Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_23-cv-00062/USCOURTS-alnd-2_23-cv-00062-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANTHONERIA McELROY, ]

]

Plaintiff, ]

]

v. ] 2:23-cv-00062-ACA

]

JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION, ]

]

Defendant. ]

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In her amended complaint, Plaintiff Anthoneria McElroy sued her employer, 

Defendant Jefferson County Commission, for (1) gender/sex discrimination, in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) 

age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 

1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); (3) retaliation, in violation of the ADEA, 29 

U.S.C. § 623(d); and (4) disability discrimination, in violation of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). (Doc. 4). Jefferson County 

moves to dismiss the amended complaint. (Doc. 21).

The court WILL GRANT IN PART and WILL DENY IN PART Jefferson 

County’s motion. The court WILL GRANT the motion to dismiss the gender/sex 

discrimination claim because it is procedurally barred. The court WILL DENY AS 

MOOT Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss the disability retaliation claim because 

FILED

 2024 Jan-12 AM 11:32

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:23-cv-00062-ACA Document 38 Filed 01/12/24 Page 1 of 15
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Ms. McElroy does not plead a claim of retaliation under the ADA. The court WILL 

DENY the motion to dismiss the age discrimination and retaliation claim under the 

ADEA because Ms. McElroy’s amended complaint is timely and she plausibly states 

a claim for relief. Finally, the court WILL GRANT Jefferson County’s motion to 

dismiss Ms. McElroy’s request for punitive damages and WILL DISMISS WITH 

PREJUDICE Ms. McElroy’s request for punitive damages. 

I. BACKGROUND

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 

“draw all reasonable inferences in favor of” the plaintiff. K.T. v. Royal Caribbean 

Cruises, Ltd., 931 F.3d 1041, 1043 (11th Cir. 2019). The court may also consider 

evidence outside the complaint if the evidence is central to the plaintiff’s claim and 

its authenticity is not challenged. SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 

F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010). If the defendant attached the document to its 

motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must also mention the document in the complaint. 

Edwards v. Dothan City Schs., 82 F.4th 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2023). 

Ms. McElroy, a woman born in 1952, alleges she works as a workforce 

planner for Jefferson County. (See doc. 4 at 3–4). In 2019, when she was sixty-sevenyears old, she informed a supervisor that she thought she was being discriminated 

against because of her age. (Id. at 3; see id. at 2). The supervisor followed her down

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the hall to her office, leaned over her desk so they were face-to-face and said in a 

threatening tone that Ms. McElroy “was never to say that [the supervisor] 

discriminated against [her] because of [her] age.” (Doc. 4 at 3). Immediately after 

this conversation, Jefferson County discriminated and retaliated against her, 

including issuing written warnings and other discipline that caused her to lose pay; 

denial of leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”); denial of training 

opportunities available to all employees in her position, including a person twenty 

years younger than her; and denial of the ability to telework. (Id. at 3–5).

On December 30, 2020, Ms. McElroy filed a charge of discrimination with 

the EEOC. (Doc. 21-2). On September 27, 2022, the EEOC declined to proceed with 

her charge and issued her a notice of right to sue. (Doc. 21-1). Her counsel was 

copied on the determination and notice. (Id. at 2). On October 18, 2022, the EEOC 

sent another letter informing Ms. McElroy that their records indicated she did not 

download the notice of right to sue from the EEOC’s online portal. (Doc. 6 at 2). 

The letter stated it included a courtesy copy of the notice. (Id.). Ms. McElroy filed 

her complaint in this case on January 17, 2023. (Doc. 1). 

Ms. McElroy’s amended complaint does not reference or attach the EEOC 

charge, the notice of right to sue, or the October 18th letter. (See doc. 4). Jefferson 

County attached the EEOC charge and the notice of right to sue to its motion to 

dismiss (docs. 21-1, 21-2) and Ms. McElroy filed the October 18th letter in response 

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to an order from this court (doc. 6 at 2). The court will consider the EEOC charge 

and the notice of right to sue because Ms. McElroy mentions them in her complaint 

(see doc. 4 at 6), they are central to her claims, and Ms. McElroy does not dispute 

their authenticity (see doc. 4). And the court will consider the October 18th letter 

because it is central to Ms. McElroy’s claims and Jefferson County does not dispute 

its authenticity. (Cf. doc. 22 at 2). 

Ms. McElroy’s amended complaint, construed liberally in the light of her 

status as a pro se litigant, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), asserts 

claims for:

• gender/sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 

• age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621(a);

• retaliation in violation of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621(a); and 

• and disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disability 

Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

(Doc. 4 at 2–7). 

