Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04192/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04192-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE BAUTISTA-PEREZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PETER KEISLER, Acting Attorney

General and MICHAEL CHERTOFF,

Secretary of Homeland Security,

Defendants.

NO. C 07-4192 TEH 

ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION

This matter came before the Court on October 15, 2007 on Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction. This class action for declaratory and injunctive relief challenges

the Department of Homeland Security’s policy of allegedly charging fees totaling more

than the $50.00 fee permitted by statute as a condition of registering for “Temporary

Protective Status.” Plaintiffs’ motion seeks to enjoin Defendants from charging more

than a $50.00 fee, and specifically, to enjoin the Defendants from charging an additional

fee for collection of biometric information. For the reasons set out below, the Court finds

that although Plaintiffs have made a strong showing of probability of success on the

merits, they have not shown that they or other members of the putative class will suffer

irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the motion for

preliminary injunction is DENIED.

//

//

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STATUTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Immigration Act of 1990 established a procedure whereby the government

could provide temporary protection to aliens in the U.S. who were forced to flee their

homelands because of natural disaster, civil strife and armed conflict, or other

extraordinary and temporary conditions. The Secretary of Homeland Security may grant

“Temporary Protective Status” (“TPS”) to nationals of certain countries temporarily

designated under the statute, which allows those nationals to stay in the United States and

obtain work authorization for the period their home country is so designated. 8 U.S.C. §

1254a(a)(1), (a)(1)(B); 6 U.S.C. § 557 (Secretary).

Once a country is designated for TPS, nationals of that country can register for

benefits under TPS. To establish eligibility for TPS, an applicant must establish, among

other things, that he or she is a national of the country designated for TPS, has been

continuously physically present and resided in the United States since the effective date

of designation, and is otherwise admissible as an immigrant (although certain grounds of

inadmissibility can be waived). 8 C.F.R. §§ 244.2, 244.3(a), 1244.3(a); 8 U.S.C. §

1254a(c)(2)(A). The government can deny an applicant TPS on the basis of the

applicant’s criminal history. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(A); (c)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. §§ 244.3(c),

244.4, 1244.3(c), 1244.4.

 El Salvador was designated for Temporary Protective Status after the January,

2001 earthquake. Since then, the Attorney General and, later, the Secretary of Homeland

Security have extended the designation multiple times; the most recent extension will

expire on March 9, 2009. 72 Fed.Reg. 46649-01 (August 21, 2007). Honduras and

Nicaragua were designated for TPS in 1999. The most recent extension of their

designations will expire on January 5, 2009. 72 Fed.Reg. 29529-02 and 29534-01 (May

29, 2007).

The statute at the core of this case limits the registration fee for TPS to $50.00. 

Title 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(B) provides:

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Registration fee

The Attorney General may require payment of a reasonable fee as a condition of

registering an alien under subparagraph (A)(iv) (including providing an alien

with an "employment authorized" endorsement or other appropriate work permit

under this section). The amount of any such fee shall not exceed $50. In the case

of aliens registered pursuant to a designation under this section made after July 17,

1991, the Attorney General may impose a separate, additional fee for

providing an alien with documentation of work authorization. Notwithstanding

section 3302 of Title 31, all fees collected under this subparagraph shall be

credited to the appropriation to be used in carrying out this section.

(emphasis added).

However, regulations governing TPS require applicants to pay more than just a

$50.00 registration fee and a work authorization fee. See 8 C.F.R. § 244. The

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS” or “Homeland Security”) requires individuals

who wish to obtain TPS to file: 

1) an application form I-821 and extensive supporting documentation. 8

C.F.R. §§ 244.6, 244.9;

2) a registration fee for TPS of $50.00. 8 C.F.R. § 107.3(b)(fee for form I-821 not to exceed $50.00); 72 Fed. Reg. 29529, 29531 (May 29,

2007); 72 Fed. Reg. 29534, 29536 (May 29, 2007); 72 Fed. Reg.

