Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03629/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03629-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHNNY DOE, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

EPIC GAMES, INC., 

Defendant. 

CASE NO. 19-cv-03629-YGR 

ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL 

ARBITRATION OR TRANSFER;

(2) GRANTING IN PART MOTION AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS;

(3) GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL 

COMPLIANCE WITH F.R.C.P. 10(A) 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 18, 20, 21, 44, 47, 49, 52 

Plaintiff Johnny Doe, by and through his guardian Jane Doe, brings this putative class 

action against defendant Epic Games, Inc. arising out of plaintiff’s in-application purchases made 

while playing defendant’s video game, Fortnite. 

Now pending before the Court are three concurrently-filed motions: (1) defendant’s motion 

to compel arbitration, or in the alternative, to transfer; (2) defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); and (3) defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff to 

comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a). Having carefully considered oral argument, 

the pleadings in this action, and the papers submitted, and for the reasons set forth below, the 

Court rules as follows: (1) defendant’s motion to compel arbitration or transfer is DENIED, (2) 

defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and (3) defendant’s 

motion to compel compliance with Rule 10(a) is GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND

The following background is drawn from the complaint and declarations offered in support 

of the parties’ briefs.

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A. Fortnite

Defendant is the creator of Fortnite, “an open-world survival video game in which players 

collect weapons, tools, and resources . . . in order to survive and advance in the game.” The game 

can be downloaded at no cost but allows players to make “in-App purchases” using virtual 

currency called “V-Bucks,” which can be earned through game play or purchased for money. One 

hundred V-Bucks general cost around $1.00, but a player can obtain V-Bucks at a discount for 

purchasing a higher quantity. On certain platforms, defendant may refund a total of three items 

during the lifetime of the user if those purchases were made within the previous 30 days. Other 

purchases are non-refundable. Players allegedly do not have access to their historical purchases, 

within the game or otherwise. 

B. The End User Licensing Agreements

Plaintiff, a minor, created a Fortnite account on March 4, 2018. Upon downloading the 

software for the video game, plaintiff accepted the terms of defendant’s End User License 

Agreement (“EULA”) by first clicking a box that read, “I have read and agree with the End User 

License Agreement,” and then clicking a button that read, “Accept.” The EULA purported to set 

forth players’ rights and obligations relating to the gaming experience. The EULA contained a 

forum selection clause, which provided, in relevant part: 

11. Governing Law and Jurisdiction. Any action or proceeding brought to 

enforce the terms of this Agreement or to adjudicate any dispute must be brought 

in the Superior Court of Wake County, State of North Carolina or the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. You agree to the exclusive 

jurisdiction and venue of these courts[.]

The EULA further provided that defendant might “issue an amended Agreement, Terms of 

Service, or Privacy Policy at any time in its discretion,” and if any such amendment “[wa]s not 

acceptable to [the player], [the player] may terminate th[e] Agreement and must stop using the 

Software.” Continued use of the software would “demonstrate [the player’s] acceptance of the 

amended Agreement and Terms of Service[.]” Plaintiff allegedly does not recall seeing, reading, 

or agreeing to the EULA, nor did plaintiff’s parents seek, read, or agree to the EULA. 

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On June 7, 2019, plaintiff logged on to Fortnite and accepted an amended EULA,1 which 

contained the following arbitration provision: 

THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS A BINDING, INDIVIDUAL 

ARBITRATION AND CLASS-ACTION WAIVER PROVISION. IF YOU 

ACCEPT THIS AGREEMENT, YOU AND EPIC AGREE TO RESOLVE 

DISPUTES IN BINDING, INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION AND GIVE UP 

THE RIGHT TO GO TO COURT INDIVIDUALLY OR AS PART OF A 

CLASS ACTION, AND EPIC AGREES TO PAY YOUR ARBITRATION 

COSTS FOR ALL DISPUTES OF UP TO $10,000 THAT ARE MADE IN 

GOOD FAITH (SEE SECTION 12). YOU HAVE A TIME-LIMITED RIGHT 

TO OPT OUT OF THIS WAIVER. 

It also provided: 

TO ENTER INTO THIS LICENSE AGREEMENT, YOU MUST BE AN ADULT 

OF THE LEGAL AGE OF MAJORITY IN YOUR COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE. 

. . . YOU AFFIRM THAT YOU HAVE REACHED THE LEGAL AGE OF 

MAJORITY, UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT THIS AGREEMENT 

(INCLUDING ITS DISPUTE RESOLUTION TERMS). IF YOU ARE UNDER 

THE LEGAL AGE OF MAJORITY, YOUR PARENT OR LEGAL GUARDIAN 

MUST CONSENT TO THIS AGREEMENT. 

In addition, the amended EULA contained a “governing law and jurisdiction” clause like the one 

contained in the original EULA. The amended EULA, also like the original EULA, stated that 

continued use of the software would demonstrate acceptance of the amended agreement. Further, 

as with the original EULA, plaintiff’s parents allegedly did not see, read, or agree to the amended 

EULA. 

C. The Instant Suit 

On May 17, 2019, plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to defendant in which counsel claimed 

that defendant had “specifically target[ed] minors for in-App Purchases” without “includ[ing] any 

provisions to get parental consent before making purchases.” The letter further asserted that 

plaintiff “can legally disaffirm contracts with [defendant] for in-App [p]urchases,” including 

purchases that were made by using the minor’s own money. The letter purported to put defendant 

on “notice of [its] violations of the state laws of California,” and “demand[ed] that [defendant] 

correct, repair, replace or otherwise rectify” its policies regarding non-refundable in-App 

 1

 The amended EULA was promulgated by defendant on March 15, 2019. 

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purchases. The letter warned that if defendant did not respond, plaintiff would file a class action 

complaint. The letter further stated that plaintiff wished to remain anonymous, describing him as 

“a minor residing in California” and “a player of Fortnite.”

On June 21, 2019, plaintiff filed the instant suit. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that he 

made several non-refundable in-App purchases using V-Bucks, including, for example, purchases 

of “Battle Pass” or “Battle Pass Tiers.” Plaintiff further alleges that he used his own money, 

through gift cards received on social occasions, to make these purchases. Plaintiff alleges that he 

made these purchases without understanding the dollar amounts involved, and although the later 

wanted to cancel the purchases, he was not allowed to do so under defendant’s non-refundable 

policy. Plaintiff brings this putative class action on behalf of all minors in the United States (the 

nationwide class) and California (the statewide sub-class) who made an in-App purchase that was 

non-refundable or made an in-App purchase with their own gift card. 

Plaintiff brings claims for declaratory judgment; violation of the California Consumer 

Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. (“CLRA”); breach of duty of good faith and 

fair dealing; negligent misrepresentation; violation of California Business & Professions Code 

§ 17200 et seq. (“UCL”); and restitution or unjust enrichment. 

II. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

The Court first considers defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The Federal 

Arbitration Act (“FAA”) reflects a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.” AT&T Mobility 

LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citation omitted). “By its terms, the [FAA] leaves 

no room for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts 

shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has 

been signed.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (emphasis in original); see 

also 9 U.S.C. § 4. “The court’s role under the Act is therefore limited to determining: (1) whether 

a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the 

dispute at issue. If the response is affirmative on both counts, then the Act requires the court to 

enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms.” Daugherty v. Experian Info. 

Sols., Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Chiron Corp. v. Ortho 

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Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Defendant moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in 

the amended EULA. In opposition, plaintiff argues, among other things, that he has disaffirmed 

the EULAs and therefore cannot be compelled to arbitrate. Thus, as a threshold issue, the Court 

must determine whether plaintiff disaffirmed the agreement in which he purportedly agreed to 

arbitration. 

A. Disaffirmance 

California law2 provides that a minor has the capacity to contract, with the exception of 

certain contracts specifically prohibited by statute,3 and subject to the power of disaffirmance. See 

Cal. Family Code § 6700 (“Except as provided in Section 6701, a minor may make a contract in 

the same manner as an adult, subject to the power of disaffirmance[.]”). Under California Family 

Code section 6710, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a contract of a minor may be 

disaffirmed by the minor before majority or within a reasonable time afterwards[.]” Cal. Fam. 

Code § 6710. 

Disaffirmance “may be made by any act or declaration” indicating an intent to disaffirm. 

