Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02342/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02342-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

RENEE ODETTE LANCASTER,

NO. CIV. S-03-2342 FCD DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF YOLO; COUNTY OF

YOLO, SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT;

SHERIFF ED PRIETO,

individually and in his

official capacity; SGT. KEN

FISCH;

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants’ County of

Yolo, County of Yolo Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Ed Prieto, and

Sergeant Ken Fisch (collectively, “defendants”) motion to dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6),

and 41(b), and motion for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 11. The motions are in response to plaintiff

Renee Odette Lancaster’s (“plaintiff’s”) second amended complaint

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,

the court orders these matters submitted on the briefs. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

alleging fifteen claims of sexual harassment and discrimination

in violation of federal and state laws. (Pl.’s Second Am. Compl.

(“Compl.”), filed November 29, 2004). For the reasons set forth

below, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part and their motion for sanctions in DENIED.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was terminated by the Yolo County Sheriff’s

Department on October 16, 2003. (Compl. at 4.) Subsequently,

plaintiff filed a complaint seeking recovery for the allegedly

unlawful termination. However, the initial complaint was never

served on defendants; thereafter on August 23, 2004, plaintiff

filed and served on defendants a First Amended Complaint. In

response, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and

a motion for more definite statement. Plaintiff did not oppose

these motions, but instead filed a non-opposition and request for

leave to amend the complaint. In its November 16, 2004 order,

the court granted plaintiff’s request for leave to amend,

providing her with one final opportunity to correct the

deficiencies in her complaint. Plaintiff subsequently filed a

second amended complaint on November 28, 2004. Defendants

responded by filing the instant motion, seeking to dismiss the

complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),

12(b)(6), and 41(b). 

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3

STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

a party may raise the defense that the court lacks “jurisdiction

over the subject matter” of a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 

It is well established that the party seeking to invoke federal

jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the court's subject

matter jurisdiction. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes,

873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). 

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the

standards the court is to apply vary according to the nature of

the jurisdictional challenge. A motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the allegations of

jurisdiction contained in the complaint as insufficient on their

face (“facial attack”), or may attack the existence of subject

matter jurisdiction in fact (“factual attack”). Thornhill

Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733

(9th Cir. 1979). If the motion constitutes a facial attack, the

court must consider the factual allegations of the complaint to

be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.

1981). If the motion constitutes a factual attack, however, “no

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of

jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733 (quoting

Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d

Cir. 1977)). Further, "[w]here a jurisdictional issue is

separable from the merits of a case," the court "may consider the

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4

evidence presented with respect to the jurisdictional issue and

rule on that issue, resolving factual disputes if necessary." 

Id.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a

court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted." However, the court may not dismiss

the complaint for failure to state a claim unless it appears

beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan,

792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court should take all

factual allegations set forth in the complaint "as true and

construed in the light most favorable to [p]laintiffs." Epstein

v. Washington Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Any ambiguity in the documents must be resolved in plaintiff’s

favor. Telluride Management Solutions, Inc. v. Telluride

Investment Group, 55 F.3d 463, 466 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, the

court must assume that all general allegations embrace whatever

specific facts might be necessary to support them. Lujan v.

Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990); Abramson v.

Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the

court need not "assume that the [plaintiff] can prove facts that

it has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc.

v. Cal. State Council of Contractors, 459 U.S. 519, 526. 

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be

read as a whole, and where specific allegations clarify the

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2 As support, defendants’ cite to O’CONNOR’S FEDERAL RULES *

CIVIL TRIALS (2005), which states: “When drafting a complaint for

federal court, the plaintiff must plead an adequate factual and

legal basis for its claims. Although notice pleading generally

suffices, in certain types of suits (e.g. civil rights,

employment discrimination, RICO, and fraud), specific factual

allegations are required.”

5

meaning of broader allegations, they may be used to interpret the

true meaning. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 230 (2000). The

materials that the court may consider is limited to 

the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and any matters which may be

judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See

Mir v. Little Co. Of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United States,

Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

ANALYSIS

A. Pleading Standard For Plaintiff’s Claims

Preliminarily, the court considers defendants’ argument that

there is a heightened pleading standard in civil rights cases

such that conclusory allegations are insufficient to survive a

motion to dismiss.2 Defendants are incorrect. In civil rights

cases, a heightened pleading standard is only applied to claims

in which subjective intent is an element of an alleged

constitutional tort. For example, in Magana v. Com. of the

Northern Mariana Islands, the court upheld the district court’s

use of a heightened pleading standard because the defendants were

sued in their individual capacities, and therefore subjective

intent could be, and indeed was, an element of the alleged

constitutional tort. Magana v. Com. of the Northern Mariana

Islands, 107 F.3d 1436, 1447 (9th Cir. 1997). However, in the

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3 Moreover, the court also notes that its November 16, 2004

order did not impose a heightened pleading standard on plaintiff. 

Rather, the order merely provided guidance for plaintiff’s

subsequent amendment. 

6

instant case, defendants Prieto and Fisch are not being sued in

their individual capacity, but rather are being sued in their

official capacity. Therefore, there can be no question as to

defendants’ intent, which necessarily makes defendants’ reliance

on a heightened pleading standard improper. Because no such

standard applies, the court must follow the general standard

requiring a liberal construction of pleadings in civil rights

cases. Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th

Cir. 1992).3 

B. Ripeness

Plaintiff alleges that she exhausted all of her

administrative remedies. (Compl. at 5.) Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), defendants, nonetheless, make a

factual attack on this allegation, disputing that plaintiff,

indeed, exhausted all of her remedies. Because this is a factual

attack, the court may evaluate the merits of the claim itself,

without having to take plaintiff’s allegations as true. 

Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733 (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav.

& Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). However, from

the materials provided by the parties, including, particularly,

Exhibit D of the Sarno declaration, this court cannot find that

plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies. While

defendants assert that the letter in Exhibit D is conclusive

proof that exhaustion has not occurred, the court does not agree;

rather it finds that the letter does not demonstrate that

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4 Nothing in this motion would prevent defendants from

bringing a motion for summary judgment seeking to show that

plaintiff is currently involved in the administrative action

referenced in the letter. In plaintiff’s opposition she merely

notes that she had received right to sue letters, which is not

the equivalent of exhausting all administrative remedies. In

(continued...)

7

plaintiff is continuing to pursue administrative remedies. (Cori

Sarno Decl. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss, filed January 20, 2005,

Exhibit D (“Sarno Decl.”).) 

The letter states that the hearing officer would not have

jurisdiction over many of the issues intended to be raised by

plaintiff, and asks plaintiff to indicate if and how she wishes

to proceed. (Id.) Specifically, the letter states that the

following claims are clearly not within the jurisdiction of the

hearing officer; (1) Labor Code section 132(a) retaliatory

termination claim, (2) EEOC retaliatory termination claim, (3)

EEOC claim concerning stalking and failure to properly

investigate, (4) any claims against a public entity, and (5) any

1983 actions in Federal Court, including Title VII violations,

POBR violations, and other torts. (Id.) In addition, the letter

states that no hearing is required regarding the “Skelly Hearing”

because plaintiff’s disability retirement claim moots the issue. 

(Id.) In light of these statements, it is possible plaintiff

believed that any further action regarding the hearing would be

futile. Essentially, the letter indicates a lack of jurisdiction

as to all, or almost all of plaintiff’s claims herein. 

Therefore, plaintiff may have believed that an administrative

hearing was not the appropriate venue to bring forth her claims,

and choose instead to bring the instant action.4 

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4(...continued)

addition, it should be noted that plaintiff does not have the

right to simply abandon her administrative proceedings. 

Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1088 (2003). 

Rather, plaintiff has the choice to bring either a civil or

administrative proceeding, and once she has chosen one route she

must see it through to completion. To allow otherwise would

effectively give plaintiff “a second bite of the procedural

apple.” Id. at 1090. However, because plaintiff alleges

“exhaustion” in the complaint, and because the present

documentation does not demonstrate otherwise, a lack of ripeness

does not bar the claim. 

8

C. Claims For Relief

1. Plaintiff’s Title VII gender discrimination claim 

To state a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff

must show that: (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was

performing according to her employer's legitimate expectations,

(3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) other

employees with qualifications similar to her own were treated

more favorably. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220

(9th Cir. 1998). If plaintiff establishes a prima facia case,

then the burden shifts to the defense to establish that the

“adverse employment action” occurred for a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981). 

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on many

enumerated grounds, including gender discrimination. Harris v.

Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2(a)(1)). Sexual harassment is a form of gender

discrimination because it is conceptually the same as imposing

more onerous duties upon one gender for the same pay as the other

gender. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir.

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5 It should be noted that in its November 16, 2004 order

granting leave to amend, the court stated that as to this claim,

in addition to several others, the individual defendants could

not be held personally liable. In her second amended complaint,

plaintiff no longer asserts liability against the individual

defendants in their individual capacity and therefore has

corrected this deficiency. 

9

2000). If sexual harassment is committed or tolerated by the

employer, the employer can be held liable. Id. 

A sexual harassment claim can be shown by proving the

existence of a hostile work environment, such that the workplace

atmosphere is so discriminatory and abusive that it unreasonably

interferes with the job performance of those harassed. Harris,

510 U.S. at 21. The working environment must be both

subjectively and objectively abusive: subjectively abusive to the

actual employee, and objectively abusive to the “reasonable

victim.” Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir.

1995) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22). The Ninth Circuit has

held, "the required showing of severity or seriousness of the

harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or

frequency of the conduct." Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878

(9th Cir. 1991) (citing King v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533,

537 (7th Cir. 1990)). Thus, in order to plead a hostile working

environment, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s alleged

conduct could unreasonably interfere with the performance of a

reasonable woman, and did in fact interfere with plaintiff’s

performance. Brooks, 229 F.3d at 924. 

In the instant action, plaintiff has sufficiently stated a

claim for discrimination under Title VII.5 First, plaintiff

alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her

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gender, which is a protected class. (Compl. at 9.) Second, the

court can infer that plaintiff experienced a hostile work

environment based on her allegations regarding a pattern of

sexual harassment in the workplace. (Compl. at 7.) Third,

because this court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the allegations of

the complaint, this court must assume that plaintiff was

performing according to her employer's legitimate expectations. 

Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6

(1963). Fourth, plaintiff alleges that she was terminated due to

her gender, clearly representing an adverse employment action. 

(Compl. at 6-7.) Finally, from the overall nature of plaintiff’s

allegations, this court can draw the reasonable inference that

plaintiff was treated less favorably than similarly situated men. 

