Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05142/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05142-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 14, 2007 Decided July 13, 2007

No. 06-5142

MIAMI BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL,

AFL/CIO AND

HOMESTEAD AIR BASE DEVELOPERS, INC.,

APPELLANTS

v.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv00067)

Kevin S. O'Scannlain argued the cause for the appellants.

Ellen J. Durkee, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the appellees. John Most and Lisa

E. Jones, Attorneys, were on brief. Andrew C. Mergen,

Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

USCA Case #06-5142 Document #1053379 Filed: 07/13/2007 Page 1 of 11
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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The

appellants, the Miami Building & Construction Trades Council

and the Homestead Air Base Developers, Inc., (collectively,

HABDI) contracted with Miami-Dade County (Miami-Dade or

County) to construct and operate a commercial airport on

surplus land forming part of what was then Homestead Air

Force Base (Homestead). HABDI challenges the decision of the

U.S. Air Force (Air Force) not to convey the land to MiamiDade for an airport, as previously planned, but instead to offer

a portion of the land to the County for a non-aviation

development. We conclude that HABDI lacks standing under

Article III of the United States Constitution. Even were we to

direct the Air Force to convey the total surplus acreage, we

cannot predict with any confidence that Miami-Dade—which

voluntarily terminated its participation in this lawsuit and,

pursuant to an agreement with the Air Force, has already

accepted a portion of the surplus property for mixed use

development—would make the policy choice to reverse course

and construct an airport, thus redressing HABDI’s alleged

injury, namely, the lost opportunity to build and operate a

commercial airport on land conveyed by the Air Force for this

purpose.

I.

The Homestead property is located in southern Miami-Dade

County, Florida near the towns of Homestead and Florida City

and between Biscayne National Park to the east and Everglades

National Park to the west. In March 1993, the United States

Secretary of the Department of Defense (Secretary)

recommended that Homestead be closed pursuant to the Defense

Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (DBCRA), Pub. L.

No. 101-510 §§ 2901 et seq., 104 Stat. 1485, 1496 (1990). After

public hearings, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment

Commission prepared a report recommending realignment rather

than closure and the recommendation was approved by the

USCA Case #06-5142 Document #1053379 Filed: 07/13/2007 Page 2 of 11
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1

A public benefit conveyance is the transfer of “surplus real

property . . . to State and local governments and certain non-profit

institutions or organizations at up to 100 percent public benefit

discount for public benefit purposes,” including “education, health,

park and recreation, the homeless, historic monuments, public airports,

highways, correctional facilities, ports, and wildlife conservation.” 41

C.F.R. § 102-75.350.

President and not disapproved by the Congress pursuant to

DBCRA. The Air Force then decided to dispose of 1,631.8

acres of Homestead it did not need for its planned realignment

of Homestead into the Homestead Air Reserve Station. 

In July 1993, Miami-Dade submitted to the Air Force a draft

redevelopment plan proposing that the Air Force transfer

Homestead’s surplus property to Miami-Dade by public benefit

conveyance1

 for redevelopment as a commercial airport. In

February 1994, the Air Force issued an environmental impact

statement (EIS) on Miami-Dade’s proposal. The EIS considered

four alternative uses of the surplus property—three of which

included a commercial airport (with varying additional

facilities); the fourth was “No-Action.” Record of Decision on

the Disposal of Homestead Air Force Base, Dade County

Florida (Oct. 1994) at 7-8 (JA 23-24). In October 1994, the Air

Force issued a Record of Decision (ROD) which determined that

certain parcels were to “be made available for disposal for use

as a public airport” and Miami-Dade “w[ould] be offered the

opportunity to apply for the property for public airport use.” Id.

at 13 (JA 29). The decision was contingent on Miami-Dade’s

submission of a qualifying application and approval thereof by

both the Air Force and the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA). In addition, the ROD advised that “future economic,

political, and environmental conditions could redirect

development by the new owners toward other alternatives or

means of implementation.” Id. at 18 (JA 34).

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Although conveyance of a fee simple interest was contemplated,

the ROD specified that “[a]ny property which the Air Force is unable

to convey by deed pending meeting environmental clean-up

requirements, will be transferred by long-term lease with a contract to

accept the property when all environmental remediations are in place.”

