Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00927/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00927-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alliance Labs, LLC, )) Plaintiff, ) 2:12-cv-00927 JWS ) vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION ) Stratus Pharmaceuticals, Inc., ) [Re: Motion at Docket 34] ) Defendants. ))

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 34, defendant Stratus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Stratus” or “defendant”)

moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss Counts II, IV, V,

and VII of the First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”)—which include various federal

and state trademark, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment claims against Stratus—

based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As for Count VII, the unjust enrichment

claim, it alternatively moves to dismiss that claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff Alliance Labs, LLC (“Alliance” or

“plaintiff”) opposes at docket 43, and defendant replies at docket 46. Oral argument

was not requested and would not assist the court. 

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II. BACKGROUND

Alliance is an Arizona company that markets and distributes enema products,

including the Enemeez Mini Enema, the Enemeez Plus Mini Enema, and the Docusol

Mini Enema. Stratus is a Florida corporation that markets and distributes competing

enema products, such as the Vacuant Mini-Enema and the Vacuant Plus Mini-Enema. 

Alliance alleges that Stratus’s Vacuant products are “knock-offs” of its Enemeez

products. Alliance maintains that Stratus has targeted its customers and represented

Vacuant products to be less expensive than the Enemeez products, but equally

effective. Alliance alleges that Stratus uses packaging that is virtually indistinguishable

from the Enemeez packaging and that Stratus copied substantial portions of the

Enemeez brochure to promote Vacuant products. Alliance also alleges that Stratus has

misrepresented the number and quantities of active ingredients in the Vacuant products.

Alliance has asserted federal claims for false advertising under § 43(a)(1)(B) of

the Lanham Act (Count I), unfair competition under § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act

(Count II), trademark infringement of Alliance’s registered ENEMEEZ and DOCUSOL

trademarks under § 32 of the Lanham Act (Count IV), and copyright infringement (Count

VI). Alliance has asserted state law claims for unfair competition (Count III), trademark

infringement (Count V), and unjust enrichment (Count VII). 

Stratus filed this motion to dismiss arguing that Alliance does not have standing

under the applicable statutes to bring the federal unfair competition claim set forth in

Count II and the federal trademark infringement claim set forth in Count IV, and thus,

those two counts should be dismissed for this court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Similarly, it argues that Alliance’s state trademark claim in Count V should be dismissed

because Alliance is not the owner of the trademarks at issue, and thus the court lacks

standing to bring the claim and must dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Stratus argues that Alliance’s unjust enrichment claim in Count VII must fail for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction based on the same reasoning. Alternatively, Stratus argues

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that Alliance’s unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(1)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal of an

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In order to survive a defendant’s motion to

dismiss, the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction.1 Where the defendant brings

a facial attack on the subject matter of the district court, the court assumes the factual

allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor.2

 The court does not, however, accept the truth of legal conclusions cast

in the form of factual allegations.3 Where the defendant brings a factual jurisdictional

attack, by challenging the truth of the allegations that would otherwise invoke federal

jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence outside the complaint to resolve the

issue and need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.4 However,

when cases are based on federal-question jurisdiction, factual jurisdictional dismissals

are exceptional and only warranted “‘where the alleged claim under the constitution or

federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of

obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’”5

Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claims. In reviewing such a

motion, “[a]ll allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and

1

Tosco v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2000).

2

Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009).

3

Id.

4

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

5

Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)). 

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construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”6 Dismissal for failure to

state a claim can be based on either “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”7

 “Conclusory

allegations of law . . . are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”8

 

To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.”9 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.”10 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.”11 “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent’

with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.’”12 “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the nonconclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be

plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”13

In deciding whether to dismiss a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), the court is generally limited to reviewing only the complaint, but

may review materials which are properly submitted as part of the complaint and may

take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record that are outside the

6

Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997).

7

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

8

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001).

9

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

10Id.

11Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

12Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

13Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

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pleadings.14 If the parties present material outside the pleadings and those materials

are not excluded, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under

Rule 56.15

IV. DISCUSSION

Standing to bring federal statutory claims

Stratus asserts that the court lacks jurisdiction to consider Alliance’s Lanham Act

claims for unfair competition and trademark infringement because Alliance is not the

owner of the trademarks at issue and thus does not have standing under the statute. 

Standing is comprised of two distinct inquiries.16 One implicates this court’s subject

matter jurisdiction, and one does not. First, the court must decide if the plaintiff has

“suffered sufficient injury to satisfy the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III.”17

If the plaintiff has not, and thus the claim does not satisfy Article III’s requirement, the

district court lacks subject matter over the claim. In such an event, the claims should be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1).18 

Second, if a plaintiff has standing under Article III of the Constitution, a court

must then consider whether a particular statute has conferred standing on that plaintiff. 

“Non-constitutional standing exists when ‘a particular plaintiff has been granted a right

to sue by the specific statute under which he or she brings suit.’”19 Congress can grant

14See Gonzalez v. First Franklin Loan Services, 2010 WL 144862, at *3

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2010) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir.

2001)); Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996); MGIC Indem. Corp. v.

Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986).

15Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

16Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (2004).

17Id. 

18Id.

19Id. at 1175 (quoting City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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standing to any plaintiff who otherwise satisfies Article III.20 When a court determines

whether a person has standing under a statute, that determination is one related to the

merits and not a threshold jurisdictional standing question.21 If a plaintiff has Article III

standing but Congress has not granted statutory standing, that plaintiff cannot state a

claim upon which relief can be granted and that claim should be dismissed under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).22 

It does not appear that Stratus is challenging Alliance’s Article III standing. 

Indeed, Alliance has pleaded a sufficient case or controversy. To satisfy Article III’s

case or controversy requirement, a plaintiff “must show that: (1) it has suffered an ‘injury

in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural

or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the

defendant; and (3) it is likely as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision.”23 These elements are met in this case because

Alliance and Stratus are competitors, and Alliance alleges that it has suffered direct

injury because of Stratus’s trademark infringement and competitive practices with the

result being loss of sales and customers. Stratus does not bring its standing argument

based on Alliance’s failure to meet these three “case or controversy requirements” or

otherwise argue that Alliance’s allegations are wholly insubstantial and made solely for

the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction. Thus, Alliance has Article III standing, and

the court has subject matter jurisdiction.

Stratus’s motion does, however, challenge Alliance’s statutory standing. As

stated above, such a motion is not jurisdictional. Instead, it is a determination related to

20Id. 

21Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 907 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). 

22Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1175.

23Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Sys. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81

(2000). 

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the merits and should be brought under Rule 12(b)(6), and thus the court will treat

Stratus’s 12(b)(1) motion as one brought under 12(b)(6). Because the motion is not one

related to subject matter jurisdiction, the court must decide whether to consider the

motion given Rule 12(g). Under Rule 12 (g)(2), if a party makes a Rule 12 motion but

omits an available defense or objection, the party may not raise that defense or

objection in a subsequent Rule 12 motion; instead, the party can raise such a defense

in its answer, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.24

Stratus already brought a Rule 12 motion based on personal jurisdiction. While the

court believes that Stratus should have considered all of its Rule 12 motions at the

outset to save judicial time and resources, it nonetheless will use its discretion to

consider the motions because it does not appear to be brought merely for delay and

such a motion resolves an issue that is likely to arise in the answer, which has not yet

been filed, or in a motion for judgment on the pleadings or motion for summary

judgment if not dealt with at this time.25 Furthermore, because the parties submitted

materials outside the pleadings for the court to consider, under Rule 12(d) the court

must treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Given that both parties have

submitted additional materials, they have reason to know that the court will consider

matters outside the pleadings and have had time to develop facts in support of or in

opposition to the motion.26 Thus, the summary judgment standards of review apply.

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”27 The

24Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2), 12(h).

25Larson v. Johnson, 2007 WL 3390883, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2007).

