Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00159/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00159-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHEILA DASHNAW et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NEW BALANCE ATHLETICS, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17cv159-L(JLB)

ORDER GRANTING (1) MOTION 

FOR FINAL CLASS ACTION 

SETTLEMENT APPROVAL; AND 

(2) MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' 

FEES, COSTS, LITIGATION 

EXPENSES, AND PLAINTIFFS' 

INCENTIVE AWARDS

This consumer action alleging false advertising has been certified as a class action, 

and its settlement approved, on a preliminary basis. Plaintiffs move for final class action 

settlement approval (doc. no. 117-1 ("Final Appr. Mot.")) and for attorneys' fees, costs, 

litigation expenses, and Plaintiffs' incentive awards (doc. no. 109-1 ("Atty Fee Mot.")). 

Defendant does not oppose the motions. Judith D. Isaacson submitted an objection 

letter. (Doc. no. 116 ("Objection").) Having read and considered the motions and the 

Objection, including supporting declarations and exhibits, the motions for final approval 

of class action settlement, and for attorneys' fees, costs, litigation expenses and Plaintiffs' 

incentive awards are granted.

Plaintiffs allege consumer fraud relating to "made in USA" representations on 

certain New Balance athletic shoes in violation of California False Advertising Law, Cal. 

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Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq. (including violation of § 17533.7 relating to the sale 

of goods produced abroad); Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et 

seq.; California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.; 

breach of express warranty; negligent misrepresentation; and unjust enrichment. In the 

operative complaint (doc. no. 16), Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, 

restitution or disgorgement of profits or unjust enrichment, and damages, including 

punitive damages on their own behalf and on behalf of the putative class. The action 

was filed in State court and removed to this Court. This Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).

After an investigation, formal discovery, and motion briefing, the parties settled in 

private mediation. Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary class action certification and 

settlement approval. The Court ultimately granted the motion and ordered notice be 

disseminated to the putative class. (Doc. nos. 108, 111, 113.) Pending before the Court 

are Plaintiffs' motions for final approval of the Amended Settlement Agreement signed 

December 7, 2018 (doc. no. 106-3 ("Settlement")), for attorneys' fees, costs and 

litigation expenses totaling $650,000, and enhancement awards of $5,000 to each 

Plaintiff. 

I. Class Membership and Representation

In the Preliminary Approval Order (doc. no. 108), the Court certified this 

action as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) for 

purposes of settlement. For the reasons stated therein, and in the absence of new 

evidence or objections to class certification, the Court certifies for settlement 

purposes a class comprised of: 

All persons who purchased any and all “Made in USA” Shoes[1] from 

New Balance and/or its Authorized Retailers in California from 

December 27, 2012 up to and including January 24, 2019 ("Class" and 

“Class Period” respectively). “'Made in USA' Shoes” means the New 

 

1 Unless defined herein, the capitalized terms are defined in the Settlement.

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Balance’s “Made in USA” labeled shoes listed below and purchased as 

new by Class members in California during the Class Period: 

ELIGIBLE NEW BALANCE SHOE MODELS

601 ML996

M1140 ML997

M1290 MR1105

M1300 MR993

M1400 MW812

M1540 PM15

M1700 PM16

M2040 US574

M3040 US576

M498 US990

M574 US993

M585 US998

M587 W1140

M770 W1290

M990 W1400

M991 W1540

M995 W3040

M996 W498

M997 W587

M9975 W990

M998 W998

MK706 WK706

ML1300 WR993

ML1978 WW812

Excluded from the Class are: (a) New Balance’s board members and 

employees, including its attorneys; (b) any persons who purchased the 

“Made in USA” Shoes for the purposes of resale; (c) distributors or resellers of “Made in USA” Shoes; (d) the judge and magistrate judge and 

their immediate families presiding over this action; (e) governmental 

entities; and (f) persons or entities who or which exclude themselves 

from the Class as provided in the notice.

(See Prelim. Approval Order at 2-4.)2 The Settlement Administrator received 

requests for exclusion from 171 individuals. (Finegan Final Appr. Decl. (doc. no. 

 

2 All page number references are assigned by the ECF system.

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117-5) at 13; id. Ex. H (doc. no. 117-13).) These 171 individuals are excluded from 

the Class.

II. Notice to the Class

In the Preliminary Approval Order, Heffler Claims Group was appointed as 

Settlement Administrator for purposes of notice to the Class and claim processing. 

(Prelim. Approval Order at 6; see also Settlement ¶¶ II.10, 17, 23.) The Court 

approved, with changes, the proposed notice of class action certification and 

settlement, and set a schedule for notice, claim submissions, exclusions, and 

objections. (Prelim. Approval Order at 6-8.)

A. Notice Content

A class certification notice "must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily 

understood language" the following:

(i) the nature of the action;

(ii) the definition of the class certified;

(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses;

(iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney 

if the member so desires;

(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who 

requests exclusion;

(vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and

(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 

23(c)(3).

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(c)(2)(B). In addition, Rule 23(e) requires notice of class action 

settlement which "describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert 

those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward to be heard." In re 

Online DVD-Rental Antitr. Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 946 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The Court approved, with changes, the content of the long-form and summary 

notice proposed by the parties, including the release, claim form and exclusion form. 

(Prelim. Approval Order at 6 & Exs. A, B.) Subsequently, to accommodate the 

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parties' requests for extensions of time and changes to the notice procedure, the Court 

approved additional content changes. (See Feb. 20. 2019 Order (doc. no. 111); Feb. 

22, 2019 Order (doc. no. 113).) Nevertheless, the parties further altered the language 

of these documents without Court approval. (Cf., e.g., Prelim. Approval Order at 19, 

22 with Finegan Final Appr. Decl. Ex. B (doc. no. 117-7) at 7, 9.) 

Although the Court does not condone alterations of Court-approved notice, the 

content of the notice distributed to the Class is approved because the notices as 

distributed were adequate to meet Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and (e) requirements.

