Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05058/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05058-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA RIVER WATCH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

REDWOOD LANDFILL INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-05058 WHA

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this Clean Water Act action, defendant Redwood Landfill, Inc. moves to dismiss the

complaint of plaintiff Northern California River Watch. The complaint alleges that defendant

violated its permits and illegally discharged waste into the navigable waters of the United

States. Defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that this Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory notice requirements of the

Clean Water Act. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Northern California River Watch is a non-profit organization dedicated to

protecting and restoring the surface and subsurface waters of Northern California. 

Defendant Redwood Landfill, Inc. owns and operates waste and composting facilities in

Marin County, California. Located on six hundred acres of land, the landfill is surrounded by

various bodies of water, such as San Antonio Creek, Mud Slough, West Slough, and the

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Petaluma River. Plaintiff accuses defendant of illegally discharging pollutants into the

groundwater and adjacent navigable waters of the United States.

On February 6, 2007, plaintiff sent defendant its notice of intent to file suit under the

Clean Water Act. Plaintiff’s notice alleged that Redwood (i) violated the terms of the General

Industrial Storm Water Permit (“GISWP”) and (ii) discharged pollutants in the absence of a

National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit (Compl. Exh. at 5–6). 

With respect to the GISWP violation, the notice stated in relevant part (at 5):

[T]he General Permit requires dischargers in operation prior to

October 1, 1992 to have developed and implemented a Storm

Water Pollution Prevention Plan (“SWPPP”) no later than that

date. Redwood continues to operate subsequent to October 1,

1992 and is required to develop and properly implement a SWPPP

for its combined landfill, sludge and composting operations. 

Information available to River Watch indicates that Redwood has

not fully developed and/or adequately implemented a SWPPP for

its combined operation as evidenced by the fact that Redwood has

failed to eliminate non-stormwater discharges from its landfill

operation. For example, total suspended solids and specific

conductivity in the stormwater exceed EPA benchmarks,

indicating a failure to utilize Best Management Practices. 

Redwood has been and will continue to be in violation of the Clean

Water Act every day it discharges unauthorized non-stormwater

and every day it discharges stormwater containing pollutants

identified above without adequately implementing a SWPPP for

the landfill site . . .

The General Permit prohibits the discharge of material other than

storm water to waters of the United States which causes or

threatens to cause pollution, contamination, or nuisance. The

General Permit prohibits the discharge of storm water to surface or

groundwater that adversely impacts human health or the

environment. Redwood’s discharges contain metals, solvents,

organics, toxins and nutrients including nitrogen, phosphate and

ammonia, which adversely impact the environment including the

jurisdictional adjacent wetlands, San Antonio Creek and the

Petaluma River. 

Since the beginning of operations, Redwood has discharged storm

water containing pollutants and non-storm water pollutants from

its landfill site into adjacent wetlands, San Antonio Creek and/or

their tributaries, in violation of the General Permit, during at least

every rain event over 1 inch as measured by the National

Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. These violations

of the Clean Water Act are ongoing. Redwood will continue to be

in violation of the General Permit each day it discharges non-storm

pollutants and contaminated storm water from its landfill, sludge

and composting operation which cause or threaten to cause

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pollution, contamination or nuisance which adversely impacts

human health or the environment.

With respect to the second allegation (regarding no NPDES permit), the notice alleged in part

(at 6):

Redwood’s continuing violations of effluent standard or

limitations, permit condition or requirement and/or orders issued

by the Administrator or a State with respect to such standard or

limitation under CWA § 505(a)(1), CWA § 402(b) and CWA §

301(a) the Code of Federal Regulations, and the Basin Plan, are

exemplified by Redwood’s illegally discharging to waters of the

United States without a NPDES permit. 

To prevent any confusion River Watch wishes to make it clear that

this second allegation relates to point source discharges rather than

non-point sources discharges covered by the General Permit. Due

to the fact that the landfill is itself a point source, it is discharging

from this point source via tributary ground waters to San Antonio

Creek, the Petaluma River and adjacent wetlands, all waters of the

United States. 

