Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00674/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00674-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID C. PATKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALOMARI, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00674-JLT (PC)

AMENDED ORDER REQUIRING 

PLAINTIFF TO EITHER FILE AMENDED 

COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY COURT OF 

WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ONLY ON 

CLAIMS FOUND TO BE COGNIZABLE

(Doc. 1)

RESPONSE DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS

I. Background

Plaintiff, David C. Patkins, is a prisoner in the custody of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action 

on May 7, 2014. (Doc. 1.)

1

 

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

 

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All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners via the 

CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.

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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

B. Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

Plaintiff complains of acts that occurred while he was housed at California Correctional 

Institute (“CCI”) in Tehachapi, California. Plaintiff names Appeals Coordinator I. Alomari,

Correctional Officers I. Vargas and Davies, Sergeant T.C. Davis, CCII M. Nipper, and Associate 

Wardens S. Reed and R. Hughes as Defendants in this action. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. 

Plaintiff alleges that his access to the courts was obstructed as he was prevented from 

effectively utilizing the institutional grievance procedure at CCI and that he was retaliated against 

for attempting to do so. The details of Plaintiff's allegations against each Defendant are discussed 

where applicable below.

Plaintiff has stated a few cognizable claims and may be able to amend to correct the 

deficiencies in his pleading so as to make additional claims cognizable. Thus, he is being given 

the applicable standards based on his stated claims and leave to file a first amended complaint or 

to notify the Court that he desires to proceed on the claims found cognizable in this order. 

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. However, "the liberal pleading 

standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations." Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 

330 n.9 (1989). "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 

1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

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"Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. While 

Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949,

977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally and are afforded 

the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, courts are 

not required to indulge unwarranted inferences. Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 

681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 

defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 

S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

If he chooses to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff should endeavor to make it as 

concise as possible. He should merely state which of his constitutional rights he feels were 

violated by each Defendant and its factual basis. Where the allegations against two or more 

Defendants are factually intertwined, Plaintiff need not repeat the factual allegations separately 

against each Defendant. Rather, Plaintiff should present his factual allegations and identify 

whichever Defendants he feels are thereby implicated.

2. Legibility

Plaintiff is incarcerated and is representing himself in this action. Under those 

circumstances, the Court is lenient in overlooking technical and other errors. However, Plaintiff’s

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miniscule writing and failure to double space his sentences renders his second amended complaint 

very difficult to decipher. Plaintiff is required to submit filings that are Aclearly legible.@ Local 

Rule 7-130(b). In submitting a first amended complaint in compliance with this order, Plaintiff is 

required to write in larger handwriting and to double space his sentences. Local Rule 7-130(c). 

The failure to do so will result in an order striking any subsequently amended complaint from the 

record. 

3. Exhibits

Plaintiff=s Complaint is comprised of approximately 26 pages of factual allegations 

followed by 230 pages of exhibits. 

First, the Court is not a repository for the parties= evidence. Originals, or copies of 

evidence (i.e., prison or medical records, witness affidavits, etc.) need not be submitted until the 

course of litigation brings the evidence into question (for example, on a motion for summary 

judgment, at trial, or when requested by the Court). If Plaintiff attaches exhibits to his amended 

complaint, the complaint must specifically reference each exhibit. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(c). For 

example, Plaintiff must state Asee Exhibit A@ or something similar in order to direct the Court to 

the specific exhibit Plaintiff is referencing. Further, if the exhibit consists of more than one page, 

Plaintiff must reference the specific page of the exhibit (i.e. ASee Exhibit A, page 3@). Exhibits 

which are merely attached to the complaint but are not referenced in the complaint will not be 

considered. 

Second, to the extent that exhibits are not referenced in the complaint, Plaintiff is advised 

that submission of evidence at this time is not proper. Plaintiff is reminded that, for screening 

purposes, the Court must assume that Plaintiff=s factual allegations are true. It is unnecessary for 

a plaintiff to submit exhibits in support of the allegations in a complaint. Thus, if Plaintiff 

chooses to file a first amended complaint, he would do well to simply state the facts upon which 

he alleges a Defendant has violated his constitutional rights and refrain from submitting exhibits

unless necessary. 

