Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-344/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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28 ORDER RE DPPS’ MOTION TO COMPEL MITSUBISHI TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY PAGE 1 OF 11

Vaughn R Walker

Law Office of Vaughn R Walker

Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 2200

San Francisco, CA 94111

Tel: (415) 871-2888

Fax: (415) 871-2890

vrw@judgewalker.com

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT) ANTITRUST 

LITIGATION

This Order Relates To:

Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs v Mitsubishi 

 MDL No 1917

 Case No 14-cv-2058-SC

 Master Case No 3:07-cv-05944SC

ORDER RE DIRECT PURCHASER 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL 

MITSUBISHI TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY 

AND OTHER EVIDENCE FROM MR KOJI 

MURATA

 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 3859 Filed 05/29/15 Page 1 of 11
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28 ORDER RE DPPS’ MOTION TO COMPEL MITSUBISHI TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY PAGE 2 OF 11

Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs (“DPPs”) move to compel the Mitsubishi Defendants1

(collectively, “Mitsubishi”) to provide testimony and other evidence sought in the deposition of 

an employee, Mr Koji Murata. On December 8-9, 2014, the DPPs’ counsel deposed Mr Murata 

in San Francisco. By letter brief, DPPs’ counsel complains that Mitsubishi’s counsel committed 

multiple discovery violations relating to Mr Murata’s deposition, including the following: (1) 

improperly halting the deposition to take a break in the middle of a line of questioning on a 

document (Exhibit 6114) despite the objection of DPPs’ counsel; (2) improperly instructing the 

witness not to answer questions about an attorney-witness conversation during the break, 

effectively shutting down any meaningful testimony on Exhibit 6114 after the break; (3)

refusing to produce and allow examination on documents used to refresh Mr Murata’s 

recollection before his deposition; and (4) asserting that all relevant emails had been provided 

or had been destroyed despite Mr Murata’s testimony that he sent a Mitsubishi business 

document to Mitsubishi colleagues from his personal email account, that no one had ever 

asked him to provide emails from this account and that he did not know if that account had 

ever been searched for documents related to this litigation. 1/30/15 R Alexander Saveri letter 

brief.

Accordingly, DPPs seek an order compelling Mitsubishi to: (1) make Mr Murata 

available for examination to answer any further questions about Exhibit 6114 and his 

conversation with Mitsubishi’s counsel during the break in his deposition; (2) produce 

documents used to refresh Mr Murata’s recollection and allow examination of Mr Murata 

regarding those documents; and (3) disclose “under oath the material details of its preservation

and search of Mr Murata’s private email account(s) and to allow further examination of Mr 

Murata regarding his knowledge thereof.” 1/30/15 R Alexander Saveri letter brief at 2.

 

1 Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (“MELCO”), Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc (“MEUS”) and Mitsubishi Electric 

Visual Solutions America, Inc (“MEVSA”). 

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 3859 Filed 05/29/15 Page 2 of 11
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28 ORDER RE DPPS’ MOTION TO COMPEL MITSUBISHI TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY PAGE 3 OF 11

I. Compelling Further Questioning on Exhibit 6114 and the Discussion Between 

Mr Murata and Mitsubishi’s Counsel During the Break

Mitsubishi responds that “the deposition was not stopped while a question was 

pending,” “the DPPs agreed to break when they could have chosen to persist with their 

questioning,” “Mr Murata provided full and complete answers to the DPPs’ questions about 

Exhibit 6114, none of which were inconsistent, or indicated coaching” and “the DPPs were 

never prevented from asking follow-up questions about Exhibit 6114.” 2/6/15 G Fuentes letter 

brief at 1.

Having reviewed the transcript excerpts, the undersigned agrees that 

Mitsubishi’s counsel did not stop the deposition while a question was pending. Instead, it 

appears that he insisted on stopping over the objection of DPPs’ counsel who wanted to finish 

his line of questioning on Exhibit 6114 before taking a break. 12/9/14 Murata deposition 

transcript page 144, lines 7-25 (Millen Dec, Ex 2). Thus, Mitsubishi’s assertion that DPPs’ 

counsel “agreed” to take a break does not fairly represent the full record.

Whether Mr Murata provided “full and complete answers” to questions about 

Exhibit 6114, the undersigned finds that Mr Murata’s responses to questions on Exhibit 6114 

were notably more circumspect and uninformative after the break. See Millen Dec, Ex 2 

(12/9/14 Murata deposition excerpt). While the witness originally spoke knowledgeably about 

the document, after the break he confirmed only that the document stated certain facts and 

disclaimed any independent knowledge, stating: “I know absolutely nothing about this.”

