Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02378/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02378-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 625
Nature of Suit: Drug Related Seizure of Property
Cause of Action: 21:0881 Forfeiture Property - Drugs

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10CV2378-LAB (CAB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S

FEES

vs.

$28,000.00 IN U.S. CURRENCY,

Defendants.

In this forfeiture case, Claimant Robert Moser successfully obtained return of the

Defendant currency, and moved pursuant to the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000

(CAFRA) for attorney’s fees of over $50,000. The government filed an opposition, arguing

that if fees are awarded, they should be reduced. Moser also requested costs, but those

have already been taxed. What is at issue here is a fee award only. The parties are familiar

with the procedural history, which is not repeated here except as necessary in the course

of discussion.

There is no real dispute here that Moser substantially prevailed and is eligible for a

fee award under CAFRA. The focus of the briefing is on the amount of the award. Moser,

as the party seeking a fee award, bears the burden of showing he is entitled to it and what

it should be. See Harris v. Maricopa County Superior Court, 631 F.3d 963, 971–72 (9 Cir. th

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2011) (in cases involving attorney’s fees generally, the burden falls solely on the claimant). 

See also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984) (burden on claimant to show what

reasonable hourly rate was). 

The government seeks to limit the award to the fees actually provided for under the

retainer agreement, while Moser argues the lodestar approach should be used, which would

likely result in a higher award. The government cites United States v. $186,416.00 in U.S.

Currency, 642 F.3d 753, 755 (9 Cir. 2011) for the principle that the fee agreement can be th

considered when determining a reasonable fee in CAFRA cases. Moser does not dispute

this, but rightly points out that the payment provided in the fee agreement is not a cap. Id.

at 755. Moser is also correct that the lodestar method is to be used. See id. at 754–55. The

statutory language, providing for an award of fees “incurred by the claimant” does not limit

the award to actual fees. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 90 (1989) (when using

lodestar method, fee award was not limited to contingent-free agreement between attorney

and client).

Using the lodestar method, the Court first makes an initial estimate of reasonable fees

by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable

hourly rate. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 94 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983);

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). The initial estimate may then be adjusted

based on other factors, known as Johnson factors after Johnson v. Georgia Highway

Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5 Cir. 1974). See Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 94; see also id. at 91–92 th

(discussing Congress’ reliance on Johnson factors). Those factors are:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the

questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the

preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the

case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)

time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount

involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability

of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and

length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in

similar cases.

Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19. (These are also known as Kerr factors, after Kerr v. Screen

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9 Cir. 1975).) Reasonable fees are adequate to attract th

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competent counsel, but do not produce windfalls to attorneys. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 92 n.6

(citing legislative history).

Reasonable Hourly Rate

Moser’s briefing focuses a great deal on the hourly rate. He argues that the relevant

comparison is to “federal practitioners possessing high levels of skill and experience” in the

greater San Diego legal communities. While Moser’s counsel, Richard Barnett, cites

evidence he is very experienced and has been identified as an expert in forfeiture law, the

question is really what level of skill, training, and experience was required in this case. See

Blum, 465 U.S. at 886 n. 11 (reasonable rate should be “in line with those prevailing in the

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and

reputation”) (emphasis added). Moser cites evidence that similarly experienced counsel in

civil forfeiture cases in this District customarily bill from $400 to $700 per hour. (Fee Mot. at

6:17–26.) The evidence, however, suggests this is the customary rate of litigators in various

types of cases, not just civil forfeitures. In other words, the customary fees represent an

average for all types of litigation work. Some areas (e.g., patent or securities) obviously

command higher fees than others (e.g., criminal defense in drug cases). It is therefore not

a particularly accurate representation of what the going rate is in this market for this type of

work.

While this was a civil forfeiture case, the central issue was the legality of a search and

seizure. The heart of this case was a motion to suppress. In this respect, the legal skills

required are more similar to those of a criminal defense attorney. The law governing

forfeitures did come into play, but the focus here was on criminal procedure much more than

forfeiture law. After the initial client interview, this would have been obvious to Barnett or any

other attorney practicing in this field. Defense attorneys’ customary rates in this District are

not as high as the rates Moser urges are the norm in forfeiture cases. For example, CJA

panel members are required to be experienced and well-trained, yet the CJA hourly rate for

appointed counsel in non-capital cases in this District is $125. 

/ / /

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It is also worth remembering that much of the work in a case like this is fairly routine,

and the degree of expertise required for those tasks is much lower. Typically, lawyers who

work in firms delegate this work to junior associates or paralegals, who bill at lower rates.

