Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01877/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01877-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE CRUZ, CASE NO. CV-F-06-1877 AWI DLB P

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

vs.

A.K. SCRIBNER, WARDEN, et al.,

Defendants. [Doc. 1]

 /

I. Screening Order

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 26, 2007.

A. Screening Standard

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court

must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous

or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any

filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time

if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984),

citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners

Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

accept astrue the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees,

425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve

all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in the complaint allegedly occurred at Corcoran State Prison, where plaintiff

is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff names Warden Scribner, Warden Botello and Officers L. Watson,

Gardemal, Sheppard-Brooks, Cisneros, Ortiz, Johnson and Rangel as defendants. Plaintiff seeks

monetary and injunctive relief. Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied the right to participate in the

annual “Pow-wow, Banquet and Sweat Ceremony” which is part of his religion. 

C. Discussion

1. Section 1983 Claims

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has

held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning

of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to

perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is

made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under

section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that

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demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights.

The court has reviewed plaintiff’s allegations and finds that plaintiff has not linked any of the

named defendants to any acts or omissions that demonstrate a violation of plaintiff’s rights. In order to

state claims for relief under section 1983, plaintiff’s allegations must place each defendant on notice as

to what acts or omissions allegedly violated plaintiff’s rights. This requires that plaintiff link each

defendant, by name, to the acts or omissions complained of. In the event that plaintiff opts to file an

amended complaint, the court will provide plaintiff with the legal standards applicable to his claims in

the paragraphs that follow. 

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no

law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. Const.,

amend. I. Prisoners “retain protections afforded by the First Amendment,” including the free exercise

of religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (1987). However,

“‘[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and

rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.’” Id. (quoting Price v.

Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060 (1948)). “In order to establish a free exercise violation,

[a prisoner] must show the defendants burdened the practice of his religion, by preventing him from

engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests.” Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). “In order to reach the

level of a constitutional violation, the interference with one’s practice of religion ‘must be more than an

inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central

to religious doctrine.’” Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737 (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir.

1987)).

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are treated

differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio School District

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prison officials cannot discriminate against particular religions. See

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1972) (per curium). Prisons must afford an inmate of a minority

religion “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow

prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.” Id. at 322. To succeed on an equal protection

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claim, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional discrimination. Lowe v. City of

Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985); FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff fails to state any claims for relief under section 1983 for violation of the Free Exercise

Clause of the First Amendment or for violation of the Equal Protection Clause because plaintiff has not

linked any of the named defendants to the actions and omissions complained of, and plaintiff has not

alleged any facts demonstrating that he was intentionally discriminated against on the basis of his

religion.

Plaintiff has alleged no facts that indicate that he is pursuing any claims based on a supervisory

liability theory. However, because plaintiff names Warden Scribner and acting Warden Botello, and

Facility Captain Rangel as defendants, the court shall provide plaintiff with the applicable legal standard.

Plaintiff is informed that supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for

the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher

v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To show a prima facie

case of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege facts indicating that supervisory defendants either:

personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and

failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself

is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’”

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged

to support claims under Section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163,

168 (1993). 

3. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act Claim

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) provides: 

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person

residing in or confined to an institution. . . , even if the burden results from a rule of

general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden

on that person–

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

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(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he has been denied the right to attend and

participate in certain ceremonies which are part of the NAI religion. These allegations fail to state a

claim for relief based on violation of RLUIPA, because plaintiff has alleged no facts linking any of the

named defendants to the deficiencies complained of. In order to state a claim, plaintiff must allege facts

specifically linking one or more defendants, by name, to the deprivations complained of.

D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s allegations plaintiff’s allegations do not give rise to any claims

for relief against any of the named defendants under section 1983 or RLUIPA. The court will provide

plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule 15-

220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading.

As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625

F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). 

Finally, if plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, plaintiff shall not make any legal

arguments or cite to any authority. (See Complaint provided with this order, § IV.) Plaintiff shall only

set forth the facts at issue in this action and state what causes of actions he is pursuing. (Id.) The

inclusion of extraneous argument and legal authority may lead to the striking of the amended complaint

from the record.

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file

an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this

order;

3. The amended complaint shall bear the caption “Amended Complaint;” and

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the

Court shall recommend that this action be dismissed for failure to obey a court

order and failure to state a claim. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 2, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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