Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05508/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05508-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 14, 2000 Decided February 15, 2000

No. 98-5508

Fort Sumter Tours, Inc.,

Appellant

v.

Bruce Babbitt,

Secretary of the Department of the Interior and

Robert G. Stanton, Director, National Park Service,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00293)

Peter Dickson argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were Paul F. Enzinna and Jody Manier Kris.

Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Wilma

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A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney.

Before: Silberman, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. (FST)

provides passenger boat service to Fort Sumter National

Monument in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. The service is provided pursuant to a concession contract with the

Secretary of the Interior, through the National Park Service

(NPS or "Park Service"), under which FST pays the Secretary an annual franchise fee. This case involves a dispute

over the fees charged during the second and third five-year

periods of FST's current contract. The district court rejected

FST's challenge to the fees, as do we. We conclude that this

court is without jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's attack on

the fee charged during the second contractual period, because

that challenge is to NPS' nonreviewable refusal to settle thenpending litigation between the parties concerning that fee.

We reject plaintiff's attack on the fee charged during the

third contractual period because FST failed to comply with

the contractual requirements for seeking reconsideration.

I

FST's current, fifteen-year contract with the Park Service

was signed in 1986 and will expire in December 2000. The

contract is governed by the National Park System Concessions Policy Act, 16 U.S.C. ss 20-20g,1 and Chapter 24 of

NPS' Concessions Guidelines, commonly referred to as NPS48 ("NPS-48") (Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 88-135). Under the

contract, FST must pay the Park Service an annual franchise

fee, which is a set percentage of plaintiff's annual gross

receipts. The fee is calculated to provide the concessioner

__________

1 In 1998, the Concessions Policy Act was replaced by the

National Park Service Concessions Management Improvement Act,

16 U.S.C. s 5951 et seq. The new legislation does not affect the

issues in this case.

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with a reasonable profit, based on a comparison to rates of

return in similar industries. See 16 U.S.C. s 20b(d); NPS-48

(J.A. at 100). In evaluating a concessioner's reported net

profits, NPS may adjust reported expenses by comparing

them to industry statistics. See NPS-48 (J.A. at 126).

FST's 1986 contract is divided into three five-year periods.

During the first, the franchise fee was set at 4.25% of gross

receipts. Section 9(e) of the contract provides that the fee for

the second and third five-year periods may be reconsidered

on either party's initiative pursuant to specified procedures.

See J.A. at 32-33. This case involves efforts to reconsider the

fee charged during each of those two periods.

A

In June 1991, at the end of the first five-year period, the

Park Service notified plaintiff that it was reconsidering the

franchise fee. After an initial analysis, NPS tentatively concluded that the appropriate fee should be 12%. That conclusion was based on an examination of FST's financial reports,

which persuaded the Park Service that FST had leased one of

its boats from a related partnership in a deal that was "not an

arm's length transaction and has resulted in lower earnings

than would have occurred under an outright purchase of the

boat." See NPS Franchise Fee Analysis ( J.A. at 74). NPS

also found that FST overpaid its corporate officers relative to

benchmarks for the water transportation industry. See id. at

73. Plaintiff objected to the proposed fee increase, and

notified NPS that rather than arbitrate or negotiate the fee,

"we believe it is in our mutual interest to seek a declaration of

rights by the courts on this critical issue." Fort Sumter

Tours v. Babbitt ("FST I"), No. 0918-1AJ, slip op. at 3

(D.S.C. Feb. 3, 1994) (J.A. at 138). Having received notice of

FST's decision to forego arbitration and proceed to court, the

Park Service notified FST that it had made a final decision to

raise the fee to 12%.

On April 21, 1993, FST filed suit in the United States

District Court for the District of South Carolina, charging,

inter alia, that: (1) NPS lacked contractual or statutory

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authority to increase the franchise fee; (2) the increase

violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.

s 706, because NPS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in

employing the procedures it used to raise the fee; and (3)

imposition of a 12% fee violated the APA because it was

unjustified "by substantial evidence regarding the profits

earned by FST." FST I, slip op. at 4, 14 (J.A. at 139, 149).