II. DISCUSSION

First, the court addresses the gender/sex discrimination claim and the 

disability discrimination claim. Then the court discusses whether Ms. McElroy’s 

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suit is timely and whether her age discrimination and retaliation claims survive on 

the merits. Finally, the court addresses her claim for punitive damages.

1. Gender/Sex Discrimination under Title VII

In her amended complaint, Ms. McElroy checked the “gender/sex” 

discrimination box. (Doc. 4 at 2). Jefferson County moves to dismiss the gender/sex 

discrimination claim because Ms. McElroy failed to timely file an EEOC charge and 

because she asserts no allegations of gender or sex discrimination in her amended 

complaint. (Doc. 22 at 11). Before filing a Title VII action, a plaintiff must file a 

charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 

1345 (11th Cir. 2022). Although a court does not strictly construe an EEOC charge, 

even under the most expansive reading of the charge, Ms. McElroy did not allege 

gender or sex discrimination. (See doc. 21-2 at 1–7); see Patterson, 38 F.4th at 1345.

Therefore, the court WILL GRANT Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss the 

gender/sex discrimination claim and WILL DISMISS Ms. McElroy’s claim WITH 

PREJUDICE. (Doc. 22). 

2. Disability Discrimination

Ms. McElroy also checked the “disability or perceived disability” 

discrimination box in her amended complaint and identified rheumatoid arthritis as 

the specific disability. (Doc. 4 at 2). Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss

substantively addresses Ms. McElroy’s ADA claim only in a footnote (see doc. 22 

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at 5 n.3); this court’s initial order expressly instructs parties that the court “will not 

consider substantive arguments made in footnotes” (see doc. 19 at 15). And even if 

the court were to consider the argument, Jefferson County construes Ms. McElroy’s 

amended complaint as asserting only a claim for retaliation under the ADA. (Doc. 

22 at 5 n.3). The court construes the amended complaint as asserting only a claim 

for disability discrimination under the ADA.

1 (See doc. 4 at 2, 6). Therefore, to the 

extent Jefferson County moves to dismiss Ms. McElroy’s claim for disability 

retaliation, the court WILL DENY the motion AS MOOT. 

3. The Timeliness of the Amended Complaint

Jefferson County moves to dismiss the age discrimination and age retaliation

claims as untimely because Ms. McElroy (1) alleges discrimination that predates her 

EEOC charge by 180 days and (2) failed to file suit ninety days after she received 

her notice of right to sue.

a. 180-Day Deadline to Bring an EEOC Charge of Discrimination

Before a plaintiff may bring suit under the ADEA, she must file a charge with 

the EEOC alleging unlawful discrimination within 180 days after the alleged 

unlawful practice occurred. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(a); Turlington v. Atl. Gas 

1 While the parties were briefing the motion to dismiss, Ms. McElroy filed a motion to 

amend her complaint “by adding Disability to the initial protected classes.” (Doc. 27). The court 

denied that motion as moot in a separate order. (Doc. 37).

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Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1433, 1435–36 (11th Cir. 1998). Ms. McElroy filed her 

EEOC charge on December 30, 2020, but her amended complaint alleges 

discriminatory acts that occurred before July 3, 2020—i.e., more than 180 days 

before she filed her EEOC charge. (Doc. 21-2; see doc. 4 at 2–5). 

Jefferson County argues the entire amended complaint should be dismissed 

with prejudice as procedurally barred because some of the alleged discriminatory 

acts fall outside the 180-day window. (Doc. 22 at 7–9). But several of the alleged 

discriminatory acts fall within the 180-day window and are timely. (See doc. 4 at 2–

5). 

And the alleged discriminatory acts that fall outside the 180-day window may 

still support some of Ms. McElroy’s claims for liability depending on the nature of 

the acts. (See doc. 4 at 2). The court construes Ms. McElroy’s amended complaint 

as alleging discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts and a hostile work environment 

claim. (See id. at 3–5). 

For the allegations of discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts, the pre-July

3, 2020 incidents may not from the basis for liability but they may be used “as 

background evidence in support of the timely claim.” Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 

Rubber Co., Inc., 421 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted; 

alteration accepted). For the allegations supporting a hostile work environment 

claim, the pre-July 3, 2020 incidents may form the basis for liability because an act 

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contributing to the hostile work environment occurred after July 3, 2020. (See doc. 

4 at 4) (describing “an extremely hostile” environment after a September 16, 2020 

warning); see Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1179.

