Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00618/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00618-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARKETQUEST GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 11-cv-0618-BAS-JLB

ORDER: 

(1) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S 

OBJECTION TO STATUS 

ORDER [ECF No. 390]

AND

(2) REINSTATING MOTIONS

v.

BIC CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Before the Court is an Objection (ECF No. 390) from Plaintiff Marketquest 

regarding this Court’s Status Order (ECF No. 388) about the current issues this Court 

must resolve on remand from the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of this Court’s grant of 

summary judgment to Defendants on the fair use defense. For the reasons stated 

herein, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s Objection to the Status Order and reinstates all 

issues identified therein. 

I. BACKGROUND

Two years ago, on April 17, 2015, this Court granted Defendants Norwood 

Promotional Products, LLC and BIC USA, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment 

(ECF Nos. 214, 215) on the basis of the fair use defense. (ECF No. 327.) 

Defendants’ counsel represented that if the Court ruled favorably on the fair use 

defense, Defendants would concede their counterclaims. (Id. at 11.) Because the 

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Court granted summary judgment on fair use, the Court denied BIC’s motion for 

summary judgment on its counterclaims (ECF No. 216) and dismissed the 

counterclaims (ECF No. 17). (ECF No. 327 at 11.) On the basis of the grant of 

summary judgment, the Court also terminated as moot all pending motions at that 

time, including Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and both parties’ 

motions regarding exclusion of certain expert testimony. (Id. at 11–12(citing ECF 

Nos. 199, 205, 217–219).) The Clerk of the Court subsequently issued a judgment. 

(ECF No. 328.) Plaintiff Marketquest appealed this Court’s order granting summary 

judgment and the Clerk’s judgment. (ECF No. 339.) On July 7, 2017, the Ninth 

Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to Defendants for fair use of the 

marks at issue in this case. (ECF No. 377). The Ninth Circuit’s decision was 

formally mandated to this Court on August 31, 2017. (ECF No. 377.) 

The Court previously requested that the parties express their views on how this 

case should proceed in view of the Mandate. (ECF No. 383) The parties submitted 

a joint statement disagreeing over certain issues. (ECF No. 386.) Based on its review 

of the joint statement, the Court issued a status order identifying the outstanding 

issues in the case. The issues identified were: 

1. Whether summary judgment should be granted to 

Defendant-Counterclaimant BIC Corporation on the 

grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact 

regarding whether :

a. The “Write Choice” mark was obtained and maintained 

by Plaintiff through fraud (ECF No. 216); and/or

b. The “All-in-One” mark and design have been abandoned 

by Plaintiff for lack of use (ECF No. 216).

2. Whether summary judgment should be granted to 

Defendants Norwood Promotional Products, LLC and BIC 

USA, Inc. on the ground that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact regarding damages to Plaintiff caused by either 

Defendant (ECF Nos. 214, 215);

3. Whether summary judgment should be granted to Defendant 

BIC USA, Inc. on the ground that there are no genuine issues 

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of material fact regarding likelihood of confusion as to the 

“The Write Choice” (ECF Nos. 215, 377 at 19–20)

(ECF No. 388.) Plaintiff has asserted objections to issues 1a, 1b, and 3 (ECF No. 

389), issues which it already argued in the joint statement are outside this Court’s 

purview (ECF No. 386). Defendants have filed a reply to the Objection. (ECF No. 

391.) The Court now considers the Objection. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Reconsideration of Denial of Summary Judgment on Validity 

Counterclaims and Dismissal of Counterclaims 

Plaintiff objects to consideration of these issues because of Defendant BIC’s

alleged failure to file a cross-appeal of this Court’s denial of its motion for summary 

judgment on its counterclaims for fraudulent procurement and abandonment and the 

dismissal of the invalidity counterclaims. (ECF No. 390.) Plaintiff claims that 

“[s]imply stated, this Court no longer has jurisdiction to consider” these issues. (Id.

at 2.) The Court overrules this objection. 

