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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CAMILLE DeLOACH, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MITZI BEVERS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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FILED Unit~ States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit · 

DEC ~ 1 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-2978 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-87-2077-W) 

Robert E. Manchester (Haven Tobias with him on the brief) of 

Cooper, Manchester, Hiltgen & Healy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

defendant-appellant. 

Steven M. Angel (Carl Hughes with him on the brief), Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for plaintiff-appellee. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Robert A. 

Nance, Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Federal Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the 

State of Oklahoma in support of defendant-appellant. 

James P. Manak, Associate Counsel, and Wayne W. Schmidt, Executive 

Director, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., Chicago, 

Illinois (Of Counsel Fred E. Inbau, John Henry Wigmore Professor 

of Law Emeritus, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, 

Illinois) filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Americans for 

Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., joined by The International 

Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.; The National District 

Attorneys Association; The National Sheriffs Association; and The 

Oklahoma Association of Chiefs of Police in support of defendantappellant. 

Appellate Case: 88-2978 Document: 01019616446 Date Filed: 12/31/1990 Page: 1 
Before LOGAN and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON, District 

Judge.* 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Mitzi Bevers1 appeals from judgment entered 

following a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Camille DeLoach in 

her civil rights action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983. Bevers asserts 

that the district court erred in failing to grant her motions in 

the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new 

trial. 

This case arises out ·of the investigation into the death of 

eighteen-month-old Ryan Swift. Both of Ryan's parents had fulltime jobs, and DeLoach was Ryan's daycare sitter. Ryan's father 

left him at DeLoach's home in the morning of September 11, 1985, 

and when Ryan's mother arrived to pick him up at 4:00 that 

afternoon, Ryan was comatose. He was taken to a hospital, where 

he died the next day from swelling of the brain caused by a severe 

blow to the head. 

The attending neurologists who operated on Ryan were of the 

opinion that the blow to Ryan's head was so severe that it would 

have rendered him unconscious immediately, and, therefore, had to 

* The Honorable Howard C. Bratton, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of New Mexico, sitting by 

designation. 

1 Defendant married after commencement of this action and is 

sometimes referred to in the record as Mitzi Bevers Welch, Mitz i 

Welch, or Detective Welch. 

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have occurred while Ryan was in DeLoach's care. The medical 

examiners who performed the autopsy on Ryan and another expert 

were of the opinion that the blow could have been delivered some 

time before September 11. The autopsy also revealed numerous 

bruises on Ryan consistent with persistent abuse. 

Bevers was the police detective assigned to investigate 

Ryan's death. Some time in October 1985, she presented the case 

file of her investigation to Assistant District Attorney Donald 

Deason. Deason declined to proceed, believing the evidence was 

insufficient to convict. But in March 1987, at the urging of 

Douglas L. Polk, M.D., one of the attending neurologists, District 

Attorney Robert Macy decided to initiate prosecution of DeLoach 

for first degree murder. Bevers prepared an affidavit which 

induced a magistrate to issue a warrant for DeLoach's arrest. 

DeLoach was arrested and after a preliminary hearing was bound 

over for trial. After a jury was empaneled for DeLoach's trial, 

the government withdrew the charge. 

DeLoach then filed this § 1983 suit alleging that Bevers 

violated DeLoach's constitutional rights by retaliating against 

her for exercise of her right to retain counsel and by preparing 

an intentionally false and misleading affidavit which caused her 

arrest on first degree murder charges. The jury found for DeLoach 

on both counts, awarding compensatory damages of $150,000 and 

punitive damages of $75,000. We affirm. 

I 

DeLoach's claim of unconstitutional retaliation alleged that 

Bevers took various actions leading to DeLoach's arrest and to her 

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being bound over for trial, and that Bevers did so in retaliation 

for DeLoach's decision to hire an attorney when she became a 

suspect in Ryan's death. "An act taken in retaliation for the 

exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under 

§ 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would 

have been proper. 11 Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1150 (7th Cir. 

