Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05143/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05143-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 9, 2001 Decided May 8, 2001

No. 00-5143

Building Industry Association of Superior California, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Gale A. Norton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(95cv0726)

Lawrence R. Liebesman argued the cause for appellants.

With him on the briefs was Rafe Petersen.

Elizabeth Ann Peterson, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellees.

With her on the brief were John Cruden, Deputy Assistant

Attorney General, and Ellen J. Durkee, Attorney.

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Neil Levine argued the cause and filed the brief for the

non-federal appellees.

Robin L. Rivett and Anne M. Hayes were on the brief for

amici curiae Pacific Legal Foundation, et al., in support of

appellants. Reed Hopper entered an appearance.

Before: Sentelle and Henderson, Circuit Judges, and

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

Silberman.

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellants Building Industry Association, et al., sought review of the Fish and

Wildlife Service's listing of various fairy shrimp species as

endangered or threatened. They now challenge a district

court decision denying their motion for summary judgment.

Determining that we have jurisdiction, we affirm the denial.

I.

In those regions of California with Mediterranean climates,

one finds shallow depressions called "vernal pools" that fill

with rainwater in fall and winter only to evaporate in spring.

In these pools reside numerous indigenous aquatic invertebrates that have evolved to survive in the pools' variable

environmental conditions. In 1992 the Fish and Wildlife

Service proposed to list as endangered species five tiny

crustaceans resident in California's vernal pools: the vernal

pool fairy shrimp, Conservancy fairy shrimp, longhorn fairy

shrimp, California linderiella, and vernal pool tadpole shrimp

(collectively, "fairy shrimp"). The proposed rule specified

actual and threatened destruction of vernal pools as a justification for the listing.1

After a comment period, the Service withdrew the proposal

to list the California linderiella. It listed vernal pool fairy

shrimp as threatened and the three remaining species as

__________

1 See Proposal to Determine Endangered Status for Fairy

Shrimp, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,856, 19,858 (proposed May 8, 1992).

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endangered. Though the Endangered Species Act (ESA)

requires the Service to designate "critical habitat[s]" for

listed species "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable," the Service declined to make designations on the

ground that so doing would put the listed species at risk of

vandalism.2

The Service's decision then began its long and bumpy

journey to appellate review. Appellants challenged the listing decision in the district court, asserting violations of the

ESA, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Constitution. Along with contesting on various grounds the

general validity of the listing decision, appellants took issue

with the Service's failure to designate critical habitats. In

response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the district

court in July 1997 granted summary judgment to the Service

on all claims except the critical habitat claim. On that claim,

the court held that the failure to designate critical habitat was

arbitrary and capricious and remanded to the Service either

for designation or for explanation why designation was not

prudent.3

While the critical habitat remand was pending, the district

court certified the listing claims under Rule 54(b). An appeal

of that portion of the decision followed, but we dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction. The listing claims and the critical habitat

claim arose out of the same body of law and fact, meaning

that the listing appeal would be intertwined with a possible

critical habitat appeal. With the threat of such a piecemeal

appeal looming, and without an explanation from the district

court as to why such an approach was desirable, we held that

we lacked jurisdiction.4

__________

2 16 U.S.C. s 1533(a)(3) (2000); see Determination of Endangered Status for Fairy Shrimp, 59 Fed. Reg. 48,136, 48,151 (Sept.

19, 1994); Withdrawal of Proposal as to the California Linderiella,

59 Fed. Reg. 48,154 (Sept. 19, 1994).

3 See Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 905-06,

908 (D.D.C. 1997).

4 See Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. Babbitt, 161 F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir.

1998).

In March 1999, the district court reviewed additional record

citations the Service had provided in support of its conclusion

that critical habitat designations would be imprudent. It

ruled that these materials did not adequately support the

Service's conclusion, vacated the Service's decision not to

designate critical habitats, and remanded once again. According to the district court, the decision constituted a final

judgment on all claims.

Appellants brought a second appeal of the listing decision.

We ordered the parties to address whether a final decision

existed because the critical habitat remand was still before

the Service, which had not itself appealed. In an attempt to

resolve any possible jurisdictional infirmity, appellants decided to abandon litigation of the critical habitat claim, leaving

for resolution only the listing claims, which were clearly final.

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To that end, appellants moved the district court to amend its

March 1999 judgment remanding to the Service or in the

alternative for leave to amend their complaint to delete the

critical habitat claim. The district court determined that due

to the pending appeal it had no jurisdiction to consider the

motion; it also indicated that if it were to regain jurisdiction,

it would deny the motion to amend the judgment but grant

leave to amend the complaint.5 Soon thereafter appellants

moved this court to dismiss their appeal, which we did. The

district court then granted appellants' motion to strike from

their complaint the critical habitat claim, the only claim on

which they had prevailed. Appellants immediately brought

this appeal, their third attempt to gain review of the district

court's dismissal of the listing claims. We once again ordered

the parties to address our jurisdiction.

