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Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 13, 1993 Decided July 22, 1994

Nos. 91-5187 and 93-5050

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

v.

PAUL A. BILZERIAN,

APPELLANT

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Civil Action No. 89-1854)

Paul A. Bilzerian, pro se.

Judith R. Starr, Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, argued the cause for the appellee.

On brief were Paul Gonson, Solicitor, Eric Summergrad, Principal Assistant General Counsel, and

Lucinda Burwell, Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission. Jacob H. Stillman and Brian D.

Bellardo also entered appearances.

Before SILBERMAN, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Paul A. Bilzerian appeals two district court

orders entered against him in favor of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). First,

Bilzerian appealsthe order granting partialsummary judgment to the SEC on its claimsthat Bilzerian

violated numerous securities laws and permanently enjoining him from further violations. Second,

Bilzerian challengesthe order that he disgorge $33,140,787, representing the profit he obtained from

his securities law violations. We affirm both orders.

I.

Before the commencement of this civil action, Bilzerian was convicted in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York of numerous violations of the federalsecurities

laws. He was sentenced to four years in prison, fined $1.5 million dollars and ordered to perform 250

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1The court subsequently granted Bilzerian's post-conviction motion to reduce his prison

sentence to twenty months. See United States v. Bilzerian, 1992 WL 301390 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2,

1992). 

2Bilzerian initiated the Cluett accumulation agreement with Jefferies on May 21, 1985. From

May 21 to May 27, Jefferies acquired 302,000 shares of Cluett stock for Bilzerian. Appendix

(App.) of SEC at 1163. On June 26, 1986, Bilzerian and Jefferies entered into the Hammermill

accumulation agreement. Id. at 1186. From June 26 to July 16, Jefferies acquired 551,000 shares

of Hammermill stock for Bilzerian. Id. at 1187. 

3Section 13(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act (Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1), requires a

stock purchaser to disclose acquisition of beneficial ownership of more than five per cent of a

company's equity securities within ten days of purchase. The disclosure is filed on a Schedule

13D form. Regarding the Cluett purchases, Bilzerian was required to file a Schedule 13D by May

31, 1985; he did not file, however, until June 4, 1985. See App. of SEC at 28. For the

Hammermill purchases, Bilzerian was required to file by July 7, 1986, but he did not file until July

25, 1986. See id. at 31. 

hours of community service.1 The Second Circuit affirmed Bilzerian's convictions in all respects. See

United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 63 (1991).

The same conduct that led to Bilzerian's criminal convictionsformsthe basis ofthe SEC's civil

action against him. In 1985 and 1986, Bilzerian accumulated substantial blocks of stock in Cluett,

Peabody and Company (Cluett) and Hammermill Paper Company (Hammermill) through a stock

accumulation agreement with Jefferies & Company (Jefferies), a broker-dealer registered with the

SEC. Under the terms of the accumulation agreement, Jefferies purchased stock in its own account

and Bilzerian agreed to buy the stock on a specific future date at Jefferies' cost plus interest and

commissions. Although Bilzerian was the beneficial owner of the stock at all times after the

agreement was entered into, Jefferies remained the record owner until the date on which Bilzerian

bought the stock.2 Bilzerian used his stock accumulation agreement with Jefferies to conceal the

extent of his ownership of Cluett and Hammermill stocks in order to delay filing a required form,

Schedule 13D, with the SEC.3 When Bilzerian eventually disclosed his accumulations of Cluett and

Hammermill stocks to the SEC, he misrepresented the source of funds used to purchase the stocks.

Bilzerian certified that he had used "personal funds" to purchase the stocks when in fact he had

obtained the funds from investors whom he had guaranteed against losses and granted a share in his

profits. Bilzerian repeated the misrepresentations on the Schedule 14D-1 form he subsequently filed

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4Section 14(d)(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1), requires that an individual making a

tender offeran offer to stockholders of a publicly owned corporation to buy their shares at a

price above the quoted market price, usually in order to effect a hostile takeoverfile a statement

with the SEC containing, among other information, the same disclosures required by section

13(d). On October 15, 1985, Bilzerian filed a Schedule 14D-1 announcing a tender offer for all

outstanding shares of Cluett common stock. See App. of SEC at 1166. On July 25, 1986,

Bilzerian filed a Schedule 14D-1 announcing a tender offer for all outstanding shares of

Hammermill stock. Id. at 1183. In Bilzerian's Schedule 14D-1 for his Cluett tender offer, he

failed to disclose that he had borrowed two million dollars to finance the tender offer. Id. at

1173. Bilzerian's Schedule 14D-1 for his Hammermill tender offer contained a similar

misrepresentationthe form falsely identified ten million dollars used to acquire Hammermill

securities as Bilzerian's personal funds. Id. at 1189. 

