Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00109/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00109-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NGOC NGUYEN

Petitioner,

v.

M.C. KRAMER,

Respondent.

 No. CV-07-00109-FVS 

 ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner's Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Ct. Rec. 1). Petitioner is proceeding pro

se. Respondent is represented by Michael G. Lagrama of the California

Attorney General's Office.

BACKGROUND

At the time this petition was filed, Petitioner was incarcerated

at Folsom State Prison. (Ct. Rec. 1). Petitioner is in custody

pursuant to his April 6, 1990, conviction for attempted murder with

great bodily injury. (Id.) Petitioner began serving an indeterminate

life sentence plus three years on May 4, 1990. (Id.) Petitioner has

not been found suitable for parole. Petitioner is challenging the

August 19, 2004 decision by the California Board of Parole Hearings

("BPH") finding him unsuitable for parole. (Id.)

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 2

I. Factual History

On September 4 , 1989, Los Angeles Police Department officers th

responded to Petitioner's residence regarding a "human immolation." 

(Ct. Rec. 13, Exh. B at 16). The officers found a "red pitcher

smelling of gasoline" on the floor in the bathroom. (Id.) The

victim, Petitioner's wife, was found in the bedroom closet. (Id.) 

She survived, but suffered burns to over 50 percent of her body. 

(Id.) Witnesses testified that Petitioner entered his home, and

moments later the victim came running out, engulfed in flames. (Id.

at 17). The victim immediately identified Petitioner as her

assailant. (Id.) She told officers that he had a drinking problem,

and while drunk, he doused her with gasoline, struck a match to paper,

and then threw the paper on her. (Id. at 18). According to the

victim, Petitioner had been attempting to leave her and their three

children, and had also been threatening to kill her "for the past

three weeks." (Id.) Petitioner stated that he committed the crime

because he was drunk, and jealous over his wife's infidelity. (Id.)

II. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of attempted murder with great

bodily injury. (Ct. Rec. 1). The Los Angeles County Superior Court,

South District, entered the judgment on April 6, 1990. (Id.) He was

sentenced to life plus three years. (Id.) He began serving his life

term on August 23, 1991 (Id.) Petitioner has been incarcerated for 19

years. His minimum eligible parole date ("MEPD") was August 23, 1998. 

(Ct. Rec. 1, Exh. A at 2). 

On May 31, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas review in

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 3

Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Ct. Rec. 1, Exh. M). There,

Petitioner challenged the same August 19, 2004 parole denial that is

the subject of this petition. (Id.) The Superior Court denied

relief. (Id.) Petitioner then filed a petition with the Second

District Court of Appeal. (Ct. Rec. 13, Exh. E). That petition was

summarily denied. (Id.) On September 13, 2006, the California

Supreme Court, with citation to two cases, denied review. (Ct. Rec.

13, Exh. F).

Petitioner filed this petition with the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of California on January 17, 2007. 

(Ct. Rec. 1). Respondent filed a response on June 15, 2007. (Ct.

Rec. 13). Petitioner filed a traverse on July 16, 2007. (Ct. Rec.

15).

DISCUSSION

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

("AEDPA"), a federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court

adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or resulted in a

decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2009); see

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000). "Clearly established

federal law" consists of "the governing legal principle or principles

set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed]

its decision." Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 798 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003)). A decision is

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 4

"contrary to" clearly established federal law in two circumstances. 

First, a state court decision is contrary to clearly established

federal law when "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases." Williams, 529 U.S.

at 405. Second, a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly

established federal law when the state court "arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 412-413. 

Under the "unreasonable application" standard, a state court

unreasonably applies clearly established federal law when it applies

the law in a manner that is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409. 

"[The] AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one

methodology in deciding the only question that matters under §

2254(d)(1) - whether a state court decision is contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71. 

In examining whether state courts reached a decision that was

contrary to federal law or whether the state courts unreasonably

applied such law, the reviewing court should look to the last reasoned

state court decision. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.

