Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00061/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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On May 4, 2010, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion to file the April 22, 2010

Supplement. (See Doc. 22).

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Exhibit 2, Attachment 1 of Respondents’ Answer has been filed under seal. (See

Docs. 27, 28).

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On September 17, 2010, the Court allowed Petitioner’s August 27, 2010 Supplement.

(See Doc. 37).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Abdul Rahman Shadabadi, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Craig Apker, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 10-61-TUC-DCB (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court are: (1) Petitioner’s March 26, 2010 Amended Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 (Doc. No. 17); (2) Petitioner’s March

26, 2010 Memorandum in Support of Petition (Doc. 18) (hereinafter “Petitioner’s Memo.”);

(3) Petitioner’s April 22, 2010 Supplement1

 (Doc. 21); (4) Respondents’ May 24, 2010

Return and Answer2

 (Doc. 25) (hereinafter “Answer”); (5) Petitioner’s July 12, 2010 Reply

(Doc. 32); and (6) Petitioner’s August 27, 2010 Supplement3

 (Doc. 36). Pursuant to the

Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge

Case 4:10-cv-00061-DCB Document 39 Filed 12/22/10 Page 1 of 9
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for Report and Recommendation. For the following reasons the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court deny the Amended Petition.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is presently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona.

Petitioner claims that the Bureau of Prisons (hereinafter “BOP”) denied him credit against

his federal sentence for pretrial detention for the period from December 15, 2004 to

December 15, 2005. (Amended Petition, p.4). 

On December 15, 2004, Petitioner was arrested by a police officer from the Citrus

Heights, California Police Department for, inter alia, being a Felon in Possession of a

Weapon. (Answer, p. 2; Petitioner’s April 22, 2010 Supplement). At the time of his arrest,

Petitioner was on California state parole and a parole hold was placed on him by the state of

California. (Answer, p.2 & Exh. 2, Att.3, p.1). On December 31, 2004, the California State

Board of Prison Terms revoked Petitioner’s parole and returned him to California state

custody for 12 months. (Answer, p.2 & Exh. 2, Att.3, p.1). With regard to Petitioner’s

parole revocation, the record reflects that on January 11, 2005, Petitioner signed a form

entitled Board of Prison Terms Notice of Right to Revocation Hearing - Acknowledgment.

(Petitioner’s April 22, 2010 Supplement). On that same date he also signed a form entitled

Board of Prison Terms Waiver of Revocation Hearing wherein he marked a box indicating

the following:

I DO NOT want a revocation hearing while my case is in court. I give up all my

hearing rights. The Board can decide if I broke the rules and whether I should go back

to prison. They can do this without me there. I may want a hearing LATER. I have

15 days after the court case ends to ask for one. I cannot ask for a hearing if it is less

than 2 months before my revocation ends.

(Id.) (capitalization in original). Additionally on January 11, 2005, Petitioner signed a form

entitled Board of Prison Terms State of California Summary of Revocation Decision:

Hearing Waived/Screening Offer, wherein Petitioner was informed of the decision to revoke

his parole and return him to custody for 12 months due to his state parole violation stemming

from his December 15, 2004 arrest. (Id.). Petitioner marked a box indicating the following:

I accept the above order and optionally waive my right to a hearing. (Id.). 

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The state eventually dismissed the criminal charges against Petitioner arising from his

December 15, 2004 arrest. (See Answer, Exh. 1, Att. 3 (Warden Rios’ July 29, 2009

Response to Request for Administrative Remedy (noting that the state criminal charges

arising from Petitioner’s December 15, 2004 arrest were dismissed)). Petitioner does not

allege that he requested a hearing with regard to his parole revocation. (See Petitioner’s

April 22, 2010 Supplement (Board of Prison Terms Waiver of Revocation Hearing indicating

that Petitioner could ask for a hearing regarding his parole revocation 15 days after his

California case ended)).

On December 23, 2004, Petitioner was indicted on the charge of Felon in Possession of

a Firearm in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California in CR 04-0481.

(Answer, p.2 & Exh. 1, Att. 1). On February 3, 2005, Petitioner was arrested by agents of

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (hereinafter “ATF”) in relation to the

indictment in CR 04-801. (Answer, p.2 & Exh. 2, p.2, Att. 4, p.1). The United States

Marshals Service assumed custody of Petitioner pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad

prosequendum, and temporarily housed him at the Sacramento County Jail on a contractual

basis. (Answer, Exh. 2, p.2, Att. 5, p.5). “On December 15, 2005, Petitioner was re-paroled

from the California Department of Corrections while in temporary federal custody pursuant

to the writ. This relinquished primary jurisdiction from the state to federal authorities.”

