Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00879/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00879-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 18:1836(a) Injunction against Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

---

1 

17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GARFIELD BEACH CVS LLC, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

MOLLISON PHARMACY, SAMERA 

YOKOUB, an individual, and DOES 1 

through 50, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK 

OF JURISDICTION 

(Doc. No. 26) 

 Pending before the Court is Defendants Mollison Pharmacy and Samera Yokoub’s 

(collectively referred to as “Defendants”) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 

No. 26.) On July 14, 2017, Plaintiff Garfield Beach CVS LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed an 

opposition. (Doc. No. 32.) Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the Court finds the motion 

suitable for determination on the papers. Accordingly, the motion hearing set for August 

24, 2017, is VACATED. As explained more fully below, having considered both parties’ 

arguments and the applicable law, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

BACKGROUND 

 The contours of this case are straightforward. Plaintiff, a subsidiary of CVS Health, 

alleges that confidential inventory and trade secret files were kept by Defendant Samera 

Case 3:17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD Document 41 Filed 08/22/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 7
2 

17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Yokoub (“Yokoub”) a former El Cajon Express Pharmacy (“Express”) employee.1

 (Doc. 

No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 6, 21.) Plaintiff contends that Yokoub was an Express driver that was entrusted 

with confidential and proprietary information including the delivery log. (Id. ¶ 21.) After 

Plaintiff purchased Express, Yokoub told Plaintiff that she had to quit as she had to care 

for her sick husband. (Id. ¶ 25.) Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Yokoub began working for 

Defendant Mollison Pharmacy (“Mollison”), Plaintiff’s competitor. (Id.) Plaintiff 

maintains that it demanded that Yokoub return the delivery logs from March through April 

before she left her position with Express, however, Plaintiff asserts that Yokoub has failed 

to do so. (Id. ¶ 26.) 

The allegedly confidential information at issue in the instant action are prescription 

files that Plaintiff purchased, which includes hard copy prescriptions, signature logs, 

customer lists, as well as similar electronic data that Express maintained in confidence. (Id. 

¶ 16.) One of the subsets of the prescription files was known as a delivery log and it 

included customers’ names, their prescription numbers, customers’ signatures confirming 

receipt of the delivery, and co-pay information for each prescription. (Id. ¶ 20.) All of the 

prescription files are not readily available public information. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

 Plaintiff instituted this action on May 1, 2017, alleging violations of the (1) Defend 

Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”); (2) California Uniform Trade Secrets Act; (3) Breach of 

Contract; (4) Unfair Competition; (5) Conversion; and (6) Tortious Interference with 

Business Relationship/Contact. (See generally Doc. No. 1.) On May 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed 

an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order, (Doc. No. 3), which was denied on 

June 9, 2017, (Doc. No. 24). Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed the present action, their 

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 26.) On June 28, 2017, both parties 

filed a joint motion to continue the briefing schedule for Defendants’ motion, (Doc. No. 

                                                                

1

 On April 11, 2017, Plaintiff closed a transaction and purchased the confidential inventory, 

trade secret prescription files, and goodwill of Double Star Pharmacy, Inc., doing business 

as Express. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 3.) 

Case 3:17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD Document 41 Filed 08/22/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 7
3 

17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28), which was granted on June 30, 2017, (Doc. No. 30). 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a motion to dismiss where a court 

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Because “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited 

jurisdiction,” a court “presume[s] that a cause [of action] lies outside this limited 

jurisdiction[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A 

Rule 12(b)(1) motion “can attack the substance of a complaint’s jurisdictional allegations 

despite their formal sufficiency, and in so doing rely on affidavits or any other evidence 

properly before the court.” St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). 

No presumption of truthfulness attaches to the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint as 

the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Thornhill Publ’g. 

Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, the court must 

presume it lacks jurisdiction until subject matter jurisdiction is established. Stock West, Inc. 

v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Any party may raise a defense 

based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. See Attorneys Trust v. Videotape 

Computer Products, Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594–95 (9th Cir. 1996). 

DISCUSSION 

A. Judicial Notice 

 As an initial matter, the Court will turn to Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. (Doc. 

No. 32-1.) Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of documents of legislative history: (1) Senate 

Report No. 114-220; and (2) House Report No. 104-788. (Id.) Defendants do not oppose 

this request. (See generally Doc. No. 36.) 

 Here, the Court finds judicial notice of the legislative documents at issue to be 

appropriate. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining 

that a court may judicially notice undisputed matters of public record but not disputed facts 

stated therein); see also Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1223 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(granting plaintiff’s request to take judicial notice of the legislative history of a state 

statute). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s unopposed request for judicial 

Case 3:17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD Document 41 Filed 08/22/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
4 

17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

notice. 

B. Merits of the Motion to Dismiss 

Defendants move to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. (See generally Doc. 

No. 26-1.) Defendants allege that the trade secrets at issue do not involve a product or 

service used, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce as required by the 

DTSA. (Id.) Plaintiff refutes this assertion. (See generally Doc. No. 32.) 

