Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00386/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00386-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

BNSF Railway Company; Matthew

Kelly McCauley; and Joel Frederick

Briggs, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

The Honorable Delbert W. Ray, Sr., et

al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-0386-PHX-DGC

ORDER

The Court held a discovery conference call with the parties on March 2, 2006. All

parties were represented. Following 50 minutes of argument, the Court took the matter under

advisement. This order will reflect the Court’s decision. 

On October 5, 2005, the Court entered a Case Management Order (“CMO”) that

permitted limited discovery in this case. Doc. #69. The Sullivan Defendants sought

discovery into “the consensual relationship between Plaintiff and the tribe and the activities

of Plaintiff which might have an effect on the political integrity, economic security, or health

and welfare of the tribe.” Id. at 2-3. The Tribal Defendants sought discovery “into all

aspects of the underlying tort case and the railroad accident on which it is based.” Id. at 3.

The Court concluded “that some discovery should be permitted, but not to the extent

advocated by Defendants.” Id. at 3. Thus, the Court declined to permit the full scope of

discovery sought by both the Sullivan Defendants and the Tribal Defendants. 

Case 3:05-cv-00386-DGC Document 89 Filed 03/07/06 Page 1 of 5
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Instead, the Court permitted limited discovery into three specific topics: (1) “the

nature and extent of Plaintiff’s right-of-way across the tribe’s land,” (2) “the nature, terms,

and duration of any contracts or agreements between the railroad and the tribe,” and (3) “the

number of trains and cars crossing the reservation daily and yearly, the general contents of

the cars, the general nature of any hazardous materials contained in the cars, the frequency

of accidents or pollution occurring as a result of the railroad’s activity on tribal lands, and

similar information related to the potential impact of the railroad on the tribe.” Id. at 3-4.

The Court permitted Rule 30(b)(6) depositions on these subjects.

The intent of the CMO was to permit limited discovery on limited subjects. The Ninth

Circuit has explained that a case such as this “does not require that the district court permit

wholesale discovery. Rather, the district court may tailor limited discovery before . . .

entertaining a motion for summary judgment.” Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad

Corp. v. Fort Peck, 323 F.3d 767, 775 (9th Cir. 2003).

As became clear during the discovery conference call and from the Court’s review of

the record, Defendants have served Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notices that substantially exceed

the scope of discovery permitted by the CMO. See Docs. ##71, 72, 73, 76, 77, and 78. The

intent of the CMO was to permit limited discovery into general subjects. For example, with

respect to the impact of the railroad on the tribe, the CMO clearly stated that Defendants

could inquire into the “general nature” of any hazardous materials contained in the cars and

the “frequency” of accidents or pollution occurring on tribal lands. The CMO stated that

“similar information related to the potential impact of the railroad on the tribe” could be

obtained, but this was intended to mean similarly general information. The Defendants’

mutli-page deposition notices inquire into numerous subjects in considerably greater detail

than the CMO contemplated. They call for the railroad to produce a witness who can testify

about “all hazardous materials” that have ever been transported across the tribal lands,

including “each of the types of materials, quantity of materials, cars per year, type of

container cars, and speed of travel.” Doc. #71 at 5. The notice seeks a witness on the impact

on adjoining properties and human-beings if any of these materials were to be spilled or catch

Case 3:05-cv-00386-DGC Document 89 Filed 03/07/06 Page 2 of 5
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fire, the history of all hazardous materials that have been spilled, all environmental audits

performed by the railroad on tribal lands, all future contemplated audits, railroad policies

concerning environmental audits, insurance, risk management, and other financial reserves

and resources available for environmental spills or releases, and the nature and extent of all

physical injuries to individuals, property damages, and environmental damages sustained as

a result of the release of hazardous materials in a 1985 derailment of a train on the

reservation. Id. at 6-7. 

These requests plainly go beyond the limited discovery contemplated by the CMO.

