Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02772/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02772-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 462
Nature of Suit: Naturalization, Petition For Hearing of Denial
Cause of Action: 8:1446 Petition for Naturalization Hearing

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

VALENTINA S. MAXWELL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ERIC S. HOLDER, JR., et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-02772-TLN-AC 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 On May 6, 2015, the court held a hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Valentina S. Maxwell appeared in pro per and Audrey 

B. Hemesath appeared for defendants. On review of the motions, the documents filed in support 

and opposition, hearing the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, THE 

COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS: 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiff was admitted to the United States on September 9, 2009, on a student visa. ECF 

No. 19-1 at 3. Shortly after her arrival in California, plaintiff was told by her family in Russia 

that her previous marriage had been declared void. ECF No. 22 at 3. Having learned that her 

marriage was no longer valid, she married Ryan Maxwell, a U.S. citizen, on November 21, 2009. 

Id. Her status was adjusted to conditional legal permanent resident on October 12, 2010. 

No. 19-1 at 3. Plaintiff applied for naturalization in July 2013. ECF No. 19 at 3; ECF No. 1 at 2. 

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On October 18, 2013, plaintiff was interviewed for and ultimately passed her naturalization test. 

ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff was scheduled to attend her U.S. Citizenship Oath Ceremony on 

November 26, 2013, but two days prior she received a call informing her that her ceremony had 

been canceled. Id. It seems that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) suspected 

that her current marriage was invalid because she was already married, making her ineligible for 

naturalization. See id. at 2–3. 

On November 27, 2013, plaintiff received a Request for Evidence (“RFE”), id., which is 

an administrative document USCIS issues when the existing record does not establish the 

applicant’s entitlement to naturalization, ECF No. 19 at 3. Plaintiff responded to USCIS’s letter 

on November 30, 2013. ECF No. 1 at 2. On March 20, 2014, two USCIS officers visited 

plaintiff at home to search the residence and ask her questions regarding her application and 

background. Id. In May 2014, plaintiff submitted additional documentation in support of her 

application, including a Russian court decision invalidating her marriage to her former husband. 

Id. 

Over a year later, USCIS had yet to decide on plaintiff’s naturalization application. Id. 

Accordingly, on November 25, 2014, plaintiff filed her complaint in this court. ECF No. 1. The 

complaint seeks judicial review of plaintiff’s naturalization application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(b), which permits district court jurisdiction where USCIS fails to act on an application 

within 120 days of the interview. ECF No. 1 at 1. On December 3, 2014, the court granted 

plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 3. On December 18, 2014, USCIS 

referred plaintiff into removal proceedings. ECF No. 19 at 3. 

On March 2, 2015, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. ECF 

No. 19. Relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1429, defendants argue that the pendency of removal proceedings 

bars action on plaintiff’s naturalization application and thus renders this matter moot. Id. At 4. 

Defendants also argue, in the alternative, that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6) because she cannot allege facts showing she is entitled to relief in light of § 1429. Id. 

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On March 15, 2015, plaintiff filed a self-styled motion for summary judgment that responds to 

defendants’ motion to dismiss.1 ECF No. 22. Plaintiff’s motion argues that there are no disputed 

issues of material fact in this matter, as she has already established that she is entitled to 

naturalization by submitting proof that her previous marriage was invalidated by the Russian 

courts. ECF No. 22 at 3–4. Plaintiff also argues that this court has exclusive jurisdiction over her 

application and accordingly, USCIS’s efforts to refer her to removal proceedings on December 

18, 2014, were improper. Id. Because plaintiff’s motion both argues she is entitled to summary 

judgment and responds to defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court construes it as a motion for 

summary judgment and opposition. 

On March 19, 2015, defendants filed a reply to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 

and opposition, arguing that plaintiff misunderstands the governing statutory scheme. ECF 

No. 25. On March 25, 2015, plaintiff filed a reply to defendants’ opposition. ECF No. 26. On 

April 13, 2015, plaintiff filed a self-styled response, requesting that the court not grant any more 

requests by defendants to continue this matter. ECF No. 30. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

The court must dismiss an action if it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 

Rule 12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a party may assert the defense of a 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction by motion. Where a defendant challenges subject matter 

jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), “the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in 

order to survive the motion .” Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., LLC v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 

1197 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Tosco Corp. v. Comtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th 

Cir. 2001)). 

 

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 Plaintiff’s motion also requests that the court take judicial notice of a number of documents 

attached to her motion as exhibits. ECF No. 22 at 2 (listing twelve documents attached as 

exhibits), 12–13 (describing the exhibits in detail). A court may take judicial notice of facts “not 

subject to reasonable dispute” because they are either “(1) generally known within the territorial 

jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. The court finds 

after reviewing plaintiff’s list of exhibits that they are not relevant to its analysis of defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff’s request for judicial notice. 

