Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-02820/USCOURTS-ca7-19-02820-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 24, 2020*

Decided February 24, 2020 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2820 

ANTHONY CYRIL MARTIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MARK WENTZ, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellants.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

Fort Wayne Division. 

No. 1:13-cv-00244-SLC 

Susan Collins, 

Magistrate Judge. 

O R D E R 

Responding to reports of an armed robbery, Indiana state police officers gave 

chase to a vehicle driven by Anthony Martin, pursued him on foot, and eventually 

apprehended him. He brought this civil rights suit, alleging that those officers used 

excessive force when they arrested and interrogated him. The district court denied the 

officers’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that disputed facts precluded an 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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No. 19-2820 Page 2 

award of qualified immunity. Because this case turns entirely on disputed facts, we lack 

jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss it. 

 When reviewing qualified immunity rulings at summary judgment, we often 

take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when denying summary 

judgment. Day v. Wooten, 947 F.3d 453, 460 (7th Cir. 2020). Here, the undisputed facts—

those that were either admitted to by the parties or confirmed by video evidence—are 

few. Shortly after midnight on July 23, 2013, officers responded to reports of an armed 

robbery at a gas station. A red Ford Explorer, which had been seen circling the gas 

station before the robbery, was spotted by an officer, who started following it. After the 

Explorer changed lanes and accelerated to speeds exceeding 70 miles per hour, the 

officer activated his lights to initiate a stop. The driver, who turned out to be Martin, 

did not pull over and proceeded at high speeds for several miles. 

 From this point, the facts are almost entirely disputed. Martin declared, under 

penalty of perjury, that officers ran their vehicle into his, causing him to crash into a 

utility pole. As he recounted, the officers drew their weapons and ordered him out of 

the vehicle. He took off running, but the officers caught and tackled him. Even though 

he then remained passive and did not resist arrest, Martin says various officers kicked 

and punched him, pressed his “pressure points” behind his ears, and tased him several 

times. He then says that, after being taken to the police station for interrogation, officers 

hit him in the head, choked him, and painfully pressed his “pressure points.” 

The officers countered with a much different story. They denied that they 

collided with Martin’s vehicle or that he drove into a pole. They acknowledged that he 

fled the scene on foot, but no officer admitted kicking or punching him, pressing 

“pressure points” to subdue him, or tasing him. Likewise, no officer admitted hitting 

Martin in the head or choking him at the police station. 

Martin sued, and the officers moved for summary judgment. As relevant to this 

appeal, they argued that qualified immunity shielded them from Martin’s claims. They 

had probable cause to arrest Martin, they contended, and were entitled to use 

reasonable force during the arrest, so their conduct did not violate any clearly 

established law and they were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. 

A magistrate judge, acting by consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), denied the officers’ 

motion for summary judgment. Without addressing their request for qualified 

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No. 19-2820 Page 3 

immunity, the judge determined that it was genuinely disputed whether the officers 

had used excessive force when arresting and interrogating Martin. 

The officers moved to reconsider, pointing out that the court had not ruled on 

their argument that qualified immunity shielded them from suit. They argued that 

Martin had not shown that their allegedly unlawful conduct was so apparent that an 

objectively reasonable officer in their shoes would have recognized that Martin’s 

constitutional rights were being violated. But the magistrate judge disagreed and 

concluded that genuine disputed facts regarding the timeline of events—whether 

Martin was beaten and tased before he ran, while he was running, when he was 

apprehended, or after he was escorted to a police car—precluded the officers’ qualified 

immunity defense. 

The officers promptly appealed the denial of qualified immunity. A denial of 

qualified immunity can be appealed only “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); see Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 771–72 

(2014). A defendant may not appeal an order denying immunity “insofar as that order 

determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for 

trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1995). The officers argue that, even taking 

Martin’s allegations as true, they did not violate any of his rights that were clearly 

established as of July 2013. In support, they cite Dockery v. Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458, 467 

(7th Cir. 2018), where we reiterated that “an officer’s use of a Taser against an actively 

resisting subject either does not violate a clearly established right or is constitutionally 

reasonable.” The officers contend that any force they may have used against Martin was 

justified by his active resistance—his high-speed drive eluding police, his disregard of 

officers’ commands to pull over, and then his flight on foot. 

But the officers’ argument on appeal depends entirely on disputed facts. The 

parties dispute whether Martin was beat and tased while on the ground, whether he 

was resisting arrest while on the ground, and whether he was choked and hit in the 

head at the police station. It is readily apparent in this appeal “that the question of 

qualified immunity turns on genuine issues of material fact.” Levan v. George, 604 F.3d 

366, 370 (7th Cir. 2010). And we have repeatedly warned “that an interlocutory appeal 

will be dismissed if the argument for qualified immunity is dependent upon disputed 

facts.” Gutierrez v. Kermon, 722 F.3d 1003, 1014 (7th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases). We thus 

lack jurisdiction over this appeal, and the appeal is DISMISSED. 

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