Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01592/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01592-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 1 - 

 WO 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Laura Breeser; et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

The Menta Group, Inc., NFP; et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. CV 10-1592-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (the 

“Motion”). (Doc. 74). Defendants have also filed a Statement of Facts in Support of their 

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 75). Plaintiffs have filed a Response to Defendants’ 

Motion (Doc. 81), a controverting statement of facts disputing Defendants’ statement of facts 

(Doc. 85), and another controverting statement of facts adding additional facts that allegedly 

establish a genuine issues of material fact (Doc. 86). Finally, Defendants have filed a Reply. 

(Doc. 90). The Court has considered the pleadings and now rules on the Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

This suit arises out of the termination of Plaintiff Laura Breeser’s (“Breeser”) 

employment by Defendant Special Education Services (“SES”). Breeser worked for SES for 

approximately twenty-nine years before SES terminated her employment. The position 

Breeser was terminated from was Principal of the Southwest Education Center (“SWEC”) in 

Phoenix, Arizona. As an initial matter, the Court must determine the undisputed material 

facts in this case. 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 1 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 2 - 

 A. The Parties’ Statements of Fact 

Local Rule of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”) 7.2(e)(1) requires motions and the 

responsive pleadings to be no more than seventeen pages. Local Rule 56.1(a) requires that a 

party moving for summary judgment file a separate statement of facts, in addition to the 

motion, setting forth each material fact on which the party relies in support of their motion. 

LRCiv 56.1(a). In addition, the rule requires that each material fact be numbered in a 

separate paragraph and refer to admissible portions of the record for that fact. Id. Rule 

56.1(b) requires the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, the non-movant, to 

file a controverting statement of facts in addition to their response to the motion for summary 

judgment. LRCiv 56.1(b). In the controverting statement of facts the non-movant must 

address every one of the material facts that the moving party put forth. Id. Further, the rule 

requires that any additional facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact that the nonmovant proffers must “be set forth in [ ] separately numbered paragraph[s] and must refer to 

[ ] specific admissible portion[s] of the record where the fact[s] find[ ] support.” Id. 

Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment in compliance with LRCiv 

7.2(e)(1). See (Doc. 74). Defendants also filed an accompanying separate statement of facts 

pursuant to LRCiv 56.1(a), which includes seventy separately numbered material facts 

spanning eleven pages. See (Doc. 75). Plaintiffs filed a Response pursuant to LRCiv 

7.2(e)(1). See (Doc. 81). Then Plaintiffs filed two separate statements of facts. (Doc. 85); 

(Doc. 86). 

1. Plaintiffs’ “Statement of Facts Establishing a Genuine Issue of 

 Material Fact” (Doc. 86) 

One of the statements of fact that Plaintiffs have filed is what they call “Plaintiff’s 

[sic] Statement of Facts Establishing a Genuine Issue of Material Fact” (the “PSOFE”). 

(Doc. 86). This statement of facts is two pages long and is merely a list of five attachments 

appended to the PSOFE. See (id.). The PSOFE is apparently additional facts that allegedly 

establish a genuine issue of material fact as discussed in LRCiv 56.1(b). 

 LRCiv 56.1(b) clearly requires any additional facts that the non-movant wants to 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 2 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 3 - 

add, “be set forth in a separately numbered paragraph and must refer to a specific admissible 

portion of the record where the facts find support.” Plaintiffs have failed to follow this rule. 

 Plaintiffs have just proffered the admissible portions of the record and nothing more. 

The PSOFE is only a list of five declarations of five different parties. See (Doc. 86 at 1-2). 

Plaintiffs have not stated what additional facts they are adding, how these additional facts 

create a genuine issue for trial, Plaintiffs have not numbered these additional facts in separate 

paragraphs, nor have Plaintiffs cited where in the admissible portion of the record the facts 

find support. Ostensibly Plaintiffs expect the Court to pick through the one hundred and 

fifty-three pages of declarations to determine if any parts of them establish genuine issues for 

trial. Plaintiffs refer to the PSOFE in their Response in an attempt to establish additional 

facts, but this is not what LRCiv 56.1(b) requires. LRCiv 56.1(b) requires additional facts to 

be set out in separately numbered paragraphs in the controverting statement of facts and then 

these additional facts must refer to admissible portions of the record. 

Failure of the non-movant to comply with LRCiv 56.1(b) is ground for the Court to 

disregard a controverting statement of facts and deem as true the moving party’s separate 

statement of facts in support of the motion for summary judgment. Szaley v. Pima Cnty., 371 

F. App’x 734, 735 (9th Cir. 2010). In addition, as discussed below, see infra Section II.B.3, 

this Court finds only one statement in these additional facts is relevant to Defendants’ 

Motion and that statement cites the wrong portion of the record. 

2. Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts Disputing Defendants’ Statement of 

 Facts (Doc. 85) 

 Plaintiffs have also filed a controverting statement of facts disputing Defendants’ 

statement of facts. (Doc. 85). This controverting statement of facts is ninety-two pages long 

and is also deficient under LRCiv 56.1(b). See (id.). While LRCiv 56.1(b) does not stipulate 

a page limit for the separate controverting statement of facts, “LRCiv 56.1 ‘does not permit 

explanation and argument supporting the party’s position to be included in the . . . statement 

of facts. Argument may be made in the response or reply brief on the motion for summary 

judgment, but within the page limits.’” Marceau v. Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, 618 F. 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 3 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 4 - 

Supp. 2d 1127, 1141 (D. Ariz. 2009) (quoting Pruett v. State, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1075 

(D. Ariz. 2009)). 

In the Reply, Defendants have moved to strike fifty-seven of the seventy 

controverting facts that Plaintiffs put forth for containing arguments properly asserted in the 

Response and for offering controverting facts not supported by citation to admissible 

evidence or by cited testimony. (Doc. 90 at 2-4). The Court finds Plaintiffs’ controverting 

statement of facts attempts to subvert the seventeen page limit for responsive memoranda 

established in LRCiv 7.2(e)(1) and add substantive argument to Plaintiffs’ claims instead of 

only material facts as required by LRCiv 56.1(b). 

