Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03287/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03287-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SERENA KWAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANMEDICA INTERNATIONAL, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-03287-MEJ 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 43

INTRODUCTION

This is an action in diversity for damages and equitable relief by Plaintiff Serena Kwan 

(“Plaintiff”), as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated, against Defendant 

SanMedica International, LLC (“Defendant”), the manufacturer of SeroVital, an over-the-counter 

supplement. Plaintiff alleges two claims for relief: violation of California’s Unfair Competition 

law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; and violation of California’s Consumer 

Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. Pending before the Court is 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 43. Plaintiff filed an Opposition 

(Dkt. No. 50) and Defendant filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 55). The Court finds this motion suitable for 

disposition without oral argument and VACATES the March 12, 2015 hearing. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). 

Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the 

Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

The following allegations are drawn from Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 

(“SAC”). Dkt. No. 42. Defendant manufactures, markets, sells, or distributes SeroVital, an overthe-counter supplement marketed to boost human growth hormone (“HGH”). SAC ¶ 1. In its 

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nationwide marketing campaign, Defendant has made the following marketing representations: 

(1) “It is clear that Growth Hormone has been associated with

wrinkle reduction, decreased body fat, increased lean muscle mass, 

stronger bones, improved mood, heightened sex drive, and making 

users look and feel decades – not years, but DECADES – younger”; 

(2) “peak growth hormone levels” are “associated with: youthful 

skin integrity, lean musculature, elevated energy production, [and]

adipose tissue distribution”; and 

(3) that SeroVital is clinically tested to boost human growth 

hormone (“HGH”) by a mean of 682% (hereafter the “682% HGH 

increase representation”).

Id. The SAC separates these associated benefit representations into two separate categories: (1) 

the wrinkle reduction, stronger bones, improved mood, heightened sex drive, making users look 

and feel decades younger, youthful skin integrity and elevated energy production representations 

are referred to as the “fountain of youth representations”; and (2) the decreased body fat, increased 

lean muscle mass, lean musculature and adipose tissue distribution are referred to as the “body 

composition representations.” Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff contends that these representations are either 

false, misleading, deceptive, or all three. Id. ¶ 2. 

Plaintiff alleges that she saw an advertisement for SeroVital in Shape magazine, which

promoted it as having the ability to increase HGH levels by 682% and that peak HGH levels are 

“clearly associated” with the fountain of youth benefits. Id. ¶ 26. In May of 2014, Plaintiff went 

to Defendant’s website (serovital.com) to purchase the product, and while browsing the website 

read representations confirming the information contained in the marketing to which she had 

previously been exposed. Id. Plaintiff purchased one box of SeroVital based upon those 

representations. Id. If she had known that SeroVital was being unlawfully sold and that it was not 

proven to provide the represented benefits, she would not have purchased it. Id. ¶¶ 26, 52.

Plaintiff represents a class of individuals who, in reliance upon Defendant’s claims, 

purchased SeroVital. On July 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed suit in this matter. Dkt. No. 1. On August 

27, 2014, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), in which she alleged two causes of 

action: (1) violation of the UCL; and (2) violation of the CLRA. Dkt. No. 13. Defendant moved

to dismiss the FAC, arguing that Plaintiff brought only substantiation claims, for which there 

exists no available private right of action, and that even if Plaintiff’s claims were construed to be 

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something other than substantiation claims, she failed to demonstrate that Defendant’s claims 

regarding SeroVital were false. Dkt. No. 21-1. The Court agreed and granted Defendant’s motion 

on October 30, 2014. Order re: Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 39. The Court granted Plaintiff leave 

to amend, but only if she could allege facts from which the Court could conclude that Defendant’s 

advertising representations were false. Id. at 7. The Court warned Plaintiff that it would not be 

enough to attack the methodology of Defendant’s study; “instead, she must allege facts 

affirmatively disproving Defendant’s claims.” Id. The Court identified three ways she could 

accomplish this:

Plaintiff could allege that one or more of the authorities alluded to 

actually studied or tested the formula SeroVital contains and found 

that it does not produce a 682% mean increase in HGH levels, or 

that Plaintiff herself did not experience such an increase when using 

the product, or that a study exists somewhere demonstrating that a 

682% increase is categorically impossible to achieve in an over-thecounter pill. 

Id.

