Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01824/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01824-39/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ROBERT HEATH, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GOOGLE LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-01824-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION 

FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF 

COLLECTIVE ACTION 

SETTLEMENT; DISMISSING ACTION 

WITH PREJUDICE

[Re: ECF 428]

Before the Court is the Parties’ Joint Motion for Final Approval of Collective Action 

Settlement Agreement. Mot., ECF 428. In this collective action, Named Plaintiff Cheryl Fillekes 

alleges that Defendant Google LLC violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., by engaging in a systematic pattern or practice of 

discrimination against applicants age forty and older for three positions at Google across the 

United States. Pending before the Court is the Parties’ motion seeking settlement approval. Mot. 

at i. The settlement resolves the claims of Named Plaintiff and 227 individuals who opted in to 

(and did not subsequently opt out of) the ADEA collective action (collectively, “Opt-In 

Plaintiffs”) (together with Named Plaintiff, “Plaintiffs”). In their motion, the Parties request that 

the Court approve the payments to Opt-In Plaintiffs, the incentive award to Named Plaintiff, and 

the attorney’s fees and litigation costs, as well as dismiss the action with prejudice. See id. at 1.

Having considered the papers filed by the Parties and the relevant legal authority, the Court 

GRANTS the Parties’ Motion and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE.

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual and Procedural Background

On April 22, 2015, Robert Heath, who has since settled and dismissed his claims (ECF 

422), filed this ADEA collective action. ECF 1. On June 25, 2015, he amended the complaint to 

add Named Plaintiff. ECF 18. On September 11, 2017, Named Plaintiff1filed a second amended 

complaint. Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), ECF 218. Defendant is a large American multinational 

corporation with internet-related products and services that employs over 72,000 employees. SAC 

¶ 10. The SAC alleges that Defendant’s interviewing and hiring policies intentionally 

discriminate against or have a disparate impact on older workers. SAC ¶¶ 3, 16–28. Named 

Plaintiff, who was 47 years old at the time of the relevant events and had extensive educational 

and work experience, interviewed with Defendant for four different positions, including by inperson interview, but Defendant never hired her. SAC ¶¶ 5, 46–56. She alleges that Defendant 

did not hire her because of her age.

Based on these alleged actions, Named Plaintiff asserts the following claims against

Defendant: (1) violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., 

for disparate treatment (on behalf of herself and a collective of similarly situated individuals), 

SAC ¶¶ 62–66; (2) violation of the ADEA for disparate impact (on behalf of herself and a 

collective of similarly situated individuals),2 SAC ¶¶ 67–71; and (3) violation of the California 

Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12900 (on behalf of herself), 

SAC ¶¶ 72–76. 

On October 5, 2016, the Court conditionally certified the following collective:

All individuals who: interviewed in-person for any Site Reliability Engineer 

(“SRE”), Software Engineer (“SWE”), or Systems Engineer (“SysEng”) position 

with Google, Inc. (“Google”) in the United States; were age 40 or older at the time 

of the interview; and were refused employment by Google; and received notice that 

they were refused employment on August 28, 2014 through [October 5, 2016].

ECF 121 at 6; ECF 119. By the end of the opt-in period, 262 individuals had opted in. Some of 

these opt-ins later withdrew or were dismissed. See, e.g., ECF 342. On August 1, 2018, the Court 

 

1 The Court omits references to prior-plaintiff Heath to avoid confusion.

2 The Court later dismissed Named Plaintiff’s disparate impact claim with prejudice. ECF 235.

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denied Google’s motion to decertify the collective action. ECF 317, 337. On September 13, 

2018, the Court denied Google’s motion for reconsideration of that decision. ECF 367.

The Parties engaged in extensive discovery in this case between September 4, 2015 and 

September 21, 2018, when they reached a settlement in principle. See Low Decl. ISO Mot. ¶ 5, 

ECF 432. Defendant deposed Named Plaintiff and about 35 Opt-In Plaintiffs and took written 

discovery from Named Plaintiff and about 75 Opt-In Plaintiffs. Id. Plaintiffs likewise 

propounded discovery on Defendant, receiving and reviewing over 419,000 pages of documents. 

