Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00034/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00034-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH WAYNE SEKERKE,

Booking No. 18165284,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ARTURO LEON; MARK O’BRIEN;

JON MONTGOMERY; DANE OLSEN

and COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-0034-GPC-RBB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS PORTIONS 

OF PLAINTIFF’S SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

VACATING HEARING

[ECF No. 58]

Before the Court is Defendants Arturo Leon and Mark O’Brien’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s First, Second, Third, and Fifth claims for relief in the Second Amended 

Complaint (ECF No. 54, “SAC”). ECF No. 58. Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 

25, 2020. ECF No. 65. Defendants filed a reply on March 31, 2020. ECF No. 66. 

The Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion 

and VACATES the hearing on the motion that was scheduled for April 17, 2020.

I. Procedural Background 

On January 7, 2019, Plaintiff proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 

lawsuit. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff currently resides in San Diego County Jail. On February 

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25, 2019, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) bringing claims under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, with supplemental state tort claims, against Arturo Leon (sued as “Arturo 

Leo”), Mark O’Brien (“O’Brien”), and Sheriff William Gore. ECF No. 7 (“FAC”). In 

the FAC, Plaintiff argued that his right to medical care had been violated due to 

Defendants’ policy of refusing to provide narcotics to inmates. Id. 

On August 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to join defendants Medical 

Administrator Barbara Lee, Deputy Olsen, Sergeant A. Sevilla, and Lieutenant Laura 

Coyne. ECF No. 21. On September 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for joinder of new 

claims and therein only named as defendants, Arturo Leon, Mark O’Brien, and Barbara 

Lee. ECF No. 26. On October 9, 2019, Plaintiff also filed an Ex Parte Notice of 

Retaliation and Request for Duplicate Orders requesting, inter alia, duplicate copies of all 

filings and court orders since July 2019. On October 11, 2019, the Court granted 

Plaintiff’s request for copies, denied Plaintiff’s motions for joinder of new claims and 

new defendants, and directed Plaintiff to file a motion for leave to file a second amended 

complaint if he wished to add defendants and claims to this case. ECF No. 30. 

On November 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”). ECF No. 35. The SAC named Dr. Arturo Leon (“Dr. 

Leon”) and Dr. Mark O’Brien (“Dr. O’Brien”), as defendants and sought to add as new 

defendants, Jon Montgomery (“Montgomery”) and Dane Olsen (“Deputy Olsen”). The 

SAC alleged seven causes of action as follows: (1) Inadequate medical care against Drs. 

Leon and O’Brien; (2) Inadequate medical care – MRSA Infection (failure to provide 

treatment) against Dr. Leon; (3) Inadequate medical care – Denying Prescription against 

Drs. Montgomery and O’Brien; (4) State Supplemental Medical Claims against Dr. Leon; 

(5) Personal Injury against Dr. Leon; (6) Retaliation against Deputy Olsen; and (7) 

Liability of San Diego County based on all other Defendants being agents, employees, or 

co-conspirators.

Due to a clerical error, the motion seeking permission to file a SAC was initially 

processed by the Court as a filed SAC and summonses were issued. ECF No. 35. On 

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December 10, 2019, the Court issued a minute order correcting the error. As a result, the 

summonses issued on November 27, 2019 were withdrawn from the docket. On 

December 20, 2019, the U.S. Marshals personally served Dr. Montgomery with a copy of 

the summons withdrawn by the December 10, 2019 order. ECF Nos. 36-37. On 

December 19, 2019, Deputy Olsen was served by mail with a copy of the withdrawn 

summon. On January 7, 2020, Montgomery and Olsen filed a motion to quash service of 

the summonses. ECF No. 45-1. 

On February 10, 2020, the Court granted the motion to quash as to Defendants 

Olsen and Montgomery, and directed that the Clerk of Court issue a new summons as to 

all the named Defendants in the SAC. In addition, the Court granted the motion to amend 

as to Counts One, Two, Three, Five, Six and Seven, subject to certain limitations and 

denied it as to Count Four.

1

II. Factual Background

The factual background has been recited at length in prior orders.2 In brief and 

most relevant part, Plaintiff arrived at San Diego County Jail on October 11, 2018. In 

Count One, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants are practicing a blanket policy of “no 

narcotic pain medication in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” SAC at 3.

