Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01109/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01109-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY L. TAYLOR,

Petitioner,

v.

TERI GONZALEZ, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 11cv1109 WQH (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [ECF NO. 1]

Petitioner Anthony L. Taylor, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on May 19, 2011 [ECF Nos. 1, 5].1 Taylor alleges that he

negotiated a plea agreement ensuring that he would receive a

twenty-year sentence. (Pet. 12-13, ECF No. 1.) He contends that

despite this agreement, the trial court denied his motion to

withdraw the plea and improperly sentenced him to twenty-four

years in prison. (Id.) Petitioner maintains that his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process was violated as a result. (Id. at

1 Because Taylor's Petition and Gonzalez's Answer are not

consecutively paginated, the Court will cite to each using the

page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.

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13, 15-16.) He also contends that his Sixth Amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel was violated when his trial

attorney misadvised him during the plea negotiations. (Id. at 13,

16-17.) 

Respondent Terri Gonzalez, the warden, filed her Answer to

Taylor's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus along with a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities and a Notice of Lodgment on

November 9, 2011 [ECF Nos. 8, 9]. Petitioner did not file a

traverse. 

On October 31, 2011, Taylor filed a "Petition for Stay and

Abeyance [ECF No. 7]." There, he requested that the Court stay

his federal petition while he exhausted a new claim in state

court. (Pet. Stay & Abeyance 4-6, ECF No. 7.) Respondents filed

an opposition on November 22, 2011; the request for a stay was

denied on August 23, 2012 [ECF Nos. 11, 15, 16]. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 1, 2008, in the Superior Court of California, County

of San Diego, Taylor, on advice from his counsel, Tom Carnessale,

pleaded guilty to attempted murder and admitted two felony-strike

priors. (Lodgment No. 12, Rep's [Appeal Tr.] vol. 2, 10-12, May

1, 2008.)2 During a chambers conference with Carnessale, the

assigned judge stated that she was considering "striking the

2 The five volumes of transcripts in Lodgment 12 are labeled

volumes 1 through 5. But the captions on the face page of each

show two volumes numbered 1, a volume 2, no volume 3, and volumes

4 and 5. To minimize confusion, the Court will cite to the two

captioned volume 1's as "volume 1 [part 1]" and "volume 1 [part

2]." Further, volume 1 [part 2] and volume 2 are duplicate

transcripts of the same hearing. The Court will refer to volume 2

when citing to the transcript of Petitioner's plea hearing. 

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strike and putting [the sentence] in the 20, 22-year category." 

(Id. vol. 5, 37, Sept. 29, 2008.)

 Petitioner subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea

on September 15, 2008; Taylor claimed that at the time of the May

1, 2008 plea, he was under stress, taking an incorrect dose of

medication, and his counsel inadequately discussed the plea

bargain and was overbearing. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 32, 36-

37, Sept. 15, 2008; Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 5,

81.) On September 29, 2008, the court denied Taylor's motion to

withdraw his plea; Judge Cookson recalled the earlier chambers

conference but sentenced Taylor to twenty-four years, despite his

understanding that he would receive no more than twenty-years

under the plea agreement. (Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr.

vol. 5, 37, 81, 86-87.) At the hearing, Taylor had new counsel;

neither counsel nor Petitioner objected to the twenty-four-year

sentence. (Id. at 36, 85-87.) 

On October 27, 2008, Taylor filed a notice of appeal. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 118, Oct. 27, 2008.) His counsel

also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the court of

appeal. (Lodgment No. 5, In re Taylor, No. [D055495] (Cal. Ct.

App. served July 14, 2009) (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) 

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

Division One, consolidated the direct appeal and the petition on

August 5, 2009. (Lodgment No. 6, In re Taylor, No. D055495 (Cal.

Ct. App. filed Aug. 5, 2009) (order consolidating direct appeal

and habeas petition).) In a consolidated opinion, the court

denied both Taylor's petition and appeal. (Lodgment No. 7, People

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v. Taylor, No. D054023, slip op. at 12, 16, 18 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec.

29, 2009).)

Taylor petitioned the California Supreme Court on February 2,

2010. (Lodgment No. 10, Petition for Review, People v. Taylor,

No. S179938 (Cal. filed Feb. 2, 2010).) The court denied the

petition without opinion on April 14, 2010. (Lodgment No. 11,

California Appellate Courts: Case Information,

[http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov (select "Supreme Court,"

search using the supreme court case number, then select Docket)]

(visited May 1, 2013).) On May 19, 2011, Petitioner filed his

federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] in this

Court. 

Because Taylor is in custody under a state court judgment,

the respondent must be the state officer who has custody of

Petitioner. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 2006); see Rules Governing §

2254 Cases, Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 (West 2006). 

Warden Gonzalez is the correct Respondent because she is the

warden of California Men's Colony, in San Luis Obispo, California,

where Taylor is currently in custody. (Answer 1, ECF No. 8.)

Petitioner also named the California Attorney General as a

Respondent in his Petition. "The state's attorney general is a

proper party only if the petitioner is not then confined, but

expects to be taken into custody." Hogan v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 189,

190 (7th Cir. 1996); see Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 2(b),

28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254. "If the petitioner is in prison, the

warden is the right respondent." Id. Because Taylor is

incarcerated, the only proper respondent is the warden.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),

28 U.S.C. § 2244, applies to all federal habeas petitions filed

after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204

(2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA

sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347

(1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Because Taylor's Petition was filed on May 19, 2011, AEDPA applies

to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204.

