Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04039/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04039-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

 Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22), Plaintiff’s Response 

(Doc. 25), and Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 26). For the following reasons, the motion will be 

granted. 

I. Background1

A. Factual Background 

On March 24, 2018, Plaintiff Alison York (“Plaintiff”) went to the drive-through 

window at the Peoria, Arizona branch location of Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank 

(“Chase”). (Doc. 1 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff and Chase were parties to a Deposit Account Agreement 

(the “Agreement”), which is the governing contract in this case.

2

 (Doc. 22-2.) Plaintiff, an 

 

1

 The following facts are drawn in the Plaintiff’s favor. 

2

 Because this claim relies on the existence of a contract, and Plaintiff does not 

dispute the authenticity of the Deposit Account Agreement, the Court will consider the 

agreement to be incorporated by reference into the Complaint. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 

F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (extending “incorporation by reference” doctrine to 

instances where “plaintiff’s claim depends on the contents of a document, the defendant 

attaches the document to its motion to dismiss, and the parties do not dispute the 

authenticity of the document”). 

In addition to the Agreement, Plaintiff’s Response alleges that Defendants’ Motion 

Alison York, 

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, National 

Association, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

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)

No. CV-18-04039-PHX-SPL 

ORDER 

 

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African-American woman who was “dressed in her dress that she does not wear in public 

and with her hair covered in an African-style head wrap” at the time of this interaction, 

wanted to make credit card payments and to withdraw $1800 in cash. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 12.) 

Plaintiff gave Defendant Karen Anliker (“Anliker”), the branch’s head teller, Plaintiff’s 

Chase Slate credit card, her Arizona driver’s license, and a withdrawal slip with both her 

mailing and billing addresses. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 13−14.) Anliker asked Plaintiff what she wanted 

to do, and Plaintiff replied, “I would like to make payments to my [two] accounts and 

[make] a withdrawal.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 12, 14.) Anliker then left the drive-through window, and 

after Plaintiff waited about twenty minutes, Defendant Cullen Keller (“Keller”), the acting 

branch manager, asked Plaintiff to come inside to verify her identity. (Doc. 1 ¶ 14.) 

Inside the branch, Keller ushered Plaintiff over to his desk and asked Plaintiff what 

she wanted to do. (Doc. 1 ¶ 15.) Plaintiff provided Keller with her driver’s license and 

Chase Slate credit card and told Keller she wanted to make payments on her credit cards 

and take out $1800 in cash. (Doc. 1 ¶ 15.) Keller informed Plaintiff of the amounts due on 

her two credit cards (a Freedom card and the Slate card) and proceeded to make the 

payments for Plaintiff by transferring money from her checking account to her credit cards. 

(Doc. 1 ¶ 15.) Because Keller told Plaintiff that she would need to see a teller for the cash 

withdrawal, Plaintiff “walked up to [Anliker] and asked for the $1800 withdrawal.” (Doc. 

1 ¶ 16.) At some point during their encounter, Anliker told Plaintiff that “[she] ha[d] never 

seen [Plaintiff] at this branch before.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 16.) Having still not received her money, 

Plaintiff returned to Keller, who printed Plaintiff’s signature card and brought it back to 

Anliker. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 16−17.) Despite now having Plaintiff’s signature card, which Keller 

had verified matched Plaintiff’s signature on her driver’s license, Anliker repeatedly told 

 

to Dismiss offers facts extrinsic to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 25 at 3−4.) However, 

regardless of whether the facts can be properly inferred from the Complaint, the Court is 

not considering the allegedly extrinsic facts. Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss need 

not be treated as a motion for summary judgment. See Keams v. Tempe Tech. Inst., 110 

F.3d 44, 46 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[A] 12(b)(6) motion need not be converted into a 

motion for summary judgment when matters outside the pleading are introduced, provided 

that ‘nothing in the record suggests reliance’ on those extraneous materials.”) (citation 

omitted). 

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Plaintiff that “she did not feel comfortable” giving Plaintiff her money and that she “had 

the right to refuse service.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 16−17.) Anliker also told Keller, while Plaintiff was 

standing at the teller station, that Plaintiff needed to “go to another branch.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 17.) 

