Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-08427/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-08427-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RENATO C PIZARRO and MERCEDITA 

D. PIZARRO,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ASTRA FLOORING COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

No. C 19-08425 WHA

 Related to

No. C 19-08427 WHA

ORDER DENYING 

MOTION TO REMAND

INTRODUCTION

In this asbestos action, plaintiffs seek remand to state court. Because defendant has 

established a colorable government contractor defense, plaintiffs’ motion to remand is DENIED.

STATEMENT

The complaint alleges that Renato C. Pizarro has been diagnosed with mesothelioma 

resulting from exposure to asbestos. He became exposed to asbestos while serving as a 

mechanic aboard various ships in the United States Navy from 1975 through 1998. 

The complaint asserts asbestos-related injury claims by him and a loss-of-consortium claim 

by his wife, Mercedita D. Pizarro (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 138, Exh. A at 1–10).

The complaint was filed in state court against companies that either manufactured 

products containing asbestos or operated and controlled workspaces containing asbestos during 

the relevant time period. Most relevant here, plaintiffs named National Steel and Shipbuilding 

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Company (“NASSCO”) in claims for general negligence, vicarious liability, premises liability, 

and loss of consortium. The complaint did not assert any product liability claims against 

NASSCO. It expressly clarified that the claims against NASSCO did not relate to “its design 

and manufacture of military equipment” but instead remained “limited to general negligence 

and premises liability,” as well as NASSCO’s failure to warn of dangerous conditions (id. at 

¶ 19).

NASSCO failed to remove within 30 days. Then, in late December, it received plaintiffs’ 

unverified responses to interrogatories. Shortly thereafter, NASSCO filed a notice of removal 

under Sections 1331, 1442(a)(1), and 1446 of Title 28 of the United States Code (Dkt. No. 1 at 

¶ 44). The notice asserted federal jurisdiction under the Federal Officer Removal Statute, 

“derivative” sovereign immunity, and the “federal enclave” defense. NASSCO filed a series 

of declarations in support of the notice of removal, including one by Retired Admiral Roger B. 

Horne and another by NASSCO Program Manager Stephen B. Severs. John Crane, Inc. 

(“JCI”), another defendant named in plaintiffs’ complaint, removed on the same day, also 

citing the Federal Officer Removal Statute. A third defendant, Spirax Sarco, Inc. (“Sarco”), 

joined NASSCO and JCI in their removals; a January order related the two cases. Plaintiffs 

have since dropped all claims against JCI, but Sarco remains joined as to NASSCO’s notice of 

removal (Dkt. Nos. 13, 51 54, 65). 

Plaintiffs now challenge NASSCO’s removal and move to remand to state court. 

Specifically, plaintiffs argue: (1) NASSCO’s removal was untimely; (2) the Federal Officer 

Removal Statute does not apply; (3) NASSCO does not enjoy derivative sovereign immunity 

under Yearsley; and (4) the “federal enclave” defense does not apply. Plaintiffs also object to 

the declarations NASSCO submitted in support of its notice of removal. This order finds that 

the Federal Officer Removal Statute applies, so it does not reach NASSCO’s Yearsley or 

federal enclave defenses. 

ANALYSIS

Remand to state court may be ordered either for procedural deficiency or for a lack of 

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a); 1447(c). Plaintiffs argue both apply here.

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1. TIMELINESS.

Plaintiffs’ motion argues that NASSCO removed more than 30 days after they served 

their complaint, which constitutes a procedural defect. This misconstrues the removal statute. 

Defendants ordinarily must remove “within 30 days after the receipt . . . of a copy of the initial 

pleading setting forth the claim for relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). But, our court of appeals 

has recognized that the removal period begins only “[a]fter a defendant learns that an action is 

removable.” This creates two distinct thirty-day windows during which the defendant can 

remove. The first, which plaintiffs emphasize, “run[s] from defendant’s receipt of the initial 

pleading.” This only applies, however, “when that pleading affirmatively reveals on its face 

the facts necessary for federal court jurisdiction.” The second, which applies if the initial 

pleading lacks sufficient detail for the defendant to conclude that the case can be removed, 

begins once “a defendant receives a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper 

from which it can determine that the case is removable.” Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 

445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiffs’ complaint did not contain sufficient information from which NASSCO could 

have discerned that it could remove, so the first window does not apply. Plaintiffs’ complaint 

did not name any particular job sites or vessels. From the complaint alone, NASSCO could 

only have discerned that Mr. Pizarro had previously worked “aboard ships and vessels 

undergoing overhaul and/or repair at various shipyards and naval stations, . . . including but not 

limited to [NASSCO] in San Diego” and that it allegedly “caus[ed Mr. Pizarro’s] exposure[] to 

asbestos from the removal and installation of asbestos products” on “commercial and U.S. 

