Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00419/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00419-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RAY CERVANTEZ; ADELINE

ADRIAN; and ESTATE OF VALARIE

CERVANTEZ, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

GRAHAM COUNTY;

SHERIFF PRESTON J. ALLRED;

ROBERT PALMER;

ROBERT NAVARETTE; and

TIMOTHY GRAVER, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-10-0419-TUC-CKJ 

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants Graham County, Sheriff Allred, Robert

Palmer, Robert Navarette and Timothy Graver’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10]. On August

30, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Response to Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 16]. Defendants have

filed their reply. Subsequently, both parties supplemented their pleadings regarding recent

Arizona authority. See Defendants Graham County, Sheriff Allred, Robert Palmer, Robert

Navarette and Timothy Graver’s Supplement to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 25];

Plaintiffs’ Response to Proposed Supplement [Doc. 26].

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ claims arise from an incident on April 27, 2009. Decedent Valarie

Cervantez was a passenger in a vehicle driven by an unnamed male. Another male, Onecimo

Hernandez Arzola was the front seat passenger.

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Safford Police Officer Medlin initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle for an expired

registration. During that stop it was determined that Decedent had an outstanding warrant

for her arrest. A search of Decedent’s purse found methamphetamine paraphernalia and

Decedent admitted to having a methamphetamine pipe in her underwear.

Decedent was transported to the Safford Police Station and officers contacted the

Graham County Jail requesting a female detention officer to conduct a search of Decedent’s

person. Graham County Jail did not have a female officer available, so Pima City Police

Chief Diane Cauthen agreed to conduct the search. Chief Cauthen arrived at the Safford

Police Station at approximately 9:00 p.m. and completed a search of Decedent finding the

methamphetamine pipe.

Officer Medlin escorted Decedent to the Graham County Jail at approximately 9:41

p.m., and Graham County Detention Officer Elisa Rope conducted a pat down of Decedent

finding no further contraband. Detention Officer Robert Navarette was summoned to process

Decedent into the facility. Officer Medlin indicated that Decedent may have used drugs.

Navarette processed Decedent in the booking area. He spoke with Decedent’s mother

twice regarding bail. At approximately 10:00 p.m. Navarette moved Decedent into the

Attorney Visit Room because the jail did not have a normal cell for a female inmate. At

approximately 10:20 p.m. Jail Supervisor Sergeant Robert Palmer gave the order for jail

personnel to rotate assignments. Navarette moved to the Control Room, Officer Rope was

assigned as the jail’s Traffic Officer.

At approximately 11:20 Sergeant Palmer noticed Decedent standing with her back

against the wall. He asked Navarette what was wrong with her. Navarette responded that

she could be on something, so Palmer instructed him to keep an eye on her. At 11:35 p.m.,

Navarette recalled that he had promised Decedent a mattress and went to advise her that he

was going to get one. At this point, Decedent was on the ground sweating and could not

respond coherently to Navarette’s questioning. Navarette informed Palmer of the situation.

At 11:45 p.m., Palmer checked on Decedent and found her on the floor shaking

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uncontrollably. Palmer believed that she might calm down if given a little time and called

Detention Officer William Smith to assist Decedent in going outside to cool off and get fresh

air.

Decedent could not keep her balance and was incoherent when attempting to speak.

Navarette and Smith placed her in the jail’s restraint chair as a makeshift wheelchair and took

her outside. Smith went to inform Palmer about his observations and asked him to call

medical and find out from Medlin what Decedent might have taken. Smith asked Detention

Officer Shawn Spitzer to help. Smith checked Decedent for track marks, per Palmer’s

direction, but found none. At midnight, Medlin returned Palmer’s call and advised him that

Decedent had smoke methamphetamine. Palmer attempted to contact his commander,

Timothy Graver.

At 12:05 a.m. (April, 28, 2009), Palmer reached Jail Commander Tim Graver who

instructed Palmer to get Decedent to a hospital. Officer Smith was instructed to call for the

Jail’s Transportation Officer Gilbert Montez to transport Decedent to the hospital. At 12:12

a.m., Smith made the call to Montez. Palmer instructed Officer Rope to assist with Decedent.

At 12:20 a.m. Rope attempted to check Decedent’s pulse, but could not find one. Rope

radioed for help. At 12:21 a.m., Navarette called Graham County dispatch and asked them

to send an ambulance. Smith also attempted to find a pulse and could not. Officers began

CPR, paramedics arrived at 12:25 a.m. and took over emergency procedures. The ambulance

departed the jail at 12:48 a.m. and transported Decedent to the Mount Graham Regional

Medical Center where she was pronounced dead at 1:09 a.m. 

On April 29, 2009, an autopsy conducted at the Forensic Sciences Center in Tucson

ruled the cause of death as acute methamphetamine intoxication and certified it as an

accident. On August 24, 2009, DPS released its report regarding its investigation. Plaintiff

Ray Cervantez ordered a copy of the report in early September 2009, but did not hear back

from DPS until December 4, 2009. Plaintiff Cervantez received a copy of the report on

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December 26, 2009. Plaintiffs served notices of claim on Defendants Graham County and

Sheriff Preston J. Allred on April 8, 2010 and April 12, 2010 respectively.

On July 14, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint [Doc. 1] and additional attachments

thereto. Plaintiffs allege a Due Process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a failure to

adopt or implement intake screening practices to determine the medical needs of incoming

inmates and for the establishment of a policy that discourages and/or forbids detention

officers from seeking emergency medical assistance when an inmate is in distress. Plaintiffs

further allege individual responsibility for deliberate indifference by Defendant Allred in the

promulgation of these policies and practices and by Defendants Graver and Navarette for

their actions in treating Decedent on the night of her death. Plaintiffs allege a cause of action

for Negligence and/or Gross Negligence against Defendants Graham County and Allred, as

well as violation of the Arizona Constitution Art. 2 §§ 2 & 15 (due process and cruel and

unusual punishment). Finally, Plaintiffs allege violation of Arizona’s Wrongful Death statute

A.R.S. § 12-611 et seq. against Defendants Graham County and Allred.

On August 17, 2010, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10]. Defendants

seek dismissal on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiffs failure to comply with Arizona’s

Notice of Claim Statute; (2) Plaintiffs failure to timely file their Complaint for the state tort

claims against Defendants Graham County and Sheriff Allred; (3) Decedent’s estate is not

a proper beneficiary to a wrongful death claim pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-612; and (4) Plaintiffs

lack standing to bring a wrongful death claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint is to contain a "short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ.

P. While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, – U.S. –,

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129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Dismissal is

appropriate where a plaintiff has failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Rule

12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Further, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id. (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Notice of Claim

Defendants aver that Plaintiffs failed to timely file a notice of claim within the 180

days prescribed by statute. Defendants assert that the accrual date for Plaintiffs’ claims was

the date of Decedent’s death while in custody of the Graham County Sheriff, April 28, 2009.

The Arizona Revised Statutes provide that:

Persons who have claims against a public entity or a public employee shall file

claims with the person or persons authorized to accept service for the public

entity or public employee as set forth in the Arizona rules of civil procedure

within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues. The claim

shall contain facts sufficient to permit the public entity or public employee to

understand the basis upon which liability is claimed. The claim shall also

contain a specific amount for which the claim can be settled and the facts

supporting that amount. Any claim which is not filed within one hundred

eighty days after the cause of action accrues is barred and no action may be

maintained thereon.

A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Furthermore, “[f]or purposes of this section, a cause of action

accrues when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or

reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event instrumentality or condition which

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Defendants reliance on the wrongful death statute for accrual of the wrongful death claim

is misplaced. See A.R.S. § 12-611 (accrual of wrongful death action occurs when a wrongful act,

neglect or default causes a death). Furthermore, it does not change the analysis under A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(B).

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caused or contributed to the damage.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B).1 Arizona courts have

construed the section defining accrual as the codification of the common law discovery rule.

Thompson v. Pima County, 226 Ariz. 42, 243 P.3d 1024, 1028 (Ct. App. 2010); Little v.

Arizona, 225 Ariz. 466, 240 P.3d 861, 864 (Ct. App. 2010). “Under the discovery rule, . .

