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Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 8, 2003 Decided May 6, 2003

No. 02-5120

BILLY STOKES,

APPELLANT

v.

STEVEN CROSS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv02305)

Richard Carnell Baker argued the cause and filed the

briefs for appellant.

Beverly M. Russell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-5120 Document #747814 Filed: 05/06/2003 Page 1 of 10
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Before: ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Contending that the district failed

to follow the procedures set forth in Kimbro v. Velten, 30

F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1994), Sergeant Billy S. Stokes of the

Uniformed Police Branch of the United States Government

Printing Office appeals the dismissal of his defamation complaint against seven co-workers. He contends that the district court treated a Westfall certification as dispositive rather than allowing him to conduct discovery on the scope-ofemployment issue and holding an evidentiary hearing. We

agree and reverse.

I.

According to the complaint’s factual allegations, which this

court accepts as true, Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Chao, 300 F.3d

867, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2002), Sergeant Billy S. Stokes worked for

over twenty-five years as a member of the Uniformed Police

Branch of the United States Government Printing Office

(‘‘GPO’’) and had an unblemished employment record. That

almost changed as a result of an incident on November 4,

2000, while Stokes was the ‘‘Officer-in-Charge.’’ Officer William Wilson, Stokes’ subordinate, was stationed that evening

at a GPO lot where an unknown individual was attempting to

enter without authorization. After Wilson radioed for assistance, Stokes and the central dispatcher monitored the situation on surveillance cameras and maintained radio contact

with Wilson until the incident was resolved. Several months

later, Stokes received a Notice of Proposed Adverse Employment Action (‘‘Notice’’), which charged that on November 4

he had failed to provide Officer Wilson with necessary assistance in dealing with the trespasser.

Stokes challenged the Notice as ‘‘false and malicious or

made with reckless disregard for the truth,’’ and GPO canceled the Notice. Stokes also filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that the seven

co-workers not only failed reasonably to investigate the inciUSCA Case #02-5120 Document #747814 Filed: 05/06/2003 Page 2 of 10
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dent in good faith and to interview critical eyewitnesses, but

also destroyed and ignored critical evidence, including video

and audio tapes that would have exonerated Stokes. Specifically, Stokes alleged that Lieutenant Steven Cross and Commander James C. Raysinger, Stokes’ superiors, induced the

participation of Manuel Rivera, Phillip Griffin, and Collins

Bailey, Jr., Stokes’ subordinates, to manufacture false statements in support of the Notice. He further alleged that they

had threatened Corporal Sherman Gray’s career and livelihood if he did not make a statement adverse to Stokes; Gray

executed a statement prepared by Griffin and Rivera but

later recanted it. The defendants’ actions, Stokes claimed,

were designed to prevent his promotion, as it was well known

that he intended to apply for the position of his supervisor,

who had recently announced his plans to retire. Stokes

alleged that he was ‘‘a leading and an extremely well-qualified

candidate’’ for the position because of his seniority and ‘‘unblemished employment performance history.’’ ‘‘[D]ue to

spite, malice and ill-will and other sinister reasons,’’ he

claimed, the defendants sought to besmirch his record and foil

his promotion opportunity by ‘‘orchestrat[ing] a conspiracy to

injure, defame, harm, or destroy’’ his professional reputation.

On motion of three defendants the case was removed to

United States district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442(a)(1), &

1446 (2000). In the district court, Assistant United States

Attorney (‘‘AUSA’’) Mark E. Nagle, by authority delegated to

and by the United States Attorney, filed a certification stating

that ‘‘C. Steven Cross, Raymond Garvey, James C. Raysinger, William Wilson, and Collins Bailey, Jr. were acting within

the scope of their authority as employees of the United States

at the time of [the] alleged incidents.’’ AUSA Nagle later

filed a second certification stating that Griffin and Rivera

were acting within the scope of their employment.

At a status call, the district court considered AUSA Nagle’s

certification to be ‘‘prima facie evidence’’ on the scope-ofemployment issue and stated that Stokes had ‘‘given no

evidence to suggest that Mr. Nagle is not able to make the

certification that he has.’’ The court therefore substituted

the United States as defendant and, because the United

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States had not waived its immunity from defamation claims,

28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000), dismissed Stokes’ claims against

the five defendants named in the AUSA’s first certification.

