Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02275/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02275-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:9607 Real Property Tort to Land - Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CITY OF SAN DIEGO 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

NATIONAL STEEL & 

SHIPBUILDING COMPANY; et aI., 

Defendants. 

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS 

AND COUNTERCLAIMS 

CASE NO. 09cv2275 WQH 

(BGS) 

ORDER 

HAYES, Judge: 

The matters before the Court are the Ex Parte Motion for Clarification and 

Correction ofOversights and Omissions in the Court's July 11, 2014 Order (ECF No. 

436) filed by the City of San Diego and the Joint Ex Parte Motion of San Diego 

Unified Port District and National Steel and Shipbuilding Company for Correction and 

Clarification ofthe Court's July 11,2014 Order (ECF No. 429). The Court will also 

address certain objections raised by the San Diego Unified Port District (ECF No. 434) 

and the City ofSan Diego (ECF Nos. 427, 437, 442) to proposed bar orders submitted 

by the parties pursuant to the Court's July 11,2014 Order. (ECFNos. 424,426,431). 

I. Background 

On October 11, 2013, Defendants San Diego Gas & Electric Company 

("SDG&E") and BAE Systems San Diego Ship Repair Inc. and Southwest Marine, Inc. 

(collectively "BAE") filed a Joint Motion for Order Confirming Good Faith Settlement 

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1 II and Barring Claims, based on the settlement between SDG&E and BAE ("Settlement 

2 I"). (ECF No. 354). On November 4, 2013, Defendant United States Navy (the 

3 "Navy") filed a Motion for Order Determining Good Faith Settlement and Barring 

4 II Claims, based on the settlement between the Navy, BAE, and National Steel and 

5 II Shipbuilding Company ("NASSCQ") ("Settlement 2"). (ECF No.366). On November 

611 5, 2013, Defendant NASSCO filed a Motion for Determination of Good Faith 

7 II Settlement between NASSCO and United States ofAmerica, based on Settlement 2. 

811 (ECFNo. 367). OnNovember 5,2013, BAE filed aMotion for Determination ofGood 

9 II Faith Settlement and Partial Claims Bar, based on Settlement 2. (ECF No. 368). On 

10 II November 6, 2013, NASSCO and San Diego Unified Port District (the "Port District") 

11 II filed a Joint Motion for order Confirming Settlement Between NASSCO and the Port 

12 II District Barring and Dismissing Claims, based on the settlement between NAS SCQ and 

13 II the Port District ("Settlement 3"). (ECF No. 370). The City ofSan Diego (the "City") 

14 II opposed each ofthese motions (collectively "Good Faith Settlement Motions").} (ECF 

1511 Nos. 382, 383, 389, 392, 393). 

1611 On July 11,2014, the Court issued an Order ("July 11,2014 Order") finding that 

17 II the three Settlement Agreements entered into between various Defendants were entered 

18 II into in good faith and were fair, reasonable, and consistent with the purposes of the 

19 II Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 

20 II ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act 

2111 ("UCFA"), 12 U.L.A. 126 (1996). (ECF No. 423). The Court found that the 

22 II proportionate share method, section 6 of the UCF A, was "an equitable method of 

23 II apportioning fault." Id. at 20. For each settlement, the Court found that the settling 

2411 parties (SDG&E, the Navy, and the Port District) could request bar orders barring 

25 II contribution-based claims by non-settling parties because the settling parties had 

26 II discharged their contribution obligations to the claimants, BAE and NASSCO. The 

271\------­

1 In addition, Defendant Camj)bell Industries o'QPosed BAE's motion (ECF No. 

2811 368) based on Settlement 2. (ECF No. 384). The Port District opposed BAE and 

SDG&E's motion (ECF No. 354) based on Settlement 1. (ECF No. 397). 

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Court therefore found that BAE and NASSCD's claims against non-settling parties 

were reduced by the equitable share ofthe settling parties' obligations, and noted that 

such claimants "bear[] the risk that [they have] settled with a responsible person for 

too little." Id. at 19-20. 

The Court ordered that the "Moving Parties shall prepare proposed orders that 

are consistent with this Order and file them on the docket within ten (1 0) days from the 

date this Order is filed." (ECF No. 423 at 428). The Court ordered that "[a]ny 

objections shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date(s) the proposed orders are 

filed." Id. 

