Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04510/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04510-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carl Pehr Erik Karlsson, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

Ronn Motor Group Incorporated, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-04510-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs Carl Pehr Erik Karlsson and Håkan Melin’s 

(“Plaintiffs”) ex parte motions for extension of time for service (Doc. 15) and service by 

alternative means (Doc. 16). Plaintiffs previously received an extension of time to serve 

Defendants Ronnal Maxwell Ford and Jane Doe Ford (“Defendants”) (Doc. 14) but have 

still been unable to properly serve them.

1 For the following reasons, the Court will grant 

both motions. 

On June 20, 2019, Plaintiffs initiated this action. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs allege they 

were fraudulently induced to invest in securities offered by Defendants. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

Defendants’ company, Ronn Motor Group, was raising capital for the manufacture of 

hydrogen or electric powered automobiles. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) In exchange for promissory 

notes and stock options, Plaintiffs transferred a total of $116,250 to Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 

29.) When those promissory notes matured, however, Plaintiffs were never transferred 

cash or common shares in the company. (Id. ¶¶ 33-36.) Demands for payment went 

 

1 The corporate defendant in this case, Ronn Motor Group, Inc., has received notice. 

(Doc. 11 at 1-2.) 

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unanswered. (Id. ¶¶ 37-41.) As a result, Plaintiffs brought claims for breach of contract, 

unjust enrichment, breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent 

inducement, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud in 

connection with the sale of securities. (Id. at 8-17.) Summonses were issued on June 24, 

2019. (Doc. 8.) 

On September 5, 2019, Plaintiffs applied for an entry of default against Ronn Motor 

Group, the corporate defendant in this case. (Doc. 11.) Ronn Motor Group had failed to 

respond to the summons, despite its registered agent receiving the summons and complaint

on July 8, 2019. (Id. at 1-2.) The next day, the Clerk entered default against Ronn Motor 

Group. (Doc. 12.) 

On September 20, 2019, Plaintiffs moved to extend the time to serve Defendants. 

(Doc. 13.) Plaintiffs indicated they had “undertaken a great deal of due diligence” yet had 

been unable to find and serve Defendants. (Id. at 1-2.) Thus, Plaintiffs requested an 

additional 90 days to complete service of process. (Id. at 2.) The Court granted that request 

in a text-only docket entry on September 23, 2019. (Doc. 14.) 

In their current motions, Plaintiffs state they are still unable to locate Defendants. 

(Doc. 16 at 3.) They again ask the Court to extend the time to effectuate service and also 

ask the Court to authorize service by alternative means. (Docs. 15, 16.) 

Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “if the plaintiff 

shows good cause for the failure [to serve], the court must extend the time for service for 

an appropriate period.” See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A) (court may extend time for 

good cause if a request is made before the deadline expires). Indeed, district courts have 

“broad” (but not “limitless”) discretion to extend the service deadline “even in the absence 

of good cause.” Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown good cause. Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 

F.2d 444, 447 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he provisions of Rule 4 should be given a liberal and 

flexible construction.”). Plaintiffs, despite hiring a private investigator, have been unable 

to identify a residential address for Defendants, which prevents them from serving

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Defendants at home. (Doc. 16 at 3.) Nor have Plaintiffs been able to effectuate service at 

Ford’s place of business—the address provided for Ronn Motor Group leads to “a lady in 

the office” who informed the process server that “Ford shares an office with her however 

she rarely sees him as he travels to China for business all the time.” (Doc. 13-1 at 5.) 

In conjunction with their request for more time, Plaintiffs ask the Court to authorize 

alternative service. (Doc. 16.) Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 

that an individual (with exceptions not relevant here) may be served in a judicial district of 

the United States by:

(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts 

of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or 

where service is made; or

(2) doing any of the following:

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the 

individual personally;

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of 

abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; 

or

(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by 

law to receive service of process.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4

Rule 4.1 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure details the available state-law 

procedures for serving process within Arizona. See also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b) (authorizing 

service outside of Arizona in the same manner as Rule 4.1, which governs service within 

Arizona). Pursuant to Rule 4.1(d) of the Arizona Rules, an individual may be served within 

Arizona using the same methods outlined in Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules. 

Additionally, Rule 4.1(k) of the Arizona Rules provides for alternative means of service: 

“If a party shows that the means of service provided in Rule 4.1(c) through Rule 4.1(j) are 

impracticable, the court may—on motion and without notice to the person to be served—

order that service may be accomplished in another manner,” in which case “the serving 

party must make a reasonable effort to provide the person being served with actual notice 

of the action’s commencement” and must, at a minimum, “mail the summons, the pleading 

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being served, and any court order authorizing an alternative means of service to the lastknown business or residential address of the person being served.” 

