Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01819/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01819-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dumitru Matache, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Social Security Administration

Commissioner, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-07-1819-PHX-FJM

ORDER

Plaintiff brought this action seeking review of the Social Security Administration’s

decision that he is not eligible for disability insurance benefits. The court has before it

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 10) and memorandum in support (doc. 12),

defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment and response (doc. 13), and plaintiff’s

response and reply (docs. 14, 15). 

I

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on October 1, 2004,

claiming disability as of July 15, 2004. He was diagnosed with gastric adenocarcinoma and

had a complete gastrectomy (stomach removal) in October 2003. He claims that since his

surgery he has had difficulty eating, with resulting weight loss, nausea, weakness, and

dizziness, and that as a result he is unable to work.

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Plaintiff’s application for benefits was denied initially and on reconsideration.

Following a hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision finding that

plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s

request for review. Plaintiff then initiated this action for judicial review pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). 

II

An ALJ’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Under this standard,

an ALJ’s findings must be upheld “if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the

record,” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004), even

where “evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation.” Id. 

Plaintiff lost approximately 30 pounds after his gastrectomy because of difficulty with

eating. At the time of the hearing, he weighed approximately 148 pounds, down from 172

pounds before surgery. He returned to work after surgery as a stair/railing installer, at the

heavy exertional level, from March 1, 2004 to July 29, 2004. He has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since that date. Tr. 22. 

The ALJ determined that plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform a full

range of medium work. Tr. 21. He adopted the vocational expert’s opinion that plaintiff’s

residual functional capacity would not preclude him from performing his past relevant work

as a truck driver at the light and medium exertional levels and as an installer of stairs and

railings. Tr. 24. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled within the

meaning of the Act “at any time through the date of [the] decision.” Id. After plaintiff’s

claim was denied, he filed a new disability application in January 2007, which was

eventually granted. Therefore, this appeal involves defendant’s denial of benefits from July

2004 through January 2007. 

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III

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of Dr. Bailes,

his primary care physician, and Dr. Rakkar, his oncologist. Because the medical opinion of

a claimant’s treating physician is entitled to special weight, an ALJ may reject controverted

testimony of a treating physician only if he provides “specific and legitimate reasons

supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,

830 (9th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). 

Dr. Bailes’ May 2004 treatment notes indicate that plaintiff complained of weakness,

but that otherwise a physical examination was within normal limits. Tr. 256. On September

30, 2004, plaintiff reported to Dr. Bailes that he had stopped working in July 2004 due to

weakness. Again, the physical examination was within normal limits. Tr. 255. On June 27,

2005, plaintiff discussed his disability claim with Dr. Bailes, who agreed to write a letter of

disability. Tr. 314. In that letter, Dr. Bailes stated that since his surgery plaintiff was unable

to work due to fatigue, difficulty eating, weight loss, and profound intermittent dizziness.

Tr. 148. He opined that plaintiff was “100% disabled as he is losing weight and potentially

failing to thrive.” Id. 

Dr. Bailes then completed a “physical capacities evaluation” on July 14, 2005, in

which he opined that plaintiff could sit, stand, and walk 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and

could perform each activity 2 to 3 hours at a time. Tr. 145. He also opined that plaintiff

could lift up to 10 pounds frequently and that his complaints of dizziness and fatigue resulted

in moderately severe limitations on functioning. Tr. 146-47. Dr. Bailes completed a second

physical capacities evaluation a year later, on September 11, 2006, this time opining that

plaintiff could sit, stand, and walk 5 hours in an 8-hour workday. Tr. 309. He again opined

that plaintiff could lift up to 10 pounds frequently and that his complaints of dizziness and

fatigue resulted in moderately severe limitations on functioning. Tr. 309-10. 

The ALJ rejected Dr. Bailes’ opinion that plaintiff is 100% disabled, in part because

that conclusion was not supported by his progress notes, which showed no clinical findings

related to plaintiff’s allegations of weakness, fatigue, or dizziness. See Tonapetyan v. Halter,

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242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding rejection of treating physician’s opinion that

was unsupported by treatment notes or objective medical findings). The ALJ noted that the

purpose of plaintiff’s only follow-up visits in June and July, 2005, was to complete the

disability application. Once completed, plaintiff sought no further treatment for his

symptoms. Tr. 22. Further, the ALJ noted as significant that Dr. Bailes opined that plaintiff

could sit, stand, and walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday and found this inconsistent with

his conclusion that plaintiff is unable to sustain work activity due to dizziness and weakness.

Tr. 23, 148. See Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal

inconsistencies within a doctor’s report constitutes a specific and legitimate basis for

rejecting the report). 

