Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02045/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02045-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1145 E.R.I.S.A.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LABORERS

HEALTH AND WELFARE TRUST FUND FOR

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA; BOARD OF

TRUSTEES OF THE LABORERS VACATIONHOLIDAY TRUST FUND FOR NORTHERN

CALIFORNIA; BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF

THE LABORERS PENSION TRUST FUND FOR

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA; and BOARD OF

TRUSTEES OF THE LABORERS TRAINING

AND RETRAINING TRUST FUND FOR

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DRONKANOKI, INC., a California

Corporation; and TRAVIS DEAN

ANDERSON, an Individual,

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. C-06-2045 SC

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

FOR ENTRY OF 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Board of Trustees of the Laborers Health and

Welfare Trust Fund for Northern California et al. ("Plaintiffs" or

"Trust Funds") brought this action against Defendants Dronkanoki,

Inc. ("Defendant Dronkanoki") and Travis Dean Anderson ("Defendant

Anderson") (together "Defendants") under the National Labor

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Management Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132. Defendants did

not respond, and, on May 22, 2006, default was entered against

Defendants. On July 19, 2006, Plaintiffs made a motion for

default judgment. Defendants have not appeared.

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs' motion for default

judgment is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants on March 17, 2006. 

See Docket No. 1. The Complaint states that Defendants failed "to

make trust fund contributions and to submit to an audit of their

books and records as demanded of them by [Defendants], and as

required by its collective bargain agreements, by the Trust

Agreements and by provisions of federal law." Compl. at 2. 

On April 10, 2006, Defendants were both personally served

with the Summons and Complaint. See Docket No. 5. After

Defendants did not respond to the Complaint, Plaintiffs requested

entry of default, which was entered on May 22, 2006. See Docket

No. 8. 

Plaintiffs filed the present Motion on July 19, 2006, which,

along with related filings, was served on Defendants by mail on

the same day. See Docket Nos. 12-16. According to the Motion and

its accompanying declarations, it is "reasonably believed that

[Defendant] Travis Dean Anderson is neither an infant nor

incompetent person nor in military or uniformed service or

otherwise exempt under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act

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of 1940 . . . or the Service Civil Relief Act of 2003." Pls' Mem.

at 6. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

After entry of default, the Court may enter a default

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 555. Its decision whether to do so,

while "discretionary," Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th

Cir. 1980), is guided by several factors.

As a preliminary matter, the Court must "assess the adequacy

of the service of process on the part[ies] against whom default is

requested." Board of Trustees of the N. Cal. Sheet Metal Workers

v. Peters, No. C-00-0395 VRW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19065, at *2

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2001). 

If the Court determines that service was sufficient, it may

consider the following factors in its decision on the merits of a

motion for default judgment:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2)

the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the

sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at

stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute

concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was

due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy

underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring

decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). In doing

so "the factual allegations of the complaint . . . will be taken

as true." TeleVideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915,

917 (9th Cir. 1987)(internal quotations omitted). 

Should the Court grant the Motion on the merits, however, the

same standard does not guide its determination whether, and how

much, to award in damages. Televideo Systems, Inc. 826 F.2d at

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917. In an ERISA case based on allegations that an employer

failed to make required plan contributions and where the employer

was delinquent at the time the action is filed, upon entry of

default judgement against the employer, a court must award damages

according to the statutory scheme outlined in 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(g)(2). Northwest Administrators, Inc. v. Albertson's,

Inc., 104 F.3d 253, 257 (9th Cir. 1996). However, "[p]laintiff[s]

ha[ve] the burden of proving damages through testimony or written

affidavit." Board of Trustees of the Boilermaker Vacation Trust

v. Skelly, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 

Finally, when a motion for default judgment requests injunctive

relief, the already strong policy favoring a decision on the

merits is strengthened. Wright, Miller & Kane Federal Practice

and Procedure Civil 3d § 2693. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Service of Process

Service of process against both Defendants was adequate. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) allows service upon an

individual by personally delivering to the individual the summons

and complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). Rule 4(h) allows service

upon a corporation by personally delivering the summons and

complaint to the corporation's authorized agent. Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(h)(2). On April 10, 2006, a copy of the Complaint, Summons, and

other filings were personally delivered to Defendant Anderson. 