The South Carolina District Court rejected all of plaintiff's

claims, finding the agency's procedures authorized and rational, and holding that the 12% fee was "not so excessive as to

preclude a reasonable opportunity for [plaintiff] to earn a

profit from its concession." Id. at 11-21 (J.A. at 146-56).

Plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit, which, after de novo review, upheld the

district court's decision. The Court of Appeals rejected

FST's contractual and APA challenges to the franchise fee,

finding that "NPS had both the statutory and the contractual

authority to raise FST's franchise fee.... [and that] the fee

determination itself [was] unobjectionable." Fort Sumter

Tours, Inc. v. Babbitt ("FST II"), 66 F.3d 1324, 1337 (4th Cir.

1995). On February 22, 1996, plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

During the week of March 10, 1996, while the petition for

certiorari was pending, FST's president, George Campsen,

Jr., approached NPS' Concessions Program Manager, Robert

Yearout, at a trade association meeting. Campsen asked

Yearout whether he was willing to discuss the franchise fee.

Although the parties dispute the contents of the ensuing

conversation,2 shortly after the meeting Campsen wrote Yearout a letter. In it, Campsen noted that "the litigation was

ongoing" and that the "judicial process" was "time consuming

and expensive," and he suggested that it was "of mutual

interest that NPS and FST make a good faith attempt to

__________

2 Yearout contends he informed Campsen that, because the

matter was still in litigation, he could not make any commitments

without the approval of the Department of Justice. See Yearout

Decl. p 6 (J.A. at 174-75). Campsen says Yearout merely told him

he would be happy to look at any information Campsen wanted to

present. See Campsen Responsive Decl. p 5 (J.A. at 210).

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resolve this matter." J.A. at 177-78. Campsen also expressed his appreciation for Yearout's "willingness to explore

the opportunity for some 'common ground' resolution." Id. at

177.

On May 10, 1996, Campsen and his son met with three

government officials: Yearout, an Interior Department attorney, and a financial analyst for the Park Service. The parties

again dispute the contents of their conversation.3 Five days

after the meeting, the Interior Department attorney sent

Campsen a letter, thanking him for the opportunity to meet,

and concluding that "[b]ecause of the continuing litigation

... , any further correspondence on this matter will come

from John Douglas, Assistant U.S. Attorney." Id. at 187.

On May 28, 1996, the Supreme Court denied the petition

for certiorari. See Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Babbitt, 116

S. Ct. 1848 (1996). In early June, the NPS financial analyst

traveled to South Carolina to meet with FST officials. On

July 1, 1996, shortly after the expiration of the 25-day period

for filing a petition for rehearing of the denial of certiorari,

Assistant U.S. Attorney Douglas sent FST's counsel a letter

advising plaintiff that "we have concluded that settlement

would not be in the interests of the United States." J.A. at

198.

B

While the litigation regarding the second contractual period

was winding to a close, so too was the second period itself.

Under section 9(e) of FST's concession contract, a party must

__________

3 NPS contends that agency counsel stated at the outset that

the purpose of the meeting was to "receive from FST information to

be considered by NPS for the purpose of possibly recommending to

the Department of Justice whether the Justice Department should

engage in settlement discussions regarding FST's pending lawsuit."

Hanslin Decl. p 5 (J.A. at 181). NPS also contends that Campsen

"stated that he understood and agreed as to this purpose." Id. p 6

(J.A. at 181). Campsen remembers no such statement by agency

counsel and denies making the statement attributed to him. See

Campsen Responsive Decl. pp 15, 16 (J.A. at 211-12).

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request reconsideration in writing within sixty days of the

end of a five-year period. If no adjustment has been agreed

to within 120 days thereafter, the concessioner is required to

reduce its position to writing within thirty days and submit it

to the Secretary for a determination of appropriate fees. See

J.A. at 32.

