Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00590/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00590-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAUL ARELLANO, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER HODGE et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14-cv-590 JLS (JLB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS 

AGAINST DEFENDANTS GLYNN 

AND SEELEY; and

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS 

AGAINST DEFENDANT ZAMORA

[ECF Nos. 63, 69]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Raul Arellano, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

filed a Third Amended Complaint on July 16, 2015, alleging civil rights violations pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants J. Chau, M. Glynn, D. Hodge, F. Sedighi, K. 

Seeley, P. Velardi, and L. Zamora. (ECF No. 59.) Presently before the Court are 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Third Amended 

Complaint against Defendants Glynn and Seeley (ECF No. 63) and Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint against Defendant 

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Zamora (ECF No. 69). As the same claims are at issue in both of Defendants’ Motions to 

Dismiss, the Court finds it appropriate to address the motions together in this Report and 

Recommendation.

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Janis L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. After a thorough review of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, the parties’ 

motion papers, and all supporting documents, and for the reasons discussed below, the 

Court RECOMMENDS that both of Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 63 and 

69) be GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJDCF”) in San Diego. (ECF No. 59 at 1.)2 Prior to arriving at the RJDCF,

Plaintiff was confined temporarily at a San Diego County jail and then at the Calipatria 

State Prison. (Id. at 11–13.) He was transferred to the RJDCF in or around December 

2011. (Id. at 13.)

A. Plaintiff’s Medical History

In or around November 2010, Plaintiff was arrested in Mexico by an agency 

contracted to arrest U.S. citizens with outstanding arrest warrants. (Id. at 11.) The Mexican 

officers physically abused Plaintiff for several days before handing him over to authorities 

in San Diego. (Id.) The abuse was so severe that it caused Plaintiff to begin having 

seizures. (Id.) 

 

1 Plaintiff’s allegations contained in the Third Amended Complaint are accepted as true for 

purposes of assessing Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss only. In addition, this Report and 

Recommendation does not provide a summary of all of the facts presented in Plaintiff’s Third Amended 

Complaint but only those that are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Glynn, Seeley, and 

Zamora.

2 All page number citations in this Report and Recommendation refer to the page numbers 

generated by the CM/ECF system.

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Approximately one-and-one-half months after being confined at the San Diego 

County jail, Plaintiff again began having seizures. (Id. at 12.) He had been regularly 

experiencing numbness and “sharp stabbing” pain in his back and on the left side of his 

head, and every time he had a seizure, the pain in these locations increased significantly 

and lasted for seven to eight days. (Id.) After that, the pain would “come[] down to the 

normal numbness and stabbing pain,” which he was “able to control better with 

medication.” (Id.) 

As a result of his seizures, pain, and numbness, Plaintiff was taken to a hospital 

approximately four times while confined at the San Diego County jail. (Id.) There, he was 

told by “doctors, [a] specialist, [a] neurologist, and everyone that stud[ied him]” that he 

had “head nerve damage” as a result of the abuse he suffered by the Mexican officers. (Id.) 

He was also told that he experienced increased pain following his seizures due to the nerve 

damage. (See id.) 

While confined at the San Diego County jail, Plaintiff was prescribed Gabapentin 

“and other strong medication for [his] pain,” which helped reduce both the frequency of 

Plaintiff’s seizures and the severity of pain that would follow. (See id. at 12–14.) He was 

provided these medications at the Calipatria State Prison as well. (Id. at 13.) Upon 

Plaintiff’s transfer to the RJDCF, the medications were replaced with others that are less 

effective at managing Plaintiff’s seizures and accompanying pain. (Id. at 13.) 

In March 2012, while at the RJDCF, Plaintiff suffered a seizure that caused him to 

fall from the top bunk of his cell, hit a metal table, and injure his lower back. (Id.) The 

pain in Plaintiff’s lower back was severe, and it prevented Plaintiff from walking to his 

meals for several weeks. (Id.)

In or around June 2012, Plaintiff saw Defendant Sedighi, a doctor at the RJDCF, 

about the increased frequency of his seizures, the constant numbness and pain in his back 

and head, the increased pain in his back and head after having a seizure, and the negative 

side effects he experiences while taking the medications prescribed to him at the RJDCF.

