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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

____________________ 

No. 20-2700 

RICKY PATTERSON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

FELICIA ADKINS, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 19-CV-2198 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 17, 2022 — DECIDED JANUARY 2, 2025 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and KIRSCH and JACKSONAKIWUMI, Circuit Judges. 

SYKES, Chief Judge. In 2003 an Illinois jury convicted Ricky 

Patterson of first-degree murder, arson, and felony concealment of a homicide in connection with the 2002 death of Derrick Prout. The crimes were set in motion when Patterson 

arranged to buy 30 pounds of marijuana from Prout in Champaign, Illinois. Prout went missing immediately after they met 

to complete the transaction. 

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The evidence against Patterson, though largely circumstantial, was characterized as “overwhelming” by the Illinois 

Supreme Court. People v. Patterson, 841 N.E.2d 889, 912 (Ill. 

2005) (“Patterson I”). The prosecution established that Patterson killed Prout while the two were at Patterson’s rented 

home in Champaign. He wrapped the body in a blanket, put 

it in the trunk of Prout’s car, then tried to clean the victim’s 

blood off his living-room carpet. When that failed, he set fire 

to his house in an attempt to destroy the evidence. Patterson 

then drove Prout’s car to a remote area northwest of Chicago

and left it in a field surrounded by trees, inaccessible except 

by an unmarked dirt road. Two days later Patterson (or perhaps an accomplice) returned and set the car on fire. Prout’s 

charred body, wrapped in the blanket from Patterson’s home, 

was found in the trunk of the burned car. DNA testing confirmed that the blood on the carpet in Patterson’s home was

Prout’s.

For these crimes Patterson was sentenced to 55 years in 

prison. The state supreme court affirmed the judgment. Id. at 

912–13. Patterson then filed a petition for state postconviction 

relief together with a motion for additional DNA testing. Protracted proceedings in state court followed. In July 2019—

more than 13 years after the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed 

the convictions on direct appeal—Patterson sought federal 

habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The one-year limitation

period had long-since expired even accounting for tolling

during the pendency of Patterson’s state postconviction petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), (d)(2). To overcome the 

time bar, Patterson invoked the exception for claims of actual 

innocence. The district court rejected his claim and dismissed 

the § 2254 petition as untimely. 

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No. 20-2700 3 

We affirm. Patterson’s § 2254 petition was more than six 

years late even with tolling for a properly filed state postconviction petition. And we agree with the district judge that Patterson’s claim of actual innocence falls far short of the 

necessary showing to qualify for this narrow gateway to merits review of an untimely § 2254 petition. 

I. Background

Our account of Patterson’s case comes from the record of 

his five-day trial and the additional proceedings in the Illinois 

trial, appellate, and supreme courts. The case has a labyrinthian factual and procedural history; we will simplify where 

possible. 

In June 2002 Ricky Patterson was living with his girlfriend 

Migdalia Rivera and their daughter in a rented house on the 

periphery of Champaign, Illinois. The house bordered acres 

of farmland and there were few neighbors. The couple shared 

a single cellphone that was registered to Rivera, but Patterson 

usually carried it; there was no landline phone in the home. 

At the time of the crimes, they were experiencing financial 

problems. They had not paid their rent for four months and 

were being evicted. On or about June 12, Patterson told the 

landlord that they would pay the $3,600 they owed in back 

rent and move out on June 22.

Derrick Prout, the murder victim, lived in Indianapolis 

with his wife Christa. He had lost his job and was selling 

drugs to supplement his unemployment benefits. Patterson 

was one of his customers. Phone records show that on June 

16, Patterson called Prout, and the two exchanged additional 

calls that day while Prout was driving back to Indianapolis 

from Chicago. Patterson arranged to buy a large quantity of 

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marijuana from Prout in Champaign the next day. Prout’s 

wife Christa later told police that Prout had already left their 

Indianapolis home for Champaign by the time she woke up 

on the morning of June 17. 

