Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02084/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02084-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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1 In her opposition, plaintiff moves to strike

defendant’s cross-motion in its entirety based on defendant’s

failure to timely serve a statement of undisputed facts as

(continued...)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JESSICA COSTA;

NO. CIV. S-05-2084 FCD/KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NATIONAL ACTION FINANCIAL

SERVICES, and ELIZABETH DOE;

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

 This matter comes before the court on (1) plaintiff Jessica

Costa’s (“plaintiff”) motion for partial summary judgment

relating to her claims for violations of the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and the

California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“RFDCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq. and (2) defendant

National Action Financial Services, Inc.’s (“defendant” or

“NAFS”) cross-motion for partial summary judgment with respect to

plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress damages pursuant to the

FDCPA and RFDCPA. Plaintiff opposes defendant’s motion,1 and

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1

(...continued)

required by Eastern District Local Rule 56-260(a). Defendant did

untimely file said statement on November 29, 2007 (Docket # 33). 

However, the court DENIES plaintiff's motion to strike because

plaintiff was not unduly prejudiced by the late filing; plaintiff

timely filed a complete and adequate response to defendant's

statement of undisputed facts in conjunction with her opposition

papers filed November 30, 2007 (Docket #34). Moreover, the sole

evidence relied upon by defendant in its motion is plaintiff’s

deposition testimony--testimony which plaintiff is obviously well

aware.

2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders these matters submitted on the

briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

3 Unless otherwise noted, the facts herein are

undisputed. (Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Assumed Statement of

Undisputed Facts, filed Nov. 30, 2007 [“SUF”]). Where the facts

are in dispute, the court recounts plaintiff’s version of the

facts. (Pl.’s Statement of Disputed Facts, filed Nov. 30, 2007

[“SDF”]). Although, for the reasons set forth below, any such

disputes do not preclude entry of partial summary judgment.

2

defendant opposes plaintiff’s motion. For the reasons set forth

below,2

 both plaintiff’s and defendant’s motions are GRANTED.

BACKGROUND3

Sometime before March 17, 2005, plaintiff incurred a debt to

NextCard. (Pl.’s Verified Complaint for Damages, filed October

15, 2005 [“Compl.”], ¶ 18). Plaintiff defaulted on this debt. 

(Id. ¶ 20). The debt was subsequently assigned to defendant for

collection. (Id. ¶ 21). On March 17, 2005, plaintiff received a

voice mail message at her home. The message stated: “This

message is for Jessica Costa. My name is Elizabeth. I received

a phone call in my office for you. If you could please contact

me back I’ll be here until 4 p.m. Eastern Time. My number is

866-529-1899 extension 2936.” (Def.’s Response to Pl.’s

Statement of Undisputed Facts, filed Nov. 30, 2007 (“DUF”), ¶ 7). 

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3

In response to the message, the next day plaintiff

telephoned the number left by Elizabeth. (SUF ¶ 3). Plaintiff

did not reach Elizabeth, and left a voice mail. (Id.). The same

day Elizabeth left a second message on plaintiff’s home phone. 

(Id. ¶ 4, 5). Upon receiving the second message, plaintiff

telephoned Elizabeth back using her cell phone. (Id. ¶ 7). 

Plaintiff reached an operator and was connected to a woman who

answered the telephone by calling herself Elizabeth. (Id. ¶¶ 7,

8). Elizabeth informed plaintiff she was calling in regards to

the debt owed on plaintiff’s NextCard account. (Id. ¶ 8). 

Plaintiff explained she was not presently employed and requested

a payment schedule. (Id. ¶ 9). Elizabeth told plaintiff setting

up payments would be considered a refusal to pay the debt. (Id.

¶ 10). Elizabeth then asked plaintiff how she was paying her

other bills, including a $400/month car payment, and whether

plaintiff was obtaining money illegally. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15). 

Elizabeth then suggested plaintiff should file for bankruptcy.

(Id. ¶ 14). Elizabeth subsequently hung up on plaintiff. (Id. ¶

17). 