Plaintiff filed her SAC on December 1, 2014. In addition to her previous allegations, she 

now refers to the top of the front of SeroVital’s label, which states “It is clear that “Growth 

Hormone has been associated with wrinkle reduction, decreased body fat, increased lean muscle 

mass, stronger bones, improved mood, heightened sex drive, and making users look and feel 

decades – not years, but DECADES – younger.” SAC ¶ 2. Plaintiff alleges this statement is 

categorically false with respect to wrinkle reduction, stronger bones, improved mood, heightened 

sex drive and the fountain of youth representations, because it is not “clear” that growth hormone 

has been associated with any of these benefits. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that there are no 

studies demonstrating that the SeroVital ingredients, alone or in combination, provide any of the 

fountain of youth represented benefits. Id. Plaintiff also points to Defendant’s statement at the 

bottom of the front of the label – “PEAK GROWTH HORMONE LEVELS ASSOCIATED 

WITH: Youthful skin integrity [and] Elevated Energy Production.” Id. ¶ 3. She alleges this is 

categorically false because “[p]eak growth hormone levels have not been associated with these 

benefits based upon any reliable scientific evidence.” Id. 

In addition, Plaintiff adds allegations regarding Defendant’s statement that SeroVital is 

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“Clinically Tested.” Id. ¶¶ 4-5. She alleges that a reasonable consumer reading this would 

interpret “Clinically Tested” to mean “clinically proven,” and that SeroVital had been clinically 

tested to provide all of the benefits set forth on the front of the label. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff contends 

that “[w]hen a manufacturer represents that its product has been clinically tested, as Defendant 

does on the front of the SeroVital label, the reasonable consumer rightfully believes that the 

defendant has clinically tested the product and has adequate scientific substantiation for the claims 

linked to the clinically tested representation.” Id. ¶ 6. 

The SAC also includes allegations regarding the study on which the SeroVital advertising 

claims rely. Plaintiff refers to a “purported supporting summary of a ‘study’ Defendant includes 

on its website,” alleging that it “is so riddled with flaws that it cannot be relied upon to draw 

efficacy conclusions.” Id. ¶ 4. She alleges that it “is not a study report but a summary that would 

not be accepted by any credible, peer-reviewed scientific journal,” that “[t]here are no authors 

identified with regard to the study summarized on Defendant’s web site, another indicator that the 

report on the web site is not to be relied upon,” and “the summary of the study’s results reveal 

numerous flaws that would lead experts in the area to conclude that this study is not credible and 

cannot be relied upon to base efficacy conclusions.” Id. ¶¶ 32-34.

Defendant now moves to dismiss the SAC, arguing that it “is again based entirely on 

allegations for which there is simply no private right of action—allegations concerning a 

purported lack of scientific substantiation for the advertising claims related to [SeroVital].”

1

 

Mem. at 4, Dkt. No. 46. Defendant argues that the SAC is fatally deficient, because it does not 

contain allegations based on testing, scientific literature, or anecdotal evidence claiming that the 

advertisements are false or misleading. Id. at 5. While the SAC contains allegations that 

 

1 Defendant ask the Court to take judicial notice of various documents in support of its Motion. 

Dkt. No. 44. Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s request. Dkt. No. 51. Although in general the Court 

may not consider any materials beyond the pleadings when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Lee 

v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001), the Court may, in some circumstances, consider 

evidence upon which the Complaint necessarily relies, Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 

F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the Court does not rely on any of the materials for which 

judicial notice is sought, and therefore Defendant’s Motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

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Defendant’s advertising claims are based on an underlying study that is flawed, Defendant 

contends that these allegations cannot form the basis for actions under the UCL or CLRA because 

they “are lack of substantiation claims—they all attack the scientific support for [SeroVital’s] 

claims without citing to or alleging that there are studies or other scientific evidence that 

contradict the scientific support on which Defendant substantiates the advertising claims.” Id. at 

6. Even if Plaintiff could bring her claims, Defendant argues they fail as a matter of law because 

the SAC fails to demonstrate that Defendant’s claims regarding SeroVital are false. Id. at 13.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based 

on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facial 

plausibility standard is not a “probability requirement” but mandates “more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the 

court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 

F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). “[D]ismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal 

theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Johnson v. 

Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a 

court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). 

Even under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), under which a party is only 

required to make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief,” a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of 

a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

“[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to 

dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 

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F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply 

recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts 

to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.”). The court must 

be able to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . 

[is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. at 663-64.

