Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02454/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02454-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY GORDON, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-02-2454 GEB GGH P

vs.

ANNA M. RAMIREZ-PALMER, 

Warden, et al., ORDER &

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Pending before the court are: 1) defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed on

December 30, 2006, to which plaintiff filed an opposition, after which defendants filed a reply;

2) plaintiff’s January 23, 2006, motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO); and 3) plaintiff’s

request for leave to serve additional interrogatories, filed on January 23, 2006.

Motion for TRO

Plaintiff has filed a wholly inadequate request for greater access to legal materials

and to the law library. He states very briefly that the library is open three days a week for four

hours a day and seeks eight hours of law library access “to research and prepare motions and

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 1 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 As to that motion for a TRO, construed as a motion for a protective order, plaintiff’s 1

request for the court to stay his transfer to another facility was denied. 

 In that order, plaintiff’s requests seeking, inter alia, mandatory law library access were

2

denied.

 This action proceeds on plaintiff’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated

3

when his mail was confiscated.

2

other pleadings.” Plaintiff does not provide any further clarification of his request; he does not

state how much time he has been allowed, nor does he provide any documentation to indicate

that he has somehow been limited in his access to the law library. On the very day he filed this

putative motion for a TRO, which the court construes as a motion for a protective order, plaintiff

filed no less than twelve other separate documents, according to the court’s docket, including an

opposition to a motion for summary judgment. 

The court construes plaintiff’s motion as a request for a protective order. As has

been noted in prior orders, filed on February 23, 2005, and on January 9, 2005, matters that go 1 2

to requests for procedures to be utilized within a litigation (if the requests are directed to a party)

are not injunctive relief requests. Matters appropriate for injunctive relief go to the merits of an

action. State of New York v. United States Metals Refining Co., 771 F.2d 796, 801 (3rd Cir.

1985). Plaintiff’s requests for a court order for law library access and for legal material for

purposes of litigating this case do not go to the merits of the instant complaint.

3

Local Rule 72-302 of the Eastern District of California permits magistrate judges

to handle all aspects of a prisoner’s case short of jury trial. It has also been interpreted as

authorizing magistrate judges to issue orders under § 636(b)(1)(A) for non-dispositive motions or

motions not involving injunctive relief. See also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673,

100 S. Ct. 2406, 2411 (1980) (magistrate judge may determine any pretrial matter except

“dispositive” motions). Therefore, the fact that parties are directed in their activities by a

magistrate judge cannot, without more, transform the matter at hand into an “injunctive” relief

matter governed by § 636(b)(1)(B). See, e.g., Grimes v. City and County of San Francisco, 951

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 2 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1991) (magistrate judge may compel a party to pay prospective sanctions of

$500.00 per day during period of non-compliance with discovery orders to ensure compliance). 

It is only when the “injunctive” relief sought goes to the merits of plaintiff’s actions or to

complete stays of an action that orders under § 636(b)(1)(A) are precluded. See, e.g., Reynaga v.

Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1992).

As plaintiff’s request does not go to the merits of plaintiff’s action, this matter

may be handled by court order. Plaintiff does not state that he is being impeded from the filing

of any specific motion or response to a motion in the instant case and in light of the vast quantity

of documents filed simultaneously with this protective order request, he can hardly do so. He

does not allege that he is being impeded from having regular access to the law library. He fails in

any way to demonstrate that, for the purposes of prosecuting this action, he is currently suffering

from any impediment. 

As before, plaintiff has not met his burden to show that he is being denied access

to the courts in having wholly failed to allege an actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,

362, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996). The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner alleging denial of

meaningful access to the courts must “demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or

legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (1996). To show a denial of access to the courts claim that might

warrant a protective order, plaintiff must “demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been

frustrated or was being impeded.” Id. Plaintiff has simply made an inadequate showing that, in

this case, he is being precluded or thwarted in his efforts to proceed. In short, plaintiff fails to

allege an actual injury sufficient to warrant intervention by this court in the form of a protective

order. The court will deny plaintiff’s insufficiently founded request. 

