Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01102/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01102-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Janis Lynn Arviso, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

L.J. Leasing, Inc., an Arizona corporation,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-01102-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendant L.J. Leasing, Inc.’s motion for attorney’s fees (doc.

37), plaintiff Janis Arviso’s response (doc. 40), and defendant’s reply (doc. 42).

I

In our Order of November 29, 2010, we granted summary judgment to defendant on

plaintiff’s claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29

U.S.C. § 623, and the Arizona Civil Rights Act, (“ACRA”), A.R.S. § 41-1463 (doc. 34). A

former clerk in defendant’s billing department, plaintiff claimed that defendant selectively

punished her for sending inappropriate emails because of her age, 60. At summary judgment,

however, plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case by showing that defendant treated

substantially younger employees more favorably and that she was similarly situated to these

employees “in all material respects.” Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006).

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II

Defendant concedes that the ADEA does not provide for an award of attorney’s fees

to a prevailing defendant. Nevertheless, it contends that one is otherwise appropriate under

our inherent power to sanction conduct in bad faith or tantamount to bad faith. See Primus

Auto. Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, defendant

contends that an award of fees is warranted pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1481(J) because

plaintiff’s ACRA claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though

not brought in subjective bad faith.” Sees v. KTUC, Inc., 148 Ariz. 366, 369, 714 P.2d 859,

862 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98

S. Ct. 694, 700 (1978)). With respect to plaintiff’s ACRA claim, defendant also invokes

A.R.S. § 12-341.01(C), which provides for an award of fees “upon clear and convincing

evidence that the claim or defense constitutes harassment, is groundless and is not made in

good faith.” Defendant seeks an award of $12,159.70 representing approximately 92 hours

of work.

As evidence of bad faith, defendant identifies plaintiff’s counsel’s reliance on written

discovery instead of depositions of defendant’s employees, delays in receiving responses to

discovery requests in September and October 2009, and a motion for an extension of time

on summary judgment. Defendant also asserts that plaintiff filed her claims for purposes of

harassment because she did not complain about age discrimination to defendant and she did

not corroborate her subjective allegations that she was discriminated against.

In response, plaintiff acknowledges that there were discovery delays and represents

that they were due to plaintiff’s counsel’s illness, staff turnover, and plaintiff’s move to

Washington. Plaintiff also relies on a reasonable cause determination by the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission as evidence that her ACRA claim was not frivolous.

“Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and

discretion.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132 (1991).

Nothing in the record supports a finding of bad faith. The notion that plaintiff’s motion for

an extension of time, which we granted over defendant’s vitriolic objection, would support

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a finding of bad faith is simply perplexing. While discovery delays are unfortunate, they

should be resolved with increased communication and professional courtesy, not unsupported

accusations of bad faith.

We are also unpersuaded that plaintiff’s ACRA claim was frivolous. Defendant

argues that plaintiff failed to support her allegations, but it does not analyze them or the

evidence that plaintiff presented on summary judgment. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion,

a discrimination claim does not lack foundation merely because an employee does not

confront his employer before filing a charge. To be sure, plaintiff’s claim was not strong.

But we must “resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by

concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been

unreasonable or without foundation.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,

421-22, 98 S. Ct. 694, 700 (1978) (developing the standard adopted in Sees). We deny

defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED DENYING defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees

(doc. 37).

DATED this 2nd day of February, 2011.

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