Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00447/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00447-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH PUCKETT, )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

JUDGE JONES, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

1: 05-CV-00447-REC-SMS 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DISMISS ACTION WITH PREJUDICE FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON

WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED (DOC.

9)

Plaintiff, previously a state prisoner at the Fresno County

Jail, is now out of custody and is proceeding pro se with an

action for damages and other relief concerning alleged civil

rights violations. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and

72-304.

I. Screening the Complaint

The Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

thereof if the Court determines that an allegation of poverty is

untrue or that the action is 1) frivolous or malicious, 2) fails

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to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 3) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2).

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

Here, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on April 6,

2005. His complaint was dismissed with leave to amend by the

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Court’s order dated May 4, 2005. Plaintiff filed a first amended

complaint (FAC) on May 23, 2005.

The FAC is substantially a repetition of Plaintiff’s

original complaint. Plaintiff sues Judge Jones, Attorney Magill

(his counsel in 1996), Judge Kapetan, the District Attorney’s

Office, and the Superior Court judges. He seeks damages and

equitable relief. He complains that he was convicted in 1996 of

grand theft, apparently in the Superior Court of San Francisco.

Subsequently, he entered into a plea bargain in December 2004 in

the Fresno Superior Court that included pleading to a strike

under California’s Three Strikes Law, namely, a robbery with a

gun, that did not constitute part of Plaintiff’s criminal record.

However, a transcript of the proceedings held on December 14,

2004, which is appended to the FAC, reveals that Judge Kapetan

noted that the prior conviction alleged as a strike was amended

to reflect a charge of violating Penal Code § 487(c), which would

not be a strike. Further, the transcript reveals that the

enhancement was stricken for sentencing purposes, and prison

priors were stricken; Plaintiff was found eligible for

Proposition 36 probation, imposition of sentence was suspended

for two years, and Plaintiff was placed on two years’ formal

probation. Plaintiff complains that the District Attorney

wrongfully, with malice, and in bad faith filed the strike

allegation, and that it caused him pain, suffering, and emotional

distress. In March 2005 Plaintiff sought to withdraw the guilty

plea, which precipitated Judge Kapetan’s appointing a public

defender, which Plaintiff alleges was a violation of his rights.

Plaintiff alleges generally the following:

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1. The defendants were acting under color of state

law. 2. and deprived plaintiff of rights secured by

the Constitution of federal statutes sections

1985(3) cause of action for damages to argue who is

injured by a conspiracy furned (sic) for the purposes

of depriving (him) either directly or indirectly

or of the equal protection of the laws, of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws.

(FAC at 4.) No facts are alleged concerning a conspiracy,

although Plaintiff states:

Now that the damage been done plaintiff has served

an unlaw (sic) sentence that happen in 1996, now that 

over plaitiff (sic) is allegeding (sic) a pervasive

pattern of illegal and unconstitutional affirmative

links between times of certain incident.

(Id.)

A. Defendants’ Conduct

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] 

 . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States. . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution. . .

shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that

defendants acted under color of state law at the time the act

complained of was committed and that the defendants deprived the

plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v. United

States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).

Further, the statute plainly requires that there be an

actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants

and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. 

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See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit

has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if

he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to link each of the named

defendants with some affirmative act or omission that resulted in

an alleged deprivation of federally protected rights.

B. Judicial Immunity

However, Plaintiff appears to allege that Judge Jones’s

conduct in accepting Plaintiff’s plea and sentencing Plaintiff

resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Further, it

appears that he is alleging that Judge Kapetan’s conduct in

appointing a public defender was a violation of his

constitutional rights. 

Absolute judicial immunity from damage actions under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 extends to judges for acts performed in their

official capacities and to officers whose functions bear a close

association to the judicial process. Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d

155, 156 (9th Cir. 1986); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075

(9th Cir. 1986). The allegations of the FAC refer to actions on

the part of judges that are within the scope of judicial

immunity. Although Plaintiff states that the Defendants are sued

in their personal capacities as well as their official

capacities, all allegations regarding judges relate to their

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official conduct. Thus, the claims against the judges are barred.

C. Prosecutorial Immunity

State prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil liability

for acts taken in their official capacity that are closely

associated with the judicial process, such as initiating

prosecution and presenting the state’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 427, 430-431 (1976); Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d

1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff names the District Attorney’s office as a

defendant, apparently with respect to charging, plea, and

sentencing decisions. Such conduct would constitute conduct in

the prosecutor’s official capacity of prosecuting the case such

that absolute immunity attaches. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against

the District Attorney’s office are barred. 

