Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00756/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00756-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Laquinn Fisher, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Mesa; Sgt. Campbell, individually

and acting on behalf of Mesa Police Dept.;

Jane Doe Campbell; Sgt. Birnbaum,

individually and acting on behalf of Mesa

Police Dept.; Jane Doe Birnbaum; Officer

Gomez, individually and acting on behalf

of Mesa Police Dept.; Jane Doe Gomez;

Officer Calkins, individually and acting on

behalf of Mesa Police Dept.; Jane Doe

Calkins, 

Defendants. 

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CV 12-00756-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 3), plaintiff's response

(doc. 4), and defendants' reply (doc. 7).

I

On May 26, 2006, Mesa police were contacted by the victim of a recent pistolwhipping. The defendant officers arrived at plaintiff's apartment to investigate. Plaintiff

matched the description and nickname of the assailant. Three individuals, including plaintiff,

left the apartment. While questioning plaintiff outside his apartment, the officers entered the

apartment pursuant to a protective sweep. The officers saw no one inside. They did,

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1

 We may take judicial notice of the Arizona courts' rulings as they are matters of

public record and were referenced in the complaint. Mirmehdi v. United States, __F.3d__,

2012 WL 2044804, at *5 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012). Moreover, plaintiff expressly agrees with the

facts as presented in Fisher I and Fisher II. Response at 2. 

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however, observe open duffel bags filled with marijuana. Plaintiff's roommate later gave

consent for the police to search the apartment. They conducted a search and seized the

marijuana. 

Plaintiff was charged with possession of marijuana for sale. The trial court denied his

motion to suppress the marijuana, and a jury found plaintiff guilty. He was sentenced to

eleven years in prison. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed plaintiff's conviction. It

found that the protective sweep was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and affirmed

plaintiff's conviction. State v. Fisher, 225 Ariz. 258, 261-62, 236 P.3d 1205, 1208-09 (Ct.

App. 2010) ("Fisher I"). The Arizona Supreme Court held that the protective sweep as

conducted violated the Fourth Amendment.1

 State v. Fisher, 226 Ariz. 563, 567, 250 P.3d

1192, 1196 (2011) ("Fisher II"). The charges were ultimately dismissed. Plaintiff was in

custody from May 26, 2006 until his release from prison on July 5, 2011.

Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa

County on February 8, 2012. The complaint asserts three counts: (1) illegal search and

seizure; (2) negligence; and (3) civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants

removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction (doc. 1), and move to dismiss the

complaint in its entirety.

II

Defendants argue that because plaintiff filed a late response, we should grant the

motion to dismiss pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i). The rule cautions that "if. . . counsel does not

serve and file the required answering memoranda. . . such non-compliance may be deemed

a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion

summarily." Id. Plaintiff did file a response, albeit late. And defendants have not argued

that they were prejudiced by the late response. Accordingly, we proceed with considering

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the motion on the merits.

III

In count three, plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against the defendant officers and

against the City of Mesa ("the City"). Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his

constitutional rights by illegally entering and searching his apartment.

Defendants argue that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified

immunity shields an officer from liability when his conduct "does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (citation

omitted). Deciding whether qualified immunity applies is a two-step inquiry that can be

completed in either order. We decide whether a constitutional right was violated, and if so,

whether that right was clearly established at the time the events unfolded. Mattos v.

Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011). A right is clearly established when all

reasonable officers would understand that their actions violate that right. Reichle v.

Howards, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). Precedent existing at the time of the

alleged violation "must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate."

Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 (citation omitted). Here, we look to existing precedent as of May

26, 2006, the date of the protective sweep.

In 1990, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless protective sweep is permissible

under the Fourth Amendment if the officers had a "reasonable belief based on specific and

articulable facts. . . that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer

or others." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1095 (1990) (quotation

and citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that his rights were clearly established under Buie.

To determine whether a right is clearly established, however, courts focus on particularized

context rather than on abstract rights. Alston v. Read, 663 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011).

Although Buie established the general parameters of the protective sweep, we do not

find that reasonable officers reading Buie would have known beyond debate that it was

unlawful to conduct a protective sweep of plaintiff's apartment. See Reichle, __U.S. at __,

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2

 Plaintiff cites two cases from 2010. See Palmieri v. Kammerer, 690 F. Supp. 2d 34,

47-48 (D. Conn. 2010); Humble v. Cnty. of Missoula, CV-09-135-M-DWM, 2010 WL

2360551, at *6 (D. Mont. June 9, 2010). Even if these cases are sufficiently related (a

question we do not decide), they could not have placed the officers on notice in 2006 that

their conduct was clearly unlawful. See Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 761 (9th Cir. 2012)

(case decided in 2004 could not have put defendant on notice of plaintiff's rights in 2001).

