Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00768/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00768-37/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAKEITH MCCOY,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. HOLGUIN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00768-ADA-HBK (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

DENY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT1

FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

(Doc. No. 194)

Pending before the Court is Defendants G. Arellano, E. Barron, O. Delgado, S. Lomas, 

Mayfield, Montanez, V. Moore, and Moreno’s motion for summary judgment with supporting 

documents. (Doc. No. 194 through 194-14, “MSJ”). Plaintiff filed an Opposition, (Doc. No. 

212), and Defendants filed a Reply. (Doc. No. 213). For the reasons stated below, the 

undersigned recommends the district court deny Defendants’ MSJ.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff LaKeith McCoy (“Plaintiff” or “McCoy”), a former state prisoner, initiated this 

action by filing a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1) Plaintiff is proceeding 

1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 

(E.D. Cal. 2022). The instant motion was filed only behalf of Defendants G. Arellano, E. Barron, O. 

Delgado, S. Lomas, Mayfield, Montanez, V. Moore, and Moreno.

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

on his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging Eighth Amendment excessive use of force 

claims against twelve Defendants and Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claims against 

another seven Defendants. (See Doc. No. 15). The events giving rise to the SAC occurred at 

California Correctional Institution (“CCI”) in Tehachapi, CA. (Id.).

After motions practice and settlement efforts, Defendants G. Arellano, E. Barron, Hollis 

Bennett, C. Casillas, DeLuna, O. Delgado, J. Gonzales, A. Holguin, Holland, Kilmer, D. King, S. 

Lomas, A. Martinez, C. Martinez, Mayfield, Montanez, V. Moore, Moreno, and Santa Maria filed 

an exhaustion-based Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 75). The prior magistrate judge 

issued a Findings and Recommendation (“F&R”) to grant the motion as to Defendants Holland, 

Kilmer, Santa Maria, Bennett and DeLuna, and the District Court adopted the F&R in part, 

dismissing Defendants Holland, Kilmer, Santa Maria and DeLuna. (Doc. No. 96).

Defendants G. Arellano, E. Barron, O. Delgado, S. Lomas, Mayfield, Montanez, V. 

Moore, and Moreno thereafter filed the instant motion for summary judgment after obtaining 

leave from the Court. (Doc. No. 194). Each Defendant submits a declaration and supporting 

exhibits. (Doc. Nos. 194-4 to 194-12). The staff sign-in sheets and incident reports attached by 

Defendants are authenticated in a separate declaration by N. Hernandez, the litigation coordinator 

for CCI. (Doc. No. 194-9).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is 

material where it is (1) relevant to an element of a claim or a defense under the substantive law 

and (2) would affect the outcome of the suit. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

247 (1987). 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving the absence 

of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When 

the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and set 

forth specific facts, by affidavits, deposition testimony, documents, or discovery responses, 

showing there is a genuine issue that must be resolved by trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Pacific Gulf Shipping Co. v. Vigorous Shipping & Trading S.A., 992 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 

2021). A mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party’s position is 

insufficient. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). Rather, the 

evidence must allow a reasonable juror, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, 

to return a verdict in that party’s favor. Id.

The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655 (2014). It may not weigh evidence or make credibility 

determinations. Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 2017). Conclusory or speculative 

testimony in affidavits and supporting papers is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact and 

defeat summary judgment. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007);

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has “held consistently that courts 

should construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid 

applying summary judgment rules strictly.” Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(quoting Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010)). While prisoners are relieved 

from strict compliance, they still must “identify or submit some competent evidence” to support 

their claims. Soto, 882 F.3d at 872. Plaintiff’s verified complaint may serve as an affidavit in 

opposition to summary judgment if based on personal knowledge and specific facts admissible in 

evidence. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, a

complaint’s conclusory allegations, unsupported by specifics facts, will not be sufficient to avoid 

summary judgment. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th 

Cir. 2001). And, where a plaintiff fails to properly challenge the facts asserted by the defendant, 

the plaintiff may be deemed to have admitted the validity of those facts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e)(2). 

