Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02318/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02318-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STANFORD PAUL BRYANT,

Plaintiff,

v.

T. ARMSTRONG, Correctional

Officer; et al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 08cv02318 W(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 91]

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO.

92]

Plaintiff Stanford Paul Bryant, a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint on December 12,

2008 [ECF No. 1], and a First Amended Complaint on March 3, 2009

[ECF No. 3], pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The ten named

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint

[ECF Nos. 15, 18]. The Court issued a Report and Recommendation

Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 27]. United States

District Court Judge Thomas Whelan subsequently adopted the Report

and Recommendation [ECF No. 37].

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The Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on June 23,

2010 [ECF No. 39].1 All ten Defendants moved to dismiss the Second

Amended Complaint [ECF No. 40], which was granted in part and

denied in part [ECF Nos. 46-47]. The six remaining Defendants,

Armstrong, Catlett, Janda, Lizarraga, Ochoa, and Trujillo, then

filed an Answer [ECF No. 49].

On December 23, 2011, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

was filed, along with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and

the declarations of Tammy Armstrong, G. Janda, G. Trujillo, T.

Catlett, T. Ochoa, and R. Lizarraga [ECF No. 91]. Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits were filed the same day

[ECF No. 92]. The Court issued a Klingele/Rand Notice on January

4, 2012, advising Bryant of the need to submit evidence in

opposition to Defendants' Motion [ECF No. 93]. On February 17,

2012, "Defendants' Notice to Court Re: Opposition to Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment" was filed, in which Defendants ask the

Court to consider all evidence and facts submitted in their summary

judgment motion as also in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment [ECF No. 96]. Plaintiff's Opposition to

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on March 26,

2012, along with exhibits [ECF No. 101].

1

 Bryant's Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 39], the

documents attached to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF

No. 91], Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 92],

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

[ECF No. 101], Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Opposition to Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment [ECF No. 113], and the Supplemental Declaration of

Stanford P. Bryant in Support of Opposition to Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 115] are not consecutively paginated. 

The Court will cite to all these filings using the page numbers

assigned by the electronic docketing system.

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The "Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment"

was filed nunc pro tunc to July 19, 2012 [ECF No. 113]. The

"Supplemental Declaration of Stanford P. Bryant in Support of

Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" was filed

nunc pro tunc to the same day, along with exhibits [ECF No. 115]. 

In his latest filing, Plaintiff indicates that he recently received

supplemental discovery responses from Defendants in light of the

Court's order compelling the discovery. (Pl.'s Suppl. Mem. P. & A.

Opp'n Defs. Mot. Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 113.) The Defendants

responded on August 1, 2012, and filed Defendants' Reply to

Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities [ECF

No. 116].

The Court has reviewed the Second Amended Complaint,

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Bryant's Motion for

Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's Opposition, Plaintiff's Supplemental

Memorandum and Declaration, and Defendants' Reply. Both summary

judgment motions are suitable for resolution on the papers,

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). 

For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Bryant's

Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's allegations arise from events that occurred while

he was incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison ("Calipatria"). 

(Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 7, ECF No. 92.)

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A. Count One: Equal Protection (Defendant Armstrong)

In count one, Bryant argues that Defendant Armstrong violated

the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against him because

of his race. (Id. at 11, 13; see Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 6, ECF No. 91.) He claims that during the eight

months Armstrong was "ASU #2's Legal Officer," she scheduled Bryant

and other African-American inmates to attend the law library during

times they were assigned to yard recreation. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J.

11, 13, ECF No. 92; see Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 19, ECF No. 91.) Notably, Armstrong scheduled Hispanic

prisoners to law library time when it did not interfere with their

yard time. (Id.) 

B. Count Two: Retaliation (Defendant Armstrong)

Bryant argues in count two that on January 28, 2008, Defendant

Armstrong violated the First Amendment by retaliating against him

for exercising his First Amendment rights. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J.

15, ECF No. 92; see Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6,

ECF No. 91.) Plaintiff claims that Armstrong overheard him helping

another inmate prepare a grievance against her, and she accused

Bryant of "snitching" on her in front of other inmates. (Pl.'s

Mot. Summ. J. 15, ECF No. 92; see Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 22-23, ECF No. 91.) Plaintiff verbally complained and

then submitted a grievance against Armstrong; she retaliated by

filing a false informational chrono against him on January 28,

2008, that is incorrectly dated February 7, 2008. (Id.)

//

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C. Count Three: Equal Protection and Retaliation (Defendants 

Lizarraga, Trujillo, Catlett, Ochoa, and Janda)

The Plaintiff argues in count three that Defendants Lizarraga

and Trujillo violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by

retaliating and discriminating against him. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J.

13-14, 16-19, ECF No. 92; see Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 6, ECF No. 91.) Defendants Catlett, Janda, and Ochoa

violated the First Amendment by retaliating against Plaintiff. 

(Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 17-20, ECF No. 92; see Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6, ECF No. 91; see also Second Am. Compl.

41-42, ECF No. 39.) 

In particular, Plaintiff asserts that after he and another

inmate submitted grievances against Armstrong, Defendant Lizarraga

retaliated against Bryant and other African-American inmates by

moving them to more restrictive cell placements, threatening

Plaintiff, and filing a false rules violation report against

Bryant. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 8, 16-17, ECF No. 92; see Defs.' Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 24, ECF No. 91.) Lizarraga's

actions are also alleged to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 

(See Second Am. Compl. 25-30, ECF No. 39; Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 8,

13-14, ECF No. 92.) Further, Defendant Trujillo retaliated against

Plaintiff by refusing to allow Bryant to call witnesses at his

disciplinary hearing and by falsifying the corresponding

disciplinary report. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 18-19, ECF No. 92; see

Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 26, ECF No. 91.) 

Bryant contends that Trujillo's actions also constituted racial

discrimination. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 8, 14, ECF No. 92.) 

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Finally, Defendants Catlett, Ochoa, and Janda purportedly

retaliated against Plaintiff by ratifying Defendants Armstrong,

Lizarraga, and Trujillo's discriminatory conduct. (Id. at 17-20

(asserting that Defendants Catlett and Janda retaliated in this

manner); see Second. Am. Compl. 41-42, ECF No. 39 (alleging that

Defendants Catlett, Janda, and Ochoa retaliated by endorsing the

other Defendant's discriminatory actions); see also Defs.' Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 27, ECF No. 91.).) 

D. Count Four: California Civil Code (Defendants Armstrong, 

Lizarraga, and Trujillo)

In count four, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Armstrong,

Lizarraga, and Trujillo violated California Civil Code sections

52.1, 51.7, and 52(b) by interfering with Bryant's constitutional

rights because of his race. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 6, 29, ECF No. 91; see Pl.'s Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

28-30, ECF No. 101.) Armstrong and Lizarraga threatened Plaintiff

with violence if he continued to submit grievances alleging racial

discrimination. (Pl.'s Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 29-30, ECF No.

101.) Bryant argues that Lizarraga "committed an act of violence"

against him by removing legal documents from his cell without

permission. (Id. at 30.) Similarly, he contends that Defendant

Trujillo intimidated Plaintiff by having approximately three

Hispanic officers surround him in a "menacing manner." (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, "The court

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Like the

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standard for a directed verdict, judgment must be entered for the

moving party "if, under the governing law, there can be but one

reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citing Brady v. S. Ry. Co.,

320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943)). "If reasonable minds could differ as

to the import of the evidence," judgment should not be entered in

favor of the moving party. Id. at 250-51; see also Blankenhorn v.

City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007).

The parties bear the same substantive burdens of proof that

would apply at a trial, including plaintiff's burden to establish

any element essential to his case. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys.

Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252; see

also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). "When

the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary

judgment is warranted if the nonmovant fails to 'make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

[its] case.'" Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993)

(quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322). The absence of a genuine

issue of material fact on an essential element of a party's case is

sufficient to warrant summary judgment for the opposing party. 

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

For those issues on which it has the burden of proof, the

moving party bears the initial task of identifying the pleadings

and evidence it "believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact." Id. at 323; see also Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Martinez v. Stanford, 323

F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003). The burden then shifts to the

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nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a

genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. 

To successfully rebut a defendant's properly supported motion

for summary judgment, the plaintiff "must point to some facts in

the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and,

with all reasonable inferences made in the plaintiff[']s[] favor,

could convince a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff[]." 

Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th

Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

323; Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249). Material issues are

those that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law." Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248; accord

Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1039-40 (9th Cir.

2000); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). More than a "metaphysical doubt" is required to establish a

genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

In deciding whether any genuine issue of material fact remains

for trial, courts must "view[] the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party . . . ." Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image

Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) (stating that the

nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed and all reasonable

inferences drawn in the nonmoving party's favor). "When opposing

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v.

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Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). While the district court is not

required to search the entire record for an issue of fact, the

court may nevertheless exercise its discretion to consider

materials in the record that are not specifically identified. 

Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031

(9th Cir. 2001); Forsberg v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d

1409, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1988).

When the nonmoving party is proceeding pro se, the court has a

duty to consider "all of [the nonmovant's] contentions offered in

motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based on personal

knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence,

and where [the nonmovant] attested under penalty of perjury that

the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct." 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants Armstrong,

Lizarraga, Trujillo, Catlett, Ochoa, and Janda argue that Bryant's

remaining causes of action fail as a matter of law. (Defs.' Mot.

Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 91.) 

Armstrong contends that she is entitled to summary judgment on

the equal protection claim in count one because there is no

evidence that any differential treatment was based on race or that

she had a discriminatory intent. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

21-22.) Armstrong also moves for summary judgment on the

retaliation claim against her in count two because there is no

evidence that she issued the informational chrono against Bryant

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for engaging in protected conduct; rather, Armstrong issued it

because of Plaintiff's repeated misconduct. (Id. at 23-24.)

Defendant Lizarraga moves for summary judgment on the equal

protection and retaliation causes of action against him in count

three. (Id. at 24-26.) Similarly, Defendants Armstrong, Trujillo,

Catlett, Ochoa, and Janda contend Bryant cannot establish a triable

issue for the retaliation claims against them in count three. (Id.

at 26-28.) Finally, Armstrong, Lizarraga, and Trujillo move for

summary judgment on the state law claims asserted by Bryant in

count four. (Id. at 29.)

