Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01154/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01154-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 04CV1154-J (JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY C. RIVAS, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

STUART J. RYAN, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 04CV1154-J (JMA)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE

JUDGE’S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; 

(2) DENYING PETITIONER’S

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS;

(3) DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO EXPAND THE

RECORD; AND

(4) DENYING PETITIONER’S

REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY

HEARING.

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Jan M. Adler’s Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) recommending that the Court deny Petitioner Roy C. Rivas, Jr.’s (“Petitioner”) Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 52.] Petitioner

timely filed Objections to the R&R. [Doc. No. 53.] Respondent has not filed a Reply. For the

reasons set forth below, this Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES the Petition in its entirety. 

Case 3:04-cv-01154-J-JMA Document 54 Filed 06/20/07 Page 1 of 18
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2 04CV1154-J (JMA)

Factual Background

On May 29, 1993, Petitioner, Raymond Senteno, Nancy Jaime, Patsy Moreno, and Gloria

Rivas went to Elpidio Beltran’s apartment. (Lodgm’t No. 3, People v. Rivas, No. D021952, slip

op. at 3.) Beltran sold drugs to Petitioner’s aunt, Gloria Rivas. (See id.) Senteno, Jaime,

Moreno, Gloria Rivas, and Petitioner intended to rob Beltran of his drugs after scaring him and

tying him up with duct tape. (See id.) Gloria Rivas, Senteno, and Jaime entered Beltran’s

apartment, followed by Petitioner. (See id.) Petitioner pointed a gun at the downstairs occupants

while holding a roll of duct tape. (See id.) Gloria Rivas told the downstairs occupants of the

apartment that she and her accomplices were the police, unplugged a telephone, and retrieved a

young boy who tried to run outside after he saw the guns. (Id. at 3.) While Petitioner, Gloria

Rivas, and Jaime were holding the occupants downstairs, six-year-old Elpidio Beltran, Jr., ran

upstairs and alerted his parents to the events. (Id.) Senteno went to the upstairs bedroom where

Beltran and his wife were watching a video and shot and killed Beltran. (Id.) All the intruders

fled the apartment. (Id.)

Procedural Background

Petitioner was charged with one count of first-degree murder under California Penal Code

(“Penal Code”) section 187(a) (count 1), one count of attempted robbery under Penal Code

Sections 664, 211, 213(b) (count 2), and one count of residential burglary under Penal Code

section 459 (count 3). The information also alleged that Petitioner used a firearm during the

commission of count 2 and count 3 within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5(a). 

(Lodgm’t No. 15 at 2-3.) The jury found Petitioner guilty on all counts, including the allegation

under 12022.5(a). (Id. at 154.) Petitioner was sentenced to thirty-three years to life. (Id. at

156.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal and a habeas corpus petition in the California Court of

Appeal challenging his conviction. (Lodgm’t Nos. 6, 2.) On April 26, 1996, the Court of

Appeal issued an order to show cause to the San Diego Superior Court in response to Petitioner’s

habeas petition. (Id.) The Court of Appeal directed the Superior Court to hold an evidentiary

hearing regarding Petitioner’s allegation that there was juror misconduct during his trial when

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the foreman, Rudy Medina, did not disclose in voir dire that he had a relationship with

Petitioner’s mother, Rita Reith, twenty-five years prior. (R&R at 4.) After the evidentiary

hearing, the Superior Court issued an opinion concluding that Petitioner was not denied a fair

trial. (Id.) Additionally, the Court of Appeal reduced Petitioner’s sentence from thirty-three

years to life to twenty-nine years to life. (Id.)

Petitioner filed and subsequently withdrew a habeas corpus petition in the California

Supreme Court. (Id.) He then filed another habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme

Court which was denied without citation of authority. (Id.) 

On June 9, 2004, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in this Court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). (Id.) On November 3, 2004, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which

this Court denied on September 29, 2005. (Id. at 4-5.) On March 15, 2006, Respondent filed an

Answer, and on June 6, 2006, Petitioner filed a Traverse and a Motion to Expand the Record. 

(Id.) 

Legal Standard

I. State Prisoner Habeas Corpus Standard

A federal court may grant a habeas petition if the applicant is in custody “in violation of

the Constitution or other laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). State

interpretation of state laws and rules cannot serve as the basis for a federal habeas petition, as no

federal or constitutional question would be implicated. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68

(1991). Habeas petitions are governed by the provisions of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 

 Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief from a state court

judgment only if the adjudication was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law, or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). 

