Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01439/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01439-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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 Unless otherwise indicated, the cited docket numbers are from the civil case that was

opened upon the filing of the motion to vacate.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Carlin Grant Bartschi, 

Defendant/Petitioner. 

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CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS

CV 09-1439-PHX-ROS (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the court are Petitioner's pro se Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 and Petitioner's Motion to Grant Relief Requested in Motion to Vacate. Doc.

#1, #5.1

BACKGROUND

On October 20, 2008, following a jury trial that ended on June 24, 2008, Petitioner

was convicted of and sentenced on eight counts of Evasion of Assessment, two counts of

Evasion of Payment, five counts of Submission of Fictitious Obligations and three counts of

Mail Fraud. Doc. #126 of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. He was sentenced to 51 months in prison

to be followed by three years of supervised release. Id. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.

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 Petitioner claims in his reply that the Speedy Trial Act was also violated after his

initial indictment. Doc. #11 at 2. Although the court typically would not address a claim

raised for the first time in a reply, for purposes of fully analyzing the ineffective assistance

claim, the court will consider appointed counsel’s actions from the time he was first

appointed following the initial indictment.

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On July 9, 2009, Petitioner filed his Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(hereafter "petition") in this court. Doc. #1. He alleges one ground for relief in the petition:

that his lawyers provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment when they failed to timely move to dismiss the indictment based on a violation

of the Speedy Trial Act. The United States filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion to

Vacate on September 22, 2009. Doc. #6. Petitioner filed a Reply on October 20, 2009. Doc.

#11. On October 21, 2009, the case was referred to this court for a Report and

Recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues in his petition that the clock began running under the Speedy Trial

Act on June 6, 2007, the day he was indicted and arraigned pursuant to a Superseding

Indictment. He claims that between June 6, 2007, and the date his trial began on June 17,

2008, there were at least 374 non-excludable days. He contends that because he was not

brought to trial within 70 non-excludable days, his rights under the Speedy Trial Act were

violated.2

 He claims that his lawyers’ failure to seek dismissal of the indictment on this basis

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Government argues in its response that the

petition must be denied because there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act and that any

delays were caused by Petitioner’s conduct. 

B. Legal Standards

The two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel was established by the

Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show: (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a

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reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

Under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., a criminal defendant’s trial

must begin within 70 days of the date the indictment was filed or the defendant’s initial

appearance, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The statute, however, provides that

certain periods of time are excluded from the 70-day calculation. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).

Among the time periods excluded is:

Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge

on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the

request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted the

continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by

taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant

in a speedy trial.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The court must set forth in the record, either orally or in writing,

its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by a continuance outweigh the interests

in a speedy trial. Id. Section 3161(h)(7)(B) contains the factors a judge must consider in

determining whether to grant a continuance. Among the factors are whether the case is so

unusual or complex that it would be unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the

required time frame, and whether the failure to grant a continuance would deny the defendant

reasonable time to obtain counsel or deny counsel for either party reasonable time necessary

for effective preparation. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii, iv).

After subtracting properly excludable periods of delay, a defendant may move for a

dismissal of the indictment if he is not brought to trial within the 70-day period mandated by

the Speedy Trial Act. United States v. Medina, 524 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 18

U.S.C. 3162(a)(2)). The burden to prove that the delay satisfies the criteria for dismissal

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rests with the defendant. Id. “Failure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial or

entry of a plea of guilty or no lo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal

under this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).

C. Application

1. Petitioner’s Attorney

Petitioner identifies three attorneys in his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Doc. #1 at 4. He contends that each of them failed to move under the Speedy Trial Act to

dismiss the indictment against him. Id. Only one of the three, however, was appointed to

represent Petitioner in defense of the charges against him. At an initial appearance on April

12, 2006, Attorney George Klink was appointed to represent Petitioner. Doc. #4 of CR 06-

0349-PHX-ROS. He represented Petitioner until the Court permitted him to withdraw as

counsel of record on February 1, 2008. Doc. #52 of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. At that time,

the Court appointed a second attorney, Philip Seplow, but only for the limited purpose of

determining whether Petitioner was entitled to appointed counsel. Id. At a status hearing on

April 11, 2008, the Court relieved Mr. Seplow of his duties, removed him from the case and

gave Plaintiff time to obtain his own lawyer. Doc. #65. Petitioner never obtained a private

lawyer and instead represented himself at trial. The Court appointed stand-by counsel in the

event Petitioner changed his mind. 

