Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06619/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06619-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Plaintiff filed a change of address on July 23, 2004, to an 1

ordinary street address in Los Angeles. (Doc. 53.) It appears

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH MARTINEZ, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

J. CATHEY, SGT., et al. )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-02-6619 REC LJO P

ORDER (1) GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER

DENYING MOTION TO SEAL

DOCUMENTS AND FOR IN CAMERA

REVIEW AND (2) DIRECTING

THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO

CONSIDER THE SEALED

DOCUMENTS IN CONJUNCTION

WITH DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(Docs. 63 & 64)

On April 1, 2005, Defendants filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the Order Denying the Motion for In Camera

Review. Upon due consideration of the written arguments and the

record herein, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration as

set forth herein. 

I. Background

Kenneth Martinez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner1

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26 that Plaintiff is no longer in state custody.

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proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 42 U.S.C.

section 1983 action. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Cathey,

Alcantar, Fischer, Marshall, Meske, and Williams (collectively

“Defendants”) violated his due process rights when their actions

caused him to be validated as a member of the Mexican Mafia

prison gang and assigned to the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) at

California State Prison, Corcoran. (Doc. 1.) 

On November 5, 2004, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 55.) In support of the Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendants filed declarations of R. Reyff, Deputy

Attorney General, and E.W. Fischer. Defendants filed a Motion to

seal exhibits A, C, D, and G to the declaration of E.W. Fischer. 

Defendants urged the court to review the sealed exhibits in

camera in connection with the Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Defendants argued that the exhibits were confidential and should

not be disclosed to the public or to Plaintiff. Their reasoning

was that disclosure “could endanger the safety and security of

the institutions” and “could threaten prison security by

divulging the methods and status of investigations into unlawful

conduct by inmates.” (Fischer Decl. at ¶ 3.)

Magistrate Judge O’Neill granted Defendants’ Motion to Seal

the exhibits on January 27, 2005. The Magistrate Judge

disagreed, however, with Defendants’ contention that the court

could rely on the sealed documents without disclosing them to

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Plaintiff. The court refused to rely on the sealed documents

unless Defendants would first do one of the following:

1) fully disclose the material under seal to

the opposing party who maintains the right to

defend against the material contained

therein; (2) provide sound legal authority

allowing the Court to rely on evidence

submitted but not disclosed to the opposing

party; or (3) request that the exhibits be

withdrawn from the Court’s consideration on

the dispositive motion.

Order Granting Motion to File Documents Under Seal at 3.

On February 25, 2005, Defendants filed a Response to the

Magistrate Judge’s Order. (Doc. 62.) They cited authority in

support of the court’s in camera review of the documents in

conjunction with the Motion for Summary Judgment. In the

alternative, Defendants asked to withdraw the documents from the

court’s consideration.

On March 23, 2005, the court issued an order denying the

Motion for In Camera Review, granting Defendants’ request to

withdraw the documents, and directing the Clerk of the Court to

return the sealed and lodged documents to Defendants (“Order”). 

(Doc. 63.)

On April 1, 2005, Defendants timely filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the Order Denying the Motion for In Camera

Review (the “Motion”). (Doc. 64.) Plaintiff has not filed an

opposition to the Motion. 

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

According to Local Rule 72-303, a district judge upholds a

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magistrate’s ruling on a referred matter unless it is “clearly

erroneous or contrary to law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

The “clearly erroneous” standard applies only to a

magistrate judge’s findings of fact. Concrete Pipe & Prods. v.

Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623, 113 S. Ct.

2264, 124 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1993). The “contrary to law” standard,

on the other hand, allows independent, plenary review of purely

legal determinations by the magistrate judge. FDIC v. Fidelity &

Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Haines

v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992). 

B. Accepting Documents Under Seal

The Magistrate Judge held that “the sensitive nature of the

documents submitted for sealing” made it appropriate to accept

them under seal. Order Granting Motion to File Documents Under

Seal at 3. Because this was a finding of fact, the Court will

reverse it only if “clearly erroneous.” See Concrete Pipe &

Prods., 508 U.S. at 623 (1993). The Court has reviewed the

materials under seal to determine whether they include

information likely to threaten penological interests. See Ponte,

471 U.S. at 499. In camera review by the district court is

appropriate “if prison security or similar paramount interests

appear to require it, . . . .” Id.

One item submitted under seal is the Confidential California

Department of Corrections Operations Manual. It contains what

appear to be guidelines explaining confidential procedures for

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combating gang activity. Another item is a letter of April 26,

1999, from inmate Sanchez, an identified gang member, to a third

party concerning a business transaction with Plaintiff. Also

submitted under seal is a debriefing statement and interview by

an inmate indicating that Plaintiff was associated with a prison

gang. 