. a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence

should know the facts underlying the cause [of action].” Thompson, 226 Ariz. 42, 243 P.3d

at 1028 (alterations in original) (quoting Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313 ¶ 29, 955 P.2d 951, 960

(App. 1998) (citations omitted).

The Arizona Supreme Court has recognized that “it is not enough that a plaintiff

comprehends a ‘what’; there must also be reason to connect the ‘what’ to a particular ‘who’

in such a way that a reasonable person would be on notice to investigate whether the injury

might result from fault.” Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 316, 44 P.3d 990, 996 (2002). To

determine when a cause of action accrues requires an analysis of the elements of the claim.

Dube v. Likens, 216 Ariz. 406, 411, 167 P.3d 93, 98 (Ct. App. 2007). “[W]hen discovery

occurs and a cause of action accrues ‘are usually and necessarily question of fact for the

jury.’” Walk, 202 Ariz. at 316, 44 P.3d at 996.

At oral argument, defense counsel relied on Thompson, supra, for the proposition that

Plaintiffs cannot sit back and simply wait for some evidence of negligence before filing their

notice of claim. Plaintiffs assert that whether or not they were diligent in their investigation

is not appropriate for resolution by a motion to dismiss. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs.

As an initial matter, the Thompson court recognized “that whether a cause of action has

accrued is ‘usually and necessarily’ a question of fact for the jury.” 226 Ariz. 42, 243 P.3d

1024, 1028 (Ct. App. 2010). Moreover, the facts of Thompson are distinguishable from the

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instant case. There, plaintiff Taylor Thompson was involved in a single car accident. Id.,

243 P.3d at 1026. Later that day, “a deputy sheriff issued a traffic citation to Taylor at the

hospital and told her and Kathy [Taylor’s mom] that the condition of the road might have

contributed to the accident.” Id. “The next day, John [Taylor’s dad] and the family’s

attorney went to the accident scene to investigate and take photographs.” Id. The family

then waited until after the accident reconstructionist that they hired provided a report before

filing a notice of claim. Id. The Court found that “the information the Thompsons

possessed before February 1, 2007, constituted ‘a minimum requisite of knowledge sufficient

to identify that a wrong occurred and caused injury,’ and that it was attributable to a

particular entity or person.” Thompson, 226 Ariz. 42, 243 P.3d at 1028 (internal citations

omitted). Contrary to Thompson, in this case the autopsy ruled Decedent’s death an accident.

Plaintiffs did not know until DPS issued its investigative report that a wrong may have

occurred.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege a negligence claim, as well as a wrongful death claim

which also sounds in negligence. “To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must

prove four elements: (1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of

care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the

defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Gipson v. Kasey, 214

Ariz. 141, 143, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (2007). In the instant case, there is a factual dispute

regarding whether there was a breach of Defendants’ duty and whether any alleged breach

caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. Moreover, there is a factual dispute regarding when this cause of

action accrued. Defendants point to language in the Walk opinion to suggest that “one may

say as a matter of law that the patient is not only aware of the injury but also on notice to

investigate whether the injury is likely attributable to the fault of someone responsible for her

care.” Defs.’ Reply to Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. 20] at 3 (quoting Walk, 202 Ariz. at 314, 44

P.3d at 994). This section of the Walk opinion was discussing inter alia the court’s previous

opinion in Kowske v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 176 Ariz. 535, 863 P.2d 254 (Ct. App.

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Defendants appear to raise Fraudulent Concealment for the first time in their reply brief.

The general rule is that issues raised for the first time in reply are deemed waived. Northwest

Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equipment, 841 F.2d 918, (9th cir. 1988). To the extent the Court

deems fit to consider this issue, Defendants’ arguments must fail for the same reasons discussed

herein, whether or not there is fraudulent concealment (which directly impacts when accrual

occurred) is an issue of fact for the jury.

