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Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JENNIE SANCHEZ, STELLA SANCHEZ, 

ADELINE SANCHEZ, DORA TRUJILLO, 

and CHARLES JARAMILLO, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

vs. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

WILLIAM BOND, County Clerk and Recorder) 

of Saguache County, Colorado, CECIL ) 

HALL, KEITH EDWARDS, CHUCK GRANT, Board) 

of County Commissioners for Saguache ) 

County, JOHN PRICE, County Chairman of ) 

the Democratic Party for Saguache ) 

County and ROBERT FELMLEE, County ) 

Chairman of the Republican Party for ) 

Sa3uache County, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) ____________________ ) 

FILED 

United St:ata11 Court of Appeals "f1!'.''11th Circuit 

MAY 301989; 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-2860 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 85-Z-825) 

Jose Garza, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, San 

Antonio, Texas; and Antonia Hernandez, Norma V. Cantu, Judith A. 

Sanders-Castro, and Albert H. Kauffman of MALDEF, San Antonio, Texas, 

with him on the brief, attorneys for plaintiffs-appellants. 

S. Morris Lubow, Denver, Colorado; and Robert S. Crites, of Crites and 

Farish, Monte Vista, Colorado, with him on the brief, attorneys for 

defendants-appellees. 

Before MOORE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,* District Judge. 

-1,.The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United ,States District Senior Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

BROWN, District Judge 

Appellate Case: 87-2860 Document: 01019957925 Date Filed: 05/30/1989 Page: 1 
This is an appeal of a vote dilution case. 

Plaintiffs-Appellants are voters from Saguache County, 

Colorado, who contend that the at-large election procedure 

used to elect county commissioners in Saguache County 

impermissibly dilutes Hispanic votes in violation of Section 

2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1973. 

After hearing the evidence, the district court concluded 

that the plaintiffs had failed to prove a violation of §2 

and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm. 

Appellants raise two main arguments on appeal. First, 

they contend that the district court misinterpreted the 

Supreme Court's ruling in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 

106 S. Ct. 2752, 92 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1986), and, as a result, 

applied erroneous standards of law to the evidence. Second, 

appellants argue that the trial court's fact:ual findings 

were clearly erroneous. In order to address these claims, 

we first review some of the evidence presented in the 

district court. 

Saguache County consists of approximately 3,000 square 

miles in central Colorado. In 1980, the county had a total 

population of 3,935, of which 41% were Hispanics 1 and 57% 

2 

were Anglos. Census records indicate that 36% of the 

voting age population was Hispanic in 1980. Despite the 

number of Hispanics in the county, no Hispanic has ever been 

1 "Hispanic" was used in the district court to mean persons of Spanish origin. The term was used interchangeably with 

the terms Mexican American, Chicano, and Spanish surnamed. 

2 "Anglo" refers to non-Hispanic whites. 

2 

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elected to the Saguache County Commission. Colorado state 

law requires the division of each county in Colorado into 

three compact districts for the purpose of .electing a board 

of county commissioners. One commissioner from each district is elected by the voters of the whole county. Each 

commissioner must be a resident of the district he· or she is 

elected to represent. 

The plaintiffs presented several witnesses who 

testified as to the political situation in Saguache County. 

The witnesses testified that the community was racially 

polarized and that Hispanics were unable to elect candidates 

to office in county-wide races. Several of the plaintiffs' 

witnesses had been defeated in county elections and stated 

their opinion that their. losses were due to bloc voting by 

Anglo voters. 

Plaintiffs also presented the testimony of Dr. Robert 

Brischetto, an expert on voting patterns and election 

systems. Dr. Brischetto stated his opinion that Hispanics 

in Saguache County had less opportunity than Anglos to 

participate and to elect candidates of their preference. 

Dr. Brischetto concluded that this condition was due to the 

at-large election procedure used in Saguache County 

elections. Dr. Brischetto's conclusion was based in large 

part upon a statistical study of selected political 

contests. He examined ten races in which Anglo and Hispanic 

candidates ran against each other. Using the voting results 

from each precinct, Dr. Brischetto compared the proportion 

of Hispanic voters in each precinct with the proportion 

of support received by the Hispanic candidate. He found a 

3 

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high correlation between the two, leading him to conclude 

that voting in nine of the races was "highly polarized." 

