Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02611/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02611-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

The State of Arizona, ex rel. Terry

Goddard, the Attorney General; the Civil

Rights Division of the Arizona Dept. of

Law; and Jill Shumway,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DHL Express (USA), Inc.,

Defendant.

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No. CV-06-2611-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it plaintiff Jill Shumway’s motion for attorney’s fees (doc. 163)

and memorandum supporting the motion (doc. 175), defendant DHL Express’s response

(doc. 179), and Shumway’s reply (doc. 180).

Shumway asserted sex discrimination and retaliation claims against DHL under

federal and state law. On January 16, 2008, we granted defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on Shumway’s discrimination claim and denied the motion on the retaliation claim

(doc. 96). Following a five-day trial, the jury concluded that defendant had unlawfully

retaliated against Shumway and awarded her $350,000 in compensatory damages. Shumway

now moves for an award of attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs in the amount of

$383,210.92, pursuant to the Arizona Civil Rights Act, A.R.S. § 41-1481(J), and Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). 

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Congress authorized the award of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party” in actions

alleging discrimination or retaliation in employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Defendant

concedes that plaintiff has satisfied the threshold burden of establishing prevailing party

status. It argues, however, that Shumway’s counsel’s fees should be reduced by 40%

because Shumway did not prevail on her discrimination claim. 

In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983), the Supreme Court

held that “the extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial factor in determining the proper

amount of an award of attorney’s fees.” Id. at 440, 103 S. Ct. at 1943. “Where the plaintiff

has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the

hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a

reasonable fee.” Id. However, “[w]here a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who

has won substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced simply because the

district court did not adopt each contention raised.” Id. 

DHL contends that the discrimination claim was distinct in all respects from the

retaliation claim. It contends that the two claims involved different legal theories, different

witnesses, and different elements of proof, and because Shumway failed to prevail on the

discrimination claim, we should reduce Shumway’s fee award to eliminate any fees

generated to advance this claim. We disagree.

In Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493 (9th Cir.

2000), the plaintiff asserted claims of sex discrimination and retaliation. A jury concluded

that the plaintiff failed to establish sex discrimination, but found that the defendant retaliated

against her because of her complaints about what she perceived as sex discrimination. The

Ninth Circuit rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees should

be reduced because she failed to prevail on all of her claims. The court reasoned that, “in

order to prevail on her retaliation claims, [plaintiff] had to prove that she reasonably believed

that [defendant] was engaged in discriminatory activity.” Id. at 518. Therefore, the court

concluded that the retaliation claim was “inextricably intertwined with her discrimination

claims.” Id.; see also Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir.

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2002) (plaintiff must establish a reasonable belief that the employer engaged in an unlawful

employment practice). The court held that because the time spent on her discrimination

claims contributed to the success of her retaliation claims, it was appropriate to award fees

for hours spent on the unsuccessful discrimination claim. 

We are presented with a similar situation here. Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim

involved allegations that DHL compensated men more favorably than similarly-situated

women. Her complaint to management about this pay disparity formed the basis of her

retaliation claim. In order to support her prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff was required

to prove that she reasonably believed that defendant had unlawfully discriminated against her

when it refused to pay her a salary commensurate with male employees. As such, the legal

theories of the two claims overlap. Moreover, the claims are factually related. Brian Kelly

was the key decision maker in both the salary decision and the decision to deny the

controlled credit commission. His alleged animus was first evidenced in his decision to deny

equal pay and then carried over into his decision to deny the controlled credit. 

At all events, “[t]he result is what matters,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S. Ct. at

1940, and plaintiff has obtained excellent results. The value of the discrimination claim is

minimal in comparison to the retaliation claim. Plaintiff was awarded $350,000 on her

retaliation claim, whereas her discrimination claim was estimated to be worth $5,250 (the

salary differential during the relevant time). Reply at 6. When a plaintiff has “obtained

excellent results,” the lawyer should “recover a fully compensatory fee . . . encompass[ing]

all hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S. Ct. at

1940. 

Because the legal theories and factual bases of the two claims are inextricably

interrelated, and because plaintiff has obtained overall excellent results, we will not apportion

the fee award based on the success or failure of the two claims. 

Defendant does not challenge the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged by

plaintiff’s counsel. Instead, it broadly contends that the fee request should be reduced

because it reflects overstaffing and duplication of efforts. It argues that plaintiff “was

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represented by no less than four attorneys at trial.” Response at 6. However, three of the

lawyers at trial represented the State of Arizona. With the exception of 8.2 hours for Gary

J. Cohen, plaintiff seeks to recover fees for the services of Douglas H. Clark, Jr. only. We

reject defendant’s argument that the fee request should be reduced because the Attorney

General’s office was also litigating the case and that plaintiff should have relied on “the

resources that were available to her from the Attorney General’s Office.” Id. First, plaintiff

is entitled to hire an independent lawyer of her choosing to prosecute her claim. Moreover,

it is evident from the processing of this case that Mr. Clark not only served as lead counsel

during trial, but also directed the overall litigation. Plaintiff states that Mr. Clark propounded

the majority of the discovery and conducted all but one of the depositions, which was

conducted by defendant’s counsel. Reply at 12.

Defendant’s only specific challenge to counsel’s time entries relate to charges in the

amount of $412.50 for docketing clerks. Purely clerical tasks should not be billed at a

paralegal rate, but should be subsumed in a law firm’s overhead. Therefore, we reduce the

requested fees by $412.50. 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING plaintiff’s motion for

attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $382,798.42 (doc. 163). 

DATED this 28th day of July, 2008.

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