Under the cross-appeal rule, an appellee may urge in support of a decree any 

matter appearing in the record but may not attack the decree with a view either to 

enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary absent 

a cross-appeal. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Netzsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 479 (1999). 

The cross-appeal rule is not applied by district courts, but rather by appellate courts 

to assess the availability of arguments before those tribunals. Id. at 479–82. 

Recognizing the inherent limitation on the applicability of the rule in this Court, 

Plaintiff places heavy reliance on the rule’s interpretation and application by the 

Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit has applied the cross-appeal rule in patent 

litigation to preclude reconsideration of certain arguments in a district court on 

remand after a failure to file a cross-appeal. Plaintiff relies on Lazare Kaplan 

International, Inc. v. Photoscribe Technologies, Inc., 714 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2013), 

which held that a district court abused its discretion by granting Rule 60(b) relief 

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from a previous final judgment resulting from a jury verdict that certain patent claims 

were not invalid. Id. at 1292, 1297. The district court granted such relief because 

the Federal Circuit broadened certain claim term limitations on a prior appeal from a 

final judgment of non-infringement, which the district court reasoned affected the 

prior patent validity judgment. Id. at 1292. On appeal from the district court’s grant 

of Rule 60(b) relief, the Federal Circuit determined that the cross-appeal rule 

precluded the relief because a finding of invalidity would expand the defendant’s 

rights and lessen the rights of the plaintiff. Id. at 1295. Plaintiff argues that this 

interpretation of the cross-appeal rule controls here and points to multiple cases in 

which the Federal Circuit has applied the rule to preclude reconsideration of final 

judgments regarding validity. (ECF No. 390 at 3.) 

Plaintiff’s reliance on the Federal Circuit’s interpretation and application of 

the cross-appeal rule is misplaced. First, the Federal Circuit’s Lazare decision makes 

clear that its interpretation of the rule was adopted “[b]ecause this issue requires 

consistent and uniform application by district courts when handling patent cases,” 

and was resolved as “an issue of the law of this court.” Lazare, 714 F.3d at 1293. 

Federal Circuit law governs in a case where the case involves non-patent claims so 

long as there is an issue of patent law whose resolution will be a substantial factor in 

determining liability under non-patent claims. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. 

Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006). A review of the First 

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14) and the Answer (ECF No. 17) shows that this 

case solely concerns alleged trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and 

raises no issues under patent law. Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation and 

application of the cross-appeal rule as barring reconsideration by a district court of 

patent validity on remand does not apply.1 Second, Plaintiff points to no authorities 

 

1 The Federal Circuit only has “exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final 

decision of a district court of the United States . . . if the jurisdiction of that court was 

based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title,” 28 U.S.C. §1295(a), which 

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outside the context of the Federal Circuit which have found the cross-appeal rule 

limits what issues a district court may consider on remand from an appellate court. 

Nor can this Court locate such authority. Lazare recognizes that the rule is a 

limitation on appellate court jurisdiction and implicitly recognizes that its application 

to a district court’s considerations on remand is of an exceedingly limited nature. 

Lazare, 714 F.3d at 1294–95 (“To the extent that the cross-appeal rule can be applied 

to preclude certain arguments in a district court on remand after a failure to file a 

cross-appeal . . .” (emphasis added)). To the extent that the Federal Circuit’s 

interpretation of the cross-appeal rule might apply in non-patent cases–a proposition 

this Court finds to be suspect—the circumstances which warranted the rule’s 

application in Lazare simply do not exist here. In Lazare, the finding of validity

which the defendant failed to cross-appeal resulted from a jury verdict after trial. Id. 

at 1291–92. For all purposes, there was an “adverse final judgment on validity” on 

the merits. Id. at 1294. This Court’s denial of summary judgment to Defendants on 

the counterclaims for fraudulent procurement and abandonment and dismissal of the 

invalidity counterclaims was simply not a merits adjudication. Rather, it was 

expressly based on Defendants’ concession that a denial would be appropriate if 

summary judgment on the fair use defense was granted. (ECF No. 327 at 11.) 