If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

As in its previous motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed 

because they are based entirely upon substantiation allegations for which there exists no private 

right of action.2

In response, Plaintiff argues that her falsity claims are not based on a lack of substantiation 

theory, but instead allege that Defendant’s representations are false because there is no clinical 

proof supporting any of the represented benefits on the label, and the summary of a study 

Defendant includes on its website cannot serve as this clinical proof because “it is so riddled with 

flaws that it cannot be relied on to draw efficacy conclusions.” Opp’n at 1. Plaintiff also argues 

that the SAC alleges two additional claims: (1) that Defendant’s marketing and sale of SeroVital 

are unlawful under the UCL; and (2) that Defendant is liable for engaging in misleading 

representations because it lacks substantiation for its claims. Id. at 3.

 

2 Defendant also appears to raise a standing argument, arguing that Plaintiff fails to allege that she 

“even took the product in the first place.” Mot. at 11. “However, the sale itself caused an 

economic injury-in-fact, and therefore this Court has standing to adjudicate the controversy.” 

Cortina v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 2015 WL 260913, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2015) (citing Steel Co. v. 

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). 

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A. False Advertising

California’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and 

unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . . .” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The 

CLRA prohibits any “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices 

undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of 

goods or services to any consumer . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770. “In an action for false 

advertising under the UCL and CLRA, the plaintiff ‘bears the burden of proving the defendant’s 

advertising claim is false or misleading.’” Stanley v. Bayer Healthcare LLC, 2012 WL 1132920, 

at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012) (quoting Nat’l Council Against Health Fraud, Inc. v. King Bio 

Pharm., Inc., 107 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1342 (2003)). Individuals may not bring suit under the 

UCL or the CLRA alleging only that advertising claims lack substantiation. Id. Instead, that right 

is reserved to “the Director of Consumer Affairs, the Attorney General, any city attorney, or any 

district attorney . . . .” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17508. Therefore, because no private right of 

action exists for a substantiation claim, private litigants may only bring claims under these 

sections for false or misleading advertising, and must provide adequate factual bases for such 

allegations. Fraker v. Bayer Corp., 2009 WL 5865678, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2009).

In the false advertising context, an advertising claim is false if it has “actually been 

disproved,” that is, if the plaintiff can point to evidence that directly conflicts with the claim. 

Eckler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2012 WL 5382218, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012). By contrast, 

an advertising claim that merely lacks evidentiary support is said to be unsubstantiated. Id.

(“There is a difference, intuitively, between a claim that has no evidentiary support one way or the 

other and a claim that’s actually been disproved. In common usage, we might say that both are 

‘unsubstantiated,’ but the caselaw (and common sense) imply that in the context of a false 

advertising lawsuit an ‘unsubstantiated’ claim is only the former.”). 

In her SAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s advertising for SeroVital is false and 

misleading because: (1) there are no studies that support Defendant’s representations, and 

Defendant lacks any credible scientific substantiation for these representations; (2) the only studies 

associating HGH with Defendant’s representations involve prescription drugs and HGH that was 

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injected intravenously, not orally administered; (3) the supporting summary of a study Defendant 

includes on its website is “riddled with flaws,” including that it is written by an unknown author 

and that it is not a study report but a summary that would not be accepted by any credible, peerreviewed scientific journal; (4) a reasonable consumer would interpret “clinically tested” as 

meaning “clinically proven,” and such a consumer rightfully believes that Defendant has clinically 

tested the product and has the scientific substantiation to back up its claims as to all the benefits on 

the front of the label; and (5) experts in HGH deem the only credible scientific evidence to 

substantiate human health benefit claims is evidence from high quality randomized controlled 

clinical trials, and no such trials exist to substantiate Defendant’s claims. SAC ¶¶ 2, 4-6, 8-9, 13-

14, 32. 

1. Defendant’s Summary

The Court previously addressed Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the flaws in the study 

Defendant summarizes and the lack of any other study supporting its representations. Order re: 

Mot. to Dismiss at 5 (“Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant claims support for its representations, 

when there in fact is no such support, perfectly describes a substantiation claim.”) (citing Eckler,

2012 WL 5382218, at *3). Once again, the SAC cites no study that disproves Defendant’s claims. 

The SAC claims that: “Plaintiff, through her counsel and her counsel’s consulting experts, has 

conducted a comprehensive search of the published literature on the ingredients specific to the 

Defendant’s Product.” SAC ¶ 41. Based on this search, Plaintiff alleges that “[n]o published 

reports . . . were found supportive of the represented 682% HGH increase, ‘fountain of youth’ or 

‘body composition’ benefit representations.” Id. However, Plaintiff still does not allege that a 

study exists showing that these benefits are categorically impossible to achieve, or that one or 

more authorities studied or tested SeroVital’s formulaand found that it does not produce the results 

Defendant claims. 

