Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00215/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00215-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELLI THOMAS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

RODERICK HICKMAN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-00215-AWI-SMS

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

COMPEL NON-PARTIES TO PRODUCE

DOCUMENTS PURSUANT TO SUBPOENAS

(DOC. 80)

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

COMPEL FURTHER PRODUCTION BY

DEFENDANT DR. UGWU-OJU (DOCS. 89,

90)

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

COMPEL FURTHER PRODUCTION OF

DOCUMENTS BY DRS. SURYADEVARA,

KRUSE, REEVES, AND GOODWIN (DOCS.

54, 56)

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

STRIKE THE DECLARATION OF TODD

SPENCER, M.D. (DOCS. 67, 65) 

Plaintiffs are proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302(c)(1) and 72-303.

Pending before the Court are three discovery motions.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed suit initially on February 27, 2006,

alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, professional negligence,

failure to obtain informed consent, civil battery, gross

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negligence, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional

distress, intentional deceit/fraud, and negligent

misrepresentation against thirteen defendants. After motions to

dismiss were determined by Judge Ishii, Plaintiff filed a first

amended complaint on November 7, 2006, and on November 9, 2007

Plaintiff Thomas filed a Notice of Errata and a Corrected Amended

Complaint (FAC).

The FAC names only six defendants: Sampath Suryadevara,

M.D., Chief Medical Officer, Central California Women’s Facility

(CCWF); 2) Shelly Kruse, M.D., a physician employed at CCWF; 3)

Ernest Reeves, M.D., a gynecologist employed at CCWF; 4) Loraine

Goodwin, M.D., a physician employed at CCWF; 5) Charles Ugwu-Oju,

M.D., a physician, a member of a medical group in private

practice under contract with CCWF to provide care to inmates, and

a doctor on staff at Madera Community Hospital, which also

provides care of inmates of CCWF; and 6) Madera Community

Hospital, a California non-profit corporation that through

agreements with the medical group of Dr. Ogwu-Oji and the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

provided treatment to inmates of CCWF, including Plaintiff. The

FAC includes claims against each of the CDCR Defendants for

negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

intentional and negligent misrepresentation, and cruel and

unusual punishment under § 1983 and the California constitution.

It includes similar claims against Dr. Ugwu-Oju and an additional

claim under § 1983 and the California constitution for due

process violations. There is also a claim against Madera

Community Hospital for professional negligence.

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After notifying counsel for all defendants and for the nonparties, Plaintiff served the subpoenas on the five CDCR/CCWF

non-parties on March 12, 2007, requiring them to produce

documents such as contracts, CDCR and CCWF policies and

procedures, and documents concerning Plaintiff’s medical

treatment. (Doc. 82 - Declaration of Erica Brand-Portnoy in

Support of Motion to Compel, Ex. B, C, D, E & F; Doc. 82, Ex. G.) 

After unsuccessful efforts to negotiate with the nonparties, on November 13, 2006, Plaintiff sent her First Set of

Requests for Production of Documents (RPD’s) to the CDCR

Defendants. In January 2007, CDCR Defendants each served their

responses and objections, but only Defendant Reeves produced any

documents, which consisted of 112 documents in response to only

three of sixteen requests. (See Plaintiff’s Memo, p. 4-5.)

Plaintiff served her first set for requests for production

of documents (RPD’s) on Defendant Oju on September 1, 2006.

Responses and conferences produced no resolution of disputes

concerning the scope and propriety of the requested discovery.

II. Motion to Compel Non-Parties to Produce Documents

 pursuant to Subpoenas 

Plaintiff filed a motion, a supporting memorandum and

declaration with exhibits and appendices; Defendant filed

opposition, and Plaintiff a reply; thereafter, the hearing on the

motion was vacated and the matter was submitted to the Court for

decision.

Plaintiff brings this Motion to Compel Non-Parties to

produce documents requested pursuant to Fed. R .Civ. P. 45 by

subpoenas duces tecum that were issued on March 12, 2007, to the

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following non-parties:

1. Deborah L. Patrick, Warden, Central California Women’s

Facility (CCWF);

2. Custodian of Records at CCWF;

3. Custodian of Records at California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR);

4. James E. Tilton, Secretary, CDCR; and

5. Dr. Peter Farber-Szekrenyi, Director, Division of

Correctional Health Care Services, CDCR.

These individuals and custodians will be referred to as

“CDCR/CCWF non-parties” or simply “non-parties.” 

By the subpoenas Plaintiff seeks documents that will enable

Plaintiff to learn more about the alleged improper surgery

performed on her on April 5, 2001, at the Madera Community

Hospital. She seeks documents relevant to her claims in this suit

about the state of her ovaries which she alleges were removed

during surgery; and documents pertaining to the surgery performed

on her, the surgeon, and the prison system’s policies regarding

inmate medical care. Plaintiff claims that despite her efforts to

avoid undue burden and expense on them, the CDCR/CCWF nonparties, like Defendants, have refused to produce documents and

argue that they should have to produce no responsive documents,

raising several objections.

The non-parties are represented by attorneys separate from

the attorneys for the defendants. 

A. Immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment

The non-parties object on the ground that they have

sovereign immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment with

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respect to the third-party subpoenas because they are employees

and/or agents of the CDCR and CCWF and thus of the state.

The non-parties rely on Estate of Gonzales v. Hickman, 466

F.Supp.2d 1226 (E.D.Cal. 2006), in which it was held that the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to subpoenas

that were issued in a suit by the estate of a corrections officer

and which sought information regarding the decedent’s employment

and equipment he wore while on duty. 

However, the present case involves not an arm of the state,

but rather a suit against the doctors and the medical officer in

their individual capacities. It is established that a suit

against state officers in their individual capacity for damages

on the basis of a violation of federal civil rights is not deemed

an action against the state and thus is not barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974).

Further, the Eleventh Amendment immunity refers to assertions of

liability on the part of the state and claims for relief against

the state, as distinct from service of process to obtain

information. Jones v. Tozzi, 2007 WL 1299795, *3 (E.D.Cal. 2007)

(citing and discussing authorities). Thus, there may in some

circumstances be sovereign immunity against subpoenas for the

sovereign itself. See, United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314 (9th

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 838 (1993). However, the

identity and extent of the immunity is determinative, and here

the Eleventh Amendment is not implicated because the persons

proceeded against are not the state itself, but rather

individuals, and further because those individuals are not

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asserted to be liable in a manner that would result in a judgment

against the state that would be paid out of the state’s treasury.

See, Jones v. Tozzi, 2007 WL 1299795, *3 (E.D.Cal. 2007) (holding

in part that trial subpoenas issued to state officers in their

individual capacities, as distinct from a state or state agency,

were not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity); Laxalt v.

McClatchy, 109 F.R.D. 632 (D. Nev. 1986) (holding that the

Eleventh Amendment did not bar subpoenas to the custodian of

records of a state gaming control board because the custodian was

not a state and because the discovery process of inspecting and

copying state records did not amount to an assertion of liability

on the state’s part or a claim for relief against it).

