Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01352/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01352-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN THOMAS ATTEBERY,

individually and on behalf of himself and 

all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

US FOODS, INC. d/b/a/ US 

FOODSERVICE, INC., a Delaware 

corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,

inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-CV-1352 JLT BAM

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND 

DIRECTING THE PARTIES TO FILE A 

JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING THE 

STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

(Doc. 5)

Steven Thomas Attebery asserts US Foods violated California’s wage and hour laws and 

Unfair Competition Law, and states claims against the company on behalf of himself and a class 

of similarly situated employees. (See generally Doc. 1, Exh. A.) Defendant moves to dismiss 

and/or stay the action, arguing: (1) Plaintiff’s fifth claim for timely paid wages pursuant to 

California Labor Code section 204 fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6); (2) a stay is warranted under the doctrine set forth in Colorado River Water 

Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); and (3) alternatively, under Landis, 

this Court should refrain from hearing the case. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion.1 For the 

1

 In lieu of an opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand (Doc. 7), in violation of Eastern 

District Local Rule 230(e). The Court denied the motion. (Doc. 17.)

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following reasons, the Court grants the motion in part and declines to reach the remainder of the 

motion. Instead, the Court directs the parties to file a joint status report as discussed below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. This Action: Attebery v. US Foods, Inc.

Plaintiff brought this class action against his former employer, US Foods, by filing a 

complaint in Fresno Superior Court on September 16, 2022. (Doc. 1 at 20.) He seeks to state 

claims on behalf of a class defined as: “All employees who are or were employed by [US Foods] 

in the state of California as hourly non-exempt employees within four (4) years prior to the date 

this lawsuit is filed . . . until resolution of this lawsuit.” (Id. at 25, ¶ 22.)

Plaintiff was employed by US Foods as a “Truck Driver/Delivery Driver,” which was 

classified as a non-exempt, hourly position. (Doc. 1 at 23, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff’s duties included 

“delivering food and food products to different locations via truck.” (Id.) He was employed by 

US Foods from about January 2014 through September 16, 2021. (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that during the relevant liability period, US Foods “implemented 

policies and practices which resulted in Plaintiff and Non Exempt Employees not receiving 

minimum wage for all hours worked.” (Doc. 1 at 23, ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges:

[D]uring the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in March 2020, 

Plaintiff and Class Members were required to undergo COVID-19 

screenings when beginning a shift at certain locations. Furthermore, 

Plaintiff was required to move trucks, hook up trailers, and move 

equipment prior to clocking in for his shift, working often up to 

thirty (30) minutes off the clock prior to the start of his shift. 

Plaintiff and Class Members were not compensated for this off-theclock time spent working and under Defendant’s control.

(Id.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts he “was regularly required to use his personal cell phone for 

work-related purposes off the clock,” including approximately 2.5 hours of uncompensated time 

spent on his cell phone with the transportation manager. (Id.)

According to Plaintiff, “due to the work load requirements and time constraints imposed 

by Defendant during every shift,” he and class members were required to work more than five 

hours without a minimum, uninterrupted thirty (30) minute meal period.” (Doc. 1 at 23–24, 

¶¶ 14–15.) He contends that he and other non-exempt employees “rarely, if ever, received an 

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uninterrupted . . . meal break when required.” (Id. at 24, ¶ 14.) He asserts they worked shifts up 

to 13 hours “and were not provided a second meal break due to the demands of the job.” (Id.,

¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges he and the class members were not compensated an “hour of pay at their 

regular rate of compensation for each workday that a compliant meal period was not provided, in 

violation of California labor laws, regulations and IWC Wage Order.” (Id., ¶¶ 14, 15.)

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that “[he] and Class Members were frequently required to 

work without being permitted or authorized a minimum ten . . . minute rest period for every four 

hours or major fraction thereof,” which he also attributes “to the workload requirements and time 

constraints imposed by Defendant.” (Doc. 1 at 24, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff asserts he “rarely, if ever, 

received any rest breaks due to the job demands and shortage of staff.” (Id.) Rather, Plaintiff 

alleges that he “was required to drive and timely make deliveries which made taking a ten-minute 

break during his shift extremely difficult.” (Id.) He contends Defendant did not pay 

compensation to class members “for each workday that a rest period was not provided . . .” (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts US Foods also “failed to lawfully reimburse Plaintiff and Non-Exempt 

employees for all business expenses necessarily incurred by Plaintiff and Non-Exempt 

Employees.” (Doc. 1 at 24, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff alleges he “was required to regularly and frequently 

use[d] his cell phone for work-related purposes in order to communicate with colleagues, 

managers, and customers,” without compensation. (Id. at 24–25, ¶ 17.) 