Celli v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 29 Cal.App.3d 511, 517 (1972). In other words, “express 

notice to the other party is unnecessary,” id., and “[n]o specific language is required to 

communicate an intent to disaffirm[,]” Berg v. Traylor, 148 Cal.App. 4th 809, 820 (2007). 

Whatever the method, “[d]isaffirmance by a minor rescinds the entire contract, rendering it a 

nullity.” I.B. ex rel. Fife v. Facebook, Inc., 905 F.Supp.2d 989, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 

 2

 Plaintiff asserts that California law applies to the Court’s disaffirmance analysis, and 

defendant does not appear to disagree. In any event, both California and North Carolina law 

recognize a minor’s right to disaffirm, and the disaffirmance analysis would not necessarily vary 

based on which law was applied. R.A. v. Epic Games, Inc., Case No. 2:19-cv-014488 (C.D. Cal. 

July 30, 2019), Dkt. No. 39 at 6. 

3

 Under California law, a minor may not: (1) give a delegation of power; (2) make a 

contract relating to real property or any interest therein; or (3) make a contract relating to any 

personal property not in his or her immediate possession or control. Cal. Family Code § 6701. 

Such contracts are void and require no act of disaffirmance. See id. The parties do not contend 

that the contracts at issue here fall into any one of these categories.

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(citing Scollan v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 222 Cal.App.2d 181, 183-84 (1963)). The disaffirmance 

statute reflects a policy of “shield[ing] minors from their lack of judgment and experience and 

confer[ing] upon them the right to avoid their contracts in order that they may be protected against 

their own improvidence and the designs and machinations of other people.” Sparks v. Sparks, 101 

Cal.App.2d 129, 137 (1950); see also Fife, 905 F.Supp.2d 1000 (same); Berg v. Traylor, 148 Cal. 

App. 4th 809, 818 (2007) (“Although in many instances such disaffirmance may be a hardship 

upon those who deal with an infant, the right to avoid his contracts is conferred by law upon a 

minor ‘for his protection against his own improvidence and the designs of others.’” (quoting 

Niemann v. Deverich, 98 Cal.App.2d 787, 793 (1950)). The statute also “discourag[es] adults 

from contracting with minors.” I.B. ex rel. Bohannon v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12-cv-01894–BLF, 

2015 WL 1056178, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015) (collecting cases). However, the “infancy 

defense may not be used inequitably to retain the benefits of a contract while reneging on the 

obligations attached to that benefit.” I.B. by & through Fife v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 12-1894 

CW, 2013 WL 6734239, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013) (citation omitted). Accordingly, if a 

minor seeks to disaffirm a contract, “equitable principles dictate that [the minor] ‘must disaffirm 

the entire contract, not just the irksome portions.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Holland v. Universal 

Underwriters Ins. Co., 270 Cal.App.2d 417, 421 (1969)). 

Here, plaintiff claims that by sending the May 17 letter and later filing suit, he has 

disaffirmed both EULAs. Defendant disagrees arguing that (i) plaintiff has not clearly 

communicated what he is or is not disaffirming, and (ii) plaintiff’s briefs suggest that he may 

continue playing Fortnite, which means he cannot disaffirm the contract. 

With respect to defendant’s first argument, both the May 17 letter and the complaint 

convey plaintiff’s intent to repudiate the binding force and effect of plaintiff’s in-App purchases. 

Neither, however, conveys disaffirmance of the EULAs more generally. Indeed, the letter asserts 

that plaintiff “can legally disaffirm contracts with [defendant] for in-App Purchases” and 

purchases plaintiff made “us[ing] [his] own money from gift cards.” Consistent with this 

assertion, plaintiff’s complaint purports to bring this declaratory judgment action “for a minor’s 

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right to disaffirm in-App purchases in Epic’s video game Fortnite.”4 Given that the minor’s power 

to disaffirm a contract is broad and can be invoked through “any act or declaration” that conveys 

his intent to repudiate a contract, Celli, 29 Cal.App.3d at 517, the Court finds this statement 

sufficient to “disclos[e] [plaintiff’s] unequivocal intent to repudiate [the] binding force and effect” 

of both EULAs.5

Berg v. Traylor, 148 Cal.App. 4th 809 (2007) is in accord. There, one of the appellants, a 

minor, purportedly entered into a contract giving the respondent authority to act as the minor’s 

exclusive personal manager in exchange for a commission and other consideration. Id. at 812-

813. After the minor obtained a recurring role on a network television show, the minor’s parent 

sent the respondent a letter stating they no longer needed her services and could no longer afford 

to pay her commission. Id. at 813. The respondent filed suit. Id. Approximately three years 

later, following issuance of an arbitration award and the filing of a petition to confirm said award, 

appellants secured substitute counsel, which filed a “Notice of Disaffirmance of Arbitration 

Award by Minor.” Id. at 815. The notice assumed that the letter sent to the respondent had 

disaffirmed the original contract but added that plaintiff disaffirmed “all other documents filed 

under his name or affecting him as a minor in this litigation.” Id. at 820. The court found that this 

language was adequate to convey the minor’s disaffirmance of the original contract, the arbitration 

award, and the subsequent judgment. Id. at 822. Likewise, plaintiff’s counsel’s representations to 

this Court constitutes disaffirmance of the EULAs.6

 4

 During the hearing on this motion, however, plaintiff’s counsel explicitly stated that 

plaintiff was “not arguing for any selective disaffirmance. We agree, it’s all or nothing. The 

whole EULA has been disaffirmed[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, to the extent the May 17 letter, 

the complaint, or plaintiff’s briefing on the pending motions were unclear regarding what was 

being disaffirmed, plaintiff’s counsel statement on the record clarified. 

5

 In its reply, defendant avers that neither the May 17 letter nor the complaint disclosed 

plaintiff’s real name, address, or Fortnite user name, “without which Epic Games could not 

possibly honor a disaffirmation.” Even assuming a minor must disclose such information in order 

to disaffirm a contract—a proposition for which defendant provides no legal authority—plaintiff 

has now identified himself to defendant. 

6

 Defendant contends that if a minor has already enjoyed the benefit of a contract, he 

“cannot disaffirm it after-the-fact in order to avoid its dispute resolution provisions.” In Berg, 

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As to defendant’s second argument that plaintiff cannot disaffirm the contract because he 

continues to play Fortnite, this contention is directly contradicted by a notice filed by plaintiff’s 

counsel shortly after the hearing on the motion, which stated that plaintiff “has not played the 

Fortnite game . . . after filing of the lawsuit” and “has no intention of playing Fortnite in the 

future.” Thus, this is not a case in which a minor seeks to “adopt that part of an entire transaction 

which is beneficial, and reject its burdens.” E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 

2d 894, 899 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (quoting Peers v. McLaughlin, 88 Cal. 294, 26 P. 119, 120 (1891)) 

(rejecting minor plaintiffs’ attempt to disaffirm a forum selection clause in Facebook’s terms of 

service while continuing to use facebook.com); 5 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise 

on the Law of Contracts § 9:14 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2011) (“If an infant enters into any contract 

subject to conditions or stipulations, the minor cannot take the benefit of the contract without the 

burden of the conditions or stipulations.”). Instead, plaintiff has disaffirmed the EULAs in their 

entirety, including by not playing Fortnite.

7

 See T. K. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., No. 17-CV-04595-LHK, 

2018 WL 1812200, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2018) (“T.K. has disaffirmed the entire renewal 

agreement. There is . . . no evidence that T.K. continues to use ACCP. . . . In these 

 

however, the California court of appeal expressly held that a minor may “disaffirm all obligations 

under a contract, even for services previously rendered, without restoring consideration or the 

value of services rendered to the other party.” 148 Cal.App.4th at 810 (emphasis supplied); see 

also I.B. ex rel. Fife v. Facebook, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Berg

for proposition that minors may disaffirm contracts even after receiving benefits). Absent 

controlling authority holding to the contrary, and in light of the broad language of Section 6710, 

the Court finds plaintiff’s disaffirmance is valid notwithstanding that he has already played 

Fortnite and made in-App purchases. See Lopez v. Kmart Corp., No. 15-CV-01089-JSC, 2015 

WL 2062606, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2015) (“California’s rules on disaffirmance are set forth in a 

statute; in other words, the legislature considered the relevant policy implications and arrived at 

chosen language. It is not for the Court to impose additional limitations or remove those that the 

legislature included based on its own policy rationale.”). 

