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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1654

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Willa Russell, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

City of Kansas City, Missouri, *

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

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Submitted: January 13, 2005

Filed: July 12, 2005

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, HANSEN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD,

Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

After investigating a complaint by an African-American subordinate, the

Kansas City Water Services Department demoted Willa Russell, a white female

supervisor in the Pipeline Division, reduced her pay, and stripped her of all

supervisory duties. Russell appealed to the City’s Human Resources Board. After

an evidentiary hearing, the Board concluded that Russell had engaged in misconduct,

though it prospectively restored her pay and reduced her demotion. Russell then

commenced this action, alleging intentional race and gender discrimination in

violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and the Missouri Human Rights Act,

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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary

judgment, and Russell appeals. Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo

and viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Russell, the

non-moving party, we reverse. See Brunke v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 344 F.3d

819, 821 (8th Cir. 2003) (standard of review).

I.

The dispute began in August 2000 when probationary employee Jennifer Love

complained to the City that supervisor Russell had pushed Love and placed her in a

headlock, had made several racially offensive comments, and had used offensive

profanity in the workplace. Love stated that three other employees heard Russell’s

offensive comments and that Russell’s two supervisors failed to take corrective action

in response to Love’s formal complaint. 

Two Water Department employees investigated this complaint by interviewing

Love, Russell, and two other Pipeline Division employees. The investigators

concluded that Love’s complaint of physical violence was unfounded but that Russell

“had made repeated inappropriate comments based on race, ethnicity, and sexual

orientation and . . . participated in or condoned activities that can only be termed as

unprofessional, especially in light of her status as a supervisor.” On September 1,

acting on this report, the Director of Water Services sent Russell a letter removing her

from the Pipeline Division offices “effective immediately,” relieving her of all

supervisory duties, and recommending “a five (5) day suspension without pay for

your unprofessional behavior.” The letter advised Russell that a predetermination

hearing had been scheduled for September 12.

The next document in the sparse record on appeal is a January 3, 2001, letter

from an EEO Investigator for the City’s Human Resources Department to the Director

of Water Services summarizing “the investigation that was conducted by the Equal

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Employment Opportunity/Diversity Office in response to allegations of racial

discrimination filed by Jennifer Love.” The letter advised that, after interviewing

Love, Russell, four office staff, and Russell’s two supervisors, the Investigator

concluded that “the following allegations [by Love] were corroborated”:

1. Ms. Russell did have a conversation with Ms. Love regarding

her family picking cotton. However, it appears that both Ms. Love and

Ms. Russell were laughing and joking during the conversation and that

Ms. Love informed Ms. Russell the next day that she did not appreciate

the comments made during the conversation.

2. Ms. Russell did make a comment regarding Mexicans taking

baths in fire hydrants while watching a Water Services video with other

employees, including an employee of Hispanic origin. 

3. Ms. Russell regularly referred to a male employee (who is

reported to be homosexual) as a “sissy pants.”

The Investigator reported that the use of inappropriate language, ethnic slurs, and

racial jokes in the office “is commonplace and tolerated” and recommended that

Russell be demoted to a non-supervisory position for at least one year.

On January 4, the EEO Investigator sent Russell a letter advising her of the

findings and the recommendation that Russell be disciplined. Though this letter was

treated as the Department’s statement of reasons at the subsequent due process

hearing before the Personnel Board, the City did not include the document in the Joint

Appendix on appeal. On January 5, Love received a letter from the Human Resources

Department rejecting her complaint because “the use of slurs, racial epithets, and

jokes based on race, ethnicity and sexual orientation is commonplace and tolerated.”

The City did not include this document in the Joint Appendix. On January 27, after

a predetermination hearing, the hearing officer determined that there was sufficient

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evidence to uphold the Director’s recommended discipline. The City likewise did not

include a copy of the hearing officer’s decision in the Joint Appendix.

