Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00222/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00222-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jonathan Aaron Tompkins,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Unknown Graber, 

Respondent.

No. CV-14-00222-PHX-DGC (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE: 

Pending before the Court is Jonathan Aaron Tompkins’ (“Petitioner”) amended 

Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal 

Custody filed on April 2, 2014 (the “Petition”) (Doc. 5). On June 19, 2014, Respondents 

filed their Answer (Doc. 13). Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 14) on July 7, 2014. The 

matter is deemed ripe for consideration.1

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in 

Phoenix, Arizona. Petitioner is serving 199 months pursuant to federal court judgments 

entered in 2004 and 2009. Before his federal incarceration, Petitioner served three years 

at a State of Florida correctional facility pursuant to a State of Florida judgment entered 

in 2005. In the Petition, Petitioner argues that the Bureau of Prisons (the “BOP”) has 

1 The case was reassigned to U.S. Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett on November 14, 2014. 

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 1 of 20
1

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

incorrectly determined that his 2004 federal sentence is to be served consecutively to his 

state sentence. The undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies and that the failure should not be excused. The undersigned 

further finds that the BOP properly calculated Petitioner’s federal sentence. It is 

therefore recommended that the Petition be denied. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On February 6, 2004, the State of Florida filed two criminal cases against 

Petitioner.2

 (Doc. 13-1 at 29, 33). On May 16, 2004, State of Florida law enforcement

took custody of Petitioner for failure to appear in those cases. (Id. at 4). The State of 

Florida thereafter filed two additional criminal cases against Petitioner.3

 (Id. at 38, 49). 

On June 15, 2004, while in state custody, Petitioner was indicted in the U.S. 

District Court for the Northern District of Florida.4

 The Court set an Initial Appearance 

2 Case No. 572004CF00127 charged Petitioner with (i) Constructive Possession of a 

Firearm by Convicted Felon and (ii) Grand Theft of $300 or more but less than $5,000. 

(Doc. 13-1 at 29). Case No. 572004CF00128 charged Petitioner with (i) Selling, 

Manufacturing, or Delivering, or Possessing with Intent to Sell, Manufacture, or Deliver, 

a Controlled Substance; (ii) two counts of Unlawful Possession of a Listed Chemical; (iii) 

two counts of Possession of Firearm, Ammunition when Subject to an Injunction against 

Committing Acts of Domestic Violence, Stalking, or Cyber stalking; (iv) Carrying 

Concealed Weapon or Electric Device; (v) Possession of a Controlled Substance; and (vi) 

multiple counts of Possession or Use of Drug Paraphernalia. (Id. at 33-34). 

3 Case No. 572004CF00539, filed on June 7, 2004, charged Petitioner with (i) Dealing in 

Stolen Property by Trafficking; (ii) Unarmed Burglary of Structure or Conveyance; and 

(iii) Grand Theft of $300 or more but less than $5,000. (Id. at 38). Case No. 

57200CF001089, filed on October 22, 2004, charged Petitioner with (i) Aggravated 

Assault by Threat with Weapon or Firearm; (ii) Shooting at or Into an Occupied Vehicle; 

and (iii) Constructive Possession of a Firearm by Convicted Felon. (Id. at 40). 

4 See Case No. 3:04-cr-00069-LC (N.D. Fla. June 15, 2004), Doc. 1. The Court may take 

judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they 

are “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or because they “can 

be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

question.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). The docket and documents in Petitioner’s criminal 

cases are public records of which we can take judicial notice. See Trigueros v. Adams, 

- 2 - 

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 2 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for June 22, 2004.5 Pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the U.S. 

Marshals Service (the “USMS”) took custody of Petitioner for attendance at the Initial 

Appearance. (Id. at 26). After the Initial Appearance, Petitioner transferred between 

state and federal custody pursuant to successive writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. 

(Id. at 26-27). On December 7, 2004, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 

Florida entered a judgment against Petitioner for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

(Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon), and sentenced Petitioner to 103 months 

in prison (the “2004 U.S. District Court Judgment”). (Id. at 13-16). The 2004 U.S. 

