Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02341/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02341-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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. PUBLISH FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cireuit . UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

RHONDA KAY RAY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

OTIS R. BOWEN, Secretary, 

Department of Health and 

Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Submitted on the briefs: 

JAN 0 D 1989 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

86-2341 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

On Appeal From The 

United States District Court 

For The District Of Colorado 

(D.C. Civil No. 85-Z-1453) 

Frederick w. Newall, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Robert N. Miller, United States Attorney, and James R. Cage, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for DefendantAppellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, SETH and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-2341 Document: 01019674174 Date Filed: 01/09/1989 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.8. The cause is therefore ordered 

submi tted without oral argument. 

Rhonda Kay Ray ("claimant") appeals from the district court's 

order affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human 

services ("the Secretary"} to deny Miss Ray's application for 

social security di sability benefi ts. For reversal, Mi ss Ray 

argues that the Secretary's decision was not support ed by 

substantial evide nce on the record as a whole because the 

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") improperly relied on the medicalvocational guidelines ("grids") in finding that Miss Ray was not 

disabled. In particular, Miss Ray claims that the Secretary 

applied the grids without adequately considering her nonexertional 

l i mi tations. Because we conclude that the Secretary's decision is 

supported by substantial evidence on the record, and for the 

reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of t he district 

court. 

Miss Ray i s now thirty years of age, has a nint h grade 

education, and has worked variously as a motel maid, a nurse's 

a i de, a counter c l erk at a dry cleaning establishment and as a 

factory worker. Miss Ray claims that she became disabled as of 

August 30, 1983, when knee pain forced her to quit he r job as a 

maid in a motel. Shortly afterward she applied for disability and 

d i sability insurance benefits, speci fying "kneecaps are out of 

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Appellate Case: 86-2341 Document: 01019674174 Date Filed: 01/09/1989 Page: 2 
joint, arthritis in legs." The Social Security Administration 

denied her claim initially and upon reconsideration. 

The claimant obtained a de novo hearing before an ALJ on 

May 22, 1984. On August 13, 1984, the ALJ issued a decision 

denying her claim, finding that Miss Ray was capable of performing 

the full range of sedentary work and that jobs requiring sedentary 

work existed in substantial numbers in the national economy. The 

Appeals Council considered a short letter from an orthopaedic 

specialist that the claimant submitted after the ALJ announced his 

decision, but nonetheless affirmed the ALJ's decision. Miss Ray 

then brought suit in the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado, seeking to overturn the denial of benefits. 

The district court ruled that the ALJ's decision was supported by 

substantial evidence, and entered judgment on behalf of the 

Secretary. 

The reports of four physicians and the claimant's testimony 

during her hearing before the ALJ comprise the principal evidence 

in this case. The three physicians whose reports the ALJ 

considered agreed that the claimant's chief health problem was her 

severe obesity. Miss Ray is five feet, eleven inches tall, and 

weighed approximately 280 pounds at the time she applied for 

disability benefits. As J. Casey Elgin, D.O., stated in a brief 

note: 

"Rhonda Ray's major health problem is her 

severe obesity. This has created stress on 

her knees and makes it painful for her to walk 

or stand for long periods of time. It will 

probably not improve until she loses 

approximately 140 lbs. This is entirely under 

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Appellate Case: 86-2341 Document: 01019674174 Date Filed: 01/09/1989 Page: 3 
her control and is the only way to take the 

stress off her knees." 

Another physician, Janet Ely, M.D., reported that she first 

treated the claimant in June 1983 for knee and hip pain. Dr. Ely 

di agnosed the claimant as suffering from chrondomalacia of the 

patella, and prescribed a weight reduction program, antiinflammatory medication, and an exercise program. or. Ely 

reported that the claimant's compliance was poor, and resulted in 

little improvement. 

The record contains two reports from Roland J. Brandt, D.O . , 

an orthopaedic specialist to whom Or. Ely referred Mi ss Ray. 

Dr. Brandt's examination essentially confirmed Dr. Ely's 

diagnosis. He stated in October 1983: 

"I do feel that [Miss Ray] is capable of 

performing a capacity requiring minimal 

walking or suspended sitting or would be 

limited with repeated walking long di stances 

or over uneven terrain." 

