Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00734/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00734-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Dennis Bixler, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 10-0734-PHX-DGC (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner Robert Dennis Bixler. Doc. 1. Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Petitioner pled guilty on September 12, 2006, to one count of sexual exploitation

of a minor, and one count of luring a minor for sexual exploitation, a class two and class

three felony, respectively, under Arizona law. Doc. 16, Exh. F, G. On October 18, 2006,

Petitioner was sentenced, in accordance with the plea agreement, to 17 years in prison for the

first offense and a consecutive term of lifetime probation for the second offense. Doc. 16,

Exh. H. 

On November 3, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction relief under Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Doc. 16, Exh. I. On April 20, 2007,

Petitioner’s post-conviction counsel filed a Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction Review

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1

 Petitioner names in ground one both his trial level counsel and post-conviction

counsel. His specific allegations of ineffective assistance, however, appear to relate only to

the performance of his trial level counsel. Moreover, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i), ineffective

assistance of counsel during post-conviction proceedings “shall not be a ground for relief in

a proceeding arising under section 2254.” Accordingly, the court will only consider the

allegations as they pertain to his trial level counsel, not his post-conviction counsel.

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by Counsel; Request for 45 Day Extension to Allow Defendant to File Pro Per Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief. Doc. 16, Exh. J. Counsel explained to the trial court that after

reviewing the record she was unable to find any claims for relief to raise in a petition for

post-conviction relief. Id. Petitioner then filed a Brief in Support of Petition for PostConviction Relief on August 30, 2007. Doc. 16, Exh. K. After briefing was completed, the

trial court issued a Minute Entry filed on February 8, 2008, in which it summarily dismissed

the petition upon finding that it raised no colorable claims for relief. Doc. 16, Exh. N.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on March 4, 2008.

Doc. 16, Exh. O. The Court of Appeals denied review on December 29, 2008. Doc. 16, Exh.

P. A subsequent Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court was denied on April 7,

2009. Doc. 16, Exh. Q. 

Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court on April 1, 2010.

Doc. 1. Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in the petition, though his first ground for

relief includes eleven separate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in addition to the

primary claim. In ground one, Petitioner alleges a violation of due process under the 5th, 6th

and 14th Amendments based on the cumulative effect of ineffective assistance of counsel.1

As to the specific claims of ineffective assistance, Petitioner alleges: (1) that his lawyer failed

to purse pretrial motions filed by his previous lawyer before proceeding with plea

negotiations; (2) that his lawyer failed to ascertain Petitioner’s mental competency despite

knowing the Petitioner was under psychiatric care and on psychotropic medications; (3) that

his lawyer failed to assert Petitioner’s rights set forth in a previously filed motion regarding

the State of Arizona’s subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s offenses; (4) that his

lawyer failed to challenge prejudicial statements made by the prosecutor during the

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sentencing hearing; (5) that his lawyer made prejudicial statements during the sentencing

hearing; (6) that his lawyer failed to provide a meaningful adversarial challenge to certain

aspects of the state’s case, including whether the images depicted were “actual children”; (7)

that his lawyer coerced and encouraged Petitioner to sign a plea agreement containing

multiple errors; (8) that his lawyer coerced and encouraged Petitioner to make false

admissions at the change of plea hearing when Petitioner was under the fog of psychotropic

medications; (9) that his lawyer allowed him to be sentenced for the completed offense of

luring a minor when the facts supported only an attempted luring; (10) that his lawyer failed

to challenge the state’s claims, and failed to challenge discrepancies between the indictment,

the plea agreement and actual evidence; and (11) that his lawyer failed to meaningfully

advocate for leniency during sentencing. In ground two, Petitioner alleges that his right to

due process under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments was violated when he was permitted to

proceed with a guilty plea while under the fog of psychotropic medications. Petitioner

contends, therefore, that the plea was not knowingly and intelligently made. In ground three,

Petitioner contends that his right to due process under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments was

violated when the State of Arizona prosecuted him for out of state offenses over which it had

no jurisdiction. On August 20, 2010, Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. Doc. 16. Petitioner then filed a Reply and a Memorandum in Support on

November 4, 2010. Doc. 21, 22.

