Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01737/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01737-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 46:741 Shipping

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

(continued...)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAVERLY WALTON, SR., 2:05-cv-1737-MCE-PAN

individually and as 

successor in interest to 

FRED WALTON, deceased,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

CHANNEL STAR EXCURSIONS, INC.

AND BRIAN GERHART,

individually and as principal

of CHANNEL STAR EXCURSIONS and

DOES One through One Hundred,

Inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

In this action, the children and heirs of Plaintiff Waverly

Walton, Sr. (“Heirs”) have moved the Court to substitute

themselves as party plaintiffs in place of their now deceased

father, Mr. Walton (“Plaintiff”). Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 25(a). 1

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(...continued) 1

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

The Court has construed the underlying Complaint as having 2

stated claims for wrongful death and survival arising from the

death of Plaintiff’s son, Fred Walton. The Complaint provides

that Waverly Walton, Senior, is suing Defendants in “his

individual capacity” and as “the successor in interest” of his

son, Fred Walton. Pl.’s Compl. (“Complaint”), filed Aug. 26,

2005, para. 1. 

2

Channel Star Excursions, Inc. and Brian Gerhart (“Defendants”)

oppose the Motion to Substitute on the following grounds: 1) this

cause of action does not survive the death of the original 2

Plaintiff, Waverly Walton; 2) the Heirs are not the proper

parties for substitution; and 3) the evidence on the record

failed to properly identify the Heirs. For the reasons set forth

below, finds substitution to be proper and, hereby, GRANTS the

Motion to Substitute. 

 

BACKGROUND

On or about August 27, 2004, Fred Walton (“Decedent”)

perished after falling into the Sacramento River while attempting

to board the river boat Matthew McKinley by way of a gangplank

affixed between the boat and the dock. Defendants owned and

operated the Matthew McKinley on the date of the accident and

were responsible for the safe passage of patrons from the dock to

the boat. Nearly a year after the accident, the Decedent’s

father, Plaintiff Waverly Walton, filed the present action

seeking compensation for the Decedent’s wrongful death. Nine

days after filing this action, Plaintiff died.

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All references to the “Rules” hereinafter shall mean the 3

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

3

On October 20, 2006, Defendants filed a Notice of Suggestion of

Death Upon the Record pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

25(a)(2). Presently before the Court is the Heir’s Motion to 3

Substitute parties pursuant to Rule 25(a).

STANDARD

 

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over

civil actions, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests

upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391

(1994). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is never waived and

may be raised by either party or the court at any time. Attorneys

Trust v. Videotape Computer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d. 593, 594-95

(9th Cir. 1996). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be

raised by the district court sua sponte: “Nothing is to be more

jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.” In re

Mooney, 841 F.2d. 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1988).

If the motion constitutes a facial attack, the court must

consider the factual allegations of the complaint to be true. 

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981).

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4

If the motion constitutes a factual attack, however, “no

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of

jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. &

Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979).

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25

Rule 25(a)(1) provides that if “a party dies and the claim

is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of

the proper parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). Therefore,

before a party can substitute a new party pursuant to Rule

25(a)(1), the Court must establish that the substantive law

controlling the suit permits survival of the cause of action. If

the cause of action does not survive the death of a party, there

can be no substitution.

 

ANALYSIS

I. Admiralty Jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff bases this Court’s jurisdiction in admiralty

pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 740 (current version at 46 U.S.C.S. §

30101 (2006)). Although Defendants did not raise the question of

our jurisdiction, we have raised it, as we must. WMX Techs. v.

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1997); (citing Mackay v.

Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1987).

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The United States Supreme Court requires a party seeking to

invoke admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)

over a tort claim to satisfy conditions both of location and

connection with maritime activity (“Grubart Test”). Jerome B.

Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534

(1995). In order to satisfy the location test, a party must

establish that the tort occurred on navigable water or that a

vessel on navigable water caused the injury if the party suffered

the injury on land. Id. The connection test raises two issues. 

First, a court must determine that the incident giving rise to

the action has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime

commerce. Id.; Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 362 (1990)

(jurisdiction over tort cases depends on whether the incident has

“a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce”). Second,

a court must determine that the general character of the activity

giving rise to the incident bears a substantial relationship to

traditional maritime activity. Id. 

 

A. Location test. 

Rivers are public navigable waterways if they are used or

suspected of being used in their ordinary condition as highways

for commerce over which trade and travel can be conducted. 46

U.S.C. § 30101. The Ninth Circuit holds that the location or

“situs” test is satisfied when the injury occurs on or over

navigable waters. Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d. 1080

(9th Cir. 2005).

