Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00940/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00940-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 11:101 Bankruptcy

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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In re: 

ESTRELLA A. KINCAID and JAMES CASE NO. CIV. S-05-0940 WBS

M. KINCAID

 Debtor, (Bankruptcy Court No.

05-21390-B-7)

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ESTRELLA A. KINCAID and JAMES MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING

M. KINCAID, MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM

JUDGMENT

 Appellants,

v. 

SUSAN K. SMITH,

 Appellee.

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This matter arises out of appellants Estrella A.

Kincaid and James M. Kincaid’s appeal from an order of the

Bankruptcy Court. Appellants now seek to reopen the appeal,

after this court dismissed the action and closed the case on June

12, 2006.

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Case 2:05-cv-00940-WBS Document 11 Filed 12/22/06 Page 1 of 7
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I. Factual and Procedural History

Appellants were debtors in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy

action before the Bankruptcy Court in this district. In re:

Estrella A. Kincaid & James M. Kincaid, Case No. 05-21390-B

(Bankr. E.D. Cal.). On March 14, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court

issued an order converting the bankruptcy proceeding to Chapter

7. Id., slip op. at 10 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. March 14, 2005). On

March 24, 2005, debtor James M. Kincaid filed a motion to

reconsider the March 14 conversion order. On April 27, 2005, the

Bankruptcy Court held hearings on the matter, and on May 2, 2005,

the court issued an order denying debtors’ request for

reconsideration. Id., slip op. at 2 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 2,

2005).

On May 10, 2005, Estrella and James Kincaid noticed an

appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s May 2, 2005, order denying

reconsideration. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1) and Federal

Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001, appellants elected to have the

appeal heard by this court. Subsequently, on May 13, 2005, the

clerk of the court sent appellants an Opening Letter, notifying

them that to properly prosecute their appeal, they were required

to “file within ten (10) days a designation of record, statement

of issues on appeal and a notice regarding the ordering of

transcripts with the bankruptcy court.” (May 13, 2005 Opening

Letter (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8006, 8007)).

Appellants, however, failed to do so, and on October 6,

2005, this court received a Notice of Incomplete or Delayed

Record from the Bankruptcy Court. (October 6, 2005 Notice.) 

Accordingly, on April 25, 2006, this court issued an order

Case 2:05-cv-00940-WBS Document 11 Filed 12/22/06 Page 2 of 7
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The only legal authorities cited by appellants in 1

support of reopening their appeal are Bateman v. U.S. Postal

Serv., 231 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2000), and Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co.

v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), which both

discuss the principle of “excusable neglect” (also mentioned by

appellants) found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1).

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requiring appellants to file a statement showing cause why the

court should not dismiss the action for failure to perfect the

appeal. (April 25, 2006 Order.) Appellants again failed to

respond, and thus, on June 12, 2006, this court entered an order

dismissing the action for failure to perfect the appeal. (June

12, 2006 Order.)

Six months later, on November 3, 2006, appellants filed

an ex parte request for a temporary restraining order, seeking to

reopen the appeal and restrain a hearing before the bankruptcy

court. Judge Karlton denied appellants’ request, based primarily

on the fact that appellants failed to establish any irreparable

harm. (November 7, 2006 Order.) Appellants now bring an

“Emergency Ex Parte Request to Address Nov. 03, 2006 ‘. . . Ex

Parte Motion to Reopen Appeal,’” which this court construes as a

motion to reopen the appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b).1

II. Discussion

Rule 60(b)(1) of Civil Procedure provides that a court

may relieve a party from a final judgment on the basis of

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 

Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy” which should be used

“sparingly in the interests of finality and the conservation of

judicial resources.” Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229

F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000); see also School Dist. No. 1J,

Case 2:05-cv-00940-WBS Document 11 Filed 12/22/06 Page 3 of 7
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Multonomah County v. AC and S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.

1993) (stating that reconsideration should only be granted in

“highly unusual circumstances”). 

The Supreme Court has stated that assessing excusable

neglect requires the court to weigh at least four factors,

including: (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2)

the length of the delay and its potential impact on the

proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the

movant acted in good faith. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. In this

case, even a brief review of these factors reveals that all of

them strongly weigh against reopening the appeal.

