Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00053/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00053-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Douglas E. Robinson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

the Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-06-53-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Dkt. ##20, 28. The parties have filed

responses to the motions and Plaintiff has filed a reply. Dkt. ##27, 31. For the reasons set

forth below, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and deny Defendant’s cross-motion.

I. Background.

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income

on June 26, 2002, claiming a disability onset date of July 23, 1997. Dkt. #12, Tr. 61-65.

Plaintiff amended his alleged onset date to May 19, 2003. Tr. 15. The application was

denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 39-42, 45-48. A hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was held on June 9, 2004. Tr. 740-86. The ALJ issued

a written decision on July 16, 2004, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 15-24. This decision became Defendant’s final

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1

“Residual functional capacity” is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations

caused by physical and/or mental impairments. See Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762

(9th Cir. 1989); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.927(a); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1

(July 2, 1996). 

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decision when the Appeals Council denied review on November 10, 2005. Tr. 7-9. Plaintiff

then commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Dkt. #1.

II. Standard of Review.

Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880,

882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but less than

a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is supported by substantial

evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that

supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from it. See Reddick v. Charter, 157

F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court cannot affirm the decision “simply by isolating a

‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 (quoting Hammock

v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)); see Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156

(9th Cir. 1975) (same). 

III. Analysis.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: chronic hepatitis

C, chronic musculoskeletal pain, moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis, history of diarrhea,

bipolar disorder, and polysubstance dependence. Tr. 16, 23 ¶ 3. The ALJ further found that

these severe impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. Tr. 16, 23 ¶ 4.

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the physical residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to

perform a limited range of light exertional work, and that sedentary unskilled jobs existed

in significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 17, 23 ¶ 6, 24 ¶¶ 10-11.1

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in step five of the sequential evaluation process

followed in resolving disability claims, i.e., whether Defendant has shown that Plaintiff had

the RFC to perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy consistent

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A person with celiac sprue disease has a severe intolerance to gluten, a protein found

in foods containing wheat, rye, barley, and oats.

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with Plaintiff’s age, education, and past work experience. Dkt. #26 at 4; see 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4) (setting forth the five-step sequential evaluation process).

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in (1) assessing the functional limitations

caused by Plaintiff’s mental impairments, (2) determining the amount of weight afforded to

the medical opinions, (3) determining Plaintiff’s physical limitations, (4) evaluating

Plaintiff’s testimony, and (5) determining vocational issues. Dkt. #26 at 4-16. Defendant

contends that the ALJ did not err and that her decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Dkt. #30.

As explained more fully below, the Court concludes that Defendant’s decision to deny

benefits must be reversed because the ALJ failed to consider all of Plaintiff’s impairments

in determining Plaintiff’s RFC and gave improper weight to medical opinions and Plaintiff’s

own testimony. The Court accordingly need not address Plaintiff’s other challenges to

Defendant’s decision.

A. Plaintiff’s Impairments.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had a history of severe diarrhea and abdominal pain and

had been diagnosed with irritable bowel syndrome and possible celiac sprue disease. Tr. 16,

18, 23 ¶ 3.2

 The ALJ, however, failed to consider these impairments in determining

Plaintiff’s RFC. This constitutes legal error. “In determining whether an individual’s . . .

impairments are of sufficient medical severity that such . . . impairments could be the basis

of eligibility under this section, the Commissioner of Social Security shall consider the

combined effect of all of the individual’s impairments without regard to whether any such

impairment, if considered separately, would be of such severity.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B)

(emphasis added); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (Commission to consider

“combination of impairments”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2) (Commission

to consider “all” impairments); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996) (same);

see also Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1996) (Commissioner must consider the

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Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s “allegations of frequent bowel movements do not

appear beyond September 19, 2003 and are totally unsupported by the record for the period

that he claims he became disabled.” Dkt. #30 at 10. To the contrary, a February 5, 2004

treatment note states that Plaintiff “continues to have diarrhea almost after every meal” and

that “whole lots of food [have been] eliminated.” Tr. 654.

