Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01161/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01161-30/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SLOT SPEAKER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-01161-HSG (DMR)

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF SLOT 

SPEAKER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF 

APPLE, INC.’S RULE 3-3 INVALIDITY 

CONTENTIONS

Re: Dkt. No. 157

Plaintiff Slot Speaker Technologies, Inc. (“Slot Speaker”), formerly THX Ltd., moves to 

strike portions of Defendant Apple, Inc.’s (“Apple”) Rule 3-3 invalidity contentions. [Docket No. 

157]. Apple opposes. [Docket No. 171]. The court held a hearing on December 8, 2016. Having 

considered the parties’ arguments and papers, and for the reasons stated below, Slot Speaker’s

motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Apple shall have 14 days in which to serve 

amended contentions consistent with this order. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In this patent case, Slot Speaker alleges infringement of its U.S. Patent Nos. 7,433,483 

(“the ’483 patent”) and 8,457,340 (“the ’340 patent”) (collectively, “the Patents-In-Suit”). First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) [Docket No. 12]. The Patents-In-Suit are entitled “Narrow Profile 

Speaker Configurations and Systems.” FAC ¶¶ 8, 12. The FAC alleges that Apple infringes the 

Patents-In-Suit by, among other things, making, using, importing, offering to sell, and/or selling in

the United States products covered by one or more claims of the Patents-In-Suit in violation of 35 

U.S.C. § 271, including but not limited to Apple’s iPhone 4 and later models, as well as its iPad 

and iMac products. Slot Speaker claims that these accused products infringe the Patents-in-Suit 

by incorporating narrow-profile speaker units that output sound through a duct or aperture having 

a narrow dimension. FAC ¶¶ 10, 14. Apple denies infringement and asserts counterclaims for 

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patent invalidity and non-infringement. [Docket No. 26.] 

On September 24, 2015, Apple served its initial invalidity contentions. The parties met 

and conferred over their sufficiency without reaching agreement. See Exs. 1-2 to Halpern Decl.; 

Exs. 1-2 to Capuyan Decl. On March 5, 2016, Apple filed a motion to amend its invalidity 

contentions. [Docket No. 90]. In its opposition, Slot Speaker criticized Apple’s lack of diligence 

in moving to amend as well as the sufficiency of the invalidity contentions, arguing that they did 

not comply with Rule 3-3. [Docket No. 95]. On April 29, 2016, the Honorable Haywood S. 

Gilliam granted Apple’s motion to amend, finding that Apple had acted with requisite diligence. 

[Docket No. 103]. Judge Gilliam declined to rule on the sufficiency of Apple’s invalidity 

contentions, explaining that the question of whether Apple’s invalidity contentions violate Local 

Rule 3-3 is independent from whether Apple has shown sufficient diligence in moving for leave to 

amend. Judge Gilliam held that “If THX has a basis for doing so, it can bring its own motion 

regarding Apple’s alleged failure to comply with Local Rule 3-3.” [Docket No. 103 at 5-6] 

(emphasis added). 

Slot Speaker subsequently filed the instant motion to strike portions of Apple’s invalidity 

contentions for failure to comply with Rule 3-3. [Docket No. 157]. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

This district has adopted local rules that “require parties to state early in the litigation and 

with specificity their contentions with respect to infringement and invalidity.” O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. 

v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed Cir. 2006). Our patent local rules 

provide “for a streamlined mechanism to replace the series of interrogatories that accused 

infringers would likely have propounded in [their] absence and are designed to require parties to 

crystallize their theories of the case early in the litigation and to adhere to those theories once they 

have been disclosed.” Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. Silergy Corp., No. 14-CV-01745-VC 

(KAW), 2015 WL 5440674, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2015) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Collaborative Agreements, LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc., No. 15-CV-03853-

EMC, 2016 WL 1461487, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2016) (“The main purpose of the discoveryrelated Patent Local Rules is to get the parties to commit to positions early on in the litigation and 

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stick to them absent good cause.”).

