Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00441/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00441-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

N.R., a minor, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

SAN RAMON VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, 

Defendant.

______________________________________/

AND RELATED THIRD PARTY CLAIM.

 /

No. C 05-00441 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS

On October 14, 2005, the Court heard oralargument on defendant San RamonValleyUnified School

District’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the hearing, the parties submitted supplemental briefing

on the effect, if any, of the 2005 amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”).

Having considered the arguments of counsel and all the briefing, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s

motion.

BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2005, plaintiffs N.R., L.C., R.P., E.P., and N.B., all minors, filed a complaint against

defendant San Ramon Valley Unified School District (“District”). Plaintiffs allege that they are each students

with one or more disabilities, and that they are each currently receiving behavioral services from Synergistic

Interventions (“SI”), a non-public agency certified by the State of California to provide intensive behavioral

support services to special needs children in both home and school settings. See Complaint ¶ 18. Plaintiffs

allege that these services are being provided to each ofthe plaintiffs pursuant to either an Individual Education

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 The complaint alleges that four of the plaintiffs have entered into “settlement agreements” with the

District. The complaint does not provide any details regarding the context in which these agreements were

entered into, or when the agreements were signed.

2

 It is unclear from the parties’ papers whether SI is currently still providing services or whether the

District has already replaced SI.

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Program (“IEP”) or a settlement agreement with the defendant,1 or both. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that on January 27, 2005, defendant advised plaintiffs that after February 1, 2005, SI

would no longer be available to provide services to any students within the district. Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiffs allege

that SI informed them that its “unavailability” was the result of a confidential mediation agreement between SI

and the District in a lawsuit concerning payment for behavioral services provided to district students. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that defendant advised plaintiffs that the Districtwould select new behavioralservices providers

to begin working with plaintiffs beginning February 2, 2005,regardless ofwhether the Districtreceived parental

consent to the new service providers. Id.2

Plaintiffs seek to prevent defendant fromreplacing SI with new behavioralservices providers, and they

allege that defendant is “obligated to continue all current services to plaintiffs as the last agreed upon and

implemented services.” Id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiffs have alleged three causes ofaction:(1) declaratory relief under

the IDEA and the California Education Code; (2) injunctive relief under the IDEA and California Education

Code §§ 56000 et seq.; and (3) breach of contract for alleged violations of settlement agreements between

some plaintiffs and defendant. Id. at ¶¶ 22-33.

LEGAL STANDARD

“After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for

judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(c). Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) are substantially identical.

See WilliamW. Schwarzer, A. Wallace Tashima & James M. Wagstaffe, FederalCivil Procedure Before Trial

§ 9:319. Under either provision, a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, to be taken

for these purposes as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legalremedy. Id. If the complaint fails to articulate a legally

sufficient claim, the complaint should be dismissed or judgment granted on the pleadings.

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DISCUSSION

1. First and Second Causes of Action Under the IDEA and California Education Code

The District contends that plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action should be dismissed for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA. The IDEA provides that a complainant may file an action

under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title V ofthe RehabilitationAct of1973, or other

federal laws which protect the rights of children with disabilities “except that before the filing of a civil action

under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections

(f) and (g) of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been

brought under this subchapter.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (as amended July 1, 2005). 

Under the IDEA, parents are entitled to complain “with respect to any matter relating to the

identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public

education to the child.” Id. at § 1415(b)(6)(A). After making their complaint, parents are entitled to “an

impartial due process hearing.” Id. at § 1415(f). A decision of the due process hearing “shall be final,” id. at

§ 1415(i)(1)(A), except that “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision . . . shall have the right to bring

a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in

any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.” Id. at § 1415(i)(2)(A). 

California Education Code §§ 56500-56507 sets forth the administrative scheme for due process

hearings under the IDEA. Under these provisions, parents may initiate a due process hearing regarding a

proposal to change identification, assessment or educational placement of a child, and such hearing will be

conducted at the state level. See Cal. Educ. Code § 5601(a)(1), (b)(4). 

