Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00555/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00555-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 20:1401 Education: Handicapped Child Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRESNO UNIFIED SCHOOL 

DISTRICT,

Plaintiff,

v.

K.U., et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

AND RELATED COUNTER-CLAIMS

CASE NOS.: 1:12-cv-01699-MJS AND 

1:14-cv-00555-MJS

ORDER:

(1) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF/COUNTER 

DEFENDANT’S COMPLAINT IN CASE NO. 

1:12-cv-01699-MJS (ECF NO. 1);

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF/COUNTER 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGEMENT IN CASE NO. 1:12-cv-01699-

MJS (ECF NO. 141);

(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF/COUNTER 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY IN CASE 

NO. 1:14-cv-00555-MJS (ECF. NO. 14);

 

(4) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’/COUNTER 

CLAIMANTS’ MOTION FOR RELEF FROM 

THE DISPOSTIVE MOTION FILING 

DEADLINE IN CASE NO. 1:12-cv-01699-MJS 

(ECF NO. 153);

(5) CONSOLIDATING CASE NOS. 1:12-cv01699-MJS AND 1:14-cv-00555-MJS;

AND

(6) DIRECTING CLERK TO CLOSE CASE 

NO. 1:12-cv-01699-MJS

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 1 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

These two actions were initiated by the Fresno Unified School District (“FUSD” or 

the “District”) against K.U., a student, by and through her mother and educational rights 

holder, A.D.U., and A.D.U. individually (jointly at times, “A.D.U.”). All parties have 

consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction for all purposes under 28 U.S.C. section 636. 

The litigation has generated many disputes and the motions being addressed 

herein. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this litigation and these motions are 

first outlined below. 

I. ORIGIN OF DISPUTE AND LITIGATION

A. Overview of the First Administrative Proceeding1and the Litigation 

it Generated

1. K.U.’s Background

 K.U., born December 20, 1991, is eligible for special education services as a

student with an intellectual disability. She resides within the boundaries of Plaintiff

Fresno Unified School District. Her mother, A.D.U., is her conservator and holds her 

educational rights.

Beginning with the 2006-07 school year, K.U. attended classes full time at 

Duncan Polytechnical High School. She graduated in June 2010, receiving a certificate 

of attendance in lieu of diploma. Her graduation notwithstanding, K.U. continued to 

attend Duncan full-time in the 2010-11 school year.

FUSD determined to move K.U. into an adult transition program. Her then most 

recent psychoeducational assessment had been performed in 2002. ADU objected and 

challenged the decision to change K.U.’s school.

 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the facts and history herein are taken from the Administrative Law Judge’s 

written decision in Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) Case No. 2012010705, dated August 3, 2012, 

and except where indicated, are believed not to be in dispute.

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 2 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

2. Disputes about K.U.’s Educational Placement

More specifically, in April 2011, the District sent A.D.U. notice that K.U.’s annual

individualized education program (“IEP”)

2

team meeting was scheduled for May 23, 

2012, and that K.U. would not attend Duncan the following year. The District sought to 

move K.U., who was then 19 years old, to an adult transition program intended to 

serve students 18 to 22 years of age, i.e., beyond high school age. A.D.U. objected

and demanded that any placement decision be made at the IEP meeting. 

 On May 17, 2011, the District informed A.D.U. that no further assessment was 

needed to determine K.U.’s eligibility for continued special education. As the end of the 

school year approached, the District assigned Susan Kalpakoff, who supervised the adult

transition program at Fresno City College, as K.U.’s case manager.

At the District's request, A.D.U. visited one of three available adult transition 

programs before the IEP meeting. A.D.U. did not consider the program to be appropriate 

for K.U. A.D.U. wanted K.U. to remain at Duncan as she had made significant 

academic progress there. A.D.U. also thought K.U.’s program should emphasize

academic skills, rather than the practical skills, such as mobility, time management, and 

vocational skills, emphasized in transitional programs. She considered K.U. to be mildly

disabled, typical in her social interactions, and better behaved than many non-disabled 

students.

 

2

An IEP is a written statement setting forth: a disabled child’s levels of achievement and performance;

measurable annual academic and functional goals; how future progress is to be measured; a statement of

the special education and services to be provided; an explanation of the extent to which the child will not

participate in regular classes with nondisabled children; a statement of individual appropriate

accommodations and alternative assessments; and, the projected date for the beginning of services. 20

U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I-VII). Beginning no later than the first IEP to be in effect when the child is 16,

the IEP must also include appropriate measurable postsecondary goals relating to training, education, 

employment, and, where appropriate, independent living skills. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII).

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 3 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The May 23, 2011 IEP meeting included A.D.U., K.U.’s advocate Sandra

Hammond, a Central Valley Regional Center

3

counselor, an FUSD case manager, two 

FUSD administrators, one of K.U.’s. teachers at Duncan, a school psychologist, and a

school counselor. The District’s agenda included two items: K.U.’s placement for the 

2011-12 school year and the "fading"

4

of the one-on-one aide who had assisted K.U. at 

Duncan. KU’s levels of performance included the results of a 2008 academic ability test 

(WIAT-II) and undated reports that K.U. was working on upper-first-grade math skills 

and first-to-second grade reading skills. Teachers reported that K.U. completed art 

projects with support, did most of what she was asked in Forestry, and identified flowers

and performed modified classwork in floral design. Further proposed levels of 

performance indicated that K.U. had good communication skills, and good fine and

gross motor skills. She was friendly, polite, willing to do her work, and able to care for

her personal needs while at school and to advocate on her own behalf. However, her 

frequent absences, headaches, and early departures as a result of seizures or related 

physical impairment had affected K.U.’s relationships with her peers.

A.D.U. wanted K.U. to focus on academics and socialization, and sought to 

have her remain at Duncan. After the District offered three adult transition programs 

for 2011-12, the IEP meeting was adjourned to allow A.D.U. to view those she had not

yet visited. 

A.D.U. rejected one, the Instructional Media Center program (IMC), which 

served students with moderate-to-severe intellectual disabilities since she believed 

 

3

The State of California finances the Central Valley Regional Center to advocate for, and provide

services to, persons with developmental disabilities.

4

The Court assumes that “fading” reflects the District’s intent gradually to discontinue K.U.’s aide as K.U.

transferred into the transition program.

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 4 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

K.U. was only mildly-to-moderately disabled. A.D.U. believed that IMC offered nothing

more than simple, functional academics.

