Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02554/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02554-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Ray King, Jr.,

Petitioner,

v. 

Arizona State Prison Complex, Florence, 

et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV 19-02554 PHX JAT (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Petitioner Anthony King, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1), on April 18, 

2019, while incarcerated at the Arizona Department of Corrections’ prison in Florence, 

Arizona.

1

 King was released from prison on or about May 15, 2019, and he filed a notice 

of change of address on May 21, 2019. (ECF No. 9). On July 3, 2019, Respondents notified 

 

1

In April of 2019, King was incarcerated at the Florence prison pursuant to his conviction 

in a different matter, Pinal County Superior Court case number CR2018-00949; he was charged in 

that matter on April 23, 2018, and on May 25, 2018, King pled guilty to one count of third-degree 

burglary (unlawful entry, a class 4 felony). On June 26, 2018, prior to his conviction in the instant 

matter, he was sentenced to serve a term of 18 months’ imprisonment. Per the Arizona Department 

of Corrections records, King was admitted to prison to begin serving his sentence in case number 

CR2018-00949 on July 13, 2018. The Pinal County Superior Court Case Information website 

indicates, per the public docket in case number CR2018-00949, that on March 5, 2019, the county 

received “NOTICE: from DOC re: Defendant Release.” The ADOC Inmate Datasearch website 

indicates King was released from prison on May 15, 2019. His “Community Supervision End 

Date” was October 13, 2019. 

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the Court that pleadings sent to King at the address noticed at ECF No. 9 had been returned 

as undeliverable. (ECF No. 16). Respondents docketed an answer to the petition on July 11, 

2019. (ECF No. 18). King has not replied to the answer to his petition, and mail sent to 

King at the only address provided to the Court has been returned. (ECF Nos. 15, 20, 21).2

I. Background

On October 26, 2018, at the conclusion of a bench trial in the Casa Grande Justice 

Court in CM-2017-000479, King was convicted on one count of misdemeanor assault and 

one count of misdemeanor disorderly conduct (domestic violence), in violation of Arizona 

Revised Statutes §§ 13-1203(a)(1) and 13-2904(A)(1); the crimes presumably took place 

on or about December 7, 2017, the date the complaint was filed. (ECF No. 19-1). At the 

time of his conviction in the Casa Grande matter King was in the custody of the Arizona 

Department of Corrections pursuant to a sentence he began serving in July of 2018 imposed 

in a Pinal County criminal matter. Pursuant to the Casa Grande convictions, the court 

sentenced King to serve 20 days in jail and 12 months of unsupervised probation, and 

ordered him to participate in domestic violence counseling and pay a fine of $100. (ECF 

Nos. 19-1; 19-2; 19-3). The Casa Grande court ordered the jail sentence to commence on 

November 1, 2019, although it ordered the sentence of unsupervised probation to 

commence October 26, 2018. (ECF No. 19-2; ECF No. 19-3).3

 

2

In June and July of 2019 King’s “payment contract” and criminal case in CM-2017-

000479 were found “delinquent,” and a warrant issued July 19, 2019. His bond was voided and 

the warrant quashed on November 5, 2019. A charge of failure to appear was dismissed on 

November 6, 2019. King’s criminal case and payment contract are currently both again delinquent.

Public records further indicate that a direct complaint was filed in the Maricopa County Superior 

Court on January 8, 2020, naming King as a defendant in CR2020-100850; in that matter he is 

charged with two counts of criminal trespass of a residential structure in the first degree with the 

crimes alleged to have occurred June 9, 2019. As of January 31, 2020, King has not appeared in 

that matter and mail sent to King by the Maricopa County Superior Court has been returned as 

undeliverable.

3 King asserts that at the conclusion of his bench trial in the instant matter, he was

. . . returned to ASPC: Florence (East Unit) where I was at because I 

received a felony page two/detainer/hold for this case under the same case [479] 

from Casa Grande Justice Court of Peace after receiving (the jail was notified not 

me) a misdemeanor page two under the same case [479] to ASPC: Safford (Graham 

Unit) did not respond to. I kept asking my CO III Herrera at ASPC: Florence (East 

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King, through appointed counsel, filed a notice of appeal, challenging the “finding 

of guilt on the charges of 13-1203(A)(1) and 13-2904(A)(1) as a domestic violence 

offense.” (ECF No. 19-4 at 2; ECF No. 19-6 at 2). Because no appellate memorandum was 

filed, the appeal was deemed abandoned on January 17, 2019. (ECF No. 19-7 at 2). King 

did not seek state post-conviction relief. 

In his federal habeas petition King asserts:

1. Appellate counsel failed to provide King with a copy of the appellate brief;

2. Appellate counsel abandoned King’s appeal;

3. King was not given warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 

(1966);4

4. King’s civil rights were violated by his arrest and conviction.5

 

Unit) why I was not being transferred back to [Safford] or another level 2 yard since 

I was done with court. I met with her numerous times between Nov. 18 and Feb. 

19. I found out from Casa Grande Justice of the Peace Courthouse after I wrote 

concerning this situation of why I still had an active felony & Misdemeanor hold 

from the same courthouse. And that’s when I received my letter my holds were 

dropped. . . . 