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s due process claim in ground one is

procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to raise it in the state court. Regarding the

individual ineffective assistance of counsel claims in ground one, and the claim in ground

two, Respondents concede that state court remedies have been properly exhausted but argue

that Petitioner has failed to satisfy the standards for habeas relief. Finally, regarding ground

three, Respondents contend that Petitioner fails to raise a cognizable federal claim.

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A. Procedural Default of Ground One Due Process Claim 

1. Legal Standards

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court

in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). A

petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues

by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Id. at

845. In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals

by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of

Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v.

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895,

898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). "Our rule is that a state prisoner has not 'fairly presented' (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that

those claims were based on federal law." Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). "If a petitioner fails to alert

the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is

unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court." Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). “Moreover, general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient

to establish exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)).

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2

 Respondents have not provided the court with a copy of the petition for review to

the Arizona Supreme Court. Even if Petitioner raised the claim in that petition for review,

however, it would be insufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.

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If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); see also Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002) (a

defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted when it is clear that the state court would hold

the claim procedurally barred). The federal court will not consider these claims unless the

petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Dretke v. Haley, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 1851-52

(2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

2. Application

Petitioner’s primary claim in ground one alleges a due process violation based on the

cumulative effect of eleven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nowhere in

Petitioner’s state petition for post-conviction relief does he allege that the cumulative effect

of multiple instances of ineffective assistance of counsel violated his right to due process.

See Doc. 16, Exh. K. Nor did he raise the claim in his petition for review to the Arizona

Court of Appeals. See Doc. 16, Exh. O.2

 Petitioner raised numerous ineffective assistance

of counsel claims, but he never alleged a separate constitutional violation based on their

cumulative effect. See Doc. 16, Exh. K at 9-11. 

 By failing to present the claim in the state court, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his

state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he returned to

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3

 The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court under Rule 32.4(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner has not shown that any of the

exceptions to the time limits under Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to him.

4

 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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the state court.3

 As a result, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner addresses the

exhaustion issue in his reply and claims that his inability to access legal resources in prison

establishes cause for the default. The court finds that Petitioner’s claim of inadequate access

to legal resources does not establish cause for the default, nor has he shown a miscarriage of

justice to overcome the procedural default. The court will therefore recommend that the

claim be denied. 

B. Merits Analysis of Ground One IAC Claims and Ground Two Claim

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

Under the AEDPA4

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the state court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or (2)

"if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent."

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an 'unreasonable

application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then

applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

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unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the

“unreasonable application” clause requires the state court’s application of Supreme Court law

to be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). "When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Legal Standard for Ineffective Assistance Claims

The two-prong test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show: (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

The Strickland test also applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective

assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). A defendant who pleads

guilty based on the advice of counsel may attack the voluntary and intelligent character of

the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel fell below the level of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. at 56. To satisfy the second prong

of the Strickland test, "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going

to trial." Id. at 59.

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5

 Petitioner also refers to a motion challenging the state court’s jurisdiction but

because that issue is raised as a separate ineffective assistance claim, the court will address

it when it gets to that claim.

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In the context of a habeas petition, a petitioner must do more than demonstrate to the

federal court that the state court applied Strickland incorrectly. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,

698-99 (2002). Rather, a petitioner must demonstrate that the state court “applied Strickland

to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id.

a. Failure to Pursue Pretrial Motions

As Respondents point out, Petitioner’s IAC claim in ground one that his lawyer failed

to pursue pretrial motions filed by his former attorney, does not identify what motions his

lawyer should have pursued. Petitioner contends in his reply that he was referring to a

motion by his former attorney for more time to obtain and review the grand jury transcript

and prepare an appropriate challenge.5

 Petitioner’s vague and conclusory claim, however,

contains nothing to show that a review of the grand jury transcript would have had any

impact on the charges. In his reply, Petitioner provides nothing more than self-serving and

unsupported assertions that the State of Arizona failed to demonstrate to the grand jury that

Petitioner transmitted images involving an “actual minor” as opposed to an adult posing as

a minor. 

