Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02876/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02876-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIMMIE STEPHEN,

Petitioner,

v.

K. CHAPPELL, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 14-2876 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Jimmie Stephen filed this pro se action for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 to challenge a prison disciplinary decision that resulted in a forfeiture of time credits.

The court reviewed the petition and found cognizable a claim that Stephen's due process rights

were violated in that the disciplinary decision was not supported by sufficient evidence.

Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause, and Stephen has filed a traverse.

(Docket # 6). For the reasons explained below, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

Jimmie Stephen was convicted in 1991 of second degree murder and found to have

suffered prior convictions. As a result of that conviction, he is now in custody at CSP San

Quentin serving a sentence of 35 years to life in prison. He does not challenge that conviction

here. Instead, the petition in this action challenges a disciplinary decision on a rule violation

report, also commonly known as a CDC-115 for the form on which it is written.

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 A CDC-115 written by correctional officer K. Ancheta charged Stephen with "delaying

staff in their duties." Resp. Ex. 2, p. 1. The CDC-115 described the circumstances of the

incident that occurred at about 10:50 a.m. on October 9, 2013:

I received a call from medical staff notifying me that they were coming to West Block

in order to conduct a CDC-602H, Inmate Medical Appeal, and requested that Inmate

STEPHEN . . . be made available. I released Inmate STEPHEN from his cell and ordered

him to remain near the West Block Officers' Podium. Approximately 25 minutes later,

when medical staff arrived in West Block in order to conduct their interview with Inmate

STEPHEN, he was not in the area and could not be located. I announced via the unit PA

system for Inmate STEPHEN to report back the (sic) the podium, but he did not respond.

I began to search the unit for Inmate STEPHEN, and finally found him back in his cell.

Inmate STEPHEN's actions delayed both custody and medical staff for approximately

twenty (20) minutes, from 1115 hours to 1135 hours. Inmate STEPHEN's disregard for

my order to remain available for medical staff caused a delay for both custody and

medical staff, and caused a disruption in the daily program for the unit. 

Resp. Ex. 2 at 1. 

A disciplinary hearing was held on October 21, 2013. Resp. Ex. 2 at 3. The reporting

employee and the sergeant in charge of the reporting employee were called as witnesses at the

hearing by Stephen. In response to Stephen's questions, the sergeant stated he did not know

where Stephen was when the correction officer ("C/O") was looking for him or for how long the

C/O looked for Stephen, and thought the C/O was looking for Stephen for "'inmate

accountability I believe but I am not sure.'" Resp. Ex. 2 at 4. In response to Stephen's question,

"'Was I in my cell when you found me?'" the C/O stated, "'You were in the second time I went

to your cell but not the first time.'" Id. Stephen testified, "I would never delay a peace officer,

Ancheta is lying." Id. The CDC-115 states that Stephen's plea was "guilty," although this

contradicts both Stephen's explanation and the hearing officer's reference to Stephen's "not

guilty" plea on the next page. Id. at 4, 5.

The hearing officer found Stephen "guilty" of the Division D(7) offense of

"WILLFULLY RESISTING, DELAYING OR OBSTRUCTING ANY PEACE OFFICER IN

THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY. Specifically, DELAYING & IMPEDING THE

PERFORMANCE OF A PEACE OFFICER. This offense requires evidence that the defendant

took a deliberate act that qualifies as resisting, delaying or obstructing a staff member, this action

affected the ability of the staff member to perform his or her assigned duties and this staff

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member was a peace officer. As a matter of institutional policy, this finding is limited to those

circumstances where either additional staff intervention is required or this disruption results in

a significant delay to the program." Id. at 4. The hearing officer stated that the finding was

based upon the details of the incident report by C/O Ancheta, as well as Ancheta's statement at

the hearing that he had to look for Stephen for at least 20 minutes before finding him back in his

cell upon his second check of the cell. The hearing officer "did take into consideration the plea

of not guilty entered by Stephen." Id. at 5. As a result of the finding of guilt, Stephen was

assessed a 90-day credit forfeiture and assigned 40 hours of extra duty. Id.

Stephen filed unsuccessful inmate appeals about the disciplinary decision. He also filed

unsuccessful state court habeas petitions challenging the disciplinary decision. 

Stephen then filed this action. Respondent has filed an answer and Stephen has filed a

traverse. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief brought under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the petition

concerns the execution of a sentence for a prisoner incarcerated in Marin County, California,

which is within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Section 2254 is the proper jurisdictional basis for a habeas petition attacking the execution of

a sentence by a petitioner in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. See White v.

Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Hayward v.

Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010).

 The Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") amended §

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The Marin County Superior Court also rejected a habeas petition from Stephen, but that order

indicated the only issue raised in that petition was that the prison was routinely rejecting his inmate

grievances. See Resp. Ex. 4.

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2254 to impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or

if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts." Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

"Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case." Id. at 413. "[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.

