Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01356/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01356-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Puente Arizona, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Joseph M. Arpaio, Sheriff of Maricopa 

County, Arizona, in his official capacity, et 

al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV14-1356 PHX DGC

ORDER 

 On January 22, 2016, the Court entered an order addressing several discovery 

issues. Doc. 373. Plaintiffs seek clarification and partial reconsideration of the order. 

Doc. 409. Defendants have filed a response as ordered by the Court. Docs. 414, 429. 

The Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part. 

A. Cervantes Arreola Deposition. 

 Plaintiffs argue that Expungement Plaintiff Cervantes Arreola should not be 

deposed again because she answered all questions in her deposition other than those 

where she asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege and questions concerning family 

members and efforts to obtain employment (discussed below). Doc. 409. Defendants 

respond that Ms. Cervantes Arreola was slow in answering several questions and 

unreasonably delayed Defendants’ ability to complete the deposition. Doc. 429 at 3-5. 

The Court directed Defendants to provide specific examples. Doc. 414 at 2. 

 The examples provided by Defendants do not support their position. See Doc. 429 

at 4-5. Defendants assert that Ms. Cervantes refused to provide her address by invoking 

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the Fifth Amendment, and only later provided it. The transcript shows, however, that she 

provided it one question later. Doc. 424 at 46-47. Defendants contend that Ms. 

Cervantes Arreola refused to state whether she was working despite her lawyer’s 

withdrawal of a Fifth Amendment objection, but Defendants did not re-ask the question 

when the objection was withdrawn. Id. at 81-82. Defendants assert that Ms. Cervantes 

Arreola said she did not want to answer a question about how she signed her name 

despite her lawyer’s withdrawal of a Fifth Amendment objection, but she did answer the 

question immediately after a discussion with her counsel. Id. at 46, line 20. Defendants 

assert that Ms. Cervantes Arreola was too tired to answer a question, but the question was 

of marginal relevance (“Do you believe that your involvement in this case will change the 

laws?”) (id. at 112), defense counsel inquired at some length into why Ms. Cervantes 

Arreola was tired (id. at 112-14), the parties agreed that she could rest (id. at 114), she 

did rest and then said she was feeling better (id.), and yet defense counsel did not re-ask 

the question (id.).1

B. Relevancy of Family Member Information. 

 The Court’s previous order held that Defendants could inquire into the names and 

immigration status of family members of the Expungement Plaintiffs. Doc. 373 at 2. 

Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider this decision, arguing that information about the 

immigration status of family members is not relevant to any issue in this case and that 

requiring the Expungement Plaintiffs to disclose it would have a substantial chilling 

effect on their involvement in this case. Doc. 409 at 6-7. 

 The Court specifically directed Defendants to address the relevancy of this 

information in their response to Plaintiffs’ motion, but they did not. Defendants argue 

that the Court previously decided this issue and should not address it again, and that the 

protective order adequately protects Plaintiffs against possible disclosure of this 

information, but they say nothing about relevancy. See Doc. 429 at 5-10. 

 

1

 Defendants cite other examples in a footnote (Doc. 429 at 5 n. 2), but the Court 

finds them no more persuasive than those discussed above. 

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 Upon reconsideration, the Court cannot see the relevancy of the immigration status 

of family members of the Expungement Plaintiffs. The Expungement Plaintiffs do allege 

that they were forced to work to support their families (Doc. 185, ¶¶ 11-12), and 

Defendants may ask them which family members they supported as alleged in paragraphs 

11 and 12 of the Second Amended Complaint. But Defendants should not inquire further 

about family members and should not ask about their immigration status. 

C. Continuing Employment. 

 The Court’s previous order held that Defendants could inquire into efforts by the 

Expungement Plaintiffs to seek or obtain employment other than the employment which 

was the subject of their previous arrests and prosecutions. Doc. 373 at 2. Plaintiffs ask 

the Court to reconsider this decision, arguing that this information is irrelevant to the 

expungement analysis, which focuses only on the constitutionality of the challenged 

conviction. Doc. 409 at 5-7. Defendants counter that this information is relevant because 

“equity is the sole basis for a court to order expungement[,] and the balancing of equities 

must always be considered before granting any [equitable] relief.” Doc. 429 at 9. 

 Defendants are correct that this Court’s authority to grant expungement is rooted 

in equity, but it does not follow that the Court may engage in a freewheeling balancing 

analysis when applying this relief. Because “the Constitution is the ultimate expression 

of the public interest,” equitable balancing is inappropriate where a party’s constitutional 

rights are at stake. Llewelyn v. Oakland Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 402 F. Supp. 1379, 

1393 (E.D. Mich. 1975). Stated differently, “enforcement of an unconstitutional law is 

always contrary to the public interest.” Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638, 653 (D.C. Cir. 

2013). 

 This circuit and other courts have therefore held that a conviction under an 

unconstitutional statute is properly expunged. See, e.g., Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133, 134 

n.1 (9th Cir. 1978); Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211, 216 (W.D. Mich. 1971); 

United States v. Rothstein, 187 F. 268, 270 (7th Cir. 1911). Defendants do not cite any 

case holding that a district court may withhold expungement where the plaintiff’s 

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conviction rests on an unconstitutional statute.2 

 Even if the Court were to conclude otherwise, Defendants have not shown that 

information about the Expungement Plaintiffs’ other employment activities would be 

relevant to the balancing of equities. Although Defendants assert that it would be 

inequitable to “reward” an individual who continues to engage in misconduct (Doc. 429 

at 14), a plaintiff’s unrelated misconduct is not a valid basis for denying him relief from 

an unconstitutional statute. Cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 393 (1948) (plaintiff’s 

“previous misconduct, not having any relation to the constitutionality of the challenged 

statutes, did not call for application of the clean hands maxim” in preliminary injunction 

suit). If equitable balancing were appropriate at all, it would focus on the public interest 

and the relative hardship to the parties. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 

(2008). Defendants have not shown that the information they seek is relevant to these 

questions. Therefore, the Court will grant reconsideration and preclude Defendants from 

inquiring into the Expungement Plaintiffs’ other employment activities. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 409) is 

granted in part and denied in part. Defendants may ask which family members were 

supported as alleged in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Second Amended Complaint, but 

may not inquire into the immigration status of the Expungement Plaintiffs’ family 

members or other efforts of the Expungement Plaintiffs to obtain work. 

Dated this 24th day of February, 2016. 

 

2 Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1972), is not to the contrary, as there was no claim in Rogers that the underlying statute was unconstitutional. 

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