Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00678/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00678-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 330
Nature of Suit: Federal Employers' Liability
Cause of Action: 45:151 Railway Labor Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY R. WELLS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY RAILROAD, a

corporation

Defendant.

1:06-CV-00678 OWW NEW

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

RE DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 12)

1. INTRODUCTION

Defendant San Joaquin Valley Railroad (“SJVR” or

“Defendant”) brings a motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff

Gary R. Wells’ (“Wells” or “Plaintiff”) claims. Plaintiff brings

his action under the Federal Employer Liability Act (“FELA”), 45

U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq., alleging he suffered severe injuries during

his employment as a locomotive engineer on account of Defendant’s

failure to provide a reasonably safe work place under the FELA

and California Public Utilities Commission General Order (“GO”)

No. 118. 

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a complaint on June 6, 2006. (Doc. 1,

Complaint.) On October 11, 2006, Defendant answered the

Complaint. (Doc. 7, Answer to Complaint.) On July 19, 2007,

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 12-1, Motion 

for Summary Judgment.) Plaintiff opposed the motion on August

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24, 2007. (Doc. 14-1, Plaintiff’s Opposition.) Plaintiff filed

evidentiary objections to Defendant’s declarations on August 24,

2007. (Doc. 15, Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections.) Defendant

replied on August 31, 2007. (Doc. 16, Reply to Opposition.)

Defendant filed evidentiary objections to Plaintiff’s

declarations on August 31, 2007. (Doc. 17, Defendant’s

Evidentiary Objections.)

3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Undisputed Facts

1. Plaintiff brings this personal injury action under the

FELA. (Doc. 14-2, Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Disputed and

Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Opposition to Defendant

San Joaquin Valley Railroad’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(“PSDUF”) No. 1.) 

2. Plaintiff is a railroad engineer who started working for

SJVR on March 25, 1997. (PSDUF No. 3.) 

3. Prior to beginning employment with SJVR, Plaintiff worked

as a railroad engineer for 18 years with the Australian Railroad.

(PSDUF No. 4.) 

4. On the day of the alleged incident, Plaintiff was working

Job. 619, which starts at Exeter and ends at Sanger. (PSDUF No.

9, 26.) 

5. The alleged incident occurred between 6:00 p.m. and 6:30

p.m. at Lindsay Foods, where Plaintiff went to retrieve a car in

order to bring it back to Exeter. (PSDUF No. 12.) 

6. At approximately 6:10 p.m., Plaintiff rode a single

locomotive engine to pick up a car at Lindsay Foods. (PSDUF No.

23.) 

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7. The train ride to Lindsay Foods takes approximately 20

minutes. (PSDUF No. 24.) 

8. During the alleged incident Plaintiff cannot tell where

he was looking at the moment his ankle twisted. (PSDUF No. 31.) 

9. On the way back from Lindsay Foods to Exeter, after the

alleged incident, Plaintiff called trainmaster Troy Forbes on his

cell phone and told him that he twisted his ankle but that he

wanted the conversation off the record because he was wearing

tennis shoes. (PSDUF No. 33-34.) 

10. Several weeks after the accident, Plaintiff returned to

take pictures of the location where he claims he was injured.

(PSDUF No. 36.) 

11. A formal investigation was held by SJVR on March 27,

2007 and Plaintiff was terminated for violating the safety rules

of SJVR. (PSDUF No. 41.) 

12. At the formal investigation Plaintiff testified, and was

represented by Pat Springman, Local Chairman of United

Transportation Union.(PSDUF No. 42.)

B. Disputed Facts

Plaintiff brings this complaint alleging on February 15,

2006 he suffered a right ankle injury on a walkway with poor

footing conditions when he stepped down from a locomotive. (PSDUF

No. 2.) 

 Prior to the alleged incident, Plaintiff was trained on

rules, regulations training, road trials and getting on and off

locomotives and equipment, including maintaining three-point

contact. (PSDUF No. 5, 7 and 8.) He was required to and did

become familiar with Defendant’s safety and operating rules.