(Answer, Exh. 2, pp.2-3; see also Answer, Exh. 2, Att. 6). On August 4, 2006, Petitioner was

released from federal custody on a recognizance bond. (Answer, Exh. 2, p. 3, Att. 4, p.2).

Petitioner ultimately pled guilty in CR 04-481 to the federal charge of Felon in Possession

of a Firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). (Petitioner’s Memo., p. 2). On March 13,

2009, Petitioner was sentenced to 63 months of confinement followed by three years of

supervised release in CR 04-801. (Id.; Answer, p. 2 & Exh. 2, Att.9). This is the sentence

at issue in the instant Petition. Petitioner is projected to complete this sentence on January

15, 2011, via good conduct time. (Answer, pp. 2-3 & Exh. 1, Att.2; Answer, Exh. 2, Att. 10).

Petitioner has a full term expiration date of September 19, 2011. (Id.). Petitioner also has a

retainer lodged against him by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Id.).

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Argument

Petitioner argues that the BOP, in calculating his federal sentence, has denied him credit

from the December 15, 2004 arrest date by California police to December 15, 2005.

Petitioner’s argument is based on his position that he was informed by the California

Department of Corrections that if the state dismissed the charges pending against him, the

12-month “sanction [for the state parole violation] would be invalid...” (Petitioner’s Memo.,

pp. 1-2). Petitioner alleges that the state dismissed the charges against him and the ATF took

over the matter resulting in his federal indictment. (Id.). Petitioner opines that because the

state dismissed the criminal charges against him, he has been in federal and not state custody,

and thus, he is entitled to credit against his federal sentence from his December 15, 2004

arrest date. (Petitioner’s Memo., p. 2). Instead, the BOP calculates Petitioner’s federal

sentence as commencing on December 16, 2005, the day that BOP maintains that the state

of California relinquished its jurisdiction over Petitioner by re-paroling Petitioner and

releasing him to the custody of the United States Marshal. (Id. at p.3; Answer, Exh. 2, Att.

3 (Warden Rios’ July 29, 2009 Response to Request for Administrative Remedy)).

Petitioner further claims that his state revocation parole proceeding violated his “5th

Amendment Right...” to due process because his parole was revoked without notice, a

probable cause hearing, a revocation hearing, and he was not asked to waive such rights prior

to the revocation of his parole. (Petitioner’s Memo., p.3).

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s sentence was properly calculated and his Amended

Petition should be denied. (Answer, pp. 3-5)

B. Jurisdiction

“Federal courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to examine their own

jurisdiction,’...and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting FW/PBS,

Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by City

of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004)). With regard to habeas

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In his Memorandum, Petitioner claims that the state parole revocation violated his

due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. (Petitioner’s Memo., p.2). To any extent

Petitioner attempts to challenge the state revocation proceeding itself, such a claim is not

cognizable in the instant Petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. Instead, any remedy for

a claim challenging the state proceeding is through 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a section 2254

petition would probably be time-barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Moreover, it is the

Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment that protects a person against deprivations

of due process by a state. See U.S. Const. amend XIV, §1 (“nor shall any state deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”); Castillo v. McFadden, 399

F.3d 993, 1002 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government

from depriving persons of due process, while the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits

deprivations without due process by the several States.”). Thus, the Fifth Amendment Due

Process Clause would not provide a cognizable ground for relief regarding Petitioner’s

allegations concerning his state parole revocation proceeding.

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petitions, federal jurisdiction is dependent upon a proper characterization of the petition.

Gay v. Winn, 2009 WL 275324, *2 (D.Ariz. Feb. 5, 2009). 

An action to challenge the manner, location or condition of the execution of a federal

sentence must be filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864.

Petitioner’s claim that the BOP has denied him pre-sentence credit to which he is entitled,

falls under section 2241.4

 See e.g. Gay, 2009 WL 275324 at * 2 (citing Rogers v. United

States, 180 F.3d 349 (1st Cir. 1999) (section 2241 petition is appropriate vehicle to challenge

the correctness of a jail-time credit determination, once administrative remedies have been

exhausted)). Further, because Petitioner is incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in

Tucson, Arizona, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter. Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353

(9th Cir. 1990); Gay, 2009 WL 275324 at * 2. 

C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:

[28 U.S.C. § 2241] does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals

before filing petitions for habeas corpus. [Footnote omitted.] However, we require, as

a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative

remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.

Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds,

Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). Respondents concede that Petitioner

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exhausted administrative remedies prior to filing the instant Petition. (See Answer, p. 3). 

