Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02454/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02454-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeffrey C. Stone, Inc. d/b/a/ Summit

Builders Construction Corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Greenberg Traurig, LLP, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-2454-PHX-MHM

ORDER

On September 22, 2010, the Court issued Plaintiff an order to show cause (“OSC”)

in writing why the Court should not impose sanctions against Plaintiff and its counsel, Grant

H. Goodman, based on its “concerns regarding Summit’s meritless action, that produced a

record containing over 2300 pages, [requiring multiple] Defendants to file multiple motions

to dismiss, as well as Summit’s lack of candor with the Court both in its pleadings and during

oral argument.” (Doc. 218)

Prior to the Court’s issuance of the OSC, Defendants had filed motions for sanctions

pursuant to, among other bases, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 206),

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1

 Joinders at Docs. 214, 219, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226.

2

 Joinders at Docs. 217, 219, 221, 222, 224, 226.

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the Court’s inherent power (Doc. 212),1

 and 28 U. S. C. 1927 (Doc. 213).2

I. Background

Plaintiff Jeffrey C. Stone, Inc. d/b/a Summit Builders Construction Company

(“Summit”) filed its original Complaint on November 23, 2009 against twenty-seven

Defendants. Thereafter, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Complaint. (Docs. 11, 19,

20, 22, 29, 32, 63, 74) Summit did not file responses to these motions but instead, on

January 18, 2010, filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 68). In its Amended Complaint,

Summit alleged violations of Federal RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.) and the Arizona

Racketeering Act (A.R.S. § 13-2314.04) statutes; Securities Fraud under Federal law (28

U.S.C. § 1658(b)) and the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (§ 18(b)(4)(d));

Tortious Interference with Contract; Civil Rights Violations (42 U.S.C. § 1983); Breach of

the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (A.R.S. § 44-1001 et. seq.); and Legal

Malpractice/Accounting Malpractice/Beach of Fiduciary Duty. (Doc. 68) Summit alleged

that it was owed more than $9 million under two construction contracts that went unpaid

when lender Mortgages Ltd. went bankrupt. Summit contended that Defendants caused

Mortgages Ltd. to go bankrupt and that Defendants were therefore liable for this debt.

More specifically, Summit alleged that it contracted with Osborn III Partners, LLC

and Central and Monroe, LLC to serve as the general contractor for two construction

projects, Ten Lofts and Hotel Monroe (the “Projects”). (Doc. 68 ¶ 2 and Ex. 2, 3)

Mortgages Ltd. provided the funding for the Projects. (Doc. 68 ¶ 3) According to Summit,

Osborn III Partners and Central and Monroe were controlled by Defendants Jonathan and

Lori Vento and Donald and Shirley Zeleznak, who were directors or officers of the nowbankrupt owner of the Projects, Grace Communities. (Doc. 68 ¶¶ 2 n.2, 49, 51) 

Summit alleged that the Ventos and Zeleznaks, as well as former Mortgages Ltd.

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officers and directors, and certain attorneys, accountants, financial advisors, and auditors

retained by Mortgages Ltd. over the years “colluded for the common benefit of a single

group,” which Summit referred to as the “Enterprise” or “Syndicate.” (Doc. 68 ¶1)

Comparing the Enterprise to Bernie Madoff and Worldcom, Summit alleged that the

Enterprise “built a classic Ponzi scheme,” driving “the primary obligors ML and RB [Radical

Bunny] into insolvency.” (Doc. 68 ¶¶ 1, 4) Summit further alleged that “[o]nce Defendants

. . . had exhausted the financial resources of ML and RB, they moved lock-step to be

‘appointed’ financial caretakers for the same entities in bankruptcy.” (Doc. 68 ¶ 4)

Thereafter, according to Summit, the “professional” Defendants “would compete for even

more cash . . . by diverting the only assets available from the liquidation” of the entities’

assets in the bankruptcies as “‘professional priority administrative claimants.’” (Id.) 

