Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03607/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03607-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 751
Nature of Suit: Labor - Family and Medical Leave Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARAH RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

AKIMA INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES, 

LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-3607-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Sarah Rodriguez brings this case asserting a claim under the federal 

Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. ("FMLA"); a claim under the 

California Family Rights Act, Cal. Lab. Code § 12945.2 ("CFRA"); and a claim of wrongful 

termination based on the alleged FMLA/CFRA violations. Defendants Akima 

Infrastructure Services LLC and Akima LLC now seek summary judgment as to all 

causes of action, or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment. Having read the 

parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, 

the court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Akima Infrastructure Services LLC ("AIS") is a small company and a 

wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant Akima LLC ("Akima"). See Declaration of 

Terrance Reichert ("Reichert Decl.") in support of defendants' motion, at ¶ 2. AIS 

provides staff augmentation services for federal agencies and specializes in recruiting, 

interviewing, and screening supplemental labor to ensure that they will support and 

advance clients' missions. Id. 

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Lawrence Livermore National Security (“LLNS”) has a prime contract with the 

United States Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Id. ¶ 3. LLNS and AIS entered into a subcontract for AIS to provide staff augmentation 

services for LLNS and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (“LLNL”). Id. When 

LLNS has a need for support staff, LLNS has the option of initiating an internal requisition 

to fill a position using LLNS resources to hire directly, or LLNS can request that AIS, the 

established subcontractor for staff augmentation, recruit candidates and hire an AIS 

supplemental labor employee. Id. If the latter, LLNS compensates AIS for providing the 

service and the employee pursuant to a multiplier in the contract. Id. 

Mr. Reichert, who is the AIS General Manager over the supplemental labor 

contract with LLNS, manages the project for LLNS. Id. ¶ 1. He works with the support 

staff situated in the Project Management Office at LLNL, where he manages both the AIS 

employees located in the Project Management Office and the supplemental labor 

personnel that AIS provides to LLNS. Id. 

Mr. Reichert became the General Manager more than three years ago. Id. At the 

time, the Project Management Office had a staff of 10 “legacy” employees, who had 

previously supported the prior contractor, and several of whom did not have fully 

delineated roles or responsibilities. Id. ¶ 4; see also Declaration of Billie D. Wenter 

("Wenter Decl." Exh. A (Deposition of Terrance Reichert ("Reichert Depo.")) at 38, 61.

1

 

As of September 2014, the AIS Project Management Office had 11 staff members, 

including Jennifer Miller, the Employment Manager, and David Andrade, a recruiter. 

Reichert Decl. ¶ 6. Mr. Andrade worked for AIS as a recruiter from August 8, 2010 until 

January 12, 2015. Id.; see also Reichert Depo. at 61-62. Ms. Miller began her 

employment with AIS on August 8, 2010. Reichert Decl. ¶ 7. 

Mr. Reichert states that when he became responsible for managing AIS’ 

supplemental labor contract with LLNS, one of his goals was to review and evaluate the 

 

1

 In his deposition, Mr. Reichert testified that he “came into the office” in July 2013. 

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core deliverables of the contract and restructure the Project Management Office using 

existing resources to optimize operations and improve the performance and quality of 

services AIS delivered to both its LLNS client and the AIS supplemental labor personnel 

working at LLNL. Id. ¶ 4. 

In September, 2014, Mr. Reichert initiated a plan to expand the project office staff 

to position for growth, with the expectation of increasing AIS' headcount of supplemental 

labor for LLNS. Id. ¶ 5. Mr. Reichert knew that the legacy contractor that previously 

provided supplemental labor had at one time maintained a headcount 25% above AIS' 

then-current levels. Id. An essential part of Mr. Reichert’s plan to grow headcount 

required improved face-to-face interaction with the large number of LLNS hiring 

managers and Authorized Requestors responsible for deciding whether to hire through 

AIS. Id. 

Mr. Reichert states that Ms. Miller possessed strong business knowledge related 

to staff augmentation services and an in-depth cultural understanding of working with 

LLNS at LLNL. Id. ¶ 7. For this reason, Mr. Reichert determined that AIS would benefit 

by having Ms. Miller devote an increasing amount of time interacting with the large 

number of LLNS hiring managers across LLNL to facilitate project improvement goals. 

Id. Thus, as part of the planning for an increased headcount and to facilitate project 

improvement goals, he decided to create a new position within the Project Management 

Office – the Employment Specialist/Recruiter. Id. ¶ 5; see also Exh. 1 to Reichert Decl. 

(AIS’ description of duties of Employment Specialist/Recruiter position). 

