Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00308/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00308-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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1 Nearly all of these defendants are moving for dismissal and/or summary

judgment. For ease of reference the court has taken the liberty of grouping the

moving defendants as follows, based upon their shared counsel:

(1) “Poli & Ball” comprised of Poli & Ball, P.L.C.; James E. Shively and K.

Scott Reynolds;

(2) “EMC” comprised of EMC Mortgage Corporation and LaSalle Bank, N.A.;

(3) “Pite Duncan” comprised of Pite Duncan & Melmet, LLP, now known as Pite

Duncan, LLP; Josephine E. Piranio; David E. McAllister; Moss Pite & Duncan, LLP,

now known as Pite Duncan, LLP; Steven W. Pite; Robert W. Bradley; Michelle Abrams;

Francine Iriarte; and Kristin A. Schuler-Hintz;

(4) “Quality Loan” comprised of “Quality Loan Service Corp. [sic]; Chris

Malipit, [sic]; Matthew A. Silverman; and Paul M. Levine[,]” doc. 49 at 1;

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

B. Spain, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 07-0308-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

EMC Mortgage Company, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

In this action, asserting federal question jurisdiction based

upon alleged violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq., plaintiff 

B.Spain names approximately 48 defendants1 and “1-100" fictitious

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(5) “Ruyle” comprised of Ralene Ruyle; Beverly Sibblies; Jeffrey Mayer;

Jonathan Babko; Mark Ehrenreich; Scott Samlin; Sherri Lauritsen; Sue Stepanek;

Virginia Darrow; Domic Cagigal; Julie Jacklet; Monica Meza and Bobbi McGarrh; and

(6) “NBI” comprised of NBI, LLC; Clifton L. Burgener; B. Frank Berry; Joe L.

Cook; Flynn Powers; and Renee Walton. 

2 Finding oral argument unnecessary, the court denies the various’

parties request for same. 

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“John and Jane Doe[]” defendants. Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (doc.

4) at 2. This prolix complaint is the subject of no less than 19

motions currently pending before the court.2 

Background

Despite his pro se status, plaintiff Spain is not a

litigation neophyte. He was a claimant in a District of Arizona

bankruptcy proceeding which spanned more than a decade. Ultimately

the Bankruptcy Court found that plaintiff’s “liens and encumbrances

. . . placed upon the real properties of [the bankrupt estate of

Norma J. Hurt] [were] null and void[.]” B. Spain v. Eagleburger

Law Group, et al., 06-0712-PHX-ROS (“Spain I”) (Doc. 92) (Nov. 7,

2006) at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Bankruptcy

Court further “enjoined [Spain] from bringing any action or filing,

or causing to be filed any lien or claim against the property of

[the bankrupt estate][.]” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

After unsuccessful appeals, the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari. See id. 

In addition to his extensive involvement in the Hurt

bankruptcy, in 2004 plaintiff commenced a federal action in

Colorado (“Spain I”). That action was transferred to this district

on March 9, 2006. As will be seen, plaintiff’s amended complaint

in Spain I bears a striking resemblance to his FAC in this action. 

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3 Quality Loan, NBI, and defendant Dean J. Werner expressly join in this

motion. See Docs. 49; 71; and 104. 

4 EMC and NBI expressly join in Pite Duncan’s motion to dismiss. Doc.

48 at 1; and Doc. 71 at 1, n.1. 

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On November 7, 2006, the court dismissed Spain I for failure to

state a claim. Spain I, doc. 92. Thereafter the court denied

plaintiff’s motion to vacate that dismissal order and denied his

motion to disqualify the judge. On January 5, 2007, the court in

Spain I ordered plaintiff not to “file any more motions[]” and

further ordered the Clerk of the Court “not to accept further

motions or pleadings in th[at] case.” Id., doc. 98 at 1 and 2. 

