Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03904/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-03904-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1Matthew Cate is the Secretary of the CDCR and was not

appointed until May, 2008. Although Cate was not the Secretary

during the relevant time period of Plaintiff’s factual allegations,

he was named as a Defendant for the limited purpose of injunctive

relief. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOANNE WARWICK,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC; CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND

REHABILITATION; PATRICIA MILLER;

MATTHEW CATE; MARVIN SPEED; TED RICH;

MICHAEL BRADY; CLAUDIA BELSHAW; JILL

BROWN; JOHN D. STOKES; and GARY

SWARTHOUT,

Defendants. /

No. C 08-03904 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY

JUDGMENT MOTIONS

This case arises out of Plaintiff's May 31, 2005 termination

as a California Parole Advocacy Program (CalPAP) attorney. 

Defendant University of the Pacific (UOP) has filed a motion for

summary judgment and Defendants California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), Patricia Miller, Matthew

Cate,1 Marvin Speed, Ted Rich, Michael Brady, Claudia Belshaw, Jill

Brown, John D. Stokes and Gary Swarthout have filed a separate

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Joanne Warwick opposes the

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Plaintiff does not oppose the motion with respect to the

claims against Patricia Miller, Michael Brady, Claudia Belshaw,

John Stokes and Gary Swarthout. Therefore, the Court grants

summary judgment in favor of those Defendants on all claims brought

against them. Plaintiff opposes the motion with respect to the

claims against Matthew Cate, Marvin Speed, Ted Rich, Jill Brown,

UOP and CDCR.

3The Court grants Defendant CDCR’s request to take judicial

notice of the terms of the injunction.

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motions.2 The motions were heard on April 8, 2010. Having

considered oral argument and all of the papers filed by the

parties, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

The CalPAP program was created as a result of the permanent

injunction in Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, No. Civ. S-94-0671 (E.D.

Cal. Mar. 9, 2004), which required the State of California to

establish a parole revocation attorney program.3 CalPAP is

operated by UOP through a contract with the State of California. 

CalPAP trains, appoints and assigns panel-contracted attorneys to

all parolees facing parole revocation proceedings. CalPAP

attorneys are paid $180 per case that they are assigned. 

In November, 2004, Plaintiff signed an agreement with CalPAP

to become an at-will independently contracted CalPAP panel

attorney. Case assignments as a CalPAP attorney were dependent on

“satisfying the conditions for admittance to correctional

facilities” pursuant to the applicable California regulations, such

as California Code of Regulations Title 15 §§ 3172.1 and 3178. 

Fourth Amended Complaint (4AC), Exh. 1 at 1. 

During her tenure as a CalPAP attorney, Plaintiff voiced her

concerns about (1) how clients were assigned to CalPAP attorneys,

(2) her difficulties in gaining access to San Quentin to meet with

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4BPH is a division of CDCR.

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To the extent that the Court relied upon evidence to which

Defendants objected, the objections are overruled. The Court did

not rely on any inadmissible evidence in reaching its decision. To

the extent the Court did not rely on evidence to which Defendants

objected, the objections are overruled as moot.

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her clients and (3) that Board of Parole Hearings (BPH)4 and CDCR

officials failed to comply with the law and impeded her ability to

serve her parolee clients. She claims that Defendants conspired to

terminate her employment with CalPAP in retaliation for voicing

several of these concerns. 

For instance, in February, 2005, Plaintiff complained to a

CalPAP supervising staff attorney, Andrew Walker, that, even though

she was able to visit her clients in county jail, once they were

transferred to San Quentin, she was not given clearance to visit

them and they were reassigned to other CalPAP attorneys. Walker

wrote to Mary Swanson, the CalPAP program director, stating,

“Joanne Warwick is throwing a fit b/c she is not on the Clearance

List” for San Quentin. Fuentes Decl., Exh. B(1). Although not

clear from the record, apparently San Quentin maintained a list of

CalPAP attorneys who were authorized to visit the prison. Swanson

contacted Claudia Belshaw, the CDCR employee at San Quentin who

acted as the liaison for the Valdivia Task Force, and helped

arrange for Plaintiff to be added to this list. It is also not

clear from the record exactly when Plaintiff was officially added

to the list, but Plaintiff believes that she was added sometime in

April, 2005. Warwick Decl., ¶ 19.5

In April, 2005, Plaintiff also complained to Walker about her

difficulties with representing a particular parolee, Johnny Hodge. 

