Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00010/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00010-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EGOROV DMITRIY,

Plaintiff,

v.

KUCHUR BELLA,

Defendant.

No. 2:20-cv-10-TLN-KJN PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE AND 

TO DECLARE PLAINTIFF 

A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT

Plaintiff Egorov Dmitriy, proceeding without counsel, commenced this action and 

requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) After the court reviewed its 

records, the undersigned ordered plaintiff to show cause why he should not be declared a 

vexatious litigant. (ECF No. 3.) The court informed plaintiff of the potential consequences of 

such a designation, and set a briefing schedule and hearing date. (Id.)

The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint, and finds it fails for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Thus, this action should be dismissed with prejudice. Further, the undersigned finds 

plaintiff to be a repeat, serial litigant whose actions have made it clear he will only continue to 

abuse the judicial process and inundate courts in this district with frivolous complaints that do 

nothing but strain the court’s limited resources. Therefore, the undersigned recommends plaintiff

be deemed a vexatious litigant, and recommends a pre–filing order be instituted against him.

///

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Background1

On August 28, 2019, plaintiff filed this action against Kuchur Bella under Title 18 U.S.C. 

§ 241 of the criminal code. (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint is largely unintelligible, but appears to 

seek damages against Kuchar regarding plaintiff’s mother’s housing. The Complaint also 

references another case of plaintiff’s in which Magistrate Judge Claire allegedly “refuse to pay 

relocation money assistance to mother petitioner in order continue neurological damage in 

USA[.]” The Complaint appears to seek $50,000 in damages from either Kuchar or the Slavic 

Community Center (a possible third party?), as well as $999 trillion dollars from the court.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court screened plaintiff’s complaint. A review of the 

court’s docket reveals that since 2014, plaintiff has filed over 30 cases in this district wherein he

proceeds pro se and requests a waiver of the filing fees.2 As shown in more detail below, none of 

plaintiff’s cases has progressed past the court’s screening process, and a majority of these actions

have been dismissed as frivolous, vague, unintelligible, fanciful, or delusional. Further, in many 

of those cases, it appears plaintiff has been using an address that is not his own, causing the 

court’s notices to flood the mail of the actual residents. (See, e.g., docket entry on January 22, 

2020, “Mail Returned as Undeliverable”; Case No. 2:19–cv–1110, three “Undeliverable” entries.)

On January 9, 2020, the court ordered plaintiff to show cause why he should not be 

declared a vexatious litigant. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff was to respond in writing by February 27, 

2020, and appear at a hearing on the matter on March 12, 2020. (Id.) On January 10, 2020, the 

court served the order to show cause on plaintiff. (See Docket Entry on 1/10/20.) Plaintiff did 

not respond in writing to the court’s order, nor did he appear at the March 12 hearing.

///

1 These facts are based on information contained in the Complaint, and on documents contained 

in the court’s docket that are part of the public record––of which the undersigned takes judicial 

notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F. 2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 

1988) (“In addition to the complaint, it is proper for the district court to take judicial notice of 

matters of public record outside the pleadings and consider them for purposes of [dismissal].”)

2 The court is aware that at times plaintiff files his complaints under the name “Dmitriy

Yegorov.” Accordingly, it takes judicial notice of the cases under the name “Yegorov.”

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I. Plaintiff’s instant claims fail under the substantiality doctrine.

A federal court has an independent duty to assess whether federal subject matter 

jurisdiction exists, whether or not the parties raise the issue. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. 

Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 

F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1996). The court must sua sponte dismiss the case if, at any time, it 

determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “Under the 

substantiality doctrine, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the question 

presented is too insubstantial to consider.” Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035 

(9th Cir. 1985) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-39 (1974)). “The claim must be ‘so 

insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this court or otherwise completely 

devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the District court, 

whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the federal issues on the merits.’” Id. (quoting 

Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)); see also Apple v. Glenn, 

183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (“a district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a 

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, 

unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.”).

Here, plaintiff’s Complaint is largely unintelligible, but appears to seek damages against 

defendant Kuchar under a section of the criminal code regarding plaintiff’s mother’s housing. 

(See ECF No. 1.) The Complaint also references another case of plaintiff’s in which Magistrate 

Judge Claire allegedly “refuse to pay relocation money assistance to mother petitioner in order 

continue neurological damage in USA.” The Complaint also seeks $50,000 from either Kuchar 

or the Slavic Community Center (a possible third party?), as well as $999 trillion dollars from the 

court. 