(Id. at 13–14.) He also discussed with Defendant Sedighi his lower back pain resulting 

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from his March 2012 fall and the neuropathy he experiences in his feet. (Id. at 14–15.) He 

asked to be prescribed the medications he was provided at the San Diego County jail and 

the Calipatria State Prison, or something similar, and Defendant Sedighi denied his request. 

(Id. at 14.) Defendant Sedighi also denied Plaintiff’s requests for treatment of his lower 

back pain and for therapeutic shoes to treat his neuropathy. (Id. at 14–15.)

Unsatisfied with the results of his visit with Defendant Sedighi, Plaintiff then saw 

Defendant Chau, another doctor at the RJDCF, in or around August 2012. (Id. at 19.) 

Plaintiff relayed to Defendant Chau all of the information he shared with Defendant 

Sedighi. (Id. at 19–21.) Defendant Chau denied Plaintiff’s requests for the medications he 

received at the San Diego County jail and the Calipatria State Prison, for treatment of his 

lower back pain, and for therapeutic shoes. (Id.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Administrative Grievances

Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the care provided to him by Defendants Sedighi

and Chau via the RJDCF’s three-tiered administrative grievance process. In his initial 

grievance, Plaintiff requested: (1) compensation of $250,000 for the injury he sustained 

from falling from the top bunk; (2) nerve pain medication; and (3) stronger pain medication 

for his back. (Id. at 32.) He also mentioned that he is “a seizure patient receiving the 

wrong medication,” that he is a diabetic, that his legs and arms get numb quickly, and that 

his feet hurt when he walks. (Id. at 32–34.) 

Plaintiff’s grievance was accepted at the first level of review on October 3, 2012, 

and Plaintiff was interviewed about the issues raised in his grievance by Defendant Velardi, 

a Nurse Practitioner at the RJDCF, on October 26, 2012. (Id. at 38.) On November 13, 

2012, Plaintiff’s requests for nerve pain medication and stronger back pain medication 

were granted. Defendant Velardi noted in the written response to Plaintiff’s grievance that 

Plaintiff has “no history of spondylosis or nerve impingement,” Plaintiff’s “back 

examination was normal,” Plaintiff “exhibited localized musculoskeletal lower back pain,”

and Plaintiff “would continue to receive the medication Sulindac (Clinoril) and [he] would 

also be given prescriptions for the medications Keppra (Levetiracetam) and Amitriptyline 

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(Elavil).” (Id. at 38–39.) Plaintiff’s request for monetary compensation was found to be 

beyond the scope of the appeals process and was not addressed. (Id.)

Plaintiff then submitted a grievance to the second level of review. (Id. at 31, 35.) In 

this grievance, Plaintiff stated that: (1) he disagreed with the denial of his requested 

compensation; (2) he should be provided the “neurotens”3 he was provided by a neurologist 

at the Calipatria State Prison; (3) he believes a deeper analysis needed to be done as to the 

spondylosis and nerve impingement findings because he continues to have numbness in his 

legs and arms and pain in his feet; and (4) his lower back pain resulting from his March 

2012 fall continues to persist and he should be provided stronger pain medication. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s second-level grievance was accepted on February 12, 2013, and reviewed 

by Defendant Glynn, Chief Executive Officer of the RJDCF, and Defendant Seeley, Chief 

Medical Executive of the RJDCF. (Id. at 40–41; 46.) Defendants Glynn and Seeley issued 

their response to Plaintiff’s second-level grievance on May 21, 2013. (Id. at 40.) The 

response states that Plaintiff’s “appeal with attachment(s), Unit Health Record (UHR), and 

all pertinent departmental policies and procedures were reviewed,” and it references both

the interview and written response Plaintiff was provided in response to his first-level 

grievance. (Id.) Specifically, Defendants Glynn and Seeley’s response notes, “[B]ased on 

 

3

 Although not material to the Court’s determination, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s reference to 

“neurotens” as a reference to Neurontin, a common brand name for the medication Gabapentin. See 

Gabapentin, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a694007.html

(last updated July 11, 2016). On July 18, 2016, the Court provided the parties notice of the Court’s intent 

to rely on this resource and gave the parties until July 25, 2016, to respond. (ECF No. 103.) On July 21, 

2016, Defendants filed a response in which they took no position on the Court’s use of the outside source 

material, except to assert that “specific information about Gabapentin should make no difference” as to 

the merits of the motion. (ECF No. 105.) The Court will interpret this as a relevance objection. On July 

28, 2016, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’ response, in which Plaintiff took no position on the 

Court’s reliance on outside source materials, and which Plaintiff instead used to reiterate his substantive 

arguments in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss. (ECF No. 108.) In light of the Court’s targeted and 

tertiary use of the website information—merely to point out that Plaintiff’s interchangeable uses of 

“neurotens” and “Gabapentin” both appear to refer to “Neurontin”—Defendants’ relevance objection is 

overruled. Because neither side was invited to engage in further merits briefing, arguments on the merits 

found in ECF Nos. 105 and 108 will not be considered.

