Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01162/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01162-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN ANDREW SHEPHEARD, II, )

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Petitioner, )

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v. )

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ROBERT HOREL, Warden, )

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Respondent. )

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1:05-CV-01162 AWI JMD HC

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATION

[Doc. #28]

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On April 8, 2008, the Magistrate Judge issued a Findings and Recommendation that

recommended the petition be DENIED with prejudice. The Magistrate Judge further recommended

that the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment. The Findings and Recommendation was

served on all parties and contained notice that any objections were to be filed within thirty (30) days

of the date of service of the order. 

On May 12, 2008, Petitioner filed objections to the Findings and Recommendation. In

Case 1:05-cv-01162-AWI -JMD Document 32 Filed 06/23/08 Page 1 of 4
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In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that "the suppression by 1

the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

prosecution." Id. at 87.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 2

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c), this Court has conducted a de novo

review of the case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file and having considered the objections,

the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation is supported by the

record and proper analysis.

In the objections, Petitioner claims that a Brady violation occurred when an audio tape of a 1

witness’s interview and diagrams the witness made during the interview were withheld until after

trial. A Brady violation occurs when the government “fails to disclose evidence materially

favorable to the accused,” including impeachment evidence. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S.

867, 869 (2006); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004). The materiality standard is met when

the “favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to

undermine confidence in the verdict.” Youngblood, 547 U.S. at 870; Banks, 540 U.S. at 698; Kyles

v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). Evidence is material under Brady if there is a “reasonable

probability” that the outcome would have been different if the prosecution had not withheld the

evidence. Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1148 (9 Cir. 2007). Nothing in the objections th

convinces the court that the California courts violated clearly established federal law by finding that

the audio tapes were so vague and unclear as to not be material. 

In the objections, Petitioner also contends that neither the Magistrate Judge nor the California

courts addressed the Brady violation that occurred when diagrams the witness made while being

interviewed were not provided until after trial. To establish a Brady violation, the petitioner has the

burden of showing that withheld evidence is material. United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th

Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has failed to provide the diagram or meet his burden to show that there

is a reasonable probability that the admission of this diagram would have caused a different outcome. 

Turning to the second ground for relief, Petitioner attempts to change his second ground from

one in which he contends the trial court erred by not instructing on the meaning of “intent” into one

in which Petitioner argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to insist on a definition of

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 3

“intent.” Petitioner argues that all evidence showed Petitioner did not come to the scene with intent

to kill anyone. The court cannot grant relief on this contention for several reasons. First, a new

theory cannot properly be raised in objections to Findings and Recommendations. Greenhow v.

Secretary of HHS, 863 F.2d 633, 638-39 (9 Cir.1988), overruled on other grounds by United States th

v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347 (9 Cir.1992). Second, such an ineffective assistance of counsel claim th

is not exhausted because it was never presented to the California Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §

254(b)(1).

Finally, Petitioner contends in his objections, as he did in the petition, that Petitioner’s

statements show that he is not guilty of First Degree Murder. As explained by the Magistrate Judge,

when reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim on federal habeas corpus review, a federal

court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Here,

Petitioner merely contends that a different meaning could be given to the evidence. Such an

argument does not show a constitutional violation.

Accordingly, the court adopts the Findings and Recommendations, and there is no need to

modify the Findings and Recommendations based on the points raised in the objections.

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue

a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

 (a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court

of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

 (b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial 

a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the 

validity of such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

 (c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 4

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability

“if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or

that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1034; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the

petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate “something more than

the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at

1040.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to issue a

certificate of appealability.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendation issued April 8, 2008, is ADOPTED IN FULL; 

2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED with prejudice; 

3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment; and

4. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 22, 2008 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

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