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6Ms. Sandoval’s official position with CDCR and her

relationship to CalPAP is not clear from the record. 

4

Plaintiff represented Hodge before he was transferred to San

Quentin. When Hodge was transferred to San Quentin, Sonia

Sandoval, a “prison representative,”6 told her that he probably

would be assigned to a different CalPAP attorney. Id. Sandoval

agreed not to let any other CalPAP attorney see him because

Plaintiff was originally assigned to him. Warwick Decl. ¶ 19. 

Plaintiff visited Hodge and he told her that a different

CalPAP attorney had been assigned to him. Plaintiff claims that

Hodge’s new attorney convinced him to accept a bad plea bargain by

telling him that Plaintiff thought the plea deal was in his best

interest. Plaintiff claims that she never spoke to Hodge’s new

attorney about the plea deal and would never have recommended that

he take such a deal. Plaintiff was concerned that Hodge did not

receive appropriate representation. She complained to Walker. 

Walker reported this incident to CalPAP Senior Staff Attorney, Paul

Lacy. Walker also notified Ted Rich, Deputy Commissioner of the

BPH, about the incident. Plaintiff continued to visit Hodge, but

claims to have done so “not as a UOP/CalPAP attorney but based on

her previous clearance.” Opposition at 7. She helped Hodge file a

complaint with the California State Bar against the other CalPAP

attorney. Plaintiff claims that Lacy responded angrily to her when

the two discussed the bar complaint. Warwick Decl. ¶ 26. 

On May 20, 2005, Plaintiff expressed her frustrations with the

CalPAP program in a nine-page letter that she faxed to BPH

Executive Director Marvin Speed. In the letter, Plaintiff wrote

about “malfeasance by parole and [BPH] staff and how the Valdivia

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7BRR appears to be an acronym for a prison official, but the

parties do not define it for the Court.

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Injunction and parolee due process rights were not being

respected.” Warwick Decl. ¶ 28. Plaintiff named Rich, as well as

many other BPH and CDCR officials, as those who were responsible

for the problems with CalPAP. Warwick Decl., Exh. D. Some of her

specific complaints in the letter include denial of access to her

clients’ files, lack of notice regarding her clients’ hearings,

failure of prison officials to investigate violations by prison

guards and vindictive acts taken against her clients whenever they

made complaints to prison officials. Plaintiff also telephoned

Speed and left him a voicemail about her concerns.

Speed forwarded the voicemail to his special assistant, Ramon

Lopez. Lopez wrote Speed an email describing some of the contents

of the voicemail. He noted, “One disturbing bit of information

from the BRR7 is that he observed this attorney ‘hug’ the parolee

in the hallway following a hearing, telling him that ‘everything

would be alright.’” Fuentes Decl., Exh. A(1). Speed forwarded

Lopez’s email to Mary Swanson asking her for advice on how to deal

with Plaintiff’s concerns raised in her letter. Speed did not

mention the hug incident or Lopez’s email. Swanson responded by

asking Speed to fax her the letter and telling him that “we can

take it from here.” Id. She also told him, “You may want to

advise her, in writing, that there are procedures in place for the

[BPH] to hear cases and that she should follow those procedures. I

can assure you that we will deal with this as swiftly as possible

on our end.” Id. She also asked Speed, “Is CDC going to take any

action regarding her clearance into the institutions? Part of the

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8The Court takes judicial notice that Ukiah is approximately

100 miles from San Quentin, a drive of approximately two hours. 

Google Maps, http://maps.google.com.

