Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02373/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02373-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rosario A. Fiorani, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Albert Lowry; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. 08-CV-02373-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Defendant Seth Berenzweig (“Mr. Berenzweig), an attorney for the law firm of Albo

& Oblon LLP in Virginia and Maryland, has moved to be dismissed from this action pursuant

to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and12(b)(6). (Dkt. # 39.) For the following

reasons, the Court grants the Motion and orders Fiorani to show cause why he should not be

sanctioned for filing this frivolous case.

BACKGROUND

On December 29, 2008, Plaintiff Rosario A. Fiorani Jr. (“Fiorani”) filed a pro se

complaint against several defendants in which he alleges violations of his civil rights

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. # 1.) Fiorani asserts that the Defendants conspired to

violate his civil and constitutional rights when they allegedly falsely imprisoned, threatened,

and intimidated him. (See id.) Fiorani also alleges that Defendants’ conduct forced him to

write a fraudulent letter in which he admitted guilt to some unspecified offense. (See id.)

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This is not the first time that Fiorani has brought these specific allegations against

these Defendants. Fiorani first raised similar allegations in the Alexandria Division of the

Eastern District of Virginia. Fiorani v. Lowry, No. 1:08-CV-00348-LMB-BRP (E.D.Va. Apr.

21, 2008) (“Fiorani I”). After the district court dismissed Fiorani’s case with prejudice, see

id., the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 286 F. App’x 23 (4th Cir. 2008). On the same day that

Fiorani filed his appeal to the Fourth Circuit in Fiorani I, he filed a similar case in the

Richmond Division of the Eastern District of Virginia, making “substantially” similar

allegations against many of the same defendants. See Fiorani v. Lowry, 3:09-CV-00394-JRS,

2008 WL 2857207 (E.D. Va. July 21. 2008) (“Fiorani II”). Again, that case was dismissed,

and the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a brief memorandum decision. See Fiorani v. Lowry, 297

F. App’x 238 (4th Cir. 2008). Thereafter, Fiorani filed a counter-claim against Mr. Lowry

when the latter brought a state-court lawsuit against Fiorani for defamation. See Lowry v.

Fiorani, No. 2008-CV-00156, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2008) (“Fiorani III”). In dismissing

Fiorani’s counter claim, the state court noted that Fiorani “must seek leave of this [c]ourt

based upon good cause prior to initiating lawsuits or any other legal process or filing against

[Mr. Lowry], his businesses, employees, agents, representatives, or legal counsel.” Id.

Despite this directive from Virginia State Court, Fiorani now brings essentially the

same civil rights claim in this Court. (See Dkt. # 1.) All but one of the Defendants, however,

have already been dismissed. Judge Dennis J. Smith was dismissed on December 22, 2009

for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Dkt. # 34.) Because Fiorani failed to provide complete and

correct addresses for Defendants Albert Lowry, Education Advancement Institution,

Entrepreneurial Systems, and Adam Levine, they were terminated from this matter on

January 25, 2010. (See Dkt. # 35.) Finally, Defendants Sarah Zaffina and Judge Douglas

Herndon were dismissed on February 5, 2010 because Fiorani provided an incorrect address

for service upon Ms. Zaffina and because the claim against Judge Herndon was barred by the

doctrine of judicial immunity. (See Dkt. # 38.)

On January 22, 2010, Mr. Berenzweig, the last remaining Defendant, moved to be

dismissed from this action. (Dkt. # 39.) First, Berenzweig brings a 12(b)(2) Motion to

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Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Id.) Berenzweig also moves to dismiss pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of res judicata and due to Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for

which relief can be granted. (Id.) Berenzweig further requests sanctions against Plaintiff to

discourage his ongoing pattern of suing the Defendants for the same alleged acts over and

over in courts across the country. (Id.) In his Response to the Motion to Dismiss, Fiorani also

raises several arguments regarding Judge Smith, who was voluntarily dismissed from this

case on December 22, 2009. (See Dkt. # 34 at 4.) He also contends that the Court erroneously

terminated the other Defendants in this case. (See Dkt. ## 35, 38.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 12(b)(2)

When the parties dispute whether personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is

proper, “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.” Rio Props.,

Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (2002). This is so, even though the defendant

is the moving party on a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss. Id. In the absence of an evidentiary

hearing, however, the plaintiff need only make “a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts

to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 575 F.3d

981, 985 (9th Cir. 2009).

