Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00371/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00371-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEANETTE HOWELL, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

CITY OF FRESNO, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-07-371 OWW/TAG

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT AS MOOT 

(Doc. 7); STRIKING SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED ON

APRIL 6, 2007 (Doc. 12)

GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 

(Doc. 21); DIRECTING

PLAINTIFF TO FILE SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT; AND

GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

TO REMAND REMOVED ACTION

(Doc. 13)

Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second

Amended Complaint, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Removed

Action.

A. Procedural Background.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages for Employment

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Discrimination against the City of Fresno Police Department,

Captain Pat Rhames, Sergeant Earl Kaundart, Chris Dick and Does

1-100. The Complaint was filed in the Fresno County Superior

Court on November 17, 2006. The Complaint alleges a First Cause

of Action “Violation of FEHA, Refusal to Hire Based on Race” and

as a Second Cause of Action “for Civil Rights Act Violations”,

the Second Cause of Action alleging that Defendants ... were

subject to the provisions of state and federal laws under which

Plaintiff has certain civil rights, and Defendants violated those

laws ....”

On February 9, 2007, Plaintiff filed a First Amended

Complaint for Damages for Employment Discrimination against

Defendants in the Fresno County Superior Court. The First Cause

of Action is for “Violation of FEHA, Refusal to Hire Based on

Race”. The Second Cause of Action alleges that “in refusing to

hire Plaintiff, Defendants ... violated Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 and specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1),

failure to hire based on race.” The Third Cause of Action is

“For Refusal to Hire in Violation of Public Policy”. The Fourth

Cause of Action is “For Violation of the California Constitution

Article I Section 8". 

On March 3, 2007, Defendants removed the action to this

Court. The Notice of Removal states in pertinent part:

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint filed on November

17, 2006, did not have a Title VII action

alleged against Defendants. The first date

upon which Defendants received a copy of the

First Amended Complaint was February 9, 2007,

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3

after Defendants’ counsel was served by

Plaintiff’s counsel a copy of the First

Amended Complaint by mail.

3. This action is a civil action of which

this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and (4),

and is one which may be removed to this Court

by Defendants pursuant to the provisions of

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a),(b), and (c), in that it

arises under several federal statutes,

including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et. seq.;

California Government Code §§ 12940, et seq.;

and California Constitution, Article I,

Section 8. 

On March 12, 2007, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss

[First Amended] Complaint, or Alternatively, Motion for More

Definite Statement; and Motion to Strike Portions of the [First

Amended] Complaint, noticing the motions for hearing on April 23,

2007. 

On April 6, 2007, Plaintiff, without first moving for and

obtaining leave to do so, filed a Second Amended Complaint. 

(Doc. 12) Also on April 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion to

Remand based on the filing of the Second Amended Complaint,

noticing the Motion to Remand for hearing on May 14, 2007. (Doc.

13). 

On April 10, 2007, Defendants filed a Declaration of NonReceipt of Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion

to Strike Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Doc.19)

On April 11, 2007, a Minute Order was entered:

In the interest of judicial economy, the

Motion to Dismiss currently set for 4/23/07

and the Motion to Remand will both be heard

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on 5/14/2007 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 3 (OWW)

before Judge Oliver W. Wanger. ** (It appears

that plaintiff did not seek leave of court

prior to filing a Second Amended Complaint).

On April 12, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to

File a Second Amended Complaint, noticing the motion for hearing

on May 14, 2007. (Doc. 21)

On April 30, 2007, Defendants filed a Second Declaration of

Non-Receipt of Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and

Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 33)

On April 30, 2007, Plaintiff filed an opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 34).

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint.

Although Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended

Complaint was filed prior to the other motions before the Court,

the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint is denied as

moot. As discussed below, the grounds upon which Defendants seek

dismissal of the First Amended Complaint are raised in opposition

to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the proposed Second

Amended Complaint, making discussion of the issues duplicative

and unnecessary. 

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended

Complaint.

As noted, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint

without first obtaining leave of court to do so. Plaintiff’s

counsel asserts that he believed he had a right to file the

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Second Amended Complaint as of right pursuant to Rule 15(a),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

However, Rule 15(a) provides in pertinent part:

A party may amend the party’s pleading once

as a matter of course at any time before a

responsive pleading is served ... Otherwise a

party may amend ... only be leave of court or

written consent of the adverse party ....

“When a state court action is removed to federal court, the

removed action is treated as if the original action has been

commenced in federal court.” Schnabel v. Lui, 302 F.3d 1023,

1037 (9 Cir.2002); see also Butner v. Neustadter, 324 F.2d 783, th

785 (9 Cir.1963)(“The federal court takes the case as it finds th

it on removal and treats everything that occurred in the state

court as if it had taken place in federal court.”). Because

Plaintiff had filed the First Amended Complaint in state court

prior to removal to this court, Plaintiff had amended her

pleading once as a matter of course. Plaintiff cannot file a

Second Amended Complaint without first obtaining leave of court. 

Whitehead v. Viacom, 233 F.Supp.2d 715, 719 (D.Md.2002). 

Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff filed the Second Amended

Complaint on April 6, 2007, that filing is ineffective and the

Second Amended Complaint is STRICKEN.

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to

eliminate the Second Cause of Action in the First Amended

Complaint for violation of Title VII and to clarify the First

Cause of Action for which Defendants sought a more definite

statement. 

