Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-mc-00009/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-mc-00009-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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 Defendants’ motion was filed in the Sacramento division of this court, while Pelco’s

motion to quash was filed in the Fresno division. Because both motions sought to limit the scope

of Pelco’s deposition and its production pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, the matters were

deemed related and heard together by the undersigned. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

L.G. PHILIPS LCD CO. LTD.,

Plaintiff, Misc. F-07-0009 EFB

Misc. S-07-0018 FCD EFB

vs.

TATUNG COMPANY, et al., ORDER

Defendants.

__________________________________/

The above-captioned miscellaneous cases were before the undersigned on Wednesday,

March 21, 2007, for hearing on defendant’s motion for protective order and third-party Pelco’s

motion to quash, or alternatively, modify the subpoena duces tecum and notice of deposition.1

Timothy R. Sullivan appeared as plaintiff’s counsel. Marc Koenigsberg appeared as defense

counsel, and Donald R. Fischbach appeared as counsel for Pelco.

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying action is a patent infringement case, which is currently pending in the

District of Delaware. Plaintiff, LG Philips LCD Co. Ltd. (“LG”), owns two patents which relate

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 As discussed at the hearing, there was some confusion by the parties and Pelco, as to

where and when the deposition was to take place. In documents filed with the court, one

deposition notice indicates the deposition is to occur in Sacramento, while another indicates

Fresno. The parties indicated that the deposition will occur in Fresno, California. 

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 After the hearing, counsel for plaintiff contacted the court and advised it that the

discovery deadline had just been extended to sometime in May 2007. In light of that

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to mounting systems used in visual display products such as liquid crystal display monitors,

laptop computers and televisions. Defendants Tatung Company and Tatung Company of

America (collectively referred to as “defendants” and/or “Tatung”) are manufacturers and

resellers of computer monitors and other visual display products. Plaintiff alleges that

defendants have directly infringed its patents with respect to twenty of defendants’ products (the

“accused products”). Plaintiff also alleges that defendants have induced other parties, including

third-party Pelco, to infringe plaintiff’s patents. Pelco, a partnership organized under the laws of

California, is a Tatung customer. 

On February 14, 2007, plaintiff noticed the deposition of Pelco for March 28, 2007,

which was later rescheduled for March 22, 2007 in Fresno, California.2

 Plaintiff also served

Pelco with a subpoena duces tecum identifying documents Pelco was to produce either at or

before the deposition. On March 15, 2007, defendants filed with this court a motion for

protective order to limit the scope of the Pelco deposition and related document production to the

accused products in the underlying Delaware litigation. In support of its motion, defendants

argued that the sought-after discovery was irrelevant and unduly burdensome, and that it sought

defendants’ confidential business and trade information. 

Both plaintiff and defendants point out that currently pending before the Special Master

in Delaware are one or more discovery motions concerning the very issue of whether plaintiff is

entitled to conduct discovery on “unaccused” products. As of the March 21, 2007, hearing, the

Special Master had not yet issued an order on those motions. The discovery cut-off in this case

is March 30, 2007.3

 

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development, the parties and Pelco are free to decide among themselves whether the deposition

will occur on March 22, 2007, or at some other time agreed upon by all those concerned. 

3

On March 7, 2007, third-party Pelco filed a motion to quash or modify the scope of the

subpoena and scheduled deposition. Pelco sought to limit the scope of plaintiff’s discovery,

citing concerns that the requested discovery sought confidential, trade-secret information. After

determining that the motions filed by Pelco and defendants were inextricably related, Pelco’s

motion was reassigned to the undersigned for expedited hearing, in light of the impending

deposition.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants’ motion and Pelco’s motion mirror each other in many ways as they seek to

limit the scope of the third-party discovery served on Pelco. 

A. Defendants’ Motion

Defendants seek a protective order limiting the scope of discovery aimed at third-party

Pelco to the accused products in the underlying suit. Defendants argue that any discovery

beyond the accused products is irrelevant. Plaintiff counters that it properly seeks information

about all potentially infringing products, not just those that have so far been identified. The

court agrees. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), “parties may obtain discovery on

any matter, not privileged that is relevant to the claims or defense of any party. . . .[and] relevant

information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to

lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). In the present case,

plaintiff represents that it has asserted claims that defendants have induced third-parties to

infringe plaintiff’s patents. The discovery propounded on Pelco appears to seek information

related to that claim insofar as it seeks to identify further incidents of infringement regarding the

patents-in-suit.

Defendants also seeks to limit Pelco’s discovery disclosures based on their claims that

such discovery is aimed at obtaining defendants’ proprietary trade secret information. 