In 1996, Congress "worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus." Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim 

--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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 To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained "in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege that the

state court violated his federal constitutional rights. 

Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885

(9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir.

1988).

A federal district court does "not sit as a 'super' state

supreme court" with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court's application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state's application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of

state law unless they rise to level of a constitutional

violation). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63

(2003), stated that "AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court

to adopt any one methodology in deciding the only question that

matters under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law." Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other

words, a federal court is not required to review the state court

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decision de novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed

directly to the reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The "novelty" in § 2254(d)(1) is "the reference to 'Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section 2254(d)(1)

"explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font of

'clearly established' rules." Id. "[A] state court decision may

not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for example, because of

a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law." Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. 

"[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is

'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,' an

authoritative decision of the Supreme Court." Id. (citing

Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin

v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996); Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the

trial court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Claim One: Due Process Violations

"[A] criminal defendant has a due process right to enforce

the terms of his plea agreement." Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d

688, 694 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.

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257, 261-62 (1971); see also Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159

(9th Cir. 2003) ("[A defendant's] due process rights conferred by

the federal constitution allow [him] to enforce the terms of the

plea agreement."). Clearly established federal law dictates that

"the construction and interpretation of state court plea

agreements 'and the concomitant obligations flowing therefrom are,

within broad bounds of reasonableness, matters of state law.'" 

Buckley, 441 F.3d at 694-95 (quoting Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S.

1, 6 n.3 (1987)). When state courts improperly apply California

contract law in interpreting plea agreements, they engage in an

objectively unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. Id. at 695 (citing Brown, 337 F.3d at 1160 n.2). 

Thus, the Court must look to state law to address the merits

of Taylor's Petition. "In California, '[a] negotiated plea

agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted according

to general contract principles . . . .'" Id. (alteration in

original) (citation omitted). These agreements are interpreted

"'according to the same rules as other contracts[.]'" Id.

(quoting People v. Toscano, 124 Cal. App. 4th 340, 344, 20 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 923, 926 (2004)). Under California law, contracts are

interpreted to give effect to the "mutual intention of the parties

as it existed at the time of contracting." Cal. Civ. Code § 1636

(West 2011). "Although the intent of the parties determines the

meaning of the contract, the relevant intent is 'objective' --

that is, the objective intent as evidenced by the words of the

instrument, not a party's subjective intent." Shaw v. Regents of

Univ. of California, 58 Cal. App. 4th 44, 54-55, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d

850, 856 (1997) (internal citation omitted). 

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When interpreting contracts, the written agreement is the

"first and highest" evidence of the mutual intent of the parties. 

Pope v. Allen, 225 Cal. App. 2d 358, 364, 37 Cal. Rptr. 371, 375

(1964). If it is clear and explicit, the language of the contract

governs its interpretation. Cal. Civ. Code § 1638 (West 2011);

see also People v. Rabanales, 168 Cal. App. 4th 494, 505, 85 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 607, 616 (2008) (quoting Ben-Zvi v. Edmar Co., 40 Cal.

App. 4th 468, 473, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 14 (1995)) ("'Where the

parties have reduced their agreement to writing, their mutual

intention is to be determined, whenever possible, from the

language of the writing alone.'").

If the terms of a promise are ambiguous or uncertain, courts

may consider the circumstances surrounding the agreement to

establish the "sense in which the promisor believed . . . that the

promisee understood it." Cal. Civ. Code § 1649 (West 2011); see

also People v. Shelton, 37 Cal. 4th 759, 767, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d

354, 358, 125 P.3d 290, 294 (2006). "'The Code provision

permitting the showing of surrounding circumstances is not

applicable to every contract which comes before a court for

interpretation. It is applicable only where the language used in

the contract is doubtful, uncertain, or ambiguous . . . .'" 

Buckley, 441 F.3d at 696 (quoting Pope v. Allen, 225 Cal. App. 2d

at 364, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 375). Terms will be implied only when

they are "'indispensable to effectuate the expressed intention of

the parties.'" Ben-Zvi, 40 Cal. App. 4th at 473, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d

at 14 (quoting Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136,

145, 280 P.2d 775, 779 (1995)). This will only occur "'upon

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grounds of obvious necessity.'" Id. (quoting Addiego v. Hill, 238

Cal. App. 2d 842, 846, 48 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243 (1965)).

Petitioner alleges that he negotiated a plea agreement

ensuring that he would receive a twenty-year sentence. (Pet. 12-

13, ECF No. 1.) To support this assertion, Taylor claims that his

former attorney, Tom Carnessale, signed a declaration

acknowledging that Taylor's "sentence would be 20 years pursuant

to negotiation with the prosecution." (Id. at 12-13.) Yet, after

the court accepted the plea, Petitioner asserts that "the trial

court set out to sentence [P]etitioner to 24 years in prison,

above and beyond the sentence that [P]etitioner was informed he

would be receiving." (Id. at 12.) 