Plaintiff maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment on

count one, his claim that Defendant Armstrong violated the Equal

Protection Clause by scheduling law library time in a

discriminatory manner. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 11-12, ECF No. 92.) 

Bryant also argues that his retaliation claim against Armstrong in

count two presents no triable issue of fact because the evidence

establishes that she knew that he had advised another inmate on how

to submit grievances against her. (Id. at 15.) After Bryant

submitted his grievance, Armstrong prepared a false informational

chrono against him that is dated February 7, 2008, but Armstrong

maintains was submitted on January 28, 2008. (Id. at 15.) 

Further, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on his retaliation and

equal protection claims against Lizarraga and Trujillo, and his

retaliation causes of action against Defendants Catlett and Janda. 

(Id. at 13-14, 16-20.)

A. Count One: Equal Protection (Armstrong)

The Supreme Court has stated that "whenever the government

treats any person unequally because of his or her [membership in a

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protected class], that person has suffered an injury that falls

squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's

guarantee of equal protection." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.

Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995); see also Damiano v. Florida

Parole & Probation Comm'n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1986)

(explaining that protected classes include race, religion, national

origin, and poverty). The same principle applies to inmates. 

"[P]risoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race." 

Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). The equal protection

guarantee safeguards not only groups of people, but also

individuals who would constitute a "class of one." Vill. of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 

A plaintiff can establish an equal protection violation by

demonstrating that the defendant intentionally discriminated on the

basis of plaintiff's membership in a protected class, such as race,

religion, national origin, and poverty. Barren v. Harrington, 152

F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1998); Damiano, 785 F.2d at 932-33. 

Alternatively, if the state action does not implicate a fundamental

right or a suspect classification, a plaintiff can make an equal

protection claim by demonstrating that the defendant intentionally

treated plaintiff differently from similarly situated individuals

without a rational basis for the different treatment. Engquist v.

Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008); Olech, 528 U.S. at

564. 

 An equal protection claim based on membership in a protected

class does not succeed, and the Fourteenth Amendment is not

violated, if the claim relies on unintentional conduct that has a

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disparate impact. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.

Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.

229, 239 (1976). "[A] plaintiff must show that the defendants

acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the

plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class." Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In her Declaration, Defendant Armstrong submits that she was

the "Ad Seg Legal Officer in Administrative Segregation Unit #2,"

or law library officer, from April 2006 to January 2008. (Defs.'

Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong 2, ECF No. 91.) She was

responsible for scheduling law library sessions for administrative

segregation unit ("ASU") inmates and escorting them from ASU to the

library. (Id. at 4.) 

ASU #2 inmates were assigned to yard groups that were

determined by Calipatria's "classification staff;" Armstrong was

not involved in making these assignments. (Id. at 2.) Yard group

assignments were based on gang affiliations and compatibility, not

race. (Id. at 3.) During Armstrong's tenure, there were eight

different yard groups in ASU #2, and each group received three

sessions of outdoor exercise per week. (Id. at 2.) There was one

three-hour morning session and one three-hour afternoon session

every day except Thursday. (Id.) Defendant states that "[e]ach

yard group was scheduled for outdoor exercise on different yards at

different times." (Id.) 

According to Armstrong, yard groups one, three, seven, and

eight were made up of prisoners who were part of the "Southern

Hispanic gang," and inmates of various races who were compatible

with that gang, including nonaffiliated inmates. (Id. at 3.) The

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Southern Hispanic gang included Hispanic and Caucasian inmates. 

(Id.) Bryant's group, yard group two, included prisoners who were

part of the "Crips" gang, which was comprised mostly of

African-American and Samoan inmates. (Id.) Yard groups four and

six consisted of prisoners who were housed on the "Sensitive Needs

Yard." (Id.) Finally, yard group five was comprised of "Blood"

gang members - mostly African-American inmates - and prisoners who

were compatible with the gang. (Id.) The basis for Armstrong's

hearsay statements is not apparent from her Declaration.

Because there was no law library in ASU #2, inmates had to be

escorted and transported to the library; only five inmates could be

taken at a time because they had to conduct their work in one of

the five separate holding cells inside the library. (Id. at 3-4.) 

The law library was available to ASU #2 inmates every Monday from

9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. or from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., as well as

every Tuesday from 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. or from 1:00 to 3:00

p.m. (Id. at 4.) Armstrong attaches copies of the "Ad-Seg Law

Library Attendance Record" that she completed for the period from

October 29, 2007, to January 8, 2008. (Id. Ex. A, at 10-20.) 

1. Differential treatment

According to Defendant, there is no evidence that she treated

the yard groups in a "substantially different" manner when

scheduling law library access. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 20.) 

Nonetheless, Armstrong concedes that on six different occasions,

she scheduled Bryant and the other inmates in yard group two for

law library visits at times that conflicted with their assigned

yard times. (See id. at 20-21.) 

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 The law library and recreation yard schedules, attached as

exhibits to the cross motions, are for a finite period; yet, they

reveal differential treatment. Yard groups one, two, three, and

four had yard times on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Saturdays. (Id.

Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga 3.) Because the library was only

available on Mondays and Tuesdays, their yard and library times

could conflict on Mondays. (Id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong 4.) 

Yard groups five, six, seven, and eight had yard times on Tuesdays,

Fridays, and Sundays, so their scheduled yard and library times

could conflict on Tuesdays. (Id. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga 3.)

Armstrong scheduled Bryant and other prisoners in yard group

two for morning or afternoon law library access that conflicted

with their Monday yard time on six of the twenty-two library

sessions reflected in the available attendance records. (Compare

id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong Ex. A, at 10-11, 13-14, 18, 20, with

id. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga Ex. A, at 16, 18, 22, 24, 32, 35.) 

The inmates assigned to other yard groups did not have many

conflicts. Yard group one prisoners had no conflicts out of the

eight law library sessions that Armstrong assigned them. (Compare

id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong Ex. A, at 10-11, 13-15, 17, 20, with

id. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga Ex. A, at 18, 24, 26, 30, 35.) 

Defendant scheduled inmates in yard group three to go to the

library seven times without any conflicts with their Monday yard

access. (Compare id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong Ex. A, at 11,

13-17, 20, with id. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga Ex. A, at 18, 24,

26, 30, 35.) Yard group four had no law library sessions during

this period. (See generally id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong Ex. A,

at 10-20; id. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga Ex. A, at 16-36.)

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Armstrong scheduled group five inmates for nine library

sessions, and none of them conflicted with their assigned Tuesday

yard access. (Compare id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong Ex. A, at

10-12, 14, 16, 20, with id. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga Ex. A, at

17, 19-20, 24, 28, 36.)2

The prisoners in yard group six were scheduled for nine law

library sessions, and only one of them conflicted with a yard

assignment. (Compare id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong Ex. A, at

10-11, 14, 15-18, 20, with id. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga Ex. A, at

17, 19, 22, 26, 30, 35-36.) Out of the nineteen library sessions

that Armstrong assigned to group seven prisoners, only two sessions

conflicted with the inmates' Tuesday yard access. (Compare id.

Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong Ex. A, at 10-20, with id. Attach. #7

Decl. Lizarraga Ex. A, at 19-20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 36.) Finally,

yard group eight inmates had no conflicts for the eleven times they

were scheduled to go to the law library. (Compare id. Attach. #2

Decl. Armstrong Ex. A, at 10-12, 14-20, with id. Attach. #7 Decl.

Lizarraga Ex. A, at 20, 24, 36.)3 

2 The Defendant states that yard groups five and seven both

had one occasion when their library access conflicted with their

yard time, but she provides no basis for this determination. 

(Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 21, ECF No. 91.) 

Armstrong draws conclusions from the record without explaining the

bases for them, forcing the Court to comb through the scheduling

records to ascertain the number of conflicts per yard group. 

"[T]his Court has discretion to refuse to consider evidence that

the offering party fails to cite with sufficient specificity." Bd.

of Trs. of the Sheet Metal Workers Health Care Plan v. Vigil, No.

C08-181-JLR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28171, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18,

2011) (citing Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 775

(9th Cir. 2002)). Nonetheless, from the Court's review,

Armstrong's calculations and records do not match.

3

 These numbers only reflect part of the period in question. 

Yard recreation records for December 3, 4, 10, 11, 17, 18, and 31,

2007, are illegible or unclear. (See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

#7 Decl. Lizarraga Ex. A, at 26, 28, 30, 32-34, ECF No. 91.) 

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Thus, Bryant and the other yard group two inmates were

scheduled for the law library at times that conflicted with their

yard access on six occasions out of the twenty-two library

sessions, or 27.27% of the time. (See generally id. Attach. #2

Decl. Armstrong Ex. A, at 10-20; id. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga Ex.

A, at 16-36.) The inmates in yard groups one, three, five, seven,

and eight had no conflicts. (See id.) Yard group seven prisoners

had two conflicts out of nineteen library sessions, which is 10.52%

of the time. (See id.) Yard group six inmates had one conflict out

of nine sessions, or 11.11% of the time. (See id.) 

The evidence demonstrates that Armstrong treated Bryant and

the inmates in yard group two differently from other yard groups. 

Their conflicts were nearly triple that of any other yard group for

the eleven-week period from October 29, 2007, to January 8, 2008. 

The inquiry is therefore whether the differential treatment rises

to the level of an equal protection violation. 

2. Whether a suspect class is implicated 

Armstrong asserts that Bryant's claim that he and the other

yard group two inmates were treated differently because of their

race fails because no suspect class is implicated. (See id.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 21.) The Defendant maintains that she

scheduled law library times based on the inmates' yard group

assignments, which are determined by gang affiliations, not race. 

(Id. at 20; see id. Attach. #3 Decl. Janda 3-4.) A yard group

assignment is not a suspect class. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

Lizarraga maintains that the Monday yard schedule for yard group

two inmates rotated each week in the morning and afternoon, but

Bryant represents that yard two had several conflicts on these days

as well. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Decl. Bryant 30, ECF No. 92; see

Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga 3, ECF No. 91.)

