Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-04624/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-04624-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Wrongful Death

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

JULIAN MURPHY,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MENDOCINO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04624-NJV

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 39

Plaintiff Julian Murphy, a minor, by and through Steven Murphy, the duly appointed 

Guardian of the person and estate of Julian Murphy, (“Plaintiff”) filed his First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) against County of Mendocino (“County”), City of Fort Bragg, Officers

McLaughlin and Brandon, California Forensic Medical Group (“CFMG”) and Dr. Taylor Fithian, 

alleging ten causes of action for the custodial suicide of Plaintiff‟s father, Shane Allen Murphy 

(“Shane Murphy”). (Doc. 31) Subsequently, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendants City of 

Fort Bragg and Officers McLaughlin and Brandon. (Doc. 36). CFMG have answered the FAC, 

while the County filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 39). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the 

court took the matter under submission and for the reasons that follow the Motion to Dismiss is 

granted in part and denied in part. In addition, Plaintiff will be allowed amendment.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

is to test the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint. A motion to dismiss may be 

brought under Rule 12(b)(6) when the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.

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A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 8 “does not require „detailed 

factual allegations,‟” a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 

1955 (2007)). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. Thus, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party must allege facts 

that are “enough to raise a right to above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the 

allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Dismissal of a complaint can be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

lack of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a 

claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

DISCUSSION

Legal framework for §1983 Claims against the County

Plaintiff‟s first six causes of action are his federal causes of action and are brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, as to the County, the court analyzes Plaintiff‟s claims 

pursuant to Monell. “In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 

2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), [the Supreme] Court held that civil rights plaintiffs suing a 

municipal entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show that their injury was caused by a municipal 

policy or custom.” Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 30-31 (2010). This is 

because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 

312, 325 (1981). 

The First, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action

This first cause of action is titled as a claim for failure to provide medical care under 

§ 1983. The fifth cause of action is titled as “Violation of Decedent‟s Right to Personal Safety.” 

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The sixth cause of action is for the “Violation of Plaintiff‟s Rights to Enjoy Continued Family 

Relationships.” None of these causes of action allege that Plaintiff‟s injury was “was caused by a 

municipal policy or custom.” Humphries, 562 U.S. at 31. Thus, the first, fifth, and sixth causes of 

action against the County are dismissed.

The Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action

As to the second, third, and fourth causes of action, the County asserts that the FAC is 

insufficient to state a Monell claim because “because Plaintiff merely alleges that a policy existed 

and alleges that the policy was the moving force behind [Shane] Murphy‟s death.” Def.‟s Mot. 

(Doc. 39) at 10. Further, the County argues that “Plaintiff does not explain the nexus between 

each alleged policy and Murphy‟s death.” Id. The County makes broad accusations regarding the 

generality of Plaintiff‟s allegations, but only specifically challenges two portions of the FAC here.

First, the County points the court to the fourth cause of action wherein Plaintiff alleges that 

“defendants maintained a policy, custom, or practice of failing to ensure that lifesaving equipment 

was available, maintained, and in good working order,” and argues that “there is not a single 

allegation in Plaintiff‟s FAC related that would connect this alleged policy with [Shane] Murphy‟s 

death.” Id. Indeed, the first time lifesaving equipment is mentioned in the FAC is within the first 

cause of action. The next mention of the life-saving equipment occurs here in the fourth. 

Nowhere within the FAC does it allege that the maintenance of lifesaving equipment has anything 

to do with Shane Murphy‟s death.

Second, the County points to the allegations in the third cause of action and states that 

“Plaintiff makes allegations regarding policies of understaffing and states that these policies were 

the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. However, then Plaintiff goes on to

make other allegations of Defendants‟ failures but does not connect those allegations to the 

policies.” Id. at 11. The court does not agree. Plaintiff‟s claims in the third cause of action are 

for failure to train. The “understaffing” to which the FAC refers is to “sufficiently trained 

personnel.” FAC (Doc. 31) at 14. While maybe not artfully worded, it is clear that this is a failure 

to train claim, and not a claim for a policy of understaffing.

Outside of these two specific arguments, the County argues generally that the facts alleged 

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in the FAC are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss because the FAC does not allege that a 

County policy “was the moving force behind the alleged violations of [Shane] Murphy‟s rights.” 

