Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05163/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05163-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 20, 1997 Decided January 20, 1998 

No. 97-5163

MILK INDUSTRY FOUNDATION,

APPELLANT 

v.

DANIEL R. GLICKMAN, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND 

NORTHEAST DAIRY COMPACT COMMISSION,

APPELLEES

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cv02027)

Steven J. Rosenbaum argued the cause for appellant, with 

whom Jonathon C. Drimmer and Jason A. Levine were on 

the briefs.

Douglas N. Letter, Appellate Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee Daniel R. 

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Glickman, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Lou Leary, U.S. Attorney, and Stephen W. Preston, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of 

Justice, were on the brief.

Clifford M. Sloan argued the cause for appellee Northeast 

Dairy Compact Commission, with whom Michael A. Rotker

was on the brief.

Paul A. Strandberg, Assistant Attorney General, State of 

Minnesota, was on the brief for amici curiae States of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and South Dakota.

Emily J. Gould, Assistant Attorney General, State of Vermont, was on the brief for amici curiae State of Connecticut, 

et al.

Eric Rome was on the brief for amici curiae Public Voice 

for Food and Health Policy, et al.

Roy J. Rodney, Jr. and Endya E. Delpit were on the brief 

for amici curiae Commissioners of the Louisiana, Arkansas, 

Georgia, South Carolina and West Virginia Departments of 

Agriculture.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, and ROGERS, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS with 

whom Circuit Judge HENDERSON concurs.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: In 1993, the six New England 

statesConnecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 

Rhode Island, and Vermont ("Compact states")agreed to 

form the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact ("Compact") to 

enable them to raise the minimum milk prices that dairy 

processors must pay to dairy farmers in their region for milk 

processed and consumed in fluid form ("farm-gate prices"). 

The Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall, without the 

Consent of Congress, ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 

("compact consent clause"). Congress purported to consent 

to the Compact with the passage of the Federal Agricultural 

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Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 ("FAIRA") § 147, 7 

U.S.C. § 7256 (Supp. 1996). Congress conditioned its consent 

on a finding of a "compelling public interest" by the Secretary 

of Agriculture ("Secretary").

Appellant, the Milk Industry Foundation, contends that 

Congress did not "consent" to the Compact but instead 

impermissibly delegated this constitutional responsibility to 

the Secretary. Appellant also claims that even assuming, 

arguendo, that the delegation was lawful, the Secretary exercised his delegated authority arbitrarily and capriciously in 

violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").

The congressional action here is not substantially different 

from countless pieces of contingent legislation enacted by 

Congress over the last few decadesincluding many that 

have been challenged and upheld by the courts. Appellant 

asserts that the instant delegation is somehow different because it involves an interstate compact. This claim is meritless. Furthermore, we have no doubt that, in instructing the 

Secretary to authorize the Compact only upon finding a 

"compelling public interest in the Compact region," Congress 

provided an "intelligible principle" to guide the Secretary's 

exercise of the delegated power. Accordingly, we hold that 

the delegation is constitutional.

We also reject Appellant's APA claim. Evaluating the 

Secretary's finding of a "compelling public interest" within 

the relevant context at issue, we find that he "examine[d] the 

relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for 

[his] action[,] including a rational connection between the 

facts found and the choice made." Thus his decision is not 

arbitrary and capricious under the APA. See Motor Vehicle 

Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 

43 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).

I. BACKGROUND 

A. The National Scheme for the Regulation of Milk Prices 

Congress initiated the federal program for the regulation of 

farm-gate milk prices with the passage of the Agricultural 

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Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 ("AMAA") § 2, 7 U.S.C. 

§§ 601-624, 671-674 (1994). The AMAA delegates the authority to set minimum milk prices nationwide to the Secretary, § 608c(18), while the states retain authority to establish 

milk prices above the federal price floor. See United Dairy 

Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Milk Control Comm'n of Pennsylvania, 335 F. Supp. 1008, 1013-15 (M.D. Pa.) (three judge 

court), aff'd without opinion, 404 U.S. 930 (1971).

B. The Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact 

In 1988, Vermont initiated an effort to regulate milk prices 

beyond its own state borders by forming an interstate compact with neighboring states. By 1993, all of the New 

England state legislatures had approved the formation of the 

Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, and all of the states' 

governors had signed resolutions supporting it. See Milk 

Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 949 F. Supp. 882, 885 (D.D.C. 

