Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00631/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00631-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 08:1252(a)(2) Injunction for Deportation

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Joseph Kwaku Boateng, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Eric H. Holder, Jr., 

United States Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. CV13-00631-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 At the direction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court held a de novo 

hearing on the citizenship claim of Petitioner Joseph Kwaku Boateng. For reasons that 

follow, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not a United States citizen by birth. 

I. Background. 

On February 5, 2010, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal 

proceedings against Petitioner by filing a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court. See 

Certified Administrative Record (“AR”) at 505-07. Petitioner appeared before an 

Immigration Judge and claimed to be a citizen of the United States by birth. AR 122. On 

January 24, 2011, the Immigration Judge found that Petitioner was not a citizen of the 

United States and ordered him to be removed to Ghana. AR 73-108. Petitioner appealed 

to the Board of Immigration Appeals, but the Board dismissed the appeal. AR 2-4. 

Petitioner petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to review the Board’s decision. 

See Boateng v. Holder, Doc. 11-72044 (9th Cir). On September 8, 2012, the Ninth 

Circuit found that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Petitioner’s 

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citizenship, and transferred the petition to this Court for a de novo hearing pursuant to 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B). Id. 

 Due to a docketing or transmission error, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was not 

received in this Court until March 27, 2013. The Court held a status conference on 

May 2, 2013, to consider the procedures to be followed in resolving the citizenship issue. 

Petitioner appeared in person at the conference and stated that he would call no 

witnesses, but would instead present documents and declarations to show that he was 

born in the United States. Petitioner identified no other basis for his claim of citizenship. 

Doc. 34. The Court established a schedule for submission of the documentary evidence 

and memoranda. Doc. 34. After documents had been submitted and the parties had 

conducted necessary discovery (Doc. 43), Petitioner again confirmed at a status 

conference on September 12, 2013, that he planned to call no witnesses. 

 The Court held the evidentiary hearing on September 18, 2013. Petitioner and 

defense counsel discussed the evidence submitted with their memoranda. When told by 

the Court that his affidavit was inadmissible hearsay, Petitioner testified briefly. 

 Petitioner is intelligent, articulate, and understands the disputed facts and their 

legal significance. Petitioner earned a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from 

the University of Alabama and completed all but one year of a master’s program in 

electrical engineering. Petitioner’s papers are well-written, and he was able to make 

evidentiary objections and constitutional arguments in his briefs and at the hearing. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 A person born in the United States is a citizen of the United States. 

8 U.S.C. § 1401(a). If a petitioner claims to be a citizen of the United States in a petition 

for review of a removal order, and if a court of appeals finds that a genuine issue of 

material fact exists concerning the petitioner’s citizenship, the court of appeals must 

transfer the proceeding to a district court for a de novo hearing on the citizenship claim. 

The proceeding in the district court is treated as if it were brought under the Declaratory 

Judgment Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B). 

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 Petitioner bears the initial burden of producing “substantial credible evidence in 

support of his citizenship claim,” and the government then bears the “ultimate burden” of 

proving that Petitioner is removable by clear and convincing evidence. Mondaca-Vega v. 

Holder, 718 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Ayala-Villaneuva v. Holder, 572 

F.3d 736, 737 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009)). “The allocation of the initial burden of proof flows 

from the nature of the proceeding. In the de novo hearing in district court, the citizen is 

in the position of a plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment.” Sanchez-Martinez v. INS, 

714 F.2d 72, 74 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983). 

 The Court will set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law separately, as 

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1). The findings of fact necessarily 

will include a discussion of evidentiary issues. Because this is essentially a bench trial on 

a declaratory judgment action, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply. See Fed R. Ev. 

1101(b). 

III. Findings of Fact. 

A. Petitioner’s Evidence. 

 Petitioner proffered seven documents to show that he was born in Orleans Parish, 

Louisiana, on June 1, 1966: (1) A “Statutory Declaration” signed under Ghanaian law by 

Petitioner’s mother, stating simply that he was born in “Orlens [sic] Parish Louisiana, 

United States.” Doc. 36 at 13. (2) A Certificate of Baptism issued by the Catholic 

Diocese of Accra, Ghana, which identifies Petitioner’s place of birth as “Orleans Parish, 

Louisiana, U.S.A.” Doc. 36 at 18. (3) Medical records issued by Ghana Health Service. 

