Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02158/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02158-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 09:0010 Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DPR CONSTRUCTION, INC.

NO. CIV. S-06-2158 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

v.

PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES O R D E R

DISTRICT COUNCIL 16 AND

PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES

LOCAL UNION NO. 376,

Defendants.

 /

This case involves awards made by two different arbitral

bodies over the same disputed work assignment. Pending before the

court is plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff seeks

to confirm an award made by the Project Labor Agreement (“PLA”) in

favor of plaintiff and to vacate an award made by the Drywall

Finishers Joint Adjustment Board (“DFJAB”) in favor of defendants.

Defendants do not oppose confirming the PLA arbitrator’s award but

oppose the court vacating the DFJAB decision, arguing that both

awards may co-exist. The court resolves the matter on the papers

and after oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the

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motion is granted.

I. Facts1

 Plaintiff, as Construction Manager of the Genetech Expansion

Project, is party to a PLA entered into on July 28, 2004 by

plaintiff’s predecessor and by the defendant union. Plaintiff is

also a signatory to the Northern California Drywall Finishers

Master Agreement, a local collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)

that allegedly prohibits plaintiff from subcontracting jobs to

workers who are not a party to the agreement. Defendants claim

that plaintiff subcontracted out the installation of an epoxy resin

to a subcontractor who had not signed the Drywall Finishers Master

Agreement. Because of this subcontract, defendants filed a

grievance against plaintiff on May 25, 2006. The grievance was

filed under the CBA and a hearing was scheduled by the Drywall

Finishers Joint Adjustment Board (“DFJAB”) for July 6, 2006.

A meeting was held between the parties on June 21, 2006, at

which time they made their respective positions known. Defendants’

position was that plaintiff was in violation of the CBA’s

subcontracting clause, while plaintiff insisted that the dispute

was superceded by the PLA. On June 26, 2006, plaintiff was

informed of the scheduled DFJAB grievance hearing. That same day,

plaintiff notified defendants of its intention to refer the dispute

to the permanent arbitrator for the PLA, and that it was requesting

the matter be heard on July 19, 2006.

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On July 6, 2006, DFJAB heard the grievance and ruled that

plaintiff was responsible to defendants for an amount equal to the

wages and benefits paid to plaintiff’s subcontractor who had

actually done the work. Counsel for plaintiff appeared prior to

the start of the meeting to state that the Board did not have

jurisdiction over the grievance and left a letter to the same

effect.

On July 25, 2006, the permanent arbitrator under the PLA,

Gerald McKay, issued his decision and award, finding that the

defendant was in violation of the PLA for attempting to enforce a

subcontracting provision under the CBA by obtaining a decision from

DFJAB. While Mr. McKay did not expressly vacate the DFJAB award,

he did say that if the defendants sought to have the award

enforced, they would be in violation of the PLA and subject to

damages and costs incurred by plaintiff in defending “its rights

to have that decision set aside.” Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 8 at 7.

II. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before

the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of

summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id.

at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

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dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in

the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir.

1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Ass’n of

Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n,

809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and that the dispute is

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-

49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200

F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of

fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l

Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.

Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings

and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine

need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see

also Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No.

20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 1093

(9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to be

believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court

must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962) (per curiam)); See also Headwaters Forest Def. v. County

of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless,

inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the

inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602

F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

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IV. Analysis

Plaintiff moves for summary judgement, asking that the

decision of McKay, the Permanent Arbitrator under the PLA, be

confirmed and that the decision of DFJAB be vacated. Defendants

do not oppose plaintiff’s motion to confirm the McKay decision. 

That decision found that defendants violated the PLA when they

filed their grievance with DFJAB. Defendants also do not seek

to confirm the DFJAB decision. They do, however, argue that the

court may not vacate that decision either. Therefore, the only

issue for the court to resolve is whether or not it may properly

vacate the DFJAB decision.

The case relied upon by plaintiff, Huber, Hunt & Nichols,

Inc. v. United Ass'n & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting

Indus., Local 38 (“Huber”), 282 F.3d 746 (9th Cir. 2002),

controls the outcome of this case. The relevant facts in Huber

are substantially similar to those in the instant action. In

Huber, the general contractor on the Pacific Bell Park project

subcontracted work to workers of one union to the exclusion of

another. Id. at 747. The Plumbers union, whose workers had not

been awarded the work, filed a grievance against the general

contractor pursuant to their CBA. Id. at 749. As here,

however, the parties in Huber were signatories to a project wide

labor agreement, the Project Stabilization Agreement, that was

to resolve disputes between the general contractor and various

labor groups. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the decision of

the arbitrator pursuant to the project wide labor agreement had

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While the FAA is not directly applicable to disputes arising 2

from labor contracts, Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083

(9th Cir. 1998), the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §

185, authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law to

enforce CBAs, of which the FAA is part. Textile Workers Union v.

Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).

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to be confirmed, and that the award made pursuant to the

aggrieved union’s CBA had to be vacated. Id. at 749.

