Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05492/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05492-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alfred E. Caraffa,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Tempe (AZ) Police Department, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV 19-05492-PHX-MTL (ESW)

ORDER

On October 24, 2019, Plaintiff Alfred E. Caraffa, who was not detained when he 

filed his lawsuit, but is now is confined in a Maricopa County Jail, filed a pro se civil rights 

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In District Court 

without Prepaying Fees or Costs. In a December 16, 2019 Order, the Court granted the 

Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff had failed to state a 

claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that cured the 

deficiencies identified in the Order. 

On February 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Seizure of Personal Property for 

Payment Under Default Judgment (Doc. 9), a Motion for Default Judgment pursuant to 

Rules 55 and 55(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 10), a Motion of Right 

to Appear and Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 11), and a First Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 12). The Court will order Defendant Guajardo to answer Counts Two, 

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Three, and Five of the First Amended Complaint; dismiss the remaining claims and 

Defendants without prejudice; and deny Plaintiff’s pending Motions.

I. Statutory Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in a case in which a plaintiff has been granted 

in forma pauperis status, the Court shall dismiss the case “if the court determines that . . . 

(B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may 

be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.”

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 

not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 

(9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se individual] ‘must be held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

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II. First Amended Complaint

In his six-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendants City of Tempe, 

the City of Tempe Police Department, the City of Tempe Mayor and Chief of Police, and 

City of Tempe Police Officer Guajardo. He seeks monetary damages and the return of his 

trading card collection.

In Count One, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to excessive force when Defendant 

Guajardo “ran up behind [Plaintiff] and restrained [his] right arm . . . without stating he 

was a[] police officer and detained [Plaintiff] against his will.” 

In Count Two, Plaintiff contends Defendant Guajardo falsely arrested him for 

disorderly conduct-fighting while Plaintiff was standing on the sidewalk in front of a bar 

and grill and was not fighting with anyone “before the officer ran up behind [Plaintiff] and 

restrained [him] with no pro[b]able cause to arrest [Plaintiff] for fighting-disorderly 

conduct.” Plaintiff alleges he was only charged with disorderly conduct-fighting, the arrest 

was not supported by probable cause, and there was no probable cause for any arrest. He 

asserts the prosecutor subsequently dismissed the charge due to insufficient evidence. 

Plaintiff contends Defendant Chief of Police “is in charge of training” police officers and 

is responsible “for being the Superior Officer of the Police Department.” He also claims 

Defendant Mayor of Tempe is Defendant Chief of Police’s “Superior.”

In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges he was falsely imprisoned when Defendant 

Guajardo arrested him for disorderly conduct, handcuffed him, detained him, and placed 

him in the County Jail. Plaintiff asserts the trial court judge released him five days later 

and the prosecutor ultimately dismissed the criminal charge due to insufficient evidence.

In Count Four, Plaintiff contends he was denied due process because there was no 

probable cause. He claims the criminal charge was dismissed because of insufficient 

evidence to prosecute. Plaintiff alleges this “clearly shows that there is no pro[b]able cause 

for an arrest for fighting-disorderly conduct [and] no pro[b]able cause for any arrest to have 

been made or for handcuffing . . . and detaining [Plaintiff].”

. . . .

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In Count Five, Plaintiff contends he was denied due process because he was 

subjected to an illegal search and seizure. He claims there was no probable cause to detain 

or arrest him “so his property was illegally searched by officials” at Defendant Tempe 

Police Department and “illegal i[m]pounded by” Defendant Tempe Police Department for 

approximately three days “under color of law by [Defendant] Guajardo and other officers 

unknown to [Plaintiff]” at Defendant Tempe Police Department, under the authority of 

Defendants Mayor and Chief of Police of Defendant City of Tempe.