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agreement to be a contract attorney with CalPAP is that the

attorney has standing to enter the institution. I would like to

know what action CDC is planning on taking.” Id. Speed responded,

“I need to check on the CDC side. I will get back to you on this.” 

Id. 

On May 24, 2005, Lacy called Plaintiff to say that the

“‘higher-ups’ at the [BPH] were not happy with [her] letter.” 

Warwick Decl. ¶ 29. 

On May 26, 2005, Plaintiff picked up a parolee named David

Frenna when he was released from San Quentin and drove him to the

Ukiah parole office8 for an initial interview with Michael Miller,

his parole officer. Mr. Miller claims that, prior to arriving for

the visit, Plaintiff called him and told him that she had “paid for

a motel room for parolee Frenna using her CalPAP earnings since she

couldn’t do much else for him.” M. Miller Decl. ¶ 4. Mr. Miller

informed his supervisor, David Romero, of this telephone call. 

This information was relayed by email to CDCR Facilities Captain

Patricia Miller on the morning of May 27. Ms. Miller became

concerned that “Plaintiff might have become overly-familiar with

her clients.” P. Miller Decl. ¶ 5. She was worried that such

“over-familiarity could jeopardize the safety and security of an

institution, e.g. an inmate might attempt to use an outsider to

smuggle contraband into prison, or to carry coded messages outside

of prison in order to commit crime.” Id. Therefore, Ms. Miller

telephoned Belshaw to share this information. Ms. Miller wanted

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Belshaw to give this information to the warden “in hopes of pulling

[Plaintiff’s] Gate Pass Clearance.” P. Miller Decl., Exh. A. 

Belshaw stated that she referred the information to the warden’s

office because only the warden of an institution can revoke a gate

pass clearance. Belshaw Dep. 75:19-23. 

Also on May 27, Mike Brady, a CDCR employee, sent an email to

Swanson and Speed stating, “There appears to be a continuing

problem with Ms. Warwick being over familiar with the parolees. 

There is an inquiry into her behavior, and I would suggest that you

suspend giving her work pending the outcome of the inquiry. This

is a very serious matter in that it seriously compromises the

safety and security of the institution and the revocation process. 

Your cooperation would be greatly appreciated.” Fuentes Decl.,

Exh. (D)(3). Included in Brady’s email was an email from another

CDCR employee, George Lehman, which stated, in relevant part, “Ted

Rich tells me that Ms. Warwick picked up a parolee at the gate upon

release, took him out to lunch, went with him to the parole office,

made a scene by demanding gate money and then took him to a motel. 

I have no idea how these facts were authenticated but it sounds

kinda bad. Has CalPAP severed ties with her? Has CDCR even been

notified of any of the going’s-on? Ted wanted to go to the Warden

with this information and I told him not to unless I called him

back. I want our DC’s [Deputy Commissioner’s] to stay out of this

if possible.” Id. Swanson was out of the office, but she replied

to the email and told Brady that she would have Rick Heyer “handle

this matter during [her] absence.” Id. Rick Heyer was a senior

attorney at CalPAP. 

On the same day, May 27, the warden, Jill Brown, became aware

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of Plaintiff’s familiarity with parolees. Brown recalls talking on

the telephone about Plaintiff, although she can’t remember whom she

spoke with or at what point in the day she spoke with this

individual. Lui Decl., Brown Dep. 37:24-38:2. Brown learned that

Plaintiff “visited an inmate after his revocation proceedings had

already been concluded, which was unusual given the fact that she

was, according to what [Brown] was told, his CalPAP attorney, and

CalPAP attorneys had contact with their clients prior to and in

preparation for the revocation proceedings.” Id. at 27:6-12. 

Brown was also told that Plaintiff “picked up [an] inmate at the

gate, drove him to the Ukiah parole office, engaged in some

discussion with the parole agent there and then subsequently

accompanied or drove the parolee [sic], now parolee, to a motel in

Ukiah.” Id. at 30:6-10. With this information, Brown was

“sufficiently concerned” about the safety and security of San

Quentin that she decided to revoke Plaintiff’s gate clearance

temporarily. Id. at 40:3. She concluded that she had “reason to

believe at that point that it was possible that [Plaintiff] used

her status as a CalPAP attorney to gain access to the institution

for personal reasons, and that was my concern.” Id. at 83:15-18. 