1984); ~also Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14, 16 

(1973); Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 

1987); Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 907-08 (3d 

Cir. 1984). The unlawful intent inherent in such a retaliatory 

action places it beyond the scope of a police officer's qualified 

immunity if the right retaliated against was clearly established. 

See Coen v. Runner, 854 F.2d 374, 378-79 (lOth Cir. 1988 ) ; Losch, 

736 F.2d at 909-10. 

Bevers contends that DeLoach had no Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel when she was merely a suspect in the criminal 

investigation. The right to retain and consult with an attorney, 

however, implicates not only the Sixth Amendment but also clearly 

established First Amendment rights of association and free speech. 

See generally United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 

U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). "Thus, 

while private parties must ordinarily pay their own legal fees, 

they have an undeniable right to retain counsel to ascertain their 

legal rights." Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 

(footnote omitted). 

There was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury 

could conclude that Bevers worked to cause DeLoach's arrest and 

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prosecution at least partly in retaliation for De~oach's decision 

to hire an attorney. Dennis DeLoach testified that after his wife 

hired an attorney, Bevers expressed displeasure, saying, "Well 

that's not being very cooperative," and thereafter appeared 

unhappy with DeLoach. II R. 99-100. A retired police officer 

acquainted with DeLoach testified that when he called on the night 

of DeLoach's arrest to ask if Bevers would allow DeLoach to 

surrender herself to authorities, Bevers replied, "Payback is 

hell, that's what she got for hiring a .smart-ass lawyer." III R. 

311. Bevers admitted saying "payback is hell" in reference to 

DeLoach's failure to "cooperate." IV R. 542, 610. At trial 

Bevers persisted in contending that DeLoach did not cooperate, but 

she never identified any such failure. She admitted that DeLoach 

answered all questions she asked in her interviews and voluntarily 

permitted a search of her house. The only evidence in the record 

supporting any failure to cooperate is DeLoach's attorney's 

request that the second Bever interview of DeLoach be at the 

DeLoach home rather than at the police station. See II R. 99-100. 

Apparently DeLoach, upon advice of counsel, also refused Bevers' 

request that she take a lie detector test. This was not before 

the jury, however. 2 

2 There is nothing in the appellate record indicating that Bevers 

sought to introduce evidence of DeLoach's refusal to take a lie 

detector test as evidence relevant to the retaliation claim. On 

appeal Bevers does challenge the district court's refusal to 

permit evidence of polygraphs taken by Ryan's parents, the Swifts. 

She argues this was relevant, not on the issue of whether the 

Swifts committed the crime, but to support Bevers' belief that 

DeLoach had committed the crime and hence to support her filing of 

the affidavit that led to DeLoach's arrest. We uphold the 

district court's decision on the exclusion of the lie detector 

Continued to next page 

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Bevers argues that she cannot be held r e sponsible for 

DeLoach's arrest and prosecution because there were many 

intervening actors making independent determinations to arrest and 

prosecute: the district attorney's office, the magistrate issuing 

the arrest warrant, and the judge at the preliminary hearing. But 

there was evide nce from which the jury could beli eve that Bevers 

manipulated the process by mischaracterizing the evidence and by 

concealing the exculpatory opinion of a key medical expert. Some 

time in October 1985, Bevers interviewed John H. Stuemke, M.D., 

Medical Director of Outpatient Department and Eme rgency Services 

for Children's Hospital, an expert in child abuse who was often 

consulted by the district attorney's office and who had testified 

for the . . 3 pros cut~on ~n many cases. Dr. Stuemke's opinion was 

that it was much more likely that one of Ryan's parents had 

rendered the fatal blow than DeLoach, and that the blow could have 

and probably d i d occur twenty-four hours or more before the child 

became comatose. Yet, Bevers did not make an investigative report 

of this interview to be included in the investigation file for use 

by the district attorney's office, apparently the only interview 

she did not record. She also d i d not report Dr. Stuemke's opinion 

in her affidavit supporting the arrest warrant. Because Bevers 

Continued from previous page 

evidence. The firmness of Bevers' conviction about DeLoach's 

guilt, based upon the Swifts having passed lie detector tests is 

not relevant to, and does not justify, either retaliatory action 

against DeLoach or falsehoods or omissions in Bevers' affidavit to 

support an arrest warrant. 