A state-court decision is “contrary to clearly established federal law” if it (1) applies a

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) confronts a set of

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facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless

arrives at the opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state-court

decision is an unreasonable application of the facts “if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

II. Reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s R&R

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth

in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005). The district court must “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676

(1980). “When no objections are filed, the district court may assume the correctness of the

magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law.” Johnson v.

Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). “Under such circumstances, the Ninth

Circuit has held that ‘a failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its burden to give

de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo.’ ” Id.

(quoting Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989)). In this case, Petitioner filed

objections to the R&R. [Doc. No. 53.] Accordingly, this Court will make de novo

determinations of factual findings as to those portions of the R&R to which objections have been

made. 

Petitioner’s Objections

Because Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R, the Court must conduct a de novo

review of the portions of the R&R to which objections were made. Petitioner objects to the

R&R on the basis that: (1) there was an unreasonable determination of the facts by the state

court because Petitioner was deprived of his right to exercise a peremptory challenge; (2) there

was an unreasonable application of federal law because the foreman, Medina, lied during voir

dire, and bias therefore should have been inferred; (3) the state court’s decision regarding

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Petitioner’s right to peremptorily challenge Medina and Medina’s presence on the jury were

contrary to federal law; (4) the admission of Patsy Moreno’s statement to a police officer that

she was the getaway driver violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and crossexamine witnesses against him; (5) Gloria Rivas’ testimony violated Petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment right to a fair trial and to cross-examination because she testified using a “script”

that the prosecution provided; (6) the R&R incorrectly concluded that there is no evidence in the

record that Gloria Rivas’ testimony was false; (7) the cumulative effect of the errors in

Petitioner’s case prejudiced the outcome. (Pet’r’s Objs. at 2-3.)

Discussion

The R&R recommends that the Petition, the motion for an evidentiary hearing, and the

motion to expand the record be denied. (R&R at 2.) The R&R finds that there was no juror

misconduct on behalf of jury foreman Medina, who had a relationship with Petitioner’s mother

twenty-five years before Petitioner’s trial. (R&R at 16.) Additionally, the R&R concludes that

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated when Patsy Moreno’s statement that she

was the “getaway driver” was admitted. (R&R at 20.) The R&R further finds that witness

Gloria Rivas did not testify according to a script, but instead was told by the prosecution to

testify truthfully. (R&R at 23.) Finally, the R&R concludes that there was no admission of false

evidence by the prosecution, there was no cumulative error, and the Motion to Expand the

Record and the Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing should be denied. (R&R at 29.) After a de

novo review of the factual findings relevant to Petitioner’s Objections and a de novo review of

all conclusions of law, this Court FINDS the R&R correctly addressed the issues raised in the

Petition. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety

and DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Motion to Expand the Record, and the

Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing. 

I. There Was Not an Unreasonable Determination of the Facts In Light of the

Evidence Presented In the State Court Proceedings

Petitioner claims that there was an unreasonable determination of the facts when the State

Court found that jury foreman Medina did not lie during voir dire and was not biased against

Petitioner. Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief from a state court

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judgment if the adjudication was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). 

A. The Superior Court’s Finding that Foreman Medina Did Not Lie During Voir

Dire 

Petitioner claims that the state court’s finding that there was no juror misconduct on

behalf of jury foreman Medina was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Pet’r’s

Pet. at 8-17.) When the Superior Court questioned Media during voir dire, he described how he

knew Petitioner’s mother:

THE COURT: Let’s talk about the beginning here. How did you know her at

that time?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: We worked for the same company.

THE COURT: What company?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Deutch Company in Oceanside.

THE COURT: What kind of work?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Electronic components.

THE COURT: How long did you know her at that company?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Two or three years.

THE COURT: Were there events in your life that caused you to know

her and her family socially during that time?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Not really.

THE COURT: Company picnics?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Yeah.

THE COURT: Any clear memory or recollection of you meeting with,

speaking with, or having any relationship with any of her family

members?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: I believe I saw him when he was a

small child, five, six or seven-years-old.

THE COURT: Do you . . . find yourself having some feelings of loyalty,

allegiance, partiality of any sort that would affect you here?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: That was 25 years ago. 

