Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01874/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01874-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROBERT CASTANOS, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-08-1874-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Robert Castanos, which challenges

the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Dkt. # 14.) For the reasons

set forth below, the Court affirms that decision in part and vacates that decision in part and

remands the case for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

On December 9, 2004, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging a

disability onset date of August 10, 2004. (R. at 91; see also R. at 131-36.) Plaintiff’s date

last insured for disability insurance benefits, and thus the date on or before which he must

have been disabled, is December 31, 2009. (See R. at 124.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied

both initially and upon reconsideration. (R. at 108-11; R. at 104-06.) Plaintiff then appealed

to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. at 103.) The ALJ conducted a hearing on

September 5, 2007. (See R. at 62-82.) On October 4, 2007, the ALJ issued an unfavorable

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The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

(governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (governing supplemental

security income benefits). Under the test:

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she is

not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) that

her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets or

equals one of the specific impairments described in the

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of the

specific impairments described in the regulations, the claimant

can still establish a prima facie case of disability by proving at

step four that in addition to the first two requirements, she is not

able to perform any work that she has done in the past. Once the

claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof

shifts to the agency at step five to demonstrate that the claimant

can perform a significant number of other jobs in the national

economy. This step-five determination is made on the basis of

four factors: the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age,

work experience and education.

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

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Notice of Decision in which he concluded that Plaintiff was not “under a disability . . . from

August 4, 2004 through the date of [the decision].” (R. at 91-98.) 

In evaluating whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step

sequential evaluation for determining disability.1

 (R. at 92-98.) At step one, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity. (R. at 93.) At step

two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:

[Claimant] is status post a work-related injury while lifting a

heavy sliding door in August 2004, and he is status post a fusion

of C5 through C7 in October 2004. He has bulging discs as C3-

C4, headaches, asthma, obstructive sleep apnea, recurrent

situational depression, situational anxiety, and chronic pain.

(Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that none of these impairments, either alone or in

combination, met or equaled any of the Social Security Administration’s listed impairments.

(Id.)

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RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his impairments.

See S.S.R. 96-8p (July 2, 1996).

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At step four, the ALJ made a determination of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”),2

 concluding that Plaintiff could perform “light unskilled work with postural

restrictions that prohibit crawling, crouching, climbing, squatting, or kneeling, with no use

of his upper extremities for work above the shoulder level, and no use of his lower

extremities for pushing or pulling of foot or leg controls.” (R. at 94.) The ALJ thus

determined that Plaintiff did not retain the RFC to perform his past relevant work “as a

service technician, laborer, delivery driver, and as a laborer loading and unloading trucks.”

(R. at 96.) The ALJ therefore reached step five, determining that Plaintiff could perform a

significant number of other jobs in the national and local economy that meet his RFC

limitations. (R. at 97.) Given this analysis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not

disabled. (R. at 98.)

On October 26, 2007, Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the Notice

of Decision. (R. at 117-18.) After granting review (R. at 114), the Council concluded that

the ALJ failed to properly evaluate medical opinion reports of Dr. Dilip Dhadvai and nurse

practitioner Gayle Campbell (R. at 114-15). On February 13, 2008, the Council remanded

the case to the ALJ with the following instructions:

Give further consideration to the treating source opinion . . . and

nonexamining source opinion . . . , and explain the weight given

to such opinion evidence.

 . . . 

Give further consideration to the claimant’s maximum residual

functional capacity during the entire period at issue and provide

rationale with specific references to evidence of record in

support of assessed limitations. In so doing, evaluate the

treating and examining source opinion . . . and explain the

weight given to such opinion evidence.

 . . . 

If warranted by the record, obtain supplemental evidence from

a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed

limitations on the claimant’s occupational bases. 

(R. at 115.) The ALJ conducted a second hearing on the matter on April 21, 2008, in which

supplemental evidence was obtained from a vocational expert. (See R. at 39-61.) On June

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Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2004) (“Any

individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a

hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action

. . . .”).

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25, 2008, the ALJ again issued an unfavorable Notice of Decision. (R. at 11-21.) In

evaluating whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ again undertook the five-step sequential

evaluation for determining disability and ultimately came to the same conclusions rendered

in his October 4, 2007, Notice of Decision. (See R. at 15-21.) Given this analysis, the ALJ

again concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 21.) The Appeals Council declined

to review the second Notice of Decision. (R. at 4-9.) 