Prout had a girlfriend in Champaign named Candice 

Johnson, and he visited her on the afternoon of June 17 after 

arriving in town. But first he met with Patterson to finalize the 

terms of their planned drug transaction. They met at a shop 

in Champaign owned by Patterson’s brother, and Patterson

arranged to buy 30 pounds of marijuana from Prout for 

$16,000 later that evening. This was odd: a man who was 

$3,600 behind in rent was unlikely to have $16,000 to pay for 

a large distribution quantity of drugs. 

After the two men agreed on the terms of their transaction, 

Prout went to his girlfriend Candice’s apartment, arriving at 

about 4 p.m. He brought a duffel bag full of marijuana and 

hid it in her pantry. Candice later testified that she and Prout

went to dinner, returned to her apartment, and watched television until about 8 p.m. when Patterson arrived in his Chevrolet Blazer. Prout went outside and spoke with Patterson. He 

then returned to the apartment, retrieved the duffel bag full 

of marijuana, told Candice that he would be back later, and 

left in his maroon Dodge Intrepid. Patterson followed in his 

Blazer.

That was the last time anyone other than Patterson saw 

Prout alive. Cellphone records show calls between Prout and 

Patterson around 8:30 p.m. via a cell tower near Patterson’s 

home on the edge of town. When Prout did not return later 

that evening as promised, Candice repeatedly tried to reach 

him, but he did not pick up her calls. She also tried calling

Patterson to find out where Prout was, but he did not answer

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No. 20-2700 5 

either. Christa Prout’s calls to her husband likewise went unanswered.

When Christa still could not reach her husband the next 

day, June 18, she called Chrystal Peacock, one of Prout’s sisters who lived in Champaign, and told her that Prout was 

missing. Chrystal called Candice and asked when she had last 

seen Prout. Candice told her what had happened the night 

before and gave her Patterson’s phone number. Peacock then 

called Patterson asking about her brother. Patterson told her 

he met Prout at a carwash the previous evening to do a drug 

deal. He said that Prout left after they completed the transaction, but he stayed behind and washed his truck. Monique 

Adams, another of Prout’s sisters, called Patterson at about 

8 p.m. on June 18 also looking for information about her missing brother. Patterson told her a different story than the one 

he gave Chrystal: he said he met Prout at a carwash where 

they were “supposed to” do a drug deal but “did not.” Patterson then hung up on Monique. 

In the overnight hours of the next day—to be precise, at 

about 3:20 a.m. on June 19—a police officer reported that Patterson’s house was on fire. While the officer waited for the fire 

department to respond, he observed that the windows and 

doors were closed and intact. When firefighters arrived, they 

confirmed that all doors to the home were locked. White supremacist graffiti was spray painted inside and outside the 

house. This too was odd. Patterson and his girlfriend were 

unlikely targets for this sort of crime; they had no problems 

with neighbors or acquaintances, and neither of them had received any race-based threats or intimidation. 

Once the fire was suppressed, local sheriff’s deputies and 

an investigator from the Illinois State Fire Marshal’s Office

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began investigating the cause of the fire. Parts of the ceiling 

and walls of the home had fallen, and the floor was covered 

with rubble. In the living room investigators discovered a can 

of spray paint and two plastic gasoline containers; the containers still smelled like gasoline. The investigator from the 

State Fire Marshal’s Office determined that the fire was intentionally set. 

On June 19 Monique Adams called Patterson again, this 

time to arrange for family members to talk with him about 

what happened to Prout. Patterson agreed to meet with them 

at 6 p.m. but did not show up. When she called him at 6:45 

p.m. to find out where he was, he told her he had just learned 

that his house had burned down and would contact her later.

