Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01203/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01203-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH MARTORANA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 1:07cv1203-IEG

Order Denying Motion for Stay

Pending Appeal; Granting Temporary

Stay

vs.

K. MENDOZA-POWERS, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s August 25, 2006

decision reversing the Board of Parole Hearing’s 2006 grant of parole to Petitioner. On June 17,

2010, the Court granted the petition and ordered Respondent to release Petitioner within thirty (30)

days on such terms and conditions that the Board determined appropriate. 

Respondent has filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay the decision pending appeal.

Alternatively, Respondent asks the Court to issue a temporary stay to allow him to seek relief from

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner has filed an opposition to the motion to stay.

Legal Standard

 Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “While an appeal is pending

from an interlocutory order or final judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction, the

court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that

secure the opposing party’s rights.” More particularly applicable to this case, Fed. R. App. Proc.

23(c) provides that “[w]hile a decision ordering the release of a prisoner is under review, the

Case 1:07-cv-01203-IEG-CAB Document 23 Filed 07/14/10 Page 1 of 4
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prisoner must – unless the court or judge rendering the decision, or the court of appeals, or the

Supreme Court, or a judge or justice of either court orders otherwise – be released on personal

recognizance, with or without surety.” In determining whether to release a successful habeas

corpus petitioner from custody pending appeal, the court must apply the same factors traditionally

considered in deciding whether to stay judgment in a civil case. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S.

770, 775 (1987). 

The traditional standard applied by district courts to determine whether to grant a stay in a

civil action is akin to the one used to decide whether a preliminary injunction should be issued.

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., -- U.S. --, 129 S.Ct. 365, 376 (2008). The Court may issue

a stay upon consideration of four factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong

showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably

injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties

interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, – U.S. –, 129

S.Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). The first two

factors are the most critical. Nken, 129 S.Ct. at 1761.

1. Likelihood of success on the merits

Respondent has failed to make a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits of

his appeal. In support of his motion, Respondent argues that the district court erred in applying the

“some evidence” standard as a matter of federal due process, that there is no federal due process

right implicated by the review of parole decisions, and that Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th

Cir. 2010) (en banc) is not clearly established federal law. The Ninth Circuit has squarely rejected

these arguments. Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that application of

the “some evidence” standard to parole determinations is mandated by clearly established federal

law); Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).

2. Irreparable injury

Respondent argues the order requiring Petitioner to be released would cause irreparable

injury because it usurps the Governor’s authority to determine parole suitability. Even assuming

the Governor’s unsuitability finding violated Petitioner’s right to due process, Respondent argues

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In Petitioner’s opposition to the motion to stay, filed on July 13, 2010, Petitioner indicates

the Board once again found Petitioner suitable for parole in 2009, a decision which the Governor

once again reversed. 

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the proper remedy is not release. Instead, Respondent argues the matter should be remanded for a

new gubernatorial review. Again, however, the Ninth Circuit has held that where the Board or

Governor’s determination of parole unsuitability was unsupported by any evidence in the record,

immediate release may be the appropriate remedy. Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1216 (reversing and

remanding with instructions to grant the writ); Pearson, 606 F.3d at 612 (declining to further stay

district court’s order requiring Respondent to release Petitioner within thirty days); McQuillion v.

Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (district court did not err in ordering Warden to

immediately release Petitioner, rather than hold new rescission hearing).

3. Substantial injury to Petitioner

Respondent argues Petitioner is serving an indeterminate life term, such that his continued

incarceration is not a significant hardship. However, the Board in March of 2006 determined

Petitioner was eligible for immediate release. Each day of Petitioner’s continuing confinement

thereafter, which is unsupported by any evidence that he poses a danger to society, constitutes a

significant constitutional injury. 

4. Public Interest

Finally, Respondent argues public safety militates in favor of a stay, citing the Governor’s

findings that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole based upon his commitment offense, his history

of substance abuse, and his prison disciplinary record. Respondent has not, however, come

forward with any evidence not apparent in the record, which would demonstrate Petitioner poses a

current risk of danger to society.1

Conclusion

Respondent has failed to demonstrate that the relevant factors support a stay of the Court’s

order granting the writ and ordering Petitioner to be released. Therefore, the Court DENIES

Respondent’s motion for a stay pending appeal. 

///

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Nonetheless, because Respondent presents substantial questions for review on appeal, the

Court GRANTS a temporary stay, for fourteen (14) days, to allow Respondent time to seek a stay

pending appeal from the Ninth Circuit pursuant to Fed. R. App. Proc. 8(a)(2)(A)(ii).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 14, 2010

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 1:07-cv-01203-IEG-CAB Document 23 Filed 07/14/10 Page 4 of 4