Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-01054/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-01054-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

CARLOS CAREY, #245 045, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-1054-WKW 

) [WO] 

KATHRYN D. HUBBARD, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Kilby Correctional Facility in Mt. Meigs,

Alabama, files this complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of rights,

privileges, or immunities afforded him under the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Plaintiff names as defendants Ann Hill, General Counsel for the Alabama Department of

Corrections, Assistant Attorney General Kathryn Hubbard, Captain Logan, and Warden

Billups. Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief and requests federal criminal charges

be filed against defendants for obstruction of proceedings and tampering with a witness,

victim, or informant. Upon review, the court concludes that dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint

prior to service of process is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1

A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint 1

screened in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure

requires the court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the

complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

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 I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks to challenge the conduct of Defendants regarding a pending lawsuit he

previouslyfiled with this court. See Carey v. Classification Supervisor Lashanda Hails, Civil

Action No. 2:14-cv-590-WKW. He maintains that Defendants Hubbard and Hill, to prepare

for their written report submitted in Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-590-WKW, instructed 

Defendants Logan and Billups, among others named in that lawsuit, to lie and commit

perjury. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges when the defendants named in Civil Action No. 2:14-

cv-590-WKWshowed Defendants Hubbard and Hill a document Plaintiff gave themwherein

he explained an enemy situation and requested protective custody, Defendants Hubbard and

Hill “told [] them to say I never gave them documents explaining an enemy situation and

never requested P.C.” Doc. No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff contends: 

this is a lie and falsehood[.] [A]ttorney Hill and Hubbard are aware of the

existence of documents that informed the Defendants [in CA 2:14-ccv-590-

WKW] of a[n] enemy situation however due to Plaintiff’s past litigation

Defendants ignored the enemy situation which has caused Plaintiff’s injuries.

Attorneys Hill and Hubbard help and assisted Defendants in committing

perjury and covering up their diliberate [sic] indifference that lead to

Plaintiff’s injuries. Attorneys unethical and illegal behavior has also

contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries.

Id. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court shall dismiss a case proceeding in forma

pauperis “at any time if the court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the

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same standard as a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d

1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). To properly state a claim, a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). Although the complaint need not set forth detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff

must provide more than mere “labels and conclusions” and the “[f]actual allegations must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The factual allegations must be sufficient “to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. Pleadings that “are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009);

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526

(1983) (a court need not “assume that [a plaintiff] can prove facts that [the plaintiff] has not

alleged.”). Mere conclusory statements to support a threadbare recital of the elements of a

cause of action will not suffice. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Cotterall v. Paul, 755

F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985) (jurisdiction cannot be premised upon a claim based on

speculation).

At the outset, the court notes Plaintiff offers nothing beyond his own speculative and

conclusory allegations that Defendants Hubbard and Hill advocated that their clients commit

perjury in a civil lawsuit. It is unclear why Plaintiff, other than possibly for harassment,2

challenges the validity of the evidence presented against him in another lawsuit by filing a

Including the instant complaint, the court notes Plaintiff has filed thirteen civil actions in this 2

court since September, 2013. 

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new complaint rather than filing an opposition, or appropriate motion, to the evidence, or

lack thereof, submitted in the prior action. That remedy remains available to Plaintiff. 

Regardless of the underpinnings motivating the instant action, the court finds,

notwithstanding the conclusory and wholly unsupported allegations presented which in and

of themselves support dismissal, the complaint is due to be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) for the following reasons.

A. The Conspiracy Claim

To the extent Plaintiff’s assertions amount to an allegation that Defendants engaged

in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights because theywished to “ignore[] the enemy

situation” because of his “past litigation,” this claim entitles him to no relief. Doc. No. 1 at

3. To establish a § 1983 conspiracy claim, “a plaintiff must show among other things, that

the defendant ‘reached an understanding to violate [his] rights.’ ” Rowe v. Fort Lauderdale,

279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11th

Cir. 1988). This requires that Plaintiff provide more than a label or a conclusion. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff cannot rely on subjective suspicions and unsupported speculation

but must provide sufficient facts to show that an agreement was made. Id. at 555-56. 

Besides pleading facts to show that an agreement was reached to deny Plaintiff’s rights, an

“‘underlying actual denial of [his] constitutional rights’” must be shown. Hadley v.

Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of

Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998).

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Review of Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim reflects only self serving, purely conclusory

allegations that fail to assert those material facts necessary to establish a conspiracy by

Defendant Strange. See Fullman, 739 F.2d at 556-57 (holding that a conspiracy allegation

that is vague and conclusory fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and may

be dismissed). The court concludes that Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against Defendants is

due to be dismissed as it is insufficient to support a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

B. Prosecutorial Immunity

To the extentPlaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hubbard and Hill challenge actions

they undertook in performing their functions as advocates for the government, they are 

entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,

273 (1993). A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity concerning advocacy-related

decisions in initiating a prosecution and presenting the State’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); see also Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1986)

(Government attorneys are entitled to absolute immunity when they engage in conduct

consistent with their role as advocates of the government in activities or functions intimately

or integrally associated with the judicial (or administrative) process); Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d

897, 908 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (“State attorneys . . .

who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor . . . are absolutely immune from

suit under section 1983 concerning activities intimately associated with the judicial

process.”); Murphy v. Morris, 849 F.2d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 1988) (“The traditional

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requirements for extending absolute immunity are satisfied by a government attorney”

defending state officials in prisoner civil rights litigation). Accordingly, to the extent

Plaintiff’s seeks damages against Defendants Hubbard and Hill in their role as advocates for

the state, such claim lacks an arguable basis and is due to be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii). Further, when there are adequate remedies at law, a § 1983

plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief against prosecutorial officials. See Bolin v. Story,

225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000).

C. Criminal Charges

Plaintiff requests that federal criminal charges be filed against Defendants under 18

U.S.C. § 1505, obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees, and

18 U.S.C. § 1512, tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant. Plaintiff, however,

does not have a constitutional right to see his alleged persecutor punished for their conduct.

“[A] private citizen lacks a judiciallycognizable interestin the prosecution or nonprosecution

of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); Leeke v. Timmerman, 454

U.S. 83, 85-86 (1981); see also Savage v. Arnold, 403 F. Supp. 172, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1975)

(private citizens have no right to institute criminal prosecutions in federal court); Keenan v.

McGrath, 328 F.2d 610, 611 (D. Mass. 1964) (sanctioning a private individual’s ability to

initiate a criminal prosecution in his own name in a federal district court would provide a

“means to circumvent the legal safeguards provided for persons accused of crime.”). 

Whether to prosecute a particular case is in the discretion of the prosecutorial authority. 

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United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979); Otero v. United States Attorney

General, 832 F.2d 141 (11th Cir. 1987). In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s request to

initiate criminal charges against Defendants is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

 II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s

complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice prior to service of process under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). 

 It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before November 20, 2014. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the District

Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and,

therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5thCir. 1982); see Stein v.

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Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206 (11thCir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30,

1981). 

Done this 6th day of November, 2014.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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