Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01193/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01193-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Robert James Fairweather,

Petitioner, No. Civ. S 02-1193 FCD PAN P

vs. Amended Findings and

Recommendations

Edward S. Alameida, Jr.,

Respondent.

-oOoThese amended findings and recommendations supplant the

findings and recommendations issued July 12, 2005. 

Petitioner is a state prisoner with appointed counsel

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner pleaded guilty of first degree murder by lying in

wait after he killed his wife during the wee hours of the

morning. 

Respondent moved to dismiss this proceeding upon the ground

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it is barred by the statute of limitation. This court denied the

motion without prejudice and appointed counsel. 

The court herein addresses the timeliness of the petition,

based on consideration of petitioner’s June 29, 2004, brief re

timeliness of petition and declaration, respondent’s July 29,

2004, brief renewing motion to dismiss, and petitioner’s August

18, 2004, reply brief in opposition to the renewed motion to

dismiss.

Petitioner concedes the “actual innocence” exception, which

would permit the court to consider untimely claims is not

applicable. Instead he claims he is entitled to statutory and

equitable tolling. 

Petitions for habeas corpus challenging state convictions or

sentences are subject to a one-year limitation period. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). The one-year period runs from the latest of (A)

the date the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review

or expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date

an unconstitutional state-created impediment preventing the

petitioner from filing the application was removed; (C) the date

the constitutional right asserted was first recognized by the

United States Supreme Court (if it is a newly recognized right

retroactively applicable on collateral review); or (D) the date

the factual predicate of petitioner’s claims could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). 

The limitation period is tolled while a “properly filed

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application” for post-conviction or other collateral review is

pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

At petitioner’s preliminary hearing Cory Trowbridge

testified that deputy public defender Steve Plesser previously

had represented Trowbridge. At petitioner’s arraignment

December 18, 2005, his counsel, deputy public defender Schutz,

stated:

[T]here’s a potential issue as to several witnesses

that the People intend to call. We represent them and

are currently representing one by our calculation. It

would be my request this Wednesday, if this Court has

time, to meet ex parte on the record, discuss with the

Court exactly how we represented these people, when we

represented them, what they are charged with, what

their testimony is going to be and then have the Court

determine if there’s a conflict.

Id.

Petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced June 19, 1996. 

He appealed; the conviction was affirmed September 11, 1997. 

Petitioner did not seek review in the California Supreme Court

and his conviction was final 40 days later, October 21, 1997. 

Petitioner did not sign his federal petition until more than four

years later. 

Petitioner contends the limitation period was tolled because

of delay in obtaining his files from his trial counsel. He

argues counsel’s conflict of interest was concealed from him and

he could not with due diligence have discovered it until August

14, 2000, when he obtained a copy of a December 19, 1995,

memorandum from Schutz to the trial judge providing a detailed

list of prosecution witnesses previously represented by the

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public defender’s office. See Petitioner’s August 18, 2004,

reply, Ex. 20. Petitioner cites Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796

(9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling applied where petitioner hired

post-conviction counsel who did nothing and failed to return

files to petitioner until well after the date the petition was

due). 

Assuming arguendo that Spitsyn is the governing precedent

and petitioner was not on notice of counsel’s conflict years

prior, the court nonetheless would find tolling only until late

May or early June of 2000, when petitioner obtained the first

portion of his files. The verified petition repeatedly states

petitioner received documents May 31, 2000, revealing facts

giving rise to his habeas claims and learned the import of that

information through a paralegal, Miller, on June 12, 2000. See

Petition paras. 84, 85, 124, 125, 209; see also Declaration of

Paralegal Charles Miller (filed May 12, 2002) stating Miller told

petitioner June 12, 2000, Steve Plesser was a public defender and

thus trial counsel had a conflict during Trowbridge’s preliminary

hearing testimony. Thus, petitioner had constructive knowledge

of the conflict May 31, 2000, and actual knowledge June 12, 2000. 

That he later obtained documents showing the full extent of the

conflict is of no moment. See Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150

(9th Cir. 2001) (petitioner learns the basis for his claim not on

the date he begins to have suspicions, but on the date he

“discovered (or with the exercise of due diligence could have

discovered) facts” adequate to support the claim. Hasan, 254

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F.3d at 1154. 

Commencing June 12, 2000, at the latest, the limitation

period ran for 76 days until petitioner signed his first state

habeas petition August 27, 2000. Giving petitioner the benefit

of continuous tolling for one full round of state habeas

petitions, the limitation period resumed running June 22, 2001,

30 days after the California Supreme Court denied the petition

May 23, 2001. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002)

(limitation period tolled continuously during one full round of

collateral review in California); Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d

973 (9th Cir. 2001) (tolling continues until 30 days after the

California Supreme Court denies habeas petition). It expired 289

days later, April 7, 2002, and petitioner was 37 days late when

he signed his federal petition May 14, 2002.

Finally, petitioner argues the court should disregard Bunney

and instead rule that continuous tolling extended until August

21, 2001, (when the time to petition the United States Supreme

Court for certiorari expired, 90 days after the California

Supreme Court denied habeas). Petitioner relies on Abela v.

Martin, 348 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 2003), which held that tolling

extends until certiorari review is foreclosed, whether the

petitioner sought Supreme Court review of state habeas denial or,

as here, did not. The holding in Abela is open to doubt but even

if this court were inclined to follow the decision it could not

because the Ninth Circuit’s controlling law is stated in Bunney. 

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends respondent’s July

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29, 2004, renewed motion to dismiss be granted and this action be

dismissed as time-barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Within 11 days after being

served with these findings and recommendations, either party may

file written objections. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 

The district judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings

and recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: August 25, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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