Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-01146/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-01146-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

SH 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Joseph Brummer, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

 No. CV 18-01146-PHX-DGC (JZB) 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Joseph Brummer, who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex (ASPC)-Eyman, Browning Unit, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Relief 

and Order (Doc. 9), which the Court construes as a motion for injunctive relief. The Court 

will deny the motion. 

I. Background 

 Plaintiff sued Defendants Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Director 

Charles L. Ryan; Special Services Unit (SSU) Correctional Officer Figueroa; ASPCTucson Deputy Wardens A. Jacobs, D. Stemple, and J. Mattos; and ADC Security 

Operations Administrator Ron Towles for violating his due process rights. Plaintiff alleges 

the following facts: Plaintiff was validated as a member of the Aryan Brotherhood in 2009 

and confined in Security Threat Group (STG) maximum custody. Plaintiff subsequently 

completed the STG step down program (SDP) and was placed in a close custody unit, with 

Case 2:18-cv-01146-DGC Document 36 Filed 05/01/19 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

a lower custody level. In September 2017, Defendant Figueroa informed Plaintiff that his 

close custody status was being revoked, but refused to give Plaintiff the required form. A 

hearing was held before Defendants Jacobs, Stemple, and Mattos on October 5, 2017, and 

Plaintiffs’ close custody status was revoked. Plaintiff was not given a copy of the hearing 

notification, informed of the evidence against him, or provided with a written result of the 

hearing. Plaintiff appealed the revocation to Defendants Towles and Ryan, and they denied 

his appeals. As a result, Plaintiff was returned to maximum custody. On screening 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated a due process 

claim against Defendants and ordered them to answer. (Doc. 7.) 

II. Legal Standards

 A. Injunctive Relief 

“A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should 

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” 

Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 

U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 

U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted) (“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 

never awarded as of right”). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show that 

(1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm without 

an injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) an injunction is in the 

public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “But if a plaintiff can only show that there are 

‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the 

merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips 

sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Shell 

Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance 

for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). Under this serious 

questions variant of the Winter test, “[t]he elements . . . must be balanced, so that a stronger 

showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Lopez, 680 F.3d 

at 1072. 

Case 2:18-cv-01146-DGC Document 36 Filed 05/01/19 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Regardless of which standard applies, the movant “has the burden of proof on each 

element of the test.” See Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 

1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). Further, there is a heightened burden where a plaintiff seeks a 

mandatory preliminary injunction, which should not be granted “unless the facts and law 

clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes additional requirements on prisoner 

litigants who seek preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. It requires that any 

injunctive relief be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to correct the 

harm be imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see Gilmore v. People of the State of Cal., 220 

F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir. 2000). 

B. Due Process 

“Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a prisoner is entitled to 

certain due process protections when he is charged with a disciplinary violation.” Serrano 

v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 

539, 564-71 (1974)). “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal 

prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not 

apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56. To determine whether a procedural due process 

violation has occurred, a court engages in a two-step analysis. First, a court looks to 

whether the person possesses a constitutionally-cognizable liberty interest with which the 

state has interfered. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-87 (1995). Second, if the state 

has interfered with a liberty interest, a court looks to whether this interference was 

accompanied by sufficient procedural and evidentiary safeguards. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. 

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). 

 It is well-settled that placement in maximum security segregation units implicates a 

liberty interest requiring due process protections. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 

(2005). A prisoner may be deprived of his liberty interest as long as he is accorded the 

proper procedural protections. For the initial decision to place a prisoner in maximum 

Case 2:18-cv-01146-DGC Document 36 Filed 05/01/19 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

custody, due process is generally satisfied if the prisoner is given notice of the factual basis 

for the placement and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 225-27; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 

460, 476 (1983). 

III. Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

 A. Plaintiff’s Contentions 

 Plaintiff seeks an order from the Court directing Defendants to transfer him from 

the maximum custody Browning Unit to a close custody unit. (Doc. 9 at 1.) Plaintiff 

asserts that on September 8, 2017, Defendant Figueroa informed him that his close custody 

status was being revoked, but he never received notice of the charges against him or a 

written result of the SDC revocation hearing. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 9 at 1.) Plaintiff states 

that while he was housed in close custody, he “enjoyed contact visits with his wife and 

family, food visits, phone calls each and every day, outside recreation in the sunlight, a job 

and all the benefits received by the ADC General Population.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) In contrast, 

Plaintiff states that in the Browning maximum custody unit he “remains housed in a 

window less [sic] super max cell 24 hours a day [and is] separated from contact visits with 

his family and [is] subjected to glass barriers between he and his family.” (Doc. 9 at 2.) 

Plaintiff also asserts that “[t]he archaic history of super max prisons is well documented” 

and that “[l]ong term confinement in super max prisons cause [sic] serious mental fatigue, 

sensory deprivation, vision damage, damages health, cause break down in family relations 

and the history goes on and on.” (Doc. 9 at 2–3.) 

 B. Defendants’ Response 

 Defendants have presented evidence that on September 8, 2017, Plaintiff signed a 

Form No. 2A, which states, in part: 

This is to confirm that effective, [September 8, 2017], you are 

assigned to Investigative Detention. This action is being taken 

because you are considered a suspect in an offense occurring 

within the institution that is triable under the criminal laws of 

the state of Arizona, or have been charged with an offense that 

could result in your being charged with a major disciplinary 

violation and which requires your detention until an 

investigation is complete. 

Case 2:18-cv-01146-DGC Document 36 Filed 05/01/19 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Doc. 14-2 at 4 (Defs.’ Ex. C).) The form does not state the specific charges against 

Plaintiff. (See id.) Defendants argue that the Form No. 2A, combined with Defendant 

Figueroa’s statement to Plaintiff that his SDP status was being revoked, satisfied the due 

process notice requirement. (Doc. 14 at 3–4.) 

 Defendants also provided a copy of a Result of STG Validation Hearing Form, 

signed by Plaintiff on October 5, 2017, which states that Plaintiff’s validation packet had 

been reviewed and that it contained sufficient evidence to validate Plaintiff as a member of 

the Aryan Brotherhood. (Doc. 19.) In the evidentiary portion of the form, it was noted 

that: 

The [hearing committee]1

 has determined the evidence 

submitted by Tucson SSU is sufficient for revocation from the 

step-down program. It should be noted; during the revocation 

hearing Inmate Brummer 160622 stated to the [hearing 

committee] that he has maintained association with known 

STG Aryan Brotherhood members/associates throughout his 

time in the step-down program. 

(Id.) Plaintiff signed the form and indicated that he wished to appeal the committee’s 

decision. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed the revocation decision the following day. (Doc. 14-2 at 

6–9 (Defs.’ Ex. D).) 

 C. Analysis 

On these facts, Plaintiff has established a likelihood of success on the merits of his 

due process claim. The available record shows that he did not receive notice of the specific 

charges against him prior to his SDP revocation hearing. Contrary to Defendants’ 

arguments, Form No. 2A does not contain sufficient details to inform Plaintiff of the 

specific reasons why his SDP status was being revoked and does not provide any 

information regarding exactly what Plaintiff did to put his SDP status in jeopardy. 

Likewise, the vague description of Defendant Figueroa’s September 2017 conversation 

 

1

 The revocation hearing committee was comprised of Defendants Jacobs, Stemple, and Mattos. (Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Case 2:18-cv-01146-DGC Document 36 Filed 05/01/19 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

with Plaintiff is insufficient to satisfy the notice requirement where there is no evidence 

that Defendant Figueroa informed Plaintiff of the charges against him. 

 Although it is a close question given the scant evidence, the Court also finds that 

Plaintiff has shown a likelihood of irreparable harm where he attests under penalty of 

perjury that as a result of his confinement in maximum custody, he “is subject to sensory 

deprivation and mental anguish.” (Doc. 22 at 5.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); S. Cal. 

