Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00424/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00424-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MICHAEL FUSON,

Petitioner

CV 06-0424 H (WMc)

REPORT AND

 RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE DENIAL OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

 v.

RODERICK Q. HICKMAN, DIRECTOR

OF THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS

Respondent

 and

BILL LOCKYER,

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

 Additional Respondent

I.

INTRODUCTION

Robert Michael Fuson (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner, brings this Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254 challenging his San Diego

Superior Court conviction in case number SCD163400 . Petitioner raises the following claims in

support of his Petition: (1) failure to give Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation violated

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; (2) failure to honor unequivocal and

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unambiguous request for counsel violated Fifth Amendment right to counsel; (3) allowing a

witness to testify while obscuring her face with her hand violated Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; (4) aggregate, consecutive

sentence of ninety years to life violated Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment; and (5) consecutive and upper terms imposed without submitting necessary factual

findings to the jury violated Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. 

After reviewing the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and supporting Memorandum of Points

and Authorities (“Answer”), Petitioner’s Traverse and supporting Memorandum of Points and

Authorities (“Traverse”), and all supporting documents submitted by the parties, IT IS

RECOMMENDED that the Petition be DENIED for the reasons set forth below. 

II.

STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

On March 1, 2002, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed a twenty count

Information against Petitioner in San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 1 at 1-10.) The

Information consisted of twenty counts of committing lewd acts upon a child (CAL. PENAL CODE §

288(a)). (Id.) Fifteen of the counts alleged Petitioner had substantial sexual contact with a victim

under fourteen years of age during the commission of the offenses (CAL. PENAL CODE §

1203.066(a)(8)), while all twenty counts alleged Petitioner committed the offenses against multiple

victims (CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.61(b), (c), (e)). (Id.) A jury convicted Petitioner of twenty

counts of committing a lewd act upon a child (CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a)) and found true the

allegations that he had committed the charged offenses against more than one victim (CAL. PENAL

CODE § 667.61(b), (c), (e)(5)). (Clerk’s Transcript [“CT”] at 292-311.) The jury further found that

Petitioner had substantial sexual contact with a victim under fourteen during the commission of

fourteen of the alleged offenses (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.066(a)(8)). (Id.) On August 29, 2002,

the Court sentenced Petitioner to a prison term of ninety years to life, consisting of six consecutive

fifteen to life terms and upper terms of eight years for the remaining counts to be served

concurrently with each other and concurrently with the indeterminate terms. (CT at 316.)

On September 5, 2002, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the California Court of

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Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (CT at 261.) On November 30, 2004 the state

appellate court affirmed the judgment, modifying it to strike the restitution order of $1,918.98 to the

Chula Vista Police Department. (Lodgment No. 2 at 3.)

On March 16, 2005 the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. 

(Lodgment No. 4.)

III.

FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

On February 23, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant Petition in this Court. On April 25, 2006,

Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition along with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 

On April 26, 2006, Respondent also lodged documents with the court. On May 26, 2006, Petitioner

filed a Traverse along with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 

IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Title 28, United States Code, section 2254, subsection (e)(1) provides: “[A] determination

of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” Id.; see also Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) overruled

on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (stating that federal courts are required

to “give great deference to the state court’s factual findings.”) The following facts are taken from

the California Court of Appeal’s opinion in Petitioner’s direct appeal. 

Petitioner has four daughters from two marriages. His first daughter, A., was 12 years old at

the time his first marriage ended in 1981. Petitioner and his second wife had three daughters: R.M.,

R., and R.L., each born between 1986 and 1990. After that time, Petitioner's wife worked and he

remained home to care for their daughters.

On October 23, 2001, Chula Vista police sergeant John McAvenia (“McAvenia”) received a

call from Child Protective Services regarding allegations that Petitioner had been molesting two of

his daughters. McAvenia called Petitioner and, using the pretext of his daughter getting into an

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altercation at school, asked Petitioner to come to the police station to discuss the matter. Detectives

in civilian clothes and unmarked cars were sent to the area of Petitioner’s home to observe his

actions as he came to the police station.

