Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04068/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04068-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0401 Labor Management Disclosure Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH GLASS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C-06-4068 MMC

ORDER DENYING ANTHONY D’ARIA’S

MOTION TO INTERVENE; VACATING

HEARING

(Docket No. 130)

Before the Court is class member Anthony D’Aria’s (“D’Aria”) motion, filed December

15, 2006, to intervene in the instant action, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs and defendants have filed separate oppositions to the motion;

D’Aria has filed a reply, and, with the Court’s permission, plaintiffs and defendants have

filed separate surreplies. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition

to the motion, the Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument, see

Civil L.R. 7-1(b), hereby VACATES the January 19, 2006 hearing on the motion, and rules

as follows.

BACKGROUND

The instant class action is asserted on behalf of a class consisting of all persons

who, at any time during the applicable statute of limitations, are or were employed as

stockbrokers at any of the brokerage offices of UBS Financial Services Inc. or its

predecessors, UBS Paine Webber and Paine Webber Group Inc., anywhere in the United

States or its territories, excluding California. (See Compl. ¶ 1.) On July 28, 2006, the

parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a proposed settlement. On August

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25, 2006, the Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement and set a fairness

hearing for January 19, 2007. Pursuant to the Class Notice, any request to opt out of the

settlement and any objections to the settlement were required to be submitted no later than

November 14, 2006. (See Class Notice at 7 ¶¶ C and D.) 

On October 13, 2006, class member Lawrence Kaufmann (“Kaufmann”) filed a

motion to intervene in the instant action for purposes of obtaining an order rejecting the

proposed settlement, consolidating the instant action with Bowman v. UBS, C-04-3525

MMC, discharging current counsel for the Bowman and Glass plaintiffs, and appointing

Kaufmann’s counsel to represent the Bowman and Glass classes. On November 14, 2006,

Kaufmann withdrew his motion to intervene.

On November 16, 2006, the Court issued an order in which the Court noted

Kaufmann’s motion contained objections to the proposed settlement, and invited the parties

to file memoranda addressing whether Kaufmann should be permitted to withdraw his

objections pursuant to Rule 23(e)(4)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

D’Aria did not file a timely objection to the settlement. Nonetheless, on

November 16, 2006, D’Aria filed a motion to substitute himself for Kaufmann and to adopt

Kaufmann’s motion to intervene. That same date, the Court issued an order denying

D’Aria’s motion.

On November 17, 2006, the Court held a fairness hearing in the Bowman action and

granted final approval of the Bowman settlement.

On December 1, 2006, plaintiff, defendants, and D’Aria filed memoranda addressing

whether the Court should permit Kaufmann to withdraw his objections to the proposed

settlement. Thereafter, plaintiffs and defendants filed separate motions to strike D’Aria’s

memorandum; by separate order filed concurrently herewith, the Court has granted those

motions.

On December 15, 2006, D’Aria filed the instant motion to intervene in the Glass

action. 

/ /

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DISCUSSION

D’Aria seeks leave to intervene as a matter of right, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; he does not seek to intervene permissively, pursuant to

Rule 24(b). D’Aria contends his interests and the interests of the class have not been

adequately represented by plaintiffs and their counsel; he seeks to intervene for the

purposes of (1) objecting to the proposed settlement; (2) replacing plaintiffs’ counsel with

his own counsel or, alternatively, appointing his own counsel as co-counsel with plaintiffs’

current counsel; (3) obtaining discovery as to “the circumstances under which the Glass

action was prosecuted and settled” and the circumstances under which Kaufmann withdrew

his objection and motion to intervene; and (4) litigating the action to trial or attempting to

negotiate a new settlement.

A. Intervention As Matter Of Right

“Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1)

when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when

the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of

the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a

practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the

applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.” See Fed. R. Civ. P.

24(a). Where, as here, the applicant seeks to intervene as of right, and in the absence of a

federal statute conferring an unconditional right to intervene, the applicant must

“demonstrate that (1) [he] has a significant protectable interest relating to the property or

transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the disposition of the action may, as a

practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect [his] interest; (3) the

application is timely; and (4) the existing parties may not adequately represent the

applicant’s interest.” See United States v. Alisal Water Corporation, 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th

Cir. 2004) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “The party seeking to intervene bears

the burden of showing that all the requirements for intervention have been met.” Id.

