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Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 10, 2011 Decided May 27, 2011

No. 10-5172

MASAAB OMAR AL-MADHWANI, DETAINEE,

CAMP DELTA AND ALI OMAR MADHWANI,

AS NEXT FRIEND OF MUSSAB OMAR AL-MADHWANI,

APPELLANTS

v.

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:04-cv-01194)

Darold W. Killmer argued the cause for the appellants. Mari

Newman was on brief. Sara J. Rich entered an appearance.

August E. Flentje, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the appellees. Robert M. Loeb,

Attorney, was on brief.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Musa’ab

Omar al-Madhwani (Madhwani), a Yemeni detainee at

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, appeals the district court’s denial of his

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petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Madhwani claims that there

was insufficient evidence to find that he was “part of” al-Qaida

and argues further that the district court relied on evidence

outside the record, abused its discretion in denying additional

discovery and committed various legal errors. Because we find

no merit in Madhwani’s evidentiary and legal arguments, we

affirm the district court. 

I.

In early summer 2001, Madhwani met two men in a coffee

shop somewhere in Yemen. The two spoke to him about the

“new Islamic state” in Afghanistan. Merits Hearing Tr. at 62, 69,

Anam v. Obama, C.A. No. 04-1194 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2009) (Tr.

10/27). One of them suggested to Madhwani—a recent high

school graduate who was unemployed—that he go to

Afghanistan to “witness the situation” for himself. Id. at 71–72.

Madhwani accepted a plane ticket and a small sum of money

from the man and left Yemen in August 2001. The stated

purpose of his trip, according to Madhwani, was “adventure”

and “to see what things are like in Afghanistan.” Id. at 73. Once

he arrived in Afghanistan, Madhwani accompanied a group of

fellow Yemenis he had met along the way to “the Arab

guesthouse” in Kandahar, where his passport and return airline

ticket were confiscated. Id. at 108–09. Madhwani was told that

his travel documents would be returned after he completed two

months of military training. Madhwani reluctantly agreed to the

arrangement and, by mid-August, he was transported to a remote

mountain camp to begin a course of physical conditioning and

small arms instruction.

Madhwani was still at the training camp when al-Qaida

attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. The camp

was closed down, for fear that it would be bombed, and

Madhwani and the other trainees were given permission to

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leave. Madhwani took a rifle from the camp’s armory and, in the

company of two trainers from the camp and a score of fellow

recruits, wandered for several months through a succession of

Afghan cities. Madhwani claimed that they were all traveling in

search of their passports, which—like Madhwani’s—had been

confiscated before they were sent to the camp. They ended up in

Kabul just three days before the capital fell to the United Statesled military coalition. Madhwani was reunited with his passport,

mysteriously, infra p. 8, and he then went to neighboring

Pakistan. There he remained for the better part of one

year—aside from a brief trip to Iran—moving from one

clandestine location to another. Madhwani believed the

Pakistani authorities would arrest him, as an Arab, if he were to

travel openly to an airport or to the Yemeni embassy to seek

help in returning home.

Madhwani was captured along with several other Arabs on

September 11, 2002, when Pakistani security forces raided the

Karachi apartment building where he had been hiding from the

authorities. Two of Madhwani’s associates—one from the same

apartment and another from across the hall—fought and died in

a two-and-one-half hour gun battle with Pakistani soldiers. After

spending five days in a Pakistani prison, Madhwani was turned

over to U.S. military custody. Madhwani was then taken to a

“dark prison” where he claims to have been tortured. He was

transferred in October 2002 to the U.S. Naval Base at

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Madhwani filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on

July 15, 2004. The district court conducted a four-day merits

hearing in 2009, which included testimony from Madhwani

himself, who testified by way of remote video connection from

Guantanamo, and by an expert witness who discussed

Madhwani’s psychological condition. The district court applied

the “command structure” standard of detention, under which an

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individual is considered to be “part of” al-Qaida—and therefore

lawfully detained—if he has “ ‘receive[d] and execute[d] orders

or directions’ ” from the terrorist organization, Anam v. Obama,

696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Hamlily v. Obama,

616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009))—a formulation of the

“part of” inquiry that we have since rejected as unduly narrow,

Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied,

79 U.S.L.W. 3362, 3566, 3567 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2011) (No. 10-736).

The district court held that evidence showing Madhwani

“voluntarily attended an al-Qaida training camp . . . and then

traveled, associated, and lived with members of al-Qaida” was

sufficient to establish that he functioned under the “command

structure” of the organization and thus was “part of” al-Qaida.

