Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05924/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05924-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARON SAUNDERS & MERLIN ) 

SAUNDERS, )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

)

DET. CYNTHIA KNIGHT, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-04-5924 REC LJO

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS.

(Docs. 26, 27, 38)

On February 7, 2005, the Court heard motions to dismiss

brought by various Defendants in this case. Upon due

consideration of the written and oral arguments of the parties

and the record herein, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss as

set forth below.

I. Factual Background

Sharon and Merlin Saunders (“Plaintiffs”) were involved in

an organization called the “Constitutional Colleagues,” which is

an “educational organization based on the principles of the

Constitution of the United States of America.” Compl. at 4. On

January 5, 1999, Fresno County Sheriff’s Department law

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enforcement officers entered a meeting room at the Fashion Fair

Mall where a meeting of the Constitutional Colleagues was taking

place. The officers executed a search warrant and Plaintiff

Sharon Saunders was arrested. Plaintiffs’ vehicle and residence

in Clovis were also searched pursuant to a warrant. Plaintiffs

allege that personal property was seized from their persons,

vehicle and home.

Plaintiff Sharon Saunders was taken into custody on a charge

of violating California Penal Code section 327. Section 327

makes an endless chain scheme unlawful. An “endless chain” is

defined as:

[A]ny scheme for the disposal or distribution of

property whereby a participant pays a valuable

consideration for the chance to receive compensation

for introducing one or more additional persons into

participation in the scheme or for the chance to

receive compensation when a person introduced by the

participant introduces a new participant. 

Compensation, as used in this section, does not mean or

include payment based upon sales made to persons who

are not participants in the scheme and who are not

purchasing in order to participate in the scheme.

Cal. Pen. Code § 327. Endless chains are more commonly known as

pyramid schemes. In addition to Plaintiff Sharon Saunders, three

other people - Blaine William, Peter Plitt and Jerry Thorstad - 

were charged with violating section 327. 

On July 7, 2003, a preliminary hearing on the criminal

charge was held in Fresno County Superior Court. Judge Nunez

dismissed the charges as to all defendants, finding that there

was no probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. 

///

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 These Defendants are District Attorney Edward Hunt, Deputy 1

District Attorney Bob Ellis, and Deputy District Attorney John

Savrnoch.

 These Defendants are Detective Cynthia Knight, Sheriff 2

Richard Pierce, Detective Mark Chapman, Sergeant Dadian, Detective

Earl Richardson, Detective Janice Rasmussen, Detective Ken Bowden,

Deputy Patrick Hanson, Deputy Juan Espinoza, and the Fresno County

Board of Supervisors.

 “County Defendants” refers to the DA and Sheriff Defendants. 3

3

II. Procedural Background

On July 2, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Complaint names as Defendants the City

of Fresno, the County of Fresno (including the Board of

Supervisors), members of the District Attorney’s Office (“DA 1

Defendants”), and members of the Fresno County Sheriff’s

Department (“Sheriff Defendants”). 

2 3

Plaintiffs allege six causes of action under section 1983. 

Counts one through six stem from violations of Plaintiffs’ rights

under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, Ninth and Tenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, respectively. 

The Complaint also mentions various state law tort theories,

though no statutory basis is provided. The Complaint states:

[F]alse arrest, imprisonment in a jail cell by said

defendants caused said plaintiffs to suffer defamation

of character, slander and libel, and loss of employment

to Sharon Saunders, as already cited herein, which

caused the loss of their home, and which caused mental

and emotional distress, anguish, humiliation,

embarrassment, trepidation, terrorization, for which

the said defendants are liable to plaintiffs for said

injuries and losses.

Compl. at 3, 14. Plaintiffs also make reference to “malicious

prosecution” and “intentional refusal to return personal

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property.” Compl. at 2.

The City of Fresno and DA Defendants filed motions to

dismiss that address all of Plaintiffs’ claims. Sheriff

Defendants moved to dismiss the state law claims only, but also

filed a motion for a more definite statement. The Court has

combined the arguments of Defendants wherever possible. 

III. Motions to Dismiss

A. Legal Standard

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2

L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). In testing the sufficiency of a complaint

against a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a court must “accept all

material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” North Star Int’l

v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). The

Court need not, however, “accept legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994). Additionally,

the pleadings of pro se litigants, such as Plaintiffs, “are held

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L.

Ed. 2d 163 (1980) (quotation omitted).