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Rule 15(a) provides that “leave shall be freely granted when

justice so requires.” Rule 15(a)’s policy of favoring amendments

to the pleadings should be applied with “‘extreme liberality’”. 

DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9 Cir.1987). th

Defendants contend that leave to file the Second Amended

Complaint should be denied because the proposed amendments will

be futile. 

Leave to amend may be denied if the proposed amended

pleading is futile or would be subject to dismissal. Deveraturda

v. Globe Aviation Security Services, 454 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th

Cir.2006); Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th

Cir.1991). “‘[A] proposed amendment is futile only if no set of

facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that

would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.’”

Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9 Cir.1997); th

Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9 Cir.1988). th

Futility of amendment, standing alone, can justify the denial of

a motion for leave to amend. United States ex rel. Lee v.

SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9 Cir.2001). th

Because futility essentially examines whether a statement of a

claim has been made, the standards governing resolution of a Rule

12(b)(6) motion are set forth.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is th

appropriate only where “it appears beyond doubt that the

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plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-

46 (1957). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the complaint

presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential

facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a motion to th

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of

all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from

them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). However, th

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they

are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). Immunities and other th

affirmative defenses may be upheld on a motion to dismiss only

when they are established on the face of the complaint. See

Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9 Cir.1999); Jablon v. th

Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9 Cir. 1980) When ruling th

on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged

in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents

relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity

is not contested, and matters of which the court takes judicial

notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-706 (9th

Cir.1988).

The proposed Second Amended Complaint alleges in pertinent

part that Plaintiff is an African-American and a black person. 

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Defendants include the City of Fresno, Captain Pat Rhames and

Sergeant Earl Kaundart who are alleged to be employed by Fresno

Police Department and Defendant Chris Dick is “sometimes

employed” by the Fresno Police Department. The proposed Second

Amended Complaint alleges in pertinent part:

2. Defendant, City of Fresno, is ... an

employer, and is subject to suit under the

California Fair Employment and Housing Act,

California Government Code § 12900 et seq.

(FEHA) ... The City of Fresno Police

Department is a department of the City of

Fresno and is not a legal entity separate and

apart from the City of Fresno, and cannot be

sued separately from the City of Fresno. 

Therefore, any reference to the City of

Fresno Police Department is a reference to

the Defendant City of Fresno. Further, any

reference to the City of Fresno Police

Department in any Complaint filed with the

Department of Fair Employment and Housing is

a reference to the City of Fresno, because

the City of Fresno Police Department is a

department of the City of Fresno.

Defendants Rhames, Kaundart, and Dick are alleged to be “subject

to suit under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act”. 

Defendant Rhames is alleged to be “a supervisor as that term is

defined in California Government Code § 12926(r), part of the

codified California Fair Employment and Housing Act”. The First

Cause of Action is for violation of FEHA for refusal to hire

Plaintiff based on race and alleges in pertinent part:

9. On or about December 5, 2005, Plaintiff

applied to the personnel office of Defendant

City of Fresno for a position with the City

of Fresno Police Department ... requesting

employment as an Identification Technician I,

but Defendants refused to hire Plaintiff.

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10. In the process of determining whether or

not to hire Plaintiff, Defendants and each of

them conducted an investigation of Plaintiff

and in the course of that investigation ...,

falsely accused Plaintiff of using illegal

drugs. Defendants then used the pretext of

this false accusation to refuse to hire

Plaintiff, when the real reason for refusing

to hire Plaintiff was because Plaintiff is an

African-American and a black person.

11. The falsity of the accusation is

underscored by the fact that Plaintiff is and

for the past decade has been a City of Fresno

employee and has been regularly tested for

the use of illegal drugs, and has always

passed those drug tests.

12. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff

was qualified for the position of

Identification Technician I with the ...

Fresno Police Department in that Plaintiff

had studied criminology at the college level,

had been a City of Fresno employee for ten

(10) years, with all good evaluations, and

had experience in customer relations and

otherwise met the job qualifications.

13. Defendants’ refusal to hire Plaintiff

constitutes disparate treatment in that it

was based on the fact that Plaintiff is an

African-American and a black person. 

Defendants intentionally refused to hire

Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s race. 

Plaintiff bases this conclusion on the fact

that Defendants continued to seek applicants

for the position of Identification Technician

I, and that Plaintiff is informed and

believes and thereon alleges that Defendants

ultimately hired two white applicants with

the same or substantially the same

qualifications as Plaintiff. Further, the

Defendants’ accusation that Plaintiff used

illegal drugs was nothing other than a

pretext to mask the real reason why

Defendants failed to hire Plaintiff, which

was and is that Plaintiff is an AfricanAmerican and a black person.

14. Defendants’ discriminatory action

against Plaintiff, as alleged above,

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constituted unlawful discrimination in

employment on account of race, in violation

of California Government Code § 12940(a).

...

18. The above-recited actions of Defendants

and in particular refusal to hire Plaintiff

and instead falsely accusing her of using

illegal drugs were all despicable acts done

with a willful intention to injure Plaintiff

or in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s

rights under FEHA. Further the refusal to

hire Plaintiff was despicable conduct that

subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust

hardship in conscious disregard of

Plaintiff’s rights under FEHA.

