Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01799/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01799-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:0271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KFX MEDICAL, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

STRYKER CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18-cv-01799-H-WVG

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

[Doc. No. 27.]

On March 29, 2019, Defendants Stryker Corporation and Howmedica Osteonics 

Corp. doing business as Stryker Orthopaedics filed a motion for leave to file an amended 

answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaims. (Doc. No. 27.) On April 22, 2019, 

Plaintiff KFx Medical, LLC filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion for leave 

to amend. (Doc. No. 29.) On April 29, 2019, Stryker filed its reply. (Doc. No. 31.) A 

hearing on the motion is currently scheduled for Monday, May 13, 2019 at 10:30 a.m. The 

Court, pursuant to its discretion under Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), determines this matter is 

appropriate for resolution without oral argument, submits the motion on the parties’ papers, 

and vacates the hearing. For the reasons below, the Court grants in part and denies in part 

Stryker’s motion for leave to amend. 

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Background

On August 2, 2018, KFx filed a complaint for patent infringement against Stryker, 

alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,585,311 and 8,951,287. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Specifically, KFx alleges that Stryker has induced infringement of the patents-in-suit by 

providing instructions and teachings to the customers of its ReelX STT Knotless Anchor 

and related product for use in a double-row rotator cuff repair procedure. (Id. ¶¶ 31-44, 

48, 58.)

On September 27, 2018, Stryker filed an answer to KFx’s complaint and 

counterclaims. (Doc. No. 14.) On February 11, 2019, the Court issued a scheduling order 

in the action. (Doc. No. 26.) By the present motion, Stryker moves for leave to amend its

answer and counterclaims to assert two new affirmative defenses and counterclaims 

alleging unenforceability of the patents-in-suit due to inequitable conduct. (Doc. No. 27-

1 at 1.) 

Discussion

I. Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) allows a party leave to amend its pleading 

once as a matter of right prior to service of a responsive pleading. Thereafter, “a party may 

amend that party’s pleading only by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse 

party and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The 

Ninth Circuit has instructed that this policy is “‘to be applied with extreme liberality.’” 

Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001). “Five 

factors are taken into account to assess the propriety of a motion for leave to amend: bad 

faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the 

plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Nunes v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2003)). The decision 

whether to grant leave to amend “is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.” 

Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., 91 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996).

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II. Analysis

By the present motion, Stryker moves for leave to amend its answer and 

counterclaims to assert two new affirmative defenses and counterclaims, alleging: (1) 

unenforceability of the ’311 patent due to inequitable conduct during the prosecution of the 

’311 patent; (2) unenforceability of the ’311 patent due to inequitable conduct during the 

reexamination of the ’311 patent; and (3) unenforceability of the ’287 patent due to 

inequitable conduct during the prosecution of the ’287 patent. (Doc. No. 27-1 at 1; Doc. 

No. 27-2 ¶¶ 93-285.) In response, KFx argues that the Court should deny Stryker’s motion 

to amend because the proposed inequitable conduct counterclaims would be futile. (Doc. 

No. 29 at 1-2.) The Court addresses each of Stryker’s inequitable conduct allegations in 

turn below.

A. Futility

i. Legal Standards for Futility of Amendment

“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to 

amend.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). “‘[A] proposed amendment 

is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that 

would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.’” Sweaney v. Ada Cty., Idaho, 

119 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Miller v. Rykoff–Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 

214 (9th Cir. 1988)); accord Barahona v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 881 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th 

Cir. 2018). In other words, “[a] proposed amended complaint is futile if it would be 

immediately ‘subject to dismissal.’ Thus, the ‘proper test to be applied when determining 

the legal sufficiency of a proposed amendment is identical to the one used when 

considering the sufficiency of a pleading challenged under Rule 12(b)(6).’” Nordyke v. 

King, 644 F.3d 776, 788 n.12 (9th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citations omitted); see Miller, 845 F.2d at 214.

