Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02154/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02154-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHANTY KEO, Civil No. 11-2154 LAB (BLM)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

LARRY SMALL, Warden,

Respondent.

INTRODUCTION I.

Petitioner Chanty Keo, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (Pet.) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions in San Diego

County Superior Court case number SCD200761 for attempted murder, robbery, assault with

a firearm, burglary, unlawfully taking a vehicle, selling a stolen vehicle, grand theft, and

attempted grand theft; the charges also included various weapons allegations and allegations

that the crimes were committed while Keo was out of custody on bail. Pet. at 6-10, 14-16 ;

1

Lodgment No. 8 at 0104-09. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends the

Petition be DENIED.

/ / /

/ / /

For ease of reference, the Court will use the page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic 1

filing system.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-

36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from these

facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The following statement of facts

is taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion denying Keo’s direct appeal of his

convictions:

Because Keo does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support

his convictions, we summarize the facts presented at trial. Such facts in the

prosecution case showed that Keo had first met Iraj Abdy in 2004 at a wrecking

yard in Chula Vista. At that time, Abdy had explained to Keo that he bought cars

and car parts for resale from businesses on El Cajon Boulevard in San Diego,

often finding missing parts for cars at the Chula Vista junkyards. When Keo told

Abdy he had some racing cars to sell, Abdy gave him the address of his

business, Crown Auto Sales, at 3601 El Cajon Boulevard. Subsequently, Keo

came with potential customers to that business, which Abdy then owned with

George Hirad, who owned another used car business, also named Crown Auto

Sales, down the street at 3470 El Cajon Boulevard. Abdy estimated that Keo had

come by his El Cajon Boulevard business seven or eight times to see him before

Abdy left in August 2005 to start his own used car business, Max Auto Sales, on

Jamacha Boulevard in Spring Valley. At that time, Hirad continued to own and

sell used cars from both businesses on El Cajon Boulevard and a salesman

named Esmaeil Taghavi continued to work at the Crown Auto Sales at 3470 El

Cajon Boulevard.

On July 24, 2006, Keo came to see Abdy at Max Auto Sales in a red

Honda Accord, driven by another Asian man, which he tried to sell to Abdy. 

When Abdy declined to buy the car, Keo pleaded with him to buy some wheel

rims because he needed money and Abdy agreed to buy them for $250. As

Abdy went into his small office where a customer named James Miller was filling

out a contract for a car he was purchasing to write a check, Keo followed him

and said he wanted cash. Having $2,000 in cash, which included five or six

$100 dollar bills and the rest in 20’s, from the proceeds of a car he had sold the

previous night inside his checkbook, Abdy opened it in front of Keo and handed

him $250.

Keo left, but then returned to the office five to 10 minutes later with a

$100 dollar bill in his hand and asked Abdy, who was still assisting Miller with

paperwork regarding the car he was purchasing, for some smaller bills. When

Abdy told Keo to go to a liquor store across the street for change, Keo insisted

Abdy had cash on hand and would leave if he made change for him. As Abdy,

who was sitting behind his desk, started to take the money out of his checkbook,

Keo suddenly tried to grab the checkbook from him, but Abdy pulled it back. 

Keo then pulled out a handgun, pointed it at Abdy, said, “Give me the money,”

and fired a shot into the wall behind Abdy's chair.

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At that point, Miller ran out of the office, and Abdy got up and started

toward the corner of his desk. As he did so, Keo rushed toward Abdy, saying,

“Give me the fucking money. I’ll kill you.” Keo then fired another shot at the

desk and Abdy gave him the money. After obtaining the money, Keo, who was

about a foot away from Abdy, continued to point the gun at him, holding it over

his head with the barrel pointed downward toward Abdy. Thinking Keo was

going to shoot him, Abdy tried to grab the gun and Keo fired a third shot, hitting

Abdy in the upper leg. Abdy then pushed Keo out of his office and fell to the

floor. Keo left the business in the Honda.

Police responded immediately to the scene of the shooting. A man

working across the street from the business had seen a young Asian male with

about two inches of “black hair ... spiked up” drive away in a red Honda after he

heard shots coming from the business. Before Abdy was taken to a hospital

where he underwent emergency surgery to insert a 38-centimeter rod with

screws into his right femur, which had been shattered by the shot in his upper

leg near his femoral artery, he gave a brief description of his assailant to a San

Diego County Sheriff’s deputy. The deputy noted that Abdy, who was in a lot

of pain, described the man who robbed and shot him as an “Asian male, about

20 to 22 years old and had spiked hair, was wearing a gray shirt and blue

pants.” Abdy described the driver of the Honda with his assailant as Asian with

hair about one inch long.

