Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01757/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01757-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES DEAN SOPHER,

Petitioner,

v.

JOE A. LIZARRAGA, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15cv1757-BEN (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ORDER 

DENYING REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING 

[ECF No. 1]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Roger T. 

Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. On August 6, 2015, Petitioner, 

James Dean Sopher, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, commenced 

these habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner 

challenges the validity of his state court conviction for committing a lewd and lascivious act 

upon a child under the age of fourteen by kissing Adrianna S., and the finding that he had 

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previously sustained a prior prison term conviction, a prior serious felony conviction, and a 

prior strike conviction for committing a lewd and lascivious act upon his minor daughter. See

Lodgment 3 at 7, 279, 282, 284. Respondent answered on December 10, 2015. ECF No. 8-1

(“Ans.”). Petitioner’s Traverse was filed on February 10, 2016. ECF No. 10 (“Trav.”).

This Court has considered the Petition, Answer, Traverse and all supporting documents 

filed by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that 

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion in People v. 

James Dean Sopher, Appeal No. D059363. See Lodgment 7. This Court presumes the state 

court’s factual determinations to be correct, absent clear and convincing evidence to the 

contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also

Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences 

properly drawn from such facts are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness).

Around August 2007, Desiree E., mother of Adrianna S., started dating 

Sopher. He told her he had previously been incarcerated for drug manufacturing 

without mentioning his past convictions for sexual misconduct with his daughter. 

Around October 27, 2007, when Adrianna was eight years old, she told Desiree 

that Sopher had kissed her. Adrianna later told Desiree that Sopher had rubbed 

his tongue in her mouth. Desiree asked Adrianna if Sopher had molested her in 

any other way, and Adrianna said no.

At trial, Adrianna testified that during the incident, while she and Sopher 

lay in a bed, he put his tongue in her mouth and kissed her. He also put his 

hands down her pants and touched her buttocks and vagina. He told her not to 

tell her mother about the incident.

Christina Schultz, a forensic interviewer of child abuse victims and medical 

social worker, interviewed Adrianna in December 2007, a videotape of which was 

played for the jury. Adrianna told Schultz: “I was sitting down watching TV and 

then [Sopher] took my body and then rolled me towards him and he trapped me 

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with his legs and then he hold his arms um[sic] and my mouth was shut he was 

kissing me and rubbing his tongue I tried to scream for my mom but my, but he 

had my mouth and I couldn’t like he wouldn’t let me go or anything.” Adrianna 

added that during the incident Sopher had put his hands under her underwear 

and touched her “private” in front, and her “behind.”

Over defense objection, the court granted the prosecution’s motion in 

limine to permit Sopher’s daughters, T.H. and T.S., and their mother, Jodi M., to 

testify under Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b) and 1108 about 

incidents of lewd and lascivious conduct on his then minor daughters, T.H. and 

T.S., leading to his guilty plea in 2000. 

T.S. testified that when she was ten years old, while at Sopher’s residence 

for the weekend, she awoke because he was licking and kissing her vagina. She 

was scared, and recounted the incident to T.H. Minutes afterwards, Sopher 

apologized to her and asked her not to tell anyone about the incident.

T.H. testified that when she was 13 years old, Sopher touched her breast. 

T.H. added that during that same weekend, T.S. woke her up, and “[T.S.] was 

shaking and crying and said that [Sopher] just came in the room and was 

touching her.” T.H. added, “[T.S.] told me that she was laying there, and she 

woke up to [Sopher] licking her.”

Jodi M. testified she picked up her daughters following their weekend at 

Sopher’s residence. T.S. was upset, teary-eyed and shaking, and said Sopher 

had touched her.

Defense Case

At trial, the prosecutor asked Sopher during cross-examination, “Did you 

kiss Adrianna?[”] He replied, “No, she kissed me. She blew into my mouth.”

Sopher stated Adrianna did that “in a playful manner.” The prosecutor asked 

him regarding his previous statement to a detective that during the incident 

Adrianna came up to him and stuck her tongue in his mouth. After his memory 

was refreshed with a copy of the statement, he said, “That’s correct, yeah.”

Sopher testified that in 2000, to avoid a life sentence, he pleaded guilty to

molesting T.H. under section 288, subdivision (a). He admitted his role in the 

incident: “[T]he thing that they accused me of was brushing against my 

daughter’s breast, and–which I did. I did do that, and I admitted that, but it was 

not done in a sexual context.” Sopher was imprisoned for over five years for 

that crime, and released on parole. But he did not tell Adrianna’s mother or her 

grandfather that he had molested any of his daughters.

Lodgment 7 at 2-5.

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On October 15, 2008, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a three-count 

information charging Petitioner with committing the following lewd or lascivious acts upon a 

child under the age of fourteen against Adrianna in violation of California (“Cal.”) Penal Code 

§ 288(a): kissing (count 1), vaginal touching (count 2), and buttocks touching (count 3). 

Lodgment 3 at 6-9. The information also alleged two alternative sentence enhancement 

provisions: (1) Petitioner was previously convicted of violating Cal. Penal Code § 288(a) and 

was subject to an alternative punishment of 25 years to life on counts 1–3 pursuant to Cal. 

Penal Code § 667.71, and (2) Petitioner’s previous conviction for violating Cal. Penal Code 

§ 288(a) rendered him subject to an alternative sentence under Cal. Penal Code § 667.61 of 

25 years to life on counts 1–3. Id. at 7-8. The information further alleged that Petitioner’s 

prior conviction for violating Cal. Penal Code § 288(a) was a qualifying serious felony prior 

conviction (Cal. Penal Code § 667(a)(1)), a violent felony prison prior (Cal. Penal Code 

§ 667.5(c)), and a three strikes prior conviction (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i) & 1170.12). Id.

at 8-9. 

Following a trial, on March 3, 2010, a jury found Petitioner guilty on count 1, but was 

unable to reach a verdict on counts 2 and 3. Id. at 279, 282. The court declared a mistrial as 

to counts 2 and 3. Id. at 279. The court subsequently found in a bifurcated proceeding that 

Petitioner qualified as a habitual sex offender within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code 

§ 667.71(a), that he had been previously convicted of Cal. Penal Code § 288(a) offense within

the meaning of Cal. Penal Code §§ 667.61 (a), (c), (d), and had a prior violent prison term 

conviction (Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(a)), a prior serious felony conviction (Cal. Penal Code 

§§ 667(a)(2), 1192.7(c)), and a prior strike conviction (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i), 668). 

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Id. at 284. On February 18, 2011, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifty-five years to life 

in state prison. Id. at 224-26, 293.