The patent local rules require “detailed disclosures of a party’s invalidity contentions.” Life 

Techs. Corp. v. Biosearch Techs, Inc., No. C 12-00852 WHA, 2012 WL 4097740, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 17, 2012). Accordingly, Rule 3-3 provides in relevant part that a party’s invalidity 

contentions must contain:

(a) The identity of each item of prior art that allegedly anticipates 

each asserted claim or renders it obvious . . . .

(b) Whether each item of prior art anticipates each asserted claim or 

renders it obvious. If obviousness is alleged, an explanation of 

why the prior art renders the asserted claim obvious, including 

an identification of any combinations of prior art showing 

obviousness;

(c) A chart identifying where specifically in each alleged item of 

prior art each limitation of each asserted claim is found, 

including for each limitation that such party contends is 

governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), the identity of the structure(s), 

act(s), or material(s) in each item of prior art that performs the 

claimed function; and 

(d) Any grounds of invalidity based on 35 U.S.C. § 101, 

indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) or enablement or written 

description under 35 U.S.C. § 112(1) of any of the asserted 

claim. 

However, these rules are “not a straitjacket into which litigants are locked from the 

moment their contentions are served;” rather, there is “a modest degree of flexibility, at least near 

the outset.” Tessera, Inc. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. C 05-4063 CW, 2007 WL 

1288199, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), 

decision reviewed, No. C-05-4063 CW, 2007 WL 2972628 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2007); see also 

Geovector Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 16-CV-02463-WHO, 2017 WL 76950, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 9, 2017) (explaining that the local rules “do not “require the disclosure of specific 

evidence nor do they require a plaintiff to prove its infringement case . . . a patentee must 

nevertheless disclose what in each accused instrumentality it contends practices each and every 

limitation of each asserted claim to the extent appropriate information is reasonably available to 

it.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

District courts have “wide discretion” in enforcing the patent local rules. Finjan, Inc. v. 

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Proofpoint, Inc., No. 13-CV-05808-HSG, 2015 WL 9460295, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015) 

(citing SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Slot Speaker moves to strike Apple’s invalidity contentions on three grounds: (1) the claim 

charts do not specifically identify where each claim limitation can be found in each alleged item of 

prior art, as required by Rule 3-3(c) (Mot. at 2, 3-15); (2) the claim charts do not identify

obviousness combinations and the motivation for those combinations with the level of specificity 

required by Rule 3-3(b) (Mot. at 2, 18-23); and (3) Apple did not provide claim charts for 

approximately 500 prior art references as required by Rule 3-3(c) (Mot. at 2-3, 19).

The court addresses each of these three challenges in turn.

A. Specificity of Prior Art Claim Charts (Rule 3-3(c))

1. Legal Principles

Under Rule 3-3(c), a party defending against a claim of infringement must provide a chart 

for each item of alleged invalidating prior art which specifically identifies where each limitation 

(or element) of each asserted claim of the patent(s)-in-suit is found. Both parties agree that the 

level of specificity required by Rule 3-3(c) for invalidity contentions is the same as that required 

by Rule 3-1 for infringement contentions. “Broad or general disclosures are ‘insufficient.’”

Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. Sceptre, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-04994-ODW (AJWx), 2015 WL 2369557, at 

*2 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2015) (applying N.D. Patent L.R. 3-3(c)) (quoting Life Techs. Corp., 2012 

WL 4097740, at *3); Largan Precision Co. Ltd. v. Genius Elec. Optical Co., No. 13-cv-02502-JD, 

2012 WL 6882275, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014) (“The requirement that the invalidity 

contentions disclose whether each item of prior art anticipates each asserted claim or renders it 

obvious would be a dead letter if parties could avoid it with broad disclaimers.”). 

Courts in this district have rejected contentions that do not provide adequate notice of a

party’s theory. For example, in Shared Memory Graphics LLC v. Apple, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 

1022, 1025-26 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (Chen, J.), the court found that the infringement contentions

lacked requisite specificity under Rule 3-1 because they were “too vague to provide fair notice as 

to what components and circuitry of the accused products infring[ed] their patents.” To illustrate

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this problem, the court explained that the claim charts failed to “specifically identify the display 

data distribution bus limitation,” and certain charts did not “indicate which structures constitute[d] 

the bus.” Id. 