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Fred Walton suffered his injury in the Sacramento River, a

navigable waterway, where he drowned. Therefore, the location

test is satisfied in this case. 

B. Connection test.

1. Potential Disruption of Maritime Commerce 

The interest giving rise to maritime jurisdiction is the

protection of maritime commerce. Foremost Ins. Co. v.

Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 675 (1982). This interest is protected

when “all operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to

uniform rules of conduct.” Id. This prong of the test does not

require that the activity be commercial. Id. 

The United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have

addressed the potential disruption of maritime commerce in

various situations involving injury on or in navigable waters. 

The Supreme Court has held that a fire aboard a ship that damaged

a dock and could have damaged nearby ships was sufficient to

satisfy this condition under the Grubart Test because damage to

ships and docks could disrupt maritime shipping and navigation. 

Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 362 (1990). Conversely, the Ninth

Circuit has held that admiralty jurisdiction was not satisfied

when woman fell from a defective ladder and was injured because

there could have been no affect to any person or thing outside

the ship, and therefore could not affect maritime commerce. Peru

v. USS Mo. Mem’l Ass’n, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28859 (9th Cir.

2006).

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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that an internal carbon

monoxide incident occurring within a ship could not disrupt

maritime commerce. H2O Houseboat Vacations Inc. v. Hernandez,

103 F.3d 914, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit has

held, however, that a United States Coast Guard rescue operation

to recover victims thrown from a kayak by rough seas could

disrupt maritime commerce. Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d

1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005).

This Court must evaluate the actions of the alleged

tortfeasor, not the injured party, in order to properly assess

the potential for disruption of maritime commerce. Taghadomi,

401 F.3d. 1080 at 1087. The general activity in this case is the

organization and the carrying out of a cruise for entertainment

purposes. More precisely, the activity included providing safe

passage from to and from the ship via a gangplank, and the

performance of rescue efforts conducted upon the Decedent’s

falling into the Sacramento River. 

To the extent this case encompasses the traverse of

passengers to and from a boat, that certainly impacts maritime

commerce as it is a central part of maritime activity. 

Similarly, the transport of passengers along a navigable waterway

whether for entertainment purposes or not, likewise impacts

maritime commerce. Furthermore, faulty rescue efforts conducted

to retrieve a drowning passenger has the potential to disrupt

maritime commerce. Id. Accordingly, the Court finds this prong

of the connection test is satisfied.

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8

2. Traditional maritime activity.

According to the Ninth Circuit, as long as a potential

tortfeasor “was engaged in traditional maritime activity [,] the

allegedly wrongful activity will ‘involve’ such traditional

maritime activity” and satisfy this condition. Id. Plaintiff

originally claimed Defendants conducted the cruise negligently

and are the proximate cause of the Decedent’s passing. The

alleged wrongful activity involves the securing of a gangway and

the transport of patrons along a navigable waterway, which is

clearly a traditional maritime activity. Therefore, the Court

finds this condition easily met.

Given that the Court has found both location and maritime

activity under the facts presented by this case, the Court also

finds that federal subject matter jurisdiction in this matter

exists. 

 

II. Survivability and Substitution of Parties

Rule 25(a)(1) states that if “a party dies and the claims

[are] not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution

of the proper parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). The foregoing

Rule raises three issues in the present action. The first is

whether a survival action under maritime law survives the death

of the Plaintiff, Waverly Walton. The second is whether the

action for wrongful death under maritime law survives the death

of the Plaintiff.

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9

And finally, the third is whether the parties to be substituted

in the survival and wrongful death actions are proper. Each

issue shall be taken in turn below. 

A. Survivability of Survival Claim.

The Defendants argue that the survival claim in this action

cannot proceed as it does not survive the death of Plaintiff

Waverly Walton. In order to assess the merits of Defendants’

position, the Court must first determine whether maritime or

state law gives rise to Plaintiff’s survival claim and whether,

under that body of law, this claim can survive the Plaintiff’s

death.

The Ninth Circuit recognized a general maritime survival

action in Evich v. Connelly, 759 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Although the United States Supreme Court overruled that case, the

Ninth Circuit nonetheless has held that Evich, for the purpose of

bringing a survival action, remains good law. Miles, 498 U.S. 19

(1990); Sutton, 26 F.3d 903. Although it is clear a maritime

action under maritime law does not survive the death of the

Plaintiff, the Court has held that Congress and state statutes,

where applicable, preserve a cause of action that would not

otherwise survive. 45 U.S.C. § 59; Gillespie, 379 U.S. 148;

Miles, 498 U.S. at 33. The incident giving rise to this cause of

action occurred in the territorial waters of California. 

