Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01191/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CROSSFIT, INC., a Delaware 

corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONAL STRENGTH AND 

CONDITIONING ASSOCIATION, a 

Colorado corporation,

Defendant.

Case No.: 14cv1191 JLS (KSC)

ORDER (1) GRANTING CROSSFIT, 

INC.’S PARTIAL MSJ AND (2) 

GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART NATIONAL 

STRENGTH AND CONDITIONING 

ASSOCIATION’S MSJ 

(ECF Nos. 77 & 102)

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff CrossFit, Inc.’s (CrossFit) Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment on the Element of Falsity (CrossFit MSJ), (ECF No. 77), and 

Defendant National Strength and Conditioning Association’s (the NSCA) Motion for 

Summary Judgment, or Alternatively Partial Summary Judgment (NSCA MSJ), (ECF No. 

102-1). Also before the Court are the NSCA’s Opposition to (NSCA Opp’n), (ECF No. 

91), and CrossFit’s Reply in Support of (CrossFit Reply), (ECF No. 100), the CrossFit 

MSJ, as well as CrossFit’s Opposition to (CrossFit Opp’n), (ECF No. 111), and the 

NSCA’s Reply in Support of (NSCA Reply), (ECF No. 112-1), the NSCA MSJ.

For reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS CrossFit’s MSJ and GRANTS IN 

PART AND DENIES IN PART the NSCA’s MSJ. 

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BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

CrossFit’s fitness training program involves “varied functional movements 

performed at a relatively high intensity,” and began increasing in popularity in 2000. 

(CrossFit MSJ at 7.)1 The company generates revenue by credentialing and certifying 

trainers through its seminar programs and through licensing the CrossFit trademark and 

other intellectual property to affiliate gyms. (CrossFit MSJ at 8.) It has credentialed more 

than 80,000 trainers, has more than one million participants, and has more than 13,000 

licensed affiliate gyms. (CrossFit MSJ at 7.)

The NSCA is a nonprofit corporation that is “dedicated to the educational and 

professional exchange of ideas in the areas of strength development, athletic performance, 

and fitness.” (NSCA MSJ at 7.) Among other things, the NSCA offers educational 

publications, certifies fitness professionals who pay a fee and pass an exam, and puts on 

national conferences and events. (NSCA MSJ at 7.) One of the NSCA’s publications is 

its “flagship journal,” the Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research (JSCR). (NSCA 

MSJ at 8.) 

CrossFit casts itself as a relative newcomer to the fitness industry and the NSCA as 

the establishment. (CrossFit MSJ at 8–9.) CrossFit’s theory of this case is that the NSCA 

has a motive to disparage CrossFit’s training program because, “[a]s more and more people 

move from the NSCA’s traditional fitness model to CrossFit training, there will be fewer 

and fewer trainers seeking NSCA certifications.” (CrossFit MSJ at 9.) According to 

CrossFit, its popularity poses “an existential threat to the NSCA.” (CrossFit MSJ at 9.) 

The response to this threat, CrossFit contends, was “to engage in a smear campaign—using 

its JSCR as a platform to malign CrossFit training as ‘unsafe.’” (CrossFit MSJ at 9.) 

/ / /

/ / /

 

1 Pinpoint citations to docketed materials refer to the CM/ECF page number electronically stamped at the 

top of each page, and do not refer to the original page numbering of the document.

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In November 2013, researchers Steven T. Devor, Michael M. Smith, Allan J. 

Sommer, and Brooke E. Starkoff published an article in the JSCR titled “Crossfit-based 

high intensity power training improves maximal aerobic fitness and body composition.” 

(Nahama Ex. A, ECF No. 73-5.) The study examined fitness results from more than fifty 

individuals participating in a CrossFit training program called “The Challenge.” (CrossFit 

MSJ at 6.) Although much of the article praised CrossFit’s effectiveness, CrossFit takes 

issue with two passages and their underlying data that CrossFit says have seriously 

damaged its reputation and caused it to lose customers. The first such passage states:

Out of the original 54 participants, a total of 43 (23 males, 20 females) fully 

completed the training program and returned for follow up testing. Of the 11 

subjects who dropped out of the training program, two cited time concerns 

with the remaining nine subjects (16% of total recruited subjects) citing 

overuse or injury for failing to complete the program and finish follow up 

testing.