19. On April 19, 2006, and within one year

of the date of the discrimination committed

by Defendants, Plaintiff filed a charge of

discrimination with the California Department

of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). In

her charge of discrimination, Plaintiff, an

unsophisticated person who has never filed a

charge of discrimination with the DFEH

before, stated the false pretext that the

Defendants and each of them gave as the

excuse for failing to hire her, i.e., that

she had been falsely accused of using illegal

drugs, when the Defendants’ real reason for

failing to hire Ms. Howell is that she is an

African-American and a black person. In her

charge, Ms. Howell identified that it was the

Defendants, who were refusing to hire her,

and who, instead of hiring her, had

‘harassed’ her in their investigation to

determine whether to hire her, and who had

falsely accused her of using drugs in the

course of their investigation into whether to

hire her.

20. The aforesaid charge of discrimination

is like and related to the causes of action

in this complaint, for the following reasons. 

An investigation into Plaintiff’s charge of

discrimination would lead to the fact that

the charge of harassment was harassment of

Plaintiff during the Defendants’

investigation of Plaintiff to determine

whether to hire Plaintiff. An investigation

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into Plaintiff’s charge of falsely being

accused of using illegal drugs would lead to

the fact that Plaintiff’s charge was and is

that Defendants were using the false

accusation as an excuse to refuse to hire

Plaintiff for the position for which she had

applied, to be an Identification Technician I

with the ... Fresno Police Department. 

Further, in the charge of discrimination,

Plaintiff explicitly states that the reason

for the discriminatory acts is because she is

an African-American and a black person.

21. On April 10, 2006 the DFEH issued to

Plaintiff a notice of right to bring a civil

action.

22. On January 31, 2007 Plaintiff amended

her aforesaid charge of discrimination with

the DFEH to specify that by Fresno Police

Department she meant the City of Fresno, and

that Chris LNU, i.e., Last Name Unknown, was

Chris Dick.

The First Cause of Action is for violation of FEHA for refusal to

hire Plaintiff based on race. 

The Second Cause of Action is for violation of public policy

for refusal to hire Plaintiff based on race. The Second Cause of

Action incorporates all preceding allegations and alleges:

24. It is against public policy under

California state law to discriminate on the

basis of race in the hiring of employees.

25. Defendants and each of them violated

that California state law public policy by

refusing to hire Jeanette Howell on the basis

of race.

The Third Cause of Action is for violation of California

Constitution, Article I, Section 8. The Third Cause of Action

incorporates all preceding allegations and asserts:

28. Article I, Section 8 of the California

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Constitution prohibits disqualifying a person

from employment because of race.

29. Defendants and each of them violated

California Constitution Article I, Section 8

by disqualifying Plaintiff from entering

employment with the City of Fresno, Fresno

Police Department because of her race.

All three causes of action are alleged against all Defendants. 

All three causes of action pray for, inter alia (1) back pay,

front pay, and other monetary relief according to proof; (2)

general damages, and special damages sufficient to compensate

Plaintiff for her losses and suffering, according to proof; (3)

punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish Defendants

for their wrongful conduct and set an example for others (except

as to the Defendant City of Fresno; and (4) interest on the sum

of damages awarded, calculated from January 27, 2006 to the date

of judgment. Plaintiff also prays for reasonable attorneys fees

and costs of suit. 

1. Personal Liability of Individual Defendants.

Defendants correctly argue that Plaintiff cannot obtain

relief against the individual Defendants under the FEHA, citing

Miller v. Maxwell’s International, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-588

(9 Cir.1993) and Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal.4th 640, 663 th

(1998)(“[W]e conclude that individuals who do not themselves

qualify as employers may not be sued under the FEHA for alleged

discriminatory acts.”). In addition, because Plaintiff cannot

obtain relief against the individual Defendants under the FEHA,

Plaintiff cannot obtain relief against these Defendants for

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violation of public. Reno v. Baird, id., at 663-664.

Plaintiff refers to a statement in Defendants’ opening brief

in support of their motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint

that “[t]he present lawsuit arises from the alleged non-hiring of

Plaintiff as an Identification Technician I at the City of Fresno

Police Department, after she was removed from the eligible list

because she did not successfully complete the background

investigation process for consideration of a conditional offer of

employment.” Plaintiff asserts that this representation means

that Plaintiff was discriminated against under California

Government Code §§ 12940(c) and (i). 

Sections 12940(c) and (i) provides in pertinent part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice,

unless based upon a bona fide occupational

qualification, or, except where based on

applicable security regulations by the United

States or the State of California:

...

(c) For any person to discriminate against

any person in the selection or training of

that person in any apprenticeship training

program or any other training program leading

to employment because of the race ... of the

person discriminated against.

...

(i) For any person to aid, abet, incite,

compel, or coerce the doing of any of the

acts forbidden under this part, or attempt to

do so.

Referring to the definition of “person” in California Government

Code § 12925(d)(“one or more individuals ...”) and to the

definition of “supervisor” in California Government Code §

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12926(r)(“any individual have the authority, in the interest of

the employer, to hire ... other employees ... if, in connection

with the foregoing, the exercise of that authority is not of a

merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of

independent judgment”), Plaintiff notes that the Second Amended

Complaint alleges that Defendant Rhames is a “supervisor” within

the meaning of Section 12926(r) and contends that the allegations

permit the inference that Defendants Kaundart and Dick are

“persons” within the meaning of Section 12925(d). Because

Sections 12940(c) and (i) refer to any “person” as opposed to the

“employer”, Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to recover from

the individual Defendants for the alleged violation of the FEHA.