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The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 

578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). Thus, a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the court’s ability to grant any relief 

on the plaintiff’s claims, even if the plaintiff’s allegations are true. 

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the 

court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. 

United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also consider 

facts which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 

(9th Cir. 1987), and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed 

with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). The 

court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” W. Mining 

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

DISCUSSION 

For the reasons explained below, the undersigned rejects defendants’ contentions that this 

court has been divested of jurisdiction and that the case is moot. However, the statutory scheme 

governing naturalization and removal proceedings clearly precludes this court from granting the 

relief requested by the complaint. Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed for failing to 

state a claim entitling plaintiff to relief. 

I. Statutory Framework 

As amended in 1990, the Immigration and Naturalization Act vests all authority to 

naturalize in the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a); Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 

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1045 (9th Cir. 2004). When an immigrant applies for citizenship, an employee of the United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) conducts an investigation, examines the 

applicant, and makes a determination whether the application should be granted or denied. 

8 U.S.C. § 1446. If the application is denied, the applicant may request a hearing before an 

immigration officer. § 1447(a). 

The statute also provides for judicial review of denials of naturalization: 

A person whose application for naturalization under this subchapter 

is denied, after a hearing before an immigration officer under 

section 1447(a) of this Title, may seek review of such denial before 

the United States district court for the district in which such person 

resides in accordance with chapter 7 of Title 5. Such review shall 

be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and 

conclusions of law and shall, at the request of the petitioner, 

conduct a hearing de novo on the application. 

8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). 

 The district courts have jurisdiction over naturalization applications in one other limited 

situation. When USCIS fails to render a decision on an application within 120 days of the 

examination required by § 1446, 

the applicant may apply to the United States district court for the 

district in which the applicant resides for a hearing on the matter. 

Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either 

determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate 

instructions, to the Service to determine the matter. 

8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). 

 With limited exceptions not relevant here, removal proceedings come within the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); Reno v. American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999).2

 A finding of removability defeats an 

application for naturalization, and the pendency of removal proceedings prevents consideration of 

an application for naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1429. Section 1429 provides in pertinent part: 

/// 

 

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 The district courts may entertain actions to enforce constitutional rights in the deportation 

process, but may not generally review the merits of removal proceedings. Franco-Gonzales v. 

Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 

1052 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

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Except as otherwise provided in this title, no person shall be 

naturalized unless he has been lawfully admitted to the United 

States for permanent residence in accordance with all applicable 

provisions of this Act. The burden of proof shall be upon such 

person to show that he entered the United States lawfully. . . [N]o 

person shall be naturalized against whom there is outstanding a 

final finding of deportability pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued 

under the provisions of this or any other Act; and no application for 

naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there 

is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a 

warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this or any other 

Act: Provided, That the findings of the Attorney General in 

terminating removal proceedings or in canceling the removal of an 

alien pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall not be deemed 

binding in any way upon the Attorney General with respect to the 

question of whether such person has established his eligibility for 

naturalization as required by this title. 

 “The natural reading of this statute is that removal proceedings and final removal orders 

are to take precedence over naturalization applications.” Perdomo-Padilla v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 

964, 970 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the pendency of a naturalization application does not 

defeat removability or prevent removal proceedings. Id. (“. . .§1429 allows the removal of 

individuals with pending naturalization applications. . .”). Absent certain circumstances 

supporting termination of the removal proceedings by the immigration judge, “the removal 

hearing shall be completed as promptly as possible notwithstanding the pendency of an 

application for naturalization. . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f); see Hernandez de Anderson v. Gonzales, 

497 F.3d 927, 933 (9th Cir. 2007). 

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

The government contends that “[t]he bar of § 1429 defeats jurisdiction under § 1447(b).” 

ECF No. 19 at 4. The Ninth Circuit, however, has expressly rejected the theory that § 1429 

divests the district courts of jurisdiction over naturalization matters where otherwise provided by 

statute. Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d at 1046 (agreeing with Sixth Circuit that pendency of 

removal proceedings does not strip district court of jurisdiction, but limits its ability to provide 

relief). Bellajaro involved judicial review under § 1421(c), but there is no reason the result 

should not be the same where the district court’s jurisdiction arises under § 1447(b). See 

Meraz v. Comfort, No. 05 C 1094, 2006 WL 861859, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2006) (collecting 

cases). 

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As the Ninth Circuit held in Bellajaro, § 1429 limits the scope of judicial review and the 

remedies the district court is authorized to provide. It does not, however, divest this court of 

jurisdiction where removal proceedings are pending. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss should 

not be granted on jurisdictional grounds. 

