Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00826/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00826-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN L. WHITWORTH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-05-0826 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

REMANDING STATE LAW CLAIMS;

VACATING HEARING

Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment, filed March 24, 2006 on

behalf of defendants Regents of the University of California, Isabel Hawkins, Ralph

Anderson, and Carol Lunsford, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Plaintiff John L. Whitworth has filed opposition, to which defendants have replied. Having

considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court deems

the matter suitable for decision on the papers submitted, VACATES the hearing scheduled

for May 12, 2006, and rules as follows.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 provides that a court may grant summary judgment “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

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is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The Supreme Court’s 1986 “trilogy” of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986),

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), requires that a party seeking summary

judgment show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the moving party

has done so, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’

designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See Celotex, 477

U.S. at 324 (quoting Rule 56(c)). “When the moving party has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “If the evidence is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). When determining whether there is a

genuine issue for trial, “‘inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.’” See Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Claim

In his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully

terminated by the University of California (“University”). The SAC includes one federal

claim, specifically, the Sixth Cause of Action, by which plaintiff alleges a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the three individual defendants, whom he states violated his

“constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,” (see SAC ¶ 57), by depriving him

of procedural due process in the manner in which he was terminated, specifically, by failing

to provide him, prior to termination, with notice of the grounds for his termination and an

opportunity to contest such grounds, (see SAC ¶¶ 32, 56).

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of

interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” 

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Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Defendants argue, inter alia, that the

individual defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Sixth Cause of Action

because plaintiff lacks evidence to prove he had a property interest in his employment with

the University and because plaintiff lacks evidence to prove the individual defendants made

any type of public disclosure that would implicate plaintiff’s liberty interests.

A. Property

Plaintiff argues he had a property interest in his employment with the University. “A

person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process purposes if there are

such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the

benefit and that he may invoke a hearing.” Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). 

Such rules or mutually explicit understandings can be created by language in a statute or

by an express or implied contract. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976).

For example, where a state statute provided that a teacher “shall initially be

employed on probation” and that such employment “shall be permanent, during efficiency

and good behavior after 4 years of continuous service,” see Roth, 408 U.S. at 566 n.2, and

an administrative rule provided that “[d]uring the time a faculty member is on probation, no

reason for non-retention need be given,” see id. at 567 n.4, a probationary teacher who

was not retained had “no possible claim of entitlement to re-employment” in light of such

statute and rule, and, consequently, no property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment,

see id. at 577-78. By contrast, if a university lacking an “explicit tenure system” has

“created such a system in practice,” a plaintiff may be able to establish a “legitimate claim

to entitlement to continued employment” under an implied contract theory in light of the

practice. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 602.

Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff was hired by the University on January 7, 2002 as

a “regular/career” employee, and that he was terminated on June 30, 2002, less than six

months thereafter. (See Poole Decl. Ex. D.) It is further undisputed that the terms of

plaintiff’s employment with the University were governed by a collective bargaining

agreement (“CBA”), which includes a provision that “[e]mployees in career appointments

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Moreover, the “understanding” set forth in plaintiff’s declaration is contradicted by

plaintiff’s earlier deposition testimony, in which, in response to the question, “During the six

or so month arrangement you had with [the University], you understood you were a

probationary employee; correct?,” he answered, “Yes.” (See Nguyen Decl. Ex. A at

178:15-18.)

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shall serve a probationary period of six (6) calendar months,” and that “[p]rior to the

completion of the probationary period, an employee may be released at the discretion of

the University, and without recourse to the Grievance or Arbitration Procedure[s] of [the

CBA].” (See Whitworth Decl. Ex. A, Art. 28.A.) In short, the CBA unambiguously provides

that a probationary employee has no right or expectation to continuing employment within

the six-month probationary period. Consequently, in the absence of a statute,

administrative rule, or some other agreement, express or implied, between plaintiff and the

University, plaintiff is unable to establish a due process deprivation claim predicated on the

loss of a property interest in his continued employment. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 602; Roth,

408 U.S. at 578.

In opposing summary judgment, Whitworth relies on his declaration, in which he

states he had an “understanding” that he had completed his probationary period after

having been employed only three months because, at the end of three-month period, he

received a positive review and was, in his words, “promoted” when he was given additional

tasks to perform. (See Whitworth Decl. ¶ 9.) To show the existence of a cognizable

property interest in continued employment, however, a plaintiff “must have more than a

unilateral expectation of it”; rather, such plaintiff must establish a “legitimate claim of

entitlement to it.” See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Here, plaintiff offers no evidence to support a

finding that he and the University had an express or implied agreement under which he

would not be subject to the CBA’s six-month probationary provision; plaintiff relies solely on

his subjective belief that he was not bound by the CBA. Such “unilateral expectation” is, as

a matter of law, insufficient to support a finding that plaintiff had a property interest in

continued employment with the University. See id.

