Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00360/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00360-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RICHARD PREIS, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0360-WS-C

 )

LEXINGTON INSURANCE )

COMPANY, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs’ motion to re-tax costs against

defendant Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”). (Doc. 229). The parties have

filed briefs and/or evidentiary materials in support of their respective positions, (Docs.

230, 232), and the motion is ripe for resolution. After carefully considering the foregoing

materials, the Court concludes that the motion is due to be granted in part and denied in

part.

Lexington argues that no costs should be taxed because, shortly after suit was

filed, it made an unconditional offer of $64,167.86, and the final jury award was $70,000,

or less than $6,000 more than the plaintiffs could have recovered without a trial. (Doc.

232 at 3-4). Lexington does not argue that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties, but it

suggests that they did not prevail very much and so should be denied all costs. As

prevailing parties, the plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to an award of costs, Holton v. 

City of Thomasville School District, 425 F.3d 1325, 1355 (11th Cir. 2005), and a denial of

costs “is in the nature of a penalty for some defection on [the prevailing party’s] part in

the course of the litigation.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1039 (11th Cir.

2000) (en banc). Lexington provides no authority for the proposition that a prevailing

plaintiff’s failure to accept a settlement offer justifies a denial of costs and, absent such

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authority, the Court declines to penalize the plaintiffs. 

I. Court Reporter Costs. 

The plaintiffs request $8,182.81 representing court reporter fees in connection with

nine depositions taken in this case. Court reporter fees for “stenographic transcripts” that

were “necessarily obtained for use in the case” are properly taxable. 18 U.S.C. § 1920(2). 

“It is not necessary to use a deposition at trial for it to be taxable, but admission into

evidence or use during cross-examination tends to show that it was necessarily obtained.” 

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600,

621 (11th Cir. 2000). “A district court may tax costs associated with the depositions

submitted by the parties in support of their summary judgment motions.” Id. (internal

quotes omitted). “Taxation of deposition costs of witnesses on the losing party’s witness

list is reasonable because the listing of those witnesses indicated both that the [prevailing

party] might need the deposition transcripts to cross-examine the witnesses, ... and that

the information those people had on the subject matter of this suit was not so irrelevant or

so unimportant that their depositions were outside the bound of discovery.” Id. (internal

quotes omitted). Such costs are not taxable if they were not “related to an issue which

was present in the case at the time the deposition was taken.” Id. (internal quotes

omitted). A party may even recover the cost of his own deposition if it was reasonably

necessary, such as to allow his counsel to confine impeachment to its proper limits. Id. at

622. 

Lexington offers a number of challenges to the plaintiffs’ request. First, it asserts

that the plaintiffs seek costs associated with the deposition of Fred Helmstrom even

though “he was never even deposed.” (Doc. 232 at 5). The plaintiffs, however, have

presented the invoice from the court reporter reflecting services rendered with respect to

Helmstrom’s deposition, which is in exactly the same form as the same court reporter’s

invoice from the following day concerning the depositions of Billy John Jones and Sandra

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A. Carter. Moreover, the invoice on Helmstrom is marked as paid by the plaintiffs or

their counsel. (Doc 230, Exhibit A at 11, 14). It requires more than Lexington’s unsworn

ipse dixit in brief to refute this evidence.

Lexington next complains that Helmstrom and Jones were not designated as its

Rule 30(b)(6) representatives. (Doc. 232 at 4-5). Perhaps so, but Lexington has not

countered the plaintiffs’ representation that they were identified by Lexington in its initial

disclosures. (Doc. 230 at 2-3). Moreover, Lexington identified both individuals on its

Rule 26(a)(3) list of trial witnesses. (Doc. 160 at 2). They thus constitute “witnesses on

the losing party’s witness list” for purposes of W&O. 

Lexington argues that the plaintiffs’ copy of the deposition of plaintiff Richard

Preis should not be taxed because it “was never used during trial, either as impeachment

or as a means to hold impeachment within proper limits.” (Doc. 232 at 6, 8-9). Contrary

to Lexington’s suggestion, W&O does not require that a party’s deposition be used at trial

before it can be taxed. On the contrary, the W&O Court quoted with approval a case

taxing such costs because “it was ‘reasonably necessary that plaintiffs’ counsel should

have a copy [of a plaintiff’s deposition] in order to protect the plaintiffs’ rights by holding

the impeachment within proper limits.’” 213 F.3d at 622 (quoting Hancock v. Albee, 11

F.R.D. 139, 141 (D. Conn. 1951)). The mere “possibility” of impeachment of his client

by the deposition made it reasonably necessary for plaintiffs’ counsel to obtain a copy. 

Hancock, 11 F.R.D. at 141.

Lexington also points out that none of the depositions “was admitted into evidence

at the trial of this matter” and that only four of them were used in opposition to

Lexington’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 232 at 4-5). As noted, however, “[i]t

is not necessary to use a deposition at trial for it to be taxable ....” W&O, 213 F.3d at 621.

