Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00937/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00937-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL JAMES GRIMES,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD RIVERMAN et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-0937 DAD P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an action filed 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s second amended complaint.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

As the court previously advised plaintiff, the court is required to screen complaints 

brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a 

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion 

thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more 

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 

U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

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holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague 

and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights 

violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff has identified several doctors and physician’s 

assistants as the defendants. Plaintiff’s primary complaint is that he is dissatisfied with the

medical care he has received from defendants. For example, plaintiff alleges that defendant Dr. 

Soltanian at some point wrote in plaintiff’s medical chart that plaintiff refuses to obtain medical 

care outside of the prison grounds. According to plaintiff, this caused him to have two major 

emergency surgeries within a ten day period. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Dr. Nasseer

is “very simple” and did nothing to treat any of plaintiff’s medical problems. Plaintiff also 

alleges that defendant Dr. Torres stopped his “cut back” surgery because plaintiff’s blood 

pressure was too high. Although, according to plaintiff, he ultimately did receive the surgery, 

plaintiff alleges that the delay he experienced in that regard resulted in fellow inmates harassing 

him for the way he smelled prior to his surgery. (Sec. Am. Compl. at 3-10.)

DISCUSSION

The allegations in plaintiff’s second amended complaint are so vague and conclusory that 

the court is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for 

relief. The second amended complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint 

must give fair notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim 

plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants 

engaged in that support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the 

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the second amended complaint must be dismissed. In the 

interests of justice, the court will grant plaintiff leave to file a third and final amended complaint.

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If plaintiff chooses to file a third amended complaint, plaintiff must allege facts 

demonstrating how the conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s federal 

constitutional or statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). In addition, 

plaintiff must allege in specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the deprivation 

of plaintiff’s rights. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official 

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982).

The court understands from plaintiff’s allegations that he is dissatisfied with the medical 

care provided to him by defendants. However, as the court previously advised plaintiff, in Estelle 

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), the Supreme Court held that inadequate medical care did not

constitute cruel and unusual punishment cognizable under § 1983 unless the mistreatment rose to

the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Deliberate indifference is “a state

of mind more blameworthy than negligence” and “requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care

for the prisoner’s interests or safety.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). 

To state a cognizable claim for inadequate medical care, plaintiff needs to allege specific 

facts demonstrating how each defendant’s actions rose to the level of “deliberate indifference.” 

In this regard, plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in his medical care, explain 

why the care he received was inadequate, and clarify what injury he suffered as a result of the 

defendant’s medical care. Plaintiff mentions in his second amended complaint that “malpractice” 

is the norm in the prison system. However, “mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical 

malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 

(9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). Likewise, a mere disagreement between 

plaintiff and defendants as to how defendants provided him with medical care fails to state a 

cognizable § 1983 claim. See Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 

2004); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Plaintiff is reminded that the court cannot refer to prior pleadings in order to make his 

third amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th 

Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a third amended complaint, the prior pleading no longer serves 

any function in the case. Therefore, in a third amended complaint, as in an original complaint, 

each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

OTHER MATTERS

Plaintiff has filed two motions for “discovery” to obtain copies of his medical records. 

The court will deny plaintiff’s motions. Plaintiff should have access to his medical records at his 

institution of confinement upon his request. If plaintiff is having difficulty accessing his medical 

records, he should file an administrative grievance at his institution. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 

3084.1(a) (prisoners may appeal “any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the 

department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material adverse 

effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.”).

In addition, plaintiff has filed a motion to “remove respondent[’s] name and replace with” 

Jerry Brown. Plaintiff has also filed a motion to dismiss two named defendants, defendant 

Alphonso and defendant Woman, because he no longer wishes to proceed on any claims against 

those defendants. The court will deny plaintiff’s motion to “remove respondent[’s] name and 

replace with” Jerry Brown. Plaintiff is advised that the caption of this case reflects the defendants

he is proceeding against. He is not proceeding against Governor Jerry Brown in this action. The 

court will also deny plaintiff’s motion to dismiss two of the named defendants as unnecessary 

because, for the reasons discussed herein, the court is dismissing plaintiff’s second amended 

complaint in its entirety. In any third amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, he need not name 

Alphonso and Woman as defendants if he no longer wishes to proceed against them.

Plaintiff has also filed a motion for a court order against the law librarian at California 

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility. Plaintiff complains that the law librarian is not making 

necessary copies for him. The court will deny plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff is advised that this 

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court is unable to issue an order against any individual who is not a party to a suit pending before 

it. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 112 (1969); Zepeda v. 

United States Immigration Service, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court may issue 

an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the 

claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.”). Again, if 

plaintiff is having trouble making copies he is required to make, his initial course of action should 

be to file an administrative grievance at his institution. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a).

Finally, plaintiff has filed a motion to place this case on “inactive” status until May 31, 

2014, because he would like additional time to study the law. In addition, plaintiff reports that 

the computers at the institution where he is confined are being replaced, and he is in the process 

of trying to find an attorney to represent him. Finally, as noted above, plaintiff states that he is 

trying to obtain a copy of his medical records. The court will deny plaintiff’s motion to have this 

action placed in “inactive” status. Plaintiff filed this civil rights action and has a duty to 

prosecute it diligently. Insofar as plaintiff needs additional time to respond to a court order, he 

should file a request for an extension of time.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Doc. No. 27) is dismissed;

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a third

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the third amended complaint must bear the 

docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Third Amended Complaint”; failure to 

file a third amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in dismissal of this action 

without prejudice; 

3. Plaintiff’s motion to remove respondent’s name (Doc. No. 23) is denied;

4. Plaintiff’s motion for a court order against the law librarian (Doc. No. 24) is denied;

5. Plaintiff’s motions for discovery (Doc. Nos. 29 & 32) are denied;

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6. Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendants Alphonso and Woman (Doc. No. 31) is denied 

as unnecessary;

7. Plaintiff’s motion to put this case on “inactive” status (Doc. No. 33) is denied; and

8. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court’s form for filing a civil 

rights action.

Dated: February 3, 2014

DAD:9

grim0937.14am

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