Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02498/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02498-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241fd Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OLWAYNE DUNKLEY,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN, STEWART DETENTION 

CENTER, ET AL.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-02498-AJB-NLS

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER, (Doc. No. 9.)

Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Olwayne Dunkley’s (“Petitioner”) 

motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (Doc. No. 9.) For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Petitioner’s motion for a TRO. 

I. BACKGROUND

On December 30, 2019, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 

U.S.C. § 2241. According to the petition, Petitioner is a lawful permanent resident who is 

currently in the custody of ICE and detained in the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, 

Georgia. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) Petitioner was charged with removability pursuant to INA 

§ 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) as an individual who has been convicted of two or more crimes involving

moral turpitude. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner challenges his removability because he contends 

annoying or molesting a child under 18 years of age, and indecent exposure are not crimes 

involving moral turpitude under Ninth Circuit authority. (Id. at 6–7.)

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On January 2, 2020, the Court granted Petitioner in forma pauperis status, (Doc. No. 

3), and on January 8, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion for a TRO. (Doc. No. 9.)

II. DISCUSSION

In his motion for a TRO, Petitioner alleges Respondents intend to transfer Petitioner 

to different detention facilities throughout the United States in retaliation for filing his 

habeas petition. (Doc. No. 9 at 2.) Petitioner states that such transfers would result in the 

loss or destruction of his legal mail and documents, and would prevent Petitioner from 

accessing the law library. (Id.) 

A TRO may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party or that 

party’s attorney if: (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the 

verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the 

applicant before the adverse party or the party’s attorney can be heard in opposition, and 

(2) the applicant’s attorney (plaintiff himself in this case, as he proceeds pro se) certifies 

in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give notice and the reasons 

supporting the claim that notice should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).

Here, Petitioner has not satisfied either procedural requirement. The motion for a 

TRO does not address the standard for issuance of a TRO, and the relevant factors appear 

to be incompletely addressed. See Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 

(9th Cir. 2017) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)) 

(discussing standards for preliminary injunctive relief). Under either of the two tests used 

by the Ninth Circuit, merits are a key factor, and neither the petition nor the TRO motion 

adequately address them. Funes Suazo v. McAleenan, No. 19CV1882-LAB (MSB), 2019 

WL 4849188, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2019).

In particular, Petitioner has not demonstrated immediate and irreparable injury. The 

motion only says Petitioner believes he will be transferred, but Petitioner does not provide 

any details as to when or how imminent that may be. In any event, it is well-established 

that prisoners have no constitutional right to incarceration in a particular prison. See Olim 

v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244–48, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983).

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Furthermore, Respondents apparently have no notice of the TRO motion, and the 

motion does not explain why a TRO should be granted before they can respond. For this 

reason alone, the motion is subject to denial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). Only in a narrow 

range of cases may a court issue a TRO before the opposing party has an opportunity to be 

heard. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438–39 

(1974). This is not such a case.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner’s motion for a TRO is DENIED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 10, 2020

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