Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00154/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00154-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN DIEGO NAVY BROADWAY

COMPLEX COALITION,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv0154 JM(WMc)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coalition (“NBCC” or “Plaintiff”) moves for

summary judgment on its National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) claims. Defendants U.S.

Department of Defense; Robert M. Gates, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department

of Defense; U.S. Department of the Navy; Ray Mabus, Jr., in his official capacity as secretary of the

U.S. Department of the Navy; Naval Facilities Engineering Command; Christopher Mossey, in his

official capacity as Commander of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command; Naval Facilities

Engineering Command Southwest; and S. Keith Hamilton, in his official capacity as Commander,

Naval Facilities Engineering Command Southwest (collectively“Federal Defendants”) cross move for

summary judgment on the NEPA claims. Having carefully considered the record in its entirety,

pertinent legal authorities, the arguments of counsel and for the reasons below, the court denies

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on all claims and grants the Federal Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on all claims. The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the file.

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BACKGROUND

On January 25, 2011, NBCC commenced this action against the Federal Defendants seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of NEPA and the Administrative Procedures

Act (“APA”). The present action comes before the court following this court’s June 26, 2008 order

granting summary judgment in favor of NBCC on its public notice and participation claim and

remanding the matter to the agency for compliance with the notice and public participation

requirements of NEPA. The parties in the earlier filed action, San Diego Navy Broadway Complex

Coalition v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, et al., No. 07cv0038 JM(WMc), jointly filed a motion to dismiss

all claims without prejudice except the public notice and participation claim which was dismissed with

prejudice. 

The following facts are undisputed.

Overview

The NavyBroadwayComplex (“NBC”) site, located on federallyowned land in downtown San

Diego, presently consists of Navy administrative facilities including the Commander, Navy Region

Southwest, and the Fleet Industrial SupplyCenter San Diego. (Administrative Record, “AR,” 80468). 

The present Navy facilities, constructed primarily between 1921 and 1944, consist of 361,000 SF of

administrative office space and 500,000 SF of warehouse space. The proposed action includes the

development of up to 3.25 million SF with approximately 1 million SF of Navy administrative space. 

(AR 80469).

In 1982 the Department of the Navy considered options for the consolidation of various Navy

installations in the San Diego area. In light of budget constraints, the Department of the Navy pursued

a “co-location” program which allowed the federal government to retain title to real property and to

lease portions of the property for private revenue-generating uses that could be used to offset the cost

of new administrative facilities. (AR 80482-83). Congress enacted legislation in 1986, Public Law

99-661, § 2732, 100 Stat 3816 (1986), authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to pursue a public-private

venture to implement the co-location concept at the NBC site. The legislation mandated that “any real

property leased shall be developed in accordance with detailed plans and terms of development which

have been duly formulated by the Navy and the San Diego community through the San Diego

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Association of Government’s Broadway Complex Coordination Group.” Id. 

To obtain the objective of updated Navy administrative facilities, an advisory group, the

Broadway Complex Coordinating Group (“BCCG”), formed in 1985 under the auspices of the San

Diego Association of Governments (“SANDAG”) to serve as community advisors for the planning

of the NBC site and to initiate consultation with local governmental authorities. In June 1987 the

Navy and the City of San Diego executed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) to establish the

terms of potential future development on the NBC site. (AR 956-62). On September 22, 1989 the

BCCG adopted the design principles for the NBC site and established detailed plans and development

terms required by the legislation. 

Initial Environmental Review Proceedings

To comply with its environmental obligations under NEPA, the Navy completed an

Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) in 1990 and issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) in July

1991. (AR 80480-82). The EIS evaluated six action alternatives, in addition to the no action

alternative, and discussed a full range of environmental issues. The ROD memorialized the Navy’s

decision to redevelop the NBC site and identified essential uses for the site. The ROD also identified

that the next step in the process was for the Navy and the City to enter into a Development Agreement

(“DA”), as contemplated under the 1987 MOU. Among other things, the MOU provided that the

Navy, in consultation with the City, would prepare a development plan and urban design guidelines

(i.e. land uses, density, viewscapes, building heights, open space, etc.). 

