Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00318/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00318-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441lm Removal- Labor/Mgmt. Relations

---

1

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICKEY LEE DILTS, RAY RIOS, and 

DONNY DUSHAJ, on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PENSKE LOGISTICS, LLC, PENSKE 

TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P., a Delaware 

corporation, and DOES 1 through 125, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS 

SETTLEMENT AND AWARDS OF 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS AND 

CLASS REPRESENTATIVE 

PAYMENTS

[Doc. No. 376]

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for final approval of 

class action settlement and award of attorneys’ fees, costs and class representative 

enhancement awards. [Doc. No. 376.] The Court held a hearing on this motion on May 

22, 2017. As discussed below, the motion for final approval is granted, and the motion for 

attorneys’ fees, costs and class representative enhancement awards is granted in part.

I. Background

Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action lawsuit in the Superior Court of San 

Diego County on January 17, 2008, alleging various wage and hour violations of 

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of

 13
2

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

California’s Labor Code and its Unfair Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 

17200. Defendants removed the case to this Court on January 25, 2008.

On November 20, 2016, after nearly nine years of litigation, including an appeal to 

the Ninth Circuit, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a settlement of the 

remaining certified claims. Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for preliminary approval 

of the class action settlement, which is memorialized in a written settlement agreement 

dated January 23, 2017. [Doc. Nos. 370, 373.]

The agreement provides for settlement of claims for meal periods under the 

California Labor Code and Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and derivative claims for wage 

statement and waiting time penalties. It authorizes: (1) a class settlement in the amount of 

$750,000; (2) an average class member award of approximately $950 from the Net 

Settlement amount; (3) a class representative award of $15,000 per person; and (4) $12,500 

in class administrator fees. Additionally, $225,000 in attorneys’ fees and $135,000 in costs 

is being requested. The settlement defines the class as “all persons employed by Penske in 

California facilities as driver/installers or helpers/installers assigned to the Whirlpool 

Account at any time during the period from January 17, 2004 through December 31, 

2009.”1 [Doc. No. 373 at 4.]

On January 23, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for preliminary approval 

of their settlement. [Doc. No. 370.] The Court granted the motion and preliminarily 

approved the settlement on February 6, 2017. [Doc. No. 372.] The preliminary approval 

 

1 Having previously formally certified the class and subsequently decertified certain subclasses, the Court 

determines that the settlement class continues to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a). The settlement 

class meets the numerosity requirement by containing 353 members, continues to share common issues 

regarding Defendants’ Labor Code violations, and satisfies the typicality requirement because the claims 

of Plaintiffs and the class are the same. Additionally, the class representatives and class counsel have not 

changed since the Court originally certified the class. Therefore, solely for the purposes of settlement in 

accordance with the Settlement Agreement, the Court certifies the defined Class. See Hanlon v. Chrysler 

Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (before approving the settlement itself, the Court’s “threshold 

task is to ascertain whether the proposed settlement class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”)

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of

 13
3

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

order set a final approval hearing for May 22, 2017. The final approval hearing took place 

as scheduled. Counsel for both parties attended. No class members filed objections to the 

settlement, and no class members attended the hearing. However, one class member 

requested exclusion from the settlement.

II. Final Approval of Settlement

A. Legal Standard for Final Approval of Class Settlement

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(3) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses 

of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the 

court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(e). “Adequate notice is critical to court approval 

of a class settlement under Rule 23(e).” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1025

(9th Cir. 1998). The Rule also “requires the district court to determine whether a proposed 

settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Id. at 1026. In making this 

determination the Court is required to “evaluate the fairness of a settlement as a whole, 

rather than assessing its individual components.” Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 

818-19 (9th Cir. 2012). Because a “settlement is the offspring of compromise; the question 

we address is not whether the final product could be prettier, smarter or snazzier, but 

whether it is fair, adequate and free from collusion.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027.

In assessing a settlement proposal the district court is required to balance a number 

of factors, namely:

the strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely 

duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status 

throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery 

completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of 

counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the 

class members to the proposed settlement.

Id. at 1026. 

