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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 12, 2007 Decided February 15, 2008 

No. 06-5203 

CALIFORNIA VALLEY MIWOK TRIBE F/K/A SHEEP RANCH OF 

ME-WUK INDIANS OF CALIFORNIA,

APPELLANT

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 05cv00739) 

Phillip Eugene Thompson argued the cause for appellant. 

With him on the briefs were Johnine Clark and Sonya 

Anjanette Smith-Valentine. 

Mark R. Haag, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were 

James Merritt Upton and Katherine J. Barton, Attorneys. 

Tim Vollmann argued the cause and filed the brief for 

amicus curiae Yakima K. Dixie in support of appellees. 

USCA Case #06-5203 Document #1099245 Filed: 02/15/2008 Page 1 of 12
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Before: GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Since the days of John 

Marshall, it has been a bedrock principle of federal Indian law 

that every tribe is “capable of managing its own affairs and 

governing itself.” Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 

(5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 

(6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (stating that tribes are “distinct, 

independent political communities, retaining their original 

natural rights”). But tribes that want federal benefits must 

adhere to federal requirements. The gateway to some of those 

benefits is the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“the Act”), 

which requires tribes to organize their governments by 

adopting a constitution approved by the Secretary of the 

Interior (“Secretary”). See 25 U.S.C. § 476. 

This case involves an attempt by a small cluster of people 

within the California Valley Miwok tribe (“CVM”) to 

organize a tribal government under the Act. CVM’s 

chairwoman, Silvia Burley, and a group of her supporters 

adopted a constitution to govern the tribe without so much as 

consulting its membership. The Secretary declined to approve 

the constitution because it was not ratified by anything close 

to a majority of the tribe. Burley and her supporters—in 

CVM’s name—then sued the United States, claiming that the 

Secretary’s refusal was unlawful and seeking a declaration 

that CVM is organized pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 476.1

 Because 

 

1

 Throughout, we refer to Burley rather than “CVM” or “the tribe” 

because we are mindful that there is an ongoing leadership dispute 

between Burley and former tribal chairman Yakima Dixie. Both 

claim to represent the tribe, and Dixie filed an amicus brief in this 

USCA Case #06-5203 Document #1099245 Filed: 02/15/2008 Page 2 of 12
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we conclude that the Secretary lawfully refused to approve 

the proposed constitution, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of Burley’s claim. Burley also argues that the 

district court erred in denying her motions for leave to file 

supplemental claims for relief. We conclude that any such 

error was harmless. 

I. 

 

Indian tribes are “unique aggregations possessing 

attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their 

territory; they are a separate people possessing the power of 

regulating their internal and social relations.” United States v. 

Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). To qualify for federal benefits, 

however, tribes must meet conditions set by federal law. The 

most important condition is federal recognition, which is “a 

formal political act confirming the tribe’s existence as a 

distinct political society, and institutionalizing the 

government-to-government relationship between the tribe and 

the federal government.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 

INDIAN LAW § 3.02[3], at 138 (2005 ed.). The federal 

government has historically recognized tribes through treaties, 

statutes, and executive orders, but it does so today primarily 

by a standardized application process administered by the 

Secretary. See generally 25 C.F.R. pt. 83; see also id. § 83.7 

(listing the factors the Secretary must consider when deciding 

whether to recognize a tribe). Among the federal benefits that 

a recognized tribe and its members may claim are the right to 

receive financial assistance under the Snyder Act, see 25 

U.S.C. § 13 (authorizing the Secretary to “direct, supervise, 

and expend” funds for a range of purposes including health 

 

case in support of the United States. We pass no judgment on that 

dispute. 

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and education), and the right to operate gaming facilities 

under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, see 25 U.S.C. 

§§ 2701 et seq.

2

Once recognized, a tribe may qualify for additional 

federal benefits by organizing its government under the Act. 