In Count Six, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to retaliation. He contends that a 

few hours before Defendant Guajardo arrested him, four Tempe Police Officers stopped to 

check Plaintiff’s identification, detained him, and told him that they “didn’t care about any 

judge[’]s ruling[;] you are not to set foot on AMC/Chase Bank property.” Plaintiff also 

asserts he donated a trading card to the Tempe Public Museum/Library because the player 

had died in Tempe. Plaintiff alleges he “asked if they wanted to use the card” in the 

museum and requested that his name be displayed as the donor of the card. Plaintiff 

contends a woman at the museum/library took pictures of his trading card and another 

trading card. Plaintiff asserts he destroyed several trading cards at the federal courthouse 

“due to red spots that formed on the back of each card,” including a trading card that “had 

the last name of Liburdi as one of the players.”

III. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated false arrest, false imprisonment, and illegal 

search and seizure claims against Defendant Guajardo in Counts Two, Three, and Five. 

The Court will require Defendant Guajardo to answer these claims.

IV. Failure to State a Claim

A. Defendant Tempe Police Department

Defendant Tempe Police Department is a subpart of the City of Tempe, not a 

separate entity for purposes of suit. Gotbaum v. City of Phoenix, 617 F. Supp. 2d 878, 886 

(D. Ariz. 2008); see Braillard, 232 P.3d at 1269 (county sheriff’s office is a nonjural 

entity); see also Vincente v. City of Prescott, 2012 WL 1438695 (D. Ariz. 2012) (city fire 

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department is a nonjural entity); Wilson v. Yavapai Cnty., 2012 WL 1067959 (D. Ariz. 

2012) (county sheriff’s office and county attorney’s office are nonjural entities). Because 

Defendant Tempe Police Department is not a separate entity, it is not capable of being 

separately sued. Thus, the Court will dismiss Defendant Tempe Police Department.

B. Defendants Mayor and Chief of Police

To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a 

specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link 

between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 

371-72, 377 (1976). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, 

a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 

436 U.S. 658 (1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. 

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to 

Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, 

through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676. 

Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Mayor and Chief of Police personally 

participated in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, were aware of a deprivation 

and failed to act, or formed policies that resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, the Court 

will dismiss without prejudice Defendant Mayor and Chief of Police.

C. Defendant City of Tempe

A municipality may not be sued solely because an injury was inflicted by its 

employees or agents. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

The actions of individuals may support municipal liability only if the employees were 

acting pursuant to an official policy or custom of the municipality. Botello v. Gammick, 

413 F.3d 971, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2005). A § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant 

“cannot succeed as a matter of law” unless a plaintiff: (1) contends that the municipal 

defendant maintains a policy or custom pertinent to the plaintiff’s alleged injury; and 

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(2) explains how such policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury. Sadoski v. Mosley, 

435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of a municipal defendant pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support that the City of 

Tempe maintained a specific policy or custom that resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s 

federal constitutional rights and has failed to explain how his injuries were caused by any 

municipal policy or custom. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Defendant City 

of Tempe.

D. Count One

The use of excessive force by police officers in the course of an arrest can violate 

the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. See White 

by White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986). The Fourth Amendment 

does not prohibit the use of reasonable force. Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 

441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006). Whether the force was excessive depends on 

“whether the officers’ actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1095; Lolli v. County of 

Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court must balance the nature and quality 

of the intrusion against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396; Lolli, 351 F.3d at 415. Moreover, 

[t]he “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be 

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . . 

“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem 

unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” violates the 

Fourth Amendment. 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted). “Whether a particular use of force was 

‘objectively reasonable’ depends on several factors, including the severity of the crime that 

prompted the use of force, the threat posed by a suspect to the police or to others, and 

whether the suspect was resisting arrest.” Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1095.

. . . .

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Plaintiff contends Defendant Guajardo “ran up behind [Plaintiff] and restrained [his] 

right arm.” This is not excessive force. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice 

Count One.

E. Count Four

In Count Four, Plaintiff contends he was denied due process because there was no 

probable cause. An alleged search or arrest and detention without probable cause does not 

constitute a violation of the arrestee’s substantive due process rights; the constitutional 

right violated, if any, would be the Fourth Amendment freedom from search and seizure. 