Defendants try to rebut plaintiff’s claim, stating that

plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate reason, specifically

that she failed to give written notice of her leave of absence. 

(Reply Supp. Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss (“Reply”), filed March 25,

2005, at 17.) However, at this stage in the pleadings this court

must assume that plaintiff’s allegations are true, therefore

plaintiff states a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

2. Plaintiff’s FEHA claim alleging gender discrimination

Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim pursuant to

California Government Code § 12940 falls under the California

Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Courts evaluate FEHA

claims under the same standards as those under Title VII. See

Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. App. 4th 511, 517 (1998)

("Although the wording of title VII differs in some particulars

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from the wording of FEHA, the antidiscriminatory objectives and

overriding public policy purposes of the two acts are identical.

In an area of emerging law, such as employment discrimination, it

is appropriate to consider federal cases interpreting title

VII."); Okoli v. Lockheed Tech. Operations Co., 36 Cal. App. 4th

1607, 1614 n. 3 (1995). Therefore, the analysis and conclusion

regarding this claim is the same as for plaintiff’s Title VII

claim. As discussed above, plaintiff has properly stated a Title

VII claim, and thus also properly alleges a FEHA gender

discrimination claim. 

3. Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim

To establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, a

plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in a protected

activity, (2) her employer subjected her to an adverse employment

action, and (3) there is a causal link between the protected

activity and the employer's action. Wrighten v. Metropolitan

Hospitals, Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir. 1984). If the

plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden of production

shifts to the defendant (employer) to articulate some legitimate,

nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action. Id. If the

employer makes such a showing, the employee can rebut this by

demonstrating that the employer’s actions were motivated by

discriminatory intent, in essence showing that the “legitimate”

reason was simply a pretext. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). 

Here, plaintiff has sufficiently pled all of the above

elements. First, plaintiff alleges she engaged in protected

activity when making complaints regarding defendants’ actions,

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including sexual harassment, stalking, and unauthorized

surveillance. (Compl. at 10.) Reporting sexual harassment has

been found to be a “protected activity.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 928

(“Asserting one's civil rights, as Brooks did by complaining of

Selvaggio's [sexually harassing] conduct, is a protected activity

under Title VII.”); EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d

1008, 1013 (9th Cir.1983). Further, plaintiff alleges that she

was retaliated against based upon the filing of an EEOC

complaint. (Id.) This too has been held to be a “protected

activity.” EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir.

1989). 

Second, plaintiff alleges that she suffered an adverse

employment action when she was terminated. (Compl. at 6-7.) In

Ray v. Henderson, the Ninth Circuit stated: "[A]n action is

cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is reasonably

likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity." 

Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000). Clearly

termination would deter employees from engaging in protected

activity, and therefore is a sufficient adverse employment

action. See O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d

756, 763 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that termination is a

sufficient adverse action). 

Finally, plaintiff alleges that she was terminated as a

result of reporting defendants’ improper activity, thus

demonstrating a sufficient causal connection between the

protected activity and the adverse employment action. (Compl. at

6-7.) In addition to the causal connection, to support an

inference of retaliatory motive the termination must have

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occurred fairly soon after the protected expression. Villiarimo

v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2002). In the

instant case, plaintiff has not pled specific dates regarding the

alleged protected activities; however, at this stage of the

pleadings, this court must assume that the termination occurred

“fairly soon” after the protected expression. Miller v Fairchild

Industries Inc., 797 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that

termination within 2 months or less of the protected expression

is sufficient to show retaliation). Thus, plaintiff has

sufficiently pled all three elements and therefore states a claim

upon which relief can be granted. 

4. Plaintiff’s FEHA claim alleging retaliation for

engaging in a protected activity

As in gender discrimination cases, lawsuits alleging

retaliatory employment discrimination in violation of

California’s FEHA statute are analogous to federal Title VII

claims, and are therefore evaluated under federal law. See Beyda

65 Cal. App. 4th at 517; Okoli, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1614 n. 3. 

Thus, under the preceding Title VII analysis, plaintiff has

properly stated a retaliation claim under FEHA.

5. Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment free speech

claims

Plaintiff alleges that her termination violated her First

Amendment right to free speech. (Compl. at 11.) The United

States Supreme Court has stated in addressing an employee’s right

to free speech that courts must be mindful of protecting both the

rights of the employer and the rights of the employee. To remedy

this problem, the Court developed what is known as the

“Pickering” balancing test. Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Tp.

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High School, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). This test requires a court to

weigh "the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in

commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the

... employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services

it performs through its employees." Id. at 568; see also Connick

v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). However, subsequent courts

feared that this balancing test would compromise the proper

functioning of government offices, and have emphasized that the

test is only to be employed when the employee’s speech touches on

a matter of “public concern.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 143. 

Specifically, the Court in Connick held that a public employee's

speech is entitled to Pickering balancing only when the employee

speaks “as a citizen upon matters of public concern” rather than

“as an employee upon matters only of personal interest.” Id. at

147. An issue of public concern has been defined as something

that is a subject of general interest, of value, and of concern

to the public at the time of publication. Cox Broadcasting Corp.

v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,

387-388 (1967). 

In the instant case, plaintiff allegedly complained of

several issues of “public concern,” therefore her termination

based upon these statements was a violation of her First

Amendment rights. (Compl. at 11.) Specifically, the complaint

states that plaintiff complained of sexual harassment, biased and

improper EEOC investigations, and the abuse of government funds,

among other things. (Id.) Each of these allegations, assuming

them true, are issues of “public concern,” as surely the public

has a right to know of any acts of impropriety within the police

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department. 