Navy ships” docked at NASSCO’s premises (Comp. ¶ 19, Exh. A at 7–10). After the initial 

30-day window closed, NASSCO learned through unverified responses to interrogatories that 

plaintiff had apparently been exposed to asbestos while aboard the USS BRISTOL COUNTY, 

a ship constructed by NASSCO and commissioned by the Navy, during an overhaul on 

NASSCO’s premises (Dkt. No. 1, Exh. C at 30–34). NASSCO’s argument for removal relies 

on the assertion that the Navy provided specifications governing the USS BRISTOL COUNTY 

overhaul, but it had no way of knowing that Mr. Pizarro worked aboard the USS BRISTOL 

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COUNTY until it received plaintiffs’ responses to interrogatories. Our court of appeals has 

held that defendants need not guess as to whether a case may be removed “until they’ve 

received a paper that gives them enough information to remove,” since premature removal may 

“subject [defendants] to fees and costs, and potentially Rule 11 sanctions, for filing a baseless 

notice of removal.” Durham, 445 F.3d at 1251. Thus, the thirty-day window opened only 

after NASSCO received the responses to interrogatories on December 23. It filed its notice of 

removal on December 26. 

NASSCO thus timely filed its notice of removal. This preliminary question of 

timeliness, however, remains distinct from the merits of whether NASSCO properly removed. 

Id. at 1254. 

2. THE FEDERAL OFFICER REMOVAL STATUTE.

Turning to the merits, the notice of removal first argues that NASSCO may remove under 

28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1), the Federal Officer Removal Statute. The statute “authorizes removal 

of a civil action brought against any person acting under an officer of the United States for 

or relating to any act under color of such office.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1120 

(9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Our court of appeals has held that Section 1442(a)(1) shall be construed broadly in favor 

of removal. Removal under Section 1442(a)(1) is not subject to the well-pleaded complaint 

rule, and defendants removing thereunder may remove an entire action unilaterally, without 

the consent of other defendants. Durham, 445 F.3d at 1253. To remove this action under 

Section 1442(a)(1), NASSCO only need establish: (1) that it is a person within the meaning of 

the statute; (2) that it can assert a colorable federal defense; and (3) that there is a causal nexus 

between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer’s directions, and plaintiffs’ claims. Id. 

at 1251. The parties do not dispute the first element.

Turning to the second element, NASSCO asserts the government contractor defense. 

This defense applies “when the Government, making a discretionary, safety-related military 

procurement decision contrary to the requirements of state law, incorporates this decision into 

a military contractor’s contractual obligations, thereby limiting the contractor’s ability to 

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accommodate safety in a different fashion.” In other words, a government contractor can 

escape state tort liability if it can show “[t]he Government made me do it.” In re Hawaii Fed. 

Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

The complaint limited plaintiffs’ claims against NASSCO to general negligence and 

premises liability, even specifying that any claims against NASSCO “are not related to its 

design and manufacture of military equipment” (Compl. ¶ 19). Plaintiffs undoubtedly 

narrowed their pleading in this way to prevent NASSCO from removing under the 

government contractor defense, for that defense “is only available to contractors who design 

and manufacture military equipment.” Cabalce v. Thomas E. Blanchard & Assocs., 797 F.3d 

720, 731 (9th Cir. 2015). As the notice of removal emphasized, however, plaintiffs’ complaint 

only carved NASSCO out from the product and design defect claims; the complaint still named 

NASSCO in a failure-to-warn claim (Dkt. No. 1 at 23 n.5). Our court of appeals has held that 

defendants may remove a failure-to-warn claim under the government contractor defense 

if the defendant shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “the Navy exercised its 

discretion by prescribing certain warnings and prohibiting others without its express approval.” 

Leite, 749 F.3d at 1123. Moreover, if the failure-to-warn claim may be removed under 

Section 1442(a)(1), then the entire action may be removed, even if plaintiffs’ other claims 

would not have been independently removable. Murphy v. Kodz, 351 F.2d 163, 166 (9th Cir. 

1965). Thus, the issue of whether the government contractor defense allows NASSCO to 

remove the entire action under Section 1442(a)(1) turns on whether NASSCO can demonstrate, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defense applies to plaintiff’s failure-to-warn 

claim. Cabalce, 797 F.2d at 731. This can be decided under a straightforward application 

of Leite.

