Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01881/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01881-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JAIME GARCIA, individually, and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P.; 

and DOES 1 through 10, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-01881 WBS JDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 

AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Jaime Garcia (“Garcia” or “plaintiff”)

originally filed this putative class action against defendant

Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. (“defendant” or “Penske”) in Yolo 

County Superior Court, seeking monetary and equitable relief 

pursuant to the California Labor Code and the Unfair Competition 

Law (“UCL”). Plaintiff alleges that defendant denied him minimum 

wages, overtime compensation, meal periods, rest breaks, expense 

reimbursements, timely pay, and income statements.

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The court now considers plaintiff’s motion to remand 

(Docket No. 10) and defendant’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 4).

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a California resident who worked for 

defendant in Yolo County “as a technician from approximately 

September 2022 to July 2023.” (Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1

Ex. A) (“Compl.”) ¶ 7.) Defendant is a transportation services 

company which is headquartered in Pennsylvania and incorporated 

in Delaware. (Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1) at 3-4.) 

Garcia states that Penske violated various provisions 

of the California Labor Code while it employed him. For example, 

Penske “typically scheduled [plaintiff] to work at least 5 days 

in a workweek, and typically in excess of 8 hours in a single 

day.” (Compl. ¶ 13.) In addition, Garcia asserts that 

“defendant[] failed to pay [him] for all hours worked (including 

minimum wages and overtime wages).” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff also 

alleges that Penske did not give him “uninterrupted meal periods” 

or “uninterrupted rest periods” while working. (Id.) Finally, 

Garcia contends that defendant did not provide him with a timely 

final paycheck, reimbursements for business expenses it made him 

undertake (such as buying tools and equipment), or itemized wage 

statements. (Id. ¶¶ 14-20.)

II. Motion to Remand

A. Standard

Pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 

defendant removed the instant action from Yolo County Superior 

Court. (Notice of Removal at 2.) CAFA gives federal district 

courts original jurisdiction over class action lawsuits where the 

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class numbers at least 100, at least one plaintiff is diverse in 

citizenship from any named defendant, and the aggregate amountin-controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest and 

costs. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441(a), 1446.

When a party moves for remand to state court and

challenges the non-movant’s projected amount-in-controversy, both 

parties must proffer evidence on “whether the amount-incontroversy requirement has been satisfied.” Ibarra v. Manheim 

Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2015). The burden 

of proof falls on the removing party to make reasonable 

assumptions and show that the amount-in-controversy exceeds $5 

million by a preponderance of the evidence. Jaurengui v. 

Roadrunner Transp. Servs., Inc., 228 F.4th 989, 993-94 (9th Cir. 

2022). The Ninth Circuit has characterized the amount-incontroversy requirement as an upper bound on “possible 

liability.” Greene v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767 (9th 

Cir. 2020).

B. Discussion

Plaintiff contests that the amount-in-controversy is 

over $5 million, as required for removal under CAFA. The court 

disagrees and finds that defendant has shouldered its burden for 

removal. On behalf of himself and over 3,400 other people 

employed by defendant, plaintiff seeks multiple declarations, 

unpaid wages, statutory penalties, actual damages, a receivership 

to preside over the disgorgement of defendant, punitive damages, 

attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief. With respect to each of 

the overtime and wage statement claims, defendant estimates that

plaintiff’s desired remedies places the amount-in-controversy 

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north of $5 million. (See Notice of Removal at 7-11.) At any 

rate, defendant argues that the remedies taken together across 

all claims easily surpass the $5 million mark.

Plaintiff, in contrast, offers no competing facts 

bearing on the amount-in-controversy. Instead, plaintiff only 

asserts that defendant’s analysis is flawed without providing 

contrary evidence. The court concludes that it is more likely 

than not that the CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement is 

met.

For the foregoing reason, the court will retain 

jurisdiction over the matter under CAFA and deny Garcia’s motion 

to remand.