On June 14, 1996, the day after the second period ended,

plaintiff wrote John Tucker, the superintendent of Fort Sumter National Monument, requesting that, for the third period,

the 12% fee be reduced to the original 4.25%. See id. at 205.

On August 1, Tucker wrote back:

[W]e would be pleased to meet with you to discuss your

proposal in relation to the probable value of the contract.

We would propose a meeting in late September at which

our respective positions would be discussed.... I will

get back to you in a few weeks to discuss a meeting date.

Id. at 207. No further correspondence ensued, and no meeting was held.

C

While the parties disputed the second- and third-period

franchise fees, FST refused to pay the increase and continued

to remit payments at the 4.25% rate. Between June 1993 and

June 1996, NPS sent FST five letters demanding payment of

past due amounts. See id. at 190-97. In December of 1996,

NPS presented FST with a debt compromise proposal for the

approximately $1 million in back fees, interest, and penalties

still due. FST counter offered. See id. at 200. On January

21, 1997, NPS rejected the counteroffer and notified FST that

if payment were not made by February 28, 1997, NPS would

terminate the contract. See id. at 203.

Plaintiff responded by filing the present lawsuit, which

challenged the Park Service's refusal to reduce the franchise

fee for the second and third contractual periods. At an early

hearing in the case, NPS advised the district court that a final

decision had not yet been reached regarding the third-period

fee, but that such a decision would be forthcoming. That

decision was made on March 31, 1997. NPS notified plaintiff

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that the 12% fee would remain in effect because FST had

failed to reduce its final position to writing and submit it to

the Secretary by the date specified in the contract. Referring to section 9(e) of the contract, NPS' notification letter

stated:

As we did not come to agreement upon an adjustment of

the franchise fee by October 12, 1996, 120 days after

June 14, 1996, you had 30 days from that date, to

November 11, 1996, to reduce your position to writing

and to submit it to the Secretary for a determination of

an appropriate fee for the period commencing June 14,

1996. This you did not do. Likewise, you did not

request that advisory arbitration be initiated in connection with your request for reconsideration of the contract's 12% franchise fee.

J.A. at 311-12.

Although Plaintiff's complaint raised multiple claims, only

two sets remain at issue on this appeal. In the first, FST

contended that the Park Service violated the APA by arbitrarily and capriciously refusing--in July 1996--to reduce the

second-period fee as requested by plaintiff. Granting summary judgment for defendants, the district court did not

reach the merits of this claim, but instead held that NPS'

refusal was judicially nonreviewable because it represented

nothing more than a refusal to settle the then-pending South

Carolina litigation. See Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Babbitt

("FST III"), No. 97cv00293, slip op. at 12-16 (D.D.C. Aug. 28,

1998) (J.A. at 312-16). Plaintiff's second contention was that

NPS breached the concession contract, and acted arbitrarily

and capriciously, by refusing to reconsider the fee for the

third period. The court granted summary judgment for

defendants on that contention as well, holding that plaintiff

had failed to submit its request for reconsideration in accordance with the procedures outlined in section 9(e) of the

contract. See id. at 16-18 (J.A. at 316-18). This appeal

followed.4

__________

4 Plaintiff's other claims challenged various NPS actions in

connection with the concession contract, on grounds ranging from

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II

We begin with the dispute over the second-period fee.

Because the district court decided the issue on summary

judgment, our standard of review is de novo. See HunterBoykin v. George Wash. Univ., 132 F.3d 77, 79 (D.C. Cir.

1998); see also Grant v. United States Air Force, 197 F.3d

539, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The question before us, however, is

quite narrow. Needless to say, we have no authority to

review the decision of the Fourth Circuit, which upheld the

merits of NPS' initial decision to raise the franchise fee.

Plaintiff contends, however, that we may review NPS' July

1996 refusal to reconsider and lower the fee. The question

before us, then, is whether NPS' refusal is subject to judicial

review.

