Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02558/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02558-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC SHAWN KEMP,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2558 LKK GGH P

vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants. AND ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ April 2, 2007, motion to dismiss filed

for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the

court recommends that some of plaintiff’s claims be dismissed, and that other claims are

dismissed with leave to amend. 

LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

a complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;”

it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). “The pleading

must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a

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legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421,

89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S. Ct. 35 (1969). The court will “‘presume

that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”

NOW, 510 U.S. at 256, 114 S. Ct. at 803, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent

standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596

(1972).

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also

consider facts which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d

1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987); and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other

papers filed with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.

1986). The court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” 

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION

At the outset, the court observes that defendants have attached five exhibits to the

motion to dismiss: plaintiff’s request for an interview form (exhibit A), a memorandum from

defendant Kernan to plaintiff (exhibit B), a 602/administrative appeal form prepared by plaintiff 

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and the responses by prison officials (exhibit C), a memorandum sent to plaintiff from the

Litigation Coordinator (exhibit D), and a copy of the name change regulations, Title 15, § 3294.5

(exhibit E). 

Attached as an exhibit to plaintiff’s opposition is a copy of what plaintiff claims is

an excerpt from a publication called “Names for Muslim Children.” 

In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the court may take judicial notice, and properly

consider, matters of public record outside the pleadings. MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman,

803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). Defendants’ Exhibits A-D are maintained in plaintiff’s

central file. See Harte declaration attached to motion to dismiss. Documents maintained in

plaintiff’s central file are not matters of public record. Accordingly, the court may not take

judicial notice of these documents. The publication “Names for Muslim Children” is also not a

matter of public record. The court may not take judicial notice of this document as well.

When a court considers extraneous matters in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

the motion is converted into one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because

the court does not wish to convert the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion, it will

not consider defendants’ exhibits A-D nor plaintiff’s “Names for Muslim Children” publication. 

See Swedberg v. Marotzke, 339 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2003).

This action is proceeding on the original complaint filed November 15, 2006. 

Plaintiff alleges that he is a practicing Muslim. Plaintiff alleges that in 2005 defendants Kernan

and Woodford denied his requests to legally change his name for religious reasons. Plaintiff

alleges that defendant Kernan told him that he could use his religious name in conjunction with

his commitment name for purposes of mail only. By legally changing his name, plaintiff

apparently seeks to go by his religious name only. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and monetary relief.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not specifically allege the legal grounds on which his

claims are brought. Because his action was filed on a complaint form for a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court construes plaintiff to be alleging a violation of his First

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Amendment rights. Defendants have also construed plaintiff to be raising a First Amendment

claim. 

To put plaintiff’s claims in context, the court will set forth the regulations setting

forth the procedures by which inmates may obtain legal name changes. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3294.5 which provides, in relevant part,

(a) All inmate or parolee requests for a legal name change shall initially be 

reviewed by the Warden or Regional Parole Administrator who shall either 

recommend approval for a legal name change or deny the request for a legal name 

change.

(b) If the request is denied, the Warden or Regional Parole Administrator shall 

respond to the inmate or parolee in writing with the reasons for denial. A copy of 

the denial shall be placed in the miscellaneous section of the inmate/parolee’s

central file.

(c) If the Warden finds reasons that exist to warrant an inmate’s request for a 

name change, then the Warden shall forward the request to the Institutions 

Division Regional Administrator, along with a memorandum listing the reasons

for recommending approval. A copy of the memorandum shall be placed in the 

miscellaneous section of the inmate’s central file.

*****

(e) If the Institutions Division Regional Administrator or the Assistant Deputy 

Director, P & CSD, agrees with the recommendation to approve the request for a

name change of an inmate or parolee, a letter shall be forwarded to the court

explaining why the Department is recommending approval for a name change, 

along with the inmate/parolee’s request. A copy of the letter shall be placed in the

miscellaneous section of the inmate/parolee’s central file.

(f) If the Institutions Division Regional Administrator or the Assistant Deputy

Director, P & CSD, denies the request for a name change of an inmate or parolee,

a letter shall be forwarded to the inmate or parolee with the reasons for denial. A

copy of the letter shall be placed in the miscellaneous section of the

inmate/parolee’s central filed. 

(g) Upon receiving final approval from the court with the ordered name change

and receiving departmental approval, the Correctional Case Records Manager

shall notify the facility mailroom and visiting room of the name change if the

offender is incarcerated; or shall notify the agent of record if the offender is on

parole. The court order shall be placed in the miscellaneous section of the

inmate/parolee’s central file, along with other documents related to the request for

a name change. 

(h) The mailroom and visiting room staff of the facility shall update their records

to reflect the additional name of the inmate. 

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(i) The original commitment name of the inmate or parolee shall remain on all

departmental records and shall continue to be used on all departmental records. 

*****

(l) If the court ordered name change is received without departmental approval, 

this clearly indicates that the inmate/parolee has not followed proper procedure to 

legally change his/her name. In this case, the Warden or Regional Parole 

Administrator shall notify the issuing court in writing that the name change cannot

legally be changed without the Director’s approval pursuant to the Code of Civil 

Procedure, Section 1279.5. A copy of the letter shall be placed in the 

miscellaneous section of the inmate/parolee’s central and a copy shall be provided

to the inmate/parolee.

Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 1279.5(b) provides that no person imprisoned in the state

prison and under the jurisdiction of the Director of Corrections shall be allowed to file an

application for change of name pursuant to Section 1276 except as permitted at the discretion of

the Director of Corrections.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, inter alia, that

Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof. U.S. Const. amend. I. The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners

retain their First Amendment rights, including the right to the free exercise of religion. O’Lone

v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987). 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Claims for

injunctive relief are unaffected by qualified immunity. Los Angeles Police Protective League v.

Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, defendants’ qualified immunity

argument only goes to plaintiff’s claim for damages. 

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their

conduct violates “clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738

(1987). In analyzing whether a particular official is entitled to qualified immunity, the court

addresses two questions. First, the court considers whether the facts alleged show that the

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct.

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2151, 2155 (2001). Second, and only if a constitutional right was violated, the court considers

whether the right was clearly established such that a reasonable officer would believe that the

alleged conduct was unlawful. Id. at 202, 121 S. Ct. at 2156. “The contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that

right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987).

Defendants argue that even if the court finds that plaintiff has alleged facts

establishing a First Amendment violation, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because

it was not clearly established at the time that thwarting an inmate’s ability to legally change his

name was unconstitutional. Defendants argue that courts that have considered the issue have

concluded that the adoption or use of a Muslim name in conjunction with the commitment name

is constitutional. Defendants argue that no court has established that prison officials must allow

a prisoner to seek a legal name change in state court during the inmate’s incarceration.

In support of their qualified immunity argument, defendants cite Malik v. Brown,

16 F.3d 330 9th Cir. 1994). In Malik, the prisoner legally changed his name to a Muslim name. 

16 F.3d at 331. The prison told him that he could send and receive mail using his commitment

name only. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded, “Malik’s adoption of a Muslim name is an

expression of his religious faith. He is entitled to use both his religious and his committed names

on correspondence, on legal documents and in his daily affairs.” 16 F.3d at 335; see also Malik

v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir. 1995)(an inmate has a First Amendment interest in using

his religious name, at least in conjunction with his committed name).

The undersigned, and the district judge assigned to this case, the Honorable

Lawrence K. Karlton, recently had occasion to fully review the issue of prisoner name changes. 

In Findings and Recommendations issued in February of this year, Ashanti v. CDC et al., 2007

WL 520958 (E.D. Cal. 2007) adopted in full on March 26, 2007 (Ashanti v. CDC et al , CIV-S03-0474 (LKK GGH), the court held in part that meeting a prisoner half way in his name change

pursuits, i.e., allowing some use of his requested name, was not a violation of the First

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Amendment or RLUIPA. This 2007 holding relied on the holdings of the Malik cases. The

undersigned is not aware of any case which has found the Malik case not to be controlling

authority in the Ninth Circuit.

Pursuant to both Malik cases cited above, a reasonable prison official would have

believed that denying plaintiff’s request to legally change his name but allowing him to use his

religious name in conjunction with his commitment name for mail purposes was lawful. 

Accordingly, the court finds that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim. 

Plaintiff’s complaint also suggests that he must legally change his name in order

to use his religious name for other purposes. However, plaintiff does not specifically allege any

other ways he would like to use his religious name. Accordingly, plaintiff is granted leave to file

an amended complaint addressing the ways he wishes to use his religious name other than for

mail purposes. 

As indicated above, plaintiff’s claim for an injunction ordering defendants to

allow him to legally change his name survives a finding that defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity. As to this claim, defendants argue that plaintiff has not stated a colorable First

Amendment claim.

To establish a violation of the free exercise clause, plaintiff must demonstrate a

“substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice...,” Hernandez v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989). Any challenge

under the free exercise clause also requires plaintiff to demonstrate that the interference with his

religious practice impacts a central religious belief or practice, one that is “mandated by his

faith.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). While the court does not interpret

“mandated by faith” as requiring a written command etched into a tablet or book, it does require

evidence that the religion considers the desired practice to be central to its theology. It must be

more than a recommended practice else the term “mandated by faith” loses all meaning.

\\\\\

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Defendants first argue that plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that legally

changing his name is mandated by his religion. Defendants also argue that plaintiff has not

demonstrated that the denial of the request to legally change his name substantially burdened the

observation of a central belief or practice of his religion. 

The court agrees that plaintiff’s complaint contains no allegations demonstrating

that legally changing his name is mandated by his religion or that defendants’ refusal to grant his

request substantially burdened the observation of a central belief or practice of his religion. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground is granted with leave to amend. If

plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must address these matters.

In conclusion, plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint as to his

claim for injunctive relief seeking a court directing defendants to allow him to legally change his

name. In the amended complaint, plaintiff must address how legally challenging his name is

mandated by his religion and how defendants’ refusal to grant this request substantially burdens

the observation of a central belief or practice of his religion. Plaintiff is also granted leave to file

an amended complaint as to his claim for damages regarding use of his legally changed name for

purposes other than mail. 

Were plaintiff to demonstrate that legally changing his name is mandated by his

religion and that defendants’ failure to allow him to use his religious name only substantially

burdened a central belief of his religion, defendants would have to demonstrate that refusing to

grant plaintiff’s request was “‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Malik, 71

F.3d at 728, quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ April 2, 2007, motion

to dismiss is granted with leave to amend as to plaintiff’s claim for damages regarding use of his

religious name for purposes other than mail and as to plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief as to

use of his religious name for purposes of mail; plaintiff is granted thirty days to file an amended

complaint; failure to file an amended complaint within that time will result in a recommendation

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of dismissal of this action;

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that (individual capacity) defendants’ motion

to dismiss be granted as to plaintiff’s claim for damages alleging violation of his First

Amendment rights by defendants’ refusal to allow him to legally change his name in conjunction

with use of his religious name for mail purposes.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 11/5/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

kemp.mtd

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