Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00343/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00343-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CONRAD FUMBO SINE, )

aka PAUL C. WILLIAM, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 07-00343 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

PHILLIP CRAWFORD, DEPARTMENT )

OF HOMELAND SECURITY, )

 ) 

Respondents. )

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

Mr. Conrad Sine (“Petitioner), who is currently

detained by Respondents at the Eloy Detention Center in Eloy,

Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on February 15, 2007, seeking his

release from this detention. Respondents filed a Response in

Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. 11)

on June 6, 2007. On or about June 25, 2007, Petitioner filed a

reply to the response to his habeas petition. See Docket No.

14.

I. Background

Petitioner is a citizen of the United Kingdom. See

Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Response”), Exh. 1. On July 14, 1998, Petitioner was admitted

to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”). See

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id., Exh. 3. The VWP’s provisions authorized Petitioner to

remain in the United States for a maximum of 90 days. Id., Exh.

3. Petitioner did not receive authorization to remain in the

United States beyond the maximum 90-day period. 

On August 31, 2001, Petitioner was convicted by the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

Georgia, on three counts of violating of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and 18

U.S.C. § 2. Id., Exh. 2. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of

70 months imprisonment on each of the three separate counts of

conviction and the sentences were ordered to be served

concurrently. Id., Exh. 2.

On August 4, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security

issued a Notice of Intent, informing Petitioner of its intent to

deport Petitioner based on the charge he had violated the terms

of his admission into the United States. Id., Exh. 3. The

Notice of Intent stated Petitioner was removable from the

United States pursuant to section 237(a)(1)(B) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), i.e., Petitioner had

remained in the United States beyond the term permitted, and

pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, i.e.,

Petitioner was an alien who had been convicted of committing an

aggravated felony as that term is defined in section

237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA. Id., Exh. 3. The Notice of

Intent stated that, when Petitioner had executed his

Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Arrival/Departure form in 1998, he had

“waived his right to contest deportability before an Immigration

Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and to any judicial

review of any and all of” the decisions regarding his alien

Case 2:07-cv-00343-PGR Document 15 Filed 06/29/07 Page 2 of 12
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1

The Visa Waiver Program allows aliens from

designated countries to obtain expedited

admission to the United States. As part of the

program, however, participants must agree to two

conditions. First, they must be seeking admission

as a nonimmigrant visitor for a period not

exceeding 90 days. Second, participants must

waive any right to contest, other than on the

basis of an application for asylum, any action

for removal of the alien.

Schmitt v. Maurer, 451 F.3d 1092, 1093-94 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). Pursuant to federal regulations,

removal of aliens admitted pursuant to the Visa Waiver Program who are

not seeking asylum “shall be effected without referral of the alien

to an immigration judge for a determination of deportability.” 8

C.F.R. § 217.4(b)(1) (2006). See also Handa v. Clark, 401 F.3d 1129,

1135 (9th Cir. 2005).

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status.1 Id., Exh. 3. 

Petitioner was taken into the custody of Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on May 31, 2006, following his

release from his term of federal imprisonment. See Petition. 

On August 31, 2006, Petitioner was notified the United

States Immigration and Custody Enforcement agency (“ICE”), would

not be conducting a custody review regarding his detention

pending his removal. See Response, Exh. 4. The United States

government sought to remove Petitioner from the United States to

the United Kingdom. See id. In October 2006, in response to

the request for travel documents allowing Petitioner into the

United Kingdom, the British Embassy requested additional

information regarding Petitioner. Id. at 3. 

On November 8, 2006, Petitioner was informed that a

review of his custody status would be conducted on December 8,

2006. Id., Exh. 5. Respondents determined in a decision issued

December 20, 2006, after the hearing, that Petitioner would

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2

During the removal period, the Attorney General

shall detain the alien. Under no circumstance

during the removal period shall the Attorney

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continue to be detained pending his removal from the United

States. Id., Exh. 6. The reviewing board concluded Petitioner

had failed to demonstrate he did not pose a flight risk and that

he had failed to demonstrate he did not pose a threat to

society. Id., Exh. 6. Additionally, the reviewing board

concluded Petitioner had not demonstrated he would comply with

the requirements of an Order of Supervision. Id., Exh. 6.

Petitioner sought another review of his custody status

on January 5, 2007. Id., Exh. 7. On March 14, 2007, the United

Kingdom asked Petitioner for additional documents, in order to

process his application for a travel document. Id., Exh. 8. On

April 30, 2007, it was again decided Petitioner should be

detained pending his removal. Id., Exh. 9. 

