Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05064/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05064-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW LEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE PEP BOYS-MANNY MOE & JACK 

OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-05064-JSC 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

INTERVENE

Re: Dkt. No. 135

Plaintiff Andrew Lee (“Plaintiff”) filed this putative class action arising out of the 

attempted collection of debt incurred as a result of his alleged misuse of his employee discount 

and for changing the oil on his car while at work at Defendant The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack 

of California (“Pep Boys”). Plaintiff alleges that the settlement demand letters that Defendant

Palmer Reifler & Associates (“Palmer”) sent to Plaintiff and others violated various provisions of 

the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Unfair Competition 

Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Now pending before the Court is proposed 

intervenor Keshaila Chang’s motion to intervene as of right as an additional plaintiff and class 

representative on the UCL claim, or in the alternative, for permissive intervention on that claim. 

(Dkt. No. 135.) Having considered the parties’ submissions, and having had the benefit of oral 

argument on January 21, 2016, the Court DENIES the motion.

BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural background of this case has already been explained in detail in 

the Court’s Order denying class certification, which the Court incorporates here in full. Lee v. Pep 

Boys—Manny Moe & Jack of Cal., No. 12-5064, 2015 WL 9480475, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 

2015). Nevertheless, the Court will recount the background relevant to the motion to intervene. 

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I. Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action on August 21, 2012 in Alameda County Superior Court. (Dkt. 

No. 5-1.) Defendants timely removed the lawsuit to federal court. (Dkt. No. 1.) Following the 

Court’s rulings on a motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff brings 

two claims against Defendants. The first claim alleges that the language of the letter Defendants 

sent to Plaintiff violates various provisions of the FDCPA. Second, Plaintiff argues that Palmer 

and Pep Boys engaged in unfair business practices in violation of California law by sending 

settlement demand letters seeking more than the $500 maximum that California Penal Code 

§ 490.5 permits, which Plaintiff contends violates the Unfair Competition Law’s unlawful prong 

(predicated on the FDCPA violation), and the unfair prong (as the letters unfairly and incorrectly 

imply to the reader that Palmer could seek more than $500 pursuant to that statutory section). As 

a result of this violation, Plaintiff seeks restitution for any settlement money that class members 

actually paid to Defendants and to enjoin Defendants from continuing to engage in their unlawful 

business practices. Chang seeks to intervene solely on this UCL claim. 

Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification on September 21, 2015. (Dkt. No. 120.) 

With respect to the UCL claim, Plaintiff sought to certify a class of all individuals in the State of 

California who received written communications sent by or on behalf of Palmer at any time from 

August 20, 2008 to the present, in which a demand for payment and/or an offer of settlement was 

made for alleged civil penalties citing Penal Code § 490.5, and in which the letter demands in 

excess of $500. The Court stayed briefing on the class certification motion pending resolution of a 

discovery dispute—namely, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s proposed deposition changes, 

which sought to make changes to his testimony that largely pertained to his fitness as class 

representative. (Dkt. Nos. 127.) The Court granted the motion to strike on October 27, 2015 and 

reset a briefing schedule on the class certification motion. (Dkt. No. 132.) Chang then filed the 

instant motion to intervene on November 5, 2015, the day before Defendants’ opposition to the 

motion to certify the class was filed, as ordered. (Dkt. Nos. 135, 136.) The Court stayed further 

briefing and hearing on the motion to intervene pending resolution of the class certification 

motion, “as the Court’s decision on certification may render moot the motion to intervene.” Lee, 

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2015 WL 9480475, at *3; see also id. at *3 n.3.

The Court denied class certification on December 23, 2015. See id. at *16. The Court 

concluded that the proposed UCL class was numerous and ascertainable and that there was a 

question of law common to the class—that is, whether it is an unfair business practice for the 

letters to cite only Penal Code § 490.5 but seek more in civil penalties than the statute permits—

but denied certification on the grounds that Plaintiff had failed to establish that his claims were 

typical of those in the class and, relatedly, because Plaintiff was an inadequate class 

representative. Lee, 2015 WL 9480475, at *14-16. Defendants and Chang subsequently fully 

briefed the instant motion to intervene.

