Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15969/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15969-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARK MUNNS; CHRISTA MUNNS,

administrators for the separate Estate

of Joshua Munns; DENNIS

DEBRABANDER; SHARON

DEBRABANDER, administrators for

the separate Estate of John Young;

LORI SILVERI, administrator for the

separate Estate of John Cote,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

JOHN F. KERRY, in his official

capacity as United States Secretary

of State; JENNIFER FOO, in her

official capacity; UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA; LLOYD’S OF LONDON;

CNA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-15969

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-00681-

MCE-EFB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 11, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed March 20, 2015

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2 MUNNS V. KERRY

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Raymond C. Fisher

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher;

Concurrence by Judge Reinhardt

SUMMARY*

Standing / Jurisdiction

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the

plaintiffs’ equitable claims due to lack of standing and their

federal benefits claims due to lack of jurisdiction, and vacated

the district court’s dismissal of the due process and takings

claims for withheld back pay and insurance proceeds in an

action brought against United States government officials by

family members and a coworker of three Americans who

were kidnapped and killed while providing contract security

services during the United States military occupation of Iraq.

The panel held that the plaintiffs had not shown that they

were likely to be harmed in the future by the United States’

policies governing the supervision of private contractors and

the response to kidnappings of American citizens in Iraq; and

therefore, the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to seek

prospective declaratory and injunctive relief regarding those

policies. The panel also held that the plaintiffs failed to

allege a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity that

would confer jurisdiction in the district court over their

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MUNNS V. KERRY 3

monetary claims. Finally, the panel held that the United

States Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over the

plaintiffs’ claims for withheld back pay and insurance

proceeds, and directed the district court to sever and transfer

those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

Judge Reinhardt concurred, and wrote separately to

emphasize that it would not be appropriate for the court to

resolve in this case any questions regarding the proper

policies for the government to follow with respect to the role

of contractors in Iraq, nor determine how the government, or

the families of hostages, should deal with terrorist groups

who hold hostage United States citizens.

COUNSEL

William Wayne Palmer (argued), Law Offices of William W.

Palmer, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

H. Thomas Byron, III (argued), Michael Raab, Stuart F.

Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Joyce R. Branda, Acting

Assistant AttorneyGeneral, and Benjamin B. Wagner, United

States Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil

Division, Appellate Staff, Washington, D.C., for DefendantsAppellees.

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4 MUNNS V. KERRY

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

This case arises from the kidnappings and brutal killings

of three Americans who were providing contract security

services during the United States military occupation of Iraq. 

The plaintiffs, who include family members and a former

coworker of these three men, brought suit against United

States government officials to challenge policies governing

the supervision of private contractors and the response to

kidnappings of American citizens in Iraq (“policy claims”). 

They also claim the government is withholding back pay, life

insurance proceeds and government benefits owed to the

families of the deceased contractors (“monetary claims”).

The district court dismissed the policy claims for lack of

standing and for presenting nonjusticiable political questions. 

It dismissed the monetary claims for failure to establish a

waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity from suits

for damages and for failure to state a claim for which relief

could be granted. We hold that the plaintiffs have not shown

they are likely to be harmed in the future by the challenged

policies. They therefore lack standing to seek prospective

declaratoryand injunctive relief regarding those policies. We

further hold that the plaintiffs have failed to allege a

governmental waiver of sovereign immunity that would

confer jurisdiction in the district court over their monetary

claims. Finally, we hold that the United States Court of

Federal Claims has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims for

withheld back pay and insurance proceeds, and we direct the

district court to transfer those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 

We thus affirm in part and vacate in part and remand.

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MUNNS V. KERRY 5

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiffs Mark Munns, Christa Munns, Dennis

DeBrabander, Sharon DeBrabander and Lori Silveri are

family members of Joshua Munns, John Young and John

Cote, who were kidnapped and tragically killed in Iraq in

2008 while working for a private security firm, Crescent

Security (Crescent). Plaintiff Gary Bjorlin was formerly

employed by Crescent in Iraq and would like to return to that

country as a private security contractor.

