Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01235/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01235-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENIZ KENISON,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMVAULT SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant.

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Civil No. 12-cv-1235-L(MDD)

ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO

STATE COURT

On April 25, 2012, Plaintiff Deniz Kenison commenced this civil-rights employment

action against her employer, Defendant CommVault Systems, Inc., in the San Diego Superior

Court. Plaintiff alleges seven claims arising out of her employment with and termination from

employment with Defendant. On May 22, 2012, Defendant filed a notice of removal, removing

this action to this Court. The notice of removal is based on diversity jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441.

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Defendant’s Notice of Removal is facially

deficient and REMANDS this action to the San Diego Superior Court.

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by Constitution or a

statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “It is to

be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the

contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also

Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is strictly

construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992);

see also Sygenta Crop Prot. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002); O’Halloran v. University of

Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). “The strong presumption against removal

jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is

proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; see also Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d

709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); O’Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1380. “Federal jurisdiction must be

rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at

566. 

Although there has not been a request to remand, it is well-established that “a district

court’s duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’

arguments.” See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th

Cir. 2004). Courts may consider the issue sua sponte. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139,

1149 n.8 (9th Cir. 1984). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “district courts have

an ‘independent obligation to address subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.’” Grupo Dataflux v.

Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (quoting United States v. S. Cal. Edison Co.,

300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2004)).

II. ANALYSIS

In attempting to invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, the defendant must prove that

there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and that the amount in controversy

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exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To determine whether the amount in controversy has been

met on removal, “[t]he district court may consider whether it is ‘facially apparent’ from the

complaint that the jurisdictional amount is in controversy.” Singer v. State Farm Mutual Auto

Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). And the defendant “must provide evidence that it is

‘more likely than not’ that the amount in controversy” satisfies the federal diversity jurisdictional

amount requirement. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Defendant fails to satisfy that requirement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1332.

Here, Plaintiff seeks damages for lost income, and emotional distress. (Compl. Prayer for

Relief.) She also seeks compensatory, general, economic, non-economic, and punitive damages. 

(Id.) Lastly, she also seeks civil penalties under the California Labor Code, and attorneys’ fees. 

(Id.) However, a precise value for the amount in controversy is not given. She only alleges that

the total amount in controversy exceeds $25,000 (Compl. ¶ 7), and that the civil penalties under

the California Labor Code may not exceed $4,000 (Compl. ¶ 81). Nothing further is provided in

the complaint.

In its notice of removal, Defendant provides several values for the amount in controversy. 

It provides the value of twelve months of salary as severance, totaling $158,900, based on a prelitigation settlement demand, to meet the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy threshold. 

(Notice of Removal ¶ 8 [Doc. 1].) Defendant also includes $47,000 for alleged past economic

losses, an additional $18,334.50 of potential unpaid wages, and $4,000 in penalties. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

With respect to other amounts in question, Defendant does not provide any concrete values or

evidence that a particular value may contribute to exceeding the jurisdictional threshold.

The dispositive value to consider here is the $158,900 of severance that is based on

Plaintiff’s pre-litigation settlement demand. (Greenman Decl. ¶ 4; Notice of Removal Ex. D.) 

Defendant cites Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2002), for the proposition

that “[i]t is well established that settlement demands are relevant evidence of the amount in

controversy.” (Notice of Removal ¶ 8.) Defendant’s position appears to be that the settlement

demand letter is sufficient evidence to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. (See id.) 

However, Defendant is mistaken. 

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“A settlement letter is relevant evidence of the amount in controversy if it appears to

reflect a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff’s claim.” Cohn, 281 F.3d at 840 (citing, among

others, Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir. 1994) (while a “settlement

offer, by itself, may not be determinative, it counts for something)). In Cohn, the Ninth Circuit

noted that the plaintiff “could have argued that the demand was inflated and not an honest

assessment of damages, but he made no attempt to disavow his letter or offer contrary evidence.” 

281 F.3d at 840. “Rather, he consistently maintained that his mark is worth more than

$100,000.” Id. There is no comparable affirmation of the $158,900 value here by Plaintiff. In

fact, after closer inspection, the Court could not identify a request for severance anywhere in the

complaint. This shows that it is more likely than not that Plaintiff disavows that valuation of her

claim. See id. Furthermore, the omission of any request for severance in the complaint suggests

that its consideration is outside the scope of Plaintiff’s claim, and thus cannot be a reasonable

estimate. See id.

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the facts presented in the notice of removal do not meet the

burden of establishing removal jurisdiction. Without the severance value to support Defendant’s

removal, the remaining values, which are scantily supported, amount to $69,334.50 at best. “If

at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Therefore, the Court

REMANDS this action to the San Diego Superior Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 23, 2012

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. MITCHELL D. DEMBIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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