3 There was conflicting testimony over whether Assistant District 

Attorney Deason was also present for this inte rview, but Deason 

testified that he had no knowledge of the interview. II R. 163. 

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admitted that she knew exculpatory evidence in her file was 

required to be made available to a defense attorney, see IV R. 

557-58, the jury could believe her failure to make a record of 

this interview or to mention it later was deliberate. When Bevers 

testified at the preliminary hearing, she completely 

rnischaracterized the substance of the interview and Dr. Stuemke's 

opinion, avoiding any exculpatory implications. When the district 

attorney's office consulted Dr. Stuemke shortly before DeLoach's 

trial, it was his opinion that convinced them to dismiss the 

charges against DeLoach. Indeed, Assistant District Attorney 

Deason testified that if Dr. Stuemke's opinion had been known 

before DeLoach's arrest, she would not have been arrested. II R. 

169. 

In Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988 ) , 

the court stated: 

"[A] prosecutor's decision to charge, a grand jury's 

decision to indict, a prosecutor's decision not to drop 

charges but to proceed to trial--none of these decisions 

will shield a police officer who deliberately supplied 

misleading information that influenced the decision. 

• . . If police officers have been instrumental in 

the plaintiff's continued confinement or prosecution, 

they cannot escape liability by pointing to the 

d e cisions of prosecutors or grand jurors or magistrates 

to confine or prosecute . . . . They cannot hide behind 

the officials whom they have defraude d." 

Id. at 994 (citations omitted). Likewise, Bevers cannot hide 

behind the decisions of others involve d in DeLoach's arrest and 

prose ution if she deliberately conceals and mischaracterizes 

exculpatory evidence. 

II 

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DeLoach alleged that Bevers violated her Fourth Amendment 

rights by causing her to be arrested pursuant to an intentionally 

false and misleading affidavit. Bevers contends that she is 

entitled to qualified immunity under the doctrine of Malley v. 

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1996). In Malley, qualified immunity in 

§ 1983 actions was equated with the good-faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule laid down in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 

(1984). Malley, 475 u.s. at 344. Leon reaffirmed the doctrine of 

Franks v. Delaware, 438 u.s. 154 (1978), that a warrant must be 

voided "if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled 

by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or 

would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of 

the truth." Leon, 468 u.s. at 923. Thus, "[w]here the judicial 

finding of probable cause is based solely on information the 

officer knew to be false or would have known to be false had he 

not recklessly disregarded the truth, not only does the arrest 

violate the fourth amendment, but the officer will not be entitled 

to good faith immunity [under§ 1983]." Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 

277, 282 (7th Cir. 1985). A reckless disregard for the truth 

exists when "the affiant 'in fact entertained serious doubts as to 

the truth of his' allegations, ... [andJ a factfinder may infer 

reckless disregard from circumstances evincing 'obvious reasons to 

doubt the veracity' of the allegations." United States v. 

Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting St. Amant v. 

Thomas, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968)), cert. denied, 470 u.s. 1003 

(1985). The Franks rule applies to omissions as well as 

affirmative misstatements, if the omissions are so probative they 

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would vitiate probable cause. Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572; 

582 n.13, 583 (lOth Cir. 1990). Recklessness may be inferred from 

omission of facts which are "cle arly critical" to a finding of 

probable cause. Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 400 (5th Cir. 1990); 

United States v. Reivich, 793 F . 2d 957, 961 (Bth Cir. 1986). 

There was evidence from which the jury could conclude that 

Bevers made intentional or reckless misstatements in her arrest 

affidavit. The third paragraph of the affidavit stated "[t]hat 

the defendant made statements to the affiant that the child had 

fallen on a toy tonka truck and this was the i njury to the 

forehead and the left ear. These statements are i nconsistent with 

the type and magnitude of the injury found by the doctors." 