See Docket No. 5. Simultaneously, the summons and complaint as to

Defendant Dronkanoki, Inc. was personally delivered to Travis

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Anderson as Dronkanoki, Inc.'s authorized agent. See Id.

B. Merits of Motion

Accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true, as it

must, the Court finds that Eitel factors weigh in favor of

entering default judgment.

1. Prejudice

Plaintiffs would be prejudiced absent entry of default

judgment. According to Plaintiffs' Motion, which is not disputed

by Defendants, Defendants' failure to make required contributions

has caused Plaintiffs harm by denying benefits to the Trust Funds'

beneficiaries and by denying "sufficient funds" to the Trust

Funds. Mot. at 4. Without the entry of a default judgment, it

appears that Plaintiffs would not have a remedy for these harms. 

Such a situation qualifies as prejudice. See PepsiCo, Inc. v.

California Security Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal.

2002).

2. Merits of Plaintiffs' Substantive Claims

Plaintiffs' substantive claims against both Defendants are

meritorious. 

Attached to the Declaration of John Hagan submitted in

support of the Motion are documents showing that Defendant

Anderson, as president of Dronkanoki, Inc., signed a Memorandum

Agreement with Local Union No. 185 of Northern California on

January 19, 2004 ("Memorandum Agreement"). See Hagan Decl., Exs.

A-B. The Memorandum Agreement inter alia obligates signatory

employers to "comply with all wages, hours, and working conditions

set forth in the the Laborers' Master Agreement for Northern

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California [("Master Agreement")]" and "to pay all sums of money

for each hour paid for or worked by employees performing work

covered by said Master Agreement to each and every all and

singular of the Trust Funds specified in said Master Agreement . .

. and to accept and assume and be bound by all of the obligations

of any trust agreement, plan, or rules or any amendments,

modifications, or changes, thereof . . . , including the

obligation to pay liquidated damages and other sums due upon

delinquency as provided in said trust agreements." Id., Ex. B. 

The Master Agreement, also attached to Hagan's Declaration,

lists, with slightly modified names, the Trust Funds, and

establishes a schedule by which employers are obligated to

contribute to them. See Id., Ex. C. 

The Complaint alleges that the Trust Funds are "employee

benefit plans created by written trust agreements subject to and

pursuant to . . ERISA." Compl. at 2. The Complaint further

alleges that Defendant Dronkanoki, Inc. is an employer in an

industry affecting commerce, that Defendant Anderson owns,

operates and controls Dronkanoki, Inc., and that "Dronkanoki Inc.

and Travis Dean Anderson constitute a single employer." Id. at 3. 

According to the Complaint, and in line with the documentary

evidence discussed above, Defendants entered into the Memorandum

Agreement with the Northern District Council of Laborers on

January 19, 2004. Id. at 3. The Complaint terms the Memorandum

Agreement a "written collective bargaining agreement." Id. The

Complaint alleges, again in line with the documentary evidence,

that by entering into the Memorandum Agreement, the Defendants

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bound themselves to comply with the Master Agreement and, thus,

the trust agreements which establish the Trust Funds as well. Id. 

Pursuant to these agreements, the Complaint alleges,

Defendants were required to make certain contributions to the

Trust Funds, and allow Plaintiffs access to their books and

records to determine the amount the Trust Funds were due. Id. at

4-5. 

According to the Complaint, over the last two years,

Defendants have failed to comply with these obligations, by

failing to make certain required contributions and denying the

Trust Funds the required access. Id. at 4. Section 515 of ERISA

states:

Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to

a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or

under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement

shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make

such contributions in accordance with the terms and

conditions of such plan or such agreement. 

29 U.S.C. § 1145. Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants have breached

their obligations under ERISA to make contributions to the Trust

Funds therefore has merit. 

On the basis of Plaintiffs' undisputed allegation in the

Complaint that the Defendants constitute a single employer,

Plaintiffs' claim that both Defendants should be held jointly and

severally liable for any liability flowing from these breaches

also has merit.

3. Sufficiency of the Complaint

The Complaint recites the basic allegations on which the

Court based its finding above that Plaintiffs' substantive claims

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had merit. The Court, therefore, finds that the Complaint is

sufficient.