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21.) Armstrong concedes that yard groups two and five contained

mostly Black prisoners; she points out that several other yard

groups contained mostly Hispanic prisoners but were not treated the

same as the Hispanic inmates in yard group one. (Id.) "[T]he fact

that there were Black inmates in other yard groups provides further

proof that any difference in treatment for Yard Group No. 2 was not

race-based." (Id. at 20.) 

Bryant states that the inmates in yard group one were

Hispanic, and "there was never another race of inmates other than

African-Americans" in yard group two. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Decl.

Bryant 34, ECF No. 92.) Other than racial distinctions, yard

groups one and two were similarly situated and had the same yard

times, every Monday, Wednesday, and Saturday. (Id. at 22.) The

Hispanic prisoners in yard one enjoyed four hours outside their

cells every Monday - two hours at the law library and two hours on

the recreation yard. (Id. at 24.) Bryant and the other

African-American prisoners in yard two, however, only received two

hours outside their cells every Monday because they had to choose

between outdoor exercise and access to the law library. (Id.) 

Bryant attaches the "Administrative Segregation Daily Yard

Activity" form for the one-week period of January 25, to January

31, 2008. (Id. at 22-23; see id. Attach. #1 Ex. 1, at 2-3.) The

form indicates that yard group two was "controlled compatible

Black/Northern Hispanic/Other," and the ethnicity of each inmate

was "Black." (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Decl. Bryant 23, ECF No. 92; see

id. Attach. #1 Ex. 1, at 2-3.) 

Armstrong contends that yard group assignments were based on

gang affiliations, but she did not serve on the classification

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committee that made the assignments. (See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong 2-3, ECF No. 91.) Defendant Janda, then

associate warden, states that the policy was to place inmates in

yard groups that were "controlled-compatible." (Id. Attach. #3

Decl. Janda 3.) Janda served on the committee that placed Bryant

in yard group two, which was deemed "controlled-compatible for

Crips (primarily Black inmates), Northern Hispanic gang members,

and other compatible inmates." (Id. at 4.) For yard group one,

Janda states, "I believe [yard group one inmates] were Southern

Hispanic gang members, and both affiliated and non-affiliated White

inmates who were deemed compatible." (Id.) 

There is no document or record showing the gang breakdown by

yard. Defendant Janda's sworn statement that yard group two was

deemed compatible for Crips gang members conflicts with the annual

review form he signed on April 24, 2008, which does not discuss

gang affiliation; instead, Janda classified yard group two as

compatible for "Blacks, Northern Hispanics, Others." (See Pl.'s

Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Ex. 25, at 112, ECF No. 101.) 

Janda's current statement that yard group two was Crips compatible

also conflicts with Bryant's sworn statement and the ASU yard

activity form indicating that the inmates were "Black." (See Pl.'s

Mot. Summ. J. Decl. Bryant 34, ECF No. 92; id. Attach. #1, Ex. 1,

at 2-3.) 

"Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and

the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion

for summary judgment or for a directed verdict." Liberty Lobby,

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Inc., 477 U.S. at 255. There is a material issue of fact as to

whether the equal protection claim implicates a suspect class.

3. Class-wide violation 

When asserting a class-wide violation based on membership in a

protected class, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant

acted with intent to discriminate based on plaintiff's membership

in that class. Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194. In cases alleging racial

discrimination, for example, "'proof of racially discriminatory

intent or purpose is required' to show a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause." City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope

Found., 538 U.S. 188, 194 (2003) (quoting Vill. of Arlington

Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 265). 

"'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as

volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that

the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course

of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,'

its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Personnel Adm'r

of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote omitted)

(citation omitted); accord Navarro v. Bock, 72 F.3d 712, 716 n.5

(9th Cir. 1995). 

If the yard groups were racially determined, Armstrong's

continued reliance on yard assignments to create the library

schedule may show that she acted with a discriminatory intent. As

discussed, to make an equal protection claim that Armstrong

discriminated on the basis of Bryant's race, Plaintiff must show

that the Defendant acted with a discriminatory intent when

scheduling law library visits. See City of Cuyahoga Falls, 538

U.S. at 194.

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Defendant argues that the attendance records show that yard

group five also contained African-American inmates and was treated

the same as yard group seven, which included mostly Hispanic

prisoners. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 20-21,

ECF No. 91.) In his Declaration, then-Chief Deputy Warden Ochoa

states that there was nothing inherently wrong with scheduling

inmates for library access at times that conflicted with their yard

access. (See id. Attach. #6 Decl. Ochoa 4.) Further, the more law

library time an inmate sought, the greater the potential for a

conflict with yard time. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 20.) When

making the schedules, Armstrong considered legal deadlines, last

minute attendance requests, limited space availability, gang

affiliations, outdoor exercise yard time, and library request

cancellations. (Id. at 22.) 

Plaintiff argues that despite their same yard schedules,

Armstrong intentionally treated Bryant and the other inmates in

yard group two differently from inmates in group one by scheduling

them for the library at times that conflicted with their yard

times. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Decl. Bryant 23, ECF No. 92.) 

Defendant "made it known" that she was affiliated with the

"Southern California Hispanic gangs," and she repeatedly referred

to those inmates as her "Homies." (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 13.) When

Plaintiff went to the law library with Hispanic inmates assigned to

other yards, he heard Armstrong "whispering personal matters" to

those inmates about her two children who were half Hispanic. (Id.

Bryant Decl. 24.) Despite her concern for inmate conflict, Bryant

notes that Armstrong consistently scheduled yard group two

prisoners with prisoners from every other yard group. (Pl.'s Opp'n

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Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 18, ECF No. 101.) When Bryant and other yard

two inmates spoke to Armstrong about her scheduling, she told

Plaintiff, "You don't have to go to the law library!" (Pl.'s Mot.

Summ. J. Decl. Bryant 23, ECF No. 92.) 

As evidence, Bryant attaches copies of the same law library

attendance records from October 29, 2007, to January 8, 2008, that

Defendant Armstrong provided. (Id. Decl. Bryant 24; id. Attach. #1

Ex. 4, at 10-20.) Bryant includes the declaration of inmate Ricky

Smith who also heard Armstrong refer to Southern California Latino

gang members as her "Homies." (Id. Attach. #1 Ex. 5, at 22.) 

Plaintiff relies on the declarations of inmates Donnell Atlas and

Cleveland Dale, who submit that Armstrong gave them an ultimatum to

choose between the law library or recreation time. (Pl.'s Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #1 Ex. 2, at 5-6, ECF No. 92; id. Ex. 3, at 8.)

In one of Armstrong's interrogatory responses, she discloses

that she was arrested for her involvement in a drug conspiracy

involving the "Avenues gang." (Pl.'s Suppl. Decl. Opp'n Defs.'

Mot. Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 115; id. Ex. 37, at 8.) Bryant argues

that being affiliated with a "Southern California Hispanic and/or

race-oriented gang" is evidence that Armstrong intended to racially

discriminate against Plaintiff when making the law library

schedule. (Pl.'s Suppl. Decl. Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 2, ECF

No. 115.) Reasonable minds, however, could differ as to whether

this proves Armstrong's discriminatory intent. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. at 250-51 (stating that judgment should not be

entered in favor of the moving party if reasonable minds could

differ as to the import of the evidence); see also id. at 255

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(noting that weighing evidence and drawing legitimate inferences

from the facts are jury functions). 

The conflicting evidence precludes summary judgment for either

side on the class-wide equal protection claim. See Nelson v. City

of Davis, 571 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that when the

evidence conflicts, questions of credibility present an issue of

fact that is inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment).

a. Class-of-one violation 

An alternative basis for relief may be an equal protection

claim under a class-of-one theory. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 601;

Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. Under this theory, Plaintiff must

establish that Armstrong intentionally treated him differently from

other similarly situated individuals without a rational basis for

the difference in treatment. See id. 

"A class of one plaintiff must show that the discriminatory

treatment 'was intentionally directed just at him, as opposed . . .

to being an accident or a random act.'" North Pacifica LLC v. City

of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jackson v.

Burke, 256 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2001)). A class-of-one claim is

premised on the theory that Defendants "harbor animus against

[plaintiff] in particular and therefore treated [him] arbitrarily." 

Papas v. Arcadia Enters., Inc., No. 3:10-CV-00550-BR, 2012 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 58485, at *37 (D. Or. Apr. 25, 2012). Bryant, however,

alleges that he and other African-American inmates assigned to yard

two were subjected to racial discrimination in violation of their

equal protection rights. (See Second Am. Compl. 13-15, ECF No.

39.)

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To the extent that Plaintiff's allegations give rise to a

class-of-one equal protection claim, Defendant urges that any

disparate treatment was based on several considerations that were

rationally related to a legitimate purpose. (See Defs.' Mot. Summ.

J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 22, ECF No. 91.) Defendant represents

that when scheduling inmates for the library, she had to balance

several priorities. (Id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong 4.)

Bryant was assigned law library sessions on twenty-two

different occasions. (Id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong Ex. A, at

10-20.) He was given priority law library access nineteen out of

the twenty-two times due to verified court deadlines. (Id.; see

also id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong 4-5 (reflecting that Armstrong

had to give priority law library access to inmates with court

deadlines).) As previously discussed, the record reflects that

Bryant had six out of twenty-two scheduling conflicts, or 27.27% of

the time. (See generally id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong Ex. A, at

10-20; id. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga Ex. A, at 16-36.) Yard group

seven prisoners had two conflicts out of nineteen conflicts, which

is 10.52% of the time, and yard group six inmates had one conflict

out of nine sessions, or 11.11% of the time. (Id.) Inmates in

yard groups one, three, five, seven, and eight had no conflicts. 

(Id.) 

