Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-15-01716/USCOURTS-ca6-15-01716-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 16a0183p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

TREVOR J. SCHLEICHER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

PREFERRED SOLUTIONS, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 15-1716 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. 

No. 2:14-cv-10729—Paul D. Borman, District Judge. 

Argued: March 9, 2016 

Decided and Filed: August 2, 2016 

Before: DAUGHTREY, MOORE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Elisabeth A. Gusfa, STERLING ATTORNEYS AT LAW, P.C., Bloomfield Hills, 

Michigan, for Appellant. David M. Cessante, CLARK HILL PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Elisabeth A. Gusfa, Raymond J. Sterling, James C. Baker, STERLING 

ATTORNEYS AT LAW, P.C., Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellant. David M. Cessante, 

Ellen E. Hoeppner, CLARK HILL PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. 

_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Between 2009 and 2013, Trevor Schleicher 

worked for Preferred Solutions, Inc. (“Preferred”), a Michigan-based company that provides 

staffing for corporate clients. With his co-worker Susan Piotrowski, Schleicher led Preferred’s 

>

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healthcare information technology staffing group. Schleicher and Piotrowski performed the 

same job, had the same responsibilities, and each earned a share of the profits they collectively 

generated. However, they asked Preferred’s CEO, Marie Seipenko, to be paid pursuant to 

different compensation models: Schleicher received 20% of the group’s profit pool, while 

Piotrowski received a $100,000 base salary plus a 10% draw from the profit pool. This worked 

out well for Schleicher: between 2009 and 2013, he outearned Piotrowski by $694,159.38. 

However, he also had a number of disagreements with Seipenko and other Preferred employees. 

In 2013, Seipenko modified Schleicher’s compensation model so that it matched Piotrowski’s. 

From that point onward, he received a $100,000 salary and 10% of the profit pool. At the end of 

that year, Seipenko terminated Schleicher. 

 Schleicher sued Preferred under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), alleging that Preferred 

violated the statute by paying him more than Piotrowski for three years, then lowering his 

compensation so that it matched Piotrowski’s. The district court granted summary judgment to 

Preferred, finding that it had conclusively established that sex played no part in the pay 

differential between Schleicher and Piotrowski. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the 

district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Preferred. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

A. Facts

1. Seipenko hires Piotrowski and her former co-worker Schleicher. 

 Preferred is a Michigan-based company that provides staffing services for corporate 

clients. R. 39-5 (Company Highlights/History at 1) (Page ID #537). John Butkovich founded 

Preferred in 1993. R. 39-2 (Seipenko Dep. at 6:24–7:10) (Page ID #385). He now sits on the 

company’s board of directors; his daughter, Seipenko, has been Preferred’s President and CEO 

since 2002. Id. at 8:1–9:15 (Page ID #386). 

 In December 2006, Seipenko hired Piotrowski, who came onboard as a vice president. R. 

39-3 (Piotrowski Dep. at 20:7–11) (Page ID #456). Around January 2007, Piotrowski introduced 

Seipenko to Schleicher, her former co-worker. R. 39-2 (Seipenko Dep. at 23:6–10) (Page ID 

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#389); R. 39-3 (Piotrowski Dep. at 19:4–6) (Page ID #456). Piotrowski told Seipenko that 

Schleicher had done well “selling healthcare IT staffing services.” R. 39-3 (Piotrowski Dep. at 

19:23–20:1) (Page ID #456). Seipenko and Schleicher had a lunch meeting in January 2007, 

where they discussed Schleicher’s work in general terms. R. 39-2 (Seipenko Dep. at 22:7–23:8) 

(Page ID #389). 

 Until 2008, Preferred was “a general IT staffing company.” R. 39-2 (Seipenko Dep. at 

11:13–22) (Page ID #386). Seipenko had tried (unsuccessfully) to move Preferred into several 

niche markets. Id. at 11:20–12:7) (Page ID #386). Around April 2008, Seipenko decided to 

move Preferred into a new niche: healthcare information technology, and “specifically training 

in go-live business for electronic medical records.” Id. at 18:3–7 (Page ID #388). The parties 

dispute what role Schleicher played in Preferred’s decision to pursue this line of business. R. 51 

(5/18/15 Op. and Order at 3–4) (Page ID #1298–99). 