The state trial court found after reviewing Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims

that they failed to state a colorable claim for relief, and the appellate courts summarily denied

review. Petitioner has not shown here that the state court’s decision denying this claim was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law, or that the decision was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court will recommend

that the claim be denied.

Moroever, as a general rule, a guilty plea eliminates subsequent claims of

constitutional violations that occurred before the plea. United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d

549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989); Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1985). “It is

well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who

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has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.” Mabry v.

Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984). "[O]ne who voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty

to a criminal charge may not subsequently seek federal habeas corpus relief on the basis of

pre-plea constitutional violations." Hudson v. Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 474 U.S. 981 (1985). An unconditional guilty plea "cures all antecedent

constitutional defects." United States v. Floyd, 108 F.3d 202, 204 (9th Cir.1997) (emphasis

in original). "When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in

fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent

claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of

the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea."

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).

 Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim for failing to challenge the grand jury

proceedings is not an attack on the voluntariness of the plea. Any failure by counsel to

pursue this issue in a pretrial motion was cured by Petitioner’s subsequent unconditional

guilty plea. The court therefore finds that this claim is barred by Petitioner’s guilty plea,

which provides an additional basis for the court to recommend that it be denied.

b. Failure to Determine Competency

Petitioner next contends that his lawyer failed to ascertain his competency after

learning that Petitioner was under psychiatric care and on medication (wellbutrin and paxil).

Petitioner claims that his lawyer failed to challenge the court’s inquiry of his ability to

understand the proceedings during the change of plea.

Petitioner goes on at length in his reply explaining the potential side effects of the

medication he was taking and claims that “the probability he was suffering from one or more

of these mind altering side effects is higher than not.” Doc. 22 at 22. Petitioner claims that

since discontinuing those medications upon arriving at the state prison, he has reviewed what

occurred during the change of plea and believes his ability to comprehend the consequences

of his plea was affected.

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A defendant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his understanding of the plea

agreement carry substantial weight in determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea. United

States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1991). The court may properly credit a

defendant’s testimony at a hearing regarding entry of a guilty plea over any subsequent

declarations to the contrary. See United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 815 (9th Cir.

1984). Other than his own after the fact, self-serving claim about his ability to

understand the proceedings, Plaintiff presents nothing to support his claim, and the record

clearly refutes it. The transcript of the change of plea hearing reflects that Petitioner

understood the questions posed to him by the judge and responded accordingly. Doc. 16,

Exh. G. When the judge inquired about whether Petitioner’s medication “in any way”

affected his ability to understand the proceeding, Petitioner answered, “No.” Doc. 16, Exh.

G at 4. There is nothing in the record to suggest the judge, prosecutor, Petitioner’s counsel,

or Petitioner himself, had any concerns about Petitioner’s ability to understand the

proceedings. Absent any basis to believe Petitioner’s competency to enter the plea was an

issue, the failure of Petitioner’s counsel to raise it was not ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner has, therefore, not shown that the state court’s decision denying this claim was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law, or that the decision was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court will recommend

that the claim be denied.

c. Failure to Challenge Jurisdiction

Petitioner next contends that his lawyer failed to pursue a previously filed motion

challenging the State of Arizona’s jurisdiction over his offenses. Petitioner fails to allege

that pursuing such a motion would have made any difference.

As Respondents assert in their response to the petition, A.R.S. § 13-108(A)(1) confers

jurisdiction on the State of Arizona if “[c]onduct constituting any element of the offense or

a result of such conduct occurs within [the] state.” Thus, by transmitting to a person in

Maricopa County, Arizona, a video file containing a minor engaged in sex acts, which

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Petitioner admitted doing, the state court had jurisdiction, regardless of where Petitioner was

when he sent the images.

