Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-1_19-cv-00008/USCOURTS-akd-1_19-cv-00008-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

WO IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

JEANETTE LEE PLACE, ) 

) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social )

Security, ) 

) No. 1:19-cv-0008-HRH

 Defendant. ) 

_______________________________________) 

O R D E R

This is an action for judicial review of the denial of disability benefits under Title II

of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434. Plaintiff Jeanette Lee Place has timely

filed her opening brief,

1

to which defendant, Andrew Saul, has timely responded.2 Oral

argument was not requested and is not deemed necessary. 

Procedural Background

On June 1, 2013, plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits under Title II of

the Social Security Act, alleging that she became disabled on January 31, 2013. Plaintiff

1Docket No. 15. 

2Docket No. 16. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 1 of 21
alleged that she was disabled due to PTSD, anxiety, mood disorder, physical disabilities,

spondylolisthesis, osteoarthritis, and shoulder deterioration. Plaintiff’s application was

denied initially. Plaintiff requested a hearing, and after administrative hearings held on

August 18, 2014 and March 23, 2015, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied plaintiff’s

application. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s June 11, 2015 unfavorable decision. On

October 27, 2016, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review. Plaintiffsought

judicial review and on March 20, 2018, the court remanded this matter for further

proceedings. Upon remand, an administrative hearing was held on January 9, 2019. After

this hearing, the ALJ again denied plaintiff’s application. Plaintiff bypassed written

exceptions, thereby making the ALJ’s May 1, 2019 decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. On July 3, 2019, plaintiff commenced this action in which she asks the court

to review the Commissioner’s final decision. 

General Background

Plaintiff was born on September 29, 1966. Plaintiff was 46 years old on her alleged

onset date, 47 years old at the time of the first administrative hearing, 48 years old at the time

of the second administrative hearing, and 52 years of age at the time of the third administrative hearing. Plaintiff has a GED. Plaintiff’s past relevant work was as a cashier, a stocker,

and a certified nursing assistant. 

The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ first found that plaintiff “last met the insured status requirements of the

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 2 of 21
Social Security Act on March 31, 2017.”3

The ALJ then applied the five-step sequential analysis used to determine whether an

individual is disabled.4

At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff “did not engage in substantial gainful activity

during the period from her alleged onset date of January 31, 2013 through her date last

insured of March 31, 2017. . . .”5 

At step two, the ALJ found that “[t]hrough the date last insured, the claimant had the

3Admin. Rec. at 852. 

4The five steps are as follows: 

Step one: Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial

gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not,

proceed to step two.

Step two: Is the claimant’s alleged impairment sufficiently

severe to limit . . . her ability to work? If so, proceed to step

three. If not, the claimant is not disabled.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment, or combination of

impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.,

pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not,

proceed to step four.

Step four: Does the claimant possess the residual functional

capacity (“RFC”) to perform . . . her past relevant work? If so,

the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant’s RFC, when considered with the

claimant’s age, education, and work experience, allow . . . her

to adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the

national economy? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the

claimant is disabled.

Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). 

5Admin. Rec. at 853. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 3 of 21
following severe impairments: cervical spondylosis, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar

spine, fibromyalgia, obesity, an anxiety disorder, a depressive disorder, and posttraumatic

stress disorder (PTSD). . . .”6 

At step three, the ALJ found that “[t]hrough the date last insured, the claimant did not

have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the

severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. . . .”7

The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Gaeta’s opinion “that the medical evidence of record does

not support a finding of listing-level severity of any physical impairment or combination

thereof.”8 The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Lace’s opinion that plaintiff “had only mild

limitations [in] terms of the cognitive functioning prongs of the ‘paragraph B’ criteria, and

at most moderate limitations in terms of the remaining ‘paragraph B’ criteria of interacting

with others and adapting or managing oneself.”9

“Between steps three and four, the ALJ must, as an intermediate step, assess the

claimant’s RFC.” Bray v. Comm’r of Social Security Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222–23 (9th

Cir. 2009). The ALJ found that 

through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual

functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

6Admin. Rec. at 853. 

