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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 19, 2007 Decided June 26, 2007

No. 05-5171

JAMES A. BUTLER,

APPELLANT

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cv00288)

Jamie W. Campbell, Student Counsel, argued the cause

as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With her on the briefs

were Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, and David J.

Arkush, Supervising Attorney.

Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S.

Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence and W. Mark Nebeker,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: TATEL, BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #05-5171 Document #1049233 Filed: 06/26/2007 Page 1 of 12
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1 Other limitations include an exhaustion requirement for

§ 1983 claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a screening procedure by

which courts dismiss before docketing complaints that do not meet

certain criteria, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and a requirement that

prisoners pay the entire filing fee over time (previously when IFP

status was granted the fee was waived), see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Appellant James A. Butler, a

federal prisoner, seeks leave to file in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on

an appeal before this Court. He has on at least five prior

occasions brought appeals before this Court that were dismissed

for failure to prosecute. The question before us is whether those

dismissals are strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA” or the “Act”). We hold that they are not, but

nonetheless exercise our supervisory discretion to deny Butler

IFP status. 

I.

In 1996, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform

Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134 §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), to

“help bring relief to a civil justice system overburdened by

frivolous prisoner lawsuits,” 141 CONG. REC. S14408-01,

*S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch),

and to “reduce the number of nonmeritorious actions brought by

prisoners for whom litigation was a costless pastime,” Ibrahim

v. District of Columbia, 208 F.3d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

The PLRA imposed several limitations on a prisoner’s ability to

file lawsuits and pursue appeals in federal courts. One of those

limitations,1 colloquially known as the “three strikes” provision,

prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis if he has

had three or more actions or appeals in federal courts dismissed

as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim, unless the

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2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) provides in full: 

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or

appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding

under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more

prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the

United States that was dismissed on the grounds that

it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is

under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

3 Butler v. DOJ, No. 05-5022 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 24, 2005);

Butler v. DOJ, No. 05-5073 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 3, 2005); Butler v.

DOJ, No. 05-5171 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2005).

prisoner faces imminent danger of serious physical harm. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g).2 

Butler, who is serving a life sentence, filed a claim under

the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) in district court

seeking records related to his conviction from the Executive

Office of the United States Attorneys and moved for leave to file

IFP. The district court denied his motion because it found that

Butler had incurred at least three strikes under § 1915(g) and

dismissed the case without prejudice to his refiling upon

payment of the filing fee. 

Butler appealed and filed a motion for leave to proceed

IFP in this Court. We ordered the government to respond to his

motion and to address whether Butler had incurred three strikes

under § 1915(g). We also appointed amicus curiae to argue in

support of Butler’s position. The government responded by

arguing that Butler had three appeals pending before this Court

in which he was either proceeding or attempting to proceed IFP,3

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4 Butler v. IRS, No. 04-5332 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 5, 2005); Butler

v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 04-5231 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2005); Butler

v. IRS, No. 04-5091 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 6, 2005); Butler v. DOJ, No. 99-

5341 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 19, 1999); Butler v. DOJ, No. 97-5308 (D.C.

Cir. July 15, 1998). 

5

 In Thompson v. DEA, No. 04-5450, also decided today, we

address several related questions including whether prisoners moving

to proceed IFP bear the burden of proving their eligibility for IFP

status and whether dismissals for various other reasons constitute

strikes.

and that we had dismissed for failure to prosecute at least five

separate appeals4 in which he was proceeding IFP. The

government argues that these five dismissals are strikes under

§ 1915(g) and that Butler is therefore barred from proceeding

IFP in this appeal. Amicus asserts that dismissals for failure to

prosecute are not strikes under § 1915(g) and urges us to allow

Butler to proceed IFP. Because Butler does not claim that he is

“under imminent danger of serious physical injury,” the only

question before us is whether a dismissal for failure to prosecute

an appeal is a strike, and if not, whether we should nevertheless

exercise our discretion to deny Butler IFP status.5

 

II.

In determining whether a dismissal for failure to

prosecute an appeal is a strike under the PLRA, we begin, as we

must, with the language of the statute. United States v.

Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d 1348, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2002)(“In

construing a statute, the court begins with the plain language of

the statute.”). By its own terms, the PLRA counts as a strike

only an action or appeal that is “dismissed on the grounds that

it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A dismissal for

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6

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(b) also obliquely

recognizes this distinction by providing that a dismissal for failure to

prosecute “operates as an adjudication upon the merits.” FRCP 41(b)

(emphasis added). The phrase “operates as” indicates that a dismissal

for failure to prosecute is not, in fact, a decision on the merits of the

claim, but rather functions as such for the purposes of claim

preclusion. See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &

EDWARD H.COOPER,FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4440 (2d

ed. 2002). 

failure to prosecute is clearly not a dismissal for “failure to state

a claim on which relief may be granted”—a phrase that tracks

the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and is

not implicated here. Nor is it a dismissal “on the grounds that

it is frivolous,” a dismissal based on the utter lack of merit of an

action or appeal. See Tafari v. Hues, 473 F.3d 440, 442 (2d Cir.

2007) (“A frivolous action advances ‘inarguable legal

conclusion[s]’ or ‘fanciful factual allegation[s].’ Thus, the term

‘frivolous’ refers to the ultimate merits of the case.”) (alterations

original, citation omitted). By contrast, a dismissal for failure to

prosecute does not rest on the merits of a claim.6

 Mathes v.

Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 788 F.2d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

(“The substantive merits of a claim are of course irrelevant to

the propriety of a dismissal for failure to prosecute . . . .”); see

also Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“Public policy favors disposition of cases on the merits. Thus,

this factor weighs against dismissal [for failure to prosecute].”);

Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting

the strong predisposition to resolve cases on the merits rather

than dismissing for failure to prosecute). 

That leaves us with the question whether a dismissal for

failure to prosecute fits appropriately within the statutory

category of a dismissal “on the ground[] that it is . . .

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7 The government’s brief appeared to argue as much. See

Appellee’s Br. at 23 (“There is something inherently abusive, and

therefore, malicious about” a prisoner bringing suit and then

abandoning his case.) (emphasis added). However, at oral argument

the government clarified its position, conceding that dismissals for

failure to prosecute are not strikes within the meaning of § 1915(g).

Oral Arg. at 46:3-5. 

malicious.”7 We hold that it does not. “A case is malicious if it

was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Tafari,

473 F.3d at 442 (parenthetically quoting Andrews v. King, 398

F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005)). Although it is possible that an

action or an appeal dismissed for failure to prosecute may have

been filed with the sole intent to harm another, that need not be

the case. As amicus correctly points out, there are nonmalicious reasons why a prisoner may fail to prosecute a matter,

including transfer to another facility and sickness. See Amicus

Reply Br. at 18.

The government nonetheless urges us to exercise our

discretionary authority to create a per se rule that would count

all dismissals for failure to prosecute as strikes. Oral Arg. at 42-

46. In Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), the Supreme

Court rejected a similar proposal. At the time, the in forma

pauperis statute authorized “federal courts to dismiss a claim

filed in forma pauperis ‘if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or

if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.’” 490 U.S.

at 324 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(1988), amended by Pub. L.

No. 104-134 § 804(a)(2), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)). Several prison

officials petitioned the Supreme Court to adopt “a per se

reading” of the in forma pauperis statute, categorizing all

complaints dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6) as “frivolous” under § 1915(d). Id. at 325. The Court

acknowledged that there were good policy reasons behind

adopting the petitioners’ approach, but nonetheless refused to

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adopt it because the Court’s “role . . . is not to make policy, but

to interpret a statute,” and “as a matter of statutory construction

[the petitioners’ proposal] is untenable.” Id. at 326. The Court

therefore concluded that complaints “filed in forma pauperis

[are] not automatically frivolous within the meaning of

§ 1915(d) because [they] fail[] to state a claim.” Id. at 331.

The government’s proposal here suffers from a similar

defect. Had Congress wanted to include dismissals for failure

to prosecute among the strikes listed in § 1915(g), it could have

done so. See, e.g., Tafari, 473 F.3d at 443 (“The PLRA makes

clear that Congress was aware of, and intended to differentiate

between, particular bases for dismissal.”). If we were to adopt

the government’s approach, we would be effectively writing

another category of strikes into the PLRA. We have neither the

authority nor inclination to substitute our policy judgment for

that of Congress. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S.

