Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_10-cv-02218/USCOURTS-alnd-2_10-cv-02218-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EUGENE MILTON CLEMONS, II,

Petitioner, 

vs.

WILLIAM G. SHARP, JR., Interim

Commissioner, Alabama Department of

Corrections; WALTER MYERS,

Warden, Holman Correctional Facility,

Respondents.

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CASE NO. 2:10-CV-2218-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is presently pending before the court on respondents’ Motion to Dismiss

Eugene Clemons’s Untimely-filed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 25.)1 Petitioner

Eugene Milton Clemons, II, protectively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

court on August 16, 2010. (Doc. 1.) After a stay of the matter pending additional state postconviction proceedings, respondents, WilliamG. Sharp, Jr. and Walter Myers, filed a Motion

seeking to dismiss Clemons’s petition as untimely filed. Upon consideration of the record,

the submissions of the parties, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that

respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Eugene Clemons’s Untimely-filed Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, (doc. 25), is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

1Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to each

document as it is filed in the court’s record.

FILED

 2015 Mar-17 AM 09:38

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:10-cv-02218-LSC Document 33 Filed 03/17/15 Page 1 of 16
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [hereinafter

“AEDPA”], Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA):

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of – 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d). “[Subsection] 2244(d)(1) provides that a ‘1-year period of limitation

shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus.’” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 416 n.6 (2005)(emphasis in Pace). Subsection 2244(d)(1) “provides one means of

calculating the limitation with regard to the ‘application’ as a whole, § 2244(d)(1)(A)(date

offinal judgment), butthree others . . . require claim-by-claimconsideration, § 2244(d)(1)(B)

2

Case 2:10-cv-02218-LSC Document 33 Filed 03/17/15 Page 2 of 16
(governmental interference); § 2244(d)(1)(C)(new right made retroactive); § 2244(d)(1)(D)

(new factual predicate).” Id. In this Circuit, “the statute of limitations in AEDPA applies

on a claim-by-claim basis in a multiple trigger date case.” Zack v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 917, 926

(11th Cir.)(en banc); see also id. at 927 (Carnes, J., concurring specially)(“Adopting the

petitioner’s interpretation of the statutory language [that § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) applied to the

application as a whole] would mean that every time the Supreme Court issued a decision

recognizing a new, retroactively applicable constitutional right, the statute of limitations bar

would be lifted for any and all other claims a petitioner wished to bring. And that would be

true no matter how old those other claims were, no matter how unrelated they were to the

new law claim, and no matter how baseless the new law claim was in that case.”).

This case is a “multiple trigger date case.” See id. at 926. Petitioner has raised an

Atkins claim,

2

(doc. 1 ¶¶ 27-41, at pp. 27-30 [stating as a ground for relief, “Mr. Clemons is

2On June 2, 2002, the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 

In Atkins, the Supreme Court held:

Our independent evaluation of the issue reveals no reason to disagree with the

judgment of the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter and

concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded

criminal. We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded

criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of

the death penalty. Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light

of our evolving standards of decency, we therefore conclude that such

punishment is excessive and that the Constitution places a substantive

restriction on the State’s power to take the life of a mentally retarded offender.

Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted). “[T]here is no question that the rule . . .

announced by the Supreme Court in Atkins . . . is a new rule of constitutional law made

3

Case 2:10-cv-02218-LSC Document 33 Filed 03/17/15 Page 3 of 16
mentally retarded and cannot be executed under the United States Supreme Court decision

in Atkins v. Virginia”]), which the parties agree is timely pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(C). (Doc.

28 at 25; doc. 30 at 22.) Therefore, respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 25), will be

denied as to petitioner’s Atkins claim.

As for Clemons’s remaining grounds for relief, respondents contend the claims are

barred by § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s one-year statute of limitations, and such claims are not subject

to either statutory or equitable tolling.

A. STATUTORY TOLLING

The issue for this court to decide is whether petitioner’s Rule 32 post-conviction

petition was “properly filed” in the Alabama state court on December 27, 1999, or on January

28, 2000. Clemons’s conviction became final on January 25, 1999, the date the Supreme

Court of the United States denied his petition for writ of certiorari. Pursuant to § 2244(d)(1),

Clemons had one year to file his federal habeas petition; however, this one-year limitations

period is tolled while “a properlyfiled application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending,” id. (d)(2). Therefore, if

Clemons’s Rule 32 petition was “properly filed” on December 27, 1999, the time for filing

his habeas petition in this court was tolled and his habeas petition is timely. However, if his

Rule 32 petition was not “properly filed” until January 28, 2000, the time for filing his

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that was previously

unavailable.” In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 2003).