Slightly more than a month later, on February 12, 2007,

plaintiff filed the present action. Although the factual predicate

differs from Spain I, the legal theory is the same - alleged RICO

violations. The next day, February 13, 2007, plaintiff filed the

FAC which is the subject of the pending motions.

Discussion

I. Rule 12 Dismissal Motions

Poli & Ball are moving for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing

that plaintiff has no standing to bring this action (doc. 30).3

Defendants Pite Duncan and BOA are moving for dismissal on this

basis as well.4 See Doc. 42; and Doc. 67. These moving defendants

also are seeking dismissal on other grounds. Alternatively, Poli &

Ball is moving for a more definite Statement under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(e) (doc. 30 at 1); and it is cross moving for summary judgment

(doc. 37). In addition to arguing lack of standing, Pite Duncan

urges dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state

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5 Poli & Ball expressly “join in and adopt” this aspect of Pite Duncan’s

dismissal motion. Doc. 47 at 1. 

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a claim.5 Doc. 42 at 1. Pite Duncan, too, argues in the

alternative for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Id.

Besides contending that plaintiff has no standing, Bank of America

(“BOA”) argues that dismissal is mandated under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(5) because it has “never been properly served[.]” Doc. 67 at

1. Alternatively, BOA also is moving for a more definite statement

pursuant to Rule 12(e). 

A. Standing

Among these varied asserted bases for dismissal and

alternative relief, the court will first consider whether plaintiff

has standing. The court must analyze standing first because it “is

the threshold issue of any federal action, a matter of jurisdiction

because ‘the core component of standing is an essential and

unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article

III.’” See Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust v. Anchor Cap., 498

F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351

(1992)). Addressing standing first also comports with the

established principle that “[f]ederal courts must determine that

they have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.” Lance v.

Coffman, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 167 L.Ed.2d 29 

(2007) (citation omitted). Indeed, Rule 12(h)(3) mandates that

“[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise

that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court

shall dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (emphasis

added). Consequently, if defendants prevail on their standing

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argument, the court will be without subject matter jurisdiction to

consider the remaining defense arguments for dismissal and the

parties’ respective summary judgment motions. 

Before addressing the merits of defendants’ standing

arguments, there is a procedural issue which the court must briefly

address. Plaintiff is moving to strike BOA’s dismissal motion

which, as just noted, raises the issue of standing (among other

issues). Relying upon Rule 12(f), plaintiff contends that the

court must strike BOA’s motion because it is “impertinen[t][.]”

Doc. 97 at 1. BOA counters that plaintiff’s motion to strike is

“procedurally improper.” Doc. 110 at 2. BOA’s position is welltaken.

Rule 12(f) provides in relevant part that “[u]pon motion made

by a party . . . , the court may order stricken from any pleading

any . . . impertinent, . . . matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)

(emphasis added). Rule 7 defines pleadings essentially as

complaints and answers. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). By its terms

then, “Rule 12(f), . . . , does not apply to striking an entire

motion.” Evans v. Firth, 2004 WL 1379458, at *1 (D.Or. 2004)

(citing, inter alia, O’Connor v. State of Nev., 507 F.Supp. 546,

548 (D.Nev. 1981), aff’d on other grounds, 686 F.2d 749 (9th Cir.

1982)). Thus, because plaintiff Spain is seeking to strike BOA’s

entire motion, as opposed to a pleading, his motion to strike is

improper and the court denies it. See id.; see also Knight v.

U.S., 845 F.Supp. 1372, 1373-74 (D.Ariz. 1993) (motions to strike

under Rule 12(f) apply only to pleadings and not to motions).

Furthermore, the court is compelled to comment upon the form

of plaintiff’s FAC. First, as noted earlier, the FAC is strikingly

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6 A 1962 Tennessee state court case, a 1951 Court of Civil Appeals of

Texas, Waco, and a 1951 California District Court of Appeal are illustrative of the

seemingly irrelevant and random cases to which plaintiff cites in the FAC. FAC at

25;22-23; 26:8-9; and 23:21.

