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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM REPPY, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OF THE ) 

UNITED STATES; DONALD P. HODEL, ) 

Secretary of the Interior of the ) 

United States; BUREAU OF LAND ) 

MANAGEMENT, a Sub-Division of the ) 

Department; INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND) 

APPEALS, a Segment of the Depart- ) 

ment's Office of Hearings and ) 

Appeals; WYOMING STATE OFFICE OF ) 

THE BLM; ANDREW s. TARSHIS, Acting) 

Chief, Oil and Gas Section of the ) 

Wyoming State Office; JOHN DOE ONE,) 

present officer in charge of ) 

Wyoming State Office; JOHN DOES ) 

TWO through TEN, other persons ) 

who contributed in some way to the) 

rejection of plaintiff's lease ) 

application, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

FILED 

United St.at.es Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit. 

MAY 1 O 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-1437 

A~peal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. C86-213K) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

William Reppy, prose. 

Roger J. Marzulla, Assistant Attorney General; Richard A. Stacy, 

United States Attorney, and Carol A. Statkus, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Martin w. Matzen and Angus E. Crane, 

Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 88-1437 Document: 01019963585 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 1 
( 

Before LOGAN and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and COOK, District Judge.* 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff William Reppy appeals the district court's 

affirmance of a decision by the Interior Board of Land Appeals 

(IBLA) rejecting Reppy's challenge to a denial of his oil and gas 

lease application for failure to comply with an administrative 

regulation. we affirm. 1 

Reppy was the successful drawee of an oil and gas lease in a 

random computer drawing conducted by the Wyoming State Office of 

the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) pursuant to an established 

leasing program. Reppy's lease application subsequently was 

rejected by the BLM, however, for failure to disclose, as required 

by BLM regulation 43 C.F.R. § 3112.2-4, the name of the filing 

service that assisted him in preparing the application. On appeal 

the IBLA entered a decision upholding the BLM's action on 

December 19, 1985. 90 I.B.L.A. 80 (1985). According to the 

record, Reppy filed a petition for reconsideration with the IBLA 

on January 6, 1986, and a revised petition for reconsideration on 

* The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1437 Document: 01019963585 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 2 
February 10, 1986. 2 Reppy's petition for reconsideration was 

denied on March 31, 1986. 91 I.B.L.A. 191 (1986). He then 

commenced the present action in district court on June 27, 1986, 

seeking review of the IBLA's decision. 

Initially, the defendants argue that Reppy's request for 

judicial review was time-barred at the outset. The Mineral Lands 

Leasing Act provides: 

"No action contesting a decision of the Secretary [of 

the Interior] involving any oil and gas lease shall be 

maintained unless such action is commenced or taken 

within ninety days after the final decision of the 

Secretary relating to such matter." 

30 u.s.c. § 226-2; see also 43 C.F.R. § 3000.5. The Department of 

the Interior has supplemented § 226-2 by promulgating the 

following regulation: 

"Finality of decision. No further appeal will lie in 

the Department from a decision of the Director or an 

Appeals Board of the Office of Hearings and Appeals. 

Unless otherwise provided by regulation, reconsideration 

of a decision may be granted only in extraordinary 

circumstances • . . . The filing and pendency of a 

request for reconsideration shall not operate to stay 

the effectiveness of the decision involved unless so 

ordered by the Director or an Appeals Board. A request 

for reconsideration need not be filed to exhaust 

administrative remedies." 

43 C.F.R. § 4.2l(c) (emphasis added). 3 Based on this statute and 

2 Inexplicably, in the government's brief accompanying a motion 

to dismiss this appeal, and in Reppy's memorandum opposing that 

motion, both parties take the position that Reppy's petition for 

reconsideration was filed on March 31, 1986. 

3 The following regulation, promulgated after the commencement of 

this suit, specifically addresses the finality and reconsideration 

of IBLA decisions: 

"A decision of the Board shall constitute final 

agency action and be effective upon the date of 

issuance, unless the decision itself provides otherwise. 

Continued to next page 

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Appellate Case: 88-1437 Document: 01019963585 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 3 
regulation, the defendants contend that because Reppy's suit was 

filed more than ninety days after the IBLA's initial decision, the 

action was barred despite the timely filing of the petition for 

reconsideration. 

If this court's decision in Geosearch, Inc. v. Hodel, 801 

F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (construing 30 u.s.c. 