Some work is delegated to staff who do not bill at all, and their cost is reflected in the

attorneys’ billing rates. Many of the lawyers whose declarations Moser relies on fall into this

category; while they themselves might charge rates of $400 to $700 per hour, they would as

a matter of course delegate work so that bills are reasonable. For example, Barnett not only

interviewed Moser, made appearances before the magistrate, communicated with opposing

counsel, and directed litigation strategy, all typically carried out by more experienced

counsel; but he also compiled exhibits, drafted responses to interrogatories, and researched

and drafted whole pleadings, tasks typically carried out for the most part by more junior 1

staff. 

If Barnett had delegated work as is typical in larger law offices and firms, his

requested rate of $500 per hour might be reasonable. Had he done so, he would also have

submitted billings from attorneys or paralegals with lower billing rates, and the average

hourly billing rate for the entire case would have been quite a bit less than $500. A case

Moser himself cites illustrates this point. In United States v. 4,432 Mastercases of Cigarettes,

322 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1078–79 (C.D.Cal., 2004), vacated on other grounds, 448 F.3d 1168

(9 Cir. 2006), the court held that the requested $400 hourly rate was reasonable. That

th

decision, however, found the $400 rate was reasonable for lead counsel and co-counsel

only; the two associates were billed at $195 per hour. Compare Gold v. NCO Financial

Systems, Inc., 2010 WL 3339498 at *2–*3 (S.D.Cal., Aug. 23, 2010) (determining

reasonable fees for attorneys and a paralegal). 

A very experienced civil forfeiture attorney would be expected to be familiar with 1

basic elements to be included in pleadings such as a notice of claim, a motion to suppress,

an opposition to a motion to dismiss or strike, and a fee motion. Experienced practitioners

typically keep exemplars of pleadings drafted in earlier cases, and update them or make

changes as needed. Associates are tasked with drafting, basic research, and proofing of

motions, and the more senior attorney drawing on his expertise identifies legal theories,

directs the associate, reviews drafts, and approves the final draft. Where this method is

used, the senior attorney’s hours are reduced but a higher hourly rate is justified.

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While delegation of less-expert tasks is not required in the practice of law, an attorney

who does all levels of work — the demanding and sophisticated as well as the basic and

routine — would typically bill at a lower hourly rate than one who does only the most difficult

work. This avoids “top-heavy” billing that the market will not support. See Bridgeport Music,

Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 520 F.3d 588, 596 (6 Cir. 2008) (approving district court’s reduction th

of lodestar amount to account for “top-heavy billing”). Because Barnett did all the legal work

here, a reasonable rate is lower. 

What that rate should be is less certain. The government’s brief does not address

the question of what a reasonable rate for Barnett would be. Barnett does not identify any

case, whether a forfeiture case or any other kind, approving any hourly rate for him, and the

Court’s own search of caselaw revealed none. Bearing in mind Barnett’s discussion of his 2

extensive work in forfeiture cases, the absence of any record of a fee award for his work is

somewhat surprising. He doesn’t say what his own customary rate is, but his fee agreement

with Moser shows he was willing to litigate this case for 1/3 of the total Moser recovered,

meaning he could not reasonably expect to collect more than about $9300 in fees from his

client. Even assuming (as discussed below) Barnett expected the case to be resolved more

quickly and the large number of hours he devoted to the case was justified by the

government’s overlitigation of the issues, he would have had to resolve this case in under

19 hours (instead of the more than 100 hours it actually took) to earn a $500 hourly fee.

Obviously there is some reasonable rate, but in this case it is not $500 per hour, nor

has Moser given a plausible basis for calculating an alternative rate. The Court, based on

its knowledge of the legal market as well as the evidence, will therefore determine what the

reasonable rate is. See Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (approving

district court’s reliance, in part, on its own knowledge and experience of legal market to 

/ / /

The affidavit of Eric Honig, attached as Exhibit D to the motion, explains that the 2

community of civil forfeiture practitioners assisting private claimants in Southern California

is very small. Honig himself says he was the first attorney in the country to obtain a fee

award in a similar case. 

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determine reasonable rate). Because it was Moser’s burden to show what the reasonable

rate was, the Court will be conservative in its determination.

Moser’s motion relies in part on the declaration of Eric Honig. Honig’s declaration

points out that in 2003, he obtained a fee award at an “enhanced rate of $300 per hour” in

the Central District of California. (Motion, Ex. D, ¶ 13.) While this was seven to nine years

before Barnett performed his work and rates have increased since then, it is also true that

3

rates are generally higher in the Central District than in this District. It also bears mention that

in that case Honig submitted evidence that the prevailing rates were $350 to $600 per hour

yet Honig’s hourly rate was $300, and that of his co-counsel was $225. This, then, can serve

as a reference point for a reasonable rate in this District. Honig also cites cases in which he 4

was awarded fees at a much higher rate, but these were more complex cases, requiring

more expertise in civil forfeiture procedure than this case.

