Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07123/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07123-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 1999 Decided February 18, 2000

No. 97-7123

Thu McGill,

Appellee

v.

George MuNoz,

President and Chief Executive Officer,

Overseas Private Investment Corporation,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv01953)

Morgan D. Hodgson argued the cause for appellant. With

her on the briefs was Shannen W. Coffin.

Thu Minh McGill, appearing pro se, argued the cause and

was on the brief for appellee.

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Joanne Zimolzak, appointed by this court, argued the

cause as amicus curiae on the side of appellee. With her on

the brief was Tami Lyn Azorsky.

Before: Williams, Rogers, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Thu McGill filed suit

against her former employer, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), alleging, inter alia, that OPIC

discriminated against her in violation of the Rehabilitation

Act. The district court denied OPIC's post-trial motion for

judgment as a matter of law on that claim, and OPIC

appealed. We hold that because McGill failed to offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that

OPIC discriminated against her, the decision of the district

court must be reversed.

I

OPIC is a federal agency established by Congress to

"facilitate the participation of United States private capital

and skills in the economic and social development of less

developed countries." 22 U.S.C. s 2191. McGill was employed there as a secretary in the Department of Legal

Affairs. On October 18, 1995, she sued her employer, citing

violations of two statutes. First, she alleged that OPIC

discriminated against her on the basis of her race and national origin, and retaliated against her for making discrimination

complaints, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. ss 2000e et seq. Second, she alleged that

OPIC discriminated against her on account of her disability

(depression), and failed to reasonably accommodate that disability, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.

ss 701 et seq.

The district court granted OPIC's motion for summary

judgment against McGill on all of the Title VII claims.

Plaintiff proceeded to trial on the remaining Rehabilitation

Act claims and secured a $75,000 verdict. After trial, the

court granted OPIC's motion for judgment as a matter of law

against McGill on the reasonable accommodation claim, but

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denied OPIC's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the

disability discrimination claim. Because the jury had not

apportioned the recovery between the two claims, the court

let McGill's $75,000 judgment stand. See McGill v. Callear,

973 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (D.D.C. 1997).

Both McGill and OPIC appealed. A prior panel of this

court rejected McGill's appeal, affirming both the order

granting OPIC summary judgment against her on the Title

VII claims, and the order granting judgment as a matter of

law against her on the reasonable accommodation claim. See

McGill v. MuNoz, 172 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (unpublished

table decision). OPIC's appeal was then set for argument.

Although McGill was represented by counsel at trial, she

appealed pro se, and we appointed an amicus curiae to

present arguments on her behalf.1 We now decide the sole

remaining issue: whether the district court improperly denied OPIC's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the

claim of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.

II

We review de novo a trial court's denial of a motion for

judgment as a matter of law. See Duncan v. Washington

Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 99-7073, 2000 WL 45501, at

*2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 2000). We do not, however, lightly

disturb a jury verdict. Judgment as a matter of law is

appropriate only if "the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that

reasonable men and women could not" have reached a verdict

in plaintiff's favor. Id. (quoting Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation

omitted)).

The Rehabilitation Act provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of

her or his disability, be ... subjected to discrimination under

any program or activity ... conducted by any Executive

agency...." 29 U.S.C. s 794. Thus, assuming without de-

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1 For purposes of this opinion, we will attribute to McGill arguments made either by her or by amicus.

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ciding that McGill is an "otherwise qualified individual with a

disability," we may uphold the jury's verdict only if McGill

proved that she was subjected to discrimination "by reason of

her disability." Id.; see Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area

Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

A plaintiff may always prove a claim of discrimination by

introducing direct evidence of discriminatory intent. As an

alternative, when the defendant denies its actions were motivated by the plaintiff's disability, the plaintiff may employ the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to bring her

Rehabilitation Act claim before a jury.2 See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc);

Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also

Marshall v. Federal Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Once a case has been fully tried on the

merits and submitted to the jury, however, the McDonnell

__________

2 The Supreme Court has described the McDonnell Douglas

framework as follows:

First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.

Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case,

the burden shifts to the defendant 'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'

Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff

must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.

...

The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the

defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.

Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53

(1981) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802 (1973)) (citations omitted). In Barth, we noted the applicability

of this framework, originally developed for actions brought under

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Douglas framework "drops from the case" and only the

ultimate question remains: "[whether] the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." United States

Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715

(1983) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10, 253 (1981)) (alteration in original); accord St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

510-11 (1993); Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d

1549, 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1999).3 On appeal, that question undergoes further refinement: we ask only whether a reasonable

jury could have found such intentional discrimination. See

Swanks, 179 F.3d at 933; Mungin, 116 F.3d at 1554.