 Petitioner asserts he is entitled to release from

detention pending his removal because he has been detained by

Respondents for more than 12 months, and, he asserts, for almost

two years since his order of removal was issued August 4, 2005.

Petitioner contends that his rights to substantive and

procedural due process have been violated by his detention for

a period exceeding six months and because his removal is not

likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioner

contends that he is not a flight risk nor a danger to the

community.

Respondents argue Petitioner’s detention is authorized

by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).2 Respondents aver Petitioner’s detention

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General release an alien who has been found

inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2) or

1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under

section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this

title.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2005 & Supp. 2006).

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is proper and not in violation of federal law or Petitioner’s

constitutional rights. 

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over the section 2241

petition only to consider the merits of Petitioner’s claim his

continued detention violates his constitutional rights. See

Arreola-Arreola v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 956, 964-65 (9th Cir.

2004); Moallin v. Cangemi, 427 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920 (D. Minn.

2006). The District Court does not have jurisdiction to

consider the propriety of the order of removal. See Real ID

Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005); Padilla

v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1209, 1213 (7th Cir. 2006); Rosales v.

Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 426 F.3d 733, 736

(5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1055 (2006). The

plain language of the REAL ID Act grants jurisdiction to

appellate courts to review questions of law presented in

petitions for review of final orders of removal, even those

pertaining to otherwise discretionary determinations. See

Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting

the REAL ID Act conferred jurisdiction on the United States

Circuit Courts of Appeal to determine if an alien’s crime was

properly categorized as an “aggravated felony”); Cabrera-Alvarez

v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining

that, in the context of appellate review of the BIA’s

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3 Section 1231(a)(6) provides:

An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible

under section 1182 of this title ... or who has

been determined by the Attorney General to be a

risk to the community or unlikely to comply with

the order of removal, may be detained beyond the

removal period .... Additionally, if an alien’s release “pose[s] a danger to the

community or to the safety of other persons or to property or a

significant risk of flight pending such alien’s removal from the

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discretionary decision to deny cancellation of removal,

interpretation of immigration statutes is a question of law that

appellate courts have jurisdiction to review pursuant to the

REAL ID Act).

III. Analysis

This Court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a

Department of Homeland Security detainee who is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. 2006).

Section 241 of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231,

applies to the detention of aliens who are being held pursuant

to an administratively final order of removal. This statute

states: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an

alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the

alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this

section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” § 1231(a)(1)(A)

(2005 & Supp. 2006). Additionally, for particular categories

of removable aliens, this section requires the Attorney General

to detain the alien during the “removal period.” See id. §

1231(a)(2). This section also explicitly allows, but does not

require, the detention of an alien beyond the ninety-day removal

period in certain circumstances. See id. § 1231(a)(6).3

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28 United States,” the alien may be detained. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(d)(1)

& 241.4(e)-(f) (2006).

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However, the Ninth Circuit has determined that subsection

1231(a)(6) does not authorize the indefinite detention of an

inadmissible alien. See Martinez-Vazquez v. INS, 346 F.3d 903,

906 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1045 (2005).

In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491

(2001), the Supreme Court examined section 1231 to determine

whether aliens may be detained indefinitely beyond the removal

period, pending their deportation. The Supreme Court concluded

that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien

would raise a serious constitutional problem.” Id., 533 U.S. at

688-89, 121 S. Ct. at 2498. To avoid the constitutional

difficulty, the Court decided to read an implicit time

limitation into section 1231(a)(6), and determined that the

statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a

period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal

from the United States. It does not permit indefinite

detention.” Id. The Supreme Court concluded that, if removal

of an alien is not reasonably foreseeable, a court should hold

that his continued detention is unreasonable and order his

release. Id., 533 U.S. at 699-700, 121 S. Ct. at 2504. The

Court determined that six months was the presumptive limit on

the “reasonably necessary” period of time to detain an alien.

See id. 533 U.S. at 700, 121 S. Ct. at 2505. The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has interpreted the “six month” limit to be a

total of six months from the date the order of removal becomes

final. See Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1300 (9th

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Cir. 2004); Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1102 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2001); accord Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052

(11th Cir. 2002).

Because Petitioner had no right to any appeal or review

of the “order” of removal issued August 4, 2005, other than an

application for asylum which he did not file, Petitioner’s order

of removal became final on August 4, 2005. Cf. Shehu v.