 (Lodgm’t No. 14 (July 19, 1994 Rep.’s Tr.) at 80-81.)

Medina was also questioned by Petitioner’s trial attorney about the nature of

his relationship with Petitioner’s mother twenty-five years prior:

MR. BOESEN: Mr. Medina, you talked to the judge about knowing Ms.

Rivas [Reith] at some point in time, a long time ago. What was your

relationship with her at that time?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: I was her supervisor at work.

MR. BOESEN: Any opportunity to share family secrets or family

history? Anything about her personal life during the course of that

relationship?

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Not a whole lot, some.

MR. BOESEN: I’m sorry?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Some.

MR. BOESEN: Anything in a personal nature you feel you could share

with us?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: No. 

(Id. at 146.)

On April 26, 1996, in response to Petitioner’s state petition for writ of

habeas corpus, the California Court of Appeal issued an order directing the San

Diego County Superior Court to hold an evidentiary hearing addressing the

following questions:

1) Whether Juror Rudy Medina in fact had a romantic

relationship with [Petitioner’s] mother. If so,

2) What were the circumstances of the relationship and its

termination, including whether there was any lasting influence on

Medina?

3) Did Medina tell the whole truth in answering the court’s and

Rivas’ counsel’s questions of him during the voir dire?

4) What, if any, justification was there for Medina’s

nondisclosure of the relationship with [Rivas’] mother in response to the

questions asked during voir dire by the court and Rivas’ counsel?

5) Did Medina’s nondisclosure operate to deprive Rivas of his

rights to challenge a prospective juror for cause or to exercise a

peremptory challenge? 

 (Lodgm’t No. 2(a) at 1, 2.) 

In response to questions one and two, the Superior Court found that Medina had

been in a romantic relationship with Petitioner’s mother that lasted from four to six

months. (Lodgm’t No. 5, Ex. F at 1.) Additionally, the Court concluded that the

relationship was “a casual dating relationship” and a “physical/sexual relationship” that

did not end acrimoniously and did not have a lasting influence on Medina. (Id. at 1-3.) 

In response to question three, the Superior Court found that Medina had been

truthful in his answers regarding his relationship with Petitioner’s mother. (Lodgm’t No.

5, Ex. F at 3.) In response to the fourth question, the Court decided that Medina’s answers

on voir dire were justified because the questions did not address the personal aspects of his

relationship with Petitioner’s mother. (Id. at 3-4.) Finally, the Superior Court concluded

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that Medina’s nondisclosure of the relationship did not deprive Petitioner of his right to

exercise a peremptory challenge. (Id. at 5.)

The R&R states that the Superior Court’s determination that Medina did not lie in

voir dire about the nature of his relationship with Petitioner’s mother was not an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court

proceedings. The R&R concludes that although Medina’s answers were misleading, the

state court’s factual determination was not unreasonable because it is plausible that

Medina interpreted the questions as only involving his work relationship with Petitioner’s 

mother. (R&R at 13.) 

The Court agrees with the R&R that the state court’s factual determination was not

unreasonable. A “state court factual determination is unreasonable only if it is ‘so clearly

incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.’ ” Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320 (1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996)). The

R&R concludes that “the state court’s factual determination was not unreasonable because

it is at least plausible that Medina believed the court and counsel were only interested in

his work relationship with Reith.” (R&R at 13.) The R&R’s conclusion is supported by

testimony during the evidentiary hearing. When asked, “Was there any reason you didn’t

reveal the nature of the relationship with [Reith] when the court was asking you those

questions?” Medina responded, “I was never asked.” (Lodgm’t No. 2(b) at 210.) 

Medina’s response to the question shows that it is plausible that he believed that he should

only answer the questions asked, and not reveal anything about the romantic relationship

with Reith in detail. 

Petitioner objects to the R&R and declares that Medina lied when he responded

“Not really” when asked, “Were there events in your life that caused you to know her and

her family socially during that time?” (Lodgm’t No. 14 (July 19, 1994 Rep.’s Tr.) at 80-

81.) Petitioner argues that, “given the absence from the record of any indication that

Medina misunderstood the question, the state court’s finding that he did not lie because he

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did not realize what he was being asked must be seen as an unreasonable determination of

the facts.” (Pet’r’s Objs. at 3.) However, this Court concludes that there is at least some

evidence supporting the state court’s finding that Medina did not lie. Medina claimed he 

did not tell the Court about his romantic relationship with Reith because he was not

directly asked, and he was confused by the question “were there events in your life that

caused you to know Mrs. Rivas and her family socially during that time? (Lodgm’t No.

