Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_10-cv-00467/USCOURTS-alnd-7_10-cv-00467-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Denial of Overtime Compensation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

DAVID LEDBETTER; RAYMOND L.

BURNETTE, JR.; RICHARD CURTIS;

FORREST SCOTT FIKES; DENNIS

FINNEN; KENNETH GAMBLE;

RICHARD E. GONZALEZ; JIMMY

HUDSON; CLINTON M. JOHNSON;

TIMOTHY JONES; DENNIS O.

K E N N E D Y ; J E F F R E Y L .

McALLISTER; TIMOTHY A.

NICHOLS; MAURICE E. PHILLIPS;

REX ROBERTSON; DANNY R.

SIMMONS;DONALDP. SMITH; BRAD

WALKER; MARTY J. WEAVER;

CLYDE T. WHITLEY; DONALD R.

WILLIAMS; LYNN WILSON,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

M E R C E D E S B E N Z U . S .

INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Defendant.

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Case Number 7:10-CV-0467-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is presently pending before the court on defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 48.) Plaintiffs have sued their employer, defendant Mercedes Benz U.S.

International, Inc., alleging that defendant failed “to properly pay Plaintiff[s] . . . wages or

overtime compensation at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for many hours

worked over 40 per week associated with unpaid lunch breaks.” (Doc. 18-1 ¶ 23.) Upon

consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the

FILED

 2014 Mar-24 AM 10:54

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:10-cv-00467-SLB Document 58 Filed 03/24/14 Page 1 of 12
relevant law, the court is of the opinion that defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

(doc. 48), is due to be denied.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d

604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Once

the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving partymust go beyond the pleadings and

show that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 324 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support

the assertion by: 

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the

motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or 

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Clark, 929 F.2d at 608 (“it is never enough simply to state

that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial”).

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In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to “weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “[C]ourts are required to view the facts and draw

reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary

judgment] motion.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)(quoting United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam)). Nevertheless, the non-moving party

“need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference.” 

Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999)(citing Brown v.

City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n.12 (11th Cir. 1988)); see also Scott, 550 U.S. at

380 (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted

by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that

version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant operates an automobile assembly plant in Vance, Alabama, where it

employs approximately 187 Maintenance Team Members. (Doc. 52 at 5; doc. 44 at 2.) 

Maintenance Team Members are non-exempt employees and are dispersed throughout the

facility. (Doc. 52 at 5; doc. 50-1 at ¶¶ 18, 19, 69). All of the plaintiffs are employed by

defendant as Maintenance Team Members. (Doc. 14 ¶ 6.)

Maintenance Team Members’ job duties include installing, inspecting, cleaning, and

repairing fixtures, machinery, equipment and pipes at defendant’s facility. (Doc. 50-2 at 2-

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3.) They remain in contact with each other, as well as non-maintenance employees, through

face-to-face communications and by a radio. (Doc. 50-1 ¶ 33.)

Defendant’s stated policy is to provide plaintiffs a 45-minute unpaid lunch period. 

(Doc. 44 at 2; doc. 50-1 ¶ 42.) According to defendant, its policy is that Maintenance Team

Members “had to take a lunch break.” (Doc. 50-1 ¶ 55.) “[I]f their lunch was interrupted,”

regardless of the length of the interrupted, the Maintenance Team Members “were to take

another 45 minute lunch break.” (Id. ¶¶ 55-56.) However, “if a Maintenance Team Member

believed he or she could not take a lunch break because of production needs, [he or she was]

to notify management and if no lunch could be scheduled and taken, [he or she was] paid for

lunch.” (Id. ¶ 57.) Maintenance Team Members do not have a scheduled time for their lunch

periods. Plaintiffs testified that they were required to wear radios and have them turned on

at work all day, including during lunch. (Doc. 50-3 at 84-86; doc. 50-4 at 103-06; doc. 50-5

at 92; doc. 50-6 at 38-39; doc. 50-7 at 56, 60-61; doc. 50-8 at 102-03; doc. 50-9 at 88-89;

doc. 50-11 at 61-62; doc. 50-12 at 60; doc. 50-13 at 88, 91; doc. 50-14 at 79; doc. 50-15 at

61-64; doc. 50-16 at 65; doc. 50-17 at 49, 51; doc. 50-18 at 114-15; doc. 50-19 at 60-61; doc.