After receiving the second certification, the court, sua sponte,

dismissed the remaining claims.

II.

In Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 300 (1988), the Supreme

Court held that federal employees are absolutely immune

from state tort liability only if (1) they were acting within the

scope of their employment and (2) their actions were discretionary in nature. Congress acted quickly to nullify ‘‘the

Westfall decision by establishing legislated standards to govern the immunity of Federal employees who have allegedly

committed state common law torts.’’ H.R. Rep. No. 100–700,

at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5947. The

Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation

Act of 1988, commonly known as the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679(d) (2000), negated the discretionary function requirement, providing instead that immunity attaches so long as the

employee ‘‘was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim

aroseTTTT’’ Id. § 2679(d)(1). Thus, when a federal employee

is sued for a wrongful or negligent act, the United States

Attorney General, or by designation the United States Attorney in the district where the claim is brought, may certify

that the employee was acting at the time within the scope of

his or her employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1); 28 C.F.R.

§ 15.3(a) (2002). ‘‘Upon certification TTT any civil action or

proceeding commenced upon such claim in a State court shall

be removed TTT to the district court of the United States for

the district and TTT shall be deemed to be an action or

proceeding brought against the United StatesTTTT’’ 28

U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). The Westfall Act further provides that

‘‘[t]his certification TTT shall conclusively establish scope of

office or employment for purposes of removal.’’ Id.

The Supreme Court has held that the government’s scope

of employment determination under the Westfall Act is judiUSCA Case #02-5120 Document #747814 Filed: 05/06/2003 Page 4 of 10
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cially reviewable regarding the substitution of the government. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420

(1995). In Lamagno, the Court noted that the petitioner’s

claims arose in a foreign country and therefore fell within an

exception to the Federal Tort Claim Act’s waiver of the

United States’ sovereign immunity. Id. at 422. As a result,

‘‘substitution of the United States would cause the demise of

the actionTTTT’’ Id. The Attorney General, thus, had a

strong incentive to certify that the defendants were acting in

the scope of their employment, because the certification sheltered not only the individual employees but also the United

States from liability. Id. at 427–28. These circumstances,

the Court concluded, magnified the need for judicial review.

Id. at 429–30. The Court also observed that the legislative

history and purpose did not show ‘‘that Congress meant the

Westfall Act to commit the critical ‘scope-of-employment’

inquiry to the unreviewable judgment of the Attorney General or her delegateTTTT’’ Id. at 426. The Court accordingly

concluded that ‘‘the Attorney General’s certification that a

federal employee was acting within the scope of his employment—a certification the executive official, in cases of the

kind at issue, has a compelling interest to grant—does not

conclusively establish as correct the substitution of the United

States as defendant in place of the employee.’’ Id. at 434.

This circuit had reached the same conclusion a year earlier

in Kimbro, which held that ‘‘[r]egardless of the content of the

certification TTT the federal district court must at least conduct an evidentiary hearing on the scope issue.’’ 30 F.3d at

1508. ‘‘If there is a material dispute as to the scope issue,’’

the court said, ‘‘the district court must resolve it at an

evidentiary hearing.’’ Id. at 1509. ‘‘[T]his procedure,’’ the

court continued, is ‘‘in keeping with the statutory scheme[,

which] does not really treat the certification as having any

particular evidentiary weightTTTT’’ Id. The court also considered the weight to which the government’s certification is

entitled, adopting the approach of the Third Circuit. Id. at

1509. In Melo v. Hafer, 13 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 1994), the Third

Circuit treated the certification as entitled to ‘‘prima facie

effect’’ but stated that

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[i]f the Attorney General’s certification is based on a

different understanding of the facts than is reflected in

the complaint, the plaintiff should be permitted reasonable discovery and should then be called upon to come

forward, as if responding to a motion for summary

judgment, with competent evidence supporting the facts

upon which he would predicate liability, as well as any

other facts necessary to support a conclusion that the

defendant acted beyond the scope of his employment.

