Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04812/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04812-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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 1 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

underlying the present motion.

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

VICTORIA RYAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDITIONS LIMITED WEST, INC. ET

AL,

Defendants. __________________________________

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Case No.: C- 06-4812 PVT

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO FILE MOTION TO

RECONSIDER ORDER GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Victoria Ryan (“Ryan”) is an artist working in pastel on paper.1 Defendant

Editions Limited West, Inc. (“Editions”) is a publisher of art posters and is authorized to publish

certain posters of Ms. Ryan’s pastels. Ryan asserts that Editions has improperly withheld

royalties and supplied posters for the production of unauthorized reproductions of her works. 

Defendant ArtSelect, Inc. (“ArtSelect”), is a retailer of posters, frames, canvas transfers, and

canvas prints. Ryan claims that ArtSelect has produced unauthorized canvas transfers from her

posters. 

On August 14, 2007, the Court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part,

Ryan’s Motion to Compel Discovery (the “Order”). For almost every document request, Ryan

Case 5:06-cv-04812-PSG Document 90 Filed 09/21/07 Page 1 of 5
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ORDER, page 2

claimed that the documents sought were relevant to: “Ms. Ryan’s claim of slander of title; Her

allegation that the defendants maintain inadequate policies against infringement; and Her truth

defense to Editions Limited’s counterclaim for defamation.” For a couple of the requests, Ryan

claims “The category is relevant to Ms. Ryan’s claims and defenses, and is not overbroad. The

communications sought are relevant to all aspects of Ms. Ryan’s claims and defenses.” The

Court found that this boilerplate language failed to explain the relevance of any documents

sought. 

On September 18, 2007, Ryan filed a motion for leave to file a motion to reconsider the

Order. Ryan argues that leave is warranted because the court failed to consider material facts

related to two rulings: 1) allegations of inadequate policies against misappropriation is not a

claim or defense in this lawsuit; and 2) Ryan is the only impediment to Defendants’ ability to

dismiss the counterclaim. On September 19, 2007, Defendants submitted an opposition to

Ryan’s motion for leave. For the following reasons, Ryan’s motion for leave is DENIED. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

A motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration must be made in accordance with

the requirements of Civ. L.R. 7-9. The moving party must specifically show: 

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law

exists from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory

order for which reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the

exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not

know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order; or 

(2) The emergence of new material facts or change of law occurring after the

time of such order; or 

 (3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal

arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order. 

Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). Civil Local rule 7-9 continues:

No motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration may repeat any oral or

written argument made by the applying party in support of or in opposition to the

interlocutory order which the party now seeks to have reconsidered. Any party

who violates this restriction shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.

 Civ. L.R. 7-9(c). 

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ORDER, page 3

B. First Alleged Manifest Failure to Consider Material Facts

Ryan takes issue with the Court’s finding that “[t]he allegation of inadequate policies

against misappropriation is not a claim or defense in this lawsuit.” (the Order at 4:15-16). The

Court went on to explain:

 The claim is copyright infringement against ArtSelect and contributory

infringement against Editions. In order to show contributory infringement, Ryan

must show Editions “(1) has knowledge of a third party's infringing activity, and

(2) induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct.” Perfect

10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass'n, --- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 1892885, (9th Cir.

2007), quoting Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2004). 

Defendants argue that documents relating to other artists are not relevant. Ryan’s

papers do not address how documents relating to the sale of other artists’ works

are relevant to showing knowledge of, or material contribution to, infringement

of Ryan’s works.

(Id. at 4:16-5:2). Ryan claims that this finding fails to consider the material fact that the

complaint “does contain such an allegation.” (Motion for leave at 3:3) (emphasis in original). 

Ryan argues:

Plaintiff’s Second Claim, for Unfair Competition, alleges that Editions Limited

‘maintained a policy in favor of permitting canvas transfers of posters it publishes

without regard to whether the copyright owner authorized canvas transfers and

promoted that policy by deceptive practices, and thus engaged in unfair

competition’ and that ArtSelect ‘failed to establish reasonable practices or follow

common practices to avoid direct or contributory copyright infringement, and that

failure was intentional in order to increase profits without regard to whether

copyrights were infringed, and thus engaged in unfair competition.’ (Compl. ¶¶

71–72.) 

(Id. at 3:3-6.) These allegations in the Complaint, however, do not alter the court’s ruling that

there is no claim for “inadequate policies against misappropriation.” To the extent that Ryan

now wishes to argue that some or all of the documents sought are relevant to the claim for unfair

competition, this argument is precluded by the Civil Local Rules. A motion for reconsideration

based on facts or law not presented to the court originally requires a showing that the party “in

the exercise of reasonable diligence . . .did not know such fact or law at the time of the

interlocutory order.” Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(1). Here, Ryan has not shown that she was

diligent but unaware of this argument at the time the order issued. Accordingly, Ryan has not

shown a manifest failure to consider material facts. 

//

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 2Moreover, Coltrain addresses a currently pending motion to dismiss. In this case, the motion

to dismiss had been denied and only the appeal was pending when Editions sought to voluntarily

dismiss the counterclaim. Thus, there is no inference that the counterclaim was dismissed

because of the filing of the motion to dismiss. 

ORDER, page 4

C. Second Alleged Failure to Consider Material Facts

Ryan also takes issue with the Court’s ruling that Plaintiff’s document requests regarding

Defendant’s counterclaim for defamation were irrelevant because Ms. Ryan “is the only

impediment to Defendants’ [sic] dismissal of the counterclaim.” (Order at 5.) Ryan now claims

that this finding was in error because it:

does not consider the fact that, given Ms. Ryan’s anti-SLAPP motion, the merits

of Editions Limited’s counterclaim would remain relevant even if the claim was

dismissed because Ms. Ryan’s would still have a claim for attorney’s fees and

costs under the anti-SLAPP statute if she were found to be the prevailing party on

her motion as the result of the dismissal. Coltrain v. Shewalter, 66 Cal. App. 4th

94, 107–108 (1998) (holding that plaintiff’s dismissal of claim while anti-SLAPP

motion was pending give rise to a presumption that the defendants were the

prevailing parties on their motion and entitled to attorney’s fees and costs).

(Mot. at 3.) Thus, Ryan argues that the court failed to consider the material fact that further

discovery was warranted in order to prove that she is a prevailing party for the purposes of

attorneys’ fees. 

This argument fails for two reasons. First, Ryan could have, but did not, argue in the

original motion that the discovery was necessary to prove prevailing party status for an award of

attorneys’ fees. Instead, as quoted above, Ryan merely stated that the discovery sought was

relevant to “ Her truth defense to Editions Limited’s counterclaim for defamation.” Second,

Ryan presents no authority for additional discovery to prove prevailing party status. Indeed,

Coltrain specifically finds it inappropriate to waste scarce judicial resources to determine who

would have won a voluntarily dismissed action. Coltrain, 66 Cal.App.4th at 103.2

 Instead,

Coltrain states that a court should make a pragmatic determination of which side achieved their

objectives. Accordingly, additional discovery into the merits of the case is not relevant to the

issue of Ryan’s potential right to attorney’s fees and the Court did not fail to consider any

material facts.

//

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ORDER, page 5

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, It Is Hereby Ordered that Ryan’s Motion for Leave to File a

Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2007

____________________________

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

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