Because the grant has been reversed on appeal, the basis for denial of summary 

judgment on the counterclaims and dismissal of the invalidity counterclaims no 

longer exists. 

As an additional note, this Court observes that subject to certain exceptions, 

denials of a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss are interlocutory

orders for which appeal does not ordinarily lie. A party may appeal an interlocutory 

 

in turn confers jurisdiction on the district courts in actions “arising under” the patent 

laws, see 28 U.S.C. §1338. The docket in this case makes clear that Plaintiff’s prior 

appeal was to the Ninth Circuit, not the Federal Circuit. This should further confirm 

the inapplicability of the Federal Circuit’s cross-appeal rule here. 

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order after the entry of final judgment because, at that point, “the interlocutory order 

merges in the final judgment and may be challenged in an appeal from that 

judgment.” Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. 

denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977); Hook v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, Nos. 95-17317, 

96-156542, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 8042, at *9 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 1997). It is true 

that upon entry of the final judgment in this case, Defendants could have appealed 

the denials of their motion for summary judgment and dismissal of the counterclaims. 

However, the Ninth Circuit reversed this Court on the very issue adjudicated on the 

merits that resulted in the entry of final judgment and remanded the case to this Court. 

(ECF No. 377.) Therefore, the entry of that final judgment no longer has effect and 

the prior denials are effectively once more interlocutory in nature. “District courts 

have inherent power to modify their own interlocutory orders in the interests of 

justice so long as they retain jurisdiction over the case.” See Rother v. Lupenko, No. 

3:08–cv–00161–MO, 2014 WL 3955211, at *7 n.5 (D. Or. Aug. 13, 2014), aff’d in 

part and rev’d in part, 691 Fed. App’x 350 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing John Simmons Co. 

v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U.S. 82, 88–89 (1922); United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 

605 (3d Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1555-56 

(E.D. Cal. 1992)). This power exists until the entry of a final judgment. Balla v. 

Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 869 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1989). This Court

unquestionably has jurisdiction over the case once more. Given that there was no 

merits adjudication of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the 

counterclaims and the dismissal of the counterclaims, the Court finds that it is in the 

interests of justice to modify the prior denial to reinstate those issues for such an 

adjudication. 

As a practical matter, both parties agree that Plaintiff’s motion for partial 

summary judgment on the validity of Plaintiff’s trademarks and against Defendants’ 

defenses of fraud and abandonment is “ripe for summary adjudication.” (ECF No. 

390 at 4.) That motion is expressly premised on Defendants’ counterclaims. (ECF 

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No. 205 at 7.) It cannot be that this Court can reconsider Plaintiff’s motion without 

reinstating the counterclaims. Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 

judgment seeks summary judgment on all counterclaims at issue in Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment, and even goes further by seeking summary judgment 

on an additional claim and multiple affirmative defenses. (Compare ECF No. 205 

with ECF No. 216). The Court sees little reason not to consider and adjudicate 

together both sides’ summary judgment motions. Accordingly, the Court overrules 

Plaintiff’s Objection on this issue (ECF No. 390) and reinstates Defendants’ 

counterclaims (ECF No. 17) and motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 216). 

B. The Mandate Requires this Court to Consider Likelihood of 

Confusion

Plaintiff also Objects to this Court’s identification as an outstanding issue 

whether summary judgment should be granted to Defendant BIC USA, Inc. on the 

ground that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding likelihood of 

confusion as to the “The Write Choice.” (ECF No. 390 at 5–8.) Plaintiff’s Objection 

is that BIC USA sought only partial summary judgment on one factor in the 

Sleekcraft factors used to assess the likelihood of confusion—actual confusion. (Id.

at 5.) Plaintiff contends that this Court’s consideration would effectively be a sua 

sponte summary judgment consideration and the “first of its kind” in the Ninth 

Circuit on the issue of likelihood of confusion. (Id. at 6.) The Court overrules 

Plaintiff’s Objection. 