Doc. 36 at 20. An immunization card included in the records bears Petitioner’s name 

and, under a line labeled “clinic,” includes the words “Orleans Parish Louisiana.” Id. 36 

at 20. (4) A certified copy of an abstracted admissions record from Calhoun Community 

College. Doc. 36 at 23. The admission record bears Petitioner’s name and identifies his 

birth place as “Orleans Parish, La.” Id. (5) A document titled “Cumulative Record for 

Basic Education Schools” which bears Petitioner’s name and identifies his place of birth 

as “Orleans Parish Louisiana, U.S.A.” Doc. 36 at 26. (6) A voter registration card issued 

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by the State of Alabama which bears Petitioner’s name and identifies his place of birth as 

“N. Orleans.” Doc. 36 at 16. Id. (7) An affidavit signed by Petitioner and stating that he 

was born on June 1, 1966, at Orleans Parish, Louisiana, at home, attended by a midwife. 

The affidavit names Petitioner’s parents and states that he was taken back to Ghana as a 

baby and completed his primary and secondary education there. Doc. 36 at 32-33. 

 B. The Government’s Objections to Petitioner’s Evidence. 

 The government moves to exclude all of Petitioner’s documents as hearsay. 

Doc. 45 at 2. The Court will address the government’s arguments. 

 Petitioner contends that the statutory declaration of his mother is admissible under 

the hearsay exception for “statements of personal or family history.” Fed. R. Ev. 

804(b)(4). For this exception to apply, however, Petitioner’s mother must be 

“unavailable,” meaning that she must be “absent from the trial or hearing” and that 

Petitioner “has not been able, by process or other means, to procure” her testimony. Fed. 

R. Ev. 804(a)(5)(B). Even if Petitioner’s mother could not afford to travel from Ghana as 

Petitioner contends, the government argues that she voluntarily signed a declaration and 

therefore could have voluntarily testified at trial remotely or given a deposition by phone. 

The Court agrees. To show his mother unavailable for purposes of Rule 804(b)(4), 

Petitioner must show that her “attendance or testimony” could not be procured “by 

process or other reasonable means.” Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) permits 

trial testimony by contemporaneous transmission from a different location, and Rule 

30(b)(4) permits depositions by phone. The phone records submitted by the government 

and discussed below show that Petitioner is in telephone contact with his mother 

(Doc. 54), and yet Petitioner made no effort to secure her remote testimony or a phone 

deposition, and never asked the Court for help in doing so. As one prominent 

commentator has explained, “[w]hen the hearsay at issue concerns . . . a statement of 

personal or family history, the proponent must not only attempt to compel attendance of a 

witness, but also must attempt to depose the witness.” Vol. 4, Jack B. Weinstein & 

Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, § 804.03[6][c] (Matthew Bender 2d 

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ed. 2013). Because Petitioner has not shown his mother to be unavailable within the 

meaning of Rule 804, her declaration is inadmissible hearsay. 

 Petitioner argues that the Certificate of Baptism, the medical records, the 

admission record from Calhoun Community College, the Ghana school records, and the 

Alabama voter registration card are all business records under Rule 803(6), but none of 

these documents is accompanied by testimony of a custodian or other qualified witness, 

or by a certificate that complies with Rule 902(11), as required by Rule 803(6)(D). In 

addition, none of these documents qualifies as a public record under Rule 803(8) because 

none sets forth Petitioner’s birth date as part of a public office’s activities, states that 

Petitioner’s birth place was observed while under a legal duty to report, or states that the 

birth place was determined during a legally authorized investigation. Fed. R. Ev. 

803(8)(A)(i)-(iii). Moreover, as discussed below, there are serious reasons to doubt the 

trustworthiness of several of these documents. Fed. R. Ev. 803(8)(B). 

 Petitioner argues that the Certificate of Baptism, medical records, and school 

records constitute ancient documents under Rule 803(16), but none of them is 

accompanied by a custodial certification as required in Rule 902(12) or by any other 

means of authentication. Because these documents are not records “whose authenticity is 

established” as required by Rule 803(16), they are not admissible as ancient documents. 

 There are additional reasons to question the veracity of Petitioner’s documents. 

As to the Certificate of Baptism, the Petitioner submitted a different “baptism 

testimonial” to the State of Louisiana when he attempted to obtain a delayed birth 

certificate. Doc. 45-1 at 8-9 (certified record from Louisiana Department of Health and 

Hospitals, Center for Records and Statistics). The baptismal testimonial states that 

Petitioner was baptized at St. Thomas Church on February 11, 1977, by Father E-B 

Koonisan (id. at 9), while the Certificate of Baptism states that he was baptized at Saint 

Thomas More Church on July 10, 1977, by Father Dominic Amliaw (Doc. 36 at 18). 