Plaintiff’s position is without merit. The proposed Second

Amended Complaint does not allege a violation of either Section

12940(c) or Section 12940 (i). Paragraph 14 alleges that

“Defendants’ discriminatory action against Plaintiff, as alleged

above, constituted unlawful discrimination in employment on

account of race, in violation of California Government Code §

12940(a).” Section 12940(a) makes it unlawful “[f]or an

employer, because of race ... to refuse to hire or employ the

person or to refuse to select the person for a training program

leading to employment ....” (Emphasis added.) Because

Defendants moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint on the

ground that the individual Defendants were not liable under the

FEHA and because Plaintiff seeks leave to the file the Second

Amended Complaint to clarify the First Cause of Action,

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Plaintiff’s failure to include allegations in the proposed Second

Amended Complaint to allege violations of Section 12940(c) or

Section 12940 (i) is telling. Further, there are no facts

alleged in the proposed Second Amended Complaint from which it

may be inferred that the position for which Plaintiff applied was

an “apprenticeship training program or any other training program

leading to employment” within the meaning of Section 12940(c). 

The proposed Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff “is

and for the past decade has been a City of Fresno employee” at

the time she applied for the position Identification Technician

I. 

Defendants further cite Vernon v. State of California, 116

Cal.App.4th 114 (2004). In Vernon, a city firefighter filed a

suit against the State of California for, among other things,

employment discrimination under the FEHA. Because the State was

not Vernon’s employer, the State was not liable to Vernon under

the FEHA. Vernon argued that the State may be liable to him, if

not as an employer, then as an “aider and abettor” under Section

12940(i), because the State aided and abetted a discriminatory

employment practice by the City which eventually resulted in his

termination. Id., at 131. The Court of Appeal rejected this

argument, holding in relevant part that, pursuant to Reno v.

Baird, supra, 18 Cal.4th 640, Section 12940(i) does not permit

liability against an individual or entity which is not the

“employer.” Id. at 132.

In Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal.App.4th 55

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(1996), cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Reno v.

Baird, the Court of Appeals rejected individual liability of

supervisory employees under the FEHA pursuant to the aiding and

abetting provision, then Section 12940(g) and now Section

12940(i). The Court of Appeals held:

Section 19240, subdivision (g) provides that

it is an unlawful employment practice for

‘any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or

coerce the doing of any of the acts

forbidden’ by the FEHA, or ‘to attempt to do

so.’ Plaintiffs contend that the supervisory

employee defendants here can be held liable

on the theory that, in making the challenged

personnel decisions on behalf of Hughes, they

‘aided and abetted’ Hughes.

Preliminarily, we can discern purposes for

the ‘aid and abet’ language independent of

any involving the liabilities of supervisory

employees. This language makes it unlawful,

for example, for third parties such as

customers or suppliers to induce or coerce

prohibited discrimination or harassment. 

Plaintiffs contend, however, that this ‘aid

and abet’ language also places individual

supervisory employees at risk of personal

liability for personnel management decisions

in which they participate. We must now

decide whether the Legislature intended to

accomplish a result so significant by a

method so abstruse.

Aiding and abetting occurs when one helps

another commit a prohibited act ... The

concept of aiding and abetting involves two

separate persons, one helping the other. 

Here we deal with individual employees of a

corporate employer. A corporation can act

only through its individual employees ... Our

question is whether it can properly be said

that a corporate employee is ‘aiding and

abetting’ his or her corporate employer when

the corporate employee acts on behalf of the

corporation by making a personnel decision

or, more precisely, whether this is the

meaning intended by the Legislature.

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Conspiracy is a concept closely allied with

aiding and abetting. A conspiracy generally

requires agreement plus overt act causing

damage ... Aiding and abetting requires not

agreement, but simply assistance. The common

basis for liability for both conspiracy and

aiding and abetting, however, is concerted

wrongful action ... A corporate employee

cannot conspire with his or her corporate

employer; that would be tantamount to a

person conspiring with himself. Thus when a

corporate employee acts in his or her

authorized capacity on behalf of his or her

corporate employer, there can be no claim of

conspiracy between the corporate employer and

the corporate employee ... In such a

circumstance, the element of concert is

missing.

Similar reasoning applies to aiding and

abetting. Linguistically, it is questionable

whether it can properly be said that an

employee who exercises delegated personnel

management authority is ‘aiding and abetting’

his or her employer in managing personnel,

and the stilted and unusual nature of such

usage alone casts doubt on plaintiffs’

construction. Had the Legislature intended

to place all employees charged with the duty

of making personnel decisions in California

at risk of personal liability, we believe the

Legislature would have done so by language

more direct and less susceptible to doubt. 

Moreover, since a corporation can act only

through its employees, the element of concert

is missing in the ‘aiding and abetting’

context just as in the conspiracy context.

The not untypical allegations in this case

illustrate the problematic nature of

plaintiffs’ construction. The allegations

charge that the individual supervisory

defendants made their personnel decisions in

accordance with corporate policy, but that

the corporate policy violated the FEHA. The

corporate policy can only be implemented by

individuals, hence the construction urged by

plaintiffs would regularly place the

personnel management risks of corporate

enterprise upon individuals who are merely

employees of the enterprise. Those

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individual supervisory employees would bear a

greater personnel management risk than the

owners of the corporation who benefit from

the fruits of the enterprise, but who are not

exposed to personal liability because of the

limited liability nature of a corporation. 