1996) ("MIF I") (explaining history of Compact). A principal 

objective of the Compact is to preserve dairy farms in the 

Compact states. See Compact art. I, § 1, reprinted in Appendix to Brief for Appellee Northeast Dairy Compact Commission. The Compact states agreed to establish a Commission consisting of three to five representatives from each 

state, with at least one person from each state being a dairy 

farmer and another a consumer representative, to administer 

the Compact. Compact art. III, § 4.

The Compact grants the Commission authority to, among 

other things, establish an "over-order" farm-gate price, a 

price of up to $1.50 per gallon over the federal minimum price 

for milk used for fluid products. Compact art. IV, § 9. The 

Compact's voting requirements are designed to ensure that 

the Commission does not pass any over-order prices without 

the broad consensus of the Compact states, both dairyproducing and dairy-consuming states. See Compact art. 

III, § 5 (requiring at least two-thirds vote of the delegations 

present to establish or terminate an over-order price); id.

("The establishment of a regulated area which covers all or 

part of a participating state shall require also the affirmative 

vote of that state's delegation.").

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C. Congress' Consent to the Compact 

Congress consented to the Compact with the enactment of 

FAIRA § 147, 7 U.S.C. § 7256 (Supp. 1996). See MIF I, 949 

F. Supp. at 886-87 (detailing efforts to obtain congressional 

consent to the compact). Congress' consent to the Compact 

was made subject to a number of conditions and limitations, 

two of which are relevant here. First, Congress conditioned 

its consent on a finding by the Secretary that the implementation of the Compact is in the compelling public interest of 

the Compact region. § 7256. ("Based upon a finding by the 

Secretary of a compelling public interest in the Compact 

region, the Secretary may grant the States that have ratified 

the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact ... the authority to 

implement the [ ] Compact."). Second, Congress limited the 

duration of its consent to the Compact, providing for its 

termination upon the Secretary's implementation of comprehensive reforms of the federal scheme for regulating milk 

prices mandated by FAIRA. See id. (providing that Congress' consent "shall terminate concurrent with the Secretary's implementation" of pending reforms to the federal 

milk-pricing scheme); see also 7 U.S.C. § 7253 (Supp. 1996) 

(mandating the consolidation and reform of the federal milkpricing scheme not later than April 4, 1999).

D. The Secretary's Findings and Appellant's Challenges to 

the Compact 

On August 28, 1996, the Secretary published a twosentence finding of a compelling public interest and authorized the Compact states to implement the Compact. 61 Fed. 

Reg. 44,290 (1996) ("Initial Finding"). Appellant promptly 

filed a motion in the District Court for the District of 

Columbia for a preliminary injunction to bar the implementation of the Compact, claiming that section 147 of FAIRA was 

an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and that 

the Secretary had exercised his delegated authority arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the APA.

Following the District Court's denial of Appellant's motion 

for a preliminary injunction, the Secretary moved to stay 

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proceedings so that he could review the entire administrative 

record and provide an amplified decision justifying his finding 

of a compelling public interest. The District Court granted 

this motion, instructing the Secretary to hold open the possibility of reaching a contrary conclusion upon reexamination of 

the record. Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 955 F. Supp. 8, 

9 (D.D.C. 1997).

The Secretary issued a second decision on March 28, 1997, 

again finding a compelling public interest in the Compact 

region warranting authorization of the Compact. 62 Fed. 

Reg. 14,879 (1997) ("Amplified Decision"). In reaching his 

decision, the Secretary emphasized the importance of taking 

"reasonable measures to preserve small family farms," noting 

that "America wants and still needs the family farm. This 

belief is obviously strongly held by the people of the Compact 

region." Id. at 14,879-80 (finding that "small dairy farms are 

an essential part of the character and culture in the Compact 

region"). The Secretary also noted that the Compact is a 

short-term measure which will expire upon the completion of 

the pending reform of the federal milk-pricing scheme. Id. at 

14,880. The Secretary found that the Compact likely would 

result in higher milk prices and therefore, at least in the 

short-term, provide higher profitability for, and decrease 

financial pressures on, family-sized dairy farms in New England. Id. at 14,879. After noting his countervailing concern 

over the Compact's potential to increase the cost of milk for 

low-income families, the Secretary concluded that there is a 

compelling public interest in the Compact region in favor of 

authorizing the Compact, stating that, "the balance has been 

properly struck, given current conditions. The Compact is a 

short-term measure that, if implemented with common sense 

and sensitivity to the needs of all affected persons and 

interests, can benefit the dairy producers and all citizens in 

the Compact region without producing adverse side effects." 

