Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_03-cv-01529/USCOURTS-alnd-2_03-cv-01529-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to each

1

document as it is filed in the court’s record.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JACQUELINE D. COLE,

Plaintiff,

vs.

HEALTHSOUTH CORPORATION,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV 03-B-1529-S

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is presently pending before the court on defendant’s Motion for Complete

or Partial Summary Judgment, (doc. 17), and plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, (doc. 20). Plaintiff 1

Jacqueline Cole has sued her former employer, defendant HealthSouth Corporation, alleging

that defendant terminated her in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act [“FMLA”].

Upon consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel,

and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that defendant’s Motion for Complete or

Partial Summary Judgment, (doc. 17), is due to be granted, and plaintiff’s Motion to Strike,

(doc. 20), is due to be denied in part and granted in part.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiff has moved to strike the declarations of defendant’s counsel, Stephen Brown

and Michelle Clemon, pursuant to the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, R. 3.7(a), and

FILED

 2006 Mar-29 PM 04:37

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 1 of 24
2

paragraph 16 of Louise Dailey’s declaration, which plaintiff contends is “inconsistent with

her deposition testimony.” (Doc. 20 at 2.)

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the declarations of defendant’s counsel will be granted.

The court has not considered the testimony of Brown and Clemon in deciding defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. However, plaintiff’s Motion to Strike will be denied as to

paragraph 16 of Dailey’s declaration.

According to the deposition transcript, Dailey testified as follows:

Q. Was any part of Jackie’s termination based on the fact that she was

fixing to have to be off?

A. Yeah.

Q. And, therefore, she would get further behind or make mistakes?

A. Not at all.

Q. Was that ever a concern with anybody?

A. No.

(Doc. 18, Ex. 2 at 131.) However, in paragraph 16 of her declaration, she testified:

I have had an opportunity to review the transcript of my deposition

testimony. On page 131 of the transcript, it states that I responded “Yeah” to

the question: “Was any part of Jackie’s termination based on the fact that she

was fixing to be off?” My response of “Yeah” was not intended to be an

affirmative response to Mr. Arendall’s question. I said “Yeah” because I was

under the impression that Mr. Arendall was in the middle of a question and

I was acknowledging the first part of the question and anticipating the

second part. It is my understanding that the audio tape of the deposition will

confirm this. Ms. Cole’s termination was in no way associated with her

request for medical leave. The fact that Ms. Cole needed to be off work for

some period of time beginning February 4 played no part whatsoever in her

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 2 of 24
3

termination. Rather, the sole reason for her termination was her continuing

performance deficiencies.

(Doc. 18, Ex. 4 ¶ 16 (emphasis added).)

Plaintiff asks the court to strike paragraph 16 of Dailey’s Declaration because it “is

directly opposite to that contained in the deposition transcript,” and “‘the court should rely

on [the] deposition testimony.’” (Doc. 20 at 2 (quoting Van T. Junkins & Assocs. v. U.S.

Indus., 736 F.2d 656 (11th Cir. 1984).) However, Dailey’s deposition testimony does not

“conflict” with her declaration; her declaration only explains her deposition testimony as it

appears in the transcript.

Defendant has submitted an audio tape of Dailey’s deposition testimony. The court

has reviewed this audio tape and finds that Dailey’s declaration is an accurate description of

her deposition testimony. On the tape, plaintiff’s counsel’s clearly asks Dailey, in the form

of a single question, “Was any part of Jackie’s termination based on the fact that she was

fixing to have to be off, and, therefore, she would get further behind or make mistakes?”

(See doc. 18, Ex. 8 [Audio Tape].) Her answer to this question, “Not at all,” (id., Ex. 2 at

131), is in conformity with her deposition testimony as a whole that the decision to terminate

plaintiff was made before plaintiff informed Dailey of her need for medical leave beginning

February 4, 2003, (see, e.g., doc. 18, Ex. 2 at 10, 36-38, 106, 121-22).