(Nahama Decl., Ex. A, ECF No. 73-5 at 5.) The article revisits this point several pages 

later: 

A unique concern with any high intensity training programs such as HIPT or 

other similar programs is the risk of overuse injury. In spite of a deliberate 

periodization and supervision of our Crossfit-based training program by 

certified fitness professionals, a notable percentage of our subjects (16%) did 

not complete the training program and return for follow-up testing. 

(Id. at 8.) Once published, the Devor Study received much attention, both in social media 

outlets and from news media. (See Nahama Decl. Ex. CC, ECF No 73-34.) 

CrossFit has identified the individuals who purportedly did not complete the study 

because of “overuse or injury,” (Nahama Decl., Exs. C, D, & KK), and the NSCA does not 

dispute that the list of individuals identified comprises those counted as suffering from 

overuse or injury in the Devor Study, (see Nahama Decl., Ex. II, ECF No. 73-40, at 6). 

Many of these individuals provided declarations explaining their actual reasons for not 

completing The Challenge:

/ / /

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PARTICIPANT DECLARATION

9 Completed The Challenge, however did not attend second 

round of testing due to other commitments.

22 Coach at gym, not a participant in The Challenge. 

Completed first round of testing out of curiosity.

26 Completed The Challenge, however did not complete 

second round of testing because he left early.

33 Did not complete The Challenge because she moved out 

of state before it ended.

34 Did not complete The Challenge because of work-related 

time commitments.

37 Completed The Challenge and attended the second round 

of testing. Unclear why data not used in study.

43 Coach at gym, not a participant in The Challenge. 

Completed first round of testing out of curiosity.

47 Did not complete The Challenge because of pre-existing 

health condition not caused by Challenge.

53 Completed The Challenge and attended the second round 

of testing. Unclear why data not used in study.

54 Did not complete The Challenge because of weightlifting 

injury sustained outside of The Challenge.

(See Nahama Decl., Exs. D–N.)

The Devor Study authors say they received this injury data from the owner of the 

gym where The Challenge was conducted. In particular, author Dr. Smith maintains that 

gym owner Mitch Potterf told him those individuals did not complete the study because 

they “had certain injuries or were preparing to participate in a CrossFit games and they 

were overtrained or not able to exercise.” (Smith Dep., 65:3–8, Nahama Decl., Ex. KK, 

ECF NO. 77-18, at 5.) Mr. Potterf denies making this statement: 

Q. Okay. So in terms of the nine citing overuse or injury for failing to 

complete the program, and finish follow-up testing, that’s untrue? 

[Potterf.] Yeah. Nobody told me they were injured. And if you talk to them; 

they’ll say they weren’t injured, so I don't know where that comes from.

Q. You have no idea where that came from?

[Potterf.] That nine stated overuse or injuries?

Q. Correct.

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(Potterf Dep., 131:19–132:3, Nahama Decl., Ex. LL, ECF No. 73-43, at 4.)

II. Peer Review and Pre-Publication 

Originally, the injury data were not part of the study. Dr. Smith stated in an affidavit 

that the initial manuscript submitted to the JSCR did not include any injury data, and that 

he only included them after “the peer reviewers and JSCR editors requested information 

about why 11 participants failed to test out.” (Nahama Decl., Ex. AA, ECF No. 73-32, at 

4.) Dr. Smith stated that he was able to add that information because he “already knew 

why the 11 participants failed to test out,” (id.); that is, he maintains that Mr. Potterf had 

informed him that those individuals suffered from overuse or injury. CrossFit contends 

that the inclusion of these data at the JSCR editorial staff’s direction is evidence of the 

NSCA’s desire to “manufacture a ‘scientific’ study concluding CrossFit training was 

unsafe.” (CrossFit MSJ at 13.)

In a message sent on August 28, 2012, JSCR Managing Editor Dr. Kraemer 

cautioned Dr. Smith about the state of the manuscript, and indicated that the study needed 

to address the risk of injury. He wrote:

You also need to caution readers as to the context of your findings due to the 

fact many people do get injured doing these types of workouts. Typically a 

lack of general prepartion [sic] is seen or people do to [sic] much to [sic] 

quickly and get hurt so how this was dealth [sic] with is of particular 

importance (see Bergeron MF, et al. Consortium for Health and Military 

Performance and American College of Sports Medicine consensus paper on 

extreme conditioning programs in military personnel. . . .). The reviewers 

wanted to give you a chance to revise and address the experimental concerns 

but context is also important for the readers as well as controls used. Thus, 

you and your research team need to really revise your paper with these factors 

and concerns in mind as you revise your paper.