At the time Brown made this decision, she did not know that CalPAP

might terminate Plaintiff if Plaintiff could no longer enter San

Quentin.

Later that day, Plaintiff’s gate clearance was revoked. Prior

to losing her gate clearance, Plaintiff did not receive any warning

that she had violated any policy, any notice that her gate

clearance would be revoked or any hearing to challenge the

revocation. CDCR did not provide Plaintiff with a written

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explanation for the reason behind her gate clearance revocation

until March 1, 2006, long after it had been reinstated. At that

time, CDCR claimed that her “visiting privileges” had been

suspended because she had continued to visit prisoners in her role

as a CalPAP attorney after the legal proceedings concerning parole

had concluded. CDCR stated, “The Department considers such action

as an abuse of the privilege of attorney visiting and constitutes

good cause for a suspension of visiting privileges.” Warwick

Decl., Exh. O. 

On May 30, 2005, Heyer sent a letter to Plaintiff, which

terminated CalPAP’s contract with Plaintiff. Warwick Decl., Exh.

K. CalPAP removed Plaintiff from the panel because her gate

clearance was revoked. Id.; Fuentes Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. D(5). On July

22, 2005, Brown’s successor, Acting Warden John Stokes, restored

Plaintiff’s gate clearance. After Plaintiff’s San Quentin gate

clearance was reinstated, she contacted CalPAP and requested to be

placed back on the CalPAP attorney panel. Swanson notified

Plaintiff that CalPAP did “not anticipate a need to contract with

[Plaintiff] in the future.” Warwick, Exh. H. 

Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) Violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Negligent Supervision; (3) Breach of Contract;

(4) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage;

(5) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations;

(6) Negligence; and (7) Declaratory Relief. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

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clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party’s evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods: 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d

1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

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absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

DISCUSSION

I. First Cause of Action: Section 1983 Free Speech Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants UOP, Rich, Speed and Cate

violated § 1983 by depriving her of her constitutional First

Amendment and due process rights. Section 1983 authorizes an

injured person to assert a claim for relief against a person who,

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acting under color of state law, violated the claimant’s federally

protected rights. To state a prima facie case, the plaintiff must

allege both (1) a deprivation of a federal right and (2) that the

person who deprived the plaintiff of that right acted under color

of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Flagg

Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Gomez v. Toledo,

446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).

A. Section 1983 Claim Against Defendants Rich and Speed

Plaintiff asserts that Rich and Speed retaliated against her

for exercising her First Amendment rights. She argues that Speed

and Rich were upset by her May 20, 2005 complaint letter and

plotted with Swanson to retaliate against her by “set[ting] in

motion the series of events that resulted in [her] gate pass being

revoked.” Opp. at 18. Plaintiff asserts that, after she wrote

this letter, Speed and Rich “began insinuating that [she] engaged

in sexual relations with inmates” and that these insinuations

“created the basis for the warden’s decision to revoke the gate

pass.” Id. 

Plaintiff must be able to prove that her “expressive conduct

was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action”

taken against her. Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d

917, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). To prove this, a plaintiff can

“(1) introduce evidence that the speech and adverse action were

proximate in time, such that a jury could infer that the action

took place in retaliation for the speech; (2) introduce evidence

that the employer expressed opposition to the speech; or

(3) introduce evidence that the proffered explanations for the

adverse action were false and pretextual.” Anthoine v. North

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Central Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 750 (9th Cir. 2010)

(citing Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir.

2003). Plaintiff relies on the first and third prongs.

Plaintiff has provided evidence of a close temporal link. Her

May 20, 2005 letter to the BPH Executive Director, Speed, described

due process violations, a lack of enforcement of the Valdivia

injunction, and concerns with Defendant Rich, among other BPH and

CDCR employees. Her gate clearance was revoked on May 27, 2005.