§ 226-2), was still viable, we would be compelled to agree with 

the defendants' position. But after this court decided Geosearch, 

in the context of a different administrative scheme, the Supreme 

Court held that the timely filing of a petition for 

reconsideration stayed the running of the applicable limitations 

period for seeking judicial review of the agency's action. See 

ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 284-5, 107 

S. Ct. 2360, 2368-69, 96 L.Ed.2d 222, 237 (1987). The language of 

the controlling statute in that case, like that in 43 C.F.R. 

§ 4.2l(c) before us, declared that agency decisions were final for 

purposes of judicial review despite the pendency of 

Continued from previous page 

The Board may reconsider a decision in extraordinary 

circumstances for sufficient reason. A petition for 

reconsideration shall be filed within 60 days after the 

date of a decision. The petition shall, at the time of 

filing, state with particularity the error claimed and 

include all arguments and supporting documents. The 

petition may include a request that the Board stay the 

effectiveness of the decision for which reconsideration 

is sought. No answer to a petition for reconsideration 

is required unless so ordered by the Board. The filing, 

pendency, or denial of a petition for reconsideration 

shall not operate to stay the effectiveness or affect 

the finality of the decision involved unless so ordered 

by the Board. A petition for reconsideration need not 

be filed to exhaust administrative remedies-" 

43 C.F.R. § 4.403. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1437 Document: 01019963585 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 4 
reconsideration motions. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found 

that such language merely "relieve[s] parties from the requirement 

of petitioning for rehearing before seeking judicial review 

but [does] not • prevent petitions for reconsideration that 

are actually filed from rendering the orders under reconsideration 

n6nfinal." 482 U.S. at 285, 107 S. Ct. at 2369, 96 L.Ed.2d at 237 

(emphasis in original). In other words, when a "petition for 

reconsideration has been filed within a discretionary review 

period specifically provided by the agency (and within the period 

alloted ~or judicial review of the original order), the 

petition tolls the period for judicial review of the original 

order." Id. at 279, 107 s.ct. at 2366, 96 L.Ed.2d at 234 

(footnote omitted). 

In reaching its decision, the Court relied on prior 

constructions of similar "finality'' language contained in the 

Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704, 4 and concluded that 

it could not distinguish the language of§ 704 from that of the 

statute under consideration. Id. at 285, 107 s.ct. at 2369, 96 

L.Ed.2d at 237. We likewise find no principled basis for 

distinguishing the language of§ 704 from that appearing in 43 

4 Section 704 provides as follows: 

"Agency action made reviewable by statute and final 

agency action for which there is no other adequate 

remedy in a court are subject to judicial review .... 

Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, 

agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes 

of this section whether or not there has been presented 

or determined an application for a declaratory order, 

for any form of rec9nsideration, or, unless the agency 

otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action 

meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior 

agency authority." 

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Appellate Case: 88-1437 Document: 01019963585 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 5 
C.F.R. § 4.2l(c), or in the recently adopted§ 4.403. Although we 

noted in Geosearch that the ninety day time limit for seeking 

judicial review furthered a congressional policy of quickly 

removing clouds on land subject to leasing, 801 F.2d at 1252, 

almost every limitation period adopted in the agency context 

reasonably could be said to have as its purpose the speedy and 

expeditious resolution of conflicting claims of right. This 

interest, however, must be balanced against the competing interest 

of preventing the wasteful consumption of judicial resources when 

a timely petition for reconsideration has been filed and further 

administrative action could render judicial review unnecessary. 

This latter concern is reflected in the decisions of three of our 

sister circuits, which relied on Brotherhood of Locomotive 

Engineers to hold that parties are precluded from seeking judicial 

review of agency action during the pendency of a petition for 

reconsideration. See United Transp. Union v. ICC, No. 88-1414 

(D.C. Cir. March 28, 1989) (WESTLAW, 1989 WL 27852); West Penn 

Power Co. v. EPA, 860 F.2d 581, 585, 586 (3d Cir. 1988); Winter v. 

ICC, 851 F.2d 1056, 1062 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 308, 

102 L.Ed.2d 327 (1988). We conclude that a timely petition for 

reconsideration tolls the ninety day limitations period contained 

in 30 u.s.c. § 226-2, and that Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 

has effectively overruled our decision in Geosearch. 5 

5 Because this panel opinion overrules a prior decision, it has 

been circulated among all the judges of this court in regular 

active service. All judges have expressed agreement with the 

conclusions reached herein as to the effect of Brotherhood of 

Locomotive Engineers on our Geosearch opinion. 