Defs.‟ Mot. (Doc. 39) at 10. The County argues that “Plaintiff does not make specific allegation 

of government official(s) violating his constitutional rights that are connected to his allegations of 

policies.” and because it is “unclear whether Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants have formal 

policies or Plaintiff is trying to show that Defendants have informal policies.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff

counters that the County asserts too high a burden and that he must be allowed discovery to pursue 

his claims.

“The Ninth Circuit has made clear that claims of Monell liability must now comply with 

the basic principles set forth in Twombly and Iqbal: (1) the complaint „may not simply recite the 

elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give 

fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively;‟ and (2) the „factual 

allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not 

unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued 

litigation.‟” La v. San Mateo Cty. Transit Dist., No. 14-CV-01768-WHO, 2014 WL 4632224, at 

*7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)); see 

also A.E. ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636–37 (9th Cir. 2012).

In A.E. ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, the Ninth Circuit considered a 

Monell claim brought by a minor who had been sexually abused while in foster 

care. 666 F.3d at 634–35. He alleged the county was liable under Monell because it 

“performed all acts and omissions . . . under the ordinances, regulations, customs, 

and practices of [the county]” and “maintained or permitted an official policy, 

custom, or practice of knowingly permitting the occurrence of the type of wrongs” 

alleged elsewhere in the complaint. Id. at 637. The court concluded these 

allegations were insufficient to state a claim, although it directed the district court 

to allow the plaintiffs leave to amend. Id. at 637–38.

San Mateo Cty. Transit Dist., 2014 WL 4632224, at *7. Thus, Plaintiff must identify “specific 

policies or customs in his FAC.” Anakin v. Contra Costa Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 16-CV-00161-

MEJ, 2016 WL 2893257, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2016). “„While the Court recognizes the 

inherent difficulty of identifying specific policies absent access to discovery, that is nonetheless 

the burden of plaintiffs in federal court.‟” Id. (quoting Roy v. Contra Costa Cty., No. 15-CVCase 1:15-cv-04624-NJV Document 43 Filed 06/29/16 Page 4 of 10
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54119-TEH, 2016 WL 54119, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016)).

As to the second cause of action, Plaintiff identifies the specific policy of the understaffing 

of properly trained supervisory staff. Plaintiff alleges that this policy is a moving force behind 

Shane Murphy‟s injury, but does not sufficiently allege facts as to how the “policy, practice, or 

custom caused the violation of his rights.” Tien Van Nguyen v. City of Union City, No. C-13-

01753-DMR, 2013 WL 3014136, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2013).

As to the third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a policy of failing to properly train custody 

staff. “A plaintiff alleging a failure to train claim must show: (1) he was deprived of a 

constitutional right, (2) the municipality had a training policy that „amounts to deliberate 

indifference to the [constitutional] rights of the persons with whom [its police officers] are likely 

to come into contact;‟ and (3) his constitutional injury would have been avoided had the 

municipality properly trained those officers.” Dasovich v. Contra Costa Cty. Sheriff Dep't, No. 

14-CV-00258-MEJ, 2014 WL 4652118, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (quoting Blankenhorn v. 

City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007)). “A municipality is „deliberately indifferent‟

when the need for more or different action, „is so obvious, and the inadequacy [of the current 

procedure] so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers . . .

can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.‟” Id. (quoting City of 

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). Here, as in Dashovich and Anakin, Plaintiff 

has identified the specific training, or lack of training, and has alleged that the lack of proper 

training led to the injury. In paragraph 46 of the FAC, Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference “to 

the deteriorating conditions at the jail due to an increasing number of jail suicides and other mental 

health related injuries and fatalities within the last 5 years.” FAC (Doc. 31) at 10. The court finds 

the allegations sufficient to provide the County fair notice to enable them to defend against the 

claims.

As to the fourth cause of action, Plaintiff identifies the policies of understaffing properly 

trained and supervised medical staff, and denying access to medical care. However, Plaintiff does 

not identify any specific County policies and does not allege how these policies resulted in injury.

Plaintiff merely makes conclusory allegations, in violation of the pleading principles identified in 

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A.E.

Accordingly, the requests to dismiss the second and fourth causes of action are granted and 

the request to dismiss the third cause of action is denied.