These considerations raise ‘incongruities; of

the same type that caused the federal

circuits to find that the ‘agent’ language

was not intended to impose personal liability

on individual supervisory employees. A known

agent of a disclosed principal is not

normally personally liable for transactions

consummated on behalf of the principal. 

Plaintiffs here contend that the Legislature

intended a different rule to apply here

without saying so directly. For the reasons

stated here plus those stated above in

connection with the ‘agent’ issue, we

conclude that the Legislature did not intend

to impose personal liability upon individual

supervisory employees by the roundabout

method of ‘aiding and abetting’ language. 

46 Cal.App.4th at 77-79. 

Because the California Supreme Court cited Janken with

approval in Reno v. Baird, supra, Plaintiff’s reliance on Section

12940(i) to impose personal liability on the individual

Defendants for the alleged violation of the FEHA by the City of

Fresno is misplaced. As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot seek

to impose personal liability on the individual Defendants for the

alleged violation of the FEHA in the First Cause of Action or for

the alleged violation of California public policy in the Second

Cause of Action.

Consequently, leave to file the proposed Second Amended

Complaint to allege personal liability of the individual

Defendants for the First and Second Cause of Action is DENIED on

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This conclusion makes it unnecessary to address Defendants’ 1

additional ground for denying leave to file the Second Amended

Complaint seeking personal liability against the individual

Defendants with regard to the three causes of action on the ground

of futility on the basis of the statutory immunity from liability

set forth in California Government Code § 820.2. 

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the ground of futility as a matter of law.1

2. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under

the FEHA.

Defendants argue that leave to file the proposed Second

Amended Complaint should be denied as futile because Plaintiff

has failed to exhaust administrative remedies before the DFEH.

Under California law an employee must exhaust the ...

administrative remedy provided by the FEHA by filing an

administrative complaint with the DFEH and obtaining the DFEH’s

notice of right to sue before bringing suit on a cause of action

under the FEHA or seeking the relief provided under the FEHA. 

Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal.3d 65, 88 (1990). “To exhaust his or her

administrative remedies as to a particular act made unlawful by

the Fair Employment and Housing Act, the claimant must specify

that act in the administrative complaint, even if the complaint

does specify other cognizable wrongful acts.” Martin v. Lockheed

Missiles & Space Co., 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1724 (1994). In the

context of the FEHA, the failure to exhaust an administrative

remedy is a jurisdictional, not a procedural defect. Id.; but

see Grant v. CompUSA, Inc., 109 Cal.App.4th 637, 644-645

(2003)(“Other courts, both state and federal, have questioned

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whether the failure to exhaust FEHA or EEOC ... remedies is truly

jurisdictional in the sense of depriving a trial court of

fundamental or subject matter jurisdiction, or whether it should

be viewed merely in the nature of a condition precedent or an

affirmative defense that can be waived if it is not asserted by

the defendant.”). However, as explained in Soldinger v.

Northwest Airlines, Inc. 51 Cal.App.4th 345, 381 (1996), quoting

Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co., 36 Cal.App4th 1607,

1615 (1995):

Incidents not described in a DFEH charge can

be included in the subsequently filed lawsuit

if they would necessarily have been

discovered by investigation of the charged

incidents, i.e., if the allegations in the

civil complaint were ‘like or related’ to

those specified in the DFEH charge ...

‘Essentially, if an investigation of what was

charged in the [administrative agency filing]

would necessarily uncover other incidents

that were not charged, the latter incidents

could be included in a subsequent [civil]

action.’ ....

The Amended Complaint of Discrimination filed by Plaintiff

with the DFEH on April 5, 2006 states:

NAMED IS THE EMPLOYER, PERSON, LABOR

ORGANIZATION, EMPLOYMENT AGENCY,

APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE, OR STATE OR LOCAL

GOVERNMENT AGENCY WHO DISCRIMINATED AGAINST

ME:

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint of Discrimination lists “Fresno,

City of,/Police Department/Chris Dick” and checks in the various

boxes for cause of discrimination “RACE” and “COLOR”. The

Complaint of Discrimination asserts that Plaintiff believes that

“[f]rom January 24, 2006 to January 31, 2006" “Captain Rhames,

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Chris LNU, Retired Police Officer; SGT Earl Kandart [sic]”

“[h]arrased me” “[a]ccused of using drugs” “because of my Race

(African-American) and Color (Black)”. 

Defendants, noting that the proposed Second Amended

Complaint alleges that Defendants discriminated against her by

failing to hire her for the position of Identification Technician

I because of her race, argue that, contrary to the allegations in

the proposed Second Amended Complaint, the DFEH investigators

would not have investigated a claim of employment discrimination

based on race based on the claims made in the charge of

discrimination:

Individuals can harass another

employee/applicant without implicating

discrimination on the part of the employer

... Plaintiff’s claims of race and/or color

harassment by Defendants Rhames, Kaundart,

and Dick occurring on January 24 to 31, 2006,

regarding accusations of drug use would not

have focused on anything beyond those

harassment accusations during that time

period, by those individuals.

Defendants’ position is without merit. Assuming, as the

Court must, the truth of Plaintiff’s allegation that she applied

for the position with the Fresno Police Department on December 5,

2006, her claim to the DFEH that she was accused by officers of

the Fresno Police Department of drug use because of her race

would necessarily led the investigation to Plaintiff’s

application for the position and the subsequent denial of her

application because of her alleged drug use. Therefore, the

allegations in the proposed Second Amended Complaint are not

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Consequently, Defendants’ contention that the First Cause of 2

Action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable

to FEHA claims is misplaced. 

