Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03263/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03263-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3263

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Bill M., by and through his father and *

natural guardian, William M., and on *

behalf of themselves and all other *

persons similarly situated; John Doe, *

by and through his mother and natural *

guardian, Jane Doe, and on behalf of *

themselves and all other persons *

similarly situated; Heather V., by and *

through her mother and guardian, *

Marcia V., and on behalf of themselves *

and all other persons similarly situated; * Appeal from the United States

Jane S., by and through her mother and * District Court for the

natural guardian, Patricia S., and on * District of Nebraska.

behalf of themselves and all other *

persons similarly situated; Kevin V., *

by and through his mother and legal *

guardian, Kathy V., and on behalf of *

all other persons similarly situated; *

Jennifer T., by and through her parents *

and legal guardians, Sharon and Greg *

T., and on behalf of themselves and all *

other persons similarly situated; *

William M., on behalf of his son, *

Bill M.; Jane Doe, on behalf of her son, *

John Doe; Marcia V., on behalf of her *

daughter, Heather V.; Patricia S., on *

behalf of her daughter, Jane S.; Kathy *

V., on behalf of her son, Kevin V.; *

Sharon T., on behalf of her daughter, *

Jennifer T.; Greg T., on behalf of his *

daughter, Jennifer T., *

Appellate Case: 04-3263 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/27/2005 Entry ID: 1908345
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*

Plaintiffs/Appellees, *

*

United States of America, *

*

Intervenor on Appeal, *

*

v. *

*

Nebraska Department of Health and *

Human Services Finance and Support; *

Nebraska Department of Health and *

Human Services; Stephen B. Curtiss, *

in his official capacity as the Director *

of Nebraska Department of Health and *

Human Services Finance and Support; *

Ron Ross, in his official capacity as the *

Director of Nebraska Department of *

Health and Human Services, *

*

Defendants/Appellants. *

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Submitted: March 16, 2005

Filed: May 27, 2005

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Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services and the Nebraska

Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support (collectively,

Nebraska) appeal from the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss based on

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. We reverse.

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1

Although we raised the question of standing sua sponte during oral argument,

it is elementary that standing relates to the justiciability of a case and cannot be

waived by the parties. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 757 n.4 (8th Cir.

1994).

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I. 

Bill M. and six other developmentally disabled adults (Plaintiffs) sued

Nebraska and various Nebraska officials in their official capacities, alleging

violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42

U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §

794; and other federal and state law provisions. Plaintiffs asserted that they are each

“eligible for, desire, have applied for or have attempted to apply for and have been

denied home and community-based Medicaid-funded services.” Compl. at 2. They

alleged that Nebraska’s withholding of funding to these services has left them without

adequate services to meet their needs and placed them “at imminent risk of

unnecessary institutionalization.” Id. Nebraska and the officials moved to dismiss

on various grounds. The district court denied the motion.

This interlocutory appeal is limited to one aspect of the dismissal motion:

Nebraska’s contention that Eleventh Amendment immunity precludes the district

court from having subject matter jurisdiction over the Title II claim. Plaintiffs

contend that Title II and related statutory provisions ostensibly abrogate Eleventh

Amendment immunity with respect to a Title II claim. Nebraska argues, in response,

that the extension of Title II to the states is unconstitutional under our circuit’s

precedent. The United States has intervened to defend the statutory abrogation. 

II.

Although we have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of an order denying

Eleventh Amendment immunity under the collateral order doctrine, Maitland v.

University of Minnesota, 260 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 2001), we must also consider

the issue of standing.1

 Article III standing requires a party to show actual injury, a

causal relation between that injury and the challenged conduct, and the likelihood that

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2

The complaint alleges that the denial of funding to one of the Plaintiffs,

Marcus J., has forced him “to remain in a more restrictive institutional setting, i.e.,

a nursing home, in order to receive the services he needs.” Compl. at 26 ¶ 109.

Because Plaintiffs’ counsel informed us at oral argument that Marcus J. is no longer

in a nursing home, we need not address the issue of whether the limitation of services

to the “more restrictive institutional setting” of a nursing home would constitute

actionable harm sufficient to provide Marcus J. with standing.