26See Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1532 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting

that if a motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment because of reference to

extrinsic evidence, the parties must have notice and an opportunity to develop facts related to

the motion) 

27Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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materiality requirement ensures that “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.”28 Ultimately, “summary judgment will not lie if the . . . evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”29 In resolving a motion

for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party.30 The reviewing court may not weigh evidence or assess the

credibility of witnesses.31 The burden of persuasion is on the moving party.32

Stratus argues that Alliance does not have standing to bring a claim for unfair

competition under § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act. The court disagrees. In order to

bring a claim for unfair competition under § 43 of the Lanham Act, the interest asserted

by the plaintiff must be a commercial interest protected by the act.33 Alleging a

discernibly competitive injury clearly falls within this category.34

Stratus also argues that Alliance does not have standing to bring a claim for

trademark infringement under § 32 of the Lanham Act because Alliance is not the

registrant of the trademarks for ENEMEEZ, ENEMEEZ PLUS, and DOCUSOL, nor is

Alliance an assignee of the registrant of the marks. Stratus filed documentation from

the United States Patent and Trademark Office to prove that Alliance is not the

registrant or assignee.35 Based on the evidence Stratus provided, Enemeez, Inc. is the

28Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

29Id.

30Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). 

31Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).

32Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

33Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992).

34Id. at 1109.

35Docs. 34-1, 34-2, 34-3, 34-4.

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most recent assign/owner of the disputed trademarks. Alliance does not dispute this

fact.

The Lanham Act provides that the registrant of a trademark may bring an action

for infringement.36 “Registrant” is defined to include the “legal representatives,

predecessors, successors and assigns” of the registrant.37 Alliance argues that

exclusive licensees are the equivalent of a registrant’s assigns and may therefore bring

a claim under § 32 of the Lanham Act. It further argues that the current owner of the

disputed Enemeez trademarks, Enemeez, Inc., is Alliance’s corporate sibling,

manufactures the Enemeez products for Alliance, and gave Alliance an exclusive

license to use the Enemeez products and trademarks. In support, Alliance filed an

affidavit of Enemeez, Inc.’s Secretary, Jim Pritchard, and a copy of the license

agreement.38 

 Even if exclusive licensees are the equivalent of assignees and have the

requisite standing under § 32 of the Lanham Act, the court concludes that Alliance is not

an exclusive licensee because, pursuant to the clear language of the licensing

agreement,39 Alliance was not assigned all rights that accompany the trademark. The

agreement explicitly and specifically states that it is a limited license and that “all

copyright and other intellectual property rights relating to the Product are retained by

Licensor.”40 Therefore, Alliance is not the proper party to bring the § 32 Lanham Act

claim; rather, the only entity with statutory standing to bring a federal trademark

3615 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).

3715 U.S.C. § 1127. 

38Doc. 43-1.

39See Finance Investment Co. Ltd. v. Gerberit AG, 165 F.3d 526, 532 (7th Cir. 1998)

(whether a party has a statutory right to sue as an exclusive licensee under §32 of the Lanham

Act depends on the language of its license agreement); 

40Doc. 43-1 at 4. 

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infringement claim is Enemeez, Inc. The court notes, however, that Enemeez, Inc. and

Alliance are both amenable to having Enemeez, Inc. joined as a plaintiff to cure any

statutory standing defect. Alliance should be provided the opportunity to file such an

amendment because an answer has not yet been filed and allowing an amended

pleading will promote speedy disposition of the entire controversy and avoid multiple

suits. 

Standing to bring state claims

Stratus argues that Alliance does not have standing to bring its supplemental

state law claims for trademark infringement and unjust enrichment. As noted above,

Alliance has Article III standing to bring the claims in this lawsuit. Thus, the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction for these supplemental claims is not in question. The issue

should have been brought through a motion for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6). Because, however, the parties included materials outside the pleadings,

the summary judgment standards apply. 

As for Alliance’s ability to bring the state trademark infringement and unjust

enrichment claims, the only statute implicated is Arizona’s trademark statutes A.R.S.