At trial, McGill alleged that OPIC discriminated against

her in two respects during the summer of 1994. First, she

was required to make up time she took off from work to

participate in an aerobics class. Second, she was required to

submit medical documentation when she used sick leave

credits for absences from work.4 We apply the legal analysis

set forth above to each of these allegations.

A

At some time prior to January 1994, McGill began taking

part in a mid-day aerobics class conducted on OPIC's premis-

__________

Title VII, to claims of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. See Barth, 2 F.3d at 1186.

3 Although plaintiff is correct in noting that the elements of a

"prima facie case" may vary depending upon the circumstances of

the allegations, see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6, the plaintiff's

"ultimate burden" is always to prove "that she has been the victim

of intentional discrimination," id. at 256.

4 These are the only two examples of discriminatory treatment

discussed in the brief of amicus curiae. The district court noted

that "[p]laintiff also testified about training opportunities but the

record does not reflect a colorable claim of disparate treatment on

that basis." McGill, 973 F. Supp. at 22 n.2. We agree, and reach

the same conclusion regarding other claims raised in plaintiff's pro

se brief but not mentioned by either the district court or amicus.

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es. In July of 1994, McGill's supervisors became concerned

that she was spending an inordinate amount of time away

from her desk, particularly at lunchtime. McGill explained

that, in addition to the authorized lunch break, she needed an

extra half hour to shower and dress after the aerobics class.

In response, McGill's supervisors advised her by memorandum that she would be permitted to take "one and one-half

hour" off for the class, but would have to "make up the extra

half hour" that was "beyond the time provided for lunch."

Pl.'s Ex. E (J.A. at 49).

McGill contends that OPIC discriminated against her on

account of her mental disability by requiring her to make up

the extra half hour. Lacking any direct evidence of discriminatory intent, McGill argues that OPIC's intent can be inferred from its disparate treatment of her; she asserts that

other, similarly-situated employees who participated in the

same class did not have to make up any time.5 Yet, while

there was testimony that numerous employees attended the

aerobics class, which lasted forty minutes, no witness testified

that any employee other than McGill took more than the

allotted lunch hour to return to work.

McGill's argument that others were treated more favorably

than she reduces to an argument that others "must" have

taken off more than just the lunch hour. For this, plaintiff

relies on testimony by Frederick Jenney, one of her attorney

supervisors, who stated that "it could take an hour-and-ahalf" for someone "to take an aerobics class and get showered

and everything in the middle of the day." J.A. at 763. But

Jenney's speculation that it "could" take an hour-and-a-half is

not evidence that it "did" take anyone--other than plaintiff--

that long. See Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 458-59 (D.C.

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5 Cf. Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting

that "[t]o establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, [plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that she is a member of

a protected class; (2) that she was similarly situated to an employee

who was not a member of the protected class; and (3) that she and

the similarly situated person were treated disparately").

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Cir. 1999) (holding speculation insufficient to avoid summary

judgment); Al-Zubaidi v. M.A. Ijaz, 917 F.2d 1347, 1348 (4th

Cir. 1990) (holding that "mere speculation is insufficient" to

support a jury verdict) (internal quotation omitted). Indeed,

immediately after the above-quoted remark, Jenney testified

that he knew of no one else in the department who did take

an hour-and-a-half off to attend the class. See J.A. at 765.

The time taken by McGill, he said, "was an unusual situation."

Id. The only other evidence in the record is to the same

effect. See J.A. at 458 (testimony of office manager Connie

Downs, stating that OPIC "just didn't have problems with

other people being away for such a long period of time").6

In sum, because plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that

she was treated unfavorably compared to other employees,7

and because she offered no other evidence of discrimination,

we find that no reasonable jury could have concluded that the

compensatory time requirement was the product of intentional discrimination.

B

McGill also contends that OPIC discriminated against her

by requiring her to provide a doctor's note for absences from

work for which she sought to use sick leave. Relying once

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6 McGill cites the testimony of secretary Ida Kingsberry as

assertedly supporting her claim that none of the other secretaries

who participated in the class were required to compensate for extra

time away from their desks. See McGill Br. at 8, 11; Amicus Br. at

44-45. Kingsberry, however, did not testify that she (or any of the

others) took off more than the lunch hour. To the contrary,

Kingsberry testified that she "d[id] not ... think that Thu McGill

was treated less favorably than others" in the department. J.A. at

375.

7 See Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507,

1514 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment because she failed to show she was similarly situated

to co-worker to whom she compared herself).

