Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00081/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00081-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1 Under the E-Government Act of 2002, this is a written opinion and therefore is

available electronically. However, it has been entered only to decide the motion or matter

addressed herein and is not intended for official publication or to serve as precedent.

2 Defendant’s memorandum of law recites the relevant date as being June 28, 2006. 

(Defendant’s Brief (doc. 10), at 3.) However, both affidavits cited by the City in support of that

fact list June 28, 2005 as the date on which the moratorium went into effect. (King Aff., ¶ 4;

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BILL SALTER ADVERTISING, INC., )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0081-WS-B

 )

CITY OF BREWTON, ALABAMA, )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (doc.

6) and defendant’s Motion to Stay Consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

(doc. 11).1

I. Background.

In September 2004, Hurricane Ivan made landfall on the Gulf Coast, leaving a trail of

devastation in its wake. Among the casualties of this historic weather event were four outdoor

advertising signs owned by plaintiff, Bill Salter Advertising, Inc. (“Salter”), within the police

jurisdiction of defendant, City of Brewton, Alabama (the “City”). These billboards sustained

significant wind damage in the storm. In the aftermath of the hurricane, the City, citing concerns

for public safety (in that future storms might cause sign faces to become airborne, endangering

pedestrians and motorists alike) and the concomitant need to revisit technical aspects of its sign

ordinance (“Ordinance”) such as wind load, imposed a temporary moratorium on the

construction or rebuilding of billboards within the City on June 28, 2005, while these safety

considerations were studied.2

 All indications in the parties’ filings are that this ostensibly

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 1 of 32
Diurno Aff., ¶ 5.) Faced with this discrepancy, the Court assumes that the affidavits are accurate

and that the 2006 date set forth in the brief is a typographical error. A further point of confusion

in the City’s filings concerns the precise nature and scope of the moratorium, which does not

appear to have been memorialized in writing. The City’s brief couches it as a moratorium on

“the erection of new billboards” while two City officials submit affidavits that the moratorium

related to “rebuilding of signs and billboards.” (Opposition Brief, at 3; King Aff., ¶ 4.) As

plaintiff’s evidence is that the moratorium has been used for both purposes, the Court assumes

that it encompasses both the construction of new signs and the rebuilding of damaged signs.

3 Although not directly relevant to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Salter

requested permission to rebuild or repair the four damaged billboards sometime in 2005, and was

eventually permitted to repair them in late 2006, subject to the proviso that sign faces would be

limited to 75 square feet, a smaller (and less profitable) size than they had been previously.

4 Neither the letter nor the City’s filings in this matter identify a particular

provision of the 9-page Ordinance that implements such a ban, and Salter now protests that the

Ordinance contains no such prohibition. On its face, however, the copy of the Ordinance

submitted by Salter herein states as follows: “No new off-premises signs or billboards will be

permitted in any zone ....” (Ordinance, § 10.775(7).) Given this unambiguous language, and for

the reasons discussed infra, the Court cannot agree with Salter’s repeated assertion in its filings

that the City engaged in a “wrongful interpretation” of its Ordinance in this respect.

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temporary moratorium remains in place today, some 22 months after it was first imposed, and

that the City has not enacted a new sign ordinance to address the safety concerns that animated

the moratorium in the first place.3

In July 2006, Salter submitted application packages to the City seeking permits to erect

nine new billboards in the City’s police jurisdiction. The next month, a City official orally

notified Salter that all nine applications were being denied because of the moratorium “until the

new sign ordinance is in place.” (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.) A follow-up letter from the City to

Salter explained that the applications had been denied because “Brewton’s Sign Ordinance

presently in effect prohibits the issuance of permits for new Off-Premise signs of [sic]

billboards.” (Id., ¶ 11 & Exh. A.)4 Within weeks, Salter submitted applications for

administrative appeal/variance with respect to each of the denied applications. In response, the

City notified Salter of certain information and fees that were necessary for the appeal/variance

requests to proceed. Although Salter contends that the need for much of this information was not

specified in the Ordinance or any other applicable regulation, and that the process was both

expensive and onerous, it submitted the requisite information and fees in November 2006. Two

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 2 of 32
5 This action is not the only current litigation concerning the City of Brewton’s sign

ordinance. In fact, less than two weeks ago the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial

court’s denial of another company’s petition seeking to enjoin the City from removing four of its

outdoor signs for noncompliance with the Ordinance. See Studio 205, Inc. v. City of Brewton, ---

So.2d ----, 2007 WL 1098551 (Ala. Apr. 13, 2007). Additionally, research confirms that Salter

and the City have skirmished before over billboard regulations, as Salter previously sued the

City of Brewton in 1994 claiming that a billboard moratorium in effect at that time was

discriminatorily applied. That legal challenge failed. See Bill Salter Advertising, Inc. v. City of

Brewton, 658 So.2d 449 (Ala.Civ.App. 1994), cert denied, 658 So.2d 451 (Ala. 1995).

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months later, on January 22, 2007, at a hearing, the City’s Board of Zoning Adjustment denied

Salter’s appeal/variance requests.

On February 2, 2007, Salter initiated this action by filing the Complaint (doc. 1) against

the City alleging various constitutional deprivations. In particular, sounding in 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and the Alabama Constitution, the Complaint alleges that the City’s purportedly temporary

moratorium on all signs requiring a permit is unconstitutional under the First Amendment; that

the City violated Salter’s procedural and substantive due process rights in delaying and

otherwise obstructing Salter’s attempts to repair hurricane-damaged signs; that the City’s sign

ordinance violates the First Amendment because its permitting requirement is an invalid prior

restraint that fails to contain minimum procedural safeguards, it affords the City virtually

unfettered discretion in determining whether or not to issue a permit, it includes content-based

restrictions that impermissibly favor commercial speech over noncommercial speech, it does not

directly advance a substantial government interest in a material way and is not narrowly tailored

to support the governmental interests asserted, and it unduly burdens the freedom of citizens and

property holders to speak; and that the City’s sign ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment

by denying Salter equal protection under the law in favoring certain entities’ speech at the

expense of others’. In its Complaint, Salter seeks multiple forms of relief, including monetary

damages and an injunction prohibiting the City from enforcing the moratorium and the

Ordinance.5

On February 22, 2007, some three weeks after filing its Complaint, Salter filed its Motion

for Preliminary Injunction, requesting that the City be preliminarily enjoined from (a)

“misinterpreting its Sign Ordinance to preclude all new outdoor advertising signs” and (b)

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 3 of 32
6 The Court takes the Motion for Preliminary Injunction under submission without

an evidentiary hearing. The law is clear that a hearing is required on such a motion only if there

are contested issues of fact that require credibility determinations. See Four Seasons Hotels and

Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 2003) (observing that an

“evidentiary hearing is not always required before the issuance of a preliminary injunction”

unless “facts are bitterly contested and credibility determinations must be made to decide

whether injunctive relief should issue”) (citations omitted); Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear

Channel Communications, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167, 1178 (11th Cir. 2002) (opining that where little

dispute exists as to raw facts, and dispute revolves around inferences to be drawn from such

facts, it is left to district court’s sound discretion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is

necessary by balancing the interests of speed and practicality against those of accuracy and

fairness). Review of the parties’ submissions reveals no material disputes as to raw facts and no

bitter contest of facts. The Court finds, after balancing the interests of speed and practicality

against those of accuracy and fairness, that no hearing is needed here. This conclusion is

bolstered by the fact that no party appears to have requested a hearing in its submissions relating

to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

7 Defendant does not mince words in ascribing a nefarious purpose to plaintiff’s

conduct both before and during this litigation. Indeed, the City theorizes that Salter filed its

permit applications for the nine new signs for the sole purpose of triggering litigation that would

allow Salter to assault the Ordinance in its entirety, mounting a “shotgun-style facial

challenge[]” that “attack[s] every conceivable provision in an ordinance,” with the intent of

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“enforcing its Sign Ordinance and Moratorium.” (Motion, at 2.) With its 31-page memorandum

of law (exceeding, without leave, the 30-page maximum prescribed by Local Rule 7.1(b)), its

supporting affidavits and exhibits, and its thicket of potentially far-reaching legal arguments, this

Motion bears a striking resemblance to a summary judgment motion, rather than an emergency

motion for preliminary relief under Rule 65 until such time as a final determination on the merits

can be made. Despite its rather unorthodox procedural posture, the Motion for Preliminary

Injunction has now been briefed and is ripe for disposition.6

II. Defendant’s Motion to Stay.

Antecedent to considering the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Court will take up

the City’s Motion to Stay Consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (doc.