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(PSDUF No. 6.) Plaintiff believed he knew his job thoroughly and

did not request further training. (PSDUF No. 11.) The “Slip,

Trip and Fall Prevention” section of SJVR’s Transportation Safety

Procedures advised on wearing high-top boots laced up all the way

to reduce the risk of falls. (PSDUF No. 18.) Specifically, SJVR

Safety Rule T-16 required Plaintiff to wear 6-inch high minimum,

lace-up work boots with safety toe, near 90-degree heel, and

leather or leather-like upper. (PSDUF No. 17.) Defendant claims

that the purpose of Rule T-16 is to minimize injuries to

trainmen, including ankle-twisting injuries while walking on

uneven surfaces such as ballast. (PSDUF No. 19.) Plaintiff knew

he was wearing his below-ankle velcro-type tennis shoes on the

day of the alleged incident in violation of Defendant’s safety

rules but had left his boots in the car at his house. (PSDUF No.

16, 20-22.) 

There was nothing unusual about the day of the alleged

incident and Plaintiff was doing his job that he does 90% of the

time. (PSDUF No. 10, 15.) In particular, Plaintiff had performed

the same job at the Lindsay location approximately five times

before the day of alleged incident. (PSDUF No. 13.) Plaintiff

had got on and off several times at the Lindsay location for line

switches and coupling of cars with no difficulties. (PSDUF No.

25.) Defendant had never received any complaints regarding

footing or ballast conditions at the Lindsay location. (PSDUF No.

14.) 

Prior to Plaintiff descending the stairs from the

locomotive, he shined the lantern on the area where he was

detraining and did not see anything unusual, but Plaintiff

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alleges the lantern did not provide adequate illumination and he

could not see the ground in detail. (PSDUF No. 28.) Plaintiff

alleges the switch lantern, while containing fresh batteries and

worked properly, did not provide adequate illumination. (PSDUF

No. 27.) Nothing distracted Plaintiff’s attention as he

descended the stairs, but he does not recall whether he looked

down while descending nor whether he looked down when he stepped

on the ground. (PSDUF No. 29.) Plaintiff alleges as he stepped

off the train, onto a walkway with poor footing conditions, he

twisted his right ankle and felt his right foot move inward.

(PSDUF No. 30.) Plaintiff alleges he identified the condition of

the walkway where he stepped down from the locomotive engine,

testifying at a company hearing that his ankle injury was caused

by “loose footing” and “a hole, depression in the walkway,” and

he saw “uneven ground.” Plaintiff also alleges that he identified

where he was injured on: (1) photographs he took a month after

the alleged incident; (2) Exhibit B-3 to Defendant’s photograph;

and (3) on Defendant’s diagram, Exhibit A,. (PSDUF No. 37.)

Defendant alleges that at its formal investigation hearing there

was never any claim made by Plaintiff or his union representative

that there were any hazardous conditions at the accident scene,

nor have there been any such complaints since the accident.

(PSDUF No. 43.) Plaintiff disputes this allegation and claims he

testified at the formal accident hearing held by Defendant that

there was loose footing, a hole, a depression in the walkway that

caused his ankle to twist. (PSDUF No. 43.) Defendant also

contends that Plaintiff did not mark the area of the alleged

incident. (PSDUF No. 32.) Defendant also alleges Plaintiff

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cannot tell exactly where he stepped down, cannot locate within a

fifty-foot radius the area where he stepped, and cannot tell

whether he stepped between two railroad ties or on the edge of

one. (PSDUF No. 37-38, 40.) Defendant contends Plaintiff cannot

tell if he stepped on anything in particular, including whether

it was a smooth or uneven surface. (PSDUF No. 37, 40.) Defendant

also asserts that trainmaster Federick Mattera inspected the

general area where the incident occurred, and found no defects

and took no exceptions to the footing and ballast conditions.

(PSDUF No. 35.) 

4. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine issue

of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence on

which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor viewing

the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden the law

places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co.,

68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are “material”

if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at

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248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom,

Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the

evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id.; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role

on summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir. 1996).

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B. Negligence under FELA

Under FELA, employees are permitted to sue their employer,

the railroad, if they are injured while on the job. Recovery is

permitted if injury results “in whole or in part from the

negligence of” the railroad, or due to any “defect or

insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its...tracks,

roadbed,...or other equipment.” 45 U.S.C. § 51. An employee

bringing a FELA claim must prove that the railroad was negligent

and that such negligence was the cause of the injury. Atchison,

T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Toops, 281 U.S. 351, 354 (1930); Northwestern

P. R. Co. v Bobo, 290 U.S. 499, 502-503 (1934)(“The jury may not

be permitted to speculate as to its cause, and the case must be

withdrawn from its consideration, unless there is evidence from

which the inference may reasonably be drawn that the injury

suffered was caused by the negligent act of the employer.”). The

employee must prove negligence on the part of the railroad in a

FELA claim. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29,

32 (1944). Each and every element as is required under a commonlaw negligence action must be proved in a FELA negligence action

or the cause of action fails. Davis v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,

541 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). 

