Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00536/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00536-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD LEROY SNOW,

Plaintiff(s),

CASE NO. 14cv536-LAB (BLM)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

vs. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

DANIEL PARAMO,

Defendant(s).

On March 10, 2014, Petitioner Edward Snow, a prisoner in state custody, filed his

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Snow is currently in state

custody following his conviction for first degree murder committed during a robbery. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 , this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Barbara Major for report and recommendation. On September 9, 2014, Judge Major

issued her report and recommendation, recommending that the petition be denied. Snow

filed objections.

A district court has jurisdiction to review a Magistrate Judge's report and

recommendation on dispositive matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). “The district judge must

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly

objected to.” Id. (emphasis added) “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). The Court is required to review only those portions of the R&R to which specific

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objections have been made. United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.

2003) (en banc).

Snow’s objections purport to incorporate by reference his entire traverse, and ask the

Court to review the entire case, and find the “conflict[s] and inconsistencies in the

testimonies of Bo Lemler, Terry Taylor and James Myers.” (Obj. to R&R (Docket no. 11 at

2.) These objections are improper for two primary reasons. First, objections to the R&R must

be “specific” — a petitioner cannot simply object to the R&R as a whole, in generalized

terms. See United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 621 (4 Cir. 2007) (“Section 636(b)(1) th

does not countenance a form of generalized objection to cover all issues addressed by the

magistrate judge; it contemplates that a party's objection to a magistrate judge's report be

specific and particularized . . . ..” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). Second, the

Court is a neutral arbiter, and as such it cannot properly act as Snow’s advocate. Here, that

means it cannot accede to Snow’s request that it review the entire case, find inconsistencies

in the evidence, and create arguments for him. See Jacobson v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1365

(9th Cir.1986)) (“It is not for the trial court to inject itself into the adversary process on behalf

of one class of litigant.”) See also Donahue v. United States, 660 F.3d 523, 524 (1st

Cir.2011) (“The courts cannot assume the role of advocates and create arguments never

made.”)

Even assuming Snow’s reference to inconsistencies in the three witnesses’ testimony

amounted to a specific objection, and assuming the Court were to comb through the record

and locate inconsistencies, it would make no difference to the outcome. The one claim in his

petition (and indeed, the only claim he exhausted by raising it before the California Supreme

Court) is that the trial court denied his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 383 U.S.

83 (1963) by failing to disclose a fraud investigation against Lemler. Under Brady, the

suppression of evidence favorable to a defendant amounts to a constitutional error requiring

that a conviction be set aside, but only if the evidence is prejudicial or material. Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282–82 (1999). Materiality, in this context, refers to prejudice;

suppressed evidence is material if there is “reasonable probability that, had the evidence

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been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” or

if suppression “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.

419, 434 (1995) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). If a violation is

found, there is no need for further harmless error analysis. Kyles at 435. In other words,

materiality or prejudice is essential to a finding of a Brady violation. Suppression of

immaterial evidence is not a harmless Brady violation; rather, it is not a Brady violation at all. 

On federal habeas review, a state court’s determination that no Brady violation occurred

because of the immateriality of the suppressed evidence is reviewed only for

reasonableness. Towery v. Schriro, 641 F.3d 300, 310 (9 Cir., 2010) (upholding as

th

reasonable the state court’s finding that suppressed information was immaterial); 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). Reasonableness is a “high threshold” for a petitioner to surmount. Cullen v.

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1402–03 (2011). A petitioner must show that there was “no

reasonable basis” for the state court’s determination, and that fairminded jurists could not

agree with it. Id. at 1402. Under this high standard, federal courts will not issue writs of

habeas corpus merely because they would have reached a different decision or because the

state court determination is found to be incorrect or erroneous. Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d

711, 724–25 (9 Cir. 2014). th

The state courts found the suppressed evidence immaterial and nonprejudicial. (See

R&R, 10:4–10, 11:7-24 (citing California Court of Appeals’ decision)). The R&R discussed

the factual basis for this determination at length. (R&R, 12:17–16:9.)

Furthermore, even assuming there were conflicts or contradictions between the

testimony of Lemley, Taylor, and Myers, the state courts’ determinations were eminently

reasonable. In addition to other points fully covered in the R&R, the Court notes that the

evidence against Snow, even discounting any testimony that might have been impeached

by the suppressed evidence, powerfully pointed to Snow’s guilt.

Lemley was the owner of a towing business, where Taylor and Myers were

employees. Taylor and Myers testified that Snow told them about his plans to rob the

business where they all worked, and solicited their help. Both became his somewhat

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reluctant accomplices, and as of the time of his trial, both had pled guilty to voluntary

manslaughter for their part in the robbery. 

The robbery was committed on the day and at the time Snow had said it would, when

he knew Taylor and Myers would not be present and the business would be minimally

guarded. Both also testified that he warned them afterwards not to go to the police, and that

he had boasted about the robbery. Myers also testified that Snow had boasted about the

killing, saying the victim had “never seen it coming.” Their testimony was corroborated by cell

phone records. Lemley, the only witness whose testimony might have been impeached by

the undisclosed evidence, had no personal knowledge of those conversations, and any

conflict or contradiction between his testimony and theirs would have made no real

difference. 

Other evidence unrelated to Lemley’s testimony supported the conviction as well. For

example, the crime was committed in a manner suggesting it was committed by someone

with inside knowledge of the business. After the robbery, expensive new merchandise and

over $30,000 in small bills similar to those taken during the robbery were found in Snow’s

home; he had provided his family with a shaky explanation of how he acquired this money.

The state courts considered several other factors in addition to the compelling evidence of

guilt, such as defense counsel’s impeachment of Lemley through cross-examination. See

Towery, 641 F.3d at 310 (upholding as reasonable a state court’s determination that witness

was adequately impeached at trial, rendering the suppressed information immaterial).

For these reasons, Snow’s objections to the R&R are OVERRULED. The Court has

reviewed the R&R, finds it to be correct, and ADOPTS it. The petition is DENIED. Because

reasonable jurists would not find it debatable that the state courts’ determination meets the

“reasonableness” standard, a certificate of appealability is likewise DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 23, 2015

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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