Defendants’ other notices also exceed the scope of the CMO. The Sullivan Defendants’

notice on contract issues (Doc. #72) contains 33 numbered categories of possible inquiry,

including detailed information about specific contracts, their negotiation, amendment, and

current status, correspondence relating to all contracts, complaints or concerns regarding

crossings, any accident at a crossing, all legal actions between the railroad and the tribe, all

studies, reports, or investigations concerning any aspect of the investigation between the

railroad and the tribe, water rights, lawsuits, and future plans of the railroad. Such inquiries

far exceed the limited discovery permitted by the CMO into the “contractual relationship

between ‘the railroad and the tribe.’” Doc. #69 at 3.

 On January 31, 2006, counsel for the railroad wrote to counsel for the Sullivan

Defendants (no deposition notices had been served by the Tribe at that time) and complained

about the breadth of the deposition notices. The letter noted that the CMO was limited in the

discovery permitted, that no discovery had been attempted by Defendants during the three

months following entry of the CMO, that the notices included 91 different categories of

information for the three depositions, and that the notices clearly exceeded the CMO. In

response, defense counsel conferred with counsel for the railroad but declined to limit the

notices. Rather, defense counsel suggested that the railroad produce its most knowledgeable

witnesses, that the depositions go forward, and that the parties then decide whether a dispute

exists. Defendants were satisfied with the railroad’s witness on the first subject permitted

in the CMO – the nature and extent of the railroad’s right-of-way across tribal lands – but

Case 3:05-cv-00386-DGC Document 89 Filed 03/07/06 Page 3 of 5
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found the contract witness to be inadequate because he could only identify the existence of

contracts, not discuss them in detail. The railroad apparently produced no witness on the

third topic. As a result, the parties placed the discovery conference call to the Court. 

During the conference call, counsel for the railroad noted that the railroad had

searched for all contracts that might be involved in the 36-mile stretch of railway across tribal

lands. Documents were sought not only in the railroad’s files and its real estate system, but

also from third party contractors. 568 pages, comprising more than 40 contracts, were

produced. The railroad produced all valuation maps, corporation maps, documents regarding

the donation of land to the tribe, tax dispute documents, engineering inventories (which

included lists of all lubricants), 40 pages on herbicides used on the tracks, engineering maps

showing each track, bridge, and crossing, timetables and speeds for trains crossing tribal

lands, track maps, all claims regarding livestock damage, personal injury, and property

damage, and an 1879 map concerning the location of the railroad. The contract witness

produced at the deposition was the individual at the railroad familiar with the location of all

contracts, but the railroad protests that no witness can testify, for example, about the

negotiation of a 1920 license agreement. Following the conference, counsel for the Sullivan

Defendants sent the Court a copy of the deposition transcript, noting that the witness had

responded “I don’t know” more than 130 times.

The Court concludes that Defendants have misunderstood the limited nature of

discovery permitted by the CMO. The intent of that order was to permit limited discovery

into general topics that would enable the parties to address application of the Montana factors

in this case. Consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent, the Court concluded that only limited

discovery of a general nature would be necessary for the Court to resolve the legal questions

presented by this case.

The Court concludes that the railroad’s responses on the first and second subjects in

the CMO – the nature and extent of the railroad’s right-of-way and the nature, terms, and

duration of any contracts or agreements between the railroad and the tribe – have been

sufficiently addressed in the discovery conducted to date. 

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With respect to the third subject, the Court will permit a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition

consistent with the narrow intent of the CMO. The parties are directed to confer on the

appropriate scope of the 30(b)(6) deposition and to complete the deposition before April 7,

2006. If the parties are unable to agree on a limited scope of the deposition, they are directed

to place another conference call to the Court in time to resolve all issues and complete the

deposition before April 7, 2006. Defendants shall take responsibility for scheduling and

initiating discussions on the limited deposition. 

In light of this change in the discovery schedule, the deadline for filing dispositive

motions shall be extended to April 28, 2006. All other terms of the CMO shall remain in

effect.

 DATED this 6th day of March, 2006.

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