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132 S. Ct. at 2093. Indeed, two courts - each applying Buie - reached opposite conclusions

as to the legality of the protective sweep. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the

officers had a reasonable and articulable belief that an individual could still be inside

plaintiff's apartment "with the still unaccounted-for gun." Fisher I, 225 Ariz. at 261, 236

P.3d at 1208. But the Arizona Supreme Court determined that because the officers made no

attempt to determine how many people lived inside plaintiff's apartment, whether anyone

remained inside was "mere speculation." Fisher II, 226 Ariz. at 567, 250 P.3d at 1196. Thus,

the court concluded that the officers "did not articulate specific facts to establish a reasonable

belief that someone might be in the apartment." Id. If two panels of judges analyzing the

facts with the luxury of time and reflection could not reach agreement as to whether the

protective sweep was valid under Buie, we decline to conclude that police officers acting in

the heat of the moment should have been able to extrapolate the right result. 

Plaintiff has not pointed to any other cases decided as of May 26, 2006 to show that

it was clearly established that the protective sweep of his apartment was invalid.2

 To the

contrary, the Arizona Court of Appeals cited a number of cases from this circuit in support

of its conclusion that the protective sweep satisfied Buie. See Fisher I, 225 Ariz. at 260-61,

236 P.3d at 1207-08 (citing United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993)

(prior to arresting a detained suspect, officers had to discover "for their own safety" whether

others were in the apartment); United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1080-81 (9th Cir.

1988) (protective sweep of apartment justified, despite lack of officers' actual knowledge

whether anyone else was inside the apartment)).

In sum, plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that the officers violated a clearly

established right. See Alston, 663 F.3d at 1098. Even if the Arizona Supreme Court's

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understanding of federal law was correct, an issue we need not decide, the officers are

entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim because the underlying right was

obviously not clearly established.

Plaintiff also asserts a § 1983 claim against the City. A § 1983 claim against a city

cannot rest on the theory of respondeat superior. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare,

666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691,

98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036 (1978)). Instead, a city is only liable if it "had a deliberate policy,

custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation." Id.

(citation omitted). Bare allegations concerning "some unidentified government policy or

custom" are no longer sufficient. Id. at 637. Enough facts must be alleged to plausibly

suggest that plaintiff is entitled to relief on his Monell claim. Id. Count three of the

complaint is completely devoid of any allegations regarding policies, customs, or practices.

Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against the City in count three.

In count two, plaintiff asserts a negligence claim against all defendants. To the extent

that plaintiff's negligence claim could be interpreted as a § 1983 failure to train or supervise

claim, it also fails. A city may be liable under § 1983 for failure to train if a plaintiff can

show that the city's failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference. Connick v.

Thompson, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). Plaintiff alleges that the City's failure

to exercise sufficient care in hiring, training, screening and supervising its officers was

conduct "constituting negligence or gross negligence." Compl. ¶ 32 (doc. 1, ex. 1). But "[a]

showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice" to establish deliberate

indifference. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407, 117

S. Ct. 1382, 1390 (1997).

Plaintiff asks for leave to amend his § 1983 claim against the City. Plaintiff, however,

admits that to discover whether the City is liable, he would need to request copies of its

training materials. But to survive a motion to dismiss on a Monell claim, plausible facts

concerning the objectionable policy, custom, or practice must be pled in the complaint. AE

ex rel. Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637. Because plaintiff does not indicate that he has additional

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facts to add, instead acknowledging that he would need copies of the City's training materials

to "discover any liability," Response at 8, we find that amendment would be futile.

Accordingly, we dismiss the § 1983 claim against the City and deny plaintiff's request for

leave to amend. See AE ex rel. Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637-38.

IV

Having dismissed all federal claims, we turn to plaintiff's state law claims for illegal

search and seizure and negligence. Once we dismiss all claims over which we had original

jurisdiction, we may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Typically, when all federal claims are dismissed, "the balance of factors

to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining

state-law claims." Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quotation omitted). This action is in its very early stages. We have not yet held a Rule 16

scheduling conference. Here, the above factors point towards declining to adjudicate

plaintiff's state law claims. State claims are best resolved by state courts.

V

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 3). Counts one

and two are dismissed without prejudice. Count three is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk

shall enter judgment.

DATED this 12th day of July, 2012.

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