Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00681/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00681-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS CLAIBORNE,

Plaintiff,

v.

LT. BEEBE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-0681-AWI DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH

LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was removed from the Kern County Superior Court by

defendants. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

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exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supplyessential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred at North Kern State Prison, Delano,

California. The defendants named in this action are Captain Brakebill; Correctional Counselor

Martinez; Lieutenant Beebe and Warden Chrones. Plaintiff states that he is mobility impaired and

requires the use of crutches. He alleges that during the week of May 8, 2005, while exiting the

dining hall, a personal alarm was sounded. Because he was unable to squat and lie in the prone

position, defendant Beebe became angry and took away his crutches. Plaintiff contends defendant

Beebe then ordered two officers to handcuff him and force him to the prone position. Plaintiff

alleges that he was issued a rules violation report and defendants Brakebill, Martinez and Chrones

conspired to sentence him to “C” status in violation of his civil rights.

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1. Excessive Force

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . .

. contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.

at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force

standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Id. at 7. “In determining whetherthe use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper

to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end

it.” Id. 

The allegation that defendant Beebe took his crutches away and ordered subordinate staff to

force plaintiff to a prone position, simply does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation for

use of excessive physical force. Plaintiff must allege some specific facts which support a claim that

defendants used force against plaintiff and the force used was excessive. Plaintiff may not rest on

a legal conclusion that excessive force was used. Plaintiff will be provided with the opportunity to

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file an amended complaint curing this deficiency.

2. Rules Violation Report

Plaintiff allegations regarding defendants’ issuance of the Rules Violation Report also fail

to state a cognizable claim for relief. The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of

liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to

invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a

liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process

Clause itself or from state law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process

Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of

confinement.” Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Under

state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing

on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests

created by state law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th

Cir. 2007). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting the existence of protected liberty

interest. Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in remaining free from administrative

segregation, May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997), or in remaining at a particular

prison, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976). Nor do prisoners

have a constitutional right to a particular classification status, see Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78,

88, n.9 (1976), and prisoners have no constitutional right to be incarcerated at a particular

correctional facility. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976). Because plaintiff has not

identified a protected liberty interest at stake, he may not pursue a claim that he was deprived of

liberty without due process of law based on the rules violation report.

In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant to section 1983, such a complaint must

“allege specific facts to support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.” Buckey v.

County of Los Angeles, 968 791, 794 (9 Cir. 1992); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police th

Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must allege that defendants conspired or

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acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sykes v.

State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974).

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Brakebill, Martinez and Chrones conspired to sentence him

to “C” status. Plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts supporting the existence of a conspiracy

among the defendants. Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that defendants conspired is insufficient to

state a claim for relief under section 1983.

 C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not state any claims upon which relief may be

granted under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended

complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state any claims

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

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amended complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 27, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3c0h UNI j8 TED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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