Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00455/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00455-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 05:0552fi Freedom of Information Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN MARINE, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES INTERNAL 

REVENUE SERVICE,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15-cv-0455-BTM-JMA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF NO. 26]

The United States Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has filed a motion for 

summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims under the Freedom of Information Act 

(“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, et seq. (ECF No. 26.) For the reasons discussed below, 

the IRS’s motion will be granted in part and denied without prejudice in part. 

I. BACKGROUND

This is one of five actions filed by related entities against the IRS.1 Each 

case is based on the claim that the IRS failed to comply with its obligations under 

5 U.S.C. § 552 to respond to FOIA requests submitted by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 

contend they submitted their requests after the IRS filed a series of liens against 

 

1 The five actions (including this one) are: Trucept, Inc., fka Smart Tek Solutions Inc. v. United States Internal 

Revenue Service, Case No. 15-cv-0447-BTM-JMA; Smart-Tek Services, Inc. v. United States Internal Revenue 

Service, Case No. 15-cv-0449-BTM-JMA; Smart-Tek Service Solutions Corp. v. United States Internal Revenue 

Service, Case No. 15-cv-0452-BTM-JMA; Smart-Tek Automated Services, Inc. v. United States Internal Revenue 

Service, Case No. 15-cv-0453-BTM-JMA; and American Marine, LLC v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 

Case No. 15-cv-0455-BTM-JMA.

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them between 2011 and 2013 holding them liable for payroll tax liabilities of other 

corporations under alter ego and/or successor liability theories. 

Plaintiff American Marine, LLC (“Plaintiff”), alleges it sent a written FOIA

request to the IRS on May 12, 2014. Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 10. Under 5 U.S.C. § 

552(a)(6)(A)(i), an agency has 20 business days following receipt of a FOIA 

request to determine whether to comply with the request and must “immediately” 

notify the requester of its determination. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). On June 26, 

2014, the IRS allegedly sent a response to Plaintiff in which it acknowledged 

receipt of the request but “failed to make any determination about the request.” 

Compl. ¶ 11. On February 27, 2015, having received no further response from the 

IRS, Plaintiff initiated this action. 

On October 7, 2016, the IRS filed the instant motion. It indicates it has now

completed its search for records and released 4,723 pages in full, and 1,192 pages 

in part, of non-exempt documents responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request. It seeks 

summary judgment on the ground that it has fully discharged its obligations under 

5 U.S.C. § 552. Plaintiff opposes the motion. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. FOIA Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates “there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing there 

is no material factual dispute and he or she is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving 

party must go beyond the pleadings and identify specific facts which show a 

genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.

District courts are directed to conduct a de novo review of the adequacy of 

an agency’s response to a FOIA request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); U.S. Dep’t of 

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Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989). 

Because FOIA cases rarely involve material factual disputes, they “are typically 

and appropriately decided on motions for summary judgment.” Defenders of 

Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 97 (D.D.C. 2009); see

Shannahan v. Internal Revenue Service, 637 F. Supp. 2d 902, 912 (W.D. Wash. 

2009). Courts “follow a two-step inquiry when presented with a motion for 

summary judgment in a FOIA case.” Shannahan, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 912. 

First, the district court must determine whether the agency has established 

that it fully discharged its obligation under FOIA to conduct an adequate search for 

responsive records. Zemansky v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th 

Cir. 1985). To meet this burden, the agency must:

demonstrate that it has conducted a “search reasonably calculated to 

uncover all relevant documents.” Further, the issue to be resolved is 

not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive 

to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was 

adequate. The adequacy of the search, in turn, is judged by a standard 

of reasonableness and depends, not surprisingly, upon the facts of 

each case. In demonstrating the adequacy of the search, the agency 

may rely upon reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted 

in good faith.

Id. (quoting Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (“Weisberg II”), 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 

(D.C. Cir. 1984)). 

If the agency satisfies its initial burden, the court proceeds to the second step 

and considers “‘whether the agency has proven that the information that it did not 

disclose falls within one of nine FOIA exemptions.’” Shannahan, 637 F. Supp. 2d 

at 912 (quoting Los Angeles Times Commc’ns, LLC v. Dep’t of the Army, 442 F. 

