Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01138/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01138-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KRISTEN BROWNE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-1138-EFB 

ORDER 

 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title 

XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For 

the reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s motion is granted, the Commissioner’s motion is denied, 

and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI on November 9, 2010, alleging that she 

had been disabled since November 15, 2009. Administrative Record (“AR”) 79, 151-159. Her 

application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 99-102, 106-110. On November 

13, 2012, a hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Amita Tracy. Id. at 35-70. 

Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, at which she and a vocational expert (“VE”) 

testified. Id. 

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On November 28, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled 

under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.1 Id. at 21-30. The ALJ made the following specific 

findings: 

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity (SGA) since November 9, 

2010, the protective filing date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.). 

* * * 

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: crushed disc and neck surgery 

performed on October 15, 2009 (Exhibit 1F/19-21); cervical myopathy; cholecystectomy 

performed on December 8, 2010 (Exhibit 3F/8-9); affective disorder (Exhibit 7F, 8F, 14F, 

15F/8); degenerative disc disease (DDD) of the cervical spine (Exhibit 5f, 11f); irritable 

bowel syndrome (IBS); and obesity (height: 5’2” and weight: 226 pounds, based on 

 1

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

 Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

 Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

 Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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testimony) (20 CFR 416.920(c)). 

* * * 

3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). 

* * * 

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds the claimant has the 

residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) 

except with the ability to do occasional overhead reaching bilaterally; and simple, routine, 

repetitive tasks. 

* * * 

5. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965). 

* * * 

6. The claimant was born on April 10, 1965 and was 45 years old, which is defined as a 

younger individual age 18-49, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963). 

7. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 

416.964). 

8. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using 

the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not 

disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the 

claimant can performed (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)). 

* * * 

10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since 

November 9, 2010, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)). 

Id. at 23-30. 

Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review of the ALJ’s decision was denied on April 

3, 2014, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-6. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel,

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by (1) rejecting the opinions of 

her treating physicians; (2) discrediting plaintiff’s testimony without clear and convincing 

reasons; (3) rejecting third-party statements without sufficient reasons; (4) failing to properly 

assess plaintiff’s RFC; and (5) failing to pose a hypothetical question to the VE that included all 

of her impairments. ECF No. 15 at 7-24. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting the 

opinions from Drs. Alexander and Tarasenko, her treating physicians. ECF No. 15 at 15-18. The 

weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by treating, 

examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a greater 

opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1295 (9th Cir. 1996). To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in 

addition to considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in 

the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted 

opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional 

may be rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. 

Id. at 830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

However, “[w]hen an examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a treating 

physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the examining physician 

are not ‘substantial evidence.’” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dr. Marsha Alexander, M.D., one of plaintiff’s treating physicians, completed a chronic 

pain residual functional capacity questionnaire. AR 425-28. Dr. Alexander diagnosed plaintiff 

with degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, post traumatic stress disorder, and shoulder 

pain, and indicated a poor prognosis. Id. at 425. It was her opinion that plaintiff could sit for 30 

minutes at one time; sit for a total of less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; stand for 1 hour at a 

time; stand/walk for about 4 hours in an 8-hour workday; would need to walk every 30 minutes 

for approximately 15 minutes, and would need to lie down 2-3 times in an 8-hour workday. Id. at 

426-427. She further opined that plaintiff could frequently lift and carry less than 10 pounds and 

occasionally lift 10 pounds; rarely twist, stoop, bend, crouch, and squat; never climb ladders; and 

reach, handle, and finger for 20 percent of the time during an 8-hour workday. Id. at 427. She 

also concluded that plaintiff would miss more than four days per month as a result of her 

impairments. Id. at 428. Dr. Alexander stated that the earliest date the medical records support 

these limitations was 2008. Id. 

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Dr. Alexander referred plaintiff to Dr. Valery Tarasenko, M.D., a pain management 

specialist. Id. at 492-519. Dr. Tarasenko diagnosed plaintiff with cervical post laminectomy 

syndrome, chronic neck pain and headaches. Id. at 521. She opined that plaintiff could sit for 20 

minutes at a time and for about 4 hours in an 8-hour day, stand for 20 minutes at one time and 

stand/walk for about 4 hours in an 8-hour workday; would need to walk every 20 minutes for a 10 

minute period; and would need to lie down 2-3 times in an 8-hour workday. Id. at 522. She 

further opined that plaintiff could rarely lift 10 pounds; never twist or climb ladders; and rarely 

stoop, bend, crouch, squat, or climb stairs. Id. at 522-523 Dr. Tarasenko also concluded that 

plaintiff did not have any limitations in reaching, handling, or fingering, and that plaintiff would 

miss about 4 days a month due to her impairments. Id. at 523. 

