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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

VINCE FORD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JAY GRUWELL, VERNON POAGE, 

DAVID THOMPSON, JAMES ARNOLD, 

and ROY MARTIN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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Fl L~ D 

U .ted States Co1_1rt~! Appeals 

m Tc·~+ r ,,.,.,.n . APPEALS ••v• 

APR O 7 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-8005 

(D.C. Civ. No . C90-0006) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and CAUTHRON, 

District Judge. ** 

Vince Ford, a Wyoming citizen and resident, brought a civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C . § 1983 against Jay Gruwell, 

Vernon Poage, David Thompson, and James Arnold, all members of the 

Wyoming State Highway Patrol, and others (we are not here 

concerned with the "others"), alleging that the four officers 

acting under the color of state law conspired to violate his 

rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The four 

defendants by answer denied liability. Discovery ensued, and, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any c ourt within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36 . 3. 

** Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, United State s District Judge for 

the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-8005 Document: 010110240398 Date Filed: 04/07/1992 Page: 1
inter alia, Ford was deposed. The defendants then moved for 

summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity. 

After argument, the district court granted defendants' motion for 

summary judgment and dismissed Ford's action. Ford appeals. 

Ford, a long-time resident of Wyoming, was self-employed in 

the outdoor sign advertising business, and also, in season, sold 

fireworks. The latter enterprise involved towing mobile homes 

around the northeast part of Wyoming to strategic places where 

fireworks were then sold out of the mobile homes. Both of Ford's 

business endeavors involved considerable use of Wyoming highways, 

where, through the years, he had numerous encounters with the 

Wyoming State Highway Patrol. In his second amended complaint, 

Ford, under the heading of General Allegations, set forth facts 

relating to some seven confrontations with the defendants, or a 

combination thereof. In his opening brief, counsel for Ford 

states that the only issue on appeal is Ford's claim that his 

Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the four members of the 

Wyoming State Highway Patrol based on events happening on February 

26, 1989 and July 6, 1989. 

Paragraph 14 of Ford's second amended complaint concerns the 

events happening on February 26, 1989, and reads as follows: 

14. On or about February 26, 1989, Plaintiff and 

his family were driving north on Highway 85, bound for 

their home in Lusk, Wyoming, when stopped by Defendant 

Gruwell. Once again, Defendant Gruwell claimed 

Plaintiff was speeding. When Plaintiff refused to sign 

the "promise to appear" section of the citation 

Defendant Gruwell issued him, Defendant Gruwell 

proceeded to handcuff and arrest Plaintiff. In the 

course of this arrest, Defendant Gruwell's excessive use 

of force caused Plaintiff's wrists to suffer lacerations 

from the handcuffs. In addition, Plaintiff's hip, which 

contained a pin from a previous fracture, was caused to 

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suffer pain and inflammation as a result of the arrest 

proceeding. Plaintiff was not, however, taken to any 

place of incarceration; rather, Defendant Gruwell 

transported Plaintiff to Lusk, Wyoming, informed him 

that he would accept a fifty-five dollar ($55.00) bond 

in lieu of signature, and released him. 

Paragraph 16 of the second amended complaint concerns 

the events happening on July 6, 1989, and reads as follows: 

16. On or about July 6, 1989, Defendants Gruwell, 

Poage, Thompson and Arnold entered Plaintiff's private 

property in Lusk, Wyoming, demanding to see certain 

"paperwork" for a mobile home parked on Plaintiff's 

property. Defendants asserted that Plaintiff had not 

been issued an appropriate permit for allegedly 

transporting the mobile home at some earlier point in 

time. Plaintiff directed Defendants to the visible and 

appropriate permit tag affixed to the mobile home for 

such purposes. When Defendants refused to examine the 

permit tag, Plaintiff demanded that Defendants remove 

themselves from his property. Defendants refused to 

depart, despite repeated similar demands. Instead, they 

remained on Plaintiff's property for some forty-five 

(45) minutes to harass, annoy, humiliate and embarrass 

Plaintiff without cause and with no ensuing citation or 

arrest. 

In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court 

held that all claims that law enforcement officers have used 

excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or 

other "seizure" of a person should be analyzed under the 

"reasonableness" standard of the Fourth .Amendment, rather than a 

"substantive due process" standard. Further, the Supreme Court 

stated that the "reasonableness" of a particular use of force 

should be judged from the perspective of a "reasonable officer" on 

the scene, rather than with a hindsight vision of 20-20. In this 

latter connection, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the 

language of Judge Friendly in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F . 2d 1028 (2nd 

Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973) that "[n]ot every push 

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or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a 

judge's chambers," violates the Fourth Amendment. In Graham, the 

Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit because it had upheld 

the district court's use of the four-part "substantive due 

process" standard in granting a motion for a directed verdict, 

rather than using the "objective reasonableness" test of the 

Fourth Amendment. 

In the instant case, the district court was fully apprised of 

Graham and the standard promulgated therein by the Supreme Court. 

As indicated, the defendants, relying on Ford's allegations in his 

second amended complaint and his deposition, moved for summary 

judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. In granting summary 

judgment, the district court recognized the clearly established 

"right of an arrestee to be free from excessive force," but went 

on to hold that Ford had "not demonstrated that the specific 

conduct [of defendant Gruwell on February 26, 1989] violated his 

right to be free from such [excessive] force." 

In Coen v. Runner, 854 F . 2d 374, 377 (10th Cir. 1988), 

we spoke as follows: 

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that 

protects government officials from personal liability 

unless their actions violate clearly established law of 

which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 

L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) . Once the defense has been raised 

and the plaintiffs have met their burden of identifying 

both the clearly established law that the government 

official is alleged to have violated and the conduct 

that violated that law, the defendant must demonstrate 

that no material issues of fact remai n as to whether his 

or her actions were objectively reasonable in light of 

the law and the information he or she possessed at the 

time. Pueblo Neighborhood Health centers, Inc. v. 

Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th Cir. 1988). A 

defendant who makes such a showing of objective 

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reasonableness is entitled to summary judgment unless 

the plaintiff can demonstrate that there are factual 

disputes relevant to the defendant's claim to immunity. 

Devargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Co., 844 F.2d 714, 719 

(10th Cir. 1988) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 

511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). 

From the allegations in the second amended complaint, and 

from Ford's deposition, we learn that on February 26, 1989, 

Officer Gruwell stopped a vehicle in the belief that the driver 

was speeding. The driver of that vehicle was Ford. The officer 

believed that Ford was driving 75 miles per hour, and Ford 

believed he was doing 55 miles per hour. That difference of 

opinion, of course, simply required resolution by an impartial 

judge. 

Ford was then given the opportunity to sign the "promise to 

appear" portion of the speeding citation issued him, which he 

refused to do. If he had signed the "promise to appear," Ford 

would apparently have been free to go. When Ford refused to sign 

the "promise to appear," Officer Gruwell, under Wyoming law, was 

apparently empowered to arrest Ford, which he proceeded to do. 

Ford, under orders from Gruwell, put his hands behind his back, 

spread his legs, the handcuffing procedure apparently requiring a 

"wide stance" on the part of the arrestee, and the officer then 

handcuffed him. Ford, in his deposition, said the cuffs were too 

tight and scraped his wrists, drawing blood, and that when 

spreading his legs Gruwell kicked his legs farther apart and that 

in so doing he aggravated a pre-existing hip injury. 

In that same deposition, however, Ford admitted that he 

suffered only a "skin scratch" from the handcuffs, that he was not 

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claiming any "damages" for injuries arising out of his arrest by 

Officer Gruwell, and that he did not seek or require any medical 

attention as a result of his encounter with Officer Gruwell on 

February 26, 1989. In any event, Ford was then transported to 

Lusk, Wyoming where he was given the opportunity of posting bond 

or going to jail. He posted bond and went on his way. 

Apparently it is agreed that under the circumstances 

described, Officer Gruwell had the right to arrest Ford, which 

included the right to have him handcuffed. Like the district 

court, using the "objective reasonableness" test, we see no 

violation of Ford's Fourth Amendment rights growing out of the 

conduct of the defendant Gruwell on February 26, 1989. See 

Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 132 (10th Cir. 1990) 

where we held that the defendant, a police officer, was entitled 

to summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and in so doing 

we held, inter alia, that where the officer was making a lawful 

arrest a failure to loosen tight handcuffs which caused pain and 

minimal injury was not "excessive force." * Under the Graham test, 

we believe that summary judgment in favor of the defendant, 

Officer Gruwell, was proper as concerns Ford's claim based on the 

events of February 26, 1989. 

Further, we agree that the actions of the officers on July 6, 

1989, meet the "objective reasonableness" test of Graham. As 

* In Hannula, at p. 131, we also stated that because of 

"societal costs" once a defendant raises a qualified immunity 

defense in a§ 1983 proceeding the plaintiff assumes the "heavy 

burden" to show that the defendant has violated clearly 

established law and that a plaintiff must also show a "substantial 

correspondence" between defendant's conduct and such clearly 

established law. 

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concerns the events of July 6, 

theory that the defendants' 

1989, it is apparently Ford's 

conduct on that date somehow 

constituted a "seizure" of his person. As the district court 

noted the defendants did not arrest or otherwise "seize" Ford, and 

they were lawfully on Ford's business premises "to determine 

whether or not the vehicle had been properly permitted." 

On July 6, 1989, defendants Arnold and Thompson, had observed 

Ford moving an over-size trailer on the state highway and they 

dispatched defendants Gruwell and Poage to check out the trailer 

and ascertain if there had been compliance with Wyoming law 

regarding the movement of trailers on the state's highways. When 

Gruwell and Poage arrived at Ford's business premises, Ford was in 

the process of unhitching the trailer from a pickup. Officers 

Arnold and Thompson arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. The 

officers checked the vehicle in question and requested that Ford 

produce the proper paperwork showing compliance with Wyoming law. 

Ford refused. While the officers were still on the premises Ford 

called and spoke with his attorney. Officer Poage also spoke 

briefly with Ford's attorney. The officers then left without 

issuing any citation. 

There admittedly was a sharp verbal exchange between Ford and 

the officers at this confrontation on July 6, 1989, during which 

Officer Gruwell allegedly put his hand on his service revolver and 

pulled it partially out of the holster. However, there is no 

suggestion that the revolver was pulled completely out of its 

holster, let alone pointed at Ford. Further, whether the officers 

were on the premises 45 minutes, as alleged by Ford, or 15 

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minutes, as shown by patrol records, is not particularly 

important. What is important is that no arrest was made, no 

citation issued, no seizure of any "papers or effects," and, in 

our view, there was, under the circumstances, no "seizure" of 

Ford's person within the Fourth Amendment. It would seem to us 

that the officers had the right to at least investigate the 

matter. In this connection, counsel suggests that defendants' 

actions on July 6, 1989, in coming into the yard surrounding 

Ford's business premises was at most a common law trespass, which 

would not form the basis for a§ 1983 action. We agree. Under 

the described circumstances, summary judgment in favor of the four 

defendants was proper as concerns Ford's claim based on the events 

of July 6, 1989. 

In short, in the words of Judge Friendly, not every "push and 

shove" violates the Fourth Amendment, nor, we add, does every 

kick. The instant case does not rise to the dignity of a§ 1983 

action. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Robert H. Mcwilliams 

Circuit Judge 

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