Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01878/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01878-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARIO NAVARRO,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEBRA HERNDON, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:09-cv-1878 KJM KJN P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

(ECF No. 165.) After carefully reviewing the record, the undersigned recommends that 

defendants’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. 

II. Procedural Background 

 This action proceeds on the amended complaint filed August 10, 2010. (ECF No. 24.) On 

November 19, 2010, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that some claims were 

barred by the statute of limitations and on the grounds that some claims failed to state claims 

upon which relief may be granted. (ECF No. 38.) On August 24, 2011, the undersigned 

recommended that defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 

78.) On September 30, 2011, the Honorable Kimberly J. Mueller adopted the findings and 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 1 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

recommendations in part. (ECF No. 79.) Judge Mueller ordered that this action shall proceed on 

plaintiff’s First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against defendants Kernan, Walker, 

Baxter, Baker, Sclafani and Morrow. (Id.) Judge Mueller identified an issue not addressed in the 

findings and recommendations: how the involvement of defendants O’Brian and Grannis in 

denying the grievances plaintiff identified in the complaint violated plaintiff’s right to access the 

courts. (Id.) Judge Mueller referred consideration of the access to the courts claim against 

defendants O’Brian and Grannis to the undersigned. (Id.) 

 On December 7, 2012, the undersigned issued supplemental findings and 

recommendations finding that this action should proceed on plaintiff’s denial of access to the 

courts claims against defendants Grannis and O’Brian. (ECF No. 84.) On March 26, 2013, Judge 

Mueller adopted the December 7, 2012 supplemental findings and recommendations. (ECF No. 

89.) 

 On May 13, 2014, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on grounds that 

plaintiff’s claims were not administratively exhausted. (ECF No. 147.) On February 9, 2015, the 

undersigned recommended that defendants’ motion be denied. (ECF No. 154.) On March 19, 

2015, Judge Mueller adopted the February 9, 2015 findings and recommendations. (ECF No. 

156.) 

 On May 29, 2015, defendants filed the pending summary judgment motion. (ECF No. 

165.) In support of the motion, defendants filed 192 pages of exhibits. (ECF No. 165-3.) On 

September 21, 2015, plaintiff filed his opposition (ECF No. 171) as well as 1384 pages of 

exhibits. (ECF Nos. 172, 173.) On December 3, 2015, defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 180.) 

III. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in 

Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56 is met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

 Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 2 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

 “Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Nursing 

Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 

387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory 

committee’s notes to 2010 amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not have the trial 

burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot 

produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

 Consequently, if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to 

the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 

establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 

allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a 

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party 

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 3 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

(9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 

1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments). 

 In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences 

are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual 

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. 

Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted). 

 By contemporaneous notice provided on September 13, 2010 (ECF No. 28), plaintiff was 

advised of the requirements for opposing a motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); 

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). 

IV. Plaintiff’s Claims 

 This action proceeds on plaintiff’s first amended complaint against defendants Kernan, 

Walker, Grannis, O’Brian, Baxter, Baker, Sclafani and Morrow. (ECF No. 24.) 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 4 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 Plaintiff alleges that he was housed in administrative segregation (“ad seg”) at California 

State Prison-Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”) for 309 days, from May 4, 2005, until plaintiff’s transfer to 

California State Prison-Lancaster (“CSP-LAC”) on March 9, 2006. Plaintiff alleges five claims 

in connection with his placement in and retention in ad seg. First, plaintiff alleges that he was 

denied his right to due process with regard to the decisions to place him in and to retain him in ad 

seg pending his transfer to CSP-LAC. Second, plaintiff alleges that the fact and continuation of 

his ad seg detention violated the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff also alleges that the physical 

conditions of ad seg violated the Eighth Amendment. Third, plaintiff alleges that he was denied 

his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freely exercise his religion while housed in ad seg. 

Fourth, plaintiff alleges that he was denied his right to access the court while housed in ad seg. 

Fifth, plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against for filing administrative grievances while 

housed in ad seg. The undersigned addresses these claims separately herein. 

 After reviewing the pleadings, the undersigned has discovered that plaintiff was housed in 

three different ad seg units during the relevant time period.1From May 4, 2005, through 

November 14, 2005, plaintiff was housed in B Facility, Building 1. (Baker declaration, ¶ 7.) 

From November 14, 2005 through December 27, 2005, plaintiff was housed in B Facility, 

Building 2. (Id.) From December 27, 2005 through March 8, 2006, plaintiff was housed in A 

Facility, Building 5. (Id.) Plaintiff’s claims do not distinguish between these ad seg units. In the 

discussion of plaintiff’s claims herein, where relevant, the undersigned distinguishes between 

these different ad seg units. 

V. Plaintiff’s Exhibits 

Defendants filed objections to plaintiff’s voluminous exhibits. The undersigned has not 

considered all of these exhibits in evaluating defendants’ summary judgment motion, as many are 

not relevant. 

////

 

1

 Plaintiff alleges that he was held in the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) for 309 days. 

However, as discussed below, it is undisputed that plaintiff was housed in administrative 

segregation for that period of time. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 5 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Defendants objected to several of the exhibits the undersigned has considered on the 

grounds that they are not authenticated. The undersigned may consider exhibits that are not 

authenticated to the extent they are relevant because they could be made admissible at trial. See 

Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (evidence which could be made 

admissible at trial may be considered on summary judgment); see also Aholelei v. Hawaii Dep't 

of Pub. Safety, 220 Fed. Appx. 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2007) (district court abused its discretion in not 

considering plaintiff's evidence at summary judgment, “which consisted primarily of litigation 

and administrative documents involving another prisoner and letters from other prisoners” which 

evidence could be made admissible at trial through the other inmates' testimony at trial). 

 Accordingly, defendants’ objections to plaintiff’s exhibits on the grounds that they are not 

authenticated are overruled.

VI. Defendant Grannis 

 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Grannis violated his constitutional rights in connection 

with her processing of plaintiff’s administrative appeals. Defendant Grannis was the Chief of 

Inmate Appeals for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) at all 

relevant times. 

 Defendants argue that defendant Grannis should be granted summary judgment in the 

entirety because she did not review, and was not responsible for reviewing, any documents 

submitted by plaintiff. 

Plaintiff alleges that he made numerous requests to defendant Grannis to remedy problems 

of retaliation and harassment against him for filing grievances, all to no avail. (ECF No. 24 at 29-

30). Plaintiff also cites the May 26, 2006 Director’s Level Decision denying his grievance 

challenging his retention in ad seg. (Id. at 62-63.) 

The gravamen of plaintiff’s claims against defendant Grannis concern the denial of 

plaintiff’s Third Level Appeal grievance challenging his retention in ad seg and her responses, or 

lack of responses, to his letters alleging that he was being denied access to the courts. The 

December 7, 2012 supplemental findings and recommendations detailed plaintiff’s claims against 

defendant Grannis in connection with his claims alleging denial of access to the courts. (ECF No. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 6 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

84.) The undersigned finds that it is more appropriate to address plaintiff’s claims against 

defendant Grannis in the discussion of the individual claims herein. 

VII. Due Process 

 Plaintiff’s due process claim is made against defendants Kernan (CSP-Sac Warden), 

Walker (CSP-Sac Associate Warden), Grannis (Appeals Coordinator), O’Brian (former Appeals 

Coordinator) and Baxter (psychologist). (ECF No. 78 at 17.) 

 A. Legal Standard 

 Prisoners have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in remaining free from arbitrary 

segregation. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1986); Richardson v. 

Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2010). See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) 

(prisoner’s liberty interest protected by due process triggered by conditions demonstrating 

“atypical and significant hardship[s] ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”) 

The process constitutionally due to an inmate placed in segregated housing depends on 

whether the placement is inherently administrative or disciplinary. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1099. 

In the administrative context, due process requires that prison officials hold an informal 

nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated, inform the 

prisoner of the reasons, and allow the prisoner to present his views. Id. at 1100. A decision to 

segregate an inmate for administrative reasons must be supported by “some evidence,” id. at 

1105-06, and periodic review is necessary to maintain the segregated confinement, id. at 1101, 

quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983) (“administrative segregation may not be 

used as a pretext for indefinite commitment of an inmate”). The evidence relied upon must have 

“some indicia of reliability.” Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146, 1273–74 (N.D.Cal. 1995).2

 B. Undisputed Facts 

 On May 4, 2005, plaintiff appeared before the prison mental health committee for 

program review. (ECF No. 24 at 21 (plaintiff’s verified amended complaint).) On that date, the 

 

2

 In the summary judgment motion, defendants incorrectly argue that the “some evidence” 

requirement only applies to orders for disciplinary segregation. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 

F.2d 1080, 1104 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Shotwell v. Brandt, 2012 WL 6569402 at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

2012). 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 7 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

committee changed plaintiff’s level of participation in the mental-health program from Enhanced 

Outpatient Program (“EOP”) to Correctional Clinical Case Management System (“CCCMS”), 

which resulted in plaintiff’s release from the EOP housing unit. (Id.) As a result of this new 

classification, plaintiff was eligible for placement in the general population. (Id.) 

 On May 4, 2005, plaintiff asked the committee if he would have safety concerns in the 

general population, having come from the EOP. (Plaintiff’s deposition at 19-20.) In a related 

grievance, plaintiff explained his safety concerns. (ECF No. 24 at 78-80.) In the grievance, 

plaintiff wrote that while in the EOP program, he was told by several inmates that he would be 

stabbed or killed if he went into either of the “other two” general population facilities at CSP-Sac, 

i.e., B and C facilities. (Id. at 78-80; defendants’ Exhibit 1.) Plaintiff did not qualify for 

placement in A Facility because it was considered a “soft” yard, which housed inmates that would 

have safety concerns on any general population facility. (Walker declaration, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff’s 

case factors were not compatible with the inmates housed on the A Facility, so his placement 

there could have endangered other inmates. (Id.) Plaintiff requested that he be transferred to a 

prison in southern California so that he could be close to his mother. (Defendants’ Exhibit F.) 

 The mental health committee remanded plaintiff to administrative segregation pending an 

investigation into the safety concerns raised by plaintiff at the hearing. (Defendants’ Exhibit A.) 

The investigation was conducted by a non-defendant, Officer Smith. (Id.) 

 That same day, plaintiff was given a notice explaining the reason for his placement in ad 

seg. (Plaintiff’s deposition at 20-21; defendants’ Exhibit A (notice to plaintiff).) The notice 

indicates that plaintiff refused to sign it. (Defendants’ Exhibit A.) 

 None of the defendants sat on the May 4, 2005 mental health committee were responsible 

for placing plaintiff in ad seg on that date.3 (Defendants’ Exhibit F (document listing committee 

members).) 

 

3

 Plaintiff claims that defendants Kernan, Baxter and Walker were involved in the May 4, 2005 

decision to place him in ad seg. (ECF No. 171 at 10-11.) Plaintiff argues that these defendants 

were “trained and admitted to having knowledge in the CCR Classification Processes, and 

Segregation for the year 2004-2006.” (Id. at 10.) However, plaintiff has provided no evidence 

contradicting the evidence provided by defendants that no defendant was involved in the May 4, 

2005 mental health committee. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 8 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

 On May 11, 2005, defendants Kernan and Baxter participated in the committee reviewing 

plaintiff’s placement in ad seg. (Defendants’ Exhibit B.) The committee elected to retain 

plaintiff in ad seg because the investigation into plaintiff’s security concerns was not complete. 

(Id.) Defendant Walker signed the chrono from the May 11, 2005 hearing in place of defendant 

Kernan, because defendant Kernan was unavailable at the time it was issued. (Walker 

declaration, ¶ 8.) 

 On June 15, 2005, plaintiff appeared before the committee for review of his ad seg 

placement. (Defendants’ Exhibit C.) Defendants Walker and Baxter participated in this 

committee. (Id.) The committee elected to retain plaintiff in ad seg pending his transfer to either 

California State Prison-Lancaster or California State Prison-Corcoran. (Defendants’ Exhibit C.) 

 On September 14, 2005, plaintiff appeared before the committee for review of his ad seg 

placement. (Defendants’ Exhibit D.) Defendants Walker and Baxter participated in this 

committee. (Id.) The committee elected to retain plaintiff in ad seg pending his transfer. (Id.) 

 On December 14, 2005, plaintiff appeared before the committee for review of his ad seg 

placement. (Defendants’ Exhibit E.) Defendants Walker and Baxter participated in this 

committee. (Id.) The committee elected to retain plaintiff in ad seg pending his transfer. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff was transferred to CSP-LAC in March 2006. 

 Mental health staff sometimes sit on classification committees to provide custody staff 

with information pertaining to an inmate’s mental health treatment needs, and ability to 

participate in and understand the committee. (Walker declaration, ¶ 1.) While mental health staff 

have authority over inmates’ treatment decisions, such as whether an inmate qualifies for 

participation in the EOP mental health program, they lack authority over custodial decisions, such 

as whether to place an inmate in the ad seg unit or release him to the general population.4 (Id.) 

 

4

 Plaintiff argues that the statement in defendant Walker’s declaration, cited above, that mental 

health staff lack authority over custodial decisions does not demonstrate that defendant Baxter, a 

psychologist, did not participate in the decisions made at the committee hearings where his ad seg 

placement and retention were reviewed. Plaintiff suggests that a declaration by defendant Baxter 

is required to make this point. Defendant Walker, the Chief Deputy Warden at CSP-Sac, is 

qualified to provide evidence regarding the authority of mental health staff at classification 

committee hearings. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 9 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

 C. Analysis 

1. May 4, 2011 Hearing 

It is undisputed that no defendant participated in the May 4, 2011 initial decision to place 

plaintiff in ad seg. Therefore, plaintiff cannot state a due process claim against defendants based 

on the May 4, 2011 initial decision to place him in ad seg. Accordingly, defendants should be 

granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s due process claim regarding the May 4, 2011 hearing. 

 2. May 11, 2005, June 15, 2005, September 14, 2005, December 14, 2005 Hearings 

It is undisputed that plaintiff received periodic reviews of the initial decision to retain him 

in ad seg, at which time he was allowed to present his views. Accordingly, the undersigned finds 

no due process violation based on the frequency of the hearings and plaintiff’s ability to present 

his views. The gravamen of plaintiff’s due process claim is that he was not informed of the 

reasons for the decisions to retain him in ad seg and that the decisions to retain him in ad seg were 

not supported by some evidence. 

a. May 11, 2005 Hearing 

The undersigned first finds no due process violation at the May 11, 2005 hearing. The 

chrono from this hearing states that plaintiff was retained in ad seg because plaintiff’s safety 

concerns, expressed at the May 4, 2005 hearing, were still under investigation by Officer Smith. 

(Defendants’ Exhibit B.) The chrono indicates that plaintiff received notice of this reason to 

retain him in ad seg. (Id.) The undersigned finds that the pending investigation into the safety 

concerns expressed by plaintiff was sufficient grounds, i.e., “some evidence,” on which to retain 

plaintiff in ad seg. 

Defendants Kernan and Baxter are the only defendants who participated at this hearing. 

Accordingly, defendants Kernan and Baxter are entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiff’s 

claim that he was denied due process at the May 11, 2005 hearing. 

 b. June 15, 2005, September 14, 2005 and December 14, 2005 Hearings 

Was Defendant Walker’s Decision to Retain Plaintiff in Ad Seg Supported by Some 

Evidence? 

The undersigned next considers whether the decisions to retain plaintiff in ad seg made by 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 10 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

defendant Walker at the June 15, 2005, September 14, 2005, and December 14, 2005 hearings 

were supported by some evidence with indicia of reliability. According to defendant Walker, 

these committees decided to retain plaintiff in ad seg pending his transfer for the following 

reasons: 

17. Until the Administrative Segregation Overflow unit was 

relocated to A Facility in late 2006, A-Facility was considered a 

“soft” yard which housed inmates that would have safety concerns 

on any general population facility. These inmates had safety 

concerns similar to inmates housed in a Sensitive Needs Yard 

(SNY). Inmate Navarro did not request SNY placement and his 

case factors were not compatible with the inmates housed on A 

Facility, therefore his placement there could have endangered other 

inmates. 

18. I did not believe that Navarrro could be safely placed on either 

B or C Facility. B Facility housed Sureno gang members and 

associates, and other dangerous and violent inmates who often 

refused to program and consistently involved themselves in serious 

and violent incidents. As a result, B Facility was constantly subject 

to lockdowns and modified programs that restricted the outdoor 

exercise and programming opportunities. While CSP-Sacramento’s 

C Facility housed predominately general population inmates who 

were more compliant and programmed more consistently than those 

housed in B Facility, it also housed two rival gangs, the Nortenos 

and the Surenos, that were subservient to the Nuestra Familia, 

Northern Structure, and Mexican Mafia prison gangs. 

19. The Sureno are a disruptive group with a documented history 

of attacking other Surenos with R-suffixes (denoting a sexual 

commitment offense), a history of EOP treatment, and those that 

disassociate from the gang. Navarro had an R suffix on a prior 

commitment offense, a history of EOP treatment, and his 

association with the Southsiders (a.k.a. Surenos), according to the 

May 11, 20055 ICC chrono. Nortenos are a disruptive group with a 

documented history of attacking Surenos. Placing Navarro on 

either B or C Facility would have unnecessarily placed him at risk 

of attack. 

20. That the officer initially assigned to investigate the asserted 

safety concern found it not to be reliable does not show that no 

safety concern existed. That officer was assigned to A Facility’s 

EOP program, and may not have been familiar with the disruptive 

groups housed on B and C Facilities, or the dynamics within those 

groups. As CDW, determining which facility could safely house 

the inmates at CSP-Sacramento was a responsibility that I dealt 

with daily, and took seriously. I had extensive experience with the 

inmate groups on all three Facilities. Based on my experience, and 

the intelligence CDCR had developed concerning these groups, 

 

5

 Defendant Walker’s declaration mistakenly identifies the date of this chrono as May 11, 2011. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 11 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

placing Navarro on either B or C Facility would have unnecessarily 

placed him at risk of attack. 

(Walker declaration, ¶¶ 17-20.) 

 As discussed above, it is undisputed that plaintiff did not qualify for placement in A 

Facility. 

 According to defendant Walker, plaintiff did not qualify for placement on B or C Facility 

because 1) he associated with the Surenos; 2) the Surenos were known to attack other Surenos 

with R suffixes; and 3) the Surenos were known to attack other Surenos who had been in the EOP 

program. It is undisputed that plaintiff had been in the EOP program and had an R suffix. (See 

ECF No. 173 at 477 (chrono stating plaintiff has R suffix); ECF No. 172 at 100 (chrono stating 

that plaintiff had a sex offense.). 

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned finds that the issue as to whether plaintiff 

was affiliated with a prison gang, and whether defendant Walker actually relied on plaintiff’s 

gang affiliation to retain plaintiff in ad seg, are materially disputed facts. 

The undersigned first addresses the issue of whether defendant Walker relied on plaintiff’s 

gang affiliation to retain plaintiff in ad seg. Plaintiff argues that defendants’ claim that he was 

retained in ad seg because of his alleged gang affiliation appears to be an explanation made up 

“after the fact.” Plaintiff indicates that he did not know that he was retained in ad seg because of 

his alleged gang affiliation until he received defendants’ summary judgment motion. The 

undersigned finds support for this argument. 

The June 15, 2005, September 14, 2005, and December 14, 2005 chronos do not state why 

plaintiff was retained on ad seg. Instead, without further explanation, these chronos state that 

plaintiff was retained in ad seg after a review of plaintiff’s CDC 114D (i.e., the May 4, 2005 

notice placing plaintiff in ad seg), plaintiff’s central file, case factors and a thorough discussion 

with plaintiff. (Defendants’ Exhibits C, D, E.) None of these chronos say anything about 

plaintiff’s alleged gang affiliation or that plaintiff was retained in ad seg due to safety concerns. 

(Defendants’ Exhibits C, D, E.) These chronos do not reference the May 11, 2005 chrono stating 

that plaintiff told the committee that he was “Southside.” While the September 14, 2005 and 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 12 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

December 14, 2005 chronos state that plaintiff was retained on single cell and walk alone yard 

due to localized safety concerns, these chronos do not describe those safety concerns. 

