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* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. BAP

L.R. 8018-6(a).

1 Hon. Judith A. Boulden, United States Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation.

FILED

U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

of the Tenth Circuit

August 11, 2005

Barbara A. Schermerhorn

Clerk NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT

IN RE ANNAMARIE WILKINS,

 also known as Anna Wilkins,

Debtor.

BAP No. KS-04-050

ANNAMARIE WILKINS,

Appellant,

Bankr. No. 01-42217-13

 Chapter 13

v. ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

JAN M. HAMILTON, Trustee,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas

Before BOHANON, CORNISH, and BOULDEN,1

 Bankruptcy Judges.

CORNISH, Bankruptcy Judge.

Debtor Annamarie Wilkins appeals an order dismissing her bankruptcy case

without prejudice. For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM.

I. Background

The Debtor filed her Chapter 13 petition on August 16, 2001. Her Chapter

13 plan was confirmed by order entered November 27, 2001. The Order

BAP Appeal No. 04-50 Docket No. 52 Filed: 08/11/2005 Page: 1 of 7
2 Order Confirming Plan ¶ 4, in Appellant’s Appendix at 31.

3 At oral argument, this Court learned that the Chapter 13 Trustee as well as the current and predecessor Bankruptcy Judge were all emphatic that Chapter 13

debtors in this district were not to gamble. We make no comment on the

propriety of this anti-gambling directive, because the important issue is whether

the Debtor was dissipating disposable income that should be paid to the unsecured

creditors.

4 Courtroom Minute Sheet, in Appellant’s Appendix at 36. 

5 Courtroom Minute Sheet, in Appellant’s Appendix at 37.

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Confirming Plan provides, in relevant part:

The debtor shall devote to the Plan all disposable income during the

first 36 months after the first payment is due under the Plan, and at

least 36 monthly payments must be paid to the Trustee. The Debtor

shall report to the Trustee any events affecting disposable income

which are not projected on Schedules I & J, including but not limited

to: tax refunds, inheritances, prizes, lawsuits, gifts, etc. which are

received or receivable during the pendency of the case.2

At the Meeting of Creditors, the Chapter 13 Trustee (“Trustee”) instructed

the Debtor not to gamble during her bankruptcy case.3

 On December 30, 2002,

the Trustee filed a motion to dismiss the Debtor’s case on the ground that she had

gambled while in bankruptcy. The Debtor opposed the motion to dismiss.

By minute order entered February 24, 2003, the bankruptcy court directed

Debtor’s counsel to advise the Trustee whether the gambling activity was prepetition or postpetition activity. The minute order further provided that

“[Debtor’s counsel] is also to advise his client that she is not to expose her

income to gambling, because any disposable [income] belongs to the bankruptcy

[estate]. If she continues to gamble anyway, her case will be dismissed.”4

 The

bankruptcy court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the

Debtor’s gambling.5

At the evidentiary hearing, held October 23, 2003, the Trustee questioned

the Debtor about her bank statements that showed ATM withdrawals at Harrah’s

Prairie Band Casino in Mayetta, Kansas (“Harrah’s”), from January through June

BAP Appeal No. 04-50 Docket No. 52 Filed: 08/11/2005 Page: 2 of 7
6 Courtroom Minute Sheet, in Appellant’s Appendix at 45.

7 Affidavit, in Appellant’s Appendix at 69.

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of 2003. The Debtor denied making the ATM withdrawals. She testified that her

aunt, Betty Davis (“Ms. Davis”), had access to her ATM card, and Ms. Davis had

made the withdrawals at Harrah’s. By minute order entered that same date, the

bankruptcy court denied the motion to dismiss, stating: “[The] Court finds that

because there is no evidence to refute the debtor’s story, the [motion to dismiss]

is denied. Court also advises debtor that if anyone finds out the truth wasn’t told

today the repercussions will be serious.”6

 The Trustee contacted Ms. Davis and obtained an affidavit from her stating

that she had not made the ATM withdrawals in question, had not gambled at

Harrah’s since 2001, and had been known by her married name, Betty Hunt, since

1973.7

On March 19, 2003, the Trustee filed his Chapter 13 Trustee’s Motion to

Dismiss with Prejudice Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 349 and 11 U.S.C. 109(g) (“Second

Motion to Dismiss”). The Debtor did not personally appear at the hearing on the

Second Motion to Dismiss. The bankruptcy court granted the Second Motion to

Dismiss, stating:

[T]he aunt claims the story concocted by [the Debtor] was a lie. So,

this court finds that [the Debtor] did, in fact gamble, that is contrary

to the Court’s admonitions and the admonitions given by the Trustee,

and more importantly it’s a serious thing when you come to this

Court and you lie.

. . . . 

Well, the other thing is that the judge before me made it very clear

that he didn’t allow Debtors to subject their income to gambling. 

Although that may not buy [sic] us to an order of this Court, her

decision to gamble after being told by the Trustee at the 341 meeting

that that was not allowed, Judge would not allow it, at that time it

was a different judge, but this judge also has the same opinion, again,

so long as the Debtor - you know, a Debtor can spend the twenty or

thirty or whatever is in the budget for recreation on gambling, that’s

not what we’re talking about. We’re talking about, in this case, my

recollection is the evidence was she spent $900.00 over a very short

BAP Appeal No. 04-50 Docket No. 52 Filed: 08/11/2005 Page: 3 of 7
8 Transcript of Hearing at 3, 6, in Appellant’s Appendix at 152, 155.

9 See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996). 

10 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001-02; 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1).