The Court finds inapposite the various authorities relied on

by Defendants and non-parties that concern immunity from suit, as

distinct from a mere subpoena. The Court therefore rejects the

non-parties’ contention that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes

them from the subpoenas; the objections on the ground of

sovereign or Eleventh Amendment immunity are overruled.

B. Waiver of Immunity

Although the Court has concluded that there is no Eleventh

Amendment or sovereign immunity, the Court determines that

Defendant Dr. Reeves’ production of documents constituted a

waiver by the state of California of any immunity. 

Reeves produced 112 documents from Plaintiff’s central file,

with an accompanying authentication by the custodian of medical

records from CCWF, in response to Plaintiff’s RPD’s. In the joint

statement, it was represented that Defendant Reeves stated that

he was not the custodian of the records requested and did not

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have possession, custody, or control over any of the CDC records

requested. (Jt. Stmt. (Doc. 63) at pp. 14, 17.) It thus appears

that Defendant Reeves obtained the documents from the custodian

of medical records of CCWF and then selectively produced them in

response to the RPD’s; it further appears from the official

custodian’s authentication that the state voluntarily provided

the documents to one Defendant, Dr. Reeves. 

It is established that a third party’s voluntarily providing

documents relevant to a case constitutes a waiver of immunity.

United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1320 (9 Cir. 1992) th

(holding that the Quinault Indian Nation was entitled to a claim

of sovereign immunity but waived it with respect to relevant

documents in the possession of the Housing Authority by

voluntarily providing the opposing party with documents that had

been in the Housing Authority’s possession). It is not

permissible for the entity claiming the immunity to provide

documents selectively and then hide behind a claim of sovereign

immunity when the opposing party requests different documents

from the same agency. Id. See also, Jett v. Penner, 2007 WL

127790, *2 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 12, 2007) (holding that the CDCR’s

providing some documents from the plaintiff inmate’s central file

to the defendants constituted a waiver of any claim of sovereign

immunity with respect to the documents in the central file).

Thus, the objections on the ground of privilege or

protection are further overruled on the ground that any privilege

or protection was waived.

C. Privacy and Privilege

The non-parties make various arguments concerning privacy

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rights: 1) the privacy rights of Defendant Dr. Ugwu-Oju will be

invaded by disclosure of financial information pertinent to

contract negotiations with the non-party state of California, and

the state of California does not have the authority to waive the

doctor’s right to privacy; 2) the privacy rights of the doctor

and of third parties, such as non-parties as to whom medical

services had been rendered, would be invaded by the disclosure,

and the state cannot waive these persons’ right to privacy; 3)

the stipulation and protective order presently in effect is

ineffective to protect privacy rights of these entities because

it protects only those documents filed with the Court, whereas

the requested discovery would not be filed with the Court but

rather would be produced during the regular course of discovery,

thus enabling any party freely to disseminate the information.

1. State Privileges

The Court rejects the assertion of privacy rights derived

from the California constitution because state privilege law does

not apply in federal question cases, but rather federal law

governs even state law claims that are pendent to federal

question cases. Jackson v. County of Sacramento, 175 F.R.D. 653,

654 (E.D.Cal. 1997); Burrows v. Redbud Community Hospital

District, 187 F.R.D. 606, 610-11 (N.D.Cal. 1998).

2. Federal Privileges and Privacy

With respect to a claim of federal privilege, Defendants

have failed to make the required threshold showing. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 26(b)(5)(A) provides that when a party withholds information

otherwise discoverable under the rules by claiming that it is

privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation

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material, then the party shall make the claim expressly and shall

describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things

not produced or disclosed in a manner that will enable other

parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or

protection without revealing the privileged or protected

information itself. In order to assist a court in determining a

claim of privilege, a court may require an adequately detailed

privilege log in conjunction with evidentiary submissions to fill

in any factual gaps. United States v. Construction Products

Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 927, (1996); see also, Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL

309485, *4 (E.D.Cal. 2007), aff’d, Allen v. Woodford, 2007 U.S.

Dist. Lexis 24345 (E.D.Cal. 2007). With respect to each document

as to which a privilege is claimed, the person claiming the

privilege should include in the privilege log the document’s

general nature and description, including its date, the identity

and position of the author, and the identity and position of all

addressees and recipients; the present location of the document;

and the specific reasons it was withheld, including the privilege

invoked and the grounds therefor. Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL

309485, *4 (citing Construction Products, 73 F.3d at 473-74, and

In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9 Cir. th

1992)).

a. Official Information Privilege

With respect to an assertion of the governmental information

privilege, the privilege log or declaration must be submitted at

the time the party claiming the privilege or protection serves

its response to the discovery request. Miller v. Pancucci, 141

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F.R.D. 292, 300 (C.D.Cal. 1992). This enables the Court to engage

in a case-specific and fact-specific balancing of the interests

of law enforcement, privacy interests of police officers or

citizens, interests of civil rights plaintiffs, policies that

inform the laws, and the needs of the judicial process. Kelly v.

City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 667-69 (N.D.Cal. 1987). The

claimant must show that the agency generated or collected the

information and maintained its confidentiality; the declarant

reviewed the material personally; there is a specific

governmental or privacy interest that would be threatened by

disclosure to Plaintiff and/or his attorney; a description of how

disclosure subject to a carefully crafted protective order would

create a substantial risk of harm to significant governmental or

privacy interests; and an assessment of the extent of the harm

that would result from disclosure. Id. at 670. It is helpful if

the agency can describe how the plaintiff could acquire the

information or information of equivalent value from other

sources. Id. 

Here, the CDCR/CCWF non-parties submitted no declarations or

privilege log; there is no indication that anyone has reviewed

the materials requested. Because Defendants have not made their

substantial threshold showing and have not provided adequate

information concerning their claim of privilege or protection,

the Court rejects the claim of privilege based on the official

information privilege under federal law.

b. Privacy Based on State Statute

The non-parties also argue for privacy based upon

California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CIMA)

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and the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability

Act (HIPAA). The CDCR/CCWF non-parties do not discuss this

objection in their opposition to the motions here; rather, they

raised the issue in their objections to Request 18 in the

subpoenas served on the five CDCR/CCWF non-parties. They have not

further indicated why CIMA or HIPAA apply. 

CIMA is a state act that generally bars disclosure of a

patient’s medical information without the patient’s

authorization, and health care providers must hold that

information confidential unless compelled to disclose by

provisions of the Act allowing such disclosure. Cal. Civ. Code §

56.10. As discussed previously, federal, not state, privilege law

applies. Boyd v. City and County of San Francisco, 2006 WL

1390423 (N.D.Cal. May 18, 2006). Because the only issues to be

resolved are determined under federal privilege law, CIMA is not

applicable here.

c. HIPAA

The court in Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 309485, at *5

(E.D.Cal. Jan. 30, 2007) addressed HIPAA’s applicability fully,

discussing both its requirements and restrictions with regard to

disclosure of protected health information. There it was

determined that disclosure is permitted pursuant to a court

order, subpoena or discovery request when the healthcare provider

receives satisfactory assurance from the party seeking the

information that reasonable efforts have been made to secure a

qualified protective order. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(2004).

