Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01935/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01935-27/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY PALMER, No. 2:05-cv-1935-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

CHELSEA FINANCING 

PARTNERSHIP, LP, CLAIRE’S 

BOUTIQUES, INC. dba CLAIRE’S 

BOUTIQUES, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Following its dismissal from this litigation on or about

January 23, 2006, Defendant Claire’s Stores, Inc. (erroneously

sued herein as CLAIRE’S BOUTIQUES, INC. dba CLAIRE’S BOUTIQUES)

(“Claire’s”) now asks this Court to award it attorney’s fees in

the amount of $18,631.25, either as a prevailing party under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205,

or alternatively due to Plaintiff’s alleged sanctionable conduct

under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (which authorizes sanctions against a

party who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies legal

proceedings). 

Case 2:05-cv-01935-MCE -GGH Document 219 Filed 04/03/06 Page 1 of 5
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2

Claire’s also urges the Court to award sanctions in accordance

with its own inherent power against a party who has acted in bad

faith.

Plaintiff filed the instant action on September 23, 2005. 

By letter dated October 17, 2005, Stacey Herter, counsel for

Claire’s, wrote Plaintiff’s attorney, Lynn Hubbard, and advised

Mr. Hubbard of a binding Consent Decree and Settlement Agreement

reached in a nationwide class action involving disabled access to

Claire’s facilities. Because the terms of that settlement

precluded the present action against Claire’s, Ms. Herter asked

that Mr. Hubbard dismiss Plaintiff’s claim as against Claire’s,

and advised him that she would be forced to file a motion to

dismiss and “seek any and all appropriate sanctions” if he failed

to do so.

While Ms. Herter claims that at some unidentified time after

sending the October 17, 2005 letter she called Mr. Hubbard’s

office “to discuss the dismissal of Claire’s”, she apparently

spoke only with a paralegal and did not follow up her call with a

confirming letter. Counsel for Claire’s made no further attempt

to solicit a voluntary dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit and

instead filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 16, 2005. Mr.

Hubbard filed a Statement of Non-Opposition to that Motion, which

was thereafter granted on January 23, 2006.

Attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in an Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim “should only be awarded under

exceptional circumstances, ‘upon a finding that the plaintiff’s

action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” 

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3

Peters v. WinCo Foods, Inc., 320 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1037 (E.D. Cal.

2004), citing Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150,

1154 (9th Cir. 1997). This cautious approach is necessary in

order to avoid the chilling effect that regular imposition of

such fees could have upon plaintiffs’ commencement of ADA claims. 

Id. An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law

or in fact. Id. 

Any shortcoming of Plaintiff’s claim against Claire’s herein

does not meet this rigorous standard. Claire’s takes issue not

with the potential merit of Plaintiff’s claim but rather with

Plaintiff’s failure to dismiss the claim sooner once he knew it

was procedurally barred by the nationwide Consent Decree and

Settlement Agreement. Claire’s argues that it was patently

unreasonable for Plaintiff’s counsel not to have voluntarily

dismissed the action against Claire’s between the time Mr.

Hubbard was made aware of the Consent Decree by letter dated

October 17, 2005 and the time a Motion to Dismiss was

subsequently filed a little less than two months later, on

December 16, 2005. Claire’s makes this claim despite the fact

that it made no further contact with Plaintiff’s counsel during

this period (aside from the aforementioned message left with a

paralegal), and despite the fact that no discovery or other

issues between the parties were pending in the meantime.

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4

While Claire’s correctly points out that attorney’s fees 

under the ADA may be assessed when a plaintiff continues to

litigate after it becomes clear that his or her case is without

merit, the delay at issue in this case simply does not constitute

an “exceptional circumstance” warranting imposition of attorney’s

fees. While Claire’s relies on the decision in Schutts v. Bently

Nevada Corp. 966 F.Supp. 1549 (D. Nev. 1997), where fees were

assessed against the losing plaintiff, to support its position,

that case is clearly distinguishable. In Schutts, over a period

spanning some five months, defense counsel sent two separate

letters requesting dismissal before ultimately filing a motion

for summary judgment after simultaneously pursuing discovery. 

Here, on the other hand, we have one letter during a two month

period with no discovery or other case activity pending. Schutts

simply does not justify imposition of attorney’s fees in this

case.

Given the circumstances present, and in exercising its

discretion, the Court further finds that any delay in dismissing

Plaintiff’s claim against Claire’s does not warrant sanctions,

either under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or pursuant to the court’s own

power. There has been no showing that Plaintiff either

recklessly multiplied the proceedings, thereby improperly forcing

Claire’s to incur unreasonable costs, or that Plaintiff acted in

bad faith by not earlier dismissing her claim against Claire’s.

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Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 1

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 78-230(h).

5

Defendant Claire’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and/or

Sanctions is accordingly DENIED.1

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 31, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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