Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01325/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01325-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph Gerald Eldridge,

Plaintiff,

v. 

JD Schroeder,

Defendant.

No. CV-14-01325-PHX-DGC (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

AND ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s “Motion for Permission and Court 

Ordered to Service by Ad in ‘USA Today’” (Doc. 54), Request of the Court (Doc. 57), 

and “Objection to Document 50” (Doc. 56). The Court has considered the motions and 

sets forth its rulings herein. 

In addition, the undersigned has considered Plaintiff’s “Complaint for Negligence”

(Doc. 21). For the reasons discussed in Sections II(A) and III(A) below, the undersigned 

recommends that the Court dismiss the “Complaint for Negligence.”1

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis in Buckeye,

Arizona. He has filed a pro se Complaint (Doc. 21) alleging a violation of his civil rights 

1 As the undersigned’s screening of the “Complaint for Negligence” is dispositive of claims raised in Plaintiff’s attempt to amend his complaint as a matter of right, the 

undersigned makes the following recommendation pursuant to Rule 72 (b), Fed. R. Civ. 

P., and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

 

Case 2:14-cv-01325-DGC Document 58 Filed 01/28/16 Page 1 of 8
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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges one count of excessive force in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment perpetrated against him by Defendant Schroeder. The Court 

screened Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Defendant Schroeder 

was required to answer.

On February 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed “Complaint for Negligence.” (Doc.21). On 

February 25, 2015, service was returned unexecuted as to Defendant Schroeder. (Doc. 

22). Defendant Schroeder has been terminated from the employ of the Arizona 

Department of Corrections (“ADC”). (Id.). The Attorney General thereafter filed under 

seal Defendant Schroeder’s last known home address (Doc. 26). The U.S. Marshals 

Service (“USMS”) was unable to serve Defendant Schroeder at his last known home

address. (Doc. 33). The home was vacant and had been sold as confirmed by USMS.

(Id.).

The Court authorized the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum to permit Plaintiff to 

conduct limited discovery for purposes of serving Defendant Schroeder (Doc. 37). 

Plaintiff has issued subpoenas to the ADC and Governor Ducey seeking “[a]ll of J.D. 

Schroeder employment records. Any and all documents that has J.D. Schroeder name on 

the document and has anything to do with J.D. Schroeder in any way on or in the form or 

document or material in any form.” The Court quashed the subpoena duces tecum to the 

Governor. (Doc. 50 at 4). The Court again required the ADC to search personnel records 

and disclose to the Court under seal any document reflecting the current location of 

Defendant J.D. Schroeder for purposes of service of process by USMS. (Doc. 50 at 4). 

The Attorney General filed a “Notice of Compliance with the Court’s December 4, 2015 

Order (Doc. 50)” on December 10, 2015, indicating that “[o]n December 9, 2015, the 

ADC Central Office and ADC Human Resources conducted another thorough search in 

attempt to locate any document reflecting an updated address for J.D. Schroeder.” (Doc. 

53 at 1). Counsel stated that the last known address of Defendant Schroeder previously 

filed under seal is the only information regarding Defendant Schroeder’s location in the 

possession of the ADC.

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USMS served a subpoena duces tecum upon the United States Postal Service

(“USPS”) on December 8, 2015, requesting “any and all knowed [sic] address’s [sic] for 

one J.D. Schroeder and any member of the J.D. Schroeder family.” (Doc. 51). USMS 

also served a subpoena duces tecum upon the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”).

(Doc. 49). The docket reflects that FBI Assistant General Counsel posted an email to the 

U.S. District Court, District of Arizona’s website, stating that a search of FBI records 

cannot be accomplished without a numerical identifier and “it is highly unlikely that the 

FBI would have any record of Mr. Schroeder’s current address. . . .” (Doc. 52).

Plaintiff now seeks permission to serve Defendant Schroeder by running “an ad in 

USA Today Newpaper [sic] or in the Media Networks.” (Doc. 54 at 1). Plaintiff further 

asks the Clerk of Court to send to the “U.S. Department of Justice FBI” Defendant 

Schroeder’s numerical identifier that Defendant Schroeder used at the ADC “(DOB, SS#, 

etc.)” in order for a “record search of NCIC” to be done. (Doc. 57 at 1). Plaintiff 

objects to the Court’s Order issued on December 4, 2015. (Doc. 50). Plaintiff also has 

filed “Complaint for Negligence” which the Court considers to be an amended complaint. 