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the Primary Care Providers interview and exam, you are being treated adequately for your 

back pain which is musculoskeletal in nature. You are currently being treated for diabetes 

and it is in good control . . . . At the First Level of Review this appeal was Partially 

Granted.” (Id. at 40.) After noting that Plaintiff did “not provide[] any new information 

or documentation that would alter the 1st level review findings,” Defendants Glynn and 

Seeley partially granted Plaintiff’s grievance and denied his request for monetary 

compensation. (Id. at 40–41.)

Plaintiff then submitted a grievance to the third and final level of review. (Id. at 31, 

35.) In this grievance, Plaintiff stated that: (1) he was dissatisfied with the second-level 

response because of its failure to grant the compensation he requested; (2) he is unable to 

provide any new documentation that will alter the first level of review because all of the 

documentation he possesses was attached to his first-level grievance; (3) that the primary 

care provider told him the medication she was providing him was meant to be temporary,

and Plaintiff should let her know if it was not working; and (4) the purpose of his filing the

grievances was to alert the RJDCF medical staff that his current medication is not working. 

(Id.) Plaintiff again requested stronger pain medication for his back, nerve pain medication 

to alleviate the neuropathy in his feet, and “neurotens” to alleviate the nerve damage that 

is connected to his seizures. (Id. at 35.)

Plaintiff’s third-level grievance was reviewed by the staff of Defendant Zamora, 

Chief of the California Correctional Health Care Services at the Office of Third Level 

Appeals-Health Care, and signed by Defendant Zamora. (Id. at 36–37.) Defendant 

Zamora’s October 16, 2013 response to Plaintiff’s third-level grievance states that 

Plaintiff’s “appeal file and documents obtained from [his] electronic Unit Health Record 

(eUHR)” indicated:

 Your care related to your appeal issues was adequate, as you received 

medical treatment and medication was provided as deemed appropriate for 

your condition.

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 You were evaluated on February 12, 2013 and again on May 21, 2013 for 

seizure disorder and diabetes. It was noted your seizure disorder is 

currently managed on Keppra, and your diabetes is well controlled with 

Metformin. You are receiving Elavil for your chronic back pain, which is 

musculoskeletal in nature, as you currently do not meet non-formulary 

criteria for gabapentin.

 On June 20, 2013 you were assessed by a clinician for a Medical 

Classification Chrono. You were issued a 128C3 for limited duty and high 

risk for seizure disorder on precautions for job assignment.

 Inmates may not demand particular medication, diagnostic evaluation, or 

course of treatment. The California Code of Regulations (CCR), Title 15, 

Section 3354, Health Care Responsibilities and Limitations, (a) 

Authorized Staff, states, ‘Only facility-employed health care staff, 

contractors paid to perform health services for the facility, or persons 

employed as health care consultants shall be permitted within the scope of 

their licensure, to diagnose illness or, prescribe medication and health care 

treatment for inmates. No other personnel or inmate may do so.

 Monetary compensation is beyond the scope of the appeals process. . . . 

 You are being evaluated, treated, monitored, and educated concerning your 

appeal issues consistent with the medical plan of care as determined by 

your PCP, specialists, and other diagnostic tests and screenings. You will 

continue to be evaluated and treatment will be provided based on your 

current clinician’s evaluations, diagnosis, and recommended treatment 

plan, in accordance with appropriate policies and procedures. 

(Id.) 

