Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00347/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00347-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARENCE EUGENE KIBLER,

Petitioner,

 v.

RICHARD KIRKLAND, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-0347 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his

conviction for felony murder (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 187, 190.2(a)(17)) and personally discharging a

firearm during the commission of the offense (Cal. Pen. Code § 12022.53(c), (d)). With

enhancements for his prior convictions, Petitioner was sentenced to prison for life without the

possibility of parole, a consecutive twenty-five years-to-life term, and a consecutive four-year term. 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, and the California Supreme Court denied a

petition for review. As grounds for federal habeas relief, Petitioner asserts that (1) the trial court

erred in admitting Petitioner’s statement to the police in violation of his right to counsel and

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996), and (2) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony

on robbery modus operandi evidence. This Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the

petition should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer and accompanying memorandum of

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

The relevant factual background is taken from the unpublished opinion of the California Court

of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, People v. Clarence Eugene Kibler, No. H024455 (December 4,

2003); Resp’t Ex. A at 3-13.

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points and authorities addressing the merits of the petition, and Petitioner filed a traverse. After

reviewing the papers, this Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the claims

presented and will deny the petition.

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner and his girlfriend, Mieko Leggett, were charged with the murder of a Shell gas

station attendant, Garinder Singh, while engaged in the commission of a robbery. Petitioner also

was charged with discharging a firearm during the commission of the offense. Both Petitioner and

Leggett pled not guilty.

At a pre-trial hearing on February 11, 2002, the prosecutor sought to introduce a tape

recording of Petitioner’s conversation with the police, in which Petitioner denied committing the

crime and claimed that he had no idea what the police were talking about. The prosecutor pointed

out that prior to being advised of his Miranda rights, Petitioner made reference to an attorney, was

immediately advised of his rights, and then agreed to talk. The prosecutor did not believe

Petitioner’s initial reference to an attorney was an invocation of his right to counsel. Defense

counsel asked that the trial court review that portion of the transcript to determine whether

Petitioner’s reference to an attorney was an invocation of his right to counsel and if his subsequent

statements should be suppressed.

Immediately following Petitioner’s arrest on July 25, 2000, the following conversation

ensued between Petitioner and Sergeant Ponte and Lieutenant Trejo from the San Jose Police

Department:

Trejo: I’m sorry it took us a little while to get to talk to you. But, you know, we had to do

a few things first. We want to talk about a caper we are working.

Kibler: Uh-hum (affirmative).

Trejo: But before we do that, I mean you’ve been around, you know how it works.

Kibler: Well I knew something was [inaudible] when they snatched up all my clothes and 

everything. Like I say I don’t really know what’s going on with that [inaudible].

Trejo: I understand, but what I have to do, you know what the procedure is. We have to 

read you the . . .

Kibler: Oh yeah, the Miranda rights and all that.

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Trejo: So before we can continue we want to hear what you have to say, but first let me do 

this. Alright. Then maybe we can talk and see what . . .

Kibler: If I’m going to jail on anything, I want to have my attorney present before I start 

speaking about whatever it is you guys are talking about. I don’t mean to sound

like an asshole or anything. I’m not trying to be an asshole. I really would like my

attorney if I’m going to be questioned because I don’t really know what’s going on. 

I don’t even have a clue.

Ponte: Well that’s what we are trying to figure out. That’s what we are trying to figure out. 

That’s why we wanted to ask you a couple of questions. 

Kibler: I have no problem with you guys questioning me. I swear to God I don’t. I just, if 

I’m going to jail, I just want my attorney around before I answer any questions. 

Ponte: Well, 

Kibler: Because nobody told me nothing.

Ponte: Well, that’s what we are trying to do. If we could talk to you and tell you.

Trejo: Clarence, we can’t continue on. You know. What I’d like to do is read the card to 

you. Then you can make a decision.

Kibler: I know that’s standard procedure.

Ponte: Yeah! We haven’t asked you anything yet.

Kibler: Alright, But, okay.

Trejo: Alright?

Kibler: Alright.

Trejo: You’ve been around.

Kibler: Yeah. Alright.

Trejo: And then you can reach a decision at that point. Alright.

Kibler: Alright.

Trejo: You have the right to remain silent. Do you understand?

Kibler: Yeah.

Trejo: Anything you say may be used against you in court. Do you understand?

Kibler: Yeah. 

Trejo: You have the right to the presence of an attorney before and during any questioning. 

Do you understand?

Kibler: Yes.

Trejo: If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you free of charge, before

any questioning if you want. Do you understand that?

Kibler: Yes.