You need to address these concerns in detail and and [sic] bring the writing 

style and clarity up to a much higher level. Remember the paper can still be 

rejected if the reviewers are not impressed with the sophistication of the 

revisions made.

(Nahama Decl., Ex. BB, ECF No. 73-33, at 6.) Consequently, Dr. Kraemer was one of the 

authors of the article to which he directed Dr. Smith. (See Nahama Decl., Ex. Q, ECF No. 

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73-21.) That paper concluded that “extreme conditioning programs” such as CrossFit were 

dangerous. (Id.) 

Before the Devor Study ran in the November issue of the JSCR, it was published 

online. CrossFit personnel began investigating the data at that time. A CrossFit 

representative interviewed Dr. Devor asking him about the injury data. (See Nahama Decl. 

Ex. DD, ECF No. 73-35.) Dr. Devor was equivocal about those data and the accuracy of 

the statement in the Devor Study extrapolating on the data, saying, for example, “I think 

that’s why the statement in the paper is as it is. Because we can’t say for sure. I mean, is 

it implied? Yes. And I think it’s reasonable to assume that’s what happened. But you’re 

right, we can’t say that with absolute certainty . . . ,” (id. at 10), or that “I don’t know the 

source of the injury. The only thing I know . . . is what the people apparently said to [coauthor Dr.] Mike [Smith]. And I’m willing to put stock in that,” (id. at 9). Dr. Devor then 

suggested that CrossFit talk to Dr. Smith, saying “I will get [him] to communicate with 

you to the best of my ability.” (Id. at 12.) Two days later Dr. Devor emailed the CrossFit 

representative stating, “I have spoken with Dr. Smith at Gonzaga University. We will have 

no further comment on our [JSCR] CrossFit publication.” (Id.)

III. Prior Summary Judgment Motion and Order 

CrossFit moved for summary judgment on the element of falsity on January 30, 

2015. (ECF No. 38-1.) In its July 20, 2015 Order, the Court denied CrossFit’s motion 

without prejudice. (Order, ECF No. 63, at 13.) The Court found that CrossFit had met its 

burden of identifying evidence—the participants’ declarations—showing the statistic cited 

in the Devor study was actually false, and that the burden therefore shifted to the NSCA to 

identify evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the information was 

not actually false. (See id. at 8, 10.) The Court denied CrossFit’s motion without prejudice, 

however, to allow the NSCA to conduct “further discovery related to (1) whether CrossFit 

accurately identified the individuals and (2) whether those individuals in fact made 

statements with respect to overuse or injury.” (Id. at 12.) 

/ / /

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IV. The JSCR’s Erratum 

Since the Court denied CrossFit’s first motion for summary judgment, the JSCR 

published the following erratum (the Erratum):

In reference to Smith, MM, Sommer, AJ, Starkoff, BE, and Devor, ST. 

Crossfit-based high-intensity power training improves maximal aerobic 

fitness and body composition. [citation], the authors have stated that the 

reasons for participants not completing follow-up testing, as reported in the 

article, were provided to the authors by the club owner. The club owner has 

denied that he provided this information. 

After the article was published, 10 of the 11 participants who did not complete 

the study have provided their reasons for not finishing, with only 2 mentioning 

injury or health conditions that prevented them from completing follow-up 

testing. 

In light of this information, injury rate should not be considered a factor in 

this study. This change does not affect the overall conclusion of the article. 

(Nahama Decl., Ex. B, ECF No. 73-6.) 

V. Sampling Fallout From the Devor Study 

For purposes of this litigation, CrossFit’s expert Dr. Michael R. Solomon conducted 

an experiment involving a “representative sample” of 604 American adults who have 

purchased a gym membership in the past twelve months or intended to purchase a gym 

membership in the next twelve months. (See Danzig Decl., Ex. II, ECF No. 111-21, at 46–

47.) The experiment involved showing some participants the Devor Study with the original 

statement reporting a 16% injury rate and others a modified version of the Devor Study

with the following language substituted in: “CrossFit’s programs injury rates are very much 

in line with injury rates for the physical fitness industry as a whole.” (Id. at 47.) 

Respondents exposed to the original 16% rate “Were 2.4 times as likely to rate CrossFit 

training as dangerous,” and were “twice as unlikely to say they would purchase a 12 month 

trial membership for CrossFit training.” (Id. (emphasis original).)