A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it contains “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

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content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading 

that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint 

suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Accordingly, dismissal for failure to state a claim is 

proper where the claim “lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a 

cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 

(9th Cir. 2008).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true 

all facts alleged in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. See Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 

938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). But, a court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

ii. Legal Standards for Pleading Inequitable Conduct

“Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement that, if proved, 

bars enforcement of a patent.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 

1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). A finding of inequitable conduct as to “any single 

claim renders the entire patent unenforceable.” Id. at 1288.

The elements of a claim for “inequitable conduct are: (1) an individual associated 

with the filing and prosecution of a patent application made an affirmative 

misrepresentation of a material fact, failed to disclose material information, or submitted 

false material information; and (2) the individual did so with a specific intent to deceive 

the PTO.” Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

The Federal Circuit has explained that a claim for inequitable conduct requires a finding of 

both materiality and intent to deceive. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287. They are separate 

requirements, and a “a district court may not infer intent solely from materiality.” Id. at 

1290. 

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In addition, the Federal Circuit has explained that to meet the standard for 

materiality, the misrepresentation or omission must be “but-for material.” Id. at 1291. A 

misrepresentation or omission is but-for material “[i]f the PTO would not have allowed a 

claim had it been aware” of the undisclosed information or the falsity of the representation. 

Id. Further, in order to establish inequitable conduct, “the specific intent to deceive must 

be ‘the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.’” Id. at 1290. 

“[W]hen there are multiple reasonable inferences that may be drawn, intent to deceive 

cannot be found.” Id. at 1290-91.

An inequitable conduct counterclaim must be pled with “particularity” under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1326. Rule 9(b) provides: “In alleging 

fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud 

or mistake.” Therefore, a claim of inequitable conduct must be pled with particularity, i.e., 

it must be pleaded in detail. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327. Specifically, the counterclaim 

“must identify the specific who, what, when, where, and how of the material 

misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO. Id. at 1328.

Moreover, although “knowledge” and “intent” may be averred generally, a 

pleading of inequitable conduct under Rule 9(b) must include sufficient 

allegations of underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer that 

a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material information or of the 

falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) withheld or misrepresented 

this information with a specific intent to deceive the PTO.

Id. at 1328-29. “A reasonable inference is one that is plausible and that flows logically 

from the facts alleged, including any objective indications of candor and good faith.” Id.

at 1329 n.5. 

iii. Stryker’s Allegations of Inequitable Conduct During the Prosecution of 

the ’311 Patent

In its proposed counterclaims, Stryker alleges that the ’311 patent is unenforceable 

due to inequitable conduct because KFx’s CEO, Tate Scott, intentionally withheld material 

evidence of prior art during the prosecution of the ’311 patent. (Doc. No. 27-2 ¶¶ 128-80.) 

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KFx argues that this counterclaim is futile because Mr. Scott did not commit inequitable 

conduct during the prosecution of that patent. (Doc. No. 29 at 11-13.) But to support this 

argument, KFx relies on evidence from outside the pleadings, specifically a declaration 

from Mr. Scott that it previously submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment 

in a prior action. (See id. (citing Doc. No. 30-1, Scott Decl. ¶¶ 12-16, 22-23).) KFx cannot 

rely on this evidence to oppose Stryker’s motion for leave to amend.

The test for determining whether a proposed amendment would be futile is the same 

test that is used “when considering the sufficiency of a pleading challenged under Rule 

12(b)(6).” Nordyke, 644 F.3d at 788 n.12. “As a general rule, ‘a district court may not 

consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’” Lee v. 

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the Court may not consider 

the Scott declaration in evaluating Stryker’s motion for leave to amend. See Nordyke, 644 

F.3d at 788 n.12 (“In evaluating whether the district court should have granted the 

Nordykes’ motion for leave to amend, therefore, we look only to facts pled in the Proposed 

Second Amended Complaint.”). 

KFx also notes that a district court granted summary judgment of a similar 

inequitable conduct counterclaim in a prior action between KFx and non-party Anthrex, 

Inc. (Doc. No. 29 at 12 (citing Doc. No. 30-13, Ex. 11 at 6).) But this is of no aid to KFx 

as the Court does not use the summary judgment standard of review when evaluating 

futility of amendment in a motion for leave to amend. Cf. Nordyke, 644 F.3d at 788 n.12. 

