Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01207/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01207-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Alan Benjamin,

Plaintiff, 

v.

Tim Coker, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 06-1207-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Hope Family Trust, Hope Family Revocable

Trust, and Matecheck L.L.C.’s (“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 48),

and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Exhibit A to Defendants’ Statement of Facts (“Motion to

Strike”) (Dkts. 59, 62).

BACKGROUND

On May 1, 2006, Plaintiff Thomas Alan Benjamin filed suit in this Court. In his

Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Tim D. Coker unlawfully obtained copies of

his Experian consumer report on three separate occasions: July 9, 2004; July 15, 2003;

and June 19, 2003. As a result of these alleged unauthorized acquisitions of his consumer

report, Plaintiff brought a variety of federal and state claims against that Defendant

Coker, including: (1) willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”); (2)

negligent violation of the FCRA; (3) violation of Arizona’s consumer statutes; (4) civil

conspiracy; (5) invasion of privacy; and (6) intentional infliction of mental distress. In

Case 2:06-cv-01207-SMM Document 103 Filed 05/23/08 Page 1 of 6
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addition, Plaintiff has brought claims for willful violation of the FCRA and civil

conspiracy against Defendant Sandra Hope. 

According to Plaintiff, his consumer reports were obtained as part of a conspiracy

between Defendant Coker and Defendant Hope. (Dkt. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 19, 30, 44.) Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Coker, an attorney who regularly reports trade line information to

credit reporting agencies and regularly obtains consumer reports of individuals through

his subscriber rights with credit reporting agencies, provides consumer reports to

Defendant Hope, a private investigator licensed by the State of Arizona. (Compl. ¶¶

6,10,11.) Plaintiff claims that the Defendant Coker did not identify, at the times he

obtained Plaintiff's Experian consumer reports, the name of the “end user” as required by

the FCRA and that he obtained the reports “under false pretenses” as that term is defined

by the FCRA. (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 26, 31, 37, 39, 45, 51.) Plaintiff further alleges that he

only became aware that Defendant Coker acquired his consumer reports after he received

a copy of his Experian report on May 18, 2005 and that he has never given Defendant

Coker permission to obtain his consumer report. (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 18.)

Upon motion by Defendants, the Court dismissed Count Two as against Defendant

Coker and Plaintiff’s claims brought under A.R.S. § 44-1696. (Dkt. 25, Order dated Nov.

3, 2006.) The Court also dismissed the claims raised in paragraphs 28 through 55 of

Plaintiff’s Complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations. (Dkt. 32, Order dated Feb.

6, 2007.) Defendants now seek summary judgment as all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. 

(Dkt. 48, Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.) Plaintiff objects to and seeks to strike Exhibit A to

Defendants’ Statement of Facts (the “Hope Affidavit”). (Dkts. 59, 62, Pl.’s Mot. to

Strike.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

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Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive

law determines which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. “Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that

is, the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130.

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial.” Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th

Cir. 1994). The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the

burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The nonmovant “may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but . . . must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986);

Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). A trial court

can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that they were not in existence

at the time of the acts complained of, and did not cause Plaintiff’s damages. (Dkt. 48,

Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 1:18-23.) Defendants assert that the last predicate act for

liability occurred on July 9, 2004, and that Defendants Hope Family Trust and

Matecheck, LLC were not in existence on or prior to July 9, 2004. (Id. at 2.) Defendants

further assert that there is no such entity as the Hope Family Revocable Trust. (Id.) 

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1

 The Local Rules state that an objection to the admission of evidence offered in

support of a motion for summary judgment must be presented in the objecting party’s

responsive memorandum or response to separate statement of facts, and not in a separate

motion to strike. LRCiv 7.2(m). Plaintiff’s position regarding the Hope Affidavit is also

presented in his responsive memorandum and controverting statement of facts. (See Dkts.

60-64.)

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Defendants submit the affidavit of Sandra Hope (“Hope Affidavit”) in support of their

Motion. (Dkt. 49, Defs.’ Statement of Facts (“DSOF”), Ex. A.)

Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ Exhibit A, Affidavit of Sandra Hope (“Hope

Affidavit”), on the grounds that the Hope Affidavit lacks proof of competency and

personal knowledge. (Dkts. 59, 62, Pl.’s Mot. to Strike 2.)1

 “A supporting or opposing

affidavit must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in

evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)(1). The Hope Affidavit states “I am the Defendant in Benjamin v. Hope,

No. CV 06-1207 in United States District Court of Arizona. I have personal knowledge

of all of the facts stated in this affidavit.” (DSOF, Ex. A ¶ 1.) The affiant goes on to state

the dates of formation for the Trust Defendants, each of which occurred after July 9,

2004. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-5.) 

Although the affiant’s attestation of personal knowledge is conclusory, it meets the

technical requirements of Rule 56. Plaintiff’s objection to the Hope Affidavit is on

technical grounds only, and does not suggest any reason why the affiant would not have

personal knowledge of the dates of formation. Additionally, as discussed below, Plaintiff

does not dispute the underlying facts that the Hope Affidavit sets forth. If Plaintiff

wished to challenge the affiant’s personal knowledge, he could have requested that the

Court reopen discovery or requested relief under Rule 56(f). Plaintiff did not pursue any

such course of action, relying solely on his technical objection to the Hope Affidavit. 

Therefore the Plaintiff’s objection to the Hope Affidavit will be overruled, and Plaintiff’s

Motion to Strike will be denied.

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2

 In a curious practice, Plaintiff responds to Defendants Matecheck and Hope Family

Trust separately, despite the fact that the Trust Defendants filed a single motion and

statement of facts. Thus the docket report contains two responses to the Motion for

Summary Judgment (Dkts. 61, 64) and two responses to the Statement of Facts (Dkts. 60,

63). Plaintiff similarly filed two Motions to Strike the Hope Affidavit (Dkts. 59, 62), and

two replies in support thereof (Dkts. 77, 78). Neither of Plaintiff’s responses to the

Statement of Facts disputes paragraph 5, which states “[t]here is no such entity as the Hope

Family Revocable Trust.” (DSOF ¶ 5.)

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Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that they were not in existence

at the time of the acts complained of in the Complaint and did not cause Plaintiff’s

damages. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 1, 3.) Defendants’ Statement of Facts sets forth the

dates of formation, each of which occurred after the last predicate act for liability. 

(DSOF ¶¶ 1-5.) Plaintiff opposes the Motion for Summary Judgment as to all Defendants

on the grounds that the Hope Affidavit is inadmissible. (Dkts. 61, 64.) Plaintiff

“disputes” Defendants’ Statement of Facts for the same reason, but does not refer to any

evidence to show that the facts themselves are in dispute. (Dkts. 60, 63.) Plaintiff also 

opposes the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Matecheck on the grounds

that Matecheck “waived its argument” that it is not a proper party to this action. (Dkt. 64

at 1-2.) Plaintiff does not dispute in any fashion Trust Defendants’ statement that no such

entity as the “Hope Family Revocable Trust” exists.2

 (Compare DSOF ¶ 5 with Dkts. 60,

63.)

As discussed above, the Court will consider the Hope Affidavit. Aside from

Plaintiff’s objection to the Hope Affidavit, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that

would create a genuine issue of material fact. (See Dkts. 60, 63.) Plaintiff does not

dispute that the Hope Family Revocable Trust does not exist. (See id.) Therefore the

Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants Hope Family Trust and Hope

Family Revocable Trust.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Matecheck did not plead in its answer that it was

not a proper party to this action. Plaintiff further argues that Matecheck “waived” this

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argument, on the theory that it constitutes an affirmative defense. An affirmative defense

is an assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s

claim even if all allegations in the complaint are true. Black’s Law Dictionary 430 (7th

ed. 1999). Matecheck’s argument—that it was not in existence at the time of the acts

giving rise to this action—is not listed as an affirmative defense under the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Plaintiff provides no support for his contention

that Matecheck’s argument constitutes an affirmative defense, nor any analysis as to why

it should be considered an affirmative defense. Moreover, Matecheck’s argument does

not fit the definition of an affirmative defense, as the argument does not raise new facts

and arguments, but simply denies Matecheck’s in the events alleged in the Complaint. 

Plaintiff’s assertion that Matecheck “waived” this argument is without merit, and the

Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant Matecheck.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Hope

Affidavit (Dkts. 59, 62). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Dkt. 48). The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly ant

terminate only Defendants Matecheck, Hope Family Trust, and Hope Family Revocable

Trust. This matter will proceed as against Defendants Tim D. Coker and Sandra Hope.

DATED this 22nd day of May, 2008.

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