Dr. Brischetto stated that, in his opinion, whites voted a:s 

a bloc to systematically defeat Hispanic candidates. He 

also concluded that Hispanics were politically cohesive, 

noting that his study showed that Hispanics generally vote 

as a bloc for Hispanic candidates. 

The defendants' expert gave his opinion that votin·g in 

Saguache County was polarized. along party lines, suggesting 

that party affiliation was a better predictor of how a voter 

would vote than was the race of the voter. The defendants 

also presented testimony from lay witnesses, who stated that 

a majority of the Democratic party in Saguache County was 

made up of Hispanics and that Hispanics controlled the 

nominating process in the party. The witnesses alsotestified that an Anglo could not be nominated by the 

Democratic party without the approval of a group of Hispanics 

that included several of the plaintiffs. Additionally, the 

witnesses gave their opinion that Hispanics in Saguache 

County were not a single cohesive group but consisted of 

several politically distinct groups. One of the defendants, 

an Anglo county commissioner, testified that he received 

substantial Hispanic support in his election to the 

commission. 

Results from county elections dating back to the 1970's 

were used by both sides in the trial court. Plaintiffs 

pointed out that no Hispanic had ever won a contested 

county-wide election and that three Hispanics had run for 

4 

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county commissioner and had been defeated. The defendants 

showed that a few unopposed Hispanics had won county-wide 

positions. The defendants also noted that Democratic 

candidates had been regularly elected to county positions, 

including the county commission. 

I. Section 2 and the Gingles requirements 

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides: 

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or 

standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or 

applied by any state or political subdivision in a 

manner which results in a denial or abridgment of 

the right of any citizen of the United States to 

vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in Section 1973b(f) 

(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of 

this section. 

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is 

established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes 

leading to nomination or election in the state or 

political subdivision are not equally open to partipation by members of a class of citizens protected 

by subsection (a) of this section in that its 

members have less opportunity than other members of 

the electorate to elect representatives of their 

choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the state or 

political subdivision is one circumstance which may 

be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a 

protected class elected in numbers equal to their 

proportion in the population. 

The Supreme Court examined §2 in Thornburg v. 

Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). 

Noting that amended §1973 repudiated the "intent test" of 

Mobil v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 

(1980), the Gingles court stated that the question §2 poses 

is whether, as a result of a challenged electoral practice, 

plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate 

5 

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in the electoral process and to elect· candidates of their 

choice. The court found that the essence of a §2 claim is 

that a certain electoral practice interacts with social and 

historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by minority and white voters to elect their 

preferred representatives. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48. 

In order to address a claim under §2, a court must 

assess the impact of the contested · election practice on 

minority elect.oral opportunities by assessing certain obj ec-

·tive factors. The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 

amendment to §2 lists several factors that may be relevant 

to a §2 claim: 

1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision 

that touched the right of the members of the 

minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise 

to participate in the democratic process; 

2. the extent to which voting in the elections of 

the state or political subdivision is racially 

polarized; 

3. the extent to which the state or political 

subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single 

shot provisions, or other voting practices or 

procedures that may enhance the opportunity for 

discrimination against the minority group; 

4. if there is a candidate slating process, 

whether the members of the minority group have 

been denied access to that process; 

5. the extent to which members of the minority 

group in the state or political subdivision bear 

the effects of discrimination in such areas as 

education, employment and health, which hinder 

their ability to participate effectively in the 

political process; 

6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 

6 

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7. the extent to which members of the minority 

group have been elected to public office in the 

jurisdiction. 

Additional factors that in some cases have had 

probative value as part of plaintiffs' evidence 

to establish a violation are: 

Whether there is a significant lack of respon- siveness on the part of elected officials to the 

particularized needs of the members of the 

minority group. 

Whether the policy underlying the state or 

political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, 

practice or procedure is tenuous. 

S. Rep. · No. 417, 97th Cong. , 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 

1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 177, 206-07. 

Several points should be kept in mind in applying the 

foregoing set of factors. First, the list is exemplary, not 

exclusive. The court may consider any relevant factors in 

reaching its conclusion. Second., there · is no requirement 

that any particular number of factors be proved or that a 

majority of them point one way or the other. Third, whether 

the political processes are "equally open" depends on a 

searching practical evaluation of the past and present 

reality and upon a functional view of the political process. 