The Navy (ECF No. 424), SDG&E (ECF No. 426), NASSCD (ECF No. 428), 

the Port District (ECF No. 431), and BAE (ECF No. 432) each submitted proposed bar 

orders (collectively "the Moving Parties"). The City objected to all five proposed bar 

orders. (ECF Nos. 427,437,440,441,442). The Port District objected to SDG&E's 

proposed bar order, which pertains to Settlement 1, and NASSCD and BAE's proposed 

bar orders, which pertain to Settlement 2. (ECF Nos. 434, 447,448). Campbell objected 

to B~'s proposed order, which pertains to Settlement 2. (ECF No. 446). The Navy 

objected to BAE and NASSCD's proposed bar orders, which pertain to Settlement 2. 

(ECF No. 443, 444). 

On July 21,2014, the Port District and NASSCD filed the pending Joint Ex Parte 

Motion for Correction and Clarification ofthe Court's July 11,2014 Order ("the Port 

District and NASSCD' s Motion for Clarification"). (ECF No. 429). Dn July 30, 2014, 

the City filed an opposition. (ECF No. 439). On July 30, 2014, the Navy filed a 

response in support ofthe Port District and NASSCD' s Motion for Clarification. (ECF 

No. 445). On August 8, the Port District and NASSCD filed a reply. (ECF No. 456). 

On July 28, 2014, the City filed the pending Ex Parte Motion for Clarification 

and Correction ofOversights and Omissions in the Court's July 11,2014 Order ("the 

City's Motion for Clarification"). (ECF No. 436). On August 1,2014, the Navy filed 

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an opposition. (ECF No. 450). On August 8, 2014, SDG&E filed an opposition. (ECF 

No. 454). On August 8, 2014, the Port District and NASSCO filed a joint opposition. 

(ECF No. 455). On August 8, 2014, BAE filed an opposition. (ECF No. 457). 

II. The Pending Motions for Clarification (ECF Nos. 429, 436) 

Both motions seek clarification on whether the City's "cost recovery" claims are 

subject to a bar order pursuant to the Settlement Agreements. (ECF No. 429 at 3-13; 

ECF No. 436 at 8). The City seeks clarification on three additional issues. First, the 

City seeks clarification on whether the Port District may maintain its cross-claims in 

relation to South Yard against non-settling parties. (ECF No. 436 at 8-9). Second, the 

City seeks clarification on whether claims related to discharges from the Municipal 

Separate Storm Water System ("MS4") system may be subject to a claims bar pursuant 

to Settlement 3. Id. at 9-10. Finally, the City seeks clarification on whether a claims 

bar can only cover "South Yard" claims pursuant to Settlement 3. Id. at 11. 

A. The City's Cost Recovery Claims 

The City has identified two cost recovery claims: its First Claim for Cost 

Recovery pursuant to CERCLA section 107(a) and its Seventh Claim for Cost 

Recovery pursuant to California Water Code section 13304. (ECFNo. 1. at31-33, 37­

38; ECF No. 393 at 21-22; ECF No. 439 at 3). The July 11, 2014 Order did not 

specifically address whether the City's cost recovery claims were subject to SDG&E 

and BAE's proposed bar order. 

With respect to Settlement 2, the Court found that ,r.the Navy's proposed bar 

order bars claims for 'contribution and indemnity' and not cost recovery claims. To 

the extent the City has cost recovery claims against the Navy that are not based on 

contribution or indemnity, such claims are not covered by the requested bar." Id. at 38­

39. Similarly, with respectto Settlement 3, the Court found that '~he parties' proposed 

order bars claims for 'contribution and indemnity' and not cost recovery." Id. at 47. 

I. Contentions of the Parties 

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The City contends that the July 11, 2014 order contains an oversight, by omitting 

discussion of the City's cost recovery claims as to Settlement 1, but discussing the 

City's cost recovery claims as to Settlements 2 and 3. (ECF No 436 at 8). The City 

also contends that the nature ofthe City's cost recovery claims should be determined 

by a motion seeking reversal of the Court's July 11, 2014 Order or a motion for 

summary judgment. (ECF No. 439 at 8-9). 

NASSCO and the Port District seek clarification because the Port District and 

NASSCO "specifically included a reference to 'cost recovery' in [their proposed bar 

order] to assure that all contribution claims under CERCLA for the parties' alleged 

common liability for the contamination and cleanup ofthe Site would be barred," but 

the Court found that "the parties' proposed order bars claims for 'contribution and 

indemnity' and not cost recovery." (ECF Nos. 429 at 7, 423 at 47). 

