Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00414/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00414-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOHN PHILIP MONCRIEF, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-0414 MCE AC P 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding through counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss defendant 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and Count V of the third 

amended complaint. ECF. No. 62. 

 Plaintiff has conceded that there is no legitimate basis for opposing the motion to dismiss 

defendant CDCR (ECF No. 67 at 2, ¶ 6), and the motion to dismiss with respect to the claims 

against CDCR was deemed unopposed (ECF No. 68 at 2). Defendant CDCR will therefore be 

dismissed from this case. This leaves defendants’ motion to dismiss Count V of the third 

amended complaint, plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court 

has determined that a hearing on the motion is not necessary and the motion will be decided on 

the papers. 

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I. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

 In relevant part, plaintiff claims that defendants Grounds, Gorham, and Frias engaged in 

extreme and outrageous conduct that was intended to cause plaintiff severe emotional distress. 

ECF No. 55 at 12-13, ¶ 68. Specifically he alleges that he was housed at the Correctional 

Training Facility (“CTF”), where the defendants were employed, during a layover stop during his 

transfer to a new prison. Id. at 5, ¶ 29. At the time he was transferred, he had housing restrictions 

that “included being housed on the ground floor, having a bottom bunk, and not being required to 

ascend or descend stairs.” Id., ¶ 28. Defendant Gorham was responsible for making housing 

assignments for layover inmates like plaintiff and, despite having plaintiff’s file, which 

documented his housing restrictions, and being advised of the restrictions by plaintiff, housed 

plaintiff on the third floor. Id. at 6, ¶¶ 34-35. 

At approximately 2:00 a.m. plaintiff was woken by defendant Frias, who ordered plaintiff 

to go downstairs. Id. at 7, ¶ 37. Plaintiff alleges that Frias “disregarded the fact that Plaintiff was 

under the influence of morphine and anti-anxiety medications which impaired his ability to walk 

and increased his risk of falling, and knew or should have known that Plaintiff had housing 

restrictions that required he not be required to ascend or descend stairs.” Id. Frias failed to assist 

plaintiff down the stairs and plaintiff fell while attempting to descend, resulting in serious 

physical injuries. Id., ¶ 37, 39. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Grounds failed to adequately train defendants Gorham and 

Frias, proximately causing his injuries. Id. at 6-7, ¶¶ 36, 38. He further alleges that “Grounds 

engaged in conduct intended to humiliate, embarrass, and instill fear in Plaintiff” and that his 

conduct “subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of his rights, and 

was offensive, oppressive, fraudulent and despicable.” Id. at 13, ¶¶ 68, 71. 

II. Motion to Dismiss 

 A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a 

complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it 

must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “The pleading must contain 

something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally 

cognizable right of action.” Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 

' 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Tr., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), and construe 

the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and resolve all doubts in 

the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). 

The court will “‘presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary 

to support the claim.’” Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994) 

(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). The court need not accept 

legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 

618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

 The elements of a prima facie claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are as 

follows: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or 

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering 

severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional 

distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d 894, 

901 (Cal. 1982) (citations omitted). For conduct to be outrageous, it “must be so extreme as to 

exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. 

It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the 

defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and 

outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. 

Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the 

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control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the 

conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in 

liability. 

Slaughter v. Legal Process & Courier Serv., 209 Cal. Rptr. 189, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 

(quoting Golden v. Dungan, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577, 586 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

“‘It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct 

directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.’” 

Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 819-20 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Christensen v. 

Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 202 (Cal. 1991)) (emphasis by Potter court). “The requirement 

that the defendant’s conduct be directed primarily at the plaintiff is a factor which distinguishes 

intentional infliction of emotional distress from the negligent infliction of such injury.” 

Christensen, 820 P.2d at 904 (citing Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 4-5, fn. 5 (Cal. 1985) 

(in bank)). 

 C. Discussion 

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress 

should be dismissed because plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to establish severe 

emotional distress or that defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct. ECF No. 6-7. 

A significant portion of plaintiff’s response is spent reiterating the facts stated in the third 

amended complaint, including a number of facts that have nothing to do with plaintiff’s 

allegations against defendants Grounds, Gorahm, or Frias. ECF No. 69 at 2-5. Plaintiff’s 

argument focuses almost exclusively on the claims against defendant Gorahm with only a passing 

reference to the allegations against defendant Frias and no mention of the allegations against 

defendant Grounds. Id. at 7-8. He requests leave to amend if the court is inclined to grant the 

motion to dismiss. Id. at 8. 

Defendants’ reply argues that plaintiff ignores the current standard for motions to dismiss 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 70 at 2-3) and focuses on the lack of factual allegations 

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against defendants Grounds and Frias (id. at 3-5). No further argument is made regarding the 

sufficiency of the allegations against Gorham. Id. 

 1. Defendant Grounds 

Plaintiff’s only specific allegation against defendant Grounds is that he failed to properly 

train defendants Gorham and Frias in the applicable policies and procedures. ECF No. 55 at 6-7, 

¶¶ 36, 38. Not only does this fail to establish action taken towards plaintiff or in plaintiff’s 

presence, which is necessary for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, but it is 

insufficient to support the claim that Gounds’ conduct was “intended to humiliate, embarrass, and 

instill fear in Plaintiff.” Id. at 13, ¶ 68. Even though the court will “presume that general 

allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim,” Nat’l Org. for 

Women, Inc., 510 U.S. at 256 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561), plaintiff offers no specific facts 

to support his general allegations. 

Even assuming all the facts alleged are true, plaintiff has not provided any factual basis 

that could support his claim that defendant Grounds intentionally caused him extreme emotional 

distress and this claim should be dismissed. 