B. Notice Distribution

Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires "the best notice that is practicable under the 

circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified 

through reasonable effort." Such notice can be given by "United States mail, 

electronic means, or other appropriate means." Id. Consistently, notice of class 

action settlement must be distributed "in a reasonable manner to all class members 

who would be bound by the propos[ed settlement]." Id. 23(e)(1)(B). "When 

individual notice by mail is not possible, courts may use alternative means such as 

notice through third parties, paid advertising, and/or posting in places frequented by 

class members." Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 

2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this regard, "publication in 

a periodical, on a website, or even at an appropriate physical location" may be 

sufficient. Id. (citations omitted).

The Court ordered notice dissemination through a number of channels (Prelim. 

Approval Order at 6-7), as proposed by the Settlement Administrator (Finegan

Prelim. Decl. (doc. no. 106-14) at 10-11, 13-15)) and incorporated into the 

Settlement (Settlement ¶I V.A.1.). 

1. Direct Notice

Direct notice was distributed by email and United States first class mail. 

(Finegan Final Appr. Decl. at 9.) Settlement Administrator timely sent 51,282 emails 

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containing the long form notice. (Id.; cf. Settlement ¶ IV.B.1.b.; Feb. 20. 2019 Order 

at 4.) Of those notices, 2,038 bounced and 239 putative Class members 

unsubscribed. (Finegan Final Appr. Decl. at 9.) Settlement Administrator timely 

sent 3,093 summary notices by first class mail to putative Class members who 

unsubscribed, whose email notices were returned as undeliverable, or for whom only 

a physical address was available.3 (Id.; cf. Settlement ¶ IV.B.1.c.; Feb. 20, 2019 

Order at 4.) Of the notices sent by U.S. mail, 247 were returned as undeliverable. 

(Finegan Final Appr. Decl. at 9.) Upon return of undeliverable notices, the 

Settlement Administrator was to perform an address search and re-send them to new 

addresses no later than March 14, 2019 (Settlement ¶ IV.B.1.d.; Feb. 20, 2019 Order 

at 4); however, notices were not re-sent until May 14, 2019. (Finegan Final Appr. 

Decl. at 9.) Accordingly, 157 notices were sent two months late and only three 

weeks before the claims due date. (See Feb. 20. 2019 Order at 4.) No justification 

for the failure to follow the Court's orders has been provided.

2. Notice by Publication

Because nearly 95% of putative Class members were unknown,4the 

Settlement Administrator proposed a comprehensive program for notice by 

publication, which the Court adopted. (Finegan Prelim. Decl. at 10-11, 13-15; 

Prelim. Approval Order at 6.)

 

3

It is possible that 3,903 notices were sent. Ms. Finegan references 3,093 

notices; however, she also states that this amount included 1,626 records without any 

email address, 2,038 bounced emails and 239 unsubscribed email addresses, which 

adds to 3,903. (Finegan Final Appr. Decl. at 9.)

4 According to Defendant, 984,835 purchases of "Made in USA." Shoes were 

made in California during the Class Period. (Kim Final Appr. Decl. (doc. no. 117-2) 

at 4.) Of those, Defendant provided addresses for 52,908 putative Class members 

(Finegan Final Appr. Decl. at 8), which represents approximately 5% of the putative 

Class membership. 

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a. Publication in Print

The summary notice was published in print. (Finegan Final Appr. Decl. at 10-

11.) Based on Settlement Administrator's recommendation that The Los Angeles 

Times was "the most efficient print title," which "far outstrips any other print title in 

reader inclination or index," the Court adopted the recommendation to publish the 

summary notice in a "1/8th page ad unit" in The Los Angeles Times on four 

consecutive Sundays with a "Spanish sub headline directing Spanish speakers to the 

website for more information." (Finegan Prelim. Appr. Decl. at 14; Prelim. Approval 

Order at 6.) Publication notice was to commence on Sunday, February 10, 2019. 

(See Prelim. Approval Order at 6; Settlement ¶ IV.B.3.) 

After the due date, in late afternoon on Friday, February 15, 2019, Plaintiffs

filed a motion to modify the notice plan because the summary notice could not fit a 

1/8th page ad unit. (Doc. no. 110.) According to the Settlement Administrator, as 

revised by the Court, the notice contained 1,100 words and was "more than double 

the word count that would fit into that ad unit." (Finegan Modif. Decl. (doc. no. 110-

1) at 2.) As noted in the February 20, 2019 Order, the summary notice as originally 

proposed by the parties (doc. no. 106-5) had 973 words, and was therefore already 

approximately double the word count that would fit the ad. (Feb. 20, 2019 Order at 

3.) The initial proposal to publish the summary notice in The Los Angeles Times as 

a 1/8th page ad unit was therefore grossly inadequate from the beginning, but the 

parties did not disclose this to the Court until after the publication due date. The 

Class Counsel and the Settlement Administrator had failed to perform their duties 

with due diligence. (Feb. 20, 2019 Order at 3.) 

As an alternative to increasing the size of a print ad in The Los Angeles Times, 

the Settlement Administrator recommended publishing in People magazine's 

California edition, which would result in a lesser increase in the cost of notice. 

(Finegan Modif. Decl. at 2.) In addition, it would "maintain[] the integrity and 

efficiency of the outreach effort while increasing the target audience reach" by 2% 

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(Id. (emphasis in orig.).) In reliance on the Settlement Administrator's 

representations and to avoid prejudice to the putative Class members, the Court 

adopted the recommendation and ordered publication no later than February 22, 

2019. (Feb. 20, 2019 Order at 4-6.) 

As reflected in the subsequent motion for emergency relief, the parties and 

Settlement Administrator had neglected to inform the Court of two additional

material facts. First, the earliest possible print publication date in People magazine 

was March 22, 2019; and second, the People magazine California edition is 

published only every two or three weeks, i.e., notice would be published once in 

People magazine rather than four times in The Los Angeles Times Sunday edition. 