//

//

//

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of

 13
4

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Analysis

1. Adequacy of Notice

The Court approved notice of this class action and proposed settlement in the 

Preliminary Approval Order. The claims administrator distributed the Notice to 354 class 

members. The Notice advised the Class of the terms of the Settlement, of their rights (1) 

to participate and to receive their share of the Settlement automatically, without submission 

of a claim form; (2) to object to the Settlement and to appear at the Final Approval Hearing, 

(3) to request exclusion from the Settlement; (4) the manner and timing for doing any of 

these acts; and (5) the date and time set for the final approval hearing. The Notice packet 

also included the class member’s individualized information such as the number of 

workweeks worked during the Class Period, and the estimated amount of their Settlement 

Payment. Adequate periods of time were provided for each of these procedures. No class 

members objected to the settlement or the adequacy of the Notice, and only one class 

member requested exclusion from the class. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Class 

received adequate notice.

2. Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case; Risk of Further Litigation; and Risk of 

Maintaining Class Action Status

As a result of the preferable nature of Settlement over the uncertainties, expense and 

length of litigation “when assessing the strength of plaintiff’s case, the court does not reach 

any ultimate conclusions regarding the contested issues of fact and the law that underlie 

the merits of this litigation.” Four in One Co. v. S.K. Foods, L.P., No. 2:08-CV-3017 KJM 

EFB, 2014 WL 4078238, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (internal quotations omitted). 

Similarly, “a proposed settlement is not to be judged against a speculative measure of what 

might have been awarded in a judgment in favor of the class.” Nat’l Rural Telecomms. 

Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

Here, the Settlement has been reached after nearly nine years of litigation, including 

an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Plaintiffs’ claims at issue in the settlement involve disputed 

legal issues. The inherent risk of further litigation in this matter is known to all involved 

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of

 13
5

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with the case. Proceeding to trial on the remaining second meal period claim presents a 

very real risk of an unfavorable decision on the merits and/or on resulting appeals. While 

Plaintiffs believe in the merits of their case, Defendants have strong defenses to class 

liability and damages determinations, and there is no guarantee that Plaintiffs will prevail. 

Furthermore, as evidenced by the somewhat recent decertification of four of the remaining 

six subclasses after remand, the risk of maintaining class certification on the remaining 

claim is ongoing. The Court finds these risks weigh in favor of settlement. 

3. The Amount Offered in Settlement

“Basic to [the process of deciding whether a proposed settlement is fair, reasonable 

and adequate] * * * is the need to compare the terms of the compromise with the likely 

rewards of litigation.” In re TD Ameritrade Accountholder Litig., 226 F.R.D. 418, 422 

(N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry 

Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25, (1968)). However, “[t]he fact that a proposed 

settlement may only amount to a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, 

meant that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved.” 

Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

Here, the proposed non-reversionary Settlement of $750,000 is estimated to cover 

100 percent of the exposure Plaintiffs’ expert calculated Defendants were liable for the 

period of January 17, 2004 through December 31, 20052, plus 38.8 per cent of the potential 

liability in the event Penske was found to have never provided a second meal period for 

any qualifying shift during the entire class period. Under the Settlement each of 353 

participating Class Members will receive, on average, $941.93. In light of the risks 

 

2 Plaintiffs’ estimates were subject to rational discounting to take into account Defendants’ claims and 

defenses regarding the second meal period and their position that Plaintiffs’ would not be able to establish 

a class wide policy at trial. The liability exposure calculation was based on Penske documents Plaintiffs 

contend constitute evidence that Defendants had not provided second meal period shifts between ten and 

twelve hours.

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of

 13
6

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

associated with continuing this litigation, the Court finds that a payout in this amount 

appears reasonable and weighs in favor of approval of the settlement.

4. Extent of Discovery

“A settlement that occurs in an advanced stage of the proceedings indicates the 

parties carefully investigated the claims before reaching a resolution.” Onitverso v. 

Zamoram, 303 F.R.D. 356, 371 (E.D. Cal. 2014). The court’s assessment focuses on 

whether the “parties have sufficient information to make an informed decision about 

settlement.” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Securities Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(quoting Linney, 151 F.3d at 1239).