In determining negligence on the part of the railroad the general

rule is “the lack of due care under the circumstances; or the

failure to do what a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily

have done under the circumstances of the situation; or doing what

such a person under the existing circumstances would not have

done.” Tiller v. Atlantic Coastline R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67

(1943). “[R]easonable forseeability of harm is an essential

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ingredient of Federal Employers’ Liability Act negligence.”

Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 372 U.S. 108, 117

(1963). The sufficiency of evidence for a FELA negligence claim

however differs slightly in that is it less burdensome than a

straight common-law negligence claim. If the employer’s

negligence played “any part, even the slightest, in producing the

injury...for which damages are sought” the burden has been met.

Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506

(1957)(emphasis added).

I. Contributory Negligence

Contributory negligence does not diminish the liability of

the railroad for recovery under FELA, except to limit the damages

available to the employee. "[T]he fact that the employee may

have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a

recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in

proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such

employee...” 45 U.S.C. § 53. However, “[t]he act does not make

the employer an insurer.” Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 361

U.S. 138, 140 (1959). If plaintiff is found contributory

negligent, a reduction of the award of damages in an amount

proportionate to the negligence contributed will be assessed.

C. Negligence under FELA and California Public Utilities

Commission, GO No. 118

The contributory negligence defense to damages is not

however available where “the violation by such common carrier of

any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to

the injury or death of such employee." 45 U.S.C. § 53; Johnson v.

Union Pacific R.R. Co., No. C-03-04574 RMW, 2004 WL 2403844, at

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 The parties here do not dispute GO No. 118 is deemed a statute under 1

FELA § 53 nor that it is a statute enacted to protect the safety of railroad

employees. 

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*5 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 27, 2004). Under FELA § 54a, “A regulation,

standard or requirement in force, or prescribed...by a State

agency that is participating in investigative and surveillance

activities under section 20105...is deemed to be a statute under

sections 53 and 54 of this title.” 45 U.S.C. § 54a. The employee

shall not be held to be guilty of any contributory negligence if

the employer’s negligence involved a violation of a safety

statute. The railroad employer is responsible for all damages

arising out of the injury. The California Public Utilities

Commission, (“PUC”) GO No. 118 is applicable to railroad

corporations operating in the State of California, and is a

safety statute contemplated to fall under 45 U.S.C. § 53. See

Judge Schubb’s decision in Wagner v. Union Pacific Railroad

Company, No. CIV. S-03-0582 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2004), holding GO

No. 118 to be a qualifying safety statute under FELA § 53 . GO 1

No. 118 governs the construction, reconstruction and maintenance

of walkways adjacent to railroad trackage and requires railroad

companies operating in the State of California to file their

standards for construction, reconstruction and maintenance of

walkways. GO No. 118 provides that “walkways shall provide a

reasonable, regular surface with gradual slope not to exceed one

inch to eight inches.” “The purpose...is to provide railroad

employees with a safe working environment.” Southern Pacific

Transp. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n of State of Cal., 647

F.Supp. 1220, 1222 (N.D.Cal. 1986). 

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5. DISCUSSION 

A. Duty under FELA

Under FELA, the railroad has a duty to provide employees

with a safe place to work. Ragsdell v. Southern Pacific Transp.

Co., 688 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982)(citing Bailey v. Central

Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1943)). “The duty is a

‘continuing one’ and requires a jury to weigh a myriad of

factors-including the nature of a task, its hazards and

efforts-in determining whether an employer furnished an employee

with a reasonably safe place to work. This continuous duty to

provide a safe place to work is broader than the general duty to

use reasonable care.” Id.

B. Evidence of SJVR’s Breach of Duty to Wells

According to Defendant, Plaintiff has insufficient evidence

that his alleged injury was caused by any breach of duty by

Defendant. (Doc. 12-1, Motion, 8:19-20.) Defendant points to

alleged failures in Plaintiff’s evidence including Plaintiff’s

inability to pinpoint and identify: (1) within a fifty-foot

radius, where the alleged incident occurred; (2) where Plaintiff

was looking when he descended from the locomotive; (3) the type

of surface he stepped onto; and (4) whether he stepped on a

railroad tie or between railroad ties. (Id., 8:20-25.) Defendant

argues summary judgment is appropriate as Plaintiff cannot

establish the defect that should or could have been remedied by

Defendant that caused Plaintiff’s injury.