A.D.U. also rejected another, the Cesar Chavez program, which served mild-tomoderately disabled students, focused on intensive language arts and math, and

provided vocational training. The vocational training program was not designed for

intellectually disabled students. A.D.U. was disturbed by the students’ behavioral and

emotional issues, particularly their cussing in the classrooms. She also spoke to the

administrator at Cesar Chavez, who recommended against placing K.U. in the program.

The IEP meeting reconvened on June 10, 2011. Attendees were A.D.U., the 

Regional Center case manager, two FUSD representatives, a school psychologist, 

and a counselor. Since the May meeting, the draft I.E.P. had been edited to list K.U.’s 

school of attendance as the District's adult transition programs rather than Duncan. 

Personal levels of performance had been edited to reflect that K.U. had made steady

progress on her 2010-11 annual goals. Although A.D.U. and her advocate, Ms. 

Hammond

5

insisted that the I.E.P. specify K.U.’s goals, the District participants

refused to do so, protesting that the District had not been permitted to assess K.U., 

and that assessment was a prerequisite to determining goals.6

A.D.U. and the District participants also disagreed on possible placements. The

District considered only the three adult transition programs, but A.D.U. wanted K.U. to 

remain at Duncan for a sixth year. A.D.U. argued that at Duncan, K.U. had made good

academic progress, had friends and socialized when she was not suffering from 

 

5

Although the OAH decision does not include Ms. Hammond on its list of attendees of the June 10, 2011

meeting, her opinion is reflected in later fact finding.

6

The ALJ found that the District had never asked to assess K.U.

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 5 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

seizures and related symptoms, and was mainstreamed. In the adult transition 

programs, protested A.D.U., K.U. would be placed only with disabled students, would no 

longer participate in a general education curriculum, and would not progress in 

academics. 

 The District offered placement in the IMC program, with goals to be determined 

after thirty days of participation. A.D.U. refused to consent.

On June 20, 2011, the District sent A.D.U. written notice of its intent to 

discontinue K.U.’s one-on-one aide since an aide would not be needed in an adult

transition program. The notice emphasized that K.U. had graduated from Duncan in 

June 2010 with 230 high school credits and that, in 2011, at 19 1⁄2 years of age, she was 

appropriately placed in her least restrictive environment: an adult transition program with 

age-appropriate peers. On August 12, 2011, Duncan's principal telephoned A.D.U. to 

advise that K.U. had been “disenrolled” from Duncan. A.D.U. protested that K.U. had 

been reassigned without a signed IEP, but the District considered placement at IMC to 

be an offer of a free and appropriate public education.7

On September 19, 2011, A.D.U. observed the adult transition program at Fresno 

City College (“FCC-ATP”). The FCC-ATP program was a collaboration between the 

District and Fresno City College that offered a menu of classes consisting of (1) 

intervention classes in reading and writing taught by a District teacher in the morning, 

(2) afternoon classes by the Fresno County Office of Education for students with IQs 

lower than 50, (3) college courses at Fresno Community College, and (4) one-on-one

tutoring with a District teacher or paraeducator when the student was not in another 

 

7 Under state and federal law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education 

to meet their unique needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 5600.

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 6 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

class or program. A.D.U. was troubled that there were only male, and only disabled,

students in the classroom.

On September 19, 2011, the District agreed to schedule an IEP meeting to 

secure K.U.’s placement in an adult transition program. It noted that placement in 

the Fresno City College program was no longer an option since A.D.U. had not 

registered K.U. for college coursework by the fall semester deadline.

A.D.U. retained an attorney, Dria Fearn, who, on October 4, 2011, demanded 

K.U.’s re-enrollment at Duncan and development of goals prior to any transition 

planning. Although the District scheduled an IEP meeting for October 25, 2011, it 

refused to re-enroll K.U. at Duncan. Instead, it maintained its offer of placement in 

FCC-ATP or IMC.

The October 25, 2011, IEP meeting included A.D.U., her attorney, Ms. Fearn, 

her advocate, Ms. Hammond, the Regional Center case manager, and District 

representatives including two attorneys and others. The meeting considered all three

adult transition programs. A.D.U. reiterated her demand that K.U. be re-enrolled at 

Duncan. The District team presented a plan for a comprehensive triennial assessment 

of K.U.’s academic achievement, social and emotional development, adaptive

behavior, post-secondary transition, and assistive technology.

8

The assessment was to take place within six weeks and be followed by an IEP 

meeting on December 12, 2011 to review the assessment results and develop K.U’s

goals and objectives. A.D.U. requested that a neutral evaluator be retained to conduct 

the assessment. The District refused. A.D.U. did not sign the assessment plan.

 

8

A school district must reevaluate a child with a disability at least once every three years unless the school

district and the parent agree that reevaluation is unnecessary. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii).

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 7 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

The District team suggested placing K.U. in the intervention classes and oneon-one tutoring in the mornings, with three class periods at Duncan in the afternoon, 

until the end of the fall semester on December 23, 2011. A.D.U. wanted the dual 

placement to continue through the end of the 2011-12 school year. She consented 

to the IEP except for the December end date for the Duncan placement.

K.U. began attending afternoon classes at Duncan on October 26, 2011. From 

that date until the December 2011 IEP meeting, A.D.U. and the District engaged in

ongoing written disputes regarding the assignment of K.U.’s aide, the location at which 

K.U. ate lunch, K.U.’s inability to participate in extracurricular activities at Duncan, and 

the District’s request to assess K.U. The disputes were not resolved except that K.U. 

was permitted to participate in extracurricular activities at Duncan.

Attendees at the December 12, 2011 IEP meeting were A.D.U. and her 

advocate, the Regional Center case manager, District representatives, and an FCC 

case manager. The District had prepared an agenda that included the concerns A.D.U.

had communicated to the District.9

It was noted, albeit without being able to specify the reading level at which K.U 

was reading, that K.U. understood materials at her reading level. K.U. was reported to 

be working on "touch money" math, demonstrating difficulty adding and subtracting

money, but not working on math goals of multiplication of multi-digit numbers. Work 

samples from another of K.U.'s teachers were presented without knowing when they

had been completed. A representative from Duncan reported that K.U. was happy in

class and completed all of her modified work, but had limited interaction with her fellow

 

9

The ALJ accepted as evidence an audio recording of this meeting.