In November 2006, while working for Crescent,

contractors Munns, Young and Cote were assigned to guard

a 46-truck convoy traveling from Kuwait to southern Iraq. 

The plaintiffs allege that on the day of the convoy, Crescent

issued the men substandard military equipment and ordered

other security team members not to accompany them on the

convoy, and that Iraqi security team members slated to join

the convoy failed to show up for work, leaving only seven

contractors to guard the convoy. When the convoy stopped

at an Iraqi police checkpoint, 10 armed men approached and,

along with the Iraqi police, took five of the contractors

captive, including Munns, Young and Cote. The men were

held for over a year, until their kidnappers brutally executed

them sometime in 2008.

The plaintiffs trace the contractors’ kidnappings and

murders to Crescent’s failure to adequately prepare and

supervise its personnel in Iraq. They allege Crescent’s

1 When reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss, we accept as

true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. See OSU Student Alliance v.

Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012). The assumed facts in this

opinion are based on the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint.

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6 MUNNS V. KERRY

deficient conduct was “officiallysanctioned” bythe Secretary

of State through an unlawful order issued by the Coalition

Provisional Authority (CPA) overseeing the U.S. occupation. 

CPA Order 17 allegedly gave “blanket immunity [to

contractors] from all prosecution,” granting them a “license

to kill” with impunity and permitting contractors to

“circumvent the authority of Congress, the Courts, and the

Constitution.”2 Additionally, the plaintiffs say they heard

rumors that CPA Order 17, and the consequent lawless

behavior of some security contractors, may have been the

motivation behind the kidnappings.

Plaintiff Bjorlin wants to know whether CPA Order 17, or

a similar policy, will be in effect if he returns to Iraq as a

security contractor, as he says he would like to do. He asserts

it is foreseeable that whatever employer he might contract

with will again make assurances about safe working

conditions, but that he cannot know if those assurances will

be honored because the U.S. government has previously

failed to hold its contractors legally accountable. He

contends that CPA Order 17’s alleged grant of blanket

immunity from prosecution exceeded the executive branch’s

constitutional authority. Accordingly, he asks the court to

declare CPA Order 17 unconstitutional and to permanently

enjoin the government from implementing it, or a similar

policy, in the future.

2 The government disputes that the order granted blanket immunity. 

Both parties agree that the text of the order itselfsuggests that it exempted

coalition contractors fromprosecution or civil suit in Iraqi courts only, and

not from the application of U.S. law. But the plaintiffs argue that the

practical effect of the order, as it was applied to contractors in Iraq, was

to exempt contractors from all legal accountability.

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MUNNS V. KERRY 7

The family members and Bjorlin together focus on the

government’s refusal to negotiate with terrorists for the

release of hostages, particularly as that policy blocks or

impedes private efforts to secure a hostage’s release. The

family members allege that officials in the State Department

prevented them from negotiating for the release of their

relatives, in violation of their First Amendment guarantees of

free speech and free assembly. Specifically, they allege that

officials told them they could not meet with a United States

citizen who had reportedly obtained information on the

location and condition of the captured men. They also allege

that the State Department blocked distribution of 90,000

flyers promising a reward for information about their missing

relatives that the families had sent to “the Middle East.”

The family members request a declaration that the

government cannot prohibit familymembersfromnegotiating

for the release of their captured relatives and an injunction

against government policies, such as those alleged above, that

violate their First Amendment rights. Plaintiff Bjorlin joins

the familymembers’ First Amendment claim. Contemplating

employment in Iraq again, Bjorlin asserts it is foreseeable that

he could be kidnapped and consequently injured by the

government’s policies impeding the efforts of family

members seeking to secure the release of their captured

relatives.