The court notes multiple issues with plaintiff’s Complaint. First, the right to represent 

oneself pro se is personal to the plaintiff and does not extend to other parties. Simon v. Hartford 

Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 

(9th Cir. 1962) (“A litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority to represent anyone 

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other than himself.”). Correspondingly, a non-attorney has no authority to appear pro se as an 

attorney for others. C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. U.S., 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987); see also

Local Rule 183(a) (“Individuals who are representing themselves in this court may not delegate 

the litigation of their claims to any other individual.”). Plaintiff is not an attorney, and so cannot 

act in a representative fashion to bring claims on behalf of his mother3or anyone else––as this is 

the unauthorized practice of law. Second, plaintiff is a private citizen, and has no standing to 

prosecute any alleged crimes. See, e.g., Newman v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., 2018 WL 

3361442, *1 (S.D. Cal. July 10, 2018). Third, even if plaintiff’s claims could be construed as 

civil claims, the court finds that plaintiff’s allegations are implausible, frivolous, devoid of merit, 

and unsubstantial. Therefore, the court concludes that this action should be dismissed for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the substantiality doctrine. Cook, 775 F.2d at 1035.

Although the court ordinarily grants leave to amend, especially with pro se litigants, the 

nature of plaintiff’s Complaint here strongly suggests that granting leave to amend would be 

futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). Courts in this 

district (i) have informed plaintiff––many times before––that he cannot bring charges under the 

criminal code, and (ii) have dismissed these cases as frivolous. (See Section II.C. below.) Such 

prior frivolous actions further counsel against granting leave to amend.

II. Plaintiff should be deemed a vexatious litigant, and a pre–filing order should 

be imposed.

Legal Standard

District courts have power under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), to issue prefiling orders that restrict a litigant’s ability to initiate court proceedings. De Long v. Hennessey, 

912 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1990). “[S]uch pre-filing orders are an extreme remedy that should 

rarely be used.” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). 

However, “[f]lagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one 

person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious 

3 The court has previously found plaintiff’s mother, Ms. Liudmyla Iegorova, to be a vexatious 

litigant. See Iegorova v. Feygan, 2019 WL 4929910, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2019), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5596478 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2019)

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claims of other litigants.” De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148. 

Before entering a pre-filing order, a court is to: (A) give the litigant notice and a chance 

to be heard before the order is entered; (B) compile an adequate record for review; (C) make 

substantive findings about the frivolous or harassing nature of the plaintiff’s litigation, and (D) 

narrowly tailor the vexatious litigant order “to closely fit the specific vice encountered. Molski, 

500 F. 3d at 1057. The first and second factors are procedural considerations; the third and fourth 

factors are substantive considerations that help the district court “define who is, in fact, a 

‘vexatious litigant’ as well as construct a remedy that will stop the litigant’s abusive behavior 

without unduly infringing the litigant’s right to access the courts.” Id. at 1057-58. As to the 

substantive factors, the Ninth Circuit has found to be helpful an examination of the litigant’s 

history, motives, representation by counsel, as well as the expense to others or burdens on the 

court and the possibility of other sanctions. Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles, 761 F. 

3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F. 2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986)).

Analysis

A. Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard

Procedural due process is satisfied where the court notifies the litigant it is considering a 

vexatious litigant order, provides details about the scope of the proceedings, and allows for the 

litigant to respond to the court’s concerns. Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1063.

The court ordered plaintiff to show cause why he should not be declared a vexatious 

litigant. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff was notified of this order on January 10, 2020, but he neither

filed a written response nor appeared at the March 3, 2020 hearing. Thus, because plaintiff was 

notified of the court’s order to show cause, and because the court held its hearing on the OSC, the 

procedural duty on this first of the DeLong steps is met. 912 F.2d at 1146; Ringgold-Lockhart, 

761 F.3d at 1063 (finding due process satisfied where the litigant was notified of the vexatious–

litigant proceedings and appeared at a hearing on the matter).

B. Adequate Record for Review

“An adequate record for review should include a listing of all the cases and motions that 

led the district court to conclude that a vexatious litigant order was needed.” De Long, 912 F.2d 

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at 1147. A district court compiles a proper record for review where a complete list of the cases 

filed by the litigant, alongside those complaints, accompanies the vexatious litigant order. 

Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1063. 

Plaintiff has filed over 30 actions in this court since 2014––almost half of which were 

filed in the past two years.4 As a general outline, the court notes that in a substantial majority of 

these cases: (a) plaintiff attempts to assert claims under the criminal code; (b) courts in this 

district have explicitly found his complaints to be legally frivolous; (c) when he has been given 

leave to amend, he fails to do so; and (d) he consistently lists his address at places where he does 

not reside. (See Section I.C.1, below, for further detail). This collection of plaintiff’s cases is 

more than adequate to provide the court with a record demonstrating his vexatious conduct. See

Molski, 500 F.3d at 1059 (finding the district court compiled a proper record for review where 

“[t]he record before the district court contained a complete list of the cases filed by Molski in the 

Central District of California, along with the complaints from many of those cases,” and where 

“[a]lthough the district court's decision entering the pre-filing order did not list every case filed by 

Molski, it did outline and discuss many of them.”).