III. Motion to Dismiss

A. Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows the 

court to dismiss a claim in a complaint when it fails to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of 

a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In deciding such a motion, the court accepts all material 

allegations of the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences 

in favor of the plaintiffs from them. Id.

Dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to allege 

“sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory.” 

Id. As such, the plaintiff must state “a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Id. Although “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a 

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id.

B. Discussion

The Ninth Circuit has held that a plaintiff seeking 

redress for violation of minimum or overtime wage laws must 

specify at least one workweek by date where the employer 

underpaid him or her. See Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 

F.3d 638, 644-45 (9th Cir. 2014), amended, (Jan. 26, 2015). The 

same applies to a claim seeking minimum wages. Id. at 645 & 

n.2.1

In his first and second claims, Garcia alleges that 

Penske failed to pay him minimum wages and overtime compensation. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 15, 32, 43-44.) California law requires that an 

employer pay an employee at least minimum wage for the first 

eight hours of his or her workday and then 150% of that hourly 

1 In Landers, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of 

a complaint alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 

29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a)(1), 211(c). Following the 

decision, district courts have applied its holding to claims 

arising under parallel provisions in the California Labor Code. 

See, e.g., Ritenour v. Carrington Mortg. Servs. LLC, 228 F. Supp. 

3d 1025, 1033-34 (C.D. Cal. 2017); Haralson v. United Airlines, 

Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 928, 942-43 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Shann v. 

Durham Sch. Servs., L.P., 182 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1048-49 (C.D. 

Cal. 2016) (“The pleading standards set forth in Landers apply 

equally to plaintiffs’ state overtime, minimum wage, meal period, 

and rest break allegations.” (capitalization altered)); Tan v. 

GrubHub, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1005-07 & n.3 (N.D. Cal. 

2016). 

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rate for anytime worked afterwards. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 

1194, 1197. 

Plaintiff argues that the defendant “required [him] to 

work off the clock[] and uncompensated” by undertaking tasks such 

as cleaning and preparing trucks during his free time. (Compl. 

¶ 15.) However, Garcia does not meet the threshold of showing 

the court that his first and second claims are plausible. 

Plaintiff does not specify any specific period of time where 

Penske neglected to pay him his due. See Ritenour, 228 F. Supp. 

3d at 1033-34. Such defects are fatal to plaintiff’s first and 

second claims, which do not state sufficient facts to survive

dismissal.

With respect to his third and fourth claims, Garcia

avers that Penske neglected to provide him with sufficient meal 

periods and rest breaks. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-17, 51, 55.) California 

law prohibits an employer from asking its employee to work 

“during a meal or rest or recovery period mandated pursuant to an 

applicable statute.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7(b).

Plaintiff states that defendant made him work when he 

was supposed to be taking a meal or rest break. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-

17, 51, 55.) On either claim, Garcia does not go farther than 

asserting that Penske denied him meal or rest breaks. Plaintiff

does not even specify a single workweek where that occurred. He 

may not proceed to discovery on the third and fourth claims 

without details in that vein. See Shann, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1044 at 

1048-49. Accordingly, Garcia does not state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted regarding meal periods or rest breaks.

Regarding his fifth claim, plaintiff claims that 

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defendant omitted to reimburse him for necessary business 

expenses he incurred in the course of work. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 58.) 

California law obligates “[a]n employer [to] indemnify his or her 

employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the 

employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her 

duties.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2802(a).

In particular, Penske “required [Garcia] to purchase 

masks, tools, and equipment (such as basic tools, pliers, clamps, 

cocking guns, drills, and other tools).” (Compl. ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiff adds that Penske “required [him] to use [his] personal 

cellular telephones for work purposes, without reimbursement.” 

(Id.)

Defendant contends that plaintiff must provide even 

more facts, such as whether Penske would in fact reimburse the 

expenses Garcia lists, to cross the threshold of plausibility. 

