Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01472/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01472-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1472

___________________________

Jerry Henry

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Ray Hobbs, Director, Arkansas Department of Corrections

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

DannyBurl;DexterPayne;JeremyAndrews,Individually, and asAgencyRepresentatives

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Helena

____________

 Submitted: January 14, 2016

 Filed: May 31, 2016

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Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Jerry Henry, a former employee of the Arkansas Department of Corrections

(“ADC”), brought this action against Warden Danny Burl, Deputy Warden Dexter

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Payne, and Major Jeremy Andrews in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Henry, an African-American, alleges that his employment was terminated

wrongfully on the basis of his race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42

U.S.C. § 1981. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court

1

granted the motion, concluding (1) that Henry failed to raise a disputed issue of

materialfact to demonstrate that the defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for firing Henry was a pretext for discrimination, and (2) that the defendants were

entitled to qualified immunity. Henry appeals, and we affirm.

I.

Henry was employed by the ADC as a correctional officer. In March 2011,

Major Andrews began an investigation involving the introduction of contraband into

the ADC. During thisinvestigation, a confidential informant told Andrewsthat ADC

inmate David Morgan was receiving tobacco from a staff member and selling the

tobacco throughout the unit. An ADC search team later found and confiscated

tobacco from a different inmate. Andrewsinterviewed the inmate, who reported that

the tobacco belonged to Morgan and that Morgan had approached him about selling

tobacco. The inmate also claimed that Morgan wasreceiving the tobacco fromHenry

and that he had witnessed Morgan give Henry $500 on one occasion. According to

the inmate, Henry passed tobacco to Morgan in the “count room,” a computer area in

which the prison monitors prisoner movement. Finally, the inmate stated that there

was more tobacco hidden elsewhere in the barracks, providing specific locations for

ADC staff to search. 

Andrews’sinvestigation corroborated these statements. First, ADC staff found

contraband in the specific locations the inmate had identified. Second, Andrews

The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, United States DistrictJudge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas.

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reviewed camera footage from the count room and confirmed that Henry and Morgan

had entered the count room together. 

Andrews questioned Henry, who denied bringing any contraband into the

prison or receiving money from an inmate. He admitted that he had allowed Morgan

into the count room but claimed that he had asked Morgan to help him fill out forms

on a computer in the room. The prison previously had directed staff not to have

Morgan assist them in the count room, and Henry admitted that he knew that Morgan

was not allowed into the room. Andrews also questioned Morgan, whose story was

consistent with Henry’s. 

Andrewssubmitted a report to Warden Burl, who forwarded the report to ADC

Internal Affairs. Internal Affairs interviewed Henry and Morgan and conducted a

computerized voice-stress analysis (“CVSA”) test on each. Henry and Morgan both

denied that Henry had sold tobacco to Morgan. The CVSA test indicated that both

had lied. 

After the Internal Affairs investigation, Warden Burl terminated Henry’s

employment. Burl stated in the termination letter that Henry had lied during the

CVSA test and had admitted to escorting Morgan to the count room. Burl terminated

Henry for committing three offenses prohibited by ADC policy: 

Section 17(a) Failure to perform or carry out work related instructions,

when such instructions are reasonable and within the employee’s ability

to perform and would not pose a safety or welfare hazard to the

employee;

17(b) Deliberate refusal to carry out reasonable work requests and or

instructions will be construed as insubordination;

18(b) Falsification of written/verbal statements/information. 

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Henry appealed his termination to the State Employee Grievance Appeal Panel. 

The panel upheld the termination, finding that ADC followed its procedures and that

Henry’s termination was warranted for making false statementsin violation ofsection

18(b). However, the panel did not find that Henry violated section 17(a) or (b). 

Henry sued the defendants for racial discrimination, alleging that Caucasian

employees were not disciplined as harshly for violating ADC policy. The only

evidence Henry provided for this claim involved a maintenance employee identified

as Lt. Tyner. Tyner, a Caucasian, and two other employees, one African-American

and one Caucasian, were investigated after ADC staff found several boxes of

cigarettes on a bus that was assigned to the three employees. The employees were not

terminated. There is no evidence establishing whether any of these employees were

required to take a CVSA test. The defendants, in contrast, provided evidence that

Burl fired a different Caucasian employee following an unrelated investigation that

found that the employee had sold contraband to inmates. The employee was given

a CVSA test, which indicated that his answers were deceptive. Burl fired the

employee in part for making false statements in violation of ADC policy section

18(b). Henry did not dispute any of these facts. The defendants moved for summary

judgment, which the district court granted. 

II.

Henry argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment

because Henry demonstrated that the defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for terminating his employment was merely a pretext for intentional

discrimination on the basis of race. We review the district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo. N. Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Moen, 808 F.3d 373, 376 (8th Cir. 2015). 

“Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the record in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wells Fargo Home Mortg.,

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Inc. v. Lindquist, 592 F.3d 838, 842 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Henning v. Mainstreet

Bank, 538 F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 2008)).

Henry alleges that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his

race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. We consider

these claims together, as both are subject to “essentially the same” discrimination

analysis as Title VII disparate-treatment claims. Briggs v. Anderson, 796 F.2d 1009,

1021 (8th Cir. 1986). 