Armstrong scheduled Bryant for library time that conflicted

with yard time more frequently than she scheduled conflicting

library and yard times for other inmates. The inquiry is whether

the schedules could have been rationally related to a legitimate

governmental interest. See Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. "[W]hen

undertaking rational basis review, the party defending the

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constitutionality of the [conduct] need not introduce evidence or

prove the actual motivation behind [the conduct], but need only

demonstrate that there is some legitimate justification that could

have motivated the action." Adhi Parasakthi Charitable v. Twp. of

W. Pikeland, 721 F. Supp. 2d 361, 381 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (emphasis

added) (citing FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).

Armstrong identifies several considerations she had to take

into account when making the library schedules. (Defs.' Mot. Summ.

J. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong 4-5, ECF No. 91.) She submits that

she had to give inmates with court deadlines priority, process

inmates' library request slips, and fill canceled library spots. 

(Id. at 4-6.) The Defendant also considered inmates' yard group

assignments because some yard groups could not go to the law

library at the same time due to a potential for conflict. (Defs.'

Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong 5, ECF No. 91.) 

Defendant also had to check inmates' ASU files for enemies and

affiliations, but she does not reference any instance in which this

concern led to Bryant's scheduling conflicts. (Id.) Moreover, the

evidence reflects that Defendant repeatedly scheduled individuals

from two to four different yard groups together at a time to attend

the law library. (See generally id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong Ex.

A, at 10-20.)

Armstrong indicates she had to consider which yard groups were

attending yard recreation on a particular day to avoid conflicts

because the exercise yards were located "outside the rear exit of

ASU 2," which is the same exit used to escort inmates to the van to

be transported to the law library. (Id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong

5.) Cellmates or inmates in the same yard group could be escorted

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to the van in groups; otherwise, inmates were escorted separately

and the exercise yard was "shut down." (Id. at 5-6.) Because this

caused delays, Armstrong typically scheduled yard groups for law

library time when those groups were scheduled for yard time. (Id.

at 6.) 

Under the allegations in his Second Amended Complaint and in

light of the evidence submitted, Bryant cannot succeed on a classof-one equal protection claim. First, he maintains that AfricanAmerican inmates in yard two are being discriminated against by

Armstrong on the basis of race, a class-wide theory. Second, the

only animus offered by Plaintiff is that Defendant Armstrong

assigned Hispanics and Whites library and yard times that did not

conflict.

Defendant Armstrong's Motion for Summary Judgment on the

class-wide equal protection claim against her in count one should

be DENIED. But to the extent Plaintiff is pursuing a class-of-one

equal protection claim against Armstrong, Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment should be GRANTED. The Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment on count one should also be DENIED.

B. Count Two: Retaliation (Armstrong)

Inmates have a First Amendment right to meaningful access to

the courts, which includes the right to invoke established prison

grievance procedures. Trueman v. State, No. CV 09-2179-PHXRCB(DKD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67847, at *12 (D. Ariz. June 15,

2010) (citing Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

Government officials may not retaliate against prisoners who

exercise their First Amendment rights. Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d

1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v.

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Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (suspending permits

because of Soranno's public criticism of defendants). 

Because retaliation by prison officials may chill a prisoner's

exercise of legitimate First Amendment rights, retaliatory conduct

is actionable even if it would not otherwise rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1242

(11th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, courts review

these claims with particular care because they are prone to abuse

by prisoners. Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996).

Defendant Armstrong argues that she is entitled to summary

judgment on the retaliation claim in count two. (Defs.' Mot. Summ.

J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 22, ECF No. 91.) She states that she

did not issue the allegedly retaliatory informational chrono

against Bryant on January 28, 2008, because of his advice to

another inmate about filing grievances; rather, she issued it

because of multiple instances of misconduct by Plaintiff between

January 8 and 28, 2008. (Id. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong, at 7-8.) 

The Defendant warned Plaintiff about several inappropriate comments

he made to her before she ultimately issued the chrono on January

28th. (Id. at 7.) 

Bryant contends that Armstrong "knew of the protected speech." 

(Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 15, ECF No. 92.) In the chrono she wrote on

Bryant, Armstrong refers to statements he made about a grievance

that was submitted by another inmate, Teklezgi Gebrezgiabher, on

January 28, 2008. (Id.) Plaintiff believes the timing is suspect,

as Defendant later conceded in an interrogatory response that the

chrono was actually submitted on January 28, instead of January 8,

2008. (Id.) Armstrong also accused Plaintiff of "dropp[ing] a

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kite," or snitching, and then taped the written complaint to her

desk and displayed it for other prisoners to see. (Id.; see id.

Decl. Gebrezgiabher 24-25.)

A plaintiff suing prison officials under § 1983 for

retaliation must establish (1) that "the retaliated-against conduct

is protected," (2) the "defendant took adverse action against

plaintiff," (3) the existence of a "causal connection between the

adverse action and the protected conduct," (4) the act "would chill

or silence a person of ordinary firmness," and (5) that the conduct

does not further a legitimate penological interest. Watison v.

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff can

allege retaliatory intent by showing a time line of events from

which retaliation can be inferred. See id. (citations omitted). 

The informational chrono issued by Armstrong is dated

"Tuesday, January 8, 2008," but references events that occurred on

January 8, 22, 25, and 28, 2008. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1

Ex. 8, at 38, ECF No. 92 (emphasis added).) Armstrong states in

her declaration and response to an interrogatory that the January

8, 2008 date on the chrono is a typographical error. (Defs.' Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong 7, ECF No. 91; Pl.'s Mot. Summ.

J. Ex. 9, at 42, ECF No. 92 ("To the best of my recollection, the

date of the chrono should be January 28, 2008, which is the date of

the last incident mentioned in the chrono.").) This, however, was

not a Tuesday.

Bryant submitted a grievance against Armstrong on January 29,

2008, alleging discriminatory law library scheduling. (Defs.' Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #3 Decl. Janda Ex. C, at 6, ECF No. 91.) 

According to Plaintiff, he did not receive the informational chrono

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until February 7, 2008, which was after his grievance against

Armstrong. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Decl. Bryant 25, ECF No. 92.) 

Plaintiff submitted another grievance against Armstrong on February

19, 2008, for the false informational chrono she previously

submitted against Bryant. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 Decl.

Janda Ex. D, at 17, ECF No. 91.)

There is a genuine issue of fact as to the nature of the

retaliated-against conduct and whether it was protected. Bryant

maintains that he was "advising Gebrezgiabher on how to secure his

CDC 602 grievance, [and] Defendant Armstrong became irate . . . ." 

(Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Decl. Bryant 25, ECF No. 92.) Armstrong

counters that "Bryant insinuated to another inmate that I would

commit misconduct by misplacing an inmate appeal that was handed to

me." (Defs.' Mot. Summ J. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong 7, ECF No.

91.) Assisting another inmate with the prison grievance procedure

is protected by the First Amendment. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d

527, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1985); accord Wiideman v. Smith, No. 3:10-cv0329-LRH-RAM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96712, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 26,

2010); Lewis v. Tilton, No. 1:07-cv-519-OWW-DLB (PC), 2008 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 11325, at *24 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2008). But see Adams

v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 1987); McCalvin v.

Fairman, 603 F. Supp. 342, 347 (C.D. Ill. 1985). 

If Armstrong submitted the chrono on January 28, 2008, as she

believes, the purportedly retaliatory chrono was written after

Bryant advised inmate Gebrezgiabher but before Bryant filed the

grievance against Armstrong on January 29, 2008. Yet, if the

chrono was actually submitted after January 28, 2008, it could have

been issued in retaliation for giving legal advice to another

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inmate or for the grievance Bryant submitted against Armstrong on

January 29, 2008. See id. Under either scenario, Bryant would

have been exercising his First Amendment rights.

Plaintiff must demonstrate that Armstrong took "adverse

action" against him. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. But the adverse

action need not rise to the level of a separate constitutional

violation. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 804, 806 (9th Cir.

1995) (claiming "transfer and subsequent double-celling were done

in retaliation for [plaintiff's] exercise of First Amendment

rights[]"). More recently, the Ninth Circuit has stated that "the

mere threat of harm can be an adverse action . . . ." Brodheim v.

Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009). "[T]he record before the

district court was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether [the corrections officer's] warning

constituted an adverse action." Id.

Here, Bryant asserts that Armstrong wrote a "false and

retaliatory '128-B Information Chrono'" accusing him of making

inappropriate comments to her. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Decl. Bryant

25-26, ECF No. 92.) The chrono was written after Bryant assisted

inmate Gebrezgiabher with his grievance against Armstrong and after

Bryant complained to Sergeant Ellis that Armstrong had accused

Plaintiff of "'dropping a kite' (Snitching)" on her. (Id. at 25.) 

The evidence is sufficient to establish the second element of a

retaliation claim, taking adverse action against the Plaintiff. 

See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. 

The remaining elements of Bryant's claim against Armstrong

cannot be resolved on these cross motions. For example, according

to Defendant Armstrong, on January 28, 2008, "Bryant insinuated to

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another inmate that I would commit misconduct by misplacing an

inmate appeal that was handed to me. It was obvious that my verbal

warnings did not work, so I wrote an Information Chrono . . . ." 

(Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Decl. Armstrong 7, ECF No. 91.) 

She wrote the chrono "based on the accumulation of events and

totality of the circumstances." (Id.) There are genuine issues of

fact as to whether (a) Bryant's protected conduct was the basis for

Armstrong's adverse action; (b) the Defendant's acts would chill a

person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activity;

and (c) Armstrong's action advanced legitimate goals of the prison

system. See id.

The jury is in the best position to weigh the credibility of

Plaintiff and Defendant, identify the constitutionally protected

conduct Bryant engaged in, and determine whether Armstrong filed

the chrono in retaliation for Plaintiff's protected conduct. See

Nelson, 571 F.3d at 929. The remaining factors required for a

retaliation claim depend on a determination of the facts. 

Accordingly, Armstrong's Motion for Summary Judgment on the

retaliation claim against her in count two should be DENIED. 

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim should also

be DENIED.

