Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01063/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01063-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Vonda Kinast, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Target Corporation, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-15-01063-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Defendant Target Corporation’s (“Target”) Motion for 

Summary Judgment. (Doc. 31.) The motion is fully briefed, and the Court heard oral 

argument on April 20, 2016. For the following reasons, Target’s motion is granted. 

BACKGROUND 

In August 2014, Plaintiff Vonda Kinast slipped and fell as she walked down the 

main aisle of a Target store in Mesa, Arizona to meet her friend, Mary Ewald. (Doc. 32, 

¶¶ 1-2, 4, 7-8.) Kinast did not see what caused her fall, but felt the sensation of her foot 

slipping on something which “felt like . . . baby powder consistency.” (Id., ¶¶ 9, 14.) 

Ewald did not see Kinast fall, but came to her aid afterward. (Id., ¶¶ 10-13.) Evan Serie, 

a former Target employee and the manager on duty at the time Kinast fell, responded to 

the scene, and paramedics arrived several minutes later. (Id., ¶¶ 17, 20.) Although 

Kinast did not see anything on the floor before her fall, both she and Ewald saw a wipe 

nearby after the paramedics arrived. (Id., ¶¶ 15-17.) Kinast does not know how long the 

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wipe was on the floor, or whether it was there before she fell. (Id., ¶ 19.) During the 

relevant time period, the main aisle was busy and crowded. (Id., ¶¶ 5-6.) Approximately 

212 other people walked through the same aisle within an hour of the fall. (Id., ¶ 28.) 

Further, fourteen people walked near the area where Kinast fell within two minutes 

before the incident. (Id., ¶ 29.) No other customers slipped and fell during this time. 

(Id., ¶ 28.) 

 In September 2014, Kinast brought a negligence action against Target in Maricopa 

County Superior Court. (Doc. 1-1 at 2-7.) Target removed to this Court and now moves 

for summary judgment. (Docs. 1, 31.) 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 

[the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

 Substantive law determines which facts are material and “[o]nly disputes over 

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly 

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). “A fact issue is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 

281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Thus, the 

nonmoving party must show that the genuine factual issues “‘can be resolved only by a 

finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’” Cal. 

Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). Furthermore, the party opposing 

summary judgment “may not rest upon mere allegations of denials of pleadings, but . . . 

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must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Brinson v. 

Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). 

If the nonmoving party’s opposition fails to specifically cite to materials either in the 

court’s record or not in the record, the court is not required to either search the entire 

record for evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact or obtain the missing 

materials. See Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 

2001); Forsberg v. Pac. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1988).

ANALYSIS 

 “A business proprietor has an affirmative duty to make and keep his premises 

reasonably safe for customers.” Chiara v. Fry’s Food Stores of Ariz., Inc., 733 P.2d 283, 

285 (Ariz. 1987). However, “[t]he mere occurrence of a fall on a floor within business 

premises is insufficient to prove negligence on the part of the proprietor.” Walker v. 

Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 511 P.2d 699, 701 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973). A proprietor 

may be liable for an invitee’s injuries only if the proprietor created the dangerous 

condition, had actual or constructive notice of it, or if the proprietor reasonably could 

anticipate that its mode of operation would regularly produce hazardous conditions. 

Chiara, 733 P.2d at 285-86. Kinast concedes she cannot prove Target created the 

condition that caused her fall, or that it had actual notice of it. (Doc. 39 at 7.) Instead, 

Kinast seeks to hold Target liable on constructive notice and mode of operation theories.

I. Constructive Notice 

 “[U]nder traditional negligence jurisprudence, a storeowner’s liability can not be 

premised simply upon a plaintiff’s proof that a storeowner had notice that a dangerous 

condition was a possibility.” Chiara, 733 P.2d at 285. Rather, a plaintiff must show that 

the proprietor “ha[d] notice of the specific dangerous condition itself . . . .” Id. Thus, 

“[o]ne of the most important questions that must be answered in establishing constructive 

notice is the length of time that a given [condition] has been present.” Walker, 511 P.2d 

at 702. Target argues that Kinast cannot prove it had constructive notice of the wipe on 

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the floor. The Court agrees. 