50-20 at 72; doc. 50-21 at 72, 76-77; doc. 50-22 at 90-91; doc. 50-23 at 71, 97; doc. 50-24

at 44-45.) But see doc. 50-10 at 139-43 [either left radio on or told Team Leader where he

was going before he left];). Maintenance Team Members are frequently interrupted during

their lunch periods to perform work duties. (Doc. 50-3 at 90-93; doc. 50-4 at 72; doc. 50-9

at 110-11; doc. 50-10 at 130-31; doc. 50-11 at 46-47; doc. 50-12 at 98-99; doc. 50-13 at 91-

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92; doc. 50-14 at 91, 96; doc. 50-15 at 121-25, 178-79; doc. 50-16 at 44; doc. 50-17 at 44;

doc. 50-21 at 82-84; doc. 50-23 at 70-71; doc. 50-24 at 50-51.) 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant asks the court to grant summaryjudgment and to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims. 

(Doc. 48.) Specifically, it argues: 

2. During the course of the proceedings in this case, Plaintiffs and

Defendant conferred with the Court and suggested that under Plaintiffs’ theory

of liability in the case, the Court could resolve this case on summary judgment.

3. On April 17, 2012, the parties filed Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s Joint

Stipulations and Suggestions for Further Proceedings in this Case. (Doc. 44). 

In that pleading, the parties stipulated certain facts and jointly stipulated to the

Court that Plaintiffs’ claim is: “Whether MBUSI’s alleged policy that

maintenance team members are subject to call to perform work duties during

their lunch period renders their lunch period compensable time worked under

the FLSA.”

4. On March 25, 2013, this Court entered its Amended Scheduling

Order (Doc. 46) which set out a summary judgment briefing schedule as to the

stipulated Plaintiffs’ claim in this case as follows:

Whether defendant’s alleged policy – that maintenance team members

are subject to call to perform work duties during their lunch period – 

renders their lunch periods compensable time worked under the FLSA.

5. The FLSA requires an employer pay its employees for “work,”

which does not include being subject to call or wearing a radio because no

physical or mental exertion is involved. Merely being subject to call to

perform work duties during their lunch periods does not impose upon the

maintenance team members significant affirmative responsibilities and is not

a real limitation on their freedom. Thus, Plaintiffs’ meal breaks are not

compensable under the FLSA.

(Id.)

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The issue, as defined by the parties, is, “Whether [defendant’s] alleged policy that

[plaintiffs] are subject to call to perform work duties during their lunch period[s] renders

their lunch period[s] compensable time worked under the FLSA.” (Doc. 44 at 2 [emphasis 1

added].) However, whether plaintiffs’ meal periods, during which they are on call or subject

to recall, are compensable does not depend on the mere presence or absence of an articulated

In fact, defendant argues: 1

At the outset, it is important to note the issues that are not before the Court, for

example:

• an individual determination as to whether the particular circumstances

of a specific maintenance team member renders his lunch period

compensable under the FLSA

• whether the frequency and severity of interruptions of maintenance

teammembers’ lunch periods renders those lunch periods compensable

time worked under the FLSA

• whether the plaintiffs can change clothes, go off site, run errands,

watch television, play games or read during their lunch periods 

• whether anygeographic restrictions are placed on plaintiffs during their

lunch periods

• whether plaintiffs must notify their supervisor as to their location

during lunch

Thus, the only issue to be decided by this Court is whether merely being

subject to call to perform work duties makes the lunch period compensable

time worked under the FLSA, and as MBUSI demonstrates below, the law is

clear that it does not.

(Doc. 40 at 14.)

