Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02888/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02888-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

---

1 

Case No. 5:14-cv-02888-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

STEVEN ANDRE,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,

 Defendants. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

Case No. 5:14-cv-02888-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Re: Docket No. 55)

 

 Plaintiff Steven Andre moves for leave to add four additional claims by way of a Second 

Amended Complaint. Defendants Bank of America, N.A. and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

oppose, pointing to this court’s earlier order dismissing Andre’s First Amended Complaint. In that 

order, the court said that because leave had not been granted to add the same four additional 

claims, “Andre will not be permitted to assert them in any future pleading.”1 Because the Ninth 

Circuit’s interprets Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) so that a plaintiff’s right to amend his complaint is 

unrestricted until an answer is filed, Andre was in fact entitled to file his FAC with the four 

additional claims. To remedy this error, the Court GRANTS Andre’s motion for leave to amend. 

I.

Andre filed an initial complaint against Defendants Bank of America, N.A. and Select 

 

1

 Docket No. 54 at 4. 

Case 5:14-cv-02888-PSG Document 68 Filed 09/23/15 Page 1 of 5
2 

Case No. 5:14-cv-02888-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Portfolio Servicing, Inc. challenging Defendants’ lending practices as improper under a variety of 

legal theories.

2

 The court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint in its entirety 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), but allowed Andre leave to amend.3 Andre then filed a FAC that

included for the first time four additional causes of action for conversion, violation of the False 

Claims Act, fraud and conspiracy.4 Because Andre failed to oppose Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss, and the additional claims exceeded those originally pleaded, the court not only dismissed 

the FAC in its entirety but specifically dismissed the four claims with prejudice.

5

 At the same 

time, in light of Andre’s pro se status, the court once again granted leave to amend.6 

But rather than amend only as to those claims originally pleaded, as permitted, Andre filed 

this motion for leave to amend to include the exact same four claims that the court previously 

found procedurally barred.7

 In addition to arguing that these four claims remain procedurally 

barred,

8

 Defendants argue that further amendments would be futile and prejudicial and cause 

undue delay.9 

II.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. The parties 

further consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §636(c) 

and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). 

 

2 See Docket No. 1. 

3 See Docket No. 41. 

4 See Docket No. 42. 

5 See Docket No. 54. 

6 See id. at 4. 

7 See Docket No. 55. 

8 See Docket No. 57 at 1; see also Docket No. 58 at 1. 

9 See Docket No. 57 at 4-8; see also Docket No. 58 at 2. 

Case 5:14-cv-02888-PSG Document 68 Filed 09/23/15 Page 2 of 5
3 

Case No. 5:14-cv-02888-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

III.

 Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that “[a] party 

may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading 

is served . . . . Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by 

written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” 

Because Defendants have only moved to dismiss, and have not answered, this court must decide 

whether it had any authority to restrict Andre’s right to amend when it granted Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss original complaint and FAC. Reading the case law of the Ninth Circuit, it appears the 

answer is no. 

First, in Mayes v. Leipzinger, the Ninth Circuit held that “[a] motion to dismiss is not a 

‘responsive pleading’ within the meaning of the Rule. Neither the filing nor granting of such a 

motion before answer terminates the right to amend; an order of dismissal denying leave to amend 

at that stage is improper.”10 The court further explained: 

In Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. State of California, 623 F.2d 613, 616 (9th 

Cir.1980), we said that “a party may, as a matter of right, amend its complaint once 

before the filing of a ‘responsive pleading’ or the entry of final judgment following 

dismissal of its action.” In Worldwide Church, as here, no final judgment was 

entered. Similarly, in Nolen v. Fitzharris, 450 F.2d 958 (9th Cir.1971), defendants 

filed no responsive pleading prior to their motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim. The district court granted the motion to dismiss the action without leave to 

amend. After noting Rule 15(a) and the absence of responsive pleading, we stated: 

“In their memorandum briefs filed in the district court, plaintiffs indicated that they 

wished to file an amended complaint. It therefore appears that plaintiffs had the 

right to amend the complaint as a matter of course, which right was denied to them 

. . . .” Id. at 959.11

 

10 Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Breier v. N. Cal. Bowling 

Proprietors’ Ass’n, 316 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1963)). 

11 Id. at 607-608. While the Ninth Circuit’s approach appears to be in the minority, see United 

States v. Union Corp., 194 F.R.D. 223, 229-232 (E.D. Pa. 2000), this court is bound by it. 

Case 5:14-cv-02888-PSG Document 68 Filed 09/23/15 Page 3 of 5
4 

Case No. 5:14-cv-02888-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Second, even if Andre were not entitled to bring his new claims as a matter of right under 

Rule 15(a)(1), he would be entitled to seek leave to under Rule 15(a)(2).12 In particular, 

Defendants have not demonstrated that they will suffer undue prejudice if Andre is granted leave to 

amend. “Prejudice to the opposing party is the most important factor.”13 Defendants argue that 

allowing Andre to include the four additional claims will unfairly impose additional litigation costs

in that it will require Defendants’ counsel to expend unnecessary time and financial resources. 

This argument is undercut, however, by Defendants’ observation that these claims rely upon the 

same facts that were presented in the earlier complaints. Although these new claims raise the 

possibility of additional discovery, this possibility alone does not rise to the level of substantial 

prejudice.14

Defendants have not made a sufficiently strong showing on any of the remaining Foman

factors to overcome the presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.15 

Defendants argue that because these additional claims rely on facts previously known to Andre, 

there has been undue delay in bringing these claims. But Andre’s pro se status, even though he is 

 

12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) ([A] party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s 

written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”); 

see also Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (“This policy 

is to be applied with extreme liberality.”).

13 Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 

U.S. 178, 182 (1962)) (listing this factor among others to be considered). 

14 Cf. Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1388 (affirming the district court’s denial of leave to amend where the 

amendment would require the appellees to relitigate a portion of the case on entirely new legal 

theories). 

15 See Raifman v. Wachovia Securities, LLC, Case No. 11-cv-02885, 2012 WL 1611030, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. May 8, 2012) (citing Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 

(9th Cir. 1990)); see also Eminence Capital, LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052 (“Absent prejudice, or a strong 

showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in 

favor of granting leave to amend.”). 

Case 5:14-cv-02888-PSG Document 68 Filed 09/23/15 Page 4 of 5
Case 5:14-cv-02888-PSG Document 68 Filed 09/23/15 Page 5 of 5