While Mitsubishi is correct that the DPPs were “never prevented from asking 

follow up questions about that exhibit,” it became quickly apparent that further questioning on 

Exhibit 6114 would not be fruitful after the break. The following excerpt provides helpful 

context.

Q. Okay. Could you tell me what you believe the trip request was for?

MR FUENTES: Object to the form.

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28 ORDER RE DPPS’ MOTION TO COMPEL MITSUBISHI TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY PAGE 4 OF 11

THE WITNESS: The meet – the trip – the business trip was for a CRT meeting or 

meetings. That’s what it was for.

BY MR MILLEN:

Q. Where was the destination for the meeting?

MR FUENTES: Can we take a really short break just for a couple of minutes?

THE WITNESS: What the document says, I believe, is SDI in Seoul -- I think that’s 

Samsung SDI – and then also LPD in Hong Kong, which I believe stands for LG Philips Display. 

MR MILLEN: I just have a couple more questions on the document. I’d like to 

finish before we take a break.

MR FUENTES: Actually, I’d like to break. It will be really short, and we’ll come 

right back.

MR MILLEN: Okay.

* * * [Two breaks were taken with limited examination about the witness’ 

conversation with counsel during the first break.]

Q. Okay. Mr. Murata, do you see on this document that Mr. Nakanishi had a 

meeting with Mr. Lee from SDI?

MR FUENTES: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: That’s what it says here, yes.

BY MR MILLEN:

Q. And do you have any reason to believe that that is not truthful and accurate?

A. I know absolutely nothing about this.

Q. Okay. And do you see in the document, Mr. Murata, that Mr. Nakanishi also 

met with Mr. Rene van Haarst from LPD?

MR FUENTES: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: I see that’s what it says here.

BY MR MILLEN:

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28 ORDER RE DPPS’ MOTION TO COMPEL MITSUBISHI TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY PAGE 5 OF 11

Q. Thank you, sir. We are done with this document at this time. 

Murata Transcript at 144-149 (Millen Dec, Ex 2). ]

The next issue is whether to grant DPPs’ motion to compel Mitsubishi to make 

Mr Murata available to answer questions about the “contents of his conversation with counsel 

during the break” in the middle of questions on Exhibit 6114. DPPs assert that counsel’s 

instruction not to answer questions regarding a conversation with counsel during the break was 

improper. 1/30/15 R Alexander Saveri letter brief at 6; see Murata Transcript 145:8 – 148:23

(Millen Dec, Ex 2). DPPs cite to Burrows v Redbud Cmty Hosp Dist, 187 FRD 606, 613-14 (ND Cal 

1998) in which Judge Illston allowed completion of a deposition because counsel coached the 

witness.

While conceding that the protocols of the Northern District of California prohibit 

coaching witnesses or suggesting answers, Mitsubishi contends that nothing about Mr Murata’s 

testimony indicates “that he was coached in any way” and that his testimony was entirely 

consistent because he agreed with what the document stated and “did not avow any personal 

knowledge about [Exhibit 6114].” 2/6/15 Fuentes letter brief at 2. Mitsubishi’s brief is notable 

for what it does not assert. It never states that counsel did not coach or suggest answers to Mr 

Murata in any way during the break. Nor does it provide a declaration to that effect. Instead, 

Mitsubishi’s argument heading states “Because Mr. Murata Was Not Coached To Provide 

Testimony, The DPPs Are Not Entitled to Re-Depose Mr. Murata About Exhibit 6114 Or His 

Privileged Conversation With Counsel.” 2/6/15 Fuentes letter brief at 2.

Mitsubishi distinguishes the cases cited by DPPs on the ground that they involve 

“obvious and improper examples of witness coaching,” claims that it would be unduly 

burdensome to require Mr Murata to fly “around the world to answer a handful of questions 

about an Exhibit he already testified to” and asserts that the DPPs have already exhausted Mr 

Murata’s personal knowledge about Exhibit 6114. 2/6/15 Fuentes letter brief at 3.

Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 3859 Filed 05/29/15 Page 5 of 11
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28 ORDER RE DPPS’ MOTION TO COMPEL MITSUBISHI TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY PAGE 6 OF 11

Upon review of the briefs and evidence submitted, the undersigned makes the 

following findings: (1) defending counsel abruptly insisted on a break during a line of questions 

on Exhibit 6114, over the objection of DPPs’ counsel; (2) after the break, the witness answered 

questions in a noticeably more circumspect and uninformative way than he had been 

answering before the break; (3) Mr Murata testified that he had spoken with counsel during the 

break, but when asked about the nature of his conversation with counsel, followed counsel’s 

instruction not to answer; (4) the parties had agreed in advance not to allow breaks during a 

question or a line of questions (12/12/14 Millen letter to Fuentes at 2-3 (Millen Dec, Ex 7); 

12/19/14 Fuentes letter to Millen at 2 (Millen Dec, Ex 8) (agreeing that no breaks were to be 

taken during a “line of questions”); and (5) Mitsubishi’s letter brief never states that counsel did 

not suggest answers or coach the witness in any way during the break.