At about 7:30 p.m., Patterson and his girlfriend went to 

their burned house and talked with police officers who were 

there. When asked about his whereabouts during the overnight hours when the fire was set, Patterson told the officers 

that he left Champaign for Chicago around 8 p.m. that night—

June 18—and returned on the afternoon of June 19 after someone called and told him that his house had burned down. His 

cellphone records contradicted this story. The records 

showed that calls were made on his phone via a cell tower in

Champaign on the evening of June 18 until about 9:30 p.m. 

and again between 7 and 9 a.m. on June 19. Indeed, Patterson’s phone did not leave the Champaign area until 1:30 p.m. 

on June 19. Call records showed that the phone traveled north

along I-57, reached Chicago at around 4:45 p.m., then immediately turned around and returned to Champaign.

Patterson told the officers that he planned to return to Chicago the next day, June 20, and agreed to meet with them

when he got back to Champaign. The officers proposed a 

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No. 20-2700 7 

meeting time of 3 p.m. on June 20. Patterson agreed. The appointed time came and went, but he did not show up.

Phone records showed that Patterson’s phone left Champaign on the morning of June 20 heading toward Chicago. It 

continued traveling north past Chicago to the border of Cook 

and Lake Counties northwest of the city. At 4:06 p.m., the 

phone placed a call via a cell tower near I-53 and Lake Cook 

Road in the Village of Long Grove in Lake County, northwest 

of Chicago. 

On June 21 investigators returned to Patterson’s home 

looking for evidence of Prout’s disappearance. They walked 

through the burned house and searched drawers and closets. 

To avoid disturbing the evidence, however, they did not look 

under the debris on the floor. Other than the locked doors and 

graffiti, they found nothing suspicious. That same day—June 

21—Patterson and his girlfriend checked into a Holiday Inn 

in St. Louis.

A little after 9 a.m. on June 22, Thomas Lucich—a Long 

Grove resident who lived on the outskirts of the village in a 

heavily wooded area—heard four or five “thuds” coming 

from outside his home and off to the east. He looked outside

in the direction of the noise. Through a small gap along a tree 

line, he saw a car on fire. He called 911. 

The burning car was in an isolated spot, accessible only by 

an unmarked, dead-end dirt road and surrounded by trees.

Importantly, it was near the border of Cook and Lake Counties and the intersection of I-53 and Lake Cook Road, the same 

vicinity as the call from Patterson’s phone at 4:06 p.m. on June 

20. Firefighters responded to Lucich’s 911 call and approached the burning car. It was a Dodge Intrepid, engulfed 

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in flames. The car had sustained heavy damage by the time 

the fire was suppressed, but the license plate confirmed that 

it was registered to Prout. His charred body was found in the 

trunk, wrapped in a blanket with a distinctive pattern of geometric shapes. A Long Grove fire lieutenant who responded 

to the fire testified at trial that a burning car makes popping 

and cracking noises as hoses and tires and other parts explode, which explained the thuds that Lucich heard.

Later that day, at the instruction of Lake County authorities, St. Louis police arrested Patterson and his girlfriend Migdalia Rivera at the Holiday Inn. The next day, June 23, St. 

Louis police detectives interviewed Patterson. He told them

that he did not own a cellphone and refused to provide Rivera’s telephone number. When asked about his whereabouts 

at the time of the fire at his home, he repeated his story that 

he had traveled to Chicago the night before. At the end of the 

interview, Patterson and Rivera were released and free to go. 

On June 24 investigators returned to Patterson’s burned 

home in Champaign to continue what was now a murder investigation. This time they searched under the rubble on the 

floor. Under a thick pile of debris in the living room, they 

found a mound of clothing. Only the top of the pile was 

burned, and under the clothing there was a small area rug and 

a soapy sponge. Under the rug was a large bloodstain. There 

was also a strong scent of Pine Sol cleaner, and it looked as if

someone had tried to clean up the blood. In the kitchen, investigators found empty bottles of bleach and Pine Sol, a 

bucket, and a roll of undeveloped film. They confiscated these 

and other items of physical evidence, sent the bloodstain for 

DNA testing, and developed the film.