Petitioner asserted in his reply and again at oral argument that both documents are 

authentic because he was baptized twice, but Petitioner does not explain why he 

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submitted one document to the State of Louisiana and another to this Court, with no 

explanation until challenged that he was baptized twice. This Court also notes that the 

handwriting on the Certificate of Baptism looks suspiciously like Petitioner’s handwriting 

on the other documents. Compare Doc. 36 at 18 with Doc. 45-1 at 11. 

 The Ghana school records also include suspicious information. Petitioner asserted 

in his reply and during oral argument that the school records are more than 20 years old. 

Doc. 48 at 9. In fact, they purport to be Petitioner’s primary school records from 1973 to 

1977, when he was seven to eleven years old. The old age of these records seems 

unlikely, however, given that they say Petitioner’s father died on December 7, 2004. 

Doc. 36 at 27. Petitioner claims that the records were updated when his mother obtained 

them from his former primary school, but it seems unlikely that a school would possess 

primary school records more than 35 years old. And even if the school keeps records for 

decades after children departed, it seems highly unlikely that the school would have any 

reason to “update” the record with the father’s death date when a copy was requested in 

2012 or 2013. Equally suspicious is the fact that the handwriting for his father’s death 

date appears identical to the handwriting elsewhere in the document. See Doc. 36 at 27. 

 Petitioner’s exhibits include other anomalies. In at least two, it appears that 

Petitioner’s place of birth has been forced into portions of the document that do not call 

for that information. In the school record, “Orleans Parish, Louisiana” is written into the 

space for “Hometown.” Petitioner does not claim that his hometown was in Louisiana 

when he was attending primary school in Ghana. Similarly, “Orleans Parish Louisiana” 

is written into the health charts in the space for “clinic.” These appear to be rather 

obvious efforts to make seemingly old records reflect Petitioner’s claimed place of birth. 

C. The Government’s Evidence. 

 The government offered evidence to undercut Petitioner’s submissions and to 

show that he was not born in the United States. As described above, the government 

submitted a baptismal testimonial that is inconsistent with the Certificate of Baptism 

submitted by Petitioner. Doc. 45-1 at 8. The government also supplied the complete 

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application submitted by Petitioner to Calhoun Community College (Petitioner presented 

only an abstract of the application). Doc. 45-1 at 11. The application identifies 

Petitioner’s birthplace as “Lafayette Parish.” Id. at 11. When seeking to obtain a delayed 

birth certificate, Petitioner submitted to the State of Louisiana three different versions of 

the abstract of the Calhoun application and two different versions of the Calhoun 

application itself. Id. at 14-22. Petitioner appears to have altered the original application 

(“Lafayette” is crossed out in one version and entirely whited out in another) to show his 

birthplace as “Orleans Parish.” Id. These documents cast serious doubt on the reliability 

of the information contained in Petitioner’s Calhoun abstract. 

 The government produced an authenticated application for a Social Security card 

submitted by Petitioner on June 6, 1990. Doc. 46-1 at 3. In the application, Petitioner 

lists his place of birth as “Accra, Ghana,” and he presented a Ghanaian passport, an I-94 

form, and an F-1 student visa as proof of his identity. Id. at 4. Petitioner now argues that 

he did not submit the application, but he admitted in his deposition that his Social 

Security number is 419-35-1721, the very number that resulted from the application. Id. 

at 21. The government also produced an application Petitioner filed for a replacement 

Social Security card. The application lists Petitioner’s Social Security number and 

identifies his place of birth as “Accra, Ghana.” Id. Petitioner admitted in a deposition 

that the address listed on this application was his previous address. Id. at 48. To prove 

his identity on this application, Petitioner submitted the Texas identification card 

discussed below. Id. at 5. 

 The government introduced an authenticated application Petitioner submitted to 

the Texas Department of Public Safety on August 31, 1994, for an identification card. 

Doc. 46-1 at 75. The application lists Petitioner’s place of birth as “Koforidua, Ghana,” 

and he presented a Ghanaian passport to prove his identity. Id. The photograph in the 

Texas identification card appears to be Petitioner. Id. at 77. 