 2. Defendant Frias 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Frias woke him around two in the morning and ordered 

him downstairs, but failed to provide plaintiff with any assistance when he began to make his way 

down the stairs. ECF No. 55 at 7, ¶ 37. He claims that Frias “disregarded the fact that Plaintiff 

was under the influence of morphine and anti-anxiety medications which impaired his ability to 

walk and increased his risk of falling” and that Frias “knew or should have known that Plaintiff 

had housing restrictions that required he not be required to ascend or descend stairs.” Id. After 

making it approximately halfway down the first flight of stairs, plaintiff fell, resulting in 

significant injuries. Id., ¶¶ 37, 39. 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts from which it could be inferred that Frias knew that 

plaintiff was under the influence of morphine and anti-anxiety medication or that even if he was 

aware of the medications plaintiff was on that he had any reason to know they would impair 

plaintiff’s mobility. Nor are there any facts that would support that Frias knew or should have 

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known about plaintiff’s housing restrictions and need for accommodation. Plaintiff does not 

allege that Frias had access to his medical file, that he informed Frias that he had mobility 

limitations, or that he informed Frias that he was medicated. There is nothing to indicate that 

Frias was required or had reason to double-check the appropriateness of plaintiff’s housing 

assignment. Moreover, in his response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff states that 

he “has insufficient information regarding the knowledge of Defendant Frias, discovery may 

uncover his knowledge of the condition and restrictions relating to Plaintiff.” Without any 

knowledge of what defendant Frias knew, plaintiff’s allegation that Frias intended to cause, or 

recklessly disregarded the probability of causing, plaintiff severe emotional distress is nothing 

more than speculation. The complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right 

to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Plaintiff’s bare factual allegations against Frias are insufficient to plead either extreme and 

outrageous behavior or an intent to cause, or reckless disregard for the probability of causing, 

emotional distress. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress against defendant Frias should therefore be granted. 

 3. Defendant Gorham 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Gorham was responsible for handling layover inmates and 

making their housing assignments and was responsible for plaintiff’s housing assignment at CTF. 

ECF No. 55 at 6, ¶ 34. During processing, plaintiff advised defendant Gorham about his housing 

restrictions and protested his placement on the third tier. Id., ¶ 35. Plaintiff alleges that when he 

was being processed, Gorham was in possession of his file, which confirmed plaintiff’s medical 

classifications and housing restrictions and that Gorham either saw the restrictions and ignored 

them, or failed to check them prior to assigning plaintiff to the third tier. Id. As a result of being 

housed on the third tier, plaintiff fell when trying to descend the stairs and suffered serious 

injuries and severe emotional distress. Id. at 7, 13, ¶¶ 37, 39, 68. 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Gorham are sufficient to state a claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. According to the complaint, Gorham’s deliberate disregard for 

the medical restrictions, put in place for plaintiff’s safety, led to plaintiff’s placement on the third 

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tier and his subsequent serious injuries. Gorham’s decision not to verify, or to verify and ignore, 

plaintiff’s medical restrictions, in light of plaintiff’s notification and protests directly to Gorham, 

could be considered extreme and outrageous. Gorham’s alleged blatant disregard for plaintiff’s 

safety is also sufficient to allege that he either intended plaintiff to suffer injury or, alternatively, 

that he recklessly disregarded the probability of injury to a person under his control. See Cole v. 

Fair Oaks Fire Dept., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 155 n. 7 (1987) (noting that behavior “may be considered 

outrageous if a defendant . . . abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the 

plaintiff’s interest.”); 

For these reasons, the motion to dismiss the intentional infliction of emotional distress 

claim against Gorham should be denied. 

D. Leave to Amend 

Plaintiff requests that if the court is inclined to grant the motion to dismiss that he be 

given leave to amend. ECF No. 69 at 2, 8. Plaintiff has already amended his complaint on three 

prior occasions, and nothing in his response to the motion to dismiss convinces the court that 

leave to amend a fourth time would cure the defaults in the third amended complaint. Especially 

in light of the fact that plaintiff has already had an opportunity to conduct discovery and was 

specifically directed to “focus on the action and identities of the putative Doe defendants.” ECF 

No. 42 at 4. If plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint again, he will need to file a motion to 

amend, accompanied by the proposed amended complaint.1

 

III. Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff fails to state a claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress against defendants Grounds and Frias, and the motion to dismiss should be 

granted as to the claim against them. Plaintiff does state a claim against defendant Gorham, and 

///// 

 

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 Plaintiff did not file a motion to amend with his third amended complaint. In light of the fact 

that defendants responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 62) and answer 

(ECF No. 63), rather than a motion to strike, the court assumes they have given their written 

consent to plaintiff amending the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Plaintiff is cautioned 

that any future attempts to amend must be made by way of motion or include proof of defendants’ 

written consent to plaintiff amending the complaint or they will be stricken from the record. 

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the motion to dismiss should be denied as to Gorham. Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend 

should be denied. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. Defendants’ motion to partially dismiss the third amended complaint (ECF No. 62) be 

granted in part and denied in part as follows: 

a. Granted as to defendant CDCR and this defendant be dismissed in its entirety; 

b. Granted as to Count V against defendants Grounds and Frias; and 

c. Denied as to Count V against defendant Gorham; 

 2. Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend be denied. If plaintiff seeks to amend the 

complaint, he must file a motion to amend the complaint within twenty-one days of this order. 

The motion must be accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. See Local Rule 137(c). 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: July 30, 2015. 

___________/S/ Allison Claire__________ 

 ALLISON CLAIRE 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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