An agency's refusal to reconsider a prior decision is only

reviewable under limited circumstances. See ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs (BLE), 482 U.S. 270, 278-81

(1987); Sendra Corp. v. Magaw, 111 F.3d 162, 166-67 (D.C.

Cir. 1997). It is true that "[i]f for any reason the agency

reopens a matter, and after reconsideration, issues a new and

final order, that order is reviewable on its merits." Sendra

111 F.3d at 167; see BLE, 482 U.S. at 278. Plaintiff contends

that NPS did reopen the fee issue in 1996. NPS, by contrast,

contends that it merely evaluated the issue for purposes of

deciding whether to settle plaintiff's South Carolina lawsuit,

and that the July 1996 letter from Assistant U.S. Attorney

Douglas represented a decision not to do so. FST does not

dispute that the Justice Department has sole authority to

settle lawsuits on behalf of the United States, see 28 U.S.C.

__________

breach of contract to violation of the APA. The district court

dismissed those claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), in some

instances because they were barred by the Fourth Circuit's decision

in FST II. See FST III, slip op. at 19, 22 (J.A. at 319, 322).

Plaintiff has not appealed from the dismissal of any claims other

than those discussed in the text.

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ss 516, 519, and that a decision whether to settle a case like

FST's--if that is what occurred here--would not be reviewable under the APA, see Oral Arg. Tr. at 5. Cf. New York

State Dep't of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1213-15 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (holding nonreviewable FCC decision to settle enforcement action); Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 685-87

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding nonreviewable FDA decision to

settle and dismiss enforcement action).5

We agree with the district court that the July 1996 letter

represented a decision not to settle the litigation between the

parties. The government's initial written response to plaintiff's overtures, sent by Interior Department attorney Lars

Hanslin in May of 1996, made clear that the government was

undertaking to review the matter in connection with the thenpending litigation. Hanslin advised FST that the Park Service's consideration would be made "in consultation with

appropriate officials of the Department of Justice." J.A. at

187. And he emphasized that

Because of continuing litigation between Fort Sumter

Tours and the National Park Service, any further correspondence on this matter will come from John Douglas,

Assistant United States Attorney. As I am sure you

appreciate, the National Park Service, because of the

litigation is not in a position to directly respond to the

concerns you have raised.

Id. (emphasis added).

The government's final decision letter, dated July 1, 1996,

makes the character of its determination even more manifest.

That letter, which is set out in relevant part in the

__________

5 Although there may be circumstances in which a substantive

statute places limits on an agency's settlement discretion, see New

York State Dep't of Law, 984 F.2d at 1215, no such argument has

been advanced concerning the Justice Department's litigation authority here.

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margin,6 was sent not by the agency, but by its Justice

Department counsel. It was sent not to FST itself, but to its

attorneys. Its subject-reference line indicated that the topic

was FST's lawsuit. The letter recited that the Park Service

had reviewed the franchise fees "with a view toward potential

settlement." Id. at 198 (emphasis added). And it informed

plaintiff's counsel that: "[W]e have concluded that settlement

would not be in the best interests of the United States." Id.

(emphasis added).

Notwithstanding the express language of the July 1996

letter, plaintiff contends that it represents the denial of a

__________

6 Marvin D. Infinger, Esq.

Sinkler & Boyd, P.A.

....

RE: Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Bruce Babbitt

C/A No. 2:93-0918-1, District of South Carolina

No. 94-1570, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

No. 95-1353, Supreme Court

Dear Marvin:

As you no doubt know, the responsible officials at the Park

Service have recently engaged in a thorough review of the

franchise fees that were at issue in the above litigation, at the

instigation of your client, with a view toward potential settlement. This review was undertaken with the full agreement

and cooperation of the Justice Department. After due consideration of both the merits of your client's contentions and the

procedural posture of the case, we have concluded that settlement would not be in the interests of the United States. I

would emphasize that this decision was based both upon the

review of the apparent fairness of the franchise fees imposed

and the fact that the Supreme Court has denied the writ of

certiorari which you had sought. This concludes my handling

of this case and I am closing my file on it at this time.