Supp. 2d 880, 894 (C.D. Cal. 2006)). Agencies seeking to withhold documents 

pursuant to a FOIA exemption “have been required to supply the opposing party 

and the court with a ‘Vaughn index,’ identifying each document withheld, the 

statutory exemption claimed, and a particularized explanation of how disclosure of 

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the particular document would damage the interest protected by the claimed 

exemption.” Wiener v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 943 F.2d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 

1991); see Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973). “The purpose 

of a Vaughn index ‘is ... to afford the requester an opportunity to intelligently 

advocate release of the withheld documents and to afford the court the opportunity 

to intelligently judge the contest.’” Shannahan, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (quoting 

Wiener, 943 F.2d at 979). 

Finally, “even if the agency satisfies the two-part test, it generally must still 

disclose any reasonably segregable portions of the withheld documents.” Id.; see

5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be 

provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which 

are exempt under this subsection.”). “‘The burden is on the agency to establish

that all reasonably segregable portions of a document have been segregated and 

disclosed.’” Id. (quoting Pac. Fisheries Inc. v. United States, 539 F.3d 1143, 1148 

(9th Cir. 2008). 

B. Reasonableness of Search 

The IRS contends it has conducted an adequate search for records 

responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request. To fulfill its obligations under the FOIA, “the 

agency must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the 

requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce 

the information requested.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 

(D.C. Cir. 1990). The agency must show “[w]hat records were searched, by whom, 

and through what process.” Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 552 

(D.C. Cir. 1994). An agency can meet its burden by submitting a “reasonably 

detailed, nonconclusory” affidavit “in good faith.” Id. (quoting Weisberg II, 745 F.2d 

at 1485). Agency affidavits that “do not denote which files were searched or by 

whom, do not reflect any systematic approach to document location, and do not 

provide information specific enough to allow the plaintiff to challenge the 

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procedures utilized” are insufficient to fulfill the agency’s burden. Weisberg v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In determining whether an 

agency has met its burden to prove an adequate search, “the facts must be viewed 

in the light most favorable to the requestor.” Zemansky, 767 F.2d at 571 (citing 

Weisberg II, 745 F.2d at 1485). 

The IRS submits the declaration of Delphine Thomas in support of its 

contention that it conducted an adequate search for records. (ECF No. 26-5.) 

Thomas is a Senior Disclosure Specialist whose duties include responding to FOIA 

requests for IRS records, which requires her to “have knowledge of the types of 

documents created and maintained by the various divisions and functions of the 

Service and an understanding of the provisions of the FOIA.” Thomas Decl. ¶ 1. 

Thomas states that the disclosure specialists initially assigned to respond to 

Plaintiff’s FOIA are now “unavailable to declare in this case.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 6. To 

familiarize herself with the case, she reviewed the case notes of the previouslyassigned disclosure specialists. Id. From her review, she determined that on June 

23, 2014, the IRS received a written FOIA request from Plaintiff, seeking “‘a 

complete copy of the administrative file’” for Plaintiff “for tax forms 940, 941, 1120 

and 1065 for years 2007-2014.” Id. ¶ 4.2 

Thomas states disclosure specialist Athena Amparano thereafter searched 

for “files” using the IRS’s Integrated Data Retrieval System (“IDRS”), an electronic 

system that “manages data that has been retrieved from the Master File System” 

which is “the Service’s nation-wide electronic information system containing 

permanent taxpayer account information.” Id. ¶¶ 7-9. Amparano reportedly 

learned from IDRS that there was collection activity related to Plaintiff, and that 

“Revenue Officer John Black (RO Black) was assigned to the collection matter.” 

 

2

 Although Thomas indicates a copy of the FOIA request is Exhibit A to her declaration, the exhibit was not 

attached. See Thomas Decl. ¶ 4. 

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Id. ¶ 10. The Disclosure Office “learned from RO Black that documents responsive 

to plaintiff’s FOIA request would be located within the commingled file maintained 

by RO Black on the Smart-Tek entities and over twenty (20) related entities.” Id. ¶ 

11. RO Black had initiated “a collection proceeding on one of the Smart-Tek

entities and, as he progressed, he realized that all the entities were related.” Id. 