Id. at 747; Kimbro, 30 F.3d at 1509. This court has reiterated the Kimbro approach since the Supreme Court’s decision

in Lamagno, stating that the certification

is not conclusive regarding substitution of the federal

government. Instead, the federal court may determine

independently whether the employee acted within the

scope of employment and, therefore, whether to substitute the federal government as the proper defendant.

Haddon v. United States, 68 F.3d 1420, 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(citing Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 434; Kimbro, 30 F.3d at 1505).

The court also has noted that the scope of employment

question is controlled by applicable state law—here, District

of Columbia law. Id. at 1423.

Other circuits have agreed that a plaintiff challenging the

government’s scope-of-employment certification ‘‘bears the

burden of coming forward with specific facts rebutting the

certification,’’ and that the question of scope of employment is

governed by state law. Lawson v. United States, 103 F.3d

59, 60 (8th Cir. 1996); accord Singleton v. United States, 277

F.3d 864, 870–71 (6th Cir. 2002); Ross v. Bryan, 309 F.3d

830, 833–34 (4th Cir. 2002); McClachlan v. Bell, 261 F.3d 908,

909–11 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the plaintiff cannot discharge this burden without some opportunity for discovery,

the district court may permit limited discovery and hold an

evidentiary hearing to resolve a material factual dispute

regarding the scope of the defendant’s employment. E.g.,

Singleton, 277 F.3d at 871; Taboas v. Mlynczak, 149 F.3d

576, 580–81 (7th Cir. 1998).

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Upon de novo review of the district court’s dismissal of

Stokes’ complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Sturm,

Ruger & Co., 300 F.3d at 871; Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154,

162 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996), we find that the district court gave

no consideration to whether a material dispute may exist

concerning the seven defendants’ scope of employment. Observing that AUSA Nagle had certified that the defendants

acted within the scope of their employment, the district court

stated that the certification served as ‘‘prima facie evidence’’

and Stokes had ‘‘given no evidence to suggest that Mr. Nagle

is not able to make the certification that he has.’’ In opposition to the motion to dismiss, however, Stokes made essentially the same arguments he makes here to show that he was

entitled to discovery on the scope-of-employment issue.

When government counsel stated her reply brief would argue

that the defendants were in fact acting within the scope of

their employment under District of Columbia law, the court

responded, ‘‘Well, in lieu of your reply I will just accept your

representation that you would state that. That is the law, as

I understand it, and TTT Plaintiff has made no showing that

Mr. Nagle is for any reason not qualified to make the

certification that he has.’’ The court then dismissed Stokes’

complaint against five defendants ‘‘for essentially the reasons

set forth by the government in its motion and the scope-ofemployment certificationTTTT’’ The court adopted the same

approach in accepting AUSA Nagle’s subsequent certification

and sua sponte dismissed Stokes’ complaint against the remaining two defendants.

The district court misapprehended the law regarding

scope-of-employment certifications. Stokes’ burden was not

to show that AUSA Nagle lacked the authority to issue the

certification. Stokes understandably has never challenged

that authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d); 28 C.F.R. § 15.3(a).

Instead, Stokes’ burden was to raise a material dispute

regarding the substance of AUSA Nagle’s determination by

alleging facts that, if true, would establish that the defendants

were acting outside the scope of their employment. See

Kimbro, 30 F.3d at 1508–09. The district court never gave

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Stokes that opportunity. Rather, the court essentially afforded conclusive weight to AUSA Nagle’s certification and apparently gave no thought to the possibility that the certification may have been in error. This procedure was contrary to

Kimbro’s instruction that the district court ‘‘not really treat

the certification as having any particular evidentiary

weightTTTT’’ Id. at 1509.

Stokes’ complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to

warrant discovery on the question of scope of employment.

Rule 8’s liberal pleading standard requires only ‘‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief,’’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and courts are

charged with construing the complaint ‘‘so TTT as to do

substantial justice,’’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f). The Rules ‘‘do not

require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he

bases his claim.’’ Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).