C. Count Three: Equal Protection and Retaliation (Lizarraga,

Trujillo, Catlett, Janda, and Ochoa)

1. Equal protection

As discussed previously, a plaintiff can establish an equal

protection cause of action by showing that the defendant

intentionally discriminated on the basis of plaintiff's membership

in a protected class, such as race. Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194-95;

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Damiano, 785 F.2d at 932-33. Or, if the state action does not

implicate a fundamental right or a suspect classification, a

plaintiff can establish an equal protection claim by demonstrating

that the defendant intentionally treated plaintiff differently from

other similarly situated individuals without a rational basis. 

Engquist, 553 U.S. at 601; Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.

a. Lizarraga

Defendant Lizarraga moves for summary judgment on the equal

protection claim in count three that he discriminated against

African-American inmates by moving them from ASU #2 to ASU #1,

which was a more restrictive placement. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 24, ECF No. 91.) The Defendant served as a

"Floor Officer" in ASU #2 during the time in question. (Id.

Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga 1.) He sometimes "physically escorted"

inmates that were being transferred from one unit to another. (Id.

at 4.)

First, Lizarraga submits that there is no evidence that

African-American inmates were treated differently from other

inmates being transferred from ASU #2 to ASU #1. (Id. Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 24.) Second, prisoners were not transferred for

punishment or retaliation; rather, when a cell became available in

ASU #1, an inmate from ASU #2, who was compatible with the inmate

in an available cell, was moved. (Id.) Third, staff in ASU #1

contacted staff in ASU #2 to request an inmate transfer. (Id. at

24-25.) Fourth, Lizarraga asserts that as a floor officer, he did

not order or approve Bryant's transfer and lacked the authority to

do so. (Id. at 25.)

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Bryant argues that after he and inmate Gebrezgiabher filed

grievances against Armstrong for racial discrimination, Lizarraga

retaliated by targeting African-American inmates assigned to ASU

#2, yard group two, and transferring them to ASU #1 until only

three yard group two inmates remained in ASU #2. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ.

J. 13, ECF No. 92.) "Defendants cannot dispute that there was

never another race of inmates assigned to Group yard No. 2 other

than African-Americans." (Id. at 14.) Also, Lizarraga knew that

yard two was comprised solely of African-American inmates when he

initiated his racially-motivated cell moves. (Pl.'s Opp'n Defs.'

Mot. Summ. J. 18, ECF No. 101.)

In his Declaration, the Defendant explains that the primary

administrative segregation unit at Calipatria is ASU #1, but in

2007-2008, officials used ASU #2 as an overflow segregation unit. 

(Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga 2, ECF No. 91.) 

ASU #1 was kept at full capacity, and as space became available,

prisoners were transferred from ASU #2 to ASU #1. (Id.) Inmates

preferred to be housed in ASU #2. (Id.) Lizarraga represents that

he did not have authority to transfer inmates from ASU #2 to ASU

#1, or determine which inmates would be transferred, though he

often escorted inmates during a transfer. (Id. at 4.) The request

by staff in ASU #1 for a transfer had to be approved by a

correctional sergeant or a higher-ranking official, because the

transferring inmate had to be compatible with the inmate in the

available cell. (Id.) Defendant states that on July 7, 2008, he

was informed that Bryant was being transferred from ASU #2 to ASU

#1; Lizarraga did not order or approve the transfer and did not

choose Bryant for the move. (Id.)

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Transportation Sergeant Catlett, Lizarraga's direct

supervisor, acknowledges that he recommended that Bryant be

considered for transfer and that Lizarraga lacked the authority to

order that inmates be transferred. (Id. Attach. #5 Decl. Catlett

1, 3-5; id. Ex. H, at 9.) Bryant's inmate transfer form was

completed by Sergeant Catlett and approved by Watch Commander J.L.

Prado; the form indicates that only a "Correctional Lieutenant or

above" could approve the transfer. (Id. Ex. H, at 9.)

Plaintiff points to some evidence contradicting Lizarraga's

statements that, as a floor officer, he lacked authority to

transfer inmates or select which inmates would be transferred to

ASU #1 when space was available. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (noting

that to withstand a motion for summary judgment, an opposition must

set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows

a genuine issue for trial); Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045 (opposing

party cannot rely on allegations that are not supported by factual

data).

Bryant submits that in a conversation between inmate Tyun

Dodson and Lizarraga, the Defendant stated, "'I'm gonna send Bryant

to ASU.'" (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Ex. 20, at 47, 49, ECF

No. 92 (Dodson Declaration).) Similarly, Lizarraga told inmate

Stevenson, "'Bryant wrote me a 602 (grievance) against me

[Lizarraga], so I moved his ass back to ASU, and you're next . . .

.'" (Id. Ex. 21, at 52 (Stevenson Declaration).) The two thirdparty declarations raise a genuine dispute concerning Lizarraga's

authority to transfer inmates.

"Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of

personal participation by the defendant." Taylor, 880 F.2d at

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1045. State officials are subject to suit in their personal

capacity if "they play an affirmative part in the alleged

deprivation of constitutional rights." King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987). "The inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each

individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have

caused a constitutional deprivation." Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d

628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Bryant has produced evidence sufficient to rebut Lizarraga's

assertion that he had no authority to transfer Bryant to ASU #2. 

There is a genuine issue of fact. For these reasons, Lizarraga's

Motion for Summary Judgment on the equal protection claim in count

three should be DENIED, and the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment should DENIED. 

b. Trujillo

Bryant argues that on August 15, 2008, Trujillo, the senior

hearing officer, conducted Bryant's disciplinary hearing for the

rules violation reported by Lizarraga, Plaintiff's refusal to

double cell. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Decl. Bryant 40, ECF No. 92.) 

Trujillo racially discriminated against Plaintiff by denying his

requests to present defense witnesses to testify during the

hearing. (Id. at 40-41.) The Defendant also wrote a false report

and misrepresented that Plaintiff had chosen not to call any

witnesses at the hearing. (Id.) At the conclusion of the hearing,

Trujillo "displayed racial discriminatory animus" toward Bryant by

calling three Hispanic officers into the office, who surrounded

Bryant in a "menacing manner." (Id. at 42.) Plaintiff contends

that Trujillo then said to him, "We [the Hispanic staff] are gonna

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continue to write you up. You are going to obey us whether you

like our race or not, or we are gonna make sure you don't ever get

out of the hole!" (Id.) 

Defendant Trujillo does not address the equal protection claim

against him in count three. (See generally Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 26, ECF No. 91 (arguing for summary

judgment only on the retaliation allegation against him in count

three).)

Plaintiff claims that Trujillo's misrepresentation of the

record and his threatening statements are evidence that his

decision to deny Plaintiff's request to call witnesses at the

disciplinary hearing was racially motivated. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J.

14, ECF No. 92.) To establish an equal protection violation based

on a protected class, Plaintiff must introduce evidence that

Trujillo acted with discriminatory intent. See City of Cuyahoga

Falls, 538 U.S. at 194. 

Bryant relies on Trujillo's response to interrogatory number

four asking him to state all reasons why, on August 15, 2008, he

"denied Plaintiff's request to have the inmates listed as

Plaintiff's witnesses on the CDC 115-A form" attend the

disciplinary hearing. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Ex. 29, at

108, ECF No. 92.) The form lists inmates Booker and Dodson. (Id.

Attach. #2 Ex. 25, at 78.) Trujillo responded to the interrogatory

as follows:

Because Plaintiff was in the Administrative

Segregation Unit, he was assigned an Investigative

Employee to assist him in investigating the charges and

interviewing witnesses. The Investigative Employee

interviewed both inmate witnesses prior to the

disciplinary hearing, and documented the interviews in

the Investigative Employee Report. Prior to the hearing,

I reviewed the Investigative Employee Report with the

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witness statements. Therefore, there was no need to

bring the inmates to the hearing.

(Id. Ex. 29, at 108-09.) In the violation report he signed on

September 12, 2008, Lieutenant Trujillo wrote, "Inmate BRYANT chose

not to have witnesses at the hearing." (Id. Attach. #2 Ex. 25, at

75.)

Trujillo's interrogatory response does not dispute that Bryant

asked to call inmates Booker and Dodson at the hearing, and that

Trujillo ignored this request. Apparently, he no longer maintains

that Bryant chose not to have witnesses at the hearing. Instead,

Trujillo states that Bryant was not prejudiced because Trujillo

reviewed the inmate witness' statements before the hearing. (See

id. Ex. 29, at 108-09.) The Defendant also disputes that he

threatened Plaintiff, called three Hispanic officers into the rules

violation hearing to threaten Bryant, or made any raciallymotivated threats. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #4 Decl. Trujillo

3, ECF No. 91.)

It is unclear whether Trujillo maintains that Bryant chose not

to call witnesses at the disciplinary hearings. The Defendant's

equivocal response to Plaintiff's interrogatory is circumstantial

evidence of Trujillo's intent to discriminate. Whether Trujillo

and other Hispanic officers threatened Plaintiff because of his

race is disputed and is for the jury to resolve. Credibility

determinations, weighing of the evidence, and drawing of legitimate

inferences all preclude summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. at 255. 

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against Trujillo on

the equal protection cause of action in count three should be

DENIED. 

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2. Retaliation

Bryant moves for summary judgment against Defendants

Lizarraga, Trujillo, Catlett, and Janda on the retaliation claim in

count three. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 14-20, ECF No. 92.) All six

Defendants move for summary judgment on the same claim. (Defs.'

Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 24-28, ECF No. 91.)

a. Armstrong

Defendant Armstrong argues that she is entitled to summary

judgment on the claim that she retaliated against Bryant by

transferring him to ASU #1. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 26, ECF No. 91.) Defendant states that she is alleged to

have had "private conversations" with Lizarraga, but she lacked the

authority to order or approve cell moves. (Id.) Armstrong

contends that there is "no evidence" that she was involved in

Plaintiff's cell transfer. (Id.) Essentially, Defendant argues

that she had no authority to transfer Bryant, the adverse action

alleged in count three. The Plaintiff does not address this

argument in either his Motion for Summary Judgment or in his

Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 

In the Second Amended Complaint, Bryant does not assert that

Armstrong retaliated against him by transferring Bryant to ASU #1. 

If anything, his claim is that after Armstrong's tenure as legal

officer ended, she was seen in ASU #2 "having private

conversations" with Lizarraga before he initiated his campaign of

racially-motivated cell transfers. (Second Am. Compl. 26, ECF No.

