Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01389/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01389-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Danny Gabriel Velasco, 

Movant/Defendant, 

v. 

United States of America, 

Respondent/Plaintiff.

No. CV-15-01389-PHX-NVW (BSB)

 CR-08-00668-PHX-NVW 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Movant/Defendant Danny Gabriel Velasco (Movant) has filed a Motion to Vacate, 

Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a person in Federal Custody, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255. (Doc. 1.)1

 Respondent/Plaintiff, the United States of America (the government), 

has filed a response asserting that the § 2255 Motion should be denied. (Doc. 4.) 

Movant has filed a reply in support of his Motion. (Doc. 5.) For the reasons below, the 

Court recommends that the Motion be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

 A. Charges, Plea, and Sentencing 

 On June 28, 2008, Movant was indicted in Case No. CR-08-00668-PHX-NVW on 

one count of felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

 

1

 Citations to “Doc.” are to the docket in CV-15-01389-PHX-NVW (BSB). 

Citations to “CR Doc.” are to the docket in the underlying criminal case, CR-08-00668- PHX-NVW. The criminal case was originally assigned to the Honorable Mary H. Murguia, but was reassigned to the Honorable Neil V. Wake after Judge Murguia was 

appointed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (CR Doc. 71.) 

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924(a)(2), and 924(e) (Count One). (CR Doc. 1.) The indictment also included a 

forfeiture allegation. (Id.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, in early 2010, Movant pleaded 

guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). (CR Docs. 63, 66.) The plea 

agreement provided that a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) was punishable 

by a maximum fine of $250,000, a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years’ 

imprisonment with a maximum term of life, or both a fine and a term of imprisonment, 

and up to five years’ supervised release. (CR Doc. 66 at 1.) The plea agreement 

stipulated that Movant would be sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. (Id. at 2.) In 

addition, the government agreed not to prosecute Movant for any offense “in connection 

with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in this case.” (Id.) 

 The plea agreement set forth a factual basis to establish the charge of felon in 

possession of a firearm, which stated that Movant had been previously convicted of 

crimes that were punishable by terms of imprisonment in excess of one year. (Id. at 4-5.) 

The plea agreement listed those convictions as (1) armed robbery in Maricopa County 

Superior Court Case No. CR87-08898, on or about January 14, 1988, (2) robbery in 

Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CR94-005859, on or about October 27, 1994, 

and (3) bank robbery (2 counts) in the United States District Court, District of Arizona, 

Case No. CR-05-00228-PHX-MHM, on or about August 30, 2005. (Id.) 

 Before sentencing, the United States Probation Office issued a Presentence 

Investigation Report (PSR) recommending a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment, to 

be followed by five years’ supervised release.2

 (PSR at 24-25.) The recommended 

sentence was the minimum sentence required under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). (PSR at 20.) It 

was based on a total offense level of 30, a criminal history category V, and consideration 

of U.S.S.G.§ 5G1.1(c)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). (Id. at 4, 7.) Based on the convictions 

admitted in the plea agreement, the PSR identified Movant as an armed career criminal 

within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). (Id. at 5.) 

 

2

 The PSR is not filed in docket of the criminal or civil case, but is retained after 

sentencing by the United States Probation Office. The Court reviewed a copy of the PSR that it obtained from the Probation Office. 

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 On April 21, 2010, the Court conducted a sentencing hearing. (CR Doc. 78.) At 

the beginning of the hearing, the Court confirmed that Movant had reviewed the PSR 

with counsel and that he did not have any objections to the PSR. (Id. at 3-4.) The Court 

stated that it had also reviewed the PSR. (Id. at 4.) During the sentencing hearing, the 

Court noted that the recommended sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment was the 

mandatory minimum term. (CR Doc. 78 at 5.) The Court then reviewed the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines calculations. (Id.) The Court stated that Movant pled 

guilty to felon in possession of a firearm, “which ordinarily might have a base offense 

level of 24.” (Id.) However, the Court noted that the base level was increased in 

Movant’s case because he had “prior felony offenses for armed robbery back in ’87, it 

looks like, a robbery back in ’94, and then a bank robbery in ‘05.” (Id.) The Court stated 

that these felony convictions were for crimes of violence. (CR Doc. 78 at 14, 16.) The 

Court concluded that Movant was an armed career criminal and that his base offense 

level was 33. (Id. at 5-6.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court sentenced Movant 

to 180 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years’ supervised release. 

(CR Docs. 65, 78.) 