Motion to Serve Additional Discovery 

Plaintiff’s motion to serve additional interrogatories is untimely, as well as failing

to identify within the motion with adequate specificity the additional questions for which he

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 3 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 See Exhibit C to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 4

4

seeks answers. In addition, plaintiff has failed even to seek an extension of time or to provide

any basis for the court to consider any such extension. 

In the original scheduling order, issued on January 20, 2005, the deadline for

completion of discovery was set for May 5, 2005. On May 13, 2005, the court granted

defendants’ request for a modification of the scheduling order, due to a medical quarantine of

plaintiff (and other inmates) at the prison where he was incarcerated, resulting in defendants’

noticed deposition of plaintiff having been canceled. See defendants’ request to modify the

schedule, filed on May 10, 2005. In that modification order, the court extended the discovery

deadline solely for the purpose of allowing defendants to take plaintiff’s deposition, until either

August 31, 2005, or until one month after the quarantine was terminated. While the deadline for

the filing of dispositive motions was extended, as were the dates for the pretrial conference and

the jury trial, the deadline for the filing of motions related to discovery was not. Plaintiff’s

deposition was taken on August 23, 2005. Even had the parties inferred, despite the explicit 4

omission of any other extension of time for discovery in the scheduling modification order, that

the filing deadline with regard to discovery was extended until thirty days beyond the taking of

plaintiff’s delayed deposition, any such unauthorized deadline would not have reasonably

extended beyond September 30, 2005. Defendants’ timely motion for summary judgment was

filed on December 30, 2006, one day before the time for doing so expired, as extended in the

May 13, 2005, order. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to serve additional interrogatories, filed on

January 23, 2006, is denied as untimely. 

Amended Complaint 

The court sets forth the allegations of the first amended complaint as they were

presented in the Findings and Recommendations, filed on June 30, 3004 and adopted by Order,

filed on August 25, 2004, and again in the court’s Order, filed on January 9, 2006. This action

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 4 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The amended complaint was modified, dismissing unnamed staff as defendants, which 5

dismissal encompassed plaintiff’s putative claim to a denial of his right of access to the courts. 

See Order, filed on April 2, 2004, p. 3, and Findings and Recommendations, filed on August 18,

2003, adopted by Order filed on September 17, 2003. 

 Plaintiff goes on to allege that unnamed staff have deprived him of access to the courts

6

during lockdowns and “fog courts” but, as noted, these unspecified defendants have been

dismissed from this action. See also, Findings and Recommendations, filed on June 30, 2004, n.

4, adopted by Order, filed on August 25, 2004.

5

proceeds on an amended complaint, filed on January 30, 2003, against defendants Mail

Supervisor Nettleton and Warden Ramirez-Palmer. This action was originally filed on 5

November 8, 2002. Plaintiff alleges that, on June 28, 2001, defendant Nettleton intercepted mail

sent to plaintiff, sending instead a disposition form disallowing the mail, which had sentimental

value for him. First Amended Complaint (FAC), p. 5. Plaintiff has no disciplinary matter

pending against him that might prompt such an action. Defendant Nettleton has failed to follow

departmental policy as well as deprived plaintiff of his rights under the First, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff seeks the return/replacement of the photo(s) at issue and 6

monetary damages.

Motion for Summary Judgment

 Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set

forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) is met. “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if . . .

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct., 2548, 2553 (1986). “[W]here the

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 5 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. “[A] complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be

granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry

of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356

(1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may

not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its

contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11,

106 S. Ct. at 1356 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is

material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 6 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at 2513. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts

placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S.

at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the

opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct.

1356 (citation omitted).

On September 18, 2003, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Motion

Defendants move for summary judgment on the following grounds: 1) plaintiff’s

allegations do not concern defendant Ramirez-Palmer; 2) plaintiff cannot support a cause of

action against defendant Nettleton as a matter of law; 3) defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity. Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ), p. 3. 