Because it is clear from the audio tape that the transcript of the deposition does not

precisely reflect Dailey’s actual testimony – due to the lack of any indication that Dailey

uttered the word “yeah” during plaintiff’s counsel’s question, and not as an answer to half

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 3 of 24
4

his question, the court will consider the audio tape as accurate evidence of Dailey’s actual

deposition testimony. When the audio tape and paragraph 16 of Dailey’s declaration are

compared, there is no conflict. Therefore, plaintiff’s Motion to Strike paragraph 16 of

Dailey’s declaration will be denied.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when the record

shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the

initial burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); see

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Once the moving party has met its

burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and show that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 324 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to “weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Id. at 249. Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 4 of 24
5

drawing of inferences from the facts are left to the jury, and, therefore, evidence favoring the

non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in her favor.

See id. at 255. Nevertheless, the non-moving party need not be given the benefit of every

inference but only of every reasonable inference. See Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d

1534, 1540 n.12 (11th Cir. 1988).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant hired plaintiff in October 2001. (Doc. 18, Ex. 1 at 26.) She worked in the

diagnostic billing section at defendant’s Diagnostic Regional Business Office in Pelham,

Alabama, processing bills for defendant’s diagnostic facilities. (Id. at 46, 60-61; id., Ex. 2

at 9-10.) At all times pertinent to the instant action, Louise Dailey, Billing Department

Manager, was the supervisor of the diagnostic billing group, and Stephanie Branham,

Regional Business Office Manager, was Dailey’s supervisor. (Id., Ex. 1 at 99; id., Ex. 2 at

8, 9; id., Ex. 3 at 7.)

Plaintiff’s job duties consisted of “processing the claims for diagnostic services,”

including x-rays and MRIs, performed at defendant’s diagnostic facilities. (Id., Ex. 1 at 61-

62.) She testified that she would print out the claims to be processed that day; process the

claims, which included ensuring that all the necessary information was included and correct;

and submit the claims to whomever was responsible for paying for the diagnostic service.

(Id. at 64-66, 71-72.) Dailey described plaintiff’s responsibilities as follows:

As a diagnostic biller, [plaintiff] was responsible for processing each

paper claim, attaching any necessary documentation (such as doctor referrals)

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 5 of 24
6

to the claim, assuring that each claim met the specifications of the entity to

which it was being sent and sending out the claim. For those claims that had

insufficient or incorrect information, [plaintiff] was responsible for creating

a weekly “dirty” report that reflected the deficiencies on any given claim.

[Plaintiff] was also responsible for generating daily productivity reports that

reflected what the billers had worked on.

(Id., Ex. 4 ¶ 4.)

As part of its agreement with certain payers, defendant submitted claims to these

payers according to their specifications. (Id., Ex. 1 at 53-54; see, e.g., id., Ex. 3 at 27 (“[The]

claims, due to our contractual arrangement, have to be put on a spreadsheet and sent out.

That’s the only way that we can get payment.”).) Plaintiff sent some of these claims, the

ones referred to by plaintiff as “direct bills,” to another department after she proofed and

processed them; these claims were not mailed by plaintiff. (Id., Ex. 1 at 162-63; see id., Ex.

3 at 23.) One of the “direct bill” payers was the Tuscaloosa VA. (Id., Ex. 1 at 162; see also

id., Ex. 2, ex. 16 at HS000057, HS000078.)

On May 7, 2002, plaintiff was placed on a 90-day probation; the Employee

Conference Report, prepared at that time, stated:

Jacqueline Cole is receiving many personal phone calls and using her cell

phone. She has also shown a decrease in her productivity and its accuracy.

Claims are not going out daily, incorrect information is being put on the claims

and claims are not going out correctly.

(Id., Ex. 1, ex. 5.) At the end of the 90-day probation, the probationary period was not

extended. (Doc. 21, Ex. 1 ¶ 10.) With the successful completion of the probation period, the

threat of termination was inapplicable. (Id. ¶ 12.)

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 6 of 24
7

Sometime in December 2002, Dailey met with plaintiff and Brenda Smith, Billing

Coordinator. (Doc. 18, Ex. 1 at 142-43; id., Ex. 2 at 20.) Plaintiff was behind in her work.