39). The Plaintiff has not asserted an independent retaliation

claim against Defendant Armstrong for transferring him to ASU #1. 

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Defendant Armstrong's Motion for Summary Judgment based on a

retaliation claim in count three should be GRANTED. 

b. Lizarraga

Defendant Lizarraga also moves for summary judgment on the

claim that he retaliated against Bryant for filing grievances by

transferring Plaintiff to ASU #1 and issuing a false rules

violation report. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

20, ECF No. 91.) First, Defendant asserts he could not have

retaliated by transferring Bryant to ASU #1 because he lacked the

authority to do so. (Id. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga 4.) Second,

Lizarraga did not retaliate by issuing the rules violation because

the violation was for Plaintiff's refusal to follow a direct order

to accept a cellmate, which Bryant admits. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P.

& A. 25; id. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga 3-4.) 

Bryant argues that on May 28, 2008, he submitted a grievance

against Lizarraga for racially motivated and retaliatory cell

transfers; after the submission, the Defendant came to Bryant's

cell threatening to move him back to ASU #1. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J.

16, ECF No. 92; see id. Decl. Bryant 31.) Inmates Dodson and

Stevenson, in their declarations, state that Lizarraga separately

told each that he transferred, or was going to transfer, Bryant to

ASU. (Id. Attach. #2 Ex. 20, at 49; id. Ex. 21, at 52.)

Bryant asserts that on July 2, 2008, Lizarraga announced,

"Yard #2 i[s] on the yard, so I am going to move some of them to

ASU." (Id. Decl. Bryant 31.) Defendant also threatened to write

up Plaintiff if he refused to live with a cellmate. (Id.) On July

7, 2008, while Bryant was at the law library, he was moved to ASU

#1; Plaintiff claims that Lizarraga disposed of some of Bryant's

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legal documents. (Id. at 37; Pl.'s Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 23,

ECF No. 101.) Plaintiff disputes that Lizarraga escorted him to a

holding cell in ASU #2 before the move. (Pl.'s Opp'n Defs.' Mot.

Summ. J. 23, ECF No. 101 (asserting that Lizarraga's statement is

contradicted in the declaration of inmate Rodney Jones).) Bryant's

claim that Lizarraga retaliated against him by transferring

Plaintiff to ASU #1 cannot be decided at this stage because there

is a genuine dispute over whether the Defendant transferred the

Plaintiff to ASU #1. 

Bryant argues that on July 17, 2008, he was served with a

false and retaliatory disciplinary report written by Lizarraga

indicating that Bryant had "refused a direct order to double cell." 

(Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 16, ECF No. 92.) The Defendant did not follow

double-celling procedure, which Plaintiff urges is further evidence

of retaliation. (Id. at 17; see id. Decl. Bryant 33.) The timing

of Lizarraga's disciplinary report suggests a retaliatory motive

because it was filed on July 8, 2008, less than thirty days after

Plaintiff's resubmitted grievance against Lizarraga was logged. 

(Id. Decl. Bryant 37.) 

Bryant submitted his grievance against Lizarraga on May 28,

2008. (Id. Attach. #1 Ex. 14, at 72.) Plaintiff resubmitted it on

June 5, 2008, and it was ultimately "logged" on June 9, 2008. (Id.

Decl. Bryant 37; see also id. Attach. #1 Ex. 14, at 72, 75.) On

July 2, 2008, the Defendant notified Bryant that because he had

been temporarily single-celled, a compatible cellmate would be

assigned to Bryant's cell. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #7 Decl.

Lizarraga 3, ECF No. 91.) Bryant contends that Defendant

threatened to write him up unless he agreed to cell with inmate

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Booker. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Decl. Bryant 31, ECF No. 92.) When

Plaintiff refused Lizarraga's direct order to accept a cellmate,

Defendant issued a rules violation report. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga 3, ECF No. 91.) 

In his July 8, 2008 rules violation report, Lizarraga states

the following:

On Wednesday, July 2, 2008, . . . I instructed

Inmate BRYANT . . . to prepare to receive a cell mate to

accommodate institutional needs. I informed BRYANT he

was double cell cleared and needed to [] a cell mate, and

a refusal too [sic] double cell would result in the

issuance of a CDCR 115 rules violation report. Inmate

BRYANT stated 'well then, you have your answer[.]' I

ask[ed] BRYANT if that meant he was refusing to double

cell. Inmate BRYANT stated 'do what you gotta do[] I

ain't doubling up'. I informed BRYANT that I intended on

housing Inmate BOOKER . . . who is assigned to the same

yard group as himself an[d] who is currently housed

singly with him. BRYANT stated 'you got my answer, and

when you write me up just don't lie I hate Liars.'

(Id. Attach. #4 Decl. Trujillo Ex. F, at 5.) The Plaintiff was

ultimately found guilty of refusing a direct order to double cell. 

(Id. at 8.) 

There is no issue of fact as to whether Bryant's conduct was

protected. He was exercising his First Amendment right to file

inmate grievances and discuss the grievance procedure with other

inmates. See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. Similarly, Lizarraga took

adverse action by issuing a rules violation against Bryant on July

8, 2008. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga 3, ECF

No. 91; see id. Attach. #4 Decl. Trujillo Ex. F, at 5.) Because

whether the Defendant transferred Bryant is disputed, neither party

is entitled to summary judgment on this aspect of Plaintiff's

retaliation claim. 

There is a material issue of fact as to whether the Defendant

transferred Bryant and, if so, whether he transferred Plaintiff and

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issued the rules violation to retaliate for protected First

Amendment activity. There is insufficient evidence to warrant

summary judgment for either party because the responsibility for

the transfer to ASU #1 and the causal connection are disputed. 

Defendant Lizarraga's Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED. 

The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should also be DENIED.

c. Trujillo

Defendant Trujillo argues that there is no evidence that he

retaliated by conducting Bryant's disciplinary hearing unfairly. 

(Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 26, ECF No. 91.) 

Defendant maintains that he was impartial during the hearing and

assigned an investigative employee to assist Bryant in interviewing

witnesses. (Id. Attach. #4 Decl. Trujillo, at 2.) Trujillo states

that he read the witness interviews and Bryant's written statement,

and Trujillo permitted Plaintiff to question the reporting officer,

Lizarraga, during the hearing. (Id.) 

Bryant argues that Trujillo retaliated by refusing Plaintiff's

requests to call defense witnesses and then misrepresenting that

Bryant merely chose not to call any witnesses. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ.

J. Decl. Bryant 40-41, ECF No. 92.) When Plaintiff appealed

Trujillo's finding on October 8, 2008, Defendant misrepresented the

facts again by stating that he allowed Bryant to call witnesses. 

(Id. at 42.) Yet, in his subsequent discovery responses, Trujillo

stated that "'there was no need to bring witnesses to the

hearing.'" (Id. at 43.) 

As an initial matter, it does not appear that Trujillo

disputes that Bryant engaged in conduct that was constitutionally

protected or that Trujillo's conduct can constitute an adverse

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action, which would satisfy two elements of a retaliation claim. 

See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. Trujillo does, however, dispute

that the disciplinary hearing was conducted to retaliate against

Plaintiff for constitutionally protected activity. He also

disputes that threatening conduct occurred. A genuine issue of

fact exists as to causation, whether the Defendant's conduct would

chill protected activity, and whether Trujillo's actions furthered

a legitimate penological interest. These elements of Bryant's

retaliation claim cannot be resolved on the evidence before the

Court. Consequently, neither Bryant nor Trujillo is entitled to

summary judgment. The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on

the retaliation claim against him in count three should be DENIED. 

Likewise, Bryant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED. 

d. Catlett

Defendant Catlett seeks summary judgment on Bryant's claim

that by denying his inmate appeals regarding Lizarraga's

retaliatory cell moves, Catlett sanctioned Lizarraga's retaliatory

conduct. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 27, ECF No.

91.) Catlett argues that his only involvement was interviewing

Plaintiff in response to his inmate appeals, and therefore there is

no evidence that he sanctioned Lizarraga's purportedly retaliatory

conduct. (Id.) 

Bryant states that Catlett knew Plaintiff had filed a

grievance against Lizarraga for discriminating and retaliating

through cell transfers. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 17-18, ECF No. 92

(referencing grievance log Cal-A-08-01027); see id. Attach. #1 Ex.

14, at 70-72 (indicating that this grievance was filed against

Lizarraga only).) Correctional Sergeant Catlett "endorsed"

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Lizarraga's false disciplinary report by signing it as the

reviewing officer, and he was with Lizarraga on July 7, 2008, when

they discussed double celling, and Catlett "authorized the racially

motivated retaliatory cell move" to ASU #1. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J.

18, ECF No. 92; id. Attach. #2 Ex. 23, at 59.) Catlett also

falsified information at his first level of review of Bryant's

grievance against Lizarraga when Catlett stated that he interviewed

Bryant on July 27, 2008, but in his discovery responses, Catlett

stated that he could not recall whether he interviewed Plaintiff. 

(Id. Decl. Bryant 39.) 

In his Opposition to Catlett's Motion for Summary Judgment,

Bryant also states that Catlett falsified a chrono indicating that

on July 2, 2008, Plaintiff told other inmates that they would be

moved to ASU #1 if they accepted a cellmate, but they could stay in

ASU #2 if they refused. (Pl.'s Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 24, ECF

No. 101.) According to Plaintiff, Catlett's reason for issuing the

chrono and recommending that Bryant be transferred to ASU #1 was

pretextual because Plaintiff's statements to other inmates did not

violate any institutional rule and were protected by the First

Amendment. (Id. at 25.) 

Some of the elements of Bryant's retaliation claim are not

disputed. First, Bryant exercised his First Amendment right to

file grievances, which is a protected activity. Watison, 668 F.3d

at 1114. Second, Catlett took adverse action against Plaintiff. 