200, 208 (1993) (courts have a “duty to refrain from reading a

phrase into the statute when Congress has left it out”). Such an

expansion of the statute would not even advance the purpose of

the PLRA, which was “designed to stem the tide of egregiously

meritless lawsuits.” Tafari, 473 F.3d at 443 (emphasis added).

Each of the three categories of strikes in the statute involves

dispositions that look to the merits of the suit. As we have

already noted, a dismissal for failure to prosecute is made

without regard to the merits of the claim. Rather, it is a

mechanism whereby courts may protect their power to ensure

compliance with their rules and orders. See D.C. Cir. Rule 38

(“When any party to a proceeding before this court . . . fails to

comply with the FRAP, these rules, or an order of this court . . .

the court may . . . impose appropriate sanctions . . . includ[ing]

dismissal for failure to prosecute”); 18A CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.COOPER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4440 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that

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the purpose of this “strong sanction [is] to enforce compliance

with proper procedure”). 

We recognize that a prisoner who files repeated actions

or appeals only to allow them to languish can present a burden

to the courts similar to the problems addressed by the three

strikes provision of the PLRA. A prisoner “for whom litigation

was a costless pastime” could repeatedly bring actions or

appeals that were dismissed for failure to prosecute without

incurring any costs—either financially or as strikes under the

PLRA. Ibrahim, 208 F.3d at 1036. We believe the best solution

to this problem lies in exercising our discretionary authority to

deny IFP status to prisoners who have abused the privilege. Our

ability to do so derives from both the PLRA itself, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) (“any court of the United States may authorize the

commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or

proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without

prepayment of fees or security therefor”) (emphasis added), and

our more general supervisory authority to manage our docket so

as to “promote[] the interests of justice,” In re McDonald, 489

U.S. 180, 184 (1989). 

Litigants have a constitutional right of access to the

courts, see, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977), but

that right “is neither absolute nor unconditional,” In re Green,

669 F.2d 779, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam). It must be

“counterbalanced by the traditional right of courts to manage

their dockets and limit abusive filings.” Cofield v. Ala. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 517 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation

omitted). When a court determines that a litigant is an abusive

filer, it “may impose conditions upon [the] litigant—even

onerous conditions . . . so long as they are, taken together, not so

burdensome as to deny the litigant meaningful access to the

courts.” In re Green, 669 F.2d at 786. Denying a prisoner the

ability to proceed IFP is one such condition courts have imposed

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on prisoners who have abused the IFP privilege. Ibrahim, 208

F.3d at 1036 (“Leave to file a claim in forma pauperis has

always been a matter of grace, a privilege granted in the court’s

discretion . . . , and denied in the court’s discretion when that

privilege has been abused by filing claims or appeals that are

frivolous or otherwise not taken in good faith.”) Indeed, the

Supreme Court has gone so far as to say that it has “a duty to

deny in forma pauperis status to those individuals who have

abused the system.” In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180 (emphasis

added). Thus, our authority to deny IFP status to a prisoner who

has abused the privilege is clear. What is not so clear, however,

is when that discretion should be exercised. 

At oral argument, we put the question to amicus, asking

for a standard that we might apply in determining when to

exercise our discretion to deny a prisoner IFP status. In

response, amicus urged us to apply the same standard that has

been used to determine whether a litigant is an abusive filer who

warrants sanctioning, Oral Arg. at 24:18-21, namely, when

“[b]oth the number and content of [the litigant’s] filings”

constitute a pattern of frivolousness or harassment of either

defendants or the court, In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C.

Cir. 1988) (per curiam). We find this suggestion helpful and

would add two additional factors to the standard—the frequency

and disposition of the filings. In a series of cases concluding

that four pro se petitioners had abused the IFP privilege to such

an extent that the Supreme Court was warranted in issuing an

order preventing them from proceeding IFP on any petition for

extraordinary writs, the Court looked to the number, content,

frequency, and disposition of the petitioner’s previous filings to

make that determination. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 511 U.S.

