Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01627/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01627-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIG LAMAR REID,

Petitioner, No. 2:06-cv-1627 FCD KJN P

vs.

WARDEN, HIGH DESERT STATE 

PRISON, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2004 conviction 

of first degree robbery. The trial court found petitioner suffered a prior serious felony conviction

within the meaning of California Penal Code § 667(a), and a prior prison term within the

meaning of California Penal Code § 667.5(b). Petitioner was sentenced to eighteen years in state

prison. Petitioner raises one claim in his petition, filed July 24, 2006, that his prison sentence

violates the Constitution. 

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Case 2:06-cv-01627-FCD-KJN Document 28 Filed 08/09/10 Page 1 of 10
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 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 1

Appellate District in People v. Reid, No. C047359 (February 24, 2005), a copy of which was

lodged by respondents. (Lodged Doc. (“LD”) 4.) 

 Fagre could not recall whether [petitioner] pulled Smith into the car. 2

2

FACTS

The opinion of the California Court of Appeal contains a factual summary. After 1

reviewing the record, the undersigned finds this summary to be accurate and adopts it herein.

 In 2002[,] Pete Fagre was an independent contractor with Yellow

Cab. He leased the cab and received fares by responding to calls

from the Yellow Cab dispatcher and to his own cellular telephone. 

To generate business, Fagre distributed business cards around

town, including at the Exxon station at the corner of Fulton and

Marconi Avenues.

 On June 5, 2002, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Fagre received a

call from Exxon employee Gordon Hoeft that some customers

needed a ride. When he arrived, [petitioner] and Genea Smith

were waiting outside. [Petitioner] wanted Fagre to take them to

Vince’s Motel on Folsom Boulevard in Rancho Cordova.

 During the 15-minute drive, Fagre and [petitioner] talked about

the job corps and about drugs. [Petitioner] asked Fagre whether he

used drugs in order to stay awake so he could work at night. Fagre

said he had not done drugs in over a year. [Petitioner] said he had

done them in the past and had just been released from jail. When

Fagre dropped [petitioner] off, [petitioner] told him he was a good

cab driver and asked for his business card.

 At approximately 6:30 p.m., Fagre received a cellular telephone

call from [petitioner], asking him for a ride. When Fagre arrived at

the corner of Martin Luther King Boulevard and 21st, Smith and

[petitioner] entered the cab. Halfway through the trip, [petitioner]

whispered to Smith and the two became quiet. [Petitioner] told

Fagre to take the El Camino Avenue exit. Fagre refused because it

was not the proper exit. Fagre exited at Marconi Avenue and, as

he attempted to move into the left lane, [petitioner] told him to

keep going. [Petitioner] then instructed Fagre to pull over. Smith

got out of the car and walked down the street. [Petitioner] also got

out and appeared to be looking for his money. [Petitioner] told

Smith, “[B]itch, get back here, give me my money.” She

responded, “I don’t have any money, you know that.” Smith got

back in the car and [petitioner] said he needed to go to the “ATM” 2

to get some money. Fagre suggested the Bank of America, which

was close by, but [petitioner] refused. [Petitioner] told Fagre to

drive to Edison and Howe Avenues, where he could get money

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 Fagre testified he could feel the barrel of the gun but did not actually see it. 3

 The police reported the call as coming in at 7:37 p.m. 4

 When asked on cross-examination whether Washington told a detective that Smith told 5

Washington to tell the police that she (Smith) did not do it, Washington said she might have and

that “sounds pretty correct.” Washington said that her statement to the detective and her

testimony were “[p]retty much the same statement.” Defense counsel noted that the difference

was whether or not Smith directed Washington to tell the police that she did not do it. 

Washington said it was the same statement: “She told me she didn’t do it. She didn’t know her

boyfriend was going to do it. Then she said I didn’t do it, I didn’t do it.”

3

from his friends. As they approached the intersection, [petitioner]

said his friends were not home and instructed Fagre to turn left on

Howe Avenue. As they passed Rainbow Street, [petitioner] said he

saw his aunt’s car and told Fagre to pull over. Smith got out of the

cab and started walking down the street. [Petitioner] came up

behind Fagre, put a gun that was wrapped in a coat up to his head,3

and said, “[T]his is a robbery, mother fucker, give me the money or

I’ll blow your fucking head off.” Fagre handed [petitioner] $180.

 Fagre immediately called 911 and said he had been robbed.4

[Petitioner] had disappeared, but Fagre saw Smith two or three

minutes later on the next street. Smith tried to flag down several

cars and succeeded in getting a Mazda to pull over and let her in. 

Fagre followed the Mazda. 

 Jasmine Washington was driving the Mazda. She saw Smith,

who she believed was 18 or 19 years old, running to the middle of

the street waving her arms back and forth, looking frightened,

scared, and shaken up. Her hair was messed up, her breasts were

hanging out of her shirt, and she looked as though she was running

away from something. Washington asked Smith if she was okay. 

