Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01660/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01660-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1660

___________

Virginia Janis, as Personal *

Representative for the Estate of *

Oliver Richards, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota

* 

Jim Biesheuvel, individually and *

in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff *

of the Custer County Sheriff’s Office, *

Custer County, State of South Dakota; *

State of South Dakota; South Dakota *

Highway Patrol, a political subdivision *

of the State of South Dakota, as employer *

of Trooper Garstenshlager; Trooper Ted *

Garstenshlager, individually and in his *

official capacity of the South Dakota *

Highway Patrol; Custer County, South *

Dakota, as employer of Deputy Biesheuvel *

and as a political subdivision of the State *

of South Dakota; Custer County Sheriff’s *

Department, as employer of Jim Biesheuvel, *

and as a political subdivision of Custer *

County; John Doe One through Three, *

jointly, severally, and individually, *

 *

 *

Defendants - Appellees. *

Appellate Case: 05-1660 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/25/2005 Entry ID: 1966964
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 The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.

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___________

 Submitted: September 12, 2005

 Filed: October 25, 2005

___________

Before MELLOY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Oliver Richards brought this action alleging that law enforcement used

excessive force in their arrest of Richards near Custer, South Dakota. The district

court1

 granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. It held that Richards

had not produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his Fourth Amendment

rights had been violated, and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Virginia Janis, on behalf of the estate of Oliver Richards, brings this appeal. We

affirm.

I. Background

On May 16, 2003, Oliver Richards’s vehicle headed northbound on Highway

79 near Angostura, South Dakota. He was traveling at approximately 40-45 mph on

the 65 mph highway. South Dakota Department of Game, Fish and Parks (“GFP”)

officers observed Richards driving erratically. GFP officers turned on their flashing

blue lights, attempted to pull-over Richards’s vehicle, and radioed in to the South

Dakota Highway Patrol and Custer County Sheriff’s Office that they were in pursuit

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 The degree of force used in moving him from the car to the road is at issue

in this case.

3

It is not clear from the record whether the cuts to Richards’ wrist were

sustained prior to Richards’ seizure by the officers. Richards conceded that the blood

on his face was present before he was removed from the vehicle.

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of a possible drunk driver. GFP officers, Highway Patrol officers, and Deputies from

the Custer County Sheriff’s Office pursued Richards for approximately thirty minutes

with their flashing overhead lights and sirens on. Richards did not stop. Because

Richards would not stop, the South Dakota Highway Patrol District Commander

authorized the deployment of tire-deflating spikes. Richards drove over the spikes

but kept going even though his tires were deflating and multiple law enforcement

vehicles were present with their emergency lights and sirens activated. Authorities

then set up a “rolling roadblock” in which law enforcement vehicles pulled in front

of, and behind, Richards’s vehicle and then slowed down until his vehicle was

stopped on the side of the road. 

Law enforcement officers approached Richards’s car and demanded he exit the

vehicle. Richards refused repeated commands to exit the car. At that point, Deputy

Sheriff Jim Biesheuvel of the Custer County Sheriff’s Office and Trooper Ted

Garstenschlager of the South Dakota Highway Patrol reached through the open

driver’s door, grabbed Richards’s arms, and pried his grip from the steering wheel.

The officers then pulled Richards out of the vehicle and placed him on the road,2

 face

down. The officers put Richards’s arms behind his back and handcuffed him.

Richards complained of pain in his left arm and shoulder. Officers then took

Richards to the side of the road, where they determined that he was not intoxicated,

but rather was suffering from diabetic shock. Officers called for an ambulance and

removed Richards’s handcuffs. Officers gave Richards a glucose tube and

administered medical care for several cuts on his wrists and a cut over his eye until

the ambulance arrived.3

 

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On May 13, 2004, Richards brought this action alleging that the officers

violated his constitutional rights. He alleged that the officers used excessive force

when they removed him from the car and handcuffed him on the ground, in violation

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Richards also alleged that the law enforcement agencies failed

to properly train, supervise, discipline, and control their officers. Finally, Richards

alleged negligent hiring, supervision, and training under South Dakota law.

Defendants claimed in their answers that they were entitled to qualified and sovereign

immunity on all claims. As a result of these defenses, the district court issued an

order requiring the defendants to move for summary judgment. The district court also

ordered that discovery not proceed until the defenses were resolved.