Dr. Solomon concludes that the Devor study “contributed substantially” to the 

“revenue, attendance and credential declines that began in 2013.” (Id. at 63.) In what he 

labels “extremely conservative damage estimates” on the low end, Dr. Solomon concludes 

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that CrossFit lost $4 million to $8 million from “revenues relating to the fees that 

consumers pay for seminars at CrossFit, Inc. affiliate gyms.” (Id. at 67.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a party may move for summary 

judgment as to a claim or defense or part of a claim or defense. Summary judgment is 

appropriate where the Court is satisfied that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect 

the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

genuine dispute of material fact exists only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. When the Court considers the 

evidence presented by the parties, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and 

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls 

on the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party may meet this burden 

by identifying the “portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’” that show an absence of dispute 

regarding a material fact. Id. When a party seeks summary judgment as to an element for 

which it bears the burden of proof, “it must come forward with evidence which would 

entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” See C.A.R. 

Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the nonmoving party must 

identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 324. This requires “more than simply show[ing] that there is some metaphysical doubt 

as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

586 (1986). Rather, to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “by her own 

affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ 

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designate ‘specific facts’” that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for 

the non-moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by “rest[ing] 

on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 

ANALYSIS

CrossFit’s Amended Complaint states causes of action for: (1) false advertising in 

violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (2) false advertising in violation of 

California Business and Professions Code § 17500 (the FAL); (3) unfair competition in 

violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 (the UCL); (4) declaratory 

relief; and (5) trade libel. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 69–105, ECF No. 71-6.) CrossFit states that 

falsity is an element of each of these claims, and seeks summary judgment that the injury 

data in the Devor study were false. (CrossFit MSJ at 25, 29.)

The NSCA seeks summary judgment that the articles published in the JSCR are not 

commercial speech, and are therefore shielded by the First Amendment from liability under 

the Lanham Act and California Business and Professions Code regardless of the truth or 

falsity of those publications. (NSCA MSJ at 5.) The NSCA also seeks summary judgment 

as to CrossFit’s trade libel claim because CrossFit cannot prove special damages, as 

opposed to general damages, and CrossFit’s declaratory judgment claim because it is 

“superfluous to other causes of action.” (NSCA MSJ at 7.) 

Although CrossFit’s MSJ predates the NSCA’s, the Court first addresses the 

NSCA’s MSJ because, if granted in its entirety, it would render CrossFit’s MSJ moot. 

I. The NSCA’s MSJ

A. Commercial Speech

The NSCA argues that the statements in the Devor Study are noncommercial speech 

that receive strong protection under the First Amendment, and are therefore not actionable 

under the Lanham Act, the UCL, or the FAL. (NSCA MSJ at 15.) CrossFit counters that 

the First Amendment does not insulate “economically motivated false statements about 

competitors.” (CrossFit Opp’n at 15.) 

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The Lanham Act and California’s FAL provide private causes of action for false 

advertising, and California’s UCL provides a private cause of action for unfair competition. 

For a representation or expression to be actionable under the Lanham Act it must be: “(1) 

commercial speech; (2) by a defendant who is in commercial competition with plaintiff; 

(3) for the purpose of influencing consumers to buy defendant’s goods or services.” 

Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1536 

(S.D.N.Y. 1994). These representations do not necessarily need to be “classic advertising,” 

but may also be “informal types of ‘promotion.’” Id. However, informal promotion must 

still “be disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public to constitute 

‘advertising’ or ‘promotion’ within that industry.” Id. The NSCA contends that CrossFit 

cannot establish the first element, that the statements in the Devor Study were commercial 

speech. 

Although both commercial and noncommercial speech enjoy some degree of First 

Amendment protection, noncommercial speech receives stronger protection. See Dex 

Media W., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012). The First 

Amendment insulates noncommercial expression from liability under false advertising 

laws. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983); Gordon & 

Breach, 859 F. Supp. at 1536–37. When commercial speech is false or misleading, it “is 

not protected by the First Amendment at all.” City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 

Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 434 (1993) (Blackmun, J. concurring); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & 

Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (“For commercial 

speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and 

not be misleading.”). Commercial speech that is false or misleading is therefore actionable 

under false advertising laws such as the Lanham Act and the California Business and 

Professions Code. See Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 114 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e 

hold that the alleged misrepresentations contained in the [trade journal] article represent 

commercial speech and are actionable under the Lanham Act.”).