 Symptomatic of facts that are argumentative is Plaintiffs’ denial of Defendants’ 

material fact 10. See (Doc. 85 at 5-28). Defendants’ material fact 10 is Breeser’s 

responsibilities at SWEC. (Doc. 75 at 3 ¶ 10). Material fact 10 lists ten items that Breeser 

was responsible for in the position she was terminated from and spans eight lines, which 

includes four lines of citations to the record supporting the responsibilities listed. Id. 

Plaintiffs’ denial of this material fact is twenty-two pages of argument in narrative form 

devoid of a single heading or numbered paragraph signifying an additional contradicting 

material fact. (Doc. 85 at 5-28)1

. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ twenty-two page so called denial of 

material fact 10 is immediately belied by the second sentence in it where Plaintiffs 

conspicuously state that “Mrs. Breeser admits that she testified as indicated in her deposition 

as cited by Defendant” in material fact 10. (Doc. 85 at 5). 

Even if the Court were to consider Plaintiffs’ twenty-two page retort, in addition to 

being argumentative, it presents page after page of additional factual allegations. Assuming, 

arguendo, these additional facts create an issue of material fact, Plaintiffs have failed to abide 

by Rule 56.1(b) and separately number each material fact in this statement of facts. 

A district court does not have a duty to search for evidence that would create a factual 

 

1

 Similarly, Plaintiffs’ denial of Defendants’ material fact 12 is six pages long (Doc. 85 at 

29-35), the denial of material fact 26 is eight pages long (id. at 43-50), the denial of material 

facts 52 and 61 are both over five pages long (id. at 72-77, 84-89). Like Plaintiffs’ denial of 

material fact 10, these denials are argumentative and none of these denials include separately 

numbered paragraphs for additional facts added to them pursuant to LRCiv 56.1(b). 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 4 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 5 - 

dispute. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Carmen v. S.F. 

Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that it would be “unfair” to 

the district court to require it “to search the entire record” if a party fails to “disclose where 

in the record the evidence for [the factual claims] can be found”)). To borrow an analogy 

used by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 

When reading [Plaintiffs’ ninety-two page controverting 

statement of facts], one wonders if [Plaintiffs], in [their] own 

version of the “spaghetti approach,” ha[ve] heaved the entire 

contents of a pot against the wall in hopes that something would 

stick. [The Court] decline[s], however, to sort through the 

noodles in search of [Plaintiffs’] claim. As the Seventh Circuit 

observed in its now familiar maxim, “[j]udges are not like pigs, 

hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” United States v. Dunkel, 

927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991). 

Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In addition to subverting the page requirement for Plaintiffs’ arguments, many of 

Plaintiffs’ proffered facts are not supported by cited testimony or citation to admissible 

evidence. Characteristic of these facts is Plaintiffs’ denial of Defendants’ material fact 61. 

See (Doc. 85 at 84-89). Defendants’ material fact 61 establishes that Tammy Patrick asked 

Defendant William Andrew Hubble (“Hubble”) if Breeser quit, and Hubble responded “yes.” 

(Doc. 75 at 10 ¶ 61). Defendants cite Tammy Patrick’s deposition for this fact. (Id.) (citing 

Doc. 75-3 at 85-86). Turning to the deposition, which Defendants properly directed the 

Court to; this is exactly what Tammy Patrick stated. (Doc. 75-3 at 85-86). Yet, Plaintiffs 

expressly deny this fact and state “[t]he citation of the record is incomplete and does not 

support the statement of fact alleged.” (Doc. 85 at 84 ¶ 61). Plaintiffs then proceed to 

unpersuasively argue this point over the following five pages. See (id. at 84-89). As part of 

their argument, Plaintiffs state “Mrs. Breeser’s declaration (which is a separate part of the 

record) makes it clear . . . .” (Id. at 88). Yet, Plaintiffs do not cite Breeser’s declaration or 

direct the Court to where in the record Breeser’s declaration is located. 

As courts in the Seventh Circuit have explained, “[w]hen analyzing Local Rule 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 5 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 6 - 

56.1(b) statements [a similar local rule to the one this Court operates under], courts are not 

required to ‘wade through improper denials and legal argument in search of a genuinely 

disputed fact.’” Phillips v. Quality Terminal Servs., LLC, 855 F. Supp. 2d 764, 771 (N.D. Ill. 

2012) (quoting Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th 

Cir. 2000)). “Rather, fact statements are designed to ‘assist the court by organizing the 

evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side proposes 

to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.’” Id. (quoting Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 527 

(citation omitted)). “Opinion, suggested inferences, legal arguments and conclusions are not 

the proper subject matter of a Local Rule 56.1 statement. Including legal arguments in a 

56.1 statement is wholly improper, redundant, unpersuasive and irksome; in short, it 

advances neither the interests of the parties nor of the court.” Id. (citing Servin v. GATX 

Logistics, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 561, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (citation omitted); Malec v. Sanford, 

191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (legal argument is improper within a Local Rule 56.1 

statement of facts); Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini–Hohberger, 476 F. Supp. 2d 

913, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (legal argument is improper within a Local Rule 56.1 statement of 

facts)). “It is the function of the Court, with or without a motion to strike, to review 

carefully statements of material facts and to eliminate from consideration any argument, 

conclusions, and assertions that are unsupported by the documented evidence of record 

offered in support of the statement.” Id. (citing Sullivan v. Henry Smid Plumbing & Heating 

Co., Inc., No. 04C5167, 2006 WL 980740, at *2 n. 2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2006); Tibbetts v. 