4

Case 2:10-cv-02218-LSC Document 33 Filed 03/17/15 Page 4 of 16
federal habeas petition expired and his petition, save his Atkins claim, was untimely filed.3

See Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004)(“We note in closing that none

of the documents Sibley attempted to file with the state courts after August 10, 2001 – the

deadline for filing a federal habeas petition – could in any way toll that deadline because,

once a deadline has expired, there is nothing left to toll. A state court filing after the federal

habeas filing deadline does not revive it.” (citing Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377, 1381

(11th Cir. 2003))).

The undisputed facts show that Clemons, represented by counsel, filed his Petition for

Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure

[hereinafter “Rule 32 Petition”] without a filing fee or application to waive the filing fee and

proceed in forma pauperis. Clemons has filed a copy of his Rule 32 Petition, which was

stamped “received & filed” on December 27, 1999, by the Court Clerk of the Circuit Court

of Shelby County. (Doc. 28-1 at 2.) His Rule 32 Petition contained the following request

for relief – “Provide Mr. Clemons, who is indigent and incarcerated, funds sufficient to

present witnesses, experts, and other evidence in support of the allegations in this Petition

and any amendments thereto.” (Id. at 32.)

On December 27, 1999, Rule 32.6(a) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedures

provided:

3The parties agree that, unless tolled, the deadline for filing his federal habeas petition

expired no later than January 26, 2000. (See doc. 25 at 9; doc. 28 at 7.) 

5

Case 2:10-cv-02218-LSC Document 33 Filed 03/17/15 Page 5 of 16
A proceeding under this rule is commenced by filing a petition, verified by the

petitioner or petitioner's attorney, with the clerk of the court. A petition may

be filed at any time after entry of judgment and sentence (subject to the

provisions of Rule 32.2(c)).4 The petition should be filed by using or

following the form accompanying this rule. If that form is not used or

followed, the court shall return the petition to the petitioner to be amended to

comply with the form. The petition shall be accompanied by two copies

thereof. It shall also be accompanied by the filing fee prescribed by law or

rule in civil cases in circuit court unless the petitioner applies for and is given

leave to prosecute the petition in forma pauperis, in which event the fee shall

be waived. If the petitioner desires to prosecute the petition in forma pauperis,

he shall file the In Forma Pauperis Declaration at the end of the form. In all

such cases, the petition shall also be accompanied by a certificate of the

warden or other appropriate officer of the institution in which the petitioner is

confined as to the amount of money or securities on deposit to the petitioner's

credit in any account in the institution, which certificate may be considered by

the court in acting upon his application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

Upon receipt of the petition and the filing fee, or an order granting leave to the

petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis, the clerk shall file the petition5and

promptly send a copy to the district attorney (or, in the case of a petition filed

in the municipal court, to the municipal prosecutor).

Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.6(a)(2000)(footnotes and emphasis added).

4On December 27, 1999, Rule 32.2(c) provided that a two-year statute of limitations

for filing a Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, measured from the date the certificate

of judgment was issued by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(2000). 

Therefore, Clemons’s Rule 32 Petition was “timely” filed under Alabama law whether it was

deemed filed in January 2000, when he filed his application to proceed in forma pauperis,

or December 1999, when he filed his Rule 32 Petition without the filing fee and without a

request to waive the fee.

5The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held, “A Rule 32 petition is deemed filed

for purposes of the limitations period the date the petition, accompanied by a request to

proceed in forma pauperis, is submitted to the circuit court, not the date the circuit court

grants the request to proceed in forma pauperis.” Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344, 353 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2006).

6

Case 2:10-cv-02218-LSC Document 33 Filed 03/17/15 Page 6 of 16
The CircuitCourt’sCase Action Summaryshows that Clemons’s Rule 32 Petition was

“filed” on January 28, 2000 – noting:

Motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis filed.

Declaration in support of [motion to] proceed In Forma Pauperis filed.