(Id., Ex. 1 at 143.) She had a stack of unprocessed claims that totaled approximately

$382,000. (Id. at 146; id., Ex. 4 ¶ 6.) Plaintiff and Smith were counseled regarding

plaintiff’s performance problems. (Id., Ex. 2 at 84, 88, and ex. 11; id., Ex. 3 at 17-18.)

Dailey consulted Branham, and they discussed terminating or otherwise disciplining plaintiff.

(Id., Ex. 5 ¶ 4.) Branham told plaintiff and Smith --

 . . . they were to get all the claims cleaned up and out the door by the next day

and to let [her] know if they had any holdups with the facilities. [Branham]

also told both of them . . . that if anything like [that] ever happened again, it

could be grounds for termination.

(Id., Ex. 3 at 18.)

Plaintiff testified that after this meeting and verbal warning, she had no further

problems processing claims accurately and in a timely manner. (Id., Ex. 1 at 160.) However,

defendant has presented evidence that the following month, January 2003, it discovered that

plaintiff had mailed a large number of claims to the Tuscaloosa VA payer instead of sending

them to the proper department for further processing. (See id., Ex. 2, ex. 16 at HS000057,

HS000078.)

On January 22, 2003, Dailey learned that a number of claims had been returned

because plaintiff had not properly handled the claims. (Id., Ex. 2 at 95-97 and ex. 16 at

HS000057.) Dailey’s notes regarding this incident state:

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 7 of 24
Debra Pettinato was the Coordinator for the department that was responsible for 2

direct billing. (Doc. 18, Ex. 1 at 165; id., Ex. 2 at 95.)

Plaintiff was absent on Thursday, January 23, 2003. (Doc. 18, Ex. 1 at 169.) 3

8

Debra Pettinato gave me the attached claims – they had been given to Debra’s 2

staff that handles direct bills.

I’ve gone over [with] Jackie on Tusc[aloosa] issues 2 other times. But this

leads me to believe she[’]s still not taking care of details. Other problems that

are happening – claims aren[’]t being sent out timely [and] with all the

required attachments. . . . 

I will address these issues when she comes back to work [January 24, 2003.]3

(Id., Ex. 2, ex. 16 at HS 000057 (footnotes added).)

However, plaintiff did not go to work on January 24, 2003. (See id., Ex. 1, ex. 7.) On

that day, plaintiff went to the emergency room complaining of a sore throat. (Id., Ex. 1 at

169-70.) Plaintiff testified as follows:

Q. It says here on January 24th you were off of work because you had–

A. Strep throat.

Q. –strep throat; right?

A. Yes.

Q. And let me show you Exhibit 7, which is the HealthSouth call-in

sheet for the regional business office dated January 24, ‘03. It looks like it’s

signed by a Lisa someone, whoever took the call. Look and see if that call-in

sheet and what’s on it is consistent with your reporting off on January 24th.

A. (Witness complies). Yes.

Q. And that was the day – I assume you got up on the morning of

January 24 and had a terrible sore throat?

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 8 of 24
9

A. Well, it was like early that morning, because I was scheduled to be

off that Thursday, I was off, and we went on a field trip with my baby’s

school. And when I came home, my throat was hurting.

Q. So you started noticing it the night before?

A. (Witness nodding head).

Q. So you had been off on Thursday, and January 24th was Friday?

A. Yes. I went in the emergency room that morning maybe about 3:30

or 4:00 that morning.

Q. So at the time you called in you had already been to the emergency

room and you knew you had strep?

A. Yes.

. . .

Q. And then you thought you would be back at work on Monday, but

you were still under the weather on Monday?

A. Yes.

Q. Let me show you Exhibit 9, which is your call-in sheet for that day.

Is what’s on that sheet consistent with your report off for that Monday, the

27th?

A. Yes.

(Id. at 168-71.)

The doctor’s excuse from the emergency room, a form entitled “Work/School

Statement,” states:

Cole, Jacquelin was seen by Dr. Hood @ 0504 hr. on 1/24/03

. . .

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 9 of 24
10

Will require time off from work/school. Return 1/27/03.

(Id., ex. 8.) The form does not indicate any diagnosis or a prescribed course of treatment.