Although Abdy was initially hospitalized for two weeks, the doctors were

not able to remove the bullet until four months later. When Abdy was

interviewed in the hospital by investigators, he said he knew the shooter, but

only by the name of Barns, or possibly Saki.

Abdy’s former business partner Hirad and salesman Taghavi from Crown

Auto Sales visited Abdy in the hospital the day after he was injured. At that

time, Abdy told Hirad that the shooter was the man Hirad had warned him not

to buy car parts from when they were partners at Crown Auto Sales. When

Hirad and Taghavi told Abdy that they had bought a Honda Civic from the same

man, Abdy said that the man had offered to sell the Honda Civic to him as well,

but he had declined. Taghavi also told Abdy that on July 22, 2006, two days

before the shooting, the same man had stopped by the Crown Auto Sales where

he worked and had wanted to sell some rims and had also asked for change for

a $100 bill. After the visit, Abdy told investigators that they should talk to Hirad

and Taghavi.

When investigators went to Hirad’s business, they discovered a green

Honda on the lot that Hirad had bought from a woman accompanied by Keo on

June 27, 2006, and determined it was the same car earlier reported stolen by

a woman named Sara Johnson. Investigators further learned that Keo and the

woman also had tried to sell the stolen Honda to Taghavi at the other Crown

Auto Sales lot on June 25, 2006, and that Keo had again appeared to sell car

parts at that lot on July 22, 2006. Both Hirad and Taghavi had had previous

dealings with Keo at the Crown Auto Sales lots because of his acquaintanceship

with Abdy, and Taghavi knew Keo as “Burns.”

Much of the above information was included in the reports provided to

San Diego County Sheriff’s Investigator Jerry Hartman, who compiled a six-pack

photographic line-up that included a photo of Keo. Hartman included Keo’s

photo because it fit the physical description of the man who shot Abdy, he knew

Keo’s nickname was Burns, which was similar to “Barns” given by Abdy, and he

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was aware of Keo’s involvement in the fraudulent sale of the green Honda with

a woman named Rita Wages, whom Hartman had recognized in a photograph

on the fake driver’s license that had been given to Hirad during that sale and

which Hirad had photocopied and given to the police during the stolen car

investigation.

When police showed Abdy the photographic line-up, he identified Keo,

who was in photograph number four, as his assailant. When Hirad and Taghavi

were separately shown the same photographic line-up, each identified the

photograph of Keo as the man who had been involved in the various incidents

at their respective used car businesses. Keo was subsequently charged with the

crimes in the instant case.

At trial, in addition to the above facts, the following evidence was

presented in the prosecution case. Abdy testified he was 100 percent sure of

his identification of Keo as his shooter and robber in the photographic line-up. 

He also identified Keo in court, and had done so at the preliminary hearing in

this case. Abdy said that Keo had gained weight and his hair was a little longer

than it had been on the day of the shooting. He explained that although he had

said that Keo was bald then, he was not totally bald on July 24, 2006, but his

hair had been very short. Abdy also said that Keo had the same facial hair at

trial as he did at the time of the shooting, “a little mustache and beard.” Abdy

denied telling the police he did not know his assailant, only that he did not know

his real name, knowing him by the name “Barns.” He later learned the

nickname had not been Barns, but Burns.

When asked on cross-examination if he had initially described the man

who shot him as having spiked hair, Abdy responded, “What is meaning, ‘spite

hair’?” He then said he did not remember saying the shooter had spiked hair. 

Although Abdy agreed that Keo usually was always “bald,” he said he had very

short hair at the time of the shooting and that he knew him as the man who sold

rims and a Honda to him.

Abdy testified that when he was questioned by investigators after the

shooting, he had forgotten to tell them that he once bought some wheel rims

from Keo and had partially paid him with a check. Shortly before trial, he

remembered the incident where he bought four Lexus rims from Keo for $450,

giving him $120 in cash and paying the balance with a check for $330, made out

to “Chanty Keo,” the name Keo had told him to write. A copy of the check was

entered into evidence.

James Miller, the customer who had been with Abdy in his office the day

of the shooting, also testified at trial. Miller had not paid much attention to Keo

until he and Abdy were both grabbing at something and the first shot was fired. 

After ducking and running out of the office, Miller heard two more shots. 

Although Miller had not been able to identify anyone in the photographic line-up,

he thought the shooter could have been in either photograph three or four, and

leaned toward number four as the man who shot Abdy. Miller identified Keo as

the shooter in court, as well as having done so at the preliminary hearing.

