Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35114/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35114-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSHUA JAMES FROST, 

No. 11-35114 Petitioner-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v.  2:09-cv-00725-TSZ

RON VAN BOENING, Superintendent, OPINION Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Thomas S. Zilly, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 8, 2011—Seattle, Washington

Filed August 22, 2012

Before: Ralph B. Guy, Jr.,* M. Margaret McKeown, and

Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman;

Dissent by Judge McKeown

*The Honorable Ralph B. Guy, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge for the Sixth

Circuit, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Erik Levin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the

Federal Public Defender, Seattle, Washington, for petitionerappellant Joshua Frost.

Robert McKenna, Attorney General, and John J. Samon,

Assistant Attorney General, Olympia, Washington, for

respondent-appellee Ron Van Boening.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

We evaluate on federal habeas review the Washington

Supreme Court’s decision to apply harmless error review over

structural error analysis where the trial court prohibited

defense counsel from arguing during closing argument both

that the State failed to meet its burden of proof establishing

accomplice liability and that a criminal defendant acted under

duress. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm.

I

On December 17, 2003, Washington state prisoner Joshua

Frost (“Frost”) was found guilty following a jury trial of first

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degree robbery, first degree burglary, second degree assault,

and attempted robbery. The Superior Court of Washington for

King County imposed a sentence of 657 months. 

Frost appealed his jury conviction to the Washington Court

of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. He subsequently

appealed that decision to the Washington Supreme Court.

Frost presented a number of issues on appeal. The Washington Supreme Court exercised its power of discretionary

review and limited his appeal to whether the trial court abused

its discretion and violated Frost’s constitutional right to counsel and a fair trial by prohibiting Frost’s counsel from arguing

reasonable doubt as to accomplice liability in closing argument while simultaneously arguing the affirmative defense of

duress. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed Frost’s

judgment and sentence but held that although the trial court

had abused its discretion by “unduly limit[ing] the scope of

Frost’s counsel’s closing argument” due to its misreading of

prior precedent, the trial court’s error was nonetheless harmless.1

The mandate issued on July 25, 2007. The United States

Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 14, 2008. Frost

v. Washington, 552 U.S. 1145 (2008).

In May 2009, after two unsuccessful rounds of collateral

state habeas litigation (called “personal restraint petitions” in

Washington), Frost filed a habeas corpus petition in the

United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. In June 2009, the district court stayed the habeas petition to allow Frost the opportunity to pursue his third and last

personal restraint petition in the Washington Supreme Court.

Following the Washington Supreme Court’s decision to deny

1The trial court had relied on its understanding of State v. Riker, 869

P.2d 43 (Wash. 1994), which held that “duress is an affirmative defense

that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence” and

stated “ ‘a defense of duress admits that the defendant committed the

unlawful act, but pleads an excuse for doing so.’ ” State v. Frost, 161 P.3d

361, 366-67 (Wash. 2007) (quoting Riker, 869 P.2d at 52) (emphasis in

original). 

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that petition as time-barred, the district court lifted the stay on

February 18, 2010.

Frost filed an amended federal habeas corpus petition—the

subject of this appeal—on February 26, 2010. Frost raised a

number of grounds for relief on appeal, including that the trial

court violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights

and Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting trial

counsel from arguing simultaneously in closing argument that

the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Frost

was an accomplice and Frost’s duress defense.

On October 5, 2010, United States Magistrate Judge Brian

A. Tsuchida issued a Report and Recommendation, concluding that the district court should deny the amended habeas petition.2

 The Report and Recommendation did not address the

Washington Supreme Court’s holding that the trial court

abused its discretion by limiting the scope of the defense’s

closing argument because the State failed to challenge that

determination. Consequently, as to the issue presently before

us, the Report and Recommendation only addressed whether

the Washington Supreme Court reasonably determined that

the trial court’s error was subject to harmless error analysis.

2Frost—for obvious reasons—does not challenge the Washington

Supreme Court’s unanimous decision that the trial court violated his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when it prohibited him from simultaneously arguing both duress and

reasonable doubt in closing argument. The State, however, asserts for the

first time on appeal that the trial court’s restriction of Frost’s closing argument did not amount to a constitutional violation and that the Washington

Supreme Court’s decision in so holding was erroneous and contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of federal law. We need not decide whether

the restriction on Frost’s closing argument violated his Sixth Amendment

right to counsel and his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because

Frost was not prejudiced under the test set forth by Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993). As a result, we assume without deciding that

the trial court’s restriction on closing argument amounted to constitutional

error and only analyze whether, under federal habeas review, that decision

amounts to harmless error under Brecht. 

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It concluded that the Washington Supreme Court reasonably

determined that the error was subject to harmless—not

structural—error analysis.

United States District Judge Thomas S. Zilly adopted the

Report and Recommendation and dismissed the habeas petition with prejudice. The district court granted a certificate of

appealability as to Frost’s claim that the restriction on closing

argument violated due process and his right to counsel, but

denied issuing a certificate of appealability as to Frost’s

remaining claims.3 Frost timely appealed. 

The pertinent facts regarding Frost’s involvement in the

robberies, burglaries, and other related crimes, as summarized

by the Washington Supreme Court, are as follows:

Frost’s criminal conduct involved five discrete

incidents over 11 days. First, on April 8, 2003, Frost,

together with accomplices Matthew Williams and

Alexander Shelton, robbed and burglarized the home

of Lloyd and Verna Gapp. Frost acted as the driver

and also entered the home with Williams and Shelton. Firearms were used.