After review and consideration of potential adverse environmental impacts to the project, the

City completed an Environmental Impact Report in 1991. A mitigation monitoring program (“MMP”)

was prepared as part of the environmental review. (AR 13196.). The City and the Navy agreed that

all required environmental processing had been completed and that no further environmental review

would be required. Id. In October 1991 the California Coastal Commission issued a consistency

determination, agreeing that the development of the NBC was consistent to the maximum extent

practicable with the state’s coastal zone management plans.

Following further public review, on November 2, 1992 the City enacted an ordinance

approving the DA for the NBC site. The DA incorporated, among other documents, the MMP and

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provided a guide to the planning and approval process for the project. The DA includes a development

plan, urban design guidelines, and phasing for the project. The DA contemplates the development of

3.25 million SF with about a third of the development for use by the Navy, about 1.65 million SF for

office space and about 1.2 million SF for hotel and retail uses. (AR 33477-87). The DA also requires

1.9 acres of public open space.

The original DA provided for the termination of the DA by January 1, 2002 unless a Developer

Lessee was selected and recorded. (AR 33443). Following public hearings, the original deadline was

extended first to January 1, 2003 and later to January 1, 2007. (AR 33489).

Subsequent Environmental Review Proceedings 

By 2004 the real estate market in San Diego improved, and the Navy took steps to implement

the DA. (AR 30918). Further, in 2005 the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (“BRAC”)

issued a directive to the Secretary of the Navy to either implement the DA or close the NBC and

relocate the units and functions of NBC to other Department of Navy owned sites in San Diego. (AR

30908). To facilitate implementation of the DA, the Navy prepared an Environmental Assessment

(“EA”) analyzing the environmental impacts associated with implementing the 1991 ROD and the

1992 DA. Concurrently with the preparation of the EA, the Navy, on March 31, 2006, selected

Manchester Pacific Gateway, LLC (“Manchester”) to participate in exclusive negotiations for the

NBC project. (AR 26615-16). With the selection of Manchester, work commenced on the design

phase submissions to Centre City Development Corporation (“CCDC”) for a consistency review and

determination of conformity with the DA. (AR 33446-47). 

Each design stage of the project had to be approved by CCDC for conformity to the standards

and initial consistency determination. Beginning in April 2006, the CCDC held five public

workshops to display the plan proposed by the developer. (AR 33446-47). The CCDC also conducted

public meetings wherein the NBC proposals were considered. Id. At these meetings, the public

provided comments to the CCDC. Such comments were provided to the Navy for consideration in its

NEPA process. 

Pursuant to NEPA, on November 22, 2006, the Navyissued a Finding of No Significant Impact

(“FONSI”). In summarizing the environmental effects of NBC, the FONSI concluded:

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The EA demonstrated that implementation of the proposed action, which includes

measures to reduce or avoid impacts to the environment as defined in the Development

Agreement, will not have a significant effect on the human environment, and therefore

an EIS is not required. The EA revealed that with measures in place to reduce project

impacts, and associated development-related best management practices, that there

would be no significant impacts to environmental quality.

(AR 41805). Shortly thereafter, the lease with Manchester was executed. (AR 41786). 

On January 7, 2009 Plaintiff commenced a case alleging that Defendants (1) failed to prepare

an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”); (2) failed to prepare a Supplemental Environmental

Impact Statement (“SEIS”); and (3) failed to allow public participation before making the FONSI. 

(FAC ¶14-28). As noted above, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion on the public participation and

notice claim and did not reach the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims.

The Environmental Review on Remand

In response to the court’s 2009 order, the Navy produced a new draft EA, released for public

review on September 17, 2008. (AF 64920-5589). The Navy held three public meetings and received

numerous comments. (AR72311). The Navy considered the comments and ultimately discussed in

greater detail, among other things, the project’s Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (“ATFP”)standards,

seismicity and soils, traffic and cumulative impacts. (AR 80450-723). 

Plaintiff now raises three principal challenges to the EA and FONSI: (1) Defendants failed to

adequately consider alternatives under NEPA; (2) Defendants failed to prepare a Supplemental

Environmental Impact Statement (“SEIS”) based upon alleged significant new circumstances and

information relating to terrorism, climate changes, seismic hazards, traffic impacts, excessive

development and cumulative impacts; and (3) Defendants violated NEPA by prejudging the outcome.