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No. 20-2700 9 

The photographs from the film included several photos

showing Patterson, Rivera, and their daughter wrapped in a 

blanket with a distinctive geometric pattern—the same as the 

blanket that was wrapped around Prout’s body in the trunk 

of his burned car. DNA testing of the blood found on the carpet of the burned home yielded only a partial profile because 

the evidentiary sample was degraded; two of the 13 tested loci 

were unavailable. But the partial profile matched Prout’s 

DNA: the probability of the same partial profile appearing in 

someone else in the general population ranged from 1 in 16.3 

quadrillion to 1 in 51.9 quadrillion.

An autopsy of Prout’s body revealed that he had been 

stabbed eight times in the head and neck, including fatal stab 

wounds to his neck that cut his windpipe and arteries. He had 

also been shot twice in the head and neck. A Lake County forensic pathologist found that Prout died of “multiple stab 

wounds with multiple gunshot wounds contributing to his 

death.” Based on her observation of Prout’s body, the 

pathologist determined that Prout had been dead for some 

time when the car fire was set, but the exact time of death was 

not ascertainable. 

On September 10, 2002, Patterson was arrested for the 

murder of Derrick Prout. He was charged with first-degree 

murder, arson, and concealment of homicidal death. The case 

proceeded to trial in April 2003. The prosecution’s case included the evidence we’ve just outlined and more. Our account above suffices for present purposes, but one additional 

point is worth mentioning. Prosecutors called Patterson’s girlfriend Migdalia Rivera as a witness, but she invoked her Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination. So the judge

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permitted the prosecution to introduce her grand-jury testimony.

Patterson testified in his own defense. He told the jury that 

on the evening of June 17, he and Prout left Candice Johnson’s 

apartment building in Champaign and drove in their own vehicles to a nearby carwash where he gave Prout $16,000 in exchange for the duffel bag of marijuana. He said Prout left the 

carwash in his Dodge Intrepid immediately after the exchange while he stayed behind and washed his Blazer. He 

said he then returned home and went to bed around 10:30 

p.m.

Patterson testified that on the following evening, June 18, 

he drove to Chicago for a court appearance on the morning of 

June 19, leaving their home in Champaign with Migdalia and 

their daughter at around 8 p.m. He said they went first to the 

Chicago suburb of Schaumburg, northwest of the city, where 

he sold eight pounds of marijuana to a man named Chris 

Smith, then stopped for the night at a motel in Palatine, also a 

northwest suburb of Chicago. He testified that his car would 

not start the next morning, so he missed his June 19 court date 

in Chicago; he said it was rescheduled for June 20. Although 

his new court date was the very next day, Patterson told the 

jury that he drove back to Champaign with his family on the 

afternoon of June 19. He said that while they were on the road 

that afternoon, he received a call from his brother who told 

him about the fire at his house. He further testified that on the 

morning of June 20, he returned to Chicago and attended his 

rescheduled court hearing at 9 a.m. Finally, he said that on 

June 21 he and his family drove to St. Louis and checked into 

a Holiday Inn, arriving at around 10:15 or 10:30 p.m. 

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Patterson’s testimony conflicted with cellphone records, 

which as we’ve noted provided compelling evidence of his 

location during the relevant timeframe. When cross-examined by the prosecutor about the whereabouts of his phone on 

June 18 and 19, Patterson claimed that he accidentally left the 

phone in a friend’s car in Champaign at 3:30 p.m. on June 18. 

When pressed for the friend’s name, he said it was Chris 

Smith—the same Chris Smith to whom he sold marijuana in 

Schaumburg that evening. When asked why he didn’t complete the sale when the two met in Champaign that afternoon, 

he said Smith did not have the money, so they arranged to do 

the deal that evening in Schaumburg. And when asked why 

he didn’t retrieve his phone from Smith when they completed 

the drug deal in Schaumburg in the evening, he said “it didn’t 

really cross my mind.” Patterson testified that he retrieved his 

phone from Smith on the morning of June 19, after he had car 

trouble and missed his court date.