....

Sincerely yours,

....

John H. Douglas

Assistant U.S. Attorney

J.A. at 198-99 (emphasis added)

reopened administrative decision, rather than the rejection of

a settlement. FST proffers three related arguments. First,

it argues that the letter cannot represent a decision regarding

settlement because the South Carolina litigation had effectively ended by the time FST made the March 1996 overture to

which the letter responded. All that remained pending at

that time was the petition for certiorari, which, FST suggested at oral argument, was not "cert. worthy." Oral Arg. Tr. at

11.

FST's argument is unpersuasive. While we raise our eyebrows at plaintiff's admission that it filed a certiorari petition

knowing it was unworthy of Supreme Court review,7 the fact

remains that that petition was pending at the time FST's

president approached NPS' Concessions Program Manager

for reconsideration. Indeed, FST's March 15, 1996 letter

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expressly noted that "the litigation is ongoing because ...

[FST] has petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court in the hopes of

judicially correcting what we perceive as a grave injustice."

J.A. at 177. Moreover, also pending at that time--and still

pending after the petition was denied--were NPS' efforts to

collect nearly a million dollars in unpaid fees, interest, and

penalties. As plaintiff itself later suggested, those, too, were

potentially part of a global settlement between the parties.

See id. at 201 (Dec. 31, 1996 letter from FST, proposing to

pay fees in arrearage at 5% and third-period fees at 6%).

Although plaintiff's self-assessment of its weak litigating position turned out to be correct, that merely confirms the

wisdom of the government's ultimate decision not to settle; it

does not establish that the government never assessed the

situation on its own.

Second, plaintiff contends that the July 1996 letter reflects

an administrative reopening, rather than the rejection of a

settlement, because it recites that the Park Service engaged

in a "thorough review" of the franchise fees, considered "the

merits" of FST's contentions, and made its decision based in

part on a "review of the apparent fairness of the franchise

__________

7 See Oral Arg. Tr. at 11 ("This was not a cert. worthy case.

Anybody could have looked at it and decided that.").

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fees imposed." J.A. at 188-89. According to FST, these are

indicators of a true agency reconsideration, not merely of a

decision whether to settle a lawsuit.

Once again, we find plaintiff's argument unpersuasive. The

fact that the agency considered the merits of plaintiff's position can hardly serve to remove its decisionmaking from the

realm of settlement. Indeed, it would be extraordinary for

the government to make a settlement decision without considering the merits of the underlying dispute. And as we have

said more generally with respect to determining whether an

agency has truly reopened a prior decision: "That the agency

discusses the merits at length when it denies a request for

reconsideration does not necessarily mean the agency has

reopened the proceedings.... It would make no sense whatsoever to hold that when an agency offers an explanation for

'affirming a prior denial,' it has in effect reopened the proceedings and rendered a new, judicially-reviewable decision."

Sendra, 111 F.3d at 167 (quoting BLE, 482 U.S. at 281). The

Supreme Court has made precisely the same point:

It is irrelevant that the commission's order refusing

reconsideration discussed the merits of the unions' claim

at length.... [O]ne cannot intelligently rule upon a

petition to reconsider without reflecting among other

things, whether clear error was shown. It would hardly

be sensible to say that the Commission can genuinely

deny reconsideration only when it gives the matter no

thought; nor to say that the character of its action (as

grant or denial) depends upon whether it chooses to

disclose its reasoning. Rather, it is the Commission's

formal action, rather than its discussion, that is dispositive.