Continued to next page 

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Appellate Case: 88-1437 Document: 01019963585 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 6 
Our review of the merits of this case involves a less arduous 

task than traversing the procedural path that brought us to this 

point. We will not reverse an act of an agency within the sphere 

of its statutory authority unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 

u.s.c. § 706(2)(A); see also Airporter of Colo., Inc. v. ICC, 866 

F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1989). When, as here, the BLM has 

strictly adhered to its regulations, we will uphold that action if 

it can be said to reasonably advance a statutory purpose. See KVK 

Partnership v. Hodel, 759 F.2d 814, 816-17 (10th Cir. 1985). The 

question before us is whether strict application of the 

requirement of identifying a filing service on a lease 

application, which assisted in preparing that application, 

reasonably advances a statutory purpose. 

Continued from previous page 

Our resolution of this issue also makes it unnecessary to 

address Reppy's argument that the government waived a limitations 

defense by failing to raise it in its answer, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(c). Although this court stated. in Geosearch that the , limitations period of§ 226-2 is jurisdictional, and thus not 

subject to waiver, we note that the Supreme Court has held that 

the limitations period for seeking review of agency denial of 

benefits under the Social Security Act is not jurisdictional and 

is subject to waiver. Bowen v. City of New-VOrk, 476 U.S. 467, 

478 & n.10, 106 s.ct. 2022, 2029, 90 L.Ed.2d 462, 474 (1986); 

Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764, 95 s.ct. 2457, 2466, 45 

L.Ed.2d 522, 538 (1975); see also Johnson v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 

1202, 1208-09 (7th Cir. 198~ vacated on other grounds sub nom., 

Bowen v. Johnson, 482 U.S. 922, 107 S.Ct. 3202, 96 L.Ed.2d 690 

(1987). Whether there is a valid basis for treating the 

limitations period in§ 226-2 differently from that addressed in 

Bowen is left for another day. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1437 Document: 01019963585 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 7 
As the district court observed, 43 C.F.R. § 3112.2-46 was 

adopted to assist the BLM in policing prohibited multiple lease 

applications for the same land parcel by unscrupu"ious filing 

services attempting to secure more than one opportunity to draw a 

lease or an interest therein. See 43 C.F.R. § 3112.5-1; 48 Fed. 

Reg. 37,656 (1983). Clearly, strict adherence to this regulation 

furthers an implicit statutory purpose of having the public 

leasing program operate in a fair and equitable manner. Cf. 30 

u.s.c. § 228 (denying benefits of grandfather clause to oil and 

gas lease claimants who fail to act honestly and in good faith). 

Reppy has produced no evidence indicating that the BLM has applied 

this regulation inconsistently or in an arbitrary manner. In 

fact, in 1983 the BLM gave public notice affirming its intention 

to strictly enforce§ 3112.2-4. See 48 Fed. Reg. 37,656 (1983). 

Reppy also argues that his noncompliance should be excused on 

the ground that the BLM received notice of his filing service's 

assistance because he used its envelope for his application, and 

the money order accompanying his application was drawn on the 

filing service's bank with its account number embossed on it. To 

support this contention, Reppy points to his own declaration which 

was before the IBLA in which he related a telephone conversation 

6 This regulation provides as follows: 

"Any applicant receiving the assistance of any 

person or entity which is in the business of providing 

assistance to participants in the Federal simultaneous 

oil and gas leasing program shall indicate on the lease -------,,......,,-,-------,----,-- a pp l i cation the name of the party or filing service that 

provided assistance." 

BLM Simultaneous Filing, Filing Assistance, 43 C.F.R. § 3112.2-4 

(1987) (emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1437 Document: 01019963585 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 8 
( that he allegedly had with a BLM official. He asserts that having 

inquired how the BLM knew a filing service had assisted him, the 

official responded that the BLM staff was familiar with the 

service's money orders and envelopes. 

Even accepting this rendition of the facts, which we have no 

reason to doubt, plaintiff Reppy cannot prevail. It would be 

unreasonable to hold that the BLM is' estopped to enforce its 

regulations because one of its employees may have noticed an 

envelope or recognized a bank account number as being that of a 

filing service. The BLM always will have acquired knowledge from 

some source--perhaps a complaining loser or an informant--before 

it disqualifies a lottery winner for not disclosing the assistance 

of a filing service. The agency does not act arbitrarily when it 

demands uniform compliance with an established and reasonable 

procedure for ascertaining significant information. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1437 Document: 01019963585 Date Filed: 05/10/1989 Page: 9