Similarly in Theranos, Inc. v. Fuisz Pharma LLC, Nos. 11-cv-05236-YGR, 12-cv-03323-

YGR, 2012 WL 6000798, at *4-7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012), the court found that the infringement 

contentions lacked the specificity required by the local rules where the contentions did not 

separately address each limitation in a claim, and gave a generic identification of “where each 

limitation of each asserted claim was found within each Accused Instrumentality,” consisting of 

nothing more than a conclusion “based on information and belief that something exist[ed] or 

occur[ed].” See also Bender v. Infineon Techs., N. Am. Corp., No. C09-02112 JW (HRL), 2010 

WL 946197, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2010) (finding infringement contentions lacked the 

requisite specificity because they were “impermissibly vague;” the claim charts provided “generic 

allegations that [did] not identify specific circuitry or components that reportedly correspond to 

the claim limitations, or at least, not in a manner that [gave] defendant fair notice as to where the 

allegedly infringing circuits [were] located”).

2. Analysis 

Slot Speaker contends that Apple’s claim charts lack the specificity required by Rule 3-

3(c) because the charts do not identify where each claim limitation can be found in each alleged 

item of prior art. The court agrees. Apple’s claim charts leave too much to guesswork.

Slot Speaker identifies three exemplars to illustrate the problems with Apple’s prior art 

charts: (1) Anderson patent chart (Exs. 3 and 29 to Halpern Decl.); (2) Aquarius speaker assembly 

chart (Exs. 4 and 34 to Halpern Decl.); and (3) Nokia mobile phone chart (Exs. 5 and 13 to 

Halpern Decl.). None of these charts provide the requisite level of specificity. 

As discussed during the hearing, the Anderson chart discloses Claim 1C of the ‘483 patent: 

“a sound reflecting surface facing the drive unit and substantially parallel with the mounting 

surface.” Ex. 3 at 8 to Halpern Decl. However, the Anderson chart does not explain what Apple 

identifies as the “sound reflecting surface.” Apple merely reproduces portions of the Anderson 

patent, highlights some of the text, and includes figures from the patent, as shown below: 

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‘483 Patent Claim Limitation Anderson

[1C] a sound reflecting surface 

facing the drive unit and 

substantially parallel with the 

mounting surface; and 

Anderson discloses a sound reflecting surface facing the drive 

unit and substantially parallel with the mounting surface. 

See, e.g.,

“The invention generally comprises of a cover 10, a base or 

acoustic reflector 12, and a speaker 14. The speaker is 

attached to a support plate 16, which in tum is mounted 

within the cover 10. A plurality of bushings 18 position the 

support plate a measured distance above the base 12. The 

speaker 14 is positioned upon the support plate 16 to direct 

sound downwardly toward and in the vicinity of the 

generally circular base 12.” (Anderson at 2:51-59 (emphasis 

added)). 

“The sides of the base facing the speaker are angled away 

from the speaker to near the surface upon the assembly 

rests, and are composed of an acoustically reflective 

material that sound is radially reflected in all horizontal 

directions off of the base 12.” (Anderson at 2:60-64 

(emphasis added)). 

. . . 

Although the preferred embodiment of the invention includes a 

conial recess in the top of the base 12, a variety of other 

configurations for the base 12 are possible. Alternative 

embodiments of the top of the base 12 include semispherical 

recess, a flat top, a pointed convex conical top, and a 

pointed convex conical top with a more acute angle to the

upper cone surface than the general conical angle of the 

base 12. Moreover, the configuration of the base 12 is not 

limited to strict conical sides, but instead may use any 

configuration that allows sound to be radially reflected in 

generally all horizontal directions away from the speaker 

assembly. Additionally, the assembly may be constructed to 

direct sound from the speaker in just a few of the 

circumferential directions.” (Anderson at 5:18-21 (emphasis 

added)).

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‘483 Patent Claim Limitation Anderson

Apple does not explain how the bolded text and/or figures disclose each element of the limitation, 

e.g., the sound reflecting surface, which must face the drive, and must be substantially parallel 

with the mounting surface. Instead, Apple leaves it to Slot Speaker (and the court) to speculate. 