Plaintiffs argue that a protective order is in place and

that it satisfies the requirements for disclosure pursuant to the

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subpoenas in question. The CDCR/CCWF non-parties contend that the

protective order is insufficient. 

A review of the protective order in place here appears to

satisfy the requirements of HIPAA as there are protections

prohibiting disclosure or use of the protected health information

for any purpose other than the litigation herein, and the

protected information is returned to the physician or destruction

of the protected health information is provided for at the end of

the proceeding. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(v). The protective order

in place here satisfactorily protects the interests of HIPAA.

(See Exhibit 1 to each of Exhibits B, C, D and F, Decl. of Erica

Brand Portnoy in Support of Motion to Compel.)

Accordingly, objections based on privilege, protection, or

privacy are overruled.

D. Overbreadth, Vagueness, and Ambiguity

The CDCR/CCWF non-parties complain that the subpoenas are

overbroad, vague and ambiguous. They take issue with the

definitions provided by Plaintiff to “CDC” and “PERSONS” because

it includes predecessors and successors in interest who would not

have possession, custody or control of the requested information. 

The contend that the definition of “COMMUNICATION” is vague and

that it appears to require the non-parties here to create

documents of verbal communications, a violation of Fed. R. Civ.

P. 34. They also complain that production of “potential contracts

or agreements” or “possible agreements or negotiations” requests

are overly broad, vague and ambiguous, and are oppressive and

unreasonable. They propose that the only relevant agreements

would be executed contracts in effect during the relevant time

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period. They further object to such terms as “prisoner medical

care,” “medical care,” and “provision of medical care.” They

contend that medical treatment or care of a broken hand or a knee

injury is irrelevant.

Although Plaintiff has redefined the term “possible

agreements or negotiations” to include “unexecuted drafts,

documentation of negotiations of contracts, or other documents

referring to these contracts, such as e-mails or letters

discussing their existence and potential problems therewith,” the

non-party recipients of the subpoenas continue to claim the

requests are overly broad and unreasonable.

Additionally, they claim that the requests are overly broad

because they do not specify a time frame relevant to this action.

Plaintiff responds that the burden to establish that the

subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive is upon the objecting

party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) specifically requires that each

request be addressed and that unless the requested inspection is

allowed, an objection be stated and the reasons for the objection

“shall be stated.” The objecting entity must state specifically

how, despite the broad and liberal construction of federal

discovery rules, each question is overly broad, unduly

burdensome, or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering

evidence revealing the nature of the burden. Klein v. AIG Trading

Group, Inc., 228 F.R.D. 418, 422 (D.Conn. 2005). Objections must

be made with sufficient specificity in accordance with

Fed.R.Civ.P. 34; objections that are not sufficiently specific,

such as statements that requests are overly broad, burdensome, or

oppressive, are waived. Ramirez v. County of Los Angeles, 231

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F.R.D. 407, 409 (C.D.Cal. 2005).

Further, the responding party should exercise reason and

common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and

phrases utilized in the discovery documents. McCoo v. Denny’s

Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 694 (D.Kan. 2000). 

Here, the objections are not sufficiently specific or

adequately explained. The objections with regard to the terms and

definitions accompanying the subpoenas in this case could have,

and should have been, resolved without court intervention.

Without the objecting party’s reasons for the objections here,

the Court overrules these objections.

E. Lack of Possession, Custody, or Control

The CDCR/CCWF non-parties contend that request numbers 1, 2,

3, 4 and 5 seek documents regarding negotiations between the

CDCR, Madera and Dr. Ugwu-Oju that would be in the possession,

custody or control of CDCR, but not CCWF or Warden Patrick or the

custodian of records there. They state that if their Eleventh

Amendment issues are resolved against them, they will work with

Plaintiff to identify the employees in possession, custody and

control.

Plaintiff contends that pursuant to the liberal federal

discovery rules, if Ms. Patrick and/or the Custodian of Records

at CCWF do not have the requested documents, they are required to

seek out the records provided they have the practical ability to

obtain them.

Since the recipients of the subpoenas here have agreed to

assist in procuring the requested documents, the Court will not

address this objection further. The CDCR/CCWF non-parties are

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reminded that cooperation in obtaining these documents promptly

is expected by the Court.

Finally, the Court notes that if a particular objection is

not directly addressed in this order, the parties are informed

that the question was considered and rejected as being improperly

raised and/or insufficiently supported.

In summary, the motion to compel non-parties to produce

documents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 IS GRANTED.

III. Plaintiff Motion to Compel Further Production by

 Charles Ugwu-Oju, M.D. 

Plaintiff moves to compel Dr. Oju to disclose billing

records and medical records related to all patients for whom Dr.

Oju has ever performed cystectomies, cone biopsies,

oophorectomies, and/or all patients whom the doctor treated for

ovarian cysts and dysplasia. Defendant Oju is defending claims of

violation of the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Clause, professional negligence, failure to obtain

informed consent, battery, negligent and intentional

misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress based on his allegedly unauthorized and unnecessary

removal of Plaintiff’s ovaries during a surgical procedure.

The motion was filed on May 8, 2007, and an amended motion

was filed the same day. A joint statement was filed on June 11,

2007, which included an appendix of authorities and the

declaration of Dakota S. Whitney as well as Defendant’s exhibits.

The hearing on the motion was vacated, and the matter was

submitted to the Court for decision. 

A. Billing Other Incarcerated Patients for Similar

 Procedures and Treatment 

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The first disputed request is number 11, which is for “ALL

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO YOUR medical bills for cystectomies, cone

biopsies, oophorectomies, AND/OR ANY other MEDICAL TREATMENT

RELATING TO removal of ovarian cysts AND/OR dysplasia.” It was

provided that personal identification information should be

redacted for individuals not covered by protective order or

stipulation. (Jt. Stmt. p. 7.) Plaintiff also limited the request

(numbers 11 and 15) to responsive documents relating to

incarcerated inmates only. (Decl. of Dakota S. Whitney ¶ 2.)

1. Relevance

 Parties have a right to obtain discovery regarding any

matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense

of any party; further, for good cause shown, the Court may order

discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved

in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To be relevant, evidence

must have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is

of consequence to the determination of the action more probable

or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R.

Evid. 401. Relevant information need not be admissible at the

trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. Information relevant to

a party’s claim or defense includes information that a party may

use to support its denial or rebuttal of the claims or defenses

of another party. Adv. Comm. Note to 2000 Amendment; see

Schwarzer, Tashima and Wagstaffe, California Practice Guide,

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, § 11:21.2. Information

relevant to the subject matter of the action, available with

leave of court for good cause shown, means information that might

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reasonably assist a party in evaluating a case, preparing for

trial, or facilitating settlement. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.