On August 9, 2004, Richards moved for reconsideration of the district court’s

order limiting discovery and requested that defendants’ motion be held in abeyance

until discovery was completed. While these motions were pending, Oliver Richards

died from causes unrelated to the incidents that gave rise to this lawsuit. Virginia

Janis, as personal representative of Richards’s estate, was substituted in his place. 

On December 28, 2004, the district court granted summary judgment in favor

of the defendants. The district court also denied Janis’s motion to reconsider its order

limiting discovery and stay resolution of the motions for summary judgment pending

discovery. Janis now brings this timely appeal.

II. Discussion

A. Excessive Force Claim

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Seiner v. Drenon, 304 F.3d 810, 812 (8th Cir. 2002). Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 (c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A motion for

summary judgment places an affirmative burden on the non-moving party to go

beyond the pleadings and, by affidavit or otherwise, produce specific facts that show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, we engage

in a two-part analysis. Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 2004). First,

we examine “whether, construed in a light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, the facts alleged show the officers’ conduct violated a constitutional right.”

Andrews v. Fuoss, 417 F.3d 813, 816; see also Littrell, 388 F.3d at 582 (“The

‘existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right’ is, therefore, the threshold

question.”) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Second, we must

determine whether the right was clearly established. Littrell, 388 F.3d at 582. This

second step is a “fact-intensive inquiry and ‘must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Id. at 583 (quoting

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.). A constitutional right is clearly established if “[t]he

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “Thus, . . . in light of the Anderson definition of clearly

established, the question whether the . . . right was clearly established at the time the

defendant acted . . . requires an assessment of whether the official’s conduct would

have been objectively reasonable at the time of the incident.” Littrell, 388 F.3d at 583

(internal quotations and citations omitted). 

In this case, Janis asserts that the officers violated Richards’s right to be free

from excessive force. We analyze excessive force claims in the context of seizures

under the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).

“To establish a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free

from excessive force, ‘the test is whether the amount of force used was objectively

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reasonable under the particular circumstances.’” Litrell, 388 F.3d at 583 (quoting

Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1994). We judge the

reasonableness of an officer’s use of force “from the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490

U.S. at 396. 

Viewing the evidence in this case in a light most favorable to Janis, we

conclude that Janis has failed to meet her burden of proving that an issue of material

fact exists as to whether the amount of force used was objectively unreasonable under

the circumstances, and, therefore, she did not show that the defendants violated a

constitutional right. Accordingly, we need not reach the second step of the qualified

immunity analysis. 

In the present case, the defendants believed that Richards was intoxicated while

operating his vehicle. They reached this conclusion after having observed Richards

driving erratically. Based on this belief, they attempted to stop his vehicle in a thirtyminute pursuit. When Richards would not stop, they used tire-deflating spikes.

When this did not stop Richards, they employed a rolling roadblock. The officers

were entitled to stop Richards and ask him to exit his vehicle. See United States v.

Mallari, 334 F.3d 765, 766-67 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that a traffic stop is justified

when an officer has an objectively reasonable basis for believing a traffic law has

been violated).

Once they were able to stop Richards, the officers ordered him to exit his

vehicle. This action was also reasonable. Smith v. Ball State Univ., 295 F.3d 763,

770 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977))

(holding that safety concerns justify asking a driver to step out a vehicle). “When

[Richards] failed to do so, the officers were justified in using force to remove him,

particularly given the potential threat to public safety of an [impaired] driver in

command of a running vehicle.” Smith, 295 F.3d at 770. 

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Janis asserts that the officers’ actions were excessive in prying Richards’s

hands from the steering wheel and pulling him from the car. In particular, Janis

argues that the officers roughly and unreasonably shoved Richards face first onto the

concrete highway. Viewing the evidence put forth by Janis in a light most favorable

to her case, the evidence does not support these assertions. Janis also argues that the

officers’ actions in pulling Richards from the car were unreasonable given that

Richards was an unarmed, frail, frightened, elderly man who was not intoxicated.

