Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01566/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01566-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DEBORAH STAMPFLI,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUSANVILLE SANITARY DISTRICT, a 

political subdivision of the 

State of California; STEVE J. 

STUMP, in his individual and 

official capacities; ERNIE 

PETERS, in his individual and 

official capacities; DAVID 

FRENCH, in his individual and 

official capacities; KIM ERB, in 

his individual and official 

capacities; MARTY HEATH, in his 

individual and official 

capacities; DOES I-V, inclusive, 

BLACK & WHITE CORPORATIONS I-V; 

and ABLE & BAKER COMPANIES, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S THIRD 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

----oo0oo----

This case is back before the court on the motion of

defendants District, Stump, Murray, Peters, French, Erb, and 

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Heath to dismiss plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. (See Mot. 

to Dismiss (“Mot.”) (Docket No. 56).)

I. Federal Claims

A. Procedural Due Process

1. Claim Against Stump

As stated in the court’s previous order, because 

plaintiff has adequately alleged a protected property interest,

she has stated a procedural due process claim against defendant 

Stump. (See Docket No. 48 at 8-11.)

2. Claims Against Individual Board Members

Plaintiff continues to allege that the individual board 

member defendants each “participated in the decision to terminate 

[her] employment and/or the denial of [her] pre- and posttermination rights,” or, if they did not, “otherwise authorized, 

approved, knowingly acquiesced in, and/or ratified the actions of 

other defendants who deprived plaintiff of her constitutional 

rights.” (See Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) at ¶¶ 42, 58, 74, 

90, 106 (Docket No. 51).) She further alleges that, during a 

closed session board meeting, they “intentionally, deliberately, 

knowingly, willfully, wantonly and in bad faith, ignored and 

disregarded [her] rights and directed, approved, authorized, 

acquiesced, condoned or otherwise facilitated” and “personally 

participated” in decisions to terminate her and deny her 

procedural protections. (See id. at ¶¶ 232-34, 330-31.)

Plaintiff has also added new allegations averring that 

each defendant board member was present at one or more meetings 

where plaintiff’s termination was discussed, were aware of 

Stump’s intention to terminate plaintiff and of documents 

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establishing her for-cause protections, and yet failed to take 

action to prevent plaintiff’s termination or to provide her with 

pre- or post-termination procedures. (See id. at ¶¶ 31-41, 47-

57, 63-73, 79-89, 95-105.)

Even with these updates, plaintiff’s allegations still 

contain merely conclusory factual allegations that are

insufficient to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss, because 

they fail to adequately allege that the defendant board members’

conduct proximately caused the alleged violations of plaintiff’s 

procedural due process rights. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 

1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991); (Docket No. 48 at 11-13). The only 

allegations speaking to the board defendants’ role in the alleged 

violations are the vague allegations that they “participated in” 

relevant decisions, without saying how, and conclusory statements

-- unsupported by factual allegations stating any action the 

board members took -- that they either “authorized,” “approved,” 

“acquiesced in,” or “ratified” actions of other unspecified 

defendants. Plaintiff does not, for example, allege that the 

board members voted to approve her termination, or even that any 

board member voiced approval of the decision to terminate her 

beforehand or afterwards.

Plaintiff cites Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 

(9th Cir. 2001), for the proposition that “[e]ven if the 

individual Board Members had not actually voted to terminate the 

plaintiff’s employment, their failure to ‘take any remedial steps 

after the violations can indicate a deliberate choice and 

establish an independent basis for liability.’” (Opp. to Mot. at 

36 (Docket No. 61).) Although she quotes Gomez’s statement that 

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a “turn[-]a-blind-eye approach does not insulate [a defendant]” 

from liability for failing to take remedial action, (id.), she 

omits critical statements that immediately follow: that in Gomez, 

the district court had made detailed factual findings showing

that “the retaliatory acts were condoned by the [defendant] 

officials, sufficient to make clear to officers they could get 

away with anything,” 255 F.3d at 1127 (quotation marks omitted, 

alterations adopted). There are no allegations to support a 

comparable theory in this case.1

Because plaintiff has not demonstrated that the 

individual board members had a duty to intervene to protect 

plaintiff from a violation of her procedural due process rights, 

and the Third Amended Complaint has not adequately alleged 

personal involvement by the defendant board members, it fails to 

state individual § 1983 claims against them. Accordingly, the 

court will dismiss plaintiff’s due process claims against the 

defendant board members.