Here, the Settlement has been negotiated after years of pending litigation and 

substantial discovery has occurred. Counsel has litigated this action through class 

certification, discovery, dispositive motions, an appeal and remand, decertification of 

certain claims and pretrial preparation. This long history evidences the parties’ significant 

knowledge regarding the relevant facts, law, and strengths and weaknesses of their claims 

and defenses. Consequently, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of approval of the 

settlement. 

5. Experience of Counsel

“The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of 

reasonableness.” In re Omnivision Technologies, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. 

Cal. 2008) (citing Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1979)). Here, 

Class Counsel has provided a declaration detailing their experience in litigating overtime, 

expense reimbursement, rest/meal period cases, and other wage and hour class cases. Class 

Counsel declares that his support of the Settlement is based on a realistic assessment of the 

strengths and weaknesses of the case, extensive legal and factual research, an assessment 

of the risks of proceeding with the litigation through the impending trial compared to the 

certain value of settlement at this time. In light of the foregoing, and according the 

appropriate weight to the judgment of counsel, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor 

of the settlement.

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of

 13
7

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6. Reaction of Class Members

“It is established that the absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class 

action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class settlement 

are favorable to the class members.” Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop., Inc., 221 F.R.D. at 529 

(citations omitted). Here, only one class member has opted out of the class and no 

objections to the settlement have been received. Id. (the absence of a single objection “is 

compelling evidence that the Proposed Settlement is fair, just, reasonable, and adequate.”) 

Accordingly, the Court finds this weighs in favor of settlement.

7. Other Factors

The Court also considers two additional factors: the process by which the settlement 

was reached and the involvement of the named plaintiffs in the process, in looking at the 

fairness of the Settlement. See Young v. Polo Retail, LLC, No. C-02-4546 VRW, 2007 WL 

951821, *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2007) (adding factors “(9) the procedure by which the 

settlements were arrived at, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITITGATION (FOURTH) § 21.6 

(2004), and (10) the role taken by the plaintiff in that process.”) Here, the parties reached 

agreement after extensive arms-length negotiations, culminating in a day long mediation

before a neutral third party. Class Counsel represent that the class representatives were 

actively involved in the case, including litigation and settlement. Further, there is no 

evidence of preferential treatment for certain class members, because final approval is not 

contingent upon the Court’s determination as to class representative incentive awards. 

Accordingly, the Court finds these factors weigh in favor of settlement.

8. Balancing of the Factors

“Ultimately, the district court’s determination is nothing more than an amalgam of 

delicate balancing, gross approximations and rough justice.” Officers for Justice v. Civil 

Service Comm’n of City and Cnty. of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation 

omitted). “[It must not be overlooked that voluntary conciliation and settlement are the 

preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex class action 

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of

 13
8

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

litigation.” Id. Having considered the relevant factors, the Court finds they all weigh 

heavily in favor of settlement. As a consequence, the Court finds the settlement

fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable.

III. Attorneys’ Fees

“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and 

nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(h). However, “courts have an independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the 

settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have already agreed to an amount.” In 

re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). That 

Defendants agreed in the settlement not to oppose counsel’s request for $225,000 “does 

not detract from the need carefully to scrutinize the fee award.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 

F.3d 938, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In a diversity action such as this, federal courts apply state law when determining 

both the right to fees and the method of calculating them. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.,

290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 

1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Existing Ninth Circuit precedent has applied state law in 

determining not only the right to fees, but also in the method of calculating fees.”). 

Following the California Supreme Court’s decision, in Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 1 

Cal. 5th 480 (2016), courts may either use the lodestar approach or “may determine the 

amount of reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created.” 

Laffitte, 1 Cal. 5th at 503-06. In discerning an appropriate percentage award in a common 

fund case, the California Supreme Court suggested considering the risks and potential value 

of the litigation, the contingency, novelty, and difficulty of the litigation, the skills shown 

by counsel, and a lodestar cross-check. Id. at 495, 503-06. Although recognizing the Ninth 

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of

 13
9

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Circuit’s 25 percent benchmark in common fund cases, it did not adopt this touchstone.3 

Id. 