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policy. Rather, the determination of whether an employee’s meal periods are compensable

work time or non-compensable meal break depends on whether the employee is completely

relieved of their job duties for the purpose of eating a meal – a determination that is based

on the totality of the circumstance and not solely on defendant’s stated policy. Therefore,

the answer to the question – Are plaintiffs’ lunch period compensable due to defendant’s

policy that they are subject to being recalled to work? – is “maybe.”

“Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 with the goal of protecting all covered workers

fromsubstandardwages and oppressive working hours.” Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham

Corp, 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2162 (2012)(internal quotations and citation omitted). To this end,

the FLSA provides, “[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek

longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in

excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular

rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The term “‘Employ’ includes to suffer

or permit to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). The Supreme Court has held that the terms “work

or employment” mean “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled

or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the

employer and his business.” Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132 (1944)(emphasis

added; internal quotations and citation omitted). “Whether time is spent predominantly for

the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s is a question dependent upon all the

circumstances of the case.” Id. at 133.

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The regulations provide:

(a) Bona fide meal periods. Bona fide meal periods are not worktime. Bona

fide meal periods do not include coffee breaks or time for snacks. These are

rest periods. The employee must be completely relieved from duty for the

purposes of eating regular meals. Ordinarily 30 minutes or more is long

enough for a bona fide meal period. A shorter period may be long enough

under special conditions. The employee is not relieved if he is required to

perform any duties, whether active or inactive, while eating. For example,

an office employee who is required to eat at his desk or a factory worker who

is required to be at his machine is working while eating. . . .

(b) Where no permission to leave premises. It is not necessary that an

employee be permitted to leave the premises if he is otherwise completely

freed from duties during the meal period.

29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (emphasis added). “To be consistent with the FLSA’s use of the term

‘work’ as construed [by the Supreme Court], . . . § 785.19 must be interpreted to require

compensation for a meal break during which a worker performs activities predominantly for

the benefit of the employer.” Reich v. Southern New England Telecommunications Corp.,

121 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Opinion Letter from Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour

Div. (Aug. 6, 2004), 2004 WL 3177911 (citing Reich).2

Plaintiffs contend theywere not completelyrelieved of their work duties because they

remained on call during the lunch period. “Whether in a concrete case [on-call] time falls

“Interpretations such as those in opinion letters – like interpretations contained in 2

policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force

of law – do not warrant Chevron-style deference. Instead, interpretations contained in

formats such as opinion letters are ‘entitled to respect’, under our decision in Skidmore v.

Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944), but only to the extent

that those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade,’ ibid.” Christensen v. Harris County,

529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)(other internal citations omitted).

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within or without the Act is a question of fact to be resolved by appropriate findings of the

trial court.” Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 136-37 (1944). “This [determination] involves

scrutiny and construction of the agreement between the particular parties, appraisal of their

practical construction of the working agreement by conduct, consideration of the nature of

the service, and its relation to the waiting time and all of the surrounding circumstances.” 

Id. at 137. The employees’ compensation may cover both waiting and task, or only

performance of the task itself. Id.

In Kohlheim v. Glynn County, 915 F.2d 1473 1477 (11th Cir. 1990), the Eleventh

Circuit addressed the issue of whether firefighters in Glynn County should be compensated

for meal time when they were required to remain at the fire house and were subjected to

taking emergency calls. The County’s policywas to exclude three hours as “meal time” from

each 24-hour tour of duty. The Eleventh Circuit has held:

Section 785.19 [29 C.F.R. § 785.19] provides that bona fide meal

periods are not worktime. In order to be considered a bona fide meal period,

however, the regulations require complete relief from duty: “The employee is

not relieved if he is required to perform any duties, whether active or inactive,

while eating.” Thus, the essential consideration in determining whether a meal

period is a bona fide meal period or a compensable rest period is whether the

employees are in fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly

scheduled meal. The district court ruled that the firefighters were not

completely relieved of their duties during mealtimes and we find no error in

this conclusion. During meal times the firefighters were required to remain at

the station and were subject to emergency calls. The record makes clear that

the firefighters were subject to significant affirmative responsibilities during

these periods. The mealtime restrictions benefit the county by ensuring

maintenance of an available pool of competent firefighters for immediate

response to emergency situations. The firefighters are subject to real

limitations on their freedom during mealtime which inure to the benefit of the

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county; accordingly, the three mealtime periods are compensable under FLSA

regulations for overtime purposes.