3. Claims Against the District

Because § 1983 does not provide for vicarious 

liability, a local government “may not be sued under § 1983 for 

1 Plaintiff also cites a number of Ninth Circuit 

decisions “recogniz[ing] that members of a council or board may 

be held individually liable for their conduct even when they act 

by way of a majority vote.” (See Opp. to Mot. at 35 (Docket No. 

61) (citing Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Trevino v. Gates, 23 F.3d 1480, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1994); Heller 

v. Bushey, 759 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other 

grounds, 475 U.S. 796 (1986); Cinevision Corp. v. City of 

Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 579-80 (9th Cir. 1984)).) However, 

because plaintiff has not alleged that a majority of the board 

member defendants -- or any -- voted to terminate her or deny her 

pre- or post-termination review, these decisions are inapposite.

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an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell 

v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 

(1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy 

or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts 

or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy, inflicts 

the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under 

§ 1983.” Id. That particular challenged acts “may be fairly 

said to represent official policy,” thereby demonstrating the 

existence of a § 1983 claim for municipal liability, may be shown 

in several ways relevant to plaintiff’s allegations.

a. Direct Municipal Action

“[M]unicipalities may be held liable . . . for acts for 

which the municipality itself is actually responsible, ‘that is, 

acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or 

ordered.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 

(1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinatti, 475 

U.S. 459, 480 (1986)). Actions of individual municipal officials 

may be said to represent official policy, but only as to 

“officials who have final policymaking authority,” and whether a 

particular official has such authority “is a question of state 

law.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 

(plurality opinion)2).

Because the Third Amended Complaint fails to adequately 

allege personal participation by the defendant board members, as 

explained above, it likewise fails to adequately allege that 

2 A majority of justices joined the Supreme Court’s 

opinion in Pembaur, except as to section II.B of that opinion. 

See 475 U.S. at 471. Where that section is cited in this order, 

the court has noted this distinction.

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their involvement amounted to a “formal decision[ ]” that would 

render any alleged constitutional violations attributable to the 

District itself. Cf. Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1127 (“[A] policymaker’s pronouncement that he has not or will not discipline 

officers that retaliated against prison litigators is sufficient 

evidence of a policy or custom . . . .”). Accordingly, it fails 

to state a claim for municipal liability under this theory.

b. Ratification

“[W]hen a subordinate’s decision is subject to review 

by the municipality’s authorized policymakers,” who “approve a 

subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification 

would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is 

final.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127; see also Clouthier v. Cnty. 

of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing 

same), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016). The complaint must 

adequately allege “a conscious, affirmative choice on the part of 

the authorized policymaker.” Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1250

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Because the Third Amended Complaint does not contain 

sufficient, nonconclusory factual allegations to allege that any 

of the defendant board members made any “conscious, affirmative 

choice” to approve Stump’s termination of plaintiff or to ratify 

any decision to deny her procedural protections, it fails to 

state a claim for municipal liability under this theory as well.

c. Delegation

Finally, plaintiff alleges that the board delegated the 

relevant final policymaking authority to General Manager Stump, 

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such that his alleged violations of her procedural due process 

rights are attributable to the District and thus may support a 

Monell claim. (See TAC at ¶¶ 11-28, 111-12, 332; Exs. 1, 2

(Docket Nos. 51, 51-1, 51-2).) In support of this theory, 

plaintiff relies on a District ordinance and resolution attached 

to the Third Amended Complaint, which she argues demonstrate that 

Stump, as General Manager, had been delegated the relevant final 

policymaking authority. (See TAC, Exs. 1, 2 (Docket Nos. 51-1,

51-2); Opp. to Mot. at 37-39 (Docket No. 61)); see also Pembaur, 

475 U.S. at 483 (plurality opinion) (“[W]hether an official had 

final policymaking authority is a question of state law.”).

