Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02415/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02415-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Russell N. Weikert and Shelley Weikert, 

husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Wright Medical Technology, Inc., a 

Delaware corporation; and Wright Medical 

Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation, 

Defendants.

No. CV11-2415-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendants Wright Medical Technology, Inc. and Wright Medical Group have 

filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss count two and Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive 

damages. Doc. 10. The motions are fully briefed. Docs. 10, 11, 12. Oral argument has 

not been requested. For reasons that follow, the Court will deny the motion.

I. Background. 

On October 26, 2006, Plaintiff Russell Weikert received a left hip implant 

manufactured and distributed by Defendants. Doc. 1 at 2-3. On December 12, 2009, 

during Russell’s usual physical workout, the implant cracked and failed. Id. Plaintiffs 

filed a complaint against Defendants on December 7, 2011, seeking damages for physical 

and mental suffering, loss of consortium, loss of present and future income, punitive 

damages, and costs. Id. at 8-9. 

II. Legal Standards.

 When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), all 

Case 2:11-cv-02415-DGC Document 13 Filed 08/03/12 Page 1 of 4
‐ 2 ‐ 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a 

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the complaint “must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

 A statute of limitations defense may be raised in a motion to dismiss if the running 

of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 

F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). Even if the relevant dates alleged in the complaint are 

beyond the statutory period, however, the complaint cannot be dismissed unless it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the 

timeliness of the claim. Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 402 (9th Cir. 

1998); see Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). 

III. Count Two.

 Defendants argue that count two should be dismissed as barred by the Arizona 

statute of limitations that applies to breach of warranty claims. A.R.S. § 47-2725. The 

relevant subsections of that statute read: 

 A. An action for breach of any contract for sale must be 

commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the 

original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not 

less than one year but may not extend it. 

B. A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless 

of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of 

warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a 

warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and 

discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause 

of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. 

 Defendants argue that tender of delivery occurred on October 26, 2006 – the day 

of Russell’s surgery – and that the statute of limitations began to run on that date. 

Doc. 10 at 3. If correct, Plaintiffs’ claim is time-barred because it was filed more than 

five years later on December 7, 2011. Doc. 1. 

Case 2:11-cv-02415-DGC Document 13 Filed 08/03/12 Page 2 of 4
‐ 3 ‐ 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants explicitly extended the warranty to future 

performance when their representative told Russell’s doctor that the implant would last 

twenty to thirty years. Id. at 5. If correct, Plaintiffs would have four years from 

December 14, 2009 – the date of the implant’s failure – to file their breach of warranty 

claim, and the claim filed on December 7, 2011 would be timely. A.R.S. § 47-2725(B). 

 Defendants respond that the term “explicit” in A.R.S. § 47-2725(B) means that the 

warranty of future performance must be express, unambiguous and clearly stated, see

Reiniger v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., No. CV-09-8185-PCT-PGR, 2010 WL 

1948588 (D. Ariz. May 12, 2010), but fail to show why their representative’s alleged 

representation to Russell’s doctor does not meet this standard. Plaintiffs cite cases 

holding that a reference to a specific future time period is sufficient to explicitly extend a 

warranty to future performance. See Tolen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 1146, 

1153-54 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Standard Alliance Indus., Inc. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 

813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ 

representative made a clear guarantee. 

 Whether this case falls within Defendants’ case law or Plaintiffs’ case law cannot 

be resolved on the current record. This issue must be resolved at the summary judgment 

stage or at trial when more information is available concerning the precise statements 

made by Defendants’ representative. Because the Court cannot at this stage conclude 

beyond doubt that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness 

of their claim, the motion to dismiss count two will be denied. Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 

402. 

IV. Punitive Damages. 

To recover punitive damages under Arizona law, a plaintiff must prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in aggravated and outrageous 

conduct with an “evil mind.” Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v. Winston & Strawn, 

907 P.2d 506, 518 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). An evil mind “may be found where defendant 

intended to injure the plaintiff. It may also be found where, although not intending to 

Case 2:11-cv-02415-DGC Document 13 Filed 08/03/12 Page 3 of 4
‐ 4 ‐ 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

cause injury, defendant consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a 

substantial risk of significant harm to others.” Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 578 

(Ariz. 1986). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to 

show an evil mind. 

 Plaintiffs allege that there was a foreseeable risk of harm inherent in the design of 

the implant, that Defendants knew or should have known of the risk, and that Defendants 

consciously disregarded the substantial risk. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 23-24, 55. Although the Court 

has doubts about whether such a claim ultimately can satisfy the demanding standard for 

punitive damages in Arizona, these allegations sufficiently plead an evil mind under the 

law quoted above – an evil mind exists when a “defendant consciously pursued a course 

of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant harm to others.” 

Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 578. Moreover, the Court notes that Rule 9(b) allows malice, 

intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind to be alleged generally.1

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) is denied. 

 Dated this 3rd day of August, 2012. 

 

1 The Court will not strike Plaintiffs’ response as requested by Defendants. The Court has not considered or relied on the factual material attached to the response. 

Case 2:11-cv-02415-DGC Document 13 Filed 08/03/12 Page 4 of 4