On cross-examination, Miller explained that he had only glanced at the

shooter, not paying attention to his hair, but rather his facial features, which

were a mix of Oriental and Black looks. He did not remember any facial hair or

spiky hair, only a long flat-top type haircut.

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Taghavi testified at trial about the encounter he had with Keo on July 22,

2006, two days before Abdy was robbed and shot, and also about the earlier

attempted sale of the stolen green Honda on June 25, 2006. Taghavi had seen

Keo at Crown Auto Sales on other occasions, but he had not known his name. 

As to the later July incident, Keo had entered Taghavi’s office just before closing,

telling Taghavi that a friend of his had a car he wanted to sell and he had some

rims to sell for $100. When Taghavi asked him where the car was, Keo said his

friend had driven it around the block. In response to Taghavi's refusal to buy

the rims, Keo then asked him for $100. When Taghavi told him he did not have

$100, Keo asked Taghavi to give him change for a $100 dollar bill and a ride two

blocks down the street. Because Keo’s changing stories made Taghavi feel

uncomfortable, Taghavi told Keo he could not give him any change or a ride. 

Taghavi never saw a car or another person during the incident and, as he was

driving away after he left work, he saw Keo walking toward 36th Street.

As to the earlier incident on June 25, 2006, Keo had arrived at Crown

Auto Sales with a woman in a green Honda Civic, telling Taghavi that the woman

wanted to sell her car. Taghavi declined to buy the car, but told them to talk to

his boss, Hirad, at the other Crown Auto Sales lot down the street.

Hirad testified at trial that on June 27, 2006, Keo, whom he recognized

from earlier visits to his business, and the woman came to his other lot on El

Cajon Boulevard and he agreed to buy the green Honda Civic for either $2,200

or $2,700, but he then sent them back to the lot where Taghavi was working to

be paid because Taghavi had the checkbook for the businesses. However, when

Keo and Taghavi could not agree on the method of payment, with Keo insisting

that payment be in cash, Taghavi sent Keo and the woman back to Hirad. At

that time, Hirad made a photocopy of the woman’s driver’s license and checked

the car registration and VIN number. Because everything appeared to be in

order, Hirad wrote a check out to “Sara Beth Johnson,” the name on the driver’s

license. He then accompanied Keo and the woman to the bank where the check

was cashed and Hirad handed the woman the money.

Hirad further testified that when he had been business partners with Abdy

he had seen Keo several times at the business selling car parts to Abdy. At that

time Hirad had warned Abdy not to deal with Keo because there was no way to

be sure that the parts had not been stolen.

With regard to the June 2006 incident, Sara Johnson testified that she

had left her green, 1996 Honda Civic, with its title papers in the glove

compartment, parked near a friend's house in Mission Hills on June 22, 2006,

while she was out of town for a few days. When she returned four days later,

she discovered the Honda was missing and reported its theft to the police. 

Johnson had taken her car keys with her and no one had permission to drive her

car while she was gone. When shown the photocopy taken by Hirad of the

driver’s license that bore her name during the sale at Crown Auto Sales, Johnson

denied that the photograph on the license was of her.

A woman named Christine Opel testified at trial that she had met Keo,

whom she had known only as Burns, through her good friend, Rita Wages, who

was originally charged along with Keo for the June 2006 burglary of Crown Auto

Sales. [footnote omitted.] Opel had seen a fake ID Wages had had in the name

of Sara Johnson. Opel was positive that Keo knew Wages was not named Sara

Johnson because she had heard Keo call Wages by her real name on several

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occasions. Opel identified Wages as the woman in the photograph on the

photocopied driver’s license bearing the name of Sara Johnson in evidence.

Although Wages was charged as a codefendant in the count 8 burglary

in this case, she was not tried with Keo.

The Defense Case

The sole defense witness was a bail bondsman who identified a

photograph he had taken of Keo on July 19, 2006, six days before the shooting

incident. Keo’s defense counsel used the photograph in closing to argue that

Keo had been bald and had had facial hair at the time of the July 25, 2006

robbery and attempted murder, while the witnesses had described the shooter

in that incident as a man with short or spiky hair on his head, and with little or

no facial hair. Although counsel conceded that Keo had been at the dealership

that day with another man to sell some auto parts, he asserted that Keo had

been wrongly identified as the shooter who later returned to the dealership for

change for the $100 bill.