5A "white knight" is a stock bidder friendly to the management of the target company. 

6Based on this conduct, Bilzerian was convicted of violating section 10(b) of the Act, 15

U.S.C. § 78j(b), and the rules promulgated thereunder for the misrepresentations and omissions in

his Schedules 13D and 14D-1. Bilzerian was also convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for

making false statements on his schedules. Finally, Bilzerian was convicted of criminal conspiracy

under 18 U.S.C. § 371 based on his schemes to accumulate Cluett and Hammermill shares in

violation of section 13(d). 

with the SEC.4

Bilzerian's misrepresentations were designed to create the impression that he was ready,

willing and able to mount hostile takeovers of Cluett and Hammermillif shareholders had known

that Bilzerian had indemnified his investors against any losses, they would have questioned his

financial ability to effectuate a hostile takeover. The purpose of Bilzerian's scheme was to induce a

"white knight" to rescue the companies from his hostile takeover by purchasing stock, including his

own, at a premium.5 The scheme succeededBilzerian sold his Cluett stock and his Hammermill

stock at a substantial profit.6

Bilzerian's convictions were also based on his "parking" of H.H. Robertson Company (H.H.

Robertson) and Armco Steel (Armco) stock with Jefferies. Under two separate "stock parking"

agreements between Bilzerian and Jefferies, Jefferies bought stock from Bilzerian with the

understanding that Bilzerian would buy the stock back on a future date for the purchase price plus

interest and commission. These agreements, like Bilzerian's accumulation agreements, served the

purpose of concealing his beneficial ownership of the stock. In order to mask the agreements,

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7Bilzerian was convicted, under 18 U.S.C. § 371, of criminal conspiracy to defraud the SEC

and the Internal Revenue Service based on his Robertson and Armco dealings. 

8Section 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c), makes it unlawful for a broker or dealer to directly or

indirectly extend or maintain credit to any customer for the purchase of any security, other than an

exempt security, without collateral.

Section 7(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f), makes it unlawful to "obtain, receive or enjoy the

beneficial use of a loan or other extension of credit from any lender ... for the purpose of ...

purchasing ... United States securities."

Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), makes it unlawful to use any manipulative or deceptive

device in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Section 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), requires any person who acquires direct or indirect

beneficial ownership of greater than five per cent of a company's class of securities to disclose

inter alia the ownership to the SEC.

Bilzerian and Jefferies exchanged a number of false invoices.7

The district court issued two ordersthat Bilzerian now appeals. The first order granted partial

summary judgment to the SEC on its claims that Bilzerian had violated certain securities laws and

regulations and accordingly enjoined Bilzerian from future violations. The court based its grant of

summary judgment on the collateral estoppel effect of Bilzerian's criminal convictions. In its second

order, the court ordered disgorgement of Bilzerian's illicit profits.

Bilzerian argues: (1) collateral estoppel was improperly applied by the trial court because his

criminal convictions did not conclusively establish the facts necessary to conclude that he had

committed the violations with which he was charged in this action; (2) the court erred in issuing a

permanent injunction on the SEC's motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material

fact existed; (3) the disgorgement order violates the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment;

and (4) the court erred in calculating the amount to be disgorged.

II.

Based on the collateral estoppel effect of Bilzerian's criminal convictions, the district court

entered summary judgment on the SEC's claims that Bilzerian aided and abetted Jefferies' violation

ofsection 7(c) and SEC Regulation T and that Bilzerian himself violated sections 7(f), 10(b), 13(d),

14(d), 14(e) and 17(a)(1) of the Act; SEC Rules 10b-5, 13d-1, 13d-2, 14d-3, 14d-6, and 17a-3

promulgated under the Act; and SEC Regulation X.8 The doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits

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Section 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d), requires any person making a tender offer to file and

disseminate a statement containing certain specified information concerning the offer, including

the source and total amount of funds for the tender offer, a description of all transactions in which

funds were borrowed for the tender offer and a description of any arrangement regarding the

shares of the company.

Section 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e), makes it unlawful "to make any untrue statement of a

material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made ...

not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in

connection with any tender offer."

Section 17(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1), requires every broker or dealer to make and keep

such records as the Commission prescribes.

Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, tracks section 10(b) of the Act. Rules 13d-1, 17

C.F.R. § 240.13d-1, and 13d-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2, provide for the filing and amendment of

Schedule 13D. Rules 14d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3, and 14d-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6, provide

for the filing of a tender offer statement. Rule 17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3, imposes record

keeping requirements on brokers and dealers. Regulations T, 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1 et seq., and X,

12 C.F.R. §§ 224.1 et seq., supplement section 7(c)'s prohibition on extensions of credit by

brokers and dealers. 

relitigation of an issue of fact or law that has been decided in earlier litigation. Parklane Hosiery Co.

v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). The district court found that Bilzerian was collaterally

estopped from contesting the facts set forth in support of the SEC's civil claims because the same

facts formed the basis of his criminal conviction. Appendix (App.) of SEC at 792. Bilzerian argues

that the facts the SEC had to establish to prevail in its civil action were either not litigated in his

criminal case or were not necessary to his convictions.

Specifically, Bilzerian argues that the district court erred in holding that his section 10(b)

convictions estop him from challenging his civil liability under sections 13(d), 14(d) and 14(e) of the

Act because the jury did not necessarily find that his misrepresentations were material as the SEC is

required to establish under those sections. We disagree. Bilzerian appealed his criminal convictions

on the ground that his misrepresentations and omissions were not material. The Second Circuit

rejected his argument explaining that "[a]fter hearing the evidence in this case, the juryconcluded that

the misstatements and omissions were material." United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298-99

(2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit's holding conclusively establishes the materiality of Bilzerian's

misstatements and omissions; his argument that collateral estoppel is inappropriate because the jury

never determined materiality accordingly fails.

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9Margin requirements prohibit a broker from extending credit in order to purchase securities

without obtaining collateral, see 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c), and prohibit a stock purchaser from

obtaining credit from any lender, see 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f)(1). 

10The jury that convicted Bilzerian expressly found that he had intentionally accumulated

Cluett and Hammermill stock through a nominee. J.A. at 174-75. Bilzerian's accumulation

agreement allowed him to obtain beneficial ownership without making any payment. The

accumulation agreements thus established that Bilzerian violated the Act's margin requirements. 

The jury's finding also established a basis for the district court's conclusion that Bilzerian aided

and abetted Jefferies' margin violations. In order to prove that Bilzerian aided and abetted

Jefferies' violations, the SEC had to prove that Bilzerian had a "general awareness that his role

was part of an overall activity that was improper" and that he substantially assisted in their

violations. See Investor's Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Bilzerian

was generally aware that Jefferies had not received the down payment required by the Act's

margin requirements at the time it transferred beneficial ownership to him. He substantially

assisted Jefferies' violation of the margin requirements by entering into the accumulation

agreements with ithad he not done so, Jefferies could not have committed the margin

violations. We reject Bilzerian's argument that he cannot be liable for aiding and abetting

Jefferies' margin violations because he himself was convicted of violating the margin requirements. 

Overlap in securities laws liability, which often exists, does not limit the violations with which a

defendant may be charged. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983)

("[I]t is hardly a novel proposition that the 1934 Act and the 1933 Act prohibit some of the same

conduct. The fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual nor unfortunate.")

(internal citations omitted).

Further, Bilzerian's criminal convictions sufficiently support his liability for aiding and

abetting Jefferies' violations of the Act's record keeping requirements. Bilzerian was aware that

Jefferies had not recorded his beneficial ownership of stockindeed that was the purpose behind

his agreement with Jefferies. He also substantially assisted Jefferies in its violations of the record

keeping requirementshad he not entered into the accumulation agreements with Jefferies,

Jefferies would not have violated the record keeping requirements.

Finally, Bilzerian's convictions established the facts necessary to support the district court's

grant of summary judgment on the claims that his actions with respect to the Robertson and

Armco stocks violated the Act's margin requirements and aided and abetted Jefferies' violation of

the margin and record keeping requirements. The jury in the criminal trial found that Bilzerian

unlawfully conspired to accumulate Armco stock and to park Robertson and Armco stock with

Jefferies. See Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1302. Accordingly, Bilzerian obtained beneficial ownership

of the stocks without making a down payment. Again, Bilzerian knew of Jefferies' violations and

in fact substantially assisted in their commission. 

Bilzerian also argues that his convictions did not establish the facts necessary to support the

SEC's civil claimsthat he violated margin requirements9(SeventhClaim, App. of SEC at 1197 ¶ 154-

56), aided and abetted Jefferies' margin violations (Eighth Claim, App. of SEC at 1197-98 ¶ 157-61)

and aided and abetted Jefferies' falsification of records(SixthClaim, App. of SEC at 1196 ¶ 149-53).