On April 12, 2003, Frost acted as the driver for

Shelton and Williams, who robbed a Taco Time restaurant while armed with firearms. Then on April 15,

2003, Frost, Williams, Shelton, and another man participated in the robbery of T and A Video. Frost

again acted as the driver and also performed surveillance of the video store prior to the robbery. On

3We do not address the uncertified issues of Frost’s appeal. See Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that to obtain a Certificate of Appealability on a claim, “[a] habeas petitioner’s assertion . . .

must make a ‘substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’ ”

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). Having considered Frost’s arguments,

we are satisfied that none of his other claims meet that standard. 

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April 17, 2003, Frost acted as the driver for Williams

and Shelton, who robbed a 7/Eleven store at gunpoint. During this robbery, one accomplice threatened two customers in the store’s parking lot with a

gun. Immediately following this robbery, Frost drove

Williams and Shelton to Ronnie’s Market, which

they also robbed using firearms. During the course

of this robbery, employee Heng Chen was shot in the

hand.

Frost, Williams, and Shelton were arrested on

April 20, 2003. Several firearms, a cash register,

safes, bank bags, and ski masks associated with the

above offenses were found inside Frost’s home.

Frost made multiple confessions to the police regarding the above offenses, recordings of which were

introduced at trial. Ultimately, Frost was charged

with six counts of robbery, one count of burglary,

one count of attempted robbery, and three counts of

assault; most charges included firearms enhancements. 

Prior to trial, Frost moved to suppress his statements to the police; the court denied his motion and

admitted the confessions. Frost testified at trial. He

generally admitted participating in the robberies but

claimed he acted under duress.

Frost, 161 P.3d at 364.

At trial, Frost testified that he felt forced to participate in

the robberies because he was concerned that if he refused to

do so, Williams would harm him, his mother, and brother. As

a result, Frost’s counsel informed the court that he intended

to argue during closing argument both that the State failed to

meet its burden as to accomplice liability and that Frost (if

found to have been an accomplice) acted under duress in committing the charged robbery offenses. In response to the

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State’s objection, citing Riker, 869 P.2d at 43, the trial court

ruled that defense counsel could not argue both theories in

closing. The court announced that if Frost’s counsel argued

the State had failed to meet its burden of proof as to any of

the robbery offenses, the court would not instruct the jury on

duress as to those offenses. Specifically, the court stated:

You cannot argue to the jury that the state hasn’t

proved accomplice liability and claim a duress

defense. You must opt for one or the other. Riker is

very clear on this. You must admit the elements of

the offense have been proved before you can use the

duress offense. 

Defense counsel objected to the court’s ruling and in response

to the court’s instructions asked, “[b]ut am I not permitted to

argue in the alternative, using duress and failure to prove in

the alternative?” “No,” the court responded. “Duress is an

affirmative defense. To quote Riker, a defense of duress

admits that the defendant committed the unlawful act but

pleads an excuse for doing so. You may not argue both.”

In compliance with the court’s ruling, defense counsel generally limited his argument to the affirmative defense of

duress. As the Washington Supreme Court noted, however,

the prosecutor acknowledged the State’s burden of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt during closing argument as to each

of Frost’s robbery offenses. The jury was also instructed on

the State’s burden of proof as to each element of the crimes

charged, as well as the requirements to prove accomplice liability.

II

We review a district court’s denial of a habeas petition de

novo and the findings of fact for clear error. Schultz v. Tilton,

659 F.3d 941, 952 (9th Cir. 2011); Brown v. Ornoski, 503

F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2007). A determination of a factual

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issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct unless

rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1294 n.21

(9th Cir. 2010). “[A] state court’s interpretation of state law,

including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged

conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”

Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). 

III

A

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) governs our review of Frost’s habeas petition. 28

U.S.C. § 2254; Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 989 (9th

Cir. 2011). The provisions of AEDPA “create an independent,

high standard to be met before a federal court may issue a writ

of habeas corpus to set aside state-court rulings.” Uttecht v.

Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 10 (2007). “This is a difficult to meet, and

highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,

which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit

of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398

(2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

“Under AEDPA, we may not grant habeas relief unless the

state court proceedings resulted in a decision that was (1)

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States;’ or (2) ‘based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.’ ” Ybarra, 656 F.3d at 989

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

B

Frost argues that the Washington Supreme Court erred in

failing to declare that the trial court’s restriction on Frost’s

closing argument was structural error. We disagree. The

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Washington Supreme Court’s decision that the trial court’s

restriction was not structural error is neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law

as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 

[1] Structural errors “affect the framework within which

the trial proceeds,” Pucket v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 140

(2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), are

rare, and require automatic reversal. Washington v. Recuenco,

548 U.S. 212, 218 (2006). The Supreme Court has found the

existence of structural errors in very limited circumstances.

Id. at 218-19 n.2 (listing circumstances the Supreme Court

has held constitute structural error).

