Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00084/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00084-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEDRO REYES,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16-CV-84 JLS (BLM)

ORDER: (1) OVERRULING 

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS; 

(2) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; AND

(3) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(ECF Nos. 91, 93)

Presently before the Court is Defendants R. Ortega, R. Beltran, and R. Madden’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Pedro Reyes’ Third Amended Complaint.

1

(“Mot.,” ECF No. 

91). Also before the Court are Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major’s Report and 

 

1 Plaintiff titled the operative complaint as his “fourth amended complaint.” ECF No. 90. Plaintiff 

previously filed a “third amended complaint” on January 16, 2018, while a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

second amended complaint and a report and recommendation concerning that motion were pending. ECF 

No. 77. The Court found that “Plaintiff could not have filed an operative third amended complaint while 

his [s]econd [a]mended [c]omplaint had a[] [report and recommendation] pending before the Court” and, 

“[t]herefore, Plaintiff’s [previous] third amended complaint [was] not [properly] before th[e] Court.” ECF 

No. 86 at 12. The Court granted Plaintiff leave “to amend his complaint and re-file a third amended 

complaint.” Id. Consequently, the Court will construe the operative complaint, ECF No. 90, as Plaintiff’s 

Third Amended Complaint.

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Recommendation advising the Court to grant the Motion (“R&R,” ECF No. 93), Plaintiff’s

Objections to the R&R (“Objs.,” ECF No. 95), Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Objections 

(“Reply,” ECF No. 99), and Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply (“Sur-Reply,” ECF No. 101). After 

considering the Parties’ arguments and the law, the Court (1) OVERRULES Plaintiff’s 

Objections, (2) ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, and (3) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R dated December 13, 2017, contains a thorough and 

accurate recitation of the factual and procedural history of this case, see ECF No. 76 at 

2–4, and Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R currently before the Court contains an accurate 

recitation of the more recent and relevant procedural history underlying the instant Motion. 

See R&R at 2–3. This Order incorporates by reference the background as set forth therein. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Review of the Report and Recommendation

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

court’s duties regarding a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court 

“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also 

United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980). In the absence of a timely 

objection, however, “the Court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the 

face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory 

committee’s note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 510 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

II. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint 

states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide 

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and 

a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555 (alteration in original). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ 

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 

when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to 

say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[F]acts that are 

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to 

relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as true 

“legal conclusions” contained in the complaint. Id. at 678–79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555). This review requires “context-specific” analysis involving the Court’s “judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit 

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—

but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2)). The Court will grant leave to amend unless it determines that no modified 

contention “consistent with the challenged pleading . . . [will] cure the deficiency.” DeSoto 

v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schriber Distrib. 

Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)).

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When a plaintiff appears pro se, the Court construes the pleadings liberally and 

affords the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). When giving liberal 

construction to a pro se complaint, however, the Court is not permitted to “supply essential 

elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Easter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 694 F. Supp. 

2d 1177, 1183 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in 

civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting 

Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268) (citing Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 

1984)). The Court should allow a pro se plaintiff leave to amend “unless the pleading 

‘could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 

F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 

2000)).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Ortega violated his Eighth Amendment rights by 

acting with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. Third Amended 

Complaint (“TAC”) at 1, ECF No. 90. Although Plaintiff asserted claims against 

Defendants Beltran and Madden in his previous complaints, Plaintiff does not appear to 

reassert his Eighth Amendment claims against either Defendant Beltran or Madden and 

does not appear to reassert his declaratory judgment claim against Defendant Beltran. See 

generally id.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s TAC without leave to amend for failure to

allege facts sufficient to state (1) an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Ortega; 

and (2) any claims for constitutional violations against Defendants Madden and Beltran. 

See generally Mot. After briefly summarizing Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R and 

Plaintiff’s Objections, the Court reviews those portions of the R&R to which Plaintiff

objects de novo.

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I. Summary of the R&R 

Magistrate Judge Major recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate 

indifference claim against Defendant Ortega because Plaintiff fails to satisfy both the 

objective and subjective requirements necessary to assert an Eighth Amendment violation. 

R&R at 7–10. First, Magistrate Judge Major finds that Plaintiff does not meet the objective 

prong because Plaintiff fails to “specify the nature of the injury or provide factual support” 

necessary to satisfy the “objective requirement of alleging a serious medical need.” Id. at 

7. While Plaintiff’s first and second amended complaints alleged “that he fell, hurt his 

neck, and ultimately required surgery,” id., which the Court previously found sufficient to 

satisfy the objective prong, id. (citing ECF No. 57 at 16–17; ECF No. 76 at 8–9), his TAC

“do[es] not describe with sufficient specificity any facts establishing that Plaintiff had a 

serious medical need, injury, or illness.” Id. at 8 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

834 (1970)). Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Major concludes that “Plaintiff does not meet 

the objective requirement of a deliberate indifference claim.” Id.