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similar, indeed many parts are identical, to his amended complaint

(“the complaint”) in Spain I. This similarity is significant

because in Spain I the court granted defendants’ motion for a more

definite statement under Rule 12(e), noting that it was “an

understatement[]” to refer to plaintiff’s complaint therein as

“unorganized[.]” Spain I, doc. 57 at 1. The same is true here. 

If possible, plaintiff’s FAC is even more “unorganized” than

his complaint in Spain I, in part because it is 10 pages longer. 

As in Spain I, plaintiff did not number any of the paragraphs in

his 29 page FAC. Also as in Spain I, plaintiff’s FAC does not

include “averment[s] of the claims set forth in a single set of

circumstances as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 10.” See id.

Likewise, the FAC in this action is “far from a ‘short and plain

statement of the facts’ required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.” See id.

The court in Spain I found plaintiff’s complaint to be “more aptly

described as an unorganized monologue of [his] inner thoughts

transcribed onto paper.” Id. at 1-2. To a certain extent, this is

an apt description of the FAC in the present case. 

Here, added to this “unorganized monologue” are lengthy

recitations to cases which on their face appear largely

irrelevant.6

 Plaintiff’s scattershot approach to pleading makes it

extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discern the precise

nature of his claims, much less the facts and legal authority which

he alleges support those claims. Indeed, the court has serious

reservations as to whether the FAC in its current form “perform[s]

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7 In light of the foregoing, plaintiff’s objections to Pite Duncan’s

request for judicial notice (doc. 86) on the grounds of hearsay; compound hearsay

and relevancy are without merit. See Doc. 86. Plaintiff’s objections are without

merit for the additional reasons set forth in Pite Duncan’s response to those

objections. See Doc. 106. 

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the essential functions of a complaint.” See McHenry v. Renne, 84

F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996). Despite the difficulty in

deciphering plaintiff’s FAC, the court must address the standing

arguments which defendants are properly raising in their dismissal

motions. 

To place this undeniably confusing FAC in context, Poli & Ball

and Pite Duncan are requesting that the court take judicial notice

of certain documents pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201. See Doc. 43;

and Doc. 30 at 3-4. Some of those documents are records available

from the Maricopa County Recorder’s Office, the Maricopa County

Assessor’s Office and from the United States Bankruptcy Court for

the District of Arizona. Others are documents and transcripts from

related judicial proceedings. The court grants the parties’ 

requests for judicial notice as these requests do not require the

acceptance of facts “subject to reasonable dispute[,]” and are

“capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See Fed. R. Evid.

201(b)(1) and (2); see also MK Ballistics Systems v. Simpson, 442

F.3d 741, 746 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (Court “may take judicial notice

of court filings and other matters of public record.”)7

“Piecing together plaintiff’s factual allegations as best they

c[ould][,]” Poli & Ball and the other moving defendants have

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8 Given the rambling nature of the FAC, the court and understandably the

defendants cannot be sure that they have accurately construed it. If not,

“plaintiff[] ha[s] only [himself] to blame[]” though. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at

1174. 

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offered a plausible reading of the FAC.8 See Doc. 30 at 3. For

purposes of these motions only, the court adopts and incorporates

by reference the moving defendants’ interpretation of the FAC, as

more fully set forth in Poli & Ball’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 30 at

2-5) and in BOA’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 42 at 3-6).

Concisely put, plaintiff alleges that defendants “wrongfully

are attempting to convert Real Property belonging to [him][.]” FAC

(doc. 4) at 12:5-6. This property is located at 2258 East Alpine

Drive, Mesa, Arizona (“the Alpine property”), id. at 12:9-10, and

purportedly subject to a promissory note and deed of trust. 

According to the complaint, in 1998 Aurora Management (“Aurora”)

acquired that property from Myrtle Arthur. Id. at 12:9-12. Later,

the Alpine property was the subject of a Nevada Bankruptcy Court

proceeding involving another entity, “Alpha Mega[.]” Id. at 13:1-6. 