In her capacity as Employment Manager, Ms. Miller was directly responsible for, 

and performed all job duties that would be assigned to the proposed new Employment 

Specialist/Recruiter position. Id. ¶ 8; Reichert Depo. at 38. Mr. Reichert believed that the 

creation and staffing of the new position – which would combine recruiting and 

employment duties – would allow significantly more time for Ms. Miller, as a manager and 

an essential AIS Project Management Office resource, to work outside of the office in a 

strategic capacity to establish and build relationships with LLNS customers and acquire 

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additional opportunities for supplemental labor personnel headcount growth. Reichert 

Decl. ¶ 8; Reichert Depo. at 51, 56-57. 

Plaintiff alleges that in 2014, Mr. Andrade "decided to leave" AIS, and that on 

September 5, 2014, Mr. Andrade emailed her, telling her that AIS was “looking for a 

Recruiter/Employment Specialist to replace [him],” and asking her to review the job 

description and advise whether she was interested in the job. Declaration of Sarah 

Rodriquez ("Rodriquez Decl.") in opposition to defendants' motion, at ¶ 3. Plaintiff claims 

she spoke to Mr. Andrade and told him she was interested, and that he then “arranged 

for an interview” with Mr. Reichert and Ms. Miller. Id. ¶ 4. 

According to plaintiff, AIS decided to hire another candidate, and Ms. Miller told 

her AIS "would not be hiring because I lacked a college degree and because my salary 

demand was too high." Id. ¶ 5. However, plaintiff claims, Ms. Miller emailed her in late 

September 2014 to say that the offer to the other candidate had "fallen through," and that 

AIS would like to hire her. Id. ¶ 6; see also Reichert Decl. ¶¶ 7-9. 

Plaintiff started her employment with AIS on October 7, 2014. Wenter Decl. Exh. 

B (Deposition of Sarah Rodriguez ("Pltf’s Depo.")) at 36-37; Rodriquez Decl. ¶ 6. Ms. 

Miller began transitioning the duties of an Employment Specialist to plaintiff at the start of 

plaintiff's employment. Reichert Decl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff's position also included recruitment of 

supplemental labor personnel. Reichert Decl. Exh. 1; Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 7. 

According to Mr. Reichert, plaintiff earned a considerably higher salary than a 

person in the standard recruiting position, Reichert Decl. ¶ 11; and plaintiff's scope of 

responsibility was broader than simply recruiting in terms of skills, responsibilities, and 

decision-making. Reichert Decl. Exh. 1; Reichert Depo. at 35-36, 61-62; see also Pltf’s

Depo. at 39, 41. According to Mr. Reichert, as plaintiff advanced through AIS, she began 

handling more employment-side responsibilities. Reichert Decl. ¶ 9; Reichert Depo. at 

35-36, 50-52; see also Pltf’s. Depo. at 39, 41-43, 54, 56. 

In her opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff asserts that while the job 

description provided by AIS for the Employment Specialist/Recruiter position lists a few of 

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the duties that she performed, it states many duties that were never part of her job 

responsibilities. Rodriquez Decl. ¶ 16. However, rather than focusing on the duties listed 

in the job description for Employment Specialist/Recruiter, Ms. Rodriguez discusses the 

job duties listed in defendants’ motion, where defendants provide a summary of duties 

discussed in general (and not uniformly comprehensible) by plaintiff and Mr. Reichert in 

their depositions. See Defs’ Motion at 5 (citing Pltf’s Depo. at 39, 41-43, 54, 56; Reichert 

Depo. at 35-36, 50-52); see also Reichert Decl. ¶ 9. These included “determining the 

prevailing wages, leveling the position and the salary, preparing documentation to justify 

higher wages, known as a ‘justification packet,’ determining the classification for a 

position, conducting new hire orientations, and providing desk audits, which involve 

reclassifying current employees, rather than prospective employees.” Defs’ Motion at 5.

 Of these, plaintiff claims in her recently-filed opposition declaration, the duties of 

“determining prevailing wages” and “preparing justification packets” are standard duties 

of a recruiter, and were performed at AIS by both herself and Mr. Menig; and the duties of 

“leveling the position,” “leveling the salary,” “determining the classification for a position,” 

and “desk audits” are not duties of a recruiter, and were performed at AIS by Ms. Miller; 

Rodriguez Decl. ¶¶ 17-21, 23. She adds that she did “assist” Ms. Morrow with the 

weekly “new hire” orientations. Id. ¶ 22. 

In early spring 2015, plaintiff informed Ms. Miller (her supervisor) that she was 

pregnant and would need to take a leave of absence beginning in the summer. 

Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Miller began to search for a replacement 

for plaintiff while she was on leave, and that Ms. Miller told her she intended to hire the 

replacement to begin in May so plaintiff would have time to train the replacement. Id.