[2] Consequently, because the Supreme Court has never

addressed in a holding a claim, such as the one presently

before us, concerning a restriction on the scope of closing

argument, the Washington Supreme Court’s determination

that the error was not structural does not require automatic

reversal. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786

(2011) (“‘[I]t is not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a

specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by

this Court.’ ” (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,

122 (2009) (alteration in original))).

[3] Frost relies on Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853

(1975), to argue that “[w]here a court prevents the accused

from arguing a valid theory of the case in closing argument,

such error is structural and not subject to harmless error

review.” Frost’s argument, however, is not persuasive under

AEDPA review because Herring held that a court’s total

denial of closing argument constituted structural error. Id. at

858-59, 863-65. The Supreme Court’s decision in Herring is

silent on whether a limitation, such as the one imposed by the

trial court in this case, is structural error. 

In Herring, the defendant was not permitted to make any

closing argument in a criminal bench trial. Id. The Supreme

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Court struck down a New York state statute that “confer[red]

upon every judge in a nonjury criminal trial the power to deny

counsel any opportunity to make a summation of the evidence

before the rendition of judgment.” Id. at 853. The Supreme

Court held that “there can be no justification for a statute that

empowers a trial judge to deny absolutely the opportunity for

any closing summation at all.” Id. at 863 (emphasis added).

In so holding, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]here can be

no doubt that closing argument for the defense is a basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial”

and that “a total denial” of the opportunity for final argument

in a nonjury criminal trial violates the Sixth Amendment. Id.

at 858-59 (emphasis added).

[4] Denying counsel any opportunity to make a closing

argument eliminates “a basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial,” id. at 858, and thereby

gives rise to “a structural defect affecting the framework

within which the trial proceeds,” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499

U.S. 279, 310 (1991). The dissent bases its argument on this

premise, but like Frost, fails to acknowledge that a rational

jurist could conclude that there is a fundamental difference

between a complete denial of closing argument and a limitation on the scope of closing argument. It is well established

that the trial judge has broad discretion to control closing

argument, see United States v. Guess, 745 F.2d 1286, 1288

(9th Cir. 1984), and, like the erroneous exclusion of a defendant’s testimony regarding the circumstances of his confession, Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986), an

improper limitation on the content of closing argument “occurr[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury, and . . .

may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of

other evidence presented in order to determine whether its

admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. 

[5] Indeed, the Supreme Court in Herring explicitly made

this distinction. The Court acknowledged that “[t]he presiding

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judge must be and is given great latitude in controlling the

duration and limiting the scope of closing summations,” 422

U.S. at 862, but went on to explain that, by contrast, “there

can be no justification for a statute that empowers a trial judge

to deny absolutely the opportunity for any closing summation

at all,” id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court repeatedly

emphasized that the denial in that case was complete. See,

e.g., id. at 859, 863 (“total denial of the opportunity for final

argument;” “the trial judge refused to hear any argument;” “to

deny absolutely the opportunity for any closing summation at

all;” “total denial of final argument”). 

[6] In clarifying its holding in Riker, it was therefore not

unreasonable for the Washington Supreme Court to hold

under Herring that the error was harmless rather than structural. Frost was not denied the opportunity to make a closing

argument—he was afforded the opportunity to argue his

defense of duress. But in so doing, his lawyer had to make a

choice because under state law one cannot be liable as an

accomplice if the defense of duress is established. In the face

of the three confessions by Frost, his testimony before the

jury admitting his participation in the crimes, and strong corroborative evidence, Frost could not deny he participated in

the crime spree. Defense counsel wisely conceded that fact to

maintain credibility in urging the jury to nonetheless excuse

his client’s conduct because he acted under duress. The jury

did not buy the defense. As a result, Frost fails to successfully

show that the Washington Supreme Court’s holding—that the

trial court’s error was not structural—is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of federal law under the Supreme

Court’s decision in Herring. 

Frost points to two Ninth Circuit cases, Conde v. Henry,

198 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Miguel,

338 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2003), to argue that the Washington

Supreme Court erred in failing to treat the restriction on closing argument as structural error. Frost’s reliance on Conde

and Miguel fails.

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As the district court held, “circuit law is not clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court and is

not, alone, a basis for the Court to grant habeas relief.” See

Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1866 (2010) (stating a court

of appeal’s decision “does not constitute clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,

§ 2254(d)(1), so any failure to apply that decision cannot

independently authorize habeas relief under AEDPA”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d

612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[C]learly established law as determined by [the Supreme Court] refers to the holdings, as

opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s decisions].”

(alterations in original) (citation omitted)); but see Duhaime

v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating Circuit law “may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an

‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also

may help [courts of appeals] determine what law is “clearly

established”) (citation omitted). Consequently, our decisions

in Conde and Miguel, alone, are insufficient to find that the

Washington Supreme Court’s decision—that the trial court’s

error was not structural—was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law.

Moreover, even if we were to look to Conde and Miguel for

guidance, these cases are distinguishable from Frost’s case. In

Conde, a pre-AEDPA habeas case, we concluded that structural error occurred because “the trial court improperly precluded Conde’s attorney from making closing argument

explaining the defendant’s theory of the case, it refused to

instruct the jury on the defendant’s theory, and, over the

defendant’s objection, it gave jury instructions that did not

require that the jury find every element of the offense.”

Conde, 198 F.3d at 741. “Together,” we found, “these errors

deprived the petitioner of effective assistance of counsel, due

process and trial by jury on every element of the charged

crime.” Id.