Therefore, the court WILL DENY Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss the 

amended complaint as procedurally barred.

b. Ninety-Day Deadline to File Suit After Notice of Right to Sue

A plaintiff bringing claims under the ADEA must file suit within ninety days 

after she has adequate notice that the EEOC dismissed the charge. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 626(e); Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., 232 F.3d 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2000). The 

EEOC issued its notice of determination that it dismissed her charge and its notice 

of right to sue on September 27, 2022. (Doc. 21-1). Ms. McElroy filed this suit on 

January 27, 2023, 122 days after the EEOC issued the notice. (Doc. 21-1; see also

doc. 1). Jefferson County moves to dismiss Ms. McElroy’s amended complaint as 

untimely because she filed suit more than ninety days after she received her notice 

of right to sue. (Doc. 22 at 5–6). 

But the clock for the ninety-day deadline begins when the claimant, or their 

counsel, received the notice. (See doc. 21-1 at 1) (“Receipt generally occurs on the 

date that you (or your representative) view this document.”). The record before the 

court is not clear as to when Ms. McElroy, or her counsel, viewed the notice. On 

October 18, 2022, the EEOC sent Ms. McElroy a letter stating that she had not 

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downloaded the notice from the online portal and provided her a courtesy copy of

the letter. (Doc. 6 at 2). Ms. McElroy represents that she spoke to someone at EEOC 

who told her the October 18th letter was not mailed until the following day; she 

alleges she did not receive the letter until after October 18th, but she never alleges 

the date she received the letter. (See id. at 3).

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Ms. McElroy’s favor, the October 18th 

letter suggests she did not view the notice until she received the October 18th letter.

See Edwards, 82 F.4th at 1311. The court must therefore determine when 

Ms. McElroy received the October 18th letter. A party is presumed to receive notice 

three days after its issuance. Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 

148 n.1 (1984); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). Ms. McElroy is presumed to have received 

the October 18th letter on October 21, 2022, see Baldwin, 466 U.S. at 148 n.1;

therefore, the ninety-day deadline expired on January 19, 2023. Accordingly, 

Ms. McElroy’s January 17, 2023 complaint is timely.

Jefferson County also argues Ms. McElroy’s attorney is copied on the 

September 27th notice and that a copy of the notice was sent to her attorney. (Doc. 

22 at 6). Although a party is considered to have notice of all facts which can be 

charged upon their attorney, see Irwin v. Dep’t of Veteran Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 92 

(1990) (cleaned up), there is no evidence or allegation before the court that her 

counsel viewed the letter.

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Based on the record before the court at this stage of the litigation, the court 

WILL DENY Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss Ms. McElroy’s amended

complaint as untimely.

4. Age Discrimination 

Jefferson County also moves to dismiss Ms. McElroy’s claim for age 

discrimination under the ADEA for two reasons: (1) she failed to exhaust her 

administrative remedies by not timely presenting the charge to the EEOC, and (2)

she failed to allege facts in her amended complaint sufficient to support a violation 

of the ADEA. (Doc. 22 at 12–13). The court does not find these arguments 

persuasive. 

First, Ms. McElroy has timely presented her charge of age discrimination to 

the EEOC. Although Ms. McElroy did not provide a date for each alleged act of 

discrimination, she did allege discriminatory acts of age discrimination after July 3, 

2020—i.e., within the 180-day window. (See doc. 21-2 at 4) (alleging discriminatory 

acts in July and August 2020). 

Second, Ms. McElroy has adequately alleged a claim for relief. As is relevant 

here, the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an 

individual who is at least forty years old, “with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment” or “limit, segregate, or classify his 

employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 

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employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.” 

29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1)–(2), 631(a). To establish a prima facie case of age 

discrimination, a plaintiff must prove she was: “(1) a member of the protected class; 

(2) qualified for the position; (3) subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) 

replaced by a person outside the protected class or suffered from disparate treatment 

because of membership in the protected class.” Kelliher v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1270, 

1275 (11th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff does not need to satisfy a prima facie case to 

survive a motion to dismiss. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–

14 (2002); see also Buchanan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 727 F. App’x 639, 642 (11th 

Cir. 2018)2 (applying Swierkiewicz to the ADEA).

Here, Ms. McElroy was a member of the protected class because she was in 

her late sixties during the alleged conduct. (See doc. 4 at 2). She alleges she was 

subject to adverse employment action because she received disciplinary action, 

including a written warning and suspension without pay; was denied leave under the 

FMLA; and was denied training opportunities that were available to all employees 

in her position. (Id. at 3–5); see Turlington, 135 F.3d at 1434, 1436 n.16. She also 

alleges a colleague twenty years younger than her was treated more favorably

because she was offered training opportunities that Ms. McElroy was denied. (Doc. 

2 Although this case is not binding authority, this court finds it persuasive. See 11th Cir. R. 

35-2; Santos v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 85 F.4th 1352, 1363 n.1 (11th Cir. 2023).