ROD at 13 (JA 29); see also Development Agreement at 2 (JA 109).

In September 1995 Miami-Dade entered an interim sixmonth lease with the Air Force for the proposed airport property

while it prepared plans for airport development and operation.

The interim lease recited: “The Lessee acknowledges that this

Lease, and any extension of it, is not and does not constitute a

commitment by the Government as to the disposal of the Leased

Premises or of Homestead AFB, in whole or in part, to the

Lessee or any agency or instrumentality thereof, or to any

sublessee.” Lease § 6.3 (JA 43). The interim lease was

amended three times under the same terms and conditions, the

last extension ending on March 31, 1997.

In June 1996, Miami-Dade entered a “Lease and

Development Agreement” (Development Agreement) with

HABDI, in which Miami-Dade agreed to lease the airport

property to HABDI for a 45-year term and HABDI agreed to

construct and operate a commercial airport, with Miami-Dade to

receive a portion of the revenue. The Development Agreement

provided: 

[T]he Lessee acknowledges that, because the County has no

long-term leasehold or ownership interest in [the lease

property] at this time, the terms of this Lease shall not be

effective until such time as the County acquires a leasehold

or fee simple interest in [the lease property] under the Long

Term Lease or the Conveyance, as applicable, and not before

. . . .

Development Agreement at 1 (JA 108).2

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On December 31, 1996, Miami-Dade applied to the Air

Force for the conveyance or long-term lease of the airport

property. Meanwhile, the Air Force had received

correspondence from environmental groups seeking a

supplemental EIS because of significant expansion of HABDI’s

airport development plan—in particular, more extensive ground

facilities and an almost two-fold increase in the projected

commercial jet usage. Subsequently, the Air Force and the

FAA, in cooperation with the Department of the Interior

(Interior) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),

decided to conduct a supplemental EIS (SEIS). The final SEIS,

issued in December 2000, considered four alternatives: (1) a

commercial airport as previously proposed; (2) a spaceport; (3)

a commercial, industrial, and/or residential “mixed use”

development; or (4) “no action.” SEIS §§ 2.2-2.5 (JA 275-356).

In the SEIS, the Air Force stated a preference for either the

proposed commercial airport or the mixed use alternatives,

explaining that it did “not consider the potential environmental

impacts of either of those alternatives to be disqualifying.” Id.

at 2.12-1 (JA 434). The FAA expressed “a stronger preference

for the commercial airport proposal because it would provide

needed additional airport capacity for south Florida” and it

believed the development “c[ould] include appropriate

environmental mitigation for the surrounding community,

Biscayne Bay, and the national parks.” Id. Both Interior and

EPA expressed a preference for the mixed use alternative. Id. 

On January 15, 2001, the Air Force issued a Second

Supplemental Record of Decision (SROD), in which it

“conclude[d] that the surplus property should not be conveyed

for airport purposes.” SROD, Disposal of Portions of the

Former Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, at 5 (Jan. 15, 2001)

(JA 441). The Air Force decided instead to retain Homestead’s

runway and taxiways and to offer Miami-Dade a smaller parcel

(approximately 717 acres) “for mixed use development.” Id. If

Miami-Dade declined the offer, the Air Force planned to assign

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Public Law 106-541 included a “Sense of Congress Concerning

Homestead Air Force Base,” which, inter alia, recognized that

“development at the Homestead site could potentially cause significant

air, water, and noise pollution and result in the degradation of adjacent

national parks and other protected Federal resources.” Water

Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 602, 114

Stat. 2572, 2693 (2000).

the 717 acres to Interior which was to negotiate a transfer of the

land (in exchange for property interests beneficial to Interior) to

a party that would develop it for a mixed use or, failing that, the

land was to be disposed of by public sale. Id. The Air Force

explained it had “determined that the development of a

commercial airport at the former Homestead AFB in such close

proximity to Biscayne and Everglades National Parks, when

development alternatives with lesser impacts are available, poses

unacceptable risks to these national resources,” noting it was

“aware that other federal agencies believe that a commercial

airport would not be consistent with the purposes of the

Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, authorized by P.L.