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s filing of the 3

Amended Complaint of Discrimination on January 31, 2007 to correct

her “fatal error” of not naming Defendant Chris Dick is untimely

because the January 31, 2007 Amended Complaint of Discrimination

was not filed within the one-year period, is incorrect based on the

conclusion set forth above. 

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futile and leave to amend will not be denied on that ground.2

Defendants further contend that leave to file the proposed

Second Amended Complaint should be denied as futile with regard

to Defendant Chris Dick on the ground that he was not named in

the charge of discrimination filed the with the DFEH. 

Because, as discussed above, Defendant Chris Dick has no

personal liability to Plaintiff under the FEHA, Defendants’

position is irrelevant. In any event, the charge of

discrimination names Chris Dick as the employer, person, etc. who

discriminated against plaintiff and names “Chris LNU, Retired

Police Officer” as one of the officers who harrased Plaintiff and

accused her of drug use. This is not a situation in which the

alleged perpetrator of the discriminatory act is not named or

described in the charge of discrimination.

Therefore, Defendants’ assertion that leave to file the

proposed Second Amended Complaint should be denied as futile on

this ground is without merit.3

3. Second and Third Causes of Action.

Defendants argue that leave to file the proposed Second

Amended Complaint should be denied on the ground of futility with

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regard to the Second Cause of Action for violation of public

policy and the Third Cause of Action for violation of the

California constitution.

a. Failure to Comply with Claim Requirement of

the California Government Tort Claims Act.

Defendants argue that these causes of action cannot proceed

because Plaintiff has failed to allege compliance with the

California Government Tort Claims Act.

California Government Code § 945.4 provides in pertinent

part:

[N]o suit for money or damages may be brought

against a public entity on a cause of action

for which a claim is required to be presented

in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with

Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with

Section 910) of Part 3 of this division until

a written claim therefor has been presented

to the public entity and has been acted upon

by the board, or has been deemed to have been

rejected by the board, in accordance with

Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this division. 

Section 950.2 provides in pertinent part:

[A] cause of action against a public employee

or former public employee for injury

resulting from an act or omission in the

scope of his employment as a public employee

is barred under Part I (commencing with

Section 900) of this division or under

Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 945) of

Part 4 of this division. This section is

applicable even though the public entity is

immune from liability for the injury.

California Government Code § 910 sets forth the contents of a

claim. The failure to allege and prove compliance with state

imposed procedural conditions to sue bars the maintenance of a

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cause of action based upon those pendant State claims. City of

San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 455 (1974); Ortega v.

O’Connor, 764 F.2d 703, 707 (9 Cir. 1985), rev’d in part on th

other grounds, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); Jacobsen v. Marin General

Hospital, 963 F.Supp. 866, 870-871 (N.D.Cal. 1997).

Plaintiff, citing City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18

Cal.4th 1143, 1148 (1998) and Scott v. Solano, 459 F.Supp.2d 959,

968-969 (E.D.Cal.2006), argues that common law discrimination

claims are not subject to the California Tort Claims Act.

However, neither City of Moorpark or Scott v. Solano so

hold. The issue before the Supreme Court in City of Moorpark was

whether California Labor Code § 132a provides the exclusive

remedy for discrimination based on a work-related injury,

precluding FEHA or common law wrongful discharge claims, the

California Supreme Court concluding that Section 132a does not

provide the exclusive remedy. 18 Cal.4th at 1148. In Scott v.

Solano the issue was whether the public entity was entitled to

dismissal of the plaintiff’s constructive discharge and

discipline claims in violation of public policy pursuant to

California Government Code § 815(a)(“Except as otherwise provided

by statute: [¶] (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury,

whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the

public entity or a public employee or any other person.”). Judge

Karlton, relying on City of Moorpark, held that the wrongful

discharge claim was not barred by Section 815(a) or any other

statutory immunity potentially available to the city. 459

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F.Supp.2d at 968.

Compliance with the claim requirement of California law is

not limited to tort actions. In Hart v. County of Alameda, 76

Cal.App.4th 766, 778-779 (1999), the Court of Appeal stated in

pertinent part:

Under the Claim Act, no suit for ‘money or

damages’ may be brought against a public

entity until a written claim has been

presented to the public entity and the claim

either has been acted upon or is deemed to

have been rejected. (Gov. Code §§ 905,

945.4) A suit for ‘money or damages’ includes

all actions where the plaintiff is seeking

monetary relief, regardless whether the

action is founded in ‘”tort, contract or some

other theory.”’ (Baines Pickwick Ltd. v. City

of Los Angeles, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p.

307, ...; Loehr v. Ventura County Community

College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071,

1079 ....

Although a few courts have stated that the

Claims Act applies only to tort claims (see,

e.g., National Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co. v.

Pitchess (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 62 ..., this

view has been criticized. (Baines Pickwitk

Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 72

Cal.App.4th 298, 305-310; Alliance Financial

v. City and County of San Francisco (1998) 64

Cal.App.4th 635, 641-642 ... As explained by

Baines Pickwick, the Legislature intended the

claims presentation statutes to broadly apply

to ‘”’all forms of monetary demands ...,’”’

and the earlier conclusion that the Claims

Act was limited to tort claims was based on

government immunity statutes, which contain

different statutory language. (Baines

Pickwick Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra,

72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 305-310.) We agree

with this latter view and adopt the rule that

the Claims Act is not limited to tort

actions.

