Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00575/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00575-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADRIANA BEATRIZ GOVEA,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00575 W

3:15-cr-01880 W 

 

ORDER (1) GRANTING 

GOVERNMENT’S UNOPPOSED 

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 

[DOC. 71]; (2) DENYING PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[DOC. 64]; AND DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Pending before the Court is Adriana Govea’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the “Petition”). Respondent United States of 

America has filed a motion to “shorten time” to file its opposition, along with the 

opposition.

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. 

See Civil Local Rule 7.1. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS

Respondent’s unopposed motion to shorten time [Doc. 71], DENIES the Petition [Doc. 

64], and DENIES a certificate of appealability.

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2015, Petitioner Adriana Govea was arraigned on an indictment 

charging her with (1) conspiracy to import and (2) importation of a controlled substance 

into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960, 963. Petitioner pled not 

guilty, and the Court appointed Attorney Jerry M. Leahy as her counsel. (See Indictment

[Doc. 1]; July 20, 2015 Min. Entry [Doc. 4].)

On August 17, 2015, the Court held a hearing to address the Government’s 

motions in limine. Attorney Leahy asked to postpone the hearing. (August 17, 2015 Tr. 

of Proceedings [Doc. 56] 4:12–15.) The Court agreed with respect to the Government’s 

motion to admit Petitioner’s cellular text communications, but proceeded with the 

remaining motions which it considered “uncontroversial.” (Id. at 4:19–23.) The Court 

then granted the Government’s motion for attorney voir dire, motion to preclude certain 

witnesses, motion to prohibit reference to punishment, motion to admit narcotics, motion 

to admit expert testimony, and motion for reciprocal discovery. (See August 17, 2015 

Min. Entry [Doc. 9].) The Court also found the Government’s motion to preclude duress 

and necessity defenses was moot because Attorney Leahy stated that he had “no intention 

of providing that kind of evidence.” (Id.; August 17, 2015 Tr. of Proceedings 7–8.)

On October 6, 2015, the Court held a hearing to consider the Government’s 

remaining motion to admit cellular text communications recovered from Petitioner’s cell 

phone pursuant to a search warrant. (October 6, 2015 Tr. of Proceedings [Doc. 57] 2–3.) 

The phone was seized from Petitioner upon her arrest. (Tr. of Jury Trial – Day One

[Doc. 58] 138:20–21.) The Court granted the Government’s motion over Attorney

Leahy’s foundational objections and denied his motion for a pre-trial evidentiary hearing 

related to the text messages. (See October 6, 2015 Min. Entry [Doc. 18].)

On October 7, 2015, voir dire began. The Court asked each juror to provide basic 

information (place of residence, occupation, marital status, etc.) and to answer whether 

any family members had dealings with the criminal justice system, whether the juror was 

ever a victim of a crime, and whether the juror had friends or relatives in law 

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enforcement. (Tr. of Jury Trial – Day One 11–12.) Government counsel and Attorney

Leahy asked follow-up questions. Government counsel exercised six peremptory 

challenges, the first four of which excluded jurors who disclosed they had a family 

member who was involved with drugs. (See, e.g., id. at 13–15, 74, 82.) Attorney Leahy 

exercised nine peremptory challenges, including jurors with backgrounds in the military 

or connections to law enforcement. (See, e.g., id. at 12–13, 39–40, 62–68.)

Petitioner’s trial commenced that same day. The Government called seven 

witnesses, starting with Customs and Border Protection Officer Sauget. Officer Sauget 

testified that on September 26, 2014 while working at the Otay Mesa port of entry, she

searched and found twenty-seven packages of methamphetamine marked “Chilango” 

under the driver and passenger seats of the BMW driven by Petitioner. (Id. at 123–40.) 

In order to access the drugs, officers had to unbolt and remove the seats, and then unbolt 

a compartment underneath the carpet. (Id. at 132–33.) Officer Sauget also testified to 

seizing Petitioner’s two cell phones. (Id. at 138–40.) The Government then called 

Customs and Border Protection Officer Corrales who testified that while working at the 

San Ysidro port of entry on September 3, 2014—three weeks before Petitioner’s arrest—

he seized drugs also marked “Chilango” from a vehicle driven by an individual named

Monica Gonzalez. (Id. at 153–58.) 