(Emerg. Mot. (doc. no. 112 ) at 3; Finegan Final Appr. Decl. at 10 (notice published 

once).) The summary notice published in People magazine also did not include a 

"Spanish sub headline directing Spanish speakers to the website for more 

information," as promised by the Settlement Administrator. (Cf. Finegan Prelim. 

Appr. Decl. at 14 & Prelim. Approval Order at 6 with Finegan Final Appr. Decl. Ex. 

D (doc. no. 117-9) at 3.) Accordingly, the Settlement Administrator and Class 

Counsel failed to perform their duties under the orders of this Court. 

b. Online Banner Ads

Online banner ads informed viewers of the pending settlement and directed 

them to the settlement website. (Finegan Final Decl. at 11; id. Ex. E (doc. no. 117-

10).) According to the Settlement Administrator, based on marketing and media use 

research, 89% of the putative Class members were frequent internet users, including 

social media. (Finegan Prelim. Appr. Decl. at 13.) The Settlement Administrator 

recommended online ads targeting individuals within the Class member profile in 

English and Spanish on websites and social media. (Id. at 13-14.) The Court 

adopted the Settlement Administrator's recommendations and ordered internet 

/ / / / /

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publication to begin no later than February 7, 20195and continue through April 8, 

2019. (Prelim. Approval Order at 6; Settlement ¶ IV.B.3.) The parties assured the 

Court that they would comply. (Emerg. Mot. at 2.) Nevertheless, the Settlement 

Administrator's final report indicates that the notice program "was substantially 

completed" on March 23, 2019,

6 or more than two weeks early. (See Finegan Final 

Appr. Decl. at 2.) In this regard, the Settlement Administrator and Class Counsel 

again deviated from the orders of this Court. 

c. Press Release

A press release consisting of the summary notice was timely issued over PR 

Newswire's California and California Hispanic Newslines. (Finegan Final Appr. 

Decl. at 11; id. Ex. F (doc. no. 117-11); cf. Finegan Prelim. Appr. Decl. at 11, 14-15; 

Prelim. Approval Order at 6.) Full text of the release was picked up by 293 online 

outlets and social media sites, including Associated Press outlets. (Id. Ex. G (doc. 

no. 117-12) at 5, 40.) 

d. Settlement Website and Toll-Free Phone Line

The Court adopted the Settlement Administrator's recommendations to 

establish (1) a settlement website as a landing page for online banner advertising 

where putative Class members could access the full-length notice, together with the 

release, claim form and exclusion form, electronically submit claims and requests for 

exclusion, and view important case filings; and (2) a 24-hour toll-free informational 

phone line. (Finegan Prelim. Appr. Decl. at 11, 15; Prelim. Approval Order at 6-7.) 

As of June 21, 2019, 103,140 users visited the settlement website and 156 calls were 

made to the toll-free line. (Finegan Final Appr. Decl. at 12-13.) 

 

5 At the request of the parties, the Court extended the February 7, 2019 

commencement deadline to February 22, 2019. (Feb. 20, 2019 Order at 4.) 

6 The Settlement Administrator does not provide a more specific end date. (Id.)

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According to the Settlement Administrator, the notice, by direct mail and 

publication combined, reached 74% of the putative Class members with an average 

frequency of 5.5 times. (Finegan Final Appr. Decl. at 2.) Without condoning the 

deficiencies in performing the Settlement Administrator's obligations under the 

Settlement and Court orders, the actual timing and manner of distributing notice were 

adequate to meet the constitutional and statutory requirements. 

III. Settlement Fairness

Class action settlements require court approval. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(e). 

"[S]ettlement of class actions present[s] unique due process concerns for absent class 

members [in part because] class counsel may collude with the defendants, tacitly 

reducing the overall settlement in return for a higher attorney's fee." In re Bluetooth 

Headset Prod. Liability Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted); see also Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 733 (1986) 

(noting the possibility of tradeoff between merits relief and attorneys' fees often 

implicit in class action settlement negotiations.) The Court's role in reviewing class 

action settlements "is to police the inherent tensions among class representation, 

defendant's interests in minimizing the cost of the total settlement package, and class 

counsel's interest in fees." Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 972 n.22 (9th Cir. 

2003); see also Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 946. If, as here, the proposed settlement

would bind class members, the Court may approve it only after a 

hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate after 

considering whether:

(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately 

represented the class;

(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm's length;

(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:

(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;

/ / / / /

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(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing 

relief to the class, including the method of processing classmember claims;

(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, 

including timing of payment; and

(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 

23(e)(3); and

(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(e)(2).7

The Court received one Objection. The Objection, however, was not to the 

Settlement fairness or class action certification. The objector disagrees with the law 

and the reality that manufacturers of quality products may be subject to lawsuits for 

various reasons. Because the Objection does not speak to any fairness factors, it does 

not warrant rejecting the Settlement.

 

7 Subsection (e)(2) was added to Rule 23 as a part of the 2018 amendments. 

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23, Advisory Comm. Notes. Prior to the amendment, the analysis 

was guided by the Churchill factors:

(1) the strength of the plaintiff's case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, 

and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class 

action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; 

(5) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; 

(6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a 

governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members of 

the proposed settlement.

Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 946 (quoting Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 

566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004); other citation omitted). The goal of the 2018 amendment 

"was not to displace any factor, but rather to focus . . . on the core concerns . . . that 

should guide the decision whether to approve the propos[ed settlement]." Fed. R. 

Civ. Proc. 23, Advisory Comm. Notes. Several of the Churchill factors were 

incorporated into Rule 23(e)(2) as amended. The remaining factors are discussed as 

relevant.

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A. Adequacy of Representation and Arm's Length Negotiations

As relevant to class action settlements, Rule 23(e)(2)(A) and (B) require 

consideration whether the class representatives and class counsel adequately 

represented the class, and whether the proposed settlement was negotiated at arm's 

length. Also relevant to the inquiry are the terms of any proposed attorneys' fees, 

including timing of payment. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(e)(2)(C)(iii).