The Navy contends that the Court already found that the City has failed to 

identify any cost recovery claims. (ECF No. 50 at 5). The Navy also contends that the 

Navy will need to maintain its section 113(f) claims against the City ifthe City is able 

to maintain its cost-recovery claims, and "[k]eeping the Navy in this litigation on such 

a slim reed which would contradict the finding that the Navy has now settled its 

responsibility for the cleanup at the site." Id. at 6. SDG&E contends that the City's 

cost recovery claims should be barred as "artfully pled claims that amount to claims for 

contribution," just as the City's intentional tort claims were barred. (ECF No. 454 at 

6). SDG&E also contends that the City's cost recovery claims are barred as a matter 

oflaw because the City was required by the State to clean up the bay and is now merely 

seeking contributions from other responsible parties for their fair share ofthe clean-up 

costs. Id. at 8 (citing Solutia Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230 (lith Cir. 2012)). 

BAE contends that the City only sought damages for contribution in its initial 

disclosures and that "the City has not, and cannot, identify any category of 'cost 

recovery' damages that are separate and apart from the contribution it seeks." (ECF 

No. 457 at 5). 

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ii. Ruling of the Court 

As a potentially responsible party, the City may maintain a section 1 07( a) claim. 

U.S. v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 136 (2007) ("Consequently, the plain 

language of[42 U.S.C. § 9607] subparagraph (B) authorizes cost-recovery actions by 

any private party, including PRPs."); see also Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co. oiN. Cal., 

523 F.3d 924, 933 (9th Cir. 2008) ("We therefore conclude that Pinal Creek's holding 

that an action between PRPs is necessarily for contribution has been overruled."). In 

Atlantic Research, the Supreme Court explained that sections 107(a) and 113(f) 

"provide two 'clearly distinct' remedies." Atlantic Research, 551 U.S. at 138. "The 

statute authorizes a PRP to seek contribution [pursuant to section 113(f)] 'during or 

following' a suit under § 106 or § 107(a)." Id. "By contrast, § 107(a) permits 

recovery of cleanup costs but does not create a right to contribution. A private party 

may recover under § 107(a) without any establishment ofliability to a third party." Id. 

at 139. "[A] defendant PRP in such a § 107(a) suit could blunt any inequitable 

distribution of costs by filing a § 113(f) counterclaim." Id. at 140. 

The Supreme Court left open the question of whether a party may recover 

compelled clean-up costs pursuant to section 1 07(a) following suit under sections 106 

or 107(a). Id. at 139 n. 6 ("For instance, we recognize that a PRP may sustain expenses 

pursuant to a consent decree following a suit under § 106 or § 107 ... We do not 

decide whether these compelled costs of response are recoverable under § 113(f), § 

107(a), or both."); see also W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Intern., Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 

93 n.7 (2d Cir. 2009) ("As the Supreme Court suggested, it may well be that a party 

who sustains expenses pursuant to a consent decree following a suit under section 106 

or section 107(a) may have a cause ofaction under either section 113(f), section 107(a), 

or both .... We need not address this issue here as Grace did not enter into the consent 

decree following suit."). However, one court has found that plaintiffs may maintain 

cost recovery claims under section 107(a), even iftheir clean-up efforts were the result 

ofgovernmental oversight. Id. at 92 (holding that the plaintiff, who, pursuant to a New 

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York State Department of Environmental Conservation consent order, remediated a 

contaminated site could "pursue necessary response costs pursuant to section 107(a) 

even though its expenditures were made in compliance with a consent order"). 

Even assuming that the City's cost recovery claims deal with the same subject 

matter addressed by the Settlement Agreements, the Court cannot dismiss the City's 

cost recovery claims because section 6 ofthe UCF A applies to contribution claims, not 

cost recovery claims. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Michigan Consolo Gas Co., No. 08­

13503, F. Supp. 2d , 2014 WL 255968, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2014) 

(finding that a consent decree entered into between the United States and all plaintiffs 

was not grounds for dismissing a third-party complaint against the United States for 

cost recovery pursuant to section 1 07(a) because "[t]he inconvertible fact remains that 

[the third-party complaintant's] claim is not a contribution claim, but one for cost 

recovery" and its "alleged status as a PRP cannot bridge the gap"). To the extent 

Defendants contend that the City's cost recovery claims are, by their nature, claims for 

contribution, the Court cannot properly resolve this issue at this stage in the 

proceedings. See id. n. 9 ("This ruling is not on a motion for summary judgment and 

the Court will not become involved in the weighing of allegations regarding the 

necessity of these costs."); cf So!utia, 672 F.3d at 1235-36 (granting summary 

judgment on a section 107(a) claim where the plaintiffs brought 107(a) claims after 

entering into a consent decree with the Environmental Protection Agency under 

CERCLA). 

