Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01245/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01245-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Cosme Covarrubias-Villarreal, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV 12-1245-PHX-GMS (DKD)

No. CR 11-806-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Movant Cosme Covarrubias-Villarreal, who is confined in the Community Education

Centers’ Limestone County Detention Center in Groesbeck, Texas, filed a pro se Motion

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal

Custody and a Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2 in 12-CV-1245-PHX-GMS

(DKD)). The Court will summarily dismiss the motion.

I. Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

There are no filing fees or court costs associated with a § 2255 proceeding. See Rule

3, Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, Advisory Comm. Notes (1976) (“There is no filing

fee required of a movant under these rules.”). Thus, the Court will deny as moot the Request

to Proceed. 

II. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to Re-Entry of Removed Alien, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), with sentencing enhancement pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(1). The plea agreement provided for a sentencing range of 3 to 63 months. On

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August 1, 2011, the Court sentenced Movant to a 37-month term of imprisonment followed

by 3 years on supervised release.

Movant seeks a reduction of his sentence or supervised release. He argues that his

attorney should have requested a time reduction pursuant to a 1995 Attorney General

Memorandum and that his attorney never instructed him about the opportunity for a

downward departure if he accepted a final deportation order. He also states that the Court

has the authority to provide for the deportation of an alien defendant as a condition of

supervised release.

III. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving

party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the

United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a

response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526

(9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982).

In this case, the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted

because Movant has waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.

IV. Waiver

Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” United States

v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume

waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d

1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a

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§ 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,

433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). The only

claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v.

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the

right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel

erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca,

985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective

assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4

(declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States, 396

F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth

Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily and

knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to attack,

in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

during sentencing.”).

As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

Providing the defendant’s sentence is consistent with this

agreement, the defendant waives . . . (2) any right to file an

appeal, any collateral attack, and any other writ or motion that

challenges the conviction, . . . the entry of judgment against the

defendant, or any aspect of the defendant’s sentence, including

the manner in which the sentence is determined, including but

not limited to any . . . motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and

2255. The defendant acknowledges that if the Court has

sentenced the defendant according to the terms of this

agreement, this waiver shall result in the dismissal of any

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appeal, collateral attack, or other motion the defendant

might file challenging the conviction, order of restitution or

forfeiture, or sentence in this case.

(Doc. 14) (emphasis added). Movant indicated in his plea agreement that he had discussed

the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and entered into the plea

voluntarily. (Doc. 14).

Movant’s assertions in his § 2255 motion do not pertain to the voluntariness of the

waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding the imposition of sentence and expressly

waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted his plea as voluntarily made.

Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the issues raised in his § 2255 motion.

Thus, the Court will summarily dismiss the motion. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Movant’s Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2 in CV 12-1245-PHXGMS (DKD)) is denied as moot.

(2) The Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

(Doc. 15 in CR 11-806-PHX-GMS) is denied and the civil action opened in connection with

this Motion (CV 12-1245-PHX-GMS (DKD)) is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of

Court must enter judgment accordingly.

(3) Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, in the event

Movant files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because

reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

DATED this 9th day of July, 2012.

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