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1993). The Walk court, however, went on to state, “we disapprove Kowske to the extent that

it suggests accrual occurs in cases of this type before a plaintiff is put on reasonable notice

to investigate whether the injury is attributable to negligence.” Walk, 202 Ariz. at 316, 44

P.3d at 997. Again, at what point Plaintiffs were on reasonable notice to investigate is a

question of fact for the jury. As such, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10] regarding

the Notice of Claim will be denied.2

B. Statute of Limitations

Defendants aver that Plaintiffs failed to timely file their Complaint within the one year

statute of limitations prescribed by statute. Defendants assert that the accrual date for

Plaintiffs’ claims was the date of Decedent’s death while in custody of the Graham County

Sheriff, April 28, 2009.

The Arizona Revised Statutes provide that “[a]ll actions against any public entity or

public employee shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues and not

afterward.” A.R.S. § 12-821. “To trigger the statute of limitations something more is

required than the mere knowledge that one has suffered an adverse result while under the

care of a professional fiduciary.” Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 317, 44 P.3d 990, 997 (2002).

Arizona courts have concluded that “the legislature intended the same discovery rule to apply

to both the filing of the notice of claim and the filing of the complaint against public entities

or employees.” Dube v. Likens, 216 Ariz. 406, 422, 167 P.3d 93, 110 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing

Stulce v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District, 197 Ariz. 87, 3 P.3d

1007 (Ct. App. 1999)).

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In light of the questions of fact regarding the accrual of Plaintiffs’ claims, dismissal

would be inappropriate. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10] regarding

the Statute of Limitations will be denied.

C. Decedent’s Estate as Beneficiary to a Wrongful Death Claim

Defendants argue that Decedent’s estate is not a proper beneficiary of a wrongful

death claim. See A.R.S. § 12-612(A). Plaintiffs do not bring a claim for wrongful death on

behalf of the estate, but rather as the surviving parents of Decedent. As such, Defendants’

argument is without merit. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10] regarding

the Decedent’s estate as a beneficiary to a wrongful death claim will be denied.

D. Standing for § 1983 Claim

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

"[T]he question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide

the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95

S.Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975). Questions of standing incorporate both constitutional and

prudential aspects. See id. "The actual or threatened injury required by Art. III [of the

United States Constitution] may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the

invasion of which creates standing.'" Id. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206 (citing Linda R. S. v.

Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1148 n.3 (1973), Sierra Club v. Morton,

405 U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364 (1972)). Standing properly exists only if "the

constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as

granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief." Warth, 422 U.S. at 501,

95 S.Ct. at 2206.

Section 1983, 42 U.S.C. states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

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injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act

or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not

be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The Ninth Circuit recognizes that a parent has a constitutionally

protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in the companionship and society

of his or her child.” Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police et al., 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991)

(citations omitted); See also Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing the

appropriate standard to apply regarding a defendant’s behavior when analyzing an alleged

violation of a parent’s due process right to associate with his or her child).

Defendants rely on a recent Arizona Court of Appeals case to assert that Plaintiffs lack

standing to assert a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This assertion is incorrect. In

Braillard v. Maricopa Co. et al., 224 Ariz. 481, 232 P.3d 1263 (Ct. App. 2010), the Arizona

Court of Appeals suggests that because a Seventh Circuit opinion was overruled (by the

Seventh Circuit), that this somehow implicates the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case

which cited the Seventh Circuit case in an opinion recognizing a child’s right to assert a

substantive due process claim for loss of familial association. See Braillard, 224 Ariz. at

488, 232 P.3d at 1270. The Braillard court states that “[t]he Ninth Circuit has not revisited

this issue following the Seventh Circuit’s overruling of Bell. And, although we ‘may choose

to follow substantive decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,’ we are not persuaded

that doing so here would ‘further predictability and stability of the law.’” Braillard, 224 Ariz.

at 489, 232 P.3d at 1271 (citations omitted). Although the Braillard court is correct that the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not discussed the Seventh Circuit’s overruling of Bell,

it has reaffirmed that the rule in this circuit is that parents have a constitutionally protected

liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment which will support a cause of action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police et al., 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th

Cir. 1991); Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2008). This Court is bound by the

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determinations of the Ninth Circuit. As such, Plaintiffs have properly plead their causes of

action.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Graham County, Sheriff

Allred, Robert Palmer, Robert Navarette and Timothy Graver’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 10]

is DENIED.

DATED this 10th day of March, 2011.

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