Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00742/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00742-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS MUNGUIA,

Petitioner,

v.

JIM ROBERTSON,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:18-cv-00742-NONE-JDP

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS THE 

PETITION 

(Doc. No. 12)

Petitioner Jose Luis Munguia, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, seeks a writ of 

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner’s sole claim in his habeas 

petition is that the state trial court erred when it reopened voir dire after the prosecutor apparently 

confused the names of two potential jurors and mistakenly exercised a peremptory challenge to 

strike the wrong one (Doc. No. 1 at 4). See People v. Munguia, No. F069834, 2017 WL 360607, 

at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2017). Before the jury was sworn in, the prosecution requested an 

opportunity to address the mistake. Id. The trial court held a hearing on that request before 

granting it and allowing the prosecution to reopen voir dire and to exercise an additional 

peremptory challenge. Id. at *2. On direct appeal, the state appellate court found that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion under California law in allowing the prosecution to reopen jury 

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selection. Id. at *3–4. The state appellate court also held that, even if the trial court erred in

granting the prosecution’s request to reopen voir dire, petitioner was not prejudiced and therefore 

“the alleged error was harmless.” Id. at *5. In addition, the state court concluded that the alleged 

error did not implicate federal rights because, apart from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), 

“errors related to the use of peremptory challenges before a jury is sworn do not implicate a 

defendant’s federal constitutional rights.” Munguia, 2017 WL 360607, at *4. 

This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. On April 30, 2019, the assigned magistrate judge ordered 

petitioner to show cause as to why his petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a 

cognizable claim to federal habeas relief and as untimely under the applicable statute of 

limitations. (Doc. No. 7.) On May 31, 2019, petitioner filed a response arguing why he believed 

he had stated a cognizable claim, but failed to address the issue of the timeliness of his federal 

habeas application. (Doc. No. 8.) On February 6, 2020, the assigned magistrate judge issued 

findings and recommendations recommending that the pending petition be dismissed for failure to 

state a cognizable claim and as time–barred.

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 (Doc. No. 12.) The findings and recommendations 

also recommended that a certificate of appealability not be issued. (Id.) The findings and 

recommendations were served on petitioner and contained notice that objections thereto were due 

within 14 days of service. (Id.) Petitioner did not file any objections to the pending findings and 

recommendations and the time to do so has passed. 

The findings and recommendations correctly concluded that petitioner failed to state a 

cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. Petitioner does not explain how the trial court’s 

alleged error violated his constitutional rights under any clearly established federal law. See § 

2254(d); Murray v. Schriro, 882 F.3d 778, 801 (9th Cir. 2018). Petitioner’s sole citation to 

federal law is to a Supreme Court decision that declined to apply the harmless-error standard to a 

coerced confession. (Doc. No. 8 at 2–3) (citing Ariz. v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).) 

 

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 In the same document as the findings and recommendations, the magistrate judge also issued an 

order denying petitioner’s request to appoint counsel. That order denying the request for counsel 

is not addressed here. 

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Petitioner has not explained how the cited authority relates to the claim he has presented. 

Moreover, the court is unaware of any Supreme Court decision that supports petitioner’s claim to 

federal habeas relief. See Lancaster v. Holland, No. CV 15-5496-KES, 2016 WL 1449534, at 

*11 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2016) (dismissing a Sixth Amendment claim after the trial court 

“unswore” the jury which resulted in one juror being replaced, noting: “[t]he Sixth Amendment 

does not guarantee Petitioner a right to a particular tribunal. It guarantees him an impartial one. 

Petitioner does not contend that any juror was biased, and he cannot contend that he did not 

receive a jury trial.”); id. (explaining that petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy in violation 

of the Fifth Amendment). 

Petitioner also claims without avail that “the reopening of peremptory challenges changed 

the makeup of the jury, affecting the framework within which the trial proceeded.” (Doc. No. 1 at 

4.) As the state appellate court explained, petitioner’s claim of “structural error” is not applicable 

in this case: “Errors of this kind include denial of counsel of choice, denial of self-representation, 

denial of a public trial, and failure to convey to a jury that guilt must be proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Munguia, 2017 WL 360607, at *4 (quoting United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 

597, 611 (2013)). Only “a very limited class of errors” can constitute structural error. Davila, 

569 U.S. at 611; see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993) (explaining that structural 

errors are “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism”) (citation omitted). The 

court is unaware of any Supreme Court authority supporting petitioner’s argument in this regard 

and petitioner has pointed to none. See Lancaster, 2016 WL 1449534, at *11 (declining to 

“decide whether the alleged constitutional error was structural or not, because as explained above, 

there was no constitutional error”). Accordingly, petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim 

for federal habeas relief. 

Even if petitioner had stated a cognizable claim, the trial court’s alleged error was 

harmless. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638. Here, the court does not entertain “grave doubt” as to the 

outcome of petitioner’s conviction. See O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). 

Petitioner has made no attempt to explain how the reopening of voir dire affected the outcome of 

the trial of his case. (See Doc. No. 1.) Therefore, dismissal of the pending petition is appropriate. 

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Additionally, the findings and recommendations correctly concluded that petitioner’s 

claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner’s conviction became final on April 19, 

2017 when the California Supreme Court denied review of his direct appeal. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) 

The instant petition was not filed until May 31, 2018. (Id.) Accordingly, the petition was filed 

outside the one-year statute of limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner does not argue that the statute of limitations 

began to run on a date later than the date on which his conviction became final, see

§ 224(d)(1)(B)–(D), or that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled in his case. 

Indeed, petitioner failed to respond to the order to show cause issued by the magistrate judge with 

respect to the statute of limitations issue. (See Doc. No. 8.) Therefore, the pending petition is 

time barred. 

Finally, the findings and recommendations correctly recommend that a certificate of 

appealability not issue because petitioner failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Petitioner has not shown that “jurists of reason 

could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could 

conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). The court accordingly declines to issue a certificate of 

appealability. 

In accordance with the provisions of § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 304, this court has 

conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the court finds 

the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and proper analysis. 

Accordingly:

1. The findings and recommendations issued on February 6, 2020 (Doc. No. 12) are

adopted;

2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. 1) is dismissed; 

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3. The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability; and

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge to this case for the 

purposes of closure and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2020 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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