Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02611/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02611-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH KEKOA MANIBUSAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDWARD J. ALAMEIDA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-2611 JSW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND

DENYING DISCOVERY MOTION AS

MOOT

(Docket nos. 16, 22, 27) 

INTRODUCTION

Joseph Kekoa Manibusan, a death row inmate confined at the California State Prison

at San Quentin ("CSP-SQ"), filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Defendants have moved for summary judgment, Plaintiff has opposed the motion, and

Defendants have filed a reply. Plaintiff also has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment,

which Defendants have opposed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's complaint and grants

Defendants' motion for summary judgment and denies Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary

judgment.

BACKGROUND

This action concerns Plaintiff's placement and retention in administrative segregation

as a gang member. The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

California Department of Corrections ("CDC") administrators believe prison gangs

pose a severe threat to the safety and security of California prisons. Prison gangs are

responsible for murders, assaults and extortion within and outside California's prisons.

Inmates who are thought to be gang members are investigated and, if deemed to meet

the requirements in Title 15, California Code of Regulations section 3378, are validated as

gang members and put in administrative segregation ("ad-seg") in a security housing unit

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1Gang associates, who apparently have weaker ties with the gangs than do gang members,

also are subjected to the validation process. Because Plaintiff was validated as a gang member,

this order discusses only gang members.

2

("SHU").1 The general process of identifying and validating a prison gang member is

described in Defendants' motion for summary judgment and the supporting declaration of

John Thompson, a correctional officer at CSP-SQ assigned to the prison Investigative

Service Unit ("ISU"), which is located in the same office as the Institutional Gang

Investigations Unit ("IGIU"). As part of his job, Thompson assists the IGIU in gathering and

maintaining information regarding prison gangs and gang activities at CSP-SQ, and

evaluating the gang status of individual inmates at the prison. 

Active gang members are identified through the "validation" process. Each CDC

institution has an Institutional Gang Investigator ("IGI") who tracks gang activities and

investigates those suspected of prison gang affiliation. Any evidence of gang activity or

affiliation collected by the IGI is noted in the inmate's central file. Validation of an inmate as

a gang member or associate requires a minimum of three original, independent source items

of documentation indicative of association with validated gang members and/or associates. 

Generally, the practice is to rely on at least some information provided by a confidential

informant. However, California regulations preclude reliance on such statements unless

other documentation corroborates information from the source, or unless the circumstances

surrounding the event and the documented reliability of the source satisfies the decision

maker that the information is true. Once the IGI believes there is sufficient documentation to

validate an inmate as a prison gang affiliate, he prepares a validation package for submission

to the Law Enforcement and Investigative Unit ("LEIU") in Sacramento. If confidential

information is relied upon, the prisoner is provided with a Confidential Information

Disclosure Form which briefly summarizes the substance of the accusation, insofar as that

can be done without disclosing the informant's identity.

Once an inmate is validated as a prison gang member or associate by the LEIU, the

Institution Classification Committee ("ICC") determines whether the inmate should be

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retained in ad-seg and given an indeterminate SHU term based on his gang affiliation. An

indeterminate SHU term means that the inmate will remain in the SHU for the duration of his

prison term unless he drops out of the gang. Although the ICC does not, as a general matter,

reexamine the underlying bases of the validation, the inmate is brought to the ICC and given

an opportunity to address the committee before a final decision on his SHU placement is

made.

Plaintiff was validated as a member of the Northern Structure ("NS") prison gang on

December 3, 2002, and consequently the ICC on December 12, 2002, assigned him to the

CSP-SQ "adjustment center," which is the equivalent of the SHU at other prisons. The

validation decision was based on information contained in a validation package consisting of

(1) a confidential memorandum authored by Defendant Correctional Officer Deseo, dated

July 23, 2002 (Declaration of Denise Dull in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Ex.

F (submitted separately under seal)), (2) a CDC 128-B chrono authored by Defendant

Correctional Officer Nakamura, dated August 12, 2002 (Dull Decl. Ex. G), and (3) a CDC

128-B chrono also authored by Defendant Correctional Officer Nakamura, dated September

3, 2002 (Dull Decl. Ex. H). 

The confidential memorandum dated July 23, 2002, which has been filed under seal

and which the Court has reviewed in camera, stated that a confidential reliable informant

told staff that Plaintiff had been recruited into the NS and was an active NS member, and

how Plaintiff's status as a condemned inmate allowed him to be active in the NS. 