4. Other Factors

None of the remaining Eitel factors dissuade the Court from

entering a default judgment against Defendants. The sum of money

at stake in the action, including attorneys' fees is $23,012.82, 

Mem. at 11. While not insignificant, this amount is not

particularly large. As the case turns upon a set of obligations

clearly stated in written agreements, and Defendants have been

served with the Complaint, which alleges Defendants' breach of

those obligations, there does not seem a strong possibility of a

dispute regarding material facts. There is also no indication

that Defendants failed to respond due to excusable neglect. 

Finally, while the policy underlying the Federal Rules of

Procedure favors a decision on the merits, it is not controlling

in light of the other factors which point to the appropriateness

of entering default judgment in this case.

The Court therefore finds that entering default judgment is

warranted. 

C. Remedy

Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to entry

of a default judgment on their § 1145 claim, and the Defendants

were delinquent at the time Plaintiffs' action was filed, it is

required to award Plaintiffs the following types of relief: (A)

the unpaid contributions,(B) interest on the unpaid

contributions,(C) an amount equal to the greater of interest on

the unpaid contributions, or liquidated damages provided for under

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1

The actual date next to what appears to be Defendant

Anderson's signature actually reads "1/06/05." The Court assumes

that this is in error, as the report is clearly for November 2005.

2The actual date next to what appears to be Defendant

Anderson's signature actually reads "1/10/05." The Court assumes

that this is in error, as the report is clearly for December 2005.

9

the plan in an amount not in excess of 20 percent of the amount of

unpaid contributions; (D) reasonable attorney's fees and costs,

and(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems

appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2); see Northwest

Administrators, Inc., 104 F.3d at 257. However, it will only

award damages which Plaintiffs have proved up. See Board of

Trustees of the Boilermaker Vacation Trust, 389 F. Supp. 2d at

1226. 

1. Unpaid Contributions

According to Plaintiffs' Motion, they are owed $13,513.35 for

contributions unpaid by Defendants during the period from June

2005 to December 2005. Mem. at 8. 

In support, Plaintiffs submit: the declaration of John Hagan,

Accounts Receivable Manager of the office which provides

administrative services to the Trust Funds, see Hagan Decl., ¶ 1;

"employer reports" for the months of September 2005 (apparently

filled out and signed by Defendant Anderson on November 13, 2005),

October 2005 (apparently filled out and signed by Defendant

Anderson on November 13, 2005), November 2005 (apparently filled

out and signed by Defendant Anderson on January 6, 2006),1

 and

December 2005 (apparently filled out and signed by Defendant

Anderson on January 10, 2006),2 which respectively show the

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Defendants owing contributions of $9,878.50, $6,123.75, $3,312.00,

and $1,207.50 ("Employer Reports"), see id., Ex. G; a single

employee's "payroll check stub worksheet" which shows Defendants

having under-reported the employee's hours for June and overreporting the employee's hours for July, and which demands $880.00

in contributions ("Payroll Worksheet"), see id., Ex. H; a table

prepared on March 3, 2006 by a member of Mr. Hagan's staff which

shows Defendant Dronkanoki owing a total of $21,092.00 in unpaid

contributions ("March 3rd Table"), see id., Ex. I; and a table

prepared on June 6, 2006 by a member of Mr. Hagan's staff which

shows Defendant Dronkanoki owing a total of $13,513.13 in unpaid

contributions ("June 6th Table"), see id., Ex. F. 

The contribution rates in the Employer Reports match the

rates recited in the Master Agreement as amended. See id., Exs.

C, D, G. The March 3rd Table lists contribution amounts unpaid to

particular Trust Funds which match the amounts Defendant Anderson

listed as owing in the Employer Reports. See id. at Exs. G, I. 

The June 6th Table, according to Hagan's Declaration, reflects a

reduction of these figures by the amount which the Trust Funds

received in payments following the creation of the March 3rd

Table. Id., ¶ 17. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have met

their burden of proof as to Defendants' under-payment of

contributions to the Trust Funds for the months of September 2005,

October 2005, November 2005, and December 2005 in the total amount

of $12,638.95. 