Taylor maintains that after he realized that the court

intended to impose a longer sentence than what he believed he

would be receiving under the plea agreement, he moved to withdraw

the plea. (Id.) That motion was denied. (Id.) Petitioner

contends that the state court breached the plea bargain by

sentencing him to twenty-four years, and this "breach by the state

court provides ample justification for rescinding the

plea . . . ." (Id. at 16.) Moreover, he maintains that his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated when the

state court denied Taylor's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and

sentenced him to twenty-four years in prison. (See id. at 13.) 

Taylor alleges that due process requires that "the terms of

the original agreement . . . be enforced, or [Petitioner] . . . be

allowed to withdraw his guilty plea." (Id. at 18.)

Respondent maintains that because Taylor is claiming a

violation of his plea bargain, "the sentencing transcript becomes

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relevant to show the absence of objection and, therefore, the

absence of breach." (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 18, ECF No.

8.) She alleges that while Petitioner claims he was informed that

he would be sentenced to twenty-years in state prison, the record

does not support that claim. (Id. at 19.) "The plea form makes

no such mention. The transcript of the taking of the plea makes

no such mention. In fact, the form and the transcript of the

taking of the plea informed Taylor he was facing a sentence of

forty-one-years-to-life." (Id.) 

The warden acknowledges that "[t]here is one place where a

mention of a lesser sentence was made." (Id.) The transcript

reveals that during the hearing on the motion to withdraw Taylor's

plea, the trial court stated, 

The Court: [Y]es. I think the court should be fair on

this. I did conduct a chambers conference. I looked at

the photographs. They weren't very pretty; however,

based on what the court felt might be an appropriate

sentence for this particular case and the victim's

recovery, I was considering striking the strike and

putting it in the 20, 22 year category. 

(Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lodgment No. 12, Rep's

Appeal Tr. vol. 5, 37).) 

Respondent insists that this evidence shows that the court

never made an agreement to a twenty-year sentence. (Id.) The

court's statement that it was considering striking a strike and a

sentence in the range of twenty to twenty-two years, "does not,

standing alone, support a reasonable expectation that the court

would necessarily impose a twenty year sentence." (Id.)

Gonzalez asserts that based on the above, "Taylor could

[have] reasonably expect[ed] that the court would consider this

sentencing result when it came time for sentencing, [and] at

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sentencing, the court adhered to the promised approach." (Id.) 

At sentencing, the court dismissed a strike prior. (Id. at 19-

20.) The imposition of a twenty-four-year sentence instead of a

twenty-year sentence "does not show the trial court did not give

consideration to the sentence referenced during the chambers

conference." (Id.) Accordingly, Respondent contends that

Petitioner is not entitled to relief because the decisions of the

trial court were not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of, United States Supreme Court precedent. (Id.) 

When reviewing a state court decision, federal courts must

look to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the

judgment. Polk v. Sandoval, 503 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The last state court to address the merits of Petitioner's due

process claim was the California Court of Appeal. (See generally

Lodgment No. 7, People v. Taylor, No. D054023, slip op. at 8-12.) 

The state court of appeal rejected Taylor's due process

claim, finding that "the record shows there was no promise of a

20-year sentence." (Id. at 2.) The court noted that "[a] plea

agreement is interpreted according to contract principles[,]" and

"[t]he guilty plea form states that the sentence was left to the

court." (Id. at 10.) The form was initialed and signed by

Taylor, indicating that he read and understood the terms of the

plea agreement, including that sentencing was left to the trial

court. (Id. at 10-11.)3 The court of appeal concluded that

3 The court found that Taylor initialed this specific term on

the plea form and signed the form, declaring under penalty of

perjury that he read, understood, and initialed each item on the

form. (Id. at 10.) Taylor's counsel initialed the form under

oath, indicating that he had read and explained the entire plea to

Petitioner. (Id.) Further, at the change of plea proceeding, the

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"there is nothing in the guilty plea form, nor in the oral

advisements given to Taylor, that supports that the court had

promised a 20-year sentence." (Id. at 11.) 

Next, the appellate court addressed trial counsel's

declaration in which he stated that the court had promised a

twenty-year sentence. (Id.) The court also considered "the trial

court's statement at the presentencing plea withdrawal hearing

that it 'was considering striking the strike and putting [the

sentence] in the 20, 22-year category.'" (Id.) This evidence

showed that the sentencing judge was "considering a particular

sentence," and these statements "standing alone" did not "support

a reasonable expectation that the court would necessarily impose

this sentence." (Id. (emphasis in original).) 

The appellate court determined that based on the above

evidence, Petitioner could have reasonably believed that the trial

court was considering dismissing the strike and enforcing a

sentence in the twenty- to twenty-two-year range. (Id. at 12.) 

The trial court dismissed a strike prior. This was consistent

with the sentencing judge's earlier comments. Similarly,

selecting a twenty-four-year sentence instead of a twenty-year

sentence did not demonstrate that the court failed to give due

consideration to the sentence discussed in the chambers

conference. (Id.) Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal

found "Taylor's claim that he was entitled to plea withdrawal on

trial court orally advised Taylor on all of the terms included in

his plea agreement, including that the sentence was left to the

court. (Id.) Taylor verbally indicated that he understood. 

(Id.)

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the basis of a breach of the plea agreement [was] unavailing." 

(Id.)

