Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00353/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00353-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY JAMES COHEA,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. MELO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00353-AWI-DLB PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

(Document 20)

Plaintiff Danny James Cohea (“Plaintiff”) is a California state prisoner proceeding pro se in 

this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on September 23, 2014, and 

it was transferred to this Court on March 3, 2015. 

On March 11, 2015, the Court dismissed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), without 

prejudice to refiling accompanied by the $400.00 filing fee.

On April 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).1 

A. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) allows the Court to relieve a party from an order for 

any reason that justifies relief. Rule 60(b)(6) is to be used sparingly as an equitable remedy to 

prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances exist. 

Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations marks and citation omitted). The 

moving party must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control. Id. (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Further, Local Rule 230(j) requires, in relevant part, that Plaintiff show 

“what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not 

 

1

Plaintiff’s consent to United States Magistrate Judge jurisdiction was filed on March 16, 2015. Plaintiff signed the 

consent on March 12, 2015. As the consent was both signed and filed after the March 11, 2015, dismissal, the Court will 

not reassign the action. 

Case 1:15-cv-00353-AWI-DLB Document 23 Filed 05/07/15 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion,” and “why the facts or 

circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.” 

B. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff first argues that District Judge Anthony W. Ishii improperly issued the March 11, 

2015, dismissal order because the Court had already designated the Magistrate Judge to hear the case 

upon transfer, and because Plaintiff had apparently given his “official” consent to the jurisdiction of 

the United States Magistrate Judge. He questions the “motivation” behind the assignment of Judge 

Ishii and argues that it violates his due process rights.2

On March 6, 2015, this case was assigned to the Magistrate Judge upon transfer pursuant to 

Appendix A to the Local Rules of this Court, which provides for initial assignment to a Magistrate 

Judge. The Court then sent Plaintiff new case documents, which included an order regarding 

consent or request for reassignment. The order explained that a Magistrate Judge will not make 

dispositive rulings without the parties’ consent.

Plaintiff states that he filed his consent form immediately, but the Court did not receive it 

until March 16, 2015. Therefore, at the time that the Court reviewed the complaint and determined it 

should be dismissed, the Court had not received his consent and the Court assigned a District Court 

Judge so that a dispositive order could issue. 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s belief, there was no questionable motivation in the reassignment, and 

the Court followed procedure in assigning a District Court judge prior to the issuance of a dispositive 

order. Moreover, this action would have been dismissed without prejudice even if the case was 

assigned to a Magistrate Judge. 

Plaintiff also suggests that Judge Ishii was biased, and should have recused himself, because 

he was named as a Defendant in his complaint. Setting aside the fact that federal judges are entitled 

to absolute immunity absent very rare circumstances not presented here, Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy 

Court, Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987), “judicial rulings or information 

acquired by the court in its judicial capacity will rarely support recusal.” United States v. Johnson, 

610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Litkey v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 

 

2 The Court notes that Plaintiff declined Magistrate Judge jurisdiction while this action was pending in the Northern 

District, prior to transfer.

Case 1:15-cv-00353-AWI-DLB Document 23 Filed 05/07/15 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

1147 (1994)). Similarly, “[a]dverse findings do not equate to bias,” Johnson, 610 F.3d at 1147, and 

in this instance, Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s ruling does not suggest bias.

Plaintiff next suggests that this Court’s dismissal precluded him from arguing that section 

1915(g) did not bar in forma pauperis status. However, Plaintiff’s case was dismissed subject to the 

Three Strikes provision without prejudice to refiling with the filing fee. Plaintiff’s disagreement 

with the procedure does not show harm or warrant reconsideration. 

Insofar as Plaintiff argues that the cases cited by the Court do not count as strikes, his 

argument is without merit. Plaintiff suggests that at least some of the cases that the Court listed as 

strikes do not constitute strikes because the appellate court did not have an opportunity to review the 

dismissals for “correctness.” However, Plaintiff’s appeals were dismissed for various reasons, i.e., 

failure to comply with procedural rules, or an appeal “so insubstantial as to not warrant further 

review.” That Plaintiff’s appeals did not warrant consideration does not mean that the underlying 

cases do not count as strikes. 

Plaintiff also disagrees with the Court’s finding that his allegations did not demonstrate that 

he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time the complaint was filed. His 

argument that an Eighth Amendment claim necessarily demonstrates imminent danger is without 

merit. 

Finally, Plaintiff’s insistence that his complaint states valid claims for relief is not a basis for 

reconsideration. Plaintiff’s disagreement with the language used in the order is also not grounds for 

reconsideration. 

C. ORDER

Based on the above, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00353-AWI-DLB Document 23 Filed 05/07/15 Page 3 of 3