Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01112/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01112-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Carlos Gonzales, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Chris Moody, 

Respondent.

No. CV-16-01112-PHX-SPL (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGE: 

I. Summary 

 After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of kidnapping, burglary, and firstdegree murder. The convictions were affirmed by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Petitioner argues the trial court committed errors regarding severance and jury unanimity. 

He also argues counsel provided ineffective assistance. Petitioner’s claims fail for the 

reasons outlined below. Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Petition be denied 

with prejudice. 

II. Factual and Procedural Background 

a. Facts and Trial Proceedings 

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The Arizona Court of Appeals found the following facts as true1: 

Gonzales and Dylan Noack (collectively, “Defendants”) were tried jointly as accomplices on charges of first degree felony murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, and burglary in the first 

degree, all dangerous offenses. The charges stemmed from an incident at A.G.’s apartment where L.O., A.G.’s roommate, 

was selling marijuana to Defendants and their mutual friend, 

Sylvia. Before the transaction was completed, Noack said, “You guys are getting robbed[,]” and Defendants shot L.O. 

multiple times killing him. Gonzales had forced A.G., who 

was present in the apartment but not involved in the 

marijuana sale, to the floor at gunpoint and ordered him to face the wall. Defendants fled, taking the marijuana and 

money they had brought with them to purchase the drugs. 

Gonzales testified at trial and admitted to shooting L.O., but explained he did so out of self-defense after seeing L.O. pull out a gun and begin firing. Gonzales denied restraining or threatening A.G., and he stated there was no plan to commit any crime at the apartment aside from purchasing marijuana. Gonzales further testified that he did not “take any money” or marijuana. 

The jury found Defendants guilty of first degree murder, 

kidnapping, and first degree burglary. The jury returned not- guilty verdicts for the armed robbery charges, but found Defendants guilty of the lesser-included offense of theft.... 

For the murder conviction, the trial court sentenced Gonzales 

to life imprisonment without the possibility of release for twenty-five years. The court imposed presumptive prison terms for the remaining convictions and ordered all sentences 

run concurrently. 

State v. Gonzales, No. 1 CA-CR 12-0442, 2013 WL 4507841, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 

22, 2013). 

b. Direct Appeal

 On March 18, 2013, Petitioner filed his opening brief on direct appeal. (Doc. 7-1, 

Ex. G, at 35.) On August 22, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions. Gonzales, 2013 WL 4507841, at *1. On September 26, 2013, Petitioner filed 

a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 7-1, Ex. J, at 134.) On 

 

1

 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ recitation of the facts is presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2012) (rejecting argument that statement of facts in state appellate court’s opinion should not be afforded the presumption of correctness). 

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February 11, 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review. (Doc. 7-2, 

Ex. L, at 2.) 

c. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings

On January 23, 2015, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. U, at 56.) On April 22, 2015, the trial court reviewed Petitioner’s 

claims and dismissed his petition. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. Z, at 112.) Petitioner did not file for 

review with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1 at 3-4; Doc. 7-2, Ex. AA, at 116.) 

d. Petitioner’s Habeas Claims

 On April 18, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1.) 

Petitioner alleges: 

(1) the trial judge improperly denied Petitioner’s motion to 

sever his case from his codefendant; 

(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, interview, and present key witnesses at trial; 

(3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to develop and present mitigating evidence and propose a plea agreement to the prosecution; and 

(4) the trial judge improperly instructed the jury regarding their duty to make unanimous findings regarding felony murder. 

III. Application of Law 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

a. The Petition is timely. 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). On April 22, 2015, the trial court reviewed Petitioner’s claims and 

dismissed his petition. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. Z, at 112.) On April 18, 2016, Petitioner filed a 

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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1.) The Petition is timely. 

b. Procedural Default

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”). In Arizona, this means petitioners must present their postconviction relief claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id.at 

31–32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum . 

. . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal 

basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

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claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 59 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet 

the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731–32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review, however, 

“if the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as 

a result of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 

1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se 

petitioners as well as to those represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner 

must establish that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to 

comply with the state’s procedural rules. Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1027 (9th Cir. 