Plaintiff filed the complaint underlying this action on October 13, 2008, seeking this

Court’s review of the ALJ’s denial of benefits.3

 (Dkt. # 1.) The case is now fully briefed

before this Court. (Dkt. ## 14-16.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).

A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is either

unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less than a

preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which,

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).

However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the

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Plaintiff’s argument extends only to Dr. McLean’s opinions regarding whether

Plaintiff was disabled between August 2004 and March 2006. To the extent that Dr.

McLean’s opinions related to the nature of Plaintiff’s impairments or his ability to perform

his past relevant work, the ALJ accepted those opinions. (See R. at 16, 20.)

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reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan,

981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (A) failing to properly consider and evaluate

the opinion of treating physician Dr. Terry McLean (Dkt. # 14 at 6, 8-9), (B) improperly

rejecting and failing to consider opinions of Nurse Practitioner Gayle Campbell (id. at 6-8),

and (C) failing to either accept or reject the opinion of treating physician Dr. Dilip Dhadvai

(id. at 7-8). The Court will address each argument in turn.

A. Opinion Reports of Dr. McLean

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred at the RFC determination stage by

misinterpreting and failing to discuss the objective medical opinions of Dr. McLean, a

treating physician.4 (Dkt. # 16 at 6, 7.) In this case, Dr. McLean, an orthopaedic spine

surgeon, treated Plaintiff for spine related impairments from September, 2004, to at least

November, 2006. (R. at 309, 531.) At several times during this period, specifically

September 22, 2005, and January 31, 2006, Dr. McLean opined that Plaintiff was

“temporarily totally disabled.” (R. at 206, 333.) Additionally, in October and November of

2004, and February of 2005, Dr. McLean noted that Plaintiff “remains off work.” (R. at 305,

312, 316.) Plaintiff contends that the “remains off work” statements indicate that Dr.

McLean “continued to keep his patient off work” during the relevant time period. (Dkt. #

14 at 6.) Eventually, on March 3, 2006, Dr. McLean opined that “[w]ith regards to work, at

least from the spine standpoint, I do feel [Plaintiff] is capable of working full-time at a

sedentary capacity with a change of position every three hours with no overhead lifting or

working and maximal lifting of 10 pounds.” (R. at 538.) 

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Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ afforded improper weight to the opinions of Dr.

McLean and the contrary opinions of a nontreating physician, Dr. Keith Cunningham, who

examined Plaintiff on May 21, 2005. However, the Court need not address this argument in

light of the conclusion that, on remand, the ALJ must address the opinions of Dr. McLean

and weigh them in light of the opinions of Dr. Cunningham and other medical opinions. See

infra part III. 

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In his decision order, the ALJ referred to Dr. McLean’s March 3, 2006 opinion

(stating that Plaintiff could perform full-time sedentary work), however, the ALJ did not

discuss this opinion in the context of whether Plaintiff was disabled during the closed period

between August 2004, and March 2006. Additionally, the ALJ failed to address the earlier

opinions of Dr. McLean that Plaintiff was “temporarily totally disabled” and unable to work

(R. at 206, 305, 312, 316, 333). Plaintiff consequently argues that “the ALJ has made no

statement specifically rejecting the opinion of Dr. McLean during [the relevant] timeframe”

and “the ALJ should have granted a finite period of benefits as [Dr. McLean’s] release is

approximately nineteen months after onset, easily meeting the initial 12 consecutive month

criterion. (Dkt. # 14 at 6-7.) 

The ALJ’s failure to consider and evaluate a medical opinion constitutes legal error.

Commission regulations state that “[r]egardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical

opinion we receive.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). Indeed, “[t]he

adjudicator is required to evaluate all evidence in the case record that may have a bearing on

the determination or decision of disability.” S.S.R. 96-5p (July 2, 1996); see also id.

(pointing out that “adjudicators must always carefully consider medical source opinions

about any issue” and that “opinions from any medical source . . . must never be ignored”).

Because the ALJ did not consider and evaluate Dr. McLean’s opinion that Plaintiff was

unable to work/disabled between August 2004, and March 2006, he committed legal error.5

The legal error is not harmless here because the opinions that the ALJ failed to discuss could

alter the ALJ’s RFC analysis and ultimate conclusions.

