Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05169/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05169-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1121 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERARDANGÉ, an individual, and as

assignee for G.A.P. INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

a California corporation and WORLD

INDIGENOUS NETWORK CORP., a

California corporation,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ANTHONY TEMPLER; ATANDA WEB

PRESENCE SERVICES, an unincorporated

entity; TOM KNIGHT, an individual; GAP

INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Pennsylvania

corporation; and DOES 1–25 inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-05169 WHA

ORDER REMANDING 

CASE AND AWARDING

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND

VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this dispute over an Internet domain name, plaintiffs Gerard Angé, G.A.P.

International, Inc. (“Gap California”) and World Indigenous Network Corp. move to remand

this matter on grounds that this Court lacks removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1441(b). 

Plaintiffs also move for attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). Finding that no federal

question was presented in plaintiffs’ complaint, this order GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion to remand

and GRANTS plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees.

Case 3:05-cv-05169-WHA Document 32 Filed 02/21/06 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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STATEMENT

On November 7, 2005, plaintiff Angé in his individual capacity and as assignee for

plaintiffs Gap California and World Indigenous Network Corp. filed a complaint in the Superior

Court of California for the County of Alameda against defendants Anthony Templer, Atanda

Web Presence Services, Tom Knight, Gap International, Inc. (“Gap Pennsylvania”) and Jon

Greenawalt. Plaintiffs alleged eleven causes of action for: intentional misrepresentation,

concealment, false promise, conversion, inducing breach of contract, intentional interference

with contractual relations, intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic

relations, conspiracy, accounting and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs have since voluntarily

dismissed his claims against Greenawalt. No party in this action is related to the GAP clothing

chain.

Plaintiffs alleged in the complaint that they owned the domain name

“gapinternational.com.” Plaintiffs operated a website at that domain name to promote their

television network, World Indigenous Television Network (“WIN-TV”), which broadcast

programs with content relevant to indigenous people. Defendant Templer provided the hosting

services for the domain name. According to plaintiffs, Templer conspired with Gap

Pennsylvania, a consulting firm providing business management, and Tom Knight to transfer

ownership and control of the domain name to Gap Pennsylvania without plaintiffs’ knowledge. 

Plaintiffs alleged that they were on the verge of obtaining fifty million dollars in funding for

WIN-TV. As a purported result of the transfer of his website to another entity, the funding fell

through. 

On December 13, 2005, Gap Pennsylvania removed this action on grounds of federalquestion jurisdiction. The remaining defendants subsequently joined in the removal. 

Defendants maintained that federal-question jurisdiction existed here because it stated a claim

for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, as well as a claim under the Lanham Act’s

anti-cybersquatting provisions. 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), 1125(d). Plaintiffs now move to remand

this action, asserting that this is not a federal-law action for infringement or cybersquatting, but

a state-law action for conversion of intangible property.

Case 3:05-cv-05169-WHA Document 32 Filed 02/21/06 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ANALYSIS

1. REMAND.

Removal under 28 U.S.C. 1441(b) is permitted for actions involving a federal question

over which the district court could have exercised original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

1331. The removing party bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Emrich v.

Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1990). The removal statutes are strictly

construed such that any doubts are resolved in favor of remand. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d

564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

Of course, where federal questions are involved a defendant can remove an action that

could have been brought in federal district court originally. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc.

v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2366 (2005). Even where a plaintiff

frames his or her complaint in terms of state law, “federal question jurisdiction will lie over

state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues.” Such a claim, however, may only be

removed to federal court if it meets certain conditions: (1) it must raise a stated federal legal

issue, (2) determination of the federal issue must be necessary to resolution of the claim, (3) the

federal issue must be actually disputed, (4) the federal issue must be substantial, and (5) the

federal court must be able to entertain the claim “without disturbing any congressionally

approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods.,

Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2366–68 (2005). If only one of

several state claims satisfies the requirements for removal on federal-question grounds, then any

other purely state claims in the same complaint may also be determined by the federal court

under its supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1441(c). This order now analyzes whether the

Grable requirements are met here.

On the face of plaintiffs’ complaint, all eleven claims are based on state-law. 

Defendants content, however, that plaintiffs’ state-law claims implicate the Lanham Act, which

governs federal trademark law. According to defendants, plaintiffs have clothed their claims for

infringement and cybersquatting in state-law dress. This order finds defendants’ arguments

unpersuasive. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Under the Lanham Act, infringement entails that:

(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or

services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,

term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any

false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact,

or false or misleading representation of fact, which—

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to

deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of

such person with another person, or 

as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her

goods, services, or commercial activities by another

person, or

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents

the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin

of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or

commercial activities,

shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he

or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

15 U.S.C. 1125(a). At its core, a trademark-infringement claim requires a showing that

defendant is “using a mark confusingly similar to a valid, protectable trademark.” Brookfield

Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999).

