection by his trial counsel 

would have excluded testimony that "created a substantial danger of 

prejudice and confusion." To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel, an appellant must show, first, that his trial counsel's 

representation was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional standards, and second, that 

counsel's deficient representation caused him prejudice. (Strickland v. 

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694; In re Emilye A. (1992) 9 

Cal.App.4th 1695, 1711.) To show prejudice, an appellant must show that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient 

performance, the result of the proceeding would have been more 

favorable to the appellant. (In re Emilye A., supra, at p. 1711; In re Dennis 

H. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 94, 98.)

"'A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every 

effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of 

the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a 

strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome 

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

"might be considered sound trial strategy." [Citation.] There are countless 

ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.'" (People v. Lewis

(1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 288, quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 

U.S. at p. 689.) "[A]n ineffective assistance claim may be reviewed on 

direct appeal where 'there simply could be no satisfactory explanation' for 

trial counsel's action or inaction. [ Citation.]" (In re Dennis H., supra, 88 

Cal.App.4th at p. 98, fn. 1.)

D. Analysis

Appellant has failed to show deficient performance by trial counsel 

or prejudice in this case. Despite appellant's claims to the contrary, 

Yrigollen never expressly said that she thought appellant was about to 

confess to her. At most, the testimony was relevant to explain appellant's 

flight to Mexico after the shooting of Ganas and explained Yrigollen's 

conduct in contacting Crime Stoppers after seeing a newspaper article 

about the shooting of Ganas. Yrigollen said she asked appellant about the 

Ganas shooting in June 2004. At that time, appellant told Yrigollen he did 

not remember much. Yrigollen told appellant he was making himself look 

bad "running like this" and encouraged him to "go back, clear it up ...." 

According to Yrigollen, appellant "looked at me. He knew ... it needed to 

be done, you know." Even if trial counsel had interposed a timely, 

successful objection to Yrigollen's testimony, it is not reasonably probable 

a result more favorable to appellant would have occurred.

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People v. Esparza, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4319 at 28-33.

2. Law Applicable to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established 

for the purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1998). In a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court must consider two factors. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Lowry 

v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that counsel's 

performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that 

he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel's alleged acts 

or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering 

the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 

(9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. A court 

indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also, Harrington v. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011).

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner must show that counsel's errors were “so serious

as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. The 

Court must evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable 

because of counsel's ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1348; United 

States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before 

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any 

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deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. However, there are 

certain instances which are legally presumed to result in prejudice, e.g., where there has 

been an actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel or where the State has 

interfered with counsel's assistance. Id. at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S., at 

659, and n. 25 (1984).

As the Supreme Court reaffirmed recently in Harrington v. Richter, meeting the 

standard for ineffective assistance of counsel in federal habeas is extremely difficult:

The pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking 

whether defense counsel's performance fell below Strickland's standard. 

Were that the inquiry, the analysis would be no different than if, for 

example, this Court were adjudicating a Strickland claim on direct review 

of a criminal conviction in a United States district court. Under AEDPA, 

though, it is a necessary premise that the two questions are different. For 

purposes of § 2254(d)(1), "an unreasonable application of federal law is 

different from an incorrect application of federal law." Williams, supra, at 

410, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389. A state court must be granted a 

deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves 

review under the Strickland standard itself.

A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 

federal habeas relief so long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on the 

correctness of the state court's decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004). And as this 

Court has explained, "[E]valuating whether a rule application was 

unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general 

the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-bycase determinations." Ibid. "[I]t is not an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a 

specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court." 

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419, 173 L. Ed. 

2d 251, 261 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785-86.

"It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state 

court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 786. "As amended by AEDPA, § 

2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims 

already rejected in state proceedings." Id. "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus 

from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error 

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

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disagreement." Id. at 786-87.

Accordingly, even if Petitioner presents a strong case of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, this Court may only grant relief if no fairminded jurist could agree on the 

correctness of the state court decision.