Anam, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 14–15. Accordingly, the district court

denied Madhwani’s petition. Id. at 16.

II.

The President’s detention authority originates with the 2001

Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which

authorizes the President “to use all necessary and appropriate

force against those nations, organizations, or persons he

determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist

attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such

organizations or persons.” Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.

224, 224; see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004)

(AUMF “authorized detention” of enemy combatants). We have

held that the authority conferred by the AUMF covers at least

“those who are part of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the

Taliban or those who purposefully and materially support such

forces in hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners.” Al-Bihani

v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79

U.S.L.W. 3568 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2011) (No. 10-7814). Determining

whether an individual is “part of” al-Qaida or the Taliban is an

inquiry that “ ‘must be made on a case-by-case basis by using a

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functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon

the actions of the individual in relation to the organization.’ ”

Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting

Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). “We

review the district court’s . . . habeas determination de

novo . . . .” Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870. Because we agree with

the district court’s conclusion that Madhwani was more likely

than not “part of” al-Qaida and find no other error in the district

court’s handling of the case, we affirm. 

A.

Madhwani argues that there was insufficient evidence to

support the district court’s conclusion that he was “part of” alQaida. Madhwani bears a “heavy burden” in challenging “the

district court’s factual findings that are the underpinnings of its

determination.” Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 14 (D.C.

Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3228, 3565, 3567 (U.S.

Apr. 4, 2011) (No. 10-439). We review factual findings for clear

error and “do not weigh each piece of evidence in isolation, but

consider all of the evidence taken as a whole.” Awad, 608 F.3d

at 7. The clear error standard “ ‘applies to the inferences drawn

from findings of fact as well as to the findings themselves.’ ” Al

Odah, 611 F.3d at 15 (quoting Overby v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter

Carriers, 595 F.3d 1290, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 

At the outset, we clarify the body of evidence upon which

we base our conclusion. The district court considered 260

exhibits and held a four-day merits hearing, during which

Madhwani himself testified for over one day. The district court

discounted a substantial portion of the Government’s

evidence—twenty-three reports of interrogations conducted in

2003 and 2004—based on its finding that the evidence was

tainted by the mistreatment Madhwani claims to have suffered

prior to arriving at Guantanamo Bay. Anam, 696 F. Supp. 2d at

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5–9. Madhwani now argues that the district court should have

disregarded statements he made to the Combatant Status Review

Tribunal (CSRT) and Administrative Review Board (ARB) at

Guantanamo Bay because those, too, were tainted by the earlier

coercion.1 See id. at 9–10. We have no need, however, to reach

Madhwani’s evidentiary challenge—or for that matter to

evaluate the district court’s treatment of the allegedly tainted

evidence—because the record contains sufficient evidence

unaffected by any claim of coercion to uphold the district court’s

determination that Madhwani was “part of” al-Qaida. See

Esmail v. Obama, No. 10-5282, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 1327701,

at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 8, 2011). That evidence consists almost

entirely of Madhwani’s own testimony. 

Notwithstanding the innocent gloss he attempts to graft onto

his narrative, Madhwani’s testimony reveals a wealth of

incriminating detail. When Madhwani arrived in Kandahar, he

stayed at an Arab guesthouse that served as a staging area for

foreign recruits to be transported to military training facilities.

Madhwani’s passport and return airline ticket were confiscated

by two individuals in the guesthouse, which “was ‘standard al

Qaeda and Taliban operating procedure[]’ when checking into

an al Qaeda guesthouse in Afghanistan.” Uthman v. Obama, No.

10-5235, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 1120282, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Mar.

29, 2011) (quoting Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 15). He was then taken

1

Madhwani testified before the CSRT on September 23, 2004,

and before the ARB in December 2005. Madhwani’s testimony in the

military proceedings largely mirrored that in the district court but he

additionally admitted to seeing Usama bin Laden twice in

Afghanistan—once at the training camp and again in Khost during the

coalition military campaign—and he did not deny that the Kandahar

guesthouse at which he stayed was al-Nebras or that the training camp

was al-Farouq.

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to a camp “in the middle of the desert, and the mountains,”

where he engaged in nearly a month of physical conditioning,

live fire training with a Kalashnikov rifle and other firearms and

received instruction regarding rocket-propelled grenades

(RPGs). Tr. 10/27 at 113–14, 116–18; Tr. 10/28 at 32. Although

Madhwani now claims he was unaware of any affiliation

between al-Qaida and the guesthouse or training camp, the

district court found that his descriptions were “consistent” with

al-Nebras guesthouse, a known way station for al-Qaida recruits,

and al-Farouq training camp, an al-Qaida facility where several

of the September 11, 2001 hijackers trained. Anam, 696 F. Supp.