Direct Appeal

On January 30, 2012, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of 

Appeal arguing that (1) the trial court failed to investigate possible jury bias; (2) the trial court 

admitted irrelevant and prejudicial evidence regarding his parole status; (3) the trial court 

failed to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193 on the limited use of expert testimony on 

child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome; (4) the trial court erred in admitting prejudicial 

expert testimony; (5) the trial court erred in admitting prejudicial hearsay testimony regarding 

his prior sexual misconduct under Cal. Evidence Code § 1108; (6) the trial court erred in 

allowing the introduction of expert opinion testimony that he was a sexual predator; and 

(7) cumulative error. Lodgment 4 at 18-62. On February 21, 2013, the state appellate court 

rejected the claims. Lodgment 7. On March 8, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing in 

the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on March 14, 2013. Lodgments 8 & 9.

On April 2, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court 

alleging the same claims. Lodgment 10. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the 

petition without comment or citation to authority on June 12, 2013. Lodgment 11.

Collateral Challenge

On November 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the San Diego 

Superior Court claiming: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for: (a) permitting hearsay 

testimony and evidence of prior alleged sex acts, (b) failing to present an expert or rebut the

prosecution’s expert, (c) failing to develop any alternative defense theory other than 

Petitioner’s testimony, (d) failing to poll the jury, which would have shown juror misconduct or 

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jury manipulation, (e) failing to file a writ of mandate or prohibition relating to trial court’s 

pretrial rulings on the in limine motions, and (f) failing to object to jury instructions that 

lowered prosecution’s burden of proof; (2) judicial error and bias; (3) error in admitting prior 

sex acts evidence; and (4) unconstitutionally vague statutes. Lodgment 12. On January 29, 

2014, the court denied the petition. See Lodgment 13.

On January 7, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition in the California Court of Appeal alleging 

the following claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for (a) not retaining an expert 

witness to rebut the testimony of the prosecution’s expert on child abuse, (b) not investigating 

Adrianna’s father and stepmother to establish a motive for Adrianna to accuse Petitioner,

(c) not obtaining evidence that “three individual jurors were badgered and intimidated into 

reaching a guilty verdict,” and (d) failing to challenge the trial court’s decision to admit the 

videotaped interview of Adrianna as part of the prosecution’s case on the ground the 

admission violated Petitioner’s right to confront adverse witnesses under Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (“Crawford”); (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

for (a) not challenging the admission of the videotaped interview of Adrianna as erroneous 

under Crawford, (b) not challenging Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1108 & 1360 as unconstitutionally 

vague, and (c) not pursuing a claim of judicial bias based on the trial court’s alleged Crawford

error; (3) judicial bias and prejudice; and (4) unconstitutionally vague statutes (Cal. Evid. 

Code §§ 1108 & 1360). See Lodgment 14. On January 26, 2015, the appellate court denied 

the petition. Lodgment 15.

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On April 3, 2015, Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the California Court of 

Appeal1 alleging the same claims. Lodgment 16. The appellate court denied the petition as 

repetitive and successive because there was no change in facts or law. Lodgment 18.

On April 30, 2015, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the Supreme Court of 

California raising the same claims that he had raised in in the California Court of Appeal. 

Lodgment 19. On July 15, 2015, the Supreme Court of California summarily denied the

petition. Lodgment 20.

On August 6, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant petition asserting the following claims: 

(1) judicial bias and prejudice; (2) unconstitutionally vague statutes; (3) ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel for: (a) not retaining an expert witness, (b) not investigating Adrianna’s father 

and stepmother to establish a motive for Adrianna to accuse Petitioner, (c) not obtaining 

evidence that “three individual jurors were badgered and intimidated into reaching a guilty 

verdict,” and (d) failing to challenge the trial court’s decision to admit the videotaped interview 

of Adrianna as part of the prosecution’s case on the ground the admission violated Petitioner’s

right to confront adverse witnesses under Crawford; and (4) ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel for (a) not challenging the admission of the videotaped interview of Adrianna as 

erroneous under Crawford, (b) not challenging Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1108 & 1360 as 

unconstitutionally vague, and (c) not pursuing a claim of judicial bias based on the trial court’s 

alleged Crawford error. Pet.

 

1 The Court notes that although the cover sheet for the petition lists the California 

Supreme Court, the filing date corresponds to the filing date for Petitioner’s habeas petition in 

the California Court of Appeal. See Lodgments 16–18.

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SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of 

review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is 

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C § 2254(d), as 

amended by AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In making this determination, a court may consider a lower court’s 

analysis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991) (authorizing a reviewing court to 

look through to the last reasoned state court decision). Summary denials are presumed to 

constitute adjudications on the merits unless “there is reason to think some other explanation 

for the state court’s decision is more likely.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99-100

(2011).

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A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court: 

(1) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases”; or 

(2) “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 

Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] 

precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).

A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal 

law where the state court “‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] 

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). “[A] federal 

habeas court may not issue [a] writ simply because that court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 

75-76 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Clearly established federal law “refers 

to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of 

the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

If the state court provided no explanation of its reasoning, “a habeas court must 

determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state 

court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree 

that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the 

Supreme Court].” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. In other words, a federal court may not grant 

habeas relief if any fairminded jurist could find the state court’s ruling consistent with relevant 

Supreme Court precedent.

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 Finally, habeas relief also is available if the state court’s adjudication of a claim “resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Wood v. Allen,

558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010). A state court’s decision will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless this Court finds that the state court’s factual determinations were objectively 

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in state court. See Miller–El, 537 U.S. at 340; 

see also Rice v. Collins, 54h6 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (the fact that “[r]easonable minds 

reviewing the record might disagree” does not render a decision objectively unreasonable). 

This Court will presume that the state court’s factual findings are correct, and Petitioner may 

overcome that presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007).

DISCUSSION

I. Judicial Bias and Prejudice

Petitioner argues that the trial judge displayed judicial “bias and prejudice” by 

improperly admitting the videotaped interview of Adrianna in violation of Crawford, 541 U.S. 

36. Pet. at 20-24; Trav. at 3-5. Petitioner acknowledges that incorrect judicial decisions rarely 

establish bias but asserts that in this case the trial court acted in an “‘extreme’ manner” by

making an “independent determination of reliability of the alleged victim’s testimony, a 

function which belonged exclusively to [t]he jury,” and allowing the prosecution to play the 

videotaped interview of the alleged victim.2 Trav. at 4. Petitioner further asserts that the trial 

 

2 The Court notes that to the extent Petitioner is arguing that the trial court made improper 

evidentiary findings in violation of state law, such claim cannot form the basis for federal 

habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 

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court “compounded [the] error” by admonishing the jury regarding credibility determinations. 

Pet. at 20-21 (citing id., Exh. K at 539-41). Finally, Petitioner claims that the alleged error was 

not harmless because the improperly introduced videotaped interview permitted the jurors to 

believe that Petitioner was a “dangerous child molester,” as evidenced by the jury’s inquiry 

during deliberations as to whether Petitioner was a registered sex offender. See Trav. at 4-5.

Respondent claims that Petitioner has not established that the trial court was biased. 

