Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01632/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01632-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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 Defendant Catholic Healthcare West responds as “Catholic Healthcare West dba St.

Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center dba Barrow Neurological Institute.” Doc. 14 at 2.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leanna Smith, individual and as the

mother of CR, a minor,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Barrow Neurological Institute of St.

Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center

owned and operated by Catholic

Healthcare West, an Arizona

Corporation, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV10-1632-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendants Banner Health System, Banner Desert Medical Center, and Scott Elton,

M.D. (collectively “Banner Health Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s first and second

causes of action for failure to state a claim. Doc. 5. Defendants Catholic Healthcare West,

Charles Alfano, M.D., and Harold Retake, M.D. (collectively “CHW Defendants”) join

Banner Health Defendants’ motion.1

 Doc. 14. Plaintiff opposes both motions and asks, in

the alternative, for leave to amend her complaint to cure deficiencies. Docs. 13, 24. The

Banner Health Defendants oppose amendment. Doc. 16. The CHW Defendants maintain

dismissal is proper, but do not oppose amendment. Doc. 28. The motions have been fully

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 The Banner Health Defendants’ and Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied

because the issues have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s

decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).

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 The Banner Health Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s complaint does not meet

the “simplicity” requirements of Rule 8 because it is “essentially a voluminous recitation of

CR’s history of medical appointments.” Doc. 5 at 4:24-26. The allegations in the complaint

are extensive, but the Banner Health Defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), not

under Rule 8. 

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briefed. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the motions in part and grant leave

to amend.2

I. Background.

Plaintiff Leanna Smith filed an action against the Banner Health Defendants and the

CHW Defendants (collectively “Defendants”) and others as a result of Defendants’ alleged

involvement in depriving Plaintiff of the custody of her daughter, C.R. Doc. 1-5 at 31-32.

The complaint alleges two tort claims (Counts I and III) and one claim for federal civil rights

violations (Count II). Id. The action was brought in state court and removed to this Court.

Doc. 1. Defendants move to dismiss Counts I and II under Rule 12(b)(6).3

Defendants argue that the Count I tort claims should be dismissed because A.R.S.

§ 13-3620(J) precludes liability for persons who report or participate in the investigation of

suspected child abuse where such persons act without malice. Docs. 5, 14. Defendants assert

that Count I does not allege malice and should therefore be dismissed for failure to state a

claim. Docs. 5, 14. Plaintiff argues that “[t]he allegations of intentionally wrong conduct

is sufficient [to] state a claim that Defendants are not immune under A.R.S. § 13-3620(J),”

citing for support to Ramsey v. Yavapai Family Advocacy Center, 235 P.3d 285 (Ariz. App.

2010). Doc. 13 at 4; Doc. 24 at 7-8. Plaintiff further asserts that under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 9, malice can be pleaded generally by alleging that Defendants intentionally

provided false and misleading information. Doc. 13 at 4-5; Doc. 24 at 7.

Defendants argue that the Count II civil rights claims should be dismissed because

Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged state action. Doc. 5 at 7-8; Doc. 14 at 7-8. Defendants

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maintain that conclusory allegations of conspiracy with government officials are insufficient

to survive a motion to dismiss. Doc. 5 at 7-8; Doc. 14 at 7-8. Plaintiff argues that Defendant

Elton acted as an agent for the State by gathering information, soliciting physician signatures,

and providing findings in a “paper” to Child Protective Services (“CPS”). Doc. 13 at 8-9.

Plaintiff argues that she will be able to uncover whether Dr. Elton acted at the behest of CPS

only during discovery. Id. Plaintiff also maintains that Dr. Alfano and the CHW Defendants

“were the key player in organizing the joint venture to pursue a CPS action against Plaintiff.”

Doc. 24 at 11-12.

II. Count I.

A complaint must give a defendant fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff’s claims

and the grounds upon which they rest. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 682

(9th Cir. 2001). Although Ramsey framed “malice” under A.R.S. § 13-3620(J) as a factual

determination that the alleged tortfeasor “intended to do something that he or she knew to

be wrong,” Ramsey did not decide whether malice must be pled expressly. Ramsey, 235 P.3d

at 292-93. Moreover, although Rule 9(b) permits intent other than fraud or mistake to be

“alleged generally” rather than “with particularity,” this does not eliminate the need to plead

malice generally when it is an element of the claim.

Applying A.R.S. § 13-3620(J), Ramsey held that a person making a report of

suspected child abuse is protected from liability only if he or she reasonably believes abuse

has occurred, but that individuals who participate in a judicial or administrative proceeding

or investigation are held to a different standard – they have qualified immunity if they acted

without malice, regardless of whether their beliefs were reasonable. Ramsey, 235 P.3d at

291-92. Plaintiff argues that “allegations of intentionally wrong conduct” are sufficient to

allege malice, but the conduct alleged in the complaint could be construed as a lack of

reasonableness. If Plaintiff intends to allege malice rather than lack of reasonableness

against some or all of the Defendants, malice must be expressly pled so that each defendant

has fair notice of the claim.

Plaintiff seeks leave to cure pleading deficiencies by amending the complaint. Courts

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should “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The

Court will permit Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint.

III. Count II.

Because the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend, Defendants’ motions to dismiss

Count II are moot. In the event that the issue of “state action” may be raised again after

amendment, the Court will take this opportunity to address some of the arguments made by

the parties, in the interest of judicial efficiency.

Under § 1983, mere conclusory allegations that a private party “conspired” with a

state actor are insufficient. Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156,

1161 (9th Cir. 2003). Instead, a plaintiff must allege a factual basis to establish state action

as to each defendant. Id. When a plaintiff alleges conspiracy between private and public

actors to violate federal civil rights, for example, the plaintiff must factually allege that there

was an agreement to violate constitutional rights. Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d

406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d

1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999)). “Such an agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on

the basis of circumstantial evidence such as the actions of the defendants. . . . To be liable,

each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each

participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

In some cases it might be difficult to assert, prior to discovery, specific conduct that

makes a defendant a state actor. This does not appear to be such a case, however, because

Plaintiff believes that amending the complaint will cure any existing pleading defects as to

Count II. Plaintiff is encouraged to do so, because the present complaint fails to allege the

requisite state action with regard to, inter alia, Defendants Alfano and Retake. See Simmons,

318 F.3d at 1161. Moreover, some of the conduct described in Plaintiff’s responses with

regard to Dr. Elton is not part of her complaint. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Banner Health Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 5) is granted in part and

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denied in part as stated above.

2. CHW Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 14) is granted in part and denied

in part as stated above.

3. Plaintiff’s motions for leave to amend the complaint (Docs. 13, 24) are

granted. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint by December 16,

2010.

DATED this 1st day of December, 2010.

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