Thus, as before, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the study Defendant 

summarizes constitute a substantiation claim. Courts have repeatedly held that actions based on 

such allegations are not actionable by private individuals. Engel v. Novex Biotech LLC, 2014 WL 

5794608, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014); Johns v. Bayer Corp., 2013 WL 1498965 *36 (S.D. Cal. 

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Apr. 10, 2013) (“[I]n the absence of affirmative scientific evidence . . . that proves that zinc and 

vitamin E did not support prostate health, the strength of Bayer’s evidence is irrelevant and 

Plaintiffs claims are based on ‘lack of substantiation’ rather than proof of falsity.”); Stanley, 2012 

WL 1132920, at *4 (“alleged lack of substantiation does not render claims false and misleading 

under the UCL or CLRA.”); Fraker, 2009 WL 5865687, at *8 (granting motion to dismiss where 

the plaintiff failed to allege that “Defendant’s advertising claims with respect to Product are 

actually false; not simply that they are not backed up by scientific evidence.”). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant’s claims are not substantiated by the supporting study, 

standing alone, cannot serve as a basis to assert claims under either the UCL or CLRA.

However, the Court must look at the SAC as a whole to determine whether Plaintiff alleges 

only a substantiation claim. See Bronson v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 2013 WL 1629191, at *8 

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013). “A claim can survive a lack of substantiation challenge by, for 

example, alleging studies showing that a defendant’s statement is false.” Id. 

2. FTC and FDA

In her FAC, Plaintiff alleged: (1) the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has stated that 

“no reliable evidence” supports that non-prescription products have the same effect as prescription 

HGH (FAC ¶ 18); (2) the New England Journal of Medicine published an article in the 1990s 

touting HGH’s benefits, and another article in 2003 warning about the potential for misleading 

consumers (Id. ¶¶ 19-20); and (3) the Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) has stated that “it is 

unaware of any reliable evidence to support anti-aging claims for over-the-counter pills and sprays 

that supposedly contain HGH” (Id. ¶ 21). The Court found that these statements may be relevant 

to Plaintiff’s claims, but they failed to demonstrate that Defendant’s advertising claims are false. 

Order re: Mot. to Dismiss at 6. The Court noted that none of the authorities cited actually refer to 

SeroVital, and that there was no way of knowing whether the alleged statements were made before 

SeroVital was in testing or on the market. Id. at 6-7. For these reasons, the Court granted leave to 

amend, but only if Plaintiff could allege facts “affirmatively disproving Defendant’s claims.” Id.

at 7. 

In her SAC, Plaintiff does not mention the New England Journal of Medicine statements, 

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but she reproduced her allegations regarding the FDA statement. SAC ¶ 43 (“The FDA has also 

stated that it is unaware of any reliable evidence to support anti-aging claims for over-the-counter 

pills and sprays that supposedly contain HGH and it has not approved any such products for antiaging or any other purpose.”) (compare FAC ¶ 21). She also reproduced her allegations regarding 

the FTC statement. SAC ¶ 42 (“Indeed, the FTC’s stated position is that with respect to oral, as 

opposed to injectable/prescription HGH products, there is ‘no reliable evidence to support the 

claim that these ‘wannabe’ products have the same effect as prescription HGH.’”) (compare FAC 

¶ 18). Unlike the FAC, however, Plaintiffs adds: “This statement is equally valid today, since the 

science has not changed as evidenced by the fact that this statement is still on the FTC’s web site.” 

SAC ¶ 42. Even with this addition, neither the FTC nor the FDA statements disprove Defendant’s 

claims, let alone show that any authority studied or tested SeroVital’s formula. 

In fact, the SAC cites no study that disproves Defendant’s claims. Plaintiff argues that 

Defendant’s representations are “categorically false” because “[t]here are no studies showing that 

any of the ingredients in SeroVital, alone or in combination, provide increases in the HGH levels 

represented on the packaging.” Opp’n at 7. As discussed above, Plaintiff states that her counsel 

and her counsel’s consulting experts conducted a comprehensive search of the published literature 

on the ingredients specific to SeroVital, but found no published reports that supported Defendant’s

representations. SAC ¶ 41. However, Plaintiff still does not allege that a study exists showing 

these benefits are categorically impossible to achieve. Again, in the false advertising context, an 

advertising claim is false if it has “actually been disproved.” Eckler, 2012 WL 5382218, at *3. 