4

Plaintiff visited Dr. Nolan for a follow up visit on August 14, 2004, after the ALJ

issued her decision in this matter. Tr. 738-39.

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combined effect of all impairments in determining whether the claimant is disabled) (citing

Gregory v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1988)); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830

(9th Cir. 1996) (Commissioner “should have considered the combined effect of the

claimant’s physical and mental impairments in determining [RFC]”); Hammock, 879 F.2d

at 500 (error not to “consider the combined effect of all of Hammock’s impairments on her

ability to return to work”).3

 

B. Dr. Joseph Nolan’s Opinions.

The medical evidence shows that Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Dr. Eduardo

Alcantar, treated Plaintiff for his chronic musculoskeletal pain and other physical

impairments from August 2002 until June 2004. Tr. 457-71, 654-76, 678-82. Dr. Alcantar

referred Plaintiff to rheumatologist Joseph Nolan. Tr. 662, 677. Plaintiff visited Dr. Nolan

on October 10, 2003, complaining that “he hurt[] all over all the time” and that “his physical

activities [were] markedly limited because of this pain.” Plaintiff stated that he could not

get any work done because virtually everything that he tried to do made the pain worse.

Dr. Nolan’s assessment was that Plaintiff suffered from chronic diffuse musculoskeletal pain.

Dr. Nolan opined that this pain was “due to the musculoskeletal complications of chronic

hepatitis C,” noting that Plaintiff “[did] not truly have a rheumatic disease to explain his

problem.” Dr. Nolan discussed his findings with Plaintiff and referred him to a pain

management specialist for further evaluation and treatment. Tr. 677.4

 

The ALJ concluded that the clinical evidence did not support Plaintiff’s allegations

of disabling pain and limitations. Tr. 18. In support of this conclusion, the ALJ relied on

Dr. Nolan’s opinion that Plaintiff did not have a rheumatic disease. Tr. 18. But the ALJ

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See also Switzer v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 382, 385-86 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[The doctor’s]

report is uncontradicted and the Secretary’s attempt to use only the portions favorable to her

position, while ignoring other parts, is improper.”).

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failed to address Dr. Nolan’s opinion that complications of hepatitis C caused Plaintiff

chronic diffuse musculoskeletal pain. See Tr. 677. The ALJ’s failure to consider and

evaluate this opinion constitutes legal error. Commission regulations specifically state that

all evidence in a case record will be considered. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(3),

416.920(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(b), 416.927(b). And the Ninth Circuit has held that

an ALJ’s rejection of a doctor’s opinion was error and not supported by substantial evidence

where the ALJ selectively focused on aspects of the medical opinion suggesting nondisability. See Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1158-60 (9th Cir. 2001); Holohan v.

Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1286 (9th

Cir. 1996); Lester, 81 F.3d at 833.5

 

Defendant contends, without citing any legal authority, that the ALJ did not err in

ignoring Dr. Nolan’s opinion that Plaintiff’s pain was caused by complications of hepatitis C

because Dr. Nolan was not a treating source since Plaintiff visited Dr. Nolan on only two

occasions and referred to Dr. Alcantar as his “primary care physician.” Dkt. #30 at 9. This

contention lacks merit for several reasons. First, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Nolan’s opinion

on the ground that he was not a treating doctor. This Court must review the adequacy of the

reasons specified by the ALJ, not the post hoc contentions of Defendant. See Connett v.

Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003); Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir.

2001) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947

F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Second, the fact that Plaintiff visited Dr. Nolan

twice does not preclude a finding that he was a treating source. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502,

416.902; Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Section 404.1502

neither explicitly forbids nor requires crediting a physician ‘treating’ status whose patient

contact is . . . limited. Its language suggests that ‘a few times’ or contact as little as twice a

year would suffice, but it does not state that this frequency of patient contact represents a

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floor.”). Nor does the fact that Dr. Alcantar was Plaintiff’s primary care physician preclude

a finding that Dr. Nolan also treated Plaintiff. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2),

416.927(d)(2) (“[W]e give more weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these

sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed,

longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s)[.]”) (emphasis added); SSR 96-5P, 1996

WL 374183, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (referring to “treating sources”). Finally, even if Dr. Nolan

was not a treating source, the ALJ was still required to consider and evaluate all of his

opinions. Commission regulations state that “[r]egardless of its source, we will evaluate

every medical opinion we receive.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d); SSR 96-5P, 1996

WL 374183, at *2 (“[O]pinions from any medical source . . . must never be ignored.”); see

also Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (discussing the weight an ALJ should give to various medical

opinions).