¶ 10. In May 2015, with Mr. Reichert's approval, Ms. Miller recruited, interviewed, and 

hired a Junior Recruiter – Peter Menig. Reichert Decl. ¶ 11. The classification for the 

position within AIS was "Administrative Assistant." Id. The wage-determined hourly pay 

for this position was $30.87, which Mr. Reichert states was “considerably lower than the 

salary for the Employment Specialist/Recruiter position.” Reichert Decl. ¶ 11.

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Also in May, 2015, Erika Post, a Personnel Assistant in the Project Management 

Office and an AIS employee since August 8, 2010, voluntarily resigned to accept a career 

growth position outside of LLNL. Reichert Decl. ¶ 10. Ms. Post was tasked with various 

administrative/clerical duties in support of Employment, Recruiting, and Human 

Resources functions. Id. Ms. Post's decision to leave AIS to further her career coincided 

with the Project Management Office's search for a Junior Recruiter. Id. 

Plaintiff asserts Ms. Miller hired Mr. Menig as her (plaintiff's) replacement, and that 

she (plaintiff) helped train Mr. Menig. Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 11. However, according to Mr. 

Reichert, Mr. Menig performed the same recruiting duties as Mr. Andrade, and essentially 

filled Mr. Andrade's position. Reichert Decl. ¶ 11 & Exh. 2 (AIS’ description of duties of 

Junior Recruiter position). Mr. Reichert asserts that Mr. Menig was hired to perform 

recruiting processes and practices only, and that he has the same role at AIS today. 

Reichert Decl. ¶ 11. 

Defendants assert that during plaintiff's employment, AIS was supportive of 

plaintiff's absences related to her pregnancy. Plaintiff took time off for doctor's 

appointments, and Ms. Miller made arrangements for plaintiff to have access to e-mail on 

her personal computer so that she could work from home. Pltf’s Depo. at 114-115, 166, 

168, 170. 

In June 2015, plaintiff formally requested the leave of absence due to her 

pregnancy. Pltf’s Depo. at 93-94; Wenter Decl. Exh. E. At the time of plaintiff's request, 

she was not eligible for leave under the FMLA or CFRA because she had not met the 12-

month length of service requirement. Pltf’s Depo. at 116, 172-173; Wenter Decl. Exh. 4F. 

AIS approved plaintiff’s leave under the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law. Wenter Decl. 

Exh. F; Pltf’s Depo. at 93-94. Her last day of work at AIS was June 5, 2015. Pltf’s. Depo. 

at 97. 

Plaintiff's leave started on June 8, 2015. Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff testified in 

her deposition that Mr. Reichert and Ms. Miller both expressed their support, when she 

went on leave, and sincerely assured her that they looked forward to her return. Pltf’s

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Depo. at 87-91, 135-136, 168-169. Plaintiff testified further that no one at the Project 

Management Office made any discriminatory or disparaging remarks about her in 

connection with her leave. Pltf’s Depo. at 130-131, 136. 

Also in June 2015, Mr. Reichert first noticed that LLNS was converting a significant 

number of AIS' contract labor positions, which meant that AIS' LLNS customer was going 

directly to AIS' supplemental labor personnel, the AIS employees, and offering those 

employees the same positions as LLNS employees. Reichert Decl. ¶ 12; Reichert Depo. 

at 74. AIS had not previously experienced this elevated number of conversions. 

Reichert Decl. ¶ 12. Mr. Reichert noted that AIS could not stop LLNS from offering 

employment to an existing AIS employee, and AIS' agreement with LLNS did not have a 

component that provided compensation to AIS for conversions. Reichert Depo. at 74. 

During the previous four contract years, AIS had seen an average annual rate of 

39 LLNS conversions. Reichert Decl. ¶ 13; Reichert Depo. at 76-77. However, for fiscal 

year 2015 (October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2015), the total number of LLNS 

conversions, where AIS personnel were directly offered LLNS employment, was 164, 

representing a 420% increase over the previous four-year running average. Reichert 

Decl. ¶ 13. 

Mr. Reichert saw a trend taking place with a variety of its customers within LLNS. 

According to Mr. Reichert, NIF, the largest section of LLNS that AIS supports, led the 

way. Reichert Depo. at 77-79, 82. At one point, NIF staffed over 40 percent of AIS'

supplemental labor, and Mr. Reichert asserts that the anticipated number of NIF 

conversions alone was upwards of 100 to 120 employees during the next six to ten 

months. Reichert Depo. at 78-79, 91-93; Reichert Decl. ¶ 12 & Exh. 3; Wenter Decl. Exh. 

I. Mr. Reichert found it necessary to mitigate the effect of the conversions, because of 

the impact on the Project Management Office's revenue, AIS' supplemental labor 

headcount, and the appropriate size office's support staff. Reichert Depo. at 79; Reichert 

Decl. ¶ 13.