The response concluded that “[a]fter review, no intervention at the Director’s Level 

of Review is necessary as your medical condition has been evaluated and you are receiving 

treatment deemed medically necessary” and ordered that “[n]o changes or modifications 

are required by the institution.” (Id. at 37.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated the present suit by filing a complaint in this Court on March 13, 

2014. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint on July 16, 2015, naming 

J. Chau, M. Glynn, D. Hodge, F. Sedighi, K. Seeley, P. Velardi, and L. Zamora as 

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defendants. (ECF No. 59.) With respect to Defendants Glynn, Seeley, and Zamora, the 

subjects of the Motions to Dismiss presently before the Court, Plaintiff alleges the 

Defendants violated his constitutional rights to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment 

and to equal protection. (Id. at 23–26.) 

On October 16, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss the claims in Plaintiff’s Third 

Amended Complaint asserted against Defendants Glynn and Seeley. (ECF No. 63.) 

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on January 11, 2016 (ECF No. 72), 

and Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition on January 20, 2016 (ECF No. 73). 

On December 21, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss the claims in Plaintiff’s Third 

Amended Complaint asserted against Defendant Zamora. (ECF No. 69.) Plaintiff filed an 

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on January 25, 2016 (ECF No. 76), and Defendants 

filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition on January 28, 2016 (ECF No. 77).

Defendants have not yet responded to the claims raised in Plaintiff’s Third Amended 

Complaint against Defendants Chau, Hodge, Sedighi, and Velardi. In addition, Defendants 

contend Defendant Velardi has not been served. (ECF No. 63-1 at 1; ECF No. 69-1 at 2.)

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

1. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a plaintiff’s complaint must 

provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed 

factual allegations, and the statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the 

. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

677 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the 

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claims in the complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . 

a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121–22

(9th Cir. 2008). The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009). 

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court does not look at whether 

the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but whether the [plaintiff] is entitled to offer evidence 

to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The court may 

consider allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and 

documents and matters properly subject to judicial notice. Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. 

City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007). The court must assume the truth of 

the facts presented and construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). However, the 

court is “not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if 

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult 

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1994).

2. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

With respect to an inmate who proceeds pro se, his factual allegations, “however 

inartfully pleaded,” “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 

by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Erickson, 551 U.S. at

94 (reaffirming that this standard applies to pro se pleadings post-Twombly). Thus, where 

a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the Court must construe the pleadings 

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liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 

(9th Cir. 2010). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, 

courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. 

Bd. of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “The plaintiff 

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged 

in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City 

of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the 

plaintiff should be given a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to 

cure. Karim–Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1988). Only 

if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment should the 

complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. Id.; see also James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 107, 

1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Analysis

1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants Glynn and Seeley’s 

response to Plaintiff’s second-level grievance, and Defendant Zamora’s response to 

Plaintiff’s third-level grievance, violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to freedom from 

cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 59 at 23–26.) Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claims against Defendants Glynn, Seeley, and Zamora should be dismissed 

because Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state 

plausible deliberate indifference claims against the Defendants. (ECF No. 63-1 at 6–8; 

ECF No. 69-1 at 6–8.) 

i. Applicable Law

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and 

unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious 

medical needs. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs may be 

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manifested in two ways: the intentional denial, delay, or interference with a plaintiff’s 

medical care, or by the manner in which the medical care was provided. See Estelle, 429 

U.S. at 104–05. In either case, the indifference to the inmate’s medical needs must be 

substantial; inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not 

amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. The “existence of any injury that a reasonable doctor or patient 

would find important and worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a medical 

condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, or the existence of 

chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need 

for medical treatment.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992), 

overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(en banc); accord Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2000); Doty v. Cnty. 

of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). As Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff

adequately alleges a serious medical need in his Third Amended Complaint and instead 

base their Motions to Dismiss on the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference prong

(see ECF No. 63-1 at 6–8; ECF No. 69-1 at 6–8), for purposes of assessing Defendants’ 

Motions to Dismiss, the Court assumes that Plaintiff’s medical needs are serious.

In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to 

indicate that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at

300–02. “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that 

person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 837). The court must focus on “what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was (or 

is), rather than what it should have been (or should be).” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838–39. 