These claims too were contradicted by the phone records, 

which showed that calls were placed on his phone from 

Champaign on the morning of June 19—first to the Chicago 

courthouse where he was scheduled to appear but did not, 

and then to his mother. Indeed, as we’ve explained, the phone 

records established that his phone did not leave Champaign

until early afternoon on June 19 and then returned that same 

evening. They also showed that on June 20, his phone traveled 

north on the route to Chicago but only made it as far as

Kankakee and Bourbonnais—about 60 miles southwest of 

Chicago—at the time he claimed to be in court for his rescheduled appearance. And a call was placed from his phone via a 

cell tower near 1-53 and Lake Cook Road in Long Grove at 

4:06 p.m. that day. Patterson admitted on cross-examination 

that he had his phone with him that day. 

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The case was submitted to the jury with instructions on 

criminal liability as a principal and under an accountability 

theory based on evidence that Patterson may have had an accomplice for all or part of this criminal course of conduct. The 

jury found Patterson guilty on all counts. The judge sentenced 

him to 50 years in prison for the murder and 5 years each for 

arson and concealment convictions, with the murder and arson sentences to run consecutively, for a total of 55 years in 

prison. 

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on direct review on December 15, 2005. Patterson I, 841 N.E.2d at 

913. The court held that the admission of Rivera’s grand jury 

testimony violated Patterson’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation but found the error harmless because the evidence 

against him was “overwhelming.” Id. at 906. The court rejected all other challenges, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and a challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 906–913. Patterson did 

not file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, so the 

judgment became final on March 15, 2006, when the time to 

do so expired.

On June 15, 2006, Patterson filed a petition for state postconviction relief and a motion for new DNA testing under 

§ 116–3 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure. See 725 ILL.

COMP. STAT. 5/116-3. His postconviction petition raised claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel; his § 116–3 motion

claimed that additional DNA testing would prove his innocence. The trial judge denied both requests. On July 11, 2012, 

the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the decision denying

Patterson’s postconviction petition but remanded for further 

proceedings on his § 116–3 motion. People v. Patterson, 971 

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No. 20-2700 13 

N.E.2d 1204, 1210–11 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“Patterson II”). Patterson did not seek further review of the adverse decision on 

his postconviction petition in the Illinois Supreme Court. 

After lengthy remand proceedings on the § 116–3 motion, 

the state agreed to submit the blood evidence for a new DNA 

test using a 15-loci test protocol. The new test produced a full 

profile that again matched Prout’s DNA. Patterson’s expert 

reviewed the test report and confirmed that the profile was 

clear and complete. The trial judge then denied the § 116–3 

motion as moot and also denied Patterson’s request for independent DNA testing. Patterson appealed, and the Illinois 

Appellate Court affirmed. On September 26, 2018, the Illinois 

Supreme Court denied Patterson’s petition for leave to appeal

(“PLA”). 

Four months later, on January 25, 2019, Patterson sought 

permission from the state supreme court to file a late PLA

from the appellate court’s July 2012 decision affirming the denial of his postconviction petition. The clerk’s office sent Patterson a notice stating that it had “timely filed ... [his] 

motion ... for leave to file a late petition for leave to appeal,” 

which would be “presented to the court for consideration.” 

On March 19, 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court denied his motion to file a late PLA. 

We come at last to these habeas proceedings. On July 24, 

2019, Patterson petitioned for habeas review under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 raising 12 separate constitutional claims. The district 

judge dismissed the petition as untimely under § 2244(d), 

which provides that a § 2254 petition must be filed within one 

year after the challenged state-court judgment becomes final, 

subject to tolling during the pendency of a properly filed application for state postconviction relief. Patterson invoked the 

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exception for claims of actual innocence, but the judge held 

that he failed to make the necessary showing to qualify for the 

exception. The judge also denied Patterson’s request for a certificate of appealability. Patterson renewed that request in this 

court, and we permitted this appeal. 

