Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-278/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United 

States District 

Court 

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

 

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)

ANTITRUST LITIGATION 

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MDL No. 1917 

Case No. C-07-5944-SC 

ORDER RE: CALIFORNIA 

ATTORNEY GENERAL DISCOVERY 

ISSUES 

This Order Relates To: 

ALL ACTIONS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Now before the Court are two administrative motions brought by 

the Attorney General of the State of California ("the AG"), 

relating to its discovery efforts coordinated with this matter. 

First, the AG moves for an order extending the applicable discovery 

cutoff, previously September 5, 2014, to permit the deposition of 

Mr. Leo Mink to take place in the Netherlands by January 30, 2015. 

ECF No. 2780 ("Mink Mot."). Second, the AG asks the Court to issue 

revised letters of request to permit the taking of evidence from 

Woong Tae Kim ("W.T. Kim") and Myung Joon Kim ("M.J. Kim") of the 

Republic of Korea. ECF No. 2794 ("Kim Mot."). Samsung opposes 

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both motions. ECF Nos. 2810 ("Mink. Opp'n"), 2827 ("Kim Opp'n"). 

For the reasons set forth below, the motion to extend the discovery 

deadline to permit the taking of Mr. Mink's deposition is GRANTED. 

The motion for the issuance of revised letters of request to permit 

the taking of evidence from W.T Kim and M.J. Kim is DENIED. 

II. BACKGROUND 

Both these motions arise out of previous discovery orders. 

First, in January of 2014 the Court granted the AG's motion for the 

issuance of a letter of request for international judicial 

assistance from the Netherlands in obtaining Mr. Mink's testimony 

pursuant to the Hague Convention.1

 ECF No. 2362 ("First Mink 

Order"). After the letter was transmitted to Dutch authorities, 

the Netherlands' Central Authority contacted the AG to inform her 

that the first request was misfiled, and a second letter of request 

would be necessary. ECF Nos. 2518 ("Second Mink Mot."). The AG 

moved for the issuance of a second set of letters, and the Court 

granted that motion in April 2014. ECF No. 2530 ("Second Mink 

Order"). Since that time the AG's office has been in repeated 

contact with Dutch authorities, who have apparently run into 

administrative difficulties in executing the Court's letters of 

request. Mink Mot. at 2-3. Those issues having now been mostly 

sorted out, the AG seeks an extension of the discovery deadline to 

permit the examination of Mr. Mink to be held by January 30, 2015. 

The AG argues the extension "affords the Dutch authorities the time 

necessary to effectuate this Court's formal requests but also 

 

1

 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 

Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 

7444 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1780) ("Hague Convention"). 

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ensures that the requested examination will be completed before the 

pre-trial conference in" this case. Id. at 3-4. 

Similarly, in May 2014 the Court granted the AG's original 

motion for the issuance of letters of request to the relevant 

authorities in the Republic of Korea seeking discovery from W.T. 

Kim and M.J. Kim. ECF No. 2571 ("Kims Order"). Several months 

later, the Court received two letters from the National Court 

Administration of the Republic of Korea requesting revisions to the 

letters of request to include the specific questions to be offered 

to the witnesses. ECF Nos. 2724; 2725 ("Korea Letters"). These 

revisions are apparently necessary for compliance with Article 

Three of the Hague Convention and Article 80 of the Civil Procedure 

Rules of Korea. Id. Now the AG has submitted revised letters, 

and asks both that the Court issue the revised letters of request 

and extend the discovery deadline to permit the discovery requested 

to go forward. 

Samsung opposes both motions. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Issuance of Letters of Request 

Letters of request, also referred to as letters rogatory, are 

formal written requests sent by a court in which an action is 

pending to a foreign court seeking discovery from a witness within 

the foreign court's jurisdiction. Asis Internet Servs. v. Optin 

Global, Inc., No. C-05-05124 JCS, 2007 WL 1880369, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

June 29, 2007). Letters of request may include, among other 

things, requests for production of documents or for depositions to 

be taken in a foreign country. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(1)(B) 

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(stating depositions may be taken abroad "pursuant to a letter of 

request (whether or not captioned a letter rogatory)"). Courts 

have inherent authority to issue letters of request, SEC v. Leslie, 

No. C 07-03444 JF (PVT), 2009 WL 688836, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 

2009), and a party opposing their issuance must show "good reason 

for a court to deny an application for a letter [of request]." Id. 

B. Modification of Scheduling Orders 

 Scheduling orders "may be modified only for good cause and 

with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Pretrial 

scheduling orders may be modified if the dates scheduled "cannot 

reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the 

extension." Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 

609 (9th Cir. 1992). The focus of the good cause inquiry is "on 

the moving party's reasons for seeking modification. If that party 

was not diligent, the inquiry should end." Id.