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Plaintiff further relies on provisions in the CBA that provide covered employees with

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Similarly, plaintiff’s reliance on a CBA provision requiring the University to “treat

members of the bargaining unit with dignity and respect in all transactions,” (see Whitworth

Decl. Ex. A, Art. 31), is unavailing in light of the CBA’s unambiguous provision that

probationary employees may be terminated at the discretion of the University.

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a procedural right to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to imposition of certain

discipline, including termination. (See Whitworth Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A, Art. 4.) Such provisions,

however, are found in a section of the CBA addressing the circumstances under which the

University may “discipline or dismiss a non-probationary career employee,” (see id. Ex. A,

Art. 4.A.) (emphasis added), and, consequently, are inapplicable to plaintiff. In any event, a

“substantive property right cannot exist exclusively by virtue of a procedural right.” See

Dorr v. County of Butte, 795 F. 2d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1986). Consequently, even assuming,

arguendo, the CBA could be interpreted as affording probationary employees both pretermination notice and an opportunity to be heard, such procedural rights do not create a

federal property interest in continued employment, given the CBA’s unambiguous provision

that probationary employees may be terminated at the University’s discretion. See id. at

878 (holding where rules governing probationary employee’s employment provided for right

to appeal disciplinary action, such procedural right did “not give rise to a protected property

interest” where rules also provided that probationary employees “served at the will of the

[employer]” ).2

Accordingly, the Court finds the individual defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on the Sixth Cause of Action, to the extent such claim is based on deprivation of

a property right.

B. Liberty

Plaintiff argues the University terminated him because Darlene Park (“Park”) had

accused him, falsely, of sexual harassment, and that termination on such ground implicated

his liberty interests, because defendants were responsible for Park’s accusation

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Defendants deny that Park ever advised defendants that plaintiff had sexually

harassed her, and deny that the decision to terminate plaintiff was based on Park’s having

made such a charge. The issue before the Court, however, is whether the individual

defendants publicly reported that Park had accused plaintiff of sexual harassment, not

whether Park actually had made such a charge or whether such a charge, if made, was or

was not the basis for the termination. Moreover, factual disputes cannot be resolved in the

context of a motion for summary judgment.

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Because the Court finds the statements identified by plaintiff are insufficient to

support a finding that any individual defendant made a public disclosure, the Court does not

consider defendants’ evidentiary objections to certain of the statements.

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becoming public, thus damaging his reputation.3

“[W]here a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of

what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” 

Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. Thus, “a plaintiff’s liberty interest is implicated [ ] when the state

makes a charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in

his community.” Llamas v. Butte Community College Dist., 238 F. 3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir.

2001) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Without a disclosure that is public,”

however, “there is no violation of due process as the reasons stated to him in private would

have no different impact on his reputation than if they had been true.” See id. at 1129.

In an attempt to prove a public disclosure, plaintiff offers evidence of six instances in

which, he asserts, Park’s charge was publicized. (See Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Support of

Opp. at 20:20-21:17.) The Court finds, however, that plaintiff has failed to offer any

evidence to support a finding that any of the statements identified by plaintiff can be

attributed to one or more of the individual defendants.4

First, plaintiff offers evidence that approximately one month before his termination,

Park told him that she had spoken to her “roommates” about actions by Whitworth she

considered to be harassing in nature. (See Whitworth Decl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff offers no

evidence, however, by which a reasonable trier of fact could find Park’s statements to her

roommates are attributable to any individual defendant.

Second, plaintiff offers evidence that Michael Gomez (“Gomez”), a co-worker, told

plaintiff six days before plaintiff was terminated that it was “common knowledge in the

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Lewis denies having made any such statement. As noted, however, for purposes of

the instant motion, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party.

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Plaintiff also fails to offer any authority for the proposition that when a terminated

employee’s chosen representative requests that a representative of the employer disclose

in a private meeting the reasons for the termination, the response is considered a public

disclosure for purposes of a federal due process deprivation analysis.

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department” that Park had accused plaintiff of sexual harassment. (See id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff

offers no evidence, however, to support a finding that any individual defendant told Gomez

or any of plaintiff’s other co-workers that Park had made such an accusation.