To establish a government contractor defense against plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims, 

NASSCO must show: “(1) the Navy exercised its discretion and approved certain warnings 

for [NASSCO’s] products, (2) [NASSCO] provided the warnings required by the Navy, and 

(3) [NASSCO] warned the Navy about any asbestos hazards that were known to [it] but not to 

the Navy.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1123. At the removal stage, NASSCO “need not win [its] case.” 

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All it must prove “by a preponderance of the evidence is that its government contractor defense 

is colorable.” Id. at 1124 (quotation marks omitted).

Turning to the first element, a defendant must show “a continuous exchange and back 

and forth dialogue between the contractor and the government,” that amounts to “more than a 

cursory rubber stamp.” Cabalce, 797 F.3d at 731. To demonstrate this, NASSCO has 

submitted declarations by retired Admiral Roger B. Horne and NASSCO Program Manager 

Stephen B. Severs. Admiral Horne previously served as “Chief Engineer and Deputy 

Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (“NAVSEA”) for Ship Design and Engineering,” 

during which time he states he “was . . . responsible for maintaining naval ship military 

specifications and for monitoring compliance with the specifications by all vendors and 

contractors of naval equipment.” Admiral Horne never oversaw the overhaul of ships or 

vessels at NASSCO specifically. His declaration states categorically, however, that for 

“[a]ll private contractors, such as NASSCO,” the Navy “dictated every aspect of the design, 

manufacture, installation, overhaul, repair, written documentation, safety conditions and 

warnings associated with its ships and equipment and did not permit deviations from its 

contractors.” This would have included “detailed direction as to the kinds of information to be 

included, including warnings” (Horne Decl. ¶¶ 2(a), 15–16).

In their motion to remand, plaintiffs emphasize that neither NASSCO’s submitted 

declarations nor the notice of removal refer to any particular military specification or 

contractual provision (Dkt. No. 57-1 at 19). They also submit a declaration by retired Navy 

Captain Francis J. Burger disputing Admiral Horne’s description of the extent to which the 

Navy exercised its discretion in controlling warnings and communications (Burger Decl. 

¶¶ 24–25). Plaintiffs’ arguments run contrary to Leite. There, our court of appeals held that 

similar declarations, including one from Admiral Horne that described the extent to which 

“the Navy issued detailed specifications governing the form and content of all warnings that 

equipment manufacturers were required to provide, both on the equipment itself and in 

accompanying technical manuals,” sufficed for the first element, at least at the removal stage. 

749 F.3d at 1123. This remained true even despite plaintiffs’ “extensive evidence [disputing 

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Admiral Horne’s declaration,] . . . including military specifications, technical manuals, 

warning label guides, and deposition excerpts.” Id. at 1122. Thus, in the context of removal, 

NASSCO’s submitted affidavits suffice for the first element.

Turning to the second element, plaintiffs do not appear to contest that NASSCO 

“performed its ship construction and repair work in conformance with government 

specifications” (Dkt. No. 64 at 5). Moreover, the Severs declaration specifically states that 

NASSCO complied with the Navy’s specifications (Severs Decl. ¶ 10). NASSCO has thus 

fulfilled the second element.

To fulfill the third element, NASSCO “need not prove that the Navy would have 

forbidden it to issue asbestos warnings had [it] requested the Navy’s approval.” Leite, 

749 F.3d at 1123. That said, the Horne declaration states explicitly that this had been the case: 

“[a]ny attempt by NASSCO to include a cautionary statement concerning asbestos in a 

technical or instruction manual would have been futile as it would have been rejected by the 

U.S. Navy as contrary to [military specifications].” This remained the case “even after [the 

Navy learned] in the late 1960’s that there was a connection between exposure to asbestos and 

cancer” (Horne Decl. ¶ 16). Our court of appeals held a similar declaration by Admiral Horne 

to be sufficient in Leite. F.3d at 1123–24. The Severs declaration provides additional support, 

stating that “no military vessels would be accepted by the U.S. Navy from a private 

construction/repair yard without strict compliance . . . of all requirements,” including those 

related to the display of “hazard information” (Severs Decl. ¶ 14). Plaintiffs, relying on the 

Burger declaration, dispute these statements (Burger Decl. ¶ 26). Leite nevertheless controls 

here, and under Leite, NASSCO’s submitted declarations suffice at the removal stage. Having 

fulfilled all three elements, NASSCO has asserted a colorable government contractor defense. 

