Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00978/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00978-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 1 Petitioner named Dora B. Schriro as a respondent in this matter. Charles L. Ryan, the

current director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, is substituted for Dora B. Schriro

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d).

 2 The term “Ponzi” scheme derives from the activities of Charles Ponzi in 1919. After

World War I, Ponzi represented to investors that he could profit from differences in currency

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Vernon Leroy Smith, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al. 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-08-978-PHX-MHM (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

(docket # 1) Respondents1

 have filed an Answer, docket # 12, to which Petitioner has

replied, docket # 13. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual Background

On November 20, 2002, a Maricopa County grand jury indicted Petitioner on one

count of fraudulent schemes and artifices, a class 2 felony; five counts of theft, class 2

felonies; and one count of illegally conducting an enterprise, a class 3 felony. (Respondents’

Exh. A) The charges were based on evidence that Petitioner engaged in a Ponzi-type2

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exchange rates. Ponzi promised investors a 50 percent return on 45-day promissory notes.

Ponzi, however, did not make any investments. Ponzi issued over 14 million dollars in notes,

and, using funds he received from investors, made payments of about 9 million dollars to his

investors A Boston newspaper exposed Ponzi’s scheme on August 1, 1920. Ponzi’s records

revealed that he had “never engaged in a regular business, that no source of profit existed, and

that he was insolvent from the inception of his venture.” In Re Independent Clearing House

Company, 41 B.R. 985, 994 n. 12 (1984). Ponzi was sentenced to prison, and was paroled three

and a half years later. He was subsequently arrested in Florida and sentenced to prison for real

estate fraud. After serving seven years in prison, he was deported to Italy, where Mussolini

gave him a job in the finance ministry. Ponzi eventually moved to South America where “he

died penniless in a charity ward in Rio de Janeiro.” In Re Independent Clearing House

Company, 41 B.R. at 994 n. 12 (citing Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1924), In re

Ponzi, 268 F. 997 (D.Mass.1920)).

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scheme, involving millions of dollars and victimizing over 4,000 people. (Respondents’

Exh. B) 

On December 22, 2003, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which he

pled guilty to Amended Count Two - theft, a class 3 felony with one with a historical prior

conviction; and Count Four - theft, a class 2 felony. (Respondents’ Exhs. C, D) In the plea

agreement, Petitioner admitted the following factual bases of the theft offenses and his prior

conviction:

Amended Count Two

Between the dates of March 7 and March 9, 2001, Vernon Leroy Smith, Jr.

knowingly and without lawful authority, in Maricopa County, obtained money

in excess of $3,000 by means of material misrepresentations with the intent to

deprive the owners of the money and converted the money for an unauthorized

use. This conduct occurred when [Petitioner] received funds through an 

advanced fee loan scheme, that was, in fact, an illegal pyramid scheme. 

[Petitioner] misrepresented that the funds to pay investors were invested in long

term investments generating a high rate of return when, instead, [Petitioner]

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 The Honorable Barry C. Schneider presided. 

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transferred said funds to Summerset Nassau Ltd. Account for his own use.

[Petitioner] admits the prior conviction of Wire Fraud committed on April 27,

1995, in CR-00-141BR in the United States District Court for the District of

Oregon for which judgement (sic) of guilt and sentencing was entered on 

December 16, 2002. [Petitioner] was represented by counsel throughout the

proceedings in this matter.

Count Four

On or about April 13, 2001, [Petitioner] knowingly and without lawful

authority, in Maricopa County, obtained money in excess of $25,000 by means

of material misrepresentations with the intent to deprive the owners of the money

and converted the money for an unauthorized use. This conduct occurred when

[Petitioner] received funds through an advanced fee loan scheme, that was, in fact, 

an illegal pyramid scheme. [Petitioner] misrepresented that the funds to pay 

investors were invested in long term investments generating a high rate of return

when, instead, [Petitioner] transferred said funds to his personal bank account 

at Bank of America.

(Respondents’ Exh. C at attachment B; Exh. E at 10-13) In exchange for Petitioner’s plea,

the remaining charges were dismissed. (Respondents’ Exh. C) During the December 22,

2003 change of plea hearing, the trial court3

 explained the following: Petitioner’s sentencing

exposure for the two offenses; the credit Petitioner would received for time served from

March 1, 2003; the restitution figures in the amounts of $872,500 and not to exceed

$4,300,000; the rights Petitioner forfeited by pleading guilty; and Petitioner’s rights to

review. (Respondents’ Exh. E at 5-10; Exh. C at attachment A) Petitioner advised the court

that he had read the plea agreement, discussed its terms with counsel, and understood those

terms. (Respondents’ Exh. E at 4-5) He further stated that the written plea agreement

contained everything to which he had agreed, that he was not forced or threatened to enter

the plea, and that he pled guilty voluntarily. (Respondents’ Exh. E at 5) Petitioner affirmed

that he understood the rights he was forfeiting by pleading guilty. (Respondents’ Exh. E at

9-10) Petitioner admitted the factual bases for his plea and his prior conviction. 