The Water Services Department demoted Russell and reduced her pay on

March 26, 2001. Russell appealed to the Human Resources Department, and a

hearing was held before its Personnel Board on June 15, 2001. Regarding the EEO

Investigator’s finding that Russell made a disparaging comment regarding Mexican

children bathing in fire hydrants in the presence of an Hispanic employee, the

employee in question, Rita Hernandez, testified that she never heard Russell make an

inappropriate ethnic comment. Hernandez testified that Love and other employees

including Russell frequently used profanity and racial slurs and that, in Hernandez’s

opinion, Russell had been singled out for punishment because she is white “in an

office where all supervisors condone the types of things she’s being accused of.” 

Regarding the EEO Investigator’s finding that Russell regularly referred to a

male employee as a “sissy pants,” the employee in question, William Recar, testified

that he is openly homosexual and has never been offended when Russell occasionally

called him “sissy boy” (not “sissy pants”); that Russell’s comments to Recar were

always friendly and non-malicious; that black and white employees regularly used

profanity and engaged in racial banter without appearing to be offended; that

Russell’s two supervisors knew of this verbal environment but took no action; and

that he had seen at least five supervisors “do the same things that Willa Russell is

being accused of and not be disciplined.” Like Hernandez, Recar opined that Russell

had been singled out for discipline because she is white.

After the hearing, the Board issued a written decision concluding that Russell

“engaged in misconduct when, in the presence of, and often directed towards, her

subordinate employees, she regularly used profanity, made inappropriate comments

about race, and called a subordinate employee ‘sissy pants’ and that her actions are

cause for disciplinary action.” However, the Board reduced Russell’s demotion from

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two position levels to one and reinstated her prior salary without back pay. In

addition, the Board expressed concern “with the fact that [Russell’s] supervisors were

not disciplined for failing to address [Russell’s] behavior and with allegations of the

pervasive use of profanity and demeaning language by both employees and

supervisors.” In response to this criticism, the Water Department issued reprimand

letters one month later to Russell’s two supervisors, a black male and a white male,

but did not demote them or reduce their pay. This lawsuit followed.

II.

As an initial matter, we agree with Russell that the district court committed an

error of law in construing the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v.

Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), as modifying the summary judgment standard applied by

this court in employment discrimination cases. See Griffith v. City of Des Moines,

387 F.3d 733, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2004). Under that standard, as we have explained in

Griffith and many other cases, an employee can survive the employer’s motion for

summary judgment in one of two ways. First, the employee can produce direct

evidence of discrimination, that is, “evidence showing a specific link between the

alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a

finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the

adverse employment action.” 387 F.3d at 736 (quotation omitted). Alternatively, if

the employee lacks direct evidence of intentional discrimination, she may survive the

employer’s motion for summary judgment by “creating the requisite inference of

unlawful discrimination” through the familiar three-step burden-shifting analysis

originating in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 

To apply the standard in this case, it is essential to focus on the specific reasons

Russell was demoted. The dispute began with Love’s complaint that she had been

physically assaulted and racially harassed by Russell. But viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to Russell, as we must, those complaints were completely

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Although the Personnel Board held an evidentiary due process hearing, it is

well-settled that Russell is entitled to a trial de novo of her Title VII claim. See Univ.

of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796 & n.5 (1986). Russell of course has no

evidence that the members of the Board were guilty of intentional race or gender

discrimination. But one issue is whether the Board served as a conduit or cat’s paw

for Water Department officials who were acting on an unlawful motive (at least in

part) in initially imposing the discipline. Compare Kramer v. Logan County Sch.

Dist. No. R-1, 157 F.3d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1998), with Lacks v. Ferguson Reorg. Sch.

Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 725 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1012 (1999). In

this case, there is at least some evidence that the Board was a mere conduit, or

perhaps an inattentive rubber stamp -- its decision repeated the EEO Investigator’s

error in reporting that Russell and others called Recar “sissy pants,” rather than “sissy

boy,” after Recar pointedly corrected that mistake at the evidentiary hearing.

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discredited by the end of the Personnel Board hearing. The EEO Investigator’s only

finding regarding Love was that Russell and Love engaged in light-hearted racial

banter that Love complained about the next day. At the evidentiary hearing, Russell,

Hernandez, and Recar all refuted Love’s allegations, and the Board’s post-hearing

findings do not even mention the alleged misconduct against Love. Thus, for

summary judgment purposes, Love’s complaint of racial harassment, though it

certainly warranted initial investigation by the City, is immaterial. Instead, the EEO

Investigator found Russell guilty of derogatory and offensive comments to Hernandez

and Recar and of tolerating a profane workplace where inappropriate racial jokes and

banter were common. The Board upheld these findings and concluded they “are

cause for disciplinary action.” 