3. Analysis

The state court denied the claim by finding that Petitioner did not establish that he 

was prejudiced by the actions of counsel. The statements made by Yrigollen at trial were 

summarized in the state court decision. (See Rep. Tr. at 335-50.) As described,

Petitioner came to stay with Yrigollen in Mexico in June 2004, a couple months after the 

shooting. (Id.) Yrigollen was a close friend of the victim's mother, and asked Petitioner 

about the shooting. (Id.) Petitioner responded that he did not remember much, and 

Yrigollen prevented him from telling her more. Suspecting that Petitioner had some 

involvement in the shooting, Yrigollen told Petitioner that it looked bad that he fled, and 

that he should "clear up" what is going on. (Id.) Finally, Yrigollen stated that Petitioner 

looked at her, and she sensed that Petitioner knew "what needed to be done." (Id.)

On cross-examination defense counsel elicited testimony from Yrigollen that even 

if she suspected that Petitioner was involved in the shooting, she waited to call a crime 

hotline and tell authorities about Petitioner until four years later, in 2008. (Rep. Tr. at 

346-47.) Further, defense counsel questioned Yrigollen regarding her own criminal 

activity, including a pending charge for drug possession at the time of her testimony. (Id.) 

Based on the testimony provided by Yrigollen, the state court found that Petitioner 

could not show that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object, or that he was 

prejudiced by the testimony provided so that the results of the trial would be different. 

The Court agrees. Yrigollen's testimony was vague, and at no point did she state 

that Petitioner confessed to her. While the testimony provided the jury information that 

Petitioner had fled the country shortly after the shooting, Yrigollen provided no further 

information regarding the facts surrounding the shooting. Further, her statements that 

Petitioner needed to clear things up and that Petitioner knew what he needed to do 

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lacked specificity, and could have just have likely indicated that Yrigollen thought that 

Petitioner, if he knew what happened at the shooting, needed to speak with law 

enforcement, regardless of whether he was implicated in the shooting or not. 

This testimony was not highly prejudicial to Petitioner. While the evidence of flight 

might have been circumstantial evidence of his guilt, the testimony was not strong, and 

the fact that Petitioner visited his uncle, in and of itself, was not overly suspicious.

Moreover, the testimony had little impact on the result in light of the much stronger

evidence of the prosecution witness Christian Arias. Arias testified that while seated in 

the car with Petitioner, he observed Petitioner shoot the victim. 

Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that but for counsel being ineffective, 

there was a "reasonable probability that... the result ... would have been different." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The prosecution presented strong evidence of Petitioner's 

guilt based on the evidence presented regarding the retaliatory shooting of a rival gang 

member. Based on the strong evidence presented of Petitioner's involvement in the 

crime of conviction, it is unlikely that jurors would have not found Petitioner guilty if his 

counsel would have objected to testimony from Yrigollen that implicated that Petitioner 

was involved and needed to speak to law enforcement. In light of the other testimony 

presented at trial, including eyewitness testimony of the shooting itself, the state court 

was reasonable in finding that any potential prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to 

any of Yrigollen's testimony was harmless. 

Fairminded jurists could therefore disagree with the correctness of the state court 

decision that counsel's failure to object to the admission of the testimony as not "so 

serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687. Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.

C. Claim Three: Failure To Provide Jury Instructions 

Petitioner, in his third claim, contends that the trial court committed prejudicial 

error in failing to instruct sua sponte on voluntary manslaughter based on a sudden 

quarrel or heat of passion. (Pet. at 9-10.) 

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1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented his claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claims were denied in a reasoned decision by the 

Court of Appeal (People v. Esparza, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4319 at 33-36) and in 

a subsequent petition for review filed with California Supreme Court (Lodged Docs. 4-5.) 

Since the Court of Appeal was the last court to issue a reasoned opinion on these 

issues, this Court “looks through” the California Supreme Court decision to the reasoned 

analysis of the Court of Appeal. 

With regard to the jury instruction claim, the Court of Appeal said in its opinion:

IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 

FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY SUA SPONTE ON VOLUNTARY 

MANSLAUGHTER BASED ON A SUDDEN QUARREL OR HEAT OF 

PASSION.

Appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error by 

failing to instruct sua sponte on voluntary manslaughter based on sudden 

quarrel or heat of passion.