(emphasis in original). 

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1. Significant Protectable Interest Related to Subject of Action

“An applicant for intervention has a significantly protectable interest if the interest is

protected by law and there is a relationship between the legally protected interest and the

plaintiff’s claims.” See Alisal, 370 F.3d at 919. “An applicant generally satisfies the

‘relationship’ requirement only if the resolution of the plaintiff’s claims actually will affect the

applicant.” Donnelly v Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 410 (9th Cir. 1998).

As D’Aria is a member of the Glass class, he has a significant protectable interest

relating to the subject of the instant action. See, e.g., In re Community Bank of Northern

Virginia Mortgage Loan Litigation, 418 F.3d 277, 314 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding when unnamed

class member seeks to intervene in class action, significant protectable interest factor “is

satisfied by the very nature of class action litigation”). No argument to the contrary has

been submitted.

Accordingly, the Court finds D’Aria has demonstrated a significant protectable

interest in the instant litigation.

2. Impairment of Applicant’s Ability to Protect His Interest

The next issue is whether “the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter,

impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect [his] interest.” See Alisal, 370 F.3d at

919. 

Defendants argue that D’Aria’s interests will not be impaired as a result of

the instant settlement because D’Aria was free to opt out of the settlement and to assert, by

means of a separate action, any claims he wished to pursue against defendants. See, e.g.,

Hawaii-Pacific Venture Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 564 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1977). In

Hawaii-Pacific, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to intervene

because, inter alia, the moving class members, who had not received notice of the

settlement and arguably were not bound thereby, could “pursue[ ] their individual claims in

independent actions” and thus did not “sustain[ ] their burden of proving impairment or

impediment to their ability to protect their interest.” See id.

Here, however, D’Aria received timely notice of the proposed settlement, D’Aria has

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 Moreover, as D’Aria observes, the Ninth Circuit has stated, albeit in a footnote, that

where a motion to intervene is timely, a class member “should have the right to intervene in

a class action if he can show the inadequacy of the representation of his interest by the

representative parties before the court,” thus suggesting that members of a class, by their

very nature, meet the first two requirements for intervention as a matter of right. See Diaz

v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1405 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal

quotation and citation omitted); see also Community Bank, 418 F.3d at 314 (holding when

class members “seek intervention as a matter of right, the gravamen of a court’s analysis

must be on the timeliness of the motion to intervene and on the adequacy of

representation,” because the “interest” and “impairment” requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) “are

satisfied by the very nature of Rule 23 representative litigation”). The Court considers the

question of timeliness infra.

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not opted out, and the November 14, 2006 deadline to opt out of the settlement has

passed. Because D’Aria has not opted out of the class settlement, and the deadline to do

so has passed, the Court finds D’Aria has demonstrated the disposition of the instant action

may impair or impede his ability to protect his interest in the claims constituting the subject

of the instant litigation.1

3. Timeliness

The third factor, as noted, is whether the motion to intervene is timely. See Alisal,

370 F.3d at 919. Timeliness “is a flexible concept”; “[a]lthough delay can strongly weigh

against intervention, the mere lapse of time, without more, is not necessarily a bar to

intervention.” See id. at 921. Generally, in determining whether a motion to intervene is

timely, courts weigh the following factors: “(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an

applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to the other parties; and (3) the reason for

and length of the delay.” See id. Where a proposed intervenor seeks to intervene for

purposes of objecting to a proposed settlement, timeliness generally is measured from the

date the proposed intervenor received notice that the proposed settlement was contrary to

its interest. See United States v. Carpenter, 298 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding

motion to intervene timely where proposed intervenors “acted as soon as they had notice

that the proposed settlement was contrary to their interests”); see also Community Bank,

418 F.3d at 314 (finding motion to intervene “presumptively timely” where filed before

deadline to opt out of class settlement).