The Court concludes that a bar ofthe City's First and Seventh Claims for cost 

recovery pursuant to CERCLA section 107(a) and California Water Code section 

13304 is inappropriate at this stage in the proceedings. The Court makes no ruling on 

the merits of any cost recovery claim. 

B. The Port District's Counterclaims and Cross-claims 

In its oppositions to the Good Faith Settlement Motions, the City contended that 

the parties seeking bar orders were required to dismiss their own cross-claims and 

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counterclaims against the other parties. (ECF No. 383 at 17-18; ECF No. 389 at 22; 

ECF No. 392 at 18; ECF No. 393 at 19-20). The Court's July 11,2014 order did not 

address whether the parties seeking bar orders must dismiss any oftheir cross-claims 

or counterclaims. The Port District's Proposed Order Confirming Good Faith 

Settlement Between NASSCO and the Port District does not apply any bar to the Port 

District's cross-claims or counterclaims or agree to dismiss any claims. (ECF No. 431). 

The Port District maintains forty-two cross-claims and counterclaims in its Third 

Amended and Supplemental Cross-Claims of the San Diego Unified Port District. 

(ECF No. 308). 

I. Contentions of the Parties 

The City contends that it would be unfair to allow the Port District to pursue its 

cross-claims and counterclaims while benefitting from a bar ofclaims brought against 

the City. The City asserts that the Court appeared to concur with its position at oral 

argument on April 25, 2014. (ECF No. 436 at 8). The Port District contends that it 

would be unfair for it to have to dismiss its cross-claims and counterclaims to the 

extent they do not pertain to the "Covered Matters" under Settlement Agreement 3 

because the Port District is only entitled to claims bar protection for "Covered 

Matters." 

ii. Ruling of the Court 

The City has cited no authority for the proposition that a settling party must 

dismiss its own claims in order to benefit from a bar order. The Port District, as a 

"person liable" under section 6, is discharged from liability for contribution related to 

the "Covered Matters." Following Settlement 3, NASSCO's claims against other nonsettling parties are "reduced by the amount ofthe Port District's equitable share ofthe 

obligation, which will be determined by the Court when any remaining contribution 

claims are resolved pursuant to Section 2 of the UCFA." (ECF No. 423 at 47). 

However, section 6 does not require that a "person liable" dismiss its own claims. As 

with the City's cost recovery claims, the Court cannot resolve the merits of the Port 

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District's cross-claims and counterclaims at this stage in the proceedings. The Court 

concludes that the Port District is not required to dismiss its cross-claims or 

counterclaims in order to benefit from the bar order under section 6 ofthe UCF A. 

C. The Scope of Settlement 3 

In its opposition to the Port District and NASSCO's Good Faith Settlement 

Motion, the City contended that the Port District and NASSCO's potential liability 

regarding discharges to the MS4 system could not be the subject ofa bar order because 

such discharges were expressly excluded from the Settlement Agreement between the 

Port District and NASSCO under 'Excluded Matters.' (ECF No. 436 at 10). In the 

July 11, 2014 Order, the Court found that "NASSCO and the Port District have stated 

that claims related to the MS4 system are "Excluded Matters" and therefore not 

covered by the Settlement Agreement or the bar order. [Citation]. However, to the 

extent the City's MS4 claims against the Port District concern discharges that resulted 

in the contamination being remediated at the South Yard, they are covered by the 

Settlement Agreement, and thus covered by the bar order." (ECF No. 423 at 47). 

In the July 11,2014 Order, the Court also noted that "NASSCO and the Port 

District contend that they are 'not seeking any claims bar or dismissal as to the 'North 

Yard' ofthe Shipyard Sediment Site .... '" (ECF No. 423 at 46). 