According to Plaintiff, US Foods “failed to maintain accurate itemized records reflecting 

total hours worked and have failed to provide Non Exempt Employees with accurate, itemized 

wage statements reflecting total hours worked and appropriate rates of pay for those hours 

worked.” (Doc. 1 at 25, ¶ 18.) He asserts IWC Wage Orders require maintaining records 

showing “when the employee begins and ends each work period, meal periods, split shift intervals 

and total daily hours worked in an itemized wage statement, and must show all deductions and 

reimbursements from payment of wages, and accurately report total hours worked by Plaintiff and 

the members of the proposed class.” (Id. at 33–34, ¶ 64.) Plaintiff contends Defendant did not 

keep the mandated records, and consequently he and class members were “unaware of the full 

compensation to which they were entitled.” (Id. at 34, ¶¶ 64–65.)

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Further, Plaintiff contends Defendant failed to pay “wages when they were due and 

payable,” because he and the class members were “not paid all lawful wages owed or provide 

with lawful meal period[s] or rest period[s] . . .” (Doc. 1 at 32, ¶ 52.) Plaintiff also alleges that 

the day of his termination, he “did not receive his final paycheck and was not compensated for 

waiting to receive his final paycheck.” (Id. at 25, ¶ 19.) He contends “[m]ore than 30 days have 

passed since Plaintiff and affected Members have left Defendants’ employ,” and they did not 

receive “payment pursuant to Labor Code § 203.” (Id. at 33, ¶ 61.) 

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant liable failure to:

• Pay lawful wages including overtime in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194, 

and 1197

2

;

• Provide lawful meal periods (or compensation in lieu of) in violation of Lab. Code 

§§ 226.7, 512 and Industrial Wage Commission Wage Orders;

• Provide rest periods (or compensation in lieu thereof) in violation of Lab. Code 

§ 226.7 and IWC Wage Orders;

• Reimburse class members’ employee expenses in violation of Lab. Code § 2802;

• Pay timely wages in violation of Lab. Code § 204;

• Pay termination wages in violation of Lab. Code §§ 201–203;

• Comply with itemized employee wage statement provisions in violation of Lab. 

Code §§ 226(a)3and IWC Wage Orders; and

• Comply with Unfair Competition Law in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code §§ 17200–17208.

(Doc. 1 at 29–35.) The matter was removed to federal court, and the Court denied Plaintiff’s 

motion to remand. (Doc. 17.)

2

 In the heading of the First Cause of Action, Plaintiff indicates the claim is brought pursuant to Section 1199. 

(Doc. 1 at 29.) The allegations of the claim, however, discuss Section 1197. (See id.) Section 1199 provides the 

punishment for violations of the Labor Code: “Every employer . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . who does any of 

the following [Labor Code violations] . . .” See Cal. Lab. Code § 1199. Section 1197 specifies that “payment of a 

lower wage than the minimum wage is unlawful.” See id. at § 1197. Despite the heading, it appears that Plaintiff 

seeks to state a claim for violation of Section 1197.

3

 In the heading of the Seventh Cause of Action, Plaintiff indicates the claim is brought pursuant to Section 226(b). 

(Doc. 1 at 35.) However, the allegations of the complaint focus upon Section 226(a). (See id.) Section 226(a) 

governs itemized wage statements while Section 226(b) relates to an employer’s obligation to “afford current and 

former employees the right to inspect or receive a copy of records pertaining to their employment, upon reasonable 

request to the employer.” See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226(a), (b). Thus, it appears Plaintiff seeks to state a claim for 

violation of Section 226(a).

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B. Similar Actions4

1. Osorio action

Felipe Osorio filed a wage-and-hour putative class and PAGA representative action against 

US Foods on December 8, 2020, in Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 20STCV46858. (Doc. 

5-3 at 4.) Osorio alleged failure to compensate all hours worked, failure to pay minimum wage, 

overtime, and double time, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and waiting time 

penalties— all under California Labor Code—and an Unfair Competition Law claim under 

California Business and Professions Code. (See generally id. at 4–18.)

After the parties reached a settlement, the court certified a settlement class that included

“current and former California non-exempt, driver employees based out of the Corona facility 

who completed at least one wellness check in California at any time between April 15, 2020 

through June 28, 2021.” (Case No. 20STCV46858, “Judgment”, filed May 3, 2023.) In addition, 

the settlement class included non-exempt, non-driver employees based out of the US Foods 

facilities in Corona, Fontana, La Mirada, Livermore, Hawthorne, Tracy, and Vista facilities who 

completed at least one COVID-19 temperature check during specified time periods. (Id.) The 

court noted the settlement class did not include subclasses, “cover[ed] the respective time periods 

during which Defendant’s California locations conducted COVID-19 related temperature checks, 

which [were] the subject of the Parties’ dispute.” (Id.) The court granted final approval of the 

settlement terms and entered judgment on May 3, 2023. (Id.) 

