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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 1, 2015*

Decided June 2, 2015

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐2980

LEONARD ASKEW,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

RANDY DAVIS, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Illinois.

No. 11‐cv‐0902‐MJR‐SCW

Michael J. Reagan,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Leonard Askew, an Illinois prisoner diagnosed with diabetes, appeals from the

grant of summary judgment against him in his suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting

deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14‐2980    Page 2

Because Askew furnished no evidence suggesting that the defendants provided

constitutionally inadequate treatment for his diabetes symptoms, we affirm.   

After Askew was transferred to Pinckneyville Correctional Center in January

2011, he faced three medical issues. The first involved his requests for special shoes.

Within a month of his arrival, he met with defendant Angel Rector, a nurse practitioner,

and told her that he wanted “diabetic shoes.” People with diabetic neuropathy (painful

nerve damage) are advised to wear properly fitting shoes to relieve pressure on areas of

the feet where ulcers are likely to form. See Sicco Bus, et al., Evaluation and Optimization of

Therapeutic Footwear for Neuropathic Diabetic Foot Patients Using In‐Shoe Plantar Pressure

Analysis, DIABETES CARE (2011), available at

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3120171/. Rector noted that Askew’s feet

were within “normal limits” and denied the request. At a later visit with Rector, Askew

again demanded the special shoes. He showed her two shoe requisitions for him from

other prisons where he had been previously incarcerated—one from two years earlier

and the other eight years old. Rector replied that a doctor must prescribe the shoes.   

Askew eventually met with Doctor Vipin Shah to request his special shoes. He

told Shah that they were necessary because he had flat feet. The doctor determined that

Askew did not have flat feet and did not need the shoes. After Askew filed a grievance to

complain about Shah’s decision, Christine Brown, the Health Care Unit Administrator,

responded that, from the records of his appointment with Shah, the doctor reasonably

concluded that Askew did not require the shoes. Randy Davis, the warden, agreed.   

Askew eventually received his shoes. A few months after the grievance, Askew

again asked Rector for the special shoes. This time she ordered a physical‐therapy

evaluation of Askew’s need for them. The evaluation was not completed, though,

because Askew was in segregation at the time of his scheduled appointment. A few

months later, Askew met again with Rector, and she ordered a “collegial review” of his

need for special shoes based on the then‐apparent crowding in his current shoes. Shah

and another doctor reviewed the request and approved the shoes, which Askew then

received in January 2012, a year after his initial request. During that year, Askew asserts,

he experienced severe pain, numbness, and swelling in his feet.

Askew’s second issue concerns his prescription for pain medication for his

diabetic neuropathy. Records show that six months after he arrived at Pinckneyville,

Askew refused to take his dose of Neurontin, which had been prescribed to treat pain in

his feet stemming from his neuropathy. When Askew’s prescription was set to expire in

July, Shah decided not to refill the prescription. The doctor gave two reasons. First,

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Askew had already complained about taking too much medication. (In addition to

refusing to take Neurontin, he continually refused his insulin doses). Second, although

the lack of insulin meant that his blood‐sugar was not well controlled, he was

“neurologically within normal limits.” Askew disputes Shah’s first reason, saying that

he only resisted taking insulin, not Neurontin.

The third issue concerns foot cream. After his arrival in Pinckneyville, Rector

provided Askew with a cream to treat the dry and sore skin on his feet caused by his

diabetes. But a month after the Neurontin prescription lapsed, Askew met with Shah

who, according to Askew, refused to give him more cream for his feet, which were still

dry and sore. Askew filed a grievance the next day with Warden Davis, and Davis

forwarded it to Brown, the grievance officer, who denied it because Askew’s medical

records reflect that Shah prescribed Askew the cream the day after Askew met with him.   

Askew later sued the medical officers, Rector and Shah, and the administrators,

Brown and Davis. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, who

recommended granting summary judgment to some defendants based on Askew’s

failure to exhaust some of his claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Askew did not oppose the

recommendation, and since the district court adopted it, Askew has waived his right to

appeal the exhaustion ruling, which, in any event, he does not now contest. See Johnson v.

Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). The district court later granted the

defendants’ motions for summary judgment on all remaining claims. It concluded that

Askew presented no evidence to support his claim that Rector or Shah had acted with

deliberate indifference regarding the shoes or that Shah had acted with deliberate

indifference regarding the prescription and the cream. It also concluded that Brown and

Davis, as administrators, could rely on the medical professionals’ judgment about the

proper treatment.   