In response, defendants claim that plaintiff was merely

airing personal grievances. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. To Dismiss

at 11.) However, contrary to defendants’ contention, even if

plaintiff’s allegations were of personal interest, that fact

alone does not require dismissal if there is nonetheless

sufficient “public concern.” Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d

512, 517 (5th Cir. 1974). The court in Smith v. United States

stated: “Smith's involvement in an issue of public concern did

grow out of his own personal interests in the subject since he

was directly affected by it. After all, who among us ordinarily

gets aggressively involved in issues in which he or she has no

personal interest?” Id. (Citations omitted). In the instant

case, because plaintiff’s speech allegedly was regarding issues

of public concern, she adequately alleges a First Amendment

claim.

6. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that “no State shall deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” This clause

guarantees the right of all similarly situated persons to be

treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473

U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state an equal protection claim

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the

defendant acted with intent to discriminate against him based

upon membership in a protected class. Barren v. Harrington, 152

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Where the challenged

governmental policy discriminates against a person on the basis

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of his gender, the classification must “serve important

governmental objectives and must be substantially related to

achievement of those objectives” in order to survive a

constitutional challenge. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197

(1976).

In this case, plaintiff claims that she was treated

differently than similarly situated male counterparts. (Compl.

at 11.) However, it is not entirely clear from the allegations

in the complaint how plaintiff was treated differently. 

Nonetheless, reading the complaint as a whole and making

reasonable inferences therefrom, the court can conclude that

plaintiff alleges, generally, that she was treated differently

than male employees when she complained to the police department

about things such as harassment and other “protected activities.” 

In order to rebut plaintiff’s equal protection claim,

defendants assert that the termination was not based upon

discriminatory intent, but rather due to plaintiff’s failure to

provide a written request for her leave of absence. (Reply at

17.) If true, this would suggest that there was not a gender

classification, however this is not a matter to be resolved on a

12(b)(6) motion. At this stage in the pleadings, this court must

assume that plaintiff’s allegations are true, specifically that

her termination was due to her gender. Treating persons

differently on the basis of gender is unconstitutional. Thus,

plaintiff states a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

7. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim 

The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against the

deprivation of liberty or property by the government without due

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process. To sufficiently plead a § 1983 claim based upon

procedural due process, plaintiff must show: (1) a liberty or

property interest protected by the Constitution, (2) a

deprivation of the interest by the government, and (3) lack of

process. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

As to the first element, plaintiff clearly does not have a

valid property interest in her employment. A government employee

only has a constitutionally protected property interest in

continued employment when the employee has a legitimate claim of

entitlement to the job. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,

577 (1972). Where an employee is terminable at will, there is no

legitimate entitlement to the job, but rather only a mere

expectation of continued employment. Id. A mere expectation

that employment will continue does not create a property

interest. Id.

However, even though plaintiff lacks a valid property

interest in her continued employment, this court finds that she

has alleged a valid liberty interest in protecting her standing

within the community. (Compl. at 12.) Courts have held that a

mere injury to reputation is not sufficient to assert a liberty

interest, whereas a showing of serious damage within the

community will suffice. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991);

Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.

1981). The court in Bollow defined what is sufficient to

constitute serious damage, stating, “to implicate a

constitutional liberty interest, the reasons for dismissal must

be sufficiently serious to stigmatize or otherwise burden the

individual so that [she] is not able to take advantage of other

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employment opportunities.” Bollow, 650 F.2d at 1101. 

Subsequently, courts have suggested that to maintain a cognizable

constitutional interest, the accusations must involve "moral

turpitude" on behalf of the individual, such as dishonesty or

immorality. Id. Further, as to the process required, the court

in Bollow stated that “when the government dismisses an

individual for reasons that might seriously damage [her] standing

in the community, [she] is entitled to notice and a hearing to

clear [her] name." Id. 

Considering the complaint as a whole, plaintiff has

sufficiently pled a cognizable claim under Bollow, namely that

she stands to suffer serious damage to her standing in the

community due to the accusations made by defendants. (Compl. at

12.) In particular, plaintiff alleges defendants’ involvement in

the initiation of false criminal charges against her. (Id.) For

the purposes of this motion, the court assumes that plaintiff’s

claims are true and finds that these types of statements are

sufficient to allege that plaintiff stands to have her reputation

within the community “seriously damaged” to the point where she

could be foreclosed of employment opportunities. Thus, plaintiff

has alleged a sufficient liberty interest. 

In regards to the other two elements of a due process claim,

plaintiff has also sufficiently pled that she was deprived of her

liberty interest without due process. (Id.) Due process

entitled plaintiff to a name clearing hearing to repair her

damaged reputation. Bollow, 650 F.2d at 1101; see also Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 & n.12 (1972). Because

plaintiff never received this hearing, her liberty interest was

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6 In her opposition, plaintiff only alleges a liberty

interest in her reputation, which she claims defendants denied

without due process. However, the complaint states that

plaintiff was deprived of due process in regards to her

disability retirement claim as well. (Compl. at 12.) While it

is not necessary to address the issue for the purposes of

surviving a 12(b)(6) motion because the allegation of injury to

plaintiff’s reputation was determined to be sufficient, it should

be noted that plaintiff’s right to disability benefits may also

represent a valid liberty interest. Board of Regents, 408 U.S.

at 577. The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that the

deprivation of disability benefits amounts to the deprivation of

constitutionally protected property. See Raditch v. United

States, 929 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991) (federal disability

payments); Knudson v. Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (9th

Cir. 1987) (municipal disability payments); Ostlund v. Bobb, 825

F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) ( "Unquestionably, the claimant

had a property interest in his disability retirement benefits.").