The undersigned has carefully reviewed and considered all arguments, points and 

authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, if any, 

objections, and other papers filed by the parties. The omission of an argument, document, paper,

or objection is not to be construed that the undersigned did not consider the argument, document, 

paper, or objection. Instead, the undersigned thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence it 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

deemed admissible, material, and appropriate for purposes of issuing this Findings and 

Recommendations on Defendant’s MSJ.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Allegations in Operative Complaint

The SAC alleges that Plaintiff was beaten by correctional staff at CCI during two separate 

but related incidents, both of which occurred on March 12, 2015. The SAC alleges the attacks 

occurred shortly after Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding inadequate access to showers, haircuts, 

and laundry in his housing unit and had a “shouting match” with Defendant Casillas where 

Plaintiff called Casillas a “bitch.” (Doc. No. 15 at 4-6 ¶¶ 11-16). In the first incident, Plaintiff 

was handcuffed and escorted by Correctional Officer (“CO”) Casillas on the way to the law 

library. Upon entering a hallway, Plaintiff saw other correctional staff—COs Moore, Holguin, 

and King—standing there. CO Casillas said “what’s up now [expletive]?” and threw Plaintiff 

into a wall. (Doc. No. 15 at 8 ¶ 24). COs Holguin and Casillas then began punching Plaintiff 

with closed fists in the back of his head while CO Holguin asked “who’s the bitch now?” (Id. ¶ 

25). COs Moore and King joined the other two COs in attacking Plaintiff with their fists and 

batons, and CO Holguin sprayed an entire can of pepper spray into Plaintiff’s eyes and ears. (Id.

¶ 26, 10 ¶ 31). The altercation eventually ended up outside, where COs Holland, Kilmer, S. 

Lomas, and Santa Maria witnessed the beating but did not intervene. (Id. at 9 ¶ 28). When 

Plaintiff was laying prone on the floor, CO Lomas grabbed Plaintiff’s left leg and began twisting 

and bending it. (Id. at 10-11 ¶ 33).

At this point, COs J. Gonzales and A. Martinez and medical staff arrived. COs Gonzales 

and A. Martinez grabbed Plaintiff’s handcuffed hands and attempted to raise them over his head 

in a technique called a “chicken wing.” (Id. at 11 ¶¶ 34-35). They then escorted Plaintiff to a 

holding cell in Dining Hall #4. (Id. at 12 ¶ 36). There, CO Gonzales shoved Plaintiff into the 

cell, causing Plaintiff to hit his head on the back of the cell. (Id.). Defendant Gonzales pulled 

Plaintiff out of the cell and then shoved him into the cell again, causing Plaintiff to once more hit 

his head. (Id.). Plaintiff was pulled out of the cell a third time and pushed onto the ground, 

where he was punched and sat on by Defendants A. Martinez, Delgado, Barron, Montanez, 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Mayfield, and Moreno. (Id. at 12-13 ¶¶ 36-37). Defendants Bennett, DeLuna, G. Arellano, and 

C. Martinez witnessed this second incident but did not intervene. (Id.).

B. Undisputed Facts and Law

As previously stated, the undersigned considers the entire record and deems only those 

facts true which are properly supported by evidence. The undersigned finds the following 

material facts to be either undisputed, or, following the undersigned’s review of the evidence 

submitted, are deemed undisputed, unless otherwise indicated.

• On March 12, 2015, Plaintiff was incarcerated at California Correctional 

Institution in Tehachapi, CA. (Doc. No. 194-3 at 1 ¶ 1; Doc. No. 212 at 12 ¶ 1).

• On March 12, 2015, at approximately 8:30 a.m., correctional officers Holguin and 

Casillas were escorting McCoy from his cell in Facility A, Building 6 on their way 

to the law library. (Doc. No. 194-3 at 2 ¶ 2; Doc. No. 212 at 13 ¶ 2).

• During an incident outside of Building 6 involving Plaintiff, an officer called a 

code 1 alarm. (Doc. No. 194-3 at 2 ¶ 5; Doc. No. 212 at 13 ¶ 5).

• After McCoy was under control and restrained outside Building 6, Officer J. 

Gonzalez and A. Martinez escorted him to dining hall number 4. (Doc. No. 194-3 

at 2 ¶ 6; Doc. No. 212 at 13 ¶ 6).

• During the incident in the dining hall, Officer Gonzalez called a code 1 alarm.

(Doc. No. 194-3 at 2 ¶ 9; Doc. No. 212 at 14 ¶ 9.)

