Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01390/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01390-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RICKEY LEE CAMPBELL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-1390 PHX SRB MEA

) 

DORA B. SCHRIRO, ARIZONA ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

)

 Respondents. )

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

Mr. Rickey Campbell (“Petitioner”), is presently

incarcerated by Respondents in Florence, Arizona. On May 15,

2006, Mr. Campbell filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket

No. 14) on December 1, 2006, asserting that the petition should

be denied as not timely filed. On or about December 18, 2006,

Petitioner filed a traverse to the answer. 

I. Procedural History

In 1981, Petitioner was convicted of burglary and was

incarcerated for four years. Answer, Exh. E. In 1992, after a

jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of five counts of sexual

abuse and child molestation of his daughter, a girl under the

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1

 Petitioner was charged in Count I with an act occurring

“during the Fall months of 1988,” in Count II and Count III with acts

occurring between “December, 1988 and January, 1989,” and in Count IV

and Count V with acts occurring between February and March of 1991.

See Answer, Exh. A. A warrant for Petitioner’s arrest on the charges

was issued in September of 1991. Id. Petitioner’s then-wife, the

child’s step-mother, was the person who instigated the criminal

investigation. Id., Exh. E at 2. At Petitioner’s trial, this witness

admitted she had written a letter retracting her allegation she had

seen Petitioner abuse his daughter. Id., Exh. E at 4. Petitioner’s

counsel also elicited trial statements from this witness regarding

inconsistencies in her statements and inconsistencies between her

statements and those of the victim. Id., Exh. E at 5. Petitioner’s

counsel introduced testimony Petitioner’s wife was untruthful and that

she had told other individuals she and the victim were not telling the

truth. Id., Exh. E at 8. 

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age of fourteen. See id., Ex. B. 

The victim testified at the trial and was crossexamined by Petitioner’s counsel. See id., Exh. B. At the

close of the prosecution’s case, Petitioner’s counsel moved for

a directed verdict on all charges, which motion was denied. See

id., Exh. B. Several witnesses testified for the defense,

however, Petitioner did not testify, which decision by

Petitioner was placed on the record by Petitioner’s counsel.

Id., Exh. B. The jury deliberated for approximately four hours

prior to issuing a verdict. Id., Exh. B.1

Prior to sentencing, the Arizona court referred

Petitioner to a psychologist for an evaluation pursuant to Rule

16.5, Arizona Rules of Criminal procedure. Id., Exh. E.

Petitioner appeared to the psychologist to be “worried and

anxious,” although he also appeared “neat and clean.” Id., Exh.

E. Petitioner reported he had graduated from high school and

studied electronics at a state college. Id., Exh. E.

Petitioner reported a doctor had examined him prior to trial and

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2 The GAF is one of the five axes of the diagnostic system

described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

(4th edition), the “DSM-IV”, and considers psychological, social, and

occupational functioning. A GAF score is a subjective determination

which represents “the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall

level of functioning.” DSM-IV at 30.

3

In the opinion of the current examiner, Ricky Lee

Campbell is currently suffering from an active

psychosis with delusions. It is thought that he

was suffering from this psychosis at the time of

the offenses. However, although he was

significantly impaired in his capacity to

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to

conform his conduct to the requirements of law,

he was not so impaired as to constitute a defense

to prosecution.

It is felt that Defendant is rehabilitable in a

psychiatric facility where he will receive both

medications and psychotherapy....

Answer, Exh. E.

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presented the “most damaging testimony possible” at his trial.

Id., Exh. E. At that time, Petitioner was taking Haldol

(prescribed to treat schizophrenia), Lithoid (lithium), and

Tegretol (used for treating seizures). Id., Exh. E. The

psychologist reported Petitioner’s “style was dramatic and at

times his orations were reminiscent of an evangelistic minister.

He appears to be very religious and believes he has experienced

contacts with the divine congregation.” Id., Exh. E. The

psychologist opined Petitioner had not experienced brain damage.

Id., Exh. E. 