“[Section 476 of the Act] authorizes any tribe . . . to adopt a 

constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of the 

Secretary of the Interior.” Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe 

of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 198 (1985). Organization under 

§ 476 vests in a tribe the power “[t]o employ legal counsel; to 

prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal 

lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the 

consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the Federal, State, 

and local governments.” 25 U.S.C. § 476(e). And some 

governmental benefits may flow only to tribes organized 

under the Act. For example, in this case the California 

Gaming Control Commission—which distributes an annual 

payment to all non-gaming tribes in the state—suspended 

CVM’s allotment of approximately $1 million when it learned 

that CVM was unorganized.3

 

Section 476 of the Act provides two ways a tribe may 

receive the Secretary’s approval for its constitution. The first 

is, in effect, a safe harbor. Section 476(a) says: 

 

Any Indian tribe shall have the right to 

organize for its common welfare, and may 

 

2

 According to the government, Burley wishes to build and operate 

a casino for CVM. Government’s Brief at 10–11. 

3

 The stakes for CVM may be raised even higher if California’s 

gaming tribes expand their casinos, as news reports suggest they are 

planning to do. See The New Indian Wars, ECONOMIST, Nov. 29, 

2007. 

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adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, 

and any amendments thereto, which shall 

become effective when— 

(1) ratified by a majority vote of the 

adult members of the tribe or tribes 

at a special election authorized and 

called by the Secretary under such 

rules and regulations as the 

Secretary may prescribe; and 

(2) approved by the Secretary pursuant 

to subsection (d) of this section. 

25 U.S.C. § 476(a). Pursuant to subsection (a)(1), the 

Secretary has promulgated several rules governing special 

elections. See generally 25 C.F.R. pt. 81. Compliance with 

these rules is a prerequisite for the Secretary’s approval of a 

proposed constitution. Among other things, the rules define 

voter eligibility, id. § 81.6, create tribal-election boards, id. 

§ 81.8, establish voting districts, id. § 81.9, describe voterregistration procedures, id. § 81.11, stipulate conditions for 

election notices, id. § 81.14, set poll opening and closing 

times, id. § 81.15, and describe the criteria for ballots, id. 

§ 81.20. According to subsection (d)(1), once shown that the 

proposed constitution is the product of the § 476(a) process, 

the Secretary “shall approve the constitution [] within fortyfive days after the election unless the Secretary finds that the 

proposed constitution [is] contrary to applicable laws.” 

25 U.S.C. § 476(d)(1).4

 

 

4

 “[A]pplicable laws” means “any treaty, Executive order or Act of 

Congress or any final decision of the Federal courts which are 

applicable to the tribe, and any other laws which are applicable to 

the tribe pursuant to an Act of Congress or by any final decision of 

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Section 476(h) provides a second way to seek the 

Secretary’s approval for a proposed constitution. Unlike the 

extensive procedural requirements of § 476(a), under § 476(h) 

a tribe may adopt a constitution using procedures of its own 

making: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of this 

Act each Indian tribe shall retain inherent 

sovereign power to adopt governing 

documents under procedures other than those 

specified in this section[.] 

25 U.S.C. § 476(h)(1). But this greater flexibility in process 

comes with a cost. Section 476(h) does not provide a safe 

harbor. As discussed in detail in Part III, the central issue in 

this case is the extent of the Secretary’s power to approve a 

constitution under this section. 

II. 

CVM is a federally recognized Indian tribe. See Indian 

Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the 

United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,194, 

71,194 (Nov. 25, 2005). It has a potential membership of 

250,5

 but its current tribal council—led by Burley—was 

 

the Federal courts.” Act of Nov. 1, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-581, 

§ 102(1), 102 Stat. 2938, 2939. 

5

 This figure was offered by the tribe itself in separate litigation. 

See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 1, California 

Valley Miwok Tribe v. United States, No. 02-0912 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 

29, 2002). We take judicial notice of that document. See Veg-Mix, 

Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 832 F.2d 601, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 

USCA Case #06-5203 Document #1099245 Filed: 02/15/2008 Page 6 of 12
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handpicked by only a tiny minority.6

 This case is the latest 

round of sparring between Burley and the federal government 

over whether the tribe is organized under the Act. Burley’s 

efforts to organize the tribe began in 2000 when, pursuing the 

safe harbor procedure of § 476(a), she and a group of her 

supporters adopted a constitution and requested the Secretary 

to call an election for its ratification. Section 476(c) required 

the Secretary to call an election on the proposed constitution 

within 180 days. For reasons not apparent from the record, the 

Secretary never called the election. Rather than press the 

matter, Burley withdrew her request for a vote on the 

constitution. 

