Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01091/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01091-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE RICHARD HOOPER,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA; WARREN E.

RUPF, Contra Costa County Sheriff;

RALPH BROWN, Contra Costa County

Deputy Sheriff; JOSHUA PATZER, Contra

Costa County Deputy Sheriff; and DOES

1-10;

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-1091 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING

IN PART

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants Ralph Brown and Joshua Patzer move, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, for summary adjudication of all

claims in the third amended complaint (TAC) filed by Plaintiff

George Richard Hooper. Plaintiff opposes the motion. The matter

was taken under submission on the papers. Having considered the

parties' papers and the evidence cited therein, the Court GRANTS in

part Defendants' motion for summary judgment and DENIES it in part.

BACKGROUND

According to Plaintiff's sworn declaration, on the evening of

March 19, 2003, he ingested approximately one hundred tablets of

pain pills and drank several beers in an attempt to commit suicide. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

At about 12:45 a.m. the next morning, Defendants Brown and Patzer,

who are Contra Costa County Sheriff's Deputies, were dispatched to

an area of Rutherford Lane in Oakley, California due to a report of

a suspicious dark-colored Volkswagon Beetle and its occupant, who

was apparently attempting to commit suicide by inhaling exhaust

fumes.

Brown reached the Volkswagon first, and he states that when he

arrived in his marked patrol car, Plaintiff was standing at the

rear of the vehicle holding a large tube that was attached to the

tailpipe. Plaintiff acknowledges that he had taken vacuum cleaner

hoses from his house and was attempting to connect them to the

car's tailpipe. When Brown arrived at the scene, he turned on his

overhead lights, shined a spotlight on Plaintiff, got out of his

patrol car, and told Plaintiff to stop what he was doing because he

wanted to talk to him. Brown was in uniform. The parties agree

that, at that point, Plaintiff got into his vehicle and fled. In

his declaration, Plaintiff states that, due to his intoxicated

state, he did not realize that Brown was a police officer.

Brown states in his declaration that, at the time Plaintiff

fled, "I pursued Hooper in my car, and at that time I decided that

I needed to detain and arrest him." Brown does not state for what

crime he believed he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff at that

time. Brown followed Plaintiff westbound on Rutherford Lane with

his overhead lights still on. Patzer approached driving eastbound

on Rutherford Lane. He was also in a marked patrol car and in

uniform. Plaintiff's sworn declaration states as follows: "As I

proceeded on what I now know was Rutherford Drive, I encountered a
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Defendants submit evidence that Plaintiff swerved his

vehicle into the eastbound lane, causing Patzer to drive into the

westbound lane to avoid colliding with Plaintiff.

3

car coming toward me in my lane of traffic. I swerved into the

other side of the street to avoid colliding with that car."1

Plaintiff's vehicle then struck a parked van and came to rest

on a curb and sidewalk. Brown and Patzer stopped their vehicles on

each side of Plaintiff's car in order to block his escape, and

exited their patrol cars with their guns drawn. According to the

undisputed evidence submitted by Defendants, Brown approached the

driver's side of Plaintiff's vehicle and repeatedly ordered

Plaintiff to get out of the car. Patzer positioned himself toward

the front of Plaintiff's car. Plaintiff states that he could not

hear the officers' commands because the drugs and alcohol had

caused him to have difficulty hearing. He also states that, at

this point, he still did not realize that Brown and Patzer were

police officers.

Defendants submit undisputed evidence that, while the officers

were commanding Plaintiff to exit his vehicle, Plaintiff began to

rev his engine, and turned his vehicle sharply to the right to

dislodge it from the curb and maneuver out from between the two

police cars. It is also not disputed that, as Plaintiff executed

this maneuver, he almost struck Patzer, who, as he dodged the

Volkswagon, fired a single shot into the vehicle, missing

Plaintiff. In his sworn declaration, Patzer states that he fired

the shot at Plaintiff's vehicle because he believed that Plaintiff

was attempting to run him over. Plaintiff states that he did not
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

intentionally drive at Patzer. 

