Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01814/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01814-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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All documents referenced are documents filed in CV-10-01814, unless specifically

indicated as filed in the related criminal action, CR-08-01249.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Respondent, 

vs.

Luis Hurtado-Villa, 

Petitioner. 

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No. CV-10-01814-FJM (MHB)

 CR-08-01249-PHX-FJM

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE:

This matter comes before this Court upon consideration of a Motion to Vacate

Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 (hereinafter, “§2255 motion”), filed on August 24,

2010, by Petitioner Luis Hurtado-Villa. (Doc. 1.)1

 Respondent, the United States of America,

filed a Response on December 21, 2010 (Doc. 10), and on March 15, 2011, Petitioner filed

a Reply (Doc. 14). On May 23, 2011, this Court ordered the matter set for an evidentiary

hearing, finding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255(b), that the “motion and the files and records

of the case [did] not conclusively show that petitioner is entitled to no relief.” (Doc. 16.) The

hearing took place on July 14, 2011, and at its conclusion the Court took the matter under

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Clerk’s document 1-1 is Petitioner’s “Declaration,” filed as an appendix to

Petitioner’s §2255 motion, and admitted without objection as Petitioner’s exhibit 101 during

the evidentiary hearing held on his motion on July 14, 2011. (Doc. 21.)

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advisement. (Doc. 21.) 

BACKGROUND

On September 26, 2008, in the related criminal matter, CR-08-01249, Petitioner was

charged in a criminal complaint with Cultivation of Marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(vii) and (b)(5). (Doc. 10-1, at 2.) Petitioner was arrested on September

25, 2008, subsequently appeared for his initial appearance, and was ultimately ordered

detained. (CR-08-10249, Docs. 5, 11.) At his initial appearance, attorney David Ochoa was

appointed to represent Petitioner. (CR-08-10249, Doc. 5.) On October 21, 2008, Petitioner

was indicted by a federal grand jury on Count One, Conspiracy to Cultivate Marijuana, a

Controlled Substance, and Count Two, Cultivation of Marijuana, a Controlled Substance and

Aid and Abet. (Doc. 10-2, at 2-3.) On December 4, 2008, Petitioner entered into a plea

agreement, in which he pled guilty to Count One of the indictment. (Doc. 10-3, at 2-11.)

Petitioner was sentenced on March 26, 2009, and was committed to the custody of the

Bureau of Prisons for a term of eighteen months, to be followed by a 5-year term of

supervised release. (Doc. 10-4, at 2.) He did not file an appeal of his judgment and sentence.

Following Petitioner’s release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, he was

transferred to immigration custody in Texas. (Doc. 1-12

, ¶8.) Petitioner was removed to

Mexico several days later. (Id.) Subsequent to Petitioner’s conviction, the United States

Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010). It is

pursuant to that decision that Petitioner raises his claim that his counsel was ineffective by

failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea, and that his guilty plea

was therefore involuntary and should be vacated, and his conviction reversed. (Doc. 1, at 5-

6.) Respondent claims in its Response that the Court need not reach the merits of Petitioner’s

claim because (1) Petitioner’s §2255 motion is untimely; (2) a released and deported

defendant does not meet the custody requirements to qualify for relief under §2255; (3)

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Petitioner’s express appeal waiver in his plea agreement precludes him from relief on an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (4) Padilla establishes a new rule of criminal

procedure that precludes retroactive application of the ruling to Petitioner’s case. (Doc. 10,

at 2-3.) 

CUSTODY REQUIREMENT

Respondent claims that a released and deported defendant does not meet the custody

requirements to qualify for relief under §2255. The Court does not find this argument

meritorious. The Ninth Circuit has held that a petitioner who is under a term of supervised

release is foreclosed from seeking coram nobis relief, because a federal defendant who is

“subject to supervised release...is in ‘custody’” and therefore “may seek relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §2255.” Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Jones

v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 24243 (1963)). See also, Stertzbach v. Shriro, 2007 WL

1624752 (D.Ariz. 2007). Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner is subject to supervised

release but argues that because Petitioner is in Mexico, the only restriction on Petitioner’s

liberty “is that he is not permitted to return to the United States without legal authorization.”

(Doc. 10, at 5.) Respondent provides no authority for this distinction, and therefore the Court

finds Petitioner “in custody” for purposes of this §2255 motion. 

 TIMELINESS OF §2255 MOTION

The 1-year statute of limitations applicable to §2255 motions runs from “the latest of -

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the

impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from

making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the

date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. §2255(f). Petitioner’s conviction became

final on April 9, 2009 because he did not appeal. The 1-year deadline to file a §2255 motion

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therefore expired on April 8, 2010, unless one of the aforementioned events occurred later

in time. Petitioner does not contest that his motion was filed outside the 1-year deadline, but

claims that the timeliness of his §2255 motion is governed by the newly recognized right in

Padilla, and that this right was made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.