• At his deposition, McCoy testified that he had not had any negative interactions 

with Defendants Barron, Delgado, Mayfield, Moreno or Montanez before March 

12, 2015. (Doc. No. 194-13 at 5-12; Doc. No. 212 at 21 ¶ 45).

C. Disputed Material Facts 

The following facts, concerning the nature of Plaintiff’s interactions with correctional 

officers outside building 6 and in dining hall 4 on March 12, 2015 are disputed.

Per Plaintiff: 

• During the escort to the law library, CDCR staff members used force against 

Plaintiff in the rotunda of Building 6 and outside the door of Building 6. (Doc. 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

No. 212 at 13 ¶ 3; see also Doc. No. 15 at 9-11, ¶¶ 27-33). 

• Defendant Moore used force against Plaintiff in the rotunda of Building 6. (Doc. 

No. 212. at 14 ¶ 10).

• Defendant Lomas used force against Plaintiff outside the door to Building 6. 

(Doc. No. 212 at 14 ¶ 11; see also Doc. No. 15 at 10-11 ¶ 33).

• Defendants Lomas and Arellano were present while other CDCR staff used force 

against Plaintiff outside the door to Building 6 and failed to intervene. (Doc. No. 

212 at 14-15, ¶¶ 13-14). 

• Defendants Barron, Delgado, Montanez, Mayfield, and Moreno used excessive 

force against Plaintiff in the dining hall. (Doc. No. 212 at 15 ¶¶ 16, 18; 16 ¶¶ 22-

23; 17 ¶ 27; 19 ¶ 39; see also Doc. No. 15 at 12-14, ¶¶ 36-39).

Per Defendants: 

• As Plaintiff and Defendants Casillas and Holguin left the rotunda of Building 6 

and entered the yard, Plaintiff attacked Officer Holguin. (Doc. No. 194-2 at 3). A 

code 1 alarm sounded over the officers’ radios. (Id.). Defendants Casillas and 

Holguin used OC spray and physical force to bring McCoy under control. (Id.).

• Sergeant C. Martinez arrived at the scene and ordered officers J. Gonzalez and A. 

Martinez to escort McCoy to dining hall number 4 for pepper spray 

decontamination and medical evaluation. (Id.).

• Once in the dining hall, McCoy again attacked prison staff in an attempt to escape 

being placed in a holding cell. (Id.). Another code 1 alarm sounded. (Id.). 

Gonzalez and A. Martinez used physical force to bring McCoy under control. 

(Id.).

• Defendant Barron was not at CCI on March 12, 2015; it was his day off. (Doc. 

No. 194-3 at 3 ¶ 15). Defendant Barron did not use force against McCoy on 

March 12, 2015 and did not interact with McCoy at all that day. (Id. ¶ 16).

• On March 12, 2015, Defendant Delgado was assigned as the complex control 

officer for Facility A, working in a booth known as “the bubble” from which the 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

officer controls the doors leading between the A-side (Buildings 1-4) and the Bside (Buildings 5-8) of Facility A. (Id. ¶ 17). 

• When the alarms sounded on March 12, 2015, Delgado was required to remain in 

the booth, which he did. There is no view from the booth to the front of building 

6, or into dining hall 4. (Id. ¶ 18). 

• Delgado did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not observe 

force being used against McCoy on that date. (Id. at 4 ¶ 19).

• Because Delgado did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not 

observe force being used against McCoy on that date, he did not write a report 

regarding the incidents. (Id. ¶ 20).

• On March 12, 2015, Defendant Mayfield was assigned as the yard officer for the 

building 5 Security Housing Unit (SHU) yard. (Id. ¶ 21). 

• When the alarms sounded on March 12, 2015, Mayfield was required to respond to 

the scenes of the incidents. Before Mayfield could arrive at the scenes, the use of 

force incidents were over. (Id. ¶ 22). 

• Mayfield did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not observe 

force being used against McCoy that day. (Id. ¶ 23). 

• Because Mayfield did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did 

not observe force being used against McCoy on that date, he did not write a report 

regarding the incidents. (Id. ¶ 24). 

• On March 12, 2015, Defendant Montanez was assigned as the floor officer 1 for 

Facility A, building 8. (Id. ¶ 25).

• When the alarms sounded on March 12, 2015, Montanez was required to respond 

to the scenes of the incidents. Before Montanez could get to the scenes, the use of

force incidents were over. (Id. ¶ 26.) 