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 8 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

students, who were new to her.

A.D.U. again refused to sign the assessment plan unless the District provided 

a neutral evaluator. She was advised that K.U. could not continue to attend FCCATP half- time. Registration for the FCC-ATP program ended January 6, 2012, and

would be required for attendance there. If A.D.U. failed to timely register K.U. for 

FCC-ATP, the only available programs would be IMC or Cesar Chavez. A.D.U. 

protested that the District ran the morning program and that K.U. did not need to 

register to attend only the District program. The District responded that the FCC-ATP

program was a full-day program and that K.U. needed to be placed in an adult

program. A.D.U. insisted on the dual placement. The District remained adamant that 

K.U. would not be permitted to continue at both FCC-ATP and Duncan. It also 

refused to consider a request for a comparison of services and mainstreaming

opportunities at Duncan and FCC-ATP.

The District did not permit K.U. to attend Duncan after December 23, 2011. 

3. Administrative Hearing Number One 

On January 24, 2012, A.D.U. and K.U., by A.D.U., filed a Request for Mediation 

and Due Process Hearing against the District with the State of California Office of 

Administrative Hearings. On February 1, 2012, the OAH issued an order directing the 

District to continue K.U.’s dual placement at FCC-ATP and Duncan.

A.D.U’s hearing request raised two grounds on which she felt that K.U. had 

been procedurally denied a free and appropriate public education: 1) the District had 

predetermined its offer of a full-time placement at FCC-ATP without considering

placement at Duncan or dual placement at FCC and Duncan; and, 2) the District 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 9 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

denied A.D.U.’s right to actively participate in the IEP process by failing to provide 

A.D.U. with necessary information and by refusing to consider A.D.U.’s input regarding

K.U.'s placement, academic and social progress, and goals and objectives.

The District countered that K.U. was barred from challenging the offer of

placement in the FCC-ATP program since A.D.U.’s refusal to consent to the 

assessment plan left the District without necessary information. It contended that 

A.D.U., not the District, had presented a pre-determined placement. Finally, it

maintained that A.D.U. had actively participated in the IEP process.

A hearing was held over a period of approximately five days in April 2012. The 

hearing was presided over by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gary Geren. However, 

Judge Geren subsequently became unavailable, and the case was assigned to ALJ 

Alexa J. Hohensee who listened to recordings of the hearings, reviewed the evidence 

and issued a decision on August 3, 2012. After noting that K.U., as the petitioning party, 

bore the burden of persuasion on all issues, Judge Hohensee effectively concluded she 

had carried that burden quite well. Specifically, she concluded that the District had 

predetermined K.U.’s placement prior to the December 12, 2011 IEP meeting, a

procedural violation that significantly impeded A.D.U.’s opportunity to participate in the

IEP process. She emphasized that the District had erred in considering K.U.’s 

placement before it had conducted K.U.’s required triennial assessment and determined 

her goals and objectives. She found that the District impermissibly refused to consider

A.D.U.’s input regarding goals and objectives, K.U.’s academic and social progress and 

A.D.U.’s opinion about placement. 

Significantly, ALJ Hohensee rejected the District’s argument that A.D.U.’s refusal 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 10 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

to consent to the triennial assessment excused the District’s procedural violation, 

emphasizing that the District was required to conduct an assessment even if A.D.U.

refused to consent. Finally, the ALJ faulted the District for failing to provide A.D.U. with 

information necessary for her to meaningfully participate in the IEP meetings. 

The ALJ did not substantively analyze the propriety of K.U.’s continuing joint 

placement at Duncan and FCC, but concluded that the procedural violations acted to 

deny K.U. a free and appropriate public education as a matter of law.

In crafting a remedy, the ALJ emphasized that the District’s failure to assess 

K.U.’s academic levels and academic performance as required by law left K.U. at risk 

of being placed in an inappropriate program for the 2012-13 school year. She ordered 

the District to secure, within sixty days, an independent educational evaluation, at the 

District’s expense, to determine K.U.’s abilities and educational needs. She also 

ordered the District to ensure that the independent assessor attended the IEP meeting

to fully explain the results of the assessment. She directed the District to ensure that all

of K.U.’s teachers attended the IEP meeting and there provided meaningful and 

accurate information regarding K.U.’s academic achievement and functional 

performance.

The ALJ acknowledged that compensatory education was an available 

equitable remedy when a student was denied a free and appropriate public

education, but explained that the absence of a recent educational assessment left 

her unable to determine whether compensatory education was an appropriate

remedy.

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 11 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

4. Post-Hearing Number One Developments

a. Disputes Over Effectuating the ALJ’s Orders

On August 10, 1012, the District sent A.D.U. notice that it had selected Paul C.

Lebby, Ph.D., to perform an independent educational assessment in accordance with 

the ALJ’s order. The notice included a copy of Dr. Lebby’s vita, the proposed dates, 

times and locations for Dr. Lebby’s classroom observation and assessment, and 

proposed dates, times, and locations for an IEP meeting to discuss the results of Dr.

Lebby’s assessment. Since the ALJ’s order mandated that the independent assessment 

address the areas outlined in the October 25, 2011, assessment plan, the notice also

included a copy of it.

On August 20, 2012, A.D.U. advised the District that K.U. would not be 

available for assessment, and that A.D.U. would not be available for the IEP 

meeting, on any of the proposed dates. She suggested alternative dates falling on or

just before the end of the sixty-day assessment period. She also proposed a location 

other than that suggested by the District. A.D.U. accused the District of violating the 

ALJ’s order by proposing that the evaluation be conducted by a District employee, and 

by enclosing with the notice a copy of the October 25, 2011 assessment plan and 

consent for assessment.

The District explained that it had enclosed the October 25, 2011, assessment

plan because the ALJ had ordered the District to follow that plan. It enclosed the IEE 

Criteria Sheet to document that Dr. Lebby was an authorized independent evaluator and 

not a District employee. Explaining that the extensive time required to conduct an 

educational evaluation meant that observation and assessment needed to begin 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 12 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

immediately, the District provided alternative dates for Dr. Lebby’s observation and 

assessment. Finally, the District advised A.D.U. that it had forwarded her requested 

dates for the IEP meeting to K.U.’s case administrator to coordinate with all the 

necessary attendees.

On August 24, 2012, A.D.U. demanded an independent evaluator other than Dr.

