Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-05455/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-05455-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

** E-filed April 6, 2010 ** 

NOT FOR CITATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

FANG-YUH HSIEH, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

STANFORD UNIVERSITY; ERIC K. 

SHINSEKI, DEPT. OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS; and PHILIP LAVORI, in his 

individual capacity, 

 

 Defendants. 

____________________________________/

No. C09-05455 HRL 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Re: Docket No. 18] 

Pro se plaintiff Fang-Yuh Hsieh filed a Title VII employment discrimination complaint 

against Stanford University (“Stanford”); Eric Shinseki, Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”); 

and Philip Lavori, his former supervisor. Hsieh’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges that 

defendants discriminated against him on account of his age, race, color, and national origin when 

they failed to employ him for positions for which he claims he was qualified. He also alleges that 

defendants “blacklisted and blackballed” him in retaliation for his prior discrimination complaints 

and that “[t]here was a conspiracy” to prevent his employment. (SAC ¶ 4.) Although not attached 

to the SAC, earlier versions of Hsieh’s complaint included copies of two Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) right-to-sue letters from November and December 2009. 

Defendants Stanford and Lavori now move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims on grounds that the 

court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and that the complaint fails to state a claim. Hsieh opposes 

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United States District Court

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the motion. Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers, as well as the arguments 

presented at the motion hearing, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion.1

DISCUSSION 

A. Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 

A party may raise a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by motion prior to filing an answer to 

a complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). If the court determines that it does not have subject-matter 

jurisdiction, it must dismiss the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A lack of jurisdiction is presumed 

unless the party asserting jurisdiction establishes that it exists. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 

of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 

Stanford and Lavori argue that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Hsieh’s Title 

VII claims against them because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. They assert that 

his EEOC right-to-sue letters reference the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), not 

Title VII. They further allege that the letters show that Hsieh made ADEA charges against Stanford 

only. Hsieh responds that the court does have subject-matter jurisdiction over the SAC precisely 

because his claims are pursuant to the ADEA and that his right-to-sue letters prove that he has 

exhausted his administrative remedies. 

Even though Hsieh’s right-to-sue letters speak to ADEA charges and the SAC includes a 

claim of age discrimination, the SAC clearly pleads that his action is “pursuant to Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 for employment discrimination.” (SAC ¶ 3.) The SAC also pleads claims 

of discrimination based on race, color, and national origin, which are outside the boundaries of 

ADEA protection. See 29 U.S.C. § 623. During the motion hearing, Hsieh clarified that he is

alleging Title VII claims against the VA, but that he is alleging ADEA claims against Stanford. He 

said that he used a form complaint that did not allow him to add a reference to the ADEA. 

Notwithstanding this explanation, plaintiff’s SAC, as written, fails to put defendants on proper 

notice of an ADEA claim. 

/// 

 

1

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, all parties have expressly consented that all 

proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally adjudicated by the undersigned. 

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United States District Court

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Indeed, Hsieh’s statements to the court, along with the fact that he has presented no evidence 

that he first filed a timely charge with the EEOC against Stanford and Lavori concerning Title VII, 

see B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002), establish that this court lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction over any Title VII claims Hsieh has against these two defendants.2

 

Accordingly, the court must dismiss his Title VII claims against Stanford and Lavori. 

B. Failure to State a Claim 

On motion, a court also may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). The Federal Rules require that a complaint include a “short and plain statement” showing 

plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Yet only plausible claims that “raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level” will survive a motion to dismiss. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Defendants argue that the SAC fails to state a claim against Lavori because he cannot be 

sued as an individual under either Title VII or the ADEA. Hsieh does not address defendants’ claim 

of a statutory bar, but instead counters that he can sue Lavori because he “was not an individual VA 

employee” during the period of time at issue in the SAC. He also argues that Lavori must remain in 

the case so plaintiff can investigate his claims through discovery. 

Defendants are correct that Lavori is not a proper defendant under Title VII or the ADEA. 

“The liability schemes under Title VII and the ADEA are essentially the same in aspects relevant to 

this issue; they both limit civil liability to the employer.” Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 

583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993). The ADEA defines “employer” to include “a person engaged in an 

industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of 

twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year” as well as “any agent of 

such a person.” 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). Yet Congress only meant by this definition to extend 

respondeat superior liability to employers—not to extend liability to individuals. Miller, 991 F.2d at 

588; see also Heilman v. Memeo, No. 08-16705, 2009 WL 4912629 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2009) (“[A] 

supervisor cannot be held liable in his individual capacity for violating the ADEA.”). Consequently, 

/// 

 

2

 The VA answered the SAC (Docket No. 22) and has not yet challenged Hsieh’s Title VII claims. 

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Hsieh cannot sue Lavori as an individual under either Title VII or the ADEA, regardless of whether 

Lavori worked for Stanford or the VA at the time of the allegations in his complaint. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing: 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is GRANTED 

without leave to amend as to plaintiff’s Title VII claims against them. This order does 

not disturb plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the VA. 

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is GRANTED with 

leave to amend as to plaintiff’s ADEA claims. 

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Lavori for failure to state a claim is GRANTED without 

leave to amend. 

4. Plaintiff may file a Third Amended Complaint by April 23, 2010. 

5. The Initial Case Management Conference is CONTINUED to May 25, 2010 at 1:30 p.m. 

The parties shall file a Joint Case Management Statement by May 18, 2010. 

6. Discovery is stayed until the parties meet and confer as required by Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 26(f). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 6, 2010 

HOWARD R. LLOYD 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

C09-05455 Notice will be electronically mailed to: 

Jennifer S Wang jennifer.s.wang@usdoj.gov, bonny.wong@usdoj.gov, lily.c.ho- 

 vuong@usdoj.gov 

Rosa Maria Loya rosa.loya@pillsburylaw.com, docket@pillsburylaw.com 

Sarah G. Flanagan sarah.flanagan@pillsburylaw.com, docket@pillsburylaw.com, 

 susie.macken@pillsburylaw.com 

Notice will be sent by other means to:

Fang-Yuh Hsieh 

1394 University Avenue 

Palo Alto, CA 94301 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not 

registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program. 

 

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