The Manchester Submission in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Manchester appears as amicus curiae in this action. Manchester brings to the attention of the

court a state court challenge brought by Plaintiff. On February 20, 2007, Plaintiff commenced an

action against the City of San Diego as a respondent and defendant, and Manchester as the real-partyin-interest. Plaintiff brought its challenges to the project pursuant to the California Environmental

Quality Act (“CEQA”). Among other things, Plaintiff broadly argued that a SEIS was required due

to alleged significant new circumstances and information relating to terrorism, climate changes,

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seismic hazards, traffic impacts, excessive development and cumulative impacts. (Manchester NOL

Exh. A). The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s claims. San

Diego Broadway Complex Coal. v. City of San Diego, 185 Cal. App.4th 924 (2010). In large part

Manchester argues that the CEQA standards, like NEPA, prohibits the issuance of a SEIS in the

absence of substantial major revisions to the initial review, Cal. Pub. Res. Code §21666; compare

with 40 C.F.R. §1502.9(c)(1), and that this court should not reach a contrary result.

The Save Our Waterfront and Downtown Homeowners Submission in Support of Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment 

Save Our Waterfront and Downtown Homeowners (“Save”) appears as amicus curiae in this

action. Relying exclusively on the Administrative Record, Save argues that NBC is particularly

vulnerable as a terrorist target; the EA did not adequately address terrorism related issues; the ATFP

standards adopted and applied to the project are only the minimum standards and fail to adequately

protect the civilian public from potential terrorist attacks; the EA does not adequately address the

capabilities of first responders to a terrorist attack; and that the EA fails to analyze the impacts of the

location of the NBC project adjacent to a railway line which transports explosives and toxic gases. 

The court only addresses those arguments raised by NBCC.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.

56(c); Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the

initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the

file which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). There is “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the

moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s

claim.” Id. (emphasis in original). The opposing party cannot rest on the mere allegations or denials

of a pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and by [the party’s] own affidavits, or by the

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‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (citations omitted). The opposing party also may not rely

solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). 

The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Any doubt as to the existence of any issue

of material fact requires denial of the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). On a motion for summary judgment, when “‘the moving party bears the burden of proof at

trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence

were uncontroverted at trial.’” Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis 

in original) (quoting International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir.

1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059 (1992)).

Administrative Procedures Act Standard

In general, judicial review of actions under NEPA is governed by the Administrative

Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§551-559, 701-706. The APA provides that any agency action

that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” is

prohibited and shall be overturned by the court. 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A); California v. Norton, 311 F.3d

1162, 1170 (9 Cir. 2002). “NEPA does not mandate particular substantive results, but instead th

imposes onlyprocedural requirements.” Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. Of Transp., 42 F.3d 517,

523 (9 Cir. 1994). Under this standard, the “court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the th

agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983). Nevertheless, “the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory

explanation” for its decision and, in reviewing that explanation, the court must consider whether the

decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there was a clear error in

judgment. Id. This inquiry must “be searching and careful” but “the ultimate standard of review is

a narrow one.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 819 F.2d 927, 929 (9th Cir. 1987) (the court applies

deferential standard of review to Environmental Impact Statements).

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When specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on

the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a

court might find contrary views more persuasive. On the other hand, in the context of

reviewing a decision not to supplement an EIS, courts should not automatically defer

to the agency’s express reliance on an interest in finality without carefully reviewing

the record and satisfying themselves that the agency has made a reasoned decision

based on its evaluation of the significance - - or lack of significance -- of the new

information. A contrary approach would not simply render judicial review generally

meaningless, but would be contrary to the demand that courts ensure that agency

decisions are founded on a reasoned evaluation ‘of the relevant factors.’

Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1988).