Lebby. On August 28, 2012, the District denied her request, emphasizing the time

constraints for conducting the assessment. The District pointed out that the ALJ’s order 

directed the District to select and retain an independent administrator. A.D.U. did not

respond.

On August 28, 2012, the District received from the California Department of 

Education a Notice of Corrective Action, dated August 21, 2012, requiring the District 

to provide proof of its compliance with the ALJ’s order by November 1, 2012.

In the 2012-13 school year, K.U. attended only the ROP program at Duncan. 

Neither A.D.U. nor K.U. participated in any portion of the FCC-ATP program.

b. K.U.’s New Administrative Case

 On October 3, 2012, A.D.U. filed a new special education due process complaint 

(in Case No. 2012100242) alleging that the District had denied K.U. a free appropriate

public education. The complaint set forth multiple bases for her claim. Relief requested 

included: (1) declaratory relief that K.U. had been denied a free appropriate public

education for the school years 2010-11 through 2012-13; (2) compensatory education 

through individual tutoring in written expression, reading, mathematics, and transition 

services; (3) permission for K.U. to socialize with her nondisabled peers, including

during lunch and extracurricular activities at Duncan; (4) reimbursement of

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 13 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

transportation costs; and (5) for the 2012-13 school year, (a) placement in a community

college program with classroom access to disabled and nondisabled peers; (b) one-toone tutoring; (c) an adequate transition program including vocational training; and (d) 

mobility training.

c. The District’s New Administrative Case

On October 5, 3012, the District also requested a new due process hearing (in 

Case No. 2012100291)

10 alleging K.U. was no longer deriving benefit from the Duncan 

program she had attended since 2006 and from which she graduated in June 2010. 

Since K.U.’s last assessment was in 2002, and since A.D.U. had withheld consent for the 

required triennial assessments, the District sought a Declaration that it could assess K.U. 

without A.D.U.’s consent. It requested a declaration permitting it to discontinue providing

instruction to K.U. at Duncan and finding its placement offers in the October 2011 IEP 

and September 2012 written notice to constitute offers of a free appropriate public

education. Finally, it sought sanctions against A.D.U. for her failure to make K.U. 

reasonably available for assessment in compliance with the ALJ’s order.

d. The District Initiates this Litigation

On October 15, 2012, shortly after the end of the sixty-day period of time it had 

been given in which to re-assess K.U., the District filed its complaint in this Court, Case 

No. 1:12-cv-1699, alleging that A.D.U. had knowingly and willfully failed to comply with 

her obligations to make K.U. reasonably available for assessment by an independent 

assessor as ordered by the ALJ. The District sought a finding by the Court that it had 

 

10 On October 30, 2012, ALJ Darrell Lepkowsky consolidated the two new due process cases, Case Nos. 

2012100242 and 2012100291.

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 14 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

made reasonable efforts to comply with the ALJ’s order and A.D.U. had not. Further, 

the District requested an order that A.D.U.’s bad faith and willful disobedience of the

ALJ’s order barred her from asserting claims against the District for failure to provide

K.U. with a free and appropriate public education. The District also requested an order 

that it was deemed to have complied with the ALJ’s order for purposes of the California 

Department of Education’s Notice of Corrective Action.

A.D.U. answered the district court complaint on November 1, 2012, 

counterclaiming that the ALJ had erred in giving the District sole authority to select an 

independent assessor and requesting a trial de novo.

B. The Second Administrative Hearing and Its Progeny

As noted above (in sections I. A. 4. b. and c. of this Order), both sides, K.U. and 

the District, initiated new administrative cases in October, 2012, essentially challenging 

the other’s action, or inaction, in response to ALJ Hohensee’s decision and the parties’ 

respective obligations under the law. The two cases were consolidated. A hearing was 

scheduled for November 19, 2012, but, due to a variety of circumstances, some 

discussed below, no hearing was convened until September 11, 2013. Then, presided 

over by ALJ Margaret Broussard, it continued over some 14 days and resulted in the 

first part of a bifurcated decision on January 23, 2014. That decision, like the previous, 

was quite favorable to K.U. and unfavorable to the District. It found that the District had 

denied K.U. a free and appropriate education during the period from October 2010 

through the date of the decision, and that the District was not absolved of its 

responsibility for doing so because of A.D.U.’s refusal to submit K.U. to assessment by 

the District’s chosen provider. Judge Broussard observed, among other things, as 

follows: The District’s claim that it would violate ALJ Hohensee’s Order by working

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 15 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

together with A.D.U. and agreeing on an alternate assessor “flies in the face of logic 

and is not reasonable”; nothing in Judge Hohensee’s Order prevented the parties from 

working together and agreeing on a mutually acceptable assessor; even unreasonable 

behavior by A.D.U. in failing to comply with the assessment order would not excuse 

the District of its obligation to serve K.U.; and “School districts ‘cannot excuse their 

failure to satisfy the IDEA’s procedural requirements by blaming Parents.’” (Citations 

omitted.)

ALJ Broussard found that K.U. had prevailed on all but one issue she decided, 

but she deferred deciding the issue of appropriate remedies for K.U. because the 

absence of a full assessment of K.U. at any time during the preceding eleven years left 

her with insufficient information upon which to fashion an appropriate remedy. She 

ordered K.U. to participate in a psychoeducational and a transition assessment, both 

at public expense and conducted by a designated individual or entity, each of whom 

were to issue written reports with service recommendations and participate in the 

hearing on remedies. She ordered that K.U.’s failure without good cause to participate 

in and complete the assessments would constitute a forfeiture of any remedies for 

compensatory education for a denial of a free and appropriate public education.

The hearing on appropriate remedies was scheduled for July 17 and 18, 2014.

To the Court’s knowledge, no decision has yet issued on the matters addressed at that 

hearing.

The District challenges Judge Broussard’s January 23, 2014, decision and, 

specifically, her ruling on the merits, her authority to interpret and modify Judge 

Hohensee’s decision, her ability to excuse A.D.U. from complying with that decision, 

and her right to convene the remedies portion of the bifurcated hearing. Accordingly, 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 16 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

and noting that Judge Broussard characterized her January 2014 decision as final and 

binding on the issues decided, the District initiated Case No.1:14-cv-555 in this court 

within the 90 day period provided in California Education Code section 56505. \

II. THE PENDING ACTIONS AND THEIR ISSUES

A. Case No. 12-1699

1. Troubled History

The instant action has been pending for what one might consider an 

inappropriately long period of time, and it has generated what one might consider an 

inappropriate excess of litigation activity. Though not necessarily relevant to the 

substantive issues presently before the Court, review of that history may give context to 

these disputes and impact actions taken, or not taken, hereafter. It thus will be 

summarized as follows.