II. Intervenor’s Background

Chang avers, and the proposed complaint in intervention alleges, that she received two 

debt collection letters from Palmer. (Dkt. No. 135-4 ¶ 2; Dkt. No.135-3 ¶ 7.) The letters were 

addressed to “Parent/Guardian of Keshaila Chang[.]” (Dkt. No. 135-4 at 4.) The second of the 

letters explains that the law firm represents Urban Outfitters “concerning its civil claim against 

you in connection with an incident involving your child in their store[.]” (Id.) The letter states 

that “[p]ursuant to common law and Cal. Penal Code § 490.5, ‘Theft of retail merchandise; civil 

liability’, Urban Outfitters may consider moving forward with a civil damages claim against you.” 

(Id.) The letter further provides that “At this time, our client is requesting that you settle this 

matter by making payment to us in the amount of $625.00 within ten (10) days of the date of this 

letter.” (Id. (emphasis omitted).) Chang’s father settled the claim with Palmer for $100.00. (Dkt. 

No. 157-2 ¶ 6.) Chang later reimbursed her father for his payment to Palmer. (Dkt. No. 135-4 

¶ 2.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for two types of intervention: 

intervention as of right and permissive intervention. A putative intervenor must satisfy four 

elements to qualify for as-of-right intervention:

(1) the applicant’s motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must 

assert an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 

subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that 

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without intervention the disposition of the action may, as a practical 

matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest; and (4) 

the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by other 

parties.

United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1988). “Although the party seeking to 

intervene bears the burden of showing those four elements are met, ‘the requirements of 

intervention are broadly interpreted in favor of intervention.’” Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 

954 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

An applicant who requests permissive intervention must prove that it meets three threshold 

requirements: “(1) it shares a common question of law or fact with the main action; (2) its motion 

is timely; and (3) the court has an independent basis for jurisdiction over the applicant’s claims.” 

Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). If the proposed 

intervenor meets those elements, then the court has broad discretion to grant or deny the motion 

but “must consider whether intervention will unduly delay the main action or will unfairly 

prejudice the existing parties.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). 

For both as-of-right and permissive intervention, courts generally construe Rule 24 

liberally in favor of intervention. See Cohorst, 2011 WL 3475274, at *4 (citing Wash. State Bldg. 

& Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982)). For class actions in 

particular, Rule 23 also provides that a court may allow class members to intervene “to protect 

class members and fairly conduct the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(B). 

DISCUSSION

I. Chang is Not Entitled to Mandatory Intervention 

The first issue is whether Chang is entitled to intervention as-of-right under Rule 24(a). 

One of the four requirements for as-of-right intervention is easily met here: the Court ruled 

previously that Plaintiff Lee is not an adequate representative of the UCL putative class. 2015 WL 

9480475 *16. The other three requirements are not so easily resolved.

“An applicant has a ‘significant protectable interest’ in an action if (1) it asserts an interest 

protected under some law, and (2) there is a ‘relationship’ between its legally protected interest 

and the plaintiff’s claims.” Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation 

omitted). “An applicant generally satisfies the ‘relationship’ requirement only if the resolution of 

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the plaintiff’s claims actually will affect the applicant.” Id. at 410 (citations omitted). Here, a 

finding of liability against Defendant Palmer on the UCL claim will not legally affect Chang. 

Palmer did not send a debt collection letter to Chang, and she did not pay any money to Palmer; 

thus, Palmer arguably owes no restitution to Chang. See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin 

Co., 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1148 (2003) (“Under the UCL, an individual may recover profits unfairly 

obtained to the extent that these profits represent monies given to the defendant or benefits in 

which the plaintiff has an ownership interest.”); see also Lee, 2015 WL 9480475, at *15 (“Put 

simply, UCl restitution is limited to money in the hands of the defendants.”). Palmer may owe 

money to Chang’s father—the person to whom Defendant’s debt collection letter was directed—

but Chang’s father is not the proposed intervenor. Indeed, if Palmer were to reimburse Chang’s 

father, nothing in this lawsuit would require Chang’s father to reimburse Chang. Thus, Chang 

does not have a “significant protectable interest” in this lawsuit. 

Further, Chang is arguably not even a putative member of Plaintiff’s proposed UCL class. 

Plaintiff identifies the class as follows:

All individuals in the State of California who received written communication(s) sent by 

or on behalf of Defendant PRA at any time from August 20, 2008, to the present, in 

which a demand for payment and/or an offer of “settlement” is made for alleged civil 

penalties citing California Penal Code § 490.5, in which the letter demands

in excess of $500 (the “UCL Class ”)[.]

