Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01133/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01133-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID B. TURNER, Jr., Civil

No.

13CV1133-WQH (BGS)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION: TO GRANT

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. Nos. 9, 12]

v.

SAN DIEGO CENTRAL JAIL;

CORPORAL SAUNDERS; DEPUTY

TORRES; SAN DIEGO COUNTY

SHERIFFS

Defendant.

I. Introduction

On May 10, 2013, David B. Turner Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. The complaint named Does and the San Diego Central Jail as

Defendants. (Doc. No. 1.) On June 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint

containing three claims of alleged Constitutional violations for incidents that occurred on

March 21 and 22, 2013, as well as on April 7, 2013. The alleged incidents occurred 1

while Plaintiff was incarcerated at San Diego Central Jail. (Doc. No. 7.) In this amended

complaint, Plaintiff named Corporal Saunders and Deputy Torres as Defendants in

On the third claim, Plaintiff mistakenly includes two different dates on his complaint, 1

April 2, 2013 and April 7, 2013. This court believes April 7 is the correct date.

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replacement of Does. (Doc. No. 11.) Plaintiff served Corporal Saunders and Deputy

Torres on July 25, 2013. (Id.) On August 2, 2013, Defendants filed a nonenumerated

12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 42 U.S.C. sec. 1997e(a). (Doc. No. 9.) 

Defendants also moved to dismiss on the ground that the federal court lacks jurisdiction

pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994), because Plaintiff’s excessive

force allegations, if proven, would contradict Plaintiff’s criminal conviction stemming

from the same incident. (Id.) Finally, Defendants also moved to dismiss on the basis

that Plaintiff’s complaint is impermissibly vague. (Id.) On September 6, 2013, the Court

provided Plaintiff with notice of the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust pursuant to

Wyatt v. Terhune, and set another deadline for Plaintiff to file an opposition no later than

September 23, 2013. (Doc. No. 23.) Plaintiff did not file any opposition. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies be

GRANTED.

II. Background

Plaintiff alleges that on March 21, 2013 Corporal Sedey, Deputy Belay, Deputy

Norie, Deputy Torres, Deputy Warren, and Corporal Saunders held him down and

repeatedly kicked, tased, and punched him while he was handcuffed. (Doc. No. 7 at 3.)

Through this use of excessive force, Plaintiff argues, his Eighth Amendment rights were

violated. (Id.)

Plaintiff also alleges that on March 22, 2013 he was placed in segregated housing

where he was denied showers and outside contact. (Id. at 4.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges

that on April 7, 2013, he was prevented from attending religious services. (Id. at 5.) As a

result of these alleged deprivations, Plaintiff claims his Sixth and Eighth Amendment

rights were violated. (Id.)

Defendants filed nonenumerated 12(b) motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint.

(Doc. No. 12.) Defendants’ nonenumerated 12(b) motions seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s

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action on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before

filing suit. Defendants also filed motions to dismiss on the basis that the Court lacks

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, as well as that Plaintiff’s claims are impermissibly

vague. (Id. at 2-4.) 

Defendants argue that, despite Plaintiff’s claim that he exhausted all informal and

formal relief from the proper County Sheriff’s Department officials regarding the alleged

Constitutional violations, he failed to provide documentation or describe how the relief

was sought. (Id.) Thus, Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege sufficient

facts to show that he complied with the mandatory PLRA provisions. (Id.) Defendants’

motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds argues that Plaintiff’s excessive force claim

is barred because he cannot collaterally attack his prior criminal conviction under the

guise of a section 1983 lawsuit. (Id. at 3 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 483).) Lastly, 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are impermissibly vague, as they lack sufficient

factual allegations to state claims. (Id. at 5.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the complaint be

dismissed due to failure to exhaust, therefore the Court need not address the motions to

dismiss made on other grounds. 

III. Discussion

A. Legal Standards for Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust

Administrative Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides that:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42

U.S.C. 

§ 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). “Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and improve

the quality of prisoner suits.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Prisoners are

not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in complaints because failure

to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216

(2007).

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The proper vehicle for challenging a complaint based on failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is a nonenumerated motion under Rule 12(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Unlike

under Rule 12(b)(6), “[i]n deciding a motion to dismiss for a failure to exhaust

nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed

issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. If the district court concludes that the prisoner has failed

to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, the claim should be dismissed without

prejudice. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007);

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120.

Failure to exhaust may not be waived. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85-86

(2006) (“[e]xhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the district court, but is

mandatory”). The United States Supreme Court stated that “[t]here is no question that

exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought

in court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. A prisoner also cannot satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement by “filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative

grievance or appeal.” Woodford, 584 U.S. at 83-84. Nor can a prisoner who did not

make any attempt to utilize the prison grievance system sidestep the exhaustion

requirement by arguing that it now would be futile to attempt to exhaust within the

prison system. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n. 6 (2002) (“we stress the point . . .

that we will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements

where Congress has provided otherwise”); see also Woodford, 584 U.S. at 100 (“if the

party never pursues all available avenues of administrative review, the person will never

be able to sue in federal court”).