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Plaintiff also contends that “[a]s a psychiatric nurse practitioner, Ms. Campbell’s

opinion should be given the weight of a physician under Gomez [v. Chater].” (Dkt. # 14 at

8.) In Gomez, a nurse practitioner’s opinion was considered to be a part of a physician’s

opinion where she worked closely under the supervision of the physician, consulted with the

physician numerous times, and was acting as an agent of the physician. 74 F.3d 967, 971

(9thsCir. 1996). Despite concluding, in a single sentence, that Ms. Campbell’s opinions

should be given the weight of a physician under Gomez, Plaintiff makes no attempt to argue

the basis for this conclusion. Additionally, Plaintiff points to no facts in the record which

support findings that, during her treatment of Plaintiff, Nurse Campbell worked under the

supervision of a physician, consulted with a physician, or was acting as an agent of a

physician. Therefore, the Court declines to conclude that the ALJ erred by not affording

treating physician weight to Nurse Campbell’s opinion. 

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B. Opinion Reports of Nurse Practitioner Campbell

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Gayle Campbell,

a psychiatric medical health nurse practitioner (“PMHNP”), and failed to consider her

opinions at step three and the RFC determination stage.6

 (Dkt. # 14 at 6-8.) In this case,

Nurse Campbell treated Plaintiff for psychiatric impairments during 2006 and 2007. During

this time period, Nurse Campbell conducted psychiatric evaluations (R. at 622-25, 633-35)

and routine follow-up evaluations/treatments (R. 550-51, 555-71, 638-39, 640-51, 657-64,

740-41) with Plaintiff. Nurse Campbell diagnosed Plaintiff with major depression and panic

disorder and assigned Global Assessment of Function (“GAF”) scores which fluctuated

between 49 (R. at 558) and 55 (See, e.g., R. at 654). On May 18, 2006, in a general letter,

Nurse Campbell opined that Plaintiff’s “symptoms are disabling at this time” and he “is not

stable and is not able to work.” (R. at 549.) Additionally, in March 2007, Nurse Campbell

filled out an RFC questionnaire in which she indicated that Plaintiff has marked limitations

in several areas of social functioning, concentration, memory, and ability to carry out

instructions. (R. at 547-48.)

In his decision order, at step three, the ALJ referred to the report from Plaintiff’s

November 7, 2007 psychiatric evaluation, Nurse Campbell’s diagnosis, and her opinion of

Plaintiff’s GAF at that time. (R. at 17.) After discussing this report, the ALJ concluded that

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“[a]lthough the undersigned gives some weight to the psychiatric evaluations by Nurse Gayle

Campbell . . . , she did not conduct nor was she qualified to perform a clinical evaluation or

administer extensive psychological testing.” (R. at 17.) Plaintiff now argues that the ALJ’s

“rejection of [Nurse Campbell’s] medical records and opinions is without merit” because a

PMHNP is “licensed to provide psychosocial assessment, make treatment plans, and provide

psychiatric/differential diagnoses while managing medical care.” (Dkt. # 14 at 6.)

Initially, Plaintiff’s characterization that the ALJ “rejected” Nurse Campbell’s medical

records and opinions is unfounded. The ALJ specifically stated that he “gives some weight”

to the psychiatric evaluations of Nurse Campbell. (R. at 17.) Plaintiff’s main objection,

rather, is aimed at the ALJ’s conclusion that a PMHNP is not “qualified to perform a clinical

examination or administer extensive psychological testing.” (Dkt. # 14 at 6, 8.) In support

of his objection, Plaintiff attaches a printout from the website www.wikipedia.com, which

states that PMHNP’s “are licensed to provide emergency psychiatric services, psychosocial

and physical assessments of their patients, treatment plans, and to continually manage patient

care.” (Dkt. # 14 Ex. 1.) This definition, even if accurate, does not establish that the ALJ

erred in affording a lesser degree of weigh to Nurse Campbell’s reports. The definition

provided does not demonstrate that Nurse Campbell is qualified to conduct clinical

examinations nor does it provide that she is qualified to administer extensive psychological

testing. Indeed, Plaintiff does not even argue that a clinical examination or extensive

psychological testing were conducted. It does appear, however, that the ALJ did recognize

that Nurse Campbell was qualified to and did conduct a psychiatric evaluation to which he

properly afforded some weight. See S.S.R. 06-3p (Aug. 9, 2006) (explaining that the Social

Security Administration “may use evidence from ‘other sources,’ as defined in 20 [C.F.R.