(Dkt. No. 120-1 at 13.) While Chang may have reviewed the letter received by her father, the 

letter makes no demand for payment from and/or an offer of settlement to Chang. The letter is 

directed solely to the parent/guardian of Chang for a claim against the parent/guardian because of 

the incident involving Chang.

Further, even if she had shown a significant protectable interest, she has not shown that her 

interest will be impaired if intervention is denied. Chang concedes that she can file a separate 

UCL action that will not be time barred as to Chang. While Chang urges that this will be 

inefficient, she does not cite any authority holding that inefficiency constitutes impairment of a 

proposed intervenor’s interest. And indeed, to hold as much would require courts to find 

impairment every time a motion to intervene is filed. This is not what the rules nor case law 

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holds. 

In her reply, Chang raises a new argument for impairment. Citing American Pipe & 

Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at 538, 552 (1974), she contends for the first time that denying 

intervention may prejudice some members of the UCL class because their claims may be barred 

by the relevant statute of limitations in any new action, whereas the limitations period would be 

tolled if they are permitted to pursue their claims on a classwide basis in this action.1 (See Dkt. 

No. 161 at 11.) Assuming that would be the result (Chang has not cited any cases so holding), the 

Court is unaware of any case holding that even though a proposed intervenor’s interest is not 

impaired, potential impairment to absent putative class members satisfies the “impairment of 

protectable interest” requirement for purposes of mandatory intervention. The lone case cited by 

Chang, Koike v. Starbucks Corp., 602 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1160-63 (N.D. Cal. 2009), is 

distinguishable as it involved intervention for the purposes of pursuing an appeal. And, in any 

event, it is a non-binding district court case that has never been followed for this proposition. For 

this reason, too, mandatory intervention does not apply.

Chang has also failed to demonstrate that her motion to intervene is timely, as discussed in 

more detail below. See infra Section II.A.3. Chang is therefore not entitled to mandatory 

intervention.

II. The Court Declines to Permit Permissive Intervention

A. Threshold Requirements

As discussed above, to establish eligibility for permissive intervention the movant must 

establish jurisdiction, commonality, and timeliness. See Donnelly, 149 F.3d at 412. 

1. Jurisdiction

Although not challenged by Defendants, the Court must decide whether it has jurisdiction 

of Chang’s state law UCL claim independent of Plaintiff’s complaint. See United Inv’rs Life Ins. 

Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2004). To establish such jurisdiction, 

 

1

In American Pipe, the Supreme Court noted that the “commencement of a class action suspends 

the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been 

parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.” 414 U.S. at 554 (footnote 

omitted).

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Chang merely conclusorily alleges that jurisdiction lies under the Class Action Fairness Act

(“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), because the amount-in-controversy exceeds $5 million. (Dkt. 

No. 135-3 at ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 161 at 14.) The record does not support this bald assertion of the 

amount in controversy. While Defendant Palmer’s database administrator testified that as of May 

14, 2015 Palmer had sent 189,269 letters demanding more than $500 and referencing Panel Code 

§ 490.5 (Dkt. No. 120-2 at 151-52), the record is silent as to how many of the recipients actually 

paid money to Palmer and thus would arguably be entitled to restitution. Thus, before the Court 

could allow Chang to intervene, the record would have to be supplemented with allegations 

showing that CAFA jurisdiction exists for her state-law UCL claim.

2. Commonality

Commonality requires the moving party to show that it has a claim or defense that shares 

with the main action a common question of law or fact. See Prete, 438 F.3d at 954. Chang 

contends that her claims “arise from a common nucleus of operative fact as those alleged in the 

present matter” inasmuch as she “received the same debt collection letter citing Penal Code 

§ 490.5 and demanding in excess of $500.” (Dkt. No. 135-1 at 11.) Chang, however, did not 

receive the same debt collection letter as Plaintiff. Palmer did not send Chang any debt collection 

letter; instead, Palmer sent Chang’s parents a letter based on a claim against Chang’s parents. 

Further, the language of the debt collection letter Chang’s father received is different from the 

language of the letter Plaintiff received: whereas Plaintiff argued that his letter was unfair within 

the meaning of the UCL because it cited only Penal Code Section 490.5 and sought more money 

than that statutory section permits, the letter involving Chang cites two separate sources of law 

creating a potential obligation to Chang’s former employer: Section 490.5 and “common law.” 