Turning now to the final element of Section 1442(a)(1) removal, NASSCO must show a 

causal nexus between its own actions, taken pursuant to the Navy’s directions, and plaintiffs’ 

claims. Durham, 445 F.3d at 1252. At oral argument, plaintiffs presented a new case, 

Morton v. 3M Co., No. CV 18-5956-R, 2018 WL 4520950 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (Judge Manuel L. 

Real), to dispute whether a causal nexus exists. In Morton, Judge Manuel Real remanded after 

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NASSCO removed an asbestos case from state court under the Federal Officer Removal 

Statute, supported by a declaration by Admiral Horne. Judge Real remanded because 

NASSCO relied entirely on affidavits and failed to identify any Navy specifications governing 

NASSCO’s conduct. Id. at *2. There are similarities between our case and Morton, but there 

is one important difference. Morton did not consider failure-to-warn claims against NASSCO. 

Id. at *1. Leite, by contrast, explicitly considered what defendants must show to remove under 

the federal contractor defense in failure-to-warn claims, and it controls in this case.

The undersigned judge respects Manuel Real and agrees with his sentiment that the 

removal petitions could and should cite to chapter and verse in the Navy specifications as to 

where the contractor was compelled to act as it did. But, the court of appeals has permitted 

contractors to substitute friendly declarations by retired admirals in more conclusory terms, 

as opposed to citing to the specifications that actually impose straitjackets on contractors. 

Leite, 749 F.3d at 1123. It is therefore with some misgivings that this order finds a causal 

nexus and allows this removal under Section 1442(a)(1). 

3. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS.

Plaintiffs object in full to NASSCO’s submitted declarations. Invoking Rules 401, 402, 

602, 702, 802, 803, 1001, and 1004 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, they argue that the 

Horne and Severs declarations are “composed entirely of conclusory, speculative statements 

without foundation and inadmissible hearsay without exception” (Dkt. No 57-2 at 4, 15). 

They rely on Holdren v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 129, 145, 149 (D. Mass. 2009), 

a nonbinding case in which a district court granted remand despite defendants’ reliance on a 

similar declaration by Admiral Horne. Holdren, decided five years before Leite, 

acknowledged that different district courts had reached different results as to whether 

declarations like Admiral Horne’s sufficed to support removal under the Federal Officer 

Removal Statute. Id. at 136. In 2014, Leite provided clarity for our circuit when it concluded 

that Admiral Horne’s declaration “[was] supported by an adequate foundation based on 

[Horne’s] knowledge of Navy procurement policies” and was admissible, at least for removal 

purposes, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 749 F.3d at 1123. Here, as there, Admiral 

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Horne’s extensive training and experience maintaining naval ship military specifications and 

monitoring compliance with specifications establishes an adequate foundation for his 

statements. Moreover, Admiral Horne’s declaration does not substantiate a particular military 

specification governing the overhaul of the USS BRISTOL COUNTY, as plaintiffs seem to 

argue. Rather, it supports NASSCO’s opinion as to what the Navy required of it. Admiral 

Horne’s declaration may thus come in under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

As for the Severs declaration, Mr. Severs previously served as an officer in the Navy and 

now works as NASSCO’s program manager. His declaration states that he oversees “planning, 

maintenance, conversion and modernization of large Navy Amphibious Assault Ships” and that 

in this role, he has “developed first-hand knowledge of repair work performed by NASSCO 

aboard naval vessels, including Newport Class Tank Landing Ships” (Severs Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5, 8). 

Mr. Severs never did any work involving the USS BRISTOL COUNTY specifically, but his 

declaration nevertheless provides percipient testimony based on his professional experience 

dealing with the Navy. It helps underscore the extent to which the Navy exercises control over 

contractors like NASSCO. Thus, the declaration may come in under Federal Rule of Evidence 

701. 

Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections are thus Overruled. Importantly, this ruling on 

plaintiffs’ objections remains within the context of this motion to remand and comes without 

prejudice to any future evidentiary objections.

NASSCO also filed evidentiary objections to plaintiffs’ submitted declaration of Captain 

Burger. Those objections need not be addressed for NASSCO to remove this action under 

Section 1442(a)(1). Accordingly, they are OVERRULED as moot. This ruling also remains 

within the context of this motion to remand and comes without prejudice to any future 

evidentiary objections.

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CONCLUSION

NASSCO has properly removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). 

Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2020.

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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