Here, notice of the proposed settlement was mailed to class members on September

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15, 2006. (See Holland Decl. ¶ 7.) On September 22, 2006, D’Aria signed a “Consent to

Join Settlement” form, by which he “consent[ed] to be a party plaintiff” in the instant action

and “authorize[d] Class Counsel to act on his . . . behalf in all matters relating to this action,

including the settlement of his . . . claims”; he also submitted a claim form, seeking his

share of the settlement proceeds. (See McInerney Decl. Exs. 1 and 2.) D’Aria attests that

“beginning in early to mid-September, 2006, and continuing in October, 2006,” he had

discussions with his counsel about the instant action and the proposed settlement. (See

D’Aria Decl. ¶ 3.) Although D’Aria thus concedes he was notified of the proposed

settlement and discussed it with counsel, he nonetheless failed to file an objection to the

settlement prior to the November 14, 2006 deadline. The instant motion to intervene was

filed December 15, 2006, more than a month after the deadline for class members to opt

out of the settlement.

a. First Factor

The first factor in the timeliness analysis is “the stage of the proceeding at which an

applicant seeks to intervene.” See Alisal, 370 F.3d at 921. The Ninth Circuit has held that

a proposed intervenor is not necessarily untimely merely because the motion to intervene is

filed after a significant amount of time and effort has been expended in accomplishing a

settlement. See Carpenter, 298 F.3d at 1125 (holding motion to intervene timely where

proposed intervenors filed “as soon as they had notice” of settlement’s terms).

Here, however, D’Aria concedes he received timely notice of the proposed

settlement yet failed to file a timely objection thereto. Rather, as noted, he submitted, on

September 22, 2006, a “Consent to Join Settlement” form, as well as a claim for his share

of the settlement proceeds. (See McInerney Decl. Exs. 1 and 2.) Indeed, after receiving

notice of the settlement, D’Aria waited nearly three months before moving to intervene, until

the last possible date, resulting in his motion being heard on the same date as the final

fairness hearing.

The primary purpose of the Court’s setting a deadline for class members to file

objections to a proposed settlement is to avoid the disruption caused by motions such as

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the instant motion to intervene. Accordingly, the Court finds the stage of the proceedings at

which D’Aria seeks to intervene weighs against a finding of timeliness.

b. Second Factor

As noted, the second factor in the timeliness analysis is “the prejudice to the other

parties.” See Alisal, 370 F.3d at 921. Here, as plaintiffs correctly point out, D’Aria’s

intervention and the subsequent reopening of the litigation “could be disastrous to the

[class member] brokers,” because a recently issued Opinion Letter by the Department of

Labor casts significant doubt on the strength of their claims. (See Plaintiffs’ Opp. at 15.)

Plaintiffs in the instant action seek recovery of overtime pay and assertedly improper

wage deductions on behalf of a class of stockbrokers, under the federal Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”) and state law. The FLSA contains various exceptions to its

requirement that employers pay their employees time and a half for work in excess of 40

hours per week, including, in particular, an exemption for “any employee employed in a

bona fide . . . administrative . . . capacity.” See In re Farmers Insurance Exchange, 466

F.3d 853, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). On November 27, 2006,

months after the proposed Glass settlement was negotiated, the Department of Labor

issued an Opinion Letter stating stockbrokers meet the requirements of the “administrative

exemption” to the FLSA and, thus, are not entitled to overtime under the FLSA. (See

McInerney Decl. Ex. 9 at 8.) Courts “must give deference to the DOL’s interpretation of its

own regulations through, for example, Opinion Letters.” See Farmers, 466 F.3d at 860.

As a result of the issuance of the November 27, 2006 Opinion Letter, plaintiffs’

federal overtime claims are significantly weakened. It is likely that plaintiffs’ state law

overtime claims will be similarly impacted. See, e.g., Franklin v. Breton Int’l, Inc., 2006 WL

3591949 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that because plaintiff therein was “an exempt

employee under the FLSA, he [was] also exempt under the overtime requirements of the

New York” law).

Consequently, if the motion to intervene were granted, plaintiffs and the other class

members are likely to be significantly prejudiced by having to either litigate their overtime

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claims, or attempt to negotiate a new settlement thereof, in the context of the Department

of Labor’s recent Opinion Letter.