Trejo: Okay. Now do you want to go ahead and talk to me? 

Kibler: Yeah I’ll talk to you. 

Trejo: Alright.

Kibler: Because I want to know what’s going on.

Petitioner did not testify at trial. Leggett testified that both she and Petitioner sold drugs, but

that only she actually used drugs – a habit she hid from Petitioner and supported by prostitution. 

Leggett testified as follows: On July 24, 2000, at about 11:30 p.m., Leggett drove her mother’s Ford

Tempo to the Shell gas station at White and Aborn to buy a lighter on sale and smoke crack in the

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bathroom. She walked up to the cashier’s window, bought the lighter, and asked for the key to the

bathroom. Singh indicated that the key was in the pass-through drawer. Singh began to flirt with

Leggett. Leggett agreed that she would orally copulate Singh for money. Singh asked her to come

back between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. when business was slow. Leggett took the bathroom key and went

into the bathroom to smoke crack and a cigarette. Then she drove home. As she was leaving home

to meet Singh, Leggett told Petitioner that she was going out to sell crack to a customer. Petitioner

wanted to go with her. They argued over whether she was really going to make a drug deal or meet

somebody. Leggett agreed to allow Petitioner to accompany her, as long as he waited out of sight

while she made the deal.

Leggett drove her mother’s Ford Tempo to the Kentucky Fried Chicken next door to the

Shell station. Petitioner got out of the car. Leggett told him to wait and that she would return in five

minutes. Leggett drove to the Shell station and parked the car next to the pump in front of the

cashier window. She walked to the window and saw Singh helping another customer who purchased

cigarettes and left. Singh came out to meet her. Leggett was surprised when Singh came out. She

expected to have sex in the back office. Singh led Leggett to the bathroom. He unlocked the door

with a key from his key ring. Leggett followed him into the bathroom. They negotiated for two to

four minutes for Leggett to take off her blouse so Singh could touch her. Leggett took off her top

and Singh touched her for about thirty seconds. The bathroom door opened quickly and Petitioner

entered the bathroom. Leggett grabbed her top off the sink and knocked over her bag. In the bag

were her cigarettes, drug paraphernalia, receipts, and mace that she carried to protect herself.

Petitioner struck Singh in the face several times as they moved around the bathroom. Singh

fell forward on the faucet. Repeatedly, Leggett called out for Petitioner to stop. She tried to stay out

of the way, picked up her mace from the floor, and sprayed it in Petitioner’s direction to try to stop

the attack. Petitioner left the bathroom, then returned and angrily demanded to know what was

going on. He kicked Singh to the floor. Leggett moved away, fearful for her own safety. She was

afraid to leave the bathroom because Petitioner had threatened that if she ever left him, he would kill

her. Petitioner jerked Singh around and tied him up. Petitioner then pulled out a gun and shot

Singh.

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Leggett left the bathroom and waited in the car. She then walked to the cashier’s window

where she saw Petitioner trying to open the cash register. Leggett waived and yelled for Petitioner

to leave the cashier’s booth. They got into the car and Leggett drove away. She did not see

Petitioner in possession of any stolen items. Petitioner and Leggett stopped at a Chevron gas station

where Petitioner pumped gas, but did not go to the attendant to pay. He used a credit card. 

Petitioner got back into the car and Leggett saw that he had a wallet that did not belong to him. 

Leggett asked what he was doing with the wallet. Petitioner told her that he had taken it from Singh. 

Leggett asked if Singh was dead, but Petitioner said he did not know. Later that morning, they

stayed at a Motel 6.

In rebuttal, Sergeant Ponte, an expert in the modus operandi of robberies, testified that there

are many methods used to rob a gas station attendant. One of the more typical ways is for a female

to lure the attendant out of the cash register area with an offer of sex or a request for help with a car. 

Once the attendant comes out, the female’s partner overpowers and robs the attendant.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), governing the scope of federal habeas corpus

proceedings filed after April 24, 1996, prevents a federal court from granting habeas relief with

respect to a state court proceeding unless the state court’s ruling was “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or reaches a different conclusion based

on facts materially indistinguishable from those of a Supreme Court case. Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry

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should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. The “objectively unreasonable” standard does not equate to “clear error”

because “[t]hese two standards . . . are not the same. The gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003).