Lodgment No. 3 at 3-11.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 19, 2006, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed an

Information charging Chanty Keo with attempted murder (count one), robbery (count two),

two counts of burglary (counts four, and eight), assault with a firearm (count three), unlawfully

taking a vehicle (count five), selling a stolen car (count six), grand theft of personal property

(count seven) and attempted grand theft of personal property (count nine). Lodgment No. 8

at 0001-05. As to counts one and two, the information alleged Keo had intentionally and

personally discharged a firearm which caused injury, within the meaning of Penal Code

§ 12022.53(d). Id. at 0001-02. As to all nine counts, the information alleged Keo had

committed his crimes while out of custody on bail, within the meaning of Penal Code

§ 12022.1(b). Id. at 0001-05.

Following a jury trial, Keo was convicted of all counts and the jury found all the

weapons and bail enhancements to be true. Id. at 0104-11. Keo was sentenced to life with

the possibility of parole for count one, twenty-five years to life for the Penal Code

§ 12022.53(d) enhancement, and two years for the Penal Code § 12022.1 enhancement. Id.

at 0145-48; Lodgment No. 3 at 2.

/ / /

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Keo appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

Division One. Lodgment No. 4. The appellate court affirmed his convictions and sentence in

a written, unpublished opinion. Lodgment No. 3. Keo then filed a Petition for Review in the

California Supreme Court. Lodgment No. 2. The California Supreme Court denied the petition

without citation of authority. Lodgment No. 1. 

Keo filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on

September 16, 2011. ECF No. 1. Respondent filed an Answer and Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in Support of the Answer on February 13, 2012. ECF No. 13. Keo filed a

Traverse on March 15, 2012. ECF No. 15. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA,

a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by

the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to

decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an

extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was

objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v.

Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court

applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it

decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the

“unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal

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principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts

of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application” clause requires that the

state court decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks

through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the basis for the

higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06

(1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal

habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the

state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on

other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when

resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning

nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state

court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established

federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth

by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at

72.

B. Analysis

Respondent contends the petition was filed beyond the one year statute of limitations

imposed on federal habeas corpus petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Answer at 2, ECF No.

15; Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 21-22. In the alternative, Respondent argues the state

court’s resolution of Keos’ claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Pet. at 15-21, ECF No. 1. 

/ / /

/ / /

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1. Timeliness

Respondent contends the petition was filed beyond the one year statute of limitations

established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 12-18, ECF No. 12.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), a petitioner has one year from the date his or her conviction is

final to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (West 2011). The statute of limitations, however, is subject to both

statutory and equitable tolling. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Holland v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 130

S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). 

Keo’s direct appeal concluded on October 28, 2008 when his petition for review was

denied. See Lodgment No. 1. His conviction therefore became final ninety days later, on

January 26, 2009, and the one year statute of limitations began running the next day. See

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Absent any statutory or equitable tolling,

Keo had until January 26, 2010, to file his federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d);

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 6(a), which states “[i]n computing any period of time prescribed . . . by any

applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of

time begins to run shall not be included” to AEDPA). He did not do so until September 15,

2011. The petition is therefore untimely unless Keo is entitled to enough statutory and/or

equitable tolling to make the petition timely.

a. Statutory Tolling

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Keo

did not file any “application[s] for State post-conviction or other collateral review” and thus he

is not entitled to any statutory tolling.

b. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at

2560. “To be entitled to equitable tolling, [Petitioner] must show, ‘(1) that he has been

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pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’

and prevented him from filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007), quoting

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases, and “the threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

As noted above, Keo’s petition was due on or before January 26, 2010. Keo claims he

sent a habeas corpus petition to this Court on October 4, 2009, well within § 2244(d)’s statute

of limitations. See Pet. at 16-19, ECF No. 1. When he did not receive any response from the

Court, he sent a letter inquiring about his petition on August 4, 2011. Pet. at 16-17, ECF No.

1. The Court informed him that there was no record of his petition having been received. 

Pet. at 20. Keo then filed the instant petition on September 15, 2011.

Assuming Keo’s version of events is accurate, 250 days had passed between when the

statute of limitations began to run on January 27, 2009, and when he claims, under penalty

of perjury, he mailed his first petition to the Court on October 4, 2009. If true, Keo would be

entitled to equitable tolling for the time period between when he mailed his first petition,

October 4, 2009, and when he was notified the petition had presumably been lost and not

filed, August 12, 2011. See Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (Petitioner entitled

to equitable tolling for the period of delay caused by the extraordinary circumstances of the

district court erroneously dismissing a petition and losing the petition). Beginning on August

13, 2011, the statute of limitations began running again, and there were 115 days remaining

within which Keo could file his federal petition. His petition was therefore due by December

6, 2011, and he filed the instant petition on September 15, 2011. Under this scenario, his

petition is timely.