The ordinance and resolution, in fact, more clearly 

demonstrate that such a delegation had not occurred, and that the 

board retained final policymaking authority on relevant matters. 

(See Mot. at 11-13 (Docket No. 56).) District Ordinance No. 17 

is titled “An Ordinance . . . Establishing A Personnel System,” 

Section 2 of which designates the “District Manager”3 as the 

District’s “Personnel Officer.” (TAC, Ex. 1 (Docket No. 51-1).) 

It goes on to describe the Personnel Officer’s duties, including 

“[a]dminister[ing] . . . provisions of this ordinance and of the 

personnel rules”; “[p]repar[ing] and recommend[ing] to the 

3 The complaint also refers to the “District General 

Manager,” suggesting that “District Manager” and “General 

Manager” are the same position. (See TAC at ¶ 18 (Docket No. 

51).) Resolution No. 04.06, plaintiff’s second exhibit, refers 

to the “District General Manager” as well, which further supports 

this notion, (see TAC, Ex. 2 (Docket No. 51-2)), though 

defendants suggest that they are different positions, (see Mot. 

at 11 n.6 (Docket No. 56)). However, construing the complaint in 

the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court will assume they 

are the same for purposes of the instant motion.

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District Board personnel rules and revisions”; “[p]repar[ing] 

. . . a position classification plan,” which “shall become 

effective upon approval by the District Board”; and 

“[p]repar[ing] . . . a plan of compensation,” which likewise 

“shall become effective upon approval by the District Board.” 

(Id. (emphasis added).) Section 4 of the Ordinance provides that 

“Personnel Rules shall be adopted by resolution of the District 

Board,” and Section 5 provides that “[a]ll [personnel] 

appointments shall be made by the District Manager, and ratified 

by the District Board.” (Id. (emphasis added).)

All of these provisions clearly operate to constrain

the District Manager’s authority respecting personnel rules and, 

in many cases, specifically provide that the District Manager’s 

choices and recommendations respecting rules and other matters 

relating to personnel are subject to the board’s approval.4 As 

plaintiff acknowledges, case law makes clear that where an 

official’s decision respecting a particular issue is reviewable 

by another official or official body with greater authority, the 

subordinate official cannot be deemed a final policymaker with 

respect to that issue. (See Opp. to Mot. at 39 (Docket No. 61) 

(citing King v. Garfield Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 2:12-cv0622-TOR, 2016 WL 3566218, at *7 (E.D. Wash. June 27, 2016), 

aff’d sub nom. King v. McGee, 739 F. App’x 864 (9th Cir. 2018))); 

see also Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127-29 (“[W]hen a subordinate’s 

decision is subject to review by the municipality’s authorized 

4 The body of the complaint cites these documents, and 

accordingly uses the same or similar language to describe the 

General Manager’s responsibilities concerning personnel 

management. (See TAC at ¶¶ 12-16 (Docket No. 51).)

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policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the 

official’s conduct for conformance with their policies.”).

Likewise, Resolution No. 04.06 states that “the Board 

of Directors is the body within the District empowered and 

charged with the adoption of policies,” (TAC, Ex. 2 (Docket No. 

51-2)), indicating that the board, not the General Manager, is 

the final policymaker with respect to “promulgat[ion of] policies 

and procedures,” (Opp. to Mot. at 39 (Docket No. 61)). Although 

the resolution also directs the General Manager to “adopt an 

employee discipline policy and procedure . . . in coordination 

with District Counsel,” it goes on to clarify that these “shall 

conform to the policies and tenets” outlined in detail in an 

attached exhibit. (TAC, Ex. 2 (Docket No. 51-2).) This makes 

clear that the District, not the General Manager, dictated the 

terms of employee discipline policies and procedures and thus 

retained final policymaking authority as to that issue.

