Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00611/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00611-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PATRICK D REGAN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

CITY OF BERKELEY, ET AL., 

Defendants.

CASE NO. 19-cv-00611-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 25 

Currently pending before the Court is the Motion of defendant City of Berkeley (“City”) to 

Dismiss Certain Claims In the Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 25.) The City moves to 

dismiss two claims from plaintiff Patrick D. Regan’s Second Amended Complaint—the fifth cause 

of action for negligence and the eight cause of action for fraud and misuse of resources under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, 

and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND.

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On the fifth cause of action, plaintiff has failed to allege sufficiently a basis for negligence 

liability that would not be barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity, and that would be 

cognizable against a public entity despite governmental immunity as stated in Cal. Government 

Code section 815(a). See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot. Dist., 43 Cal.3d 148, 160-61 (1987) (Cal. 

Labor Code 3601(c) bars tort claims based on the employers’ actions); Jones v. Dep't of Corr. & 

Rehab., 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1384 (2007) (Labor Code section 3601(c) “insulates the employer 

from common law vicarious liability to an employee for the acts of another employee”); De Villers 

v. Cty. of San Diego, 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 247 (2007) (in order to establish tort liability of 

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 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court 

finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the Court 

VACATES the hearing set for August 13, 2019. 

Case 4:19-cv-00611-YGR Document 33 Filed 07/22/19 Page 1 of 2
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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

governmental agency, must show either (1) vicarious liability for the actions of its employees or 

(2) direct liability theory by identifying a specific statute declaring the governmental entity to be

liable or creating some specific duty of care in favor of the injured party). Direct tort liability 

against a municipality cannot be based upon the principles in California Civil Code section 1714 

alone, and plaintiff’s suggestion to the contrary does not fairly state the applicable law he cites in 

the Zelig and Eastburn decisions. See Zelig v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 1132 (2002) 

(“To the extent the Court of Appeal determined that the provisions of Civil Code section 1714 

properly may be applied to extend the liability of a public entity in this setting beyond the usual 

reach of the “dangerous condition” provisions of Government Code section 835 . . . the appellate 

court was in error.”); Eastburn v. Reg'l Fire Prot. Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1183 (2003) (“direct 

tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at 

least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code 

section 1714”). 

On the eighth cause of action, plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable basis for liability 

against the municipality consistent with Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 

U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (“[a] municipality cannot be held liable . . . under § 1983 on a respondent 

superior theory,” but can only be sued directly for alleged unconstitutional conduct resulting from 

an official policy, pattern or practice). Plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation of rights secured by 

the United States Constitution or federal law, nor has he alleged a policy or custom on the part of 

the City. 

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss claims five and eight is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND to correct the above deficiencies. To the extent that plaintiff has a basis for filing a Third 

Amended Complaint, he shall so file by no later than August 13, 2019 or shall file a notice that he 

rests on the current complaint. The City shall file its response 21 days thereafter. 

This terminates Docket No. 25. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

July 22, 2019

Case 4:19-cv-00611-YGR Document 33 Filed 07/22/19 Page 2 of 2