Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00696/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00696-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DORIAN DAVIS aka

WALI AT-TAQI DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. HEDGPETH,

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-00696-OWW-SMS PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING (1) DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO

EXHAUST BE GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART, (2) DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM BE DENIED, AND (3)

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ON

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY GROUNDS BE

DENIED

(Doc. 40)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Findings and Recommendations - Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Dorian Davis aka Wali At-Taqi Davis, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 9, 2007. The

action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed May8, 2008, against Defendant Warden

A. Hedgpeth for violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the denial of outdoor exercise and other program

opportunities during periods of lockdown at Kern Valley State Prison in Delano, California.

On June 29, 2009, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust, for failure to

state a claim, and on qualified immunity grounds. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Plaintiff filed an opposition

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on August 28, 2009, Defendant filed a reply on September 4, 2009, and the motion has been deemed

submitted. Local Rule 230(l). 

II. Failure to Exhaust

A. Legal Standard

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claims in compliance with 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a), subjecting the claims to dismissal. Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

of 1995 provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42

U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Prisoners

are required to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 549

U.S. 199, 211, 127 S.Ct. 910, 918-19 (2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th

Cir. 2002). Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of

the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001), and

the exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 435

U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983 (2002). 

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has an administrative grievance

system for prisoner complaints. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.1 (West 2009). The process is

initiated by submitting a CDCR Form 602. Id. at § 3084.2(a). Four levels of appeal are involved,

including the informal level, first formal level, second formal level, and third formal level, also

known as the “Director’s Level.” Id. at § 3084.5. Appeals must be submitted within fifteen working

days of the event being appealed, and the process is initiated by submission of the appeal to the

informal level, or in some circumstances, the first formal level. Id. at §§ 3084.5, 3084.6(c). In order

to satisfy section 1997e(a), California state prisoners are required to use this process to exhaust their

claims prior to filing suit. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85-86, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006); McKinney,

311 F.3d at 1199-1201. 

Section 1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement, but rather, is an affirmative

defense under which Defendant has the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. 

Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 921; Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The failure to

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exhaust nonjudicial administrative remedies that are not jurisdictional is subject to an unenumerated

Rule 12(b) motion, rather than a summary judgment motion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (citing Ritza

v. Int’l Longshoremen’s&Warehousemen’sUnion, 837 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curium)). 

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court may look

beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. If the Court

concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is

dismissal without prejudice. Id. 

B. Discussion

1. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff was transferred to Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) on October 26, 2005. Plaintiff

alleges that since his arrival, the yards he has been on have been locked down on and off, with a

lockdown occurring every month. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of these recurring lockdowns, his

right to outdoor exercise or out-of-cell recreation is being violated, and he is being deprived of his

liberty interest in privileges such as canteen, quarterly packages, phone calls, visitation, outdoor or

out-of-cell recreation, social contact with other inmates, physical law library access, and education,

without due process of law.

2. Exhaustion of Eighth Amendment Claim

a. Summary of Relevant Appeals

Plaintiff filed an appeal on February 9, 2006, in which he grieved the lockdown of Facility

A from January 2, 2006, to January 18, 2006, and his inability to exercise during that time. (Doc.

40-5, court record p. 10-12.) The appeal was rejected as untimely filed at the final level of review. 

(Doc. 40-7, Grannis Dec., court record p. 4.) Defendant contends that the appeal failed to grieve

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim that he was on lockdown month after month without adequate

exercise, or his claim that he was denied due process. Defendant also contends that the appeal was

not fully exhausted in light of its rejection for untimeliness.

Defendant contends that only one other appeal filed by Plaintiff is even tangentially related

to lockdowns, and it grieved denial of access to the law library. (Doc. 40-3, Tarnoff Dec., court 

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record p. 3; Doc. 40-5, pp. 23-24.) Defendant contends that the appeal was not exhausted through

the Director’s Level of review and did not adequately grieve Plaintiff’s claims in this action.

Notwithstanding the issue of whetherit was fullyexhausted or not, the appeal addressing lack

of access to the law library would not satisfy the exhaustion requirement with respect to Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment and due process claims, and Plaintiff does not argue otherwise. Griffin v.

Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). That leaves at issue only the appeal grieving the

January 2006 lockdown.

b. Sufficiency of the Appeal

In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, prisoners are required to comply with the

applicable procedural rules governing the appeals process, and it is the appeals process itself which 

defines the level of detail necessary in an appeal. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218; Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. 

In California, prisoners are required only to describe the problem and the action requested. Tit. 15

§ 3084.2(a). Therefore, the appeal is sufficient “‘if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for

which redress is sought,’” Griffin at 1120 (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir.

