Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01428/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01428-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOSHUA DEROCHE, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

LINDY FUNKHOUSER, M. BARGAN,

PAMELA BARR, JILL KENNEDY,

JASON LANE, REDENTOR ESPIRITU,

FNU WANDRY,

Defendant. 

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No. CV 06-1428-PHX-MHM (MEA)

ORDER

Plaintiff pro se, Joshua DeRoche (“Plaintiff”), filed this civil rights action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against various officials at the Maricopa County Fourth Avenue Jail (Dkt.

#69). The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey, who has

issued a Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #80) recommending that the Court dismiss

without prejudice Defendant FNU Wandry (“Defendant”) pursuant to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 4(m). Plaintiff has filed a written objection to the Report and

Recommendation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court must review the legal analysis in a Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In addition, a district court

must review the factual analysis in the Report and Recommendation de novo for those

Case 2:06-cv-01428-MHM Document 88 Filed 09/16/08 Page 1 of 4
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facts to which objections are filed. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”). “Failure to object to a

magistrate judge's recommendation waives all objections to the judge's findings of fact.” 

Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 562 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

The relevant authority, as set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation is as follows. FRCP 4(m) provides that if

a defendant is not served within [the time allowed], the court--on motion or

on its own after notice to the plaintiff--must dismiss the action without

prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a

specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the

court must extend the time period for service for an appropriate period.

Dismissal of a party is appropriate where a plaintiff fails to show good cause for

delays in service. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1994). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that the United States Marshal’s failure to effect

service for a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis constitutes “good cause.” See Puett

v. Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 275 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e hold that an incarcerated pro se

plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to rely on the U.S. Marshal for service of

the summons and complaint, and, having provided the necessary information to help

effectuate service, plaintiff should not be penalized by having his or her action dismissed

for failure to effect service where the U.S. Marshal or the court clerk has failed to perform

the duties required of each of them under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) and Rule 4 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.”). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must provide the U.S. Marshal

with the “information necessary to identify the defendant . . . .” Walker, 14 F.3d at 1422. 

Where a pro se plaintiff fails to provide the Marshal with accurate and sufficient

information to effect service of the summons and complaint, the Court may, sua sponte,

dismiss the unserved defendants. Id. at 1421-22. Furthermore, neither the Marshal

Service nor the Court may engage in investigatory efforts on behalf of the parties to a

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lawsuit as this would improperly place the Court in the role of an advocate. Hall v.

Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the court should not assume

the role of advocate for a pro se litigant).

Plaintiff contends that he provided accurate and sufficient information to effect

service on Defendant. Since neither the Marshal’s Service or the Court are permitted to

conduct investigatory efforts on behalf of Plaintiff, the Court must rely on the information

provided by Plaintiff. Plaintiff points to the fact that he has consistently provided an

address and alternate address for Defendant Wandry. See Dkt. #s 8, 69, 71. However,

Plaintiff was advised that the addresses provided for Defendant Wandry were not accurate

after the first attempt to serve him. Plaintiff was notified as early as February 2007, that

Defendant was no longer employed at the Maricopa County Jail or by Maricopa County

Correctional Health Services. See Dkt. #20. Further, neither Correctional Health

Services, nor the Maricopa County Jail are parties to this matter, and thus may not be

ordered to provide a last known address. Regardless, the Correctional Health Services

indicated more than one year ago that no employee with the last name of Wandry was

employed by the Service at that time; it is unlikely that either entity would be able to

provide a current address for Defendant Wandry. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff

has not provided the U.S. Marshal Service’s with information that is accurate and

sufficient enough to be able to effect service on Defendant Wandry.

Plaintiff also argues that he has been denied the opportunity to undertake

additional discovery in order to ascertain Defendant Wandry’s current address. Plaintiff

points to the fact that discovery did not close until August 28, 2008. However, the mere

fact that discovery concluded after the time required for Plaintiff to execute service on

Defendant Wandry under Rule 4(m) is not a defense; the close of discovery and the time

allotted for service of process are not the same (although the time allotted for service may

be extended for an appropriate period upon a showing of good cause). Plaintiff has had

ample opportunity to submit discovery requests regarding Defendant Wandry’s current

address, but failed to do so until August 20, 2008. Plaintiff points to no other factors that

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would constitute “good cause” for his delay in attempting to effect service on Defendant

Wandry. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to show good cause for his delay in

effecting service on Defendant Wandry.

The Court notes that it retains discretion to grant a permissive extension of time to

serve, even in the absence of good cause, where there is no statute of limitations bar, lack

of prejudice to the defendant, or where the defendant was eventually, although not timely,

served. See Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). However, the Court

will not grant such an extension of time to serve in the instant case. Plaintiff does not

argue that any of the above factors are present, and the Court finds no compelling basis to

permissively extend the time allotted for service under FRCP 4(m).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation (Dkt. #80) in its entirety as the Order of the Court.

DATED this 15th day of September, 2008.

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