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46. 

The Supreme Court noted .several limitations on actions 

brought under §2. The court stated that election devices, 

such as at-large elections, may not be considered per se 

violative of §2. Also, the combination of an electoral 

mechanism and the lack of proportional representation alone 

does not establish a violation. And finally, the existence 

of racial bloc voting may not be assumed; plaintiffs must 

prove it. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45-46. 

7 

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In an attempt to· give lower courts a framework for 

analyzing §2 claims, the Supreme Court set forth three 

"necessary preconditions" which must be present if plaintiffs are to prevail on their vote dilution claim. First, 

the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is 

sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute 

a majority in a single member district. Second, the minority 

group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. 

Third, the minority group must show that the white majority 

votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat 

the minority's preferred candidate. A white bloc vote that 

normally will defeat the combined strength of minority votes 

plus white "crossover" votes is said to be legally significant white bloc voting. Id. at 50-51. If these conditions 

are not present, then the challenged electoral practice 

cannot be considered as the cause of the minority's inability 

to elect its preferred candidates. Id. at 50. 

II. The District Court's Findings 

The district court addressed the three "preconditions" 

of Gingles in its findings. The court found that Hispanics 

in Saguache County were sufficiently large and geographically 

compact to constitute a majority in a single district. The 

court went on to state, however, that Hispanics were not 

politically cohesive and that the plaintiffs had failed to 

demonstrate that whites voted sufficiently as a bloc to 

usually defeat the minority's preferred candidates. 

The court found that Hispanics controlled the Democratic 

party in Saguache County and that Hispanics had a very 

8 

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strong say as to which candidates could run on the Democratic 

ticket. Based on this fact and on the testimony of the 

witnesses, the court found that several Anglo county commissioners had in fact been the preferred candidates of 

Hispanics. The court also observed that in two recent elections in which Hispanics had run for the county commission, 

the Hispanic candidate had lost by only 53 votes in one race 

and by 22 votes in the other. These close races, as well as 

the election of Anglo candidates · preferred by Hispanics, 

indicated to the court that Hispanics have the ability to 

elect commissioners under the at-large system currently in 

use in the county. Considering all of the circumstances, 

the court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to meet their 

burden of proving that Hispanics in Saguache County have 

less opportunity to participate in the political process and 

to elect representatives of their choice. 

III. The Standards Applied by the District Court 

Appellants first contend that the district court 

applied an erroneous standard of law in its conclusion that 

Hispanics were not politically cohesive. Appellants argue 

that the test for political cohesion under §2 is whether the 

minority group generally votes as a bloc for the same candidates. Appellant believes that, contrary to the standards 

set forth in Gingles, the district court seized upon party 

affiliation to "explain away" the plaintiffs' evidence that 

Hispanics tend to vote for the same candidates. 

It is clear from Gingles that a showing that a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the 

9 

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same candidates can establish the requisite political 

cohesiveness under §2. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56. Furthermore, 

we agree with appellants that a court may not explain away 

evidence of racial bloc voting by finding that such voting 

is caused by underlying differences between the minority and 

white population. The reasons why minority voters may vote 

alike is unimportant in determining whether in fact the 

minority group votes as a bloc. Racially polarized voting, 

which indicates political cohesion, exists when there is a 

consistent relationship between the race of the voter and 

the way in which the voter votes or, in other words, where 

minority voters and white voters vote differently. Id. at 

53, n.21. 

In our view, however, the district court did not employ 

an erroneous· standard in concluding that Saguache County 

Hispanics were not politically cohesive. As an initial 

matter, appellants overstate the district court's reliance 

on party affiliation as a factor in its decision. The court 

briefly addressed the study of defendants' expert, Dr. Ellis, 

who sought to establish that party affiliation was the 

primary determinant of voter behavior in Saguache County. 

The court was critical of the methodology used by Dr. Ellis 

in his study, but tempered its criticism with the comment: 

"That doesn't mean that I give no weight to the analysis of 

Dr. Ellis, because I think what he has shown--and probably 

it's almost clear enough to be seen without any statistics--

is that political party plays a very strong role in the 

results." (Tr. Vol. VII, p. 3). Appellants contend that 

10 

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this innocuous and undoubtably correct observation requires 

reversal. We disagree. There is no indictation that the 

court found plaintiffs' statistical evidence of Hispanic 

political cohesion to be insignificant because it could be 

explained by party affiliation. Rather, the court found 

that Hispanics were not politically cohesive based on the 

testimony of Mr. Gomez, who stated that his involvement in 

Saguache County politics had led him to the conclusion that 

Hispanics in the county consisted of several politically 

distinct groups which often support different candidates. 