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a favorable decision by the court will redress the alleged injury. Minnesota Citizens

Concerned for Life v. Federal Election Comm’n, 113 F.3d 129, 131 (8th Cir. 1997)

(citing Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Plaintiffs

allege in their Title II claim (their first claim for relief) that Nebraska’s failure to

provide adequate funding “places [Plaintiffs] at risk of institutionalization.” Compl.

at 28 ¶ 117 (emphasis added). The mere risk that Plaintiffs may be institutionalized

due to the lack of adequate funding does not constitute an actual or imminent harm

sufficient to satisfy the first element of standing.2

Plaintiffs also allege, however, in portions of their complaint incorporated by

reference into the first claim for relief, see id. at 27 ¶ 111, that they have suffered

actual harm from Nebraska’s refusal to fund home and community-based Medicaidfunded services. See id. at 15-16 ¶ 51 (lack of funding precludes necessary

residential services in a community setting for Bill M.); id. at 17 ¶¶ 55-56 (same for

John Doe); id. at 19-20 ¶ 69 (Heather V.’s required services are underfunded, which

jeopardizes her health and safety); id. at 22 ¶ 83 (Jane S. is unable to move to a work

setting more suited to her needs due to the denial of additional funding); id. at 23 ¶¶

90-91 (Kevin V.’s services are not adequately funded to protect his health and safety);

id. at 24 ¶¶ 97-98 (same for Jennifer T.); id. at 26 ¶¶ 107-08, 110 (same for Marcus

J.). We accept as true all of the complaint’s material allegations and construe the

complaint in favor of the complaining party for purposes of deciding the question of

standing. See Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815, 817 (8th Cir. 2004). We conclude

that Plaintiffs have alleged concrete and particularized harm sufficient to satisfy the

first element of standing. Plaintiffs also meet the other standing requirements that the

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alleged harm be traceable to the defendant’s challenged action and redressable by the

court’s favorable decision. See Minnesota Citizens, 113 F.3d at 131 (“When

government action or inaction is challenged by a party who is a target or object of that

action . . . ‘there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him

injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.’”)

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62)).

III.

We review de novo a decision to deny or grant a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Metzger v. Village of Cedar Creek, Neb., 370 F.3d 822,

823 (8th Cir. 2004). We held in Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010

(8th Cir. 1999) (en banc), that “the extension of Title II of the ADA to the states was

not a proper exercise of Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Accordingly, Alsbrook is dispositive here unless it has been

superseded. 

Plaintiffs and the United States argue that Alsbrook has been superseded by

Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004). The plaintiffs in Lane were paraplegics

who used wheelchairs for mobility. They alleged that the lack of reasonable access

to state and county courthouses constituted a Title II violation. Tennessee moved to

dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the plaintiffs argued that

Congress had abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title II. The Supreme

Court held that “Title II, as it applies to the class of cases implicating the

fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’

§ 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 1994

(emphasis added). The Court thus carefully limited its holding to a particularized

class of cases. See id. at 1993 (“Because we find that Title II unquestionably is valid

§ 5 legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of

judicial services, we need go no further.”) (emphasis added). Several of our sister

circuits have interpreted Lane accordingly. See Cochran v. Pinchak, 401 F.3d 184

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3

Although Lane may well presage the eventual rejection of Alsbrook’s

rationale, the Supreme Court’s carefully cabined holding counsels against a

conclusion that Lane supersedes Alsbrook. Such a determination would have to come

from the Supreme Court or from an en banc decision of our court. 

4

We held in Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593, 599 (8th Cir. 2003), that

Nebraska’s receipt of federal funds effected a knowing waiver of its sovereign

immunity to actions brought under Section 504.

5

The United States’ argument that we should direct the district court to hold in

abeyance the Eleventh Amendment issue until after the Section 504 claim has been

resolved fails for the same reason.

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(3d Cir. 2005) (refusing to extend Lane to Title II claims by disabled prison inmates);

Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004) (same). See also Pace v. Bogalusa

City School Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 303 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Jones, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part) (concluding, as to issue not reached by majority, that

Fifth Circuit’s prior precedent “remains valid in holding that ADA Title II, apart from

the Lane scenario, does not validly abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment

immunity”). We conclude that Alsbrook has been modified by Lane to the extent that

a discrete application of Title II abrogation—related to claims of denial of access to

the courts—has been deemed by the Court to constitute a proper exercise of

Congress’ power. Other applications of Title II abrogation, like the one at issue here,

continue to be governed by Alsbrook.

3

IV.

Plaintiffs and the United States argue that even if Nebraska were to prevail on

its interlocutory appeal, Nebraska would still have to defend the “essentially

identical” claim that Plaintiffs bring under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,4

 as

well as the ADA claims brought against the Nebraska officials. Because the Eleventh

Amendment provides Nebraska constitutional immunity from suit, the existence of

parallel claims is immaterial.5

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The denial of Nebraska’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity with

respect to Plaintiffs’ Title II claim is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district

court with direction to dismiss the Title II claim against Nebraska.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.

I agree that Bill M., John Doe, Jane S., and Marcus J. have Article III standing

based on their allegations of injury resulting from the State’s refusal to provide

community-based funding under Medicaid to which they claim entitlement. I also

agree that although Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004), undermined some of

the reasoning of Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999)

(en banc), our court’s en banc precedent still governs this case, which involves only

a claim for additional funding of community-based services and implicates no

fundamental constitutional right. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. 

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