IV. DISCUSSION 

Samsung makes three similar arguments in opposition to the 

AG's motions. First, Samsung argues the AG has not been diligent 

in pursuing these discovery requests. Second, Samsung suggests the 

AG's requests are prejudicial and, in the case of Mr. Mink's 

deposition, duplicative of previous discovery. Third, comity 

interests are not implicated here and do not weigh in favor of 

granting the AG's motions. 

The purpose of the good cause standard and the focus on 

diligence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) is twofold. First, analyzing whether good cause exists to vary a 

deadline allows the court to balance the need for certainty in case 

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management against the unexpected difficulties that often arise in 

complying with case scheduling. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory 

committee's note to 1983 amendment (suggesting that because 

scheduling orders are often entered early in the litigation, a 

"good cause" standard is preferable). Second, centering the good 

cause analysis on the moving party's diligence prevents parties 

from profiting from carelessness, unreasonability, or gamesmanship, 

while also not punishing parties for circumstances outside their 

control. See Orozco v. Midland Credit Mgmt. Inc., No. 2:12-cv02585-KJM-CKD, 2013 WL 3941318, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2013). 

Accordingly, if a party "fails to heed repeated signals," waits 

until the eleventh hour for tactical reasons, or otherwise acts 

carelessly or in bad faith, courts are unlikely to vary the 

applicable schedule. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609; see also In re W. 

States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 737 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (being "aware of the facts and theories supporting 

amendment since the inception of the action" demonstrated lack of 

diligence); Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 

No. 11-cv-2861-SC, 2012 WL 6095089, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 

2012) (Conti, J.) (finding lack of diligence where a party waited 

until the eve of the discovery deadline to seek amendment); 

Unlimited Holdings, Inc. v. Bertram Yacht, Inc., Civ. No. 2005-46, 

2008 WL 4642191, at *7-8 (D.V.I. Oct. 15, 2008)(referring to 

plaintiffs' "cavalier attitude" toward discovery and apparent 

"belief that this Court's orders are mere suggestions"). 

A. Mr. Mink's Deposition 

The Court finds the AG acted diligently in pursuing Mr. Mink's 

deposition for four reasons. 

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 First, the AG did not wait an unreasonably long time before 

beginning the Hague Convention process. Samsung argues that the AG 

knew or should have known of Mr. Mink's relevance when Samsung 

filed supplemental responses to interrogatories in October 2011. 

Samsung is right that its supplemental interrogatory responses 

identified Mr. Mink as potentially relevant as early as October 

2011, however those responses are voluminous, and include hundreds 

of names and dozens of pages listing meetings between various 

representatives of the Defendants. Sorting through that list and 

identifying key participants must have required extensive time and 

effort. Nevertheless, Samsung insists that at the latest, the AG 

should have begun pursuing Hague Convention procedures in December 

2012, when Mr. Mink was identified as a potential deponent. Yet 

the documents Samsung cites in support of this argument support, 

rather than undermine, the conclusion that the AG acted diligently. 

For instance, in that December 2012 letter identifying Mr. Mink as 

a potential deponent, Plaintiffs listed Mr. Mink among 26 

individuals who might be deposed in the future, and then solicited 

information about his employment status, intent to invoke Fifth 

Amendment rights, and Defendants' views on whether he was likely to 

have relevant information. See ECF No. 2810-1 ("Cunningham Mink 

Decl.") Ex. A (listing the first six Philips deponents and seeking 

information about 26 potential deponents including Mink). The 

letter also informed Defendants that Plaintiffs would seek to 

depose six Philips affiliated individuals first, before turning to 

some of the 26 additional individuals including Mr. Mink. Id. at 

1. This shows more than anything else that the AG and Plaintiffs 

were working together at an early date in trying to identify 

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witnesses, narrow the scope of discovery where possible, and 

investigate the usefulness of pursuing discovery against witnesses, 

including Mr. Mink. 

Second, the AG's decision to allow more than eight months for 

its letters of request to be issued and executed was not careless 

or unreasonable. As all the parties have seen, difficulties and 

delays are to be expected when a party utilizes Hague Convention 

procedures, however empirical research shows that in the vast 

majority of cases, Hague Convention requests for oral testimony are 

resolved within six months.2

 

 Third, and perhaps most compellingly, the reason the AG is 

seeking an extension of time in this instance relates not to 

carelessness, bad faith, or a lack of diligence, but rather because 

the Dutch authorities have experienced unique and unexpected 

difficulties outside the Court's or the AG's control. As counsel 

points out, the AG's office has been in frequent communication with 

Dutch authorities seeking a resolution of these issues, even going 

so far as to hire a Dutch agent to seek a resolution of this issue, 

but has so far been thwarted by misfiled documents, conflicts of 

interest, and other administrative issues outside the AG's control. 

See ECF No. 2780-1 ("Varanini Mink Decl.") ¶¶ 4-6. Now the AG has 

apparently reached an agreement with the Dutch authorities, and 

only needs time to accommodate their schedule. Id. at ¶ 7. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that the AG acted diligently in 

 

2

 Am. Bar Ass'n, Int'l Litig. Comm., Section of Int'l L. & Prac., 

Report on Survey of Experience of U.S. Lawyers with the Hague 

Evidence Convention Letter of Request Procedures, at 10 (Oct. 9, 

2003) ("ABA Report"), available at: 

http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/lse_20us.pdf (showing 84.4 percent 

of letters of request for oral testimony are resolved within 6 

months). 