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is

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a lack of a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The

Court must determine whether or not it appears to a certainty

under existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of

facts that might be proved in support of a plaintiff’s claims. 

De La Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S. Ct. 2416, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1979).

B. Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims

1. Claims based on the Ninth & Tenth Amendment

Plaintiffs’ fifth and sixth causes of action allege

violations of section 1983 based on rights protected by the Ninth

and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution. Neither Amendment

provides a proper basis for a civil rights claim. Strandberg v.

City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 748-49 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ninth

Amendment); Stone v. City of Prescott, 173 F.3d 1172, 1174-75

(9th Cir. 1999) (Tenth Amendment). Accordingly, these causes of

action are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. Statute of Limitations

a) The Applicable Statute of Limitations

Actions pursuant to section 1983 are governed by the statute

of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state. 

Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). Until

January 1, 2003, the statute of limitations in California was one

year. Id. at 1014. Effective January 1, 2003, personal injury

actions in California became subject to a two-year statute of

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limitations period pursuant to section 335.1 of the California

Code of Civil Procedure. The California Court of Appeal has held

that the two year limitation period does not apply retroactively

to acts or omissions occurring or causes of action accruing

before the effective date of section 335.1. Maldonado v. Harris,

370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). 

While state law determines the length of the limitations

period, federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues. 

Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013. Under federal law, a “claim accrues when

the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is

the basis of the action.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

b) Plaintiff Sharon Saunders

To the extent they are based on the allegedly unlawful

searches and seizures, the claims of Plaintiff Sharon Saunders

accrued on January 5, 1999 and are subject to the then-applicable

one year statute of limitations. Defendants argue that the

claims are time-barred because Plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed

July 2, 2004.

Plaintiff Sharon Saunders argues that the statute of

limitations on her claims was tolled by section 945.3 of the

California Government Code and did not begin to run until July 7,

2003, the date the charges against her were dismissed. Section

945.3 provides, in pertinent part, that:

No person charged by indictment, information, complaint

or other accusatory pleading charging a criminal

offense may bring a civil action for money or damages

against a peace officer or the public entity employing

a peace officer . . . while the charges are pending

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before a justice, municipal, or superior court.

 

Any applicable statute of limitations for filing and

prosecuting these actions shall be tolled during the

period that the charges are pending before a justice,

municipal, or superior court.

Cal. Govt. Code § 945.3. This section applies to toll the

limitations period on state law as well as section 1983 claims. 

Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The City argues that section 945.3 is applicable because of

the City’s limited involvement, but cites no legal authority. DA

Defendants argue that the third claim (Fifth Amendment) is

nonetheless time barred because while section 945.3 bars suits

against officials while charges are pending, it does not prevent

a motion for a return of property, which is provided for by

section 1538.5(a)(1) of the California Penal Code. DA Defendants 

misconstrue Plaintiffs’ claims. In the prayer for relief,

Plaintiffs seek damages under their Fifth Amendment claim, not

simply the return of property. Thus the motion provided for in

the penal code was insufficient to provide relief and Plaintiffs’

avenue for relief was a lawsuit, which was barred at the time. 

Accordingly, the section 1983 claims of Plaintiff Sharon

Saunders are not barred by the statute of limitations and cannot

be dismissed on this basis.

c) Plaintiff Merlin Saunders

Plaintiff Merlin Saunders’ section 1983 claims accrued on

January 5, 1999, and are likewise subject to the one year statute

of limitations. By its terms, section 945.3 applies only to

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persons facing charges. There is no allegation that Plaintiff

Merlin Saunders was arrested or faced charges at any time. 

Accordingly, his claims accrued on January 5, 1999 and are barred

by the one year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the section

1983 claims of Plaintiff Merlin Saunders are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE as to all Defendants. 

3. Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Monell 

a) Monell

Whether Plaintiff Sharon Saunders can state a cause of

action under section 1983 is governed by Monell v. Dept. of

Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.