Due to the hydrological connection between the waste disposal site

and waters of the Untied States, point source discharges occur

every day, as evidenced by the groundwater monitoring results

referenced above. Therefore, this Notice of Violations covers all

point source discharges occurring from February 6, 2002 through

February 6, 2007. Redwood has violated the Clean Water Act, the

Basin Plan and the Code of Federal Regulations for discharging

pollutants into waters of the United States without a NPDES

permit. Redwood has done little or nothing to abate these

violations. River Watch believes these violations are ongoing and

continuing.

Plaintiff filed the complaint against defendant on October 1, 2007, seeking injunctive relief,

civil penalties, restitution and remediation under the Act.

ANALYSIS

A party cannot bring an action under the Act without giving notice of the alleged

violation at least sixty days before commencing suit. Notice under this subsection “shall be

given in such manner as the [EPA] Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.” 33 U.S.C.

1365(b)(1)(A). The EPA issued the following regulation regarding notice, which was operative

at the time the complaint was filed:

Notice regarding an alleged violation of an effluent standard or

limitation or of an order with respect thereto, shall include

sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify the

specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been

violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or

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 Unless indicated otherwise, internal citations are omitted from all cites.

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persons responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the

alleged violation, the date or dates of such violation, and the full

name, address, and telephone number of the person giving notice.

40 C.F.R. 135.3(a)(1973). If the plaintiff fails to comply with these notice provisions, then the

suit must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,

493 U.S. 20, 31–33 (1987).

The Ninth Circuit has elaborated on what constitutes sufficient notice under the Act. 

In San Francisco BayKeeper, v. Tosco Corp., 309 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth

Circuit held:

The regulation does not require, however, that plaintiffs “list every

specific aspect or detail of every alleged violation.” “The key

language in the notice regulation is the phrase ‘sufficient

information to permit the recipient to identify’ the alleged

violations and bring itself into compliance.” Notice is sufficient if

it is specific enough “to give the accused company the opportunity

to correct the problem.” In short, the Clean Water Act’s notice

provisions and their enforcing regulations require no more than

“reasonable specificity.”1

The Ninth Circuit also recognizes that defendants have better access to their records than

plaintiffs do. According to Tosco, 309 F.3d at 1158–59 (emphasis in original):

We hold that [plaintiff’s] allegation that coke spilled into the

slough on each day of ship loading — even on days for which

[plaintiff] did not provide specific dates — was sufficiently

specific to fulfill its notice obligation. [Defendant] is obviously in

a better position than [plaintiff] to identify the exact dates, or

additional dates, of its own ship loading. The notice regulation

does not require [plaintiff] in such a situation to provide the exact

dates of alleged violations; rather, it requires only that [plaintiff]

provide “sufficient information to permit the recipients to identify .

. . the date or dates.” Given the knowledge that [defendant]

already had, [plaintiff’s] letter was specific enough to notify

[defendant] of the nature of the alleged violations, as well as the

likely dates of those violations.

Plaintiffs therefore are not obligated to provide every detail of the alleged violations; they just

have to provide sufficient information for defendants to identify the nature, locations, and dates

of the conduct in question.

Defendant argues that the notice was legally and factually inadequate to support

subject-matter jurisdiction — i.e., the notice fails to provide defendant with sufficient

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 See General Permit No. CAS000001 (State Water Resources Control Board) Water Quality Order

No. 97-03-DWQ issued pursuant to Section 402 of the Act.

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information to identify (i) the activity alleged to constitute the violation, (ii) the location of the

alleged violations, and (iii) the date(s) of the violations. This order finds that plaintiff’s notice

was sufficiently specific to support subject-matter jurisdiction.

1. DOES THE NOTICE PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO

IDENTIFY THE ACTIVITY ALLEGED VIOLATION?

The first allegation in the notice addressed the GISWP. The GISWP required

dischargers in operation prior to October 1, 1992, to have developed and implemented a

Storm Water Prevention and Pollution Plan (“SWPPP”) no later than that date.2

Plaintiff’s notice alleged that defendant violated the terms of the GISWP by allowing various

discharges from its facilities that exceeded EPA benchmarks, not fully developing or

implementing a SWPPP, and failing to utilize “best management practices” (Compl. Exh. at 5).