2002) cert. dismissed, 538 U.S. 919 (2003). Where no reasoning is

given in either the state court of appeals or the state supreme court,

Ninth Circuit courts must determine whether a state court’s decision

was objectively unreasonable based on an independent review of the

record. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 5

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-982 (9th Cir. 2000). "Independent

review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional

issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a

silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable." Id. 

Here, both the Second Appellate Court and the California Supreme

Court issued two-sentence denials, both citing In re Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4 1061 (2005), and In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4 616 (2002). th th

(Ct. Rec. 1, Exhs. O, P). Thus, this Court will conduct an

independent review of the record.

Petitioner raises four arguments in his petition challenging the

August 19, 2004 decision of the BPH. First, he alleges that there is

"no evidence of any nexus between the facts of the crime and [his]

current threat to public safety." (Ct. Rec. 1). This lack of nexus,

according to Petitioner, prohibits the BPH from using the commitment

offense as a reason to deny parole. (Id.) Second, Petitioner argues

that the reasons other than the commitment offense that were used to

support parole denial were not supported by "some evidence." (Id.) 

Third, the BPH failed to consider "many of their own parole

suitability criteria, failed to provide individualized consideration

to Petitioner and thereby reduced the hearing to little more than a

sham." (Id.) And fourth, Petitioner argues that parole denial based

on the unchanging facts of the commitment offense violates his Due

Process rights. (Id.) This Court disagrees with all four arguments

for the reasons set forth below.

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 6

Under United States Supreme Court precedent, a prisoner’s due

process claim is addressed in two steps: first, a court must ask

whether the state has interfered with a constitutionally protected

liberty interest, and second, the court must decide whether the

procedures accompanying the deprivation were constitutionally

sufficient. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,

460 (1989); Sass v. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9 Cir. th

2006). 

Respond alleges that California inmates do not have a federally

protected liberty interest in parole. (Ct. Rec. 13). The U.S.

Supreme Court has determined that state parole statutes create a

federally protected liberty interest in parole if the statute uses

mandatory language that creates a presumption that parole will be

granted if certain findings are made. See Board of Pardons v. Allen,

482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442

U.S. 1, 12 (1979). Respondent bases his position on In re Dannenberg,

34 Cal. 4 1061 (2005) cert. denied, 546 U.S. 844 (2005). In that th

case, the California Supreme Court held that California Penal Code §

3041 (a)-(b) (the parole statute) does not create a presumption that

parole will be granted unless the BPH first finds the prisoner

suitable for release. Id. Despite the California high court's

holding in Dannenberg, the Ninth Circuit has held to the contrary,

finding that California life prisoners do have a protected liberty

interest in parole. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1127-28 (9 Cir. 2006); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 th

(9 Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit has also stated that this liberty th

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 7

interest vests all “prisoners whose sentence provides for the

possibility of parole with a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in the receipt of a parole release date, a liberty interest

that is protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due Process

Clause.” Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9 Cir. 2007). Thus, under th

Ninth Circuit case law, Petitioner has a federally protected liberty

interest that was interfered with by the BPH's decision to deny him

parole. 

Since Petitioner has a federally protected liberty interest in

parole, this Court must next determine whether the procedures

surrounding the BPH's deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. 

Under the Supreme Court's decision in Greenholtz, the due process

protections guaranteed in a parole hearing are minimal, requiring only

an opportunity to be heard and notice of the reasons for any adverse

decision. 442 U.S. at 16; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 472 (1983). 

