Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01388/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01388-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RALPH WILLIAM CAMPOS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES A. YATES, )

)

Respondent. )

___________________________________)

1:07-cv-01388-OWW-TAG HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 

FOR VIOLATION OF THE ONE-YEAR

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

ORDER TO FILE RESPONSE WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

September 21, 2007. A preliminary review of the Petition, however, reveals that the petition may be

untimely and should therefore be dismissed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

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dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed on th

September 21, 2007, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner was convicted on January 20, 1999. (Doc. 1, p. 1). In this

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See, Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9 Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus th

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See, id. 

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case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court on May 10, 2000. Thus,

direct review would conclude on August 8, 2000, when the ninety-day period for seeking review in

the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v.

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). th th

Petitioner would have one year from August 8, 2000, or until August 8, 2001, absent applicable

tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

As mentioned the instant petition was filed on September 21, 2007, over six years after the

limitations period expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, the

petition is untimely and must be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999) see, also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 1 th

557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned

that tolling the limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the

next appellate level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent

the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. However, the limitations period is

not tolled for the time such an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct.

2120, 2129 (2001). 

///

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In other words, unless Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition in the Stanislaus County Superior Court on or 1

before August 8, 2001, and remained pending until denied on 2006, the statute of limitations would have expired before he

filed the instant petition. Although the Court finds it highly unlikely that the Stanislaus County Superior Court took five years

to decide his first petition, the Court will permit Petitioner to file a response to this Order to Show Cause in which he may

provide any additional information regarding the filing date of the first petition, so that the Court can calculate the running

and tolling of the one-year statute with greater accuracy. 

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Petitioner asserts that he filed a “round” of state habeas petitions to exhaust the claims in the

instant petition, beginning with a petition in the Stanislaus County Superior Court. (Doc. 1, p. 13). 

Petitioner does not indicate the date on which he filed this petition, but does indicate in attached

documents that it was denied on October 18, 2006 and that then a successive petition in the same

court was denied on November 17, 2006. Petitioner then filed a habeas petition in the California

Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“5 DCA”) that was denied on December 21, 2006. (Id. at th

14). Petitioner then filed a petition in the California Supreme Court that was denied on June 13,

2007. (Id.). 

However, as mentioned, the one-year limitations period would have already expired on

August 8, 2001, a date that was, in all likelihood, well before Petitioner filed his first state habeas

petition in the Stanislaus County Superior Court. A petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the 1

limitations period, as is apparently the case here, has already expired prior to filing a state habeas

petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir. 2000); see Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, th

1259 (11 Cir. 2000)(same); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (petitioner fails to exhaust

th

claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year limitations period). 

The documents filed by Petitioner indicate that he had filed a previous federal petition in this

Court that was denied and his subsequent appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit was similarly rejected. It thus appears that Petitioner believes that he is entitled to keep filing

federal petitions until a Court permits him to proceed to the merits. This is incorrect. The Court

must dismiss an untimely petition under the AEDPA.

The Court cannot conclude otherwise than that the petition is untimely and must be

dismissed. However, in an excess of caution, the Court will permit Petitioner to file any further

evidence he has that would entitle him to AEDPA tolling such that the petition would be timely. 

Petitioner will be afforded the opportunity, in his response to this Order to Show Cause, to provide

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additional information regarding when and where he filed his state habeas petitions if he believes

that the instant petition is timely and that he is entitled to statutory tolling under the AEDPA. 

 ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of service

of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In his response, Petitioner should provide

the dates on which he filed any state habeas petitions, the names of the courts in which he

filed those petitions, the results, if any, of those petitions, and the dates the results were

issued. Petitioner should provide, where possible, copies of all petitions filed as well as

copies of the rulings by the state courts.

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in Findings and 

Recommendations recommending that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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