Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02245/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02245-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Dwayne McGee )

) No. CV 04-2245-PHX-MHM (JJM)

Petitioner, )

) REPORT AND

vs. ) RECOMMENDATION

)

)

C.J De Rosa, Warden, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

________________________________ )

On October 20, 2004, Petitioner Michael Dwayne McGee filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. Pursuant to the November 10, 2004 Order issued by District Judge Mary

H. Murguia, the Petition was referred to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Marshall for a report

and recommendation.

Background

McGee is an inmate at the FCI in Phoenix, Arizona. See Exhibit 1. He is currently

serving a 247 month sentence to be followed by 5 years of supervised release based upon

conviction in the Southern District of Mississippi for Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to

Distribute Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1).

On March 14, 2004, three weeks after being placed into cell 124 at the Federal

Correctional Institution ("FCI") in Phoenix, Arizona, a random search was conducted by

Officer Hoffman in the cell McGee shared with two other inmates. See Exhibit 3 at V.

During the search a ten-inch, unsharpened metal rod was found in the main light fixture. Id.

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McGee was charged with Possession/Manufacture/Introduction of a weapon in violation of

Code 104 of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Regulations. Id. 

Advanced written notice of the charge was given to McGee on March 15, 2004. See

Exhibit 3 at I(a). Two days later he was advised of his rights before the Disciplinary Hearing

Officer ("DHO"). Id. at I(C). On March 22, 2004, McGee appeared before the DHO where

he waived his right to staff representation and did not request any witnesses. Id. at II.

McGee argued that he did not know about the weapon and had just moved into the cell. Id.

at III(A). The DHO found McGee guilty of violating Code 104 and took away one day of

good conduct time and placed him into 30 days of disciplinary segregation. Id.

Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 542.15, McGee appealed the DHO’s findings to the Western

Regional Office and the General Counsel. The DHO’S findings were upheld by both

agencies. McGee now brings a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus claiming a violation of

his due process rights. 

Discussion

McGee has met the burden requiring him to exhaust federal administrative remedies

prior to bringing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Prior to bringing a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus, federal prisoners are required to exhaust all federal administrative

remedies. Tatum v. Christensen, 786 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1986); Fendler v. U.S. Parole

Commn., 774 F.2d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 1985); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir.

1986) (per curium). Exhausting administrative remedies from a Federal Correctional

Institution requires an appeal to the Warden, the Regional Director and the General Counsel.

28 C.F.R. § 542.14. First, a complaint to the Warden must be made. If unsatisfied with the

Warden's response, the prisoner may appeal to the Regional Director “within twenty (20)

calendar days of the date of the Warden’s response.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.15. If still unsatisfied,

an appeal to the General Counsel’s Office must be made “within thirty (30) calendar days

from the date of the Regional Director’s response.” Id. 

Here, McGee pursued timely appeals to both the Regional Director and General

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Counsel’s Office. See Exhibits 4, 5. Because timely appeals have been made and neither

party disputes the issue, McGee has met his exhaustion requirements. 

Habeas corpus relief is potentially available for McGee because he is protected by the

due process clause and was sanctioned with the loss of good time credit. Prisoners may

claim the protections of the due process clause and they may not be deprived of life, liberty,

or property without due process of law. Id. at 556. (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519

(1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.

91(1945)). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) the Supreme Court held that

loss of “good-time credits” was a deprivation of liberty which required due process

protections because the loss of credits could lengthen confinement. McGee was sanctioned

one day of good-time credit following his conviction of Possession/Manufacture/

Introduction of a Weapon in violation of Code 104. He argues that the loss of good-time

credit was made in violation of his due process rights. Since a valid liberty interest is at stake

and McGee is protected by due process, this claim is ripe for habeas review.

Although McGee argues he was unprepared to defend himself, he was given every

right required by due process to defend himself at the proceeding before the DHO. Due

process requires that inmates facing prison disciplinary hearings which may result in the

deprivation of a liberty interest be given at least 24 hours advanced written notice of a

claimed violation, the opportunity to call witnesses, and the opportunity to present

documentary evidence in defense of the charges. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-567. 

McGee was given advanced written notice of the charge against him on March 15,

2004, one week before the hearing was held. See Exhibit 3, I at (A) and (B). McGee was

given the opportunity to request witnesses but declined to do so. See Exhibit 3, III (C). The

evidence submitted by McGee in the disciplinary hearing consisted only of a personal

statement claiming he had just moved into the cell. He presented no documentary evidence

although that option was available, as well. Id. at (B) and (D). McGee therefore was granted

every procedure required under due process.

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In reviewing a decision made by a prison disciplinary board, the only requirement is

that “some evidence” exist to support the board's finding. While due process protects against

arbitrary actions in prison disciplinary proceedings, it does so to a lesser extent than it does

in criminal prosecutions. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495 (1985); Superintendent

Massachusetts Correctional Institute v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-455 (1985). Because McGee

is appealing the decision of a prison disciplinary hearing, the Court must determine whether

there was “some evidence” in the record to support the DHO's finding. 

Although McGee shared the cell with two other inmates and the metal rod was found

in a common area accessible to all three inmates, the record is “not so devoid of evidence that

the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 471

U.S. at 457. In Hill, the Supreme Court found that “some evidence” existed where a guard

testified to hearing a commotion, and upon investigating the commotion found an assaulted

inmate and the three accused individuals fleeing down a walkway. Because the evidence

presented does not have to logically preclude any conclusions other than the one reached by

the disciplinary board, the revocation of good-time credit for the three inmates was upheld

even though there was no evidence making a logical inference that any specific one of the

three inmates committed the assault. Id. at 457. Thus, the purpose of the “some evidence”

standard is not to ensure that logical inferences can be made in disciplinary board findings,

but to ensure that there is evidence to support disciplinary board findings so that they are not

made arbitrarily. Id. 

While not necessarily a fair result under traditional standards for criminal

prosecutions, there was clearly “some evidence” in the record to support the prison

disciplinary board's finding against McGee. The essential evidence relied upon by the DHO

was that McGee had been living in the cell for over three weeks, that Officer Hoffman

searched the cell and found a ten-inch metal rod, and that the metal rod was determined to

be capable of being used to inflict serious bodily injury to another. See Exhibit 3 at V. As

McGee had only lived in the cell for three weeks and he shared the cell with two other

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inmates, he is correct that other logical inferences can be made regarding the metal rod.

However, the Court is required only to determine whether there is some evidence to support

the DHO’s finding. The Court finds that the evidence cited by the DHO satisfies that

standard.

Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule – Civil

72.1(b), Rules of Practice of the United States District Court, District of Arizona, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the

record, issue an Order denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1]. The

Magistrate Judge further recommends that all motions pending in this action be dismissed

as moot. 

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 04-2245-PHXMHM. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 30th day of November, 2005.

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