46649-01 (August 21, 2007)(extensions of designation for Honduras,

Nicaragua, and El Salvador, respectively, setting fee at $50.00); 

3) an application for employment authorization, if desired, and a $340.00

fee for documentation of work authorization. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.7(b),

244.6; and 

4) a “biometrics services fee” for applicants over 14. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.7(b)(1), 244.6. (The biometrics fee, previously set at $70.00, was

raised to $80.00 on July 30, 2007. 72 Fed. Reg. 29851, 29873 (May

30, 2007)). 

Homeland Security charges the “biometrics services fee” for processing of fingerprints,

photographs, and electronic signatures used for background and security checks and

identity verification, and for storage and maintenance of the information so collected. 

Declaration of Barbara Velarde, Chief of Service Center Operations for the United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security (“Velarde

Decl.”) ¶¶ 7, 18; see also 72 Fed. Reg. 29851, 29857 (May 30, 2007)(discussing uses of

biometrics fee). 

Although aliens are required to re-register for TPS whenever a country is reCase 3:07-cv-04192-TEH Document 40 Filed 10/17/07 Page 3 of 13
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designated, Homeland Security collects the $50.00 TPS registration fee only once. 8

C.F.R. § 244.17(a); 72 Fed.Reg. 46649, 46650 (August 21, 2007)(explaining fee structure

for El Salvador re-registration); Velarde Decl. ¶ 13. However, aliens are required to pay

a new biometrics fee (and work authorization document fee) for each re-registration. 72

Fed.Reg. 46649, 46650 (August 21, 2007); Velarde Decl. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs allege, and

DHS admits, that it requires applicants to pay the biometrics fee even if Homeland

Security does not need updated biometric information. 

* * *

Plaintiffs are foreign nationals from Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua who

currently have TPS. They allege they have been required to remit fees totaling over

$50.00 on multiple occasions as they re-register for TPS, even though their biometric data

was being reused. They claim that because 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(B) provides that the

fee charged by DHS “as a condition of registering” for TPS is “not to exceed” $50.00, the

$70.00 or $80.00 biometric services fee DHS charges them is unlawful. The Plaintiffs’ 

class action Complaint, brought on behalf of all nationals of El Salvador, Honduras, and

Nicaragua who submitted applications to register for TPS and were required to pay fees

of more than $50.00, seeks an order declaring the additional fee unlawful, enjoining DHS

from imposing fees over $50.00, and requiring Defendants to refund all fees over $50.00

paid by class members. This Motion for Preliminary Injunction, brought by nationals of

El Salvador who have not yet re-registered for TPS or paid a biometric services fee under

the most recent re-designation of El Salvador, seeks solely an order enjoining DHS from

charging Plaintiffs and other class members more than $50.00 for TPS registration,

including collection of biometric information.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD

Ordinarily, a party seeking preliminary injunction must meet “one of two

standards, described in this circuit as ‘traditional’ and ‘alternative.’” Burlington Northern

R. Co. v. Department of Revenue of State of Wash., 934 F.2d 1064, 1074 n.6 (9th Cir.

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1991), quoting Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1987). Under the traditional

test, a preliminary injunction should issue when a plaintiff shows “(1) a strong likelihood

of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary

relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement

of the public interest (in certain cases).” Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.

Winter, F.3d , 2007 WL 2481465, *2 (9th Cir. August 31, 2007); Los Angeles

Memorial Coliseum Comm’n. v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.

1980). Under an alternative test, plaintiff must demonstrate “either a combination of

probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious

questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.” Lands

Council v. Martin (Lands Council II), 479 F.3d 636, 639 (9th Cir. 2007); Clear Channel

Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003). These two

formulations “represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of

irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases.” Paramount Land Co.

LP v. California Pistachio Com'n, 491 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2007).