Direct Evidence. At oral argument, Russell’s attorney conceded that she does

not have direct evidence of discrimination. The concession may be ill-advised. The

City’s primary stated reasons for disciplining Russell, as reflected in the

Investigator’s report and in the Board’s decision, were her comment about Mexican

children in Hernandez’s presence and her calling the homosexual Recar “sissy

pants.”1

 On appeal, the City characterizes these as “derogatory comments based on

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. . . ethnicity and sexual orientation.” But at the hearing, both Hernandez and Recar

testified, under oath, that Russell had never made comments they considered bigoted,

derogatory, or offensive. Moreover, they opined that Russell had been singled out

for discipline on account of her race. When two co-workers who are the alleged

victims of misconduct deny that misconduct occurred and assert that the plaintiff is

herself the victim of discrimination by the employer, that may well be direct evidence

of discrimination sufficient to withstand the employer’s motion for summary

judgment. And if this testimony is not by itself sufficient, it is a powerful showing

of the pretext needed to defeat summary judgment under McDonnell Douglas. 

The McDonnell Douglas Analysis. The three-part McDonnell Douglas

analysis begins with the plaintiff employee establishing a prima facie of

discrimination, followed by the employer articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its adverse employment action. Neither of those steps is at issue here.

Rather, as is usually the case, the question is whether Russell countered the City’s

non-discriminatory explanation with a sufficient showing that the City’s stated reason

is merely a pretext for unlawful intentional discrimination.

One common way to show pretext is with evidence that other similarly situated

individuals who were not in the plaintiff’s protected class engaged in the same

conduct but were treated differently. See Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d

968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994). In a case of alleged discriminatory discipline, such as this,

the plaintiff must produce evidence that the acts of other employees who were not

disciplined or were disciplined less severely were of “comparable seriousness” to her

infraction. Lanear v. Safeway Grocery, 843 F.2d 298, 301 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). 

In the district court, Russell named twenty-eight Pipeline Division employees

who regularly used profanity or told racist jokes and were not disciplined or demoted.

The district court concluded that these “broad, general allegations” did not meet the

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“rigorous” test that the compared employees be similarly situated in all material

respects. In our view, the district court’s general survey of this overgrown forest

overlooked the two most important trees. 

Viewing the summary judgment record most favorably to Russell, the evidence

is that Love’s initial complaint -- that Russell was guilty of offensive racial comments

to Love, Hernandez, and Recar -- was either invalidated by the City’s investigations

or discredited by the hearing testimony of Hernandez and Recar. The remaining valid

basis for Russell’s demotion was that she tolerated as a supervisor, and indeed helped

to foster, a workplace in which unacceptable profanity was rampant and inappropriate

racial and ethnic joking was common. But as to that misconduct, there were two

similarly situated employees: Russell’s two immediate supervisors who tolerated the

same workplace for years, who participated in the friendly but unacceptable verbal

environment, and who reported to the same City officials who demoted Russell. Yet

these two supervisors, one a black male and the other a white male, initially received

no discipline at all and then were given a slap on the wrist after the Personnel Board

had upheld a reduced but still severe punishment of Russell. When combined with

Russell’s other evidence casting doubt on the bona fides of the City’s decision,

particularly the above-described testimony of Hernandez and Recar, we conclude that

the showing of pretext was more than enough to defeat the City’s motion for

summary judgment.

Conclusion. Title VII does not bar an employer, particularly a public employer,

from taking decisive action to clean up a workplace where racial and ethnic jokes are

common and the use of offensive profanity is rampant. That action may of course

include relieving responsible supervisors of their supervisory duties. But when the

only white female supervisor in the relevant work force presents strong evidence of

double standards, selective enforcement of human resource policies, and

scapegoating, as Willa Russell has in this case, it is for a jury to decide whether she

is the victim of intentional race or gender discrimination. 

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The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for

further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

______________________________

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