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 7 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

The following facts are undisputed (defendants’ separate statement of undisputed

facts in support of defendants’ motion for summary judgment (DSSUF)): plaintiff is a state

prisoner, who at all times relevant to this action, was in the custody of the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) at California Medical Facility (CMF)-Vacaville. 

DSSUF # 1. During the time relevant for this action, defendant Ramirez-Palmer was employed

by CDCR as CMF’s warden. DSSUF # 2. Defendant Nettleton, at the time relevant for this

action, was employed by CDCR as a correctional officer at CMF, whose duties involved

inspecting inmate mail pursuant to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. DSSUF #’s 4

& 5. All incoming packages and mail addressed to an inmate were opened and inspected before

delivery. The purpose of the inspection was to prevent inmates from receiving contraband as

well as to record the receipt of permitted personal property. DSSUF # 6. If contraband was

discovered, the item was confiscated and the inmate was properly notified. Furthermore, the

inmate was advised that he must direct mailroom staff regarding the disposition of the property

within 15 days. DSSUF # 7. Because inmates were not allowed to promote, further, or assist any

gang, an inmates’ possession of photographs which contain gang-related activity was prohibited,

and such photographs were treated as contraband. DSSUF # 8. On or about June 28, 2001,

defendant Nettleton authorized the withholding of three photographs mailed to plaintiff because

he deemed them to contain gang-related activity. DSSUF # 9. On June 28, 2001, plaintiff

received a mail disposition form, indicating that three photographs were being withheld because

they contained gang related activity. Plaintiff was instructed to advise the mailroom staff, within

15 days, whether he wanted the pictures destroyed or mailed to someone, the bottom of the form

expressly stating: “NOTE: All mail disposition forms not returned to mailroom within 15 days

from the date of notice will result in mail being destroyed.” DSSUF # 10. Plaintiff knew the

photos would be destroyed after 15 days. DSSUF # 11. Plaintiff’s last day to respond to the mail

disposition form was July 13, 2001. DSSUF # 12. On August 22, 2001, plaintiff submitted a

grievance to Correctional Officer (C/O) Rick Forester, regarding the photos. In the grievance,

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 8 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3193(b) sets forth as follows: 7

“The department shall accept liability for the loss or destruction of

inmate personal property when it is established that such loss or

destruction results from employee action. Inmates shall utilize the

inmate appeal process if unable to resolve a personal property

claim pursuant to section 3084.1. Upon acceptance of liability, the

department shall provide similar items of equal or greater value to

the inmate when such items are available via donated property

items consistent with sections 3084.7(e) and 3191(c). If donated

items are not available, monetary compensation to the inmate for

such loss shall not exceed either the dollar value assigned to the

item or items at the time the inmate received authorization to

possess the property; the cost of the item, verified by receipt; or the

replacement value for the item or a similar item, as determined by

the department. Staff recommendations to the Victim

Compensation and Government Claims Board regarding monetary

reimbursement will be made accordingly.”

9

plaintiff claims that he previously sent a grievance to defendant Nettleton on June 29, 2001. 

DSSUF # 13. Plaintiff has never seen the photographs. DSSUF # 16. Plaintiff is aware that

CDCR has a policy to pay for the loss or destruction of inmate personal property, pursuant to

CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3193. DSSUF # 17. 7

Opposition

By his opposition, plaintiff disputes the following facts set forth by defendants as

undisputed: that his allegations with respect to defendant Ramirez-Palmer are not related to the

disposal of his photographs (DSSUF # 3); he also disputes that defendant Nettleton never

received a grievance from plaintiff on any matter (DSSUF # 14) and refutes the implication that

he (plaintiff) did not send back a completed mail disposition form to Nettleton when Nettleton

says that he did not receive the completed form back from plaintiff indicating plaintiff’s

preference for disposition of the photos (DSSUF # 15). (In addition, plaintiff purports to dispute

DSSUF #’s 8, 11, and 16, but either provides an insufficient basis therefore, or fails to refute the

evidence of his own testimony, as discussed infra). Opp., p. 6. 