When Petitioner arrived at the station, McAvenia took him to his private office as all of the

interview rooms were being used. The office was small and contained a refrigerator, coffee maker,

desk, and two chairs. The office also had windows that looked out into a larger office area where

police personnel and civilians wearing plain clothes could be seen. McAvenia was seated behind

the desk and Petitioner was seated in the chair closest to the door, which locked people out, but not

in. McAvenia used a hidden micro cassette recorder to record the interview which lasted for

approximately ninety minutes.

McAvenia began the interview by telling Petitioner that he was the focus of an

investigation into some pretty serious allegations which could result in charges. McAvenia also

explained that Petitioner was not under arrest and that the police wished to investigate the matter to

see if there was anything to the charges. Petitioner initially stated that he was not going to address

anything without an attorney because of his prior dealings with CPS. McAvenia said that was okay

and asked if CPS had contacted Petitioner. Petitioner continued talking, explaining that he

understood how CPS allegations worked, to which McAvenia responded he was just letting

Petitioner know why he was there. Petitioner then stated that he could “deal with it,” but “there’s

nothing I can say, at this point without an attorney’s advice.” (Lodgment No. 2, People v. Fuson,

No. SCD163400, slip op. at 20.) McAvenia responded, “That’s obviously your right and that’s the

way, we respect that.” (Id.) Petitioner then stated, “If you wanna interview me, go ahead. I don’t

care. I don’t care.” (Id.) McAvenia repeated that if Petitioner wanted an attorney it was his right

and he was “not here to talk [Petitioner] out of requesting . . . .” (Id.) McAvenia then, in response

to Petitioner’s claim of not being able to afford an attorney, said “well, we can get one appointed

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for you. That’s the law.” (Id.) McAvenia then reiterated that there were serious allegations and

Petitioner continued talking.

About ten minutes into the interview, Detective Ruth Hinzman (“Hinzman”) came into the

room. At this point, Petitioner moved from the chair nearest the door to the other chair across from

McAvenia. Both Hinzman and McAvenia were wearing plain clothes and neither had a badge or

gun visible. McAvenia updated Hinzman about Petitioner’s request for an attorney because of his

concerns about CPS and informed her that Petitioner “can’t afford a lawyer and I said well you

don’t have to talk without [a] lawyer, we can get him one.” (Id. at 21.) Hinzman then questioned

Petitioner about his understanding that the court will appoint an attorney for him and Petitioner

stated that he understood. Hinzman then told him, “Well you know you’re, you understand you’re

free to leave at any time. And you don’t have to talk to me.” (Id.) Petitioner stated, “I don’t wanna

leave. I wanna take care of my kids. I want my girls safe.” (Id.) McAvenia then again advised

Petitioner about the allegations stating:

[I]n the scope of the way these investigations usually go, because there has been

some disclosure by both of them, again separately and apart from each other, it

would look like you'd probably end up getting charged with a child molestation

charge, lewd and lascivious act with a child under the age of fourteen. And I don't

know if that's what's gonna' happen but it's a possibility. And if that's the case, then

what happens is your daughters are pretty much compelled to tell what it is they've

been saying [and] why. And if there's some reason why they're making stuff up

against you, then that's our job to find out what that's all about. If in fact it's been

goin' on, and they stick to their stories, then that's our job also. This is our one

chance to hear your side of what may or may not have been going on or what, what

this might be all stemming from. We're not here to deprive you of your rights. If you

want a lawyer, we're gonna' stop talkin' to you. But if there is somethin' goin' on we

need to understand it better, and this is what we'd like to hear.

(Id.)

Later in the interview, Hinzman again asked Petitioner if he was okay talking with her about

the investigation. He responded, “Yeah,” explaining that "[a]ll a lawyer can do is sit here and say,

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don't answer that, don't answer that, don't answer that." Hinzman then told Petitioner:

You're in control of what we talk about. Okay? If I ask you a question and you don't

wanna' answer it, all you have to do is say, I don't wanna' answer it. If I ask you

another question and you feel comfortable answering it, then you can answer it.

You're in control of this conversation. Okay?