2002) and adopting the Strong standard), which “advances the primary purpose of . . . notify[ing]

the prison of a problem,” id. (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s appeal specificallyreferencesthe lockdown from January2, 2006, to January

18, 2006, but does grieve the ill effects of the denial of outdoor exercise and recreation for periods

of more than three days, and requests that during lockdowns, inmates be provided with outdoor

exercise on the alternate exercise and recreation yards, in accordance with their constitutional right

under the Eighth Amendment. Although Plaintiff did not complain about monthly lockdowns on

an ongoing basis, under the Strong standard’s “low floor,” his appeal placed prison officials on

notice that the deprivation of outdoor exercise during lockdowns impinges upon his Eighth

Amendment rights, a deprivation which forms the basis of his claim in this action. Griffin at 1120. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s appeal was sufficient to satisfy section 1997e(a), if

properly exhausted.

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c. Timeliness of the Appeal

Plaintiff was required to submit his appeal to the third level and final level of review within

fifteen working days from the date of receipt of the second level decision, tit. 15 § 3084.6, and at the

formal levels of appeal, this requires that the appeal be forwarded to the appeals coordinator within

fifteen days, tit. 15 § 3084.2(c). Plaintiff’s appeal was returned to him on July 26, 2006, making the

deadline for submission to the Director’s Level of review August 16, 2006. Tit. 15 § 4003(j). 1

Plaintiff submits evidence that he mailed the appeal on August 16, 2006, when he handed

it to a correctional officer. (Doc. 43, Opp., pp. 7, 24.) While the appeal was actually sent out in the

mail to the Chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch on August 17, 2006, Plaintiff’s appeal was timely

submitted if his action in handing it to the correctional officer for mailing constituted the forwarding

of the appeal to the appeals coordinator. (Id., p. 25.) In light of the applicable regulation’s language

and in the absence of any evidence or argument to the contrary from Defendant, the Court finds no

basis for concluding that handing the appeal to an officer for mailing does not constitute the act of

forwarding the appeal to the appeals coordinator. Therefore, based on the record before it, the Court

finds that Plaintiff’s appeal was timely submitted on August 16, 2006, and recommends that

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust be denied. 

3. Exhaustion of Due Process Claim

With respect to Plaintiff’s claim that he was deprived of various privileges without due

process of law, the evidence submitted by Plaintiff shows that inmate Will Palmer submitted a group

appeal on August 15, 2006, alleging due process and equal protection violations against KVSP

prison officials arising from the placement of all Facility D inmates on lockdown following the

discovery of weapons in a cell. (Opp., p. 28.) Due to the lockdown, inmates lost their privileges,

including yard, canteen, telephone, packages, and education. (Id.) As relief, the appeal sought the

adoption of a new policy by the warden prohibiting the suspension of privileges for the entire inmate

population based on the actions of a few individual inmates. (Id.)

Defendant incorrectly argues in his reply that the deadline was August 10, 2006. The deadline

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commenced upon receipt of the appeal by Plaintiff rather than the date of issuance of the decision. Tit. 15 § 3084.6.

Further, weekends and holidays are not working days, and the first day is excluded. Tit. 15 § 4003(j).

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Title 15 regulations permit group appeals, and this appeal arguablysets forth the very general

facts at issue in Plaintiff’s due process claim. However, group appeals must be accompanied by “[a]

legible list of the participating inmates’ names, signatures, departmental identification numbers, and

housing,” tit. 15 § 3084.2(f)(1), and Plaintiff’s name was not on the list of participating inmates. 

(Id., p. 33.) The Court does not reach the issue of whether the appeal was exhausted or whether it

would in fact satisfy the exhaustion requirement for Plaintiff’s due process claim because Plaintiff

was not a participating inmate and may not use the appeal to demonstrate exhaustion of his due

process claim. 

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Plaintiff also includes a copy of an appeal filed by B. Salaam on October 26, 2006, which

challenges the loss of privileges due to the modified program in effect on FacilityD. (Id., pp. 34-37.) 

There is no indication that the appeal was a group appeal, and if it was intended as such, it lacks the

requisite list of participating inmates, which would have to include Plaintiff. (Id.) In addition, there

is no evidence that the appeal was exhausted. (Id.)

In conclusion, the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim on the ground

that Plaintiff may not use either Will Palmer’s group appeal or B. Salaam’s appeal to demonstrate

that he exhausted his due process claim, and Plaintiff has not submitted any other evidence of claim

exhaustion.

III. Failure to State a Claim

A. Legal Standard

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against him. 

“The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint,” Schneider v. California Dept. of

Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), which must contain “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell

The appeal does not appear to have been exhausted, as the last action taken on it per the exhibits submitted

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by Plaintiff was a return of the appeal and request that the Plan of Operations for Facility D be attached to it. (Opp.,

p. 43.)