 In 2009, Seipenko hired Schleicher and one of his co-workers, Katrina Purdy. R. 51 

(5/18/15 Op. and Order at 4) (Page ID #1299). Schleicher worked directly with Piotrowski: 

Seipenko wanted them to “co-sell[] and co-lead[] activities and growth targeted at the health 

information technology space.” R. 39-3 (Piotrowski Dep. at 49:5–10) (Page ID #464). 

Schleicher and Piotrowski were Preferred’s only salespeople specializing in this health IT 

market. R. 39-7 (Schleicher Dep. at 73:18–21) (Page ID #579). Both “perform[ed] the same 

job” at Preferred. R. 39-3 (Seipenko Dep. at 70:3–9) (Page ID #401). 

2. Schleicher and Piotrowski select different compensation models. 

 When she first joined Preferred, Piotrowski received a $120,000 annual salary, plus a 

10% commission rate. R. 39-3 (Piotrowski Dep. at 46:3–10) (Page ID #463). Piotrowski’s 

commissions were measured as the “gross profit that [she] produced in [her] business unit.” Id.

at 46:8–10 (Page ID #463). Sometime thereafter—but before Schleicher joined Preferred—

Piotrowski elected to switch to a different compensation model: a $100,000 salary plus 20% 

commissions. R. 39-2 (Seipenko Dep. at 77:9–78:1) (Page ID #403); R. 39-3 (Piotrowski Dep. 

at 46:12–15) (Page ID #463). 

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 When Schleicher joined Preferred, he negotiated with Seipenko to create a new 

compensation model that differed from Piotrowski’s in two respects. R. 39-2 (Seipenko Dep. at 

69:7–12) (Page ID #401). First, Schleicher wanted to be paid directly from a profit pool, instead 

of earning income on a commissions basis. Id.; R. 39-7 (Schleicher Dep. at 75:2–77:17) (Page 

ID #579–80). The pool would consist of the “collective gross profit produced by [Schleicher] 

and [Piotrowski], less direct costs for conducting the business.” R. 39-3 (Piotrowski Dep. at 

47:8–11) (Page ID #463). Pursuant to the profit-pool model, Schleicher would receive a set 

draw of the profits that he and Piotrowski collectively generated in their healthcare IT sales unit, 

“regardless of what an individual did in any particular quarter.” R. 39-7 (Schleicher Dep. at 

80:1–81:13) (Page ID #580–81); R. 51 (5/18/15 Op. and Order at 6–7) (Page ID #1301–02). 

Second, Schleicher wanted to be paid exclusively from the profit pool, with no salary. Id. at 

76:14–77:4 (Page ID #579–80). Schleicher and Seipenko settled on the following model: 

Schleicher would receive 20% of the profit pool “with no guaranteed base salary.” R. 51 

(5/18/15 Op. and Order at 7) (Page ID #1302). 

 Because Seipenko agreed to Schleicher’s profit-pool proposal—and because the profit 

pool would consist of profits generated exclusively by Schleicher and Piotrowski—Seipenko 

modified Piotrowski’s compensation model. R. 39-3 (Piotrowski Dep. at 46:24–47:5 (Page ID 

#463). Seipenko offered Piotrowski the same compensation model that Schleicher had 

negotiated. R. 39-2 (Seipenko Dep. at 237:22–25) (Page ID #443). Piotrowski declined, opting 

instead for a $100,000 base salary plus a 10% draw from the profit pool. Id. at 78:2–5, 238:1–2) 

(Page ID #403, 443); R. 39-3 (Piotrowski Dep. at 47:1–7, 140:23–141:6) (Page ID #463, 486–

87). Schleicher “talked openly with” Piotrowski about his profit-pool-only compensation model; 

by his account, Piotrowski “wouldn’t touch it with a 10-foot pole” because it was risky. R. 39-7 

(Schleicher Dep. at 81:11–17) (Page ID #581). 