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-74 (1994). See Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun 

Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a 

specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must 

be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric 

of substantive due process.” (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 

(1998))). Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Count Four.

F. Count Six

To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation against a government official, a 

plaintiff must prove “(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, 

he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary 

firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial 

causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action.” 

Blair v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 608 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted). Plaintiff 

does not allege any facts to support a conclusion that he was retaliated against because he 

engaged in constitutionally protected activity. Thus, the Court will dismiss without 

prejudice Count Six.

V. Plaintiff’s Motions

A. Motion for Default Judgment

In his Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff claims he is entitled to a default 

judgment, states he no longer has copies of “legal documents with the civil case nos. on 

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them,” and lists evidence he believes “will satisfy[]y the Court to bring a default judgment 

against the United States, [i]ts officers, [a]gencies.”

First, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(d), which states that a “default judgment 

may be entered against the United States, its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant 

establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that satisfies the court,” is inapplicable 

because the United States, its officers, or its agencies are not parties to this lawsuit. Second, 

an entry of default is only appropriate “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for 

affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 

Defendants have not been served with the Complaint or First Amended Complaint and, 

therefore, were not required to file a response. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a). Thus, the Court 

will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment.

B. Motion for Seizure of Personal Property

Plaintiff requests the Court seize all of Defendant Guajardo’s personal property “as 

the civil action is in default judgment.” Defendant Guajardo is not in default and no default 

judgment has been entered. Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Seizure of 

Property.

C. Motion for Right to Appear and Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff requests to be present at a hearing on the motion for default judgment and 

requests the appointment of counsel because he is indigent.

1. Request to Appear at Hearing

No hearing has been set in this case and, as previously noted, Plaintiff is not entitled 

to a default judgment. Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request to be present at the 

hearing.

2. Request for Appointment of Counsel

There is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a civil case. See

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). In 

proceedings in forma pauperis, the court may request an attorney to represent any person 

unable to afford one. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915(e)(1) is required only when “exceptional circumstances” are present. Terrell v. 

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A determination with respect to exceptional 

circumstances requires an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the merits as well as 

the ability of Plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal 

issue involved. Id. “Neither of these factors is dispositive and both must be viewed 

together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 

1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 Having considered both elements, it does not appear at this time that exceptional 

circumstances are present that would require the appointment of counsel in this case. 

Plaintiff is in no different position than many pro se litigants. Thus, the Court will deny 

without prejudice Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel.

VI. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other 

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this 

action.

B. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendant, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy 

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate 

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must 

submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to 

comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

C. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these 

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure 

to comply with any order of the Court).

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IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Seizure of Personal Property (Doc. 9), Motion for 

Default Judgment (Doc. 10), and Motion of Right to Appear and Appointment of 

Counsel (Doc. 11) are denied.

(2) Counts One, Four, and Six of the First Amended Complaint are dismissed

without prejudice.

(3) Defendants City of Tempe Police Department, City of Tempe Mayor, City 

of Tempe Chief of Police, and City of Tempe are dismissed without prejudice.

(4) Defendant Guajardo must answer Counts Two, Three, and Five of the First 

Amended Complaint.

(5) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the First 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 12), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver 

forms for Defendant Guajardo.

(6) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(7) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint on Defendant within 90 

days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever 

is later, the action may be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii).

(8) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the First 

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(9) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant of the commencement of 

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this 

Order. 

(10) If Defendant Guajardo agrees to waive service of the Summons and First 

Amended Complaint, he must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, 

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not the Plaintiff, within 30 days of the date of the notice and request for waiver of 

service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1)(F) to avoid being charged the 

cost of personal service.

(11) The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not returned 

by Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, 

the Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, 

and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, or this 

Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 

required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 

pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 

ordered by the Court.

(12) Defendant must answer the relevant portions of the First Amended 

Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the 

applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

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(13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett pursuant to Rules 

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Dated this 25th day of February, 2020.

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