The mail log provided by Keo, however, indicates the only time documents were sent

to this Court was on June 3, 2010. According to Keo, this was a “request for acknowledgment 2

By this time, however, the statute of limitations had run and the filing therefore has no effect 2

on any possible equitable tolling to which Keo may be entitled.

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of receipt of [his] petition.” Pet. at 16, ECF No. 1. If the mail log is correct, no outgoing mail

was sent on or near October 4, 2009. If these facts are accurate, the statute of limitations

expired on January 26, 2010 and Keo’s September 15, 2011 petition would be untimely. 

 Because the parties briefed the merits of the petition, the Court finds it unnecessary

to resolve this factual dispute governing the timeliness argument and will address the merits

of Keo’s claims.

2. Due Process Rights and the Pretrial Lineup

Keo contends the pretrial lineup shown to witnesses by police was unduly suggestive

because it was constructed with individuals who looked similar to him rather than with

individuals who looked similar to descriptions of the assailant given by witnesses. Pet. at 6-7.

He also contends the other individuals in the lineup did not match his appearance “in all

significant aspects.” Id. at 7. Respondent argues the state court’s denial of this claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 17-19.

Keo raised this claim on direct appeal in the petition for review he filed in the California

Supreme Court. Lodgment No. 2. Because that court issued a summary denial of the claim,

this Court must “look through” to the state appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the

basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. That court wrote:

Initially, we note that the record is not totally clear as to the court’s in

limine ruling. Even though the prosecutor argued that defense counsel was not

raising any issue as to whether the eyewitness testimony should be excluded as

tainted by the purported suggestive lineup as compared to only suppressing the

photographic lineup shown the witnesses, the court’s ruling appears to have

impliedly found that the photographic lineup was not suggestive and that all

testimony regarding such lineup would be admitted. However, because defense

counsel had narrowed the motion during argument below to apply only with

regard to Abdy’s identification of him as the robber and shooter, Keo’s appellate

assertions, which generally refer to all the eyewitness testimony and the

identifications of him made by various other witnesses who were shown the

photographic lineup before trial are waived. (Evid. Code, § 353.) As to Keo’s

due process claims regarding the photographic lineup and Abdy’s in-court

identification testimony, on this record, we conclude they lack merit.

“Due process requires the exclusion of identification testimony only if the

identification procedures used were unnecessarily suggestive and, if so, the

resulting identification was also unreliable. [Citations.]” (People v. Yeoman

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 123.) The defendant bears the burden of showing the

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identification procedure used in any case was suggestive and unreliable. (People

v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1222.) “‘The issue of constitutional reliability

depends on (1) whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and

unnecessary [citation]; and if so, (2) whether the identification itself was

nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances, taking into account

such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time

of the crime, the witness’s degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior

description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the

confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation [citation]. 

If, and only if, the answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the

second question is no, is the identification constitutionally unreliable.’ [Citation.]

In other words, ‘[i]f we find that a challenged procedure is not impermissibly

suggestive, our inquiry into the due process claim ends.’ [Citation.]” (People v.

Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 412 (Ochoa).)

To evaluate suggestiveness in a witness identification procedure, the

above factors are considered to determine “‘[t]he question [of] whether anything

caused defendant to “stand out” from the others in a way that would suggest

the witness should select him.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25

Cal.4th 926, 990 (Cunningham); see also People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th

595, 610.) Although our review is deferential to the trial court’s findings of fact

which involve credibility determinations, we independently review the trial

court’s ruling “that a pretrial identification procedure was not unduly suggestive.” 

(Id. at p. 609.)

Afterindependently reviewing the subject photographic lineup, which was

entered into evidence as People’s Exhibit No. 11 and contained the photographs

of Keo and five other men, we agree with the trial court’s implied finding that

the photographic lineup was not suggestive. All the photos in the lineup were

Asian males of similar age and build, and the backgrounds of the photographs

were all similar. Although four of the men had longer hair than the close buzz

cut in Keo’s photograph, the sixth man had a close buzz cut like Keo’s. Two of

the other men also had facial hair similar to that depicted in Keo’s photograph. 

Although not all of the people in the lineup looked like Keo in “all significant

aspects” as he claims, there is simply no requirement that only perfect matches

or “very similar” individuals be placed in a lineup. Rather, the critical point is

that the suspect not be included in the lineup in such a manner as to make his

identification a virtual certainty. (See Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 990.) 

Nothing about the composition of the photographic lineup impermissibly singled

our Keo as the suspect in the crimes.

Moreover, Keo was afforded an opportunity at trial to attack the manner

in which the photographic lineup was assembled and conducted. “‘Counsel can

both cross-examine the identification witnesses and argue in summation as to

factors causing doubts as to the accuracy of the identification including reference

to . . . any suggestibility in the identification procedure. . . .’ [Citation.]” 

(Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U. S. 98, 113-114, fn. 14.) Keo’s counsel

cross-examined Detective Hartman in detail regarding the manner of selecting

the individual photographs for the lineup and argued in closing that Abdy’s

identification of the shooter was invalid because he had initially told the police

that his assailant had spiky hair while none of the photos in the lineup showed

a man with spiky hair. Counsel essentially argued that the victim Abdy had

identified Keo’s photograph in the lineup solely because he knew him from

earlier dealings.

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Contrary to Keo’s continual reliance on the argument that his photograph

depicting him as bald or with a short buzz cut should not have been included in

the lineup because it did not fit Abdy’s initial description of the suspect and

therefore suggests the lineup “was constructed to match [his] pre-robbery

description rather than that of the spikey-haired robber,” the facts demonstrate

that there were legitimate reasons to include his photograph in the lineup

because of additional information about Keo’s nickname obtained from Abdy and

other witnesses during the criminal investigation. Keo’s argument went to the

weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. The jury was free to consider

any inconsistencies in Abdy’s and the other witnesses various identifications and

descriptions of the suspect given to police just after the robbery and shooting

when deciding what weight to afford the evidence.

Because we have determined that Keo has failed to show that the

photographic lineup was unduly suggestive, we need not consider whether

Abdy’s identifications of him were otherwise reliable. (Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th

at pp. 412-413.) Accordingly, we conclude on this record that the trial court

properly denied Keo’s motion to exclude evidence about the photographic lineup

at trial.

Lodgment No. 3 at 13-17.

The first question the Court must confront is whether the identification process used

by Detective Hartman was “unduly suggestive.” The California law applied by the state

appellate court to Keo’s claim is consistent with clearly established Supreme Court law on the

issue of eyewitness identification evidence. “An identification procedure is suggestive when

it ‘emphasize[s] the focus upon a single individual’ thereby increasing the likelihood of

misidentification. [United States v.] Bagley, 772 F.2d [482, 492 (9th Cir.1985)] (“The repeated

showing of the picture of an individual, for example, reinforces the image of the photograph

in the mind of the viewer.”); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d

1199 (1967).” United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1998). Detective

Hartman testified that he put the photographic lineup together after speaking to Abdy and

Taghavi. Lodgment No. 9, vol. 2 at 314. Abdy gave him a possible nickname of “Saki” or

“Barns” or “Burns” for the person who robbed and shot him. Id. at 321, 353-54. Using this

information and the general description of an Asian male with short hair, Hartman asked other

law enforcement officials if the description and nickname matched anyone they were familiar

with and searched law enforcement databases. Id. at 321, 327. Hartman then took the

general description and entered the information into a database used to prepare photo lineups. 

Id. at 328. Hartman chose photographs to include in the lineup from those generated by the

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database. Id. at 328-29. When asked how and why he included Keo in the lineup, he

responded as follows:

[DET. HARTMAN]: Okay. The first person I developed I found out was

in the Department of Corrections custody. Therefore, he was eliminated as a

suspect. When I ran that individual I found he had a law enforcement contact

with another Asian male and a female by the name of Rita Wages. I was already

familiar with Rita Wages — well, I was familiar that there was a female that was

involved in the selling of a stolen car to Mr. Taghavi and Mr. Hirad.

So I had in my possession a copy of the driver’s license that was used to

make that sale and I realized that the pictures matched, Rita Wages and this

individual. I did an inquiry on Ms. Wages, or Rita Wages, and found out that she

had currently — she had been incarcerated the beginning of July, and when she

was arrested she was with two other individuals, one being a Sareang Ye and

one being your client.

I ran an inquiry — actually, there was three or four other individuals

arrested in that case. I ran them. I found out two were currently out on bond,

one of which was your client, and therefore I put him in the lineup.

Id. at 331.

Hartman also testified that the purpose of a lineup is “[t]o show an objective series of

photographs to a witness or victim . . . to potentially identify a suspect,” that “[a] lineup should

never be done to focus the attention of the lineup on a particular individual,” and that “[i]t

should be indifferent, basically each picture being somewhat different than the others, or all

of them similar.” Id. at 335. In this case, Hartman said, he wanted the photographs to have

some variation, partly because Abdy first said the attacker had his hair in a ponytail and others

described the attacker as having short, spiky hair. Id. Two people in the lineup, including

Keo, had short hair and the others had longer hair, including one person with a ponytail. Id.

at 338-39. The appellate court’s independent review of the photographic lineup confirmed that

the individuals pictured were all Asian males of similar age, build and with similar backgrounds,

and that two individuals had short hair while four had longer hair. Lodgment No. 3 at 15.