Ed. 2d 611 (1978). In Monell, the Supreme Court held that

municipalities are “persons” within the meaning of section 1983

but the municipality itself must cause the constitutional

deprivation. Id. at 691. A city may not be held liable for

unconstitutional acts of its employees under a respondeat

superior theory. Id. A “direct causal link between a municipal

policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation” is

required. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 103

L. Ed. 412, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989). 

In Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1992),

the Ninth Circuit summarized the ways by which municipal

liability under section 1983 may be established: 1) if the

violation was committed “pursuant to a formal governmental policy

or a longstanding practice or custom,” 2) if the individual who

committed the violation “was an official with final policy-making

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authority,” or 3) if “an official with final policy-making

authority ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or

action.” Id. at 1346-47. The practice must be “so persistent

and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled

city policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

b) City of Fresno

The City of Fresno argues that the Complaint fails to state

a cause of action for civil rights violations against the City of

Fresno under Monell because it alleges no action on the part of

City of Fresno, let alone any action pursuant to a formal policy

or longstanding practice. The Complaint alleges that the

violations described “constituted a policy usage, custom, habit,

pattern and practice” by Defendants. Compl. ¶ 12. The Complaint

also alleges that the City the County of Fresno “have agreements

in writing or contracts in which they have agreed to co-operate

within each others [sic] jurisdictions,” that the City allows the

County to maintain its offices within the City’s jurisdiction,

and that the actions of the Sheriff Defendants were being carried

out within the City of Fresno, and because the group meetings

were in the City of Fresno it “placed the jurisdiction over the

alleged crimes within the original jurisdiction of the Fresno

City Police.” The Complaint alleges that the City of Fresno has

received “secret training” from the government that amounts to

the “application of secret policy and secret law.” The Complaint

further alleges that the City of Fresno has a “policy of

knowingly allowing the various local city and county government

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agencies and their agents employees and officers to carry out

acts an alleged enforcement actions which knowingly and

intentionally violate the federal and state . . . rights.” The

Complaint maintains that there is a history of judgments against

the City and County for such violations. 

It is apparent to the Court that there is no set of facts

under which Plaintiffs may state a section 1983 claim against the

City of Fresno. The allegations are insufficient to establish

that a violation of a federally protected right occurred as a

result of a policy, practice or custom adopted or ratified by a

City of Fresno municipal policymaker, indeed there is no action

alleged on the part of the City of Fresno or anyone acting on its

behalf. That the Sheriff’s Office is allowed to operate within

the City does not indicate a policy or custom. 

To the extent that Plaintiffs allege that the City of Fresno

is liable for the actions of the Fresno County Sheriff’s

Department, the allegations are likewise insufficient. Even

assuming the Sheriff’s Office could be linked to the City of

Fresno, under Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, a local government may not

be held liable for the acts of its employees under a respondeat

superior theory. The liability of a local government must rest

on its actions, not the actions of its employees. 

Because Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that the

alleged constitutional violations were the product of a policy or

custom of the City of Fresno, Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the City of Fresno.

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c) DA Defendant Hunt

DA Defendants argue that the section 1983 claims against

Defendant Hunt must be dismissed because the Complaint fails to

allege that Hunt was involved in the prosecution of Plaintiff

Sharon Saunders and also fails to allege an injury due to a

policy or custom of the local governmental unit.

As discussed supra, municipalities cannot be held liable

under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. The same

rule applies to individuals. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. Here,

there is no allegation that DA Defendant Hunt was personally

involved in the prosecution of Plaintiff Sharon Saunders. 

Even given the most liberal of readings, DA Defendants still

prevail. To satisfy section 1983's policy requirement, there

must be a rule or regulation that was promulgated, adopted or

ratified by local government or a custom, even if unapproved

through official channels. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91; see also

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). “Proof

of random acts or isolated events are insufficient to establish

custom.” Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The allegations regarding DA Defendant Hunt are insufficient

to demonstrate causation such that DA Defendant Hunt may be

liable for the acts of his subordinates. Hunt’s name is only

mentioned twice within the body of the Complaint, and there is no

allegation that he was personally involved in Plaintiff Sharon

Saunders’ prosecution. Further, Plaintiffs’ violations are

rooted in the activities of the Sheriff Defendants; Hunt cannot

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be liable for their actions.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims are DISMISSED

as to DA Defendant Hunt.

4. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

A state prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from

liability under section 1983 for damages resulting from their

conduct in “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the

State’s case insofar as that conduct is ‘intimately associated

with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128

(1976). Immunity rests on the “nature of the function performed,

not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Kalina v.

Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127, 118 S. Ct. 502, 139 L. Ed. 2d 471

(1997). If a prosecutor steps outside of his or her role as an

advocate, his or her conduct is protected by immunity only to the

extent that any other individual would be protected in performing

the same function. Id. at 129-30. If a prosecutor performs

administrative or investigative functions that do not relate to

an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of prosecution or

for judicial proceedings, the prosecutor is not entitled to

absolute immunity. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-96, 111 S.