Petitioner fails to offer any legitimate argument showing a motion challenging the

state court’s jurisdiction would have been successful. In his reply, he simply contends that

his lawyer should have pursued the issue rather than concede it. Absent any showing of

prejudice, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim for failing to challenge the state court’s

jurisdiction must fail. Petitioner has, therefore, not shown that the state court’s decision

denying this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law,

or that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly,

the court will recommend that the claim be denied.

Additionally, like the failure to pursue a grand jury challenge claim, a claim that his

lawyer failed to challenge the state court’s jurisdiction is not an attack on the voluntariness

of the plea. Any failure by counsel to pursue this issue in a pretrial motion was cured by

Petitioner’s subsequent unconditional guilty plea. The court therefore finds that this claim

is barred by Petitioner’s guilty plea, which provides an additional basis for the court to

recommend that it be denied.

d. Failure to Challenge Prosecutor’s Statements at Sentencing

Petitioner next alleges that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance when he failed

to challenge prejudicial statements made by the prosecutor during the sentencing hearing.

In arguing for a sentence greater than the presumptive term, the prosecutor speculated about

Petitioner’s motive in changing the designated hotel where he would take the victim (actually

an undercover law enforcement officer). Doc. 16, Exh. H at 5-6. The prosecutor speculated

that Petitioner switched the hotel to ensure that if the victim told anyone where she was

going, they would go to the wrong place to find her. Id. The prosecutor further stated that

the agents involved believed he may have been planning to kidnap the victim. Id. The

prosecutor conceded that she could not say this with any certainty. Id.

Petitioner addressed this issue during his allocution and said he did not change the

location for the reason argued by the prosecutor, but rather because the hotel was booked

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up. Doc. 16, Exh. H at 12. In imposing the presumptive sentence on the first offense and

probation on the second, the sentencing judge made no mention of any alleged motive in

changing the hotel. Doc. 16, Exh. H at 12-13.

Under these circumstances, Petitioner has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel.

Even if counsel’s failure to respond or challenge the prosecutor’s speculation was deficient

performance, Petitioner has not shown any prejudice. Petitioner addressed the issue himself

and the sentencing judge did not go along with the prosecutor’s recommendation for a prison

term greater than the presumptive. There’s simply no evidence the judge relied on the

prosecutor’s speculation when imposing the sentence. Petitioner has, therefore, not shown

that the state court’s decision denying this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court law, or that the decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the claim be denied.

e. Prejudicial Statements by Petitioner’s Counsel

Petitioner next alleges that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the

sentencing hearing when he talked about the age of the person in the image Petitioner

transmitted, a prior allegation in Minnesota and prior drug convictions. After reviewing the

change of plea transcript and the sentencing transcript, the court finds that the statements

were in no way prejudicial. Petitioner had already admitted the person in the image was

under age 15, and the other statements involved information provided to the judge in the

presentence report. Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance based on his counsel’s

statements at the sentencing hearing has no merit and the court will recommend that it be

denied. 

f. Failure to Challenge State’s Case

Petitioner next contends that his lawyer failed to meaningfully challenge the state’s

assertion that the transmitted images showed “actual children.” Petitioner admitted this

element of the sexual exploitation of a minor offense during the change of plea proceeding.

Doc. 16, Exh. G at 16-17. He presents nothing to demonstrate that a challenge to this aspect

of the state’s case would have been successful, thus failing to show any prejudice. Petitioner

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has, therefore, not shown that the state court’s decision denying this claim was contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law, or that the decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the

claim be denied.