Petitioner does not argue that he was deprived of either of these

protections. However, he does argue that the BPH decision was not

supported by "some evidence." The Ninth Circuit has held that a

parole board's decision deprives a prisoner of due process with

respect to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole if

the board's decision is not supported by "'some evidence in the

record,' or is 'otherwise arbitrary.'" Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 (quoting

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985)

(holding the "some evidence" standard applies in prison disciplinary

proceedings)). The "some evidence" standard requires this Court to

determine "whether there is any evidence in the record that could

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 8

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Hill, 472

U.S. at 455-56. Although Hill involved the accumulation of good time

credits rather than release on parole, later Ninth Circuit cases have

held that the same constitutional principles apply in the parole

context because both situations directly affect the duration of the

prison term. See Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390

(9th Cir. 1987) (adopting the "some evidence" standard set forth by

the Supreme Court in Hill in the parole context); accord, Sass, 461

F.3d at 1128-1129; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion, 306 F.3d at

904. Because the Supreme Court has never held the "some evidence"

standard to be applicable in the parole context, Respondent argues

that the basic protections of Greenholtz are all that is

constitutionally required. (Ct. Rec. 13 at 7.) This Court will not

address the validity of Respondent's argument, but will instead

proceed in accordance with Ninth Circuit precedent finding the "some

evidence" standard applicable to parole hearings. 

"To determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not

require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of

the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead,

the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion reached'" by the parole board. 

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-456). The "some

evidence standard is minimal, and assures that 'the record is not so

devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were without

support or otherwise arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S.

at 457).

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 9

In order to determine whether 'some evidence" supported the BPH’s

decision with respect to Petitioner, the Court must consider the

California statutes and regulations that govern the BPH's decisionmaking. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. Under California law, the BPH

must set a release date "unless it determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of

current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration . . . and that a parole date therefore, cannot be fixed

. . . ." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). The overriding concern in

determining parole suitability is public safety and the focus is on

the inmate's current dangerousness. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th

1061, 1086 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 844 (2005). 

The BPH has promulgated regulations setting forth the guidelines

it must follow when determining parole suitability. See Cal. Code.

Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c) and (d). Circumstances tending to show that

a prisoner is unsuitable for release include the following: 

(1) the commitment offense, where the offense was committed in an

"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner"; (2) the

prisoner's previous record of violence; (3) "a history of

unstable or tumultuous relationships with others"; (4) commission

of "sadistic sexual offenses"; (5) "a lengthy history of severe

mental problems related to the offense"; and (6)"serious

misconduct in prison or jail."

Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c). Circumstances tending to

show suitability for release include: 

(1) the prisoner has no juvenile record of assaulting others or

committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to victims;

(2) the prisoner has experienced reasonably stable relationships

with others; (3) the prisoner has performed acts that tend to

indicate the presence of remorse or has given indications that he

understands the nature and magnitude of his offense; (4) the

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 10

prisoner committed the crime as the result of significant stress

in his life; (5) the prisoner lacks any significant history of

violent crime; (6) the prisoner's present age reduces the

probability of recidivism; (7) the prisoner "has made realistic

plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be

put to use upon release"; and (8) "[i]nstitutional activities

indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon

release."

Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(d). 

In examining the BPH's statutory and regulatory framework, the

California Supreme Court recently held that the proper inquiry for a

reviewing court is "whether some evidence supports the decision of the

Board . . . that the inmate constitutes a current threat to public

safety, and not merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of

certain factual findings." In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212

(2008). The Lawrence court also asserted that the Board's decision

must demonstrate "an individualized consideration" of the specified

criteria, but "[i]t is not the existence or nonexistence of

suitability or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the parole

decision; the significant circumstance is how those factors

interrelate to support a conclusion of current dangerousness to the

public." Id. at 1204-1205. As long as the evidence underlying the

BPH's decision has "some indicia of reliability," parole has not been

arbitrarily denied. Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390.

Here, the BPH relied on the commitment offense as one factor to

support its finding that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole. (Ct.

