Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01726/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01726-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERTO ANTONIO RAYA,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1726 MCE KJM P

vs.

D.L. RUNNELS, et al. 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his 2001 Sacramento County conviction

for manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture

methamphetamine, and transportation of methamphetamine. Petitioner was sentenced to 17

years and 8 months in prison. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On direct appeal, the Third Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal

summarized the facts elicited at petitioner’s jury trial as follows: 

Officers James Smith and Joe Marsac were on traffic patrol at

about 1:00 a.m. on September 14, 1999. They saw a Chevy Blazer

enter Interstate 80 from Northgate Boulevard heading north; its

four-way flashers were on, its speed fluctuated, and it was

weaving. The Blazer exited the freeway at Norwood Avenue. 

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Suspecting driving under the influence, the officers followed and

stopped the Blazer in the parking lot of a Jack-in-the-Box

Restaurant. Raya was driving the Blazer and Wakefield was the

passenger. 

Raya told the officers he had no license as his had expired. He

explained the Blazer was his neighbor’s and he borrowed it to get

some Pepsi for his wife. A search of Raya revealed a plastic

baggie with a brownish-yellowish substance resembling

methamphetamine in his pocket. It was stipulated there were .14

grams of a substance containing amphetamine and

methamphetamine. Raya struggled as he was placed under arrest. 

He said the methamphetamine was his wife’s and must have been

in the wad of money she gave him for the Pepsi. Wakefield was

searched for weapons and released. 

Two cash register receipts were also found in Raya’s pocket. The

first was from Save Max Foods, with a purchase time about 30

minutes earlier, for root beer, two bottles of Wizard charcoal

lighter, a Swiss beauty pad, and lemon-lime soda. The second

receipt, dated the same night, was from the Rite Aid on Watt

Avenue. It was for two bottles of denatured alcohol and a 24

ounce King Cobra beer.

The officers searched the Blazer and found scales and a pager

under the passenger seat. In the back were chemicals associated

with methamphetamine manufacturing. The officers suspected a

methamphetamine lab and called a special drug officer and task

force. Among the items found were 33 bottles of Revive, with 100

tablets in each bottle. Revive contains pseudoephedrine, a

precursor to methamphetamine. Also found were Red Devil lye,

hydrogen peroxide, red phosphorus, iodine crystals, rubber gloves,

glass flasks, Wizard charcoal lighter fluid, plastic milk cartons with

an amber liquid, denatured alcohol, bottles of water, a bag of ice,

suitcases, wine carafes, a Pyrex dish, a coffee pot, a funnel, various

containers and rubber tubing. No fingerprints were obtained from

any of these items.

The chemicals found were sampled. The parties stipulated that the

criminalist who analyzed the substances would testify as follows to

the results. There was a bi-layered liquid containing

methamphetamine and indications of P-2-P, a compound

associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine. There were

also red phosphorus and iodine, reagents commonly used in

clandestine labs to manufacture methamphetamine from ephedrine

or pseudoephedrine, and hydrochloric acid. All the chemicals

necessary to manufacture methamphetamine from ephedrine or

pseudoephedrine using red phosphorus and iodine or hydriodic

acid were detected.

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Brian Quirk, a Drug Enforcement Agency special agent, opined it

was a pseudoephdrine reduction methamphetamine lab. In his

opinion methamphetamine was being produced, as shown by the

bi-layered liquid containing methamphetamine. The 33 bottles of

Revive were evidence of a plan to produce more. That amount of

pseudoephedrine was sufficient to produce 1400 dosage units of

methamphetamine. It was stipulated that both Raya and Wakefield

have knowledge of the nature and character of methamphetamine. 

. . .

David Raymond, an Oregon detective, testified about a search he

conducted in Selma, Oregon. While he was conducting the search

Raya and his wife, Naomi, came on the property. The property was

16 acres in rural Oregon; there was a cabin without electricity and a

trailer. In the trailer were glassware, tubing, filters, funnels, cotton

balls, and a flask in a suitcase with a pawn slip for Naomi Raya. In

the cabin were documents for Roberto and Naomi Raya. There

were also gallon jugs with an unknown liquid, a quart of muriatic

acid, empty iodine containers, and a scale with methamphetamine

residue on it. Outside were 25 empty pseudoephedrine containers

and pseudoephedrine tablets. In the trash were three empty lye

containers, an empty container of Wizard lighter fluid, a plastic

bottle with white residue, letters to the Rayas, empty

pseudoephedrine bottles, an empty jar of iodine crystals, an empty

bottle of hydrogen peroxide, an empty bottle of rubbing alcohol,

used filters, a baggie with red residue consistent with red

phosphorus, and a spoon with a cotton ball that tested positive for

methamphetamine. In Detective Raymond’s opinion, the items

were for the manufacture of methamphetamine. The items were

similar to those found in the back of the Blazer. There was nothing

unique, however, as to these items compared to other ephedrine

reduction methamphetamine labs. During the search, Raya

directed Naomi to unlock the trailer and cabin for the officers; she

had the keys. 