II.

Appellants allege numerous errors in the district court's

decision. They argue that the rule's heavy reliance on a

study, the so-called "Simovich study," not made available

during the comment period violated the APA, as did the rule's

__________

5 See Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. Babbitt, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.

1999).

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enumeration of fairy shrimp populations in terms of vernal

pool complexes rather than individual pools. They further

contend that the listing was not supported by the best

available scientific data, as required by the ESA, and that the

Service misapplied its own policy on independent peer review.

The nonfederal appellees, public interest groups that intervened below ("intervenors"), argue that we lack jurisdiction

because no final judgment exists. We address that argument

before reaching the merits.

A.

Intervenors' jurisdictional argument is subtle. Absent appeal by the agency, an order remanding to an agency for

further proceedings is not an appealable final decision even

where the district court dismisses the case. See NAACP v.

United States Sugar Corp., 84 F.3d 1432, 1436 (D.C. Cir.

1996). Before amendment of the complaint, therefore, the

critical habitat remand pending before the Service prevented

our assertion of appellate jurisdiction over the listing claims.

Accordingly, appellants amended their complaint to omit the

critical habitat claim. Though the 1997 decision was not final

at the time it was entered, under the doctrine of cumulative

finality the dismissal of the only claim that survived that

decision retroactively rendered it final and appealable. See

15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H.

Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure s 3914.9, at 631-42

(2d ed. 1992); cf. Sacks v. Rothberg, 845 F.2d 1098, 1099 (D.C.

Cir. 1988) (per curiam).

Intervenors argue, however, that the district court abused

its discretion in allowing amendment of the complaint after

judgment. If that were so, the March 1999 decision remanding to the Service would still be in force, and there would be

no final judgment for this court to review. Ordinarily postjudgment amendment of a complaint under Rule 15(a) requires reopening of the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or

60(b). See Cassell v. Michaux, 240 F.2d 406, 407-08 (D.C.

Cir. 1956). This prevents litigants from resurrecting claims

on which they have lost. Cf. Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d

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1205, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). But that concern is absent here: appellants prevailed on the claim in

question, and dropped it only so that they might appeal

dismissal of other claims.

Appellants respond (and the Service agrees) that because

the remand was not a final judgment, no motion under Rule

59 or 60 was necessary to amend the complaint to abandon

claims they no longer wished to pursue. We agree. The

general requirement of a Rule 59 or 60 motion prior to postjudgment amendment is employed to serve the judicial policy

"favoring finality of judgments and the expeditious termination of litigation." See 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure

s 1489, at 694 (2d ed. 1990). Neither goal is served by

requiring a Rule 59 or 60 motion here. Indeed, it would be

passing strange if in order to secure appeal of the claims on

which they lost appellants were forced to litigate to finality

claims on which they preliminarily prevailed and that they

now wish to abandon.6

B.

As noted, the rule relies heavily on the Simovich study,

which was released after the proposal and which the agency

received only during the comment period. The study was

therefore not among the materials published for public comment. Appellants argue that the Service's failure to seek

comment on the study violated the APA.

__________

6 Intervenors argue that they are prejudiced by appellants'

amendment because they are forced to relitigate the dropped claim

in a separate suit. But the inability of a third party to rely on the

disposition of a claim cannot force a plaintiff to litigate what it

wishes to drop. In any event, one intervenor recently sued the

Service to compel designation of critical habitats for the four listed

species. The district court has granted summary judgment to that

intervenor and ordered the Service to designate critical habitats by

August 8, 2001. See Butte Envtl. Council v. White,

No. Civ. S-00-0797 WBS GGH (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2001).

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It is not disputed that the Service placed great weight on

the Simovich study. It is cited frequently in the rule, which

touted it as "[s]cientifically credible." 59 Fed. Reg. at 48,141.

The Service concedes that the study is "the first long-term

multidisciplinary study" and "the most scientifically based

and well-documented professional study" of California vernal

pools ever attempted, that it is "more comprehensive than

any previous study," and that "the final rule relied substantially on the findings in the Simovich study."

The Service nonetheless contends that it was not required

to publish the Simovich study for public comment, and we

agree. The APA generally obliges an agency to publish for

comment the technical studies and data on which it relies.

