Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00975/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00975-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD CHRISMAN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08cv0975 - IEG (WVG)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 70]

vs.

DAVID SMITH, M.D.; M. SHERIDAN;

M.X. McCURTY; DR. RICHARDS; R.N.

MARQUEZ and C/O ESCALANTE,

Defendants.

Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment brought by Defendants M.

Sheridan, N. Marquez, and G. Escalante (“Defendants”) pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff, a former state inmate, asserts an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stemming from alleged inadequate and delayed

medical care for injuries he sustained when he was attacked by another inmate. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

On September 26, 2006, Plaintiff, then an inmate at Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility (“RJD”), was attacked by another inmate. (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 14.) 

A corrections officer escorted Plaintiff to the Psychiatric Services Unit, and a Medical Technical

Assistant (“MTA”) examined him. (Declaration of K. Sheriff (Sheriff Decl.) ¶ 3.) During the

Case 3:08-cv-00975-IEG-WVG Document 80 Filed 12/16/10 Page 1 of 9
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examination, the MTA observed that Plaintiff had a bloody nose and that a fingernail on his left

hand was bleeding. (Sheriff Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. 1) Pursuant to institution policy, the MTA documented

his findings in a Medical Report of Injury or Unusual Occurrence Form. (Sheriff Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. 1) 

Pursuant to institution policy and custom and practice, the MTA called the attending nurse, who

advised the MTA that Plaintiff did not have to be seen at the Triage Treatment Area (“TTA”) and

could be returned to his cell. (Sheriff Decl. ¶ 5.) A correctional officer escorted Plaintiff back to

his cell without incident. (Id.)

On September 27, 2006, Plaintiff received a pass and went to the Facility One Clinic

(“Clinic”). Plaintiff advised the clinic officer, Defendant G. Escalante, of his injuries. Escalante

told him to “come back tomorrow.” (Chrisman Decl. ¶ 12.)

The next day, September 28, 2006, Plaintiff filled out a Health Care Services Request

Form requesting treatment for sciatica and a broken finger. (See Ex. 2.) At about 1:00 p.m., the

attending nurse, Defendant N. Marquez, examined him. During the examination, Plaintiff reported

a constant throbbing pain in his left fifth finger, which was tender, swollen and appeared bruised,

and lower back pain, with related muscles spasms, numbness and tingling to his right lower

extremities. (Declaration of N. Marquez (Marquez Decl.) ¶ 3; see Ex. 3.) Marquez took Plaintiff’s

vital signs and completed an M.D. referral, checking the box marked “Routine,” which indicated

her opinion that the reported injuries were non-emergent. Marquez also requested x-rays

consistent with orders given to her that afternoon by the attending physician, and she then referred

Plaintiff for a follow-up visit in the Physician’s Clinic in two weeks. (Marquez Decl. ¶ 6.) She

also gave Plaintiff a bottle of Ibuprofen 200 mg for pain before he left the clinic and advised him to

submit another Health Care Services Request Form should his symptoms worsen. (Id.) Marquez

had no further contact with Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff’s symptoms worsened and, ultimately, he suffered through two surgeries, severe

nerve damage and amputation of his finger. (Chrisman Decl. ¶ 23.) This action followed. (Doc.

No. 1.) The case is presently before the Court on a motion for summary judgment brought by

Defendants Sheridan, Escalante, and Marquez. (Doc. No. 70.) Plaintiff filed a response in

opposition and Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. Nos. 72, 74.)

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DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard for a Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings and materials demonstrate “there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material issue of

fact is a question a trier of fact must answer to determine the rights of the parties under the

applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute

is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id.

The moving party bears “the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis

for its motion.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. To satisfy this burden, the movant must demonstrate

that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Id. at 322. Where the moving party does not

have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it may carry its initial burden of production in one

of two ways: “The moving party may produce evidence negating an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case, or, after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that the

nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to

carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., v. Fritz Cos., 210

F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant

must then show that there are genuine factual issues which can only be resolved by the trier of fact. 

Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000). The non-moving party

may not rely on the pleadings alone, but must present specific facts creating a genuine issue of

material fact through affidavits, depositions, or answers to interrogatories. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

The court must review the record as a whole and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

the non-moving party. Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). 

However, unsupported conjecture or conclusory statements are insufficient to defeat summary

judgment. Id.; Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, the

court is not required “‘to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact,’” Keenan v.

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Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1996) (citations omitted), but rather “may limit its review to the

documents submitted for purposes of summary judgment and those parts of the record specifically

referenced therein.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir.

2001).

II. Analysis

A. Legal Standard for Deliberate Indifference to a Prisoner’s Serious Medical

Needs in Violation of the Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that involves the “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428

U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). This principle “establish[ed] the government’s obligation to provide

medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Id. The Supreme Court has noted

that “[a]n inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to

do so, those needs will not be met.” Id.; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-55 (1988).

Prison officials violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

1989). “Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or

injury states a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. “This is true whether the

indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs, or by prison

guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with

the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted). 

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in

further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 104. Thus, the

“existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s

daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a

prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60

(9th Cir. 1992), overrruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Doty v.