The psychologist diagnosed Petitioner as suffering from

bipolar disorder and assessed Petitioner as having a Global

Assessment of Functioning (GAF)2 of 30, noting serious impairment

of judgment, and delusions. Id., Exh. E.3 In a presentence

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4 Petitioner asserted the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction; the trial court erred by admitting opinions

regarding the victim’s truthfulness; his sentences were excessive; his

consecutive sentences in Count IV and Count V violated his right to

be free of double jeopardy; the trial court erred by granting the

government’s untimely motion to be allowed to impeach Petitioner with

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report, the author noted Petitioner was “quite sure that his

presence in [the 1990 Arizona governor’s race] made it necessary

for the run-off election.” Id., Exh. E. Petitioner denied

having committed the alleged acts of molestation to both the

psychologist and the presentence author. 

Petitioner’s counsel sought a new trial, alleging juror

misconduct. Id., Exh. C. The Arizona Superior Court conducted

a hearing and heard witnesses regarding the alleged juror

misconduct. Id., Exh. C. The Superior Court concluded there

was no misconduct by the jurors and denied Petitioner’s motion

for a new trial. Id., Exh. C. The trial court then conducted

a mitigation hearing regarding Petitioner’s sentencing. Id.,

Exh. C. On July 21, 1992, Petitioner was sentenced to the

presumptive terms of imprisonment for each conviction, i.e.,

three terms of 10 years, one term of seventeen years, and one

term of twenty years, the sentences to be served consecutively.

Id., Exh. C & Exh. D. 

Petitioner filed a timely appeal of his convictions and

sentences and also filed a counseled petition for postconviction relief asserting ineffective assistance of trial

counsel for counsel’s failure to seek an examination of

Petitioner pursuant to Rule 11, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Id., Exh. E4 & Exh. G & Exh. H (“if properly

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a prior conviction; his counsel was ineffective because he failed “to

conduct a pretrial competency examination.”

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presented this evidence could have swayed the jurors to acquit

the Appellant because of insanity.... a new trial is requested

in order to afford the Appellant the opportunity to establish

his mental competency to stand trial and his ability to

appreciate right from wrong at the time of the offenses.”). 

Petitioner presented evidence he had been admitted to a medical

facility in 1991 for a period of 16 days and had been diagnosed

at that time as suffering from bipolar disorder, with possible

explosive and impulse control disorders. Id., Exh. K at 2.

At Petitioner’s request, the Arizona Court of Appeals

stayed Petitioner’s direct appeal pending the outcome of his

action for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. I & Exh. J.

Petitioner amended his action for post-conviction relief to

assert he had been incompetent to stand trial. Id., Exh. L &

Exh. M. The Arizona Superior Court conducted a competency

hearing on November 10, 1994, during which hearing Petitioner

appeared and was represented by counsel. Id., Exh. N. After

testimony was heard, the hearing was continued and further

testimony taken on November 18, 1994. Id., Exh. N.

Petitioner’s trial counsel testified at the hearing. Id., Exh.

N. 

In a decision issued April 5, 1995, the Arizona

Superior Court denied Petitioner’s claim for post-conviction

relief, based on the allegation he was incompetent to stand

trial, and also denied relief on Petitioner’s claim his counsel

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was ineffective for failing to request a Rule 11 hearing. Id.,

Exh. O. The court concluded, as a matter of fact, Petitioner’s

counsel had discussed Rule 11 procedures with his associates,

and that counsel believed Petitioner was competent to stand

trial when Petitioner received his medication. Id., Exh. O.

The court also noted trial counsel did not consider

insanity a viable defense to the 1991 molestation charges

because Petitioner claimed he had not committed the alleged

acts. Id., Exh. O. The court further noted counsel had

requested a Rule 26.5 examination after hearing the victim’s

stepmother testify at trial Petitioner had referred to himself

as the “Messiah” at the time of the crimes. id., Exh. O. The

Superior Court noted the opinions of two physicians, offered at

the post-conviction hearing, regarding Petitioner’s competency.

Id., Exh. O. The physicians opined Petitioner was incompetent

to stand trial in September 1993, but further opined they could

not speculate as to whether Petitioner was incompetent to stand

trial on the molestation charges in 1992. Id., Exh. O. 

The Arizona Superior Court concluded Petitioner’s

counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a hearing

regarding Petitioner’s competency pursuant to Rule 11, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. M & Exh. O. Petitioner

sought review of the Superior Court’s decision denying postconviction relief by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. P.

