Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02891/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02891-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Gordon Daniels, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-2891-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 6). In the motion,

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. Background

Plaintiff, an airport security screener for the Transportation Security Administration

(the "TSA"), filed a formal complaint of discrimination with his employer on September 14,

2004. Plaintiff alleged that the TSA discriminated against him because of a disability, which

Plaintiff listed as diabetes. On September 6, 2006, Plaintiff received the Department of

Homeland Security's Final Order on the complaint, which concluded that Plaintiff had failed

to prove he was subjected to discrimination on the basis of a physical disability. Included

with the order was a document entitled "Notice of Appeal Rights," which provided that

Plaintiff had the right to appeal or file a civil action naming Michael Chertoff, Secretary of

the Department of Homeland Security, as the defendant. 

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On December 1, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal district court. On

December 18, 2006, Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint alleging that the named

defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of disability and

retaliation. Plaintiff asserts that the discrimination claim is based on Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act,

and Section 403 of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 (the

"VEVRA"). Named as defendants are Michael Chertoff, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Department of Homeland Security, and twelve individuals identified as TSA managers

or supervisors. The twelve individuals are named as defendants in both their individual

capacities and in their official capacities as TSA employees.

II. Legal Standard

Defendants seek dismissal of the discrimination claim against them under Rules

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, because the Court

finds Defendants' arguments are more properly brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court will

consider Defendants' motion under Rule 12(b)(6) only.

A court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would

entitle him to relief." Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Buckley v.

Los Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1992)); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); W. Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). "The federal rules require only a 'short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Gilligan v.

Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). "The

Rule 8 standard contains a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to

state a claim." Id. at 249 (quotation marks omitted). "All that is required are sufficient

allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them." McKeever v.

Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47; 5 C. Wright & A.

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Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1202 (2d ed. 1990)). Indeed, though "'it may appear

on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely[,] . . . that is not the

test.'" Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249 (quoting Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

"'The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is

entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'" Id. Finally, it is well established that pro

se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded[,] are held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]" Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (quotation marks

omitted); see Ortez v. Wash. County, 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Because Ortez is a

pro se litigant, we must construe liberally his inartful pleading[.]") (citation omitted). "In

civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the pleading

liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt." Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police

Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988); see Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 899 n.2 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citing Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972)); Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 352 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Karim-Panahi, 839

F.2d at 623).

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim, "[a]ll allegations of material

fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."

Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996); see Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S.

25, 27 n.2 (1977). In addition, the district court must assume that all general allegations

"embrace whatever specific facts might be necessary to support them." Peloza v. Capistrano

Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1173 (1995)

(citations omitted). The district court need not assume, however, that the plaintiff can prove

facts different from those alleged in the complaint. See Associated Gen. Contractors of

Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Similarly, legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness and

"conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a

motion to dismiss." Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998); see Jones v. Cmty.

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Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1984); W. Mining Council, 643 F.2d at 624.

"Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); see William W. Schwarzer et al., Federal Civil Procedure

Before Trial § 9:187, at 9-46 (2002). Alternatively, dismissal may be appropriate when the

plaintiff has included sufficient allegations disclosing some absolute defense or bar to

recovery. See Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783, n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) ("If the

pleadings establish facts compelling a decision one way, that is as good as if depositions and

other . . . evidence on summary judgment establishes the identical facts."); see also Federal

Civil Procedure Before Trial § 9:193, at 9-47. 

III. Discussion

A. Americans with Disabilities Act

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him, in violation of section

12112(b)(5)(A) of the ADA, by refusing to fully accommodate him while failing to show

how the full accommodation would be an undue hardship. In response, Defendants argue

that Plaintiff's claim under the ADA is barred because the ADA does not apply to federal

employees. Plaintiff counters that the ADA is applicable to federal employees because of

the relationship between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

Under the ADA, the federal government is excluded from the definition of

"employer." See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i). Based on this exclusion, federal courts have

concluded that the ADA provides no remedy to federal employees. See Calero-Cerezo v.

U.S. Dept. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 11 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that the opinion would

concentrate on the Rehabilitation Act, "since the ADA is not available to federal

employees"); Henrickson v. Potter, 327 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that "the entire

federal government is excluded from coverage of the ADA"); Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d

101, 103 (2nd Cir. 1998) (stating that, as a federal employee, plaintiff "has no remedy for

employment discrimination under the ADA"). Accordingly, even construing the facts alleged

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in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as

true, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim for relief under

the Americans with Disabilities Act and the claim will be dismissed as against all

Defendants. See SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Calif., Inc., 88 F.3d 780,

783 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a court may dismiss a claim as a matter of law for "(1) lack

of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim."). 

B. The Rehabilitation Act

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et

seq., by refusing to expeditiously process his request for a reasonable accommodation due

to his diabetes and by repeatedly making unnecessary requests for fitness-for-duty

examinations and medical information. In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim

is barred because the Rehabilitation Act is preempted by the Aviation and Transportation

Security Act of 2001 (the "ATSA"). Plaintiff counters that the Rehabilitation Act is not

preempted because the purpose of the ATSA was not to create an "independent kingdom [the

TSA] which had no obligation to obey other federal laws or which could discriminate against

its employees at will." 