(Defendants D, E.) In his declaration, defendant Walker does not state that he told plaintiff at 

these hearings that he was being retained in ad seg based on security concerns posed by his 

alleged gang affiliation. 

The June 15, 2005 chrono actually suggests that plaintiff may have been retained in ad seg 

for reasons other than his alleged gang status. The June 15, 2005 chrono states that Correctional 

Officer Smith’s report was complete and, based on that report, the committee believed that 

plaintiff had local safety issues and should be transferred to Lancaster or Corcoran. (Defendants’ 

Exhibit C.) This finding appears to contradict the statement by defendant Walker in his 

declaration that Officer Smith found no safety concern. Thus, the June 15, 2005 chrono suggests 

that plaintiff was retained in ad seg for reasons other than the statement in the May 11, 2005 

chrono that plaintiff had said he was gang affiliated. The undersigned also observes that the 

statements in the September 14, 2005 and December 14, 2005 chronos that plaintiff was retained 

on single cell and walk alone yard due to localized safety concerns mirror the language in the 

June 15, 2005 chrono that plaintiff was to be transferred based on local safety issues found by 

Officer Smith. The report by Officer Smith is not in the court file. 

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that whether defendant Walker 

relied on plaintiff’s alleged gang affiliation to retain him in ad seg is disputed. 

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned further finds that whether the May 11, 2005 

chrono was “some evidence” of plaintiff’s gang affiliation, with indicia of reliability, is a 

materially disputed fact. In relevant part, the chrono reports that plaintiff stated at this hearing, “I 

am with Southside.” (Defendants’ Exhibit B.) Defendants cite no other evidence supporting the 

finding that plaintiff was associated with the Sureno gang. 

Conversely, in his verified statement of undisputed facts, plaintiff states that “on May 4, 

2005 and all later related committee dates were [sic] instructed by plaintiff he was not a gang 

member or associate in any type or form and his family lives only in the southside of California, 

////

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 13 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

no northern California prisons.”6 (ECF No. 171 at 12.) The June 15, 2005 chrono states that 

plaintiff stated, “I want to go down south to be closer to my mother.” (Defendants’ Exhibit C.) 

In his opposition, plaintiff also cites a July 8, 2004 classification committee chrono, 

signed by defendant Walker, stating that plaintiff had no gang affiliations. (ECF No. 172 at 100.) 

The chronos from the June 15, 2005, September 14, 2005, and December 14, 2005 committee 

hearings all state that the committees reviewed plaintiff’s central file, which presumably 

contained this chrono. (Defendants’ Exhibits C, D, E.) Defendants do not explain how defendant 

Walker considered the July 8, 2004 chrono. 

Plaintiff’s allegations that he told the committees that he was not associated with any 

gang, that he wanted to go “down south” to be closer to his mother, the July 8, 2004 chrono 

stating that he was not gang affiliated, and the lack of any other evidence linking plaintiff to the 

Sureno gang, undermine the credibility of the statement in the May 11, 2005 chrono that plaintiff 

stated that he was associated with the Surenos. Based on this evidence, which plaintiff alleges 

defendant Walker had knowledge of, the undersigned finds that the May 11, 2005 chrono 

potentially lacked indicia of reliability. The evidence suggests that the statement in the May 11, 

2005 chrono that plaintiff was “southside” could also have meant to reflect plaintiff’s request to 

be housed near his mother rather than any alleged gang affiliation. 

 In his declaration, defendant Walker also states that in his experience, inmates sometimes 

deny having asserted a valid safety concern once they realize it will affect their housing. (Walker 

declaration, ¶ 16.) Defendant Walker states that prison policy dictates that safety and security 

take precedent over all other security concerns and, as part of plaintiff’s committee, he was 

responsible for determining whether a valid safety concern existed. (Id.) Defendant Walker may 

be suggesting that even if plaintiff later denied having told the May 11, 2005 committee that he 

was associated with a gang, defendant Walker was entitled to disregard this statement because 

 

6

Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed Facts is essentially an unverified declaration. To the extent that 

the facts stated therein are based on plaintiff’s personal knowledge, his testimony on those 

subjects could be presented in admissible form at trial, and, accordingly, it is considered here in 

determining the propriety of summary judgment. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 

(9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that, at the summary judgment phase, a court may consider evidence 

that is inadmissible in form, so long as its contents can be presented in admissible form at trial). 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 14 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

plaintiff may have disavowed it once he realized it would affect his housing. The problem with 

this argument is that, according to defendants, at the May 4, 2011 hearing plaintiff expressed 

concerns regarding his safety in the general population. Therefore, plaintiff appeared to be aware 

of his own safety issues and showed a willingness to express them. Defendants’ claim that 

plaintiff was willing to be housed in the general population regardless of safety concerns is 

inconsistent with plaintiff’s actions at the May 4, 2011 hearing. 

Defendants argue that “[t]he Constitution demands due process, not error-free decision 

making.” See Shotwell v. Brandt, 2012 WL 6569402 at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2012). In other words, 

defendants argue that even if the May 11, 2005 chrono mistakenly stated that plaintiff reported 

affiliation with the Sureno gang, they were entitled to rely on it in retaining plaintiff in ad seg. 

The undersigned agrees that reliance on information that later proves false may not violate due 

process if the information had indicia of reliability at the time the decision was made. However, 

for the reasons discussed above, the undersigned cannot find that the information relied on to 

retain plaintiff in ad seg necessarily had indicia of reliability at the times it was relied on by 

defendant Walker to justify his decisions to retain plaintiff in ad seg. 

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that defendant Walker should be 

denied summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s decisions to retain plaintiff in 

ad seg on June 15, 2005, September 14, 2005, and December 14, 2005 were not supported by 

some evidence in violation of plaintiff’s right to due process. 

Did Defendant Walker Provide Plaintiff with Adequate Notice of the Reasons Plaintiff 

Was Retained in Ad Seg?

 Defendant Walker claims that plaintiff was retained in ad seg on June 15, 2005, 

September 14, 2005, and December 14, 2005 based on safety concerns posed by plaintiff’s gang 

affiliation. Defendant Walker states that the finding that plaintiff was gang affiliated was based 

on the statement in the May 11, 2005 chrono that plaintiff told the committee that he was 

associated with the Surenos. 

 As discussed above, the June 15, 2005, September 14, 2005, and December 14, 2005 

chronos do not specifically state why plaintiff was retained in ad seg. The June 15, 2005 chrono 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 15 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

states that plaintiff should be transferred due to local safety issues, and the September 14, 2005 

and December 14, 2005 chronos state that plaintiff should be single-celled and placed on walk 

alone yard due to “localized safety” issues. However, these local safety issues are not explained. 

In his declaration, defendant Walker does not state that he told plaintiff at these hearings that he 

was being retained in ad seg based on security concerns posed by his alleged gang affiliation. At 

his deposition, plaintiff testified that he was not told at the committee hearings why he was being 

retained in ad seg other than being told it was for general security and safety reasons. 

 Citing plaintiff’s deposition transcript, defendants claim that plaintiff was told the reasons 

he was retained in ad seg. However, plaintiff testified that he was not told why he was being 

retained in ad seg other than based on general safety and security issues. (Plaintiff’s deposition at 

46: 20-46; 47: 1-8; 51: 23-25; 53: 24-25; 54: 1-7; 54: 24-25; 55: 1-22; 56: 17-25.) In other 

words, plaintiff did not testify that he was told that he was being housed in ad seg due to safety 

concerns raised by his gang affiliation. Plaintiff’s alleged gang affiliation was not discussed at 

the deposition. 

 While due process in the administrative segregation context does not require detailed 

written notice of the charges or even a written description of the reasons for placing the prisoner 

in administrative segregation, see Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100-01, the Supreme Court has held 

that the level of due process due prisoners before being placed in administrative segregation 

includes “some notice” of the charges. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983). In Taylor v. 

Rodriguez 238 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit held that the constitutional 

requirements for notice in administrative segregation should be similar to the notice requirement 

in disciplinary segregation, and should contain specific allegations of conduct of involvement 

with a prison gang, not merely vague, unspecific charges of being involved. Id. (“[a] hearing is 

not meaningful if a prisoner is given inadequate information about the basis of the charges against 

him. A prisoner should not ... have to guess what conduct forms the basis for the charges against 

him.”). 

 Defendants have not demonstrated that plaintiff received adequate notice of the reasons he 

was being retained in ad seg. At best, the record demonstrates that plaintiff was generally 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 16 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

informed that he was being retained for security and safety reasons. However, these vague, 

unspecific reasons did not adequately inform plaintiff of the reasons he was being retained. 

According to plaintiff’s deposition transcript and opposition, he did not know that he was being 

retained in ad seg based on an alleged gang affiliation until he received defendants’ summary 

judgment motion. If plaintiff was not informed that his retention was gang related at the 

committee hearings, then plaintiff did not receive adequate notice of the reasons for his retention 

in ad seg. For these reasons, defendant Walker should be denied summary judgment as to this 

claim. 

Defendant Baxter 

Defendant Baxter, a psychologist, attended the May 11, 2005, June 15, 2005, September 

14, 2005, and December 14, 2005 hearings. It is undisputed that defendant Baxter had no 

authority over the decision regarding whether to place plaintiff in the general population or to 

retain him in ad seg. On these grounds, defendants move for summary judgment as to defendant 

Baxter. 

 Because it is undisputed that defendant Baxter had no authority over the decision 

regarding whether to place plaintiff in the general population or retain him in ad seg, defendant 

Baxter should be granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s due process claims. 

Defendants O’Brian and Defendant Kernan 

Plaintiff alleges that his grievance challenging his retention in ad seg was improperly 

denied. Defendants O’Brian and Kernan participated in the second level denial of grievance no. 

05-1022, aka SAC 0502084, challenging plaintiff’s retention in ad seg. 

 In his declaration, defendant Walker states that he reviewed grievance 05-1022, aka SAC 

05-02084 in defendant Kernan’s place: 

I reviewed administrative appeal S-05-02084, attached at 

Defendants’ Exhibit H, in Warden Kernan’s place. I was 

responsible for conducting a supervisory review of the second level 

response prepared by a subordinate officer. 

Walker declaration, ¶ 27. 

////

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 17 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“Congress did not intend § 1983 

liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent.”); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (no 

affirmative link between the incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy 

demonstrating their authorization or approval of such misconduct). “A person ‘subjects’ another 

to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979) 

(no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 

438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978) (no liability where there is no evidence of personal participation), cert. 

denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of 

official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (complaint devoid of specific factual allegations of personal 

participation is insufficient). 

 Because defendant Kernan did not participate in the review of this grievance, the 

undersigned recommends that defendant Kernan be granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 18 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

claim that defendant Kernan’s review of this grievance violated his right to due process in 

connection with his retention in ad seg. 

 In his declaration, defendant O’Brian discusses grievance no. 05-1022, in relevant part, as 

follows,

1. I was employed by the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) as an Appeals Coordinator at California 

State Prison-Sacramento (CSP-Sacramento) from approximately 

2004 through 2008. 

2. Although I was assigned to CSP-Sacramento’s Appeals Office, I 

was not the only Appeals Coordinator employed there and I was not 

the only person responsible for processing the appeals. The 

Litigation Office, Inmate Trust Department, and the prison facilities 

that housed the inmates were separate from the Appeals Office, and 

I neither supervised, nor had authority over, the staff employed in 

those separate locations. 

**** 

18. I have reviewed the responses to appeal SAC-S-05002084. My 

response at the second level of review contains an inadvertent error: 

I indicated that I had considered the first-level interview when no 

such interview was conducted. When preparing appeal responses, I 

sometimes cut and pasted a prior response and used it as a template, 

and then edited it to address the situation. In preparing this 

response, I unintentionally erred and failed to delete the reference to 

the first level interview. I did, however, review the appeal packet 

and investigate the issues before preparing my response. Navarro 

could have submitted a request-for-interview form or return to the 

second level of review and request that the error be addressed. I do 

not recall him ever doing so. He also could have addressed this 

error in his appeal to the third level of review. 

  

23. Appeal SAC-05-4-2084. I have reviewed the documents at 

page 67-76 and 85-96 of the complaint (ECF No. 24) and pages 3-

7, 10-11, and 12-13 of Navarro’s Request for Judicial Notice (ECF 

No. 120-1.) Based on these documents, I am able to tell how I 

processed this appeal. This appeal, submitted on October 2, 2005, 

was initially stamped as received by the OT on October 4, 2005. In 

the Action Requested section, Navarro sought a transfer, and all 

documentation concerning his alleged hold status. I screened out 

the appeal on October 4, 2005, in accordance with prison 

regulations, because Navarro failed to attach documents from his 

last Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) action and his 

Classification Staff Representative (CSR) endorsement. Navarro 

resubmitted the appeal on approximately October 7, 2005, 

explaining that he did not have the necessary documents because he 

was not given them after the hearing. He did not indicate that he 

had ever sought the documents from a Correctional Counselor. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 19 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

Correctional Counselors are responsible for providing inmates 

copies of the documents after a classification hearing, and for 

providing inmates access to the Central File where these documents 

were kept. In accordance with CDCR policy, on October 14, 2005, 

I again screened out the appeal, and directed Navarro to request the 

documents from the Correctional Counselor. 

24. Navarro submitted a new appeal form on October 24, 2005, 

addressing the same issue and explaining that he had requested 

documents from Correctional Counselor Lynch, but was unable to 

resolve the issue. The OT stamped the appeal received on October 

25, 2005, and provided it to me for processing. I authorized the 

bypass of the informal-level of review, assigned the appeal to the 

Administrative Segregation Captain and Correctional Counselor II 

for the first-formal level of review, and gave the appeal packet to 

the OT for processing. I expected that the assigned reviewers 

would competently investigate and respond to the appeal and 

address any issues found to exist. Because this appeal concerned 

the timing of Navarro’s transfer and not the transfer decision itself, 

prison regulations did not dictate that the appeal bypass the firstformal level of review. On December 7, 2005, the first-formal level 

of response issued, granting the appeal in full, advising Navarro 

that he did not have any transfer holds, and that he was the second 

inmate on the list for transfer to California State Prison-Lancaster. 

25. Navarro appealed to the second level of review on December 

14, 2005, asserting that nothing had been granted because his 

transfer endorsement had expired on December 9, 2005, two days 

after the first-level response issued. The OT stamped the appeal as 

received on December 23, 2005 and provided it to me for 

processing. I assigned the appeal response to myself and the 

Warden for the second level of review, and I gave the appeal packet 

to the OT for processing. I conducted a thorough inquiry at the 

second level of review, despite the typographical error explained in 

paragraph 18, above. My response explained that Navarro still was 

endorsed for transfer, detailed the proceedings concerning his 

transfer, and provided him copies of all classification documents 

concerning the transfer decision. (See Compl. 87, 89-96, ECF No. 

24.) I advised Chief Deputy Warden Walker of my findings 

through my draft response, which he reviewed and approved. I had 

no authority to make Navarro’s transfer occur any sooner or move 

him out of the administrative segregation unit, and I could not 

predict the exact date of his transfer. I do not believe that there is 

any further relief he sought that I could have granted. I did not 

intentionally delay, or fail to properly process his appeal. 

(O’Brian declaration.) 

 Copies of the documents relevant to grievance no. 05-1022, aka SAC 0502084, are 

attached as defendants’ Exhibit H. After reviewing these documents, the undersigned finds that 

defendant O’Brian’s description of these documents is accurate. 

////

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 20 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

Ratification of an unconstitutional act by superiors after the fact will only support liability 

when the superiors’ past actions were the moving force behind the constitutional violation in the 

first place. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 884–885 (9th Cir. 1991). This court is unwilling 

to adopt a rule that anyone involved in adjudicating grievances after the fact is per se potentially 

liable under a ratification theory. However, this is not to say that persons involved in 

adjudicating administrative disputes, or persons to whom complaints are sometimes made, can 

never be liable. If, for example, a reviewing official’s rejections of administrative grievances can 

be construed as an automatic whitewash, which may have led other prison officials to have no 

concern of ever being reprimanded, a ratifying official may be liable for having put a defective 

policy in place. 

 The undersigned does not find that the processing or denial of grievance no. 05-1022 by 

defendant O’Brian violated plaintiff’s right to due process. There is no evidence that past actions 

by defendant O’Brian were the moving force behind the alleged deprivation, i.e., plaintiff’s 

continued retention in ad seg. The undersigned further finds that the denial of plaintiff’s second 

level grievance was not an “automatic whitewash” of the alleged deprivation, as evidenced by 

plaintiff being provided with the classification documents pertaining to his ad seg placement. If 

defendant O’Brian was attempting to “whitewash” the alleged deprivation, then plaintiff would 

not have been provided with these documents. Accordingly, for these reasons, the undersigned 

recommends that defendant O’Brian be granted summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s due 

process claims. 

Defendant Grannis

 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Grannis improperly denied grievance no. 05-1022 

challenging his retention in ad seg. 

It is undisputed that on May 26, 2006, plaintiff’s Third Level Appeal challenging his 

continued retention in ad seg, i.e., grievance no. 05-1022, was denied at the Third Level of 

Review. (ECF No. 172-1 at 209-10.) While the Third Level Response contains defendant 

Grannis’s name typed at the end, defendant Grannis did not sign the response. (Id. at 210.) 

Plaintiff’s appeal was denied as moot because he was no longer housed at CSP-Sac. (Id. at 209-

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 21 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

10). 

 Defendants move for summary judgment as to this claim on grounds that defendant 

Grannis did not review grievance no. 05-1022. In support of this argument, defendants make the 

following arguments. 

From the time plaintiff entered CDCR custody in 2004 until his transfer away from CSPSac in March 2006, plaintiff filed one grievance that was accepted for third level review: No. 05-

1022. (Voong declaration, ¶ 7.) 

 Defendant Grannis was employed by the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) as Chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch (“IAB”) from 2002 through her 

retirement in December 2009, and for three additional months was a retired annuitant. (Grannis 

Declaration, ¶ 1.) The IAB provides the third and final level of review in CDCR’s administrative 

grievance process. (Id. at ¶ 2.) In her declaration defendant Grannis goes on to state, in relevant 

part, 

4. Appeals Screening 

Approximately three IAB employees were responsible for screening 

appeals. They would review each appeal and determine whether to 

accept it for review, or screen it out (reject it) because it failed to 

comply with the prison regulations governing the appeal process 

(e.g., the appeal was untimely, lacked critical information, had not 

been processed at the lower-levels of review, or otherwise did not 

comply with prison regulations). 

5. Inmates sometimes claimed that the prison Appeals Coordinator 

would not properly process their appeals. When this occurred, the 

employee screening the appeal would conduct an inquiry to 

determine why the appeal was being rejected at the lower levels of 

review. Based on their findings, the appeal could be screened out, 

or forwarded for further processing. 

6. When a decision was made to screen out an appeal, a letter was 

prepared to notify the inmate of the screening decision. My 

signature typically was placed on the letter electronically because I 

was the Chief of the IAB. The presence of my signature of a 

screening letter does not indicate that I reviewed, assessed or even 

was aware of a screened-out appeal. I generally was not involved 

in the appeal-screening process at all. I did not directly supervise 

the employees responsible for screening appeals, I did not sign 

screening letters, and I did not review appeals at the screening stage 

except – on very rare occasions – when a screening question rose 

that could not be resolved by the screening employee’s direct 

supervisor. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 22 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

7. The IAB on average, received daily over one hundred appeals 

that were accepted for review. Although isolated screening errors 

may have occurred, I was not aware of any pervasive deficiencies 

in the appeal-screening process. 

8. Appeal Inquiry 

Each appeal that survived screening was assigned to one of 

approximately twenty Appeals Examiners for review. Appeals 

Examiners typically held the rank of Facility Captains – the highest 

ranking uniformed officer – and were assigned to handle appeals 

from a set number of specified institutions. This ensured that the 

Appeals Examiner was familiar with the institution, and any and 

institution-specific issues (e.g. an ongoing modified program). 

Appeals Examiners would review the allegations in the appeal, 

determine whether and what additional information was needed, 

obtain the necessary information, and prepare a written response. 

Although isolated errors may have occurred, I was not aware of any 

pervasive deficiencies in the appeal-inquiry response process. 