 The government also submitted Petitioner’s authenticated application for an 

Alabama driver’s license. Id. at 81. The government notes that Petitioner presented a 

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passport with an I-94 form to prove his identity, which he “could not have had unless he 

previously presented himself as an alien upon his entry into the United States.” Doc. 46 

at 8. 

 The government produced an authenticated application that Petitioner submitted to 

Tuskegee University in March of 1988, in which Petitioner lists his place of birth as 

“Accra, Ghana.” Id. at 91. An admissions officer at the University filled out and signed 

a Form I-20 Certificate of Eligibility for Non-Immigrant (F-1) Student Status on 

Petitioner’s behalf, and Petitioner’s place of birth again was stated as “Accra, Ghana.” 

Id. at 93. Petitioner certified that the information in the form was correct. Id. Petitioner 

admitted in his deposition that he attended Tuskegee University. Id. at 33. The Form I20 contains an admission number that matches the I-94 number that was presented for 

Petitioner’s Social Security card. Id. at 93, 4. 

 The government also introduced an authenticated application for lawful permanent 

residence in the United States submitted by Petitioner’s father, Michael Yaw Boateng. 

Doc. 46-1 at 86. Petitioner’s father certified under penalty of perjury that Petitioner was 

born in Ghana. Id. at 87. 

 Finally, the government presented recordings of Petitioner’s phone calls from the 

detention center where he is now held. Doc. 54. In the recordings, Petitioner contacts 

various family members and requests that they procure documents from various sources 

in Ghana to help prove that Petitioner was born in the United States. With respect to the 

medical records, Petitioner instructs that a doctor should sign the record, it should bear 

Petitioner’s name, “they should place the stamp of the clinic on it,” and that the record 

should show immunizations in “about” November of 1967 because “[t]hat is the date 

when they prepared, they prepared the card.” Doc.54 at 17, 20.1

 Petitioner adds that the 

record should show his birthdate as June 1, 1966, explaining “[t]hat is my birth date, so 

they should not change it.” Id. at 20. Petitioner’s brother expresses concern about the 

 

1

 Citations are to page numbers affixed to the top of the page by the Court’s CMECF system, not to numbers at the bottom of the page. 

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cost of this document, stating that “you have already spent about fifteen hundred on the 

other one,” but Petitioner states that his brother should send their mother another “four 

hundred.” Id. at 13, 19. 

 In another call, Petitioner speaks to his mother about the school records, referring 

to them as “the one you prepared and sent to me.” Id. at 47. Petitioner notes that 

someone named “Mampongteng” “wrote hometown on it. Instead of writing place of 

birth on it, he wrote hometown on it.” Id. The school records, as discussed above, have a 

printed box for “Hometown” in which someone has written “Orleans Parish Louisiana.” 

Doc. 36 at 26. Petitioner’s telephone comments suggest that this form was prepared with 

the aid of his mother and someone named Mampongteng, rather than being an authentic 

record of Petitioner’s schooling more than 35 years ago. 

 These translated calls further undercut the reliability of the documents submitted 

by Petitioner. At the September 12, 2013, status conference, Petitioner stipulated that the 

recordings of his calls were authentic.2

D. Petitioner’s Evidentiary and Constitutional Objections.

 Petitioner objects to the government’s documentary evidence on relevance and 

hearsay grounds. The Court agrees that the application for an Alabama driver’s license 

(Doc. 46-1 at 81) is not particularly probative. When asked if Petitioner would have 

needed to enter the United States with an I-94 form and a Ghanaian passport even if his 

assertions were true – that he was born in the U.S. and later taken to Ghana – the 

government’s counsel did not know. 

 The other documents are clearly relevant, and the Court concludes that they are 

not barred by the hearsay rule. The government provided certificates from the relevant 

public officials for each document in satisfaction of the public records exception. Fed. R. 

 

2

 Petitioner offered this stipulation when the Court and counsel for the government discussed a possible two-month delay in the evidentiary hearing due to the government’s need to produce a witness to authenticate the phone recordings and the Court’s intervening trial schedule. In addition to this authentication by stipulation, the government submitted a certificate from an Immigration Services translator that the 

transcript is a correct translation of Petitioner’s recorded calls. Doc. 54 at 8. 