Next, Magistrate Judge Major concludes that Plaintiff fails to meet the subjective 

element of the deliberate indifference standard because Plaintiff fails sufficiently to allege 

that Defendant Ortega knew of, and yet disregarded, a substantial risk of harm. Id. at 

8–10. Magistrate Judge Major finds Plaintiff’s allegations, that Defendant Ortega “was 

responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries, in charge of Plaintiff’s medical treatment, and that 

Dr. Ortega provided inadequate medical care,” insufficient to meet the subjective prong. 

Id. at 9. Magistrate Judge Major notes that, even if Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that 

Defendant Ortega either caused a delay in Plaintiff’s medical treatment or provided 

inadequate medical treatment, those allegations, “even at the level of malpractice or gross 

negligence, do[] not establish deliberate indifference.” Id. at 9–10 (citing Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Thus, because Plaintiff fails to meet both prongs of the 

deliberate indifference standard, Magistrate Judge Major recommends that the Court grant 

Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Ortega. 

Id. at 10. Because “Plaintiff has unsuccessfully attempted to state a constitutional claim 

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against [Defendant] Ortega four times,” Magistrate Judge Major recommends dismissing 

Plaintiff’s TAC without leave to amend. Id. 

Finally, Magistrate Judge Major concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state any 

claims against Defendants Beltran and Madden. Id. at 10–11. Magistrate Judge Major 

concludes that, despite the Court’s repeated warnings that any claims not reasserted in the 

TAC would be considered waived, id. at 10 (citing ECF No. 63 at 3; ECF No. 76 at 11; 

ECF No. 86 at 12), Plaintiff has failed to reassert his Eighth Amendment and Declaratory 

Judgment claims against Defendant Beltran and has failed to reassert any specific claims 

against Defendant Madden. Id. at 10–11. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Major recommends 

that the Court grant Defendants’ Motion without leave to amend as to Plaintiff’s claims 

against Defendants Beltran and Madden. Id. at 11.

II. Summary of Plaintiff’s Objections

In his Objections to the R&R, Plaintiff makes general objections to Magistrate Judge 

Major’s overall recommendation that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff 

repeatedly states that the Court must construe all facts in his pleading liberally and afford 

Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, Objs. at 2 (citing Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F. 3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010)), and that, under this standard, “[D]efendants [should be] made to go forward 

and [be] made responsible for their actions.” Id. at 3. 

Plaintiff also filed a Sur-Reply, which contains specific objections to the R&R as to 

Defendant Ortega and Defendants Beltran and Madden. See generally Sur-Reply. 

Although Plaintiff improperly filed the Sur-Reply without Court permission, see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 7(a)(7), the Court will consider Plaintiff’s objections contained therein. In his 

Sur-Reply, Plaintiff objects to the R&R on two grounds. First, Plaintiff argues that, with 

regard to his deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Ortega, Defendant Ortega

failed to establish that he gave Plaintiff “any real medical attention.” Sur-Reply at 1–2. 

Further, Plaintiff contends that his injuries were severe enough that Defendant Ortega

should have sent Plaintiff to an outside hospital for surgery and, by delaying Plaintiff’s 

treatment, Defendant Ortega violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at 2. 

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Second, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Major’s recommendation to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Beltran and Madden. Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff appears to 

argue that Defendants Beltran and Madden acted in concert with Defendant Ortega and,

thus, Plaintiff has shown that they were deliberately indifferent. Id. at 2. 

The Court will review, de novo, those parts of the R&R to which Plaintiff objects.

III. Court’s Analysis 

A. Deliberate Indifference Claim Against Defendant Ortega

Plaintiff contends that, contrary to the R&R, his TAC contains sufficient factual 

detail to show that Defendant Ortega violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to 

provide adequate medical care and that Defendant Ortega’s delay in giving proper 

treatment contributed to Plaintiff requiring surgery. Objs. at 2; Sur-Reply at 2–3; see also

TAC at 1. 

An inmate has an Eighth Amendment right to adequate physical and mental health 

care. Doty v. Cnty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). “To establish 

unconstitutional treatment of a medical condition . . . a prisoner must show deliberate 

indifference to a ‘serious’ medical need.” Id. (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 

1059 (9th Cir. 1992)). A determination of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need 

involves a two-step analysis consisting of both objective and subjective inquiries. Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 837. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate a serious medical need such that 

failure to provide treatment could “result in further significant injury” or “unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Second, the plaintiff must show that the 

defendant’s response to the medical need was deliberately indifferent. Id. (citing 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059–60).

Deliberate indifference consists of (1) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (2) harm caused by the indifference. Id. Such 

indifference may be manifested when “prison officials deny, delay[,] or intentionally 

interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians 

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provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). 

This standard is one of subjective recklessness. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839–40. “To satisfy 

this subjective component of deliberate indifference, the inmate must show that prison 

officials ‘kn[e]w [] of and disregard[ed]’ the substantial risk of harm, but the officials need 

not have intended any harm to befall the inmate; ‘it is enough that the official acted or 

failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Lemire v. Cal. 

