Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00193/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00193-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Socorro Jacobo Aguilar asserts she is entitled to a period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff argues the administrative law judge erred in 

evaluating the medical record, including opinions of a licensed nurse and non-examining physicians. 

For the reasons set forth below, the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings pursuant to 

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

BACKGROUND

In July 2015, Plaintiff filed her application for benefits, alleging disability beginning April 4, 

2014, due to breast cancer, uterus cancer, depression, and arthritis in her knees. (Doc. 9-6 at 6; Doc. 9-

7 at 12) The Social Security Administration denied the application at the initial level and upon 

reconsideration. (See generally Doc. 9-4) Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on the 

application and testified before an ALJ on October 4, 2017. (See Doc. 9-3 at 22, 40) The ALJ 

determined Plaintiff was not disabled and issued an order denying benefits on February 7, 2018. (Id. at 

SOCORRO JACOBO AGUILAR,

 Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

)

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)

)

Case No.: 1:19-cv-0193 - JLT

ORDER REMANDING THE ACTION PURSUANT 

TO SENTENCE FOUR OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

ORDER DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF SOCORRO JACOBO AGUILAR, AND 

AGAINST DEFENDANT, THE COMMISSIONER 

OF SOCIAL SECURITY

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22-33) Plaintiff requested review of the decision with the Appeals Council, which denied the request 

on December 10, 2018. (Id. at 2-5) Therefore, the ALJ’s determination became the final decision of 

the Commissioner of Social Security. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

District courts have a limited scope of judicial review for disability claims after a decision by 

the Commissioner to deny benefits under the Social Security Act. When reviewing findings of fact, 

such as whether a claimant was disabled, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

ALJ’s determination that the claimant is not disabled must be upheld by the Court if the proper legal 

standards were applied and the findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 

389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)). The record as a whole 

must be considered, because “[t]he court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that 

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 

DISABILITY BENEFITS

To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish she is unable to 

engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a disability only if:

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only 

unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work 

experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the 

national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in 

which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be 

hired if he applied for work. 

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The burden of proof is on a claimant to establish disability. Terry v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990). If a claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, 

the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the claimant is able to engage in other substantial 

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gainful employment. Maounis v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1984).

ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION

To achieve uniform decisions, the Commissioner established a sequential five-step process for 

evaluating a claimant’s alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The process 

requires the ALJ to determine whether Plaintiff (1) is engaged substantial gainful activity, (2) had 

medically determinable severe impairments (3) that met or equaled one of the listed impairments set 

forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; and whether Plaintiff (4) had the residual functional 

capacity to perform to past relevant work or (5) the ability to perform other work existing in significant 

numbers at the state and national level. Id. The ALJ must consider testimonial and objective medical 

evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927.

Pursuant to this five-step process, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since the alleged onset date of April 4, 2014. (Doc. 9-3 at 24) Second, the ALJ found 

Plaintiff’s severe impairments included: “history of breast cancer, stage II[;] history of uterus cancer 

stage I; major depressive disorder, recurrent; migraine headaches; seizure disorder; arthritis bilateral 

knees; [and] arthritis bilateral hands.” (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s impairments 

did not meet or medically equal a Listing. (Doc. 9-3 at 24-27) Next, the ALJ found:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except the claimant can lift 50 pounds occasionally, 

25 pound[s] frequently. The claimant can sit, stand, or walk six hours in an eight-hour 

day. The claimant can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant 

can frequently climb ramps, stairs, crouch, crawl, kneel, and stoop. The claimant 

should avoid concentrated exposure to temperature extremes and hazards. The 

claimant should never drive a vehicle for work. The claimant cannot remember and 

carry out detailed jobs. The claimant cannot maintain attention concentration 

persistence and pace for detailed tasks.

(Id. at 27) With this residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff was 

“capable of performing past relevant work as a packager machine operator and farm worker fruit II.” 

(Id. at 32) Thus, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act 

from April 4, 2014, through the date of the decision. (Id.)

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed “to analyze the opinion evidence in accordance with the 

regulations, Agency policy, and Ninth Circuit precedent.” (Doc. 12 at 13, emphasis omitted) The 

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Commissioner argues that “[s]ubstantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision and the Court should 

affirm.” (See Doc. 15 at 7)

A. Evaluation of the Medical Evidence 

In this circuit, the courts distinguish the opinions of three categories of physicians: (1) treating 

physicians; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3) nonexamining physicians, who neither examine nor treat the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1996). In general, the opinion of a treating physician is afforded the greatest weight. Id.; see 

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). Further, an 

examining physician’s opinion is given more weight than the opinion of non-examining physician. 

Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). 

Finally, an ALJ must consider opinions of other medical professionals—such as nurse practitioners—

who may offer “judgment about some of the same issues addressed in medical opinions from 

acceptable medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1); see also Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 

655 (9th Cir. 2017) (describing circumstances when opinions from “other sources” may be considered 

acceptable medical opinions).1

An opinion is not binding upon the ALJ, and may be discounted whether another physician 

contradicts the opinion. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion 

of a treating or examining medical professional only by identifying a “clear and convincing” reason. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may 

be rejected for “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the 

record.” Id., 81 F.3d at 830. When there is conflicting evidence, “it is the ALJ's role to determine 

credibility and to resolve the conflict.” Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court 

must uphold the ALJ’s resolution of the conflict when there is “more than one rational interpretation of 

the evidence.” Id.; see also Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The trier of fact 

and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support 

1 The Social Security Administration adopted new rules applicable to claims filed after March 27, 2017, which 

expanded the category of acceptable medical providers to include, among others, nurse practitioners. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1502(a)(6), (7), (8); 416.902(a)(6), (7), (8) (2017); Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 

82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017). These revisions do not apply to Plaintiff’s claim, which was filed in 2015.

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either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ”).

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred in rejecting the limitations identified by Debra Martin, FNP-C;

Dr. Octrant; and Dr. Kiger.2 (Doc. 12 at 13-20) Because the medical opinions were not contradicted

by the opinions of other physicians, the ALJ was required to identify clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting the physician’s opinions. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

1. Opinion of Debra Martin, FNP-C

Ms. Martin, a certified family nurse practitioner who treated Plaintiff on a monthly basis, 

completed a “Physical Medical Source Statement” on March 8, 2016. (Doc. 9-15 at 32-35) She 

indicated Plaintiff had a history of malignant carcinoma of the left breast. (Id. at 32) Ms. Martin noted 

Plaintiff was diagnosed with a partial tear of the left MCL, depression, insomnia, osteoarthrosis, and 

chronic fatigue. (Id.) 

Ms. Martin reported Plaintiff underwent an MRI on her left knee that showed the partial tear in 

February 2016 and a knee x-ray showed osteoarthrosis in 2015. (Doc. 9-15) According to Ms. Martin, 

Plaintiff could walk one block without severe pain; sit for more than two hours at a time and at least six 

hours in an eight-hour day, and stand for thirty minutes at one time and about four hours total in an 

eight-hour day. (Id. at 33) She opined Plaintiff needed to be able to shift positions at will from sitting, 

standing, or walking; and to be able to walk around every 90 minutes. (Id.) Ms. Martin noted Plaintiff 

also required unscheduled breaks due to muscle weakness, chronic fatigue, pain/paresthesias, and 

adverse effects of her medication. (Id.) Ms. Martin believed Plaintiff could lift and carry less than 10 

pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally. (Id. at 34) She opined Plaintiff could occasionally 

twist, stoop, crouch, and crawl. (Id.) She indicated Plaintiff had limits with reaching, handling, and 

fingering; and could use her hands for twisting, fine manipulation, and reaching for 30 percent of each 

2

In the opening brief, Plaintiff asserts that “the opinion[s] of Ms. Martin, Dr. Angert and the State Agency medical 

consultants... establish greater, and more detailed limitations than are accounted for in the ALJ’s [residual functional 

capacity] finding.” (Doc. 12 at 14) However, Plaintiff fails to address the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Angert’s opinion. (Id. at 

14-20) Instead, Plaintiff focuses only upon the ALJ’s analysis of the opinions from Ms. Martin and the state agency 

physicians. (Id.) 

Notably, the Ninth Circuit “has repeatedly admonished that [it] cannot ‘manufacture arguments for an appellant.’” 

Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). Rather, the Court will “review only issues with 

are argued specifically and distinctly.” Id. Therefore, when a claim of error is not argued and explained, the argument is 

waived. See id. at 929-30 (holding an argument was waived because the party made only a “bold assertion” of error, with 

“little if any analysis to assist the court in evaluating its legal challenge”); Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 873 

n.34 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the assertion of error was “too undeveloped to be capable of assessment”). Because Plaintiff 

has not identified a specific error by the ALJ related to Dr. Angert’s opinion— and offered no analysis to assist the Court in 

her opening brief—any challenge related to the opinion of Dr. Angert was waived. See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 873 n.34.