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deprived without proper due process. Thus, plaintiff has

sufficiently pled a claim upon which relief can be granted.6

8. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest claim 

As discussed in the previous claim, plaintiff has pled a

valid liberty interest in her standing within the community, and

has alleged that defendants deprived her of that interest. 

(Compl. at 13.) This is sufficient to plead a claim upon which

relief can be granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

9. Plaintiff’s defamation claim 

To state a claim for defamation, plaintiff must show the

intentional publication of a statement of fact that is false,

unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which

causes special damage. Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal. App. 4th 637

(1999). Where the words are not facially defamatory, special

damages must be pled to show inducement and innuendo. Babcock v.

McClatchy Newspapers, 82 Cal. App. 2d 528, 537 (1947). In

Rothman v. Jackson, the court described defamation as any

publication which would “expose [the] defamed person to hatred,

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contempt, ridicule, or obloquy or cause [the] person to be

shunned or avoided or injured in his or her occupation, or which

charge[s] [the] person with [a] crime, suggest[s] that [the]

person has an infectious or loathsome disease or is impotent or

unchaste, tend[s] to injure [the] person in his or her business

or profession, or otherwise cause actual damage.” Rothman v.

Jackson, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1134 (1996). Further, the defaming

publication can be either internal or external. Kelly v. General

Telephone Co., 136 Cal. App. 3d 278, 284 (1982).

In their papers, defendants claim that the statements

attributed to them are immune under California Civil Procedure

Code § 47 (b). (Reply at 8-13.) This section states: 

A privileged publication or broadcast is one made in

any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial

proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding

authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course

of any other proceeding authorized by law and

reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with

Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 47 (b). This privilege is absolute and

applies regardless of whether the communication was made with

malice or the intent to harm. Kashian v. Harriman, 98 Cal. App.

4th 892, 912-13 (2002). Further, the privilege extends not only

to statements made during investigations and judicial

proceedings, but also to statements made prior to any official

action or investigation. Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB,

32 Cal. 4th 350, 362 (2004). Thus, any communication concerning

possible wrongdoing made to an official governmental agency, like

a local police department, designed to prompt action such as an

inquiry or investigation, as well as communications made pursuant

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to that inquiry or investigation, maintain an absolute privilege. 

Passman v. Torkan, 34 Cal. App. 4th 607, 617 (1995). In Shaddox

v. Bertani, the court stated; “California has a policy of

encouraging reports concerning suspected misconduct or unfitness

by law enforcement officers. This policy is so strong that

virtually no complaint, no matter how ill-founded or basely

motivated, has yet been found sufficient for either criminal or

civil liability.” Shaddox v. Bertani, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1406,

1415 (2003) (citations omitted).

In plaintiff’s complaint, she sufficiently pleads a cause of

action for defamation. She alleges that the defamatory

statements were published with intent to harm, that the

statements were false, and that these statements directly injured

plaintiff. (Compl. at 13.) However, all of defendants’

statements are privileged under § 47 (b), and therefore

plaintiff’s claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

Plaintiff claims that defendants, either directly or

indirectly, made false criminal accusations to the District

Attorney, and filed false civil claims regarding her conduct. 

Clearly these statements fall within the § 47(b) privilege since

they relate to plaintiff’s alleged wrongdoing and were made

within the course of an investigation or judicial proceeding. 

Passman v. Torkan, 34 Cal. App. 4th 607, 617 (1995). In

addition, plaintiff alleges that defendants defamed her

reputation as a law enforcement officer. (Compl. at 14.) 

Plaintiff has failed to show that any of these statements fell

outside of criminal or civil proceedings or investigations, thus

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7 Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with prejudice because in

its November 16, 2004 order, this court put plaintiff on notice

of the deficiencies in her complaint and explained that she had

“one further opportunity to correct” these deficiencies. 

(Emphasis in original). Defendants extensively addressed the

privilege in their papers and plaintiff failed to adequately

respond. Thus, because plaintiff was given an opportunity to

correct the problem, but failed to do so, this court finds that

to allow her to replead would be futile, and therefore dismisses

with prejudice. 

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these statements regarding her fitness as an officer also fall

under the § 47(b) privilege, even if they were made with malice. 

Kashian, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 912-13. Thus, because all of

defendants’ statements are privileged, plaintiff fails to state a

claim, and her defamation claim is dismissed with prejudice.7 

10. Plaintiff’s POBR claim

Under California Government Code § 3309.5(a), known as the

“Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act” (“POBR”),

it is “unlawful for any public safety department to deny or

refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections

guaranteed to him or her by [the code].” One of the statutory

protections afforded to public safety officers is to have any

adverse comment regarding the officer shown to them prior to

placing it in their personnel file. Cal. Gov’t Code § 3305. 

Specifically, § 3305 states; “No public safety officer shall have

any comment adverse to his interest entered in his personnel file

. . . without the public safety officer having first read and

signed the instrument containing the adverse comment . . . .” 