ANALYSIS

Although Plaintiffs have shown a high likelihood of success on the merits, they

have not shown a likelihood of irreparable injury or that other factors weigh in their favor. 

In short, they have not met their burden of demonstrating entitlement to “the

extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction at an early stage of the litigation, before

the defendant has had the opportunity to undertake extensive discovery or develop its

defenses.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 714 (9th Cir. 2007).

I. Likelihood of Success On The Merits

DHS argues that its policies and procedures comply with § 1254a(c)(1)(B) because

applicants for TPS are, in fact, charged only a one-time $50.00 registration fee. DHS

views the $80.00 biometric service fee as falling outside the ambit of § 1254a(c)(1)(B)

because it “serves an entirely different purpose” than a registration fee: it is used for

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running the biometric data program, identity checks, FBI background checks, and related

functions. DHS argues this ostensibly reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference

under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

842 (1984). See United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007), citing

Chevron (if Congress has not spoken on the question at issue, court should defer to

agency’s permissible construction of statute). 

Deference is not warranted here. First, the statute is scarcely silent on the issue of

fees: the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(B) unambiguously prohibits fees “as a

condition of registering” for TPS of over $50.00. The requirements of the TPS statute

show that collecting fingerprints, photographs, and signatures to identify applicants and

do background checks is an integral part of the registration process. The registration fee

is the fee charged “as a condition of registering an alien under subparagraph (A)(iv).” 

Subsection (A)(iv), in turn, requires the applicant to register to the “extent and in the

manner which the Attorney General establishes.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(iv). 

Regulations require applicants to submit fingerprints on Form FD-258, collected by the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(e), 244.6. The

$80.00 biometrics fee is charged for the fingerprinting process. 8 C.F.R. §

103.7(b)(1)(“A service fee of $80 will be charged for any individual who is required to

have biometric information captured in connection with an application or petition for

certain immigration and naturalization benefits (other than asylum), and whose residence

is in the United States”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1)(every form that requires

fingerprints on FD-258 must be submitted with the service fee). Another regulation

incorporates immigration form instructions into the regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1),

and the TPS application, Form I-821, requires biometric data. In short, DHS charges the

biometrics fee for forms that are required “as a condition of registering” an alien for TPS. 

Moreover, the TPS statute itself requires the applicant to establish he or she is

from a designated country and that he or she has not been convicted of a disqualifying

criminal offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A), (c)(2). Since the biometric information is

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 1 It provided that “The Attorney General may require payment of a reasonable fee as a condition

of registering an alien under subparagraph (A)(iv) (including providing an alien with an

'employment authorized' endorsement or other appropriate work permit under this section). The

amount of any such fee shall not exceed $50.” Id.

 2 The amendment provided that “In the case of aliens registered pursuant to a designation under

this section made after July 17, 1991, the Attorney General may impose a separate, additional fee

for providing an alien with documentation of work authorization.” Id.

7

used for background checks that go directly to the applicant’s criminal history, collecting

biometric information should be considered part of the registration process. In fact, in a

recent final rule increasing the biometrics services fee, Homeland Security noted that 

Background checks are an integral part of determining the applicant's eligibility for

a benefit, and thus, their costs are appropriate for full recovery through a fee. Were

it not for the underlying application or petition for immigration benefits, these

specific security checks would not have been conducted.

“Adjustment of the Immigration and Naturalization Benefit Application and Petition Fee

Schedule, 72 Fed.Reg. 29851, 29866 (July 30, 2007). 

Second, although Homeland Security argues that the statute does not expressly bar

a biometrics fee, the fact that it limits the registration fee to $50.00, but gives explicit

permission to charge an extra fee solely for employment authorization documents strongly

suggests that other fees are not permitted. As originally passed in the Immigration Act of

1990, section 1254a(c)(1)(B) allowed only a $50.00 registration fee (including any fee for

work authorization). Pub L. No. 101-649, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5030 (1990).1

 In

1991, Congress added the language allowing an additional fee for a work authorization

document. Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of

1991, § 304(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat 1773 (1991).2

 However, although the

government has always required applicants to submit fingerprints, see, e.g., 8 C.F.R.