During the proceedings in the district court, Askew five times moved for

recruitment of counsel. He argued that his case was complex, his ability to litigate was

restricted by his imprisonment, and his trial would likely involve conflicting and expert

testimony. The court denied each request. It explained that Askew at first had not met

his threshold burden of showing that he had attempted to find counsel. Later, the court

concluded, the case was not overly complex relative to Askew’s skills, his filings were

easy to understand, and he did not raise any unique discovery problems. The court

noted that it would revisit the issue if the case went to trial, which it did not.   

On appeal Askew first challenges the grant of summary judgment for Rector and

Shah on his claim that their delay in providing him with diabetic shoes violated the

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Eighth Amendment. He argues that the one‐year delay caused needless pain, and

because doctors had ordered the shoes for him at two previous prisons, Rector and Shah

deliberately disregarded the necessity of the shoes. But under the Eighth Amendment,

prison medical personnel like Rector and Shah are not required to defer to a prior

doctor’s diagnosis; rather, they are free to make their “own, independent medical

determination as to the necessity of certain treatments or medications, so long as the

determination is based on . . . professional judgment and does not go against accepted

professional standards.” Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir.

2012); see Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 393, 396–97 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that

doctor was not deliberately indifferent when he did not provide inmate with soft‐soled

shoes that had been provided at previous prison). The explanations that Rector and Shah

gave for deciding that the shoes were not medically necessary in 2011 (that his feet were

within “normal limits” and were not flat) show that they exercised professional

judgment, thereby satisfying the Eighth Amendment. See Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409

(7th Cir. 2014); Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2008).   

Two other reasons persuade us that summary judgment was proper on the shoe

claim. First, even if Askew was in pain from diabetic neuropathy when he first requested

the shoes, nothing in the record suggests that his shoes were the cause. To the contrary,

because, as he concedes, he was not taking his insulin, Askew was not controlling his

diabetes, and this neglect may have caused his pain. See NAT’L INST. OF NEUROLOGICAL

DISORDERS AND STROKE, DIABETIC NEUROPATHY INFORMATION PAGE,

http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/diabetic/diabetic.htm (last visited May 13, 2015)

(“The first step [in treating diabetic neuropathy] is to bring blood sugar levels under

control by diet and medication.”). Second, Askew was in disciplinary segregation when

the physical‐therapy evaluation, which Rector ordered to determine if he needed the

shoes, was scheduled. Askew does not contend that Rector or Shaw caused him to miss

that evaluation, so he cannot fault them for any delay attributable to his time in

segregation.   

Askew next challenges the grant of summary judgment on his claim that Shah

demonstrated deliberate indifference by not refilling the Neurontin prescription.

Because he had been receiving Neurontin for the past three years, Askew contends that

his need for it was obvious. But Shah explained that he based his decision on Askew’s

refusal to take this medicine and his evaluation that, despite Askew’s poorly controlled

diabetes, he remained “neurologically within normal limits.” Although Askew disputes

the first reason—that he complained about taking Neurontin—he has not contradicted

the legitimacy of Shah’s second medical rationale—that based on Askew’s current

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neurological tests the medication was no longer necessary. This omission defeats his

claim. See Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409; Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006).   

Askew next challenges the grant of summary judgment on his claim that Shah

was deliberately indifferent to his need for foot cream. But the first time that Askew met

with Shah and asked him for cream, Shah prescribed it the next day. Askew has not

provided evidence, or even argued, that the one‐day delay exacerbated his condition.

See Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 619, 624–25 (7th Cir. 2010); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538

F.3d 763, 779 (7th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2007).

Askew also contests the grant of summary judgment for Davis and Brown,

arguing that they should have intervened to improve his treatment. As administrators,

they were permitted to defer to Shah’s and Rector’s medical opinions. See King v. Kramer,

680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012); Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1010–11. Although Brown was

also a nurse, her interaction with Askew was limited to her capacity as an administrator

investigating health‐related grievances. She is therefore held to the standard of a

grievance officer, not a medical professional, and in that capacity she can defer to a

treating physician’s assessment. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2009)

(noting that prison’s division of labor must be respected); Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579,

586 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding it proper for Health Care Unit Administrator—who was also

a nurse— to defer to doctor’s diagnosis), overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini,

724 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2013).   

Finally, Askew challenges the denials of his five motions for recruitment of

counsel. He urges that the district court should have granted his motions because

counsel could have better argued his claims. A district court may enlist counsel to assist

an unskilled plaintiff with complex litigation. See Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 564–

65 (7th Cir. 2014). But the district court reasonably concluded that, because Askew had

filed well‐written submissions and the issues were straightforward, the case was not so

complex that it necessitated an attorney. See Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir.

2014).

AFFIRMED.

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