Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01933/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01933-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLIE JONES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-1933 ALA P

vs.

LIEUTENANT E. SANDY, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

____________________________/

Plaintiff Leslie Jones is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 7, 2007, this court granted defendant’s motion for

summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim that defendant Hughes retaliated against

plaintiff and denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim

that defendant Sandy was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical need. Pending

before the court are plaintiff’s and defendant’s motions for reconsideration. For the reasons

stated below, both motions will be denied. 

I

A district court may reconsider a ruling under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59(e) or 60(b). See Sch. Dist. Number. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,

1262 (9th Cir. 1993). “Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with

Case 2:04-cv-01933-ALA Document 98 Filed 02/20/08 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly

unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Id. at 1263.

A

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Hughes denied plaintiff’s family visits based on a newly

implemented policy which, plaintiff alleges, only applies to those inmates whose victims were

minors. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration at 3. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Hughes

denied the visits to retaliate against plaintiff because plaintiff had filed a lawsuit against former

coworkers and friends of defendant Hughes. Id. at 2-3. 

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech may

support a § 1983 claim. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). “Within the

prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that

prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”

Id. at 567-68; see also Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)

(explaining that a plaintiff must plead facts which suggest “that the protected conduct was a

‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the defendant's decision”) (citation omitted). 

At issue here is whether the denial of plaintiff’s family visits advanced a legitimate

correctional goal. Paragraph (1) of section 3177 of the California Code of Regulations, Title 15,

provides that an inmate may not have family visits if that inmate has been convicted of a violent

offense involving a minor or family member, or any sex offense. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15,

§3177(b)(1) (2007)(emphasis added). Subsection (A) to paragraph (1) provides that, “Inmates

may be prohibited from family visiting where substantial documented evidence or information of

the misconduct described in section 3177(b)(1) exists, without a criminal conviction.” Id. 

Plaintiff continues to cite a version of section 3177 that is not accurate. Section

3177(b)(1) is applicable to, not only violent offenses involving minors, but any sex offense. Id.

Case 2:04-cv-01933-ALA Document 98 Filed 02/20/08 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Plaintiff was arrested on such an offense and section 3177(b)(1) is therefore applicable. Thus,

plaintiff cannot show that the denial of plaintiff’s family visits was not advancing a legitimate

correctional goal. As such, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied. 

B

Defendants argue that this court should reconsider denying their motion for summary

judgment as to whether defendant Sandy was deliberately indifferent because “undisputed

material facts show that defendant Sandy did not know about plaintiff’s medical condition, had

no knowledge of plaintiff’s medications, and no awareness of the effects that would occur if the

medications were confiscated.” Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration at 2. 

In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the court will view the facts and

inferences from these facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Here, plaintiff was the nonmoving party.

At issue is whether defendant Sandy was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious

medical needs. Plaintiff has alleged that defendant Sandy was deliberately indifferent by

“ordering the confiscation of plaintiff’s doctor ordered prescribed medications.” Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. Defendant Sandy claims that

she did not know of plaintiff’s medical condition or of his medications. Defendant’s Motion for

Reconsideration at 2. 

It is established that deliberate indifference is found when a prison official “intentionally

interfer[s] with... treatment once prescribed.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1165(9th

Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). If plaintiff can prove that

defendant Sandy ordered the confiscation of his medication without justification, such action

would constitute the intentional interference of treatment. Conversely, if plaintiff is unable to

prove defendant Sandy was responsible for the confiscation of his medication, or that defendant

Sandy was not justified in ordering plaintiff’s medication confiscated, plaintiff’s claim would

fail. Thus, as to deliberate indifference, there is a genuine issue as to a material fact. As such,

Case 2:04-cv-01933-ALA Document 98 Filed 02/20/08 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

defendant’s motion for reconsideration will be denied. 

II

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s December 18, 2007, motion for reconsideration is DENIED; and

2. Plaintiff’s December 21, 2007, motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

/////

DATED: February 20, 2008

 /s/ Arthur L. Alarcón 

 UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

Case 2:04-cv-01933-ALA Document 98 Filed 02/20/08 Page 4 of 4