The Court, however, finds that Plaintiffs have not met their

burden as to $874.40 which Plaintiffs claim they are owed as a

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result of Defendants' alleged under-reporting of hours for a

single employee. The Hagan Declaration states: 

[Defendants] under-reported for June a total of 80 hours

of work, yielding (a gross figure of) $888.00 owed for

June, and [Defendants] over-reported 90 hours for July,

which would yield a credit. Thus, [the March 3rd Table]

and the later [June 6th Table] show 80 hours and a (net

figure) of $874.40 owed for June 2005.

Id., ¶ 18. This description accurately reflects the submitted

documentation; however, it does not sufficiently explain how the

figures it recites were reached. In particular, there is no

explanation how application of a credit for over-reporting 90

hours reduced the debt for under-reporting 80 hours by only $5.60. 

The Court therefore declines to order compensation for the $874.40

which Plaintiffs claim they are owed on these grounds.

2. Liquidated Damages

Plaintiffs have requested liquidated damages in the amount of

$2,250. Mem. at 9. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(C)(ii),

liquidated damages are recoverable if provided for in the plan

agreement and do not equal more than 20% of unpaid contributions

awarded. The Master agreement states:

Subject to accounting verification, liquidated damages

shall be assessed on delinquent contributions at a flat

rate of one hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) per

month.

Hagan Decl., Ex. C. Attached to Hagan's declaration is a table

labeled "Statement of Liquidated Damages Due" which shows an

assessment against Defendants of $150 per month in liquidated

damages for delinquencies every month beginning in February 2004

through December 2005, for a total of $2,500.00. See Id., Ex. E. 

However, except for the documents discussed above covering

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September 2005 to December 2005, Plaintiffs provide no back-up

documentation showing that Defendants were in fact delinquent

paying their contributions during this period. A simple

recitation of money owed is not sufficient to prove up damages in

a motion for default judgment. See Walters v. Statewide Concrete

Barrier, Inc., C-04-2559 JSW, 2006 WL 2527776, *7-8 (N.D. Cal.

Aug. 30, 2006). Thus, the Court awards only liquidated damages

for the months of September 2005 to December 2005: $600.

3. Pre-Judgment Interest 

Plaintiffs request a total of $2,465.73 in pre-judgment

interest on Defendants' unpaid contributions. Mem. at 9. 

Interest on unpaid contributions based on a rate set by the

employee benefit plan is recoverable under 29 U.S.C 

§ 1132(g)(C)(i), even if liquidated damages have already been

awarded. Northwest Administrators, Inc. v. A.D. Automotive

Distributors Inc., No. C-05-2880 SC, 2006 WL 1626940, *5 (N.D.

Cal. June 12, 2006). The Master Agreement provides that "[a]ll

delinquent contributions shall bear simple interest at the rate of

one and one-half percent (1.5%) per month until receipt of

payment." See Hagan Decl., Ex. C.

The same problem afflicts Plaintiffs' request for prejudgment

interest which afflicts their request for liquidated damages. 

Except for the months of September 2005 through December 2005,

Plaintiffs provide no back-up documentation for their claim that

contributions were delinquent and so no substantiation to their

claim that interest is due for these other months. 

The Court is also not completely satisfied with the

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3

Without information regarding the amount by which Defendants

satisfied their delinquencies to particular Trust Funds and the

exact date on which this was done, such a calculation is not

possible. See Hagan Decl., ¶ 13.

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documentation submitted in support for interest claimed on unpaid

contributions for the months of September 2005 through December

2005. For example, the Statement of Liquidated Damages Due lists

$182.32 in interest due on Defendants' delinquent September 2005

"Vacation Holiday" contribution. See Hagan Decl., Ex. E. The

March 3rd Table lists $1,958.52 in unpaid September 2005 Vacation

Holiday Contributions. See id. Ex. I. One and half percent of

$1,958.52 is $29.38, which multiplied by 8 (the number of months

by which the contribution was late when the interest figures in

the Statement of Liquidated Damages Due were calculated, see id.,

Ex. E.) equals $235.02. The Court assumes the discrepancy between

this amount and the amount now requested, $182.32, is due to the

partial payment which Defendants made in early 2006. see id., ¶

17. Thus, the Court will accept the interest figures for

September 2005 through December 2005 listed on the Statement of

Liquidated Damages Due, but it will not, as requested by

Plaintiffs, see Mem. at 9, attempt the impossible task of

extrapolating out from these figures the interest due at the date

of this ruling.3 

Therefore, the Court awards a total of $1661.70 in

prejudgment interest for unpaid contributions for the months of

September 2005 through December 2005.

