Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00028/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00028-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KABITA CHOUDHURI,

Plaintiff,

v.

SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICES LLC, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-00028-PJH 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER 

JURISDICTION 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 5

Before the court is pro se plaintiff Kabita Choudhuri’s motion for a temporary 

restraining order and application to proceed in forma pauperis. The court finds that the 

matter is suitable for decision without oral argument and without further briefing. Having 

reviewed plaintiff’s motion and her complaint, and carefully considered the arguments 

therein and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby 

DISMISSES plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend and DENIES plaintiff’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this foreclosure-related action against defendants Specialized Loan 

Services, LLC (“SLS”) and two of its alleged agents, Britt Johnson and Barbara Johnson. 

Plaintiff alleges that she signed a written mortgage contract with Wells Fargo Bank 

on December 22, 2005 for property located at 331 Richardson Way, Mill Valley, CA 

94941 (the “property”).

1

 Compl. at 10; Dkt. 1-3, Choudhuri Decl. ¶ 2 (stating contract 

 

1 Plaintiff states that the property is “also known as 331-335 Richardson Way, Mill Valley, 

CA 94941” but it is unclear whether it comprises a single residence or multiple 

residences. See also Dkt. 1-1, Ex. A.

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executed in 2005). Between 2005 and the present, plaintiff’s property and the 2005 

mortgage contract have been the subject of several actions. See Choudhuri v. Wells 

Fargo et al., 11-cv-0518 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Choudhuri v. Wells Fargo et al., 15-cv-3608 

(N.D. Cal. 2015); Choudhuri v. Bell & Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, CIV083115 (Marin 

County Superior Court) (2008). 

The present action appears to stem from events that began in early 2018. 

Specifically, the complaint alleges that in March 2018, First American Loan Star, the 

then-servicer of plaintiff’s mortgage, notified plaintiff that SLS had taken over as the 

servicer on her mortgage. Compl. at 12. The complaint, however, also alleges that “In 

2018, Wells Fargo Home Service was replaced by [SLS],” “without any notice to the 

plaintiff.” Compl. at 12. 

Plaintiff alleges a number of failures on SLS’s part. First, plaintiff alleges that SLS 

failed to notify plaintiff that SLS had taken over for Wells Fargo Home Service. 

Second, plaintiff alleges that SLS “failed to conduct due diligence prior to acquiring 

the servicing contract.” Compl. at 12. According to the complaint, if SLS had conducted 

its due diligence, it would have discovered a January 22, 2018 stay issued by a 

bankruptcy court. Compl. at 12-13. Plaintiff has provided no information about the action 

in which the alleged stay was issued, and the court’s own research failed to uncover any 

other information. Further, though plaintiff relies on the continued effectiveness of the 

alleged January 22, 2018 stay, the complaint makes the incompatible allegation that the 

underlying action was dismissed, and that Wells Fargo received partial relief from that

stay. Compl. at 12 (alleging a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal and partial 

relief from stay is set for hearing on January 16, 2019). 

Third, plaintiff alleges that on “December 21, 2018, plaintiff found an envelope 

from defendants Britt and Barbara Johnson, requesting the property be vacated by 

January 9, 2019” (the “December 2018 letter”). Compl. at 12. Plaintiff takes issue with 

the tone of that notice, Compl. at 13, alleges that the “Johnsons are attempting to steal 

the property” from plaintiff, and argues that a sale could not have taken place because of 

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the January 22, 2018 stay and because plaintiff has not received a notice of default. 

Lastly, plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to respond to the “qualified written 

request” for information that she sent in response to the December 2018 letter. 

In support of her complaint, plaintiff attaches what appears to be the December 

2018 letter as Exhibit A. Contrary to plaintiff’s allegations, that letter—dated December 

31, 2018—does not require her to vacate the premises by January 9, 2019, and appears 

to be sent by “Property Solutions,” not SLS as plaintiff alleges. Ex. A. The letter, entitled 

“Notice to Occupant,” informs plaintiff that the property was sold at a recently completed 

foreclosure sale and that Property Solutions represents the property’s new owner. Ex. A. 

The letter informs plaintiff (and the property’s current residents) that they have two nonexclusive options: “Relocation Assistance” or “Continue to Lease.” 

