Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-02497/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-02497-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

*E-FILED - 6/12/08*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ROBERT A. CHESTRA,

Petitioner,

 v.

DARREL ADAMS, 

Respondent. /

No. C 06-2497 RMW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Robert Chestra, a California state prisoner who is proceeding pro se, seeks a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction for seconddegree robbery. In response to the order to show cause, respondent has filed an answer and

petitioner has filed a traverse. Having reviewed the briefs and the underlying record, the

court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the claims presented and will

deny the petition. 

BACKGROUND

The charges against petitioner arose from his robbing a bank in Burlingame,

California in 2002. The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts as follows:

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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On September 23, 2002, near 1:15 p.m., [petitioner] walked into the

Washington Mutual Bank in Burlingame and got into line. When [petitioner’s]

turn arose, he gave the teller, Jinky Lasat, a note that said, ‘”I have a gun. Give

me your 100s and 50s.’”

Lasat considered pushing her alarm, but she was afraid that if she did,

[petitioner] might shoot her. She decided to stall him instead. Lasat returned

the note to [petitioner] and told him, ‘”I don’t know what the note sa[ys].’” 

[Petitioner] replied, ‘”You know what it said.’” Believing [petitioner] was

serious about robbing the bank, Lasat gave him all the $100 and $50 bills in her

drawer; a total of $1,100. [Petitioner] put the money into his pants pocket and

left. He walked about a block and a half to where he had parked his car, a

Toyota 4Runner. [Petitioner] got into his car and drove away.

Meanwhile, Lasat screamed to her manager that she had been robbed. She

called the police and provided a description of [petitioner].

A few minutes later, at 1:28 p.m., Burlingame Police Sergeant Michael

Matteucci was on patrol when he heard a report that the Washington Mutual

Bank had been robbed. The report provided a description of the robber and

said he claimed to be armed. Matteucci drove toward the bank[.] When he

was about four blocks away, he saw a Toyota 4Runner driving toward him. The

driver, [petitioner], matched the description of the robber, so Matteucci turned

his patrol car around and started to follow the 4Runner. After calling for and

obtaining back-up, Matteucci stopped the 4Runner and detained [petitioner]. 

Another officer brought Lasat to the scene of the stop. She identified

[petitioner] as the man who had robbed her just minutes earlier.

People v. Chestra, No. H028197, 2004 WL 3019001 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 30,

2004) at *1 (“Op.”). 

A San Mateo County Superior Court jury convicted petitioner of second-degree

robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 212.5(c). Op. at 1. The superior court, taking into consideration

sentencing enhancements for petitioner’s prior felony convictions and prior prison terms

(Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(a), 667.5, 1170.12(c)(2)), sentenced petitioner to a total term of

forty years to life in state prison. Id. The California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate

District, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed petitioner’s conviction and summarily denied

petitioner’s habeas petition. Id.; Ans., Exs. F, H. The California Supreme Court denied

direct review and his state habeas petition. Ans., Ex. I, J. Petitioner filed the instant federal

petition in 2006. 

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner alleges that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance when he failed to (A) impeach Officer Matteucci’s testimony at the

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1. The court, upon a motion from petitioner, dismissed a fourth, and unexhausted, claim

regarding double jeopardy. Renewed Order to Show Cause at 2. 

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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state suppression hearing by using the police reports; (B) call the other arresting officers to

testify at the suppression hearing to further impeach Officer Matteucci’s testimony; and (c)

inform petitioner of his right to testify at the suppression hearing.1

 Order to Show Cause

(“OSC”) at 4; Pet. at 7-8. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal habeas court will entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). The court may not grant a petition with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 

Id. § 2254(d)(1). The court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made

by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of

the state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming,

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the

highest state court to consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned

opinion, in this case the opinion of the California Court of Appeal. See Nunnemaker at

801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted only if the error had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638

(1993)).

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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DISCUSSION

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are examined under Strickland

v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness of

counsel, petitioner must establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s

performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-68. Second, he must establish that he was

prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. Id. Where the defendant is challenging his conviction, the

appropriate question is “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the

factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id. at 695. It is

unnecessary for a federal court considering a habeas ineffective assistance claim to address

the prejudice prong of the Strickland test if the petitioner cannot even establish

incompetence under the first prong. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir.