(Doc. 21).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Amendment as a Matter of Course

Rule 15(a)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., allows a party to amend a pleading once as a matter 

of course within twenty one days after serving it. LRCiv 15.1(b) requires a party who 

files an amended pleading as a matter of course to file a separate notice of the filing of 

the amended pleading. “The notice must attach a copy of the amended pleading that 

indicates in what respect it differs from the pleading which it amends, by bracketing or 

striking through the text that was deleted and underlining the text that was added.” Id.

LRCiv 3.4 requires all complaints filed by incarcerated persons to be “signed and legibly 

written or typewritten on forms approved by the Court” unless the Court finds that the 

complaint is understandable and conforms to applicable requirements.

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A district court’s local rules are not petty requirements, but have “the force of

law.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 191 (2010) (citation omitted). The District

Court of Arizona routinely denies motions for leave to amend for failure to comply with

LRCiv 15.1(a). See, e.g., Bivins v. Ryan, 2013 WL 321847, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28,

2013); J-Hanna v. Tucson Dodge Inc., 2012 WL 1957832, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2012);

Huminski v. Heretia, 2011 WL 2910536, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 18, 2011).

B. Alternate Methods of Service

“Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the 

procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.” Omni Capital Intern.,

Ltd. V. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987), superseded by statute on other

grounds; SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2007). “A federal court is without 

personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been served in accordance 

with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.” Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1986).

Rule 4(e)(1)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides in relevant part that “[u]nless federal law 

provides otherwise, an individual . . . may be served in a judicial district of the United 

States by: (1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of 

general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is 

made; or (2) doing any of the following: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of 

the complaint to the individual personally. . . .” Under Rule 4.1(k), Ariz. R. Civ. P., if 

personal service becomes impracticable, then the court may direct that service be 

accomplished by alternate means. See BMO Harris Bank, N.A., v. D.R.C. Investments, 

L.L.C., No. CV-13-1692-PHX-LOA, 2013 WL 4804482, at *4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2013)

(personal service found to be impracticable where five attempts made to serve and 

defendants were evading service of process); see also Blair v. Burgener, 245 P. 3d 898, 

903-04 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (interpreting “impracticable” to mean difficult or 

inconvenient, not impossible).

If the court allows an alternate or substitute form of service, “reasonable efforts 

shall be undertaken by the party making service to assure that actual notice of the 

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commencement of the action is provided to the person to be served . . . .” Rule 4.1(k), 

Ariz. R. Civ. P. “[A]lternative method[s] of service must comport with constitutional 

notions of due process.” BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Guthmiller, No. CV-14-00275-PHXJAT, 2014 WL 2600362, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 10, 2014). The method must be 

“reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the 

pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Recommendation that the Court Dismiss Plaintiff’s “Complaint of 

Negligence” (Doc. 21)

The undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to comply with LRCiv 15.1(b) and 

LRCiv 3.4 in filing his “Complaint for Negligence.” (Doc. 21). Plaintiff has not 

presented the document on the proper form. Plaintiff is aware of the proper form because 

he used it when filing his Complaint. Nor has Plaintiff filed a separate notice that he is 

filing an amended complaint as a matter of course. There is no attachment to the required 

notice that indicates by strike out, underlining, or bracketing in what way the “Complaint 

for Negligence” (Doc. 21) differs from the Complaint (Doc. 1). Because the “Complaint 

for Negligence” does not comply with the Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for 

the District of Arizona, the undersigned will recommend that the “Complaint for 

Negligence” be dismissed without prejudice.

B. Plaintiff’s “Objection to Document 50” (Doc. 56)

Plaintiff has filed “Objection to Document 50,” which the undersigned construes 

as a timely filed objection directed to District Judge Campbell, seeking review of the 

Magistrate Judge’s Order filed on December 4, 2015. (Doc. 50). Pursuant to Rule 72(a), 

Fed. R. Civ. P., Plaintiff may file an objection to a Magistrate Judge’s nondispositive 

pretrial order within fourteen days after being served with a copy. The undersigned 

refers “Objection to Document 50” (Doc. 56) to District Judge Campbell for further 

action deemed appropriate.