3

 Plaintiff

alleges that, after his arrival, Plaintiff’s pharmacy faxed Plaintiff’s prescriptions to the jail

but Plaintiff was never provided with his prescription medication. Id. at 9. Plaintiff 

argues that there is “no penological purpose” for this policy and that “[s]uch a blanket 

policy is unconstitutional.” Id. at 4. 

 

1 The Court also denied Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and emergency injunction, 

noting that his motion was premised on events outside of the scope of this action and additionally, 

appeared to be moot given the provision of medical care that was already provided to him. ECF No. 53 

at 17-18.

2 The factual background is recited in the Court’s prior orders denying Plaintiff’s motions to join 

defendants and claims (ECF No. 30) and granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s motion for leave 

to file a second amended complaint (ECF No. 53). 

3 Due to the inconsistent paragraph numbering, the Court refers to the ECF pagination for the SAC.

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In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied medical care between October and 

November of 2018 based on the following allegations: (1) Plaintiff developed MRSA4

infection within a day of arriving to jail facility (Count Two); and (2) Plaintiff has been 

denied prescription medication to manage the pain related to his opioid withdrawals.

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the denial of the prescription medication, he has 

“suffered severely”; his “sleep is denied”; and “often times can’t even focus on reading a 

book due to the pain.” Id. Plaintiff states that his “[d]aily activities such as putting on 

clothes, cleaning, and showering can not be done without suffering through severe pain” 

and that his “blood pressure has dramatically increased.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that he 

suffers from cervical and spinal stenosis, degenerative disk disease, scoliosis, and severe 

pain and inflammation in his thoracic spine. Id. at 4, 5.

Dr. Leon

With respect to Dr. Leon, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his right to adequate 

medical on the basis of denial of prescription medication (Count One) as described 

above, and for failure to provide Plaintiff with treatment for the MRSA infection (Count 

Two). With respect to the MRSA infection, Plaintiff alleges that his infection worsened 

for three months until November 30, 2018 when a judge ordered Plaintiff to be seen by a 

medical professional. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that due to Dr. Leon’s failure to provide 

treatment, Plaintiff has sustained a permanent black scar on his ankle and permanent 

feelings of a “numb-like sensation to the touch that sends a minor painful sensation to the 

foot.” Id. at 6. 

Plaintiff also brings a personal injury claim against Dr. Leon for refusing to taper 

Plaintiff off his opioid pain management medications (Count Five) which caused Plaintiff 

to suffer from extreme withdrawal symptoms and to collapse and hit his head on a steel 

 

4 The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines "MRSA" to mean "methicillin-resistant

Staphylococcus aureus." Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/MRSA (last

visited Feb. 5, 2020).

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door on November 5, 2018. Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges that the Physician Desk Reference 

(“PDR”) book warns users of his pain management medication, Lyrica, to “[a]void abrupt 

withdrawal. Gradually taper over 1 week.” Plaintiff further alleges that the PDR also 

warns against abrupt withdrawal from his morphine medication. Id. at 9. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Leon prescribed nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug

(“NSAID”) medication which Plaintiff alleges subjected Plaintiff’s liver and kidneys to 

unnecessary risk of harm. Id. at 8. 

Dr. O’Brien

In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that he has written letters addressed to Dr. O’Brien 

to no avail and that the Defendants (Dr. Leon and Dr. O’Brien) are practicing a blanket 

policy of no narcotic pain medication in violation of the Eight Amendment. Id. at 7. In 

Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. O’Brien is a jail medical officer and has continued 

to deny him the treatments ordered by the jail physician. Id.5

III. Discussion

Defendants Dr. Arturo Leon (“Leon”) and Dr. Mark O’Brien (“O’Brien”) argue 

that Plaintiff’s First, Second, Third, and Fifth Causes of Action fail to state a claim and 

should be dismissed as against them without leave to amend. Plaintiff opposes. 

a. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal 

under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or 

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Rule 8(a)(2), the plaintiff is required 

only to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

 

5 Plaintiff also alleges (1) a retaliation claim against Deputy Olsen, claiming that Deputy Olsen placed 

Plaintiff in administrative segregation one week after Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this Court

(SAC at 10); and (2) that County of San Diego is liable since all other Defendants were acting as agents, 

employees, or co-conspirators of the County. SAC at 11.