(Id. at 22.) When Petitioner again said "okay . . . lemme explain," Hinzman yet again asked if he

"fully [understood].” (Id. at 22.) Petitioner stated he understood "how interrogation, quote,

interviews, work," that he understood police work and a lot of things because he had "lots of

associates . . . in law enforcement," and lots of education in "different disciplines." (Id.) When

Petitioner later said he was not going to contest anything his daughters said, that he was not going

to put them in that position, and asked if the detectives wanted him to confess to something he did

not do, they said "no," they just wanted him to tell the truth and to be honest with them. Later

McAvenia further explained that he did not want Petitioner to just confess and be done with it

because he’d like to know Petitioner's version of the facts and "if it looks to me like the daughters

got together, then it's out." (Id.) Petitioner then said he had no idea what went on as far as the

investigation, but he knew how interrogations worked and he did not care, stating "If I did I

wouldn't, I wouldn't of spoken to you. I would still be getting a lawyer." (Id. at 22-23) He then

stated if "[I] honestly felt [I] had anything to . . . hide, or anything to gain by hiding, we wouldn't be

holding this conversation." (Id. at 23.) At the end of the interview, Petitioner was taken into

custody.

During Petitioner’s trial, his daughter R.L., with Petitioner off to her right, began testifying

with her right hand covering the right side of her face. Defense counsel explained at a sidebar

conference: 

Your honor, I'm certainly aware of the sensitivity of this child, of testimony from the

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1

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). The current

Petition was filed on February 23, 2006, and is therefore governed by the AEDPA.

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victim because this is her father, but she has her face covered, at least blocking her

view from the defendant's point of view. I understand . . . what her emotions are. I'm

also sensitive to the requirement that he have the opportunity to be confronted with

his accuser. And I'm afraid this is kind of obscuring that issue because she is

blocking her face. I think we can position her such that she doesn't have to see her

father but he ought to be able to see her. We would just hate to have this raised at

some other level by him, but he can't see the witness as she testifies. Basically for

the record, what's she's done, she's facing towards the jury, the defendant is off to her

extreme right, and she's taken her right hand and covering that side of her face

obscuring his vision of her entire face.

(Id. at 35.) Defense counsel then requested that the court tell R.L. to take her hand down, but the

court denied the request. R.L. was then questioned in open court on direct examination, crossexamination, redirect, and recross without further objection.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of ninety years to life, consisting of

six consecutive fifteen to life terms and upper terms of eight years for the remaining counts to be

served concurrently with each other and concurrently with the indeterminate terms. 

V.

STANDARD

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254, sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:1

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.

[...]

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

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adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (d)(1)-(2).

When determining what “clearly established federal law” is under section 2254(d)(1), federal

courts look to United States Supreme Court holdings at the time of the state court's decision. Lockyer

v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). 

Ninth Circuit law may also be considered for “its persuasive authority in applying Supreme Court

law.” Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds,

Lockyer, 538 U.S. 63; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

968 (2003). 

A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established United States Supreme Court

precedent if (1) the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme

Court cases, or (2) the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, but still reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 412; Bell v.

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73; Clark, 331 F. 3d at 1067. A state court

decision does not have to cite to or even demonstrate an awareness of clearly established Supreme

Court precedent, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradicts

such precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

A state court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court

precedent, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s

cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529

U.S. at 407. Alternatively, an unreasonable application may be found, “if the state court either

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unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it

should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should

apply.” Id.; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003); Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067. An unreasonable

application of federal law requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76. Instead, the state court's application must be “objectively unreasonable.” 

Id.

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

to the last reasoned state-court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Van

Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003). If the dispositive state court order does not

“furnish a basis for its reasoning,” however, federal habeas courts must conduct an independent

review of the record to determine whether the state court unreasonably applied controlling federal

law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). “Independent review of the record is not

de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine

whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848. 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

VI.

DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not violated by the

failure to give him Miranda warnings because he was not in custody at the time of his

police interview. 

Petitioner claims that his motion to suppress statements to police should have been granted

because his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when officers conducted

a custodial interrogation without advising him of his Miranda rights. (Petition at 6.) Petitioner

contends that police lured him to the station by falsely telling him that his daughter was in an

altercation at school and that he was followed to the station by plainclothes detectives. (Traverse at

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3.) Petitioner further claims that when he arrived at the station, he was brought into a “cramped,

windowless office in the interior of the station” and told that allegations had been made that he had

touched his children sexually. (Id.) Petitioner then claims that a second detective entered the room,

blocking his path to the door. (Petition at 6.) Based on the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner

asserts that a reasonable person would have felt like he was in custody. (Traverse at 3.)