2(b) at 210-11.) Additionally, as established in Jeffries, “In a proceeding instituted by an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct.” 114 F.3d at 1500. This Court ADOPTS the R&R’s application of the rule in

Jeffries, because the state court’s factual determinations were not “so clearly incorrect that

[they] would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id.

B. The Superior Court’s Determination that Jury Foreman Medina Was Not

Biased Against Petitioner

The R&R adopts the state court’s finding that Medina’s relationship with

Petitioner’s mother did not bias him against Petitioner. The R&R concludes that Medina

was not biased against Petitioner because the relationship occurred twenty-five years

before and had no effect on him at the time of Petitioner’s trial. Petitioner objects to the

R&R’s conclusion that Medina was not biased against him. In addition, Petitioner states

that he would have used his right to peremptorily challenge Medina had he been given the

opportunity to do so.

 Any party to an action can make an objection and challenge a prospective juror for

cause. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 225 (2007). Implied bias and actual bias are grounds for

challenging prospective jurors for cause. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v.

Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 558 (1984). Actual bias is “the existence of a state of mind on

the part of the juror in reference to the case, or any of the parties, which will prevent the

juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of

any party.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 225(b)(1)(c) (2007). Implied bias can be inferred from

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“the existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity against, or bias towards,

either party.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 229(f) (2007). In addition to challenges for cause, a

party to a trial is also entitled to peremptory challenges to remove jurors. See Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 231 (2007). 

 The Court agrees with the R&R and FINDS that Medina’s relationship with

Petitioner’s mother did not bias him against Petitioner. When asked, “Do you . . . find

yourself having some feelings of loyalty, allegiance, partiality of any sort that would affect

you here?”, Medina replied, “That was twenty-five years ago.” The Court agrees with the

R&R that “although not precise, Medina’s response can logically be taken to mean . . . that

the relationship occurred a long time ago and had no [effect] on him in the present.” (See

R&R at 16.) Further, the testimony elicited during the evidentiary hearing supports the

R&R’s conclusion that Medina’s relationship with Petitioner’s mother did not end

acrimoniously. Reith was asked a series of questions about her breakup with Medina, and

whether the relationship ended on bad terms:

[Government’s Attorney]: Mr. Medina was not the one who ended the

relationship acrimoniously was he?

THE COURT: I think the question, Mrs. Reith, is whether or not Mr.

Medina ended the relationship angrily or on bad terms. “Acrimony”

means to do so with anger, with a lot of animosity. That’s what

“acrimony” means.

THE WITNESS: No.

THE COURT: Did he end it like that?

THE WITNESS: No.

(Lodgm’t No. 2(b) at 108.) Although Reith stated at the hearing that Medina wanted to

marry her, but she would not marry him because she did not believe that he would be

faithful, this testimony was contradicted by her declaration. (See id. at 61-62.) In her

declaration, Reith stated that “Mr. Medina refused to divorce his wife and marry me.”

(Reith Decl. ¶ 3) As a result, any bias that may have been inferred to Medina as a result of

Reith’s refusal to marry him is undermined by her declaration stating that it was actually

Medina who opposed the couple’s marriage. 

 Petitioner also claims that his right to a peremptory challenge was denied. The

R&R concludes that the state courts’ factual finding that Petitioner was not denied his

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right to a peremptory challenge is reasonable for two reasons. (R&R at 16.) First, the

information that Medina failed to disclose in voir dire was not directly related to bias. 

Second, even if Medina had disclosed the relationship, there is no certainty that

Petitioner’s counsel would have exercised a peremptory challenge. (See Lodgm’t No. 6,

Ex. F at 7; Lodgm’t No. 3 at 14-15.) The findings of the R&R and the state courts are

supported by Medina’s testimony during the evidentiary hearing that his relationship with

Reith ended twenty-five years ago, that the relationship was casual, and that he did not

harbor any bad feelings toward Reith when they separated. (See Lodgm’t No. 2(b) at 197.) 