I. Contentions of the Parties 

The City contends that discharges to the MS4 system are clearly defined by 

NASSCO and the Port District's Settlement Agreement as "Excluded Matters." (ECF 

No. 436 at 10). The City further contends that the Court adopted unsupported, 

qualifying language from NAS SCO and the Port District's reply briefin support ofits 

Good Faith Motion and permitted a bar to claims related to the MS4 system to the 

extent they resulted in "South Yard" contamination. The City also contends that 

specification is needed that a claims bar as to Settlement 3 cannot include liabilities as 

to the "North Yard." Id. at 11. The Port District and NASSCO contend that the City 

has not identified any MS4 claims, and to the extent any MS4 claim is related to "South 

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Yard" remediation, it is a "Covered Matter" and subject to a bar order. (ECF No. 455 

at 4). The Port District and NASSCO also contend that their proposed bar order 

already makes clear that it would not apply to the "North Yard." Id. at 9-10. 

ii. Ruling of the Court 

Settlement Agreement 3 provides that "[t]his agreement pertains only to the 

'South Yard' of the Shipyard Sediment Site." (ECF No. 370-3 at 15). "Covered 

Matters" under Settlement Agreement 3 includes "any and all costs incurred by [the 

Port District and NAS SCO] that have arisen out of, or that arise out of, or in connection 

with, the investigation and remediation required to comply with all legally enforceable 

requirements imposed by the Agency in connection with the implementation of the 

CAO ... but 'Covered Matters' shall not include, and shall expressly exclude all 

Excluded Matters (as defined in Section 1.8, below)." (ECF No. 370-3 at 18). 

"Excluded Matters" under Settlement Agreement 3 includes "any obligations under 

Order Directives, Section A, Paragraphs 3 through 5 ofthe CAO addressing Municipal 

Separate Storm Water System ('MS4') investigation and mitigation and any other 

obligations or liabilities associated with the MS4 or discharges from the MS4 .... " (ECF 

No. 370-3 at 18). Order Directives, Section A, Paragraphs 3 through 5 of the Final 

Cleanup and Abatement Order ("Final CAO") issued by the California Regional Water 

Quality Control Board ("Regional Board") provide MS4 Interim Mitigation Measures, 

an MS4 Investigation and Mitigation Plan, and an MS4 Investigation and Mitigation 

Implementation and Report, respectively, that the City and the Port District are required 

to implement. (ECF No. 367-3 at 29-30). 

Liabilities related to discharges from the MS4 system are expressly excluded 

from the Settlement Agreement between the Port District and NASSCO. Because the 

settlement between the Port District and NASSCO specifically excluded discharges 

into the MS4 system, claims related to discharges into the MS4 system cannot be the 

subject of a bar order. 

With respect to the ''North Yard," it is undisputed that Settlement 3 does not 

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cover liabilities related to the "North Yard." The terms ofSettlement 3 make this clear. 

The Court concludes that it is unnecessary for the Port District's proposed bar order to 

state that liability as to the "North Yard" is not barred. 

III. Objections to Proposed Bar Orders (ECF Nos. 434, 442) 

A. SDG&E's Proposed Bar Order (ECF No. 426) 

I. The Port District's Objections (ECF No. 434) 

Paragraph four of SDG&E's Proposed Bar Order provides: 

With respect to the claims ofeX.Prress contractual indemnity and ofcontract 

alleged by the San Diego Umfied Port District against SDG&E as the 

Twentietli and Twenty-First Claims for Relief in ilie Port District's Third 

Amended and Supplemental Cross Claims (ECF No. 308), the Port District 

has asserted claIms for independent damages for attorney's fees and 

investigative costs that may not be recoverable under a CERCLA 

contrioution claim. Such state law claims are not barred ~y this Order, but 

rather are dismissed withol!!prejudice. Bank One v. C. v.y Corp., et ai., 

No. 01-cv-01807-MSK-MJW, 2008 WL 501412, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 

2008). 

(ECF No. 426 at 3). The Port District objects to paragraph four ofSDG&E's proposed 

bar order. (ECF No. 434). The Port District objects on the ground that SDG&E 

improperly limits the scope of its Twentieth and Twenty-First Claims for Relief to 

"attorney's fees and investigative costs." (ECF No. 434 at 3-4). The Port District 

further objects on the ground that it requires the Port District to dismiss its Twentieth 

and Twenty-First Claims for Relief without prejudice. Id. at 4-5. 

