Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00045/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00045-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Robert Hammersley has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

In 2003, Petitioner pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence 

(DUI) in the San Luis Municipal Court. During a telephonic hearing, Petitioner waived 

his right to counsel. He also submitted a signed, notarized waiver of counsel form. 

 In 2010, Petitioner was convicted in Wisconsin of felony Operating While 

Intoxicated (OWI) and sentenced to three years imprisonment and three years extended 

release. Petitioner alleges the sentence was enhanced by the 2003 DUI conviction. 

 Petitioner waived his right to counsel in 2003, so his collateral attack of the 

conviction based upon a failure to appoint counsel fails. He does not satisfy an exception 

to the in-custody requirement, therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 

Robert Hammersley, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Micki McCath, 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-14-0045-PHX-DGC (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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II. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 1. Facts of the Case 

 On October 1, 2001, Petitioner was cited for driving under the influence and 

driving on a revoked license, both class 1 misdemeanors. (Doc. 22, Ex. B.) On October 

29, 2001, the San Luis Municipal Court issued a warrant for Petitioner’s failure to appear 

in court. (Doc. 22, Ex. A.) On August 26, 2003, Petitioner notified the municipal court 

that he wished to plead guilty. (Doc. 22, Ex. L.) Petitioner requested he be permitted to 

plead guilty telephonically because he lived in Wisconsin. (Id.) 

 On August 26, 2003, Petitioner pleaded guilty telephonically. The court reviewed 

the following forms with Petitioner: Guilty/No Contest Plea Proceeding, Waiver of 

Counsel, Waiver of Trial by Jury, and Right to Apply for Post-Conviction Relief and to 

Set Aside Judgment of Guilt. (Doc. 22, Exs. C, D, E, F, and L.) The Court accepted his 

plea of guilty and waiver of counsel. (Doc. 22, Exs. C, D.) 

 On October 29, 2003, the municipal court received Petitioner’s paperwork, which 

had been signed by Petitioner in front of Terri A. Berth, a notary public in the state of 

Wisconsin. (Id.) These forms included the “Waiver of Counsel” form. (Doc. 22, Ex. D.) 

For the DUI conviction, the court sentenced Petitioner to one day of jail, with nine days 

suspended, participation in an alcohol screening program, and a $1,216 fine. (Doc. 22, 

Exs. A, G.) 

 Petitioner is not in custody for this 2003 offense. 

 2. Wisconsin Felony Conviction 

 On October 21, 2008, Petitioner was charged in the State of Wisconsin with 

operation of vehicle while intoxicated. (Doc. 22, Ex. H.) The State alleged Petitioner had 

five prior OWI convictions. (Id.) Petitioner was found guilty at a jury trial on April 27, 

2010. (Ex. I.) On June 17, 2010, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to three years of 

imprisonment to be followed by three years of extended supervision. (Id.) Petitioner’s 

discharge date is January 5, 2016. (Doc. 22, Ex. Q.) 

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 3. Arizona Motion for Post-Conviction Relief 

 On July 2, 2011, Petitioner filed, in the San Luis Municipal Court, a “Rule 32 OfRight Motion” for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 22, Ex. J.) Petitioner argued that his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his physical court appearance 

was mandatory and his waiver of counsel was not knowing and voluntary. (Id.) 

 The court denied the motion. (Doc. 22, Ex. L.) The court noted the motion was 

filed eight years after his guilty plea, despite the requirement that he had 90 days from the 

entry of judgment and sentence. (Id.) The court ruled that: “defendant knowingly and 

voluntarily plead[ed] guilty to the charges, defendant having been advised of his rights 

and options through telephonic proceedings and defendant having reviewed and signed 

all legal form in his case and knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waiving his 

constitutional rights. “ (Id.) 

