Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05647/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05647-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLEN R. WEBSTER, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-04-5647 REC/DLB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS, DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND

AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT

On November 7, 2005, the court heard defendant’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings and plaintiff’s motion to amend.

Upon due consideration of the record and the arguments of

the parties, the court grants defendant’s motion and denies

plaintiff’s motion for the reasons set forth herein.

On April 29, 2004, Glen R. Webster, proceeding in pro per,

filed a “COMPLAINT: Discrimination and Retaliation In Violation

of the Americans With Disabilities Act and Civil Rights Act”. 

On June 15, 2004, before the United States filed an Answer,

plaintiff filed an Amended “Complaint: Discrimination and

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Retaliation In Violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act

and Civil Rights Act”. The United States filed an Answer to the

Amended Complaint on October 15, 2004. 

The United States moves the court for judgment on the

pleadings. In addition to filing an opposition to the motion for

judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff filed a motion to amend.

A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

1. Governing Standards.

As explained in Wright & Miller, 5A Federal Practice and

Procedure, § 1367, pp. 509, 514 (1990):

A Rule 12(c) motion is designed to provide a

means of disposing of cases when the material

facts are not in dispute and a judgment on

the merits can be achieved by focusing on the

content of the pleadings and any facts of

which the court will take judicial notice. 

The motion for judgment on the pleadings only

has utility when all material allegations of

fact are admitted in the pleadings and only

questions of law remain. ...

...

Ordinarily, a motion for judgment on the

pleadings should be made promptly after the

close of the pleadings. If a party indulges

in excessive delay before moving under Rule

12(c), the court may refuse to hear the

motion on the ground that its consideration

will delay or interfere with the commencement

of the trial. The determination whether the

motion constitutes a delay of trial is within

the sound discretion of the judge. However,

if it seems clear that the motion may

effectively dispose of the case, the court

should permit it regardless of any possible

delay its consideration may cause. 

Conversely, if the pleadings do not resolve

all of the factual issues in the case, a

trial on the merits would be more appropriate

than a resolution of the case on a Rule 12(c)

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motion. 

This court held in City of Merced v. R.A. Fields, 997 F.Supp.

1326, 1331 (E.D.Cal. 1998) that the standard applied to a Rule

12(c) motion is essentially the same as that applied to a Rule

12(b)(6) motion. The motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim is rarely granted - it is possible only in “extraordinary

cases. United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966

(9 Cir. 1981). The pleading at issue must be construed in the th

light most favorable to the pleader. Parks School of Business,

Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9 Cir. 1995). “[A] th

complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim

unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In

reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true

all material allegations in the pleading at issue, as well as

reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. NL Industries, Inc.

v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9 Cir. 1986). This is so no th

matter how improbable the facts alleged. Neitzke v Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The question of plaintiffs’ ability to

prove its allegations is generally of no concern in ruling on a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.

1996). Courts need also to assume that all general allegations

“embrace whatever specific facts might be necessary to support

them,” Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School Dist., 37 F.3d 517,

521 (9 Cir. 1994), but need not accept as true “conclusory th

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allegations”. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9 Cir. 1981). th

2. Failure to Allege Compliance with Federal Tort

Claims Act.

To the extent that the Amended Complaint is brought pursuant

to the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States moves for

judgment on the pleadings. In so moving, the United States notes

that the Amended Complaint does not allege compliance with the

FTCA.

An action against the United States for damages resulting

from the negligence or wrongful conduct of a government employee

must be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§

2671-2680. As a jurisdictional prerequisite, a FTCA action can

only be instituted once an administrative claim is denied, either

actually or constructively by the agency’s failure to act upon

the claim within six months. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Therefore, a

FTCA action may not be maintained when the claimant failed to

exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. McNeil v.

United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993). Further, a plaintiff cannot

bring a FTCA action prematurely and then subsequently amend his

complaint after denial of the administrative claim because the

district court lacks jurisdiction over an FTCA action filed

before the exhaustion requirement of Section 2675(a) is

satisfied. Duplan v. Harper, 188 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10 Cir. th

1999); Sparrow v. U.S. Postal Service, 825 F.Supp. 252, 254-255

(E.D.Cal. 1993).