1998). 

A. Police Report

Petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to impeach Officer Matteucci’s

suppression hearing testimony by introducing the police reports into evidence. Pet. at 7-8. 

Petitioner contends that because the facts described in the police reports differ from the

facts as Matteucci described them in his testimony, trial counsel should have been able to

impeach the witness. By questioning his credibility in this way, trial counsel should have

been able to undermine confidence in Matteucci’s stated reasons for stopping the vehicle

and the arrest. Id., P. & A. at 18. The state appellate court upheld the trial court’s denial of

petitioner’s motion to suppress, stating, that “the facts apparent to Officer Matteucci were

sufficient to support [petitioner’s] initial detention.” Op. at 3. 

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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The facts of the stop and arrest, as described at the suppression hearing, were

summarized by the state appellate court as follows:

Sergeant Matteucci was on patrol when he heard a report that the Washington

Mutual Bank had been robbed. The report described the robber as a black

male, approximately 30 years of age, wearing blue jeans, a black t-shirt, and a

black baseball cap. According to the report, the robber said he was armed.

Matteucci drove toward the bank. When he was less than one half mile away,

he saw a Toyota 4Runner driving toward him; i.e. away from the bank. 

Matteucci could see that the driver, [petitioner], was a black man in his 30’s

who was wearing a black t-shirt and a black “beanie-type” hat.

Matteucci believed [petitioner] might be the bank robber, so he decided to

follow him. To ensure his own safety, Matteucci called for backup.

Matteucci followed the 4Runner through the streets of Burlingame and onto

Highway 101. When other officers joined in the pursuit, Matteucci activated

his lights and stopped the 4Runner. [Petitioner] pulled to the side of the

highway. Because the robber was reported to have said he was armed,

Matteucci and the other officers used a “high risk stop.” They ordered

[petitioner] out of his vehicle at gun point.

[Petitioner] got out of his 4Runner. Matteucci saw that [petitioner], like the

robber, was wearing jeans. Matteucci walked past [petitioner] and looked

inside the 4Runner through the open driver’s side window. He saw a black

baseball cap on the passenger side floorboard.

The officers ordered [petitioner] to walk behind the 4Runner and to lie down

on the ground. [Petitioner] complied. As he did so, the demand note

[petitioner] had used to rob the bank fell out of his pants. One of the officers

retrieved it. Officer Matteucci also saw that money was falling out of

[petitioner’s] pants.

About 15 minutes later, Officer Brian McKague arrived at the scene with

Lasat. McKague asked Matteucci to put the black baseball cap on

[petitioner]. Matteucci retrieved the cap from the 4Runner and placed it on

[petitioner’s] head. Lasat identified [petitioner] as the bank robber. Later the

officers searched [petitioner’s] pants. They found $1,100 in cash.

The trial court considering this evidence denied [petitioner’s] motion to

suppress ruling Officer Matteucci’s observations sufficient to support the

initial detention and the subsequent arrest and search.

Op. at 2. 

The arresting officers, viz., Matteucci, Kaiser, and Gleason, filed police reports. 

Matteucci’s police report states that “a search of [petitioner’s] person at the stop location”

yielded a cellphone, a note “with the writing ‘I have a gun 100 + 50 only” found in

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2. At trial, Officer Keith Tamura, who arrived at the scene as the other officers brought

petitioner to his feet, testified that he picked up the note from the ground. Ans., Ex. B, Vol.

2 (Reporter’s Transcript, 3/5/03) at 242-43. 

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petitioner’s right rear pocket, and “$1,100.00 in cash” in the left front pocket of his jeans. 

Ans., Ex. H (Amended State Appellate Habeas Petition, Ex. A at 4, Burlingame Police

Report). Matteucci says nothing in the report about papers or anything else falling out of

petitioner’s pockets. Kaiser’s version of events, as stated in his police report, was: 

As I checked [petitioner’s] pants pockets I found $1,100.00 in cash . . . in

[petitioner’s] left front pants’ pocket. Upon checking the right rear pocket of

[petitioner’s] pants I felt a hard object in the pocket. I pulled out a dark

brown leather wallet. As I pulled the wallet out of [petitioner’s] right rear

pocket a white piece of paper came out of the pocket with the wallet and fell

to ground. This piece of paper was a note with the writing “I have a gun

100+50 only[.”] I handed the note to Sgt. Matteucci.2

 

Id., (Ex. A at 11). Officer Gleason’s report states that as Officer Kaiser removed

petitioner’s wallet from his right rear jean pocket, a small white piece of paper fell to the

ground from the same pocket, which Officer Kaiser picked up. Id., (Ex. A at 12). 