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County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) (“serious” medical conditions are those a

reasonable doctor would think worthy of comment, those which significantly affect the prisoner’s

daily activities, and those which are chronic and accompanied by substantial pain).

“In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to indicate

that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302

(1991). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to

malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429

U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a

high legal standard.”) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v.

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)).

The court must focus on the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical needs and the nature of

the defendants’ response to those needs. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. Differences in

judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding appropriate medical

diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v.

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

A mere delay in treatment does not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, unless

the delay or denial was harmful. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State

Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985); Hunt, 865 F.2d at 200 (“[D]elay in providing

a prisoner with dental treatment, standing alone, does not constitute an Eighth Amendment

violation.”); Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Certainly, not every

twinge of pain suffered as the result of delay in medical care is actionable.”). While the harm

caused by delay need not necessarily be “substantial,” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 & n.2; see also

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d at 1336, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), the

Eighth Amendment is violated if “delays occurred to patients with problems so severe that delays

would cause significant harm and that Defendants should have known this to be the case,” Hallett,

287 F.3d at 1206, and “a finding that the inmate was seriously harmed by the defendant’s action or

inaction tends to provide additional support to a claim that the defendant was ‘deliberately

indifferent’ to the prisoner’s medical needs.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

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Regarding inaction or delay of treatment, “the fact that an individual sat idly by as another

human being was seriously injured despite the defendant’s ability to prevent the injury is a strong

indicium of callousness and deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s suffering.” Id. (citing Estelle,

429 U.S. at 106). However, a finding that the defendants’ neglect of a prisoner’s condition was an

“isolated occurrence,” Wood, 900 F.2d at 1334, or an “isolated exception,” Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986), to the defendants’ overall course of treatment of

the prisoner ordinarily militates against a finding of deliberate indifference. McGuckin, 974 F.2d

at 1060. Further, prison officials who “ignore[] the instructions of a prisoner’s treating physician

are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference.” Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1165; Estelle,

429 U.S. at 105; Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Whether Defendants Acted with Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Serious

Medical Needs

1. Defendant M. Sheridan

Defendants contend that Plaintiff is mistaken in identifying Defendant Sheridan as the

Medical Technical Assistant (“MTA”) who inspected him on September 26, 2006. In support,

Defendants have submitted the declarations of M. Sheridan and K. Sheriff, along with an exhibit

(Def.’s Ex. 1). Sheridan maintains that he was not an MTA in September 2006 and that he had no

contact with Plaintiff on September 26, 2006. See Sheridan Decl. ¶¶ 3-4. A named but as yet

unserved Defendant, K. Sheriff, states that he treated Plaintiff on September 26, 2006, see Sheriff

Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, and his declaration is corroborated by a Medical Report of Injury or Unusual

Occurrence from September 26, 2006 completed by K. Sheriff, see Def.’s Ex. 1. Sheriff’s

declaration demonstrates that on September 26, 2006, about 8:30 p.m., Plaintiff entered the

Psychiatric Services Unit after reporting he had been attacked by another inmate. Sheriff Decl. ¶ 3. 

Sheriff observed and documented that Plaintiff had a bloody nose and hand. Sheriff Decl. ¶ 3;

Def.’s Ex. 1. Sheriff then consulted the attending nurse at the Treatment Triage Area (“TTA”), and

she advised him that Plaintiff did not need to be seen in the TTA and could be returned to his cell. 

Sheriff Decl. ¶ 5. Sheriff bandaged Plaintiff’s finger and had him escorted back to his cell. Id.

Based upon the foregoing submissions, Defendants have met their burden of showing that

Defendant Sheridan was not present on September 26, 2006 and therefore could not have been

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 Plaintiff alleges that on September 26, 2006, he was violently and viciously attacked by 1

another inmate, leaving his face disfigured, and his face and hand bloody. Chrisman Decl. ¶ 4. A

correctional officer escorted Plaintiff to the clinic. Id. ¶ 5. There, Plaintiff contends Medical

Technical Assistant (“MTA”) Sheridan inspected him for injuries to determine if he was in need of

immediate treatment. Id. During the inspection, Plaintiff complained of extreme pain and that his

finger was swollen, immovable, very painful, and obviously fractured. Id. ¶ 6. At one point during

the inspection, the correctional officer and the MTA chuckled. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff responded by stating

that his face and nose are broken, and the correctional officer responded, “it looks like it.” Id.

Following the inspection, the MTA told Plainitff he could go back to his cell and that he could sign

up for sick call. According to Plaintiff, the procedure for sick call can take up to two weeks. Id. ¶ 9.

Plaintiff requested to go to the infirmary, but the MTA denied permission. Id. ¶ 10.

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deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff has not introduced any

evidence to rebut Defendant’s proof and demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact; he

has merely repeated his previous allegations. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 3; Chrisman Decl. ¶¶ 5-11. 1

Because there is no genuine issue as to whether Defendant Sheridan participated in the alleged

constitutional violation, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claim against

Sheridan.