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Ev. 803(8). Any second layer of hearsay is cured because the relevant statements in the 

documents were made by Petitioner and thus are opposing party statements under 

Rule 801(d)(2). In the case of the application for permanent residence submitted by 

Petitioner’s father, the sworn statements of Petitioner’s father are admissible as 

“statements of personal or family history,” and Petitioner’s father is unavailable because 

he is dead. Fed. R. Ev. 804(a)(4). 

 Petitioner objects to the introduction of the phone recordings, asserting that they 

were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Because the exclusionary 

rule does not apply to civil cases, including deportation hearings, Petitioner’s 

constitutional challenge does not prevent the Court from considering the phone 

recordings. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984). 

 In addition, the Fourth Amendment is not triggered unless the government intrudes 

into an area “in which there is a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 

privacy.’” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). Such an expectation exists 

only if (1) Petitioner has an “actual subjective expectation of privacy” in the place 

searched, and (2) society is objectively prepared to recognize that expectation. United 

States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 1991). Although Petitioner claims he had a 

subjective expectation of privacy in calls he made from the detention facility, Petitioner 

knew of the detention center’s policy to record phone calls. Petitioner acknowledged that 

each phone call had an automated message informing the participants that calls were 

monitored. Petitioner also admitted during the hearing that he received a handbook 

informing him that his phone calls could be recorded. If Petitioner knew that the 

government was monitoring his calls, he could not have subjectively expected privacy. 

And even if Petitioner believed his calls were private, the Ninth Circuit has held that 

society is not prepared to recognize that expectation. See United States v. Van Poyck, 77 

F.3d 285, 291 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We hold that any expectation of privacy in outbound calls 

from prison is not objectively reasonable and the Fourth Amendment is therefore not 

triggered by the routine taping of such calls.”). 

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E. Evaluation of the Evidence. 

After the evidentiary objections are considered, all that remains of Petitioner’s 

evidence is his brief testimony at the hearing that he was born in New Orleans, Louisiana. 

Petitioner provided no details of his birth or the basis for his knowledge that he was born 

there. His bare statement falls far below the “substantial credible evidence” threshold 

required to shift the burden to the government. See Mondaca-Vega, 718 F.3d at 1081. 

 Even if the Court were to consider the declaration of Petitioner’s mother, it would 

reach the same conclusion. She too states only that Petitioner was born in Louisiana. 

She provides no explanation of how or why she was in the United States in 1966, no 

details of Petitioner’s birth, and no explanation of why or when she returned to Ghana. 

 In Mondaca-Vega, the petitioner made the threshold showing required in a case of 

this type by proving that his wife and foreign-born children had been granted derivative 

citizenship through him and that the Secretary of State had issued him a United States 

passport. Id. at 1078. Petitioner has provided no comparable evidence. Petitioner stated 

during the status conferences that he has family members in the United States, but none 

of them appeared to provide evidence. Moreover, Petitioner produced no evidence to 

support his assertion that his mother lived in the United States when he was born – no 

housing, employment, education, or tax records concerning his mother’s alleged stay 

here, no photographs, and no evidence from his other living family members. The 

uncorroborated testimony of Petitioner, and his mother’s hearsay declaration if it were 

considered, do not constitute substantial evidence. 

 Even if the Court found that Petitioner had met his initial burden, the government 

has produced clear and convincing evidence to rebut Petitioner’s claim. The documents 

submitted by the government show that Petitioner repeatedly identified himself as a 

Ghanaian by birth. The government’s submissions also strongly suggest that Petitioner 

falsified records submitted to the Court and other records previously submitted to the 

States of Alabama and Louisiana. Petitioner has provided no explanation for how he 

arrived in the United States if not with the student visa of a man from Ghana with the 

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same name and born on the same day as Petitioner. Because the government successfully 

undermined the evidence Petitioner submitted, and also marshaled sufficient evidence to 

clearly convince the Court that Petitioner was born in Ghana, the government’s 

documentary submissions meet the clear and convincing standard. 

 The phone recordings only buttress the Court’s conclusion that Petitioner was not 

born in the United States. The recorded phone conversations show that Petitioner and his 

family sought to create documents to prove his citizenship. 

IV. Conclusion of Law. 

 Petitioner has failed to present substantial credible evidence that he was born in 

the United States, and the government has shown otherwise by clear and convincing 

evidence. Petitioner therefore is not a United States citizen by virtue of birth in this 

Country. 

 IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Petitioner is not a citizen of the United States by birth. 

 2. The Clerk shall file a copy of this order with the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. 

 Dated this 24th day of September, 2013. 

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