A. Reported Instructional Conference

At the reported conference on jury instructions, trial counsel 

advised the court, "Your Honor, just to be specific, we're not requesting an 

instruction for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included. I think that 

was what we discussed and wanted to put on the record." The prosecutor 

added that the defense was not asking for self-defense instructions 

because self-defense would be inconsistent with the defendant's theory of 

the case. Appellant's trial counsel concurred, saying, "That is correct, Your 

Honor. We're not requesting the instruction, and it would, in fact, be 

inconsistent with our theory."

B. Law of Invited Error

"When a defense attorney makes a 'conscious, deliberate tactical 

choice' to forego a particular instruction, the invited error doctrine bars an 

argument on appeal that the instruction was omitted in error. [Citations.]" 

(People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 657-658.) In the context of 

voluntary manslaughter instructions, " 'the doctrine of invited error ... 

applies if the court accedes to a defense attorney's tactical decision to 

request that lesser included offense instructions not be given' [citation] ...." 

(People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1330 (Castaneda).)

C. Analysis

Appellant claims the rule of Castaneda does not apply in his case 

because "trial counsel provided no tactical reason for not requesting 

instructions on voluntary manslaughter." Accepting appellant's contention 

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as correct for purposes of this argument, the next question is whether sua 

sponte instructions on voluntary manslaughter were called for in this case.

"Voluntary manslaughter 'is the unlawful killing of a human being 

without malice,' committed 'upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.' (§ 

192, subd. (a).) [T]o establish the crime of voluntary manslaughter, there 

must be evidence that (1) the defendant killed in the heat of passion, and 

(2) such passion would be aroused in an ordinarily reasonable person 

under the circumstances. [Citation.]" (Castaneda, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 

1330-1331.) " 'The provocation which incites a defendant to homicidal 

conduct in the heat of passion must be caused by the victim [citation], or 

be conduct reasonably believed by the defendant to have been engaged 

in by the victim.' [Citation.] '[T]he victim must taunt the defendant or 

otherwise initiate the provocation.' [Citations.] The ' "heat of passion must 

be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an 

ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances ...." 

' [Citation.]" (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705.)

In this case, appellant claims the provocation consisted of bad 

looks and the throwing of a gang sign by Norteno gang members at the 

mini-mart. He also contends George Ganas walked "real slow" in front of 

Rodriguez's vehicle, acted tough, and placed his hands in his waistband, 

as if he were reaching for weapon. Such conduct falls short of taunting or 

the initiation of provocation, and any heat of passion engendered by 

Ganas's actions was not such passion "as would naturally be aroused in 

the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and 

circumstances." (People v. Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 705.) The 

evidence was simply insufficient to justify a sua sponte instruction on 

voluntary manslaughter and reversal for instructional error is not required.

People v. Esparza, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4319 at 33-36.

2. Analysis

To the extent Petitioner alleges the instructional claim violated state law, 

Petitioner's claim is not cognizable in this proceeding. The Supreme Court has held that 

a challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim 

cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72. 

A claim that an instruction was deficient in comparison to a state model or that a trial 

judge incorrectly interpreted or applied state law governing jury instructions does not 

entitle one to relief under § 2254, which requires violation of the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3). Accordingly, to the extent 

that Petitioner raises state law claims, his claims should be dismissed.

Although the Supreme Court has held that the failure to instruct on lesser included 

offenses can constitute constitutional error in capital cases, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 

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625, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 65 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1980), it has reserved decision on whether such 

an omission in non-capital cases constitutes constitutional error, id. at 638 n.7. When the 

Supreme Court has expressly reserved consideration of an issue, there is no Supreme 

Court precedent creating clearly established federal law relating to a petitioner's habeas 

claim. Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a petitioner 

cannot rely on circuit authority, and there is no basis for relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) 

for an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Alberni v. McDaniel, 

458 F.3d at 864; Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955-57 (9th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, there is no clearly established federal law within the meaning of § 

2254(d) concerning a state court's rejection of a claim that Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights in a non-capital case were violated by a failure to instruct on a lesser 

included offense. Thus, such a claim is not cognizable in a proceeding pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 and is subject to dismissal. Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1105-06 

(9th Cir. 1998).