The ALJ also rejected the opinion of Dr. Rakkar, plaintiff’s oncologist. On October

25, 2006, Dr. Rakkar wrote a letter stating that since October 2003, plaintiff had chronic

fatigue, dizziness, and hypotension that prevented him from being able to stand, walk, or

work for any length of time. Tr. 316. He concluded that plaintiff should be considered

permanently disabled. Id. In rejecting Dr. Rakkar’s opinion, the ALJ properly noted that

whether a claimant is disabled is an administrative, not medical, finding that is reserved to

the Commissioner, and is not entitled to “special significance.” Id. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(e)(3). Moreover, the ALJ noted that Dr. Rakkar had not seen plaintiff since

January 2004, over two and a half years before issuing his three-sentence opinion stating that

plaintiff was “permanently disabled.” An “ALJ need not accept a treating physician’s

opinion that is conclusory and brief and unsupported by clinical findings.” Tonapetyan, 242

F.3d at 1149. 

The ALJ also relied on the contrary opinions of Drs. Cunningham and Kapur as

additional specific reasons for rejecting the opinions of Drs. Bailes and Rakkar. On

December 20, 2004, Keith Cunningham, M.D., performed a consultative physical

examination of plaintiff and documented plaintiff’s ability to move normally and

independently. Tr. 213. He noted that plaintiff was thin, but that there were no signs of

malnutrition or cachexia (weight loss and loss of appetite). Tr. 214. Plaintiff reported to Dr.

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Cunningham that he did housework and was able to drive. Tr. 213. Based on this

examination, Dr. Cunningham opined that plaintiff could perform a range of medium work.

Tr. 215-17. 

On April 15, 2005, Vikram Kapur, M.D., also completed a consultative physical

examination. He documented an unremarkable examination, including plaintiff’s intact

muscle tone and motor strength, with no evidence of muscle atrophy. Tr. 150-51. He noted

that while plaintiff reported difficulty with eating and drinking, he denied recent loss of

weight or appetite. Although Dr. Kapur diagnosed plaintiff with anorexia and cachexia

secondary to post-surgical removal of the stomach, he nevertheless concluded that plaintiff

did not have any functional limitations that would preclude him from work. Tr. 151. The

ALJ’s misstatement regarding Dr. Kapur’s diagnosis, Tr. 23, does not diminish Dr. Kapur’s

ultimate conclusion that plaintiff’s condition would not prevent him from working. 

We conclude that the ALJ provided sufficient reasons supported by substantial

evidence in the record for rejecting the opinions of Drs. Bailes and Rakker. 

IV

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly discounted his subjective allegations of

functional limitations. An ALJ is entitled to use ordinary techniques of credibility

evaluation. However, if the claimant’s testimony shows no malingering, the ALJ may reject

the claimant’s testimony about the severity of symptoms only with “specific findings stating

clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir.

1996). “When evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ’s

decision, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196.

The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations of disabling limitations are not

supported by the medical record when taken as a whole. Tr. 21. He first found that the

objective medical evidence did not support plaintiff’s allegations. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(b) (medical evidence must reasonably support subjective claims). Plaintiff’s

cancer was in remission, and although he was below his normal weight, his weight had

increased steadily following chemotherapy. Tr. 150, 212, 256, 312, 315. The findings by

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two separate consultative examining physicians showed unremarkable findings, despite his

weight loss and fatigue. Plaintiff had normal muscle strength, with no signs of muscle

atrophy or wasting, that would support the severity of plaintiff’s symptoms. Tr. 23, 155, 213.

See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (lack of muscle atrophy is

inconsistent with claim of inactivity and chronic fatigue and bedrest). 

Moreover, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent with his

subjective testimony. Plaintiff reported that he performed household chores, drove, and was

able to travel to Chicago for a week, visiting family. Tr. 213, 357-58. The ALJ properly

concluded that these activities are inconsistent with plaintiff’s allegations of disabling

fatigue, weakness, and dizziness. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir.

2002) (ability to perform various household chores such as cooking, laundry, washing dishes,

and shopping suggested ability to perform work). The ALJ also found significant the fact

that plaintiff was not taking any medication nor had he sought medical treatment for his

symptoms. This lack of medical treatment is inconsistent with the alleged severity of his

symptoms. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that an ALJ

may discredit the testimony of a plaintiff who failed to seek treatment). 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff’s

testimony was not wholly credible is supported by specific findings and clear and convincing

reasons and therefore is entitled to deference. See Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995).

V

Finally, plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in failing to appropriately evaluate the lay

witness statements of plaintiff’s wife and son. Lay testimony is competent evidence of the

severity of impairment and must be considered unless the ALJ expressly determines to

disregard it and give reasons germane to each witness for doing so. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d

503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Here, the ALJ found that the statements provided by plaintiff’s wife and son were not

evidence of disability because they amounted to general observations of plaintiff. Plaintiff’s

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wife stated only that he had difficulty eating and had lost weight, but she did not describe any

functional limitations. Plaintiff’s son stated that since chemotherapy ended, his father never

recovered his strength and could not return to work. Tr. 23-24, 63. This was inconsistent

with the record evidence which showed that plaintiff did return to work after his surgery for

a significant period of time. Therefore, this statement is not persuasive evidence of

disability. Tr. 107, 355-57. The ALJ provided specific reasons germane to each witness for

discounting the lay witness statements.

VI

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports

the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff is not disabled.

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendant’s cross-motion for summary

judgment (doc. 13) and DENYING plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 10).

DATED this 12th day of August, 2008.

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