240.6 (1992), the statute has never been amended to allow a separate fee for collecting

biometric information. By the principle of statutory construction “expressio unius est

exclusio alterius,” Congress’s listing of one permissible additional fee indicates it

intended to exclude other fees. See Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307,

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 3 It appears that before then, the cost of fingerprinting services and background checks was

incorporated into the INS’s various immigration fees (which, under 8 U.S.C. § 1356(m), fund

immigration services). For example, one of the rationales for raising those fees in 1991 was that

“[t]he significant cost of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) fingerprint and record checks

required for many types of applications and petitions have, since 1990, been paid for by the

Examinations Fee Account. These costs were previously absorbed by the FBI.” INS/EOIR Fee

Review, 56 Fed. Reg. 12647 (April 11, 1991).

8

1312-1313 (9th Cir. 1992); see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432

(1987)(when Congress includes certain language in one part of a statute but omits it from

another, Congress is presumed to act intentionally and purposely in doing so). 

The history of the biometrics service fee itself is also instructive. The government

first began collecting a fee for fingerprinting services in 1998, after Congress passed a

statute limiting what entities could collect fingerprints for immigration purposes. 

Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub L. 105-119, 111 Stat 2440 (November 26, 1997). 

Implementing regulations set the initial fee at $25.00, with a fee analysis “to determine

the full cost to the service of fingerprinting individuals for immigration benefits” to

follow. 63 Fed. Reg. 12979, 12981 (March 17, 1998).3

 Since that time, fees have

increased, and the regulation requiring a fee “for fingerprinting by the service” was

changed to a fee “for capturing biometric information” in 2004. 69 Fed.Reg. 20528,

20534 (April 15, 2004). In other words, the increased cost of fingerprinting, and now, of

capturing even more elaborate electronic biometric information, has come to pass long

after the $50.00 fee limit was imposed by Congress in 1991.

Homeland Security claims that this fact – that § 1254a(c)(1)(B) was written before

“important developments in the need and capability of the Agency to capture and use

biometrics in administering the Agency’s programs” – weighs in its favor. It argues that

it used its expertise to determine it needed a separate fee schedule to offset the costs of

performing its newly onerous and complex functions, and that therefore its interpretation

of the statute as not prohibiting separate fees is all the more reasonable. But Homeland

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 This “surcharge” on other applicants for services rendered to asylum applicants and others was

repealed briefly in 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, § 457, and reinstated in 2003, Pub L. 108-7, § 107. 

9

Security’s need to collect expensive biometric information does not make its strained

interpretation of the statute any more reasonable, or give it license to ignore the statute’s

plain meaning. Congress could have allowed the government to charge a “reasonable”

fee that could be adjusted for rising costs or other changed circumstances (as it did in the

original and slightly different TPS program for nationals of El Salvador in 1990,

Immigration Act of 1990 § 303(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978). It did not. 

The statute is clear, and changed circumstances (or costs) do not alter the plain language

limiting fees to $50.00. 

Finally, DHS argues that the biometrics services fee is separate because nearly all

applicants for any immigration benefit are required to pay it. 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b). But

the regulation must comply with the authorizing statute, and cannot, in itself, provide a

rationale for contradicting the clear prohibition on fees over $50.00 embodied in the

statute. Moreover, since 1990 (with only a brief interruption) the government has been

authorized to set its fees at a level “that will ensure recovery of the full costs of providing

all such services, including the costs of similar services provided without charge to

asylum applicants or other immigrants.” 8 U.S.C. § 1356(m).4

 Asylum applicants pay

no fee for biometric services, 8 C.F.R. 103.2(e)(4)(ii)(B), in part because of the