In the Northern District of California as in all federal courts, depositions are to be 

conducted as if the witness were testifying at trial. FRCP 30(c). Courts have ruled that once a

deposition begins, counsel should not confer with the witness except to determine whether a 

privilege should be asserted. BNSF Railway Co v San Joaquin Valley Railroad Co, 2009 WL 

3872043 at *3 (ED Cal 2009) (citing cases); see also In re Stratosphere Corp Securities Litig, 182 

FRD 614, 620-621 (D Nev 1998); see also 4/25/2014 Judge Donato’s Standing Order Regarding 

Civil Discovery at ¶13 (http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/jdorders) (“Private conferences between 

deponents and attorneys about the substance of the testimony while the witness is under oath 

are improper and prohibited, including on breaks during the deposition, except for the sole 

purpose of determining whether a privilege should be asserted.”).

In In re Stratosphere Corp Securities, the court condoned counsel speaking to his 

witness during regularly scheduled deposition recesses, but drew the line at breaks requested 

by defending counsel: “If [the break is] requested by the deponent or deponent’s counsel, and 

the interrogating attorney is in the middle of a question, or is following a line of questions 

which should be completed, the break should be delayed until a question is answered or a line 

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28 ORDER RE DPPS’ MOTION TO COMPEL MITSUBISHI TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY PAGE 7 OF 11

of questions has been given a reasonable time to be pursued.” 182 FRD at 621. During the 

Murata deposition, Mitsubishi’s counsel did not follow this standard procedure and 

contravened the agreement of counsel earlier in the deposition, to allow completion of a line of 

questions before taking breaks. Further, Mitsubishi’s counsel did not represent that the 

conversation with Mr Murata during the break was solely to determine whether a privilege 

should be asserted, which would have been a permissible ground for counsel to confer with the 

witness about his testimony during the break.

Accordingly, in the interests of justice, the undersigned grants the DPPs’ motion 

to compel Mitsubishi to produce Mr Murata for further examination in the offices of the 

undersigned in San Francisco on Exhibit 6114 and on whether his conversation with counsel

during the break was limited to determining whether the attorney client privilege should be 

asserted.

II. Documents Used to Refresh the Witnesses’ Recollection Before the Deposition

Mitsubishi opposes the DPPs’ motion to compel production of documents used 

to refresh Mr Murata’s recollection in preparation for his deposition on the ground that the 

selection of documents would reveal protected attorney work product. Mitsubishi does not 

contend that any of the documents themselves contained attorney work product since they 

were all produced earlier to the DPPs.

Federal Rule of Evidence 612 provides: “[I]f a witness uses a writing to refresh 

memory for the purpose of testifying, either (1) while testifying, or (2) before testifying, if the 

court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of justice, an adverse party is 

entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness 

thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the 

witness.” Some courts have interpreted Rule 612 to allow discovery of documents that a 

witness reviewed to refresh his recollection and any privilege is waived as to those portions 

reviewed. See United States v 22.80 Acres of Land, 107 FRD 20, 25 (ND Cal 1985).

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28 ORDER RE DPPS’ MOTION TO COMPEL MITSUBISHI TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY PAGE 8 OF 11

In ruling on such motions to compel, courts must balance the competing 

interests of ascertaining the facts and maintaining the confidentiality of protected material such 

as attorney work product. Id. Some courts have considered the following factors: (1) whether 

witness coaching occurred; (2) the type of document, e g, itself attorney work product and (3) 

whether the request is a fishing expedition. Server Tech Inc v Am Power Conversion Corp, 2011 

US Dist LEXIS 42980 at *32-33 (citing Parry v Highlight Indus, Inc, 125 FRD 449, 452 (WD Mich 

1989).

Mitsubishi relies on Aguinaga v John Morrell & Co, 112 FRD 671, 683 (D Kan 

1986) for the proposition that the selection of documents used to refresh the witness’ 

recollection is protected by the attorney work product doctrine. In Aguinaga, the magistrate 

ruled that the defendant was required to produce all documents reviewed by a witness in 

preparation for his deposition and granted the plaintiffs’ motion to compel. 112 FRD at 675. 