Addendum to Appellant's Brief in Chief, tab 5. DeLoach's 

testimony, as well as a transcripted interview of DeLoach by 

Bevers, revealed, however, that DeLoach merely offered this 

incident as the only instance on September 11 she could recall 

where Ryan could have sustained any injury while in her care. 

Paragraph five of the affidavit included the following: "And 

further statements made by CAMILLE MEYER DELOACH to the affiant 

were that she had found the child not breathing and that she had 

administered CPR, and after getting the chil d to breath failed to 

contact emergency assistance while waiting approximately 15-20 

minutes for the mother to arrive to pick the child up." Id. But 

DeLoach's transcripted interview with Bevers and Bevers' report of 

her initial interview with DeLoach both reveal that the child was 

breathing and this was an exaggeration of the amount of time 

DeLoach said passed between resuscitation and the arrival of Mrs. 

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Swift. Id. tab 6, at 1 (transcript of interview on 10-8-85) ("He 

was just real lethargic, and just breathing shallow so I gave him 

mouth to mouth and he seemed to pick up his breathing and then she 

arrived and we called the ambulance."); id. tab 2, at 2 

(defendant's report of interview on 9-12-85) ("She stated that 

. . . she checked on Ryan and found him not ~o be breathing very 

much and at this time attempted to administer CPR. A few minutes 

later, Mrs. Swift came to pick up Ryan and it was at that time 

that the ambulance and the Fire Dept. were called."). 

Paragraph four of the affidavit provided as follows: 

"From further investigation by the affiant and interviews with Dr. Polk who was the treating neurologist on 

the case, Dr. Polk told this affiant that he performed a 

craniotomy and that Ryan T. Swift suffered an acute 

injury from a blow to the head. Dr. Polk and Dr. Cagle 

both related to the affiant that the victim, Ryan T. 

Swift would have immediately gone into unconsciousness. 

Dr. Cagle was the assisting neurologist in the case and 

was present during the craniotomy. Both Dr. Polk and 

Dr. Cagle told the affiant that the injury had to be one 

of a non-accidental nature." 

Id. While all this information is true, Bevers failed to set 

forth the opinion shared by the medical examiners and Dr. Steumke 

that the fatal blow could have been rendered more than a day 

before Ryan became unconscious, even though Bevers did relate that 

the medical examiners had ruled the death a homicide. Bevers also 

excluded all reference to autopsy findings of many bruises of 

varying ages covering the infant's body. 

Not all errors and omissions will negate probable cause, of 

course, and not all evidence known to the office r need be included 

in every affidavit used to secure an arrest warrant. But in the 

case of omitted evidence it is not enough to ask simply whether 

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the truthful statements included in the affidavit are by 

themselves sufficient to support a probable cause finding; the 

court also must ask if inclusion of the omitted material would 

negate probable cause. Thus, in Stewart we held that failure to 

disclose in an affidavit that the main complainant had recanted 

his testimony "would be a reckless omission of a material fact in 

violation of plaintiff's clearly established rights because the 

affidavit would not support probable cause if it were modified so 

as to include that exculpatory evidence." 915 F.2d at 583. In 

Hale, the Fifth Circuit found an officer's failure to mention 

"information garnered from a number of witnesses which tended to 

contradict [the officer's] allegations" to fall into the "clearly 

criti cal " category. 899 ·F.2d at 400. In the instant case, the 

fact that the prosecution reposed great confidence in Dr. 

Stuemke's opinion, evidenced by his frequent use as an expert 

witness for the prosecution and that the district attorney dropped 

the charges upon learning Dr. Stuemke's views, is strong evidence 

that probable cause would have been vitiated had Dr. Stuemke's 

views been incorporated in the affidavit of probable cause. 

We have long recognized that it is a jury question in a civil 

rights suit whether an officer had probable cause to arrest. 

~' Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 541 (lOth Cir. 1963); 

Marland v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312, 314 (lOth Cir. 1963). 