Plaintiff seems to be claiming that BOA “wrongfully obtained an

Order” in the Alpha Mega bankruptcy “establishing that Aurora . . .

owed a total [of] $80,253.00, . . . , on the Alpine property

promissory note.” Doc. 30 at 4 (citing FAC (doc. 4) at 13-14). 

More recently, in another related bankruptcy proceeding in this

District, the Bankruptcy Court “held that the Nevada Bankruptcy

Court’s determination of the amount of that secured debt made was

binding on Aurora[’s] . . . successor-in-interest, Bing Four, LLC.” 

Id.; see also id., exh. 7 thereto. 

From what the court and the defendants are able to surmise,

the thrust of plaintiff’s lawsuit seems to be that the foregoing

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actions resulted in a wrongful and/or fraudulent overstatement of

Aurora’s debt. See FAC at 14-15. These alleged actions also form

the basis for plaintiff’s theory that “defendants’ conduct in

enforcing the note and deed of trust was part of a fraudulent

conspiracy, giving rise to RICO liability[.]” Doc. 30 at 5. 

Poli & Ball assert that given the absence of any allegations

in the FAC that plaintiff was “personally involved in any of the

challenged transactions[,]” he lacks standing to bring this

lawsuit. Id. Necessarily assuming the truth of the allegations in

the FAC, Poli & Ball further assert that plaintiff lacks standing

because “any injury resulting from the allegedly misapplied

payments or the allegedly inflated secured debt were suffered by

Aurora . . . , Bing Four, . . . and/or Alpha Mega,” not plaintiff. 

Id.

Pite Duncan echoes this lack of personal involvement argument,

adding, likewise, that there are no allegations of plaintiff’s

involvement in either of the two bankruptcy proceedings mentioned

in his FAC. What is more, Pite Duncan contend that the FAC is void

of any allegations that “[p]laintiff had or has any interest,

either legal or equitable, in the [Alpine] Property[,]” which is

“currently owned by Michael Mattatall who is not a party to this

litigation.” Doc. 42 at 8 and 9; see also Doc. 43, exh. J thereto. 

 BOA’s arguments that plaintiff lacks standing are nearly

identical to the arguments just outlined. Any alleged injury was

sustained by Aurora or Alpha Mega, not by plaintiff. Further, the

FAC contains no allegations connecting plaintiff to either of those

entities. Moreover, BOA points out that plaintiff himself alleges

that Aurora acquired the Alpine property in 1988. FAC (doc. 4) at

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12:9-12. In light of the foregoing, BOA contends that plaintiff

has not sufficiently alleged standing.

In opposing these dismissal motions, plaintiff did not address

standing. As to Poli & Ball’s motion in particular, with no basis,

plaintiff responds that that motion is “is a substantive and

procedural nullity[.]” Doc. 88 at 1. Except for inserting

different names, plaintiff’s response to Pite Duncan’s dismissal

motion is the same. Compare Doc. 87 with Doc. 88. Taking a

different but equally unresponsive approach, plaintiff devotes the

bulk of his opposition to BOA’s motion to arguing that it “is

nothing more and nothing less than a frivolous demurrer[.]” Doc. 82

at 9. The only potentially relevant and significant aspects of

plaintiffs’ responses are his averment that he has “an ownership

interest in Aurora[,]” and the promissory note and warranty deed

which he attaches in an effort to establish that purported

interest. Doc. 88 at 2, ¶ (3) (citing attached Note and Warranty

Deed); Doc. 87 at 2, ¶ (3) (citing attached Note and Warranty

Deed). 

“Article III of the United States Constitution ‘requires a

litigant to have standing to invoke the power of a federal court.’”

Williams v. Boeing Co., 2008 WL 509229, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 27,

2008) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315,

82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)) (other quotation marks and citation

omitted). “To have standing, a ‘plaintiff must allege personal

injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful

conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’” Id.

(quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315) (emphasis added). 

Stated slightly differently, “the injury that a plaintiff alleges

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must be unique to that plaintiff, one in which he has a ‘personal

stake’ in the outcome of a litigation seeking to remedy that harm.” 

Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d

817, 821 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,

818-19, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997)) (other citation

omitted). Thus “standing . . . requires a plaintiff to demonstrate

the now-familiar elements of injury in fact, causation, and

redressability.” Lance, ___ U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 1196

(citation omitted). The Supreme Court has variously described an

“injury in fact” as one that is “concrete and particularized” and

“actual or imminent.” See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 

“An injury is particularized if it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a

personal and individual way.” Id. at 561 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 

“Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or

factual.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citation omitted). Where, as here, a defendant is facially

attacking standing, i.e.,“assert[ing] that the allegations in the

complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction

as a matter of law[,]” Whisant v. U.S., 400 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th

Cir. 2005) (citation omitted), the court “must accept as true all

material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the

complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Warth v. Seldin, 422

U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (citation

omitted). Plaintiff Spain, as the party invoking federal

jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing the elements of

standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Plaintiff

can meet this burden by “alleging specific facts sufficient to

satisfy the standing elements.” See Loritz v. U.S. Court of

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Appeals for Ninth Circuit, 382 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

The allegations in plaintiff’s FAC fall woefully short of

meeting these standards. The FAC is completely void of any

allegations that plaintiff has a “personal stake” in the outcome of

this litigation. The requisite personal stake is missing because

the only alleged injuries seem to be “loss of the Alpine property,

the payment of interest, and the payment of attorneys fees.” Doc.

30 at 5. However, those injuries “were suffered, if at all, by

Aurora, Alpha Mega and/or Bing Four,” not by plaintiff. Id. at 5-

6. Further, insofar as the court is able to discern, there is

nothing in the FAC connecting plaintiff to those entities, much

less in such a way as to confer standing upon him. 

Plaintiff’s response that he has an “ownership interest in

Aurora[,]” doc. 872 at 2, ¶ (3); and doc. 88 at 2, ¶ (3), is

insufficient to satisfy his burden of pleading specific facts

establishing the elements of standing. First, there is no similar

ownership allegation in the FAC. Second, even if there was, the

meaning of that ownership averment is unclear. What is clear,

though, is that even if the FAC included this ownership allegation,

nonetheless, it would not suffice to establish plaintiff’s

standing. 

If plaintiff is claiming that Aurora is a limited liability

corporation (“LLC”) and he is a member thereof, then, as Poli &

Ball correctly assert, by statute he is not a “proper party” to

this action. ARS § 29-656 specifically provides that “[a] member

of a [LLC], solely by reason of being a member, is not a proper

party to proceedings by or against a [LLC] unless the object is to

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enforce a member’s right against or liability to the [LLC] or

except as provided in this chapter.” ARS § 29-656 (footnote

omitted). The FAC does not include allegations which would even

arguably bring plaintiff within the purview of that exception.

Similarly, even if Aurora is not a LLC, but simply a

corporation and plaintiff is a shareholder therein, still, he would

lack standing. That is so because, as Poli & Ball also accurately

notes, “[g]enerally, a shareholder does not have standing to

redress an injury to the corporation in which [he] holds stock.” 

EMI Limited v. Bennett, 738 F.2d 994, 9979 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing

cases). The court is fully cognizant that a corporate shareholder

may have standing to pursue a derivative action. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23.1. Plaintiff’s FAC does not come close to alleging the

detailed allegations necessary to sustain such a cause of action

under that Rule, however. 