The District filed Case No. 12-1699 on October 15, 2012. Its primary objective 

was, in effect, to have the Court determine that A.D.U.’s failure to make K.U. available 

for assessment as ordered by ALJ Hohensee excused the District from the obligations 

imposed upon it by the ALJ’s Order.

Early in the litigation of Case No. 12-1699 the parties agreed to undertake to 

negotiate toward resolution of their disputes. The Honorable Barbara A. McAuliffe, U.S. 

Magistrate Judge, convened two days of settlement negotiations in January and 

February 2013. Reportedly, agreement was reached on all issues. However, once the 

proposed agreement was reduced to writing, A.D.U., acting on behalf of herself and as 

guardian for K.U., refused to accept the terms. That refusal continued after initial points 

of concern were addressed and seemingly corrected. 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 17 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

At that time, and apparently in connection therewith, Rick Ruderman, attorney for 

A.D.U and K.U., moved to withdraw as counsel of record for both on the ground that 

irreconcilable differences had arisen between attorney and client. (ECF No. 26). (It is 

deserving of mention that Mr. Ruderman was the second attorney to undertake 

representation of A.D.U. and K.U. in their dispute with the School District. The hearing 

record reflects that they previously had been represented by Dria Fearn. As it turned 

out, Mr. Ruderman was not to be the last attorney to represent them nor the only one to 

withdraw because of irreconcilable differences.) The Court delayed ruling on the motion 

to withdraw while A.D.U. undertook prolonged and initially unsuccessful efforts to obtain 

new counsel, while the Court considered whether the settlement should be approved 

over A.D.U.’s objection, and while the parties continued to explore the possibility of 

settlement. (See ECF Nos. 28, 29, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 46 and 71.) 

On June 17, 2013, the Court granted Attorney Ruderman’s motion to withdraw 

as counsel for A.D.U., but not as to K.U., and set a schedule for briefing of a proposed 

motion to enforce settlement as to K.U. (ECF No. 46.) New concerns regarding 

settlement arose and continued negotiations proved unproductive. (ECF No. 71.) 

Attorney Ruderman renewed his motion to withdraw as attorney for K.U., and it was 

granted on August 2, 2013. (ECF Nos. 77 & 79.) 

On July 8, 2013, attorney Roger A. Greenbaum entered the case on behalf of 

A.D.U. and on August 6, 2013, on behalf of K.U. as well. (ECF Nos. 58 & 81.) 

Scheduling Orders were amended to accommodate new counsel and the protracted 

proceedings. (ECF No. 87.)

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 18 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

On August 12, 2013, attorney Greenbaum moved to amend the Answer and 

Counterclaims. (ECF Nos. 85 & 86.) After briefing, the motion to amend was denied on 

October 28, 2013. (ECF No. 104.)

The stipulated administrative record from the initial OAH hearing was lodged 

with the Court on September 26, 2013. (ECF No. 100.) The School District later moved 

to supplement the record to introduce evidence of A.D.U.’s post-administrative hearing 

noncompliance with the ALJ’s Order. (ECF No. 105.) Over objection by K.U., the Court 

granted the motion to supplement, reserving, however, the question of whether the 

issues raised by such evidence were properly before the Court. (ECF No. 132.)

Consistent with that reservation, on November 14, 2013, the Court sue sponte

raised the issue of whether the U.S. District Court was the proper forum for Plaintiff to 

seek, not review of the ALJ’s decision, but enforcement of it. (ECF No. 117.) The 

parties briefed the issue on November 25, 2013 and the District supplemented its 

briefing on November 27, 2013. (ECF Nos. 127, 128 & 131.) The Court has not 

heretofore resolved that issue; it will do so in connection with its ruling on pending 

motions.

However, on November 6, 2013, A.D.U.’s third attorney, Roger Greenbaum, 

moved to withdraw as attorney of record for both K.U. and A.D.U. on the grounds that 

A.D.U. had breached promises to compensate counsel (ECF No. 109) and the lateradded grounds of loss of the relationship of trust and confidence necessary to the 

relationship. (ECF No. 125.) On November 27, 2013, the Court granted attorney 

Greenbaum’s withdrawal motion and, to accommodate A.D.U.’s loss of counsel, 

continued until January 16, 2014, the deadline for filing dispositve motions. (ECF No. 

132.) In doing so, the Court pointedly advised A.D.U. on the record that, given the 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 19 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

accommodations afforded A.D.U. due to her frequent change of counsel and the 

resulting delay in proceedings, the continuance to January 16, 2014, would be the final 

one. A.D.U. acknowledged that she understood.

On January 24, 2014, the court was notified of ALJ Broussard’s decision, after 

hearing, on the second, consolidated, administrative claims. (ECF No. 136.) The 

parties were ordered to file briefs on the effect of that decision on the proceedings 

pending in this Court. (ECF No. 137.) They did so on February 16 and 18, 2014. (ECF 

Nos. 146, 147.)

In the interim: on January 31, 2014, the School District filed its now pending 

motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 141); on February 19, 2014, attorney Tania L. 

Whiteleather was substituted in as attorney of record for A.D.U. and K.U. (ECF No. 

149); the time for opposition to the motion for summary judgment and hearing thereon 

was extended to accommodate new counsel (ECF Nos. 150, 151); hearing on the 

motion for summary judgment was continued initially to March 28, 2014 (ECF No. 

151); and, ultimately, the motion for summary judgment was deemed submitted on 

March 25, 2014. (ECF Nos. 156, 157.)

On January 13, 2014, despite having been advised on November 27, 2013, that 

no further extension of the dispositve motion deadline would be granted, A.D.U. filed a 

pro se “request for an extension from the court for the filing of dispositive motions.”

(ECF No. 135.) Ms. Whiteleather filed a formal request for the same relief on March 

14, 2014. (ECF No. 153.) The motion was deemed submitted on April 10, 2014. (ECF 

No. 164.)