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again on indirect evidence of discriminatory intent, McGill

asserts that office policy did not require documentation for

such absences, and thus that OPIC's claimed reliance on such

policy was pretextual.8

OPIC's written policy defines "sick leave" as "a period of

approved absence with pay from official duty," which is

authorized only in limited circumstances, including "[w]hen

the employee is unable to satisfactorily perform the assigned

duties because of sickness [or] mental illness." J.A. at 308.

The policy states that it is the supervisor's responsibility to

determine "that the nature of the employee's illness was such

to incapacitate him for his job," and provides that "[a] medical

certificate signed by appropriate medical authority is generally required for sick leave exceeding 3 days duration." Id.

Because McGill was never absent for more than three days at

a time, she contends that OPIC violated its policy by requiring written documentation.

In fact, there is no evidence that OPIC violated its sick

leave policy. That policy does not end with the passages

quoted above. It also includes the following procedures for

dealing with the apparent abuse of sick leave:

When the employee appears to be using sick leave improperly (for example, chronic use of brief periods of sick

leave), the employee may be required to comply with

special leave procedures more stringent than those applied to other employees. For example, the employee

may be required ... to provide evidence to substantiate

__________

8 Cf. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289 (noting that one form of evidence from

which a jury may be able to infer discriminatory intent is "evidence

the plaintiff presents to attack the employer's proffered explanation

for its actions"); id. at 1290 n.5 (noting that the "sufficiency of the

finding of pretext to support a finding of discrimination depends on

the circumstances of the case") (quoting Fisher v. Vassar College,

114 F.3d 1332, 1338 (2d Cir. 1998) (en banc)).

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brief periods of illness. An employee who is being

placed on leave restriction shall be notified in writing, in

advance, of the procedures and their duration. At the

end of six months, the employee's record will be reviewed

to see if the restrictions can be lifted.

Id. (emphasis added). It is this aspect of the policy that

OPIC applied to McGill.

In the summer of 1994, McGill's office manager, Connie

Downs, noted that McGill had missed work five times in a

one-month period. The absences conformed to a clear pattern--each time McGill received a poor performance appraisal, she took off the following one or two days of work. See id.

at 59, 409. Responding to what appeared to her to be an

abuse of sick leave, Downs sent McGill a memorandum,

entitled "Special Leave Procedures." Id. at 59. The memo

advised McGill that her "pattern" of leave "raise[d] a question

about whether you are using sick leave for the purposes for

which it is intended," and therefore "warrant[ed] special leave

procedures." Id. at 59-60. Pursuant to OPIC's written

policy, which was quoted in the letter, Downs instructed

McGill that she would be required to provide a physician's

certificate when she wanted to take sick leave for future

absences. See id. at 60. The memorandum also notified

McGill that the requirement would be reviewed in six months

to determine whether it could be rescinded. See id.

As Downs' memorandum fully complied with the written

sick leave policy set forth above,9 there is no evidence to

__________

9 McGill contends that a fragment of Downs' trial testimony

shows that Downs did not act in compliance with OPIC's policy,

which expressly permits sick leave for both physical and mental

illness. Although at one point Downs did testify that she doubted

McGill's need for leave because McGill "didn't appear ... physically sick," J.A. at 410, in context it is clear that Downs was distinguishing between real and feigned illness, rather than between

kinds of illnesses. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he question is whether you're

using sick leave for actual sick leave, or whether you're just using

sick leave for leave that you just want to take.").

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support McGill's contention that it was mere pretext. Nor

did McGill furnish other evidence of intentional disparate

treatment--or, for that matter, of disparate treatment at all.

McGill offered no evidence that employees with similarly

suspicious patterns of absenteeism were treated any differently than she was. See Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani,

Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding

that terminated employee failed to show that retained employee had similar difficulty in getting along with others in

the firm). In fact, McGill offered no evidence that employees

with a similar frequency of absenteeism--whether suspicious

or not--were treated any differently. See Mungin, 116 F.3d

at 1554, 1558 (overturning jury verdict where plaintiff failed

to show that employer's explanation for his treatment was

pretextual, or that similarly-situated colleagues were treated

more favorably).

In short, McGill offered no evidence--either direct or circumstantial--from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that OPIC imposed the medical documentation requirement because of her disability.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no reasonable

jury could have found that OPIC intentionally discriminated

against McGill. We therefore reverse the order denying in

part OPIC's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and

remand the case for entry of judgment for defendant. See

Mungin, 116 F.3d at 1558; see also Scott v. District of

Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reversing and

remanding when "the facts, viewed in the light most favorable

to [plaintiff], indicate that he cannot recover on any of his

claims").

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