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entitled to relief,” and “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if, taking all well-pleaded factual 

allegations as true, it contains enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a 

motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from 

that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to 

relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations 

omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true all facts alleged 

in the complaint, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. al-Kidd v. 

Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless 

the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’ ” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 

957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 

Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to amend would 

be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658; Schreiber, 

806 F.2d at 1401.

b. Violations of Right to Medical Care (First, Second and Third Causes of 

Action)

“The government has an ‘obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is 

punishing by incarceration,’ and failure to meet that obligation can constitute an Eighth 

Amendment violation cognizable under § 1983.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2014). The motivating principle underlying this obligation is the belief 

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that the public “be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the 

deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

“In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care, a 

plaintiff must show deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” Id. (internal

citations omitted). “This includes both an objective standard—that the deprivation was 

serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment—and a subjective standard—

deliberate indifference.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

To meet the objective element of the standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate the 

existence of a “serious medical need.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Such a need exists if 

failure to treat the injury or condition “could result in further significant injury” or cause 

“the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 

(9th Cir. 2006). “Indications that a plaintiff has a serious medical need include the 

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy 

of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Colwell, 

763 F.3d at 1066 (internal citations omitted).

The subjective element of the standard is satisfied by showing “(a) a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by 

the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference “may appear when 

prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be 

shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. 

United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). “In deciding whether there has been 

deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs, we need not defer to the 

judgment of prison doctors or administrators.” Hunt v. Dental Dep't, 865 F.2d 198, 200 

(9th Cir. 1989).

1. First Cause of Action

The First Cause of Action is alleged against Dr. Leon for his refusal to provide 

Plaintiff with morphine in order to treat Plaintiff’s opioid addition withdrawal symptoms 

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and Dr. Leon’s prescription of NSAID medication that Plaintiff alleges aggravated his 

gastrointestinal condition. As against Dr. O’Brien, Plaintiff alleges that he wrote letters 

addressed to Dr. O’Brien to no avail and alleges in a conclusory fashion that Dr. O’Brien 

practiced a blanket policy of no narcotic pain medication. SAC at 3. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed since he has failed to

sufficiently allege both requisite prongs for deliberate indifference: (1) the purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (2) the harm 

caused by the indifference.

On the first prong, a purposeful act or failure to respond, Dr. Leon argues that 

Plaintiff’s complaints about Dr. Leon – i.e., prescribing Plaintiff NSAID medication and 

refusing to taper Plaintiff off morphine are insufficient to show deprivation of medical

care – because they show that Dr. Leon actually did respond to and address Plaintiff’s 

medical needs, and therefore disprove the allegation that Dr. Leon committed a 

purposeful act or failed to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need. Plaintiff 

counters that Defendants did not respond reasonably to the risk since his pharmacy faxed 

over “6 months worth of prescription records” to the prison. ECF No. 65 at 6.6 Plaintiff 

also alleges that Defendants have Plaintiff’s medical records from “Family Health Center 

as well as past medical records proving [his] severe medical conditions.” ECF No. 65 at 

10. Based on this, Plaintiff argues that Defendants were aware that Plaintiff was 

receiving opioid pain management and were also aware “of how long Plaintiff had been 

on opioid pain management” and that insured “FDA guidelines” and standard medical 

care mandate the tapering of any patient’s opioid medication to address withdrawal

symptoms. Id.

 

6 Plaintiff cites Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) for this proposition. While the Supreme 

Court in Farmer did consider the question of “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment, the 

factual allegations are markedly different. In Farmer, petitioner filed a Bivens complaint, alleging that, 

placing petitioner, a transsexual female, in the prisons general population demonstrated a deliberate 

indifference to the petitioner’s safety. 

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On the second prong, harm caused by deliberate indifference, Dr. Leon contends

that Plaintiff has failed to establish any causal relationship between Dr. Leon’s actions 

and his harm. On the refusal to provide Plaintiff with morphine, Defendants allege that 

Plaintiff has failed to establish that Dr. Leon caused Plaintiff “harm separate from the 

underlying pain caused by his preexisting conditions.” ECF No. 58-1 at 6. However, the 

crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that Dr. Leon’s refusal to prescribe Plaintiff morphine to 

ease his opioid addiction withdrawal symptoms has led to his deterioration in health 

because the morphine would have alleviated the pain caused by his preexisting 

conditions. Additionally, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged harm in arguing that he has 

“suffered withdrawals and was sent to the ER multiple times” and also has suffered a 

“continued increase” in his blood pressure due to the chronic pain. ECF No. 65 at 9-10. 

