Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02202/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02202-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRENCE QUINTEN CROSS,

Petitioner,

v.

A.M. GONZALES, Warden, et al.,

Respondent.

 

 

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Case No. 13-CV-2202-BAS (JMA)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE DENIAL

OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

I. Introduction

Petitioner Terrence Quinten Cross (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. On January 31, 2012, Petitioner was convicted by jury in

San Diego Superior Court case number SCD227465 for selling and

possessing cocaine base (Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11352(a), 11351.5).

[Resp. Ans. at 1:2-4; Pet. at 2.] Petitioner contends the trial court abused its

discretion, thereby violating his due process rights, by admitting evidence of

a prior drug sale not relevant to material facts and more prejudicial than

probative, to prove propensity for criminality. [Pet. at 6.]

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The Court has considered the Petition and Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in support thereof, Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of

Points and Authorities, Petitioner’s Traverse, and all the supporting

documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and

evidence presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends that the Petition be DENIED. 

II. Factual Background

The following statement of facts is taken from the California Court of

Appeal opinion, People v. Terrence Quinten Cross, No. D061591, slip op.

(Cal. Ct. App. April 5, 2013). [Lodgment No. 4.] This Court gives deference

to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct. Tilcock v.

Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner may rebut the

presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. Id.;

see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The facts as found by the state appellate

court are as follows:

A. Factual Summary

Defendant’s arrest arose from a “buy-walk” operation, in which

undercover officers purchase drugs without immediately arresting

the seller after the purchase. This operation permits undercover

officers to preserve their true identities for continued undercover

activities. Under the applicable procedures, an undercover officer

will purchase drugs from a drug seller, and then walk away. Shortly

after, uniformed police officers contact the suspected seller on a

pretext and will obtain the seller’s identity for later arrest. During

this contact, the officer merely conducts a weapons patdown and

does not engage in a full search. 

In this case, the buy-walk undercover officer was San Diego Police

Officer Joel Tien. In June 2011, Officer Tien called Eric Robertson

and arranged to buy some drugs. When they met at 11th and C

streets in the downtown San Diego area, Officer Tien asked Robertson to help him purchase a $20 amount of rock cocaine. 

Robertson agreed, and Officer Tien handed him a prerecorded $20

bill.

Officer Tien followed Robertson for a short while, and then saw

Robertson speaking with a person later identified as James Morgan. 

Morgan led Robertson to the corner of 17th Street and Island

Avenue, where defendant was standing.

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Viewing the events from about 10 to 15 feet away, Officer Tien saw

Morgan communicating with defendant. Officer Tien then observed

defendant turn away, lift his shirt, lean over, and put his right hand

towards the front of his pants. Officer Tien then saw defendant and

Morgan (who were standing right next to each other) make motions

as if they were exchanging something. Officer Tien saw Morgan

turn around and place a white rock-like substance (later identified as

rock cocaine) on a soup lid that Robertson was holding. Robertson then walked towards Officer Tien, and the officer took the cocaine

from Robertson. Officer Tien also saw Robertson take out the $20

bill from Robertson’s pocket, hand the currency to Morgan, who then handed the money to defendant. Officer Tien saw defendant

physically take hold of the money.

As Officer Tien walked away from the group, Officer Tien gave

Robertson a prerecorded $5 bill in response to Robertson’s request

for compensation for his assistance with the drug purchase.

Shortly after, Officer Tien radioed fellow police officers, described

Morgan and defendant, and asked the officers to contact these two

men for later arrest. Defendant was wearing a distinctive green

shirt. Police Officer Dan Stanley responded, and contacted

defendant for questioning on another subject matter and confirmed

his identity. The officer conducted a patdown search of defendant

only on areas where defendant could be hiding a weapon. The

officer did not find any prerecorded money during this limited

search. Officer Stanley then released defendant. Viewing the

contact from a distance, Officer Tien confirmed that Officer Stanley

had detained the correct individual who had sold the drugs. Another

officer searched Morgan, and did not find any prerecorded money.

Defendant was later arrested for selling cocaine.

At trial, Officer Tien testified about the details of the transaction (as

summarized above) and said he was 100 percent certain and there

was “no doubt” in his mind that defendant was the person who gave

the drugs to Morgan and that defendant received the $20 bill for the

drugs. Officer Tien also testified as an expert witness explaining

that drug dealers in this downtown area (known as the East Village) are aware of undercover police officer tactics, including the use of

prerecorded money, and that sellers often use third party

intermediaries (known as “facilitators”) to avoid being arrested. 

Officer Tien also described the reasons and purposes of the buywalk operation. 

Over defense objections, San Diego Police Officer Jessie Zaldiver

testified that while working undercover he purchased a similar

amount of drugs from defendant at the same location about five

years earlier.