The Government then called Monica Gonzalez’s former roommate, Alicia Rosales, 

who testified that Gonzalez made arrangements for her to smuggle drugs. (Tr. of Jury 

Trial – Day Two [Doc. 59] 179:9–16.) According to Rosales, she provided her 

information to Gonzalez to pass along to an “Anna,” who arranged for the purchase of a 

car. Anna told Rosales they would need to pick up the car from “Adriana,” but plans

changed, and Rosales never met or communicated with “Adriana.”1

 (Id. at 184:2–6, 

186.) Approximately two weeks after Monica Gonzalez was arrested, Rosales was 

 

1 Petitioner’s full name is Adriana Beatriz Govea.

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arrested attempting to smuggle methamphetamine into the United States. (Id. at 178:14–

20.) Rosales was released on the condition that she cooperate with the Government, 

including reaching out to her smuggling contact “Anna.” (Id. at 196:1–10.) 

The Government’s next witness established a connection between Rosales and 

Petitioner. Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent Guerra testified to the 

content of the text messages recovered from Petitioner’s phone. Agent Guerra testified 

that Petitioner received a text message from her boyfriend “Alan” containing Rosales’ 

information, including name, date of birth, and driver’s license number. (Id. at 251–52.) 

Agent Guerra testified that Petitioner then provided that information via text message to a 

car insurance agent. (Id. at 250.) He also testified that Petitioner later sent both Rosales’ 

and Gonzalez’ information, along with the dates of their arrests, to a contact named 

“Attorney Bill” and asked for case information. (Id. at 257–61.) On the day of her own 

arrest, Petitioner again texted Attorney Bill. The message said: “Someone told the boss 

Alicia talked so he’s worries [sic].” (Id. at 261.) 

Attorney Leahy called Petitioner as the only defense witness. Petitioner testified 

that she had no knowledge that her boyfriend Alan was involved with drugs. (Id. at 285–

86.) Petitioner testified that she coordinated the purchase of a vehicle in the United 

States because Alan did not have a visa to enter. (Id. at 274:4–7, 276:13–17.) She also 

testified that, in the time leading up to her arrest, she grew fearful of Alan and therefore 

would do what he asked without questioning him. (Id. at 274–75, 297.) She testified that 

on the evening of her arrest, she had borrowed her cousin’s BMW and was travelling to 

Mexico with her youngest child to have a paternity test done at the prompting of Alan’s 

wife. (Id. at 290–91.) After arriving, she met with Alan’s son-in-law who then borrowed 

the BMW to pick up Alan’s wife. (Id. at 311–13.) When he returned, he informed 

Petitioner the wife was not coming. (Id. at 313.) After a couple hours spent with the sonin-law at a restaurant, Petitioner returned to the border to cross back into the United 

States but was stopped and arrested after drugs were found hidden beneath the seats of 

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the BMW. (Id. at 293–96.) Defense rested after Petitioner testified, and closing 

arguments were delivered the same day. (Id. at 333–34.) 

On October 9, 2015, the Court read the jury its instructions, and re-read the 

instructions when Attorney Leahy pointed out that some words had been omitted from 

the instruction as to the definition of “knowingly.” (Tr. of Jury Trial – Day Three [Doc. 

61] 14–15.) The jury began deliberations and returned guilty verdicts on both counts. 

(Id. at 17–18; see also Jury Verdicts [Docs. 22, 23].) 

On October 24, 2016, Petitioner was sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of 

120 months followed by two concurrent three-year terms of supervised release. (Minute 

Entry of Sentencing [Doc. 49].) The next day, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal of her 

sentence and conviction. (See Pet’r’s Reply Ex. A [Doc. 72-1].) The appeal was 

voluntarily dismissed on April 5, 2017. (See Pet’r’s Reply Ex. C [Doc. 72-1].)

On March 19, 2018, Petitioner filed the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (See Pet.