The Court therefore determines that, while Barnett might command a higher rate in

other cases, a reasonable hourly rate in this case was no more than $300.

Hours Reasonably Expended

The motion documents over 100 hours of work on the claim in this case, which is

surprisingly high. In its order granting Moser’s claim, the Court noted that this was really a

rather straightforward case, and held that the constitutional violations requiring suppression

were obvious. Barnett, upon learning the facts, might well have assumed the government

would settle quickly and on terms very favorable to his client.

The claim was not settled however. The government, for reasons that are not clear,

obstinately opposed the claim. The government, not satisfied with merely opposing his claim,

filed a motion to strike it. The basis for that motion was the specious suggestion that there 

/ / /

/ / /

Barnett’s billings run from August 20, 2010 to April 11, 2012. He requests the $500

3

hourly rate for the entire period.

The Court is also permitted to consider awards in other cases as one of the Johnson 4

factors. 

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wasn’t sufficient evidence the $28,000 seized in Moser’s home belonged to him. The 5

government continued to oppose Moser at every turn, and Moser responded in kind. In

other words, after the case began, the government’s unnecessarily aggressive posture

forced Moser to choose whether to expend effort to continue litigating or cut his losses and

forfeit the $28,000.

While the government’s obstinacy and aggressive litigation may have required Barnett

to undertake tasks that would otherwise have been unnecessary, there is no reason why

Barnett should have spent so much time on those tasks. In other words, it appears Barnett

gave the government’s litigation work more respect than it deserved. Seasoned attorneys

skilled in the management of cases are expected to be able to gauge the appropriate level

of response to opposing counsel’s maneuvers. They are expected to recognize and

succinctly point out weak arguments, rather than expending effort disproportionate to the

arguments’ persuasive power. Rather than responding in kind and point-by-point to lengthy

briefs, experienced counsel should know when a more measured response is appropriate. 

In other words, experienced counsel are expected to make reasonable independent

judgments about how to litigate the case, rather than allowing opposing counsel to set the

agenda and dictate their use of resources. This is easier said than done, of course, and even

experienced counsel miscalculate sometimes, but the standard here is reasonableness.

The Court has reviewed Barnett’s billing entries. To his credit, on some occasions,

he cuts his hours, a common practice to account for work done in good faith that later proves

to have been unnecessary. The billing entries, however, also include numerous items that

suggest the time spent and billed was unnecessarily high for an attorney experienced in civil

forfeitures and criminal procedure; too much time was billed for matters that are familiar to

all experienced federal litigators. For example, the government’s opposition to Moser’s

motion for summary judgment was mostly directed at marshaling the evidence. Then two

It isn’t clear why the government brought this motion, but the only required response 5

was to show that the money was Moser’s and not someone else’s. Moser’s opposition did

that in just a few pages, but then went on to debate at length the government’s brief over the

adequacy of Moser’s objections to numerous special interrogatories. In all, the body of the

opposition ran 30 pages, and an additional 161 pages of exhibits were attached.

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pages was spent attempting to show Moser hadn’t met the well-known standards for

summary judgment. The standards the government cites are well-known and in no way novel

or complex. Barnett’s billing entries on September 22 and 23, 2011 show he spent 6.75

hours drafting a reply brief to the opposition, and also researching Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

Here, a succinct reply brief showing that the government’s evidence was inadmissible would

have been sufficient, and it is unclear why research on the Rule 56 standards was required.

To cite a second example, Barnett’s attorney’s fees motion was lengthy and

supported by several declarations, and he also filed a ten-page reply to the government’s

opposition. But, as discussed above, his briefing omitted some key points, touched on

others only in passing, and expended effort on favorable but less than apt comparisons.

This is not to say Barnett in any way acted improperly by conducting extra research,

confirming his understanding of basic legal principles, or familiarizing himself with tangential

aspects of the case. Succinct briefing is preferred. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Astrue, 2012 WL

183206, slip op. at *3 (E.D.Tenn., Jan. 18, 2012) (“Plaintiff's counsel, in the manner which

is always appreciated by this Court, makes a succinct argument. “) That is not to say

attorneys err by devoting more time and words to briefing, particularly where the likely ruling

on particular points is in doubt, and the Court is aware that cases look simpler in hindsight. 