See also Garcia-Holmes v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2006

WL 2022882: “Garcia-Holmes’s claim of wrongful discharge in

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This conclusion makes unnecessary any consideration of 4

Defendants’ arguments that leave to amend the Second and Third

Causes of Action should be denied because of the failure to allege

a statutory basis for the alleged violation of public policy, that

there is no recognized claim for violation of public policy based

on a refusal to hire, and that Article I, Section 8 of the

California Constitution does not apply to a refusal to hire.

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violation of public policy clearly sounded in tort. As such,

Garcia-Holmes failed to comply with the applicable six-month

limit for filing a claim under the Tort Claims Act. This failure

is fatal to her present action.” 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the

proposed Second Amended Complaint to include the Second and Third

Causes of Action is DENIED as futile.4

4. Prayer for Prejudgment Interest and Punitive

Damages.

Defendants argue that leave to file the proposed Second

Amended Complaint should be denied as futile to the extent the

proposed Second Amended Complaint prays for prejudgment interest

and punitive damages.

a. Prejudgment Interest.

The proposed Second Amended Complaint prays for “interest on

the sum of damages awarded, calculated from January 27, 2006 to

the date of judgment.” 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to

prejudgment interest. Defendants rely on California Civil Code §

3291, which provides in pertinent part:

In any action brought to recover damages for

person injury sustained by any person

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resulting from or occasioned by the tort of

any other person, corporation, association,

or partnership, whether by negligence or by

willful intent ..., it is lawful for the

plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest

on the damages alleged as provided in this

section.

...

This section does not apply to a public

entity, or to a public employee for an act or

omission within the scope of employment, and

neither the public entity nor the public

employee shall be liable, directly or

indirectly, to any person for any interest

imposed by this section.

Plaintiff argues that Section 3291 does not bar prejudgment

interest in this case because the claims alleged in the proposed

Second Amended Complaint are not personal injury claims.

In Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 53 Cal.3d 121, 123

(1991), the California Supreme Court held that the applicability

of Section 3291 depends on the primary purpose of the cause of

action, concluding that prejudgment interest under Section 3291

“is not available in insurance bad faith actions because such

actions are brought primarily to recover economic loss caused by

the tortious interference with a property right, and any damages

recovered for actual personal injury, including emotional

distress, are incidental to the award of economic damages.” 

In Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc., 13 Cal.App.4th 976,

1001-1005 (1993), the Court of Appeals concluded that an under

the FEHA for sexual harassment in the workplace is an action for

personal injury within the meaning of Section 3291:

As early as 1915, the United States Supreme

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Court declared ‘the right to work for a

living in the common occupations of the

community is of the very essence of the

personal freedom and opportunity that it was

the purpose of [the Fourteenth Amendment] to

secure.’... Even before that, the California

Constitution declared: ‘No person shall, on

account of sex be disqualified from entering

upon or pursuing any lawful business,

vocation or profession.’ ... Our Supreme

Court has consistently interpreted this

provision and the equal protection clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment as conferring a

personal right on women to be free to engage

in any business, vocation or profession

permitted to men ....

‘”An injury is personal when it impairs the

well-being or the mental or physical health

of the victim.”’ ... It is beyond dispute

sexual harassment in the workplace has this

effect. As one commentator familiar with the

subject put it, ‘[S]exual harassment exists

in terribly harsh, ugly, demeaning, and even

debilitating ways ... It is a form of

violence against women as well as a form of

economic coercion ...’ ... The mere fact

sexual harassment occurs in the workplace

does not convert the invasion of a personal

right into the invasion of an economic one. 

The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim

is that the alleged sexual advances were

“unwelcome.”’ ....

Even in the case of so-called ‘quid pro quo’

harassment, the principal injury is personal,

not economic. Threats involving actual job

benefits may never be expressed. They may

never have to be. The victim may capitulate

to a supervisor’s demands or tolerate an

offensive environment because of a perceived,

albeit unarticulated, threat to his or her

employment status. In that event, tangible

job benefits may never be actually threatened

but toleration of the harassment is, in

effect, a ‘quid pro quo’ not only for the

job-related benefits but for the job itself. 

Where an employee is constructively

discharged because the employee can no longer

tolerate the supervisor’s sexual harassment,

or is fired in retaliation for opposing the

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supervisor’s conduct, the employee has

already suffered from a ‘hostile

environment.’ Thus, ‘quid pro quo’ and

‘environmental’ harassment are not distinct

forms of sexual harassment but more like

poles of a continuum rooted in violation of

the personal right to be free from and

unwanted and unwelcome sexual advances.

For these reasons we conclude a sexual

harassment claim under FEHA seeks to

vindicate decidedly personal rights.

13 Cal.App.4th at 1004-1005. In Holmes v. General Dynamics

Corp., 17 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1435-1437 (1993), the Court of

Appeals concluded that a tortious wrongful termination in

violation of public policy claim is not one to recover personal

injury damages within the meaning of Section 3291 but, rather,

involves the infringement of property rights:

Guided by Gourley’s categorical holding, we

cannot say that a tortious wrongful

termination action is one to recover personal

injury damages within the meaning of the

statute. A wrongful termination claim

primarily involves the infringement of

property rights, not personal injury ...