7

 In R.A. v. Epic Games, Inc., Case No. 2:19-cv-014488 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2019), Dkt. 

No. 39 at 9, which dealt with similar motions in a separate case brought against the same 

defendant, the court reached a similar conclusion. Specifically, the court found that plaintiff 

disaffirmed the EULA by submitting a declaration to the court conveying his disaffirmance. The 

court further found that there was “no evidence . . . that Plaintiff continued playing the Fortnite 

video game after he submitted his declaration that would contradict his intent to disaffirm the 

entirety of the EULAs.” The same is true here. 

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circumstances, the Court sees no basis to enforce the arbitration or no-class-action terms of a 

contract that is now a ‘nullity.’”).

Because plaintiff validly disaffirmed the EULAs, plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate 

this dispute pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in the amended EULA.8 Defendant’s 

motion to compel arbitration is therefore DENIED.

9

III. MOTION TO TRANSFER

Having found that plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate this dispute, the Court 

considers defendant’s motion to transfer this action to the Eastern District of North Carolina 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1391(b) or 1404(a). 

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) 

 Under 28 U.S.C. section 1391(b), venue is proper in (1) a district in which any defendant 

resides, if all of the defendants reside in the same state; (2) a district in which a substantial part of 

the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is 

the subject of the action is situated; or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, 

if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. Relevant here, with respect to 

the first prong, a corporate defendant “resides” “in any judicial district in which such defendant is 

“subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question[.]” 

 8

 The Court notes that the first page of the amended EULA states, in all-caps text, that an 

individual must be an adult of the legal age of majority or have the consent of a parent or legal 

guardian in order to enter into the agreement. Neither occurred here, that is, plaintiff was a minor 

at the time he purportedly accepted the EULAs, and his parent or legal guardian did not authorize 

him to do so. The original EULA, in contrast, did not contain a parallel provision. However, in 

light of the Court’s finding that both EULAs have been disaffirmed, the Court need not reach a 

decision on the enforceability of the agreements in light of an apparent lack of adult consent. 

9

 Defendant’s motion for leave to submit a recent decision also is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 

47) In the decision submitted by defendant, an order granting a motion to compel arbitration in 

Williams v. Eaze Solutions, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-02598-JK (N.D. Cal.), Dkt. No. 17, the court held 

that where a contract was unenforceable because of an unlawful object, the arbitration clause was 

severable and separately enforceable from the rest of the contract. Here, in contrast, the parties do 

not argue that the EULAs had an unlawful object. Rather, as discussed herein, the EULAs are 

unenforceable because of plaintiff’s disaffirmance, which defendant itself argues cannot be 

selective as to certain parts of the agreement but not others. Thus, Williams is distinguishable and 

has no bearing on this Court’s decision to deny the motion to compel arbitration. 

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28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). “[I]n a [s]tate which has more than one judicial district,” such as 

California, “and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction . . . , 

such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that [s]tate within which its contacts 

would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate [s]tate.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). 

 Where, as here, a defendant raises a venue challenge, the plaintiff bears the burden of 

showing that venue is proper. Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 

(9th Cir. 1979). The court need not accept the pleadings as true and may consider facts outside of 

the pleadings. See Kukje Hwajae Ins. Co., Ltd. v. M/V Hyundai Liberty, 408 F.3d 1250, 1254 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Plaintiff claims venue is proper for two reasons: (i) defendant waived its right to argue 

lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to move to dismiss on this basis, and venue therefore is 

proper under sections 1391(b)(1) and (c)(2); and (2) a substantial portion of the events at issue 

occurred in this jurisdiction, and venue therefore is proper under section 1391(b)(2).10 The Court 

addresses each. 

 First, with respect to personal jurisdiction and venue under section 1391(b)(1), plaintiff 

argues defendant’s failure to move on a timely basis to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 

within 21 days of service constitutes waiver and is sufficient to establish the “residency” 

requirement under section 1391(b)(1). See Agasino v. American Airlines, No. 19-cv-03243-LB, 

2019 WL 3387803, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2019) (by failing to move to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction, defendant “therefore has waived any personal-jurisdiction arguments and is 

subject to personal jurisdiction here with respect to this case”); Ward v. Certain Underwriters at 

Lloyd’s of London, No. 18-cv-07551-JCS, 2019 WL 2076991, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 

2019) (“As far as this Court is aware, every court to consider the issue has held that personal 

jurisdiction even based on waiver is sufficient to establish ‘residency’ for the purpose of 

§ 1391(c)(2).”) (citing cases); AT&T Corp. v. Teliax, Inc., No. 16-cv-01914-WHO, 2016 WL 

4241910, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2016) (“A party waives a defense based on lack of personal 

 10 Defendant contends that venue does not lie under any of the three prongs of section 

1391(b). However, defendant did not address plaintiff’s arguments on reply. 

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jurisdiction by omitting it from its first Rule 12(b) motion. . . . [B]ecause [defendant] did not 

contest personal jurisdiction, it is therefore ‘subject to personal jurisdiction’ in this district for the 

purposes of establishing venue.”) (citing cases and treatise); Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Pac. Asian 

Enters., Inc., No. C-07-5749 SC, 2008 WL 2951277, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2008) 

(“[Defendants], each having brought a Rule 12 motion without challenging personal jurisdiction, 

have waived that defense. As each of the Defendants is subject to personal jurisdiction in this 

district, each is considered to reside here for the purposes of venue.”) (citations omitted).) 

Defendant does not distinguish these cases nor offer any contrary authority. Accordingly, this 

Court finds plaintiff has carried his burden of establishing that venue is proper in this district 

under section 1391(b)(1) based on defendant’s waiver. 

 Even if venue was not proper under section 1391(b)(1), the Court finds plaintiff also has 

established proper venue under section 1391(b)(2), namely, because a substantial portion of events 

at issue occurred in this district. Notably, section 1391(b)(2) “does not require that a majority of 

the events have occurred in the district where the suit is filed, nor does it require that the events in 

that district predominate,” and “venue may be proper in multiple districts if a ‘substantial part’ of 

the underlying events took place in each of those districts.” Ward v. Certain Underwriters at 

Lloyd’s of London, No. 18-CV-07551-JCS, 2019 WL 2076991, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2019) 

(quoting Tech. Credit Corp. v. N.J. Christian Acad., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 993, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 

2018)). Here, plaintiff contends, and defendant does not dispute, that plaintiff downloaded and 

played Fortnite, and completed all in-App purchases, in this district. This is sufficient to establish 

venue under section 1391(b)(2) given the dispute at issue. 

B. 28 U.S.C § 1404(a)

The Court proceeds to consider whether transfer is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. section 

1404(a). That statute provides: 

For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a 

district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it 

might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have 

consented.

Section 1404(a) “does not condition transfer on the initial forum’s being ‘wrong’ . . . [a]nd it 

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permits transfer to any district where venue is also proper . . . or to any other district to which the 

parties have agreed by contract or stipulation.” Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. United States 

District Court, 571 U.S. 49, 59 (2013) (“Atlantic Marine”).11 Importantly, the moving party 

carries the burden of showing that the transferee district is the more appropriate forum. Jones v. 

GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Courts considering transfer must first determine whether the action could have been 

brought in the target district in the first instance. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 

(1960). An action could have been brought in any court that has subject matter jurisdiction over 

the claims and personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and where venue would have been proper. 

See id. Here, defendant contends, and plaintiff does not appear to dispute, that this action could 

have been brought in the Eastern District of North Carolina. 

If the action could have been brought in the target district, courts then undertake an 

“individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. 

Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)) 

(internal quotations omitted). Relevant factors the Court may consider include: (1) plaintiff’s 

choice of forum, (2) convenience of the parties, (3) convenience of the witnesses, (4) ease of 

access to the evidence, (5) familiarity of each forum with the applicable law, (6) feasibility of 

consolidation with other claims, (7) any local interest in the controversy, and (8) the relative court 

congestion and time of trial in each forum. Vu v. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 

1151, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2009).12 The Court considers the relevant factors below.13

 11 Where a valid forum selection clause governs, “a district court should ordinarily transfer 

the case to the forum specified in that clause” except “under extraordinary circumstances unrelated 

to the convenience of the parties[.]” Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 581. The EULAs contain forum 

selection clauses, however, because they have been disaffirmed, they do not modify the Court’s 

analysis of the motion to transfer pursuant to section 1404(a).