He “communicated with other Revenue Officers working the related cases and had 

all the case files he identified transferred to him” and then “started working the 

case files as one large case file.” Id. As RO Black “received or created” new 

documents, “he added them to the commingled file in chronological order, not 

based on a particular entity,” and as a result, “the files for plaintiff and all the other 

entities were all mixed together.” Id. ¶ 12. The commingled files totaled 65 boxes 

containing “around 141,000 pages.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13.

Disclosure Specialist Ed Pullman “phoned plaintiff’s representative to 

confirm that her request was for the administrative file maintained by Collection

personnel.” Id. ¶ 14. Amparano and Pullman, later joined by Thomas, attorneys 

and law clerks in the Office of Chief Counsel, worked from late 2014 through fall 

2015 to “search for responsive documents within the commingled file of the SmartTek entities....” Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 21. “As part of my review, I noted which documents 

were responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request and which documents were responsive 

to the other related entities’ FOIA requests.” Id. ¶ 22. Thomas states she has 

“been informed that ... my colleagues and I located 5,960 pages of documents 

responsive to [Plaintiff’s] request,” id. ¶ 22, and concludes, “[t]o my knowledge, 

there are no other records responsive to this request,” id. ¶ 23. 

Plaintiff argues this evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the adequacy of 

the IRS’s search, because it fails to explain what documents the commingled files 

contained, the methodology used to review the 65 boxes of documents, criteria for 

selecting responsive documents, and because it does not identify the entities 

whose records were in the commingled file. Pl.’s Opp. at 6-7. 

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The Court agrees with Plaintiff in part. To sustain its burden, the IRS must

show “[w]hat records were searched, by whom, and through what process.” 

Steinberg, 23 F.3d at 552. Although a “reasonably detailed, nonconclusory” 

affidavit submitted “in good faith” will generally meet this burden, id. at 551 (quoting 

Weisberg II, 745 F.2d at 1485), in key respects, Thomas’s declaration is too 

conclusory to suffice. 

First, the IRS has provided no explanation how it interpreted Plaintiff’s FOIA 

request, nor has it described the scope of documents it sought out in response. 

Federal agencies responding to FOIA requests are required to use search 

methods that can reasonably be expected to yield the requested information. Lane 

v. Dep’t of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2008). Without a description of 

the categories of documents the IRS determined were responsive to the request—

that is, what records the IRS was searching for—the Court has no context for 

evaluating the reasonableness of the methods it used to find them. 

Second, Thomas’s declaration fails to give sufficient information about the 

IRS’s review of the 65 boxes of documents. The IRS spent months reviewing the 

boxes and removing particular documents, but it has not explained what 

documents the document review team was looking for and pulling out of the boxes,

including the criteria or search parameters the team used to determine which 

documents to remove for production. Although an agency need only prove its 

search was “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents,” Zemansky, 

767 F.2d at 571, to evaluate the adequacy of the IRS’s search, the Court needs 

information regarding the document review to determine whether the IRS’s search 

of the 65 boxes was reasonable. See County of Santa Cruz v. Ctrs. for Medicare 

and Medicaid Servs., No. C-07-2889 MMC, 2009 WL 816633, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 

26, 2009) (holding IRS failed to demonstrate reasonableness of search where 

supporting declarations reported that searches of various files located no 

responsive documents, without explaining “the process used to conduct [the IRS’s] 

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search”).

Next, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s argument that the IRS cannot establish the 

reasonableness of its search without identifying the other entities whose records 

were in the 65-box commingled file. The IRS did not address this argument in its 

reply brief. 

Two countervailing principles bear upon Plaintiff’s contention. On the one 

hand, the Court must make a de novo determination of the adequacy of the IRS’s 

response to Plaintiff’s FOIA request, Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 

U.S. at 755, and it must be able to “intelligently judge the contest” to perform this 

role. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 977. On the other hand, withholding information relating 

to return information of another taxpayer or taxpayers, including the identity of 

third-party taxpayers, is authorized under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), in conjunction with 

26 U.S.C. § 6103(a), and 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(C). See Johnson v. Comm’r of 

Internal Revenue, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1128-29 (W.D. Wash. 2002). 