Ct. 1934, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991). 

Here, DA Defendants argue that prosecutorial immunity

applies to bar Plaintiffs’ claims and that the section 1983

claims should be dismissed. Plaintiffs’ allegations include the

only the following statement as to DA Defendants:

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 The Court notes that under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of 4

Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Sharon Saunders may amend her complaint

as of right prior to the filing of a responsive pleading. No

responsive pleading has been filed in this case and thus the Court

is note required to grant leave to amend. 

13

DEFENDANTS D.D.A. BOB ELLIS, AND DEPUTY DISTRICT

ATTORNEY JOHN SAVRNOCH, FAILED TO FULFILL AND CARRY OUT

THEIR SAID LEGAL DUTY UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW TO

THE INJURY AND DAMAGE OF PLAINTIFFS HEREIN . . ..

Pls.’ Compl. at 16. 

This allegation is insufficient to allege that DA Defendants

did anything other than perform traditional prosecutorial

functions. Absent such an allegation, DA Defendants are

protected by absolute immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ section

1983 claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to DA Defendants.

In sum, all claims of Plaintiff Merlin Saunders are

dismissed with prejudice because they are time barred. The

section 1983 claims of Plaintiff Sharon Saunders are dismissed

with prejudice as to the City of Fresno. Plaintiff Sharon

Saunders may amend her complaint as to the claims against DA

Defendants. Such an amendment will only be successful if it 4

satisfies the requirements of Monell and alleges involvement on

the part of DA Defendants in activities outside the scope of the

prosecution. Plaintiff Sharon Saunders is reminded that she is

subject to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule

11(b)(3) provides that by presenting a signed pleading to the

court the pleader represents that the factual contentions therein

“have evidentiary support” or “are likely to have evidentiary

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support” after reasonable discovery. Failure to comply with Rule

11 may result in sanctions, including dismissal of this action

and/or the imposition of monetary sanctions.

C. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims

1. Compliance With the California Tort Claims Act

All Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ state law claims fail

because the Compliant fails to allege compliance with California

Tort Claims Act, Cal. Govt. Code section 810, et seq.. 

a) Legal Standard

Government Code section 945.4 provides that “no suit for

money or damages may be brought against a public entity” until

after a written claim for damages has been presented to the

public entity. A claim relating to “injury to the person” must

be filed within six months of accrual. Cal. Govt. Code § 911.2. 

An action is barred if a claim is not timely presented. Cal.

Govt. Code § 950.2. 

Compliance with the claim procedure is an integral part of a

plaintiff’s cause of action and must be pleaded and proved. 

State of California v. Sup. Ct. of Kings County (Bodde), 32 Cal.

4th 1234, 1239 (2004). Failure to allege compliance with the

Tort Claims Act is fatal to a plaintiff’s state law claims. If

the claims procedures are not fully satisfied prior to filing

suit, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to support one of

the available grounds for excuse. Van Alstyne, California

Government Tort Liability Practice (4th ed. 2004) § 8.40. 

Defendants are correct that the Complaint does not allege

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compliance with the Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs attached to

their opposition various documents apparently relating to the

claims of Plaintiff Sharon Saunders, who argues that the superior

court relieved her of the claim requirement. However, a motion

to dismiss is decided on the face of the complaint, and a

plaintiff is required to either plead compliance with the Tort

Claims Act or demonstrate that compliance is not required. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state law claims are DISMISSED. To the

extent Plaintiffs’ state law claims are not dismissed with

prejudice for other reasons set forth in this order, Plaintiffs

must comply with the pleading requirements of the Tort Claims Act

in any amended pleading. 

b) Dismissal with Prejudice as to City of Fresno

The City of Fresno asserts that no claim against the City

was filed within the statutory period and that Plaintiffs’ claims

against it should be dismissed. The City of Fresno submitted the

declaration of Kerry Trost, the Senior Risk Analyst for the

City’s Risk Management Division, in support of its argument. Ms.

Trost avers that she is the person who would know whether a claim

has been filed with the City of Fresno and that no such claim has

been filed by Plaintiffs.

The City of Fresno requests that the Court take judicial

notice of Ms. Trost’s declaration pursuant to Rule 201 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 201 provides that:

A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to

reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial

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court or (2) capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned.