7Admin. Rec. at 853-854. 

8Admin. Rec. at 854. 

9Admin. Rec. at 854. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 4 of 21
404.1567(b) except that she could frequently climb ramps or

stairs; never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; and occasionally

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She should . . . avoid[] all

unprotected heights and hazardous machinery. In addition, the

claimant’s work should [be] limited to routine tasks at a single

workstation with no production rate or high-speed paced work,

as well as only occasional interaction with the public, coworkers and supervisors.[10] 

The ALJ gave great weight11 to Dr. Gaeta’s opinion12

and Dr. Lace’s opinion.13 The

ALJ gave little to no weight to the opinions of Social Worker Tomkinson and FNP Brown.14

The ALJ gave some, but little, weight to PT Weaver’s May 2013 opinion.15 The ALJ gave

10Admin. Rec. at 855. 

11Admin. Rec. at 861. 

12Dr. Gaeta’s opinion is discussed below in detail. 

13Michael Lace, Psy.D., testified as a medical expert at the third administrative

hearing. Dr. Lace testified that plaintiff would 

be limited to occasional contact with co-workers, the general

public and supervisors. She would also be limited to a single

work location. . . . So, no travel. Could be in one building with

different workstations within the building, but no more than a

single location. And [she] would be limited . . . to routine tasks

with little or no high-speed production type of tasks involved.

Admin. Rec. at 913-914. 

14Admin. Rec. at 861. Tomkinson’s and FNP Brown’s opinions are discussed below

in detail. 

15Admin. Rec. at 861. PT Weaver’s opinion is discussed below in detail. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 5 of 21
some, but little weight,16 to Dr. Brogdon’s May 2013 opinion.17 The ALJ gave some weight18

to Dr. Caldwell’s opinion.19 The ALJ gave some weight20 to Dr. Winn’s opinion.21 The ALJ

16Admin. Rec. at 861. 

17On May 31, 2013, Dr. Brogdon noted that he and plaintiff

talked a good bit about the patient’s decision to go on disability[.] I believe that the patient has a strong case relating not only

to her mental condition but also to her physical condition. She

has spondylolisthesis which produces rather severe pain in

addition to chronic hip pain. She had functional assessment

from physical therapy that revealed that these conditions are

both limiting her very severely in her ability to move and

accomplish work-related tasks. This coupled with the patient’s

continuing mood lability and posttraumatic stress is a severe

hindrance that I think would make it impossible for the patient

to support herself financially by working[. I]n this situation,

disability makes the most sense as far as the way to have her

continue to be supported and allow some quality of life. 

Admin. Rec. at 343. 

18Admin. Rec. at 862. 

19On January 4, 2014, Jay Caldwell, M.D., opined that plaintiff could occasionally

lift/carry 35 pounds; frequently lift/carry 10 pounds; stand/walk for 6 hours; sit for 6 hours;

was unlimited as to push/pull; could frequently crouch; could occasionally climb ladders/scaffolds and stoop; had no limitations as to climbing ramps/stairs, balancing, kneeling,

and crawling; was limited as to reaching overhead; had no limitations as to handling,

fingering, and feeling; and should avoid moderate exposure to vibration. Admin. Rec. at

433-436. 

20Admin. Rec. at 862. 

21On February 27, 2014, Dr. Winn opined that plaintiff was not significantly limited

asto her abilityto remember locations and work-like procedures, understand/remember/carry

out short and simple instructions, perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular

(continued...)

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 6 of 21
gave some, but little weight,22 to the April 2014 opinion of Dr. Kemper.

23 The ALJ gave

some, but little weight,24 to Social Worker Weyhmiller’s June 2014 opinion.25 The ALJ gave

21(...continued)

attendance, be punctual within customary tolerances, sustain an ordinary routine without

special supervision, work in coordination with or in proximity to others without being

distracted by them, make simple work-related decisions, complete a normal workday and

workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, perform at a

consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, ask simple

questions or request assistance, get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them

or exhibiting behavioral extremes, maintain socially appropriate behavior, adhere to basic

standards of neatness and cleanliness, be aware of hazards and take appropriate precautions,

travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation, and set realistic goals or make plans

independently of others; and was moderately limited in her ability to understand/remember/

carry out detailed instructions, maintain concentration and attention for extended periods,

interact appropriately with the general public, accept instructions and respond appropriately

to criticism from supervisors, and respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. 