Ans. at 19-20. Respondent maintains that an adverse ruling against Petitioner in admitting

Adrianna’s out-of-court statement and then instructing the jury about making credibility 

determinations does not amount to a constitutional violation. Id. at 20. Respondent further 

claims that Petitioner fails to demonstrate any judicial “misconduct or bias that was so 

prejudicial that it deprived defendant of a fair, as opposed to a perfect trial.” Id.

Petitioner raised this claim in the habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court. 

Lodgment 19 at 5-9. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition without 

comment or citation to authority on July 15, 2015. Lodgment 20. Because the California 

Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition, the Court must “look through” the silent 

denial to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804 n.3. The California 

Court of Appeal found that Petitioner’s claim lacked merit, reasoning as follows:

Adverse rulings, even if erroneous, do not establish judicial bias. (People v. 

Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1110.) Here, the trial court’s ruling on the 

admissibility of the videotaped interview of the victim was not erroneous under 

Crawford because the victim testified at trial. “[W]hen the declarant appears for 

cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all 

on the use of his prior testimonial statements. . . . The Clause does not bar 

admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or 

explain it.” (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9).

 

422, 438 n.6 (1983) (noting that the Due Process Clause does not permit federal courts “to 

engage in a finely-tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules”). 

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Lodgment 15 at 2. 

“The right to a fair trial is a ‘basic requirement of due process’ and includes the right to 

an unbiased judge.” Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 287 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing In re Murchison,

349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). To prove judicial bias, a petitioner must overcome the

presumption of honesty and integrity in favor of the judge. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 

(1975) (there is a “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators”); 

Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 924 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 

511, 519 (9th Cir. 2010)) (petitioner is required to overcome a “strong presumption that a 

judge is not biased or prejudiced.”). “Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid 

basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); 

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). Moreover, on federal habeas 

review, a state court’s finding of the absence of bias is entitled to a presumption of 

correctness. Sivak, 658 F.3d at 924; Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The court “must ask whether the state trial judge’s behavior rendered the trial so 

fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the United States Constitution.”

Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995).

Petitioner alleges that “the admission of th[e] videotaped interview immediately after 

direct testimony, violat[es] . . . the Confrontation [C]lause.” Pet. at 24. The United States 

Supreme Court has concluded that “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, 

the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial 

statements.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 

(1970)). The rationale behind this holding is that “the declarant is present at trial to defend or 

explain [her prior out-of-court statement].” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. In this case, 

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Adrianna testified at trial [Lodgment 1 at 434-49] and was cross-examined [id. at 449-57]. 

Accordingly, there are “no constraints at all on the use of [Adrianna’s] prior testimonial 

statements,” including the playing of the videotaped interview, and the trial judge did not err 

in allowing the videotape to be played. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. Petitioner’s 

disagreement with the trial judge’s ruling is insufficient to demonstrate bias. See Liteky, 510 

U.S. at 555; Poland, 117 F.3d at 1103.

Petitioner further claims that the trial court “compounded it[]s error” by “giving a 

special, lengthy admonishment to the jury which specifically addressed the question of 

credibility.” Pet. at 20-21 (citing id., Exh. K at 115-17). The trial judge stated the following 

during the jury “admonishment” challenged by Petitioner:

All right. Ladies and gentlemen, just a few brief words before we adjourn 

for the day. I think maybe what you’ve experienced today underscores what I 

attempted to impress upon you during the selection process, that you and you 

alone are the judges of the facts, and that a very important corollary necessar[]y

to deciding the facts is to decide issue of credibility and believability. And those 

issues and determinations rest solely upon your shoulders as members of the 

jury. And such credibility determinations are important in every case, not just 

this one. Although certainly, they’re important in this case as well.

But I sometimes talk about the strengths of our jury system, from my 

experience and perspective. And it’s always been my very strong belief that one 

of the core strengths of our jury system is that it reposes decisions in a case 

such as this regarding facts and credibility, not upon the narrow shoulders of a 

single judge, but rather on the collective shoulders of 12 members drawn from a 

cross section of our community.

And to just underscore how important common sense and human 

experience is to your decision-making tasks and the task to which you’re put in 

terms of deciding credibility, sometimes I try to give a very poor example of that 

by concluding, for the sake of this discussion, that no one on the jury is over 30 

years of age. And if anyone is under 30, well, forgive me for making you older 

than you are.

But what I mean to say by that is that if, for this example, you take each 

30 per juror and apply a multiple of 12, you obviously end up, by my poor 

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arithmetic, with 360 years of human experience and common sense being 

brought to bear upon the issues in this case.

And I have no hesitation in saying that it’s been my experience that jurors 

uniformly are up to the task of making important decisions like you’re being 

called upon to make in this case. And I’m confident that you’ll make those 

decisions appropriately after an objective analysis of the evidence and applying 

the law as I’ll give it to you much more comprehensively at the conclusion of the 

evidence.

So we’re going to adjourn until tomorrow morning, and what are we going 

to do? Well, maybe watch a little figure skating, among other things, but 

whatever we do, it’s not going to have any connection to the subject matter of 

this case. You’re going to remember the admonitions, and really, after a day like 

this, you ought to make a conscious effort to disengage yourself from these 

proceedings. Okay? Don’t–don’t let it weigh on you to the extent that you can 

avoid your mind wandering back to this courtroom. We’ll pick it up tomorrow 

morning, hopefully, refreshed.

Lodgment 1 at 539-40; see also Pet., Exh. K at 115-16. Petitioner does not explain why the 

trial judge’s admonishment regarding credibility determinations evidenced the judge’s bias or 

prejudice. See Pet., Trav. Having reviewed the above admonishment, the Court finds 

Petitioner’s argument to be without merit.

Accordingly, Adrianna’s videotaped interview was properly admitted, and even if it had 

been erroneously admitted, the admission of the challenged evidence did not establish a 

biased judge, create a fundamentally unfair trial, nor violate Petitioner’s due process rights. 

See Duckett, 67 F.3d at 740. Petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption of honesty 

and integrity in favor of the trial judge. See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47; Sivak, 658 F.3d at 924. 

The Court concludes that the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to nor 

involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the 

United States Supreme Court, nor was an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 

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U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s first claim for relief be 

DENIED. 

II. Constitutionality of Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1108 and 1360 

Petitioner argues that Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1108(a) and 1360(a) are unconstitutionally 

vague, violate due process, and are therefore void. See Pet. at 24-26; Trav. at 5-6. In 

support, Petitioner asserts that the U.S. Supreme Court has not specifically limited the voidfor-vagueness challenge to only criminal statutes. See Pet. at 24; Trav. at 6. Petitioner 

contends that the wording of the challenged statutes is broad and does not put a person of 

common intelligence on “notice of what is prohibited,”

3 and that the statutes “lack a set 

standard of application,” leading to their enforcement in a discriminatory manner. See Pet. at 

24, 26; Trav. at 5. Finally, Petitioner maintains that the challenged statutes apply to a 

particular type or class of crimes and permit convictions of those crimes based on evidence

that is not admissible in any other type of criminal trial. Pet. at 26. 