Plaintiff immediately called NAFS and reached Elizabeth

through the operator. (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiff informed Elizabeth

she could not talk to plaintiff “that way,” and requested to

speak with Elizabeth’s supervisor. (Id. ¶ 19). Elizabeth told

plaintiff she could not speak with a supervisor until she got a

job. (Id. ¶ 20). Elizabeth then hung up on plaintiff. (Id.). 

Plaintiff called Elizabeth back. (Id. ¶ 21). Elizabeth answered

the phone and immediately yelled “you sure did get a job fast.” 

(Id. ¶ 22, 32). Plaintiff requested to speak to Elizabeth’s

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supervisor, and Elizabeth hung up the phone. (Id. ¶ 23). 

Plaintiff again called Elizabeth back. (Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff

reiterated her request to speak with Elizabeth’s supervisor. 

(Id. ¶ 26). Elizabeth then suggested plaintiff “pick up a pen,

preferably blue or black. Go down to McDonalds and fill out an

application.” (Id. ¶ 28). Elizabeth then hung up on plaintiff

yet again. (Id. ¶ 31).

During all four conversations, Elizabeth never identified

the company she worked for. (SDF ¶ 2). Plaintiff returned home

and requested a friend call back in order to discern the company

collecting on her account. (SUF ¶ 34). Plaintiff’s friend, Mr.

Baucom, called defendant from his personal cell phone. (Id. ¶

35) Upon reaching an operator, Baucom asked for the name of the

company. (Id.). Baucom was then asked for his phone number,

which he refused to give. (Id. ¶ 36, 37). The operator informed

Baucom the company had caller ID and that there was no account

listed for Baucom’s phone number. (Id. ¶ 38). The operator then

hung up without providing the company name. (Id.). Several

minutes later, Baucom called defendant from plaintiff’s home

phone. (Id. ¶ 39). He requested the name of the company and was

told he had called NAFS. (Id. ¶ 40, 41).

Approximately a week later, plaintiff received another voice

mail message from Elizabeth at her home. (SDF ¶ 1). Plaintiff

also received a letter from defendant regarding her NextCard

account, dated April 7, 2005. (SUF ¶ 44, 45). 

During plaintiff’s phone conversations with Elizabeth, and

for approximately a half hour after, plaintiff shook due to 

stress caused by the phone calls. (SDF ¶ 5). Plaintiff claims

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she still shakes in response to phone calls by unknown numbers

and she refuses to answer the phone. (SUF ¶ 48). Plaintiff’s

heart races and her palms get sweaty when she does not know the

caller. (Id.). Plaintiff claims she also suffers difficulties

sleeping two to three times per week. (Id. ¶ 49). Plaintiff has

not seen any type of medical doctor or mental health professional

for help treating her symptoms. (Id. ¶ 53). Plaintiff has not

taken any type of prescription or over-the-counter medication to

help treat her symptoms. (Id. ¶ 54). 

STANDARD

A motion for partial summary judgment is resolved under the

same standard as a motion for summary judgment. See California

v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment

is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no

genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

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make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. In resolving the summary

judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

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the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677

F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). The evidence of the opposing

party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may

be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in

favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS 

A. FDCPA

Plaintiff argues defendant violated 15 U.S.C § 1692d(6) and

15 U.S.C § 1692e(11) in failing to provide meaningful disclosure

of defendant’s identity in voice mail messages left on

plaintiff’s home phone. (Pl.’s Mot. Partial Summary Judgment,

filed Oct. 4, 2007 (“Pl.’s Mot.”), at 2). Defendant contends

Elizabeth’s failure to disclose the identity of NAFS was not a

violation of § 1962d(6), and that the messages left for plaintiff

were not a “communication” as defined by § 1692e(11) and thus,

not actionable under the statute. (Def.’s Mot. Partial Summary

Judgment, filed Nov. 30, 2007 (“Def.’s Mot.”), at 5, 8-9). 

Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 to eliminate abusive debt

collection practices, to insure that debt collectors who refrain

from using abusive debt collection practices are not

competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent state

action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. 15

U.S.C. § 1692e; see also Wade v. Regional Credit Association, 87

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4 Defendant also attempts to argue that the messages were

left in order to “locate the debtor” and therefore should not be

subject to the disclosure requirements of § 1692d(6). (Def.’s

Opp’n at 5, 6). However, defendant cites no case law in support

of this proposition, and absent such, the court is not persuaded

by defendant’s passing argument. 