This is insufficient under Rule 3-3. See Shared Memory Graphics LLC, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 1026 

(concluding that the patentee’s “vague contentions and conclusory statements invite[d] Defendants 

and the Court merely to assume the presence” of the claim limitation). To comply with Rule 3-

3(c)’s disclosure requirements, Apple must specifically identify where each limitation appears in 

the Anderson patent, or, at least narrow the range of possibilities (e.g., “Apple considers the 

‘sound reflecting surface’ to be one of the following....”) While Apple is not required to lock 

down its invalidity theories at this stage in the case, Apple also cannot preserve a generalized

meaning of the phrase “sound reflecting surface,” and force Slot Speaker to chase down every 

conceivable rabbit hole during discovery. 

Similarly, for its chart of the Aquarius sound assembly, Apple simply re-produces the same 

pictures and/or diagrams from the product catalog, and bolds certain text in Aquarius publications. 

For example, the JBL Aquarius chart discloses the following for Claim 1B of the ‘483 patent:

//

//

//

//

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‘483 Patent Claim Limitation JBL Aquarius 4

[1B] a drive unit disposed on a

mounting surface, said

mounting surface forming a

barrier acoustically isolating

the drive unit’s forward

radiation from its rearward

radiation

JBL Aquarius 4 discloses a drive unit disposed on a mounting 

surface, said mounting surface

forming a barrier acoustically isolating the drive unit’s forward 

radiation from its rearward

radiation.

See, e.g.,

(JBL Aquarius 4 Catalogue at 13) 

“The Aquarius Series were all based on a common design 

principle slot loaded bass enclosures

combined with a widely dispersed high frequency response. 

The intent was to develop a series of

loudspeakers that would have few limitations in room 

placement and a stereo sound field

that was largely independent of listener position.” (JBL 

Aquarius 4 Article at 1 (emphasis added))

. . . 

. . .

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See Ex. 4 at 3-11 to Halpern Decl.

As with the Anderson patent chart, Apple fails to explain what pictures and/or diagrams, or 

language from the Aquarius publications, or combinations thereof disclose “a drive unit disposed 

on a mounting surface, said mounting surface forming a barrier acoustically isolating the drive 

unit’s forward radiation from its rearward radiation,” as specified in Claim 1B of the ‘483 patent. 

For its Nokia mobile phone chart, Apple produces a series of unlabeled photographs of the 

exterior of certain Nokia mobile phones, and incorporates them by reference for each claim 

limitation in the chart. See Ex. 13 at 3-15 to Halpern Decl. 

‘483 Patent Claim Limitation Nokia 3361, 3395, and 3315 mobile phones

[1A] 1. A narrow profile sound

system, comprising:

To the extent the preamble is a limitation, the Nokia 3361, 

3395, and 3315 mobile phones disclose

a narrow profile sound system.

See, e.g., 

. . . 

. . . 

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‘483 Patent Claim Limitation Nokia 3361, 3395, and 3315 mobile phones

[1B] a drive unit disposed on a

mounting surface, said

mounting surface forming a

barrier acoustically isolating

the drive unit’s forward

radiation from its rearward

radiation;

Nokia 3361, 3395, and 3315 mobile phones disclose a drive 

unit disposed on a mounting surface,

said mounting surface forming a barrier acoustically isolating 

the drive unit’s forward radiation

from its rearward radiation.

See, e.g.,

Limitation [1a], Nokia 3361 Images A, B, Nokia 3395 Images 

A, B, D, E, Nokia 3315 Images A,

B; Nokia 3361 User Guide at cover, 63; Nokia 3395 User 

Guide at cover, 35; Nokia 3315 User

Guide at 21.

. . . 

This type of disclosure is plainly insufficient under Rule 3-3(c), as these photographs do 

little more than show what each phone looks like. Apple compounds the problem by 

incorporating the unlabeled photographs by reference into its charting of other claims (see, e.g., 

Claim 1B, above). To comply with Rule 3-3(c), Apple must label the relevant portion(s) of each 

photograph and explain how the photographs individually or collectively disclose the claim 

limitation. 