4. Attorney's Fees and Costs

 Plaintiffs seek $441.24 in costs and $4,342.50 in attorney's

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fees. Mem. at 9. When plan documentation makes provisions for it,

Section 1132(g)(D) allows the recovery of reasonable attorney's

fees and costs incurred in seeking payment of unpaid

contributions. See 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(D). The Trust Agreements

make such a provision. Leigh Decl., Ex. C. 

a. Costs

Plaintiffs base their demand for $441.24 in costs on filing

fees and the costs of personally serving the Defendants. See

Leigh Decl., ¶ 13. The Ninth Circuit has held in the context of

20 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) that courts are allowed to "award only the

types of 'costs' allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and only in the

amounts allowed by section 1920 itself, by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 or by

similar such provisions," Arguendo v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 75

F.3d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1996), a standard which is logically

applicable to the award of costs under § 1132(g)(2) as well. A.D.

Automotive Distributors Inc.,, 2006 WL 1626940, at *7 (N.D. Cal.

June 12, 2006).

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of costs in the amount of

the filing fees, including E-Filing fees, in the amount of

$262.24, and the service-of-process fees of $179.00. See 28

U.S.C. § 1920 (stating that a court may tax as costs fees of the

clerk and marshal); Civ. L.R. 54-3(a)(1) (“The Clerk's filing fee

is allowable if paid by the claimant.”); Civ. L.R. 54-3(a)(2)

(“Fees for service of process by someone other than the marshal

acting pursuant to FRCivP 4(c), are allowable to the extent

reasonably required and actually incurred.”). The Court therefore

awards costs in the amount of $441.24.

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b. Attorney's Fees

Plaintiffs' request of $4,342.50 in attorney's fees is based

on 19.3 hours of attorney time billed at $225.00 per hour. See

Leigh Decl., ¶ 13. In support, Plaintiffs submit a billing

statement listing the times which Plaintiffs' attorneys billed on

the matter. See Leigh Decl., ¶ 13, Ex. F. 

In determining the amount of attorney's fees to award in an

ERISA action, the Court applies "a hybrid loadstar/multiplier

approach." D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 904 F.2d

1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1990) overruled on other grounds by

Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557(1992). This approach involves

first determining the loadstar amount and then making any upward

or downward adjustments as the specifics of the situation demand,

such adjustments being the exception rather than the norm. Id. 

The loadstar amount is calculated by "multiplying the number of

hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly

rate." Id. 

Counsel's rate of $225.00, while on the high end, is

reasonable in view of "prevailing market rate[s]." Id. at 1384. 

However, the number of hours billed is not reasonable given

the relevant simplicity of the case and level of activity in it. 

By way of comparison, in two similar case, Peters, 2000 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 19065, at *7 and A.D. Automotive Distributors Inc.,, 2006 WL

1626940, at *7, the attorneys spent respectively five and four

hours working on their cases. Even compared to a similar case in

which the court awarded fees for significantly larger numbers of

hours billed, see Walters v. Shaw/Guehmann Corp., No. C-04058 WHA,

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4By way of comparison, the attorneys in Peters, 2000 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 19065, at *7, and A.D. Automotive Distributors Inc.,, 2006 WL 1626940, at *7, both charged a rate of $180 per hour, while

the attorney in Shaw/Guehmann Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11992,

at *9, charged $150 per hour. It is additionally notable that the

attorney in A.D. Automotive Distributors Inc. is one of the local

bar's most experienced litigators involved in this type of action. 

 

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2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11992, *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15,

2004)(approximately 12 hours), the number of hours for which

Plaintiff's counsel requests compensation is high. 