It is unclear whether Plaintiffs seek permission to serve Defendants by publication 

or whether they seek permission to serve by alternative means. (Doc. 16 at 1, 4.) Plaintiffs, 

at times, style their request as a request for service by publication under Rule 4.1(l) of the 

Arizona Rules. (Id.) To obtain permission to serve by publication under Rule 4.1(l), “a 

party must file an affidavit setting forth facts indicating it made a due diligent effort to 

locate an opposing party to effect personal service. A ‘due diligent effort’ requires such 

pointed measures as an examination of telephone company records, utility company 

records, and records maintained by the county treasurer, county recorder, or similar record 

keepers.” Sprang v. Petersen Lumber, Inc., 798 P.2d 395, 399 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). That 

said, Plaintiffs’ motion concludes by stating that “[a] Proposed Order granting this Motion 

with delivering the complaint via certified mail to Defendant Ronnal Ford’s verified place 

of business, statutory agent for Ronn Motor Group, Inc., and Defendant Ron Ford’s 

potential counsel . . . is lodged herewith.” (Doc. 16 at 4.) It appears, then, that Plaintiffs 

seek to effectuate service by mailing the complaint to others who may have contact with 

Defendants, rather than by publishing notice in a newspaper. This form of alternative 

service may be authorized under Rule 4.1(k) of the Arizona Rules. See, e.g., Blair v. 

Burgener, 245 P.3d 898, 901, 906 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that “leaving copies 

of the required documents with a woman working at the front desk of the [served party’s] 

office” was adequate alternative service.) 

The Court will construe Plaintiffs’ motion as seeking service by alternative means, 

rather than by publication.2 Rule 4.1(k) requires a showing of impracticability. 

Impracticability in this context “requires something less than the ‘due diligence’ showing 

required before service by publication may be utilized.” Blair, 245 P.3d at 903. Moreover, 

“the showing for alternative service requires something less than a complete inability to 

 

2 Construing the motion in this manner also avoids the problem that service by 

publication may not be the most practicable solution. See, e.g., Ruffino v. Lokosky, 425 

P.3d 1108, 1113 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018) (rejecting the use of notice by publication because 

viable methods of alternative service existed). 

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serve the defendant because the defendant’s current address is unknown or the defendant 

completely has avoided service of process.” Id. at 904. Thus, in the context of Rule 4.1(k), 

“impracticable” simply means that the traditional means of service have proved to be 

“extremely difficult or inconvenient.” Id. at 903. 

Here, Plaintiffs have attempted service on Defendants at Ronnal Ford’s place of 

business six times. (Doc. 16 at 3.) Each time, the process server has been rebuffed. (Id.)

It is impractical to continue attempting to personally serve Defendants at their place of 

business—Defendants are not there. 

Plaintiffs have also demonstrated that personal service at Defendants’ residence is 

impractical. Plaintiffs have been unable to locate a residential address for Defendants. 

(Id.) Even after Plaintiffs hired a private investigator, Defendants are nowhere to be found.

(Id.) The investigator also concluded that Defendants are using aliases, P.O. boxes, and 

fake phone numbers to avoid detection. (Id.) In other words, Plaintiffs have gone to 

significant lengths to find Defendants. Further searching seems “extremely difficult or 

inconvenient.” Blair, 245 P.3d at 904 (internal quotation omitted). See also Barber v. 

Lilly, 2013 WL 5498245, *3 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“Plaintiff made a dozen or so unsuccessful 

attempts to personally serve the Defendants at the Lillys’ place of business and their current 

residence. Plaintiff has demonstrated that her continued efforts to serve Defendants by 

traditional means are impracticable within the meaning of Rule 4.1(k).”); Composite 

Industrie S.A. v. Vision Air Am., Inc., 2014 WL 1230492, *2 (D. Ariz. 2014) (traditional 

service impracticable where process server attempted service at defendant’s home three 

times and at his business twice and evidence of evasion was present).

Although some form of alternative service is warranted here, only one of Plaintiffs’ 

suggestions is appropriate. Plaintiffs have made clear that Defendants cannot be found at 

Ronnal Ford’s place of business. Delivering service there seems futile. The Court also 

will not grant Plaintiffs’ request to provide notice to Defendants’ “potential counsel.” 

Aside from one voicemail, there is no evidence that Scott Lawler is acting as counsel for 

Defendants. Whatever may be going on between Defendants and Lawler, the Court is 

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unwilling, of its own accord, to assume an attorney-client relationship where there may not 

be one. 

Thus, the most logical point of service is on the registered agent for Ronn Motor 

Group. Plaintiffs have successfully served the company previously (Doc. 11-1). If anyone 

knows the whereabouts of Defendants, the registered agent is the best bet. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiffs’ motion for extension of time to effectuate service (Doc. 15) is 

granted in part. Plaintiffs will have 14 days from this Order to serve Defendants.

(2) Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to effectuate service through alternative means 

(Doc. 16) is granted. Service may be completed and will be considered effective by 

sending the summons, the original complaint (Doc. 1), and Doc. 4 through USPS certified 

mail addressed to Ronn Motor Group’s registered agent at 1013 Centre Road, Suite 403-

B, Wilmington, DE 19805. 

(3) The date of effective service shall be deemed the date on which Plaintiffs 

deliver the mailing into the possession of the United States Postal Service for delivery (i.e.,

after the documents are placed in the mail). 

Dated this 21st day of January, 2020.

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