(Compare Dkt. No. 120-3 (“Pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 490.5, . . . Pep Boys may consider 

moving forward with a statutory civil damages claim against you.”); and id. at 7 (same), with Dkt. 

No. 135-4 (“Pursuant to common law and Cal. Penal Code § 490.5, . . . Urban Outfitters may 

consider moving forward on a civil damages claim against you.”).) Thus, Plaintiff’s UCL class 

claim and Chang’s UCL claim are slightly different due to the varying language of the letters. 

Nevertheless, construing the commonality requirement broadly as required, see Prete, 438 F.3d at 

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954, the Court concludes that the citations to Section 490.5 when seeking in excess of $500—even 

in the presence of a citation to other law—is a common question, especially since the letter states 

that the recipient will receive a release of “the statutory civil ‘penalty’ claim” and not also of any 

common law claims. (Dkt. No. 135-4 at 4.)

3. Timeliness

To determine whether intervention is timely, courts consider three factors: “(1) the stage of 

the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) 

the reason for and length of the delay.” Cohorst v. BRE Props., Inc., 10CV2666 JM BGS, 2011 

WL 3475274, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011) (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 

Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 2007); Cnty. of Orange v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th 

Cir. 1986)). “Timeliness is a flexible concept; its determination is left to the district court’s 

discretion.” Alisal Water, 370 F.3d at 921 (citation omitted).

a. Stage of the Proceeding

The age of this case weighs against a finding of timeliness, as this case was originally filed 

nearly three and a half years ago. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 771 F.3d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 

2014) (concluding that the stage of the proceedings discouraged a finding of timeliness where the 

movants “sought intervention more than four years after th[e] case began”). “[A]lthough the 

length of the delay is not determinative, any substantial lapse of time weighs heavily against 

intervention.” United States v. Washington, 86 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); 

see also Alisal Water, 370 F.3d at 921 (noting that “the mere lapse of time, without more, is not 

necessarily a bar to intervention,” and “a party’s interest in a specific phase of a proceeding may 

support intervention at that particular stage of the lawsuit”) (citation omitted). Along with the 

significant lapse of time, the circumstances presented here—in particular, the work done to date—

support the conclusion that this case has reached too advanced a stage to permit a finding of 

timeliness.

To date in this action, Plaintiff has amended the class action complaint twice. The parties 

have litigated a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a number of discovery 

disputes, and a motion for class certification. They have engaged in extensive discovery including 

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three separate deposition sessions of Plaintiff, and they have participated in multiple mediations in 

an attempt to resolve this action. The Court has set deadlines for dispositive motions and trial on 

Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims. The Court withheld setting a schedule on the UCL claim in light of the 

instant motion to intervene—that is, given that resolution of this motion will determine whether 

the UCL claim can proceed at all and, if so, whether it may do so as a class action. While Chang 

emphasizes that this action has not yet proceeded to the merits—i.e., motions for summary 

judgment—“in class actions, . . . certification . . . is the significant litigation event[,]” Lewis v. 

First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 1:06-cv-478-EJL-LMB, 2010 WL 3735485, at *3 (D. Id. Aug. 5, 

2010) (citations omitted), and by the time Chang filed the instant motion to intervene, Plaintiff had 

already filed his motion for class certification and Defendants’ opposition was due the next day. 

In short, the amount of time and work done to date renders Chang’s motion to intervene untimely. 

See Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1303 (noting that movants’ “focus on what had not yet occurred prior to 

[their motion] . . . ignores what had already occurred by that time”); cf. Winston v. United States, 

No. 14-cv-05417-MEJ, 2015 WL 9474284, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2015) (“As discovery has yet 

to commence and no significant substantive rulings have been made, the case remains in the early 

stages of litigation. Thus, the proceedings have not advanced to the point where intervention is 

appropriate.”) (citations omitted).

Chang relies chiefly on United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 393 (1977), for 

the proposition that it is never too late to intervene in a class action, and intervention is even 

appropriate after entry of judgment. But in United Airlines and its progeny, courts granted 

intervention for the sole and limited purpose of appealing the district court’s order denying 

certification and striking class allegations. See id.; see also Jou v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 13-

cv-03075-JSC, 2015 WL 4537533, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2015) (explaining that that United 

Airlines did not apply because the intervention did not follow a Rule 41(a) dismissal). The Ninth 

Circuit has explicitly stated that the timeliness inquiry for intervention does not apply to 

intervention for the limited purpose of appeal from a denial of class certification. Alaska v. 

Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 123 F.3d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1997). As Chang does not seek to 

intervene for such a limited purpose, her cited cases do not apply.

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Chang’s reliance on Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, No. 11-cv0178-JCS, 2015 WL 1926312 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2015), is equally unavailing. There the 

plaintiffs challenged the “ethical guidelines” that restrict donor compensation and thus, according 

to the plaintiffs, restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The district court certified the 

Sherman Act question, but denied certification of the claim for injunctive relief on the grounds 

that the named plaintiffs did not intend to donate eggs again. The proposed intervenors satisfied 

that standing issue, and sought to intervene solely to pursue the injunctive relief remedy. The 

court granted them permissive intervention. 

Even though the intervenors filed their motion after class certification proceedings, the 

court found that the proposed intervention “does not meaningfully implicate any stage of [the] 

case before the recent class certification.” Id. at *4. Not so here. Given the different language in 

the letter sent to Chang’s parents, and given that the letter was directed at Chang’s parents and not 

Chang, and that Chang’s father and not Chang paid Palmer, Chang’s intervention implicates 

nearly every earlier stage of this proceeding, including the motions to dismiss and for judgment on 

the pleadings, all of which may need to be brought anew. Whereas in Kamakahi the timing of the 

motion to intervene weighed only “slightly against a finding of timeliness, but not strongly[,]” id.

at *4, in light of all that has happened in this case, and what would have to be revisited, the timing 

of Chang’s motion weighs heavily against intervention. Further, at the time intervention was 

granted in Kamakahi, the district court had otherwise stayed all proceedings pending the 

defendants’ appeal of the court’s grant of class certification. Here, in contrast, the case is moving 

forward. 

In light of the motion practice in this case leading up to the instant motion to intervene, 

Chang’s motion comes at very late stage of the proceedings, strongly supporting a finding of 

untimeliness.

b. Prejudice to Other Parties

“In the context of a timeliness analysis, prejudice is evaluated based on the difference 

between timely and untimely intervention—not based on the work” the defendants would need to 

do regardless of when intervention was sought. Kamakahi, 2015 WL 1926312 at *4 (footnote and 

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citation omitted); see also Day v. Apoliona, 505 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]hat the 

[applicant] is filing its Motion now, rather than earlier in the proceedings, does not cause prejudice 

. . . since the practical result of its intervention . . . would have occurred whenever the state joined 

the proceedings.”). That is, prejudice is harm arising from late intervention as opposed to early 

intervention. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Commercial Realty Projects, 

Inc., 309 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s finding of prejudice where 

parties had already reached a settlement agreement because late intervention would “complicate 

the issues and upset the delicate balance achieved” by the parties’ agreement) (citations omitted).

Chang contends that there is no prejudice to Defendants because her substitution as class 

representative “will not inject new issue[s] and matters into the litigation that exceed the scope of 

the operative Complaint[,]” her claims have already been part of the case since the beginning, and 

Chang will make herself available for deposition to prevent delay on a renewed motion for 

certification. (Dkt. No. 135-1 at 9.) Not so. While the UCL claim has been part of this action 

since the outset, as discussed in the context of the stage of the proceedings, there are issues 

particular to Chang’s claim that likely would have to be litigated if the Court permits her 

intervention. These issues include her standing given that Palmer did not direct a settlement letter 

to her, did not make a claim against her, and did not receive any money from her, as well as

whether she states a claim in light of the different language in the letter sent to her father. See 

Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal.4th 310, 320-21 (2011) (noting that to adequately allege injury 

and therefore establish standing for a UCL claim, a plaintiff must show that they personally lost 

money or property as a result of the unfair competition) (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204). 

While Chang’s claim is, at a high level, the “same” as Plaintiff’s UCL claim in the operative 

complaint, her pleading raises new issues beyond the scope of the claims and defenses raised by 

Plaintiff, which constitutes prejudice. Cf. Munoz v. PHH Corp., No. 1:08-cv-0759-AWI-BAM, 

2013 WL 3935054, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2013) (finding no prejudice where the intervenor’s 

claims were identical to those in the operative complaint “presence in this action does not expand 

the scope of this litigation”) (citation omitted); Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & 

Wildlife Serv., No. 05-cv-629, 2006 WL 1455430, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 24, 2006) (finding motion 

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to intervene timely where “it does not appear that [the intervenor’s motion or pleading] has raised 

‘new issues or matters’ that are well beyond the scope of claims and defenses raised by the 

existing parties”).