RadioShack Corp., No. 03C2249, 2004 WL 2203418, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2004); 

Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 917, 920 n. 1 (N.D. Ind. 2004)). “The Court’s scrutiny of 

material statements of facts applies equally to the party seeking summary judgment and the 

party opposing it. Where a party offers a legal conclusion or statement of fact without 

proper evidentiary support, the Court will not consider that statement.” Id. (citing Malec, 

191 F.R.D. at 583. 

Defendants have moved to strike fifty-seven of the seventy controverting facts that 

Plaintiffs proffered in their controverting statement of facts. (Doc. 90 at 2-4). The Court 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 6 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 7 - 

will not grant the motion to strike but will consider or disregard the evidence consistent with 

the authority discussed above. 

 B. The Undisputed Material Facts

The undisputed facts show that SES is a not-for-profit organization that operates 

special education schools in Illinois and Arizona that help meet the educational, social and 

emotional needs of young people who have severe behavioral and emotional handicaps. 

(Doc. 74 at 3). In Arizona, SES operates the SWEC, a special education school for 

kindergarten through 12th grade students in and around Phoenix who are challenged by 

social-emotional, learning, and behavior difficulties. (Id.). Defendant The Menta Group, 

Inc, NFP (“The Menta Group”) is a not-for-profit organization that is the marketing vehicle 

for the schools affiliated with SES. (Id.). Plaintiffs admit that The Menta Group has never 

employed Breeser. (Doc. 81 at 11). 

 Around 1990, SES hired Breeser to work at one if its schools in Illinois. (Doc. 74 at 

4). In 2004, Breeser moved from Illinois to Arizona to become the Principal/Administrator 

of SWEC. (Id.). Breeser held this position until August 2008, when she became the Life 

Skills Director at SWEC. (Doc. 85 at 64-65 ¶¶ 41-44). Breeser was placed on sabbatical by 

SES sometime between the end of November and beginning of December 2008. (Doc. 85 at 

67 ¶ 48). On March 1, 2009, Hubble called Breeser and terminated her employment. (Doc. 

75 at 9 ¶ 53); see also infra Section II.A.1. 

 On March 15, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants in the Maricopa 

County Superior Court. (Doc. 1-1). On July, 27, 2010, Plaintiffs’ case was removed to this 

Court. (Doc. 1). On October 29, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a first Amended Complaint, asserting 

seven counts against Defendants. (Doc. 20). On April 18, 2011, this Court dismissed all of 

the claims against Defendants except Count One for Wrongful Termination and the 

Defamation Claim found in Count Five. (Doc. 38 at 15). The Court also dismissed all of 

the individual Defendants, leaving only The Menta Group, SES, John and Jane Does I-X, 

and Black and White Corporations I-X as Defendants. (Id.). On June 11, 2012, Defendants 

filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 74). 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 7 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 8 - 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ two remaining claims 

against Defendants—wrongful termination and defamation. (Id. at 2). Summary judgment is 

only appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A 

party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support that assertion by . . 

. citing to particular parts of materials in the record,” or by “showing that materials cited do 

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot 

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Id. 56(c)(1)(A)&(B). Thus, summary 

judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the 

burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be unable to 

establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do more than 

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by “com[ing] 

forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). In the summary judgment context, the Court construes all 

disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 

F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not 

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is 

that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 247-248 (1986). A material fact is any factual issue that might affect the outcome of the 

case under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248. A material fact is “genuine” if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 8 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 9 - 

 At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge’s function is to determine whether 

there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence 

favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 249-250. If 

the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, the judge may grant 

summary judgment. Id. 

A. Plaintiffs’ Wrongful Termination Claim 

 In the Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ wrongful termination claim should 

be summarily dismissed for two reasons. (Doc. 74 at 2). First, Defendants contend that the 

wrongful termination claim is barred by the statute of limitations. (Id. at 8). Second, 

Defendants argue that even if the wrongful termination claim is not barred, Breeser cannot 

establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination. (Id. at 9). 

 1. Statute of Limitations 

 In the Amended Complaint, Breeser alleges that Defendants violated Arizona’s 

Employment Protection Act (“AEPA”) (Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) § 23-1501) by 

terminating her employment so she would not “gain further information forming a factual 

basis to ‘blow the whistle’ on Defendants and their illegal practices.” (Doc. 20 at 4 ¶ 16). 

The statute of limitations to bring a wrongful termination claim under the AEPA is one year 

and is found in A.R.S. § 12-541(4). The statute of limitations states, “[t]here shall be 

commenced and prosecuted within one year after the cause of action accrues, and not 

afterward,” actions “[f]or damages of wrongful termination.” A.R.S. § 12-541. “Although 

‘accrual’ is not defined in this section, [Arizona] courts have applied the common law 

‘discovery rule’ to interpret that term within statutes of limitations.” Stulce v. Salt River 

Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 3 P.3d 1007, 1010 ¶ 10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Anson 

v. American Motors Corp., 747 P.2d 581, 584 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (accrual under two-year 

wrongful death statute of limitations)). 

That common law rule, if sufficient evidence supporting its 

application is presented, may delay commencement of the time 

period within which suit must be filed. Under the discovery 

rule, a cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff knew or by 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 9 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 10 - 

the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the 

defendants’ conduct and therefore the statute of limitations does 

not begin to run until that time.” Mayer v. Good Samaritan 

Hosp., 482 P.2d 497, 501 (Ariz. 1971); See also Vega v. Morris, 

910 P.2d 6, 8 (Ariz. 1996). The burden of establishing that the 

discovery rule applies to delay the statute of limitations rest[s] 

on plaintiff. Ulibarri v. Gerstenberger, 871 P.2d 698, 702 

(Ariz. Ct. App.1993); Cooney v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 770 

P.2d 1185, 1187 (Ariz. Ct. App.1989). 