As such, KFx has failed to demonstrate that Stryker’s proposed counterclaim alleging 

inequitable conduct during the prosecution of the ’311 patent is futile.

iv. Stryker’s Allegations of Inequitable Conduct During the 

Reexamination of the ’311 Patent

In its proposed counterclaims, Stryker alleges that the ’311 patent is unenforceable 

due to inequitable conduct because Mr. Scott and prosecution counsel withheld material 

evidence of prior art during the reexamination of the ’311 patent. (Doc. No. 27-2 ¶¶ 181-

215.) Specifically, Stryker alleges that Mr. Scott and prosecution counsel committed 

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inequitable conduct by deliberately withholding the Millett Abstract, the 2005 Millett 

Article, and the 2011 Scott Statement references from the examiner during the 

reexamination proceedings until after the examiner issued its notice of intent to issue a 

reexamination certificate, and, thereafter, by failing to comply with MPEP § 2256 to ensure 

that the references were properly disclosed. (Id. ¶¶ 190-200.)

KFx argues that these inequitable conduct allegations fail because under 37 C.F.R. 

§ 1.555(a), KFx had to two months to submit an IDS to the examiner. (Doc. No. 29 at 13.) 

KFx notes that it did submit an IDS within section 1.555(a)’s two-month window albeit 

after the examiner issued its notice of intent to issue a reexamination certificate. (Id.) But 

KFx’s argument fails to recognize that once the examiner issued the notice of intent to 

issue a reexamination certificate, in order for the references to be considered by the 

examiner during the reexamination proceedings, KFx would need to comply with the 

requirements set forth in MPEP § 2256, regardless of the deadlines set forth in 37 C.F.R. 

§ 1.555(a). See MPEP § 2256. Stryker alleges that KFx failed to comply with MPEP § 

2256, and, thus, KFx never properly disclosed those material references during the 

reexamination proceedings. (Doc. No. 27-2 ¶¶ 195-208; see Doc. No. 31-1, Ex C.)1

KFx argues that Stryker misrepresents the requirements of MPEP § 2256 in its 

proposed counterclaims. (Doc. No. 29 at 14-15.) KFx is incorrect. Stryker’s allegations 

correctly cite to the version of MPEP § 2256 that was in place in 2011 during the time of 

the reexamination proceedings. (See Doc. No. 27-2 ¶ 196; Doc. No. 31-1, Ex C.) KFx 

incorrectly relies on the requirements set forth in the current version of MPEP § 2256 that 

was not in effect during the reexamination proceedings at issue. 

 

1 The Court may consider Exhibit C to Stryker’s reply in evaluating Stryker’s motion for leave to 

amend because it is a document issued by the PTO during the reexamination of the ’311 patent, and, thus, 

the Court may and does take judicial notice of it. See NetFuel, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., No. 5:18-CV02352-EJD, 2018 WL 4510737, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2018); IPS Grp., Inc. v. Duncan Sols., Inc., 

No. 15-CV-1526-CAB (MDD), 2016 WL 9023432, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2016); see also Tellabs, Inc. 

v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (explaining that a court may consider judicially 

noticeable documents when evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).

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KFx also cites to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 

221 F.3d 1318, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000), and argues that it did not have duty to explain the 

materiality of the references at issue. (Doc. No. 29 at 13.) But the Fiskars decision is of 

no aid to KFx because the Fiskars decision did not involve MPEP § 2256 and its specific 

requirements. See generally 221 F.3d 1318. In sum, KFx has failed to demonstrate that 

Stryker’s proposed counterclaim alleging inequitable conduct during the reexamination of 

the ’311 patent is futile.

v. Stryker’s Allegations of Inequitable Conduct During the Prosecution of 

the ’287 Patent

In its proposed counterclaims, Stryker alleges that the ’287 patent is unenforceable 

due to inequitable conduct because Mr. Scott and prosecution counsel intentionally buried 

certain material prior art evidence related to double-row rotator cuff repairs. (Doc. No. 27-

2 ¶¶ 235-53.) Specifically, Stryker alleges that they “deliberately buried the 2011 

Statement of Tate Scott, the 2012 Scott Declaration, and the Millett Abstract amongst over 

250 references, and deliberately referred the examiner to copies filed in a prior application, 

with the deceptive intent of preventing the examiner from recognizing their materiality.” 