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day. (Id.) Further, she believed Plaintiff would be off task 25 percent or more each day and was 

incapable of even low stress work due to pain, depression, and chronic fatigue. (Id. at 35) Ms. Martin 

also opined Plaintiff “need[ed] to avoid fumes [and] gases,” and should avoid temperature extremes 

because heat caused dizziness and cold caused joint pain. (Id.)

After summarizing limitations identified by Ms. Martin, the ALJ stated: “The undersigned gives 

this opinion little weight as it is not consistent with the claimant’s history of largely normal physical 

examinations including a normal gait station and neurological findings (Exhibit 5F) (Exhibit 11F). 

Further Ms. Martin is not an acceptable medical source.” (Doc. 9-3 at 21) Plaintiff argues the reasons 

identified by the ALJ to reject the limitations identified by Ms. Martin are not “clear and convincing,” 

and the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion using factors identified by the Regulations. (Doc. 

12 at 15-17) 

a. Status as an “other source”

As noted above, an ALJ must consider the opinions of nurse practitioners when reviewing the 

medical record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1); Revels, 874 F.3d at 655. However, nurse practitioners are 

not considered acceptable medical sources, but rather “other sources.” Bifarella v. Colvin, 51 F.Supp. 

3d 926, 931 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (“a nurse, although a treating medical source, is viewed as an ‘other 

source’ and not as an ‘acceptable medical source’”) (citing SSR 06-3p, 2006 SSR LEXIS 5; 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1513(d)).

Opinions from “other sources,” such as nurse practitioners, “are not entitled to the same 

deference” as those of a physician. Revels, 874 F.3d at 655. Opinions of “other sources” “may be 

discounted [if] the ALJ provides reasons germane to each source.” Fields v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 

WL 3003992 at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2019) (citing Popa v. Berryhill, 872 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 

2017)); see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (opinions from other sources 

may be rejected with germane reasons). Because Ms. Martin was a certified nurse practitioner, the ALJ 

could reject the limitations identified by Ms. Martin by providing germane reasons.

b. Inconsistency with the record

The Ninth Circuit determined that “inconsistency with other medial records is a germane reason 

to reject the opinion of a non-acceptable medical source.” Green v. Berryhill, 731 Fed. Appx. 596, 599 

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(9th Cir. 2018), citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To reject an opinion as 

inconsistent with the medical record, the “ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions.” Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). The ALJ must “set[] out a detailed and thorough summary 

of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and mak[e] findings.” 

Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986).

The ALJ found the limitations identified by Ms. Martin were “not consistent with the claimant’s 

history of largely normal physical examinations including a normal gait, station, and neurological 

findings.” (Doc. 9-3 at 31, citing Exh. 5F [Doc. 9-14 at 2-60; Doc. 9-15 at 2-70] and Exh. 11F [Doc. 9-

17 at 9-45]) However, the ALJ failed to explain how Plaintiff’s gait and neurological findings are 

inconsistent with the limitations identified by Ms. Martin with reaching, handling, fingering, and fine 

manipulation. In addition, the ALJ failed to identify any evidence that conflicted Ms. Martin’s 

conclusion that Plaintiff “need[ed] to avoid fumes [and] gases” as well as temperature extremes.3 (See 

Doc. 9-3 at 31) 

Moreover, the ALJ failed to identify any specific clinical findings in the treatment record, and 

instead cites broadly to more than 100 pages of medical records. This failure to identify specific 

evidence among the exhibits is an error, as the Ninth Circuit indicated courts will not “comb the 

administrative record to find specific conflicts.” See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 

2014); see also Verduzco v. Colvin, 2019 WL 384960 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015) (explaining the 

court “cannot meaningfully review the ALJ’s determination” where the ALJ cited generally to several 

exhibits, “which comprise[d] more than 120 pages of medical records”); Wilson v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 

384960 at *7 n. 11 (S.D. Al. Jan. 30, 2019) (finding a “summary citation to two exhibits, collectively 

consisting of over seventy pages of medical records, is insufficient, as the Court is unable to determine 

what inconsistencies the ALJ relied on”).

The ALJ’s analysis of the opinion of Ms. Martin fails to “achieve the level of specificity” that 

the Ninth Circuit requires. Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. As such, the purported inconsistency with the 

record is not a germane reason for giving less weight to the limitations identified by Ms. Martin.

3

In the residual functional capacity, the ALJ indicated Plaintiff “should avoid concentrated exposure to 

temperature extremes and hazards.” (Doc. 9-3 at 27) However, it is unclear why the ALJ believed Plaintiff needed to only 

avoid concentrated exposure rather than any exposure to temperature extremes, fumes, and gases.