Logerquist v. Danforth, 932 P.2d 281, 284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). “The relevant inquiry is 

when did a plaintiff’s ‘knowledge, understanding, and acceptance in the aggregate provide [ ] 

sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.’” Little v. State, 240 P.3d 861, 864 ¶ 9 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990, 996 ¶ 23 (Ariz. 2002)). “Once the 

defendant has established a prima facie case entitling him to summary judgment on a statute 

of limitations defense, the plaintiff has the burden of showing available, competent evidence 

that would justify a trial.” Logerquist, 932 P.2d at 284 (quoting Ulibarri, 871 P.2d at 703). 

 In this case, the Court finds Plaintiffs have proffered no such evidence. Plaintiffs 

filed their initial claims on March 15, 2010. (Doc. 1-1). In Defendants’ separate statement 

of facts, Defendants state Breeser was terminated on March 1, 2009, over a year before 

Plaintiffs filed suit. (Doc. 75 at 9 ¶¶ 53-54). Defendants cite Hubble’s deposition (Doc. 75-2 

at 50-86) and his declaration (Doc. 75-3 at 20-24) as support for this material fact. (Id.). In 

their controverting statement of facts, Plaintiffs deny this is the date of termination and 

attempt to create a disputed factual issue. See (Doc. 85 at 77-78). Plaintiffs cite Breeser’s 

declaration and the declaration of her attorney, Richard Treon, as support for their argument. 

However, Plaintiffs neither proffer a different date of termination nor cite any evidence in the 

record that shows when Breeser was actually terminated. Essentially, Plaintiffs want the 

Court to find this is a disputed fact based on competing statements in the parties’ 

declarations, the proverbial “he said vs. she said” argument. 

 However, Hubble’s declaration, the support for Defendants’ statement of fact, is 

more than merely testimonial evidence. Unlike the declarations Plaintiffs cite to supporting 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 10 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 11 - 

their argument, Hubble’s declaration supports the “March 1, 2009” date with evidence 

beyond the declaration itself. Hubble’s declaration states, “[t]he documents submitted by 

both Breeser to the Arizona Department of Economic Security and by SES to Paychex 

confirm that March 1, 2009 was Breeser’s date of termination. These documents are 

attached as Exhibit 11.” (Doc. 75-3 at 24¶ 29). Turning to Exhibit 11, there is no dispute 

that it is the form submitted by Breeser to the Arizona Department of Economic Security and 

dated July 7, 2009. (Id. at 56). The form Breeser submitted to the State of Arizona tells the 

applicant to “Explain why you feel you were discharged (provide dates),” under this it says 

in handwriting “Not sure, No specific reason.” Further down the form it says in handwriting, 

“I was injured on Nov 29th [sic] 2008. Put on Medical leave until March 1 [sic] 200[9]. 

Called on the phone by [unreadable] Hubble 3/1/0[9] and told I was discharged.”2

 (Id.). 

 Plaintiffs’ statement of facts fails to create a disputed issue of material fact as to the 

date Breeser was terminated. In the controverting statement of facts, Plaintiffs argue Breeser 

was never “told” on March 1, 2009 that she was terminated. (Doc. 85 at 78 ¶ 54). This 

argument is directly refuted by Breeser’s own words written on the form to the Arizona 

Department of Economic Security—“Called on the phone by [unreadable] Hubble 3/1/0[9] 

and told I was discharged.” (Doc. 75-3 at 56). 

 In addition, Plaintiffs attempt to put this date in dispute by arguing in their statement 

of facts that Breeser only put March 1, 2009, because “she sought to have her unemployment 

benefits started by the State on March 1 because that was the date that Defendant told the 

State that she was terminated.” (Doc. 85 at 78 ¶ 54). The Court notes that Breeser is asking 

the Court to contradict the date the State of Arizona has her on file as starting her 

unemployment benefits. If the Court were to agree with Plaintiffs, Breeser would have 

misled either this Court or the State of Arizona as to her date of termination creating 

 

2 The handwriting on the form says the dates “March 1 2008” and “3/1/08”. (Doc. 75-3 at 

56). However, the Court finds these dates written on the form are unquestionably mistakes 

and intended to read “March 1, 2009” and “3/1/09”, because Breeser stated that she was 

injured on November 29, 2008 and put on medical leave until March 1, 2008. This statement 

makes no temporal sense unless Breeser meant March 1, 2009. Further, the date March 1, 

2008, has never been a date at issue in this case and Plaintiffs repeatedly refer to March 1, 

2009, as the date at issue (Doc. 85 at 78 ¶ 54). 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 11 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 12 - 

inconsistent findings. See generally Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 

782-83 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing factors courts may consider in determining whether to 

apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Courts may apply the doctrine when a party’s later 

inconsistent position creates inconsistent court determinations, thus, threatening judicial 

integrity). The Court will not find a disputed issue of fact based merely on Breeser 

contradicting her own prior statements. 

 Finally, in their controverting statement of facts, Plaintiffs fail to cite where Breeser 

claims she used the March 1, 2009 date solely to obtain unemployment benefits as of that 

date. Plaintiffs merely state that Breeser testified in her declaration to putting this date on 

her application in order to receive unemployment benefits. (Doc. 85 at 78 ¶ 54). The only 

citation to the record to support Breeser’s statement is to Richard Treon’s declaration. See

(id.) (citing “See Declaration of undersigned counsel, PSOFE, ¶1, Ex. E, ¶18,” this citation is 

found at Doc. 86-3 at 8 ¶ 18). Richard Treon’s declaration does not discuss this statement by 

Breeser. Assuming, arguendo, that Breeser’s statement created an issue of material fact, 

evidently Plaintiffs expect the Court to cull through Breeser’s seventy page declaration (Doc. 

86-1 at 1-70) to determine whether she in fact made the statement. 