Janis argues that Richards was in diabetic shock and was simply scared and hard of

hearing, and therefore posed no risk to the officers or anyone else. At the time they

pulled Richards from the car, however, the officers did not know that Richards’s

actions were the result of a diabetic seizure, not intoxication. Further, the officers did

not know what level of risk Richards posed (i.e., whether he possessed a weapon).

The officers removed the handcuffs and administered medical attention immediately

after learning of Richards’s medical condition. Based on the record, the use of force

was measured, brief, and appropriate to accomplish the purposes of the stop to: 1)

secure Richards and his vehicle; 2) ensure that no criminal activity was afoot; and 3)

preserve Richards’s, the officers’, and the public’s safety in light of the

circumstances. Richards’s elderly condition is evidence that the amount of force

employed was not reasonable, but it is not by itself sufficient for a jury to find that the

officers’ actions were unreasonable. In light of the officers’ knowledge at the time

of the events, the evidence does not prove that the officers’ actions constituted

excessive force.

Janis’ further argues that she could prove that a genuine issue of material fact

exists if she is permitted to engage in discovery. Qualified immunity is an immunity

from suit, not simply from liability. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

Its purpose is to “avoid ‘subject[ing] government officials either to the costs of trial

or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery’ in cases where the legal norms the

officials are alleged to have violated were not clearly established at the time.” Id.

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982)). Accordingly, “[u]nless

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the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a

defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before commencement

of discovery.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. Janis claims to be seeking the following

additional information: 1) what was demonstrated by the tape recordings of radio

traffic between the people involved in the incident; 2) what the officers remember

regarding the incident that is not contained in the police reports; 3) what Richards

stated to officers at the scene; 4) what movements Richards made within his vehicle

other than grabbing the steering wheel; 5) how long it took for officers to remove

Richards; 6) whether the other officers involved remember the incident the same way

as the two primary two officers; 7) what the training of each involved officer was; and

8) whether these officers required to participate in additional training because of other

past incidents of excessive force. 

However, Janis already possessed police reports of the incident, a transcript of

the radio traffic between a highway patrol trooper who was involved in the pursuit

and the dispatcher, and the daily activity report from the Fall River County

Dispatcher. Janis also had affidavits from both officers involved in removing

Richards from his vehicle. Finally, Janis had a videotape from one of the officers’

vehicles that provided a partially obstructed view of the events that transpired when

Richards was pulled over. Thus, the district court reasonably concluded that Janis

already had much of the information she might have found with further discovery. 

Accordingly, Janis failed to meet her burden of establishing that the amount of

force used was objectively unreasonable. Therefore, the officers’ actions do not

constitute a violation of a constitutional right. Because we conclude that the officers’

actions were reasonable, the claims against the other defendants cannot succeed.

Kiser v. City of Huron, 219 F.3d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 2000).

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B. Motion to Stay

Janis asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff’s

motion to stay resolution of the summary judgment motion pending additional

discovery. “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) allows a party defending against

a summary judgment motion to request a court to postpone a decision until

completion of adequate discovery.” Temporomandibular Joint Implant Recipients v.

Dow Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 1484, 1490 (8th Cir. 1997). Janis argues that the motion

in this case was filed before the plaintiffs had a realistic opportunity to pursue

discovery relating to its theory of the case. “A party invoking [56(f)’s] protections

must do so in good faith by affirmatively demonstrating why he cannot respond to a

movant’s affidavits as otherwise required . . . and how postponement of a ruling on

the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant’s

showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Willmar Poultry Co. v. MortonNorwich Products, Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1975). Here, Janis fails to

demonstrate that a postponement of a ruling on the motion for summary judgment,

particularly in light of the affidavits and supporting materials previously submitted

and the death of Mr. Richards, might reveal additional pertinent information. We

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

C. Award of Costs

We review the awarding of costs for abuse of discretion. Martin v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 251 F.3d 691, 695 (8th Cir. 2001). Under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), costs other than attorneys’ fees are to be awarded to the

prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. Accordingly, Janis is required to

overcome the presumption that defendants are entitled to costs. Janis fails to meet

this burden. She fails to suggest a rationale under which the district court’s actions

constitute an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the award of costs.

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IV. Conclusion

The district court correctly granted summary judgment. The officers

appropriately stopped and detained Richards to investigate whether he was driving

under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and the amount of force used was objectively

reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, we affirm the

decision of the district court.

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