Petitioner's due process claim fails because he has not

provided the Court with any objective evidence that the trial

court breached the plea agreement. Taylor contends that he was

promised a twenty-year sentence, but the plea form and transcript

of the plea colloquy reflect that the prosecution would "dismiss

the balance of the complaint" and that the sentence was left to

the court. (See Pet. 12-13, ECF No. 1; Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's

Tr. 6, May 1, 2008; Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s [Appeal Tr.] vol. 2,

9.) Petitioner initialed this term on the form. (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk's Tr. 6; Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s [Appeal Tr.] vol. 2, 7.) 

Taylor understood the maximum sentence was forty-one years to

life. (Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s [Appeal Tr.] vol. 2, 9.)

This plea form is the basis for deciding the parties' mutual

intent. See Ben-Zvi, 40 Cal. App. 4th at 473, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

14 ("Where the parties have reduced their agreement to writing,

their mutual intention is to be determined, whenever possible,

from the language of the writing alone.") The plea form is clear

and unambiguous and does not promise a twenty-year sentence. See

Schuster v. Clark, No. 1:10–cv–01983–AWI–SKO–HC, 2011 WL 2144287,

at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (denying petitioner's due process

claim on the basis that he failed to show that the plea agreement

was ambiguous in any respect); Rodgers v. Sisto, No.

2:07–cv–02383–JKS, 2011 WL 70566, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2011)

(same).

Taylor's maximum sentence was forty-one years to life. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 7, May 1, 2008.) Petitioner

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initialed the statement on the plea form that his maximum sentence

was forty-one years to life, and he acknowledged the maximum term

when he was orally advised by the trial court. (Id.; Lodgment No.

12, Rep.'s [Appeal Tr.] vol. 2, 9.) During Taylor's plea, the

trial court asked whether any promises or threats had been made to

him to plead guilty. (Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s [Appeal Tr.] vol.

2, 9.) Petitioner responded, "No." (Id.)

Thus, nothing in the guilty plea form or the oral advisements

given to Taylor supports his assertion that he was promised a

twenty-year sentence. See Branch v. Swarthout, Civil No. 11cv857

AJB (NLS), 2011 WL 6013023, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011)

("[T]here is no breach of the plea agreement because there was no

term in that agreement that limited [petitioner's] incarceration

to 15 years."); Connolly v. Curry, No. C 08–4517 MMC (PR), 2011 WL

1990571, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) (denying petitioner's due

process claim because the sentencing transcript and documentary

evidence did not show a promise made outside of the plea

agreement). Instead, the guilty plea form and the oral

admonitions given to Petitioner clearly show that the terms of

sentencing were left to the court, and Taylor was aware of, and

fully comprehended, the terms of his plea agreement. (See

generally Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 6-8; Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s

[Appeal Tr.] vol. 2, 7-9.) It is not necessary to imply that a

twenty-year sentence is a term of the plea agreement to effectuate

the expressed intent of the parties. See Ben-Zvi, 40 Cal. App.

4th at 473, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14. To do so would insert terms

into the contract that the Petitioner now wishes were there. See

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id. (citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 184

Cal. App. 3d 1479, 1486, 237 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477 (1986)). 

Given the clarity of the plea agreement, there is no reason

to include implied terms to effectuate the parties' intentions. 

See Buckley, 441 F.3d at 696. There are no ambiguous or uncertain

terms that require the Court to consider extrinsic evidence of the

parties' objective intent. See id. at 696-97.

Taylor's written agreement plainly states that he could

receive a sentence of "41 years to life in State Prison." 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 7; Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr.

vol. 5, 86-87.) "The party asserting breach [of a plea agreement]

bears the burden of proving the underlying facts establishing a

breach." Atkins v. Davison, 687 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (2009)

(citing United States v. Laday, 56 F.3d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1995)). 

Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-four years. (Pet. 12-13, ECF

No. 1.) His sentence is consistent with the plea agreement and is

lower than the maximum sentence of forty-one years. (Lodgment No.

12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 5, 86-87.) Thus, the superior court

did not breach the plea agreement or improperly sentence Taylor to

twenty-four years.

The state court of appeal properly concluded that

Petitioner's claim of breach of the plea agreement does not

entitle him to relief. This decision was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor was the decision based upon

an unreasonable determination of the facts. See id. § 2254(d)(2). 

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For all these reasons Taylor's due process claim should be

DENIED.4

B. Claim Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Taylor contends that his counsel provided him with

ineffective assistance by misadvising him of the terms of his plea

bargain. (Pet. 13, 16-17, ECF No. 1.)5

[P]etitioner was informed by his attorney that he . . .

had negotiated a plea bargain for 20 years in prison in

exchange for petitioner's guilty plea. It turns out

this was erroneous and [P]etitioner relied on this

erroneous information in making the decision to waive

his constitutional rights and to plead guilty instead.

Petitioner has said that he would otherwise not have

pleaded guilty if he had been informed that the sentence

was for 24 years in prison.

(Id. at 17.)

4

 Taylor makes brief mention of being deprived of his right

to a "fair trial." If this is intended to be an additional claim

for habeas relief, the claim is flawed. First, it is unexhausted. 

It was not raised with the California Supreme Court. (See

Lodgment No. 10, Petition for Review 1-2, People v. Taylor, No.

S179938.) Second, Taylor pleaded guilty and did not go to trial. 