Id. at 14,880.

At the time the Secretary published his Initial Finding, he 

also published a statement saying that he was "concerned 

about potential effects of the Compact in several respects" 

and that he would revoke his authorization if he determined 

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that conditions warranted revocation. 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,291. 

Likewise, in his Amplified Decision, the Secretary maintained 

that he would revoke authorization if he determined that 

changing conditions in the Compact region warranted such 

action. 62 Fed. Reg. at 14,880. However, in an addendum to 

his Amplified Decision, the Secretary retreated from this 

position. 62 Fed. Reg. 16,539 (1997) ("Addendum").

Following issuance of the Secretary's Amplified Decision, 

the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The District 

Court granted Appellees' summary judgment motion and 

denied Appellant's summary judgment motion. Milk Indus. 

Found. v. Glickman, 967 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1997) ("MIF 

II").

II. ANALYSIS 

We review the District Court's grant of summary judgment 

de novo. See Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 

see also Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859, 862 

(D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Where the decision under review is the 

district court's assessment of the legal sufficiency of an 

agency's action in light of the record, ... [w]e proceed as if 

the Commission's decision had been appealed to this court 

directly," notwithstanding the intervening step; the district 

court's decision is not entitled to any particular deference) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). On the APA 

claim, our review of the Secretary's finding is deferential. 

See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 ("The scope of review under 

the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is narrow and a court 

is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.").

A. Congress' Contingent Consent Was a Lawful Delegation 

In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), the Supreme Court 

articulated what has come to be known as the "delegation 

doctrine." However, since Field, the Court has invalidated 

statutes on grounds of unlawful delegations on only two 

occasions, both of which occurred prior to the full development of the regulatory state ushered in by the New Deal. 

See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 

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495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 

(1935). In recent decades, it has become widely accepted that 

Congress may, as a general matter, confer substantial authority upon a coordinate branch of government, as long as it 

provides an "intelligible principle" to guide the delegatee's 

exercise of the power conferred. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).

1. The Power Delegated was Delegable Power

In the instant case, Congress made its consent contingent 

upon a finding by the Secretary that the Compact was in the 

compelling public interest of the Compact region. This act of 

contingent legislation is not substantially different from 

countless pieces of legislation passed by Congress over the 

last several decadesincluding many which have been challenged under the delegation doctrine and found to be constitutional by reviewing courts. We are unpersuaded by Appellant's efforts to distinguish the delegation in this case, on the 

grounds of both the nature of the legislative power delegated 

and the extent of executive action involved, from delegations 

that have been upheld as constitutional.

Appellant argues that consent to the Compact does not 

entail on-going administration of a regulatory scheme by the 

Executive Branch, on the assumption that this matters. 

However, precedent does not support Appellant's suggestion 

that contingent legislation is permissible only when associated 

with the administration of an on-going regulatory scheme. 

Rather, the Supreme Court has adopted the "general rule" 

that " '[a] constitutional power implies a power of delegation 

of authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes.' " Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1748 (1996) (quoting 

Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948) (alteration 

in original)). See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 

425-26 (1944) ("Congress is not confined to that method of 

executing policy which involves the least possible delegation 

of discretion to administrative officers.").

The Court frequently has upheld Congress' delegation of 

responsibilities to the Executive through contingent legislation requiring an executive agent to take some action upon 

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the finding of specified conditions. For example, in upholding 

Congress' delegation to the Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that would be fair and equitable and would 

effectuate the purposes of the Emergency Price Control Act 

of 1942, the Court stated:

The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and 

promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct.... These essentials are preserved when Congress 

has specified the basic conditions of fact upon whose 

existence or occurrence, ascertained from relevant data 

by a designated administrative agency, it directs that its 

statutory command shall be effective.

Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424-25. Thus, the relevant distinction 

between the legislative and the executive is one of function,

not of frequency. See Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1744 (" 'The true 

distinction ... is between the delegation of power to make 

the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it 

shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its 

execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. 

This first cannot be done; to the latter no objection can be 

made.' ") (quoting Field, 143 U.S. at 693-94) (alteration in 

original).

In any case, the Secretary's delegated role here is consistent with the Secretary's role in the regulation of milk prices 

nationwide. In this instance, the Secretary was not asked to 

regulate milk prices directly. Instead, he was asked to 

determine whether permitting the Compact Commission to 

override the national minimum price for milk, in the case of 

the Compact states pending reform of the federal milkpricing scheme, would be in the compelling public interest of 

the Compact region. This question implicates the Secretary's 

administrative role in regulating milk prices.

Appellant asserts that congressional consent to interstate 

compacts must be "effective of its own force, with no role for 

the Executive," Brief for Appellant at 11, but fails to offer 

any compelling reason why the compact consent clause should 

be understood differently from Congress' other Article I 

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powers for the purposes of the delegation doctrine. Cf. 

Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1748 (Congress' power to "make Rules 

for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 

forces" pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 ("Clause 14") 

"is no less plenary than other Article I powers") (citations 

omitted). If, as the Court held in Loving, Congress can 

lawfully delegate the power to define crimesa power which 

is arguably at the height of that which might be defined as 

legislativethen surely it can lawfully delegate to the Secretary the power to authorize an interstate compact upon the 

finding that the Compact would serve a compelling public 

interest in the Compact region. Although it may still be 

possible to posit hypothetical instances of delegations which 

might be found unlawful, we are unconvinced that this is such 

an instance.

Appellant notes that, in Loving, the Court observed at 

length that the Executive has traditionally played a significant role in the regulation of the military, see id. at 1744-48, 

thus suggesting that Loving should not be viewed as a 

weighty precedent in this case. There is nothing in the 

Loving opinion that we can find, however, indicating that this 

historical fact is a limiting principle governing application of 

the delegation doctrine. Indeed, such a reading of Loving

would conflict with previous statements of the Court. See, 

e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385 ("Our constitutional principles 

of separated powers are not violated ... by mere anomaly or 

innovation."). Rather, it appears that the Loving Court 

examined the historical practice of England as a tool for 

ascertaining the Framers' intent in drafting Clause 14. See 

Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1747 ("... the Framers knew well this 

history ..."). In addition, the Court emphasized the lack of 

any clear and "absolute rule against" the delegation at issue 

in Loving. See id. at 1748. Although Appellant maintains 

that the delegation at issue here is a novelty, it fails to 

identify any clear and absolute rule against such a delegation.

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2. The Delegation Was Governed by an Intelligible 

Principle

Where the power at issue is a delegable power, Congress 

may provide discretionary authority to a coordinate branch of 

government "[s]o long as Congress 'lay[s] down by legislative 

act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 

authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to 

conform.' " Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) 

(second alteration in original)). Applying this general rule 

over the last several decades, the Supreme Court has upheld, 

"without deviation, Congress' ability to delegate power under 

broad standards," id. at 373, including delegations authorizing 

the Executive to take action upon finding that it would be in 

the "public interest" to do so. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (upholding delegation to FCC to regulate broadcast licensing in the 

"public interest"); New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United 

States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932) (upholding delegation to ICC to 

authorize the consolidation of carriers where it finds that such 

consolidation would be in "the public interest"); see also 

Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425 ("It is no objection [under the delegation doctrine] that the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory 

standards and declaration of policy call for [the delegated 

agent's] judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary 

administrative policy within the prescribed statutory framework.") (citations omitted).

The "compelling public interest in the Compact region" 

standard falls well within established "intelligible principle" 

parameters. Indeed, Appellant's arguments in support of its 

APA claim convincingly demonstrate that the "compelling 

public interest" standard is discernible and demanding. In 

advancing this argument, Appellant has no difficultynor do 

wein defining the scope of the "compelling public interest" 

standard.