• Montanez did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not 

observe force being used against McCoy that day. (Id. ¶ 27). 

• Because Montanez did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

not observe force being used against McCoy on that date, he did not write a report 

regarding the incidents. (Id. at 5 ¶ 28). 

• On March 12, 2015, Defendant Moore was assigned as the search and escort 

officer for building 6 on Facility A. (Id. ¶ 29).

• When the alarms sounded on March 12, 2015, Moore was required to respond to 

the scenes of the incidents. Before Moore could get to the scenes, the use of force 

incidents were over. (Id. ¶ 30). 

• Moore did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not observe 

force being used against McCoy that day. (Id. ¶ 31).

• Because Moore did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not 

observe force being used against McCoy on that date, he did not write a report 

regarding the incidents. (Id. ¶ 32). 

• On March 12, 2015, Defendant Lomas was assigned as the search and escort 

officer for building 5 on Facility A at CCI. (Id. ¶ 33).

• When the alarms sounded on March 12, 2015, Lomas was required to respond to 

the scenes of the incidents. Before Lomas could get to the scenes, the use of force 

incidents were over. (Id. ¶ 34). 

• Lomas did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not observe 

force being used against McCoy that day. (Id. ¶ 35). 

• Because Lomas did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not 

observe force being used against McCoy on that date, he did not write a report 

regarding the incidents. (Id. ¶ 36). 

• On March 12, 2015, Defendant Moreno was assigned as the floor officer 1 for 

building 7 on Facility A at CCI. (Id. at 6 ¶ 37). 

• When the alarms sounded on March 12, 2015, Moreno was required to respond to 

the scenes of the incidents. Before Moreno could get to the scenes, the use of 

force incidents were over. (Id. at 6 ¶ 38). 

• Moreno did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not observe 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

force being used against McCoy that day. (Id. ¶ 39).

• Because Moreno did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not 

observe force being used against McCoy on that date, he did not write a report 

regarding the incidents. (Id. ¶ 40).

• On March 12, 2015, Defendant Arellano was assigned as the building sergeant for 

buildings 7-8, Facility A at CCI. (Id. ¶ 41). 

• When the alarms sounded on March 12, 2015, Arellano was required to respond to

the scenes of the incidents. Before Arellano could get to the scenes, the use of 

force incidents were over. (Id. ¶ 42). 

• Arellano did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not observe 

force being used against McCoy that day. (Id. ¶ 43).

• Because Arellano did not use force against McCoy on March 12, 2015, and did not 

observe force being used against McCoy on that date, he did not write a report 

regarding the incidents. (Id. ¶ 44).

D. Eighth Amendment Excessive Use of Force and Failure to Intervene

Prison officials who use excessive force against an inmate violate the inmate’s Eighth 

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 832 (1994); Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). “[W]henever prison 

officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the [Eighth Amendment], 

the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or 

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 

1, 6-7 (1992). When determining whether the force was excessive, the court looks to the “extent 

of injury suffered by an inmate . . . the need for application of force, the relationship between that 

need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ 

and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Id. at 7 (quoting Whitley v. 

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). While de minimis uses of physical force generally do not 

implicate the Eighth Amendment, significant injury need not be evident in the context of an 

excessive force claim, because “[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.

Correctional officials have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect those in custody 

from constitutional abuses by correctional colleagues. United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 887-88

(9th Cir. 1993). An official’s failure to intervene, if provided an opportunity to do so, can violate 

a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir.

1995); Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Knapps v. City of

Oakland, 647 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“A reasonable officer could not have 

reasonably but mistakenly believed that he had no duty to intervene to stop another officer in their 

immediate presence from inflicting excessive force on a subject when they could have prevented 

it.”). “[T]he core judicial inquiry” is whether the prison officer either, on one hand, failed to 

intervene in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or, on the other hand, maliciously 

and sadistically failed to intervene to cause harm. Stevenson v. Holland, 2017 WL 2958731, at

*13 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2017). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly recognized that excessive force 

cases are rarely suited for summary judgment. “Because [the excessive force inquiry] nearly 

always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences 

therefrom, we have held on many occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of 

law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 

(9th Cir. 2002); see also Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1997) (as 

amended) (“We have held repeatedly that the reasonableness of force used is ordinarily a question 

of fact for the jury.”).