Summit alleged that the Enterprise “made contractual warranties of financial solvency

to Summit,” however, “[r]ather than paying Summit for work performed,” the Enterprise

“devised a scheme to siphon assets away,” and as a result, Summit “was denied payment

exceeding $9,000,000.00.” (Doc. 68 ¶¶ 2, 4)

Thereafter, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Docs. 79,

81, 84, 89, 91, 94, 100, 115, 199, 202) Defendants argued that with respect to the RICO

claims, Summit lacked standing to pursue such claims, and in addition, failed to adequately

allege proximate cause. Defendants also argued that Summit did not have standing to bring

a claim for securities fraud because it failed to plead facts showing that it was a purchaser

or seller of securities. With respect to Summit’s tortious interference with contract claim,

Defendants argued, among other things, that Summit failed to meet even the first element of

such a claim because it had not alleged that it had a direct contractual relationship with

Mortgages Ltd., the alleged subject of the tortious interference. Further, Defendants argued

that because Summit failed to allege that any of the Defendants acted under color of state

law, it failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As to Summit’s claim of breach of the

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Defendants argued that even if Summit was a creditor of

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3

 Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) provides that a “plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order

by filing . . . a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for

summary judgment.” Such dismissal is “without prejudice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B).

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Mortgages Ltd., it would nevertheless lack standing to bring such a claim because only the

bankruptcy trustee has standing to pursue fraudulent transfer and fraudulent conveyance

actions for the benefit of all creditors, and that such claims had been transferred to the

Liquidating Trustee appointed under the confirmed bankruptcy plan. 

With respect to Summit’s legal malpractice claim, Defendant attorneys argued that

Summit failed to allege facts to demonstrate that it had an attorney-client relationship with

them or, in the alternative, that they owed a duty of care to non-client Summit. Defendants

further contended that Summit’s breach of fiduciary duty claim failed because such a claim

requires proof of an actual attorney-client relationship, which Summit failed to allege.

Finally, with respect to Summit’s accounting/auditing malpractice claim, the

accountant/auditor Defendants argued that Summit failed to allege the necessary element that

it is “one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance” Defendants provided

information. Defendants further argue that Summit failed to identify the alleged

“misrepresentations” on which it supposedly relied.

Thereafter, Summit filed responses to the motions to dismiss, and Defendants filed

replies thereto. The Court granted Summit’s request for oral argument, and on August 30,

2010, the Court held a three-hour hearing on the motions. One day later, on August 31,

2010, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i).3

 

II. Discussion

Sanctions Under the Court’s Inherent Power

Federal courts have the inherent power to assess attorney’s fees against counsel in

response to abusive litigation practices. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765

(1980); Chambers v. PASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45, 46 (1991) (courts have the inherent

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4

 “[T]he probate exception[] is a practical doctrine designed to promote legal certainty

and judicial economy by providing a single forum of litigation, and to tap the expertise of

probate judges by conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the probate court.” Wisecarver v. Moore, 489

F.3d 747, 749 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946)).

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power to assess attorney’s fees against counsel who has acted in bad faith, wantonly,

vexatiously, or for oppressive reasons). A district court may impose sanctions if it

“specifically finds bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith.” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d

989, 994 (9th Cir. 2001). “Sanctions are available for a variety of types of willful actions,

including recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness,

harassment, or an improper purpose.” Id. In Fink, the Ninth Circuit held that “an attorney’s

reckless misstatements of law and fact, when coupled with an improper purpose . . . are

sanctionable under a court’s inherent power.” Id. 

Here, Summit’s actions, as well as its misstatements of both fact and law in its briefs

and at oral argument, which continue unabated in its Responses to this OSC, evidence bad

faith. Some illustrative examples follow. 