BLE, 482 U.S. at 280-81

But, plaintiff continues, surely the inclusion of language

indicating the agency undertook a "thorough review" at least

renders the letter ambiguous. And, that being so, was not

summary judgment inappropriate, since on summary judgment uncertainties are to be resolved in the non-moving

party's favor? See FST Br. at 26 (citing Adickes v. S. H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). The answer is: not

these kinds of uncertainties. For the reasons just stated, the

"thorough review" language does not render the letter ambiguous. But even if it did, ambiguity as to whether the agency

had reopened its decisionmaking would not advance appellant's cause. To the contrary:

Only "when the agency has clearly stated or otherwise

demonstrated" that it has reopened the proceeding will

the resulting agency decision be considered a new final

order subject to judicial review under the usual standards.... [U]nless the agency clearly states or indicates that it has reopened the matter, its refusal of a

request for reconsideration will be treated as simply that.

Sendra, 111 F.3d at 167 (quoting Morris v. Sullivan, 897 F.2d

553, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Not even plaintiff contends that NPS "clearly" stated it

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had reopened the matter.

Finally, plaintiff argues that it was error for the district

court to conclude that NPS' decision was a nonreviewable

settlement determination without first demanding that the

agency produce the full administrative record of the 1996

decision. Summary judgment was inappropriate, FST contends, because there are factual disputes over what happened

at several meetings between the parties, see supra notes 2 &

3, and because NPS did not characterize its decision as one

involving settlement "until this suit was filed and then only in

the [form of] post hoc affidavits." FST Br. at 26.

We reject this argument as well. As the district court

held, while there may be factual disputes in this case, they

are not material to resolution of the issue at hand. Here we

have a formal decision document: the July 1, 1996 letter from

Assistant U.S. Attorney Douglas. That document is not "post

hoc." To the contrary, because it was a contemporaneous

communication of the agency's final determination, it is as

"hoc" as a document can be. The decision expressly communicated on the face of that document is: "[W]e have concluded

that settlement would not be in the interests of the United

States." J.A. at 198 (emphasis added). In such circumstances, both this court and the Supreme Court have held

that we should look no further. "Courts will not," we said in

Sendra Corp. v. Magaw, "look behind the agency's formal

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disposition of the reconsideration request to see whether the

agency 'in fact' reopened its original decision (and thus rendered a new final order)." Sendra, 111 F.3d at 167. "Where

the [agency's] formal disposition is to deny reconsideration,

and where it makes no alteration in the underlying order, we

will not undertake an inquiry into whether reconsideration 'in

fact' occurred." BLE, 482 U.S. at 280-81.

In sum, we agree with the district court that the July 1996

decision was a nonreviewable settlement determination. This

Circuit has recently held that the nonreviewability of a similar kind of agency decision is not simply a question of

deference to agency discretion, but of the absence of jurisdiction. See Entravision Holdings, LLC v. FCC, No. 99-1025,

slip op. at 4 & n.* (D.C. Cir. 2000) (denial of reconsideration);

see also BLE, 482 U.S. at 282, 287. Accordingly, we must

vacate the judgment with respect to the claims regarding the

second contractual period, and remand with instructions to

dismiss those claims for lack of jurisdiction.

III

In its remaining set of claims, plaintiff contends that NPS'

refusal to reconsider the franchise fee for the third five-year

period breached the concession contract and was arbitrary

and capricious. NPS refused to reconsider on the ground

that, as it read the contract, FST had failed to comply with a

requirement that it submit a second written statement of its

position after 120 days had passed without agreement. The

district court found that the language of the contract unambiguously supported NPS' interpretation. See FST III, slip

op. at 17 (J.A. at 317). Because the ambiguity of a contract is

a question of law, our review is de novo. See Bennett Enters.,

Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d 493, 497 (D.C. Cir.

1995); LTV Corp. v. Gulf States Steel, Inc., 969 F.2d 1050,

1055 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Like the district court, we believe the contract is clear and

that the government was entitled to enforce it according to its

terms. Section 9(e) states:

Within sixty (60) days after the end of each 5-year

period of this contract or as otherwise specified, at the

instance of either party hereto, the amount and character

of the franchise fees provided for in this section may be

reconsidered. Such request shall be made in writing

within 60 days after the end of the applicable contract

year but cannot be made before the end of such year. In

the event that the Secretary and the Concessioner cannot

agree upon an adjustment of the franchise fees within

120 days from the date of the request for renegotiation as

made by either party, the position of the Concessioner

must be reduced to writing within 30 days therefrom

and submitted to the Secretary for a determination of

appropriate fees....