Counsel in Shaw/Guehmann Corp. spent a total of 4 hours

preparing the motion for default judgment and associated

declarations. Plaintiffs' counsel spent 11.2 hours on the same,

see Leigh Decl., Ex. F., almost three times what plaintiff's

counsel in A.D. Automotive Distributors spent working on his

entire case. Thus, 11.2 hours is not reasonable, especially in

light of the frequency with which Plaintiffs' counsel's law firm

handles these types of cases, a factor presumably reflected in

Plaintiffs' counsel's relatively high billing rate.4 Thus, the

Court reduces to 4 the amount of hours Plaintiffs' counsel may

bill for preparing their Motion and associated declarations.

The Court additionally declines to award attorney's fees in

the amounts requested for the following tasks on the grounds that

they appear unnecessary and/or excessive, and so smack of padding:

1) 3/22/06, 30 minutes, "Received and reviewed ADR schedule

and CMC requirements. Work on Disclosures." Leigh Decl., Ex.

F. Defendants had not yet answered, and so there was no

reason to work on disclosures, which, indeed, Plaintiffs'

counsel appears never to have worked on again. This figure

is therefore reduced by half to 15 minutes, or .25 of an

hour.

2) 5/10/06, 20 minutes; 5/23/06, 1 hour and 30 minutes;

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5/25/06, 30 minutes; 6/6/06, 1 hour and 20 minutes; 6/8/06,

30 minutes. Id. All of these entries either refer to tasks

subsumed within preparation of the Motion or which have no

apparent purpose given the posture of the case at the time,

for example, "Notes for Discovery" on 6/6/06. The Court

therefore declines to award any fees for these tasks.

3) 6/29/06, 1 hour, detailing tasks related to a phone call

from the Court regarding scheduling. Id. The Court is aware

the phone calls in question were very brief, and cannot

imagine that the other tasks listed, such as "Memo to

secretary regarding same and E-filing notice of same" could

have accounted for the rest of the time claimed. Id. The

Court therefore reduces this amount to 30 minutes or .5 of an

hour.

Reflecting these modifications, the court finds that the

loadstar amount appropriate to the work done by Plaintiffs'

counsel is equal to 7.85 hours, which billed at a rate of $225.00

per hour equals $1,766.25. Finding no reason to modify that

figure upward or downward due to exceptional circumstances, the

Court awards that amount in attorneys fees to Plaintiffs. 

5. Equitable Relief

In addition to damages, Plaintiffs request that the Court

issue a mandatory injunction compelling Defendants to permit

Plaintiffs to audit Defendants' financial records. Mem. at 10. 

Section 1132(g)(2)(E) empowers courts to grant such equitable

relief as they deem appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(E). The

authority to conduct such an audit is granted to the Trust Funds

by the Trust Agreements. See, e.g., Leigh Decl., Ex. C. In light

of this grant of authority and Defendants' pattern of

delinquencies, the court grants Plaintiffs' request for injunction

to allow Plaintiffs to conduct an audit, but only against

Defendant Dronkanoki and limited to records regarding Defendant

Dronkanoki's employment practices.

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6. Post-Judgment Interest, Costs, and Attorney's Fees

Plaintiffs also request post-judgment interest, costs, and

attorney's fees. The Court declines to award such damages. The

statutory remedies provided in Section 1132(g)(2) for unpaid

contibutions are exclusive. See Parkhurst v. Armstrong Steel

Erectors, Inc., 901 F.2d 796, 797 (9th Cir. 1990). And, as the

foregoing discussion demonstrates, a plaintiff's entitlement to

those remedies is subject to its proving up its entitlement to

them. The Court declines the invitation to allow Plaintiffs to

avoid this requirement through issuance of an amorphous forwardlooking award of potential damages. If Defendants continue to be

delinquent, they will be subject to another suit by Plaintiffs and

thus another set of damages. The Court feels this is, and should

be, sufficient incentive for Defendants to cease being delinquent

in its contributions going forward. 

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V. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs'

motion for default judgment and AWARDS damages against Defendants

jointly and severally as follows: $12,638.95 in unpaid

contributions; $600 in liquidated damages; $1,661.70 in prejudgment interest; $441.24 in costs; and $1,766.25 in attorney's

fees, for a total of $17,108.14. The Court further ORDERS

Defendant Dronkanoki to give Plaintiffs reasonable access to its

records so that Plaintiffs can audit its employment practices. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 11, 2006

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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