8

F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing purpose of the

FDCPA). As such, the statute is liberally construed to protect

the “least sophisticated debtor.” Clark v. Capital Credit &

Collection Services, Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006);

see also Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318-19 (2d Cir.

1993). This objective standard “ensure[s] that the FDCPA

protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd . . .

the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.” Clomon, 988

F.2d at 1318-19. 

1. Section 1692d(6)

Defendant contends the messages left by its agent disclosed

the caller (Elizabeth) and were in no way “harassing, oppressive,

or abusive.” Therefore, the messages did not violate § 1692d(6). 

Moreover, if the caller were required to identify herself as a

debt collector, § 1692d(6) would be inconsistent with 15 U.S.C. §

1692c(b) which prohibits debt collectors from communicating with

third parties.4 

Section 1692d(6) states, in relevant part, that: 

A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the

natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress or

abuse any person in connection with the collection of a

debt. Without limiting the general application of the

foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this

section: . . .(6) . . . the placement of telephone

calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s

identity. (Emphasis added.) 

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5 Neither the Ninth Circuit or any other circuit court

has ruled on this issue.

6 The United States District Court for the Northern

District of California has noted that § 1692d(6) applies equally

to calls made by an automated service and those calls made by a

live person. See Joseph v. J.J. MacIntyre Companies, L.L.C., 281

F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 

9

While various district courts have assigned different definitions

to the term “meaningful disclosure,”5

 the United States District

Court for the Central District of California, in Hosseinzadeh,

recently provided a succinct and comprehensive definition, which

this court finds persuasive considering factual similarities

between this case and Hosseinzadeh. In Hosseinzadeh, the court

defined “meaningful disclosure” as “requir[ing] that the caller

[s]tate his or her name and capacity, and disclose enough

information so as not to mislead the recipient as to the purpose

of the call.” Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., Inc., 387 F. Supp.

2d 1104, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 

In Hosseinzadeh, the plaintiff received several pre-recorded

messages6 on her home phone. Id. at 1008. The company

representative stated: “This message is for Ashraf. Asharf my

name is Clarence Davis. I have some very important information

to discuss with you in reference to a file that has been

forwarded to my office that involves you personally. Contact my

office right away at 877-647-5945, extension 3618.” Id. 

Applying the “meaningful disclosure” standard, the court found

that the messages left for the plaintiff did not satisfy the

requirements of § 1692d(6). Id. at 1112. The court held that

“defendant violated § 1692d(6) when its employees failed to

disclose defendant’s identity and the nature of defendant’s

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7 The FDCPA and the RFDCPA are “strict liability”

statutes. See Clark v. Capital Credit & Collections Servs., 460

F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2006).

10

business in the messages left on plaintiff’s answering machine.” 

Id. (emphasis added). 

The messages left for plaintiff in the present case are

strikingly similar to those left in Hosseizadeh. In both

instances, the caller failed to disclose he or she was calling on

behalf of a collection agency. (DUF ¶ 7); Hosseizadeh, 387 F.

Supp. 2d at 1180. Similarly, the caller failed to divulge the

true nature and purpose of the call--that is, to collect a debt

owed by each of the plaintiffs. (DUF ¶ 7); Hosseizadeh, 387 F.

Supp. 2d at 1180. As such, applying Hosseizadeh to the facts

here, defendant necessarily violated § 1692d(6) when Elizabeth

failed to disclose her identity as a debt collector and the

nature of the call when she left the messages on plaintiff’s

voice mail.7 See accord Foti v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., 424

F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding collector’s

identification of itself by name in pre-recorded message did not

satisfy FDCPA’s requirement that it disclose that the

communication is from a debt collector); Knoll v. Allied

Interstate, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 943 (D. Minn. 2007) (finding

the debtor stated a claim under the FDCPA section requiring

meaningful disclosure of a caller's identity where the debt

collector had a practice of transmitting the false name “Jennifer

Smith” via a caller identification device to consumers to lure

them into answering the phone or returning the collector’s 

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calls).