Id. This Defendant issued an informational chrono that detailed

his request that Bryant be transferred to ASU #1. (Defs.' Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #5 Decl. Catlett 3, ECF No. 91; see id. Ex. G, at

7.) He signed the rules violation report that was issued by his

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subordinate, Officer Lizarraga. (Id. Attach. #5 Decl. Catlett 4.) 

But signing the report is not an adverse action that would support

a retaliation claim. The Defendant contests to some degree that he

misrepresented that he had interviewed Bryant; Catlett states in an

interrogatory responses that he does not recall whether he or

someone else personally interviewed Plaintiff. Nonetheless, this

is not a material issue of fact sufficient to preclude summary

judgment for Defendant Catlett. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

at 248 (stating that material issues are those that might influence

the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law).

But the evidence does conflict as to whether there is a causal

connection between the protected conduct - filing a grievance

against Lizarraga on May 28, 2008 - and Catlett's July 2, 2008

chrono. See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. It is unclear whether

Catlett knew that Bryant had submitted a grievance against

Lizarraga on May 28, 2008, before Plaintiff was transferred to ASU

#1 on July 7, 2008. Nonetheless, the parties do not dispute that

Catlett was with Lizarraga on July 2, 2008, when Lizarraga informed

Bryant that he needed to accept a cellmate. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #5 Decl. Catlett 3, ECF No. 91; see id. Ex. G, at 7.) It

is also undisputed that on July 7, 2008, Catlett issued an

informational chrono referring to the cellmate incident and

requesting that Bryant be transferred to ASU #1. (Id. Attach. #5

Decl. Catlett 3-4; see id. Ex. G, at 7.) 

On July 2, 2008, Catlett heard Lizarraga inform Plaintiff that

he needed to accept a cellmate and that if he refused, Lizarraga

would have to issue a rules violation. (Id. at 3; id. Ex. G, at

7.) Plaintiff refused and began encouraging other inmates to do

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the same. (Id. at G, at 7.) Catlett states, "Plaintiff refused an

order, and I knew that Lizarraga would follow policy and issue

Plaintiff a Rules Violation Report (RVR) for the violation. On

July 7, 2008, I wrote a CDC 128 Informational Chrono to document

what I witnessed in support of the forthcoming RVR." (Id. Attach.

#5 Decl. Catlett 3; see id. Ex. G, at 7.) That same day, Catlett

completed a form approving Bryant for transfer to ASU #1. (Id. at

5.) Catlett represents that he was responding to a request from

ASU #1 staff for an inmate transfer. (Id. at 4.) 

Sergeant Catlett's authority to transfer inmates is unclear. 

In his Declaration, Catlett states, "I thought it was appropriate

to transfer Plaintiff to ASU 1. Therefore, I approved Plaintiff

for transfer to ASU 1 that day." (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #5

Decl. Catlett 4-5, ECF No. 91 (emphasis added).) Yet, in the

informational chrono dated July 7, 2008, Catlett wrote, "I am

requesting that Inmate Bryant be rehoused in ASU#1 as his continued

presence in ASU #2 is a disruptive force as he encourages other

Inmates to resist double celling within ASU#2." (Id. Ex. G, at 7

(emphasis added); see also id. Ex. H, at 9.) 

There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a

sufficient causal connection exists between Plaintiff's grievance

against Lizarraga and Catlett's informational chrono and cell

transfer order. The jury should also decide whether Catlett's

actions would chill a person of ordinary firmness and whether they

furthered a legitimate penological interest. See Watison, 668 F.3d

at 1114. Catlett's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment on the retaliation claim against

Catlett in ground three should both be DENIED. 

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e. Ochoa and Janda

Then-Chief Deputy Warden Ochoa and former Associate Warden

Janda argue that the retaliation claims against them in count three

fail as a matter of law. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P.

& A. 27, ECF No. 91; see id. Attach. #3 Decl. Janda 2; id. Attach.

#6 Decl. Ochoa 1.) Ochoa is alleged to have sanctioned the other

Defendants' misconduct by instructing the appeals coordinator to

screen out Bryant's grievance regarding Lizarraga's cell transfers. 

(Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 27.) Defendants Ochoa and Janda

purportedly ratified the racial discrimination of Defendants

Armstrong, Lizarraga, and Trujillo through Ochoa's denials of

Plaintiff's grievances. (Id.) Ochoa and Janda argue that these

claims are merely based on the fact that, as supervisors, they

reviewed and responded to Bryant's inmate appeals. (Id. at 27-28.) 

In their declarations, both Defendants assert that they did

not screen out or refuse to process any of Bryant's appeals. (Id.

Attach. #3 Decl. Janda 2 (affirmatively stating so); id. Attach. #6

Decl. Ochoa 2 (indicating that he has no recollection of screening

out any grievance).) Ochoa and Janda state that they reviewed the

appeals based on the information provided to them, and Janda

submits that there is no evidence that he denied the appeals in

retaliation. (Id. Attach. #3 Decl. Janda 2; id. Attach. #6 Decl.

Ochoa 3.)

The Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant Ochoa's Motion for

Summary Judgment, but he seeks summary judgment on his retaliation

claim against Defendant Janda. (See generally Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J.

15-20, ECF No. 92; see id. at 19-20.) According to Bryant, by

signing Lizarraga's false disciplinary report, which was unfairly

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adjudicated by Trujillo, Janda ratified Lizarraga's and Trujillo's

misconduct. (Id. Decl. Bryant 44; see Defs. Mot. Summ. J Attach.

#4 Decl. Trujillo Ex. F, at 5, ECF No. 91.) Bryant states that

Defendant Janda was aware of two retaliatory cell moves (June 7,

2007, and July 7, 2008) and that he conducted the Institutional

Classification Committee review that resulted in the June 2007

transfer of Plaintiff to ASU #2, yard group two. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ.

J. Decl. Bryant 44-45, ECF No. 92.) 

"A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983

'if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the

constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation.'" Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011),

cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012) (quoting Hansen v.

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A causal connection is

established if a defendant sets in motion a series of acts by

others or knowingly refuses to terminate a series of acts by others

that the supervisor reasonably should have known would lead to a

constitutional violation. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207-08 (citing

Dubner v. City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th

Cir. 2001)). "'A supervisor can be liable in his individual

capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training,

supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence

in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a

reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.'" Id. at

1208 (quoting Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th

Cir. 1998)). 

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The claim against Ochoa is that he sanctioned the Defendants'

misconduct by causing Bryant's grievance to be screened out. The

Defendant completed the second level review for four different

grievances submitted by Plaintiff. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

#6 Decl. Ochoa 2-3, ECF No. 91.) "I don't recall screening-out any

inmate appeals filed by Plaintiff that are mentioned in the Second

Amended Complaint." (Id. at 2.) In opposing Ochoa's Motion for

Summary Judgment, Bryant does not present any arguments or evidence

showing that Ochoa retaliated against him. See Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 324 (requiring that to withstand summary judgment, the opposing

party must produce competent evidence that establishes genuine

issues for trial). 

Bryant belatedly attempts to oppose Ochoa's Motion in his

supplemental memorandum and declaration. (Pl.'s Suppl. Mem. P. &

A. Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 5, ECF No. 113.) He argues that

although Ochoa indicated that he did not review any specific policy

when denying Bryant's appeals, Defendant later identifies a prison

policy "that would support" Ochoa's denial. (Id.; Pl.'s Suppl.

Decl. Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 40, at 33-49, ECF No. 115.) 

Bryant's assertion that Ochoa reviewed the antidiscrimination

policies identified in discovery responses adds little to the claim

against Defendant Ochoa. (See Pl.'s Suppl. Mem. P. & A. Opp'n

Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 5, ECF No. 113.) Plaintiff has not provided

the type of evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 

There is no material triable issue, and Ochoa's Motion should be

GRANTED. 

As to Defendant Janda, on October 7, 2008, he signed the rules

violation report that was written by Lizarraga three months

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earlier; Janda signed in place of Associate Warden S. Anderson, who

was not available to sign the report. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #3 Decl. Janda 3, ECF No. 91; see id. Attach. #4 Decl.

Trujillo Ex. F, at 5.) Janda states, "I signed the RVR as a

reviewer. My task was to review the written report for specificity

and completeness and to spot other issues such as timeliness and

due process issues." (Id. Attach. #3 Decl. Janda 3.) Unlike the

circumstantial evidence that Defendant Catlett knew of Lizarraga's

misconduct because he directly supervised Lizarraga, issued a

chrono against Bryant, and transferred Plaintiff to yard one, there

is no evidence that Janda knew Lizarraga may have had a retaliatory

motive. (See id. Attach. #3 Decl. Ochoa 3 (submitting that the

correctional sergeants directly supervised Defendants Armstrong or

Lizarraga).)

As chairperson of the Institution Classification Committee,

Janda participated in the decision to transfer Plaintiff from ASU

#1 to ASU #2 on June 7, 2007, which was seven days after Bryant

served Janda with a summons and complaint in different civil action

pending before the court. (Id. at 4; Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. Decl.

Bryant 44-45, ECF No. 92.) Also, Bryant submits that Janda knew

that Lizarraga transferred Plaintiff in retaliation a second time

from ASU #2 to ASU #1 on July 7, 2008. (Id. at 45.) 

Bryant points to no evidence indicating how Janda knew about,

or was involved with, a racially motivated and retaliatory cell

transfer on June 7, 2007. The events giving rise to this action

occurred after June 7, 2007. Consequently, they cannot be the

basis for a retaliatory transfer before that date. Furthermore,

there is nothing in the record showing how Janda's position as

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chairperson affected any subsequent cell moves or how Janda was

involved with Lizarraga's July 2008 allegedly retaliatory transfer. 

Bryant attempts to establish Janda's liability because, as a

supervisor, he signed off on a report that Janda reviewed for

completeness and timeliness. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3

Decl. Janda 3, ECF No. 91.) 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that reasonably supports a

conclusion that former-Associate Warden Janda retaliated against

him for engaging in constitutionally-protected conduct. The

eleventh-hour assertion that Janda retaliated against Plaintiff

after Janda was served with a summons for a separate lawsuit is

unrelated to the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. 