However, “‘[w]hether an adverse employment action is intended

to be retaliatory is a question of fact that must be decided in the

light of the timing and the surrounding circumstances.’” Anthoine,

2010 WL 2026040, at *7 (quoting Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977)

(emphasis added). The surrounding circumstances establish that

Speed and Rich did not have any involvement in revoking Plaintiff’s

gate clearance, and Plaintiff presents no evidence that they did. 

Further, there is no evidence that the proffered explanations for

the adverse action were false or pretextual.

There is also no evidence that Rich knew about Plaintiff’s

May, 2005 complaint letter. There is no evidence that Speed or

Rich insinuated to the warden, or anybody else, that Plaintiff

engaged in “sexual relations” with parolees. In fact, there is no

evidence that Speed or Rich told the warden anything about

Plaintiff. There is no evidence that Speed or Rich had any

authority to revoke Plaintiff’s gate clearance, took part in the

decision to revoke Plaintiff’s gate clearance or asked Brown to

revoke Plaintiff’s gate clearance. In short, there is no evidence

that Speed or Rich “set in a motion a series of events” that led to

Plaintiff’s gate clearance being revoked in retaliation for her

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9There is also no evidence that Brown, on her own accord,

revoked Plaintiff’s gate clearance in retaliation for exercising

her First Amendment rights. 

10Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s gate clearance

was not revoked in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment

rights, it need not address the parties’ arguments concerning

whether she was a public employee or whether Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), applies.

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exercising her First Amendment rights.9

 Therefore, the Court

grants Speed and Rich summary judgment on the § 1983 claims

asserted against them.10 

B. Section 1983 Claim Against Cate

Defendant Cate is sued in his official capacity as the

Secretary of CDCR. In this position, Cate is responsible for the

policies, practices and customs of CDCR. Because the Court

concludes that there is no evidence that Rich, Speed or Brown 

revoked Plaintiff’s gate clearance in retaliation for her protected

speech, Cate is not liable for CDCR policies, practices and customs

related to any alleged retaliatory clearance revocation. 

C. Section 1983 Claim Against Defendant UOP

Normally, private entities like UOP are not liable under 

§ 1983 because the statute imposes limitations only on state action

under color of state law and does not reach the conduct of private

parties. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n,

531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). However, Plaintiff claims that UOP is

liable under § 1983 because it conspired with state actors.

As noted above, there is no evidence that any state actors

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Even if such evidence

exists, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against UOP fails because there

is no evidence of a conspiracy between UOP and state actors to

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violate her constitutional rights. 

An agreement or conspiracy between a government actor and a

private party is sufficient to satisfy the state action test. See

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980) (private individual

jointly acting with state officials may be engaged in conspiracy

and acting “under color of state law”). Establishing liability

for a conspiracy between a private actor and a state actor is no

different from establishing liability for a conspiracy between two

state actors. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The plaintiff must show “an agreement or meeting of the minds to

violate constitutional rights.” Id. “To be liable, each

participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of

the plan, but each participant must at least share the common

objective of the conspiracy.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Plaintiff’s evidence falls short of this standard. Plaintiff

claims that Mary Swanson, the CalPAP program director, and Speed,

the executive director of the BPH, agreed to fabricate a reason to

terminate Plaintiff. Swanson knew that Plaintiff needed a valid

San Quentin gate clearance in order to maintain eligibility as a

CalPAP attorney. Plaintiff asserts that, once Swanson learned

that Plaintiff made a complaint to Speed about the CDCR, all

Swanson had to do was tell Speed that revocation of the San

Quentin gate clearance would essentially terminate Plaintiff’s

contract as a CalPAP attorney. Thus, Plaintiff simply points to

the May 20 email in which Swanson notified Speed that part of the

agreement to be a contract attorney with CalPAP was that each

attorney needed clearance to enter a prison. Fuentes Decl., Exh.

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11Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim against Defendant UOP under

the theory that its employees violated her constitutional rights. 