The August 12, 2002, chrono stated that Defendant Correctional Officer Nakamura

had reviewed an outgoing letter written by inmate Gabriel Martinez, a validated NS prison

gang member in East Block ad-seg. The letter was addressed to Dora Ybarra of Modesto,

California. In the letter, Martinez asked Ybarra to send him a package in his friend's name. 

He wrote that his friend's name was "Joseph (Joe)," and included in the letter a form for

sending packages to condemned inmates. The sender's name section of the form had the

name Dora Ybarra, and the recipient section of the form was filled out "To: Joseph

Manibusan, T-06046." From this information, Nakamura concluded that Plaintiff was

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communicating with NS prison gang members and/or associates in the East Block of the

prison, and that this could be used as a direct link for validating Plaintiff as a member or

associate of the NS. (Dull Decl. Ex G.)

The September 3, 2002, chrono, also authored by Nakamura, stated that he had

reviewed an outgoing letter from inmate Carlos Ballardo, a validated NS member housed in

Carson Section, to Alicia Ballardo of Fairfield, California. The letter included the statement,

"Give this hook-up to Dennis and tell him I said if he can send $35.00 and I'll give it back my

first day out and tell him gracias! Joseph Manibusan T-06046." From this, Nakamura

concluded that Plaintiff was actively communicating with NS members and/or associates 

and that this could be used as a direct link for validating Plaintiff as a member or associate of

the NS. (Dull Decl. Ex. H.)

On November 19, 2002, a confidential information disclosure form, also known as a

CDC 1030 form, regarding the confidential information used to validate Plaintiff's gang

status, was placed in Plaintiff's prison central-file and made available for his review. The

confidential memorandum itself was placed in the confidential part of his file and was not

made available for Plaintiff's inspection. Copies of Nakamura's chronos were also placed in

Plaintiff's central file when they were written and copies were given to Plaintiff. 

On November 14, 2002, Gang Coordinator/Investigator Lt. K. Brandon filled out a

CDC form 812, also know as a gang validation package, which starts the process for

identifying an inmate as a gang member. On the form he listed the three pieces of

information in Plaintiff's file. On November 19, 2002, Correctional Officer J. Thompson, of

the IGIU, filled out a Gang Status Review memorandum and wrote that the three pieces of

information in Plaintiff's file indicated that Plaintiff was a member of the NS. On December

3, 2002, LEIU reviewer D.T. Hawkes conducted a Gang Validation/Rejection Review of the

three documents in Plaintiff's file and found that they met the validation requirements of Title

15 of the California Code of Regulations section 3378, and validated Plaintiff as a member

of the NS prison gang. (Dull Decl. Ex. E.) On December 12, 2002, Plaintiff appeared before

the ICC for a Program Review. He was told that based upon his recent validation as a NS

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member he would be housed in the CSP-SQ adjustment center. He was told of his option to

debrief, and was informed that he could appeal the ICC's decision. According to the notes of

the ICC chairperson, D. Wooten, Plaintiff indicated he understood and had no questions. 

(Dull Decl. Ex. J.) Plaintiff appealed his validation as a member of the NS through all three

levels of administrative review. 

Because a prisoner who is labeled as a gang member generally remains in ad-seg until

he paroles, debriefs or dies, Plaintiff may remain in ad-seg for the rest of his life term unless

the decision to categorize him as a gang member is set aside. Plaintiff has remained in the

adjustment center since December 2002. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court will grant summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (a fact is material if it might affect the

outcome of the suit under governing law, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine "if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.") 

Generally, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of

the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden

then shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or

by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted). 

The court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See

T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The

evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the

inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

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nonmoving party. See id. at 631.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution protects individuals against governmental deprivations of life, liberty or

property without due process of law. Changes in conditions of confinement for a prison

inmate may amount to a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, provided

that the liberty interest in question is one of real substance. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

477-87 (1995). As Plaintiff has noted, in Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394-95

(2005), the Supreme Court held that indefinite placement in Ohio's "supermax" facility

imposes an "atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context." Because

indefinite placement in California's SHU imposes deprivations similar to those discussed in

Wilkinson, it appears that California prisoners might have a liberty interest in not being

placed indefinitely in the SHU. Accord id. at 2395 (necessity of harsh conditions in light of

danger that high-risk inmates pose to prison officials and other inmates does not diminish

conclusion that conditions rise to a liberty interest in their avoidance). The Court need not

decide whether this is the case, however, because even if an atypical and significant hardship

was imposed, Plaintiff received all of the due process to which he was entitled. 