9. Appeal Decisions 

Appeals Examiners forwarded their draft responses to my office for 

review. I was unable to, and did not, personally review every 

response submitted to my office. At any given time, at least three 

people, including myself, were responsible for conducting the final 

review. My typed name was typically included on third-level 

decisions because I was the Chief of the IAB; it does not indicate 

that I investigated, reviewed, or even was aware of a particular 

appeal. 

10. Unless an appeal was assigned to me for review, I generally 

was not aware of its content. When I reviewed an appeal, I always 

assessed the Appeals Examiner’s written response to determine 

whether it satisfactorily addressed the issue the inmate raised. If I 

believed that the response missed an issue or did not fully flesh out 

all relevant facts, I returned it to the Appeals Examiner for further 

consideration. Once I was satisfied with the response, I signed “N. 

Grannis” above my typed name. 

11. Letters 

Inmates sometimes submitted letters to the IAB instead of formal 

appeals on a CDCR 602 form. When this occurred, the letters were 

processed in accordance with the procedures outlined above: the 

letter was date stamped and forwarded for screening, the screening 

employee could issue a screening letter directing the inmate to 

submit a formal 602 or could forward the letter to the Appeals 

Examiner for further processing; and any response would undergo a 

final review. 

12. Inmate Mario Luis Navarro (V-31698) 

I was not responsible for screening out or otherwise rejecting 

inmate Navarro’s appeals or letters. I have reviewed appeals No. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 23 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

051022 (SAC-05-02084). As is indicated by the absence of my 

signature on this document, I had no substantive role in processing 

this appeal, and I was not responsible for any of the response. 

13. I have never taken any adverse action against an inmate for 

filing an administrative appeal or lawsuit. I never caused inmate 

Navarros’s appeals to be delayed, screened out, denied, or 

improperly processed because he had filed appeals. 

14. I was not employed at California State Prison, Sacramento 

during Navarro’s incarceration there in 2005 and 2006 and I neither 

supervised, nor had authority over, the staff employed there. I was 

not responsible for the fact or continuation of Navarros’ 

administrative segregation placement; his access to religious 

services, his legal property, his trust account statement, or the 

prison library; and I was not responsible for the physical conditions 

of his confinement. And I do not recall ever being informed that 

Navarro was seeking review, through the appeals process or 

otherwise. 

(Grannis Declaration, ¶¶ 4-14.) 

 Defendants have presented evidence that defendant Grannis had no substantive role in the 

processing of the grievance filed by plaintiff regarding his continued retention in ad seg. Plaintiff 

has provided no evidence demonstrating that defendant Grannis participated in the processing of 

this grievance. 

 Because defendant Grannis did not participate in the processing of plaintiff’s grievance 

challenging his continued retention in ad seg, defendant Grannis should be granted summary 

judgment as to this claim. 

 3. Qualified Immunity 

As discussed above, the undersigned recommends that all defendants except for defendant 

Walker be granted summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s due process claim. Accordingly, 

the undersigned considers defendants’ argument for qualified immunity with respect to defendant 

Walker only. 

 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Resolving the defense of 

qualified immunity involves a two-step process; the court must determine (1) whether the plaintiff 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 24 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

has alleged or shown a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was 

clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001)). These steps may be analyzed in any order. Id. at 

236.

 “Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly 

established constitutional right.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. To be clearly established “[t]he 

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 

what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 

“[E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011); see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 906 

(9th Cir. 2002) (“The proper inquiry focuses on...whether the state of the law [at the relevant 

time] gave ‘fair warning’ to the officials that their conduct was unconstitutional.”) (quoting 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). 

 First, for the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that defendant Walker 

potentially violated plaintiff’s right to due process because the decisions to retain plaintiff in ad 

seg were not supported by some evidence. Whether defendant Walker actually relied on 

plaintiff’s self-proclaimed gang affiliation, contained in the May 11, 2005 chrono, to justify 

plaintiff’ retention is not clear. Moreover, to the extent defendant Walker relied on the May 11, 

2005 chrono as proof of plaintiff’s gang affiliation, this chrono lacked indicia of reliability. The 

undersigned further finds, for the reasons discussed above, that defendant Walker potentially 

violated plaintiff’s right to due process by not giving plaintiff adequate notice of the reasons he 

was retained in ad seg. 

It is difficult to evaluate the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis with respect 

to plaintiff’s due process claim because it is not clear why defendant Walker retained plaintiff in 

ad seg. However, to the extent defendant Walker relied on the May 11, 2005 chrono, for the 

reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that a reasonable prison official would have 

potentially known that this chrono lacked indicia of reliability with respect to plaintiff’s alleged 

gang affiliation. Thus, a reasonable officer would have known that relying on this chrono alone to 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 25 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

retain plaintiff in ad seg violated plaintiff’s right to due process. 

With respect to plaintiff’s claim alleging that defendant Walker did not give him adequate 

notice of the reasons he was detained in ad seg, the undersigned finds that a reasonable prison 

official would know that only telling an inmate that he was being in retained in ad seg, month 

after month, based on unspecified “security concerns” violated due process. 

For these reasons, defendant Walker should not be granted qualified immunity. 

VIII. Eighth Amendment 

Plaintiff alleges that the fact and continuation of his ad seg detention violated the Eighth 

Amendment. This claim is made against defendants Kernan, Walker, Grannis, O’Brian and 

Baxter. (ECF No. 78 at 18.) Plaintiff also alleges that the physical conditions of ad seg violated 

the Eighth Amendment. This claim is made against defendants Kernan, Walker, Grannis, 

O’Brian, Baxter, Baker and Sclafani. (Id.) 

 A. Retention in Ad Seg 

 The findings and recommendations addressing defendants’ motion to dismiss described

this claim as follows: 

Plaintiff, a designated participant in CSP-Sac’s Mental Health 

Program, spent nearly a year in segregated housing waiting for 

transfer to another institution. The Supreme Court recently 

addressed problems associated with this confluence of factors: 

This shortfall of resources relative to demand contributes to 

significant delays in treatment. Mentally ill prisoners are 

housed in administrative segregation while awaiting transfer 

to scarce mental health treatment beds for appropriate care. 

One correctional officer indicated that he had kept mentally 

ill prisoners in segregation for “6 months or more.” 

[Citation omitted.] Other prisoners awaiting care are held in 

tiny, phone booth sized cages. The record documents 

instances of prisoners committing suicide while awaiting 

treatment. 

Brown v. Plata, S. Ct. 1910, 1933 (May 23, 2011.) Both the fact of 

plaintiff’s protracted isolation, and the physical conditions of his 

confinement, warrant further inquiry. 

(ECF No. 78 at 19.) 

 In the summary judgment motion, defendants first argue that plaintiff has repeatedly 

asserted that he was “incorrectly labeled” with mental illness, and that his diagnoses were mere 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 26 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

pretext. (ECF No. 165-1 at 25.) Thus, defendants argue, any theory that plaintiff’s mental health 

diagnoses precluded his placement in ad seg should not preclude summary judgment. (Id.) 

 While plaintiff claims that he did not suffer from any mental illness, it is undisputed that 

he was in the EOP Program and then transferred to the CCCMS program. While plaintiff alleges 

that he did not suffer from mental illness, the evidence suggests otherwise. 

 Defendants next argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to this claim because 

there is no evidence that plaintiff’s purported mental illness presented a substantially serious risk 

that could be exacerbated because of his ad seg placement. 

 As noted above, plaintiff was classified as “CCCMS” while he was housed in ad seg. 

“The Correctional Clinical Case Management System (CCCMS) provides mental health services 

to seriously mentally ill inmates with ‘stable functioning in the general population, 

Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU) or Security Housing Unit (SHU)’ whose mental health 

symptoms are under control or in ‘partial remission as a result of treatment.’” Coleman v. Brown, 

28 F.Supp.3d 1068, 1074 (E.D.Cal. 2014) (citations omitted). “CCCMS is the lowest level of 

care in the State’s prison mental health delivery system, and is designed to provide a level of care 

equivalent to that received by non-incarcerated patients through outpatient psychiatric treatment.” 

Lemire v. CDCR, 726 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013). 

 To succeed on a claim that his retention in ad seg violated his Eighth Amendment rights 

based on his mental illness, plaintiff must demonstrate some harm to his mental illness. See 

Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1995.) For example, plaintiff could 

demonstrate that his mental illness decompensated while he was housed in ad seg. In the instant 

case, plaintiff has not demonstrated that his incarceration in ad seg caused any harm to his mental 

illness. For this reason, defendants should be granted summary judgment as to this claim.7

 

7

 In Coleman v. Brown, 28 F.Supp.3d 1068, 1099 (E.D. 2004), the district court held that the 

placement of seriously mentally ill inmates in ad seg for non-disciplinary reasons for more than a 

minimal period necessary to effect a transfer violates the Eighth Amendment. This holding was 

based on a finding regarding CDCR policy and involved a claim for injunctive relief only. This 

holding does not apply to individual cases for money damages. In other words, mentally ill 

prisoners alleging Eighth Amendment claims for money damages based on extended 

incarceration in ad seg must still prove injury. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 27 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

 B. Conditions of Ad Seg

 Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment claim based on the conditions of ad seg against 

defendants Kernan, Walker, Grannis, O’Brian, Baxter, Baker and Sclafani. Plaintiff alleges the 

following specific conditions that allegedly violated the Eighth Amendment: 1) inadequate 

lighting in his cell; 2) inadequate ventilation, which made it hot in the summer and cold in the 

winter; 3) his toilet and sink leaked, causing unsanitary puddles of water; 4) inadequate access to 

outdoor exercise; 5) inadequate access to clean clothing and clean linen; 6) no hot water in the 

cell; 7) inadequate access to cleaning supplies; and 8) inadequate food. 

 The undersigned observes that defendants do not generally argue that the conditions in ad 

seg did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Instead, defendants generally argue that they were not 

responsible for any alleged deprivation. 

 The undersigned again observes that it is undisputed that plaintiff was housed in different 

ad seg units during the relevant time period. Plaintiff was housed in B Facility, Building 1, from 

May 4, 2005, through November 14, 2005. (Baker declaration, ¶ 7.) On November 14, 2005, 

plaintiff was transferred to B Facility, Building 2. (Id.) On December 27, 2005, plaintiff was 

transferred to A Facility, Building 5, where he remained until his March 8, 2006 transfer. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff’s complaints regarding the conditions in ad seg do not appear to distinguish 

between these different ad seg units. Thus, it appears that plaintiff is arguing that he suffered all 

of the alleged Eighth Amendment violations in each of the ad seg units in which he was housed. 

 1. Legal Standard 

 The Eighth Amendment proscribes conditions of confinement constituting cruel and 

unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

imposes duties on prison officials to “provide humane conditions of confinement.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a 

prisoner must show that he was objectively deprived of something “sufficiently serious.” Id. at 

834. A deprivation is sufficiently serious when the prison official’s act or omission results “in the 

denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id., quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Next, the prisoner must show that the deprivation occurred as a result 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 28 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

of deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety; this determination is premised on an 

assessment of the prison official’s subjective state of mind. Id., citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 

294, 302-03 (1991). 

 A prison official who knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or 

safety demonstrates deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, “the 

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.” Id. However, an official that 

knows of a substantial risk to an inmate’s health or safety but acts reasonably under the 

circumstances will not be held liable under the cruel and unusual punishment clause, even if the 

threatened harm results. See id. at 843. 

 2. Defendant Grannis 

 Plaintiff bases defendant Grannis’s liability for his Eighth Amendment claim challenging 

the conditions in ad seg on her processing of grievance no. 05-1022, which was denied at the third 

level review. Defendants argue that defendant Grannis should be granted summary judgment 

because she did not know about the alleged conditions of ad seg. 

 As discussed above, defendants have presented undisputed evidence that from the time 

plaintiff entered CDCR custody in 2004 until his transfer away from CSP-Sac in March 2006, 

plaintiff filed one grievance that was accepted for third level review: No. 05-1022. (Voong 

declaration, ¶ 7.) While the memorandum denying this grievance at the third level of review 

contains defendant Grannis’s name typed at the end, defendant Grannis did not sign the response. 

(ECF No. 172-1 at 209-10.) In her declaration, defendant Grannis states that she had no 

substantive role in the processing of this appeal, and was not responsible for any of the response. 

(Id. at ¶ 12.) 

 Defendants have presented evidence that defendant Grannis had no substantive role in the 

processing of grievance no. 05-1022. Plaintiff has provided no evidence demonstrating that 

defendant Grannis participated in the processing of this grievance or otherwise had knowledge of 

the conditions of ad seg. For these reasons, defendant Grannis should be granted summary 

judgment as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim challenging the conditions of ad seg. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 29 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

 3. Defendant Baxter 

 Defendants argue that defendant Baxter, the psychologist who participated at the 

committee hearings reviewing plaintiff’s retention in ad seg, should be granted summary 

judgment as to Eighth Amendment claim challenging the conditions of ad seg. Defendants argue 

that defendant Baxter had no authority over the conditions in ad seg. In support of this claim, 

defendants cite defendant Walker’s declaration which states, in relevant part, 

11. Mental health staff sometimes sit on ICC committees to 

provide custody staff with information pertaining to the inmate’s 

mental health treatment needs, and ability to participate in and 

understand the committee. While mental health staff have authority 

over inmates’ treatment decisions, such as whether an inmate 

qualifies for participation in the EOP mental health program, they 

lack any authority over custodial decisions, such as whether to 

place an inmate in the ASU or release him to the general 

population. Mental health staff also lack responsibility for or 

authority over the day-to-day conditions in the ASU, and are not 

responsible for the due process protections provided in connection 

with the hearing. 

(Walker declaration, ¶ 11.) 

 Defendants have presented evidence that defendant Baxter had no authority over the 

conditions in ad seg, and plaintiff has presented no evidence contradicting this evidence. Because 

defendant Baxter had no authority over the conditions in ad seg, she cannot be liable for any of 

the unconstitutional conditions that allegedly existed while plaintiff was confined in ad seg. 

Accordingly, defendant Baxter should be granted summary judgment as to this claim. 

 4. Defendant Kernan 

 Defendants move for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim 

against defendant Kernan, the Warden, on the grounds that plaintiff did not inform defendant 

Kernan of any ad seg conditions, except law library access. In support of this argument, 

defendants cite defendant Walker’s declaration which states, in relevant part, 

I reviewed administrative appeal S-05-02084, attached at 

Defendants’ Exhibit H, in Warden Kernan’s place. I was 

responsible for conducting a supervisory review of the second level 

response prepared by a subordinate officer. 

Walker declaration, ¶ 27. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 30 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

 Defendants also cite plaintiff’s deposition testimony at pages 32-34 and 92. 

At page 92 of his deposition, plaintiff testified that, “—basically, from the beginning 

when I saw Kernan, I told him that I need my legal property...” (Plaintiff’s deposition at 92.) At 

page 33, plaintiff testified that he asked defendant Kernan if he could get his legal property. (Id. 

at 33.) From this testimony, defendants infer that when plaintiff saw defendant Kernan, he only 

asked defendant Kernan about his legal property, and raised no other conditions of confinement. 

In his opposition, citing his deposition testimony, plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly gave 

defendant Kernan notice of the alleged Eighth Amendment violations. (ECF 171 at 17.) The 

undersigned has reviewed the deposition testimony cited by plaintiff. At his deposition, plaintiff 

testified that he told defendant Kernan about the inadequate conditions in ad seg when defendant 

Kernan walked the ad seg tiers. At page 84-85, plaintiff testified, 

Q: All right. How about in terms of the defendants that you named 

in this lawsuit –Baker, Baxter, Grannis, Kernan, O’Brian, Sclafani 

and Walker --- which of those defendants were responsible for 

clothing and bedding – 

A: I told them – 

Q: --providing you clothing and bedding? 

A: I told them at each committee how it was, and I’m –since 

Kukrall was there during the committees and Mr. Walker, the 

defendant Walker, I’m thinking he’s –he’s the one that can fix it. 

Like, if I’m going – in this environment when there’s a problem 

you go to the top and he will fix it; usually a captain or lieutenant 

and in some cases a sergeant. 

But the CO’s, unless they get direct orders, they won’t fix it unless 

some paper pushes it; so I brought I directly to Mr. Walker. I wish I 

had told – there was Mr. Kernan. He did walk the tiers once in a 

while. That was a surprising thing about him. He used to walk the 

tiers, and I did see him on five occasions, and a lot of people, not 

just me, they were hollering for him and referencing the things that 

we were being subject to back there. So he’s aware of it too. 

(Plaintiff’s deposition at 84-85 (emphasis added).) 

 Plaintiff also testified that he gave defendant Kernan a grievance alleging that he was not 

receiving yard access: 

I was given this, and these –I gave this to the warden. I gave this to 

Grannis. I gave it to Walker. I sent it to Kernan, and he was shown 

this when he walked the tier one day. My neighbors were there 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 31 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

when I gave it to him, ... 

(Plaintiff’s deposition at 89-90.) 

 The undersigned agrees with defendants that defendant Kernan did not receive notice of 

the at-issue conditions in ad seg from grievance S-05-02084 because he did not participate in the 

review of this grievance. However, the undersigned does not find that the other evidence cited by 

defendants, i.e., plaintiff’s deposition transcript, demonstrates that plaintiff did not make 

defendant Kernan aware of the at-issue conditions in ad seg. 

 At his deposition, plaintiff clearly testified that he handed defendant Kernan a grievance 

alleging inadequate outdoor exercise when defendant Kernan “walked the tier one day.” 

Plaintiff’s testimony that he and other inmates shouted out their concerns regarding ad seg 

conditions to defendant Kernan on another occasion as he walked the tier is less persuasive 

evidence of defendant Kernan’s knowledge of the ad seg conditions.8

 Nevertheless, the 

undersigned finds that plaintiff’s deposition testimony cited above is sufficient to create a 

materially disputed fact regarding whether defendant Kernan had knowledge of the at-issue 

conditions in all three of the ad seg units in which plaintiff was confined. Accordingly, defendant 

Kernan should be denied summary judgment as to this claim. 

 5. Defendant Walker 

 Defendants argue that defendant Walker should be granted summary judgment as to 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim challenging the conditions of ad seg on the grounds that he 

did not deliberately disregard any condition of confinement. Defendants argue that defendant 

Walker consistently relied on his staff, whom he trusted and believed to be capable and 

competent, to investigate and respond to any complaints. 

 In support of their argument that defendant Walker did not act with deliberate 

indifference, defendants cite the following sections of defendant Walker’s declaration: 

21. As CDW [i.e., Chief Deputy Warden] I generally was not 

responsible for the direct supervision of inmates. Rather, I 

 

8

 In his declaration, quoted below, defendant Walker states that “it was not uncommon for 

inmates to yell out to me with their concerns when I walked through the housing unit.” (Walker 

declaration, ¶ 23.) 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 32 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33

supervised the high ranking officials responsible for supervising the 

correctional staff who ran the housing units. Whenever I became 

aware that an employee under my supervision was not performing 

their required or expected duties, or needed additional training or 

supervision, I promptly took corrective action. While isolated 

issues occurred, I did not allow any pervasive or ongoing problems 

to continue uncorrected. 

22. As with any environment where people are held against their 

will, inmates sometimes complained about the conditions of 

confinement or the officers responsible for their supervision. I 

never knowingly disregarded any complaint. But if I personally 

reviewed, investigated or handled every complaint, I would not 

have had time to perform my duties as CDW. Thus, I typically 

delegated the review, investigation and response to subordinate 

staff. 

23. Inmates sometimes voiced their concerns to me in person, 

through the administrative appeal process, or in writing. It was not 

uncommon for inmates to yell out to me with their concerns when I 

walked through the housing unit. I always would delegate an 

investigation of any significant concerns to building staff. 

24. At committee hearings, inmates sometimes presented me with 

letters addressing their concerns or directly addressed their 

concerns. I relied on the Sergeant or Correctional Counselor in 

attendance at the committee to investigate and address the concern. 