 The non-movant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 

doubt as to the material facts” by “com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is 

a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586–87. Plaintiffs did invoke the 

discovery rule in the Response. See (Doc. 81 at 8). Plaintiffs, however, make the conclusory 

statement that the discovery rule governs the statute of limitations, therefore, a genuine issue 

of material fact exists. (Id.). Plaintiffs’ conclusory statement is not enough. Plaintiffs have 

not proffered sufficient evidence to establish that the discovery rule applies to determining 

when Breeser was terminated. See Logerquist, 932 P.2d at 284. Plaintiffs have proffered no 

competent evidence that would justify a trial. See id. 

 The Court finds there is no genuine dispute as to the material fact that Breeser was 

terminated on March 1, 2009. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ wrongful termination claim is barred by 

the one year statute of limitations under Arizona law because Plaintiffs filed suit on March 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 12 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 13 - 

15, 2010. Consequently, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the 

wrongful termination claim in Count One of the Amended Complaint. 

 2. Prima Facie Case of Wrongful Termination 

The Court need not address whether Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case for 

wrongful termination because Plaintiffs’ wrongful termination claim is barred by the statute 

of limitations as discussed above, see supra Section II.A.1, and the claim is summarily 

dismissed. 

B. Plaintiffs’ Defamation Claim 

 In the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ 

defamation claim should also be summarily dismissed. (Doc. 74 at 2-3). In the Amended 

Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants defamed Breeser by “stat[ing] to third parties 

matters that were false, which they knew to be false, and which directly injured the 

reputation of [ ] [ ] Breeser.” (Doc. 20 at 20 ¶ 30). The Court finds six statements at issue 

under Plaintiffs’ defamation claim: 

 Statement 1, is the statement Hubble allegedly made regarding Breeser to Tammy 

Patrick (“Patrick”), a parent of a student, in February 2009. In response to Patrick’s 

question, “did she quit?” Hubble responded “yes.” (Doc. 74 at 13). 

 Statement 2, is the statement Patrick allegedly overheard Hubble make to Ken 

Carwell (“Carwell”), President of the Board of Directors, in April 2009. Patrick alleges that 

she heard Hubble say to Carwell while laughing, “I don’t think [Breeser] realizes that she is 

such a bitch.” (Id. at 14). 

 Statement 3, is the statement Carwell allegedly made to Patrick in April 2009 that 

Breeser “quit.” (Id.). 

 Statement 4, is the statement that Elizabeth Conran (“Conran”), Secretary of the 

Board of Directors and member of the management team for SES, allegedly made to Don 

Houston (“Houston”), former principal and Breeser’s supervisor, that “[Breeser] never could 

handle the job anyway.” (Id.). 

 Statement 5, is a statement made by unidentified agents of Defendants, on an 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 13 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 14 - 

unidentified date, to Miriam Curchitser (“Curchitser”), an elementary teacher at SWEC, that 

Breeser “quit and abandoned” her job. (Doc. 81 at 16) (citing PSOFE, ¶3, Ex. C.). 

 Statement 6, is an unidentified statement or statements made by unidentified 

Defendants to unidentified prospective employers on an unidentified date regarding the 

circumstances of Breeser’s employment and termination. (Doc. 20 at 20 ¶ 30). 

 For the following reasons, the Court finds none of these statements factually support 

Plaintiffs’ defamation claim and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. “A 

defamation action compensates damage to reputation or good name caused by the publication 

of false information. To be defamatory, a publication must be false and must bring the 

defamed person into disrepute, contempt, or ridicule, or must impeach plaintiff’s honesty, 

integrity, virtue, or reputation.” Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 787 

(Ariz. 1989) (citations omitted). The tort of defamation includes libel and slander. 50 Am. 

Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 1 (2013). Libel is the publication of defamatory statements by 

written or printed words. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568 (1977). Slander is the 

publication of defamatory statements by spoken words. Id. 

 1. Statements 1 and 4 are Barred by the Statute of Limitations 

 Under Arizona law, the statute of limitations for a defamation claim is one year and 

is found in A.R.S. § 12–541(1). This statute provides, in part: 

There shall be commenced and prosecuted within one year after the 

cause of action accrues, and not afterward, the following actions: 

1. For . . . injuries done to the character or reputation of another by 

liable or slander. 

A.R.S. § 12–541(1). As a general rule, Arizona’s defamation rule provides that a defamation 

action accrues—and the statute of limitations begins to run—upon publication of the 

defamatory statement. Boatman v. Samaritan Health Servs., Inc., 812 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 1990) (citing Lim v. Superior Court in and for Pima Cnty., 616 P.2d 941, 942 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 1980). 

 Defendants argue that alleged Statements 1 and 4 are barred by the statute of 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 14 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 15 - 

limitations because there is no dispute that Statement 1 was made in February 20093

, 

Statement 4 was made prior to March 1, 20094

, and Plaintiffs filed suit over one year later on 

March 15, 2010. (Doc. 74 at 14). Plaintiffs argue that the discovery rule applies because 

Breeser did not learn of the statements until after March 15, 2009. (Doc. 81 at 13). 

 “[T]he ‘discovery rule’ [ ] holds that when defamatory statements are published in a 

manner in which they were peculiarly likely to be concealed from the plaintiff, the cause of 

action accrues when the plaintiff discovers the statements or reasonably should have 

discovered them.” Carey v. Maricopa Cnty., CV-05-2500-PHX-ROS, 2009 WL 750220, at 

*6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2009) (citing Clark v. Airesearch Mfg. Co. of Ariz., Inc., a Div. of 

Garrett Corp., 673 P.2d 984, 986 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)). “However, Arizona cases have 

applied the discovery rule exceedingly sparingly” in defamation claims. Id. (noting that “the 

discovery rule has been found to apply in only one case, a case decided under A.R.S. § 12-

821.01 rather than A.R.S. § 12.541.”). In Clark, the court cited cases from Illinois, Texas, 

Washington, and California, in finding that the discovery rule did not extend to cases where 

remarks were not made in an “inherently secret or confidential matter.” 673 P.2d at 987; see 

also Carey, 2009 WL 750220 at *6 (emphasizing that defamatory remarks must be published 

in an inherently secret or confidential matter). “Clandestine” remarks are not enough. 