Henry does not identify any direct evidence of discrimination. Absent direct

evidence, we apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to claims of 2

employment discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Lockridge v. Bd. of

Trs. of Univ. of Ark., 315 F.3d 1005, 1010 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Under this

framework, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of

discrimination. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1046 (8th Cir. 2011)

(en banc). The burden of production then shifts to the defendants to “articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for their actions. Dixon v. Pulaski Cty. Special

Sch. Dist., 578 F.3d 862, 868 (8th Cir. 2009). “If the defendant articulates such a

reason, the burden returns to the plaintiff to show the defendant’s proffered reason

is pretextual.” McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2007). 

We follow our past practice of assuming without deciding that Henry presented

a prima facie case of discrimination. See Keefe v. City of Minneapolis, 785 F.3d

1216, 1225 (8th Cir. 2015). The employer’s burden of providing a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action is not onerous. Bone v.

G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 2012). The defendants’ stated

reasons for terminating Henry—their determinations that he violated ADC policy by

making false statements and improperly allowing an inmate into the count

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 2

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room—satisfy this standard. See Johnson v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 424 F.3d

806, 811 (8th Cir. 2005) (“If the employer was motivated by a good faith belief that

[the employee] was dishonest, then it was not motivated by his race, even if the

conclusion about [the employee’s conduct] was erroneous.”). Accordingly, the

burden shifts to Henry to show pretext. See McGinnis, 496 F.3d at 873. 

Henry claims that he created a genuine dispute on the question of whether his

firing was pretextual because he identified a similarly situated Caucasian employee

whom the defendants treated more favorably. “At the pretext stage, ‘the test for

determining whether employees are similarly situated to a plaintiff is a rigorous

one.’” Bone, 686 F.3d at 956 (quoting Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 853

(8th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1043). To

succeed in his claim, Henry must show that he and the employee outside of his

protected group were “similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Id. (quoting

Rodgers, 417 F.3d at 853). 

Henry contendsthat Tyner issimilarly situated because both he and Tyner were

suspected ofselling contraband to inmates, and he claims that Tyner wastreated more

favorably because Tyner was not terminated. However, Henry has introduced no

evidence showing that Tyner failed a CVSA test or that he escorted an inmate into a

prohibited area, the conduct Burl relied on when he decided to terminate Henry. See

Johnson, 424 F.3d at 811 (holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to coworkers when he “identifie[d] no evidence” that the employer believed that coworkers engaged in similar misconduct). 

Henry alternatively claims that Tyner was treated more favorably because he

was not required to submit to a CVSA test after being suspected ofselling contraband

to inmates. Under this theory, the defendants discriminated against Henry by

investigating him more thoroughly than a similarly situated Caucasian employee. 

Thus, even if the defendants ultimately had sufficientreason to terminate Henry based

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on his failing a CVSA test, Henry claims that his firing was still pretextual because

the defendants discovered the evidence justifying his termination based on a raciallymotivated investigation. This claim also fails. There is no evidence in the record

concerning whether or not Tyner—or the two other employees assigned to the bus

where contraband was found—were required to take CVSA tests. Further, even if

Henry could establish that Tyner was treated more leniently, it would not support

Henry’s claim that the alleged lenience stemmed from any racial bias. One of the

other employees suspected of storing contraband on Tyner’s assigned bus was

African-American. Because Henry does not argue that Tyner was treated any more

leniently than the similarly situated African-American employee, he cannot establish

that any alleged lenience toward Tyner was motivated by racial bias. See Bone, 686

F.3d at 957 (rejecting plaintiff’s comparator evidence because some ofthe employees

receiving allegedly favorable treatment were part of same protected classes as

plaintiff); Hitt v. Harsco Corp., 356 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2004) (same). 

In contrast, the defendants have provided evidence that a similarly situated

Caucasian employee was subject to the same treatment as Henry. Internal Affairs

investigated a Caucasian employee who was suspected of selling contraband to

inmates. Burl fired this employee after he failed a CVSA test in which he denied

these allegations. Thus, the only evidence in the record concerning a similarly

situated Caucasian employee undermines Henry’s claim that his termination was

motivated by race. See Logan v. Kautex Textron N. Am., 259 F.3d 635, 639-40 (7th

Cir. 2001) (rejecting claim that African-American plaintiff’s termination was

motivated by race when numerous similarly situated Caucasian employees also were

fired). Henry’s attempt to show pretext through comparator evidence fails. 

Henry also claims that the defendants’ shifting explanationsfor terminating his

employment give rise to an inference of pretext. See, e.g., Young v.

Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 152 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that

substantial change in employer’s explanation for decision to terminate employee

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supported an inference of pretext). Henry suggeststhat the reason for his termination

shifted because the State Employee Grievance Appeal Panel upheld Burl’s decision

to fire Henry on only one of the three grounds that Burl had provided. That the

appeal panel—whose members are not defendants in this action—rejected Burl’s

determination as to two of Henry’s alleged violations does not indicate that Burl or

the other defendants shifted their explanations. Instead, Burl’s explanation has been

consistent, and Henry thus cannot establish pretext based on a shifting explanation. 

See E.E.O.C. v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 462 F.3d 987, 995 (8th Cir. 2006)

(holding that evidence did not support inference of pretext when employer’s

explanation for terminating employee remained consistent). 

Because Henry did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

defendants’legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment was

merely a pretext for intentional race discrimination, the district court did not err by

granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. See Bone, 686 F.3d at 958.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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