Respondent contends that Petitioner came to the police station voluntarily–although

admittedly a ruse was employed. (Answer at 17.) Further, Respondent claims that Petitioner was

told from the outset of the interview that he was not under arrest, he was in control of the discussion

and the questions he answered, and he could terminate the conversation and leave. (Id.) Respondent

also asserts that both detectives maintained “matter-of-fact, low key demeanors throughout, and

were polite and courteous at all times.” (Id.) Based on these facts, Respondent asserts that a

reasonable person would not have felt like he was in custody. (Id.)

Miranda warnings are required for a person questioned by police after being “taken into

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The ultimate inquiry into whether custody has attached is “simply

whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with

formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). Miranda warnings are not

required simply because the questioning takes place at a police station or because the questioned

person is the one whom the police suspect. Id. Instead, the court must evaluate all of the

circumstances surrounding the questioning and determine whether “a reasonable person [would]

have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v.

Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).

Once a suspect is in custody and has invoked the right to silence or the right to an attorney,

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the invocation must be scrupulously honored. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. Neither right may be

invoked, however, anticipatorily–that is, before or outside of the context of custodial interrogation.

McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991).

In Oregon v. Mathiason, the defendant, responding to a card left at his door, called police

and agreed to meet with an officer at the police station. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493

(1977). When the defendant arrived, he was met by an officer, taken into an office, and interviewed

with the door closed. Id. The officer informed the defendant he was not under arrest, but that police

suspected he was involved in a burglary. Id. The officer then falsely told the defendant that his

fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime. Id. After just five minutes of being in the office,

the defendant confessed and was allowed to leave thirty minutes after questioning began. Id. at 493-

94. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not in custody during the interview as he had

arrived voluntarily, was immediately told he was not under arrest, and was allowed to leave after

thirty minutes. Id. at 495; California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (holding no custody

where defendant came to police station voluntarily, was told he was not under arrest, and left in less

than thirty minutes); see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (stating that factors

weighing in favor of no custody were that the police did not transport the defendant to the station

and did not threaten him with arrest). The Court explained that Miranda warnings are not required

just because questioning takes place at the station house or because the questioned person is a

suspect. Id. The Court also stated that the false statement by police about finding the defendant’s

fingerprints had no bearing on the custody determination. Id. at 495-96.

In the present case, the state appellate court’s holding that, based on the totality of the

circumstances, Petitioner was not in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes is not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme

Court. Although Petitioner came to the police station based on the false story that his daughter was

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injured, he came voluntarily, just like the defendant in Yarborough, rather than being brought by

police. Further, the false story about Petitioner’s daughter is similar to the police officer’s false

statement in Mathiason that the defendant’s fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime, which

the Supreme Court stated had no bearing on the custody determination. Also, the room Petitioner

was taken into was not a sterile interview room. Rather, it was a private office that contained a

refrigerator and coffee maker and had windows that looked out into a larger business type office. 

Petitioner also initially sat next to the door, which was unlocked from the inside, and only moved

when Detective Hinzman entered the room.

Furthermore, at the outset of the interview, Sergeant McAvenia told Petitioner he was not

under arrest, akin to the situations in Mathiason and Beheler. The interview then proceeded for

about ninety minutes, but the detectives maintained a casual tone throughout the interview and

refrained from making threats, similar to the detectives in Yarborough. Throughout the interview,

Petitioner was repeatedly told that he did not have to talk, he was free to leave, he did not have to

answer any questions he did not want to answer, and he could have an attorney present. Sergeant

McAvenia did tell Petitioner that he was the focus of an investigation into some “pretty serious

allegations” and that charges may be filed. However, the Supreme Court has held in an analogous

situation that custody was not established where police informed the defendant he was a suspect in a

burglary. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493, 495. 

B. Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel was not violated because his attempt to

invoke the right occurred before he was in custody and was therefore ineffective. 

Petitioner claims that his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated when, after he was

confronted with serious allegations of sexual misconduct, he was not provided a lawyer despite

informing detectives that he did not wish to speak without a lawyer present. (Petition at 7.)