11). In that Motion, the City accuses Salter of setting an “evidentiary trap” by attempting to

force the City to defend itself against a Rule 65 motion despite a “virtually barren” evidentiary

record in which neither initial disclosures nor formal discovery have taken place. (Doc. 11, at

2.)7 According to the Motion, the City is at a strategic disadvantage because it has not been able

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 4 of 32
leaving the City bereft of any billboard regulation of any kind. (Id. at 5.)

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to conduct any discovery and therefore cannot sufficiently and adequately respond to the Motion

for Preliminary Injunction without conducting, at a minimum, the following discovery: (i) the

depositions of all individuals listed in Salter’s nine billboard applications, (ii) the depositions of

the two declarants who offered declarations in support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction,

(iii) production of all of Salter’s documents pertaining to their applications, and (iv) a Rule

30(b)(6) deposition of Salter. (Id. at 6.) The City therefore asks that plaintiff’s Motion for

Preliminary Injunction be stayed until such time as this sweeping “preliminary” discovery has

been conducted.

Although the City argues that there are “significant factual ... issues that need to be

addressed” before the Rule 65 Motion may be decided, it does so in conclusory terms, largely

omitting identification or explanation of what those factual issues are and why they are germane

to Salter’s request for a preliminary injunction. (Motion to Stay, at 6.) At best, defendant

justifies its request for extensive preliminary discovery (which would almost certainly

contemplate both considerable expense to the parties and considerable delay to these

proceedings) by stating that it needs to inquire fully into the circumstances surrounding the

submission of the billboard applications, that it requires discovery on the question of irreparable

harm, and that factual investigation is needed to determine whether Salter has any genuine

interest in noncommercial speech for purposes of standing. The City cites no authority that has

allowed such wide-ranging discovery as a prerequisite to ruling on a motion for preliminary

injunction in a First Amendment billboard case. More importantly, the City’s position overlooks

the fact that Salter’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction turns on pure questions of law relating to

a predominantly facial challenge to the Ordinance’s constitutionality, as to which no preliminary

discovery is reasonably necessary. See, e.g., Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d

1250, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005) (observing in First Amendment sign ordinance case that the

plaintiff’s claims raised purely legal questions as its constitutional challenge to that ordinance

was “facial rather than as applied, so that our resolution of the legal questions is only minimally

intertwined with the facts”); Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1343 (11th

Cir. 1994) (“the issuance of a preliminary injunction in the context of free speech turns solely on

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 5 of 32
8 This is not to say, of course, that the City will be forbidden from exploring this

topic and attempting to develop that theory during merits discovery. It is to say, however, that

this theory is sufficiently remote and unlikely that this Court will not postpone ruling on a

motion for preliminary injunctive relief alleging irreparable harm to allow defendant to

investigate that unlikely possibility now. This subject will certainly be fair game once merits

discovery commences.

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whether the challenged ordinance violates the First Amendment”) (citation omitted).

 The topics on which the City professes to have need for preliminary discovery do not

have any apparent bearing on whether the Ordinance is constitutional or unconstitutional. To be

sure, the question of irreparable harm is in play for Salter’s Rule 65 Motion; however, as

explained in Section III.D.2., infra, the irreparable harm element is satisfied as a matter of law in

this context, without the need for factual examination as to how Salter has been harmed by the

denial of the permits. Moreover, while the Court appreciates the City’s position on Salter’s

standing, particularly as to aspects of the Ordinance which were not used as a basis for denying

the permit requests, no discovery is needed here before a preliminary determination as to

standing may be made. As to aspects of the Ordinance not used as a basis for denying the permit

applications, the question of standing is purely legal and no discovery is needed. (See Section

III.F.4., infra.) As to Salter’s standing to challenge stated bases for denying the applications, it

is uncontroverted that Salter did submit nine permit applications for new signs and that the City

denied both those applications and Salter’s ensuing requests for variances, for the stated reasons

of the moratorium and the off-premises sign prohibition in the Ordinance. To the extent that the

City insinuates that the nine permit applications were a mere sham concocted by Salter to pave

the way for a full-scale, broadside attack on the Ordinance in its entirety, the City will not be

afforded leave to conduct preliminary discovery in what is, in effect, a fishing expedition seeking

evidence to support a facially implausible theory. It strains credulity to suggest that Salter did

not legitimately seek permits for the nine new requested signs, but that it was instead using those

applications to bait the City into denying the permits so as to confer standing on Salter to launch

a comprehensive legal offensive aimed at striking down the entire Ordinance.8

The City further maintains that preliminary discovery is necessary “to insure that a

complete and thorough record will be available for appellate purposes.” (Motion to Stay, at 8.) 

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 6 of 32
9 The Solantic court delineated two kinds of cases on interlocutory appeal from

denial of preliminary injunction: those in which the district court’s ruling rests solely on a

premise as to the applicable law, with the facts being either established or of no controlling

relevance; and those in which the law is undisputed but the probability of success on the merits

depends on facts likely to emerge at trial. Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1274. In the first category of

cases, ruling on the merits may be appropriate on interlocutory appeal, but in the second

category it is not. Id. Nothing will prevent the City from arguing on interlocutory appeal (if one

is filed) that this case falls in the second Solantic category, that the facts are not simple and

straightforward, that the record reasonably requires expansion, and that the legal questions are

inextricably intertwined with disputed or undiscovered facts. As such, the Solantic decision in

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In that regard, the City expresses concern that if the Rule 65 Motion is denied, Salter will seek

interlocutory appellate review, which could result in a final disposition of the case by the

Eleventh Circuit without further evidentiary development. The City is correct that appellate

courts have shown some propensity to decide the merits of a case on interlocutory appeal from a

ruling on a preliminary injunction motion, provided that certain conditions are satisfied. See

Solantic, 410 F.3d at1272-74 (making final determination on the merits in First Amendment sign

case on interlocutory appeal from denial of preliminary injunction, because facts were

straightforward, record required no expansion, and legal issues had been fully briefed and

cogently presented); Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1171 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e recognize

that an appellate court under some circumstances may decide the merits of a case in connection

with its review of a denial of a preliminary injunction.”). This concern is insufficient to warrant

a preliminary discovery period here for two reasons. First, the City has failed to identify any

respect in which the record may properly be deemed inadequate to allow resolution of the issues

presented by Salter’s Motion. If the existing record is adequate for this Court to pass on

preliminary injunction issues (which it is), then it is also sufficient for purposes of any

interlocutory appellate review that may occur. Second, if the City fears that the specter of

Solantic may prompt the Eleventh Circuit to enter judgment on the merits on interlocutory

appeal, then its remedy is not to receive unnecessary, time-consuming preliminary discovery

now (at the expense of timely, efficient ruling on the Rule 65 motion), but is instead to

distinguish the Solantic line of cases on interlocutory appeal, if this case ever reaches that point,

so as to convince the Eleventh Circuit to stay its hand as to the merits of the dispute until after a

reasonable discovery period and final disposition in District Court.9

 To delay these proceedings

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 7 of 32
no way militates in favor of granting the City extensive preliminary discovery now at the

expense of a timely, efficient resolution of the pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction,

inasmuch as the City will have ample opportunity to explain on interlocutory appeal (if any) why

this case falls outside the first category of cases described in Solantic. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at

1171 n.4 (finding that case fell into second category of cases, such that it would be inappropriate

for appeals court to reach the merits of plaintiffs’ claims because of the absence of the necessary

evidence by which to do so).

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so that defendant may secure discovery that may be useful if (a) there is an interlocutory appeal,

and (b) the Eleventh Circuit decides to issue a merits ruling, would be to delay plaintiff’s Rule

65 motion based on speculation and conjecture. This the Court will not do.

Furthermore, the City’s protestations that, without preliminary discovery, it is unable “to

sufficiently and adequately respond to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Motion

to Stay, at 5-6), are undercut by the City’s submission of a 24-page memorandum of law (doc.

10) and accompanying exhibits in opposition to Salter’s request for preliminary injunction. That

memorandum of law reveals no specific subjects therein on which the City purports to require

discovery before being able to effectively rebut Salter’s request; rather, the City states only in

general terms that its efforts to oppose the Motion have been stymied because “much of the

argument relies on facts that are much in dispute” and the City has not yet had the benefit of

discovery. (Opposition Brief (doc. 10), at 15.) What categories of facts are disputed or

unknown to the City? How are those facts linked to the specific narrow legal questions relating

to Salter’s likelihood of success on the merits? The City does not say. At some level, the proof

is in the pudding. As the City has filed a lengthy opposition brief and exhibits, and as nothing in

its opposition brief would support a conclusion that the City is unable reasonably to defend

against the legal issues presented in Salter’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction as this case is

presently postured, the Court cannot credit the City’s blanket assertion that it is unable, without

the benefit of discovery, effectively to counter the Rule 65 motion.