In the July 11, 2014 Order, Court found that: 

rTlhe Port District's Twentieth and Twenty-First Claims for Relief in its 

ThudAmended Crossclaim asserts independent contract claims that cannot 

be covered by the bar order. The Port District has asserted claims for 

independent damages for attorney's fees and investigative costs incurred 

that mID' not be recoverable under a CERCLA contribution claim. The 

Court iinds that the Port District's claims for contractual indemnity and 

breach ofcontract are the type ofclaims that were intended to be excluded 

from the UCF A. The iniury alleged in the Port District's Twentieth and 

Twenty-First Claims fofReliefgoes beyond SDG&E's liability to the Port 

District for contamination costs, and these claims cannot be covered by the 

bar order. 

(ECF No. 423 at 31). The Court cited to the comments ofsection 1 ofthe UCF A, which 

state that "[a]n action for breach of warranty is held to sound sometimes in tort and 

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sometimes in contract. There is no intent to include in coverage ofthe Act actions that 

are fully contractual in their gravamen and in which the plaintiff is suing solely because 

he did not recover what he contracted to receive." U.C.F.A. § 1 cmt. 

The Court specifically found that the Port District's Twentieth and Twenty-First 

Claims for Relief could not be subject to a bar order because they were contractual in 

nature. A bar order cannot require the Port District to dismiss these claims. Nor can a 

bar order limit the scope of damages that the Port District may recover under these 

claims to "attorney's fees and investigative costs," which the Court only used as 

examples of the types of damages sought by the Port District in its Twentieth and 

Twenty-First Claims for Relief. 

The Port District's objections (ECF No. 434) to the SDG&E Proposed Bar Order 

(ECF No. 426) are sustained. 

ii. The City's Objections (ECF No. 437) 

Paragraph 3 ofSDG&E's proposed bar order provides: 

Pursuant to Section 6 ofthe UCFA, Section 877.6 ofthe California 

Code of Civil Procedure, and CERCLA section 1136 and subject only to 

Paragraph 4 below, any and all claims against SDG&E by BAE S;,stems 

and any other party to this action with respect to "Covered Matters under 

the Settlement A~eement (which expressly does not include any "Excluded Matters ') are hereb..J dismIssed, with prejudice and are 

hereafter and forever barred. "Covered Matters" under the Settlement 

Agreement, and references to the "Shwyard Sediment Area," and "Site" in 

the Settlement Agreement only reter and relate to areas within the 

"Shipyard Sediment Site" as defined in the "CAO." References to the 

"North Ship.yard" in the Settlement Agreement only refer and relate to the 

North or BAr: Shipyard that is within the ShipyarcfSediment Site. Claims 

that relate to any non-marine sediment (i.e.., landside) areas are outside the 

Shipyard Sediment Site and are not barrea by this Order. 

(ECF No. 426 at 2-3). The City objects to Paragraph 3 on the ground that it bars the 

City's cost recovery claims. (ECF No. 437 at 4). 

Paragraph 3 subjects the City's cost recovery claims to a claims bar. As discussed 

above, the City's cost recovery claims are not subject to any claims bar. The City'S 

objection to SDG&E's proposed bar order on this ground is sustained. 

B. The Navy's Proposed Bar Order (ECF No. 424) 

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Paragraph 3 ofthe Navy's proposed bar order provides: 

Pursuant to Section 6 ofthe UCF A, any and all claims for contribut!on 

or indemnity against the Navy, arisin&..out ofthe facts alleged in the ActIOn 

(except such claims which are_s.p~itically excluded by the terms of the 

Settlement Agreement), are BARRED. ALL CLAIMS oy any non-settling 

party against the Nary are BARRED re~ardless of whether they are 

brought I?ursuant to Section 107 ofCERCLA, Section 113 of CERCLA, 

or any other theory, as any claims against the Navy arising out of facts 

alleged in the Action are in the nature of contribution arising out of a 

common liability, whether framed in terms of federal or state statute or 

common law ana are, therefore, barred contribution claims. 

(ECF No. 424 at 2). Paragraph 5 ofthe Navy's proposed bar order provides that "[a]ll 

claims, cross-claims and counterclaims in the Action asserted by the non-settling parties 

against the Navy and asserted by the Navy against the non-settling parties are hereby 

dismissed with prejudice." Id. at 3. The City objects to these paragraphs on the ground 

that they would bar the City's cost recovery claims. (ECF No. 427 at 2-3). 