Nothing in plaintiffs’ complaint suggests that confusion between the parties’ marks will

be at issue in this dispute. Plaintiffs did not allege that web browsers visiting

gapinternational.com would confuse defendant’s business-consulting products with plaintiffs’

television programs pertaining to indigenous people. On the contrary, plaintiffs articulated that

these browsers were looking for information about WIN-TV and met with inapposite content. 

As a result, according to plaintiffs, the network lost valuable funding. 

The ultimate issue will be whether defendants improperly converted and conspired to

convert plaintiffs’ website into Gap Pennsylvania’s property. The parties argue at length as to

whether conversion of a domain name is a state-law claim. Our circuit recently made clear that

it is. In Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029–36 (9th Cir. 2003), the court applied California

law to determine whether a domain name was covered by the tort of conversion, and if so, what

showing was required. The court concluded that “Kremen’s domain name is protected by

California conversion law, even on the grudging reading we have given it.” Id. at 1035. 

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United States District Court

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Plaintiffs’ relief is provided by California law. Defendant simply does not satisfy any of the

Grable factors.

Likewise, defendant’s argument that plaintiffs’ claims necessarily implicate federal anticybersquatting regulations is unpersuasive. As our circuit recently explained: 

Cybersquatting occurs when a person other than the trademark

holder registers the domain name of a well known trademark and

then attempts to profit from this by either ransoming the domain

name back to the trademark holder or by using the domain name

to divert business from the trademark holder to the domain name

holder.

Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation

omitted). 

Plaintiffs in no way claimed that defendants were cybersquatting. According to

plaintiffs, WIN-TV already was posting material on gapinternational.com. Defendants then

allegedly converted the domain name into one for Gap Pennsylvania’s use. Plaintiffs have not

alleged that Gap Pennsylvania was operating a website under the domain name

gapinternational.com to divert customers from WIN-TV. As noted above, plaintiffs’ television

network and defendant’s consulting firm were not appealing to the same customer base. Again,

defendant cannot satisfy the Grable factors.

At bottom, defendant’s arguments suffer from an attempt to translate every issue relating

to the Internet into a federal question. The Internet is not a talisman bestowing federal

jurisdiction. There remains a place for state courts to determine the rights and responsibilities

in the constantly evolving world of Internet law. Congress has not indicated an intent to strip

state courts of this role. While the Lanham Act bestows federal jurisdiction, it does so only

over claims that explicitly fall under its scope. 

This is in contrast to the securities context where Congress passed the Securities

Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”). Congress enacted SLUSA “because

heightened pleading requirements in federal securities cases caused a pilgrimage of securities

claims to state courts, thus circumventing congressional reforms designed to restrict federal

securities claims.” Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2002). The

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effect of SLUSA is to push certain state-law claims relating to securities into federal court so as

to satisfy the federal standards. There is no similar statute for the Internet.

Defendants’ request, in the alternative, for allowance to amend their removal petition is

DENIED. Plaintiffs’ claims simply do not implicate the Lanham Act or federal law. Defendants

have not indicated any other theory of jurisdiction that would justify further delay in

adjudicating this action.

This order does not rule on defendants’ request for judicial notice. None of the

documents proffered by defendants are relevant to a determination whether removal was proper.

2. ATTORNEY’S FEES.

Plaintiffs also move for attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). That section

provides that “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual

expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” A court may make “an

award of fees when a defendant’s removal, while ‘fairly supportable,’ was wrong as a matter of

law.” Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The intent or bad faith of defendant are irrelevant to the court’s determination. Ibid.

This order finds that fees are warranted here. Defendants incorrectly tried to fit

plaintiffs’ state-law claims into the framework of the Lanham Act. As articulated above,

defendants completely misstated the gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint—conversion of

intangible property. Defendants also erred in arguing that conversion of a domain name was

not a state-law claim. 

Plaintiffs’ demand for $2,600 in fees is reasonable under the circumstances and based on

competitive billing rates. Defendants and their counsel are responsible for paying this sum to

plaintiffs.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is GRANTED. Defendants and their counsel shall pay

plaintiffs a total of $2,600 to compensate for the fees and costs associated with bringing this

motion. Finding further argument unnecessary, hearing on this motion is VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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