Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00180/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jose Carlos Vazquez, 

Movant/Defendant, 

v. 

United States of America, 

Respondent/Plaintiff.

No. CV-15-00180-PHX-DGC (BSB)

 CR-13-00499-PHX-DGC 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Movant/Defendant Jose Carlos Vazquez (Movant) has filed a Motion to Vacate, 

Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a person in Federal Custody, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255, challenging his conviction and sentence in CR-13-00499-DGC.1

 (Doc. 1.)2 

Respondent/Plaintiff, the United States of America (the government), has filed a response 

asserting that the § 2255 Motion should be denied. (Doc. 4.) Movant has not filed a 

 

1

 Movant filed a separate § 2255 motion challenging his conviction and sentence in United States v. Vazquez, CR-13-50056-PHX-DGC. (See Vazquez v. United States, CV-13-00181-PHX-DGC (BSB), Doc. 1.) That motion is identical to the motion in this 

case. The Court did not consolidate these § 2255 proceedings. Accordingly, the government filed a separate responses to each § 2255 motion. However, the responses are substantively the same. (Compare Vazquez v. United States, CV-15-00180-PHXDGC (BSB), Doc. 4 with Vazquez v. United State, CV-15-00181-PHX-DGC (BSB), 

Doc. 7.) Because the two § 2255 cases are not consolidated, the assigned magistrate judge issues separate Report and Recommendations for each case, but they are substantively identical. However, the Report and Recommendation in CV-15-00181-

PHX-DGC (BSB) includes additional facts regarding Movant’s admission to the 

supervised release violation. 

2

 Citations to “Doc.” are to the docket in CV-15-00180-PHX-DGC (BSB). 

Citations to “CR Doc.” are to the docket in the underlying criminal case, CR-13-00499- DGC.) 

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reply and the time to do so has passed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

recommends that the § 2255 Motion be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Charges, Plea, and Sentencing 

 In 2011, Movant was convicted by a jury in the Middle District of Florida, Case 

No. 6:10-CR-00304-GAP-GJK, under the name Carlos Alexis Rodriguez-Hernandez, of 

unlawfully transporting aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and(a)(1)(B)(i), 

and of illegal reentry in violation of § 1326(a) and (b)(1). (United States v. RodriguezHernandez, 6:10-CR-00304-GAP-GJK, Doc. 46; PSR at 3.)3

 On April 26, 2011, Movant 

was sentenced in that case to thirteen months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ 

supervised release. (United States v. Rodriguez-Hernandez, 6:10-CR-00304-GAP-GJK, 

Doc. 61.) On September 29, 2011, Movant was released to the custody of Immigrations 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and was deported to Mexico on October 6, 2011. (PSR 

at 3.) 

 On February 21, 2013, the government filed a criminal complaint against Movant 

in the District of Arizona alleging reentry of a removed alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(a), and enhanced by (b)(1). (CR Doc. 1.) Based on that charge, and after the 

matter was transferred to the District of Arizona, on April 3, 2013, the Probation Office 

filed a petition to revoke supervised release in the former Middle District of Florida case. 

(United States v. Vazquez, CR-13-50056-PHX-DGC, Doc. 2.) 

 On April 9, 2013, Movant was indicted in CR-13-00499-PHX-DGC on reentry of 

removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), as enhanced by (b)(1). (CR Doc. 12.) 

On May 16, 2013, Movant pleaded guilty to the indictment without a plea agreement 

before Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade. (CR Doc. 18.) The same day, Movant 

 

3

 Pursuant to LRCrim 32.1(d)(3), the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) is not filed in docket of the criminal or civil case, but is retained after sentencing by the United States Probation Office. The Court reviewed a copy of the PSR that it obtained 

from the Probation Office. 

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admitted the supervised release violation before the magistrate judge. (United States v. 

Vazquez, CR 13-50056-PHX-DGC, Doc. 13.) 

 On May 17, 2013, the magistrate judge entered findings and a recommendation 

that the assigned district judge accept Movant’s guilty plea in CR-13-00499-PHX-DGC. 

(CR Doc. 19.) The magistrate judge also recommended that the district judge accept the 

Movant’s admission of violation of the terms of supervised release in CR-50056-PHXDGC. (United States v. Vazquez, CR 13-50056-PHX-DGC, Doc. 14.) On June 17, 2013, 

the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in both 

matters. (CR Doc. 20; United States v. Vazquez, CR 13-50056-PHX-DGC, Doc. 15.) 

