Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01488/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01488-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAIMAN RAHBARIAN, an 

individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE; and DOES 1 

through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-01488 JAM-KJN

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Before the Court is Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank’s 

(“Defendant”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Paiman Rahbarian’s 

(“Plaintiff”) first amended complaint (“FAC”) that alleges chainof-title defects and procedural irregularities in Defendant’s 

servicing of his mortgage. For the following reasons, 

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.1

 

///

///

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for February 11, 2015.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Attar Fakhri, Plaintiff’s mother, took out a mortgage on her 

home in 2007. FAC ¶ 35. The Deed of Trust named California 

Reconveyance (“CRC”) as trustee and Washington Mutual as lender 

and beneficiary. Id. Plaintiff alleges, “on information and 

belief,” that Washington Mutual transferred the mortgage to “WaMu 

Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate Series 2007-OA4.” FAC ¶ 36. 

This entity then “filed a Form 10-K with the SEC and was 

dissolved.” FAC ¶ 37. Dissolution caused “the assets,” 

including Plaintiff’s mother’s mortgage, to be distributed to the 

certificate holders. Id. Washington Mutual then itself 

dissolved, conveying its assets to Defendant. FAC ¶ 38. 

Plaintiff alleges that his mother’s mortgage was not among these 

assets now owned by Defendant, because it was previously 

transferred to the certificate holders. FAC ¶ 45.

Following his mother’s death in 2011, Plaintiff took 

possession of the mortgaged home. FAC ¶¶ 40-41. Plaintiff soon 

defaulted on the mortgage, and CRC issued a Notice of Default and 

Election to sell, dated March 12, 2013. FAC ¶¶ 41, 46. On that 

same day, CRC recorded a “Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust,” 

signed by Colleen Irby as Vice President of JPMorgan Chase. FAC 

¶¶ 42-43. Plaintiff alleges that Colleen Irby “is, in fact, a 

‘robo-signer.’” FAC ¶ 43.

Plaintiff alleges that he then contacted Defendant to 

request a short sale, but Defendant rejected the request because 

Plaintiff “d[id] not qualify for loss mitigation.” FAC ¶ 51. 

Nonetheless, the trustee sale has been “postponed indefinitely.” 

FAC ¶ 53. 

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The Court previously granted in part and denied in part 

(Doc. #17) Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s original 

complaint. Plaintiff then filed this FAC (Doc. #19) on December 

10, 2014 — ten days after the deadline set by the Court’s order. 

The FAC contains one cause of action brought under California’s

Homeowner Bill of Rights (“HBOR”). Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant violated HBOR by failing to “provide notice to 

Plaintiff that he could request certain information from 

Defendant,” having Colleen Irby “robo-sign” the “Corporate 

Assignment of Deed of Trust,” and “fail[ing] to engage in the 

appropriate loss mitigation.” FAC ¶¶ 57-59 (citing Cal. Civ. 

Code §§ 2923.55, 2924.17 & 2923.55(b)(1)(iii)). Defendant now

moves to dismiss the “robo-signing” allegations of the FAC (Doc. 

#20). Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. #21).

II. OPINION

A. Discussion

1. Late Filing of FAC

Defendant first urges the Court to dismiss the FAC under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to obey a 

court order. Mot. at 3. Absent a showing of prejudice, this 

Court prefers to decide cases on the merits. The Court finds 

that Defendant has not suffered any significant prejudice owing 

to Plaintiff’s delay of ten days in filing the FAC. Indeed, 

Defendant puts forth no specific reasons that it was prejudiced. 

Instead, Defendant states generally that it “incurred increased 

costs in moving to dismiss the complaint, engaging in case 

management practice, and otherwise participating in and

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monitoring this litigation[.]” Mot. at 5:27-28. The Court 

therefore considers the merits of the motion under Rule 

12(b)(6).

2. Robosigning Allegations

Defendant argues that the FAC’s robosigning allegations 

should be dismissed because even if robosigning occurred, it was 

not a “material” violation of HBOR. Mot. at 8; Reply at 3-4; 

see Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.12. Plaintiff counters that Colleen 

Irby’s signing without verifying that Defendant had a

“beneficial interest in the loan” was material because 

“different lenders and their servicers offer a varying set of 

. . . mitigation options to avoid foreclosure.” FAC ¶ 45; Opp. 

at 9:3-4.

California Civil Code section 2924.12 provides injunctive 

relief only for “material” violations of certain provisions of 

HBOR, including the section prohibiting robosigning: section 

2924.17. There is little case law defining the term “material” 

with respect to robosigning allegations. Defendant cited 

Johnson v. PNC Mortgage, 2014 WL 6629585 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 

2014). See Mot. at 8. In Johnson, the plaintiffs alleged 

robosigning where the defendant bank had purported to assign 

their mortgaged property to a different bank, but that 

“assignment [was] void” because the defendant did not have an 

interest in the property at the time. 2014 WL 6629585, at *2.

The court concluded that even if “the assignment [was] a sham, 

that would materially affect the original lender[,]” but not the 

plaintiffs. Id. at *9. “Nothing in the FAC suggest[ed] that 

the assignment affected the [plaintiffs’] loan obligations —

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apart, perhaps, from changing the entity to whom they sen[t] 

payments[.]” Id. The court held therefore that the alleged 

violation was not material and dismissed the claim. Id.

Plaintiff here does not attempt to distinguish Johnson, but 

instead argues that the violation was material in that it 

deprived him of the opportunity to benefit from mitigation 

options from a different loan servicer. Opp. at 9. Whether or 

not this loss of opportunity makes the violation “material,” the 

FAC lacks any factual basis to support an allegation that 

Plaintiff’s theoretical other servicer would have provided

Plaintiff with other options. It is unclear that Plaintiff’s 

servicer would have been different if not for the robosigning. 

Also, the FAC does not explain why this other servicer would 

have found Plaintiff eligible for loss mitigation when Defendant 

had determined that Plaintiff “does not qualify[.]” See FAC 

¶ 51. Because the FAC is devoid of these facts, the Court must 

dismiss Plaintiff’s 2924.17 allegations. The Court grants leave 

to amend to allow Plaintiff one more chance to supplement his 

factual allegations in order to establish that the violation was 

material. 

Resolving the motion on this issue, the Court does not 

reach Defendant’s further arguments that the FAC’s robosigning 

allegations lack specificity. 

III. ORDER

The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 

41(b) for failure to comply with the Court’s order. The Court 

GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Defendant’s motion as to the FAC’s 

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robosigning claim. Defendant did not move to dismiss the 

allegations related to California Civil Code sections 2923.55 and 

2923.55(b)(1)(iii), so these allegations need not be amended. 

If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, the second

amended complaint is due within twenty (20) days from the date of 

this order. Defendant’s responsive pleading must be filed within 

twenty (20) days thereafter. Plaintiff’s failure to meet this 

and any future Court deadlines may result in sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2015

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