To this end, Mr. Reichert began exploring options to enable the Project 

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Management Office to adapt to the loss of revenue caused by the increased conversions. 

Reichert Depo. at 79. Mr. Reichert states that he considered numerous options for 

restructuring the Project Management Office staff. Reichert Decl. ¶ 14. He reviewed 

each position held by the 12 employees in the Project Management Office staff and 

considered how the scope of work directly affected successful completion of contract 

deliverables as defined in AIS’ agreement with LLNS. Reichert Decl. ¶ 14. He also 

considered alternatives to on-site payroll and information technology support functions, 

such as using shared services or outsourcing, but he determined that it was impractical. 

Id.; Reichert Depo. at 99. 

Mr. Reichert eventually determined that the employment function was overstaffed 

for the current amount of work and the continued loss of employees, and in particular, 

concluded that the prior addition of the Employment Specialist/Recruiter position resulted 

in significant overlap with the skills, knowledge, and abilities of Ms. Miller, the 

Employment Manager. Reichert Decl. ¶ 14. 

Mr. Reichert concluded that Ms. Miller could handle the majority of plaintiff's 

duties, and Ms. Morrow, the Employee Relations Manager, could also absorb some of 

those duties. Reichert Decl. ¶ 15; Wenter Decl. Exh. C (Deposition of Debra Morrow 

("Morrow Depo.") 41-43, 57; Wenter Decl. Exhs. J, K. By process of elimination and in 

considering the most practical, efficient, and financially sound solution, Mr. Reichert 

made the decision to eliminate plaintiff's position. Reichert Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Reichert 

Depo. at 89-91; Wenter Decl. Exh. J. Mr. Reichert contends that plaintiff's leave of

absence did not factor into his decision. Reichert Decl. ¶ 18.

Plaintiff gave birth to twins on August 5, 2015. Pltf’s Depo. at 116; Cplt ¶ 11; 

Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 13. At that time, plaintiff had not yet satisfied the 12-month service 

requirement under the FMLA/CFRA, and, thus, was on an unprotected leave. AIS 

continued to grant her a personal leave of absence. Pltf’s Depo. at 116. Plaintiff

completed the 12-month waiting period for eligibility under the FMLA/CFRA on October 7, 

2015. Wenter Decl. Exhs. G, H.

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On or around August 25, 2015, plaintiff informed AIS that she planned to take 

FMLA leave starting on October 7, 2015, until November 2, 2015. Wenter Decl. Exh. H. 

On September 30, 2015, AIS Human Resources sent plaintiff correspondence regarding 

her request for FMLA leave, a Notice of Eligibility, Rights and Responsibilities, and a 

Designation Notice for FMLA leave commencing on October 7, 2015, and ending on or 

about November 1, 2015. Wenter Decl. Exh. G; see also Cplt ¶ 12; Rodriguez Decl. 

¶ 14. 

By September 30, 2015, however, AIS had already determined that it would 

eliminate plaintiff's position. Wenter Decl. Exhs. J, K; Reichert Decl. ¶ 15. On October 

23, 2015, approximately one week before plaintiff’s leave was set to expire, Mr. Reichert 

and Ms. Morrow contacted plaintiff at home and informed her of AIS’ decision to eliminate 

her position and end her employment. Pltf’s Depo. at 121-124; Wenter Decl. Exh. L; 

Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 15. 

On May 17, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint of discrimination with the California 

Department of Fair Employment and Housing, alleging violation of the CFRA, and 

requested and received an immediate notice of right-to-sue.2 

Also on May 17, 2016, plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action in Alameda 

County Superior Court. Plaintiff alleges that defendants terminated her position while she 

was out on maternity leave, in violation of the FMLA and the CFRA. Defendants 

removed the case on June 27, 2016, alleging federal question jurisdiction and diversity 

jurisdiction. 

 

2

 Because the CFRA, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2, et seq., is part of the Fair Employment 

and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940, et seq., a plaintiff is required to 

exhaust a claim under the CFRA by filing a claim with DFEH and obtaining a right-to-sue 

letter, just as with any FEHA claim. Flores v. Calif. Pac. Med. Ctr., 2005 WL 2043038 at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2005). However, the FMLA is not enforced by the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission, but rather by the Wage and Hour Division of the 

U.S. Department of Labor, and does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative 

remedies. Bonzani v. Shinseki, 2011 WL 4479758 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2011). An 

employee seeking to enforce the FMLA has the choice of filing a complaint with the 

Secretary of Labor or filing a private lawsuit. 29 C.F.R. 825.400. There is no exhaustion 

requirement. See Sutton v. Derosia, 2012 WL 4863788 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2012).

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Motions for summary judgment

A party may move for summary judgment on a “claim or defense” or “part of . . . a 

claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Id. 