Defendant further contends that Dr. Nolan could find no medical explanation to

account for Plaintiff’s pain. Dkt. #30 at 9. But the ALJ did not assert this as a reason for

rejecting Dr. Nolan’s opinion. Moreover, Dr. Nolan specifically stated that he believed

Plaintiff’s pain was “due to the musculoskeletal complications of chronic hepatitis C.”

Tr. 677.

C. Plaintiff’s Testimony.

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he was unable to work due to severe joint and

muscle pain. He further testified that he experienced continuous pain throughout his body.

Tr. 17, 740-86. The ALJ found this testimony not credible, stating that there was not

objective medical evidence of the pain. Tr. 18, 21, 23 ¶ 5.

“Pain of sufficient severity caused by a medically diagnosed ‘anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormality’ may provide the basis for determining that a

claimant is disabled.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 344-45). Moreover, “[o]nce a claimant

produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject a

claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on lack of objective medical evidence to fully

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corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir.

2004) (citation and alterations omitted); see Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282 (“The claimant need not

produce objective medical evidence of the pain . . . itself, or the severity thereof. Nor must

the claimant produce objective medical evidence of the causal relationship between the

medically determinable impairment and the symptom.”) (citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-48);

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2) (“[W]e will not reject your statements about the

intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms

have on your ability to work solely because the objective medical evidence does not

substantiate your statements.”); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *1 (July 2, 1996) (same);

see also SSR 95-5p, 1995 WL 670415, at *1 (Oct. 31, 1995) (“Because symptoms sometimes

suggest a greater severity of impairment than can be shown by objective medical evidence

alone, careful consideration must be given to any available information about symptoms.”).

In addition, unless the ALJ “makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative evidence

thereof, he or she may only find [the claimant] not credible by making specific findings as

to credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883

(citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84). “‘General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must

identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s

complaints.’” Reddick, 157 F.3d at722 (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 834); see Dodrill v.

Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).

In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff suffers from chronic hepatitis C and

musculoskeletal pain. The ALJ found that these impairments were severe. Tr. 16, 23 ¶ 3.

Dr. Nolan opined that Plaintiff’s chronic musculoskeletal pain was caused by complications

of his hepatitis C. Tr. 677. Plaintiff has thus “produced medical evidence of underlying

impairments consistent with his subjective complaints[.]” Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 166 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Because the ALJ made no finding that Plaintiff was malingering, she was required to

give clear and convincing reasons in support of her adverse credibility finding. Robbins, 466

F.3d at 883. This clear and convincing standard “is the most demanding required in Social

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Security cases.” Moore v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir.

2002). The ALJ asserted multiple reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony, but none of

them is convincing or supported by substantial evidence.

1. Objective Medical Evidence.

The ALJ found Plaintiff not credible because his “allegations of disabling pain and

limitations [were] not supported by abnormal clinical findings or objective medical evidence

in the record.” Tr. 21. This is an improper reason for disbelieving Plaintiff. See Robbins,

466 F.3d at 884 (holding that lack of objective medical evidence was an improper reason for

rejecting the claimant’s testimony of disabling pain where there was evidence that the

claimant had severe shoulder, back, and knee impairments) (citing SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL

374186, at *1; Light, 119 F.3d at 792).

Moreover, substantial evidence does not support the asserted reason when the record

is considered as a whole. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “abnormal clinical findings

were limited to tenderness.” Tr. 18. To the contrary, the overwhelming medical evidence

shows that Plaintiff suffered from severe chronic musculoskeletal pain. See Tr. 16. Dr.