12 This list is non-exclusive and courts may consider other factors. See Williams v. 

Bowman, 157 F.Supp.2d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that this list of factors “does not 

exhaust the possibilities” and highlighting differing combinations of factors used by courts in 

conducting this analysis). 

13 Neither party addresses the sixth and eighth factors, that is, feasibility of consolidation 

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1. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum 

“While a plaintiff’s choice of forum always weighs against transfer under section 1404(a), 

a court considering transfer must determine how much weight to give this choice under the 

circumstances.” Glob. Hawk Ins. Co. v. Vega, No. 15-CV-02093-YGR, 2015 WL 7720801, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2015). “Although great weight is generally accorded plaintiff’s choice of 

forum, when an individual . . . represents a class, the named plaintiff’s choice of forum is given 

less weight.” Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). The rationale 

for a diminished degree of deference is that “where there are hundreds of potential plaintiffs . . . all 

of whom could with equal show of right go into their many home courts, the claim of any one 

plaintiff that a forum is appropriate merely because it is his home forum is considerably 

weakened.” Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas., Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947). Where a case 

involves a putative statewide class, courts in this district have applied varying degrees of 

deference. See, e.g., Hendricks v. StarKist Co., No. 13-CV-729 YGR, 2014 WL 1245880, at 

*2–3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014) (discussing “diminished degree of deference,” and ultimately 

applying “at least some deference” where plaintiff sought to represent nationwide class and 

California class); Bennett v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., C 11–02220 CRB, 2011 WL 3022126, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. July 22, 2011) (citation omitted) (“[A]s a putative class representative for a state-wide 

class, Plaintiff’s forum choice is not entitled to the same degree of deference as an individual 

plaintiff pursuing her own claim on her own behalf.”); Cardoza v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 2009 WL 

723843, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009) (“The Court does not give less weight to Plaintiff’s 

choice of forum based on Plaintiff’s decision to bring this suit on behalf of a [statewide] class. 

Courts tend to do so in cases where the plaintiff seeks to represent a nationwide class.”). 

Further, in determining the appropriate amount of deference to accord plaintiff’s choice of 

forum, courts consider the extent of the parties’ contacts with the chosen forum, including contacts 

relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 739 (citing Pac. Car & Foundry 

Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1968)). A plaintiff’s choice of forum receives only 

 

with other claims and relative court congestion. 

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minimal deference if the operative facts did not occur within the forum and the forum has no 

interest in the parties or subject matter. Id. In contrast, where “there is no evidence that plaintiffs 

engaged in forum shopping and both plaintiffs and defendant have significant contacts with the 

Northern District of California, plaintiffs’ choice of forum carries significant weight.” Roling v. 

E*Trade Sec., LLC, 756 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 

Here, plaintiff purports to bring this action on behalf of a nationwide class and a California 

sub-class. That this case involves a putative nationwide class diminishes the deference afforded to 

plaintiff’s choice of forum. Even if the classes are certified, however, the named plaintiff, who 

resides in this district, “would still bear a fiduciary responsibility to lead the class,” and thus his 

choice of forum still is entitled to some deference. Van Slyke v. Capital One Bank, 503 F.Supp.2d 

1353, 1363 (N.D. Cal. 2007). As to the extent of the parties’ contacts with this forum, plaintiff 

avers that his contacts are significant because he resides, downloaded and played Fortnite, and 

accepted and disaffirmed the EULAs in this district. Defendant does not dispute these facts but 

counters that it has no relevant contacts with this district, and indeed, the relevant functions related 

to in-App sales and refunds are determined by employees located in North Carolina. That said, it 

also cannot be disputed that large numbers of Fortnite players reside in this district.

On balance, although defendant’s relevant contacts with this district appear minimal, it is 

undisputed that plaintiff has substantial contacts with this forum. Thus, plaintiff’s choice of forum 

is entitled to at least some deference. This factor weighs minimally against transfer. 

2. Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses 

Section 1404(a) provides for transfer to a more convenient forum, “not to a forum likely to 

prove equally convenient or inconvenient.” Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Childers, No. 5:10-cv-03571-

JF/HRL, 2011 WL 566812, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011) (quoting Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 646). 

Thus, transfer “should not be granted if the effect is simply to shift the inconvenience to the 

plaintiff.” Id. (citing Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 

1986)). Further, “[t]he convenience of the witnesses, particularly non-party witnesses, is often the 

most important factor” in ruling on a motion to transfer venue under section 1404(a). Grossman v. 

Johnson & Johnson, No. 14-CV-03557-VC, 2015 WL 1743116, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2015) 

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(citation omitted). To evaluate witness convenience, “courts must consider not only the number of 

witnesses, but also the nature and quality of their testimony.” United States ex rel. Tutanes-Luster 

v. Broker Sols., Inc., No. 17-CV-04384-JST, 2019 WL 1024962, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019) 

(citation omitted). Moreover, courts generally give less consideration to the convenience of party 

witnesses or witnesses employed by a party because these witnesses can be compelled by the 

parties to testify regardless of where the litigation will occur. Allstar Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Your 

Store Online, LLC, 666 F.Supp.2d 1109, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2009). “[In] establishing inconvenience 

to witnesses, the moving party must name the witnesses, state their location, and explain their 

testimony and its relevance.” Imran v. Vital Pharm., Inc., No. 18-CV-05758-JST, 2019 WL 

1509180, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2019) (citation omitted). 

As previously mentioned, defendant avers that the employees familiar with issues in this 

case, including the marketing of and refunds for in-App purchases, work at or near defendant’s 

headquarters in Cary, North Carolina. Plaintiff counters that based on publicly-available job 

postings, some party witnesses, including defendant’s software engineers and Chief Technology 

Officer, work at defendant’s office in Larkspur, California. Plaintiff further emphasizes that 

defendant has not identified any witnesses who cannot be produced in this district or for whom 

this district would not be a more convenient forum. 

Defendant’s arguments fail to persuade. Although it is likely some witnesses would be 

inconvenienced by traveling from North Carolina headquarters to this district for trial, defendant 

does not identify any one of them—much less a non-party witness—with specificity. The absence 

of reference to non-party witnesses is notable because defendant’s employees may be compelled 

to appear in this Court. Insofar as some employees may leave the company by the time this case is 

tried, the Court cannot predict where these former employees will reside, and thus, cannot assume 

either district will be a more convenient forum. With respect to depositions, those can be 

conducted in North Carolina if appropriate. 

Defendant has not carried its burden of demonstrating that North Carolina is a more 

convenient location for the parties or most witnesses. Plaintiff, for his part, has not identified any 

witnesses that would be inconvenienced by transfer either. Therefore, this factor is neutral. 

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3. Ease of Access to Evidence 

“[I]n the age of electronically stored information, the ease of access to evidence is neutral 

because much of the evidence in this case will be electronic documents, which are relatively easy 

to obtain in any district.” See Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Oz-Post Int’l, LLC, 2018 WL 

3956430, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2018) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). As 

such, this factor is neutral. 

4. Familiarity with Applicable Law 

Plaintiff contends that this Court is more familiar with California law, which governs at 

least two of his six claims in this action. Defendant counters that there is a dispute regarding 

whether California law or North Carolina law will apply to the substantive claims, and thus, it is 

premature for the Court to consider which if either court is more familiar with the applicable law. 

Defendant’s argument persuades. Given that a dispute remains regarding what state’s law applies, 

this factor is neutral. 

5. Local Interest in the Controversy 

Defendant argues that this factor is, at worst, neutral, because North Carolina has as much 

interest in regulating the conduct of one of its corporations as California does in protecting its 

residents. In R.A. v. Epic Games, Inc., Case No. 2:19-cv-014488 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2019), Dkt. 

No. 39 at 15 n.4, the court found California and North Carolina both had interests in the outcome 

of the litigation based on this rationale, especially given the reach of defendant. This Court 

agrees. Thus, this factor is neutral. 

6. Balancing of Factors

 In sum, all section 1404(a) factors are neutral except for plaintiff’s choice of forum, which 

weighs minimally against transfer. As such, defendant has not established that the Eastern District 

of North Carolina is the more appropriate forum, and its request for transfer is DENIED.