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court 

of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery 

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Material facts are those that might affect the 

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively 

demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. 

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue 

where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can 

prevail merely by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to 

support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25. If the moving party 

meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set out specific facts showing a 

genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). 

When deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Hunt v. City of L.A., 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011).

2. Claims under the FMLA and CFRA

The FMLA and CFRA permit any eligible employee to take unpaid leave for family 

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care and medical leave to care for a child, parent, or spouse, or to care for his or her own 

serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1); Cal. Gov't Code § 12945.2(a). An 

"eligible employee" is one who has been employed for at least 12 months and worked at 

least 1,250 hours during the previous 12-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i); Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11087.

The FMLA creates two interrelated substantive rights for employees. Sanders v. 

City of Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, 

Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Richey v. AutoNation, Inc., 60 Cal. 

4th 909, 920 (2015). First, an employee has the right to take up to twelve weeks of leave 

for the protected reasons. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a). Second, an employee who takes 

FMLA leave has the right to be restored to his or her original position or to a position 

equivalent in benefits, pay, and conditions of employment upon return from leave. See

29 U.S.C. § 2614(a). Similarly, the CFRA allows an employee “to take up to a total of 12 

workweeks in any 12-month period” for the protected reasons, and requires the employer 

to provide “a guarantee of employment in the same or a comparable position upon the

termination of the leave.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2(a).

Subsection 2615(a) of the FMLA “sets forth two very different ways to protect 

these substantive rights.” Sanders, 657 F.3d at 777. First, an employee can bring a 

“discrimination” or “retaliation” claim if the employer “‘discharge[s] or in any other manner 

discriminate[s] against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful’” by the 

FMLA. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)). Second, an employee can bring an 

“interference” or “entitlement” claim if the employer “‘interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or 

den[ies] the exercise of or the attempt to exercise’ the substantive rights guaranteed by 

FMLA.” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)). 

Similarly, 

[v]iolations of . . . CFRA generally fall into two types of claims: 

(1) “interference” claims in which an employee alleges that an 

employer denied or interfered with her substantive rights to 

protected medical leave, and (2) “retaliation” claims in which 

an employee alleges that she suffered an adverse 

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employment action for exercising her right to CFRA leave.

Rogers v. Cnty of L.A., 198 Cal. App. 4th 480, 487-88 (2011). The statutory authority for 

a CFRA “interference” claim arises from § 12945.2(t), which makes it unlawful for an 

employer “to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of, or the attempt to exercise, 

any right” provided by CFRA. The statutory authority for a CFRA “retaliation” claim arises 

from § 12945.2(l)(1), which makes it unlawful to retaliate against any individual because 

of his or her exercise of the right to family care or medical leave as provided by CFRA.

The FMLA does not entitle the employee to any rights, benefits, or positions they 

would not have been entitled to had they not taken leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B). It 

simply guarantees that an employee's taking leave will not result in a loss of job security 

or in other adverse employment actions. See Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 

1132-33 (9th Cir. 9th Cir. 2003). 

B. Defendants' Motion

In their motion, defendants seek summary judgment as to all three causes of 

action, or in the alternative, partial summary judgment. They argue that the first and 

second causes of action for violation of the FMLA/CFRA fail as a matter of law because 

plaintiff does not allege facts showing that defendants denied her any leave of absence to 

which she was entitled, or that defendants unlawfully denied her reinstatement, or that 

she was terminated because she exercised her right to take leave under the 

FMLA/CFRA. 

Defendants acknowledge that plaintiff is not claiming that AIS denied her a leave 

of absence. Rather, defendants focus on plaintiff’s contention that AIS wrongfully denied 

her reinstatement following her leave. Their argument is that because plaintiff's position 

was eliminated while she was on leave, AIS was under no obligation to reinstate her. 

They also briefly address the question whether plaintiff can show that she was terminated 

because she exercised her right to take leave under the FMLA/CFRA, but plaintiff herself 

does not respond to that argument. Finally, defendants seek summary judgment as to 

the third cause of action for wrongful termination, arguing that this claim fails because it is 

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based on AIS' alleged violations of the FMLA and CFRA. 

Plaintiff does not address the three causes of action separately, but simply argues 

that summary judgment cannot be granted as to the FMLA claim. She notes that 

defendants have focused on only the fifth element of the prima facie case – that the 

employer denied the plaintiff FMLA benefits to which she was entitled. She contends that 

it is defendants' burden in this motion to show an absence of evidence to support that 

element of the claim, and she argues that defendants' motion should be denied because 

a triable issue exists with regard to the question whether plaintiff's position was in fact 

eliminated. 