Our review of the record indicates that Bilzerian's criminal convictions conclusively established all

of the facts the SEC was required to prove with respect to the specified claims.10 Accordingly, we

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11Remaining before the district court are claims that include: Bilzerian violated various

provisions of the Act by manipulating the stock market; several individuals aided and abetted

Bilzerian's violations of the Act through their participation in the Cluett and Hammermill

transactions; and Bilzerian violated various provisions of the Act with respect to his transactions

in Pay 'N Pak stock. 

affirm the district court's grant of partial summary judgment.11

III.

We review de novo the district court's grant ofsummary judgment to the SEC on its request

for permanent injunctive relief. When a defendant has violated the securities laws, an injunction is

appropriate if the court determines there is a reasonable likelihood that he will violate the laws again

in the future. See SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In order to

determine whether a reasonable likelihood of future violations exists, the court considers "whether

a defendant's violation was isolated or part of a pattern, whether the violation was flagrant and

deliberate or merely technical in nature, and whether the defendant's business will present

opportunities to violate the law in the future." Id.

There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bilzerian's securities violations

were part of a pattern or whether they were flagrant and deliberate in nature; they unquestionably

were, as the brief summary of his conduct set forth earlier manifests. Courts have often found that

the combination of these two factors justifies injunctive relief prohibiting future violations of the

securities laws. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1978) (nature and extent

of securities violations warranted injunction); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801,

807 (2d Cir. 1975) (serious and intentional nature of defendant's conduct warranted injunction).

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that injunctive relief is appropriate.

Bilzerian argues, however, that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether his

occupation provides him an opportunity to violate the securities laws. We disagree. Even assuming

Bilzerian is correct, that circumstance would not make injunctive relief inappropriate. See SEC v.

Koracorp Indus., 575 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.) (changing occupations so that opportunity for securities

laws violationsis not readily available does not necessarily defeat injunctive relief), cert. denied, 439

U.S. 953 (1979). Moreover, the nature of Bilzerian's past violations indicates that, notwithstanding

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a change in occupation, he will nonetheless be able to violate the securitieslaws. Bilzerian's securities

laws violations did not arise from a position of authority in a brokerage firm, or from any other

position for that matter. They resulted from actions he took as an investor. Bilzerian will be able

to commit similar violations so long as he is able to persuade people to finance his schemes.

Bilzerian also arguesthat he has given the court sufficient assurances against future violations

to remove the need for a permanent injunction. Bilzerian's argument relies on his affidavit filed in the

district court in which he declares that he "will be careful and make every effort to assure that [he

does] not violate the federal securities law in the future." See App. of SEC at 478. If a defendant

could survive summary judgment by simply submitting a self-serving statement about his desire to

conform to the law in the future, it "would establish ... a ritualistic dodge around a permanent

injunction on a motion for summary judgment." SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 656 (9th Cir. 1980).

We do not intend to provide Bilzerian with any such dodge. Because the other relevant factors

counsel in favor of injunctive relief, Bilzerian's assertions do not alter our conclusion that summary

judgment was appropriate.

Finally, Bilzerian argues that the district court wasrequired to hold a hearing before entering

a permanent injunction against him. Courts have approved the entry of a permanent injunction,

however, on a motion forsummary judgment based wholly on the facts established by the defendant's

prior criminal conviction. See SEC v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1993) (injunction granted

on summary judgment based on collateral estoppel effect of criminal convictions of securities laws

violations); SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of injunctive relief.

IV.

Bilzerian alleges that the disgorgement order violates the double jeopardy clause of the fifth

amendment because it punishes him for the same conduct that led to his criminal convictions. The

double jeopardy clause is violated when multiple punishments are imposed for the same offense. See

Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 789 (1994). Bilzerian's imprisonment resulting from his convictions

unquestionably constitutes punishment so that the only issue is whether the disgorgement order

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12Moreover, Bilzerian ignores language elsewhere in the Halper opinion that a civil sanction is

punitive if it "may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as deterrent or retribution." 

Halper, 490 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). Under this definition, disgorgement is not a second

punishment because it is not exacted solely for deterrence or retribution. 

constitutes renewed punishment for the same conduct.

Bilzerian bases his argument on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Halper, 490

U.S. 435 (1989). He specifically relies on the Court's statement in Halper that "a civil sanction that

cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also

serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment." Accordingly, he argues that, because

disgorgement is not solely remedial but also a type of deterrence, it is punishment within the meaning

of the double jeopardy clause. We find Bilzerian's reliance on Halper misplaced.