Id. Both Parties also retained experts who produced multiple expert reports pertaining to potential 

statistical disparities in Defendant’s hiring practices. Id.

Since the action’s inception, the Parties have also engaged in extensive settlement 

discussions. They attended a settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Ryu on December 19, 

2017 and continued discussions in the summer of 2018. See Low Decl. ¶ 7. The Parties engaged 

in a second settlement conference with Judge Ryu on October 5, 2018 and reached a settlement in 

principle. Id. The Settlement Agreement was finalized in April 2019, when Named Plaintiff, 

Defendant, and counsel signed the Agreement. See id.

On May 14, 2019, the claims administrator Kurzman Carson Consultants, LLC (“KKC”) 

sent notice to the Opt-In Plaintiffs. Seven opt-ins did not accept the Settlement Agreement, 

leaving 227 Opt-In Plaintiffs (included Named Plaintiff) in the collective. See Mot., Ex. 4. Six of 

the opt-ins declined after discussions about the Agreement with Plaintiffs’ counsel. See Low 

Decl. ¶ 12. The other opt-in who did not accept could not be reached despite several attempts 

through various means by KCC and Plaintiffs’ counsel. Id.

B. Settlement Agreement

In the Parties’ Settlement Agreement, Defendant agrees to a gross settlement amount of 

$11 million. Mot., Ex. 1 (“Agreement”) § III.A, ECF 428-2. The gross settlement amount will be 

allocated as follows: Named Plaintiff will receive $10,000 as an incentive award for serving as 

Lead Plaintiff. Id. § III.B. Plaintiffs’ counsel will receive $2,750,000 in fees (25% of the gross 

settlement amount, without factoring in programmatic relief) plus costs of $174,349. Id. § III.B; 

Mot. at 4. KCC’s costs (which total $21,390) will also be deducted from the gross settlement 

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amount. Id. § III.A.3; Low Decl. ¶ 17.

The remainder of the fund will go to Plaintiffs. $2.683 million of the gross fund will be 

distributed equally among the 227 Opt-In Plaintiffs, which amounts to at least $11,465 per 

Plaintiff. Id. § VII.A. The remainder of the fund will be distributed on a pro rata basis to those 

Opt-In Plaintiffs who have provided information to Collective counsel concerning lost-wages

damages they may have suffered as a result of Defendant’s decision not to hire them. Id. Each 

Opt-In Plaintiff will receive a pro rata share of the fund proportional to their alleged lost wages. 

Id. All payroll withholding taxes will be paid out of the fund. Id. § III.A; see generally id. § VII. 

KCC will bear responsibility for distributing the funds. Id. §§ III.A.3, VII.B, VII.H. If 

more than $25,000 remains after KCC has attempted to distribute the funds, the funds will be 

distributed equally among Opt-In Plaintiffs. Id. § VII.I. If less than $25,000 remains, the 

remainder will be donated to the AARP Foundation, and KCC will request that the donation be 

used to promote the employment of individuals over 40 years of age in technology jobs. Id. 

Defendant has also agreed to certain “programmatic relief” for four years, including 

“training employees and managers on age-based bias; the creation of a subcommittee within 

recruiting that will focus on age diversity in [Software Engineering, Site Reliability Engineering, 

and Systems Engineering] positions; ensuring that Google’s marketing collateral reflects age 

diversity; ensuring that any age bias complaints for the relevant positions are adequately 

investigated; and conducting surveys of departing employees about potential discrimination.” 

Mot. at 4; see Agreement § IV.A–D.

Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs agree to release the following 

claims and rights against Defendant:

[A]ll known or unknown claims, promises, causes of action, or similar rights of any 

kind that they may presently have for discrimination because of age based on claims 

or allegations that were raised or could have been raised in this Action, in the Second 

Amended Complaint, or in any Complaint filed in this Action, including, without 

limitation, claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 

(“ADEA”) or parallel state or local laws (“Released Claims”).

Agreement § V.A. Named Plaintiff also agrees to release “any and all employment-related 

claims” she might bring against Defendant. Id. § V.C. Plaintiffs also agree not to apply to a job 

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with Defendant for three years. Id. § VI.