His case is unlike one where a petitioner claimed his right to a

fair trial was violated where the trial court refused to enforce

the plea agreement and information prejudicial to the petitioner

had been disclosed to the prosecutors during plea negotiations. 

See McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1536 n.22 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Finally, even an unexhausted claim can be denied on the merits. 

See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2).

5 In Taylor's state habeas corpus petition, he raises two

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He complains of

ineffective assistance of his initial trial counsel during plea

negotiations and the taking of Taylor's plea, and the ineffective

assistance of his second trial counsel at sentencing. (Lodgment

No. 5, People v. Taylor, No. D054023 (petition for writ of habeas

corpus at 18, 27).) In his federal Petition, Taylor argues that

"the obvious failing of both trial counsels in relation to the

guilty plea and 24-year sentence [constitutes ineffective

assistance]." (See Pet. 13, ECF No. 1.) Yet, his claim appears

to focus on the misadvice of Taylor's first attorney concerning

the length of the sentence. (See id. at 17.) Nevertheless,

Respondent addresses both claims in the Answer. 

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Respondent contends that Taylor's ineffective assistance of

counsel claim fails for two reasons -- one procedural and one

substantive. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 22, ECF No. 8.) 

First, Gonzalez alleges that Taylor's claim of misadvisement is

procedurally barred because it was forfeited in state court. (Id.

at 23.) Next, she maintains that Petitioner's claim fails

substantively because he has not met the second prong of the test

outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984),

which requires that he suffer prejudice as a result of his

counsel's ineffective assistance. (Id. at 26-27.) Respondent

claims that Taylor cannot establish prejudice.

There is no objective evidence showing a reasonable

probability that Taylor would have rejected the plea had

he been accurately advised that the court was

considering, but not promising, a sentence in the 20- to

22-year range. If Taylor had rejected the plea

agreement and gone to trial, he would have litigated a

case in which there was no dispute that he attacked the

victim with a knife, and he would have exposed himself

to a potential sentence of forty-one years to life or

more, lost the mitigating factor arising from an early

admission of guilt, and lost the court's stated

intention to consider dismissing a strike prior

conviction so as to avoid a life sentence. Because

Taylor would not likely have foregone the significant

advantages of the plea had he been properly advised,

there was no prejudice from counsel's misadvisemet.

(Id. at 26.)

1. Procedural Default

State courts may decline to review a claim based on a

procedural default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83-87

(1977). "Just as in those cases in which a state prisoner fails

to exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner who has failed to

meet the State's procedural requirements for presenting his

federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to

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address those claims in the first instance." Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). A petitioner who has defaulted his

federal claims in state court by not complying with procedural

rules technically meets the requirements for exhaustion because

state remedies are no longer available. Id. at 732 (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b); Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26, n.28

(1982)). But federal habeas petitioners cannot "avoid the

exhaustion requirement by defaulting their federal claims in state

court[,]" provided the procedural default is based on an

independent and adequate state ground. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732.

"A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a

state court 'if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state

law ground that is independent of the federal question and

adequate to support the judgment.'" Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S.

53, 55 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729). "In order to constitute adequate and independent grounds

sufficient to support a finding of procedural default, a state

rule must be clear, consistently applied, and well-established at

the time of the petitioner's purported default." Wells v. Maass,

28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

A petitioner's failure to follow a state procedural rule

"does not prevent a federal court from resolving a federal claim

unless the state court actually relied on the state procedural bar

'as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.'" Evans

v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 206 (2006) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489

U.S. 255, 261-62 (1989)). "[A] procedural default does not bar

consideration of a federal claim on . . . habeas review unless the

last state court rendering a judgment in the case '"clearly and

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expressly"' states that its judgment rests on a state procedural

bar." Harris, 489 U.S. at 263 (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi,

472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985)). The state court may also reach the

"merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding." Id. at 264

n.10. As long as the state court explicitly invokes a state

procedural bar as an independent basis for its decision, the

federal habeas court is required to "honor a state holding that is

a sufficient basis for the state court's judgment, even when the

state court also relies on federal law." Id. (citing Fox Film

Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)).

The respondent has the initial burden of pleading an adequate

and independent procedural bar as an affirmative defense in a

habeas case. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665-66

(9th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir.

2003). The burden then shifts to the petitioner to place that

defense in issue. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. The petitioner

may accomplish this with factual allegations and case authority

that demonstrate inconsistent applications of the procedural rule. 

Id. At this point, the burden shifts back to the respondent to

prove the bar is applicable. Id. "It is the law of this circuit

that the ultimate burden is on the state, not the petitioner, to

show that a procedural state bar was clear, consistently applied,

and well-established at the time the party contesting its use

failed to comply with the rule in question." Insyxiengmay, 403

F.3d at 666. Even if the state rule is independent and adequate, a

petitioner can overcome the procedural bar by showing (1) cause

for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

violation of federal law or (2) that failure to consider the

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claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50. 

Here, Gonzalez asserts a procedural default and maintains

that Petitioner forfeited his ineffective assistance claim based

on misadvisement when he failed to raise the issue in the trial

court. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 23, ECF No. 8.) 