14

 14 Defendant notes that this is the third putative class action brought against Epic Games 

in recent months, all which were filed in districts outside of North Carolina. The other two were 

transferred to the Eastern District of North Carolina. R.A. v. Epic Games, Inc., Case No. 2:19-cv014488 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2019), Dkt. No. 39; Krohm v. Epic Games, Case No. 5:19-cv-00173 

(N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2019), Dkt. No. 13. Neither is binding on this Court, however, and in any 

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IV. MOTION TO DISMISS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 

if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, the 

plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires the 

plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In deciding whether the plaintiff has 

stated a claim, a court must assume that plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw all reasonable 

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 

F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims. Below, the Court analyzes each claim in 

turn.15

A. Declaratory Judgment 

Defendant moves to dismiss claiming that plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a declaratory 

judgment given the dispute over the legal effect of disaffirmance and the failure to plead whether 

defendant refused plaintiff’s request for a refund. 

Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, “[i]n a case of actual controversy,” the Court 

“may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, 

 

event, both are distinguishable. In R.A., the court found that in light of the parties’ contacts with 

North Carolina, the number of witnesses located there, and the fact that the Central District of 

California bench is vastly understaffed weighed in favor of transfer. Here, the parties here have 

not provided any information regarding relative court congestion here. In Krohm, the court 

transferred the action because of the EULA’s forum selection clause, which, as discussed, does not 

apply here in light of plaintiff’s disaffirmance. 

15 Defendant devotes a portion of its motion to dismiss to its argument that plaintiff has 

not disaffirmed its in-App purchases. This argument is not tied to any specific cause of action 

defendant seeks to have dismissed. In any event, as previously discussed, the May 17 letter and 

the filing of this suit conveyed plaintiff’s intent to disaffirm in-App purchases allegedly made 

using plaintiff’s own money.

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whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). “This statute does not 

create new substantive rights, but merely expands the remedies available in federal courts.” Shell 

Gulf of Mexico, Inc. v. Center for Biological Diversity, Inc., 771 F.3d 632, 635 (9th Cir. 2014). 

“To determine whether a declaratory judgment action presents a justiciable case or controversy, 

courts consider ‘whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a 

substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy 

and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’” Id. (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. 

Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). A critical question is whether the declaratory relief 

“will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue[.]” McGrawEdison Co. v. Preformed Line Prods. Co., 362 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1966). 

Here, plaintiff seeks “a determination by the Court that: (a) this action may proceed and be 

maintained as a class action; (b) the sales contracts between [d]efendant and the children of the 

class members, relating to the purchase of Game Currency, are voidable at the option of the 

respective class members on behalf of their minor children; (c) if the class members elect to void 

the contracts, they will be entitled to restitution and interest thereon; (d) an award of reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs of suit to Plaintiff and the Class is appropriate; and (e) such other and 

further relief as is necessary and just may be appropriate as well.” 

Defendant’s standing arguments fail to persuade. To claim that there is no dispute on 

disaffirmance strains credulity. Nowhere in its numerous filings related to the pending motions 

does defendant suggest that it agrees with plaintiff’s position on disaffirmance or refunds, such 

that there can be no dispute. To the contrary, in its motion, defendant argues that plaintiff did not 

and cannot disaffirm contracts with defendant. Further, the May 17 letter sent by plaintiff’s 

counsel to defendant stated plaintiff’s position that he “can legally disaffirm contracts with 

[defendant] for in-App [p]urchases” and that defendant’s “non-refundable policy violates the laws 

of the state of California with respect to contracting with minors.” The letter “demand[ed] that 

[defendant] correct, repair, replace[,] or otherwise rectify the Fortnite video game non-refundable 

policy” and stated that plaintiff would file a complaint if defendant did not respond. There is no 

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evidence, allegation, or suggestion that defendant responded. Defendant therefore has indicated 

its unwillingness to honor plaintiff’s disaffirmance and refund the in-App purchases. 

Next, with respect to the notion that plaintiff lacks standing because he has not alleged that 

he purchased items labeled “not eligible for refund” or that he saw any non-refundable disclosures, 

the complaint alleges that “[s]ome items remain non-refundable and outside Epic’s refund policy 

including for example, Battle Pass or BattlePass tiers,” both which plaintiff allegedly purchased. 

The complaint also includes screenshots indicating that when a player purchases “Battle Pass,” at 

the bottom-right of the screen, there is a disclaimer that the item “is not eligible for refund.” 

Whether or not he saw this or any other disclosure before making in-App purchases, plaintiff 

alleges that he later “wanted to disaffirm” and “cancel” his in-App purchases but “was not allowed 

to do so,” in part because of defendant’s non-refundable policy. At this juncture, the Court must 

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, resolving any ambiguity in his 

favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). The Court thus finds that the 

allegations in the complaint are sufficient to establish plaintiff’s standing for purposes of his 

declaratory judgment claim. 

Finally, T. K., on which defendant relies, does not compel a different result. There, the 

court allowed plaintiff to proceed with a declaratory relief claim, finding that the complaint 

“show[ed] an apparent dispute between the parties about the legal effect of disaffirmance, insofar 

as Adobe initially refused to refund all of T.K.’s payments made under the renewal agreement and 

did so only after T.K. filed this action.” 2018 WL 1812200, at *13. Here, defendant is not 

entitled to dismissal simply because it has not affirmatively rejected a refund request. Nor can 

defendant claim to be ignorant regarding plaintiff’s position on disaffirmance. Rather, like in T.K, 

there exists an actual controversy between the parties over the rights of minors to disaffirm in-App 

purchases and, if the contracts can be disaffirmed, whether minors are entitled to refunds. See In 

re Apple In-App Purchase Litig., 855 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1035-36 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (denying 

motion to dismiss declaratory relief claim for determination that minors’ sales contracts of in-app 

game currency are voidable). 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim for declaratory relief is therefore DENIED. 

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B. California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) 

Defendant moves for dismissal of the CLRA claim on the grounds that virtual currency is 

not a good or service and because plaintiff was not misled. The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods 

of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction 

intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” Cal. 

Civ. Code § 1770(a). Plaintiff alleges that defendant has violated the CLRA’s proscription against 

(i) the concealment of the characteristics, use, benefit or quality of goods; (ii) representing that 

goods have uses or characteristics that they do not have; (iii) representing that goods are of 

particular standard or quality when they are not; and (iv) representing that a transaction confers or 

involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited 

by law. The Court considers each argument in turn. 

1. “Goods or Services” 

The CLRA applies to transactions involving the sale or lease of “goods or services.” 

Relevant here, “goods,” as defined in California Civil Code section 1761(a), means “tangible 

chattels bought or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, including 

certificates or coupons exchangeable for these goods.” 

Defendant argues that V-Bucks, the virtual currency plaintiff allegedly purchased while 

playing Fortnite, is not a “good or service” under the CLRA. Defendant primarily relies on two 

cases for support. In the first, Berry v. American Express Publishing, Inc., 147 Cal. App.4th 224, 

227, 229 (2007), the California Court of Appeal held that “the extension of credit” was not 

“tangible chattel.” Specifically, the court found that although a plastic credit card was tangible, it 

had “no intrinsic value and exist[ed] only as an indicia of the credit extended to the card holder.” 

Id. at 229. Thus, “separate and apart from the sale or lease of any specific goods or services, [the 

extension of credit] does not fall within the scope of the [CLRA].” Id. 

In the second case, I.B. ex rel. Fife v. Facebook, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 989, 996 (N.D. Cal. 

2012), which relied on Berry, minors brought a CLRA claim against Facebook arising out of their 

alleged purchases of “Facebook Credits,” a “payment system” that allowed “users to make 

purchases within the Facebook website.” On a motion to dismiss, the court found that Facebook 

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Credits, like the extension of credit in Berry, were not “tangible chattel,” and thus were not 

covered by the CLRA. Id. at 1007-08. 