In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, the court grants Slot Speaker’s motion to strike

for failure to satisfy Rule 3-3(c), and orders Apple to amend all offending charts, and not just the 

exemplars discussed in this order. 

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B. Obviousness 

1. Legal Principles

Rule 3-3(b) requires a disclosure of “[w]hether each item of prior art anticipates each 

asserted claim or renders it obvious,” and if “obviousness is alleged, an explanation of why the 

prior art renders the asserted claim obvious, including an identification of any combinations of 

prior art showing obviousness.” Vague or “catch-all phrases” of obviousness are insufficient. 

See, e.g., Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., 2015 WL 2369557, at *3 (the “catch-all phrase ‘any element of 

an asserted claim can easily be identified by cross-reference to the same particular claim element 

in other charted prior art reference to show that the element was known in the prior art’” was

insufficient under Rule 3-3(b)); Life Techs., 2012 WL 4097740, at *3 (“Vaguely disclosing that 

one prior art can substitute for another is insufficient under our local rules.”); see also Zest IP 

Holdings, LLC v. Implant Direct MFG, LLC, No. 10CV0541-GPC-WVG, 2014 WL 358430, at *5 

(S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (a blanket statement that “each item of the prior art renders the asserted 

claims obvious in combination with each other, or any of them, and/or in combination with 

features well known to people with skill in the art at the time of the respective applications” was 

insufficient under S.D. Cal. Patent Local Rule 3-3(b), which is identical in relevant part to this 

district’s Rule 3-3(b)). 

However, “[c]ourts in this district have held that Rule 3-3(b) does not always require the 

accused infringer to spell out in exact detail every particular combination it intends to assert.” 

Fujifilm Corp. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 12-CV-03587-WHO, 2015 WL 757575, at *28 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015). For example, at least two courts have found that in order to satisfy 

Rule 3-3(b), a party need not list every combination of prior art when the theory of obviousness is 

the same for each and every possible combination of prior art. The party may instead so state. 

Thus, in Avago Techs. Gen. IP PTE Ltd. v. Elan Microelectronics Corp., No. C04 05385 JW HRL, 

2007 WL 951818, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2007), the patentee moved to compel the alleged 

infringer to supplement its final invalidity contentions to comply with Rule 3-3(b). The alleged 

infringer organized its prior art references into two groups, and disclosed that “its theory of 

obviousness [was] the same for each and every possible combinations of the two groups.” Id. 

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The district court found that the alleged infringer “reasonably specifi[ed]” the obviousness 

combinations under Rule 3-3(b). It denied the patentee’s motion to compel, even though the 

patentee argued that this grouping method resulted “in literally billions of different possible 

combinations.” Id. 

Similarly, in Keithley v. The Homestore.com, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 

2008), the patentee moved to strike invalidity contentions where the alleged infringer grouped 

references of prior art which, according to the patentee, led to “thousands or perhaps millions of

possible combinations.” The alleged infringer argued that it had adopted the approach in Avago

by grouping the prior art and asserting that the theory of obviousness was the same for each and 

every possible combination between the groups. Id. The court agreed with Avago and found the 

infringer’s grouping method satisfied Rule 3-3(b). Id.

The court notes that one court required a defendant to explicitly identify each combination 

of prior art, where the defendant similarly asserted that any reference from one group of prior art 

could be combined with any reference from another group of prior art to render the claim obvious. 

See, e.g., Sick A.G. v. Omron Sci. Techs. Inc., No. C 06-2028 CW (MEJ), 2007 WL 1223675, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2007) (requiring defendant to “explicitly identify each combination of prior 

art that allegedly renders a claim obvious to address the danger of potentially inaccurate 

disclosures). The approach in Sick A.G. has not been adopted by any court in this district, and thus

appears to be an outlier. As discussed above, the trend in this district is not to require this level of 

identification where an alleged infringer can reasonably demonstrate identical theories of 

obviousness for grouped combinations of prior art. See Fujifilm Corp., 2015 WL 757575, at *28; 

Avago Techs. Gen. IP PTE Ltd., 2007 WL 951818, at *4; Keithley, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. 