Finally, the City’s proposal that plaintiff’s Motion be simply placed on hold for an

indefinite period of time to enable discovery to be conducted ignores the time-sensitive nature of

plaintiff’s request. See, e.g., Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3d 1117, 1127-28

(11th Cir. 2005) (observing that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy requiring a

showing of, inter alia, irreparable injury unless the injunction issues immediately). Salter’s

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 8 of 32
10 In a similar vein, the undersigned cannot agree with defendant’s contention that

“[t]here is simply no urgency to consider” whether preliminary injunctive relief is warranted in

this case and that the legal issues raised by Salter’s motion should simply be deferred for

resolution on summary judgment. (Opposition Brief, at 23.) Let’s be clear: Salter is alleging a

deprivation of its First Amendment rights by operation of a sign ordinance and moratorium by

the City of Brewton. If that claim is meritorious, then plaintiff is suffering irreparable harm on a

daily basis. See, e.g., KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th Cir.

2006) (opining that “it is well established that the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even

minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury”) (citation omitted). 

Simply put, then, Salter’s allegation that it is suffering a First Amendment deprivation creates

urgency, and obliges this Court to consider and rule on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction as

expeditiously as circumstances reasonably allow. As such, plaintiff’s claims clearly are

appropriate for preliminary adjudication under the Rule 65 rubric and will not be deferred until

after the close of merits discovery many months hence.

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Motion contends that it is incurring irreparable harm on an ongoing basis because of the City’s

actions. To stay that Motion for untold lengths of time to allow preliminary discovery is to run

the risk of condemning Salter to months of unremediated, unremediable harm. The whole point

of the Rule 65 remedy is that, in certain narrow contexts, justice delayed truly is justice denied. 

Salter having invoked that remedy, this Court will not cavalierly set that request to one side

indefinitely to allow the City to conduct discovery that it has not shown to be reasonably

necessary to its ability to defend against said motion for preliminary injunction. To do so would

be antithetical to the remedial purposes of Rule 65 and would run an unacceptable risk of

perpetuating the harms that the rule is designed to prevent.10

For all of these reasons, defendant’s Motion to Stay Consideration of Plaintiff’s

Preliminary Injunction (doc. 11) is denied.

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

A. Legal Standard.

To be eligible for preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 65, Fed.R.Civ.P., a movant

must establish each of the following elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the

threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that

entry of the relief would serve the public interest. See KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville,

458 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 9 of 32
11 This is particularly true as to Salter’s arguments that the Ordinance is facially

unconstitutional. See generally Café Erotica of Florida, Inc. v. St. Johns County, 360 F.3d 1274,

1282 (11th Cir. 2004) (“When analyzing a facial challenge, we must analyze the [ordinance] as

written.”).

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26 (11th Cir. 2005); Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176. In this Circuit, “a preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the

burden of persuasion as to the four requisites.” McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301,

1306 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

As noted, a prerequisite of preliminary injunctive relief is that a plaintiff must show a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Indeed, “[t]he requesting party’s failure to

demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits may defeat the party’s claim,

regardless of its ability to establish any of the other elements.” Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v.

Christopher, 43 F.3d 1431, 1432 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

In response to Salter’s 20 pages of detailed legal argument articulating why it believes it

has a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits in its First Amendment challenges to the

Ordinance and moratorium, defendant is virtually silent. To justify its failure to rebut plaintiff’s

legal arguments on these points, the City offers two responses. First, it says, Salter’s contentions

about the likelihood of success on the merits rest “on facts that are much in dispute.” 

(Opposition Brief, at 15.) However, the City offers this blanket statement without identifying

where those factual disputes lie. As already explained supra, whether these provisions of the

Ordinance comport with the First Amendment is a purely legal inquiry in many respects.11 For

example, does the Ordinance’s ban on new off-premises signs require factual development

before an assessment can be made as to whether it is substantially likely to be unconstitutional? 

The City would apparently answer affirmatively, but identifies no facts that would need to be

procured antecedent to that determination. Besides, if as the City insists, there are disputed facts

material to these legal questions, the surest way for plaintiff to defeat the Motion for Preliminary

Injunction is to offer its view of the facts in a manner that might undercut Salter’s ability to show

a likelihood of success on the merits. But the City has not done so, instead relying solely on a

conclusory sleight of hand to allude to unspecified factual discrepancies and an unsupported

need for preliminary discovery. That is simply not an adequate ground for pretermitting the Rule

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 10 of 32
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65 inquiry or outright denying preliminary injunctive relief to Salter.

Second, the City balks that there is no recent Eleventh Circuit authority affirming entry

of a preliminary injunction in a sign ordinance case, implying that the very premise of Salter’s

motion is invald. This contention, too, is misplaced. If the common-law requirements for

issuance of a preliminary injunction are satisfied, then there is nothing peculiar about sign

ordinance cases that prevents entry of a preliminary injunction in that context. Municipal

ordinances are not entitled to an automatic exemption from Rule 65. See generally Summum v.

Pleasant Grove City, --- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 1128876 (10th Cir. Apr. 17, 2007) (ordering entry of

preliminary injunction against municipality whose restrictions on speech in public park

trammeled plaintiff’s First Amendment rights); Vincenty v. Bloomberg, 476 F.3d 74 (2nd Cir.

2007) (affirming district court’s entry of preliminary injunction prohibiting New York City, on

First Amendment grounds, from enforcing ordinances prohibiting sale of aerosol spray paint

cans and indelible markers to adults between ages of 18 and 21); Gold Coast, 42 F.3d at 1343

(reciting standard preliminary injunction requirements in reviewing request for preliminary

injunction against ordinance on First Amendment grounds). The City offers no principled reason

why municipal ordinances should be excluded from the proscriptions of preliminary injunctions

if the prerequisites for entry of same are otherwise satisfied. Simply put, if Salter can clearly

demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the Ordinance is unconstitutional in the stated respects,

and if Salter is further able to show that the risk of irreparable injury, the balance of harms and

the public interest all warrant preliminary injunctive relief, then there would be nothing improper

or untoward about preliminarily enjoining the City from enforcing the offending terms of its

Ordinance.

The City’s objections to the premise of Salter’s Motion lacking merit, the Court is left

with an opposition brief that unhelpfully fails to mount any substantive rebuttal to plaintiff’s

showing of its likelihood of success on the merits. To be clear, it remains plaintiff’s burden to

prove its entitlement to a preliminary injunction. A defendant’s silence does not necessarily

equate to a plaintiff’s meeting its burden of proof. The Court will not automatically find a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits simply because the City has neglected to make

any effective response; rather, the Court will scrutinize plaintiff’s filings to determine whether

Salter has clearly established the burden of persuasion on that factor. That said, the Court will

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12 See Pinto v. Universidad De Puerto Rico, 895 F.2d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1990) (“the

court is under no duty to exercise imagination and conjure what a plaintiff might have alleged,

but did not, and do counsel's work for him or her”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43

F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every

potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary

judgment”); Morgan v. North Mississippi Medical Center, Inc., 403 F. Supp.2d 1115, 1120 (S.D.

Ala. 2005) (litigant who fails to rebut arguments propounded by its adversary “adopts this

strategy at its peril, inasmuch as this Court will not formulate a party’s arguments for it”);

Bowden ex rel. Bowden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 124 F. Supp.2d 1228, 1236 (M.D. Ala. 2000)

(“[i]t is not for the court to manufacture arguments on Plaintiff’s behalf”).

13 It is undisputed that Salter did not present its constitutional arguments to the

Board of Zoning Adjustment; however, it could not legally have done so under Alabama law, so

the Board’s findings (if any) as to the constitutionality of the Ordinance and moratorium would

be entitled to no weight in these proceedings. See Budget Inn of Daphne, Inc. v. City of Daphne,

789 So.2d 154, 158 (Ala. 2000) (“A zoning board of adjustment or other such administrative

agency cannot entertain a constitutional challenge and would be without authority or power to

make a determinative ruling on such a challenge.”).

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not undertake unilaterally to formulate, present, and evaluate every argument that the City could

have made, but has elected not to make; therefore, the City omits response to this pivotal legal

issue at its own risk.12

B. Inapplicability of Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of Review.

One further matter must be addressed before reaching the substance of Salter’s request

for entry of preliminary injunction. Although the Rule 65 standard is firmly established in

federal jurisprudence, the City argues that Alabama law requires that the Board of Zoning

Adjustment’s decision not to grant Salter a variance must be reviewed under an arbitrary and

capricious standard. (Opposition Brief, at 4-5.) But this contention mixes apples and oranges. 