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against employees on the 

basis of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2). Employees may bring collective age discrimination actions 

under the ADEA, which “shall be enforced using certain of the powers, remedies, and procedures 

of the [Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)].” Church v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 137 

F.R.D. 294, 298-99 (N.D. Cal 1991); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Collective actions allow 

aggrieved employees “the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of 

resources.” Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989) (discussing FLSA 

collective action provision, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), in context of ADEA claims). Courts in this 

district have held that either the Secretary of Labor or a district court must approve the settlement 

of an FLSA claim. See Gonzalez v. Fallanghina, LLC, No. 16-CV-1832-MEJ, 2017 WL 1374582, 

at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2017); Slezak v. City of Palo Alto, No. 16-CV-3224-LHK, 2017 WL 

2688224, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2017).

The Ninth Circuit has not specifically addressed the criteria courts should use to determine 

whether to approve an FLSA settlement. However, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have 

followed the standard set forth in the Eleventh Circuit’s Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 

679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982). See, e.g., Gonzalez, 2017 WL 1374582 at *2; Slezak, 2017 WL 

2688224, at *2. Under Lynn Food Stores, before approving an FLSA settlement, the court must 

scrutinize the settlement agreement to determine if it is “a fair and reasonable res[o]lution of a 

bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.” 679 F.2d at 1355. If the settlement reflects a 

reasonable compromise over issues that are in dispute, the Court may approve the settlement “in 

order to promote the policy of encouraging settlement of litigation.” Id. at 1354.

III. DISCUSSION

In their motion, the Parties ask the Court to (1) approve the terms of the ADEA settlement, 

including the recovery for each Plaintiff, attorneys’ fees and costs, and Named Plaintiff’s incentive 

award; and (2) dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice. See Mot. at i, 1. The Court discusses each 

request in turn.

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A. Approval of the Collective Settlement

Before approving an ADEA settlement, pursuant to FLSA procedures, the Court must find 

that (1) the case involves a bona fide dispute; (2) the proposed settlement agreement is fair and 

reasonable; and (3) the award of costs is reasonable. Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1354. The 

Court addresses each issue in turn.

1. Bona Fide Dispute

“A bona fide dispute exists when there are legitimate questions about the existence and 

extent of the defendant’s FLSA liability.” Jennings v. Open Door Mktg., LLC, No. 15-CV-4080-

KAW, 2018 WL 4773057, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018) (quoting Gonzalez, 2017 WL 1374582, 

at *2). That is, there must be some doubt whether the plaintiffs will be able to succeed on the 

merits of their FLSA claims. See Selk v. Pioneers Mem’l Healthcare Dist., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 

1172 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Collins v. Sanderson Farms, 568 F. Supp. 2d 714, 719–20 (E.D. 

La. 2008)). If there were no doubt as to the employer’s liability, the FLSA settlement would allow 

an employer to avoid paying out the full cost of complying with the FLSA. See id. at 1173.

Here, the Court finds that there is a bona fide dispute. The Parties have rigorously debated 

whether Defendant’s interviewing and hiring practices and policies constitute age discrimination 

under the ADEA, as evidenced by the years of litigation on these issues, including hotly contested 

motions to dismiss, to certify the collective, to decertify the collective, and to reconsider the order 

declining to recertify the collective. For example, the Parties disputed (and still dispute) whether 

Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination; whether this case can 

properly proceed as a collective; whether Named Plaintiff’s claims were proper under the ADEA; 

whether Plaintiffs’ expert’s statistical evidence—which is critical to claims like these—was 

admissible and sufficient to establish discrimination; whether Google interviewers have access to 

interviewees’ ages when evaluating them; and more. See, e.g., ECF 317, 252, 235, 119; see also 

Mot. at 7; Low Decl. ¶ 9.

Because the Parties disputed these aspects of the case, the Court finds a bona fide dispute 

under the FLSA. Most importantly, the Court acknowledges that the purpose of the bona fide 

dispute requirement has been satisfied here. See Saleh v. Valbin Corp., No. 17-CV-0593-LHK, 

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2018 WL 6002320, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018) (citing Lynn Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1353 

n.8) (“The purpose of this analysis is to ensure that an employee does not waive claims for wages, 

overtime compensation, or liquidated damages when no actual dispute exists between the 

parties.”).