The December 2018 letter included forms allowing plaintiff to choose the 

“Relocation Assistance” option. Those forms, entitled “Agreement to Vacate – Relocation 

Program” and “Agreement to Vacate – Release,” notify plaintiff that if she (and all other 

residents) vacates the property by January 9, 2019, and complies with certain other 

conditions, then the owner of the property will not pursue available legal remedies to 

obtain possession of the property or to recover the fair rental value for the time plaintiff 

continues to reside at the property. Ex. A. In addition, the letter states that if plaintiff 

agrees to vacate by January 9, 2019 (and complies with other conditions), the new 

owner, through SLS, will pay plaintiff $3,000 dollars.2 Ex. A. 

Lastly, the letter directs plaintiff to contact Britt Johnson for more information. Ex. 

A. The letter appears to state that Britt Johnson works for “Coldwell Banker.”

Based on the above allegations and conduct, the complaint asserts three causes 

of action: 

(1) “Common Counts” for defendants’ breach of contract by failing to provide 

 

2 Plaintiff understands the letter to require her to pay the new owner $3,000. Choudhuri 

Decl. ¶ 5. 

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statutorily required disclosures and the “amount promised for cash-out finances” as 

stated in the 2005 mortgage contract. In addition, this cause of action alleges that SLS 

has failed to provide plaintiff with statutorily required notices and information under the 

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”); 

(2) “Breach of Contract” for SLS’s failure to provide certain notices as required by 

the Truth In Lending Act (“TILA”) and RESPA; and

(3) “Fraud” for SLS’s failure to conduct due diligence and SLS’s deliberate failure 

to withhold information from the bankruptcy court and the plaintiff about the transfer of the 

servicing contract. Further, plaintiff alleges the Johnson defendants should have adhered 

to a higher professional standard and that the notice is coercive, lacks dates of sale and 

the names of the alleged buyers. 

DISCUSSION

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and cannot hear every dispute 

presented by litigants. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 

Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.1989). Federal courts can only adjudicate 

cases which the Constitution or Congress authorize them to adjudicate: those cases 

involving diversity of citizenship (where the parties are from diverse states and the 

amount in controversy is at least $75,000), or a federal question, or those cases to which 

the United States is a party. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of 

America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994). Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over 

civil cases and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Id. at 377.

Every federal court is under a continuing obligation to assess its own subjectmatter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12; Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 

1077 (9th Cir.1983). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Allstate 

Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 358 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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Plaintiff asserts that this court has subject-matter jurisdiction because the action 

involves diverse parties and because it raises federal questions. See Compl. at 4-5, 8. 

The court disagrees. First, plaintiff has not shown that diversity jurisdiction exists 

because the complaint alleges that both plaintiff and the Johnsons are citizens of 

California. See Compl. at 1, 3; Renewed v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. C 11-

1324 PJH, 2012 WL 423741, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2012) (“jurisdiction based upon 

diversity . . . requires complete diversity”). 

Second, the court does not have federal question jurisdiction because plaintiff’s 

action does not arise under federal law. “A case arises under’ federal law within the 

meaning of § 1331 if a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates 

the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution 

of a substantial question of federal law.” Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 

1208, 1219 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). Federal law does not create 

plaintiff’s causes of action, Compl. at 13-14 (asserting causes of actions for “Common 

Counts,” “Breach of Contract,” and “Fraud”), and plaintiff has failed to show that her relief 

necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. 

Accordingly, the court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and DISMISSES 

plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff’s amended complaint should clearly 

state the basis for this court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. If plaintiff believes that she has 

a cause of action that arises under federal law, plaintiff should assert a distinct claim that 

specifies the federal statute that has allegedly been violated and specifies how 

defendants’ conduct violated a particular section or subsection of that federal statute. 

Plaintiff must also differentiate between the defendants and clearly specify what 

each of the three defendants did in violation of a federal law. There are currently no facts 

pled as to the individual defendants which would give rise to liability under any of 

plaintiff’s three causes of actions.

B. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Because plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter 

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jurisdiction, plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order must be DENIED as moot. 

Cortes v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-1773-PJH, 2017 WL 4865563, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 

2017) (“a federal court has no power to consider claims for which it lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction”). In any event, even if this court had subject-matter jurisdiction, it would deny 

plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order on the merits as well.

The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order (a “TRO”) are 

“substantially identical” to those required for a preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales 

Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001); Lockheed Missile & 

Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The 

party seeking the TRO “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he 

is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking 

Assn’s, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter 

v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).3 Further, “ ‘[a] plaintiff must 

do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff 

must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive 

relief.’ ” Koller v. Brown, 224 F. Supp. 3d 871, 879 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Caribbean 

Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

Plaintiff cannot meet that standard for two reasons. First, plaintiff cannot show an

imminent or immediate threatened injury. Plaintiff motion is premised on plaintiff’s belief 

that she is required to vacate her residence by January 9, 2019. As explained above, 

Exhibit A does not support that conclusion. Exhibit A gives plaintiff the option to 

voluntarily vacate the property by January 9, 2019. It also gives plaintiff the option to 

continue to lease the property from the new owner. Under either case, the December 

 

3 Alternatively, “ ‘serious questions going to the merits' and a hardship balance that tips 

sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as 

the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the 

injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 

1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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2018 letter does not indicate that plaintiff will be required to vacate by January 9, 2019. 