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According to the Second Affirmative Defense alleged in the

Answer, plaintiff filed a tort claim on August 10, 2004. As

noted, plaintiff commenced this action on April 29, 2004, before

he filed the tort claim. In his opposition to the motion for

judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff asserts:

[T]he Plaintiff has received the usual letter

of denial from VA that any of there [sic]

people did anything wrong. The Plaintiff

having spent many years as a National Service

Officer working in the VA system knew exactly

what VA would come back with. In his many

years of experience working in the VA system

he has never seen VA admit to doing any

wrong. The denial letter was provided to the

Defendants Council [sic] long before we got

to the point of going before this Court. In

the case in 2001 the same procedure was done

and excepted [sic] by the Court.

However, plaintiff does not address the failure to comply

with the exhaustion requirements of the FTCA. The fact that

plaintiff believes he knew what the response to the tort claim

would be does not excuse compliance with the exhaustion

requirements of the FTCA. In Webster v. Veterans Administration,

et al., No. CV-F-01-5271 REC/LJO, the United States moved to

dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of compliance with the

FTCA. After describing the jurisdictional prerequisites to an

action under the FTCA, the court noted:

However, at oral argument, the United States,

because of the allegation of a violation of

the ADA, agreed to hold this action in

abeyance pending the expiration of the six

month period. The court construes this

agreement to be consent to a waiver of

sovereign immunity to allow Webster to file

an amended complaint alleging compliance with

the FTCA, see Duplan v. Harper, 188 F.3d

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1195, 1199-1200 (10 Cir. 1999) (Plaintiffs’ th

filing of an amended complaint was treated by

the parties and the court has the institution

of a new suit against the United States under

the FTCA).

Here, however, no such agreement or waiver has been made by the

United States. The United States cannot be forced to do so

because of the strictures of sovereign immunity. Therefore,

plaintiff cannot rely on what occurred in the earlier case to

excuse his noncompliance with the exhaustion requirement of the

FTCA. Accordingly, to the extent that this action is based on

the FTCA, it must be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

The United States argues that the claims alleged in the

Amended Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice to the extent

that those claims are based on tort. The United States notes

that plaintiff’s claim was denied on February 3, 2005,

approximately eleven months after this action was commenced. 28

U.S.C. § 2401(b) provides in pertinent part that “[a] tort claim

against the United States shall be forever barred unless ...

action is begun with six months after the date of mailing, by

certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the

claim by the agency to which it was presented.” Because

plaintiff did not file a complaint within six months of the

denial of the tort claim, the United States asserts that the

claims alleged in the Amended Complaint are forever barred by the

provisions of Section 2401(b). 

The court agrees with the United States. The six-month

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statute of limitations set forth in Section 2401(b) commences to

run when the agency properly mails a notice of final denial. See

Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9 Cir. 1998), th

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1040 (1999). To proceed with the claims

under the FTCA, plaintiff would have had to file a complaint on

August 3, 2005. Plaintiff did not do so and, as noted above, he

could not have further amended the Amended Complaint in this

action to allege compliance with the FTCA. Therefore, any claims

for relief under the FTCA alleged in the Amended Complaint are

barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) and are dismissed with prejudice.

3. Americans with Disabilities Act.

The United States moves for judgment on the pleadings to the

extent that the Amended Complaint purports to allege a claim

against the Veterans Administration under the Americans with

Disabilities Act.

Judgment on the pleadings is granted on this ground. Title

II of the ADA does not apply to the federal government. Cellular

Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2 Cir. 2000), cert. nd

denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001).

4. 38 U.S.C. § 511.

Defendant also moves for judgment on the pleadings to the

extent that the Complaint seeks judicial review of benefit

determinations by the Veterans Administration, defendant

contending that judicial review by this court is barred by 38

U.S.C. § 511. 