Petitioner alleges that the conversation then continued and he restated that he was not going to

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address anything without an attorney. (Id.) Instead of ending the interview, Petitioner claims that

police continued talking to him for ninety minutes before arresting him. (Id.)

Respondent claims that Petitioner’s requests for counsel were ineffective because he was not

in custody at the time of the requests. (Answer at 18.) Respondent further asserts that because

Petitioner could not invoke Miranda anticipatorily, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was not

violated. (Id.)

The United States Supreme Court has “never held that a person can invoke his Miranda

rights anticipatorily, in a context other than custodial interrogation.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S.

171, 182 n.3 (1991). Therefore, because Petitioner was not in custody during his police interview,

as discussed in Part A, supra, the state appellate court’s determination that Petitioner’s Fifth

Amendment right to counsel was not violated is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law as established by the Supreme Court. 

C. Petitioner’s sentence does not violate the Sixth Amendment prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment.

Petitioner claims that the ninety year to life sentence that he received is cruel and unusual in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Petition at 9.) He argues that the sentence is improper because

the aggregate time “far exceeded the amount of time he would have received if he had been

convicted of first degree murder.” (Traverse at 19.) He further claims that even multiple sex

offenses should not impose a sentence greater than the “taking of a single human life.” (Id. at 20.)

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s sentence is not cruel or unusual because he committed

multiple sex offenses against multiple victims on multiple occasions. (Answer at 24.) Respondent

further contends that sexual acts upon minors are “highly repugnant”, can have long-lasting effects,

and are especially heinous because Petitioner committed the crimes against his own daughters. (Id.

at 24-25.)

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 Justices Scalia and Rehnquist stated that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality

guarantee. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991). Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and

Souter stated that the Eighth Amendment “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly

disproportionate’ to the crime.” Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices White, Blackmun,

Stevens, and Marshall believe 

The language of the [Eighth] Amendment does not refer to proportionality in so many

words, but it does forbid “excessive fines,” a restraint that suggests that a

determination of excessiveness should be based at least in part on whether the fine

imposed is disproportionate to the crime committed. Nor would it be unreasonable to

conclude that it would be both cruel and unusual . . . to impose any punishment that

is grossly disproportionate to the offense for which the defendant has been convicted.

Id. at 1009-10 (White, J., dissenting). The majority position rejected previous holdings such as in

Solem v. Helm, where the Supreme Court held that a sentence must be proportionate to the crime for

which the defendant has been convicted. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).

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Harmelin v. Michigan is a leading U.S. Supreme Court case discussing proportionality under

the Eighth Amendment. Although Harmelin does not provide a majority opinion setting forth the

exact Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement, seven Justices agreed that, at the very least,

grossly disproportionate sentences are prohibited.2

 However, “the relative lack of objective

standards concerning terms of imprisonment has meant that “[o]utside the context of capital

punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [are] exceedingly

rare.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Harmelin, the Supreme Court held

that a life sentence without the possibility of parole for the possession of 672 grams of cocaine was

not cruel and unusual. Id. at 961, 996. 

The Supreme Court has further upheld serious sentences for less serious crimes than in the

present case, as in Rummell v. Estelle, where the Court held valid a life sentence for the commission

of three felonies over the course of nine years. Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1980). 

The felonies were fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services, passing

a forged check in the amount of $28.36, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Id.; see also

Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370-72 (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to forty year sentence

for possession and distribution of less than nine ounces of marijuana).

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Based on the holdings in Harmelin, Rummell, and Hutto, the state appellate court’s holding

that Petitioner’s sentence was not cruel and unusual is not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. The magnitude

of Petitioner’s sexual offenses against his own daughters is far greater than the offenses committed

in the three aforementioned cases. Further, Petitioner committed repeated offenses over a long

period of time, as did the defendant in Rummell, yet Petitioner’s sentence is less severe than

Rummell’s life sentence without parole. 

D. Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was not violated when R.L.

testified while obscuring her face from him using her hand.

Petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process were violated because his daughter, R.L., testified at his trial while

shielding her face from Petitioner’s view with her hand. (Petition at 8.) Petitioner claims that the

Sixth Amendment requires a “face-to-face meeting” to protect against false testimony and to give

the accused the opportunity to observe the witness’s facial expression. (Traverse 16-19.) 