Further, the absence of the instruction did not result in any fundamental 

unfairness. The only basis for federal collateral relief for instructional error is that an 

infirm instruction or the lack of instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72; Cupp v. 

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S. Ct. 396, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1973); see Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1974) (it must be 

established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even "universally 

condemned," but that it violated some right guaranteed to the defendant by the 

Fourteenth Amendment). The Court in Estelle emphasized that the Court had very 

narrowly defined the category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness, and that 

beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process 

Clause has limited operation. 502 U.S. at 72-73.

However, when habeas is sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a failure to instruct on 

the defense theory of the case constitutes error if the theory is legally sound and 

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evidence in the case makes it applicable. Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 

2006); see Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S. Ct. 883, 99 L. Ed. 2d 54 

(1988) (reversing a conviction and holding that even if a defendant denies one or more 

elements of the crime, he is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is 

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment, and the 

defendant requests such an instruction).

Petitioner contends that the trial court should have sua sponte instructed the jury 

with regard to heat of passion voluntary manslaughter. Petitioner argues that the 

provocation was based on the fact that the victim exchanged "bad looks," was acting 

tough, and making gestures including making gang signs and putting his hands in his 

pants near the waist. (See Rep. Tr. at 67-68, 72-73, 112-114.) Upon review, the state 

court found that the victim's actions fell short of the provocation required, and that any 

heat of passion engendered from his actions was not such passion as would be aroused 

in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person. People v. Esparza, 2012 Cal. App. 

Unpub. LEXIS 4319 at 33-36. The state court holding was in accord with state law that 

ordinarily reasonable people do become provoked by gang references or challenges. 

See People v. Avila, 46 Cal. 4th 680, 706 (2009) ("Even assuming it was reference to a 

gang, and that a gang member might have perceived the statement as some sort of a 

challenge, the requisite provocation must be one that would provoke an ordinarily 

reasonable person. Reasonable people do not become homicidally enraged when 

hearing the term 'Carmelos,' even if it is understood as a fleeting gang reference or 

challenge.") (citation omitted.) The instruction was not applicable here, and further 

defense counsel stated that the theory of provocation would be inconsistent with the 

defense strategy. 

Petitioner has not shown that he suffered any fundamental unfairness or that the 

omission had any substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict. Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court deny Petitioner's claim 

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concerning the failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of voluntary 

manslaughter.

D. Claim Four: Cumulative Error

In his final claim for relief, Petitioner argues that the cumulative effect of the errors 

at his trial violated his right to due process and a fair trial. (Pet. at 11.)

In the last reasoned decision denying Petitioner's claim, the appellate court held: 

V. REVERSAL IS NOT COMPELLED BY ASSERTED CUMULATIVE 

ERROR.

Appellant contends the cumulative effect of errors committed at trial 

violated his right to due process of law under the 14th Amendment to the 

United States Constitution.

We have concluded that no prejudicial error occurred. Accordingly, 

there was no error to cumulate to appellant's prejudice. (People v. 

Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 565; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 

585, 630.)

People v. Esparza, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4319.

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that under clearly established United States 

Supreme Court precedent, the combined effect of multiple trial errors may give rise to a 

due process violation if it renders a trial fundamentally unfair, even where each error 

considered individually would not require reversal. Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 

(9th. Cir. 2007) (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 40 

L. Ed. 2d 431 (1974) and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 

35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973)). See also Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011) (if 

no error of constitutional magnitude occurred at trial, "no cumulative prejudice is 

possible"). "The fundamental question in determining whether the combined effect of trial 

errors violated a defendant's due process rights is whether the errors rendered the 

criminal defense 'far less persuasive,' Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, and thereby had a 

'substantial and injurious effect or influence' on the jury's verdict." Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 

(quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).

This Court has addressed each of Petitioner's claims raised in the instant petition 

and has concluded that no error of constitutional magnitude occurred at his trial in state 

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court. This Court also concludes that the errors alleged by Petitioner, even when 

considered together, did not render his defense "far less persuasive," nor did they have 

a "substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict." Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim of cumulative error.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply 

to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 

834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 4, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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