 Before sentencing, the Probation Office issued a PSR recommending a sentence of 

sixty-three months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised release. 

(PSR at 14.) The recommended sentence was at low end of the Sentencing Guidelines 

range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months’ imprisonment. (PSR at 14.) The 

Guidelines range was based on a total offense level of 22, and a criminal history category 

IV. (PSR at 4, 7.) The total offense level of 22 was calculated from a base offense level 

of eight (U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a)), a sixteen-level enhancement for Movant’s conviction for 

unlawfully transporting aliens (U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii)), and a two-level 

deduction for acceptance of responsibility (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)). (PSR at 4.) 

 On July 31, 2013, Movant filed a sentencing memorandum. (CR Doc. 22.) He did 

not challenge the calculations in the PSR. (Id.) Rather, he argued that the recommended 

sentence was excessive and he requested a variance. (Id.) After a sentencing hearing, on 

August 13, 2013, the Court sentenced Movant in CR-13-00499-PHX-DGC to sixty-three 

months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised release. (CR Docs. 24, 

25.) In the supervised release violation case, CR-13-50056-PHX-DGC, the Court 

revoked Movant’s supervised release and sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment to 

run concurrent with his sentence in CR 13-00499-PHX-DGC. (Vazquez, 13-50056, 

Doc. 18.) 

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B. Direct Review 

 On August 15, 2015, Movant filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. (CR Doc. 26.) In his opening brief, Movant alleged that the Court erred by 

“failing (1) to announce the Sentencing Guidelines range, (2) to explain adequately its 

reasons for imposing the sentence, and (3) to indicate that it was not basing the sentence 

on [Movant’s] rejection of a fast-track plea offer.” United States v. Vazquez, 584 Fed. 

App’x 348 (9th Cir. 2014). Movant also alleged that the magistrate judge improperly 

participated in plea negotiations. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected Movant’s arguments, 

and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. Movant filed a petition for writ of 

certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which was denied in January 2015. 

Vazquez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1012 (2015). 

C. § 2255 Motion 

 On February 3, 2015, Movant filed the pending § 2255 Motion challenging his 

conviction and sentence in CR 13-00499-PHX-DGC. The § 2255 Motion asserts that: 

(1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Movant of his constitutional rights 

(Ground One); (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a sentencing 

enhancement based on a prior conviction (Ground Two); (3) trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to ensure that there was an adequate factual basis for Movant’s guilty plea 

because trial counsel did not dispute the validity of the underlying removal proceeding 

(Ground Three); and (4) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely 

notice of appeal (Ground Four). (Doc. 1 at 4-8.) 

 The government argues that § 2255 review of Movant’s claims asserted in 

Grounds One, Two, and Three is procedurally barred because these claims, although 

labeled as claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, are substantive challenges to 

Movant’s conviction and sentence that are unrelated to counsel’s performance, and 

should have been raised on direct appeal. (Doc. 4 at 5.) The government alternatively 

argues that all of Movant’s claims lack merit. Movant has not filed a reply in support of 

his § 2255 Motion and the time to do so has passed. 

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II. Procedural Bar 

 Generally, “claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral 

review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.” Massaro v. United States, 538 

U.S. 500, 504 (2003). Thus, a claim presented for the first time in a § 2255 motion is 

procedurally defaulted and barred from review. See Bousley v. United States., 523 U.S. 

614, 621 (1998) (finding claim defaulted when movant challenged his guilty plea but had 

not raised that claim on direct appeal); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) 

(noting that a motion to vacate or modify a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 cannot be 

used as a substitute for a direct appeal). “Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a 

claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the 

defendant can first demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ . . . or that he is 

‘actually innocent’” Bousley, 523 U.S at 622 (citations omitted). However, claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel need not be exhausted on direct appeal, but are properly 

brought in a § 2255 motion. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 509 (“We do hold that failure to 

raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim 

from being brought in a later, appropriate proceeding under § 2255.”). 

 The government argues that the claims asserted in Grounds One, Two, and Three 

are substantive challenges to Movant’s conviction and sentence, and not ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims. Also, as the government notes, Movant’s claims in Grounds 

One through Three largely focus on the conduct of the magistrate judge during the 

change of plea hearing and on the conduct of the district judge during sentencing. 