“humanitarian nature of the asylum process,” 72 Fed. Reg. 29851, 29867 (July 30, 2007);

there are other categories of individuals for whom the fee is waived as well. See, e.g., 72

FR 53035, 53031 (Sept. 17, 2007)(fees waived for applicants for “U” non-immigrant

status (cooperating victims of crime)). Congress presumably wanted to reduce the

financial burden of applying for TPS on aliens who could not return to their home country

because of civil strife or natural disaster; otherwise it would not have expressly limited

registration fees to $50.00. If USCIS can waive fees for asylum applicants and other

aliens for “humanitarian” reasons, and assess a surcharge on others to make up the

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difference, it could certainly do so for another category of aliens that Congress evinced an

intent to protect – particularly when it is required to limit fees by statute. 

At this juncture, Plaintiffs have argued convincingly that the biometric services fee

is charged as a condition of registration for TPS, and therefore have shown a high

likelihood of success on the merits. 

II. Irreparable Injury To the Plaintiff

The Court can grant a preliminary injunction only “when the moving party has

demonstrated a significant threat of irreparable injury, irrespective of the magnitude of

the injury.” Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs

claim that they will suffer irreparable injury if the government is not enjoined to limit fees

to $50.00.

It is well-settled that monetary injury alone is not irreparable injury for the

purposes of preliminary injunctive relief. Phany Poeng v. United States, 167 F.Supp.2d

1136, 1142 -1143 (S.D.Cal. 2001), citing Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v.

National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980)(monetary injuries not

generally considered irreparable); Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 408 F.3d 112, 115

(2nd Cir. 2005)(“[a]t the preliminary injunction stage, the only cognizable harms are

those that cannot be remedied at the end of trial if the movant were to prevail”; no

injunction where plaintiffs can recoup money placed into escrow if they prevail); 

Bedrossian v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 409 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 2005)(loss of

income not irreparable injury); National Ass'n of Internal Revenue Emp. v. Nixon, 349

F.Supp. 18, 21 (D.C.D.C., 1972)(issue is “well settled”); see also 11A Wright and Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 p. 149-150 (““A preliminary injunction usually

will be denied if it appears that the applicant has an adequate alternate remedy in the form

of money damages or other relief”).

Here, it appears that any harm to Plaintiffs will be fully remedied if they prevail on

their claim for a refund of unlawfully collected fees. Plaintiffs argue that they will suffer

irreparably injury because they “will be confronted with the Hobson’s choice of paying

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 5 At oral argument, counsel for Plaintiffs suggested that if members of the putative class

were not required to pay the $80.00 biometrics fee, they would send that money to their

families in El Salvador, where that amount would be far more significant. However, even

if this assertion were supported by declarations or other evidence, the Plaintiffs must show

that they, not some third party, will suffer irreparable injury.

11

an exorbitant service fee they are not required by statute to pay, or refuse to pay and risk

the exploitation inherent in illegal employment, as well as apprehension, detention, and

removal from the United States because they will have lost their TPS.” However, this

Court finds that being forced to make a choice between paying $80 and facing deportation

is not, in itself, irreparable injury. The First Circuit’s opinion in DeNovellis v. Shalala,

135 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1998) is instructive. There, after a workplace reorganization, the

Plaintiff federal employee was given the choice of a lateral transfer to another city, or of

staying in same city with a demotion. She brought suit alleging age discrimination, and

sought a preliminary injunction preventing her reassignment. The Court found no

irreparable injury: 

We start with the obvious. It is Janey-Burrell's choice whether she accepts the

transfer to San Francisco or whether she remains in Boston at a reduced salary. If

she accepts the transfer, there is no diminution in pay or loss of status. If she stays

in Boston, she will suffer a diminution in pay, but will recover all of that pay and

perhaps other damages if she prevails on the merits. Even under traditional Rule 65

standards, a temporary loss of income which may be recovered later does not

usually constitute irreparable injury.