Defendant did not testify or call witnesses, but his counsel

challenged the prosecution’s case on many grounds, including

claiming that Officer Tien was biased and emphasizing there was no

physical evidence to show defendant’s involvement in the crime.

After deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of possessing

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and selling the cocaine. The court imposed a seven-year sentence,

which included the lower term for the cocaine sale, doubled because

of a prior strike, plus a consecutive one-year term for a prior prison term finding.

[Lodgment No. 4 at 1-4.]

III. Procedural Background

On July 22, 2011, the District Attorney for the County of San Diego filed

an Indictment charging Petitioner with two counts: Count One:

selling/furnishing a controlled substance, cocaine base (Cal. Health & Saf.

Code § 11352(a)); and Count Two: possession/purchase of cocaine base for

sale (Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11351.5). [Clerk’s Transcript “CT” at 1-2.] On

January 31, 2012, a jury found Petitioner guilty of the charges. [Resp. Ans. at

3:15-16.] Petitioner was sentenced on March 2, 2012 to state prison for the

aggregate term of seven years, which was calculated as follows: the lower

base term of three years was imposed for his conviction for selling cocaine

base (Count One), which was doubled to six years under the One Strike Law;

and a consecutive one-year term was imposed for the true finding he served

a prison prior term within the meaning of Penal Code § 667.5(b). The

sentence for his conviction of possessing cocaine base (Count Two) was

ordered stayed pursuant to Penal Code § 654, as was the special allegation

pertaining to that charge. [Lodgment No. 2 at 1.]

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, Division One (“California Court of Appeal”). [Lodgment Nos. 1-4.] On

April 5, 2013, in an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment. [Lodgment No. 4.] Petitioner then filed a Petition for

Review in the California Supreme Court on May 15, 2013 [Lodgment No. 5],

which was denied without comment on June 19, 2013. [Lodgment No. 6.] 

On September 13, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. Respondent filed an

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Answer on January 27, 2014, and Petitioner filed a Traverse on February 24,

2014. 

IV. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a) sets forth the following scope of

review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The current Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320

(1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of

the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as

follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

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the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from

this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to

the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000); see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the

Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order

does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82

(9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76);

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state

court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus

claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme

Court precedent],” the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly

established federal law. Id.

B. Admission of Prior Bad Act Evidence

Petitioner contends that the trial court’s admission of his 2006 drug sale

into evidence violated his right to due process and deprived him of a fair trial.

[Pet. at 6.] He argues the admission of the prior drug sale conviction was

unduly prejudicial and the differences between the two drug sales undermined

the probative value of the prior sale. [Id.; Lodgment No. 4 at 8.] Petitioner

claims the jury likely improperly gave undue weight to the 2006 drug sale

evidence, causing them to condemn Petitioner as a habitual drug dealer,

rather than to evaluate whether he did in fact commit the charged offense. 

[Pet. at 6.] In denying Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal stated:

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[Petitioner] argues the trial court erred in permitting the

prosecution to present facts of a prior drug sale; in 2007

he was convicted of selling cocaine base to an undercover

officer on the same street corner where the current alleged

drug sale took place.

1. Background

Before trial, the prosecutor requested the court’s permission

to introduce evidence of defendant’s 2007 conviction for

selling $20 worth of rock cocaine to an undercover officer

on the same street corner where the current alleged drug

sale took place. After extensive arguments and a motion for

reconsideration, the court ruled the prosecution could

present evidence of the prior sale and arrest to show

defendant’s knowledge of undercover operations and to

establish a common plan or scheme to sell drugs. 

However, to avoid any undue prejudice, the court refused to

permit the prosecution to present evidence that defendant

was convicted of the prior drug sale or that police officers

found prerecorded money in defendant’s sock after he was

arrested for the prior offense.

Thereafter, the prosecutor called Officer Zaldivar, the

undercover police officer in the prior drug sale. Before the

testimony, the court instructed the jury on the limited

purposes of the prior acts evidence (defendant’s prior

knowledge of police officer undercover tactics and

defendant’s use of a common scheme or plan). The court

also admonished the jury that: “If you conclude that the

defendant committed the uncharged offense, that conclusion

is only one factor to consider with all the other evidence. It

is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty

of selling cocaine base or possessing cocaine base for the

purpose of sale. The People must still prove each charge

and allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Officer Zaldivar then testified that on November 8, 2006,

while working undercover, he encountered defendant on 17th

Street and Island Avenue. Officer Zaldivar made a hand

signal indicating he wanted to buy $20 worth of cocaine

base, and asked defendant if he had any drugs to sell. Defendant responded by asking, “Are you a police officer?” 