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether a plaintiff can pursue

§ 1983 claims against a private entity under a respondeat superior

theory of liability. However, the law is clear that government

entities may not be held vicariously liable for the

unconstitutional acts of their employees under the theory of

respondeat superior. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the 

City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Fuller v. City of Oakland,

(continued...)

16

A(1). Swanson asked, “I would like to know what action CDC is

planning on taking,” and Speed replied, “I need to check on the

CDC side.” Id. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that

Speed followed up on this. Plaintiff argues that, had “Ms.

Swanson never told defendant Speed that pulling Ms. Warwick’s gate

pass would be cause for termination, the strong likelihood is that

defendants Speed and Rich would never have engaged in their rumor

campaign, and Ms. Warwick would still be a UOP/CalPAP attorney

. . . .” 

However, the fact that Swanson told Speed about the effect of

revoking a gate clearance is not sufficient to raise an inference

that Swanson and Speed had an agreement to terminate Plaintiff in

retaliation for complaining about UOP, CalPAP, CDCR or BPH. 

Moreover, there is no evidence that Speed or Swanson discussed the

matter with Brown, or with anyone who influenced Brown’s decision

to revoke Plaintiff’s gate clearance. Further, because Plaintiff

was an at-will independent contractor, UOP did not need to create

a “cause” to remove her from the CalPAP panel of attorneys. 

Because Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of a

conspiracy between UOP and any state actors, Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim against UOP fails.11

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11(...continued)

47 F.3d 1522, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995). Many other circuits, as well

as several district courts in the Ninth Circuit, have concluded

that a private entity is liable under § 1983 only when its official

policy or custom causes a deprivation of constitutional rights. 

See e.g., Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir.

2003); Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 (7th

Cir. 2002); Burke v. North Dakota Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, 294 F.3d 1043, 1044 (9th Cir. 2002); Austin v.

Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 729 (4th Cir. 1999); Harvey v.

Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129-30 (11th Cir. 1992); Rojas v.

Alexander’s Dep’t Store, 924 F.2d 406, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1990);

Carrea v. California, 2009 WL 1770130, *8 (C.D. Cal.); Brown v.

Carnevale, 2008 WL 4570342, *5 (D. Or.); Tater-Alexander v.

Amerjan, 2008 WL 961233, *12 (E.D. Cal.). Plaintiff has not

presented any evidence that UOP maintained an official policy or

custom that caused a deprivation of her constitutional rights. For

this additional reason, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim against UOP fails. 

17

D. Due Process Claims

Plaintiff argues that she has a cause of action against CDCR

Defendants for violation of her due process rights which survives

summary judgment because CDCR Defendants did not properly move on

this cause of action. However, Plaintiff’s operative complaint

fails even to plead a due process claim. The only constitutional

violation that Plaintiff alleges is a violation of her free speech

rights under the First Amendment. Although Plaintiff’s complaint

includes the words “due process” in passing, it does not put State

Defendants on notice that Plaintiff is alleging this type of claim. 

Plaintiff’s complaint does not even identify the particular

property interest at issue that is allegedly protected by the

Constitution. Because Plaintiff’s allegations are couched in terms

of a retaliation claim, not a due process claim, Plaintiff may not

assert a due process claim at this late stage in the litigation.

Even if Plaintiff could assert a due process claim, she has

not established that she had a property interest in her San Quentin

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gate clearance and was entitled to notice of revocation, a hearing

and an appeal. The California regulation cited by Plaintiff, 15

California Code of Regulations § 3178, generally describes the

rules for attorney visits and consultations. It does not confer a

right for an attorney to receive a prison gate clearance. 