The court finds that defendants’ motion must be GRANTED. As an initial matter, 

the court notes that plaintiff’s FMLA claim appears not to be based on the 

“discrimination/retaliation” section of the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). That is, 

there are no allegations in the complaint, and no arguments in plaintiff’s opposition to 

defendants’ motion, that AIS discharged plaintiff or otherwise discriminated against her 

for “opposing any practice made unlawful by” the FMLA. Instead, plaintiff’s FMLA claim 

is an “interference” claim, see 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), as she alleges that defendants 

violated the FMLA when they failed to reinstate her to her former position. 

To establish a prima facie case where the employer fails to reinstate an employee, 

the employee must establish that “(1) he was eligible for the FMLA's protections, (2) his 

employer was covered by the FMLA, (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) he 

provided sufficient notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his employer denied him 

FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.” Sanders, 657 F.3d at 778 (citations omitted).3 

In interference claims, the employer's intent is irrelevant to a determination of liability. 

See Liu, 347 F.3d at 1135. Here, plaintiff has failed to establish that AIS denied her 

 

3

 While the Ninth Circuit has set forth the elements necessary to establish a “prima facie 

case” in interference claims – which include claims of failure to reinstate – the court has 

also declined to analyze interference claims using the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting 

framework. See Sanders, 657 F.3d at 778. Rather, the court has indicated, an employee 

“can prove this claim, as one might any ordinary statutory claim, by using either direct or 

circumstantial evidence, or both.” Id. (citing Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125).

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FMLA benefits to which she was entitled.

“The right to reinstatement guaranteed by 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) is the linchpin of 

the entitlement theory because ‘the FMLA does not provide leave for leave's sake, but 

instead provides leave with an expectation that an employee will return to work after the 

leave ends.’” Sanders, 657 F.3d at 778 (citations omitted). Thus, evidence that an 

employer failed to reinstate an employee who was out on FMLA leave to her original (or 

an equivalent) position establishes a prima facie denial of the employee's FMLA rights. 

See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (explaining that any violation of the FMLA 

constitutes interference with rights under the FMLA)). 

Nevertheless, while the FMLA created a statutory right to reinstatement after 

taking FMLA leave, this right is not without limits. “Nothing in [§ 2614] shall be construed 

to entitle any restored employee to . . . any right, benefit, or position of employment other 

than any right, benefit or position to which the employee would have been entitled had 

the employee not taken the leave.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B).4The Department of 

Labor (“DOL”) has interpreted this part of the statute in various regulations that set forth 

the limitations on an employee's right to reinstatement. See Sanders, 657 F.3d at 779. 

Of particular relevance here, 29 C.F.R. § 825.216 provides, in part: 

a) An employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to 

other benefits and conditions of employment than if the 

employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA 

leave period. An employer must be able to show that an 

employee would not otherwise have been employed at the 

time reinstatement is requested in order to deny restoration to 

employment. For example:

(1) If an employee is laid off during the course of taking FMLA 

leave and employment is terminated, the employer's 

responsibility to continue FMLA leave, maintain group health 

plan benefits and restore the employee cease at the time the 

employee is laid off, provided the employer has no continuing 

obligations under a collective bargaining agreement or

otherwise. An employer would have the burden of proving that 

an employee would have been laid off during the FMLA leave 

period and, therefore, would not be entitled to restoration. 

 

4

 The CFRA, Cal. Labor Code § 12945.2, contains a similar provision. See Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 2, § 11089. 

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Restoration to a job slated for lay-off when the employee's 

original position is not[,] would not meet the requirements of 

an equivalent position.

29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(1). As the regulation makes clear, where the employer defends 

against an interference claim by, e.g., alleging that it had a legitimate reason not to 

reinstate an employee, the employer carries the burden of proof. See Sanders, 657 F.3d 

at 779-81. That is, it is not enough for the employer to show merely that it had 

“reasonable cause” for not reinstating the employee; it must go further, and show that the 

employee would not have been employed in the same position even if he had not taken 

FMLA leave. Id. at 780-81 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2614(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(B)).

Plaintiff worked for AIS as an Employment Specialist/Recruiter beginning on 

October 7, 2014. AIS has a supplemental labor contract with LLNS at the LLNL. Under 

the agreement, AIS provides supplemental labor to LLNS. AIS has a Project 

Management Office on-site at LLNL. Plaintiff worked for the Project Management Office. 

On June 5, 2015, she went out on disability leave due to her pregnancy. 

AIS has demonstrated, through the testimony of Mr. Reichert, that shortly after 

plaintiff went out on pregnancy leave, but well before she became eligible for FMLA 

leave, AIS learned that its customer, LLNS, had been converting AIS' supplemental labor

personnel to its own employees at an unprecedented rate. Mr. Reichert first became 

aware of this activity by LLNS in June 2015 (the same month that plaintiff went out on 

pregnancy leave). AIS could not stop the conversions, and it did not receive 

compensation from LLNS for the lost headcount of its supplemental labor personnel.