Petition for relief from conviction or sentence pursuant to Rule 32 of the

Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure filed.

Grounds of petition filed.

(Doc. 28-3 at 2.)

On March 14, 2000, Clemons filed a Motion to Correct Clerical Error, asking the

court “to correct a clerical error of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Shelby County,” and

“direct[ ] the Clerk to docket, as filed on December 27, 1999, Petitioner’s [Rule 32] 

Petition.” (Doc. 28-7 at 2.) The state court set Clemons’s motion for a hearing and

specifically instructed counsel “to provide the Court with appropriate case law re: the issue

of filing without the appropriate Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and order thereon

being filed with the original petition.” (Doc. 28-3 at 3.) On May 4, 2000, after a hearing on

the matter, the state court denied Clemon’s Motion to Correct Clerical Error because “the

Court finds the Defendant’s Rule 32 Petition was properly filed on January 28, 2000.” (Id

at 5.)

The Circuit Court’s decision to denyClemons’s Motion to Correct Clerical Error was

affirmed on appeal. Clemons v. State, 55 So. 3d 314, 335 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003), rev’d on

other grounds Ex parte Clemons, 55 So. 3d 348 (Ala. 2007)(holding that Court of Criminal

7

Case 2:10-cv-02218-LSC Document 33 Filed 03/17/15 Page 7 of 16
Appeals could not raise procedural bar of preclusion sua sponte absent extraordinary

circumstances). In its decision, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:

In this case, the petition that counsel attempted to file on December 27,

1999, was not accompanied by a filing fee or a request to proceed in forma

pauperis. Therefore, the petition was not properly filed at that time, as

contemplated by Rule 32.6(a), Ala. R. Crim. P. Thereafter, on January 28,

2000, a Rule 32 petition and a request to proceed in forma pauperis were

presented to the circuit clerk, and that was the date the circuit clerk used as the

filing date for the Rule 32 petition. The circuit court did not grant the request

to proceed in forma pauperis until February 2, 2000. Therefore, the circuit

court should have used February 2, 2000, as the filing date.6 However, as the

appellant concedes, any error regarding the filing date is not important in this

case because the appellant timely filed his petition. Under these

circumstances, the circuit court properly denied the appellant's request to

change the filing date to December 27, 1999.

Id. 

Clemons contends that his Rule 32 Petition was filed on December 27, 1999, based

on two rules:

First, when there is a discrepancy regarding a filing date, the petition is

deemed filed when stamped as such by the court. See Ex parte Nesbitt, 850

So. 2d 228, 229 (Ala. 2002). Second, if a petition initially contains some

insufficiency, such as an incomplete filing fee or IFP request, Alabama law

deems it properly filed when first submitted to the court so long as the defect

6

In Hyde v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Rule 32 Petition,

overruled the Clemons’s court’s finding that the Rule 32 Petition is deemed filed when the

filing fee is waived by the grant of IFP status. See Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344, 348, 353

and n.6 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006). It held that, “to the extent that Clemons holds that a Rule

32 petition is not deemed ‘filed’ until the date the circuit court grants the request to proceed

in forma pauperis, it is hereby overruled;” however, it noted, “In those cases, as in Clemons,

in which a petition is initially submitted without a request to proceed in forma pauperis, the

correct filing date would be the date the request to proceed in forma pauperis is eventually

submitted.” Id. at 353 and n.6.

8

Case 2:10-cv-02218-LSC Document 33 Filed 03/17/15 Page 8 of 16
is cured within a reasonable period of time. See id. at 231-32; Garrett v. State,

644 So. 2d 977, 980 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), overruled on other grounds by

Ex parte Jenkins, 972 So. 2d 159 (Ala. 2005); Hyde v. Alabama, 950 So. 2d

344, 353 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006). These two rules, separately and together,

dictate that Mr. Clemons’[s] Rule 32 petition be deemed properly filed on

December 27, 1999 because (1) the court stamped it filed and received on that

date and (2) the deficiency contained in Mr. Clemons’ initial IFP request was

promptly cured.

(Doc. 28 at 10.)