1. Adequacy of Class Counsel's Representation

Based on the submissions filed in support of preliminary settlement approval

and settlement class certification, the Court provisionally appointed Jason H. Kim 

and Aubry Wand as Class Counsel. (Prelim. Approval Order at 4.) Before reaching 

Settlement, Class Counsel engaged in informal investigation and thorough discovery, 

including depositions and expert discovery. They fully briefed their motion in 

support of class certification and opposed Defendant's Daubert challenges to 

Plaintiffs' experts and motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Settlement was 

initially reached with a private mediator's assistance, and the negotiations were 

finished among counsel. (See Kim Atty Fee Decl. (doc. no. 109-2); id. Ex. A (doc. 

no. 109-3); Wand Atty Fee Decl. & Ex. A (doc. no. 109-6)).

The proposed Settlement provides for injunctive and monetary relief. The 

injunctive relief requires that for five years, Defendant's shoes with less than 95% 

domestic content less prominently advertise the "Made in USA" label and disclose 

that the "Made in USA" collection contains domestic value of 70% or greater.8 

(Settlement ¶ III.D.) In the monetary relief portion of the Settlement, Defendant 

agreed to create a non-reversionary Escrow Fund of $750,000 from which $200,000 

is to be paid to the Settlement Administrator for Administrative Costs, $15,000 for 

 

8

It appears that the injunctive relief stops short of enforcing California Business 

and Professions Code §17533.7.

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Plaintiffs incentive awards, subject to Court approval, with the balance to be used for 

Class member claims and, if any funds remain, for cy pres awards. (Id. ¶ III.A.) 

Defendant also agreed to pay without objection up to $650,000 to Class Counsel for 

attorneys' fees, costs and litigation expenses, subject to Court approval. (Id. ¶ VIII.) 

Accordingly, the Settlement obligates Defendant to pay up to $1.4 million in 

exchange for dismissal of this action and release of claims, including Class members' 

claims.

Based on the submissions made in support of the Attorneys' Fee Motion and 

Final Approval Motion, as well as on the docket in this case, the Class Counsel had 

sufficient information to negotiate a fair Settlement and had adequately prosecuted 

this action with Plaintiffs' assistance.

2. Attorneys' Fees

Where, as here, 

a settlement agreement is negotiated prior to formal class certification, 

. . . [¶] . . . such agreements must withstand an even higher level of 

scrutiny for evidence of collusion or other conflicts of interest than is 

ordinarily required under Rule 23(e) before securing the court's approval 

as fair.

Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 946. The Court has a duty to look for any "subtle signs that 

class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests and that of certain class 

members to infect the negotiations." Id. at 947. Examples of such subtle signs are 

(1) when counsel receive a disproportionate distribution of the 

settlement . . .;

(2) when the parties negotiate a “clear sailing” arrangement providing 

for the payment of attorneys' fees separate and apart from class funds

. . .; and

(3) when the parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants 

rather than be added to the class fund.

Id. (citations and most internal quotation marks omitted).

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The Settlement includes all three features. 

[T]hat the defendant in form agrees to pay the fees independently of any 

monetary award or injunctive relief provided to the class in the 

agreement does not detract from the need carefully to scrutinize the fee 

award. Even when technically funded separately, the class recovery and 

the agreement on attorneys' fees should be viewed as a “package deal.” 

. . . [A]ssessment of the settlement's overall reasonableness must take 

into account the defendant's overall willingness to pay.

 

Id. at 948-49 (internal citation and some quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

First, Defendant is willing to pay a total of $1.4 million, while attorneys' fees 

comprise the better part of $650,000. 

Second, the Settlement includes a “clear sailing” arrangement (Settlement ¶

VIII.A.) whereby "the defendant agrees not to oppose a petition for a fee award up to 

a specified maximum value." Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 940 n.6. This "carries the 

potential of enabling a defendant to pay class counsel excessive fees and costs in 

exchange for counsel accepting an unfair settlement on behalf of the class." Id. at 

947. 

Finally, the Settlement includes an implied "kicker," whereby "all fees not 

awarded would revert to defendants rather than be added to the cy pres fund or 

otherwise benefit the class." Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947. The kicker is implicit in 

that Defendant agreed to pay without objection up to $650,000 for attorneys' fees, 

costs and litigation expenses subject to Court approval. (Settlement ¶ VIII.A.) The 

Settlement does not allow that, if the Court awards less, the difference be added to 

the non-reversionary Escrow Fund for the benefit of the Class. (See id; cf. id. ¶

III.A.1 ($750,000 Escrow Fund is "non-reversionary" in that no part of it reverts to 

Defendant).) 

Although the $650,000 sum was negotiated with the mediator's assistance 

(Atty Fee Mot. at 14), this, by itself, is not sufficient to assure that the attorneys' fee 

amount was the product of collusion-free negotiations in light of the clear sailing and 

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kicker provisions. Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 948. The Court "ha[s] a special obligation 

to assure itself that the fees awarded in the agreement [are] not unreasonably high." 

Id. at 948 (internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted); see also id. at 

941. Specifically, 

[W]hen confronted with a clear sailing provision, the district court has a 

heightened duty to peer into the provision and scrutinize closely the 

relationship between attorneys' fees and benefit to the class, being 

careful to avoid awarding “unreasonably high” fees simply because they 

are uncontested.

Id. at 948 (citation omitted). 

For this same reason, a kicker arrangement reverting unpaid attorneys' 

fees to the defendant rather than to the class amplifies the danger of 

collusion already suggested by a clear sailing provision. If the 

defendant is willing to pay a certain sum in attorneys' fees as part of the 

settlement package, but the full fee award would be unreasonable, there 

is no apparent reason the class should not benefit from the excess 

allotted for fees. The clear sailing provision reveals the defendant's 

willingness to pay, but the kicker deprives the class of that full potential 

benefit if class counsel negotiates too much for its fees. 