Plaintiff points to Section 8 of Ordinance No. 17, 

which provides that “[t]he District Manager shall have the right, 

for due cause, to demote, dismiss, reduce in pay, or suspend 

without pay for thirty calendar days, any permanent employee.” 

(TAC, Ex. 1 (Docket No. 51-1).) The relevant inquiry, however,

is whether Stump had been delegated final policymaking authority 

over relevant matters and, if so, whether a final policy he 

created caused a deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. See Monell, 

436 U.S. at 694 (municipal liability exists only “when execution 

of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury”); 

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 (plurality opinion) (“Authority to make 

municipal policy . . . may be delegated by an official who 

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possesses such authority.”). Plaintiff’s suggestion that 

discretionary authority to make individual personnel decisions is

sufficient is therefore unavailing; rather, authority to create 

final policy governing those decisions is what is required.

Further, throughout the Third Amended Complaint, 

plaintiff repeatedly acknowledges that dismissals of permanent 

employees are subject to pre- and post-termination review -- the 

crux of her procedural due process claim -- per the board’s own 

duly adopted policies and procedures. (See, e.g., TAC at 37, 41, 

331 (Docket No. 51) (citing Resolution No. 04.06 (Docket No. 51-

2)).) These allegations confirm that any of the General 

Manager’s disciplinary decisions, including dismissal, were 

subject to review before becoming final; as Praprotnik makes 

clear, this means the General Manager was not a final policymaker 

as to hiring and firing decisions. See 485 U.S. at 127-29.5

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the 

Third Amended Complaint, incorporating exhibits 1 and 2, still 

fails to sufficiently allege that Stump was a final policymaker 

with respect to the due process violations plaintiff alleges. 

The court will therefore grant defendants’ motion to dismiss 

5 Section 9 of Ordinance No. 17, which reserves for “the 

District Board [the ability to] abolish any position or 

employment” in the District,” (see TAC, Ex. 1 (Docket No. 51-1)), 

provides further support for the conclusion that the board, not 

the General Manager, is the final policymaker respecting the 

management of District positions and staffing.

Further, as noted, plaintiff argues that Stump had 

final authority “to hire and fire employees.” (Opp. to Mot. at 

39 (Docket No. 61).) However, Ordinance No. 17, which states 

that “[a]ll appointments shall be made by the District Manager[ ] 

and ratified by the District Board,” (TAC, Ex. 1 (emphasis added) 

(Docket No. 51-1)), makes clear that the District Manager lacked 

final authority as to hiring as well.

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plaintiff’s procedural due process claim under § 1983 as against 

the District.

B. Conspiracy to Deprive Procedural Due Process

Because, as previously noted, the Ninth Circuit has 

made clear that “conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort 

under § 1983,” (Docket No. 48 at 17 (quoting Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc))), and 

because plaintiff has added no allegations to her complaint 

bearing on this point, the court will grant defendants’ motion to 

dismiss the Third Amended Complaint’s conspiracy claim.

V. State Law Claims

A. Violation of District Law, Policy, and Procedure

Plaintiff has styled her fourth cause of action as 

“Violation of District Law, Policy, and Procedure.” (See TAC at 

¶¶ 288-322 (Docket No. 51.) Although plaintiff cites no statute 

providing for such a cause of action, she cites two California 

Court of Appeal decisions, Read v. City of Lynwood, 173 Cal. App. 

3d 437, 442-43 (2d Dist. 1985), and Summers v. City of Cathedral 

City, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1047, 1065-66 (4th Dist. 1990), in 

contending that “an employee who is terminated in violation of 

the employer’s own laws or regulations has a valid claim for 

relief against the employer.” (TAC at ¶ 290 (Docket No. 51).)