However, the Court declines to find review of these grounds precluded. Movant, who is 

proceeding pro se, casts Grounds One, Two, and Three as claims of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel and, in an abundance of caution, the Court considers Movant’s claims as 

challenges to trial counsel’s representation. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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III. Movant’s Claims 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims 

 1. Standard to Establish Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 To obtain relief for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

show both that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692 (1984). To be deficient, counsel’s 

performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” 

Id. at 690. In reviewing counsel’s performance, courts “indulge in a strong presumption 

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 

Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 

Id. at 689. The standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most deferential one. It 

is “all too tempting” to “second guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse 

sentence.” Id. “The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to 

incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from best 

practices or most common custom.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 

 To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a “reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. To satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong when 

a petitioner has pleaded guilty, he must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (citations omitted). 

 The court need not reach both components of Strickland “if the defendant makes 

an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“Although we have 

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discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice 

component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to 

approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry 

if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”). 

 2. Ground One 

 In Ground One, Movant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

advise Movant of the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea as 

required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969), and Rule 11 of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 1 at 4.) 

 Both Boykin and Rule 11 concern the court’s obligations at a change of plea 

hearing, not defense counsel’s performance. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44 (stating that the 

trial court must examine the defendant on the record to ensure that defendant understands 

his constitutional rights his is waiving by pleading guilty); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (setting 

forth the trial court’s duties before accepting a guilty plea). As discussed below, to the 

extent Ground One can be construed as asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for not 

objecting to the trial court’s failure to satisfy its obligations under Boykin and Rule 11, 

Movant’s claim fails. 

 The record reflects that the magistrate judge complied with Boykin and Rule 11. 

During the change of plea hearing, the magistrate judge confirmed that Movant had read 

a plea agreement that had been offered to him on March 8, 2013, that he understood that 

agreement, and that he decided to reject that agreement after discussing it with counsel. 

(Doc. 4, Ex. A at 5-6.) The magistrate judge also confirmed that Movant had reviewed 

the indictment with counsel and that he wanted to plead guilty to the indictment. (Id. at 

5, 7.) Movant stated that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation. (Id. at 6.) He 

confirmed that he had not had any substances that could interfere with his ability to 

understand the change of plea hearing, he was not forced or threatened to plead guilty, 

and he was not promised anything to plead guilty. (Id. at 7.) Movant confirmed that he 

understood that the indictment charged him with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), reentry of 

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removed alien, and alleged that he could be subject to a sentencing enhancement under 

§ 1326(b)(1). (Id. at 7.) 

 The magistrate judge reviewed the maximum statutory penalties for the offense to 

which Movant was pleading guilty. (Doc. 4, Ex. A at 8.) The magistrate judge also 

explained how the alleged sentencing enhancement would affect the possible sentence. 

(Id.) The magistrate judge also explained that because Movant was currently serving a 

term of supervised release that was imposed in the Middle District of Florida, a guilty 

plea to a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) could be used to establish a violation of his 

supervised release. (Id. at 11.) Movant indicated that he understood his sentencing 

exposure. (Id. at 10-11.) The magistrate judge then discussed how the Sentencing 

Guidelines would apply to Movant, and confirmed that Movant had discussed with 

counsel how the Sentencing Guidelines applied to his case. (Id. at 11-17.) The 

magistrate judge explained the negative consequences of pleading guilty in addition to a 

conviction and sentence in the criminal case before the court, including possible 

immigration consequences. (Id. at 18.) The magistrate judge then explained the 

constitutional rights that Movant was waiving by pleading guilty. (Id.) Movant affirmed 

that he understood those rights and wanted to give up his rights and enter a plea of guilty. 

(Id. at 22.) 

 The magistrate judge also set forth the elements of the charged offense, and 

confirmed that Movant understood those elements. (Id. at 21-22.) The government 

offered a factual basis for the guilty plea and Movant agreed with those facts. (Id. at 24-

25.) He agreed that he was convicted of unlawfully transporting aliens and reentry of a 

deported alien on April 26, 2011 in the Middle District of Florida. (Id. at 24.) Movant 

then plead guilty to violating § 1326(a), with a possible sentencing enhancement under 

§ 1326(b)(1). (Id. at 25-26.) The magistrate judge found that Movant knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty plea, he understood the charge, there was 

a factual basis for the plea, and Movant was competent to enter a guilty plea. (Id. at 25.) 