During this interaction, Plaintiff accidentally knocked something off the counter, and 

Anliker raised her voice at Plaintiff and accused her of throwing things. (Doc. 1 ¶ 17.) 

Plaintiff and Keller returned to Keller’s desk, and he apologized for Anliker’s 

behavior. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 18−19.) He told Plaintiff that, though he wanted to help her, he could 

not override Anliker’s decision. (Doc. 1 ¶ 19.) He did inform Plaintiff, however, that 

Anliker would never treat a customer in that manner again. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 18−19.) Keller told 

Plaintiff that she “did not know how many people came into the bank with fraud and that 

that someone had just stolen $4,500 from the Bank.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 18−19.) He printed a copy 

of Plaintiff’s driver’s license and a “verification guide” for Plaintiff but informed her that 

company policy forbade her from having a copy of her signature card, which Plaintiff 

alleges was a lie. (Doc. 1 ¶ 18.) Keller then told Plaintiff to return to Anliker, who, at that 

point, completed Plaintiff’s $1800 withdrawal. (Doc. 1 ¶ 20.) Plaintiff told Anliker that she 

was “completely out of line” and that “all [Anliker] had to do was go and look into the 

computer” to verify her identity. (Doc. 1 ¶ 20.) Anliker responded that Plaintiff’s 

information was “not in the computer,” which Plaintiff alleges was another lie. (Doc. 1 

¶ 20.) By the end of the interaction, Plaintiff had spent more than an hour at the bank. (Doc. 

1 ¶ 20.) 

B. Procedural Background 

On November 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendants for racial 

discrimination under 42 U.S.C. section 1981 and A.R.S. section 41-1442, conversion, and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). (Doc. 1.) On January 4, 2019, 

Defendants filed this Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 22.) On January 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed 

her Response.3

 (Doc. 25.) On January 29, 2019, Defendants filed their Reply. (Doc. 26.) 

 

3

 The Court acknowledges Defendants’ argument as to the untimeliness of 

Plaintiff’s Response. (Doc. 26 at 1.) However, the Court declines to strike Plaintiff’s 

Response and will address the motion on its merits. 

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II. Legal Standard 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” such 

that the defendant is given “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which 

it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2)); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). In reviewing a complaint for failure

to state a claim, the Court must “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact, 

and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Daniels-Hall v. 

Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & 

Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031−32 (9th Cir. 2008)). In comparison, “allegations that 

are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences” are not 

entitled to the assumption of truth, id., and “are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim.” In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citation omitted). Likewise, the court need not accept legal conclusions as true. Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

 Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.

Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility requires more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that 

are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between 

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) for two 

reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory and (2) insufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory. See Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 

(9th Cir. 2008) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990)). 

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III. Analysis 

A. Discrimination in the making of a contract 

The Civil Rights Act protects the rights of racial minorities to, among other things, 

“make and enforce contracts,” defined by the statute as “the making, performance, 

modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, 

terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). When racial 

discrimination impairs a contract, section 1981 entitles a plaintiff who has rights under the 

contract to relief. Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). “In order 

to evaluate claims of intentional discrimination where intent itself is generally impossible 

to prove, [the courts in this Circuit] appl[y] the McDonnell burden-shifting framework,” 

which requires that a plaintiff first establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 

Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973)). To establish a prima facie section 

1981 claim, the plaintiff must show that “(1) [she] is a member of a protected class, 

(2) [she] attempted to contract for certain services, (3) [she] was denied the right to contract 

for those services, and (4) such services remained available to similarly-situated 

individuals who were not members of the plaintiff’s protected class.” Childs v. Boyd 

Gaming Corp., No. 2-18-CV-00316-GMN-VCF, 2018 WL 4333945, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 

11, 2018) (internal quotations omitted).4

 Moreover, the plaintiff must plausibly show the 

defendant’s discrimination was intentional. Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 

1989); see also Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania., 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). 

There is no dispute that the first element is met. Plaintiff is African-American. There 

also appears to be no dispute over the second element. The alleged discrimination 

 

4

 Some courts have used a different standard for section 1981 claims, finding that the statute is violated if: “(1) plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff because of his or her race; and (3) the discrimination involved the making or enforcing of a contract.” Allen v. U.S. Bancorp, 264 

F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (D. Or. 2003). However, the Court finds that the greater weight of Ninth Circuit authority supports the use of elements stated in Childs v. Boyd Gaming Corp., No. 2-18-CV-00316-GMN-VCF, 2018 WL 4333945, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 11, 2018). See 

Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1144−45 (9th Cir. 2006). 