B. § 2255 Motion 

 Over five years later, on July 17, 2015, Movant filed the pending § 2255 Motion in 

which he argues that he is entitled to relief based on the recent Supreme Court decision in 

Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S.___, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). (Doc. 1.) The parties 

agree that Movant timely presents his claim in the § 2255 Motion. (Doc. 1; Doc. 4 at 2.) 

Therefore, the Court assumes that the § 2255 Motion is timely.3

 However, as set forth 

below, the Court finds that Movant is not entitled to § 2255 relief and, therefore, 

recommends that the Motion be denied. 

 

3

 The parties agree that the § 2255 motion is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) because it asserts a single claim based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Johnson. (Doc. 1 at 9; Doc. 4 at 2.) However, the retroactive application of Johnson is 

an open question in the Ninth Circuit. See Section II n.4. Therefore, the Court has doubt 

as to whether the Motion is timely, but need not resolve this issue because the 

government does not contest the timeliness of the § 2255 Motion. (Doc. 4 at 2.) 

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II. The Armed Career Criminal Act 

 Movant argues that under the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Johnson, his 

September 30, 2007 conviction for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which was used to 

enhance his sentence, does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act (ACCA). (Doc. 1 at 11.) Pursuant to the ACCA, a defendant with three 

prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses faces a mandatory 

minimum sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The ACCA 

defines “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 

one year . . . that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). This is referred to as 

the “elements clause.” 

 If a prior crime does not include an element of force, it may still be a violent 

felony if its elements match the elements of the ACCA list of “generic” crimes, which 

includes burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving explosives. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). “To determine whether a past conviction is for one of those crimes, 

courts use what has become known as the ‘categorical approach.’ They compare the 

elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements 

of the ‘generic’ crime — i.e., the offense as commonly understood.” Descamps v. United 

States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). If the prior convictions do not 

qualify under the categorical approach, the court determines whether the prior crime 

“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). This is known as the ACCA’s “residual clause.” 

Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556. 

 The Supreme Court recently held that the ACCA’s “residual clause” is 

unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-58. The Supreme Court, 

however, did “not call into question application of the [ACCA] to the four enumerated 

offenses, or the remainder of the [ACCA’s] definitions of a violent felony.” Id. at 2563. 

Movant argues that Johnson applies retroactively to his claim asserted in his § 2255 

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motion that his sentence was improperly enhanced under the ACCA. (Doc. 1 at 11.) The 

government argues that Johnson does not apply to this claim because Movant’s sentence 

was enhanced under the ACCA based on prior convictions that were defined as violent 

felonies under the “elements clause,” not the “residual clause.” (Doc. 4 at 4-5.) As 

discussed below, the Court agrees with the government and resolves this matter without 

determining whether Johnson applies retroactively.4

III. Movant’s Sentence does not Implicate the Johnson Decision 

 As the government argues, the Court relied on the following convictions to 

determine that Movant was an armed career criminal for sentencing purposes: (1) armed 

robbery, Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CR87-08898, on January 14, 1998, 

(2) robbery, Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CR94-05859, on or about 

October 27, 1994, (3) bank robbery (two counts), United States District Court, District of 

Arizona, Case No. 05-00228-PHX-MHM, on August 30, 2005. (CR Doc. 78 at 5, 14, 16; 

PSR at 5, 8-9.) Movant admitted these convictions. (CR Doc. 66 at 4-5; PSR at ¶¶ 25, 

40-43; CR Doc. 78 at 3-4, 5-6.) Contrary to Movant’s assertion, the Court did not 

consider Movant’s September 30, 2007 conviction for a violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g).5

 

(Doc. 1 at 11.) 

 In his § 2255 Motion, Movant concedes that his prior convictions in Maricopa 

County Superior Court Case Nos. CR87-08898 and CR94-05859 are violent felonies 

 4

 Courts that have addressed whether Johnson applies retroactively have reached different conclusions. See Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (Johnson

decision regarding imposition of enhanced sentence under residual clause of ACCA 

announced new rule of constitutional law and is thus categorically retroactive to cases on collateral review); but see In re Rivero, 2015 WL 4747749, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2015) (concluding that while Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law, the 

rule is not retroactive to career offender challenges on collateral review); In re Gieswein, 2015 WL 5534388, at *5 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 2015) (concluding that Johnson announced 

a new rule of constitutional law, but denying an application to file a second or successive 

§ 2255 motion because the Supreme Court has not made that rule retroactive to cases on 

collateral review). The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the issue of retroactivity of Johnson. 

5

 Movant also identifies that conviction as a “2010 conviction for the mere 

possession of a firearm, 922(g)(1).” (Doc. 1 at 11.) The Court did not rely on a 2010 conviction for a violation of § 922(g)(1) in determining Movant’s sentence. (CR Doc. 78 

at 5, 14, 16; PSR at 5, 8-9.) 