Rather, the ‘‘simplified notice pleading standard relies on

liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to

define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.’’ Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512

(2002) (citations omitted). ‘‘ ‘The issue is not whether the

plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is

entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.’ ’’ Id. at 511

(quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). ‘‘To

that end, the complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiffs’

favor, and we grant plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that

can be derived from the facts alleged.’’ Kowal v. MCI

Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(citations omitted).

Consequently, to obtain discovery and an evidentiary hearing, Stokes need only have alleged sufficient facts that, taken

as true, would establish that the defendants’ actions exceeded

the scope of their employment. The scope issue is governed

by District of Columbia law, which looks to the Restatement

(Second) of Agency (1958) in defining scope of employment.

Haddon, 68 F.3d at 1423–24. Under the Restatement,

[c]onduct of a servant is within the scope of employment

if, but only if: [a] it is of the kind he is employed to

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perform; [b] it occurs substantially within the authorized

time and space limits; [c] it is actuated, at least in part,

by a purpose to serve the master; and [d] if force is

intentionally used by the servant against another, the use

of force is not unexpectable by the master.

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(1). ‘‘Conduct of a

servant is not within the scope of employment if it is TTT too

little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.’’ Id.

§ 228(2). The District of Columbia’s formulation of this test

‘‘excludes from the scope of employment all actions committed ‘solely for [the servant’s] own purposes.’ ’’ Weinberg v.

Johnson, 518 A.2d 985, 990 (D.C. 1986) (footnote omitted).

‘‘[T]he intent criterion focuses on the underlying dispute or

controversy, not on the nature of the tort, and is broad

enough to embrace any intentional tort arising out of a

dispute that ‘was originally undertaken on the employer’s

behalf.’ ’’ Id. at 992 (citations omitted); see also Boykin v.

District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 562 (D.C. 1984).

The government contends that the defendants’ conduct was

within the scope of their employment because it was incidental to their duty to investigate and report officers who fail to

render assistance. Stokes contends, however, that the defendants’ alleged conduct—destroying critical evidence, preparing and submitting false affidavits by use of threat and

coercion, and engaging in other criminal acts—falls outside

the scope of their employment. It is unclear whether evidence of such conduct alone would be sufficient under District

of Columbia law, which liberally construes the doctrine of

respondeat superior, at least with respect to the first prong of

the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(1). See Haddon,

68 F.2d at 1425–26; Weinberg, 518 A.2d at 988–90. But

Stokes’ counsel explained that, if permitted to conduct discovery on the scope-of-employment issue, he would seek depositions of the defendants and other witnesses as well as statements they had made and memoranda they had written

indicating their intent to prevent the best candidate, namely

Stokes, from getting the promotion. Such evidence, he maintained, would indicate that they had maliciously acted conUSCA Case #02-5120 Document #747814 Filed: 05/06/2003 Page 9 of 10
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trary to their employer’s interest and, therefore, outside the

scope of their employment.

Not every complaint will warrant further inquiry into the

scope-of-employment issue. In Singleton, 277 F.3d 864, for

example, the Sixth Circuit noted that while an evidentiary

hearing on the scope issue may sometimes be appropriate, the

district court had not erred in dismissing the claim without a

hearing where the plaintiff ‘‘did not allege any facts in his

complaint or in any subsequent filing TTT that, if true, would

demonstrate that [the defendant] had been acting outside the

scope of his employment.’’ Id. at 871; accord Davric Maine

Corp. v. United States Postal Serv., 238 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir.

2001). But that is not this case. Stokes was not required to

allege the existence of evidence he might obtain through

discovery. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512–13. He was

merely required to plead sufficient facts that, if true, would

rebut the certification. We hold that he met that burden and

is entitled to discovery.

Accordingly, because the district court deviated from the

Kimbro approach by essentially affording conclusive weight

to the AUSA’s scope-of-employment certifications and failing

to consider whether Stokes’ allegations entitled him to discovery, we reverse. On remand, the district court shall allow

Stokes to conduct at least limited discovery on the scope-ofemployment issue.

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