After Read was decided by the California Court of 

Appeal, however, that court has repeatedly disapproved of the 

decision. See Kemmerer v. Cnty. of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 

1426, 1434 (5th Dist. 1988), disapproved of on other grounds by

Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist., 7 Cal. 5th 798, 

814 (2019); Hill v. City of Long Beach, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1684, 

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1692 n.11 (2d Dist. 1995); see also Trevino v. Lassen Mun. 

Utility Dist., 2:07-cv-02106-LKK-DAD, 2008 WL 269087, at *7 (E.D. 

Cal. Jan. 29, 2008) (recognizing disapproval).

Further, the relevant portion of Summers -- which 

relied on Read -- is most clearly read to stand for the 

proposition that California’s rule against contracts restricting 

terminations of public employment does not preclude assertion of 

other causes of action that may exist based on a municipality’s 

violation of its own laws. See Summers, 255 Cal. App. 3d at 

1065. But this proposition, in and of itself, does not establish

a separate cause of action by which public employees may sue for 

alleged rules violations.

In Retired Employees Association of Orange County, Inc. 

v. County of Orange, 52 Cal. 4th 1171, 1176 (2011), the only 

other case which could remotely support plaintiff’s theory, the 

California Supreme Court held merely that, absent a legislative 

prohibition, “a California county and its employees [may] form an 

implied contract that confers vested rights to health benefits on 

retired county employees.” Nowhere does it articulate a 

generalized cause of action against municipalities for violations 

of their own laws or regulations, or even a more limited one in 

the employment termination context.

Because plaintiff has failed to identify a valid cause 

of action or common law doctrine that would permit plaintiff to 

proceed on this theory apart from her procedural due process 

claim, the court will dismiss this cause of action for failure to 

state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

B. Government Claims Act

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Defendants again argue that plaintiff’s failure to 

present a public entity claim under the Government Claims Act

(the “Act”) to the District prior to filing suit constitutes a 

fatal, incurable defect to each of plaintiff’s state law causes 

of action seeking damages. (See Mot. at 18-28 (Docket No. 56).)

1. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

As before, plaintiff argues she need not comply with 

the presentation requirements for claims seeking money damages 

because hers is primarily one for declaratory and/or injunctive 

relief. (See TAC at ¶ 2 (Docket No. 51).) However, the court 

has previously concluded plaintiff is not entitled to this 

exemption because her prayer for damages is not “clearly 

incidental to her claim for injunctive and declaratory relief,” 

given the extensive compensatory and punitive damages she seeks,

(see Docket No. 48 at 22-23), and plaintiff does not appear to 

have altered her requested relief in her Third Amended Complaint.

2. Fees, Salaries, and Wages

As before, plaintiff argues that her claims, to the 

extent they seek compensation for unused earned sick and personal 

leave, are exempted from these requirements pursuant to one of 

the Act’s statutory exceptions, which exempts “[c]laims by public 

employees for fees, salaries, wages, mileage, or other expenses 

and allowances” from presentation. (Opp. to Mot. at 57-58 

(boldface omitted) (Docket No. 61)); Cal. Gov. Code § 905(c). 

This argument is identical to that presented in plaintiff’s

previous opposition, (see Docket No. 44 at 75-76), which the 

court addressed in its previous order, stating that because 

plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged excuse from compliance 

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with the presentation requirement in her complaint, the court 

could not credit her argument on that point, (see Docket No. 48 

at 29 n.10). Although the court specified that it would give 

plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to add allegations in 

support of this argument, (see id.), she does not appear to have 

done so in the Third Amended Complaint, (see TAC (Docket No. 

51)). 

