Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00163/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00163-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Benefits

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELLEN THIVIERGE,

Plaintiff,

v.

HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE

COMPANY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND

FIDUCIARY OF THE MILLS PENINSULA

HOSPITALS GROUP WELFARE PLAN NUMBER

506, and THE MILLS PENINSULA

HOSPITALS GROUP WELFARE PLAN NUMBER

506,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-0163 CW

SECOND ORDER

REGARDING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS' FEES

On July 17, 2006, the Court granted in part Plaintiff Ellen

Thivierge's motion for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in

prosecuting her claims for ERISA disability benefits. The Court

found that, while Plaintiff was entitled to attorneys' fees and

costs, she did not submit evidence of the prevailing market rate or

show that the time her attorney spent on this case was reasonably

necessary. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a

supplemental brief, including that evidence, and a revised bill of

Case 4:05-cv-00163-CW Document 51 Filed 10/11/06 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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costs. Plaintiff has submitted her supplemental brief. Defendant

Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company has responded. Having

considered all of the papers filed by the parties and the evidence

cited therein, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to

$65,062.50 in attorneys' fees and $1,559.18 in costs.

BACKGROUND

As explained in the Court's prior orders, Plaintiff filed this

suit after Defendant Hartford terminated her long-term disability

benefits. On March 28, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion

for judgment and denied a cross-motion by Defendants Hartford and

Mills Peninsula Hospitals Group Welfare Plan Number 506. The Court

awarded Plaintiff $50,444.25 in disability benefits plus

prejudgment interest.

Plaintiff moved to recover attorneys' fees and costs, totaling

$78,562.93. But, as noted above, Plaintiff failed to submit

evidence of the prevailing market rates and to make a showing that

the time her attorney spent on this case was reasonably necessary. 

In addition, Plaintiff sought to recover costs that are not

recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Plaintiff now submits the declarations of two experienced San

Francisco Bay Area ERISA attorneys, who are familiar with her

counsel, Scott Kalkin, and with the prevailing market rate of

attorneys in this field, and a revised bill of costs. Although in

her moving papers Plaintiff sought attorneys' fees for 204.65 hours

of work based on an hourly rate of $375.00, she now seeks

attorneys' fees for 179.6 hours of work based on an hourly rate

between $415.00 and $495.00.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 In awarding attorneys’ fees, courts look at several factors:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service

properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to

acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) time limitations

imposed by the client or circumstances; (7) the amount involved and

the results obtained; (8) the experience, reputation, and ability

of the attorneys; (9) the “undesirability” of the case; (10) the

nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

and (11) awards in similar cases. Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1045 n.2

(citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3). 

3

LEGAL STANDARD

As previously explained in the Court's July 10, 2006 order,

courts calculate attorneys' fees under § 1132(g)(1) using the

hybrid lodestar/multiplier approach used by the Supreme Court in

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). McElwaine v. U.S. West,

Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999). The lodestar/multiplier

approach has two parts: (1) the court determines the lodestar

amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended in

the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate; and (2) the court may

adjust the lodestar upward or downward using a multiplier based on

factors not subsumed in the initial calculation.1 Van Gerwen v.

Guarantee Mutual Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The applicant seeking an award of fees must submit evidence

supporting the hours worked and the rates claimed. Id. The court

may reduce these hours if the documentation is inadequate or if the

hours are duplicative, excessive or unnecessary. Id. There is a

strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable

fee, and a multiplier may be used only in rare or exceptional cases

where the lodestar is unreasonably low or unreasonably high. Id.;

Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Determining a reasonable hourly rate is a critical inquiry. 

Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895

n.11 (1984)). The court must consider several factors, including

the experience, skill and reputation of the applicant. Chalmers v.

City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), reh'g

denied, opinion amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.

1987). The court must look to the rate prevailing in the community

for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill,

experience and reputation; it may not refer to the rates actually

charged to the prevailing party. Id. at 1210-11. It is the

applicant's burden to produce evidence, other than the declarations

of interested counsel, that "the requested rates are in line with

those prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers

of reasonably comparable skill and reputation." Jordan, 815 F.2d

at 1263. 

DISCUSSION

I. Attorneys’ Fees Under ERISA

As noted above, the Court has already concluded that

attorneys' fees are appropriate. Now, the Court must determine a

reasonable hourly rate and whether the time spent by Plaintiff's

counsel was reasonably necessary.

A. Hourly Rate

As noted above, the fee applicant has the burden of producing

satisfactory evidence that the requested hourly rate is reasonable

based on the prevailing market rates. Plaintiff now provides

evidence to show that the originally requested hourly rate of

$375.00 is reasonable. She includes declarations of two

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experienced San Francisco Bay Area ERISA attorneys, who are

familiar with the background, experience, work and reputation of

Plaintiff's counsel. Both attorneys state that Mr. Kalkin's firm,

Roboostoff & Kalkin, is one of the premier firms in the San

Francisco Bay Area handling ERISA disability litigation from the

plaintiff's side. One attorney states, "Based upon my knowledge of

the prevailing hourly rates in the San Francisco Bay Area for ERISA

related work, it is my opinion that attorneys with skill,

experience and a reputation in the community similar to Mr. Kalkin

can, and do, command hourly rates of $375.00 per hour or more." 