Id. at 949 (internal citation and some quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

The Court therefore turns to the Attorneys' Fee Motion. "[A]ttorneys' fees and 

costs may be awarded in a certified class action where so authorized by law or the 

parties' agreement." Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941(citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(h)). 

Defendant agreed to pay up to $650,000 for attorneys' fees, costs and litigation 

expenses. (Settlement ¶ VIII.) This amount was negotiated with the mediator's 

assistance after the parties had agreed on relief to be provided to the Class. (Kim 

Final Appr. Decl. at 2.) 

Class Counsel request $227,620.22 for costs and litigation expenses. (Kim 

Atty Fee Decl. at 5 & Ex. C (doc. no. 109-5); Wand Atty Fee Decl. at 8.) They 

contend they incurred fees in the aggregate sum of $750,145.50, billed at their 

regular hourly rates. (Kim Atty Fee Decl. at 3 ($316,968); Wand Atty Fee Decl. at 4 

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& Ex. A ($433,177.50).) However, they request no more than $650,000 for fees, 

costs and litigation expenses combined.

a. Costs and Litigation Expenses

Class Counsel submitted declarations summarizing costs and litigation 

expenses amounting to $227,620.22. (Kim Decl. at 5 & Ex. C ($117,854.26); Wand 

Decl. at 8 ($109,765.96).) Because the lists included insufficient support for the 

requested sums, the Court issued the Order for Supplemental Documentation. (Doc. 

no. 119.) Based in the issues raised in the order, Class Counsel provided additional 

information regarding travel expenses, expert fees, Westlaw legal research charges, 

and line items which were not sufficiently identified in the motion. (Resp. to Order

(doc. no. 120).) Class Counsel reduced their request by $21,264.62 to eliminate 

duplication of travel expenses and account for a retainer refund due from one of their 

experts. (Id.) Further, they explained that $2,448.71 in Westlaw charges represents a 

pro rata portion of the monthly Westlaw fees attributable to the pending case (id. at 

7), which the Court finds to be reasonable. Accordingly, Class Counsel's request for 

206,355.60 in costs and litigation expenses is reasonable under Rule 23(h).

b. Attorneys' Fees

After costs and litigation expenses, $443,644.60 remains available for 

attorneys' fees from the agreed-upon sum of $650,000. “The award of attorneys’ fees 

in a class action settlement is often justified by the common fund or statutory feeshifting exceptions to the American Rule, and sometimes by both.” Bluetooth, 654 

F.3d at 941. Attorneys' fees in the pending case are based on the Settlement, which 

provides for payment from a common fund. (See Atty Fee Mot. at 2.) Alternatively, 

the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §1780(e), and the private attorney 

general statute, Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §1021.5, provide for attorneys' fees. 

Regardless of the Settlement provision, in a class action the Court has an independent 

/ / / / /

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duty to consider the reasonableness of the requested attorneys' fees. Bluetooth, 654 

F.3d at 941. 

Two different methods for calculating reasonable attorneys' fees have been 

approved depending on the circumstances -- the lodestar method and percentage-ofrecovery method. Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941-42.

The “lodestar method” is appropriate in class actions brought under feeshifting statutes . . ., where the relief sought—and obtained—is often 

primarily injunctive in nature and thus not easily monetized, but where 

the legislature has authorized the award of fees to ensure compensation 

for counsel undertaking socially beneficial litigation. [¶] Where a 

settlement produces a common fund for the benefit of the entire class, 

courts have discretion to employ either the lodestar method or the 

percentage-of-recovery method. Because the benefit to the class is 

easily quantified in common-fund settlements, we have allowed courts 

to award attorneys a percentage of the common fund in lieu of the often 

more time-consuming task of calculating the lodestar. 

Id. at 941-42 (citations omitted).

The Settlement provides for monetary and injunctive relief. The Court 

therefore turns to the lodestar method to determine whether the attorneys' fee request 

is reasonable. 

The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the 

prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation (as supported by 

adequate documentation) by a reasonable hourly rate for the region and 

for the experience of the lawyer.

Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941. 

Kim, a partner at Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP, has 

approximately twenty years of litigation experience, including complex civil 

litigation and class actions. (See Kim Prelim. Appr. Decl. App. A (doc. no. 106-8) at 

3; Kim Atty Fee Decl. (doc. no. 109-2) at 2.) He is based in northern California and 

customarily bills his work at $775 per hour. He has adjusted his rate to $550 per 

hour to more accurately reflect the billing rates for consumer class action attorneys in 

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this District. (Kim Atty Fee Decl. at 2-4 & Ex. B (doc. no. 109-4).) Plaintiffs also 

request fees for electronic discovery specialist Abigail Laudick, an attorney licensed 

in Maryland and Massachusetts, at the rate of $175 per hour, and paralegal Sam 

Marks at the rate of $125 per hour. Wand of The Wand Law Firm, P.C., had 

approximately five years of class action litigation experience at the outset of this 

case. (Wand Atty Fee Decl. (doc. no. 109-6) at 2-3.) He is based in Los Angeles and 

customarily bills his work at $525 per hour. He has adjusted his rate to $475 to more 

accurately reflect the prevailing rates in this District. (Id. at 4.) The Court finds that 

the requested hourly rates are reasonable.

Kim submitted detailed billing records showing that he, Laudick, and Marks 

collectively billed 413.5 hours to this case. (Kim Atty Fee Decl. Exs. A, B.) From 

the actually billed hours, he had excluded all time for attorneys who billed less than 5 

hours each to this case. (Kim Atty Fee Decl. at 3.)

Although Wand also submitted time records, they are not detailed in that all 

time entries for a day are entered together, thus making it difficult to determine how 

much time was spent on each task. (See Wand Atty Fee Decl. Ex. A.) Block billing 

like this "makes it more difficult to determine how much time was spent on particular 

activities." Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007). It 

may therefore support a finding that the attorney failed to carry his burden and 

warrant a reduction to arrive at the reasonable number of hours. Wand's time records 

state that he billed 825.1 hours to this case. (Wand Atty Fee Decl. Ex. A.) 