Additionally, the FAC does not contain the requisite

allegations for plaintiff as a supposed Aurora shareholder to

support a finding that he has standing to assert a direct claim for

RICO violations. More specifically, plaintiff Spain is not

alleging “either . . . an injury distinct from injuries to other

[Aurora] shareholders, or (2) a special duty between [he] and the

defendant[s][.]” See Abrahamson v. Western Savings and Loan

Association, 1994 WL 374294, at *4 (D.Ariz. 1994) (citing Sparling

v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)). Thus,

to the extent plaintiff is attempting to allege injury in fact

based upon his purported affiliation with Aurora, he has failed to

do so.

The moving defendants framed their standing arguments in terms

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of failure to plead the requisite injury in fact. The court

observes, however, that also missing from the FAC are any

allegations showing a “causal connection between [plaintiff’s

claimed] injury and the defendant[s’] conduct[.]” See Get Outdoors

II, LLC v. City of San Diego, Cal., 506 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir.

2007) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130). The

conclusory nature of plaintiff’s allegations, coupled with the fact

that they are presented in what best can be described as a rambling

narrative, wholly fail to establish this second and equally

critical element of standing.

As the foregoing shows, whether plaintiff is a member of a

LLC, or a corporate shareholder, he has not alleged an injury

“unique” to him as the standing doctrine requires. Nor has he

otherwise pled that he has a personal stake in the outcome of this

litigation sufficient to confer standing. Likewise, the FAC is

void of any allegations demonstrating the necessary causal

connection for standing purposes. In short, plaintiff Spain has

not satisfied his burden of “clearly and specifically set[ting]

forth facts sufficient to satisfy . . . Art. III[’s] standing

requirements.” See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110

S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). “A federal court is powerless

to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient

allegations of standing.” Id. at 155-56, 110 S.Ct. 1717. Yet, in

effect, this is what plaintiff Spain is asking this court to do. 

The court declines. 

For the reasons discussed above, insofar as they are premised

upon a lack of standing, the court grants the motions to dismiss

brought by Poli & Ball (doc. 30); Pite Duncan (doc. 42); and BOA

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(doc. 67); and joined in by EMC (doc. 48); NBI (doc. 71); Quality

Loan (doc. 49); and Dean J. Werner (doc. 104). In light of that

ruling, the court denies as moot the alternative relief sought by

Poli & Ball and Pite Duncan, i.e. a more definite statement

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 

 Ruyle and David Huston are the only defendants who did not

move for dismissal based upon lack of standing, or at least join in

one of the motions by other defendants asserting lack of standing. 

Instead, the Ruyle defendants’ dismissal motion is based upon lack

of personal jurisdiction; insufficiency of process and failure to

state a claim. See Doc. 46. 

Defendant David W. Huston is moving for judgment on the

pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12©, or alternatively, for

dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim. Defendant Huston further contends that he is entitled to

dismissal based upon lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant

Huston also separately filed a cross-motion for summary judgment

(doc. 64). 

Because this court has “both the power and the duty to raise

the adequacy of [a plaintiff’s] standing sua sponte[,]” it will do

so regardless of the fact that the Ruyle defendants and Mr. Huston

are not asserting lack of standing. See Bernhardt v. County of Los

Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). When the court does

that, obviously it comes to the same conclusion as it did with

respect to the other moving defendants: plaintiff has not

sufficiently alleged standing. Accordingly the court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, and thus grants the motions to dismiss by the

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9 The court hastens to add that even assuming standing, nonetheless it

would grant the motion to dismiss by the Ruyle defendants. The Ruyle defendants

are entitled to dismissal on this alternate basis because, as fully explained in

their motion and documented in the attached exhibits, plaintiff improperly

attempted to effect service upon them by serving EMC’s Associate General Counsel.

See Doc. 46 at 6-9; and exhs. 1-13 thereto. In accordance with Rule 12(b)(5), this

insufficiency of process provides another basis for dismissing the FAC as against

the Ruyle defendants. 

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Ruyle defendants (doc. 46)9 and defendant Huston (doc. 62), albeit

for different reasons than they urge.