A second effort to organize came in 2001, when Burley’s 

group adopted a new constitution for the tribe. This time, 

Burley bypassed the § 476(a) process and instead sent the 

constitution directly to the Secretary for approval. The 

Secretary informed her that the constitution was defective and 

the tribe still unorganized. 

Perhaps relying on the old adage, Burley made a third 

attempt in early 2004. Meanwhile, Congress passed the 

Native American Technical Corrections Act, which added 

§ 476(h). The Secretary then responded to Burley by rejecting 

her proposed constitution and explaining that she would need 

to at least attempt to involve the entire tribe in the 

 

6

 In 1999, the Secretary recognized Burley as CVM’s chairperson. 

The Secretary also entered into a “self-determination contract” with 

the tribe under the Indian Self-Determination Act. See 25 U.S.C. 

§ 450f. Pursuant to that contract, the tribe received funds for the 

development of its government. Subsequently, however, the 

Secretary modified her stance and recognized CVM’s leadership 

only on an interim basis, pending the tribe’s organization effort. 

Burley does not challenge this change. 

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organizational process before the Secretary would give 

approval: 

Where a tribe that has not previously 

organized seeks to do so, [the Secretary] also 

has a responsibility to determine that the 

organizational efforts reflect the involvement 

of the whole tribal community. We have not 

seen evidence that such general involvement 

was attempted or has occurred with the 

purported organization of your tribe. . . . To 

our knowledge, the only persons of Indian 

descent involved in the tribe’s organization 

efforts, were you and your two daughters. 

Letter from Dale Risling, Sr., Superintendent, United States 

Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs-Cent. 

Cal. Agency, to Silvia Burley (Mar. 26, 2004). 

Burley, in CVM’s name, then sued the United States for 

its failure to recognize the tribe as organized. She also twice 

motioned for leave to file supplemental claims for relief. The 

district court dismissed the original complaint for failure to 

state a claim and also denied the motions for leave. 

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. 

Broudy v. Mather, 460 F.3d 106, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

Although Burley initially filed two claims for relief—one 

under § 476(h) of the Act and the other under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 704—we 

review only the APA claim because § 476(h) offers no private 

cause of action. We review the denial of leave to file 

supplemental claims for abuse of discretion. Hall v. CIA, 437 

F.3d 94, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

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III. 

The Burley faction has chosen not to repeat its effort to 

organize under § 476(a). Instead, it has tried to organize under 

§ 476(h). Burley argues that, under § 476(h), the Secretary 

had no choice but to approve the proposed constitution. The 

Secretary reads § 476(h) to allow her to reject any constitution 

that does not “reflect the involvement of the whole tribal 

community.” We consider the question within the framework 

of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Secretary’s legal 

interpretation did not come in either a notice-and-comment 

rulemaking or a formal adjudication, the usual suspects for 

Chevron deference. We nonetheless believe that Chevron—

rather than Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)—

provides “the appropriate legal lens through which to view the 

legality of the Agency interpretation,” Barnhart v. Walton, 

535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002), because of the “interstitial nature of 

the legal question” and the “related expertise of the Agency,” 

id. We must therefore determine whether Congress has 

spoken directly to the issue. If it has not, we must defer to the 

agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable. Chevron, 

467 U.S. at 842–43. We hold that the Secretary’s 

interpretation is a permissible one.7

 

7

 We recognize that we typically do not apply full Chevron

deference to an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statutory 

provision involving Indian affairs. In the usual circumstance, “[t]he 

governing canon of construction requires that ‘statutes are to be 

construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous 

provisions interpreted to their benefit.’ ” Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 

1081, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of 

Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)). “This departure from the 

Chevron norm arises from the fact that the rule of liberally 

construing statutes to the benefit of the Indians arises not from the 

ordinary exegesis, but ‘from principles of equitable obligations and 

USCA Case #06-5203 Document #1099245 Filed: 02/15/2008 Page 9 of 12
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Burley asserts that § 476(h) unambiguously requires the 

Secretary to approve any constitution adopted under that 

provision. In Burley’s view, the Secretary has no role in 

determining whether a tribe has properly organized itself to 

qualify for the federal benefits provided in the Act and 

elsewhere. That cannot be. Although the sovereign nature of 

Indian tribes cautions the Secretary not to exercise 

freestanding authority to interfere with a tribe’s internal 

governance, the Secretary has the power to manage “all

Indian affairs and [] all matters arising out of Indian 

relations.” 25 U.S.C. § 2 (emphases added).8

 We have 

previously held that this extensive grant of authority gives the 

Secretary broad power to carry out the federal government’s 

unique responsibilities with respect to Indians. See Udall v. 

