Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06285/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06285-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

u~1ited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAR 2 2 1990 

---------~ROBERT L. HOECKER 

JOYCE E. CARLE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

L. F. WOODS, POSTMASTER, U.S. POST 

OFFICE, Norman, Oklahoma, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Clerk 

No. 89-6285 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. CIV-87-1871-W) 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellant Joyce Carle appeals the order of the district court 

granting appellee's motion to dismiss appellant's employment 

discrimination claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 1 
The significant facts of the case are undisputed on appeal. 

Appellant is a clerk-stenographer in the Norman, Oklahoma, post 

office. In an administrative complaint brought in accordance with 

the United States Postal Service's (the "Agency") administrative 

Equal Employment Opportunity procedures, she alleged that on 

August 28, 1984, she was denied use of a door providing access to 

an adjacent general clerk's office 

disciplinary action regarding the quality 

further alleged that these actions were 

and threatened with 

of her work. 

the result of 

She 

sex 

discrimination and/or reprisal for a previous complaint with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). After a hearing, the Agency issued its final decision on October 7, 1985, 

finding no discrimination. On October 25, 1985, appellant 

initiated an appeal with the EEOC, which affirmed the Agency's 

decision on August 17, 1987. Appellant then instituted the 

instant civil action. 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), civil actions must be brought 

by a plaintiff against the head of the appropriate governmental 

agency within thirty days of notice of a final decision of the 

EEOC. Johnson v. United States Postal Service, 861 F.2d 1475, 

1478 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). 

Appellees moved for dismissal in the district court on the ground 

appellan~ failed to name the proper party within the thirty-day 

period. The district court agreed and granted the motion. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 2 
The basis for a dismissal for "inability to amend a complaint 

naming an improper party is failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted." Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1476 n.l. As such, 

our standard of review on appeal is de novo. National Commodity & 

Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 1989). 

To properly file her action, appellant should have filed her 

complaint against the head of the Agency, Preston R. Tisch, 

Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service, by 

September 17, 1987. 1 Instead, the district court found that 

appellant did the following: 

1. On September 14, 1987, [appellant] filed a 

complaint with this Court naming the Defendant as L.F. 

Woods, Postmaster, United States Post Office, Norman, 

Ok. Service was effected September 16, 1987. By 

affidavit, L.F. Woods asserted that he received a 

summons on September 16, 1987, without a complaint 

attached. Appellant did not contest the affidavit 

before the district court. 

2. On September 22, 1987, [appellant] filed a summons 

for United States Postal Service, Postmaster General 

Preston R. Tisch. Service was effected on September 28, 

1987. 

3. On September 22, 1987, [appellant] filed a summons 

to Edwin Meese [in Washington, D.C.]. Service was 

effected on September 28, 1987. 

4. On September 30, 1987, [appellant] filed a summons 

for the Attorney General [in Washington, D.C.]. Service 

was effected on October 5, 1987. 

1 In the top right hand corner of the copy of the EEOC decision 

attached to the judicial complaint, a handwritten notation states 

"Received 8-18-87 J. Carle." Appellant does not dispute the date 

of receipt. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 3 
5. On September 30, 1987, [appellant] filed a summons 

for the United States Attorney [in Oklahoma City]. 

Service was effected on October 2, 1987. 

[District Court Order at 2.] 

On appeal, appellant asserts that her addition of the 

Postmaster General as a party after the expiration of the 

limitations period should relate back to her original, timely 

complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c} governs the relation back of 

amendments to pleadings. The relation back of an amendment is 

dependent upon the satisfaction of four factors: 

(1) the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct 

set forth in the original pleading; (2) the party to be 

brought in must have received such notice that it will 

not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense; (3) that 

party must or should have known that, but for a mistake 

concerning identity, the action would have been brought 

against it; and (4) the second and third requirements 

must have been fulfilled within the prescribed 

limitations period. 

Slade v. United States Postal Service, 875 F.2d 814, 815 (10th 

Cir. 1989} (quoting Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986)). 

"With respect to actions brought against an agency or officer of 

the United States, Rule 15(c} further provides that '[t]he 

delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney 

or the Attorney General of the United States, satisfies the second 

and third requirements of the Schiavone test." Id. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 4 
Appellant first argues that the service made upon the United 

States Attorney satisfies Rule 15(c). [Appellant's brief at 5-6. ) 

On this point, we agree with the district court that service on 

the United States Attorney in this case does not satisfy Rule 

15(c) because the United States Attorney was served outside the 

limitations period. As stated above, Rule 15(c) provides that 

effective service on either the United States Attorney or the 

Attorney General satisfies the final requirements of the Schiavone 

test. However, such service must be made within the limitat ions 

period. Rule 15(c); Slade, 875 F.2d at 815. For purposes of this 

test, "delivery or mailing" of service is sufficient. Rule 15(c). 