“Even if a prison official should have been aware of the risk, if he ‘was not, then he has 

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not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Peralta v. Dillard, 

744 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 946 (2015) (quoting Gibson 

v. Cnty. Of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

The subjective standard for deliberate indifference requires “more than ordinary 

lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (quoting 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). “[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate 

medical care by itself [does not] create a cause of action under § 1983. A defendant must 

purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need in order 

for deliberate indifference to be established.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

Differences in judgment between a prisoner and a prison official regarding

appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate 

indifference claim. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107–08; Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 

(9th Cir. 1989). In addition, a prison official’s reliance on the medical opinions of other 

qualified staff, when the official serves in an administrative role and has no expertise to 

contribute his own medical opinion, is not deliberate indifference. See Peralta, 744 F.3d 

at 1087.

ii. Defendants Glynn and Seeley

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint alleges Defendants Glynn and Seeley’s 

response to Plaintiff’s second-level grievance violated his Eighth Amendment right to be 

free from cruel and unusual punishment. (See ECF No. 59 at 23–24.) In support of these 

claims, Plaintiff alleges that it was “obvious” from his second-level grievance that Plaintiff

was in a lot of pain, and that by relying on the interview and examination of Plaintiff 

conducted at the first level of review, Defendants Glynn and Seeley “totally ignored 

everything [Plaintiff] wrote on his grievance.” (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff further alleges that 

Defendants Glynn and Seeley “left [him] to suffer for many months because they received 

[his] grievance on 2-7-2013 but didn’t address[ it] until 5-21-2013.” (Id.)

Plaintiff attached as exhibits to his Third Amended Complaint copies of his secondlevel grievance and Defendants Glynn and Seeley’s response thereto (ECF No. 59 at 30–

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35; 40–41), and both Plaintiff and Defendants reference these documents in their pleadings 

and motion papers (see, e.g., ECF No. 59 at 23–24; ECF No. 63-1 at 6–8). Therefore, in 

assessing Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, the Court considers the documents themselves 

in addition to the factual allegations pled in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. See 

Outdoor Media Group, 506 F.3d at 899 (holding courts may consider allegations contained 

in exhibits attached to the complaint). 

Upon a thorough review of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint and the documents

attached thereto, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to plead facts supporting a plausible 

deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Glynn and Seeley. First, Plaintiff fails to

plead any facts from which the Court may draw the reasonable inference that Defendants 

Glynn and Seeley knew of an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health. While Plaintiff’s 

Third Amended Complaint alleges the Defendants—by virtue of their reviewing Plaintiff’s 

second-level grievance—should have been aware that Plaintiff was in a lot pain, the court 

must focus on “what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was (or is), rather than what it 

should have been (or should be).” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838–39. Defendants’ second-level 

response attached to the Third Amended Complaint indicates the Defendants were not 

aware of an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health. The response states that, upon 

reviewing Plaintiff’s appeal file, Defendants Glynn and Seeley learned that Plaintiff was 

“allowed the opportunity to fully explain [his] appeal issue(s)” during his first-level review 

interview, and the primary care provider who interviewed and examined Plaintiff at the 

first level of review, Defendant Velardi, concluded that Plaintiff is being treated adequately 

for his back pain and diabetes and granted Plaintiff’s requests for nerve pain medication 

and stronger pain medication. (ECF No. 59 at 38–39; 40–41.) Therefore, the second-level 

response demonstrates that it was Defendants Glynn and Seeley’s understanding that all of 

the medical issues Plaintiff complained of in his grievance were adequately assessed and 

remedied at the first level of review, and “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk 

that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot . . . be 

condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. 

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Even if Plaintiff had adequately alleged that Defendants Glynn and Seeley knew of 

an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health, the Third Amended Complaint still fails to

meet the threshold for stating a plausible Eighth Amendment Claim. To survive 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Third Amended Complaint must allege facts that 

support a reasonable inference that Defendants Glynn and Seeley not only knew of an 

excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health but also purposefully disregarded it. See 

Farmer, 511 U.S. 842. The allegations in the Third Amended Complaint fail to 

demonstrate that Defendants Glynn and Seeley purposefully disregarded any risk of harm

to Plaintiff’s health. To the contrary, the second-level response demonstrates Defendants 

Glynn and Seeley reviewed and considered Plaintiff’s grievance and appeal file in full and 

issued a written response in accordance with the findings of Defendant Velardi, a medical 

professional, that Plaintiff’s medical conditions were being treated adequately. 