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 20 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

2. Motions Pending

There then are two submitted motions and one necessarily inherent issue 

awaiting decision by the Court in case 12-1699:

a. The School District’s motion for summary judgment 

deemed submitted March 25, 2014 (ECF No. 156) on the motion (ECF No. 141), 

opposition (ECF No. 152) and reply (ECF No. 155) and related papers.

b. The issue raised by the Court (ECF No. 117) of whether 

this action for enforcement of ALJ’s Hohensee’s hearing decision is properly before the 

Court, briefed by the parties (ECF Nos. 127, 128, 131), necessarily will be resolved 

prior to resolving the District’s motion for summary judgment. 

c. K.U and A.D.U.’s motion for relief from the dispositive 

motion deadline, deemed submitted April 10, 2014 (ECF No. 164) on the basis of the 

moving papers (ECF Nos. 153 and, arguably,135), the opposition (ECF No. 162), and 

the reply (ECF No. 163). 

B. Case No. 14-555 

1. Motion for Stay

As noted above, the District disagrees with ALJ Broussard’s January 23, 2014, 

decision modifying Judge Hohensee’s order and excusing A.D.U.’s non-compliance with 

that order. To meet the filing deadline triggered by what Judge Broussard characterized 

as a final decision on those issues, the District initiated Case No. 14-555 on April 18, 

2014. (ECF No. 1)

The District then, on May 17, 2014 (ECF No. 14) moved this Court to issue an 

Order staying the remedies hearing in the ongoing consolidated administrative cases 

numbered 2012100242 and 2012100291. A.D.U. and K.U, who filed an answer and 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 21 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

counterclaim on May 27, 2014 (ECF No. 17), have filed an opposition to the motion to 

stay (ECF No. 22) and the District has filed a reply (ECF No. 24). The matter was 

deemed submitted on June 26, 2014 (ECF No. 26) and now stands ready for decision.

2. Consolidation

On July 2, 2014, the Court sua sponte ordered the parties to file a statement of 

reasons, if any they had, why Case No. 14-555 should not be consolidated with Case 

No. 12-1699. (ECF No. 26.) A.D.U. opposed consolidation (ECF No. 27), and the District 

filed a statement of non-opposition, but requested clarification as to whether 

consolidation would extend A.D.U.’s time for filing dispositive motions in Case No. 12-

1699. (ECF No. 28.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“The IDEA assures that all children with disabilities receive a free appropriate 

public education.” Lake Wash. Sch. Dist. v. Office of Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 

634 F.3d 1065, 1066 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Federal

funding is conditioned upon state compliance with the IDEA’s extensive substantive and 

procedural requirements.” Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th 

Cir. 1992). States are required to provide “[a]n opportunity for any party to present a 

complaint . . . with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or 

educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public 

education to such a child.” 20 U.S.C.§ 1415(b)(6). If the complaint is not resolved “to the 

satisfaction of the parents,” then “the parents or the local educational agency involved in 

such a complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing” to 

resolve issues raised in the complaint. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(1)(A), (f)(1)(B)(ii), (f)(3)(B). 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 22 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

Under California law, a due process hearing may be initiated under the following 

circumstances: (1) “[t]here is a proposal to initiate or change the identification, 

assessment, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate 

public education to the child”; (2) “[t]here is a refusal to initiate or change the 

identification, assessment, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a 

free appropriate public education to the child”; (3) “[t]he parent or guardian refuses to 

consent to an assessment of the child”; or (4) “[t]here is a disagreement between a 

parent or guardian and a local educational agency regarding the availability of a program 

appropriate for the child, including the question of financial responsibility . . . .” Cal. Educ. 

Code § 56501(a)(1)-(4).

Once the state educational agency has conducted a due process hearing and 

reached its final decision, an aggrieved party may commence suit in federal court: “Any 

party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the hearing officer] shall have the 

right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); 

see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1); Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 

550 U.S. 516, 526 (2007). 

On review of a due process decision, a district court must “receive the records of

the administrative proceedings,” “hear additional evidence at the request of a party,” and 

“bas[e] its decisions on the preponderance of the evidence.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). 

Thus, review under IDEA differs from review of other administrative decisions, which is 

generally limited to the record before the administrative body and requires that the 

administrative determination be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. See

Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1995). Under 

IDEA, the court must give “due weight” to the administrative decision, and may not 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 23 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

“substitute [its] own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school 

authorities which they review.” Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. 

Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982), superseded by statute on other grounds, N.B. v. 

Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1213 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008). However, the 

Court has discretion to determine how much deference to give state educational 

agencies, and is free to accept or reject the agency’s findings in part or in whole. 

Capistrano, 59 F.3d at 891.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction over the District’s Complaint in Case No. 12-1699

To determine whether the Court has jurisdiction over the District’s complaint, the 

Court first must determine whether the District is “aggrieved” by ALJ Hohensee’s 

decision within the meaning of IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The District argues that 

it is aggrieved because it has expended efforts attempting to comply with the decision, 

received a Notice of Corrective Action for its failure to comply, and was required to 

defend itself in the second OAH due process hearing. (ECF No. 127 at 3-4.) A.D.U. 

argues that the District is not aggrieved because it is seeking enforcement of a provision 

in the decision that it embraces. (ECF No. 128 at 5.)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has not directly 

addressed the issue of whether a party seeking to enforce an IDEA due process 

decision is “aggrieved,” and the case law from other jurisdictions is divided. Some courts

have decisively concluded that a party seeking to enforce an IDEA due process decision 

is not aggrieved by that decision. E.g., Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1275 

(4th Cir. 1987) (concluding that parties who received a favorable decision were not 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 24 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

aggrieved); Metro. Sch. Dist. of Martinsville v. Buskirk, 950 F. Supp. 899, 902 (S.D. Ind. 

1997) (“A suit to enforce an administrative decision clearly is not brought by a party 

aggrieved by that decision.”); Moubry ex rel. Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696(ELY), 

951 F. Supp. 867, 885, 886 n.13 (D. Minn 1996). Some of these courts, as well as 

others that have avoided addressing the question directly, have chosen to imply a 

private right of action for parents and students to enforce IDEA decisions under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983.11 E.g., Robinson, 810 F.2d at 1272-75; Jeremy H. v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. 

Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1996), called into doubt by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. 

Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 802-803 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). Still others have concluded that 

parents and students may bring an enforcement action directly under IDEA, because 

holding to the contrary would undercut IDEA’s statutory policies. E.g., Nieves-Marquez 

v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 115-17 (1st Cir. 2003). More specifically, disallowing an 

IDEA enforcement action would “render virtually meaningless the guarantee of a free 

appropriate education” and would create incentives for school systems not to comply. Id.

at 116; Dudley v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 768 F. Supp. 2d 779, 783-84 (E.D. Penn. 

2011) (“Such a loophole would allow unfortunate delays in the resolution of important 

and immediate issues concerning a child’s remedial education and generally open the 

door to significant mischief by a School District[.]”).

None of these positions support a conclusion that the Court has jurisdiction over 

the District’s complaint. First, the District’s statutory right of action is limited to contesting 

 

11 The Ninth Circuit has held, in a case involving parents seeking money damages, that “the 

comprehensive enforcement scheme of the IDEA evidences Congress’ intent to preclude a § 1983 claim 

for the violation of rights under the IDEA.” Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 

2007). However, other courts that share this view have opined that this bar on § 1983 relief does not 

extend to IDEA enforcement actions. Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of City of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 532 n.6 (4th 

Cir. 1998); C.K. v. Tredyffrin/Easttown Sch. Dist., No. 08-2571, 2010 WL 9583434, at *2 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 

30, 2010); L.J. v. Audubon Bd. of Educ., No. 06-5350 (JBS), 2009 WL 995458 at *3 n.1 (D.N.J. April 13, 

2009). The Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed whether § 1983 actions are available to parents or 

students seeking to enforce an IDEA administrative order.

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 25 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

findings and decisions, with respect to the complaint presented, by which it is aggrieved. 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); see Lake Wash. Sch. Dist. v. Office of Superintendent of Pub. 

Instruction, 634 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In short, § 1415 establishes a private 

right of action for disabled children and their parents. It creates no private right of action 

for school boards or other local educational agencies apart from contesting issues raised 

in the complaint filed by the parents on behalf of their child.). Here, the District is not 

“aggrieved” by the ALJ’s decision within the plain wording of the statute. Although A.D.U.

prevailed at the administrative hearing, the District has not appealed ALJ Hohensee’s

decision nor alleged any error on the part of ALJ. To the contrary, the District seeks 

enforcement of a provision of the decision which the District finds favorable. Indeed, the 

District’s pleadings reveal that its issues arise not from the ALJ’s decision, but from

A.D.U.’s conduct subsequent to that decision, i.e., her refusal to allow the District to 

assess K.U. 

Second, § 1983 does not give municipal bodies, such as the District, any rights to 

bring a cause of action against a private individual. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, even if 

enforcement of IDEA decisions is available to parents and students under § 1983, that 

right does not extend to the District. 

Lastly, the policies that might favor permitting enforcement actions by parents 

and students are not implicated in enforcement actions brought by school districts. The 

primary purposes of IDEA include ensuring that children with disabilities have available 

to them a free appropriate public education, and that the rights of such children and their 

parents are protected. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B). Allowing enforcement actions by 

parents promotes these policies by ensuring that school districts comply with their 

statutory obligations. However, IDEA contains no corresponding policies in favor of the 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 26 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

school district that would support allowing enforcement actions against parents and 

children. “[T]he statement of purpose strongly suggests that Congress intended to 

provide a private right of action only to disabled children and their parents.” Lake Wash. 

Sch. Dist., 634 F.3d at 1068 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lawrence Twp. Bd. of 

Educ. v. New Jersey, 417 F.3d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 2005)). 

The District argues that, without a judicial remedy in this Court, it has no means to 

enforce ALJ Hohensee’s decision because the OAH has no jurisdiction to enforce its 

own orders. (Citing Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 223 F.3d 1026, 1029.) 

Additionally, the California Department of Education is permitted to intervene when a 

school district fails to comply with a due process decision, but has no enforcement 

authority when parents or children fail to comply. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 4650(a).

It is true that the District may have no forum to obtain the specific declaratory

relief it seeks in this case. However, the Court cannot imply a right of action where one 

does not exist simply because a party has no other remedy. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 

66, 78 (1975) (four factors for determining whether a statute provides an implied private 

right of action). Additionally, the Court notes that a parent’s refusal to consent to an 

assessment is grounds for seeking a due process hearing under California law. Cal. 

Educ. Code § 56501(a)(3). Thus, the issue of whether the District has a continuing 

obligation to K.U. in light of A.D.U.’s refusal to consent to the assessment ordered by 

ALJ Hohensee could be, and ultimately was, adjudicated in the OAH. 

Based on the foregoing, the District has not articulated any legitimate legal basis 

for this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case. “If the court 

determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 27 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Accordingly, the District’s complaint must be dismissed. 

For the same reasons, the Court will deny the District’s motion for summary judgment.

B. Consolidation of Cases 12-1699 and 14-555

The District does not oppose consolidation of Case Nos. 12-1699 and 14-555, but 

asks for clarification regarding the effect of consolidation on the dispositive motion 

deadline. (ECF No. 28.) It is the District’s understanding that no more dispositive motions 

will be permitted regarding issues presented in Case No. 12-1699. (Id.)

A.D.U. opposes consolidation on the ground that the District’s complaint in Case 

No. 12-1699 is ready for adjudication and should be dismissed. (ECF No. 27.) A.D.U. 

argues that consolidation will further delay K.U.’s access to needed educational services. 

(ECF No. 27.)

The Court may consolidate actions that involve “a common question of law or 

fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. Following dismissal of the District’s complaint, the only issue 

remaining in Case No. 12-1699 will be A.D.U.’s counterclaim that ALJ Hohensee erred in 

giving the District sole authority to select the assessor for K.U.’s evaluation. (ECF No. 9.) 

This counterclaim shares common questions of law and fact with the District’s complaint 

in Case No. 14-555. (ECF No. 1.) In light of the Court’s decision to dismiss the District’s 

complaint in Case No. 12-1699, A.D.U.’s concerns regarding delay are unwarranted.

Accordingly, the Court finds that consolidation is appropriate.

C. Motion to Extend the Dispositive Motion Deadline

A.D.U. seeks additional time to file dispositive motions in Case No. 12-1699. (ECF 

No. 153.) The District opposes the motion on the ground that A.D.U. has not shown 

excusable neglect. (ECF No. 162.) The majority of the parties’ arguments focus on 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 28 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

whether A.D.U. should be permitted to file a motion to dismiss, an issue that is now moot 

in light of the Court’s decision herein to dismiss the District’s complaint.