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s adjudication of

the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This Court

must presume any determination of a factual issue made by the state court to be reasonable and

correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

B. Analysis of Petitioner’s Legal Claims

1. The Trial Court’s Failure to Suppress Petitioner’s Statements to the Police

Petitioner alleges that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting his statements

made to the police after he invoked his right to counsel. He claims that although he did not admit

any involvement with either the robbery or Singh’s murder, his comments were used to undercut his

credibility and dispute his manslaughter defense.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that a suspect subjected

to custodial interrogation must first be advised that he has the right to remain silent, that statements

made can be used against him, that he has the right to counsel, and that he has the right to have

counsel appointed. These warnings must precede any custodial interrogation, which occurs

whenever law enforcement officers question a person after taking that person into custody or

otherwise significantly depriving a person of freedom of action. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 

“Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express

questioning or its functional equivalent . . . [including] words or actions on the part of the police

(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446

U.S. 291, 301 (1980). If the suspect indicates a request for counsel, “the interrogation must cease

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until an attorney is present.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). However, the rule that

interrogation must cease because the suspect requested counsel does not apply if the request is

equivocal or ambiguous. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). A statement concerning

an attorney made before interrogation begins is far less likely to be a request for attorney assistance

during interrogation than a similar statement made during custodial interrogation. See United States

v. Doe, 170 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir.1999). Habeas relief is appropriate where (1) the statement

was admitted in violation of Miranda and (2) that admission “‘had a substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

Initially, the state appellate court reviewed whether Petitioner’s initial statement regarding

counsel was an invocation of his right to counsel pursuant to Miranda. The appellate court analyzed

this question in light of the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Rhode Island v.

Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, considering whether the suspect is subjected to words or actions on the part

of the police which are “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response:”

[T]he special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where

a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subject

to interrogation. ‘Interrogation,’ as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must

reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.

Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected

to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term

‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any

words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest

and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses

primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This

focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in

custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without

regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the

police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a

suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held

accountable for the unforeseeably results of their words of [sic] actions, the definition

of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of the police officers

that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

Resp’t Ex. A at 15-16, quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-02 (fns. omitted). The

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appellate court noted that Petitioner “had made his initial request for an attorney before interrogation

had begun and before Miranda advisements were given. Up until then, there was no express

questioning of [Petitioner] about the case. The procedural statements that Officer Trejo made

invited no response from [Petitioner] concerning the case. They were ‘those normally attendant to

arrest and custody.’” Resp’t Ex. A at 16. The appellate court concluded that before Miranda

advisements were issued, “[n]othing that the officers said or did was reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response from [Petitioner].” Id.

Next, the state appellate court determined whether Petitioner knowingly and intelligently

waived his right to counsel after being advised of his Miranda rights. The appellate court relied on

the California Supreme Court’s ruling in People v. Bradford, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1036 (1997) noting,

“[o]nce it is deter

mined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he

could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his

statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of

law.” Resp’t Ex. A at 16. In the instant case, the state appellate court found no Miranda violation,

stating:

There is evidence that at the time when [the police] were questioning

[Petitioner], he was fully aware of the [sic] both the nature of the right being

abandoned and the consequences of his decision to abandon it. [Petitioner] indicated

that he knew about Miranda advisements. In addition . . . he attempted to invoke his

right to counsel before he was even given the advisements. It is inconceivable that

the reading of [Petitioner’s] Miranda rights could have caused him to forget the

rights of which he had just been advised and had just tried to assert. 

[Petitioner] contends that [the police] coerced him into speaking without an

attorney present. On the record before us, we find no indication of coercion.

[Petitioner] was the one that continued the conversation while [the police] tried to

give Miranda advisements. In fact, [Petitioner] interrupted [the police] after [the

police] stated that before they could continue, he had to read the Miranda

advisements. Accordingly, we find that there was no Miranda violation in this case.

Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting [Petitioner’s] statements to [the police].

Resp’t Ex. A at 16-17 (fn. omitted). Once the Miranda rights were given, Petitioner “stated that he

would talk to the officers because he ‘want[ed] to know what [was] going on.’ Thereafter, he did

not invoke his right to counsel.” Id. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to establish that his statements

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made to the police were admitted in violation of Miranda.

Moreover, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the trial court’s admission of Petitioner’s

statements “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 654. The appellate court noted that throughout his interview with the police,

Petitioner “did not admit any involvement with either a robbery or Mr. Singh’s murder. 

Furthermore he denied that he was the man on the video.” Resp’t Ex. A at 13. Petitioner fails to

establish how the admission of his statements resulted in any prejudice. Throughout the entire

questioning by police, Petitioner never made any admission or confession, and in fact steadfastly

maintained his innocence with respect to the robbery-murder. Because Petitioner did not testify at

trial, there was no testimony or credibility issue for the jury to evaluate. The entire manslaughter

defense was presented through Petitioner’s co-defendant, Leggett, leaving her to suffer any

challenge to her credibility based on her statements to police. 

