Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_22-cv-00243/USCOURTS-azd-4_22-cv-00243-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mary S Garrow,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Tucson Clips LLC,

Defendant.

No. CV-22-00243-TUC-RM (LAB)

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendant Tucson Clips, LLC’s Motion for Attorneys’ 

Fees and Related Non-Taxable Expenses. (Doc. 27.) Plaintiff did not respond, and the 

time for doing so has passed.1 LRCiv 7.2(c). For the reasons that follow, the Motion will 

be denied.

I. Background

Plaintiff was employed by Tucson Clips, LLC (“Defendant”) during the events 

giving rise to the Complaint. (Doc. 1 at 2.) In January 2021, Plaintiff filed a charge of

employment discrimination against Defendant with the U.S. Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission. (Id.; Doc. 8-3 at 2.) In February 2021, Plaintiff filed a report 

with the Marana Police Department alleging that Defendant’s general manager and others 

had falsely imprisoned her. (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 8-2.) The Marana Police Department did 

not refer the incident for prosecution because the investigating officer determined 

probable cause did not exist. (Doc. 8-2 at 5.) Defendant subsequently terminated 

1 Defendant avers that it made good-faith efforts to confer with Plaintiff regarding 

attorneys’ fees and costs, but Defendant was unable to contact Plaintiff. (Doc. 27 at 1.)

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Plaintiff. (Doc. 1 at 3.)

In December 2021, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Settlement Agreement

containing the following relevant provisions:

4. Waiver of Unknown Claims. The parties understand, and claimant 

acknowledges, that she is releasing any and all charges, claims and actions

under the ADE, ADEA, and/or Title VII arising out of Claimant’s 

employment with Respondents, except any charge, claim or action based 

upon rights or claims that may arise under the ADE, ADEA, or Title VII 

after the Effective Date of this Agreement...

6. Full and Final Release. Claimant acknowledges that she may have 

sustained damages, losses or expenses which are presently unknown or 

unexpected and/or future damages, losses or expenses which are not 

anticipated or known arising out of or in connection with the facts, 

relationships, transactions and occurrences which have or could have been 

the subject of the Claims, Additional Claims, Charge of Discrimination, 

dispute and/or damages alleged against Respondents. Nevertheless, 

Claimant acknowledged that this Agreement has been negotiated and 

accepted in light of such knowledge, and further, being fully aware of these 

possibilities, Claimant expressly waives and relinquishes all rights benefits 

that she had or may have . . . Claimant acknowledges that she is forever 

precluded from filing any lawsuit in any court of law or equity in any 

jurisdiction, making any claim whatsoever against Respondents and/or the 

Released Parties, or making any further demands in any way arising out of 

or relating to arising from conduct occurring on or before the last 

counterpart signature date on this Agreement...

17. Material Breach. Upon material breach of this agreement, an affected Party 

may initiate legal action to recover damages and/or injunctive relief, and the 

parties hereby stipulate to the appropriateness of injunctive relief in such an 

action. The prevailing party in any action, suit or legal proceedings brought to 

enforce the agreement’s terms, including confidentiality, shall be entitled to 

recover attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in such action or suit.”

(Doc. 27 at 3; Doc. 8-3.) After signing the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff filed a breach 

of contract lawsuit against Defendant in Pima County Justice Court, challenging the 

Agreement’s validity. (Doc. 8 at 10; Doc. 8-4.) In July 2022, the Justice Court granted 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with prejudice and awarded 

sanctions of $5,000 against Plaintiff for bringing suit in violation of the Settlement 

Agreement. (Doc. 8 at 10; Doc. 8-5.)

On May 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint against Defendant. (Doc.

1.) Plaintiff begins her “Statement of Claims” by asserting that “Plaintiff filed her 

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Employment Charge of Discrimination on January 14, 2021, which gave rise to the 

issuance of Plaintiff’s Right to Sue letter dated February 16, 2022.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff, 

who proceeded pro se, alleged four claims against Defendant: (1) age and race 

discrimination; (2) retaliation; (3) preferential treatment under Title VII2 of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 2-3.)

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 8.) 

Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman issued a Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R”), finding that all the claims raised in the Complaint occurred before the date of 

the execution of the Settlement Agreement and, thus, were precluded by the Agreement. 

(Doc. 21 at 5.) The R&R also found that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata in 

light of the Pima County Justice Court judgment finding the Settlement Agreement valid. 

(Id.) Therefore, the R&R recommended this Court grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

(Id. at 6.) This Court adopted the R&R in full over Plaintiff’s objection, thereby 

dismissing the Complaint with prejudice.

3

 (Doc. 25.)

Defendant then filed the pending Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Related NonTaxable Expenses. (Doc. 27.) Defendant avers that it is entitled to $13,702.50 in 

attorneys’ fees and $181.90 in non-taxable expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 

per the Settlement Agreement. (Id.) 

II. Legal Standard

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Court, “in its discretion, may allow the 

prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k). A prevailing 

party “achieve[s] a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” Jankey v. 

2 As the Court previously noted, “[a]lthough the Complaint does not specifically state that 

the claim is raised pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Defendant and the Court 

are proceeding on the understanding that the Civil Rights Act is the statute on which 

Plaintiff relies.” (Doc. 25 at 2, n.2.)

3 Defendant also filed a Motion for Sanctions, arguing that the Court should award

Defendant sanctions because Plaintiff filed the Complaint in bad faith. (Doc. 9.) 

Magistrate Judge Bowman issued an R&R recommending this Court deny the Motion for 

Sanctions but stated that Defendant could file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. 

(Doc. 23 at 6.) Neither party filed objections, and this Court adopted the R&R in full. 

(Doc. 24.)

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Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122, 1129–30 (9th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The standard promulgated by the Supreme Court provides that a district court may award 

attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action only “upon a finding that the 

plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Christiansburg 

Garment Co. v. Equal Empl. Opportunity Commn., 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). In applying 

this standard, a district court must not “engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, 

because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or 

without foundation.” Id. at 421–22. 

The Christiansburg standard is strict to promote the “vigorous prosecution of civil 

rights violations under Title VII,” and it is applied with particular rigor in cases with a pro 

se plaintiff. Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 619-620 (9th Cir. 

1987). The Ninth Circuit has evaluated three factors to determine whether to grant a fee 

award against a pro se civil rights plaintiff: (1) whether the court dismissed the action 

before proceeding to trial; (2) whether the plaintiff recognized the merits, or lack thereof,

of her claims; and (3) whether the plaintiff acted in bad faith. Minor v. Fedex Off. & Print 

Services, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Miller, 827 F.2d at 

620).

III. Discussion

Because Defendant prevailed on all claims, which were dismissed with prejudice, 

the Court finds that Defendant is the prevailing party as required to obtain an attorneys’ 

fee award under Title VII. See Minor, 205 F. Supp. at 1087 (finding defendants were 

prevailing parties where plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice on grounds that 

the claims were barred by res judicata). Because Defendant is the prevailing party, the 

Court will address the factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit to determine whether

Plaintiff’s claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” to warrant an 

attorneys’ fee award. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. Because Plaintiff proceeded pro 

se, the Court must apply this standard “with particular strictness.” Miller, 827 F.2d at

620. 

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Because Plaintiff’s Complaint was dismissed with prejudice on a motion to 

dismiss before proceeding to trial, the first factor favors granting attorneys’ fees. (Docs. 

21, 25.) The Court notes, however, “that this early dismissal limited the burden of 

litigating this case” on Defendant. Minor, 205 F. at 1087. 

Under the second factor, the Court evaluates whether Plaintiff recognized the 

merits of her case. In Miller, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that “pro se plaintiffs cannot 

simply be assumed to have the same ability as a plaintiff represented by counsel to 

recognize the objective merit (or lack of merit) of a claim.” 827 F.2d at 620. In that case,

the Court reversed an attorneys’ fee award against a pro se plaintiff whose claim had 

previously been rejected by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the 

California Labor Commission, and the California Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in relying on those 

rejections to find that the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous because “it is unclear whether 

[the plaintiff’s] initial claims were found to be frivolous by these agencies.” Id.; see also 

Minor, 205 F. Supp. at 1088 (“prior rejections of a plaintiff’s complaint, without a 

frivolous finding, do not support an award of fees”).