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under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). (Doc. 1 at 11.) The Court agrees that Movant’s felony 

convictions for armed robbery in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1904 (CR87-08898) 

and for robbery in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1902 (CR94-05859) are violent 

felony convictions within the meaning of the ACCA. See United States v. Brice, 593 

Fed. App’x 709, 711 (9th Cir. 2015) (felony convictions for armed robbery in violation of 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1902 and 13-904 qualify as violent felony convictions for purposes 

of the ACCA). 

 In his Reply, however, Movant for the first time argues that his robbery 

convictions in Maricopa County Superior Court Case Nos. CR87-08898 and CR94-05859 

are not violent felonies under the “elements clause” of the ACCA. (Doc. 5 at 1.) 

Plaintiff explains that he was convicted in each Maricopa County case pursuant to a plea 

agreement that stipulated that the offenses were “non-dangerous.” (Id.) Movant did not 

file copies of those plea agreements.6

 Even if this claim were properly asserted in a 

Reply, it is time-barred because Movant presented it in a § 2255 motion that was filed 

more than one year after his conviction in CR-08-00668-PHX-NVW became final.7

 

 The third conviction that the Court relied on to determine that Movant was an 

armed career criminal was his 2005 conviction for two counts of bank robbery in District 

of Arizona, Case No. CR05-00228-PHX-MHM. Movant does not challenge the Court’s 

 

6

 Because Movant raises this argument for the first time in his Reply, the Court need not consider it. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.)) 

7

 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (stating the one-year limitation period for filing a § 2255 motion commences on “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes 

final”.) Movant was sentenced on April 21, 2010. (CR Doc. 78.) Because Movant did 

not file a direct appeal, his conviction became final on May 5, 2010, upon the expiration of time for seeking direct review. Thus, his claim that the sentencing Court improperly considered his Maricopa County robbery convictions to be violent felony convictions under the ACCA’s “elements clause” is untimely. Furthermore, Johnson did not 

announce a new rule of constitutional law that applies to the ACCA’s “elements clause.” 

Therefore, § 2255(f)(3) does not apply to Petitioner’s claim that his Maricopa County robbery convictions do not constitute violent felonies under the ACCA’s elements clause. 

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consideration on this conviction.8 (Doc. 1 at 11.) Moreover, Movant’s conviction for 

two counts of bank robbery in violation 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) constitutes a violent felony 

under the ACCA’s “elements clause,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). See United States v. 

Selfa, 918 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1990) (a conviction for robbing a bank “by force and 

violence, or by intimidation,” under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a crime of violence for 

purposes of sentence enhancement as a career criminal under § 4B1.1). 

 Finally, Movant, argues that his 2007 conviction for a violation § 922(g) cannot be 

considered a violent felony under the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson. (Id.) 

However, as previously noted, the Court did not rely a 2007 conviction for a violation of 

§ 922(g) to determine that Movant was an armed career criminal under the ACCA. 

Accordingly, the Court does not need to resolve this issue. 

IV. Conclusion 

 The Court properly sentenced Movant as an armed career criminal under 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) because Movant had three prior violent felony convictions under the 

ACCA’s “elements clause,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), before his conviction for felon 

in possession of a firearm in CR08-00688-PHX-NVW. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 

Contrary to Movant’s assertion, the Court did not enhance his sentence by applying the 

“residual clause” to any of his prior convictions. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. 

Accordingly, even assuming Johnson applies retroactively on collaterally review — an 

issue the Court does not resolve — Movant is not entitled to relief. 

 Accordingly, 

 

8

 In his Reply, Movant argues for the first time that the “federal bank robbery counts in 2005” were improperly counted as two convictions. (Doc. 5.) To support his argument, Movant cites the government’s statement in its Response that Movant had 

committed “four violent felony crimes.” (Doc. 5 (citing Doc. 4 at 4).) To the extent that 

Movant raises a new claim in his Reply, the Court need not consider that claim. See

Zamani, 491 F.3d at 997. 

Moreover, contrary to Movant’s assertion, the author of the PSR and the 

sentencing Court considered the 2005 bank robbery counts as a single conviction. (PSR at 43; CR Doc. 78 at 5.) Additionally, the government’s response to the § 2255 motion states that Movant was subject to an enhanced sentence under the ACCA because he had 

“three prior ‘violent felony’ convictions prior to his U.S.C. § 922(g) violation.” (Doc. 4 at 4.) 

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IT IS RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 

Sentence by a person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Movant has not made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 23rd day of October, 2015. 

 

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