II. Discussion

A state prisoner seeking federal habeas review of his conviction or sentence under § 2254 must do so within one year 

of the date the judgment becomes final. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The 

limitations period is tolled for the “time during which a 

properly filed application for [s]tate post-conviction or other 

collateral review ... is pending.” Id. § 2244(d)(2). The district 

judge dismissed Patterson’s § 2254 petition as untimely. We 

review that decision de novo. Arnold v. Richardson, 14 F.4th 

780, 784 (7th Cir. 2021).

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Patterson’s convictions and sentence on December 15, 2005; the judgment became final on March 15, 2006, when the time to file a petition 

for certiorari in the Supreme Court expired. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009). More than 13 years elapsed 

between that date and his § 2254 petition on July 24, 2019. Patterson’s petition is therefore untimely unless the limitation 

period was tolled for all but one year of that intervening period.

The limitation clock ran for 91 days from the date the judgment became final to June 15, 2006, when Patterson filed his 

state postconviction petition and § 116–3 motion for additional DNA testing. Time was tolled from that date until July 

11, 2012, when the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the denial 

of the postconviction petition. Though the appellate court 

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No. 20-2700 15 

remanded for further proceedings on the § 116–3 motion, Patterson could have sought further review of the adverse decision on his postconviction petition in the state supreme court. 

But he did not file a PLA in the Illinois Supreme Court. So as 

of that date—July 11, 2012—the petition for state postconviction relief was no longer pending and the limitation clock restarted. See Fernandez v. Sternes, 227 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 

2000). Counting from that date and including the 91 days that 

elapsed before Patterson filed his postconviction petition, the 

limitation period expired on April 12, 2013—more than six 

years before he filed his § 2254 petition.

Patterson argues that the limitation period was tolled during the remand proceedings on his § 116–3 motion and remained tolled until September 26, 2018, when the Illinois 

Supreme Court denied his PLA seeking review of the appellate court’s decision affirming the denial of that motion. He 

also maintains that the limitation clock stopped again on January 25, 2019, when he filed his motion in the state supreme 

court seeking permission to file a late PLA from the appellate 

court’s July 2012 decision affirming the denial of his postconviction petition. He argues that because the clerk’s office accepted his motion as “timely filed,” the limitation period was 

further tolled from January 25 until March 19, 2019, when the 

state supreme court denied the motion to file a late PLA. On 

this chain of reasoning, the limitation clock was still running 

when he filed his § 2254 petition on July 24, 2019. 

Patterson’s tolling theory suffers from several flaws. First,

“a motion under § 116–3 is not a collateral review of the underlying judgment and therefore does not toll the statute of 

limitations for bringing a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Price v. Pierce, 617 F.3d 947, 952 (7th Cir. 

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2010). Nor was the time tolled while Patterson’s motion for 

leave to file a late PLA was pending. We’ve held that if the 

Illinois Supreme Court grants a motion to file a late PLA, the

limitation period is tolled from the date of the motion through 

the court’s decision on the merits. Fernandez, 227 F.3d at 979. 

But that did not happen here. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Patterson’s motion, so his motion to file a late PLA had 

no effect on the running of the limitation clock. Id. Patterson’s 

§ 2254 petition was more than six years too late. 

Though untimely, Patterson argues that we should review 

the merits of his § 2254 petition under the exception to the 

time bar for claims of actual innocence. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). To pass through the “actual innocence” gateway to merits review of a time-barred § 2254 

petition, a state prisoner “must establish that, in light of new 

evidence, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–37 (2006) (quoting Schlup v. 