(Respondents’ Exh. E at 10-12) 

During the January 23, 2004 sentencing hearing, defense counsel agreed that

Petitioner should receive 328 days presentence incarceration credit. Defense counsel also

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acknowledged that Petitioner had a “lengthy” criminal history. (Respondents’ Exh. G at 24,

33) That same day, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of 10 years

imprisonment on Amended Count Two - theft, a class 3 felony with one historical prior

felony conviction. The court suspended the imposition of sentence on Count Four and

ordered Petitioner to serve 7 years probation to commence upon his release from the

Department of Corrections. (Respondents’ Exhs. F, G) In support of the aggravated

sentence, the court explained:

With respect to Count II [theft with an admitted historical prior felony 

conviction], probation is not available, the Court must consider the 

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The State recommends an 

aggravated term, the presentence writer recommends an aggravated term. 

Defense asks for a mitigated term.

In balancing these factors, the Court cannot lose sight of a number of matters.

There are prior felony convictions, there are multiple, multiple victims. These

crimes were committed for pecuniary gain. They were committed while he

was an absconder under indictment in another jurisdiction.

The magnitude of the loss is significant that was suffered by the victims. 

The emotional injury suffered by the victims is significant. The mitigating

factors that are offered are that he’s remorseful, that he promises to make 

his first priority the payment of restitution. Mitigation is also offered that his 

family will suffer a hardship, his wife and his children. And the cooperation, 

as well, with law enforcement agencies.

When all is said and done, I - especially considering the victims who have

come forward and the many victims who have submitted impact statements

that, in conclusion, I find that the aggravating factors are substantially 

significant to warrant an aggravated term.

(Respondents’ Exh. G at 36-37) 

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings

On March 8, 2004, Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief and

requested appointment of counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. H) On January 10, 2005,

Petitioner’s counsel filed a notice advising the court that she had completed post-conviction

review and that Petitioner had “instructed counsel not to file a petition on his behalf, stating

that [Petitioner] wishes to file a pro per petition raising issues of his choosing.” 

(Respondents’ Exhs. I, J) Counsel also requested an extension of time to allow Petitioner to

file a pro per petition. (Id.) On September 12, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for postCase 2:08-cv-00978-MHM Document 14 Filed 03/31/09 Page 4 of 29
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conviction relief and request for a restitution hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. K) Petitioner

argued that: (1) the trial court erred in aggravating his sentence in violation of Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); (2) the

trial court erred in relying upon undisclosed victim impact statements in sentencing

Petitioner; and (3) the trial court improperly calculated Petitioner’s presentence incarceration

credit. (Id.) On January 17, 2006, the trial court “summarily” dismissed the petition and

noted that, “[b]y his stipulation, [Petitioner] waived any objections to the amount of

restitution.” (Respondents’ Exh. N)

Before the trial court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief, on December

30, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

(Respondents’ Exh. O; docket # 1 at 3) Petitioner raised the same issues that he presented in

his petition for post-conviction relief. (docket # 1 at 3) On November 13, 2006, the Court

of Appeals denied review. (docket # 1 at 19, November 13, 2006 Order) 

On December 29, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona

Supreme Court which was denied on May 22, 2007. (Respondents’ Exhs. O, P; docket # 1

at 21, May 22, 2007 Order)

C. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. 

(docket # 1; docket # 12 at 6) Petitioner raises the following claims: (1) the trial court

violated his Sixth Amendment rights by imposing an aggravated sentence based on factors

that were not found by a jury; (2) the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by using a historical prior conviction as an aggravating factor to enhance

his sentence; (3) the trial court’s consideration of victim impact statements violated

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him; (4) the State violated

the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by failing to give Petitioner sufficient notice of the charges

against him and of the State’s intention to seek an aggravated sentence; and (5) the trial

court failed to correctly calculate Petitioner’s presentence incarceration credit. (docket # 1

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at 24-28) Respondents assert that the Petition should be denied. (docket # 12) Petitioner

opposes that assertion. (docket # 13) 

II. Grounds Three and Five

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s claims raised in Grounds Three and Five are not

cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. (docket # 12 at 7-9) The Court will discuss

this issue below.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) defines the scope of review for federal habeas corpus

petitions:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United

States. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(emphasis added). Accordingly, “[a] habeas petition must allege the

petitioner’s detention violates the constitution, a federal statute or a treaty.” Franzen v.

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, Franzen v. Deeds 493 U.S. 1012 (1989)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(3)). “[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie for errors of state

law.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,

780 (1990)). The purpose of habeas proceedings under § 2254 is to ensure that state

convictions satisfy federal constitutional requirements applicable to states. Burkey v. Deeds,

824 F.Supp. 190, 192 (D.Nev. 1993). The federal district court does “not sit as a super state

supreme court.” Id. Rather, federal courts may only intervene in state proceedings to

correct errors of constitutional magnitude. Id. (citing Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d

1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

A. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment

right to confrontation by considering victim impact statements at sentencing. (docket # 1 at

26, 35-37) Respondents argue that the trial court’s consideration of victim impact

statements is a matter of state law, not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

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Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 39(a) provides that a victim has the “right to be

heard” and can exercise this right “by appearing personally, or where legally permissible and

in the discretion of the court, by submitting a written statement, an audiotape or videotape.” 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 39(a). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 39(b)(7) provides that a victim

has the right to be heard at sentencing. Likewise, the Arizona Constitution provides that

“[t]o preserve and protect victims’ rights to justice and due process, a victim of crime has a

right . . . [t]o be heard at any proceeding involving a post-arrest release decision, a

negotiated plea, and sentencing.” Ariz.Const. § 2.1(A)(4). Arizona law requires the trial

court to hear from victims of crime. In this case, the trial court heard from the victims

through victim impact statements. 

The trial court’s consideration of victim impact statements pursuant to Arizona Rule

of Criminal Procedure 39 and the Arizona Constitution was a matter of state law. To the

extent that Petitioner’s allegations in Count Three challenge the application of state law,

those claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254;

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1990) (federal court has

no authority to review state application of state law); Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116,

1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to consider alleged errors in violation of state sentencing

law). Moreover, Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim lacks merit.

In support of Ground Three, Petitioner states that during the sentencing hearing, the

prosecutor referred to “numerous victim impact statements” which the trial judge also

considered. (docket # 1 at 35-36, citing Tr. 1/23/04 at 19, 36-37) (Respondents’ Exh. G at

19) Petitioner asserts that he “had no opportunity to review [the victim impact statements],

cross-examine the proponents, or rebut their content. . . .” (docket # 1 at 35) Petitioner

contends that the victim impact statements were testimonial and, therefore, their admission

under the circumstances of this case violated the Sixth Amendment. (docket # 1 at 36) In

support of his claims, Petitioner cites Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), where

the Supreme Court held that the government cannot introduce out-of-court testimonial

evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial unless the declarant is unavailable at trial and

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the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 68. At issue, is whether,

under Crawford, a defendant has a right to confrontation at sentencing. 

The Sixth Amendment protects the right of the accused “to be confronted with the

witnesses against him” “[i]n all criminal prosecutions.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. In

discussing pre-trial rights, the Supreme Court has stated that “the right to confrontation is a

trial right.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987) (emphasis added). The

Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford does not require a different conclusion. 

Several circuit courts have reached the same conclusion. The First Circuit has held

that “Crawford does not apply to sentencing,” United States v. Monteiro, 417 F.3d 208, 215

(1st Cir.2005). The Second Circuit has stated that Crawford provides no basis to reconsider

Supreme Court precedent establishing the permissibility “of out-of-court statements at

sentencing.” United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2005). The Fifth, Sixth,

Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have also recognized that the right to

confrontation does not apply to sentencing. See United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 236

(5th Cir.1999); United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 627-28 (6th Cir.2005); Szabo v. Walls,

313 F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Fleck, 413 F.3d 883, 894 (8th Cir.2005);

United States v. Powell, 973 F.2d 885, 893 (10th Cir.1992); United States v. Cantellano, 430

F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2005).

The Crawford decision deals with trial rights. Following the sound reasoning of the

above-listed circuit courts, the Court concludes that the right to confrontation is not a

sentencing right. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment challenge to the sentencing

court’s consideration of victim impact statements lacks merit. 

Additionally, the Supreme Court recognizes that victim impact statements are

admissible during sentencing. In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), the

Supreme Court held that the introduction of a victim impact statement during the sentencing

phase of a capital case violated the Eighth Amendment. In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.

808, 825, 827 (1991), the Supreme Court overruled Booth, in part, by holding that the Eighth

Amendment does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of all victim impact evidence.

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However, the Payne ruling retains Booth’s prohibition on admitting characterizations and

opinions from the victim’s family about the crime, the defendant, or the appropriate

sentence. Id. at 830 n. 2. (upholding over eighth amendment challenge admission of victim

impact evidence at sentencing phase of capital trial). Victim impact statements are

admissible at sentencing unless their admission would be “so unduly prejudicial that it

renders the sentence fundamentally unfair.” Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992, 1009 (9th

Cir.1997); see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. When a judge, as opposed to the jury, reviews

victim impact statements, we presume that the judge properly applied the law and

considered only the evidence he knew to be admissible. Gretzler, 112 F.3d at 1009; see also

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v.

Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002). 

Here, there is no evidence that the trial judge considered the victim impact statements

improperly in sentencing Petitioner. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting

habeas petitioner’s claim that introduction of victim impact statements during sentencing

violated the Sixth Amendment). Also, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the victim impact

statements were disclosed to the defense before sentencing. (Respondents’ Exh. L at exhibit

3; Exh. G at 23) The victim impact statements were attached to the presentence “report and

separated so they can be made an exhibit for all parties to see. . . . .” (Respondents’ Exh. L

at exhibit 3) During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel indicated that he had read the

presentence report. (Respondents’ Exh. G at 23) In view of the foregoing, the court’s

consideration of victim impact statements during sentencing did not give rise to a

constitutional violation. 

B. Ground Five

In Ground Five, Petitioner asserts that the trial court did not properly calculate his

presentence incarceration credit. (docket # 1 at 28) Although the trial court gave Petitioner

credit for 328 days, Petitioner argues he was deprived presentence incarceration credit for

time that he was incarcerated in Oregon awaiting sentencing in a different case. Petitioner

does not cite any specific federal law in support of Ground Five. Rather, he “asks [the

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court] for a little help” in identifying the governing law and states that he believes the Equal

Protection Clause or the Eighth Amendment applies. (docket # 1 at 40-41) The calculation

of presentence incarceration credit is a state law matter which Petitioner cannot transform a

into a federal claim by citing federal law. Poland, 169 F.3d at 584; See A.R.S. § 13-709(B)

(stating that “[a]ll time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is

sentenced to imprisonment for such offense shall be credited against the term of

imprisonment otherwise provided for by this chapter.”) Moreover, there is no federal

constitutional right to presentence incarceration credit. Lewis v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926,

928 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Gray v. Warden of Montana State Prison, 523 F.2d 989, 990

(9th Cir. 1975) (stating that “[t]he origin of the modern concept of pre-conviction jail time

credit upon the term of the ultimate sentence of imprisonment is of legislative grace and not

a constitutional guarantee.”)).

Because Petitioner’s claim in Count Five challenges the application of state law, it is

not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; McGuire, 502 U.S. at

67-68; Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (federal court has no authority to review state application of state

law).

III. Ground Four

In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that the State violated his Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights by providing insufficient notice of the charges against him and of the

State’s intention to seek an aggravated sentence. (docket # 1 at 27, 37-40) Respondents

argue that Ground Four should be denied as procedurally defaulted and barred from federal

habeas corpus review. (docket # 12) As discussed below, Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted his claims in Ground Four.

A. Legal Principles

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). When seeking

habeas relief, petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has properly exhausted each

claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam). The exhaustion

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inquiry focuses on the availability of state remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). The prisoner

“shall not be deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right under the law of the State to

raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). In other

words, proper exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state courts one full opportunity

to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s

established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 845. “One complete round”

includes filing a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary

appellate review procedure in the State.” Id. State prisoners may skip a procedure

occasionally employed by a state’s courts to provide relief only if a state law or rule

precludes use of the procedure, or the “State has identified the procedure as outside the

standard review process and has plainly said that it need not be sought for purposes of

exhaustion. Id. at 848, 850. 

To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to

rule upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest”

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989);

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the State with the

necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate

state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”). In Arizona,

unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if

the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. Crowell v. Knowles , 483 F.Supp.2d

925 (D.Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Contrary to Respondents’ assertion, Petitioner was not required to present his claims to the

Arizona Supreme Court. 

In addition to presenting his claims to the proper court, a state prisoner must fairly

present his claims to that court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. A claim is “fairly

presented” in state court only if a petitioner has described both the operative facts and the

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federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28. It is not enough that

all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state court or that a

“somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28 (stating that a

reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not alert the court to federal nature of the

claim). Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the specific constitutional

guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d

895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such

as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair

presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th

Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne,

223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner to have made “a general appeal

to a constitutional guarantee,” such as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a

“constitutional error” or a “fair trial”). Likewise, a mere reference to the “Constitution of

the United States” does not preserve a federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152,

162-63 (1996). Even if the basis of a federal claim is “self-evident” or if the claim would be

decided “on the same considerations” under state or federal law, the petitioner must make

the federal nature of the claim “explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the

federal courts . . . .” Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim

to the state court if the court must read beyond the pleadings filed in that court to discover

the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27. 

In sum, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2)

through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005)(citations omitted). 

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds such as

waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S.

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at 729-30. Thus, a state prisoner may be barred from raising federal claims that he did not

preserve in state court by making a contemporaneous objection at trial, on direct appeal, or

when seeking post-conviction relief. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995)

(stating that failure to raise contemporaneous objection to alleged violation of federal rights

during state trial constitutes a procedural default of that issue); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding claim procedurally defaulted where the Arizona Court of

Appeals held that habeas petitioner had waived claims by failing to raise them on direct

appeal or in first petition for post-conviction relief.) If the state court also addressed the

merits of the underlying federal claim, the “alternative” ruling does not vitiate the

independent state procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Carringer

v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court found ineffective assistance

of counsel claims “barred under state law,” but also discussed and rejected the claims on the

merits, en banc court held that the “on-the-merits” discussion was an “alternative ruling”

and the claims were procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review). A higher

court’s subsequent summary denial of review affirms the lower court’s application of a

procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

The second procedural default scenario arises when a state prisoner failed to present

his federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the

state courts’ procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the

previously unraised claims. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart,

303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d 1035,

1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (postconviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must

be filed within thirty days of trial court's decision). A state post-conviction action is futile

where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th

Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal

of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule

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32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as “technical” exhaustion because

although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an

available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted

his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no

remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”). 

In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To

establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the

defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following

objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that

the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Ordinarily, the ineffective assistance of counsel in

collateral proceedings does not constitute cause because “the right to counsel does not

extend to state collateral proceedings or federal habeas proceedings.” Martinez-Villareal v.

Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a habeas petitioner

bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not

reach the prejudice prong. 

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. To satisfy the “fundamental

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miscarriage of justice” standard, petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). Even if petitioner asserts a

claim of actual innocence to excuse his procedural default of a federal claim, federal habeas

relief may not be granted absent a finding of an independent constitutional violation

occurring in the state criminal proceedings. Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94. 

B. Application of Law to Ground Four

As previously stated, in Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that the State violated his

Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by failing to provide sufficient notice of the charges

against him or of the State’s intention to seek an aggravated sentence. Petitioner did not

properly present his claims raised in Ground Four to the state courts. (Respondents’ Exh. K) 

Indeed, Petitioner concedes that he never presented these claims to the state courts. Rather,

he argues that these issues were “indirectly raised with the issues violating Blakely and the

illegal use of aggravating factors not found by a jury. The statutory language missing from

the indictment was discovered when [Petitioner] was preparing this federal habeas corpus

[petition.]” (docket # 1 at 27) 

A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting a federal claim

to the appropriate state courts in the proper manner. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257

(1986). As Petitioner admits, he did not properly present any of his federal claims raised in

Ground Four to the state courts. Petitioner’s assertion that the claims in Ground Four were

“indirectly raised” with other claims is not sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. 

See Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1240 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that a “claim has been

fairly presented when a petitioner has properly raised the same factual and legal theories in

the state courts which he is attempting to raise in his federal habeas petition.”) 

 The claims raised in Ground Four are technically exhausted and procedurally barred,

because a return to state court to present those claims would be futile because they would be

procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law. First, Petitioner is time-barred under Arizona

law from raising these claims in a successive petition for post-conviction relief because the

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time for filing a notice of post-conviction relief has long expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1

and 32.4 (a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed “within ninety days after the

entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and

mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.”) Although Rule 32.4 does not bar dilatory

claims if they fall within the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1(d) through

(h), Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions apply to him. Moreover, a state

post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987

(9th Cir. 2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing

untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition

for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). 

Furthermore, under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, a

defendant is precluded from raising claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in

any previous collateral proceeding. See Krone v. Hotham, 181 Ariz. 364, 366, 890 P.2d

1149, 1151 (1995) (capital defendant’s early petition for post-conviction relief raised limited

number of issues and waived other issues that he could have then raised, but did not); State

v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112,113, 912 P.2d 1341, 1342 (App. 1995) (“Defendants are precluded

from seeking post-conviction relief on grounds that were adjudicated, or could have been

raised and adjudicated, in a prior appeal or prior petition for post-conviction relief.”); State

v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 624, 875 P.2d 850, 857 (App. 1994) (defendant’s claim that his

sentence had been improperly enhanced by prior conviction was precluded by defendant’s

failure to raise issue on appeal). The claims asserted in Ground Four could have, and

should have, been properly raised on post-conviction review. Accordingly, the State court

would find those claims procedurally barred. 

1. Cause and Prejudice

As set forth above, Petitioner’s claims in Ground Four are procedurally defaulted and

barred from federal habeas review absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” or a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

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To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to

the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Murray, 477

U.S. at 488-492. The following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by

state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably

available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Prejudice is actual

harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d

240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). Where petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default,

the court need not consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the

alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

Petitioner does not assert any specific basis to overcome the procedural bar. (docket

# 13) As a general matter, Petitioner’s pro se status and ignorance of the law do not satisfy

the cause standard. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir.

1986); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988). Because Petitioner offers

no legitimate “cause” which precluded him from properly exhausting his state remedies, the

Court declines to reach the issue of prejudice. Engle, 456 U.S. at 134 n. 43. 

2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that failure to consider his claims raised in

Ground Four will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A federal court may review

the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim if the petitioner demonstrates that failure

to consider the merits of his claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A “fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs

when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent. Id. 

This gateway “actual innocence” claim differs from a substantive actual innocence

claim. Smith v. Baldwin, 466 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court

described the gateway showing in Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-16, as a less stringent standard

than a substantive claim of actual innocence. See also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463,

476 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a “habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence

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claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt and must affirmatively prove that

he is innocent.”). If Petitioner passes through the Schlup gateway, the court is only

permitted to review his underlying constitutional claims. Smith, 466 F.3d at 807. The

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies only to a “narrow class of cases” in

which a petitioner makes the extraordinary showing that an innocent person was probably

convicted due to a constitutional violation. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 231 (1995). To

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, Petitioner must show that “a constitutional

violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at

327. To establish the requisite probability, Petitioner must prove with new reliable evidence

that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327. New evidence presented in

support of a fundamental miscarriage of justice may include “exculpatory scientific

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence that was not

presented at trial.” Id. at 324, see also, House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (stating that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice contention must involve evidence that the trial jury did

not have before it). 

Petitioner has not established that, in light of newly discovered evidence, “it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327.

IV. Grounds One and Two

Respondents concede that Grounds One and Two are properly before the Court and

argue that those claims are meritless. The court will consider the merits of Grounds One and

Two after setting forth the standard of review. 

A. Standard of Review

In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) which “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner

applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court

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convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 693 (2002). 

Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a habeas petition “with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court” unless the state court’s decision

was either (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006); Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). 