(See id.) Also, plaintiff did not testify or otherwise present evidence that Dr. Hood had

prescribed a course of treatment or that she was incapacitated for the entire weekend.

Plaintiff returned to work on January 28, 2003. (Id. at 174.) When she returned, she

handed Dailey the Work/School Statement and told her that she was leaving at 1:00 p.m. for

a previously-scheduled checkup. (Id., Ex. 2 at 102 and ex. 18.) Plaintiff testified that the

following occurred when she returned to work on January 28, 2003 – 

When [Dailey] came over to me to my desk, she said, “Well, how are

you feeling, Jacqueline?” And I told her, “I’m feeling fine, you know, but

today is my regular checkup. I’m scheduled to work half a day today, I have

a doctor’s appointment for my annual checkup.” She told me, “Well, I don’t

know about [that] with all the time you’ve been off, you know.” And like I

told her, I can’t control my sickness, nobody can. And so she told me, “Well,

I’ll have to see.”

. . .

She told me she will have to see, but I told her I was going whether she

saw or not, because that was my appointment.

(Id., Ex. 1 at 173.) Dailey testified that she did not tell plaintiff that she could not leave

work; however, she did “warn[ ] her that she was way behind.” (Id., Ex. 2 at 102.) 

Plaintiff went to her doctor’s appointment. (Id., Ex. 1 at 176.) According to Dailey,

that afternoon she and Branham decided that plaintiff should be terminated. (Id., Ex. 4 ¶ 11;

see also id., Ex. 3 at 44.) Branham must approve any termination decision in her area. (Id.,

Ex. 3 at 23.) Dailey and Branham decided that plaintiff should be terminated; however,

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 10 of 24
Dailey’s notes state, “[Higginbotham] ask[ed] does [Branham] agree [with] this 4

[decision];” Dailey told her Branham did; and Higginbotham said she wanted “to hear from

[Branham] we can let her go.” (Doc. 18, Ex. 2, ex. 16 at HS000077.)

11

Branham wanted Lauren Higginbotham in Human Resources, to look at Dailey’s

documentation before actually terminating plaintiff. (Id. at 24, 44; id., Ex. 4 ¶ 11.)

Higginbotham’s approval was not required; Branham testified – 

Q. If Lauren Higginbotham had said don’t fire [plaintiff], would that

have prevented you from firing her?

A. No.

(Id., Ex. 3 at 42.)

The following day, January 29, 2003, Higginbotham told Dailey to go ahead and fire

plaintiff, but Higginbotham wanted to talk to Branham “to make sure that [Dailey] had

[Branham’s] agreement.” (Id. at 25-26.) Branham, however, was out of the office until 4

January 31, 2003. (See id. at 26.)

Plaintiff returned to work on January 29, but she left early to have an MRI. (Id., Ex.

1 at 176-78.) On January 30, plaintiff gave Dailey a doctor’s excuse for January 29 and a

letter from her doctor, which stated that she needed to be off for surgery on February 4, 2003.

(Id. at 179-80 and exs. 11, 12; id., Ex. 2 at 104-05 and exs. 17, 19.)

On January 31, 2003, when Branham returned, Dailey told her about plaintiff’s need

for surgery. (Id., Ex. 2 at 118; id., Ex. 3 at 42.) Dailey also told Higginbotham about “the

time [plaintiff] has missed [and] the [surgery].” (Id., Ex. 2, Ex. 16 at HS000079; see also id.,

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 11 of 24
12

Ex. 3 at 37.) Branham talked with Higginbotham and, later in the afternoon of January 31,

2003, Branham and Dailey told plaintiff that she was fired. (Id., Ex. 1 at 187-88; id., Ex. 3

at 26.)

III. DISCUSSION

There are basically two types of FMLA claims: one based on the employer’s denial

of or interference with the employee’s substantive rights under the FMLA, and the other

based on the employer’s discrimination or retaliation against the employee for engaging in

activity under the FMLA. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has described the two types

of claims as follows:

First, the FMLA contains prescriptive protections that are expressed as

substantive statutory rights. The Act provides eligible employees of a covered

employer the right to take unpaid leave for a period of up to twelve work

weeks in any twelve-month period for a serious health condition as defined by

the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). After the period of qualified leave expires,

the employee is entitled to be reinstated to the former position or an equivalent

one with the same benefits and terms of employment that existed prior to the

exercise of the leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a). To insure the availability of these

guarantees, the FMLA declaresit “unlawful for any employer to interfere with,

restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided.”

