Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05202/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05202-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 3, 2002 Decided July 16, 2002

No. 01-5202

Trans Union LLC,

Appellant

v.

Federal Trade Commission, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02087)

Ernest Gellhorn argued the cause for the appellant. Roger

L. Longtin and Stephen L. Agin were on brief. Mary E.

Gately entered an appearance.

John F. Daly, Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, argued

the cause for the appellees. Lawrence DeMille-Wagman and

Michael D. Bergman, Attorneys, Federal Trade Commission;

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ration; Alisa B. Klein and Mark B. Stern, Attorneys, United

States Department of Justice; Rosa M. Koppel, Attorney,

United States Department of Treasury; Thomas J. Segal,

Deputy Chief Counsel, and Elizabeth R. Moore, Counsel,

Office of Thrift Supervision; and Katherine H. Wheatley,

Assistant General Counsel, Board of Governors of Federal

Reserve System, were on brief. Richard M. Ashton, Associate General Counsel, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve

System; Gregory F. Taylor, Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and Larry J. Stein, Attorney, United

States Department of Treasury, entered appearances.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, State of California, and

Susan E. Henrichsen, Deputy Attorney General, State of

California, were on brief for the amici curiae in support of

the appellees.

Before: Edwards, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Trans Union,

LLC, a "credit reporting agency" (CRA) under the Fair

Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. ss 1681 et seq.,1

challenges regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade

Commission (FTC) and other federal agencies2 to implement

__________

1 The FCRA defines a CRA as

any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative

nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the

practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of

furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses

any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of

preparing or furnishing consumer reports.

15 U.S.C. s 1681a(f). The parties agree that Trans Union comes

within this definition. See Appellant's Br. at 3; Appellees' Br. at

12.

2 The other federal agencies sued in this action are the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal

the privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

(GLBA), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified

at 12 U.S.C. ss 6801 et seq.). Trans Union contends the

regulations unlawfully restrict a CRA's ability to disclose and

reuse certain consumer information because (1) a CRA is not

a "financial institution" subject to the FTC's rulemaking

authority under the GLBA; (2) the regulations' definition of

the statutory term "personally identifiable financial information" (PIFI) is overbroad; (3) the regulations' restrictions on

reuse of information are inconsistent with the GLBA; and (4)

the challenged regulations infringe Trans Union's right of

free speech under the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution. The district court rejected these challenges

and upheld the regulations. For the reasons set out below,

we affirm the district court's decision.

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I.

The Congress enacted the GLBA in order "[t]o enhance

competition in the financial services industry," Pub. L. No.

106-102, 113 Stat. at 1338, by "eliminat[ing] many Federal

and State law barriers to affiliations among banks and securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial service

providers," H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-434 at 1 (1999). Title V

of the GLBA contains a number of provisions designed to

protect the privacy of "nonpublic personal information" (NPI)

that consumers provide to financial institutions, see 15 U.S.C.

ss 6801-6809, reflecting "the policy of the Congress that each

financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect

the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic

personal information," 15 U.S.C. s 6801(a). The GLBA restricts the ability of a "financial institution" to disclose NPI to

a nonaffiliated third party by requiring (subject to certain

exceptions not pertinent here) that the financial institution

provide the consumer with notice of the institution's disclo-

__________

Deposit Insurance Corporation and the National Credit Union

Administration. This opinion will refer to the appellee agencies,

collectively, as the FTC.

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sure policies and the opportunity for the consumer to "opt

out" of disclosure. Id. s 6802(a)-(b), (e). The GLBA further mandates that an unaffiliated third party recipient of

NPI "shall not, directly or through an affiliate of such receiving third party, disclose such information to any other person

that is a nonaffiliated third party of both the financial institution and such receiving third party, unless such disclosure

would be lawful if made directly to such other person by the

financial institution." Id. s 6802(c).

To implement its disclosure restrictions, the GLBA gives

the FTC and other agencies broad rulemaking authority:

(a) Regulatory authority

(1) Rulemaking

The Federal banking agencies, the National Credit

Union Administration, the Secretary of the Treasury,

the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the

Federal Trade Commission shall each prescribe, after

consultation as appropriate with representatives of

State insurance authorities designated by the National

Association of Insurance Commissioners, such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of

this subchapter with respect to the financial institutions subject to their jurisdiction under section 6805 of

this title.