On January 14, 2010, during the pendency of this case, Summit improperly removed

probate case PB2008-001651, In the Matter of the Estate of Scott M. Coles, from the probate

court to the district court. In Summit’s Response (Doc. 108) to Defendant Coles Estate’s

Motion to Remand, Summit not only failed to cite any authority to support removal, but

blatantly mischaracterized the holding of Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), as

having “entirely done away with” the probate exception.4

 In its July 29, 2010 remand order,

the Court warned Summit that further misrepresentation of the law could result in the

imposition of sanctions. (Doc. 191) 

Summit represented to this Court both in briefing and at oral argument that in Bridge

v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008), the Supreme Court had dispensed

with a direct injury requirement in the context of RICO claims. (Doc. 187 at 5; Tr. at 42)

Bridge says only that a RICO plaintiff claiming mail fraud as a predicate act need not have

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been the party to directly rely on the misstatement sent through the mail, but must still have

been directly injured by the sending of the false statement. 

Summit misrepresented the holding of SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002), to try

to avoid the holding of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), that

only a purchaser or seller of securities may pursue a claim for securities fraud. (Doc. 107 at

17) At the hearing, counsel for Summit conceded—after requiring Defendants to brief the

issue and prepare to argue it at the hearing—that Summit could not pursue a claim for

securities fraud and withdrew that count. (Tr. at 65: “And they are correct, in the purchase

or sale, that’s not [what] we are doing here.”). 

Summit cited United States v. Warneke, 310 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2002), to support the

proposition that bankruptcy fraud and fraudulent transfers can be predicate acts. (Doc. 187

at 10). Warneke is a criminal RICO case about a motorcycle gang, addressing guns,

shootings, and drugs, not bankruptcy or fraudulent transfers. 

Summit cited Natomoas Gardens v. Sinadinos, 2009 LEXIS 110063 (E.D. Cal. 2009),

for the proposition that there could be RICO standing for an individual injury apart from a

corporation. (Doc. 119 at 13-14). That case does not mention the word “RICO” and does

not address RICO standing issues. Instead it deals with a motion to substitute counsel. 

In Summit’s Response to Greenberg Traurig’s Motion to Dismiss Amended

Complaint and Response to Estate of Scott M. Coles’ Joinder, Summit cited Qantel Corp. v.

Niemuller, 771 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D.N.Y 1999) to support its allegation that it has RICO

standing. (Doc. 119 at 16). Summit stated that the court in Qantel “analyzed the question

of whether a shareholder had standing to bring a racketeering suit against defendants who

had manipulated equipment leases and their receivables arising from those leases.” The cited

case, however, concerns an action in which the director of a corporation sought an order

requiring the corporation to pay his attorney’s fees during the pendency of the action. 

Summit’s Response to Francine Coles’ Motion to Dismiss contains an eight-line block

quotation which cannot be found in either of the two cited cases. (Doc. 114 at 4) These

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 Identical documents were filed at 244 and 249.

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examples are but a few of Summit’s many erroneous or incomplete citations.

Summit requested oral argument, which the Court granted. Despite several attempts

by the Court to accommodate counsel’s request to familiarize himself with the courtroom

audio-visual system, counsel failed to take advantage of these opportunities and was woefully

unprepared for the hearing.

During oral argument, in response to the Court’s questioning, counsel stated that

Summit had filed a proof of claim in the Mortgages Ltd. bankruptcy proceeding, which the

bankruptcy record demonstrates otherwise. Counsel also stated that Summit contracted with

Mortgages Ltd., which the record demonstrates to the contrary. As discussed above, Summit

made other misstatements during the hearing about the holdings of certain cases. 

Less than twenty-four hours after the conclusion of the hearing, Summit filed a

voluntary notice of dismissal. Although the plain language of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) allows a

plaintiff to dismiss an action without prejudice before the opposing party serves either an

answer or a motion for summary judgment, Summit’s eleventh-hour dismissal–after multiple

Defendants were required to brief two rounds of motions to dismiss and prepare for an oral

argument requested solely by Summit–violates the purpose of the rule. Rule 41(a)(1) was

designed to “allow[] a plaintiff to dismiss an action without the permission of the adverse

party or the court only during the brief period before the defendant [has] made a significant

commitment of time and money.” Cooter and Gell v. Hartmarx, 496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990).