The primary issue in this case is not whether the City of Brewton’s Board of Zoning

Adjustment’s denial of Salter’s billboard applications was correct under the terms of the

Ordinance (a determination which would be made on an “arbitrary and capricious” basis under

Alabama law), but is instead whether the Ordinance and accompanying moratorium violate

constitutional free speech guarantees.13 As to those First Amendment questions, there is no

presumption that the City’s actions in enacting the Ordinance and moratorium are valid, and no

such deference attaches to those decisions. See generally Islamic Center of Mississippi, Inc. v.

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 12 of 32
14 That said, the Court recognizes that Salter also seeks a preliminary injunction on

the ground that the City misinterpreted the Ordinance. As to that claim, the standard of review

may well be arbitrary and capricious, but the Court need not make such a finding given its

determination, infra, that Salter has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the

wrongful interpretation theory, even if the City’s interpretation is reviewed de novo.

15 This line of argument follows from the unremarkable proposition that a court

determining the plain meaning of an ordinance should examine the ordinance as a whole, rather

than focusing on particular provisions in isolation. See, e.g., Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,

410 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005).

-13-

City of Starkville, Miss., 840 F.2d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that, while courts

ordinarily accord municipal zoning decisions considerable deference, such deference is not

warranted when a zoning plan infringes upon First Amendment rights). The Court rejects the

City’s contention to the contrary.14

C. Request for Preliminary Injunction on the City’s Allegedly Wrongful

Interpretation of Ordinance.

Salter attempts to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits with respect to

its claim that the City wrongly interpreted the Ordinance as banning all new off-premises signs

or billboards. Plaintiff cannot meet its burden on this claim. Section 10.775(7) of the Ordinance

is directly on point, stating that “No new off-premises signs or billboards will be permitted in

any zone, nor shall a permit be issued for any permitted on-premises sign for any premises on

which there exists a grandfathered off-premises sign or billboard unless the off-premises sign or

billboard is first permanently removed.” Id. On its face, this language lends unequivocal

support to the City’s stated interpretation of the Ordinance as proscribing the nine new offpremises signs for which Salter sought permits in 2005.

Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. As an initial matter, Salter insists

that the Ordinance must be read as a whole, and that § 10.775(7) conflicts with other provisions

therein.15 In that regard, Salter relies heavily on §§ 10.713-716 of the Ordinance, which it

contends shows that “outdoor advertising signs” are plainly allowed in the City of Brewton. But

this argument conflates two distinct terms, as “outdoor advertising signs” logically could

encompass on-premises signs or off-premises signs. That some outdoor advertising signs may

be allowed (which is the most that §§ 10.713-716 can be reasonably construed as stating) does

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 13 of 32
16 In particular, these sections generally forbid outdoor advertising signs from being

placed upon any street or highway right-of-way (§ 10.713); from being located in a manner that

impedes the view of a street or highway intersection (§ 10.714); from blocking ingress or egress

from a door, window or fire escape (§ 10.715); and from being less than 8 feet above sidewalk

level or 15 feet above street level (§ 10.716).

-14-

not mean that all outdoor advertising signs are allowed. Those sections do not expressly state

that off-premises signs are permitted, but rather impose certain limitations on any outdoor

advertising signs that may otherwise be allowed.16 Far from contradicting § 10.775(7), these

“outdoor advertising sign” provisions are entirely consistent with it, inasmuch as they regulate

such signs as are permitted under other aspects of the Ordinance, including § 10.775(7). Section

10.775(7) makes this link clear by stating that if an existing off-premises billboard is removed or

destroyed, “any replacement sign or billboard shall be in conformance with the provisions of this

ordinance,” which would of course include the restrictions in §§ 10.713-.716. Id. Thus, §§

10.713-.716 do not specify that outdoor advertising signs are always allowed; rather, they merely

impose certain restrictions to any such signs that are permitted. As § 10.775(7) acknowledges

circumstances in which signs would be built that would be subject to those restrictions on

outdoor advertising signs, there is no inconsistency here, and plaintiff’s attempts to show

otherwise are not substantially likely to prevail.

Next, Salter argues that § 10.775(7) cannot possibly mean what it says because offpremises billboards are not mentioned in § 10.74’s catalog of prohibited signs. Again, plaintiff

conjures an illusory incongruity. Section 10.74 recites several categories of signage that are

always forbidden in the City, such as signs painted on fire escapes or utility poles, signs that

imitate official traffic control devices, signs that flash or illuminate intermittently, sandwich

signs, and signs that produce noise, interfere with communication transmissions, or emit smoke

or odors. (Ordinance, §§ 10.741-.745.) These categories of signs are always prohibited. The

reason for the omission of off-premises billboards from that section is simple and obvious: They

are not always prohibited. Existing off-premises billboards are grandfathered in, as stated in §

10.775(7), so Salter’s argument mistakenly would construe a prohibition on new off-premises

billboards (as described in § 10.775(7)) as a prohibition on all off-premises billboards (which is

not set forth anywhere in the Ordinance). Thus, far from the omission of off-premises billboards

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 14 of 32
17 Imagine the confusion that would ensue had the City followed Salter’s suggestion

and listed off-premises billboards as a category of prohibited sign under § 10.74. How could

such an absolute prohibition be squared with the language of § 10.775(7), which allows existing

off-premises signs to be grandfathered in and even allows replacement off-premises signs to be

erected so long as they comply with the other provisions of the Ordinance? It couldn’t. Thus,

Salter’s argument would fault § 10.74 for not injecting ambiguity and uncertainty into the

regulatory scheme, which is hardly a valid basis for invalidating the City’s construction of §

10.775(7).

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in § 10.74 causing an internal contradiction, said omission is perfectly consistent with §

10.775(7), the section that Salter seeks to undermine.17 If anything, Salter would have this Court

disregard the plain meaning of § 10.775(7) because § 10.74 is not inconsistent with it, a result

which cannot be justified under logic or common sense.

Finally, plaintiff asserts that § 10.775(7) cannot apply to Salter’s permit applications

because it is limited to the R-A (“Rural Agricultural”) zoning district. Plaintiff’s position stems

from the fact that § 10.775 is structured as a schedule of permitted sign requirements in tabular

form by zoning district, followed by eight numbered subsections. Between subsections (2) and

(3) is a line reading simply “* None specified”, which is apparently a reference to asterisks in the

R-A lines of the table for sign specifications (maximum area, maximum height, number of faces,

etc.). The asterisk denotes that the Ordinance does not specify any particular size, height or

numerical restrictions for signs on property zoned R-A. Remarkably, Salter asserts that because

the asterisk legend is placed where it is, all subsections of § 10.775 following that legend must

apply only to R-A property. But nothing in subsections (3) through (8) even references the R-A

zoning district, much less states that they are confined to that district. To the contrary, several

subsections unequivocally contradict Salter’s interpretation. For example, subsection (3)

discusses temporary signs on business premises, shopping center premises, subdivisions, mobile

home parks, and the like, which premises obviously would not be zoned as “Rural Agricultural.” 

Subsection (4) likewise addresses temporary signs placed on the premises of new businesses,

which is inconsistent with Salter’s R-A theory. Most telling of all is that subsection (7), the very

provision at issue here, states that no off-premises signs “will be permitted in any zone,” not just

the R-A zone. Rather than suggesting that subsections (3) through (8) are confined to R-A

zoning districts, far and away the most sensible interpretation of the placement of the “* None

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 15 of 32
18 Salter presents evidence that a City official informed it that the applications were

being denied because of the moratorium. (McCurdy Decl., ¶ 10.) And the City’s opposition

brief takes pains to point out that Salter filed its permit applications “with full knowledge of the

temporary moratorium,” suggesting that such moratorium was indeed a moving force in the

denial. (Opposition Brief, at 3.)

19 These sentiments are echoed in the Affidavit of Pete Diurno, a City official who

explains that the moratorium “was due, in part, to [his] concerns regarding safety, new wind-load

requirements, and the work underway towards the consideration of a new ordinance.” (Diurno

Aff., ¶ 5.)

-16-

specified” statement is that it was the product of a simple formatting error in generating the

schedule of permitted sign requirements and the accompanying notes. In short, plaintiff’s

strained interpretation of § 10.775 is implausible to the extreme and is confuted by the plain

language of that section; therefore, it cannot support a finding that Salter is substantially likely to

prevail on the merits as to its claim that the City wrongfully interpreted the Ordinance to deny

the permits based on an off-premises sign prohibition.