Dr. Brandt further opined that Miss Ray's limitations were 

temporary in nature, and that her progress depended entirely on 

her motivation a nd vigorous participation in an exercise program. 

He again examined Miss Ray more than five weeks later, but stated 

that ''I don't have any new feelings since the last report." 

Shortly after Miss Ray requested the Appeals Counci l to 

review the ALJ' s decision, the Council received a one-paragraph 

letter from Milo L. Messner, M.D. Dr. Messner described the 

"Patellar-Femoral type pain" the claimant was suffering from and 

predicted that she would probably require surgery at some point. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2341 Document: 01019674174 Date Filed: 01/09/1989 Page: 4 
He concluded that Miss Ray "is basically at the present time 

incapacitated from any type of activity that would require getting 

up and down from a sitting position or using stairs." 

In a social security hearing such as this one, the claimant 

bears the burden of proving a disability, as defined by the Social 

Security Act, that prevents him from engaging in his prior work 

activity. Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 243 (lOth Cir .) ; 42 

U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(S) (1983). Once the claimant has established a 

disability, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the 

claimant retains the ability to do other work activity and that 

jobs the claimant could perform exist in the national economy. 

Gossett v. Bowen, F.2d (lOth Cir.), No. 86-2149, slip 

op. at 6 (Dec. 5, 1988); Reyes, 845 F.2d at 243~ Williams v. 

Bowen, 844. F.2d 748, 751 (lOth Cir.). The Secretary meets this 

burden if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

Gossett, slip op. at 6; ~ Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1521 

(lOth Cir. ). "Substantial evidence" requires "more than a 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance," and is satisfied by 

"such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the 

conclusion ." Campbell, 822 F.2d at 1521; Brown v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 

361, 362 (lOth Cir.). The determination of whether substantial 

evidence supports the Secretary's decision is not simply a 

"quantitative exercise," for evidence is not substantial if it is 

overwhelmed by other evidence or if it really constitutes mere 

conclusion. Fulton v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1052, 1055 (lOth Cir.); 

Knipe v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 141, 145 (lOth Cir.). 

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Appellate Case: 86-2341 Document: 01019674174 Date Filed: 01/09/1989 Page: 5 
The ALJ found that Miss Ray was incapable of performing work 

she has performed in the past, particularly work as a maid or 

nurse's aide. An individual is disabled within the meaning of the 

Social Security Act, however, only if his impairments are so 

severe that 

"he is not only unable to do his previous work 

but cannot, considering his age, education, 

and work experience, engage in any other ki nd 

of substantial gainful work which exists in 

the national economy, regardless of whether 

such work exists in the immediate area in 

which he lives, or whe t her a specific job 

vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be 

hired if he applied for work . " 

42 u.s.c.A. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1983). The ALJ considered these 

factors--age, education, and work experience--as well as the 

claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), found that she 

was capable of performing work for which jobs exist in substantial 

numbers in the national economy, and thus concluded that she was 

not disabled. This finding was the fifth in a five-step inquiry 

we have outlined in Gossett v. Bowen, ____ F.2d ____ (lOth Cir.), 

No. 86-2149, slip op. at 7-8 (Dec. 5, 1988), and in Reyes v. 

Bowen, 845 F.2d 242 , 243 (lOth Cir.). The ALJ's step five finding 

is the linchpi n of his determination that Miss Ray is not entitled 

to disability benefits, and Miss Ray argues that this finding is 

not supported by substantial evidence. 

To determine whether work that the claimant can perform is 

available in the national economy, the ALJ relied on the medicalvocational guidelines--the "grids.'' Automatic application of the 

grids is appropriate only when a claimant's RFC, age, work 

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experience, and education match a grid category. Heckler v. 

Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 462 n.5; Gossett, slip op. at 10; Huston 

v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1131 (lOth Cir.); Gatson v. Bowen, 838 

F.2d 442, 446 (lOth Cir.); Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 579 

(lOth Cir.); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(e)(2). 