B. The Secretary's Finding Was Not Arbitrary and 

Capricious

Congress' requirement that the Compact can only be authorized upon a finding of a compelling public interest in the 

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Compact region provides a demanding standard requiring 

that the data and reasoning justifying the Secretary's finding 

weigh heavily in favor of authorizing the Compact. We find 

that the Secretary's Amplified Decision meets this standard.

1. The Secretary's Finding is "Agency Action" Reviewable 

Under the APA

As a threshold matter, the Secretary argues that his finding is not "agency action" reviewable under the APA, but 

rather "merely [a] determin[ation] that conditions in the 

Compact region met the condition set by Congress for implementation of the Compact." Brief for Appellee Secretary at 

30. This is a distinction without a difference. The APA 

defines "agency action" to include agency rules, see 5 U.S.C. 

§ 551(13), and defines an agency "rule" as "the whole or a 

part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or 

prescribe law or policy...." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). The Secretary neither disputes that the APA's procedural requirements 

for informal rulemaking were satisfied, see 5 U.S.C. § 553, 

nor explains why his Amplified Decision should not be understood as a rule implementing congressional policy. We see no 

meaningful distinction between the delegation at issue here 

and the many acts of contingent legislation passed by Congress over recent decades. Through such contingent legislation, Congress enacts a policy (in this case, consent to the 

Compact), which is to be implemented upon the Executive's 

finding of the conditions specified by Congress (in this case, a 

"compelling public interest in the Compact region"). Clearly, 

the Secretary's finding and his corresponding authorization of 

the Compact is a rule reviewable under the APA's "arbitrary 

and capricious" standard.

2. The Secretary's Finding of a Compelling Public Interest in the Compact Region is Not Arbitrary and Capricious

Under familiar and well-established principles, the Secretary's finding must be upheld as long as the Secretary 

"examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory 

explanation for its action including a 'rational connection 

between the facts found and the choice made.' " State Farm,

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463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. 

United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)); Republican Nat'l 

Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 76 F.3d 400, 407 (D.C. Cir. 

1996) (APA's arbitrary and capricious standard of review is 

"satisfied if the agency enables us to see what major issues of 

policy were ventilated ... and why the agency reacted to 

them as it did") (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied,

117 S. Ct. 682 (1997). To meet this standard, the factors 

undergirding the Secretary's finding must be appropriate to 

the relevant context. In the instant case, four aspects of the 

relevant context are particularly noteworthy.

First, the Secretary was required to find a compelling 

public interest in the Compact region. See 7 U.S.C. § 7256 

(Supp. 1996). Thus, contrary to Appellant's arguments, how 

the situation of dairy farmers in New England compares to 

that of dairy farmers in the remainder of the country is 

largely irrelevant. Rather, an appropriate inquiry must focus 

on the Compact region measured in absolute, not relative, 

terms.

Second, it is significant here that Congress' consent to the 

Compact is for a very limited duration. Consent expires 

upon the completion of pending reforms of the federal scheme 

for regulating milk prices nationwide, rendering the Compact 

a transitional, interim measure. See id. (providing that Congress' consent "shall terminate concurrent with the Secretary's implementation of the dairy pricing and Federal milk 

marketing order consolidation and reforms under section 7253 

of this title").

Third, it is also important to bear in mind that, under the 

disputed legislation, the Secretary is not authorized to implement any particular regulatory measure, but, rather, to determine whether the Compact Commission should be allowed to 

regulate milk prices in the Compact region. Appellant argues that the Secretary erred in failing to give due weight to 

the possibility that increased milk prices might burden lowincome families in the Compact region. However, any 

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sion's actions, not the Secretary's, that will affect consumer 

prices. Significantly, the Commission is composed of equal 

numbers of representatives from each Compact statethose 

which are primarily dairy-consuming states as well as those 

which are primarily dairy-producing states. Compact art. 

III, § 4. In addition, at least one representative from each 

state must be a consumer representative, id., a two-thirds 

vote of the Commission is required to raise farm-gate prices, 

and each state is subject to a Compact regulation increasing 

farm-gate prices only if the state's delegation votes for the 

measure. Compact art. III, § 5.

Finally, the record clearly identifies a strong consensus 

within the Compact states that the preservation of family 

dairy farms is of vital importance to the region's economic 

and environmental interests in a number of ways. Thus, 

although the availability of a sufficient supply of milk from 

large-scale farmerseven in the event that local family farmers go out of businessis a relevant inquiry in assessing 

whether there is a compelling public interest, it must be 

balanced against this countervailing factor of a strong regional desire to maintain family dairy farms.