To establish that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) the state’s long arm statute confers jurisdiction over the defendant; and

(2) that “the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the constitutional principles of due

process.” See Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1019 (citation omitted). Because Arizona’s longarm statute extends jurisdiction “to the maximum extent permitted by the . . . Constitution

of the United States,” the Court’s personal jurisdiction inquiry largely collapses into an

analysis of due process. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Davis v. Metro Prod., Inc., 885 F.2d 515,

520 (9th Cir. 1989); Williams v. Lakeview Co., 199 Ariz. 1, 5, 13 P.3d 280, 282 (2000). 

Under the due process clause, a defendant must have sufficient “minimum contacts”

with the forum state so that subjecting the defendant to its jurisdiction will not “offend

traditional conceptions offair play and substantial justice.” Int’l ShoeCo. v. Washington, 326

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U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, “the

defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State [must be] such that he [or she]

should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 (1980). In accord with the due process clause, the

“minimum contacts” standard may be satisfied in two ways. First, a court may exercise

general jurisdiction when the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are “continuous and

systematic.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).

Second, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction if a defendant “has purposefully directed

his activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that

arise out of or relate to those activities.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472,

(1985) (internal quotation omitted). “In addition to establishing the requisite contacts, the

assertion of jurisdiction must be found reasonable.” Bauman, 579 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.

2009) (internal quotation omitted). 

Here, Fiorani has not made a prima facie showing that Mr. Berenzweig has minimum

contacts with Arizona. In his complaint, Fiorani acknowledges that Mr. Berenzweig is a

resident of Virginia. (Dkt. # 1 at 6.) In addition, Plaintiff does not allege that Mr. Berenzweig

took any actions in Arizona or directed any conduct towards Arizona or citizens of Arizona.

(See id.) In this case, there simply is no basis to find that Mr. Berenzweig has “continuous

and systematic” contacts with Arizona that would subject him to general jurisdiction. See

Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415. With respect to specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff has also failed

to provide any evidence to demonstrate Mr. Berenzweig “has purposefully directed his

activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise

out of or relate to those activities.” See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472.

II. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

The Court also finds that dismissal is proper pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), under the doctrine of res judicata. Under res judicata, a final

judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating

issues that were or could have been raised in that action. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City &

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County of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 336 (2005). Pursuant to this principle, federal courts are

required to give preclusive effect to state court judgments whenever the courts of the state

from which the judgments emerged would do so. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).

In the present case, the laws of Virginia for res judicata apply because the first claim

brought by Fiorani was decided there. See Fiorani I, No. 1:08-CV-00348-LMB-BRP, at *

1–2. Under Virginia law, four elements must be met to establish res judicata: (1) the remedies

sought must be identical; (2) the causes of action must be identical; (3) the parties must be

identical; and, (4) the quality (capacity) of the persons for or against whom the claim is made

must be identical. See Wright v. Castles, 349 S.E.2d 125, 128 (Va.1986) (citing Mowry v. Va.

Beach, 93 S.E.2d 323, 327 (Va.1956)).

Each of these elements is met here. First, Fiorani seeks monetary damages, just as he

did in a previous action in the District of Eastern Virginia. See Fiorani I, No.

1:08-CV-00348-LMB-BRP, at *1–2. Next, the complaints in both cases raise claims pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. Fiorani also named Mr. Berenzweig as a Defendant in both

actions. See id. Finally, the quality or capacity of the parties is the same in both proceedings.

See id. Moreover, another Division of the Eastern District of Virginia has already determined

that Fiorani’s claims against Mr. Berenzweig and the other named Defendants are barred by

res judicata. See Fiorani II, 2008 WL 2857207, at *2.