2d at 11–12; see Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1102, 1107

(D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). As we

have noted before, “if a person stays in an al-Qaida guesthouse

or attends an al-Qaida training camp, this constitutes

‘overwhelming’ evidence that the United States had authority to

detain that person.” Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1109 (quoting AlBihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2). 

Madhwani’s connections to al-Qaida, however, did not stop

there. When the camp closed after September 11, 2001

Madhwani left in the company of about twenty other recruits,

guided by two “trainers” from the camp. Tr. 10/27 at 129–31.

Madhwani was “told” to take a rifle from the camp’s armory

and, although he claims that he did not want to carry a weapon,

he “could not” get rid of it because he was “afraid to get in

trouble.” Id. at 133. We have found in other detainee cases that

“carrying a brigade-issued weapon” is evidence that in

combination with other factors may “strongly suggest”

affiliation with enemy forces. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872–73; cf.

Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 15–16. 

From al-Farouq, Madhwani and his fellow recruits

embarked on a dizzying odyssey across Afghanistan, returning

from the camp to Kandahar, traveling from Kandahar to Kabul

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and then on to Khost. The two camp trainers eventually “saw

that there was nothing happening” and left the group. Tr. 10/27

at 141. Madhwani and his remaining companions decided to go

back to Kabul. They arrived just three days before the capital

fell to the advancing forces of the Northern Alliance. As in AlAdahi, Madhwani’s movements in Afghanistan in the midst of

the military conflict between the United States-led coalition and

the Taliban and its al-Qaida allies may not be “conclusive”

evidence of association with enemy forces but the movements

“add to the weight of the government’s case.” 613 F.3d at 1110. 

The ostensible purpose of each leg of Madhwani’s journey

back and forth across Afghanistan, according to his testimony,

was to search out the people who held his passport. After Kabul

fell, Madhwani claimed that he joined civilian refugees fleeing

the capital toward Khost and soon fell in with a large group

traveling on foot through mountainous terrain towards Pakistan.

There, as Madhwani and others were staying in abandoned

houses, one day a stranger driving a car approached them and

asked, according to Madhwani’s testimony, “did anybody lose

their passports, clothes, personal stuff, you know, like tape

recorders, or anything.” Tr. 10/27 at 145–46. Fortuitously,

according to Madhwani, he found his passport among the lostand-found items in the car. Although the district court credited

other aspects of Madhwani’s testimony, it found that “mere

happenstance” could not explain how Madhwani recovered his

passport from al-Qaida custody. Anam, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 15.

We agree with the district court and find Madhwani’s

explanation implausible. See Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1107

(“[F]alse exculpatory statements are evidence—often strong

evidence—of guilt.”). 

Finally, the circumstances surrounding Madhwani’s capture

nearly one year later indicate a continuing association with alQaida. Although Madhwani apparently surrendered peacefully

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to Pakistani forces, two of his associates fought to the death

rather than be taken alive—a Yemeni named Ammar, who had

been staying in the same apartment as Madhwani, and another

Arab from the apartment across the hall known to Madhwani as

“Hamza the Syrian” or “Hamza the Palestinian” and later

identified as Hamza Zubair. Tr. 10/27 at 166. Madhwani

testified that Zubair sometimes “pray[ed] with us” or “watch[ed]

TV with us.” Id. at 166–67. The district court found that Zubair

was a member of al-Qaida. Anam, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 14.

Madhwani’s association with enemy forces at the moment of his

capture constitutes further evidence that he was “part of” alQaida. See Uthman, 2011 WL 1120282, at *4 (finding it “highly

significant” that detainee was “captured in the company of a

Taliban fighter and two al Qaeda members”). 

Madhwani now argues that the district court’s factual

finding with respect to Zubair was clearly erroneous because it

was based in part on interrogation reports from two other

detainees, which reports Madhwani contends are contradictory

and unreliable. We see no clear error here. The two reports

differ slightly in their physical descriptions of Zubair but they

corroborate each other in the most important details: both

identify Hamza Zubair as an Egyptian who taught “mountain

tactics” at al-Farouq training camp. The task of resolving

“discrepancies among the various accounts” offered into

evidence is “quintessentially a matter for the jury”—or, here, for

the district judge sitting as the fact-finder. Joy v. Bell Helicopter

Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The district

court, moreover, highlighted the significance of the fact that

Zubair “fought to the death to avoid capture.” Anam, 696 F.