Additionally, the evidence at trial of the events leading to Singh’s death is entirely

inconsistent with Petitioner’s heat of passion manslaughter defense, as demonstrated by the fact that

Petitioner wore a single glove on his shooting hand, bound the victim with electrical wire, and

gagged him with toilet paper. Resp’t Exs. E1 (Reporter’s Transcript “RT”) at 113-118, 127, 131,

134, 150-51, 155; E2 at 287. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the state appellate court’s

determination was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme

Court precedent, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1), (2).

2. The Trial Court’s Admission of Robbery Modus Operandi Evidence in Rebuttal

Next, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in admitting Sergeant Ponte’s rebuttal

testimony discussing the modus operandi of gas station robberies. Sergeant Ponte testified that one

of the more typical ways of robbing a service station attendant is for a female to lure the attendant

out of the cash register area with an offer of sex or a request for help with her car; once the attendant

comes out, her partner overpowers and robs him. Petitioner alleges that this evidence was severely

prejudicial, rendering his trial fundamentally unfair and denying his federal due process rights,

because the subject matter of the testimony was not beyond the common experience of the ordinary

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juror.

Respondent contends that this claim was not fairly presented to the state supreme court and

thus remains unexhausted. Respondent maintains that Petitioner’s failure to raise the federal

constitutional violation related to this claim specifically, deprived the highest state court available of

the opportunity to address the merits of the claim that Petitioner seeks to raise in federal court. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982). However, as Respondent

notes, this Court still may deny a claim on the merits even if it is unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2). Moreover, it appears that exhaustion would be futile at this stage of the proceedings. 

Accordingly, this Court will review the merits as set forth below.

A state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review unless the ruling

violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory provision,

or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991);

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). In

order to obtain habeas relief on the basis of an evidentiary error, Petitioner must show that the error

was one of constitutional dimension and that it was not harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U.S. 619 (1993). He would have to show that the error had “‘a substantial and injurious effect’ on

the verdict.” Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at

623).

The state appellate court noted that under California law, “[e]xpert opinion testimony is

admissible if it is related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion

of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and the opinion is based on matter including the witness’s

special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education.” Resp’t Ex. A at 18 (citing to Cal.

Evid. Code § 801). The appellate court reviewed whether this testimony “is one of such common

knowledge that men of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness or

whether, on the other hand, the matter is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of

an expert would assist the trier of fact.” Resp’t Ex. A at 18-19 (citing to People v. Cole, 47 Cal.2d

99, 103 (1956)). The state appellate court noted the trial court’s conclusion that, “I’m not sure that it

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isn’t beyond the common experience of some of the jurors.” Resp’t Ex. A. at 19. 

The appellate court then concluded that:

[W]e do think that the subject matter of Sergeant Ponte’s expert testimony

was “sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would

assist the trier of fact.” [citation omitted] . . . Sergeant Ponte’s testimony suggested

that this activity had meaning and importance that ways beyond the common

experience of the jurors. It assisted them in assessing the significance of

[Petitioner’s] and Leggett’s acts. That is, that they were working as a team to rob

Mr. Singh. Significantly, Sergeant Ponte did not offer his opinion on the ultimate

issue of [Petitioner’s] and Leggett’s guilt. He testified that there are numerous ways

to rob a gas station, one of which involves a female luring the attendant out of a

locked cashier booth so that her partner can overpower and rob him. This gave the

jury an alternate theory to explain [Petitioner’s] and Leggett’s behavior. There was

no error in admitting the testimony.

Resp’t Ex. A. at 19-20.

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the admission of the robbery modus operandi evidence

was an “error . . . of constitutional dimension,” or a violation of any federal or statutory law

depriving him of a fundamentally fair trial. Dillard, 244 F.3d at 767. Petitioner similarly fails to

establish that the error had a “‘ substantial and injurious effect’ on the verdict.” Id. Thus, the Court

concludes that the state appellate court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, United States Supreme Court law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

(2).

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal

constitutional rights in the underlying state court proceedings. Accordingly, the petition for writ of

habeas corpus is denied. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: ____________________ 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:05-cv-00347-JF Document 18 Filed 07/27/06 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

P:\pro-se\sj.jf\hc.05\Kibler347den 12

A copy of this order was mailed to the following:

Clarence Eugene Kibler

E-97032

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95531

Margo J. Yu

CA State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Ave

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Case 5:05-cv-00347-JF Document 18 Filed 07/27/06 Page 12 of 12