The ATSA was passed in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks with

the stated goal of fundamentally changing the way the United States "'approaches the task

of ensuring the safety and security of the civil air transportation system.'" See Castro v.

Secretary of Homeland Security, 472 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting H.R. Conf.

Rep. No. 107-296 at 53, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2002, pp. 589-90). To accomplish

the goal, the ATSA created a "workforce of federal employees to screen passengers and

cargo at commercial airports." Id. Under the ATSA:

[T]he Under Secretary shall establish qualification standards for

individuals to be hired by the United States as security screening

personnel. Notwithstanding any provision of law, those

standards shall require, at a minimum, an individual–

* * *

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(iii) to meet, at a minimum, the requirements set forth in

subsection (f);

(iv) to meet such other qualifications as the Under Secretary

may establish; and

(v) to have the ability to demonstrate daily a fitness for duty

without any impairment due to illegal drugs, sleep deprivation,

medication, or alcohol.

49 U.S.C. § 44935(e)(2)(A). 

Subsection (f) of the ATSA provides that, notwithstanding any provision of law,

screeners must: (1) possess a high school diploma, a general equivalency diploma, or

experience that the Under Secretary has determined to be sufficient for the individual to

perform the duties of the position; (2) possess basic aptitudes and physical abilities, including

color perception, visual and aural acuity, physical coordination, and motor skills; and (3) be

able to read, speak, and write English. 49 U.S.C. § 44935(f). In addition, Public Law 107-

71, Title I, § 111(d), 115 Stat. 620, codified as a note to 49 U.S.C. § 44935, provides: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Under Secretary

of Transportation for Security may employ, appoint, discipline,

terminate, and fix the compensation, terms, and conditions of

employment of Federal service for such a number of individuals

as the Under Secretary determines to be necessary to carry out

the screening functions of the Under Secretary under section

44901 of title 49, United States Code.

Reviewing the foregoing provisions of the ATSA, the court in Castro v. Secretary of

Homeland Security, 472 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2006), concluded that the ATSA, in

establishing hiring standards for airport security screeners, exempts the TSA from

compliance with the Rehabilitation Act. In so concluding, the Castro court stated:

The plain language of the ATSA indicates that TSA need not

take the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act into account

when formulating hiring standards for screeners.

* * *

We read the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of

law" as Congress's indication that the statute containing that

language is "intended ... to take precedence over any preexisting

or subsequently-enacted ... legislation [on the same subject]."

United States v. McLymont, 45 F.3d 400, 401 (11th Cir. 1995);

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see also Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113

S.Ct. 1898, 1903, 123 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993) (commenting

favorably upon interpretations by Courts of Appeals of similar

"notwithstanding" language "to supersede all other laws" and

quoting, "a clearer statement is difficult to imagine.") (citations

omitted). Thus, the "notwithstanding" language of section

44935(e) and the note to the statute indicate that TSA shall

implement hiring standards and conditions of employment

(including physical standards) for screening personnel, whether

or not those standards and conditions of employment are

consistent with the Rehabilitation Act. 

Castro, 472 F.3d at 1337. The same conclusion was reached in Tucker v. Ridge, 322

F.Supp.2d 738 (E.D.Tex. 2004). In Tucker, the plaintiff sued the TSA alleging that he was

discriminated against and unlawfully denied a position with the TSA because of a physical

disability. Reviewing the language of the ATSA, the court, like Castro, concluded: 

[T]he Rehabilitation Act is superceded by the [ATSA], which

grants the Under Secretary of Transportation the authority to

establish hiring criteria for security screening personnel. 49

U.S.C. § 44935(e)(3). Consistent with the ATSA's plain

language, the criteria that the Under Secretary establishes are

neither subject to review nor challenge under the Rehabilitation

Act.

Tucker, 322 F.Supp.2d at 742. 

 The ATSA's preemptive effect was extended in Pino v. Hawley, ---- F.Supp.2d ----,

2007 WL 936738, *5 (W.D.Pa. March 26, 2007), wherein the plaintiff sued the TSA for

discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act after being terminated because of a medical

condition that impacted his job performance. After reviewing the language of the ATSA, the

court held that the ATSA's pre-emptive effect, as expressed in Castro and Tucker, extends

beyond the hiring process, stating:

The foregoing provisions evidence Congress's intent to give the

TSA carte blanche with regard to all of its employment

decisions regarding security screeners, including the termination

of an existing employee who is deemed to be no longer qualified

to perform his screening job due to his lack of daily fitness for

duty.

Pino at *6. In reaching its decision, the Pino court relied, in part, on Yeager v. Chertoff, No.

06-740 (W.D.Wash. Nov. 13, 2006), wherein the court held that because the ATSA preempts

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated section 403 of the VEVRA. However, a

review of the VEVRA indicates that there is no such section. Instead, sections 4212 and

4214 involve the promoting and training of veterans. Accordingly, the Court will analyze

Plaintiff's claim as if brought under 38 U.S.C. §§ 4212 and 4214. 

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the Rehabilitation Act, the TSA is not required to provide accommodations to employees

who are not capable of meeting the specific physical qualifications and employment

standards promulgated by the ATSA and/or the Under Secretary. 

