Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01241/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01241-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARLON E. SIGUENZA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv1241-BEN (MDD)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. No. 18]

vs.

MINERVA COTERO, et al.,

Defendants.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

Roger T. Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 72.3 of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 6, 2011, Plaintiff Marlon E. Siguenza (“Plaintiff”) filed a civil rights

lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants M. Cotero and R. Variz. (Doc.

No. 1). On November 3, 2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”),

naming Cherly K. Pliler and George Guirbino as additional Defendants. (Doc. No.

14). On November 22, 2011, Defendants Cotero and Variz filed the instant Motion to

Dismiss. (Doc. No. 18). Plaintiff filed a Opposition to Defendants’ Motion on January

10, 2012. (Doc. No. 28). Defendants filed a Reply on January 12, 2012. (Doc. No.

32). On January 12, 2012, Defendants Pliler and Georbino filed a Notice of Joinder

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as to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 33). 

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts are taken from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and are not to be

construed as findings of fact by the Court. 

Plaintiff is a prisoner housed at Centinela State Prison. On May 11, 2011,

Plaintiff visited the prison law library and attempted to print ten copies of a 91 page

document in support of his petition to the California Supreme Court for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus. (FAC at 4). Plaintiff filled out a request to print the materials, but

was informed by the clerk that M. Cotero, the prison official in charge of approving

copies, had denied his request. Id. Plaintiff spoke with Cotero and reiterated his

request, but Cotero informed Plaintiff that, according to prison regulations, she

would not approve any request over 50 pages, and would not approve a request for

more than three copies. Id. 

Plaintiff explained to Cotero that he had served as the law library clerk at

Calipatria State prison where inmates were allowed to copy 100 page documents and

make as many copies as were required so long as the inmate explained they were

necessary. Id. Plaintiff also asserted that Cotero’s refusal was contrary to DOM §

101120.15, which provides that a court order is only required for the copying of

documents over 100 pages, but Cotero continued to deny his request. Id.

Plaintiff reduced his document to 24 pages and again asked Cotero to print his

document. (FAC at 5). Three copies were printed and Plaintiff mailed them to the

California Supreme Court. Id. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of

the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Specific facts are not necessary; the

statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the [...] claim is and the

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grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal

citations omitted). Nevertheless, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to

provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Bell v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Thus, while specific detail is not

required, every complaint must, at a minimum, plead “enough facts to state a claim

for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 547; Weber v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,

521 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008). The federal rules require more than a mere

“unadorned ‘the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation’” or a pleading that

simply offers “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

The court must assume the truth of the facts which are presented and construe

all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). A pro se party’s pleadings

should be construed liberally. Id. However, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true.” Bell, 127 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, the court is

not required to “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted

deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, the court

may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v.

Bd. of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s FAC contains a single claim, alleging that Defendants Cotero, Variz,

Pliler, and Georbino violated his right to access the courts. (FAC at 3). In their

Motion, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for three reasons. First,

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Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim is barred because he failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing suit. (Doc. No. 18 at 7). Second, Defendants

contend that even if Plaintiff’s claim were not barred, he has failed to state a valid

claim. Id. Finally, Defendants assert that even if Plaintiff’s claim were valid, it

should still be dismissed because the Defendants are protected by qualified

immunity. The Court addresses each of these points in turn. 

A. Failure to Exhaust 

In their Motion, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s FAC should be dismissed

because Plaintiff himself concedes that he has not exhausted his administrative

remedies. (Doc. No. 18 at 4). Defendants note that Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on

June 6, 2011, but that, according to Plaintiff’s own FAC, Plaintiff did not exhaust his

administrative remedies until October 10, 2011. Id.

The Ninth Circuit has held that “failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies is a

matter of abatement” not going to the merits of the case and is properly raised

pursuant to a motion to dismiss, including a non-enumerated motion under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Wyatt v.Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a

non-enumerated motion under Rule 12(b) to be the “proper pretrial motion for

establishing nonexhaustion” of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);1

Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368-69 (9th

Cir. 1988). Wyatt also holds that non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as set

forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense which defendant prison

officials have the burden of raising and proving. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. However,

unlike Rule 12(b)(6), “[i]n deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed

issues of fact.” Id. at 1120 (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d at 369). 

1 In so finding, the Ninth Circuit made clear that unlike a motion for summary judgment,

“dismissal of an action on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not on the

merits.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (citation omitted). Thus, if the court finds that the prisoner

has failed to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, “the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without

prejudice.” Id. (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d at 368 & n.3).

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The Prison Litigation and Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to

provide that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42

U.S.C. § 1983], or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and not left to the

discretion of the district court. Woodford v Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). Exhaustion

is required prior to the filing of any prisoner lawsuit concerning prison life, whether

the claims involve general conditions or specific incidents and whether they allege

excessive force or some other wrong. “Even when the prisoner seeks relief not

available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a

prerequisite to suit.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). A claim is not

“exhausted” simply because administrative remedies are no longer obtainable.