D. Analysis

“After a district court sentences a federal offender, the Attorney General, through the

BOP, has the responsibility for administering the sentence.” United States v. Wilson, 503

U.S. 329, 336 (1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. §3621(a)); see also Allen v. Crabtree, 153 F.3d 1030,

1033 (9th Cir. 1998). The statute governing calculation of a term of imprisonment provides

that a federal sentence commences on the date the defendant is received in custody to begin

service of his sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Section 3585 also provides for credit for prior

custody as follows:

A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any

time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences--

(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or

(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was

arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence

was imposed; 

that has not been credited against another sentence.

18 U.S.C. §3585(b) (emphasis added). Through the last clause of section 3585(b), “Congress

made clear that a defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time.” Wilson,

503 U.S. at 337.

Further, Section 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute the credit at

sentencing. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334; United States v. Lualemaga, 280 F.3d 1260, 1265 (9th

Cir. 2002). Instead, the Attorney General, acting through the BOP, has the responsibility to

compute the credit allowed by section 3585(b). Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334-35; see also Id. at

335 (“Because the offender has a right to certain jail-time credit under §3585(b), and because

the district court cannot determine the amount of the credit at sentencing, the Attorney

General has no choice but to make the determination as an administrative matter when

imprisoning the defendant.”). “[T]he BOP has developed detailed procedures and guidelines

for determining the credit available to prisoners.” Id. at 335 (citing Federal Prison System

Program Statement 5880.24; Federal Bureau of Prisons Operations Memorandum No. EMSDM 154-89). See also Cruz v. Sanders, 2008 WL 5101021, *1 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 2, 2008)

(“The BOP’s guidelines for computation of sentences are set forth in Program Statement

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5880.28, which expressly incorporates the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §3585(b).” (citing

Program Statement 5880.28 at 1-14)); (Answer, Exh. 2 (citing Program Statement 5880.28,

Sentence Computation Manual when discussing computation of Petitioner’s sentence)). The

BOP’s internal guidelines provided in the Program Statements are not entitled to the same

deference as promulgated regulations, but they are nonetheless entitled to “some deference”

if they are a permissible construction of the statute. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61

(1995). See also Allen, 153 F.3d at 1033.

Petitioner’s California state parole was revoked as a result of his December 15, 2004

arrest, he was returned to state custody for 12 months for that parole violation, and he was

released from service of that sentence on December 15, 2005. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b),

Petitioner cannot receive credit for his federal sentence for time which has been credited

against another sentence. Because Petitioner received credit toward his state parole

revocation for the period until December 15, 2005, that time cannot be credited against his

federal sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §3585(b); Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337 (a defendant cannot

receive a double credit for his detention time).

Further, that Petitioner was arrested by ATF while in state custody for his parole violation

does not alter the Court’s conclusion. “Normally, the sovereign which first arrests an

individual acquires priority of jurisdiction for purposes of trial, sentencing, and

incarceration” unless the sovereign with priority of jurisdiction relinquishes it to another

sovereign. United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684 (9th Cir. 1980). Further, “‘[w]hen an

accused is transferred pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum he is considered

to be on loan to the federal authorities so that the sending state’s jurisdiction over the accused

continues uninterruptedly.’” Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting

Crawford v. Jackson, 589 F.2d 693, 695 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In this instance, Petitioner was serving the time imposed for his state parole revocation when:

ATF arrested him on February 3, 2005; he presented in federal court on February 3, 2005 and

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On February 3, 2005, the federal court issued an order directing that: 

on order of a court of the United States, or a request of an attorney for the

Government, the person in charge of the corrections facility in which the

defendant is confined deliver the defendant to a United States Marshal for the

purpose of an appearance in connection with a court proceeding.

(Answer, Exh. 2, Att.5, p.5)

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thereafter on the federal charges5

; and he was re-paroled from the California Department of

Corrections in December 2005 after serving the 12 months imposed for his state parole

revocation. Consequently, the State of California had primary jurisdiction over Petitioner,

which continued uninterrupted from the date of Petitioner’s arrest on December 15, 2004

until December 15, 2005 when the state of California relinquished jurisdiction by re-paroling

Petitioner and releasing him to the federal authorities. See Id.; Warren, 610 F.2d at 684.

Under the instant circumstances, Petitioner cannot receive credit against both his state parole

revocation and his federal sentence because such double credit violates 18 U.S.C. §3585(b).

See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337 (a defendant cannot receive double credit for his detention time).

E. CONCLUSION

Because Petitioner received credit toward his state parole revocation for the period from

December 15, 2004 to December 15, 2005, he is not entitled to credit against his federal

sentence for that same period. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

deny Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§2241 (Doc. No. 17).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the

following case number: CV 10-61-TUC-DCB.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

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Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003).

DATED this 22nd day of December, 2010.

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