106-541.” Id. at 7 (JA 443).3

On January 12, 2001, HABDI filed this action challenging

the Air Force’s decision to prepare an SEIS. HABDI filed an

amended complaint on March 8, 2001 challenging the 2001

SROD itself, alleging the Air Force violated the DBCRA, the

Base Closure Community Assistance Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.

103-160, §§ 2901 et seq., 107 Stat. 1547, 1909 (1993), and the

Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. On March 16,

2001, Miami-Dade filed a similar suit which was voluntarily

dismissed on December 13, 2001 after the County filed an

application with the Air Force for conveyance of the Homestead

property for mixed use development.

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An “economic development conveyance” is a “transfer [of] real

property and personal property . . . for purposes of job generation on

the installation,” 32 C.F.R. § 174.9(a), for which “the Secretary

concerned shall seek to obtain consideration at least equal to the fair

market value,” id. § 174.10(b), although a conveyance may be made

without consideration under certain circumstances, id. § 174.10(e).

5

On the merits, the district court concluded that the SEIS was

performed in conformance with Air Force regulations, the SROD was

not arbitrary or capricious and there was no record evidence to support

HABDI’s due process and equal protection claims. See Miami Bldg.

& Constr. Trades Council v. Sec’y of Def., No. 01cv0067, slip op. at

15-16 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2006).

On July 13, 2004, the Air Force and Miami-Dade entered an

“Economic Development Conveyance”4 agreement under which

the Air Force agreed to convey 604 acres of the Homestead to

Miami-Dade for mixed use (but non-aviation) development. As

of February 16, 2006, the Air Force had delivered and MiamiDade had accepted deeds for 580 acres of the property; an

additional 24 acres were to be conveyed after environmental

remediation. 

On March 16, 2006, the district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the Air Force for lack of jurisdiction on the

ground the plaintiffs lacked standing or, alternatively, on the

merits.5

 Miami Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Sec’y of Def.,

No. 01cv0067 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2006).

HABDI filed a notice of appeal on May 12, 2006. 

II.

“Because the question of standing goes to our jurisdiction

over the case, we must consider it first.” AT&T Corp. v. FCC,

317 F.3d 227, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens

for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998)). “The

‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three

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elements’: (1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and (3)

redressability.” Rainbow/PUSH Coal. v. FCC, 396 F.3d 1235,

1240 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)) (other internal quotation omitted).

Following our decision in US Ecology, Inc. v. United States

Department of the Interior, 231 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000), we

conclude that the district court correctly held that HABDI lacks

Article III standing because it has not demonstrated

redressability.

In US Ecology, the State of California (California) had

sought to purchase from Interior a parcel of federal land in the

Mojave Desert (Ward Valley Site) for use as a low-level

radioactive waste facility and, in connection with the purchase,

had contracted with US Ecology to develop the site. Interior

initially issued a ROD approving the sale but subsequently

rescinded the ROD. California and US Ecology filed separate

suits in the district court challenging the rescission. After the

actions were consolidated, the district court granted summary

judgment in Interior’s favor. US Ecology appealed but the State

of California did not. While US Ecology’s appeal was pending,

Interior sent California a letter advising it that Interior was

terminating its purchase application.

On appeal we held that US Ecology lacked Article III

standing based on its “most obvious failing—its inability to

demonstrate that it is ‘ “likely,” as opposed to merely

“speculative,” that [its] injury will be “redressed by a favorable

decision.” ’ ” US Ecology, 231 F.3d at 24 (quoting Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare

Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976))) (alteration in original).

The court explained that the policy decision whether to go ahead

with the purchase and development of the Ward Valley Site

belonged entirely to the State of California and “[c]ourts have

been loath to find standing when redress depends largely on

policy decisions yet to be made by government officials”

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because “the question of ‘[w]hether [appellant's] claims of

economic injury would be redressed by a favorable decision [in

such a] case depends on the unfettered choices made by

independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of

broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either

to control or to predict.’ ” Id. at 24 (quoting ASARCO Inc. v.

Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989)) (alteration in original). 