2. Analysis

Apple does not identify specific obviousness combinations in its contentions. Rather, it 

lists groups of prior art, and explains that a person of ordinary of skill would be motivated to 

combine such groups for the reasons set forth in particular sub-sections of Section III (Core 

Concepts) of its invalidity contentions, as well as Section VI, which describes Apple’s overarching 

theories of obviousness. 

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Using the example discussed at the hearing, Apple provides the following disclosure of 

obviousness for Claim 1C in the Anderson chart: 

To the extent not disclosed, this limitation would have been obvious 

in light of Anderson alone, Anderson in combination with the 

knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art, Anderson in 

combination with the other charted prior art references for the ‘483 

patent, or Anderson in combination with the prior art set forth in 

Sections III.A (“Narrow Profile Ducted Speakers Were WellKnown”), and III.C (“Varying the Shape of the Duct Was WellKnown”) of Apple’s Invalidity Contentions. A person of ordinary 

skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Anderson 

with these disclosures and/or the knowledge of a person of ordinary 

skill in the art for the reasons set forth in Sections III.A (“Narrow 

Profile Ducted Speakers Were Well-Known”), III.C (“Varying the 

Shape of the Duct Was Well-Known”), and VI (“Reasons to 

Modify, Extend, or Combine Claimed Concepts”). 

Ex. 3 at 10-11 to Halpern Decl. (emphasis added). 

Apple’s disclosure is vague. For example, the phrase “the other charted prior art 

references” is unclear. Does it refer to any, some, or all of the charted prior art references for the 

‘483 patent? Similarly, does the phrase “Anderson in combination with the prior art set forth in 

Sections III.A (“Narrow Profile Ducted Speakers Were Well-Known”), and III.C (“Varying the 

Shape of the Duct Was Well-Known”) of Apple’s Invalidity Contentions” mean that any (or just 

some) of the prior art discussed in these sub-sections can be combined with the Anderson patent?

Moreover, to the extent that Apple’s approach involves grouping of prior art, Apple must explain 

which prior art references fall in a particular group, as well as the theory of obviousness for 

combinations from particular groups. In short, Apple can and must be more specific. 

Citing to KRS International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), Slot Speaker argues 

that Apple’s contentions also do not comply with Rule 3-3(b) because they do not disclose why a 

person of ordinary skill in the arts would be motivated to combine the alleged items of prior art. 

KRS International Co. does not address local rule disclosure requirements. At issue was whether 

the Federal Circuit properly denied summary judgment to an alleged infringer who asserted that 

the patent was invalid on the grounds of obviousness. In its discussion, the Supreme Court 

rejected a “rigid approach” to obviousness, and acknowledged that “it can be important to identify 

a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the 

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elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” Id. at 415, 418-19. It is quite a stretch for 

Slot Speaker to argue that this discussion in KRS International Co. stands for the proposition that a 

party must disclose a motivation to combine as part of its obviousness contentions under our local 

rules. 

At least one court in this district concluded that our patent local rules do not require that an 

explanation of obviousness include the motivations to combine. See Fujifilm Corp., 2015 WL 

757575, at *31. In Fujifilm Corp., the patentee moved to strike portions of an expert’s report 

containing previously undisclosed explanations of motivations to combine certain prior art 

references. The patentee argued that Rule 3-3(b) requires an alleged infringer to disclose 

motivations to combine as part of its obviousness contentions because motivation is relevant to 

determining obviousness. Id. The court rejected this argument. It began by examining the text of 

Rule 3-3(b). The court noted that although a prior version of Rule 3-3(b) required a party to 

disclose the motivation to combine prior art references as part of its obviousness contentions, the 

current version of the rule does not.1 Id. The court went on to explain that, while motivation to 

combine may be relevant to the obviousness inquiry, the “patent local rules do not mandate the 

disclosure of all evidence relevant to an accused infringer’s invalidity theories,” and the patent 

rules, while intended to have parties crystallize theories of the case early on, “are not designed to 

force parties to produce, far in advance of trial, all evidence they tend to offer in support of their 

legal theories.” Id. at *32 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 This court agrees with the reasoning set forth in Fujifilm Corp. The patent local rules 

require disclosure of specific invalidity theories, but do not compel disclosure of all evidence 

relevant to proof of those theories. Thus, while motivation to combine may be relevant to 

establishing Apple’s theory of obviousness, Rule 3-3(b) does not require Apple to reveal this 

information in its obviousness contentions. 