(Id. ¶ 248.) 

KFx argues that Stryker’s burying theory of inequitable conduct fails as a matter of 

law. (Doc. No. 29 at 15-16.) The Court agrees. “[T]he alleged burying of material 

information in a long list of citations to the PTO by itself is insufficient to state a claim for 

inequitable conduct.” Seaboard Int’l, Inc. v. Cameron Int’l Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00281-

MLH-SK, 2013 WL 3936889, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2013); see HVLPO2, LLC, v. 

Oxygen Frog, LLC, No. 4:16CV336-MW/CAS, 2018 WL 6492972, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 

21, 2018); ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1318 (M.D. Fla. 

2013); Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 353, 358 (D. Del. 

2009); see also Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1327 (“[a]n applicant can not be guilty of inequitable 

conduct if the reference was cited to the examiner, whether or not it was a ground of 

rejection by the examiner.”); but see Coolsystems, Inc. v. Nice Recovery Sys. LLC, No. 

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16-CV-02958-PJH, 2016 WL 6091577, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2016) (“‘[B]urying’ can 

state a claim for inequitable conduct.”). Thus, Stryker’s allegations of inequitable conduct 

based on the alleged burying of material references fail as a matter of law.

In its proposed counterclaims, Stryker also alleges that the ’287 patent is 

unenforceable due to inequitable conduct because Mr. Scott and prosecution counsel 

intentionally buried and withheld the 2004 Millet Slides prior art reference during the 

prosecution of the ’287 patent. (Doc. No. 27-2 ¶¶ 254-285.) KFx argues that these 

inequitable conduct allegations are futile because the Millet Slides were cumulative in light 

of the prior art that before the examiner. (Doc. No. 29 at 16-18.)

In order to properly plead a claim for inequitable conduct, the claimant must 

adequately allege that the information at issue is “material.” Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327. 

It is well established “that information is not material if it is cumulative of other 

information already disclosed to the PTO.” Star Sci., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 

537 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008); accord Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 

F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“A reference is not but-for material, however, if it is 

merely cumulative.”); see 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (“[I]nformation is material to patentability 

[only] when it is not cumulative to information already of record or being made of record 

in the application.”). Thus, a claim of inequitable conduct that is premised on allegations 

that the patentee failed to disclose cumulative information fails as a matter of law. See

Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A reference that is 

cumulative to other references of record does not meet the threshold of materiality needed 

to prove inequitable conduct.”); see also Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 

1328 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A] patentee need not cite an otherwise material reference to the 

PTO if that reference is merely cumulative or is less material than other references already 

before the examiner.”) Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1443 

(Fed. Cir. 1991) (a patentee “ha[s] no obligation to disclose cumulative references”). “A 

reference is cumulative when it ‘teaches no more than what a reasonable examiner would 

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consider to be taught by the prior art already before the PTO.’” Regeneron Pharm., 864 

F.3d at 1350.

In its allegations, Stryker concedes that KFx filed an information disclosure 

statement during the prosecution of the ’287 Patent that identified the 2004 Millett Article 

and 2011 Scott Statement prior art references to the examiner. (Doc. No. 27-2 ¶ 224.) KFx 

notes that Stryker’s own allegations further concede that the 2004 Millett Article contains 

all of the material information, other than dates, that Stryker alleges is contained in the 

2004 Millett Slides. (Doc. No. 29 at 16-17.) Stryker does not dispute this. Indeed, in its 

reply, Stryker states: “Like the 2004 Millett Article, the Millett Slides disclosed every 

limitation of claim 1 of the ’287 Patent with the exception of a knotless ‘second anchor,’ 

as well as the exact limitation that the examiner found to be missing from the other prior 

art of record when he allowed the final claims of the ’287 Patent.” (Doc. No. 31 at 9-10.) 