In the present action, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated the Rehabilitation Act

by refusing to process his request for a reasonable accommodation due to his diabetes and

by repeatedly making unnecessary requests for fitness-for-duty examinations and medical

information. However, as the foregoing case law, which the Court finds persuasive, makes

clear, the ATSA preempts the Rehabilitation Act and the TSA is not required to provide

accommodations to employees who are not capable of meeting the specific physical

qualifications and employment standards promulgated pursuant to the ATSA. As a result,

the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claim that Defendants violated the Rehabilitation Act is

preempted. Accordingly, even construing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff and accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, Plaintiff's allegations are

insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim for relief under the Rehabilitation Act and the

claim will be dismissed as against all Defendants. See SmileCare Dental Group, 88 F.3d at

783. 

C. Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, by failing to take affirmative steps to promote,

advance, or train him or provide career opportunities, violated the VEVRA.1

 In response,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim under the VEVRA must be dismissed because there

is no private right of action under the VEVRA. Plaintiff counters that the TSA has waived

any such protection because of the instructions it provides to its managers and supervisors

to comply with federal affirmative action laws.

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Despite Plaintiff's argument, the case law is clear that there is no private right of

action under 38 U.S.C. §§ 4212 or 4214. In Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291 (3rd Cir. 1996), the

Third Circuit found that section 4214 does not provide a private right of action. Similarly,

the Tenth Circuit, in Suazo v. Regents of Univ. of California, 149 F.3d 1191, *2 (10th Cir.

1998) (Table), joining the other courts that have addressed the issue, held that there is no

private right of action under sections 4212 or 4214. Finally, in McCloskey v. Chertoff, No.

14047 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 28, 2005), the court dismissed a claim brought under section 4214 on

the ground that no private right of action exists thereunder. Considering the foregoing case

law, Plaintiff herein has no private right of action under sections 4212 or 4214 of the

VEVRA. Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to state a

claim for relief under the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act and the claim

will be dismissed as against all Defendants. See SmileCare Dental Group, 88 F.3d at 783.

D. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by

refusing to expeditiously process his request for a reasonable accommodation. In response,

the twelve employee Defendants argue that they cannot be sued in their individual capacities

under Title VII. The employee Defendants further argue that the Title VII claim against

them in their official capacities should be dismissed because it is repetitive and merges with

Plaintiff's Title VII claim against the TSA. Plaintiff counters that the employee Defendants

can be sued in their individual capacities because they acted willingly with malice and

reckless indifference to his federal civil rights. Plaintiff also argues that the claim against the

employee Defendants in their official capacities should not merge with the claim against the

TSA because the employee Defendants acted with personal malice and not with an intent "to

serve the master" such that they were acting outside the scope of their employment. 

In the Ninth Circuit, employees cannot be held liable in their individual capacities

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon,

88 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir.

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Defendants have not sought dismissal of the Title VII claim against Michael Chertoff,

the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, who is the properly named defendant

in an action against the TSA. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Title VII claim against the TSA will

proceed. 

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1995) (stating that there is no personal liability for employees, including supervisors, under

Title VII); Taylor v. ScottPolar Corp., 995 F.Supp. 1072, 1079 (D.Ariz. 1998) (stating that

it is well settled in the Ninth Circuit that a defendant may not be sued in his individual

capacity under Title VII). The cases Plaintiff cites in opposition, Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699

F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1983) and Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1986), are

inapposite as they involve claims that defendants violated certain constitutional rights under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the present case, Plaintiff is not asserting that the employee Defendants

violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, under controlling

Ninth Circuit case law, the twelve employee Defendants cannot be held liable in their

individual capacities under the Title VII claim and the claim will be dismissed as against the

twelve employee Defendants in their individual capacities.

In addition, the Title VII claim against the twelve employee Defendants in their

official capacities will be dismissed because it merges with Plaintiff's claim against his

employer, the TSA. See Taylor, 995 F.Supp. at 1079 (dismissing certain Title VII defendants

because "the employer alone is liable for any violation of Title VII; thus, claims against the

individuals in their official capacity merge into claims against the employer"); see also Gary

v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C.Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of Title VII claim against

an employee in his official capacity because it merges with claim against the employer).

Plaintiff's argument that the employee Defendants were acting outside the scope of their

employment belies the allegations set forth in his complaint, which allegations do not set

forth any non-employment related conduct by the employee Defendants. Accordingly, the

Title VII claim against the twelve employee Defendants in their official capacities will be

dismissed.2

 

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IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 6) is GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Americans with Disabilities Act claim against

all Defendants is dismissed;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Rehabilitation Act claim against all Defendants

is dismissed;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance

Act claim against all Defendants is dismissed;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Title VII claim against David Couts, Robert

Earby, Shannon Dalton, Kenneth Elmer, Clifford Harrington, Andre Watson, David

Bonczkiewicz, Brian Kuhn, Larry Brown, Vincent Ingegneri, Orville Richard, and Clarence

Looney, in their individual and official capacities, is dismissed. 

DATED this 17th day of April, 2007.

 

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