Setting aside the merits of Plaintiff’s argument, as a threshold issue, it seems 

likely that the alleged alter egos’ identities have already been disclosed. “[O]nce 

tax return information is made a part of the public domain, the taxpayer may no 

longer claim a right of privacy in that information” and “‘§ 6103’s directive to keep 

return information confidential is moot.’” Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 

338 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Figur v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 515, 517 (N.D. 

Cal. 1987). Bonar is Plaintiff’s president, and he indicates in a declaration 

submitted in support of Plaintiff’s opposition that Plaintiff issued its FOIA request 

after being served with an IRS lien based on “payroll tax liabilities of unrelated 

corporations.” Decl. Brian Bonar ¶ 2. Presumably the alleged alter egos were 

identified in the IRS lien. Such a presumption seems supported by Bonar’s 

declaration; he describes the entities as “unrelated corporations,” and his 

characterization of the corporations as “unrelated” implies he knows who they are. 

Also, in researching the relevant legal issues, the Court encountered the district 

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court’s opinion in Goldberg v. United States, No. 13-61528-CIV, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 104815, at *3-4 n.2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2015). The Goldberg litigation 

apparently arose from the same investigation of RO Black, and the district court’s 

order appears to have disclosed the names of the entities involved. See id. If so, 

under Lampert, disclosing their names in this litigation would appear not to run 

afoul of § 6103(a). 

The fact that any privilege pertaining to the identities of the alter egos may 

have been dispelled does not necessarily mean the identity of every entity whose 

files were in the 65 boxes has to be disclosed to establish the reasonableness of 

the IRS’s search. At this stage, the record regarding the search the IRS undertook 

is not yet complete, and the Court will reserve ruling on the merits of Plaintiff’s 

argument until the record is more fully developed.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the IRS has failed to carry its burden 

to demonstrate the adequacy of its search. Its motion for summary judgment will 

be denied without prejudice. 

C. Withholding of Responsive Documents Pursuant to FOIA Exemptions

The IRS indicates it withheld all, or portions of, responsive documents

pursuant to FOIA exemptions. 

1. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (“Exemption 3”) in Conjunction with 26 U.S.C. § 

6103(a); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (“Exemption 6”)

The IRS withheld responsive information pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 3 

and 6. 

Under Exemption 3, matters “specifically exempted by statute” are deemed 

exempted under FOIA “if that statute—(A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld 

from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) 

establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters 

to be withheld....” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A). 26 U.S.C. § 6103 is an Exemption 3 

statute. Long v. United States, 742 F.2d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 1984). Section 

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6103(a) provides that taxpayer “returns and return information shall be 

confidential.” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a). “Return information” is defined to include, 

among other things, “a taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of his 

income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, ... 

whether the taxpayer’s return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other 

investigation or processing, or any other data ... with respect to a return.....” 26 

U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2). Pursuant to Exemption 3 and § 6103(a), the IRS withheld 

documents that contained information of “taxpayers other than plaintiff” as well as 

Plaintiff’s “owners.” Queener Decl. ¶¶ 15-16. 

Exemption 6 restricts from disclosure “personnel and medical files and 

similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion 

of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Under Exemption 6, the IRS withheld 

information relating to taxpayers and persons other than Plaintiff. Queener Decl. 

¶¶ 23-25. 

At this stage, the Court will reserve ruling on the validity of the IRS’s 

withholding of information under Exemptions 3 and 6. Plaintiff’s essential 

contention in this case is that the IRS’s response to its FOIA request was 

inadequate because it failed to produce information pertaining to alter ego entities 

whose tax liability was the basis for the lien against Plaintiff. The information 

withheld on the basis of the foregoing exemptions relates to “owners” of Plaintiff, 

and unidentified taxpayers other than Plaintiff, some of which may be the alter ego 

entities whose documents Plaintiff seeks. The IRS disputes whether Plaintiff can 

obtain tax information relating to Plaintiff’s alter egos without an authorization from 

the alter ego. Plaintiff cannot obtain such an authorization, however, without 

knowing which entities’ records have been withheld. Although the IRS claims even 

the names of the alter egos are protected from disclosure, if those names have 

already been published such that any related privacy interest has been lost, there 

would appear to be no impediment to identifying, in subsequent briefing, any alter 

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ego taxpayers whose records were withheld. If the IRS can disclose those names 

in subsequent proffers, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to more intelligently 

advocate for disclosure of the withheld information. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 977. 