Finally, the family members claim that the government is

unlawfully withholding money that belongs to them as

survivors of their deceased contractor relatives, in violation

of the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth

Amendment. First, they allege that their relatives’ employer,

Crescent, owes them back pay for their relatives’ time in

captivity and life insurance proceeds that Crescent’s insurer

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8 MUNNS V. KERRY

paid to the company but were rightfully due family members

as beneficiaries. The family members state that Crescent

required them to sign releases of liability against the company

and its owner in order to receive a portion of the proceeds but

that some benefits are still being withheld.3 The plaintiffs

contend that the Secretary of State is “ultimately responsible

for its contractor’s nonpayment and retention of private

benefits.” Second, the family members claim entitlement to

benefits under three federally administered compensation

programs: theLongshore andHarborWorkers’ Compensation

Act, the Defense Base Act and the War Hazards

Compensation Act. However, nothing in the record indicates

that the plaintiffs sought these benefits directly from the

agency that administers the programs, the Department of

Labor.

The district court dismissed all claims against the

government with prejudice, ruling (1) the plaintiffs lacked

standing to pursue their policy claims for injunctive and

declaratory relief, (2) those claims raised nonjusticiable

political questions, (3) their monetary claims were barred by

sovereign immunity, and (4) they failed to state a claim under

the Takings Clause. The plaintiffs appeal. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.4

3

In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also made claims against

Lloyd’s of London and CNA Financial Corporation, Crescent’s insurers,

regarding the insurance proceeds. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed

those defendants in order to pursue this appeal.

4 Because “the record reveals no evidence of intent to manipulate our

appellate jurisdiction” through the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of the

private defendants in this case, the district court’s dismissal of the

government defendants is final and appealable under § 1291. Sneller v.

City of Bainbridge Island, 606 F.3d 636, 638 (9th Cir. 2010).

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MUNNS V. KERRY 9

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal without

leave to amend. See Oki Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo

Bank, 298 F.3d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

A. Standing to Seek Equitable Relief

Bjorlin and the familymembers contend theyhave Article

IIIstanding to seek declaratoryand injunctive relief regarding

the State Department’s policies governing the immunity of

security contractors and the handling of kidnappings in Iraq. 

We disagree. Because the plaintiffs cannot show they are

likely to be harmed by these alleged policies in the future, we

do not have the authority in this case to determine the legality

or constitutionality of the policies or to enjoin their

implementation.

“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of

federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Susan B.

Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014)

(quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). “The doctrine of standing

gives meaning to these constitutional limits by ‘identify[ing]

those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the

judicial process,’” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)), and

“serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to

usurp the powers of the political branches,” id. (quoting

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013)).

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show

(1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection

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between the injury and the conduct complained of and (3) a

likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision. See id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). The

principal issue in this case is whether the plaintiffs have

alleged an “injury in fact.” “An injury sufficient to satisfy

Article III must be ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual

or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 2341

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560) (some internal quotation

marks omitted). The party asserting the claim has the burden

of establishing standing. See id. at 2342.

1. Bjorlin

Bjorlin does not allege he has already been injured. 

Rather, he seeks prospective relief for an injury that might

occur to him in the future. He bases his threat of injury on

the experience of his former colleagues who were captured

and killed in Iraq, allegedly as a result of CPA Order 17 and

the State Department policies that impeded their family

members from seeking their release.

The Supreme Court has “repeatedly reiterated that

‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute

injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future

injury’ are not sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,

133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (alterations in original) (quoting

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). Rather

than requiring literal certainty, the Court has sometimes

framed the injury requirement as a “substantial risk” that the

harm will occur. Id. at 1150 n.5 (citing, inter alia, Monsanto

Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153 (2010)).