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The exceptions set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 511(b) are: (1) 1

matters subject to 38 U.S.C. § 502 (Federal Circuit jurisdiction

over Administrative Procedure Act review of VA rulemaking); (2)

matters covered by 38 U.S.C. §§ 1975 and 1984 (jurisdiction of

federal district courts over suits on Veterans’ Group Life

Insurance, National Service Life Insurance and U.S. Government Life

Insurance); (3) matters arising under chapter 37 of Title 38

(involving VA housing and small business loans); and (4) matters

arising under chapter 72 of Title 38 (covering the appeals process

to the Board, Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and, ultimately

to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. See

Bates v. Nicholson, 398 F.3d 1355, 1359 n.1 (Fed.Cir.), cert.

denied, 125 S.Ct. 2294 (2005). None of these exceptions apply to

the allegations of the Amended Complaint. 

8

38 U.S.C. § 511 provides:1

(a) The Secretary shall decide all questions

of law and fact necessary to a decision by

the Secretary under a law that affects the

provision of benefits by the Secretary to

veterans or the dependents of survivors of

veterans. Subject to subdivision (b), the

decision of the Secretary as to any such

question shall be final and conclusive and

may not be reviewed by any other official or

by any court, whether by an action in the

nature of mandamus or otherwise.

In Price v. United States, 228 F.3d 420, 421 (Fed.Cir.

2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 903 (2001), the Federal Circuit

explained:

As amended by the Veterans Judicial Review

Act, Pub.L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105

(1988) (VJRA), the Veterans’ Benefits Act of

1957, Pub.L. No. 85-86, 71 Stat. 83,

precludes judicial review in Article III

courts of VA decisions affecting the

provision of veterans’ benefits, including

medical expense reimbursement. 38 U.S.C. §

511(a) ... The exclusive avenue for redress

of veterans’ benefits determinations is

appeal to the Court of Veterans Appeals and

from there to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

In Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d 1080 (9 Cir. 1980), the Ninth th

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Circuit addressed whether the district court had jurisdiction to

review the VA’s procedures for suspending or terminating studentveterans’ educational benefits. The Ninth Circuit noted that the

Supreme Court in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), held

that Section 211(a), now Section 511(a), does not preclude

judicial review of the constitutionality of veterans’ benefits

legislation. The Ninth Circuit further referred to its decision

in Moore v. Johnson, 582 F.2d 1228 (9 Cir. 1978). The Devine th

court then explained:

We have interpreted Robison to require a

examination of the ‘substance’ of an action,

to determine whether it challenges a

‘decision of the Administrator on a “question

of law or fact concerning a benefit provided

by a law administered by the Veterans

Administration,”’ ... or instead challenges

the constitutionality of an Act of Congress

... In conducting such an examination, we are

assisted by the legislative considerations

that prompted the passage of section 211(a). 

The Court in Robison identified two primary

purposes:

(1) to insure that veterans’

benefits claims will not burden the

courts and the Veterans’

Administration with expensive and

time-consuming litigation, and (2)

to insure that the technical and

complex determinations and

applications of Veterans’

Administration policy connected

with veterans’ benefits decisions

will be adequately and uniformly

made.

Here, the “substance” of the Amended Complaint is that the

Veterans Administration did not provide a machine allegedly

needed for plaintiff’s post-operative recovery for rotator cuff

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surgery on plaintiff’s right shoulder and pain medication in a

timely manner; that the Veterans Administration will not pay for

antibiotics prescribed by a “civilian doctor”; and that the

Veterans Administration will not replace “his appointed V.A.

doctor ... a doctor Yee ... with a English speaking American

Doctor.” None of these claims can be construed as challenging

the constitutionality of an Act of Congress. 