After Mr. Klink withdrew, the court determined that Petitioner was not eligible for

appointed counsel and his only option was to pay for his own lawyer. Because he chose

instead to represent himself, he has no cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel

against the lawyers that came after Mr. Klink, given the very limited purposes for which they

were appointed. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (“[A] defendant

who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense

amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’”). Thus, only Petitioner’s claim

of ineffective assistance against Mr. Klink is cognizable.

2. Compliance With Speedy Trial Act

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 The Court’s order was before the 2008 amendments to the rule and thus, the order

cites 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A)(B)(ii) and (iv). The content of those subsections did not

change, just the numbering.

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As stated above, Petitioner’s initial appearance, following the return of an indictment,

was on April 12, 2006. Doc. #4 of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. On May 11, 2006, Mr. Klink

filed the first motion to continue the trial. Doc. #12 of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. The Court

granted the motion and continued the trial to July 5, 2006. Doc. #13 of CR 06-0349-PHXROS. The Court found that the ends of justice served by continuing the trial outweighed the

best interest of the public and Petitioner in a speedy trial. Id. The court based its finding on

the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii, iv).3

 Id. The Court therefore excluded

the time beginning on May 11, 2006, the date the motion was filed, until the new trial date.

Id. The 29 days between the initial appearance and the motion were not excluded.

On June 22, 2006, Mr. Klink filed a motion to designate the case complex. Doc. #14

of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. One week later, he filed a second motion to continue based on

the complexity of the case and the extensive discovery. Doc. #15 of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS.

The Court granted the motion to continue on June 30, 2006, again making the “ends of

justice” finding supported by the specific reasons set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii,

iv). Doc. #16 of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. The Court therefore excluded the time between

June 29, 2006, and the new trial date of September 6, 2006. Id.

In the motion to designate the case complex, Mr. Klink explained that the

Government’s allegations against Petitioner were so extensive and broad that all of

Petitioner’s financial affairs dating back to 1995 would have to be examined. Doc. #14 of

CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. Additionally, counsel explained that the allegations involved a

complex scheme that would require substantial amounts of time to understand and

preparation to defend against. Id. Counsel stated that it would be unreasonable to expect

adequate preparation within the usual time limits. Id. On August 4, 2006, the court held a

status conference to address the motion. Doc. #19 of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. Referencing

the reasons presented by counsel, the Court granted the motion and set a new scheduling

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order. Doc. #20 of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. The Court set a new trial date of August 21,

2007, and excluded the time between June 29, 2006 and the new trial date. Id. 

On May 16, 2007, Mr. Klink filed a third motion to continue the trial, again explaining

the need for more time to review the extensive discovery. Doc. #21 of CR 06-0349-PHXROS. In a Minute Entry on May 25, 2007, the Court granted the motion, re-set the trial on

December 4, 2007, and indicated that an order would follow. Doc. #25 of CR 06-0349-PHXROS. The docket does not show that a follow-up order was issued, most likely because a

superseding indictment was filed against Petitioner on May 29, 2007. Doc. #23 of CR 06-

0349-PHX-ROS. The Court then held a status conference on June 11, 2007, and, after

considering proposed amendments to the scheduling order, directed counsel for Petitioner

to submit a fourth motion to continue. Thus, although the Court in its May 25, 2007, status

conference minute entry did not exclude time when it continued the trial to December 4,

2007, the failure to do so became irrelevant in light of the supervening indictment and the

subsequent fourth motion to continue.

