Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00844/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00844-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeffrey Michael Charley, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 07-0844-PHX-NVW (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 filed by Petitioner Jeffrey Michael Charley. Doc. #1. Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Petitioner pled guilty on September 19, 2003, to one count of second degree murder and one

count of armed robbery. Doc. #7, Exh. B, C, D. On October 31, 2003, Petitioner was

sentenced to 16 years in prison (flat time) for the second degree murder conviction and a

concurrent term of 10.5 years in prison for the armed robbery. Doc. #7, Exh. F, G. 

On January 27, 2004, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction relief under Rule

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure followed by a Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief on May 10, 2004. Doc. #7, Exh. H, I. In a Minute Entry filed on September 29, 2004,

the trial court summarily dismissed the petition. Doc. #7, Exh. J. Petitioner sought review

in the Arizona Court of Appeals but the request was denied in an order filed on August 16,

Case 2:07-cv-00844-NVW Document 8 Filed 06/04/08 Page 1 of 5
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2005. Doc. #7, Exh. K, L. Petitioner’s request for review in the Arizona Supreme Court was

denied on January 23, 2006. Doc. #7, Exh. M, N.

Through counsel, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court

on April 23, 2007. Doc. #1. Petitioner, who was 14 years old at the time of the offenses,

alleges in his petition that the process by which his case was transferred to and charged in

adult court violates substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Doc. #1 at 5. Petitioner further alleges that the process violates the

constitutional right to equal protection and the separation of powers doctrine. Id. On July

16, 2007, Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. #7.

Despite being represented by counsel and being informed in the screening order of the

opportunity to file a reply, Petitioner has not filed one.

The Presentence Investigation report summarized the facts of the case as follows:

On February 7, 2002, Jeffrey Michael Charley and three of his juvenile

friends were smoking marijuana and firing a .22 caliber rifle at bottles and

birds in a vacant lot. When they observed two ice-cream vendors, the

defendant stated he was going to “jack” them by shooting one and striking the

other. One juvenile reportedly did not take the defendant seriously. However,

when they observed another ice-cream vendor, the defendant grabbed the rifle

and declared he was going to “jack this fool,” because this vendor was alone.

Suddenly, the defendant ran toward the vendor, who was partially obstructed

by dust from all-terrain vehicles in the area. A short time later, the other

juveniles became concerned and investigated. They discovered the body of

forty-four year old Jose Miguel Casarez-Vasquez, who died from a single

gunshot wound to his chest.

On February 14, 2002, police arrested Jeffrey Charley, after an

investigation. In an interview, the defendant reportedly decided to rob the

victim for money. He did this despite his friends, whom he refused to identify,

telling him both it was “a stupid thing to do” and that he would get caught.

When Mr. Charley confronted the victim, he commanded, “Give me your

fucking money.” Mr. Casarez-Vasquez did not seem to understand and spoke

something in Spanish. The victim grabbed the barrel of the rifle and a struggle

ensued. The defendant, who had his finger on the trigger of the rifle,

“flinched” when the rifle discharged. Mr. Charley did not think Mr. CasarezVasquez was shot, at first, and struck him in the face with the weapon. After

the victim fell to the ground and appeared dead, the defendant bent down and

took $50.00 from the victim’s fanny pack. Mr. Charley ran from the scene,

hiding the weapon and the money.

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DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s challenge to the process by which Petitioner

was transferred to and charged in adult court is barred by his guilty pleas to second degree

murder and armed robbery. Respondents alternatively contend that the equal protection and

separation of powers claims are procedurally defaulted and that all of the claims fail on the

merits. Because the court agrees that Petitioner’s claims are barred by his guilty pleas, the

court need not reach the merits of the claims or whether certain claims are procedurally

defaulted.

As a general rule, a guilty plea eliminates subsequent claims of constitutional

violations that occurred before the plea. United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th

Cir. 1989); Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1985). “It is well settled that

a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised

by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.” Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,

508 (1984). "[O]ne who voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty to a criminal charge may

not subsequently seek federal habeas corpus relief on the basis of pre-plea constitutional

violations." Hudson v. Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981

(1985). An unconditional guilty plea "cures all antecedent constitutional defects." United

States v. Floyd, 108 F.3d 202, 204 (9th Cir.1997) (emphasis in original). "When a criminal

defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with

which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the

deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may

only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea." Tollett v. Henderson,

411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).

Here, Petitioner’s indictment charged him with first degree murder and armed

robbery. Doc. #7, Exh. A. With the assistance of counsel, Petitioner entered a plea

agreement in which the first degree murder charge was reduced to second degree murder,

thereby significantly reducing the possible prison term. Doc. #7, Exh. B. The plea

agreement contained no conditions preserving Petitioner’s right to challenge the procedure

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by which he was transferred to adult court. Id. The transcript of the change of plea

proceeding shows that the guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made and

Petitioner does not claim otherwise. Doc. #7, Exh. C at 8. By voluntarily and intelligently

pleading guilty to second degree murder and armed robbery, Petitioner has waived federal

habeas relief for any alleged constitutional violations that occurred before the plea.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims alleging constitutional defects in the process by which he

was transferred to adult court are barred. 

Respondents further argue that an exception to the general rule barring collateral

attack on a guilty plea does not apply here. In United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 765

(1989), the Court explained that a pleading defendant does not waive a claim that the

government lacked the power to bring the indictment. As Respondents argue, however,

Petitioner’s claims do not challenge the State of Arizona’s authority to charge him as an

adult. Petitioner simply challenges the process by which the charges were brought in adult

court rather than juvenile court. Moreover, Petitioner does not argue that this exception, or

any exception, applies to him. By failing to file a reply, he has done nothing to refute

Respondents’ argument that his guilty pleas foreclose the ability to obtain habeas relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Petitioner’s voluntary and intelligent

guilty pleas bar federal habeas relief on the claims presented. Petitioner may not challenge

any alleged federal constitutional defects in the process by which he was transferred to or

charged in adult court. The court will therefore recommend that the petition be denied and

dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

 That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

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which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 3rd day of June, 2008.

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