To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendants Glynn and Seeley should have conducted

an independent examination of Plaintiff at the second level of review instead of relying on 

the interview and examination conducted at the first level of review, such allegations fail 

to state a plausible deliberate indifference claim. Defendants Glynn and Seeley are not 

medical doctors (ECF No. 63-1 at 7), and they reviewed Plaintiff’s second-level grievance 

in their capacities as prison administrators. It is not deliberate indifference for prison 

officials serving in administrative roles to rely on the opinions of qualified medical staff in 

responding to a plaintiff’s second-level grievance. See Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1087; see also 

Doyle v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., No. 12-cv-2769-YGR, 2015 WL 5590728, at *9 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015) (“It simply cannot be said that, by signing off on the denials at 

the second . . . level[], defendants . . . disregarded a substantial risk of harm to [plaintiff]’s 

health by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it.”). 

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s collateral argument that Defendants were deliberately 

indifferent when they were late in responding to Plaintiff’s grievance also fails to state a 

plausible Eighth Amendment claim. This collateral theory fails because Plaintiff fails to 

plead any facts that suggest the Defendants’ tardiness was purposeful or anything more 

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than a mere inadvertence. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting the 

standard for alleging a plausible claim, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 

F.3d 1116, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2008), and although the Court must construe Plaintiff’s 

complaint liberally, see Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 338, it may not “supply essential elements of 

claims that were not initially pled.” See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Alaska, 

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to plead

plausible deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Glynn and Seeley and 

recommends that, with respect to these claims, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 

63) be GRANTED. In addition, as it is clear the Third Amended Complaint’s deficiencies 

with respect to these claims cannot be cured by amendment, the Court recommends 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against these Defendants be DENIED with 

prejudice.

iii. Defendant Zamora

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint alleges Defendant Zamora’s response to 

Plaintiff’s third-level grievance also violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free 

from cruel and unusual punishment. In support of this claim, Plaintiff alleges that he 

disagrees with Defendant Zamora’s denial of histhird-level grievance because it is contrary 

to Plaintiff’s own opinions about his medical needs. (See ECF No. 59 at 25–26.)

Plaintiff attached as exhibits to his Third Amended Complaint copies of his thirdlevel grievance and Defendant Zamora’s response thereto (ECF No. 59 at 30–35; 36–37), 

and both Plaintiff and Defendants reference the documents in their pleadings and motion 

papers (see, e.g., ECF No. 59 at 25–26; ECF No. 69-1 at 6–8). Therefore, in assessing 

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, the Court considers the documents themselves in addition 

to the factual allegations raised in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. See Outdoor 

Media Group, 506 F.3d at 899. 

Upon a thorough review of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint and the documents 

attached thereto, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to plead any facts that support a plausible 

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deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Zamora. First, the Third Amended 

Complaint fails to plead any facts that suggest Defendant Zamora herself performed any 

action that would have caused her to become aware of the existence of an excessive risk to 

Plaintiff’s health. Although Defendant Zamora signed the response to Plaintiff’s thirdlevel grievance, she did not herself review Plaintiff’s appeal file. The third-level response 

expressly states that the grievance “was reviewed . . . by staff under the supervision of the 

Chief, Office of Third Level Appeals-Health Care,” that is, by Defendant Zamora’s staff. 

(ECF No. 59 at 36.) Thus, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Zamora knew Plaintiff was 

in pain because she “should have seen [this]. . . on [his] grievance” is undercut by the fact 

that Defendant Zamora did not herself review Plaintiff’s grievance. 

Second, the Court cannot reasonably infer from the Third Amended Complaint that 

Defendant Zamora became aware of an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health via the 

information her staff communicated to her. The third-level response attached to Plaintiff’s 

Third Amended Complaint states that the information communicated to Defendant Zamora 

by her staff indicated that Plaintiff’s care related to his grievance issues is adequate, he is 

receiving ongoing medical care, his seizure disorder is being managed by medication, he 

is receiving pain medication, he did not meet the criteria for Gabapentin, his medical care 

is consistent with the medical plan of care as determined by his primary care provider, 

specialists, and other diagnostic tests and screenings, and he would continue to be 

monitored and treated in accordance with appropriate policies and procedures. (Id. at 36–

37.) Thus, the information Defendant Zamora’s staff provided to her suggests that 

Defendant Zamora knew not that a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health existed, but

rather that all of the medical issues Plaintiff raised in his third-level grievance had been 

adequately assessed and remedied at a lower level of review. 