495, 506-07 (1947). Relevance should be construed liberally and

with common sense, and it has been defined to encompass any

matter that bears on, or reasonably could lead to other matter

that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.

Miller v. Pancucci , 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D.Cal. 1992) (citing

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). 

Plaintiff argues that the documents requested may show that

there was a pattern of Defendant Oju’s performing improper

procedures or engaging in negligence, or that Oju had a financial

or other improper motive to remove Plaintiff’s ovaries

unnecessarily, and/or that the CDCR and/or Madera Community

Hospital had notice of Defendant’s improper motives and/or

medical treatment of incarcerated patients.

Defendant argues that the information would only be relevant

to the subject matter of the action and as such requires a

showing of good cause under Rule 26(b)(1) before discovery is

ordered; bills for other patients with similar conditions do not

tend to make more or less probable a fact of consequence to the

determination of the action. See, Fed. R. Evid. 401. Further,

Defendant cites authority to the effect that information

regarding Defendant Oju’s overall financial condition is not

discoverable because ordinarily it is not relevant and/or does

not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Here, the information has substantial relevance to the case

before the Court. See, Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 309485, *6-7

(E.D.Cal. 2007) (concluding that where alleged abuse of medical

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treatment for financial gain was alleged, comparable medical

records for third parties and financial records for the

procedures were an opportunity to show deliberate indifference by

pattern and practice of medical abuse). 

2. Privacy

Defendant argues that the request invades a federally

recognized, general right to privacy, which the parties agree

exists and may be raised in response to a discovery request. See, 

Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1497 (10 Cir. th

1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 910 (1993) (upholding a court’s

denial of a motion to compel discovery of the names of all

participants in a study concerning parents who had to make

decisions concerning whether to administer heroic life-sustaining

treatment to a severely handicapped newborn based on the

importance of maintaining the privacy of the other parents, which

the court determined outweighed the relevance and necessity of

the information requested); DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114, 119-20

(3d Cir. 1982); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616

(N.D.Cal. 1995) (recognizing a constitutionally based right that

when claimed requires balancing the need for the information

sought against the privacy right asserted). However, the right of

privacy is conditional rather than absolute, and limited

impairment of the right may be allowed if properly justified by a

need for the information that outweighs the privacy interest.

Perry v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 734 F.2d 1441, 1447 (11th

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985); Ragge v.

MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604 ;(C.D.Cal. 1995); see

also, Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9 Cir. 1976). th

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The Court is to balance the interests under federal law because

state law does not inform federal privilege law. Jackson v.

County of Sacramento, 175 F.R.D. 653 (E.D.Cal. 1997). Further, a

carefully drafted protective order could minimize the impact of

any disclosure. Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 616. Finally, where

disclosure is ordered, the scope of disclosure should be narrowly

circumscribed and specific, and should be permitted only to the

extent necessary for a fair resolution of the lawsuit. Cook v.

Yellow Fright System, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 552 (E.D.Cal. 1990),

overruled on another point, Jackson v. County of Sacramento, 175

F.R.D. 653, 654 (E.D.Cal. 1997).

Here, the Plaintiff needs the evidence to investigate a

motive or practice concerning unnecessary procedures, which in

turn would be relevant to the material issue of deliberate

indifference on the Eighth Amendment claim and to issues of

liability on the other claims. Compare, Allen v. Woodford, 2007

WL 309485, *6-7 (E.D.Cal. 2007) (concluding that where alleged

abuse of medical treatment for financial gain was alleged,

comparable medical records for third parties and financial

records for the procedures were an opportunity to show deliberate

indifference by pattern and practice of medical abuse). The

privacy interests can be protected by redaction, which Plaintiff

has already requested be effected, and by a protective order.

With respect to a protective order, the Court notes that

there is a protective order in this case. (Doc. 33, filed

September 5, 2006.) However, the parties have raised concerns

concerning the adequacy of the order. The parties will be

directed to meet and confer within fifteen days of the date of

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service of this order in order to determine any additional

provisions needed in a protective order; if the parties are

unable to resolve their differences with respect to the

protective order, then they will be directed to arrange for a

conference call with the Court. 

Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ claim of a

privacy interest that would bar disclosure. 

3. HIPAA

As previously discussed, HIPAA does not bar disclosure

where, as here, the court will order it pursuant to a discovery

request, and it appears that Defendants and/or any pertinent

healthcare provider can receive satisfactory assurance from the

party seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been

made to secure a qualified protective order. 45 C.F.R. §

164.512(e)(2004); see, Hutton v. City of Martinez, 219 F.R.D.

164, 167 (N.D.Cal. 2003) (concluding that where the resisting

party had attempted to obtain the information by subpoena and

discovery request, and where there was an adequate protective

order). 

Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s contention that

HIPAA bars the discovery.

Further, the Court notes that Defendant’s privilege log does

not list any documents withheld in response to this request.

Thus, objections on the basis of privilege appear to be waived.

4. Vagueness, Overbreadth, Burden

As noted hereinabove, with respect to these objections, the

objecting entity must state specifically how each question is

overly broad, unduly burdensome, or oppressive by submitting

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affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the

burden. Klein v. AIG Trading Group, Inc., 228 F.R.D. 418, 422

(D.Conn. 2005). Objections that are not sufficiently specific,

such as statements that requests are overly broad, burdensome, or

oppressive, are waived. Ramirez v. County of Los Angeles, 231

F.R.D. 407, 409 (C.D.Cal. 2005). The fact that complying with a

discovery request will involve expense or consumption of time

does not necessarily render it unduly burdensome. Jackson v.

Montgomery Ward & Co., 173 F.R.D. 524, 529 (D.Nev. 1997).

Here, the objections are not sufficiently specific or

adequately explained. (Deft.’s Exs. to Jt. Stmt., Ex. A, pp. 6,

8.) Defendant merely made the unspecific assertion without

stating any explanation concerning the objections except for

specification of additional claims of protection based on

privilege, privacy, or statute. Without the objecting party’s

reasons for the objections here, the Court overrules these

objections.

B. Documents concerning Other Patients’ Treatment

Request number 15 is for “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ANY

patient who had a cystectomy, cone biopsy, oophorectomy, AND/OR

ANY other MEDICAL TREATMENT RELATING TO removal of ovarian cysts

AND/OR dysplasia.” Plaintiff provided that personally identifying

information should be redacted for individuals whose

confidentiality is not covered by protective order or 

stipulation. (Deft.’s Exhibits to Jt. Stmt., Ex. A, p. 8.)

Further, Plaintiff has limited the request to documents regarding

incarcerated patients only. (Whitney Decl. ¶ 2.)

Defendant disputes the relevance of these documents.

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Plaintiff argues that documents concerning incarcerated patients

who received similar treatment to that of Plaintiff may show a

pattern of Defendant’s performing improper procedures, or of

negligence or of Defendant’s motives in intentionally removing

Plaintiff’s ovaries. These documents are generally discoverable

for the reasons stated above concerning request 11. 

Likewise, the analysis of privacy rights and HIPAA set forth

with respect to request 11 also applies with respect to request

15.