4 See Yegorov v. Bel Air Company, 2:14-cv-01852-MCE-CKD PS; Yegorov v. Counsulate of 

Ukraine in San Francisco, 2:14-cv-01886-KJM-EFB PS; Yegorov v. McBrien, 2:14-cv-02106-

JAM-CKD PS; Yegorov v. Roman, 2:14-cv-02119-GEB-AC PS; Yegorov v. Buchkovskaya, 

2:14-cv-02185-KJM-DAD PS; Yegorov v. United States of America, 2:14-cv-03003-TLN-AC

PS; Yegorov v. Zigaylo, 2:15-cv-00664-TLN-EFB PS; Yegorov v. Kramer, 2:15-cv-01042-TLNGGH PS; Yegorov v. Walmart, 2:15-cv-01065-GEB-AC PS; Yegorov v. Goodwill Industries, 

2:15-cv-01066-KJM-AC PS; Yegorov v. Ray, 2:15-cv-01279-KJM-CKD PS; Yegorov v. 

Carmichael Adventist Church, 2:15-cv-01543-TLN-CKD PS; Yegorov v. President Seventh-Day 

Adventist Church, 2:15-cv-01692-MCE-AC PS; Yegorov v. Secret Service, 2:15-cv-01693-JAMCKD PS; Yegorov v. Owens et al, 2:16-cv-02576-JAM-DB PS; Yegorov v. Government USA, 

2:17-cv-01109-MCE-CKD PS; Yegorov v. Government USA, 2:17-cv-01110-MCE-GGH PS; 

Yegorov v. Government USA, 2:17-cv-01111-JAM-GGH PS; Yegorov v. Dzyba, 2:19-cv-01110-

MCE-AC PS; Yegorov v. Baker 2:19-cv-02337-MCE-EFB PS; Yegorov v. Daniil, 2:18-cv00601-MCE-GGH PS; Yegorov v. Sutter Hospital, 2:18-cv-00609-TLN-AC PS; Yegorov v. 

Hutchenson, 2:18-cv-01095-TLN-DB PS; Yegorov v. Interpol US, 2:18-cv-01558-KJM-CKD

PS; Yegorov v. Japan, 2:18-cv-01731-KJM-CKD PS; Yegorov v. Switzerland, 2:18-cv-01733-

KJM-DB PS; Yegorov v. Spain, 2:18-cv-01732-KJM-EFB PS; Yegorov v. Great Britain, 2:18-

cv-02840-TLN-EFB PS; Yegorov et al v. Welby, 2:19-cv-00720-KJM-CKD PS; Yegorov v. 

Becerra, 2:19-cv-01685-MCE-AC PS; Dmitriy v. Vladislava 2:20-cv-00009-JAM-AC PS; 

Dmitriy v. Bella, 2:20-cv-00010-TLN-KJN PS; Dmitriy v. Yuriy, 2:20-cv-00011-JAM-AC PS; 

Dmitriy v Eastern District Court, 2:20-cv-00076–KJM-DB PS.

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C. The Frivolous or Harassing Nature of Plaintiff’s Litigation

“[B]efore a district court issues a pre-filing injunction . . . it is incumbent on the court to 

make substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant's actions.” De 

Long, 912 F. 2d at 1148. Under the Ninth Circuit’s framework, the court considers whether:

1) the litigant’s history of litigation entails vexatious, harassing or duplicative 

lawsuits; 

2) the litigant has an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; 

3) the litigant is represented by counsel; 

4) the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an 

unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and 

5) other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties.

Molski, 500 F. 3d at 1052 (citing Safir, 792 F.2d at 24). 

As described in subsections 1–5 below, the weight of these factors supports a substantive 

finding that plaintiff–– by filing the cases listed in footnote 4––has engaged in frivolous and 

harassing behavior, such that the third De Long step favors instituting a pre–filing order.

1) Plaintiff’s history of vexatious, harassing lawsuits

Plaintiff has filed over 30 actions in this court since 2014, nearly half of which have come 

in the past two years. Courts in this district have screened each of these complaints, as plaintiff

has submitted a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in every case he has filed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines . . . the action 

(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”). 