The reach of the Halper decision isshort. As the Court explained: "What we announce now

is a rule for the rare case, the case such as the one before us, where a fixed penalty provision subjects

a prolific but small-gauged offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages

he has caused." Because the disgorgement order did not ask Bilzerian to give up anything in excess

of the amount of hisillicit gains, Bilzerian does not present "the rare case" contemplated by the Court

in Halper.12 Accordingly, we conclude that the disgorgement order is remedial in nature and does

not constitute punishment within the meaning of double jeopardy.

Finally, we reject Bilzerian's argument that disgorgement constitutes punishment unless it is

ordered to make the government whole. Disgorgement is no less remedial in nature merely because

victims other than the government have been injured by Bilzerian's violations of the securities laws.

The district court ordered Bilzerian to give up only his ill-gotten gains; it did not subject him to an

additional penalty. Therefore the disgorgement does not constitute punishment. See United States

v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he forfeiture of illegal proceeds, much like the

confiscation of stolen money from a bank robber, merely places that party in the lawfully protected

financial status quo that he enjoyed prior to launching his illegal scheme. This is not punishment

within the plain meaning of the word.") (internal citation omitted).

V.

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Finally, Bilzerian mounts two other challenges to the disgorgement order. Bilzerian first

argues that disgorgement was not appropriate because he did not profit from his violations of the

securities laws. This argument rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the reason the district

court ordered disgorgement. Bilzerian asserts that the district court found disgorgement appropriate

because his misrepresentations suppressed the market price of the stock in question and he was

therefore able to purchase stock at an artificially lower price; accordingly, he should disgorge the

resulting profit. As Bilzerian sees it, the district court erred in ordering disgorgement because he did

not purchase any stock after his alleged misrepresentations and so he could not have profited from

any purchase price decrease caused by his misrepresentations.

But the district court found that Bilzerian's misrepresentations inflated the price he received

from the sale of the securities. See App. of SEC at 1149-50. If Bilzerian had disclosed the truth

about hisstock purchases and source offunding, the market would have discounted his ability to take

over the target corporations. By failing to make these disclosures, Bilzerian created the impression

that hostile takeovers were imminent, thereby driving up the price of the target corporations'

securities. Accordingly, the district court ordered Bilzerian to disgorge the difference between the

price he received for the sale of his sharesinflated artificially by hisfalse filings with the SECand

the price the shares would have brought were it not for his untimely and misleading filings. App. of

SECat 1149-50. Bilzerian's argument that he purchased no stock after making his misrepresentations

is therefore irrelevant.

Bilzerian also argues that the district court incorrectly calculated the amount of the

disgorgement ($33,140,787.00). We will uphold the district court's disgorgement calculation unless

it constitutes clear error. SEC v. First City Fin., 890 F.2d 1215, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1989). We find that

the district court's disgorgement order reasonably approximated Bilzerian's illicit profits. The court

was careful to order disgorgement of the profits caused by Bilzerian's securities violations only. For

the sharesBilzerian purchased after hissecurities violations occurred, the court subtracted Bilzerian's

purchase price from the price at which he later sold the stocks based on the theory that all

appreciation occurring after his violations was due to his illegal actions. For the shares purchased

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before his violations, the court subtracted from the sales price the market price on the first day of his

violations, thereby ensuring that any pre-violation appreciation was not disgorged.

Calculations of this sort are often impreciseit is impossible to say with certainty what

portion of Bilzerian's profits is attributable to his securities violations. Bilzerian, however, bears the

burden of establishing that the price increases that occurred during his ownership of the stocks were

attributable to market forces rather than to his violations. See First City Fin., 890 F.2d at 1232. He

failed to carry his burden. Absent proof of this sort, the district court's calculation of the

disgorgement amount was not clearly erroneous.

Finally, Bilzerian arguesthat disgorgement was not proper because no one wasinjured by his

fraudulent schemes. We disagree. Whether or not Bilzerian's securities violations injured others is

irrelevant to the questionwhether disgorgement is appropriate. The primary purpose of disgorgement

is not to refund othersfor lossessuffered but rather "to deprive the wrongdoer of hisill-gotten gain."

SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d at 1335. Moreover, others were injured by Bilzerian's deceptionsinvestors

paid Bilzerian an inflated price for his stocks because of his illegal actions.

For the preceding reasons, the decisions of the district court are

Affirmed.

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