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim lacks merit because it is not based on a 

definition of a crime, but rather on the admissibility of the evidence. Ans. at 21. Respondent 

argues that the challenged statutes do not set out any crime or elements of a crime, and do 

not “forbid nor require the doing of an act in terms so vague that a person of common 

intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning and differ as to it application.” Id. at 22

 

3 Petitioner asserts that Cal. Evid. Code § 1108(a) does not put him on notice that

“accusations, which have not been previously plead and proven in a court of law, may serve 

as evidence against him,” and that Cal. Evid. Code § 1360(a) does not put him on notice that 

the prosecution may admit the testifying child’s statements as “substantial evidence” in their 

case-in-chief. Pet. at 25 (emphasis in original), 26.

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(citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984)). Respondent thus asserts that the 

California Court of Appeal properly rejected the claim. Id.

A law is unconstitutionally vague if it either “fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will 

enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits” or “authorize[s] and even 

encourage[s] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 

41, 56 (1999); see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-03 (2010); Kolender v. 

Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). “Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to 

citizens and arbitrary enforcement, . . . the more important aspect of [the] vagueness doctrine 

is not actual notice, but . . . the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to 

govern law enforcement.” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Federal courts assessing whether a state statute is unconstitutionally vague are 

required to look to the plain language of the statute and consider state courts’ construction of 

the statute. See id. at 355; Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 941-42 (9th 

Cir. 1997). Federal courts must accept a narrow construction to uphold the constitutionality of 

a state statute if the statute’s language is readily susceptible to it. See Nunez by Nunez, 114 

F.3d at 942. For vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment 

freedoms, a court should examine the statute “in the light of the facts of the case at hand.” 

United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

Petitioner raised this claim in the petition for review filed in the California Supreme 

Court. Lodgment 19 at 9-11. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition 

without comment or citation to authority. Lodgment 20. Because the California Supreme 

Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition, the Court must “look through” the silent denial to 

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the California Court of Appeal’s opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804 n.3. The California Court of 

Appeal upheld the constitutionality of Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1108 and 1360, reasoning as follows: 

[Petitioner] contends statutes authorizing admission of the interview (Evid. Code, 

§ 1360) and evidence of [Petitioner’s] prior sex crimes (id., § 1108) are “void for 

vagueness.”

. . .

The Evidence Code provisions are not susceptible to [Petitioner]’s void-for 

vagueness challenge because they prescribe no conduct. Such a challenge lies 

only when a statute “‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so 

vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 

meaning and differ as to its application.’” Roberts v. U.S. Joycees (1984) 468 

U.S. 609, 629.

Lodgment 15 at 1-2. 

The state appellate court reasonably determined that Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1108 and 1360 

are not unconstitutionally vague. See id. Cal. Evid. Code § 1108(a) provides that “[i]n a 

criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the 

defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by 

Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” The challenged 

statute uses straightforward language and references other California Evidence Code sections, 

which define key terms employed in section 1108(a). Specifically, Cal. Evid. Code § 1101 sets 

forth the general rule that propensity evidence is not admissible to prove a person’s conduct 

on a specific occasion. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1108. Further, Cal. Evid. Code § 352, which is 

incorporated into Cal. Evid. Code § 1108(a), permits the trial court to exclude otherwise 

admissible evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that 

its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger 

of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Cal. Evid. Code § 352. 

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As such, persons of ordinary intelligence who are accused of a sexual offense would 

understand that Cal. Evid. Code § 1108(a) is an exception to the general rule that propensity 

evidence is not admissible [see Cal. Evid. Code § 1101], and that the evidence of their 

commission of another sexual offense may be offered by prosecution and admitted, subject to 

the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence’s relevance and prejudicial effect. See Johnson v. 

Paramo, 2015 WL 1439969, at *21 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2015) (stating that Cal. Evid. Code 

§ 1108(a) is an exception to the general rule that propensity evidence is not admissible); 

Kolender 461 U.S. at 357.

Further, the language of the challenged Cal. Evid. Code § 1360 provides the following:

(a) In a criminal prosecution where the victim is a minor, a statement made by

the victim when under the age of 12 describing any act of child abuse or neglect 

performed with or on the child by another, or describing any attempted act of 

child abuse or neglect with or on the child by another, is not made inadmissible 

by the hearsay rule if all of the following apply:

(1) The statement is not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule.

(2) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, 

that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide 

sufficient indicia of reliability.

(3) The child either:

(A) Testifies at the proceedings.

(B) Is unavailable as a witness, in which case the statement may be 

admitted only if there is evidence of the child abuse or neglect that 

corroborates the statement made by the child.

(b) A statement may not be admitted under this section unless the proponent of

the statement makes known to the adverse party the intention to offer the 

statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the 

proceedings in order to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to 

prepare to meet the statement.

(c) For purposes of this section, “child abuse” means an act proscribed by 

Section 273a, 273d, or 288.5 of the Penal Code, or any of the acts described in 

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Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, and “child neglect” means any of the acts 

described in Section 11165.2 of the Penal Code.

Id. The language of the statute is clear and the relevant portion of the statute puts an 

ordinary person on notice that a statement made by a child victim describing an act of abuse 

may be admitted if the statement is sufficiently reliable and the child testifies at the 

proceedings. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.

Due process requires that the challenged statute not only afford notice, but also provide 

standards for its application and adjudication to preclude arbitrary and discriminatory 

enforcement of the statute. See id. at 358 (stating that “[w]here the legislature fails to 

provide . . . minimal guidelines, a . . . statute may permit ‘a standardless sweep [that] allows 

policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.’”). The Kolender

Court construed the challenged statute to require people accused of loitering to provide 

“credible and reliable” identification. Id. at 358, 361. The Court reasoned that the lack of any 

standard for determining how a suspect should meet the requirement vested “virtually 

complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect ha[d] satisfied 

the statute,” and found that the statute at issue was unconstitutionally vague. Id. Unlike the 

statute in Kolender, Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1108 and 1360 do not vest “virtually complete

discretion” in law enforcement officials, because the statutes supply sufficient guidance to 

attorneys, judges and juries charged with interpreting the statute, and thereby minimize the 

danger of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. See id. at 358. 

In light of the above, the Court concludes that Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1108 and 1360 are 

not unconstitutionally vague, and that the state appellate court’s decision upholding the 

constitutionality of the statutes at issue was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

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clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Numerous courts have reached the 

same conclusion. See, e.g., Renella v. Adams, 2007 WL 963969 at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 

2007) (noting that “the Supreme Court has never held that the admission of evidence of prior 

crimes violates due process,” and rejecting petitioner’s constitutional challenge to Cal. Evid. 

Code § 1108); Johnson v. Paramo, 2015 WL 1439969, at *20-22 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2015) 

(rejecting petitioner’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated when trial court 

admitted evidence of his prior uncharged sexual offense pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 1108, 

and rejecting petitioner’s constitutional challenge to Cal. Evid. Code § 1108); see also Mejia v. 

Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that the admission 

of prior sexual offense evidence violated his constitutional rights); Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 

985, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2003) (admission of evidence under Cal. Evid. Code § 1360 did not 

violate defendant’s due process rights); Cunningham v. Grounds, 2013 WL 2153283, at *4

(N.D. Cal. May 16, 2013) (same). The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s 

second claim for relief be DENIED. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for (a) not 

retaining an expert witness, (b) not investigating Adrianna’s father and stepmother to establish 

a motive for Adrianna to accuse Petitioner, (c) not obtaining evidence that “three individual 

jurors were badgered and intimidated into reaching a guilty verdict,” and (d) failing to 

challenge the trial court’s decision to admit the videotaped interview of Adrianna as part of the 

prosecution’s case on the ground the admission violated Petitioner’s right to confront adverse 

witnesses under Crawford. Pet. at 26-42. Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claim is without merit. Ans. at 22-29.

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Under clearly established federal law, “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of 

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of 

the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To prove ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that 

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. The proper measure of 

attorney performance is “simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 

688. “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance;” that is, the defendant must overcome the 

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound 

trial strategy. Id. at 689-90. To determine whether errors of counsel prejudiced the defense, 

a court “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury” and consider 

whether “the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would 

reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.” Id. at 696. The Court need not 

address both the deficiency prong and the prejudice prong if the defendant fails to make a 

sufficient showing of either one. Id. at 697. 

Petitioner raised his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in the petition for review 

filed in the California Supreme Court. Lodgment 19 at 11-30. Because the California Supreme 

Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition [Lodgment 20], the Court must “look through” the 

silent denial to the California Court of Appeal’s opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804 n.3. The 

California Court of Appeal considered Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim

and denied it as follows:

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[Petitioner] claims his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective 

assistance by: (1) not retaining an expert witness to rebut the testimony of the 

prosecution’s expert on child abuse; (2) not investigating the victim’s father and 

stepmother to establish a motive for the victim to accuse Sopher; (3) not 

obtaining evidence that “three individual jurors were badgered and intimidated 

into reaching a guilty verdict”; and (4) not seeking writ review of the admission 

of a videotaped interview of the victim as part of the prosecution’s case on 

the ground the admission violated Sopher’s right to confront adverse witnesses 

under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford). 

. . .

To the extent Sopher faults trial . . . counsel for not pursuing . . . claims 

of Crawford error, his ineffective assistance claims fail because counsel have no 

duty to make meritless arguments . . . merely to create a record impregnable to 

assault for claimed inadequacy of counsel.” (People v. Constancio (1974) 42 

Cal.App.3d 533, 546.) Finally, Sopher’s claims [that] trial counsel was ineffective 

for not retaining an expert witness, not investigating the victim’s father and 

stepmother to uncover a motive for the victim’s accusations against Sopher, and 

not obtaining evidence of juror intimidation fail to state a prima facie case. The 

petitioner “‘must establish the nature and relevance of the evidence that counsel 

failed to present or discover.’” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 766.) Sopher’s 

conclusory allegations of counsel’s deficiencies, without any factual explanation 

of what evidence adequate representation would have discovered or how 

that evidence would have led to a better outcome at trial, are insufficient. 

(People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.).

Lodgment 15 at 1-2. Because Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim consists 

of several sub-claims, the Court will address each sub-claim separately below.

(a) Failure to Retain Expert Witness 

Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not retain an 

expert witness. See Pet. at 27-28, 32-35; Trav. at 8. Specifically, Petitioner faults his trial 

counsel for not retaining an expert witness to assist him in preparing a defense and to rebut 

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the testimony of the prosecution’s expert on child abuse, Christina Schultz.

4

 Pet. at 27-28, 34.

Petitioner further maintains that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies 

because he was “denied a potentially meritorious defense.” Id. at 40.

Respondent argues that Petitioner has not offered a supporting declaration from his 

trial counsel and does not specify what experts should have been secured, whether there was

any expert who would have testified for him, whether such testimony would have been

admissible, or how the outcome of the trial would have been different. Ans. at 24, 26-27. 

Respondent thus claims that Petitioner’s assertions are speculative and insufficient to rebut the 

strong presumption that his trial consel’s decision not to call an expert witness fell within the 

wide range of reasonably competent professional assistance. Id. at 24, 26.

Christina Schultz, a forensic interviewer for the child abuse program at PalomarPomerado Health, interviewed Adrianna on December 12, 2007, and testified during 

Petitioner’s trial. Lodgment 1 at 488-538. Ms. Schultz testified that she has a master’s degree 

in social work, has attended numerous relevant trainings and seminars, and has worked in the 

child abuse program for almost six years, conducting approximately 450 interviews. Id. at 

489-91. Ms. Schultz explained that she functions as a neutral fact-finder during the interviews

and she described how she prepared for and conducted the interview of Adrianna. Id. at 489-

94. After the video-taped interview was played for the jury [id. at 494-96], Ms. Schultz 

testified that during the interview, Adrianna used an anatomical female drawing to show that

Petitioner touched her on the vaginal and buttocks areas. Id. at 499. Ms. Schultz further 

 

4 Petitioner also asserts that his trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation into 

Ms. Schultz’s qualifications [Pet. at 33-34; Trav. at 8], and to object to the prosecution’s lack 

of proper foundation for Ms. Schultz’s testimony [Pet. at 32-33; Trav. at 8].

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stated that the victims of abuse commonly make partial disclosures and disclose molestation 

acts in stages, and that some children may be inconsistent in their reports. Id. at 500, 506. 

Ms. Schultz testified that some children may continue to be around a perpetrator after the 

incident has occurred. Id. at 501. Ms. Schultz also testified that perpetrators may engage in 

“grooming,” which involves building a trusting relationship first and then engaging in subtle 

forms of abuse in order to work up to more egregious sexual acts.5 Id. at 503-05. 

Trial counsel conducted an extensive and lengthy cross-examination of Ms. Schultz, 

challenging her qualifications, experience, credibility, and impartiality. Id. at 507-32; 534-35. 

Trial counsel elicited an admission from Ms. Schultz that this was Ms. Schulz’s “first job as a 

forensic interviewer” and asked a number of questions designed to challenge her assertion 

that she conducted a neutral interview. Id. at 508-12. Trial counsel also asked questions 

suggesting that Adrianna had not told the truth and that another individual, such as Adrianna’s 

mother, may have caused or contributed to the statements made by Adrianna against 

Petitioner. Id. at 510-32. Finally, trial counsel asked questions that undermined Ms. Schultz’s

opinion that it was normal for children to disclose information about their abuse in stages. Id. 

To support his claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that Ms. 

Schultz was not qualified to testify as an expert, Petitioner provides a declaration from William 

Allen who opines that trial counsel “did not perform his due diligence with regard to 

 

5 Specifically, Ms. Schultz testified that “grooming” is a “dynamic between a perpetrator and a 

victim where the perpetrator may engage in a–often a trusting relationship with a child or 

something in secrecy. And it could be initially they do subtle things, subtle forms of touching.” 