For essentially the same reasons set forth in the third motion to continue, Mr. Klink

filed a fourth motion to continue on June 12, 2007. Doc. #27 and #30 (amended motion) of

CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. Finding that the ends of justice were served by a continuance and

basing that finding on the specific reasons set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii, iv), the

Court granted the motion and set a new trial date of March 11, 2008. Doc. #31 of CR 06-

0349-PHX-ROS. The Court excluded the time from June 12, 2007 to the new trial date, thus

overlapping the prior extension to December 4, 2007, and rendering it moot. Id. 

On January 14, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss the supervening

indictment, despite being represented by Mr. Klink. Doc. #39 of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS.

Petitioner claimed the court lacked jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and that the charges against him failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Id. On February 4, 2008, Mr. Klink was allowed to withdraw from further representation and

Philip Seplow was appointed for the limited purpose of determining whether Petitioner was

 entitled to appointed counsel. Doc. #52. Thus, any alleged obligation on Mr. Klink’s part

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to move for dismissal based on a violation of the Speedy Trial Act ended on February 4,

2008.

Because there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act during Mr. Klink’s

representation of Petitioner, moving for dismissal on that basis would have been futile. The

only time period that was not excluded was the 29 days between the initial appearance and

the first motion to continue. Otherwise, the Court properly excluded the time based on its

finding that the ends of justice served by continuing the trial outweighed the best interest of

the public and Petitioner in a speedy trial. The Court properly supported its findings with

specific references to the reasons set forth by Mr. Klink in his motions and the statutory

reasons provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii, iv). Thus, Mr. Klink’s failure to move for

dismissal based on a purported Speedy Trial Act violation was not deficient performance and

not a violation of Petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel.

It should be noted also that nowhere in the record does it show Petitioner voiced any

objection to Mr. Klink’s motions to continue the trial. Further, when Petitioner represented

himself beginning on February 4, 2008, to the end of his trial on June 24, 2008, he never

moved to dismiss the case for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act.

Finally, in an abundance of caution, the court will address the Motion to Continue

Trial filed by Mr. Seplow on February 25, 2008. Doc. #58 of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. Mr.

Seplow explained in the motion that he had yet to meet with Petitioner to fulfill his limited

role of determining whether Petitioner was entitled to court-appointed counsel. Id. He

explained that regardless of this determination, any new lawyer would need time to prepare

for trial. Id. Thus, he moved for a 60-day continuance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). The Court granted the motion upon finding that “failure to continue the

proceeding would deny counsel for the [Petitioner] the reasonable time necessary for

effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.” Doc. #62 of CR 06-

0349-PHX-ROS (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv)). Based on this factor, the Court

found that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweighed the interests in

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a speedy trial. Id. The Court, therefore, re-set the trial to May 13, 2008, excluding the time

between the date the motion was filed and the new trial date. Id. 

On April 11, 2008, Mr. Seplow was relieved of his limited duties and no longer

assigned to the case. Doc. #65 of CR 06-0349-PHX-ROS. During the limited time Mr.

Seplow was involved in the case, time was properly excluded from the 70-day trial deadline.

Thus, Mr. Seplow’s failure to seek dismissal on speedy trial grounds was not deficient

performance and not ineffective assistance.

For the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that Petitioner’s claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel, the only claim in his petition, be denied.

D. Motion to Grant Relief Requested in Motion to Vacate

On September 18, 2009, Petitioner filed a Motion to Grant Relief Requested in Motion

to Vacate. Doc. #5. He claims that the United States failed to file a timely response to the

motion to vacate. In its Response to Motion to Grant Relief Requested in Motion to Vacate,

the Government acknowledged that its response to the petition was untimely by a day. Doc.

#7. In a separate motion, however, the Government moved for an extension of time to file

its response to the petition, which this court granted. Doc. #8, #10. Accordingly, the court

will recommend that Petitioner’s Motion to Grant Relief Requested in Motion to Vacate be

denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in

Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. #1) be denied; and

That Petitioner's Motion to Grant Relief Requested in Motion to Vacate (Doc. #5) be

denied;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 27th day of May, 2010.

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