In considering a NEPA challenge, the court “may not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency concerning the wisdom or prudence of a proposed action.” Laguna Greenbelt, 42 F.3d at 523

(quoting Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 871 F.2d 484, 492 (9 Cir. 1987)). Under the “rule of th

reason,” the court determines “‘whether the [EIS] contains a reasonably thorough discussion of the

significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences’ by making ‘a pragmatic judgment

whetherthe [EIS’s]form, content and preparation foster both informed decision-making and informed

public participation.’” Id. (quoting Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346,

1356 (9 Cir. 1994)). Review under the rule of reason and for abuse of discretion “are essentially the th

same.” Churchill County v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9 Cir. 2001). The role of the court “is to th

ensure that the agency has taken a hard look” at the environmental effects. Or. Natural Res. Council

v. Lowe, 109 F.3d 521, 526 (9 Cir. 1997). th

An EIS is required “for major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C). To determine whether an EIS is required, the agency may

first prepare an EA. 40 C.F.R. §1501.4(b). An EA, like that at issue here, is a “concise public

document” that briefly describes the proposal, examines alteratives, and considers environmental

impacts to determine whether an EIS is required. 40 C.F.R. §1508.9. If the agency determines that

an EIS is not required, it issues a FONSI. 40 C.F.R. §1501.4(e), §1508.13. To challenge an agency’s

decision not to prepare an EIS, a plaintiff need not show that significant effects will in fact occur, only

that there are “substantial questions whether a project may have a significant effect” on the

environment. Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9 Cir. 1998). th

/ / /

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The NEPA Claims 

Plaintiff raises three essential NEPA challenges to the adequacy of the environmental review:

(1) the failure of the EA to consider any alternative except the “No Project” alternative; (2) the failure

to prepare a SEIS in light of new circumstances and information; and (3) Defendants allegedly

prejudged the outcome of the EA in violation of NEPA by entering into a long-term lease with

Manchester prior to completion of the 2009 EA.1

Consideration of Alternatives

Under the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) regulations, every environmental

assessment must “include brief discussions of . . . alternatives as required by section 102(2)(E) [of

NEPA].” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(h). Pursuant to NEPA, all federal agencies “shall . . . study, develop,

and describe appropriate alternatives to recommend course of action in any proposal which involves

unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E). 

While the CEQ regulations do not create a “numerical floor on alternatives to be considered,” all

reasonable alternatives must be considered and “an appropriate explanation” must be given for

alternatives that are eliminated. Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1246

(9 Cir. 2005). “An agency must look at every reasonable alternative, with the range dictated by the th

nature and scope of the proposed action.” Northwest Envt’l Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin.,

117 F.3d 1520, 1538 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas, 956 F.2d 1508, th

1520 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Plaintiff contends that the EA impermissibly limited the number of alternatives considered to

two: the preferred project and the “no project” alternative and therefore the Navyfailed to complywith

its NEPA obligations. Plaintiff contends that Defendants could have considered, at a minimum, the

following two alternatives: (1) construction of the Navy facilities at another unidentified federally

owned site; and (2) a lesser development and intensity of the site. 

With respect to construction of the project at another federally owned site as a contemplated

alternative required to comply with NEPA, the court concludes that Defendants did not act arbitrarily,

The parties agree that Defendants complied with their public notice and participation 1

obligations under NEPA. 

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capriciously, or contrary to law by not considering another site other than the Broadway site. The

National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 authorizes the development of Navy administrative

facilities at the Broadway Complex site and only then if the terms of the development are mutually

approved by the Navy and the City of San Diego. Pub. L. No. 99-661, §2732(c). Further, the DA also

provided for the development to proceed at the Broadway site. 

The nature and scope of the proposed action is clearly defined: (1) to comply with the

Congressional mandate; (2) to consolidate Naval shore administrative activities; (3) to provide

efficient centralized administrative facilities to serve the many Navy installations in the San Diego

area; and (4) to provide the Navy facilities at reduced or no cost to the taxpayer. (AR 80468). The

court notes that there is no evidence before the court suggesting that any other potential site satisfies

the nature and scope of the proposed action, particularly in light of the Congressional mandate. 

Under the rule of reason standard, Laguna Greenbelt, 42 F.3d at 523, limiting the alternatives

to only the NBC site complies with NEPA. As set forth in the 2009 EA, absent development of the

NBC site, the Navy would require a significant funding increase to bring the existing buildings “up

to a reasonable level of modernity and efficiency [and] cost the taxpayer a significant amount of

money.” (AR 80495). The court concludes that limiting the alternatives to a choice between the 2

NBC site or the so-called no action alternative, in light of the nature and proposed scope of the project

alternative, is not arbitrary, capricious, nor contrary to law.