Residual functional capacity primarily measures a claimant•s 

exertional capacity, or in simplest terms, his strength. Huston, 

838 F.2d at 1131 . Nonexertional limitations, such as pain, may 

also limit an individual•s capacity to work, such that he may not 

be able to perform the full range of work available within an RFC 

category. See Channel, 747 F.2d at 580. As we observed in Huston 

v. Bowen, 838 F . 2d 1125, 1131 (lOth Cir.): 

"Nonexe rtional pain perhaps can be 

characterized as pain that is present whether 

or not a claimant is exerting himself or 

herself i n activities that relate to the 

strength requirements of the grid 1 s RFC ranges 

(sedentary through very heavy). Under the 

regulatory framework, exertion appears to be 

measured primarily in terms of the strength 

requirements for such physicial activities as 

walking, standing, lifting, carrying, pushing, 

pulling, reaching, and handling." 

We have not hesitated to overturn the secretary's finding of 

nondisability when the Secretary applies the grids without 

adequately considering the evidence of claimant ' s nonexertional 

limitations. Gossett, slip op. at 11; Williams, 844 F.2d at 760. 

Miss Ray urges that we overturn the Secretary's finding of 

nondisability in her case because he did not adequately consider 

her complaints of pain, and in particular because he did not 

consider the extent to which the pain she experiences limits her 

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ability to perform the full range of work covered by the sedentary 

RFC category. At the hearing, Miss Ray testified that she was "in 

pain a lot of times,» that she was ''not comfortable sitting or 

standing," and that her knee pain kept her from sleeping at night. 

The ALJ acknowledged these complaints of pain in his decision, and 

so demonstrated that they were considered and not discredited. 

Thus there is no issue of credibility. The ALJ, as mentioned, 

after considering the claimant's testimony as to her pain, found 

no nonexertional impairments. The record supports this finding. 

This is in contrast to Huston v. Bowen, 838 F . 2d 1125, 1131 (lOth 

Cir.), where we said: 

"The record contains evidence that the 

claimant's pain not only constituted an 

impairment sufficient to limit the claimant to 

light work but sufficient to preclude the 

claimant from any subst antial gainful 

employment on a sustained basis." 

Mi ss Ray's testimony, taken as altogether true, does not lead to 

the conclusion that the pain she suffers represents a 

nonexertional impairment which precludes application of the grids. 

The mere presence of some nonexertional pain did not automatically 

preclude reliance on the grids. See Gossett, slip op. at 15; 

Channel, 747 F . 2d at 582 n.6. As we emphasized i n Gossett, slip 

op. at 14 (quoting Brown v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 361, 362 (lOth Cir.)), 

"disability requires more than mere inability to work without 

pain." Miss Ray stated that she was uncomfortable sitting, but 

she did not testify that her pain rendered her incapable of 

s itting for extended periods of time, or that i t int erfered with 

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her ability to work in a seated position. The ALJ expressly . 

considered the claimant's pain complaints in the course of his 

decision. Her testimony, taken as fully credible, did not 

establish the presence of disabling pain. Under these 

circumstances a formal finding as to the credibility of claimant's 

pain testimony would be no more than ritualistic. 

The ALJ must determine the claimant's eligibility for 

disability benefits in light of the entire record, with particular 

attention to medical evidence and evidence of motivation. See 

Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 516 (lOth Cir.}. None of the three 

physicians whose reports the ALJ had before him concluded that 

Miss Ray was incapable of engaging in sedentary work as would 

involve primarily seated work, some walking and standing, lifting 

of objects weighing no more than 10 pounds, and occasional lifting 

and carrying of objects such as files, ledgers, or small tools. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a). The claimant's testimony 

does not contradict her physicians' assessment. 

The ALJ thus properly relied on the medical-vocational 

guidelines to demonstrate the existence of substantial gainful 

work in which Miss Ray could engage. The presence of 

nonexertional impairments precludes reliance on the grids only to 

the extent that such impairments limit the range of jobs available 

to the claimant. Gossett, slip op. at 15; Channel, 747 F.2d at 

582 n.6. Again, the ALJ's finding that Miss Ray suffered from no 

nonexertional impairment severe enough to limit the range of jobs 

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available to her, and his consequent reliance on the grids, was 

supported by substantial evidence. 

The Secretary argues that Miss Ray's failure to follow her 

weight loss and exercise programs deprives her of any right to 

disability benefits under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530, 416.930 (1987). 

We need not consider this issue because the ALJ found that 

Miss Ray was capable of sedentary work in her present condition, 

and substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the 

ALJ•s finding. 

AFFIRMED. 

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