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Applying this standard, we 

consider “all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be 

admitted under rules of admissibility that would govern at 

trial.” House, 547 U.S. at 538 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the entire record, we “make ‘a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed 

jurors would do.’” Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). Patterson can succeed under this standard only if he produces “reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. And “[t]he bar to proving [an actual-innocence]

claim ... is onerous.” Dixon v. Williams, 93 F.4th 394, 403 (7th 

Cir. 2024). The standard “is demanding and permits review 

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No. 20-2700 17 

only in the ‘extraordinary’ case.” House, 547 U.S. at 538 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

Patterson’s evidence falls far short of satisfying this standard. He points first to a medical report showing that on June 

16, 2002, he was treated in the emergency room for lower back 

strain and prescribed narcotic pain medication. He contends 

that the ER report proves that he was physically incapable of

committing these crimes. Not so. The ER report has limited

weight, if any at all. Standing alone, it does not establish that 

Patterson was physically incapable of fatally stabbing and 

shooting Prout. Indeed, Patterson’s trial attorney testified 

during state postconviction proceedings that he ruled out a 

medical defense after consulting the treating physician who 

told him that Patterson could have committed the crimes with

the back condition and pain medication described in the report. Finally, Patterson’s case was submitted to the jury with 

instructions on principal liability as well as an accountability 

theory based on evidence suggesting that Patterson might 

have had an accomplice. 

Patterson next argues that other drug dealers had a motive 

to kill Prout over unpaid debts. This claim is based on information from Prout’s wife Christa, his girlfriend Candice Johnson, and other family members who reported that Prout had 

been threatened by other drug dealers several months before 

the crimes. Vague, unsubstantiated reports of threats hardly 

qualify as reliable evidence that someone else likely committed the murder. Even if we grant that the evidence of threats

might suggest that someone else might have had a motive to

kill Prout months before the murder, it does not advance Patterson’s claim of actual innocence. Without more, any theory 

of an alternative suspect is speculative. 

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Patterson also suggests that someone saw Prout’s car after

their drug transaction at the carwash—namely, a witness 

named Kim Taylor, who said she thought she saw Prout’s car 

at an intersection in Champaign late in the evening on June 

17. As the district judge noted, however, Taylor’s statement

was equivocal. She said she saw a car that she believed was 

Prout’s, but when she approached it, she saw another person 

driving and concluded that it must belong to someone else. 

Finally, Patterson points to information from Sally and 

Robert Kruger, who lived in Long Grove near the spot where 

Prout’s car was set on fire. They reported hearing two gunshots shortly before they saw the fire. For starters, this argument is seriously underdeveloped. It was presented only in 

Patterson’s pro se habeas petition; there is no statement from 

the Krugers, either sworn or otherwise. Moreover, a report of 

two gunshot-like sounds is consistent with Thomas Lucich’s 

trial testimony that he heard several loud thuds before he saw 

the car fire. And the Long Grove fire lieutenant testified that 

burning cars make popping and cracking sounds as hoses and 

tires and other parts explode. 

In short, Patterson’s “new evidence” is meager and in 

some respects not new at all. And when considered against 

the powerful case the prosecution presented at trial, it does 

not come close to establishing a probability that no reasonable 

juror would have found him guilty. The circumstantial evidence of Patterson’s guilt—the physical evidence, cellphone 

records, witness testimony, and DNA evidence—was overwhelming. Although the initial DNA test produced only a 

partial profile, the match between Prout’s DNA and the blood 

on the carpet was statistically irrefutable. And the match was 

Case: 20-2700 Document: 64 Filed: 01/02/2025 Pages: 19
No. 20-2700 19 

later confirmed by more sophisticated DNA testing during 

the § 116–3 proceedings.

Accordingly, we agree with the district judge that Patterson has not satisfied the demanding actual-innocence standard to obtain merits review of his untimely § 2254 petition. 

The petition was properly dismissed. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 20-2700 Document: 64 Filed: 01/02/2025 Pages: 19