See Solite Corp. v. EPA, 952 F.2d 473, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

(per curiam). But to avoid "perpetual cycles of new notice

and comment periods," Ass'n of Battery Recyclers v. EPA,

208 F.3d 1047, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2000), a final rule that is a

logical outgrowth of the proposal does not require an additional round of notice and comment even if the final rule

relies on data submitted during the comment period. See

Int'l Fabricare Inst. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 384, 399 (D.C. Cir.

1992) (per curiam); Solite, 952 F.2d at 484. Such is the case

here. The Simovich study, while the best available, only

confirmed the findings delineated in the proposal. In relying

on it, the Service "did no more than provide support for the

same decision it had proposed to take." Int'l Fabricare, 972

F.2d at 399. Essentially, the proposal advanced for comment

a hypothesis and some supporting data. The Simovich study

provided additional support for that hypothesis--indeed, better support than was previously available--but it did not

reject or modify the hypothesis such that additional comment

was necessary. See Solite, 952 F.2d at 484.

Appellants next object to the rule because it counts fairy

shrimp populations by the number of vernal pool complexes,

not the number of individual vernal pools, in which they

reside. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 48,137. (A pool complex is a

group of individual pools that, due to their proximity, are

susceptible to the same threats.) Appellants insist that the

proposal never put the public on notice of the "complexes

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methodology" or of the definition of complexes.7 But the use

of complexes to measure fairy shrimp populations was no

surprise: the proposal itself used the term five times. See 57

Fed. Reg. at 19,856, 19,858, 19,859. Moreover, nothing in the

final rule's use of complexes constituted a deviation from the

proposed rule. The proposal posited danger to existing fairy

shrimp populations, which were discussed in terms of both

individual pools and pool complexes; consistent with the

proposal, the final rule found danger to existing fairy shrimp

populations, which were measured--most accurately, according to the rule--in terms of pool complexes. The final rule's

measurement of populations solely in terms of complexes,

after the proposal's uncommitted use of both methodologies,

was a tightening of the rule's reasoning, but it was nonetheless a logical outgrowth of the proposal. Appellants have not

pointed to any way in which the sharpened focus on complexes changed the rule's reasoning or conclusion.

Appellants also claim that methodological flaws in the

Simovich study and other relied-upon authorities mean that

the rule was not based on the "best scientific and commercial

data available," as required by 16 U.S.C. s 1533(b)(1)(A).

Yet as the district court noted, appellants "have pointed to no

data that was omitted from consideration." 979 F. Supp. at

903. Assuming that studies the Service relied on were imperfect, that alone is insufficient to undermine those authorities'

status as the "best scientific ... data available." Appellants

misread s 1533(b)(1)(A): the Service must utilize the "best

scientific ... data available," not the best scientific data

possible. The Service may not base its listings on speculation

or surmise or disregard superior data, cf. Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154, 176 (1997); City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891

F.2d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1989), but absent superior data--and

__________

7 Appellants' brief never explains why they were disadvantaged

by the Service's reliance on pool complexes. At oral argument

appellants suggested that reliance on complexes reduced the number of discrete groups of fairy shrimp, meaning that a threat to a

single shrimp grouping threatens a greater fraction of that species.

Their argument remains somewhat obscure.

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appellants point to none--occasional imperfections do not

violate s 1533(b)(1)(A).

Finally, we reject appellants' claim that the listing's validity

is undermined by its failure to comply with the Service's peer

review policy. To be sure, the listing was not subjected to

the present peer review procedure, which requires that "during the comment period" the Service obtain three independent specialists' opinions on the merits of the decision and

reprint them in the listing. See Peer Review Policy Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270 (July 1, 1994). But the current

peer review policy came into force 22 months after the close

of the fairy shrimp comment period. Appellants point out

that a March 1995 letter from a Service official to Congressman Richard Pombo stated that "[i]n conformance with policy

(59 FR 34270), the Service sought scientific peer review of the

listing proposal." Letter from George T. Frampton, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for the Service, to Hon. Richard Pombo 1

(March 10, 1995). That statement may have misled the

congressman as to the Service's compliance with the specific

peer review procedures promulgated in 1994, but the listing

was in fact subject to peer review that was intense though

less formal than is currently required. In any event, appellants suggest no basis on which the letter would render the

later-enacted policy statement retroactively binding on an

already-concluded comment period.8

* * * *

The denial of appellants' motion for summary judgment is

Affirmed.

__________

8 Appellants also argue that this application of the ESA exceeds

Congress' Commerce Clause power and that the Service misapplied

the ESA's statutory factors. According to appellants' brief, however, the former claim fails under National Association of Home

Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and is asserted

only to preserve the possibility of en banc review. Appellants

conceded at oral argument that the latter claim was not pressed

below.

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