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concerned the banking contract between the parties. Thus, the Court will focus on whether 

Plaintiff has satisfied the third element of denial of the right to contract and the fourth 

element of whether Chase’s services remained available to similarly-situated individuals 

who were not African-American. The Court will also address whether the alleged 

discrimination was intentional. 

Denial of the Right to Contract. To meet the third element of a section 1981 claim, 

the alleged discrimination must result in the actual loss of a contract interest. Jeffery v. 

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2000). In other words, the 

statute is not violated if a plaintiff is not deprived of the right to make and enforce a 

contract. Id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants interfered with her contractual rights because 

Defendants “thwarted [Plaintiff’s] right to make a contract.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 25.) She further 

argues that she “made a contract for the Bank to keep her money on deposit to be withdrawn 

at her request.” (Doc. 25 at 5.) Under the terms of the Agreement between Plaintiff and 

Chase, Chase retained the right to require identification it deemed acceptable before 

allowing a withdrawal; to place reasonable restrictions on large cash withdrawals; and to 

refuse a transaction if it suspected fraud. (Doc. 22-2 at 7, 8, 17.) 

Courts have repeatedly held that there is no actual loss of a contract interest if a 

customer is ultimately served, even if there is a delay based on racial discrimination. For 

example, in Lopez v. Target Corp., a Hispanic plaintiff alleged that a Caucasian cashier 

twice told him that her checkout line was closed to him, then continued to help Caucasian 

customers while making rude comments and gestures towards him. 676 F.3d 1230, 

1231−32 (11th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff was eventually able to complete his purchase with 

a different cashier. Id. at 1232. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that the plaintiff had failed 

to state a claim under section 1981. Id. at 1234. The court reasoned that, even if he was 

delayed and mistreated based on his race, the plaintiff was able to complete his transaction 

at the same store at the same price using the same methods as other customers. Id. Thus, 

he was not denied the ability to make or enforce a contract nor had he suffered an actual 

loss of a contract interest. Id. at 1234; see also Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355 (5th 

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Cir. 2003) (affirming that a Hispanic plaintiff could not establish interference with an 

actual contract interest when she was required to show identification in order to use her 

credit card to make a purchase because she received all she was entitled to under the retail 

contract); Jeffery, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (granting summary judgment 

to the defendant when a cashier asked to search the African-American plaintiff’s bag prior 

to completing his transaction because “claims of delayed service do not rise to the level of 

interference with a contract sufficient to grant relief under [section] 1981”). Likewise, here, 

Plaintiff suffered no actual loss of a contract interest. Although she alleges delay and 

mistreatment due to her race, she ultimately received all that she was entitled to under her 

contractual relationship with Chase. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint 

fails to plausibly satisfy the third element of a section 1981 claim. 

Similarly-Situated Individuals. The fourth element of a section 1981 claim requires 

a showing that the services for which the plaintiff attempted to contract remained available 

to those who were not members of the plaintiff’s protected class. Childs, 2018 WL 

4333945, at *4. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Caucasian customers were not subjected to the 

same treatment Plaintiff encountered while she was at the bank. (Doc. 1 ¶ 21.) Though this 

statement is conclusory on its own, other courts have found this allegation sufficient in the 

discrimination context when other facts support the plausible inference that such other 

individuals were not treated similarly. See Nganje v. CVS Rx Servs., 13-CV-2327-HRH, 

2014 WL 545354, at *7−8 (D. Ariz. 2014). Such is the case here. Plaintiff alleges that the 

bank was full of other customers. (Doc. 1 ¶ 17.) Moreover, Defendant concedes that there 

were many customers in the bank but incorrectly argues that “Plaintiff’s Complaint 

concedes that ... there was only one Teller on duty.” (Doc. 22 at 2.) Plaintiff’s Complaint 

does not so allege. Even if the Court were to consider this fact, however, it would actually 

support the inference here. Thus, the Court finds that it is plausible that other non-AfricanAmerican similarly-situated individuals at the bank that day were not subjected to this type 

of treatment for a cash withdrawal. Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled this element. 