Further, after being shown the adverse comment, the officer is

entitled to insert a written response into the personnel file. 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 3306. Finally, pursuant to § 3306.5(a), the

safety officer is permitted to inspect the personnel files used

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to determine that officer's qualifications for things such as

employment, promotion, and termination, upon a reasonable

request. 

Here, plaintiff asserts her POBR claim against the County of

Yolo, its Sheriff’s Department, and the Sheriff in his official

capacity. (Compl. at 14.) From the language of the statute, it

is clear that liability under the POBR does not extend to the

County of Yolo. Rather, plaintiff’s claim can only be brought

against the Sheriff’s Department, and the Sheriff because he is

acting as an official of the Department for purposes of

liability. Thus, the County of Yolo must be dismissed as a party

to this claim. 

As to the allegation itself, plaintiff states, “false and

unjustified documents were generated and thereafter maintained in

files used for personnel purposes to which plaintiff was denied

access, and [] plaintiff was never provided with the opportunity

to review and rebut said false and unjustified documents

maintained for personnel purposes by defendants . . . .” (Compl.

at 15.) These allegations clearly demonstrate a claim under the

POBR. Plaintiff claims that she never received an opportunity to

review or rebut adverse comments placed in her personnel file. 

This states a violation of §§ 3305, 3306, and 3306.5, and

therefore properly pleads a claim upon which relief can be

granted. 

11. Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim 

In order to plead a cause of action under the ADA, plaintiff

must show that she is: (1) disabled within the meaning of the

ADA, (2) qualified to perform the essential functions of her job,

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8 This court assumes for the purpose of this claim that

plaintiff is alleging a violation of her rights under Title I of

the ADA.

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and (3) suffered an adverse employment decision because of her

disability. Snead v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 237

F.3d 1080, 1087 (2001).8 An employee is considered disabled if

her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or

more of the major life activities. Braunling v. Countrywide Home

Loans Inc., 220 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2000); 42 U.S.C. §

12102(2)(A). 

As to the second element, "[a]n ADA plaintiff bears the

burden of proving that she is a qualified individual with a

disability--that is, a person who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of her job." 

Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999)

(internal citations omitted). There is some disagreement as to

whether a plaintiff who is seeking disability benefits can be

considered a qualified individual. Some courts have held that a

plaintiff seeking disability benefits is barred from bringing an

ADA claim because they cannot be a “qualified individual” if they

are disabled. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198

F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000); Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90

F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996). Specifically, in Weyer, the

court states, “[o]nce an individual becomes disabled and thus

eligible for disability benefits, that individual loses the

ability to sue under a strict reading of Title I's definition of

"qualified individual with a disability" because that individual

can no longer work with or without a reasonable accommodation.” 

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Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1108 (citing Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp.,

145 F.3d 601 (3rd Cir. 1998)). Taking the contrary opinion, the

court in Johnson v. State, Oregon Dept. of Human Resources

stated, "neither application for nor receipt of disability

benefits automatically bars a claimant from establishing that

[she] is a qualified person with a disability under the ADA." 

Johnson v. State, Oregon Dept. of Human Resources, Rehabilitation

Div., 141 F.3d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1998). The court goes on to

state: 

Because of the inherent differences in the definitions

of the term "qualified individual with a disability"

under the ADA and the terms used in ... disability

benefits programs ... an individual can meet both the

eligibility requirements for receipt of disability

benefits and the definition of a "qualified individual

with a disability" for ADA purposes. Thus a person's

representations that s/he is "disabled" or "totally

disabled" for purposes of disability benefits are not

necessarily inconsistent with his/her representations

that s/he is a "qualified individual with a

disability." Accordingly, they should never be an

automatic bar to an ADA claim. 

Id. (quoting EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Notice No. 915.002,

February 12, 1997, II.A).

In this case, plaintiff simply states that she is disabled,

and does not describe the disability in any manner. (Compl. at

15.) However, taking plaintiff’s allegations as true, this court

makes the reasonable inference that plaintiff is disabled within

the meaning of the ADA. Further, as to the third element,

plaintiff has alleged that she was terminated due to her

disability, which clearly suffices to show that she suffered an

adverse employment decision. (Compl. at 7.)

As to whether plaintiff is a “qualified individual,”

plaintiff alleges that she is currently seeking disability

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9 Nothing in this order would prevent defendants from

bringing a motion for summary judgement seeking to show that the

definition of “disability retirement” and “qualified individual”

are necessarily inconsistent. If it can be shown that the two

definitions cannot be reconciled, then plaintiff’s ADA claim

could be properly dismissed.

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retirement benefits, which suggests that she can no longer

perform the essential duties of her job. (Compl. at 12.)

However, following Johnson, and taking all inferences in

plaintiff’s favor, the court must assume, at this juncture, that

it is possible that she satisfies the ADA’s "qualified

individual" definition, while at the same time satisfying the

qualifications for disability retirement. Johnson, 141 F.3d at

1367. Therefore, plaintiff pleads a valid claim upon which

relief can be granted.9 

12. Plaintiff’s ADA reasonable accommodation claim 

In addition to forbidding disparate treatment of those with

disabilities, the ADA also makes it unlawful for an employer to

fail to provide reasonable accommodations for those with known

physical or mental limitations or otherwise qualified individuals

with disabilities, unless the accommodations would impose an

undue hardship on the operation of the business. 42 U.S.C. §

12112 (5)(A); McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1266

(citing Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (1st

Cir. 2002))

For the purposes of the instant claim, the analysis above is

controlling, finding that plaintiff has stated a valid claim that

she was discriminated on the basis of a disability. As to the

allegation that defendants failed to provide plaintiff with

reasonable accommodations, taking all inferences in her favor,

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the court must infer at this juncture that reasonable

accommodations were possible, but were not effectuated. (Compl.

at 15.) Thus, plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can

be granted. 