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Here, Frost was permitted to argue during closing argument

his defense of duress—the primary defense theory in his case.

Further, as the Washington Supreme Court and the district

court highlighted, “[t]he record clearly shows the prosecutor

argued it was the state’s burden to prove that Frost was an

accomplice and to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and

every element of the charged offenses.” Frost v. Van Boening,

No. C09-725-TSZ-BAT, 2010 WL 5775657, at *8 (W.D.

Wash. Oct. 5, 2010) (adopted by Frost v. Van Boening, No.

C09-725Z, 2011 WL 486198 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2011)); see

Frost, 161 P.3d at 364 (“In closing, the prosecutor repeatedly

mentioned the State’s burden of proof as to Frost’s robbery

offenses. Likewise, the jury was properly instructed on the

State’s burden of proof in general, as well as the requirements

to prove accomplice liability in particular.” (internal citation

omitted)). Thus, the jury had ample instruction on the principles of criminal law to which they were to apply the facts they

determined. 

[7] In Miguel, a direct appeal from a federal criminal proceeding, we held that structural error occurred when the district court precluded defendant’s counsel from arguing during

closing argument at trial that someone other than the defendant shot the victim, and in instructing the jury that no evidence supported the defense theory. Miguel, 338 F.3d at

1000-01. Although we cited to Herring in so ruling, our decision in Miguel insufficiently establishes under AEDPA that

the Washington Supreme Court’s determination in this case

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. 

The dissent relies on Miguel but overlooks that Miguel

involved a direct appeal and that, in comparison, our review

under AEDPA is significantly limited. On federal habeas

review we must uphold the state court’s adjudication of a

claim unless the adjudication of that claim “was contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established

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Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) (emphasis added). 

The logical extension of the dissent’s rule would be to

declare structural error and automatic reversal any time a trial

judge placed limits on closing argument because petitioner

could argue that, as to the contested issue, the limitation

resulted in a “total denial of closing argument on a legitimate

theory.” Dissent at p.9591. That cannot be the law and the

Supreme Court has never said anything of the sort. It certainly

ignores the Court’s pronouncement in Recuenco, 548 U.S. at

218:

We have repeatedly recognized that the commission of a constitutional error at trial alone does not

entitle a defendant to automatic reversal. Instead,

“ ‘most constitutional errors can be harmless.’ ”

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting

Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306). “ ‘[I]f the defendant

had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject

to harmless-error analysis.’ ” Id. (quoting Rose v.

Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986)).

Fulminante, for example, applied harmless error review to

improperly admitted involuntary confessions, which were

found to have violated constitutional rights under the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments, just as the Washington Supreme

Court found here.

Further, as we have been reminded, AEDPA does not permit us to reject a state court’s interpretation of Supreme Court

precedent simply because we disagree. See, e.g., Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). In Lockyer, the Supreme

Court reversed our decision to grant habeas, explaining:

It is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its “independent review of the legal question,” is left with

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a “firm conviction” that the state court was “erroneous.” We have held precisely the opposite: “Under

§ 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause,

then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

411 (2000). Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 409; Bell v. Cone, 535

U.S. 685, 699 (2002); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537

U.S. 19, 27 (2002) (per curiam).

Id. at 75-76 (some internal citations and quotation marks

omitted); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473

(2007) (“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal

court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect

but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.”).

[8] Thus, even were we to read Miguel and Conde as holding that structural error occurs any time a court places an

improper restriction on defense counsel’s summation, we cannot say that such an interpretation is the only reasonable reading of Herring. “Because AEDPA authorizes federal courts to

grant relief only when state courts act unreasonably, it follows that the more general the rule at issue—and thus the

greater the potential for reasoned disagreement among fairminded judges—the more leeway state courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Renico, 130 S.

Ct. at 1864 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks

and brackets omitted). Given our limited review, therefore,

our decision in Miguel does not establish that the Washington

Supreme Court’s holding applying harmless error involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court. Absent such a showing,

under AEDPA we must give deference to the state court’s

decision that harmless error analysis applies here.

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C

Frost argues that even if the trial court’s restriction on closing argument was not clearly established structural error, the

Washington Supreme Court’s decision involved an objectively unreasonable application of the harmless error standard.

Our review of the Washington Supreme Court’s harmless

error determination, however, is limited because the particular

legal claim presented, given a finding of a constitutional violation but no prejudice, changes our normal level of deference

on federal habeas review. On habeas review, where a constitutional error is found, “a court must assess the prejudicial

impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial

under the ‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard set forth

in Brecht . . . .” Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121 (2007) (citing

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). Our analysis therefore is not governed by the two-part test requiring “(1) that the state court’s

decision was ‘contrary to’ or ‘an unreasonable application’ of

Supreme Court harmless error precedent; and (2) that the petitioner suffered prejudice under Brecht from constitutional

error.” Merolillo v. Yates, 663 F.3d 444, 454-55 (9th Cir.

2011) (emphasis in original) (quoting Inthavong v. Lamarque,

420 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005)). “Habeas relief,” we

have held, “is warranted only if the error had a ‘substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’ ” Id. at 454 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38). We

addressed our limited review under AEDPA in Merolillo:

In Fry v. Pliler4 . . . the Supreme Court squarely

4

In Fry, the Supreme Court stated: 

We hold that in § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the

prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal

trial under the “substantial and injurious effect” standard set forth

in Brecht . . . whether or not the state appellate court recognized

the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the “harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman. 