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant’s claim lacks evidentiary support is said to be unsubstantiated. 

Id.

3. Defendant’s Use of “Clear”

In her FAC, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s advertising is false because the study did not 

specifically test for “youthful skin integrity, lean musculature, elevated energy production, [and] 

adipose tissue distribution,” which appears on the bottom of the packaging. FAC ¶ 14. The Court 

rejected this contention “outright,” finding that the SeroVital advertising does not state that the 

product was clinically tested to produce these results, only that peak growth hormone levels are 

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associated with those benefits. Order re: Mot. to Dismiss at 5. Thus, “it is irrelevant that the 

study upon which the advertising claims rely did not test for the presence of those benefits, and 

this alleged deficiency cannot serve as the basis for Plaintiff’s false advertising claim.” Id. 

In the SAC, Plaintiff adds allegations of other benefits described on the front of 

SeroVital’s packaging. See SAC ¶ 2 (“It is clear that Growth Hormone has been associated with 

wrinkle reduction, decreased body fat, increased lean muscle mass, stronger bones, improved 

mood, heightened sex drive, and making users look and feel decades – not years, but DECADES –

younger.”). Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s use of “it is clear” and “associated with” are

categorically false, because it is not “clear” that growth hormone has been associated with any of 

these benefits, yet these statements “impart the message that the available science establishes that 

increased HGH levels provide these benefits.” Id.; Opp’n at 7-8. She argues that “[t]here are no 

studies involving oral over-the-counter secretagogues such as SeroVital demonstrating that the 

SeroVital ingredients, alone or in combination, provide any of the body composition benefits.” 

Opp’n at 7. However, once again, Plaintiff does not allege that a study exists showing that these 

benefits are categorically impossible to achieve, or that one or more authorities studied or tested 

the formula SeroVital contains and found that it does not produce such results. 

4. Clinically Tested

Plaintiff has also added allegations that “[a] reasonable consumer reading Defendant’s 

SeroVital label as a whole would rightfully interpret ‘Clinically Tested’ to mean ‘clinically 

proven,’” and “would understand the ‘Clinically Tested’ representation to mean that SeroVital had 

been clinically tested to provide all of the benefits set forth on the front of the label.” SAC ¶ 5. 

Plaintiff notes that the phrase “Clinically Tested” is “in the middle of the label” and “not textually 

connected to a particular statement on the label nor is it qualified in any manner.” Id. She also 

notes that the study that Defendant summarizes on its web site “did not even test whether 

SeroVital provided any of the fountain of youth or body composition benefits.” Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff 

argues that Defendant’s use of “Clinically Tested” takes her claim out of the realm of the lack of 

substantiation cases. Opp’n at 8. The Court disagrees. 

In its previous Order, the Court addressed Plaintiff’s argument that she “does not simply 

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allege that Defendant’s growth hormone benefit representations are unsubstantiated; rather 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misrepresents that its growth hormone benefit representations are 

supported by clinical testing when they are not.” Order re: Mot. to Dismiss at 5. The Court found 

that “Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant claims support for its representations, when there in fact 

is no such support, perfectly describes a substantiation claim.” Id. (citing Eckler, 2012 WL 

5382218, at *3). 

In support of her revised claim, Plaintiff cites to the same cases cited in her prior 

opposition: McCrary v. Elations Co., LLC, 2013 WL 6403073 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2013); Hughes 

v. Ester C Co., 930 F. Supp. 2d 439, (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 782 F. 

Supp. 2d 522 (S.D. Ohio 2011); Cabral v. Supple, LLC, No. 12-00085-MWF, Dkt. No. 29 at 1, 4 

(C.D. Cal. July 3, 2012); and Garcia v. Clarins, et al., No. 14-cv-21249, Dkt. No. 16 at 16 (S.D.

Fla. Sept. 4, 2014). See Opp’n at 8, 10. However, as the Court observed in its prior Order, in 

those cases the plaintiff was able to demonstrate, with affirmative evidence, that the advertising 

claims are false in and of themselves. See Order re: Mot. to Dismiss at 6 (“The Court therefore 

rejects Plaintiff’s contention that there exists any ‘recognized exception’ to the rule against private 

enforcement of substantiation claims”). Plaintiff has failed to provide any such affirmative 

evidence here, and none of the cases cited by Plaintiff stand for the proposition that she may make 

an end run around the bar against private substantiation claims by simply alleging that an 

advertiser’s reference to the substantiation itself is misleading. 