A. Plaintiff’s Account of March 12, 2015

As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff may rely on the facts contained in a verified complaint, 

which in this case (Plaintiff’s SAC) describes in detail the actions of each Defendant on March 

12, 2015. (See Doc. No. 15 at 7-14); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 

2000) (en banc). In opposing summary judgment, Plaintiff also relies on his own declaration, 

Defendants’ interrogatory responses, and the declaration of Joshua Howard, a fellow inmate. 

(See Doc. No. 212 at 24-130). 

The SAC asserts that all moving Defendants either used excessive force against Plaintiff, 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

failed to intervene while others used excessive force against Plaintiff, or both. (See generally

Doc. No. 15). In Plaintiff’s account, he did not pose any threat to Defendants Holguin, Casillas, 

Moore, and King, nor was he resisting orders when they initially used force against him in the 

hallway of Building 6, punching him in the back and the back of the head. (Id. at 7-8 ¶¶ 17-25). 

Because Plaintiff was handcuffed and arguably did not pose a threat to Defendants nor resisting 

orders, the force used against him was not applied in a good faith attempt to restore or maintain 

order. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. Further, the offensive comments made by Defendants during 

the initial attack support an inference that they used force against Plaintiff maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm, as does the fact that they repeatedly punched Plaintiff in the back of 

the head while he was handcuffed. (Id. at 8 ¶¶ 25-26). 

Defendant Holguin’s use of an entire can of pepper spray on Plaintiff also constitutes 

excessive force. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that the “use of [tear gas] in small amounts may be a 

necessary prison technique if a prisoner refuses after adequate warning to move from a cell or 

upon other provocation presenting a reasonable possibility that slight force will be required.” 

Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979). However, “‘[i]t is generally recognized 

that it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment for prison officials to use mace, tear gas, or other 

chemical agents in quantities greater than necessary or for the sole purpose of inflicting pain.’” 

Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 240 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 763 

(4th Cir.1996)) (emphasis omitted); see also Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1025 (finding 

Eighth Amendment violation where officer discharged can of pepper spray until empty, and 

another officer joined in). Here, there is no indication that Plaintiff was not already under control 

or that pepper spray was necessary to subdue him, nor did Defendant Holguin warn Plaintiff 

before using pepper spray on him. Thus, Holguin’s use of an entire can of pepper spray was an 

excessive use of force. See Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1025; see also Spain, 600 F.2d at 195.

The SAC alleges Defendant S. Lomas and other staff came out of housing unit 5 into the 

yard at this time and “watch[ed] the beating” but did not intervene. (Id. at 9 ¶ 29). Based on the 

facts alleged, at this point Defendants Holguin, Casillas, Moore, and King were beating a 

handcuffed inmate with their batons and Defendant Lomas was close enough to have an 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

opportunity to intervene but did not do so. Further, after Plaintiff was lying prone on the ground, 

Defendant Lomas grabbed Plaintiff’s left leg, twisting and bending it. (Id. at 10-11 ¶ 33). 

Because Plaintiff was prone on the floor, had just been pepper sprayed and beaten by four other 

correctional officers, he was not in a position to harm any of the Defendants, who far 

outnumbered him. (Id. at 10-11, ¶¶ 31-33). Thus, Lomas did not apply force in a good faith 

effort to restore or maintain discipline but seemingly maliciously and sadistically to cause further 

harm to Plaintiff. The SAC alleges Plaintiff later suffered a swollen and bruised left ankle with 

cuts from Defendant Lomas’ hands, and severe knee pain in his left knee. (Id. at 14 ¶ 40).

After the initial use of force incident, Defendants J. Gonzalez and A. Martinez lifted 

Plaintiff’s handcuffed hands behind his back toward his head in a painful position known as a 

“chicken wing” and transported Plaintiff to dining hall #4. (Id. at 11 ¶ 34). At this point, Plaintiff 

had been beaten with fists by four officers, pepper sprayed, and had his left leg violently twisted. 

There is no indication he was resisting orders or Defendant Gonzalez and Martinez’s attempts to 

transport him. The abusive use of handcuffs can constitute excessive force in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1989); Meredith v. Erath, 342 

F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003); Wall v. Cnty. of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2004). These 

cases establish that an officer cannot use more force than necessary to restrain an individual. 