11 In re Armstrong, 303 B.R. 213, 218 (10th Cir. BAP 2004).

12 United States v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528, 1531 (10th Cir. 1997).

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period of time. So I am going to dismiss this case. I’m not going to

do it with prejudice, because 109(g) doesn’t really allow it. I do

think 105 may allow it, I really, I would be surprised if Congress

would (indiscernible) having somebody stay in a bankruptcy

proceeding who blatantly tells untruths to the Court. I’m not going

to supersede 109, the statutory language by the 105, I don’t really

like to do that. I think Congress gave me the basis on which I can

dismiss with prejudice under 109(g). This is a very close call, but

I’m just going to dismiss this case, period, without prejudice.8

The bankruptcy court entered its written order on May 4, 2004,

incorporating its rationale therein. After receiving an extension of time, the

Debtor filed her notice of appeal on June 1, 2004.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. The bankruptcy court’s order

is a final order subject to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).9

 The Debtor timely

filed her notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002, and

the parties have consented to this Court’s jurisdiction because they have not

elected to have the appeal heard by the United States District Court for the

District of Kansas.10

A bankruptcy court’s order dismissing a Chapter 13 case is reviewed for

abuse of discretion.11 “In reviewing a court’s determination for abuse of

discretion, we will not disturb the determination absent a distinct showing it was

based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or

manifests a clear error of judgment.”12

III. Discussion

The bankruptcy court held that it would dismiss the bankruptcy case, but

BAP Appeal No. 04-50 Docket No. 52 Filed: 08/11/2005 Page: 4 of 7
13 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references in text are to the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of the United States Code.

14 Section 1307 provides:

[O]n request of a party in interest or the United States trustee and

after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this

chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title, or may dismiss a case

under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and

the estate, for cause, including–

(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;

(2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under chapter 123 of title 28;

(3) failure to file a plan timely under section 1321 of this title;

(4) failure to commence making timely payments under section 1326 of this title;

(5) denial of confirmation of a plan under section 1325 of this title and denial of a request made for additional time for filing

another plan or a modification of a plan;

(6) material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a confirmed plan;

(7) revocation of the order of confirmation under section 1330 of this title, and denial of confirmation of a modified plan under

section 1329 of this title;

(8) termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified in the plan other than completion of

payments under the plan;

(9) only on request of the United States trustee, failure of the debtor to file, within fifteen days, or such additional time as

the court may allow, after the filing of the petition

commencing such case, the information required by paragraph

(1) of section 521; or

(10) only on request of the United States trustee, failure to timely file the information required by paragraph (2) of section 521.

11 U.S.C. § 1307(c).

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not with prejudice under 11 U.S.C. § 109(g).13 The Court will therefore review

the dismissal under § 1307.14 Although none of the conditions listed in § 1307

BAP Appeal No. 04-50 Docket No. 52 Filed: 08/11/2005 Page: 5 of 7
15 Gier v. Farmers State Bank (In re Gier), 986 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1993).

16 Id. (internal quotation omitted).

17 Reply Brief at 3.

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apply to the Debtor, the list is not exclusive.15 A Chapter 13 case may be

dismissed if, after considering the totality of the circumstances, the court

determines that “under the circumstances of the case there has been an abuse of

the provisions, purpose, or spirit of [the Chapter].”16

The Debtor argues that postpetition gambling does not rise to the level of

an abuse of Chapter 13. She claims that it was improper for the Trustee to

instruct her not to gamble, an activity that is legal in the state of Kansas and

gaining in popularity across the country, and it was improper for the Trustee to

conduct an investigation into her gambling activity. In her reply brief, she states: 

“The Trustee essentially says that it has the power to dismiss the case for actions

demonstrating lack of good faith or abuse of the Bankruptcy system. In re Gier,

986 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1993). However, he never cites such facts other than

claiming that she gambled.”17 This is not correct. The Trustee cited the Debtor’s

gambling, the Debtor’s failure to devote all her disposable income to the Plan,

and the Debtor’s false testimony to the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court,

in considering the totality of the circumstances, relied on both the Debtor’s

violation of the bankruptcy court’s prior order instructing her not to gamble

during her Chapter 13 case and the Debtor’s false testimony when questioned

about the ATM withdrawals at Harrah’s.

The use of budgeted recreation funds for gambling would ordinarily not,

without more, constitute an abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of Chapter

13. But in this case, there is more: the Debtor committed perjury. “Chapter 13

requires the debtor ‘to be honest, forthcoming, truthful, and frank.’ Whether the

BAP Appeal No. 04-50 Docket No. 52 Filed: 08/11/2005 Page: 6 of 7
18 In re Alt, 305 F.3d 413, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing In re Love, 957 F.2d

1350, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992)). See also Gier, 986 F.2d at 1330 (in dismissing Chapter 13 case, court considered, among other factors, that the debtor’s

testimony was inconsistent with his plan); Flygare v. Boulden, 709 F.2d 1344,

1348 (10th Cir. 1983) (a debtor’s sincerity is a relevant factor in determining bad

faith); In re Armstrong, 303 B.R. 213, 222 (10th Cir. BAP 2004) (the debtor’s sincerity was lacking; dismissal was warranted).

19 In re Hall, 304 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2002) (Chapter 11 case).

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debtor has been forthcoming with the bankruptcy court and the creditors is

properly considered in deciding whether dismissal for lack of good faith is

appropriate.”18 A bankruptcy court may dismiss a debtor’s case because of

perjury.19

The bankruptcy court’s dismissal was not based on a clearly erroneous

finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law. Nor does it manifest a clear

error of judgment. We therefore affirm.

IV. Conclusion

The bankruptcy court’s order is AFFIRMED.

BAP Appeal No. 04-50 Docket No. 52 Filed: 08/11/2005 Page: 7 of 7