When prison officials initially determine whether a prisoner is to be segregated for

administrative reasons and a liberty interest of real substance is implicated, due process

requires that they hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the

prisoner is segregated, inform the prisoner of the charges against him or the reasons

segregation is being considered, and allow the prisoner to present his views. Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). Due

process also requires that there be an evidentiary basis for the prison officials' decision to

place an inmate in segregation for administrative reasons. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 455 (1985); Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104-05. This standard is met if there is "some

evidence" from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. 

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2There is some authority for the proposition that the evidence relied upon to confine an

inmate to the SHU for gang affiliation must have "some indicia of reliability" to satisfy due

process requirements. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1273-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see

also Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 874

(1991) (considering accuracy of polygraph results when used as evidence to support placement

in administrative segregation); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987) (evidence

relied upon by a prison disciplinary board must have "some indicia of reliability").

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Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1105. The "some evidence"

standard applies to an inmate's placement in SHU for gang affiliation. See Bruce v. Ylst, 351

F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2003).2 

Plaintiff alleges that his right to due process was violated because he did not receive

proper notice prior to his validation that he was under investigation by the IGIU for gang

association or membership, he never received a copy of the validation packet used against

him, and he was not given an opportunity to confront the evidence against him and to 

present his views. However, due process in this context requires only that the prisoner be

notified of the reasons for the segregation and provided an informal hearing within a

reasonable amount of time--it does not require detailed written notice of charges or a written

decision describing the reasons for placing the prisoner in administrative segregation. See

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1101; see also Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.

1997) (the more stringent procedural protections required by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539 (1974), for disciplinary decisions are not necessary because placement in the SHU for

gang affiliation is done as administrative segregation rather than disciplinary segregation);

accord Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 2397 (determining that prisoners are constitutionally entitled

only to the informal, non-adversary procedures set forth in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.

Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), and Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460

(1983), prior to assignment to "supermax" facility). Here, it is undisputed that the pieces of

information relied upon to validate Plaintiff as a gang member, with the exception of the

confidential informant memorandum itself, were placed in his file and were available to him

for viewing, and that copies of the CDC 1030 form and the CDC 128-B chronos were

provided to Plaintiff. A copy of the LEIU's decision validating him as a gang member also

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was placed in his file. All of these were available to be viewed by Plaintiff prior to the

December 12, 2002, ICC hearing.

Plaintiff also argues that he was unable to present an effective defense because he was

not allowed to see the confidential memorandum relied upon to validate him. Defendants

state that the memorandum contains confidential information that, if disclosed to the inmate,

would present a grave security risk to the inmates identified in the memoranda and harm the

prison staff's efforts to thwart prison gangs. Even in the disciplinary segregation context--

where procedural protections are greater--the Supreme Court has indicated that the level of

specificity required to give a prisoner notice of the charges against him could vary in

response to legitimate penological needs. "[T]he Court has stated that in identifying the

safeguards due process requires in this context, courts should remember 'the legitimate

institutional needs of assuring the safety of inmates and prisoners' and avoid 'burdensome

administrative requirements that might be susceptible to manipulation.'" See Zimmerlee v.

Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 188 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1207 (1988) (quoting

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-55). One legitimate concern for prison administrators

is the possibility that disclosure of certain information can endanger another inmate's safety,

such as might occur if prison administrators disclose the identity of a confidential inmateinformant or disclose enough details about the information provided by such an informant

that the accused can figure out his identity. Cf. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 568-69. There are

affirmative and undisputed statements from declarant Thompson that disclosing the

information in the confidential memorandum to Plaintiff would severely endanger the safety

of numerous inmates, and would seriously threaten the ongoing prison investigation into the

organization and activities of prison gangs. The Court finds that these legitimate institutional

concerns justify the denial of access by Plaintiff to the confidential memoranda in accord

with due process. 

Plaintiff further argues that the evidentiary support for his validation is insufficient. 

