Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-04942/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-04942-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

THOMAS DAVIDSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

APPLE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.5:16-cv-04942-LHK (HRL)

ORDER RE DISCOVERY DISPUTE 

JOINT REPORT NO. 1

Re: Dkt. No. 129

This is a putative consumer class action against Apple alleging that its iPhone 6 and iPhone 

6 Plus (“iPhones”) are defective. The alleged defect manifests itself when a user’s touch or swipe 

on the touchscreen brings no response from the iPhone. Plaintiffs say that two touchscreen 

controller chips (“touch IC chips”) underneath the touchscreen convert touches of the user into 

instructions to the iPhone software to do what the user is ordering. Allegedly, through poor 

design, insufficient padding, or weak external casing, in normal use the solder joints of the touch 

IC chips become loose, and the electrical connectivity between the chips and the motherboard to 

which they are attached is interrupted. Result: the instructions the touches generate do not get

transmitted to the software, and nothing happens. Plaintiffs claim that countless iPhone users have 

had this problem. Apple, apparently, attributes the failures to rough handling or carelessness by 

users.

Case 5:16-cv-04942-LHK Document 162 Filed 12/14/17 Page 1 of 5
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No one disputes that Apple should be allowed to test the plaintiffs’ iPhones. However, 

Discovery Dispute Joint Report #1 (“DDJR #1”) arises because the parties cannot agree on a 

protocol that Apple must follow in doing so. They did agree on designating a neutral expert to run 

the tests (including any tests that the plaintiffs wanted). They hung up on three issues and came to 

the court to sort them out.

First, the plaintiffs were concerned about maintaining the privacy of any user-created 

content on an iPhone. Apple addressed that concern by offering to allow plaintiffs to restore each 

iPhone to its factory default settings, which (they say) would wipe out all user-created content. 

Alternatively, Apple agreed that it would not look at any user-created content. Apparently, this 

issue has by now been resolved, since the plaintiffs do not cite it as a sticking point in DDJR #1, 

and it was not discussed at the November 8th hearing the court held with both lead counsel.

Second, the plaintiffs are concerned about the possibility of destructive testing. They do 

not want their iPhones to be damaged, altered, or destroyed while undergoing Apple’s tests. 

Apple tries to assuage those concerns by representing that it will do no destructive testing. This 

attempt at reassurance does not succeed because Apple refuses to describe what tests it plans to 

have the neutral expert run. That raises real concerns. Should Apple alone be the “decider” of 

whether a particular test is destructive? Suppose it is mistaken? Suppose the neutral expert does 

not know if a test is destructive or not? How would the plaintiffs, or the court, know if some data 

is altered, perhaps unwittingly or unknowingly, as a consequence of one of the tests? Apple’s 

promise is that its testing will not “permanently alter the physical appearance or functionality of 

the iPhones.” There are holes in that promise, such as how about data alteration (or deletion, or 

even addition) that does not change “functionality”? Based on that promise, the court simply does 

not have confidence that the iPhones after Apple’s tests are going to be returned in exactly the 

same state they were in when turned over to the expert.

The court’s concern is exacerbated by Apple’s insistence that disclosing what tests it 

intends to run would disclose its attorney’s work product. That is, disclosing the tests, whatever 

they might be, would reveal counsel’s strategy for defending the lawsuit. This court has no 

background in smart phone technology or testing, but this assertion is hard to fully accept. How is 

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United States District Court

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the court to know whether or not disclosing the tests would tip off plaintiffs to some area of 

inquiry they would not have thought of otherwise? The only good safeguard, other than just 

taking Apple’s word for it, or hoping the expert will recognize destructive testing and refuse to do 

it, is to tell the plaintiffs what the tests are going to be and give them the opportunity to object. 

The third issue, which overlaps the second, is the thorniest. Should plaintiffs receive the 

data or information obtained from the iPhones on account of Apple’s tests? The court is not sure 

what tests the plaintiffs might wish to run, if any, but their request is that both sides 

simultaneously receive the data from both side’s tests. Apple vigorously opposes that proposition.

One way of looking at it is that the data coming out of the iPhones in testing is just that, 

data, which is nothing more than factual. Indeed, that data or information “belongs” to the 

plaintiffs, so why should they not have it? The court envisions that the information derived from 

the tests would be distinguishable from the conclusions someone might draw from analysis of the 

information.