District Court Judgment did not specify whether the sentence was to run consecutively to 

or concurrently with other sentences. The USMS returned Petitioner to the custody of the 

State of Florida for the completion of the state proceedings. (Id. at 27). 

On February 21, 2005, the Florida state court entered a judgment against 

Petitioner, which adjudged Petitioner guilty of multiple counts in all four state cases and 

sentenced Petitioner to three years in prison (the “2005 Florida State Judgment”). (Id. at 

44). The 2005 Florida State Judgment states that the state sentence is to run 

consecutively to any active sentence being served.6

 Petitioner remained in state custody 

until October 19, 2007, when the USMS took custody of Petitioner for service of his 

federal sentence. (Id. at 27). 

On September 24, 2008, while incarcerated at the U.S. Penitentiary in Pollock, 

Louisiana, Petitioner was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 

Louisiana for committing the offense of Assault Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury (18 

658 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking notice of documents from petitioner’s state 

court habeas petition); Lopez v. Swope, 205 F.2d 8, 11 n.2 (9th Cir. 1953) (taking judicial 

notice of records in habeas petitioner’s case in another U.S. District Court, which set 

forth the indictment, conviction, and sentences for crimes referred to in habeas petition).

5 See Case No. 3:04-cr-00069-LC (N.D. Fla. June 15, 2004), Doc. 6.

6 See Case No. 3:04-cr-00069-LC (N.D. Fla. June 15, 2004), Doc. 60 at 5.

- 3 -

 

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 3 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S.C. § 113(a)(6)) against another inmate.7 On June 9, 2009, the Court entered 

judgment against Petitioner for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6), and sentenced him to 

96 months in prison to “run consecutive to any term of imprisonment he is currently 

serving.” (Doc. 13-1 at 21). 

The BOP determined that Petitioner’s federal sentence began on October 19, 2007, 

the date on which USMS took custody of Petitioner for service of his federal sentence. 

(Id. at 10). Petitioner argues that this determination is contrary to the 2004 U.S. District 

Court Judgment, asserting that the Court intended the sentence to run concurrently with

his State of Florida sentence. 

In his Reply (Doc. 14), Petitioner states that he filed a Motion for Clarification8 in 

the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida regarding the 2004 U.S. 

District Court Judgment. On July 24, 2014, Judge Lacey A. Collier, who issued the 2004 

U.S. District Court Judgment, granted Petitioner’s Motion for Clarification.9

 Attached to 

the Order is Judge Collier’s June 5, 2014 letter to the BOP. In the letter, Judge Collier 

states that he did not intend to make the federal sentence run concurrently with the State 

of Florida sentence. (See Attachment 1).

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Court has Jurisdiction Over the Petition

Federal courts are always “under an independent obligation to examine their own 

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). A federal 

court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction. Id. A federal court’s 

7 See Case No. 1:08-cr-00258-DDD-JDK (W.D. La. Sept. 24, 2008), Doc. 1.

8 See Case No. 3:04-cr-00069-LC (N.D. Fla. June 15, 2004), Doc. 58.

9 See Case No. 3:04-cr-00069-LC (N.D. Fla. June 15, 2004), Doc. 59. On September 8, 

2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s July 24, 2014 Order. 

(Id. at Doc. 60). The Court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration on September 

9, 2014. (Id. at Doc. 61). 

- 4 -

 

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 4 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

jurisdiction over a habeas petition depends on whether a federal prisoner is seeking to 

challenge the legality or the execution of his or her sentence. 