Lexington next argues that the depositions of Carter, Jones, Allen Ladd, and John

Moran should not be taxed because their testimony supported Lexington’s successful

motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims for bad faith and

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misrepresentation, as well as on the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim to the extent based

on Lexington’s failure to pay for flood damage. As Lexington explains, “Plaintiffs were

not the prevailing parties with regard to these issues [and] [e]quity dictates that Plaintiffs

not be entitled to costs related to issues they lost.” (Doc. 232 at 5, 8). Prevailing party

status, however, is determined for the case as a whole, not issue by discrete issue. E.g.,

Head v. Medford, 62 F.3d 351, 354 (11th Cir. 1995) (“A party who has obtained some

relief usually will be regarded as the prevailing party even though he has not sustained all

his claims ....”) (internal quotes omitted). Thus, “[a] party need not prevail on all issues

to justify a full award of costs ....” Id. (internal quotes omitted). Without more involved

analysis than Lexington offers, the Court declines to reduce the plaintiffs’ award because

they did not prevail on all claims advanced. 

Any portion of the cost of a deposition that was incurred “for the convenience of

the attorney” rather than being “necessarily obtained for use in the case” is not properly

taxable. Newman v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 648 F.2d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1981). 

Lexington argues that much of the plaintiffs’ deposition costs must be disallowed under

this principle. (Doc. 232 at 6-9). 

Lexington’s primary objection is to all aspects of the videotaped depositions of

Jones, Moran, Carter, and Barry Fulford. According to Lexington, “[s]uch costs [are

necessarily] incurred for the convenience of counsel.” (Doc. 232 at 6). On the contrary,

“we hold that, when a party notices a deposition to be recorded by nonstenographic

means, or by both stenographic and nonstenographic means, and no objection is raised at

that time by the other party to the method of recordation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(c), it is appropriate under § 1920 to award the cost of conducting the

deposition in the manner noticed.” Morrison v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 97 F.3d 460,

464-65 (11th Cir. 1996). Lexington concedes that Moran and Carter were its Rule

30(b)(6) representatives, (Doc. 232 at 4-5), and the record reflects that the depositions of

Lexington and Jones were noticed as “videotape & stenographic.” (Doc. 85). Because

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there is no evidence that Lexington objected to this designation, under Morrison the cost

of conducting the videotaped depositions is awardable. Fulford was deposed on August

9, 2007, (Doc. 230, Exhibit A at 9), long after the discovery deadline expired and

apparently pursuant to some side agreement by the parties. Having permitted the video

deposition to occur without objection, under Morrison Lexington cannot be heard to

complain that its cost is taxed.

That the cost of videotaping the depositions is awardable does not mean that every

cost charged in connection with the depositions is awardable. Lexington objects to the

$600 cost of converting certain videotapes to DVD and to the $116 cost of archiving the

master tapes. Because nothing in the record suggests the plaintiffs were not entitled to the

master tapes, they cannot recover the cost of archiving them. Because nothing in the

record suggests that both a videotape and a DVD copy were necessary, the plaintiffs

cannot recover the cost of the DVD conversions. See Cherry v. Champion International

Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The concept of necessity for use in the case

connotes something more than convenience or duplication to ensure alternative methods

for presenting materials at trial.”) (upholding trial court’s refusal to allow both videotape

and stenographic transcript as costs).

Lexington also objects to $116.05 charged for shipping five depositions to the

plaintiffs. “Costs associated with delivering, shipping, or handling transcripts are

ordinary business expenses and are not recoverable.” Kerns v. Pro-Foam, Inc., 2007 WL

2710372 at *3 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (internal quotes omitted).

Finally, Lexington objects to $20.00 charged for CD ROM with ASCII and e-tran

of the Jones and Carter depositions. As stated in the Court’s order on the plaintiffs’

motion to retax, such duplication is for the convenience of counsel and is not taxable. 

(Doc. 228 at 2).

In summary, the plaintiffs seek $8,182.81 in court reporter fees. The Court

disallows $852.05 of this request. The taxable amount for court reporter fees, therefore,

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“Exemplification” is limited to “an official transcript of a public record,

authenticated as a true copy for use as evidence,” Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. MPW

Industrial Services, Inc., 249 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotes omitted),

and is not at issue. 

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is $7,330.76.

II. Copying Costs.

“Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the

case” are properly taxable. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).1

 “[I]n evaluating copying costs, the

court should consider whether the prevailing party could have reasonably believed that it

was necessary to copy the papers at issue.” W&O, 213 F.3d at 623. For example, the

cost of copying documents produced by an adverse party may be awardable under this

rule. Id. However, “[e]xtra copies or copies prepared for the convenience of counsel are

not taxable ....” Biomedical Disposal, Inc. v. Mediq/PRN Life Support Services, Inc.,

2007 WL 2593075 at *3 (N.D. Ga. 2007); accord Bates v. Islamorada, Village of Islands,

2007 WL 2113586 at *18 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 2004 WL

3712721 at *6 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (the first copy of opponent’s trial exhibits was

necessarily obtained, but the second and third copies were for the convenience of counsel

and not taxable). Moreover, costs of “general copying” are not recoverable. Duckworth

v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1399 (11th Cir. 1996). 