Defendants respond in three ways. First, defendants argue

that because McKay chose not to vacate, doing so now would be an

improper expansion of his award. Second, defendants note that

McKay’s decision was issued after the DFJAB decision was already

rendered; accordingly, they were not acting in defiance of a

decision by the PLA arbitrator. Third, defendants maintain that

plaintiff failed to take preventative action to protect the

arbitral process and that both awards, although inconsistent,

should be allowed to stand. 

A. Vacating the DFJAB Award Would Not Expand McKay’s Award

Vacating the DFJAB award would not expand McKay’s decision;

rather, it would give it effect, because only the district court

-- not McKay -- possesses the authority to vacate an arbitration

award. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (setting forth situations in which a court

may vacate an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration

Act, or “FAA”). In addition, McKay’s decision noted that 2

defendants would be liable for costs incurred by plaintiff in

defending “its right[] to have that decision set aside,” Pl.’s

Mot., Ex. 8, at 7, implying that plaintiff could enforce such a

right in the appropriate forum. Accordingly, the court finds

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that the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), in

conjunction with the FAA, provides the court with the authority

to vacate the DFJAB decision.

Defendants’ reliance on Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Int’l Bd.

of Elec. Workers (“Louisiana Pacific”), 600 F.2d 219, 220 & 223-

25 (9th Cir. 1979), is not to the contrary. There, the Ninth

Circuit upheld two contradictory awards from different arbitral

boards, effectively obligating the General Contractor to pay two

different sets of employees for the work done of one. As an

initial matter, the two decisions here are not merely

duplicative (i.e., requiring a contractor to pay twice for the

same work), which was the case in Louisiana Pacific. Rather,

McKay found that the very filing of the grievance under the CBA

was itself a violation of the PLA agreement. The two decisions

here are therefore more hostile to one another than were the

duplicative awards in Louisiana Pacific.

Furthermore, the Huber court expressly distinguished

Louisiana Pacific, noting that it did not involve the type of

“overarching, multiunion labor agreement” at issue in Huber,

which “is designed to trump the local collective bargaining

agreements when there is a conflict.” 282 F.3d at 754, n.8. 

Similarly, the present case also involves “an overarching,

multiunion labor agreement” -- here, the Project Labor

Agreement. Indeed, even the Louisiana Pacific court

distinguished itself from cases in which there was a mechanism

in place for dealing with jurisdictional disputes. 600 F.2d at

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225 (noting that “[a]n employer can presumably protect himself .

. . by contracting with each union for trilateral arbitration in

the case of jurisdictional disputes giving rise to a demand for

arbitration”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Vacating the DJFAB decision is also sensible from a policy

perspective. In the context of labor disputes, “arbitration is

a substitute for industrial strife.” Huber, 282 F.3d at 754

(internal quotation marks omitted). Allowing the award of one

arbitral body to stand when it is inconsistent with the award

made pursuant to a project wide agreement would give rise to the

unrest and dissatisfaction that national labor policy seeks to

prevent. Id. at 755. Accordingly, the court cannot confirm

McKay’s award without simultaneously vacating the DFJAB award.

B. Order of Awards

Next, defendants argue that because DFJAB reached its

decision prior to McKay’s decision under the PLA, the former did

act in defiance of the latter. The court disagrees. The fact

that defendants managed to be heard by DFJAB before plaintiff

could resolve the dispute under the PLA does not demonstrate

that defendants were not acting in defiance of the PLA. As a

factual matter, plaintiff informed defendants prior to and on

the day of the grievance hearing that the matter would be heard

by McKay under the PLA. Furthermore, it would undermine the

arbitral process if this court were to permit parties to race to

an award and then plead ignorance to any future award that may

be issued. Because defendants had notice of the pending hearing

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before the general arbitrator, and because the PLA superceded

the CBA, defendants violated the PLA when they proceeded with

the DFJAB hearing.

C. Plaintiff Was Not Required to Seek an Injunction

Finally, defendants assert that vacating the DFJAB decision

would be inappropriate where plaintiff failed to seek an

injunction to stop DFJAB from hearing the grievance, and where

plaintiff waited a month after the filing of the grievance to

refer the matter to the permanent arbitrator. The court

disagrees. None of the cases cited by defendants requires a

party to seek an injunction in this situation; rather, they

merely indicate that an injunction is potentially available when

the arbitral process is threatened. See Aluminum Workers v.

Consol. Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 1982);

Teamster Local 299 v. U.S. Truck Co. Holdings Inc., 87 F. Supp.

2d 726 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 

Defendants also cite to language in Louisiana Pacific for

the proposition that failure to take preventative action should

be a significant factor in the court’s determination of whether

to vacate an award. 600 F.2d at 226. That case is

distinguishable from the preventative action at issue here. In

Louisiana Pacific, the Ninth Circuit found that the general

contractor’s failure to contract for arbitration prior to a

jurisdictional dispute precluded it from later seeking judicial

relief. Here, however, the plaintiff did, in fact, contract for

arbitration before the jurisdictional dispute arose in the form

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of the PLA. 

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 29, 2007.

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