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c. Factors under Social Security Ruling 06-03p

Plaintiff contends the ALJ also erred by failing to consider the factors identified in Social 

Security Ruling 06-03p and the Regulations to evaluate the opinion of other medical sources. (Doc. 12 

at 18-19) In Social Security Ruling406-03p, the Commissioner acknowledged that “medical sources 

who are not acceptable medical sources, such as nurse practitioners, ... have increasingly assumed a 

greater percentage of the treatment and evaluation functions previously handled primarily by 

physicians.” Id., SSR LEXIS 5 at *8. As such, the Commissioner identified several factors the ALJ 

should consider when determining the weight to give opinions “other sources,” including: the length of 

time the source has known the claimant, how frequently the source saw the claimant, the consistency of 

the opinion with other evidence in the record, the relevance of the opinion; and the source’s training 

and expertise. Id., 2006 SSR LEXIS 5 at *11, *15. 

The ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Martin was “the claimant’s provider.” (Doc. 9-3 at 31) 

However, the ALJ did not address the length of the treatment relationship between Ms. Martin and 

Plaintiff, or the fact that Ms. Martin treated Plaintiff on a monthly basis. (See id.) Further, as discussed 

above, the ALJ erred in evaluating the consistency of the opinion with other evidence in the record. 

Thus, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion of Ms. Martin using factors identified by the 

Regulations and SSR 06-03p.

2. Opinions of Drs. Ocrant and Kiger.

On September 29, 2015, Dr. Ocrant reviewed available records related to Plaintiff’s application 

for benefits at the initial level. (Doc. 9-4 at 6, 8-9) Dr. Ocrant noted an x-ray of Plaintiff’s right knee 

showed narrowing of the medial joint space and osteophytic spurring, and Plaintiff reported knee pain 

with movement and palpation. (Id.) Further, Dr. Ocrant observed that Plaintiff received injections in 

both knees. (Id.) 

Dr. Ocrant opined Plaintiff could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

frequently, sit about six hours in an eight-hour day, and stand/walk about six hours in an eight-hour 

day. (Doc. 9-4 at 8) According to Dr. Ocrant, Plaintiff had postural limitations due to her bilateral 

4 Social Security Rulings are issued by the Commissioner to clarify regulations and policies. Han v. Bowen, 882 

F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989). Although the Rulings do not have the force of law, the Ninth Circuit gives the rulings 

deference “unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the Act or regulations.” Id.

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knee pain, and she was limited to occasionally crouching; crawling; kneeling; and climbing ramps, 

stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. (Id. at 8-9) Dr. Ocrant found no manipulative or environmental 

limitations. (Id.) Dr. Kiger identified the same physical limitations and affirmed Dr. Ocrant’s opinion 

on January 15, 2016. (Id. at 19-20) 

The ALJ gave the opinions of Drs. Ocrant and Kiger “little weight, as the medical record does 

not support the[] limitations.” (Doc. 9-3 at 30) The ALJ indicated opinions were inconsistent with the 

record because it “shows that the claimant has had largely normal physical examinations including a 

normal gait and station as well as only mild tenderness of the joints.” (Id., citing Exh. 5F [Doc. 9-14 at 

2-60, Doc. 9-15 at 2-70]; Exh. 9F [Doc. 9-16]; and Exh. 11F [Doc. 9-17 at 9-45]) Thus, the ALJ again 

cited to nearly 200 pages of medical records in Exhibits 5F, 9F, and 11F. (See id.) However, the ALJ 

did not explain how the limitations identified by Drs. Ocrant and Kiger were inconsistent with these

records, and offered only his conclusion. For example, the ALJ failed to explain how the limitation to 

light work was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s examinations, or why he believed Plaintiff could perform 

postural activities on a frequent basis, rather than occasionally as the physicians opined after reviewing 

the record and imaging of Plaintiff’s knees. 

The limited analysis by the ALJ is insufficient, as the Ninth Circuit determined “[t]he ALJ must 

do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, 

rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Consequently, the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinions of Drs. Ocrant and Kiger.

B. The Residual Functional Capacity Determination

A claimant’s residual functional capacity is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [her] 

limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

2, § 200.00(c) (defining an RFC as the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the capacity 

for sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of jobs”). In formulating a RFC, the 

ALJ weighs medical and other source opinions, as well as the claimant’s credibility. See, e.g., Bray v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009). Further, the ALJ must consider “all 

of [a claimant’s] medically determinable impairments”—whether severe or not—when assessing a 

RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).