13. Plaintiff’s FEHA disability discrimination claim 

As previously discussed, because California courts rely on

federal discrimination cases to interpret FEHA, the analysis

pertaining to the preceding ADA claim also applies to this FEHA

claim. See Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal. App. 4th 228, 235 (1997);

Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir.

1996). Thus, for the reasons stated above, plaintiff has stated

a disability discrimination claim under FEHA. 

14. Plaintiff’s FEHA reasonable accommodation claim 

As noted above, this claim is evaluated under the same

analysis as plaintiff’s similar ADA claim. Therefore, plaintiff

also states a claim upon which relief can be granted under FEHA. 

15. Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim 

Under California law, in order to have an enforceable

contract, plaintiff must prove the existence of an offer,

acceptance, and consideration. Soldau v. Organon Inc.,

860 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1988). Further, for a contract to have

consideration, there must be a bargained for benefit or detriment

for both parties. Naify v. Pacific Indem. Co., 11 Cal. 2d 5

(1938). If one party has the option of withdrawing at its

pleasure without suffering any detriment, then the contract is

considered illusory and is invalid. Id. 

In this case, plaintiff alleges that a valid contract was

formed when County Counsel agreed to refrain from subjecting

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10 The court properly considers the letters contained in the

Sarno Declaration pursuant to Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699,

706 (9th Cir. 1998). Parrino holds that “a district court ruling

on a motion to dismiss may consider a document the authenticity

of which is not contested, and upon which the plaintiff's

complaint necessarily relies.” Id. Further, the court may

consider the document “even if the plaintiff's complaint does not

explicitly refer to it.” Id.

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plaintiff to any adverse action if she agreed to take a leave of

absence. (Compl. at 18.) However, defendants allege that

plaintiff was not fired because she took a leave of absence, but

rather because she failed to notify defendants of the leave of

absence. (Reply at 17.) This failure to notify was considered

an abandonment of employment. (Sarno Decl., Ex. F) From the

letter sent to plaintiff by Troy Smith, Assistant County Counsel,

it is clear that pursuant to the alleged “agreement,” plaintiff

was required to submit a written request for the leave of

absence.10 (Sarno Decl., Ex. F.) The request was to made by

plaintiff herself, and was to include doctor’s notes indicating

that the leave of absence was a medical necessity. Id.

Specifically, the letter states: 

If Ms. Lancaster’s treating physician determines that

she is medically unable to return to work on August 20,

2003, she may submit a written request that she be

placed on an unpaid leave of absence. Upon receipt,

the County will agree to grant Ms. Lancaster’s request

for an unpaid leave of absence. . . . The County will

grant this leave of absence to Ms. Lancaster on the

condition that it is medically necessary; therefore,

doctor’s notes must substantiate all time during the

leave of absence. 

Id. This court construes this letter as an offer requiring

acceptance by performance. Simply put, in order to accept the

offer, plaintiff would have to provide a proper written request.

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11 Additionally, the contract at issue lacks consideration

and therefore is illusory. In the alleged contract, plaintiff

had the option of withdrawing at her pleasure without suffering

any detriment, while defendants remained bound to the alleged

agreement. Thus, the contract is considered illusory and is

invalid. Naify v. Pacific Indem. Co., 11 Cal. 2d 5 (1938). 

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Here, plaintiff failed to plead that she provided a written

response as required, and defendants have asserted that plaintiff

failed to do so. (Reply at 17.) Plaintiff’s only response

regarding the leave of absence consisted of a letter from her

counsel stating that plaintiff would accept a leave of absence if

defendants agreed to certain conditions. (Sarno Decl., Ex. F.) 

The letter included no doctor’s notes. (Id.) In addition, the

letter was not a clear acceptance of the alleged offer because it

also recommended the alternative that plaintiff be put on an

involuntary leave of absence for medical reasons. (Id.) 

Defendants responded to this letter, stating (1) that it was not

their policy to place persons on involuntary leaves for medical

reasons, and (2) if plaintiff wanted to proceed with the offered

leave of absence, she would need to send a request herself, not

through her lawyer, and include medical certification that she

was unable to work. Id. Further, she was told that if she

failed to respond by September 22, 2003, she would be “considered

as having abandoned her employment.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff never responded, and therefore she failed to

accept defendants’ offer. Since there was no acceptance, there

was never a valid contract which defendants could breach.11

Thus, plaintiff fails to plead a claim upon which relief can be

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12 Defendants claim in their reply that the terms and

conditions of Plaintiff’s employment were governed by statute,

and not by contract. On this basis, defendants allege plaintiff

is unable to sue for breach of contract. While the court in its

order granting leave to amend suggested that it found merit in

this argument, upon reading the second amended complaint it

appears that this argument fails. Plaintiff is not suing

regarding her employment contract, but rather on the basis of an

alleged contract between herself and County Counsel, whereby she

was promised that no adverse action would be taken in regards to

her employment if she were to take a leave of absence. Thus,

because she is not suing under her employment contract, the

action is not governed by statute and a contract claim is proper,

even though it is ultimately unsuccessful on the facts here. 