As the district court concluded, the threat of injury to

Bjorlin from CPA Order 17 is too speculative to constitute

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MUNNS V. KERRY 11

injury in fact. Even assuming that CPA Order 17 granted

blanket immunity to contractors and contributed to a lawless

atmosphere for security contractors in Iraq, Bjorlin

acknowledges that the order is no longer in effect, although

he speculates that it or a similar order could be reinstated in

the future.5 Moreover, even if he seeks such employment in

the future, Bjorlin may or may not be hired to provide private

security in Iraq. For Bjorlin to be injured in the future,

therefore, he would have to be hired and sent to Iraq to

perform security services again, the State Department would

have to reinstate CPA Order 17 or a similar policy, and that

policy would have to cause injury to Bjorlin in one of the

ways he fears: by creating a lawless atmosphere that

encourages his contractor employer to improperly provide for

his safety, which then leads to his kidnapping, or by

motivating an individual to kidnap him. The chain of events

that must occur for Bjorlin to be injured by the nowinoperative Order 17 is on its face much too attenuated for the

threatened injury to be certainly impending or to present a

substantial risk of its occurrence. See City of Los Angeles v.

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108–09 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff

who had been subjected to an illegal chokehold by police did

not have standing to pursue a prospective injunction against

the use of chokeholds because it was too speculative that he

would be stopped and illegally choked again). Moreover,

Bjorlin has not alleged facts supporting his speculation that

CPA Order 17 (or its equivalent) would likely be reinstated.

5 As noted earlier, supra n.2, the government disputes that the order

granted blanket immunity. Because the plaintiffs’ lack of standing

deprives this court of jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims regarding the

order, we do not resolve the parties’ dispute over the effect of the order.

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12 MUNNS V. KERRY

Bjorlin alternatively argues that the government’s earlier

implementation of CPA Order 17, coupled with the

government’s ongoing assertion that the policy was legal,

make him uncertain as to what policies the government will

implement if he returns to Iraq as a security contractor. This

uncertainty, he contends, constitutes an injury in fact because

it deters him from seeking work in a field of employment that

may subject him to a policy he believes is illegal. The

Supreme Court rejected an analogous theory of injury in

Clapper, in which the plaintiffs argued that their subjective

fear of future violations of their rights deterred them from

certain activities in the present. See 133 S. Ct. at 1151–53. 

Acknowledging that, in some circumstances, a similar

“chilling effect” can constitute a cognizable injury, the Court

nonetheless drew the line at situations in which the chilling

effect was based on a plaintiff’s fear of future injury that

itself was too speculative to confer standing. See id. at 1152. 

The Court reasoned, “allowing [the plaintiffs] to bring this

action based on costs they incurred in response to a

speculative threat would be tantamount to accepting a

repackaged version of [their] first failed theory of standing.” 

Id. at 1151. Here too, Bjorlin’s alternative theory of injury

fails because his deterrence from seeking employment is

ultimately based on his fear of an injury that we have already

determined is too speculative to confer standing. Cf. Drake

v. Obama, 664 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding a

military service member’s injury was “entirely speculative”

when it was based on his fear of being penalized for obeying

an order from the President that he believed would be

unconstitutional).

Like his allegations regarding CPA Order 17, Bjorlin’s

allegations of the threat of injury from the government’s

hostage response policies are too speculative and abstract to

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MUNNS V. KERRY 13

constitute injury in fact. Bjorlin alleges only that he will

“likely be employed as a contractor in the region in the

immediate future,” and that he “may be kidnapped” and

thereafter injured by the U.S. government’s policies that

impede the efforts of private citizens to secure the release of

their captured relatives. First, he alleges no concrete plans to

return, only an abstract “wish[]” to do so. Even if he seeks a

position in private security in Iraq, he may not obtain one. 

His “some day” hope to return to Iraq is not the sort of

specific planning that the Supreme Court has held is required

to demonstrate that a future injury is sufficiently imminent for

a federal court to address it prospectively. See Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). Second,

even if Bjorlin’s plans to return to Iraq were otherwise

sufficientlyconcrete, his likelihood of being kidnapped would

still be speculative. His supposed risks of injury are at least

as speculative as Lyons’ claim that he was likely to

experience an illegal police chokehold again. See Lyons,

461 U.S. at 108 (“We cannot agree that the ‘odds’ that Lyons

would not only again be stopped for a traffic violation but

would also be subjected to a chokehold without any

provocation whatsoever are sufficient to make out a federal

case for equitable relief.” (citation omitted)). The same is

true of Bjorlin’s likelihood of being injured by the

government’s hostage response policies. The chain of events

leading to injury from these policies is simply too

hypothetical and attenuated to constitute injury in fact. As

the district court summed up:

What Mr. Bjorlin really seeks, then, is a

declaration of his rights, if he elects to serve

again, if he is hired by a contractor, if he is

shipped overseas, if CPA Order 17 is still in

effect or if another similar order instead

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governs, and, with respect to the kidnapping

declaration, if he is kidnapped, and if he is

then held hostage. Based on this logic, almost

any American even contemplating serving

overseas could make roughly the same

argument.