III. Mootness 

The government argues next that because § 1429 prevents consideration of plaintiff’s 

naturalization application during the pendency of removal proceedings, the case is moot. 

Mootness is a justiciability doctrine that applies where changed circumstances undermine the 

plaintiff’s standing. United States Parole Commn. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) 

(quoting Henry Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 

1384 (1973)). Generally, a claim is moot when changes in circumstances forestall any chance of 

meaningful relief. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The undersigned is unpersuaded that mootness doctrine provides the appropriate 

framework for analyzing the matter at bar. The pending removal proceedings currently prevent 

plaintiff from obtaining naturalization, but they do not necessary mean that she will be 

adjudicated removable and thus ineligible for naturalization. While removal (or a removability 

finding) would undoubtedly moot this case by rendering plaintiff ineligible for naturalization, 

relief under § 1447(b) will be available if removal proceedings are resolved in plaintiff’s favor. 

The Article III “case and controversy” presented by the complaint arises from USCIS’s failure to 

adjudicate plaintiff’s naturalization application – a circumstance that has not changed. 

Accordingly, the problem plaintiff faces is not that her claim is moot but that this court 

may not grant relief so long as the removal proceedings remain pending. See Klene v. 

Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that an ongoing case or controversy exited 

between a naturalization applicant and USCIS despite the pendency of removal proceedings). As 

counsel for the government pointed out at the hearing on the motion, this is a process which can 

take years. The court therefore turns to the question whether the complaint presents a claim on 

which relief can be granted. 

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IV. Failure to State A Claim 

Because plaintiff is currently facing removal proceedings, the Attorney General may not 

further consider or act upon her naturalization application. 8 U.S.C. § 1429. Accordingly, this 

court cannot remand with instructions to grant the application, or with instructions to promptly act 

upon the application. These are the only forms of relief that this court would be authorized to 

provide absent application of § 1429. See § 1447(b). In the analogous context of judicial review 

under § 1421(c), district courts have concluded that the pendency of removal proceedings 

precludes relief and supports dismissal for failure to state claim. See Omo v. Barrett, 

No. 11-04975, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20921 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Breyer, J.); Fayard v. 

Napolitano, No. 10-1109, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43738 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (Benitez, J.); Chen v. 

Holder, No. 10-00291, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72418 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (Fogel, J.); Aye Aye 

Kyi v. Chertoff, No. 08-03383, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98574 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (White, J.). The 

same result is appropriate here. 

Plaintiff argues that the removal proceedings may not stand in the way of her lawsuit 

because removal was wrongfully initiated. Plaintiff contends that the filing of her complaint 

under § 1447(b) vested exclusive jurisdiction over her immigration status in this court, depriving 

USCIS of authority to pursue removal. In support of this proposition, plaintiff cites United 

States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), which holds inter alia that 

federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over naturalization applications once a judicial 

determination is sought under § 1447(b). In Hovsepian, the Ninth Circuit rejected USCIS’s 

contention that it retained concurrent jurisdiction and could consider and decide naturalization 

applications even after a petition for review had been filed. Id. at 1159–61. That holding does 

not affect the authority of the Attorney General to initiate removal proceedings, which are distinct 

from naturalization applications. While it is true that USCIS lost jurisdiction over plaintiff’s 

naturalization application when she filed her complaint in this court, its independent authority to 

initiate removal was unaffected. 

Hovsepian also presented a claim by the government that the district court had erred under 

§ 1429 by considering a § 1447(b) naturalization claim during the pendency of removal 

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proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the district court was not precluded from 

adjudicating the naturalization issue, but that ruling was based on the fact that no removal 

proceedings were “pending” in that case because immigration authorities had not formally 

commenced such proceedings with the filing of a Notice to Appear. Id. at 1165. The Court of 

Appeals did not hold that USCIS lacks authority to initiate removal proceedings where the district 

court has jurisdiction over a § 1447(b) claim. See id. Here, in contrast to Hovsepian, USCIS did 

file a Notice to Appear. ECF No. 19-1. Accordingly, removal proceedings were formally 

commenced against plaintiff and § 1429 applies. 

The pendency of removal proceedings prevents naturalization, not the other way around. 

See Perdomo-Padilla, 333 F.3d at 970. Because removal proceedings are pending against 

plaintiff, this court may not grant any relief. Because no relief may be granted, dismissal is 

appropriate. Dismissal should be without prejudice to refiling if and when removal proceedings 

conclude in plaintiff’s favor. 

CONCLUSION 

In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 19, be GRANTED and plaintiff’s 

complaint be dismissed without prejudice; and 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and request for judicial notice, ECF 

No. 22, be DENIED as moot. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also E.D. 

Local Rule 304(b). Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court 

and served on all parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. E.D. Local Rule 

304(d). Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

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District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 

951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: May 15, 2015 

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