15 U.S.C. s 6804(a)(1). Section 6805(a) further provides for

enforcement of both the GLBA and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto "by the Federal functional regulators,

the State insurance authorities, and the Federal Trade Commission with respect to financial institutions and other persons subject to their jurisdiction under applicable law," as

described in section 6805(a). Id. s 6805(a). The first six

paragraphs of section 6805(a) specify under what authority

and by which agencies the GLBA and the regulations are to

be enforced against banks, savings associations, commercial

lending companies, credit unions, securities brokers and dealers, investment companies, investment advisers and insurance

providers. See id. U.S.C. s 6805(a)(1)-(6). The final, catchall

paragraph of section 6805(a) mandates enforcement "[u]nder

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the Federal Trade Commission Act by the Federal Trade

Commission for any other financial institution or other person

that is not subject to the jurisdiction of any agency or

authority under paragraphs (1) through (6)." Id.

s 6805(a)(7). CRAs are not among the entities identified in

the first six paragraphs.

On May 24, 2000 the FTC published its Final Rule on

"Privacy of Consumer Financial Information," 65 Fed. Reg.

33,646, setting forth regulations comparable to and consistent

with those promulgated by other federal agencies. See 65

Fed. Reg. at 33,646 n.3.3 On August 30, 2000 Trans Union

filed an action in the district court challenging the FTC's

regulations on the grounds, inter alia, that (1) a CRA is not a

"financial institution" subject to the FTC's rulemaking authority under 15 U.S.C. s 6804(a)(1); (2) the FTC overbroadly defined PIFI; (3) the regulations' restrictions on reuse of

consumer information are inconsistent with the GLBA; and

(4) the regulations violate Trans Union's First Amendment

free speech right. In a memorandum opinion and order filed

April 30, 2001, the district court rejected all of Trans Union's

objections and granted summary judgment in the agencies'

favor. See Individual References Serv. Group, Inc. v. FTC,

145 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2001). Trans Union filed a notice

of appeal on June 20, 2001 challenging the regulations on the

four grounds enumerated above.

II.

The court reviews the district court's summary judgment

decision de novo and "we may affirm only if 'there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact [and] the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Gilvin v. Fire,

259 F.3d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.

__________

3 We hereafter expressly address only the regulations adopted by

the FTC because it is the agency with jurisdiction over CRAs and

thus with authority to enforce the GLBA and regulations promulgated thereunder against appellant Trans Union under 15 U.S.C.

s 6805(a)(6).

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Civ. P. 56(c))). We conclude the FTC is entitled to summary

judgment under this standard and therefore affirm the district court. We address each of Trans Union's arguments

seriatim.

A. Authority to Regulate CRAs

First, Trans Union asserts the FTC lacks authority to

promulgate regulations governing CRAs because a CRA is

not a "financial institution" subject to the FTC's regulatory

authority under 15 U.S.C. s 6804(a)(1). In reviewing the

FTC's interpretation of the GLBA, we use the familiar Chevron analysis:

If ... " 'Congress has directly spoken to the precise

question at issue,' " we "must give effect to Congress's

'unambiguously expressed intent.' " Secretary of Labor v.

[Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n], 111 F.3d

913, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Chevron USA, Inc. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

842, 104 S.C. 2778, 81 LED.2d 694 (1984)). "If 'the

statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific

issue,' we ask whether the agency's position rests on a

'permissible construction of the statute.' " Id. (quoting

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.C. 2778).

National Multi Housing Council v. EPA, 292 F.3d 232, ___

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Cyprus Emerald Resources Corp. v.

Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 195 F.3d 42, 45

(D.C. Cir. 1999)). To the extent that the statutory term

"financial institution" may be ambiguous, we believe the FTC

reasonably construed the term to apply to a CRA.

Section 6809 of title 15 defines "financial institution" as

"any institution the business of which is engaging in financial

activities as described in section 1843(k) of Title 12." Section

1843(k)(4) of title 12 in turn defines "activities that are

financial in nature" to include "[e]ngaging in any activity that

the [Federal Reserve] Board has determined, by order or

regulation that is in effect on November 12, 1999, to be so

closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks

as to be a proper incident thereto (subject to the same terms

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and conditions contained in such order or regulation, unless

modified by the Board)." On February 28, 1997, the Federal

Reserve Board promulgated a regulation, still "in effect on

November 12, 1999," which expressly identifies as among

"activities ... so closely related to banking or managing or

controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto" those

activities that "are usual in connection with making, acquiring, brokering or servicing loans or other extensions of credit," including:

Credit bureau services. Maintaining information related

to the credit history of consumers and providing the

information to a credit grantor who is considering a

borrower's application for credit or who has extended

credit to the borrower.

Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y), 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9329 (1997) (codified at 12

C.F.R. s 225.28(b)(2)(v)). Because the Federal Reserve

Board's regulation characterizes credit bureau services as "so

closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks

as to be a proper incident thereto," we conclude the FTC

permissibly determined that Trans Union, which provides

such services, see Appellant's Brief at 3, comes within the

GLBA's definition of a "financial institution"4 and is therefore

__________

4 Trans Union also contends the FTC is precluded from regulating a CRA's disclosure of consumer report information by virtue of

the GLBA's "savings" clause:

[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to modify, limit, or

supersede the operation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and

no inference shall be drawn on the basis of the provisions of

this chapter regarding whether information is transaction or

experience information under section 1681a of this title.

15 U.S.C. s 6806. Trans Union reasons that because the FCRA

authorizes a CRA to furnish consumer reports, the FTC may not

place restrictions on a CRA's disclosure of credit report information. The FCRA, however, expressly limits a CRA's authority to

furnish reports to specific, enumerated types of information, see 15

U.S.C. s 1681a(d), and to specific, enumerated "circumstances and

no other," 15 U.S.C. s 1681b(a). Thus, the savings clause does not

subject to its rulemaking authority under 15 U.S.C.

s 6804(a)(1).

B. Definition of "Personally Identifiable

Financial Information"

Next, Trans Union challenges the FTC's definition of PIFI.

Both the GLBA and the regulations define NPI5 in terms of

PIFI. The GLBA does not define PIFI but the FTC regulations define the term to mean

any information:

(i) A consumer provides to you [the financial institution] to obtain a financial product or service from you;

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(ii) About a consumer resulting from any transaction

involving a financial product or service between you

and a consumer; or

(iii) You otherwise obtain about a consumer in connection with providing a financial product or service to

that consumer.

_________

prevent the FTC from restricting a CRA's disclosure either of

unenumerated types of information or under unenumerated circumstances.

5 The GLBA defines NPI as

personally identifiable financial information--

(i) provided by a consumer to a financial institution;

(ii) resulting from any transaction with the consumer or any

service performed for the consumer; or

(iii) otherwise obtained by the financial institution.

15 U.S.C. s 6809(4)(A). The FTC regulations define NPI as

(i) Personally identifiable financial information; and

(ii) Any list, description, or other grouping of consumers (and

publicly available information pertaining to them) that is derived using any personally identifiable financial information

that is not publicly available.

16 C.F.R. s 313.3(n)(1).

16 C.F.R. s 313.3(o)(1)(i)-(iii).6 This broad definition of PIFI

"treat[s] any personally identifiable information as financial if

it was obtained by a financial institution in connection with

providing a financial product or service to a consumer." 65

Fed. Reg. at 33,658. Trans Union challenges the definition

on two grounds, both of which we reject.

First, Trans Union asserts the FTC's definition of PIFI is

ultra vires because the GLBA does not expressly confer

authority to define PIFI as it does the term "publicly available information." See 15 U.S.C. s 6809(4)(B) (term "nonpublic personal information" "does not include publicly available information, as such term is defined by the regulations

__________

6 The regulation provides the following examples of PIFI:

(A) Information a consumer provides to you on an application to obtain a loan, credit card, or other financial product or

service;

(B) Account balance information, payment history, overdraft

history, and credit or debit card purchase information;

(C) The fact that an individual is or has been one of your

customers or has obtained a financial product or service from

you;

(D) Any information about your consumer if it is disclosed in

a manner that indicates that the individual is or has been your

consumer;

(E) Any information that a consumer provides to you or that

you or your agent otherwise obtain in connection with collecting on, or servicing, a credit account;

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(F) Any information you collect through an Internet "cookie"

(an information collecting device from a web server); and

(G) Information from a consumer report.

116 C.F.R. 313.3(o)(2)(i). The regulation expressly excludes the

following from the definition of PIFI:

(A) A list of names and addresses of customers of an entity

that is not a financial institution; and

(B) Information that does not identify a consumer, such as

aggregate information or blind data that does not contain

personal identifiers such as account numbers, names, or addresses.

116 C.F.R. 313.3(o)(2)(ii).

prescribed under section 6804 of this title"). We disagree.

"Where ... Congress enacts an ambiguous provision within a

statute entrusted to the agency's expertise, it has 'implicitly

delegated to the agency the power to fill those gaps.' "

County of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1016 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (quoting National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v.

FERC, 811 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1987); citing Chevron,

467 U.S. at 843-44); see also Women Involved in Farm

Economics v. USDA, 876 F.2d 994, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(noting "the presumptive delegation to agencies of authority

to define ambiguous or imprecise terms we apply under the

Chevron doctrine"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). Thus,

administrative implementation of a particular statutory

provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears

that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the

agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such

authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an

agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-andcomment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a

comparable congressional intent.