Accordingly, the Court FINDS that Petitioner was not denied his right to exercise a

peremptory challenge to Medina.

II. Petitioner Was Not Denied His Right to an Impartial Jury

In addition to alleging that Medina was biased against him, Petitioner similarly

alleges that he was denied his right to an impartial jury. The R&R concludes that

Petitioner was not denied his right to an impartial jury because the evidentiary hearing did

not indicate that there was bias against him. In Smith v. Phillips, the Supreme Court held

that “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has

the opportunity to prove actual bias.” 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982). As already stated,

Petitioner received an evidentiary hearing and was unable to prove actual bias because

Medina’s testimony showed that his casual relationship twenty-five years prior with Reith

did not end acrimoniously. The Court thus ADOPTS the R&R’s conclusion and DENIES

Petitioner’s claim that he was denied his right to an impartial jury.

III. Sixth Amendment Violations

 Petitioner contends that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because (1)

Patsy Moreno’s statement to a police officer that she was the getaway driver violated his

right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and (2) the admission of Gloria Rivas’

testimony violated his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial because she testified

according to a script. 

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A. The Admission of Moreno’s Statement that She Was the Getaway Driver 

The R&R concludes that Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by

the admission of Moreno’s statement to a police officer that she was the getaway driver. 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is outlined in Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Crawford court held that “[t]estimonial statements

of witnesses absent from trial are admissible only where the declarant is unavailable, and

only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the witness].” Id.

at 59. Because Moreno stated that she was the getaway driver during her interrogation by

Officer Martin Silva (See Lodgm’t No. 14, Vol. 3 at 344), her statement is considered

testimonial, and would not be admissible under Crawford unless Petitioner had a prior

opportunity to cross-examine her. (R&R at 19.)

However, due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct.

1173 (2007), Crawford does not apply to the admissibility of Moreno’s statements. The

Whorton court held that the Crawford rule is not a “watershed rule” and cannot be applied

retroactively on collateral review. Id. at 1181. Because Petitioner’s appeal was decided in

1996, and Crawford was decided in 2004, Crawford does not apply to Petitioner’s case. 

Instead, the test in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), controls. Roberts provides that

hearsay testimony is admissible if: (1) the declarant is unavailable; and (2) the statement

either falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bears adequate indicia of reliability. 

Id. at 66. Even if Petitioner demonstrates that Moreno’s statement does not fall within a

firmly rooted hearsay exception or does not bear indicia of reliability, he still is not

entitled to relief unless the error “had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.’ ” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)

(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). 

To challenge the admissibility of Moreno’s statement, Petitioner must demonstrate

that the statement that Moreno made either did not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay

exception or did not bear an adequate indicia of reliability. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56. 

Petitioner objects on the basis that Moreno’s statement did not bear an indicia of

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reliability. However, “self-inculpatory statements have long been recognized as bearing

strong indicia of reliability.” Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004). The

R&R concludes that the statement bore an indicia of reliability because “Moreno

implicated herself when she admitted she was the ‘getaway driver’ for the robbery attempt,

but did not attempt to shift blame or implicate [Petitioner].” (R&R at 19.) The R&R’s

conclusion is supported by the fact that Moreno told a police officer that she was the

getaway driver, and it is unlikely that she would have fabricated a statement to the police

that inculpated herself. Therefore, this Court FINDS that Moreno’s statements were

admissible because she was unavailable due to exercising her Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination, and her statement bore an indicia of reliability. This Court thus

ADOPTS the R&R’s conclusion that Petitioner was not denied his Sixth Amendment right

to confront and cross-examine Moreno.

B. The Admission of Gloria Rivas’ Testimony

Petitioner contends that during his trial, witness Gloria Rivas testified according to

a script provided by the prosecution so that she could obtain a plea deal. Petitioner asserts

that Gloria Rivas’ alleged false testimony violated his due process rights. In exchange for

testifying, Gloria Rivas was to plead guilty to second-degree murder and attempted

robbery. (Lodgm’t No. 14, Vol. 4 at 380.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “an agreement that requires a witness to testify

truthfully in exchange for a plea is proper so long as ‘the jury is informed of the exact

nature of the agreement, defense counsel is permitted to cross-examine the accomplice

about the agreement, and the jury is instructed to weigh the accomplice’s testimony with

care.’ ” Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.

Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1537 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

The jury was informed of the nature of the plea agreement before Gloria Rivas

testified. (Lodgm’t No. 14, Vol. 4 at 380.) During Gloria Rivas’ direct examination, she

stated that Rivas had a gun and tape in his hand, but alluded that Rivas and the others did

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not talk about how they were going to use the gun and tape in connection with the robbery. 

The prosecutor then sought to correct her testimony: 

Q: What was the [tape] to be used for, Gloria?

A: I don’t know what he was going to use it for. Or–I don’t know,

nobody talked about nothing, what we were going to use it, I don’t

know.

Q: Gloria, you know if you don’t tell the truth I will prosecute you for

first degree murder, don’t you?

A: Yes, I do.

Q: And?

A: Yes, I know that.

(Id. at 414.)

Gloria Rivas then changed her testimony, and she stated that she, Petitioner,

Senteno, Jaime, and Moreno discussed that they were going to rob Beltran for his drugs

and scare him with the gun. (Id. at 422.) In an exchange between Petitioner’s attorney

and Gloria Rivas during cross-examination, Petitioner’s attorney stated that if Gloria Rivas

did not testify truthfully, she would forfeit her plea agreement:

Q: In fact, [the prosecutor] during direct examination, would you say,

appeared to get a little upset with you?

A: Today?

Q: Yes.

A: Yes.

Q: Told you you might not get your deal, right?

A: Yes.

Q: Scared you, didn’t it?

A: Of course.

Q: Badly?

A: Yes.

Q: That is when you came back in here and changed your testimony,

correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Told you he was pretty upset with you, right?

A: Yes.

Q: Told you if you don’t get your act together and say what you were

supposed to say you would be in big trouble.

A: Not what I’m supposed to say, the truth is what he said. 

(Id. at 490-91.)

The R&R concludes that Petitioner’s claim that Gloria Rivas was testifying

according to a script is not plausible because Gloria Rivas was instructed to testify

truthfully. (R&R at 23.) Petitioner objects to the R&R on the basis that Gloria Rivas’

testimony was restricted to benefit the prosecution and not the defense. (Pet’r’s Objs. at

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15.) However, Petitioner does not offer any evidence other than his own assertions

supporting the premise that Gloria Rivas testified according to a script. The record

indicates that Gloria Rivas was instructed to testify truthfully, and that she understood this

instruction. (See Lodgm’t No. 14, Vol. 4 at 414, 491.) In addition, Petitioner’s attorney

questioned Gloria Rivas regarding the truthfulness of her testimony, and she indicated that

she understood her obligation to tell the truth. Further, the jury was aware of the plea

agreement between Gloria Rivas and the prosecution, and the jury was instructed to take

her plea agreement into account when assessing her testimony. (Lodgm’t No. 14, Vol. 4 at

380.) Finally, the Court notes that it is not improper for a witness to testify truthfully in

exchange for a plea agreement. See Allen, 395 F.3d at 995. Accordingly, the Court

ADOPTS the R&R’s conclusion that the admission of Gloria Rivas’ testimony was not an

unreasonable application of law.

IV. Petitioner’s Claim that His Due Process Rights Were Violated Due to the

Prosecution’s Use of False Evidence 

Petitioner objects to the R&R’s statement that false evidence must be knowingly

used by the prosecution for a conviction to be set aside. Petitioner also objects to the

R&R’s conclusion that there is no evidence that the prosecution used false evidence. 

Petitioner argues that false evidence was used when “Gloria testified under oath that

petitioner did not have a gun or duct tape and that the only reason she changed her

testimony was because of the prosecutor’s duress and to earn her deal.” (Pet’r’s Objs. at

19.) 

The Supreme Court has consistently held that “a conviction obtained by the

knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there

is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of

the jury.” See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Although a prosecutor’s

presentation of false evidence is viewed seriously and its effects must be carefully

scrutinized, a new trial is not automatically granted. United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d

1543, 1550 (9th Cir. 1986). Rather, a finding of “materiality of the evidence” is required. 

Id. 