III. Matters Pertaining to Previously Dismissed Defendants

In his responsive memorandum to Mr. Berenzweig’s Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Fiorani

raises several arguments regarding Judge Smith, who was voluntarily dismissed from this

case on December 22, 2009. (Dkt. # 34 at 4.) Because Judge Smith has already been

terminated from this matter, however, the Court need not consider Fiorani’s arguments.

Furthermore, to the extent that Fiorani is attempting to amend his Complaint and reassert his

claims against Judge Smith, the Court finds that Fiorani’s allegations against Judge Smith

pertain to his official function as a judge; therefore, Fiorani’s civil rights claims against Judge

Smith are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med.,

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363 F.3d 916, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissing a plaintiff’s 28 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against

a judge on the basis of judicial immunity).

Fiorani also appears to argue that the Court improperly dismissed those Defendants

for whom Fiorani failed to provide correct addresses so that the United Sates Marshals Office

could effect service of process. In two previous Orders, the Court directed Fiorani to show

cause why several of the named Defendants should not be terminated for Fiorani’s failure to

provide correct and complete addresses. (Dkt. ## 35, 38.) The Court then terminated

Defendants Albert Lowry, Education Advancement Institution, Entrepreneurial Systems,

Adam Levine, Sarah Zaffina, and Judge Douglas Herndon from this action when Fiorani

failed to respond to the order to show cause. (See id.) And, while Fiorani now blames a snow

storm and marital problems for his failure to respond to the Court’s order to show cause, he

does not explain why he failed to provide correct and complete addresses, and he does not

even attempt to provide the necessary addresses for these unserved Defendants. (See Dkt. #

41.) Accordingly, the Court finds that dismissal of these Defendants was proper as they were

never served as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, 5,

12(b)(5).

IV. Mr. Berenzweig’s Motion for Sanctions

As a final matter, the Court finds that sanctions against Fiorani may be appropriate

in this matter. Fiorani has filed several actions in multiple federal and state courts seeking

damages against the Defendants originally named in this case. All of these actions appear to

be barred by the doctrines of judicial immunity and res judicata. Moreover, in the instant

action there is nothing in the record suggesting that Arizona has personal jurisdiction over

the named Defendants. 

While it is true that Fiorani is appearing pro se, the fact that he has repeatedly filed

complaints in multiple courts alleging similar claims indicates that Fiorani should be aware

that he had no legal basis for bringing this case in the District of Arizona. Indeed, multiple

district courts had already dismissed Fiorani’s complaints under the doctrines of res judicata

and judicial immunity when he filed his complaint in this case. Accordingly, the Court finds

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that this is this is at least the third effort Fiorani has made to bring virtually identical § 1983

claims that are barred by the doctrines of judicial immunity or res judicata. See Fiorani I, No.

1:08-CV-00348-LMB-BRP, at * 1–2; See Fiorani II, 2008 WL 2857207, at *2. Moreover,

Fiorani had been warned by another court to stop litigating issues already decided by other

courts. See Fiorani III, No. 2008-CV-00156, at *2 (ordering that Fiorani “must seek leave

of this Court based upon good cause prior to initiating lawsuits or any other legal process or

filing against [Lowry], his businesses, employees, agents, representatives, or legal counsel.”).

Based on these findings, the Court orders Fiorani to show cause why he should not be

sanctioned $1,000 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) for continually filing

the same frivolous complaints over and over in various courts. See, e.g., Warren v. Guelker,

29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions on a pro se plaintiff that

filed multiple complaints raising the same frivolous claims). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant

Seth Berenzweig’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 39);

(2) Within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, Plaintiff Rosario A. Fiorani, Jr. shall

file a memorandum SHOWING CAUSE why the Court should not impose a $1,000 sanction

on him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c).

(3) The Clerk of the Court is directed to TERMINATE this action WITH

PREJUDICE.

DATED this 31st day fo March, 2010.

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