4. Linkage Requirement

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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 

other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named 

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff=s 

federal rights. 

Plaintiff must clearly identify which Defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each 

violation of his constitutional rights and their factual basis as his Complaint must put each

Defendant on notice of Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 

1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).

5. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a)

Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a) states that "[a] party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, 

counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate 

claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party." 

"Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not 

be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different 

defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, 

multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing feesfor the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any 

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prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees." George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 

(7th Cir. 2007) citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

The fact that claims are premised on the same type of constitutional violation(s) (i.e. 

retaliation) against multiple defendants does not make them factually related. Claims are related 

where they are based on the same precipitating event, or a series of related events caused by the 

same precipitating event. Plaintiff is advised that if he chooses to file a first amended complaint, 

and fails to comply with Rule 18(a), all unrelated claims will be stricken.

D. Claims for Relief

1. Retaliation

Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and to 

be free from retaliation for doing so. Waitson v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-1115 (9th Cir. 

2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir.2009). A retaliation claim has five 

elements. Id. at 1114. 

There are five elements that a plaintiff's claim for retaliation must address. First, the 

plaintiff must allege that the retaliated-against conduct is protected. Id. The filing of an inmate 

grievance is protected conduct, Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005), as are the 

rights to speech or to petition the government, Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant took adverse action 

against the plaintiff. Rhodes, at 567. Third, the plaintiff must allege a causal connection between 

the adverse action and the protected conduct. Waitson, 668 F.3d at 1114. Fourth, the plaintiff 

must allege that the “official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from 

future First Amendment activities.” Robinson, 408 F.3d at 568 (internal quotation marks and 

emphasis omitted). Fifth, the plaintiff must allege “that the prison authorities’ retaliatory action 

did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution. . . .” Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 

527, 532 (9th Cir.1985). 

It bears repeating that while Plaintiff need only allege facts sufficient to support a 

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plausible claim for relief, the mere possibility of misconduct is not sufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678-79, and the Court is “not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The conduct identified by Plaintiff as retaliatory must have been motivated by his engaging in a 

protected activity, and the conduct must not have reasonably advanced a legitimate penological 

goal. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271-72 (citations omitted). Thus, mere allegations that Plaintiff 

engaged in protected activity, without knowledge resulting in animus by a Defendant, is 

insufficient to show that Plaintiff=s protected activity was the motivating factor behind a 

Defendant’s actions.

Plaintiff alleges that on March 25, 2012, he submitted two inmate grievances and the very 

next day, Defendants C/Os Davies and Vargas ransacked his cell, accused him of damaging state 

property, threatening he would have to pay for it, and began rumors via the porters that 

"something might happen to complainers' property." (Doc. 1, at p. 7, 10) Plaintiff alleges that on 

June 24, 2012, he handed Defendant C/O Vargas an inmate grievance and the very next day, 

Defendants C/Os Davies and Vargas again ransacked his cell and issued him an unsubstantiated 

disciplinary violation (id., at pp. 7, 9) and kept Plaintiff's photo album (id., at p. 14). These 

allegations state cognizable retaliation claims against Defendants C/Os Davies and Vargas. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was the subject of excessive force (apparently not intended to be 

part of this action) on which he filed a staff misconduct appeal and that a little over a month later, 

he was removed from the yard and placed in a holding cage and told to sign a "CDC-114D Fear 

Order," which he refused. (id., at p. 21). Approximately 20 minutes later, Defendant Sgt. Davis 

showed up and told him that he was "going to the hole" "for making a staff complaint" and he 

was placed in Ad Seg for approximately four months thereafter (id). These allegations state a 

cognizable retaliation claim against Defendant Sgt. Davis. 

Plaintiff fails to show that Defendants AC Alomari, CCII Nipper, and/or Associate 

Wardens Reed and Hughes had knowledge of Plaintiff's protected activities prior to their acts of 

which Plaintiff complains. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable retaliation claim against 

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Defendants AC Alomari, CCII Nipper, and/or Associate Wardens Reed and Hughes.

2. Due Process -- Inmate Appeals/Grievances

Plaintiff appears to grieve the processing, and reviewing of his 602 inmate appeals by 

Defendants AC Alomari, CCI Nipper, and Associate Wardens Reed and Hughes. 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due 

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action 

for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for 

which the protection is sought. AStates may under certain circumstances create liberty interests 

which are protected by the Due Process Clause.@ Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). 

Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint which 

Aimposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life.@ Id.

A[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any 

substantive right upon the inmates.@ Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 

accord Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 

F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement 

to a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) 

(existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). AHence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest 

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.@ Azeez v. 

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Actions in reviewing prisoner=s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under 

a ' 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. The argument that anyone who knows about a 

violation of the Constitution, and fails to cure it, has violated the Constitution himself is not 

correct. AOnly persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against 

a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.@ Greeno 

v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir.2005) accord George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th 

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Cir. 2007); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7th Cir.1999); Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 

992-93 (7th Cir.1996). 

Thus, since he has neither a liberty interest, nor a substantive right in inmate appeals, 

Plaintiff fails, and is unable to state a cognizable claim against AC Alomari, CCII Nipper, and/or 

Associate Wardens Reed and Hughes for the processing and/or reviewing of his 602 inmate 

appeals. 2 

3. Access to the Courts

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). However, "prison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not 

ends in themselves, but only the means for ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity to present 

claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts." Id., at 351 (internal quotes 

and citations omitted). Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or 

hindrance of Aa litigating opportunity yet to be gained@ (forward-looking access claim) or from 

the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). 

A[T]he injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim.@ 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Inmates do not enjoy a constitutionally protected right Ato transform 

themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions 

to slip-and-fall claims.@ Id. at 355. Rather, the type of legal claim protected is limited to direct 

criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions such as those brought under section 

1983 to vindicate basic constitutional rights. Id. at 354 (quotations and citations omitted). 

AImpairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly 

constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.@ Id. at 355 (emphasis in original). 

"Although prison officials may not obstruct a prisoner's access to the courts by unreasonably 

 

2

To the extent that Plaintiff included allegations regarding the handling of his inmate appeals in an attempt to show 

exhaustion of his administrative remedies, he is advised that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that must be 

raised by a defendant. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Plaintiff need not demonstrate exhaustion in his 

complaint. Instead, arguments pertaining to the availability or unavailability of administrative remedies may be 

raised in response to a defense motion.

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blocking his access to a law library, prison officials may place reasonable limitations on library 

access in the interest of the secure and orderly operation of the institution." Id. (citing Bell v. 

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-48 (1979)).

The interference, that Plaintiff alleges, with his use of the prison grievance system, in and 

of itself, does not amount to a cognizable claim for violation of his right of access to the court. 

Plaintiff's allegations that on June 22, 2012, he submitted an appeal to Defendant C/O Vargas that 

was never returned to Plaintiff forced "default and loss of non-frivolous deliberate indifference 

injury suit" (Doc. 1, p. 10) and his allegations that he "sought court resolve -- to no avail" because 

of Defendant C/O Vargas disposing of his appeals for the "gross, rampant, and escalating pattern 

of CCI staff misconduct" (id.) does not state a cognizable claim against Defendant C/O Vargas 

for violation of Plaintiff's right of access to the court. Likewise, Plaintiff's allegations that the 

actions of Defendants CCII Nipper and AC Alomari "effectively preventing access to the prison 

grievance process, forcing default of the 9-24-12 appeal" (id., at p. 15) are not cognizable.

Further, Plaintiff's allegations that "the courts fail to acknowledge petitioners nonfrivolous case (even disregarding to treat the habeas corpus petition as a writ of mandate for 

return of property . . . that CCII M. Nipper and AC Alomari has [sic] caused petitioner injury, 

forcing default to the loss of irreplaceable and sentimental family memories C/O Vargas has 

stolen" (id., at p. 16)3are also not cognizable. Plaintiff's allegations that he "sought court resolve, 

to no avail . . . and, forced to default, lost non-frivolous First Amendment Retaliation claim 

against C/O Vargas" (id., at p. 20)4is likewise not cognizable. 

However, Plaintiff's allegations in this regard fall short of demonstrating unlawful 

interference with access to the court. To assert a forward-looking access claim, the non-frivolous 

“underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint 

sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002). 

 

3

It is noteworthy that Plaintiff refers to pages 62-111 of his exhibits attached to the Complaint to support this claim. 

However, this generalized reference to exhibits violates Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(c) and the Court declines to ferret 

through forty-nine pages of exhibits attempting to support Plaintiff's allegations.

4 This time, Plaintiff refers to 65 pages of exhibits (pages 112-177) attached to the Complaint which the Court 

declines to review. 

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To state a claim, the plaintiff must describe this “predicate claim ... well enough to apply the 

‘non-frivolous' test and to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than 

hope.” Id. It is not enough for Plaintiff merely to conclude that the claim was non-frivolous. 

Instead, the complaint should “state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(a) just as if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement 

should describe any remedy available under the access claim and presently unique to it.” Id. at 

417–418. 

Moreover, when a prisoner asserts that he was denied access to the courts and seeks a 

remedy for a lost opportunity to present a legal claim, he must show: (1) the loss of a nonfrivolous or arguable underlying claim; (2) the official acts that frustrated the litigation; and (3) a 

remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit. 

Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413–414, 

overruled on other grounds, Hust v. Phillips, 555 U.S. 1150, 129 S.Ct. 1036, 173 L.Ed.2d 466 

(2009)).

Here, it appears that Plaintiff contends that the habeas action which, apparently the Court 

concluded should have been presented as a petition for writ of mandate, was unsuccessful because

Defendant C/O Davies failed to issue a log number to one of Plaintiff's inmate appeals.

5

 (id., at 

pp. 8, 54, 55) Why this failure translates to an action which doomed his habeas petition, is not 

clear. Finally, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the remedy he sought in the prior action is no 

longer available. Because he has failed to state facts to support each of these elements, he has not 

stated a cognizable claim against Defendant C/O Davies for violation of Plaintiff's right of access 

to the court.

4. Supervisory Liability

 

5

Notably, the Monterey County Superior Court allowed that Plaintiff could submit a copy of the appeal log to 

demonstrate that he “appealed the failure to process or respond to his appeal or the requests submitted to either 

facility. Petitioner has the ability to obtain copies of the inmate appeals tracking system log. Petitioner should 

submit a copy of the log reflecting his appeal was received. This will enable the court to determine if prison 

officials are in fact failing to timely process appeals.” (Doc. 1 at 55) However, there is no showing that Plaintiff 

ever did so.

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It appears that Plaintiff may have named CCII Nipper and Associate Wardens Reed and 

Hughes because they hold a supervisory position. 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their 

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be 

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief 

under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that 

would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 

promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for 

the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In 

a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the 

term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's 

misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; each government official is only liable for his or 

her own misconduct. Id. 

A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the

elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to 

dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch 

allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather 

because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the 

form of a factual allegation.@ Id. 

Thus, Plaintiff=s allegation that Defendants AC Alomari, CCII Nipper, and Associate 

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Wardens Reed and Hughes are liable because their subordinates violated Plaintiff's rights is not 

cognizable. 

II. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff is given the choice to either file a first amended complaint or to proceed on the 

claims found cognizable in this order: (1) for retaliation against Defendants Sgt. Davis, and C/Os 

Davies and Vargas. Plaintiff must either notify the Court of his decision to proceed on these 

cognizable claims, or file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the service of this order. 

If Plaintiff needs an extension of time to comply with this order, Plaintiff shall file a motion 

seeking an extension of time no later than thirty days from the date of service of this order.

If Plaintiff chooses to file a first amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See 

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The first amended complaint must allege in 

specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 

1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the 

claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 

(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's first amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and 

plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. 

The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified 

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by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff 

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his first amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints).

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 

Court in this order, or

b. notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file a first amended 

complaint and wishes to proceed only on the claims identified by the Court 

as viable/cognizable in this order; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2014 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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