The court also rejects Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants arbitrarily failed to consider a

lesser intensity of development. After “the 1990 EIS was completed and the ROD issued, the decision

on intensity of development suitable for the purpose and needs of that project had been made. An

examination of alternatives which didn’t meet that standard, such as less intense development was not

warranted.” AR 13197. In other words, the Navy considered that a reduced density would not likely

attract a qualified developer or comply with the nature and scope of the proposed action.

Here, looking to the nature and scope of the proposed project, Northwest Envt’l Def. Ctr., 117

F.3d at 1538, the overarching goal is to achieve the Congressional mandate consisting of the

The court notes that the 1990 EIS considered and rejected six alternatives as infeasible. (AR 2

1663-1720). 

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construction of new Navy administrative facilities, at no or minimal cost, in consideration for a longterm lease of the NBC property to a private party. Pub. L. 99-661, §2732. The Navy’s determination

that the existing intensity of use is adequate to achieve the purpose and needs of the project, and that

a lesser intensitywould not satisfy the Congressional mandate, is not arbitrary, capricious nor contrary

to law. NEPA only requires consideration of reasonable alternatives. Native Ecosystems Council v.

U.S. Forest Service, 428 F.3d 1233, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005) In Native Ecosystems, the Ninth Circuit

noted that there is no “numerical requirement” in determining whether the agency acted reasonably

in analyzing available alternatives and that the “obligation to consider alternatives under an EA is a

lesser one than under an EIS.” Id. There, the Ninth Circuit concluded that consideration of the noaction and a preferred alternative, as here, did not violate NEPA, finding that “[s]o long as ‘all

reasonable alternatives’ have been considered and appropriate explanation is provided as to why an

alternative was eliminated, the regulatory requirement is satisfied.” Id. 

Finally, the court notes that Plaintiff fails to identify any other reasonably available alternative

that would comply with the legislative mandate. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff asserts that the “real

reason for ignoring the alternative is that Defendants had already entered into a lease that allowed for

development within the parameters of the Development Agreement, so there was no reason in their

minds to look at an alternative outside their previous commitment.” (Reply at p.6:11-14). This facile

argument ignores the legislative mandate and the several environmental studies carried out before

executing the lease agreement with Manchester, including consideration of six alternatives as set forth

in the 1990 EIS. (AR 1641-1772). 

In sum, the court finds that Defendants’ consideration of the identified alternatives is neither

arbitrary or capricious nor does it violate NEPA. 

Preparation of a SEIS

Plaintiff contends that Defendants violatedNEPA bypreparing the 2009 EA instead of a SEIS.3

A SEIS is only required where the agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action relevant

to environmental concerns where significant new information arises relevant to environmental

The court notes that Plaintiff withdrew its challenges to the adequacy of the EA based upon 3

seismic hazards and traffic. (Reply at pp. 10:26-11:3). 

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concerns and the changes or “new information is sufficient to show that the remaining action will

affec[t] the quality of the human environment in a significant manner or to a significant extent not

already considered.” Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374; 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C). Plaintiff contends that the

following impacts, either individually or collectively, require Defendants to prepare a SEIS.

Terrorism

Plaintiff and Amicus Curiae, Save, argue that the level of analysis on terrorism provided for

in the EA is insufficient and that a SEIS is required. A report submitted by Plaintiff during the review

process indicates that the NBC site is a potential terrorist target. (AR 67156 - 163). The report,

authored by Brian Michael Jenkins, an advisor on terrorism and military related issues, noted that it

is “unusual for major military facilities to be located in the heart of urban areas.” Id. He also opines

that the proximity of NBC to civilian hotels and retail facilities “increases the risk for those facilities”

and that “security for the new Navy headquarters will have to take into account a range of possible

incidents or modes of attack,” such as violent protests; assaults of naval personnel; bombings;

shooting; arson attacks involving rail tankers; rocket and mortar fire; and chemical, biological, or

radiological weapons. Id.