In response, Plaintiff argues the alleged hazardous

conditions in the area of the alleged incident were “ubiquitous

at and around the accident site” (Doc. 14-1, Plaintiff’s

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Opposition, p. 2:15-17, 5:18-25, 6:1-14.) Anywhere he would have

set his foot would have caused the alleged injury to occur. (Id.,

p. 2:16-17.) The photocopy images of the photographs, provided

and referenced by both Defendant and Plaintiff in their

arguments, are obscure and difficult to assess. Discerning from

the photographs whether the conditions alleged by Plaintiff were

pervasive is not feasible. See Doc. 14-3, Declaration of John

Furstenthal (“Decl. Furstenthal”), Exhibit 6 and 7; and Doc. 14-

4, Declaration of Edward B. Stanton (“Decl. Stanton”), Exhibits

2, 5 and 6.

Plaintiff cannot identify where he was looking when he

descended from the locomotive, but he argues that he identified

the type of surface and conditions he stepped into and that he

stepped onto a walkway. (Doc. 14-5, Declaration of Gary Wells

(“Decl. Wells”), ¶¶ 2,6-9.) “When I stepped off the engine there

was loose footing and apparently some sort of hole or depression

in the walkway...” (Id., ¶ 6.) “After I twisted my ankle, I

looked at the place where I stepped and noticed a hole or

depression in the walkway.” (Id., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff also refers to

his testimony provided in the formal investigatory hearing before

SJVR held on March 27, 2006 concerning his alleged accident,

where he testified that his was caused by “loose footing...a

hole, a depression in the walkway.” (Id., ¶ 8 and Exhibit 1.)

I. Conflicting Testimony

Defendant argues that Wells’ declaration, that he stepped on

a “depression or hole,” should be disregarded. Defendant asserts

that Plaintiff did not so testify in his deposition and Plaintiff

cannot create a triable issue of material fact by providing a

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declaration that contradicts his deposition testimony. (Doc. 16,

Reply, p. 3:20-21; Doc. 17, Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections, §

2.) The general rule in the Ninth Circuit is that a party cannot

create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior

testimony. Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 952 F.2d 262,

266 (9th Cir. 1991); Foster v. Arcata Associates, 772 F.2d 1453,

1462 (9th Cir. 1985); Cleveland v. Policy Mngt. Systems Corp.,

526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999).

However, an affidavit that conflicts with deposition

testimony is only considered a “sham” for purposes of disposing

of a case on summary judgment when it is shown to “create” an

issue of fact in order to avoid summary judgment. Kennedy v.

Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 952 F.2d at 266. If the affidavit

attempts to explain the testimony at deposition in which an

individual was confused, then it may preclude summary judgment. 

“[T]he district court must make a factual determination that the

contradiction was actually a “sham.” Id., at 267.

Plaintiff asserts in his declaration that his deposition was

taken over a year after the accident and his recollection was

refreshed thereafter as to his earlier testimony on March 27,

2006. He was able to recollect that his “right ankle injury was

caused by loose footing and a hole or depression in the walkway.”

(Doc. 14-5, Decl. Wells, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff asserts in his

declaration that a review of the photograph he had taken, Exhibit

D-1, about which he was questioned at his deposition,

demonstrates he could not have stepped in between railroad ties

or the edge of a railroad tie due to the width of the locomotive

which would have extended “beyond the length of the ties.” (Id.,

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Q. Do you recall exactly where you stepped in or, or what caused you 2

to twist your ankle?

A. It was loose footing. It was–looking down at the ground was fine and

when I stepped off there was apparently a hole, a depression in the walkway.

14

¶ 9.) Plaintiff reasons he only could have “stepped onto the

uneven ground of the walkway where there was a hole or

depression.” (Id.) This is an issue that concerns Plaintiff’s

credibility and the physical condition of the walkway. Plaintiff

testified under oath at his investigatory hearing as to the

location of the alleged injury, the conditions of the walkway and

the cause of his alleged injury. The discrepancy in Plaintiff’s

testimony is sought to be to be explained by failure of

recollection. This does not justify a finding that the

discrepancy was a “sham” as a matter of law rather it raises an

issue of credibility. Kennedy, 952 F.2d at 267. Defendant’s

objection is SUSTAINED as to Plaintiff’s declaration.