What is more, these issues would have to be resolved before the parties address Chang’s 

typicality and adequacy as class representative in the context of a renewed motion for class 

certification, and class certification was supposed to be completed by the end of 2015. Given the 

repeated impasses that the parties reached during the course of discovery to date, it seems likely 

that this additional discovery would not be smooth-sailing either, as Plaintiff’s counsel seeks to 

represent Chang as substituted class representative here. Thus, an ultimate decision on class 

certification with Chang as representative would be delayed. In comparison, had Chang moved to 

intervene earlier, the motion practice and discovery taken to date would already have included all 

of these issues. This is prejudice. See, e.g., Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., No. C-08-5198-EMC, 

2010 WL 3743532, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010) (finding prejudice where permitting 

intervention would cause the parties to engage in additional discovery and other work that would 

necessarily delay class certification). In contrast, denying intervention will not prejudice Chang, 

who admits that she will still be able to file an independent action asserting her own UCL claim. 

She can even bring it as a class action, although the class may look a bit different from the putative 

class in this action. 

This factor therefore weighs against timeliness.

c. Reason for and Length of Delay

The third factor, the reasons for and length of the delay, also suggests that the motion to 

intervene is untimely. A party “seeking to intervene must act as soon as he ‘knows or has reason 

to know that his interests might be adversely affected by the outcome of the litigation.’” Peruta, 

771 F.3d at 572 (quoting United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 589 (9th Cir. 1990)). “Delay is 

measured from the date the proposed intervenor should have been aware that its interests would no 

longer be protected adequately by the parties, not the date it learned of the litigation.” 

Washington, 86 F.3d at 1503 (citation omitted); accord Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Even a lengthy delay, however, “is not as damaging as a failure to adequately explain 

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the reason for the delay.” Smith ex rel. Thompson v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., NO. CV 93-7044 

RSWL (GHKx), 2014 WL 176677, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2014) (citing Wilson, 131 F.3d at 

1304, and Marsh, 194 F.3d at 1052).

Chang argues that her delay in moving to intervene was reasonable inasmuch as she filed 

the motion “very shortly after Defendants raised the adequacy issues relating to Plaintiff in their 

. . . Motion for Sanctions.” (Dkt. No. 135-1 at 9.) Defendants filed the sanctions motion on 

October 29, 2015. (Dkt. No. 133.) While Plaintiff’s inadequacy was not the subject of the 

motion, in the motion Defendants did contend that Plaintiff’s counsel obstructed Plaintiff’s 

deposition to hide his inadequacy. (See Dkt. No. 133.) Measured from that date, Chang’s motion 

to intervene one week later involves minimal delay and a rational explanation. The focus on the 

motion for sanctions, however, is misplaced: Chang’s counsel (who is also Plaintiff’s counsel) 

expressed awareness that Defendants would challenge Plaintiff’s adequacy in June 2015 following 

the second session of Plaintiff’s deposition. (See Dkt. No. 157-4 at 6 (Plaintiff’s counsel refers in 

an email to defense counsel’s “attack on adequacy”); see also id. at 15 (in a draft discovery letter 

dated July 8, 2015, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel ended the June 2015 deposition early 

when Plaintiff’s inadequacy arose).) Plaintiff also noted in his motion for class certification filed 

in September of 2015 his understanding that Defendants would challenge Plaintiff’s adequacy. 

(Dkt. No. 120-1 at 16.) Because counsel’s knowledge is imputed to the client in the same action,

see McDaniel v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1260 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (“An 

attorney’s knowledge, whether actually told to a client or not, is imputed to the client.”) (citing 

Herman v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 71 Cal. App. 4th 819, 838 (1999)), Chang therefore 

knew of questions to Plaintiff’s adequacy as early as June 2015, nearly three months before 

Plaintiff filed his motion for class certification, but Chang did not move to intervene until 

Defendants’ opposition to class certification was nearly due. 

Chang again relies on Kamakahi, and argues that there the court rejected the defendant’s 

argument that “plaintiffs’ counsel knew that the existing plaintiffs were inadequate long before the 

intervenors sought intervention” and instead agreed that it was appropriate for counsel to “await 

the District Court’s decision on adequacy before seeking intervention.” (Dkt. No. 161 at 9.) 