/ / /

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In the Ninth Circuit, courts determine whether expression is commercial speech by, 

first, considering whether it fits the traditional definition of commercial speech because it 

“does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 958 

(quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 

U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). 

Second, if the expression does not fit within the traditional definition commercial 

speech, courts consider the factors outlined in Bolger, looking to whether: “(1) the speech 

is admittedly advertising, (2) the speech references a specific product, and (3) the speaker 

has an economic motive for engaging in the speech.” Am. Acad. of Pain Mgmt. v. Joseph, 

353 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67); see also Dex 

Media, 696 F.3d at 958. An economic motive alone, however, does not make speech 

commercial. Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 960.

Speech may be classified as commercial even when it contains “discussions of 

important public issues.” Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67–68 (“Advertisers should not be permitted 

to immunize false or misleading product information from government regulation simply 

by including references to public issues.”); see also Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First 

Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 734–35 (9th Cir. 1999) (adopting the four-factor test for 

determining whether “representations constitute ‘commercial advertising and promotion’” 

stated in Gordon & Breach, 859 F. Supp. at 1536).

Third, courts must consider whether the “commercial aspects of the speech are 

‘inextricably intertwined’ with otherwise fully protected speech, such that the publication 

sheds its commercial character and becomes fully protected speech.” Dex Media, 696 F.3d 

at 960. In that case, courts may not “parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase 

and another test to another phrase.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 

487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). 

Courts are particularly careful when reviewing causes of action directed toward 

academic works, “because academic freedom is ‘a special concern of the First 

Amendment.’” ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 496 (2d Cir. 

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2013) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 

603 (1967)). In ONY, for example, the Second Circuit concluded that “to the extent a 

speaker or author draws conclusions from non-fraudulent data, based on accurate 

descriptions of the data and methodology underlying those conclusions, on subjects about 

which there is legitimate ongoing scientific disagreement, those statements are not grounds 

for a claim of false advertising under the Lanham Act.” Id. at 498. Significantly, the 

Second Circuit noted that “it is relevant that plaintiff does not allege that the data presented 

in the article were fabricated or fraudulently created.” Id. at 497.

Viewing the evidence of the facts underlying the publication of the Devor Study in 

the light most favorable to CrossFit—the nonmovant for purposes of the NSCA MSJ—the 

injury data in the Devor Study would not be shielded by the First Amendment by virtue of 

being presented in an academic journal. Based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable 

fact finder could conclude that the NSCA fabricated the injury data and published them in 

the JSCR knowing they were false with the intention of protecting its market share in the 

fitness industry and diminishing the burgeoning popularity of the CrossFit program. If the 

trier of fact were to draw that conclusion from the evidence, the injury data would be 

commercial speech. 

As the Supreme Court noted in Bolger, the fact that items of commercial speech 

appear alongside discussions of matters of public importance does not insulate that speech 

under the First Amendment. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67–68. The Devor Study as a whole 

does far more than merely proposing a commercial transaction, but the excerpts based on 

potentially fabricated data about a competitor’s product may nonetheless be commercial 

speech. Looking at the communication from the JSCR editorial staff to the Devor Study 

authors, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the NSCA pressured the authors to 

include data disparaging CrossFit’s exercise regimen, and the editor-in-chief’s 

admonition—“[r]emember the paper can still be rejected if the reviewers are not impressed 

with the sophistication of the revisions made”—could be construed as a veiled threat that 

the JSCR would not be interested in publishing the Devor Study if it did not include 

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information showing “the fact many people do get injured doing these types of workouts,” 

whether or not that “fact” was true in this qualitative study. (See Nahama Decl., Ex. BB, 

ECF No. 73-33, at 6.) There is, of course, a countervailing inference to be drawn—that 

the editor-in-chief was simply bringing his knowledge of the fitness industry to bear and 

sincerely believed (or for that matter still believes) that CrossFit has a high injury rate, as 

opposed to an attempt to denigrate CrossFit for the NSCA’s benefit. This possible 

inference, however, does not entitle the NSCA to summary judgment. 

To the contrary, the evidence now before the court could reasonably support the 

inference that the injury data were false and—worse—that the NSCA knew they were false 

and published them anyway in an attempt to protect its position in the market. If a party 

intentionally publishes false data about a competitor’s product to protect its own market 

share, that speech is commercial in nature and not subject to the same degree of protection 

as noncommercial speech. 