. . .

Naomi Raya had been with Raya for 17 years and married to him

for 14. They had three children together, ages 16, 13 1⁄2, and 10 1⁄2. 

She received no financial support from her husband, but gave him

money. Raya did not live with her at the Arcade apartment. 

Naomi began using methamphetamine in 1992 to lose weight. She

weighed over 200 pounds then and Raya was hanging around with

prettier ladies. 

Naomi testified the methamphetamine lab in the back of the Blazer

was hers. She had learned to cook methamphetamine in Oregon. 

She participated in numerous cooks there. Raya did not know of

her activities and he lost respect for her when he learned of the lab

in Oregon. When she returned to California she resumed her

manufacturing activities. She manufactured methamphetamine at

the residence of a disabled woman for whom she worked. She also

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manufactured with two men at a house near Mather Air Base. She

knew her colleagues only by their first names or nicknames and did

not know their addresses. She described in detail the process she

used to make methamphetamine.

September 13 was her wedding anniversary and she wanted to

spend the night at a motel with Raya. Wakefield was going to

baby-sit the children. She also had a vague plan to continue to

manufacture methamphetamine. The night before she and a

girlfriend purchased the Revive tablets in Reno. While she and

Raya were at the motel, the friend and “her old man” would come

and transfer the items from the back of the Blazer to their vehicle. 

Naomi boxed up al the necessary equipment and chemicals in the

back of the Blazer. 

About 8:00 p.m., Naomi and Raya picked up Wakefield and

stopped to get something to eat. They returned to the apartment

just before midnight. She told Raya and Wakefield she had to go

to the store real quick. Raya got mad at her and yelled that she was

wasting time and tweaking. She went to Rite Aid that night to get

denatured alcohol; she also got beer as a gift for the friend who

would pick up the equipment and chemicals. She went to the Rite

Aid although it was far from her apartment because she had to stop

at her friends. She told them she had not yet figured out what

motel she and Raya were going to. Once she got a room, she

would call them.

When Naomi returned from the store, Raya was still angry. Then

she told him she still needed to get some soda and ice for the kids. 

Raya got even more angry and said he would go to the store. 

Naomi reached in her pocket and gave him some money. She

asked him to also get some lighter fluid and cosmetic pads. She

used the pads as a funnel. Raya and Wakefield left for the store. 

The bag of methamphetamine and the Rite Aid receipt must have

been with the money she gave him. 

Naomi testified a friend gave her the paper with the map and list of

chemicals. She put it in her purse. She never saw the officers

search her purse.

Naomi denied telling her mother she would take the rap for Raya. 

She denied she saw a transcript of the preliminary hearing. She

denied she told her sister she would protect Raya and take the fall

because she would only get probation. 

. . . 

Naomi’s mother testified Naomi told her Raya had a prior record

and was looking at substantial time so she was going to take the

rap. Raya sent her a transcript of the preliminary hearing where the

officers described the manufacturing process; she gave it to Naomi.

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1

 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court does not agree. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in

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According to Naomi’s sister, Naomi said Raya had a prior record

so she was going to take the rap. She was going to do it to protect

her husband. She was going to stand by her husband until the end.

Pet., Ex. A at 2-9.

Petitioner asserted all of the claims that he presents in this action in his appeal to

the California Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed Raya’s conviction. Pet., Ex. A at

29. The California Supreme Court denied a petition for review. Pet., Ex. B.

II. Standards for Habeas Corpus Relief

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Also, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming lower court’s grant of habeas relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief). See also Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore

did not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim).1 Courts are not required to

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violation of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

70-71; Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

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address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show that he is not precluded from obtaining

relief by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

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of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform an “‘independent review of the record’ to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other

words, the court assumes the state court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). 