Thus, the record of the plea colloquy establishes that the magistrate judge fulfilled her 

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obligations under Boykin and Rule 11. Accordingly, Movant cannot show that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to assert that the trial court did not meet these 

obligations. 

 Ground One can also be construed as arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to advise Movant of the constitutional rights he would be waiving by pleading 

guilty. (Doc. 1 at 4.) This claim also lacks merit. During the change of plea hearing, 

Movant confirmed that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation. (Doc. 4, Ex. A at 

6.) He also confirmed that he understood his trial rights and that he wished to waive 

them and to plead guilty. (Doc. 4, Ex. A at 5, 18, 22.) “Statements made by a defendant 

during a guilty plea hearing carry a strong presumption of veracity in subsequent 

proceedings attacking the plea.” United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 

2008). When, as here, a collateral challenge rests on unsupported allegations that 

contradict a movant’s sworn statements, the Ninth Circuit has held that claim fails. See 

Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases and rejecting a 

movant’s challenge to his guilty plea that was contradicted by his sworn statements 

during the change of plea hearing). 

 Even if trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to explain Movant’s 

trial rights to him, Movant cannot establish prejudice because, as set forth above, the 

magistrate judge advised Movant of his trial rights at the change of plea hearing. (Doc. 4, 

Ex. A at 18-21 (explaining Movant’s right to be represented by an attorney, plead not 

guilty, and have a jury trial, at which he would be presumed innocent and could confront 

and cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, use the subpoena power of the court, and 

testify or remain silent).) Movant confirmed, under oath, that he understood those rights, 

and that he wanted to waive them and plead guilty. (Doc. 4, Ex. A at 21-22.) 

 An attorney’s alleged failure to advise a defendant of his rights or the 

consequences of pleading guilty is not prejudicial when court addressed those issues 

during the change of plea colloquy. See Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051-

52 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged 

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miscalculation of the sentencing range when the court informed him of the possible 

sentences and fines); see also United States v. Mayweather, 634 F.3d 498, 506-07 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (concluding that the defendant’s claim that he pleaded guilty under a mistaken 

belief as to his sentencing exposure was “demonstrably false” when the defendant was 

advised of the potential penalties at the change of plea hearing). Moreover, nothing in 

the record suggests that had trial counsel explained Movant’s trial rights to him in a 

different manner, Movant would not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to 

trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Therefore, Movant’s claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel asserted in Ground One lack merit and he is not entitled to relief on Ground 

One. 

 3. Ground Two 

 In Ground Two, Movant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to an unsupported allegation in the PSR. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Specifically, Movant 

argues that the PSR recommended an increase to his offense level based on an 

unspecified aggravated felony conviction. (Id.) The record, however, does not support 

Movant’s assertion that his sentence was increased based on an aggravated felony 

conviction. Rather, the record reflects that Movant’s offense level was increased sixteen 

levels based on his 2011 conviction and sentence in the Middle District of Florida for 

unlawfully transporting aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), a class C 

felony. (PSR at 3, 4; 6:10-CR-00304-GAP-GJK, Docs. 14, 46.) The PSR specifically 

identified the case number, 6:10-CR-00304-GAP-GJK, and the date and details of 

Movant’s sentences in that case. (PSR at 3-4.) 

 A sixteen-level enhancement for Movant’s prior conviction for unlawfully 

transporting aliens was appropriate under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii). See United 

States v. Guzman-Mata, 579 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The 16-level alien 

smuggling enhancement applies if there is a prior conviction for an offense described in 

§ 1324(a)(1)(A) or (2).”). Movant’s sworn statements at the change of plea hearing 

confirmed that he was convicted of unlawfully transporting aliens and that he understood 

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the maximum penalties he was facing, including the potential for a sentencing 

enhancement based on that conviction. (Doc. 4, Ex. A at 8-10.) 