Defendant argues, in rebuttal, that the court should not

follow this line of cases, as the type of “full” disclosure on a

voice mail message, required by Hosseizadeh, may leave defendant

open to liability under other sections of the statute,

specifically § 1692c(b). Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive. 

In the present case, defendant left messages on plaintiff’s home

phone. Compare Horkey v. J.V.D.B. & Associates, Inc., 333 F.3d

759 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding statutory damages under § 1692d

for collection agency’s phone calls to plaintiff at her place of

employment). Plaintiff lived alone at the time and has testified

no one else unintentionally heard the messages left by Elizabeth. 

(Ex. B to Def. Mot., Costa Depo. at 76:19-24). “[T]he

legislatures’ concern in enacting these provisions about privacy

violations resulting from deliberate disclosure of the debtor’s

status to third parties such as the debtor’s employer has far

less applicability to phone calls made to the debtor’s phone

number at his or her residence for similar reasons.” Joseph v.

J.J. MacIntyre Companies, L.L.C, 281 F.Supp. 2d 1156, 1164 (N.D.

Cal. 2003). Therefore, while defendant’s argument may carry

weight in certain circumstances, under the undisputed facts here,

its argument is simply inapplicable. 

2. Section 1692e(11)

Plaintiff argues the plain language of § 1692e(11) makes

clear defendant was required to disclose that the messages were

from a debt collector attempting to collect a debt owed by

plaintiff. Defendant argues the messages left by Elizabeth for

plaintiff were not “communications” as defined by § 1692a(2) and

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thus did not fall within the meaning of § 1692e(11). 

Section 1692a(2) defines “communications” as “the conveying

of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any

person through any medium.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (emphasis

added). As such, it is clear the messages left by defendant on

plaintiff’s answering machine constitute “communications” within

the meaning of § 1692a(2). Although the messages do not mention

specific information about plaintiff’s debt or the nature of the

call, § 1692a(2) applies to information conveyed “directly or

indirectly.” Hosseinzadeh, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. Here,

defendant’s messages conveyed information to plaintiff, including

the fact that there was a matter that she should attend to and

instructions on how to do so. Id. Therefore, the messages left

by defendant are “communications,” subjecting defendant to the

provisions of § 1692e. 

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any

“false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in

connection with the collection of any debt.” Section 1692e sets

forth a non-exclusive list of conduct that constitutes a

violation of Section 1692e. Section 1692e(11) states: 

(11) The failure to disclose . . . in [the] initial

oral communication that the debt collector is

attempting to collect a debt and that any information

obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure

to disclose in subsequent communications that the

communication is from a debt collector, except that

this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading

made in connection with a legal action. (Emphasis

added).

In the present case, it is undisputed the messages left on

plaintiff’s voice mail did not disclose the caller’s identity

(beyond stating her name as Elizabeth) or the nature of the call. 

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(DUF ¶ 7). Thus, defendant violated § 1692e(11) because the

messages left for plaintiff did not convey the required

information. See Hosseinzadeh, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1116; see also

Foti v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 669

(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that “NCO Financial Systems” was

insufficient to satisfy disclosure requirement of § 1692e(11)

when the message left for the plaintiff contained “no other

suggestion or clue that the correspondence [was] from a debt

collector”). Namely, Elizabeth, the caller, failed to state her

messages were from a debt collector and in regards to the debt

owed on plaintiff’s NextCard account. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at

669 (“[I]t appears defendant’s messages are “communications”

subjecting defendant to the provisions of § 1692e(11), it also

appears that the defendant has violated § 1692e(11) because the

messages do not convey the information required by § 1692e(11),

in particular, that the messages were from a debt collector”). 

The court notes, however, that this policy is not well

served in instances in which a plaintiff returns the call of a

debt collector knowing she is calling a collection agency. See

Briggs v. Credit Collections, Inc., 2007 WL 4034997 at *3 (W.D.

Okla. Nov. 15, 2007). Although the purpose of the FDCPA requires

“a liberal construction of § 1692e(11) so as to protect the least

sophisticated consumer, the purpose does not require patently

unnecessary identification in subsequent communications when

there are facts to suggest. . . that the consumer placed the call

knowing who [she] was calling and understanding that [she] was

speaking with a debt collector regarding debt collection.” Id.