 Kinast has not provided sufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could 

determine the length of time that the wipe was on the floor. Kinast did not see the wipe 

before she fell and even admits that the wipe might not have been on the floor until after. 

Instead, she argues that Target’s housekeeping practices create a triable question of fact. 

Her argument is similar to one rejected by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Walker, in 

which the plaintiff sued the defendant proprietor after slipping on a peach. Id. at 701. 

The defendant did not have a regular inspection schedule; each employee “had the 

responsibility of looking out for, and cleaning up, any spills.” Id. The plaintiff urged the 

court “to adopt a test for determining a defendant’s culpability for injuries to a business 

invitee based solely upon evidence of defendant’s housekeeping practices.” Id. at 703. 

The court held that “such a test is not the law in Arizona . . . .” Id. Instead, “[a] plaintiff 

must show that the defective condition had been in existence for a sufficient length of 

time prior to the injury for the proprietor, in the exercise of reasonable care, to find and 

correct it, or take remedial action.” Id. The court affirmed a summary judgment for the 

defendant because the plaintiff produced no evidence regarding the length of time that the 

peach was on the floor. Id. at 704. Similarly, Kinast provides no evidence regarding the 

length of time that the wipe was on the floor prior to her fall and therefore cannot prove 

that Target had constructive notice. 

 Kinast argues that whether Target had constructive notice of the condition is 

“speculative and therefore a question for the jury.” (Doc. 39 at 8.) However, Arizona 

law does not permit merely speculative claims to reach a jury. See McGuire v. Valley 

Nat’l Bank of Phoenix, 381 P.2d 588, 590 (Ariz. 1963) (upholding directed verdict 

against plaintiff where there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer 

“that one period of time was more reasonable than any other” and instead would have to 

guess whether the condition had been present for a sufficient length of time). 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence regarding the length of time 

the wipe was on the floor, no reasonable jury could find that the wipe was on the floor 

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long enough to put Target on constructive notice of its presence. 

II. Mode of Operation 

Even where actual or constructive notice is lacking, a business may be liable for 

an accident on its premises based on its “choice of a particular mode of operation and not 

[the] events surrounding the plaintiff’s accident.” Contreras v. Walgreens Drug Store 

No. 3837, 149 P.3d 761, 763 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). To prevail under a mode-ofoperation theory, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) the business reasonably could anticipate 

that the hazardous condition would occur on a regular basis, and (2) the business did not 

exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” Shuck v. Texaco Refining & 

Marketing, Inc., 872 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). The rule is of limited 

application. Chiara, 733 P.2d at 286. It “focuses not on whether a [condition] occurs at 

some interval,” but on whether the condition creates a hazard “to customers with 

sufficient regularity to be considered customary, usual, or normal.” Contreras, 149 P.3d 

at 764. 

 Target admits that customers sometimes dispose of wipes in carts rather than in 

trashcans. However, Kinast presents no evidence that cart wipes regularly created 

hazardous conditions for Target’s customers. This case is similar to Contreras, in which 

the plaintiff slipped on a slimy blue substance on the floor of the defendant’s store. 149 

P.3d at 762. The plaintiff produced evidence that spills occurred a couple of times per 

week. Id. Affirming the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for defendant, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals stated that “although [the] evidence might permit a reasonable 

jury to conclude spills occur with some regularity, it does not permit the inference such 

spills regularly created a hazardous condition.” Id. at 763. Because the plaintiff did not 

present evidence “about the location of the spills or the hazard they present to 

customers,” the court held that evidence of spills occurring twice a week was “not 

sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that a hazardous condition resulting from 

those spills would regularly occur.” Id. Likewise, Kinast presents no evidence of past 

incidents involving cart wipes such that Target reasonably could anticipate wipes 

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regularly would pose a hazard. On this record, no reasonable jury could find that Target 

reasonably should have anticipated dangerous conditions from cart wipes based on its 

mode of operation. 

CONCLUSION 

 Target is entitled to summary judgment because Kinast cannot show it had 

constructive notice of the condition that caused her fall, or that Target reasonably could 

anticipate that its mode of operation would regularly produce hazardous conditions. 

 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Target Corporation’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, (Doc. 31), is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and 

terminate this case. 

 Dated this 21st day of April, 2016. 

Douglas L. Rayes 

United States District Judge

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