Mr. Reichert explained that the total number of supplemental labor employees 

hired directly by the LLNS customer represented a 420% increase over the previous fouryear running average. As a result, it became necessary that he mitigate the conversions, 

which impacted the Project Management Office's revenue, AIS' supplemental labor

headcount, and the appropriate size of the office's support staff. Mr. Reichert explored 

various options for restructuring the Project Management Office staff and ultimately 

concluded that the most practical, efficient, and financially sound solution was to 

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eliminate plaintiff's position.

The undisputed evidence shows that AIS granted plaintiff’s request for FMLA 

leave, but that while she was out on leave it ended plaintiff's employment because it

eliminated her position. The FMLA requires that an employer reinstate an employee after 

taking such leave, so long as the employee would still be employed in the position had 

she not taken FMLA leave. Sanders, at 780-81 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A), 

(a)(3)(B)). The court thus finds that AIS has carried its burden to show that plaintiff would 

not have been employed in the same position even had she not taken FMLA leave, and 

defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on the first cause of action.

Plaintiff argues that during the eight months she worked at AIS (before she went 

out on leave), she did not perform many of the job duties listed in the job description for 

the Employment/Specialist Recruiter position, and that of the duties she did perform, the 

same duties were performed by Mr. Menig. As described above in the “Background” 

section, plaintiff focuses on seven duties that defendants list in their motion – two of 

which (determining prevailing wages and preparing justification packets) she claims were 

standard recruiter duties, which both she and Mr. Menig performed during the time she 

was working at AIS; four of which (leveling the position, leveling the salary, determining 

the classification of a position, and conducting desk audits) she claims were employment 

duties, which she herself never performed during that time, but which Ms. Miller did 

perform; and one of which (conducting new hire orientations) she claimed she performed 

as an assistant to Ms. Morrow. 

Plaintiff argues that there was one “technical recruiter” position that ran from Mr. 

Andrade, to plaintiff, to Mr. Menig, and that the only difference between her job and Mr. 

Menig’s was that once a week, for two hours, she assisted Ms. Morrow with new hire 

orientations. However, the fact that she and Mr. Menig may have performed some of the 

same duties does not mean that the Employment Specialist/Recruiter position involved 

the exact same duties as the Junior Recruiter position. 

Indeed, a review of the two job descriptions makes clear that while many of the 

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same tasks were assigned to both positions, the Employment Specialist/Recruiter 

position encompassed many of the recruiting duties of the Junior Recruiter position, but 

not the reverse. The Junior Recruiter job description lists duties that appear to be solely 

connected to recruiting, while the Employment Specialist/Recruiter job description 

includes many employment-related duties. Moreover, the job description for the 

Employment Specialist/Recruiter position lists supervisory duties and requirements for 

particular expertise that are not listed as part of the Junior Recruiter position. See

Reichert Decl. Exhs. 1 & 2. The difference between the two positions is also reflected in 

the fact that the salary for the Employment Specialist/Recruiter position amounted to 

considerably more than the wage-determined hourly pay rate for the Junior Recruiter 

position. 

Plaintiff and Mr. Menig may have performed some of the same recruiting tasks, but 

it does not follow that AIS could not as a matter of law eliminate plaintiff’s position. The 

evidence shows that plaintiff was hired to fill the newly-created Employment 

Specialist/Recruiter position at a time when Mr. Reichert expected to increase AIS’ 

headcount of supplemental labor provided to LLNS, and to transition Ms. Miller’s 

employment-side responsibilities to the new position, in order to provide Ms. Miller with 

more time to work outside the office in a strategic capacity to establish and build 

relationships with LLNS customers. As plaintiff’s employment advanced, the 

employment-side responsibilities were transitioned to plaintiff. For example, she began 

assisting with new-hire orientations. The fact that as of the time she went out on 

pregnancy leave (eight months after beginning her employment at AIS) there were 

employment-side duties that were still being performed by Ms. Miller is not evidence that 

plaintiff was hired as a Junior Recruiter or that she and Mr. Menig were performing the 

same job.

Defendants also argue that they are entitled summary judgment on the second 

cause of action. The FMLA and CFRA are "substantively identical," and California state 

courts have held that the same standards apply (at least as to interference claims). 

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Rogers, 198 Cal. App. 4th at 491-92; see also Richey, 60 Cal. 4th at 919. Accordingly, 

defendants assert, plaintiff’s CFRA claim fails for the reason explained above; namely, 

AIS lawfully did not reinstate plaintiff to her position, because AIS eliminated her position 

during her pregnancy leave and established that she would not have been employed 

even if she had not taken leave. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, 11089.