Paragraphs 3 and 5 subject the City's cost recovery claims to a claims bar. These 

paragraphs are inconsistent with the Court's July 11,2014 Order and this Order. The 

City's objections to the Navy's proposed bar order on this ground are sustained. 

C. The Port District's Proposed Bar Order (ECF No. 431) 

Paragraph 3 ofthe Port District's proposed bar order provides: 

Pursuant to Section 6 of the UCF A and Section 877.6 of the 

California Code ofCivil Procedure, and CERCLA section 113, any and all 

claims for contribution, cost recovery, or equitable indemnity against the 

Port District arising out of the facts alleged in the Complaint, 

counterclaims; and cross-claims in this Action (except such claims which 

are specifically excluded or reserved by the terms of the Settlement 

Agreement). regardless of when such claims are asserted or by whom, rera1i~to Covered Matters under the Settlement Agreement are hereby BARRED. Such claims by any non-settling Qarty are-barred regardless of 

whether they are brou~ht pursuant to CERCLA section 107, CERCLA 

section 113, or any otJier theory, as any claims against the Port District arisin~ out of the facts alleged in tliis Action are in the nature of 

contribution claims arising out of a common liability, whether framed in 

terms of federal or state statute or common law. 

(ECF No. 431 at 2-3). The City objects to paragraph 3 ofthe Port District's proposed 

bar order on the ground that it would bar the City's cost recovery claims as to the Port 

District. (ECF No. 442 at 3-4). The City further objects to paragraph 3 on the ground 

that it fails to specify that the claims bar only applies to claims related to the "South 

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Yard" and not the "North Yard." ld. 

Paragraph 5 ofthe Port District's proposed bar order provides that "[a]ll claims, 

cross-claims and counterclaims in the Action asserted by any other party in this action 

against the Port District relating to the Covered Matters in the Settlement Agreement 

are hereby dismissed with prejudice." (ECF No. 431 at 3). The City objects to 

paragraph 5 on the ground that it fails to acknowledge the cost recovery exception to the 

claims bar. Id. at 6. Finally, the City objects to the Port District's proposed bar order 

for failing to state that it will dismiss its contribution and indemnity "South Yard" crossclaims against non-settling parties. ld. at 6-7. 

Paragraphs 3 and 5 subject the City's cost recovery claims to a claims bar. These 

paragraphs are inconsistent with the Court's July 11, 2014 Order, which found that 

"[NASSCO and the Port District's] proposed order bars claims for 'contribution and 

indemnity' and not cost recovery." (ECF No. 423 at 47). 

Paragraphs 3 and 5 only bar claims related to "Covered Matters," and therefore 

do not apply to liabilities arising from contamination to the "North Yard." The Port 

District's proposed bar does not require further specification. 

As discussed above, the Port District is not required to dismiss its counterclaims 

or cross-claims in order to seek a bar order. 

The City's objections to the Port District's proposed bar order are sustained to the 

extent the Port District's proposed bar order bars the City's cost recovery claims. The 

City's objection to the Port District's proposed bar order for failing to specifically 

exclude ''North Yard" claims is overruled. The City's objection to the Port District's 

failure to agree to dismiss its counterclaims and cross-claims related to "Covered 

Matters" is overruled. 

IV. Conclusion 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, based on the Port District and NASSCO's 

Motion for Clarification (ECF No. 429) and the City's Motion for Clarification (ECF 

No. 436), the July 11,2014 Order is CLARIFIED as follows: 

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1. 	 The City's First and Seventh Claims for cost recovery are not 

subject to a bar order. 

2. 	 The Port District is not required to dismiss its counterclaims and 

cross-claims in order to benefit from a bar order. 

3. 	 Claims related to discharges into the MS4 system cannot be barred 

by the Port District's bar order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Moving Parties (SDG&E, BAE, NASSCO, 

the Navy, and the Port District) shall prepare proposed orders that are consistent with 

this Order and file them within fifteen (15) days from the date this Order is filed. The 

Moving Parties shall also submit the proposed orders in Word Perfect format to 

efile_hayes@casd.uscourts.gov. Any objections shall be filed within fifteen (15) days 

from the date( s) the proposed orders are filed. 

DATED: ~y 

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