Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05707/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05707-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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*E-FILED 5/17/05*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

 

MARIAN P. VICK, 

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

Defendant.

NO. C 03-05707 RS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Marian Vick ("Vick") moves for entry of judgment in her favor and against defendant

Jo Anne Barnhart, the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"). Vick requests that the

Court reverse the Commissioner's denial of her application for social security benefits because, she

contends, she is disabled and, therefore, unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity. The

Commissioner opposes Vick's motion and cross-moves for entry of judgment in her favor. The

motions were fully briefed and submitted on the papers pursuant to Civil L.R. 16-5. Based on all the

papers filed to date, as well as on the administrative record, Vick's motion for summary judgment is

denied, and the Commissioner's cross-motion is granted, for the reasons set for below.

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II. BACKGROUND

Vick suffers from a back disorder and right upper extremity radiculopathy. Born on March 7,

1942, Vick is currently 63 years old, has a high school education, and has relevant vocational

background as a leasing agent and apartment manager. See Administrative Transcript ("AT") at p. 11.

On June 17, 2002, Vick applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging an inability to work since

November 1, 2001 due to back pain. Id. She has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her

alleged onset date of disability. Id. Her application was denied by the Social Security Administration

("SSA") initially and upon reconsideration. Vick subsequently filed a timely request for hearing before

an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). On February 19, 2003, a hearing was held at which Joseph

Jensen, M.D., ("Dr. Jensen") testified as the Commissioner’s medical expert, along with the

Commissioner’s vocational expert Darlene McQuary ("VE"). Vick was also present and testified at the

hearing. Edward M. Katz, M.D. ("Dr. Katz"), Vick’s treating physician, did not attend the hearing,

although his assessment of Vick's disability was submitted into evidence.

Dr. Katz's assessment stated that Vick had chronic cervical strain with radiculopathy, right C7;

C5-6 central disc bulge; and C6-7 disc bulge and cervical spondylosis. Id. at p.12. Based on this

assessment, Dr. Katz opined that Vick could perform less than a full range of sedentary work, and

hence suffers from a back disorder which meets or equals the requirements for a disability under 20

C.F.R. §404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (2002). 1.04 ("Listing 1.04"). Id.

In contrast, Dr. Jensen stated that Vick suffers from a back disorder which does not meet or

equal the requirements for a disability under Listing 1.04. "[W]hile there is evidence of cervical

spondylosis with some encroachment of the neural foramen and some right upper extremity

radiculopathy, Dr. Katz's assessments were not supported by the objective medical findings." Id. In

addition, two state agency doctors who had previously reviewed the medical evidence, also concluded

that Vick’s alleged disability did not meet the requirements of Listing 1.04. Id. at 108-115. In a

Physical Residual Capacity Form, dated August 5, 2002, 

Nayvin Gordon, M.D. ("Dr. Gordon") and Anthony Jackson, M.D. ("Dr. Jackson") 

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reviewed the medical evidence and concluded that Vick "had the ability to lift and/or carry up to 10

pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, stand and/or walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, sit

for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and occasionally reach overhead." Id. at 12.

The VE testified that Vick's past work as a leasing agent and apartment manager constituted

light, skilled jobs. Id. at p. 14. In answer to a hypothetical question asked by the ALJ to the VE, as

required by 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(v), in the context of an individual of Vick's age, education,

vocational background, and stated medical limitations, the VE stated that "the hypothetical individual

could perform the claimant's past work as a leasing agent and apartment manager." Id. 

The ALJ determined the following relevant findings. First, Vick has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since she filed her application. Id. at 14. Second, the medical evidence establishes that

Vick suffers from various impairments which are "severe," but that she does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Listing 1.04. Id. Third, Vick's

allegations of disabling pain are not credible for the reasons given in the rationale portion of the ALJ's

decision. Id. Fourth, Vick has the ability to lift (with both arms) up to 10 pounds frequently and 20

pounds occasionally; push/pull up to 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally; stand/walk for

6 hours in an 8-hour workday; sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; occasionally reach overhead; and,

frequently perform fine fingering, gripping and grasping and occasional torquing. In addition, she could

only occasionally turn her neck up/down or side to side and is restricted from using vibrating tools. Id.

at pp. 14-15. Fifth, Vick has relevant work experience as a leasing agent and apartment manager (light,

skilled jobs); as a general clerk (light, semi-skilled job); and, as a delivery driver (light, unskilled job).

Id. at p. 15. Sixth, Vick is able to perform her past work as a leasing agent and apartment manager. Id.

Seventh, that Vick was not under a "disability," as defined in the Social Security Act (20 C.F.R.