Plaintiff avers that he filed a 602 appeal on June 29, 2001, after defendant

Nettleton had authorized the withholding of a letter, legal materials, and three photos mailed to

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 9 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Judicial notice may be taken of court records. Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 8

F.R.D. 626, 635 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126

(1981).

 The court, therein, adjudicated defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

9

administrative remedies.

 Plaintiff filed a “petition,” in the instant action, file-stamped November 8, 2002, many 10

months after the incident at issue and after the photos had apparently been disposed of, alleging

generally that Vacaville State Prison staff failed to allow him access to the courts. This court’s

present review of the initial filing indicates that plaintiff did include a vague allegation that

defendant Nettleton had disallowed plaintiff’s mail on or about June 28, 2001, in contravention

10

plaintiff on June 28, 2001. Opp., p. 3. Plaintiff also contends that he had C/O Hughes contact

defendant Nettleton by phone in June, 2001, and that he submitted numerous request forms to

speak to Nettleton (which he does not date), which went unanswered; he also asserts that he

responded to the mail disposition form on July 13, 2001. Id. & Exh. 3, plaintiff’s declaration. 

The court takes judicial notice that in its June 30, 2004, Findings and Recommendations, p. 5, 8 9

adopted by Order filed on August 25, 2004, the undersigned noted that a copy of a 602 inmate

appeal form signed by plaintiff and dated June 29, 2001, a day after plaintiff’s receipt of the mail

disposition form, contained no log number or any other indication that it was ever processed and

that plaintiff also averred that not only did he send the 602 timely but also had officers call the

mail room about the incident at issue. Both defendants and plaintiff also include a copy of the

unlogged June 29, 2001, 602 inmate appeal as an exhibit to the motion and opposition herein. 

MSJ, Exh. E , p. 2; Opp., Exh. 1, p. 4. 

In his current opposition to the summary judgment motion, when plaintiff was

notified that Rick Forester was in charge of the mail room, he states that he sent several inmate

requests for an interview to Forester and received a ducat for an interview in July, 2001. Opp., p.

3. He asserts, however, incorrectly as far as this action is concerned, that he filed a petition in the

court in July, 2001, in order to obtain an order preventing defendants from destroying his mail

and pictures. Nor does plaintiff declaring that he filed such a petition in this court on that date

make it so. See, Opp., Exh. 3, plaintiff’s declaration. In the exhibits to his opposition, plaintiff 10

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 10 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

of departmental policy. The filing was signed by plaintiff and dated November 3, 2002, which

even by application of the mailbox rule, comes nowhere near to being July, 2001. The “petition”

was properly construed as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and was dismissed with leave

granted to file an amended complaint. See Order, filed on January 22, 2003. 

11

includes in addition to the June 29, 2001, appeal, copies of an inmate request for interview, dated

9/26/01; copies of an inmate appeal rejection form, dated both 9/21/01 and 9/28/01, with the

comment from appeals coordinator M. Cry, that an appeal about mail is processed automatically

to the second level “per OP 47" and CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3084 and should have been

forwarded to Cry’s office “immediately” and not three months later. Opp., Exh. 1, pp. 1-2. 

Plaintiff’s undated request for interview, in apparent response to the rejection, states that he sent

in an appeal (the June 29, 2001, unprocessed appeal) as soon as he received the mail disposition

form and, when he did not receive the 602 back, sent an inmate request for interview which “can

be verified through the ducats.” Id., p. 3. Plaintiff includes another request for interview, dated

12/10/02, stating that he had sent in an appeal dated 11/06/02 to which no response has been

forthcoming; plaintiff does not include a copy of that appeal. Id., p. 5. Plaintiff includes an

undated copy of a rejection of an appeal, indicating that plaintiff had failed to first resolve the

matter informally; it is not made clear that this was a form returned with respect to the June 29,

2001, appeal. The other appeal or grievance form copies plaintiff includes are dated in the year

2004, and are therefore irrelevant to the gravamen of this action. Moreover, of the exhibits he

has provided, only the June 29, 2001, appeal would have been a timely response to the mail

disposition form. Even the August 22, 2001, appeal defendants submit (MSJ, Exh. E, p. 1),

which plaintiff sent to Rick Forester, references a conversation with him on August 4, 2001,

concerning his mail, which itself is a date beyond the 15 days that plaintiff was notified within

which to respond. He does refer to the June 29, 2001, grievance to defendant Nettleton to which

he avers Nettleton refused to respond, but that is a separate issue from whether or not his August

22, 2001, appeal could have been timely, which plainly, standing alone it could not have. 