§] 404.1513(d) and 416.913(d), to show the severity of the individual’s impairment(s) and

how it affects the individual’s ability to function” and stating that “[a]lthough the factors in

20 [C.F.R. §] 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d) explicitly apply only to the evaluation of medical

opinions from ‘acceptable medical sources,’ these same factors can be applied to evidence

from ‘other sources’”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (setting forth the factors that

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are considered in deciding how much weight to afford to a medical opinion and stating that

the ALJ will “look at the treatment the source has provided and at the kinds and extent of

examinations and testing the source has performed”). Therefore, the ALJ did not err when

determining the weight that he would afford to Nurse Campbell’s November 7, 2007 report.

 Other than discussing the November 7, 2007 report, however, the ALJ did not

specifically address, either at step three or when making the RFC determination, the other

relevant opinions (R. at 547-49) of Nurse Campbell or other medical source opinions

addressing Plaintiff’s psychiatric impairments (See R. at 235-53, 254-61). On remand, the

Appeals Council specifically directed the ALJ, in the context of Nurse Campbell, to “[g]ive

further consideration to the treating source opinion . . . and explain the weight given to such

opinion evidence.” (R. at 115.) Additionally, the Council directed the ALJ to “[g]ive further

consideration to the claimant’s maximum residual functional capacity” and “evaluate the

treating and examining source opinion . . . and explain the weight given to such opinion

evidence.” (R. at 115.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “clearly did not comply with the

directives of the remand” because he failed to evaluate the opinion of Nurse Campbell that

Plaintiff “is not stable and is not able to work” (R. at 549) and her opinion regarding the

severity of Plaintiff’s limitations in the areas of social functioning, concentration, memory,

and ability to carry out instructions (R. at 547-48). (Dkt. # 14 at 8.) As previously stated,

the ALJ’s failure to consider and evaluate a medical opinion constitutes legal error. See

supra part II.A. Because the ALJ did not consider and evaluate certain opinions of Nurse

Campbell (R. at 547-49), he committed legal error. This error is not harmless because the

opinions that the ALJ failed to discuss could possibly yield a finding of disability under step

three or could alter the ALJ’s RFC analysis. 

C. Opinion Report of Dr. Dhadvai

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Plaintiff’s argument appears only to extend to Dr. Dhadvai’s RFC opinions (R. at

583-85). To the extent that Dr. Dhadvai’s opinions related to the nature of Plaintiff’s

impairments or his ability to perform his past relevant work, the ALJ accepted those

opinions. (See R. at 16, 20.)

8

RFC opinion evidence provided by several physicians employed by the State

contradicted the RFC opinions of Dr. Dhadvai.

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to “accept or reject the opinion” of Dr.

Dilip Dhadvai, a treating physician.7

 (Dkt. # 14 at 7-8.) In his decision order, after

specifically discussing the medical conclusions of Dr. Dhadvai and other treating physicians,

the ALJ stated, “As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned gives significant weight to the

opinions of the residual functional capacity conclusions reached by the physicians employed

by the State Disability Determination Services8

 [which] also supported a finding of “not

disabled.” (R. at 20.) Although the ALJ does not explicitly state that he rejected the RFC

opinions of Dr. Dhadvai, it is clear that, after balancing all of the medical opinions, the ALJ

choose to reject the RFC opinion of Dr. Dhadvai and accept the contradictory RFC opinions

of the physicians employed by the State. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th

Cir. 1989) (“As a reviewing court, we are not deprived of our faculties for drawing specific

and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s opinion.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertion has no

merit. 

 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did “not afford weight” to the RFC opinion of Dr.

Dhadvai. (Dkt. # 14 at 8.) A treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to “substantial

weight.” Embrey v. Brown, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). If the treating physician’s

opinion is contradicted by the opinion of another physician, however, it may be rejected upon

“specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester v.

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). “The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421 (quotation omitted).

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In this case, the ALJ discussed Dr. Dhadvai’s RFC opinion from March 2007 (R. at

583-85). That opinion provided that Plaintiff suffered impairments that would pose

functional limitations in excess of the RFC limitations set forth by the ALJ. Specifically, Dr.