(ECF No. 1 at 6) (misspellings corrected). He further asserts: “Seeing as I was not Mirandized, the 

courts never gave me a chance to run my sentence concurrent, they extend the hundred and eighty 

day Rule by filing and refiling a hold under a felony to not only reset the clock but to get me 

transferred to court . . .” (ECF No. 1 at 7) (misspellings corrected). 

4 All of King’s claims seem to be predicated on the assertion that his Miranda rights were 

violated:

At the time of arrest police officers came to the house with alot of back up, guns 

drawn told me to freeze and comply with guns drawn so I did. I was tossed in the 

dirt very roughly face 1st, put in the back of a police vehicle taken to a substation 

in Casa Grande and later booked into jail @ Pinal County detention facility or Pinal 

County Jail. I was later O.R. on my own recognizance but at no time was I ever 

read from the time I made contact with officers, or when I was transferred to a 

substation or when I was at court/booked into county jail either for that matter was 

I ever [Mirandized]. . . . I thought it was law if you were and/or are not properly 

[Mirandized] that your case could not be prosecuted or brought to trial because your 

rights were violated from the beginning and that any evidence uncovered is fruits 

from a poisonous tree. . . . But I thought that if you were not Mirandized that your 

case had to be dropped or could not be prosecuted/charged you because the 

arresting officers violated your rights when arresting you. 

(ECF No. 1 at 8) (misspellings corrected).

5 King contends: “The Casa Grande Justice of Peace court violated multiple civil rights, 

constitutional and federal rights in the course of maliciously and fraudulently not only arresting 

me but charging & convicting me of two misdemeanor cases that should’ve never made it to trial 

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Respondents aver all of King’s claims for relief were procedurally defaulted in the 

state courts. 

II. Analysis

Absent specific circumstances, the Court may only grant federal habeas relief on the 

merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. See O’Sullivan 

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 

(1991). To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim the petitioner must afford the state 

courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim 

to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. E.g., Castille v. Peoples, 

489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). In noncapital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test is satisfied if the habeas petitioner 

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 2008). 

To fairly present a claim in the state courts, thereby exhausting the claim, the petitioner 

must present to the state courts the “substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal 

court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 

(9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of 

his claim to the state courts, including a reference to the operative federal constitutional 

guarantee relied on by the petitioner and a statement the facts supporting the claim. See 

Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 

(9th Cir. 2007). 

A petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has the right to raise 

the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred 

from pursuing a previously un-presented claim in the state’s “highest” court. See Woodford 

v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2006). 

 

in the 1st place.” (ECF No. 1 at 9) (misspellings corrected). In this claim for relief King seems to 

assert a violation of his right to a speedy trial. (Id.). 

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[The federal courts] recognize two types of procedural bars: express and 

implied. An express procedural bar occurs when the petitioner has presented 

his claim to the state courts and the state courts have relied on a state 

procedural rule to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied procedural bar, on 

the other hand, occurs when the petitioner has failed to fairly present his 

claims to the highest state court and would now be barred by a state 

procedural rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, and 

the preclusion of claims bar King from returning to the state courts to exhaust any 

unexhausted federal habeas claim, he has exhausted but procedurally defaulted any claim 

not previously properly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

If a prisoner has procedurally defaulted a claim in the state courts he is not entitled 

to a review of the merits of the claim in a federal habeas action absent a showing of both 

cause and prejudice. E.g., Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court 

may also consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the failure to consider the 

merits of the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 750; Atwood v. Ryan, 870 F.3d 1033, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017); Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 

322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011). “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural 

default of the claim, i.e., an objective factor outside of his control, and “prejudice” is actual 

harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. E.g., Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. To 

establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual 

and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” Id. It is the petitioner’s burden to establish both cause and prejudice with 

regard to their procedural default of a federal habeas claim in the state courts. Correll v. 

Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415 (9th Cir. 1998).

A petitioner meets the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception by 

“establish[ing] that under the probative evidence he has a colorable claim of factual 

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innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333. 339 (1992) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found 

him guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004); 

Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

King did not raise any claims in his direct appeal, which the state court deemed 

“abandoned,” and he did not assert any ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims

(or any other claims) in a state action for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, all of his 

federal habeas claims are procedurally defaulted because they were not exhausted in the 

state courts and Arizona’s procedural rules bar King from returning to the state courts to 

exhaust the claims. King has not responded to the answer to his petition asserting his federal 

habeas claims are procedurally defaulted and, therefore, he fails to meet his burden of 

showing cause and prejudice with regard to the procedural default of the claims. King does 

not assert his factual innocence and, accordingly, no fundamental miscarriage of justice 

will occur absent the Court’s consideration of his habeas claims.

III. Conclusion

All of King’s claims for federal habeas relief were procedurally defaulted in the 

state courts, and he has not met his burden of establishing cause for or prejudice arising 

from his procedural default of his claims. King does not assert his factual innocence of the 

crimes of conviction and, therefore, he has not shown a fundamental miscarriage of justice 

will occur absent consideration of the merits of his federal habeas claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that King’s petition seeking a federal 

writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

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Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which 

to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) 

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of 

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections 

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations 

of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should King seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should be 

denied because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

Dated this 30th day of January, 2020.

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