She said “no” and that her boyfriend had beaten her up. She was

crying. Once inside Washington’s car, she was shaking and talking

loudly, like she was hysterical. Smith asked to be taken home.

 After driving approximately two blocks, Washington noticed a

taxicab behind her and wondered aloud why it was following her. 

Before they reached Fulton Avenue, Washington heard sirens and

saw two police cars coming toward them. Smith then said that her

boyfriend had robbed the cab driver but she did not know he was

going to do it. She also said that she did not do it. The police 5

pulled them over at gunpoint and handcuffed them.

 Sacramento County Sheriff’s Deputy Matt Curtis interviewed

Fagre shortly after he observed Fagre following the Mazda. Fagre

was visibly upset, shaking, having a hard time talking, and chain

smoking. Fagre said that when he gave the money to [petitioner],

both Smith and [petitioner] got out of the car and then [petitioner]

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 Terry Reid had felony convictions for check fraud, assault with force likely to produce 6

great bodily injury, and false impersonation.

4

took off. Fagre never said he actually saw the gun.

 Smith directed Sheriff’s Sergeant Kenneth Georges, Deputy

Curtis, and Deputy Aaron Zelaya to an apartment at 2401 Marconi

Avenue, a little over a quarter of a mile away from the robbery. 

[Petitioner’s] mother, Terry Reid, was inside the apartment. Terry

Reid said that [petitioner] had arrived at her apartment at

approximately 8:30 p.m., yelling to be let in. He was sweaty and

agitated and kept asking, “[W]here is the girl[?]” He came inside

and changed his clothes. She overheard him saying on the

telephone that he had just gotten some money and that he called for

a cab. [Petitioner] stayed for 25 to 30 minutes. At trial, Terry Reid

denied making these statements.

6

 On June 12, 2002, deputies found [petitioner] hiding in the

bedroom closets of one of the apartments at the complex where his

mother lived. Investigators from the Sacramento County District

Attorney’s Office unsuccessfully tried to locate Smith, using her

aliases, past addresses, and other identifying data.

 [Petitioner] testified in his own behalf. In June 2002 he was a

cook at A Touch of Class and on the side sold rock cocaine from a

house located between 21st and 36th Avenue. He had known

Smith for a couple of weeks and thought she was a prostitute.

 On June 5, 2002, he wanted to buy snacks from the Exxon station

and then go to Vince’s Motel with Smith. He saw Fagre and Smith

talking, so he assumed they knew each other. In the cab on the

way to the motel, Fagre said he used drugs and asked [petitioner] if

he knew where to get drugs. Fagre gave Smith his business card

and said he would check with [petitioner] later. [Petitioner] and

Smith spent the night at a friend’s motel room. In the morning,

[petitioner] had a friend take him to 21st and Martin Luther King

Boulevard so he could sell drugs.

 Smith pulled up to the house at that location in a cab and told

[petitioner] that she wanted to purchase an “eight ball,” or about

four and a half grams, of drugs. [Petitioner] weighed out the

amount, and Smith paid him $80 and left the house, heading in the

direction of the cab.

 Smith came back 10 minutes later and said that “the person”

wanted something bigger. [Petitioner] went outside. Fagre honked

his horn and Smith waived at [petitioner] to come inside the cab

with her. [Petitioner] initially wanted to go to his mother’s house,

where he kept larger amounts of drugs, but instead they went to

Hubacher Cadillac to see if his car was ready. [Petitioner’s]

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 According to the service manager at Hubacher Cadillac, there was no record of a 7

Cadillac being brought in for service, under the name of either Reid or Vickers, on June 4 or 5,

2002.

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girlfriend, Beverly Vickers, had dropped it off the previous

morning.7

 [Petitioner] then directed Fagre to his mother’s apartment

complex, where [petitioner] gave his mother drugs, changed

clothes, and weighed the drugs he was going to give to Fagre. 

When he returned to the cab, Smith was no longer there. Fagre

asked for the “stuff” and [petitioner] asked for money. Fagre said

he had already given [petitioner] the money. [Petitioner] started

looking for Smith while Fagre followed in his car. Fagre said he

did not have time for this, asked [petitioner] to give him what he

came out there for, and told [petitioner] that if he did not, Fagre

was going to call the police and claim [petitioner] had robbed him. 

(People v. Reid, slip op. at 2-8.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District. 

The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence on February 24,

2005. (LD 4.) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (LD 5.) 

The California Supreme Court denied the petition on May 11, 2005. (LD 6.) Petitioner did not

seek habeas relief in the state courts. (Pet. at 2.) 

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1994); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). 

A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. 

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th

Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de

novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

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This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citation omitted).