But here, it should have been clear even ex ante that not all the billed work was reasonably

necessary to prosecute Moser’s claim. Because the billing entries are generalized by task,

the Court cannot say with any certainty how much of each day’s work was reasonably

necessary. The Court therefore relies on its own experience, see Ingram, 647 F.3d at 928,

and estimates that no more than 60 hours were reasonably expended on the work. 

Lodestar

Based on the Court’s determinations of a reasonable hourly rate and hours

reasonably expended, the Court calculates the lodestar figure at $18,000. This figure is

necessarily somewhat crudely determined, because of Moser’s failure to carry his burden

as fully as he should have. But it does not matter much in this case if it is somewhat

inaccurate, because the Court will adjust it downward after considering the Johnson factors.

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Johnson Factors and Adjustments

The lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable, Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815

F.2d 1258, 1262 (9 Cir. 1987), and courts do not frequently adjust it after it is calculated. th

Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 18 (9 Cir. 1994). Some of the Johnson (or Kerr) factors th

are subsumed within the lodestar calculation, and are therefore not used to adjust the

lodestar figure after it is calculated. Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363–64 (9th

Cir. 1996). Of those that are not subsumed within the lodestar figure, only the relevant ones 

need to be considered. McGrath v. County of Nevada, 67 F.3d 248, 252 (9 Cir. 1994) th

(district court should take into account Kerr factors it finds to be relevant).

The Court has already considered the time and labor required; the novelty and

difficulty of the questions; the required skill level; and Barnett’s experience, reputation, and

abilities. There have been relatively few fee awards under CAFRA, and neither party has

pointed to a case similar to this one where a fee award was made. 

The remaining relevant factors are the customary fee, whether the fee is fixed or

contingent, the amount involved, and the “undesirability” of the case. These all boil down to

a limited set of facts, namely that Barnett knew Moser could not recover more than $28,000,

and he agreed in a contingent fee agreement to accept 1/3 of the total recovery as his fee.

Civil forfeiture cases involve a variety of types of property and a wide range of

property values. Within this range, a claim for $28,000 is not as lucrative as some, but a

contingency fee agreement would be enough to attract competent counsel. See Blanchard,

489 U.S. at 92 n.6 . It is not such an undesirable case that a higher fee award is merited in

order to encourage attorneys to undertake the representation.

The Court finds very significant the fact that Barnett was willing to undertake the

representation for no more than $9,333.33 plus costs. He might have expected it to settle

quickly, based on the strength of Moser’s suppression argument. But there was no

assurance of that. He might also have hoped for an award of fees under CAFRA. But he

would have been aware that fee awards are not common, and also that they are not

intended to produce a bounty for attorneys. See Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 92 n.6. The logical

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and reasonable inference here is that Barnett and Moser agreed to a fee of no more than

about $9300. 

It is also significant that this was a contingent fee agreement. The fraction of the

recovery that goes to the attorney under such agreements typically compensates the

attorney not only for work done in cases where his client prevails, but also covers the

attorney’s losses in cases where the client recovers little or nothing. In other words, it is

adjusted upwards to account for risk. The $9,333 figure can be presumed to be higher than

what Barnett would charge if there were no risk, i.e., if Moser had guaranteed payment

regardless of the outcome.

While the Court recognizes that this figure is not a cap on the award, it is nevertheless

relevant. See $186,416.00 in U.S. Currency, 642 F.3d at 755 (court may consider fee

agreement when determining reasonable fee award). Bearing in mind the relevant Johnson

factors, the Court determines that a fee award of $18,000 is excessive, but an award of

$14,000 is reasonable.

To Whom Is the Award Made?

Moser’s motion argues the fee award should be made directly to Barnett, while the

government argues any award should be made to Moser. It is unclear why the parties are

disputing this at all, much less why it should have been the subject of substantial argument.

CAFRA fee awards ordinarily are made to the claimant. $186,416.00 in U.S.

Currency, 642 F.3d at 755–56 (citing Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521 (2010)). But they may,

as here, be contractually assigned to the claimant’s counsel. Id., 642 F.3d at 756 (citing

Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 875 (9 Cir. 1999) (“In the absence of a

th

contractual assignment to counsel, § 1988 requires that attorney fee awards be made

directly to the prevailing party.”)) Because Moser assigned any fee award to Barnett, the

award should be made to Barnett.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Conclusion and Order

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds Richard Barnett, Esq. is the

assignee of Claimant Moser, the prevailing party. The Court AWARDS Barnett, Esq.,

attorney’s fees under CAFRA, in the amount of $14,000.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 11, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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