More recently, the Supreme Court clarified the exhaustion rule further, holding

that it is the prisoner’s observance of the state’s regulations and procedures concerning

its administrative appeals process, and not the PLRA itself, that determines whether a

prisoner has properly exhausted administrative remedies. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

218 (2007). For this reason, the particulars of the California system are essential to 

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determine whether Plaintiff complied with those regulations and properly exhausted the

claims he brings in this lawsuit. 

B. The California System

The administrative appeal system for California inmates is codified in Title 15 of

the California Code of Regulations. Effective January 28, 2011, California’s regulations

concerning the administrative appeals process were updated and changed in some

respects. CDCR now has a three-level appellate review process, and the informal level of

review has been abolished. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, sections 3084.2, 3084.7 (2011).

Inmates and parolees may “appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by

the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having an

adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 sec. 3084.1 (2011). The

appeal must be submitted to the local institution’s appeals coordinator within 30 calender

days of the event or decision being appealed. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, sec. 3084.8(a)

(2011). The appeals coordinator may cancel and reject an appeal within 30 calender days

of the event or decision being appealed. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 sec. 3084.8(b). The

appeals coordinator may also cancel and reject an appeal if the inmate fails to submit it

within these time constraints. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, sec. 3084.6(c)(4) (2011). 

An administrative appeal may only contain one issue or set of related issues. Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, sec. 3084.2, 3084.2(a)(1) (2011). If an inmate adds an issue to the

appeal that was not included when it was originally submitted, administrative remedies

are deemed not exhausted as to that new issue that was not addressed by prison staff

through all required levels of administrative review. Cal. Code Regs. tit. sec. 3084.1(b)

(2011). The inmate is required to list all staff members involved and describe their

involvement in the issue. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 sec.3084.2(a)(3) (2011). Appeals are to

be initially submitted directly to the appeals coordinator at the inmate’s institution for

review and processing at the first and second levels of review. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

sec. 2084.7(a) (2011).

An inmate wishing to exhaust administrative remedies is required to complete

three steps: (1) a first-level review by the institution’s division head; (2) a second-level

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review conducted by the institution head, no lower than Chief Deputy Warden, or his or

her designee; and (3) the third-level review, conducted by the Office of Appeals, in

Sacramento, California. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, sec. 3084.7 (2011). A decision by the

Office of Appeals constitutes the Secretary’s decision. The administrative process is

completed, or exhausted, only after the inmate has complied with all prison grievance

procedures, and received a decision from the Office of Appeals. Cal. Code Regs. tit. sec.

3084.7(c)(3) (2011); Woodford, 541 U.S. at 95-96. The administrative process must be

completely exhausted before the inmate files his civil rights lawsuit. Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006).

C. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust His Claims before Filing This Lawsuit

Plaintiff fails to provide any documentation of his efforts to exhaust all forms of

administrative relief from the proper San Diego County Sheriff’s Department officials or

from the Office of Appeals in Sacramento. Despite indicating that he exhausted all forms

of relief in his Complaint, Plaintiff has not substantiated it with any evidence. Plaintiff

checked the “Yes” box in the form Complaint, yet he does not describe how or when the

relief was sought. Likewise, he does not provide the results of his alleged requests for

relief. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that he “need [sic] to amend Complaint, told to get a civil

rights suit because [sic] of the excessive force cruel and unusual Eighth Amendment

rights. (Complaint, sec. 2.) Defendants declare that they have no record of Plaintiff filing

an administrative grievance, which would be needed to exhaust at the first level of

review. Significantly, Plaintiff included lodgments in support of his First Amended

Complaint. (Doc. No. 18.) One of the attached lodgments is a San Diego Sheriff’s

Department Grievance Report. (Id. at 20.) The attached report establishes that Plaintiff

is aware of, and has successfully navigated, the grievance process while at George Bailey

Detention Facility. In fact, Plaintiff did so on at least two occasions with respect to

issues regarding his legal mail. (Id.) The attached grievance was made on July 27, 2013

and responded to on July 29, 2013. Thus, the fact that the Sheriff’s Department has no

record of Plaintiff filing any grievances concerning excessive force, placement in

segregated housing or the denial of Plaintiff’s right to attend religious services serves to

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further indicate that Plaintiff did not file any grievances on the matters before the Court. 

Without any facts or evidence to indicate Plaintiff followed the required procedures and

exhausted his claims prior to filing the action, the Court must recommend that

Defendants’ nonenumerated 12(b) motions be GRANTED because pursuant to the

PLRA, exhaustion is mandatory. 

D. Conclusion

Having reviewed the matter, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint should be 2

dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend, but leave will only be allowed so

long as Plaintiff establishes that he fully exhausted all administrative remedies with

respect to his Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights. 

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is

submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

sec. 636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than November 8, 2013, after receiving a

copy of this Report and Recommendation, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document shall be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties within 10 days of being served with the objections.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 8, 2013

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

As noted above, Defendants also moved to dismiss on the basis that the excessive force 2

claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, as well as for lacking sufficient facts to state a claim. The

Court, however, need not address the merits of those arguments because Plaintiff’s claims are

dismissed for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies pursuant to the PLRA. 

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