Here however, service on the U.S. Attorney General was mailed on 

September 22, 1987, and service was delivered on September 28, 

1987; both events falling outside the limitations period. 

Likewise, service on the U.S. Attorney was late (mailed on 

September 30, delivered on October 2). Accordingly, appellant's 

service upon neither the U.S. Attorney nor the U.S. Attorney 

General was sufficient to satisfy Rule 15(c). 

Next, appellant argues that the notice served upon the local 

postmaster should be imputed to the Postmaster General through the 

"identity of interests exception." [Appellant's brief at 3.) 

Under this exception, where recognized, notice is imputed to a 

"subsequently named and sufficiently related party'' when the 

complaint is timely filed and notice is given to the party named 

in the complaint within the limitations period. Schiavone, 477 

U.S. at 29. This circuit has recognized that "[R]ule 15(c) is an 

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Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 5 
explicit statement of the procedures and safeguards that make up 

[the identity-of-interests] exception." Johnson, 861 F.2d at 

1481. Thus, assuming some notice can be imputed to the Postmaster 

General, that notice must still satisfy the Schiavone factors in 

order to pass Rule 15(c) muster. 

The only person who received any notice of appellant's legal 

action within the limitations period was the local postmaster. 

The local postmaster received only a summons; he did not receive a 

copy of the complaint. In order to render effective service, Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(d) requires that a summons be accompanied by a copy 

of the complaint. Without a copy of the complaint, the local 

postmaster would not have had sufficient notice of the substance 

of the civil action. Thus, even if this defective notice can be 

imputed to the Postmaster General, the Postmaster General cannot 

be said to have received notice within the limitations period such 

that he would not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense. 

Additionally, the Postmaster General could not have known within 

the limitations period from the local postmaster's receipt of the 

civil summons that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the 

action would have been brought against him. Accordingly, in our 

opinion, whatever notice can be imputed to the Postmaster General 

from the local postmaster's receipt of the summons is insufficient 

for purposes of establishing the second, third and fourth factors 

of the Schiavone test. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 6 
Finally, appellant argues that the district court erred in 

disallowing an equitable tolling of the limitations period. This 

circuit has recognized that an equitable tolling of the 

limitations period may be appropriate in the context of a 

discrimination case. Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1480-81. However, a 

Title VII time limit will be tolled only if there has been "active 

deception." Id. at 1481. Here, as the district court noted, 

instead of being misled or deceived or lulled into inaction, 

appellant was specifically instructed on the party and timing 

requirements of§ 2000e-16(c) through the EEOC'~ "Notice of Right 

to File a Civil Action" attached to the EEOC decision. [R., EEOC 

Decision at 3.] Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 

denial of an equitable tolling of the limitations period. 

The order of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit JudQe 

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Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 7 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

THEFILED 

JOYCE CARLE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

L.F. WOODS, Postmaster, ) 

U.S. POST OFFICE, Norman, ) 

OK 73070-9998, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

0 RD ER 

POBF.:RT D. DENNIS 

,., ""l'<, U3. D!SiRlr.T C'J 1_, . 

~'< f)~_\:,'.- ,_. ~·_::,;w~~- No. CIV-87-1871-W 

This matter comes on before the Court on Motion of Defendant 

to Dismiss. The action involves a discrimination claim by 

Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. Said statute provides 

in pertinent part that a plaintiff must bring a civil action within 

thirty days of a final decision by the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC). In the present case Defendant asserts that 

Plaintiff failed to name the proper party within the thirty-day 

limitations period and that an amended complaint naming the proper 

party cannot relate back. This Court agrees and grants Defendant's 

Motion to Dismiss. 

On August 18, 1987, Plaintiff received a final decision by the 

EEOC, denying Plaintiff's claim of discrimination. 1 Pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), Plaintiff had thirty days within which to 

1

A copy of the EEOC decision was attached to the judicial 

complaint in the instant action. On the top right hand corner of 

the EEOC decision, a handwritten notation states "Received 8-18-87 

J. Carle." Defendant refers to this notation as indicating the 

date of receipt by Plaintiff. Brief in Support of Defendant's 

Motion to Dismiss, p. 10. In response, Plaintiff does not dispute 

the date of receipt. 

Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 8 
file a civil action against the head of the governmental agency. 