29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

When an employee alleges a deprivation of these substantive

guarantees, the employee must demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence only entitlement to the disputed leave. In such cases, the intent of the

employer is immaterial. See Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711,

713 (7th Cir.1997) (“We shall continue to resolve suits under the FMLA . . .

by asking whether the plaintiff has established, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that he is entitled to the benefit he claims.”); see also Hodgens v.

General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir.1998)(“Because the issue

is the right to an entitlement, the employee is due the benefit if the statutory

requirements are satisfied, regardless of the intent of the employer.”).

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 12 of 24
13

In addition to the substantive guarantees contemplated by the Act, the

FMLA also affords employees protection in the event they are discriminated

against for exercising their rights under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)

& (2). Specifically, “[a]n employer is prohibited from discriminating against

employees . . . who have used FMLA leave.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). 

Furthermore, an employer may not consider the taking of FMLA leave as a

negative factor in employment actions. Id. Because the FMLA’s

implementing regulations bar certain discriminatory conduct, the protections

contemplated by these sections have been characterized as proscriptive in

nature. See Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160.

In contrast to what an employee must show to establish a deprivation

of a substantive guarantee under the Act, when an employee raises the issue

of whether the employer discriminated against an employee by taking adverse

action against the employee for having exercised an FMLA right, the question

of intent is relevant. The issue becomes whether the employer's actions were

motivated by an impermissible retaliatory or discriminatory animus. Id. (“In

such a case, the employer's motive is relevant, and the issue is whether the

employer took the adverse action because of a prohibited reason or for a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.”).

King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891(7th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff alleges both

types of FMLA claims based on her termination. Defendant argues, inter alia, that plaintiff

cannot establish either an interference claim or a retaliation claim because plaintiff cannot

prove that she had a “serious health condition,” and also because the decision to terminate

her was made before she notified defendant on January 30, 2003, of her need for medical

leave beginning February 4, 2003.

A. “SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITION”

Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot establish that she had a qualifying “serious

health condition” pursuant to the FMLA; therefore, it contends her FMLA claims are due to

be dismissed. The purpose of the FMLA is “‘to balance the demands of the workplace with

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 13 of 24
14

the needs of families’ by ensuring the availability of ‘reasonable leave’ for employees who

need time for health or family reasons.” Smith v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 273

F.3d 1303, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001)(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)-(2)). The Act entitles an

eligible employee to take up to twelve workweeks of unpaid leave because of a “serious

health condition” that makes her unable to perform the functions of her position. 29 U.S.C.

§ 2612; 29 C.F.R. § 825.112. The regulations’ define “serious health condition” to include

an illness that involves “continuing treatment by a health care provider,” which, in turn, is

defined as:

(2) Continuing treatment by a health care provider. A serious health condition

involving continuing treatment by a health care provider includes any one or

more of the following:

(i) “[a] period of incapacity (i.e., inability to work, attend school or

perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition,

treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom) of more than three consecutive

calendar days . . . that also involves:

. . .

(B) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one

occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the

supervision of the health care provider.

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 14 of 24
Section 825.114 also defines a “serious health condition to include “an illness, injury, 5

impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves:

(1) Inpatient care (i.e., an overnight stay) in a hospital, hospice, or

residential medical care facility, including any period of incapacity (for

purposes of this section, defined to mean inability to work, attend school or

perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition,

treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom), or any subsequent treatment in

connection with such inpatient care; or

(2) Continuing treatment by a health care provider. A serious health

condition involving continuing treatment by a health care provider includes

any one or more of the following:

(i) A period of incapacity (i.e., inability to work, attend school

or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health

condition, treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom) of more than three

consecutive calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or period of

incapacity relating to the same condition, that also involves:

(A) Treatment two or more times by a health care

provider, by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct

supervision of a health care provider, or by a provider of health

care services (e.g., physical therapist) under orders of, or on

referral by, a health care provider; or

(B) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one

occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment

under the supervision of the health care provider.