For all of these reasons, it is this Court’s finding that plaintiff has failed to carry its

burden of proving a substantial likelihood of success on its claim that the City wrongfully

interpreted its Ordinance to forbid Salter’s requested signage. Salter having failed to show a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits, no preliminary injunction will issue on this claim,

and this Court need not consider whether the other prerequisites for preliminary injunctive relief

are satisfied. See Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2004) (observing

that “likelihood of success is an essential prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary

injunction”).

D. Request for Preliminary Injunction on the Billboard Moratorium.

Salter’s permit applications were apparently denied by the City at least in part because of

the June 2005 moratorium.18 This moratorium is broader than the Ordinance’s ban on new offpremises signs because it appears to cover both new billboards and the repair or replacement of

existing billboards. The City has proffered only fragmentary evidence to explain the purpose of

the moratorium, as a City official avers that “We were still concerned with the wind-load

requirements and safety issues involved with sign faces becoming airborne. We were also

continuing to consider the possibility of a new sign ordinance.” (King Aff., ¶ 4.)19 The City

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 16 of 32
20 In applying the Central Hudson test to the City of Brewton’s moratorium, the

Court agrees with and adopts the approach utilized in Trinity Outdoor, L.L.C. v. Oconee County,

Ga., 2003 WL 25301942, *7 (M.D. Ga. May 21, 2003), a billboard case in which the

constitutionality of a moratorium under the First Amendment was at issue.

-17-

offers neither evidence nor argument that the moratorium has since expired or been dissolved or

repealed, or that a new sign ordinance has been implemented. Thus, all indications are that the

moratorium remains in effect today.

1. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

The Supreme Court has observed that moratoria are not per se unconstitutional, but that

they are instead properly viewed as “an essential tool of successful development.” Tahoe-Sierra

Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 338, 122 S.Ct.

1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (2002). A moratorium on all billboard repair or construction is properly

viewed as a government regulation on commercial speech, the constitutionality of which must be

evaluated under the following four-part test: (1) whether the commercial speech concerns lawful

activity and is not misleading, so as to be entitled to First Amendment protection; (2) whether

the asserted governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the

governmental interest asserted; and (4) “whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to

serve that interest.” Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New

York, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980).20 More recently, the Supreme

Court has characterized the second through fourth Central Hudson criteria as being “whether the

State’s interests in proscribing [commercial speech] are substantial, whether the challenged

regulation advances these interests in a direct and material way, and whether the extent of the

restriction on protected speech is in reasonable proportion to the interests served.” Edenfield v.

Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993).

The advertising billboards at issue in these proceedings are plainly entitled to First

Amendment protection, so there is no doubt that that element is satisfied. But all appearances at

this preliminary stage are that the City has a substantial interest in safeguarding its citizens from

wind-damaged signs and their attendant hazards to persons and property, and that a temporary

moratorium on billboard construction to allow the City to study these safety issues is reasonably

in furtherance of that legitimate objective, so that the second and third Central Hudson elements

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 17 of 32
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are also present. The critical question, then, is whether an ongoing, indefinite moratorium

(presently at 22 months and counting) is in reasonable proportion to the governmental interests

being served. At this preliminary stage, and with no explanation by the City for the prolonged

duration of the moratorium, the Court finds it substantially likely that this question would be

answered in the negative. It is difficult to fathom circumstances under which the City would

legitimately need in excess of 22 months to re-examine the wind-load requirements and other

safety features of its Ordinance, and to ascertain whether a new ordinance would be beneficial to

public safety. As it appears that the moratorium has extended far longer than reasonably

necessary to promote the City’s interest in studying the safety aspects of billboard specifications

in the wake of Hurricane Ivan, plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits as to its claim that the City’s moratorium violates the First Amendment. See Howard v.

City of Jacksonville, 109 F. Supp.2d 1360, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (120-day moratorium on

issuance of licenses for adult entertainment businesses was unconstitutional in that it was longer

than necessary to meet the asserted government interest in correcting / improving the licensing

ordinance); compare Bronco’s Entertainment, Ltd. v. Charter Tp. of Van Buren, 421 F.3d 440,

453 (6th Cir. 2005) (182-day moratorium for updating zoning regulations and licensing scheme

did not violate First Amendment where it “was generally applicable, was not intended to

suppress speech, and was of a reasonably short duration”).

2. Irreparable Harm.

With respect to irreparable harm, the Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that “[a] showing

of irreparable injury is the sine qua non of injunctive relief” and that “the absence of a

substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive

relief improper.” Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176 (citations omitted). To satisfy plaintiff’s burden of

proof, the threat of harm must be irreparable; indeed, “[t]he possibility that adequate

compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of

litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” United States v. Jefferson

County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1520 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Faculty Senate of Florida Int’l University

v. Winn, --- F. Supp.2d ----, 2007 WL 485970, *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2007) (“Irreparable harm is

injury for which a monetary award cannot be adequate compensation.”) (citation omitted).

The City disputes whether Salter can show irreparable harm arising from the enforcement

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 18 of 32
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of the moratorium against it, arguing that Salter’s delay in filing its Motion for Preliminary

Injunction and the adequacy of monetary relief militate against an irreparable harm finding here. 

(Opposition Brief, at 16-20.) In so arguing, however, the City overlooks binding authority

recognizing that “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d

1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also Blue Moon Entertainment, LLC v. City of

Bates City, Mo., 441 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms,

even for the period required to litigate a facial challenge, may constitute an irreparable injury.”);

Bl(a)ck Tea Society, 378 F.3d at 15 (“A burden on protected speech always causes some degree

of irreparable harm.”). The City of Trussville court found that a categorical bar of

noncommercial speech in a billboard ordinance encumbers free speech in a manner that cannot

be cured by monetary damages. See City of Trussville, 458 F.3d at 1272. The same conclusion

would apply to First Amendment violations infringing upon commercial speech. See, e.g.,

Summum, 2007 WL 1128876, at *8 (“we have assumed irreparable injury when plaintiffs are

deprived of their commercial speech rights”). On that basis, plaintiff has made a sufficient

showing of irreparable harm if it is subject to continued enforcement of the moratorium.

3. The Remaining Rule 65 Factors.

The third requirement for injunctive relief is that “the threatened injury to the movant

outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party.” Siegel, 234

F.3d at 1176. The City argues that this balancing requirement is not satisfied here, couching the

relevant interests as being Salter’s interest in avoiding a possible temporary loss of income, on

the one hand, and the City’s interest in protecting citizens from endangerment at the hands of the

continuing threat of hurricanes and other strong storms. (Opposition Brief, at 21.) This

characterization greatly misstates the interests at stake. Viewed correctly, the balance is between

Salter’s interest in avoiding irreparable harm via operation of the moratorium, and the City’s

interest in enforcing an indefinite moratorium that bears no reasonable proportionality to the

government interest it was purportedly implemented to promote. Thus couched, the weighing of

harms clearly militates in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief. See City of Trussville,

458 F.3d at 1272 (third requirement for injunctive relief satisfied because “even a temporary

infringement of First Amendment rights constitutes a serious and substantial injury, and the city

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 19 of 32
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has no legitimate interest in enforcing an unconstitutional ordinance”). 

The fourth and final requirement for injunctive relief is that “if issued, the injunction

would not be adverse to the public interest.” Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176. The City argues in

conclusory terms that a preliminary injunction will harm the interests of the citizens of the City

of Brewton. (Opposition Brief, at 21-22.) This claim is meritless, as the citizens of Brewton can

have no legitimate interest in enforcing an indefinite moratorium that is substantially likely to

violate the First Amendment. See City of Trussville, 458 F.3d at 1272 (injunctive relief “plainly

is not adverse to the public interest” because “[t]he public has no interest in enforcing an

unconstitutional ordinance”). This factor, too, favors a grant of preliminary injunctive relief.

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Salter’s Motion for Preliminary Injunctive

Relief is due to be granted with respect to enforcement of the moratorium on all signs in the

City of Brewton, and the City will be preliminarily enjoined from enforcing same.

E. Request for Preliminary Injunction on Ordinance’s Prohibition of New OffPremises Billboards.

Salter also seeks a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City from enforcing the

prohibition on new off-premises signs or billboards set forth in § 10.775(7) of the Ordinance.

The first question in assessing plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits in its First

Amendment attack on the off-premises sign prohibition is whether that speech regulates

noncommercial speech in addition to commercial speech. See City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261,

1269 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has afforded commercial and noncommercial speech

different treatment under the First Amendment.”). On its face, § 10.775(7) does not regulate

noncommercial speech, but is instead confined to commercial speech. Indeed, by its terms, this

provision applies only to “off-premises signs or billboards,” which are further defined as “[a]ny

off-premises or off-site sign advertising an establishment, merchandise, product, service or

entertainment, etc., which is not sold, provided, manufactured or furnished on the property in

which said sign is located.” (Plaintiff’s Exh. D, at 9.) Nonetheless, Salter insists that this

provision “expressly includes noncommercial messages within the definition of off-premise

signs and then (purportedly) completely bans such signs.” (Plaintiff’s Brief (doc. 7), at 19.) 