Based on Hartman’s testimony and the state appellate court’s independent evaluation

of the lineup, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support a conclusion by this Court 

that the lineup used in Keo’s case was suggestive. There is nothing in the record that shows

Keo’s photograph was highlighted in any way, that his appearance was so markedly different

from the other individuals in the lineup that the witnesses who were shown the lineup were 

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more likely to choose Keo, or that an emphasis was focused on Keo’s image such that a

witness would be likely to misidentify him. See Bagley, 772 F.2d at 492. 

Moreover, as the state court correctly noted, even if the identification procedure was

suggestive, the identification was not automatically excludable. In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.

188, 198-99 (1972), the Supreme Court held a suggestive identification need not be excluded

if, “under the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ the identification was reliable.” Id. at 199; see

also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). In determining reliability, the question is

whether the identification gives rise to “a very substantial likelihood” of misidentification. 

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198; Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). The Supreme

Court recently noted as follows:

Instead of mandating a per se exclusionary rule, the Court [has] held that

the Due Process Clause requires courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis,

whether improper police conduct created a “substantial likelihood of

misidentification.” Biggers, 409 U.S., at 201 [citation omitted]. “[R]eliability [of

the eyewitness identification] is the linchpin” of that evaluation, the Court stated

in Brathwaite. Id., at 111 [citation omitted.] Where the “indicators of [a

witness’] ability to make an accurate identification” are “outweighed by the

corrupting effect” of law enforcement suggestion, the identification should be

suppressed. Id., at 114 [citation omitted.] Otherwise, the evidence (if

admissible in all other respects) should be submitted to the jury.

Perry v. New Hampshire, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 716, 724 (2012).

Factors which should be considered in determining whether an identification is accurate

are: “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’

degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty

demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and confrontation.”

Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (1977). 

In Keo’s case, the Manson factors weigh in favor of the admission of Abdy’s

identification, as the state court correctly concluded. Abdy had a very good opportunity to

view the individual at the time of the crime. He had a face-to-face conversation with him for

several minutes and spoke to him twice within a period of ten minutes. Lodgment No. 9, vol.

1 at 68-70, 73-89. The evidence also supports a conclusion that Abdy was paying close

attention to the individual because he was negotiating the purchase of wheel rims and because

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the individual tried to grab the checkbook containing Abdy’s money then shot Abdy when he

resisted. Id. at 73-88. 

Abdy’s description of the individual, however, was not particularly consistent. While he

testified at trial that he knew Keo from prior interactions, that Keo was the person who robbed

and shot him, and that the individual who robbed him was bald and had a small mustache and

beard, he first told police that he did not know who shot him and that the individual had spiked

hair or hair in a pony tail and no facial hair. Lodgment No. 9, vol. 1 at 119, vol. 2 at 301, 322-

31. Abdy also admitted he discussed the description of the robber with Esmaeil Taghavi and

George Hirad, who had also had business dealings with Keo. Lodgment No. 9, vol. 1 at 125-

26. Abdy told Hirad that the robber was the person with whom Hirad had warned Abdy not

to do business. Lodgment No. 9, vol. 2 at 246. All agreed that the robber was Keo. 

Lodgment No. 9, vol. 1 at 125-26; Lodgment No. 9, vol. 2 at 200-01, 204. Indeed, it was this

difference between Abdy’s description of the robber and Keo’s actual appearance as well as

his discussion with Taghavi and Hirad about Keo being the robber that formed the basis of the

defense contention that Abdy identified Keo as the robber only because he was a familiar face. 

Abdy testified, however, that he was 100% certain that Keo was the individual who robbed

and shot him. Lodgment No. 9, vol. 1 at 99. Moreover, Abdy explained that he did not tell

the officer that he did not know the assailant; he said he did not know the assailant’s name. 

Id. at 126, 129. Finally, Abdy identified Keo in the lineup within three weeks of the incident. 

Lodgment No. 9, vol. 2 at 316. In sum, Abdy’s identification of Keo had sufficient indicators

of reliability such that, even if the product of a suggestive, lineup, it should not have been

excluded. 

As to Taghavi and Hirad, both of whom identified Keo in the photographic lineup as the

person who sold them the stolen car, the Manson factors also weigh in favor of admission. 

Taghavi and Hirad both had a very good opportunity to view the individual at the time of the

crime, having had face-to-face conversations with him on several occasions. Lodgment No.