Third, the fact that Defendant Zamora’s response to Plaintiff’s third-level grievance 

offers a difference in judgment from Plaintiff’s own assessment of his medical needs is not 

enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107; Sanchez, 

891 F.2d at 242. 

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Fourth, as stated above, it is not deliberate indifference for a prison administrator, 

who is not a medical doctor, to rely on the medical opinions of other qualified staff. See 

Peralta, 744 U.S. at 1087. Therefore, the Third Amended Complaint fails to allege facts 

from which the Court can reasonably infer that Defendant Zamora was deliberately 

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs by virtue of her reliance on her staff’s 

opinions. 

Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff relies on the theory that Defendant Zamora has 

liability for any alleged deliberate indifference by a member of Defendant Zamora’s staff

with respect to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, the Third Amended Complaint fails to 

allege any facts suggesting that Defendant Zamora would be liable for such conduct. 

Supervisors are not vicariously liable for the constitutional violations of their subordinates

under section 1983. Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1085–86 (citing Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 

198, 200 (9th Cir.1989)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[V]icarious liability is 

inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits.”). Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for 

the allegedly unconstitutional violations of a subordinate if a plaintiff sets forth allegations 

in his complaint that show: (1) how or to what extent the supervisor personally participated 

in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting or failing to act, the supervisor 

was an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint 

fails to allege any facts that suggest Defendant Zamora directed her staff to be deliberately 

indifferent in responding to Plaintiff’s medical needs or otherwise personally participated 

in any deliberately indifferent conduct of her staff. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to 

sufficiently plead a deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Zamora and 

recommends that, with respect to this claim, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 69) 

be GRANTED. In addition, as it is clear the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Third Amended 

Complaint with respect to this claim cannot be cured by amendment, the Court 

recommends Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Zamora be DENIED 

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with prejudice. 

2. Equal Protection

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants Glynn and Seeley’s

response to Plaintiff’s second-level grievance, and Defendant Zamora’s response to 

Plaintiff’s third-level grievance, violated his constitutional right to equal protection. (ECF 

No. 59 at 23–26.) Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Glynn, Seeley, 

and Zamora should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to 

allege sufficient facts to state equal protection claims against the Defendants. (ECF No. 

63-1 at 8–9; ECF No. 69-1 at 8–9.) 

i. Applicable Law

The “Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State 

shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is 

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated a like.” City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 

457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). A plaintiff may state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of 

the Equal Protection Clause in two ways. First, a plaintiff may show that a defendant acted 

with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon his membership 

in a protected class, such as race. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 

1998). Second, if the action in question does not involve a plaintiff’s membership in a 

suspect class, a plaintiff may establish an equal protection claim under the “class of one” 

theory by showing he was intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated 

individuals without a rational basis for the difference in treatment. Engquist v. Oregon 

Dep’t of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 

562, 564 (2000); Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004), 

overruled on other grounds by Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control 

Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2007). “A class of one plaintiff must show that the 

discriminatory treatment ‘was intentionally directed just at him, as opposed to being an 

accident or a random act.’” North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th 

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Cir. 2008) (quoting Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2001)). A class of one claim 

is premised on the theory that “defendants . . . harbor animus against [plaintiff] in particular

and therefore treated [him] arbitrarily.” Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. V. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 

(9th Cir. 2008). 

ii. Defendants Glynn and Seeley

Upon a thorough review of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint and the documents 

attached thereto, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to plead any facts that support a plausible

equal protection claim against Defendants Glynn and Seeley under either of the two 

available theories. For Plaintiff to have alleged a plausible equal protection claim against 

Defendants Glynn and Seeley under the theory that he was intentionally discriminated 

against based upon his membership in a protected class, Plaintiff would have had to allege

that the Defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on his membership in a 

protected class, such as a certain race, national origin, or religion. The allegations pled in 

the Third Amended Complaint fail to make this showing. While the Third Amended 

Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, the Hispanic race (see

ECF No. 59 at 7), it fails to allege any facts that suggest Defendants Glynn and Seeley

acted with the intent or purpose to discriminate against Plaintiff based upon his being

Hispanic. 

