Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01446/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01446-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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On May 14, 2015, the above-titled action was reassigned to the undersigned.

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At the time plaintiff filed the instant complaint, plaintiff was incarcerated in the San

Francisco County Jail.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GALE JOSEPH YOUNG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ERIC HOLDER, et al.,

Defendant. /

No. C-15-1446 MMC (PR)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT;

AFFORDING PLAINTIFF LIMITED

LEAVE TO AMEND

Before the Court is plaintiff Gale Joseph Young’s (“Young”) “Complaint Under the

Civil Rights Act,” filed March 30, 2015,1

 by which Young seeks relief against eight officials

or employees of federal agencies and two employees of a municipal agency. Having read

and considered the complaint, the Court rules as follows.

By separate order filed concurrently herewith, the Court has granted Young’s

application to proceed in forma pauperis. Where, as here, a party proceeds in forma

pauperis, the district court “shall dismiss the case” if the plaintiff “fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or “seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). 

Likewise, where, as here, a prisoner2

 “seeks redress from . . . [an] officer or employee of a

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On October 27, 2011, a jury found Young guilty of possessing crack cocaine with

the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and, on February 27, 2012, judgment

was entered. On April 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the

judgment and remanded the matter for retrial. The matter was not retried, however, as, on

August 12, 2014, the indictment was dismissed on motion of the government.

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governmental entity,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the court “shall . . . dismiss the complaint,

or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint – (1) . . . fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

In his complaint, Young alleges his civil rights were violated in the course of a

federal criminal prosecution, specifically, United States v. Young, CR 08-0502 MMC,3 and

has named as defendants ten individuals (see Compl. at 2-3), from whom he seeks

“punitive damages” and “supervision relief” (see Compl. at 3). For the reasons stated

below, the Court finds the complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety.

At the outset, the Court finds Young’s claim for “supervision relief” fails to state a

claim against any defendant named herein. As noted, the indictment in United States v.

Young was dismissed, and, consequently, to the extent Young presently is subject to

“supervision,” it is not the result of United States v. Young. To the extent Young presently

is subject to a term of supervised release imposed by a federal court, Young must seek

relief from the court that imposed such term. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). To the extent

Young’s reference to “supervision” pertains to a restriction imposed by a state court, Young

may only seek relief in federal court by filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus, see

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), against the “state officer who has custody,” see Fed. Rules Governing

§ 2254 Cases, Rule 2(a), after he has exhausted the remedies available in state court, see

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

Accordingly, Young’s claim for “supervision relief” will be dismissed, without leave to

amend and without prejudice to pursuing said claim in an appropriate forum.

The Court next addresses Young’s claims for monetary relief.

First, Young seeks monetary relief from former United States Attorney General Eric

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Holder, United States Attorney Melinda Haag, erroneously sued as “Melinda Haggen,” and

four Assistant United States Attorneys, specifically, William Frentzen, erroneously sued as

“William Frantzen,” Robert Rees, Acadia Senese, and Kathryn Haun. With respect to each

of those six defendants, Young alleges, in full, the following: “Federal prosecutors violated

my civil rights by committing outrageous misconduct to convict me in U.S. v. Young

because I refused to be an investigating informant for the FBI and U.S. Attorney Office.” 

(See Compl. at 3.) Such claim is subject to dismissal without leave to amend, however, as

a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from suit for claims for damages based on

“initiating a prosecution” or “presenting the [government’s] case,” see Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); such immunity is not defeated by Young’s allegation that the

prosecutors had a retaliatory motive, as “[t]he intent of the prosecutor when performing

prosecutorial acts plays no role in the immunity inquiry,” see McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d

1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1987).

Second, Young seeks monetary relief from two peace officers employed by the San

Francisco Police Department, specifically, Kirk Edison and Rick Yic. With respect to each

of those two defendants, Young alleges, in full, the following: “[They] gave false

information and testimony in prosecuting U.S. v. Young.” (See Compl. at 3.) To the extent

the claim is based on testimony given before the grand jury or at trial, the claim is subject

to dismissal without leave to amend, as witnesses in criminal cases are entitled to absolute

immunity from civil liability. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1506 (2012) (holding

“grand jury witness has absolute immunity from any [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim based on the

witness’ testimony,” as well as any claim alleging witness “conspired to present false

testimony”); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 327-28, 345-46 (1983) (holding trial

witnesses entitled to “absolute immunity from civil liability based on their testimony”;

affirming dismissal of claim that police officers gave “false testimony” during plaintiff’s

criminal trial). To the extent the claim is based on “false information,” the claim is subject to

dismissal as Young has not alleged any facts to suggest what conduct, other than

testimony, he may be challenging. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

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(holding complaint fails to state claim on which relief may be granted, where complaint

lacks “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”). The Court will, however, afford Young

leave to amend to allege, if he can do so, facts specifying any other means by which such

allegedly “false information” was conveyed.

Third, Young seeks monetary relief from two special agents employed by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, specifically, Michael Bergh, erroneously sued as “Mikael

Bergh,” and Brian Gilhooly. With respect to each of those two defendants, Young alleges,

in full, the following: “[They] knowingly indicated [sic] me with drugs I did not possess -- in

efforts to make me coroberator [sic] in the murder of Charles Holden a federal informant.” 

(See Compl. at 3.) As discussed above, to the extent the claim is based on testimony

given before the grand jury or at trial, such defendants are entitled to absolute immunity,

and the claim is subject to dismissal without leave to amend. See Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at

1506; Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345-46. To the extent the claim may be based on conduct other

than testimony, the Court will afford Young the opportunity to allege other conduct he may

be challenging. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Young’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

If Young wishes to file a First Amended Complaint, he shall do so no later than

August 21, 2015.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2015 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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