Within this overall context, the Secretary's finding of a 

compelling public interest within the Compact region was 

reasonably supported by the following key factors: (1) a 

principal objective of the Compact is to preserve family farms 

in the Compact region; (2) family dairy farmers in the region 

are under severe financial stress; and (3) the Compact will 

effectively preserve family dairy farms during the transitional 

period pending reform of the national scheme for regulating 

milk prices, at which time congressional consent will expire. 

These factors, in turn, were reasonably supported by the 

record before the Secretary. See MIF II, 967 F. Supp. at 571 

n.8 (citing portions of the record supporting key factors relied 

on by the Secretary).

Prior to this case, the Secretary, in reviewing milk prices 

pursuant to his authority under the AMAA, found that it 

would not be in the public interest to raise farm-gate prices in 

New England. See 58 Fed. Reg. 12,634 (1993). Appellant 

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argues that this prior decision cannot be squared with the 

decision under attack here. We disagree. First, the question 

addressed by the Secretary in the instant case is not whether 

farm-gate prices should be increased, but whether the Compact Commission should be authorized to raise prices during 

the transitional period pending reform of the national priceregulation scheme. Notably, the factors relevant to a price 

determination in a federal milk marketing order under the 

AMAA and those considered by the Commission under the 

Compact are not identical. Compare 7 U.S.C. §§ 602, 

608c(18) (1994) with Compact arts. I, IV, §§ 1, 9(e), (f). 

Moreover, individual states already possess the authority to 

regulate prices above the AMAA floor. See United Dairy 

Farmers, 335 F. Supp. at 1013. In a region in which individual state regulation is impracticable because of the small 

geographic area and the interrelationships among neighboring states, the Compact simply gives the New England region 

similar authority. Thus, permitting state governments to 

collaborate in setting farm-gate prices above the AMAA price 

floor is hardly incompatible with the objectives of the AMAA. 

In any event, even if the Secretary were deciding directly 

whether prices should be raised, it is well-established that he 

would not be bound by his prior decision, so long as the 

decision under review is well-reasoned. See, e.g., DIRECTV, 

Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1997); National 

Audubon Soc'y v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

Furthermore, the fact that the Secretary considered possible negative consequences of authorizing the Compact does 

not render his finding invalid; rather, this merely demonstrates that the Secretary realized that the compelling public 

interest standard is a high hurdle and weighed factors on 

every side. In particular, the Secretary's concern that the 

Compact might result in higher retail prices for fluid milk in 

the Compact region does not invalidate his finding. The 

Secretary noted this concern, but, while expressing some 

uncertainty as to how the Commission would implement the 

Compact, he ultimately assumed that the Commission would 

be sensitive to consumer needs and thus that any rise in milk 

prices would not be so great as to offset the compelling public 

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interests warranting authorization of the Compact. See Amplified Decision, 62 Fed. Reg. at 14,880. The reasonableness 

of this assumption is amply supported by the Compact's 

structural requirements designed to protect consumer interests, described above. As an additional safeguard to ensure 

that the Compact is implemented with sensitivity to all affected persons and interests, the Secretary offered the Commission the assistance of the Department of Agriculture to 

achieve this goal. Id.

Finally, the Secretary's initial emphasis on a perceived 

authority to revoke the Compact, followed by his acknowledgment that he lacks such revocation authority, is not determinative of the question before us. The Secretary first stated, 

in his Amplified Decision, that, "[g]iven the shifting nature of 

the compelling interest test, the Department strongly believes 

that the authority to withdraw or revoke its authorization is 

an essential element of any decision which finds that a 

compelling public interest exists." 62 Fed. Reg. at 14,880. 

In an Addendum to that decision, published approximately 

one week later, the Secretary recognized that he "may have 

inadvertently created the impression that it would have been 

impossible for [him] to authorize implementation in the absence of revocation authority" and clarified that, "[i]n fact, 

... [his] finding of compelling public interest was based on a 

broad array of factors which [he] discussed in [the Amplified 

Decision and] was not contingent upon the existence of revocation authority." 62 Fed. Reg. at 16,539.