Admin. Rec. at 116-117. Dr. Winn explained that plaintiff “has the ability to understand,

retain and follow instructions and sustain attention to perform simple tasks[,]” that her

“[c]oncentration, persistence and pace will be decreased by anxiety and depressive sxs[,]”

that she could “manage occasional contacts with the public [and] accept supervision

delivered in a reassuring manner[,]” and would “be able to adapt to changes in the work

environment, but may be resistant to the changes initially.” Admin. Rec. at 116-117.

22Admin. Rec. at 863. 

23On April 25, 2014, Dr. Kemper wrote a note excusing plaintiff from jury duty

because “[s]he has Agoraphobia with Panic Disorder that interferes with her ability to

function under stress. . . .” Admin. Rec. at 539. 

24Admin. Rec. at 863. 

25In June 2014, Weyhmiller noted that both plaintiff’s “physical and emotional pain

are impacting her daily functioning on several levels.” Admin. Rec. at 665. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 7 of 21
some weight26 to plaintiff’s GAF scores.27 The ALJ considered the lay testimony28 of

plaintiff’s husband,29 Glenda Halvorsen,30 and Zachary Kelly.

31

The ALJ found plaintiff’s pain and symptom statements less than credible because

they were not consistent with the objective medical evidence and because they were not

consisted with her reported daily activities, which the ALJ found were “suggestive of

improved functioning over the course of the longitudinal period at issue.”32 

At step four, the ALJ found that “[t]hrough the date last insured, the claimant was

unable to perform any past relevant work. . . .”33

At step five, the ALJ found that “[t]hrough the date last insured, considering the

claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs

that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have

26Admin. Rec. at 864. 

27On May 31, 2013, plaintiff’s GAF score was 50-60. Admin. Rec. at 344. On June

28, 2013, plaintiff’s GAF score was 60-70. Admin. Rec. at 342. On July 25, 2013,

plaintiff’s GAF score was 55-60. Admin. Rec. at 347. On September 29, 2014, plaintiff’s

GAF score was 55. Admin. Rec. at 802. 

28Admin. Rec. at 864. 

29Ronald Place, plaintiff’s husband, completed function reports on August 28, 2013

and September 5, 2014. Admin. Rec. at 226-234; 285-287. 

30Admin. Rec. at 278. 

31Admin. Rec. at 279. 

32Admin. Rec. at 860-861. 

33Admin. Rec. at 864. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 8 of 21
performed[,]” including working as a bottle packer, a routing clerk, or a marker.34 This

finding was based35 on the interrogatories the ALJ put to Raymond North, a vocational

expert.36

Thus, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff “was not under a disability, as defined in the

Social Security Act, at any time from January 31, 2013, the alleged onset date, through

March 31, 2017, the date last insured. . . .”37

Standard of Review

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings

and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of

the Commissioner. . . .” The court “properly affirms the Commissioner’s decision denying

benefits if it is supported by substantial evidence and based on the application of correct legal

standards.” Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). “Substantial evidence

is ‘more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Andrews

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). “‘To determine whether substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s decision, [the court] review[s] the administrative record as a whole,

34Admin. Rec. at 865-866. 

35Admin. Rec. at 865-866. 

36Admin. Rec. at 1172-1176. 

37Admin. Rec. at 866. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 9 of 21
weighing both the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039). If the evidence is susceptible to more than

one reasonable interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision. Id. But,

the Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed “‘simply by isolating a specific quantum of

supporting evidence.’” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Discussion

Plaintiff’s first argues that the ALJ’s physical RFC was flawed. The ALJ found that

plaintiff “had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) except that she could frequently climb ramps or stairs; never climb ladders,

ropes or scaffolds; and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She should . . . avoid[]

all unprotected heights and hazardous machinery.”38 These were the physical limitations

opined to by Dr. Gaeta,39 a medical expert who testified at the third administrative hearing. 

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Gaeta’s opinion cannot constitute substantial evidence in

support of the ALJ’s RFC because Dr. Gaeta did not review the entire medical record but

instead relied only on the one examination done byDr. Trimble, a neurologist who examined

plaintiff on July 14, 2014.40 Plaintiff argues that one examination which found that she was

38Admin. Rec. at 855. 

39Admin. Rec. at 886-887. 

40Admin. Rec. at 667-668. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 10 of 21
neurologically intact is not substantial evidence contradicting all the other medical records

that showed that she had limited range of motion, pain, and abnormal sensations.41

To the extent that plaintiff is contending that Dr. Gaeta only relied on Dr. Trimble’s

neurological exam, that contention is wrong. Dr. Gaeta testified that he found that exam to

be the “most thorough exam” and that he gave that exam “more weight” than a physical

therapy evaluation.42 But he did not testify that this exam was the only medical evidence he

relied on or considered. Rather, he testified that he “put a lot of weight on” the July 14, 2014

neurological examination43 and that he reviewed all the medical evidence in the record.44

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Gaeta’s opinion was misplaced

because Dr. Gaeta acknowledged that he had not read or considered all of the treatment

notes. This is based on an exchange between Dr. Gaeta and plaintiff’s lawyer during the

third administrative hearing. The attorney asked Dr. Gaeta whether “a person with the

[c]laimant’s neck impairment of cervical spondylosis [would] have difficulty with range of

motion of the neck and movements of the neck[.]”45 Dr. Gaeta testified that he did not “know

whether that was described anywhere, with limitation of motion[], but that can happen,

41Admin. Rec. at 306-307, 331, 574, 585, 590-591, 817, 821, 829, 832-833, 839, 1182-

1183, 1192, 1200, 1204, 1329. 

42Admin. Rec. at 888-889. 

43Admin. Rec. at 888. 

44Admin. Rec. at 884. 

45Admin. Rec. at 893. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 11 of 21
yes.”46 Plaintiff contends that there is evidence in the record that she had limited motion in

her neck and thus it is clear that Dr. Gaeta did not do a comprehensive review of the medical

record, as the ALJ found.47 In short, plaintiff contends that Dr. Gaeta failed to consider or

ignored some of the medical evidence as it related to her cervical spondylosis.

Dr. Gaeta testified that he did not see any evidence in the record that plaintiff had

limited motion in her neck due to this impairment. There were, however, a number of

medical records which indicated that plaintiff’s cervical range of motion was limited. On

May 29, 2013, on exam by PT Weaver, plaintiff’s cervical range of motion was as follows:

“1. Flexion: chin 2” from chest[.] 2. Extension: 0 to 40 degrees[.] 3. Rotation: right and

left 0 to 50 degrees.”48 On April 28, 2014, at her physical therapy appointment, plaintiff’s

cervical range of motion was as follows: “1. Forward Flexion: chin 2” from chest. 2. 

Extension: neutral[.] 3. Rotation: right to 40 degrees, and left to 50 degrees. All motions

are limited by pain.”49 On June 12, 2014, on exam by PT Weaver, plaintiff’s cervical range

of motion was as follows: “1. Forward Flexion: chin 1” from chest. 2. Extension: 0 to 40

degrees. 3. Rotation: right and left to 65 degrees.”

50 On May 21, 2014, on exam by PT

46Admin. Rec. at 893. 

47Admin. Rec. at 857. 

48Admin. Rec. at 306. 

49Admin. Rec. at 574. 

50Admin. Rec. at 585. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 12 of 21
Weaver, plaintiff’s cervical range of motion was as follows: “1. Forward Flexion: chin 1”

from chest. 2. Extension: 0 to 40 degrees. 3. Rotation: right and left 0 to 65 degrees.”51

On August 12, 2014, on exam by PT Weaver, plaintiff’s cervical range of motion was as

follows: “1. Flexion: chin 2” from chest[.] 2. Extension: 0 to 40 degrees[.] 3. Rotation:

right to 60 degrees, and left to 40 degrees.”52 Weaver also noted that “[a]ll motions limited

due to muscle tightness and pain at end range.”53 On September 4, 2014, on exam by PT

Weaver, plaintiff’s cervical range of motion was as follows: “1. Forward Flexion: chin 2”

from chest[.] 2. Extension: 0 to 30 degrees[.] 3. Rotation: right and left 40 degrees with

pain most pronounced to the right.”