Upon review of the billing records, the Court reduced time for entries lacking 

sufficient description,9reflecting excessive time spent for the task, or excessive 

duplication of time between counsel. The Court based its assessment on the

 

9 Entries which do not specify a subject matter (for example, designated 

generally as "email string" with client or opposing counsel) and reflecting more than 

a minimal amount of time, and unspecified "legal research," were reduced.

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counsel's stated experience and expertise in the area of consumer class actions.10 

Because Class Counsel were awarded litigation expenses for case-related onboard 

internet charges during travel,11 it is assumed that corresponding time was billed to 

the relevant tasks and cases. Time described solely as travel was reduced. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Kim, Laudick and Marks together reasonably billed 

359 hours, and Wand reasonably billed 653 hours to this case. 

Based on the foregoing, the lodestar amounts to $488,053. The lodestar is 

presumptively reasonable. Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941-42 & n.7. It can be adjusted 

by an appropriate positive or negative multiplier using the Kerr factors if necessary 

to achieve reasonableness:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the 

questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service 

properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to 

acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is 

fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the 

experience, reputation, and the ability of the attorneys; (10) the

"undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the 

professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar 

cases.[12]

Id. at 942 n.7 (quoting Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.3d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 

1975)). Because "[m]any of these factors are subsumed within the calculation of 

hours reasonably expended at a reasonable rate[, . . .] the Kerr factors only warrant a 

 

10 The Court reduced time billed for resubmitting deficient filings when the 

defects should have been readily apparent to an attorney with Class Counsel's 

experience and expertise. (See, e.g., docs. no. 58, 101, 105.)

11 See Kim Atty Fee Decl. Ex. C; see also Resp. to Order at 4 n.3.

12 "At least one factor is no longer valid – whether the fee was fixed or 

contingent." Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 92 n.7 (citation omitted). 

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departure from the lodestar in rare and exceptional cases." Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). “Foremost among these considerations, however, is the 

benefit obtained for the class.” Id. at 942. “Thus, where the plaintiff has achieved 

‘only limited success,’ counting all hours expended on the litigation—even those 

reasonably spent—may produce an ‘excessive amount,’ and the Supreme Court has 

instructed district courts to instead ‘award only that amount of fees that is reasonable 

in relation to the results obtained.’” Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 

440 (1983)). 

This is not a rare case warranting departure from the lodestar. The attorneys’ 

skills, risks of contingency litigation, preclusion of other work due to accepting this 

case, and the experience, reputation and ability of counsel are already reflected in the

billing rates approved by the Court. The calculation of reasonable hours, while based 

on the counsel's experience and expertise in consumer class action litigation, also 

allows for additional work necessitated by issues which do not occur as a matter of 

course, such as, for example, Defendant's constitutional challenge to California 

Business and Professions Code §17533.7. 

The recovery obtained for the benefit of the Class is modest. Defendant 

provided information showing that 984,835 pairs of shoes were sold in California 

with the allegedly misleading "Made in USA" labeling. (Kim Final Appr. Decl. at 4.) 

According to Plaintiffs' expert, each pair sold at a $10.10 premium. (Prelim. Appr. 

Mot. at 24.) The maximum possible award was therefore approximately $10 million. 

To settle, Defendant agreed to somewhat ameliorate the allegedly misleading nature 

of its advertising for five years and pay no more than $1.4 million.13 (Settlement ¶¶ 

 

13 Plaintiffs acknowledge that the value of injunctive relief is difficult to quantify

with precision. (Atty Fee Mot. at 20-21.) Defendant submitted a declaration 

outlining the efforts it will undertake to comply, which Plaintiffs value at $6.1 

million. (Michael Decl. (doc. no. 106-3) at 104-07; Prelim. Appr. Mot. (doc. no. 

106-1) at 25.) This valuation has limited probative value because it is not entirely 

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III., VIII.) The $488,053 lodestar represents approximately 35% of the monetary 

relief obtained for the benefit of the Class.14 When considered in light of the 

opposition to class certification, Daubert challenges to Plaintiffs' price premium 

calculation, and the constitutional challenge to Plaintiffs' claims, the expense of 

prosecuting the case through trial, and the uncertainty of the outcome on one hand, 

and on the other hand, the monetary recovery and benefit of injunctive relief, the 

lodestar strikes a fair balance between the benefit conferred on the Class and the 

amount of attorney work necessary to achieve it. Accordingly, neither an increase 

nor a reduction of the lodestar is warranted. 

The $488,053 lodestar exceeds $443,644.60, which remains available from the 

agreed-upon sum of $650,000 after payment of costs and litigation expenses. Under 

the Settlement, Class Counsel cannot recover more than $443,644.60. (Settlement ¶

VIII.A.) The Court therefore finds that the request for attorneys' fees is reasonable

under Rule 23(e) and (h). Neither the amount of attorneys' fees, the clear sailing 

arrangement, nor the kicker provision render the Settlement unfair to the Class.

3. Plaintiffs' Representation of the Class and Incentive Awards

Based on the submissions filed in support of preliminary approval, the Court 

provisionally appointed Plaintiffs Sheila Dashnaw, William Meier, and Sheryl Jones 

 

supported by evidence. More importantly, the injunctive relief appears to fall short 

of fully enforcing the law. (Cf. Settlement ¶ III.D. with Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§17533.7.) Rather than estimate the monetary value of the injunctive relief to the 

Class, the Court relies on the lodestar method to evaluate the reasonableness of 

requested attorneys' fees. See Staton, 327 F.3d at 974. 