 At the time Schleicher and Piotrowski negotiated these different deals, Seipenko did not 

“have any idea” which of them would end up making more money. R. 39-2 (Seipenko Dep. at 

238:3–17) (Page ID #443). Neither party disputes that Schleicher made considerably more than 

Piotrowski: between 2009 and 2013, Schleicher outearned her by $694,159.38. R. 43-10 

(Earnings Chart) (Page ID #895). However, at no point during Schleicher’s tenure at Preferred 

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did Piotrowski complain to Seipenko or ask to change her compensation model. R. 39-3 

(Seipenko Dep. at 120:18–121:16) (Page ID #481–82). 

3. Seipenko modifies Schleicher’s compensation model after he has several 

problems at Preferred. 

 Preferred’s healthcare IT staffing group did well after Schleicher joined the company. 

The group generated $892,940.22 in revenue in the fourth quarter of 2009; in the following 

years, the group brought in $13.1 million (2011), $16.6 million (2012), and $11.4 million (2013). 

R. 51 (5/18/15 Op. and Order at 8) (Page ID #1303). 

 Schleicher, however, had problems with a number of different people at Preferred. 

Although the parties dispute many of the details, R. 51 (5/18/15 Op. and Order at 9–10) (Page ID 

#1304–05), Schleicher sent Seipenko two emails in which he acknowledged these issues. In the 

first, sent on October 8, 2012, Schleicher wrote: 

First, I want to tell you again that I feel terrible that I’m at the root of any 

problems for you or anyone else in the company. It sickens me to be tied to 

anything negative relative to my efforts here at Preferred. I’m 100% committed 

to getting back on the same page again with you, am wide open to constructive 

criticism, will be accountable for my actions, and will work very hard to be a 

better employee, person, and colleague! 

R. 39-10 (10/8/12 Email from Schleicher to Seipenko) (Page ID #657). Shortly thereafter, 

Schleicher and Seipenko got into a major dispute over a project scheduled to take place at one of 

Preferred’s New Jersey-based clients right around the time of Hurricane Sandy. R. 39-2 

(Seipenko Dep. at 204:13–209:25) (Page ID #435–36); R. 51 (5/18/15 Op. and Order at 10–11) 

(Page ID #1306). Although the parties dispute the sequence of events, Schleicher evidently 

disobeyed several direct orders from Seipenko. R. 51 (5/18/15 Op. and Order at 10–11) (Page 

ID #1305–06). That incident prompted another email from Schleicher: 

I could have never predicted or imagined when I decided to come work for you 

how much resistance I would get from you every step of the way. 

 . . . . 

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 . . . I have given you everything I have with nothing but the best intentions 

at heart. I do not believe there is a justifiable reason to let me go and I hope that 

is not what you want to do. 

R. 39-12 (10/30/12 Email from Schleicher to Seipenko at 1–2) (Page ID #661–62). 

 The parties also dispute Schleicher’s sales performance. R. 51 (5/18/15 Op. and Order at 

8–9) (Page ID #1304). Seipenko recalls that Schleicher’s co-workers complained that Schleicher 

“was not pulling his weight in sales,” and that Schleicher told Seipenko that Piotrowski should 

shoulder more sales responsibility. R. 39-2 (Seipenko Dep. at 107:16–18, 137:20–138:5) (Page 

ID #410, 418). Schleicher counters that his performance was not deficient; further, he claims 

that Seipenko made several derogatory, gender-based remarks to him during his time at Preferred 

(e.g., “[Y]ou might be better suited in an office with more men”). R. 39-7 (Schleicher Dep. at 

253:22–255:21) (Page ID #624). 

 On May 3, 2013, Seipenko told Schleicher that she was changing his compensation plan: 

from that point forward, his compensation would be calculated similar to that of Piotrowski 

($100,000 salary plus 10% of the profit pool). R. 39-2 (Seipenko Dep. at 92:19–23) (Page ID 

#406). By Seipenko’s account, she changed Schleicher’s pay structure “to motivate him to sell.” 