To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable

application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court

which existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-

15 (2003); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has

acknowledged that it cannot reverse a state court decision merely because that decision

conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on a federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Even if the state court neither explained its ruling nor cited United States Supreme

Court authority, the reviewing federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme Court

precedent to determine whether the state court reasonably applied federal law. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that

citation to federal law is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute “does not

even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Id. 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 

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(2000).

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An incorrect

application of federal law does not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.

652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state

court's decision is objectively unreasonable.”) “It is not enough that a federal habeas court,

in its independent review of the legal question,” is left with the “firm conviction” that the

state court ruling was “erroneous.” Id.; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. Rather, the petitioner must

establish that the state court decision is “objectively unreasonable.” Middleton v. McNeil,

541 U.S. 433 (2004); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76. 

In conducting an analysis under the AEDPA, the habeas court considers the last

reasoned state court decision addressing the claim. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803

(1991). Additionally, the habeas court presumes that the state court’s factual determinations

are correct and petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (stating that “a determination of factual issues

made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden

of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); Williams v.

Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Where a state court decision is deemed “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application

of” clearly established federal law, the reviewing court must next determine whether it

resulted in constitutional error. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002). 

On habeas review, the court assesses the prejudicial impact of most constitutional errors by

determining whether they “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007) (Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for

harmlessness). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a

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sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on

the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-57 (1998) (holding that for habeas

relief to be granted based on constitutional error in capital penalty phase, error must have

had substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict in the penalty phase.); Hernandez v.

LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441 (N.D.Cal., Aug. 18, 2006) (finding that even if the evidence

of three of petitioner’s prior convictions was insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by

the court’s consideration of those convictions because the trial court found four other prior

convictions which would have supported petitioner’s sentence.) The Court will review

Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds One and Two under the applicable standard of

review. 

B. Analysis

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by sentencing him to an aggravated sentence in the absence of factual

findings by a jury. (docket # 1 at 24, 31-33) In Ground Two, Petitioner raises a related

claim that the court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by using a “historical prior

conviction” “as an aggravating factor to enhance his sentence.” (docket # 1 at 25, 33-35) 

Petitioner properly presented these claims to the state courts on post-conviction review. 

The state court rejected these claims. (Respondents’ Exhs. K, N) As discussed below,

Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application, of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

1. Waiver Pursuant to Guilty Plea

Respondents argue that Petitioner waived his Sixth Amendment challenge to his

sentences pursuant to his guilty plea. (docket # 12 at 19-21) The Court agrees that

Petitioner’s guilty plea effectively waived his right to challenge his sentences on Sixth

Amendment grounds. 

In his guilty plea, Petitioner specifically agreed that, by pleading guilty, he “waived

and g[ave] up any and all motions, defenses, objections, or requests which he has made or

raised, or could assert hereafter, to the court’s entry of judgment against him and imposition

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of a sentence upon him consistent with this agreement.” (Respondents’ Exh. C at 2) 

Petitioner specifically agreed that he would be “sentenced to the Department of Corrections

on Amended Count Two for a term not to exceed ten years.” (Respondents’ Exh. C at 1;

Exh. E at 5-7) During the change of plea hearing, the court advised Petitioner that he faced

a sentencing range of 3.5 to 16.25 years imprisonment if convicted of theft with a prior

conviction, Amended Count II. (Respondents’ Exh. E at 5-7) The court also reminded

Petitioner that the plea agreement he had entered into with the State provided that as to

Amended Count II, Petitioner would “be sentenced to the Department of Corrections for a

term not to exceed 10 years . . . .” (Respondents’ Exh. E at 7) On post-conviction review

Petitioner challenged his sentences on Blakely grounds, and the trial court enforced

Petitioner’s waiver. (Respondents’ Exhs. K, N) 

As the state court found, Petitioner’s guilty plea waived his right challenge to his

sentences on Blakely grounds. See United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 303 (3rd Cir.

2007) (concluding that defendant’s “Blakely-based contention,” was argument that

defendant “waived as part of [his] plea agreement.”); United States v. Cortez-Arias, 403

F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by 425 F.3d 547, 548 n. 8 (2005) (joining other circuits

in concluding that claim under [United States v.] Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) was waived

when he waived the right to appeal his sentence, noting that in exchange for his guilty plea

and waiver, the defendant received a benefit). Moreover, Petitioner’s sentencing challenges

lack merit as discussed below.

2. Merits of Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that his aggravated sentence imposed on Amended

Count II violates the Sixth Amendment because factors used to impose an aggravated

sentence were not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The controlling Supreme

Court law is Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2000) in which the Supreme Court held

any factor which leads to a sentence greater than would be imposed based on the jury’s

finding of guilt must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Petitioner

was sentenced in 2003 before Blakely was decided, that decision applies to this case because

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Petitioner’s challenge to his sentence was pending in his Rule-32 of right proceeding when

Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004. (see docket # 12 at 19) 

Here, the trial court imposed an aggravated 10-year sentence on Petitioner’s

conviction for theft, a class 3 felony, with one prior conviction. (Respondents’ Exh. F) In

the plea agreement, Petitioner admitted the prior conviction and admitted the factual basis

for his plea. (Respondents’ Exh. C) In sentencing Petitioner, the trial court considered the

aggravating and mitigating factors. (Respondents’ Exh. G at 36) As aggravating factors, the

court considered Petitioner’s prior felony convictions, the “multiple victims,” the crimes

were committed for pecuniary gain, the crimes were “committed while [Petitioner] was an

absconder under indictment in another jurisdiction,” “the magnitude of the loss to the

victims,” and “the [significant] emotional injury to the victims.” (Respondents’ Exh. G at

36-37) As discussed below, the court properly considered these factors in sentencing

Petitioner and did not violate Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights. 

The Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee proscribes the imposition of a sentence

above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a

jury or admitted by the defendant. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Since it

first articulated this rule, the Supreme Court has retained an exception for prior convictions. 

Id.; United States v. Quintana-Quintana, 383 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004); United States

v. Maria-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 664, 670 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that prior aggravated felony

conviction did not constitute an element of the offense where base sentence for illegally

reentering the United States following deportation is enhanced if deportation was subsequent

to conviction for aggravated felony); United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1020, 1025

(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court could consider defendant’s prior conviction in

imposing sentence enhancement even though such conduct had not been charged in the

indictment, presented to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v.

Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that Apprendi held that all prior

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convictions are exempt under Apprendi’s new rule, therefore, district court properly

considered prior convictions in sentencing).

In Blakely, the Court applied the rule announced in Apprendi and clarified that the

“‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose

solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. . .

.In other words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may

impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any

additional findings.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04 (emphasis in original). The Court

concluded that before a trial court can impose a sentence above the statutory maximum, a

jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt, or defendant must admit, all facts “legally

essential to the punishment.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).

As previously stated, the court in this case sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term

of 10 years’ imprisonment. (Respondents’ Exh. G) On direct review, Petitioner challenged

his aggravated sentence on the ground that the judge, rather then a jury, found the

aggravated factors in violation of the Sixth Amendment as discussed in Blakely. The state

court rejected Petitioner’s claim. As discussed below, Petitioner has not established that the

state court decision is contrary to or involves an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

Applying Blakely, several courts within the Ninth Circuit have held that a federal

habeas petitioner’s “prior conviction alone” is sufficient to support the imposition of “a

sentence anywhere within the statutory range.” Jones v. Schriro, No. CV-05-3720-PHXJAT (DKD), 2006 WL 1794765, * 3 (D.Ariz., June 27, 2006). In Jones, the court found no

Blakely violation where petitioner’s aggravated sentence was based, in part, on a prior

conviction. Id. at * 3 n. 2. The court noted that “once a jury finds or a defendant admits a

single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find and

consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the maximum

prescribed in that statute.’” Id. at * 2 (quoting State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 585, 115

P.2d 618 (2005)). Thus, the Jones court found that rule of Blakely was satisfied once

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petitioner admitted a single aggravating factor. Id. at * 3. Specifically, petitioner in Jones

admitted either in the written plea agreement, at the change of plea hearing, or at sentencing

to three different aggravating factors. Id. The Jones court found that petitioner’s admission

of any one of those aggravating factors authorized the trial court to impose a sentence

anywhere within the statutory range. Id.

Similarly, in Stokes v. Schriro, 465 F.3d 397, 402-03 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit

held that “the Arizona state courts’ interpretation of these [sentencing] provisions does not

contradict clearly established federal law [Apprendi/Blakely]. A statutory maximum need

not be defined by every one of the facts found at trial, so long as the defendant is not

exposed to a greater punishment than that authorized solely by those facts (or the fact of a

prior conviction) . . . Because the twenty-year sentence was authorized by the jury’s

findings, no Apprendi violation occurred” and hence the federal habeas petitioner is “not

entitled to habeas relief on this claim.” Id. at 402-03 (internal quotations and citations

omitted). 

Additionally, in Garcia v. Schriro, No. 06-855-PHX-DGC (DKD), 2006 WL

3292473 (D.Ariz., Nov. 9, 2006), the district court held that petitioner’s aggravated sentence

did not violate Blakely. The court explained that the “trial court properly considered

petitioner’s prior convictions as an aggravating circumstance that increased the maximum

allowable sentence under Blakely. Once the new maximum was established, the court was

free to consider the other aggravating circumstances of parole violation and pecuniary gain

in deciding where to sentence petitioner within the new maximum range.” Id. at * 2. In so

finding, the court explained that Petitioner’s admission of pecuniary gain in the plea

agreement was sufficient to establish an aggravating factor in accordance with Blakely. Id.

at * 3. The court also found that the trial court properly considered petitioner’s prior

convictions even though the plea agreement provided that the state withdrew the allegations

of prior convictions. Garcia, 2006 WL 3292473, * 2. The court noted that the prior

convictions were not alleged for enhancement purposes and that the court learned of the

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prior convictions from a probation officer’s presentence investigation report and from

petitioner’s counsel. Id.