The chronos attached at Defendants’ Exhibit C through E indicate 

that Sergeant Kukrall, Correctional Counselor Lynch, and 

Correctional Counselor Forrester sat on Navarro’s ICC hearings 

with me. In my experience, these officials were capable, 

experienced, and competently performed their duties. I trusted 

them to investigate the issues brought to my attention, and relied on 

them to do so. Further, I assumed that if the inmate was unhappy 

with the result of the investigation, he would file an administrative 

appeal. I regularly informed inmates that they should do so. 

(Walker declaration, ¶¶ 21-22.) 

 In essence, defendant Walker argues that it was not his job to personally investigate 

inmate complaints regarding ad seg conditions. Defendant Walker states that it was the job of 

other prison officials he supervised, which apparently included other members of plaintiff’s 

classification committee, i.e., Sergeant Kurkrall, Correctional Counselor Lunch and Correctional 

Counselor Forrester, to investigate inmate complaints regarding conditions of confinement. 

Defendant Walker states that if an inmate was unhappy with the results of an investigation, they 

could file an administrative grievance. 

////

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 33 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

 At his deposition, plaintiff testified that he complained about ad seg conditions at the June 

15, 2005, September 14, 2005, and December 14, 2005 committees.9

 Plaintiff also testified that 

he handed defendant Walker a grievance alleging that he was not receiving adequate outdoor 

exercise. (Plaintiff’s deposition at 89.) 

 “In a § 1983 or a Bivens action – where masters do not answer for the torts of their 

servants – the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each 

Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own 

misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). A supervisor may be liable under 

Section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) 

a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation. See Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Starr v. Baca, 

652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). Supervisor liability is established by showing the 

supervisor’s knowing acquiescence to Eighth Amendment violations that are based upon 

deliberate indifference. See Oregon State University Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 

1074-75 & n.18 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 While defendant Walker may have delegated the authority to review plaintiff’s complaints 

regarding the ad seg conditions to other prison officials he supervised, plaintiff alleges that he 

 

9

 At his deposition, plaintiff testified that at the June 15, 2005 classification hearing, he told the 

committee about the conditions in ad seg: “I told them my property issues. I told them how the 

custody – how they were not letting me out to yard. I told them many grievance issues – no 

clothing. All kinds of different issues with this.” (Plaintiff’s deposition at 48.) Plaintiff also 

testified that at the September 15, 2005 classification hearing, he told the committee about the 

conditions in ad seg: 

I presented many issues to them and that I was very upset that I was not being provided 

answers and pretty much I had told them all kinds of other issues related to my 

environment there: not having [m]y legal property, using the phone, exercise yard, and all 

kinds of –aside from the administrative process, many, many things I told them. I think it 

was like a – a good ten minutes I sat in there. I elaborated on facts. I didn’t just sit there. 

(Id. at 50.) 

 Plaintiff testified that after he told the committee about the conditions in ad seg, defendant 

Walker told plaintiff that he, plaintiff, would be transferred soon. (Id. at 51.) Plaintiff testified 

that, “[Walker] told his sergeant that was there – I think that was Kukrall. Kukrall. He was there, 

and I thought that I would get some things fixed since he was there at that time.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

also testified that at “each committee,” he “mentioned” the “filthy conditions, where I wasn’t 

given clothing. It was freezing or hot. I wasn’t being provided yard.” (Id. at 71; 84.) 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 34 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

repeatedly complained about the alleged Eighth Amendment violations at the June 15, 2005, 

September 14, 2005, and December 15, 2005 committee hearings. Plaintiff’s complaints at the 

September 14, 2005, and December 15, 2005 committee hearings suggested that the prison 

officials who defendant Walker supervised had not responded to plaintiff’s complaints. Based on 

plaintiff’s repeated complaints, the record suggests that defendant Walker knowingly acquiesced 

to the alleged Eighth Amendment violations. Based on these circumstances, the undersigned 

cannot find that defendant Walker did not act with deliberate indifference when plaintiff 

repeatedly complained about the conditions in ad seg. 

Defendant Walker suggests that he did not act with deliberate indifference to any 

complaint by plaintiff regarding the conditions in ad seg because he knew that plaintiff could file 

an administrative grievance regarding ad seg conditions if he felt that his complaints were not 

adequately investigated. That administrative remedies were available to plaintiff does not 

demonstrate that defendant Walker’s failure to respond to plaintiff’s alleged repeated complaints 

regarding ad seg conditions did not constitute deliberate indifference.10 

 For the reasons discussed above, defendant Walker should be denied summary judgment 

as to plaintiff’s claim alleging Eighth Amendment violations in all three of the ad seg units in 

 

10

 Plaintiff filed a grievance challenging the conditions in ad seg. (See Defendants’ Exhibit G, 

grievance no. 05-2214.) On March 22, 2006, defendant Walker reviewed the second level 

grievance. (Id.) Defendant Walker’s response suggested knowledge of some of the conditions of 

which plaintiff complained. In his memorandum, defendant Walker described the summary of 

plaintiff’s appeal, 

You are appealing the living conditions in the B Facility 

Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU) 2 Block Overflow, where 

you contend you and other inmates have been deprived of linen and 

blanket exchange, unit temperature being too cold, no hot water in 

the cell, and not having access to the Law Library. 

It should be noted that Correctional Sergeant Baker addressed your 

concerns at the First Level Response. At that time, a portion of 

your appeal was granted. In addition you are now informed that 

you and other inmates were removed from the B Facility ASU 

overflow, which made our appeal issues null and void. B Facility 

ASU had limited and restricted programs to yard and library and 

with the deactivation of the unit, your appeal issues were 

eliminated. 

(Id.) (emphasis added.) 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 35 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

which he was housed. 

 6. Defendant Baker 

It is undisputed that defendant Baker was assigned only to B Facility, Building 2, where 

plaintiff was housed from November 17, 2005, through December 27, 2005. (Baker declaration 

at ¶ 7.) In his response to grievance no. 05-2214, defendant Walker described this housing unit as 

“2 Block Overflow.” (Defendants’ Exhibit G.) It is undisputed that defendant Baker worked as 

Administrative Segregation/Overflow Sergeant in B Facility, Building 2. (Baker declaration, ¶ 

1.) 

 Defendants move for summary judgment as to defendant Baker on the grounds that she 

did not knowingly disregard any risk to plaintiff. In her declaration, defendant Baker describes 

her duties as the Administrative Segregation/Overflow Sergeant: 

As ASU Sergeant, I worked Thursday through Monday, with 

Tuesdays and Wednesdays off. I was not directly responsible [for] 

supervising the inmates; that was the role of the assigned 

correctional officers. My duties included supervising the 

correctional officers assigned to Building 2, keeping records and 

preparing reports and resolving issues brought to my attention by 

subordinate officers. When I became aware, on isolated occasions, 

that an officer was derelict in his duties, that ASU procedures were 

not being followed (e.g., searches for contraband were not being 

conducted or a blanket exchange was overdue), or that an officer 

needed assistance resolving an issue, I promptly investigated and 

took corrective action. 

(Baker declaration, ¶ 3.) 

 The undersigned herein addresses plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against defendant 

Baker as to each of the alleged Eighth Amendment violations. 

Blanket, Cell and Water Temperature 

Defendants argue that defendant Baker promptly responded to plaintiff’s living-conditions 

grievance no. 05-2214, investigated and took corrective action. In relevant part, this grievance 

addressed plaintiff’s claims alleging that his cell was cold and his cell had no hot water, and his 

claim alleging that he did not have a clean blanket. 

////

////

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 36 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37

 In her declaration, defendant Baker addresses her response to grievance no. 05-2214: 

10. I have reviewed administrative appeal No. SAC-S-05-02214, at 

Defendants’ Exhibit G. On December 12, 2005, I was assigned to 

investigate and respond to this appeal at the first-formal level for 

review. Navarro raised four issues: 1) that there had been no 

blanket exchange for over seven months; 2) the cell temperatures 

were too cold; 3) the in-cell water was not hot; and 4) ASU inmates 

did not receive weekly law-library access unless they were eligible 

for Preferred Legal User (PLU) status, and despite numerous 

requests for library access, Navarro had not been able to attend. I 

completed my investigation and the first-formal level response by 

December 19, 2005, well before the deadline I was given, and I did 

not disregard any unacceptable condition of confinement of which I 

was aware. 

11. Blanket Exchange. Prison operational procedure directed that 

blankets be exchanged for laundering every six months, during the 

winter months. Navarro, who had been housed in the building only 

since November 14 (six days before the earliest date the grievance 

appears to have been submitted), asserted that the blanket exchange 

was overdue. Because approximately 75 inmates were housed in 

Building 2, 150 blankets were needed to complete the exchange. I 

promptly contacted Laundry, but was informed that they did not 

have sufficient blankets in stock to complete the exchange. I did 

not have direct authority over Laundry, but I granted the relief 

within my control by drafting a memorandum notifying Laundry 

that blankets were needed to conduct the exchange. On December 

21, 2005, nine days after the Navarro appeal had been assigned to 

me, the blanket exchange was completed. 

12. Cell Air & Water Temperature. Each ASU cell contains an 

air vent and a sink. I requested that the prison Maintenance 

Department conduct temperature readings in Navarro’s cell. On 

Friday, December 16, 2005, a Maintenance Department employee 

determined that the vent blowing air into Navarrro’s cell registered 

at 78 degrees and the sink’s hot-water temperature registered at 90 

degrees. Both of these temperatures were within the standard 

housing unit temperature guidelines. I was not responsible for 

establishing the guidelines, and I had no reason to believe 

temperatures that fell within the guidelines were unsafe. 

13. Custody staff could not adjust the in-cell temperature. It is my 

understanding that all water-temperature controls were located in 

the boiler room, outside the facility. I did not have authority to, nor 

did I know how to, adjust the water temperature myself. I also 

never turned off the hot water supply to the cells, and I was not 

aware of any custody staff doing so. Water temperatures were the 

responsibility of the Maintenance Department. When I was alerted 

to water-temperature complaints, I contacted the Maintenance 

Department. 

14. Inmates sometimes complained about the air temperatures in 

their cells. When this occurred, I either filled out a work-order 

notifying the Maintenance Department, directed that a subordinate 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 37 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

38

officer do so, or notified the Maintenance Department myself. I 

lacked authority to make adjustments to the ventilation system 

myself, and I never did so. I also was not aware of any custody 

staff doing so. Sometimes a change in the in-cell temperature was 

caused by a number of inmates who impeded the air flow into their 

cells by covering the vents with wet paper. This redirected the air 

to cells with unblocked vents and, when enough vents were 

covered, affected the temperature in the unblocked cells. When this 

happened, I would have officers walk the tiers and direct the 

offending inmates to remove the paper. 

(Baker Declaration, ¶¶ 10-14.) 

 In his opposition, plaintiff does not dispute that he received a clean blanket as a result of 

defendant Baker’s investigation. The undersigned finds that defendant Baker’s response to 

plaintiff’s grievance alleging that he required a clean blanket did not demonstrate deliberate 

indifference. Defendant Baker did not disregard plaintiff’s concerns and responded reasonably. 

 The undersigned next considers plaintiff’s claim alleging that defendant Baker 

disregarded his complaints that his cell was cold. At his deposition, plaintiff testified that even 

though the tests indicated that heat was blowing in through the air vent, it was still cold. 

(Plaintiff’s deposition at 79.) Plaintiff testified that “The building was built below the earth at 

least about waist high. So the walls were always moist with water and – back there.” (Id. at 77.) 

He also testified, 

To me the air was turned on cold in the winter time. They were not 

providing no extra blankets. All the COs were wearing thick 

jackets, scarves. Back then I think they let them wear scarves, but 

they were wearing beanies and everything, mitts sometimes. And 

me, I was in boxers. 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff’s testimony that the guards wore thick jackets, scarves, beanies and mittens is 

inconsistent with the finding that the air temperature going into plaintiff’s cell was 78 degrees. 

This deposition testimony is sufficient to create a factual dispute regarding whether the air in 

plaintiff’s cell was unconstitutionally cold. While the undersigned acknowledges that the 

temperature in plaintiff’s cell may be different from the temperature outside of his cell, the 

difference in temperatures alleged by plaintiff and defendants is so stark that they cannot be 

reasonably reconciled. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 38 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

39

 Turning to the issue of defendant Baker’s state of mind, it is undisputed that defendant 

Baker responded to plaintiff’s grievance alleging that his cell was cold by sending out a 

maintenance worker, who then measured the temperature of air going into plaintiff’s cell at 78 

degrees. If the air going into plaintiff’s cell was 78 degrees and if, as plaintiff alleges, the guards 

outside his cell were wearing heavy jackets, etc., then there was clearly something wrong with the 

ventilation, lending credence to plaintiff’s claim. Because defendant Baker was the unit Sergeant, 

then it is reasonable to infer that she had knowledge of or was able to see the clothing the officers 

working in her unit were wearing. For these reasons, the undersigned cannot determine whether 

defendant Baker acted with deliberate indifference when she relied solely on the 78 degree 

temperature measured by the maintenance department to find that plaintiff’s cell was adequately 

warm. Accordingly, defendant Baker should be denied summary judgment as to this claim. 

 Turning to plaintiff’s claim that his cell lacked hot water, plaintiff does not dispute that 

the temperature of the water in his cell was measured at 90 degrees. At his deposition, plaintiff 

testified that he thought the reason that there was no hot water in his cell was because guards 

turned the hot water off to the cells to punish the inmates for complaining. (Id. at 80.) 

Apparently this action could explain why his cell water could be warm on the day it was tested by 

maintenance, but cold on other days. Plaintiff has no proof that any defendant was involved in 

turning off the hot water to his cell. (Id. at 81.) 

 In her declaration, defendant Baker stated that she had no knowledge of custody staff 

turning down the water temperature. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that defendant Baker 

had knowledge that custody staff turned down the water temperature. Unlike plaintiff’s claim 

alleging that his cell was cold, plaintiff has presented no evidence suggesting that defendant 

Baker had reason to doubt the water temperature measured by maintenance. For these reasons, 

the undersigned finds that defendant Baker did not act with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s 

complaints that his cell lacked hot water. Accordingly, defendant Baker should be granted 

summary judgment as to this claim. 

////

////

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 39 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40

Leaks

 The undersigned next considers plaintiff’s claim that his cell toilet and sink leaked while 

he was housed in B facility, Building 2. In her declaration, defendant Baker states, in relevant 

part, 

27. Leaks. Building 2 occasionally had leaks, either because of 

temporary plumbing issues or moisture seeping through the 

concrete structure. I do not recall being made aware of any leaks in 

Navarro’s cell. However, when I became aware of leaks, I made 

sure Maintenance was notified and provided notice up my chain of 

command. I always followed this procedure. 

(Baker declaration, ¶ 27.) 

 In his opposition, plaintiff provides no evidence that defendant Baker had knowledge of 

any leak in his cell while he was housed in B Facility, Building 2. Accordingly, the undersigned 

finds no evidence of deliberate indifference by defendant Baker with respect to alleged leaks in 

plaintiff’s cell. On this ground, defendant Baker should be granted summary judgment as to this 

claim. 

Cleaning Supplies, Clean Clothing and Linen

 The undersigned next considers plaintiff’s claim that he was denied adequate cleaning 

supplies and clean linen and clothing while housed in B Facility, Building 2. In her declaration, 

defendant Baker states, in relevant part, 

29. Cleaning supplies & Laundry exchange. Upon assignment 

to the ASU, inmates were typically provided a kit containing toilet 

paper, soap, toothpowder (powdered toothpaste), forms, and 

cleaning supplies. The ASU had schedules for the laundering of 

clothing and linens, and for providing basic hygiene and cleaning 

supplies to inmates. I was not directly responsible for providing the 

supplies or conducting the laundry exchange. Whenever I became 

aware that the established schedules were not being adhered to, I 

promptly took action to correct the situation. 

(Baker declaration, ¶ 29.) 

 Attached to plaintiff’s opposition as exhibits are logs showing the days on which plaintiff 

received a cell inspection, exercise, showers, supplies, clothing, meals, and trash disposal. These 

logs show that from November 17, 2005, through December 27, 2005, plaintiff received 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 40 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

41

“supplies” on November 20, 2005, November 27, 2005, December 4, 2005, and December 18, 

2005. (ECF No. 173 at 88-93.) The log form states, “Cleaning and personal hygiene supplies 

shall be offered on a weekly basis to all inmates and provided on an as-needed basis.” (Id.) 

In a verified declaration filed in support of his opposition, plaintiff observes that the form 

does not state what supplies were provided. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff states that he was not given 

adequate toilet paper. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he was frequently forced, “for weeks, to use my 

uncovered hand to clean myself after using the toilet, because toilet paper was not provided ‘as 

needed.’” (Id.) 

 In her declaration, defendant Baker states that her duties included “keeping records and 

preparing reports.” (Baker declaration, ¶ 3.) Defendant Baker does not address whether her 

record keeping duties included reviewing the logs described above. However, it is not 

unreasonable to infer that defendant Baker’s record keeping duties as well as her duties of 

supervising the correctional officers in the unit included review of these logs. 

The logs indicate that plaintiff was given “supplies” on an almost weekly basis while 

housed in B Facility, Building 2. While plaintiff alleges that he was not given adequate cleaning 

supplies and toilet paper, he has provided no evidence that defendant Baker was made aware that 

he did not receive adequate supplies. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that to the extent 

defendant Baker reviewed the logs regarding supplies, they contained no evidence that plaintiff 

was not receiving adequate cleaning and personal hygiene supplies. Accordingly, defendant 

Baker should be granted summary judgment as to this claim. 

Regarding linen exchange, the log form states, in relevant part, ”Clothing will be issued 

upon assignment and exchanged and laundered not less than every other week. Towels, sheets 

and pillow cases will be laundered not less than once every (2) weeks.” (ECF No. 173 at 88.) 

The ad seg logs show that plaintiff did not receive “linens” for the entire time he was housed in B 

Facility, Building 2. (Id. at 88-92.) 

 Prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to be provided with clean clothing and clean 

linen on a regular basis. Toussaint v. Rushen, 553 F.Supp. 1365, 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1983.) The 

undersigned finds that plaintiff’s alleged failure to receive clean bedding and linen for the 40 days 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 41 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

42

he was housed in B Facility, Building 2 potentially violated the Eighth Amendment. Because the 

record suggests that defendant Baker reviewed the logs containing the information regarding 

linen exchange, defendant Baker is not entitled to summary judgment as to this claim.11

Outdoor Exercise

 The undersigned next considers plaintiff’s claim that he was denied adequate exercise 

while housed in B Facility, Building 2. 

 There are two requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation based on prison 

conditions: (1) the deprivation must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the defendant 

must have acted or failed to act with deliberate indifferent to a substantial risk to the prisoner’s 

health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 836. 

“’[O]rdinarily the lack of outdoor exercise for extended periods is a sufficiently serious 

deprivation’ for Eighth Amendment purposes.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir.

2010) (quoting LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit has not 

specified exactly how much exercise time passes constitutional muster, though it has found 45 

minutes per week insufficient, Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 1994), and agreed that 

two hours per week was enough, Pierce v. Cty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In her declaration, defendant Baker addresses plaintiff’s claim alleging inadequate access 

to outdoor exercise: 

22. Outdoor Yard. My role in Building 2’s outdoor-exercise 

program was limited. I believe that the Facility Captain set the yard 

schedule, which designated the day and time for each yard group to 

attend the outdoor yard. The ICC assigned each inmate to a 

particular yard assignment (i.e., a particular walk-alone or 

compatible group or yard). The building correctional officers 

escorted the inmates to yard in accordance with their scheduled 

yard assignment. Inmates could decline to attend yard if they did 

not want to go. While I monitored yard release to ensure that the 

officers properly escorted the inmates, in accordance with ASU 

procedures, I was not directly responsible for escorting the inmates, 

or for determining who would be escorted. It was my 

understanding that the exercise schedule was being adhered to. I do 

not recall knowing that Navarro was not receiving the yard time. 

Whenever an inmate complained of an ongoing denial of yard time, 

 

11

 At his deposition, plaintiff testified that when defendant Baker interviewed him in his cell 

regarding his grievance, “my clothes were just filthy.” (Plaintiff’s deposition at 72.) 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 42 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

43

I investigated by talking to the building officers. I did not know 

that the amount of yard time offered to Navarro put him at a 

sufficiently serious risk of harm. 