Finally, there has been no specification sufficient to

establish valid objections on the basis of overbreadth,

vagueness, or undue burden.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to compel

further production by Defendant Ugwu-Oju.

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Production

 of Documents by Defendants Suryadevara, Kruse,

 Reeves, and Goodwin

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further production of documents

by the Defendant doctors was filed on February 5 and 7, 2007, and

a joint statement regarding the discovery disputes was filed on

March 6, 2007. On March 14, 2007, Defendants filed objections and

a motion to strike the declaration of Todd Spencer, M.D., which

had been submitted in support of the motion. On March 21, 2007,

Plaintiff filed opposition to the objections and motion to

strike. Defendants filed a reply on March 30, 2007. The hearing

on the motion was vacated, and the matter was thereafter

submitted to the Court for decision.

Plaintiff moves to compel further production of documents by

Defendants Drs. Sampath Suryadevara, Loraine Goodwin, Shelly

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Kruse, and Ernest Reeves in response to Plaintiff’s first set of

requests for production of documents (RPD’s), which were served

on the four doctors, referred to herein as the “CDCR Defendants,”

on November 13, 2006, and which contained sixteen requests that

were identical for each Defendant.

On December 19, 2006, Plaintiff served subpoenas for

production and inspection on the custodian of records at the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

and the custodian of records at the Central California Women’s

Facility (CCWF) seeking the same documents sought in the RPD’s.

On January 11, 2007, the CDCR Defendants filed a motion to quash

the subpoenas and/or for a protective order; on January 16, the

motion was withdrawn.

On January 8, 2006 the CDCR Defendants each served their

responses and objections to the RPD’s. Plaintiff states that only

Defendant Reeves produced any documents, which consisted of 112

documents in response to three of the sixteen requests. None of

the defendants have produced any documents requested in the RPD’s

for documents involving contracts, investigations, complaints

about medical care; relating to policies, procedures and

protocols used by contracting physicians in treating inmates of

CCWF; and being used for reviewing the care rendered and bills

submitted by contracting physicians generally, and Dr. Ugwu-Oju

specifically, regarding plaintiff Kelli Thomas and other inmates

of CCWF. 

After the exchange of numerous letters and telephone

conversations between the parties, on February 2, 2007, the CDCR

Defendants filed supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s RPD’s,

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which produced no new documents or agreement to produce, but

which stated:

Without waiving previously asserted objections to this

request, responding parties respond as follows:

Responding parties, sued in their individual

capacities, have no legal right to the documents

requested and thus have no documents in their

possession, custody or control responsive to this

request. 

Following the receipt of the supplemental responses,

Plaintiff and Defendants exchanged a series of letters and

contacts explaining their respective positions.

Defendants mount numerous objections to the motion to compel.

Defendants allege that none has possession, custody or control of

the documents requested, that the state of California is immune

from subpoenas under the Eleventh Amendment, that the documents

belong to the state and Defendants have no authority to produce

them, the documents are available from another source, are

protected under the California Constitution and California

Evidence Code § 1040, the U. S. Constitution, federal common law

of privacy and the federal Privacy Act, deliberative process

privilege, work product privilege, and attorney-client privilege

along with boilerplate objections. The primary objection is that

the defendants do not have possession, custody or control of the

documents requested.

A. Eleventh Amendment

Defendants’ objections based on the Eleventh Amendment are

not well taken. This action proceeds against Defendants in their

individual capacities, and thus the action is not against the

state. The Court further relies on the analysis of the application

of principles of immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment that

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is set forth above in connection with Plaintiff’s motion regarding

subpoenas to non-party officers of the state. Here, a requirement

that state officers produce documents does not raise the

possibility of a judgment against the state that would have to be

paid from its treasury. Defendants have no Eleventh Amendment

immunity from their obligation to respond to the discovery

requests. 

B. Lack of Possession, Custody, or Control

Defendants contend in their responses that they are not in

possession, custody or control of the documents. Defendants also

supplemented their responses alleging that they are being sued in

their individual capacities and have no legal right to the

documents requested and thus have no documents in their custody,

possession, or control that are responsive to the requests.

The requested documents include documents relating to any

contracts or potential contracts or agreements or possible

agreements or negotiations between the CDC or CCWF and Dr. Oju

relating to the provision of medical services for the CDC, between

the CDC or CCWF and Madera relating to the provision of medical

services at Madera, or between Dr. Oju and Madera relating to the

provision of medical services at Madera; relating to complaints

made by any person regarding Dr. Oju, including but not limited to

his medical treatment, and to investigations of Dr. Oju, including

of his medical treatment and/or billing practices by the state

medical board, CDC, or any other agency of the office; all

documents relating to the CDC’s written policies, procedures, or

protocols relating to prisoner medical care, to the contracting of

physicians for the purpose of providing medical services to

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prisoners, for reviewing the medical care rendered by physicians

contracting with the CDC or by Dr. Oju, for reviewing the medical

bills submitted by physicians contracting with the CDC and/or

those who are members of the panel of approved providers or

submitted by Dr. Oju; documents relating to bills submitted by Dr.

Oju for cystectomies, cone biopsies, cophorectomies, and/or any

medical treatment relating to removal or treatment of ovarian

cysts and dysplasia, and for treatment of Plaintiff; all documents

relating to Plaintiff’s medical treatment, to requests for medical

treatment by Plaintiff and the CDC’s response, if any, to such

requests; and all documents relating to representations by the CDC

relating to whether Plaintiff’s ovaries were removed. (Jt. Stmt.,

Ex. S.)

Defendants have stated under oath that they have no documents

in their possession, custody or control that are responsive to any

of the requests. Defendants are doctors who were involved in

Plaintiff’s medical care at CCWF while employed by the CDCR. Dr.

Reeves and Dr. Kruse treated Plaintiff at CCWF and are still

employed there as physicians. Dr. Reeves provided some of

Plaintiff’s medical records in response to the request, but he did

not provide any other types of documents beyond records from

Plaintiff’s own medical file to which Plaintiff herself could have

access. Dr. Oju, a surgeon at Madera Community Hospital who

contracts with CDCR through his medical group to provide services

to inmates at CCWF, performed a surgery on Plaintiff at Defendant

Madera Community Hospital. Dr. Goodwin treated Plaintiff at CCWF

but is no longer an employee of the CDCR. Dr. Suryadevara is still

employed by CDCR but no longer works at CCWF, where Plaintiff is

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housed; from about 2003 until recently, Dr. Suryadevara was Chief

Medical Officer of CCWF, responsible for the medical care of CCWF

inmates and supervisor of all CCWF medical staff, including the

Defendants Kruse, Goodwin, and Reeves. (Jt. Stmt., pp. 9-14; Exs.

P, Q.) 

Defendants have attached to their reply to the opposition to

their motion to strike a declaration from Defendant Dr.

Suryadevara “in an attempt to informally resolve this motion and

to assist the court in deciding this motion, even though Dr.

Suryadevara is not an executive of the CDCR and has not been

ordered by the court to submit a declaration.” 