Accordingly, the Court finds the prejudice resulting to other class members if D’Aria

were permitted to intervene weighs against a finding that D’Aria’s motion to intervene is

timely.

c. Third Factor 

The Court next turns to the third factor in the timeliness analysis, “the reason for and

length of the delay.” See Alisal, 370 F.3d at 921. 

D’Aria submits no evidence with respect to the reason he did not seek to intervene

before the deadline had passed for class members to object to the proposed settlement. 

D’Aria attests only that when he learned Kaufmann had withdrawn, he authorized counsel

“to challenge the adequacy of the settlements on [D’Aria’s] behalf and to put him forward in

place of” Kaufmann. (See D’Aria Decl. ¶ 4.) In his motion to intervene, D’Aria argues that

UBS and Kaufmann deliberately delayed providing notification of Kaufmann’s withdrawal of

his motion to intervene until it was too late for other class members to file their own

objections to the proposed settlement. D’Aria relies on Kaufmann’s declaration, in which

Kaufmann states he reached a settlement with UBS on November 7, 2006, a week before

Kaufmann provided notice to the Court of such settlement. (See Kaufmann Decl., filed

November 15, 2006, ¶ 5.) There is no evidence, however, that UBS conspired with

Kaufmann to delay announcement of Kaufmann’s withdrawal of his motion.

Moreover, D’Aria submits no evidence that he relied on Kaufmann to object on his

behalf, or that he would have filed his own objection had Kaufmann not moved to intervene. 

In any event, nothing precluded D’Aria from filing his own timely objection to the proposed

settlement. Indeed, other class members filed timely objections. Accordingly, the Court

finds D’Aria has failed to provide adequate justification for his delay in seeking to 

intervene.

With respect to the length of the delay, as noted, D’Aria delayed for nearly three

months after receiving notice of the settlement, as well as close to a month after the

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deadline for class members to object to the proposed settlement had passed. “A class

member must intervene when he knows or has reason to know that his interests might be

adversely affected by the outcome of the litigation.” Alisal, 370 F.3d at 923. 

Here, D’Aria knew of the settlement, consulted with counsel, and nonetheless failed

to object to the settlement in a timely manner. The Class Notice clearly set forth November

14, 2006 as the deadline for submission of objections to the settlement, and expressly

provided that any class member who failed to object in the manner set forth in the Class

Notice would be “deemed to have waived any objections and [would] be foreclosed from

making any objection.” (See Class Notice at 7 ¶ C.) D’Aria thus was aware that by failing

to object in a timely manner, he was forgoing an opportunity to object to the settlement. 

D’Aria has offered no adequate support for an order permitting him to evade that deadline

by submitting untimely objections to the settlement in the form of a motion to intervene.

Accordingly, the Court finds “the reason for and length of the delay” in seeking

intervention weighs against a finding of timeliness.

d. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds D’Aria’s motion to intervene is

untimely and, consequently, that D’Aria has not shown he is entitled to intervene as a

matter of right. See Alisal, 370 F.3d at 919 (holding “party seeking to intervene bears the

burden of showing that all the requirements for intervention have been met”) (emphasis in

original).

4. Adequacy of Representation

Although D’Aria’s motion for intervention as a matter of right fails because he has

not demonstrated such motion is timely, the Court nonetheless will continue its analysis of

the four-factor test. 

The fourth and final factor is whether “the existing parties may not adequately

represent the applicant’s interest.” See Alisal, 370 F.3d at 919. In determining adequacy

of representation, the Court considers three factors: “(1) whether the interest of a present

party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2)

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whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether

a proposed intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that other

parties would neglect.” Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“The most important factor in determining the adequacy of representation is how the

interest compares with the interest of existing parties.” Id. “When an applicant for

intervention and an existing party have the same ultimate objective, a presumption of

adequacy of representation arises.” Id. “If the applicant’s interest is identical to that of one

of the present parties, a compelling showing should be required to demonstrate inadequate

representation.” Id.

Here, D’Aria and the named Glass plaintiffs have the same ultimate objective:

obtaining compensation for assertedly unpaid overtime and improper wage deductions. 