"It is true that the issue of probable cause 

odinarily is for the judge rather than the jury. That 

is because the issue usually arises in the context of a 

motion to suppress evidence, which the judge decides. 

But where the issue arises in a damage suit, it is, as 

the panel opinion acknowledged, a proper issue for the 

jury if there is room for a difference of opinion. The 

underlying issue in deciding whether the police had 

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probable cause to do what they did is 

which is also the underlying issue 

negligence --a classic jury issue." 

reasonableness, 

in deciding 

Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985) (en bane) 

(citations omitted) (probable cause to search). This rule applies 

also to cases in which the officers made the misrepresentations in 

an application for an arrest warrant. Easton v. City of Boulder, 

776 F.2d 1441, 1448 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 816 

(1986); ~also Malley v. Briggs, 475 u.s. 335, 341 & n.4 (1986). 

Based upon Bevers' own admissions on cross-examination at 

trial, the jury could believe the misstatements and omissions in 

the affidavit were deliberate. See IV R. 580-85. The alleged 

misstatements and omissions in this case clearly were material 

enough that the district court was justified in submitting the 

question of probable cause to the jury. 

III 

Bevers challenges several j ury instructions and the district · 

court's failure to give other instructions. As to most of these, 

Bevers made no objection at trial, so the challenges must be 

judged by a plain error standard. After carefully reviewing 

defendant's objections in light of the instructions and the record 

as a whole, we believe the instructions gave the jury ample 

understanding of the issues and applicable standards, and Bevers 

was not prejudiced by any particular instruction. See Big Horn 

Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1271 & n.19 

{lOth Cir. 1988). 

The only issue that Bevers has raised and that concerns us 

regarding the award of punitive damages is her claim for 

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remittitur on the basis that the sum of $75,000 is three times 

Bevers' net worth. She correctly points out that such damages are 

to punish and not to bankrupt a defendant against whom they are 

awarded. See Thi£Y v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 518 

(Okla. 1983). The only argument made to the district court in 

Bevers' motion for remittitur and brief in support, however, was 

that "there was no evidentuary [sicJ basis for the jury to 

conclude that Plaintiff was entitled to an award" of $75,000, and 

that the award "is so overly punitive as to suggest the jury was 

swayed by passion and prejudice and did not take into 

consideration evidence of Defendant's assets and net worth." I R. 

tab 144 at 1. Both are all-or-nothing 

specifically on Bevers' ·ability to 

arguments, not focused 

pay. The jury did have 

evidence of Bevers' net worth; but it was not permitted to 

consider whether Bevers had insurance coverage. If, as now 

claimed on appeal, insurance does not cover the punitive damages 

award, that information should have been presented to the district 

court in support of the remittitur motion. Because Bevers failed 

to make such an argument to the district court, we will not 

consider it on appeal. 

This is a tragic case. Bevers admitted that she made up her 

mind that DeLoach, the babysitter, was guilty of murder shortly 

after her first interviews with the three principal suspects--

DeLoach and the child's parents. She apparently never waivered 

from that belief, and a jury could believe it very much affected 

her actions thereafter: that she took DeLoach's hiring of a 

lawyer as evidence of guilt; that she did not pay attention to Dr. 

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Stuemke's opinions because the doctor did not agree with her views 

(Or. Stuemke testified to that effect); that she deliberately 

failed to record Dr. Stuemke's views to prevent the defense lawyer 

from obtaining that exculpatory information; and that when the 

district attorney decided to file the case and Bevers was asked to 

prepare an affidavit, she deliberately slanted the facts by 

misstatements and omissions to help persuade the magistrate to 

issue the warrant. The amicus briefs are alarmed that upholding 

the verdict against Bevers will chill future law enforcement 

officers. But accepting the jury's findings as true, what Bevers 

did is totally unacceptable behavior for an investigative officer. 

Impelled by her own bias to slant the evidence, she improperly 

hindered the others whom the law supposes will make imp~tial 

determinations--the district attorney and the magistrate--before 

DeLoach is required to undergo the ordeal of arrest and trial for 

first degree murder. 

AFFIRMED. 

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