Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01502/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01502-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

3:16-cv-01502-BEN 

 3:13-cr-01076-BEN-1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NARADA TURAIL CADE,

Movant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01502-BEN 

 3:13-cr-01076-BEN-1

ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL; and

(2) DENYING MOTION TO

VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR 

CORRECT SENTENCE UNDER 

28 U.S.C. § 2255

[Docket Nos. 61, 66]

Movant, Narada Turail Cade, proceeding pro se, filed a Motion for Appointment of 

Counsel and to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

Respondent, the United States (“the government”), filed a response, opposing the motion. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Movant’s Motions.

BACKGROUND

On March 28, 2013, Movant waived indictment and was charged by a criminal 

information with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and (b), Sex Trafficking of Children.

///

Case 3:16-cv-01502-BEN Document 2 Filed 04/04/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 5
2

3:16-cv-01502-BEN 

 3:13-cr-01076-BEN-1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Docket Nos. 13, 14.)1 Movant pleaded guilty to the charged offense. (Docket Nos. 23, 

24.) The plea agreement included a waiver of appeal and collateral attack of his 

sentence, “except a post-conviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the high end 

of the guideline range recommended by the Government pursuant to this agreement at the 

time of sentencing.” (Docket No. 22 at p. 10.)

The parties agreed to jointly recommend Movant’s sentencing be based on the 

following U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Base Offense Level, Specific Offense 

Characteristics, Adjustments, and Departures: 

1. Base Offense Level [§ 2G1.3(a)(2)] 30

2. Use of a Computer [§ 2G1.3(b)(3)] +2

3. Commercial Sex Act [§ 2G1.3(b)(4)(B)] +2

4. Acceptance of Responsibility [§ 3E1.1] -3

(Docket No. 22 at p. 8.) At sentencing, the government complied with the plea 

agreement by recommending the above Guideline calculations. (Docket No. 29.) The 

government’s Guideline calculations produced a Guideline range of 135 to 168 months’ 

custody. (Id.) The government recommended Movant receive a sentence of 135 months’ 

custody. (Id.) 

Movant concurred with the government’s Guideline calculations, and 

recommended a sentence of “10 years or low end [sic].” (Docket No. 33.) The Court

ultimately sentenced Movant to the low end of the Guideline range of 135 months in 

custody and a term of supervised release of ten years. (Docket Nos. 34, 35.)

On May 9, 2016, Movant filed the instant motion. (Docket No. 77.) His filing was 

in the form of a letter that stated:2

 

1 All docket citations refer to the criminal case docket, No. 13-cr-01076-BEN-1.

2 The following is copied verbatim from Movant’s filing, including all grammatical 

and spelling errors.

Case 3:16-cv-01502-BEN Document 2 Filed 04/04/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 5
3

3:16-cv-01502-BEN 

 3:13-cr-01076-BEN-1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I’m requesting this letter to the Court of San Diego, Ca. I’m 

asking for an attorney to over look my case about the Johnson 

Case that is now retroactive. I think that my case were clam as 

a violent crime. I think I’m eligible on this Johnson case that is 

retroactive. My crime is sex trafficking to a minor that was 

known as a violent crime. I’m asking for an attorney in the San 

Diego, CA district.

(Docket No. 61 at p. 1.) The Court construes Movant’s filing as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

motion to vacate or reduce his sentence pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and a motion for appointment of 

counsel.

3

 

A. Motion for Appointment of Attorney 

Courts have discretion to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants upon a 

showing of exceptional circumstances. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th 

Cir. 1991); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir. 

1981). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the 

likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims 

pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017 

(9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted); see also Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1318. 

“Neither of these factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching 

a decision.” Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017 (internal citations omitted).

As will be explained in further detail below, the Court find Movant’s motion to be 

without merit, and thus cannot say there is any likelihood of success on the merits. 

Moreover, Movant fails to demonstrate an inability to represent himself beyond the 

ordinary burdens encountered by litigants representing themselves pro se. Therefore, the 

Court finds that the exceptional circumstances required for the appointment of counsel 

are not present. Movant’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

 

3 On October 6, 2017, Movant filed a second motion for appointment of attorney 

because he was “asking the Court for a sentence reduced [sic].” (Docket No. 66 a p. 1.)

Case 3:16-cv-01502-BEN Document 2 Filed 04/04/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 5
4

3:16-cv-01502-BEN 

 3:13-cr-01076-BEN-1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 22554

Under section 2255, a movant is entitled to relief if the sentence: (1) was imposed 

in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States; (2) was given by a court 

without jurisdiction to do so; (3) was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by 

law; or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. 

Speelman, 431 F.3d 1226, 1230 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). If it is clear the movant has failed to 

state a claim, or has “no more than conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts and 

refuted by the record,” a district court may deny a § 2255 motion without an evidentiary 

hearing. United States v. Quan, 789 F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1986).

Movant’s motion fails because he validly waived his right to collaterally attack his

sentence. The record discloses no issues as to the voluntariness of Movant’s plea. And 

contrary to his belief, Johnson is not applicable to his sentence. In Johnson, the Supreme 

Court considered language in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The ACCA 

imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for a defendant who violates 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g) and “has three previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony 

or serious drug offense, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Supreme Court examined 

the definition of “violent felony” and held that a portion of that definition known as the 

“residual clause” is void for vagueness. Imposing an increased sentence under the 

residual clause of the definition of “violent felony” violates the Constitution’s guarantee 

of due process. 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The Supreme Court expressly confined its holding to 

this particular portion of the statute and confirmed that its holding does not apply to the 

“serious drug offense” clause or the remainder of the “violent felony” definition. Id.

Johnson is not applicable because Movant was not sentenced under the residual 

clause of the violent felony definition of the ACCA. See United States v. Ruiz-Diaz, 668 

F. App’x 289, 290 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Because the [sentencing] enhancement was not 

 

4 The Court determines there is no need for an evidentiary hearing.

Case 3:16-cv-01502-BEN Document 2 Filed 04/04/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 5
5

3:16-cv-01502-BEN 

 3:13-cr-01076-BEN-1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

predicated on a residual clause like the one struck down in Johnson, there is no arguable 

issue as to whether [defendant’s] sentence is illegal.”). Rather, he was sentenced 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 2G1.3(a)(2), which were not implicated by Johnson. 

See United States v. Padilla, No. 2:10-CR-00454-CAS, 2017 WL 962756, at *3 (C.D. 

Cal. Mar. 13, 2017) (finding Johnson inapplicable to petitioner’s § 2255 petition because 

petitioner’s “sentence was not based upon any guidelines that might have been implicated 

by Johnson.”).

As there are no arguable grounds as to whether Movant’s sentence is illegal, the 

Court enforces the collateral attack waiver. Ruiz-Diaz, 668 F. App’x at 290 (citing 

United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2009)). Alternatively, Movant’s 

motion is denied on the merits. 

CONCLUSION

The Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence is DENIED.

A court may issue a certificate of appealability where the movant has made a 

“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” and reasonable jurists could 

debate whether the motion should have been resolved differently, or that the issues 

presented deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 335 (2003). This Court finds that Movant has not made the necessary showing. A 

certificate of appealability is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 4, 2018

Case 3:16-cv-01502-BEN Document 2 Filed 04/04/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 5