Kohlheim v. Glynn County, 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir. 1990)(emphasis added). The

court notes that the firefighters’ duties during their meal periods remained essentially

identical to their duties during the other hours of their tour of duty.

In this case, defendant’s stated policy is to provide each Maintenance Team Member

an uninterrupted 45-minute period for lunch and to compensate a team member for each and

every interrupted lunch period. The employer in Kohlheim had no such policy; each and

every firefighter’s pay was reduced for three meal periods regardless of whether, as a matter

of fact, the firefighters answered a call, and the firefighters duties were unchanged during the

meal periods. In this case, the fact that plaintiffs were required to wear radios or to be

available to be recalled for “equipment problems or parts delivery,” (see doc. 19 at 4-5), does

not prove, as a matter of fact, that they were “required to perform any duties, whether active

or inactive, while eating,” see 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). However, the fact that they were

frequently recalled to work during their meal period to perform their customary job duties,

a fact the court assumes for purposes of summary judgment, indicated that they were not

completely relieved of their work duties and their meal breaks, even the rare, uninterrupted

meal break, are compensable.

As set forth above, whether an employee’s meal break is compensable by virtue of the

employee’s on-call status is a question of fact. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136-37. The pertinent

facts include defendant’s policy, the parties’ “practical construction” of that policy as shown

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by their conduct, and the nature of the employee’s job duties while on call and while on duty. 

See id. at 137; Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1477. Employees that are on call during their meal

periods and are often interrupted for work within their regular job duties are not relieved of

their work duties during the meal period. See Bernard v. IBP, Inc., 154 F.3d 259, 265 (5th

Cir. 1998); see also Opinion Letter from Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour Div. (Feb. 12,

1997), 1997 WL 998005 (Employees “who are required to remain ‘on call’ in the company

break room would have to be compensated for the meal period, unless their meal period was

totally uninterrupted or is only interrupted for rare and infrequent emergency calls to

duty.”)(emphasis added). Because the record supports a finding that at least some of the 3

In this Opinion Letter, the Department of Labor noted: 3

As you are aware, section 785.19 of 29 C.F.R. Part 785, states that bona fide

meal periods that occur during the scheduled workday are not hours worked

if the employee is completely relieved from duty for the purposes of eating

regular meals. It is not necessary that an employee be permitted to leave the

premises if he is otherwise completely freed from duties during the meal

period.

On the other hand, section 785.17 of 29 C.F.R. Part 785, states that an

employee who is required to remain “on call” on the employer’s premises or

so close thereto that he cannot use the time effectively for his own purposes 

is working while “on call.” If, however, the employee is actually relieved of

all duties for the meal period, except for rare and infrequent emergency calls,

the meal period can be excluded from hours worked except when the period

is actually interrupted. It should be noted that it is probable that employees

eating lunch on the premises would always be subject to call in serious

emergencies, but this alone would not make the meal period working time. 

However, if the meal period is frequently interrupted by calls to duty, the

employee would be not considered relieved of all duties and the meal period

would have to be counted as hours worked.

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plaintiffs’ meal breaks are interrupted on a regular basis for the purpose of requiring

plaintiffs to performtheir regular work duties a question of fact exists as to whether plaintiffs

are completely relieved of their work duties for purposes of eating a regular meal. The fact

that Maintenance Team Members are “on call” is not dispositive of the issue of whether their

meal breaks are compensable time under the FLSA. However, that policy, in conjunction

with evidence of how it is applied, indicates a question of fact exists as to whether

Maintenance Team Members were completely relieved oftheir work duties during their meal

breaks.

Therefore, defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgment is due to be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court is of the opinion that there are material facts in

dispute and defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. An Order denying

defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (doc. 48), will be entered contemporaneously

with this Memorandum Opinion.

DONE, this 23rd day of March, 2014.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Opinion Letter from Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour Div. (Feb. 12, 1997), 1997 WL 998005

(emphasis in original).

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