(Doc. 14, at 4-5.) Since Padilla was decided on March 31, 2010, if the decision created a

newly recognized right to be applied retroactively, then Petitioner’s §2255 motion, filed on

March 15, 2011, is timely.

The Supreme Court in Padilla determined that advice of counsel concerning a specific

risk of deportation “is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel.” Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. Thus, the failure to advise a defendant about

the immigration consequences of a conviction may satisfy the first prong of Strickland v.

Washington. Id. When the Supreme Court announces a “new rule,” in general, the rule

applies to all criminal cases pending on direct review. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,

351 (2004). New “substantive rules,” “generally, apply retroactively. This includes

decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as well as

constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute

beyond the States’s power to punish.” Id., at 351-52 (citations omitted). “Such rules apply

retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands

convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that the law

cannot impose on him.” Id., at 352 (citation omitted).

New procedural rules, on the other hand, “do not produce a class of persons convicted

of conduct that law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone

convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise.

Because of this more speculative connection to innocence, [the Supreme Court] give[s]

retroactive effect to only a small set of “‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’ implicating

the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the proceedings.” Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352

(citation omitted). Respondent argues that Padilla announced a “new rule” of criminal

procedure that should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. A Supreme

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Court case announces a new rule “if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the

time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).

Prior to Padilla, the Ninth Circuit had held that “it is objectively unreasonable under

contemporary standards for attorney competence” for an attorney to misadvise a client of the

immigration consequences of a conviction, but not for an attorney to simply offer no advice

concerning immigration consequences. United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015 (9th

Cir. 2005) (as amended) (abrogated on other grounds by Padilla); United States v. Fry, 322

F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court in Padilla held that an attorney’s

performance falls below the objective standard of reasonableness if she fails to advise her

client of the potential impact the client’s guilty plea may have on his immigration status.

Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1486. In reaching that conclusion, the Court applied the principles of

Strickland, in particular whether or not the attorney’s failure meets the first prong of the

Strickland test-that is, whether it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”

Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. Although the Court did not address the retroactive application of

its decision, the Court did portend such result when it “[gave] serious consideration” to the

Respondent’s concern that its ruling would open the “floodgates” to new litigation

challenging prior guilty pleas. Id., at 1484. The Court mitigated such concern by noting the

difficulty those petitioners purportedly pouring through the gates would have meeting the

prejudice prong of Strickland. Id., at 1485.

As Padilla was recently decided, only the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has issued

a ruling on the applicability of Padilla to cases on collateral review. In that case, the

petitioner became aware of the immigration consequences of his conviction after he was

transferred to immigration court for removal proceedings some years after his conviction.

United States v. Orocio, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 2557232 *1 (3rd Cir. June 29, 2011).

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis challenging his plea conviction,

claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not advise

him of the immigration consequences of his drug conviction. Id. The District Court denied

relief, and the petitioner appealed. Id. During the pendency of his appeal, the Supreme

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Court decided Padilla, and the Third Circuit court faced squarely the issue of Padilla’s

retroactivity to cases on collateral review:

The question we confront is whether counsel has been constitutionally

adequate in advising a criminal defendant whether to accept a plea bargain.

The Court held only one year after Strickland that “the same two-part standard

[of Strickland] ... [is] applicable to ineffective-assistance claims arising out of

the plea process,” and a court must therefore determine “whether counsel’s

advice [to accept a plea] was within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” In Padilla, the Court relied on “recent changes

in our immigration law [that] have made removal nearly an automatic result for

a broad class of noncitizen offenders.” Moreover, the Padilla Court noted that

it had “never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences

to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’

required under Strickland,” a distinction “ill-suited” for removal scenarios.

The application of Strickland to the Padilla scenario is not so removed from

the broader outlines of precedent as to constitute a “new rule,” for the Court

had long required effective assistance of counsel on all “important decisions,”

in plea bargaining that could “affect[] the outcome of the plea process.” In that

light, Padilla is best read as merely recognizing that a plea agreement’s

immigration consequences constitute the sort of information an alien defendant

needs in making “important decisions” affecting “the outcome of the plea

process,” and thereby come within the ambit of the “more particular duties to

consult with the defendant” required of effective counsel. Far from extending

the Strickland rule into uncharged territory, Padilla reaffirmed defense

counsel’s obligations to the criminal defendant during the plea process, a

critical state of the proceedings. 

Orocio, 2011 WL 2557232 *4 (Supreme Court citations omitted).