Id. at 94:19–22 (Page ID #407). Schleicher recalls that, during this May 3 meeting, Seipenko 

“told [him] that she was not happy that [he] made more money than” Piotrowski and that she 

wanted to “equalize” their compensation. R. 39-7 (Schleicher Dep. at 226:20–227:3) (Page ID 

#617). 

4. Seipenko terminates Schleicher. 

The discord between Schleicher and Seipenko grew in 2013. R. 51 (5/18/15 Op. and 

Order at 13) (Page ID #1308). On December 2, 2013—after Schleicher evidently disobeyed a 

direct order from Seipenko regarding his supervision of a Preferred employee—Seipenko 

terminated Schleicher. Id. at 14 (Page ID #1309). 

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B. Procedural History 

On February 17, 2014, Schleicher filed a four-count complaint against Preferred, alleging 

that: 

 1. Preferred had violated the EPA; 

 2. Preferred had violated Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act; 

 3. Preferred had breached its employment contract with Schleicher; and 

 4. Preferred was unjustly enriched as a result of Schleicher’s work at Preferred. 

R. 1 (Compl. at 6–10) (Page ID #6–10). Preferred moved for summary judgment on all four of 

Schleicher’s claims on January 23, 2015. R. 39 (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.) (Page ID #343). 

Schleicher responded on February 13, 2015. R. 43 (Pltf.’s Br. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. 

J.) (Page ID #762). 

 On May 18, 2015, the district court issued an order (1) granting Preferred’s motion for 

summary judgment on Schleicher’s EPA claim and (2) declining to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over Schleicher’s state-law claims. R. 51 (5/18/15 Op. and Order at 1) (Page ID 

#1296). Because the district court reasoned that Preferred had “acquiesce[d] that Plaintiff ha[d] 

established a prima facie case under the EPA,” it focused on whether Preferred had rebutted that 

case with an affirmative defense. R. 51 (5/18/15 Op. and Order at 19) (Page ID #1314). It 

concluded that “Piotrowski’s compensation differential was based on a factor other than sex—

namely personal choice regarding the risk associated with the compensation structure.” Id. at 21 

(Page ID #1316). Finding no genuine dispute of material fact “that sex provided no reason for” 

this differential, the district court dismissed Schleicher’s EPA claim with prejudice. Id. at 23–24 

(Page ID #1318–19). 

 Schleicher timely appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 

Preferred on his EPA claim, but not its dismissal of his state-law claims. R. 59 (Notice of 

Appeal at 1–2) (Page ID #1346–47). 

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Michael v. City of Troy 

Police Dep’t, 808 F.3d 304, 307 (6th Cir. 2015). “Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing 

the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are 

no genuine issues of material fact for trial.” Shadrick v. Hopkins Cty., 805 F.3d 724, 736 (6th 

Cir. 2015). 

B. Schleicher’s EPA Claim 

 “The EPA prohibits employers from paying an employee at a rate less than that paid to an 

employee of the opposite sex for performing equal work.” Beck-Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 

353, 359 (6th Cir. 2006). Schleicher makes a two-part EPA argument. First, he claims that 

Preferred violated the EPA by “maintaining the pay disparity” between Schleicher and 

Piotrowski for more than three years. Appellant Br. at 21. Second, he argues that Preferred 

violated the EPA again when it tried to cure this pay disparity by lowering Schleicher’s 

compensation to match Piotrowski’s. Id. at 31. The second part of Schleicher’s argument 

depends on the first: the EPA forbids an employer from lowering an employee’s wages only if it 

does so to remedy an underlying EPA violation. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). If the first part of 

Schleicher’s argument fails, the second fails as well. 