This argument is in no way unique to Salter in this case; to the contrary, plaintiffs in this Circuit

have routinely made similar contentions with respect to similar off-premises sign bans. Such

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 20 of 32
21 The City of Morrow regulation defined a billboard as an “advertising sign or a

sign which advertises a commodity, product, service, activity or any other person, place or thing,

which is not located, found or sold on the premises upon which such sign is located.” 112 F.3d

at 1115. This definition is markedly similar to the City of Brewton’s billboard definition.

-21-

arguments have routinely failed. For example, in Southlake Property Associates, Ltd. v. City of

Morrow, Ga., 112 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1997), the city banned off-site billboards in a regulation

similarly worded to that at issue here.21 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that this ordinance

imposed no restraint on noncommercial speech because “[t]he definition of billboard as an

offsite advertising sign does not include noncommercial speech as such speech is always onsite.” 

Id. at 1119. In Coral Springs Street Systems v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2004),

the Eleventh Circuit revisited and reaffirmed the vitality of the Southlake holding, explaining

that “according to the law of this Circuit, noncommercial messages are by definition onsite signs

and therefore certainly not treated unfavorably compared with commercial signs” in the context

of an off-site ban. Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1344; see also Lockridge v. City of Oldsmar, Fla.,

--- F. Supp.2d ----, 2007 WL 613826, *10 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2007) (off-site billboard ban “did

not favor commercial over noncommercial speech because the prohibitions on billboards did not

apply to noncommercial signs”); Action Outdoor Advertising JV, L.L.C. v. Town of Shalimar,

Fla., 377 F. Supp.2d 1178, 1193 (N.D. Fla. 2005) (determining that “given the Eleventh

Circuit’s clear instruction that all noncommercial speech is inherently onsite, the phrase further

defining a billboard as providing information concerning any activity ‘that takes place on

property other than that where the sign is located’ eliminates noncommercial speech from the

scope of the definition’s reach”). Simply put, “Eleventh Circuit precedent is clear that all

noncommercial speech is onsite in nature and thus the prohibition against billboards does not

implicate noncommercial signs.” Town of Shalimar, 377 F. Supp.2d at 1195.

As a matter of law, then, the City’s prohibition on off-premises billboards does not and

cannot reach noncommercial speech. Accordingly, Salter’s assertion that the ban on offpremises signs regulates both commercial and noncommercial speech and that it somehow

impermissibly favors commercial speech over noncommercial speech – an oft-attempted and oftrejected gambit by interested plaintiffs in these kinds of cases – once again misses the mark

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 21 of 32
22 Plaintiff’s briefs on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction argue emphatically that

the off-premises sign prohibition regulates noncommercial speech despite the existence of

binding Eleventh Circuit precedent (Southlake, Coral Springs) to the contrary. Given plaintiff’s

counsel’s extensive experience in litigating billboard cases in the Eleventh Circuit in recent

years, including multiple cases whose outcomes turn on Southlake and Coral Springs, it would

be most surprising if counsel were unaware of both the existence of Southlake and Coral

Springs, and the fact that they are directly adverse to the position he is advocating here. If he

were aware of these cases, then it is unclear how plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to reference these

decisions can be squared with his ethical duty of candor toward the tribunal under Rule 3.3 of the

Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, the comment to which explains that a lawyer “is not

required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of

pertinent legal authorities.” (Id.)

23 To the extent that Salter relies on City of Trussville for the proposition that offpremises bans unconstitutionally favor commercial speech over noncommercial speech

(Plaintiff’s Brief, at 20), such reliance is misplaced. In City of Trussville, the panel found an

ordinance unconstitutional because billboards (the largest signs permitted by the ordinance) were

confined to commercial speech. 458 F.3d at 1270. Here, by contrast, Salter does not argue, and

the City of Brewton’s Ordinance does not appear to state, any discrepancy in size allowances

between noncommercial signs and commercial signs. In fact, City of Trussville supports this

Court’s finding that Salter lacks a substantial likelihood of success on its contention that the offsite ban applies to noncommercial speech, inasmuch as the City of Trussville court found that a

regulation applying to any “off-premise sign which directs attention to a business, commodity,

service, or entertainment, sold or offered for sale at a location other than the premises on which

said sign is located” was “by definition limited only to commercial messages.” 458 F.3d at

1270. That conclusion is fatal to Salter’s argument that the City of Brewton’s off-premises sign

ban regulates noncommercial speech.

24 See also Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Cobb County, GA, 193

Fed.Appx. 900, 904 (11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2006) (“Because the prohibition on ‘off-premises outdoor

-22-

here.22 This category of arguments being squarely and unambiguously foreclosed by a line of

binding precedent, Salter’s assertion that it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits

with respect to its argument that the off-site ban unconstitutionally regulates noncommercial

speech is unfounded.23

The prohibition on off-premises signs being limited to commercial speech under the

foregoing reasoning, review of the constitutionality of that provision is governed by the fourfactor Central Hudson test described supra. See This That and the Other Gift and Tobacco, Inc.

v. Cobb County, Ga., 439 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Courts use the four-prong test in

Central Hudson to determine if commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment.”).24 At

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 22 of 32
advertising signs’ extends only to commercial speech, we review the challenge to these

provisions under the four-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas”);

Lockridge, 2007 WL 613826, at *10 (explaining that Central Hudson test is used to determine

validity of government restrictions on commercial speech).

-23-

the risk of redundancy, that test requires a court to determine (1) whether the speech concerns

lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) whether the regulation serves a substantial

governmental interest; (3) whether the regulation directly and materially advances the

government’s asserted interest; and (4) whether the regulation is no more extensive than

necessary to serve that interest. Id.

There is no reason to doubt that the speech in which Salter seeks to engage constitutes

lawful activity and is not misleading, such that it lies within the purview of the First

Amendment. With respect to the governmental interest, the Ordinance states that its purpose is

“to ensure safe construction, light, air, and open space, to reduce hazards at intersections, to

promote public safety by eliminating confusing, distracting and unsafe signs, to prevent the

accumulation of trash, to protect property values of the entire community, and to require a

positive visual environment in harmony with the natural beauty of Brewton.” (Ordinance, §

10.7.) As the Supreme Court found in a seminal First Amendment case relating to billboards,

there can be no “substantial doubt that the twin goals that the ordinance seeks to further – traffic

safety and the appearance of the city – are substantial governmental goals.” Metromedia, Inc. v.

City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981) (plurality

opinion); see also Town of Shalimar, 377 F. Supp.2d at 1190 (“following Metromedia courts in

the Eleventh Circuit have uniformly found the promotion of safety or aesthetics to constitute

substantial government interests”). Moreover, there can be no serious question that the offsite

billboard ban directly and materially advances these interests; indeed, a plurality of the

Metromedia Court found that “the prohibition of offsite advertising is directly related to the

stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance

is underinclusive because it permits onsite advertising.” 453 U.S. at 511; see also Town of

Shalimar, 377 F. Supp.2d at 1191 (third Central Hudson prong satisfied where record contains

no evidence suggesting that ordinance fails to directly advance municipality’s legitimate goals,

such that there is no basis for court to disagree with judgment of defendant’s local lawmakers). 

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 23 of 32
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In the face of this authority, there is no substantial likelihood that Salter will succeed on the

second and third prongs of the Central Hudson analysis.

With respect to the fourth factor, Central Hudson’s proportionality inquiry, once again

the Metromedia plurality opinion is instructive, as it states as follows:

“If the city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards

and are unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective

approach to solving the problems they create is to prohibit them. The city has

gone no further than necessary in seeking to meet its ends. Indeed, it has stopped

short of fully accomplishing its ends: It has not prohibited all billboards, but

allows onsite advertising and some other specifically exempted signs.”

453 U.S. at 508. Courts in this Circuit have hewed to the Metromedia analysis in finding similar

bans on off-premises billboards to satisfy the Central Hudson test for constitutionality. See

Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Cobb County, GA, 193 Fed.Appx. 900, 904-05 (11th

Cir. Aug. 17, 2006) (“Cobb County”) (prohibition on off-premises outdoor advertising signs

passes muster under all four prongs of Central Hudson, using Metromedia analysis); Lockridge,

2007 WL 613826, at *10-11 (similar); Town of Shalimar, 377 F. Supp.2d at 1192 (similar).

In sum, then, this Court finds that it is not substantially likely that Salter will be able to

establish that the Ordinance’s prohibition of new off-premises billboards in the Ordinance

implicates noncommercial speech. The challenged section of the Ordinance being confined to

commercial speech, the Court further finds that Salter is not substantially likely to be able to

establish that such prohibition is unconstitutional under Central Hudson and Metromedia. 