Here, Class Counsel submits that awarding $255,0004, or 30 percent of the common 

fund, is fair and reasonable in light of the benefit that has been conferred on the Class, the 

substantial hours and efforts expended “resulting in considerable, negative lodestar 

multiplier,” the litigation risks and complexity of the case, the contingent nature of the fee, 

the experience of counsel, and the fees commonly awarded in cases of this type. Class 

Counsel also asserts that the successful appeal of the FAAAA rest and meal period claims 

in Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC., 769 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 2014) affected dozens of cases 

and “set the rights of California truck drivers for every shift and trip thereafter.” [Doc. No. 

376-1 at 16:4-5.] Class Counsel argues that because the requested 30 percent award is less 

than the lodestar it is therefore reasonable.

As the Court previously acknowledged, the settlement amount of $750,000 confers 

substantial benefits upon the Settlement Class, particularly in light of the risks associated 

with continuing this litigation to trial and weighs in favor of the fee amount. See Hensley 

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (holding that “the most critical factor is the degree 

of success obtained”). While Class Counsel has litigated this case for over nine years, the 

Court is mindful that their pursuit of some untenable claims is partially responsible for the 

protracted length of this lawsuit. Further, the Court notes that when looking at the overall 

history of the case Class Counsel has in fact achieved very limited success. As a 

 

3 When employing their discretion and utilizing the percentage-of-recovery method, federal “courts 

typically calculate 25% of the [common settlement] fund as the ‘benchmark’ for a reasonable fee award.” 

In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d at 942. In assessing the reasonableness of the 

award in common fund percentage award cases, the Ninth Circuit has provided a non-exhaustive list of 

factors to be used, including “the extent to which class counsel achieved exceptional results for the class, 

whether the case was risky for class counsel, whether counsel’s performance generated benefits beyond 

the cash settlement fund, the market rate for the particular field of law (in some circumstances), the 

burdens class counsel experienced while litigating the case (e.g. cost, duration, foregoing other work), and 

whether the case was handled on a contingency basis.” In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 

F.3d 934, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2015).

4 This is $37,500 more than the 25% fee benchmark, which would equal approximately $187,500.

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of

 13
10

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

consequence, the Court finds consideration of Class Counsel’s expended effort and skill to 

be a neutral factor in deciding the requested fees. That being said, the Court acknowledges 

that a number of factors support the fees request. For example, this litigation as a whole 

involved some novel, complicated, and labor intensive claims and issues which weighs in 

favor of the award. See In re Heritage Bond Litig., 2005 WL 1594403, at *20 (C.D. Cal. 

June 10, 2005). Additionally, Class Counsel assumed the risk of taking this case on a 

contingency fee basis. See Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1264 (C.D. 

Cal. 2016) (“Courts consistently recognize that the risk of non-payment or reimbursement 

of expenses is a factor in determining the appropriateness of counsel’s fee award.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Furthermore, the experience of Class 

Counsel in litigating class actions of this type supports the request. Moreover, the reaction 

of the Class to the settlement has been positive, with only one class member requesting 

exclusion, which supports the fee application.

The lodestar amount further supports approval of the requested attorneys’ fees. 

Class Counsel declares that they have worked over 775.55 hours on the case, and that the 

calculated lodestar fee on these hours is $492,190.50. Plaintiffs calculate the lodestar with 

the following hourly rates for attorneys from the law firm Cohelan Khoury & Singer: $750 

for Michael Singer, $550 for J. Jason Hill, $200 for paralegal Amber Worden and $170 for 

paralegal Matthew Atlas. [Doc. No. 376-2 at 14.] In support, declarations and other 

evidence are offered to demonstrate the reasonableness of these rates compared to the 

prevailing market rates in the San Diego community for attorneys of their experience and 

ability. See PLCM Group v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000) (a reasonable hourly 

rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant 

community). Further, Class Counsel attests they have included in their lodestar calculation 

only fees associated with the summary judgment motion that led to the Ninth Circuit appeal 

and subsequent remand of the Labor Code section 226.7 claims. Moreover, Class Counsel 

is requesting an amount that is less than the lodestar calculation, resulting in a multiplier 

of -2.18.

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 13
11

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds the requested fees are reasonable, and grants

Class Counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $225,000.

