Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00260/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00260-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Montez Lavell Wright, III,

Petitioner,

v. 

Attorney General of the State of Arizona, et 

al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-24-00260-PHX-KML

ORDER 

Petitioner Montez Lavell Wright, III, was convicted in state court of two counts of 

first-degree murder and numerous other crimes. Wright was sentenced to natural life on 

one of the murder counts and additional terms of imprisonment on the other counts. After 

an unsuccessful direct appeal and petition for post-conviction relief, Wright filed a federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Magistrate Judge Camille D. Bibles issues a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the petition be denied because all of Wright’s 

claims are procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 16.) Wright filed objections.

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district court 

must review de novo the portions to which an objection is made. Id. The district court need 

not, however, review the portions to which no objection is made. See Schmidt v. Johnstone, 

263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“[D]e novo review of factual and legal issues 

is required if objections are made, but not otherwise.”) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

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The R&R labels Wright’s claims as “prosecutorial misconduct,” “Brady claim,” 

“ineffective assistance of counsel,” and “perjured testimony.” (Doc. 16 at 10-13.) The R&R

reasons all four of these claims are procedurally defaulted because Wright failed to raise 

the claim on direct appeal or, for those claims Wright properly raised in a petition for postconviction relief, because he did not seek review of the trial court’s order denying relief. 

The R&R also concludes Wright has not established “cause and prejudice” to excuse his 

procedural default.

Wright’s objections do not dispute he failed to properly raise his claims in state 

court. Instead, Wright argues “cause and prejudice exist and should excuse [the procedural 

default] of all claims presented.” (Doc. 17 at 1.) Wright’s objections do not identify facts 

sufficient to meet the “cause and prejudice” standard.

“A procedural default may be excused if the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the 

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law[.]” Rodney v. 

Garrett, 116 F.4th 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Cause” 

requires a petitioner “show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] 

efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Id. “Prejudice” requires the petitioner 

“establish not merely that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that 

they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error 

of constitutional dimensions.” Bradford v. Davis, 923 F.3d 599, 613 (9th Cir. 2019)

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

In his objections Wright does not point to any “factor external to the defense” that 

might be sufficient to satisfy the “cause” standard.1 Nor, independently, do the objections 

make the requisite showing of “prejudice.” Instead, the objections reargue issues addressed 

by the R&R without identifying why the R&R’s analysis is wrong.

1 Although not mentioned by the parties or in the R&R, Wright’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim might be subject to the exception recognized in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S.

1 (2012). Martinez provided “ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel may 

constitute ‘cause’ to forgive procedural default of a trial-ineffective-assistance claim.” 

Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 380 (2022). But here, Wright’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel is not “substantial,” meaning he cannot take advantage of 

Martinez. Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F.3d 1230, 1241 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d on other grounds 

sub nom. Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022).

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 16) is ADOPTED. The 

petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall enter 

judgment in favor of Respondents and close this case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis on appeal are DENIED because the dismissal of the petition is justified 

by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling 

debatable.

Dated this 2nd day of January, 2025.

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