Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02001/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02001-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY FOLEY,

CDCR #AV-1283,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LACEY MARTZ, Public Defender; 

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-02001-CAB-AGS

ORDER:

1) GRANTING RENEWED MOTION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 4]

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE 

A CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

Gregory Foley (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Avenal State Prison (“AVP”) 

and proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on 

August 27, 2018. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff seeks damages against the public 

defender appointed to represent him during his criminal trial and the Office of the Public 

Defender itself, based on claims that they violated his 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th Amendment 

rights. (Id. at 2, 8-9.) Because he has since filed a properly supported renewed Motion to 

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Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 4), the Court grants Plaintiff leave to 

proceed IFP, but sua sponte dismisses his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon 

which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1).

I. Procedural History

At the time he filed his Complaint, Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee required 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(a civil action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is granted 

leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)).

On October 19, 2018, the Court denied Plaintiff’s initial Motion to Proceed IFP

because he failed to attach a certified copy of his prison trust account statement. (See 

ECF No. 3.) Nevertheless, the Court also granted Plaintiff forty-five days leave in which

to complete and file a properly supported IFP Motion, and the Clerk of Court provided 

him with a form for doing so. (Id. at 3-4.)

On November 23, 2018, Plaintiff filed a renewed Motion to Proceed IFP, together 

with the accounting which was missing from his original Motion (ECF No. 4). 

II. Renewed Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

As Plaintiff now knows, to institute a civil action, he must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite his failure to prepay the 

entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 

Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1051; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, because he is a prisoner, even if he is granted leave to proceed IFP, Plaintiff 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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remains obligated to pay the entire filing fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter “King”). 

From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% 

of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the 

average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, 

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). 

The institution having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, 

assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account 

exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his renewed IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified Prison 

Certificate issued by an accounting specialist at AVP, together with copies of his CDCR 

Inmate Statement Report, both attesting as to his trust account activity and balances for 

the 6-month period preceding the filing of his Complaint. See ECF No. 4 at 4, 7; 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements

show Plaintiff carried no average monthly balance, deposited no money to his account 

over the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, and had an 

available balance of zero at the time of filing. 

Based on this financial information, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Renewed 

Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 4), and assesses no initial partial filing pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a 

prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal 

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judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the 

initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP 

case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). However, the Court will direct the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, 

or his designee, to collect the full balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case and 

forward installments to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

III. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims Lacey Martz, the Deputy Public Defender who represented him 

during San Diego County Superior Court criminal proceedings, committed “legal 

malpractice” and thereby violated his 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment rights. (See

Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2, 8, 17-19.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Martz failed to properly 

challenge and/or cross-examine prosecution witnesses, object to inadmissible testimony, 

“diligently investigate the evidence and interview witnesses,” present a proper defense, or

“return documents to her client, which ... [he] needed for litigation in other matters.” 

(See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2, 8-9, 12-15.) Plaintiff further contends the Office of the 

Public Defender, “failed to supervise and train” Martz, and “allowed the acts without 

correction.” (Id. at 2, 19, 22.) He states he “is not seeking to invalidate his conviction,” 

but only demanding unspecified amounts of general and punitive damages “for both 

mental and emotional distress.” (Id. at 23.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

///

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D. “Under Color” Requirement

First, to the extent Plaintiff names both the Deputy San Diego County Public 

Defender who represented him, Lacey Martz, and the “Office of the Public Defender” 

itself as Defendants, see Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1-2, he fails to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s 

traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. 

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 468 

(9th Cir. 2003) (“[The public defender] was, no doubt, paid by government funds and 

hired by a government agency. Nevertheless, [her] function was to represent [her] client, 

not the interests of the state or county.”); Garnier v. Clarke, 332 Fed. App’x 416 (9th Cir. 

2009) (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal of prisoner’s § 1983 claims against 

appointed counsel).

E. Criminal Proceedings – Heck’s “Favorable Termination” Requirement

Second, there are two methods for state prisoners to raise complaints related to 

their imprisonment in federal court. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) 

(“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to 

imprisonment....”) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). In general, 

claims of constitutional violations related to the “circumstances” of a prisoner’s 

confinement must be brought in a civil rights action under Section 1983, see id., while 

constitutional challenges to the validity or duration of a prisoner’s confinement must be 

raised in a petition for federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, or through 

appropriate state relief. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78-79 (2005) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(en banc) (“The Court has long held that habeas is the exclusive vehicle for claims 

brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of habeas, and such claims may not be 

brought in a § 1983 action.”) (citing Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81-82).

///

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Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages based on claims that he has been 

unlawfully convicted, sentenced, and/or incarcerated due to his public defender’s “legal 

malpractice,” see Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2, 8-19, he may not pursue those claims in a civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without first showing his conviction has

already been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions 

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination, or called into question by a federal 

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A 

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or 

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 

§ 1983.