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pursuing Mr. Mink's testimony. Nonetheless, Samsung raises to 

additional grounds it argues should bar a finding of good cause. 

 First, Samsung contends that Mink's deposition will be 

duplicative of other discovery against Philips. This claim is 

belated and misplaced. While the risk of duplicative discovery 

might be a reason to deny a motion for the issuance of letters of 

request, the AG twice brought such motions, and the Court twice 

granted them, each time unopposed. Here, the Court is not 

evaluating the merits of the AG's request (at least with regard to 

Mink's deposition), but rather whether good cause exists to grant 

an extension of time. Additionally, even if the Court were to 

evaluate the merits of this issue under Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i), 

Samsung is incorrect that the AG must "show that Mr. Mink could 

provide . . . unique information . . . " in order to depose him. 

Mink Opp'n at 4. Neither Rule 26 nor any other authority supports 

the application of such a heightened standard. Rather, the 

ordinary rules of relevance in discovery, and Rule 30's grant of 

authority for a deposition of "any person, including a party" 

clearly permit this deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). 

 Consideration of prejudice, on the other hand, is clearly a 

proper (although not usually dispositive) consideration in 

assessing good cause. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. Here, 

Samsung's chief complaint is that the schedule proposed by the AG 

might allow for Plaintiffs to depose Mink after Defendants have 

filed their summary judgment motions, thereby according Plaintiffs 

an unfair advantage. Mink Opp'n at 4. Setting aside the fact that 

Samsung seems to be arguing on the one hand that Mr. Mink's 

testimony will be duplicative and on the other hand that Mink's 

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testimony will be so significant as to alter how they might 

approach summary judgment briefing, the Court is still not 

persuaded. This potential prejudice can be easily mitigated by (1) 

the fact that, if Plaintiffs adopt the strategy that concerns 

Samsung, Defendants will still have the opportunity to file reply 

briefs addressing any issues related to Mr. Mink's deposition 

raised in Plaintiffs' opposition briefing, and (2) court-ordered or 

party-requested supplemental briefing. See Civ. L.R. 7-3(d) 

(permitting additional briefing provided the filing party obtains 

prior court approval). Furthermore, the AG is only associated with 

this case for discovery purposes. As previously ordered, only 

discovery deadlines apply to the AG (not the other pretrial or 

motion deadlines). See ECF No. 2459 ("Scheduling Order), at 2 n.1 

("The California Attorney General joins in this stipulation but 

only insofar as it concerns the close of fact and expert discovery 

on Defendants and the date of expert reports."). As a result, the 

potential for prejudice (as well as gamesmanship) is lower here. 

 Accordingly, this is a circumstance in which the AG could not 

have reasonably met the schedule, despite its diligence, and 

therefore the AG's motion to extend the discovery deadline to allow 

the deposition of Leo Mink to be completed by January 30, 2015 is 

GRANTED. 

 B. W.T. Kim and M.J. Kim

 The Court finds that the AG has failed to demonstrate 

diligence, and accordingly good cause, for extending the discovery 

deadline to permit them to pursue discovery from W.T. Kim and M.J. 

Kim. There are two key difference between the AG's pursuit of Mr. 

Mink's deposition and the depositions of W.T. and M.J. Kim. First, 

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rather than file an initial motion for the issuance of letters of 

request eight months prior to the discovery deadline, as the AG did 

with regard to Mr. Mink's case, this motion was only filed a little 

more than three months prior to the discovery cutoff. An ABA 

report analyzing time frames for the execution of letters of 

request found that, while more than 65 percent of requests for oral 

testimony are executed within four months of issuance, only 12.5 

percent are executed within two months. ABA Report at 10. While 

the report provides no figure for requests executed within three 

months, these findings at least suggest that the AG's request may 

have been late even from the outset. Second, and more importantly, 

the AG's initial letters of request failed to comply with the 

Republic of Korea's requirements for execution and with Article 3 

of the Hague Convention. Unlike the case of Mr. Mink, the delays 

here are the result of the AG's actions, and not factors outside 

her control. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that because the AG did not 

diligently pursue the depositions of W.T. Kim and M.J. Kim, good 

cause is lacking for an extension of the discovery deadline as to 

these deposition. As a result, the AG's motion for the issuance of 

revised letter of request for the taking of evidence from W.T. Kim 

and M.J. Kim is DENIED. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS the 

following: 

 The AG's motion for extension of time to permit the 

deposition of Mr. Leo Mink to be completed by January 30, 

2015 is GRANTED. 

 The AG's motion for the issuance of revised letters of 

request for the taking of evidence from W.T. Kim and M.J. 

Kim is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

Dated: October 1, 2014 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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