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) 

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 842). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. 

A showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional 

deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.” Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092 

(9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004)).

First, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Major that Plaintiff fails to meet the 

objective prong because Plaintiff fails to show a serious medical need. See R&R at 7–8. 

Although the Court previously found Plaintiff met this element in prior iterations of his 

complaint, see, e.g., ECF No. 76 at 7–10, Plaintiff’s TAC fails to specify the nature or 

severity of the injury or describe his medical need in any way. In its previous Order 

dismissing Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, “the Court caution[ed] Plaintiff that 

should he choose to file a Third Amended Complaint, it must be complete by itself and that 

any claim . . . not re-alleged will be considered waived.” ECF No. 86 at 12. Despite this 

warning, Plaintiff does not reallege details about his serious medical need in the TAC. See 

generally TAC. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to meet the objective prong. 

Next, the Court must agree with Magistrate Judge Major’s recommendation that, 

even if Plaintiff meets the objective prong, Plaintiff’s TAC does not “demonstrate that 

Dr. Ortega was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and thereby also 

fails the subjective element.” R&R at 8. Although Plaintiff asserts that “the incident did 

in fact happen and we all have to recognize that fact,” Sur Reply at 2, his allegations are 

conclusory and devoid of facts explaining how Defendant Ortega was deliberately 

indifferent. This is precisely the sort of “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

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accusation” that the Supreme Court has held is insufficient under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

As the Court noted in its previous Order, “the subjective element of deliberate 

indifference is a difficult standard; Plaintiff must show, by well-pled factual allegations, 

that Defendant Ortega knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.” ECF No. 86 at 

7 (citing Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074). Neither Plaintiff’s TAC nor his objections address 

Defendant Ortega’s subjective knowledge. At most, Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate 

that Defendant Ortega was responsible for his care; but the allegations do not plausibly 

show Defendant Ortega was subjectively aware of Plaintiff’s condition but failed to 

provide adequate care. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objection and 

ADOPTS the R&R as to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Ortega.

B. Claims Against Defendants Beltran and Madden

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Major that Plaintiff’s claims against 

Defendants Beltran and Madden must be dismissed because Plaintiff’s TAC does not 

reassert his Eighth Amendment or Declaratory Judgment claims against Defendant Beltran

and fails to reassert any claims against Defendant Madden. As noted above, the Court 

cautioned Plaintiff that, if he filed a third amended complaint, “it must be complete by 

itself and that any claim against any defendant not realleged will be considered waived.” 

ECF No. 86 at 12. Despite this warning, Plaintiff failed to reallege the claims against 

Defendants Beltran and Madden. 

Plaintiff’s objections do not change the Court’s conclusion. Plaintiff’s allegation in 

his Sur-Reply that Defendants Madden and Beltran “acted in concert with Dr. Or[t]ega in 

the deliberat[e] indifference issue,” Sur Reply at 2, does not change the fact that the TAC 

is completely devoid of any mention of either Defendants Beltran or Madden. See 

generally TAC. Even if the Court did consider the allegations in the Sur-Reply, Plaintiff

fails to provide any facts to support his contention that Defendants Beltran and Madden,

acting in concert with Defendant Ortega, knew of Plaintiff’s serious medical need and were

deliberately indifferent towards Plaintiff’s medical condition. Accordingly, the Court 

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OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objection and ADOPTS the R&R as to Plaintiff’s claims against 

Defendants Madden and Beltran.

IV. Leave to Amend

Finally, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Major’s recommendation to deny 

leave to amend. When determining whether to grant leave to amend, Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15(a)(2) instructs courts to “freely give leave when justice so requires.” 

However, leave to amend may be denied at the district court’s discretion if there is “undue 

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by 

virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 

U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

Here, there is a strong showing that amendment would be futile because of Plaintiff’s 

repeated failures to cure known deficiencies. Plaintiff has had four opportunities to replead his causes of action with sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief. After 

each iteration of the complaint, the Court has provided in-depth decisions explaining the 

basis for dismissal, yet Plaintiff still has failed to meet the required pleading requirements. 

Indeed, Plaintiff “has filed multiple complaints with similar factual allegations and each 

time has filed fewer factual allegations than the prior complaint.” See ECF No. 86 at 12. 

This failure to correct identified deficiencies “is a strong indication that [Plaintiff has] no 

additional facts to plead.” Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d 1079, 1098 (9th Cir. 

2002), abrogated on other grounds by Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 

U.S. 308 (2007)). Accordingly, the Court will DENY leave to amend.

///

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///

///

///

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CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court (1) OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF 

Nos. 95, 101); (2) ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety (ECF No. 93); and (3) GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiff’s 

Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 90). This Order ends the litigation in this matter. 

The Clerk of Court SHALL close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2019

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