Plaintiff also identifies publications issued by the Department of Justice and the Federal

Emergency Management Agency which identify the need and methods for conducting terrorist threat

assessments. Plaintiff also correctly argues that NEPA requires federal agencies, where practicable,

to consider potential environmental impacts of terrorist attacks on potential targets. In San Luis

Obispo Mothers of Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d 1016 (9 Cir. 2006) the Nuclear

th

RegulatoryCommission (“NRC”) categorically determined that NEPA did not require consideration

of the environmental effects of potential terrorist attacks primarily because “the possibility of a

terrorist attack . . . is speculative and simply too far removed from the natural or expected

consequences. Id. at 1030. The Ninth Circuit rejected NRC’s argument. The Ninth Circuit considered

NRC’s post-September 11, 2001 policy opinion that the NRC should engage in a comprehensive

review of its terrorist threat assessment framework and design basis threat. It also noted that the NRC

had established an Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response to coordinate and implement a

comprehensive security review applicable to all facilities. Id. at 1031. The Ninth Circuit determined

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that it could not reconcile NRC’s argument that any terrorist attack on nuclear facilities was so remote

with its stated policy goals to perform a top-to-bottom review of terrorist attacks. The Ninth Circuit

then concluded that “NEPA obligates the NRC to take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental

consequences of that risk,” even if precise quantification of that risk is not ascertainable. Id. at 1032.

Upon remand, the NRC conducted a further review of the potential radiological impact of

potential terrorist acts on spent fuel storage casks. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear

Regulatory Comm’n, 635 F.3d 1109 (9 Cir. 2011) (“Mothers for Peace II”). Using generic th

assessments of radiological dose calculations, the NRC concluded that there would be no significant

impact on the environment. Id. at 1112. The Ninth Circuit concluded that NRC complied with NEPA

when it considered the evidence regarding a potential terrorist threat (even though the information

could not be disclosed at a public hearing because of the sensitive nature of the terrorism information). 

Noting the Supreme Court’s admonition against imposing additional procedures on agencies’ NEPA

decision-making determinations, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that there was no

reasoned basis for NRC’s determination and concluded that the NRC did not abuse its discretion in

not disclosing sensitive information and finding the evidence did not alter the FONSI. Id. at 1120.

In the main, Plaintiff argues that the expansion of the Navy’s presence in downtown San Diego

presents and/or increases the potential threat of a terrorist attack. Plaintiff then argues that the level

of analysis in the EA does not comply with NEPA. For example, Plaintiff argues that NBC must “be

the subject of comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessments” that include “violent protests;

assaults or assassinations of naval personnel; bombings; shootings; arson attacks involving tankers;

rocket and mortar fire; and chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.” (Reply at p.9:9-11). The

court concludes that the level of detail and depth of analysis demanded by Plaintiff exceeds the scope

and demands of NEPA.

Here, the level of analysis provided byDefendants exceeds that identified in Mothers for Peace

II. The court concludes that the Navy took a hard look at the environmental consequences of potential

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terrorist attacks and adopted standards to address potential terrorist concerns. See Kleppe v. Sierra 4

Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (“The only role for a court is to insure that the agency has taken

a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences; it cannot ‘interject itself within the area of discretion of

the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.’”). The EA directly addressed issues of

terrorism and concluded that the NBC site would comply with ATFP (antiterrorism for protection

building standards) and that the “proposed action . . . would not jeopardize the national security of a

military installation or the safety of our citizens.” (AR 80518-19). In reaching its conclusions,

Defendants relied upon its own experts by having the threat independently evaluated by the Naval

Criminal Investigative Service (“NCIS”) and by considering public comments concerning potential

terrorist threats, including those of Brian Jenkins. (AR 69867; 80518-23; 81426; 81214; 81157). See

Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378 (“[A]n agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its

own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more

persuasive.”). 

Finally, the court notes that the same naval administrative services that are currently located

on the NBC site will remain after construction of the project. In this sense, the potential terrorist threat

remains essentially the same, except that the administrative services will be located in modern,

improved, and higher security facilities. Where, as here, “the proposed action does not significantly 5

alter the status quo, it does not have a significant impact under NEPA” and a SEIS is not required. 

