Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01975/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01975-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth C:ir~Hit 

APR 111989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

GERALD MOORE; DARLA MOORE; LONNIE WOOD; } 

JUANITA WOOD; BILLY R. MCDONALD; CASEY } 

JONES; DENVER KIRBY; DENNIS BERGLAND; ) 

KATHY BERGLAND; ZEMRIE BRADFORD; BURKE ) 

LEMAY; JACQUE LEMAY; VERNON GLOVER; } 

TRAVIS WITCHER; RUTH HINDERLITER, } 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA; THE 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, EX REL., MICHAEL 

TURPEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL; LEO WINTERS, 

TREASURER, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

} 

) 

} 

} 

) 

} 

) 

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) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

. Clerk 

No. 87-1975 

(D.C. No. 83-2136-T) 

( W. D. Ok la. ) 

Before ANDERSON and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS, District 

Judge.** 

**The Honorable Richard D. Rogers, United States District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a}; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

*This order and 

be cited, or 

for purposes of 

res judicata, 

judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-1975 Document: 010110035107 Date Filed: 04/11/1989 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the district court 

granting defendants' motions for summary judgment. 

Plaintiffs, former officers with the Oklahoma City Police 

Department, their wives, or widows of. ret i rants, commenced the 

underlying 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and 28 u.s.c. SS 2201 and 2202 action 

against the City of Oklahoma City and the Oklahoma State Treasurer 

and the Oklahoma Attorney General acting on behalf of the State of 

Oklahoma. Plaintiffs contended their vested property rights in 

retirement benefits were taken under color of state law without 

due process, contrary to the fourteenth amendment, when Okla. 

Stat. tit. 11, S 50-120 (1981) was repealed. For relief, 

plaintiffs sought a declaration that the repeal of § 50-120 was 

unconstitutional, reinstatement of the vested agreement to provide 

retroactive and prospective payments, and an award of attorney's 

fees and costs. 

Prior to 1982, Oklahoma City had a municipal police pension 

and retirement system. In 1982, all municipal police pension and 

retirement systems, including the Oklahoma City system, were 

consolidated into a statewide police pension and retirement 

system. Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 50-101, et~ (1981). The 

Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System and the Oklahoma 

Police Pension and Retirement Board (State Board) were established 

to administer the retirement system. All assets of the municipal 

pension and retirement systems were transferred to the State 

Board. Id. at §§ 50-102 .1, 50-131. 

Initially, S 50-120 (1981) provided retired police officers 

with a potential pension adjustment, based on a formula related to 

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Appellate Case: 87-1975 Document: 010110035107 Date Filed: 04/11/1989 Page: 2 
an increase or decrease in an officer's base salary. In 1983, the 

Oklahoma legislature repealed this portion of the statute. The 

repeal of § 50-120 was the basis for this action alleging 

unconstitutional deprivation of plaintiffs' vested retirement 

benefits. 

All defendants and plaintiffs filed motions for summary 

judgment. The district court granted defendants' summary judgment 

motions, finding that plaintiffs did not have a vested right in 

the retirement benefits, because the benefits were merely a future 

expectation. Also, the district court found that any cost of 

living benefits were vested only to the extent that benefits were 

first paid to the retired officer. Plaintiffs appealed. 

Relying on Baker v. Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and 

Retirement System, 718 P.2d 348, 353 (Okla. 1986), which held that 

"police officers who had retired or who could have retired and 

become eligible for payment of pension benefits prior to the 

effective date of the repeal of the pension adjustment provisions 

acquired a right under those provisions which may not be 

detrimentally affected by subsequent acts of the Legislature[,]" 

we vacated the district court's order and remanded for further 

proceedings. Moore v. City of Oklahoma City, Unpub. No. 85-1558 

(10th Cir. filed September 29, 1986). After remand, the district 

court again considered the original motions for summary judgment 

filed by the parties. 

The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary 

judgment and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. 

The district court concluded that Oklahoma City was not a proper 

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Appellate Case: 87-1975 Document: 010110035107 Date Filed: 04/11/1989 Page: 3 
party, because Oklahoma City had taken no actions against 

plaintiffs to cause a decrease in their benefits and Oklahoma City 

no longer had control of the retirement funds. Also, the district 

court concluded there was no basis for liability of the State 

Treasurer and Attorney General in that they were not proper 

parties. The district court determined the two individual 

defendants played no part in the payment or the administration of 

benefits. In addition, the court determined that there were no 

factual allegations against these defendants. The district court 

also concluded the State of Oklahoma was not a proper party. In 

so ruling, the district court stated that to the extent plaintiff 

sought back payments, the State of Oklahoma had eleventh amendment 

immunity, which had not been waived. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 

U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). To the 

extent plaintiffs sought to prev~nt the State • Board from 

diminishing future payments, the district court indicated 

plaintiffs needed to bring suit against the State Board itself. 

Accordingly, the district court granted defendants' motions for 

summary judgment and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. 

