Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01194/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01194-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dale Allen Severance,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Brian D. Kaiser, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-01194-PHX-NVW (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

On October 20, 2015, Petitioner Dale Allen Severance, who is confined in the 

Arizona State Prison Complex-Safford in Safford, Arizona, filed a pro se Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Amended Petition”) (Doc. 10) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The Court required Respondents to answer (Doc. 11). By Order issued

on December 18, 2015 (Doc. 16), the Court allowed Respondents to file a dispositive 

motion in lieu of an answer. Pending before the Court is Respondents’ Motion to 

Dismiss Habeas Petition for Failure to Exhaust Any Claim (Doc. 18). The Court ordered 

that a response to the Motion to Dismiss shall be filed no later than February 1, 2016 

(Doc. 19). No response has been filed. The matter is deemed submitted for decision. 

The undersigned finds that there are two bases for dismissing the Amended 

Petition (Doc. 10). First, the Court may summarily grant Respondents’ Motion to 

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Dismiss as Petitioner has failed to timely respond. LRCiv 7.2(i). Second, the Court may 

grant Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss on the merits because Petitioner has not exhausted 

any of his federal habeas claims.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 28, 2014, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of Aggravated Driving or 

Actual Physical Control while Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs in 

violation of Arizona law. (Doc. 1 at 26). The state trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty 

plea.1 (Doc. 16 at 6-7). On September 26, 2014, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a 

six year term of incarceration. (Id. at 9-12). In its December 4, 2014, minute entry, the 

trial court acknowledged receipt of Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”) 

and appointed counsel to represent Petitioner.2 (Id. at 14-16). The trial court granted 

several extensions of time to file a PCR petition. A recent minute entry set January 4, 

2016 as the deadline to file a PCR petition. (Id. at 18). However, Petitioner requested 

and received another filing extension. (Attachment 1).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A “state prisoner must normally exhaust available state remedies before a writ of 

habeas corpus can be granted by the federal courts.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It has been settled since 

Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner 

must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will 

entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). The rationale for the doctrine relates to the 

policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 U.S. at 275 (1971). The comity policy is 

designed to give a state the initial opportunity to review and correct alleged federal rights 

1 The docket and documents in Petitioner’s criminal cases are public records of which the Court can take judicial notice. See Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (taking notice of documents from petitioner’s state court habeas petition).

2 A plea-convicted defendant is entitled to a Rule 32 of-right proceeding. See

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4.

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violations of its state prisoners. Id. In the U.S. Supreme Court’s words, “it would be 

unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state 

court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional 

violation.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950); see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 

11 (1984) (“[W]e have long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of 

comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice require a federal 

court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute 

provides that a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) 

“exhausted” the available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of 

available State corrective process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render 

such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

A district court has the discretion to stay a habeas petition that contains both exhausted 

and unexhausted claims. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005); Raspberry v. Garcia, 

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Regarding petitions containing only unexhausted 

claims, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that “[o]nce a district court 

determines that a habeas petition contains only unexhausted claims, it need not inquire 

further . . . Instead, it may simply dismiss the habeas petition for failure to exhaust.” 

Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

III. DISCUSSION

It is undisputed that Petitioner has not exhausted any of his federal habeas claims.

Petitioner’s of-right PCR petition has not yet been filed. While the PCR petition was due 

by January 4, 2016, Petitioner requested and received another filing extension. 

(Attachment 1). Because Petitioner’s of-right PCR proceedings are still pending, the 

limitations period under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) has not commenced.3

3 In this case, the relevant triggering event for purposes of the one year statute of 

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Respondents seek dismissal of Petitioner’s Amended Petition because Petitioner 

has failed to exhaust all remedies available in the state court. In addition, the Court finds 

that Petitioner has not responded to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. “[I]f the 

unrepresented party . . . does not serve and file the required answering memoranda, . . . 

such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion 

and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.” LRCiv 7.2(i). Either summarily or 

on the merits for failure to exhaust all available state remedies, the undersigned will 

recommend that Petitioner’s Amended Petition (Doc. 10) be dismissed without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss Petitioner’s Amended Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 10) without prejudice.

Effect of Recommendation 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment.

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., the parties shall have fourteen days 

from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific 

written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which 

to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

limitations under AEDPA is the date on which Petitioner’s judgment became “final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Under Ninth Circuit case law, an Arizona defendant’s of-right PCR proceeding is a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F. 3d 710, 711, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Therefore, when an Arizona petitioner’s PCR proceeding is of-right, AEDPA’s statute of limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. See Id.

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Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated this 9th day of February, 2016. 

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