[Doc. 64].) On June 13, 2018, the Government filed a motion to “shorten time” to file its 

opposition, along with the opposition. (See Mot. to Shorten Time [Doc. 71]; Resp’t’s 

Opp’n [Doc. 70].) Petitioner did not file an opposition to the motion to shorten time. On 

June 28, 2018, Petitioner filed a reply. (See Pet’r’s Reply [Doc. 72].)2

II. STANDARD

Petitioner argues that her sentence should be vacated because she was denied 

effective assistance of counsel. (Pet. 1.) To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, Petitioner must prove (1) that her attorney’s performance was seriously deficient 

and (2) that Petitioner’s defense was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

 

2 Although Attorney Leahy has failed to cooperate with either party, neither party has sought a court 

order compelling his cooperation. (Pet. 1–4; Resp’t’s Opp’n 2:9–11.) 

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First, Petitioner must establish deficient performance by proving that her attorney 

made errors “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by 

the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Given the “distorting effects of hindsight,” courts must 

“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. 

Second, Petitioner must establish prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable 

probability that—but for her attorney’s error—the outcome of her trial would have been 

different. See id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome,” because the “purpose of the effective assistance 

guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation... 

[but] to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.” Id. at 689, 694.

For claims of cumulative error, “[w]here no single error or omission of counsel, 

standing alone, significantly impairs the defense, the district court may nonetheless find 

unfairness and thus, prejudice emanating from the totality of counsel’s errors and 

omissions.” Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1979); see Sanders v. Ryder, 

342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003). However, Petitioner still bears the burden of 

showing prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 

1327 (9th Cir. 1978). Even claims of structural error brought under an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim require Petitioner to prove prejudice. See Weaver v. 

Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910–11 (2017). 

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on a laundry list of 

alleged errors including (1) failing to pursue a plea agreement, (2) inadequately opposing 

the Government’s motions in limine, including its motion to admit Petitioner’s text 

messages, (3) failing to ask follow-up questions on jury voir dire, (4) failing to question a 

Government witness about “blind mules,” (5) failing to expose an incriminating witness’s 

bias, (6) failing to properly prepare Petitioner before testifying, and (7) failing to call 

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other defense witnesses. (See Pet. 6–25.) The Government counters that Petitioner did 

receive effective assistance of counsel and, at best, Petitioner’s own untruthfulness 

disadvantaged Attorney Leahy. (Resp’t’s Opp’n 6.) 

A. Failing to pursue a plea agreement.

Petitioner faults Attorney Leahy for failing to proactively engage in plea 

negotiations. (See Pet. 26:1–12.) But she concedes that Attorney Leahy told her that her 

story was not believable, that he advised her to meet with the Government and she 

refused, and that he explained to her that she faced the mandatory minimum sentence if 

she failed to cooperate or have a credible story—she still refused. (See Govea Decl. ¶¶ 

11, 12.) Under the circumstances, the Court finds that Attorney Leahy’s alleged failure 

to proactively engage in plea negotiations (which Petitioner refused to entertain) does not 

constitute deficient performance.

B. Opposing the Government’s motions in limine.

Petitioner argues that Attorney Leahy was ineffective because he failed to oppose 

the Government’s motions in limine at the August 17, 2015 hearing. During that hearing, 

Attorney Leahy twice requested a continuance. (See August 17, 2015 Tr. of Proceedings

[Doc. 56] 4:12–18; see also Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. 5].) The Court agreed to postpone ruling on

the Government’s motion in limine to admit text messages but continued with the other 

motions because they were standard, non-controversial motions. 3

 (Id. at 4:19–23.) 

 

3 For example, the Government moved for a limited attorney-conducted voir dire of the jury, which the 

Court granted and informed Attorney Leahy he was also allowed limited voir dire. The Government 

moved to prohibit reference to Petitioner’s health, age, finances, education, and potential punishment. 

The Court granted the motion as to the potential punishment but stated that the other information could 

come in as foundation if Petitioner chose to testify. The Government requested limited character

evidence and the Court simply acknowledged that the Federal Rules of Evidence would be enforced as 

to character evidence. (See generally August 17, 2015 Tr. of Proceedings [Doc. 56].)