Carey, 2009 WL 750220 at *7. “Remarks made among co-workers and their associates are 

simply not the sort of defamation that comes under the scope of the discovery rule. That rule 

is limited to things which are, by actual rule of confidentiality or privacy, inaccessible to the 

wronged party.” Id.

 In this case, neither Statement 1 nor 4 were inaccessible to Breeser because of the 

rule of confidentiality or privacy. Statement 1 is the answer Breeser’s former co-worker 

gave the parent of a student when asked a question—Hubble allegedly said “yes” in answer 

 

3

 As Plaintiffs admit in their controverting statement of facts, “[i]n February of 2009 

[Patrick] specifically asked where was Mrs. Breeser, and [Patrick] was told she was no 

longer with [SES]. [Patrick] said, ‘What happened? Did she quit?’ And [Hubble] goes, ‘Yes, 

she did.’” (Doc. 85 at 84 ¶ 61). 

4

 As Plaintiffs admit in their controverting statement of facts, “[t]his conversation occurred 

prior to Mr. Houston’s termination on March 1, 2009.” (Doc. 85 at 91 ¶ 66). 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 15 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 16 - 

to Patrick’s question whether Breeser quit. Statement 4 is the comment made among 

Breeser’s former co-workers, which Conran made to Houston, stating Breeser “never could 

handle the job anyway.” These remarks may have been clandestine, but they were not made 

in an inherently confidential matter. Accordingly, the Court finds the discovery rule does not 

apply to toll the statute of limitations for these allegedly defamatory remarks. Therefore, 

Plaintiffs are barred from seeking damages for these remarks because Plaintiffs failed to 

make their claim within one year of the remarks being made. 

 2. Statement 2 is not Defamatory 

Statement 2 is the comment Patrick allegedly overheard Hubble make to Carwell, 

that Breeser was a “bitch.” Statements that are opinion or hyperbole cannot support a claim 

for slander. Burns v. Davis, 993 P.2d 1119, 1129 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); Donahoe v. Arpaio, 

869 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1062 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“Statements of rhetorical hyperbole are not 

actionable as ‘[t]he law provides no redress for harsh name-calling.’”) (quoting Flowers v. 

Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)). Only statements which may be reasonably 

interpreted as factual assertions, not simply statements of opinion, are actionable as 

defamation. Donahoe, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (citing Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 

979, 986 (9th Cir. 2002)). “To determine whether a statement can be reasonably interpreted 

as a factual assertion, a court ‘must examine the totality of the circumstances in which it was 

made.’” Id. (quoting Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia, 69 F.3d 361, 366 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

“The issue of whether an allegedly defamatory statement constitutes fact or opinion is a 

question of law for the court to decide.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 314 F.3d at 985). “Where 

the allegedly defamatory statement could ‘reasonably be construed as either fact or opinion, 

the issue should be resolved by a jury.’” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 314 F.3d at 985–86). 

 In this case, this alleged statement is clearly an opinion expressed by Hubble. The 

statement was allegedly made after Breeser was fired in April 2009. There is nothing more 

to the statement than the harsh moniker that Hubble used to describe Breeser that could lead 

the Court to find this statement was a factual assertion. Plaintiffs extrapolate from Hubble’s 

statement that it is more than merely an opinion. Plaintiffs argue that the context in which 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 16 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 17 - 

Hubble made the statement makes it defamatory because it “could have caused Ms. Patrick 

to believe that Plaintiff must have been incompetent in her job and a liar to boot because why 

else would her employer think such of her?” (Doc. 81 at 18). The Court finds the same 

argument could be made in defamation claims about almost any expressed opinion. An 

opinion is almost always based on the perception of the speaker. The law, however, has 

made no allowance for merely stating an opinion as the sole basis of a defamation claim. 

“[O]bscenities, vulgarities, insults, epithets, name-calling, and other forms of verbal abuse 

are insufficient to raise a claim for defamation.” Foroughi v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., CV-10-

506-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 2231931, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2010) (citing Flowers, 310 F.3d 

at 1127). 

 In Foroughi, the plaintiff alleged a co-worker called her “bitch,” “idiot,” and 

“slacker.” Id. This Court found such name-calling, while offensive, does not give rise to a 

cause of action for defamation under Arizona law. Id. In this case, Plaintiffs have cited no 

case that supports their argument for an exception to this rule. Accordingly, the Court finds 

this statement by Hubble was not defamatory. 

 3. Statement 3 does not Qualify as Slander per se 

 Statement 3 is the statement that Carwell made to Patrick in April 2009, when he told 

her Breeser had “quit.” Plaintiffs argue that this statement is slander per se. (Doc. 81 at 16). 

“As a general rule, slander Per quod is not actionable unless special damages are pleaded and 

proved.” Modla v. Parker, 495 P.2d 494, 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (citing Berg v. 

Hohenstein, 479 P.2d 730, 732 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971)). “However, slander Per se is 

actionable without a need to plead or prove special damages if the utterance falls within one 

or more specified categories . . . .” Id. “An utterance is slander Per se when its publication 

charges a contagious or venereal disease, or charges that a woman is not chaste, or tends to 

injure a person in his profession, trade or business, or imputes the commission of a crime 

involving moral turpitude.” Id. at 496 n. 1 (citations omitted). Damages in these cases are 

assumed. Id. at 496. 

 Oral slander which concerns one in her profession, trade or business is the category 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 17 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 18 - 

which Breeser relies upon in support of her contention that Carwell’s statement was slander 

per se and therefore a genuine issue of material fact exists for the jury; that is, whether the 

statement made by Carwell in fact injured Breeser in her profession. (Doc. 81 at 16). 