In Jett, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court prematurely dismissed the 

plaintiff’s claims where he alleged that the prison doctors were deliberately indifferent to 

his medical needs in light of his fractured thumb. The Ninth Circuit found that 

“deliberate indifference” could still exist even where prison doctors ordered x-rays, 

prescribed pain medicine, and continued to see the plaintiff prisoner. See Jett, 439 F.3d 

at 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). The Jett court pointed to evidence that suggested the doctors 

might have been aware of aftercare instructions but did not follow them. Id. at 1097. At 

this time, it would be premature to dismiss Plaintiff Sekerke’s claims with respect to the 

refusal to prescribe opioid medication or with respect to the prescription of the NSAIDS. 

See e.g., Goldman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 768 F. App’x 714 (9th Cir. 2019) (district 

court dismissal was premature where incarcerated plaintiff alleged that prison officials 

denied prescribed medication for his opioid addiction).

Dr. Leon argues that Plaintiff’s claims should be considered in the context of 

“medical malpractice,” rather than deliberate indifference, citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 

(“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the 

victim is a prisoner.”). However, in Estelle, the Supreme Court focused on the 

“inadvertent” or “accidental” nature of the prison officials’ actions. Id. at 105-106. The 

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Estelle plaintiff had been prescribed multiple medications for pain related to his lower 

back injury, but his prescription was not filled because the prison staff officials lost his 

prescription. Id. at 100. Here, Sekerke’s allegations target Dr. Leon’s actions that were 

not inadvertent or accidental, but instead, were deliberately undertaken in accordance 

with an internal policy declining to prescribe any narcotics to incarcerated individuals. 

Accordingly, Dr. Leon’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the alleged refusal to 

provide morphine. 

On the question of the provision of the NSAID medications, Dr. Leon argues that 

Plaintiff has not shown how this caused him pain. Plaintiff alleges that the prescription 

of NSAID medications is “so below the standard of care that it amounts to no treatment at 

all.” ECF No. 65 at 7. Plaintiff does not argue that the provision of NSAID medications 

amounts to deliberate indifference, but rather, that it falls short of the requisite standard 

of care. Therefore, while the provision of NSAID medication may provide relevant 

factual background, Dr. Leon’s actions in providing NSAID medication are not 

actionable and the motion to dismiss this theory of liability is GRANTED. 

Similarly, with respect to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Dr. Leon’s attempt to 

present himself as “Dr. Jose Jiminez,” the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged how 

this might have caused any harm. As such, Plaintiff’s theory of liability based on this

allegation is insufficient and the motion to dismiss this theory is GRANTED with 

prejudice.

As to Dr. O’Brien, the two bare allegations against him are so vague that they do 

not reveal a purposeful act or failure to respond that led to Plaintiff’s harm caused by 

deliberate indifference. Consequently, Dr. O’Brien’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

2. Second Cause of Action

The Second Cause of Action is brought against Dr. Leon for his alleged failure to 

provide Plaintiff with any treatment for the MRSA infection that plaintiff contracted 

“within a day of arriving” to the jail. SAC at 6. Dr. Leon argues that Plaintiff’s second 

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cause of action should be dismissed because it is an “impermissible attempt to transform 

a medical malpractice [claim] into a constitutional violation.” ECF No. 58-1 at 7. 

On the first prong of deliberate indifference, a purposeful act or failure to respond, 

Dr. Leon argues that MRSA treatment is not a serious medical need since it does not 

significantly affect his activities or create chronic and substantial pain. On the second 

prong, harm caused by deliberate indifference, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not 

established a causal relationship and his allegations are too conclusory to establish that 

Dr. Leon’s conduct somehow contributed to the worsening of Plaintiff’s condition. The 

Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges that his infection worsened over the course of the three 

months that elapsed before he was able to get adequate treatment and that the delayed 

treatment caused a permanent black scar and permanent damage (i.e., a “numb-like 

sensation to the touch that sends a minor painful sensation to the foot). SAC at 6. At this 

time, dismissing Plaintiff’s claims would be premature. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (9th 

Cir. 2006); Goldman, 768 F. App’x 714 (9th Cir. 2019).