In the vast majority of his actions where the complaint was intelligible, plaintiff has 

asserted claims under 18 U.S.C. (the criminal code), which cannot be maintained by private 

citizens. See Allen v. Gold Country Cascino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (no private 

right of action for violation of criminal statutes). In many of the screening orders dismissing his

case, courts in this district have told plaintiff as much.

5 Despite this, he continues to file cases.—

5 See, e.g., Yegorov v. Hutchenson, 2:18-cv-01095-TLN-DB PS, ECF No. 3 at 3 (“These criminal 

provisions, however, provide no basis for civil liability.”); Yegorov v. Great Britain, 2:18-cv-02840-

TLN-EFB PS, ECF No. 3 at 2 (“Plaintiff, however, cannot state a claim for violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 241, a criminal statute that does not provide a private right of action.”).

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including this case––in which he asserts claims under the criminal code. Many of these cases

were determined to be too incoherent to state a cause of action at all, and were dismissed without 

leave to amend at the screening stage.

6

In many of plaintiff’s actions, the court explicitly dismissed the complaint as “frivolous”

or gave plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint because the complaint was too incoherent to 

even determine frivolity, which the undersigned construes as ultimately frivolous in nature.

7

 In a 

majority of plaintiff’s actions, he requests damages somewhere between $9 and $999 trillion 

dollars. See Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Under the 

substantiality doctrine, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the question 

presented is too insubstantial to consider.”); see also Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 

1999) (“a district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the 

allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of 

merit, or no longer open to discussion.”). 

Finally, the undersigned notes that in multiple of plaintiff’s actions, although courts 

granted his leave to amend, he failed to file amended complaints.

8

 See Chambers v. NASCO, 

Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (recognizing that a court “may act sua sponte to dismiss a suit for 

failure to prosecute”); Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 

(9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that courts may dismiss an action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(b) sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute or comply with the rules of civil 

6 See Yegorov v. Roman, 2:14-cv-02119-GEB-AC PS; Yegorov v. Walmart, 2:15-cv-01065-

GEB-AC PS, ECF No. 3 at 2 (“Plaintiff’s complaint contains sentences that are largely 

incomplete and/or incoherent, making it impossible to discern any basis for the court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction.”)

7 See, e.g., Yegorov v. Switzerland, 2:18-cv-01733-KJM-DB PS, ECF No. 3 at 3 (“[N]ot only 

does the complaint fail to state a claim, but the complaint’s allegations are also delusional and 

frivolous.”); Yegorov v. Hutchenson , 2:18-cv-01095-TLN-DB PS (dismissed for, amongst other 

reasons, frivolity).

8 See, e.g., Yegorov v. Owens et al., 2:16-cv-02576-JAM-DB PS; Yegorov v. Government USA, 

2:17-cv-01109-MCE-CKD PS.

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procedure or the court’s orders); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(“Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), the district court may dismiss an action for 

failure to comply with any order of the court.”). 

Thus, the above record supports a substantive vexatious finding, given plaintiff’s history 

of frivolous and harassing litigation. Molski, 500 F.3d at 1059 (“Frivolous litigation is not 

limited to cases in which a legal claim is entirely without merit. It is also frivolous for a claimant 

who has some measure of a legitimate claim to make false factual assertions.”).

2) The lack of objective good faith expectation of prevailing

Courts in this district have screened all of plaintiff’s complaints since 2014. Therein, 

plaintiff has been informed in an overwhelming majority of these cases of the following:

a. He cannot raise claims under the federal criminal code (18 U.S.C.);

b. To maintain claims in federal court, he must follow the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, including Rule 8(a)’s requirement to lodge a “short and plain 

statement” of his claim, with factual allegations connecting the particular 

defendants with the causes of action he intends to assert; and

c. Federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over frivolous, fanciful, 

or delusional claims.

Despite these warnings and guidance, and despite the liberal granting of leave to amend, plaintiff

continues to file baseless, fanciful, delusional, and frivolous claims. The undersigned sees no 

possible way a litigant in plaintiff’s position could maintain a good–faith expectation of 

prevailing in his actions. See Endsley v. California, 2014 WL 5335857 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2014) 

(aff'd in part, Endsley v. California, 627 Fed App'x 644 (9th Cir. 2015)) (civil detainee declared a 

vexatious litigant after bringing numerous cases alleging the same constitutional “violations;” the 

court found plaintiff could not have had an “objective good faith expectation of prevailing” on 

claims he had already been told were not cognizable). Thus, this factor supports a substantive 

finding about the frivolous or harassing nature of plaintiff’s litigation tactics, favoring a finding 

that he be declared a vexatious litigant.