For proper filing in this case, Plaintiff should have filed a 

complaint against Preston R. Tisch, Postmaster General of the 

United States Postal Service, by September 17, 1987. Instead, the 

record indicates that Plaintiff filed and served the following: 

(1) On September 14, 1987, Plaintiff filed a complaint with 

this Court naming the Defendant as L.F. Woods, 

Postmaster, United States Post Office, Norman, Ok. 

Service was effected on September 16, 1987. 2 

( 2) on September 22, 1987, Plaintiff filed a summons for 

United States Postal Service, Postmaster General Preston 

R. Tisch. Service was effected on September 28, 1987. 

( 3) On September 22, 1987, Plaintiff filed a summons to Edwin 

Meese (with the appropriate Washington, D.C. address). 

Service was effected on September 28, 1987. 

(4) On September 30, 1987, Plaintiff filed a summons for the 

Attorney General (with the appropriate Washington, D.C. 

address]. Service was effected on October 5, 1987. 

(5) On September 30, 1987, Plaintiff filed a summons for the 

United states Attorney [with the appropriate Oklahoma 

City address). Service was effected on October 2, 1987. 

It is clear from the record that the local postmaster, L.F. 

Woods, was the only person who had any notice regarding a lawsuit 

2

By affidavit filed with this Court, L.F. Woods deposes that 

he received a summons in the captioned matter on September 16, 

1987, without a complaint attached. Plaintiff does not controvert 

this affidavit in subsequent response. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 9 
within the thirty-day limitations period. 3 It is equally clear 

that the local postmaster in Norman, Oklahoma, L.F. Woods, is not 

the proper party to this lawsuit. Title 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-16(c) 

states that the only proper defendant to a discrimination suit is 

the head of the governmental agency, department or unit. Abundant 

case law interprets the statute to mean exactly what it says 

regarding the proper defendant in such cases. See Johnson v. 

United States Postal Service, 861 F.2d 1475, 1478 (10th Cir. 1988); 

Canino v. United States AC, 707 F.2d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1983); 

Hall v. Small Business Administration, 695 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 

1983); Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 958 n.1 (D.C. cir. 1980, 

as amended); Hakley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 115 n. 17 (D.C. 

Cir. 1975); Drayton v. Veterans Administration, 654 F. Supp. 558, 

562 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Brooks v. Brinegar, 391 F. Supp. 710, 711 

(W.D. Okla. 1974); and Carle v. United States Postal Service, et 

al, No. CIV-86-1297-W, 13-14 (W.D. Okla. December 31, 1986). The 

last case cited, Carle v. United States Postal Service, supra, 

serves a dual function. Not only does case law support a plain 

reading of the statute, but the Plaintiff in this action previously 

had been subjected to a dismissal by this Court for failure to 

comply with the requirement to name the proper party within the 

thirty-day limitations period for a discrimination claim. Thus, 

Plaintiff herein had notice of said statute by virtue of an adverse 

3

The notice L. F. Woods received was defective because he 

received a summons only without benefit of an accompanying 

complaint. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 10 
court order issued against Plaintiff. In addition, the EEOC' s 

final Decision issued to Plaintiff herein contained a notice 

statement, filed with this Court in the present action by Plaintiff 

herself, which stated in pertinent part: 

"You are further notified that if you file a civil 

action, YOU MUST NAME THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL AGENCY OR 

DEPARTMENT HEAD AS THE DEFENDANT. Rule 25(d) (2) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that you may 

describe the defendant by official title rather than by 

name. Failure to provide the NAME OR OFFICIAL TITLE of 

the agency head or, where appropriate, the department 

head, may result in the loss of any judicial redress to 

which you may be entitled. ( Please note: For this 

purpose, Department means the overall national 

organization, such as the now defunct Department of 

Health, Education and Welfare, not the local 

administrative department where you might work.) You 

must be sure that the proper defendant is named when you 

file your civil action." (emphasis in the original) 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff herein filed a lawsuit naming the 

local postmaster, L.F. Woods, as the only defendant in the present 

lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court must now answer the following two 

questions. First, will the facts of this case allow an amended 

complaint naming the proper party to relate back to the original 

complaint? Second, do the facts of this case warrant an equitable 

tolling of the limitations period? 

questions in the negative. 

The Court answers both 

Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth 

the conditions by which an amendment may relate back to the date 

of the original pleading. Subsection (c) of said Rule 15 provides: 

Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended 

pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 

original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date 

of the original pleading. An amendment changing the 

party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 11 
the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the 

period provided by law for commencing the action against 

the party to be brought in by amendment that party (1) 

has received such notice of the institution of the action 

that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining his 

defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known 

that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the 

proper party, the action would have been brought against 

the party. 