2. Fair and Reasonable Resolution

To determine whether the settlement is fair and reasonable, the Court looks to the “totality 

of the circumstances.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1173. In making this determination, courts 

consider the following factors: (1) the plaintiffs’ range of possible recovery; (2) the stage of 

proceedings and amount of discovery completed; (3) the seriousness of the litigation risks faced 

by the Parties; (4) the scope of any release provision in the settlement agreement; (5) the 

experience and views of counsel and the opinion of participating plaintiffs; and (6) the possibility 

of fraud or collusion. See, e.g., id.; Jennings, 2018 WL 4773057, at *4. 

The Court will now address each of these factors accordingly. 

a. Plaintiffs’ Range of Possible Recovery

Regarding the Plaintiffs’ range of possible recovery, courts in the Ninth Circuit have found 

FLSA cases settling for approximately 25%–35% of the total possible recovery to be reasonable. 

See, e.g., Jennings, 2018 WL 4773057, at *5–*6; Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1175; Glass v. UBS 

Financial Services, Inc., No. 06-CV-4068-MMC, 2007 WL 221862, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 

2007), aff’d, 331 F. App’x 452 (9th Cir. 2009); Greer v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 15-CV-1066-

EPG, 2018 WL 2059802, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2018); Johnson v. MetLife, Inc., No. SACV 13-

128-JLS, 2014 WL 12773568, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014).

Each Plaintiff’s average gross recovery under the Agreement is $48,458. Plaintiffs submit 

that this amount represents over 80% of the estimated actual damages each Opt-In allegedly 

suffered during the relevant time, based on the lost wages information provided to Plaintiffs’ 

counsel. See Low Decl. ¶ 11; Mot., Ex. 1 at 62–72 (documenting each Plaintiff’s recovery based 

on lost wages). Given this substantial recovery, this factor weighs in favor of approval.

b. The Stage of the Proceedings and Amount of Discovery Completed

The Court next assesses “the stage of proceedings and the amount of discovery completed 

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to ensure the Parties have an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case before reaching a 

settlement.” Jennings, 2018 WL 4773057, at *5 (quoting Slezak, 2017 WL 2688224, at *4). If the 

Parties have “sufficient information to make an informed decision about [the] settlement, this 

factor weighs in favor of approval.” Id. (quoting Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 

1239 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

This case is several years old, and in that time the Parties have engaged in extensive 

discovery, including depositions, written discovery, and expert reports. See Low Decl. ¶ 5.

Indeed, at the time the case settled, Defendant had filed a summary judgment motion. ECF 352. 

Before that, the Parties had engaged in extensive discovery and briefing related to the motions to 

certify and then to decertify the collective. Moreover, the Parties have participated in numerous 

settlement discussion throughout this time. See Low Decl. ¶ 7. Given the current stage of the 

case, the Parties have a good understanding of the merits of their respective positions. 

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.

c. The Seriousness of the Litigation Risks Faced by the Parties

Courts will approve an FLSA settlement when there is a significant risk that litigation 

could result in a lower recovery for the class or no recovery at all. See Jennings, 2018 WL 

4773057, at *5. Plaintiffs faced significant risks if they were to proceed with this litigation. At 

the time the case settled, Defendant had filed a summary judgment motion targeting several 

potential weaknesses in Plaintiffs’ case (ECF 352). Moreover, when the Court declined to 

decertify the case, it indicated that it reserved the right to reconsider the decision either for both 

phases of the two-phase Teamsters pattern-or-practice trial or for the remedial phase only. ECF 

337 at 28–29. Thus, Plaintiffs faced the risk that the collective might eventually be decertified. 

And given Defendant’s vehement denial of any wrongdoing, it is likely that this case would have 

been appealed on both factual and legal issues were it to proceed to trial.

Accordingly, further litigation could easily result in Plaintiffs recovering less than the 

settlement amount or perhaps nothing at all, so this factor weighs in favor of approving the 

settlement.

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d. The Scope of Any Release Provision in the Settlement Agreement

Courts in this district have rejected blanket releases of all potential claims against the 

employer for all unlawful acts whatsoever. See, e.g., McKeen-Chaplin v. Franklin Am. Mortg. 