See Ritenour, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 1033-34 (dismissing claim for 

failure to reimburse business expenses due to plaintiff not 

specifying when plaintiff incurred such costs).

The issue with Penske’s suggestion is that it would

require bloating the Complaint with minutia. In contrast to the 

first four claims, Garcia provides sufficient detail here as 

opposed to just reciting the statutory language. See Shann, 182 

F. Supp. 3d at 1005-06. Accordingly, Garcia states a plausible 

claim upon which relief may be granted on this claim.

In his sixth claim, Garcia alleges that Penske 

“willfully failed and refused to timely pay [him]” following the 

end of his employment with the company. (Compl. ¶ 19.) 

California law requires that employers give an employee his or 

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her last paycheck within 72 hours after the end of the working 

relationship or face fines. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-03.

In that vein, Plaintiff explains that he stopped 

working for defendant in July 2023, after which he did not

receive his final paycheck in a timely manner. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 14, 

19.) With that detail and the other allegations in the 

complaint, Garcia pleads sufficient facts to survive Penske’s 

motion to dismiss on his sixth claim.

Plaintiff’s seventh claim is that defendant failed to 

provide him with accurate itemized wage statements. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 

20, 70.) California law mandates that an employer “furnish to 

their employee . . . an accurate itemized statement” of wages 

earned. Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a). Only “a knowing and 

intentional failure by an employer to [do so]” violates the 

statute. Id.(e)(1).

Here, Garcia alleges that Penske neglected to give him 

itemized wage statements with the requisite intent. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of 

a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). In particular, he 

states that “defendant[] ha[s] intentionally and willfully failed 

to provide [its] employees with complete and accurate wage 

statements.” (Compl. ¶ 70 (capitalization altered).) Plaintiff 

also provides exact dates where defendant did not provide him 

with sufficient information regarding his pay. See Varsam v. 

Lab’y Corp. of Am., 120 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1180-81 (S.D. Cal. 

2015). Plaintiff’s seventh claim states a plausible claim upon 

which relief may be granted.

Garcia’s eighth claim seeks relief under the UCL, which 

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prohibits any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or 

practice. (Compl. ¶¶ 76-94 (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§§ 17200-01).) In other words, a claim arising under the UCL may 

allege that a business act or practice is unlawful, unfair, 

and/or fraudulent. Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 

Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1553-54 (4th Dist. 2007). To show that a 

business act or practice is unlawful, Garcia must show “a 

violation of another law [a]s a predicate” for the claim. Id. at 

1554.

Because plaintiff pleads sufficient facts in the 

Complaint to survive Penske’s motion to dismiss on the fifth, 

sixth, and seventh claims, his eighth claim under the “unlawful” 

prong of the UCL may utilize the violations alleged in those

three claims as predicates. See id. at 1553-54. To the extent 

it does so, Garcia’s eighth claim states a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.

Penske concludes by moving to dismiss Garcia’s class 

claims. (Def.’s Mot. (Docket No. 4) at 21-24 (citing Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23).) In its current posture, the court declines to 

address arguments regarding class certification. See Varsam, 120 

F. Supp. 3d at 1184 (“It is more appropriate for such arguments 

to be presented at the class certification stage of the 

litigation.”).

For all the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss 

only the first, second, third, and fourth claims against 

defendant.

C. Leave to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs the 

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court to “freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice 

so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “[T]his policy is to be

applied with extreme liberality.” Herring Networks, Inc. v. 

Maddow, 8 F.4th 1148, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, the 

court will give plaintiff leave to amend his complaint against 

Penske.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to 

remand the case to state court (Docket No. 10) be, and the same 

herby is, DENIED; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s first, second, third, and fourth claims 

against it (Docket No. 4), be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims

against it be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

Plaintiff is granted twenty days from the date of this 

Order to file an amended complaint if he can do so consistent 

with this Order.

Dated: October 3, 2024

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