Thus, plaintiff has failed to show an imminent or immediate injury. 

Second, plaintiff’s motion must be denied because plaintiff has not shown she is 

likely to succeed on the merits of her claim. In general, plaintiff has both failed to allege 

how defendants conduct violated any particular statute and plaintiff has failed to include 

sufficient details about the complained of conduct to allow the court to determine if a 

statute has been violated. For example, plaintiff claims that SLS’s failure to exercise 

sufficient due diligence resulted in SLS not knowing about the alleged January 2018 stay. 

But plaintiff fails to include any details about the January 2018 stay—for example, the 

case name and number)—and fails to state how a failure to exercise “diligence” violates 

any specific statute. 

Similarly, plaintiff claims that the December 2018 letter violates § 807(3) of the 

FDCPA but fails to allege how it does so. That subsection prohibits “The false 

representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication 

is from an attorney.” But the December 2018 letter does not purport to be from a lawyer. 

In addition, plaintiff fails to allege that the FDCPA applies to the December 2018 letter 

because plaintiff does not allege that SLS (or Property Solutions) is a “debt collector” as 

defined by § 803(6) of the FDCPA.4 

Lastly, plaintiff’s complaint generally alleges that SLS and its agents violated 

RESPA by failing to respond to plaintiff’s “qualified written request.” True, § 2605(e) of 

RESPA requires servicers to, inter alia, respond to a borrower’s “qualified written 

requests” within five business days. But the complaint does not state a claim under that 

statute because plaintiff fails to allege how many days have passed since she sent the 

alleged letter. Further, because plaintiff has failed to include any allegations about her 

letter to SLS, the court cannot determine whether it was a “qualified written request” as 

 

4 The same goes for plaintiff’s complaint that defendants violated § 809(b) of the FDCPA. 

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defined by § 2605(e)(1)(B).5 Additionally, plaintiff does not assert a cause of action 

arising under RESPA, but simply raises a state law claim for breach of contract for the 

defendants’ alleged failure to provide notices required by RESPA. 

C. IFP Application

A plaintiff seeking to proceed in forma pauperis “must allege poverty with some 

particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 

(9th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The court finds that plaintiff’s IFP application, 

showing plaintiff makes about $4,444.84 per month, Dkt. 4, fails to show that “plaintiff 

cannot pay the filing fees necessary to pursue the action.” La Douer v. U.C.S.F., No. 15-

cv-02214-MEJ, 2015 WL 4323665, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(1)). Accordingly, the court DENIES plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP. 

Plaintiff shall pay the entire filing fee of $400.00 no later than January 25, 2019. Failure 

to make that payment by that deadline, will result in dismissal of plaintiff’s action. 

In addition, plaintiff is responsible for service of the summons and the complaint 

and any amendments and attachments, as well as scheduling orders and other 

documents specified by the Clerk, pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Under Rule 4(m), plaintiff must serve defendants “within 90 days after the 

complaint is filed.”

6

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND. At minimum, plaintiff’s amended complaint, if any, should specifically state 

how defendants’ alleged conduct violated a particular section of a federal statute. 

Plaintiff may not add any additional parties without leave of court and plaintiff’s amended 

 

5 The complaint also alleges a breach of contract claim but plaintiff neither attaches the 

alleged contract nor specifies how defendants breached that contract. 

6 The court notes that plaintiff filed a declaration stating that she called an SLS agent to 

inform SLS of the motion for a TRO and that plaintiff filed a “certificate of service”

purporting to show that the defendants were mailed copies of plaintiff’s motion. That 

does not satisfy plaintiff’s obligation to serve the complaint on defendants, which must be 

done in accordance with Rule 4(e) and (g). 

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complaint shall be filed by January 25, 2019. 

Plaintiff may wish to seek free legal advice by calling the Legal Help Center at 

415-782-8982 or by signing up for an appointment at the Legal Help Center, 450 Golden 

Gate Avenue, 15th Floor, Room 2795, San Francisco California 94102. The litigant can 

speak with an attorney who will provide basic legal help, but not legal representation. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2019

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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