The governing standards are established. Rule 34 requests may

be used to inspect documents, tangible things, or land in the

possession, custody, or control of another party. The party

seeking production of documents bears the burden of proving that

the opposing party has such control. United States v.

International Union of Petroleum and Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO, 870

F.2d 1450, 1452 (9 Cir. 1989). Property is deemed within a th

party's possession, custody, or control if the party has actual

possession, custody, or control thereof, or the legal right to

obtain the property on demand. In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d

465, 469 (6th Cir. 1995) (documents prepared by Federal Reserve

and bank during bank examination were subject to discovery despite

Federal Reserve's ownership of documents, in light of apparent

relevance of documents and fact that bank had possession of

documents). A party having actual possession of documents must

allow discovery even if the documents belong to someone else;

legal ownership of the documents is not determinative. In re

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Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d at 470 (Federal Reserve regulations

prohibiting disclosure of confidential documents in party's

possession held invalid when conflicting with discovery order). 

"Control" need not be actual control; courts construe it

broadly as "the legal right to obtain documents upon demand."

United States v. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, 870

F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (Ninth Circuit refused to compel

an international union to produce documents belonging to local

union affiliates in response to a subpoena where the international

union did not have physical possession of the documents); Scott v.

Arex, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 39, 41 (D.Conn.1989) (party controls

document if it has right, authority, or ability to obtain

documents on demand). 

"Legal right" is evaluated in the context of the facts of

each case. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 76 F.R.D. 420,

423 (D.Ill. 1977). The determination of control is often factspecific. Central to each case is the relationship between the

party and the person or entity having actual possession of the

document. Estate of Young v. Holmes, 134 F.R.D. 291, 294

(D.Nev.1991). The requisite relationship is one where a party can

order the person or entity in actual possession of the documents

to release them. Id. This position of control is usually the

result of statute, affiliation or employment. Id.; In re Citric

Acid Litig. (9th Cir. 1999) 191 F.3d 1090, 1107 (court cannot

order production of documents held by a separate legal entity,

where requested party is not in actual possession or custody of

the documents).

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agent relationship. In Rosie D. v. Romney, 256 F.Supp.2d 115, 119

(D.C.Mass.2003), defendant state officials were required to

produce documents that were in the possession of non-party

agencies. The state's Division of Medical Assistance (MDA)

delegated the delivery of health services to several entities that

in turn were authorized to engage subcontracted service providers. 

MDA's contracts required these entities to maintain books and

records and gave MDA the right to examine and copy these records. 

There was little doubt, in light of these contractual provisions,

that the state officials had the right to control and obtain the

documents that were in the possession of the non-parties. In Clark

v. Vega Wholesale Inc., 181 F.R.D. 470 (D. Nev. 1998), Vega sought

discovery on Clark's allegations of physical injury by requesting

Clark's medical records and sought to compel Vega to execute a

medical release. The court denied Vega's motion, finding that

Clark did not have control over the records.

Here, unlike the situation in Allen v. Woodford, CV-F-05-

1104-OWW-LJO, E.D.Cal. 2007, discussed by the parties, there is no

indication that the documents requested in the RPD’s, which

involved contracts, investigations, complaints of medical care, or

the policies for reviewing billings from contract physicians would

necessarily be within the possession, custody or control of

individual Defendants Drs. Kruse, Reeves or Goodwin, in the course

of their employment relationship. The defendants in Allen in their

official capacities were the Director of the CDCR (Woodford), the

Acting Director of the CDCR (Rimmer), the Deputy Director of

Health Care Services of the CDCR (Campbell), and the Warden of the

CCWF (Mitchell). The only defendant in common in the two cases is

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ngement The Court notes that there is no comprehensive declaration from any of the Defendants describing 1

their duties and their access to and authority over any of the records requested; only Dr. Suryadevada has submitted a

declaration, and it addresses only his knowledge of who the custodians of the records are.

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Dr. Suryadevara, who was the Chief Medical Officer of the CCWF. 

Pursuant to the discussion in Allen v. Woodford, it is

apparent that defendants Dr. Goodwin (former staff doctor at

CCWF), Dr. Reeves (gynecologist at CCWF) and Dr. Kruse (staff

physician at CCWF) were or are not in a position with job duties

or authority such that it may be reasonably concluded that their

employment relationship would give rise to their actual

possession, custody, or control, or the legal right to obtain

control of, documents involving the negotiation or drafting of

contracts between the CDCR or CCWF and outside physicians;

investigations and/or complaints of medical care involving the

CCWF and the inmates of the CCWF; the arrangement or review of the

payment of invoices of outside doctors; or the formulation,

drafting, revising, or maintaining of the CDCR’s or CCWF’s

policies and procedures for inmate medical care. Defendants

represented in correspondence that Drs. Reeves and Kruse could

only access hard copies of an inmate’s medical records upon

request, solely for the purpose of treating an inmate, and not for

any other purpose. (Exs. in Supp. of Jt. Stmt., Ex. Q, p. 3.)1

Contrary to the circumstances in Allen, none of the documents

previously produced by Dr. Reeves suggests that he has possession,

custody or control of documents other than medical records

reflecting his own treatment of his patients; likewise, the

matters before the Court do not reflect that Dr. Reeves has a

right to obtain medical records other than the records of his own

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treatment. With the exception of Dr. Suryadevada, the Defendants

are not persons who are even arguably officials or executives of

the agencies with ultimate authority or control over the CDCR

and/or the CCWF. 

Only Dr. Suryadevara, as former Chief Medical Officer of

CCWF, could arguably be or have been in a position to provide some

of the requested information. However, the doctor is no longer

employed at CCWF, where Plaintiff is housed. It has not been shown

that Dr. Suryadevara retains any authority of any type over the

facility or over the arrangements, relationships, and processes

that constitute the subject matter of the documents requested.

Further, it has not been shown that merely by virtue of his former

employment as a medical doctor and supervisor he is in a position

to obtain documents over which he states he has no control or

custody. The nature of his present status, and the extent of the

trust and authority extended to him within the CDCR, are only

matters of speculation. 

However, as Allen v. Woodford instructs, as a party he does

have an obligation in good faith to cooperate in the acquisition

of this discovery by Plaintiff. In that regard, Defendants

provided a declaration of Dr. Suryadevara with their Reply to

Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Strike (Doc. 78). The

doctor states that it was provided “in an attempt to informally

resolve this motion and to assist the court in deciding this

motion, even though Dr. Suryadevara is not an executive of the

CDCR and has not been ordered by the court to submit a

declaration.” It appears that Defendants are seeking to aid the

resolution of this dispute without an order to provide a

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In Allen, the defendants had already produced documents responsive to 2

the requests for contract documents, and the court determined that this

established that the CDCR defendants have possession, custody or control of

some of the responsive documents. The officials were required to provide the

information requested, and if they themselves were not the custodians of the

requested records, they were required to provide the information via

declaration as to who has custody, possession or control of the documents. 