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). A court may take judicial notice of facts

outside the pleadings on motion to dismiss, including judicial

notice of “records and reports of administrative bodies.” Mack

v. South Bay Beer Distrib., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.

1986). Matters of public record may thus be considered without

converting a 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. 

The Court hereby takes judicial notice of the absence of a record

regarding a claim filed by Plaintiffs against the City of Fresno. 

California Government Code section 945.3 specifies that it

“shall not extend the time within which a claim is required to be

presented” under the Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, because no

claim was filed with the City of Fresno pursuant to the Tort

Claims Act within the applicable statutory period, Plaintiffs’

state law claims against the City of Fresno are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

2. Failure to State a Claim

The City of Fresno argues in the alternative that Plaintiffs

have failed to state a claim as to any of their state law causes

of action and that the state law claims are time-barred. The

Court agrees. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

require a statement showing the pleader is entitled to ht relief

requested. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Specific elements must be

pleaded to allege defamation, negligent infliction of emotional

distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See

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 Neither the Sheriff nor the DA Defendants raised the statute 5

of limitations issue with respect to the state law claims. Because

it is an affirmative defense, the parties must raise the issue in

order for the Court to base dismissal thereupon.

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id.; Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649

(9th Cir. 1984) (pleading mus give fair notice and state elements

of claim plainly and succinctly). 

For defamation, a plaintiff must allege slander or libel,

both of which require a “false and unprivileged publication.” 

Cal. Civ. Code §§ 44-46. Plaintiffs attached to their complaint

newspaper and online articles that mention Plaintiff Sharon

Saunders’ arrest. Plaintiffs have failed to allege, and from the

facts appears cannot allege, any act of publication by the City

of Fresno or a City employee. Similarly, the claims for

emotional distress require some act on the part of the defendant,

here the City of Fresno. The Complaint fails to allege that the

City of Fresno or any employee thereof was in any way involved in

Plaintiffs’ case, other than that the January 5, 1999 meeting

took place within the City and vague allegations regarding the

interactions of the County and City of Fresno. This is

insufficient. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state law claims are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the City of Fresno.

As to the statute of limitations issue, as discussed supra,

the statute was tolled Plaintiff Sharon Saunders while charges

against her were pending. Also as discussed, no tolling

provision applied to Plaintiff Merlin Saunders and his claims are

time-barred and DISMISSED as against the City of Fresno.5

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3. Discretionary Immunity of DA Defendants

DA Defendants also argue that all state law theories fail to

state a claim due to discretionary immunity. Section 820.2 of

the California Government Code specifies that “[e]xcept as

otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable

for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or

omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested

in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Cal. Govt.

Code § 820.2. 

“Under California law the immunity statute is given an

‘expansive interpretation’ in order to best further the rationale

of the immunity, that is, to allow the free exercise of the

prosecutor’s discretion and protect public officers from

harassment in the performance of their duties.” Ingram v.

Flippo, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1280, 1292 (1999) (discussing sections

821.6 and 820.2). Oddly, DA Defendants do not cite section

821.6, which provides that a “public employee is not liable for

injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or

administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment,

even if he acts maliciously or without probable cause.” Cal.

Govt. Code § 821.6. In any event, the more general immunity

provision in section 820.2 is applicable here and DA Defendants

are immune from suit as to Plaintiffs’ state law claims. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state law claims against DA Defendants

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

///

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 Plaintiff Merlin Saunders could not, of course, state a 6

claim for defamation as the alleged statements were not of and

concerning him. 

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4. Litigation Privilege of DA Defendants

Even if DA Defendants were not immune from suit, to the

extent Plaintiff Sharon Saunders attempts to state a claim for

defamation based on statements made during the course of her 6

criminal prosecution, the statements are privileged. 

Section 47 of the California Civil Code provides that a

“privileged publication or broadcast is one made: (a) in the

proper discharge of an official duty. (b) In any (1) legislative

proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official

proceeding authorized by law.” Cal. Civ. Code § 47. DA

Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that any comments made

were in the course of a judicial proceeding or other proceeding

authorized by law and are absolutely privileged. Accordingly the

state law claim for defamation against DA Defendants is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

5. Sovereign Immunity

County Defendants argue that they are immune from liability

under California law. Section 815 of the California Government

Code provides that public entities are not liable “[e]xcept as

otherwise provided by statute.” Cal. Govt. Code § 815(a). 