Based on this record of evidence, petitioner’s claim is without merit because he is

unable to demonstrate that trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance resulted in

prejudice. First, setting aside the issue of Matteucci’s credibility, it is immaterial to the

question of the legality of the vehicle stop or arrest whether the items fell out of petitioner’s

pockets or were found on his person. Matteucci stopped petitioner’s vehicle because of his

proximity to the bank and because he closely matched the race, sex, age, and clothing of

the suspect described in the radioed reports. The state appellate court found these factors

sufficient to justify the stop and the arrest. The note’s appearance was irrelevant to this

determination. Therefore, the differences between the testimonial and written versions of

events regarding the provenance of the note are likewise irrelevant. Because the stories of

the note are irrelevant, trial counsel’s alleged error could not have resulted in a different

outcome. 

Second, even if the testimonial and written versions differ, petitioner has not shown

that this fact casts doubt on Matteucci’s credibility. Rather, these are slightly different

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3. Trial counsel, Linda Bramy, submitted a declaration in which she states that she did not

have petitioner testify at the suppression hearing “because I did not believe his testimony

would help him prevail on the suppression motion.” Ans., Ex. K at 1. Bramy asserts that

petitioner did not tell her that the baseball hat was under the passenger seat and therefore

not visible from outside the vehicle. Id. 

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versions of the same event, perhaps the result of different perceptions and powers of recall. 

Because these differences are slight, petitioner cannot show that trial counsel’s failure to

bring them to the trial court’s attention would have changed the outcome. Finally, the

alleged contradictions are about the unimportant matter whether the note was found on

petitioner’s person or dropped out of his pocket before the search. As stated above, the

stop and the arrest were based on facts independent of the finding of the note. Petitioner,

then, has not shown that these unimportant details would have made a difference in the

outcome of the proceeding, and therefore, he has not shown that trial counsel’s alleged

error resulted in prejudice. 

B. Testimony of Other Arresting Officers

Petitioner contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when she failed

to call the other arresting officers to testify as to their recollections and as to the contents of

the police reports and thereby impeach Officer Matteucci’s credibility. OSC at 4. This

contention is likewise without merit. Because it involves the same issues and evidence as

the previous claim, it has been fully addressed above. 

C. Informing of Right to Testify 

Petitioner further contends that trial counsel failed to inform him about his right to

testify at the suppression hearing. Pet., P. & A. at 26. Petitioner asserts that his testimony

would have rebutted Officer Mattuecci’s testimony that the baseball hat was in plain view

and thereby undermine the validity of petitioner’s arrest.3

 Id.

Petitioner’s claim is without merit because he fails to demonstrate that prejudice

resulted from trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. Setting aside the issue

whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient, the court has already determined that

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petitioner has not shown that prejudice resulted from trial counsel’s failure to introduce

petitioner’s impeachment evidence. Specifically, sufficient evidence existed apart from the

note and hat evidence to justify the stop and arrest. So, even if petitioner had testified and

thereby challenged Matteucci’s assertion that the baseball hat was in plain view, it is

unlikely that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Again, Matteucci

stopped petitioner’s vehicle because it was close to the bank and because petitioner closely

matched the description of the suspect, not because of the observations of the hat and note. 

Accordingly, even if trial counsel’s performance was deficient, petitioner has not shown

that the outcome of the proceeding would have resulted in a ruling favorable to petitioner. 

CONCLUSION

Applying the highly deferential standard imposed by AEDPA, this court concludes

that the state court’s determination was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

Accordingly, the court concludes that petitioner has failed to show any violation of his

federal constitutional rights in the underlying state court proceedings and parole hearing. 

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall enter judgment and

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 6/6/08 ______________________________ RONALD M. WHYTE

 United States District Judge 

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