Summit and Summit’s counsel, Grant Goodman, filed separate responses to the

Court’s subsequent OSC. Counsel’s responses (Docs. 243 and 248)5

 are at times

incomprehensible, assert intemperate and unsupported allegations about certain Defendants,

and contain further misstatements of law and fact. For example, although the language is

difficult to decipher, counsel appears to assert that the Court is without authority to issue

sanctions, including sanctions under its inherent authority: “Due to framing, or lack thereof,

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of the Order to Show Cause a reroute to the ‘inherent authority’ train and 28 U.S.C. § 1927

and the apparition of ‘bad faith’ left the station, ironically, within 5 days of the issuance of

the following opinion’s issuance. Cf. Lawrence vs. Richman Group of CT LLC, et al., (2nd

Cir. September 16, 2010).” (Doc. 248 at 5) First, counsel fails to include a complete citation

to authority, as he does elsewhere in his brief. Next, Lawrence addresses sanctions imposed

under Rule 11 and its safe harbor provision. 620 F.3d 153, 159. Here, Summit’s dismissal

did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to impose sanctions. “[A]ttorney fees and sanctions

are by nature collateral to the merits [of a case] and therefore properly within a district court's

jurisdiction even after a dismissal under Rule 41(a).” Building Innovation Indus., L.L.C. v.

Onken, 473 F. Supp.2d 978, 983 (D. Ariz. 2007) (citing Moore v. Permanente Med. Group,

Inc., 981 F.2d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1992), and Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 396). Further, the

safe harbor provision is incorporated in Rule 11(c)(2); the provision does not apply to

sanctions imposed under a court’s inherent power.

Counsel also misrepresents proceedings in the bankruptcy court that occurred

subsequent to the dismissal of this case. Counsel states that

Three weeks later....Summit in the ML bankruptcy ‘objects’ to sale of the

Ten Lofts Project by ML “free and clear” arising out of ML inequitable

conduct in the form of; (a) payment guarantee failure as a condition

precedent contractually and by statute; (b) direct contact by ML executive

officers to Summit (and its subcontractors) rendering payment “assurances”

and ratification of the contractual warranties of payment; © failure to fund;

(d) untimely contractual funding described as “erratic” and a legal

proximate cause in anticipatory breach; (e) required application of nonbankruptcy law in favor of Summit as creditor; (f) and, title insurance

indemnification as an intended beneficiary arising out of title insurance

bought by ML. (See, Dkt. #2961, 9/21/2010, 2:08-bk-07465). One week

later on September 28, 2010 through Court Order of October 1, 2010

Summit unconditionally was paid as a super-priority “creditor”, and not as

a general unsecured claimant, together with accruing interest on its amount

of damages sustained for $3,445,095.79. (See Dkt. #2976).

(Doc. 244 at 4-5) 

Counsel’s statement that Summit was “unconditionally . . . paid . . . on its amount

of damages sustained” distorts the facts. In its October 1, 2010 Order approving the sale

of the property, the Bankruptcy Court ruled as follows:

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To address the Summit Objection to the extent necessary to permit