9, vol. 1 at 159-69, vol. 2 at 223-35. In fact, Hirad drove to the bank with the individual who

sold him the stolen car. Lodgment No. 9, vol. 2 at 235-36. The evidence also supports a

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conclusion that Taghavi and Hirad were paying close attention to the individual because they

were negotiating the purchase of a car over a substantial period of time. The negotiations

took some time because Hirad had to check the VIN number, the title papers and the driver’s

license of the woman (Rita Wages, impersonating Sara Beth Johnson, the actual owner) who

was supposedly selling the car, the individual did not want to accept a check, and

arrangements had to be made to secure cash. Id. at 231-36. 

Taghavi and Hirad testified at trial that they knew Keo from prior interactions, but did

not specifically give a description of the individual who sold them the stolen car, primarily

because the illegality of the sale did not come to light until Abdy was shot. Lodgment No. 9,

vol. 1 at 169-71, vol. 2 at 255. Both Taghavi and Hirad identified Keo in the lineup within two

weeks of the incident. Lodgment No. 9, vol. 1 at 158-60, vol. 2 at 225-26316. In sum,

Taghavi’s and Hirad’s identification of Keo also had sufficient indicators of reliability such that,

even if the product of a suggestive, lineup, they should not have been excluded. See Perry,

132 S.Ct. at 724.

For all the foregoing reasons, this Court cannot conclude the state court’s rejection of

Keo’s claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. For the foregoing reasons, this Court

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner's Petition be DENIED on ground one .

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Keo contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when she failed to

present testimony by an eyewitness identification expert. Pet. at 8-10, ECF No. 1. 

Respondent counters that the state court’s resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Mem. of P. & A. Supp.

Answer at 19-21.

Keo raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California Supreme Court.

Lodgment No. 2. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. Lodgment No.

1. Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state appellate court’s opinion denying

the claim as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. That court wrote:

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On appeal, Keo contends his retained trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to call an expert on eyewitness identification without

explanation after alerting the court that she may do so. His claim fails on

appeal.

“To secure reversal of a conviction upon the ground of ineffective

assistance of counsel under either the state or federal

Constitution, a defendant must establish (1) that defense counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,

i.e., that counsel’s performance did not meet the standard to be

expected of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) that there

is a reasonable probability that defendant would have obtained a

more favorable result absent counsel’s shortcomings. [Citations.] 

‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.’ [Citations.]” (Cunningham, supra, 25

Cal.4th at p. 1003.)

Further, “[i]f the record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or

failed to act in the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was asked

for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no

satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal.” (People v. Kraft

(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1068-1069 (Kraft); People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15

Cal.4th 264, 266-267 (Mendoza Tello).)

Here, the record is silent on why Keo’s counsel did not call an expert to

testify on eyewitness identification. Because counsel was not asked for an

explanation and the record fails to eliminate the possibility of a satisfactory

explanation for not calling one, i.e., counsel may have made a tactical decision

not to call an eyewitness expert because she thought the expert might be more

helpful to the prosecution than to the defense in light of so many of the

witnesses, including the shooting victim, already knew Keo before the crimes,

we must reject the claim for purposes of this appeal. (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th

at pp. 1068-1069; Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 266-267.)

Lodgment No. 3 at 17-18.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in federal court, Keo must

first establishe that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “This requires a

showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s

performance must be “highly deferential.” Id. at 689. Second, he must show that counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced the defense, such that the result of the proceeding would

have been different absent counsel’s errors. Id. at 687. On federal habeas review, “the

question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, [but] whether there is any

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington v.

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Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011). The Court need not address the performance

prong if the claim can be resolved on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697. 

As the state court properly concluded, counsel could have made a reasonable tactical

decision that calling an eyewitness identification expert would not have helped Keo’s case as

much as casting doubt on the witness’ identification of Keo via cross examination and

argument. Counsel could have reasonably feared the prosecutor would be successful in

discrediting an eyewitness expert’s favorable testimony because the witnesses identified

someone they had seen numerous times. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. As such, Petitioner

has not established that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable. In addition, Keo

has not met Strickland’s prejudice prong because he has not shown what the expert would

have testified to and how that testimony would have changed the outcome of his trial. Id. at

689. He simply speculates that the testimony of an eyewitness identification expert would have

helped his case. That is an insufficient showing to meet Strickland’s prejudice standard, and

the state court therefore reasonably rejected Keo’s claim. See id.; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-

13. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner's Petition be DENIED on ground

two. 

V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge

Larry Alan Burns under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d)(4) of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1) approving and adopting

this Report and Recommendation, and (2) DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 16, 2012 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than July 30, 2012. The parties are advised that

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failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 18, 2012

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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