As with his claims regarding CPA Order 17, Bjorlin

alternatively argues that his uncertainty about how the

government will respond if he were to be taken hostage is

itself an injury because that uncertainty deters him from

seeking employment as a contractor. Because Bjorlin’s

feeling of deterrence is based on a fear of speculative future

injury, this theory of injury fails. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at

1152–53.6

In sum, Bjorlin does not allege a sufficient likelihood of

injury resulting from CPA Order 17 or the government’s

hostage response policy, nor is there any probability he could,

given the many inherent contingencies. Therefore, he does

not have standing to seek prospective declaratory and

injunctive relief regarding those policies.

2. Family Members

Plaintiff family members challenge only the hostage

response policies. Unlike Bjorlin, the family members assert

that these policies infringed on their First Amendment rights

in the past. But rather than seeking retrospective relief for

6 We do not suggest that other persons claiming injury from the

government’s alleged hostage response policy in different circumstances

would be unable to allege sufficient facts to establish Article III injury. 

See infra note 7.

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MUNNS V. KERRY 15

past wrongs, like Bjorlin they ask the court to declare these

policies unlawful and to enjoin their future implementation. 

They too lack standing because they have not alleged how the

challenged policies are likely to affect them in the future.

“Past exposure to harmful or illegal conduct does not

necessarily confer standing to seek injunctive relief if the

plaintiff does not continue to suffer adverse effects. Nor does

speculation or ‘subjective apprehension’ about future harm

support standing.” Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964,

970 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, and

quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000)). “Once a plaintiff has

been wronged, he is entitled to injunctive relief only if he can

show that he faces a ‘real or immediate threat . . . that he will

again be wronged in a similar way.’” Id. (omission in

original) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111). Despite being

harmed in the past, the family members must still show that

the threat of injury in the future is “certainly impending” or

that it presents a “substantial risk” of recurrence for the court

to hear their claim for prospective relief. Clapper, 133 S. Ct.

at 1147, 1150 n.5.

The family members have not alleged any facts

demonstrating that they are likely to be reinjured by the

hostage response policies. At oral argument, plaintiffs’

counsel asserted for the first time that the family members

might again seek to communicate within Iraq to determine

who was responsible for the kidnapping and killing of their

relatives. If so, counsel maintained, the government’s past

impediments to their private efforts during a hostage event

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16 MUNNS V. KERRY

will once again be applied to them.7 This argument is waived

because it was never presented to the district court below. 

See AlohaCare v. Hawaii, Dep’t of Human Servs., 572 F.3d

740, 745 (9th Cir. 2009). In any event, this new assertion still

would not demonstrate the likelihood of injury required for

prospective relief. The family members’ statement that they

might seek to communicate in Iraq to determine who killed

their relatives, coupled with the fact that it is unclear how

hostage response policies would even apply to an inquiry

after the hostage event has concluded, make this claim too

speculative to constitute injury in fact. See Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 564.

* * *

We hold that the district court properly dismissed the

plaintiffs’ policy claims for lack of standing. We therefore do

not address the political question doctrine as an alternative

basis for dismissing these claims.