The Arizona Court of Appeals consolidated Petitioner’s

stayed direct appeal with its review of the Superior Court’s

denial of post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. Q. In a memorandum

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decision filed January 25, 1996, addressing the merits of each

of Petitioner’s claims for relief, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and affirmed the Superior

Court’s decision denying post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. S.

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the Court of Appeals’

decision on June 21, 1996. Id., Exh. U. 

Petitioner initiated a second action for postconviction relief in the Arizona Superior Court in 2003. Id.,

Exh. W. In a decision issued on October 6, 2003, the Arizona

Superior Court found the claims were precluded as waived by

Petitioner’s failure to raise the claims either in his direct

appeal or in his first action for state post-conviction relief.

Id., Exh. Z. Petitioner filed a third petition for postconviction relief in 2004. Id., Exh. AA. The Arizona Superior

Court again concluded the claims were precluded as waived by

Petitioner’s failure to raise the claims either in his direct

appeal or in his first action for state post-conviction relief.

Id., Exh. AA. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas action on May 15,

2006, asserting he is entitled to habeas relief because he did

not have a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial.

Broadly construed, Petitioner also alleges his counsel was

ineffective, and that the charges against him were improperly

“stacked.” 

Respondents contend the petition for federal habeas

relief was not timely filed. Petitioner responds his petition

was not timely filed because he has been incarcerated in a

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mental health unit of the prison and medicated against his will.

II. Analysis

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the

statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

Petitioner is a state prisoner whose conviction became

final on approximately September 19, 1996, when the time for

petitioning the United States Supreme Court for review of the

Arizona state courts’ decisions in his direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence expired. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Petitioner’s state

conviction became final after April 24, 1996, the effective date

of the AEDPA. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). However, the AEDPA also entitled a petitioner to tolling

of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a “properly

filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2006); Artuz v. Bennet, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000). 

Section 2244(d)(2) provides for tolling

during the time a “properly filed” state

court petition is pending. “Properly filed”

means the petition’s “delivery and acceptance

are in compliance with the applicable laws

and rules governing filings” in that state.

In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the United States

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5

 Several United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, and one

published opinion issued by the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, have concluded that the relevant statute of

limitations begins to run on a federal habeas action when a petitioner

stands convicted by a state court and the time for seeking certiorari

by the United States Supreme Court expires, regardless of whether or

not the petitioner actually sought certiorari. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2003); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920,

924 (9th Cir. 2002); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 345 (1st Cir. 2003);

Anderson v. Litscher, 281 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2002); Williams v.

Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Bowersox, 159

F.3d 345, 347-48 (8th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 400

(4th Cir. 1998); Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 98 (2nd Cir. 1998); Souch

v. Harkins, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1084-85 (D. Ariz. 1998); Smith v.

Lord, 230 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Moore v. Hawley, 7 F.

Supp. 2d 901, 903 (E.D. Mich. 1998). See also Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1525 (1997) (noting that the

defendant’s conviction became final when his time for filing a

petition for a writ of certiorari expired). Cf. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1994) (“A state conviction and

sentence become final for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the

availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted

and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has

elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied.”). 

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Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a

postconviction petition is untimely under

state law, that [is] the end of the matter

for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”

Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005).

 Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 19,

1996, when the time expired for seeking certiorari regarding his

convictions and sentences. Cf. Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d

894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2001); Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1158-59.5

Petitioner did not seek any form of relief from his

convictions and sentences from September 19, 1996, through

September 20, 1997, when the one-year statute of limitations on

his federal habeas action expired. Petitioner did not have any

action for post-conviction relief pending in a state court from

1996 until 2003, when Petitioner filed his second action for

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post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, a period of more than six years. This

action for state post-conviction relief could not and did not

restart the already-expired statute of limitations for filing

Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d

1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000). 

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only be considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has determined that equitable tolling of the

filing deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only

if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. See Lott, 304

F.3d at 922; Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002).

Additionally, equitable tolling is only appropriate when

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence,

account for the failure to file a timely claim. See Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

To be entitled to equitable tolling, a habeas

petitioner “must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’

were the but-for and proximate causes of his untimeliness.”

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding “at the

very least, the prisoner must show that the ‘extraordinary

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6 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not squarely

addressed whether the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Pace

“lowered” the standard for equitable tolling set in Spitsyn. See

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 n.5 (9th Cir.