In addressing the government’s argument that Padilla broke new ground, the Court

noted that, “[a]lthough the Padilla Court acknowledged that some courts had previously

held” that it is not ineffective assistance of counsel for an attorney to fail to advise a client

of the immigration consequences of a plea, “the Court straight-forwardly applied the

Strickland rule-and the norms of the legal profession that insist upon adequate warning to

criminal defendants of immigration consequences-to the facts of Jose Padilla’s case.” Id. at

*5. The Court’s “new rule” analysis “[l]ook[ed] to the intersection of Strickland and Teague,

[and] made three observations:”

(1) “case law need not exist on all fours to allow for a finding under Teague

that the rule at issue was dictated by ... precedent,”; (2) “Strickland is a rule of

general applicability which asks whether counsel’s conduct was objectively

reasonable and conformed to professional norms based ‘on the facts of the

particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct,’”; and (3) “‘it will

be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one

not dictated by precedent,’” 

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

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But see, James v. United States, 2011 WL 3100380 *2 (E.D.N.C., July 25, 2011)

(noting that the Fourth Circuit “has stated in dicta in an unpublished decision” that the

Padilla decision does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review); Mendoza v.

United States, 2011 WL 1226475 (E.D. Va. March 24, 2011); Doan v. United States, 2011

WL 116811 (E.D.Va. Jan 4, 2011).

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The Court found that Padilla “followed from the clearly established principles of the

guarantee of effective assistance of counsel,” and rejected the government’s argument that

Justice Alito’s observation (in his concurring opinion) that “[u]ntil today, the longstanding

and unanimous position of the federal courts was that reasonable defense counsel generally

need only advise a client about direct plea consequences” is evidence of an intended new

rule. Id. at *6. The Court stressed that “Strickland did not freeze into place the objective

standards of attorney performance prevailing in 1984, never to change again.” Id. The Court

noted that “lower court decisions not in harmony with Padilla were, with few exceptions

decided before 1995 and pre-date the professional norms that, ... [have] long demanded that

competent counsel provide advice on the removal consequences of a client’s plea.” Id. The

Third Circuit concluded that “Padilla followed directly from Strickland and long-established

professional norms,” and therefore held that “it is an ‘old rule’ for Teague purposes and is

retroactively applicable on collateral review.” Id., at *7.

Other lower courts have reached the same conclusion: United States v. Hubenig, 2010

WL 2650625 *7 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) (“In fact, the Ninth Circuit has held [that] ‘[e]ach

time that a court delineates what ‘reasonably effective assistance’ requires of defense

attorneys with respect to a particular aspect of client representation, ... it can hardly be

thought to have created a new principle of constitutional law.’”) (quoting Tanner v.

McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2007)); United States v. Dass, 2011 WL

2746181 *3 (D. Minn, July 14, 2011) (collecting cases in accord, and noting that “at least one

court has characterized this as the ‘majority position,’” referring to Marroquin v. United

States, 2011 WL 488985 (S.D.Tex. 2011)).3 

This Court agrees with these decisions. On the most practical level, the Strickland

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analysis requires consideration of professional norms, which are not immutable. In Padilla,

the Supreme Court referenced numerous professional publications in reaching its conclusion

that counsel must advise a client of the risk of deportation. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. Also,

the change in immigration law that affects the likelihood of removability of aliens necessarily

changes the professional advice. Id. at 1480 (“changes to our immigration law have

dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction”). The Court also pointed

out that the notion that advice concerning immigration consequences can fall below

professional norms and meet the first prong of the Strickland test is not new. See Kwan, 407

F.3d at 1017. Although Kwan and other similar lower court decisions were limited to

applying Strickland to affirmative misadvice regarding immigration consequences, the

Supreme Court found “no relevant difference between an act of commission and an act of

omission in [the] context” of Padilla’s case. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1484 (internal quotations

omitted).

For all of the above reasons, the Court finds that Padilla did not create a “new rule,”

either procedural or substantive. Although Petitioner has raised Padilla on collateral review,

even if Padilla may be retroactively applied, his motion is nonetheless untimely (filed over

1-year from the date on which his conviction became final) unless he can show that the

limitations period began when Padilla was decided. Pursuant to §2255(f)(3), the 1-year

limitation period, although expired under §2255(f)(1), is reset on “the date on which the right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review.” It stands to reason that a finding that the right asserted does not announce a “new

rule” under Teague would preclude application of §2255(f)(3). Petitioner argues however,

that Padilla, “while not necessarily creating a new rule of law,” “did away with the direct

versus collateral [consequences] distinction.” (Doc. 1, at 17.) He claims that this distinction

entitles him to the benefit of the limitations period provided by §2255(f)(3). (Id.) The

Supreme Court in Padilla did not for the first time terminate this distinction: on the contrary,

the Court specifically noted that it had “never applied a distinction between direct and

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The cases cited above in support of the proposition that Padilla did not create a new

rule and is thus retroactively applied, involved writs of corum nobis filed by petitioners, and

thus did not involve a statute of limitations, or were §2255 motions filed within 1-year of the

date the petitioner’s conviction became final. See, Orocio, Hubenig, and Dass, supra.