Rec. 1, Exh. A at 74). In California, the gravity of the commitment

offense alone can be a sufficient basis for denying parole where the

facts are especially heinous or egregious, and go beyond the minimal

elements of the crime. In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4 616, 682 (2002); th

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 11

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1126; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 913-916; Irons, 505 F.3d at

852-853. The BPH found that lighting his wife on fire with the kids

in the front yard showed a "exceptionally callous disregard" for human

suffering. (Ct. Rec. 1, Exh. A at 74). This factor alone provides

"some evidence" supporting the BPH's decision. Despite the holding of

Rosenkrantz, Petitioner argues that there is no evidence of a "nexus"

between the facts of the crime and his threat to public safety, and

also argues that denying parole based on the commitment offense

violates due process. (Ct. Rec. 1 at 5). This Court does not agree. 

Under clearly established federal law, Petitioner is guaranteed an

opportunity to be heard, notice of the reasons for the BPH's decision,

and that any decision by the BPH will be supported by "some evidence." 

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16; Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. Petitioner does

not allege he was denied notice or an opportunity to be heard, and the

record contains "some evidence" (the facts of his crime) to support

the BPH's decision that Petitioner was currently a threat to public

safety. (Ct. Rec. 1, Exh. A at 74). Thus, this Court finds that the

BPH's decision comports with due process. 

Petitioner also argues that the factors other than the commitment

offense relied on by the BPH were not supported by "some evidence." 

(Ct. Rec. 1 at 5). Under Ninth Circuit case law, the "some evidence"

standard is minimal. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S.

at 457). In denying parole, the BPH recognized the trivial motivation

for the crime, prior criminality (including spousal abuse,

solicitation of a prostitute, and DUI), and the fact that while in

prison, Petitioner has not participated in enough self-help programs. 

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 12

(Ct. Rec. 1, Exh. A at 74-75). Further, the BPH noted that Petitioner

has not gained insight into his crime, and has attempted to minimize

his responsibility by blaming it on alcohol and his wife's

extramarital affair. (Id. at 75). These are all factors properly

considered by the BPH under its own regulations, Cal. Code. Regs.,

tit. 15 § 2402(c)-(d), and were all supported by evidence in the

record before the BPH. As long as "some evidence" supported the

decision of the BPH, then the decision is valid. See Jancsek, 833

F.2d at 1390. As this Court as already pointed out, the facts of the

commitment offense alone provide "some evidence" sufficient to deny

parole. This line of argument by Petitioner is without merit.

Petitioner's final argument is that the BPH failed to consider

its own parole suitability criteria, and did not give him

individualized consideration. (Ct. Rec. 1 at 6). However, the record

shows the BPH gave Petitioner the reasons for its decision to deny him

parole, and carefully considered all of the information before it,

including both suitability and non-suitability factors. (Ct. Rec. 1,

Exh. A at 74-76); see Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c)-(d). Under

California case law, as long as the BPH provides individualized

consideration, and its decision is supported by "some evidence," then

its decision to deny parole is not rendered arbitrarily. In re

Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212 (2008). Further, because the Ninth

Circuit has held the "some evidence" standard applicable in the parole

context, as long as "some evidence" supports the decision of the BPH,

then the state courts' denial of relief is not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 13

Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987).

Thus, the BPH complied with its own regulations and California law, as

well as federal law. The California courts' decisions denying relief

were thus valid and constitutional, and cannot be overturned under the

AEDPA.

ORDER 

Petitioner was given all of the due process protections he is

guaranteed under "clearly established" federal law. See Greenholtz,

442 U.S. at 16; Irons, 505 F.3d at 851; Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390. 

Petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard, and notice of the

reasons for the adverse decision by the BPH. Further, the BPH

decision was supported by "some evidence." Based on its review of the

record, this Court finds that the California courts' decisions were

not "objectively unreasonable," and cannot be disturbed by a federal

habeas court. Accordingly, Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Ct. Rec. 1) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk is hereby directed to enter this

order, furnish copies to counsel, enter judgment for Respondent, and

CLOSE THE FILE.

DATED this 28th day of April, 2010.

 s/ Fred Van Sickle 

Fred Van Sickle

Senior United States District Judge

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