C. Hazardous Conditions and GO No. 118 Violation

I. Evidence of Violation of GO No. 118

Defendant argues that Plaintiff makes general unfounded

allegations that the condition of the tracks at the location of

the alleged incident violated GO No. 118. (Doc. 12-1, Motion, p.

9:7-8.) Further, there are no witnesses to the alleged

violations, no experts opining that tracks violated GO No. 118

and no documents to support Plaintiff’s theory. (Id., p. 9:9-12.) 

Plaintiff rejoins that he testified at his investigatory hearing

a month after the alleged incident before the SJVR that he

stepped on uneven ground or a hole or depression in the walkway.2

(Doc. 14-5, Decl. Wells, ¶ 8; Doc. 14-4, Decl. Stanton, Exhibit

4, March 27, 2006 Formal Hearing Transcript, p. 43.) Plaintiff

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 Q. Well, after your foot turned inward, did you look at the place 3

where you had stepped?

A. Did I look at the place where I stepped?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. What did you see?

A. Broken ties, uneven ground.

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re-confirmed the conditions of the area where he stepped down

from the locomotive at his deposition a year later, citing

“broken ties, uneven ground.” (Doc. 12-1, Motion, Exhibit A, 3

March 9, 2007 Deposition Transcript of Gary Wells, p. 79:24-25-

80:1-5.) Plaintiff asserts photograph D-1, identified as a

photograph of the scene where the alleged incident occurred,

depicts a “depression in the walkway with unevenly scattered

ballast and debris.” (Doc. 14-5, Decl. Wells, ¶ 9.). Plaintiff

asserts the photographs provided by both Plaintiff and Defendant,

show improper and poor footing conditions. Defendant replies

that trainmaster Federick Mattera inspected the area a few days

after and found no defects or hazards. (Doc. 12-1, Motion, p.

12:16-17.) 

Plaintiff provides expert testimony by track and walkway

expert, Edward Stanton (“Stanton”), supporting the alleged GO No.

118 violations. Stanton reviewed Plaintiff’s deposition

testimony, formal hearing testimony before Defendant on March 27,

2006, and Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s photographs. (Doc. 14-4,

Decl. Stanton, ¶ 4.) Stanton claims he is a railroad track and

track structures consultant with over forty years experience in

railroad construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of way

projects. (Id., ¶ 1.). From 1958 to 1987, his employment involved

construction, maintenance and rehabilitation of railroad tracks

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and walkways for Class I railroads, for which SJVR falls under.

(Id., ¶ 3.) He states he “was required to know the track

structure standards set forth by the Federal Rail Administration,

“FRA,” and walkway standards set forth by PUC, including being

responsible for ensuring railroads were compliant with FRA

regulations and/or GO 118.” (Id.) 

Upon a review of the photographs, Stanton finds: (1) In

Exhibit D-1, the measured slope is 10.5 degrees when the standard

under GO No. 118 is about 3.5 degrees, (Doc. 14-4, Decl. Stanton,

¶ 6.) and (2) Exhibit D-1 depicts a “bowl-shaped depression

approximately 6 feet in length and 0.5 feet in depth,” which is

conspicuous, hazardous and non-conforming. (Id., ¶ 15.). Stanton

also cites to scouring of walkway material in photographs marked

“B” from Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. “The scouring has

created holes, depressions–leaving an irregular surface on the

walkway.” (Id., ¶ 12.) Stanton points to “mounds” in photograph

B-5 which he claims create “uneven ground and a tripping or

stumbling hazard, particularly at night in areas absent of

artificial lighting.” (Id.) Stanton also opines to other

conditions that create poor footing conditions including the type

of ballast that appears in photographs marked “D,” noting that

typical industry practice for walkway surfaces is “level, compact

roadbase (1" or smaller) or yard ballast (1-1/2" and smaller),”

and it appears from the photographs [D-1, D-7, D-8, D-9 and D10], that ballast is 3/8" to 1/2...and fowled with...sand

material.” (Doc. 14-4, Decl. Stanton, ¶¶ 13-14.). He notes that

suitable walkway material consists of material that interlocks

with adjoining material, eliminating any shift of material

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underfoot but that it appears in photographs D-1, D-7, D-8, D-9

and D-10 that material on the walkway consists of material that

prevents interlocking. Stanton concludes upon review of the

materials, including photographs and testimony, “the loose,

unevenly scattered rocks and debris on top of the dirt area

alongside the track contributed to the aforesaid poor footing

conditions.” (Id., ¶ 18.) 

