Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01803/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01803-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Brent Adler (“Plaintiff”) is a former California state prisoner. Plaintiff is proceeding 

pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on October 28, 2011. On January 18, 2013, the Court ordered that the 

action proceed on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against Defendants Gonzalez, Zanchi, Peterson, 

Cannon, Wallace, Foster, Karlow, Stanford, Sampson and Snyder.

Defendants filed their answer on July 26, 2013. 

On July 29, 2013, the Court issued a Discovery and Scheduling Order. Part I of the Order 

requires the parties to provide initial disclosures, including names of witnesses and production of 

documents. 

BRENT ADLER,

 Plaintiff,

v.

GONZALEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:11cv01803 AWI DLB (PC)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

(Document 18)

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On August 12, 2013, Defendants filed a Request for Reconsideration of Part I of the Discovery 

and Scheduling Order. Plaintiff did not file an opposition. The matter is deemed submitted pursuant 

to Local Rule 230(l).

LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 303(c), which permits District 

Judge review of a Magistrate Judge’s order. Local Rule 303(a) incorporates the “clearly erroneous” or 

“contrary to law” standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). Thus, the District Judge 

must “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72(a).

DISCUSSION

Defendants correctly argue that Part I of the Discovery and Scheduling Order requires the 

parties to engage in disclosures similar to those required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

26(a)(1). Defendants are also correct in that Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time he filed the 

complaint and is proceeding pro se, and that such actions are generally exempt from initial disclosure 

requirements.

Defendants are incorrect, however, insofar as they argue that the Discovery and Scheduling 

Order is an improper “standing order” meant to modify the initial disclosure requirements. As the 

Court has previously explained in many other prisoner actions where the Discovery and Scheduling 

Order has been issued, the order is a case-specific order that issued in this action “[t]o expedite the fair 

disposition of this action and to discourage wasteful pretrial activities.” Therefore, the order is proper 

since “even in a case excluded . . ., the court can order exchange of similar information in managing 

the action under rule 16.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) Advisory Committee Note of 2000. The fact that a 

similar order has issued in other prisoner cases does not transform the order into a formal, or informal, 

standing order.

The Court notes that the discovery order at issue, which has been used and upheld in other 

actions in this Court, was implemented in light of the numerous discovery issues that were arising with 

increasing frequency in other pro se prisoner actions. Defendants’ discovery practices were bordering 

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on unnecessarily obstructive, and these tactics caused numerous discovery disputes that required 

extensive Court resources to resolve. The intent of the order, as explained above, is to discourage 

similar wasteful activities. The Court also notes that in other prisoner actions where the Discovery 

Order has been upheld, the parties have filed their notice of initial disclosures without incident. 

Defendants further believe that such requirements are an undue burden on the State in prisoner 

cases. However, again, the intent behind the order is to streamline the discovery process and 

ultimately reduce the overall burden on the State, the Court and the parties. Similarly, although 

Defendants suggest that the order deprives counsel of the exercise of professional judgment in 

determining how much time and effort to devote to investigation, the order requires no more than 

would be required under Rule 26(a), or in the ordinary course of investigating a complaint. The 

purpose of initial disclosures under FRCP 26(a) is “to accelerate the exchange of basic information . . . 

and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such information.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) 

Advisory Committee Note of 1993 (emphasis added). Orders such as this fall well within the vested 

control of a trial court to control its docket and to ensure efficient use of limited judicial resources. 

Defendants also attempt to raise an issue based on the Discovery and Scheduling Order’s 

failure to limit the disclosures to “discoverable information.” While the order may not specifically 

state that disclosures are limited to “discoverable information,” the context of the order, as well as 

common sense, dictate that only discoverable information need be exchanged. Indeed, the order limits 

Defendants’ disclosures to information regarding individuals “likely to have information about 

Defendant(s)’ claims or defenses, or who will be used to support Defendant(s)’ version of the events 

described in the complaint.” July 29, 2013, Order at 2. 

Finally, insofar as Defendants object to the requirement that Defendants produce materials in 

the possession, custody or control of Defendants and CDCR, their objection fails. Defendants 

specifically object to the definition used in Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 309945 (E. D. Cal. 2007), 

cited in the order, and contend that some are retired, and the remaining Defendants are employed in 

different positions within CDCR. Defendants argue that they do not control CDCR or its documents. 

Mot. 9. This standard, however, requires no more than production of information for which 

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Defendants have “the legal right to obtain” on demand. If a document does not fall within the 

definition of Allen, it need not be produced. Certainly, Defendants will not have “possession, custody 

or control” of all of CDCR’s documents. The order does not require Defendants to produce 

documents that they cannot otherwise obtain in the course of their employment. 

The above arguments are not persuasive and do not establish that the Discovery and 

Scheduling Order, in general, is contrary to law or clearly erroneous.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2013 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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