There is no basis to conclude that Janda harbored a retaliatory

intent or was aware of Defendants Lizarraga and Trujillo's

misconduct. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207-08. Janda's Motion for

Summary Judgment on the retaliation claim in count three should be

GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED.

D. Count Four: California Civil Code Sections 52.1, 51.7, and 

52(b) (Armstrong, Lizarraga, and Trujillo)

Finally, Defendants Armstrong, Lizarraga, and Trujillo move

for summary judgment on the state law claims against them in count

four. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 29, ECF No.

91.) California Civil Code section 52.1 provides a cause of action

for any person whose rights were interfered with, or were attempted

to be interfered with, by another. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b) (West

2010); Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., 68 Cal. App.

4th 101, 110, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 64-65 (1998). 

California Civil Code § 52.1, commonly known as the

Bane Civil Rights Act, provides that "[a]ny individual

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whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights

secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, has

been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with

[by threats, intimidation, or coercion], may institute

and prosecute . . . a civil action for damages." 

Fernandez v. Morris, No. 08-CV-0601 H(PCL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

54298, at *23 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2008) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code §

52.1(b)).

To state a claim under section 52.1, "the statutory language

clearly requires only 'threats, intimidation, or coercion.'" 

Moreno v. Town of Los Gatos, 267 F. App'x 665, 669 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Some courts have suggested that a plaintiff must also establish the

existence of violence or intimidation by threat of violence. See

Fernandez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54298, at *23 (quoting Cabesuela,

68 Cal. App. 4th at 111, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65); Rabkin v. Dean,

856 F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Cal. Civ. Code §

52.1(j)) ("[T]he statute is meant to protect against violence or

the threat of violence.") The Ninth Circuit, however, has

concluded that requiring violence or a threat of violence "is no

longer a correct interpretation of section 52.1's requirements." 

Moreno, 267 F. App'x at 666.

By way of contrast, California Civil Code section 51.7

provides that persons have the right to be free from violence or

threats of violence resulting from their membership in a protected

class. Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7(a); Cabesuela, 68 Cal. App. 4th at

111, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65 (citing Boccato v. City of Hermosa

Beach, 29 Cal. App. 4th 1797, 1809, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282, 290

(1994)). California Civil Code section 52(b) describes the

available remedies for a violation of section 51.7, which include

"actual damages, punitive damages, a civil penalty of $25,000 per

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plaintiff, attorney's fees and injunctive relief." Pinzon v.

Jensen, No. 1:08-cv-1543 AWI GSA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11185, at

*17 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2009); see Cal. Civil Code § 52(b).

1. Armstrong, Lizarraga, and Trujillo 

These three Defendants argue that the evidence proves they did

not threaten or intimidate Plaintiff; rather, they were merely

performing their job duties to house and guard Bryant, as well as

adjudicate his rules violation. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 29, ECF No. 91.) There is no evidence, the Defendants

contend, that they acted or made threats based on Plaintiff's race;

in fact, Bryant's claim is that Armstrong, Lizarraga, and Trujillo

made threats because Plaintiff filed grievances against them. 

(Id.) Although the Plaintiff does not move for summary judgment on

these claims, he opposes Defendants' Motion. (See Pl.'s Opp'n

Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 28-30, ECF No. 101.) 

The California Supreme Court has explained that to prevail on

a claim under section 52.1, a plaintiff must establish "an

attempted or completed act of interference with a legal right,

accompanied by a form of coercion." Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.

4th 329, 334, 949 P.2d 941, 943-44, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 844, 847

(1998). Federal courts have held that "[t]he word 'interferes' as

used in 52.1 means 'violates.'" Cameron v. Buether, No.

09-CV-2498-IEG(WMc), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27276, at *12 (S.D. Cal.

Mar. 23, 2010) (quoting Austin V. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist.,

149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 883, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 472 (2007)). 

"The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by

'threats, intimidation or coercion,' tried to or did prevent the

plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under

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the law, or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she

was not required to do under the law." Shoval v. San Diego County,

No. 09-CV-01348-H (JMA), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77723, at *10 (S.D.

Cal. Aug. 31, 2009) (quoting Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th at 334, 949

P.2d at 943-44, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847).

Bryant asserts that Defendant Armstrong interfered with his

First and Fourteenth Amendment rights with verbal threats of

violence because of his membership in a protected racial class. 

(Pl.'s Opp'n Pl.' Mot. Summ. J. Decl. Bryant 61, ECF No. 101.) 

Specifically, Armstrong intimidated Bryant with verbal threats of

violence by telling Plaintiff he would get "taken care of and would

not safely walk the prison yard" if he continued to pursue

grievances against Armstrong for discrimination. (Id.) The

Defendant, in contrast, testifies, "I never threatened or

intimidated Plaintiff." (Defs. Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Decl.

Armstrong 8, ECF No. 91.) The jury must evaluate the parties'

credibility to determine whether Armstrong made these threats.

In his Declaration, Plaintiff also claims that Defendant

Armstrong threatened him when she authored a chrono "suggesting

that [Bryant's] safety could be in jeopardy." (Pl.'s Opp'n Defs.'

Mot. Summ. J. 61, ECF No. 101.) Yet, in the July 8, 2008 chrono,

Armstrong described various comments Bryant had made in front of

other inmates regarding her "showing favoritism to other races." 

(Id. Attach. #1 Ex. 8, at 40.) The Defendant also wrote: "Bryant

makes most of these comments in front of other inmates. I feel

that this could possibly jeopardize [Bryant's] safety. I also feel

that Inmate Byant's resentment towards me could lead to him

becoming assaultive towards me based on his extensive past Staff

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assaultive history." (Id.) It is for the jury to decide whether

the reference to Bryant jeopardizing his safety should be construed

as a threat of violence or a form of coercion. 

As to Lizarraga, the Plaintiff represents that Lizarraga

similarly interfered with his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights

with verbal threats of violence because of Bryant's membership in a

protected racial class. (Id. Decl. Bryant 61.) Defendant told

Bryant he would make sure Plaintiff was "taken care of" and would

not be able to safely walk the yard if Plaintiff continued to

pursue grievances for discrimination. (Id.) 

Plaintiff speculates that on July 7, 2008, after Bryant

tendered his grievance against Lizarraga for discriminatory and

retaliatory cell transfers, Lizarraga disposed of some of

Plaintiff's legal documents while moving him to ASU #1. (Id. at

61-62.) The Defendant testifies, in contrast, that he "never

threatened or attempted to intimidate Plaintiff." (Defs.' Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #7 Decl. Lizarraga 5, ECF No. 91.) Lizarraga also

submits that on July 7, 2008, he escorted Bryant to a holding cell

in ASU #2 for the transfer to ASU #1, but did not escort him to ASU

#1 or take his property. (Id.) Bryant's speculation about missing

property does not constitute evidence that would defeat Lizarraga's

Motion for Summary Judgment. Nevertheless, other evidence

conflicts, and Lizarraga is not entitled to summary judgment. 

Finally, Bryant contends that Defendant Trujillo intimidated

Plaintiff with the threat of physical violence when he called

Hispanic officers into the office to surround Plaintiff in a

"menacing manner." (Pl.'s Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Decl. Bryant

//

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63, ECF No. 101.) Trujillo denies that allegation: 

I never threatened or attempted to intimidate

Plaintiff. I did not call any officers or staff into the

RVR hearing in order to threaten or intimidate Plaintiff

for any reason. Specificlaly, I did not call three

Hispanic officers into the RV hearing to harass,

intimidate, or threaten Plaintiff. I never witnessed any

officers or staff threaten or attempt to intimidate

Plaintiff. I never engaged in or made any

racially-motivated attacks or threats against Plaintiff. 

(Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #4 Decl. Trujillo 3, ECF No. 91.) 

This claim cannot be resolved by weighing conflicting declarations. 

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of

the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are

to be drawn in his favor." Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255. 

For these reasons, Defendants Armstrong, Lizarraga, and

Trujillo's Motion for Summary Judgment on the state law claims in

count four should be DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 91]

should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Bryant's Motion for

Summary Judgment should be DENIED.

As to the equal protection cause of action in count one

against Defendant Armstrong, there is a genuine issue of material

fact, and summary judgment on a class-wide theory for neither party

is appropriate and should be DENIED. But Armstrong's Motion for

Summary Judgment for the equal protection cause of action on a

class-of-one theory should be GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment should also DENIED.

With respect to count two, Defendant Armstrong is also not

entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation claim against her. 

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Armstrong's Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED, and

Bryant's Motion for Summary Judgment should also be DENIED.

In count three, there is a genuine issue of material fact for

the equal protection cause of action against Defendant Lizarraga.

His Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED, and Bryant's

Motion should be DENIED. Similarly, Bryant is not entitled to

summary judgment for the equal protection claim against Trujillo in

count three, and Plaintiff's Motion should be DENIED. Trujillo did

not seek summary judgment on this aspect of count three.

Bryant does not attempt to establish a retaliation cause of

action in count three against Armstrong, and her Motion for Summary

Judgment should therefore be GRANTED. There is an issue of fact

with respect to whether Defendant Lizarraga retaliated against

Bryant; Defendant Lizarraga's Motion for Summary Judgment should be

DENIED. Plaintiff's Motion on this claim should also be DENIED. 

Defendant Trujillo is not entitled to summary judgment on the

retaliation claim in count three. Plaintiff's and Defendant

Trujillo's Motions should both be DENIED. Defendant Catlett is not

entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation claim in count

three. Thus, Catlett's Motion for Summary Judgment as well as

Bryant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED. Defendants

Ochoa and Janda are both entitled to summary judgment on the

retaliation claims against them in count three, and their Motion

for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED. Bryant has not moved for

summary judgment against Defendant Ochoa. Plaintiff Bryant's

Motion for Summary Judgment concerning Janda's retaliatory conduct

alleged in count three should be DENIED. 

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Finally, with respect to the California Civil Code violations

asserted in count four, there are material issues of fact as to

whether Defendants Armstrong, Lizarraga, and Trujillo are liable. 

Their Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before August 29, 2012. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before September 12,

2012. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

DATE: August 3, 2012 __________________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

 United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Whelan

All Parties of Record

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