 We have read the EPA to establish a three-step burden-shifting scheme: 

First, “[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the EPA, 

plaintiffs must show that an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for 

equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and 

which are performed under similar working conditions.’” Beck-Wilson, 441 F.3d at 359 (quoting 

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974)). “Unlike the showing required 

under Title VII’s disparate treatment theory, proof of discriminatory intent is not required to 

establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act.” Id. at 360 (quoting Peters v. City of 

Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Price 

Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). 

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Second, “[o]nce the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must ‘prove’ 

that the wage differential is justified under one of the four affirmative defenses set forth under 

§ 206(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which 

measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (4) any other factor other than sex.” 

Buntin v. Breathitt Cty. Bd. of Educ., 134 F.3d 796, 799 (6th Cir. 1998).1 Importantly, “a 

defendant bears both the burden of persuasion and production on its affirmative defenses.” 

Beck-Wilson, 441 F.3d at 364–65. 

Finally, if an EPA defendant proves an affirmative defense, an EPA plaintiff “must come 

forward with evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact” regarding pretext. 

Timmer v. Michigan Dep’t of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 844 (6th Cir. 1997); accord Balmer v. 

HCA, Inc., 423 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Fox v. Vice, 

563 U.S. 826 (2011). Put another way: an “EPA plaintiff bears the burden of producing

evidence of pretext solely where a reasonable jury viewing the defendant’s evidence could find 

only for the defendant.” Buntin, 134 F.3d at 800 n.7. Accordingly, “[i]n order ‘to survive [a] 

defendant’s motion for [summary judgment], the EPA plaintiff need not set forth evidence from 

which a jury could infer that the employer’s proffered reason for the wage differential is 

pretextual.’” Beck-Wilson, 441 F.3d at 365 (quoting Buntin, 134 F.3d at 799). “Rather, as the 

party who bears the burden of persuasion, the defendant who makes a motion [for summary 

judgment] must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to whether the difference in pay is 

due to a factor other than sex.” Id.

 Applying these principles, we may uphold the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

“only if the record shows that [Preferred] established the [“factor other than sex”] defense so 

clearly that no rational jury could have found to the contrary.” Id. (quoting Buntin, 523 F.3d at 

 1

Schleicher contends that “[t]he EPA is a strict liability statute” because a plaintiff need not show 

intentional discrimination to establish a prima facie case. Appellant Br. at 20–21. He is mistaken. Although intent 

is not an element of the first step of proving an EPA violation, the EPA makes plain that “not all differences in pay 

for equal work constitute violations of the Act.” Timmer v. Michigan Dep’t of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 843 (6th 

Cir. 1997). Thus, an employer’s intent is relevant under the EPA’s second step, because an employer-defendant can 

defeat a claim of discrimination by proving any of the EPA’s four statutorily enumerated affirmative defenses. 

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). An employer’s intent is also relevant under the EPA’s third step, which addresses pretext. 

See Timmer, 104 F.3d at 844. Accordingly, under the EPA, an employer’s intent does matter—not at the first step, 

but certainly at the second and third. 

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800). Such is the case here. The district court held—and Preferred does not appear to dispute—

that Schleicher established a prima facie EPA case. We agree: Schleicher has satisfied the 

EPA’s first step because he has shown that Preferred paid him $694,159.38 more than Piotrowski 

for performing the same work. Beck-Wilson, 441 F.3d at 359. However, Preferred has proven 

that this pay disparity was due to a “factor other than sex”—namely, when given both pay 

options, Piotrowski chose to be compensated pursuant to the $100,000 salary plus 10% draw 

model. Further, Schleicher’s claims of pretext are unconvincing. 

 Accordingly, both parts of Schleicher’s EPA argument fail. First, Preferred did not 

violate the EPA when it paid Schleicher more than Piotrowski. Nor did it violate the EPA when 

it equalized Schleicher’s and Piotrowski’s compensation models, because there was no 

underlying EPA violation to “cure.” The district court properly entered summary judgment in 

favor of Preferred. 

1. Preferred did not violate the EPA when it paid Schleicher more than 

Piotrowski between 2009 and 2013. 