Fry, 551 U.S. at 121-22 (internal citations omitted). 

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addressed the harmless error standard to be applied

by a federal habeas corpus court and held that Brecht

is the applicable test. In Pulido v. Chrones, we reaffirmed that under Fry, “we need not conduct an analysis under AEDPA of whether the state court’s

harmlessness determination on direct review . . . was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law,” and held that “we apply the

Brecht test without regard for the state court’s harmlessness determination.” 629 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th

Cir. 2010) (citing Fry, 551 U.S. at 119-22). In light

of Fry and Pliler, we hold that the Brecht “substantial and injurious effect” standard governs our harmless error review . . . .

Id. at 455 (some alterations in original) (internal citations

omitted) (granting habeas relief). Consequently, to determine

whether Frost is entitled to habeas relief, our analysis is

focused on whether the trial court’s restriction on Frost’s closing argument “had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637. 

[9] Brecht teaches that Frost is “not entitled to habeas

relief based on trial error unless [he] can establish that it

resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v.

Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). We hold “[i]n light of the

record as a whole” that the trial court’s limitation on defense

counsel’s closing argument did not have a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict”

for several reasons. Id. at 638 (internal quotation marks omitted).

First, the evidence of Frost’s guilt at trial was overwhelming. Frost gave three taped confessions, all of which were

entered into evidence at trial. Further, although he testified

that he was fearful of co-defendant Williams (a.k.a. “Fatal”),

Frost also testified in detail to his involvement in the crimes

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for which he was charged as an accomplice: (1) he admitted

that he drove Williams to the Gapp residence on the night of

the robbery, that he entered the residence, and removed

money and guns from Gapp’s safe; (2) that he drove the codefendants to the Taco Time restaurant, T and A video store,

the 7/Eleven convenience store, and Ronnie’s market on the

night that each of the robberies took place; (3) that he was

aware that Williams carried a bag containing such items as a

ski mask and gloves that were routinely used to commit the

crimes; and (4) he testified about his co-defendant’s use of

firearms. Finally, the testimony of Detective Broggi regarding

the loaded guns, cash register, bank bags, safe, and ski masks

that were found at Frost’s home further corroborated Frost’s

role in the crimes. 

Second, the state’s burden of proof did not go uncontested

because defense counsel was barred from contesting accomplice liability. As the district court found in the face of powerful inculpatory evidence, Frost’s counsel admitted during

closing argument that although Frost was guilty of accomplice

liability on certain counts, the state had failed to meet its burden of proof on others. Specifically, Frost’s counsel argued:

I think you can find Joshua Frost guilty of the

Gapp robbery because that is just so overpowering,

and he did go into the house. I think you can find

Joshua Frost guilty of the T and A robbery not

because he went in to do the robbery but because he

actually entered the store. And the only reason I

think that you could find him guilty of that is that it

is kind of just too much to ask for somebody who is

willing to take the step to let him off.

And I know that is what you are thinking, some of

you. But as to the cases in which he didn’t go in anywhere and was just told to stay put, we are asking

you find him not guilty, and even if you find him

guilty, he is not guilty of the guns. You can find him

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guilty of displaying the gun as an accomplice, I suppose, which is one of the things you have to find to

make a robbery in the first degree. But that doesn’t

require you to find the special verdict firearm allegation in addition. You don’t have to do that. And we

hope you don’t. And we think that the basis for not

doing that is that the guns were out of his control.

Finally, the jury was fully informed of the state’s burden to

prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,

including accomplice liability. For example, the prosecutor in

closing argument stated:

Now I have divided my closing argument into two

different parts. The reason for that, ladies and gentlemen, is there really are two parts in some ways you

look at this. The first part has to do with the charges

and the evidence and has the state proven all the elements and all the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.

And then the second part has to do with the defense

of duress, and this is important because the first part,

again, the state has the burden. To get to duress, the

first part, again, the state has the burden. To get

duress you really have to find the state proves its

case beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .

Let’s start first with the charges. We went through

these in the beginning and I want to quickly go

through them, because there is a lot of them, there is

a lot of different robberies and a lot of different

assaults.

***

I will start off by talking about accomplice liability. The reason I will talk about that first is because

that is really what this case is about in terms of the

defendant’s actions . . . a person who is an accomFROST v. VAN BOENING 9581

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plice in the commission of a crime is guilty of that

crime whether present at the scene or not. The person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime

if, with knowledge, that it will promote or facilitate

the commission of a crime he . . . aids or agrees to

aid another person in planning or committing a

crime. And the word aid means all assistance

whether by words, acts, or encouragement.

Well, the defendant has admitted that he knew

what was going on. He knew that they were going to

these stores, all of them, to commit a robbery. He

knew they were armed and he knew that was the

plan.

[10] Thus, in light of our review of the record, we hold that

considering the evidence—Frost’s three videotaped confessions, the incriminating evidence seized from his home, and

the remaining trial testimony—and the focus during closing

arguments both on Frost’s duress defense by his attorney and

on the State’s burden of proof in general and as to accomplice

liability in particular by the prosecutor, as well as the court’s

clear jury instructions regarding the State’s burden of proof,

the trial court’s limitation on defense counsel’s closing argument did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637. There may be circumstances where a trial court’s limitation on closing arguments may not survive the Brecht harmless error analysis. However, that is not the case here.