3. Actual Compliance with Government Claims Act

Plaintiff contends she has complied with the Act’s 

presentation requirements “by way of various written 

communications to the District through its General Managers, as 

well as written and oral communications to the defendants’ 

retained legal counsel, Kevin A. Flautt.” (See TAC at ¶ 116

(Docket No. 51).) In response to the court’s previous order, 

plaintiff has attached four of the written communications as 

exhibits. (See TAC, Exs. 3-6 (Docket Nos. 51-3, 51-4, 51-5, 51-

6).) Although the oral communications referenced in the Third 

Amended Complaint have not been provided, it goes without saying 

that oral communications are not a written claim, as required by 

the Act. See Wilhite v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:11-CV-1692 

AWI JLT, 2012 WL 273088, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012).

As for the written communications, as stated in the 

court’s prior order, a series of letters, taken collectively, 

cannot constitute a “claim” within the meaning of the Government 

Claims Act. (See Docket No. 48 at 24-25.)6 Accordingly, the 

6 As previously stated, any “supplemental claims” 

plaintiff presented to the District after filing this suit and 

after defendants filed their first motion to dismiss cannot 

establish compliance with the Act. (See Docket No. 48 at 25-26.)

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court looks to the one most relevant letter to evaluate its 

compliance with the act. Plaintiff alleges that, in a letter, 

the District “denied all the plaintiff’s claims.” (TAC at ¶ 123, 

Ex. 6 (Docket Nos. 51, 51-6).) That letter responded directly to 

a letter from plaintiff’s counsel dated March 30, 2020, attached 

to the complaint at Exhibit 3, which thus appears to represent 

the most relevant letter for the court to evaluate.

The March 30 letter plainly fails to adhere to the 

Act’s enumerated requirement for a claim. Although it includes 

plaintiff’s counsel’s mailing address, it does not include “[t]he 

. . . post office address of the claimant,” any “[monetary] 

amount claimed,” or “whether the claim would be a limited civil 

case.” Cal Gov. Code §§ 910(a),(f) (emphasis added); (see TAC, 

Ex. 3 (Docket No. 51-3)); see also Olson v. Manhattan Beach 

Unified Sch. Dist., 17 Cal. App. 5th 1052, 1061 (2d Dist. 2017) 

(holding claim failed to substantially comply with Act’s 

presentation requirements where it “d[id] not contain the address 

of the claimant” or “the dollar amount claimed or whether the 

claim would be a limited civil case”).

Indeed, the contents of the letter do nothing to make 

clear that it is intended to function as a claim at all. Rather, 

it states that “Ms. Stampfli wishes to reserve and utilize any 

Further, “it is well-settled that claims statutes must 

be satisfied even in the face of the public entity’s actual 

knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claims. Such 

knowledge, standing alone, constitutes neither substantial 

compliance nor a basis for estoppel.” See J.J. v. City of San 

Diego, 223 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 1219 (4th Dist. 2014) (internal 

citations omitted). Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are 

therefore unavailing.

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and all rights and duties which may stem from binding union 

contracts or collective bargaining agreements,” and “request[s] 

that she be afforded any and all appeal or review rights 

available.” (TAC, Ex. 3 (Docket No. 51-3).) It further “demands 

. . . proper procedural and substantive due process,” including 

“notice of the reason for the deprivation of [plaintiff’s] rights 

(disciplinary actions, including suspension and termination), as 

well as an opportunity to provide a response that would be 

afforded meaningful consideration.” (Id.) It goes on to state 

that, “[f]inally, Ms. Stampfli wishes to initiate any informal 

and/or formal grievance procedures at this time.” (Id.)

Nowhere does the letter indicate plaintiff sought 

monetary compensation, yet section 910 and precedent construing 

it make clear that a “claim” under the Act is necessarily a 

monetary claim. See Cal. Gov. Code § 910(f) (requiring that a 

claim include “[t]he amount claimed”); Loehr v. Ventura Cnty. 

Comm. Coll. Dist., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 1082-84 (2d Dist. 1983)

(noting that, although the substantial compliance doctrine may 

apply when a claim is defective, it “cannot cure total omission 

of an essential element from the claim,” and that plaintiff’s 

claim was fatally defective in part because “[n]owhere in the 

letter is there a claim for money damages, nor, for that matter 

. . . even an estimate of the amount of any prospective injury, 

damage or loss”) (citing Cal. Gov. Code §§ 910, 945.4)).