Similarly, it is not clear that the regulations that set forth

the procedures for excluding individuals from a prison confer a

constitutionally protected property interest. The Ninth Circuit

has held that “a substantive property right cannot exist

exclusively by virtue of a procedural right.” Dorr v. County of

Butte, 795 F.2d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, “while state law

may create an interest in having officials adhere to state

procedures, those procedures alone do not give rise to a

‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ that is subject to the

protections of the federal due process clause.” Federal Deposit

Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 475 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting

Memphis Light, Gas & Water v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)). 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s gate clearance was suspended on an emergency

basis with no opportunity for a notice or a hearing; and it was

reinstated within sixty days. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegation

that she has a constitutionally protected interest in a prison gate

clearance and thus in the state prison procedures is unsupported. 

II. State Law Immunities

State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s tort claims are barred

under various sections of the California Government Claims Act. 

Section 821 provides that a “public employee is not liable for an

injury caused by his adoption of or failure to adopt an enactment

or by his failure to enforce an enactment.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820. 

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Section 821.2 states that a public employee is not liable for

denying or revoking a permit, approval, or similar authorization. 

Section 820.2 states that a public employee is not liable for

discretionary acts “whether or not such discretion be abused.” 

CDCR, as a public entity, also enjoys similar immunities. See Cal.

Gov’t Code § 818.2 (not liable for an injury caused by failing to

enforce any law), § 818.4 (not liable for revoking any permit or

“similar authorization”), § 818.8 (not liable for

misrepresentations by its employees “whether or not such

misrepresentations be negligent or intentional”). Because of these

immunities, State Defendants -- CDCR, Rich, Speed and Brown --

cannot be held liable in tort for the revocation of Plaintiff’s San

Quentin gate clearance. 

However, even if State Defendants were not immune, Plaintiff’s

state tort claims would fail. 

III. Second and Sixth Causes of Action: Negligent Supervision

Claims and Negligence Respectively

Plaintiff alleges negligent supervision and negligence claims

against CDCR and Brown. Plaintiff alleges that CDCR supervisors

engaged in acts of negligent supervision by failing properly to

train their employees on the enforcement of California’s prison

visitation laws. Plaintiff also alleges that CDCR Defendants

failed to protect her from having her gate clearance revoked and

therefore being terminated as a CalPAP attorney. Specifically,

Plaintiff alleges that CDCR Defendants misinterpreted and

misapplied the following regulations: Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 15,

§§ 3172.1 (Approval/Disapproval of Prospective Visitors), 3176

(Denial, Restriction, Suspension, Termination or Revocation of

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Visits and Exclusion of a Person), 3176.1 (Visitor Violation

Process), 3176.3 (Exclusion of a Person from Institutions/

Facilities), 3178 (Attorney Visitations and Consultation), and 3179

(Appeals Relating to Visiting). However, California courts do not

impose negligence liability on an agency for failing to follow its

regulations. Desert Healthcare Dist. v. PacifiCare FHP, Inc., 94

Cal. App. 4th 781, 793 (2001) (“a negligence duty cannot be derived

from an administrative regulation.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

negligent supervision and negligence claims against CDCR Defendants

for improperly revoking a prison gate clearance based on CDCR’s own

regulations fail. 

IV. Third Cause of Action: Breach of Contract

Plaintiff alleges a breach of contract claim against UOP. She

also alleges that UOP breached the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing by cutting her caseload and by terminating her for

complaining about the CalPAP program. To prevail on a breach of

contract claim, Plaintiff must establish four elements: "(1) the

existence of a valid contract; (2) Plaintiff’s performance or

excuse for nonperformance; (3) Defendant's unjustified or unexcused

failure to perform; and (4) damage to Plaintiff." Lincoln Nat'l

Corp. v. TakeCare, Inc., 1998 WL 281290, *3 (N.D. Cal.); see also

First Commercial Mortgage Co. v. Reece, 89 Cal. App. 4th 731, 745

(2001). 

The terms of Plaintiff’s agreement with UOP to become a CalPAP

panel attorney do not guarantee Plaintiff any set amount of parolee

clients. The agreement states, “CalPAP will assign cases to panel

attorneys at its sole discretion, and inclusion in the panel

attorney list is not a guarantee of case assignment.” (emphasis

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added). Under the agreement, CalPAP had complete discretion to

assign no cases to Plaintiff. 