TriValley CAREs v. Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1125 (9 Cir. 2012). th

In sum, the court concludes that Defendants took a hard look at the environmental

consequences of potential terrorist attacks by relying on the expertise of NCIS, adopting the ATFP

standards, and considering extensive public input on the issue of terrorism. 

The court notes that the terrorism risks are of low probability, as identified in the report 4

prepared by Brian Jenkins. (AR 67157). While there is no specific known terrorist risk to the NBC

site, the Jenkins report notes that “[i]t is extremely difficult to assign a statistical probability to a

terrorist attack on any specific facility.” Id. 

 While Plaintiff argues that NBC is “slated to become the Navy’s center for logistics for the 5

global war on terror,” (Motion at p.17), the court notes the administrative record indicates that the

NBC site “would be limited to administrative functions that are not directly involved in ongoing

combat missions.” (AR 80519). 

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Climate Change

Plaintiff contends that the 2009 EA fails to adequately address global warming and climate

change impacts related to the NBC such that a SEIS is required. Plaintiff represents that the project

will emit about 68,893 metric tons of greenhouse gases and that the EA fails to quantify any proposed

reduction in greenhouse gases. 

The court concludes that Defendants took a hard look at the environmental consequences of

greenhouse gases and climate changes. The EA sets forth an eleven- page discussion of climate

change issues. While the majority of this discussion concerns global climate change in general, the

EA identifies actions to be taken to reduce the number of vehicle trips to the site thus reducing

greenhouse gases. The EA also discusses regulations for building energy efficiency, fuel efficiency

for vehicles, and renewable energy, among other things. (AR 80718 - 19). The EA also highlights

that, “because of the uncertainties involving the assessment of such emissions regionally and globally,

the incremental contribution of this proposed action on global climate change cannot be determined

given the current state of the science and assessment methodology.” (AR 80720). 

In sum, the court concludes that the EA adequately considered the project’s impact on global

warming in proportion to its significance.

Excessive Development Intensity and Cumulative Impacts

Plaintiff argues that the project’s cumulative impacts in conjunction with the planned

construction of a cruise ship terminal and other proposed developments in the Marina District have

not been adequately studied and warrant a SEIS. NEPA defines a cumulative impact as “the impact

on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past,

present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency . . . or person undertakes

such other actions.” 40 C.F.R. §1508.7. In particular, Plaintiff identifies that the Midway Museum

is located directly across from the projects, which is a view corridor to be implemented when the NBC

is built. Plaintiff also identifies that a planned cruise ship terminal at Broadway Pier will also impact

the views. 

The court finds that the EA took a hard look at potential future developments and considered

the cumulative impacts of the project. The 2009 EA considered the visual environment in the NBC

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area, including the Midway Museum corridor, the Cruise Ship Terminal and other berthing along the

waterfront. The EA considered the project viewshed and aesthetics. (AR 80542- 57). Not only does

the EA discuss the rapid development that could impact view corridors along the waterfront, (AR

80704-07), but it also discusses the DA and the “design criteria to preserve and reinforce the existing

views and to capture new views as redevelopment on large waterfront parcels [] occurs.” (AR 80544). 

The EA focused on the aggregate effects to aesthetics and viewshed, rather than reviewing individual

past or present developments, and specifically identified those developments included in the North

Embarcadero Alliance Visionary Plan (“NEAVP”). The NEAVP plan contemplates the expansion of

the cruise ship terminal, including the development in the waterfront area of other commercial uses

and public amenities. (AR 7744-64). The NEAVP also discusses substantial redevelopment of the

B Street Pier (about one block from the NBC site) noting that the size and configuration, and the

nature of other commercial development on the pier, will be based on the future needs of the cruise

ship industry in San Diego. (AR 7780). Under these circumstances the court concludes that

Defendants took a hard look at both anticipated and unanticipated development intensity and

cumulative impacts of the NBC.

In sum, the court concludes that a SEIS is not required under NEPA because Defendants’

decision was based on consideration of relevant factors and the actions were not arbitrary, capricious,

nor a violation of law.