Requiring a debt collector to interrupt the conversation to

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interject she was a debt collector would likely be “a pointless

formality.” Id. (citing Dikeman v. National Educators, Inc., 81

F.3d 949, 954 (10th Cir. 1996)). Therefore, the court finds that

the requirement of § 1692e(11) does not apply to the subsequent

calls plaintiff made to defendant after Elizabeth disclosed

during the initial phone conversation that the calls were in

regards to collection on plaintiff’s NextCard account. 

In summary, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for partial

summary judgment with respect to violations under §§ 1692d(6) and

1692e(11) of the FDCPA. In light of the factors enumerated in 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1), plaintiff is awarded statutory damages

in the amount of $1,000.00. 

B. RFDCPA

Plaintiff argues violations of the FDCPA also constitute

violations of California’s RFDCPA. Therefore, plaintiff asserts

defendant necessarily violated the RFDCPA when it violated the

FDCPA. Defendant contends it did not violate the FDCPA and

therefore did not violate the RFDCPA. 

In order to promote consistent state action, the RFDCPA

incorporates the majority of the FDCPA in California Civil Code 

§ 1788.17. Section 1788.17 states: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title,

every debt collector collecting or attempting to

collect a consumer debt shall comply with the

provisions of Sections 1692b to 1692j, inclusive of, 

and shall be subject to the remedies in Section 1692k

of, Title 15 of the United States Code.

Therefore, claims asserted under the FDCPA constitute violations

of the RFDCPA. Cal. Civil Code § 1788.17. Accordingly, a

plaintiff who recovers under the FDCPA is entitled to damages

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under the corresponding section of the RFDCPA. Cal. Civil Code §

1788.30(a). Such recovery is not, as alleged by defendant,

improper “double recovery.” See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.32

(“remedies provided herein are intended to be cumulative . . .

.”); Adams v. CIR Law Offices, LLP, 2007 WL 2481550 (S.D. Cal.

Aug. 29, 2007).

The court thus awards plaintiff statutory damages in the

amount of $1,000.00 pursuant to California Civil Code § 1788.17,

for the same reasons as set forth above.

C. Emotional Distress Damages Under the FDCPA and RFDCPA

Defendant moves for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim

for emotional distress damages pursuant to the FDCPA and RFDCPA,

arguing plaintiff cannot establish the requisite elements for a

state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”), and thus, she cannot maintain a claim for emotional

distress damages under the statutes. (Def.’s Mot. at 6). 

Plaintiff opposes defendant’s motion, arguing that a plaintiff

need not prove the elements of a claim for IIED under state law

to recover emotional distress damages pursuant to the FDCPA and

RFDCPA, and that under the applicable lower threshold for such

claims, plaintiff can survive summary judgment. (Pl.’s Opp’n at

8).

Under the FDCPA and RFDCPA, plaintiff may recover in

addition to statutory damages, actual damages, including damages

for emotional distress, sustained as a result of defendant’s

conduct in violation of the statutes. 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(1);

Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. Here, plaintiff does not claim any

out-of-pocket losses or other actual damages, except damages for

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28 8 The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this issue.

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alleged emotional distress she sustained as a result of

defendant’s conduct.

District courts are split over whether a plaintiff’s claims

for emotional distress damages under the FDCPA are evaluated

under the state law governing the tort of IIED or some lower

standard.8 Under the latter approach, courts have concluded that

an FDCPA plaintiff does not need to meet state law standards for

IIED in order to recover emotional distress damages for an FDCPA

violation. See e.g., Panahiasl v. Gurney, 2007 WL 738642 at *1

(N.D. Cal. March 8, 2007); see also Foster v. D.B.S. Collection

Agency, 2006 WL 3491867 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 2006); McGrady v.

Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1338-39 (M.D.