And after satisfying himself with Officer Zaldivar’s answer, he walked south with Officer Zaldivar and reached into his

pocket and asked Officer Zaldivar for money. Officer

Zaldivar gave him four prerecorded $5 bills. In exchange,

defendant took a rock cocaine substance out of his pocket

and placed it in the officer’s hand.

At the conclusion of the evidence in the current trial, the

court repeated its earlier instruction regarding the relevance

of Zaldivar’s testimony. During closing arguments, both

prosecutor and defense attorney also cautioned the jury as

to the limited purpose of Zaldivar’s testimony. The

prosecutor argued that the jury could consider the evidence

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to infer that defendant’s common plan was to sell the

cocaine because of the similarities between the prior sale

and the current sale (“same quantity, $20, same controlled

substance, crack cocaine, same exact street corner, 17th and

Island...) And to show defendant’s knowledge of the

undercover tactics used by law enforcement officers to

explain why no money was found on his person. i.e., that he

quickly hid the money or transferred it shortly after the sale. 

But the prosecutor devoted most of his argument in

discussing Officer Tien’s eyewitness testimony, and

emphasized that the prior drug sale evidence was only a

“very small” part of the prosecution’s case.

Defense counsel likewise told the jury it could not consider

the prior-sale evidence to infer that “because [defendant] did

it before, that he’s guilty again, and reiterated that the jury was permitted to consider the evidence only “for the limited

purpose of deciding whether or not [defendant] knew about

the undercover tactics... when he allegedly acted in the case

or whether [defendant] had a common plan or scheme to commit the offenses alleged.”

2. Applicable Law

Generally, evidence of the defendant’s other crimes or

misconduct is inadmissible when it is offered to show the

defendant had the criminal propensity to commit the charged

crime. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (A).) However, prior acts evidence may be admitted when relevant to prove some

other fact, such as knowledge or common plan. (Evid. Code,

§ 1101, subd. (B); see People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal.4th 380, 393- 403 (1994). If the evidence is admissible on a proper basis,

the court should conduct a section 352 balancing analysis to

ensure there is no undue prejudice. (People v. Lindberg, 45 Cal.4th 1, 22-23 (2008).) Because this type of evidence can

be so damaging, “[i]f the connection between the uncharged

offense and the ultimate fact in dispute is not clear, the

evidence should be excluded”....’” (People v. Fuiava, 53 Cal.4th 622, 667 (2012).) We review the trial court’s rulings

on the admission of evidence under sections 1101 and 352

for abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 667-667.)

3. Analysis

The trial court found the evidence of defendant’s prior drug

sale was admissible to show the existence of a common

plan or scheme and to show defendant’s knowledge of

undercover operations. The court’s conclusions were proper

and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court also

did not err in refusing to exclude the evidence under section

352.

With respect to common plan, the evidence of a very similar

prior drug sale at the same location supported an inference

that defendant was engaged in a plan or scheme to sell drugs

at this location, and therefore the current offense was part of

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that plan. (See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 393-403.) ... In this case, defendant claimed the prosecution did not prove

he participated in the drug sale. The evidence of defendant’s

prior drug sale was relevant to refute this defense and

establish defendant’s involvement in the drug transaction. The evidence supported an inference that defendant was

involved in a plan to sell drugs and that the transaction with

Morgan was part of this plan.

... In both instances, defendant was at the same exact

location (17th Street and Island Avenue), and thus it can be inferred he was using this corner as his home base to engage

in street drug sales. In addition, defendant was carrying

drugs on his person, had a $20 amount of unwrapped rock

cocaine, and was wary of undercover police officers. ... The

trial court found the evidence “clearly falls within the

exception common plan or scheme because it’s the same

behavior, same location, allegedly, from the prior conviction.” 

The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

evidence on this basis.

Defendant also challenges the court’s admission of the prior

sale evidence to show his awareness of law enforcement

undercover tactics. However, the evidence was strongly

probative to show defendant’s knowledge of undercover

operations in the East Village area to explain why defendant

sold the drugs through facilitators and why defendant did not

have the prerecorded money on him when he was searched. 

The prior sale evidence helped the jury understand

defendant’s actions and was relevant to establish that

defendant committed the crime even if he did not have the

prerecorded money in his pocket shortly after the transaction

and did not directly sell drugs to Officer Tien. ...

Defendant additionally contends that even if the evidence

was relevant and material on common plan and knowledge

grounds, the court should have excluded the evidence under

Evidence Code § 352. ... On our review of the record, we

conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to

exclude the evidence under § 352. As explained above, the

prior drug sale evidence was strongly probative of a common

design or plan and defendant’s knowledge of undercover

operations to explain his actions. On the other hand, the

danger of unfair prejudice or jury confusion was limited. The

prior drug sale evidence was brief and straightforward, and

was not particularly egregious or likely to inflame the jury

against defendant. 