Regarding the first consideration, in this case the

opposing party is Susan Smith, trustee, who represents the

interests of the estate, and thus appellants’ creditors. By

continually refusing to move their appeal forward, appellants

have unreasonably stalled the case. In doing so, they

effectively prevent their creditors, who have a legitimate

entitlement to portions of appellants’ estate, from collecting on

their debts. 

The prejudice to the opposing party is even clearer,

considering the second factor, i.e. the length of the delay. 

Appellants appealed the Bankruptcy Court order on May 10, 2005,

and as per the Opening Letter, had ten days to perfect their

appeal. It is now over eighteen months later, and appellants

have still yet to file the appropriate designation of record,

statement of issues and notice regarding the ordering of

transcripts with the bankruptcy court. Appellants have been

parties to various bankruptcy proceedings, and subsequent

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appeals, for over six years, and are thus undoubtedly familiar

with the procedures involved. A delay of eighteen months in

perfecting an appeal is wholly unreasonable, and highly

prejudicial to those with interests in the property in question.

With regard to the reason for the delay, appellants

argue that because they moved residences, they never received any

of the relevant communications from the court. As evidence of

this fact, they cite this court’s April 25, 2006, notice

requiring appellants to show cause, which was returned to this

court as “Undeliverable.” (April 28, 2006 Docket Entry No. 4.) 

However, appellants were put on notice of the requirements for

perfecting their appeal eleven months prior to this courts April

25, 2006, order to show cause. Significantly, appellants filed

their notice of appeal on May 10, 2005, and indicated “805 F.

St.” as their address of record. The Opening Letter, which

detailed the requirements for appellants to perfect their appeal,

was sent a mere three days later to that same address, and there

is no indication that the letter was not received. Accordingly,

appellants had notice of their obligations regarding their

appeal, and their subsequent change of address does not excuse

their failure.

Moreover, appellants’ repeated assertions regarding

their change of address ignore the very clear Local Rules of this

district, which provide that “[e]ach attorney appearing and each

party appearing in propria persona is under a continuing duty to

notify the Clerk and all other parties of any change of address

or telephone number of the attorney or the party if appearing in

propria persona. Absent such notice, service of documents at the

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Moreover, “[i]f mail directed to a plaintiff in propria 2

persona by the Clerk is returned by the U.S. Postal Service, and

if such plaintiff fails to notify the Court and opposing parties

within sixty (60) days thereafter of a current address, the Court

may dismiss the action without prejudice for failure to

prosecute.” L.R. 83-183(b).

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prior address of the attorney or party shall be fully effective.”2

L.R. 83-182(f). Even if there were no such local rule, the most

basic common sense would dictate that if you want to get notices

from the court you had better let the court know where to send

them. 

Appellants argue that “the court had notice that the

mail from this court was not delivered to the movants Kincaids,

who thereby had no notice of decisions or orders . . . .” (Nov.

3, 2006 Ex Parte Request.) Maybe so, but the court still didn’t

know where they moved to. If the Kincaids think it is up to the

court to hunt them down whenever they move just to make sure they

receive their notices, they are sorely mistaken. The

responsibility regarding a change of address falls to appellants-

-this court’s repeated delivery to appellants’ address of record

constitutes legally effective notice. 

Finally, appellants assert they have acted in good

faith, but the factual history in this matter yields a different

conclusion. As the Bankruptcy Court noted, in the original March

14, 2005, order converting the bankruptcy to Chapter 7,

appellants’ conduct throughout all three bankruptcy proceedings

has been “replete with delaying tactics as well as outright

dishonesty.” Kincaid, Case No. 05-21390-B, slip op. at 10

(Bankr. E.D. Cal. March 14, 2005.) As highlighted above,

appellants’ unreasonable delays in the present appeal are no

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different. 

Accordingly, appellants’ failure to perfect their

appeal in this case does not constitute “excusable neglect,” and

this court’s June 12, 2006, decision to dismiss the appeal was

proper. Appellants have had more than ample opportunity to

litigate their case, but have instead sought to continually delay

resolution of the matter. Once a party has litigated their

position to the fullest extent allowed, the interests of finality

in judicial procedure mandate that a final judgment remain final. 

See Kona, 229 F.3d at 890.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that appellants’ motion to

reopen their appeal be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: December 21, 2006

Case 2:05-cv-00940-WBS Document 11 Filed 12/22/06 Page 7 of 7