(Baker declaration, ¶ 22.) 

 In her declaration, defendant Baker states that she was not responsible for escorting 

inmates to the yard, although she monitored the yard release to ensure that the officers were 

properly escorting the inmates. Defendant Baker states that she does not recall that plaintiff was 

not receiving yard time. 

Attached to plaintiff’s opposition are logs showing that, while he was housed in B 

Facility, Building 2, he received exercise on November 24, 2005, November 25, 2005, November 

29, 2005, December 6, 2005, and December 8, 2005. (ECF No. 173 at 89-92). The logs show 

that plaintiff refused yard on November 29, 2005. (Id. at 90.) At his deposition, plaintiff testified 

that the entries indicating that he refused yard were false. He also alleges that he received 

outdoor exercise on only one occasion while housed in B Facility, Building 2. 

Once again, it is not unreasonable to infer that defendant Baker’s record keeping duties, as 

well as her duty to supervise the correctional officers working in the unit, included reviewing 

these logs. 

Assuming that the logs are accurate, they reflect that plaintiff may have received 

constitutionally adequate exercise during the first part of his stay in B Facility, Building 2, but 

inadequate exercise during the second part of his stay. Assuming defendant Baker reviewed these 

logs, the undersigned cannot find that she is entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim 

alleging inadequate outdoor exercise. 

 In addition, the undersigned observes that in response to plaintiff’s grievance alleging 

inadequate yard time in B Facility, Building 2, defendant Walker stated that “B Facility ASU had 

limited and restricted programs to yard...” (Defendants’ Exhibit G.) It is unclear what defendant 

Walker meant by “limited and restricted” yard programs. However, it is reasonable to infer that 

defendant Baker, as the unit Sergeant, had knowledge of the “limited and restricted” yard 

program in her unit. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 43 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

44

Spoiled Food

 At his deposition, plaintiff clarified his claim regarding inadequate food. Plaintiff testified 

that he was served spoiled meat “[o]n a couple of occasions,” that made him ill. (Plaintiff’s 

deposition at 90.) Plaintiff also testified that the lunch meat he was given was “real bad.” (Id. at 

91.) Plaintiff testified that because he did not have access to the canteen, he could not supplement 

his diet when he received bad meat. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that he told “the sergeant” about the 

bad meat, referring to defendant Baker. (Id. at 91.) 

Defendants argue that defendant Baker was not responsible for plaintiff’s receipt of bad 

food. Defendants cite defendant Baker’s declaration which states, 

ASU inmates were served food prepared on another facility by 

persons outside the ASU. The individual meals were prepackaged 

and plated on a tray or placed in a lunch bag before being delivered 

on a cart to Building 2. The building officers were responsible only 

for delivering the meals to the inmates through the tray slot in the 

cell door. As a Correctional Sergeant, I was not directly 

responsible for delivering food, and I was not aware of any problem 

with the food or food service. 

(Baker declaration, ¶ 21.) 

 Based on plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the undersigned finds that whether defendant 

Baker had knowledge that plaintiff received bad or rotten meat, or did anything to address that 

issue, are disputed material facts. Accordingly, defendant Baker should be denied summary 

judgment as to this claim. 

Lighting

 Defendants do not address plaintiff’s claim against defendant Baker that his cell did not 

have adequate lighting.12 Accordingly, defendant Baker is not entitled to summary judgment as 

 

12

 Adequate lighting is one of the “fundamental attributes of ‘adequate shelter’ required by the 

Eighth Amendment.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996). Inmates are required 

to have “a minimum level of illumination in jails so that normal activities of life may be 

conducted. See, e.g., Martino v. Carey, 563 F.Supp. 984, 1000 (D.Or. 1983) (collecting 

illumination cases). Courts have found lighting conditions to be inadequate if they cause inmates 

to suffer health problems, including headaches, eye strain, and fatigue. See Hoptowit v. 

Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985). In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that the 

inadequate lighting exacerbated his impaired vision that was already damaged. (ECF No. 24 at 

32.) 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 44 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

45

to plaintiff’s claim that his cell was not adequately lit. 

 7. Defendant Sclafani

Neither party has clarified in which of the three ad seg units where plaintiff was housed

defendant Sclafani, a correctional officer, worked. In his declaration, defendant Sclafani states 

that he worked in the ad seg unit at CSP-Sac, but does not identify the particular unit. (Sclafani 

declaration, ¶ 1.) In his deposition, plaintiff testified that defendant Sclafani was “one of the 

regular custody officers that worked in the building that I was – or actually the block B2.” 

(Plaintiff’s deposition at 72.) Based on this testimony, the undersigned finds that defendant 

Sclafani worked in Facility B, Building 2, where plaintiff was housed from November 17, 2005,

to December 27, 2005. This finding is supported by defendant Baker’s statement in her 

declaration that she supervised defendant Sclafani. (Baker declaration, ¶ 9.) Accordingly, the 

undersigned’s analysis of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Sclafani is 

limited to the time plaintiff spent in Facility B, Building 2.13 

 To the extent defendant Sclafani worked in the other at-issue ad seg units in which 

plaintiff was housed, defendants’ summary judgment motion is denied. Given defendants’ failure 

to clearly specify the ad seg units defendant Sclafani worked in, and the voluminous record, the 

undersigned is not willing to evaluate claims which may or may not exist. 

 Defendants move for summary judgment as to defendant Sclafani on the grounds that he 

did not knowingly disregard any risk to plaintiff. 

 Cleaning Supplies, Clean Clothes and Linen

 With respect to cleaning supplies, clothing and linen exchange, defendant Sclafani states 

in his declaration, in relevant part: 

19. Cleaning supplies, Clothing, and Linen Exchange. Upon 

assignment to the ASU, inmates were typically provided a kit 

containing cleaning and hygiene supplies (toilet paper, soap, tooth 

powder, cleaning supplies, etc.) and request forms. The ASU 

building officers were responsible for passing out cleaning and 

 

13 In the statement of undisputed facts, defendants indicate that defendant Sclafani may have 

worked in B Facility, Building 1, where plaintiff was housed from May 4, 2005, to November 14, 

2005. However, the undersigned can find no evidence indicating that defendant Sclafani actually 

worked in B Facility, Building 1 during this time. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 45 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

46

hygiene supplies and conducting the clothing and linen exchange in 

accordance with a set building schedule. At one point, inmates 

were responsible for the supply line. When I learned that there 

were distribution problems and that some inmates were not 

receiving equal supply rations, I revamped the process and prepared 

the supply bags for the building officers to distribute to the inmates. 

While isolated errors may have occurred, I never became aware of 

any significant deficiency, much less any deficiency sufficient to 

pose a risk of harm to any ASU inmate. 

20. Correctional officers also were responsible for conducting 

laundry exchange for linens and clothing. The ASU schedule 

divided these duties between the second and third watch officers. 

Third watch officers were responsible for conducting clothing 

exchange. Inmates who did not have clothes to exchange could still 

be provided clean clothes. While isolated errors may have 

occurred, I was not aware of any ongoing deficiency in the clothing 

exchange process, much less any deficiency sufficient to pose a risk 

of harm to any ASU inmate. 

21. Second watch officers were responsible for exchanging linens 

on Tuesdays. While isolated errors may have occurred, I was not 

aware of any ongoing deficiency in the linen exchange process, 

much less any deficiency sufficient to pose a risk of harm to any 

ASU inmate. 

Sclafani declaration, ¶¶ 19-21.

 At his deposition, plaintiff testified that he “referred his concerns” to defendant Sclafani 

regarding “toilet paper, soap, toothpaste, anything.” (Plaintiff’s deposition at 72.) Plaintiff went 

on to testify that defendant Sclafani “didn’t do anything” after plaintiff expressed his concerns to 

him. (Id. at 74.) 

 Based on plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the undersigned finds that whether defendant 

Sclafani provided plaintiff with adequate cleaning and hygiene supplies is materially disputed. 

Accordingly, defendant Sclafani should be denied summary judgment as to this claim. 

 Defendants argue that defendant Sclafani should be granted summary judgment as to 

plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive adequate clean clothing and linen.14 As discussed above, 

plaintiff presented logs indicating that he did not receive any clean clothes or linen while he was 

 

14

 Defendants argue that plaintiff has identified only two days when defendant Sclafani was 

responsible for linen exchange and the exchange did not occur: September 5, and November 22, 

2005. (ECF No. 165-2 at 12 (Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts No. 71).) As discussed 

above, it does not appear that defendant Sclafani was employed in the ad seg unit where plaintiff 

was housed on those dates. Accordingly, the undersigned will not address this issue further. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 46 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

47

housed in B Facility, Building 2 from November 17, 2005, to December 27, 2005. It is 

undisputed that correctional officers, like defendant Sclafani, were responsible for conducting the 

laundry exchange. (Sclafani declaration, ¶ 20.) In his declaration, defendant Sclafani states that 

he was not aware of any deficiency in the laundry exchange process. (Id. ¶ 20-21.) 

While plaintiff did not specifically testify at his deposition that he told defendant Sclafani 

that he was not receiving clean clothes and clean linen, he testified that he made him aware of his 

concerns regarding the conditions in ad seg: “So I got at him – you know, referred my concerns 

to him many times: toilet paper, soap, toothpaste, anything.” (Plaintiff’s deposition at 72.) 

Plaintiff also testified that defendant Sclafani did not respond to his concerns: 

Q: Now, in terms of – in terms of officers complying. So he was a 

correctional officer assigned to the administrative segregation unit 

and you expressed your concerns to him and you felt like he didn’t 

do enough to address those concerns? 

A: Who did you mean by saying “him”? 

Q: Officer Sclafani. 

A: Oh yeah, he didn’t do anything. I told her that. 

(Id. at 74.) 

From plaintiff’s deposition testimony, it is reasonable to infer that plaintiff made 

defendant Sclafani aware of his complaints regarding the conditions in ad seg, including the lack 

of clean linen and clean clothes. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that whether defendant 

Sclafani had knowledge of plaintiff’s failure to receive clean linen and clean clothes is a 

materially disputed fact. Therefore, defendant Sclafani should be denied summary judgment as to 

this claim. 

Inadequate Lighting and Leaks 

With respect to inadequate lighting, defendant Sclafani states in his declaration, 

“Whenever I became aware that the lighting in a cell was too dim, I relayed that information up 

the chain of command so that a work order could be submitted to correct the problem.” (Sclafani 

declaration, ¶ 25.) With respect to plaintiff’s claim that his cell contained leaks, defendant 

Sclafani states in his declaration, “On occasion, I became aware of leaks in the building. When 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 47 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

48

this occurred, I provided notice up the chain of command so that the Maintenance Department 

could be notified and fix the problem. I was not responsible for fixing the leak myself.” (Id. at 

12.) 

 Plaintiff has provided no evidence that defendant Sclafani failed to provide notice of his 

complaints regarding inadequate lighting and leaks up the chain of command. Plaintiff has 

provided no evidence, for example, that he repeatedly complained to defendant Sclafani regarding 

these conditions, which would suggest that defendant Sclafani did not report his complaints. For 

these reasons, the undersigned finds that there is no evidence that defendant Sclafani acted with 

deliberate indifference with respect to these conditions. Accordingly, defendant Sclafani should 

be granted summary judgment as to these claims. 

Cell and Water Temperature

 With respect to plaintiff’s claims alleging that his cell was cold and lacked hot water, 

defendant Sclafani states, 

8. Cell Air and Water Temperatures. Heating and air 

conditioning was supplied to the ASU cells through a centralized 

system that vented directly into each cell. I had no authority to 

change the temperature settings, and I never did. When I received 

complaints concerning cell temperature, I would convey the 

complaint up my chain of command, so that the Maintenance 

Department could be contacted to address the problem. ASU 

inmates sometimes regulated cell temperature by blocking their cell 

vents with toilet paper. This threw the heating and air system off 

by forcing excess air into the cells with unblocked vents. 

Whenever I was aware that this was occurring I, or another officer, 

went to cell and directed the inmates to unblock the vents. I never 

believed the in-cell temperatures to pose any risk of harm to inmate 

Navarro, and I never knowingly disregarded his complaint 

concerning the temperature of his cell. 

9. The hot water supply controls for the showers and cells were 

separate. I lacked the authority or ability to adjust the water 

temperature in the ASU cells; this was the responsibility of the 

Maintenance Department. I did not have the authority to turn off 

the hot-water supply to a cell, and I never did so. I did not know 

the in-cell water temperature to pose any risk to inmates in the 

ASU. 

** ** 

11. When problems arose involving the temperatures in the ASU 

cells, the officers were required to either correct the problem (i.e. 

direct inmates to uncover the vents), or report the problem up the 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 48 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

49

chain of command so that it could be addressed. I always did so. 

(Sclafani declaration, ¶¶ 8, 9, 11.) 

 As discussed above, whether plaintiff’s cell was unconstitutionally cold is a disputed 

material fact. With regard to defendant Sclafani’s mental state, at his deposition, plaintiff 

testified that he told defendant Sclafani “numerous times” that there was no heat in his cell. 

(Plaintiff’s deposition at 76.) While plaintiff has presented no direct evidence that defendant 

Sclafani failed to convey his complaints “up the chain of command,” as defendant Sclafani states 

was his practice, plaintiff’s claim that he told defendant Sclafani “numerous times” that his cell 

was cold suggests that defendant Sclafani may not have conveyed plaintiff’s concerns. For these 

reasons, the undersigned finds that whether defendant Sclafani responded to plaintiff’s complaints 

regarding the temperature of his cell is a materially disputed fact. Therefore, defendant Sclafani 

should not be granted summary judgment as to this claim. 

With respect to plaintiff’s claim that his cell lacked hot water, as discussed above, 

plaintiff’s cell water temperature was measured at 90 degrees. At his deposition, plaintiff 

testified that correctional staff tampered with the water temperatures to punish inmates for 

complaining, which would explain why his water temperature would measure 90 degrees on the 

day it was measured, i.e., correctional staff were not tampering with it on that day. Plaintiff has 

presented no evidence disputing defendants’ evidence that defendant Sclafani had no control over 

the cell water temperature, i.e., he did not tamper with it. Based on this evidence, the undersigned 

finds that plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendant Sclafani violated his Eighth Amendment 

rights with respect to the temperature of the water in his cell. 

Outdoor Exercise

With respect to plaintiff’s claim alleging inadequate outdoor exercise, defendant Sclafani 

states in his declaration, 

Yard time was divided into separate sessions. The classification 

committees assigned each inmate to either a walk-alone (individual) 

or a compatible group yard assignment, and a master list which 

directed which inmates were assigned to each outdoor-yard session. 

I was not responsible for creating this list. The Control Booth 

Operator typically retained the list and directed the building officers 

to escort particular inmates for safety reasons, to ensure that two 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 49 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

50

incompatible inmates would not be escorted at the same time. Any 

available building officer could be assigned [to] escort any inmate 

on a given day. Inmates could, and sometimes did, refuse to attend 

yard. Approximately three times a month, when the regular Control 

Booth Operator was absent and a relief officer was filling in, the 

ASU building officers would run the yard program. I never 

knowingly failed to offer to escort Navarro to his assigned yard 

session when it was my responsibility to do so. I also never denied 

Navarro access to the exercise yard because of any administrative 

appeal or lawsuit filed. As a Correctional Officer, I was required to 

report any complaints that an inmate was not receiving his 

scheduled yard up the chain of command so that it could be 

addressed. I took this duty seriously, and never failed to report any 

yard deprivation of which I was aware. 

(Sclafani declaration, ¶ 15.) 

 As discussed above, the logs indicate that plaintiff may not have received adequate 

outdoor exercise while housed in B Facility, Building 2. The record contains no evidence 

regarding why plaintiff failed to receive adequate exercise. However, defendant Walker’s 

response to plaintiff’s second level grievance no. 05-2214 states that B Facility had a “limited and 

restricted” yard program, suggesting that plaintiff’s failure to receive adequate yard time was 

based on a policy. (Defendants’ Exhibit G.) In his declaration, defendant Sclafani states that it 

was not his responsibility to schedule inmates for yard sessions. He also states that he never 

knowingly failed to escort plaintiff to the yard when it was his responsibility to do so. Plaintiff 

has provided no evidence demonstrating that defendant Sclafani was responsible for his failure to 

receive yard time. 

Because defendants have presented unopposed evidence that defendant Sclafani was not 

responsible for plaintiff’s failure to receive yard time, the undersigned recommends that 

defendant Sclafani be granted summary judgment with respect to this claim. 

Spoiled Food

Regarding plaintiff’s claim alleging that he received spoiled food, defendant Sclafani 

states, 

ASU inmates were served food prepared on another facility by 

persons outside the ASU. Individual meals were prepackaged and 

either put on a tray or into a lunch bag before delivery to the 

building. The building officers, including myself, were responsible 

for delivering the meals through the tray slot in the cell door. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 50 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

51

Although isolated issues arose, I was not aware of any pervasive 

problems with the food or the food service, and I never knowingly 

delivered an unsafe or nutritionally unsafe meal. 

(Sclafani declaration, ¶ 14.) 

At his deposition, plaintiff testified that he told defendant Sclafani about the spoiled food. 

(Plaintiff’s deposition at 92.) In his opposition, plaintiff also states that when he received the 

spoiled food from defendant Sclafani, he showed the food each time to defendant Sclafani. (ECF 

No. 171 at 24.) Plaintiff alleges that in response, defendant Sclafani told him that there was 

nothing else, take it or leave it. (Id.) Based on these statements, the undersigned finds that 

whether defendant Sclafani had knowledge that plaintiff was receiving spoiled food is a 

materially disputed fact. Accordingly, defendant Sclafani should be denied summary judgment as 

to this claim. 

8. Defendant O’Brian 

 Regarding his Eighth Amendment claims, plaintiff alleges that defendant O’Brian failed 

to respond to grievance no. 05-2214 which challenged the conditions in ad seg. Plaintiff also 

alleges that defendant O’Brian ignored his requests for interviews. 

Defendants argue that defendant O’Brian is entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment claims challenging the conditions of ad seg on the grounds that she did not 

have authority over the conditions in ad seg. Defendants also argue that defendant O’Brian 

alerted supervisory staff whenever she became aware of an issue that required staff intervention. 

Defendants further argue that defendant O’Brian was not aware of plaintiff’s repeated requests for 

interviews. In support of these arguments, defendants cite defendant O’Brian’s declaration which 

states, in relevant part, 

17. Inmates could, and often, submit request-for-interview slips 

requesting the status of their appeals, including whether they had 

been logged and received. The [Office Technician] generally was 

responsible for responding to these requests, without my assistance 

or oversight. However, on occasions, these requests were given to 

me for response. 

20. I was not assigned to the facility where inmate Navarro was 

housed, and I was not directly responsible for his confinement 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 51 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

52

conditions or his requests for access to his property, the law library, 

inmate trust records, or the services of religious advisors. I also did 

not supervise the staff in Navarro’s assigned building, or those 

officers in departments other than the Appeals Office. Although 

some errors inevitably occurred in the processing of appeals, I was 

not aware of any pervasive deficiencies in the processing of 

appeals. 

**** 

26. Appeal SAC-S-05-2214. I have reviewed the documents 

comprising defendants’ Exhibit G, and pages 59-77 of Navarro’s 

Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 120-1). Based on these 

documents, I am able to tell how I processed this appeal. This 

appeal, originally submitted as a group appeal on November 30, 

2005, sought: 1) clean blankets to be issued; 2) a higher thermostat 

temperature; 3) hot water in the cells; and 4) weekly law library 

access for all administrative segregation unit inmates. On 

November 29, 2005, I screened out this appeal in compliance with 

the appeal regulations, because it did not contain the names, 

signatures, CDCR number, and housing information for the other 

inmates who sought to be included in the appeal, and did not 

document the cells lacking hot water or the dates that requests had 

been made to staff. Navarro corrected the deficiencies and 

resubmitted the appeal for review on December 1, 2005. The OT 

stamped and dated the appeal as received on approximately 

December 6, 2005, and provided to me for processing. I allowed the 

appeal to bypass the informal level of review and assigned it to 

facility, where Sergeant Baker and the Facility Captain conducted 

the review. 

