Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00900/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00900-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON McCLAIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCHOO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:19-cv-00900-BAM (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 

ACTION

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 

CLAIMS

(ECF Nos. 1, 13, 14)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

(ECF No. 14)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

I. Background

Plaintiff Jason McClain (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On January 15, 2020, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that Plaintiff 

stated a cognizable claim against Defendants Schoo, Gonzalez, and Brooks for failure to protect 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment, but failed to state any other cognizable claims. The Court 

ordered Plaintiff to either file a first amended complaint or notify the Court of his willingness to 

proceed only on the cognizable claim. (ECF No. 13.) On January 30, 2020 Plaintiff notified the 

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Court of his willingness to proceed on the cognizable claim for failure to protect against the 

defendants, as identified by the Court. (ECF No. 14.) In his notification, Plaintiff also requests 

that the Court issue an order that he be placed on the priority legal user list so he may be provided 

with legal materials such as motion paper. (Id.)

II. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 

or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 

true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted 

unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

A. Allegations in Complaint

Plaintiff is currently housed at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, 

California. The events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred at North Kern State Prison 

during a transportation stop. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Sergeant M. Schoo; 

(2) Correctional Officer L. Gonzalez; and (3) Correctional Officer A. Brooks.

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Plaintiff alleges that the events at issue occurred during Plaintiff’s transportation by the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) transportation team 

consisting of Defendants Schoo, Gonzalez, and Brooks. Plaintiff is a max custody level 4 inmate 

who requires special transportation accommodations that include full transportation restraints, 

constant observation and single placement in the bus security holding cell. Plaintiff is an openly 

transgender inmate vulnerable/open to physical attacks by overly aggressive inmates and for this 

reason Plaintiff fully depends upon correctional staff protection.

On February 7, 2018, Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Schoo about his safety concerns while 

under escort/transport. Plaintiff stated to Defendant Schoo, “I’m not going to have any problems 

during transport am I.” Defendant Schoo replied, “I’m well [aware] of who you, and what you

are.” He then added, “You’ll be safe on this ride.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.)

Plaintiff was placed in waist chain restraints by Defendant Gonzalez and escorted to the 

transportation bus. Defendant Brooks then placed Plaintiff in security leg restraints. Defendants 

Gonzalez and Brooks escorted Plaintiff on to the transportation bus. Instead of placing Plaintiff 

inside the single-man security cell, they opted to seat Plaintiff among other inmates in the back of 

the bus. Before the transportation bus exited the prison facility, Defendant Shoo conducted a 

security walk through and conducted a head count.

During the February 7, 2018 bus ride, the transportation team stopped at North Kern State 

Prison to pick up more inmates. Defendants Shoo and Brooks exited the bus, leaving Defendant 

Gonzalez to load and watch those inmates entering the bus and those already seated on the bus. 

Defendant Gonzalez eventually exited the bus, leaving Plaintiff and the other inmates unattended. 

One of the newly arrived inmates, Inmate Ritter, used this opportunity to slip out of his handcuffs 

and waist chain restraints and then attack Plaintiff from behind. Inmate Ritter wrapped the waist 

chain restraints completely around Plaintiff’s neck, stopping his breathing. Plaintiff feared for his 

life and struggled to free himself without success. After Plaintiff fought for his life for 

approximately 3 or 4 minutes, Defendant Gonzalez returned to the bus and heard Plaintiff’s gags 

and attempts to call for help. Plaintiff then heard the bus horn sound. Defendants Schoo and 

Brooks then arrived and were able to subdue Plaintiff’s attacker, Inmate Ritter. Plaintiff was then 

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escorted from the bus and into North Kern State Prison, where he was evaluated by medical staff.

Plaintiff alleges that the defendants attempted to cover up the incident by not allowing 

Plaintiff to be fully assessed or medically evaluated. Plaintiff also claims that medical staff failed 

to properly document Plaintiff’s injuries on the medical report. After the medical evaluation, 

Plaintiff was escorted by Defendant Brooks and placed back on the transportation bus. Plaintiff 

was secured inside of the bus security transportation cell.