Dhadvai opined that, in an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff could sit for less than one hour,

stand/walk for less than one hour, and never lift or carry even five pounds. (Id.) Dr. Dhadvai

also stated that Plaintiff could not crawl, climb, squat, or bend; could only occasionally

reach; and could not use his feet for repetitive motions. (Id.) Dr. Dhadvai further noted that

Plaintiff was severely limited by his pain. (Id.) 

In the decision order, the ALJ also summarized the conflicting opinions of Dr.

McLean, a treating physician, and Dr. Keith Cunningham, an examining physician employed

by the State. (R. at 18-19.) Both of these physicians’ opinions conflicted in varying degrees

with the RFC opinions of Dr. Dhadvai. Specifically, Dr. Cunningham reported that Plaintiff

was able to lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; has no limitations

in standing, walking, or sitting; has no need for assistive devices; could occasionally crawl

and reach; could frequently climb, stoop, kneel, and crouch; and could constantly balance,

handle, finger, feel, and grasp. (R. at 345-46.) Dr. McLean opined that “[w]ith regards to

work, at least from the spine standpoint, I do feel [Plaintiff] is capable of working full-time

at a sedentary capacity with a change of position every three hours with no overhead lifting

or working and maximal lifting of 10 pounds.” (R. at 538.) 

The ALJ therefore did not err by affording less weight to Dr. Dhadvai’s RFC opinion

than to other physicians’ RFC opinions. The conflicting evidence discussed by the ALJ,

including objective medical tests and conflicting physician testimony, is supported by the

record and could rationally be viewed as substantial evidence inconsistent with Dr.

Dhadvai’s RFC opinion. Weighing the evidence is the province of the ALJ, and as long as

the ALJ’s inferences are reasonable this Court must defer to them. Andrews, 53 F.3d at

1039; Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198; Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. The ALJ’s conclusion that the

conflicting evidence undermined the credibility of Dr. Dhadvai’s opinion was reasonable,

and thus the Court will not disturb it.

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The ALJ gave a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical

evidence, stated his interpretation thereof, and made findings. See Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421.

He gave clear and convincing reasons for doing so, and those reasons are supported by

substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Thus, the ALJ did not err in

discounting Dr. Dhadvai’s opinion.

III. Remedy

Having found that the ALJ erred in failing to address certain opinions of Dr. McLean

and Nurse Campbell, the Court has the discretion to remand the case either for further

proceedings or for an award of benefits. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir.

1998). The rule in this Circuit is that the Court should:

credit[] evidence and remand[] for an award of benefits where

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for

rejecting [certain] evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues

that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be

made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be

required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence

credited.

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Here, even if the ALJ credits Nurse Campbell’s opinions indicating that Plaintiff has

marked limitations in several areas of social functioning, concentration, memory, and ability

to carry out instructions (R. at 547-48), outstanding issues related to whether Plaintiff meets

all listing criteria must be resolved at step three before determining whether Plaintiff suffers

from one of the Social Security Administration’s listed impairment. Likewise, even if the

ALJ credits the opinions of Dr. McLean and Nurse Campbell, there are outstanding issues

that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made. Plaintiff argues that

a closed period of benefits, from August 2004 to at least March 2006, is merited based solely

on the opinion of Dr. McLean. (Dkt. # 14 at 9.) However, in light of the contradictory

evidence in the record relevant to the opinions of Dr. McLean and Nurse Campbell (R. at

235-61, 283-89, 334-47), it is not clear that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff

disabled, even for a closed period. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e) (stating that

the Commissioner is “responsible for making the determination or decision about whether

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you meet the statutory definition of disability” and explaining that “[a] statement by a

medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will

determine that you are disabled”); Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, *15 (9th Cir. 1990)

(declining to remand a case for an award of benefits “because there may be evidence in the

record to which the ALJ can point to provide the requisite specific and legitimate reasons for

disregarding [a treating physician’s] opinion”). Therefore, under these circumstances, the

Court will remand for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION

The ALJ erred in failing to address certain opinions of Dr. McLean and Nurse

Campbell. Because outstanding issues remain before a determination of disability can be

made, remand for further proceedings is proper. Therefore, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED IN PART and

VACATED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED for further proceedings

consistent with this Order.

DATED this 11th day of June, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-01874-GMS Document 17 Filed 06/11/09 Page 13 of 13