27. The first level response, dated December 22, 2005, stated that 

the blanket-exchange process had been started, the Maintenance 

Department had investigated and verified that the cell air and water 

temperatures were within correctional guidelines, and that a process 

had been instituted to provide increased library access. It appears 

that the OT sent the appeal packet out to Navarro but that it was 

returned to the Appeals Office before reaching him, because the OT 

stamped the appeal as being received again on January 9, 2006, and 

updated the response date to indicate it was provided to Navarro on 

January 13, 2006. I was not responsible for this delay. 

28. Navarro appealed to the second level of review on January 29, 

200[6 ] and the OT stamped the appeal as received on February 1, 

200[6]. The appeal was given to me for processing and I assigned 

it to the facility for review at the second level, and returned it to the 

OT for processing. The appeal was misfiled until the error was 

discovered on February 25, 200[6]. I did not cause this delay, and I 

was not aware of it at the time. Because Navarro had transferred 

out of the institution, the reviewer interviewed inmate Young (E65018) in his place. Inmate Young withdrew the appeal because 

the complained-of-conditions no longer existed. 

29. While I processed this appeal, I was not assigned to or 

responsible for addressing the substantive issues. I expected that 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 52 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

53

the assigned reviewers would competently investigate and 

respon[d] to the appeal, and address any issues found to exist, and I 

did not intentionally delay, or fail to properly process this appeal. 

(O’Brian declaration, ¶¶ 17, 20, 26-29.) 

 Plaintiff has provided no evidence demonstrating that defendant O’Brian intentionally 

ignored a request for interview slip plaintiff submitted regarding the ad seg conditions. 

 The undersigned next considers defendant O’Brian’s processing of grievance 05-2214. 

As discussed above, ratification of an unconstitutional act by superiors after the fact will only 

support liability when the superiors' past actions were the moving force behind the constitutional 

violation in the first place. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 884–85 (9th Cir. 1991). This 

court is unwilling to adopt a rule that anyone involved in adjudicating grievances after the fact is 

per se potentially liable under a ratification theory. However, this is not to say that persons 

involved in adjudicating administrative disputes, or persons to whom complaints are sometimes 

made, can never be liable. If, for example, a reviewing official's rejections of administrative 

grievances can be construed as an automatic whitewash, which may have led other prison 

officials to have no concern of ever being reprimanded, a ratifying official may be liable for 

having put a defective policy in place. 

 Defendant O’Brian was not a superior officer to any of the officials responsible for 

conditions in ad seg. Therefore, defendant O’Brian is not liable for the conditions of ad seg 

unless her processing of grievance 05-2214 could be construed as a whitewash. While defendant 

O’Brian admits that errors occurred in the processing of this grievance, it is clear that the 

grievance was responded to on the merits. The undersigned does not find that defendant 

O’Brian’s involvement with this grievance constituted a whitewash which may have led other 

prison officials to have no concern for the conditions in ad seg. Accordingly, defendant O’Brian 

should be granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. 

////

//// 

////

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 53 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

54

 9. Qualified Immunity 

Defendant Kernan

 Defendants argued that defendant Kernan should be granted summary judgment because 

he was not informed of any condition plaintiff complained of in ad seg. However, as discussed 

above, whether defendant Kernan had knowledge of the ad seg conditions is a materially disputed 

fact. Accordingly, taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the undersigned finds 

that defendant Kernan potentially violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by disregarding 

plaintiff’s complaints regarding the ad seg conditions. The undersigned further finds that a 

reasonable correctional official, in defendant Kernan’s position, would know that disregarding 

plaintiff’s complaints violated the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, defendant Kernan is not 

entitled to qualified immunity. 

Defendant Walker

 Based on the discussion above, the undersigned finds that defendant Walker potentially 

violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Based on plaintiff’s allegation that he complained 

about the ad seg conditions at the June 15, 2005, September 14, 2005, and December 14, 2005 

classification committee hearings, the undersigned finds that a reasonable prison official in 

defendant Walker’s position would have known that continuing to rely on his subordinates, and 

disregarding plaintiff’s complaints, potentially violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. 

Accordingly, defendant Walker is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

Defendant Baker

 Defendants’ summary judgment motion does not address plaintiff’s claim that defendant 

Baker violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to adequate cell lighting. Accordingly, the 

undersigned does not address the qualified immunity analysis with respect to this claim. 

Based on the discussion above, the undersigned finds that defendant Baker potentially 

violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights with respect to his claims alleging that his cell was 

cold, he did not receive clean linen and clothing, he received spoiled food and he did not receive 

adequate outdoor exercise. Based on the evidence discussed above, the undersigned also finds 

that a reasonable prison official in defendant Baker’s position would have known that 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 54 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

55

disregarding the alleged violations violated the Eighth Amendment. As discussed above, the logs 

would have put defendant Baker on notice that plaintiff was not receiving adequate clean 

clothing, linens and outdoor exercise. Plaintiff claims that he told defendant Baker that he 

received rotten food. 

With regard to plaintiff’s claim alleging that his cell was cold, a reasonable correctional 

official would have known that even if the temperature at plaintiff’s cell vent read 78 degrees, 

something was wrong with the ventilation if the officers in the unit wore heavy jackets, etc. 

For the reasons discussed above, defendant Baker is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

Defendant Sclafani

Based on the discussion above, the undersigned finds that defendant Sclafani potentially 

violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights with respect to his claims alleging inadequate 

cleaning supplies, inadequate clean clothing and linen, his cell was cold, and he received spoiled 

food. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence suggests that 

defendant Sclafani was made aware of all of these conditions but failed to take any corrective 

action. The undersigned finds that a reasonable correctional officer would have known that 

failing to respond to plaintiff’s complaints violated the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, 

defendant Sclafani is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

IX. Religious Freedom 

 Plaintiff, who is Native American, alleges that he was denied his First Amendment right 

to freely exercise his religion. Plaintiff also raises an Equal Protection claim related to his request 

to practice his religion. (ECF No. 78 at 19.) These claims are made against defendants Kernan, 

Walker, Grannis, O’Brian, Baker and Sclafani. (Id. at 19.) 

 A. First Amendment Right to Religious Freedom 

 Plaintiff alleges that during the time he was held in ad seg at CSP-Sac, he was denied 

access to sweat lodges and a spiritual leader. He also alleges that he was not allowed to access 

his religious property. 

////

////

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 55 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

56

Legal Standard 

“The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at the prison door. 

The free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be 

curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” 

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citations omitted). “[A] 

prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a 

prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. 

Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); see also Clement v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148, 

1151 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). A prison regulation that impinges on First Amendment rights 

“is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 

78, 89 (1987). 

Discussion—Defendants Grannis and O’Brian

 Citing plaintiff’s deposition, defendants state that with respect to defendants O’Brian and 

Grannis, plaintiff bases his claim for denial of his ability to practice his religion on a grievance he 

sent to Grannis that was never returned. (Plaintiff’s deposition at 98.) Defendants argue that 

because defendant Grannis was not responsible for processing or responding to plaintiff’s 

grievances, plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against these defendants should be dismissed. 

 In response to defendants’ argument regarding defendants O’Brian and Grannis, plaintiff 

argues in his opposition, “The evidence is too numerous to adequately present in such limited 

space. Including that plaintiff has responded to this substance of both facts of the persons and 

evidence concerning ‘hindering’ ‘ability’ and practice of religion in the previous DUF’s sections 

to each named defendant.” (ECF No. 171 at 58.) 

 Plaintiff does not direct the court to the particular grievance raising his claim alleging 

denial of ability to practice his religion to which defendant Grannis allegedly failed to respond. It 

is not the court’s duty to comb through the record looking for this grievance, or any other relevant 

grievance, on plaintiff’s behalf. For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned finds that there 

is no evidence that either defendant Grannis or defendant O’Brian failed to process a grievance 

alleging plaintiff’s inability to practice his religion. Accordingly, defendants Grannis and 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 56 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

57

O’Brian should be granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. 

Discussion—Access to Sweat Lodge

 Defendants move for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim that he was denied access 

to a sweat lodge on the grounds that the same safety concerns that precluded his placement into 

CSP-Sac’s other yards also precluded him from access to the sweat lodges there. (See Walker 

declaration, ¶ 26.) Defendants state that this restriction was necessary to ensure plaintiff’s safety. 

(Id.) As discussed above, the undersigned cannot determine whether valid security concerns 

precluded plaintiff’s placement in Facility B and Facility C. For that reason, defendants are not 

entitled to summary judgment on these grounds. 

 Defendants go on to, somewhat indirectly, address the involvement of each defendant in 

plaintiff’s inability to practice his religion. The focus of the court’s inquiry regarding this issue is 

whether the individual defendants caused plaintiff to be denied access to the sweat lodge. 

To be liable for a civil rights violation, a state actor must act or fail to act in a manner that 

deprives another of a constitutional right. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The Ninth Circuit explains: 

A person deprives another of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the 

plaintiff complains]. The inquiry into causation must be 

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each 

individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation. 

Id. at 633 (internal citation, quotation omitted; emphasis in original). 

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 

constitutional deprivation.” Id. 

In the statement of undisputed facts, defendants concede that plaintiff addressed his ability 

to practice his religion with defendant Walker “at committee.” (ECF No. 165-2 at 22.) 

Defendants argue that defendant Walker then directed the Sergeant or Correctional Counselor in 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 57 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

58

attendance at the committee hearings to address such concerns. (Id.) 

It is undisputed that defendant Walker caused plaintiff to be retained in ad seg. It is 

undisputed that plaintiff could not access the sweat lodge while he was in ad seg. Thus, the 

Sergeant and Correctional Counselors could take no action to address this issue. Because 

defendant Walker caused plaintiff to be retained in ad seg and had knowledge that plaintiff could 

not attend the sweat lodge, and because it is disputed whether valid security reasons justified 

plaintiff’s retention in ad seg, defendant Walker should be denied summary judgment as to this 

claim. 

Defendants argue that defendant Kernan had no knowledge that plaintiff was being denied 

his ability to practice his religion. Defendants cite the portion of plaintiff’s deposition where he 

testified that he “really didn’t address” his religion claims with defendant Kernan. (Plaintiff’s 

deposition at 98.) 

Q: Okay. And then Kernan and Walker – did you talk to them 

about your religious religion claim? 

A: Kernan I didn’t –when I was asking him, I was more concerned 

with my legal property when I saw Kernan walking the tier, and at 

the committee that’s all I mentioned. At that time I didn’t think an 

issue was with religion with Kernan. I was just thinking I was 

going to get out of there; but if I ended up staying there, I wanted 

my legal property. So I really didn’t address that to Kernan other 

than inmate requests that was never responded to. 

(Id.) 

The undersigned has reviewed the record and can find no evidence of plaintiff otherwise 

informing defendant Kernan that he could not access the sweat lodge. 

In his opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion, plaintiff argues that he 

informed defendant Kernan of his claims involving his inability to practice his religion in 

grievances nos. 2214 and 2084. As discussed above, defendant Kernan did not participate in 

either of these grievances. Accordingly, defendant Kernan should be granted summary judgment 

as to plaintiff’s claim that he was denied access to the sweat lodge because there is no evidence 

that defendant Kernan had knowledge of this issue. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 58 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

59

With respect to defendants Baker and Sclafani, it is clear that neither of these defendants 

had control over plaintiff’s placement in ad seg, which caused him to be denied access to the 

sweat lodge. Defendant Baker was the ad seg sergeant, whose duties included supervising the 

correctional officers in Facility B, Building 2, keeping records and preparing reports, and 

resolving issues brought to her attention by subordinate officers. (Baker declaration, ¶ 3.) 

Defendant Sclafani worked as a Correctional Officer in Facility B, Building 2. Defendant 

Sclafani’s duties included supervising the inmates in his assigned building. (Sclafani declaration, 

¶ 2.) Even assuming these defendants had knowledge that plaintiff was being denied access to a 

sweat lodge, they did not cause plaintiff’s placement in ad seg, nor did they have any control over 

plaintiff’s removal from ad seg to a yard where he would have access to a sweat lodge. 

Accordingly, because defendants Baker and Sclafani did not cause plaintiff to be denied access to 

a sweat lodge, these defendants should be granted summary judgment as to this claim.

Discussion -- Access to Spiritual Advisor 

Defendants argue that no defendant denied plaintiff access to a spiritual advisor. 

 Defendants argue that defendant Kernan is entitled to summary judgment as to this claim 

because plaintiff did not ask defendant Kernan to see a spiritual advisor. Defendants state that 

plaintiff testified at his deposition that he did not tell defendant Kernan about his religious claims. 

(Plaintiff’s deposition at 98.) While plaintiff gave this statement at his deposition, he earlier 

testified that he asked defendant Kernan for access to a chaplain at a classification committee. 

(Id. at 94.) It is undisputed that defendant Kernan participated only in the May 11, 2005 

classification committee hearing. 

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony regarding whether he asked defendant Kernan for access 

to a spiritual advisor is conflicting. However, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment 

based on this conflicting testimony. Rather, a jury should decide whether plaintiff asked 

defendant Kernan for access to a spiritual advisor at the May 11, 2005 classification committee 

hearing.15 Accordingly, defendant Kernan should be denied summary judgment as to this claim.16

 

15

 Under the “sham affidavit rule,” which is most often invoked in the context of a motion for 

summary judgment, “a party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 59 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

60

Defendants argue that defendant Walker is entitled to summary judgment as to this claim 

because defendant Walker directed the Sergeant and Correctional Counselor in attendance at the 

committee hearings to investigate such concerns, and trusted and relied on them to do so. 

(Walker declaration, ¶ 24.) Defendant Walker was not aware of any ongoing problem that was 

not promptly corrected once supervising staff was notified. (Id.) 

At his deposition, plaintiff testified that at each committee hearing, he mentioned his 

religion claims to defendant Walker. (Plaintiff’s deposition at 98.) Plaintiff is claiming that he 

told defendant Walker that he was being denied access to a spiritual advisor at the June 15, 2005, 

September 14, 2005, and December 14, 2005 classification committee hearings. If plaintiff 

complained about access to a spiritual advisor at each of these hearings, then it appears that the 

Sergeants and Correctional Counselors, whose job it was to investigate this claim, were not doing 

their job. Based on plaintiff’s ongoing complaints, the undersigned does not find that defendant 

 

deposition testimony.” Van Asdale v. International Game Technology, 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (citing Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991)). Courts 

generally do not apply the sham affidavit rule to conflicting statements within the same 

deposition. See Kimble v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2013 WL 4501023 at * 4 (N.D. Ohio 

2013) (“The court rejects defendants' assertion that the sham affidavit doctrine...enables courts to 

disregard deposition testimony.”); Gullick v. Ott, 517 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1075 (W.D. Wis. 2007) 

(“sham affidavit” rule does not apply to inconsistencies within same deposition); Kelly v. 

Chambers, 2009 WL 765267 at * 5 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“Although such “sham affidavits” are looked 

down upon, the rationale for disfavoring “sham affidavits” does not extend to discrepancies 

within the same deposition.”). “In short, the decision as to what to believe and what to disregard 

in plaintiff's deposition testimony is entrusted to the jury at trial, not to the court on summary 

judgment.” Kimble, 2013 WL 4501023 at *4. 

16 The undersigned also observes that in his opposition, plaintiff alleges that after his uncle died in 

January 2006, he saw defendant Kernan walking the ad seg block and asked him if he, plaintiff, 

could see the chaplain. (ECF No. 171 at 55.) Plaintiff alleges that he showed defendant Kernan 

his uncle’s obituary from the newspaper. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Kernan told 

plaintiff to write the ad seg sergeant. (Id. at 55-56.) 

Plaintiff’s claim in his opposition that he asked defendant Kernan to see a spiritual advisor 

after his uncle died contradicts his deposition testimony that he did not address his religious 

claims to defendant Kernan. Plaintiff cannot create an issue of fact regarding whether he asked 

defendant Kernan to see a spiritual advisor by contradicting his prior deposition testimony in his 

opposition. See Van Asdale v. International Game Technology, 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir, 

2009). In other words, plaintiff’s contradictory statement in his opposition constitutes a “sham 

affidavit.” Accordingly, the undersigned disregards plaintiff’s claim in his opposition that he 

asked defendant Kernan for access to a spiritual advisor after his uncle died. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 60 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

61

Walker is entitled to summary judgment as to this claim. See Cunnigham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 

1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000) (supervisor liable for acquiescence to the constitutional deprivation). 

Turning to defendant Baker, at his deposition, plaintiff testified that on December 22, 

2005, he filed a grievance with defendant Baker requesting access to a chaplain. (Plaintiff’s 

deposition at 96-97.) Plaintiff testified that the grievance was never returned to him. (Id. at 97.) 

Defendants move for summary judgment as to defendant Baker on grounds that defendant Baker 

did not know of this grievance. In support of this argument, defendants cite defendant Baker’s 

declaration: 

Inmates can worship in their cells, and I never interfered with 

Navarro’s ability to do so. I am an American Indian and I am 

familiar with American Indian religious practices. I never treated 

Navarro differently from other inmates because of his Native 

American beliefs. Moreover, as ASU Sergeant, I generally was not 

responsible for processing inmates’ requests for religious items or 

services but whenever I received such a request, I always relayed it 

to the appropriate recipient. I do not recall ever being aware that 

Navarro was having difficulties accessing any permitted religious 

items or a spiritual advisor. I am informed that Navarro claims he 

submitted an appeal concerning his ability to practice his religion 

on December 22, 2005. I generally was not informed of the content 

of inmates’ appeals unless they were assigned to me for review, or 

brought to my attention by the reviewing officer. I do not recall 

ever being aware of an appeal concerning Navarro’s ability to 

practice his religion. Moreover, Navarro transferred out of 

Building 2 just five days after the appeal was submitted. Thus, by 

the time any response could have been due, I no longer had any 

authority over Navarro. I am informed that Navarro claims that his 

uncle passed away on January 7, 2006. I was not assigned to the 

facility where Navarro was housed in 2006 and, therefore, had no 

authority over his ability to practice his religion at that time. 

(Baker declaration, ¶ 28.) 

Plaintiff’s opposition contains no evidence demonstrating that defendant Baker was aware 

of the grievance he allegedly filed on December 22, 2005. Plaintiff has also presented no 

evidence that defendant Baker was otherwise made aware of his request to see a spiritual advisor. 

Defendants have presented uncontroverted evidence that defendant Baker had no knowledge of 

plaintiff’s desire to see a spiritual advisor. For this reason, defendant Baker should be granted 

summary judgment as to this claim.

////

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 61 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

62

With regard to defendant Sclafani, defendants argue that there is no evidence that 

defendant Sclafani denied any request by plaintiff to see a spiritual advisor. In support of this 

argument, defendants cite defendant Sclafani’s declaration which states, in relevant part, 

Inmates could also request, either in writing or verbally, to any 

correctional officer in the unit, to see a spiritual advisor. Any time I 

received such a request, I conveyed it to either the head chaplain or 

the denomination-specific spiritual advisor requested. I did not 

have the authority to require the spiritual advisor to respond. 

(Sclafani declaration, ¶ 18.) 

 At his deposition, plaintiff testified that he raised his religious claims with defendant 

Sclafani “many times.” (Id. at 98-99.) Based on plaintiff’s testimony that he made his religious 

claims to defendant Sclafani “many times,” the undersigned finds that whether defendant Sclafani 

conveyed plaintiff’s requests to the spiritual advisor is a reasonably disputed fact. Accordingly, 

defendant Sclafani should be denied summary judgment as to this claim. 

Discussion—Access to Religious Property

Plaintiff alleges that he was not given his religious property while in ad seg. (Plaintiff’s 

deposition at 96.) In his opposition, plaintiff describes his religious property as including a red 

headband, medicine bag, prayer ties, eagle feather and herbal medicine. (ECF No. 171 at 56.) 

Defendants argue that there is no evidence that any defendant attempted to interfere with 

any attempt made by plaintiff to access his religious property. 

 There is no evidence that plaintiff ever asked defendant Kernan for assistance in obtaining 

his religious property. At his deposition, as discussed above, plaintiff did not testify that he asked 

defendant Kernan for access to his religious property. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that he 

otherwise brought this matter to the attention of defendant Kernan. Accordingly, defendant 

Kernan should be granted summary judgment as to this claim. 