Here, plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief regarding educational services specified in their

IEPs. Plaintiffs request the Court to “maintain SI as the current behavior support services provider for plaintiffs

until the agreed-upon transition process has been successfully completed.” Complaint, Prayer ¶ 1. Plaintiffs

allege that defendant is in violation of the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, which plaintiffs contend prohibits

defendant from changing services providers. Id. at ¶ 26. The relief plaintiffs seek is available under the IDEA,

and thus plaintiffs are required to exhaust their administrative remedies. See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1309 (plaintiffs

required to exhaust administrative remedies because “the administrative process has the potentialfor producing

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the very result plaintiffs seek, namely, statutory compliance.”); see also Tyler B. v. San Antonio Elem. Sch.

Dist., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

Plaintiffs contend that they are not required to exhaust administrative remedies because it is

“improbable” that they will obtain adequate relief through administrative procedures. In support of this

argument, plaintiffs assert that “it is extremely unlikely that, as a result of a due process hearing, any plaintiff

could obtain equitable or legalreliefto adequately address a situationwhere, as here, plaintiffs have alleged that

defendant district has attempted to contract with a third party for the purpose of intentionally and wrongfully

interfering with plaintiffs’ contractual and statutory rights.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition at 2. Plaintiffs offer no case

law or statutory authority for this proposition. Moreover, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that any of the

exceptionsto the administrative exhaustion requirement, as described in Hoeft, are applicable here. SeeHoeft,

967 F.2d at 1303-04 (stating exhaustion is not required where it would be futile, inadequate, or when an

agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law).

Alternatively, plaintiffs seek leave to amend their complaint to specifically allege exhaustion of

administrative remedies. Plaintiffs contend that they have satisfied this requirement by filing compliance

complaints with the California Department of Education’s Compliance Unit. The Ninth Circuit in Hoeft held

that district courts have discretion to determine, on a case by case basis, whether a compliance complaint

“would substitute for exhausting IDEA procedures in challenges to facially invalid policies.” Id. at 1308. The

court noted that a compliance complaint “may furnish an appropriate administrative remedy where the only

purposes served by exhaustion are to notify the state of local noncompliance and to afford it an opportunity to

correct the problem.” Id. 

The Court concludes that a compliance complaint filed with CDE would not substitute for exhausting

the IDEA administrative procedures in this case because plaintiffs are not challenging a facially invalid policy,

but rather seek relief in the form of continued and uninterrupted services from their current services provider.

As stated above, such relief is available through the administrative process, and plaintiffs must exhaust those

remedies. 

Plaintiffs also state, somewhat inconsistently, that they have exhausted their administrative remedies by

“participating” in due process hearings concerning their claims that the District breached its settlement

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agreements with plaintiffs. In their reply, defendants state that these administrative proceedings have not

concluded, and plaintiffs’ counsel did not contradict this statement at oral argument or in the supplemental

briefing. Accordingly, because the administrative proceedings have not concluded, plaintiffs have not

exhausted their administrative remedies and the Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ first and second causes

ofaction under the IDEA and the California EducationCode. The Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion

and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action.

2. Third Cause of Action for Breach of Contract

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ remaining claim for breach of contractforlack ofsubjectmatter

jurisdictionbecause there is neither diversity nor federal question jurisdiction over this cause of action. At oral

argument, plaintiffs contended for the first time that the recent amendments to the IDEA conferred federal

jurisdiction over claims to enforce settlement agreements that resolve IDEA disputes. The parties have

submitted supplemental briefing on this issue.

The Individuals withDisabilitiesEducationImprovementActof2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat.

2647 (2004), made numeroussubstantive amendments to the IDEA. Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional argument is based

on the amended version of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F), which provides,

(F) WRITTEN AGREEMENT. – In the case that a resolution is reached to resolve the

complaint through the mediation process, the parties shall execute a legally binding agreement

that sets forth such resolution and that – 

(i) states that all discussions that occurred during the mediation process shall be

confidential and may not be used as evidence in any subsequent due process 

hearing or civil proceeding; 

(ii) is signed by both the parent and a representative of the agency who has the 

authority to bind such agency; and

(iii) is enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court

of the United States. 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(2005). Plaintiffs contend that this subsection confers jurisdiction in this Court to

enforce the settlement agreements entered into between the plaintiffs and the District. Defendants contend that

this language does not confer such jurisdiction, and that even if it does confer jurisdiction, it only does so for

settlement agreements entered into after July 1, 2005, the effective date of the IDEA amendments.

