Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07153/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07153-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided April 4, 1995

No. 94-7153

CNPQCONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTIFICO E

TECNOLOGICO, AN AGENCY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL,

APPELLEE

v.

INTER-TRADE, INC., A DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CORPORATION, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(94cv1153)

-

ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Larry W. Thomas and Gregory J. Bendlin, Attorneys, were on the Motion to Dismiss, for appellee.

Samuel Bailey, Jr., and Donald L. McClure, Sr., Attorneys, were on the Opposition to the Motion

to Dismiss, for appellants.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and BUCKLEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: This case is before the court on the motion of appellee CNPqConselho

Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnologico (CNPq) to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The appeal was brought by Inter-Trade, Inc., and others (Inter-Trade), which seek to challenge a

magistrate judge's assessment of attorneys' fees and costs as part of a decision remanding the case to

the District of Columbia Superior Court. Under the Federal Rules, a party displeased by a magistrate

judge's order must file written objections within ten days as a prerequisite to obtaining appellate

review. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72; Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 345 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1993). InterTrade's attempt to do so was rejected by the district court as out of time, and CNPq claims that as

a result we lack jurisdiction to review the magistrate's order. The contested issue is whether the three

USCA Case #94-7153 Document #114870 Filed: 04/04/1995 Page 1 of 4
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1CNPq raised several other grounds for dismissal which we do not address in light of our

ruling on this issue. 

days added to the filing deadline by FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) to account for mailing are calendar days

(which include weekends and legal holidays) or business days. We hold that the three days provided

by FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) are calendar days.1

On June 23, 1994, the magistrate judge to whom the pretrial matters in this case had been

assigned pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 72 granted CNPq's motion for remand to D.C. Superior Court

and its accompanying request for attorneys' fees and costs. The order was served on the parties by

mail. On July 12, Inter-Trade attempted to file written objections to the magistrate judge's order.

The district court refused to accept Inter-Trade's objections, however, because earlier that same day

it had formally approved the order.

Inter-Trade now seeksreview of the magistrate judge's order imposing liability for attorneys'

fees and costs. CNPq counters that since Inter-Trade's objections were refused by the district court

as untimely, they were not preserved for appeal. Inter-Trade responds that it is entitled to review of

the order in spite of the district court's refusal to accept its objections; that refusal, Inter-Trade

claims, erroneously truncated the time within which it was permitted to object and thereby preserve

its challenge for appeal.

FED. R. CIV. P. 72 provides that objections to an order or recommendation of a magistrate

judge are to be filed "within 10 days after being served with a copy." The Advisory Committee Notes

to FED. R. CIV. P. 72 indicate that this ten-day period is subject to FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e). For its part,

Rule 6(e) states:

Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some

proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper

upon the party and the notice or paper is served upon the party by mail, 3 days shall

be added to the prescribed period.

Both parties agree that since the magistrate judge's order in this case was served on the parties by

mail, Rule 6(e) extended the ten-day period for objecting by three days.

The parties also agree that the ten days available pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 72 are business

days, since FED.R.CIV. P. 6(a) excludes weekends and legal holidays from the computation of filing

USCA Case #94-7153 Document #114870 Filed: 04/04/1995 Page 2 of 4
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

2Even if Inter-Trade's exceptions were filed in a timely fashion, it does not necessarily follow

that we would then examine them ourselves. The proper course in such a case might be to

remand and have the district court consider them in the first instance, as contemplated by Rule 72. 

periods of less than eleven days.

In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules ... [w]hen the

period ... prescribed or allowed islessthan 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays,

and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.

FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a). The question upon which this case turns is whether Rule 6(e)'s three-day

extension is subject to Rule 6(a)'s exclusion of weekends and holidays. If it is not, then the district

court correctly refused to enter Inter-Trade's objections, which would have been due on July 11the

day before they were filed. If, on the other hand, Rule 6(a) does apply to the Rule 6(e) extension,

Inter-Trade's objections were properly submitted to the district court.2

Rule 6(a) sets forth the method for "computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by

these rules." Rule 6(e) does not, we think, establish a "period of time" within the meaning of Rule

6(a). The latter apparently contemplates periods of time bounded by specific acts or

occurrencessuch asthe period of time between service of a magistrate's judgment and the filing of

objections. Rule 6(e) does not, in our view, establish a "period of time" in this sense. It provides for

a three-day extension to a "prescribed period," and that extension is not in itself a period governed

by Rule 6(a)'s counting instructions for periods under eleven days. See Tushner v. United States

District Court, 829 F.2d 853, 855-56 (9thCir. 1987); National Savings Bank v. Jefferson Bank, 127

F.R.D. 218, 227 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Nalty v. Nalty Tree Farm, 654 F. Supp. 1315, 1316-17 (S.D.

Ala. 1987); 4A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1171, at 516-20 (2d ed.

1987). In computing time under both 6(a) and 6(e), the three-day addition for mailing should have

no effect in determining the run of the prescribed period, such as the ten-day period for objection

under Rule 72. When the Rules provide for a period of less than eleven days, its run should be

computed excluding weekends and holidays, pursuant to Rule 6(a), and the three-day

extensioncounting weekends and holidaysshould then be added at the end. See Tushner, 829

F.2d at 853; Nalty, 654 F. Supp. at 1317-18. Compare WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &

USCA Case #94-7153 Document #114870 Filed: 04/04/1995 Page 3 of 4
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

3This date was obtained by excluding intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and Monday, July 4,

1994, a legal holiday, from the computation. 

PROCEDURE § 1171, at 520 (suggesting that the three calendar days should be counted first, and the

prescribed period then computed).

Applying the foregoing analysisto this case, the ten-day period set byRule 72counting only

business daysran from the service of the magistrate judge's order to July 8, 1994.3 Adding three

calendar days to account for service by mail, as dictated by Rule 6(e), we compute July 11 as the

deadline for objecting in the district court. Inter-Trade's attempt to file written objections on July 12

came a day late. By that mistake, Inter-Trade failed to preserve its objections for appeal.

Accordingly, we grant CNPq's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

USCA Case #94-7153 Document #114870 Filed: 04/04/1995 Page 4 of 4