The secrecy of prison officials methods, the status of

ongoing investigations, and the identity and statements of

confidential sources can be important to prison security. See

Ponte, 471 U.S. at 499. Keeping these documents under seal is

important to maintaining that secrecy. The Court holds that the

Magistrate Judge’s finding that the sensitive nature of the

documents requires them to remain under seal was not clearly

erroneous.

 C. Due Process Limitations on In Camera Review 

Because the documents remain under seal, the Court must

decide whether the Magistrate Judge properly declined to consider

the documents ex parte in connection with Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment. The Magistrate Judge reviewed the authority

that Defendants cite and concluded that none of it justified

supporting a dispositive motion with materials kept under seal

from the nonmoving party. Order at 2-3. Generally, ex parte

review of in camera submissions is disfavored. American-Arab

Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir.

1995). This general rule does not foreclose the possibility that

certain exigent circumstances require that a court consider

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information that is not disclosed to the other party. Id.; see

Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

(national security). The Magistrate Judge, after reviewing the

authority Defendants cite, concluded that none of the authority

binds it to reach the conclusion that Defendants urge. 

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L.

Ed. 2d 40 (1985), addressed the importance of review by counsel

to determine whether potentially exculpatory evidence was subject

to discovery. Id. at 60. The Court held that in camera review

by the trial court was sufficient to protect defendant’s due

process rights. Id. Ritchie does not address the central

question at hand because the issue here does not concern

discovery, but rather whether a court may decide a dispositive

motion based on evidence to which the nonmoving party lacks

access. Of some relevance, though, is that Ritchie does express

the high court’s willingness to allow the trial court to

substitute its judgment for that of plaintiff and plaintiff’s

counsel. Id.

In Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 105 S. Ct. 2192, 85 L. Ed.

2d 553 (1985), the Court considered, in a due process context,

the manner by which prison officers could explain their reasons

for refusing to call witnesses at the inmate’s request. The

Court held that the reasons why the prison officials refuse to

call witnesses

are almost by definition not available to the

inmate; given the sort of prison conditions

that may exist, there may be a sound basis

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In Ponte, even the dissenting Justices agreed that “sealed 2

contemporaneous explanations followed by in camera review . . .

would satisfy [due process] concerns fully.” 471 U.S. at 513

(Marshall, J., dissenting).

The sentence that follows the passage authorizing in camera 3

review indicates that requiring such review could be the

plaintiff’s prerogative: “But there is no reason for going

further, and adding another weight to an already heavily weighted

scale by requiring an inmate to produce evidence of which he will

rarely be in possession, and of which the superintendent will

almost always be in possession.” Ponte, 471 U.S. at 499. It is

hard to see, however, how by challenging the prison procedure, a

plaintiff does not waive his right to object to a permissible means

of establishing the procedure’s reliability endorsed by the Supreme

Court. 

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for refusing to tell the inmate what the

reasons for denying his witness request are. 

Indeed, if prison security or similar

paramount interests appear to require it, a

court should allow at least in the first

instance a prison official’s justification

for refusal to call witnesses to be presented

to the court in camera.

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Ponte, 471 U.S. at 499. In the context of a due process

discussion, this language appears to endorse in camera review of

confidential materials. The passage could be construed as

permissive, however, entitling the inmate to request that the

court review materials in camera in support of plaintiff’s

assertion that the materials are unreliable. Moreover, the 3

Ponte Court does not explicitly address the due process

implications of the trial court’s in camera review. Instead, the

Court speaks only to what procedure can establish due process in

the underlying prison proceeding. Id. At first blush, this

seems to be a very fine distinction that the Magistrate Judge

draws, but it is a valid one. See Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d

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1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1985) (addressing separately plaintiff’s due

process challenge to the prison disciplinary committee’s reliance

on confidential informants and plaintiff’s due process challenge

to court’s refusal to allow him or his counsel to review material

submitted to the court in camera).

Defendants’ invocation of the California Code of Regulations

is similarly unavailing. Defendants seem to argue that because

these materials are confidential for correctional purposes,

keeping them from Plaintiff is appropriate in these proceedings

as well. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3121(a)(1)-(2). The

Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that these regulations do

not govern civil procedure in this Court. Though the classified

status of documents might be relevant as to whether the documents

should be under seal at all, it does not bear on whether using

the materials against Plaintiff without his knowledge of their

contents is appropriate.