The delivery or mailing of process to the United 

States Attorney, or the United States Attorney's 

designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, 

or an agency or officer who would have been a proper 

defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses 

(1) and (2) hereof with respect to the United States or 

any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the 

action as a defendant. 

In Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986), the Supreme Court 

of the United States clarified Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of . 

civil Procedure regarding relation back. The Supreme Court stated: 

"Relation back is dependent upon four factors, all of 

which must be satisfied: (1) the basic claim must have 

arisen out of the conduct set forth in the original 

pleading; ( 2) the party to be brought in must have 

received such notice that it will not be prejudiced in 

maintaining its defense; (3) that party must or should 

have known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, 

the action would have been brought against it; and (4) 

the second and third requirements must have been 

fulfilled within the prescribed limitations period." Id 

at 29. 

There is no dispute that Plaintiff herein meets the first 

element of the test. This Court's analysis focuses on the second, 

third and fourth elements. 

In Schiavone, the plaintiffs timely filed a complaint within 

the limitations period, but served the defendant outside the 

limitations period. The court found that in order for the relation 

back to apply under Rule 15(c) notice must be given within the 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 12 
limitations period. Thus, a party who files a lawsuit within the 

limitations period but serves the defendant outside the limitations 

period cannot invoke the relation back provisions of Rule 15(c). 

The court held this to be so, even though Rule 4(j) allows 120 days 

for service of process after timely filing of a lawsuit. The court 

stated: "We are not inclined, either, to temper the plain meaning 

of the language by engrafting upon it (Rule 15(c)) an extension of 

the limitations period equal to the asserted reasonable time, 

inferred from Rule 4, for the service of a timely filed complaint." 

Id. at 30. 

In the instant case, Plaintiff argues that the service upon 

the United States Attorney by Plaintiff satisfies the relation back 

requirement of Rule 15 (c). Plaintiff cites Edwards v. United 

States, 755 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1985) to support its position. 

Plaintiff misses, however, the pertinent point in the Edwards case: 

The United States Attorney was served within the limitations 

period. Plaintiff herein served the United states Attorney on 

October 2, 1987, fifteen days outside the limitations period. 

Thus, the Edwards case comports with the Schiavone ruling that 

notice must occur within the limitations period in order to invoke 

Rule 15(c). Here, the facts fail to comport with the Schiavone 

ruling. The record herein indicates that the Attorney General, the 

Postmaster General, and the United States Attorney were served 

outside the limitations period, therefore precluding relation back 

by the clear holding of the Schiavone case. 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 13 
The only person who received any notice whatsoever within the 

limitations period was L.F. Woods, the local postmaster. L.F. 

Woods received only a summons naming him as the sole defendant in 

a lawsuit. The summons did not indicate what kind of action was 

being taken against him. Thus, the question from this set of facts 

is whether the identity-of-interest exception within the framework 

of Rule 15(c) may be invoked to sufficiently impute knowledge of 

the discrimination claim from the local postmaster to the 

Postmaster General. 

The Schiavone court recognized the identity-of-interest 

exception arguendo stating: 

"Even if we were to adopt the identity-of-interest 

exception, and even if Fortune properly could be named 

as a defendant, we would be compelled to reject 

petitioner's contention that the facts of this case fall 

within the exception. Timely filing of a complaint, and 

notice within the limitations period to the party named 

in the complaint, permit imputation of notice to a 

subsequently named and sufficiently related party. In 

this case, however, neither Fortune nor Time received 

notice of the filing until after the period of 

limitations had run. Thus, there was no proper notice 

to Fortune that could be imputed to Time." Id. at 29. 

This Circuit has recognized the identity-of-interest 

exception, stating that "rule 15 (c) is an explicit statement of 

procedures and safeguards that make up this exception." Johnson 

v. United States Postal Service, 861 F.2d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir. 

1988). Further, this Circuit permits the use of the identity-ofinterest exception if the addition of a party who has a close 

identity of interest with the old party will not be prejudiced. 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 14 
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 103, 106 (10th 

Cir. 1967). 

This Court finds that the facts herein fail to come within the 

identity-of-interest exception because the Postmaster General did 

not have proper notice within the limitations period, one of the 

safeguards of Rule 15 (c), and the Postmaster General would be 

prejudiced if this Court allowed relation back under these 

circumstances. 