Dr. Leon argues that since Plaintiff did not address this argument in his opposition, 

and so, on this basis, has failed to preserve his argument for appeal citing Walsh v. Nev. 

Dep’t of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006). However, Walsh is 

inapplicable since there the plaintiff failed to plead her claim in her complaint. Further,

the Walsh court explained that “no bright line exists to determine whether an issue has 

been properly raised below, but a workable standard is that the issue must be raised 

sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it.” Walsh v. Nevada Dep't of Human Res., 471 

F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Here, the issue of the MRSA 

infection was properly raised before the trial court and Dr. Leon’s motion to dismiss is 

DENIED.

3. Third Cause of Action

The third cause of action is brought against Dr. O’Brien and against non-movant 

Defendant Jon Montgomery. Plaintiff primarily brings his allegations against 

Montgomery for his alleged instructions to jail physicians to uphold the jail policy of 

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refusing to prescribe any narcotic pain medication for incarcerated individuals. With 

respect to O’Brien, Plaintiff only states: “Defendant Jon Montgomery and Mark O’Brien 

continue to deny the treatments ordered by the jail physician.” SAC at 9. Defendants 

argue that this allegation is too “vague” to be sustained since Plaintiff has alleged neither 

a serious medical need nor causation. The Court agrees with Defendants and finds that

Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts with respect to Dr. O’Brien and GRANTS

Dr. O’Brien’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES the claim with respect to Dr. O’Brien. 

c. Personal Injury (Fifth Cause of Action)

In the Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiff brings a personal injury claim against Dr. 

Leon for refusing to taper Plaintiff off his opioid pain management medications, since, as 

a result, Plaintiff suffered from extreme withdrawal systems and on November 5, 2018, 

Plaintiff collapsed and hit his head on a steel door. Id. at 9. Paramedics were called and 

Plaintiff was sent by ambulance to the UCSD hospital. Id. 

Dr. Leon argues that Plaintiff’s claim should be understood as a claim for 

professional negligence which requires that a plaintiff establish that a duty of care was 

owed, the breach of such duty, a causal connection between alleged breach and claimed 

injury, and actual damage. See Hanson v. Grode, 76 Cal. App. 4th 601, 606 (1999).7

Plaintiff does not address this argument in his opposition. Construing Plaintiff’s claim as 

one for professional negligence, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege what duty 

Defendants have allegedly breached. 

While the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in 

civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the 

benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential 

 

7 Defendant cites California Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.5(2), which does not list the elements 

of an action against a health care provider, but provides that an action for injury against a health care 

provider must be brought within three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff 

discovers the injury, whichever occurs first.

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3:19-cv-0034-GPC-RBB

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elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the 

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff’s injuries that he sustained as a result of hitting his head on the steel door 

can be understood as part of his allegations related to the injuries he suffered as a result 

of inadequate medical care; however, he has not sufficiently alleged a claim for personal 

injury or professional negligence. As such, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the fifth cause 

of action is GRANTED. 

d. Conclusion

In sum, the Court hereby GRANTS DR. O’Brien’s motion to dismiss the first and 

third causes of action without leave to amend and further GRANTS Dr. Leon’s motion to 

dismiss the first cause of action as to the NSAID theory of recovery and the fifth cause of 

action without leave to amend. The Court DENIES Dr. Leon’s motion to dismiss the 

first cause of action as to the failure to provide morphine theory of recovery and the 

second cause of action.8 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2020

 

8

In his opposition, Plaintiff improperly attaches a separate motion for a court order to provide Plaintiff 

with “pro-per legal status and access to the jail’s law library.” ECF No. 65 at 12. The underlying 

motion to dismiss was filed by Dr. Leon and Dr. O’Brien, and not by the County of San Diego. The 

County of San Diego would be the proper party to address this issue and it is not clear whether the 

County of San Diego was served with a copy of this motion. If Plaintiff wishes to have this motion 

heard by the Court, he must file this separately and direct it to the County of San Diego. 

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