Congress enacted the DTSA on May 11, 2016. Cave Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Truven 

Health Analytics Inc., Case No. 15-cv-02177-SI, 2017 WL 1436044, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 

24, 2017). The DTSA only covers acts occurring “on or after the date of the enactment of 

this Act.” Id. The Act creates a cause of action for the “owner of a trade secret that is 

misappropriated . . . if the trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended 

for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1). A trade secret includes 

“all forms and types” of information that derives value from being secret and that the owner 

took reasonable measures to keep secret. Id. at § 1839(3)(A)(B). 

First, the Court notes that both parties dispute whether Defendants’ motion is a facial 

or factual attack on jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 32 at 5; Doc. No. 36 at 2.) In a facial attack, 

“the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their 

face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 

(9th Cir. 2004). By contrast, in a factual attack, “the challenger disputes the truth of the 

allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. Here, the 

Court finds that Defendants’ jurisdictional attack is factual because they present extrinsic 

evidence to challenge Plaintiff’s contention that the trade secrets at issue are products used, 

or intended for use, in interstate or foreign commerce as is required by the DTSA. (Doc. 

No. 26-1 at 2; Doc. Nos. 26-2, 26-3 (see Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (noting 

that a jurisdictional challenge was a factual attack where it relied on extrinsic evidence) 

(citation omitted)).) 

Defendants’ extrinsic evidence comes in the form of two affidavits from Yokoub 

and Bassam Massaad. (Doc. Nos. 26-2, 26-3.) Yokoub states that when she was making 

Case 3:17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD Document 41 Filed 08/22/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 7
5 

17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

deliveries for Express, the patients she delivered to all resided in California, and almost 

exclusively within San Diego County. (Doc. No. 26-2 ¶ 3.) Bassam Massaad2

 testified that 

Mollison serves customers that exclusively live in San Diego County and that Yokoub only 

delivered prescription’s to Mollison’s customers located within San Diego County. (Doc. 

No. 26-3 ¶¶ 4, 6.) Based on this, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s cannot bring a claim 

under the DTSA as the allegedly confidential information was never used in interstate or 

foreign commerce. 

In response, Plaintiff does not “furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to 

satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 

F.3d at 1039 (citation omitted). Instead, Plaintiff asserts that a “jurisdictional finding of 

genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate” where like here “the jurisdictional issue and 

substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the 

resolution of factual issues going to the merits of an action.” 3 (Doc. No. 32 at 6 (citing Safe 

Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039).) Additionally, Plaintiff argues that a motion to dismiss 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is only proper when the allegations in the complaint 

are frivolous. (Doc. No. 32 at 6.) 

 Here, the question of whether Plaintiff’s trade secrets comply with the jurisdictional 

standard as set forth in the DTSA goes to the heart of Plaintiff’s federal claim. The Court 

illuminates that Plaintiff’s complaint is only in federal court based on its DTSA violation, 

which is a federal cause of action. Thus, Plaintiff’s DTSA claim is the source of both 

subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s substantive claim for relief. See Safe Air for 

Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (“The question of jurisdiction and the merits of an action are 

intertwined where a statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the 

federal court and the plaintiff’s substantive claim for relief.”). 

                                                                

2

 Bassam Massaad is the president of Defendant Mass Drugs, Inc. doing business as 

Mollison Pharmacy. (Doc. No. 26-3 ¶ 1.) 

3

 Defendants make no arguments to oppose this assertion in their reply brief. (See generally

Doc. No. 36.) 

Case 3:17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD Document 41 Filed 08/22/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
6 

17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

However, whereas here, Defendants have provided declarations that dispute 

allegations in the complaint, “the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of 

factual issues going to the merits.” Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 

1987) (citation omitted). Thus, a review of Defendants’ motion under the typical Rule 

12(b)(1) standard applicable to factual motions would not be proper. Instead, “the trial 

court should employ the standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment” when 

“ruling on a jurisdictional motion involving factual issues which also go to the merits[.]” 

Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). In the current matter, after 

a careful analysis of the docket, the Court is reluctant to utilize a Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 564

 standard to analyze the motion. This is due to the fact that the instant action 

is in its early stages of litigation; thus a Rule 56 standard would be premature as both parties 

have not engaged in substantial discovery. 

Consequently, as the Court is disinclined to convert the present action into a motion 

for summary judgment, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is DENIED

without PREJUDICE to raising this argument in a properly noticed and appropriately 

timed motion for summary judgment. See Johnson v. Hernandez, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 

1035 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that converting the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 

into a motion for summary judgment would be “premature because [p]laintiff [had] not yet 

had the opportunity to engage in discovery and thus [had] not had the opportunity to 

develop the evidence he may need to rebut Defendants’ facts”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Johnson v. Jacobs, No. 2:14-cv-02323-JAM-EFB, 2015 WL 1607986, 

at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2015) (“Rather than convert this motion into one for summary 

judgment at this early stage, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction without prejudice in order to allow for discovery by both parties . . . .”). 

                                                                

4

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states that “the court shall grant summary judgment 

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

Case 3:17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD Document 41 Filed 08/22/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 7
7 

17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons just stated, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED without 

PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 22, 2017 

Case 3:17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD Document 41 Filed 08/22/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 7