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Attorney Leahy’s decision not to oppose the Government’s standard motions in limine 

does not constitute deficient performance. 

Petitioner also argues that Attorney Leahy committed a “critical failure” by not

opposing the Government’s motion to preclude evidence of duress and necessity, which 

the Court found to be moot after Attorney Leahy indicated he had no intention of making 

the requisite pre-trial offer of proof. (Pet. 8:25–9:5.) But a duress defense would have 

required Petitioner to admit knowing the drugs were present and then explaining why she 

knowingly broke the law. Such testimony was contrary to Petitioner’s assertions of 

innocence and consistent denial of any knowledge of the drugs in her car. (Govea Decl.

¶ 11.) Accordingly, Attorney Leahy’s decision not to make the pre-trial offer for duress 

and necessity defenses was not deficient.

4

The Court addressed the postponed motion to admit Petitioner’s text messages on 

October 6, 2015. (See October 6, 2015 Tr. of Mot. Hr’g [Doc. 57]; see also Pl.’s Mot.

[Doc. 7].) Attorney Leahy opposed the motion.

5

 (See Def.’s Opp’n Mot. [Doc. 14].)

Petitioner contends Attorney Leahy’s opposition was “rushed, hastily drafted, and lacked 

substance.” (Pet. 9:21–26.) Ironically, Petitioner’s argument itself lacks substance. To 

demonstrate deficient performance, Petitioner must demonstrate that a basis for excluding 

 

4 Petitioner also asserts Attorney Leahy’s decision not to make a pre-trial offer of proof prevented her 

from submitting any evidence of duress at trial. (Pet. 9:2–5, 21:14–20.) In reality, it only prevented the 

jury from receiving instructions as to a duress/necessity defense. See U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, 

Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit, 6.5 Duress, Coercion, or Compulsion 

(2010). Attorney Leahy was still able to—and did in fact—elicit testimony from Petitioner about her 

fear of Alan in an attempt to explain why Petitioner did as he requested without asking questions. (Tr. 

of Jury Trial – Day Two 275:14–17; 297:17–22; 326:22–327:8.) Attorney Leahy’s strategy was 

consistent with Petitioner’s claimed lack of knowledge. The Court finds Attorney Leahy’s performance 

in this regard was not deficient.

5 In addition to filing an opposition to the Government’s in limine motion, Attorney Leahy made 

multiple objections against the admission of the text messages at trial. (See, e.g., Tr. of Jury Trial – Day 

One 166:22–23, 167:22, 170:14; Tr. of Jury Trial – Day Two 232–34.) Attorney Leahy also objected to 

the translation of those messages, requiring the court certified translator who made the translation to 

testify. (See id. at 234:11–23; 236:11–13; 237:6–7.) Attorney Leahy then cross-examined the translator 

to highlight her use of discretion when making translations. (See id. at 240:18–241:1.) 

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the text messages existed. Petitioner does no such thing, nor—based on the record—is 

this Court aware of any valid ground that existed for excluding Petitioner’s text messages 

from trial. Additionally, Petitioner would have to show that exclusion of the text 

messages would have changed the result at trial, despite the substantial evidence 

supporting the jury’s verdict. Petitioner attempts no such showing. For these reasons, 

the Court finds Petitioner has failed to demonstrate Attorney Leahy’s opposition to the 

Government’s motion to admit the text messages was deficient or that her defense was 

prejudiced by the admission of the text messages.

C. Jury voir dire.

Petitioner challenges Attorney Leahy’s decision during voir dire not to follow up 

with every potential juror who indicated he or she had a family member involved with 

illegal drugs. (Pet. 15–16.) But Attorney Leahy could reasonably assume that such 

jurors would be more forgiving and sympathetic to Petitioner. Indeed, Government 

counsel recognized the inference and opined to the jury panel about the need to set aside 

sympathies. (See Tr. of Jury Trial – Day One 31:14–32:14.) The Government further 

manifested its concerns by using its first four peremptory challenges to excuse jurors who 

had a close family member involved with illegal drugs. Attorney Leahy behaved 

reasonably by choosing not to call further attention to those jurors who were more likely 

to have been sympathetic to his client. The Court, therefore, rejects Petitioner’s claim 

that Attorney Leahy’s choices on voir dire constituted deficient performance.