Thus, “[w]hen redress depends on the cooperation of a third

party, ‘it becomes the burden of the [appellant] to adduce facts

showing that those choices have been or will be made in such

manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of

injury.’ ” Id. at 24-25 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

at 562) (second alteration in original). The court concluded US

Ecology had not met its burden because “even were the

Department of the Interior to issue a [land patent transferring

title of the Ward Valley Site to California] as US Ecology

requests, only the State of California is capable of accepting title

and taking ownership of the land.” Id. at 25. We believe

HABDI has failed to meet its burden for substantially the same

reason. 

Here, only Miami-Dade “is capable of accepting title and

taking ownership of the land,” id., and whether to reverse course

and build an airport rather than the planned mixed use

development is a policy decision only Miami-Dade can make.

What its decision would be if offered—as originally—the full

1,631.8 acres to construct an airport is beyond the court’s

control or ken. It might, as HABDI insists, choose an airport or

it might maintain its present course. Thus, like US Ecology,

HABDI’s “disappointment at having invested—and perhaps

lost—time and money” in the proposed project, “without more,

is not enough” to establish standing. US Ecology, 231 F.3d at

25. HABDI must also demonstrate redressability and, like US

Ecology, has failed to do so. 

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HABDI attempts to distinguish this case from US Ecology

but to no good effect. First, HABDI asserts that, unlike US

Ecology, it possesses a “contingent legal right” to lease the

original 1,631.8 acres to operate a commercial airport and the

loss of this right constitutes a sufficient injury. We disagree.

US Ecology, “seek[ing] refuge in a few lines of dicta found . . .

in University Medical Center of Southern Nevada v. Shalala,

173 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1999),” claimed standing based on a

legal right to develop the Ward Valley Site contingent on

California’s right to purchase the site from Interior. Id.

“[A]ssuming” that a contingent legal right “poses a circumstance

under which the redressability problem might be avoided,” we

found no such circumstance in that case because US Ecology

had not demonstrated a “legally enforceable right” to compel

California to “accept the Ward Valley Site if offered” or even

“to develop the facility were California ultimately to pursue the

Ward Valley Site.” Id. Like US Ecology, HABDI too lacks the

legal right to compel the potential land transferee—in this case,

Miami-Dade—to accept the land transfer. The Development

Agreement expressly provides that the terms of the lease—and

consequently any rights HABDI may have thereunder— “shall

not be effective until such time as the County acquires a

leasehold or fee simple interest in [the lease property] under the

Long Term Lease or the Conveyance, as applicable, and not

before.” Development Agreement at 1 (JA 108). And that time

will not come unless and until Miami-Dade decides to accept the

original acreage and proceed with airport development—events

that may never occur. Thus, as in US Ecology, see 231 F.3d at

25, even assuming the contingent legal right theory could

support redressability in the proper case—an issue we do not

decide—this is not that case. See id. (rejecting US Ecology’s

“contingent legal right” claim).

HABDI also attempts to distinguish US Ecology factually,

noting that in that case “the court found that the State chose not

to appeal an adverse lower court decision amid concerns about

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‘the lack of funds to purchase the site,’ ‘the apparent lack of

authority of [the State agency] to acquire land,’ and ‘substantial

steps . . . required to proceed with the requested sale.’ ”

Appellants’ Br. at 14 (quoting US Ecology, 231 F.3d at 24)

(alteration by appellants). This characterization, however, is not

entirely accurate. The three quoted circumstances were not

California’s reasons for declining to appeal but instead Interior’s

reasons for terminating California’s application after California

had declined to appeal. See US Ecology, 231 F.3d at 23-24. In

any event, there is no reason to believe that Miami-Dade is

interested in proceeding with airport development rather than the

planned mixed use development. Based on the record evidence,

we cannot agree with HABDI that Miami-Dade’s “preferred

use” remains use as a commercial airport. See Appellants’ Br.

at 11. 

Because the appellants have failed to demonstrate that their

alleged injury is redressable in this proceeding, we conclude that

they lack standing under Article III of the United States

Constitution. Accordingly, the district court’s summary

judgment is affirmed.

So ordered. 

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