\\\\\

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 11 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Plaintiff did not file any motion to compel discovery. 11

 Neither of his “oppositions” to responses to his first set of interrogatories set forth 12

either any interrogatories or the responses thereto.

12

Plaintiff has also submitted, as part of his opposition to the motion for summary

judgment his objections to defendants’ discovery responses, in an effort to demonstrate that

defendants’ apparent evasiveness militates for a finding that defendants are not forthcoming as 11

to the timing of his appeals or attempted entreaties to defendant Nettleton, entitled respectively,

“Opposition to defendant Nettleton’s response to plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories,”

“Opposition to defendants’ response to plaintiff’s first request for production of documents,”

“Opposition to defendant Nettleton’s response to plaintiff’s first request [sic] for admissions,”

“Opposition to defendant Nettleton’s response to plaintiff’s first set [sic] of admissions,” and a

repeated “Opposition to defendant Nettleton’s response to plaintiff’s first set of

interrogatories.” The difficulty in submitting these “oppositions” or objections to defendants’

12

discovery responses is that plaintiff does not fully set forth the requests nor are the requests

always coherent. For example, without including request nos. 1, 2, or 3, the

responses/production to which he evidently did not an objection, plaintiff seeks, in request for

production no. 4:

Copies of any and all documents other than those described in

request no. 1 and 2, and 3 which contain, mention or discuss

previous request or information by any employee’s [sic]

concerning handling of plaintiff’s mail.

Defendant objected to this request, according to plaintiff, on the grounds of, inter alia,

incomprehensibility, a characterization that is not without foundation on the face of it. On the

other hand, when plaintiff in his first set of requests for admissions asked defendant Nettleton to

admit, among other things, that he had received the June 29, 2001, 602 appeal, plaintiff sets forth

the relevant portion of the response:

\\\\\

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 12 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Because plaintiff does not include the actual response, but has apparently copied the 13

responses by hand, the court is unable to discern the ultimate accuracy of his submissions.

13

Defendant Nettleton does not recall whether he received an inmate

appeal from plaintiff, he does not have possession, custody, or

control of any documents that refresh his recollection, and he is

therefore unable to admit or deny that part of this request for

admission. 

Similarly, in his responses to requests for admission nos. 2 and 3, when plaintiff

seeks an admission that defendant Nettleton received a phone call from an Officer Hughes

regarding plaintiff in July 2001, (a request which suffers from some vagueness), according to

plaintiff, and when plaintiff asks Nettleton to admit that, on August 4, 2001, mail room staff 13

member Rick Foster (identified elsewhere as “Forester”) contacted him concerning plaintiff’s

602 and the mail disposition form, Nettleton issues neither a forthright denial or an admission,

but claims no recollection. Notwithstanding his faulty recollection as to these points, defendant

Nettleton is evidently sufficiently confident with respect to a request for admission (no. 5),

asking him to admit that he refused to answer the alleged June 29, 2001, 602 appeal from

plaintiff that he is able to deny straightforwardly that he refused to answer an appeal from

plaintiff. Moreover, in his affidavit, while defendant Nettleton declares that he did not receive

the mail disposition form setting forth his preference as to the disposition of the photos, nor did

he ever receive a 602 appeal from plaintiff with respect to any matter, he makes no reference

whatever to whether or not any officers communicated with him with respect to this matter. In

the reply to plaintiff’s opposition wherein plaintiff references claims to have made, in addition to

the unlogged appeal, numerous requests for interviews and attempts to contact defendant through

officers (Forester) & (), while defendant argues that there is no evidence that plaintiff contacted

Nettleton before the photographs were destroyed, Nettleton does not take the opportunity to

unequivocally declare that he was never contacted or otherwise made aware of plaintiff’s efforts

to communicate with him in the time prior to the disposition of the photos. 