Here, Plaintiff received a letter from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”), officially notifying Plaintiff of her “right to sue” Defendant in 

“federal or state court” based on her charge of employment discrimination. (Doc. 22 at 

4.) The letter informed Plaintiff that the EEOC’s decision not to proceed further with 

investigating her claims “does not mean the claims have no merit,” nor does the 

determination “certify that the respondent is in compliance with the statutes.” (Id.) The 

letter instructed Plaintiff to “file a complaint in court within 90 days” if she wanted to

“file a lawsuit against the respondent(s) named in the charge of discrimination.” (Id. at 

5.) The letter is dated February 16, 2022, and Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint, which 

prominently references the letter, in May 2022. (See Doc. 1 at 2.) Thus, as in Miller, the 

EEOC’s determination to close Plaintiff’s case does not equate to the agency finding that 

her claims were frivolous. To the contrary, given the EEOC’s affirmation that she had a 

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“right to sue” and that closing her case did not mean her claims were meritless, Plaintiff 

reasonably may have believed she had a viable Complaint. Furthermore, Plaintiff may 

have surmised that the EEOC’s instructions superseded the waivers imposed by the 

Settlement Agreement and the prior Pima County Court judgment. Based on these 

circumstances, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s Complaint was frivolous based on 

the Settlement Agreement or the EEOC’s determination is unpersuasive. 

Defendant’s argument that “Plaintiff’s claims were more clearly frivolous, 

unreasonable, and without foundation on the principles of res judicata” based on the Pima 

County Justice Court judgment is also unavailing. (Doc. 27 at 7.) As is the case here, 

pro se status is “particularly relevant” where the defendant prevails based on res judicata, 

which “involve[s] procedural rules that are difficult even for experienced lawyers and 

judges to apply, much less lay persons.” Chester v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 873 F.2d 207, 

209 (8th Cir. 1989). Consequently, “most courts that have addressed the issue have 

concluded dismissal based on the doctrine of claim preclusion or res judicata is not a 

proper basis for an award of attorneys’ fees.” Minor v. Fedex Off. & Print Services, Inc., 

205 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Gleason v. Gilmour, 2011 WL 

1458012, at *2 (D.Or. Apr. 12, 2011)). To complicate matters, Plaintiff’s Complaint in 

the Pima County Justice Court challenged the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement

itself; it did not raise claims based on employment discrimination. (See Doc. 8-4.) Thus, 

Plaintiff may not have deduced that the Pima County Justice Court judgment would bar 

her claims on a seemingly unrelated matter, particularly given the EEOC letter. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the second factor weighs against 

granting attorneys’ fees because it is reasonable to believe that Plaintiff did not recognize 

that her claims lacked merit. Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court cannot find that 

Plaintiff recognized, or should have recognized, that her claims were barred by res 

judicata or the Settlement Agreement. As to the third factor, bad faith, the Court finds 

that Defendant did not present evidence to establish that Plaintiff litigated this matter in 

bad faith. Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff made misrepresentations or, as 

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described above, that Plaintiff proceeded knowing her claims lacked merit. Therefore, 

the Court finds the third factor weighs against granting attorneys’ fees. 

Weighing the three factors, the Court concludes that Defendant has not established 

that Plaintiff’s Complaint was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” to warrant 

the award of attorneys’ fees. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. However, the Court 

cautions Plaintiff that additional claims against Defendant based on the allegations in this

case will be barred by res judicata, and an award of attorneys’ fees may be justified if 

Plaintiff brings another lawsuit against Defendant based on the same allegations asserted 

in this case.

Defendant also argues that it is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Settlement 

Agreement because the Agreement provides that the prevailing party in an action brought 

to enforce the Agreement’s terms “shall be entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs 

incurred in such action or suit.” (Doc. 27 at 2-3.) The Court finds that because Plaintiff’s 

Complaint was not brought to enforce the Settlement Agreement’s terms, Defendant is not 

entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Settlement Agreement.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Related NonTaxable Expenses (Doc. 27) is denied.

Dated this 17th day of November, 2023.

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