Littell, 366 F.2d 668, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“In charging the 

Secretary with broad responsibility for the welfare of Indian 

tribes, Congress must be assumed to have given [her] 

reasonable powers to discharge it effectively.”); see also

United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 

 

normative rules of behavior,’ applicable to the trust relationship 

between the United States and the Native American people.” Id.

(quoting Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49, 59 

(D.C. Cir. 1991)). Here, however, the Secretary’s proposed 

interpretation does not run against any Indian tribe; it runs only 

against one of the contestants in a heated tribal leadership dispute, 

see supra note 1. In fact, as we later explain, the Secretary’s 

interpretation actually advances “the trust relationship between the 

United States and the Native American people.” Therefore, 

adherence to Chevron is consistent with the customary Indian-law 

canon of construction. 

8

 This grant of authority was initially lodged in the Secretary of 

War. See Act of July 9, 1832, ch. 174, § 1, 4 Stat. 564. It was 

eventually transferred to the Secretary of the Interior in 1849. See

Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 5, 15 Stat. 228. 

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1986) (noting that § 2 serves “as the source of Interior’s 

plenary administrative authority in discharging the federal 

government’s trust obligations to Indians”). The exercise of 

this authority is especially vital when, as is the case here, the 

government is determining whether a tribe is organized, and 

the receipt of significant federal benefits turns on the decision. 

The Secretary suggests that her authority under § 476(h) 

includes the power to reject a proposed constitution that does 

not enjoy sufficient support from a tribe’s membership. Her 

suggestion is reasonable, particularly in light of the federal 

government’s unique trust obligation to Indian tribes. See 

Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942) 

(noting “the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the 

Government in its dealings with” tribes). A cornerstone of this 

obligation is to promote a tribe’s political integrity, which 

includes ensuring that the will of tribal members is not 

thwarted by rogue leaders when it comes to decisions 

affecting federal benefits. See id. at 297 (“Payment of funds at 

the request of a tribal council which, to the knowledge of the 

Government officers charged with the administration of 

Indian affairs . . . , was composed of representatives faithless 

to their own people and without integrity would be a clear 

breach of the Government’s fiduciary obligation.”); Seminole 

Nation v. Norton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 122, 140 (D.D.C. 2002) 

(noting that the Secretary “has the responsibility to ensure that 

[a tribe’s] representatives, with whom [she] must conduct 

government-to-government relations, are valid representatives 

of the [tribe] as a whole”) (emphasis added). 

The sensibility of the Secretary’s understanding of 

§ 476(h) is especially apparent in a case like this one. 

Although CVM, by its own admission, has a potential 

membership of 250, only Burley and her small group of 

supporters had a hand in adopting her proposed constitution. 

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This antimajoritarian gambit deserves no stamp of approval 

from the Secretary. As Congress has made clear, tribal 

organization under the Act must reflect majoritarian values. 

See 25 U.S.C. § 476(a) (requiring majority vote by tribe for 

adoption of a constitution); id. § 476(b) (requiring majority 

vote by tribe for revocation of a constitution); id. §§ 478, 

478a (requiring majority vote by tribe in order to exclude 

itself from the Act). And as we have previously noted, tribal 

governments should “fully and fairly involve the tribal 

members in the proceedings leading to constitutional reform.” 

Morris v. Andrus, 640 F.2d 404, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 

Because the Secretary’s decision not to approve Burley’s 

proposed constitution was permissible, we affirm the 

dismissal of Burley’s claim. 

Burley also argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying her motions for leave to file 

supplemental claims. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d). Any such 

error was harmless. See FED. R. CIV. P. 61. Because there has 

been no fact development in this case, no harm is done by 

requiring Burley to file her supplemental claims in a new 

cause of action. See 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,

FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1506, at 197 (2d ed. 

1990) (noting that “when joinder will not promote judicial 

economy or the speedy disposition of the dispute between the 

parties, refusal to allow the supplemental pleading is entirely 

justified”). 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is 

Affirmed.

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