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).

The GLBA is silent on the meaning of PIFI and, as is

apparent from the parties' differing positions and from our

discussion of the term's meaning infra, the term itself is not

without ambiguity. Accordingly, we conclude that the FTC is

authorized to define PIFI and that its definition is entitled to

Chevron deference, given the broad rulemaking authority the

GLBA confers on the FTC (and the other agencies) to

"prescribe ... such regulations as may be necessary to carry

out the purposes of [the act] with respect to the financial

institutions subject to their jurisdiction under section 6805 of

this title." 15 U.S.C. s 6804(a)(1).

Trans Union next challenges the FTC's definition of PIFI

insofar as it encompasses information appearing in consumer

credit report headers, such as name, address, telephone number and social security number, which, Trans Union contends,

is not "financial" information and therefore does not come

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within the GLBA's definition of NPI as "personally identifiable financial information." 15 U.S.C. s 6809(4)(A) (emphasis added). Because, as noted above, the GLBA is silent on

the meaning of PIFI, we review the FTC's interpretation of

the term under Chevron only to determine if it is a permissible one. We conclude that it is.

Trans Union contends the term "financial" in PIFI must be

given its "plain meaning" and therefore must be applied only

to information that "describes [an individual's] financial condition." Appellant's Br. at 21. We disagree. The dictionary

defines "financial" expansively to mean "relating to finance

and financiers." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 851

(1993); see also V Oxford English Dictionary 921 (2d ed.1989)

(defining "financial" as "[o]f, pertaining, or relating to finance

or money matters"). Given the breadth of the definition, we

cannot conclude the Congress unambiguously intended the

restrictive "plain meaning" Trans Union espouses. Similarly,

we cannot rule out the FTC's broad interpretation of "financial" to encompass any information that "is requested by a

financial institution for the purpose of providing a financial

product or service," 65 Fed. Reg. at 33,658, inasmuch as all

such information can be fairly characterized as "relating to

finance and financiers." The FTC explained that its "approach is consistent with the broad definition of 'financial

institution' used in the statute, which encompasses not only

traditional financial activities (such as banks, mortgage lenders, finance companies), but also a large number of entities

that engage in activities not traditionally considered financial

(such as financial career counselors, insurance companies, and

data processors)." 65 Fed. Reg. at 33,658. While the FTC

could have defined "financial" more narrowly, the meaning it

chose is nevertheless a permissible one. Accordingly, under

Chevron, we defer to the FTC's interpretation.

C. "Reuse" Regulation

Next, Trans Union raises two objections to the "reuse"

restrictions set out in 16 C.F.R. s 313.11 which limit the

manner in which a third party, such as a CRA, may "use"

information it receives from a financial institution, as, for

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example, in a credit report request. We reject each challenge.

First, Trans Union contends the regulation exceeds the

FTC's authority under the GLBA because it prohibits a CRA

from using "aggregated information" about consumers, which

contains no "personally identifiable" information, while 15

U.S.C. s 6802(c) prohibits a third party from reusing only

"nonpublic personal information." We reject this challenge

as not yet ripe.

"To determine whether a controversy is ripe for judicial

review the court must evaluate 'the fitness of the issues for

judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.' " General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290

F.3d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Abbott Labs. v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). Whether the FTC may

lawfully prevent disclosure of aggregated data by CRAs is

plainly not yet fit for judicial decision. The FTC (as well as

the other agencies) has not determined whether or to what

extent aggregation should be considered "use" within the

meaning of 16 C.F.R. s 313.11. See Appellees' Br. at 44 n.26

("None of the agencies has taken any enforcement action or

issued any formal guidance on such issues."); 5/3/2002 Oral

Arg. Tr. at 42 ("[I]t's an open issue at the agencies. I think if

you look at the rule-making record, the statement of basis

and purpose, it's quite clear that when the agencies were

promulgating the use restriction, aggregation was not even

discussed."). Unless and until the FTC determines that use

includes aggregation, and at what level, the issue is not fit for

the court to consider and Trans Union suffers no hardship

from the court's withholding consideration of the issue.