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Supp. 2d at 14. We hold, accordingly, that the district court did

not err in finding Zubair was a member of al-Qaida.2

In light of Madhwani’s guesthouse and military training

camp admissions, his carrying a rifle at the behest of camp

superiors, his suspicious movements and implausible narrative

and his final capture in the company of at least one known alQaida operative, we conclude that a preponderance of the

evidence unmistakably showed Madhwani was “part of” alQaida when he was captured.

B.

In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence,

Madhwani offers a laundry list of evidentiary and legal

complaints. None establishes a convincing basis for us to reverse

the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. 

Madhwani asserts that the district court improperly relied

on evidence outside the record. Madhwani cites a passing

reference the district judge made, during his oral ruling from the

bench, to a newspaper article about a group of aspiring terrorists

who were “turned down because they did not have the

credentials.” Tr. 12/14 at 52. We note at the outset that the legal

basis for Madhwani’s objection is obscure. The case relied upon

by Madhwani held that referring to evidence outside the record

during a criminal trial “would be a denial of due process,”

2

Zubair’s connection with al-Qaida is the subject of Madhwani’s

pending motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from the

judgment. Whether any new evidence Madhwani submits regarding

that connection is persuasive enough to establish Zubair was not

connected with al-Qaida or, by extension, Madhwani was not a part of

al-Qaida “at the time of his capture,” see Salahi, 625 F.3d at 751, is a

question we leave the district court to resolve in the first instance.

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Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 173 (1961), but “[t]his Court

has . . . stated that the detainees [at Guantanamo Bay] possess no

constitutional due process rights.” Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba

II), 561 F.3d 509, 518 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Kiyemba v.

Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022, 1026–27 (D.C. Cir. 2009)),

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010). We need not address the

underlying legal basis for Madhwani’s objection, however,

because we disagree with his assertion that the district court

“relied” on the newspaper article at all: no mention of it appears

in the district court’s written opinion and order. See Anam, 696

F. Supp. 2d 1. Even assuming Madhwani had a constitutional

right to due process and assuming the district court violated it by

relying on evidence outside the record—premises we do not

accept—such error would be “harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt,” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23–24 (1967),

given the conclusive weight of the record evidence linking

Madhwani to al-Qaida. 

Madhwani claims that the district court erred in denying his

request for further discovery regarding, inter alia, the two

detainees whose statements the district court cited in support of

its finding that Hamza Zubair was a member of al-Qaida. We

review the district court’s management of the discovery process

for abuse of discretion, see Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 724, and we

find no abuse of discretion here. The district court’s Case

Management Order (CMO) requires the government to produce

all “reasonably available” exculpatory evidence and allows

petitioners to request further discovery under certain specified

conditions. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 WL

4858241, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008); see Bensayah, 610

F.3d at 724 (upholding CMO discovery standard as “consistent”

with Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)). Madhwani’s

discovery request, however, did not establish the conditions

required under the CMO for further discovery. The

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request—which consisted of a blanket demand for statements

made by eight different detainees—was neither “narrowly

tailored” nor did it offer any detail to “explain why” further

discovery was needed with respect to the individual detainees.

Pet’r’s Mot. for Discovery, Anam v. Bush, No. 1:04 CV 1194, at

6–8 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2009); In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee

Litig., 2008 WL 4858241, at *2.

Finally, Madhwani raises a series of arguments that we

reject out of hand. Although Madhwani contends that the district

court applied an erroneous legal standard to support detention,

we have repeatedly held that the “command structure” test

employed by the district court “is sufficient to show that person

is part of al Qaeda” but “is not necessary.” Uthman, 2011 WL

1120282, at *2 (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Awad, 608

F.3d at 11–12. In fact, any legal error worked in Madhwani’s

favor for the “command structure” test “does not reflect the full

scope of the Executive’s detention authority under the AUMF.”

Uthman, 2011 WL 1120282, at *2. Madhwani also contests the

admission of hearsay evidence not falling within any exception

recognized by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the application

of the preponderance of the evidence standard. He admits,

however, that we have considered and rejected the same

arguments before. Thus we conclude that Madhwani’s

remaining arguments are foreclosed as a matter of circuit

precedent. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878–81; Awad, 608 F.3d

at 10–11. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

denial of Madhwani’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

So ordered.

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