§§ 44–1451, 44–1452. Stratus argues that Arizona’s trademark law only allows an

owner of a trademark registered with the Secretary of State for Arizona to bring a suit to

enforce a trademark. In response, Alliance notes that its trademark infringement claim

is based on Arizona common law, and pursuant to §44-1452, the common law is not

affected by Arizona’s trademark statute. 41 Neither party provided the court with

adequate briefing as to whether Alliance is the proper party to bring an infringement

claim under Arizona’s common law. Stratus states that under the Restatement of Torts,

only an owner of a trademark can seek relief for common law trademark infringement,

41A.R.S. § 44-1452 expressly reserves Arizona’s common law trademark rights stating:

“Nothing in this article shall adversely affect the rights or the enforcement of rights in marks

acquired in good faith at any time at common law.” 

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citing to Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., Inc.

42 However, Stratus did not cite

to any Arizona cases applying the Restatement of Torts or cases otherwise supporting

its argument that Alliance is the wrong party to raise an Arizona common law trademark

infringement claim. Similarly, Stratus did not cite to any Arizona cases that support its

argument that Alliance is the wrong party to raise an unjust enrichment claim. Thus,

Stratus failed to meet its burden of persuasion, and the court cannot conclude at this

time that Stratus is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these two state claims. 

Failure to state an unjust enrichment claim

Stratus also argues that Alliance fails to raise a proper unjust enrichment claim. 

It argues Alliance does not allege a prior relationship between plaintiff and defendant

and thus fails to state an unjust enrichment claim. It also argues that because there is

an adequate legal remedy available to Alliance, that being trademark infringement,

Alliance fails to state an unjust enrichment claim. Stratus requests that this claim be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 

To assert a valid claim of unjust enrichment under Arizona common law, Alliance

must allege 1) an enrichment by Stratus; 2) an impoverishment by Alliance; 3) a

connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment; 4) an absence of

justification; and 5) an absence of a remedy provided by law.43 This court concludes

that Alliance has adequately alleged all five elements. Status focuses on the fifth

element, absence of a legal remedy, arguing that the applicable trademark infringement

laws provide adequate remedies. However, as Alliance points out, the availability of

another remedy does not prevent Alliance from pleading a claim for relief under the tort

of unjust enrichment in the alternative. Under Rule 8(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, a plaintiff may set forth alternative claims for relief and as many separate

42567 F.2d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1977).

43Cmty. Guardian Bank v. Hamlin, 898 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 

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claims as it has, regardless of consistency.44 An unjust enrichment claim is not deficient

if a complaint also alleges claims for alternative forms of relief.45 As for Stratus’s

argument that Alliance failed to allege that there was a prior relationship between

Alliance and Stratus, existence of a prior relationship is not one of the elements of

unjust enrichment under Arizona law. The case Stratus cites, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc.,

46 was construing California law. Thus, Alliance has adequately pled its unjust

enrichment claim.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, defendant’s motion to dismiss at docket 34 is

HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:

Defendant’s request for the court to dismiss plaintiff’s federal unfair competition

claim in Count II is DENIED.

Defendant’s request for the court to dismiss plaintiff’s federal trademark

infringement claim in Count IV is GRANTED. However, plaintiff is granted 30 days

leave from the date of this order in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which

cures the statutory standing deficiency by including Enemeez, Inc. as a plaintiff. 

Defendant’s request for the court to dismiss plaintiff’s state trademark

infringement claim in Count V and unjust enrichment claim in Count VII for lack of

standing is DENIED without prejudice to renew in a motion for judgment on the

pleadings or in its answer in the event plaintiff fails to amend its complaint as allowed

above.

44Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2), (3).

45See In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., 812 F. Supp. 2d 390, 411 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)

(refusing to dismiss state law unjust enrichment claims because an adequate remedy at law

existed, holding “[t]his argument is premature because Plaintiffs may plead in the alternative.”).

46572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Defendant’s request for the court to dismiss plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim in

Count VII for failure to state a claim for relief is DENIED.

DATED this 23rd day of January 2013.

 /s/ 

JOHN W. SEDWICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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