54 On January 23, 2015, on exam by PT Weaver,

plaintiff’s cervical range of motion was as follows: “1. Forward Flexion: chin 2” from chest. 

2. Extension: 25 degrees[.] 3. Rotation: right to 60 degrees left to 50 degrees. 4. Side

Bend: right to 30 degrees; left to 20 degrees. All motions limited due to pain at end range.”55

On February 6, 2015, on exam by Dr. Kemper, plaintiff’s neck had “reduced ROM in all

directions[.]”56 On June 10, 2015, on exam byPT Weaver, plaintiff’s “C-spine AROM [was]

51Admin. Rec. at 591. 

52Admin. Rec. at 817. 

53Admin. Rec. at 817. 

54Admin. Rec. at 821. 

55Admin. Rec. at 832. 

56Admin. Rec. at 839. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 13 of 21
limited by 30-40% throughout due to pain and guarding.”57 On July 20, 2015, on exam by

PT Weaver, plaintiff’s cervical range of motion was as follows: “1. Forward Flexion: chin

1” from chest. 2. Extension: 30 degrees[.] 3. Rotation: right to 60 degrees; left to 60

degrees. 4. Side Bend: right to 20 degrees; left to 20 degrees. All motions are guarded and

limited at end range from pain and muscle tightness.”58 On September 10, 2015, on exam

by PT Weaver, plaintiff’s cervical range of motion was as follows: “1. Forward Flexion:

chin to chest. 2. Extension: 60 degrees[.] 3. Rotation: right to 70 degrees; left to 30

degrees. 4. Side Bend: right to 30 degrees; left to 30 degrees. All motions are guarded and

limited at end range from pain and muscle tightness.”59 On November 24, 2015, on exam by

PT Weaver, plaintiff’s cervical range of motion was as follows: “1. Forward Flexion: chin

1” from chest. 2. Extension: 40 degrees[.] 3. Rotation: right to 60 degrees; left to 50

degrees. All motions are limited at the end range from pain and muscle tightness.”60 On

April 12, 2018, on exam by PA Frazier, plaintiff’s neck range of motion was “limited to full

flexion and lateral bending[.]”61 This evidence62 shows that plaintiff had limited range of

57Admin. Rec. at 1204. 

58Admin. Rec. at 1200. 

59Admin. Rec. at 1192. 

60Admin. Rec. at 1182-1183. 

61Admin. Rec. at 1329. 

62Although much of this evidence was from PT Weaver, who at the time in question

(continued...)

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 14 of 21
motion in her neck throughout the relevant time period. Yet, both Dr. Gaeta and the ALJ

appeared to have ignored this evidence. 

The ALJ explained that she was not including any limitations related to plaintiff’s

cervical spondylosis because therewas “evidence of normal functioning of[plaintiff’s] upper

extremities despite her cervical spondylosis such that there is no evidence of radiculopathy

caused by this impairment.”63 This was based on Dr. Gaeta’s testimony that plaintiff retained

normal functioning in her arms, did not have radiculopathy and that her imaging did not show

any nerve impingement or displacement, all of which was correct. But this says nothing

about the evidence that plaintiff had reduced range of motion in her neck. As set out above,

there is substantial evidence in the record that plaintiff had limitations flowing from her

cervical spondylosis, but the ALJ, based on Dr. Gaeta’s testimony, did not include any such

limitations. “[A]n ALJ is not free to disregard properly supported limitations.” Robbins v.

Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006). Yet, that is what the ALJ did here. 