7 At oral argument, the government represented that there are no State

Department policies preventing private individuals frommaking efforts to

secure the release of relatives who are kidnapped abroad, citing the

Foreign Affairs Manual. That manual outlines the U.S. government’s

policies regarding communicating and coordinating with families of

hostages or kidnapping victims. See Hostage Taking and Kidnappings,

7 U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual 1820. It states that,

in the event a U.S. private citizen seeks the release of their relatives

through the payment of ransom or through any other means that deviate

from U.S. government policy, the government will limit its participation

and cooperation. See id. at 2. But see Rukmini Callimachi, The Cost of

the U.S. Ban on Paying for Hostages, N.Y. Times (Dec. 27, 2014)

(reporting that at least one woman seeking the release of her kidnapped

son was told by U.S. officials that she could be prosecuted for paying a

ransom to her son’s captors).

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MUNNS V. KERRY 17

B. Jurisdiction over Monetary Claims

The district court dismissed the plaintiff familymembers’

due process and Takings Clause claims for their relatives’

back pay, unpaid insurance proceeds and withheld federal

benefits for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure

to state a claim for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (b)(6). 

As an initial matter, we note that if the district court had no

jurisdiction over the claims, its determination that the claims

failed on their merits was a “nullity.” Orff v. United States,

358 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2004). So we address

jurisdiction first. We conclude that the plaintiffs have not

alleged a waiver of sovereign immunity that would confer

subject matter jurisdiction on the district court.

“Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, courts have no

subject matter jurisdiction over cases against the [federal]

government.” Kaiser v. Blue Cross of Cal., 347 F.3d 1107,

1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Mitchell,

463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)). “[A]ny waiver ‘must be

unequivocally expressed in statutory text . . . and will not be

implied.’” Ordonez v. United States, 680 F.3d 1135, 1138

(9th Cir. 2012) (omission in original) (quoting Lane v. Pena,

518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)).

The familymembers contend that the Federal Tort Claims

Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2674, waives sovereign immunity

for their claims. However, they have missed a crucial first

step. The FTCA requires, as a prerequisite for federal court

jurisdiction, that a claimant first provide written notification

of the incident giving rise to the injury, accompanied by a

claim for money damages to the federal agency responsible

for the injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b);

Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1442 (9th Cir. 1983)

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(“Exhaustion of the claims procedures established under the

Act is a prerequisite to district court jurisdiction.”). The

plaintiffs have not alleged or provided evidence that they

have exhausted their administrative remedies under the

FTCA, so they cannot rely on that statute’s waiver of

sovereign immunity for jurisdiction.

Alternatively, the plaintiffs cite two other federal statutes

for waiver of sovereign immunity: 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)

and § 1391(e). Section 1343(a)(3) is a general jurisdiction

statute that “does not waive sovereign immunity.” Jachetta

v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 908 (9th Cir. 2011). Section

1391(e) provides nationwide venue in the district courts for

mandamus actions against federal officials, but does not

waive sovereign immunity for suits for damages. See

Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 542 (1980); Gilbert v.

DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1985).

Next, the plaintiffs argue that the district court has

jurisdiction over their federal benefits claims because the

United States has waived its sovereign immunity under the

three federal statutes at issue: the Longshore and Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), the Defense Base

Act (DBA) and the War Hazards Compensation Act

(WHCA). District courts do not have jurisdiction over claims

under the LHWCA, which must first be heard by the

Department of Labor, whose determinations may later be

appealed to the federal courts of appeals. See 33 U.S.C.

§§ 913(a), 921(c); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dir., Office of

Workers’ Comp. Programs, 519 U.S. 248, 262 (1997). The

DBA incorporates the “protections and procedures” of the

LHWCA, which include the requirement to file a claim with

the Department of Labor before seeking judicial review. 

Pearce v. Dir., OWCP, 603 F.2d 763, 765, 770–71 (9th Cir.

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1979); see also Serv. Empls. Int’l, Inc. v. Dir., OWCP,

595 F.3d 447, 452–54 (2d Cir. 2010). Claims under the

WHCA may be heard only through the Department of

Labor’s administrative process and are “not subject to review

. . . by any court by mandamus or otherwise.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1715.