We find no support for appellants' contention that the court 

relied on party affiliation to explain away or rebut 

evidence of racially polarized voting. 

Along this same line, appellants contend that the issue 

· of political cohesiveness must be determined by· examining 

only "objective" factors, such as a correlation and regression analysis of voting data, and not through the testimony 

of lay witnesses. Clearly, a statistical analysis of voting 

data is highly relevant to the issue of political cohesion. 

See e.g., Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 865 F.2d 1566, 

1574-78 (11th Cir. 1988). We find nothing in Gingles, 

however, to suggest that a trial court is prohibited from 

considering lay testimony in deciding whether a minority 

group is politically cohesive. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56 

("A showing that a significant number of minority group 

members usually vote for the same candidates is one way of 

proving political cohesiveness .... ") (emphasis added). 

11 

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See also Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F. 2d 

1547, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) (Plaintiffs established racially 

polarized voting through regression analysis and the 

testimony of lay witnesses.) The experiences and 

observations of individuals involved in the political 

process are clearly relevant to the question of whether the 

minority group is politically cohesive. This testimony 

would seem to be required if the court is to identify the 

presence or absence of distinctive minority group interests. 

Thus, we cannot conclude that the district court's 

consideration of lay testimony violated the standards of 

Gingles. 

Appellants next argue that the district court considered improper factors in it_s finding that Anglos do not 

usually vote as a bloc to defeat minority preferred candidates. Appellants believe that the court erred because it 

considered the election of unopposed Hispanics to county 

office as evidence of Anglo support for Hispanics. It must 

be noted that Gingles cautions against attaching too much 

significance to the success of unopposed minority candidates: "[T]he success of a minority candidate in a particular election does not necessarily prove that the district 

did not experience polarized voting in that election; 

special circumstances, such as the absence of an opponent 

may explain minority electoral success in a polarized 

contest." Id. at 57. In the instant case, the trial court 

summarized the significance of the election of unopposed 

Hispanics as follows: 

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There is also, I guess, an assumption in these 

considerations in the statistics that we should 

not--the court should not consider the races 

where an Hispanic is unopposed. But it would 

seem to me there is an equally important inference that if an Hispanic is unopposed, he is, 

indeed, supported by Anglos or he wouldn't be 

unopposed. It seems to me that inference is one 

which can be made. 

(Tr. Vol. VII, p. 4) 

The distript court did not err in its consideration of 

unopposed candidates. Gingles clearly does not establish a 

per·se rule against consideration of such evidence; it does 

caution against foreclosing claims on that basis alone. In 

this case, we cannot conclude that the district court gave 

undue weight to those races in which a Hispanic ran unopposed. The election of unopposed Hispanics was only one of 

several factors leading to the court's fin dings on vote 

dilution. 

Appellants also contend that it was improper for the 

court to consider the election of three Anglo Democrats to 

the county commission as evidence of Hispanics' ability to 

elect candidates of their preference. Citing two Fifth 

Circuit decisions, appellants suggest that it is 

inappropriate to consider ·candidates who are not themselves 

minorities in determining whether racial bloc voting exists 

and in determining whether the minority group has been able 

to elect candidates of their preference. This question is 

important in the present case because it is clear that the 

success of certain Anglo candidates played a significant 

part in the court's finding that vote dilution had not 

occurred. 

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The Gingles opinion offers little guidance on what 

significance the race of the candidates is to be given in 

assessing a §2 claim. In Gingles, the district court found 

that black voters had been denied equal opportunity to elect 

candidates of their preference. In reaching this finding, 

the district court considered only elections that pitted 

black candidates against white candidates. The Supreme 

Court affirmed but was divided on the importance of the race 

of the minority group's candidate. Four justices were of 

the view that "the race of the candidate per se is 

irrelevant to racial bloc voting analysis." Id. at 6 7. 