 Defendants argue that defendant Walker is entitled to summary judgment as this claim 

because defendant Walker directed the Sergeant and Correctional Counselor in attendance at the 

committee hearings to investigate such concerns, and trusted and relied on them to do so. 

(Walker declaration, ¶ 24.) Defendant Walker was not aware of any ongoing problem that was 

not promptly corrected once supervising staff was notified. (Id.) 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 62 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

63

As discussed above, at his deposition plaintiff testified that at each committee hearing he 

mentioned his religion claims to defendant Walker. (Plaintiff’s deposition at 98.) Plaintiff is 

claiming that he told defendant Walker that he was being denied access to his religious property 

at the June 15, 2005, September 14, 2005, and December 14, 2005 classification committee 

hearings. If plaintiff complained about access to his religious property at each of these hearings, 

then it is appears that the Sergeants and Correctional Counselors, whose job it was to investigate 

this claim, were not doing their job. Based on plaintiff’s ongoing complaints, the undersigned 

does not find that defendant Walker is entitled to summary judgment as to this claim. See 

Cunnigham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000) (supervisor liable for acquiescence to 

the constitutional deprivation). 

Turning to defendant Sclafani, in his declaration, defendant Sclafani addresses the 

procedures inmates follow to obtain their religious property: 

The portion of an inmate’s personal, religious and legal property 

that was not kept in his assigned cell was maintained by the 

property officer assigned to Receiving and Release (R & R). 

Inmates could submit requests to R & R to access that property. I 

did not have authority over the property stored in R & R. It was not 

my responsibility to process person, legal, or religion property 

access requests, or to retrieve inmates’ property from R & R. 

Whenever I received a property access request, I always forwarded 

it to R & R. 

(Sclafani declaration, ¶ 17.) 

 As discussed above, at his deposition, plaintiff testified that he raised his religious claims 

with defendant Sclafani “many times.” (Id. at 98-99.) Based on plaintiff’s claim that he raised 

his religious claims with defendant Sclafani “many times,” the undersigned finds that whether 

defendant Sclafani forwarded plaintiff’s requests for access to his religious property to R & R is a 

disputed material fact. Accordingly, defendant Sclafani should be denied summary judgment as 

to this claim. 

 Turning to defendant Baker, in her declaration, defendant Baker states that she was not 

generally responsible for processing inmate’s requests for religious items. (Baker declaration, ¶ 

28.) Defendant Baker states that when she received such a request, she always relayed it to the 

appropriate recipient. (Id.) Defendant Baker states that she does not recall ever being aware that 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 63 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

64

plaintiff was having difficulty accessing his permitted religious items. (Id.) 

 In his opposition, plaintiff provides no evidence that he ever gave defendant Baker a 

request for access to his religious property or that defendant Baker failed to forward the property 

request to R & R. Because defendants have presented uncontroverted evidence that defendant 

Baker had no knowledge that plaintiff was having difficulty accessing his religious property, 

defendant Baker should be granted summary judgment as to this claim. 

Qualified Immunity

Because the undersigned recommends that defendants Grannis, O’Brian and Baker be 

granted summary judgment on the merits of plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, there is no need 

to address qualified immunity as to these defendants. 

 As discussed above, the undersigned recommends that defendant Walker be denied 

summary judgment as to all three of plaintiff’s First Amendment claims based on plaintiff’s claim 

that he repeatedly brought these issues to defendant Walker’s attention at the classification 

committee hearings. With respect to the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the 

undersigned finds that defendant Walker potentially violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights 

with respect to all three of these issues: access to a sweat lodge, access to a spiritual advisor and 

access to religious property. With respect to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, 

the undersigned finds that a reasonable prison official would have known that plaintiff’s repeated 

complaints indicated that his First Amendment rights were being violated, and that the people 

defendant relied on to investigate these complaints were not doing their job. See Cunnigham v. 

Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000) (supervisor liable for acquiescence to the 

constitutional deprivation). Accordingly, defendant Walker is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

 The undersigned recommends that defendant Kernan be denied summary judgment as to 

plaintiff’s claim that he was being denied access to a spiritual advisor based on plaintiff’s claim 

that he brought this issue to defendant Kernan’s attention at the classification committee. The 

record suggests that defendant Kernan ignored this request, as plaintiff allegedly did not meet 

with a spiritual advisor for the entire time he was housed in ad seg. With respect to the first prong 

of the qualified immunity analysis, the undersigned finds defendant Kernan potentially violated 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 64 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

65

plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by disregarding his request for access to a spiritual advisor. It 

is difficult to analyze the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis because it is unclear 

why defendant Kernan allegedly ignored this request. Nonetheless, the undersigned finds that a 

reasonable prison official, including a Warden, would have known that ignoring a request for 

access to a spiritual advisor violated the First Amendment. Accordingly, defendant Kernan is not 

entitled to qualified immunity. 

 The undersigned recommends that defendant Sclafani be denied summary judgment as to 

plaintiff’s First Amendment claims that he was denied access to a spiritual advisor and to his 

religious property. Plaintiff alleges that he made his First Amendment requests to defendant 

Sclafani “many times.” With respect to the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the 

undersigned finds that defendant Sclafani potentially violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights 

by allegedly disregarding his requests for access to a spiritual advisor and access to his legal 

property. With respect to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the undersigned 

finds that a reasonable correctional officer would have known that ignoring these requests 

violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Accordingly, defendant Sclafani is not entitled to 

qualified immunity with respect to these claims. 

 B. Equal Protection 

Legal Standard

 “The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people 

equally. Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause entitles each prisoner to a reasonable opportunity 

of pursing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to 

conventional religious precepts.” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Discussion 

 Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to this claim because they 

did not treat plaintiff differently from any other inmates because of his Native American beliefs. 

Defendants cite the declarations of defendants Baker, Walker and Sclafani in support of this 

claim. (ECF No. 165-2 at 22 (statement of undisputed facts, no. 138).) Defendants also claim 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 65 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

66

that plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint at page 81 that “a number of other prisoners” felt 

that they were denied their right to practice their religious ceremonies. The undersigned cannot 

locate this allegation in the amended complaint. 

 At his deposition, plaintiff testified that in the December 22, 2005 grievance he made the 

following claim: 

Because I did bring that up to her as one of the program things. 

That’s –that’s not listed on the programs available, but I should be 

entitled to see a chaplain. I saw a Catholic chaplain go back there 

to see another inmate, so I felt entitled to that as well; that I should 

have the Native American chaplain. 

(Plaintiff’s deposition at 97.) 

 Plaintiff’s deposition testimony set forth above is the only evidence the undersigned can 

locate supporting his Equal Protection claim. 

 To succeed on the instant claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged discrimination 

was intentional. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). That means that 

plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants knew that plaintiff was being denied access to a 

spiritual advisor while spiritual advisors of other faiths were permitted in the ad seg unit. Plaintiff 

has provided no evidence demonstrating that any defendant had knowledge of this disparity, 

either from personal observation or from information received from plaintiff. As discussed 

above, there is no evidence that defendant Baker reviewed plaintiff’s December 22, 2005 

grievance. For these reasons, plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendants intentionally 

discriminated against him. Accordingly, defendants should be granted summary judgment as to 

this claim. 

X. Access to the Courts 

 Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his right to access the courts. This claim proceeds 

against defendants Baker, Sclafani, Morrow, O’Brian and Grannis. (ECF No. 78 at 20.) The 

undersigned summarized plaintiff’s access to the courts claims in the August 24, 2011 findings 

and recommendations addressing defendants’ motion to dismiss as follows: 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 66 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

67

“It is now established beyond a doubt that prisoners have a 

constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 

U.S. 817, 821 (1977); see also Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 609 

(9th Cir. 1990). This right “requires prison authorities to assist 

inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by 

providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate 

assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 

828. In order to state a denial of access claim under the First 

Amendment, a prisoner must show that he suffered an “actual 

injury” as a result of the defendants’ action by explaining how the 

challenged official’s acts or omissions hindered plaintiff’s efforts to 

pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 

351-55 (1996). Actual injury may be shown if the alleged 

shortcomings “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” such as 

having his complaint dismissed for “failure to satisfy some 

technical requirement” or if he “suffered arguably actionable harm 

that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by 

inadequacies of the law library that he was unable to even file a 

complaint.” Id. at 351. 

The actual injuries alleged by plaintiff appear to be: (1) his 

inability to present a timely and complete petition for review before 

the California Supreme Court, in the direct appeal of his criminal 

conviction, citing case number LA042924, and California Supreme 

Court Case No. S138165; and (2) plaintiff’s inability to fully state 

all grounds in support of his habeas corpus petition filed in the 

United States District Court for the Central District of California, 

resulting in the dismissal of claims on procedural default, failure to 

exhaust, and failure to raise issues on direct appeal in the state 

courts. This court’s review of Navarros v.Sullivan, Case No. Civ07-1593 DDP [previously SGL] PJW [footnote omitted], supports 

plaintiff’s assertion that he failed to exhaust his state court remedies 

on some claims. (See generally id. at Dkt. No. 61 (according to 

plaintiff [petitioner therein] the option of dismissing his 

unexhausted claims and proceeding on his exhausted claims, or to 

have his entire petitioner dismissed as “mixed.”) 

(ECF No. 78 at 21-22.) 

Plaintiff’s State Appeal

After reviewing the record, the undersigned finds that the following facts are undisputed 

regarding plaintiff’s state appeal. 

In the California Court of Appeal, plaintiff was represented by counsel in his appeal of his 

criminal conviction. (ECF No. 181 at 6.) On August 13, 2004, plaintiff’s counsel filed a Wende 

brief, indicating that there were no arguable issues for review. (Id.) On December 17, 2004, 

plaintiff filed his own supplemental briefing in support of the appeal. (Id. at 7.) The docket from 

the California Court of Appeal indicates that on December 17, 2004, the case was fully briefed. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 67 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

68

(Id.) On September 14, 2005, the California Court of Appeal issued an opinion affirming 

plaintiff’s conviction. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff signed his petition for review addressed to the California Supreme Court on 

October 16, 2005. (ECF No. 165-4 at 13.) On November 30, 2005, the California Supreme Court 

denied the petition for review without comment or citation. (Id. at 11.) 

Plaintiff’s Federal Petition

 The undersigned has taken a closer look at plaintiff’s federal petition, and summarizes that 

review herein. 

On March 10, 2007, plaintiff filed the original petition in the United States District Court 

for the Central District of California.17 (See United States District Court docket, 2:07-1593 at 

ECF No. 78 at 3 (findings and recommendations recommending that the petition be denied.) On 

September 13, 2007, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the claims were 

unexhausted and that plaintiff had a pending habeas petition before the California Supreme Court. 

(Id.) That state habeas petition was denied on October 10, 2007. (Id.) 

 On October 17, 2007, plaintiff filed an amended petition, raising 15 grounds for relief, 

many of which appeared to be based on the recently denied state habeas petition. (Id.) 

Accordingly, on November 6, 2007, the magistrate judge court denied the motion to dismiss as 

moot. (Id.) The magistrate judge ordered respondent to file a response to the amended petition. 

(Id.) 

 On December 13, 2007, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition on the 

grounds that it contained unexhausted claims. (See id. at ECF No. 54.) On February 7, 2008, the 

magistrate judge denied the motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiff’s claims were exhausted. 

(Id.) 

 On December 10, 2009, the magistrate judge issued an 18 page opinion recommending 

that plaintiff’s habeas petition be denied on the merits. (Id. at ECF No. 78.) On April 7, 2001, 

the district court adopted these findings and recommendations. (Id. at ECF No. 80.) 

 

17

 Judicial notice may be taken of court records. Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 

635 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981).

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 68 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

69

Analysis

Plaintiff’s pleadings regarding the instant claim are somewhat confusing. However, after 

reviewing the opposition, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has clarified his access to the courts 

claim to allege as follows. 

 Plaintiff alleges that due to inadequate law library access, etc., he was unable to present in 

his petition for review and federal habeas petition a claim challenging his three strikes sentence. 

(ECF No. 171 at 32-22.) It appears that plaintiff is arguing that his two prior convictions used as 

strikes were improperly counted as two strikes because they arose from a single criminal act. 

Plaintiff alleges that his strikes came from his 1995 convictions in case no. KA026295. (Id. at 

31.) A copy of the minute order from that case is attached to the opposition. (ECF No. 173-2 at 

25-26.) The minute order reflects that on March 10, 1995, plaintiff was convicted of making a 

terrorist threat (Cal. Penal Code 422) and oral copulation against a victim (Cal. Penal Code § 

288A(c). (Id. at 26.) 

 In his opposition, plaintiff cites People v. Burgos, 117 Cal.App.4th 1209 (2004), in 

support of his argument that his convictions for oral copulation and making a terrorist threat in 

case no. KA026295 should not have been considered as separate strikes. A trial court may, but is 

not required to, exercise its discretion to strike a prior strike conviction where the prior strikes 

arise from a single incident with a single victim or a single act. People v. Burgos (2004) 117 

Cal.App.4th 1209, 1212, fn.3, 1216. (2004). 

 The undersigned observes that plaintiff raised his claim challenging his 3 strikes sentence 

in his federal petition. (See Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit M, p. M18.) Thus, 

plaintiff’s access to the courts claim is without merit to the extent it is based on his inability to 

raise this claim, as a violation of federal law, in federal court. Plaintiff’s access to the courts 

claim is, therefore, limited to his alleged inability to raise this claim, as a violation of state law, in 

his petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court. 

 Defendants move for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s access to the courts claim on 

several grounds. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s access to the courts claim fails because he has 

not demonstrated that he sought to raise a non-frivolous issue. Defendants also argue that 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 69 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

70

plaintiff has failed to link any defendant to his claim. Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s claim 

is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 

For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s access to the courts 

claim is Heck barred. For that reason, the undersigned does not address defendants’ other 

arguments for summary judgment as to this claim.18 

 In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994), the Supreme Court held “habeas corpus 

is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement 

and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal 

terms of § 1983.” Thus, a plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 action to recover damages for 

“harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render [his] conviction or sentence invalid” 

when his sentence and conviction have not previously been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, 

or called into question upon issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a federal court. Id. at 486–87. 

As noted by defendants, the Seventh Circuit and several Ninth Circuit district courts have 

held that until an inmate’s conviction or sentence has been overturned, he cannot bring claims for 

damages for denial of access to legal materials or legal assistance to aid him in challenging some 

aspect of his conviction or sentence. The undersigned quotes herein from Koch v. Jester, 2014 

 

18

 The undersigned observes that it is possible, although not likely, that the California Supreme 

Court would have taken up plaintiff’s claim challenging his 3 strikes sentence had he raised it in 

his petition for review. The California Supreme Court, when considering a petition for review, 

“normally will not consider an issue that the petitioner failed to timely raise in the Court of 

Appeal.” Cal. Rules Court, Rule 8.500(c). The exceptions to this rule are when: the California 

Supreme Court has granted review (Rule 8.516(b)(1), Cal. R. Ct.); or the newly-raised claim 

involves a pure question of law not turning upon disputed issues of fact, or a matter of particular 

public importance. People v. Randle, 35 Cal.4th 987, 996–97 (2005). 

 Plaintiff’s claim alleging that his convictions for making a terrorist threat and oral 

copulation against a victim should have been counted as one strike raises a question of law, i.e., 

whether the trial court should have exercised its discretion to strike one of the convictions. Thus, 

arguably, the California Supreme Court could have considered this claim even though it was not 

raised in the California Court of Appeal. 

Whether plaintiff’s claim challenging his 3 strikes sentence was “non-frivolous” is not 

clear. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the facts underlying his convictions in case no. 

KA026295 should have resulted in his two convictions being treated as one strike. Other than 

the minute order, plaintiff has filed no evidence regarding this case. As such, plaintiff’s claim 

that his convictions in that case should have been treated as one strike is speculative and 

unsupportive. The fact that plaintiff’s appellate counsel failed to raise this claim suggests that 

this claim lacks merit. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 70 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

71

WL 3783961 at *5 (D. Or. 2014), which addressed this issue: 

Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the intersection of the 

First Amendment and Heck as they apply to an inmate's claim for 

denial of access to the courts, the Seventh Circuit and several 

district courts in the Ninth Circuit have addressed the issue and held 

Heck bars such claims. For example, in Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 

429 (7th Cir. 2012), the plaintiff brought a claim under § 1983 for 

damages against prison officials alleging they denied him access to 

the courts in violation of the First Amendment when they prevented 

him from using library resources to prepare a motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea. The plaintiff's conviction had not been reversed, 

expunged, declared invalid, or called into question upon issuance of 

a writ of habeas corpus by a federal court before the plaintiff filed 

his § 1983 action. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's 

claim on the ground that it was barred by Heck because the 

plaintiff's conviction had not been reversed. The plaintiff asserted 

the “favorable termination requirement of Heck ... [was] 

inapplicable because an award of damages for having been denied 

an opportunity to research his motion to withdraw his plea or his 

right to appeal his sentence would not necessarily imply that his 

conviction or sentence is invalid.” Id. at 432. Specifically, the 

plaintiff asserted 

his access-to-courts claim [did] not challenge directly his 

underlying criminal conviction, despite the fact that ... he 

sought access to the courts to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Invoking Lewis v. Casey ... and Christopher v. Harbury, 536 

U.S. 403 (2002), [the plaintiff] further argue[d] that “the 

loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of 

relief” can form the basis of an access-to-courts claim. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added). Consequently, 

[the plaintiff] maintain[ed] that he need only demonstrate 

that his lost, underlying claim—here, a lost opportunity to 

withdraw a guilty plea or to appeal—would have been nonfrivolous or “arguable,” not that it would have been 

successful. 

Id. at 433. The district court rejected the plaintiff's argument and 

granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that “a 

favorable determination on [the plaintiff's] damages claim 

necessarily would imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff's] 

conviction,” and, therefore, the plaintiff's claim was barred by 

Heck. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court and noted the 

plaintiff's argument gave “too crabbed a reading to the scope of the 

bar established in Heck.” Id. The Seventh Circuit pointed out that it 

had concluded in an earlier case (Hoard v. Reddy, 175 F.3d 531 

(7th Cir.1999)) “‘that only prospective relief is available in a 

prisoner's suit complaining of denial of access to the courts unless 

he has succeeded in getting his conviction annulled, since otherwise 

an effort to obtain damages would be blocked by Heck.’” Burd, 

702 F.3d at 433 (quoting Hoard, 175 F.3d at 533). Although the 

Seventh Circuit acknowledged that ruling “seem[s] paradoxical 

alongside Lewis's holding that a § 1983 plaintiff in an access-tocourts case needs only a non-frivolous, rather than meritorious, 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 71 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

72

claim,” the Seventh Circuit, nevertheless, concluded the following 

after examining Lewis, Heck, and other cases: 

Because the underlying claim for which [the plaintiff] 

sought access to the prison law library was the opportunity 

to withdraw his guilty plea, he cannot demonstrate the 

requisite injury without demonstrating that there is merit to 

his claim that he should have been able to withdraw the 

plea. Such a showing necessarily would implicate the 

validity of the judgment of conviction that he incurred on 

account of that guilty plea. The rule in Heck forbids the 

maintenance of such a damages action until the plaintiff can 

demonstrate his injury by establishing the invalidity of the 

underlying judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that [the 

plaintiff] has not established a basis for recovering any type 

of damage relief under § 1983. 

Id. at 434–35. 

District courts in the Ninth Circuit have followed the reasoning of 

the Seventh Circuit and concluded pursuant to Heck that, until their 

conviction or sentence has been overturned, inmates cannot bring 

claims for damages for denial of access to legal materials or legal 

assistance to aid them in challenging some aspect of their 

conviction or sentence. See, e.g., Gregory v. County of San Diego, 

No. 13-cv- 1016 WQH JMA, 2013 WL 5670928, at *5 (S.D.Cal. 

Oct.15, 2013); Collins v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 3: 10-cv-0697 

RCJ V, 2011 WL 768709, at *2 (D.Nev. Jan.26, 2011); Cole v. 