Here, accepting the Plaintiff’s version of facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, 

because Gonzalez and Martinez pulled Plaintiff’s hands into a painful position to transport him 

when the facts reflect no need to do so, their actions constitute excessive use of force.

Once in dining hall #4 and in front of the dining hall holding cell, Defendant Gonzalez 

shoved Plaintiff into the cell hard enough that he hit his head against the back wall of the cell. 

(Id. at 12 ¶ 36). Gonzalez repeated this a second time, again causing Plaintiff to hit his head on 

the back of the cell. (Id.). Defendant Arellano and another officer witnessed this and did not 

intervene. (Id.). Defendant Gonzalez pulled Plaintiff out again and threw him on the floor. At 

that point, Defendants Delgado, Barron, Montanez, Mayfield, and Moreno started punching 

Plaintiff “wherever they could find unprotected body parts while he was on the ground” and 

Defendant A. Martinez kicked Plaintiff “in his left side in the ribs.” (Id. at 13 ¶ 37). Accepting 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Plaintiff’s version of facts as true, Defendants Delgado, Barron, Montanez, Mayfield, and Moreno 

all used force on Plaintiff when he was not resisting or otherwise threatening anyone, thus their 

force was apparently applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment.

After the incident, Plaintiff describes having numerous injuries including:

a swollen and bruised left ankle . . . cuts and numbness to both wrist 

[sic], swollen left knee along with cuts to the sides of both knees, 

redness, swelling, and an abrasion to the left thigh . . . injury to the

left side of his back, lacerations to the left side of his head, 

concussion, swollen right jaw, bruising to the right back arm . . . 

Plaintiff was blinded, partially, by the pepper spray which lasted 

approximately three weeks, and Plaintiff suffered from swelling and 

pain to the back of his head from being repeatedly punched.

(Id. at 14 ¶ 40). The detailed and significant injuries Plaintiff documents support an inference 

that the force used by Defendants was excessive and far beyond any that may have been 

necessary to restore or maintain order. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. 

If accepted as true, Plaintiff’s account of the interactions on March 12, 2015—multiple 

beatings inflicted on Plaintiff while he was handcuffed and not resisting or ignoring orders—

could convince a reasonable juror that moving Defendants Moore, Lomas, Delgado, Barron, 

Montanez, Mayfield, and Moreno used excessive force against Plaintiff, and that moving 

Defendants Lomas and Arellano failed to intervene in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 

B. Defendants’ Account of March 12, 2015

In response to Plaintiff’s allegations, each moving Defendant contends that they neither 

used excessive force against Plaintiff nor did they observe force being used against him. (See 

generally Doc. Nos. 194-4 to 194-12). Thus, they do not respond with a detailed account of the 

incidents described in the SAC but with categorical denials that they were present for the events 

in question. In Defendant Barron’s case, he avers that he was not even at CCI on the date in 

question. (See Doc. No. 194-4). The other Defendants assert that they reported to one or both of 

the scenes of uses of force against Plaintiff but arrived after any uses of force had ended. (See

Doc. Nos. 194-5 to 194-12). In support of their accounts, each Defendant relies on their own 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

declarations and the staff sign-in sheets indicating their assignments for March 12, 2015 (or in 

Barron’s case, the fact that his name does not appear on the staff sign-in sheet). As to Defendants 

Arellano, Delgado, Montanez, Moore, Lomas, Mayfield, and Moreno, Defendants rely on the fact 

that none of them completed an 837-C incident report, which they would have been required to 

complete if they had either used force or observed others using force on Plaintiff.

C. Defendants Fail to Establish the Absence of a Genuine Issue of Material Fact

Defendants’ primary evidence in support of summary judgment is their own self-serving 

declarations that they were not present when force was being used and thus could not have 

committed any of the alleged constitutional violations. Defendants point to the fact that if they 

had used force on March 12, 2015 or witnessed force being used, they would have prepared an

837-C Incident Report to document it. (See Doc. Nos. 194-4 to 194-12). The Court is 

unpersuaded by this argument, particularly given the lack of any direct evidence corroborating 

Defendants’ accounts. Defendant Barron, for example, offers only his own testimony and a staff 

sign-in sheet where his name is absent. (See Doc. No. 194-3). He might be expected to have 

offered an affidavit by a supervisor or other knowledgeable person to attest that he was not 

present at work that day or a documentation showing dates worked. Indeed, despite at least 18

prison officials admitting to being present at some point for the incidents in question, none of the 

Defendants offers a single corroborating eyewitness account to corroborate that the other 

Defendants were not present. 