Ala. 1998). Under this approach, courts instead have analogized

the FDCPA to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). Panahiasl,

2007 WL 738642 at *1-2. “Under the FDRA, a statutory scheme very

similar to the FDCPA, a plaintiff who proves a violation of the

[A]ct is entitled to actual damages for emotional distress

arising from the violation, without first having to prove a right

of action under state law.” Id. at *2. Applying this rational,

courts hold that when a violation of the FDCPA has been

established, actual damages for emotional distress can be proven

independently of state law requirements; a plaintiff need not

prove state law tort elements to be compensated for their

emotional distress. Id. However, a plaintiff must demonstrate

more than transitory symptoms of emotional distress and

unsupported self-serving testimony by a plaintiff is not

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sufficient. Wantz v. Experian Info. Systems, 386 F.3d 829, 834

(7th Cir. 2004); Cousin v. Trans Union Co., 246 F.3d 359, 371

(5th Cir. 2001).

Alternatively, other courts require a plaintiff to prove a

claim for IIED under state law in order to collect damages for

emotional distress. See Pflueger v. Auto Finance Group, Inc.,

1999 WL 33738434 at *4 (C.D. Cal. 1999); cf. Carrigan v. Central

Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 468, 470-71 (N.D. Ga. 1980)

(holding plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of mental

distress arising from violations of the FDCPA met state

requirements under Georgia tort law); Venes v. Professional

Service Bureau, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 671, 674-75 (Minn. Ct. App.

1984) (finding plaintiff satisfied state elements of IIED and

could thus recover emotional distress damages). Under California

law, to prove a claim for IIED a plaintiff must show: (1) extreme

and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) with intent to cause

plaintiff emotional distress; (3) severe emotional distress

suffered by plaintiff; and (4) defendant’s conduct actually and

proximately caused plaintiff’s severe emotional distress. See

Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 209 (1982)

(enumerating elements of IIED under California law); see also

Pflueger, 1999 WL 33738434 at *4 (listing elements of IIED

plaintiff must prove to succeed in claims arising under FDCPA and

RFDCPA). 

This court finds persuasive those cases requiring a

plaintiff to establish the elements of a claim for IIED under

state law in order to sustain a claim for emotional distress

damages under the FDCPA and RFDCPA. First, Section 1692 et seq.

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contains no indication Congress intended to create a more lenient

IIED standard in enacting the FCDPA. Moreover, the FDCPA

expressly requires to recover above and beyond statutory damages,

definable actual damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1). There must

be some standards to adjudge those damages, and the court finds

that the standards for a state IIED claim serve that purpose well

as they ensure that the alleged damages are real and

quantifiable.

Here, plaintiff cannot establish the requisite elements of a

claim for IIED. Indeed, plaintiff does not discuss application

of the facts to the state law standard for IIED in her

opposition; on that basis alone, the court could grant the motion

in defendant’s favor. However, the court nonetheless discusses

its findings. 

The subject conduct does not rise to the level of “extreme

and outrageous” conduct as a matter of law. At most, plaintiff

alleges conduct that was rude and impolite; significantly, the

conduct occurred in only two voice mail messages and four brief

conversations taking place on one afternoon. Such conduct is not

actionable as an IIED claim. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot. Dist.,

43 Cal.3d 148, 155 (1987) (“Mere insults, indignities, threats,

annoyances, petty oppressions or other trivialities” are not

actionable as “outrageous conduct”). Moreover, specifically in

collection cases, courts have long recognized that the very

nature of collection efforts often cause a debtor to suffer

emotional distress. See Bowden v. Spiegel, 96 Cal. App. 2d 793,

789 (1950). To be actionable as an IIED claim, however, the

conduct must go beyond “all reasonable bounds of decency.” Id.;

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see also Ross v. Creel Publishing, 100 Cal. App. 4th 736, 746-47

(2003). The conduct here simply does not meet this threshold.

Additionally, the court notes that in this case, plaintiff

initiated the bulk of the conduct with defendant by continuing to

call Elizabeth back after Elizabeth hung up on plaintiff several

times. This is not a case in which the debt collector repeatedly

called and harassed a plaintiff despite being asked not to call. 

Here, plaintiff could have chosen to stop the contact altogether

but did not do so.