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Intentional Discrimination. In addition to the elements above, the Ninth Circuit 

requires a section 1981 plaintiff to show intentional discrimination by the defendant. Evans 

v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff is an African-American 

woman who was wearing an African-style headwrap. Plaintiff provided her valid driver’s 

license and both her mailing and billing addresses, in person, at the drive-through window, 

along with her Chase Slate credit card. Though offering such identification, she followed 

Keller’s instructions and went into the bank, where, eventually, her signature card—which 

matched her driver’s license signature—was provided to Anliker from Keller, the branch 

manager. Moreover, Keller told Plaintiff the amounts due on her two credit cards and 

proceeded to make her two credit card payments. Further, whether Plaintiff provided both 

her billing and mailing addresses does not require or even more plausibly insinuate that her 

identity should have been questioned. Indeed, she provided her Chase Slate credit card, 

which requires a billing address. In fact, it is arguably more plausible to infer that Plaintiff 

was providing an abundance of identifying information. But, regardless, this argument goes 

to the merits of this case. In sum, it is unclear to the Court what additional identification 

Defendants wanted from Plaintiff or on what grounds they may have suspected fraud. 

Indeed, Plaintiff provided many forms of identification. Additionally, as the events 

unfolded, Anliker treated Plaintiff rudely. Plaintiff also alleges that Caucasian customers 

were not treated in the same manner while Plaintiff was at the bank. Taking these facts 

together, the Court can plausibly infer that Defendants intentionally discriminated against 

Plaintiff due to her race. 

Accordingly, though Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged element four and Defendant’s 

intent, she ultimately fails to state a claim for relief under section 1981 because she has not 

shown that she was denied any actual loss of a contract interest. 

B. Discrimination in a place of public accommodation 

Under the Arizona Civil Rights Act: 

“No person, directly or indirectly, shall refuse to, withhold from or deny to 

any person, nor aid in or incite the refusal to deny or withhold, 

accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof because of race 

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. . . nor shall distinction be made with respect to any person based on race . . . 

in connection with the price or quality of any item, goods or services offered 

by or at any place of public accommodation.” 

A.R.S. § 41-1442(B). “Places of public accommodation” include “all establishments which 

cater or offer their services . . . to or solicit patronage from members of the general public.” 

A.R.S. § 41-1441. Though there is minimal case law construing this statute, Arizona courts 

have previously held that the requisite standard for discrimination under the statute is the 

same as that of section 1981, Lopez v. Cheesecake Factory, 2016 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 654, 

at *6 (Super. Ct. Ariz. Jan. 26, 2016),5

 and that a delay in service does not violate the 

statute, Lopez v. Lowe’s HIW Inc., 2012 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 387, at *5 (Super. Ct. Ariz. 

Oct. 3, 2012). In Lopez v. Lowe’s, a Hispanic plaintiff alleged that while he was waiting in 

line to buy supplies, an employee helped white customers first and told another employee 

to do the same. Id., at *1. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim under A.R.S. section 41-1442(B) because the statute prohibits refusal and 

denial of service, but not delay. Id., at *5. Following that holding, Plaintiff’s claim fails on 

the same grounds. 

 Furthermore, A.R.S. section 41-1442, the Arizona Civil Rights Act, is very similar 

to 42 U.S.C. section 2000a, the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. In construing other 

sections of the Arizona Civil Rights Act that are analogous to sections of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, Arizona courts have found the federal courts’ construction of the federal 

statute persuasive. Civil Rights Div. of Ariz. Dep’t of Law v. Superior Court In and For 

Pima Cty., 706 P.2d 745, 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Ariz. Civil Rights Div., Dep’t of Law 

v. Olson, 643 P.2d 723, 727 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). To succeed on a claim under 42 

U.S.C. section 2000a, a plaintiff must show that she: 

 

5

 Plaintiff cites Lopez v. Cheesecake Factory for the proposition that a section 1981 claim and a claim under A.R.S. section 41-1442(B) are proven identically. (Doc. 25 at 3.) This is incorrect. Rather, Lopez v. Cheesecake Factory says that the discrimination 

elements of the claims are proven identically. 2016 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 654, at *6 (Super. Ct. Ariz. Jan. 26, 2016). 

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“(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) attempted to exercise the right to 

full benefits and enjoyment of a place of public accommodations; (3) was 

denied those benefits and enjoyment; and (4) was treated less favorably than 

similarly situated persons who are not members of the protected class.” 

Brown v. Luxor Hotel & Casino, 2014 WL 2858488, at *2 (D. Nev. June 23, 2014) (citing 

United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 894 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1990)). Because the 

federal courts’ construction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been persuasive to the 

Arizona courts in the past and these elements are consistent with the Arizona courts’ 

limited analysis of A.R.S. section 41-1442, the Court finds these elements persuasive in 

the instant case.6

 Like the section 1981 claim, the first and second elements are not disputed for this 

claim. Additionally, because the discrimination element is proven identically to the section 

1981 claim, the fourth element is met. As to the third element, federal courts have reached 

the same finding as the Lopez v. Lowe’s court, requiring a plaintiff to show a denial of 

service rather than a delay in order to state a claim under section 2000a. Jeffery, 90 F. Supp. 

2d at 1070. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 

A.R.S. section 41-1442(B). 

C. Common law conversion 

Arizona defines conversion as “an intentional exercise of dominion or control over 

a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor 

may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.” Universal Mktg. & 

Entm’t v. Bank One of Ariz., N.A., 53 P.3d 191, 193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1) (1965)). To succeed on a conversion claim, a 

plaintiff must have had “the right to immediate possession of the chattel at the time of the 

alleged conversion.” Sears Consumer Fin. Corp. v. Thunderbird Prods., 802 P.2d 1032, 

1034 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). Generally, a bank and a depositor have a debtor-creditor 

 

6

 Although the Court uses the elements of a section 2000a claim to analyze Plaintiff’s claim under A.R.S. section 41-1442(B), Plaintiff has not asserted a section 

2000a claim. 

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relationship, meaning the bank has the right to possess deposited money and the depositor 

cannot claim conversion. In re Cent. Bank, 205 P. 915, 917 (Ariz. 1922); Sports Imaging 

of Ariz., L.L.C. v. 1993 CKC Tr., 2008 WL 4448063, at *15 n.23 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 

2008). In other words, “A conversion claim cannot be used merely to enforce a debt that 

may be discharged by the payment of money generally.” Sports Imaging, 2008 WL 

4448063, at *14. However, “[M]oney can be the subject of a conversion claim if it can be 

described, identified, or segregated, and an obligation to treat it in a specific manner is 

established.” Id.

Plaintiff relies on Sports Imaging to argue that this case is one in which she had an 

immediate right to her money because she presented identification in conformity with the 

Agreement, and Defendants subsequently withheld the money from her. (Doc. 25 at 7.) 

However, such reliance on that case is misplaced. Sports Imaging makes clear that this case 

is not one where a plaintiff designated money in a separate account, which was to be used 

for a particular purpose. 2008 WL 4448063, at *14; see Murphy v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l 

Ass’n, No. CV 10-01391-PHX-ROS, 2010 WL 11405084, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010).

Instead, this case is the type of case the court refers to as a “mere creditor-debtor” situation. 

Sports Imaging, 2008 WL 4448063, at *14. Plaintiff is the creditor of debtor Chase because 

Plaintiff deposited funds with Chase. At that point, Chase, the debtor, was granted title to 

those funds, and Plaintiff became the creditor. Thus, Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants 

“converted [Plaintiff’s] funds by failing to pay a debt they owed to [her]” when she sought 

to withdraw her $1800 but Anliker initially refused to give Plaintiff her money. Id. Plaintiff 

is not alleging that she deposited funds in a specific account for a specific purpose, either 

before or on the day at issue, and that Defendants failed to give her her money in 

accordance with such specific purpose. Therefore, this case “involve[s] a claim against a 

debtor for conversion of the funds representing the indebtedness.” Id. Thus, there can be 

no claim for conversion. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to properly 

state a conversion claim. 