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There is no evidence in the record that the prosecutor offered false testimony or

coerced Gloria Rivas’ testimony. Even though Gloria Rivas initially testified that she did

not know what the tape would be used for and that the robbery was not planned, she

corrected herself and stated that she, Petitioner, and the other accomplices discussed the

robbery beforehand. (Lodgm’t No. 14, Vol. 4 at 422.) The prosecutor pointed out the

inconsistencies in Gloria Rivas’ testimony, and she corrected them while testifying under

oath during direct examination. Moreover, Petitioner’s attorney questioned Gloria Rivas

regarding the truthfulness of her testimony, and she stated that she knew that she had to

tell the truth. (Lodgm’t No. 14, Vol. 4 at 490-491.) In addition, evidence introduced at

trial established that Petitioner and four accomplices traveled to the apartment with a gun

and duct tape, unplugged the phone once they reached the apartment, and designated a

getaway driver. (Lodgm’t No. 3, People v. Rivas, No. D021952, slip op. at 3.) These facts

suggest that the group had developed a plan before the robbery took place. In contrast,

Petitioner has failed to put forth any evidence or point to any testimony supporting his

account that the robbery was not planned. Finally, even if Gloria Rivas falsely testified

that the robbery was planned, there is no reasonable likelihood that the false testimony

could have affected the judgment of the jury due to other evidence establishing that

Petitioner participated in the robbery by pointing a gun at the occupants of the victim’s

apartment. The Court thus FINDS that the prosecution did not use or solicit false

testimony, and that Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated.

V. Cumulative Impact of the Errors In the Case

Petitioner argues that the cumulative impact of the alleged errors in this case

entitles him to relief. A “cumulative error applies where, ‘although no single trial error

examined in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal, the cumulative effect

of multiple errors [has] still prejudiced a defendant.’ ” Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d

1197, 1212 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th

Cir. 1996)). The R&R states that “no constitutional errors occurred at [Petitioner’s] trial,

and thus there is no cumulative effect.” (R&R at 26.) Petitioner objects on the basis that

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“the implied bias of the jury foreman, Patsy’s out-of-court testimonial statement and

Gloria’s coerced testimony contradicting her uncoerced exculpatory testimony all

conjoined to so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial

of due process.” (Pet’r’s Objs. at 20.) 

The Court has examined Petitioner’s claims and has found no indication that there

were constitutional errors at trial. As noted above, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

juror misconduct or that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Even if there were

constitutional errors at trial, the weight of the evidence indicates that the outcome of the

trial would have been the same regardless of the alleged errors. Accordingly, this Court

ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES Petitioner relief.

VI. Motion to Expand the Record

Petitioner filed a Motion to Expand the record to include a declaration by prisoner

Dale R. Hurd as well as twelve additional exhibits regarding the timeliness of the Petition. 

(R&R at 26.) Because the Court decided in its September 29, 2005 Order that the Petition

is timely, the Court DENIES AS MOOT the Motion to Expand the Record. [See Doc.

No. 33.]

VII. Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner moves for an evidentiary hearing, but does not state why he should be

granted an evidentiary hearing. A district court has discretion to grant a motion for an

evidentiary hearing. Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). Evidentiary

hearings in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas cases are governed by the AEDPA. In order for a

district court to grant an evidentiary hearing, the Court must “determine whether a factual

basis exists in the record to support the petitioner’s claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403

F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078). If there is no factual

basis, then the court must “ascertain whether the petitioner has ‘failed to develop the

factual basis of the claim in State court.’ ” Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670 (quoting Baja,

187 F.3d at 1078). If “the Petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis for his claim in

state court, ‘the court must deny a hearing unless the applicant establishes one of the two

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narrow exceptions set forth in § 2254 (e)(2)(A) & (B).’ ” Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670

(quoting Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078). There are six situations where a habeas petitioner

should be entitled to an evidentiary hearing: “(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not

resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by

the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not

adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly

discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the

state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford

the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313

(1963), overruled on other grounds by Keeny v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5 (1992).

This Court ADOPTS the R&R’s conclusion that Petitioner received a full and fair

evidentiary hearing regarding the relationship between Medina and Petitioner’s mother,

making another evidentiary hearing unnecessary. Petitioner had an adequate opportunity

to develop the record because both Medina and Reith were questioned at the evidentiary

hearing. Additionally, Petitioner does not satisfy any of the six factors in the Townsend

test because the state court made a reasonable determination of the facts, and Petitioner

has failed to raise any newly discovered evidence. For these reasons the Court DENIES

Petitioner’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, this Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES the

Petition in its entirety. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 19, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: All Parties 

 Magistrate Judge Adler

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