Id. at 503. She also stated that “grooming” is “a process of building [a] relationship and 

possibly beginning with more subtle forms of abuse, subtle forms of touching, kissing, and 

then possibly leading to more egregious acts.” Id. at 504-05.

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investigating this case” and that Ms. Schultz “did not have the necessary credentials to testify 

as an expert witness.” See Pet., Exh. L at 119-20. Mr. Allen states that he has “thirty (30) 

years [of] experience in the criminal writs and appeals field” assisting “approximately nine 

hundred inmates,” and that he has “had the pleasure of receiving compliments from attorneys 

of [his] work.” Id. at 120. Mr. Allen does not provide any details regarding his legal 

education, training, or experience. Id. at 119-20; see also id. at 81 (Petitioner’s declaration 

contains numerous statements attributed to Petitioner’s “paralegal” that appear to refer to Mr. 

Allen). Mr. Allen also does not provide any facts for his opinions, other than to state that they 

were based on his review of the record and of Ms. Schultz’s testimony. Id. at 120. 

Respondent maintains that because Mr. Allen is neither an attorney nor a recognized expert on 

ineffective assistance of counsel, his declaration is insufficient to support Petitioner’s claim. 

Ans. at 25. The Court agrees with Respondent’s contention that Mr. Allen’s declaration is not 

sufficient to establish that Ms. Schultz was not qualified to testify as an expert or to

substantiate Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Although Petitioner claims that counsel should have retained an expert to rebut Ms. 

Schultz’s testimony, Petitioner does not describe the specific facts that the expert would have 

rebutted or disputed, nor does he identify the expert who would have provided such 

testimony. As summarized above, trial counsel engaged in lengthy and directed crossexamination designed to do precisely what Petitioner is requesting—undermine the validity of

Ms. Schultz’s interview and opinions and suggest that Adrianna’s statements regarding the 

sexual abuse were not truthful. The decision to use cross-examination, rather than a 

competing expert to challenge an expert opinion, is a valid trial tactic. See Ward v. Beard, 

2013 WL 5913816, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013) (citing United States v. Gamba, 541 F.3d 

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895, 900 (9th Cir. 2008); Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2003); Gustave v. United 

States, 627 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1980)) (“A defense attorney’s decisions regarding the 

manner and scope of cross-examination and what use to make of potential impeachment 

evidence are matters of trial tactics left to the attorney’s sound professional judgment.”). A 

federal habeas court’s review of counsel’s tactical decisions “must be highly deferential” and 

accorded “‘a strong presumption’ of validity, regardless of whether [the court] agree[s] with 

it.” United States v. Quintero–Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689). 

Petitioner has not identified any expert witness who would have testified on his behalf 

nor specifically described the conflicting opinion that such an expert would have provided. On 

the other hand, trial counsel vigorously cross-examined Ms. Schultz regarding her 

qualifications, interview techniques, and opinions. Trial counsel also obtained responses from 

Ms. Schultz that could be used to undermine Adrianna’s statements. Furthermore, Petitioner’s

trial counsel emphasized the “weaknesses” of Ms. Schultz’s testimony and the credibility of 

Adrianna’s statements made to Ms. Schultz during his closing argument. Lodgment 1 at 711-

14. In light of the above, Petitioner cannot overcome the strong presumption that his trial 

counsel’s tactical decision not to hire an expert witness was reasonable. See Harrington, 562 

U.S. at 107 (deferring to counsel’s decision not to hire an expert because the counsel was 

entitled to “formulate a strategy that was reasonable at the time and to balance limited 

resources in accord with effective trial tactics and strategies.”).

Petitioner also has not demonstrated that he suffered prejudice as a result of his trial

counsel’s alleged failure to secure an expert witness. A claim of prejudice stemming from 

counsel’s failure to call an expert witness must be supported by evidence sufficient to create a 

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reasonable probability that the jury would have had a reasonable doubt concerning Petitioner’s

guilt. See Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 1990). In this case, other than 

generally speculating that a hypothetical expert could have assisted in preparing Petitioner’s 

defense and/or rebutted Ms. Schultz’s testimony, Petitioner does not suggest what credible 

evidence an expert could have offered to create a reasonable doubt as to Petitioner’s guilt on 

count 1. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner did 

not deny physical contact with Adrianna (the kiss), which was the underlying act of abuse in 

count 1, and was not prejudiced by Ms. Schultz’s testimony regarding abuse victims’ delay in 

disclosure of the full extent of the abuse, as evidenced by the jury’s inability to reach a verdict 

on counts 2 and 3. See Lodgment 7 at 6; see also Lodgment 3 at 279, 282. The Court thus 

finds that Petitioner’s conclusory and speculative allegations are insufficient to demonstrate 

prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s decision not to call an expert witness. See Grisby v. 

Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 379 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Speculation about what an expert could have 

said is not enough to establish prejudice.”). Accordingly, the state appellate court’s decision 

was not an unreasonable application of clearly-established Supreme Court law, and the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s sub-claim be DENIED.

(b) Failure to Investigate Adrianna’s Father and Stepmother to Establish a

Motive for Adrianna to Accuse Petitioner

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating Adrianna’s 

father and stepmother, Nathaniel and Michelle Slasson. See Pet. at 35-36; see also Trav. at 

10. Petitioner states that he did not have “sexual contact with Adrianna” and “was 

absolute[ly] innocent of the accusations made against [him],” and theorizes that the “ulterior

motive” for these claims was an attempt by Adrianna’s father and stepmother “to gain full 

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legal custody” of her. Pet. at 36, 81. Petitioner claims that he was prejudiced as a result of 

his trial counsel’s alleged failure because he was not able to present a complete defense. Id. 

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim is without merit because Petitioner did not provide 

any supporting declarations from his trial counsel, Nathaniel Slasson or Michelle Slasson, and 

did not establish that the Slassons’ alleged testimony would have been admissible at trial. 

Ans. at 27-28. 

Clearly established federal law provides that trial counsel “has a duty to make 

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 

unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. “[A] particular decision not to investigate must be 

directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of 

deference to counsel’s judgments.” Id.; Cox v. Del Papa, 542 F.3d 669, 679 (9th Cir. 2008)

(same), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1185 (2009). Moreover, a claim of failure to interview a 

witness cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel “when the person’s account is 

otherwise fairly known to defense counsel.” Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 

(9th Cir. 1986). Reasonable tactical decisions, including decisions regarding counsel’s 

presentation of a case, are “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90. An 

ineffective assistance claim based on the failure to call a witness generally requires evidence 

that the uncalled witness would in fact have testified [United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d at 

1231-32], what the “witness would have testified to” [United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 

1409 (9th Cir. 1987], and that the testimony would have created a reasonable doubt as to 

defendant’s guilt [Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 1990)].

