Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00637/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00637-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Howard Lee Mitchell, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Scottsdale, City of, 

Defendant.

No. CV-15-00637-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Scottsdale’s Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff Howard Mitchell’s Amended Complaint. (Doc. 6). The Court now rules on the 

motion. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On May 6, 2013, the City of Scottsdale (“City”) filed a complaint in Scottsdale 

Municipal Court against Howard Mitchell (“Mitchell”) and on May 10, 2013, moved to 

terminate Mitchell’s possessory rights in nearly thirty animals. (Doc. 11 at 2). The 

Municipal Court held a probable cause hearing over several non-consecutive dates 

spanning from June through October. Id. On October 30, 2013, the Municipal Court 

ordered that Mitchell’s animals be seized and taken to the Arizona Humane Society. Id.

On appeal, the Superior Court remanded the case on September 18, 2014 for further 

proceedings. Id. The Arizona Court of Appeals granted the City’s Petition for Special 

Action and found for the City on December 4, 2014. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court 

denied review. Id. 

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II. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS 

The City alleges several reasons why the complaint should be dismissed. One of 

the reasons for dismissal raised by the City is jurisdictional; thus, it falls under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1). Claims raised under Rule 12(b)(1) should be 

addressed before other reasons for dismissal filed under Rule 12(b). See Wright and 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1350, 209–10 (1990) (“[W]hen the 

motion [to dismiss] is based on more than one ground, the court should consider the Rule 

12(b)(1) challenge first since if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and objections become moot and do not need to 

be determined.”) 

 The first reason for dismissal raised by the City is a lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 11. at 9). Thus, the Court will 

address this reason for dismissal of the amended complaint. 

 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal district courts from having subject 

matter jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 

In recent years, the Supreme Court has narrowed the application of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (“[O]ur cases since Feldman

have tended to emphasize the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule.”); see also Exxon 

Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 292 (Rooker-Feldman does not apply to parallel state and 

federal litigation); Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n. 3 

(2002) (Rooker-Feldman “has no application to judicial review of executive action, 

including determinations made by a state administrative agency”). Despite the Supreme 

Court’s scaling back of the doctrine, Rooker-Feldman still “remains a viable 

jurisdictional bar.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 860 n.6 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

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 There are two general situations where Rooker-Feldman applies: (1) where a state 

court loser explicitly asks a federal district court to exercise appellate review of the statecourt judgment, and (2) where a state court loser’s federal claim constitutes a de facto 

appeal from a state court judgment. Id. at 858–59 (citing Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 

F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004)). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that: 

A federal claim constitutes a de facto appeal where “claims raised in the federal court action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s 

decision such that adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the 

state court’s ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules.” 

Id. at 859 (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). If either of 

these two situations apply, the federal court must dismiss the complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898. 

 The City argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court from having 

subject matter jurisdiction over Mitchell’s complaint. (Doc. 11 at 9). The City contends 

the first Rooker-Feldman bar applies, as Mitchell’s complaint constitutes a direct appeal 

from a state court judgment. (Doc. 11 at 9–10). In support of its argument, the City 

observes that Mitchell’s Amended Complaint opens with what appears to be a request for 

a direct appeal of the state court’s decision. (Doc. 11 at 9). For example, Mitchell asserts 

in his Amended Complaint that the “present Federal District Court is the next higher in 

the hierarchy of appeal for relief from the municipal court verdict.” (Doc. 6 at 1). 

Mitchell also “submit[s] a motion/request for relief by the overturning of the findings of 

the AZ Appeals Court and AZ Supreme Court.” (Doc. 1 at 6). 

 The City is correct in stating that the relief Mitchell requests constitutes an appeal 

of state court decisions. Mitchell asks that the Court order the City to return the animals 

and property seized pursuant to a state court judgment. If the Court were to grant the 

relief Mitchell seeks, it would necessarily involve overturning the state court judgment 

that deprived him of his animals and property in the first place. The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine forbids federal courts from taking such action. The proper avenue for Mitchell’s 

appeal of a state court judgment lies in the state court system and ultimately in the United 

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States Supreme Court. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this 

case. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that the City’s Motion to Dismiss Mitchell’s Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 6) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and dismiss 

the case with prejudice. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions before this Court 

are denied as moot. 

 Dated this 2nd day of October, 2015. 

Case 2:15-cv-00637-JAT Document 23 Filed 10/05/15 Page 4 of 4