(ii) Any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal

care.

(iii) Any period of incapacity or treatment for such incapacity

due to a chronic serious health condition. A chronic serious health

condition is one which:

15

29 C.F. R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i)(B) (emphasis added). “Treatment by a health care provider”

5

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 15 of 24
(A) Requires periodic visits for treatment by a health care

provider, or by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct

supervision of a health care provider;

(B) Continues over an extended period of time (including

recurring episodes of a single underlying condition); and

(C) May cause episodic rather than a continuing period

of incapacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.).

(iv) A period of incapacity which is permanent or long-term due

to a condition for which treatment may not be effective. The employee

or family member must be under the continuing supervision of, but

need not be receiving active treatment by, a health care provider.

Examples include Alzheimer's, a severe stroke, or the terminal stages

of a disease.

(v) Any period of absence to receive multiple treatments

(including any period of recovery therefrom) by a health care provider

or by a provider of health care services under orders of, or on referral

by, a health care provider, either for restorative surgery after an

accident or other injury, or for a condition that would likely result in a

period of incapacity of more than three consecutive calendar days in the

absence of medical intervention or treatment, such as cancer

(chemotherapy, radiation, etc.), severe arthritis (physical therapy),

kidney disease (dialysis).

29 CFR § 825.114(a). A “serious health condition” does not include:

Conditions for which cosmetic treatments are administered (such as most

treatments for acne or plastic surgery) . . . unless inpatient hospital care is

required or unless complications develop. Ordinarily, unless complications

arise, the common cold, the flu, ear aches, upset stomach, minor ulcers,

headaches other than migraine, routine dental or orthodontia problems,

periodontal disease, etc., are examples of conditions that do not meet the

definition of a serious health condition and do not qualify for FMLA leave.

Restorative dental or plastic surgery after an injury or removal of cancerous

growths are serious health conditions provided all the other conditions of this

16

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 16 of 24
regulation are met. Mental illness resulting from stress or allergies may be

serious health conditions, but only if all the conditions of this section are met.

Id. (c).

In order to qualify as a “serious medical condition” based on plaintiff hospital stay, 6

such stay must have been “[i]n-patient (i.e., an overnight stay) in a hospital.” 29 C.F. R. §

825.114(a)(1).

17

includes “examinations to determine if a serious health condition exists and evaluations of

the condition,” and “a regimen of continuing treatment includes, for example, a course of

prescription medication (e.g., an antibiotic) or therapy requiring special equipment to resolve

or alleviate the health condition (e.g., oxygen).” Id. § 825.114(b) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff alleges she had two serious health conditions – strep throat, which kept her

off work from January 24th through January 27th, and a cyst of her ovary, which required

surgical removal and several days of bed rest. (See doc. 1, ¶¶ 7-8, 9; doc. 18, Ex. 1 at 183-

84.)

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s bout of strep throat was not a serious health

condition. Plaintiff disagrees. She argues:

Plaintiff did not work on January 24th because she was off sick. She

called in sick on the 27th. . . . Exhibit 8 [to plaintiff’s deposition] shows that

Plaintiff was in the hospital for strep throat and presented a doctor’s excuse

returning her to work on the 28th. This shows she was both hospitalized and 6

that she was sick for more than three consecutive days (January 24, 25, 26, 27)

for a condition which required her to go to the emergency room and that

incapacitated her for three or more days. As a result, under Russell [v. North

Broward Hospital, 346 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2003)] and 29 C.F. R. § 825.114,

she suffered a serious health condition on that occasion.

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 17 of 24
18

(Doc. 20 at 20 (emphasis in original; footnote added).) Plaintiff testified that she was seen

in the emergency room on the morning of Friday, January 24, 2003. (Doc. 18, Ex. 1 at 170.)

She testified that she was diagnosed with strep throat and given a “Work/School Statement”

that said she had been seen in the emergency room and that she would return to work on

Monday, January 27, 2003. (Id. at 168, 170-71, and ex. 8.) On Monday, January 27, 2003,

plaintiff was still “under the weather” and called in sick to work; she returned to work on

January 28, 2003. (Id. at 171.)