2008). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

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petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United 

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or prejudice, the court need 

not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 

1999); Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 n.13. Lastly, “[t]o qualify for the ‘fundamental 

miscarriage of justice’ exception to the procedural default rule” a petitioner “must show 

that a constitutional violation has ‘probably resulted’ in the conviction when he was 

‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 

496). See also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make a credible 

showing of “actual innocence” by “persuad[ing] the district court that, in light of the new 

evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.”). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that 

was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

IV. DISCUSSION

a. Ground One 

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges the trial judge erred by failing to “sever his case 

from his co-defendant’s based on the grounds the two had antagonistic defenses and that 

the co-defendant had made statements implicating Petitioner in the crimes.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) 

Although Petitioner states his defense was self-defense, Petitioner does not describe the 

co-defendant’s trial defense. Petitioner also does not describe how the defenses were 

antagonistic and presents no cases in support of this claim. Petitioner’s only trial 

reference is that co-defendant’s counsel elicited on cross-examination of a witness that 

Petitioner also “yelled about getting robbed.” (Id.) But the Arizona Court of Appeals 

found that “whether only [codefendant] or both Defendants said ‘You are getting robbed’ 

is not an issue that rises to the level of antagonism necessary to order severance.” 

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Gonzales, 2013 WL 4507841, at *4. Petitioner does not explain how this single 

statement was antagonistic to his defense and how it was prejudicial in light of the all the 

evidence presented to the jury. Petitioner waived this argument by failing to properly 

present it. See United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 886 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We have 

cautioned that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort 

at developed argumentation, are deemed waived, and that it is not sufficient for a party to 

mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh 

on its bones.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Petitioner also failed to exhaust this claim because it was raised only as a state law 

claim on direct appeal. Petitioner argued on direct appeal that the denial of the motion to 

sever was a violation of Arizona Criminal Rule of Procedure 13.4(a) and the test adopted 

by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Cruz, 672 P.2d 470 (1983). (Doc. 7-1, Ex. G, at 

68-69.) 

 Further, a writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for violations of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Petitioner asserts in 

his Reply that a failure to sever is a violation of the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 11 at 7.) 

But “[t]he Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court’s denial of a 

motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution.” Grajeda v. Scribner, 541 F. 

App’x 776, 778 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 2013). To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly 

concluded that Zafiro and Lane2

 do not ‘establish a constitutional standard binding on the 

states and requiring severance in cases where defendants present mutually antagonistic 

defenses.” Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 776 (citation and quotation omitted). Petitioner’s 

claim is not cognizable on federal review. 

 Finally, assuming arguendo Petitioner’s claim is cognizable, and assuming it is the 

claim raised on direct appeal, Petitioner fails to demonstrate manifest prejudice. “A 

defendant seeking a reversal by reason of a district court’s denial of a motion to sever 

 

2 Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993); United States v. Lane, 474 

U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1996) (explaining that “[i]mproper joinder does not, in itself, violate the Constitution”). 

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must establish that the prejudice he suffered from the joint trial was so ‘clear, manifest or 

undue’ that he was denied a fair trial. That is even true where the defenses are 

antagonistic.” Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation 

omitted). Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals thoroughly reviewed the arguments 

regarding the “you are getting robbed” statement and whether the defenses in this case 

were antagonistic. The court found the statement was properly admitted and not so 

antagonistic to warrant severance. Gonzales, 2013 WL 4507841, at *4. The court also 

found, contrary to Petitioner’s claim, that “the record reflects [codefendant] and Gonzales 

presented consistent defenses, and each argued the other was not guilty.” Id. Under the 

deferential standard afforded to the state court decision, Petitioner’s claim fails. 

b. Ground Two 

i. Procedural Default 

 Petitioner asserts “trial counsel ineffectively failed to investigate, develop and 

present key witnesses during his trial proceedings....” (Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner does not 

contest that he failed to exhaust this claim when he failed to present it to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 11 at 9.) Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally 

defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1. Petitioner moves to excuse the default by 

asserting “[a]ny failure to fairly present this claim to the state court is attributable to the 

ineffective assistance of Mr. Gonzales’s appellate post-conviction counsel.” (Doc. 11 at 

9.) Because this claim involves an alleged ineffective assistance of PCR counsel in the 

failure to allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the Court must consider whether 

Petitioner has shown “cause” to excuse this procedural default under the “narrow 

circumstance” delineated by Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012). 

 Petitioner bears the burden to show that “the underlying ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate 

that the claim has some merit.” Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate this claim has merit. This case involves an armed robbery 

and felony murder during what the prosecution described as a “drug rip[off].” (Doc. 7-3, 

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Ex. HH, at 165.) The prosecution argued that Petitioner and his codefendant planned the 

drug robbery that resulted in kidnapping and murder. Petitioner’s counsel argued that 

Petitioner testified “the plan was to buy marijuana, not to commit a robbery.” (Doc. 7-3, 

Ex. HH, at 207.) Instead, Petitioner argued he acted in self-defense when a victim 

(marijuana seller) pulled out a gun and began firing. Gonzales, 2013 WL 4507841, at *1. 

