Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00307/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00307-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES E. BAKER, JR.,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-0307 GEB DAD P

vs.

DAVID L. RUNNELS, et al., ORDER AND 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the court is respondents’ motion to dismiss the

petition on the grounds that it contains one unexhausted claim and another claim that is not

cognizable.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 31, 2003, petitioner was found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon

(Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1)), battery with serious bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 243(d)),

infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a)), and making criminal

threats (Cal. Penal Code § 422). For each of the offenses, with the exception of the making 

criminal threats charge, the jury also found that petitioner had inflicted great bodily injury upon

the victim under circumstances involving domestic violence (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(e)). 

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(Mot. to Dismiss (MTD) at 2.) The trial court found that petitioner had a prior serious felony

conviction (Cal. Penal Code § 667(a)) and had suffered four strikes under California’s Three

Strikes law (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i), 1170.12). (Id.) Petitioner’s motion to strike his prior

convictions was denied and he was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 36 years to life. 

(Id.) 

On March 28, 2003, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. (Pet., Ex. A-A at 3.) On

December 28, 2004, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed the

judgment of conviction. (MTD at 2.) 

On February 4, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court. (Id.) The petition was summarily denied on March 16, 2005. (Pet., Ex. B.)

On February 13, 2006, petitioner filed his habeas petition with this court. 

Therein, he presents the following claims: (1) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on selfdefense in violation of petitioner’s right to due process; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to request a self-defense instruction; (3) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

the defense motion to strike his prior convictions; and (4) prosecution witnesses Shantillia

Tucker and Yvonne Moore committed perjury.

ANALYSIS

I. Claim Four and the Exhaustion Requirement

In the pending motion to dismiss respondents first contend that petitioner has

failed to exhaust his state court remedies as to his fourth claim in which he argues that

prosecution witnesses committed perjury at his trial. Petitioner does not dispute this assertion. 

Rather, petitioner simply asserts, without citation to authority or further explanation, that the

court has the “power to review claim four.” (Opp’n at 2.) In the alternative, petitioner states that

if the court disagrees with his conclusion, “it should stay and abeyance his claims, that way

petitioner can return to the state court to exhaust and properly present his claims. (Opp’n at 3.) 

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The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A petitioner satisfies the

exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting to the highest state court all claims before presenting

them to the federal court. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam); Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Crotts v. Smith, 73 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1996);

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1986).

 The court has reviewed the petition and the exhibits thereto, including the

petition for review filed with the California Supreme Court on petitioner’s behalf, and concludes

that petitioner’s fourth claim was never presented to the California Supreme Court and is

unexhausted. As noted above, however, in his opposition to the motion to dismiss petitioner has 

suggested his claims be subject to “stay and abeyance.” The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed

the district court’s discretion to stay a federal habeas proceeding to allow a petitioner to present

unexhausted claims to the state court where there is good cause for the petitioner’s failure to

exhaust all claims in state court before filing a federal habeas petition. See Rhines v. Weber, 544

U.S. 269, 277 (2005); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000) (authorizing

district courts to stay fully exhausted federal petitions pending exhaustion of other claims);

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1998). This

discretion to issue a stay extends to mixed petitions. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 660 (9th Cir.

2005) (“Rhines concluded that a district court has discretion to stay a mixed petition to allow a

petitioner time to return to state court to present unexhausted claims.”). The Court cautioned,

however, that “stay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances,” and

“district courts should place reasonable time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and back.” 

Id. at 277-78. The Court noted that district courts should not grant a stay if the petitioner has

engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay or if the unexhausted claims are plainly

meritless. Id. at 278.

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Petitioner has provided no argument in support of his suggestion that his claims

be subject to stay and abeyance. As a result, the court is unable to determine whether petitioner

has good cause for failing to exhaust all claims before filing this action, whether petitioner’s

unexhausted claim is potentially meritorious, and whether petitioner has acted with diligence. 

See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1998) (failure

to make a showing of diligence in pursuing additional claims may foreclose a stay). For these

reasons, petitioner’s request for stay and abeyance will be denied without prejudice to his filing

of a proper and fully supported motion for a stay and abeyance.

Petitioner will be granted thirty days to file such a motion if he wishes to pursue

that course. The motion submitted for filing must include a proof of service showing that a copy

of the motion was served on respondents’ counsel. The motion must: (1) show good cause for

petitioner’s failure to exhaust all claims prior to filing this action; (2) demonstrate that his

unexhausted claim is potentially meritorious; (3) describe the status of state court proceedings on

the unexhausted claim; and (4) demonstrate that petitioner has acted with diligence in pursuing

this claim. 

In light of this order, respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition for including an

unexhausted claim will be denied as moot. 

II. Claim Three and Federal Question Requirement

Respondents next argue that petitioner’s third claim concerning the trial court’s

refusal to strike his prior convictions at the time of sentencing, fails to present a cognizable

federal habeas claim because it rests entirely on state law grounds. (MTD at 3.) Petitioner does

not address this argument in his opposition to the pending motion to dismiss.

In his petition, petitioner describes this claim as follows: “The defense filed a

motion to strike the prior[.] The court abused its discretion when it falled [sic] to grand [sic] the

motion and strikes the 20 year priors and sentence appellant under the two strikes provision of

the three strikes law.” (Pet. at 6.) In support of this claim, petitioner cites merely to Exhibit C to

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his petition, a copy of the decision in People v. Burgos, 117 Cal. App. 4th 1209 ( 2004). In the

cited case the state appellate court determined that the trial court had abused its discretion in

failing to strike one of two prior convictions that arose from a single criminal act. Id. at 1216. 

The determination by the court in Burgos was based solely on an interpretation of California law

as reflected in state statutes and state court decisions interpreting those state sentencing statutes.

The court concludes that petitioner’s claim is solely one that the sentencing court

abused its discretion under state law in refusing to strike his prior convictions and that no federal

due process claim is presented. The claim presented is not cognizable under § 2254 since habeas

corpus relief is not available to correct allege errors in the state court’s application or

interpretation of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768

F.2d 1083, 1084-85 ((9th Cir. 1985); see also Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th

Cir. 1989) (the determination of whether a prior conviction qualifies for a sentence enhancement

under California law is not a cognizable federal claim). 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Respondents’ October 30, 2006 motion to dismiss the petition as containing an

unexhausted claim, is denied as moot;

2. Petitioner is granted thirty days to file and serve a proper motion for stay and

abeyance; the motion must make the showing described in this order and must include a proof of

service showing the date on which a true and exact copy of the motion was placed in the mail to

respondents’ counsel;

3. Respondents’ opposition or statement of non-opposition to petitioner’s motion

shall be filed and served within twenty days after petitioner’s motion is placed in the mail to

respondents’ counsel;

4. Petitioner’s reply to any opposition, if any, shall be filed and served within

twenty days after the opposition is served.

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Also, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondents’ October 30, 2006

motion to dismiss petitioner’s third claim challenging the trial court’s failure to strike his prior

convictions at the time of sentencing, be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 6, 2007.

DAD:4

bake0307.mtd

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