416.920(f) and 404.1520(f)). Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

To be eligible for Social Security disability benefits, the claimant must be disabled. "A claimant

bears the burden of proving that an impairment is disabling." Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th

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Cir. 1985). Disability is defined as "an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An "impairment" for purposes of this definition "results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical

and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). In addition, a person is disabled only if

the impairment is so severe as to preclude not only performance of her previous work, but also,

considering her age, education and work experience, performance of "any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

The Court's review of the ALJ's decision is limited. The determination denying benefits will be

upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and if the ALJ

applied the proper legal standards. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); Kail v.

Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984); Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir.

1983). When the proper legal standards are not applied by the ALJ in weighing the evidence and

reaching a decision, it must be set aside, even if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. 

Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978); Lebus v. Harris, 526 F. Supp. 56, 59 (N. D.

Cal. 1981).

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion." Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993); Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). The reviewing court must "look to the record as a

whole and not merely at the evidence lending support to a finding." Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988,

990 (9th Cir. 1978), quoting Walker v. Matthews, 546 F.2d at 818; see also Desrosiers v. Sec. of

Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). The court cannot substitute its own

conclusion for that of the ALJ if there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's outcome. Young v.

Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990); Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1985).

When a claimant gives testimony regarding subjective pain, the ALJ must analyze several

possible bases for discounting or affirming subjective allegations of pain made by the claimant. 20

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C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929. The ALJ must consider "the extent to which [the claimant's]

symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other

evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). "Objective medical evidence" is defined in this section as

medical signs and laboratory findings. "Other evidence" includes statements from the claimant,

statements or records of the treating physician or psychologist and others about the claimant's medical

situation, diagnosis, daily activities, efforts the claimant has made to work, and other evidence about

how the claimant's impairment affects his or her ability to work. The claimant must show that the

objective medical evidence and other evidence demonstrate that he or she has a medical impairment(s)

"which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when

considered with all of the other evidence ... would lead to a conclusion that [the claimant] is disabled." 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a).

In determining whether an applicant is eligible for benefits, the Social Security Administration

("SSA") follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the SSA determines whether

the applicant is currently engaged in gainful employment. If he is, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(b). At step two, the SSA determines whether the applicant has a severe impairment; the

applicant must demonstrate that he has "anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which

can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques," and that the

impairment significantly interferes with his or her work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.908; 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(c). At step three, if the applicant is suffering from such an impairment, the SSA then

determines whether the impairment is included on a standardized list, or is equivalent to or more serious

than an ailment on the list. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d). At step four, if the applicant meets the burden of

showing such an impairment, he is considered disabled. At step five, if the applicant is unable to

demonstrate that his impairment is equivalent to or more severe than a listed impairment, the SSA will

consider the applicant's ability to do his former job or other work based on his education, age, and

experience. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e) - (f).

IV. DISCUSSION

Vick argues that the ALJ did not afford appropriate weight to the medical evidence (e.g., the

opinion of Dr. Katz), improperly discounted Vick's credibility, and failed to include the functional

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limitations set forth by Dr. Katz in the hypothetical functional question posed to the VE, as required by

20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(v).

A. The Proper Weight of Medical Evidence

Vick contends that the ALJ disproportionately weighed the medical opinion of Dr. Jensen over

that of Dr. Katz, and that this disproportionate weighing was a substantial factor in the denial of social

security benefits. In contrast to the medical opinion of Dr. Katz, who opined that Vick was not capable

of performing sedentary or light work on a regular and continuing basis, see AT at pp. 120-127, Dr.

Jensen testified that Dr. Katz’s assessments were not supported by the objective medical findings, and

furthermore, that Vick could perform such work on that basis. Id. at p. 12. Specifically, Dr. Jensen

testified that although there was some evidence of right upper extremity radiculopathy, the impairment

did not meet or equal the criteria contained in Listing 1.04. Id. Vick argues, however, that there is

ample evidence in the record to support her contention that a disability does, in fact, exist per Listing

1.04. For example, she contends, the ALJ did not properly consider Dr. Katz’s examination which

showed "tightness and tenderness in the neck," Id., and a set of Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)

studies which showed, among other findings, in the opinion of Dr. Katz, " bilateral foraminal narrowing

at C5-6 and left sided foraminal narrowing at C6-7 secondary to bony osteophytes." Id. at pp. 12-13.

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly weighed the medical evidence in adopting Dr.

Jensen's assessment of Vick's limitations, based on the specific and legitimate reasons that: (1) the

testimony of Dr. Jensen is also supported by the medical opinions of Dr. Gordon and Dr. Jackson, and

(2) the lack of objective findings and laboratory tests (i.e., x-rays, MRI scans, etc.) to support Dr.

Katz's assessment. Id. at pp. 13-14. 

While generally a treating physician, by virtue of proximity to a patient, may be in a better

position to determine the scope of a disability than would a non-treating physician, the record here

reflects that the ALJ gave specific legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to accept Dr.