The Ninth Circuit has endorsed in camera review as a means

of determining whether confidential information from an

unidentified prison informant is reliable. Zimmerlee v. Keeney,

831 F.2d 183, 186-87 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Mendoza, 779 F.2d at

1293). The Magistrate Judge correctly concludes that the due

process implications of in camera review by the trial judge were

not before the Zimmerlee court. It seems unlikely, however, that

the Ninth Circuit would hold that in camera review can establish

that the prison’s administrative proceedings pass due process

muster without accepting as a premise that such in camera review

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is itself permissible. Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge

correctly concludes that Zimmerlee does not bind us to reject a

due process challenge to in camera review.

On the other hand, Zimmerlee, combined with the overwhelming

weight of other United States Courts of Appeals’ authority, does

not leave much question as to how the Ninth Circuit would respond

to a more specific challenge to a district court’s in camera

review. The Ninth Circuit has upheld against a due process

challenge an in camera evidentiary hearing to determine the

validity of informant information where a criminal defendant and

his counsel were prohibited to attend. United States v.

Anderson, 509 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1974). In at least one

context concerning government informants, in camera proceedings

are “favored procedure.” See United States v. Spires, 3 F.3d

1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1993)(holding that where a criminal

defendant seeks disclosure of a government informant “an in

camera hearing is favored procedure” to determine whether

disclosure of informant’s identity would be relevant and helpful

to defendant). 

The Ninth Circuit relied on Mendoza in Zimmerlee to

determine the process by which prison officials could establish

reliability of confidential informant statements. Zimmerlee, 831

F.2d at 186-87. In Mendoza, the Seventh Circuit addressed the

specific question whether a district court violated an inmate’s

due process rights by granting summary judgment against his

habeas corpus claim based on in camera review of materials

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concerning confidential informants. 779 F.2d at 1291. The court

acknowledged the “concerns for institutional safety and

correctional goals” that motivate protection of constitutional

informants. Id. at 1295. Balancing these concerns with the

inmate’s due process rights, the court noted that “[s]ubmission

of a confidential report for in camera review allows the court to

determine whether the committee’s actions were fair, i.e.,

whether the committee acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner

by accepting confidential information without some indication of

the reliability of the information.” Id. The Seventh Circuit

upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment, declining

to adopt a general rule allowing inmates or their counsel access

to reports containing confidential information. Id. at 1298. 

The appellate court in Mendoza did conduct in camera review

of the confidential documents to determine whether the inmate’s

attorney, but not the inmate, should have had access to them. 

Id. The court determined that denying the inmate’s attorney

access was permissible because prison officials’ decision to

withhold them was motivated by concerns for institutional safety. 

Id. 

Another court of appeals has also decided the narrow issue

before the Court. Freitas v. Auger, 837 F.2d 806, 810 n. 7 (8th

Cir. 1988). That case also concerned the reliability of

confidential reports in a prison disciplinary proceeding. Id. at

807. The prisoner argued that denying his counsel access to the

confidential reports before the district court denied him an

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Some courts have held that an inmate may have certain limited 4

rights to have his attorney review, subject to a protective order,

confidential information that might endanger penological interests

in the hands of the inmate. See, e.g., Wagner v. Williford, 804

F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff, who is currently

proceeding pro se, would not benefit from such a privilege. Nor

has Plaintiff asked the Court to allow an attorney to review the

materials on his behalf. Thus, the Court need not decide whether

Plaintiff’s due process rights require the Court to allow an

attorney to review of the confidential documents for Plaintiff.

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essential due process protection. Id. at 810 n. 7. The

appellate court rejected the argument and upheld the district

court’s denial of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 relief. Id. at 810. 

The lower court’s in camera review of the confidential

information provided a satisfactory means of determining the

reliability of the prison officials’ confidential informants. 

Id.

Other courts, without explicitly deciding the narrow issue

of the due process merits of ex parte in camera review, have

endorsed district courts’ ex parte in camera review in prison due

process cases. See, e.g., Russell v. Selsky, 35 F.3d 55, 58 (2d

Cir. 1994); Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 880 (3d Cir.

1987); Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 269, 282 (6th Cir. 1988);

Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 702 (10th Cir. 1991).

The Magistrate Judge does not cite, and the Court is unable

to find, a single case that refused on due process grounds to

consider in camera confidential materials supporting a prison

disciplinary action. Authority of the Supreme Court, the Ninth

Circuit, and other federal circuits indicates that in camera

review in this context is permissible. Accordingly, the Court 4

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holds that the Magistrate Judge shall review in camera Exhibits

A, C, D, and G to the Declaration of E.W. Fischer for the purpose

of deciding Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

 ACCORDINGLY:

1. Exhibits A, C, D, and G to the declaration of E.W.

Fischer shall remain under seal.

2. The Magistrate Judge shall review the sealed documents

in camera and consider them in deciding Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

810ha4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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