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4 at 5). Construing the amended complaint liberally in the light of her status as a pro 

se litigant, see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and construing the facts in the light most 

favorable to Ms. McElroy, the court finds she has adequately alleged a claim of age 

discrimination.

Accordingly, the court WILL DENY Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss 

the age discrimination claim. 

5. Retaliation

The court construes Ms. McElroy’s amended complaint as asserting a 

retaliation claim under the ADEA and a retaliatory-hostile-work-environment claim, 

also under the ADEA. (Doc. 4 at 3–5). Jefferson County moves to dismiss the 

retaliation claims for two reasons: (1) she failed to exhaust her administrative 

remedies by not timely presenting the charge to the EEOC, and (2) she has failed to 

allege a prima facie case of retaliation. (Doc. 22 at 13–15). 

Jefferson County’s first argument failsfor the same reasons the court provided 

regarding the age discrimination claim: Ms. McElroy timely presented her charge to 

the EEOC because some of the alleged dates of retaliation were after July 3, 2020.

(Doc. 4 at 3–5). That leaves only Jefferson County’s second argument—that 

Ms. McElroy failed to plausibly state a claim for ADEA retaliation. 

a. ADEA Retaliation

To allege a prima facie case of ADEA retaliation, a plaintiff must show “(1) 

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she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse 

employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected 

expression.” Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002); 

see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). A plaintiff need not prove a prima facie case to survive 

a motion to dismiss. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511, 514.

Ms. McElroy alleges that after she informed her immediate supervisor that the 

supervisor was discriminating against Ms. McElroy because of her age, her 

supervisor followed Ms. McElroy to her office, leaned over her desk in a threatening 

stance and said, in a threatening tone, that Ms. McElroy “was never to say that [her 

supervisor] discriminated against her because of her age.” (Doc. 4 at 3). She alleges 

that immediately after that incident she was targeted and retaliated against. (Id.). She 

also alleges that she was retaliated against after she complained about a lack of 

training. (Id.). And construing Ms. McElroy’s complaint liberally, and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in her favor, she has plausibly alleged adverse employment 

actions, such as receiving written and oral warnings, denial of FMLA leave, and 

denial of training opportunities. (Id. at 3–5). 

b. Retaliatory-Hostile-Work-Environment Claim

To adequately allege a retaliatory-hostile-work-environment claim, 

Ms. McElroy must plead that the harassment “well might have dissuaded a 

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 

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Monaghan v. Wordplay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 861 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation 

marks omitted); see Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1311 (holding that a prima facie case of 

retaliation is the same under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA). 

Ms. McElroy alleges that after she complained about discrimination, she was 

yelled at, humiliated, disciplined for misconduct she did not engage in, denied leave 

under the FMLA, denied the ability to telework, and denied training opportunities. 

(Doc. 4 at 3–5). Ms. McElroy has adequately alleged a retaliatory-hostile-workenvironment claim.

Accordingly, the court WILL DENY Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss 

the retaliation claims. 

6. Punitive Damages

Ms. McElroy seeks as damages the “maximum amount that Alabama permits 

$500,000.” (Id. at 6). Jefferson County moves to dismiss Ms. McElroy’s claim for 

punitive damages. (Doc. 22 at 15–16). Although a plaintiff may recover punitive 

damages under Title VII and the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)–(2), a plaintiff 

is prohibited from recovering punitive damages from a government or government 

entity. § 1981a(b)(1). Because Ms. McElroy filed suit against a government entity, 

she is not entitled to recover punitive damages under Title VII and the ADA. See 

§1981a(b)(1); Booth v. Pasco Cnty., 757 F.3d 1198, 1206 n.12 (11th Cir. 2014). And 

punitive damages are not recoverable under the ADEA. Goldstein v. Manhattan 

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Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1446 (11th Cir. 1985).

Accordingly, the court WILL GRANT Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss 

Ms. McElroy’s claim for punitive damages and WILL DISMISS WITH 

PREJUDICE her claim for punitive damages. 

III. CONCLUSION

The court WILL GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Jefferson 

County’s motion to dismiss. The court WILL GRANT the motion to dismiss the 

gender/sex discrimination claim and will dismiss Ms. McElroy’s claim WITH 

PREJUDICE. The court WILL DENY AS MOOT the motion to dismiss the 

disability retaliation claim. The court WILL DENY the motion to dismiss the age 

discrimination and retaliation claims under the ADEA. Finally, the court WILL 

GRANT the motion to dismiss Ms. McElroy’s claim for punitive damages and 

WILL DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE her claim for punitive damages.

DONE and ORDERED this January 12, 2024.

 _________________________________

 ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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