On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that they are entitled to a 

declaratory judgment that the pension and retirement statute 

violates the United States Constitution. As stated above, the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court in Baker v. Oklahoma Firefighters Pension 

and Retirement System, 718 P.2d at 353, held that retired officers 

who had vested rights could not have those rights "detrimentally 

affected by subsequent acts of the Legislature." Accordingly, we 

conclude that any federal constitutional issue is rendered moot by 

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Appellate Case: 87-1975 Document: 010110035107 Date Filed: 04/11/1989 Page: 4 
the holding in Baker. Cf. State of N.M. ex rel. N.M. State 

Highway Dep't v. Goldschmidt, 629 F.2d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 

1980)(enactment of legislation can moot an appeal); Valdez v. 

Applegate, 616 F.2d 570, 571 (10th Cir. 1980)(statute passed 

during course of litigation may render a case moot and make a 

determination of the former controversy unnecessary). 

In addition, Baker resolves plaintiffs' claim for prospective 

relief. Therefore, the only claim remaining relates to the 

request for retroactive relief. 

Plaintiffs argue that Oklahoma City should remain liable to 

plaintiffs under the retirement contract, because Oklahoma City 

originally provided for the increases. Okla. Stat. tit. 11, 

§§ 50-102.1 and 50-131 transferred all assets and obligations held 

by the Oklahoma City retirement system to the State Board. 

Oklahoma City no longer has control over the pension funds. As 

the district court stated and as plaintiff conceded, Oklahoma City 

has taken no actions to decrease plaintiffs' retirement benefits. 

The district court correctly determined that plaintiffs' 

constitutional rights were not violated by a policy or custom of 

Oklahoma City. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of the 

City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). We conclude the district 

court correctly granted Oklahoma City's motion for summary 

judgment. 

Next, plaintiffs argue the State of Oklahoma and the 

individual state defendants should remain liable for retroactive 

benefits. Plaintiffs argue that the State Board is not the proper 

party defendant because "the state through another act of the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1975 Document: 010110035107 Date Filed: 04/11/1989 Page: 5 
legislature absconded with the funds.'' Brief of Appellants at 5. 

Because the state "took" the funds, plaintiffs contend the state 

treasurer would be liable for repayment of the funds. Id. at 6. 

It is well settled that the eleventh amendment bars suit for 

damages against a state for retroactive relief. See Edelman v. 

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651. A suit against a state employee in his 

official capacity actually is a suit against the state, see Griess 

v. State of Colo., 841 F.2d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1988), and 

eleventh amendment immunity would extend to the state employee. 

Seibert v. State of Okla. ex rel. The Univ. of Okla. Health Servs. 

Center, 867 F.2d 591, 594 (10th Cir. 1989); Litton Indus., Inc. v. 

Colon, 587 F.2d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 1978)(citing In re Ayers, 123 

U.S. 443 (1887)). 

In this case, the district court granted summary judgment on 

the ground that the State Board, not the ~tate of Okl~homa and 

individual defendants, should have been sued. Accordingly, the 

issue we must decide is whether the State Board is an arm or alter 

ego of the state and thereby immune under the eleventh amendment 

or whether it is a separate entity which must be independently 

sued. In determining whether an entity is an arm or alter ego of 

the state, courts look at the functions, purposes, powers, nature, 

and characteristics of the entity as determined by state law to 

decide if the suit in reality is against the state. Mount Healthy 

City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); 

Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1525 (10th Cir. 1988); Unified 

School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson, 583 F.2d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-1975 Document: 010110035107 Date Filed: 04/11/1989 Page: 6 
• 1978): Sessions v. Rusk State Hosp., 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 

1981). 

The most ~ritical consideration in determining whether the 

State Board is an arm of the State of Oklahoma is whether a 

judgment would be paid out of the state treasury. See 

Miller-Davis Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 567 F.2d 

323, 327 (7th Cir. 1977). In the case at bar, the State Board 

independently, without interference from the state treasury, 

controls the pension and retirement fund. As plaintiffs stated in 

their motion for summary judgment, the assets of the fund are 

vested in the State Board. Record at 23; see Okla. Stat. tit. 11, 

§§ 50-131, 50-132. The State Board determines the amount of 

liability, reserves, and contributions necessary to discharge 

liability and administrative costs. Okla. Stat. tit. 11, 

§ 50-105.1. Plaintiffs also stated in their motion for summary 

judgment that the funding is substantially if not entirely from 

contributions of members. Record at 24; see Okla. Stat. tit. 11, 

§ 50-109. The State Board has responsibility for investing the 

money in the fund. Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 50-105.4. Although the 

money for the fund is in a special account of the state treasury, 

it is segregated from general public funds and managed by the 

State Board, such that the State Board can transfer money of the 

fund to a custodian bank or trust company of the pension and 

retirement system. Id. at§ 50-105.6; see Miller-Davis, 567 F.2d 

at 327. Consequently, the state treasurer performs no functipn in 

administering the fund. All money provided for the pension and 

retirement fund is paid over to and received by the State Board 

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Appellate Case: 87-1975 Document: 010110035107 Date Filed: 04/11/1989 Page: 7 
j 

• for the use and benefit of the pension and retirement system. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 50-107. The State Board makes decisions 

regarding benefits. Id. at § 50-105.2. All administrative, 

management, and operation expenses are paid for by fund money. 

Id. at§ 50-133. Legal right, title, and interest in the assets 

of the fund "vest exclusively" in the State Board. Id. at 

§ 50-132. 

Nothing in the statute indicates that the State Board's 

budget is submitted to the State of Oklahoma or that the State of 

Oklahoma is responsible for benefits which could not be paid from 

the fund. Cf. Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 

1518, 1521 (11th Cir. 1983)(state responsible for debts incurred 

that could not be paid out of earned revenue). Rather, the 

statute indicates the fund is separate and . distinct and is not 

supported by State of Oklahoma tax money. If the fund is 

insufficient to meet the pension obligations, the State of 

Oklahoma would not be liable. Also, the funds are not to be used 

for anything other than the Police Pension and Retirement System. 

In their district court response to the motion for summary 

judgment filed by the State of Oklahoma and individual defendants, 

plaintiffs seemed to recognize the financial independence of the 

State Board and pension and retirement fund from the state 

treasury. Plaintiffs stated that they did not want to sue the 

State Board, because they did not want to 11 deplete the funds built 

by their own contributions.". Record at 57. Based upon 

plaintiffs' statement and the statutes, we conclude that any money 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-1975 Document: 010110035107 Date Filed: 04/11/1989 Page: 8 
judgment against the State Board would not be paid from the state 

treasury. 

Another consideration is the extent to which the State Board 

functions with autonomy from the State of Oklahoma. Hefley v. 

Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487, 1493 (10th Cir. 1983). As stated 

above, the State Board receives its funding from non-state 

sources. See Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 723 (3d Cir. 1979), 

cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). Also, the State Board consists 

of thirteen members: seven elected members, one member appointed 

by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, one member 

appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, one member 

appointed by the Governor, one member appointed by the President 

of the Oklahoma Municipal League, the State Insurance Commissioner 

or his designee, and the Director of State Finance or his 

designee. Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 50-103.1. The State Board is 

not controlled by state appointees. See Blake, 612 F.2d at 723. 

It independently · manages the pension and retirement fund. Thus, 

we conclude the State Board is autonomous from the State of 

Oklahoma. 

A further consideration is the State Board's ability to sue 

and be sued. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. 

Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177, 179 (1st Cir. 1974); Huber, Hunt & 

Nichols, Inc. v. Architectural Stone Co., 625 F.2d 22, 24-25 (5th 

Cir. 1980). Although nothing in the statute specifically states 

the State Board may sue, the statute does state the State Board 

can be sued. 

State Board 

"Any aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the 

in granting, denying or adjusting a pension or 

9 

Appellate Case: 87-1975 Document: 010110035107 Date Filed: 04/11/1989 Page: 9 
I 

retirement benefit, to the district court in Oklahoma County." 

Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 50-129. In other lawsuits filed in 

Oklahoma courts, the State Board has been sued as an entity, not 

as the State of Oklahoma. See, ~, Baker v. Oklahoma 

Firefighters Pension & Retirement Sys., 718 P.2d 348. In addition 

to having the right to use the Oklahoma Attorney General's office, 

the State Board may employ a private attorney. Okla. Stat. tit. 

11, § 50-105.1.E; see Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge 

Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 

474 U.S. 1057 (1986). We conclude the State Board may sue and be 

sued. 

Under Oklahoma law all factors relating to the operations and 

functions of the State Board indicate the State Board is not an 

arm of the State of Oklahoma and would be the proper party 

defendant for monetary relief. The Stat~ of Oklahoma and the 

individual defendants were not proper parties. By plaintiffs' own 

admissions, the individual defendants exercised no control over 

the administration of the State Board or the funds. Cf. Ex Parte 

Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908)(in making an officer of a state a 

party defendant in a suit to enjoin enforcement of an act alleged 

to be unconstitutional, an officer must have a connection with 

enforcement of the act). We conclude the district court properly 

granted the State defendants' motion for summary judgment. 

Under the circumstances of this case, plaintiffs should have 

been given the opportunity to seek permission to amend their 

amended complaint to name the proper defendant. Accordingly, the 

judgment of the United States District Court for the Western 

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Appellate Case: 87-1975 Document: 010110035107 Date Filed: 04/11/1989 Page: 10 
i 

District of Oklahoma is affirmed, unless plaintiffs file a motion 

to amend their amended complaint to name the proper defendant 

within thirty days from the date of this order and judgment. If 

plaintiffs do file the motion to amend within thir~y days, the 

district court is directed to vacate its final judgment. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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