Co., No. 10-CV-5243-SBA, 2012 WL 6629608, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (ruling that the 

plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that it would be fair and reasonable for a court to enforce a general 

release provision of all claims related to their employment in an FLSA settlement); Garcia v. 

Jambox, Inc., No. 14-CV-3504-MHD, 2015 WL 2359502, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2015) 

(disapproving of release of all claims known and unknown against defendants, including those that 

seemingly had “no relationship whatsoever” to wage and hour issues); Ambrosino v. Home Depot. 

U.S.A., Inc., No. 11-CV-1319-MDD, 2014 WL 1671489, at *2–*3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014) 

(same). However, when a district court in the Ninth Circuit approves an FLSA collective action 

settlement, it may approve a release of any claims sufficiently related to the current litigation. See 

Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1178–79; see also Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 

741, 748 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1287–89 (9th 

Cir. 1992)).

Here, the release provision, consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent, is limited to releasing 

age discrimination claims that Plaintiffs could have asserted in the instant action. See Agreement 

§ V.A. As such, the release is not a blanket release of all potential claims, but is instead tailored to 

the age discrimination action here. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approval of the 

settlement.

e. The Experience and Views of Counsel and the Opinion of Participating 

Plaintiffs

“In determining whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the opinions of counsel should 

be given considerable weight both because of counsel’s familiarity with the litigation and previous 

experience with cases.” Slezak, 2017 WL 2688224, at *5 (citation omitted). Here, the Parties’ 

counsel, “who are experienced in class litigation,” “believe that the Settlement is fair and 

reasonable.” Mot. at 10. The Agreement was reached as the result of arms-length, non-collusive 

negotiations over more than a year and with the aid of Magistrate Judge Ryu. Moreover, after 

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notice and discussion with counsel, only six opt-ins declined to join the settlement.3 No objections 

were filed. Low Decl. ¶ 12. Thus, 97% of the class chose to participate in the settlement, 

indicating widespread approval of the Agreement by the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, this factor 

weighs in favor of approval of the settlement.

f. The Possibility of Fraud or Collusion

When courts in the Ninth Circuit examine the terms of FLSA settlements, courts will often 

find fraud or collusion if the following conditions are present: 

(1) when counsel receives a disproportionate distribution of the settlement, or when 

the class receives no monetary distribution but class counsel are amply rewarded; (2) 

when the plaintiffs negotiate a ‘clear sailing’ agreement providing for the payment 

of attorney’s fees separate and apart from class funds . . .; and (3) when the parties 

arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants rather than be added to the class 

fund. 

Jennings, 2018 WL 4773057, at *8 (alterations omitted) (quoting In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. 

Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011)).

In this case, the Court finds no signs of fraud or collusion. The Parties reached the 

settlement through arm’s-length negotiations, including with the help of Magistrate Judge Ryu. 

Low Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs’ Counsel will not receive a disproportionate distribution of the 

settlement fund since only 25% of the gross settlement amount will go towards attorney’s fees. 

Low Decl. ¶ 13. In addition, the Court does not find any evidence of a clear sailing agreement or 

any reversion of funds. See generally Agreement. Therefore, the Court concludes this factor 

weighs in favor of approval.

* * *

After considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the proposed 

settlement is a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute.

B. Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Costs

Attorney’s fees and litigation costs may also be awarded as part of an FLSA settlement if 

they are reasonable. See Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1180–81; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Where a 

 

3 An additional opt-in could not be reached.

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settlement produces a common fund for the benefit of the entire class, courts may employ either 

the lodestar method or percentage-of-recovery method to determine whether the attorney’s fees are 

reasonable. See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942. When applying a percentage-of-recovery 

method, courts often use 25% of the fund as the “benchmark” for a reasonable fee award. See In 

re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 949 (9th Cir. 2015). In addition, courts can 

use the lodestar method to cross-check the percentage of recovery. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft 

Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that when applying the percentage-of-the-fund 

approach, the court may use the lodestar as a cross-check on the reasonableness of the fee request).