In Nino v. Flannigan, No. 2:04cv2298-JWS (CRP), 2007 WL 1412493 (D.Ariz., May

14, 2007), the district court found that petitioner’s aggravated sentence comported with

Blakely where one of the aggravating factors, a prior conviction, was Blakely-exempt, and

petitioner admitted the other aggravating factor during the plea colloquy. Id. at * 4. The

court explained that under A.R.S. § 13-702, the existence of a single aggravating factor

exposes a defendant to an aggravated sentence. Id. In Nino, the trial judge considered two

aggravating circumstances, “the criminal history beyond the alleged and proven and the

struggle with the officers.”Id. The court noted that Blakely does not require the fact of a

prior conviction be presented to and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing

Blakely, 542 U.S. 296) “A history of prior convictions is Blakely exempt.” Id. Accordingly,

the Nino court held that because “one Blakely exempt factor supports the aggravated

sentence, consideration of other factors imposing sentence does not violate Petitioner's Fifth

and Sixth Amendment rights established in Blakely. Id.

 Similarly, in this case, Petitioner pled guilty to theft, a class 3 felony with one prior

conviction. (Respondents’ Exhs. C, E) Under the applicable Arizona law, at the time of

Petitioner’s sentencing a conviction for theft, a class 3 felony, yielded a presumptive term of

6.5 years imprisonment. (Respondents’ Exh. E at 6) The court could impose a mitigated

term as low as 3.5 years, or an aggravated term as high as 16.25 years. (Respondents’ Exh.

E at 6) Petitioner’s prior conviction is exempt from Blakely’s jury trial requirement and

allowed the trial court to impose an aggravated sentence. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301-02. 

Also exempt from Blakely’s jury trial requirement are aggravating factors admitted by

the defedant. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. In addition to admitting that he had a prior

conviction, as part of the factual basis for his plea, Petitioner admitted that his offenses were

committed for pecuniary gain and that there were multiple victims. (Respondents’ Exh. C at

attachment B) (stating that Petitioner “obtained money in excess of $3,000 by means of

material misrepresentations with the intent to deprive the owners of the money and

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converted the money for an unauthorized use . . . [Petitioner] transferred said funds to

Summerset Nassau Ltd. Account for his own use.” And Petitioner “obtained money in

excess of $25,000 by means of material misrepresentations with the intent to deprive the

owners of the money and converted the money for an unauthorized use . . . [Petitioner]

transferred said funds to his personal bank account at Bank of America.”) At the sentencing

hearing, Petitioner referred to the “hurt” he inflicted on “so many people.” (Respondents’

Exh. G at 33-34)

 Petitioner’s admission of the factual bases for his guilty pleas, and his admission that

his conduct impacted multiple victims, supported the imposition of an aggravated sentence

without any additional findings. See Rivera v. Fizer, No. 06-2904-PHX-PGR (JI), 2007 WL

2994808, * 11 (D.Ariz., Oct. 12, 2007) (stating that “the maximum sentence was . . .

authorized solely upon Petitioner’s admission of multiple victims.”) 

Although the trial court also found several other aggravating factors, Petitioner’s

prior felony convictions, and/or the aggravating factors which he admitted - multiple victims

and pecuniary gain - were sufficient to expose him to the aggravated term of imprisonment. 

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04. In other words, without any additional jury findings,

Petitioner’s prior conviction and/or the admitted aggravating factors expanded the

sentencing range to include an aggravated sentence. Therefore, Petitioner’s aggravated

sentence comports with the Sixth Amendment. 

Based on the foregoing, the state court’s finding that Petitioner’s aggravated sentence

did not violate the Sixth Amendment is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of the Supreme Court’s Apprendi/Blakely jurisprudence.

3. Merits of Ground Two

In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated when the court enhanced his sentence using a prior conviction that was neither

charged in the indictment nor proved to a jury. (docket # 1 at 33-35) In support of this

claim, Petitioner cites Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005) for the

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proposition that “the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial for a fact about a prior

conviction that cannot be conclusively proven in the judicial record.” (docket # 1 at 33)

Shepard was not a constitutional decision. Rather, Shepard decided an issue of

statutory interpretation. The issue in Shepard was whether the Armed Career Criminal Act

(“ACCA”) permitted a sentencing court to consider police reports and complaint

applications to establish that prior convictions for burglary were violent felonies. Id. at

1257. In an earlier decision, Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), the Supreme

Court held that “the ACCA generally prohibits the later court from delving into particular

facts disclosed by the record of conviction” to determine the character of a prior conviction

for purposes of enhancing a sentence under the ACCA. Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1257-58. In

Shepard, the Court held that the rule of Taylor applies to convictions on pleas, as well as to

convictions on jury verdicts. Id. at 1258, 59. 

Petitioner’s claim fails because the trial court at sentencing made a finding about the

fact of Petitioner’s prior conviction, not the character of his conviction. Shepard and Taylor

only restrict the sources a sentencing court may consider to determine the character of a

prior conviction as a violent felony under the ACCA. The fact of a prior conviction may be

found by the sentencing court. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224

(1998) (holding that the government need not allege in its indictment and need not prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had prior convictions for a district court to use

those convictions for purposes of enhancing a sentence.”) Although some Supreme Court

justices have expressed disagreement with Almendarez-Torres after Blakely, that decision

has not been overruled and this Court is bound to follow it. See, Butler v. Curry, 28 F.3d

624, 643 (9th Cir. 2008).

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be

denied.

Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (docket # 1) be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 30th day of March, 2009.

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