Plaintiff avers that the “digital content” players can acquire through in-App purchases, 

including “virtual supplies, ammunition, and skins,” is more akin to a “real-world” good than the 

credit at issue in Berry and I.B. The Court disagrees. The complaint alleges that Fortnite players 

can use real money to purchase V-Bucks, which can then be used to purchase content with which 

to play the game. Thus, the transactions at issue in this case involve purchases of virtual currency, 

not virtual supplies, ammunition, and skins. As such, and contrary to plaintiff’s contention, this 

case bears close similarities to I.B., in which Facebook Credits, which could be used as “payment” 

on Facebook’s website, were not considered “goods” under the CLRA. Additionally, like in 

Berry, V-Bucks “exist only as an indicia of the credit extended” to a Fortnite player. Moreover, 

although “supplies” and “ammunition” may sound tangible, they are, as plaintiff himself agrees, 

“digital.”16

Plaintiff’s CLRA claim therefore fails because the virtual currency at issue is not a good or 

service. Nevertheless, in order to fully address the claim on the merits, the Court proceeds to 

consider the other proposed basis for dismissal, namely, whether plaintiff has adequately pleaded 

that he was misled.

2. Whether Plaintiff Adequately Pleaded that He Was Misled 

The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or 

practices.” Cal Civ. Code § 1770(a). To state a claim under the CLRA, a plaintiff generally must 

allege a misrepresentation, reliance, and damages. See Marolda v. Symantec Corp., 672 

F.Supp.2d 992, 1002-03 (N.D. Cal. 2009). A plaintiff can state a claim under the CLRA by 

alleging either an affirmative misrepresentation or a failure to disclose. See Rasmussen v. Apple, 

Inc., 27 F.Supp.3d 1027, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Claims under the CLRA are governed by the 

 16 The cases on which plaintiff relies, Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 719 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1112 (N.D. 

Cal. 2010), Morgan v. AT & T Wireless Services, Inc., 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1260, 99 

Cal.Rptr.3d 768 (2009), and America Online, Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 90 Cal.App.4th 1, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 

699 (2001), are inapposite, as all three involved internet and telephone service providers. Plaintiff 

does not argue that, as currently alleged, his CLRA claim is based on purchase of a “service.” 

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“reasonable consumer” test. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citing Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

Here, defendant argues that plaintiff’s CLRA claim fails because plaintiff was not misled. 

Specifically, defendant contends that plaintiff does not claim that he saw statements about in-App 

purchases being “not eligible for refund,” and even if he had, he has not alleged that these 

statements caused him damages. Plaintiff counters that the complaint sufficiently pleads that he 

was “misled and misinformed” by defendant and suffered harm from relying on these 

misrepresentations. The portions of the complaint to which plaintiff cites, however, do not 

support these contentions. For example, while plaintiff alleges that a disclaimer stating that 

purchases are “not eligible for refund” appears “in very small inconspicuous text,” plaintiff does 

not allege whether he saw this disclosure, and if he did, how he was misled by it. Further, it is not 

clear whether plaintiff’s theory regarding defendant’s non-refundable policy is based on 

affirmative misrepresentations or a failure to disclose: in one part of the complaint, plaintiff 

describes the “non-refundable” disclosure as “inconspicuous,” and in another part, he alleges there 

was a “publicized non-refund policy.”17

T.K. is instructive. There, a minor brought a CLRA claim related to Adobe’s sales of 

subscriptions to the “Adobe Creative Cloud Platform” to minors. 2018 WL 1812200, at *1. 

Adobe brought a motion to dismiss, arguing in part that plaintiff failed to allege that she relied on 

defendant’s alleged misrepresentations, which purportedly led plaintiff to belief that she “had no 

right to either disaffirm the[] contracts or receive refunds.” Id. at *7. The court agreed, finding 

that the complaint did not allege that plaintiff actually read the relevant terms of service or relied 

 17 The Court notes that the complaint sets forth several theories for how defendant’s 

conduct was misleading and unlawful. For example, plaintiff alleges that he was induced to make 

in-App purchases, did not understand how much actual money was involved, did not understand 

defendant’s refund policy, and was not allowed to disaffirm or receive a refund. Plaintiff also 

alleges that defendant did not institute proper parental controls. While plaintiff may pursue any 

plausible theory at this juncture, the Court notes that any amended complaint would benefit from 

clarification regarding these separate theories, including which theory underlies each cause of 

action. 

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on them. Id.

18 Similarly here, plaintiff fails to allege that he relied on any particular 

misrepresentations or omissions when making in-App purchases. 

In addition, the subsections of the CLRA cited in the compliant, namely sections 

1770(a)(5) (representations regarding “characteristics, . . . uses, benefits, or quantities”), 

1770(a)(7) (representations that goods “are of a particular standard, quality, or grade”), and 

1770(a)(14) (representations regarding “rights, remedies, or obligations”), are unsupported. 

Nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff allege facts showing that defendant misrepresented the 

characteristics, uses, benefits, or quantities of V-Bucks, or failed to disclose that they were of 

lower standard or quality than represented. Further, and as previously explained, plaintiff fails to 

explain how he was misled regarding his rights, remedies, or obligations when making the in-App 

purchases.

 The Court finds plaintiff’s CLRA claim fails on this ground as well. However, because 

amendment of the pleadings could potentially cure the defects identified herein, the CLRA claim 

is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

C. Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

Defendant moves for dismissal of this claim on the basis that it is not grounded in any 

express contract provision. Moreover, defendant argues there was no breach of these purported 

implied covenants because players must enter payment methods to make in-App purchases and 

plaintiff allegedly made such purchases using his own money. 

Every contract in the state of California contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing that neither party will injure the right of the other party to receive the benefits of the 

agreement. In re Apple In-App Purchase Litig., 855 F.Supp.2d at 1041 (citing Wolf v. Walt Disney 

Pictures & Tel., 162 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1120 (2008)). “The covenant is implied in every contract 

in order to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract.” Imber-Gluck v. Google, 

 18 The T.K. court also found that the plaintiff could not draw a plausible connection 

between defendant’s terms of service and the alleged injury because plaintiff was able to exercise 

her right to disaffirm the contract and received a refund. The portion of the court’s holding carries 

no weight here, where plaintiff does not allege that he received any refund from defendant. 

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Inc., No. 5:14–CV–01070–RMW, 2014 WL 3600506, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014). As such, 

the implied covenant “cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond 

those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement.” Appling v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co., 340 F.3d 769, 779 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 352 

(2000)). However, “breach of a specific provision of the contract is not a necessary prerequisite” 

for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. 

Marathon Development California, Inc., 2 Cal.4th 342, 373 (1992).

“A plaintiff asserting a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing must allege the following elements: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the plaintiff did all, 

or substantially all of the significant things the contract required; (3) the conditions required for 

the defendant’s performance had occurred; (4) the defendant unfairly interfered with the plaintiff’s 

right to receive the benefits of the contract; and (5) the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant’s 

conduct.” Oculus Innovative Sciences, Inc. v. Nofil Corp., 2007 WL 2600746, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 10, 2007) (citation omitted). Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant breached its duty of good 

faith and fair dealing by not taking steps to ensure that minors obtained consent from their parents 

or guardians before playing Fortnite and by inducing minors to make non-refundable in-App 

purchases. 

 Defendant relies on T.K. to support its argument. There, the court dismissed plaintiff’s 

good faith and fair dealing claim on the ground that plaintiff had not alleged that defendant 

frustrated her right to receive the benefits of the contract. 2018 WL 1812200, at *9. Specifically, 

the court found that plaintiff’s entire case was premised on her claims that Adobe’s terms of 

service misled her about her rights under California law and that Adobe refused to honor her 

disaffirmance. Id. By the plaintiff’s own admission, however, the contract did not promise her 

the right to disaffirm, and thus, it was not actionable as a breach of the implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing, which covers “the express covenants or promises of the contract.” Id. 

(quoting Imber-Gluck, 2014 WL 3600506 at *8).

The Court agrees that this case is similar to T.K. Namely, plaintiff alleges that defendant 

breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by misleading plaintiff with respect 

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to disaffirmance and refunds. However, the EULA and the screenshot included in the complaint 

indicate that defendant never promised plaintiff such options would be available, and indeed, 

stated that certain products were non-refundable. Further, although the amended EULA requires 

minors to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian before accepting the agreement, the Court is 

not persuaded that defendant breached an implied covenant by failing to ensure minors abide by 

this provision. Indeed, the provision imposes a duty on the player, not defendant. Thus, plaintiff 

has not alleged any failure to receive the benefits of a contract between him and defendant. See In 

re Apple In-App Purchase Litig., 855 F. Supp. 2d at 1042 (“The Terms & Conditions signed by 

Plaintiffs expressly provide that Plaintiffs are responsible for activity occurring on or through their 

accounts and Apple may charge them for any such activity. Thus, the implied covenant cannot 

negate Apple's ability to charge Plaintiffs.”)