Under this view, only the status of the candidate as the 

chosen representative of a racial group is important. Id. A 

total of five justices, however, felt that such a hard and 

fast rule was contrary to precedent and was not necessary to 

the disposition of the case. Id. at 83, 101. This division 

on the Supreme Court prompted a difference of opinion among 

the circuit courts as well. At least one circuit has 

adopted Justice Brennan's view that the race of the 

candidate is irrelevant to voting analysis. See Carrollton 

Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1557-58 (11th 

Cir. 1987). In contrast, two Fifth Circuit cases have 

interpreted Gingles to mean that "the race of the candidate 

is in general of less significance than the race of the 

voter--but only within the context of an election that 

offers voters t:;he choice of supporting a viable minority 

candidate." Campos · v. City of Baytown, Texas, 840 F. 2d 

1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 

14 

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(citing Citizens For A Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, La., 

834 F. 2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987), rehearing denied 849 F. 2d 

14 71, petition for cert. filed. These cases suggest that 

the court should exclude from its analysis elections that do 

not include a candidate who is a minority. Gretna, 834 F.2d 

at 504 (" [I] mp licit in the Gingles holding is the notion 

. that black preference is determined from elections which 

offer the choice of a black candidate.") But see Overton v. 

City of Austin, 1989 U.S.App. Lexis 5927 (5th Cir. May l, 

1989) ("In the absence of further Supreme Court guidance, we 

do not criticize this methodology, although it is not the 

only permissible way to approach §2 claims.") 

We do not believe that a per~ rule against examining 

races that have only white candidates is. implicit in 

Gingles. Such a rule would be clearly contrary to the 

plurality opinion, which views the race of the candidates as 

irrelevant in voting analysis. Moreover, such a rule is 

questionable in light of the language of §2, which seeks to 

give minorities equal opportunity to "elect representatives 

of their choice." 42 U.S. C. § 19 7 3 (b) . Nothing in the 

statute indicates that the chosen representative of a 

minority group must be a minority. Additionally, §2 

requires that the district court make a determination from 

the totality of the circumstances, not from a selected set 

of circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no 

rule of law prohibiting the district court from examining 

those elections having only Anglo candidates. Such elections may be relevant and can be used to discern whether 

15 

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racially polarized voting exists and to measure the success 

of minority preferred candidates, so long as one of the · 

Anglo candidates can be considered a preferred candidate of 

the minority group. As with other types of relevant 

evidence, the district court has a right to consider these 

elections and to give them such weight as the circumstances 

warrant. Based on the facts of this case, we cannot 

conclude that the district court erred in considering races 

having only Anglo candidates. 

IV. Factual Findings 

Appellants next challenge the factual findings of the 

district court. In particular, appellants contest the 

findings that Hispanics were not politically cohesive, that 

Anglo Democrats had been chosen by the minority group, and 

the overall finding that Hispanic votes had not been diluted 

in violation of 2. 

We begin· by noting that the clearly erroneous test of 

Rule 52(a) is the appropriate standard for appellate review 

of factual findings, including the trial court's ultimate 

findings on vote dilution. Gingles, 4 78 U.S. at 79. The 

application of this standard "preserves the benefit of the 

trial court's particular familiarity with the indigenous 

political reality " Id. Furthermore, if the district 

court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the 

record reviewed in its entirety, the .court of appeals may 

not reverse it even though convinced that had it been 

sitting as the trier of fact it would have weighed the 

evidence differently. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 

16 

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564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Where 

there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factf.inder' s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. 

Id. 

Applying the foregoing standard to the record in this 

case, we cannot say that the district court erred in finding 

that Hispanics were not politically cohesive. As an. initial 

matter, the district court found the testimony of Mr. Gomez 

to be straightforward and believable. Mr. Gomez, who was 

familiar with the political situation in Saguache County, 

testified as to some of the differences among Hispanics in 

the county including the differing political objectives of 

various factions. See Anderson, supra, at 575 ("When 

findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial court's findings.") He cited instances 

where Hispanics differed on which candidates to· support. 

For example, he stated that Mr. Abeyta could have won his 

race for the county commission in 1982, except that members 

of Abeyta's own family worked against him. 

Appellants assume that their statistical evidence· 

conclusively showed political cohesion among Hispanics. 