The record also contains an opinion by Dr. Bill Payne, M.D., a nonexamining physician. 

AR 72-78. Dr. Payne opined that plaintiff could lift 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds 

occasionally; stand, walk and sit for about 6-hours in an 8-hour workday, and push and pull 

without limitation. Id. at 71-72. He further opined that plaintiff was limited to occasionally 

reaching overhead. Id. at 74. 

In assessing plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ gave “little weight” to the opinions of plaintiff’s 

treating physicians, while adopting the physical limitations assessed by Dr. Payne. Id. at 28. As 

Drs. Alexander and Tarasenko’s opinions were contradicted by Dr. Payne’s opinion, the ALJ was 

required to give “specific and legitimate” reasons for rejecting their treating opinions. See Orn, 

495 F.3d at 632. Giving little weight to Dr. Alexander’s opinion, the ALJ pointed to what he 

described as an inconsistency between Dr. Alexander’s 2012 RFC assessment, which opined that 

plaintiff was experiencing her limitations since 2008, and her February 2011 Solano County 

disability report in which he estimated that plaintiff would be able to return to work by August 1, 

2011. AR 28. While an ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion that is inconsistent with 

other medical evidence, including the physician’s own treatment notes, Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 

F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008), it is not clear that Dr. Alexander’s statements are necessarily 

inconsistent. While the 2011 statement was an estimate of a return to work date, it was not a 

definite medical finding that plaintiff was in fact able to do so on that date. In both documents, 

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Dr. Alexander indicated that plaintiff suffered from debilitating impairments dating back to 2008. 

Although she estimated in the disability report that plaintiff would be able to return to work in 

August 2011, six months after she completed the report, there is no indication from the record 

that plaintiff’s impairments did in fact improve over this six month period. Thus, the evidence 

suggests that Dr. Alexander was simply incorrect in her estimated projection that plaintiff’s 

impairments would sufficiently improve over the course of six months to allow plaintiff to return 

to work in August 2011. There does not appear to be evidence in the record of any subsequent 

examinations or findings to suggest that her 2012 opinion that plaintiff has continuously suffered 

from debilitating impairments since 2008 was, in fact, erroneous. While the issue presents a close 

question here,2 the court need not resolve it at this point. As noted below, the case must be 

remanded for other reasons. 

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 

Dr. Tarasenko’s opinion. ECF No. 15 at 17-18. The ALJ provided the following explanation for 

his treatment of Dr. Tarasenko’s opinion: “This opinion is given little weight, as it is not 

consistent with the evidence.” AR 28. This conclusory statement falls short of satisfying the 

specific and legitimate standard. An ALJ may satisfy his burden of providing specific and 

legitimate reasons for rejecting a contradicted medical opinion “by setting out a detailed and 

thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, 

and making findings.” Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (1988). As explained by the Ninth 

Circuit: 

To say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient 

objective findings does not achieve the level of specificity our prior 

cases have required even when the objective factors are listed 

seriatim. The ALJ must do more than offer his own conclusions. He 

must set forth his own interpretation and explain why he, rather 

than the doctors, are correct. 

Regenniter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 2

 As argued by the Commissioner, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Morgan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 595 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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Here, the ALJ offered only his conclusion that Dr. Tarasenko’s opinion is inconsistent 

with the evidence of record, but fails to specifically identify any portions of the record that are 

inconsistent with his opinion. The ALJ did not set forth her interpretation of the evidence and 

explain why such evidence undermines Dr. Tarasenko’s opinion. The ALJ’s conclusory 

dismissal of Dr. Tarasenko’s opinion does not constitute a specific and legitimate reason for 

rejecting her opinion. 

Accordingly, the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons, supported by 

substantial evidence, for rejecting Dr. Tarasenko’s treating opinion. Therefore, the matter must 

be remanded for further consideration.3 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 3. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order; and 

 4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. 

DATED: September 29, 2015. 

 3

 Because the court finds that remand is necessary for further consideration of the medical 

evidence, the court declines to address plaintiff’s additional arguments. 

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