Under Rule 4, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service 

requires the mailing or delivery of the summons and a copy of the 

complaint. Thus, where in the instant case L.F. Woods received a 

summons only, he did not receive service of process within the 

limitations period. 

a lawsuit. This 

He did, however, receive some notice regarding 

Court views said notice of a lawsuit as 

insufficient notice for purposes of imputing such notice to a 

subsequent, added party. Otherwise, under the circumstances, 

defective service or even rumors of personal lawsuits against 

branch employees of a government agency would necessitate reporting 

to the national head of that agency on the chance that the lawsuit 

turned out to be a Title VII discrimination suit against the head 

of the agency. In short, imputation of defective notice attenuates 

Rule 15(c) beyond reasonable limits. 

Assuming that L.F. Woods received proper service, giving him 

actual knowledge that the lawsuit was a Title VII discrimination 

claim, the Court would still find that the imputation of that 

knowledge to the Postmaster General fails to satisfy the 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 15 
requirements of Rule 15(c). As noted earlier, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16(c) specifically states that the head of the governmental agency 

is the proper party to a discrimination suit. L.F. Woods is not 

a proper party in any circumstances of this case. Rule 15 (c) 

imputes knowledge to the sovereign if the party would have been a 

proper defendant. Also in the Schiavone case, the court assumes 

the identity-of-interest exception under the condition that 

"Fortune properly could be named as a defendant. " Pertinent 

paragraph cited above. Therefore, the identity-of-interest 

exception permits the imputation of notice to be passed on only by 

a party who could be properly named as a defendant. As stated, 

L.F. Woods is not a proper defendant in the instant case. 

In addition, the EEOC gives explicit instructions in capital 

letters regarding the proper party. The Legislature as well as the 

agency governing discrimination claims have gone to extra lengths 

to plainly state the circumstances in which the sovereign may be 

sued. See analysis in Drayton v. Veterans Administration, supra. 

If this Court now allowed all discrimination claims naming only 

local employees to relate back, the Postmaster General would suffer 

prejudice by being unable to effectively predict and manage civil 

cases against it. Cases filed months earlier against local 

employees could relate back to the Postmaster General in derogation 

of the specific statutory limitations period. In short, the 

Postmaster General could rely on 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-16(c) at its 

peril only. Prejudice would result. 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 16 
The foregoing discussion answered the attendant questions 

regarding the issue of relation back. Next, the Court considers 

whether an equitable tolling of the limitations period is 

appropriate in this case. 

The Tenth Circuit has recognized an equitable tolling is 

applicable to the limitations period in discrimination claims. 

Johnson v. United states, supra at 1480; Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 

1107, 1110 ( 10th Cir. 1984) . In Johnson, the court stated this 

circuit's standard regarding appropriate tolling: 

"Thus, in this circuit, a Title VII time limit will 

be tolled only if there has been 'active deception.' Mr. 

Johnson has not been 'actively misled' here and we also 

conclude that he was not 'lulled into inaction' in any 

way that rises to the active deception standard of our 

circuit's case law." (emphasis in the original) Id. at 

1481. 

Applying said standard to the facts of this case clearly 

demonstrates that equitable tolling is inappropriate. Far from 

being misled or lulled into inaction, Plaintiff herein previously 

received specific notice by court order discussing Title VII 

requirements concerning the failure to name the proper party within 

the thirty-day limitations period. Further, as cited earlier, 

Plaintiff had notice clearly stated in plain language that the 

local department was not the proper party in a discrimination 

claim, and that failure to sue the head of the national agency by 

name or official title could result in loss of judicial redress. 

(These facts are clearly distinguishable from Martinez where equity 

recognized an ambiguity in a notice to a layman of whether an 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-6285 Document: 01019966689 Date Filed: 03/22/1990 Page: 17 
agency's response to a request for reconsideration constituted the 

"final" decision.) 

Finally, for purposes of equitable considerations, the Court 

observes that the previous claim dismissed by this Court concerned 

allegations that Leslie Woods violated a Settlement Agreement 

entered into on November 29, 2984. See Complaint, 1 8, Carle v. 

United states Postal Service. Leslie Woods. Postmaster, CIV-86-

1297-W. At least part of the dispute in that lawsuit concerned the 

use by Carle of an adjacent office wherein Kerry Hampstead worked. 

See statement by Carle, last attachment of said complaint. The 

present lawsuit concerns an incident occurring in August 1984, 

regarding use by Carle of Kerry's private office, an adjacent 

office. See Status Report, dated January 6, 1988, Carle v. L.F. 

Woods, CIV-87-187-W. It appears that the incident triggering the 

present lawsuit was an integral part of the previous lawsuit. 

Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. 

ENTERED this / 1 71-1 day of July, 1989. 

~/4YL,< 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

t:::?VTl:::~e-fJ /IV JVl)~r>'l~T i>t:Jt:Kl:;7 

C)A/ 1-17-~?. 

11 

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