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Importantly when, as here, “an ALJ rejects all medical opinions in favor of his own, a finding 

that the RFC is supported by substantial evidence is less likely.” See Stairs v. Astrue, 2011 WL 

318330, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2011). For example, this Court determined an ALJ erred where all 

medical opinions were rejected before the ALJ formulated the RFC. See Perez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

2018 WL 721399 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2018). 

In Perez, two non-examining physicians opined the claimant “had no severe physical

impairments. Id., 2018 WL 721399 at *6. The ALJ “gave no weight” to these opinions, finding the 

record indicated the claimant had some limitations. Id. “After rejecting all the doctor’s opinions, the 

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be capable of a reduced range of light work with postural 

manipulative and environmental restrictions.” Id. The Court found the ALJ erred, explaining:

A claimant’s residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but is an issue to be 

decided by the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.920(d)(2). However, the finding 

must be supported by substantial evidence in the record and the ALJ must explain his 

reasoning behind the RFC. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c.

Here, the ALJ stated that the RFC was supported by the weight of the objective 

evidence and Plaintiff’s less than credible testimony. But the Court is unable to 

determine how the ALJ arrived at the conclusion that Plaintiff was capable of light 

work. Absent adequate explanation of the record, without specific support from a 

medical source, and with no testimony from a medical expert, the ALJ appears to have 

defined his own limitations for Plaintiff. The Court finds that this was error. See Day v. 

Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (the ALJ was not qualified as a 

medical expert and therefore could not permissibly go outside the record to consult 

medical textbooks for purpose of making his own assessment of the claimant’s 

physical condition); Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) (“As a lay 

person,... the ALJ was simply not qualified to interpret raw medical data in functional 

terms and no medical opinion supported the determination.”); Rohan v. Chater, 98 

F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) (“ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play 

doctor and make their own independent medical findings.”).

Id., 2018 WL 721399 at *7-8. Without the support of a physician’s opinion, the Court concluded the 

RFC lacked the support of substantial evidence. Id. at *8.

Likewise, the Court is unable to determine upon what evidence the ALJ relied to determine

Plaintiff was capable of lifting and carrying 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, and 

perform postural activities—including crouching, kneeling, and stooping—on a frequent basis. Each of 

the opinions in the record identified greater limitations. For example, Drs. Ocrant and Kiger 

determined Plaintiff could lift and carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally. (Doc. 9-4 

at 8, 19-20) In addition, the physicians believed Plaintiff could only occasionally crouch, crawl, knee, 

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and climb due to bilateral knee pain, which was treated with injections. (Id. at 8-9, 19-20) Without 

medical opinions to support the ALJ’s conclusions, the RFC lacks the support of substantial evidence. 

See Perez, 2018 WL 721399 at *7-8; Perez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 958 F.2d 445, 446 (1st 

Cir. 1991) (holding “the ALJ’s conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence” if an RFC is 

formulated without the findings of a physician). Accordingly, the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical 

record and assessing Plaintiff’s physical RFC.

C. Remand is Appropriate

The decision whether to remand a matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) or to 

order immediate payment of benefits is within the discretion of the district court. Harman v. Apfel, 

211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). Except in rare instances, when a court reverses an administrative 

agency determination, the proper course is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or 

explanation. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 

12, 16 (2002)). Generally, an award of benefits is directed when:

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence, 

(2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of 

disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required 

to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited. 

Smolen v, 80 F.3d at 1292. In addition, an award of benefits is directed where no useful purpose would 

be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record is fully developed. Varney v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The ALJ erred in evaluating the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating nurse practitioner and the 

physicians who reviewed the record. In addition, the residual functional capacity articulated by the 

ALJ lacks the support of substantial evidence in the record and the matter should be remanded for 

further consideration. See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1102-03 (remanding the matter to the Social Security 

Administration for reconsideration after finding the ALJ erred by offering his own medical conclusion, 

which was not supported by any medical evidence); Perez, 958 F.2d at 446 (finding that where the ALJ 

offered any opinion “without any assessment of residual functional capacity by a physician, ...it is 

necessary to remand for the taking of further functional evidence”). 

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set for above, the Court finds the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards 

in evaluating the limitations identified by Ms. Martin, Dr. Ocrant, and Dr. Kiger. Due to these errors, 

the residual functional capacity lacks the support of substantial evidence, and the ALJ’s decision cannot 

be upheld by the Court. See Sanchez, 812 F.2d at 510; Perez, 958 F.2d at 446. Accordingly, the Court

ORDERS:

1. The matter is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further 

proceedings consistent with this decision; and

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Socorro 

Jacobo Aguilar, and against Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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