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 88. 

According to Plaintiff’s FAC, after Plaintiff’s request to copy his documents was

refused, he filed a grievance in an attempt to correct the situation. (FAC at 8). On

May 17, 2011, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal with log number CEN-A-11-00447. 

That appeal was denied at the third and final level on October 10, 2011. Id. Plaintiff

provides a copy of that decision with his FAC. (See FAC, Ex. A). Accordingly,

Defendants are correct that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

before he filed suit.

In his Opposition, Plaintiff counters that he properly exhausted his

administrative remedies before he filed his FAC on November 3, 2011. (Opp. at 5-6). 

Plaintiff acknowledges that his Complaint was filed before he exhausted, but

contends that because the FAC supersedes the original Complaint, and his

administrative remedies were exhausted before the FAC was filed, his claim should

not be dismissed. Plaintiff cites Rhodes v.Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir.

2010) in support of the proposition that dismissal is improper where the plaintiff has

exhausted remedies prior to amending his complaint. (Opp. at 6). In their Reply,

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Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot exhaust his administrative remedies during

the course of litigation, thus amendment cannot cure Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust

before filing his original Complaint. (Reply at 2). 

In McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1198-2001 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth

Circuit held that a court must dismiss a claim brought under § 1983 when the

plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, even when

he is the process of doing so. The fact that the plaintiff in McKinney could exhaust

his claims before the court ruled on their merits did not rescue the plaintiff’s claims,

as § 1997e(a) requires exhaustion before a claim is brought, not before judgment is

reached. Id. at 1200. The McKinney Court further recognized that “[w]hile it is true

that requiring dismissal may, in some circumstances, occasion the expenditure of

additional resources on the part of the parties and the court, it seems apparent that

Congress has made a policy judgment that this concern is outweighed by the

advantages of requiring exhaustion prior to the filing of suit.” Id. 

In Rhodes, however, the court found dismissal improper where the plaintiff

filed an amended complaint containing claims that would have been unexhausted in

the original complaint, but which had become exhausted prior to the plaintiff’s filing

of the amended complaint. The Court emphasized that plaintiff’s original complaint

contained no unexhausted claims, and the claims in his amended complaint were not

even discovered by the plaintiff until well after the filing of the original complaint. 

Rhodes, 621 F.3d 1007. The Rhodes court permitted the new claims, reasoning that it

was impossible for plaintiff to have exhausted claims he was unaware of, and

recognized that plaintiff had never brought a claim before the court until it had

become exhausted. Id. 

Unlike the plaintiff in Rhodes, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not allege

new, properly exhausted claims. Rather, Plaintiff’s FAC contains the same claim

presented in his original Complaint, with the addition of two new defendants. 

Plaintiff thus falls under the general rule that a plaintiff may “initiate litigation in

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federal court only after the administrative process ends and leaves his grievances

unredressed.” Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot rescue his unexhausted claim through

amendment. Though McKinney did not deal with this exact situation, it explicitly

rejected the argument that a plaintiff can cure unexhausted claims while the action

is pending. As Plaintiff’s Complaint was improper, no subsequent action can cure

that defect other than dismissal by the Court and re-filing by the Plaintiff. 

McKinney, 311 F.3d at 2001; see also Parmer v. Alvarez, 2010 WL 4117266 (S.D. Cal.

2010) (dismissing claim without leave to amend, finding that leave to amend is futile

where plaintiff’s original complaint was not properly exhausted). To hold that

amendment can rescue unexhausted claims would render McKinney and Rhodes

irrelevant. While it may be inefficient to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims now that they are

exhausted, § 1997e(a) instructs that the Court must do so. The clear language of §

1997e(a) makes efficiency considerations irrelevant. Accordingly, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s FAC

DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend.

B. Failure to State a Claim

Defendants also ask the Court to evaluate Plaintiff’s claims on the merits and

dismiss with prejudice. (Doc. No. 18). In some circumstances, a district court may

proceed to the merits of a claim despite a procedural fault. For example, 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2) permits a court reviewing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to render a

decision on the merits “notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust

remedies available in the courts of the State.” Section 1997e(a), however, does not

provide the court with this option. Rather, dismissal under § 1997e(a) is mandatory. 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The absence of a provision in § 1997e(a)

mirroring § 2254(b)(2) suggests that a decision on the merits is inappropriate in §

1983 cases where the plaintiff has failed to exhaust. Nevertheless, in the interest of

providing a full and complete recommendation, the Court will proceed to address

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Plaintiff’s claim on the merits. 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that Plaintiff has

failed to allege actual injury or that he was actually impeded from filing his Motion to

Amend. 

“Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, state

prisoners have a right of access to the courts.” Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075

(9th Cir.2007) (overruled on other grounds) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346

(1996)). “[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires

prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal

papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance

from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). Access

to the courts means that a prisoner has the opportunity to prepare, serve, and file

court documents in cases affecting his liberty. Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1075-76 (quoting

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 384). 