Respondent contends that there is no “absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with

witnesses.” (Answer at 19.) Further, since no physical barrier or technological device was used to

insulate R.L. from the view of Petitioner, he was able to view her general demeanor. (Id. at 21.) 

Respondent also claims that R.L. was subject to cross-examination and that the jury was able to view

both Petitioner and R.L. and see both their reactions during her testimony. (Id. at 21-22.) 

The Confrontation Clause “ensure[s] the reliability of the evidence against a criminal

defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the

trier of fact.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990). As the Supreme Court stated in that

case:

The primary object of the [confrontation clause] was to prevent depositions or ex

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parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against

the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness

in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and

sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face

with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the

stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.

Id. (emphasis added). The right to a face-to-face confrontation is not an absolute right. Id. at 844. 

In Craig, the Supreme Court held that a statute allowing child witnesses to testify from a separate

room using closed-circuit television did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to confront

witnesses if a specific finding is made that the procedure is necessary to further an important state

interest. Id. at 857. The Court explained that the “‘Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for

face-to-face confrontation’ . . . a preference that ‘must occasionally give way to considerations of

public policy and the necessities of the case.’” Id. at 849. The Court further stated that, even

though the use of closed-circuit television prevented the witness from seeing the accused, 

Maryland's procedure preserves all of the other elements of the confrontation right:

The child witness must be competent to testify and must testify under oath; the

defendant retains full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination; and the

judge, jury, and defendant are able to view (albeit by video monitor) the demeanor

(and body) of the witness as he or she testifies.

Id.

In the present case, the state appellate court’s holding that Petitioner’s right to confront

witnesses was not violated is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law as determined by the Supreme Court. All the elements of the right of confrontation present in

Craig are also present here, along with R.L.’s physical presence in the courtroom. R.L. was

competent to testify and did testify under oath. Petitioner had the full opportunity to conduct crossexamination, and he did so, where he could test the recollection and sift the conscience of R.L. 

Further, the judge, jury, and Petitioner were all able to view the demeanor of R.L. as she testified 

and, unlike the witness in Craig who testified via closed-circuit television, R.L. was physically

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 The Court explained that “the screen would enable appellant dimly to perceive the witnesses,

but the witnesses to see him not at all.” Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988).

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present in the courtroom. 

The present case is distinguishable from Coy v. Iowa, where the Supreme Court held that the

accused’s confrontation right was violated when a large screen was erected between the accused

and two complaining witnesses, blocking him from their sight.3 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1022. Here, there

was no physical barrier blocking R.L.’s view. She was forced to sit in open court in a position

where she could see Petitioner. Although R.L. chose to shield her face from Petitioner, this action

was part of her demeanor and within full view of the jury, which could then draw any necessary

inferences from her conduct. As the Supreme Court has stated, “The Confrontation Clause does

not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look

elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw its own conclusions.” Id. at 1019. It would not be possible

for the jury to draw such inferences with the use of a large screen, as in the Coy case, because the

witness’s view of the accused is blocked without any action on the part of the witness that the jury

could consider as part of her demeanor.

E. Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was not violated by the imposition of

consecutive and upper terms.

Petitioner claims his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated by the court

imposing concurrent upper terms of eight years as to fourteen counts based on three aggravating

factors listed in the probation report. (Petition at 9.) Petitioner claims these factors were the basis

for increasing his sentence beyond the statutory maximum, which violated his right to a jury trial

because the factual issues presented by the three factors were never submitted to the jury. (Id.)

Petitioner further claims that for three of the six counts for which the court imposed

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consecutive sentences of fifteen years to life, the sentence was based on an implied finding that the

offenses were not committed “against a single victim during a single occasion.” (Id.) Petitioner

asserts that this implied finding violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because his

sentence was increased beyond the statutory maximum without submitting the necessary facts to the

jury. (Id.)

Respondent contends that the imposition of upper terms did not violate Petitioner’s right to

a jury trial because California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(7) authorizes the imposition of upper

terms when the defendant is sentenced to concurrent terms for other crimes where consecutive

sentencing was available. (Answer at 27.) Respondent asserts that in this case, where Petitioner

was sentenced concurrently on fourteen counts where consecutive sentencing was available, the

Court can use the sentencing decision as an aggravating factor to impose upper terms on the

remaining six counts. (Id.) 