This declaration was to be provided by the supervisor/s of the named

individual defendants explaining the issue of access, who had access, the

statute or written policy relied upon as to access, under what circumstances

access was granted, the process for getting access, and why the process did

not allow access by the defendants. Upon reconsideration, the Court’s order

was amended to require the parties themselves to provide declarations

regarding their knowledge and understanding of the appropriate source or

custodian of the needed documentation. 

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declaration like the one required in Allen.2

Dr. Suryadevara’s declaration responds to every request but

16 in some manner. He provided the names of the custodian of

records, insofar as he knew them, to requests 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8,

and 9, which requested documents regarding contracting of CDC and

CCWF with Dr. Ugwu-Oju and with Madera Community Hospital, and

contracting between Madera Community Hospital and Dr. Ugwu-Oju, as

well as the written policies, procedures, and protocols dealing

with these contracting functions. 

The declaration also provides the name of the custodian of

records, insofar as Dr. Suryadevara knew it, with respect to

additional documents: (a) Requests 4, 10, 11, 12, and 13 -

documents regarding complaints about medical treatment and

billings by Dr. Ugwu-Oju, and procedures, policies and protocols

for reviewing bills of contracting physicians generally and Dr.

Ugwu-Oju specifically; and policies, procedures and protocol for

reviewing bills for specific procedures as well as bills for the

treatment of Plaintiff; (b) Request 8 - documents regarding CDC

policies, procedures, or protocols for reviewing care rendered by

contracting physicians; (c) Request 14 - all documents relating to

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the medical treatment of Plaintiff; and (d) Request 15 - requests

for medical care from the CDC by Plaintiff and the CDC responses

to these requests. As to request 5, which asks for documents

regarding the investigation into Dr. Ugwu-Oju’s treatments and

billing practices by the State Medical Board, the CDC or any

agency, Dr. Suryadevara responded that he believed no documents

responsive to this request existed.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants cannot be

compelled to produce the documents in question because based on

the evidence presently before the Court, it has not been

established that they have possession or control, or the right to

control and obtain, the documents requested.

However, the Court notes that Dr. Suryadevara, the former

chief medical officer, has stated who the general custodian of

numerous records is believed to be. It appears that Dr.

Suryadevara has extensive knowledge with respect to the custody

and control of many of the records in question. It is in the

interest of efficient discovery for Plaintiff to proceed to

attempt to obtain the records from these custodians.

Further, when the parties meet and confer concerning other

matters referred to in this order, the parties will be directed to

meet and confer in good faith to determine what arrangements, if

any, can be made to facilitate the production of the requested

discovery. If the parties cannot facilitate this production, they

will be directed to arrange a telephonic conference call with the

Court. 

C. Privacy

With respect to request 4, which seeks all documents relating

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to complaints made by any persons regarding Dr. Oju, including but

not limited to his medical treatment and medical billing,

Defendants argue that the federal common law right to privacy and

the Federal Privacy Act prevent disclosure.

Complaints regarding Dr. Oju might show that there was a

pattern of performance of improper procedures, negligence, motive,

and/or whether the CDCR had prior notice of Dr. Oju’s performing

improper medical procedures. These matters concern the heart of

the Plaintiff’s case. With respect to privacy, whether the

physicians’ own or the interest of a patient in one’s own medical

records, the need for the information outweighs any privacy

concern, particularly where as here the Plaintiff has agreed to

redaction of identifying information (names, CDCR numbers) of

third parties not covered by the protective order. (Ex. A, p. 5,

ll. 5-8.) Further, CDCR Defendants could mark the documents as

confidential and thereby further protect them. 

 With respect to HIPAA, as previously noted, there is no bar

to disclosure here where a protective order has been sought.

Further, it is questionable whether the information is even

subject to the statute because of the redaction. See, 42 U.S.C. §

1320d(6).

Defendants argue that Cal. Civ. Code § 1798 et seq., the

Information Practices Act, prevents disclosure of information

maintained by an agency that identifies an individual, including

his or her medical history. However, even if redacted records

qualified as protected matter under the statute, § 1798.24(k)

provides that the protected information may be disclosed to any

person pursuant to a subpoena, court order, or other compulsory

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legal process if, before the disclosure, the agency reasonably

attempts to notify the individual to whom the record pertains and

such notification is not prohibited by law. It thus does not

appear that there is any ultimate barrier to disclosure.

D. Privilege

With respect to requests 4 and 5, seeking all documents

relating to complaints made by any persons regarding Dr. Oju,

including but not limited to his medical treatment and medical

billing, and further relating to all investigations of Dr. Oju or

his medical treatment and/or billing by the state medical board,

the CDC, or any other agency, Defendants argue that Cal. Evid.

Code § 1040 and the federal official information privilege prevent

disclosure. 

As previously noted, state privilege law does not inform or

govern the application of federal privilege law.

With respect to the qualified federal official information

privilege, the Court will not proceed to determine whether the

potential benefits of disclosure of any regulatory or governmental

personnel files or disciplinary records will outweigh the

potential disadvantages. See, Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936

F.2d 1027, 1033-34 (9 Cir. 1990). This is because the Defendants th

have not made the threshold showing, required at the time the

response to the discovery request is filed and/or served, that the

agency has generated or collected the material and maintained its

confidentiality and a government official has personally reviewed

the material; further, the claimant must show a specific

governmental or privacy interest that would be threatened by

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disclosure is identified, set forth a description of how

disclosure subject to a carefully crafted protective order would

create a substantial risk of harm to a significant interest; and

an estimate of how much harm would be done if disclosure occurred.

Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 300 (C.D.Cal. 1992).

Defendants did not provide a declaration and made only generalized

assertions of harm. Further, Defendants did not provide a

privilege log with respect to this request, and thus any claim of

privilege is waived. See, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Corp.

v. United States District Court, 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9 Cir. th

2005) (holding that boilerplate objections or blanket refusals

inserted in a response to a Rule 34 request for production of

documents are insufficient, and a privilege may be deemed waived

in light of all pertinent circumstances where the privilege log is

untimely served and does not show whether the withheld documents

are privileged). 

Defendants also claimed a deliberative process privilege

generally but not with respect to any specific request. This

protection is for documents reflecting advisory opinions,

recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by

which government decision and policies are formulated. Dept. of

Interior & Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath Water Users

Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001). The privilege is based on

the fact that officials will not communicate candidly among

themselves if each remark is discoverable; the policy is to

enhance the quality of agency decisions by protecting open and

frank discussion among those who make them within the government.

Id. However, the qualified, common law executive privilege must be

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asserted by 1) making a formal claim of privilege by the head of

the department that has control over the requested information

after personally considering the material; 2) explaining by

affidavit or declaration the need for preserving the

confidentiality of the material; and 3) providing a detailed

explanation of each withheld document. Landry v. F.D.I.C., 204

F.3d 1125, 1135 (9 D.C.Cir. 2000). th

At this point, Defendants have averred that there are no

documents responsive to this request. There has been no proper

claiming of the privilege. The Court concludes that at present, no

privilege has been established.