the sale as provided in this Order, as a condition to the completion of the

sale of the Property and prior to any other distribution of Sale Proceeds

authorized in this Order, Sale Proceeds, in the sum of $3,445,095.79 shall

be deposited and held in escrow (the “Escrowed Sale Proceeds”) for the

sole benefit of Summit Builders and ML Manager, free from any other

claims or interests other than the undivided ownership interests of Osborn

III Loan LLC and the pass-through investors, with the alleged liens and

interests of Summit Builders and ML Manager to attach to the Escrowed

Sale Proceeds in the same manner, extent and priority that such liens and

interests held in the Property as they existed immediately prior to the sale of

the Property provided for in this Order. The Escrowed Sale Proceeds shall

be deposited in an interest-bearing account with the title company handling

the closing, or another escrow company mutually agreeable to ML Manager

and Summit Builders, and shall be disbursed only pursuant to further Order

of this Court, upon appropriate notice to parties asserting an interest in the

Escrowed Sale Proceeds. All disputes, arguments, claims, other lien

interests and defenses of and between Summit Builders and ML

Manager as the Manager and Agent are preserved.

In re Mortgages Ltd., 2:08-bk-07465-RJH (Doc. 2976). Pursuant to the bankruptcy

court’s Order, the sum of $3,445,095.79 was placed in an escrow account for the benefit

of both Summit and ML Manager, with disbursement by the bankruptcy court conditioned

upon a future state court determination regarding the contested issue of Summit’s lien

priority. Id. (Doc. 2961) Thus, contrary to counsel’s assertion, Summit was not

“unconditionally paid.”

Summit filed a separate response to the Court’s OSC (Doc. 230), in which it does

“not attempt to defend or otherwise justify the pleadings filed on its behalf . . . by its

former counsel Grant Goodman.” Summit asserts that it “has essentially repudiated those 

pleadings when–immediately following Mr. Goodman’s performance at oral argument on

August 30, 2010–it dismissed the entire case . . . .” Moreover, Summit states that it “will

not dispute the reasonableness of the amount sought by Defendants” except to the extent

that the motions and applications for fees do not comply with Local Rule 54.2. 

Summit maintains that “all of the objectionable conduct here lies at the feet of Mr.

Goodman” and that it was “affirmatively misled by Mr. Goodman.” Summit alleges that

during oral argument it “realized that Mr. Goodman’s responses to the Court . . . could

not be squared with Mr. Goodman’s earlier representations to Summit regarding the good

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faith basis for the allegations in the pleadings.”

According to Summit’s own description, Summit “is a large, sophisticated

contractor who possesses a high level of experience and expertise in the business

administration, construction management and superintendence” of complex and highquality projects. (Doc. 68, Ex. 3 “Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and

Contractor”) Summit is also experienced in litigation, having been represented by firms

such as Fennemore Craig and Graif Barrett & Matura. (Doc. 230; 2:08-bk-07465-RJH,

Doc. 2976) In addition, Summit employs in-house counsel. Yet despite this level of

business and legal sophistication, Summit argues, incredibly, that it relied entirely upon

Mr. Goodman’s representations regarding the good faith basis for the allegations in the

pleadings and therefore should be held blameless. 

Summit, however, cannot shift the blame for what it admits is “objectionable

conduct” entirely onto counsel. The Court finds that Summit had an obligation to make at

least a cursory inquiry into Mr. Goodman’s representations in the pleadings and its failure

to do so does not excuse it but rather suggests bad faith. Further, at oral argument,

Summit stood by and allowed its counsel to make blatant misrepresentations of both the

facts and the law. The Courts finds that Summit’s inactions described above, its eleventhhour dismissal, which violates the purpose of Rule 41(a)(1), as well as its improper

removal of the probate case, constitutes conduct that is tantamount to bad faith. 

Accordingly, the Court will assess attorneys’ fees against Summit as well as its counsel. 

See Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a district

court may award sanctions under its inherent powers against a party or his counsel when

either acts in bad faith); accord Byrne v. Nezhat, M.D., 261 F.3d 1075, 1106 (11th Cir.

2001). 

III. Conclusion

In sum, the Court finds that counsel’s repeated misrepresentations concerning the

facts and law in his briefing and during oral argument, despite warning by the Court,

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coupled with counsel’s continued misrepresentations in his responses to the Court’s OSC,

cannot be attributed to mere carelessness but rather constitute an improper effort to

mislead both the Court and opposing counsel. Counsel’s actions in this regard, as well as

his improper removal of the probate case and voluntary dismissal at the eleventh hour,

constitutes conduct tantamount to bad faith and, as such, is sanctionable under the Court’s

inherent power. 