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C. Plaintiff’s “Motion for Permission and Court Ordered to Service by Ad in 

‘USA Today’” (Doc. 54) 

This case was originally filed on June 13, 2014. (Doc. 1). The Court granted

Plaintiff’s fourth Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, screened Plaintiff’s

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 A(a), and required Defendant Schroeder to 

answer. (Doc. 14 at 2-4). The Court thereafter granted Plaintiff three extensions of time 

within which to serve Defendant Schroeder. (Docs. 17, 25, 37). The Court allowed the 

issuance of subpoenas duces tecum to “permit the Plaintiff to conduct reasonable 

discovery limited to ascertaining the requisite service information for Defendant 

Schroeder, specifically Defendant Schroeder’s current address.” (Doc. 37 at 2). Plaintiff 

has attempted to secure a current address for Defendant Schroeder through the use of the 

provided subpoenas duces tecum. However, despite the efforts Plaintiff has made to 

locate Defendant Schroeder, Defendant Schroeder has not been served. The last 

extension of time to serve expired on December 14, 2015. (Id.) The Court has ordered 

Plaintiff to show cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed without prejudice for 

failure to timely serve pursuant to Rule 4(m), Fed. R. Civ. P. (Doc 50). Plaintiff has filed 

an objection to the Court’s Order. (Doc. 56). Plaintiff has also responded to the order to 

show cause. (Doc. 55). Because Plaintiff has objected to the Court’s Order (Doc. 50) 

requiring Plaintiff to show cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed, the 

undersigned does not address Plaintiff’s response (Doc. 55) to the order to show cause at 

this time.

Plaintiff’s attempts to locate Defendant Schroeder have been unsuccessful to date.

Plaintiff now requests that the Court approve an alternate means of service. Plaintiff 

seeks permission to serve Defendant Schroeder by having USMS place an ad in the USA 

Today newspaper or “the Media Networks.” (Doc. 54 at 1). However, in order to 

approve an alternate method of service of process, the Court must find, and Plaintiff must 

show, that personal service is “impracticable.” Rule 4.1(k), Ariz. R. Civ. P. The Court 

finds that Plaintiff has not done so. Defendant Schroeder has left the employ of the ADC

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and moved. No evidence has been presented to suggest that Defendant Schroeder is 

evading service of process or that service of process is so difficult and inconvenient that 

an alternate method of service is necessary. If USMS had a current address for the 

Defendant, the Court has no reason to believe USMS would be unable to effectuate 

personal service.

Even if the Court were to find that personal service of Defendant Schroeder is 

impracticable, the alternate methods of service of process sought by Plaintiff do not 

comport with constitutional notions of due process. An ad in USA Today or Media 

Networks is not a reasonable alternative method of service that would assure actual 

notice of the lawsuit to Defendant Schroeder. Therefore, the Court will deny “Motion for 

Permission and Court Ordered to Service by Ad in ‘USA Today.’” (Doc. 54).

D. “Request of the Court” (Doc. 57)

Plaintiff has also filed a “Request of the Court.” (Doc. 57). Plaintiff’s document 

is not a proper motion. Plaintiff cannot request relief from the Court through the filing of 

a “Request” directed to the Clerk of Court. See Rule 7(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. (“A request 

for a court order must be made by motion.”). In addition, the Clerk of Court is not in 

possession of the information Plaintiff wishes to provide to the USMS. Nor is the Court. 

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s “Request of the Court.”

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

IT IS ORDERED denying “Motion for Permission and Court Ordered to Service 

by Ad in ‘USA Today.’” (Doc. 54).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying “Request of the Court.” (Doc. 57).

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss without prejudice “Complaint 

for Negligence.” (Doc. 21).

Effect of Recommendation

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

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However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., the parties shall have fourteen days 

from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific 

written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated this 28th day of January, 2016. 

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