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered mental and physical injuries. His physical injuries 

included bruising, uncontrollable pain, neck stiffness and difficulty sleeping. Plaintiff seeks a 

declaration that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. He also seeks compensatory and 

punitive damages.

B. Discussion

1. Eighth Amendment – Failure to Protect

Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners from 

violence at the hands of other prisoners because being violently assaulted in prison is simply not 

part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1994); Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). However, prison officials are liable 

under the Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference to conditions 

posing a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that deliberate 

indifference occurs when an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial 

risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841; Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 

1040.

At the pleading stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim 

against Defendants Schoo, Gonzalez, and Brooks for failure to protect him from harm in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment.

2. Eighth Amendment – Medical Care

Although unclear, Plaintiff may be attempting to assert a claim for deliberate indifference 

to his medical needs. A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and 

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unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment unless the mistreatment rises to the 

level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for 

deliberate indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating 

that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the 

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was 

deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the defendant “knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” Simmons v. Navajo Cty. Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 

1019 (9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown 

where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical 

need” and the indifference caused harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a 

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be 

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this 

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 

429 U.S. at 105–06). “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating 

a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth 

Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the 

victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. Cty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 

1316 (9th Cir. 1995). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

Further, a “difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between 

medical professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to 

deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. 

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 

744 F.3d 1076, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 

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2012) (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, Plaintiff “must 

show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive 

risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

As currently pled, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a cognizable 

claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

According to the allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff received prompt medical attention after 

the attack. Plaintiff’s assertions that any such treatment was negligent are not sufficient to 

support an Eighth Amendment claim. Additionally, Plaintiff’s mere disagreement with the form 

of treatment also is not sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim.

III. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

In his notification to the Court, Plaintiff also states that because he is currently in solitary 

confinement, he has limited access to the law library, and has received no responses to numerous 

written requests for interview asking the librarian for motion paper. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks a 

court order to be placed on the priority legal user list and to provide him with all legal materials. 

(ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff’s request will be construed as a motion for preliminary injunction.

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter 

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a 

preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 

favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20 (citations omitted). An injunction 

may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 22 (citation 

omitted).

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for 

preliminary injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it 

have before it an actual case or controversy. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); 

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 

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464, 471 (1982). If the Court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no 

power to hear the matter in question. Id. Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the Court find 

the “relief [sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation 

of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the 

Federal right.”

Furthermore, the pendency of this action does not give the Court jurisdiction over prison 

officials in general. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491–93 (2009); Mayfield v. 

United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the parties 

in this action and to the viable legal claims upon which this action is proceeding. Summers, 555 

U.S. at 491−93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969.

In his motion, Plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief against any of the named defendants 

in this action. Rather, he seeks a court order that would place him on the priority legal user list 

and entitle him to be provided with legal materials. Such an order would presumably be directed 

at prison staff at the institution where he is currently housed, which is not the same institution 

where the allegations in the complaint occurred. (ECF No. 14.)

“A federal court may issue an injunction [only] if it has personal jurisdiction over the 

parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of 

persons not before the court.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigration Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 

1985). Thus, the Court must deny Plaintiff’s motion because it lacks jurisdiction over CDCR 

generally, or any staff apparently responsible for the distribution of legal materials or maintaining 

the priority legal user list at his current institution.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim for failure to protect in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment against Defendants Schoo, Gonzalez, and Brooks, but fails to state any other 

cognizable claims.

Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is HEREBY DIRECTED to randomly assign a 

District Judge to this action.

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Furthermore, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s complaint, filed June 14, 2019, (ECF No. 1), against 

Defendants Schoo, Gonzalez, and Brooks for failure to protect in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment;

2. All other claims be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state claims upon which relief 

may be granted; and

3. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, (ECF No. 14), be DENIED.

***

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file objections within the specified 

time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 

appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 3, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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