3. Defendant G. Escalante

On September 27, 2006, Plaintiff received a pass and went to the Facility One Clinic

(“Clinic”) seeking treatment for injuries he sustained during the assault the night before. Chrisman

Decl. ¶ 12. There, he encountered Defendant Escalante. Id. Plaintiff alleges that although he had

two black eyes, a swollen finger and a large gash on his nose, Escalante told him to “come back

tomorrow.” See Chrisman Decl. ¶ 28. Escalante acknowledges having worked as a clinic officer

on September 27, 2006, but he has no specific recollection of an encounter with Plaintiff that day. 

See Escalante Decl. ¶ 5. Escalante maintains he followed institution policy at all times, and that

pursuant to institution policy, inmates were not permitted into the Clinic unless they had an

objective and obvious injury requiring immediate or emergency medical care, had completed a

Health Care Services Request Form, or scheduled an appointment with a health care provider in

the Clinic. Id. ¶ 5. Escalante has never harbored ill will toward Plaintiff or intended to cause him

harm. Id. ¶ 8. There does not appear to be any record of the encounter or an inmate grievance

regarding Escalante’s behavior.

Based on the record before the Court, no reasonable juror could find that on September 27,

2006, Escalante was aware of facts suggesting a delay in treatment could result in “further

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significant injury” to Plaintiff. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. The facts indicate Plaintiff may have had

a difference of opinion as to the urgency of his injuries, but a difference of opinion does not

amount to deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. State

of Or., State Welfare Division, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). At most, Escalante’s decision

not to admit Plaintiff into the Clinic is an “isolated occurrence,” see Wood, 900 F.2d at 1334, and

Plaintiff returned to the Clinic and received treatment the next day, see generally Marquez Decl.;

Def.’s Exs. 2-3. Accordingly, any delay in treatment did not cause substantial harm See Wood,

900 F.2d at 1334 (delay of several days in receiving pain medication for a broken shoulder did not

amount to a constitutional violation). Because there is no genuine issue as to whether Defendant

Escalante was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, the Court DISMISSES

WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claim against Escalante.

2. Defendant N. Marquez

Defendants argue that Defendant Marquez was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs. Def.’s Mot. at 6-8. In support, Defendants have submitted the declaration

of N. Marquez, along with two exhibits (Def.’s Ex. 2-3). Marquez states that on September 26,

2006, she examined Plaintiff in the Clinic while working as an attending nurse. Marquez Decl. ¶

3. Plainitff had completed a Health Care Services Request Form requesting medical care for

“sciatica and a broken finger.” Id. ¶ 4; Def.’s Ex. 2. During the examination, Plaintiff reported a

constant throbbing pain in his left fifth finger, which was tender, swollen and appeared bruised,

and lower back pain, with related muscles spasms, numbness and tingling to his right lower

extremities. Id. ¶ 5; Def.’s Ex. 3. Plaintiff reported he had fallen from his bunk two days earlier

and hit the stool. Id. Plaintiff also complained of chronic low-back pain since 1989. Id. Marquez

took Plaintiff’s vital signs and completed an M.D. referral, checking the box marked “Routine,”

which signified her opinion that the reported injuries were non-emergent. Id. ¶ 6. It appears that

Plaintiff was also examined by Dr. Richards that afternoon as well, and Dr. Richards told Plaintiff

he ordered x-rays and prescribed pain medication, and to come back in two weeks. SAC ¶ 35. Dr.

Richards also advised Plaintiff to see the nurse before he left the clinic. Id. Before Plaintiff left

the clinic, Marquez requested x-rays consistent with Dr. Richards’ orders and referred Plaintiff for

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a follow-up visit in the Physician’s Clinic in two weeks. Marquez Decl. ¶ 6. She also advised

Plaintiff to submit a Health Care Services Request Form should his symptoms worsen and gave

him a bottle of Ibuprofen 200 mg for his pain before he left the clinic. Id. Marquez declares that

she never harbored any ill will against Plaintiff or intended to cause him harm. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. In

substance, Plaintiff’s account of his examination is the same as that of Marquez, except that

Plaintiff emphasizes Marquez did not heed his repeated pleas for additional treatment. See

generally Chrisman Decl.

Based on the record before the Court, no reasonable juror could find that on September 28,

2006, Marquez was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. On the contrary,

Marquez took notes and examined Plaintiff, ordered x-rays as directed by the attending physician,

scheduled Plaintiff for a follow-up appointment in two weeks, advised Plaintiff to complete a

Health Services Request form should his condition worsen, and gave him pain medication before

he left the Clinic. See generally Chrisman Decl.; Marquez Decl. That Marquez did not acquiesce

to Plaintiff’s repeated requests for additional treatment does not mean that she was deliberately

indifferent, Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1977), even assuming his injuries

resulted from malpractice or even gross negligence, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. As much as the

Court sympathizes with the fact that Plaintiff sustained permanent damage as a consequence of his

medical treatment, it cannot provide relief under § 1983 because there is no genuine dispute as to

whether Marquez exhibited deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Accordingly, the

Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claim against Marquez.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Sheridan, Escalante,

and Marquez.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 16, 2010

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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