The Devor Study does not explicitly promote the NSCA’s products or services, but 

nonetheless satisfies some of the Bolger factors. The first Bolger factor weighs against a 

finding of commercial speech because publication in an academic journal is not admittedly 

advertising. The second factor—reference to a specific product—is typically geared 

toward self-promotion as opposed to disparagement of another’s product. See, e.g., Am. 

Acad. of Pain Mgmt., 353 F.3d at 1106. Although not dispositive for purposes of the 

Court’s First Amendment analysis, the Lanham Act is directed toward false or misleading 

representations of fact about “the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of 

his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.” 15 U.S.C. § 

1125(a)(1)(B). Of course, speech does not necessarily need to mention one’s own product 

to be commercial, just as an advertisement may impliedly promote one product by 

disparaging another—a point particularly salient in an election season. See Jordan v. Jewel 

Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 518 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The notion that an advertisement 

counts as ‘commercial’ only if it makes an appeal to purchase a particular product makes 

no sense today, and we doubt that it ever did.”); cf. Coastal Abstract Serv., 173 F.3d at 735 

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(affirming the jury’s finding that representations about a competitor to one of “two or 

possibly three institutions” forming “the relevant purchasing public” was a “promotion” 

within the meaning of the Lanham Act). Because the injury data disparage a competitor’s 

product and there is some evidence that those behind the injury data knew the data were 

false and stood to gain from their publication, this factor weighs in favor of a finding of 

commercial speech. As for the third factor, again drawing all reasonable inferences in 

CrossFit’s favor, the NSCA had an economic motive for publishing this data, specifically 

in preserving or expanding its market share in the fitness industry and curtailing the 

burgeoning popularity of CrossFit. 

Lastly, the Court concludes that the commercial speech elements of the Devor study 

are not inextricably intertwined with noncommercial speech. Although they appear in the 

same article as speech deserving greater First Amendment protection, assuming the injury 

data were false and injected into the article to deride CrossFit’s product, it would have been 

easy enough to publish an article with data that were not made up, and one could easily 

imagine the Devor Study without the statements premised on these false data. In fact, the 

Erratum shows that the parts of the article that may constitute commercial speech are not 

inextricably intertwined with the remainder of the article. That is, the Erratum advises 

readers that the “injury rate should not be considered a factor in this study” but that it “does 

not affect the overall conclusion of the article.” (Nahama Decl., Ex. B., ECF No. 73-6, at 

2.) 

Thus, the Court DENIES the NSCA’s MSJ on this point. 

B. CrossFit’s FAL Claim

The NSCA argues CrossFit’s FAL claim fails as a matter of law because the Devor 

Study and statements in question do not specifically mention the NSCA’s products or 

services. (NSCA MSJ at 25.) The NSCA bases this argument on the plain text of the 

statute, specifically that the FAL prohibits “a defendant’s untrue statements that have the 

intent ‘to dispose of real or personal property or to perform services,’ but only as to ‘any 

statement, concerning that real or personal property or those services . . . or concerning 

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any circumstance or matter of fact connected with the proposed performance or 

disposition thereof.’” (NSCA MSJ at 25 (emphasis original) (quoting FAL, Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 17500).) 

As CrossFit points out, the NSCA does not cite any case law to support this 

proposition. The Court is not persuaded that a defendant cannot, as a matter of law, be 

liable under the FAL for false advertising directed at another’s products as opposed to false 

advertising promoting one’s own products, and therefore DENIES the NSCA’s MSJ on 

this point. 

C. CrossFit’s Trade Libel Claim

The NSCA next argues that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on 

CrossFit’s trade libel claim because CrossFit lacks sufficient evidence to prove special 

damages.

“Trade libel is defined as an intentional disparagement of the quality of” one’s 

product, “which results in pecuniary damage to plaintiff.” Erlich v. Etner, 224 Cal. App. 

2d 69, 73 (1964). The plaintiff must prove “that the publication has played a material and 

substantial part in inducing others not to deal with him, and that as a result he has suffered 

special damages.” Id. “[I]n the usual case, . . . the plaintiff must identify the particular 

purchasers who have refrained from dealing with him, and specify the transactions of 

which he claims to have been deprived.” Id. at 73–74.

Some courts, however, have allowed plaintiffs to show instead a “general loss of 

custom[ers],” by “showing an established business, the amount of sales for a substantial 

period preceding the publication, the amount of sales subsequent to the publication, [and] 

facts showing that such loss in sales were the natural and probable result of such 

publication.” New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2004) 

(quoting Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 

1047 (C.D. Cal. 1998)); see also Fowler v. Curtis Pub. Co., 182 F.2d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 

1950); Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, 17 F.2d 255, 261 (8th 

Cir. 1926).