364, 365 (1994) (denying petitioner IFP status whenever seeking

an extraordinary writ because petitioner’s twenty-two petitions

and motions over three years were an abuse of the privilege); In

re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 16-17 (1991) (denying petitioner IFP

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status whenever seeking an extraordinary writ because

petitioner’s thirty-two IFP filings over three years were an abuse

of the privilege); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 177-78 (1991)

(denying petitioner IFP status whenever seeking an

extraordinary writ because petitioner’s forty-three petitions and

motions over three years were an abuse of the privilege); In re

McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989) (denying petitioner IFP status

whenever seeking an extraordinary writ because petitioner’s

seventy-three filings over eighteen years were an abuse of the

privilege). Thus, in concluding whether Butler should be

allowed to proceed IFP, we will examine the number, content,

frequency, and disposition of Butler’s previous filings to

determine if there is a pattern of abusing the IFP privilege in his

litigation history.

Before turning to that analysis, we pause to address

amicus’ reliance on our decision in Powell, which it asserts

supports the argument that Butler is not an abusive filer. See

Amicus Reply Br. at 16-18. In Powell, we reversed the district

court’s enjoining of two pro se litigants from filing claims

without leave of the court, because, we concluded, their prolific

filings did not warrant such an “extreme” remedy. See 851 F.2d

at 434 (“An injunction is an extreme sanction and should be

imposed in only the most egregious cases. On this record, such

a case is not before us.”). On that conclusion rests a

fundamental distinction between Powell and what we are

considering here that escapes amicus. Powell involved a direct

restriction on the litigant’s right of access to the courts. The

question facing us is quite different. We are not contemplating

imposing a restriction on a constitutional right, but rather

denying a privilege. The factors we consider to make that

determination are similar to those employed by Powell and its

progeny, but the test is different because we are not considering

the extreme penalty of denying Butler access to the courts. Our

inquiry therefore is not whether Butler’s litigation history is

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8 USCA No. 06-5116 (held in abeyance); USCA No. 06-5026

(held in abeyance); USCA No. 05-5171 (this case); USCA No. 05-

5073 (held in abeyance); USCA No. 05-5022 (Butler lost on summary

affirmance).

9 Butler v. DOJ, 1:2002cv00412 (filed Mar. 6, 2002); Butler

v. DEA, 1:1994cv00571 (filed Mar. 21, 1994); Butler v. DOJ,

1:2003cv00608 (filed Mar. 6, 2003); Butler v. Treasury Inspector

General, 1:2003cv00672 (filed Mar. 12, 2003); Butler v. IRS,

1:2002cv01034 (filed May 28, 2002); Butler v. IRS, 1:2002cv01112

(filed June 7, 2002); Butler v. Bureau of Prisons, 1:2002cv01113

(filed June 7, 2002); Butler v. FBI, 1:1996cv01150 (filed May 23,

1996); Butler v. DOJ, 1:2003cv01209 (filed June 4, 2003); Butler v.

Tapscott, 1:1994cv01236 (filed Jan. 27, 1995); Butler v. Assistant

Attorney Gen., 1:1994cv01241 (filed Nov. 6, 1995); Butler v. USPO,

1:1995cv01705 (filed Sept. 8, 1995); Butler v. DOJ, 1:1996cv01907

(filed Mar. 15, 1999); Butler v. Dept. of Treasury, 1:1995cv01931

(filed Oct. 13, 1995); Butler v. Bureau of Prisons, 1:2002cv02203

(filed Nov. 7, 2002). 

abusive enough to justify the extreme penalty of an injunction,

but simply whether he has abused a special privilege of the court

to such an extent that that privilege should not again be extended

to him here. 

Butler is a prolific filer. In addition to his five appeals

that we dismissed for failure to prosecute, we are aware of five

other appeals Butler has filed with this court.8 Eight of these ten

appeals have been docketed within the last four years. For each,

Butler was proceeding IFP. The Joint Appendix contains a

PACER print-out listing dozens of cases that include “James A.

Butler” as a party. Although it is unlikely that all of these are

our “James A. Butler,” we have been able to identify at least

fifteen that are.9 It appears that all of these are FOIA actions,

most of which are related to Butler’s conviction. Many of these

appear to be seeking the same documents. In each, he was

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proceeding IFP. All but one were dismissed on either summary

judgment, a motion to dismiss, or for failure to respond.

Considering this pattern, it appears that filing these actions is a

“pastime” for Butler. We conclude that he has abused the

privilege to proceed IFP and deny his motion to do so here

again. Butler may continue to engage in this pastime if he

wishes, but if he chooses to do so here, it will have to be on his

own dime.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, Butler’s motion for leave to

proceed IFP is denied.

So ordered.

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