The first part of Schleicher’s argument—that Preferred violated the EPA when it paid 

him more than Piotrowski—is somewhat ambiguous. He argues that even if Preferred did not 

violate the EPA in 2009 when it hired Schleicher and agreed to his 20% profit-pool-only 

compensation model, the resulting disparity between Schleicher’s income and Piotrowski’s 

“became violative of the EPA by 2013” (or perhaps sometime between 2009 and 2013). 

Appellant Br. at 21; see id. at 4 (“A facially neutral pay model may become violative of the EPA 

when the employer maintains the pay differential over an extended time.”). Schleicher contends 

that Seipenko knew that she was paying Schleicher substantially more than Piotrowski. Id. at 22. 

By maintaining that disparity quarter after quarter, Schleicher argues, Preferred violated the 

EPA. Id. at 22–24. 

 We disagree. Schleicher has established a prima facie case under the EPA: Preferred 

paid Schleicher $694,159.38 more than Piotrowski between 2009 and 2013, which is enough to 

satisfy the EPA’s first step. See Beck-Wilson, 441 F.3d at 359. However, whether Preferred 

violated the EPA turns on two additional questions. First, can Preferred prove that this pay 

disparity was due to any of the four grounds that the EPA lists as affirmative defenses? Second, 

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assuming that Preferred can make this showing, is there a fact dispute as to whether its 

justifications are pretextual? We conclude that the answer to the first question is “yes,” and the 

answer to the second is “no.” 

a. Preferred paid Schleicher more than Piotrowski because of a 

“factor other than sex.” 

 First, the record in this case is clear that Preferred paid Schleicher more than Piotrowski 

because of a “factor other than sex,” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1): Piotrowski chose to be compensated 

pursuant to her $100,000 salary plus 10% profit-pool draw model rather than the model that 

Schleicher chose. 

 The EPA’s fourth, “factor other than sex” defense was intended to be “a broad principle.” 

Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712 F.2d 1024, 1030 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting 109 Cong. Rec. 

9203 (1963) (statement of Rep. Griffin)). It is not, however, a “blanket” protection: it “does not 

include literally any other factor, but a factor that, at a minimum, was adopted for a legitimate 

business reason.” EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988). We strictly 

interpret this defense: “[U]nless the factor of sex provides no part of the basis for the wage 

differential, the requirements [for the defense] are not met.” Beck-Wilson, 441 F.3d at 365 

(quoting Brennan v. Owensboro-Daviess Cty. Hosp., 523 F.2d 1013, 1031 (6th Cir. 1975)); see 

also Timmer, 104 F.3d at 843 (“[T]he burden of proving that a factor other than sex is the basis 

for a wage differential is a heavy one. . . . If proven, though, the defendant is absolved of liability 

as a matter of law.”). 

 Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Schleicher, we conclude that sex 

played no role in Preferred’s decision to pay Schleicher more than Piotrowski. To begin, 

Preferred adopted a profit-pool model because Schleicher negotiated with Seipenko to create that 

compensation plan. Schleicher points to Piotrowski’s statement during her deposition that she 

“didn’t have the choice” to switch back to a commissions-based model after Preferred 

implemented the profit pool. Appellant Br. at 8 (quoting R. 39-3 (Piotrowski Dep. at 47:1–5) 

(Page ID #463)). That concession, Schleicher claims, “directly conflicts with” Preferred’s theory 

that Piotrowski earned less than Schleicher because of her “personal choice.” Id. at 9. Not so. 

The relevant “personal choice” in this case is different: Seipenko offered Piotrowski the exact 

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same compensation model (a 20% profit-pool draw) that Schleicher received, and Piotrowski 

declined that offer. Indeed, Piotrowski testified that at no point during Schleicher’s tenure with 

Preferred did she ever want to alter her compensation model to match Schleicher’s model. 

Moreover, Schleicher knew that Piotrowski did not want to be paid on a profit-pool-only basis 

because she thought it was risky. 