Further, in the SAC, Plaintiff acknowledges that testing has been performed, but disputes 

the adequacy of that testing. SAC ¶ 32. If the Court were to permit Plaintiff to proceed on this 

theory, private litigants could bring substantiation causes of action on advertising claims simply 

by adding “magic words,” tethering the claims to an advertiser’s particular substantiation. See 

King Bio, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 1338 (explaining the purpose of the rule as follows: “This 

limitation prevents undue harassment of advertisers and is the least burdensome method of 

obtaining substantiation for advertising claims”); see also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17508 (giving 

power to demand substantiation for advertising only to “the Director of Consumer Affairs, the 

Attorney General, any city attorney, or any district attorney”). If Plaintiff wishes to bring claims 

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alleging that Defendant’s advertisements are false or misleading, then she must do so based on 

actual facts showing this, not simply an assertion that Defendant’s substantiation is inadequate. 

King Bio, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 1342.

B. Misleading and/or Deceptive Advertising

Regardless of whether the SeroVital claims are provably false, Plaintiff alleges that she can 

prevail by showing that the challenged representations are deceptive, misleading or both. SAC 

¶ 8. She argues that this is a separate and independent claim under the CLRA, and maintains that 

King Bio—the source of the rule of law that lack of substantiation claims do not state a claim—“is 

either wrongly decided or has been wrongly applied to misleading and deceptive claims.” Opp’n 

at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff notes that the CLRA provides for claims against false, misleading or 

deceptive representations,” and “[r]equiring a plaintiff to establish falsity in order to state a claim 

for misleading or deceptive representations violates basic principles of statutory construction by 

rendering the terms ‘misleading’ and ‘deceptive’ surplusage.” Id. As such, she seeks review of 

the King Bio holding. Id. 

If the Court were to adopt Plaintiff’s proposal, it would not only overturn King Bio, but the 

entire body of law on this issue, including the laws enacted by the California State Legislature. As 

the Court previously observed, “[i]ndividuals may not bring suit under the UCL or the CLRA 

alleging only that advertising claims lack substantiation. Instead, that right is reserved to ‘the 

Director of Consumer Affairs, the Attorney General, any city attorney, or any district attorney . . . 

.’” Order re: Mot. to Dismiss at 5 (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17508 andciting Stanley v. 

Bayer Healthcare LLC, 2012 WL 1132920, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012) (“Private individuals 

may not bring an action demanding substantiation for advertising claims” and “alleged lack of 

substantiation does not render claims false and misleading under the UCL or CLRA.”)). As this 

rule is both settled and fundamental, the Court declines to overrule the Legislature’s explicit 

exception for cases where advertising is allegedly misleading or deceptive due to lack of 

substantiation. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17508 (giving power to demand substantiation for 

advertising only to “the Director of Consumer Affairs, the Attorney General, any city attorney, or 

any district attorney”); see also King Bio, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 1345-46 (“The Legislature 

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indicated an intent to alter the burden of substantiating advertising claims only with respect to 

prosecuting authorities”). 

C. Plaintiff’s UCL Claim

In her Opposition, Plaintiff argues that she has stated a valid claim under the UCL because 

“selling SeroVital without the prerequisite competent and reliable scientific 

evidence/substantiation” is “unlawful.” Opp’n at 18. However, as discussed above, individuals 

may not bring suit under the UCL or the CLRA alleging only that advertising claims lack 

substantiation. Further, unsubstantiated claims are already, by definition, unlawful under section 

17508: “It shall be unlawful for any person doing business in California and advertising to 

consumers in California to make any false or misleading advertising claim, including claims that 

(1) purport to be based on factual, objective, or clinical evidence. . . .” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§ 17508 (emphasis added). Thus, as the Legislature has carved out a specific exception limiting 

the right to bring lack of substantiation claims to prosecuting authorities, private litigants may only 

bring claims under these sections for false or misleading advertising, and must provide adequate 

factual bases for such allegations. Engel, 2014 WL 5794608, at *2 (citing Fraker, 2009 WL 

5865678, at *8). As Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s advertising claims have 

“actually been disproved,” her UCL claim must also fail.

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. As the Court 

previously provided Plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint, and she has once again 

failed to allege facts from which the Court could conclude that Defendant’s advertising 

representations were false, the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court 

shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2015

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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