Thus, the ALJ’s physical RFC was flawed, which means that the hypothetical the ALJ gave

to North, the vocational expert, was incomplete. And “[i]f a vocational expert’s hypothetical

does not reflect all the claimant’s limitations, then the expert’s testimony has no evidentiary

value to support a finding that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.” Hill

62(...continued)

would not have been considered an “acceptable medical source”, this is still evidence that

the ALJ should have considered in evaluating the severity of plaintiff’s cervical spondylosis

impairment and how it affected her ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1) (2013). 

63Admin. Rec. at 857. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 15 of 21
v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Thus, the ALJ’s step five

finding was not supported by substantial evidence. 

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting FNP Brown’s opinions. On

November 9, 2018, FNP Brown opined that plaintiff could sit for less than 2 hours; could

stand/walk for less than 2 hours; would need to take unscheduled breaks, up to 4 per hour;

needed to use a cane or other assistive device for occasional standing/walking; could rarely

lift less than 10 pounds; could rarely look down or up or turn head left to right; could

occasionally hold her head in static position; could rarely twist; could never stoop/bend,

crouch/squat, or climb ladders; could rarely climb stairs; could occasionally use her hands

for grasping; and could rarely do fine manipulation or reach overhead.64 Brown also opined

that plaintiff was seriously limited but not precluded in her ability to remember work-like

procedures, maintain attention for a 2-hour segment, maintain regular attendance and be

punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances, sustain an ordinary routine without

special supervision, make simple work-related decisions, complete a normal work-day and

workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting, deal with normal work stress, maintain socially

appropriate behavior, travel in unfamiliar places, and use public transportation; and was

unable able to meet competitive standards as to working in coordination with or proximity

to others without being unduly distracted and performing at a consistent pace without an

64Admin. Rec. at 1351-1352. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 16 of 21
unreasonable number and length of rest periods.65 Brown also opined that plaintiff would

be off task more than 20% of the time and that she would miss more than four days of work

per month.66

FNP Brown was a treating source.67 “As a general rule, more weight should be given

to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the

claimant.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). “[I]f the treating doctor’s

opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner may not reject this opinion

without providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the

record for so doing.” Id. (quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

FNP Brown’s opinions were contradicted by Dr. Gaeta’s and Dr. Lace’s opinions; and so,

the ALJ was required to give specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting FNP Brown’s

opinions.

The ALJ gave no weight to the opinions of FNP Brown because theywere “dated over

a year [and a] half after the date last insured of March 31, 2017” and thus “they do not

65Admin. Rec. at 1353. 

66Admin. Rec. at 1354. 

67Under the regulations applicable to plaintiff’s application, “evidence from an

acceptable medical source is distinguished from evidence from a non-acceptable medical

source.” Hale v. Berryhill, Case No. 3:17-cv-00697-HZ, 2018 WL 2221675, at *9 (D. Or.

May 15, 2018). FNP Brown was an acceptable medical source because his medical source

statement was signed by Dr. Rodney Schaffer, Brown’s supervising physician. Admin. Rec.

at 1355. See Taylor v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 17 of 21
reasonably relate to, and are . . . likewise largely irrelevant to, the claimant’s functioning

during the period at issue. . . .”68 Plaintiff argues that this was not a legitimate reason for

rejecting FNP Brown’s opinions. Plaintiff acknowledges that FNP Brown’s opinions were

dated after the date last insured, but she argues that this was not a reason to reject the

opinions because FNP Brown was in the same office that had treated her throughout the

relevant period. Thus, she contends that FNP Brown would have had access to her medical

records. Plaintiff also argues that the date of the opinions was not a legitimate reason

because FNP Brown stated that plaintiff’s functional limitations had begun in 2010,69 which

she contends means that FNP Brown’s opinions were relevant to the period at issue, even

though they were dated after her date last insured. 

The ALJ erred as to FNP Brown’s opinions. In the Ninth Circuit, “although there may

be a thumb on the scale in favor of opinions flowing from contemporaneous exams, an ALJ

still must carefullyconsider retrospectively-rendered opinions and can’t disregard thembased

solely on when they were rendered.” Barker v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., Case No.