Challenges to the legality of a sentence must generally be raised in the sentencing 

court by a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 

952, 954 (9th Cir. 2008). Challenges to the manner, location, or conditions of the

execution of a sentence must generally be raised in the custodial court by a petition 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. at 956. However, if a prisoner’s remedy under Section 2255 

is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,” then the prisoner may 

challenge the legality of a sentence through a Section 2241 petition filed in the custodial 

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864 n.2; Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 

F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000). This exception is known as the “savings clause” or 

“escape hatch.” Alaimalo v. U.S., 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The “savings clause” exception is narrow and is only available when a petitioner

(i) makes a claim of actual innocence and (ii) has not had an “unobstructed procedural 

shot” at presenting that claim in a Section 2255 petition. Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 

895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006); Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003). The 

burden is on the petitioner to show that he or she satisfies both prongs of the exception. 

To satisfy the first prong, a petitioner must show that “in light of all the evidence, it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Stephens, 464 

F.3d at 898; Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). To satisfy the second 

prong, a petitioner must show that he or she never had the opportunity to raise a claim of 

innocence by a Section 2255 motion. Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060.

Here, Respondents argue that Petitioner is actually challenging the “imposition or 

legality of his sentence, not its execution, because he is claiming that his Florida 

judgment does not accurately reflect his actual or intended sentence.” (Doc. 13 at 13). 

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s arguments are not properly raised in a Section 2241 

petition. 

Although Petitioner references federal law in arguing his interpretation of the 2004 

- 5 -

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 5 of 20
1

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

U.S. District Court Judgment, Petitioner does not allege that the 2004 U.S. District Court 

Judgment is illegal or defective. In fact, Petitioner unequivocally states in the Petition 

that he is “arguing that the execution of his sentence is unlawful, not the imposition of the 

sentence.” (Doc. 5 at 10). In his Reply, Petitioner reiterates that he is not challenging the 

“imposition of his sentence.” (Doc. 14 at 2). Instead, Petitioner “claims that his 

sentencing court intended the sentence to run concurrent, but the BOP is thwarting that 

objective.” (Id.). 

As Petitioner explicitly asserts that he is challenging the execution, not the 

legality, of the 2004 U.S. District Court Judgment, the undersigned finds that the Petition 

is properly construed as a petition under Section 2241.10 Bogovich v. Sandoval, 189 F.3d 

999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Although courts must construe pro se complaints liberally . . . 

courts should not undertake to infer into the case one cause of action when a complaint 

clearly states a claim under a different cause of action.”). The U.S. District Court for the 

District of Arizona is the custodial court. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that 

the Court find that it has jurisdiction over the Petition. 

B. Petitioner’s Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Should Not be 

Excused 

Federal prisoners are generally required to exhaust available administrative 

remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Tucker 

v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1991); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571

(9th Cir. 1986). Yet the failure to satisfy the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. 

Tucker, 925 F.2d at 332. The district court has the discretion to excuse the exhaustion 

10An argument that the federal and state sentences should have run concurrently would be 

outside the scope of the Petition. That argument would challenge the legality of the 2004 

U.S. District Court Judgment, and must be raised in a Section 2255 petition filed in the 

sentencing court (the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida). Petitioner 

does not qualify for the “savings clause” exception as Petitioner does not allege that (i) he 

is actually innocent and (ii) has been hindered from pursuing a claim of innocence in a 

Section 2255 motion. 

- 6 - 

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 6 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

requirement if the administrative remedy is inadequate, ineffective, or if attempting to 

exhaust would be futile or cause irreparable injury. Fraley v. United States Bureau of 

Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993); United Farm Workers of America v. Arizona 

Agr. Emp’t. Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1983). A “key consideration” 

in exercising such discretion is whether “relaxation of the requirement would encourage 

the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 

1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir.1990)). 

Other considerations include (i) whether “agency expertise makes agency consideration 

necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision” and (ii) whether 

“administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to 

preclude the need for judicial review.” Montes, 919 F.2d at 537.

The BOP has established an Administrative Remedy Program “to allow an inmate 

to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 

C.F.R. § 542.10(a). Before filing a formal administrative grievance, an inmate is to “first 

present an issue of concern informally to staff, and staff shall attempt to informally 

resolve the issue. . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 542.13. A request for informal resolution is 

submitted using a BP-8 form. See Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 

2010). The formal grievance system under the Administrative Remedy Program consists 

of three levels of review: 

1. In the first level of review, an inmate files a formal Administrative Remedy 

Request written on a BP-9 form. The BP-9 form must be submitted to the Warden within 

20 calendar days following the date on which the basis for the Request occurred. 28 

C.F.R. § 542.14. 