The plaintiffs request $4,719.88 for “litigation copies used during the discovery

and litigation phase of this case.” (Doc. 230 at 4). This figure represents something in

excess of 33,000 copies, (Doc. 230, Exhibit A at 18-34, 36), exclusive of the multiple

copies of trial exhibits discussed below. The plaintiffs make no effort to demonstrate that

this enormous number of copies — which would occupy approximately 11 linear feet —

was necessarily obtained, other than its unhelpful description of the lawsuit as

constituting “document intensive litigation.” (Doc. 230 at 4). The Court finds this an

inadequate explanation for the plaintiffs’ request, especially given the Court’s experience

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The plaintiffs may consider themselves fortunate, since their failure of proof

would justify a complete denial of their request for the cost of copying. E.g., Case v.

Unified School District, 157 F.3d 1243, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding denial of

copying costs because “[i]t was not the district court’s burden to support the substantial

weight of 71,194 copies or any lesser amount ....”).

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of being showered by the plaintiffs with multiple, redundant hard copies of the same

small universe of documents. It is apparent that large amounts of copying were

conducted for the convenience of counsel, and it is likely that some general copying

occurred as well. The uncertainty as to the degree of taxable copying raised by the

plaintiffs’ superficial presentation must be resolved against them, and the Court concludes

that two-thirds of their requested copies are not taxable.2

 The balance will be taxed at the

rate of $0.10 per page, which is what counsel charged the plaintiffs after they complained

about an extravagant charge of $0.50 per page. (Doc. 230, Exhibit A at 24-25). The

awardable amount is thus $1,100.00.

The plaintiffs also request $1,301.29, representing half the cost of producing the

multiple sets of exhibit books used at trial. Lexington challenges neither the necessity of

obtaining these copies nor the cost of doing so. Instead, Lexington notes the parties’

agreement to split the cost of the exhibit books (which included both sides’ exhibits). 

(Doc. 232 at 9-10). Nothing in the parties’ agreement, however, exempted the cost of the

exhibit books from an award of costs. See, e.g., Rogriguez v. Ithal, 2003 WL 22284202

at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“[T]his cost-sharing arrangement does not control Ithal’s right as

the prevailing party to recover costs if the [shared expense] was reasonably necessary to

the litigation.”); Paul v. USIS Commercial Services, Inc., 2007 WL 2727222 at *2 (D.

Colo. 2007).

The term “[c]opies of paper” is limited to “reproductions involving paper in its

various forms.” Arcadian Fertilizer v. MPW Industrial Services, 249 F.3d 1293, 1296

(11th Cir. 2001). The cost of the exhibit books includes $832.50 in index tabs and

binders, plus 9% tax of $74.92, for a total of $907.42. (Doc. 230, Exhibit A at 37). The

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Section 1821(c)(2) provides a travel allowance, but the plaintiffs have provided no

basis for calculating such an amount. Section 1821(d) provides a subsistence allowance,

but there is no evidence that the plaintiffs’ expert, whose invoices reflect a Mobile

address, was entitled to one. 

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plaintiffs’ share of this expense cannot be recouped, reducing their recovery by $453.71.

In summary, the plaintiffs seek $6,021.17 in copying costs. The Court disallows

$4,073.59. The taxable amount for copying, therefore, is $1,947.58.

III. Expert Witness Costs.

The plaintiffs seek to recover the entire amount they paid their expert witness in

fees, including “formulation of his expert report, opinion and deposition time,” as well as

his time at trial. (Doc. 230 at 5). However, “when a prevailing party seeks

reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound by the

limit of [28 U.S.C.] § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory authority to the

contrary.” Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 439 (1987). The

only explicit statutory authority to the contrary arises in the context of court-appointed

experts. Id. at 442. 

Section 1821(b) provides a daily attendance fee of $40. This fee applies to

deposition time as well as trial. Morrison v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 97 F.3d at 463. 

The plaintiffs’ expert testified for part of one day at trial, and there is no evidence that his

deposition consumed more than one day. Accordingly, Section 1821(b) limits the

plaintiffs’ recovery to $80.00.3

 

In summary, the plaintiffs seek $16,110.75 in expert witness costs. The Court

disallows $16,030.75. The taxable amount for expert witnesses, therefore, is $80.00.

IV. Conclusion.

For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiffs’ motion to re-tax costs is granted

with respect to those items identified above, in the total amount of $9,358.34. In all other

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respects, the motion to re-tax is denied.

 

DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of October, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

 

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