Therefore, this Court must look to California law to determine

the survivability of the underlying survival claim.

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10

The California survival statute states that a “cause of

action for or against a person is not lost by reason of the

person’s death, but survives ...” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.20. 

Consequently, this Court holds that the present survival action

on behalf of the Decedent and brought by the Plaintiff survives

and may be maintained by a proper party. 45 U.S.C. § 59;

Gillespie, 379 U.S. 148; Miles, 498 U.S. 19 at 33; Sutton, 26

F.3d 903 at 919; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.20. 

 

B. Survivability of Wrongful Death Claim

Like the foregoing argument, Defendants contend Plaintiff’s

wrongful death claim may not proceed as it does not survive. 

Again, the Court must first ascertain the body of law, maritime

or state, that governs this action to determine whether this

wrongful death claim survives the death of the Plaintiff.

With respect to wrongful death, the Supreme Court has held

that there is no general provision under maritime law, however,

“admiralty accommodation of state remedial statutes ... is

constitutionally permissible.” Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock

Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 815 (2001) (issue of state

remedial measure not addressed because petitioner sought remedies

only under federal law). The Supreme Court has likewise held

that state remedies have been applied in accident cases maritime

wrongful death cases in which no federal statute specifies the

appropriate relief and the decedent was not engaged in maritime

trade. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202

(1996).

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The Death on the High Seas Act (“Jones Act”) does not apply to

accidents occurring on rivers, therefore federal law does not

preempt in the present case and state law, in fact, does apply. 

46 U.S.C. § 688 (current version 46 U.S.C. § 30104); Cal. Code

Civ. Proc. § 377.61. 

While Plaintiff’s counsel incorrectly identified California

Code of Civil Procedure Section 377 as authority for wrongful

death actions under California law, it is Section 376 that

governs the issue. Specifically, Section 376 authorizes parents

to assert a cause of action for wrongful death for the wrongful

act or negligence causing the death of the parent’s child

provided the child is a minor. In light of the Court’s

conclusion that California law should govern this question, this

Court necessarily finds that the California survival statute is

controlling in determining whether the present action survives

the death of Plaintiff, Waverly Walton. The statute provides

that a “cause of action for or against a person is not lost by

reason of the person’s death, but survives ...” Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. § 377.20. Consequently, it is clear that the present cause

of action survives the death of Plaintiff Waverly Walton and can

be maintained by a proper party.

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 C. Proper Substitution

Defendants contend that the Heirs are not proper parties for

substitution under Rule 25 given Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to

assure the Court they are, in fact, Plaintiff’s heirs. In

response to the foregoing, Plaintiff’s counsel provided the Court

with a Declaration asserting that, in fact, the Heirs are the

beneficiaries to Plaintiff’s estate.

California law states that, “‘decedent’s successor in

interest’ means the beneficiary of the decedent’s estate or other

successor in interest who succeeds to a cause of action ... that

is the subject of a cause of action.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §

377.11. In Plaintiff’s Reply and Declaration, Plaintiff’s assert

that the children of Waverly Walton, (Waverly, Iris, Sharon,

Wanda, Jerry, and Tammy) are the successors in interest to

Waverly Walton and beneficiaries to his estate. See Doc. No. 34,

January 4, 2007. Furthermore, the Heirs assert that no other

person has a superior right to commence the action or proceeding

or to be substituted for Plaintiff in the pending action or

proceeding. Id. 

Because the present action survives the death of Plaintiff

Waverly Walton, and because the parties are proper parties to be

substituted, the Court finds substitution of the Heirs in place

of Plaintiff to be proper. Fed. Rule Civ. P. 25(a)(1);

Gillespie, 379 U.S. 148; Miles, 498 U.S. 19 at 33; Sutton, 26

F.3d 903 at 919; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.20; Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. § 376.

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III. Identity of parties to be substituted

Defendant’s contend that the Heirs are not properly

identified in the record and, therefore, may not be substituted.

The Court is satisfied that the Declaration and Plaintiff’s Reply

establish that Waverly Walton is deceased, and that his children,

(Waverly, Iris, Sharon, Wanda, Jerry, and Tammy) are the

beneficiaries of his estate.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds it may properly maintain jurisdiction over

this action as maritime jurisdiction exists. In addition, the

Court finds that both claims survive the death of the original

Plaintiff, Waverly Walton. The Court further finds that the

Heirs have properly established themselves as successors in

interest to Waverly Walton’s estate. Therefore, the Heirs are

hereby substituted as Plaintiffs in this proceeding.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 8, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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