Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02820/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02820-30/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1391 Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUISA GONZALEZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

TEXACO, INC., TEXACO

PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., 

CHEVRON CORPORATION, 

Defendants. /

No. C 06-02820 WHA

ORDER GRANTING 

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND

TERMINATING SANCTIONS

INTRODUCTION

This is a tort action arising out of the alleged dumping of toxic oil-production

byproducts in the Ecuadorian rain forest. Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ toxic byproducts

caused cancer in themselves and their family members. Defendants move for terminating

sanctions and summary judgment against two plaintiffs, who never actually had the cancer that

they alleged existed. For the below-stated reasons, defendants’ motions are GRANTED.

STATEMENT

The seven plaintiffs in this action lived in the Ecuadorian rain forest. Between 1971 and

1992, defendants, some of the world’s largest oil producers, pumped crude oil from beneath the

Ecuadorian rain forest. Defendants allegedly contaminated the waters around plaintiffs’ homes. 

In that region of Ecuador, because of a lack of other water supplies, people often drank and

bathed in the contaminated waters. 

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Litigation regarding defendants’ alleged conduct has been ongoing for well over a

decade. In 1993, a group of Ecuadorians, purporting to represent a plaintiff class, sued Texaco

in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. That action was

dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, on the condition that Texaco agree to litigate the

issues in Ecuador. See generally Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002).

In 2003, a group of Ecuadorians brought a lawsuit in Ecuador seeking injunctive relief

that would include a clean up of the polluted areas and payment for 10 percent of the total repair

work (Compl., Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., Super. Ct. of Nueva Loja, Lago Agrio,

Province of Sucumbios, Ecuador; May 7, 2003).

In 2004, ChevronTexaco Corp. and Texaco commenced an arbitration proceeding

against Petroecuador, claiming a right to indemnification for their costs and expenses in

connection with the litigation brought in Ecuador. The Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador

sued to stay the arbitration. See generally Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F.

Supp.2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). That action is still pending. Civil Docket Sheet, Republic of

Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. Civil 04-8378 LBS.

Plaintiffs in this action allege that defendants’ activities exposed them and their families

to toxins that caused them cancer. This action sets forth various tort claims against defendants,

including negligence, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and battery.

The claims of two specific plaintiffs, Gloria Chamba and Luisa Gonzales, are at issue in

the instant motions. In the complaint, Chamba alleged that she suffers from emotional distress

due to her son’s leukemia, allegedly caused by defendants’ conduct (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 12). At

her deposition, however, she admitted that her son does not have and has never had leukemia. 

Chamba herself has suffered no physical injury. The relevant deposition testimony is as follows

(Rector Decl. (Chamba) Exh. 1 at 23–24, 100–01):

Q: In October 2002 did any of the doctors tell you that your

son had been diagnosed with leukemia?

A: No.

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Q: Has any doctor ever told you that your son has been

diagnosed with leukemia?

A: Absolutely not.

***

Q: Paragraph 12 of the complaint says that “In October 2002

Jane Gloria Chamba’s son who was seven years old was

diagnosed with leukemia.” Did you know that

(indicating)? . . . 

[A:] No.

Q: That’s false, isn’t it?

A: Yes, it’s false.

Q: Your son was not diagnosed with leukemia in October

2002, was he?

A: No.

Q: And your son has never been diagnosed with any type of

cancer, has he?

A: No.

Q: So when the complaint says that “Gloria Chamba’s son

contracted cancer because of his exposure to those toxins,”

that’s false, isn’t it?

A: Yes.

Q: And when the complaint says that “Gloria Chamba

provides care to her son as he slowly deteriorates from his

cancer,” that’s false, isn’t it?

A: Yes.

***

Q: Did you ever authorize your lawyers to sue Texaco,

claiming that your son has leukemia?

A: No.

Q: Did your lawyers ever tell you that they were going to sue

Texaco, claiming that your son was diagnosed with

leukemia?

A: No.

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1

 Following her deposition, medical tests revealed what plaintiffs’ counsel describe (without any

evidentiary support) as “an ovarian abnormality which may be cancerous in nature” (Gonzales Opp. 2).

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Q: Did Ms. Teresa [plaintiffs’ paralegal] ever ask you whether

your son had been diagnosed with leukemia?

A: No.

Q: Did Ms. Teresa ever ask you whether your son had been

diagnosed with any cancer?

A: No.

A similar problem has arisen with respect to Gonzales. She alleged in the complaint that

she had been diagnosed with breast cancer allegedly caused by exposure to defendants’ toxins.