D. Failing to cross examine about “blind mules.”

Petitioner claims Attorney Leahy was deficient by failing to explicitly question 

Officer Sauget about the existence of “blind mules.” (Pet. 16.) However, as the 

Government points out, doing so would have opened the door to modus operandi 

evidence which would have raised even more doubt as to the credibility of Petitioner’s 

version of events. (Resp’t’s Opp’n 9:1–10.) The Government could have responded by 

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putting on an expert to testify about the rarity of blind mules, the unique circumstances 

where blind mules may be utilized, and how those circumstances differ from the facts of 

Petitioner’s case. 

In light of the potential pitfalls of questioning Officer Sauget about blind mules,

Attorney Leahy used his cross-examination to elicit testimony to show how Petitioner 

may not have known about the drugs. Attorney Leahy sought to establish that the signs 

of seat tampering that Officer Sauget detected would have been imperceptible to 

Petitioner when seated in the driver’s seat. (Tr. of Jury Trial – Day One 140–51.) For 

these reasons, the Court finds that it was reasonable for Attorney Leahy to avoid asking 

Officer Sauget general questions about blind mules and, instead, to pursue specific 

testimony to help legitimize Petitioner’s claimed lack of knowledge.

E. Failing to cross examine about bias.

Petitioner claims Attorney Leahy did not properly address witness Alicia Rosales’ 

bias during cross-examination. (Pet. 16–17.) The record reflects the Government sought 

to take the sting out of Rosales’ potential bias by raising her cooperation with the 

Government on direct examination. (Tr. of Jury Trial – Day Two 191–92.) Nevertheless, 

Attorney Leahy also raised Rosales’ potential bias at the start of cross-examination when 

he asked why the Government released her without charges after finding a large quantity 

of methamphetamine in her Jeep. (Id. at 196:1–10.) Attorney Leahy then ended crossexamination by eliciting testimony from Rosales that she understood her state-court case 

would be dismissed and she hoped the trial judge in this case (who would also be her 

sentencing judge) would grant her a lesser sentence for testifying. (Id. at 200–02.) 

Attorney Leahy then reiterated the point on re-cross twice. (Id. at 204–06). For these 

reasons, Petitioner’s claim that Attorney Leahy failed to raise Ms. Rosales’ bias on crossexamination lacks merit.

//

//

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F. Preparation of Petitioner to testify.

Petitioner raises several alleged deficiencies related to her trial testimony. First, 

she contends she was inadequately prepared to testify because “Attorney Leahy never 

engaged in any practice questioning” with her. (Pet. 20:7–15, 21:14–16.) This claim is 

not supported by the record. 

In her declaration, Petitioner admits she met with Attorney Leahy approximately 

eight times and that, at each meeting, he had her go over her story and told her he was 

“testing . . . to see whether [she] changed any facts.” (Govea Decl. ¶¶ 4, 11, 24, 25.) 

Petitioner also stated that when she testified at trial, she told the same story she had 

previously given in his office. (Id. ¶ 24.) The Court finds Attorney Leahy’s performance 

was not deficient.

Next, Petitioner attacks the substance of her own testimony, blaming Attorney 

Leahy for eliciting her “nonsensical, confused, and inconsistent” story about traveling to 

Mexico to get a paternity test.6

 (Pet. 22:11–24.) Petitioner contends that if Attorney 

Leahy had not elicited that testimony, it would not have been subject to attack by the 

Government. (Id. 22:11–24.) Petitioner’s blame is misdirected. She was warned by 

Attorney Leahy that her story was not believable, yet she chose to proceed to trial. 