Indeed, D’Aria, in his proposed complaint-in-intervention, expressly adopts “all of the

allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint in this action except those that relate to the adequacy of

the putative class representatives,” and alleges no additional substantive causes of action

against defendants. (See Proposed Complaint in Intervention ¶ 3.) Thus, D’Aria must

make a “compelling showing” of inadequate representation. See Arakaki, 324 F.3d at

1086; see also League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1306

(9th Cir. 1997) (“When a proposed intervenor has not alleged any substantive

disagreement between it and the existing parties to the suit, and instead has vested its

claim for intervention entirely upon a disagreement over litigation strategy or legal tactics,

courts have been hesitant to accord the applicant full-party status.”).

D’Aria argues class counsel is inadequate for the following reasons: (1) the dollar

amount of the settlement is too low compared to the actual damages suffered by the class;

(2) each class member in the instant action will receive significantly less than the recovery

per class member in Bowman; (3) the instant action was settled without any formal

discovery, expert analysis, or other formal litigation activity; (4) the attorneys’ fees

negotiated are too high compared to the time and effort expended; (5) the settlement was

negotiated as a “claims made” settlement under which all unclaimed settlement funds and

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 The parties estimate the losses at approximately $128 million to $180 million. (See

New York Attorney General Decl. Ex. 1 (Transcript of Aug. 11, 2006 preliminary approval

hearing) at 13:1-14:5.) 

3

 D’Aria’s contention that plaintiffs’ counsel did too little to prepare for settlement

negotiations adds no further support in the absence of a showing that the settlement

amount is inadequate. Consequently, the Court denies as moot defendants’ motion, filed

January 11, 2007, to strike the supplemental declaration of John Halebian as conclusory,

in that the opinions challenged thereby concern the subject of adequate preparation.

11

any portion of the claimed attorneys’ fees that are not approved by the Court will revert to

UBS; and (6) proper notice was not provided to the class. (See Motion at 2-3.) In essence,

D’Aria complains that the amount of the settlement is too small, the amount of attorneys’

fees sought is too large, and the circulation of the notice was too narrow.

In asserting the amount of the settlement is inadequate, D’Aria sets forth no analysis

with respect to the likelihood of success on the merits of the class claims if such claims

were tried rather than settled. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026

(9th Cir. 1998) (providing district court must consider, inter alia, “the strength of the

plaintiffs’ case” in determining whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate). 

Although D’Aria contends the Glass plaintiffs suffered between $240 million and $880

million in unpaid overtime,2

 he provides no analysis of the applicability to the class

members of the FLSA’s administrative exemption. As discussed above, the Department of

Labor recently issued an Opinion Letter stating the administrative exemption applies to

stockbrokers and, consequently, that stockbrokers are not entitled to overtime pay under

the FLSA. Because the reasonableness of the settlement depends not only on the claimed

amount of damages, but also on a showing of the strength of the plaintiffs’ case, and D’Aria

fails to provide any analysis on the latter point, his computation of damages fails to provide

adequate support for a finding that the amount of the settlement is inadequate.3

D’Aria’s next contention is that the amount of the settlement is too low when

compared with the settlement in Bowman. There is no evidence, however, that the

Bowman and Glass settlements constitute parts of a single settlement, let alone a single

settlement pursuant to which settlements funds were allocated to the Bowman class at the

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expense of the Glass class members. As the Court noted at the Bowman fairness hearing,

the Bowman action was settled prior to the filing of any of the actions that ultimately were

consolidated in the Glass action, and the amount of the Bowman settlement was unaffected

in any way by the later settlement negotiations in the Glass action. (See McInerney Decl.

Ex. 3 (Transcript of Nov. 17, 2006 Bowman fairness hearing) at 12:6-24.) 

Moreover, D’Aria fails to set forth any independent analysis of the Glass class

members’ likelihood of success on the merits of their claims as compared to that of the

Bowman plaintiffs. Rather, D’Aria relies entirely on the analysis set forth in the amicus brief

submitted by the Attorney General of the State of New York, in which the Attorney General

compared the California law applicable to the Bowman plaintiffs with the New York law

applicable to the New York class members in the instant action. When UBS filed a detailed

response to the amicus brief, explaining the differences between the two states’ laws, the

Attorney General filed a reply conceding California’s overtime laws are significantly more

favorable to plaintiffs than New York’s overtime laws. D’Aria presents no argument to the

contrary.