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s good faith and fair dealing claim is 

GRANTED. Because amendment would not be futile, however, the Court grants plaintiff LEAVE 

TO AMEND. 

D. Negligent Misrepresentation 

Next, defendant avers that plaintiff has not established any of the five elements of a 

negligent misrepresentation claim. “The elements of negligent misrepresentation are (1) the 

misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for believing it 

to be true, (3) with intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable 

reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage.” Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth 

Capital Partners, LLC, 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 243 (2007) (citing Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield 

Co., 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 983 (2003)); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1710(2) (defining “[d]eceit” as 

including “[t]he assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground 

for believing it to be true”). Plaintiff alleges that defendant misrepresented material facts by not 

giving notice to plaintiff of its “non-refundable policy” at the time of in-App purchases and by 

“omitting to give summaries or reports of purchases that have already occurred[.]” Plaintiff 

further alleges that defendant had a duty to provide players, including minors, with honest and 

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accurate information and should have known that a reasonable minor would be misled by its 

policies. 

Here, defendant argues that although the complaint alleges it did not give notice to plaintiff 

of its non-refundable policy at the time of his purchases, plaintiff also alleges that defendant “may 

allow a refund of a total of three items through the lifetime of the user” and identifies which items 

are not eligible for refund under this policy. Defendant also contends that under the EULA, 

purchases of V-Bucks and content are final and not refundable except “as otherwise required by 

applicable law.” 

 As explained with respect to plaintiff’s CLRA claim, plaintiff has failed to allege 

sufficiently that defendant made a misrepresentation or that plaintiff justifiably relied on any 

misrepresentation. Thus, as with the CLRA claim, plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim is 

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND insofar as plaintiff may be able to replead to meet the 

elements of the claim. 

E. UCL 

Defendant argues plaintiff’s UCL claim fails because (i) plaintiff does not sufficiently 

allege claims under any of the UCL’s prongs, and (ii) plaintiff cannot seek equitable relief under 

the UCL because he already has an adequate remedy at law. The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, 

unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 

advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The UCL creates a cause of action for business 

practices that are (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, or (3) fraudulent. Each “prong” of the UCL provides a 

separate and distinct theory of liability. Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 731 

(9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff asserts claims under all three prongs. The Court addresses each.

1. Unlawful 

The unlawful prong of the UCL prohibits “anything that can properly be called a business 

practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns., Inc. v. L.A. Cellular 

Telephone Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 (1999) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “By 

proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, the UCL permits injured consumers to ‘borrow’ 

violations of other laws and treat them as unlawful competition that is independently actionable.” 

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In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1225 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting CelTech Commc’ns., 20 Cal.4th at 180).

Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s conduct is unlawful under the UCL because it (i) violates 

the CLRA, (ii) breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (iii) constitutes 

negligent misrepresentation, and (iv) violates the minor’s right to disaffirm a contract. As to the 

first three claims, the Court has dismissed these causes of action. Accordingly, they may not form 

the basis for plaintiff’s UCL claim. The Court also has found, however, that plaintiff’s allegations 

are sufficient to support his theory that defendant is unwilling to honor plaintiff’s disaffirmance of 

his in-App purchases. 

Thus, plaintiff may proceed with his UCL claim for unlawful conduct to the extent it is 

predicated on defendant’s alleged violation of the minor’s right to disaffirm a contract. 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s UCL claim on this ground is therefore DENIED. 

2. Unfair 

There are two standards for determining what is “unfair competition” under the UCL. The 

first standard, in the context of claims brought by consumers, requires allegations that the 

challenged conduct violates a “public policy” that is “tethered” to a specific constitutional, 

statutory, or regulatory provision. Gregory v. Albertson’s, Inc., 104 Cal. App. 4th 845, 853 

(2002). The second standard “involves balancing the harm to the consumer against the utility of 

the defendant’s practice.” Lozano, 504 F.3d at 735. 

Plaintiff asserts that defendant’s conduct is unfair under both standards. Specifically, 

plaintiff alleges that defendant engaged in unfair practices by actively advertising, marketing, and 

promoting applications as “free” with the intent to induce minors to purchase game currency. The 

complaint, however, does not contain a single factual allegation to support this conclusory 

statement. Indeed, plaintiff alleges that V-Bucks can be earned in-game or purchased for money, 

and players must enter and save a payment method in order to make in-App purchases. As such, 

the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s UCL claim insofar as that claim is 

premised on the unfair prong of the UCL. However, because amendment would not be futile, the 

Court grants plaintiff LEAVE TO AMEND.

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3. Fraudulent 

The “fraudulent” prong of the UCL “requires a showing [that] members of the public are 

likely to be deceived.” Wang v. Massey Chevrolet, 97 Cal. App. 4th 856, 871 (2002). “[W]hether 

a business practice is deceptive will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for decision on” a 

motion to dismiss. See Williams, 552 F.3d at 938. To state a claim under the fraudulent prong, a 

plaintiff also is “required to prove ‘actual reliance on the allegedly deceptive or misleading 

statements,’ and that ‘the misrepresentation was an immediate cause of the injury-producing 

conduct.’” Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 793 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Kwikset v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310 (2011) and In Re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 

(2009)). Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant’s conduct was fraudulent under the UCL because 

defendant intentionally and knowingly “omitted giving information” on amounts spent on in-App 

purchases, thereby misleading plaintiff about his purchase history. Elsewhere in the complaint, 

plaintiff alleges that Fortnite players have no way of knowing and cannot track the money already 

spent on in-App purchases.

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim under the fraudulent prong of the UCL fails because 

players can track through their credit or debit cards or through PayPal, and in any event, defendant 

is not obligated to provide players with such information. Plaintiff counters that minors do not 

have access to their parents’ credit card or bank account statements and that non-disclosure of 

material information such as purchasing history is fraudulent. 

Plaintiff’s argument that minors do not have access to information about their purchase 

history is undermined by the fact that plaintiff’s allegations in this case are based on in-App 

purchases he made using his own money. Moreover, it is reasonable to believe that at least some 

minors obtain the consent of their parents or guardians before using their credit cards or bank 

accounts to make in-App purchases, and for those who do not, the Court is not persuaded that 

defendant must make their purchase history easily accessible through Fortnite. In addition, 

plaintiff’s allegation that defendant “omitted giving information” about purchase history does not 

explain whether plaintiff ever sought this information and whether defendant refused to provide it. 

Plaintiff’s UCL claim under the fraudulent prong is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

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4. Adequate Remedy at Law

Having found that plaintiff’s UCL claim survives to the extent it is brought under the 

unlawful prong and predicated on an alleged violation of the minor’s right to disaffirm, the Court 

considers whether the claim nevertheless fails because plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. 

The Court recently considered this issue in Luong v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 2018 WL 

2047646 at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2018). There, like here, defendant argued that plaintiffs’ UCL 

claim was subject to dismissal to the extent they sought equitable relief because plaintiffs already 

had an adequate remedy at law. Id. This Court held: 

[T]here is a split of authority in the California district courts on the question of 

whether plaintiffs should be barred from pleading claims for equitable relief under 

the UCL and CLRA if they have alleged a claim that would provide an adequate 

remedy at law. See Aberin v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 16-CV-04384-JST, 

2018 WL 1473085, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) (denying dismissal); Adkins v. 

Comcast Corp., No. 16-CV-05969-VC, 2017 WL 3491973, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 

1, 2017) (“A few federal courts seem to have decided that claims for equitable relief 

should be dismissed at the pleading stage if the plaintiff manages to state a claim 

for relief that carries a remedy at law. . . . But this Court is aware of no basis in 

California or federal law for prohibiting the plaintiffs from pursuing their equitable 

claims in the alternative to legal remedies at the pleadings stage.”); Huu Nguyen v. 

Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 16-CV-05591-LHK, 2017 WL 1330602, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 11, 2017) (granting dismissal because plaintiff had adequate remedy at 

law); Munning v. Gap, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 

2017) (same); Moss v. Infinity Ins. Co., 197 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 

2016) (same). The Court finds those decisions allowing claims for equitable 

relief to proceed as an alternative remedy, at the pleading stage, to be more 

persuasive, based upon the broad remedial purposes of the California consumer 

protection statutes.

Id. (emphasis supplied). Specifically, the Court reasoned that Business & Professions Code 

section 17205 expressly states that the remedies provided for a UCL violation are “cumulative to 

each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.” Id.; see 

also State v. Altus Fin., S.A., 36 Cal. 4th 1284, 1303 (2005) (“[T]he fact that there are alternative 

remedies under a specific statute does not preclude a UCL remedy, unless the statute itself 

provides that the remedy is to be exclusive.”). 

 Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s UCL claim because plaintiff has an 

adequate remedy at law is DENIED. 

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F. Unjust Enrichment 

The Ninth Circuit has held that under California law, while “there is not a standalone cause 

of action for unjust enrichment, . . . [w]hen a plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment, a court may 

construe the cause of action as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.” Astiana v. Hain 

Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

“The fact that one person benefits another is not, by itself, sufficient to require restitution. The 

person receiving the benefit is required to make restitution only if the circumstances are such that, 

as between the two individuals, it is unjust for the person to retain it.” First Nationwide Savings v. 

Perry, 11 Cal.App.4th 1657, 1663 (1992) (emphasis in original); see also Astiana, 783 F.3d at 

762 (explaining that restitution and unjust enrichment “describe the theory underlying a claim that 

a defendant has been unjustly conferred a benefit through mistake, fraud, coercion, or request” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Plaintiff alleges defendant was unjustly enriched through its policy of not refunding inApp purchases of digital products and game currency. Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to 

recover all revenue acquired as a result of this policy. Defendant argues that this claim fails for 

the same reason as certain of the other claims, namely, because plaintiff has not alleged that he 

requested to disaffirm his contract with defendant or that defendant unjustly refused such a 

request. This argument fails because, as explained above, plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that 

defendant was unwilling to honor plaintiff’s disaffirmance and refund plaintiff for his in-App 

purchases. Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim nevertheless fails, however, because plaintiff has 

not alleged that he was misled or that defendant breached any express or implied covenant as it 

relates to defendant’s non-refundable policy.19

As such, defendant’s motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim is GRANTED. As with 

the other claims that have been dismissed, however, plaintiff shall be granted LEAVE TO AMEND. 

 19 Defendant additionally argues that plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim fails because he 

has an adequate remedy at law. As discussed, however, plaintiff is permitted to pursue alternative 

forms of relief, notwithstanding the availability of a legal remedy. 

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V. MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 10(A) 

Finally, the Court addresses defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff to comply with Rule 

10(a), which provides that every pleading must “name all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). 

Defendant asks the Court to require Johnny Doe to litigate under his initials and require Jane Doe 

to litigate under her full name. 

As a threshold matter, plaintiff contends that the motion is procedurally improper because 

it essentially is a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting plaintiff leave to proceed 

under a pseudonym, filed absent leave of Court. Plaintiff filed this action on June 21, 2019 and 

concurrently field an ex parte motion to seek leave from the Court to proceed under a pseudonym. 

In its ex parte motion, plaintiff noted that defendant would not be prejudiced by the Court 

allowing plaintiffs “to press their claims anonymously at this juncture[,] given the limited, initial 

stage through which [p]laintiffs seek this relief: as [p]laintiffs plead their case, and [d]efendant 

presents its answer and defenses.” On June 25, 2019, defendant executed a waiver of service of 

summons that included receipt of the motion. Just over two weeks later, on July 11, 2019, the 

Court granted plaintiff’s motion. 

The Court granted plaintiff’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym when this case was in 

its infancy, before defendant’s counsel had appeared let alone responded to the complaint. Now 

that defendant’s counsel has appeared and the parties have engaged in motion practice that 

provides additional insight into the case, the circumstances have changed materially. This is 

sufficient to warrant consideration of the motion to compel compliance with Rule 10(a) on the 

merits. See Jane Doe v. John F. Kennedy University, No. 4:13-cv-1137-DMR (N.D. Cal.), Dkt. 

Nos. 4, 34 (granting an ex parte motion to proceed under a pseudonym and later granting motion 

for an order requiring plaintiff to refile under her true name). 

Turning to the merits, in the Ninth Circuit, parties may proceed under pseudonyms only 

“in the ‘unusual case’ when nondisclosure of the party’s identity ‘is necessary . . . to protect a 

person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.” Does I Thru XXIII v. 

Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 

Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1981)). The Court determines whether the plaintiff may 

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proceed anonymously by balancing five factors: (1) the severity of the threatened harm, (2) the 

reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears, (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to such 

retaliation, (4) the prejudice to the opposing party, and (5) the public interest. Id. at 1068–69. 

Here, plaintiff contends that he should be permitted to proceed under pseudonym because 

his gaming habits constitute highly sensitive personal information and he fears retaliation from the 

community if his identity is revealed. Plaintiff further argues that defendant will not suffer any 

hardship from plaintiff proceeding anonymously because defendant knows plaintiff’s identity. 

Further, plaintiff avers that the public interest in seeing this case resolved on the merits weighs in 

favor of granting anonymity, implying that plaintiff may not proceed with the litigation if he must 

face public scrutiny. 

Plaintiff’s arguments fail to persuade. Although plaintiff’s position in this litigation may 

be unpopular to some, his fear of social stigmatization is speculative and there is no indication 

plaintiff is likely to suffer more severe retaliation than in the typical consumer action. Further, 

plaintiff’s “technology preferences” and “video-gaming habits,” while perhaps sensitive, do not 

justify the use of a pseudonym, which runs contrary to the “normal presumption in litigation [] that 

parties must use their real names.” Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 

F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1043). Indeed, 

information about plaintiff’s use of Fortnite is of an entirely different nature than that which 

typically justifies the use of pseudonyms, such as information about sexual abuse, human 

trafficking, or mental illness. Moreover, the public interest in resolution of this case on the merits 

does not outweigh the public’s interest in the openness of the proceeding. 

 As such, defendant’s motion to compel compliance with Rule 10(a) is GRANTED. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS: 

(i) defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is DENIED; 

(ii) defendant’s motion to transfer this case to the Eastern District of North Carolina is 

DENIED; 

(iii) defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to (A) declaratory judgment, and (B) 

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United States District Court 

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a

the UCL, insofar as plaintiff’s claim is brought under the unlawful prong and 

predicated on an alleged violation of the minor’s right to disaffirm; 

(iv) defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to (A) the

CLRA, (B) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (C) negligent

misrepresentation claim, (D) the UCL, except as set forth above, and (E) unjust

enrichment; and

(v) defendant’s motion to compel compliance with Rule 10(a) is GRANTED.

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An amended complaint must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of issuance of this

order.21 Such complaint must identify plaintiff Johnny Doe and his guardian Jane Doe by name in 

accordance with Rule 5.2 as it relates to minors. Any response to thereto is due fourteen (14) 

days after plaintiff’s filing.22

This Order terminates Docket Numbers 18, 20, 21, 44, and 47, 49, and 52. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

20 In light of the Court’s grant of the motion to compel compliance with Rule 10(a), 

plaintiff’s unopposed administrative motion to file under seal Docket Number 42-1, which 

includes plaintiff’s screen name for playing Fortnite, is DENIED. 

21 On December 18, 2019, while the instant motion was pending, plaintiff filed a motion 

for leave to file a first amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 49.) In light of this order, plaintiffs’ motion 

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to plaintiff to review this order and file an amended complaint in 

conformity thereof. 

22 On January 9, 2020, the parties filed a joint discovery letter brief. (Dkt. No. 52.) The 

parties are advised that the court shall issue a protective order with respect to source code when 

and if such an order is necessary. There is no need to issue it at present. Additionally, the instant 

order addresses, at a minimum, some of the other discovery issues, and accordingly, the requests 

set forth in the letter are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties are ordered to meet and 

confer and determine whether any disputes remain. If another motion is brought, the parties 

SHALL comply with this Court’s standing order and submit letter briefs. 

January 23, 2020

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