Defendant claims that the notice failed to satisfy the “reasonably specific” standard

articulated in Tosco. The notice did not allege with sufficient specificity what pollutants were

being discharged, what activity constituted the violation (e.g., filling, compacting, installing

cover, cleaning equipment), or the specific standard, limitation or order alleged to have been

violated. Moreover, the notice did not adequately explain how defendant failed to develop and

implement a SWPPP and use the “best management practices.”

That is not the case. Plaintiff’s notice described the alleged violation and relevant

standard — in contravention of the GWISP, Redwood failed to eliminate from its landfill

operation non-storm water discharges, which contained metals, solvents, organics, toxins and

nutrients (e.g., nitrogen, phosphate, and ammonia). Contrary to defendants, this order finds that

the SWPPP was not readily available to plaintiffs through the Regional Quality Board. 

Defendant therefore cannot claim that the notice failed to include specifics about how its

SWPPP violated standards under the GWISP. Given the information plaintiff had access to,

its description of the alleged violation and standard applied was sufficiently specific.

The second claim in the notice concerned NPDES permits. Pollutants cannot be

discharged from a point source to waters of the United States without a NPDES permit. 

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 Defendant claims that an entire landfill is not considered a “point source” under the Act, which

defines “point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any

pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding

operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. 1352. 

This order finds that defendant’s reading of the statute is too narrow. First, the list in the statute is not

exhaustive; it specifically states that a point source includes but is not limited to the list items. Second, case law

allows for a broad definition of point source. See Carr v. Alta Verde Industries, Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.

1991) (cattle feedlot was a point source); Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa

1997) (pipeline’s facility was a point source); Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 442 (M.D. Pa.

1986) (hazardous waste overflows from lagoon constituted discharge of pollutants to navigable waters from a

point source).

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Clean Water Act Section 301 and 33 U.S.C. 1311. The complaint alleges that defendant

illegally discharged pollutants without a NPDES permit. This second allegation differs from

the first in that it relates to point source discharges rather than non-point source discharges

(which are covered by the GISWP). The landfill constitutes a point source that discharges

pollutants, plaintiff argues.3

Defendant counters that plaintiff’s notice was insufficient because it did not satisfy the

requirement to identify the alleged activity constituting a violation. Part of the notice stated,

“Due to the hydrological connection between the waste disposal site and waters of the United

States, point source discharges occur every day, as evidenced by the groundwater monitoring

results referenced above” (Compl. Exh. A at 6). Moreover, plaintiff could not attempt to cure

its “factually deficient” notice by referencing monitoring reports. This all was insupportably

vague, says defendant.

This order disagrees. The notice contained enough information to identify the activity

alleged to violate the prohibition against discharging pollutants from a point source without a

NPDES permit. First, the notice went into detail about the adequacy of defendant’s leachate

collection and removal system (“LCRS”), which was supposed to be constructed along the

entire perimeter of the landfill site to contain contaminated groundwater. The notice stated that

a regulator from the Regional Water Quality Control Board for the San Francisco Bay Region,

Alan Friedman, expressed concerns in a 2004 email about the effectiveness of the LCRS. 

He made specific recommendations for monitoring the effectiveness of the LCRS. Second, the

notice cited specific groundwater reports that identified pollutants in the water that exceeded

water-quality standards — e.g., Annual Reports 2005 and 2006, and the First Semiannual

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 These monitoring reports were not attached to the complaint. Rather, defendant includes the reports

in its reply.

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Groundwater Monitoring Report of 2006. For example, the notice stated, “Present in amounts

that exceed State of California Minimum Contaminant Levels as well as historic background

limits are ammonia (Annual Reports 2005 and 2006), iron (Annual Report 2005, issued

May 23, 2006), acetone and carbon disulfide (First Semiannual Groundwater Monitoring Report

of 2006)” (Compl. Exh. at 4). The notice and the reports cited by the notice provided sufficient

notice as to the nature of the alleged violations against defendant. Defendant argues that the

reports generally and consistently found that no volatile organic compounds were detected at

concentrations at or above the reporting limit in any groundwater monitoring wells,

and inorganic results were generally within historic concentration ranges. Defendant then

admits that the notice cited instances where various volatile organic and inorganic compounds

were detected by the reports as exceeding reportable limits — but these instances were caused

by factors outside defendant’s control. At this point of the proceedings, because there may be a

factual dispute on this matter, this order will not dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on these grounds.4

2. DOES THE NOTICE PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION

REGARDING THE LOCATION AND DATES OF THE ALLEGED

VIOLATIONS?