4

 Defendant requests the Court takes judicial notice of the Complaints in Osorio and Hawkins. (Doc. 5-3.) A court 

may take judicial notice of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute” because it is generally known or “can be 

accurately and readily determined” from indisputably reliable sources. Fed. R. Evid. 201. “[C]ourts may take 

judicial notice of documents filed in other court proceedings” or on its docket. NuCal Foods, Inc. v. Quality Egg

LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 977, 984-85 (E.D. Cal. 2012); see also Schulze v. FBI, 2010 WL 2902518, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 

July 22, 2010) (quoting U.S. v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007)) (“A federal court may ‘take notice of 

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct 

relation to matters at issue.’”). However, facts contained within those filings that are subject to reasonable dispute 

do not qualify for judicial notice. Fed. R. Evid. 201; U.S. v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the existence of the state class action 

complaints but does not take as true the facts stated therein. The Court also takes judicial notice of the Osorio 

judgment filed on May 3, 2023, and the Hawkins “Joint Stipulation re Request for Dismissal without Prejudice and 

Order” dated January 29, 2014; “Joint Stipulation and Order to Permit Filing of First Amended Complaint” dated 

January 29, 2014; and the filing of the First Amended Complaint occurring on February 16, 2014. See NuCal 

Foods, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d at 984-85; see also Hott v. City of San Jose, 92 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 

(taking judicial notice of state court filings).

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2. Hawkins action

Carrell Hawkins filed his putative wage and hour class action on April 26, 2021, in 

Orange County Superior Court, Case No. 30-2021-01197275-CU-OE-CXC. (Doc. 5-3 at 20.) 

Hawkins alleged claims against US Foods, Catalyst Forward Group, and ShiftableHR for wage, 

meal, and rest period violations; failure to maintain required records; unfair business practices;

and failure to provide accurate wage statements. (Id. at 20–35.) Pursuant to the stipulation of the 

parties, the court dismissed ShiftableHR from the action without prejudice. (Register of Action 

[“ROA”] No. 85.) Hawkins and the defendants reported they engaged in settlement discussions, 

after which “a settlement in principal was reached among Plaintiff, catalyst, and US Foods, with 

continued settlement negotiations facilitated by the mediator.” (ROA No. 88.) As part of the 

settlement, and in anticipation of seeking approval of the terms, Hawkins filed a First Amended 

Complaint on February 16, 2024. (See ROA Nos. 88, 94.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when “the 

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 

Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, under Rule 

12(b)(6), “review is limited to the complaint alone.” Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 

1274 (9th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court explained: “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Supreme Court explained,

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 

Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a 

defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility 

and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will 

ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.

Indeed, it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but 

that is not the test.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The Court “will dismiss any 

claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently 

all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing Assoc. v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 

629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). To the extent pleading deficiencies can be cured by the plaintiff 

alleging additional facts, leave to amend should be granted. Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. 

Cal. Collection Serv., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

B. Colorado River Doctrine

The Ninth Circuit clearly articulated how to apply the Colorado River Doctrine in United

States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 988 F.3d 1194, 1206 (9th Cir. 2021), as follows:

Pursuant to Colorado River, in rare cases, “there are principles 

unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and 

regard for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving 

the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by 

federal courts or by state and federal courts.” Colo. River, 424 U.S. 

at 817. In the interest of “[w]ise judicial administration, giving 

regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive 

disposition of litigation,” a district court can dismiss or stay[ ] “a 

federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding.” Id. 

at 817–18. Because of “the virtually unflagging obligation of the 

federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given [to] them,” id. at 817, 

“[o]nly the clearest of justifications will warrant [a] dismissal” or 

stay, id. at 819. The instances in which a court can stay an action 

pursuant to Colorado River “are considerably more limited than the 

circumstances appropriate for abstention. The former circumstances, 

though exceptional, do nevertheless exist.” Id. at 818.The court’s 

“task in [such] cases ... is not to find some substantial reason for the 

exercise of federal jurisdiction by the district court; rather, the task is 

to ascertain whether there exist ‘exceptional’ circumstances, the 

‘clearest of justifications,’ that can suffice under Colorado River to 

justify the surrender of that jurisdiction.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l

Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983). “If there is 

any substantial doubt as to” whether “the parallel state-court 

litigation will be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt 

resolution of the issues between the parties ... it would be a serious 

abuse of discretion to grant the stay or dismissal at all.” Id. at 28.