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

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(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Independent review of the record is not de

novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine

whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.”); accord Pirtle v. Morgan, 313

F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). When it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of

a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the AEDPA’s deferential

standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de novo. Nulph v.

Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

II. Sentencing Error

Petitioner claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to trial when he

was sentenced to an aggravated term based on findings of facts that were not submitted to a jury. 

(Pet. at 5.) 

Respondent argues that the state court’s finding that California’s determinate

sentencing system does not violate the right to a jury trial is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. (Ans. at 19.) 

The last reasoned rejection of this claim is the decision of the California Court of

Appeal for the Third Appellate District on petitioner’s direct appeal. The state court rejected this

claim as follows: 

 The court imposed the upper term for [petitioner’s] robbery

conviction for the following reasons, noted in the probation report: 

the offense required planning; [petitioner] has engaged in prior acts

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 The probation report recounted that [petitioner] had the following convictions: felony 8

burglary, attempted receipt of stolen property, and possession of cocaine, all in Ohio in 1991;

second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) in 1994, when [petitioner] robbed a video store clerk

at gunpoint; and misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242) in 2000, when [petitioner] became

“physical” with his wife after she called police to report an argument with him. He had also been

arrested for the following offenses: assault with intent to commit mayhem/rape (Pen. Code,

§ 220) while armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)) in 1993, when [petitioner]

displayed a handgun to a man and his girlfriend after he loaned the man $50 and demanded sex

from the girlfriend as repayment; and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code,

§ 23152, subd. (a)), being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,

§ 11550, subd. (a)), and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364) in 2002,

which case had been continued as of the date of the probation report.

8

of violent conduct; his prior convictions are substantial;8

[petitioner] has served a prior prison term; and [petitioner’s]

performance on parole has been unsatisfactory. The court specified

it did not find any circumstances in mitigation.

 Applying the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, the United States Supreme Court held in Apprendi

that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases

the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be

tried to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Apprendi,

supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) For this purpose, the statutory

maximum is the maximum sentence that a court could impose

based solely on facts reflected by a jury’s verdict or admitted by the

[petitioner]. Thus, when a sentencing court’s authority to impose

an enhanced sentence depends upon additional fact findings, there

is a right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the

additional facts. (Blakely, supra, 159 L.Ed.2d at pp. 413-414.) 

 Relying on Apprendi and Blakely, [petitioner] claims the trial

court erred in imposing the upper term because the court relied

upon facts not submitted to the jury and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt, thus depriving him of the constitutional right to a

jury trial on facts legally essential to the sentence.

 The contention fails. One of the reasons the trial court gave for

imposing the upper term is [petitioner’s] prior criminal

convictions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2).) As we have

noted, the rule of Apprendi and Blakely does not apply to a prior

conviction used to increase the penalty for a crime. Since one valid

factor in aggravation is sufficient to expose [petitioner] to the

upper term (People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 433), the

trial court’s consideration of other factors, in addition to the prior

convictions, in deciding whether to impose the upper term did not

violate the rule of Apprendi and Blakely.

(LD 4 at 14-15.)

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In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme Court made it clear

that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; accord Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270,

274-75 (2007); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004). The Court in Apprendi found

that recidivism was distinguishable from other matters employed to enhance punishment because

(1) “recidivism is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's

increasing an offender's sentence,” (2) “recidivism does not relate to the commission of the

[charged] offense[,]” and (3) prior convictions result from proceedings that include substantial

procedural protections. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (internal quotation marks, alterations and

citations omitted). In carving out this “narrow exception” for prior convictions, the Apprendi

Court explicitly declined to overrule its decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523

U.S. 224 (1998). Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90 (“Because Almendarez-Torres had admitted the

three earlier convictions for aggravated felonies - all of which had been entered pursuant to

proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of their own - no question concerning the

right to a jury trial or the standard of proof that would apply to a contested issue of fact was

before the Court. . . . More important, . . . our conclusion in Almendarez-Torres turned heavily

upon the fact that the additional sentence to which the defendant was subject was the prior

commission of a serious crime.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In this case, petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction

enhancements and agreed to have the trial court decide the truth of those allegations. (Reporter’s

Transcript at 588.) The court found the allegations true. (Clerk’s Transcript at 242.) The trial

court chose to impose the upper term based on the fact of petitioner’s recidivism. (Reporter’s

Transcript at 663.) Petitioner does not have a right to a jury trial when his sentence was

enhanced based on the facts of his prior conviction. Almendarez-Torres, 532 U.S. at 246;

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488. 

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Moreover, there is no clearly established federal law that requires a jury trial on

the existence of a prior conviction. Accordingly, the denial of this claim by California Court of

Appeal was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. This

claim should be denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a writ of

habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 6, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

reid1627.157

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