When an appellate mandate has issued regarding a lower court’s decision, the 

lower court is obliged to execute the terms of the mandate. United States v. 

Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000). In construing a mandate, the lower 

court may consider the opinion the mandate purports to enforce as well as the 

procedural posture and substantive law from which it arises. Id. at 1093. In most 

cases, enforcing the mandate is uncontroversial because its terms are plain and square 

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both with the underlying opinion and the procedural history of the case. Id.

2

 

Here, there should be nothing controversial about this Court considering 

likelihood of confusion related to “The Write Choice” mark now that the case is 

before this Court once more. In reversing this Court’s grant of summary judgment 

on the fair use defense for that mark, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[w]e remand for the 

district court to consider Marketquest’s trademark infringement claim regarding 

Defendants’ use of ‘The Write Choice.’” Marketquest Group, Inc. v. BIC Corp., 862 

F.3d 927, 939 (9th Cir. 2017). As the Ninth Circuit observed, “[t]he district court 

could not properly find here that there was no evidence of confusion, fail to conduct 

a Sleekcraft analysis, and still conclude that the Defendants qualified for the fair use 

defense” because “[t]he fair use defense only comes into play once the party alleging 

infringement has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that confusion is likely.”

Id. (quoting KP Permanent II, 408 F.3d at 608–09). This observation makes clear 

that a showing of likelihood of confusion is a prerequisite to consideration of the fair 

use defense. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the defense and, therefore, 

this Court necessarily had to consider likelihood of confusion before reaching the 

applicability of the defense. In light of the clear terms of the Mandate, there is 

nothing “sua sponte” about this Court’s identification of likelihood of confusion as 

an issue this Court must address. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Objection to consideration of 

likelihood of confusion assumes too much. The fact that this Court must now 

consider likelihood of confusion because of the Mandate should not be interpreted to 

mean that a grant of summary judgment will issue. As the Plaintiff correctly observes 

 

2 Additionally, “mandates require respect for what the higher court decided, 

not for what it did not decide.” Kellington. 217 F.3d 1084 (quoting Biggins v. Hazen 

Paper Co., 111 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 952 (1997)). A lower 

court is therefore left to address any issue not expressly or impliedly disposed of on 

appeal. Id. at 1094; Nguyen v. United States, 792 F.2d 1500, 1502 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The Ninth Circuit did not address the validity of Plaintiff’s trademarks in any way 

and, therefore, on remand, this Court has the authority to address the issue. 

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in Objection, summary judgment in trademark cases is “generally disfavored” 

because of “the intensely factual nature of trademark disputes.” Marketquest, 862 

F.3d at 932. The record in this case is a special reminder of this proposition. 

Accordingly, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s Objection on the basis of the Mandate’s 

plain terms. 

C. Reinstatement of All Other Motions

Neither party has objected to reinstatement of: Defendants Norwood and BIC 

USA, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment regarding damages (ECF Nos. 214, 215), 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14); Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 205), and the parties’ Motions to Exclude Experts or 

Non-retained Witnesses (ECF Nos. 199, 217, 218, 219). Therefore, the Court 

reinstates these motions and pleadings.

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that: 

1. Plaintiff’s Objection is OVERRULED. 

2. The Court REINSTATES the following: 

a. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14);

b. Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaims (ECF No. 17)

c. Defendants Norwood and BIC USA, Inc.’s motion for summary 

judgment regarding damages (ECF Nos. 214, 215),

d. Defendant BIC Corporation’s motion for summary judgment regarding 

fraud and abandonment (ECF No. 216);

e. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 205), and

f. The parties’ Motions to Exclude Experts or Non-retained Witnesses 

(ECF Nos. 199, 217, 218, 219).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 12, 2018

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