Yet, the district court specifically found the plaintiffs' 

study to be inadequate because it did not consider Anglo 

candidates who were sponsored by Hispanics. Thus the trial 

court considered plaintiffs' statistics to be somewhat 

unreliable. Moreover, we 

analyzed by plaintiffs' 

note that of 

expert, four 

17 

the ten 

involved 

races 

state 

Appellate Case: 87-2860 Document: 01019957925 Date Filed: 05/30/1989 Page: 17 
representative elections covering a five-county area. The 

district court may have considered these eleations to be of 

limited value in assessing whether voting for county commission seats was racially polarized. Of the six remaining 

races analyzed, only three were general elections for the 

Saguache County Commission. With this limited number of 

elections underlying the plaintiffs' claim, together with 

the evidence suggesting that Hispanics were not politically 

cohesive, the trial court's finding that plaintiffs failed 

to meet their burden of proof is not clearly erroneous. 

Similarly, the district court was not clearly erroneous 

in finding that three Anglo Democratic candidates were the 

chosen representatives of Hispanics. The district court 

found that Hispanics controlled the Democratic party in 

Saguache County, a finding that is not seriously challenged 

on appeal. That finding was supported by the evidence,which 

showed that Hispanics constituted a maj.ority of the Democratic party and were very active in the political process. 

There was testimony to the effect that no candidate could 

secure the Democratic slot in county races without the 

support of a group of Hispanics that included some of the 

plaintiffs. There was testimony that Hispanics had chosen 

and supported Anglo candidates for the county commission. 

In light of these facts, we cannot conclude that the 

district court clearly erred in finding that Hispanics had 

been able to elect several county commissioners, even if the 

successful candidates were Anglos. Plaintiffs failed to 

explain how these candidates could obtain the nomination and 

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support of the Democratic party if, as plaintiffs now 

contend, they were not the choice of Hispanics. Not only 

did these candidates receive substantial Hispanic support in 

terms of votes, but the . evidence suggests that they were 

chosen by Hispanics in the first place. Cf. White v. 

Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973) 

(" [Tlhe black community has been effectively excluded from 

participation in the Democratic primary selection process.") 

See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 129, 91 S.Ct. 

1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971) ("We have discovered nothing in 

the record or the court's findings indicating that poor 

Negroes were not allowed to register or vote, to choose the 

political party they desired to support, to participate in 

its affairs or to be equally represented on those occasions 

when legislative candidates were chosen.") 

The foregoing factors support the trial court's finding 

that the · electoral system used to elect Saguache County 

Commissioners does not violate §2. The high level of 

Hispanic participation in the political process and the 

success of several Hispanic-supported candidates weighs 

heavily against a finding of vote dilution. Also, the 

plaintiffs' evidence in the district court was found to be 

lacking in several respects, including the failure of 

plaintiffs' expert to analyze all of the relevant elections. 

Although the lack of success of Hispanic candidates is a 

strong factor tending to show vote dilution, we cannot 

conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding 

otherwise. The court carefully considered the totality of 

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the circumstances in this case and concluded that Hispanics 

have an equal opportunity to participate in the political 

process and to elect representatives of their choice. This 

determination is "peculiarly dependent upon the facts of 

each case." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79. As the Supreme Court 

stated in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 769-70: "[W]e are 

not inclined to overturn these findings, representing as 

they do a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal 

of the design and impact of the . . . [electoral mechanism] in 

light of past and present reality, political and otherwise." 

V. Sufficiency of the Trial Court's Findings 

Appellants' final contention is that the trial court's 

findings, which were made from th~ bench, were not detailed 

enough to meet the requirements of Rule 52 (a). Appellant 

cites several decisions emphasizing the need for detailed 

findings in vote dilution cases. See e.g. , Velasquez v. 

City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984). 

Although the trial court's findings in this case could have 

been more detailed, the court made findings on all of the 

Gingles factors and disclosed the factual bases for its 

findings. This is sufficient to meet the requirements of 

Rule 52. See Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United 

States, 724 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 

U.S. 1182, 106 S.Ct. 2915, 91 L.Ed.2d 544 (1986). See also 

McGruder v. Phillips 

406, 411 (8th Cir. 

County Election Commission, 850 F. 2d 

1988). Similarly, although written 

findings are preferable in this type of case, they are not 

required by Rule 52(a). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2860 Document: 01019957925 Date Filed: 05/30/1989 Page: 20