The fact that the Circuit Court Clerk stamped Clemons’s Rule 32 Petition “received

and filed” does not indicate that the Rule 32 Petition was “properly filed” as that term has

been interpreted by the Supreme Court. In Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000), the Court

stated, “If, for example, an application is erroneously accepted by the clerk of a court lacking

jurisdiction, or is erroneously accepted without the requisite filing fee, it will be pending,

but not properly filed.” Artuz, 531 U.S. at 9 (bold emphasis added; other emphasis in

original). The court, therefore, finds that the “filed” stamp on the face of Clemons’s Rule

32 Petition does not prove that his Rule 32 Petition was “properly filed” on December 27,

1999.

The undisputed facts show that Clemons’s Rule 32 Petition was not accompanied by

the required filing fee or an application to waive the filing fee in conformity with Rule 32's

requirements. However, Clemons contends that a request for relief included in his Rule 32

Petition constituted an application to proceed in forma pauperis, although not in the required

“form.” (Doc. 28 at 12.) As stated above, Clemons’s Rule 32 Petition contained this request

for relief – “Provide Mr. Clemons, who is indigent and incarcerated, funds sufficient to

9

Case 2:10-cv-02218-LSC Document 33 Filed 03/17/15 Page 9 of 16
present witnesses, experts, and other evidence in support of the allegations in this Petition

and any amendments thereto.” (Doc. 28-1 at 32.) This request for relief makes no mention

of a filing fee or ask for waiver of the same. The court has rejected this argument in a

factually-similar case. In Smith v. Campbell, Case No. 5:05-CV-1547-LSC-JEO, a death

habeas case, the petitioner Smith, like Clemons, had argued that his request to be provided

“funds sufficient to present witnesses, experts and other evidence” contained in his Rule 32

Petition was the equivalent of an IFP motion, although not in the proper technical form. The

court held:

Smith acknowledges that the Rule 32 application filed on September 27,

2001, was not accompanied by an In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) Declaration or

the filing fee. (Doc. 17 at 5-6). He also does not deny that he never filed a

Declaration or statement of his prisoner account, and did not pay the filing fee

until February 6, 2002. (Id.). Instead, he states that “Alabama law does [not]

require a motion to proceed in forma pauperis to be in a prescribed form.” (Id.

at 6 n. 5 (citing ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.6(a)). He further argues,

In the prayer for relief at the end of Mr. Smith’s state habeas petition,

Mr. Smith stated: “Petitioner Ronald Bert Smith, Jr. respectfully asks

this Honorable court to grant him the following relief. . . (b) provide

petitioner, who is indigent, with funds sufficient to present witnesses,

experts, and other evidence in support of the allegations contained in

this petition.” (E.H. CR. 157). While Mr. Smith’s request to proceed

in forma pauperis was not in the proper form, Alabama courts have no

authority to provide funds to a petitioner absent a petitioner being

deemed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, it is implied, that Mr. Smith,

in his prayer for relief, was requesting to proceed in forma pauperis.

(Id.).

Contrary to Smith’s assertion, the foregoing language in his prayer for

relief does not imply that he be granted IFP status so that the filing fee could

be waived. The filing fee is not even mentioned nor did Smith file a certified

10

Case 2:10-cv-02218-LSC Document 33 Filed 03/17/15 Page 10 of 16
copy of his prison account funds as proof of indigence. Smith also does not

provide any case law illustrating that Alabama has no authority to “provide

funds” in the absence of an IFP declaration. In order to properly file the

petition, the mandatory language of Rule 32.6(a) required Smith [to file] a

separate declaration form and proof of financial indigence by producing a

certified copy of his prison account. Smith clearly did neither.

For the foregoing reasons, this court rejects Smith’s argument that he

properly filed his Rule 32 application in accordance with State form and filing

requirements. The September 27, 2001, Rule 32 application was not properly

filed, and therefore did not trigger the tolling requirements of 28 U.S.C.

§2244(d)(2).

Smith v. Campbell, Case No. 5:05-CV-1547-LSC-JEO, doc. 32 at 19-20 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 15,

2009). 

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held:

Although the February 6, 2002 filing was timely under Alabama's two

year statute of limitations, it was not within the one year statute of limitations

required by AEDPA. Relying on statutory tolling, Smith[, the petitioner],

argues that we should consider the Rule 32 Petition as having been “properly

filed” on September 27, 2001, when it was originally submitted to the Clerk,

albeit without the filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

However, Alabama law precludes such a construction of AEDPA's

requirement for a “properly filed” state petition. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 148 L. Ed. 2d 213 (2000) (“[A]n application is

‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the

applicable laws and rules governing filings.”). Alabama law requires that a

Rule 32 petition “be accompanied by the filing fee prescribed by law or rule

in civil cases in the circuit court unless the petitioner applies for and is given

leave to prosecute the petition in forma pauperis.” Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.6(a). 