The Court will therefore reserve ruling on these issues until the record has 

been more fully developed.

2. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (“Exemption 5”)

Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency 

memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than 

an agency in litigation with the agency....” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “This exemption

entitles an agency to withhold . . . documents which a private party could not 

discover in litigation with the agency.” Pac. Fisheries, 539 F.3d at 1148 (quoting 

Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“Exemption 5 thus covers the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product 

privilege, and the executive ‘deliberative process’ privilege.” Maricopa, 108 F.3d 

at 1092.

a) Attorney-Client Privilege

Pursuant to Exemption 5, the IRS withheld eight pages of documents on the 

ground they contain information protected by the attorney-client privilege. “The 

attorney-client privilege protects confidential disclosures made by a client to an 

attorney in order to obtain legal advice, ... as well as an attorney's advice in 

response to such disclosures.” United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 607 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

The IRS submits the declaration of Jacqueline Kay Queener, an attorney in 

the IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel, in support of its privilege claim. She indicates 

the withheld documents are “pages in an electronic history transcript documenting 

RO Black’s collection activities,” and that the withheld information contains his 

“record of legal advice he received from Chief Counsel Mindy Meigs concerning 

alter-ego/successor entity status” in the course of confidential communications 

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with Meigs. Queener Decl. ¶¶ 17-19. Queener states she is familiar with FOIA’s 

segregation requirements, and that the IRS complied with such requirements in 

withholding the referenced information. Id. ¶ 14. 

The Court finds the Queener declaration sufficiently detailed and nonconclusory to support the conclusion that the withheld information falls within the 

scope of the privilege, because it reflects RO Black’s confidential communications 

with agency lawyers for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 

at 607. The Court also finds the IRS complied with its duty to produce reasonably 

segregable portions of documents containing such information. 

Accordingly, the Court grants the IRS’s motion for summary judgment as to 

its determination that the foregoing documents contained attorney-client privileged 

information and were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption 5.

b) Deliberative Process Privilege

The IRS withheld five pages of documents in part pursuant to Exemption 5 

on grounds they are covered by the deliberative process privilege. “In order to be 

protected by the deliberative process privilege, a document must be both (1) 

‘predecisional’ or ‘antecedent to the adoption of agency policy’ and (2) 

‘deliberative,’ meaning ‘it must actually be related to the process by which policies 

are formulated.’” United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.

1988) (additional citation and internal quotation marks omitted)) (holding death 

penalty evaluation form completed by U.S. Attorney and submitted before final 

decision whether to seek the death penalty fell within deliberative process 

privilege). Shielding such documents from production is meant to encourage 

forthright and candid discussions of ideas and improve the decision-making 

process. Id. (citing Assembly of the State of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 968 

F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir.1992)). 

The IRS relies on the Queener declaration in support of its privilege claim. 

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Queener Decl. ¶¶ 20-22. She states that the withheld information consists of a 

case activity record entered by an IRS Officer that “contains a deliberative 

discussion concerning the status of efforts to collect the outstanding tax liabilities

of plaintiff and several related entities, and possible future courses of action” 

(¶ 22(a)); copies of an email exchange between RO Black and another revenue 

officers “concerning an entity potentially related to plaintiff and several other 

entities (¶ 22(b)); and a memo prepared by a revenue officer “that contains a 

deliberative discussion concerning alternative courses of action, and suggesting 

that plaintiff’s and several related entities’ cases all be assigned to the same 

employee to promote effective tax administration” (¶ 22(c)). She indicates the 

withheld information “reflect the deliberations of the Service with respect to 

collection activities” and “reflect opinions or recommendations ... that precede the 

final decisions concerning the collection actions pursued by the Service.” Id. ¶ 22. 

The Court finds this evidence sufficient to support the IRS’s privilege claim. 

The withheld documents are both predecisional and deliberative in the sense that 

they are actually related to the IRS’s ongoing efforts to determine how to proceed 

with its enforcement action. Fernandez, 231 F.3d at 1246. The Court also finds 

the IRS has shown it complied with its duty to reasonably segregate and produce 

non-exempt information. Accordingly, the Court grants the IRS’s motion for 

summary judgment as to its withholding of information on this ground.