Section 820 provides that public employees, however, are liable

for their torts to the same extent as private individuals unless

an immunity provision applies. Id. at § 820. Public entities

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are vicariously liable for the torts of their employees, but are

immune if the employee is immune. Id. at § 815.2. In addition

to vicarious liability, “[w]here a public entity is under a

mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to

protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the

public entity is liable for any injury proximately caused by its

failure to discharge the duty . . ..” Id. at 815.6. 

County Defendants assert that the California Court of Appeal

has stated that to state a cause of action against a public

entity, “every fact essential to the existence of statutory

liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the

existence of a statutory duty.” Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch.

Dist., 177 Cal. App. 3d 792, 802 (1986). The “statute or

‘enactment’ claimed to establish duty must at the very least be

identified.” Id. 

As an initial matter, according to their papers, the moving

County Defendants do not include the County of Fresno itself, but

only the various individuals named. Those individuals are public

employees to whom section 815 immunity does not apply. As a

second matter, federal and not state law, sets the standard for

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), although the state law standard

for dismissal is “highly relevant.” Church of Scientology v.

Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 696 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984). Federal pleading

is notice pleading and requires only a “short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Defendants have presented and the Court’s

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Plaintiffs argue in their opposition that filing of the 7

government claim defeats sovereign immunity. This is not the law;

the statute specifically states “subject to any immunity” and

“subject to any defenses.” Cal. Govt. Code § 815(b).

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own research has revealed no federal case in which a plaintiff’s

state law claims were dismissed on this basis. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs’ state law claims will not be dismissed on this ground

at this time. This determination in no way affects County

Defendants’ ability to assert immunity at a later time.7

IV. Motion for a More Definite Statement

A. Legal Standard

Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows

for a motion for a more definite statement if a pleading “is so

vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to

frame a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Motions

for a more definite statement are disfavored, but are within the

Court’s discretion and may sometimes be appropriate. “[P]roper

pleading under Rule 8 requires a pleading to contain allegations

of each element of the claim. If it does not, and if the

deficiency is not so material that the pleading should be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a more definite statement is

appropriate.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.36[1] (Matthew

Bender 3d ed.). However, “where the information sought by the

moving party is available and/or properly sought through

discovery the motion should be denied. Famolare, Inc. v. Edison

Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 945 (E.D. Cal. 1981); see

also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d §

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1376.

B. Discussion

Sheriff Defendants argue that a motion for a more definite

statement is appropriate here because it “is not clear whether

plaintiffs intend to separately plead state law claims for relief

or, if so, against which defendants each state law claim is being

asserted.” Sheriff Defs.’ Mot. at 3. Plaintiffs assert that the

Complaint clearly alleges that all claims are against all

Defendants. 

The Court notes at the outset that if the Sheriff Defendants

had moved, as the City of Fresno did, for the dismissal of

Plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), such

dismissal would likely have been proper. Plaintiffs’ Complaint

states various state law claims but is deficient as to its

factual allegations and which of those state law causes of action

are actually being asserted. Nonetheless, the causes of action

are at least named, and the City of Fresno was able to frame a

motion to dismiss based on these state law claims; while a motion

to dismiss is not a responsive pleading, it is apparent that the

bare minimum required for such pleading is present in the

Complaint such that Defendants could, at the very least, deny the

allegations and raise appropriate defenses. Accordingly, Sheriff

Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is DENIED. 

The Court also notes, however, that a First Amended

Complaint will be required because of the pleading deficiencies

as to the Tort Claims Act. The Court encourages Plaintiff Sharon

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Saunders to specifically set forth her state law causes of action

in any amended pleading in much the same manner as she did her

federal claims. 

ACCORDINGLY, Plaintiffs’ Complaint against the City of

Fresno is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in its entirety based

on failure to state a claim and failure to comply with the

California Tort Claims Act.

FURTHER, Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims against the DA

Defendants are hereby DISMISSED based on prosecutorial immunity.

FURTHER, Plaintiffs’ state law claims against the DA

Defendants are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE based on

discretionary immunity.

FURTHER, Plaintiffs’ state law claims against the Sheriff

Defendants are DISMISSED based on failure to allege compliance

with the California Tort Claims Act.

FURTHER, Sheriff Defendants’ motion for a more definite

statement is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

ia40ij UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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