Here, Petitioner does not provide any evidence, other than his self-serving and 

conclusory declaration, to support his allegations. In his declaration, Petitioner merely states 

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that because he did not commit the charged crimes, there must be an “ulterior motive” behind 

the accusations and that he suggested to counsel that he “investigate Adrianna’s father and 

stepmother because they had been trying to gain full legal custody.” Pet. at 81. Petitioner 

provides no evidence or facts to support his ulterior motive theory. Petitioner does not 

provide a declaration from the Slassons or anyone who knew the Slassons to support his 

theory. Petitioner also does not provide any evidence, other than his bald statement that “to 

[Petitioner’s] knowledge, [counsel] did not fulfill my request to investigate Adrianna’s father 

and stepmother” to support his claim that counsel did not investigate the Slassons Id. at 81.

“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not 

warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioner has not 

established that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Because Petitioner has not established the substance or relevance of any 

alleged impeachment or motive testimony, Petitioner also has not established prejudice. 

The Court thus finds that the state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 

F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that petitioner did not satisfy the prejudice prong 

under Strickland when he failed to show “what additional testimony his suggested forty-one 

witnesses would give in order to change the outcome of the trial”); Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 

480, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel for not calling an alleged alibi witness was without merit, where the petitioner did not 

provide evidence that the witness would have provided helpful testimony to the defense, by, 

for example, providing an affidavit from an alleged witness). Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s sub-claim be DENIED.

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(c) Failure to Investigate Jury Misconduct

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate jury 

misconduct. See Pet. at 36-38; Trav. at 8, 11-12. Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel 

“possesses three post jury notes indicating three individual jurors were badgered and 

intimidated into reaching a guilty verdict on Count 1,”

6 and argues that his trial counsel should 

have requested a hearing to investigate potential jury misconduct and moved for a new trial. 

Pet. at 36. Petitioner further claims that he was not able to obtain the jury notes from his trial 

counsel and could not submit any juror declarations. See Pet. at 29, 36; Trav. at 11-12. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s supporting declaration is self-serving, that Petitioner has 

not submitted any declarations from the jurors, and that Petitioner thus fails to overcome the 

strong presumption that his trial counsel was not ineffective. Ans. at 28. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a fair trial by a panel 

of unbiased, indifferent jurors. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). The right to a jury 

trial applies to state criminal trials through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Due process requires that 

the defendant be tried by “a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence 

before it.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). “When the jury breaches this duty by 

considering extraneous facts not introduced in evidence, ‘a defendant has effectively lost the 

rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and the assistance of counsel with regard to jury 

 

6 Petitioner alleges that the notes were “collected [from three jury members] after trial” and 

they demonstrated that “each of them had been bullied, badgered, and or coerced into their 

guilty verdict,” that one jury member “said the Jury Foreman was ‘playing DA’s advocate’ and 

‘pushing for a verdict,’” and that the other juror stated that his “experience was so bad that 

[the juror] would never serve on a jury again.” Trav. at 8.

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consideration of the extraneous evidence.’” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 700 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(quoting Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1980)).

The “near-universal and firmly established common-law rule in the United States flatly 

prohibit[s]” the admission of juror testimony to impeach a verdict except where an 

“extraneous influence” affected the verdict. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 

(1987); see also Mattox v. U.S., 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892) (“on a motion for a new trial on the 

ground of bias on the part of one of the jurors, the evidence of jurors, as to the motives and 

influences which affected their deliberations, is inadmissible either to impeach or to support 

the verdict. But a juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence 

of any extraneous influence . . . .”). “Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is grounded in the 

common-law rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict and the exception 

for juror testimony relating to extraneous influences.” Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121 (citation 

omitted). Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which is the federal counterpart to California 

Evidence Code § 1150, states:

(b) During an Inquiry Into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment.

(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the 

validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement 

made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of 

anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes 

concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s 

affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.

(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:

(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the 

attention;

(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or

(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.

Id. Fed. R. of Evid. 606(b) renders affidavits or declarations suggesting jury misconduct 

inadmissible if they do not demonstrate on their face that extraneous information affected jury 

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deliberations. Id.; see also Hard v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 870 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (“The type of after-acquired information that potentially taints a jury verdict should 

be carefully distinguished from the general knowledge, opinions, feelings, and bias that every 

juror carries into the jury room”). Accordingly, federal courts have properly denied motions 

for an evidentiary hearing and/or a new trial where such requests are based on juror 

declarations found to be inadmissible under Rule 606(b). See, e.g, United States v. 

Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding district court’s denial of new trial 

because Rule 606(b) barred consideration of declarations stating that jurors ignored court’s 

instructions and discussed defendant’s failure to testify); see also Morgan v. Woessner, 997 

F.2d 1244, 1261 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming district court’s denial of evidentiary hearing and 

new trial under Rule 606(b) where jurors revealed during interviews that they wanted to send 

a message to city hall with their verdict and that they speculated about the plaintiff’s 

attorney’s fees during their deliberations).

In this case, Petitioner’s sole evidence is his own declaration asserting that his trial

counsel told him that three jurors had written notes indicating they had been badgered and 

bullied into finding him guilty. Pet., Exh. E at 80-82. Even if the Court accepts as true 

Petitioner’s hearsay statements regarding the alleged juror notes, Petitioner has failed to 

establish ineffective assistance of counsel. According to Petitioner, the notes do not contain 

any evidence of “extraneous prejudicial information” or improper “outside influence;” they 

merely contain information regarding the jury’s deliberations, statements made by one juror to 

another during deliberations, and/or the mental process of a juror. Id. As such, the alleged 

notes could not be used to impeach the verdict and would not have warranted an evidentiary 

hearing or motion for new trial. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117 (admission of jury testimony is 

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“flatly prohibited” to impeach a jury verdict except where an “extraneous influence” affected 

the verdict); Mattox, 146 U.S. at 149 (“the evidence of jurors, as to the motives and influences 

which affected their deliberations, is inadmissible either to impeach or to support the 

verdict.”). Counsel’s failure to make such a motion, therefore, does not constitute ineffective 

assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Because the state court’s decision was not 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that this sub-claim be DENIED.

(d) Failure to Challenge the Trial Court’s Decision to Admit Interview Tape

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a writ of 

mandate challenging the trial court’s ruling admitting the videotaped interview of Adrianna on 

the ground that the admission violated his right to confront adverse witnesses under Crawford, 

541 U.S. 36. See Pet. at 38-39; Trav. at 12. Petitioner asserts that the video was not offered 

to support Adrianna’s testimony after impeachment on cross-examination, but as part of the 

prosecution’s case-in-chief, which allowed Adrianna “to testify twice before the jury, once 

without the possibility of cross examination.” Pet. at 38; Trav. at 12. Respondent maintains

that Petitioner’s claim fails because the trial court did not err by admitting the videotaped 

interview and because Petitioner has not established that a petition for writ of mandate would 

have been granted. Ans. at 28. As stated above, the state appellate court found the claim to 

be without merit. Lodgment 15 at 2. 