3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (“Exemption 7(A)”)

Exemption 7(A) applies to “records or information compiled for law 

enforcement purposes” to the extent production of such information “could 

reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings....” 5 U.S.C. § 

552(b)(7)(A). To support withholding information or documents under Exemption 

7(A), an agency “must establish only that they were investigatory records compiled 

for law enforcement purposes and that production would interfere with pending 

enforcement proceedings.” Barney v. Internal Revenue Service, 618 F.2d 1268, 

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1272-73 (8th Cir. 1980). For purposes of Exemption 7(A), the IRS is a law 

enforcement agency, Shannahan v. Internal Revenue Serv., 680 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 

1281 (W.D. Wash. 2010), and civil tax enforcement proceedings are “enforcement 

proceedings,” Barney, 618 F.2d at 1273. “The IRS need only make a general 

showing that disclosure of its investigatory records would interfere with its 

enforcement proceedings.” Lewis v. Internal Revenue Serv., 823 F.2d 375, 380 

(9th Cir. 1987). “[D]isclosure of such records as witness statements, documentary 

evidence, agent’s work papers and internal agency memoranda, prior to the 

institution of civil or criminal tax enforcement proceedings, would necessarily 

interfere with such proceedings by prematurely revealing the government’s case.” 

Barney, 618 F.2d at 1273; see NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 

236-37 (1978). 

The IRS submits the declaration of Rosanna Savala, a Supervisory Revenue 

Officer, in support of its decision to withhold all or part of nine pages of documents

under Exemption 7(A). Savala Decl. ¶¶ 14-20. She indicates the withheld 

information consists of “part of an email exchange between RO Black and another 

revenue officer “discussing ongoing efforts to collect plaintiff’s outstanding tax 

liabilities” (¶¶ 15, 16); a “Sensitive Report,” a document created by RO Black for 

field collection management that reported on case activity, potential next steps, 

potential barriers to resolution of the case, and other sensitive information (¶¶ 17, 

18); portions of a memo from a revenue officer to a collections group manager that 

concern “prior and possible future actions or secondary investigations the Service 

could elect to pursue” against plaintiff (¶ 19); and an email sent to an assistant 

United States Attorney (AUSA) concerning potentially criminal tax liability, which 

the AUSA forwarded to IRS for possible investigation (¶ 20). She states disclosure 

of the information could “compromise the Service’s on-going efforts to collect 

plaintiff’s outstanding tax liabilities” because it would “allow plaintiff to determine 

the nature, direction, scope and limits of other courses of action the Service may

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elect to pursue Id. ¶ 15.

The Court finds this evidence sufficient to show disclosure of the referenced 

information would interfere with its enforcement proceedings such that it fell within 

the scope of Exemption 7(A), and further finds the IRS complied with its duty to 

reasonably segregate and produce all non-exempt information. See Queener

Decl. ¶ 14. Accordingly, the IRS’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to 

its decision to withhold responsive information pursuant to Exemption 7(A).

4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (“Exemption 7(D)”)

Exemption 7(D) protects information compiled for law enforcement purposes 

from disclosure to the extent it 

could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential 

source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any 

private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, 

and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law 

enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an 

agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, 

information furnished by a confidential source[.]

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). Exemption 7(D) “has long been recognized as affording 

the most comprehensive protection of all of FOIA’s law enforcement exemptions.” 

Billington v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 301 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 2004). To invoke 

its protections, an agency must show the particular source “provided information 

under an express assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances from which such 

an assurance could be reasonably inferred.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 

508 U.S. 165, 172 (1993). “A source should be deemed confidential if the source 

furnished information with the understanding that the [agency] would not divulge 

the communication except to the extent [it] thought necessary for law enforcement 

purposes.” Id. at 174.

The IRS withheld 26 pages of documents in full or in part under Exemption 

7(D). The IRS relies on the declaration of Ms. Queener, who states that the 

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referenced documents “contain either the identity, or sufficient information from 

which the identity could readily be discerned, of sources of information that 

furnished information to the Service... with the understanding that it would only be 

divulged to the extent necessary to facilitate ongoing efforts by the Service to 

enforce the Federal tax laws as applied to plaintiff.” Queener Decl. ¶ 28. 