Consequently, because Frost did not establish “actual prejudice,” we hold that he is not entitled to habeas relief. Id.

IV

The Washington Supreme Court’s decision that the trial

court’s restriction on closing argument did not constitute

structural error was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined

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by the United States Supreme Court. We need not consider

whether the Washington Supreme Court erred in deciding that

the trial court’s restriction on Frost’s closing argument violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because in light of our

review of the record as a whole, the trial court’s restriction on

Frost’s closing argument did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The record demonstrates that Frost

was afforded the opportunity to present his defense—duress

—and the State was not relieved of its burden of proof beyond

a reasonable doubt. Federal habeas relief was properly denied.

AFFIRMED.

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

“Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, there are two separate

and distinct reasons why you should find my client not guilty.

Unfortunately, I may explain only one reason to you. (And a

silent p.s.: I wish I could argue reasonable doubt to you, but

I can’t!).” This hypothetical summation mimics the extraordinary circumstances of Frost’s closing argument, the legal

equivalent of counsel having one hand tied behind his back.

Due to a misunderstanding of state law, the trial judge forced

Frost to “opt for one or the other” legitimate defense—

arguing duress or putting the government to its burden of

proof. This undisputed denial of the constitutional right to

present proper argument on alternative defense theories created a Hobson’s choice that violated Frost’s Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and his Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process rights.

In Herring v. New York, the Supreme Court explained the

critical importance of closing argument: “The Constitutional

right of a defendant to be heard through counsel necessarily

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includes his right to have his counsel make a proper argument

on the evidence and the applicable law in his favor, however

simple, clear, unimpeached, and conclusive the evidence may

seem.” 422 U.S. 853, 860 (1975) (quotation marks omitted)

(emphasis added). Not only that, “the trial court has no discretion to deny the accused such right.” Id. (emphasis added). It

is no surprise that legal lore focuses on the centrality of closing argument—from Clarence Darrow to F. Lee Bailey, and

even the television lawyer Perry Mason. Forcing Frost’s

counsel to roll the dice by choosing to defend on one theory

or the other set up a structural deficiency that tainted the

framework of Frost’s trial. Because closing argument plays a

critical role in the adversarial process, improperly restricting

counsel to a solitary defense theory is both a violation of the

accused’s constitutional rights and a structural error mandating a new trial. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that such a denial is not structural error.

The Washington Supreme Court unanimously held that the

trial court’s erroneous interpretation of defenses available

under Washington law violated Frost’s constitutional rights.

State v. Frost, 161 P.3d 361, 368-69 (Wash. 2007). The court

first noted that “it is generally permissible for defendants to

argue inconsistent defenses so long as they are supported by

the evidence,” id. at 365, and that the trial court here erred in

precluding alternative defenses. Although “a defendant may

be required to admit that he committed acts constituting a

crime in order to claim duress, he or she is not required to

concede criminal liability.” Id. at 368. Because Frost opted to

argue a duress defense, the trial court forced him to do exactly

what is prohibited—concede criminal liability on the robberies and let the government off the hook on the “beyond a

reasonable doubt” standard.

The state high court recognized that “[b]y preventing counsel from arguing this point in closing, the trial court lessened

the State’s burden to some degree.” Id. at 368. Significantly,

the court held that there “remained an evidentiary basis, how9584 FROST v. VAN BOENING

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ever slim, for counsel to argue that the State failed to prove

Frost participated in each of his accomplices’ criminal acts

with adequate knowledge of promotion or facilitation.” Id.

Frost’s claim that the prosecution had not met its burden

regarding accomplice liability was “best illustrated by the robberies in which Frost was only a driver and remained in the

car.” Id. at 368-69. The court concluded that the trial court’s

error “resulted in the imposition of an undue limitation on the

scope of defense counsel’s closing argument. This limitation

infringed upon Frost’s due process and Sixth Amendment

rights.” Id. at 369. The Washington Supreme Court was unanimous on this point. Nonetheless, the five-justice majority

treated the error as harmless rather than structural. Id. at 369-

70.

According to the four dissenting justices, “[t]he entire

framework of Frost’s trial was tainted because the jury was

not privy to his full defense.” Id. at 371 (Sanders, J., dissenting). Once the prosecution finished arguing that it had met its

burden, Frost’s counsel’s silence on the reasonable doubt

issue infected the entire trial process. Id. at 372 (the trial

court’s “error vitiates the jury’s findings because we cannot

know what the jury would have decided but for defense counsel’s final arguments.”). The challenge to the state court’s

majority opinion, declining to find structural error by a 5-4

margin, meets the difficult standard for habeas relief under the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Unable to circumvent the legal principle announced in Herring, the majority improperly imposes a super-AEDPA

requirement that the Supreme Court have “addressed in a

holding” the “restriction on the scope of closing argument.”

Op. at 9571. But see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76

(2003) (“Section 2254(d)(1) permits a federal court to grant

habeas relief based on the application of a governing legal

principle to a set of facts different from those of the case in

which the principle was announced.” (emphasis added)). The

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majority then goes astray in concluding that the state court’s

holding as to structural error is neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law as set forth in

Herring.