Building on Supreme Court precedent, we have listed eight factors 

to be considered in determining whether a Colorado River stay is 

appropriate:

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(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake; 

(2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desire to avoid 

piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained 

jurisdiction; (5) whether federal law or state law provides the rule of 

decision on the merits; (6) whether the state court proceedings can 

adequately protect the rights of the federal litigants; (7) the desire to 

avoid forum shopping; and (8) whether the state court proceedings 

will resolve all issues before the federal court. R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v.

Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation 

omitted). The factors are not a “mechanical checklist.” Moses H.

Cone, 460 U.S. at 16. We apply the factors “in a pragmatic, flexible 

manner with a view to the realities of the case at hand.” Id. at 21. 

“The weight to be given to any one factor may vary greatly from case 

to case, depending on the particular setting of the case.” Id. at 16. 

“Some factors may not apply in some cases,” Montanore Minerals

Corp. v. Bakie, 867 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017), as amended on

denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Oct. 18, 2017), and, in some cases, 

a single factor may decide whether a stay is permissible, see, e.g.,

Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908, 913 (9th 

Cir. 1993); Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19 (“[T]he consideration that 

was paramount in Colorado River itself [was] the danger of 

piecemeal litigation.”).

State Water, 988 F.3d at 1202–03 (emphases in original) (internal footnote omitted).

C. Landis Stay

“The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 

control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 

counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). A trial court may 

“find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an 

action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Levya 

v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979). In deciding whether to grant 

a stay, a court weighs several factors: the potential for damage that may result from granting a 

stay, the hardship a party may suffer in being required to litigate the case, and whether, because 

of the stay, justice is furthered through simplifying or complicating the issues, proof, and 

questions of law. CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Timely Pay Wages

In Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action, he notes that “Labor Code § requires that all wages are 

due and payable twice in each calendar month.” (Doc. 1 at 32, ¶ 52.) Plaintiff contends he was 

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not timely paid all wages due and payable because “he was not paid all lawful wages owed or 

provided with lawful meal period[s] or rest period[s].” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff contends he and class 

members are entitled to penalties under Labor Code § 210. (Id., ¶ 53.) Plaintiff does not provide, 

however, sufficient factual allegations to support this legal theory, as there are no allegations that 

he was not paid every two weeks as required by Section 204. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also

Dutra v. J.R. Simplot Co., 2023 WL 113846, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2023) (“Section 204 requires 

the payment of wages in a timely manner; it does not provide a right to wages”) (citing Johnson v. 

Hewlett-Packard Co., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1136 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011), aff’d 546 Fed. 

App’x 612 (9th Cir. Sept. 5, 2013). 

Moreover, a violation of Section 204 “does not grant employees a private right of action 

against employers who violate section 204.” Young v. ABM Sec. Servs., 905 F.2d 1541, at *3 (9th 

Cir.1990); see also Slay v. CVS Caremark Corp., 2015 WL 2081642, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 

2015) (“Section 204 does not provide a private right of action”); Thistlewaite v. United Parcel 

Service, 2022 WL 17578868, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2022) (“courts regularly hold that there is 

no private right of action under § 204”). Because Plaintiff does not have an individual, private 

right of action for a violation of Section 204, the motion to dismiss the claim is granted, without 

leave to amend.

B. Colorado River Doctrine and Landis Stay

The Court next evaluates whether the remainder of the case may be dismissed or stayed 

pursuant to the Colorado River balancing test. As noted earlier, final judgment was entered in the 

Osorio case and settlement is in progress in the Hawkins case. Given that the motion to dismiss

is unopposed and the issue of res judicata was not briefed5, the Court declines the reach the issue 

of whether Colorado River applies. Instead, pursuant to its inherent authority to control its 

docket, Landis, 299 U.S. at 254, the Court orders the parties to file a joint statement addressing 

the res judicata effect of Osorio and Hawkins, and whether the remainder of the motion to dismiss 

should be resolved or held in abeyance.

5 The Court notes that the failure to brief the issue of res judicata is through no fault of the parties, as the related state 

case settled after the instant motion was filed.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the fifth cause of action for a violation of California 

Labor Code § 204 is GRANTED, without leave to amend.

2. The question of whether Colorado River applies is HELD IN ABEYANCE.

3. Within 14 days of this order, the partis SHALL file a joint status report addressing 

(i) the res judicata effect of the developments in the related state cases; (ii) whether the Court 

should proceed to resolve the pending motion and/or continue to hold it in abeyance; and (iii) 

whether alternative motions practice will be required.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 8, 2024 

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