For Plaintiff to have alleged a plausible equal protection claim against Defendants 

Glynn and Seeley under a class-of-one theory, Plaintiff would have had to allege that 

Defendants Glynn and Seeley “harbored animus” against him individually and 

intentionally treated Plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals without 

any rational basis for the different treatment. The allegations raised in the Third Amended 

Complaint fail to make this showing. While the Third Amended Complaint alleges facts 

that suggest Plaintiff was treated differently from other similarly situated prisoners—“I am 

treated different than others because all other inmates were getting my old type of 

medication I used to get for his symptoms,” “others are taking Gabapentin or other type of 

seizure medication when the Keppra was not working for them or had bad side effects from 

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it,” “others with the same problems are getting such treatment and shoes” (ECF No. 59 at 

19)—it is devoid of any facts that suggest that Defendants Glynn and Seeley harbored any 

hostility toward Plaintiff individually and that as a result of such hostility, the Defendants

intentionally treated Plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to plead 

a plausible equal protection claim against Defendants Glynn and Seeley and recommends 

that, with respect to this claim, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 63) be 

GRANTED. However, because it is not absolutely clear the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s 

Third Amended Complaint with respect to this claim cannot be cured by amendment, the 

Court recommends Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against Defendants Glynn and Seeley 

be DENIED without prejudice and with leave to amend.

iii. Defendant Zamora

Similarly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to plead any 

facts that support a plausible equal protection claim against Defendant Zamora. First, 

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that suggest Defendant Zamora acted with an intent or 

purpose to discriminate against Plaintiff based on Plaintiff’s membership in a protected 

class. The Third Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts connecting any intentional 

conduct by Defendant Zamora to Plaintiff’s protected class status. (See ECF No. 59 at 25–

26.) 

Second, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts that suggest 

Defendant Zamora intentionally treated Plaintiff differently from other similarly situated 

prisoners. While the Third Amended Complaint does allege facts that suggest Plaintiff was 

treated differently from other similarly situated prisoners (discussed above), the Third 

Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts that suggest Defendant Zamora harbored any 

hostility toward Plaintiff individually and that as a result of such hostility, she intentionally 

treated Plaintiff differently from other similarly situated individuals. 

Furthermore, even if Defendant Zamora treated Plaintiff differently from other 

similarly situated prisoners, Defendant Zamora’s response to Plaintiff’s third-level 

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grievance, which is attached to the Third Amended Complaint, demonstrates she had a 

rational basis for doing so. Defendant Zamora’s third-level response states that Plaintiff 

was evaluated by medical staff with respect to his appeal issues and it was determined by 

licensed clinical staff that Plaintiff’s current medical treatment from his condition is 

adequate and appropriate and that he does not meet the criteria for the specific medication 

he desires. (ECF No. 59 at 37.) In addition, Defendant Zamora’s third-level response 

indicates that under California law, prisoners may not demand that they be prescribed 

certain medications. (Id.) Therefore, Defendant Zamora had a rational basis for denying 

Plaintiff’s third-level grievance, and the Court cannot draw from Plaintiff’s Third 

Amended Complaint the reasonable inference that Defendant Zamora intentionally treated 

Plaintiff differently from other similarly situated prisoner’s without a rational basis for such 

different treatment. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to plead 

a plausible equal protection claim against Defendant Zamora and recommends that, with 

respect to this claim, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 69) be GRANTED. 

However, because it is not absolutely clear the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Third Amended 

Complaint with respect to this claim cannot be cured by amendment, the Court 

recommends Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against Defendant Zamora be DENIED 

without prejudice and with leave to amend.

C. Plaintiff’s Request for Appointment of Expert

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Defendants 

Glynn and Seeley (ECF No. 63) contains a request that the Court grant Plaintiff an expert 

witness. (ECF No. 72 at 7–8.) For its failure to comply with the Court’s Local Rules, the 

Court recommends that Plaintiff’s request be DENIED without prejudice. Should 

Plaintiff still desire to request the appointment of an expert in this case, he must file his 

request in the form of a separate written motion that complies with the requirements set 

forth in Civil Local Rule 7.1. 

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 

District Court issue an Order: (1) accepting this Report and Recommendation; 

(2) GRANTING Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 63 and 69); (3) DENYING 

with prejudice Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Glynn, Seeley, 

and Zamora; and (4) DENYING without prejudice and with leave to amend Plaintiff’s 

equal protection claims against Defendants Glynn, Seeley, and Zamora. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 19, 2016, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than August 26, 2016. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2016

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