Plaintiff then drove his car eastbound on Rutherford Lane. He

crashed into a curb several blocks away, which deployed the air

bags in his vehicle. Patzer arrived at the scene and parked his

patrol car approximately ten feet behind Plaintiff. It is not

disputed that Plaintiff backed his vehicle into Patzer's vehicle,

striking it, and then rolled forward and came to a stop against the

curb. Brown arrived and parked next to Patzer; both officers

exited their vehicles and approached Plaintiff's car with their

guns drawn. Plaintiff was grasping the steering wheel with both

hands. According to Patzer's declaration, he told Plaintiff not to

move or he would shoot, and Plaintiff responded, "Good, shoot me." 

Plaintiff does not dispute this.

Patzer opened the driver's side door. Both officers ordered

Plaintiff to get out of the car, but he refused. The evidence is

not disputed that the officers then struck Plaintiff several times

in an effort to dislodge his grip on the steering wheel and remove

him from his car; Patzer struck Plaintiff on the arm once with his

baton, and several more times in the face and shoulders with his

fists. Patzer then dragged Plaintiff out of the vehicle and put

him face down on the street. Plaintiff states that he was not

resisting at this point, but he does not dispute Defendants'

evidence that his arms were underneath his body and not restrained. 

Patzer acknowledges punching Plaintiff once in the ribs as he tried

to get his arms behind him in order to handcuff him. In

Plaintiff's sworn declaration, he states that Patzer kicked him in

the face. It is not clear from Plaintiff's declaration whether he
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

claims that Patzer kicked him while he was handcuffing him, or

afterwards. After the officers handcuffed Plaintiff, they placed

him in the back of a patrol car.

A paramedic on the scene found abrasions to Plaintiff's face. 

The emergency room physician at Sutter Delta Hospital, where

Plaintiff was taken after the incident, also noted abrasions to his

face. No other injuries were reported. On October 21, 2003,

Plaintiff entered a plea of nolo contendere to violating California

Penal Code section 69 (felony resisting arrest).

On March 18, 2004, Plaintiff filed the complaint that

initiated this lawsuit. On April 9, 2004, Plaintiff filed an

amended complaint against Brown, Patzer, Contra Costa County, and

Contra Costa County Sheriff Warren E. Rupf. On May 10, 2004,

Defendants Contra Costa County and Sheriff Rupf moved to dismiss

the claims against them. On June 21, 2004, the Court granted the

motion to dismiss in part and granted Plaintiff leave to amend his

complaint. On July 16, 2004, Plaintiff filed his second amended

complaint and, on July 22, he filed the TAC. On August 3,

Defendants Contra Costa County and Sheriff Rupf again moved to

dismiss the claims against them. Plaintiff did not oppose that

motion and, on November 3, 2004, the Court granted it.

The TAC alleges the following causes of action against Brown

and Patzer, all of which arise from the officers' pursuit and

arrest of Plaintiff: (1) excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, (2) assault and battery, (3) intentional infliction of

emotional distress, (4) violation of the Bane Act, a State law

which provides civil penalties for interference with protected
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

rights accompanied by discriminatory intent, and common law causes

of action for (5) failure to intervene, and (6) negligence.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving

party is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a

material fact on such issues, nor must the moving party support its

motion with evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.;

see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990);

Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). If the moving party shows an

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific

evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to

show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

DISCUSSION

I. Excessive Force

A. Heck v. Humphrey

Defendants contend that Plaintiff's excessive force claim is

barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck,

the Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff may not recover damages

for "harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid" unless he or she can prove that the

conviction or sentence has been overturned, expunged or declared

invalid. 512 U.S. at 486-87. The test is "whether a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of

[the plaintiff's] conviction or sentence." Id. at 487.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

Here, Defendants argue that a judgment in favor of Plaintiff

on his excessive force claim would invalidate his plea of nolo

contendere to the charge of felony resisting arrest. A plea of

nolo contendere has the same effect as a guilty plea or guilty

verdict for purposes of Heck analysis. See Nuno v. County of San

Bernardino, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1135 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 

Plaintiff cites Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th

Cir. 2005), in which the Ninth Circuit held, "In California, the

lawfulness of the officer's conduct is an essential element of the

offense of resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer." 

