Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_07-cv-00766/USCOURTS-alnd-2_07-cv-00766-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Declaratory Judgemen

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TRAWICK CONTRACTORS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE BESSEMER HOUSING

AUTHORITY, et al.,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

07-AR-0766-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the court is the motion of plaintiff, Trawick

Contractors, Inc. (“Trawick”), to remand the above-entitled action

to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, Bessemer

Division, from which it was removed by defendant, C&N Contractors,

Inc. (“C&N”). For the reasons that follow, Trawick’s motion will

be granted.

Procedural History

Trawick filed this action in the state court on October 19,

2006, seeking declaratory judgment and a preliminary and permanent

injunction against The Bessemer Housing Authority (“BHA”), and its

Executive Director, Reynold M. Jones (“Jones”). The complaint was

served on BHA and Jones on October 25, 2007. The action as against

Jones was dismissed by non-consent order of the state court on

January 10, 2007. Not being certified for interlocutory appeal

under Rule 54(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, the said order

dismissing Jones remained appealable by Trawick to the Supreme

FILED

 2007 May-23 PM 03:31

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:07-cv-00766-WMA Document 17 Filed 05/23/07 Page 1 of 9
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Court of Alabama by Trawick until the case was ostensibly removed

to this court by C&N. The involuntary dismissal of Jones provided

a ground for remand not asserted by Trawick. On April 24, 2007,

Trawick added C&N as a defendant in the state court. The amended

complaint and the original complaint are materially

indistinguishable, the only real difference being that the amended

complaint adds C&N. 

In its amended complaint, Trawick alleges that it entered a

bid to perform work for BHA on various municipal projects.

According to Trawick, it was the lowest responsible bidder, but BHA

nevertheless wrongfully awarded the contract to C&N. Trawick

thereupon sued BHA, and ultimately C&N, “pursuant to the Alabama

Public Works Law, Code of Alabama § 39-2-1, et seq., and the

Alabama Declaratory Judgment Act, Code of Alabama § 6-6-220, et

seq.”

C&N filed its notice of removal at 9:58 A.M. on April 27,

2007. BHA, which did not file a notice of removal after it was

served with the state-court complaint on October 25, 2006,

consented to C&N’s removal. C&N asserts that this court has

original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1331, i.e.,

that Trawick’s claims arise under federal law. At 11:20 A.M. on

April 27, 2007, without knowing of the removal, Trawick filed a

second amended complaint in the state court after the case had

already been removed. Trawick’s belated second amended complaint

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purported to clarify its claim by alleging that it “is only

asserting claims under Title 39 of the Code of Alabama.” It

expressly disclaimed any and all relief based on federal law. This

after-the-fact clarification does not satisfy C&N.

Trawick filed its motion to remand on May 3, 2007, contending

that C&N’s removal was improper because the amended complaint does

not raise a federal question. Trawick supplemented its motion to

remand on May 14, 2007, asserting that C&N’s removal was also

defective under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because it occurred more than

30 days after BHA was served with the state-court complaint and

made aware of the disputed fact of removability. 

Analysis

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides the mechanism by which Trawick

seeks remand:

A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect

other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be

made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of

removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before

final judgment appears that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.

In its motion to remand, Trawick points to two deficiencies in

C&N’s removal — one procedural and one substantive. These defects

will be addressed in succession. 

I. Timeliness of C&N’s Removal

The Eleventh Circuit has not expressly settled the debate

between those district courts within the circuit who apply the

“first-served defendant rule” and those who apply the “last-served

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defendant rule” in situations like this one. Under the firstserved defendant rule, all served defendants must join in a removal

within 30 days after service on the first-served defendant. See,

e.g., Adams v. Charter Communications VII, LLC, 356 F. Supp. 2d

1268 (M.D. Ala. 2005); Holder v. City of Atlanta, 925 F. Supp. 783

(N.D. Ga. 1996); Noble v. Bradford Marine, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 395

(S.D. Fla. 1992). Under the last-served defendant rule, the 30-day

clock starts when the last defendant is served. See, e.g.,

Fitzgerald v. Bestaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (N.D. Ala. 2003).

This court has consistently applied the first-served rule, and sees

no reason to change. C&N did not file its notice of removal until

184 days after the first-served defendant, BHA, was served with the

original complaint. Other than adding C&N, the amended complaint

is identical in all material respects to the original complaint.

If the action was removable when it was removed on April 24, 2007,

it was removable by BHA on October 25, 2006, when it was served. 

Because “all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in

favor of remand to state court,” the court will continue to apply

the first-served defendant rule. University of South Alabama v.

American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999). Although

arguments for the adoption of the last-served defendant rule are

not without merit, this court is still persuaded by the arguments

found in Adams. In that case, the court was confronted with a

situation very similar to the one here: the removing defendant had

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not been named as a party at the time the initial 30-day period

expired, but it removed within 30 days of being served with the

first pleading that identified it as a defendant. 356 F. Supp. 2d

at 1278. The court nevertheless remanded the action, explaining

that this fact “does not alter the application of the ‘first-served

defendant rule.’” Id. The court emphasized that “even though §

1446’s time requirement is not jurisdictional, the time requirement

is mandatory and must be strictly applied.” Id. at 1272 (citations

omitted). This court finds the reasoning in Adams persuasive.