Moreover, a claim that his lawyer failed to challenge whether the images depicted

actual children is not an attack on the voluntariness of the plea. Any failure by counsel to

pursue this issue was cured by Petitioner’s subsequent unconditional guilty plea. The court

therefore finds that this claim is barred by Petitioner’s guilty plea, which provides an

additional basis for the court to recommend that it be denied.

g. Plea Agreement Contained Mistakes

Petitioner next claims that his lawyer coerced and encouraged him to sign a plea

agreement that contained multiple errors. The plea agreement signed by Petitioner and filed

in the state court shows minor typographical errors on page three that were corrected and

initialed by the parties. Doc. 16, Exh. F. In addition, the signature line on the last page had

the wrong defendant’s name but that name was crossed out and Petitioner’s name was

handwritten in. Petitioner signed the line above his hand-written name. Id. The last page

also contained an incorrect case number. Id. Petitioner has shown no evidence, besides his

own allegation, that his lawyer coerced him into signing the agreement. Moreover, he has

failed to provide any showing of prejudice that resulted from these minor mistakes in the plea

agreement. 

Petitioner’s claim fails to meet the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. As

such, he has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision denying this claim was contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law, or that the decision was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the

claim be denied.

h. Coerced Drug-Induced Responses at Plea Hearing

Petitioner next contends that his lawyer coerced him to make false admissions at the

change of plea hearing when Petitioner was under the fog of psychotropic medications. As

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discussed above, the transcript from the change of plea hearing provides no support

whatsoever for Petitioner’s contention that he was under the “fog” of psychotropic

medications. Doc. 16, Exh G. To the contrary, Petitioner’s answers to the questions

presented to him during the hearing demonstrate he fully understood the proceedings,

including the consequences of pleading guilty.

Additionally, Petitioner presents nothing beyond a mere allegation to support his

contention that his lawyer coerced him to make false admissions to the state court. Nor has

Petitioner claimed that absent this coercion by his lawyer, he would not have entered the plea

agreement. Petitioner’s claim therefore fails to meet the standard for ineffective assistance

of counsel. Consequently, he has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision denying

this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law, or that the

decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court

will recommend that the claim be denied.

i. Allowed Plea to Completed Offense

Petitioner next claims that his lawyer allowed him to be sentenced for the completed

offense of luring a minor when the facts supported only an attempted luring. Petitioner

agreed during the change of plea hearing that he was pleading guilty to luring a minor for

sexual exploitation. Doc. 16, Exh. G at 6. Under Arizona law, “[a] person commits luring

a minor for sexual exploitation by offering or soliciting sexual conduct with another person

knowing or having reason to know the other person is a minor.” A.R.S. § 13-3554(A). The

factual basis provided at the hearing established that Petitioner developed an on-line

relationship with a person he thought was a 13 year old girl. Doc. 16, Exh. G at 18. The

prosecutor explained that they later started communicating by phone and that Petitioner

eventually traveled to Phoenix to meet the girl at a Mesa hotel for the purpose of having sex.

Id. The photo Petitioner sent to the girl (the basis for the first offense) “was one of several

that he sent in order to convince her that the acts in the photo were something that he and she

could enjoy doing together.” Id. They had conversations to that effect by telephone and via

e-mail. Id. When asked if that is what happened with respect to the luring offense, Petitioner

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answered, “Yes.” Doc. 16, Exh. G at 19. The state court found that these facts established

a factual basis for the luring offense. Id.

Petitioner claims that the facts only supported an attempted luring but he offers no

specifics about how the facts he admitted failed to satisfy the elements of the offense. This

court agrees with the state court that the admitted facts satisfy the elements of luring a minor

for sexual exploitation. Thus, Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge

the factual basis. As a result, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision

denying this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law,

or that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly,

the court will recommend that the claim be denied. 

j. Failure to Challenge State’s Claims and Evidence

Petitioner next contends that his lawyer failed to subject the state’s claims to

meaningful adversarial challenge and failed to challenge discrepancies between the

indictment, plea agreement and actual evidence. The only specific example alleged by

Petitioner involves an alleged discrepancy regarding one of the dates Petitioner was logged

on to his computer. He alleges that actual computer records show he was not logged on to

his computer on a certain date, but that the undercover officer’s logs, the indictment and the

plea agreement all assert that he transmitted images on that date. 

