Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02588/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02588-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CORNELL HARRISON,

Petitioner,

v.

C. TAMKIN, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No.12-2588-IEG(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

(DOC. NO. 6)

Cornell Harrison (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition For Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. Respondent C. Tamkin

(“Respondent”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition.

Petitioner has not filed an Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss.

The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s Petition,

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, and the lodgments presented therewith, finds that Petitioner is not entitled to

the relief requested and that Petitioner’s Petition is

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barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 5, 2010, Petitioner pled guilty to one count

of corporal punishment to a spouse and admitted a prior

strike conviction. On that same date, Petitioner was

sentenced to nine years imprisonment and was ordered to

pay $1,800.00 in restitution.

Petitioner did not appeal his convictions or sentence.

On May 5, 2011, Petitioner constructively1/ filed a

Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego

Superior Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3). The Petition requested the trial court’s transcripts of the

proceedings in his case to be provided to him at no cost.

In the Petition, Petitioner stated, “I have future plans

of Attacking/Litigating issues regarding/surrounding my

case...” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3 at 3). On June 30,

2011, the Superior Court denied the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 4).

On July 28, 2011, Petitioner filed a second Petition

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5). The Petition was essentially the same as the Petition filed on May 5, 2011. On

1/

The Court gives Petitioner the benefit of the “mailbox rule” which deems

that a petition is constructively filed when it is delivered to prison officials

for filing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266(1988).

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September 12, 2011, the Superior Court denied the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6).

On February 25, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of

Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7). The Petition was

essentially the same as the Petition filed on May 5, 2011.

In the Petition, Petitioner stated: “I need my sentencing

transcripts in order, to contest my Restitution. I should

be allowed one copy.” Petitioner explained to the Court of

Appeal that he did not understand why restitution amounts

were being deducted from his prison account when he

thought that he did not have to pay restitution. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 3). On March 15, 2012, the

Petition was denied. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 8).2/

On May 10, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9). The Petition was essentially the same as the Petition filed on May 5, 2011, and

claimed that his restitution fine was unlawful. In the

Petition, Petitioner stated, “I am pursuing avenues in

which to contest how effectively, competently, my attorney

explained, so that a laymen (sic) could understand, the

stipulations and understanding within my/the ‘Plea agreement’: specifically ‘Low, mid, High term’ Legal regulations, Legalities.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9 at 4).

2/

 On March 14, 2012, the Court Reporter at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing

sent Petitioner a letter stating that she had received a request from Petitioner

for an estimate to produce a transcript of his case. The Court Reporter stated

that the cost of the transcript was $30.15. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9, last

page).

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Further, Petitioner stated, “I want to ‘Appeal’ my restitution hearing, imposition, decision, in which to provide

an effective and adequate defense in case my ‘contentions’

regarding me (sic) ‘restitution’ imposition - not sentence

- are challenged, Argued by court; debated. They cannot

determine what’s frivolous or considered ‘mere’ browsing.”

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 9 at 4). On July 25, 2012, the 

California Supreme Court denied the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 10).

On October 23, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. On December 12, 2012,

Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition that is now

before the Court.

 II

PETITIONER’S PETITION IS BARRED

BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1. The AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that the Petition is barred by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“the

AEDPA”) statute of limitations. The provisions of the

AEDPA apply to petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed

in federal court after the AEDPA’s effective date of April

24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059,

2068 (1997). Therefore, because the Petition was filed on

August 27, 2010, the AEDPA applies to this case.

Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA on April 24,

1996, “state prisoners had almost unfettered discretion in

deciding when to file a federal habeas petition.” 

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Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d

1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 U.S. 897

(1998), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir.

1998). “[D]elays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a prisoner from seeking relief.” Id. 

With enactment of the AEDPA, a state prisoner’s time

frame for seeking federal habeas relief was dramatically

limited. The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by, in part,

adding subdivision (d), which provides for a one-year

limitation period for state prisoners to file habeas

corpus petitions in federal court. Section 2244(d)

states, in pertinent part:

 (d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply

to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court. The limitation period shall run from

the latest of -

(A) the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment

to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant

was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if

the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims

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presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection.

Petitioner did not file an appeal after he was

sentenced on May 5, 2010. If a petitioner does not appeal

the state court judgment, his conviction becomes final on

the date on which the time for filing such an appeal

expired. U.S. v. Garcia, 210 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000);

Miller v. Adams, 2009 WL 6526009 at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2009);

Kapral v. U.S., 166 F.3d 565, 575, 577 (3rd Cir. 1999);

Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F. Supp 2d 1057, 1060 (C.D. Cal.

2001). In California, a conviction becomes final 60 days

after the Superior Court proceedings have become final.

Lewis, 173 F. Supp 2d at 1060. Therefore, Petitioner’s

conviction became final on July 5, 2010.3/

Therefore, absent tolling, Petitioner had one year

or until July 5, 2011, to file his Petition For Writ of

Habeas Corpus in this Court. However, as explained in

detail below, Petitioner waited over one year to file the

Petition that is now before the Court, thus making it

untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner filed several petitions for post-conviction relief in the California Superior, Appellate, and

3/

The 60th day after May 5, 2010 was July 4, 2010. Since July 4, 2010 was a

national holiday, the Court uses July 5, 2010 as the date Petitioner’s conviction

became final.

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Supreme Courts. The statute of limitations is tolled while

a “properly filed” state habeas corpus petition is “pending” in the state court. Under the holding of Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), the “statute

of limitations is tolled from the time the first state

habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme

Court rejects petitioner’s final collateral challenge,”

provided the petitions were properly filed and pending

during that entire time. The statute of limitations is not

tolled from the time a final decision is issued on direct

state appeal and the time the first state collateral

challenge is filed because there is no case “pending”

during that interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006

Statutory tolling is unavailable for the interval

between successive filings in the same court. Dils v.

Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001); Camacho v.

Hernandez, 2009 WL 192483 at *4 (S.D. Cal. 2009).

However, the Ninth Circuit applies a two part test

to determine whether the period between the denial of one

petition and the filing of a second petition in the same

court should be tolled. Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968

(9th Cir. 2010), citing Hamerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069,

1075 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the court must ask whether the

petitioner’s subsequent petitions are limited to an

elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the

first petition. King v. Roe, 340 F. 3d 821, 823 (9th Cir.

2003). If the petitions are not related, the subsequent

petition constitutes a new round of collateral attack, and

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the time between them is not tolled. Banjo, supra, at 969,

citing Hemerle, supra, at 1075. If the successive petition was attempting to correct deficiencies of a prior

petition, then the petitioner is still making “proper use

of state court procedures” and habeas review is still

pending. Banjo, supra, at 969, citing King, supra, at 823.

Discovery motions do not statutorily toll the

statute of limitations because they do not constitute “a

properly filed application for post-conviction or other

collateral review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). Discovery motions do not challenge a petitioner’s conviction, but simply seek material that might

be of assistance to him/her in later state and/or federal

proceedings. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th

Cir. 2009) citing Hodge v. Greiner, 269 F.3d 104, 107 (2nd

Cir. 2001); Pineda v. Trimble, 2012 WL 2160964 at *1 (C.D.

Cal. 2012) (A “Motion for Order For Transcripts” to

prepare a “habeas defense” does not toll the statute of

limitations.)

Petitioner’s first petition for relief after his

convictions and sentence became final was filed on May 5,

2011 in the San Diego Superior Court. On June 30, 2011,

the Superior Court denied the Petition. From July 5, 2010

(the date Petitioner’s convictions and sentence became

final) to May 5, 2011, (the date Petitioner filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego

Superior Court) (10 months), the statute of limitations

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was not tolled because there was no case pending during

that interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006.

From May 5, 2011 (the date Petitioner filed his

first petition for relief after his conviction and sentence became final) to July 25, 2012, (the date the

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus), Petitioner’s Petitions consisted

of requests that the San Diego Superior Court, California

Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court, provide

him with transcripts of the proceedings in his case at no

cost to him. In the Petitions, Petitioner made clear that

he was seeking the transcripts for his future plans to

litigate issues in his case, to contest the competence of

his counsel, and to contest the imposition of a restitution fine on him. The Petitions did not challenge his

conviction nor the restitution fine. Rather, the Petitions

were motions for discovery that sought material that might

have been helpful to him in future state and/or federal

proceedings. Such motions do not toll the statute of

limitations. Ramirez, supra, at 999-1000, Pineda, supra,

at *1. Therefore, from May 5, 2011 to July 25, 2012 (1

year, 2 months, 20 days), the statute of limitations was

not tolled.

On October 23, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. From July 25, 2012

(the date the California Supreme Court denied the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus) to October 23, 2012, (2 months,

28 days), the statute of limitations was not tolled

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because there was no case pending during that interval.

Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006.

Adding together the three periods of time when the

statute of limitations was not tolled (10 months + 1 year

2 months, 20 days + 2 months, 28 days), results in a total

of two years, three months and 18 days, which is well

beyond the one year statute of limitations mandated by 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, Petitioner failed to

file his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in a timely

fashion and it is therefore barred. 

 III

THE PETITION IS NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE TOLLING

OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that equitable

tolling is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). see

Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562 (2010). In

Holland, the Court recognized equitable tolling of the

AEDPA one-year limitations period when the prisoner can

show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). The

Ninth Circuit has held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations is subject to equitable tolling. Calderon v.

United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288

(9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v.

United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th

Cir. 1998). However, the Ninth Circuit in Beeler noted

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that “equitable tolling will not be available in most

cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if

‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.

[quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696,

701 (9th Cir. 1996)]. The Beeler court wrote that district

judges must “take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas process” and “only authorize

extensions when this high hurdle is surmounted.” Id. at

1289.

The burden is on Petitioner to show that the “extraordinary circumstances” he has identified were the

proximate cause of his untimeliness, rather than merely a

lack of diligence on his part. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d

796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d

1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). Equitable tolling “is unavailable in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling (under AEDPA) is very high, lest the

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

 The obligation to act diligently “does not pertain

solely to the filing of the federal habeas petition,

rather it is an obligation that exists during the period

appellant is exhausting state court remedies as well.” Roy

v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) citing Lacava

v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3rd Cir. 2005). When courts

assess a habeas petitioner’s argument in favor of equita12cv2588 11

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ble tolling, they must conduct a “highly fact-dependent”

inquiry. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th

Cir. 2000), Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir.

2002). The extraordinary circumstances must be the “butfor and proximate cause” of the untimely filing. Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, Petitioner has failed to show that he has 

diligently pursued his rights. Petitioner did not file a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

courts that challenged the restitution ordered by the

sentencing court, nor the effectiveness of counsel.

Rather, he filed petitions that were actually discovery

motions that sought material that might have been helpful

to him in pursuing state court petitions that might have

challenged the ordered restitution. Further, Petitioner

has failed to show that some extraordinary circumstance

beyond his control prevented his timely filing of the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. Consequently, the Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition is not

entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. IV

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a thorough review of the record in this

matter, the Court has determined that Petitioner has

failed to comply with the AEDPA’s statute of limitations

and that he is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d).

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 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 17, 2013, any

party to this action may file written objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all

parties no later than May 1, 2013. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 20, 2013

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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