However, the Court will grant additional time to file dispositive motions with 

respect to A.D.U.’s counterclaim in Case No. 12-1699. Specifically, the Court will extend 

the time to file dispositive motions on A.D.U.’s counterclaim to the dispositive motion

deadline in Case No. 14-555, which will be set at the Initial Scheduling Conference.

D. Motion to Stay the OAH Remedies Hearing in Case No. 14-555

The District sought a stay of the OAH remedies hearing on the ground that it had 

appealed the underlying due process decision on the merits. (ECF No. 14-1 at 1.) 

A.D.U. argues that the District is not entitled to a stay because it was required to, but did 

not, follow procedures set out in the California Rules of Court. (ECF No. 22 at 3-4.)

Additionally, the District and A.D.U. disagree on the legal standard applicable to 

requests to stay administrative proceedings, and whether the District has met that 

standard. (ECF Nos. 14-1 at 6, 22 at 4-12.)

The Court denied the District’s motion by minute order on July 15, 2014 (ECF No. 

29), and herein sets forth its reasoning. 

At the outset, it must be noted that none of the authorities relied on by the District 

support granting a stay in the circumstances presented here. First, the District cites 

cases that stand for the proposition that a court has discretionary power to stay 

proceedings on its own docket. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936); 

CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962); Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 

1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005); Rivers v. Walt Disney Co., 980 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (C.D. 

Cal. 1997). (ECF No. 14-1 at 5-6.) This proposition, and the legal standard for granting 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 29 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

such a stay, is inapplicable because the District seeks to stay proceedings before a 

different forum.

Second, the District cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 (ECF No. 14-1 at 6), 

which pertains to stays of proceedings to enforce a judgment. Because Case No. 14-555

is in essence an appeal, rather than an enforcement action, Rule 62 is inapplicable. 

Next, the district cites 5 U.S.C. § 705 (ECF No. 14-1 at 6), which permits a district 

court to “postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights 

pending conclusion of the [judicial] review of proceedings.” However, this provision 

applies only to the action of agencies that are authorities of the Government of the 

United States, 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1), and not to the State of California Office of 

Administrative Hearings. 

The District also cites Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 18 (ECF No. 14-1 at 

6), which permits a court of appeals to stay an order of an administrative agency. While 

the district court sits in a quasi-appellate posture with respect to an IDEA due process 

decision, it is not a court of appeals. Thus, Rule 18 does not apply.

Finally, the District argues that it can find no authorities directly on point because 

its case is unique and presents a matter of first impression. (ECF No. 24 at 2.) However, 

the District is not the first party to seek to enjoin a state administrative proceeding. 

Principles of comity, equity, and federalism require federal courts to abstain from 

enjoining certain state administrative proceedings that are “judicial in nature.” Younger v. 

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-50 (1971) (abstention principles applicable to state criminal 

proceedings); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 

627 (1986) (extending Younger to certain state administrative proceedings). Abstention 

is appropriate in favor of a state proceeding if (1) the state proceedings are ongoing, (2) 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 30 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

the proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) the state proceedings 

provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Fresh Int’l Corp. v. Agric.

Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Here, 

there can be no doubt that the OAH hearing is ongoing and presents an adequate 

opportunity to raise federal questions concerning IDEA. And, although the OAH hearing 

will adjudicate issues of federal law, it also will implicate important state interests in 

education. See Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of Educ., 662 F.2d 1008, 1018 (3d Cir. 1981), 

(abstaining in deference to teacher tenure termination proceedings because state’s 

interest in education is important), cited with approval by Dayton, 477 U.S. at 627 n.2.

Accordingly, this Court must abstain from interfering with the remedies hearing.

Moreover, even if abstention is not required, the District has not met the standard 

to stay an administrative proceeding. A request for such a stay is evaluated under the 

same standards employed in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive relief. See

Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d in part on other grounds, 

463 U.S. 1328 (1983). The party seeking a stay must show “either a probability of 

success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious legal 

questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [the movant’s] favor.” 

Abassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Nken v. 

Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 432 (2009). These factors are considered on a “sliding scale.”

Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 526 F.3d 406, 412 (9th Cir. 2008). “Where the stay applicant 

demonstrates a strong likelihood of success, the possibility of irreparable injury is 

sufficient to warrant a stay. On the other end of the sliding scale, where the stay 

applicant demonstrates that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor, the 

applicant must show only that it raises ‘serious legal questions.’” Id. (citations omitted). In 

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 31 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

some cases, the public interest also must be “strongly considered.” Lopez, 713 F.2d at 

1435.

Here, the District has shown neither a strong likelihood of success on the merits 

nor the possibility of irreparable injury.12 Moreover, the balance of hardships tips sharply 

in favor of K.U., as postponement of the remedies hearing will further delay her 

educational opportunities. When the Court considers the public interest in ensuring that 

children with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education, the balance weighs 

overwhelmingly against the District. 

For these reasons, the Court denies the District’s motion to stay.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The District’s complaint (ECF No. 1) in Case No. 1:12-cv-1699-MJS is 

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction;

2. The District’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 141) in Case No. 1:12-

cv-1699-MJS is DENIED;

3. The District’s motion to stay remedies hearing (ECF No. 14) in Case No. 1:14-

cv-555-MJS is DENIED;

4. K.U. and A.D.U’s motion for relief from Order setting filing deadline for 

dispositive motions (ECF No. 153) in Case No. 1:12-cv-1699-MJS is 

GRANTED;

5. Dispositive motions relating to A.D.U.’s cross-complaint in Case No. 1:12-cv1699-MJS will be due at the same time as dispositive motions in Case No. 

 

12 The District’s claim that it will be irreparably injured by expending additional time and money litigating 

the remedies hearing is, at this stage of the proceedings, unpersuasive.

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 32 of 33
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33

1:14-cv-555-MJS, a date to be set at the Initial Scheduling Conference in 

1:14-cv-555-MJS;

6. Case No. 1:12-cv-1699-MJS is CONSOLIDATED with Case No. 1:14-cv-555-

MJS;

7. The Clerks shall administratively CLOSE Case No. 1:12-cv-1699-MJS; and

8. All future filings shall be in Case No. 1:14-cv-555-MJS.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00555-MJS Document 32 Filed 07/30/14 Page 33 of 33