Plaintiffs’ counsel requests fees in the amount of $2.75 million and costs in the amount of 

$174,348.98. Mot. at 11, 14; Mot. Ex. 2, ECF 428-2; Mot., Ex. 3, ECF 428-3. These attorney’s 

fees constitute 25% of the $11 million dollar settlement. Plaintiffs’ counsel have expended over 

4,000 hours litigating this case and have accumulated a lodestar in the amount of $2,433,068 (plus 

any fees for the time it takes to finalize the settlement). Low Decl. ¶¶ 13–14; Mot., Ex. 2. 

Therefore, their request for attorney’s fees represents a multiplier of 1.13. Low Decl. ¶ 14. Thus, 

the percentage of recovery matches the benchmark in the Ninth Circuit, and a lodestar cross check 

confirms that the request is reasonable.

Furthermore, the litigation costs sought by Plaintiffs’ counsel are reasonable. These costs 

primarily involve professional fees, such as expert fees and court reporting fees, as well as travel 

expenses. Low Decl. ¶ 15. “There is no doubt that an attorney who has created a common fund 

for the benefit of the class is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses from that 

fund.” Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1181 (citation omitted). The Court finds that the amount 

requested in costs is reasonable under the circumstances and appropriately documented. The same 

is true of the costs requested by KCC in the amount of $21,390. See Agreement § III.A.3; Low 

Decl. ¶ 17.

Accordingly, the requested attorney’s fees and litigation costs are reasonable. 

C. Incentive Award

The Settlement Agreement also provides for an incentive award of $10,000 for Named 

Plaintiff. Mot. at 14–15. “[A] district court may award an incentive payment to the named 

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plaintiffs in an FLSA collective action to compensate them for work done on behalf of the class.” 

Selk, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1181. In determining whether a service award is warranted, courts 

consider “the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the degree to which 

the class has benefited from those actions, and the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended 

in pursuing the litigation.” Id. (quoting Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

In FLSA settlements, courts in this district have generally found service awards of $5,000 to be 

reasonable. Jennings, 2018 WL 4773057, at *9.

Though the $10,000 award for Named Plaintiff is greater than the typical incentive award 

in this district, the Court finds that Named Plaintiff’s deep involvement with this active case 

warrants a larger service award. Since June 25, 2015, when she was added as a named plaintiff, 

Named Plaintiff has spent approximately 250 hours participating in this litigation, including 

assisting with the amended complaint and her motion to certify the collective, travelling to 

California from New York to participate in a full-day deposition, responding to written discovery, 

gathering and producing documents, and travelling to California to participate in mediation. 

Fillekes Decl. ISO Mot. ¶ 2, ECF 428-1; see also Low Decl. ¶ 16. Named Plaintiff’s active, 

continued participation in the case was critical to achieving the substantial recovery here. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the requested incentive award is appropriate and approves it.

D. Dismissal of Action

In the motion’s statement of issues to be decided, the Parties ask that this action be 

dismissed with prejudice if the Court approves the settlement. Mot. at 1. The Court having 

approved the ADEA settlement hereby DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE this action. Pursuant to 

the Parties’ Settlement Agreement, the Court retains jurisdiction over this Action for the purpose 

of entering all orders and judgments authorized that may be necessary to implement and enforce 

the Settlement. Agreement § VII.G.1.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Parties’ Joint Motion for Final 

Approval of Collective Action Settlement Agreement. Pursuant to the request in the Joint Motion, 

the Court hereby DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE this action.

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Without affecting the finality of this Order and accompanying Judgment in any way, the 

Court retains jurisdiction over (1) implementation and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement 

until each and every act agreed to be performed by the parties pursuant to the Settlement 

Agreement has been performed; (2) any other actions necessary to conclude the Settlement and to 

administer, effectuate, interpret, and monitor compliance with the provisions of the Settlement 

Agreement; and (3) all parties to this action and Settlement class members for the purpose of 

implementing and enforcing the Settlement Agreement. Within 21 days after the distribution of 

the settlement funds and payment of attorneys’ fees, the parties shall file a Post-Distribution 

Accounting in accordance with this District’s Procedural Guidance for Class Action Settlements. 

The parties must seek approval from the Court for any Cy Pres distributions.

The Clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2019

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

Case 5:15-cv-01824-BLF Document 433 Filed 08/15/19 Page 13 of 13