Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00847/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00847-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Monica Faith Furst,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-00847-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

Plaintiff Monica Furst applied for supplemental security income in June 2014. 

Following state agency denials of her application, Furst appeared with counsel and testified 

at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). In September 2017, the ALJ 

decided that Furst was not disabled. In doing so, the ALJ followed the sequential five-step 

analysis applicable to disability benefits applications. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The 

ALJ found: (1) Furst has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her application 

date; (2) Furst’s severe impairments are liver disease, schizophrenia, and other psychotic 

disorders; (3) Furst’s impairments do not automatically qualify her for benefits under 

agency regulations; (4) notwithstanding her impairments, Furst retains the capacity to 

perform light work, except she can only frequently balance and climb ramps or stairs, can 

never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, must avoid working around moving machinery and 

unprotected heights, and is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with only 

occasional time around the public; and (5) considering Furst’s residual functional capacity, 

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age, education, and work experience, along with testimony from a vocational expert 

(“VE”), Furst was not disabled because she could work as a production assembler, picking 

table worker, or housekeeper. (AR 15-28.) The ALJ’s decision became final after the 

denial of interagency review. Furst now asks the Court to review the ALJ’s decision.

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), reviews only those issues 

raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s decision, and will uphold the ALJ’s decision 

unless it contains harmful legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence. Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Furst argues the ALJ: (1) improperly found 

Furst’s visual and lower back impairments are not severe at step two; (2) ignored a treating 

source opinion; and (3) failed to account for Furst’s moderate limitation in concentration, 

persistence, or pace when posing hypothetical questions to the VE. The Court takes these 

arguments in turn.

1. Step two is a de minimis screening standard meant to dispose of groundless 

claims. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). An ALJ may find that an 

impairment is not severe “only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no 

more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 

F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). As such, an ALJ’s conclusion that a plaintiff’s impairment 

is not severe must be “clearly established by medical evidence.” Id. at 687.

Here, the ALJ cited some evidence suggesting Furst’s vision impairment is only a

slight abnormality, but the evidence does not so clearly rule out its severity. For example, 

treatment notes from NP Bohannon on June 20, 2016 state that Furst is legally blind in her 

right eye, and Furst testified that she does not drive or take the bus because it is too difficult 

to read road signs. (AR 51, 1786, 1790.) Furst’s claim of severe vision impairment is not 

wholly groundless. The ALJ should not have screened out this claim at step two.

The same is not true for Furst’s allegations of disabling lower back problems. The 

record includes several treatment notes rating Furst’s back pain as a 7 or 8 out of 10, for 

which Furst was prescribed pain relievers. (AR 1578, 1851, 1958-60.) But, as the agency 

notes in its response brief, the medical record reveals that Furst’s back pain was not 

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particularly limiting. For example, musculoskeletal examinations were negative and 

reflected good and normal range of motion, and Furst was observed to have normal gait 

and station. (Doc. 13-14 (citing administrative records)). Though Furst undoubtedly 

experiences back pain, the ALJ did not err in concluding that Furst’s back pain no more 

than minimally affects her ability to function.

2. The ALJ failed to address a Mental Impairment Questionnaire completed by Dr. 

Minerva Villafane. The agency argues that this error is harmless because Dr. Villafane’s 

opinions are not supported by the record. It is not this Court’s place, however, to weigh 

medical opinions in the first instance. The ALJ is responsible for weighing medical opinion 

evidence and, therefore, a remand is appropriate so that the ALJ can address Dr. Villafane’s 

assessment.

3. When determining whether disability claimants can perform other work in the 

national economy, ALJs typically pose hypothetical questions to VEs. If an ALJ relies on 

a VE’s answer to one of these hypothetical questions to conclude that jobs still exist for a 

claimant notwithstanding her impairments, the hypothetical must include all the claimant’s 

functional limitations. Brink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 343 Fed. App’x. 211, 212 

(9th Cir. 2009). Relying on Brink, Furst argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical question, which 

limited Furst to simple, routine, and competitive tasks and only occasional public 

interaction, did not adequately account for Furst’s moderate limitations in concentration, 

persistence, and pace. (AR 19, 54.) This Court has rejected this exact argument in prior 

cases, concluding that Brink (an unpublished, nonprecedential decision) is an outlier on 

this point and inconsistent with binding Ninth Circuit precedent. See Stommes v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., No- CV-17-00071-PHX-DLR, 2018 WL 1531706, at *3 (D. Ariz. 

Mar. 29, 2018). The ALJ’s hypothetical was proper. Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED that the agency’s non-disability decision is REVERSED and 

this matter REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this decision. The Clerk 

shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case.

Dated this 27th day of March, 2020.

Douglas L. Rayes

United States District Judge

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