Accordingly, Salter has failed to carry its burden of clearly showing a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits as to its claim that the prohibition on new off-premises billboards violates

the First Amendment. No preliminary injunction will issue as to that cause of action.

F. Request for Preliminary Injunction on Other Aspects of Ordinance.

1. Background.

In addition to seeking a preliminary injunction as to the moratorium and the Ordinance’s

prohibition on new off-premises billboards, Salter seeks to enjoin enforcement of assorted other

aspects of the Ordinance that it deems constitutionally problematic. Specifically, at this Rule 65

juncture, Salter asks the Court to enjoin the City from enforcing the Ordinance on the following

bases: (i) that the Ordinance’s exemptions (covering topics like official traffic signs, temporary

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 24 of 32
25 The City does not argue, and could not reasonably argue, that Salter lacks

standing to challenge the moratorium or the Ordinance’s prohibition on new off-premises signs,

which were the stated reasons for denial of Salter’s nine permit applications. Thus, the City’s

standing objection is confined to Salter’s efforts to invalidate other aspects of the Ordinance. 

There clearly being standing for Salter to challenge the moratorium and the ban on new offpremises signs, and the City not having interposed a standing objection to those claims, this

Order will not recite a pro forma analysis of the Defenders of Wildlife factors and the

accompanying prudential considerations with respect to each of those claims.

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signs and decorations for holidays and grand openings, political signs that comport with certain

regulatory controls, and certain types of flags) render the Ordinance a content-based regulation

that flunks strict scrutiny review; (ii) that the Ordinance unconstitutionally imposes more

stringent restrictions on political signs than on commercial signs; (iii) that the permitting

requirements of the Ordinance lack required procedural safeguards, such as setting specific time

limits on the City’s decision-making process and allowing for prompt judicial review of adverse

permitting decisions; and (iv) that the Ordinance affords unbridled discretion to City

decisionmakers as to permit applications.

There is no allegation and no evidence that the nine permitting decisions underlying the

Motion for Preliminary Injunction were prompted by any of these purported infirmities, or that

any of those features of the Ordinance were the driving force behind the permit denials on which

this action is predicated. For that reason, before (and in certain respects, in lieu of) reaching the

traditional preliminary injunction analysis, the City devotes considerable attention in its brief to

arguing that Salter lacks standing to contest these ancillary provisions of the Ordinance. If the

Court understands it correctly, the City’s position is that because Salter’s sign applications were

denied on the grounds of the moratorium and the Ordinance’s prohibition on new off-premises

signs, Salter has no standing to challenge any aspect of the Ordinance other than the off-premises

provision. (Opposition Brief, at 13.) On that basis, the City decries Salter’s “sweeping attack on

several provisions that do not apply to it and on the ordinance as a whole under the overbreadth

doctrine” as an abuse of Article III standing principles. (Id.)

25

2. Legal Prerequisites for Standing.

“Standing is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the

Court to entertain the suit.” CAMP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257,

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 25 of 32
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1269 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The doctrine of standing includes both “irreducible

constitutional requirements and prudential considerations.” E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Hadley, 901

F.2d 979, 984 (11th Cir. 1990); see also City of Trussville, 458 F.3d at 1266 (“In addition to the

constitutional requirements, there are also prudential standing principles ....”). The irreducible

constitutional minimum elements of standing, as propounded in the seminal case of Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), are that a plaintiff

must show each of the following: “(1) an injury in fact, meaning an injury that is concrete and

particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the causal

conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Granite

State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Fla., 351 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2003)

(“City of Clearwater”).

If Salter is able to satisfy these constitutional requirements, then it must also comport

with prudential standing principles, and in particular the requirement that “a party generally may

assert only his or her own rights and cannot raise the claims of third parties not before the court.” 

City of Trussville, 458 F.3d at 1266. This prudential requirement is subject to an overbreadth

exception, which “simply allows a plaintiff to bring a facial challenge to a provision of law that

caused her injury, regardless of whether the provision’s regulation of her conduct in particular

was constitutional.” Id. at 1267. This Circuit’s overbreadth jurisprudence stresses that “a

plaintiff may bring an overbreadth challenge to only those provisions of a law or ordinance that

affect its activities” and that “the overbreadth doctrine does not change the statutes or provisions

of an ordinance a plaintiff may challenge; she can only contest those which actually caused her

injury” under constitutional standing principles. Id. Stated differently, the law of this Circuit is

crystal clear that Salter must satisfy the constitutional standing prerequisites for every provision

of the Ordinance that it challenges here. See CAMP, 451 F.3d at 1273 (conclusively rejecting

proposition “that injury under one provision is sufficient to confer standing on a plaintiff to

challenge all provisions of an allegedly unconstitutional ordinance” and explaining that a

plaintiff must “establish injury in fact as to each provision, even under the overbreadth

doctrine”).

3. No Injury in Fact as to Political Signs.

The fundamental standing problem that Salter encounters with respect to its challenge to

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 26 of 32
26 In its reply brief, Salter attempts to bolster its political signs business by stating

that it is “an entity that often displays political messages on its signs in the City.” (Reply Brief

(doc. 16, at 6.) But the record is devoid of any evidence that such is the case, and the

unsupported statements of counsel cannot be credited in the standing inquiry. See CAMP, 451

F.3d at 1276 (“Standing cannot be inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but

rather must affirmatively appear in the record.”) (citations omitted). As such, the naked

representation of plaintiff’s counsel that Salter “often” posts political billboards in the City of

Brewton substantially embellishes the evidence of record and cannot confer standing on Salter to

challenge the political sign aspects of the Ordinance.

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the aspects of the Ordinance concerning political signs is that it has not shown a substantial

likelihood that the restrictions on political signs expose it to an injury in fact, one that is “(a)

concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 

American United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 2007 WL 677729, *23 n.16 (11th Cir.

Mar. 7, 2007). With respect to the injury-in-fact requirement, the Eleventh Circuit has opined

that “[w]hile this requirement is hard to define precisely, we know that the plaintiff must at least

claim to personally suffer some harm.” City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d at 1116.

Here, there is no indication that any of the nine signs for which Salter made application

were designated for political messages. Salter does not specialize in political signs; to the

contrary, its evidence is that Salter’s signs include advertisements for “businesses, organizations,

special events, charitable causes, churches, hospitals, schools, and political and ideological

opinions.” (Crawley Decl., ¶ 5.) At most, Salter’s paltry showing on this point is that on

occasion (no evidence as to how frequent) in its 50 year history it has posted political signs, and

that at some indeterminate time in the future (again, no evidence as to when) it may post political

signs again, with no indication that it has ever posted or will ever post political signs in the City

of Brewton, as opposed to other locales in its extensive territory of operations.26 From the record

presented by Salter, there is no indication as to whether it is reasonably likely that Salter would

desire to post a political sign in the City of Brewton sometime in the next week, the next month,

the next year, or the next five years. As such, any harm that Salter may incur from

unconstitutional restrictions in the political sign aspects of the Ordinance is far too remote and

speculative at this time, on this record, to comport with the irreducible constitutional minimum

requirement that an injury in fact is needed for Article III standing to exist. See CAMP, 451 F.3d

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27 That said, the Court notes that defendant has not requested that plaintiff’s claims

be dismissed for want of standing, but has instead used standing as a lever to oppose the granting

of preliminary injunctive relief to Salter. Moreover, the Court recognizes that this case is at a

very early stage, and that a plaintiff need not prove standing until “the final stage of litigation.” 

CAMP, 451 F.3d at 1269. Accordingly, the undersigned does not find today that there is no

possibility that Salter can establish standing to contest the Ordinance’s political sign restrictions,

nor does it dismiss such claims. Rather, the Court’s finding is that plaintiff is not entitled to a

preliminary injunction specifically directed at the political sign restrictions set forth in the

Ordinance because plaintiff has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood that it will be able to

prove standing to pursue such a claim in this action. See generally Securities and Exchange

Commission v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 727, 731 (11th Cir. 2005) (when preliminary

injunction is challenged on jurisdictional basis, plaintiff need only establish a reasonable

probability of ultimate success on the question of jurisdiction when action is tried on merits).