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In Sundance Image Tech., Inc. v. Cone Editions Press, Ltd., No. 02 CV 2258 JM 

(AJB), 2007 WL 935703, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2007), the defendant moved for summary 

judgment against the plaintiffs’ trade libel claim on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not 

“produced any admissible evidence that the statements caused consumers not to buy from 

Plaintiffs.” The court rejected this argument because there was evidence from two 

consumers who had seen the publication in question—one who said the publication “was 

back there in [his] mind” and resulted in him “hesitat[ing]” in buying the plaintiffs’ 

products, and another who stated that he had seen the publication. Id. There was also 

testimony that a marketer “de-emphasized” the plaintiff’s product as a result of the 

publication, that four million individuals had seen the publication, and that plaintiff’s 

revenue had declined. Id. Taken together, this evidence gave rise to a genuine dispute of 

material fact on the trade libel claim and precluded summary judgment. Id. at 10. The 

court stated, “a rational trier of fact could conclude that consumers saw the statements on 

the Internet, that consumers were deterred from buying Plaintiffs’ products after being 

exposed to the statements, that distributors were likewise deterred from selling Plaintiffs’ 

products, and that Plaintiffs lost revenues as a result.” Id. 

Likewise, the evidence before the Court in this matter could support an inference 

that would-be CrossFit customers caught wind of the injury data—either from the Devor 

Study itself or from a citation to it—and decided not to participate. CrossFit identifies 

evidence that the Devor Study received much attention in the traditional and social media, 

exposing many potential customers to the injury data. CrossFit’s expert’s report attempts 

to quantify the results of that exposure in a systematic manner. The authorities the NSCA 

cites for its argument on this point do not show that the expert evidence provided from Dr. 

Solomon’s experiment and in his expert report are insufficient as a matter of law to show 

damage as required in a trade libel cause of action. To the contrary, the results are at least 

somewhat probative of the fact that potential customers who see the injury rate reported in 

the Devor Study were likely to refrain from dealing with CrossFit. 

Thus, the Court DENIES the NSCA’s MSJ as to CrossFit’s trade libel claim. 

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D. CrossFit’s Declaratory Judgment Claim

The NSCA urges the Court to dismiss CrossFit’s declaratory judgment cause of 

action as superfluous. CrossFit contends that it seeks relief not available through its other 

causes of action: “a declaration that the NSCA made a false statement about the injury 

rate.” (CrossFit Opp’n at 30.) A declaratory judgment must pertain to a claim “of a 

justiciable nature, thus excluding an advisory decree upon a hypothetical state of facts.” 

Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 325 (1936). 

The decision on whether to grant declaratory relief is a matter of discretion for the 

district court, and “should be denied when it will neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying 

and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from 

the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” United States v. State of Wash., 759 

F.2d 1353, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1985). 

The relief CrossFit seeks in its declaratory judgment cause of action goes no further 

toward settling the legal relations or terminating these proceedings than does CrossFit’s 

motion for partial summary judgment on the element of falsity. Rather, it appears that with 

this claim CrossFit seeks an abstract statement that the data were false. Practically 

speaking, the Court is already providing such a statement by ruling on CrossFit’s Motion 

for Partial Summary Judgment, which is limited only to the question of whether the injury 

data were false. However, the Court provides that ruling to dispose of a particular element 

of legally cognizable causes of action, and thereby narrows the issues for trial. CrossFit’s 

declaratory judgment cause of action is superfluous in this case, and the Court therefore 

exercises its discretion to dismiss it. Accordingly, the NSCA’s MSJ on this point is 

GRANTED.

II. CrossFit’s MSJ

CrossFit asks the Court for summary judgment in its favor that the injury data in the 

Devor study were false. CrossFit adds that events that have transpired since the Court 

denied its first motion for summary judgment further bolster its position that the injury data 

are false. In particular, the NSCA published the Erratum “confirming the ‘injury’ data . . . 

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is false” and the NSCA failed to depose or take relevant discovery from the individuals 

who were counted as injured in the Devor study but later stated they were not injured. 

(CrossFit MSJ at 5–6.)