2. If an inmate is dissatisfied with the Warden’s response, the inmate may submit 

an appeal on a BP-10 form to the appropriate Regional Director within 20 calendar days 

of the date the Warden signed the response to the inmate’s Administrative Remedy 

Request. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15. 

3. If an inmate is dissatisfied with the Regional Director’s response, he or she 

- 7 -

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 7 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

may appeal to BOP’s General Counsel. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15.

In the context of a Section 2241 petition, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 

held that a petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be excused where 

continuing the administrative appeal process would be futile. For example, in Fraley v. 

U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 1993), the BOP did not give a petitioner 

credit against her sentence for the seven months she spent under house arrest before her 

trial. To challenge that determination, the petitioner filed a “Request for Administrative 

Remedy” (the first formal level of administrative review) with the BOP. Id. at 925. The 

Community Correctional Office denied the petitioner’s request, citing to official BOP 

policy. Id. The petitioner then filed a Section 2241 petition. Although the petitioner did 

not pursue the remaining two levels of administrative review, the Court excused the 

failure as “the Regional Director would almost certainly have denied [the petitioner’s] 

request as well, citing the same official Bureau of Prisons policy.” Id.

In Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2012), the BOP deducted and 

applied a portion of a petitioner’s prison wages to the petitioner’s restitution obligation 

pursuant to the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. The petitioner argued that 

under the terms of his restitution order, the BOP did not have the authority to collect 

restitution payments. In challenging the BOP’s collection of the payments, the petitioner 

completed the first level of the BOP’s formal administrative review system. Id. at 1045. 

The warden denied the petitioner’s request, citing to official policy. The petitioner then 

filed a Section 2241 petition. After the district court dismissed the petition for the 

petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the petitioner appealed to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court concluded that the BOP’s reliance on official 

policy showed that further administrative appeals would “unquestionably have been 

denied.” Id. at 1046. The Court therefore held that the petitioner’s failure to exhaust was 

excused based on the futility exception. Id.

Here, Petitioner admits that he only filed a BP-8 form (request for informal 

resolution). (Doc. 14 at 1). Petitioner argues that his failure to exhaust his administrative 

- 8 -

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 8 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

remedies should be excused because “continuing the administrative remedy process 

would have been futile.” To support this argument, Petitioner cites to Ward v. Chavez, 

678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Yet unlike the petitioners in Ward and Nunez, 

Petitioner did not complete any level of the BOP’s formal administrative review process 

before filing the Petition. The undersigned finds that excusing Petitioner’s failure would 

encourage the deliberate bypass of the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program. Such 

bypass would not promote judicial efficiency, would deprive the BOP of the opportunity 

to utilize its agency expertise in addressing inmates’ grievances, and would deprive the 

BOP of the opportunity to correct its own mistakes. See United Farm Workers of 

America, 669 F.2d at 1253 (purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an 

administrative agency to exercise its expertise over the subject matter and to allow an 

opportunity to correct any mistakes that may have occurred, thus avoiding unnecessary or 

premature judicial intervention into the administrative process). 

The undersigned therefore recommends that the Court not excuse Petitioner’s 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Even if Petitioner’s failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies should be excused, Petitioner’s claim should be denied on the 

merits as discussed below.

C. The BOP Properly Calculated Petitioner’s Sentence

After a defendant is sentenced, the BOP is responsible for determining (i) the date 

the federal sentence “commences”; (ii) whether the defendant should receive credit for 

time spent in custody before the sentence “commenced”; and (iii) whether the defendant 

should be awarded credit for “good time.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3585(a) and (b); 18 U.S.C. § 

3621(b)(4); see also United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331-33 (1992) (BOP 

determines credit issues, not the district courts). Determination of the commencement 

date of a federal prisoner’s sentence, as well as credit for prior custody, is governed by 18 

U.S.C. § 3585:

(a) Commencement of sentence.--A sentence to a term of 

imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is 

received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives 

- 9 -

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 9 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official 

detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.