 On October 10, 2011, Petitioner moved the trial court to reconsider/rehear his Rule 

32 Of-Right Motion. (Doc. 22, Ex. M.) The court denied Petitioner’s motion on 

November 22, 2011. (Doc. 22, Ex. N.) On December 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion 

for notice of appeal. (Doc. 22, Ex. O.) On April 4, 2012, the court denied the motion. 

(Doc. 22, Ex. P.) 

B. ARIZONA FEDERAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 On January 9, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

(Doc. 1.) Petitioner raises four grounds for relief. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that 

he is innocent of the 2003 DUI. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges he was denied his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel because he “was convicted and sentenced to 

imprisonment without an attorney, no prosecutor, no valid waiver of counsel on the 

record, and [] was not physically present at any proceeding.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) In Ground 

Three, Petitioner alleges his current sentence was unlawfully enhanced by his wrongful 

sentence. In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges his claims are not barred by the statute of 

limitations. 

 On October 22, 2014, the State filed a Response to the Petition. (Doc. 22.) 

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Respondent argues the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the Petition because Petitioner 

is not in custody for the 2003 conviction. Respondent also argues the Petition is not 

timely and the claims are procedurally defaulted. 

 On November 12, 2014, Petitioner filed a Reply where he reiterated the same 

arguments presented in the Petition. (Doc. 23.) Petitioner also argued that any procedural 

default be excused based upon his lack of counsel and innocence. (Doc. 23 at 12.) 

C. WISCONSIN FEDERAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

On September 17, 2014, Petitioner filed Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin challenging three of his prior 

DUI/OWI convictions. Hammersley v. McCash, No. 14–C–1147, 2015 WL 1407391, 1 

(E.D.Wis. Mar. 26, 2015). Petitioner sought “to challenge a prior conviction which was 

used to illegally enhance his current confinement and conviction.” Id. The District Court 

noted that “relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is generally unavailable to collaterally attack an 

expired prior conviction” unless “the prior conviction used to enhance the sentence was 

obtained where there was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment.” Id. (citing Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 

404 (2001)). The Court found that it was undisputed that Petitioner was represented in 

two of the three convictions. Id. 

 The Court also addressed his San Luis DUI conviction. It stated that “Petitioner 

has not explained in his filings in this court why his waiver was constitutionally invalid.” 

Id. The Court “conclude[d] that Petitioner has failed to state a claim in this court under 

Coss whether his waiver was valid or not.” Id. The Court also found: 

 Additionally, even if the waiver of counsel was invalid, habeas relief 

would still not be warranted because the penalty for fifth and sixth offense 

OWI was the same at the time Petitioner was convicted in 2010. See Wis. 

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Stat. §§ 346.63(1); 346.65(2)(am)5 (2007–2008).1 Therefore, the fourth 

offense, the only conviction challengeable under Coss, would not change 

the result of his fifth/sixth offense. 

Id. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

 A. CUSTODY 

 1. Law 

 This Court has jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas relief from persons 

who are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The 

United States Supreme Court has interpreted § 2254(a) “as requiring that a habeas 

petitioner be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his 

petition is filed,” although he need not be physically confined to challenge a sentence on 

habeas corpus. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989). A petitioner “who files a 

habeas petition after he has fully served his sentence and who is not subject to court 

supervision is not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of this court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” 

De Long v. Hennessy, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 Standing alone, the collateral consequences of a conviction are not sufficient to 

render an individual “in custody” for habeas purposes. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492. “If that 

conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not 

 

1 See Wis. Stat. §346.65(2)(am)5 (2007–2008): “Except as provided in pars. (f) and (g), [any person violating s. 346.63 (1)] is guilty of a Class H felony and shall be fined not less than $600 and imprisoned for not less than 6 months if the number of 

convictions under ss. 940.09(1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations and other convictions counted under s. 343.307(1), equals 5 or 6, except that suspensions, revocations or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.” 

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challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the 

prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.” Lackwanna County, 532 U.S. at 403-

404. 

 An exception to the “in-custody” rule exists for a prior conviction that was 

“obtained where there was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment, as set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 

799 (1963).” Id. at 404. See also, Custis v. United States, 511 U.S 485, 496 (1994). 