\\\\\

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 13 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

Discussion

Defendant Ramirez-Palmer

Defendants contend that plaintiff does not have standing to allege an injury as to

defendant Ramirez-Palmer, as his allegations with respect to the disposal of his photographs do

not concern her, thus he is unable to allege an injury he suffered in relation to her conduct. MSJ,

pp. 5-6. Plaintiff, however, argues in his opposition that both defendants Nettleton and RamirezPalmer failed to follow departmental policies, depriving him of his constitutional rights under the

First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the manner of the disposal of the photos. Opp., p. 2. 

The problem for plaintiff is that in his deposition response with respect to his claim against

defendant Ramirez-Palmer, he denies that his allegations against her relate to the only claim

remaining in this action – the claim relating to his confiscated mail. See MSJ, Exh. C, plaintiff’s

deposition, 31:19 -32:19:

Q. Because - - so the reason that Ana Ramirez-Palmer is named in

the Complaint as a defendant is not related to the holding of the

mail?

A. No.

Q. It’s related to your alleged access - - denial of access to court?

A. Correct.

Q. And one is for alleged denial of access to court due to

lockdowns and fog counts; right?

A. Correct.

Q. And the - - of the two defendants, Defendant Nettleton is only

related to the claim regarding the mail.

A. Correct.

Q. Nettleton has nothing to do with your denial of access to

courts?

A. No, he doesn’t. Not that I know of, no.

Q. And you’re not alleging anything in your Complaint against

Nettleton on that claim, right?

A. No.

Q. And the only claim against Ramirez-Palmer has to do with the

alleged denial of access to court?

A. Correct.

Q. All right. Ramirez-Palmer is not involved with the mail?

A. No, not that I know of, no.

As has been noted above, plaintiff’s denial of access to the courts claim was

dismissed and plaintiff has been proceeding only as to his allegations regarding the confiscation

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 14 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

of his mail. To the extent plaintiff ever intended to proceed on this claim against defendant

Ramirez-Palmer, whether construed as an abandonment of any such allegation against this

defendant or clarifying that he never intended to implicate Ramirez-Palmer in his mail

confiscation claim, his sworn deposition testimony is sufficiently unequivocal that that claim

relates only to defendant Nettleton. 

While plaintiff attempts to resurrect the claim with respect to Ramirez-Palmer in

his opposition, he provides no foundation for reviving the allegation with respect to this

defendant, nor does he explain the evidence of his own testimony against the allegation. Reply,

p. 5; Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806, 119 S. Ct. 197 (1999)

(party must do more than simply contradict his own previous sworn statement to survive

summary judgment). In this case, plaintiff does not even acknowledge the contradiction. 

Plaintiff has not met the burden, shifted to him in the face of defendants’ evidence of plaintiff’s

own deposition testimony, to defeat defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to defendant

Ramirez-Palmer, and the court finds that, as to defendant Ramirez-Palmer, defendants are

entitled to summary judgment.

Defendant Nettleton

Although plaintiff submits no declaration, letter or statement from, for example,

C/O Hughes warranting that plaintiff did call Nettleton on plaintiff’s behalf in June 2001,

nevertheless, as to defendant Nettleton, plaintiff has raised an issue of fact as to whether or not he

had any communication from any of the sources plaintiff has stated by which he sought to

contact Nettleton in a timely fashion about the photographs, a fact which defendant has simply

not adequately disputed. On the other hand, what plaintiff has failed to demonstrate, by any

credible evidence, is precisely what the photographs were. While he has set forth in his own

declaration (Opp., Exh. 3) that “plaintiff’s wife sent him the letter, legal material and photo’s

[sic],” such evidence is hearsay at best (given that he did not actually receive anything, he could

only have “known” what was sent to him if someone told him); he fails to submit any declaration

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 15 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

from her setting forth, under penalty of perjury, exactly what was contained in the package she

apparently sent. In addition to failing to file a supporting affidavit other than his own, that is,

from a person who had actual knowledge of the contents at issue, plaintiff has not documented

any phone call or even provided any letter from the sender of the package at issue as to precisely

what photographs were in the package. It is undisputed that plaintiff did not see the photographs;

it is undisputed that defendant Nettleton deemed them to be contraband and it is undisputed that

the photographs were destroyed or otherwise disposed of. No proof beyond defendants’ affidavit

(and the copy of the mail disposition form) exists as to what was pictured in the photographs. 