Because C&N’s removal was not timely under the first-served

defendant rule, Trawick’s motion to remand will be granted.

II. Federal-Question Jurisdiction

If Trawick had not raised the fatal procedural deficiency

discussed above, the court would nevertheless remand the case sua

sponte or would grant Trawick’s motion to remand because the

amended complaint does not present a bona fide federal question.

It is understood, of course, that a defendant can remove an action

to federal court if the claim is one over which the federal

district court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and

(b). However, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal

question must be presented on the face of a plaintiff’s complaint

in order to for a claim to arise under federal law and be

cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Kemp v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp.,

109 F.3d 708, 712 (11th Cir. 1997). “If the plaintiff elects to

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bring only state law causes of action in state court, no federal

question will appear in the complaint that could satisfy the

well-pleaded complaint rule, and the case may not be removed to

federal court.” Id. (citing 13B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.

Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3566

(1984)). For purposes of determining whether the action was

properly removed the question is whether from the face of the

complaint, Trawick’s right to relief requires the resolution of a

substantial issue of federal law. See Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d

1292, 1310 (11th Cir. 2001); Kemp, 109 F.3d at 712. A tangential,

or indirect, or unnecessary issue that may incidentally involve the

consideration of a federal statute or regulation is not enough to

provide a basis for removal under 28 U.S.C § 1331. A simple

example of this difference is a personal-injury railroad crossing

accident in which the plaintiff alleges as part of its state-law

negligence claim, that the railroad did not comply with a federal

safety regulation. The line is not always that easy to draw.

In its amended complaint, Trawick asserts two claims, one for

declaratory judgment and another for preliminary and permanent

injunctive relief. The crux of both of Trawick’s claims, and the

sole reason that Trawick believes it is entitled to the relief it

seeks, is its allegation that it, not C&N, is “the lowest,

responsible and responsive bidder for the Projects.” Title 39 of

the Alabama code sets forth the procedures for awarding contracts

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by state agencies. See Ala. Code 1975 § 39-2-1, et seq. Trawick

says that when BHA awarded the contract to C&N, it failed to follow

these state-law mandated procedures. C&N counters that Trawick’s

right to relief is depends upon an interpretation of form HUD-5369

and 24 C.F.R. § 85.36, both of which receive passing reference in

Trawick’s amended complaint. C&N argues, by way of conclusion,

that Trawick is “specifically seeking relief under HUD [U.S.

Department of Housing and Urban Development] regulations.” Trawick

denies this and points to its effort to clarify. 

The court respectfully disagrees with C&N. In its prayers for

relief, Trawick does not invoke any federal statue, regulation, or

assert any other federally created right. It seeks only for the

court to

enter a binding declaratory judgment pursuant to the

[Alabama] Declaratory Judgment Act, declaring (a) that

Trawick is the lowest, responsible and responsive bidder;

(b) that [C&N] was not the lowest, responsible and

responsive bidder; (c) that the contract be awarded to

Trawick; and (d) for such other, further and different

relief to which Trawick may be entitled;

and for the court to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction

enjoining and restraining [BHA and C&N] and all of their

agents, servants, employees, and all other persons acting

in concert with them, from and against taking any action

in furtherance of awarding, entering into, executing or

performing any work based on any contract in connection

to the work that is the basis of this lawsuit, which

would be in violation of both Title 39 of the Code of

Alabama.

Trawick bases its requests for relief on Alabama, not federal, law.

The fact that a HUD form and a provision from the Code of Federal

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Regulations are referenced in Trawick’s amended complaint does not

create a federal question. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 3234, 92 L.Ed.2d

650 (1986) (discussing the “long-settled understanding that the

mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does

not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction”). Also see

MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3d § 103.31[3] — [5] for a comprehensive

treatment of the subject. At § 103.31[5][c], Professor Moore’s

treatise reaches the pinnacle of its analysis when it says:

The [United States Supreme Court] has yet to formulate a

single, precise, all-encompassing test for jurisdiction

over federal issues embedded in state-law claims. This

is because, even when a state-law claim presents a

substantial federal question, the exercise of federal

jurisdiction is appropriate only if it would be

consistent with congressional judgment about the sound

division of labor between state and federal courts

governing the application of the federal-question

statute. Thus, because arising-under jurisdiction to

hear a state-law claim always raises the possibility of

upsetting the state-federal line drawn (or at least

assumed) by Congress, the presence of a disputed federal

issue and the ostensible importance of a federal forum

are never necessarily dispositive. According to the

court, there must always be an assessment of any

disruptive potential in exercising federal jurisdiction.

The question is whether the state-law claim necessarily

raises a federal issue, actually disputed and

substantial, that a federal forum may entertain without

disturbing any congressionally approved balance of

federal and state judicial responsibilities.

Unfortunately, such an interest balancing approach is

difficult to apply in specific cases, raising the danger

of unpredictability and wasted judicial resources in

resolving individual cases. 

This federal court sees no reason why it is better equipped than a

state court to preside over the resolution of what are essentially

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state-law claims. Federal judicial restraint is called for,

resolving any jurisdictional doubt in favor of the forum chosen by

the plaintiff. Trawick’s motion to remand will be granted for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Trawick’s

motion to remand this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

DONE this 23rd day of May, 2007.

_____________________________

WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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