Alabama courts have unequivocally required that one of these formalities,

either the payment of the filing fee or the filing of an in forma pauperis

motion, be completed in order for a Rule 32 petition to be considered properly

filed. See, e.g., Ex Parte Carter, 807 So. 2d 534, 536-37 (Ala. 2001)(holding

that where neither a filing fee nor a motion to proceed in forma pauperis were

filed with a Rule 32 petition, the Alabama circuit court lacked jurisdiction to

11

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consider the petition precisely because the petitioner had omitted them); Hyde

v. Alabama, 950 So. 2d 344, 353 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)(“A Rule 32 petition

is deemed filed for purposes of the limitations period the date the petition,

accompanied by a request to proceed in forma pauperis, is submitted to the

circuit court, not the date the circuit court grants the request to proceed in

forma pauperis.”); Clemons v. State, 55 So. 3d 314, 333-37 (Ala. Crim. App.

2003)(“[I]n this case, the petition that counsel attempted to file on December

27, 1999, was not accompanied by a filing fee or a request to proceed in forma

pauperis. Therefore, the petition was not properly filed at that time, as

contemplated byRule 32.6(a), Ala. R.Crim. Pro.”), rev’d on other grounds, Ex

parte Clemons, 55 So. 3d 348 (Ala.2007), overruled in part by Hyde, 950 So.

2d at 353. [Footnote] Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the district

court's determination that Smith's federal habeas petition was time barred

because it was not filed within AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations, which

was not statutorily tolled because Smith's Rule 32 Petition had not been

“properly filed” during AEDPA's one-year limitation period. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2).

[Footnote:] Smith's reliance on Hyde as support for his position is

unpersuasive. In Hyde, the state court was willing to treat the date of

the original submission of the Rule 32 petition as the properly filed date

because the petitioner had fully complied with the state court filing fee

rules by filing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and it was the

court that caused the delay by not ruling on the motion to proceed in

forma pauperis for some time. 950 So. 2d at 353. Hyde's rationale is

simply inapplicable here, where neither the filing fee nor motion for in

forma pauperis was filed. Nor do we find Garrett v. State, 644 So. 2d

977 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), overruled by Ex parte Jenkins, 972 So. 2d

159 (Ala.2005), applicable to support Smith's argument that his filing

date should relate back to the date that his petition was originally sent

to the Clerk. Garrett addressed the requisite form for a Rule 32

petition. It is not applicable to the circumstances here,7

especially in

light of the Alabama law explicitly addressing the failure involved in

this case.

7Those “circumstances” included a request for relief, similar to that included in

Clemons’s Rule 32 Petition, and failure to pay the filing fee or file an IFP petition. See Smith

v. Campbell, No. 5:05-cv-01547-LSC-JEO, doc. 32 at 19-20.

12

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Smith v. Commissioner, Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 703 F.3d 1266, 1270-71 & n.4 (11th

Cir. 2012) Clemons contends that his situation “is readily distinguishable” from Smith

because Smith “addresses only a petition that did not contain any sort of request for IFP

status.” (Doc. 28 at 13.) However, Smith’s circumstances are indistinguishable from

Clemons’s circumstances.

Based on binding Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit caselaw, the court finds that

Clemons’s Rule 32 Petition was not properly filed until after the expiration of the deadline

for filing his § 2254 habeas petition. Therefore, Clemons is not entitled to any period of

statutory tolling pursuant to § 2244(d)(2).

In the alternative, the court finds that the Rule 32 Petition was not “properly filed”

based on the state-courts’ decisions denying his motion to have his Rule 32 Petition deemed

filed on December 27, 1999. See Carroll v. Price, Case No. 5:14-CV-0065-JHH-TMP, 2015

WL 225468, *4 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2015)(“For this court’s purposes, therefore, these [statecourt orders finding Rule 32 Petition not timely filed because no filing fee was paid with

petition] mean that petitioner never ‘properly filed’ the Rule 32 petition and it had no

statutory tolling effect.”). This finding is entitled to deference. Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3,

7 (2007)(citing, inter alia, Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-17 (2005); see alsoCross

13

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v. McDonough, No. 4:06cv460-RH/WCS, 2008 WL 817088, *6 (N.D. Fla. March 25, 2008).