I. DECLINING TO FIND STRUCTURAL ERROR IS CONTRARY TO

SUPREME COURT LAW

The Supreme Court has not equivocated: “There can be no

doubt that closing argument for the defense is a basic element

of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial.” Herring, 422 U.S. at 858. The Court in Herring did not grant the

accused partial satisfaction by limiting the constitutional right

to one particular defense theory; instead, as though anticipating the situation here, the Court used as an example the

inalienable right of the defense to argue that the prosecution

had not met its burden. Id. at 862 (“for the defense, closing

argument is the last clear chance to persuade the trier of fact

that there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.”).

Interpreting Herring as limited to absolute preclusion of final

argument misreads the case. Total preemption of half the

legitimate defenses is tantamount to absolute preclusion of

argument on half the case. Here, as in Herring, that preclusion

resulted in a structural error.

A state court decision is contrary to clearly established law

“if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing

law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.” Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). Although structural errors that

command automatic reversal are rare, this is such a case. The

Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, including in the landmark Fulminante case, that harmless error analysis is not

appropriate in cases that “contain a ‘defect affecting the

framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply

an error in the trial process itself.’ ” Neder v. United States,

527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499

U.S. 279, 310 (1991)). According to the Court, nothing “could

be more important than the opportunity finally to marshal the

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evidence for each side before submission of the case to judgment.” Herring, 422 U.S. at 862; see also United States v.

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984) (recognizing structural

error where “counsel was . . . prevented from assisting the

accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.”).

The majority upholds harmless error review by incorrectly

claiming that the trial court was simply exercising its discretion in denying argument on what it considered to be mutually

exclusive defenses. To the contrary, the Washington Supreme

Court unanimously held that “the trial court erroneously interpreted our decision in Riker and, based on that erroneous

interpretation, unduly limited the scope of Frost’s counsel’s

closing argument, thus abusing its discretion.” Frost, 161 P.3d

at 365. The court’s reference to abuse of discretion was legal

speak for the fact that the trial court was flat wrong as a matter of law. The trial court’s restriction was not an exercise of

its “great latitude in controlling the duration and limiting the

scope of closing summations.” Herring, 422 U.S. at 862.

Legitimate leeway to control the scope of closing argument

cannot be equated with the absolute and erroneous denial of

argument on a factually supported, legally available defense.

When Herring is applied to the facts of this case—where the

trial court did not exercise its discretion—it is clear that, with

respect to the burden of proof defense, the difference “between total denial of final argument and a concise but persuasive summation, could spell the difference, for the defendant,

between liberty and unjust imprisonment.” Id. at 863.

The imposition of a total gag order on Frost’s constitutional

right to argue that the prosecution had not met its burden of

proof struck at the heart of the trial framework. In fact, the

compounding error here—requiring concession of guilt—was

far worse than the error in Herring, where counsel’s forced

silence did not amount to a concession of guilt. The error at

Frost’s trial was not simply “an error in the trial process

itself,” but compromised counsel during a critical stage of the

proceeding.

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The dilemma for Frost’s counsel could not have been

starker when he had to give up argument on the reasonable

doubt standard—a constitutional mainstay of defense closing

arguments—in exchange for a duress instruction. Because the

trial court threatened to take the duress instruction “out of the

case” if Frost discussed the government’s failure to meet its

burden, the jury could not hear the magic words “beyond a

reasonable doubt” from the mouth of defense counsel.

The prosecutor’s parroting of the reasonable doubt standard, one he claimed to have surmounted, can hardly be considered equivalent to argument from Frost’s perspective.

Under the Sixth Amendment, no aspect of an attorney’s advocacy is more important than marshaling the evidence for his

own side in closing. Herring, 422 U.S. at 862. The majority

fails to explain how the prosecutor’s unrestricted argument

countenances deprivation of Frost’s constitutional “right to be

heard in summation of the evidence from the point of view

most favorable to him.” Id. at 864. From a practical standpoint, where the right is infringed so as to excise a key

defense, “[t]here is no way to know whether [the unmade

arguments] in summation might have affected the ultimate

judgment . . . .” Id. As the legal maxim recognizes, defense

argument here would have brought things hidden and obscure

to the light of reason. Nonetheless, the majority conjectures

that the jury simply “did not buy” Frost’s defense even though

the defense “wisely conceded” Frost’s participation in the

crime to “maintain credibility.” Op. at 9573. The majority

glosses over the fact that Frost’s counsel was forced by the

trial court to make this so-called concession, and that the right

to closing argument exists “however simple, clear, unimpeached, and conclusive the evidence may seem.” Herring, 422

U.S. at 860.

Contrary to the governing legal principle announced in

Herring, the majority holds that no structural error occurs so

long as an accused is allowed to argue any one of his defense

theories. Op. at 9573 (“Frost was not denied the opportunity

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to make a closing argument—he was afforded the opportunity

to argue his defense of duress.”). Nothing in Herring supports

the majority’s half a loaf limitation. The state court’s holding

that no structural error occurred was directly contrary to

Supreme Court law as set out in Herring.