Fourteenth Amendment

County Defendant also moves to dismiss the first six causes of action on the basis that 

Plaintiff has failed to plead Fourteenth Amendment violations. Essentially, the County alleges 

that the facts do not show deliberate indifference on the part of the County and that mere 

negligence is insufficient. At this point, only the third cause of action remains and it alleges a 

policy of failure to train. As discussed above, failure to train may indeed amount to deliberate 

indifference. See Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 484. Thus, Plaintiff is not required to allege that “acts 

attributed to Defendants rose above mere negligence or lack of care” as the County suggests. The 

claim against the County is for its policy and the harm it committed. Accordingly this basis for 

dismissal is denied.

The Eighth Cause of Action

Next the County asserts that the state law claims of negligent hiring, training, and 

supervision contained in the eighth cause of action are due to be dismissed because the FAC does 

not identify a statutory basis for the claims and because Plaintiff has not properly pled a claim for 

vicarious liability. Plaintiff argues in his Response that the County is vicariously liable under Cal. 

Gov‟t Code § 815.2(a) for the acts of its employees, or under § 815.4 for the acts of other 

Defendants who were independent contractors of the County.

“All government tort liability must be based on statute” and “§ 815.2(a) “expressly makes 

the doctrine of respondeat superior applicable to public employers.” Hoff v. Vacaville Unified 

Sch. Dist., 19 Cal.4th 925, 932 (1998). 

The California Supreme Court has explained the framework as follows: Section 

815 establishes that public entity tort liability is exclusively statutory: “Except as 

otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether 

such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public 

employee or any other person.” Section 815.2, in turn, provides . . . “(a) A public 

entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee 

of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission 

would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that 

employee or his personal representative. (b) Except as otherwise provided by 

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statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of 

an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” 

Finally, section 820 delineates the liability of public employees themselves: “(a) 

Except as otherwise provided by statute . . ., a public employee is liable for injury 

caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person. (b) The 

liability of a public employee . . . is subject to any defenses that would be available 

to the public employee if he were a private person.” In other words, the general 

rule is that an employee of a public entity is liable for his torts to the same extent as 

a private person (§ 820, subd. (a)) and the public entity is vicariously liable for any 

injury which its employee causes (§ 815.2, subd. (a)) to the same extent as a private 

employer (§ 815, subd. (b)). C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 53 

Cal.4th 861, 868 (2012) (some internal quotation marks and alterations omitted; 

paragraphing added). 

Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of California, No. 15-CV-03717-WHO, 2015 WL 8527338, at 

*19-20 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015). This claim does not properly plead the actions of an employee 

of the County acting within the scope of his employment to assert vicarious liability. Instead, the 

claim is pled as a direct liability claim, in violation of the statute. Similarly, “Cal. Gov‟t Code § 

815.4 only imposes liability for the acts of independent contractors to the same degree as a public 

entity would be liable for the acts of a public employee.” Resendiz v. Cty. of Monterey, No. 14-

CV-05495-LHK, 2015 WL 3988495, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015). Accordingly, the request to 

dismiss the eight cause of action against the County is granted.

Doe Defendants

The County requests that the court dismiss all Doe Defendants because the allegations 

against them are non-specific and vague and almost never distinguished from the named 

Defendants. Plaintiff asserts that it is too early at this stage to dismiss the Doe Defendants as 

discovery has not yet occurred. Of course, if discovery had occurred in this matter there would be 

no need for Doe Defendants. The point the County is making is that because all of the causes of 

action in the FAC are pled against all Defendants equally, and because the standards for pleading 

these claims may vary based on the status of the Defendants,

1

having some level of particularity 

provides Defendants of some notice. On the other hand, because the court will allow amendment 

of the FAC, the court is confident that the allegations in the second amended complaint will 

provide context and clarity sufficient to cure the County‟s concerns. Accordingly the court will 

 

1

 For example, as discussed above there are specific pleading requirements under Monell for 

claims against a public entity which do not apply to a private company such as CFMG.

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not dismiss the Doe Defendants at this time.

The Ninth Cause of Action

The County moves to dismiss the ninth cause of action, failure to summon medical care, by 

arguing that “[l]iability under section 845.6 is limited to serious and obvious medical conditions 

requiring immediate care. Watson v. State, 21 Cal. App. 4th 836 (1993),” and that “[i]t is unclear 

at what point during [Shane] Murphy‟s time at the [Mendocino County Jail] that Plaintiff alleges 

that Murphy was in need of immediate medical care and unclear how his alleged medical 

condition would have been obvious.” Def.‟s Mot. (Doc. 39) at 16. The County‟s arguments are 

well taken. 