 Specifically, during the change of plea hearing, the magistrate judge explained the 

maximum penalties for a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), including the possible sentence 

if the sentencing enhancements applied. (Id. at 8-9.) Movant confirmed, under oath, that 

he understood the maximum penalties. (Id. at 10.) Movant’s counsel also explained that 

he believed Movant would be subject to a sixteen-level enhancement, and that Movant 

could face a Sentencing Guidelines range of 41 to 105 months’ imprisonment depending 

on his criminal history. (Id. at 16-17.) Movant confirmed that he had been convicted in 

the Middle District of Florida of unlawfully transporting aliens, the basis of the sixteenlevel sentencing enhancement. (Doc. 4, Ex. A at 24-25.) 

 Because Movant’s conviction for unlawfully transporting aliens properly formed 

the basis for a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement, an objection to that enhancement 

would lack merit and, therefore, Movant cannot show that trial counsel’s performance 

was deficient for failing to object to that enhancement. See Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 

115, 124 (2011) (“It is unnecessary to consider whether counsel’s second justification 

was reasonable, however, since the first and independent explanation — that suppression 

would have been futile — confirms that his representation was adequate under 

Strickland . . . .”); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating 

that defense counsel’s failure to raise a meritless objection does not constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment); Nardi v. Schriro, 2008 WL 4446963, 

at *41 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2008) (stating that “because the underlying challenge to the 

jury instructions lacks merit, the corresponding ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

has no merit for lack of showing prejudice to Petitioner’s defense.”). 

 Accordingly, Movant cannot show that trial counsel was ineffective and the Court 

does not need to reach Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 

805 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the 

need to consider the other.”). Thus, Movant is not entitled to relief on Ground Two. 

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 4. Ground Three 

 In Ground Three, Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the factual basis for Movant’s guilty plea on the ground that there were 

“irregularities” in Movant’s removal proceeding. (Doc. 4 at 7.) As discussed below, 

Movant has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective in this regard. 

 During the change of plea hearing, Movant admitted (in addition to the other 

elements of illegal reentry) that he had been removed from the United States. (Doc. 4, 

Ex. A at 21-22, 24-25.) The validity of the underlying removal order is not an element of 

the offense of illegal reentry. See United States v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 

2014) (holding 8 U.S.C. § 1326 does not require the government to prove that an order of 

removal was issued when the alien has been removed). 

 Specifically, at the change of plea hearing, Movant confirmed that he was 

removed from the United States on October 6, 2001. (Doc. 4, Ex. A at 24-25.) He also 

admitted that he was found in the United States on February 2013, and that he did not 

have consent of the United States government to reapply for admission to the United 

States. (Doc. 4, Ex. A at 24.) The magistrate judge advised Movant that by pleading 

guilty to reentry after removal, he “may be waiving any right [he] may otherwise have to 

challenge the legality of that particular prior removal.” (Id. at 18.) It does not appear that 

Movant challenged the underlying removal order when he was first convicted of illegal 

reentry in 2011 in the Middle District of Florida. (See United States v. RodriguezHernandez, 6:10-CR-00304-GAP-GJK.) 

 Because Movant confirmed that he was previously removed from the United 

States, and there is no evidence that Movant had previously challenged his order of 

removal, trial counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to object to the factual 

basis for Movant’s guilty plea to the offense of reentry after removal. Accordingly, the 

Court does not need to reach Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

697 (there is no need to address the deficiency of counsel’s performance if prejudice is 

examined first and found lacking); Rios, 299 F.3d at 805. Thus, Movant’s claim of 

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ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in Ground Three lacks merit and he is not 

entitled to relief on that claim. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel — Ground Four 

 The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to the effective 

assistance of counsel during all critical stages of the criminal proceedings, and during a 

criminal defendant’s first appeal as of right. Mempa v. Ray, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). A 

petitioner prisoner may seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on a denial of effective 

assistance of trial or appellate counsel. Id. 

 In Ground Four, Movant argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to file a timely notice of appeal. (Doc. 1 at 9.) This claim fails because the record 

reflects that counsel filed a timely notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1) 

(establishing deadlines for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case). Movant was 

sentenced on August 13, 2013. (CR Doc. 25.) Two days later, on August 15, 2013, 

counsel filed a notice of appeal. (CR Doc. 26.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

denied Movant’s appeal on the merits. Vazquez, 584 Fed. App’x 348. Accordingly, 

Movant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice of direct 

appeal lacks merit. 

IV. Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, the § 2255 Motion should be denied because 

Movant’s claims lack merit. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 

Sentence by a person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Movant has not made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 2nd day of October, 2015. 

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