At oral argument, plaintiff contended that he is being

discriminated against with regard to benefits by the Veteran’s

Administration in retaliation for the filing by plaintiff of

Webster v. Veterans Administration, et al., No. CV-F-01-5271

REC/LJO. As noted, the caption of plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

refers to the “Civil Rights Act”. To the extent that the Amended

Complaint may be construed to be an attempt to allege a claim for

violation of constitutional rights, the FTCA does not contain a

waiver of sovereign immunity for constitutional tort claims. See

Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Furthermore, plaintiff cannot state a claim for violation of

constitutional rights against employees of the Veteran’s

Administration under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal

Narcotics Bureau, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), because such a claim is

precluded by Section 511(a). See Hicks v. Small, 842 F.Supp. 407

(D.Nev. 1993), aff’d, 69 F.3d 967 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Consequently, the United States is entitled to judgment on

the pleadings because of this court’s lack of jurisdiction under

Section 511(a).

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Plaintiff did not respond to the merits of the citation to

Section 511(a). Plaintiff does not argue that the statute is

inapplicable to his claims under the standards set forth above. 

However, plaintiff does state:

The Defendant can site all the Veterans

Judicial Review Act he pleases but it isn’t

going to justify the day to day treatment and

Lack of treatment we Veterans get on a daily

basis. If this Court sees fit to dismiss

this Complaint, the Plaintiff will be back to

file it again and again until his Complaint

is judged on it’s merits instead of twisted

stories to fit the issue at hand.

Plaintiff is advised that he has a remedy by law set forth

in 38 U.S.C. § 7104 by which he can appeal any benefits

determination to the Board of Veterans Appeals. If dissatisfied

with the ruling of the Board of Veterans Appeals, plaintiff may

appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims pursuant to 38

U.S.C. § 7252. If still dissatisfied, plaintiff may appeal to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292. Plaintiff cannot proceed in this

court if this court does not have jurisdiction. Plaintiff is

warned that he risks being sanctioned if he persists in filing

complaints in this court that this court has ruled it does not

have jurisdiction to consider. Such sanctions can include prefiling review of complaints attempted to be filed by plaintiff, a

requirement that plaintiff pay the court’s filing fee before

filing a complaint and/or other monetary or terminating

sanctions, including dismissal. While plaintiff has the right to

file a complaint containing allegations and prayers for relief

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within this court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the court

cautions plaintiff that plaintiff will be responsible for

considering the law cited by this court in filing any such future

complaints and that the failure to heed this court’s rulings may

lead to the imposition of sanctions as described in this Order.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.

In his motion to amend, “[t]o show the continual harassment

and Retaliation shown by the Veterans Administration”, plaintiff

seeks leave to add allegations pertaining to the delay in

providing medical coverage benefits to his new spouse and her

child after his marriage on February 19, 2005 and the reduction

in plaintiff’s benefits because of his divorce and remarriage,

plaintiff contending that the alleged actions were due to the

gross negligence and misfeasance of the Veterans Administration.

Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that

“leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” “The purpose of pleading is ‘to facilitate a proper

decision on the merits’ ... and not erect formal and burdensome

impediments to the litigation process. Unless undue prejudice to

the opposing party will result, a trial judge should ordinarily

permit a party to amend its complaint.” Howey v. United States,

481 F.2d 1187, 1990 (1973). However, “[t]his strong policy

toward permitting the amendment of pleadings ... must be tempered

with considerations of ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive

on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies

by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

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party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of

amendment, etc.’ Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 ... (1962).” 

Schlacter-Jones, 936 F.2d 455, 443 (9 Cir. 1991). th

Here, leave to amend is denied on the ground of futility. 

First of all, defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings

for lack of jurisdiction with regard to the allegations of the

Amended Complaint presently before the court. Secondly, to the

extent that plaintiff seeks to amend to include claims for

negligence and/or misfeasance against the Veterans

Administration, the proposed amendments do not include

allegations that plaintiff has complied with the requirements of

the Federal Tort Claims Act with respect to the proposed

allegations and plaintiff made no such representations at oral

argument. Thirdly, the proposed allegations challenge decisions

concerning the provision of benefits. As ruled supra, this court

does not have jurisdiction to conduct such a review because of

the provisions in 38 U.S.C. § 511(a).

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is

granted.

2. Plaintiff’s motion to amend is denied.

3. Judgment for defendant to be entered.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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