Stephen's petitions in state court were summarily rejected. See Resp. Exs. 5-6, 8.1

 "When

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may

be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any

indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

86, —, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011) (one-sentence order denying habeas petition analyzed

under §2254(d)); see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013) (order discussing

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state law claim but not federal claim rebuttably presumed to be rejection on the merits and

therefore subject to § 2254(d)). Stephen does not dispute that the state supreme court decided

his claim on the merits.

DISCUSSION

A. State Judicial Remedies Were Exhausted

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). 

To exhaust the factual basis for the claim, "the petitioner must only provide the state court

with the operative facts, that is, 'all of the facts necessary to give application to the constitutional

principle upon which [the petitioner] relies.'" Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citations omitted). Compare id. (finding that petitioner provided sufficient facts to exhaust

claim concerning disciplinary proceeding where he explicitly stated that he was denied his due

process rights under Wolff v. McDonnell, cited to a case, a statute and a regulation, and noted

that he was charged with battery on a non-inmate) with Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th

Cir. 2012) (general allegation that prosecutor engaged in "pervasive misconduct" does not alert

a state court to separate instances of purported misconduct), and id. at 1120 (general allegation

of IAC is not sufficient to alert a state court to separate specific instances of IAC). For purposes

of determining whether a claim has been exhausted, "counseled petitions in state court may, and

sometime should, be read differently from pro se petitions." Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d

1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Respondent argues that the petition must be rejected because state judicial remedies were

not exhausted for the due process claim. The court does not agree. Petitioner's federal habeas

petition was quite garbled, and extremely liberal construction was needed to find the due process

claim. His habeas petition in the California Supreme Court was also quite garbled, and this court

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reads that pro se petition liberally to include a due process claim based on the insufficiency of

the evidence. Although petitioner's state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court was

not a model of good advocacy, he did use the phrase "due process," did state that "petitioner

was false[ly] written up," and did cite to the case of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),

in the portion of the petition in which he was directed to state the grounds for relief. Resp. Ex.

7 at 3. Wolff sets out the procedural protections that are necessary in a prison disciplinary

hearing to satisfy the federal right to due process, although Wolff itself does not discuss the

evidentiary requirement. The Supreme Court case that added the requirement that there be

"some evidence" to support the disciplinary decision is Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

454 (1985). It would not be unreasonable for a layman to refer to all the procedural protections

constitutionally required in a disciplinary proceeding as the "Wolff protections." The state court

receiving Stephen's petition would be required to engage in the same liberal construction as this

court does in order to do substantial justice. Cf. In re Joshua S., 41 Cal.4th 261, 272 (Cal. 2007)

("'notices of appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is

reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could

not possibly have been misled or prejudiced"). State judicial remedies have been exhausted for

the due process claim. 

B. The Due Process Claim Fails

An inmate in California is entitled to due process before being disciplined when the

discipline imposed will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence. See Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484, 487 (1995). The process due in such a prison disciplinary proceeding includes

written notice, time to prepare for the hearing, a written statement of decision, allowance of

witnesses and documentary evidence when not unduly hazardous, and aid to the accused where

the inmate is illiterate or the issues are complex. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-67

(1974). The Due Process Clause only requires that prisoners be afforded those procedures

mandated by Wolff and its progeny; it does not require that a prison comply with its own, more

generous procedures. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled

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on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472.

The revocation of good-time credits "does not comport with 'the minimum requirements

of procedural due process' unless the findings of the prison disciplinary [decision-maker] are

supported by some evidence in the record." See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454

(1985) (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558). There must be "some evidence" from which the

conclusion of the decision-maker could be deduced. Id. at 455. An examination of the entire

record is not required nor is an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or

weighing of the evidence. Id. The relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary decision-maker. Id. This

standard is considerably lower than that applicable in criminal trials. Id. at 456. 

Here, there was sufficient evidence to support the disciplinary decision. The evidence

included: (a) C/O Ancheta's written description in the CDC-115 that he had ordered Stephen to

remain at the podium, that Stephen left the area, that Ancheta called for him over the PA without

success, that Ancheta had to look for him for 20 minutes before finding him, and that Stephen's

failure to stay at the podium as ordered had delayed custodial staff, medical staff and

programming in the unit; and (b) Ancheta's statement at the hearing that he looked for 20

minutes before finding Stephen in his cell, where Stephen was not to be found the first time

Ancheta looked for him there. This is enough to satisfy the extremely deferential "some

evidence" standard. 

"The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any

conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at

457. The evidence supporting the disciplinary decision was constitutionally sufficient and

reliable. Stephen's right to due process was not violated by the hearing officer's decision to find

him guilty and impose discipline. The state court's rejection of his claim was not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Stephen is not entitled to the writ

of habeas corpus.

A certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case

in which "reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional

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claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Stephen's "motion to strike '3' 'false' compromised 115 or 'disciplinary write-ups'" is

DENIED. (Docket # 7.) As mentioned in the order to show cause, the only CDC-115 at issue

in this case is the one for the October 9, 2013 incident. With regard to the CDC-115 for the

October 9, 2013 incident, no relief (such as striking the CDC-115) will be granted because there

was no due process violation. 

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. The clerk shall close

the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 9, 2015 _______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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