5

The eight paragraphs of 28 U.S.C. §2255 have been restyled (a) through (h), effective

January 7, 2008.

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collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional

assistance’ required under Strickland.” Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. 

In any event, by virtue of the insertion of the second clause of §2255(f)(3), the

requirement in the conjunctive that the right “be made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review,” would not make sense if the “new right” recognized by the Supreme Court

did not constitute a new rule under Teague.

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 Otherwise, if the new right was merely an “old

rule of criminal procedure” applied in a new context, or a new substantive rule that alters the

range of conduct or class of persons the law punishes, it would apply retroactively without

a precedential finding of retroactivity, making the second clause of §2255(f)(3) superfluous.

The Supreme Court, in discussing the interplay between two clauses of §2255(f)(3), has

declared that: “if this Court decides a case recognizing a new right, a federal prisoner seeking

to assert that right will have one year from this Court’s decision within which to file his

§2255 motion. He may take advantage of the date in the first clause of ¶6(3)5

 only if the

conditions in the second clause are met.” Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 358-59

(2005). Thus, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the reasoning of the dissenting

Justice, “that the limitation period in ¶6(3) begins to run when the right asserted is made

retroactive.” Id., at 360. Although the Supreme Court in Dodd did not specifically address

whether or not §2255(f)(3) contemplates the existence of “new rights” that do not necessarily

constitute “new rules,” the reasoning highlights the interdependence of the “new right” and

“retroactive application” clauses of the limitations statute. Because Petitioner’s claim was

not “newly recognized” by the Supreme Court in Padilla, he can not avail himself of the

limitations period provided in §2255(f)(3), and his motion is untimely, unless Petitioner can

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As noted above, the Supreme Court in Padilla specifically noted that it had “never applied

a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally

‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland.” Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482.

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establish equitable tolling.

The Ninth Circuit has made equitable tolling available only when “extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time” and

“the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345

F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); Holland v. Florida, __ U.S. __, __, 130

S.Ct. 2549, 2560, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (holding that 28 U.S.C. §2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling in appropriate cases). Petitioner argues as a basis for equitable tolling that

Padilla recognized for the first time the distinction between direct versus collateral

consequences, and therefore, in turn, “extended a previously-recognized right to effective

assistance counsel in criminal proceedings as related to immigration advisals.”6

 (Doc. 1, at

16.) It should first be noted that Padilla was decided on March 31, 2010, eight days before

his 1-year limitations period expired. Secondly, Petitioner waited nearly a year after Padilla

was decided to file his motion. Finally, Petitioner was aware of the facts in support of his

claim prior to the expiration of the 1-year limitations period, when he was “transferred to

federal immigration custody in Texas” and “appeared before an Immigration Judge and

learned for the first time that not only did [his] conviction make [him] removable from the

United States, that [he] would never be allowed to live legally in the United States.” (Doc.

1-1, at 4.) 

Petitioner has not established that extraordinary circumstances existed beyond his

control making it impossible to file his motion on time, and is thus not entitled to equitable

tolling, making his §2255 motion untimely. 

PLEA AGREEMENT WAIVER

Respondent also claims that Petitioner’s express appeal waiver in his plea agreement

precludes him from relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court does not

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find this argument meritorious. The Ninth Circuit has also held that, at least with respect to

a §2254 proceeding challenging a state conviction, a waiver provision in a plea agreement

“is unenforceable with respect to an IAC claim that challenges the voluntariness of that

waiver.” Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005). Although not

specifically applying this principle to §2255 proceedings, the Ninth Circuit has acknowledge

that “[t]hose of our sister circuits considering this issue have uniformly held that a waiver of

§2255 rights cannot be enforced against a petitioner challenging the waiver’s validity on

ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.” United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1156

n.4. See also, United States of America v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2011)

(refusing to remand the case for fact-finding relating to an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim relating to the voluntariness of an appeal waiver, but “leav[ing] open the possibility”

of such a claim being raised in a collateral proceeding). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Movant’s claims are barred as

untimely. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Movant’s §2255 Motion to Vacate

be denied. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Movant’s pro se “Motion

Under 28 USC § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal

Custody” (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability on appeal

be GRANTED because the issues are “debatable among jurists of reason,” or the questions

are “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d

757, 770-71 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), superceded on other

grounds by 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2))

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 12th day of August, 2011.

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