J.A. at 32 (emphasis added). Thus, the contract requires that

if the parties cannot agree within 120 days from the date of

the original written request, the concessioner must again

reduce its position to writing within another thirty days and

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submit it to the Secretary. It is conceded that no writing was

submitted after the passage of the 120-day period.

Plaintiff contends that its original request for a 4.25% fee

for the third period--submitted in its June 14, 1996 letter--

should be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a writing.

As the district court noted, however, the contract plainly

"includes reference to two separate writings: a written request initiating the reconsideration process, and a written

summary of the concessioner's position to be submitted sometime after 120 days, but no more than 150 days after the

original request, assuming the parties do not resolve the issue

earlier." FST III, slip op. at 17 (J.A. at 317). At bottom,

FST asks us to read the latter provision out of the contract--

a suggestion that is inconsistent with our general approach to

contract interpretation. See United States v. Insurance Co.

of N. Am., 83 F.3d 1507, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting the

"cardinal principle of contract construction: that a document

should be read to give effect to all its provisions") (quoting

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52,

63 (1995)); see also YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28

Fed. Cl. 366, 389 (1993) ("When interpreting the language of

a contract, a court must give reasonable meaning to all parts

of the contract and not render portions of the contract

meaningless.").

Nor is the provision at issue unimportant to the contract.

Section 9(e) channels fee disputes through a series of resolution points short of litigation. The second writing requirement compels the concessioner to reconsider its own position

and make a final offer, while at the same time ensuring that

the Secretary will have a last clear chance to negotiate a

settlement. FST chose to ignore that contractual requirement and resort directly to the courts (for a second time).

Like the district court, we find the contract unambiguous and

plaintiff's failure to abide by its terms fatal to its cause.8 Nor

do we find anything in the government's behavior inconsistent

with its duty to act in good faith when enforcing its rights

under a contract. See Solar Turbines, Inc. v. United States,

23 Cl. Ct. 142, 156-57 (1991).9

IV

For the forgoing reasons, we reject plaintiff's challenges to

the franchise fees the Park Service established for the second

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8 The district court further concluded that because NPS did not

reconsider the third-period fee, "there was no 'final agency action'

subject to review under the APA." FST III, slip op. at 18 (J.A. at

318). The government does not press this point on appeal, see NPS

Br. at 24, and we conclude that NPS' third-period decision is

reviewable. Notwithstanding the contract's use of the term "reconsideration" to describe the process for adjusting fees, the contract

essentially grants the concessioner the right to a new agency

decisionmaking for each five-year period, provided it follows the

requisite procedures. See J.A. at 32-33; see also 16 U.S.C.

s 20b(d). NPS' decision is therefore reviewable, although FTS'

appeal fails on the merits because plaintiff did not follow those

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procedures.

9 This is not a case like Orange Cove Irrigation District v.

United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 790 (1993), cited by plaintiff, in which the

Court of Federal Claims held the government to have breached its

covenant of good faith and fair dealing by insisting on adherence to

an unreasonable deadline. There, the two-week deadline imposed

by the government was not contained in the contract, was imposed

without notice to the contracting party, and was so short as to make

it "almost certain" that compliance would be impossible. Id. at 801.

Moreover, the contracting party did comply "soon" after the deadUSCA Case #98-5508 Document #496499 Filed: 02/15/2000 Page 16 of 17
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and third periods of the concession contract. The judgment

with respect to the second contractual period is vacated and

remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims for lack of

jurisdiction. In all other respects the judgment below is

affirmed.

__________

line. See id. at 802. The situation here is different in every

respect.

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