Defendants produced a privilege log with respect to only

three requests, namely 14, 15, and 16 (all documents relating to

Plaintiff’s medical treatment by the CCWF, all of Plaintiff’s

requests for medical treatment and the CDC’s responses to such

requests, and all documents relating to representations by the CDC

relating to whether or not Plaintiff’s ovaries were removed).

Defendants claim attorney-client privilege and work product

protection regarding “correspondence, facsimile transmission cover

sheets, and memoranda between defendants’ attorneys, Jim Amis,

Litigation Coordinator at CCWF and defendant.” The privilege logs

are set forth on pages 94, 95, 102, 103, 107, and 108 of the Joint

Statement re: Discovery Dispute filed on March 6, 2007. 

Plaintiff correctly contends that the privilege logs are

inadequate to permit the Court’s assessment of the applicability

of any privilege or protection. As noted hereinabove, Fed. R. Civ.

P. 26(b)(5)(A) provides that when a party withholds information

otherwise discoverable under the rules by claiming that it is

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privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material,

then the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe

the nature of the documents, communications, or things not

produced or disclosed in a manner that will enable other parties

to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection without

revealing the privileged or protected information itself. In order

to assist a court in determining a claim of privilege, a court may

require an adequately detailed privilege log in conjunction with

evidentiary submissions to fill in any factual gaps. United States

v. Construction Products Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir.

1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 927, (1996); see also, Allen v.

Woodford, 2007 WL 309485, *4 (E.D.Cal. 2007), aff’d, Allen v.

Woodford, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24345 (E.D.Cal. 2007). With

respect to each document as to which a privilege is claimed, the

person claiming the privilege should include in the privilege log

the document’s general nature and description, including its date,

the identity and position of the author, and the identity and

position of all addressees and recipients; the present location of

the document; and the specific reasons it was withheld, including

the privilege invoked and the grounds therefor. Allen v. Woodford,

2007 WL 309485, *4 (citing Construction Products, 73 F.3d at 473-

74, and In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th

Cir. 1992)).

Further, the Court declines to find a waiver from the

privilege log previously submitted. In view of the importance of

the privileges in question, the Court will grant the Defendants

forty-five days in which to create and serve a privilege log. The

Court informs Defendants that it is only with respect to

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voluminous documents that a document-by-document log may not be

required. See, Schwarzer, Tashima, and Wagstaffe, California

Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure before Trial, § 11:795

(2007); Adv. Comm. Notes to 1993 Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b).

E. Relevance

Documents concerning negotiation of contracts between Dr. Oju

and CDC or CCWF, and the contracts between the doctor and the 

institutions, will reveal the identity of caretakers and the terms

that governed the care; they may reveal a history of problems or a

motive to perform a more invasive procedure than was necessary.

Policies for providing and reviewing medical care might shed light

on the quality of care actually rendered and any investigations of

any Defendant’s conduct. Any policies or protocols concerning

review of Dr. Oju’s medical treatment might reveal the motives or

reasons for his conduct, and might indicate knowledge or

negligence on the part of the hospital. It does not appear that an

updated list of such policies is publicly available. Policies and

procedures for reviewing medical bills submitted by contracting

physicians might reveal a motive for the treatment in this case or

a pattern of misconduct. Investigations of Defendant Oju’s

treatment and billing, as well as documents relating to the

billing itself, might reveal a pattern of misconduct or knowledge

thereof. 

F. Burdensome Request 

Defendants argue with respect to many of the records

requested that the documents are equally available to Plaintiff.

However, Defendants have not shown the public availability of all

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the documents, and Defendants have not made a specific, detailed

showing that the burden or expense of producing the documents

outweighs the need for them or their likely benefit. See, Natural

Resources Defense Council v. Curtis, 189 F.R.D. 4, 13 (D.D.C.

1999). Likewise, the fact that some of the documents might be

possessed by Plaintiff or be available to Plaintiff or the public

is not a basis for refusing to produce documents that are

otherwise discoverable. See, 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s

Federal Practice, § 26.41[13] 3d ed. 2006); Weiner v. Bache Halsey

Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624, 625 (S.D.Fla 1977). 

Further, Defendants argue that the requests are excessive

because they are not limited in time. However, Defendant did not

designate a reasonable time period and scope limitation and then

produce documents accordingly. Further, Plaintiff agreed to limit

the request to documents created and/or received within the last

ten years. (Jt. Stmt. p. 32.)

V. Motion to Strike Declaration of Todd Spencer, M.D.

On March 14, 2007, the CDCR Defendants filed a motion to

strike the declaration of Todd Spencer, M.D., which was submitted

by Plaintiff in the initial motion. In the declaration, Dr.

Spencer, a radiologist who asserted that he was familiar with the

procedures used by radiologists in his office to create imaging

reports of prisoners of CCWF who were patients, and who declares

that the images and reports are returned to the prison without any

copy being owned or retained by the office. CDCR Defendants

objected to the declaration, contending, generally, that the

declaration was not timely, and that it is irrelevant because the

subject matter does not include as an issue whether or not the

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CDCR or CCWF have control or custody over medical records or

radiology films. The first paragraph of the Declaration, a onepage document, reads as follows: 

I am employed by Todd Spencer, M.D., Medical Group, Inc.

(“Medical Group”) as a radiologist in their office

located at 1100 Almond Ave., Suite 101 in Madera,

California. As part of my job duties, I am required to

be familiar with the procedures in which radiologists in

my office create Imaging Reports for patients who are

prisoners at the Central California Women’s Facility. I

have personal knowledge of the facts attested to in this

declaration, and if called upon to do so, could and

would testify competently thereto.

The foregoing paragraph is six lines of this document which has

eighteen lines of text. The remaining lines are specifically

objected to line by line on many grounds, including generally lack

of foundation/personal knowledge, hearsay, and impermissible

opinion. The Court concludes that it should be stricken as

irrelevant and immaterial.

In summary, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s motion to

compel Defendants Kruse, Goodwin, Reeves, and Suryadevara to

produce further documents IS DENIED. 

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

1) Plaintiff’s motion to compel non-parties to produce

documents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 IS GRANTED; and

2) Plaintiff’s motion to compel further production of

documents by Dr. Ugwu-Oju IS GRANTED; and 

3) Plaintiff’s motion to compel Drs. Suryadevara, Kruse, 

Reeves, and Goodwin to produce further documents IS DENIED; and

4) Defendants’ motion to strike the declaration of Dr. Todd

Spencer IS GRANTED; and

5) The parties ARE DIRECTED to meet and confer in good faith

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within fifteen days of service of this order to determine any

additional provisions needed in a protective order, and if the

parties are unable to resolve their differences with respect to

the protective order, then they ARE DIRECTED immediately

thereafter to arrange for a conference call with the Court by

calling Harriet Herman at 499-5692; and

6) Defendants ARE DIRECTED to create and serve on Plaintiff

no later than forty-five days after the date of service of this

order an adequate privilege log in conformity with the standards

set forth above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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