Although this court does not have jurisdiction over the

federal benefit program claims, nothing in this opinion

precludes the family member plaintiffs from seeking relief

under these federal statutes through the proper administrative

procedures. As the government has represented to the court,

“no statute of limitations would prevent filing a new

administrative claim at this time.” Appellees’ Supp. Br. 15.

The only possible waivers of sovereign immunity that the

plaintiffs allege involve the Due Process and Takings Clauses

of the Fifth Amendment. But these provisions are not general

waivers of sovereign immunity and do not establish

jurisdiction in the district courts over monetary claims such

as those brought by the plaintiffs. Absent an independent

waiver of sovereign immunity, due process and takings

claims against the federal government in excess of $10,000,

such as the family members’ claims, fall under the exclusive

jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims

under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. See McGuire v.

United States, 550 F.3d 903, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2008). The

district court correctly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over

the family members’ monetary claims.

C. Transfer

The family members request that their claims be

transferred to the Court of Federal Claims if this court lacks

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jurisdiction. If we lack jurisdiction over a civil action,

28 U.S.C. § 1631 directs us to transfer a case if (1) the court

to which the action is to be transferred would have had

jurisdiction “at the time [the action] was filed,” and (2) “it is

in the interest of justice” to transfer. See also Clark v. Busey,

959 F.2d 808, 812 (9th Cir. 1992).8 As discussed above, the

due process and takings claims are the plaintiffs’ only

monetary claims for which sovereign immunity has

potentially been waived, and the Tucker Act provides

jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims for such claims. 

See McGuire, 550 F.3d at 910–11.

The government nonetheless argues that the Court of

Federal Claims has no jurisdiction over the due process claim

because it is not a “money-mandating” provision. This

argument goes too far. “The Court of Federal Claims

ordinarily lacks jurisdiction over due process claims under

the Tucker Act, but has been held to have jurisdiction over

illegal exaction claims ‘when the exaction is based upon an

asserted statutory power.’” Norman v. United States,

429 F.3d 1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted)

(quoting Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d

1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “An illegal exaction involves

a deprivation of property without due process of law,” id.,

which is exactly what the plaintiffs allege. But “[t]o invoke

Tucker Act jurisdiction over an illegal exaction claim, a

claimant must demonstrate that the statute or provision

causing the exaction itself provides, either expressly or by

‘necessary implication,’ that ‘the remedy for its violation

8 Although the plaintiffs did not move for transfer in the district court,

we have held that such a motion is not required because § 1631 mandates

that a court “shall” transfer if the necessary conditions are met. See Hays

v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 868 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1989).

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entails a return of money unlawfully exacted.’” Id. (quoting

Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United States, 205 F.3d 1369, 1373

(Fed. Cir. 2000)). The family members have alleged an

exaction. Although they have not identified in their

complaint a statutory power upon which the alleged exaction

was based, we are not in a position to determine whether the

complaint could be amended to satisfy this jurisdictional

prerequisite. That determination is best left to the Court of

Federal Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction over Tucker

Act claims such as this. See McGuire, 550 F.3d at 910–11.

The government contends the takings claims cannot be

transferred because they are not colorable claims. To

establish jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, however, “the

Court of Federal Claims asks only whether the plaintiff is

within the class of plaintiffs entitled to recover under the

[provision] if the elements of a cause of action are

established.” Greenlee Cnty. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871,

876 (Fed. Cir. 2007). This jurisdictional inquiry goes only so

far as to determine whether the provision being invoked is a

“money-mandating” source of authority, not whether the

plaintiffs’ claims for relief have any merit. Jan’s Helicopter

Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see

also In re United States, 463 F.3d 1328, 1335 (Fed. Cir.