Defendants’ Prejudgment of the Outcome

Plaintiff contends that the entire review process is, as a matter of law, defective under NEPA

because Defendants prejudged the outcome of the 2009 environmental review process. The only fact

supporting this argument is that Defendants entered into a lease agreement with Manchester in 2006. 

Seen in context of the entirety of the record, this argument is not significant nor persuasive and does

not undermine the court’s conclusion that Defendants’ took a hard look at relevant NEPA

environmental considerations.

As noted in Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135 (9 Cir. 2000) “[p]roper timing is one of NEPA’s th

central themes. An assessment must be ‘prepared early enough so that it can serve practically as an

important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be used to rationalize or justify

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decisions already made.” Id. at 1142. In Metcalf the Ninth Circuit concluded that the federal

defendants did not engage the NEPA process “at the earliest possible time.” Rather, the “Federal

Defendants did not even consider the potential environmental effects of the proposed action until long

after they had already committed in writing to support the Makah whaling project.” Id. at 1143. It was

only after NOAA had signed a contract with the Makah that it commenced the environmental review

process.

Here, in contrast to Metcalf, Defendants commenced the NEPA review process more than 16

years before entering into the lease with Manchester. At the earliest possible time, in October 1990,

Defendant completed an EIS, considering a full range of environmental issues. (AR 1665-1770). The

ROD, issued in July 1991, adopted the preferred alternative identified in the 1990 EIS (which is

essentially the current preferred alternative). Defendants continued to pursue environmental review

of the NBC project by obtaining a consistency determination from the California Coastal Commission

in October 1991. Meanwhile, Defendants and the City of San Diego jointly developed the DA in 1992. 

Significantly, the scope of the present NBC project remains as first contemplated in 1990. The record

also shows that the Navy completed the 2006 EA prior to entering into the Manchester lease. This is

not the case where, like Metcalf, the NEPA process was found to be driven by the parties’ agreement.

Instead, the Manchester lease was driven by the NEPA process. The record demonstrates that

environmental review was conducted by Defendants at the “earliest possible time to insure that

planning and decisions reflect environmental values.” Audrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351

(1979).

The court notes that several other factors unrelated to NEPA led to signing of the Manchester

lease. First, the DA originally required any development lease to be signed by January 1, 2002. The

deadline was extended to January 1, 2003 and then again to January 1, 2007. (AR33489-97). Second,

in 2005, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission issued a directive requiring the Secretary of

the Navy to either implement the 1992 DA or to close NBC. (AR 30908). Even under pressure arising

from the expiration of the deadlines in the DA and the Base Realignment and Closure Commission,

Defendants did not enterinto a lease agreement with anydeveloper. Only after completion of the 2006

EA did Defendants enter into the lease agreement with Manchester.

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In sum, the court concludes that the NEPA review process conducted by Defendants was not,

based upon the entirety of the record, untimely nor improperly influenced by the 2006 Manchester

lease. 

The Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff moves the court to take judicial notice of (1) the Manchester ground lease and (2) a

10News story re: U.S. Geologic Survey’s opinions by Susan Hough. The court denies the request for

judicial notice, not because the ground lease is not properly subject to judicial notice under FRE 201,

but because Plaintiff fails to show that expansion of the Administrative Record is warranted under the

circumstances. 

6

Expansion of the Administrative Record is appropriate under limited circumstances (1) to

explain agency action; (2)where the agency relied upon documents not included in the record; (3) to

explain or clarify technical terms; or (4) where there is a strong showing in support of a claim or bad

faith or improper behavior. Sw. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1442,

1450 (9 Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiff argues that the “ground lease explains that the 2009 environmental

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assessment process was nothing more than a charade.” (Oppo at p.2:15-16). This bare assertion does

not point to any provision in the lease that explains Plaintiff’s conclusion that the 2009 EA is a

charade. As Plaintiff’s conclusory mischaracterization of the Manchester lease does not explain

agency action or support a claim of improper behavior, the court grants Defendants’ motion to strike

the extra record material filed by Plaintiff.

In sum, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on all

claims. The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 17, 2012

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

The court notes that Plaintiff withdrew its challenge to the seismological survey conducted

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byDefendants. (Reply at p. 10:26-28). Accordingly, the 10News story document is not relevant to any

issue before the court. 

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