The Court finds this evidence sufficient to show the withheld information 

relates to the identity of a confidential source, such that it falls within Exemption 

7(D), Landano, 508 U.S. at 174, and further finds the IRS has sufficiently 

demonstrated it complied with its duty to reasonably segregate and produce nonexempt information, see Queener Decl. ¶ 14.

Accordingly, the Court grants the IRS’s motion for summary judgment as to 

the validity of its withholding of the foregoing information under Exemption 7(D).

5. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (“Exemption 7(E)”)

Exemption 7(E) protects information compiled for law enforcement purposes 

from disclosure to the extent it “would disclose techniques and procedures for law 

enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law 

enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be 

expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). To establish 

this exemption, “the Government must show that the technique that would be 

disclosed under the FOIA request is a technique unknown to the general public.” 

Pully v. Internal Revenue Serv., 939 F. Supp. 429, 438 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citing 

Malloy v. Dep’t of Justice, 457 F. Supp. 543, 545 (D.D.C. 1978)). 

The IRS withheld two pages in part pursuant to Exemption 7(E). Queener 

Decl. ¶ 29. The IRS relies on the declaration of Ms. Queener, who states the 

redacted information relates to Plaintiff’s “Risk Score,” “which reflects the Service’s 

assessment of the priority of having the taxpayer’s account assigned to a 

dedicated collection specialist to actively pursue collection of the taxpayer’s 

outstanding liabilities.” Id. However, her declaration does not address whether 

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the Risk Score is a “technique unknown to the general public.” Pully, 939 F. Supp. 

at 438. Accordingly, the evidence is insufficient to support withholding under 

Exemption 7(E), and the Court will deny summary judgment without prejudice as 

to this exemption.

6. Exemption 3 in Conjunction with 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(7)

The IRS withheld parts of documents pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(7), 

which is an Exemption 3 statute. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 839-40 & 

n.26 (5th Cir. 1979) (referring to § 6103(e)(7) under its then-applicable statutory 

designation, § 6103(e)(6)). Pursuant to § 6103(e)(7), “[r]eturn information with 

respect to any taxpayer may be open to inspection by or disclosure to any person 

authorized by this subsection to inspect any return of such taxpayer if the Secretary 

determines that such disclosure would not seriously impair Federal tax 

administration.” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(7). Section 6103(e)(7) gives the taxpayer 

“unrestricted access to his own returns, but as to other information or materials 

collected by the IRS in the course of determining tax liability,” availability of the 

returns “is conditioned on the Secretary’s determination that such access would 

not impair tax administration.” Chamberlain, 589 F.2d at 837. Documents 

reflecting information “prepared or collected by the Secretary with respect to 

determining the existence of liability for a tax or penalty” is subject to withholding 

under § 6103(e)(7). Id. at 840. 

The IRS relies on the declaration of Ms. Savala, who states she is authorized 

by Treasury Department Order No. 150-10 and related authority to determine 

under § 6103(e)(7) whether disclosure of return information would impair tax 

administration. Savala Decl. ¶¶ 6-13. She determined that the same documents, 

and portions of documents, identified and withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(A), 

are also subject to withholding under § 6103(e)(7). Compare id. ¶¶ 6-13 with ¶¶

14-20. She indicates all of the withheld information would, if disclosed, “allow 

plaintiff to determine the nature, direction, scope and limits of other courses of 

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action the Service may elect to pursue in order to collect plaintiff’s outstanding tax 

liabilities,” id. ¶ 8, and “allow plaintiff to circumvent the law” or “compromise future 

actions that the Service may pursue,” id. ¶¶ 12, 13. 

The Court finds the IRS’s evidence sufficient to show disclosure of the 

withheld information access would impair tax administration so as to justify its

withholding under § 6103(e)(7). The Court further finds the IRS complied with its 

duty to reasonably segregate and produce non-exempt information. See Queener

Decl. ¶ 14. Accordingly, the Court grants the IRS’s motion for summary judgment 

as to this exemption.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, the IRS’s motion for summary judgment 

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2017

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