Alcantar, who treated Plaintiff on a monthly basis for nearly two years, repeatedly diagnosed

Plaintiff with chronic hepatitis C, rheumatoid arthritis, arthralgia, and fibromyalgia.

Dr. Alcantar’s numerous treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff suffered from chronic pain

in his abdomen, back, neck, and joints. Tr. 457-58, 654-76, 678-82. Dr. Alcantar referred

Plaintiff to Dr. Nolan, a rheumatic specialist. Dr. Nolan examined Plaintiff and diagnosed

him with chronic diffuse musculoskeletal pain. Although Dr. Nolan ruled out a rheumatic

disease, he found that Plaintiff’s pain was related to his hepatitis C. Tr. 677. Following a

second examination, Dr. Nolan indicated that Plaintiff’s pain was most likely caused by

hepatitis C as opposed to fibromyalgia. Significantly, Dr. Nolan opined that, regardless of

the specific diagnosis, Plaintiff “[was] clearly medically disabled from performing gainful

employment because of the severity of his pain” and his “physical activities [were] markedly

restricted to the point that he [could not] work.” Tr. 738-39. In sum, the ALJ’s conclusion

that objective medical evidence did not support Plaintiff’s testimony of disabling pain is

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Although the notes from Plaintiff’s second visit with Dr. Nolan were not available

to the ALJ before she issued her decision, the Court “properly may consider [the notes]

because the Appeals Council addressed them in the context of denying [Plaintiff’s] request

for review.” Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ramirez v.

Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1152 (9th Cir. 1993)); see Tr. 7-9 (citing Ex. AC-4, Tr. 738-39).

7

See Tr. 753 (“[S]ometimes, you don’t get up, and you turn around and you’re waking

up finally about 10 o’clock, and you’re going, where are my kids, and they had already got

themselves up and got themselves ready, and went ahead and went off to school, and you’re

thinking God what a horrible father I am[.]”).

8

Specifically, Plaintiff testified as follows:

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neither a proper reason for discrediting the testimony nor supported by substantial evidence.6

2. Plaintiff’s Daily Activities.

The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain on the ground that his

“testimony at the hearing and statements in the medical records confirmed that [he had] very

little impairment in his activities of daily living.” Tr. 20. Specifically, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff was the sole caretaker of his two young daughters, was able to drive, cook, and

grocery shop, and attended church. Tr. 17-21.

An ALJ “may reject a claimant’s symptom testimony if the claimant is able to spend

a substantial part of [his] day performing household chores or other activities that are

transferrable to a work setting.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 n.7 (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d

597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). In this case, the ALJ did not address the limited nature of

Plaintiff’s daily activities or whether such activities were transferrable to the work place.

Moreover, an examination of the entire record “shows that the ALJ has erred in

characterizing statements and documents contained therein to reach the conclusion that

[Plaintiff] exaggerated [his] symptoms.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. Plaintiff testified that

he is not always able to get up in the morning and get his daughters off to school, and that

his daughters do the laundry after school. Tr. 753, 762, 782.7

 Plaintiff further testified that

doing the dishes is painful and that his entire house is a mess because he is unable to vacuum

or clean the floors and walls. Tr. 763-64.8

 With respect to cooking and grocery shopping,

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[T]he house is a mess, I can’t run a vacuum because on account when I push

it, it hurts my spine, so I don’t run the vacuum so there’s a lot of debris . . . .

[F]or me to bend over and pick up something is quite a task . . . . [D]oing the

dishes hurts, you know, because you turn around and you have to reach

forward and wash the dishes and it, anytime I have to do anything that I have

to reach forward on, it hurts. . . . [T]he house is a mess. It used to be clean,

you know, I even still worked a hard job, and I still [went] in there and kept the

house clean. Now the floor is dirty, the walls are dirty, everything is dirty

because I got kids and they’re being kids and even the bathroom’s a mess.

Tr. 763-64; see Tr. 745-46 (“[A]ll I want to do is take care of the kids . . . [and] I can’t even

do that.”); Tr. 765 (“I’m living the life of a housewife, but then I’m not getting the

housework done, I’m not getting all the things done.”).