3) Plaintiff’s lack of counsel

In every one of the actions plaintiff filed since 2014, he has proceeded pro se and requests 

the court waive fees due to his poverty. Though courts are generally protective of pro se litigants, 

this factor cannot outweigh plaintiff’s abusive litigation tactics––especially since courts in this 

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district have, for over five years, liberally construed his complaints, granted him leave to amend, 

and provided him with guidance on the standards for bringing cases in federal court––guidance he

has failed to heed.

4) The unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel

Of plaintiff’s complaints filed in this district since 2014, roughly half have come in the 

past two years. Plaintiff’s abusive tactics have imposed an unnecessary burden on the personnel 

of this court. Employees in the Clerk’s office continually scan and file his frivolous complaints 

and motions, which judges in this court must review (and––given his history––dismiss); the 

Clerk’s office must then mail out these orders. In a majority of those instances, the mail is 

returned as undeliverable, requiring the court to track him down, notify him of his duty to keep 

his address current, and send more notices to defunct addresses. 

Thus, unless the court halts plaintiff’s actions, his abusive tactics will continue to pose an 

unnecessary burden on the court and its personnel. See Spain v. EMC Mortg. Co., 2010 WL 

3940987, at *12 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2010), aff'd sub nom. Spain v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 487 F. 

App'x 411 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding unnecessary burden where the litigant persistently filed 

motions and other submissions that were baseless, causing needless burden on the courts).

5) The inadequacy of lesser sanctions 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), courts in this district have screened plaintiff’s complaints 

for frivolous claims, claims that fail under Rule 8, and claims asserted against immune 

defendants. In many of those instances, courts have instructed plaintiff on how to amend to state 

a claim and granted his leave to amend.9 However, plaintiff has not once successfully filed an 

amended complaint. Given plaintiff’s consistent use of the in forma pauperis motion, it is 

unlikely monetary sanctions would be an effective deterrent to his abusive filing behavior.

Thus, the undersigned has concluded that the only way to end plaintiff’s abusive and 

frivolous litigation is to institute a restrictive pre–filing order. See Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 

1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen there is . . . conduct in the course of litigation that could be 

9 See, e.g., Yegorov v. Counsulate of Ukraine in San Francisco, 2:14-cv-01886-KJM-EFB PS; 

Yegorov v. United States of America, 2:14-cv-03003-TLN-AC PS. 

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adequately sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should [take this course].”); but see

Spain, 2010 WL 3940987, at *12 (“Especially because plaintiff has not heeded any of this court's 

prior warnings regarding the manner in which he has conducted this litigation, the need for a 

carefully circumscribed pre-filing order is readily apparent.”).

D. Narrowly Tailored Vexatious Litigant Order

In Molski, the Ninth Circuit approved the scope of a vexatious litigant order because it 

prevented the plaintiff from filing “only the type of claims [he] had been filing vexatiously,” and 

“because it will not deny [him] access to courts on any . . . claim that is not frivolous.” Molski, 

500 F.3d at 1061. Here, in order to prevent the types of claims plaintiff has been filing 

vexatiously, the undersigned recommends the following pre–filing order:

a.) Any future filing, of any kind, by plaintiff in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of California shall contain the following words in all capital letters at 

the top of the front page: “PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN DECLARED A VEXATIOUS 

LITIGANT, AS PER CASE NO. 2:20-cv-10-TLN–KJN-PS.” If a proposed filing 

does not contain that heading, the Clerk of the Court shall lodge (not file) the proposed 

filing, nor shall the court review it––any incomplete filings shall be returned to 

plaintiff without further action of the court;

b.) If plaintiff submits an action as a self-represented plaintiff accompanied by the 

required heading, the Clerk of the Court is directed to open the matter as a 

miscellaneous case to be considered by the General Duty Judge of this court. The Duty 

Judge shall then determine whether the case is in fact non-frivolous. If it is frivolous, 

the Duty Judge shall dismiss the action without comment, pursuant to this pre–filing 

order. If it is not frivolous, the Duty Judge shall order the Clerk to allow the 

complaint to be filed as normal; and

c.) The requirements of subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall be waived if plaintiff's filing is 

made on his behalf by a licensed attorney at law in good standing who signs the filing 

as the attorney of record for plaintiff.

The undersigned finds the scope of this order narrow enough to allow plaintiff access to the 

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courts, but broad enough to cover––and halt––his vexatious behavior. Molski, 500 F.3d at 1061

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

2. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be DENIED as moot;

3. Plaintiff be DECLARED a Vexatious Litigant; and

4. The Court ISSUE a pre–filing order as described in Section II.D. above. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: March 16, 2020

dmit.10

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