For purposes of the Lanham Act and the California Business and Professions Code, 

a party may demonstrate falsity by showing a statement “was literally false, either on its 

face or by necessary implication, or that the statement was literally true but likely to 

mislead or confuse consumers.” Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 

1139 (9th Cir. 1997); Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1994) (“This 

Circuit has consistently held that state common law claims of unfair competition and 

actions pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 are ‘substantially 

congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act.”).

In its prior Order on summary judgment, the Court denied CrossFit’s motion so the 

NSCA could take “further discovery related to (1) whether CrossFit accurately identified 

the individuals and (2) whether those individuals in fact made statements with respect to 

overuse or injury.” (Order, ECF No. 63, at 12.) However, the NSCA has identified no 

evidence obtained in the interim showing that CrossFit did not accurately identify the 

individuals in the study or showing that they in fact made statements with respect to 

overuse or injury. 

As before, the Court concludes that the declarations from these Devor Study 

participants show the data were false and that the NSCA has presented no evidence to the 

contrary. The NSCA argues the Court should conclude the injury data are not actually 

false because “Mr. Potterf’s statements recounted by Dr. Smith, rebuts CrossFit’s evidence 

and thereby gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact.” (NSCA Opp’n at 10.) This 

argument is irrelevant to the instant motion, which does not seek summary judgment that 

the authors of the Devor Study knew the data were false. At most this would show that Dr. 

Smith believed that the individuals reported they were injured during The Challenge, but 

in the context of the other evidence it does not support a reasonable inference that these 

individuals in fact reported dropping out because of injury. CrossFit seeks summary 

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judgment that the injury data in the Devor Study were false, and that the participants who 

were counted as injured because of The Challenge in the Devor Study “were not injured 

during the Devor Study, and they never told anyone they were injured.” (CrossFit Reply 

at 2.) What the JSCR editorial staff and authors knew or believed about the injury data 

may ultimately be relevant to whether the statements in the Devor Study are 

constitutionally protected speech, but they are not relevant to the question of whether the 

data are actually false. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the NSCA, declarations of two 

participants may at most raise a dispute of fact over whether those individuals reported 

being injured at the time of the Devor Study, (see NSCA Opp’n at 15), although the 

declarations do not indicate that they were injured doing the workouts in The Challenge, 

(see Nahama Decl., Ex. E (“I did not complete The Challenge or participate in the second 

round of testing because I was suffering from a health condition that was exacerbated by 

any physical activity. My health condition was not caused by my participation in The 

Challenge or CrossFit, and in fact predated my involvement with CrossFit.”); Nahama 

Decl., Ex. F ¶ 4 (“I did not complete The Challenge or participate in the second round of 

testing because I injured my back. I sustained this injury while lifting, but this lifting was 

not a part of The Challenge.”).) Even if a fact finder concluded that two participants were 

injured or their health conditions were exacerbated by The Challenge and that they reported 

these injuries to Mr. Potterf, who then passed that information on to Dr. Smith, that would 

still leave only two, rather than nine, participants who dropped out due to injury, and the 

statement that “the remaining nine subjects (16% of total recruited subjects)” dropped out 

because of overuse or injury would still be false.2 

 

2 The parties discuss the admissibility of Dr. Smith’s testimony pertaining to what Mr. Potterf told him on 

hearsay grounds. The Court declines to resolve this dispute at this time, however, because even if the 

Court credited as true that Mr. Potterf told Dr. Smith these individuals dropped out due to overuse or 

injury, in the absence of any evidence detracting from the veracity of the majority of the participants’ 

declarations that they were not injured at all, this report from Mr. Potterf would be insufficient to create a 

genuine dispute of fact as to whether the injury data were true or false. As indicated above, what Mr. 

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Lastly, although the Erratum stops short of plainly stating that the injury data were 

false—as one might expect given the pendency of this litigation—it at least indicates that 

the Devor Study authors no longer stand behind it. Taken together with the other evidence, 

the Erratum corroborates the Court’s previous finding that CrossFit’s evidence shows the 

data were false. 

CrossFit has presented evidence showing the injury data were in fact false—

regardless of whether the authors knew it at the time—and the NSCA has identified no 

evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in 

CrossFit’s favor on the element of falsity as it pertains to each of CrossFit’s causes of 

action. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

the NSCA’s MSJ and GRANTS CrossFit’s MSJ.

Dated: September 21, 2016

 

Potterf told Dr. Smith is likely relevant to what the NSCA knew or believed when it published the Devor 

Study. If necessary, the Court will resolve this evidentiary matter in that context.

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