IV. Costs

Attorneys are entitled to recover “those out-of-pocket expenses that would normally 

be charged to a fee paying client.” Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiffs provide evidence that they have incurred $166,000 in costs over the course of 

this litigation. Plaintiffs request the Court award $135,000 even though the actual costs 

exceed this amount. Defendants do not oppose the costs. 

The Court has reviewed the request and finds two particular expense items 

groundless and exorbitant. Plaintiffs request reimbursement in the amount of $50,000 for 

an “Appeal Consultant5” and over $89,000 for payment of a “Statistician,” yet Class 

Counsel provides no explanation regarding these expenses.6 The Court is unable to 

ascertain why these expenses were incurred in relation to the Settled Claims and therefore 

declines to reimburse the monies spent an Appellant Consultant and reduces the amount to 

be reimbursed for the Statistician by fifty percent. As a consequence, the Court awards

$71,419.637in fees.

V. Class Representative Payments.

In the Settlement papers, Plaintiffs ask for incentive awards of $15,000, to each of

the three named plaintiffs. Although “incentive awards are fairly typical in class action 

cases,” they are discretionary. Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir. 

2009). “Generally, when a person joins in bringing an action as a class action he has 

disclaimed any right to a preferred position in the settlement.” Staton, 327 F.3d at 976

 

5 The Appeal Consultant cost $60,000 but Plaintiffs subtracted $10,000 in “Cost Contribution” from the 

litigation costs, thereby claiming the expenses totaled $166,220.82 rather than $176,220.82

6 At the final approval hearing, the Court questioned how Plaintiffs could include a request for 

reimbursement for $60,000 for an Appeal Consultant, but counsel was unable to provide the Court with a 

satisfactory explanation

7

$166,220.82 - $50,000 (Appeal consultant) - $44,801.195 (50 percent of statistician expenses) = 

$71,419.625.

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 13
12

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(internal ellipses, quotations, and citation omitted). The purpose of incentive awards, 

therefore, is “to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to 

make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, 

sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” Rodriguez, 

563 F.3d at 958-59. However, “district courts must be vigilant in scrutinizing all incentive 

awards to determine whether they destroy the adequacy of the class representatives.” 

Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013). 

In preliminarily approving the Class Settlement, the Court cautioned Plaintiffs that 

it considered the proposed class representative award of $15,000 to be excessive. Nothing 

has convinced the undersigned that such an amount is warranted, especially considering 

the limited success of this litigation as a whole and the average amount each class member 

will receive. To award a class representative over fifteen times more than what the average 

class member will receive, or two percent of the $750,000 common fund, is excessive. See 

Ko v. Natura Pet Prods., Inc., No. C 09-02619, 2017 WL 2289342, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 

10, 2012) (holding that an incentive award of $20,000, compromising one percent of the 

approximately $2 million common fund was “excessive under the circumstances” and 

reducing the incentive award to $5,000). Accordingly, the Court reduces the discretionary 

incentive awards to $5,000 per class representative. 

VI. Settlement Administration Cost

Finally, Class Counsel seeks payment of $12,500 to the Claims Administrator. The 

Court has reviewed the declaration detailing the work performed by CPT Group, Inc., and 

finds that paying this amount in administrative costs reasonable.

VII. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. The Court GRANTS final approval of the proposed settlement;

2. The Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees, costs and 

class representative payments [Doc. No. 376];

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 13
13

3:08-CV-00318-CAB-(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. The Court GRANTS Class Counsel $225,000 in attorneys’ fees and $71,419.63

in costs from the common fund;

4. The Court GRANTS class representative enhancement awards of $5,000 each 

to Plaintiffs Dilts, Rios and Dushaj to be paid from the common fund;

5. The Court GRANTS $12,500 in settlement administration costs to be paid from 

the common fund to CPT Group, Inc.

6. The Class member who asked to opt out of the settlement is excluded from the 

class.

7. The Court retains continuing jurisdiction over this settlement solely for the 

purposes of enforcing the agreement, addressing settlement administration 

matters, and addressing such post-judgment matters as may be appropriate under 

Court rules and applicable law.

8. Judgment is hereby entered on the terms set forth above. The Clerk of the Court 

shall close this case.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2017

Case 3:08-cv-00318-CAB-BLM Document 382 Filed 06/16/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 13