2006) (holding that jurisdiction was satisfied because the

statute invoked was money-mandating, even though it was

“clear from the face of [the] complaint that [the plaintiff did]

not come within the reach of [the statute]”). Because the

Takings Clause is a money-mandating provision, which

would entitle the plaintiff family members to relief if they

establish that the government deprived them of property to

which they were entitled without just compensation, see

McGuire, 550 F.3d at 911, the Court of Federal Claims would

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have jurisdiction over their takings claims if they had been

originally brought there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

Even if the Court of Federal Claims would have

jurisdiction over the due process and takings claims, we still

must determine whether it would be “in the interest of

justice” to transfer. Id. We ordinarily find transfer to be in

the interest of justice where, as here, the plaintiffs appear to

have been “unaware of or confused about the proper forum in

which to file [their] action.” Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d

1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006). We therefore direct the district

court, on remand, to transfer the due process and takings

claims to the Court of Federal Claims.9

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’

equitable claims due to lack of standing and their federal

benefits claims due to lack of jurisdiction. We vacate

dismissal of the due process and takings claims for withheld

back pay and insurance proceeds. Pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 21, we direct the district court to sever the

due process and takings claims from the remainder of the

case, and to transfer them the Court of Federal Claims. See

FDIC v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 222 (10th Cir. 1996)

9 Admittedly, the plaintiffs’ allegations that the federal government is

directly responsible for the withholding of insurance proceeds and back

pay are quite spare. But we leave such issues to the court with jurisdiction

over the claims.

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(indicating that the district court should sever the claims

under Rule 21 before transferring only part of the initial

action). Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND

REMANDED.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join fully in Judge Fisher’s opinion for the court. 

Although it answers every legal issue presented to us

correctly, I would like to emphasize a few points, mainly to

make certain that it is clear that it would not be appropriate

for us to resolve in this case any questions regarding the

proper policies for our government to follow with respect to

the role of contractors in Iraq. Nor, more important, would it

be appropriate for us to determine here how the government,

or the families of hostages, should deal with any terrorist

group or other foreign entities who may hold captive relatives

of citizens of the United States.

As to the former issue, it is agreed that the Order issued

by the Coalition Provisional Authority governing contractors

in Iraq is no longer in effect; nor is there any indication that

it will be reinstated by the Coalition or by our government in

the future. Under these circumstances, the one plaintiff who

tells us that he may someday want to work for a contractor in

Iraq has no legal basis for requesting us to rule on a nonexistent government policy. Neither Mr. Bjorlin nor we have

any idea what our policymay be as to government contractors

if and when he ever decides to return to Iraq and is again

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employed there. Under our longstanding rules, courts simply

do not answer hypothetical questions of this kind.

The more troubling and painful question is what the role

of our government should be if and when terrorist groups like

ISIS or Al Queda capture an American citizen and hold him

hostage, and whether the government may, or should, impose

any limitation on the rights of the citizen’s family or friends

to communicate with that group or pay a ransom. It is

significant that the government has told this court that

currently there are no policies preventing private individuals

from making efforts to secure the release of relatives who are

held captive abroad. More important however from the

standpoint of the legal rules that govern us, the parties

bringing the action – relatives of contractors’ employees

“brutally killed,” as Judge Fisher puts it, in the Middle East

– seek no damages resulting from that policy but simply seek

to have the policy declared unlawful. They ask that the

government be enjoined from implementing the policy in the

future. Again, even assuming that contrary to what the

government tells us, such a policy exists, we cannot under

well established legal rules render a decision that will be of

no immediate benefit to the individuals bringing the lawsuit. 

Because the plaintiffs have no relatives currently in the

Middle East, or currently in greater danger from terrorist

groups than any of the rest of us, we again face only a

hypothetical question – the kind that courts do not answer.1

1

I do not preclude the possibility that under other circumstances, a court

might find it necessary to consider the constitutionality ofrules bearing on

the subject at issue here. This is not that case, however, and further

speculation on this point would be just that – speculation.

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MUNNS V. KERRY 25

For theses reasons, we do not consider the wisdom, let

alone the existence or the legality, of any government policy

regarding how to deal with any terrorist groups that may in

the future hold American citizens captive. That is a question

that, for now at least, is best left to the American people.2

2

Judge Fisher has correctly ordered that the claims for back pay, life

insurance proceeds and government benefits filed by relatives of the

murdered contractors be transferred to the Court of Claims. They are

properly resolved by that court, not ours.

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