Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05554/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05554-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 460
Nature of Suit: Deportation
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BYUNG HOON CHUNG, individually; DUK

BONG CHUNG, individually; MYUNG BIN

CHUNG, individually; KUO CHUL

CHUNG, individually; on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

MICHAEL MUKASEY, Attorney General

of the United States; DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY; MICHAEL

CHERTOFF, Secretary of DHS; and

DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

 

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Case No. 07-5554 SC

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss

("Motion") filed by the defendants Michael Mukasey, the Department

of Homeland Security, and Michael Chertoff (collectively the

"Government"). Docket No. 9. The plaintiffs Byung Hoon Chung,

Duk Bong Chung, Myung Bin Chung, and Kuo Chul Chung (collectively

"Plaintiffs") filed an Opposition and the Government submitted a

Reply. Docket Nos. 17, 19. For the following reasons, the

Government's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

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II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, a family, are natives and citizens of South

Korea. Byung Hoon Chung entered the United States with his wife

and children in 1992 on a tourist visa and subsequently obtained

alien registration cards ("green cards") for himself, his wife,

and their two children, thereby becoming legal permanent

residents. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, however, the green cards

they obtained had been fraudulently issued by Leland Sustaire,

who, at that time, was an employee of the Immigration and

Naturalization Service ("INS") and was using his government

position to sell fraudulent green cards. A detailed examination

of Sustaire's fraudulent scheme may be found in Shin v. Mukasey,

519 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 2008), and Hong v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d

1030, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Although Sustaire destroyed the government files relating to

those aliens to whom he had sold fraudulent green cards, he made

and kept for himself a list of those who had obtained unwarranted

changes in their status. See Hong, 518 F.3d at 1033. After the

Department of Justice began investigating Sustaire, he eventually

turned this list over to the prosecutors in an attempt to gain

leniency. Id. Plaintiffs were allegedly on this list and, as a

result, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE," formerly the

INA) placed Plaintiffs in removal proceedings. On April 20, 2005,

an Immigration Judge ("IJ"), following a hearing, ordered

Plaintiffs removed from the United States because Plaintiffs were

not in possession of valid documents that would allow them to

remain in the country. Olsen Decl., Docket No. 10, Ex. A, Oral

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Decision of IJ ("Removal Order"), at 4. 

The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed the IJ on

March 9, 2006. Id. Ex. B. Plaintiffs then filed a petition for

review in the Ninth Circuit. Oral argument was heard on June 15,

2007. Olsen Decl. Ex. C. After oral argument and while the case

was still pending before the Ninth Circuit, Plaintiffs, on

November 16, 2007, filed the present action in this Court. See

First Am. Compl. ("FAC"), Docket No. 3. Plaintiffs' FAC raised

essentially the same arguments that were raised in their petition

for review by the Ninth Circuit. In their FAC, Plaintiffs allege

that the Government should be prevented from removing Plaintiffs

because of equitable estoppel, unclean hands, and laches, and that

Plaintiffs' Due Process rights were violated. FAC ¶¶ 35-62. In

addition, Plaintiffs' FAC was drafted as a class action with

putative classes consisting of other aliens who unknowingly

purchased fraudulent green cards from Sustaire. Id. ¶ 28. 

On May 13, 2008, in an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit

denied Plaintiffs' petition. See Chung v. Mukasey, No. 06-71728,

2008 WL 2037715, at *1 (9th Cir. May 13, 2008) (unpublished). In

that decision, the Ninth Circuit specifically rejected Plaintiffs'

Due Process and estoppel claims. Id. The Government now moves to

dismiss Plaintiffs' action pending before this Court.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of

the complaint. Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate

if the plaintiff is unable to articulate "enough facts to state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). For purposes of such a

motion, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff and all properly pleaded factual allegations are

taken as true. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969);

Everest & Jennings, Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226,

228 (9th Cir. 1994). All reasonable inferences are to be drawn in

favor of the plaintiff. Id. Unreasonable inferences or

conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual

allegations, however, are insufficient to defeat a motion to

dismiss. W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.

1981).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. REAL ID Act of 2005

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs' action in this Court is

barred by the REAL ID Act of 2005 ("the Act"), Pub. L. No. 109-13,

Div. B., 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005). The Act eliminated

district court review of removal orders and vested jurisdiction

for such review exclusively in the courts of appeals. See

Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2005)

(stating "under the new judicial review regime imposed by the Act,

a petition for review [in the courts of appeals] is now the

exclusive means for challenging final removal orders by the BIA .

. ."). 

B. Ninth Circuit Has Already Adjudicated Plaintiffs' Claims

Even if this Court were to have jurisdiction to entertain

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Plaintiffs' action, it would be precluded from doing so, as the

Ninth Circuit has already adjudicated these claims. See Chung,

2008 WL 2037715, at *1 (stating "[b]ecause the finding of

removability was based on sufficient evidence, and because the

Chungs allege no other basis for a due process violation, their

argument that the immigration court may be estopped from

deportation for violations of due process . . . fails" and their

"argument that the government should be equitably estopped from

pursuing their removal is equally unavailing") (internal quotation

marks omitted). Although Plaintiffs' FAC included claims for

unclean hands and laches, these claims are merely repetitions of

Plaintiffs' claims for due process violations and estoppel, and

are therefore also barred by the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Chung.

Plaintiffs alerted this Court to the fact that a petition for

rehearing en banc has been filed in Chung. Contrary to

Plaintiffs' assertion, however, the fact that a petition for

rehearing has been filed does not alter the precedential value of

a decision that has not been withdrawn.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 21, 2008 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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