(b) Credit for prior custody.--A defendant shall be given 

credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any 

time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the 

sentence commences--

(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence 

was imposed; or 

(2) as a result of any other charge for which the 

defendant was arrested after the commission of the 

offense for which the sentence was imposed; 

that has not been credited against another sentence.

18 U.S.C. § 3585 (bold in original); see also Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th 

Cir. 1991); United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1301 (9th Cir. 1977) (“a federal term 

cannot begin until a prisoner has been received by federal authorities.”); United States v. 

Graham, 538 F.2d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1976) (“Unless time is served in federal custody, it 

does not count as credit for time served under a federal sentence.”). 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the BOP may designate a state prison as the 

place of service of a federal sentence, and it may make that designation nunc pro tunc. 

“Thus, when a person subject to a federal sentence is serving a state sentence, the [BOP] 

may designate the state prison as the place of imprisonment for the federal sentence—

effectively making the two sentences concurrent—or decline to do so—effectively 

making them consecutive.” Setser v. U.S., 132 S.Ct. 1463, 1467-68 (2012). However, “a 

designation for concurrent service of sentence will be made only when it is consistent 

with the intent of the federal sentencing court or the goals of the criminal justice system.” 

BOP Program Statement § 5160.05(8). Courts give the BOP considerable deference in 

determining whether to grant such requests. As explained by the Ninth Circuit: “a 

designation by the BOP is plainly and unmistakably within the BOP’s discretion and we 

cannot lightly second guess a deliberate and informed determination by the agency 

charged with administering federal prison policy.” Taylor v. Sawyer, 284 F.3d 1143, 

- 10 -

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 10 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1149 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Setser v. U.S., 132 S.Ct. 1463 

(2012).

Here, Petitioner argues that the BOP failed to follow proper procedures in 

considering Petitioner’s request for nunc pro tunc designation of the state sentence for 

service of his federal sentence. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that the BOP failed to ask 

the federal sentencing court if it has any objections to such a designation. (Doc. 5 at 14). 

Yet the BOP did make such an inquiry. Attached to Judge Collier’s Order granting 

Petitioner’s Motion for Clarification is a May 23, 2014 letter from the BOP to Judge 

Collier. The letter states that:

 [Petitioner] has requested that his federal sentence be 

served concurrently with the state term, which would be 

accomplished by the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) designating 

the state institution for service of his federal sentence. . . . 

 Such a retroactive designation is made if the federal 

sentencing Court indicates the federal term is to be concurrent 

with the state term, or if the federal sentencing Court does not 

state it’s [sic] intention, such designation may be completed 

after the review of all factors under Title 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). 

 The Bureau strives to administer sentences in accordance 

with federal statutes, Bureau policy, and the intent of the 

sentencing court. It is the Bureau’s preference that the federal 

sentencing court state its position with respect to a retroactive 

designation. . . . Should the Court indicate the sentence is to 

run concurrent with the state term, the Bureau will commence 

the sentence on the date of imposition, which will result in 

[Petitioner’s] release from custody on or about January 13, 

2019. . . . Should the Court indicate the term is to run 

consecutive to the state term, he will continue to a current 

projected release date of June 21, 2022.

Case No. 3:04-cr-00069-LC (N.D. Fla. June 15, 2004), Doc. 59; see Attachment 1 at 3-5.

On June 5, 2014, Judge Collier responded to the BOP’s letter, stating:

 This Court objects to a retroactive designation as the 

cases do not seem to be related. 