 Petitioner alleges that “defense counsel never interviewed any of” the witnesses 

who may have hidden evidence at the scene of the crime. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner asserts 

those witnesses “could have undermined the felony counts that propped up the charge of 

felony murder in this case.” (Doc. 1 at 7) (emphasis added). Petitioner argues one of the 

witnesses may have testified that neither defendant was seen leaving the crime scene with 

a bag of marijuana. (Id.) But Petitioner may not simply speculate about what a witness 

might say. Petitioner must produce evidence regarding the witness testimony. Grisby v. 

Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Speculation about what an expert could 

have said is not enough to establish prejudice.”). “[E]vidence about the testimony of a 

putative witness must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the 

witness or on affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state that the testimony would have 

been favorable; self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.” 

United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991). 

 Petitioner argues that a witness may have testified that defendants were not seen 

carrying a bag (of marijuana) from the scene of the murder. But Petitioner does not 

present evidence or cite to the record regarding the bag, or how this singular piece of 

evidence was critical to the defense. Defendants were acquitted of the armed robbery but 

convicted of kidnapping and armed burglary as the predicate for felony murder, likely 

diminishing the value of the “bag” evidence. Also, the bag could have been hidden at a 

nearby location or removed by a third party. The Court is not obligated to search the 

record to advance Petitioner’s bare allegation. “We review only issues which are argued 

specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief. We will not manufacture arguments 

for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim . . . .” Greenwood v. FAA, 

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28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted). Because Petitioner fails to 

prove this claim has merit, Petitioner fails to excuse the procedural default. 

ii. Merits 

 Petitioner also fails to prove this claim on the merits. The trial court denied this 

claim on PCR review. The court wrote: 

 First, Defendant argues that his counsel was 

ineffective because he failed to conduct seven “key” witness interviews that could have resulted in evidence to exculpate Defendant from the theft charge. However, all but one of 

those witnesses apparently were interviewed by officers and their statements were provided to the defense. Defense 

counsel explained that these witnesses were not interviewed 

because their statements did not assist Defendant and, in 

some instances, could have caused more damage than good. 

Defendant has not shown that the decision not to interview 

these witnesses, under these circumstances, was 

unreasonable. Notably, Defendant does not argue that the information in these recorded interviews was helpful, and he acknowledges that his investigator has been unable to 

interview them. Thus, he simply speculates that if they had been interviewed again by defense counsel, they may have said something exculpatory. That is not the “demonstrable 

reality” necessary to show ineffectiveness. Moreover, even if 

Defendant had been found not guilty of theft, these witnesses could not have had anything to offer on the kidnapping count. 

Therefore, the ultimate result, a felony murder conviction, would not have been changed by their testimony. 

(Doc. 7-2, Ex. Z, at 113.) 

 Here, Petitioner fails to establish how a failure to interview witnesses prejudiced 

his case. Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance—counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice—there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687-88. “When the claim at issue is one for ineffective 

assistance of counsel, moreover, AEDPA review is doubly deferential . . . because 

counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment . . . [and] federal 

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courts are to afford both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” 

Woods v. Etherton, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016) (per curiam) (quotations and citations 

omitted). 

 Here, Petitioner’s speculation regarding potential witnesses fails to establish 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the reasons explained above. Under these 

circumstances, this claim of ineffective assistance is conclusory and without merit, and 

Petitioner fails to show that he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner 

has failed to present any evidence to show that the trial court’s decision regarding his 

ineffective assistance claim is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established Supreme Court law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

As such, this Court finds that the trial court did not unreasonably apply clearly 

established Federal law or unreasonably determine the facts in light of the evidence 

presented, and Petitioner cannot meet his burden to show prejudice. 

c. Ground Three

 Petitioner argues “trial counsel ineffectively failed to investigate, develop and 

present mitigation and propose a plea agreement to the State . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 8.) 

Specifically, Petitioner argues that trial counsel did not “propose a plea agreement to the 

State” or submit a mitigation report “to the prosecutor in furtherance of reaching an 

agreement in the matter.” (Id.) Petitioner adds that counsel “failed to advise him that he 

could be convicted of felony murder if he were convicted of either the kidnapping or the 

armed robbery....” (Id.) Petitioner did not raise these claims in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, so these claims are procedurally defaulted. The court also finds Petitioner fails 

to demonstrate the claim has merit. 