Sisto, Civ. No. S–09–0364 KJM P, 2009 WL 2230795, at *4 

(E.D.Cal. July 24, 2009). 

Koch v. Jester, 2014 WL 3783961 at * 5. 

 In the instant case, plaintiff seeks money damages on grounds that defendants thwarted his 

ability to raise a colorable claim challenging his 3 strikes sentence in his petition for review filed 

in the California Supreme Court by denying him adequate law library access, etc. 

 The undersigned agrees with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit and the district courts, 

discussed above, that claims by prisoners for damages based on alleged denial of access to the 

law library, legal materials, etc., to aid them in challenging their some aspect of their conviction 

or sentence are Heck barred unless the conviction or sentence has been overturned. Plaintiff’s 

conviction and sentence have not been overturned. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims alleging denial 

of access to the courts based on his claim that he was prevented from effectively litigating his 

state appeal based on inadequate law library access, etc., is Heck barred. 

////

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 72 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

73

XI. Retaliation

 This action proceeds on the following retaliation claims, based on the allegations that the 

following defendants retaliated against plaintiff for filing administrative grievances: 1) 

defendants O’Brian and Grannis by further refusing to process administrative grievances; 2) 

defendant Morrow for further refusing plaintiff access to his legal property and to the law library, 

after plaintiff complained; 3) defendants Sclafani and Baker by failing to remedy adverse 

conditions of confinement in the ad seg and for denying plaintiff access to a religious advisor. 

(ECF No. 78 at 22.) 

Legal Standard

 A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) an assertion 

that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s 

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment 

rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005). Direct and tangible harm will support a First 

Amendment retaliation claim even without a demonstration of chilling effect on the further 

exercise of a prisoner’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 568, n.11. “[A] plaintiff who fails to 

allege a chilling effect may still state a claim if he alleges he suffered some other harm” as a 

retaliatory adverse action. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Rhodes, 

408 F.3d at 568, n.11. A plaintiff must plead facts which suggest that retaliation for exercise of 

protected conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendants’ conduct. 

Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989.) Mere conclusions of 

hypothetical retaliation will not suffice; rather, a prisoner must “allege specific facts showing 

retaliation because of the exercise of the prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Frazier v. Dubois, 922 

F.2d 560, 562, n.1 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Defendants Grannis and O’Brian

 As discussed above, plaintiff alleges that defendants Grannis and O’Brian retaliated 

against him for filing administrative grievances by refusing to process other administrative 

grievances he filed. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 73 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

74

 Defendants move for summary judgment as to defendant Grannis on grounds that she did 

not engage in any adverse action against plaintiff. Citing defendant Grannis’ declaration quoted 

above, defendants argue that defendant Grannis was not employed at CSP-Sac, did not supervise 

the staff there, did not screen out plaintiff’s grievances, and was not assigned to process or 

respond to his grievances. Defendants argue that defendant Grannis was not aware of any error in 

the processing of plaintiff’s grievances. 

 The undersigned has reviewed the relevant exhibits attached to plaintiff’s opposition and 

finds that plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendant Grannis took an adverse action against 

him. First, plaintiff has attached several correspondences from defendant Grannis which he 

received well after he transferred away from CSP-Sac. (See ECF No. 172 at 14, 15, 16, 17.) 

Plaintiff cannot base his retaliation claim against defendant Grannis based on these 

correspondences. 

 Plaintiff has also attached a letter dated March 9, 2006, returning a Director’s Level 

appeal because it was not completed through the second level of review. (ECF No. 172-2 at 9.) 

While this letter has defendant Grannis’s typed signature, it appears that someone else signed this 

letter on behalf of defendant Grannis. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Grannis refused to process his grievances, which would not 

necessarily be reflected in documentary evidence. However, in her declaration, defendant 

Grannis stated that she did not review letters received by her office from inmates. (Grannis, 

declaration, ¶ 11.) Defendant Grannis also stated that she was not involved in screening 

grievances. (Id. at ¶ 4-8.) Based on these statements, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s claim 

that defendant Grannis refused to process his grievances is unsupported by any admissible 

evidence. Accordingly, defendant Grannis should be granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s 

retaliation claim because there is no evidence that she took any adverse action against plaintiff. 

 With respect to O’Brian, defendants argue that defendant O’Brian did not harbor any 

retaliatory animus toward plaintiff. Defendants argue that defendant O’Brian never intentionally 

delayed, screened out, or improperly process plaintiff’s grievances. In her declaration, defendant 

O’Brian discusses her processing of plaintiff’s grievances. As discussed above, in her declaration 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 74 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

75

defendant O’Brian described the processing of grievance nos. 05-2084 and 05-2214. (O’Brian 

declaration, ¶¶ 23-29.) While O’Brian admits that the processing of appeal no. 05-2214 was 

delayed because the OT stamped the wrong date on the appeal and it was later misfiled, there is 

no evidence that these actions were taken against plaintiff in retaliation for filing grievances. 

 In her declaration, defendant O’Brian addresses other grievances filed by plaintiff: 

30. Appeals SAC-H-05-00546 and SAC H-05-0668. I have 

reviewed the prison’s appeal tracking print out and the documents 

at pages 27-30 of the Complaint (ECF No. 24-1), and page 82 of 

Navarro’s Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 120-1). Based on 

these documents, I am able to tell that I was not assigned to or 

responsible for the substantive reviews or responses for these 

appeals. The letter “H” in the appeal log indicates that the appeal 

was handled by the health-care-appeals office. On occasion, I 

assisted with the screening of health care appeals, however, I was 

not employed in the health-care-appeals office. I had no authority 

over the people assigned there, and I did not have access to the 

medical files. I did not intentionally delay, or fail to properly 

process, this appeal. 

31, Appeal [no log number assigned]. [Footnote: Because 

copies of screened out appeals were not retained by the prison, I 

cannot verify whether this comprises the entire appeal. Further, I 

relied on my attorney in this matter to identify the appeals that 

Navarro put at issue in this action.] 

I have reviewed the documents at page 16-21 of the Complaint 

(ECF No. 24-1) and pages 19, 36 of Navarro’s Request for Judicial 

Notice (ECF No. 120-1.) Based on these documents, I am able to 

tell that this appeal, dated November 20, 2005, was screened out by 

health-care-appeals office, and not by me. The appeal was not 

assigned a log number because it never was accepted for review. 

Because this was a health-care appeal, I would not have been 

responsible for any substantive review or response to the appeal. I 

was not employed in the health-care appeals office, I had no 

authority over the people assigned there, and I did not have access 

to the medical files. I did not intentionally delay, or fail to properly 

process, this appeal. 

32. Appeal [no log number assigned]. I have reviewed the 

documents at pages 22-24 of the Complaint (ECF No. 24-1) and 

pages 16-17, 20, 23-24, 26-27, 51, 66-67, and 82 of Navarro’s 

Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 120-1). Based on these 

documents, I am able to tell that I was involved only some of the 

screening of this appeal. Navarro submitted this appeal on 

December 15, 2005, and it was stamped received on December 23, 

2005. On occasion I assisted with the screening of health care 

appeals, however I was not employed in the health care appeal 

office, I had no authority over the people assigned there, and I did 

not have access to the medical files. Because this is a health care 

appeal, I would not have been responsible for any substantive 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 75 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

76

review or response to the appeal. This appeal requested Navarro’s 

removal from CCCMS and copies of his medical records. Navarros 

explained that he had unsuccessfully sought copies of his medical 

records from individual doctors and attempted to authorize the 

release of his medical and central file records so that I could 

provide copies to him. On an attached page, Navarro indicated that 

he was simultaneously submitting a request to medical records and 

that [he] did not want to be interviewed, and would not further 

explain his request. 

33. I screened out this appeal on January 13, 2006, because inmates 

were required to proceed through the proper channels by submitting 

requests to the medical records department rather than requesting 

records through an individual doctor or an appeal to me. Then, if 

the request was denied, the inmate could file an appeal. Navarro 

also did not show when, or to whom, he requested removal from 

CCCMS. Thus, my screening letter instructed Navarro to show that 

he had gone through the designated channels. 

34. Navarro resubmitted the appeal and the OT stamped it as 

received on February 1, 2006. The appeal was screened out by 

health care appeals staff on February 8, 2006, and not by me. 

Navarro had not complied with the first screening letter. He did not 

show any unsuccessful effort to obtain relief through the proper 

channels, except his statement that the medical records were not 

provided to him during the June 17, 2005 file review provided by 

SAC-H-05-0668. The screening letter explained that the appeal 

regulations precluded inmates from filing a separate, duplicate 

appeal challenging a prior appeal. Navarro was again instructed to 

proceed through the proper channels by submitting a request to 

medical and to as his doctor to be removed from CCCMS. The 

screening letter also clarified that if those efforts were denied, he 

could appeal the denial. 

35. Navarro resubmitted the appeal on February 26, 2006. I 

screened out the appeal on March 3, 2006, because Navarro had not 

complied with the earlier screening letters by showing that he had 

unsuccessfully sought to obtain his medical records or his removal 

from CCCMS through the proper channels. The June 17, 2005 file 

review provided by SAC-H-05-0668 could not be reconsidered in 

this appeal, because the appeal regulations do not permit duplicate 

appeals. I explained that, under the regulations, if Navarro was not 

satisfied with the June 17 file review, he had 15 working days to 

appeal SAC-H-05-0668 to the next level of review. Concerning 

Navarro’s request for removal from CCCMS, I directed Navarro to 

file a new appeal and identify the medical staff whom he had 

requested removal from CCCMS, and the date of those requests. 

To facilitate the review of any such appeal, I waived the 

requirement that he provide supporting documentation and agreed 

to allow Navarro to submit only an explanation of his removal 

requests in support of the appeal. I did not intentionally delay, or 

fail, to properly process this appeal. 

36. Appeal [no log number assigned]. I have reviewed the 

documents at pages 2-9 of the Complaint (ECF No. 24-2) and pages 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 76 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

77

31, 52, 62-63, and 82 of Navarro’s Request for Judicial Notice 

(ECF No. 120-1). Based on these documents, I am able to tell how 

I processed this appeal. Navarro submitted this appeal on 

December 22, 2005, concerning the processing of his mail, and the 

OT stamped it received on December 27, 2005. I screened the 

appeal out on January 9, 2006, because it was unclear whether 

Navarro sought to submit the appeal as a staff complaint or as a 

legal-mail issue. He indicated an attempt to resolve informally with 

the mailroom (the informal review requirement is waived for staff 

complaints), but also requested a formal investigation into staff who 

handled mail (implicating a possible staff complaint). The January 

9, 2006 screening letter directed Navarro to clarify the nature of his 

claim, and to submit the required CDC 1858 Form if he wished to 

proceed with a staff complaint. Navarro resubmitted the appeal and 

it was stamped received on February 1, 2005. I screened out the 

appeal on February 8, 2006, because it indicated that staff held 

Navarro’s mail on three dates, but did not identify the dates or the 

staff involved. Navarro resubmitted the appeal and it was stamped 

received on March 2, 2006. I screened out this appeal again 

because Navarro’s resubmission contained too much unnecessary 

verbiage, and still did not provide the required information. I 

directed Navarro to resubmit the appeal and “supply the 

information noted on the screening form 2/8/06. This will allow the 

appeal to be processed.” I did not intentionally delay, or fail to 

properly process this appeal. 

37. Appeal [no log number assigned]. I have reviewed the 

documents at pages 16-20 of the Complaint (ECF No. 24-2.) Based 

on these documents, I am able to tell how this appeal was 

processed. Navarro noted he had previously submitted an appeal 

that was “lost” and dated the appeal December 28, 2005 and March 

5, 2006. The OT date stamped the appeal as received on March 7, 

2006. The appeal asserted that Navarro had submitted a trustaccount statement on November 2, 2005 that was forwarded on 

November 18, 2005, and sought, as the action requested, a trust 

account statement or a signed statement explaining why one could 

not be provided. The attached form indicates that Navarro was 

seeking a “a second copy of the printout, so when the court inquires 

for further information I can proceed in a timely manner.” The 

appeal was screened out on March 8, 2006 because Navarro had not 

completed the appeals process at the informal level of review, as he 

was required to do. I did not intentionally delay, or fail to process, 

this appeal. 

(O’Brian declaration, ¶¶ 30-37.) 

 The undersigned finds that defendant O’Brian’s declaration, quoted above, demonstrates 

that defendant O’Brian did not fail to process plaintiff’s administrative grievances for improper 

reasons. In other words, defendants have demonstrated that defendant O’Brian did not retaliate 

against plaintiff. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 77 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

78

 The undersigned has reviewed plaintiff’s opposition and finds that plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that defendant O’Brian retaliated against him for filing administrative grievances. 

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that defendant O’Brian be granted summary judgment 

as to plaintiff’s retaliation claim. 

Defendant Morrow 

 As clarified in the order screening, plaintiff alleges that defendant Morrow retaliated 

against him by denying him access to his legal property and the law library after plaintiff 

complained to the May 11, 2005 classification committee that defendant Morrow told plaintiff 

that no legal property would be provided to him while he was housed at CSP-Sac. (ECF No. 21 

at 9; see also ECF No. 24 at 27 (amended complaint).) 

 Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that defendant Morrow harbored 

no retaliatory animus toward plaintiff. In his declaration defendant Morrow states, in relevant 

part, 

1. I was assigned by the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) from August 1986 until my retirement in 

November 2010. During 2005 and 2006, I was a Correctional 

Officer assigned as the Legal Officer for California State Prison, 

Sacramento’s (CSP-Sacramento) A-Facility. 

2. As the Legal Officer, I was responsible for supervising both 

inmates attending the library and the inmate library clerks in the A 

Facility law library during second watch. My duties included 

searching inmates for weapons and contraband, escorting inmates to 

the library and supervising inmates during the library sessions. I 

was not responsible for supervising other officers or staff. I was not 

the Law Librarian, and I had no authority over the Law Librarian. 

3. I am informed that Mario Luis Navarro (V-31698) was assigned 

to CSP-Sacramento’s B-Facility, Building 1, Bed 106L, from May 

4 through November 4, 2005; and to B Facility, Building 2, Bed 

132L from November 14 through December 27, 2005. B-Facility 

had a separate law library and its own Legal Officer. I was not 

assigned to B Facility and my duties did not extend to the inmates 

housed there. 

4. I am informed that inmate Navarro was assigned to A Facility, 

Building 5, from December 27, 2005 through March 8, 2005. As A 

Facility’s Legal Officer, I was one of many people responsible for 

providing A Facility inmates with access to the law library and their 

legal property. 

(Morrow declaration, ¶¶ 1-4.) 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 78 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

79

 Plaintiff was housed in B Facility at the time he allegedly complained about defendant 

Morrow to the May 11, 2005 classification committee. However, at that time, defendant Morrow 

was employed in A Facility. According to defendant Morrow, his duties did not extend to B 

Facility. 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against defendant Morrow is not supported by the record. 

Plaintiff does not address how defendant Morrow, who was employed in A Facility, denied him 

access to his legal property while he was housed in B Facility. Plaintiff also does not address 

how defendant Morrow denied him access to the law library while he was housed in B Facility. 

Because defendants have presented uncontroverted evidence that defendant Morrow could not 

have retaliated against plaintiff, as plaintiff alleges, defendant Morrow should be granted 

summary judgment as to plaintiff’s retaliation claim. 

Sclafani and Baker

 As discussed above, plaintiff alleges that defendants Sclafani and Baker denied plaintiff’s 

access to a religious advisor and ignored his complaints regarding unconstitutional conditions in 

retaliation for plaintiff filing administrative grievances. Defendants argue that there is no 

evidence that these defendants harbored any retaliatory animus toward plaintiff. In their 

declarations, both defendanst Sclafani and Baker states that they took no adverse action against 

plaintiff and did not treat him differently because he submitted administrative appeals. (Sclafani 

declaration, ¶ 27; Baker declaration, ¶ 33.) 

 In opposing defendants’ summary judgment motion it is plaintiff’s burden to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his protected conduct, i.e., filing grievances, was a 

substantial or motivating factor behind the defendants’ conduct. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 

1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 As discussed above, the undersigned above recommends that defendants Baker and 

Sclafani be denied summary judgment as to some of plaintiff’s Eighth and First Amendment 

claims. With respect to his retaliation claims, plaintiff has not demonstrated that either defendant 

was motivated to commit the alleged Eighth and First Amendment violations in order to retaliate 

against plaintiff for filing grievances. In fact, at his deposition, plaintiff testified that defendant 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 79 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

80

Baker did not retaliate against him. (Plaintiff’s deposition at 104.) Plaintiff testified that his 

retaliation claim was against defendants O’Brian, Grannis and Morrow.19 (Id.) Plaintiff did not 

identify defendant Sclafani as a defendant against whom he was alleging retaliation. 

 Accordingly, defendants Sclafani and Baker should be granted summary judgment as to 

plaintiff’s retaliation claims.

XII. Remaining Matters 

Plaintiff’s Additional Request for Relief in Opposition

 In his opposition, plaintiff argues that the court should strike the portion of defendants’ 

summary judgment motion pertaining to defendants Baxter and Kernan because these defendants 

did not personally submit declarations in support of the dispositive motion. The undersigned is 

aware of no authority requiring a moving party to submit a personal declaration in support of a 

motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request to strike the motion for summary 

judgment brought on behalf of defendants Baxter and Kernan on these grounds is denied. 

 In the opposition, plaintiff also requests that the court deem the responses to requests for 

admissions by defendants Grannis and O’Brian admitted because they are not verified by 

defendants. In the reply to plaintiff’s opposition, defendants argue that plaintiff’s request that the 

responses be deemed admitted is untimely because discovery is closed. The undersigned agrees 

that plaintiff’s request regarding the request for admissions is untimely. In any event, as noted by 

defense counsel, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3) provides that requests for admission 

may be signed by the party or the attorney for the party. Defense counsel signed the requests for 

admission on defendants’ behalf. 

 In the reply, defendants also note that plaintiff alleges that defendant Kernan’s responses 

to request for production of documents is unverified. To the extent plaintiff is requesting that the 

court address a discovery matter, this request is untimely. In addition, as noted by defendants, 

verification of responses to requests for production of documents is not required. See Bashkin v. 

 

19

 Plaintiff also testified that his retaliation claim was against defendant Walker. (Plaintiff’s 

deposition at 104.) However, the undersigned did not order service of a retaliation claim against 

defendant Walker. 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 80 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

81

San Diego County, 2011 WL 1486313 at *7 (S.D. Cal. 2011). 

Objections

 The claims in this action have been extensively briefed by both parties. Plaintiff’s 

amended complaint, including exhibits, is 488 pages. Defendants’ summary judgment motion, 

including exhibits, is 307 pages. Plaintiff’s opposition, including exhibits, is 1474 pages. 

Because of the extensive briefing, objections to these findings and recommendations may be no 

longer than 20 pages (the page limit includes exhibits, if any). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that : 

 1. Defendants’ summary judgment motion (ECF No. 165) be denied as to the following 

claims: 1) due process claims against defendant Walker; 2) all Eighth Amendment conditions of 

confinement claims against defendants Kernan and Walker; 3) the Eighth Amendment conditions 

of confinement claims against defendant Baker alleging that plaintiff’s cell was cold, he was 

denied clean linen and clothing, he was denied adequate outdoor exercise, his cell had inadequate 

lighting and he was served spoiled food; 4) the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement 

claims against defendant Sclafani alleging that plaintiff received inadequate cleaning supplies, he 

was denied clean linen and clothing, his cell was cold and he was served spoiled food; 5) the First 

Amendment claims against defendant Walker alleging denial of access to a sweat lodge, spiritual 

advisor and religious property; 6) the First Amendment claims against defendant Kernan alleging 

denial of access to a spiritual advisor; and 7) the First Amendment claims against defendant 

Sclafani alleging denial of access to a spiritual advisor and religious property; 

 2. Defendants’ summary judgment motion (ECF No. 165) be granted in all other respects. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that 

////

////

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 81 of 82
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

82

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: March 25, 2016 

Na1878.sj(2) 

Case 2:09-cv-01878-KJM-KJN Document 183 Filed 03/25/16 Page 82 of 82