Respondent relies primarily on the California Court of Appeal's

holding that Taylor forfeited his ineffective assistance claim

when he failed to request that his plea be withdrawn based an

counsel's alleged misadvisments. (Id. at 22-23 (citing Lodgment

No. 7, People v. Taylor, No. D054023, slip. op. at 13-14).) She

also cites two California Supreme Court cases, People v. Vera, 15

Cal. 4th 269, 275-76, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 934 P.2d 1279 (1997),

overruled on other grounds by People v. French, 43 Cal. 4th 36,

47, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 613, 178 P.3d 1100, 1107 (2008); and

People v. Hernandez, 33 Cal. 4th 1040, 1051, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880,

888, 94 P.3d 1080, 1087 (2004). (Id.) 

To determine whether Taylor's claim is procedurally barred,

the Court looks to the California Court of Appeal's opinion

because it is the last reasoned state court opinion. Vansickle v.

White, 166 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 1999). "Where there has been

one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same

claim [are presumed to] rest upon the same ground." Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

The court of appeal invoked a state procedural bar. (See

Lodgment No. 7, People v. Taylor, No. D054023, slip. op. at 13.)

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Although the failure to move for plea withdrawal may not

create a forfeiture in cases where the sentence was in

violation of the plea agreement, this exception to the

forfeiture rule does not apply to claims that concern a

misadvisement of the sentence.

Generally, an appellate court will not consider

claims of error that could have been, but were not,

raised in the trial court. Taylor was authorized to

request that the trial court permit him to withdraw his

plea based on misadvisement concerning the terms of his

agreement. The record of the presentencing plea

withdrawal motion shows that [counsel] . . . was aware

that Taylor thought the court had promised a 20-year

sentence. Further, Taylor himself was, of course, aware

of what he thought his sentence was supposed to be under

the agreement. Given this knowledge, the failure of

both Taylor and his counsel to request to withdraw the

plea when the trial court selected the 24-year sentence

forfeits this challenge to his plea on appeal.

(Id. at 13-14 (citations omitted).)

Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim based on his

counsel's misadvisements is procedurally barred if the rule

governing its forfeiture is both adequate and independent. See

Wells, 28 F.3d at 1010. A state procedural rule is adequate when

the rule is "firmly established and regularly followed" at the

time of the alleged default. Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053,

1077 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted), overruled

on other grounds by Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th

Cir. 2003); see also Bennett, 322 F.3d at 583 (citing Poland v.

Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1999)); Wells, 28 F.3d at

1010 (stating that rule must be clear and consistently applied at

the time of petitioner's default).

a. Burden of Proof 

If a procedural bar is raised, the Petitioner has the burden

of putting the defense in issue. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

But Petitioner's burden is "quite modest: at most, Petitioner need

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only assert allegations; he does not need to prove anything." 

Dennis v. Brown, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2005)

(citing Bennett, 322 F.3d at 585-86). Still, the state bears the

ultimate burden of proving procedural default. Bennett, 322 F.3d

at 585. To establish the adequacy of a state procedural rule, it

must be regularly and consistently applied. Id. at 585-86. "This

burden should exist whether or not the petitioner identifies the

correct basis upon which to challenge the adequacy of the rule." 

King v. LaMarque, 464 F.3d 963, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2006).

At Taylor's sentencing hearing on September 29, 2008, he was

sentenced to twenty-four years. (Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s Appeal

Tr. vol. 5, 81, 86-76.) Although the trial court had just denied

Petitioner's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, neither counsel

nor Petitioner objected to the length of the sentence. (Id. 85-

87.) It was not until October 27, 2008, when Petitioner filed his

notice of appeal that Taylor raised the issue of his counsel's

misadvisements. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 118.) The

California Court of Appeal held that "Taylor's challenge based on

counsel's misadvisement has been forfeited by [his] failure to

raise the issue before the trial court." (Lodgment No. 7, People

v. Taylor, No. D054023, slip. op. at 13.) 

Gonzalez contends that Petitioner's ineffective assistance

claim is procedurally defaulted. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

22-23, ECF No. 8.) "[Petitioner's claim] is procedurally barred

because it was forfeited in the state court[,]" and "[f]ailing to

raise the issue in trial is a proper procedural bar." (Id. at

23.) Respondent has met her initial burden to raise procedural

default as a defense. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 585.

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This initial burden, however, is not the only burden that

Gonzalez must satisfy. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. "[I]t is

the law of this circuit that the ultimate burden is on the State,

not the petitioner, to show that a procedural state bar was clear,

consistently applied, and well-established at the time the party

contesting its use failed to comply with the rule in question." 

Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 666. In support of Respondent's

contention that Taylor's claim is procedurally barred, she relies

on the holding of the appellate court and cites two cases. 

(Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 22-23, ECF No. 8.) 

The first case that Gonzalez relies on is People v. Vera, 15

Cal. 4th at 275-76, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257-258, 934 P.2d at 1283-

1284. (Id.) The court in Vera states that it is a "the wellestablished procedural principle that, with certain exceptions, an

appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have

been--but were not--raised in the trial court." People v. Vera,

15 Cal. 4th at 275, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257-258, 934 P.2d at 1283

(citing People v. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th 580, 589-90, 20 Cal. Rptr.

2d 638, 642, 853 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1993)). This general principle

would apply to the procedural bar asserted by Respondent. (See

Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 22-23, ECF No. 8.)