III. Arguments and Analysis

A. Admission of Detective’s Testimony Regarding Prior Bad Acts (Claim 1)

Petitioner argues that it was error to admit the testimony of the Oregon detective

regarding petitioner’s presence during a search of a methamphetamine manufacturing laboratory

in Oregon. The California Court of Appeal held that such evidence was prejudicial, but its

admission constituted harmless error. For reasons that follow, petitioner’s claim fails to allege

injurious error as mandated by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). 

1. Contrary to Clearly Established Federal Law Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the court first examines whether the California

Court of Appeal’s opinion resulted in a decision that was contrary to clearly established federal

law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 

The Oregon detective’s testimony is not probative for any purpose other than to

show the petitioner’s propensity to commit the crime with which he was charged. As found by

the California Court of Appeal, the evidence is prejudicial as “it shows a disposition to

manufacture methamphetamine.” Pet., Ex. A at 11. 

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It is an open question whether the use of “prior crimes” evidence to show

propensity to commit the charged crime is a violation of the Due Process Clause. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991). For purposes of this analysis, this court will assume that

the use of prior crimes evidence to show propensity is contrary to clearly established federal law. 

2. Harmless Error Standard

Under Brecht, the standard for determining whether habeas relief must be granted

is “whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.” 507 U.S. at 623. The Oregon detective’s testimony did not have such an effect or

influence, as explained below. 

The California Court of Appeal found the error of admitting the detective’s

testimony to be harmless, stating:

As to Raya, the evidence was strong. He was stopped after driving

erratically late at night in a Blazer containing a methamphetamine

lab, including a substantial quantity of pseudoephedrine, the

precursor to methamphetamine. He had methamphetamine in his

pocket, as well as receipts for recently purchased chemicals that are

used in the manufacturing process. His defense was that all this

incriminating evidence was Naomi’s. This defense required the

jury to accept her story that although she wanted to spend her

wedding anniversary with her husband, she still intended to

transfer the lab to friends that night. She was making last minute

purchases of chemicals while trying to keep Raya from finding out

about her activities, but was so careless as to not only let Raya run

an errand in the Blazer, but to accidentally give him both

methamphetamine and an incriminating receipt. The jury also had

to reject strong rebuttal evidence that Naomi intended to take the

blame to keep Raya from serving a lengthy prison sentence. Given

the strength of the evidence against Raya, and the credibility

problems with his defense, it is not reasonably probable he would

have been acquitted of any count if the evidence of the Oregon lab

had been excluded. 

Pet., Ex. A at 13.

There was substantial evidence against petitioner. Petitioner was arrested at the

scene of the crime, in a car being used to manufacture methamphetamine. RT 151-165. 

Petitioner’s only defense was to place all the blame on his wife, Naomi. Particularly troublesome

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to petitioner’s defense was the testimony of Naomi’s sister and mother. Each of them said

Naomi said she was going to take the blame for petitioner to keep him from serving a long

sentence. RT 983, 999, 1001. Furthermore, petitioner sent the transcript of his preliminary

hearing to the mother, who gave it to Naomi, who thus had access to the appropriate facts on

which to base her testimony. RT 986, 992. 

Even assuming the use of prior crimes evidence to show propensity to commit the

charged crime is contrary to clearly established federal law, enough other evidence was properly

admitted at the trial against petitioner such that the detective’s testimony did not have substantial

and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s guilty verdict. 

B. Admission of Testimony of Rebuttal Witnesses Regarding Prior Conviction (Claim 2)

Petitioner argues that the testimony of Naomi’s mother and sister was

inadmissible hearsay and unduly prejudicial because both witnesses stated that petitioner had a

prior conviction. The statements were made in the context of these witnesses’ responding to the

prosecutor’s questions during trial, as to whether Naomi had said she would take the rap for

petitioner because he had a prior record. RT 983, 999-1000. Petitioner’s claim is barred by 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) because the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to clearly

established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 

In Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75, the Court held that the trial court’s admission of

evidence of the defendant’s prior injury to his child was not enough to grant defendant’s habeas

petition. The evidence of this prior bad act was not used to show propensity to commit the

charged crime, especially in light of a limiting instruction given to the jury. Id. Specifically, the

court in Estelle stated that the introduction of the challenged evidence did not “so infuse the trial

with unfairness as to deny due process of law.” Id. Similarly, in Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926

F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit stated, “Only if there are no permissible

inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. Even

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then, the evidence must ‘be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’ (citation

omitted).” 

The California Court of Appeal correctly found that the rebuttal testimony of the

mother and sister was not admitted to show propensity to commit the charged crime. Pet., Ex. A

at 15. Rather, the testimony that petitioner had a prior conviction explained Naomi’s motivation

to testify falsely in order to help her husband. That petitioner’s wife had a motivation to testify

falsely is a constitutionally permissible inference for the jury to draw from the evidence. 