Furthermore, plaintiff cannot demonstrate she suffered

“extreme emotional distress.” Plaintiff claims only that she was

upset and angry at the time, that her hands shake and are sweaty

when she now receives calls from unknown persons, and that she

has occasional trouble sleeping to date; she has not, however,

seen any medical professionals as a result of her alleged

aliments and does take any medications, prescription or over-thecounter. Such symptoms are not sufficient to demonstrate extreme

distress. Girard v. Ball, 125 Cal. App. 3d 722, 787-788 (1981). 

In Girard, the plaintiff claimed emotional distress after a debt

collector attempted to collect on a debt against him by making

phone calls and sending collection letters. The plaintiff

claimed he “couldn’t sleep” and suffered from “anxiety symptoms”

and nervousness, but he sought no treatment for his condition. 

Id. Although subsequently the debtor claimed more extensive

symptoms, the court held that emotional distress damages could

not be sought for such “trivial” and “transitory” claims. Id.

Such is also the case here.

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Finally, even were the court to consider plaintiff’s claims

under a lower standard, neither the messages alone nor the

entirety of plaintiff’s conversations with defendant rises to the

level necessary for plaintiff to recover emotional distress

damages. Even those courts that have concluded that an FDCPA

plaintiff need not meet state law standards for IIED, nonetheless

require more than transitory symptoms of emotional distress for a

plaintiff to recover damages. See Wantz, 386 F.3d at 834;

Cousin, 246 F.3d at 371. For example, in Wantz, the court

illustrated the types of “conclusory allegations” that do not

permit emotional distress damages under the FDCPA:

Wantz’s only evidence as to emotional distress was his

testimony that: (1) he was ‘humiliated and embarrassed’ 

every time he was rejected for credit;’ (2) it is 

‘mentally and emotionally distressful when dealing with

credit reporting agencies;’ and (3) it is ‘embarrassing

to go somewhere and have them check your credit report and

see all that stuff on there’ . . . Without further evidence

to buttress those assertions, Wantz’s case [can] not go

forward. 

386 F.3d at 834. Similarly, in Cousin, the court described the

types of evidence necessary to support a claim for emotional

distress damages, stating that a plaintiff alleging intangible

loss must set forth evidence with specificity which includes

“corroborating testimony or medical or psychological evidence in

support of the damage award.” 246 F.3d at 371 (emphasis added);

see accord Dawson v. Washington Mutual Bank, 390 F.3d 1139, 1149-

50 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting “[n]on-experts, such as family

members, friends, or co-workers, may testify to manifestations of

mental anguish and clearly establish that significant emotional

harm occurred”).

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Here, the only evidence of plaintiff’s emotional distress is

her own testimony, and this evidence demonstrates that her

alleged emotional distress was transitory in nature and of the

type not recoverable under the FDCPA. While plaintiff is correct

that she is not required to present expert testimony in support

of her claim, Zhang v. American Gem Seafoods, 339 F.3d 1020, 1040

(9th Cir. 2003) (upholding emotional distress damages based only

on testimony), she fails to acknowledge that she cannot rely

solely on her uncorroborated testimony to establish emotional

distress. Wantz, 386 F.3d at 834; Cousin, 246 F.3d at 371. 

Indeed, she has no corroborating evidence–-no witnesses to

confirm her symptoms and no documentary evidence to support her

claims. Without such evidence to buttress her assertions,

plaintiff’s claims cannot go forward. Wantz, 386 F.3d at 834. 

In conclusion, although defendant’s representative,

Elizabeth, was unnecessarily rude and unkind to plaintiff,

plaintiff’s claims of stress do not rise to the level necessary

to set forth a viable claim for IIED under either state law or

any lower threshold established in some case law. Therefore, for

the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion for partial

summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim for emotional

distress damages is GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS plaintiff’s

motion for partial summary judgment with respect to her claims

under 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) and 1692e(11) of the FDCPA as well as

her corollary claims under the RFDCPA. The court also GRANTS

defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment as to plantiff’s

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9 The court notes that the instant order does not

apparently resolve the entirety of this case. Both parties moved

only for partial summary judgment, and the complaint appears to

allege other violations of the FDCPA and correspondingly the

RFDCPA. (Compl., filed Oct. 18, 2005, pursuant to order of

transfer by the United States District Court for the Northern

District of California).

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claim for emotional distress damages under the FDCPA and RFDCPA.9

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 19, 2007

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