Because plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged standing, as

explained earlier, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and

so may not proceed to the merits. Therefore, the court denies as

moot all remaining pending motions as enumerated at the conclusion

of this decision.

II. Amendment

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly instructed that pro se

litigants should be given an opportunity to amend their complaints

unless it is clear that no amendment can cure the defect. See,

e.g., Flowers v. First Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir.

2002) (“We are very cautious in approving a district court’s

decision to deny pro se litigants leave to amend.”) Largely due to

the wholly inadequate and conclusory allegations in the FAC, at

this juncture it is impossible for the court to engage in any

meaningful futility analysis. For that reason, and keenly aware of

the Ninth Circuit’s general reluctance to deny pro se litigants an

opportunity to amend, the court will allow plaintiff to amend his

complaint. 

Before filing any amended complaint, however, plaintiff would

do well to seriously consider the numerous apparent defects

discussed in defendants’ motions, such as the lack of personal

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jurisdiction by the Ruyle defendants and defendant Huston, and the

fact that arguably this action is an impermissible collateral

attack on prior court proceedings. The court stresses that these

are just two of the seeming defects, which are too countless to

enumerate, in the FAC – and two which at first glance it does not

appear can be cured by amendment. 

Additionally, plaintiff is reminded of the necessity of fully

complying with Rule 8, which requires that averments “be simple,

concise, and direct[.]” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1). If plaintiff

has any doubt as to the pleading requirements under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, he can consult, among other sources, the

Rule’s Appendix of Forms, which are “intended to indicate the

simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate.” 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 84. 

Finally, given the manner in which plaintiff has conducted

this litigation to date, as well as his extensive prior litigation

involvement documented in the record, the court cautions him

regarding the use of the courts in a vexatious fashion. 

“[F]lagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated

because it enables one person to preempt the use of judicial time

that properly could be used to consider meritorious claims of other

litigants.” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057

(9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

At this juncture the plaintiff has not engaged in a “flagrant abuse

of the judicial process[.]” See id. Given his numerous filings,

most of them wholly without merit, coupled with the tone and form

of those filings, plaintiff is dangerously close to crossing the

line from permissible use of the judicial process to flagrant abuse

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however. The court will not look favorably upon the filing of an

amended complaint which does not fully comport with the relevant

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and governing case law. An

amended complaint, if any, shall be filed and served within 30 days

of the entry date of this order.

For the reasons discussed herein, the court hereby

(1) DENIES plaintiff’s Motion for partial summary judgment

(doc. 11);

(2) GRANTS the motion to dismiss by the Poli & Ball defendants

based upon lack of standing, but DENIES the alternative relief

sought under Rule 12(e) (doc. 30);

(3) DENIES as moot the motion to strike by the Poli & Ball

defendants (doc. 39);

(4) GRANTS the motion to dismiss by the Pite Duncan

defendants, but DENIES the alternative relief sought under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e)(doc. 42);

(5) DENIES as moot the motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) by the EMC defendants (doc. 45);

(6) GRANTS the motions to dismiss by the Ruyle defendants

(doc. 46) and by defendant David W. Huston (doc. 62); 

(7) DENIES as moot the cross-motion for summary judgment by

defendant David W. Huston (doc. 64);

(8) DENIES as moot the motion to strike by the Poli & Ball

defendants (doc. 65);

(9) GRANTS the motion to dismiss by defendant Bank of America

based upon lack of standing (doc. 67);

(10) DENIES as moot the motion for summary judgment by the NBI

defendants (doc. 71);

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(11) DENIES plaintiff’s motions to strike defendant (docs. 90;

91; 92; 92; 94; 95; and 96); 

(12) DENIES plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant Bank of

America’s motion to dismiss (doc. 97); and

(13) GRANTS plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint

within thirty (30) days of the entry date of this order. 

 DATED this 17th day of March, 2008.

Copies to all counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

Case 2:07-cv-00308-RCB Document 119 Filed 03/18/08 Page 19 of 19