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D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

In Arizona, a claim for IIED requires three elements: (1) “the conduct by the 

defendant must be ‘extreme’ and ‘outrageous’”; (2) “the defendant must either intend to 

cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will 

result from his conduct”; and (3) “severe emotional distress must indeed occur as a result 

of defendant’s conduct.” Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987). Courts 

should determine “whether the acts complained of can be considered sufficiently extreme 

and outrageous to state a claim for relief.” Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 578 

P.2d 152, 155 (Ariz. 1978) (citation omitted). The defendant’s conduct must be “so 

outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 

Id. (quoting Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 460 P.2d 666, 668 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969)). “The 

liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty 

oppressions, or other trivialities.” Midas Muffler Shop v. Ellison, 650 P.2d 496, 500 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)). 

Plaintiff alleges the following actions by Defendants in support of her claim: 

(1) Defendants deprived her of her money after she showed identification; (2) Defendant 

Anliker told her to go to another branch because Defendant was “not comfortable” 

completing Plaintiff’s cash withdrawal; (3) Defendants Anliker and Keller lied to cover up 

discrimination; and (4) Defendant Anliker raised her voice and accused Plaintiff of 

throwing things, all of which were allegedly done because Plaintiff is African-American. 

(Doc. 25 at 6.) Taking these allegations as true, as the Court must, Defendants’ actions 

were not so outrageous as to be utterly intolerable. Morgan v. Freightliner of Arizona, LLC, 

No. CV 16-498-TUC-CKJ, 2017 WL 2423491, at *10 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2017) (discussing 

various cases alleging racial and sexual discrimination based on even worse behavior than 

that allegedly engaged in by Defendants here and finding that the allegations there did not 

suffice to withstand a motion to dismiss). 

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Plaintiff cites to Coffin v. Safeway, Inc., (Doc. 25 at 6), to support her IIED claim, 

but that case actually emphasizes the insufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 323 F. Supp. 

2d 997 (D. Ariz. 2004). In Coffin, the plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to repeated 

and continuous sexual harassment by her manager for eight months. Id. at 1003−04. The 

plaintiff alleged that the manager sought sexual favors and made frequent sexual 

comments, sounds, and gestures toward her. Id. at 999. The court held that these facts were 

sufficient to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s IIED claim. Id. at 

1004. In contrast, in Morgan, one plaintiff, a woman over the age of 40, alleged that her 

supervisor engaged in sex and age discrimination by giving her inaccurate reviews that 

negatively affected her pay, assigning her undesirable shifts, and requiring her to work 

more than 80 hours per week at times. 2017 WL 2423491, at *1−3. The other plaintiff in 

that case, a Hispanic man of Mexican origin, alleged that the same supervisor discriminated 

against him based on race, color, and national origin through similar acts. Id., at *1, 3. The 

court held that neither plaintiff alleged behavior by the supervisor that met the “extreme 

and outrageous” requirement. Id., at *10. 

Both the Coffin and Morgan courts addressed the difficulty of assessing 

discrimination in the context of an IIED claim. See Morgan, 2017 WL 2423491, at *9−11; 

Coffin, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1004. Ultimately, the courts concluded that repeated acts of 

alleged discrimination, in conjunction with the degree of outrageousness, which varies by 

case, are a strong indication of whether a plaintiff’s allegations will withstand a motion to 

dismiss. See id. Plaintiff’s claim here does not meet the mark discussed in either Coffin or 

Morgan nor the cases those courts analyze. Instead, Plaintiff alleges an isolated incident in 

which she was subjected to rude comments and a delay in service. The fact that Defendants 

may have based their decision to make rude comments and delay service to Plaintiff on the 

day at issue because she is African-American, which the Court must credit, does not, by 

itself, appear to withstand a claim for IIED, at least under these facts. Thus, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for IIED. 

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IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted. However, 

Plaintiff may file a new amended complaint if she can plead sufficient facts to establish 

that Defendants may be liable to Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (stating that a court 

“should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”). If Plaintiff elects to do so, 

she has until August 30, 2019 to file an amended complaint. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) is granted. 

2. That Plaintiffs’ Complaint is dismissed without prejudice; 

3. That Plaintiffs have until August 30, 2019 to file an amended complaint; and 

4. That Defendants have three weeks from the date Plaintiff files an amended 

complaint to file responsive pleadings. 

 Dated this 12th day of August, 2019. 

Honorable Steven P. Logan 

United States District Judge 

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