Yet, for a state procedural bar to be considered adequate,

the rule must be "firmly established and regularly followed." 

Anderson, 232 F.3d at 1077. While Vera describes a general

procedural bar of forfeiture, it does not establish that the

procedural bar in this case is firmly established or regularly

followed. See generally Vera, 15 Cal. 4th 275, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d

754, 934 P.2d 1279. In fact, Vera notes that this procedural bar

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is applied, "with certain exceptions." Id. Vera does little to

satisfy Respondent's "ultimate" burden to "to show that [the

alleged] procedural state bar [is] clear, consistently applied,

and well-established . . . ." See Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 666.

Gonzalez also cites People v. Hernandez, 33 Cal. 4th at 1051,

16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 888-889, 94 P.3d at 1087. (Answer Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 23, ECF No. 8.) The case, however, does not address

the procedural bar. See id. Rather, Hernandez is support for the

general rule that a trial court has "no sua sponte duty to give

[a] limiting instruction [on the use of gang evidence]." (See

Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 23, ECF No. 8.) Hernandez does not

establish or discuss the adequacy of the procedural bar at issue

here.

Respondent makes no allegation that the procedural bar in

this case is independent and adequate, nor does she cite to a case

supporting such a contention. On this basis, Respondent has

failed to satisfy the burden of demonstrating that the alleged

procedural bar is "clear, consistently applied, or well

established." See Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 666. Under these

circumstances, this Court need not decide whether the rule is

applied independently of federal law. See Smith v. Campbell, No.

C 06-02972 MHP, 2011 WL 1321585, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2011). 

Because Respondent has failed to carry her burden of

establishingthe adequacy of the general bar,6 the Court will

6 Moreover, sentencing immediately followed the trial

court's ruling on Taylor's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

(See Lodgment No. 12, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 5, 82-90.) During

the motion hearing, witnesses were called and multiple reasons

were given reasons for the request to withdraw Taylor's plea. 

Counsel noted that an additional reason was the misadvisements

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address the merits of Taylor's ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. 

2. Merits of Taylor's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Claim

For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a basis for

federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy the two-part test

outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687. First,

Taylor must show that his counsel's performance was deficient. 

Id. Second, he must establish that counsel's deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. Id. To satisfy the prejudice

prong, Petitioner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability

that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent

the error. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000);

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is "a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A court need not decide whether

counsel's performance was deficient before addressing whether the

defendant suffered any prejudice; it is often "easier to dispose

of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice . . . ." Id. at 697.

prior defense counsel made to Petitioner concerning the length of

his sentence. (Id. at 36-37.) But new counsel informed the court

that the issue was not ripe because Taylor had not been sentenced. 

(Id.) After denying the motion to withdraw Taylor's guilty plea,

Judge Cookson proceeded to sentence him. (Id. at 82.) On appeal,

the California Court of Appeal concluded that counsel's statements

were not a timely objection that raised ineffective assistance

based on misadvice from Taylor's prior counsel. (See Lodgment No.

7, People v. Taylor, No. D054023, slip op. at 14.) Thus, the

claim was forfeited. (Id.) This conclusion is not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(d)(2).

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The United States Supreme Court noted that "[s]urmounting

Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, __, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). In the

context of federal habeas review, "[t]he standards created by

Strickland and § 2254(d) are both 'highly deferential . . . .'" 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788

(2011).

Trial counsel is presumed to be competent. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689. "To rebut this presumption, [Petitioner] must

demonstrate that his counsel's performance was unreasonable under

prevailing professional norms and was not the product of sound

strategy." Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 815 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89). Counsel's representation

is deficient if "it falls outside the range of competence demanded

of attorneys in criminal cases." Id.

Taylor contends that his attorney provided ineffective

assistance because he misadvised him of the length of his sentence

under the plea agreement. (Pet. 17, ECF No. 1.) Counsel

allegedly informed Petitioner that his sentence would not exceed

twenty years, but there was no agreement to a twenty-year

sentence. (Id.) Taylor asserts that he would not have pleaded

guilty if he knew he would receive a twenty-four-year sentence. 

(Id.)

It is axiomatic that a trial is almost like a roll of

the dice both for the prosecution and the defense in any

given case. The fact that the prosecution, the trial

court or the appellate court did not know what

petitioner's defense would have been, or precisely how

the trial would have unfolded before the jury, so to

extrapolate from pretrial evidence that the outcome of a

trial would have been is an inexact science at best and

foolhardy at wors[t].

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(Id. at 15.) 

Gonzalez alleges that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of

counsel claim fails substantively. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 23-27, ECF No. 8.) Respondent maintains that Taylor does not

provide any objective evidence to support his contention that

there was an agreement on a twenty-year sentence. (Id. at 25-26.) 

She claims that Petitioner's arguments are based on his "private

expectations" that were not disclosed prior to the acceptance of

the plea. (Id.) These subjective beliefs alone, contends

Gonzalez, "do[] not provide a basis for relief." (Id. at 26.) 