The Court has reviewed the confidential memorandum in camera and the two chronos, and

finds that they meet the "some evidence" standard, and that the evidence relied upon has

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sufficient indicia of reliability. With respect to reliability, the confidential memorandum

contains information obtained by a correctional sergeant during a debriefing interview with a

NS member. The NS member identified Plaintiff as a member of the NS and stated how

Plaintiff's status as a condemned inmate allowed him to be active in the NS. This

information met CDC reliability standards because other information provided during the

interview was corroborated by separate sources, and the informant provided selfincriminatory information. The non-confidential chronos are reliable insofar as the letters

they rely upon were written by NS members and refer directly to Plaintiff, and the letters

themselves were provided as part of the validation package. Accordingly, the Court finds

that the information in the memorandum and chronos is constitutionally reliable, that is, they

contain some factual information from which the validating committee could reasonably

conclude that the information was reliable. Moreover, Officer Thompson has stated in his

declaration that safety considerations prevent the disclosure of the confidential memorandum

or the name of the informant. See Zimmerlee, 831 F.2d at 186-87. 

With respect to the requisite quantum of evidence, Defendants concede that although

the two chronos indicate that Plaintiff has ties to the NS, "[t]aken alone, [they] . . . would not

be sufficient to support Plaintiff Manibusan's validation as a member of the NS. When

considered in conjunction with the confidential material presented against Plaintiff, however,

they support his validation." (Thompson Decl. at 4.) Because the Court has found the

memorandum to be a reliable source of evidence, it can be considered. Moreover, the

number of sources relied upon is not relevant to the federal due process analysis of whether

there is "some evidence" to support the determination. The state regulation's requirement of

three separate sources is a matter of state law and does not dictate the outcome of the federal

analysis. Even a single source of information can be sufficient to satisfy the federal due

process "some evidence" standard. See Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288. The Court finds that

Defendants have met the some evidence standard.

Plaintiff has failed to show that there is a triable issue of fact on his claim that he was

not afforded due process when he was validated as a member of the NS prison gang. 

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Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

II. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

In his opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion and cross-motion for

summary judgment, Plaintiff cites Castillo v. Terhune, et al., C 94-2847 MJJ (N.D. Cal.), in

which the parties entered a settlement agreement on September 23, 2004, agreeing to certain

changes in the Department of Corrections' gang-validation procedures. Plaintiff alleges that

his due process rights were violated because Defendants have not complied with the revised

procedures. Defendants have attached a copy of the settlement agreement to their reply and

opposition to Plaintiff's cross-motion, and the Court's takes judicial notice of the settlement

agreement's existence. 

The settlement agreement does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim for relief

because it is not a determination that there was any constitutional violation in the gangvalidation process. Moreover, a settlement agreement does not provide a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, the violation of which is a necessary element of a

§ 1983 claim. As a practical matter, the settlement agreement also does not aid Plaintiff

because he was not a party to it and it was made after the LEIU validated Plaintiff as a gang

member (that is, Plaintiff was validated as a gang member on December 3, 2002, while the

settlement agreement was not fully executed until September 23, 2004). The settlement

agreement states expressly that its provisions shall be applied on a prospective basis only. 

See Def.'s Ex. A at ¶ 25. Although the settlement agreement contemplates changes in the

gang validation criteria, the settlement agreement itself acknowledges that it will take several

months for those changes to be implemented. Finally, the agreement provides that,

There can be no individual inmate relief regarding an inmate's gang validation

granted through the [process set forth in the settlement agreement]; individual

inmate concerns regarding his/her own gang validation can only be raised as

exemplars by [Castillo's] counsel of alleged noncompliance. Individual inmate

concerns must be raised through the California Department of Corrections

inmate appeals process (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084, et seq.) and separate

suit.

Id. at ¶ 31(c). 

Plaintiff's third level review was denied at the Director's Level on October 23, 2003,

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3This is not to say that Plaintiff cannot pursue his continued retention in the adjustment

center under the "inactive review" provisions adopted by the Department of Corrections pursuant

to the settlement agreement. Before coming to federal court, however, he must exhaust his

administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

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almost a year before the settlement agreement was entered. Thus, there is no practical way

he could have raised a challenge for failure to comply with the new procedures by way of the

administrative grievance process. Accordingly, Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary

judgment is DENIED.3 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows, 

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. (Docket no. 16.) 

Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. (Docket no. 27.)

Plaintiff's discovery motion is DENIED as moot. (Docket no. 22.)

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against

Plaintiff and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2006

_____________________________

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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