The court ruled that, if an officer used excessive force at the

time of an arrest, the arrest would be unlawful and the arrestee

could not be convicted of resisting. Id. at 695-96. However, the

Smith court ruled that the defendants in that case were not

entitled to summary judgment under Heck because it was not clear

from the record whether Smith had plead guilty to resisting,

delaying or obstructing the officer based upon his actions during

his arrest (which would have triggered Heck), or based upon his

actions prior to his arrest when officers were attempting to

conduct an investigation at Smith's house and had not yet attempted

to detain him. Id. at 697-98.

Plaintiff argues that Heck does not bar his excessive force

claim because Brown and Patzer used excessive force both before and

after they arrested him. Plaintiff contends that the officers'

actions during the initial car chase on Rutherford Lane occurred

before Plaintiff's arrest, and that their actions while he was face

down on the street occurred after his arrest.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

Here, the evidence is not clear at what point Defendants had

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Brown states that he decided

to arrest Plaintiff when Plaintiff drove away from the initial

encounter with him, but Defendants have not specified the crime for

which Brown had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff at that time. 

Brown does not state that he was attempting to detain Plaintiff

pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150

before Plaintiff fled in his vehicle. Defendants' declarations

state that they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for

resisting arrest and various vehicle code violations, but it

appears that this had not occurred when Plaintiff first drove away

from Brown. Thus, there is no evidence that Defendants had

initiated a lawful arrest when Plaintiff initially fled, and there

is a genuine factual dispute whether Defendants' actions during the

initial car chase occurred during the course of their arrest of

Plaintiff. It is during this time that, according to Plaintiff,

Patzer drove his car in the wrong lane toward him, an action that

Plaintiff asserts constituted deadly and excessive force.

In addition, Plaintiff's declaration states that Patzer kicked

him the face at some point after Defendants dragged him from his

vehicle and threw him on the ground, and after he had been

physically restrained and was not resisting. It is not clear from

Plaintiff's declaration whether he claims that Patzer kicked him

after he was handcuffed. However, drawing all inferences in favor

of Plaintiff, there is a material dispute whether, if he was kicked

in the face, he was kicked after Defendants had effectuated his

arrest.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

For the foregoing reasons, there is a genuine factual dispute

whether the actions of which Plaintiff complains -- Patzer's

driving on the wrong side of the road toward him and Patzer's

kicking him in the face -- occurred entirely during his arrest, or

whether they occurred before or after his arrest, respectively. If

these actions occurred before or after his arrest, Plaintiff's

excessive force claim arising from them is not barred under Heck by

his nolo contendere plea. See Smith, 394 F.3d at 697-98. 

Plaintiff has not submitted evidence that Brown committed any act

that may form the basis for an excessive force claim that is not

Heck-barred. Thus, Defendants' motion for summary adjudication of

Plaintiff's excessive force claim is denied with respect to Patzer

and granted with respect to Brown. 

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary

judgment of qualified immunity from Plaintiff's excessive force

claim. The defense of qualified immunity protects government

officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The

threshold question is whether, taken in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, the facts alleged show that the officer's conduct

violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the

existence of a clearly established right at the time of the

allegedly impermissible conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). If the law is determined

to be clearly established, the next inquiry is whether a reasonable

official could have believed his conduct was lawful. Act

Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Excessive force claims arising in the context of an arrest or

investigatory stop are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment

reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

(1989). The reasonableness of a particular use of force is judged

from the perspective of the officer; that analysis "must embody

allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to

make split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving -- about the amount of force that

is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396-97.

Resolving factual disputes in favor of Plaintiff and crediting

his evidence, there was no probable cause to arrest him when he

drove away from the initial encounter with Brown, and his arrest

had been completed when he was restrained on the ground and

handcuffed. Plaintiff had a clearly established right to be free

from excessive force in both situations, which occurred before and

after his arrest, respectively. And, under these circumstances, no

reasonable officer could have believed that driving his patrol car

the wrong way down the street directly at Plaintiff was reasonable,

nor could he have believed that kicking him in the face after he

had been arrested was permissible.

For the foregoing reasons, Patzer is not entitled to summary

judgment of qualified immunity from Plaintiff's excessive force

claim.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

II. State Law Claims

A. Assault and Battery

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a cause of

action for assault and battery because he cannot prove that

unreasonable force was used. In California, in order to make a

prima facie case of assault against a police officer, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that the officer's use of force was unreasonable

in addition to the elements of a general assault claim. Scruggs v.

Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 264 (1967). A claim for assault

requires a showing of an unlawful attempt, coupled with present

ability, to commit violent injury on the person of another. Eres

v. County of Alameda, 1999 WL 66519, *11 (N.D. Cal. 1999).

For the reasons stated above, there is a genuine dispute of

material fact whether Patzer used excessive force during the March

20, 2003 incident. However, Plaintiff may not bring a State law

tort claim based upon an excessive force claim that is Heck-barred. 

Susag v. City of Lake Forrest, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1412-13

(2002). Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary adjudication

of this claim is denied with respect to Patzer and granted with

respect to Brown.

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress because he has not

submitted evidence that Defendants' behavior was outrageous or that

he suffered severe emotional distress as a result of that behavior. 

Under California law, a plaintiff must establish the following

elements to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

emotional distress: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the

defendant with the intent to cause, or reckless disregard of the

possibility of causing, emotional distress; (2) severe or extreme

emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the

emotional distress. Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579,

593 (1979).

Here, because there is a triable issue of fact whether Patzer

drove his car on the wrong side of the road toward Plaintiff before

a legal arrest was initiated, and whether Patzer kicked Plaintiff

in the face after his arrest was completed, there is also a genuine

dispute whether Patzer's conduct was extreme and outrageous. In

addition, Plaintiff states in his declaration that he has suffered

emotional distress as a result of the March 20, 2003 incident. 

Thus, summary adjudication of this claim against Patzer is not

appropriate. Defendants' motion for summary adjudication of this

claim against Brown is granted. See Susag, 94 Cal. App. 4th at

1412-13.

C. Bane Act

Plaintiff's Bane Act claim is based upon his claim of

excessive force. Thus, Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's Bane

Act claim fails because his excessive force claim fails must be

rejected. However, under the Bane Act, a plaintiff must show

interference with a protected right and that the interference was

"due to his or her race, color, religion, ancestry, national

origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age,

disability, or position in a labor dispute." Boccato v. City of

Hermosa Beach, 29 Cal. App. 4th 1797, 1809 (1994) (internal
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that Defendants'

conduct was accompanied by discriminatory intent. And, Plaintiff

has submitted no evidence that he is a member of a class of persons

protected by California Civil Code section 51.7, which is a

requirement to bring a claim under the Bane Act. Id. Thus,

Defendants' motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's Bane Act

claim is granted.

D. Failure to Intervene

The TAC states a common law cause of action for failure to

intervene, alleging that police officers other than Defendants had

a duty to intervene in Defendants' alleged constitutional

violations. Police officers have a duty to intercede if their

fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect, and

the witnessing officers have an opportunity to intercede. 

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff has not argued or submitted evidence that Brown had

an opportunity to intervene when, as Plaintiff claims, Patzer drove

at him on the wrong side of the road and kicked him once in the

face. Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary adjudication of

this claim.

E. Negligence

Plaintiff's sixth cause of action is for negligence. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's negligence claim must fail

because his section 1983 claim fails. However, the Court has

denied Defendants' motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's

claim against Patzer for excessive force.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

In order to prevail on his claim for common law negligence,

Plaintiff must show that (1) Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of

care, (2) Defendants breached that duty, (3) the breach caused

Plaintiff's injury, and (4) Plaintiff suffered damages. See Spates

v. Dameron Hosp. Ass'n, 114 Cal. App. 4th 208, 213 (2003). For the

reasons stated above, there is a triable issue of fact on each of

these elements with respect to Patzer. Defendants' motion for

summary adjudication of this claim against Patzer is denied. Their

motion for summary adjudication of this claim against Brown is

granted. See Susag, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 1412-13.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary

judgment (Docket No. 47) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

The Court grants Defendants' motion for summary adjudication of all

claims against Brown. The Court also grants Defendants' motion for

summary adjudication of Plaintiff's claims, against Patzer, under

the Bane Act and for failure to intervene. The Court denies

Defendants' motion for summary adjudication of the remaining claims

against Patzer. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/14/05 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge