Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01218/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01218-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 450
Nature of Suit: Interstate Commerce
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Interstate Commerce Act

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Defendant has requested oral argument. That request is denied because the parties

have thoroughly discussed the law and the evidence, and oral argument will not aid the

Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d

724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Plaintiffs also made claims against Allied’s parent company, but it has since been

dismissed from this action by stipulation. (Dkt. # 23.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

BLAKE TAYLOR; MARK FLOOD, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

ALLIED VAN LINES, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-08-1218-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Allied Van Lines

(“Allied”). (Dkt. # 27.) For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion.1

DISCUSSION

On May 21, 2008, Plaintiffs Blake Taylor and Mark Flood filed a complaint in

Arizona Superior Court alleging various state law claims against Defendant Allied, a motor

carrier.2

 (Dkt. # 1 Ex. 1.) The allegations arose out of Allied’s transportation of Plaintiffs’

Case 2:08-cv-01218-GMS Document 34 Filed 04/28/09 Page 1 of 5
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household goods from Texas to Arizona. (See id.) Defendants removed the case to this

Court on July 1, 2008, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 (2006) and 1445(b) (2006). 

Allied filed a motion to dismiss on July 9, 2008. (Dkt. # 8.) In the motion, Allied

argued that all of Plaintiffs’ state law claims were preempted by the Carmack Amendment,

49 U.S.C. § 14706 (2007). (Id. at 2-9.) In their response to the motion, Plaintiffs did not

dispute that argument and advanced no authority holding that such state law claims are not

subject to Carmack Amendment preemption. (See Dkt. # 13 at 2-5.) Instead, Plaintiffs

argued that “simply because [they] did not specifically allege that Defendant Allied violated

the Carmack Amendment by name does not compel dismissal of their complaint.” (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiffs thereupon urged the Court to follow Margetson v. United Van Lines, Inc., 785 F.

Supp. 917, 922 (D.N.M. 1991), which held that although a plaintiff’s state law claims arising

out of the interstate shipment of her household goods were preempted by the Carmack

Amendment, the plaintiff’s complaint should nevertheless not be dismissed because it could

be construed as stating a Carmack Amendment claim. The Margetson court thus dismissed

the plaintiff’s state law claims but permitted a Carmack Amendment claim to proceed. Id.

Plaintiffs asked that this Court do the same.

On December 15, 2008, based on both the authorities provided by Allied and

Plaintiffs’ failure to dispute preemption, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ state law claims

against Allied, holding that they were preempted by the Carmack Amendment. (Dkt. # 18

at 3 (“[T]he Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claims against Allied are preempted by the

Carmack Amendment.”).) Further, the Court distinguished Margetson because Plaintiffs’

Complaint, even when read liberally, failed to allege all of the elements of a prima facie

claim under the Carmack Amendment. (Id.) However, Plaintiffs had also requested that the

Court permit them to amend their pleading (Dkt. # 13 at 5-6), and because Allied did not

oppose that request (see Dkt. # 14 at 3), the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend the

Complaint in order “to correct its deficiencies.” (Dkt. # 18 at 3.)

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The Amended Complaint added a new state law claim for negligence that was not

pled in the original Complaint, but neither party suggests that this claim is different from the

other state law claims such that it would not fall under the Court’s prior ruling that all of

Plaintiffs’ state law claims are preempted by the Carmack Amendment.

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Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint that, in addition to pleading a Carmack

Amendment claim, also repled the state law claims.3

 (Dkt. # 24.) Allied now advances a

second motion to dismiss the state law claims, arguing that the Court has already found them

preempted and has, in fact, already dismissed them from the case. (Dkt. # 27.) Allied is

correct. The Court found that the Carmack Amendment is the proper vehicle for Plaintiffs’

claims arising from loss or damage to goods carried in interstate commerce and that

Plaintiffs’ state law claims are thus preempted. (Dkt. # 18 at 3.)

Plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary (which Plaintiffs failed to advance in the original

briefing on this matter) is that Allied did not issue a bill of lading, and therefore the Carmack

Amendment is inapplicable. (Dkt. # 32.) Even if Plaintiffs had properly presented this

argument to the Court in opposition to the initial motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs’ argument

would still fail because it confuses the issues of liability and preemption. The Carmack

Amendment preempts all state law claims of the kind made by Plaintiffs. See White v.

Mayflower Transit, L.L.C., 543 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Carmack Amendment

is a federal statute that provides the exclusive cause of action for interstate shipping contract

claims, and it completely preempts state law claims alleging delay, loss, failure to deliver and

damage to property.”); Hall v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It

is well settled that the Carmack Amendment is the exclusive cause of action for interstateshipping contract claims alleging loss or damage to property.”); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. N.

Am. Van Lines, Inc., 970 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Hughes wisely concedes that

federal law preempts any state common law action against North American acting solely as

a common carrier. It is clear that the Carmack Amendment established a uniform national

liability policy for interstate carriers.”). Carriers can limit their liability under the Carmack

Amendment if they meet four requirements, including the issuance of a bill of lading. See

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Hughes, 970 F.2d at 611-12 (“Before a carrier’s attempt to limit its liability will be effective,

the carrier must (1) maintain a tariff in compliance with the requirements of the Interstate

Commerce Commission; (2) give the shipper a reasonable opportunity to choose between two

or more levels of liability; (3) obtain the shipper’s agreement as to his choice of carrier

liability limit; and (4) issue a bill of lading prior to moving the shipment that reflects any

such agreement.”) (emphasis added).

The mere fact that a carrier may not be able to limit its liability under the Carmack

Amendment, however, does not affect whether the Carmack Amendment is the exclusive

remedy for a plaintiff to advance claims against an interstate shipper. The Margetson court

explained this distinction well, rejecting the very same argument made by Plaintiffs here.

In that case, the plaintiff argued that “in order for a carrier to bring itself within the protection

of the Carmack Amendment, the carrier must prove compliance with the [above-described]

four requirements,” including that “the carrier issued a receipt or bill of lading prior to

moving the shipment.” Margetson, 785 F. Supp. at 921. The Margetson court rejected that

argument, noting that the plaintiff:

improperly confuse[d] the issues of permissible limitation of

liability and preemption. The Carmack Amendment imposes

absolute liability on carriers for loss of or injury to property.

Carriers may, however, successfully limit their liability under

the Amendment by complying with the four requirements set

forth above.

The distinction between when one is covered by the

Carmack Amendment and when liability is successfully limited

under the Amendment is clearly set out in the Hughes decision,

in which the court held that [the] plaintiff’s state and common

law remedies were preempted by the Carmack Amendment, and

then went on to address the issue of whether defendants had

properly complied with the requirements necessary to limit

liability.

Id. (citing Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407, 1412-24 (7th Cir. 1987)); see

also Taylor v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 509, 511 (W.D.N.C. 1998) (“Plaintiffs

contend that in order for the Carmack Amendment to be applicable, Defendants must prove

compliance with certain requirements. . . . Plaintiffs are confusing the issues of application

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of the Carmack Amendment with Defendants’ limitation of liability. Compliance on the part

of the Defendants with the requirements mentioned by the Plaintiffs may limit their liability

under the Carmack Amendment, but does not affect preemption.”). As these cases make

clear, even if Allied did not issue a bill of lading, and therefore cannot limit its liability, the

Carmack Amendment nevertheless remains “the exclusive cause of action for interstate

shipping contract claims,” and Plaintiffs’ state law claims are thus preempted. White, 543

F.3d at 584.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 27)

is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counts one through five of the Amended

Complaint (Dkt. # 24) are DISMISSED with prejudice. The only remaining claim in this

case is count six of the Amended Complaint, asserting liability under the Carmack

Amendment.

DATED this 28th day of April, 2009.

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