Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02385/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02385-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

James Hines,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 03-2385 GEB PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Nuckle, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner without counsel prosecuting a

civil rights action. Plaintiff claims defendants violated his

Eighth Amendment rights in July of 2001, when they failed to

protect him from being attacked by his cell-mate and failed to

provide medical care for some of the injuries he sustained in the

attack. 

Presently before court is plaintiff’s April 26, 2005, motion

for summary judgment, which defendants opposed August 30, 2005.

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2

Governing Legal Standard

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to

support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on an

issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

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opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the “‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id. at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

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A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no motion to

strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United States

Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979) (incompetent

medical evidence).

Application

The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from

deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to

a prisoner. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). “Deliberate

indifference” is a state of mind more blameworthy than mere

negligence. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). The

defendant must know of but disregard an excessive risk of harm;

he must know the facts from which the inference of harm should be

drawn and also draw the inference. Id. Failure to abate a risk

that should have been perceived but was not does not violate the

Eighth Amendment. Id. 

Plaintiff fails to establish he is entitled to summary

judgment on claims some defendants failed to protect him from

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attack by his cellmate. He declares defendants Tutor, Roberts,

Nuckle and Gale knew, before plaintiff’s cell-mate attacked him,

that plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm, but

disregarded the risk. Defendants controvert plaintiff’s

declaration in opposing summary judgment. Disputed material

facts preclude summary judgment for plaintiff.

“The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon

incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a

violation of the Eighth Amendment . . .” McGuckin v. Smith, 974

F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991). A violation of the Eighth

Amendment occurs when prison officials deliberately are

indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs. Id. The threshold

for a medical claim under the Eighth Amendment is extremely high:

A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference .

. . only if [he] knows of and disregards an excessive

risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of

Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under

this standard, the prison official must not only “be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but

that person “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was

not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290

F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). This “subjective

approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental

attitude actually was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. 

“Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s

Eighth Amendment rights. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059

(alteration and citation omitted).

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (footnote

omitted).

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“Deliberate indifference to medical needs may be shown by

circumstantial evidence when the facts are sufficient to

demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a risk of harm.” 

Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted); see also Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197

(acknowledging a plaintiff may demonstrate that officers “must

have known” of a risk of harm by showing the medical need was

obvious and extreme). Delay in medical treatment can amount to

deliberate indifference if (1) the delay seriously affected the

medical condition for which plaintiff was seeking treatment, and

(2) defendants were aware the delay would cause serious harm. 

Shapley v. Nevada Board of State Prison Commissioners, 766 F.2d

404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985).

Plaintiff provides no evidence, in seeking summary judgment,

that his medical needs posed a substantial risk of serious harm,

and defendants knew of yet disregarded that risk. Plaintiff

declares some of the defendants refused to permit medical staff

to treat some of his injuries, but he offers no evidence any of

the injuries were serious and required care to avoid the risk of

harm.

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends plaintiff’s April

26, 2005, motion for summary judgment be denied.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

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recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: February 7, 2006. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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