It is well-settled that a conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any 

supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. F.T.C. v. Publ'g

Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Apr. 11, 1997) (citing 

Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993)). Such an affidavit is likewise 

insufficient, without more, to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Here, 

Defendants’ affidavits are each virtually identical, consist of conclusory statements regarding 

their whereabouts and actions on March 12, 2015, and offer only weak circumstantial evidence in 

support. None of the Defendants offers a detailed response to the allegations in Plaintiff’s SAC. 

Instead, they categorically deny that they were present for the events described and focus on the 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

deficiencies in Plaintiff’s declaration in opposition to the MSJ. (See Doc. No. 213 at 1-4). As 

discussed further below, the Court finds this insufficient to show an absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. 

Even assuming Defendants have met their burden and Plaintiff must point to a genuine 

issue of material fact, Plaintiff has done so in the detailed factual allegations contained in his 

SAC. Plaintiff has offered a detailed account of the incidents on March 12, 2015 “painting a 

picture entirely different from that described by the government.” See United States v. 1 Parcel

of Real Property, Lot 4, Block 5 of Eaton Acres (“Eaton Acres”), 904 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1990).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that all eight moving Defendants, who claim to have been absent at 

the time, were involved in specific uses of force against him at particular locations at CCI. 

Plaintiff alleges that at different times specific Defendants slammed him into a wall, punched him

in the back of the head, beat him with batons, used an entire can of pepper sprayed on him, 

twisted his leg, lifted him into a painful restraint hold, slammed him into a cell wall, and kicked 

him in his left side rib cage. (See Doc. No. 15 at 7-14). In Defendants Lomas’ and Arellano’s

case, Plaintiff also alleges they were present and stood by while other prison staff used excessive 

force against Plaintiff. (Id. at 9 ¶ 28; 12 ¶ 36). While Plaintiff’s account may be “hardly 

overwhelming” in the face of Defendants’ numerous affidavits presenting a different account, “it 

would make a world of difference which version of events the trier of fact believes.” Eaton 

Acres, 904 F.2d at 492. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has at a minimum raised a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether moving Defendants were present for the uses of force on 

March 12, 2015 and whether they either used force or failed to intervene when they witnessed 

excessive force being used.

In their Reply, Defendants claim that the declaration attached to Plaintiff’s Opposition is 

deficient because it does not explicitly state that it was made with personal knowledge and that 

the declarant is competent to testify to the matters stated, as required by Rule 56(c)(4) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 213 at 1-2). Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s 

declaration is conclusory and lacks sufficient specificity to defeat summary judgment. (Id. at 2-

4). 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

As noted above, the Ninth Circuit has “held consistently that courts should construe 

liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary 

judgment rules strictly.” Soto, 882 F.3d at 872. While Plaintiff’s declaration does not explicitly 

state that it was made on personal knowledge, the “requirements of personal knowledge and 

competence to testify may be inferred from the declaration itself.” Jenkins v. Perry, 2009 WL 

3049318, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009) citing Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d

999, 1018 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, Plaintiff’s personal knowledge of the facts alleged can be 

inferred from Plaintiff’s involvement in the events described. Moreover, as noted above, to the 

extent Plaintiff’s declaration lacks sufficient detail to defeat summary judgment, the Court looks 

to the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s SAC, a verified complaint containing facts based on personal 

knowledge, as an affidavit opposing summary judgment. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1132 n.14. While 

Plaintiff’s declaration is relatively sparse, the SAC, as noted above, states in detail the actions of 

each Defendant on March 12, 2015 sufficient to carry his burden of showing a genuine dispute of 

material fact. (See Doc. No. 15 at 7-14). Viewed liberally, with all inferences drawn in 

Plaintiff’s favor as this Court must do, the undersigned finds whether each of the moving 

Defendants were present during the events complained of depends on a credibility contest 

between Defendants and Plaintiff, which cannot be decided at the summary judgment stage but is 

properly within the purview of a jury.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 194) be DENIED.

////

////

NOTICE TO PARTIES

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, a party may file written 

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Dated: August 1, 2023 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00768-KES-HBK Document 214 Filed 08/02/23 Page 17 of 17