Attorney General, 482 F.3d 652, 656-57 (3d Cir. 2007)

(concluding denial of an alien’s application for asylum, which

alien was admitted pursuant to the VWP, constituted a final

order of removal because the alien was entitled to no further

process before deportation); Schmitt v. Maurer, 451 F.3d 1092,

1096 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The statutory text and legislative

history therefore make it abundantly clear that an alien may not

challenge an Order of Removal issued to an alien who overstayed

a visa issued through the Visa Waiver Program on any grounds

other than asylum. Nor do the text or history of the adjustment

of status statutes or regulations suggest a contrary result.”);

Itaeva v. INS, 314 F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting

alien’s argument that she could apply for suspension of

deportation after having been admitted under the Visa Waiver

Program). Accordingly, the six-month presumptively

constitutionally-permissible period of detention expired

February 4, 2006. Petitioner has, therefore, been detained for

approximately sixteen months beyond the six-month

constitutionally-permissible limit for detention of an alien

pursuant to section 1231. 

[In Zadvydas the Supreme Court] held that,

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unless special circumstances exist, an alien

ordered removed whose removal is not

reasonably foreseeable may not be detained

indefinitely, but only for “a period

reasonably necessary to secure removal.” Id.

at 699, 121 S. Ct. 2491; see also id. at

690-92, 121 S. Ct. 2491. Detention for 6

months, including the 90-day removal period,

is “presumptively reasonable.” Id. at 701,

121 S. Ct. 2491. A due process analysis and

remedy follow: If, after 6 months, the alien

makes a showing that there is “no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future,” then the government must

establish such a likelihood, or the existence

of special circumstances, or the alien must

be released from custody. Id. at 696, 701,

121 S. Ct. 2491.

Khotesouvan, 386 F.3d at 1300. 

The burden of showing that there is no significant

likelihood that a habeas petitioner will be removed in the

reasonably foreseeable future rests with the petitioner seeking

relief. See Pelich v. INS, 329 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003).

If the petitioner meets his burden, the government must then

introduce evidence to refute that assertion. See id.; Lin Guo

Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2002). A petitioner

may make such a showing by establishing that there is an

“institutional barrier” to his repatriation, i.e., that the

country of removal does not have an agreement with the United

States to accept repatriation of its nationals. See Kim Ho Ma,

257 F.3d at 1115 (concluding that, because the United States had

no functioning repatriation agreement with Cambodia, the

designated country of removal, and because the Cambodian

government did not accept the return of its nationals from the

United States, there was no reasonable likelihood that the INS

would be able to accomplish the petitioner’s removal in the

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4

[P]etitioner has satisfied his burden of

“provid[ing] good reason to believe that there is

no significant likelihood of removal in the

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reasonably foreseeable future); Fahim v. Ashcroft, 227 F. Supp.

2d 1359, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2002). Petitioner must demonstrate that

“the circumstances of his status” or the existence of

“particular barriers to his repatriation” to his country of

origin are such that there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Fahim, 227 F.

Supp. 2d at 1366.

Petitioner has not established the circumstances of his

status are such that there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Neither has

Petitioner produced evidence of an “institutional barrier”

prohibiting his return to United Kingdom. Compare Ekeh v.

Gonzales, 197 Fed. App. 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding

that an alien, who had been detained for 30 months and who had

applied for travel documents from “Liberia, Nigeria, Ethiopia,

South Africa, France, Cote D’Ivoire, Italy, Sweden, the

Netherlands, and Switzerland” and who had “submitted to

interviews with Liberian and Nigerian officials and has

repeatedly pledged to ‘sign any document presented to him’ to

gain his removal” had met his burden of establishing there was

no reasonable likelihood of his removal in the foreseeable

future); Yassir v. Ashcroft, 111 Fed. App. 75, 77 (3d Cir.

2004); Abdel-Muhti v. Ashcroft, 314 F. Supp. 2d 418, 429 (M.D.

Pa. 2004); Rajigah v. Conway, 268 F. Supp. 2d 159, 166 (E.D.N.Y.

2003).4

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reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas at 701,

121 S. Ct. 2491. Indeed, he has submitted a

letter from the Guyanese Ambassador, stating that

the embassy will not issue travel documents to

him both because of his pending judicial

proceedings and because of his inability to

receive adequate medical treatment for his eye

disease in Guyana.

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IV. Conclusion

Because Petitioner has not met his burden of

establishing there is no significant likelihood of his removal

in the reasonably foreseeable future, Petitioner is not entitled

to habeas relief from his detention pending his removal based on

his claim that his continued detention violates his federal

constitutional or statutory rights.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Sine’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied without prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

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consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 28th day of June, 2007.

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