14 "If an agreement is reached in the amount of a settlement fund and a separate 

amount for attorney fees the sum of the two amounts ordinarily should be treated as a 

settlement fund for the benefit of the class." Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 943 (internal 

quotation marks, ellipsis and citation omitted); see also id. at 945. For purposes of 

this case, the Court combines the $750,000 Escrow Fund and the additional $650,000 

amount for attorneys' fees, costs and litigation expenses.

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as representatives for the certified Class (collectively "Plaintiffs"). (Prelim. Approval 

Order at 4.) As relevant to adequacy of representation, the Court considers whether 

(1) "the named plaintiffs . . . have any conflicts of interest with other class members 

and (2) will [they] prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class." Online 

DVD-Rental, 779 F.3d at 943(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Under the Settlement, each Plaintiff may receive up to $5,000 as an incentive 

award for service as a Class representative. (Settlement ¶¶ III.A.2., VIII.C.) 

Plaintiffs each request $5,000. Incentive awards such as this "are discretionary and 

are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, 

[and] to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action . 

. .." Rodriguez v. West Publ'g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2009). The 

amount of the award must be related to the actual service or value the class 

representative provides to the class. See id. at 960.

Although incentive awards are "fairly typical in class actions," Rodriguez, 563 

F.3d at 958, they "should not become routine practice," lest the representatives be 

"tempted to accept suboptimal settlements at the expense of the class members whose 

interests they are appointed to guard." Radcliffe v. Experian Information Solutions 

Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). The potential conflict between the representative and the class is 

exacerbated when, as here, there is a large difference between the requested incentive

award and individual class member recovery. See id. at 1165. Accordingly, "courts 

must be vigilant in scrutinizing all incentive awards to determine whether they 

destroy the adequacy of the class representatives." Id. at 1164.

Plaintiffs' request for $5,000 each vastly exceeds the monetary relief available 

to each Class member under the Settlement. Nevertheless, the amount is not so high 

as to bring into question Plaintiffs' adequacy of representation. See Online DVDRental, 779 F.3d at 947 (approving $5,000 incentive awards where class members 

/ / / / /

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received $12 each). The combined request for $15,000 represents approximately 1% 

of the $1.4 million monetary relief under the Settlement. See id. 

Plaintiffs benefitted the Class by filing and prosecuting this action, responding 

to formal written discovery, being deposed, and providing input to Class Counsel, 

including regarding Settlement. Meier devoted 29.5 hours, Dashnaw devoted 32.5 

hours, and Jones devoted 41 hours to the prosecution of this action. (Docs. no. 109-7 

through 9.)

No structural differences are present in the Settlement. Plaintiffs and the Class 

members have the same kind and amount of claims against Defendant, and no subclasses are warranted in this case. See Online DVD-Rental, 779 F.3d at 943. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs had no incentive to favor one group of Class members over 

another.

Finally, there appears to have been no agreement for payment of incentive 

awards between Plaintiffs and Class Counsel before the Settlement. The incentive 

awards are conditioned on Court discretion, as the Settlement does not guarantee 

each Plaintiff $5,000. (Settlement ¶ VIII.C.) Under the circumstances, the requested 

awards are reasonable. 

4. Arm's Length Negotiations

The Settlement was reached with the assistance of a private mediator after 

thorough investigation, discovery and substantive motion briefing. The amounts 

requested for attorneys' fees and Class representative incentive awards are

reasonable. Viewed as a whole, the Settlement terms are fair under the

circumstances. Based on the evidence presented, the Settlement appears to have been 

reached through arm's length negotiations.

B. Adequacy of Relief Provided to the Class

Rule 23(e)(2)(C) requires the Court to consider whether the relief provided for 

the Class is adequate in light of

(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;

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(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to 

the class, including the method of processing class-member 

claims;

(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, including 

timing of payment; and

(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3)[.]

In addition, Rule 23(e)(2)(D) requires consideration whether "the proposal treats 

class members equitably relative to each other."

1. Costs, Risks, and Delay of Trial and Appeal

As discussed in the context of attorneys' fees, the Settlement provides a modest 

relief to the Class. Each Class member can recover a maximum of $10 per qualifying 

pair of shoes, up to $50 for 5 or more pairs, or $100 per household. (Settlement ¶ 

III.B.8.) If funds remain after all valid claims are paid, or any claim payment checks 

remain uncashed, the remainder is to be distributed in equal parts to the Public 

Justice Foundation and Consumer Federation of California as cy pres recipients. (Id.

¶ III.C.2.) On the other hand, if valid Class member claims exceed the fund, the 

claim payments are reduced pro rata. (¶ III.C.1.) The Settlement includes injunctive 

relief, which somewhat ameliorates the allegedly misleading "Made in USA" 

advertising for five years, and a payment of not more than $1.4 million, of which 

$750,000 is available for payment of Administrative Costs, Plaintiffs' incentive

awards, Class members' claims, and cy pres awards, if any. (Settlement ¶¶ III.A., 

VIII.) 

The case was aggressively litigated through settlement. No reason exists to 

expect that the same intensity of litigation would not continue if the case had not 

settled. Defendants vigorously opposed class certification, mounted Daubert

challenges to Plaintiffs' price premium calculation, and questioned the 

constitutionality of Plaintiffs' statutory claims. If Plaintiffs survived these 

challenges, bringing the case to trial would entail significant time and expense, while 

the outcome was uncertain. Based on the expense of prosecuting the case through 

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trial, and the uncertainty of the outcome, the relief provided to the Class is adequate

for purposes of settlement.

2. Equitable Treatment of Class Members

The Settlement distinguishes among Class members depending on the number 

of pairs of qualifying shoes they purchased. Each Class member can recover a 

maximum of $10 per pair, up to $50 for 5 or more pairs, or $100 per household. 

(Settlement ¶ III.B.8.) Approximately 3% of the valid claims were submitted for 

more than one pair of shoes. (See Finegan Final Appr. Decl. at 15.) It is unclear 

whether any of those claims were for more than five pairs per person or more than 

ten pairs per household. (See id.) Given the small percentage of possibly affected 

Class members, the proposed plan of distribution is equitable. 