Additionally, her husband Nixon Rodriguez Crespo filed derivative claims based on his wife’s

loss of consortium. In Gonzales’s deposition, however, she admitted that she has never been

diagnosed with breast cancer (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 8; Rector Decl. (Gonzales) Exh. 3 at 38–40,

213):1

Q: At the time you filed the complaint against Texaco in April

2006, did you know that you had not been diagnosed with

breast cancer?

A: Yes.

Q: You knew that it was false that you claimed to have breast

cancer; right?

A: Yes.

***

Q: And so you made up a false claim about having breast

cancer, didn’t you?

A: At that time, yes.

***

Q: Did you think it would help your case if you sued, claiming

to have breast cancer, when you had not been diagnosed

yet?

A: Yes.

Q: Is that why you did it?

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A: Yes.

** *

Q: Were you hoping that Texaco would pay you if you

claimed to have cancer?

A: Yes.

ANALYSIS

Defendants now move for terminating sanctions, or alternatively, for summary judgment

against Chamba and Gonzales. 

1. PLAINTIFF GLORIA CHAMBA.

With respect to Chamba’s claims, counsel’s one-paragraph “response” to the instant

motion is not an opposition. Counsel simply states that Chamba “filed this action on the belief

that the health of her family had been adversely impacted by the conduct of defendants” but that

she “lacks any evidence with which to refute Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment”

(Chamba Opp. 1). 

Both of defendants’ proposed grounds for relief must be granted as to plaintiff Chamba. 

Dismissal of Chamba’s claims is appropriate here. “[O]utright dismissal of a lawsuit, . . . is a

particularly severe sanction, yet is within the court's discretion.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991); see also Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“Dismissal is an available sanction when a party has engaged deliberately in deceptive

practices that undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings because courts have inherent

power to dismiss an action when a party has willfully deceived the court and engaged in

conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice.”) (quotations omitted). 

Moreover, there is no triable issue of fact with respect to any of Chamba’s claims in this matter. 

Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Chamba’s claims pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff Chamba’s claims are dismissed with prejudice.

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2. PLAINTIFF LUISA GONZALES.

In “opposition” to the motion against Gonzales, counsel moved for dismissal of her

claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Counsel also stated that Chamba

recently learned of an ovarian abnormality which “may be cancerous in nature.” Counsel

requests that, in the alternative to dismissal, Gonzales be allowed to amend her claim to include

the newly-discovered condition (Gonzales Opp. 1–2).

As with Chamba, summary judgment and terminating sanctions are appropriate on the

claims Gonzales asserted in the complaint. It is uncontroverted that she alleged that she had

breast cancer when she knew that she did not. There are therefore no triable issues of fact as to

Gonzales’s claims against defendants. Moreover, she engaged in “deliberately in deceptive

practices that [have] undermine[d] the integrity of judicial proceedings.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 958. 

Outright dismissal is appropriate. At this advanced stage in the proceedings, the Court also

finds no good cause to grant plaintiff voluntary dismissal without prejudice or leave to amend. 

Plaintiff Gonzales’s claims, and those of her husband and co-plaintiff Rodriguez Crespo, are

dismissed with prejudice.

***

This is not the first evidence of possible misconduct by plaintiffs’ counsel in this case. 

It is clear to the Court that this case was manufactured by plaintiffs’ counsel for reasons other

than to seek a recovery on these plaintiffs’ behalf. This litigation is likely a smaller piece of

some larger scheme against defendants. During a discovery dispute, defendants brought to the

Court’s attention a January 2006 letter written by plaintiffs’ counsel Cristobal Bonifaz to an

acquaintance in Ecuador. The letter states, in relevant part (Rector Decl. (Gonzales) Exh. 1):

What I need is the following:

(1) Three or four people who have resided close to the lakes of

petroleum left by Texaco and who have discovered in the

last four years that they have some form of cancer.

(2) If it is possible also a simple letter from Dr. Ribadeneira or

from any medic who has examined these persons that says

that in his opinion there is at least a 51% probability that

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 The translation of the letter provided states that “la copa de gracia” is literally “cup of grace.” The

non-literal use in this instance was translated to mean “we’ll finally stick it to Chevron.”

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the cancer was caused by the fact that these people have

been exposed to the petroleum contamination in the

Amazon.

(3) Letters or some type of simple document by which these

persons give you authorization to seek a remedy in court to

compensate them.

***

It is possible that with this last action in court that I am planning

we will give Chevron “la copa de gracia”2

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, as to plaintiffs Chamba, Gonzales, and Crespo, this action

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in favor of defendants. Whether a monetary sanction should

be imposed will be reserved.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2007. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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