13 Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with prejudice because in

its November 16, 2004 order, this court put plaintiff on notice

of the deficiencies in her complaint and told her that she had

“one further opportunity to correct” these deficiencies. 

(emphasis in original) The court specifically addressed the

breach of contract claim, and defendants also addressed the claim

extensively in their previous motion to dismiss papers. Thus,

because plaintiff was given an opportunity to correct the

problem, but failed to do so, this court finds that to allow her

to replead would be futile and therefore dismisses the claim with

prejudice. 

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granted, and the claim is dismissed with prejudice.12,13

D. Rule 41(b) Motion For Failure To Comply With A Court Order

In their motion to dismiss, defendants move to dismiss the

case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Pursuant to

Rule 41(b), the district court may dismiss an action for failure

to comply with any order of the court. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992). District courts have the

inherent power to control their dockets and, "[i]n the exercise

of that power they may impose sanctions including, where

appropriate, . . . dismissal of a case." Thompson v. Housing

Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). Despite this

authority, dismissal is a harsh penalty and therefore should only

be imposed in extreme circumstances. Hamilton Copper & Steel

Corp. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 898 F.2d 1428, 1429 (9th Cir.

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1990). 

On November 16, 2004, in response to defendants' first

motion to dismiss and plaintiff's non-opposition, this court

ordered plaintiff to amend her complaint in order to comply with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a). In the order, the

court noted that it was providing plaintiff with her last

opportunity to cure the problems with plaintiff’s pleadings. 

Further, in a footnote, the court addressed two specific problems

which needed to be remedied:

For example, as to individual defendants Prieto and

Fisch, there is merit to defendants' motion to dismiss

claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities

Act ("ADA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

("Title VII"), the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act ("FEHA"), and the Public Safety Officer's

Procedural Bill of Rights ("POBR"). (Defs.' MTD at

6-7, 9-10.) In general, these defendants may not be

held personally liable under those acts. Greenlaw v.

Garrett, 59 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 1995) (Title VII); Stern

v. California State Archives, et al., 982 F. Supp. 690,

692-93 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (ADA); Reno v. Baird, 18

Cal.4th 640, 663 (1998) (FEHA); Cal. Gov. Code §

3309.5(e) (Deering, LEXIS through 2003 Sess.) (POBR).

Similarly, as to plaintiff's contract claim, defendants

set forth a compelling argument that the terms and

conditions of civil service employment are controlled

by statute, not by contract. (Defs.' MTD at 8-9.)

(Mem. & Order, filed November 16, 2004, at 3.) 

As detailed above, in the second amended complaint,

plaintiff remedied the vast majority of the deficiencies in her

complaint, including both the specific problems noted by the

court. While the complaint still requires many inferences to be

drawn in plaintiff’s favor, it nevertheless adequately pleads

claims for all but two of the fifteen claims.14 Therefore, this

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14(...continued)

plaintiff has adequately pled the majority of her claims for

relief. However, the court notes that it appears from the

arguments advanced on the instant motion that many of plaintiff’s

claims may be subject to a Rule 56 motion.

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court finds that plaintiff complied with its order and thus

denies defendants’ Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss. 

E. Sanctions

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) states that a party

submitting pleadings, motions, or other papers to the court is

certifying to the best of their knowledge that the "claims,

defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,

modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of

new law . . . ." Pursuant to Rule 11, courts have held that

sanctions may be awarded where a pleading is frivolous, filed for

an improper purpose, lacks evidentiary support regarding

allegations and/or factual contentions, or is unwarranted under

existing law. G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096,

1109-11 (9th Cir. 2003). The decision to levy sanctions is

within the discretion of the court, and their imposition should

only occur in order to deter and punish improper conduct. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 11(c); Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363,

367 (9th Cir. 1996). In evaluating whether to issue sanctions,

the court must look at whether the conduct was “reasonable,” such

that it meets the standard of a “competent attorney admitted to

practice before the District Court.” Zaldivar v. City of Los

Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986).

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In the instant case, the court finds that neither

plaintiff’s complaint, nor her conduct, warrants the issuance of

sanctions. As previously discussed, all but two of the fifteen

claims alleged in the second amended complaint survive

defendants’ motion to dismiss, and neither of those which fail

can be considered frivolous. Further, even though in some

instances plaintiff pled only minimal details regarding her

claims, such is permitted by the federal rules, and this fact

alone does not suggest that there is a lack of evidentiary

support for plaintiff’s claims. Moreover, this court’s order

granting leave to amend did not impose a heightened pleading

standard upon plaintiff, and the resulting second amended

complaint generally complied with the pleading requirements under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Thus, the court finds that

plaintiff’s (and her attorney’s) actions were reasonable, and

therefore not deserving of sanctions. 

CONCLUSION

In the instant case, plaintiff has properly pled this

court’s subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. Further,

plaintiff properly pled thirteen of her claims, and the remaining

two claims, albeit inadequately pled, were not frivolous. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1) and 41(b)

is DENIED, defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion is DENIED in part and

GRANTED in part, and defendants’ motion for sanctions is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 20, 2005.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL JR.

United States District Judge

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