Further, the Court finds that Summit’s failure to make a reasonable inquiry into

Mr. Goodman’s representations, its silence in the face of counsel’s misrepresentations to

the Court, its eleventh-hour dismissal, as well as its improper removal of the probate

case, is conduct tantamount to bad faith. 

Accordingly, pursuant to its inherent power, the Court will award attorney’s fees

as sanctions against both Summit and its counsel, Grant Goodman. In light of the award

of sanctions under this authority, the Count need not address the imposition of sanctions

under Rule 11 or 28 U. S. C. 1927. 

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant Greenberg Traurig LLP’s Motion for

Attorney Fees Pursuant to the Court’s Inherent Power in the amount of $27,300. (Doc.

212)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding attorney’s fees to Defendants DeConcini

McDonald Yetwin & Lacy, P.C. in the amount of $15,592.50.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding attorney’s fees to Defendant Francine

Coles in an amount to be determined upon compliance with the requirements of LR Civ.

54.2.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding attorney’s fees to Defendant Coles

Estate in an amount to be determined upon compliance with the requirements of LR Civ.

54.2.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding attorney’s fees to Defendants Ashley

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Coles, Christopher Olson and Rachel Schwartz-Olson, George and Mary Jane Everette,

Mike and Donna Denning, Nechelle and John Doe Wimmer, Phillip Sollomi, Jr. and

Carolyn L. Sollomi in an amount to be determined upon compliance with the

requirements of LR Civ. 54.2.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding attorney’s fees to Defendant MCA

Financial Group, Ltd. in an amount to be determined upon compliance with the

requirements of LR Civ. 54.2.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding attorney’s fees to Defendants Mayer

Hoffman McCann P.C. and CBIZ Accounting, Tax & Advisory Services, LLC in an

amount to be determined upon compliance with the requirements of LR Civ. 54.2.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding attorney’s fees to Defendants Zeleznak

Family Trust, Vento Family Trust, Jonathan and Lori Vento, Donald and Shirley

Zeleznak, and Ryan Zeleznak in an amount to be determined upon compliance with the

requirements of LR Civ. 54.2.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding attorney’s fees to Defendants Hirsch &

Shah, CPAs LLC in an amount to be determined upon compliance with the requirements

of LR Civ. 54.2.

On July 29, 2010, the Court granted the Coles Estate’s Motion to Remand. (Doc. 

191) At that time the Court also granted the Coles Estate’s request under 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c) for attorney’s fees and costs incurred as a result of the removal. (Id. at 4.) The

Coles Estate having submitting its fee application pursuant to LR Civ. 54.2, and the Court

having reviewed it for reasonableness,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding the Coles Estate attorney’s fees and

costs in the amount of $15,511.45, to be paid by Summit as originally ordered.

In light of the foregoing,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot MCA Financial Group, Ltd.’s

Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. (Doc. 206)

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Defendants DeConcini

McDonald Yetwin & Lacy, P.C.’s Application for Award of Attorney’s Fees. (Doc. 213)

In light of the award of attorney’s fees to Defendant Francine Coles above, and in

the Court’s discretion,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant Francine Coles’ Motion for

[Further] Sanctions Against Grant H. Goodman. (Doc. 250)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall submit their fee applications

pursuant to LR Civ. 54.2 within 14 days of the entry of this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 20 days of the service of this order,

Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ counsel shall jointly cause the delivery of a copy of this order 

to the appropriate authority within the Arizona State Bar for whatever further

investigation, review, or action it may deem appropriate.

DATED this 21st day of March, 2011.

Case 2:09-cv-02454-NVW Document 253 Filed 03/21/11 Page 13 of 13