In conclusion, the court grants Slot Speaker’s motion to strike Apple’s obviousness 

contentions, with leave to amend consistent with the discussion above. 

 

1

Slot Speaker concedes, as it must, that the current version of Rule 3-3(b) does not require a party 

to disclose motivations to combine. Reply at 13. 

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C. Disclosure of Additional Prior Art References

Apple’s invalidity contentions include approximately 500 uncharted references to various 

patents, publications, and other items. See Ex. 11 at pp.75-99 to Halpern Decl. At the hearing, 

Apple explained that it included these references solely as background on the state of the art, and 

that it will not rely on any of them as invalidating prior art. 12/8/16 Hearing Trx. at 23:14-24:16. 

However, Apple’s representation at the hearing is at odds with its invalidity contentions, which 

presently state that the 500 references are disclosed as “prior art,” either for anticipation or 

obviousness. Ex. 11 at pp.75-99 to Halpern Decl. The court orders Apple to amend its 

contentions to specifically state that these references are for background use only, and will not be 

relied upon as invalidating prior art. See Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., No. 14-CV-01197-WHO, 

2016 WL 2988834, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2016) (permitting the use of a “previously 

undisclosed reference to be used as background material” as long as the reference is “not asserted 

as [an] invalidating prior art reference”). 

D. Leave to Amend

As discussed in this order, the court strikes certain of Apple’s invalidity contentions with 

leave to amend. Slot Speaker argues that Apple should not be given the opportunity to amend 

because it cannot demonstrate good cause. According to Slot Speaker, Apple refused to amend its 

contentions despite Slot Speaker’s repeated requests, and thus willfully flouted the local rules. 

The cases relied upon by Slot Speaker are inapposite. They occur in the context of a party 

formally moving to amend its contentions to add newly discovered information, not where, as 

here, a party requests leave to amend its existing contentions to comply with the disclosure rules in 

response to a motion to strike. See, e.g., West v. Jewelry Innovations, Inc., No. C071812 JF

(HRL), 2008 WL 4532558, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2008) (denying defendant’s motion to amend 

its preliminary invalidity contentions); Allure Energy, Inc. v. Nest Labs, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 538, 

540 (E.D. Tex. 2015) (denying defendant’s motion for leave to amend its invalidity contentions 

for lack of good cause); MyMedicalRecords, Inc. v. Walgreen Co., No. 2:13-CV-00631-ODW, 

2013 WL 6834639, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2013) (denying defendant’s motion to amend its 

unauthorized amendments to its invalidity contentions, and granting motion to strike because 

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defendant did not timely seek a court order to amend its invalidity contentions and did not 

demonstrate good cause for the amendments); Zest IP Holdings, LLC v. Implant Direct MFG, 

LLC, No. 10CV0541-GPC-WVG, 2014 WL 358430, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (denying 

defendant’s motion for reconsideration, its renewed motion to amend its invalidity contentions, 

and its motion to further amend its invalidity contentions). 

Neither Rule 3-6, nor the cases cited by Slot Speaker, stand for the proposition that a party 

requesting leave to amend in response to a motion to strike must make the same showing of “good 

cause” that it would be required to make if formally moving to amend its contentions to add newly 

discovered information. 

To the extent Slot Speaker argues that leave to amend should be denied because it was 

prejudiced during claim construction due to Apple’s deficient contentions, Slot Speaker conceded

at the hearing that it received Apple’s invalidity contentions three months prior to claim 

construction. Slot Speaker therefore could have filed this motion before claim construction. 

12/8/16 Hearing Trx. at 11:19-12:7. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, Slot Speaker’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. Within 14 days, 

Apple shall amend its invalidity contentions in a manner consistent with this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2017 

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

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