 The trial court denied this claim on PCR review. The court wrote: 

Second, Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective because he did not 

make a plea offer to the State when the State did not tender an offer. Again, even assuming the failure to make an offer was deficient performance, it is pure speculation whether the State would have accepted such an offer, particularly when the State had to expend resources to try the case against the co-defendant. Defendant’s conclusion that if his counsel “had done the 

requisite work and negotiation with the County Attorney’s Office, [Defendant] would have accepted the plea offer” is not supported by any 

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facts that a plea offer actually would have been available. 

(Doc. 7-2, Ex. Z, at 113.) 

 The negotiation of a plea bargain is “‘a critical phase of litigation for purposes of 

the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. 

Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010)). If 

counsel has misadvised a defendant about the law during a plea negotiation, or 

improperly coerced a defendant to accept a plea bargain, counsel’s performance may be 

found deficient. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (“If a plea bargain 

has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in 

considering whether to accept it.”). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel based on representations during plea negotiations, Petitioner must show that the 

outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice. Lafler, 

132 S. Ct. at 1384. 

 Petitioner fails to establish counsel was ineffective regarding the plea agreement 

process. Importantly, Petitioner does not establish 1) what plea agreement counsel should 

have sought, 2) whether Petitioner would have accepted that specific offer, and 3) 

whether there is any evidence the State would have agreed to that offer. Petitioner merely 

alleges that counsel failed to develop and “propose a plea agreement to the State.” (Doc. 

1 at 8.) Petitioner’s claim is pure speculation. Petitioner presents no evidence to show 

prejudice (that the outcome of the plea process would have been different).3

 See United 

States v. Boone, 62 F.3d 323 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding no prejudice where petitioner 

failed to show “the prosecution was willing to enter plea negotiations with [defendant’s] 

counsel, or that such plea would have been acceptable to the court, or that the resulting 

sentence would have been different than that imposed”). Moreover, under the “doubly 

deferential” standard, Petitioner fails to argue or establish why the trial court 

unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law or unreasonably determined the 

 

3

 The Court reviewed the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, but that 

Petition also does not specify what plea offer Petitioner sought. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. Y, at 108.) 

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facts in light of the evidence presented. 

 Regarding the claim that counsel failed to advise Petitioner that he could be 

convicted of kidnapping/felony murder or armed robbery/felony murder, Petitioner 

surprisingly fails to present any evidence or argument regarding this point. The Court, 

after an independent review of the record, did not find this issue was raised during any 

state-court proceeding. Petitioner did not address this argument in the Reply. Petitioner’s 

single-sentence claim is waived because Petitioner presents no argument or foundation 

for the claim. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“conclusory allegations 

which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”). 

d. Ground Four 

 Petitioner argues “the trial court erred when it gave a felony murder jury 

instruction that did not require the jurors to be unanimous in their findings . . . .” (Doc. 1 

at 9.) Petitioner asserts the jury instruction “did not call for unanimity in regard to the 

underlying felony offense” but instead “jurors were free to find Petitioner committed 

Burglary in the first degree, Armed Robbery and/or kidnapping to convict” of felony 

murder. (Id.) 

 In order to warrant federal habeas relief, an error in jury instructions “cannot be 

merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned,’ but must violate some 

due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. State of 

California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). To prevail on Ground 

Four, Petitioner must demonstrate that the instructions provided by the trial court so 

“infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quotation and citation omitted). 

 Petitioner’s claim fails because the Constitution does not require unanimous 

agreement on the theory underlying the conviction. In Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 

(1991), the Supreme Court held that the constitution permitted a general verdict for firstdegree murder based on either premeditation or felony murder, without jury unanimity as 

to which theory applied. The Court stated that “[w]e have never suggested that in 

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returning general verdicts in [multiple theory] cases the jurors should be required to agree 

on a single means of commission, any more than the indictments were required to specify 

one alone,” 501 U.S. at 631. See also Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 937 n. 1 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (“Submitting a multi-theory crime to the jury without requiring unanimity on 

any one predicate theory is not a constitutional violation.”); Sullivan v. Borg, 1 F.3d 926, 

927-28 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Schad to find that instruction allowing jury to convict 

defendant of first degree murder without unanimity on felony murder or premeditated 

murder did not violate due process). 

 To meet this burden, petitioner must point to the existence of clearly established 

United States Supreme Court precedent supporting his claim to relief. Petitioner cites to 

no case supporting his claim. Petitioner’s claim fails. 

V. Evidentiary Hearing 

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are 

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. The Court will therefore recommend that the 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

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Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 15th day of December, 2016. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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