Basically, plaintiffs are concerned that if Apple gets to run tests it does not have to 

describe in advance, and if it gets sole custody of its test results, then it can use the test results that 

favor the defense and ignore results that support plaintiffs’ case. Plaintiffs are especially 

concerned that Apple has some tool or software program that no one else has to run diagnostics on 

the iPhone. After all, this product is not like a tire, or hair dryer, or power tool; it is an extremely 

complicated, sophisticated, multi-purpose instrument with a closed architecture shrouded in an 

aura of mystery. Could one reasonably speculate that Apple can get diagnostic information out of 

an iPhone that no one else could get? Plaintiffs certainly think it could.

True, Apple’s counsel did represent to the court that it would not use any “proprietary” 

test, or tool. It would only use “common” tests available in the marketplace. Counsel, however, 

declined to identify any proprietary test and even declined to name any common test that Apple 

might employ on plaintiffs’ iPhones. He said that plaintiffs could run any of the tests that Apple 

plans to run, but would not say what they were, repeatedly citing the work product doctrine as the 

basis for his refusals.

Defense counsel said that Apple did want to power up the iPhones, but would not have the 

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expert open their cases or connect them to a computer. He also disclaimed any intent to do any of 

the tests that plaintiffs’ counsel suggested were possible: Apple would not access the “software,” 

nor the “meson” chip (whatever that is), and there simply was no accelerometer sensor. Much 

time was spent at the hearing listening to defense counsel saying what Apple was not going to do, 

but almost nothing on what it was going to do (other than to acknowledge that its goal was to find 

out whether the phones had been dropped). 

The court has read all of the cases cited by Apple and the plaintiffs. None are controlling 

and none are directly on point. Only Galitski v. Samsung Telcoms. Am., LLC, No. 3:12-cv-4782, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99199 (N.D. Tex., July 22, 2014), involved a smart phone, and the court’s 

concern there was not about work product protection but about insuring the non-destructive testing 

really was going to be non-destructive. Interestingly, in that case Samsung agreed that plaintiffs’ 

representative could be present during the testing, and the court required Samsung to give to 

plaintiffs’ counsel a “reasonably specific description of the tests to be performed and the 

procedures to be followed” so that they would have the ability to challenge a test as destructive.

The court is not persuaded that the plaintiffs’ attorneys are quite as unclear about the ins 

and outs of smart phone testing as they seem to let on. But, their fears of data destruction and 

their concerns about Apple taking unfair advantage of its opportunity to test their iPhones are not 

to be dismissed lightly. There is little doubt that Apple knows lots about it and is not going out of 

its way to explain it. On the other hand, the court does appreciate, as Apple has pointed out, that it 

is not Apple’s job to make plaintiffs’ case. However, Apple has not satisfied the court that 

allowing secret testing will assure no data is destroyed or altered or deleted. And, Apple’s counsel 

was so very careful in his choice of words responding to the court’s probing questions about 

testing that he left the court feeling it was not getting a full picture. In the present situation, the 

court is inclined to come down on the side of disclosure. 

The court is not convinced that the work product doctrine is implicated in the testing of

plaintiffs’ iPhones. What the parties do with the results is probably work product, but what comes 

“out” of those instruments is just data or information. If the court is wrong, and it is deemed work 

product, then work product protection, which is not absolute, should give way to the exception in 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii), because the court believes plaintiffs have a substantial need for the 

information to prepare their case and likely cannot get it by other means. Plaintiffs shall arrange 

forthwith for delivery of their iPhones to the neutral expert. At least 48 hours before testing is to 

commence, both sides will simultaneously identify and describe with particularity to the other side

each test they want to be run, which will give the other side the opportunity to object that a certain 

test may be destructive. Any test objected to shall not be run until the parties agree or the court 

orders it. All test results shall be given to both sides. Any test not objected to may be run. The 

neutral expert will agree to be bound by the protocol and keep all communications with each 

party’s attorneys confidential, not to be disclosed to the other side.

If an appeal is taken from this order, the order is stayed until the appeal is resolved.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 14, 2017

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

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