Housing Rights Ctr. v. Los Feliz Towers Homeowners Ass’n, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1070 

(C.D. Cal. 2005) (declarant has personal knowledge of her own symptoms); see also 

Thomas v. Garcia, 1:08-cv-00689-JLT (PC), 2013 WL 3773861, at *11 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 

2013) (a party may testify as to what he felt when injured, how the injury affects him now 

and impacts his life, and any other information within his own personal knowledge based 

upon his own perceptions). 

 Notwithstanding, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief because he has not 

clearly demonstrated that the balance of hardships tips in his favor. Although being 

confined in the Browning unit imposes a serious hardship, Defendants would also face 

serious hardship if the Court ordered them to transfer Plaintiff to a lower security level 

after he has been found guilty of violating the terms of the SDP by continuing to associate 

with known STG members and where this decision has been upheld through the 

administrative appeal process. (See Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 19.) An injunction would interfere 

with Defendants’ ability to maintain the security classification system and their ability to 

ensure that high-risk prisoners are separated from lower security level prisoners. Because 

both parties would face serious hardship if the Court ruled against them, Plaintiff has not 

shown that the balance of equities tips in his favor. 

 Additionally, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that an injunction would be in the 

public interest. Although it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a 

party’s constitutional rights, see Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012), 

courts “should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the 

extraordinary remedy of injunction[,]” Winter, 555 U.S. at 376–77 (quoting Weinberger 

Case 2:18-cv-01146-DGC Document 36 Filed 05/01/19 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)). Special consideration is warranted when 

the requested injunction would affect the operation of a prison – a setting where courts 

must “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a 

criminal justice system caused by the relief.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). Matters of prison 

security and public safety are best served by prisons managed within the discretion of 

prison officials. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979). “The public interest inquiry 

primarily addresses impact on non-parties rather than parties.” Bernhardt v. L.A. Cty., 339 

F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

 Defendants argue that “[i]gnoring the determinations of a hearing designed to weigh 

the evidence of STG activity would unfairly jeopardize institutional security.” (Doc. 14 

at 6.) In response, Plaintiff summarily argues that the “[t]he balance of hardships and 

public interests are in Plaintiff's favor,” which is insufficient to meet his burden on this 

prong on the preliminary injunction test. (Doc. 22 at 5.) The non-parties who would be 

impacted by the requested relief are prisoners and staff who have a safety and security 

interest in prisoners being assigned to housing that corresponds to their determined security 

level. 

 Finally, there is heightened scrutiny where the movant seeks a preliminary 

injunction that alters rather than maintains the status quo. Dahl v. HEM Pharms. Corp., 7 

F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that mandatory, as opposed to prohibitory, 

injunctions are subject to heightened scrutiny). The Ninth Circuit has held that this type 

of mandatory injunctive relief is disfavored and should be denied unless the facts and law 

clearly favor the movant. Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979) 

(citations omitted). Applying this heightened scrutiny to the available record, Plaintiff's 

allegations do not warrant a mandatory preliminary injunction, especially where it would 

possibly require the Court to involve itself in prison housing assignments and the prison’s 

security classification process. 

 On this record, where the balance of hardships does not tip in Plaintiff’s favor and 

the requested injunctive relief is not in the public interest, Plaintiff has not made the 

Case 2:18-cv-01146-DGC Document 36 Filed 05/01/19 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

requisite showing for a preliminary injunction, particularly where he seeks a mandatory 

injunction. Plaintiff’s request for an order directing that he be transferred out of his current 

housing unit will denied. 

 IT IS ORDERED that the reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Relief and Order (Doc. 9), and the Motion is denied. 

 Dated this 1st day of May, 2019. 

Case 2:18-cv-01146-DGC Document 36 Filed 05/01/19 Page 8 of 8