- 11 -

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 11 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 When this Court imposed its sentence of 103 months, the 

details of the charges and facts of the state case were 

unknown to the Court. To have made the sentence 

concurrent with some unknown future sentence in state 

court without intimate knowledge and understanding of the 

charges and the facts supporting those charges would have 

been an abuse of discretion. However, the state court in 

imposing its sentence had full knowledge and understanding 

of the charges, facts, and surrounding circumstances of the 

case. With this information, the court made a determination 

that the sentence should run consecutive or it would have 

stated it to be concurrent with the known federal sentence of 

which it had full knowledge. I trust and accept the state 

court judge’s judgment. 

Case No. 3:04-cr-00069-LC (N.D. Fla. June 15, 2004), Doc. 59; see Attachment 1 at 2 

(emphasis added).

The USMS took custody of Petitioner for service of his federal sentence on 

October 19, 2007. (Doc. 13-1 at 27). Therefore, under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), Petitioner’s 

federal term of imprisonment commenced on October 19, 2007. The time Petitioner 

spent in the State of Florida’s correctional facilities between May 16, 2004 and his 

release to federal custody on October 19, 2007 was credited towards Petitioner’s state 

sentence. (Doc. 13-1 at 44). 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) prohibits the award of double credit. 

U.S. v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992) (stating that Congress made clear in Section 

3585(b) that a defendant could not receive double credit for his detention time). 

Therefore, the time that was credited towards Petitioner’s state sentence may not be 

credited to Petitioner’s federal sentence. 

Petitioner’s claim in this case is that the BOP failed to comply with the 2004 U.S. 

District Court Judgment. The record shows that Petitioner’s federal sentence is properly 

being served consecutive to his state sentence. The record further shows that the BOP 

properly calculated Petitioner’s federal sentence. The undersigned therefore finds that 

the BOP did not fail to comply with the 2004 U.S. District Court Judgment and that the 

BOP properly concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to credit for the period of time 

that Petitioner served in the State of Florida’s correctional facilities. 

- 12 -

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 12 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny and 

dismiss the Petition (Doc. 5) with prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 5) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 11

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

11 A Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) is required where a § 2241 petition attacks the 

petitioner’s conviction or sentence. See Porter v. Adams, 244 F.3d 1006 (9th. 2001). 

Although that is not the case here, in the event Petitioner files an appeal and the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals concludes that a COA is required, the undersigned recommends 

that the Court decline to issue a COA because reasonable jurists would not find the 

recommended disposition of the Petition debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000).

- 13 -

 

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 13 of 20
1

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated this 19th day of February, 2015. 

- 14 - 

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 14 of 20
ATTACHMENT 1

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 15 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS CASE NO. 3:04cr69LAC 

JONATHAN TOMPKINS

REFERRAL AND ORDER

Referred to Judge Lacey Collier on July 23, 2014 

Motion/Pleadings: MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

Filed by Defendant on 6/26/14 Doc.# 58

RESPONSES:

on Doc.# ________________

on Doc.#

Stipulated Joint Pldg.

Unopposed Consented

JESSICA J. LYUBLANOVITS, CLERK OF COURT

s/Mary Maloy

LC (1 OR 2) Deputy Clerk: Mary Maloy

ORDER

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED this 24 day of th

July, 2014, that:

(a) The relief requested is GRANTED.

(b) See Attached. 

s/L.A. Collier

LACEY A. COLLIER

Senior United States District Judge

Entered On Docket: By: 

Rules 58 & 79(a) FRCP or 32(d)(1) & 55 FRCRP

Copies sent to:

Document No.

Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 16 of 20 Case 3:04-cr-00069-LC Document 59 Filed 07/24/14 Page 1 of 5
Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 17 of 20 Case 3:04-cr-00069-LC Document 59 Filed 07/24/14 Page 2 of 5
Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 18 of 20 Case 3:04-cr-00069-LC Document 59 Filed 07/24/14 Page 3 of 5
Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 19 of 20 Case 3:04-cr-00069-LC Document 59 Filed 07/24/14 Page 4 of 5
Case 2:14-cv-00222-DGC Document 16 Filed 02/19/15 Page 20 of 20 Case 3:04-cr-00069-LC Document 59 Filed 07/24/14 Page 5 of 5