II. DECLINING TO FIND STRUCTURAL ERROR IS AN

UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF SUPREME COURT LAW

Not only is the state court’s holding contrary to Herring,

the holding also unreasonably applies Herring to the particular facts of Frost’s case. We know from Williams that “[a]

state-court decision that correctly identifies the governing

legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case . . . [is] ‘an unreasonable application of . . .

clearly established Federal law.’ ” 529 U.S. at 407-08 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). The Washington Supreme Court

correctly identified the rule in Herring, but then failed to reasonably apply it to a new set of facts. The majority compounds this error by creating a new requirement for AEDPA

relief—factual identity with Supreme Court precedent—

which is not the law. The Supreme Court emphasized this

point in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007),

where it reversed an Eleventh Circuit decision applying an

improperly restrictive test under the AEDPA: “AEDPA does

not ‘require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly

identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied.’

Nor does AEDPA prohibit a federal court from finding an

application of a principle unreasonable when it involves a set

of facts ‘different from those of the case in which the principle was announced.’ ” (citations omitted)

The unreasonableness of the state court’s application of

Herring is underscored by our decision in United States v.

Miguel, which mirrors this case. 338 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2003).

The majority brushes Miguel aside, stating that it is, by itself,

insufficient to establish federal law. Op. at 9575. I have no

quarrel with that point, but Miguel does not exist in a vacuum;

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instead, it illustrates the application of the legal principle from

the Supreme Court’s decision in Herring to a new set of facts.

Although Ninth Circuit law alone is undisputedly not “clearly

established federal law,” when such law explains clearly

established Supreme Court law, it is persuasive authority that

helps determine whether the state court unreasonably applied

Supreme Court law. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597,

600 (9th Cir. 2000).

In Miguel, we found structural error where the district court

precluded defendant’s counsel from arguing a defense theory.

338 F.3d at 1003. Because the district court erroneously

believed that there was no evidence that anyone other than

defendant had fired the gun, it foreclosed this line of argument. Id. at 999. Relying on Herring, we stated: “Because

reasonable inferences from the evidence supported the

defense theory, the court erred in precluding counsel from

arguing his theory and in instructing the jury that no evidence

supported it. Such an error is structural and requires reversal

under our precedent.” Id. at 1001; see also Conde v. Henry,

198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 1999) (granting pre-AEDPA

habeas relief because of both structural error and a violation

of the right to counsel when the state court precluded counsel

“from arguing his theory of the defense in closing arguments.”).

In Frost’s case, the trial court declined to allow alternative

defense arguments based on an erroneous understanding of

state law and on its misapprehension of the factual predicate

for a duress defense. Miguel, which raises an identical theory

preclusion issue, delineates the metes and bounds of the structural error principle set forth in Herring: absolute preclusion

of closing argument on a legitimate defense theory is a constitutional error that undermines the structure of the trial process. The majority sidesteps this reality by inappropriately

invoking its newly-created “identical facts” requirement and

offering up the rationale that Miguel’s reading is not “the only

reasonable reading of Herring.” Op. at 9577. On the facts

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here, the majority’s reading is unreasonable under AEDPA.

The majority also mischaracterizes this argument as one

where “[t]he logical extension of the dissent’s rule would be

to declare structural error and automatic reversal any time a

trial judge placed limits on closing arguments.” Op. at 9576.

Not so. The rule at issue relates to the total denial of closing

argument on a legitimate theory, not to discretionary limits on

the argument.

To make matters worse, the paramount nature of the

defense argument that was foreclosed—the government’s burden of proof—strikes at the heart of the right to counsel. The

Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “the Due Process

Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). “[E]ven when no theory of defense

is available, if the decision to stand trial has been made, counsel must hold the prosecution to its heavy burden of proof

beyond reasonable doubt.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 n.19.

Indeed, “if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s

case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a

denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary

process itself presumptively unreliable.” Id. at 659.

Our decision in United States v. Swanson, based on principles derived from the above Supreme Court cases, further

demonstrates the unreasonable application of Herring to the

facts here. 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991). In Swanson, we

reversed a conviction because defense counsel conceded that

the government had met its burden of proof. We wrote that

the concession “lessened the Government’s burden of persuading the jury” and caused a “breakdown in our adversarial

system.” Id. at 1074. A new trial was required because counsel’s “conduct tainted the integrity of the trial.” Id. Prejudice

was presumed because the concession that the prosecution

had met its burden “was an abandonment of the defense of his

client at a critical stage of the criminal proceedings.” Id.

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Frost’s concession of guilt here is no different than the ineffective counsel in Swanson who voluntarily conceded guilt. In

truth, being forced to concede guilt by the court is a far

greater error with the same end result: unconstitutional lessening of the government’s burden. Such lessening of the government’s burden is structural error requiring reversal. See

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993) (erroneous

definition of “reasonable doubt” vitiated all of the jury’s findings because one could only speculate what a properly

charged jury might have done). In denying relief, the majority

conflates the improper lessening of the government’s burden

of proof with Frost’s factual inability to deny that he “participated in the crime spree.” Op. at 9573.

The Hobson’s choice forced upon Frost pitted one constitutional right against another—his right to put the government

to its burden and his right to full and complete closing

argument—thus hobbling his rights to effective counsel and

due process. The trial court’s error tainted the framework of

the trial by rendering Frost’s conviction speculative. Because

the state court’s decision is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law as set forth in Herring,

I respectfully dissent.

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