Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01550/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01550-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John McComish, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Jan Brewer, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. cv-08-1550-PHX-ROS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ and Intervenor-Defendant Clean Election

Institute’s (“CEI”’s) Notice of Discovery Dispute (Doc. 110). Plaintiffs have asked

Defendant CEI for a number of pieces of information that are matters of public record, but

which would involve calculations of various sorts. CEI refused to answer these

interrogatories and requests for production stating that they 

call for publicly-available information that is equally available to Plaintiffs and

that gathering and analyzing this publicly-available information to determine

the answer to this interrogatory would be no more burdensome for Plaintiffs

than for CEI.

Plaintiffs cite to several cases holding that, as a general rule, discovery is not limited to

matters that are not known by the discovering party or matters that are not a matter of public

record. See, e.g., Rca Mfg. Co. v. Decca Records, 1 F.R.D. 433, 435; 8 Charles Alan Wright,

Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2014 (2d. ed,

1994). CEI responds that this principle “does not mean that a party has a duty to collect and

Case 2:08-cv-01550-ROS Document 148 Filed 09/26/08 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

analyze publicly-available data not in its possession, custody, or control in responding to an

interrogatory.”

Rule 26(b)(2)(C) requires the district courts to “limit the frequency or extent of

discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rules if it determines that:

(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be

obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or

less expensive . . . .

This is a textbook example of such a situation. If CEI does have any of the

information requested by the Plaintiffs already collated and calculated, it is discoverable.

CEI should not, however, be required to spend its time performing calculations on publicly

available figures that Plaintiffs could do just as easily for themselves. While Plaintiffs want

to generate admissions from CEI that the matching funds harm traditional candidates, this

does not justify the burden imposed on CEI as a result.

Plaintiffs further request that CEI “produce all expert reports, communications, or

opinions concerning the Clean Elections Act, which [it] regard[s] as relevant to the issues

raised by Plaintiffs’ or Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunction.” This has

led to a dispute over the meaning of the term expert. Plaintiffs have defined “expert” as

“anyone with greater than ordinary knowledge and understanding.” CEI, on the other hand,

argues that “[t]his definition is contrary to the ordinary legal meaning of the term ‘expert,’

particularly when read in conjunction with the request’s references to ‘reports’ and

‘opinions.’ Were Plaintiffs’ definition to be adopted, CEI argues that the request is

overbroad and unduly burdensome as, “[b]ecause CEI’s work focuses on the Clean Elections

Act (“CEA”), the vast majority of its documents likely were prepared by someone with a

‘greater than ordinary knowledge and understanding’ of the CEA 

Plaintiffs have repeatedly clarified what they meant by use of the word “expert” –

and, apparently, did so throughout the discovery process – thus eliminating any confusion

that might have resulted; their definition will stand for purposes of this discovery request.

The claim that the request is overbroad and unduly burdensome is, perhaps, more serious if

the discovery request was read to require CEI to turn over every document in its possession

Case 2:08-cv-01550-ROS Document 148 Filed 09/26/08 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

about the CEA. However, the request specifies CEI must produce anything CEI deems

relevant to the issues raised in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. If this request, given

these limits in scope, is, in fact, unduly burdensome, CEI must demonstrate that by laying

out the specific burden that would be placed upon it.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED Plaintiffs may not require CEI to gather and analyze data in

response to its discovery requests where the underlying data is publicly available. Where

CEI has already performed the requested analysis or has requested documents on-hand, the

fact that the data is publicly available does not excuse it from compliance with Plaintiffs’

discovery requests.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED CEI shall respond fully to Plaintiffs’ Third Request

for Production operating under the definition of “expert” specified by Plaintiffs.

DATED this 26th day of September, 2008.

Case 2:08-cv-01550-ROS Document 148 Filed 09/26/08 Page 3 of 3