 Schleicher tries to analogize his case to our decision in Bence v. Detroit Health 

Corporation, but that case is inapposite. Defendant Detroit Health Corporation ran health spas, 

“each of which was divided into a men’s division and a women’s division which operated on 

alternate days.” Bence, 712 F.2d at 1025. Male managers ran the men’s division, and female 

managers ran the women’s division. Id. at 1025–26. Because Detroit Health Corporation’s 

“gross volume of membership sales to women was 50% higher than the gross volume of 

membership sales to men,” id. at 1026, it compensated its managers differently based on their 

sex: “Male managers were paid 7.5% of the individual spa’s gross sales of memberships to men. 

Female managers were paid 5% of gross sales of memberships to women. Male assistant 

managers received 4.5% of gross sales to men. Female assistant managers received 3% of gross 

sales to women.” Id.

 Detroit Health Corporation attempted to defend its compensation scheme under the 

EPA’s fourth affirmative defense, arguing that “a legitimate business policy of providing male 

and female employees equal total remuneration” was a “factor other than sex.” Id. at 1029–31. 

We rejected that defense, reasoning that “segregating male and female employees into men’s and 

women’s departments . . . plus application of a lower commission rate only to those who sold 

memberships to women effectively locked [Detroit Health Corporation’s] female employees, and 

only female employees, into an inferior position regardless of their effort or productivity.” Id. at 

1031. 

 Schleicher ignores two important differences between his case and Bence. First, Bence

involved a transparent example of sex-based pay discrimination. Detroit Health Corporation 

paid its male managers (who worked in a male-only division) at a rate 50% higher than its 

female managers (who worked in a separate, female-only division). It did so purportedly to 

equalize compensation between its male and female managers. In Schleicher’s case, there is no 

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evidence that sex played any role in Preferred’s decision to compensate Schleicher (a man) and 

Piotrowski (a woman) pursuant to different compensation models. Second, the Bence plaintiffs 

were never in a position to choose how they would be compensated: women received one 

(lower) rate, while men received a different (higher) rate. R. 51 (5/18/15 Op. and Order at 22–

23) (Page ID #1317–18). In contrast, Preferred gave Schleicher and Piotrowski the option to 

select the compensation model that suited them best. Piotrowski hedged her risk by selecting a 

model that guaranteed her a $100,000 salary in exchange for a smaller (compared to Schleicher) 

draw from the profit pool—her personal choice was clearly a “factor other than sex,” and it 

explains why Schleicher outearned Piotrowski between 2009 and 2013. At bottom, Bence does 

not help Schleicher. 

 We thus conclude that Preferred has carried its heavy burden of proving that the disparity 

between Piotrowski’s and Schleicher’s pay was due to a “factor other than sex.” Neither party 

disputes that Schleicher outearned Piotrowski during his time at Preferred. However, this 

disparity arose because Schleicher convinced Seipenko to add a new profit-pool model, and the 

disparity continued only because Piotrowski declined that model because she did not want to be 

paid exclusively from the profit pool. Because Preferred has demonstrated that “the factor of sex 

provide[d] no part of the basis for the wage differential” between Schleicher and Piotrowski, it 

has established an affirmative defense to Schleicher’s prima facie EPA case. Beck-Wilson, 

441 F.3d at 365 (quoting Owensboro-Daviess Cty., 523 F.2d at 1031). 

b. Schleicher has not shown that Preferred’s proffered reasons for 

maintaining the pay disparity are pretextual. 

Because Preferred established an affirmative defense under 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv), 

Schleicher must raise a genuine issue of fact that Preferred’s justification for paying him more 

than Piotrowski is pretextual. See Buntin, 134 F.3d at 800 n.7. He has not done so.2

 Because 

this is a burden of production, not persuasion, Schleicher “need not set forth evidence from 

 2

Schleicher arguably waived many of his arguments about pretext in this case. He addressed pretext in 

cursory fashion in his opposition to Preferred’s motion for summary judgment. R. 43 (Pltf.’s Br. in Opp. to Def.’s 

Mot. for Summ. J. at 18) (Page ID #787). Indeed, the district court thought that Schleicher had introduced no 

evidence of pretext. R. 51 (5/18/15 Op. and Order at 23) (Page ID #1318). However, in his briefing before the 

district court, Schleicher alleged pretext and, in support of this argument, highlighted his success at Preferred and 

listed several discriminatory comments that Seipenko allegedly made. R. 43 (Pltf.’s Br. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for 

Summ. J. at 16–20) (Page ID #785–89). Moreover, Preferred has not raised a waiver argument. 

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which a jury could infer that [Preferred’s] proffered reason for the wage differential is 

pretextual.” Beck-Wilson, 441 F.3d at 365 (quoting Buntin, 134 F.3d at 799). Even with this low 

bar in Schleicher’s favor, he has not produced evidence of pretext sufficient to withstand 

summary judgment. 

 In his brief on appeal, Schleicher lists several comments Seipenko allegedly made and 

incidents that occurred at Preferred that Schleicher claims evidence pretext. Appellant Br. at 30–

31. Most relate to Seipenko’s decision to cut Schleicher’s pay in 2013, not her continued 

maintenance of the pay disparity between Schleicher and Piotrowski from 2009 to 2013. Id. 

Although Schleicher does provide three examples that seem to relate directly to the disparity 

(and not the 2013 pay cut), all three are unavailing. 

 First, Schleicher claims that “Seipenko directed exclusionary comments toward” him 

because he was a man. Id. at 30. He does not, however, explain why Seipenko’s alleged gender 

animus caused her to pay him more than his female co-worker, Piotrowski. Second, Schleicher 

argues in conclusory fashion that “[t]he nearly $700,000 disparity itself is evidence of pretext.” 

Id. That is enough to establish a prima facie case under the EPA; it is non-responsive to 

Preferred’s affirmative defense under § 206(d)(1)(iv). Finally, Schleicher repeats his claim that 

Piotrowski had “no choice” when Preferred switched to the profit-pool compensation model. Id.

at 31. Again, this is irrelevant: the “choice” justifying Preferred’s affirmative defense is 

Piotrowski’s decision to be paid a $100,000 salary plus 10% of the profit pool. At bottom, 

Schleicher does not present any evidence suggesting that Preferred’s proffered reason for paying 

him more than Piotrowski—that Piotrowski did not want to be paid under the same model as 

Schleicher—is pretextual. Because Schleicher has produced no evidence raising a fact dispute 

about Preferred’s “factor other than sex” defense, his claim that Preferred violated the EPA when 

it paid him more than Piotrowski fails. 

2. Preferred did not violate the EPA in 2013 when it modified Schleicher’s 

compensation plan. 

 Schleicher also argues that Preferred violated the EPA when it changed his compensation 

plan to match Piotrowski’s. This second part of his argument necessarily depends on the first 

part. The EPA provides “[t]hat an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation 

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of [§206(d)(1)] shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the 

wage rate of any employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). “Under the express terms of the EPA, when 

a prohibited sex-based wage differential has been proved, an employer can come into compliance 

only by raising the wage rate of the lower paid sex.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.25 (2016); see Corning 

Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 207 (“[T]o remedy violations of the Act, ‘[t]he lower wage rate must 

be increased to the level of the higher.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 309, at 3 (1963))). Thus, an 

employer violates the EPA by lowering an employee’s wages only if it does so to remedy an 

underlying EPA violation. 

 That is not the case here. Because Preferred has proven its affirmative defense under 

§ 206(d)(1), the fact that it changed Schleicher’s compensation plan to match Piotrowski’s is 

irrelevant: there was no EPA violation to cure. Schleicher argues that “[b]y reducing 

Schleicher’s commissions from 20% to 10%, the employer violated the plain terms of the EPA.” 

Appellant Br. at 32. The plain terms of the EPA suggest otherwise: Preferred’s decision to cut 

Schleicher’s “commissions” was not actionable discrimination because the underlying pay 

disparity between Schleicher and Piotrowski did not violate the EPA. Thus, the second part of 

Schleicher’s EPA argument also fails. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in favor of 

Preferred. 

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