Jensen’s conclusion as opposed to that of Dr. Katz. Id. at 12-15. "When a nontreating physician's

opinion contradicts that of the treating physician-but is not based on independent clinical findings, or

rests on clinical findings also considered by the treating physician-the opinion of the treating physician

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may be rejected only if the ALJ gives 'specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on

substantial evidence in the record.'" Morgan v. Commissioner, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999),

citing Andrews v. Shalala , 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.1995). "Opinions of a nonexamining, testifying

medical advisor may serve as substantial evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the

record and are consistent with it." Id. at 600. "[W]hen evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Id. at 601. First, Dr. Jensen's assessment, which

was based on the review of the medical evidence present to the ALJ, is consistent with the assessments

by the state agency doctors, Dr. Gordon and Dr. Jackson. See AT at p. 12. Second, the Medical

Source Statement prepared by Dr. Katz for the ALJ lacks sufficient explanatory remarks substantially

to justify its conclusions, and thus to refute Dr. Jensen's testimony that Vick could perform sedentary or

light work on a regular and continuing basis. Id. 14. Therefore, since the record reflects that there is

sufficient evidence to support Dr. Jensen's testimony, the medical evidence was not improperly weighed

by the ALJ.

B. Vick's Credibility

Vick argues that the ALJ committed an error of law by failing to find her credible, without first

providing clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Specifically, Vick alleges that the ALJ failed carefully to consider her statements about her symptoms,

as required by Social Security Ruling 96-7p. The Commissioner argues that Vick's contentions are not

credible for at least three reasons. First, the ALJ noted that despite Vick's claim of disability since

November 1, 2001, the earliest record of treatment was a June 26, 2002 report by Dr. Katz. Id. at p.

12. Second, the ALJ stated that there are no treatment records from July of 2002 until January of

2003. Id. Third, although the ALJ has found that the claimant suffers from various impairments which

are "severe," these impairments are not listed in, or medically equal to, an impairment listed in Listing

1.04. Id. at p. 14.

"The ALJ may consider at least the following factors when weighing the claimant's credibility:

'[claimant's] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant's] testimony or between [her]

testimony and [her] conduct, [claimaint's] daily activities, [her] work record, and testimony from

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physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which

[claimant] complains.'" Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 

(9th Cir. 2002), citing Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th,1997).

Applying those credibility factors, the ALJ permissibly concluded that Vick's testimony did not

comport with the lack of evidence of severe limitations precluding the performance of a wide range of

light work. See AT at p. 13. Further, the ALJ found that "[t]he objective medical findings contained in

[Dr. Katz's] sparse treatment notes and the March 28, 2003 cervical spine MRI scan are consistent

with the limitations found [by Dr. Jensen]." Id. at p. 14. No error of law, therefore, arises from the

ALJ's findings regarding Vick's credibility.

C. Hypothetical Functional Question

Vick contends that the ALJ committed a legal error by failing to include Dr. Katz's stated

restrictions in the hypothetical question posed to the VE. Specifically, Vick alleges that the ALJ

premised a single hypothetical question to the VE based solely on the opinion of Dr. Jensen and not on

that of Dr. Katz, and that this premise was improperly outcome-determinative with respect to the

analysis performed at step five. The hypothetical question assumed an individual of Vick's age,

education, vocational background, and stated medical limitations, as testified to by Dr. Jensen, to which

the VE responded that "the hypothetical individual could perform the claimant's past work as a leasing

agent and apartment manager." Id. at p. 14. The Commissioner contends that Dr. Jensen's testimony

constituted the requisite substantial evidence on which the ALJ may rely.

The "ALJ must propose a hypothetical that is based on medical assumptions supported by

substantial evidence in the record that reflects each of the claimant's limitations." Osenbrock v. Apfel,

240 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Roberts v. Shalala , 66 F.3d 179, 184 

(9th Cir.1995). As noted above, the Commissioner properly concluded that Dr. Jensen's testimony

constitutes substantial and specific medical evidence, and thus the hypothetical premised on Dr.

Jensen's testimony fully and accurately reflected Vick's impairments and degree of functional limitations.

As a result, the ALJ need not have based the hypothetical question on Dr. Katz's restrictions, since the

ALJ properly rejected those restrictions based on substantial evidence contained in the record.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants the Commissioner's motion for summary

judgement and denies Vick's motion for summary judgment. A separate judgment will be entered by the

Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 17, 2005

/s/ Richard Seeborg 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge 

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER WAS ELECTRONICALLY

PROVIDED TO:

Counsel for Plaintiff(s)

Harvey P. Sackett, Esq.

Email: hps@hpspc.com

Counsel for Defendant(s)

Sara Winslow, Esq.

Email: sara.winslow2@doj.gov

Dated: May 17, 2005

 /s/ BAK 

Chambers of Magistrate Judge Richard Seeborg

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 RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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