Id. at 63-64. In this case, Plaintiffs similarly have to choose whether to pay the fee or

lose their TPS benefits and become subject to removal. Plaintiffs have not argued that the

$80.00 fee is so onerous that it causes an irreparable hardship. Cf. Olson v. Wing, 281

F.Supp.2d 476, 486 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)(loss of medical benefits might create irreparable

harm because plaintiffs will be unable to obtain medical services), citing Goldberg v.

Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970)(loss of subsistence benefits can be irreparable injury).5

 If

they pay the fee, they will recover it if they prevail on the merits. 

Plaintiffs offered no persuasive responses to the Court’s question asking what

harm Plaintiffs will suffer that cannot be remedied if Plaintiffs were to prevail. First, they

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suggested that a refund might not be available because the government may not have

funds available to pay restitution. While some courts have found irreparable injury if a

plaintiff shows that a money judgment might go unsatisfied absent equitable relief, see,

e.g., Alvenus Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Delta Petroleum (U.S.A.) Ltd., 876 F.Supp. 482, 487

(S.D.N.Y. 1994), Plaintiffs have made no such showing here, offering only their own

unsupported conjecture. Second, Plaintiffs argued that if this Court does not resolve the

merits of the action until after El Salvador’s TPS expires, plaintiffs who remain in the

United States might be reluctant to claim a refund. The most recent designation for El

Salvador expires on March 9, 2009. 72 Fed.Reg. 46649-01 (August 21, 2007). Pure

speculation that members of the class might be dissuaded from claiming a refund for fear

of exposing their immigration status – seventeen months from now -- is insufficient to

constitute irreparable injury.

Plaintiffs have not shown what harm they might suffer that cannot be remedied if

they prevail in this action. They therefore have not carried their burden of showing a

possibility of irreparable injury. 

III. The Balance of Hardships

The government has presented at least some evidence that it will suffer serious

hardship were a preliminary injunction granted. It adduced evidence that the biometric

fee pays for Homeland Security’s funding of background checks that “enhance national

security and ensure the integrity of the immigration process,” and for maintenance of

computer and other systems that allow immigration adjudicators to access the biometric

data electronically. See Declaration of Barbara Velarde, ¶¶ 7, 16, 18, 19. The amount of

fees at issue is significant. While the government has not provided a precise estimate of

the dollar amount at issue, Velarde estimates that TPS beneficiaries and applicants from

Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador will have paid approximately $25,000,000 in

biometric service fees in fiscal year 2007 alone. Velarde Decl. ¶ 20. Ms. Velarde

declared that loss of tens of millions of dollars a year in biometrics fees would

significantly affect the agency’s ability to perform its screening functions. Id. 

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The immediate hardship to the Plaintiffs is not clear. Although regulations allow

for both a waiver of the TPS fee, 8 C.FR. § 244.20, and, now, of the biometrics services

fee because of an inability to pay, 8 U.S.C. § 103.7(c)(1), (5), Plaintiffs alleged that they

have paid the fees in the past, First Amended Complaint ¶ 12, and have not alleged or

submitted evidence that the fees create a particular hardship for them (such as serious

financial difficulties or imminent homelessness). The Court notes that Plaintiffs have not

alleged that they are seeking or have ever sought waivers of any of the fees at issue. They

argue only that the fees are “exorbitant,” and that waiver provisions are so onerous and

require disclosure of so much potentially sensitive information that waiver is not a

realistic option for most applicants. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ failure to apply for a waiver,

coupled with their failure to introduce any evidence of genuine hardship, shows that the

balance of hardships does not tip in their favor.

CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiffs have shown neither a possibility that they will suffer irreparable

injury nor a balance of hardships tipping in their favor. Accordingly, their motion for

preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 17, 2007 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:07-cv-04192-TEH Document 40 Filed 10/17/07 Page 13 of 13