Further, Respondent asserts that Taylor does not satisfy the

second prong of Strickland in light of the undisputed evidence

that he attacked the victim. (Id.) Gonzalez urges that absent a

plea deal, Petitioner faced a "potential for a lengthy determinate

sentence plus an indeterminate life sentence had the case gone to

trial . . . ." (Id.) Respondent maintains that acceptance of the

plea bargain was in Taylor's best interest, a fact he likely

appreciated at the time of sentencing. (Id.) She asserts, "There

is no objective evidence showing a reasonable probability that

Taylor would have rejected the plea had he been accurately advised

. . . ." (Id.) Accordingly, Gonzalez claims that Petitioner can

not establish any prejudice as a result of counsel's

misadvisements. (Id.) 

This Court again reviews the last reasoned state court

decision as the basis of the judgment. Polk v. Sandoval, 503 F.3d

at 909. The last state court to address the merits of

Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was the

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California Court of Appeal. (See generally Lodgment No. 7, People

v. Taylor, No. D054023, slip. op. at 12-18.) 

The state appellate court held that even if counsel provided

Petitioner with inadequate advice about his plea, his claim still

fails because there was no showing of prejudice. (Id. at 17.) 

The court noted that Taylor must show that "there is a reasonable

probability that had he been correctly advised about the

consequences of his plea he would not have pleaded guilty but

would have insisted on proceeding to trial." (Id.)

Based on the evidence provided by Petitioner and the trial

record, the appellate court found there was an insufficient

showing of prejudice.

[T]here is no objective evidence showing a reasonable

probability that Taylor would have rejected the plea had

he been accurately advised that the court was

considering, but not promising, a sentence in the 20- to

22-year range. If Taylor had rejected the plea

agreement and gone to trial, he would have litigated a

case in which there was no dispute that he attacked the

victim with a knife, and he would have exposed himself

to a potential sentence of 41 years to life or more,

lost the mitigating factor arising from an early

admission of guilt, and lost the court's stated

intention to consider dismissing a strike prior

conviction so as to avoid a life sentence. Because

Taylor would not likely have foregone the significant

advantages of the plea had he been properly advised,

there was no prejudice from counsel's misadvisement.

(Id. at 18.)

The Supreme Court, in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58

(1985), stated that "the two-part Strickland v. Washington test

applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective

assistance of counsel." There, the petitioner pleaded guilty

pursuant to a written plea agreement; he alleged ineffective

assistance of counsel because his attorney misadvised him of his

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parole eligibility date. Id. at 54-55. The Supreme Court held

that in the context of guilty pleas, the prejudice prong of the

Strickland test requires a petitioner to demonstrate that

"counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the

outcome of the plea process." Id. at 59. "In other words, in

order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the [Petitioner]

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial." Id. Prejudice is determined based

on an objective evaluation. Id. at 60 (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 695). It cited with approval Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d

371, 375 (7th Cir. 1984), as an example of an objective evaluation

of a claim of prejudice. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. In Hill, the

Court quotes the following passage from Evans: "'It is

inconceivable to us . . . that [the defendant] would have gone to

trial on a defense of intoxication, or that if he had done so he

either would have been acquitted or, if convicted, would

nevertheless have been given a shorter sentence than he actually

received[.]'" Id. at 59-60 (alteration in original). With this

guidance, the Court will turn to Taylor's claim.

The claim of ineffective assistance fails because Taylor has

not demonstrated that his counsel's performance prejudiced the

outcome of his case. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. He provides no objective evidence showing that,

absent counsel's misadvisements, there is a reasonably probability

that he would not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to

trial and, if convicted, would have been sentenced to less than

twenty-four years. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Turner v. United

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States, No. 1:07CR152, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18647, at *9 (E.D.

Va. Mar. 4, 2009) ("Judged objectively, there is simply no

reasonable likelihood Turner would have pleaded not guilty and

insisted on going to trial absent [counsel's] supposed errors.").

Here, there is nothing in the record to establish that Taylor

may have been able to avoid conviction or that a meritorious

defense might have been available to him at trial. Petitioner

attacked the victim with a knife, and he had two felony-strike

priors. (See Lodgment No. 7, People v. Taylor, No. D054023, slip.

op. at 15 ("When speaking to the police after his arrest[,] . . .

Taylor acknowledged that he attacked the victim with a knife.") 

By pleading guilty, Taylor was able to avoid a possible

indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life. (See id.) 

Given the potential sentence he faced had he been convicted at

trial, Petitioner benefitted significantly from the plea

agreement. See Ceesay v. Ryan, No. C 01-4047 SI (PR), 2003 WL

22434110, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2002) (finding no prejudice

because in light of petitioner's favorable plea agreement, it was

unlikely that he would have proceeded to trial). 

Petitioner failed to provide any objective evidence to show

that there is a reasonable probability that he would have forgone

the benefits of his plea bargain and opted to go to trial, had his

initial counsel correctly advised him of the length of his

sentence or new counsel moved to withdraw the guilty plea. Thus,

Petitioner has not established that he was prejudiced under

Strickland. Hill, 747 U.S. at 60. Accordingly, the California

Court of Appeal's decision was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

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law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor was the decision based upon

an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C.§

2254(d)(2). For all these reasons, Taylor's ineffective

assistance of counsel claim should be DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the

United States District Judge William Q. Hayes under 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons

outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the district court

issue an Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying

the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 5, 2013, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections

to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall 

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

July 19, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise 

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those objections on appeal of the Court's order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 11-56 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED 

Dated: June 4, 2013 ____________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Hayes

 All parties of record

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