Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02376/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02376-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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1 Although plaintiff was represented by counsel prior to removal of this action,

plaintiff is appearing pro se. The Court hereby grants Howard Kaloogian, Lowell Robert

Fuselier, David Hart and David Hayek and the Law Firsm of Kaloogian & Fuselier, LLP ex

parte motion for determination that counsel does not represent plaintiff Lonnie Blasko. [doc.

#12]

09cv2376

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONNIE Q. BLASKO,

Plaintiff,

v.

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK; et al.,

Defendant.

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Civil No. 09cv2376 L(WVG)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE [doc.

#7]

Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and California Reconveyance Company move

to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has not

filed an opposition to the motion.1

 When an opposing party does not file papers in the manner

required by Civil Local Rule 7.1(e.2), the Court may deem the failure to "constitute a consent to

the granting of a motion or other request for ruling by the court." CIV. L.R. 7.1(f.3.c). Even

when a motion is unopposed, the Court reviews the motion on the merits to determine if cause

exists to grant the motion. 

Case 3:09-cv-02376-L-WVG Document 13 Filed 08/30/10 Page 1 of 6
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1. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v.

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide

the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted). Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of

all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal conclusions

need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Roberts

v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987); W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618,

624 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are

not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Pareto v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 139 F.3d 696,

699 (9th Cir. 1998).

In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond

the complaint for additional facts, e.g., facts presented in plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition

to a defendant’s motion to dismiss or other submissions. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903,

908 (9th Cir. 2003); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1998); see also 2

MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 12.34[2] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) ("The court may not . . . take

into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss, because

such memoranda do not constitute pleadings under Rule 7(a)."). 

A court may, however, consider items of which it can take judicial notice without

converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d

1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). Judicial notice may be taken of facts "not subject to reasonable

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dispute" because they are either "(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the

trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EVID. 201. Additionally, a court may take

judicial notice of "‘matters of public record’ without converting a motion to dismiss into a

motion for summary judgment.’" Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986)). Under the

incorporation by reference doctrine, courts may also consider documents "whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically

attached to the [plaintiff’s] pleading." In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986

(9th Cir.1999) (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994) (alteration in

original)).

2. Background

On October 20, 2006, WAMU and plaintiff entered into an agreement concerning real

property located in Fallbrook, California. Plaintiff executed a promissory note for one million

dollars. The Note was secured by a Deed of Trust. Also, plaintiff executed a home equity line

of credit agreement with WAMU and signed a Second Deed of Trust which further encumbered

the property. The Deeds were recorded on October 31, 2006.

WAMU was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the FDIC was appointed as

the receiver on September 25, 2008. JPMORGAN annd the FDIC entered into a purchase and

assumption agreement whereby JPMorgan acquired certain WAMU assets. 

On June 27, 2009, a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust was

issued because plaintiff was in arrears in the amount of $56,645.73 on the loans. A Notice of

Trustee’s Sale was recorded on October 8, 2009 and October 16, 2009. 

3. Discussion

a. Real Party in Interest

JPMorgan contends that it did not assume liability for claims arising out of WAMU’s

residential mortgage loans and home equity lines of credit made prior to September 25, 2008. 

Because the mortgage loan at issue was executed prior to September 25, 2008, JPMorgan argues

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that the claims plaintiff asserts are not claims for which it has assumed liability. (Memo of

Ps&As at 4-7. In support of this assertion, JPMorgan quotes from Section 2.5 of the Purchase

and Assumption Agreement but fails to provide the P&A Agreement as an exhibit. Accordingly,

the Court cannot take judicial notice of it or its contents and dismissal of the complaint on this

basis must fail.

b. TILA 

In her first cause of action, plaintiff contends that defendants failed to provide her with

two copies of the three-day right to rescind notice as required under the Truth in Lending Act. 

In seeking dismissal of the action, defendants argue that plaintiff’s TILA damage claim is time

barred. 

The applicable statute of limitations for a claim for damages under TILA is "one year

from the date of the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). "[T]he limitations period

in Section 1640(e) runs from the date of consummation of the transaction but . . . the doctrine of

equitable tolling may, in the appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the

borrower discovers or had reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud or nondisclosures that

form the basis of the TILA action." King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Because the transaction was consummated on October 20, 2006, and this action was filed on

October 15, 2009, plaintiffs’ TILA damages claim is time barred. Plaintiff has not provided any

allegations in support of equitable tolling and have not filed an opposition. The Court therefore

has no basis to conclude that there are grounds for equitable tolling for a sufficient period of

time to make this action timely and this claim must be dismissed.

c. RESPA

Plaintiff complaint states that “[d]efendants have violated RESPA by failing to provide

the disclosures required by RESPA in an accurate and timely fashion.” (Complaint at ¶ 25.) 

The complaint does not even suggest which disclosures were not provided. Plaintiff must, at a

minimum, identify the specific disclosures she did not receive in order to state a claim under

RESPA. As a result, the complaint fails to meet the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard and

must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

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d. California Business & Professions Code § 17200

California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or

fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” CAL.

BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. “[T]he UCL borrows' violations of other laws and treats them as

unlawful practices independently actionable under the UCL.” Vega v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,

N.A., 654 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2009). “As such, a defendant cannot be liable under

§ 17200 for committing unlawful business practices' without having violated another law.”

Gonzalez, 2010 WL 144862, at *15 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s third claim for relief does not identify any borrowed violated law. Even if the

alleged TILA and RESPA claim are assumed to provide the wrongful business practice or

pattern, because those claims have been dismissed, the UCL claim also fails and must be

dismissed. See Gonzalez, 2010 WL 144862, at *16; Vega, 654 F. Supp. at 1118. 

Based on the foregoing, defendant JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The

Court must consider whether a motion to dismiss should be granted with leave to amend. See

Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Rule 15 advises the court that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). "This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality." Eminence Capital,

LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is

clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment. Id. at 1052. Accordingly, plaintiffs

are GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND.

If plaintiff chooses to amend pursuant to this Oorder, the amended complaint must be

complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See CIV. L.R. 15.1. Defendants

not named and claims not re-alleged are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Defendant JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint is GRANTED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND. 

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2. If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, she must file and serve it no later

than August 20, 2010. Defendants shall file and serve any response to the amended complaint

within the time set in Rule 15(a)(3).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 30, 2010

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. WILLIAM V. GALLO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

Case 3:09-cv-02376-L-WVG Document 13 Filed 08/30/10 Page 6 of 6