The mail disposition form plaintiff received, signed by defendant Nettleton and dated 6/28/01,

had the following box checked: “Gang activity: ‘Inmates and Parolees shall not knowingly

promote, further, or assist any gang.’ (Title 15, § 3023).” The following notation is made by

hand on the form beside the checked line: “1 of 3 signs picture.” MSJ, Defendants’ Exh. D. 

Plaintiff has sworn under oath that he never saw the mail at issue, but is “only

going by what I was told of what was sent to me, of what I had requested was to be sent to me,”

including two pictures of his children and photos of his mother, the item of particular sentimental

value being any photo of his mother; he refers to his children as “still living,” so that the loss of

those pictures did not concern him so much. See defendants’ Exh. C, plaintiff’s dep., 13:16-25. 

He reiterates that he has never seen the photographs at a later point, indicating that he does not

know precisely which children were pictured. Id., 22:6-20. 

Plaintiff is claiming that his First Amendment rights were violated because, in

essence, he is not a gang member or affiliated with a gang and the photographs were innocent

family photos. Plaintiff has a First Amendment right to receive innocuous photographs of his

mother and children; however, if the photographs instead were, indeed, contraband, his

constitutional rights could not have been infringed, a point with which he does not take issue. 

Under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987), “when a prison regulation

impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 16 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

legitimate penological interests.”

As to his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, plaintiff is claiming 

a violation of his constitutional due process rights by defendant Nettleton’s actions in disposing

of his photos, allegedly without complying with the appropriate prison regulation. Defendant

declares that he inspected inmate mail in 2001, pursuant to Cal. Code Regs. tit. xv, §§ 3023,

3130-3147, without further specifying the applicable provisions. MSJ, Nettleton Dec., Exh. A.

Section 3023 sets forth, inter alia, that gangs present a serious safety and security

threat to prisons in California and that inmates are prohibited from knowingly promoting,

furthering or assisting any gang. Among the referenced procedures, §§ 3130-3147, governing the

processing of mail, § 3137 allows for inmates to appeal within 15 days through the inmate

grievance procedure, § 3084.1, “a notice that mail is being designated as undelivered....” Cal.

Code Regs. tit. xv, § 3137(b). To do so “will postpone any disposition of the mail until an appeal

decision is made at the second level of appeal review.” Id. Thereafter, only if the appeal is

denied at the second level, will the mail be disposed of per § 3147(a)(5)(B). 

Under § 3138(b), all packages and mail addressed to an inmate are to be opened

and inspected prior to delivery, the purpose of which is, inter alia, “to prevent the introduction of

contraband.” There appears to be an exception, under § 3138(d)(1) to the regulation holding

them pending appeal under § 3147(a)(5)(B), as to packages which an “inmate is not qualified to

receive”; such packages may be disposed of under § 3147(a)(5). Under § 3147(5)(B):

Incoming mail disallowed under the provisions of this article,

under facility procedures, or pursuant to an appeal, shall be

destroyed or mailed at the inmate’s expense to an approved outside

correspondent. The undelivered mail shall be destroyed 15 days

after notification of undelivered mail is forwarded to the inmate

unless the inmate designates who is to receive the mail and

authorizes withdrawal from their trust account to pay for the

expense of mailing, or as authorized by the institution head,

provides sufficient postage stamps already in the inmate’s

possession.