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)); Moss v. U.S.

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short

of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal at 1949 (citing

Twombly at 555), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Eighth Amendment Claim

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from

inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and only those

deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficientlygrave to form

the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995

(1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth

Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew

of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Outdoor exercise is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment, and the denial

of outdoor exercise may violate the Constitution, dependent upon the circumstances. Richardson

v. Runnels, No. 07-16736, 2010 WL 92777, at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2010); Norwood v. Vance, Nos.

07-17322, 08-15778, 2010 WL 27406, at *6 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2010); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082,

1087 (9th Cir. 1995); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979). While the “‘temporary

denial of outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not a substantial deprivation,’” Norwood, 2010

WL 27406, at *5-7 (quoting May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997)), when an inmate

alleges the denial of constitutionally adequate outdoor exercise, the inquiry is fact specific and

requires full consideration of the context in which the denial occurred, Richardson, 2010 WL92777,

at *4-5; Norwood, 2010 WL 27406, at *5-7.

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Here, Plaintiff alleges that from the time he was transferred to KVSP on October 26, 2005,

the yards he has been on have been on and off lockdown, with lockdowns occurring at least monthly,

and that during these lockdowns, he does not get outdoor exercise. Plaintiff alleges, for example,

that lockdowns have been in place for two weeks, lifted for one week, and then reinstated again for

one month, and the sporadic lockdowns complained of span over years. Further, Plaintiff alleges

medical effects as a result of the lack of adequate outdoor exercise, and that as the warden and

policymaker, Defendant was responsible for signing off on all policies and has ignored alternatives

to satisfying the need for exercise. 

The Court finds these allegations sufficient, at the pleading stage, for Plaintiff to state an

Eighth Amendment claim. See Richardson, 2010 WL 92777, at *4 (distinguishing a thirty-day

emergency lockdown from cumulative lockdowns amounting to more than thirty days). While

Defendant is correct that prison officials have discretion to handle emergency situations which arise

and that their decisions in the exercise of this discretion are entitled to deference, this fact specific

inquiry cannot properly be resolved at the pleading stage. Id. Therefore, the Court recommends that

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be denied.

IV. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Government officials

enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). Thus, if a constitutional violation

occurred, prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity if they acted reasonably under the

circumstances. Millender v. County of Los Angeles, 564 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests - the need to hold public officials accountable

when theyexercise powerirresponsiblyand the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction,

and liability when they perform their duties reasonably,” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815

(2009), and protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,”

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986). 

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In resolving a claim of qualified immunity, courts must determine whether, taken in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and if so,

whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156

(2001); McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 560 F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2009). While often

beneficial to address in that order, courts have discretion to address the two-step inquiry in the order

they deem most suitable under the circumstances. Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818 (overruling holding in

Saucierthat the two-step inquirymust be conducted in that order, and the second step is reached only

if the court first finds a constitutional violation); McSherry, 560 F.3d at 1130.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead facts showing that he violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights, and that the placement of the institution on lockdowns lasting less than a month

when there were threats of violence does not show a constitutional violation. Defendant argues that

in the absence of clearly established authority to the contrary, a reasonable official could have

thought lockdowns lasting less than a month and instituted due to security threats were justified and

necessary to protect prison officials and inmates.

On Defendant’s motion to dismiss at the pleading stage, the Court is limited to a review of

the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s pleading. The reason for the institution of the lockdowns at

issue is not clear from the complaint. Defendant’s argument is premised on the assumption that the

lockdowns were based on threats of violence jeopardizing the safety and security of the institution,

but this has not actually been pled. Plaintiff alleges the denial of exercise resulting from the on and

off again lockdowns that are occurring on a monthly basis, but the underlying or official reason given

for the lockdowns is not provided. Plaintiff describes the lockdowns as “fictitious,” and while he

makes an argument that locking down the whole yard due to a fistfight between inmates is

unjustified, the fistfight is set forth not as the reason or a reason behind any of the lockdowns at issue

but simply as an example of a potential reason that Plaintiff finds lacking. (Amend. Comp., court

record pp. 5, 7.) 

It is simply not clear whythe multiple lockdowns were imposed and for that reason, the Court

cannot reach the argument that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that he

reasonably believed that locking down the institution due to security threats was reasonable. The

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record needs further factual development with respect to the nature of the lockdowns, including,

critically, the stated justification. Only then may the Court properly address whether Defendant

acted reasonably.

V. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s

motion to dismiss, filed June 29, 2009, be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to

exhaust be DENIED;

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claim for failure to exhaust be

GRANTED and the claim be dismissed from this action without prejudice;

3. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to

state a claim be DENIED; and

4. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on qualified

immunity grounds be DENIED.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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