Second, Trans Union contends the reuse regulation improperly prohibits CRAs from reusing account numbers for marketing purposes in violation of section 6802(d) which, Trans

Union contends, expressly exempts CRAs from all restrictions on marketing account numbers. We conclude the FTC

reasonably construed section 6802(d) otherwise. Section

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sion for waiver by the consumer pursuant to the opt-out

provisions in section 6802(b): "A financial institution shall not

disclose, other than to a consumer reporting agency, an

account number or similar form of access number or access

code for a credit card account, deposit account, or transaction

account of a consumer to any nonaffiliated third party for use

in telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or other marketing

through electronic mail to the consumer." 15 U.S.C.

s 6802(d). The FTC has interpreted the language "other

than to a consumer reporting agency" to create a narrow

exception that permits a financial institution to disclose an

account number to a CRA only for the specific marketing

purposes expressly authorized in section 605(c)(1)(B) of the

FCRA, namely "in connection with [a] credit or insurance

transaction that is not initiated by the consumer" if "the

transaction consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance," 15

U.S.C. s 1681b(c)(1)(B). In other words, the FTC maintains,

the Congress inserted the exception into section 6802(d)

solely to prevent a conflict between this section and FCRA

s 605(c)(1)(B) which authorizes such marketing disclosure.

We find the FTC's interpretation is both plausible and consistent with the plain intent of section 6802(d) to more tightly

restrict disclosure of account numbers than of other NPI. If

the exception were read as broadly as Trans Union advocates--to permit unfettered marketing use of an account

number by a CRA--the account number would enjoy less, not

more, protection than other NPI because it could be disclosed

without any opportunity for the consumer to opt out.

D. Free Speech

Finally, Trans Union contends the regulations' restrictions

on disclosure and reuse violate its First Amendment right of

free speech because they prevent Trans Union from disseminating truthful nonpersonal information. To the extent the

challenge goes to the reuse of aggregated information, we

conclude it is not ripe for the reasons set out supra, p. 12.

With regard to the other challenged restrictions, we conclude

Trans Union's First Amendment arguments are foreclosed by

our opinion in Trans Union Corp. v. FTC (Trans Union I),

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245 F.3d 809, reh'g denied, 267 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001),

cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2386 (June 10, 2002).

First, Trans Union asserts the regulations do not survive

strict scrutiny review. In Trans Union I, however, the court

expressly held that "information about individual consumers

and their credit performance" in Trans Union's marketing

lists is not subject to strict scrutiny because it "is solely of

interest to the company and its business customers and

relates to no matter of public concern." 245 F.3d at 818.

The information Trans Union wishes to disclose here likewise

implicates no public concern and therefore, as in Trans

Union I, "warrant[s] 'reduced constitutional protection.' " Id.

(quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,

472 U.S. 749, 762 n.8 (1985)).

Trans Union next argues that even if its contemplated

marketing qualifies only as commercial speech, the regulations do not pass constitutional muster for several reasons.

Trans Union first contends the regulations do not advance a

substantial state interest. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec.

Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) ("In

commercial speech cases, ... we ask whether the asserted

governmental interest is substantial."). This argument as

well is precluded by Trans Union I which expressly recognized that the governmental interest in "protecting the privacy of consumer credit information" "is substantial." 245 F.3d

at 819. Trans Union also contends the FTC did not satisfy

its burden of identifying a harm that the regulation alleviates

to a material degree. See Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999)

(under Central Hudson test, "governmental body seeking to

sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate

that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will

in fact alleviate them to a material degree") (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993)). On rehearing in

Trans Union I, however, the court concluded that "the

government cannot promote its interest (protection of personal financial data) except by regulating speech because the

speech itself (dissemination of financial data) causes the very

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harm the government seeks to prevent." Trans Union v.

FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The same is true

here. Finally, Trans Union asserts the regulations are overbroad. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767 ("laws restricting

commercial speech" must "be tailored in a reasonable manner

to serve a substantial state interest in order to survive First

Amendment scrutiny") (citing Board of Trustees of State

University of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); Central

Hudson, 447 U.S., at 564). As we noted on rehearing in

Trans Union I, regulations such as these, which "[a]im[ ]

directly at [their] intended target," "ha[ve] neither indirect

nor unintended effects on speech" and "therefore sweep[ ]

only as broadly as necessary to accomplish [their] goal:

protecting the privacy of personal financial information." 267

F.3d at 1142-43. Trans Union has not proposed any specific

means by which "the Government could achieve its interests

in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts

less speech." Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 122

S. Ct. 1497, 1506 (2002). The only alternative Trans Union

suggests--allowing CRAs to use a notice and opt-out mechanism as other financial institutions do--is not significantly

narrower than the regulations' present restrictions under

which a consumer is already provided notice and opportunity

to opt out by the financial institution with which he conducts

the transaction in the first instance. There is no reason to

believe a consumer would be more eager to relinquish his

privacy right to a CRA that subsequently obtains his NPI

than he was to the financial institution with which he initially

dealt.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court

is

Affirmed.

USCA Case #01-5202 Document #689606 Filed: 07/16/2002 Page 14 of 14