(Govea Decl. ¶¶ 11, 16). At that trial, Attorney Leahy logically elicited testimony about 

Petitioner’s reasons for entering Mexico and her actions while in Mexico immediately 

before her arrest at the border. The fact that the jury did not believe Petitioner’s story is 

not a reflection on Attorney Leahy’s competence. 

Finally, even assuming for the sake of argument that Attorney Leahy’s decision to 

allow Petitioner to testify was deficient, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice for two 

 

6 Petitioner also blames Attorney Leahy for eliciting her “nonsensical testimony” that a friend borrowed 

her car while she was eating at a restaurant at the mall. (See Pet. 22:25–28.) This testimony was, in 

fact, not elicited by Attorney Leahy but was instead revealed on cross-examination by the Government 

(See Tr. of Jury Trial – Day Two 310–312.) Petitioner then contradicts herself by criticizing Attorney 

Leahy for not eliciting the borrowed car testimony on direct, referring to it as “the only helpful 

testimony” she provided. (See Pet. 24:16–25:13.)

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reasons. First, based on the strength of the Government’s case, Petitioner would have 

been convicted even had she not testified. The Government’s evidence included:

(1) incriminating text messages which tied Petitioner to Alicia Rosales and Monica 

Gonzalez—the two women arrested for smuggling drugs in the weeks leading up to 

Petitioner’s arrest; (2) Alicia Rosales’ testimony that she was told by her smuggling 

contact to pick up a vehicle from “Adriana”; (3) testimony that the drugs found in Alicia 

Rosales’ vehicle bore the same “Chilango” marking as the drugs found in Petitioner’s 

vehicle; and (4) the location of the drugs in the BMW, which could only be reached by 

unbolting and removing the seats. 

Second, Petitioner’s testimony offered no new, meaningful inculpatory evidence. 

The Government had already introduced testimony of Petitioner’s “nonsensical” story 

through Officer Sauget, who testified that at the border crossing, Petitioner stated she was 

driving her cousin’s car and that she had travelled to Mexico for an DNA test for her 

child scheduled for eight o’clock in the evening. (See Tr. of Jury Trial – Day One

128:13–23.) If anything, Petitioner’s testimony strengthened her case by allowing her to 

provide a back story as to why she had sent the text messages, how she ended up driving 

the BMW, and why she was in Mexico. (Tr. of Jury Trial – Day Two 271–305.)

7

 

G. Lack of defense witnesses.

Petitioner contends that Attorney Leahy should have introduced evidence at trial 

that Peralta—Petitioner’s cousin and owner of the car in which she was arrested—had 

 

7 In a single sentence, Petitioner states that Attorney Leahy failed to inform her that it was her decision 

whether or not to testify. (Pet. 20:11–14; Govea Decl. ¶ 16.) Assuming for the sake of argument this 

assertion is true and constitutes structural error, Petitioner must still demonstrate prejudice. See Weaver 

v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910–11 (2017) (finding that when structural error is raised in the 

context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant is required to show prejudice). The 

Court finds Petitioner could not demonstrate prejudice because of the strength of the Government’s case 

and because her “nonsensical” story had already come in to evidence through Officer Sauget’s 

testimony. 

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previously used that vehicle to smuggle drugs. (Pet. 23:25–24:6.) But Attorney Leahy’s 

justification for omitting this evidence is clear—Peralta admitted that Petitioner arranged 

for her to smuggle drugs from Tijuana into the United States on more than one occasion. 

(See Pet. Ex. I.) Attorney Leahy’s decision not to call Peralta to testify does not support 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Aside from Peralta, Petitioner has failed to identify any other witnesses that would 

have assisted her defense, particularly given the substantial evidence supporting the 

jury’s guilty verdict. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to meet her burden in establishing 

prejudice on this claim.

H. Totality of the alleged errors.

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate that any aspect of Attorney Leahy’s performance fell outside the wide range 

of professionally competent assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 

(1984). Thus, the Court need not address the cumulative effect of the claimed errors.

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Petition [Doc. 64]. And 

because reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s assessment of the claims debatable 

or wrong, the Court DENIES a certificate of appealability. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Clerk of the Court shall close the district court file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 4, 2019

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