Whether the railroad did and could provide safe walkways is

a factual issue. The Stanton opinion raises a genuine issue of

material fact regarding whether the walkway conditions were

properly maintained and unsafe for walking, and in violation of

GO No. 118. Whether the manner in which the Plaintiff stepping

onto the walkway was reasonable, whether the walkway was

hazardous, and whether the railroad was negligent in maintaining

the walkway is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If as

Plaintiff asserts, the walkway’s condition violated GO No. 118, a

statute enacted for the safety of railroad workers, it could

establish negligence on the part of Defendant. Under a FELA

claim, Plaintiff need only show partial liability not entire

liability for injury, therefore the issue of what role his tennis

shoes played in contributing to the injury is a genuine issue of

material fact for trial. 

a. Admissibility of Declaration of Edward Stanton

under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

Defendant argues that Stanton’s declaration fails to meet

the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

(“Rule 702") and therefore is inadmissible to create a triable

issue of material fact. (Doc. 16, Reply to Opposition, p. 3-6;

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Doc. 17, Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections, § 3.) Federal Rules

of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony: 

If scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness

qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education, may testify thereto in the form

of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is

based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony

is the product of reliable principles and methods, and

(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods

reliably to the facts of the case.

Fed.R.Evid.702.

“[T]he advisory committee notes emphasize that Rule 702 is

broadly phrased and intended to embrace more than a narrow

definition of qualified expert.” Thomas v. Newton Intern.

Enterprises, 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994) (Longshoreman

with 29 years experience in various positions for numerous

stevedore companies lays the minimal foundation knowledge, skill

and experience required to give “expert” testimony on working

conditions of experienced long shore personnel) “Expert opinion

evidence is itself sufficient to create a genuine issue of

disputed fact sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.”

Id., at 1270. Stanton has 45 years experience working in the

railroad industry in areas of “rail construction, rehabilitation,

and maintenance of way projects for Class I railroads whose

tracks are used by short line railroads,” such as SJVR. (Doc. 14-

4, Decl. Stanton, ¶ 1.) He was responsible for ensuring

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“construction, maintenance and rehabilitation projects” complied

with FRA and GO No. 118. (Id., ¶ 3.). Thus, Stanton is

foundationally qualified as an “expert” in rail and walkway

construction, rehabilitation and maintenance.

Defendant argues that Stanton’s declaration contains

improper legal opinion. Defendant cites Marx & Co., Inc. v. The

Diners’ Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 508; see also Aguilar v.

International Longshoremen’s Union, 966 F.2d 433, 447 (9th Cir.

1997) (matters of law are for the court’s determination not that

of an expert witness); CFM Communications, LLC v. Mitts

Telecasting Co., 424 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1233 (E.D.Cal. 2005)(Expert

witness in field of communications law or FCC matters was

prohibited from testifying about how FCC law applied to the facts

of this case.). 

Stanton’s opinion that GO No. 118 is the applicable law is

an improper legal opinion, as is the opinion that Defendant

violated GO No. 118 or any other statute. The objection is

SUSTAINED in part as to these legal conclusions. 

 Defendant objects that Stanton’s declaration is inadmissible

because it fails to rely on established facts, including

Plaintiff’s “sham” declaration and various photographs labeled

“D” that Defendant claims do not show location of incident. 

Plaintiff’s affidavit has not been found a “sham.” The disputed

evidence on which the opinion is based does not lack foundation

as Plaintiff identified the photographs as the scene of the

incident in his declaration and at his deposition, albeit not

within a fifty-mile radius. Plaintiff also declared that the

conditions in the pictures were pervasive and that any place

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Plaintiff stepped was poor footing and a hazardous condition.

(See Doc. 14-1, Plaintiff’s Opposition, p. 2:15-17, 5:18-25, 6:1-

14.)

Defendant attacks Stanton’s declaration for lack of

foundation regarding the measurements Stanton proffers for the

hole or depression, arguing this opinion rests solely on his

examination of photograph D-1. Plaintiff in his declaration

identified photograph D-1 as the photo he took of the alleged

accident site. Stanton performed measurements on the photograph,

providing among other data, distances and slope measurements.

However, Defendant offers no competing expert testimony on

measurement of the photographs or on the inability to measure

based on the photographs presented.

Defendant’s object to Stanton’s declaration claiming lack of

precision in the measurement of the pictures. Arguing Stanton

does not know how far away the photo was taken from the alleged

site and his lack of site visitation. However, such arguments go

to the weight not the admissibility of the testimony. 