The Secretary's mistaken belief that he could revoke authorization of the Compact, should he determine that changing 

conditions warranted revocation, does not render his decision 

invalid in light of the demanding "compelling public interest" 

standard. In his Amplified Decision, the Secretary concluded 

that "given current conditions" authorization of the Compact 

was in the compelling public interest of the Compact region. 

62 Fed. Reg. at 14,880. Rather than attempt to predict 

precisely how relevant conditions might play out in the future, 

the Secretary simply planned to revoke his authorization 

should changing conditions warrant. See id. ("Facts and 

circumstances that may currently justify authorization may 

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subsequently change to the extent that a compelling public 

interest no longer exists in the Compact region."). However, 

when pushed to clarify whethereven without revocation 

authority and without being able to predict with certainty 

how relevant conditions might changehe anticipated that 

authorization nevertheless would be in the compelling public 

interest of the Compact region, the Secretary clarified that 

authorization was still warranted. See Addendum, 62 Fed. 

Reg. at 16,539. On the record at hand, we have no good 

reason to question this predictive judgment.

Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, "an 

agency's predictive judgments about areas that are within the 

agency's field of discretion and expertise" are entitled to 

"particularly deferential" review, as long as they are reasonable. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. 

Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 821-22 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citations 

omitted). The question of whether permitting the Compact 

Commission to override federal farm-gate prices pending the 

reform of the national milk pricing scheme would be in the 

compelling public interest of the Compact region implicates 

the Secretary's expertise in the regulation of milk prices. We 

find that the Secretary's predictive judgment on this point is 

reasonable, notwithstanding his confusion over the authority 

to revoke.

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons explained above, the District Court's decision granting Appellees' summary judgment motion and denying Appellant's summary judgment motion is affirmed.

So ordered.

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge, with whom HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judge joins, concurring: I join the opinion of the court and 

write separately only to note another reason underscoring 

why the condition requiring that the Secretary of Agriculture 

determine whether a compelling public interest existed in the 

Compact region does not involve an impermissible delegation.

The Compact Clause has always been recognized as a 

device to protect federal power from encroachments by the 

states. The Framers required the "Consent of Congress" 

before any state could "enter into any Agreement or Compact 

with another State." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. It has 

ever since been "evident that the [Compact Clause] prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination tending to 

the increase of political power in the States, which may 

encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the 

United States." Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 

(1893). As Joseph Story explained, "the consent of congress 

may be properly required, in order to check any infringement 

of the rights of the national government; and at the same 

time a total prohibition, to enter into any compact or agreement, might be attended with permanent inconvenience, or 

public mischief." JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE 

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1397 (1833); see also 

Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause 

of the ConstitutionA Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 

YALE L.J. 685, 694-95 (1925).

The Compact Clause was drafted at a time when the states 

were relatively powerful and independent entities. The drafters of the Constitution sought to ensure the supremacy of 

federal power in interstate affairs. Although the drafters 

spoke of congressional consent, it is clear that they hoped not 

just to vindicate the legislative power of Congress, but to 

protect the power of the entire federal government with the 

Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court has since recognized 

that the Compact Clause required congressional consent for 

interstate compacts only when the compact infringes upon 

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federal power. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-60, 471 (1978).

With this background in mind, it is clear that the process of 

consent in the instant case fully realized the purpose of the 

Compact Clause. The New England states appropriately 

sought congressional consent to the dairy compact, which will 

affect the federal regulation of milk prices pursuant to the 

Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. 

§§ 601-624, 671-674 (1994). They obtained that consent from 

Congress and its delegate, the Secretary of Agriculture. 

Both Congress and the Secretary were capable of vindicating 

the federal power protected by the Compact Clause, the 

former under the Clause itself, and the latter by virtue of 

delegated and statutory powers. As the Supreme Court has 

observed, "the constitution makes no provision respecting the 

mode or form in which the consent of congress is to be 

signified, very properly leaving that matter to the wisdom of 

that body, to be decided upon according to the ordinary rules 

of law, and of right reason." Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 

Wheat.) 1, 85-86 (1823). For these reasons, the balance of 

power envisioned in the Compact Clause has been preserved 

by the actions of the New England states, Congress, and the 

Secretary.

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