In arguing the amount of attorneys’ fees negotiated reflects inadequate

representation, D’Aria fails to recognize that the Ninth Circuit has held 25% of the gross

settlement amount to be the benchmark for attorneys’ fees awarded under the percentage

method. See, e.g., Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the

settlement provides for a maximum fee of $11,250,000, which is 25% of the $45 million

settlement amount. (See Amended Joint Stipulation of Settlement ¶ 29(a).) Moreover, the

Ninth Circuit has held that where, as here, the settlement provides that unclaimed

settlement funds revert to the defendant, the district court must award fees as a percentage

of the entire fund, or pursuant to the lodestar method, not on the basis of the amount of the

fund actually claimed by the class. See Williams v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 129

F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1997). Consequently, D’Aria has failed to show counsel’s claim

for a 25% fee award indicates either some impropriety or inadequacy in counsel’s

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 The Court, of course, ultimately will determine whether the amount claimed should

be awarded.

5

 See also Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 (9th

Cir. 1990) (holding unclaimed amount of class action judgment against defendant may be

returned to defendant “when deterrence is not a goal of the statute or is not required by the

circumstances”); In re Microsoft I-V Cases, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 721 (2006) (noting,

under California law, “a court approved settlement could properly include a ‘reversion of . . .

funds to the defendant,’ such as the one-third reversion” of unclaimed settlement funds

provided for in settlement therein) (citation omitted; ellipsis in original).

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representation.4

The Court likewise finds unpersuasive D’Aria’s contention that plaintiffs’ counsel

inadequately represented the class by agreeing to a settlement under which any unclaimed

settlement funds, or the amount by which attorneys’ fees are reduced, will revert to UBS. 

D’Aria cites no authority holding improper a settlement providing for such reversion of

unclaimed or unawarded funds; indeed, there is authority suggesting to the contrary. See,

e.g., Williams, 129 F.3d at 1027 (discussing class action settlement without expressing

concern as to provision for reversion of unclaimed funds to defendant); Wilson v.

Southwest Airlines, Inc., 880 F.2d 807, 816 (5th Cir. 1989) (approving settlement containing

provision that unclaimed funds under consent decree would be divided between plaintiffs’

counsel and defendant); Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, 3 Newberg on Class Actions §§

10:15, 10:17 (4th ed. 2002) (citing cases).5

Finally, with respect to notice, D’Aria argues that plaintiffs’ counsel “failed to give

proper notice to the class by misrepresenting the nature and amount of the proposed

settlement, limiting actual notice solely to the last known address of class members, and

failing to publish any notice in a widely circulated financial publication likely to be seen by

class members.” (See Motion to Intervene at 3:19-22.) D’Aria does not identify the

asserted misrepresentations, and the Court is aware of none. Nor does D’Aria submit

evidence supporting his assertion as to the use of addresses. By contrast, plaintiffs’

counsel attests “notice was not limited to the last known address of class members;

instead, the claims administrator did address updated searches and re-mails.” (See

McInerney Decl. ¶ 14; see also Holland Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.) Finally, plaintiffs’ counsel attests he

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 In light of this ruling, the Court does not reach plaintiffs’ argument that D’Aria’s

counsel engaged in unethical conduct by criticizing the manner in which Kaufmann, his

former client, withdrew his motion to intervene in the instant action. 

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“took out a full page advertisement in the Registered Rep,” which, he further attests, is a

“monthly national publication subscribed to by a large number of brokerage houses,

branches and brokers themselves.” (See id. ¶ 15 and Ex. 10.) D’Aria submits no evidence

to the contrary. Consequently, D’Aria has not shown the notice provided to the class was

inadequate.

In sum, D’Aria has failed to demonstrate he “would offer any necessary elements to

the proceeding that other parties would neglect.” See Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, D’Aria has not shown, let alone made a

“compelling showing” of, see Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1086, inadequate representation. 

Consequently, even if his motion to intervene had been timely, said motion, for this

additional reason, will be denied.6

 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, D’Aria’s motion to intervene in the instant action is

hereby DENIED.

This order terminates Docket No. 130.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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