Respondent also argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences does not violate

Petitioner’s right to a jury trial because the verdict reflected findings that the crimes were

committed against separate victims at different times and in different places. (Id. at 33.) 

Respondent claims that this is sufficient reason to impose consecutive terms as no additional factfinding by the jury is required. (Id. at 34.) Respondent further asserts that neither the U.S.

Supreme Court, nor any other court, has ever held that imposing consecutive terms is subject to the

constitutional limitations of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the defendant was convicted of second degree possession of a

firearm, which carried a potential prison sentence of five to ten years. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466, 469-70 (2000). The judge, however, relying on a New Jersey hate crime statute, imposed

an enhanced sentence of twelve years after finding by a preponderance that the crime was

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 The hate crime statute allowed imposition of a ten to twenty year prison term. Apprendi, 530

U.S. at 469.

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motivated by racial bias.4 Id. at 471. The Supreme Court held that the imposition of a twelve year

sentence violated the defendant’s right to a jury trial stating that, “other than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. 

Similarly in Blakely v. Washington, the defendant was convicted of second degree

kidnaping with a firearm, which carried a standard sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three months.

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298-99. The sentence could be increased, however, if the judge found

“substantial and compelling reasons.” The judge in Blakely, after making a factual finding that the

defendant acted with deliberate cruelty, imposed a sentence of ninety months. Id. at 300. The

Supreme Court held that the sentence violated the defendant’s right to a jury trial explaining that

“the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding

additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.” Id. at 303-04. 

The Court explained that the facts stipulated to in the guilty plea only authorized the imposition of a

fifty-three month standard sentence–therefore the judge had no authority to impose a ninety month

sentence. Id. at 304.

Petitioner’s upper-term sentence as to six counts, in contrast to the facts in Apprendi and

Blakely, did not involve judicial fact-finding beyond the jury verdict and is therefore not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme

Court. California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(7) lists aggravating factors that can be used to

enhance a sentence including, “the defendant was convicted of other crimes for which consecutive

sentences could have been imposed but for which concurrent sentences are being imposed.” In the

present case, Petitioner was sentenced concurrently on fourteen counts where consecutive sentences

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could have been imposed. This fact can be used as an aggravating factor allowing for the

imposition of upper terms on the remaining counts. No additional fact-finding by the jury was

required to make this determination, unlike the findings of racial bias in Apprendi or deliberate

cruelty in Blakely.

Similarly, the imposition of consecutive sentences is not an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Both Blakely and Apprendi

only dealt with “increas[ing] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,”

not with the imposition of consecutive terms. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301; accord Apprendi, 530 U.S.

at 476. The Apprendi court specifically declined to address consecutive sentencing and focused on

the imposition of an enhanced sentence on one particular count stating:

It is appropriate to begin by explaining why certain aspects of the case are not

relevant to the narrow issue that we must resolve. First, the State has argued that

even without the trial judge's finding of racial bias, the judge could have imposed

consecutive sentences on counts 3 and 18 that would have produced the 12-year term

of imprisonment that Apprendi received; Apprendi's actual sentence was thus within

the range authorized by statute for the three offenses to which he pleaded guilty. The

constitutional question, however, is whether the 12-year sentence imposed on count

18 was permissible, given that it was above the 10-year maximum for the offense

charged in that count. The finding is legally significant because it increased--indeed,

it doubled--the maximum range within which the judge could exercise his discretion,

converting what otherwise was a maximum 10-year sentence on that count into a

minimum sentence. The sentences on counts 3 and 22 have no more relevance to our

disposition than the dismissal of the remaining 18 counts.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474. Because neither Apprendi, Blakely, nor any other Supreme Court case

deals with the Sixth Amendment implications of consecutive sentencing, Petitioner cannot establish

an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court.

VII.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

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For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order DENYING Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 24, 2006 any party to this action may file a

written objection with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than December 11, 2006. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may result in a waiver of the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see also

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 18, 2006

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

cc: All Counsel and Parties of Record

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