Because the operative letter did not comply with the 

Government Claims Act’s requirements, plaintiff has not alleged 

facts demonstrating compliance with the Act.

4. Notice Provisions of Government Claims Act

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Plaintiff argues that defendants’ right to assert a 

defense based on the Act is waived because “defendants never 

provided notice to the plaintiff or her retained representative 

that her claims were defective or deficient in any way.” (TAC at 

¶ 141 (Docket No. 51)); see Cal. Gov. Code § 911. As noted, 

however, the March 30, 2020 letter does nothing to identify 

itself as a claim or otherwise indicate that plaintiff sought 

financial compensation, as a claim must. Rather, it identified 

itself as a request for “appeal or review” and to “initiate . . . 

grievance procedures.” (See TAC, Ex. 3 (Docket No. 51-3).) 

There was thus no reason the District would have recognized a 

need to notify plaintiff of the letter’s insufficiency as a claim

within the meaning of the Act, as the letter did not purport to 

be one nor was it recognizable as such. Accordingly, the 

District has not waived its sufficiency defense.

5. Contract-Based Exemptions

Finally, plaintiff argues that she is exempted from the 

Act’s presentation requirements as to her contract-based claims 

pursuant to Government Code sections 930 and 930.4. (See Opp. to 

Mot. at 57-59 (Docket No. 61).) However, “as a matter of 

[California] law, there can be no express or implied-in-fact 

contract between plaintiff and [her public employer] which 

restricts the manner or reasons for termination of his 

employment.” See Summers, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 1066 (citing, 

inter alia, Miller v. California, 18 Cal. 3d 808, 813 (1997) 

(“[I]t is well settled in California that public employment is 

not held by contract but by statute and that, insofar as the 

duration of such employment is concerned, no employee has a 

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vested contractual right to continue in employment beyond the 

time or contrary to the terms and conditions fixed by law.”), and 

Humbert v. Castro Valley Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist., 214 Cal. App. 2d 

1, 13 (1st Dist. 1963) (applying rule in context of special 

municipal districts)).

Accordingly, this exemption does not apply, and

plaintiff’s state law claims in counts one, two, and three of the 

Third Amended Complaint must be dismissed.

C. California Public Records Act

The court previously directed plaintiff “to explicitly 

detail the categories of public records and particular public 

documents sought that have not been produced by defendants,” (see

Docket No. 48 at 32 n.11), and she has since updated her 

complaint to include a ten-item list describing the categories of 

records sought, (see TAC at ¶ 364 (Docket No. 51)). Defendants 

dispute these allegations. (See Docket No. 58.) Yet, because on 

a motion to dismiss the court must take plausible and wellpleaded facts alleged in the complaint as true, see Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001), the court will credit 

plaintiff’s allegations at this stage and thus will deny 

defendants’ motion as to plaintiff’s Public Records Act claim.7

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, insofar as it seeks 

dismissal of plaintiff’s procedural due process claim against 

7 The court notes, however, that it does not look 

favorably upon unfounded factual allegations. Accordingly, to 

the extent that defendants dispute these allegations’ accuracy, 

the court hopes that plaintiff is correct. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

11(b)(3).

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defendant Stump in his individual capacity (count five), and of 

her California Public Records Act claim (count seven), be, and 

hereby is, DENIED;

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in all other respects, 

defendants’ motion be, and hereby is, GRANTED.8

Dated: December 10, 2021

8 In her opposition, plaintiff has not sought additional

leave to amend her complaint. (See Opp. to Mot. (Docket No. 

61).) Further, plaintiff has been given leave to amend her 

complaint three times already. She may not do so indefinitely. 

Accordingly, the court does not grant plaintiff leave to file a 

Fourth Amended Complaint.

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