Defendant’s objections to Stanton’s declaration is OVERRULED in

part as to violating Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

II. Evidence of Causal Nexus between Alleged Defect of

Violation and Alleged Injury

Defendant argues that if arguendo Plaintiff could

demonstrate a defect or violation of GO No. 118 at the scene of

the alleged incident, there is no evidence of causal nexus

between alleged defect or violation and Plaintiff’s injury. (Doc.

12-1, Motion, p. 9:16-19.) Defendant cites numerous court FELA

decisions where plaintiff failed to show causation between the

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violation of a safety regulation and an injury. Plaintiff

however, has provided expert testimony on the hazardous

conditions of the walkway and the resulting injury. Plaintiff

testified and asserts in his affidavit that he looked, after his

right ankle twisted, where he stepped and saw uneven ground and

the loose footing, and depression in the ground which was the

cause of his injury. Assuming Defendant violated GO No. 118, a

safety statute designed to provide Plaintiff with safe footing,

it breached its duty to Plaintiff. See Southern Pacific Transp.

Co., 647 F.Supp. at 1222. Under FRA § 213.231 railroads are

required to visually inspect track structures on a regular

schedule proscribed under the statute and under certain

conditions designed to ensure proper visual inspection: “Each

inspection shall be made by foot or by riding over the track in a

vehicle at a speed that allows a person making the inspection to

visually inspect the track structure for compliance with this

part.” FRA § 213.231(a). 

Plaintiff argues a reasonable inference can be drawn that

the required FRA visual inspection at regular intervals would

have disclosed to Defendant non-compliance of the walkway with GO

No. 118. (Doc. 14-1, Plaintiff’s Opposition, p. 15:15-17.) 

Defendant should have identified and corrected violations of GO

No. 118. Stanton opines that a “reasonable inference from the FRA

inspection requirements is that a visual inspection of the track

would have alerted the railroad that the walkway alongside the

track was not in compliance with General Order No. 118.” (Doc.

14-4, Decl. Stanton, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff’s argue, and provide

evidence, that the unsafe footing conditions on the walkway would

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have been disclosed by the visual inspections required under FRA,

providing actual or constructive notice to Defendant. 

Defendant argues, there were no unsafe or defective footing

conditions, citing to their visual inspection by trainmaster

Frederick Mattera, shortly after the alleged incident and

claiming SJVR had received no prior complaints. Defendant cites

to trainmaster Frederick Mattera’s visual inspection three days

after the alleged incident where he found no defects and had

received no prior complaints regarding footing or ballasting

conditions in the area prior to alleged incident. (Doc. 12-3,

Declaration of Frederick Mattera, ¶¶ 5-6.) Defendant claims

rather the causation was Plaintiff’s negligence in wearing tennis

shoes in violation of its safety regulations.

Defendant argues that the sole proximate cause of

Plaintiff’s injury was Plaintiff’s negligence in wearing tennis

shoes on the day of the alleged incident in violation of a safety

rule and SJVR is not liable under the FELA. Defendant cites

Hurley v. Patapsco & Back Rivers R.R. Co., 888 F.2d 327, 330 (4th

Cir. 1989), where the court held the injury was solely caused by

plaintiff’s negligence, after finding plaintiff failed to provide

any causation link through expert testimony that inadequate

lighting was cause of injury. Here, it has not been established

conclusively that the conditions of the walkway did not

contribute in whole or in part to Plaintiff’s injury when he

stepped down from the locomotive. Plaintiff’s expert opines that

the walkway was defective and not properly maintained. If the

trier of fact finds that the conditions of the walkway violated

GO No. 118 and/or were unsafe, the analysis proceeds to whether

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any defect or violation was in part or in whole the cause of

Plaintiff’s injury. There is a genuine issue of material fact

for trial as to the cause of Plaintiff’s injury. 

D. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike 

I. Motion to Strike

Rule 12(f) provides that "redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matters" may be "stricken from any

pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "A motion to strike matters

that are not part of the pleadings may be regarded as an

“invitation” by the movant “to consider whether [proffered

material] may properly be relied upon.” United States v. Crisp,

190 F.R.D. 546, 551 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (quoting Monroe v. Board of

Educ., 65 F.R.D. 641, 645 (D. Conn. 1975)). Motions to strike

are disfavored and infrequently granted. Pease & Curren Refining,

Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F.Supp. 945, 947 (C.D. Cal. 1990),

abrogated on other grounds by Stanton Road Assocs. v. Lohrey

Enters., 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993). Such motions should be

granted only where it can be shown that no evidence in support of

an allegation is admissible. Id.

a. Federal Rules of Evidence

Plaintiff moves to strike evidence under California Evidence

Code §§ 350 and 352. Plaintiff brought this matter in federal

court therefore, an analysis under Federal Rules of Evidence is

appropriate. The equivalent Federal rules of evidence are 401

and 403: 

California Evidence Code §§ 350 and 352:

(A) No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence. Cal.