CV-18-08136-PCT-DWL, 2019 WL 3718975, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 7, 2019) (reconciling

Smith v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988) with Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540 (9th Cir.

1996). Here, the ALJ did not carefully consider FNP Brown’s opinions. Rather, the ALJ

disregarded his opinions solely based on when they were rendered. 

68Admin. Rec. at 861. 

69Admin. Rec. at 1355. 

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Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting PT Weaver’s opinion. On May

29, 2013, Weaver noted that plaintiff’s “chronic pain [is] complicated by degenerative

changes as identified by MRI, deconditioning (48% of reference), morbid obesity and

depression. The patient’s current functional limitations would prevent gainful employment

at this time.”70

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ stated that Weaver’s opinion was simply that she could

not work and that this was not a proper summary of Weaver’s opinion. Plaintiff argues that

the ALJ ignored Weaver’s opinion that she was deconditioned by 48%.

The ALJ did not err as to her summary of Weaver’s opinion. Weaver basically opined

that plaintiff could not work and the ALJ stated that Weaver “opined that the claimant’s

functional limitations prevented gainful employment. . . .”71 This was an adequate summary

of Weaver’s opinion.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred as to Social Worker Tomkinson’s opinion. 

On December 12, 2018, Tomkinson opined that plaintiff had limited but satisfactory abilities

to maintain regular attendance, be punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances, ask

simple questions or request assistance, interact appropriately with the general public,

maintain sociallyappropriate behavior, adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness,

and use public transportation; had seriously limited, but not precluded abilities to

70Admin. Rec. at 616. 

71Admin. Rec. at 861. 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 19 of 21
understand/remember/carry out short and simple instructions, get along with co-workers or

peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, respond

appropriately to changes in a routine work setting, be aware of normal hazards and take

appropriate precautions, and travel in unfamiliar places; and would be unable to meet

competitive standards as to remembering work-like procedures,maintaining attention for two

hours, sustaining an ordinary routine without special supervision, working in coordination

with or proximity to others without being unduly distracted, making simple work-related

decisions, completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from

psychologically based symptoms, performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable

number and length of rest periods, accepting instructions and responding appropriately to

criticism from supervisors, and dealing with normal work stress.72 Tomkinson also opined

that plaintiff would be off task more than 20% of the time and would miss more than four

days of work per month.73

Because Tomkinson would not be considered an acceptable medical source under the

regulations that are applicable to plaintiff’s application,74 the ALJ was only required to give

a germane reason for rejecting his opinion. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.

72Admin. Rec. at 1357. 

73Admin. Rec. at 1358. 

74Under the regulations applicable to plaintiff’s application, “[p]ractitioners such as

physician’s assistants, nurse practitioners, chiropractors, audiologists, naturopathic

physicians, and therapists, are ‘other sources’ or non-acceptable medical sources.” Hale,

2018 WL 2221675, at *9 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(1), 416.913(d)(1) (2013)). 

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Case 1:19-cv-00008-HRH Document 18 Filed 01/14/20 Page 20 of 21
2012). The ALJ gave Tomkinson’s opinion no weight because it was “dated over a year

[and] a half after the date last insured of March 31, 2017” and thus it did “not reasonably

relate to” and was “largely irrelevant to[] the claimant’s functioning during the period at

issue. . . .”75

Plaintiff argues that this was error because Tomkinson had stated that he had been

working with plaintiff since January 2016 and at times saw her weekly.

76 But, there are no

treatment notes to support Tomkinson’s statement. The only note or record fromTomkinson

in the record is the December 2018 opinion. The ALJ did not err as to Tomkinson’s opinion. 

The ALJ gave a germane reason for rejecting Tomkinson’s opinion. 

If the ALJ erred, which she did, plaintiff requests that this matter be remanded for

further proceedings. A “[r]emand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate” here

because “enhancement of the record would be useful.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587,

593 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted). 

Conclusion

The decision of the Commissioner is reversed and this matter is remanded for further

proceedings. 

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 14th day of January, 2020. 

/s/ H. Russel Holland 

United States District Judge

75Admin. Rec. at 861. 

76Admin. Rec. at 1356. 

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