Petitioner fails to allege any prejudice resulting from his attorney’s failure to

challenge this issue. Petitioner’s claim therefore fails to meet the standard for ineffective

assistance of counsel. Consequently, he has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision

denying this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law,

or that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly,

the court will recommend that the claim be denied.

Moreover, a claim that his lawyer failed to challenge an inconsistency involving the

date on which a certain event occurred is not an attack on the voluntariness of the plea. Any

failure by counsel to pursue this issue was cured by Petitioner’s subsequent unconditional

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guilty plea. The court therefore finds that this claim is barred by Petitioner’s guilty plea,

which provides an additional basis for the court to recommend that it be denied.

k. Failure to Advocate for Leniency

In his last ineffective assistance claim, Petitioner contends that his lawyer failed to

meaningfully advocate for leniency at his sentencing hearing and failed to challenge the State

of Arizona’s mandatory sentencing ranges. Regarding counsel’s advocacy for leniency at

sentencing, the record shows that Petitioner’s claim is factually untrue. Counsel argued for

the minimum sentence permitted by the plea agreement and, in addition to his own advocacy,

presented evidence to support his argument, including a request for leniency from

Petitioner’s mother, documentation showing participation in rehabilitation programs in the

jail, and a letter from Petitioner. Regarding the failure to challenge Arizona’s mandatory

sentencing laws for Petitioner’s offenses, Petitioner has made no showing that such a

challenge had a reasonable probability of succeeding. 

For these reasons, Petitioner’s claim fails to meet the standard for ineffective

assistance of counsel. As such, he has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision

denying this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law,

or that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly,

the court will recommend that the claim be denied.

3. Ground Two Due Process Claim

Petitioner alleges in ground two that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and

intelligently made because he was under the fog of psychotropic medications. He claims that

this resulted in a violation of his right to due process under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments.

The court addressed the voluntariness of Petitioner’s plea above in the claim alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to ascertain Petitioner’s competency. As

explained above, there is nothing in the record, other than Petitioner’s own self-serving

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allegations and speculation, to suggest Petitioner was in a “fog” from medication such that

his plea was not voluntary and intelligent. To the contrary, the change of plea transcript

demonstrates he fully understood the proceedings. Petitioner has, therefore, not shown that

the state court’s decision denying this due process claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court law, or that the decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the claim in ground

two be denied.

C. Ground Three Not a Cognizable Federal Claim

Petitioner’s final claim alleges that his right to due process under the 5th, 6th and 14th

Amendments was violated when the State of Arizona prosecuted him for out of state offenses

over which it had no jurisdiction. Petitioner argues that he was at his home in New Mexico

and that any images he transmitted were sent, as a link, to an electronic data storage location

in Sunnyvale, California owned by Yahoo. He claims that the undercover officer then

imported the images from the link in California. He argues that because he did not directly

transmit images to Arizona, the State of Arizona did not have jurisdiction over his conduct.

To be eligible for federal habeas corpus relief, a state prisoner must establish that he

is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for errors of state law. Lewis

v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). It is not the policy of the federal courts to re-examine

state court determinations of state law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

(1991). Federal courts are without jurisdiction to review State court applications of state

procedural rules. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1998). A petitioner may not

"transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due

process." Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). "[T]he Supreme Court has

long settled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not assure immunity from judicial error or

uniformity of judicial decisions." Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006).

Respondents argue that the question of a state court’s jurisdiction is a matter of state

law that is not cognizable on habeas review. The court agrees. Petitioner has not

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demonstrated that a state court’s determination regarding its own jurisdiction over a criminal

offense raises a potential due process violation. Arizona’s jurisdiction over Petitioner’s

actions is a question of state law not cognizable on federal habeas review. The court will

therefore recommend that ground three be denied.

D. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner has requested that the court grant an evidentiary hearing on his claims.

Based on the above analysis, the court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary

hearing because his petition fails to raise any colorable claims for relief. See Earp v.

Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

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findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 6th day of April, 2011.

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