 In order to fit within the business category, the slanderous 

utterance must prejudice the person in the profession, trade or 

business in which he is actually engaged. This means that the 

statement must be of or concerning one in his business capacity. 

Words which are merely injurious to one regardless of his 

occupation do not qualify as slander Per se. 

Modla, 495 P.2d at 496-96 (citations omitted). As the Restatement (Second) of Torts 

explains5

, 

Disparaging words, to be actionable per se under the rule [for 

slanderous imputations affecting conduct of business, trade, or 

profession], must affect the plaintiff in some way which is 

peculiarly harmful to one engaged in his trade or profession. 

Disparagement of a general character, equally discreditable to 

all persons, is not enough unless the particular quality 

disparaged is of such a character that it is peculiarly valuable in 

the plaintiff’s business or profession. . . . . Thus, a statement that 

a physician consorts with harlots is not actionable per se 

although a charge that he makes improper advances to his 

patients is actionable; the one statement does not affect his 

reputation as a physician whereas the other does so affect it. 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573 cmt e (1977) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court 

must determine if Carwell’s statement, that Breeser “quit,” disparages a quality that is 

“peculiarly valuable” to Breeser’s profession of being a school administrator. 

 Plaintiffs argue that Hirsch v. Cooper, 737 P.2d 1092 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), is 

controlling. (Doc. 81 at 15-16). In Hirsch, the defendant doctor told a representative of a 

 

5

 “In the absence of controlling statutory or case authority, Arizona courts generally 

follow the Restatement of the Law on a particular subject if its position, as applied to the 

claim at issue, ‘is logical, furthers the interests of justice, is consistent with Arizona law and 

policy, and has been generally acknowledged elsewhere.’” Freeman v. Sorchych, 245 P.3d 

927, 932 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011), review denied (Aug. 31, 2011) (quoting Ramirez v. Health 

Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 665 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998)). “Further, Arizona courts 

routinely look to guidance from courts of other states on matters of first impression. Id. 

(citing Tritschler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 144 P.3d 519, 527 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006)). 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 18 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 19 - 

foundation selecting physicians to treat foundation beneficiaries regarding plaintiff, “Neil 

Hirsch, I wouldn’t send my dog or cat to him.” 737 P.2d at 1094, disapproved on other 

grounds by Godbehere, 783 P.2d 781. The plaintiff brought a defamation claim against the 

doctor under the argument that this statement was slander per se because the statement 

regarded his profession and referrals from the foundation dropped in a dramatic fashion after 

the comment was made. Id. at 1095. The court agreed, and found the doctor’s remark was 

peculiar to being a doctor and was “a statement which tend[ed] to injure a person in his 

profession,” and therefore it was slander per se. Id. By contrast, in Modla v. Parker, the 

court concluded that the statement, “do me a favor and see a psychiatrist,” purportedly made 

to a patient by a hospital administrator, “clearly d[id] not pertain to [the patient] in any 

business capacity” and thus did not constitute slander per se. 495 P.2d at 495, 497. 

 Plaintiffs contend that Breeser’s “entire career was tied to providing care to special 

needs children” and Carwell’s comment that she “quit” “could be found by the trier of fact to 

be damaging to [Breeser] in her profession.” (Doc. 81 at 16). Defendants cite various 

jurisdictions which have explicitly held that falsely telling a third party that a claimant “quit” 

or “resigned” is not slander per se. (Doc. 90 at 10) (citing Ferguson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 

CIV.A. H-09-4114, 2011 WL 1485680, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2011); Springer v. 

Physician Sales & Serv., 16940, 1998 WL 543743, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 28, 1998)). 

Further, Defendants argue Hirsch is not controlling because Carwell’s comment was not 

directly related to Breeser’s professional ability. (Id. at 11). 

 The Court finds the generic statement, that Breeser “quit,” is not peculiarly valuable 

to Breeser’s profession, any more so than the statement would be to any other profession. In 

Hirsch, the statement “I wouldn’t send my cat or dog to him,” directly related to the 

plaintiff’s ability to care for patients. This statement was slander per se because the plaintiff 

was a doctor and disparaging remarks about sending patients to a physician is peculiarly 

valuable to the profession. See Hirsch, 737 P.2d at 1095. Unlike this statement in Hirsch, 

merely making the statement that Breeser “quit,” even if made falsely, did not have the 

required unique relation to Breeser’s ability to perform her job as a school administrator. 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 19 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 20 - 

Further, other courts have found that factually similar situations do not support claims of 

slander per se. Therefore, the Court finds Statement 3 does not qualify as slander per se 

under Arizona law and does not support Plaintiffs’ defamation claim. 

 4. Statement 5 is not Supported by the Record

 Statement 5 is a statement Curchitser made in her declaration. (Doc. 86-2 at 12-14). 

Plaintiffs state in their Response that Curchitser said in her declaration that she was told by 

unidentified agents of Defendants that “[Breeser] had quit and abandoned her job.” (Doc. 81 

at 16). Curchitser’s declaration (Doc. 86-2 at 12-14) is found in the PSOFE (Doc. 86). 

 Statement 5 is not supported by citation to the record and will not be considered. 

First, Plaintiffs do not claim that this statement made by Curchitser is the basis for any part 

of their defamation claim. Plaintiffs merely argue that Curchitser’s statement corroborates 

Statement 1. (Doc. 81 at 16). 

 Second, Plaintiffs citation to Curchitser’s declaration and the PSOFE fails to comply 

with LRCiv 56.1(b). As the Court explained above, see supra Section I.A.1, the PSOFE fails 

to lay out additional facts in separately numbered paragraphs in accordance with LRCiv 

56.1(b). LRCiv 56.1(b) further requires that additional facts be supported by admissible 

portions of the record. While the effect on the Court, of Plaintiffs’ failure to put this 

additional fact in a separately numbered paragraph, could be somewhat mitigated if Plaintiffs 

had properly cited to the record in the Response, Plaintiffs cite the wrong part of the record 

for Curchitser’s statement in the Response. In the Response, Plaintiffs cite “PSOFE, ¶3, Ex. 