9

See Tr. 487 (stating that Plaintiff “generally does microwave meals only”); Tr. 783

(“Cooking is, it’s fajitas, corn dogs [and] sometimes I do the cooking myself and then it’s

something that you can put together in a few minutes.”).

10See Tr. 764 (“I drive to church, I drive to the store, I drive to the doctor’s offices and

that’s about it.”)

11See Tr. 766 (“[O]ccasionally I miss [services] when I’m sick. . . . [S]ometimes it’s

just like . . . you can’t wake up, you can’t move, you can’t do anything[]”).

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Plaintiff testified that he usually makes easy meals when he does the cooking and that it is

very painful to pick up a gallon of milk and other items at the grocery store. Tr. 487, 765,

783.9

 With respect to driving, Plaintiff testified that it hurts to drive and that he drives as

little as possible. Tr. 764-65.10 Finally, Plaintiff testified that he is not always able to attend

church due to his ailments. Tr. 766-67.11

The Ninth Circuit “has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has

carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping [and] driving a car, . . . does not

in any way detract from [his] credibility as to [his] overall disability. One does not need to

be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be disabled.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fair, 885 F.2d at 603); see Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Cooper v.

Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987); Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir.

1986). Considering the record as a whole and in the proper context, the Court concludes that

substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s daily activities

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were inconsistent with his pain testimony. See Benecke, 379 F.3d at 594; Vertigan, 260 F.3d

at 1050; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Regennitter, 166 F.3d at 1297; see also Holohan, 246 F.3d

at 1208.

3. Work Related Issues.

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he stopped working in May 2003. Tr. 745. The

ALJ concluded that this statement was untruthful on the ground that a medical record

indicated that Plaintiff “was working in the maintenance department of his apartment

complex until July of 2003” and Plaintiff “stated that he was going to try to find part-time

work[.]” Tr. 21-22 (citing Tr. 591). The medical record actually provides that Plaintiff “was

previously working at [the apartment] complex in the maintenance [department].” Tr. 591

(emphasis added). There is no way to tell from the medical record whether Plaintiff

performed maintenance work at the apartment complex after May 19, 2003, the alleged onset

date of disability. Moreover, Plaintiff specifically explained at the hearing that he stopped

doing maintenance work for the apartment complex prior to May 2003. Tr. 779. The ALJ’s

decision to discredit Plaintiff’s testimony on this ground is not supported by substantial

evidence. In addition, Plaintiff’s mere desire to try to find part-time work does not render

his disabling pain testimony incredible considering the record as a whole. See Moore, 278

F.3d at 924-25 (“[T]he SSA’s regulations provide for a ‘trial work period’ in which a

claimant may test [his] ability to work and still be considered disabled.’”) (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1592); Lester, 81 F.3d at 833 (“In evaluating whether the claimant satisfies the

disability criteria, the Commissioner must evaluate the claimant’s ‘ability to work on a

sustained basis.’ Occasional symptom-free periods – and even the sporadic ability to work

– are not inconsistent with disability.”) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); emphasis in

original); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7.

4. Plaintiff’s Use of Alcohol.

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he had a history of drug and alcohol use. Plaintiff

stated that he occasionally drank one or two beers at night to help him sleep and that he did

not get drunk or drink alcohol during the day. Tr. 17, 759-61. The ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s

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“credibility [was] undermined because he denied having any history of alcohol abuse at his

consultive evaluation.” Tr. 22 (citing Tr. 486-92 (5/19/03 report of Steven Hirdes, Ed.D.,

indicating that Plaintiff “denied any history significant for alcohol abuse”)). The ALJ,

however, does not cite any evidence showing that Plaintiff had a history of alcohol abuse.