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There is no absolute privilege for trade secrets and similar confidential information. 

Chembio Diagnostic Sys. v. Saliva Diagnostic Sys., 236 F.R.D. 129, 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 

 However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7) provides that a district court, “for good

cause shown,” may order “that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or

commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way.” Id. (citations

omitted). To demonstrate good cause under this provision, a party is required to establish a

“particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory

statements.” Bank of New York v. Meridien Biao Bank Tanz, Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 143

(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citations omitted). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific

examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Id. The party seeking the

protective order must also show that the harm caused by its disclosure outweighs the need of the

party seeking the disclosure. Id. 

As discussed in more detail in the following section, defendants have not made a

sufficient showing that the requested information qualifies as a trade secret or other confidential

information. Furthermore, they have not indicated how any harm in disclosure is not adequately

mitigated by the protective order already in place in the Delaware action. 

B. Pelco’s Motion

The court is similarly unpersuaded by Pelco’s assertion the requested discovery threatens

to expose highly confidential business information and trade secrets. First, the court finds that

Pelco has failed to demonstrate that the requested information constitutes trade secret or highly

confidential business information. 

“Trade secret or commercially sensitive information must be important proprietary

information and the party challenging the subpoena must make a strong showing that it has

historically sought to maintain the confidentiality of this information.” Gonzales v. Google, Inc.,

234 F.R.D. 674, 684 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citations omitted). 

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Pelco’s declaration supporting its motion merely asserts that it is not a publicly traded

company, i.e., that it is a partnership. Pelco makes no declarations with respect to safeguards it

uses or has historically used to protect the requested information. Pelco makes no showing that

the communications between it and defendants concerning the sale, manufacturing, marketing

and distribution of visual display products are protected by any privilege, or are otherwise

subject to confidentiality agreements. Furthermore, in a letter dated February 27, 2007, from

Pelco’s counsel to plaintiff’s counsel, Pelco indicates its willingness to produce several

categories of requested information including: “all contracts, supply agreements, licenses or

distribution agreements between Pelco and Tatung or ViewSonic; documents related to technical

specifications, manufacturing or assembly of Tatung and ViewSonic Products;” and, “documents

relating to the marketing of products to Pelco including brochures, etc.” Pelco’s very recently

demonstrated willingness to produce such information undercuts its current claims that this and

similar information are protected trade secrets. 

The court also notes that in defendants’ motion for a protective order, defendants claim

some of the information sought by plaintiff from Pelco are defendants’ proprietary trade secret

information. Neither Pelco nor Tatung has suggested that a confidentiality agreement is in place

to govern their business relationship. Absent such an arrangement between Pelco and Tatung, it

remains unclear how Pelco – a third party not in privity with Tatung – can have in its possession

Tatung’s proprietary trade secret information. 

Further, neither Tatung nor Pelco have provided a convincing explanation as to how the

protective order currently in place in the Delaware action fails to protect the allegedly sensitive

information. That order applies to and protects confidential information produced by parties and

non-parties alike. Under the provisions of that order, trade secret and highly sensitive business

information may be designated as “highly sensitive confidential information.” Such a

designation limits the disclosure of such information to the parties’ attorneys only. Thus, the

provisions of the protective order appear to obviate Tatung’s and Pelco’s concerns about plaintiff

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obtaining a competitive advantage through Pelco’s disclosure of the requested information. 

Finally, based on plaintiff’s representations in its opposition to defendants’ motion for

protective order, it appears that defendants have been less than forthcoming with information

directly sought from it during discovery. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Opposition to Tatung’s Motion for

Protective Order, at 4:23-27 (noting that plaintiff has had to obtain through third party discovery

information that defendants allegedly denied the existence of). Given the difficulty in obtaining

information directly from defendants, third party discovery efforts appear to be justified. 

Further, the protective order already in place accounts for and appears to adequately protect

defendants and Pelco alike from further disclosure of confidential information beyond the

parties’ attorneys. 

III. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Defendants’ motion for a protective order is denied; 

2. Pelco’s motion to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum and notice of deposition

is denied; 

3. Notwithstanding the denial of Pelco’s motion, plaintiff shall limit the use of any

confidential or sensitive information produced by Pelco (at the deposition or in response to the

subpoena) in accordance with the terms regarding the handling of “highly sensitive confidential

information” set forth in the protective order in place in the District of Delaware; 

4. Notwithstanding the denial of defendants’ and Pelco’s motions, if the Special Master

in the District of Delaware issues an order prior to Pelco’s scheduled deposition that limits

plaintiff’s discovery to the accused products, the parties shall comply with the terms of any such

order or ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 21, 2007.

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