[Lodgment No. 4 at 4-11.] 

The admission of evidence is an issue of state law. Holley v.

Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). “Simple errors of state law

do not warrant federal habeas relief.” Id. (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

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62, 67 (1991)). On federal habeas, the sole issue is whether the petitioner’s

conviction violated constitutional norms. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d

918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430

(9th Cir. 1986) (“The dispositive issue is . . . whether the trial court committed

an error which rendered the trial so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it

violated federal due process.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

“A habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden in showing a due process

violation based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159,

1172 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has “defined the category of

infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.” Dowling v.

United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). “Under AEDPA, even clearly

erroneous admissions of evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may

not permit the grant of federal habeas corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly

established Federal law,’ as laid out by the Supreme Court.” Holley, 568 F.3d

at 1101. There is no clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

U.S. Supreme Court, on the issue of whether “admission of irrelevant or

overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation.” Id. Thus, it

cannot be said that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of the claim in

this instance was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law.

Furthermore, pursuant to Jammal, “[o]nly if there are no permissible

inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due

process.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. “Evidence introduced by the prosecution

will often raise more than one inference, some permissible, some not.” Id. In

such cases, the jury must be relied upon to sort out the inferences in light of

the court’s instructions. Id. Here, as the trial court determined, there were

rational inferences, not constitutionally impermissible, that the jury could draw

from the 2006 drug sale evidence, namely that Petitioner was involved in a

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common plan or scheme to sell drugs, and Petitioner was in possession of

knowledge regarding undercover police tactics. Both could be inferred based

upon the similar methodology to sell cocaine in each instance. Specifically,

in both instances, defendant was at the same exact location (17th Street and

Island Avenue), was carrying drugs on his person, had a $20 amount of

unwrapped rock cocaine base, and was wary of undercover police officers.”

[Lodgment No. 4 at 9; Ans. at 11:13-25.] Further, the prior 2007 conviction,

where Petitioner personally exchanged cocaine base for money with Officer

Zaldivar, creates the permissible inference Petitioner was knowledgeable of

police undercover operations at the time of the instant drug sale. [Ans. at

11:18-21.] 

 “One typical - and constitutionally permissible - way to [prove that the

defendant committed the crime charged] is to show that the crime shared

certain characteristics - a modus operandi - with other crimes that [the

defendant] had committed.” Boyde, 404 F.3d at 1172 (citing United States v.

Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 1972)). Such a showing “makes it

more likely that [the defendant] was involved when a crime sharing those

characteristics occurred later.” Id. (citing McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378,

1382 (9th Cir. 1993)). Because the jury could draw permissible inferences

from the 2006 drug sale, admission of that evidence did not violate due

process, even if there existed an impermissible inference, so long as the jury

was instructed that it could not draw any improper inferences from it. The trial

judge gave a limiting instruction to the jury: 

The People presented evidence that the defendant

committed the offense of selling cocaine base that was not

charged in this case.

You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact

committed the uncharged offense. Proof by a preponderance of

the evidence is a different burden of proof than proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the

evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact

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is true. 

If the People have not met this burden, you must disregard this

evidence entirely.

If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged offense,

you may, but are not required to, consider that evidence for the

limited purpose of deciding whether or not:

The defendant knew about the undercover tactics of Team

8 when he allegedly acted in this case; or

The defendant had a common plan or scheme to commit the

offenses alleged in this case.

If you conclude that defendant committed the uncharged offense,

that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the

other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the

defendant is guilty of selling cocaine base, or possessing cocaine

base for the purpose of sale. The People must still prove each

charge and allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.

[CT Vol. 1 at 68.] 

Additionally, to avoid any undue prejudice, the court refused to permit

the prosecution to present evidence that defendant was convicted of the prior

drug sale or that police officers found prerecorded money in defendant’s sock

after he was arrested for the prior offense. [Lodgment No. 4 at 5.] The Court

must presume that the jury followed the instructions to consider only the

permissible inferences (see Boyde, 404 F.3d at 1173), and thus the Court

concludes that admission of evidence about the prior drug sale did not violate

Petitioner’s due process rights. 

Accordingly, this Court recommends that this claim be denied.

V. Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

magistrate judge finds Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to federal

habeas relief under the applicable legal standards and, accordingly, the

undersigned magistrate judge hereby recommends that the Petition be

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and that judgment be entered accordingly.

/ / 

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This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Cynthia Ann Bashant, United States District Judge assigned to this case,

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not

later than September 5, 2014, any party may file written objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not later than

September 15, 2014. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 14, 2014

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

13 13cv2202

Case 3:13-cv-02202-BAS-JMA Document 16 Filed 08/14/14 Page 13 of 13