Id. at 486-87; Washington v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 

(9th Cir. 2016).

“Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within 

‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state 

prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but 

not to the fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 

2003) (emphasis added), quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498-99 (holding that a writ of 

habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the 

“exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court).

Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on alleged violations of his 4th, 5th, 6th and 

14th Amendment rights in San Diego Superior Court Case No. SCN323137, he may not 

proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless he alleges and can show that conviction has already 

been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a 

showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no

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cause of action under § 1983.’”), quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. This is because an award 

of damages in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and 

consequently affect the duration of his confinement. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see also 

Pattillo v. Lombardo, No. 2:17-CV-01849-JAD-VCF, 2017 WL 3622778, at *4 (D. Nev. 

Aug. 23, 2017) (“When a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his custody, 

raises a constitutional challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release ... or seeks 

damages for purported deficiencies in his state court criminal case, which effected a 

conviction or lengthier sentence, his sole federal remedy is the writ of habeas corpus.”); 

Toney v. Ruiz, No. 3:10-CV-00405 BTM (PCL), 2010 WL 2383787, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 

9, 2010) (noting that “ineffective assistance of counsel claims ‘necessarily imply the 

invalidity’ of criminal proceedings.”) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (to succeed on ineffective assistance claim 

petitioner must show that counsel’s performance fell below objective standard of 

reasonableness and that but for counsel’s errors the result of the trial would have been 

different)).

Because Plaintiff does not allege to have already invalidated his conviction in San 

Diego County Criminal Case No. SCN323137, the case which forms the basis of this 

§ 1983 suit by way of direct appeal, executive order, or through the issuance of either a 

state or federal court writ of habeas corpus, Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, his Complaint must be 

dismissed sua sponte and in its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 

relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). See Phillipi 

v. Does, No. CIV. 11-2612 DMS RBB, 2011 WL 6400303, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 

2011) (sua sponte dismissing civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 

§ 1915A because “habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy whenever the claim for 

damages depends on a determination that ... the sentence currently being served is 

unconstitutionally long.”) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643-44 (1997); Heck, 

512 U.S. at 486–87; Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1121.

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F. Leave to Amend

Finally, while the Court would typically grant Plaintiff leave to amend in light of 

his pro se status, it concludes doing so under the circumstances would be futile. See 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 

817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis for 

dismissal without leave to amend).

Amendment is futile because even if Plaintiff could somehow allege facts to show 

Defendants acted “under color of state law,” his claims for damages under § 1983 could 

not yet proceed because his past efforts at invalidating his conviction in San Diego 

Superior Court Case No. SCN323137 both by way of direct appeal, and through a federal 

writ of habeas corpus, have been unavailing. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452–MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. 

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council 

v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

Here, the Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s direct appeal in People v. Foley, 

No. D066567, 2015 WL 4751210, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015) (unpub.), in which 

his conviction in San Diego County Criminal Case No. SCN323137 was affirmed on 

sufficiency of the evidence grounds. Id.., slip op. at 6. In addition, the Court further takes 

notice of its own records in Foley v. Kernan, S. D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:16-cv-00408-

JLS-BGS, in which Plaintiff’s subsequent federal habeas corpus petition seeking to 

challenge the constitutional validity of his criminal conviction in San Diego Superior 

Court Case No. SCN323137 on various constitutional grounds, including claims of 

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ineffective assistance of trial counsel, was dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 

id., ECF Nos. 1, 9, 37, 52; Foley v. Kernan, No. 16CV0408-JLS (BGS), 2017 WL 

3840343, at *23 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 

WL 3426209 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2018). 

Therefore, because both Plaintiff’s state direct appeal and federal collateral 

proceedings reveal he cannot amend his Complaint to allege the additional facts required 

to show the underlying conviction which forms the basis of his § 1983 claims in this case

has already been invalidated, the Court denies leave to amend as futile. See Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1127; Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that leave 

to amend is not required if it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 

could not be cured by amendment.”) (internal citations omitted).

IV. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 4);

2) DIRECTS the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect 

from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION;

3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph 

Diaz, Acting Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) without prejudice, but without leave to amend;2

 

2 See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (court should dismiss 

claims barred by Heck without prejudice “so that [the plaintiff] may reassert his claims if 

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5) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if 

appeal would not be frivolous); and

6) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2019

 

he ever succeeds in invalidating his conviction.”); Briggs v. Enriquez, No. CV 17-4615-

FMO(E), 2017 WL 6210802, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2017), report and recommendation 

adopted, No. CV 17-4615-FMO(E), 2017 WL 6209818 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017).

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