This order finds that the notice was sufficiently specific with respect to the location of

the alleged violations. It is not always necessary for plaintiff to identify specific locations and

dates. The violations were ongoing and did not point to specific discharges. The Ninth Circuit

has held, “As the district court correctly noted, the failure to develop and implement pollution

prevention plans are violations ‘occurring at the facility in general.’ Moreover, ‘the

deficiencies in these plans are ongoing, so there is no specific date that can be alleged as the

date of the violation.’” Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, 236 F.3d 985,

996 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Regarding the GISWP claim, the notice already described the location of the landfill

facility and its relation to the surrounding waters. The notice also alleged that Redwood has

engaged in illegal discharges “during at least every rain event over 1 inch as measured by the

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National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration” (Compl. Exh. at 5). This is

sufficient.

With respect to the second allegation regarding the NPDES permit, defendant claims

that the notice did not explain where the offending discharges originate or exit from the landfill,

which was problematic considering defendant uses about four hundred acres (out of the total six

hundred acres) for disposal activities and there are 32 storm-water drainage points on the

property. Plaintiff also identified the affected water bodies in too generic a manner and failed to

“specify any reasonable date range for the alleged discharges or the number of occurrences,”

defendant argues (Br. 6).

This order finds that the notice provided enough information to the recipient to identify

the location of the alleged discharges. Plaintiff claims that “[t]he groundwater monitoring

reports referenced [in the notice] identify by number the specific wells where the samples were

taken, thereby informing defendant of locations where pollutants are released from the landfill

into groundwater which then migrate to adjacent surface waters” (Opp. 9). As the Ninth Circuit

noted in Tosco, defendant is in the best position to know the contents of its these reports,

which were prepared for defendant. With the help of the reports, defendant should be able to

locate where leachate is seeping from the landfill into surrounding waters. 

Defendant tries to distinguish the situation in Tosco. It argues that the defendants there

had more background knowledge in addition to the notice letter, whereas in the instant case,

mere reference to the monitoring reports is different from the knowledge defendants had in

Tosco. That is not necessarily the case. Monitoring reports can still provide enough

background information to make the notice sufficiently specific. 

With respect to defendant’s complaint about the lack of dates, this order finds that

plaintiff specified a reasonable date range. Again, as the Ninth Circuit held in Tosco, plaintiff is

not required to provide the exact dates of alleged violations; it need only provide “sufficient

information to permit the recipients to identify . . . the date or dates.” Furthermore, “[w]here

[plaintiff] alleged an ongoing violation of [defendant’s] obligation to implement best available

technology to prevent storm water pollution, no specific dates were needed.” Tosco, 309 F.3d

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at 1158. Plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation here: “Point source discharges occur every day,

as evidenced by the groundwater monitoring results referenced above.” The notice specifically

stated, “[T]his Notice of Violations covers all point source discharges occurring from

February 6, 2002 through February 6, 2007” (Compl. Exh. at 6). The district court in California

Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. City of West Sacramento, 905 F.Supp. 792, 800 (E.D. Cal.

1995) (Levi, J.), held that the following portion of the notice letter failed to give sufficient

notice of dates: “For the previous five years on hundreds of occasions you have violated your

[NPDES] permit.” In the instant case, because the notice alleged that the illegal discharges

occurred every day, plaintiffs do not need to pinpoint a specific date. Moreover, California

Sportfishing was a district court case decided before Tosco. Defendant is sufficiently put on

notice of the date range of alleged violations.

CONCLUSION

Because this order finds that plaintiff’s notice was sufficiently specific in identifying the

alleged environmental violations, the Court is not divested of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 21, 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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