Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02355/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-02355-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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28 1 03CV2355-B (WMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIMCORE CORPORATION, a California

Corporation, ROMER INC., a California

Corporation, HOMER EATON, an

individual, and HEXAGON

METROLOGY AB,

Plaintiff,

v.

FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Florida

Corporation,

Defendant.

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Civil No: 03 CV 2355-B(WMC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF

LAW

Cimcore Corp., Romer Inc., Hexagon Metrology, and Homer Eaton (collectively

“Plaintiffs” and “Romer”) move the Court for reconsideration of their motion for judgment

as a matter of law that there is insufficient evidence to support Defendant Faro’s defense of

non-infringement. For the reasons herein, the motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 30, 2006, a nine person jury was sworn in for the trial in the instant

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28 2 03CV2355-B (WMC)

case. At the close of Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, Plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of

law (JMOL). On November 28, 2006, at the close of evidence, Plaintiffs again moved for

JMOL.

 On December 4, 2006, the fourth day of deliberations, the jury indicated that they

were unable to reach a unanimous verdict on infringement. The jurors did reach a verdict

on invalidity, finding the patent valid. On December 6, 2006, the Court heard and denied

the parties’ cross-motions for JMOL. On December 7, 2006, the Court declared a mistrial

on the issues of infringement, willfulness and damages. Following the trial, the Court

permitted the parties to speak with the jurors. Romer now moves the Court to reconsider its

denial of JMOL based on juror declarations which Romer contends attest to the failure of

one of the jurors to properly deliberate.

II. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF LAW

1. Motion for Reconsideration

A party may be relieved from a final judgment under Rule 60(b) for reasons of

mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, a void or satisfied judgment, or any other

reason which would justify the relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (West 2006). Under Rule

60(b)(2), relief is appropriate where the newly discovered evidence could not have been

discovered due diligence in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).

2. Judgement as a Matter of Law

A motion for judgment as a matter of law must be denied and a jury verdict upheld if

the judgment is supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified

School District, 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is evidence

adequate to support the jury's conclusion, even if it is possible to draw a contrary

conclusion from the same evidence. The Court must review the record as a whole but

disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. 

All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

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28 3 03CV2355-B (WMC)

party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986). 

A jury's inability to reach a verdict does not necessarily preclude a judgment as a

matter of law. Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1197

(9th Cir. 2000). However, in considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the

Court may not substitute its view of the evidence for the jury's, may not make credibility

determinations, and may not weigh the evidence. Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1227. “The test is

whether the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits

only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to that of the jury.” White

v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002). “If reasonable minds could differ

as to the import of the evidence, however, a verdict should not be directed.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 250-51.

B. ANALYSIS

Romer argues that the newly discovered evidence demonstrates that a reasonable

jury would have rendered a verdict of infringement. The crux of the argument, is that “but

for” one juror’s inability to follow the Court’s instructions and deliberate, the jury would

have been unanimously in favor for Romer. 

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not generally permit inquiry into a jury’s

deliberations. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). Allegations of a juror’s misunderstandings on the

Court’s instructions, a juror’s misunderstandings of the law or a juror’s preconceived

notions cannot be used to attack a verdict. See e.g., United States v. Stacey, 475 F.2d 1119,

1121 (9th Cir.1973); United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1390 n.8 (9th Cir.1996); United

States v. Davis, 960 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1992).

While a “hung” jury is not a verdict, there is no reason to presume that the policy

behind Rule 606(b) should not apply to attacking jury deliberations here. Moreover,

although there are exceptions to Rule 606(b), such as introduction of outside evidence, the

Court finds that none of these exceptions apply here. Simply because a juror may have

applied his own personal knowledge and experience does not merit the conclusion that

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 Although Plaintiffs analogize to Hard v. Burlington Northern R.R. to argue that the juror

declarations should be considered, the circumstances here are not those of Hard. See 812 F.2d 482,

485 (9th Cir.1987). Unlike the juror in Hard who had past experiences with one of the litigants in the

suit and shared this knowledge with his fellow jurors during deliberations, here the juror’s knowledge

was general, it had no specificity as to Plaintiffs' or Defendant’s practices or products.

4 03CV2355-B (WMC)

outside evidence was introduced into the deliberations or that the jury did not properly

deliberate. See Hard v. Burlington Northern R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir. 1987)

(“Jurors must rely on their past personal experiences when hearing a trial and deliberating

on a verdict.”).1

 

Even compelling evidence that a juror absolutely and adamantly refused to

deliberate - which is not asserted here unanimously by the jurors - would be unavailing to

impeach the jury’s verdict. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 122-23 (1987). The

Court is unable to find any Circuit authority permitting impeachment of a jury verdict

based upon internal irregularity of juror conduct.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ reasoning that simply because eight jurors found

infringement does not compel the conclusion that no reasonable jury could have found noninfringement. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein, Romer has failed to provide any new evidence that merits

reconsideration of this Court’s earlier denial of Romer’s motion for judgment as a matter of

law. Therefore Romer’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: March 12, 2007

Hon. Rudi M. Brewster

United States Senior District Court Judge

cc: Hon. William McCurine Jr.

 United States Magistrate Judge

 All Counsel of Record

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