“When an otherwise qualified § 2254 petitioner can demonstrate that his current sentence 

was enhanced on the basis of a prior conviction that was obtained where there was a 

failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the current sentence 

cannot stand and habeas relief is appropriate.” Lackwanna County, 532 U.S. at 405.2

 “[I]t is the defendant’s burden in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction 

to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance of 

counsel.” United States v. Lenihan, 488 F.3d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir. 2007) (relying on 

Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004)). 

 2. Application 

 Petitioner does not establish there was a failure to appoint counsel in his San Luis 

DUI case. On August 26, 2003, the trial judge held a telephonic hearing with 

Petitioner. (Doc. 22, Exs. L, N.) The court reviewed the Waiver of Counsel form with 

Petitioner. (Doc. 22, Ex. D.) The form advised Petitioner of the charges, his “right to be 

represented by an attorney at all critical stages of this criminal case,” that counsel would 

be appointed without cost to Petitioner if appropriate, and the potential for imprisonment 

and a fine upon a finding of guilty. (Id.) The final line of the form, above Petitioner’s 

 

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 Other exceptions may exist. “Alternatively, after the time for direct or collateral review has expired, a defendant may obtain compelling evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, and which he could not have 

uncovered in a timely manner.” Lackawanna County, 532 U.S. at 405 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)). Assuming arguendo this is an exception to the “in-custody” requirement, Petitioner presents no newly-obtained evidence regarding his San Luis DUI conviction. 

Petitioner bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. See Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997). 

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signature, stated that “[a]fter reading and understanding all of the above, I give up my 

right to an attorney in this case, and to have an attorney appointed for me if I cannot 

afford one.” (Id.) The court and Petitioner signed this form. (Id.) The court found 

“Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to be represented 

by counsel after being advised of the right to be represented by counsel including the 

right to have counsel appointed free of charge if the Defendant is indigent.” (Doc. 1 at 

32.) Petitioner later signed the form and it was received by the court on October 29, 2003. 

(Doc. 22, Ex. L.) 

 Petitioner was not denied counsel under Gideon. First, and foremost, Petitioner 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. (Doc. 22, Ex. D.) 

See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81 (“Waiver of the right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in 

the criminal process generally, must be a ‘knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient 

awareness of the relevant circumstances.’” (citation omitted). Petitioner alleges “there 

was no valid waiver of counsel on the record” (Doc. 1 at 8),3

 but the record demonstrates 

otherwise. Petitioner signed a thorough waiver of counsel form after a hearing before the 

court. (Doc. 22, Exs. C, D.) Petitioner was not denied counsel. See id. at 87–88, 94 

(noting that “the Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant” and that “States 

are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance of an 

uncounseled plea they deem useful”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 

 

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 Petitioner’s conclusory statement that there was “no valid waiver” implicates Petitioner’s rights under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Lackawanna

permitted collateral attacks on prior convictions where there was a failure to appoint counsel under Gideon. It is arguable that Petitioner’s claim fails as a matter of law because Lackawanna does not permit Petitioner to challenge the substance of his Faretta

hearing and waiver. See Sudduth v. Almager, CV 06-07322 GPS (SS), 2008 WL 

2037288, 8 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2008) (finding petitioner’s claim did not fit under Lackawanna because “Petitioner has not alleged that there was a complete failure to appoint counsel in the prior proceedings; rather, he alleges that he was not provided 

Faretta advisements regarding the dangers of self-representation at the time he pled guilty”). Because the record firmly establishes Petitioner waived his right to counsel, the Court does not resolve this issue. 

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CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Petitioner has not established a failure to appoint counsel in his San Luis DUI conviction. 

Because Petitioner cannot satisfy an exception to the in-custody requirement, the Court 

recommends that this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court 

will therefore recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied 

and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

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findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 18th day of June, 2015. 

 

 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

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