The medical evidence is consistent with Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing that he used

alcohol in moderation to help him sleep. Tr. 315, 320. Plaintiff’s denial of a history of

alcohol abuse is not a convincing reason supported by substantial evidence for rejecting

Plaintiff’s testimony. See Robbins, 466 F.3d at 884, n.2 (holding that the ALJ erred in

finding the claimant’s testimony not credible based on his apparent inconsistent statements

regarding alcohol use where the ALJ’s assessment of the claimant’s statements was “missing

from the record, and no effort appear[ed] to have been made to investigate the possible

disparity during the hearing”).

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that alcohol was recommended to him by the nurse

practitioner at Dr. Alcantar’s office and that the nurse wrote him a prescription for nightly

alcohol with Dr. Alcantar’s acquiescence. Tr. 22, 740-86. The ALJ found it “incredible that

[Plaintiff’s] doctor or nurse practitioner would recommend the use of alcohol given

[Plaintiff’s] chronic hepatitis C, bipolar disorder, pain medication, and history of drug and

alcohol abuse.” Tr. 22. If the ALJ had developed the record further on this issue, however,

she would have learned that Plaintiff was in fact prescribed nightly alcohol by a nurse

practitioner at Dr. Alcantar’s office. Dkt. #26 Ex. 4 (2/5/04 prescription by FNP Sharon

Ponce indicating that Plaintiff was “drinking 2 beers each evening for help to go to sleep”).

Whether or not prescribing Plaintiff alcohol was sound medical treatment given some of his

impairments, the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff less credible merely because he testified that

he had in fact received such treatment.

D. The Decision to Remand for Further Proceedings or an Award of Benefits.

Having decided to vacate Defendant’s decision, the Court has the discretion to remand

the case for further development of the record or for an award benefits. See Reddick, 157

F.3d at 728. In Smolen, the Ninth Circuit held that evidence should be credited and an action

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remanded for an immediate award of benefits when the following three factors are satisfied:

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, (2) there

are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be

made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant

disabled were such evidence credited. 80 F.3d at 1292; see Varney v. Sec. of Health &

Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988) (Varney II) (“In cases where there are

no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a proper determination can be made, and

where it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to award benefits if the

claimant’s excess pain testimony were credited, we will not remand solely to allow the

ALJ to make specific findings regarding that testimony.”); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d

683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1989)

(“In a recent case where the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for

discounting the opinion of claimant’s treating physician, we accepted the physician’s

uncontradicted testimony as true and awarded benefits.”) (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d

643, 647 (9th Cir. 1988)); Hammock, 879 F.2d at 503 (extending Varney II’s “credit as true”

rule to a case with outstanding issues where the claimant already had experienced a long

delay and a treating doctor supported the claimant’s testimony). On many occasions since

Smolen, the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed the rule that improperly rejected evidence must be

credited as true. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000); Lester, 81 F.3d

at 834; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 729; McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076-77 (9th Cir.

2002); Moisa, 367 F.3d at 887; Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593-95. At least one panel, however,

has explicitly held that the “credit as true” doctrine is not mandatory in the Ninth Circuit.

Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 348;

Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919; Ngyuen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1996); Byrnes

v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1995)).

The Court need not choose between these “two opposing lines of authority, neither

of which has an unimpaired claim to being the law of the circuit.’” Greenhow v. Sec. of

Health & Human Servs., 863 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled in part by United

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States v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc)). The Court concludes, on the

specific record before it, that Plaintiff’s testimony of disabling pain should be credited as true

and the case remanded for an award of benefits. The ALJ acknowledged in her decision that

she had weighed all relevant factors in making her adverse credibility determination. Tr. 22;

see Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. Moreover, Plaintiff’s testimony is consistent with the medical

evidence, and at least one doctor explicitly found that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the

severity of his symptoms were credible and consistent. Tr. 453. The ALJ has acknowledged

that if Plaintiff’s testimony is credited, a disability finding would be required. Tr. 785; see

Tr. 22-24 (finding that steps one through four of the disability evaluation process had been

satisfied). Thus, “a remand for further proceedings would serve no useful purpose.”

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 730.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #20) is granted and

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #28) is denied.

2. Defendant’s administrative decision is vacated.

3. The case is remanded for an award of benefits.

DATED this 11th day of December, 2006.

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