Stryker argues that the 2004 Millet Slides were a more material reference than the 

2004 Millet Article because the slides were presented to the public between January 8-10, 

2004, which is an earlier date than the October 2004 date of the 2004 Millett Article. (Doc. 

No. 31 at 9-10.) In response, KFx notes that the 2011 Scott statement, which was also 

before the examiner, disclosed that Dr. Millett told Mr. Scott that Dr. Millett performed the 

procedures in the 2004 Millett Article in a clinical setting for two years prior to October 

2004. (Doc. No. 29 at 17.) This is consistent with Stryker’s proposed allegations. In the 

proposed counterclaims, Stryker alleges: “the 2011 Statement of Tate Scott, the 2012 Scott 

Declaration both evidence the fact that Dr. Millett performed the procedures set forth in 

the 2004 Millett Article between 2002 and 2004.” (Doc. No. 27-2 ¶ 244.)

KFx argues, thus, that the 2004 Millett Article when combined with the 2011 Scott 

Statement provides the exact same material information as the 2004 Millett Slides. (Doc. 

No. 29 at 17.) In response, Stryker does not dispute this. Rather, Stryker again relies on 

its contention that the 2004 Millett Article and the 2011 Scott Statement were buried among

the other references that were presented to the examiner. But allegations of burying are 

insufficient to state a claim for inequitable conduct. See Seaboard, 2013 WL 3936889, at 

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*6; HVLPO2, 2018 WL 6492972, at *5; ParkerVision, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 1318; Symbol 

Techs., 609 F. Supp. 2d at 358. Thus, Stryker is unable to adequately allege that the 2004 

Millet slides are non-cumulative of the other information already disclosed to the examiner. 

See Advanced Micro Devices v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. C 08-00986 SI, 2010 WL 

963920, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2010) (explaining that in order to state a claim for 

inequitable conduct the claimant must allege why the information is material and non 

cumulative); SKF Condition Monitoring, Inc. v. Invensys Sys., Inc., No. 07CV1116 BTM 

BGS, 2010 WL 3463686, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010) (same); see also Molins, 48 F.3d 

at 1185. As a result, Stryker’s affirmative defense and counterclaim for unenforceability 

of the ’287 patent due to inequitable conduct is futile because Stryker’s allegations of 

inequitable conduct regarding the ’287 patent fail as a matter of law. 

B. The Other Johnson Factors

The other Johnson factors favor granting Stryker leave to amend its answer and 

counterclaims as to its inequitable conduct counterclaims related to the ’311 patent. See

Johnson, 356 F.3d at 1077. Stryker has not previously amended its answer, and there is no 

evidence of bad faith by Stryker or prejudice to KFx. In addition, there is no undue delay 

because Stryker filed the present motion for leave to amend within the deadlines for such 

motions as set by the Court. (See Doc. No. 26 at 5.) Accordingly, the Court grants Stryker

leave to amend its answer and counterclaims to add allegations of unenforceability due to 

inequitable conduct as to the ’311 patent.

///

///

///

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Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant Stryker’s

motion for leave to amend. Specifically, Stryker is granted leave to amend its answer and 

counterclaims to add allegations of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct as to the

’311 patent, but Stryker is not granted leave to amend its answer and counterclaims to add 

allegation of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct as to the ’287 patent.

2

 Stryker 

must file its amended answer and counterclaims within 14 days from the date this order is 

filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 7, 2019

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

2 The Court notes that its partial grant of Stryker’s motion for leave to amend is without prejudice 

to KFx challenging the inequitable conduct counterclaims and defenses at a later stage in the proceedings, 

such as through a motion for summary judgment.

Case 3:18-cv-01799-H-WVG Document 38 Filed 05/07/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of 12