 M. Cry’s response to plaintiff’s 9/26/01, appeal/request indicates that plaintiff’s appeal was an

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 17 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

automatic second level appeal but was untimely by some three months; on the other hand,

plaintiff’s unlogged June 29, 2001, appeal was apparently (though not conclusively shown here)

rejected for plaintiff’s having failed to proceed first through the informal level. However, even

assuming defendant (or others) improperly processed plaintiff’s grievance, plaintiff does not

make an adequate showing of anything greater than negligence. 

To the extent that the procedure for disposing of plaintiff’s photographs was

authorized, plaintiff simply has not shown any entitlement to due process based on even a failure

to comply fully with state regulations, even had he adequately demonstrated that that is what

occurred. Plaintiff is correct that prisoners may not be deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process. Opp., p. 8, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S. Ct. 2963,

2974 (1974); however, the cases cited in that decision in support of that proposition speak to,

inter alia, the process that is due prior to being placed in disciplinary confinement, see, e.g.,

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972) or have been overruled, e.g., Wilwording v.

Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S. Ct. 407 (which, inter alia, did not require exhaustion of

administrative exhaustion of prisoner’s civil rights claims), overruled in Woodford v. Ngo, __

U.S. ___ , 126 S. Ct. 2378 (2006). Plaintiff cites Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728 (9 Cir. 1974), th

which recognizes the property rights of state prisoners; see also, Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d

1071 (9 Cir. 2003). However, plaintiff has provided insufficient evidence that the state th

procedures themselves for dealing with the processing of mail deemed contraband violates due

process or that he was deprived of due process on the occasion of the loss of photos he never

saw. 

State regulations give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause

of the federal constitution only if those regulations pertain to “freedom from restraint” that

“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 18 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 “[W]e recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests 14

which are protected by the Due Process Clause. See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S.

369, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987). But these interests will be generally limited to

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as

to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones,

445 U.S. 480, 493, 100 S.Ct.1254, 1263-1264 (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington, 494

U.S. 210, 221- 222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037 (involuntary administration of psychotropic

drugs), nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, supra. 

19

prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); see also, 14

Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 999 (9 Cir. 2006). A recent Ninth Circuit case has found that th

a state law must satisfy two requirements such that a liberty interest protected by the federal

constitution is raised: “the law must set forth ‘substantive predicates’ to govern official decision

making’ and... it must contain explicitly mandatory language....’” which interests are generally

limited pursuant to Sandin, supra. Myron v. Terhune, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2242352 *2 (9th

Cir. Aug. 2006). Even assuming the requisite mandatory language in the state regulations

governing processing/disposition of mail, at most, as noted, plaintiff has demonstrated that

defendant Nettleton may have been negligent in his conduct, which does not rise to constitutional

deprivation implicating due process. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S. Ct. 662

(1986).

To the extent that plaintiff continues to allege that he was denied to due process

because defendant’s actions were unauthorized and intentional, the United States Supreme Court

has held that “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not

constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Thus, where the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation

remedy, only authorized, intentional deprivations constitute actionable violations of the Due

Process Clause. An authorized deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state

procedures, regulations, or statutes. Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985);

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 19 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

20

see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). The California

Legislature has provided a remedy for tort claims against public officials in the California

Government Code, §§ 900, et seq. In addition, defendants have pointed out that CDCR has a

policy for compensating inmates for the loss of their personal property, under CAL. CODE REGS.

tit.xv, § 3193.

This court finds that plaintiff cannot dispute any genuine issue of material fact

with respect to the confiscation and disposition of his mail/photographs by defendant Nettleton

and can demonstrate thereby, at most, negligence but not the violation of any constitutional right. 

The court will recommend that summary judgment be entered for defendant Nettleton.

 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s January 23, 2006, motion for a temporary restraining order,

construed as a motion for a protective order, is denied; and

2. Plaintiff’s belated motion for leave to file additional interrogatories, filed on

January 23, 2006, is denied as untimely.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, filed on December 30, 2005, be granted and judgment be entered for

defendants.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

\\\\\

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 20 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

21

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 8/11/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

gord2474.msj

Case 2:02-cv-02454-GEB-GGH Document 102 Filed 08/11/06 Page 21 of 21