Moreover, as in Gourley, the nature of a

tortious wrongful termination action is not

to vindicate the plaintiff’s personal

interest. Rather, the essence of such claim

is to vindicate the public interest ... The

similarities between an insurance bad faith

claim and a tortious wrongful termination

action for purposes of this issue require us

to conclude the court correctly determined

section 3291 was inapplicable ....

We reach the foregoing conclusion even though

we are well aware that GD’s conduct caused

Holmes to suffer extensive personal damages. 

As Gourley makes clear, in analyzing whether

an action falls within the ambit of section

3291 a court must focus on the nature of the

tort rather than the type or extent of the

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damages suffered in the particular case.

17 Cal.App.4th at 1436-1437. Holmes distinguished Bihun:

Here, by contrast, it is the employer’s

violation of a public policy resulting in the

loss of a tangible economic benefit (a job),

rather than the invasion of a personal

freedom interest, which primarily defines the

action. We therefore conclude Bihun is

inapposite.

17 Cal.App.4th at 1437 n.15.

The allegations of the proposed Second Amended Complaint

demonstrate that the primary purpose of Plaintiff’s claim is to

recover for the loss of a tangible economic benefit, the

employment position for which Plaintiff alleges she was not hired

because of her race. The allegations of the proposed Second

Amended Complaint do not allege the type of harassment involved

in Bihun. Consequently, Plaintiff may seek prejudgment interest

pursuant to Section 3291.

b. Punitive Damages.

Defendants contend that the prayer for punitive damages

should be stricken from the proposed Second Amended Complaint. 

Defendants argue that the allegations in Paragraph 18 are

unsupported by specific factual allegations against the

individual Defendants to allow an award of punitive damages under

California Civil Code § 3294. No punitive damages are reasonable

against a public entity. California Government Code § 818.

It is not necessary to address this issue because Plaintiff

is not entitled to recover against any of the individual

Defendants. See discussion supra.

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D. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Removed Action.

Plaintiff’s motion to remand is based on the assumption that

leave to file the Second Amended Complaint will be granted. 

Plaintiff’s contention is that remand of the action will be

appropriate because of the elimination in the Second Amended

Complaint of the federal question cause of action upon which

removal was based. Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),

which provides in pertinent part:

... If at any time before final judgment it

appears that the district court lacks

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded ....

Plaintiff’s position is incorrect. “[J]urisdiction must be

analyzed on the basis of the pleadings filed at the time of

removal without reference to subsequent amendments ... Because of

this rule, a plaintiff may not compel remand by amending a

complaint to eliminate the federal question upon which removal

was based.” Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass’n of

Securities Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9 Cir.1998). th

Because Plaintiff does not contest that subject matter

jurisdiction existed in this court at the time of removal,

Plaintiff cannot rely on the elimination of the federal question

cause of action in the proposed Second Amended Complaint to

mandate remand under Section 1447(c).

28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) provides:

Whenever a separate and independent claim or

cause of action within the jurisdiction

conferred by section 1331 of this title

[federal question] is joined with one or more

otherwise non-removable claims or causes of

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action, the entire case may be removed and

the district court may determine all issues

therein, or, in its discretion, may remand

all matters in which State law predominates.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides in pertinent part:

Except as provided in subsection[] ... (c) or

as expressly provided otherwise by Federal

statute, in any civil action of which the

district courts have original jurisdiction,

the district courts shall have supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims that are

so related to claims in the action within

such original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy under

Article III of the United States Constitution

....

Section 1367(c)(3) provides that the district court “may” decline

to exercise such supplemental jurisdiction if “the district court

has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction”. As explained in Albingia Versicherungs A.G. v.

Schenker Intern. Inc., 344 F.3d 931, amended on other grounds,

350 F.3d 916 (9 Cir.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1041 (2004): th

[S]ection 1447(c) means that it if it is

discovered at any time in the litigation that

there is no federal jurisdiction, a removed

case must be remanded to the state court

rather than dismissed. Section 1447(c) does

not mean that if a facially valid claim

giving rise to federal jurisdiction is

dismissed, then supplemental jurisdiction is

vitiated and the case must be remanded. Once

supplemental jurisdiction exists, it remains,

subject to the discretionary provision for

remand in section 1441.

Although this court has discretion pursuant to Section

1441(c) to remand this action to state court because Plaintiff

has been allowed to file the Second Amended Complaint eliminating

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If remand is granted, Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ 5

fees and costs. However, Plaintiff is entitled to seek attorneys’

fees and costs if remand is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c). Because Section 1447(c) does not apply, Plaintiff is not

entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.

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the Title VII cause of action, the court is not required to

remand.5

Because leave has been granted to file the Second Amended

Complaint, because no federal question is presented in the Second

Amended Complaint, and because there have been no proceedings in

this Court other than the motions discussed in this Order,

discretion is exercised in favor of remanding the action, as

amended by the Second Amended Complaint, to the Fresno County

Superior Court. The federal court has no interest in a local

employment dispute, not asserting claims under federal law or the

U.S. Constitution.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. The Second Amended Complaint filed on April 6, 2007

(Doc. 12) is STRICKEN.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended

Complaint is DENIED as moot.

3. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the proposed Second

Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

Plaintiff shall file a Second Amended Complaint in accordance

with this Order within 20 days of the filing date of this Order.

4. Defendant shall submit within five days following

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service, a form of order consistent with this Decision.

5. Once Plaintiff has filed the Second Amended Complaint as

ordered herein, Plaintiff’s motion to remand action is GRANTED

and this action is remanded to the Fresno County Superior Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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