D. Invalidation of Plaintiff’s Conviction

Moreover, when seeking damages for an allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, “a § 1983 plaintiff

must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-88

(1994). “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 488.

Plaintiff has not alleged that the underlying conviction or

sentence has been reversed or otherwise invalidated by a state

tribunal. Accordingly, the claim should be dismissed. 

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E. Defendant Magill

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead

(1) that the defendant acted under color of state law and (2)

that the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the

Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson v. United States, 781

F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). Generally, private parties are

not acting under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939

F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiff names attorney Magill as a defendant. It appears

that Magill was acting as a private attorney in defendant

Plaintiff in the criminal action. Plaintiff has not alleged facts

showing how Defendant Magill was acting under color of state law.

Even if Magill was acting as Plaintiff’s public defender,

Plaintiff nevertheless has failed to allege facts showing how

Defendant Magill has acted under color of state law. In order to

recover under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege and prove that

Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of

a right secured by the Constitution or federal statute. KarimPanahi v.Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.

1988). It is established that a public defender does not act

under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional

functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317, 325 (1981); Rivera v.

Green, 775 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1985).

F. Malice

In this action, Plaintiff is attempting to relitigate issues

determined in prior actions. In Puckett v. Fresno Superior Court,

CIV F 03 6161 REC DLB, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s

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 “The first clause of 1985(2) concerns conspiracy to obstruct justice in the federal courts, or to intimidate a

party, witness or juror in connection therewith” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1028 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985) and is not

applicable.

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allegations against Judge Jones and attorney Magill on the basis

of judicial immunity and absence of actions under color of law.

(Findings and Recommendations filed November 6, 2003, adopted on

March 25, 2004). In Puckett v. Duncan, CV F 98-5845 OWW HGB P,

the Court denied plaintiff’s habeas corpus petition, in which

Plaintiff challenged his 1996 plea as coerced and the assistance

of attorney Magill as ineffective. (Findings and Recommendation

dated February 18, 2000, adopted on October 16, 2002.) Thus, it

is inferred that to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking to

relitigate issues already litigated, Plaintiff’s complaint is

malicious and should be dismissed.

G. Conspiracy

In the FAC, Plaintiff appears to mention a claim for relief

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The second clause of section

1985(2) proscribes conspiracies for the purpose of impeding the

due course of justice in any state, with the intent to deny equal

protection of the laws, and section 1985(3) proscribes

conspiracies to deny equal protection of the law or equal

privileges and immunities.1 Coverdell v. Dep’t. of Soc. and

Health Svcs., State of Washington, 834 F.2d 758, 767 (9th Cir.

1987). An allegation of racial or class-based discrimination is

required to state a claim for relief under either the second

clause of section 1985(2) or section 1985(3). Bretz v. Kelman,

773 F.2d 1026, 1028-1030 (9th Cir. 1985). No such allegation or

basis for such an allegation appears in either of Plaintiff’s

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complaints filed in this action.

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy under §

1983, Plaintiff must allege some facts with respect to the

conspiracy. In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant

to section 1983, such a complaint must “allege specific facts to

support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.” 

Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.

1992); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d

621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must allege that defendants

conspired or acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was

done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sykes v. State of

California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting the existence

of a conspiracy among defendants. Further, Plaintiff has not

alleged facts demonstrating that defendants violated his

constitutional rights. In order to state a cognizable claim for

relief for conspiracy, Plaintiff must establish that defendants

conspired to violate an underlying constitutional right.

II. Conclusion

In view of the nature of Plaintiff’s claims, it does not

appear that Plaintiff could allege facts sufficient to state a

claim. In its order dismissing the original complaint, the Court

notified Plaintiff of all defects except those pertaining to the

newly asserted, vague allegations of conspiracy. Plaintiff has

had an opportunity to remedy the defects, but Plaintiff has not

remedied the defects; the allegations remain essentially the

same. There is thus no basis for inferring that it is possible

that Plaintiff can remedy the defects outlined hereinabove. It

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appears that giving Plaintiff another opportunity to amend the

complaint would be futile. 

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that

1. The complaint BE DISMISSED without leave to amend and

with prejudice for failure to state a claim; and

2. The Clerk of Court BE DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Defendant because the dismissal would terminate the action in its

entirety.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 26, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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