3. Claim Distribution

Each Class member who wished to receive any monetary compensation had to 

submit a Claim Form no later than June 6, 2019. (Settlement ¶ III.B.; Finegan Final 

Appr. Decl. Ex. B (doc. no. 117-7 ("Notice")) at 2, 5, 7; see also Notice App. B

(Claim Form).

15) The Claim Form, signed under penalty of perjury, required Class 

members to provide contact information, including a physical address, and list the 

shoe model they purchased from the list of eligible shoe models, including the date 

and location of purchase. No other proof of purchase was initially required to submit 

a claim for one pair of shoes for a maximum payment of $10. Class members who 

submitted a claim for more than one pair had to provide proof in the form of a 

receipt, photo of the shoes, purchase order, or credit card statement reflecting the 

purchase. Regardless of the number of shoes claimed, the Settlement Administrator 

 

15 The Claim Administrator failed to provide copies of any of the three 

attachments to the long-form notice distributed to the Class (App. A (Release and 

Waiver of Claims), App. B (Claim Form) and App. C (Exclusion Form). (See 

Finegan Final Appr. Decl. Exs. A-I (docs. 117-6 through 14).) The Court accessed 

these documents on the settlement website. 

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could request additional proof to validate the claim, which had to be provided within 

35 days of request, or the claim could be reduced or denied. Class members with 

questions were directed to the settlement website and the toll-free number. 

Ultimately, valid claims are to be paid by check via U.S. mail sent no later than 14 

business days after final judgment in this case. (Settlement ¶ III.B.7-9, C.3 & 

II.A.20.; Notice at 8.) The cy pres awards are to be disbursed to the beneficiaries no 

later than 180 calendar days after final judgment. (Settlement ¶ III.C.2. & 4.) 

The Class members submitted a total of 58,120 claims; however, the 

Settlement Administrator rejected 9,548 as invalid and approved 48,572. (Finegan 

Final Appr. Decl. at 15.) Upon the Court's request (doc. no. 122), the Settlement 

Administrator provided a detailed breakdown of reasons for rejecting these claims. 

(Mahan Decl. (doc. no.123).) The Court finds the Settlement Administrator's 

processing of these claims to be reasonable. No claims were rejected for 

untimeliness or inability to provide proof of purchase. (See Mahan Decl.)

The valid claims reflect an approximately 5% participation rate. (Finegan 

Final Appr. Decl. at 15.) Although the rate is very low, see Briseno, 844 F.3d at 

1131 (noting "[i]t is not unusual for only 10 or 15% of the class members to bother 

filing claims" (citation omitted)), this is not necessarily fatal to the Settlement, see 

Online DVD-Rental, 779 F.3d at 945 ("settlements have been approved where less 

than five percent of class members file claims" (citation omitted)). 

Requests for exclusion were received from 171 putative Class members 

(Finegan Final Appr. Decl. at 13) and one Class member objected. As noted, the 

Objection was not directed to the terms of the Settlement or Class certification. 

Accordingly, the Class members' response to the Settlement does not preclude a

finding of fairness.

/ / / / /

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The total amount of valid claims is $490,420.

16

 After deductions for the 

administrative costs of up to $220,00017 (Kim Final Appr. Decl. at 13) and Plaintiffs'

incentive awards totaling $15,000, the Escrow Fund balance is sufficient to provide a 

100% payment to the Class members who filed valid claims. The remaining funds 

(at least $24,580) and any funds remaining due to returned or uncashed Settlement 

checks shall be distributed as cy pres awards. (Settlement ¶ III.B.2.) The Court 

approves the claim payment and cy pres distribution plan as stated in the Settlement 

and the Settlement Administrator's July 25, 2019 declaration.

4. Attorneys' Fees

As discussed above, the requested attorneys' fees are reasonable. The 

fees are to be paid within 14 business days after final judgment in this case. 

(Settlement ¶¶ VIII.A., II.A.20.) Because this action does not involve a coupon 

settlement, the timing of payment does not preclude a finding of reasonableness or 

settlement fairness. See Online DVD-Rental, 779 F.3d at 949-50.

5. Agreements Required to Be Identified

According to Plaintiffs' there are no agreements other than the Settlement. 

(Kim Final Appr. Decl. at 4.)

C. Government Participation

Because Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing that 

California Business and Professions Code §17533.7 violates the First Amendment, 

notice of the challenge was served on the California Attorney General pursuant to 28

 

16 This amount may be increased, if the Settlement Administrator is able to 

obtain any of the physical addresses which the Class members had not provided. 

(See Mahan Decl. at 4.)

17 See Settlement ¶ III.A.; February 20, 2019 Order at 5. The Settlement 

Administrator's invoices so far have not reached this amount. See Finegan Final 

Appr. Decl. Ex. I. 

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U.S.C. § 2403(b) to provide him an opportunity to intervene. (Doc. no. 87.) The 

Attorney General filed a notice of non-intervention. (Doc. no. 94.)

Furthermore, Defendant provided notice of class action settlement to the 

United States Attorney General and California Attorney General pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §1715. (Najemy Decl. (doc. no. 117-4).) No government officials have 

objected to the Settlement. (Kim Final Appr. Decl. at 5.)

D. Settlement Fairness

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds the Settlement fair, reasonable, 

and adequate under Rule 23(e). 

IV. Order

The motions for final class action settlement approval (doc. no. 117) and for 

attorneys' fees, costs, litigation expenses and Plaintiffs' incentive awards (doc. no. 109) 

are granted. The parties and the Settlement Administrator shall timely perform their 

remaining obligations under the Settlement, orders of this Court and as stated above, 

including payment of Class members' claims, attorneys' fees, costs and litigation 

expenses, Plaintiffs' incentive awards, Administrative Costs and cy pres awards, as well 

as compliance withe the injunctive relief conferred by the Settlement.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2019

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