Third, plaintiff offers evidence that during a meeting held shortly after plaintiff’s

termination, which meeting was attended by plaintiff, plaintiff’s union steward Nick Slater

(“Slater), and Howard Lewis (“Lewis”), a Senior Labor Relations Specialist representing the

University, plaintiff and Slater asked Lewis to provide the reasons for the termination, at

which time Lewis stated that Park had accused plaintiff of sexual harassment. (See id.

¶ 18.)5 Plaintiff fails to offer any evidence, however, to support a finding that any individual

defendant directed Lewis to make a public statement to Slater or to any other third party, or

otherwise had any involvement in Lewis’s making a statement to Slater, such that a

statement by Lewis could be attributed to an individual defendant.6

Fourth, plaintiff relies on a September 16, 2002 letter from Lewis to Slater, in which 

Lewis responds to questions posed by Slater about the termination. (See Poore Decl. Ex.

E.) According to plaintiff, the letter can be interpreted as including a statement by Lewis to

Slater that one reason for the termination was that Park had accused plaintiff of sexual

harassment; plaintiff fails to point to any language that reasonably can be interpreted in

such a manner. Rather, the letter, to the extent it touches upon a charge of sexual

harassment, explicitly states that Park had not accused plaintiff of sexual harassment and

that the University had not characterized any of plaintiff’s interactions with Park as

harassment. (See id.)

Fifth, plaintiff argues that because the above-referenced letter from Lewis to Slater

was placed in the University’s “Grievance File,” (see id. ¶ 6), such placement constitutes a

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The Ninth Circuit, while recognizing a “circuit split” as to the issue, has not had

occasion to consider whether an employer’s “maintaining stigmatizing information in its

personnel files” can constitute the requisite public disclosure. See Llamas, 238 F. 3d at

1130. Defendants offer evidence that the September 16, 2002 letter is not contained in

plaintiff’s “personnel file,” (see Supp. Jones Decl. ¶ 8), which might suggest some

distinction exists between plaintiff’s “personnel file” and the “Grievance File” referenced by

plaintiff. In any event, given that the “Grievance File” does not contain a statement that

plaintiff was accused of sexual harassment and/or that he was terminated on account of

such an accusation, this Court will not further address the issue.

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separate public disclosure. Plaintiff offers no evidence, however, that the “grievance file” is

accessible to the public,7

 and, in any event, as discussed above, the letter cannot fairly be

interpreted as including a statement that plaintiff was accused of sexually harassing Park.

Sixth, and lastly, plaintiff argues that “the doctrine of republication applies because

plaintiff has been compelled to explain his termination to numerous potential employers.” 

(See Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Opp. at 21:13-15). This argument fails, for want of

both evidentiary and legal support. The only evidence offered pertaining to prospective

employers is plaintiff’s declaration that some potential employers “found out” he had been

terminated by the University, (see Whitworth Decl. ¶ 34); plaintiff offers no evidence that he

has been compelled to disclose the fact of the termination to any potential employer, let

alone compelled to disclose that he was terminated because of a charge of sexual

harassment. Moreover, even if such evidence had been offered, such “self-publication”

cannot, as a matter of law, constitute the requisite public disclosure. See Llamas, 238 F.

3d at 1130-31 (holding evidence that plaintiff, in response to questions on job application

forms, advised potential employers he had been terminated on account of cheating

insufficient to satisfy public disclosure requirement).

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In light of the Court’s finding that plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence to show

the individual defendants deprived plaintiff of a federally-protected property or liberty

interest, the Court does not reach defendants’ alternative arguments that the individual

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and that the Sixth Cause of Action is barred by

the statute of limitations.

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Accordingly, the Court finds the individual defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on the Sixth Cause of Action, to the extent such claim is based on deprivation of

liberty.8

II. State Law Claims

The Court’s jurisdiction over the instant action is based on the existence of a federal

question, (see Notice of Removal ¶ 5), and, consequently, the Court’s jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s state law claims is supplemental in nature, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where “the district

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). Where, as here, a district court has granted summary judgment on the sole

federal claim, the district court, pursuant to § 1367(c)(3), may properly decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. See Bryant v. Adventist

Health System/West, 289 F. 3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED as to the Sixth

Cause of Action; in all other respects, the motion is DENIED without prejudice.

2. Whitworth’s state law claims are hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of

California, in and for the County of Alameda.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 10, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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