Notwithstanding that plaintiff alleges separate causes of action in the complaint for 

violation of the FMLA and violation of the CFRA, plaintiff has made no argument in her 

opposition to defendants’ motion that in any way distinguishes the two claims. Her entire 

opposition focuses on the FMLA claim (or on the joint FMLA/CFRA claim), and she does 

not otherwise mention the CFRA or argue that she is asserting a retaliation claim under 

the CFRA. 

In any event, to the extent that the complaint can be construed as asserting a 

claim of retaliation under the CFRA, that claim fails because plaintiff has not established 

a prima facie case of retaliation. The elements of a claim for retaliation in violation of 

CFRA are (1) the defendant was an employer covered by CFRA, (2) the plaintiff was an 

employee eligible to take CFRA leave, (3) the plaintiff exercised her right to take leave for 

a qualifying CFRA purpose, and (4) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, 

such as termination, fine, or suspension, because she exercised her right to CFRA leave. 

Dudley v. Dept. of Transportation, 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 261 (2001); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, 

§ II 094 ("employers cannot use the taking of CFRA leave as a negative factor in 

employment actions").

Here, plaintiff has not established that she suffered an adverse employment action 

because she exercised her right to take CFRA leave. The evidence shows that plaintiff 

went out on pregnancy disability leave on June 8, 2015; that in June 2015, Mr. Reichert 

first discovered that LLNS was converting a significant number of AIS’ contract labor 

positions, with the result that AIS was beginning to lose significant revenue; that AIS was 

compelled to restructure the Program Management Office; and that Mr. Reichert 

determined that the best solution was to restructure the office by eliminating the 

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Employment Specialist/Recruiter position, transitioning duties back to Ms. Miller, and 

assigning Mr. Menig (or another employee) the remaining recruiter duties.

Evidence of corporate restructuring and job eliminations suffice to meet an 

employer's burden of producing substantial evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for its actions. See Rogers, 198 Cal. App. 4th at 490-91. As explained above,

AIS had a legitimate business reason for eliminating plaintiff's position, which was 

unrelated to plaintiff's leave of absence. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she had 

no personal knowledge about why the Project Management Office decided to eliminate 

her position, that no one told her that her position was eliminated because she had taken 

personal leave, and that no one from the Project Management Office ever said anything 

to her that she regarded as discriminatory. Pltf’s Depo. at 124,136-137. 

Plaintiff has provided no evidence supporting her claim that she was not reinstated 

in her former position because she took family leave, or even supporting an inference 

that AIS considered her leave in making the restructuring decisions that were 

necessitated by LLNS’s headcount reduction. See Haley v. Cohen & Steers Capital 

Mgmt., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 944, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ("A plaintiffs subjective belief that 

his termination was unnecessary or unwarranted is not sufficient to create a genuine 

issue of material fact."); Houston v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2006 WL II41238, at *24 

(N.D. Cal. May 1, 2006) ("A plaintiff may not defeat a defendant's motion for summary 

judgment merely by denying the credibility of the defendant's proffered reason for the 

challenged employment action.").

Plaintiff testified at her deposition that Mr. Reichert informed her that AIS was

ending her employment because her position was being eliminated; neither he nor 

anyone else told her it was because she took a leave of absence. Plaintiff also admitted 

that no one at the Project Management Office said anything discriminatory regarding the 

fact that she took a leave. Plaintiff's subjective belief that it was unfair or unlawful for AIS 

to end her employment does not undermine AIS' stated reason for eliminating her role. 

See, e.g., Rivera v. FedEx Corp., 2013 WL 6672401, at *5, *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013). 

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As plaintiff cannot present evidence sufficient to draw a reasonable inference that AIS'

stated reason for eliminating her role was pretextual, she cannot establish the requisite 

casual connection for her CFRA retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court grants 

defendants’ motion as to the second cause of action.

The court grants defendants’ motion as to the third cause of action for wrongful 

termination because plaintiff cannot establish that her discharge violated any public policy 

and because her claim fails as a matter of law for the reasons set forth above. Discharge 

in violation of the CFRA constitutes wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See

Nelson v. United Techs., 74 Cal. App. 4th 597, 612 (1999). As its federal counterpart, 

violation of the FMLA also constitutes a violation of public policy. Liu, 347 F.3d at 1137-

38. The third cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is 

dependent upon the allegations and claims underlying her FMLA and CFRA claims, and 

therefore rises and falls with those two claims. In general, a claim for violation of public 

policy does not exist against employers who have not violated the law. Jennings v. 

Marralle, 8 Cal. 4th 121, 135 (1984); see also Yau v. Saint Francis Mem’l Hosp., 2015 

WL 3639521, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2015). 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED. The dates previously set for the pretrial conference and the trial are 

VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 19, 2017

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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