“Under California Government Code § 845.6, public entities and public employees are 

generally not „liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or 

obtain medical care for a prisoner in his [or her] custody.‟” Resendiz v. Cty. of Monterey, No. 14-

CV-05495-LHK, 2015 WL 7075694, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) (quoting Cal. Gov‟t Code § 

845.6). “Public entities and public employees are liable for injuries proximately caused to 

prisoners where: (1) „the employee is acting within the scope of his [or her] employment,‟ (2) „the 

employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care,‟

and (3) „he [or she] fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.‟” Id. Thus, 

Plaintiff “must allege facts showing that „a public employee, acting within the scope of his or her 

employment, failed to take reasonable action to summon medical care.‟” Id. The ninth cause of 

action makes no such allegation. Moreover, the other facts set forth in the FAC, which revolve

around Shane Murphy‟s suicide, do not indicate a set of circumstances that would set forth a claim 

for failure to summon medical care against the County, especially where “[t]he provision of 

§ 845.6 upon which Plaintiff relies makes exceptions for failure to diagnose and/or medicate a 

mental illness (Cal. Gov‟t Code § 855.8) and for [failure] to confine a person for mental illness 

(Cal. Gov‟t Code § 856).” Cabral v. Cty. of Glenn, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1195 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 

Accordingly, the request to dismiss the ninth cause of action is granted.

Tort Claims Act

Here the County argues that the eighth and ninth causes of action are due to be dismissed 

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because Plaintiff has failed to comply with the filing requirements under the Tort Claims Act. 

Plaintiff argues that:

In Castaneda[ v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 21 2 Cal. App. 4th 1051, 1060 (2013)], 

an action was brought against the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) by the heir of a former prisoner who had died of cancer 

after being released from CDCR custody. The government claim and lawsuit in 

Castaneda were filed by the decedent before his death for his injuries. When he 

died, the lawsuit was amended to maintain the action as a survivor action and add a 

wrongful death cause of action brought by the deceased‟s daughter. However, no 

government claim was filed by the daughter for the wrongful death action. The 

Court found that the daughter could not substitute the tort claim filed by the 

decedent for his injuries for her own wrongful death claim, and thus could not 

maintain a cause of action for wrongful death. Id. at 1063. 

In the present action, the opposite is true. The tort claim filed by Plaintiff in this 

action was filed on his behalf only, and not as a survivor.”

Def.‟s Mot. (Doc. 39) at 12.

First, the court notes that it has now dismissed both of these claims. Second, the court 

disagrees with the County‟s analysis of Plaintiff‟s claims. Both causes of action, while based on 

facts surrounding the injuries to Shane Murphy, are brought in terms of injuries to the Plaintiff. 

Accordingly the request to dismiss the eighth and ninth causes of action on this basis is denied.

The Tenth Cause of Action

The County moves to dismiss this survival claim because the injuries alleged in the claim 

are Plaintiff‟s and not Shane Murphy‟s. Plaintiff suggests that this issue is curable by amendment. 

The court agrees. The request to dismiss the tenth cause of action is granted with leave to amend.

Standing

Here the County argues that the allegations related to Plaintiff‟s own injuries contained 

within his survival actions under § 1983 should be dismissed or amended. Plaintiff asserts that the 

allegations are sufficient and that the request is appropriate for a later motion. This issue is nearly 

moot at this point where the court has dismissed most of Plaintiff‟s claims against the County but 

is allowing amendment. However, the third cause of action remains and is problematic. 

“[S]urvival actions [] are based on injuries incurred by the decedent.” Hayes v. Cty. of San Diego, 

736 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013). The third cause of action speaks in terms of violations of 

Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights, and the personal injury of Plaintiff. These errors are easily curable 

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upon amendment. Accordingly, the request to dismiss the survival actions under § 1983 are 

granted. 

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, it is ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is granted in part 

and denied in part. Plaintiff shall have until on or before July 19, 2016 in which to file a second 

amended complaint.

At this juncture, it appears to the court that at least some of Plaintiff‟s claims against the 

County will survive and proceed toward discovery. The court would strongly encourage the

parties to meet and confer regarding the second amended complaint to avoid further costly and 

time consuming motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2016

______________________________________

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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