Evid.Code § 350.

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(B) The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability

that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time

or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing

the issues, or of misleading the jury. Cal.Evid.Code § 352

Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403:

(A) Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid.401.

(B) Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the

jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or

needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Fed.R.Evid.403.

II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Wayne R. Sims’ Declaration

¶¶ 5 through 8

Plaintiff moves to strike as irrelevant under California

Evidence Code § 350 (equivalent Federal Rules of Evidence 401)

all references in paragraphs 5 through 8 of Wayne R. Sims

declaration regarding Plaintiff’s failure to designate an expert

witness. (Doc. 15, Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections, p. 1:23-

25.) Plaintiff asserts that the parties agreed to continue the

date for disclosing experts until August 10, 2007. Plaintiff

provides a letter memorializing this agreement that was mailed

and faxed to Defendant’s attorney Wayne R. Sims and Plaintiff

timely disclosed Stanton as Plaintiff’s expert. (Doc. 14-3, Decl.

Furstenthal, Exhibit 8, Letter of July 20, 2007 from John

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Fustenthal to Wayne R. Sims, Re: Expert Disclosure Witness.)

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.

III. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Frederick Mattera’s

Declaration ¶¶ 3 through 6

Plaintiff moves to strike as irrelevant under California

Evidence Code § 350 and 352 (equivalent Federal Rules of Evidence

401 and 403), paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, of Mattera’s declaration

relating to safety rules, safety procedures manual and no history

of prior complaints of area of accident. Plaintiff asserts that

Defendant was in violation of GO No. 118 and as such FELA

liability is absolute. (Doc. 15, Plaintiff’s Evidentiary

Objections, p. 2:3-20.) This is a legal conclusion and has no

effect. An objection to the admissibility of the testimony is

the appropriate remedy. Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

Plaintiff moves to strike as irrelevant under California

Evidence Code § 350 and 352 (equivalent Federal Rules of Evidence

401 and 403) paragraph 5 of Mattera’s declaration regarding SJVR

receiving no prior complaints of such conditions in the area

prior to the accident. Plaintiff asserts Defendant violated GO

No. 118, and therefore liability is absolute. (Doc. 15,

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections, p. 2:28, 3:1-15.) This is

also an objectionable legal conclusion. Plaintiff’s motion is

DENIED.

Plaintiff moves to strike paragraph 6 of Mattera’s

declaration where Mattera claims he inspected the area three days

following the incident and found no defects in the footing and

ballast conditions in the area. Plaintiff asserts that he,

Plaintiff, identified where he was injured in the photographs and

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the conditions of the walkway both in his deposition testimony

and SJVR investigatory hearing testimony. (Doc. 15, Plaintiff’s

Evidentiary Objections, p. 3:16-24.) Plaintiff has not proved as

a matter of law the conditions of the walkway and location of the

alleged incident. Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

Plaintiff moves to strike paragraph 8 of Mattera’s

declaration as without foundation, under California Evidence Code

§ 350 and 352 (equivalent Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403). 

Mattera asserted in his declaration that neither Mr. Springman

nor Plaintiff made any claim that there were any hazardous

conditions and that no complaints of such hazardous conditions

have been made since the accident. Plaintiff asserts that he

stated that his right injury ankle was caused by “loose footing”

and a hole or depression in the walkway at the SJVR’s formal

investigation hearing. (Doc. 15, Plaintiff’s Evidentiary

Objections, p. 4:3-11.) Plaintiff has not proved as a matter of

law that there were hazardous conditions. Plaintiff’s motion is

DENIED.

//

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

(1) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

(2) Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s declaration is

OVERRULED.

(3) Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s Expert Edward

Stanton’s declaration is SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part.

(4) Plaintiff’s motion to strike ¶¶ 5-8 of Wayne R. Sims’

declaration is GRANTED. 

(5) Plaintiff’s motion to strike ¶¶ 3-6, 8 of Frederick

Mattera’s declaration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

bb4ed UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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