C.” as the support for Curchitser’s statement. (Doc. 81 at 16). However, Exhibit C, the third 

exhibit attached to the PSOFE, is not even Curchitser’s declaration. Exhibit C of the PSOFE 

is the declaration of Sabastian Davis. (Doc. 86-2 at 7-10). Curchitser’s declaration is 

Exhibit D to the PSOFE. (Doc. 86-2 at 12-14). Further, neither “¶3” of Exhibit C nor 

Exhibit D is a statement made by Curchitser regarding Breeser’s termination. 

 Even if Plaintiffs had properly cited to the record, all the information Plaintiffs have 

given in the Response is that statements were made by “agents of Defendants” to Curchitser 

that Breeser had quit and abandoned her job. (Doc. 81 at 16). Plaintiffs establish neither 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 20 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 21 - 

who made the statement nor when the statement was made. The facts Plaintiffs have given 

in the Response are not enough to establish a genuine issue for trial and Plaintiffs fail to 

direct the Court to additional facts to bolster their claim. 

 The Court is left to fend for itself and pick through the record to establish Plaintiffs’ 

claim with no citation to an admissible portion of the record where Curchitser made this 

statement.6

 Accordingly, the Court will not consider Curchitser’s statement for purposes of 

Plaintiffs’ defamation claim. 

 5. Statement 6 is not Supported by the Record 

 Statement 6 is the unidentified statement or statements made to prospective 

employers about Breeser’s termination. Plaintiffs only reference this vague claim once in 

their pleadings, which is in the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 20 at 20 ¶ 30). Plaintiffs do not 

address this statement in their Response (Doc. 81) or establish any facts supporting this claim 

in their controverting statement of facts (Doc. 85). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not 

established that there is any issue of fact, or any facts that exist, with regard to this claim. 

Therefore, the Court finds this statement is unsupported by facts and does not justify 

Plaintiffs’ defamation claim. 

 In summary, in considering Plaintiffs’ defamation claim based on these six 

Statements, the Court finds Plaintiffs have not “come forward with [admissible and] ‘specific 

 

6

 The Court notes Plaintiffs likely intended to cite ¶ 8 of Curchitser’s declaration. 

(Doc. 86-2 at 13-14 ¶ 8). This statement by Curchitser merely says Hubble and Carwell told 

Curchitser on two different occasions in December 2008 that Breeser had “resigned.” (Id. at 

13 ¶ 8). Even if Plaintiffs properly cited the record and the Court were to consider 

Curchitser’s declaration, the Court would dismiss the defamation claim for the following 

reasons. 

 First, as discussed above, see supra Section II.B.1, these statements by Hubble and 

Carwell are barred from consideration by the statute of limitations because they were made 

in December 2008, over one year prior to Plaintiffs filing suit. 

 Second, even if these statements were not barred by the statute of limitations, merely 

saying Breeser “quit” or “resigned” does not rise to the level of slander per se and does not 

support a claim for defamation, as discussed above, see supra Section II.B.3. 

 Finally, unlike Plaintiffs’ Response asserts, Hubble and Carwell did not tell 

Curchitser that Breeser had “abandoned her job.” (Doc. 81 at 16). While the difference 

could be argued to merely be an issue of semantics, this point underscores the purpose of 

LRCiv 56.1(b). If Plaintiffs want the Court to rely on the arguments made in their briefs, 

Plaintiffs are advised to ensure additional facts are actually supported by the record and the 

record is properly cited. This is especially true in a claim for defamation where the claim 

relies on what Defendants actually said about Breeser. 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 21 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 22 - 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586–87. 

Defendants have shown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the facts 

do not support Plaintiffs’ defamation claim. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law on the defamation claim in Count Five of the Amended Complaint. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

C. Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Actions 

 Counsel’s egregious abuse of the clear mandate in LRCiv 56.1(b) is a glaring 

example of the kind of conduct that needlessly drives up the cost and time of litigation. 

Specifically, Counsel has proffered a ninety-two page controverting statement of facts (Doc. 

85) that attempts to subvert the seventeen page limit of responsive pleadings dictated by 

LRCiv 7.2(e)(1). Plaintiffs’ controverting statement of facts continually makes arguments 

properly asserted in their response and adds additional facts without a single heading or 

separate numbered paragraph. Further, Counsel has proffered a separate statement of facts 

setting out additional facts (the PSOFE, Doc. 86) that is nothing more than a list of five 

attachments also devoid of a single separate paragraph listing these additional facts. 

 Between the ninety-two pages of argument in the controverting statement of facts and 

the one-hundred and fifty-three pages of attachments that constitute Plaintiffs’ additional 

facts, it appears to the Court as though Counsel endeavored to obfuscate the relevant material 

facts in this case in an attempt to bolster Plaintiffs’ claim that there is a disputed fact, 

somewhere, precluding summary judgment. Counsel then leaves it to the Court to find what 

that fact is and where that fact is located. Counsel is reminded, as explained above, see 

supra Section I.A.2, “[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” Indep. 

Towers of Wash., 350 F.3d at 929 (citing Dunkel, 927 F.2d at 956). 

// 

// 

// 

// 

// 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 22 of 23
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

- 23 - 

III. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 74) is 

granted. The two remaining claims from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Doc. 20), 

Plaintiffs’ wrongful termination and defamation claims, are summarily dismissed. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in 

favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs, with Plaintiffs to take nothing. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall close this case. 

 Dated this 21st day of March, 2013. 

Case 2:10-cv-01592-JAT Document 91 Filed 03/21/13 Page 23 of 23