See Gullett v. Armontrout, 894 F.2d 308, 310 (8th Cir. 1990) (in evaluating evidence, jury could

have credited wife’s “obvious bias” in favor of her husband). Further, the court eliminated any

reference to the term of years petitioner received for the conviction or that petitioner was a three

striker. RT 977 (in limine ruling); CT 277 & RT 1281 (jury instructed not to consider penalty). 

In light of Estelle, the admission of prior bad acts evidence that is not used to show propensity,

coupled with an effort by the trial court to limit the prejudicial effect of the evidence, is not

enough to justify granting a habeas petition. 

Moreover, the rebuttal testimony was not “of such a quality as necessarily

prevents a fair trial.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. Even without the testimony as to Naomi’s

motivation for testifying, there was strong evidence supporting the conclusion that Naomi’s story

was not to be believed, as reviewed by the Court of Appeal. Pet., Ex. A at 13. Naomi’s mother

also had and shared the transcripts sent by petitioner, which would have enabled Naomi to testify

as to what materials were found in the car. RT 986, 992. 

The jury could draw a permissible inference as to Naomi’s motivation to testify

falsely from the rebuttal testimony. Furthermore, there was strong evidence of petitioner’s guilt,

ensuring that any impermissible inference the jurors drew from the rebuttal testimony was not

determinative of the outcome of the case. Petitioner was not denied a fair trial. 

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C. Use of Jury Instruction for Reporting Juror Misconduct (Claim 3)

Petitioner argues his constitutional rights were violated by the giving of California

Jury Instruction (“CALJIC”) 17.41.1, which obligates jurors to report instances of juror

misconduct during deliberation. This claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In Brewer v. Hall,

378 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 2004), the court stated, “There is no clearly established federal law

determined by the Supreme Court that indicates that the use of CALJIC 17.41.1 was

constitutionally improper . . .” Because there is no clearly established federal law on this issue,

the state court’s resolution cannot run afoul of federal law and habeas corpus relief is not

available. 

D. Lack of Lesser Included Offense Jury Instruction (Claim 4)

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s failure to issue a jury instruction on the

lesser-included offense of attempt was a denial of due process. This claim as well is barred by 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

There is no clearly established federal law regarding a trial court’s failure to issue

a jury instruction on lesser included offenses in a non-capital case. As a result, the Ninth Circuit

has taken the position that “such a claim fails to present a federal constitutional question and will

not be considered in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.” James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327

(9th Cir. 1976). However, an exception may arise when the requested instruction was necessary

to the theory of defense. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984); cf. Windham v.

Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998) (mentioning no exception to the general rule). In

Bashor, the court found the defense theory was not centered around a lesser included offense

because defense counsel did not seek such an instruction at trial. 730 F.2d at 1240.

Petitioner was not prevented from presenting his theory of defense at trial. 

Petitioner asserts that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser included offenses of

“attempted manufacture or unlawful possession of laboratory equipment and chemicals” with

respect to the charge of manufacture of methamphetamine. Pet. at 13-14 & n.3. However, the

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only jury instruction on lesser included offenses sought by defense counsel was one regarding the

offense of possession as a lesser included crime to transport. RT 1072. 

The defense theory was made obvious in closing argument when defense counsel

stated, “The only issue of significance in this case, I will tell you right now is whether or not Mr.

Raya knew what was in the back of that Blazer plain and simple.” RT 1136. To find the

petitioner guilty merely of attempted manufacture still would require the finding of intent to

commit the crime, which would conflict with the defense theory that petitioner did not even

know that he was transporting materials to manufacture methamphetamine. The defense pointed

the finger of blame at petitioner’s wife, claiming that she not only put the materials in the car, but

had even handed petitioner a bag of methamphetamine and a receipt for materials used in the

manufacturing process, which petitioner unknowingly placed in his pocket. RT 1144, 1147-

1148, 1152-1154. It was not fundamentally unfair to deny the jury instructions on lesser included

offenses of attempted manufacture or unlawful possession when defense counsel’s single-minded

goal was to portray petitioner as blameless. 

IV. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus

should be denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas

corpus be denied.

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These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties

are advised the failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 6, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

raya1726.fr

Case 2:03-cv-01726-MCE -KJM Document 12 Filed 06/07/06 Page 13 of 13