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at 1276 (finding that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge two provisions of ordinance where it

had presented no evidence that those provisions apply to the permits it seeks and the record did

not evidence actual or imminent injury from those provisions); Prime Media, Inc. v. City of

Brentwood, 474 F.3d 332, 339 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding plaintiff’s claims relating to certain

provisions of sign ordinance to be “conjectural or hypothetical,” rather than “palpable and

distinct,” such that they were insufficient to establish an injury in fact). Accordingly, it is the

finding of this Court that the record at present is insufficient to establish that Salter possesses

standing to contest the Ordinance’s restrictions on political signs because there is no evidence

that such restrictions are imminently likely to affect its activities.27 For that reason, no

preliminary injunctive relief will be awarded to Salter with respect to the political sign

provisions of the Ordinance.

4. No Redressability as to Objections to Exemptions, Lack of Procedural

Safeguards, and Excessive Discretion.

As for Salter’s remaining objections to sundry aspects of the Ordinance (e.g.,

exemptions, lack of procedural safeguards, unfettered discretion to City officials), plaintiff’s

efforts to show standing to bring each of those claims are foreclosed by a recent line of precedent

in this Circuit culminating in the newly decided KH Outdoor, L.L.C. v. Clay County, Fla., ---

F.3d ----, 2007 WL 925282 (11th Cir. Mar. 29, 2007) (“Clay County”).

In this formidable and burgeoning line of cases, courts have deemed the injury

complained of not to be redressible for standing purposes because even if the plaintiff succeeded

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 28 of 32
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in showing the objected-to provisions of the Ordinance to be unconstitutional, some other

provision would preclude it from being able to erect billboards. See Clay County, 2007 WL

925282, at *4 (concluding that any injury that billboard company actually suffered from

challenged ordinance provisions is not redressible because plaintiff’s applications failed to meet

requirements of other statutes and regulations not challenged); Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1343

(declining to review certain challenged provisions of a sign ordinance that are unrelated to the

provisions actually responsible for the denial of the permit application, such that review of them

would have utterly no impact on outcome of the case); Tinsley Media, LLC v. Pickens County,

GA, 2006 WL 2917561, *6 (11th Cir. Oct. 12, 2006) (“The injury, in this circumstance, is the

prohibition of the intended form of expression of Tinsley Media, i.e., the erection of advertising

billboards. Tinsley Media fails to satisfy the “redressability” requirement of standing because,

even if we declared unconstitutional one or more of the exemptions, the striking of those

exemptions would not in any way benefit the proposed forms of expression of Tinsley Media. ...

The permitting requirements for billboards would remain.”); Granite State Outdoor Advertising,

Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 194 Fed.Appx. 754, 758 (11th Cir. Sept. 6, 2006) (“City of Fort

Lauderdale”) (finding that where outdoor advertiser was categorically prohibited from its

activity of outdoor advertising, it lacked standing to challenge ordinance’s restrictions on

political signs and the ordinance’s exemptions because advertiser’s injury of being denied

permits could not be redressed by striking these provisions from the ordinance as

unconstitutional, such that there was no point in evaluating plaintiff’s objections to those

exemptions); Cobb County, 193 Fed.Appx. at 906 (where ordinance categorically banned all offpremises outdoor advertising, plaintiff outdoor advertiser lacked standing to object to aspects of

ordinance addressing temporary signs, exemptions, and the like because even if these provisions

were declared unconstitutional, the ordinance would continue to prohibit off-premises outdoor

advertising, which is the plaintiff’s only intended activity, such that its injury would not be

redressed by a favorable decision); Lockridge, 2007 WL 613826, at *6 (“Plaintiff has failed to

show that he has standing to challenge the alleged lack of procedural safeguards because he has

not alleged in his complaint or presented evidence that he intended to construct signs that would

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 29 of 32
28 Remarkably, despite the fact that he was counsel of record for the sign companies

in many of these cases that are directly adverse to his position here, plaintiff’s counsel neglects

to mention any of them in his arguments concerning standing. This omission is of some concern

given plaintiff’s counsel’s ethical obligation of candor to the tribunal in positing legal arguments

and his failure to disclose these adverse authorities despite his personal participation in many of

these cases and, presumably, his actual knowledge of these decisions.

29 Against this wall of precedent, Salter would apparently lean on City of Trussville,

but that decision is plainly distinguishable and therefore cannot support the weight that plaintiff

would place on it. In City of Trussville, the Eleventh Circuit allowed a billboard company to

-30-

otherwise be permitted.”).28

A typical, representative exposition of the reasoning animating this substantial line of

authority was set forth in Advantage Advertising, LLC v. City of Hoover, Ala., 200 Fed.Appx.

831 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2006). Significantly, the City of Hoover ordinance included a provision

banning off-premise billboards, which both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit concluded

was not violative of the First Amendment. When the sign company attempted to challenge other

ordinance provisions that allegedly granted unbridled discretion to city officials or constituted

unconstitutional prior restraints of speech, the City of Hoover found no standing, reasoning as

follows:

“Although ADvantage challenged the lack of several procedural safeguards that

allegedly grant unbridled discretion to city officials, ... ADvantage was not

subject to those provisions because off-premise signs are never permitted under

the ordinance. ... ADvantage did not allege in its complaint or present evidence

that it intended to construct signs that might be permitted under the statute, which

would subject ADvantage to the lack of procedural safeguards. ADvantage lacks

standing to challenge the lack of procedural safeguards.”

City of Hoover, 200 Fed.Appx. at 835. Similarly, in City of Fort Lauderdale, the Court reasoned

that the sign company lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of a sign ordinance’s

exemptions for flags, holiday decorations, and the like, inasmuch as “[t]he injury that Granite

State suffered from being denied a permit under the categorical ban on billboards would not be

redressed by a challenge to this provision. ... Granite State was injured because it was not

permitted to erect billboards. ... If the exemptions that it challenges were struck from the statute

as unconstitutional, Granite State still would not be able to erect a billboard.” City of Fort

Lauderdale, 194 Fed.Appx. at 758 (citations omitted).29

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 30 of 32
challenge both a restriction (not a prohibition) on commercial signs and the portion of the

ordinance supplying the basic definitional structure for the challenged section, as well as the

plaintiff’s contention that the ordinance discriminated noncommercial speech by restricting the

largest size of sign permitted to commercial messages only. 458 F.3d at 1267-68. Unlike this

case and the myriad authorities cited above, however, City of Trussville was not a case in which

a valid, enforceable ban on billboards effectively mooted any discussion about the constitutional

status of other, superfluous portions of the Ordinance. As such, Salter’s position is not materially

bolstered by City of Trussville.

30 The same reasoning would also preclude consideration of Salter’s claims

concerning the exemption for political signs, even if those claims did pass muster under an

injury-in-fact analysis.

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The bottom line is this: Salter suffers an injury in that it cannot erect new off-premises

billboards in the City of Brewton. Even if could show a substantial likelihood of success on all

of these other challenges to the Ordinance concerning its exemptions, unbridled discretion, and

want of procedural safeguards, Salter would remain unable to erect new off-premises billboards

in the City of Brewton because it has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on its claim

that the prohibition on new off-premises billboards is unconstitutional. Accordingly, pursuant to

the uniform line of Circuit authority addressing this precise issue, the Court finds that there

would be no point in evaluating Salter’s objections to these provisions, because any injury these

provisions may be causing Salter is not redressible. See Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1349

(declining to decide constitutionality of remaining challenged portions of ordinance because

declaring them unconstitutional “would not make a whit of difference to Coral Springs; it would

not have a right to a sign permit whether these provisions ... are valid or not”); Harp Advertising

Illinois, Inc., v. Village of Chicago Ridge, Ill., 9 F.3d 1290, 1292 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Harp suffers

an injury (it can’t erect the proposed billboard), but winning the case will not alter that

situation.”). Salter has not made a substantial showing that its claims that the ordinance

unconstitutionally contains certain exemptions, vests unbridled discretion in decisionmakers, and

lacks procedural safeguards are redressible.30 It not appearing substantially likely that it has

standing to pursue those claims at this juncture, Salter will not be granted preliminary injunctive

relief as to any of these claims.

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 31 of 32
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IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Stay Consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary

Injunction (doc. 11) is denied.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (doc. 6) is granted in part, and

denied in part. The Motion is granted with respect to the post-Hurricane Ivan

moratorium on billboards, and the City of Brewton is hereby preliminarily

enjoined from enforcing that moratorium. The Motion is denied in all other

respects.

3. Review of the court file reflects that defendant has, for unknown reasons, failed to

file an answer or other responsive pleading under Rule 12, Fed.R.Civ.P., even

though its answer was due by no later than April 3, 2007. Defendant is ordered

to remedy this defect on or before May 7, 2007.

DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of April, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00081-WS-B Document 14 Filed 04/26/07 Page 32 of 32