This Court has discussed and rejected Petitioner’s claim that the trial court improperly 

admitted the videotaped interview of Adrianna in violation of Petitioner’s right to confront 

adverse witnesses under Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. See supra, Section I. Furthermore, even if 

Petitioner could establish that his trial counsel’s conduct was constitutionally deficient, 

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Petitioner has not established “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner fails to demonstrate that a petition for writ of mandate 

from the admission of the videotaped interview would have been granted and that the alleged 

error by the trial court affected the result of the proceeding. See id. As such, Petitioner 

cannot establish either prong of Strickland. See id.; see also McCullock v. Woodford, 2009 WL 

2059432, at *31 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2009) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel was 

ineffective by not filing a petitioner for writ of mandate regarding the court’s ruling on 

petitioner’s motion to continue, where the trial court’s denial of the continuance did not violate 

the petitioner’s constitutional rights and the petitioner failed to demonstrate that a petition for 

writ of mandate would have been granted); Lopes v. Campbell, 2009 WL 635187, at *11 (E.D. 

Cal. Mar. 11, 2009) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective by not 

filing a petition for writ of mandate regarding the court’s ruling on petitioner’s Cal. Penal Code 

§ 995 motion, where the court found that the petitioner’s claim was “conclusory and 

unsupported,” and there was “no reason to believe that [the] petition for writ of mandate 

would have been granted.”). Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and the Court 

RECOMMENDS that habeas relief on this sub-claim be DENIED. 

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for (a) not challenging the 

trial court’s admission of the videotaped interview of Adrianna as erroneous under Crawford, 

(b) not challenging Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1108 and 1360 as unconstitutionally vague, and (c) not 

pursuing the claim of judicial bias based on the trial court’s alleged Crawford error. See Pet. at 

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42-43; Trav. at 12-13. Petitioner further argues that he was prejudiced by his appellate 

counsel’s performance because the appellate court might have reversed his conviction had the 

issues been brought on direct appeal and because he was denied the ability to seek federal 

habeas corpus review of the issues. Pet. at 44-45. Respondent alleges that Petitioner’s 

appellate counsel was not deficient. Ans. at 29. 

The California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition asserting 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. See Lodgment 20; see also Lodgment 19 at 

27-30. The California Court of Appeal found that Petitioner’s claim “fail[ed] on the merits” 

reasoning as follows:

Sopher faults his appellate counsel for: (1) not challenging the admission 

of the videotaped interview of the victim as erroneous under Crawford; (2) not 

challenging Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1360 as unconstitutionally vague; 

and (3) not pursuing a claim of judicial bias based on the trial court’s alleged 

Crawford error.

. . . 

To the extent Sopher faults appellate counsel for not pursuing vagueness 

challenges to Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1360 or claims of Crawford error, 

his ineffective assistance claims fail because counsel have no duty to 

make meritless arguments . . . merely to create a record impregnable to assault 

for claimed inadequacy of counsel.” (People v. Constancio (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 

533, 546.).

Lodgment 15 at 1-2.

Where a petitioner challenges the effectiveness of his appellate counsel, the Strickland

standard applies in the same manner as claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Smith 

v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001), 

cert. denied, 535 U.S. 995 (2002). “Defense counsel does not have a constitutional duty to 

raise all nonfrivolous issues on appeal.” McGee v. Dexter, 2010 WL 2044526, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 

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April 19, 2012) (citing Pollard v. White, 119 F.3d 1430, 1435 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Appellate 

counsel’s failure to raise an issue on direct appeal cannot constitute ineffective assistance 

when the ‘appeal would not have provided grounds for reversal.’” Id. (quoting Wildman v. 

Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

Accordingly, to prevail on his claim, Petitioner must demonstrate that his appellate 

counsel was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. As discussed throughout this Report and Recommendation, the 

above legal issues are without merit. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1108 and 1360 are not 

unconstitutionally vague and numerous courts have reached the same conclusion. See

Section II. Similarly, the Crawford decision does not prohibit or restrict the use of Adrianna’s 

interview tape since Adrianna testified at trial, so the admission of the tape was not an error 

and did not indicate judicial bias or prejudice. See Sections I and III. Because the identified

claims are without merit, Petitioner’s appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance 

by failing to raise them. Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Jones 

v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000)) (“[a]ppellate counsel’s failure to raise 

issues on direct appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance when the appeal would not 

have provided grounds for reversal.”). 

Even if Petitioner could satisfy the first prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel 

test, he has not satisfied the second prong. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the California 

Court of Appeal specifically considered the claims at issue and found them “meritless.” See

Lodgment 15; see also Pet. at 44-45. Because the state court correctly found that all three 

claims were without merit, Petitioner cannot establish prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

692 (counsel’s failure to raise a non-meritorious claim does not prejudice defendant). 

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Accordingly, Petitioner fails to satisfy his burden under both prongs of the Strickland

test. See id. The Court thus finds that the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law, and RECOMMENDS that the claim be DENIED.

V. Request for Evidentiary Hearing and Appointment of Counsel

Petitioner requests that the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing and appoint an 

attorney to represent him at the hearing. See Pet. at 45; Trav. at 13. A federal court’s 

discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which 

provides:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court 

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless 

the applicant shows that—

(A) the claim relies on—

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral

review by the Supreme Court, that was previously made unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

“Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues 

which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000). Here, Petitioner generally argues that “having presented sufficient 

preliminary facts to warrant it, an evidentiary hearing should be held to establish the 

underlying facts of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim,” and that he is “entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing during which he would be given an opportunity to flesh out the facts 

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supporting his claims.” Pet. at 45; Trav. at 13. However, Petitioner does not establish that his 

request relies on a new rule of constitutional law, or a factual predicate that could not have 

been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See id. Similarly, Petitioner 

has not alleged facts that would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the 

underlying offense. See id. Finally, as set forth above, Petitioner’s claims are meritless and 

the Court finds no basis or need for an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. 

A financially eligible habeas petitioner seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may 

obtain representation whenever the court “determines that the interests of justice so require.’” 

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The interests of justice require appointment of counsel when the court conducts an evidentiary 

hearing on the petition. Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations 

omitted). However, the appointment of counsel is discretionary when no evidentiary hearing 

is necessary. Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 729 (citing Sumner v. Mata, 

449 U.S. 539, 545-57 (1981) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (“unless an evidentiary hearing is held, 

an attorney’s skill in developing and presenting new evidence is largely superfluous; the 

district court is entitled to rely on the state court record alone.”). Because the Court finds that 

an evidentiary hearing is not appropriate, the Court also DENIES Petitioner’s request for 

appointment of counsel to represent him during the hearing. See id.

///

///

///

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District 

Judge issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) 

directing that Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than August 12, 2016, any party to this 

action may file written objections with this Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than August 26, 2016. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections 

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/22/2016

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