In order to establish a “serious health condition” pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §

825.114(a)(2)(i)(B), plaintiff must establish that she was incapacitated for more than three

days and was treated on one or more occasions by a health care provider that prescribed a

regime continuing treatment. Plaintiff has not carried her burden of proof on this point. The

evidence before the court is that plaintiff visited the ER on the morning of Friday, January

24, 2003. She was treated, and given a release saying that she could return to work on

Monday, January 27, 2003. Plaintiff did not go to work on Monday, the 27th. This evidence

is insufficient to establish that she was incapacitated for more than three days. 

As noted in Bond v. Abbott Laboratories, 7 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Ohio 1998):

[That a plaintiff was “required” to be incapacitated for more

than three days] does not mean that, in the employees' own

judgment, he or she should not work, or even that it was

uncomfortable or inconvenient for the employee to have to

work. Rather, it means that a “health care provider” has

determined that, in his or her professional medical judgment, the

employee cannot work (or could not have worked) because of

the illness. If it were otherwise, a note from a spouse, parent, or

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 18 of 24
19

even one's own claim that one cannot work because of illness

would suffice. Given the legislative history surrounding its

enactment, the FMLA cannot be understood to establish such

liberal standards for its application.

Id. at 974 (brackets in original)(quoting Olsen v. Ohio Edison Co., 979 F. Supp. 1159, 1166

(N.D. Ohio 1997) (internal citation omitted). This court agrees with the above analysis. See

also Olsen, 979 F. Supp. at 1166 (in order to show plaintiff was required to miss work for

more than three days, plaintiff must show he “was prevented from working because of the

injury or illness based on a medical provider’s assessment of the claimed condition.”);

Brannon v. Oshkosh B'Gosh, Inc. 897 F. Supp. 1028 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (holding that

plaintiff's testimony that she saw a doctor, was given three prescriptive drugs and stayed

home from work for more than three days was insufficient to prove that she was

incapacitated). 

In addition, even assuming plaintiff had established that she was incapacitated for

more than three days, she did not submit any evidence that the health care provider

prescribed her a “regimen of continuing treatment.”

Because plaintiff has not established that she was incapacitated for more than three

days, her illness which began on January 24, 2003 was not a serious health condition entitled

to protection under the FMLA.

Therefore, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on an alleged lack of

a serious health condition will be granted to the extent plaintiff’s claims are based on the

leave occasioned by her bout of strep throat, which plaintiff has not demonstrated was a

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 19 of 24
20

serious health condition. For purposes of summary judgment, however, the court assumes

plaintiff can establish that her ovarian cyst was a serious health condition.

B. TIMING OF DEFENDANT’S DECISION TO TERMINATE

Defendant contends that plaintiff’s interference and retaliation claims based on her

termination are due to be denied because it decided to terminate plaintiff before she notified

defendant of her need for FMLA leave beginning February 4, 2003.

As set forth above, Dailey and Branham testified that they decided to terminate

plaintiff on January 28, 2003. Higginbotham, at Branham’s request, reviewed the

documentation regarding plaintiff’s work problems, and on January 29, 2003, she approved

the decision to terminate plaintiff, subject to verification from Branham that she had

approved of the decision to terminate. Plaintiff gave Dailey notice of her request for leave

on January 30, 2003. Branham and Higginbotham, through Dailey, were aware of plaintiff’s

leave request before Dailey and Branham told plaintiff that she was terminated.

1. Retaliation Claim

The McDonnell Douglas tripartite, burden shifting analysis applies to claims of

discrimination and retaliation in violation of FMLA. See Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d

1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 2000). “To state a claim under the FMLA, a plaintiff must show that:

(1) she availed herself of a protected right; (2) she suffered an adverse employment decision;

and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment decision.” Id. (citations omitted).

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 20 of 24
21

To prove a causal connection, “the plaintiff must generally show that the decision

maker was aware of the protected conduct at the time of the adverse employment action.”

Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000)(citing

Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993); Raney v. Vinson Guard

Serv., Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1197 (11th Cir. 1997)), cert. denied 532 U.S. 1037 (2001). “That

requirement rests upon common sense. A decision maker cannot have been motivated to

retaliate by something unknown to him.” Id. Also, plaintiff cannot establish a causal

connection between an adverse employment action and her request for leave when, as in this

case, defendant first had notice of her request for leave after it had begun “contemplating”

the adverse employment action at issue. See Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532

U.S. 268, 272 (2001)(per curiam). In Breeden, the Supreme Court held:

The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on two facts: The EEOC had

issued a right-to-sue letter to respondent three months before Rice announced

she was contemplating the transfer, and the actual transfer occurred one month

after Rice learned of respondent’s suit. The latter fact is immaterial in light

of the fact that petitioner concededly was contemplating the transfer before it

learned of the suit. Employers need not suspend previously planned [adverse

employment actions] upon discovering [protected activity], and their

proceeding along lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitively

determined, is no evidence whatever of causality.

Id. (emphasis added and internal citations omitted).

Therefore, because defendant has presented undisputed evidence that it

“contemplated” plaintiff’s termination before plaintiff notified it of her need for FMLA

leave, plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between her termination on January 31,

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 21 of 24
22

2003, and her request for FMLA leave given to Dailey on January 30, 2003. Therefore,

plaintiff’s retaliation claim will be dismissed.

2. Interference Claim

“To state a claim of interference with a substantive [FMLA] right, an employee need

only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that [s]he was entitled to the benefit

denied.” Strickland v. Water Works and Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (11th Cir.

2001)(citing O’Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1353-54 (11th Cir.

2000); King, 166 F.3d at 891). “The issue [in an FMLA interference claim] is simply

whether the employer provided its employee the entitlements set forth in the FMLA . . . .

Because the issue is the right to an entitlement, the employee is due the benefit if the

statutory requirements are satisfied, regardless of the intent of the employer.” Hodgens v.

General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 1998)(internal citations and quotations

omitted). The FMLA makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny

the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided” by the FMLA. 29 U.S.C.

2615(a)(1). The FMLA creates two primary rights – (1) the right to a leave of absence for

a qualifying purpose, and (2) right to reinstatement upon return from such leave. Plaintiff

claims she was denied the right to a leave of absence because defendant terminated her on

January 31, 2003, before her qualifying leave, which was set to begin on February 4, 2003.

Section 2612(a)(1) provides: 

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 22 of 24
23

Subject to section 2613 of this title, an eligible employee shall be entitled to

a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for one or more

of the following:

. . .

(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to

perform the functions of the position of such employee.

29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). “To be eligible for FMLA benefits, one must at a minimum be

an ‘employee,’ not a ‘recently terminated employee.’ . . . A termination decision makes one

ineligible for FMLA benefits . . . .” Dvorak v. Mostardi Platt Associates, Inc., 289 F.3d 479,

486 (7th Cir. 2002)(citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1); Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d

517, 523 (6th Cir. 1998)); see also Brohm, 149 F.3d at 523 (“Brohm was not an ‘eligible

employee’ at the time he received medical attention for his condition. He had already been

terminated a week earlier.”). Plaintiff was not an “employee” at the time of her qualified

leave on February 4, 2003, because defendant already had terminated her on January 31,

2003. Therefore, she cannot established that she was an “eligible employee” entitled to

leave. 

Because plaintiff cannot establish she was an eligible employee, the court finds that

defendant did not deny her a leave of absence to which she was entitled under the FMLA.

Therefore, plaintiff’s interference FMLA claim will be dismissed.

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 23 of 24
24

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court is of the opinion that plaintiff’s Motion to Strike

is due to be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike will be granted

as to the declaration of Brown and Clemon; such evidence has not been considered by the

court. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike will be denied as to paragraph 16 of Dailey’s declaration.

Also, the court is of the opinion that there are no material facts in dispute and defendant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. An order granting defendant’s motion for summary

judgment will be entered contemporaneously with this Amended Memorandum Opinion.

DONE, this 29th day of March, 2006.

 

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 2:03-cv-01529-SLB Document 33 Filed 03/29/06 Page 24 of 24