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 The other amendments took place either on the date ofthe Act’s enactment, December 3, 2004, or

on October 1, 2005. See id.

4 Although the complaint does not specify when the settlement agreements were entered into, they

were all entered into prior to January 31, 2005, the date the complaint in this case was filed.

5

 Section 1415(e)(2)(F) would also only apply if the settlement agreements were entered into pursuant

to the IDEA mediation process. The complaint does not describe the circumstances under which the settlement

agreements were negotiated. Because the Court concludes that § 1415(e)(2)(F) does not apply retroactively,

it need not address this factual question.

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The Court concludes that even ifthe recent amendments to IDEA conferred jurisdiction on the federal

courts to enforce settlement agreements reached through the IDEA mediation process, these amendments do

not operate to confer such jurisdiction in this case. The amendment to § 1415(e)(2)(F), along with many of

the other amendments, took effect on July 1, 2005. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2005).3 It is undisputed that all

of the settlement agreements between plaintiffs and the Districtwere entered into priorto July 1, 2005.4 Thus,

the amended version of§ 1415 would only apply to the settlement agreements at issue if the Court applied the

amendment retroactively.5 

Plaintiffs contend that the Court can retroactively apply § 1415(e)(2)(F) because it is strictly

jurisdictional and does not expand the parties’ rights or obligations. However, even if plaintiffs’ interpretation

of§ 1415(e)(2)(F)is correct, there is nothing in the amendments to suggest that courts may retroactively apply

any of the amendments, much less retroactively apply certain subsections on a piecemeal basis. Cf. Tucker

v. Calloway CountyBd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that 1997 IDEA amendments

were prospective only and noting that nothing in the 1997 amendments suggested retroactive application). In

addition to amending § 1415(e)(2)(F), the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004

made numerous substantive amendments to the IDEA which clearly do affect parties’ rights and obligations

under that statute. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (2005) (setting forth new requirements regarding content

ofwritten notice provided to parents as well as new subsection regarding handling ofdue process complaints).

Plaintiffs provide no authority for the proposition that the Court can retroactively apply a single amended

subsection of a statute in the absence of clear language authorizing such piecemeal retroactivity. Indeed, the

Court concludes that to do so would be contrary to the “presumption against retroactive legislation that is

deeply rooted in our jurisprudence.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946

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(1997) (internal quotation omitted). 

Because the Court concludes that § 1415(e)(2)(F) does not confer federal subjectmatter jurisdiction

over plaintiffs’ third cause of action, and because the Court has dismissed plaintiffs’ IDEA claims forfailure to

exhaust administrative remedies, there is no basis for jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim. Cf.

Opera Plaza Residential Homeowners Association v. Tuan Hoang, 376 F.3d 831, 840 (9th Cir. 2004)

(noting breach of contract claim is “creature of state law.”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings and DISMISSES this cause of action without prejudice.

3. Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to allege claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “based upon defendant’s

violation of the IDEA and plaintiffs’ rights to due process, equalprotection and free speech as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution.” Plaintiff’s Opposition at 4. Plaintiffs also contend that they can state a claim

under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Significantly, plaintiffs have not submitted a proposed

amended complaint, nor do they elaborate in any way on the nature of these proposed claims.

The Court concludes that allowing plaintiffs to amend the complaint would be futile, and thus DENIES

leave to amend. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998). For all ofthe

reasons set forth above regarding the failure to exhaust administrative remedies under IDEA, plaintiffs cannot

reframe their IDEA claims under Section 1983 because theywould still be required to exhaust administrative

remedies. See Robb, 308 F.3d at 1048 (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim based on IDEA when plaintiff

failed to exhaust administrative remedies). Similarly, to the extent that plaintiffs’ amended complaint would be

alleging “injuriesthat could be redressed to any degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures and remedies,

exhaustion of those remedies is required.” Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (stating exhaustion of IDEA

remedies is required prior to filing suit under ADA, Rehabilitation Act, Constitution, or other federal laws if

relief sought is available under IDEA).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s

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motion for judgment on the pleadings, DISMISSES plaintiffs’ claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and

DENIES plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend. [Docket No. 59].

Dated: November 23, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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