2005). See also Astorga v. Terhune, 130 Fed. App. 181, 183 (9th Cir.

2005); Boudette v. Schriro, 2006 WL 664364, at *3 (D. Ariz.).

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circumstances’ were the but-for and proximate cause of his

untimeliness”).6 It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that

equitable tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston v. Palmer,

417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). “‘[T]he threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very

high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro,

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting United States v.

Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner has not established there were extraordinary

circumstances beyond his control which made it impossible for

him to file a timely federal habeas petition. A federal habeas

petitioner seeking equitable tolling must also act with

“reasonable” diligence “throughout the period he seeks to toll.”

Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); see also

Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).

In response to the assertion his habeas petition is not

timely filed, Petitioner contends he has been held in a portion

of the prison were he was “unable to write and was forced med

and could not have paper or pen to write to fight my case and

was impaired and did not have access to courts to fight my side

and extraordinary circumstance, warranting I get a new trial...”

However, the Court notes Petitioner was able to file two

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separate pro se civil rights suits in the United States District

Court, in 2003 and 2004, and that Petitioner was apparently

located in two separate portions of the Arizona Department of

Corrections facilities in 2003 and 2004, where he was apparently

able to possess writing materials and sufficient help to

initiate and proceed with these two claims. See Campbell v.

Stewart, Docket No. 03 CV 1516, and Campbell v. Weare, Docket

No. 04 CV 2752. Additionally, Petitioner was able pursue an

appeal of the decision in one of these civil rights cases.

Petitioner was also able to file two actions for post-conviction

relief in the Arizona state courts in 2003 and 2004.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law,

lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and

temporary mental incapacity do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Fisher

v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–16 (5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v.

Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that

petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s “rules, statutes, and

the time period set forth therein do not justify equitable

tolling”). Additionally, at least one other federal court has

concluded “the difficulties attendant on prison life, such as

transfers between facilities, solitary confinement, lockdowns,

restricted access to the law library, and an inability to secure

court documents do not by themselves qualify as extraordinary

circumstances” warranting equitable tolling. Corrigan v.

Barbery, 371 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).

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A state habeas petitioner’s demonstrated and extended

mental incompetence may warrant the equitable tolling of the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations. However, Petitioner provides no

evidence his mental illness prevented him from timely filing his

habeas petition or diligently pursuing post-conviction relief

until the date he actually filed his petition; any such claim is

belied by the evidence Petitioner filed and prosecuted two

section 1983 claims and two actions for state post-conviction

relief in 2003 and 2004. Compare Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d

919, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding the district court erred

by not holding an evidentiary hearing regarding equitable

tolling where ongoing, if not consecutive, periods of mental

incompetency were demonstrated by the petitioner); Nara v.

Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 319-20 (3d Cir. 2001), overruled in part on

other grounds by Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). See

also Woodburn v. Stewart, 154 Fed. App. 643, 645 (9th Cir. 2005)

(concluding a habeas petitioner is entitled to a remand for

further factual development of his claim of equitable tolling

due to mental incompetence whenever the petitioner alleges “in

a sworn pleading, against which the state has offered no

evidence at all, that he was incompetent in the years when his

petitions should have been filed,” quoting Laws, 351 F.3d at

923). 

Petitioner’s traverse to the answer is not sworn nor

dated. Petitioner offers no sworn pleading alleging he was

mentally incompetent throughout the entire period he seeks to

equitably toll, from 1996 through 2006. Petitioner does not

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state why he failed to file a federal habeas action instead of

successive state petitions for post-conviction relief and

federal civil rights claims challenging the conditions of his

confinement, which he filed in 2003 and 2004. Additionally,

Petitioner allowed more than six years to pass, from 1996

through 2003, without pursuing any avenue of federal, or state,

habeas relief and, therefore, the Court concludes that

Petitioner did not act with the requisite reasonable diligence

which would warrant equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations and a finding that his federal petition is timely

filed.

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to it pursuant

to the AEDPA. Petitioner has not shown that the circumstances

of his case warrant application of equitable tolling so that

this Court may address the merits of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Campbell’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

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Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 22nd day of December, 2006.

Case 2:06-cv-01390-SRB Document 16 Filed 12/27/06 Page 15 of 15