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Kamakahi does not help Chang. The portion of Kamakahi on which Chang relies was the court’s 

description of the intervenor’s argument, not its own view. And the Kamakahi court did not 

conclude as much. Instead, the court found “sound” “[t]he rationale that attorneys who fail to 

select appropriate class representatives should not be given unwarranted do-overs[.]” 2015 WL 

1926312, at *6. The court did note that this doctrine had its downsides because it creates an 

incentive for intervenors to obtain separate counsel when shared counsel might be more efficient. 

Id. In the end, the court found the intervenor’s motion timely “[e]ven if this factor weighs against 

intervention[.]” Id. In other words, it implied that taking a second bite of the class representative 

apple after a finding of inadequacy is not a sufficient explanation for delaying a motion to 

intervene, but nevertheless permitted intervention in that case because there was no prejudice. Not 

so here, for the reasons described above. While Chang moved to intervene before class 

certification was actually decided, she waited until shortly before Defendants’ opposition to class 

certification was due as a back-up plan in case their first, years-long litigation strategy of Plaintiff 

as class representative failed. And Plaintiffs’ counsel knew from the beginning that their client 

never paid any money to Defendants “in settlement” and thus might not be an adequate 

representative of those who did pay money. Thus, this factor too weighs in favor of a finding of 

untimeliness.

Ultimately, the timeliness inquiry requires the Court to consider all of the circumstances. 

See NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973). Here, on balance, given the amount of 

litigation that has already occurred to date and the prejudice to Defendants in granting 

intervention, the Court concludes that Chang’s motion is not sufficiently timely to warrant 

intervention. 

B. The Court Declines to Exercise its Discretion to Allow Intervention

“Even if an applicant satisfies [the] threshold requirements, the district court has discretion 

to deny permissive intervention.” Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 412 (citation omitted). “In exercising its 

discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 

adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). “[T]he court may also 

consider other factors in the exercise of discretion, including the nature and extent of the 

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intervenors’ interest and whether the intervenors’ interests are adequately represented by other 

parties.” Perry v. Prop. 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, even if Chang had satisfied the three threshold requirements for permissive 

intervention (which she has not), the Court would nevertheless deny intervention because allowing 

Chang to intervene to serve as class representative for the UCL class will significantly delay the 

adjudication of the original parties’ case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). As discussed above, 

because Palmer did not send Chang a settlement letter, and instead sought to settle a claim against 

Chang’s parents, and because Chang did not pay any monies to Palmer, there are serious questions 

as to whether she has standing to bring a claim or can state a UCL claim. The different language 

in the letter sent to her father also raises issues about whether she states a claim. Regardless of the 

final outcome, allowing Chang to intervene will mean resolution of this already very old case will 

be delayed while these legal questions are litigated.

In short, permitting Chang to intervene as class representative is not as simple as a mere 

substitution that revives Plaintiff’s UCL class claim. Allowing her claims to proceed would 

require further discovery and motion practice focusing on her unique claims prior to a renewed 

motion for class certification. Put another way, permitting her intervention “would divert time and 

resources from the principal thrust of [Plaintiff’s] lawsuit and entangle the legal and factual issues 

involved therein within a web that is not of the original parties’ making.” UMG Recordings, Inc. 

v. Bertselsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408, 415 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also Hanni v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 

No. 08-cv-00732-CW, 2010 WL 289297, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010) (concluding that judicial 

economy would suffer with the addition of a proposed intervenor’s new claims and issues because 

intervention would require additional discovery, push back deadlines, and delay the resolution of 

the existing case). Under these circumstances, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to 

permit her to intervene.

* * *

Chang is not entitled to mandatory intervention and the Court declines to grant permissive 

intervention. In her reply, Chang attaches a declaration from her father, Stephen Chang, the 

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recipient of Palmer’s letter, who avers that he is “ready, willing, and able to serve as class 

representative . . . [t]o the extent that the Court believes that [he] should participate in this 

lawsuit[.]” (Dkt. No. 161-1.) The Court declines to construe Chang’s motion as brought on 

behalf of her father. To the extent that this is a request to file a subsequent motion to intervene to 

substitute Stephen Chang as UCL class representative, it is too little too late: the motion would be 

all the more untimely, and would likely fail on similar grounds as Chang’s motion due to the 

different language of the letter.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the Court DENIES the motion to intervene. The parties 

shall jointly submit a proposed schedule for resolution of Plaintiff’s UCL claim by February 5, 

2016.

This Order disposes of Docket No. 135.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2016

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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