But the court held that the process of selecting documents for preparing a witness is protected 

by the attorney work product doctrine. 112 FRD at 683-4. In so ruling, the court explained that 

Federal Rule of Evidence 612 is a rule of evidence, not discovery, its purpose is to allow an 

adverse party to access those documents which affect the witness’ testimony, but since 

plaintiffs already possessed the documents, the only purpose for ordering production would be 

to reveal the attorneys’ process of selecting relevant documents. The Aguinaga court quoted

the Third Circuit decision in Sporck v Peil, 759 F2d 312 (3d Cir), cert denied, 575 US 903 (1985): 

“Proper application of Rule 612 should never implicate an attorney’s selection, in preparation 

for a witness’ deposition, of a group of documents he believes critical to a case.” 112 FRD at 

683.

Absent controlling Ninth Circuit law, the undersigned is guided by district court 

decisions in the Ninth Circuit, including United States v 22.80 Acres of Land, 107 FRD 20 (ND Cal 

1985) and Server Tech v APC, 2011 WL 1447620 (D Nev 2011). In 22.80 Acres of Land, use of a 

document to refresh a witness’ recollection was deemed to waive any work product protection, 

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28 ORDER RE DPPS’ MOTION TO COMPEL MITSUBISHI TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY PAGE 9 OF 11

but even then courts have discretion to determine if the interests of justice require disclosure 

of all or only a part of a document that had been used to refresh a witness’s recollection. In 

Server Tech, the court included an analysis of the Parry factors.

Here, the DPPs allege that Mr Murata was coached with respect to Exhibit 6114 

and hence they were prevented from ascertaining underlying facts due to instructions not to 

answer. It is unknown whether Exhibit 6114 was one of the documents used to refresh Mr 

Murata’s recollection. In any event, the events and circumstances reflected in the transcript 

weigh in favor of granting the motion to compel production of documents used to refresh Mr 

Murata’s recollection in preparation for his deposition. The documents themselves were not 

attorney work product. While the selection of these documents in preparing Mr Murata to 

testify could be attorney work product, this would not constitute the most sensitive of work 

product, such as attorney written opinion work product. Hence, the nature of the documents 

used to refresh Mr Murata’s recollection weigh only slightly, if at all, against granting the 

motion to compel. On the other hand, the DPPs’ request for documents used to refresh the 

witness’ recollection in deposition preparation does not appear to be a “fishing expedition” but 

rather is consistent with an established practice that is routinely observed in this district and 

elsewhere. Furthermore, the events evidenced in the deposition transcript suggest a degree of 

attorney intervention and witness guidance inconsistent with appropriate norms. In light of 

these facts, the undersigned concludes that the interest of uncovering the facts outweighs the 

need to protect the confidentiality of attorney work product that might be disclosed solely in 

the selection of documents used to prepare a witness for deposition.

III. Search of Mr Murata’s Personal Email Account for Responsive Documents

Mr Murata testified under oath that he:

(1) sent a Mitsubishi document to business colleagues from his personal email 

account; 

(2) did not know if his personal email account was searched for relevant documents;

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28 ORDER RE DPPS’ MOTION TO COMPEL MITSUBISHI TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY PAGE 10 OF 11

(3) was never asked to provide anyone with his e-mails from his personal account;

(4) has used his personal email account for “a long time” and still uses it; and

(5) did not know if “e-mails are automatically deleted from that account.” See 

Murata Transcript Vol II at 167:22 – 168:24 (Fuentes Dec, Ex 6).

These facts indicate that Mr Murata’s personal email account should have been searched for 

responsive documents because he used it during the relevant period to send Mitsubishi

business documents. Yet there is no evidence that this account had ever been searched.

On this record, the undersigned finds that Mitsubishi should provide further 

information regarding its efforts to preserve and search for responsive documents in Mr 

Murata’s personal email account. If in its review, Mitsubishi determines that it should conduct 

additional searches if necessary, it should do so. The DPPs’ motion to compel is also granted 

with respect to requiring Mr Murata to testify about the circumstances of any destruction of or 

search for relevant emails contained in his personal email account.

CONCLUSION

The DPPs’ motion is GRANTED. Mitsubishi is ordered to: 

(1) make Mr Murata available in the undersigned’s offices in San Francisco no 

later than 30 days from the date of this order to testify on 

(a) Exhibit 6114,

(b) his conversation with counsel during the break of his prior deposition, 

(c) documents used to refresh his recollection for that deposition, 

(d) any search for or destruction of relevant emails contained in his 

personal email account;

(2) produce all documents used to refresh Mr Murata’s recollection in 

preparation for his deposition; and 

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