UOP argues that it did not have any obligation to give

Plaintiff a hearing before she was removed from the attorney list

because the agreement states that “CalPAP panel attorneys serve on

the panel at-will.” The agreement further states, “Either CalPAP

or the individual attorney may remove the attorney’s name from the

panel attorney list at any time, provided that written notice is

given to the other party.” Plaintiff does not contest that she was

given written notice of her termination. Rather, Plaintiff asserts

that UOP breached the contract when it conspired with CDCR to

revoke her gate clearance, because she needed a gate clearance to

carry out her duties. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s

evidence does not support such a conspiracy, her breach of contract

and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

claims fail. 

V. Fourth Cause of Action: Intentional Interference with

Prospective Economic Advantage 

Plaintiff alleges intentional interference with prospective

economic advantage (IIPEA) against CDCR Defendants. 

To state a claim for the tort of IIPEA, Plaintiff must show,

for each Defendant: (1) an economic relationship between Plaintiff

and a third party containing the probability for future economic

benefit for Plaintiff; (2) Defendant’s knowledge of this

relationship; (3) intentional acts by Defendant designed to disrupt

the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship;

(5) damages proximately caused by Defendant’s acts; and (6) that

Defendant’s acts were wrongful by some legal measure other than the

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fact of the interference itself. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed

Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1153-54 (2003). 

“California law has long recognized that the core of

intentional interference business torts is interference with an

economic relationship by a third-party stranger to that

relationship, so that an entity with a direct interest or

involvement in that relationship is not usually liable for harm

caused by pursuit of its interests.” Marin Tug & Barge, Inc. v.

Westport Petroleum, Inc., 271 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2001). See also,

ViChip Corp. v. Lee, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2006)

(“[T]he core of intentional interference business torts is

interference with an economic relationship by a third-party

stranger to that relationship”).

Here, CDCR Defendants are not “strangers” or “interlopers”

regarding Plaintiff’s duties under the CalPAP contract. The CDCR

contracted with UOP to create and run CalPAP to provide parolees

with legal representation because the Valdivia injunction required

CDCR to provide for such representation. CalPAP attorneys are

retained solely to perform work involving the CDCR and the CDCR

could choose not to renew its contract with CalPAP if the CDCR

became dissatisfied with the performance of CalPAP’s attorneys. 

Thus, CDCR had a direct, continuing and substantial interest in the

performance of CalPAP attorneys. CDCR Defendants are not

“strangers” or “interlopers” subject to an IIEPA claim. 

VI. Fifth Cause of Action: Intentional Interference with 

 Contractual Relations

Plaintiff alleges intentional interference with contractual

relations (IICR) against CDCR Defendants. 

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12Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3178(d) provides in relevant part,

“An attorney who wishes to consult in person with an inmate shall

contact the institution/facility at which the inmate is housed. . .

Requesting attorneys must . . . explain any prior suspension or

exclusion from a correctional facility . . . .”

23

Plaintiff admits that her contract to serve as a CalPAP panel

attorney was at-will. Under California law, a party who interferes

with an at-will contract cannot be sued for interference with

contract. Lovesy v. Armed Forces Benefits Ass’n, 2008 WL 696991,

at *11 (N.D. Cal.) (“[A]s a matter of law, a claim for interference

with contract is improper if the contract is ‘at will.’”). Any

such claim is more properly viewed as an interference with a

prospective economic advantage. Reeves v. Hanlon, 33 Cal. 4th

1140, 1152 (2004). 

VII. Seventh Cause of Action: Declaratory Judgment

Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment that she will not

have to explain the May, 2005 gate clearance revocation as would be

required by Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3178(d).12 Such declaratory

relief is not appropriate because this order summarily adjudicates

all claims in favor of Defendants. Therefore, there is no present

and actual controversy between the parties. 

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS CDCR Defendants’

motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 127) and GRANTS UOP’s

motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 128). The clerk shall

enter judgment in favor of Defendants and Plaintiff shall bear

Defendants’ costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 07/06/10 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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