Coleman Dec., ¶ 9. The other attorney states that Mr. Kalkin is "a

skillful and seasoned attorney of the highest caliber," and, in his

opinion, the reasonable value of Mr. Kalkin's time "is at least

$375.00 per hour." Harris Dec., ¶ 7. 

Plaintiff has demonstrated the reasonableness of $375.00 per

hour. But she had not shown that the higher amounts that she

requests in her supplemental briefing are reasonable. She states

that her counsel's skill, experience and reputation in the legal

community, "falls somewhere between" three other San Francisco Bay

Area ERISA attorneys and, therefore, a reasonable hourly rate for

Mr. Kalkin is "somewhere between $415.00 and $495.00." Although

she provides evidence that courts in this district have found

$415.00 to $495.00 to be reasonable hourly rates for those three

attorneys, she provides only her own statement as support for her

assertion that her counsel's skill, experience and reputation in

the legal community are comparable to that of the three attorneys. 

Defendant Hartford's arguments that Plaintiff has not

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demonstrated the reasonableness of the $375.00 hourly rate are

unpersuasive. It first points out that Plaintiff seeks a higher

fee in her supplemental briefing than she did in her motion for

attorneys' fees. As Defendant Hartford notes, the Court granted

Plaintiff leave to provide evidence to support her requested fee,

not to request a higher hourly amount. The Court, however, did not

find that Plaintiff demonstrated the reasonableness of the higher

hourly rate and thus this argument is moot. Defendant Hartford

then argues that the opinion and declarations of the two ERISA

lawyers do not support Plaintiff's requested hourly rate. But

Defendant Hartford submits no evidence in the form of declarations

or affidavits to show that the hourly rates represented in

Plaintiff's declarations are unreasonable or excessive. Defendant

Hartford's argument that Plaintiff submits no evidence to show that

clients pay these rates is similarly without merit. Defendant

Hartford cites no case where a court has required such information.

The Court concludes that $375.00 is a reasonable rate.

B. Hours Expended by Plaintiff's Counsel

In its prior order, the Court reminded Plaintiff that counsel

for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude

from the fee request hours that were unnecessary. The Court also

instructed Plaintiff that fees are not available for the

administrative portion of an ERISA appeal. McElwaine, 176 F.3d at

1172 n.8; Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269 F.3d 974, 987

n.51 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has subtracted 32.55 hours, the

time spent on her administrative appeal, from her fee request. But

she adds 5.5 hours to her fee request for the time spent preparing

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the supplemental briefing, declaration and revised cost bill.

Defendant Hartford argues that more time should be excluded

from the fee award. Reviewing Mr. Kalkin's time log, the Court

finds that the time spent was reasonable. Defendant Hartford,

however, should not have to reimburse Plaintiff for the time her

counsel spent negotiating an undisclosed settlement with another

defendant; the Court will deduct the 0.6 hours spent on that

activity. Nor should Defendant Hartford have to reimburse

Plaintiff for the additional 5.5 hours her counsel spent preparing

and filing the supplemental briefing, which was necessitated by the

deficiency of her original request. After deducting 6.1 hours from

the 179.6 Plaintiff requests in her supplemental brief, the Court

finds that Plaintiff's counsel reasonably spent 173.5 hours related

to this action.

II. Costs

Plaintiff originally filed a bill of costs seeking to recover

$1,1819. On April 28, 2006, that bill of costs was signed by the

Deputy Clerk. But, as the Court explained in its prior order, the

Ninth Circuit has interpreted the “costs of action” provided in

ERISA § 1132(g)(1) to allow reimbursement of “only the types of

‘costs’ allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and only in the amounts

allowed by section 1920 itself . . . .” Agredano v. Mutual of

Omaha Cos., 75 F.3d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1996). Section 1920 permits

the taxing of costs for the following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees of the court

reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript

necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and

disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for

exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for

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use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this

title; (6) Compensation of court appointed experts,

compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses,

and costs of special interpretation services under section

1828 of this title.

As noted above, only some of the costs listed in Plaintiff's

original bill of costs were recoverable under section 1920.

Plaintiff has revised her bill of costs, deducting $160.00 for

"fee charged by CPA for computation of interest." Plaintiff now

seeks to recover costs in the amount of $1,659.18 for the filing

fee, copies of the administrative record and trial exhibits and the

mediator's fee. Plaintiff contends that the costs she seeks are

allowed by section 1920. Defendant Hartford contends that only the

$150 filing fee is allowed by section 1920. Both parties are

incorrect. Section 1920 covers the cost of copying, but it does

not cover the mediator's fee. Thus, the Court will deduct $100

from Plaintiff's awarded costs.

CONCLUSION

The Court awards attorneys' fees to Plaintiff in the amount of

$65,062.50, calculated by multiplying 173.5 hours of work by $375

per hour. The Court also awards Plaintiff costs in the amount of

$1,559.18. Defendant Hartford shall pay these amounts forthwith. 

Defendant Hartford's Request for Judicial Notice (Docket No. 48) is

GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/11/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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