 In Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002), the Supreme Court

distinguished between two types of claims for denial of access to the courts. The first

type is a forward-looking denial of access claim that may arise from the frustration or

hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained.” Id. at 2185-87. The second

type is a backward-looking denial of access claim that may arise from the loss of a

meritorious suit that cannot now be tried and has been forever lost because of the

interference of government officials. Id. at 2186-87. Further, Harbury reiterated the

ruling in Lewis: in order to state a claim for interference with the right of access to

the courts, a plaintiff must establish actual injury to a nonfrivolous (1) criminal trial

or appeal, (2) habeas proceeding, or (3) section 1983 case challenging the condition of

his confinement. Lewis, 581 U.S. at 355.

Here, Plaintiff claims that his right to access the court was violated when

Defendant Cotero refused to allow him to make ten copies of his 91 page Motion to

Amend Exhibits which Plaintiff wished to file in support of his state court application

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to the California Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. (FAC at 1). 

Plaintiff has failed to plead with specificity that he suffered an actual injury. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not suffer harm by being limited to three copies. 

Plaintiff must show that he suffered actual injury “such as the inability to meet a

filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 359. Defendants note that

Plaintiff’s documents were accepted by the California Supreme Court.2 Thus,

Plaintiff cannot show that his failure to make ten copies, despite the California

Supreme Court’s previous order that he do so, prejudiced his underlying claim in any

way. 

As to Plaintiff’s claim that he was not allowed to copy the full number of pages,

his claim also fails. Plaintiff is correct that, in some cases, being forced to omit

arguments or claims can support a claim for denial of access to the courts. Lewis, 518

U.S. at 359; Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 1999); Keenan v. Hall, 83

F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, while Plaintiff states that he was forced to

reduce the size of his motion to amend his exhibits, he does not state that he was

forced to abandon any arguments or other substantive points in support of his

motion. See FAC. The California Supreme Court summarily denied Plaintiff’s

petition, likewise giving no indication that the denial was due to Plaintiff’s

abbreviated motion to amend. (Doc. No. 19, Ex. 2). Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion

that a reduction in the size of his filing inflicted actual injury and prejudiced his

underlying habeas petition is insufficient to support his current claim. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 While the Court must construe Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, it cannot

supply missing elements from Plaintiff’s claim that were not initially pled. Ivey, 673

F.2d at 268.

As Plaintiff has failed to plead with specificity that the reduction in size of his

2

Defendants have provided a copy of the Docket Report for Plaintiff’s California Supreme

Court case, No. S191248. The Court takes judicial notice of the Docket Report, specifically the entry

dated May 16, 2011, which states that Plaintiff’s motion to amend his habeas corpus exhibits was

received. (Doc. No. 19-1, Decl. of Sylvie P. Snyder in Support of Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. B). 

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motion prejudiced his underlying habeas claim, the Court RECOMMENDS that,

should the district court reach the merits of Plaintiff’s claim, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claim DISMISSED without prejudice. The

Court declines, however, to dismiss with prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice is only

appropriate when it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment. 

Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

C. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects “government officials... from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity does not protect a

defendant when: (1) the defendant’s action violated a federal constitutional right; and

(2) the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. LSO, Lt. V.

Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000). A qualified immunity defense is generally

not amenable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) because facts necessary to establish an

affirmative defense generally must be shown by matters outside the complaint. See

Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that, in light of court’s

duty to accept allegations in the complaint as true, a finding of qualified immunity in

a motion to dismiss is inappropriate). While a ruling on immunity “should be made

early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the

defense is dispositive[,]” (Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199 (2001)), the court is

usually “not equipped at this stage to determine whether qualified immunity will

ultimately protect [the defendant]. Those issues must be resolved at summary

judgment or at trial.” Id.; see also Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir.

2001). 

In some cases, qualified immunity can be determined in a motion under Rule

12(b)(6). In Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit

emphasized that qualified immunity is “a right not merely to avoid standing trial, but

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also to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery.” (internal citations

omitted). Therefore, when the record is clear that the official had a reasonable belief

that his conduct was lawful, a court may properly dismiss a claim on the basis of

qualified immunity. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir.

1993). 

Here, because no constitutional violation has occurred, the Court need not

address whether Defendants are protected by qualified immunity. If, however,

Plaintiff were able to show a constitutional violation, Defendants would not be

protected by qualified immunity at this stage as it is not clear from the face of

Plaintiff’s FAC that Defendants’ held a reasonable belief that their actions were

constitutional. Id. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the basis of Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust

his administrative remedies be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s FAC DISMISSED

without prejudice and without leave to amend.

2) If Plaintiff’s claim is not dismissed for failure to exhaust, Plaintiff’s claim be

DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 

It is further ORDERED that:

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) (1988). Any party may filed written objections with the court and serve a

copy on all parties by June 27, 2012. The document shall be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed

by July 11, 2012.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 6, 2012

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

 

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