B. EQUITABLE TOLLING

“[Section] 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). However, “a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling

only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649 (quoting

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418))(internal quotations omitted). “Because a lawyer is the agent of his

client, a federal habeas petitioner – who does not have a constitutional right to counsel – is

ordinarily bound by his attorney’s errors . . . .” Cadet v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 742 F.3d 473,

477-78 (11th Cir.2014). Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit has held “that attorney negligence,

however gross or egregious, does not qualify as an ‘extraordinarycircumstance’ for purposes

of equitable tolling; abandonment of the attorney-client relationship . . . is required.” Id. at

481.

But for counsel’s failure to pay the filing fee or submit an application for waiver of

the filing fee Clemons’s Rule 32 Petition would have been filed on December 27, 1999, and

would have tolled the time for filing his federal habeas petition. However, counsel did not

pay the filing fee or submit an in forma pauperis application to waive the fee until January

28, 2000, after the expiration of the statute of limitations for filing the federal petition. 

Counsel’s failure to pay the filing fee or submit an application for waiver of the fee did not

constitute an abandonment; rather, their error appears to have been “garden variety”

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negligence.8 Therefore, counsel’s error is not an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to

warrant equitable tolling of the time for filing his federal habeas petition..

8Counsel for Clemons has submitted an affidavit, in which he states that an employee

in the ShelbyCountyCircuit Clerk’s Office “informed [him] that a check for a filing fee was

not necessary to file the [Rule 32] Petition.” (Doc. 28-12 ¶ 4.) Also, he stated:

If the Shelby County Clerk’s office had indicated that a filing fee was

necessary, I would have sent a check . . . with the Rule 32 Petition on

December 27, 1999. If the Shelby County Clerk’s office had indicated on

December 27, 1999, or anytime thereafter, that a filling fee was necessary, I

would have had a check sent immediately to the courthouse. If I had not seen

the file-stamped Rule 32 Petition marked “received and filed” on January 3,

2000, I would have inquired and then sent a check. Because there was no

indication that a check might be required until after the In Forma Pauperis

Petition had been filed, no check was ever issued from my law firm for the

Rule 32 Petition in this matter.

(Id. ¶ 6.) Counsel contends, “As a result of my conversation with the Clerk’s office, it was

my understanding that no fee was required to accompany the Rule 32 Petition.” (Id. ¶ 7.)

The court does not question the reasons given by counsel for his failure to pay the

filing fee at the time he filed the Rule 32 Petition. Although he may have been misled to

assume that no filing fee or an application to waive the filing fee was necessary at the time

of filing, his assumption that the Rule 32 Petition would be “properly filed” on December 27,

1999, was not reasonable, even considering the statement and subsequent non-action of the

Shelby County Clerk’s Office. Rule 32.6 plainly stated that the filing fee or waiver of the

filing fee was required at the time of filing. Moreover, nothing in the words or actions of the

Clerk’s Office constitute an extraordinary circumstance that prevented counsel from paying

the filing fee or submitting an application to waive the fee on December 27, 1999, or filing

his federal habeas petition within the time allowed. See Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d

1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999)(“Equitable tolling is appropriate when a movant untimely files

because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable

even with diligence.”)

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court is of the opinion that respondents’ Motion to

Dismiss Eugene Clemons’s Untimely-filed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (doc. 25),

will be granted in part and denied in part. The court finds Ground I of Clemons’s § 2254

Habeas Petition, alleging “Mr. Clemons is mentally retarded and cannot be executed under

the United States Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia,” (doc. 1, subsection C.I., ¶¶

27-41, at pp. 27-30), is timely filed and, therefore, respondents’ Motion to Dismiss will be

denied as to this ground. However, all other claims set forth in the habeas petition, (see doc.

1, subsections C.II.-XXXII), are untimely and the Petition will be denied as to these grounds. 

An Order granting in part and denying in part respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Eugene

Clemons’s Untimely-filed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (doc. 25), will be entered

contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.

DONE this 17th day of March, 2015.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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