Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-02-03923/USCOURTS-ca8-02-03923-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-3923

___________

Daryl L. Davis, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Calzona Hall, Ex-Director, St. Louis *

County Department of Justice Services, *

in his individual capacity; Dora B. *

Schriro, Director, Missouri Department *

of Corrections, in her individual *

capacity; Robert A. Meechum, *

Lieutenant; Jacqueline D. Young; *

St. Louis County; Brian Goeke; Larry *

Wilson; Susan Martin; Stacy Breedon; *

John Prier; Travis Clyburn, * Appeals from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern District

Defendants, * of Missouri.

*

Barbara Knell; Rebecca Atterberry, *

*

Defendants - Appellants, *

*

Pat Roll, *

*

Defendant. *

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___________

No. 02-3924

___________

Daryl L. Davis, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* 

v. * 

* 

Calzona Hall, Ex-Director, St. Louis *

County Department of Justice Services, *

in his individual capacity; Dora B. *

Schriro, Director, Missouri Department *

of Corrections, in her individual *

capacity; Robert A. Meechum, *

Lieutenant; Jacqueline D. Young; *

St. Louis County; Brian Goeke; Larry *

Wilson, *

*

Defendants, *

*

Susan Martin; Stacy Breedon; John *

Prier; Travis Clyburn, *

*

Defendants - Appellants, *

*

Barbara Knell; Rebecca Atterberry; *

Pat Roll, *

*

Defendants. *

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___________

No. 03-1343

___________

Daryl L. Davis, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* 

v. * 

* 

Calzona Hall, Ex-Director, St. Louis *

County Department of Justice Services, *

in his individual capacity; Dora B. *

Schriro, Director, Missouri Department *

of Corrections, in her individual *

capacity; Robert A. Meechum, *

Lieutenant; Jacqueline D. Young; *

St. Louis County; Brian Goeke; Larry *

Wilson,; Susan Martin; Stacy Breedon; *

John Prier; Travis Clyburn; Barbara *

Knell; Rebecca Atterberry; Pat Roll, *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

__________

Submitted: November 17, 2003

 Filed: July 14, 2004

___________

Before RILEY, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

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1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), we recite these facts in the

light most favorable to Davis as the non-moving party. See, e.g., Cravens v. Blue

Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2000) (construing

the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party).

2

A defendant entering an Alford plea pleads guilty and consents to the

imposition of a sentence while still proclaiming his or her innocence of the charged

offense. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).

-4-

These interlocutory appeals follow the district court’s disposition of the

defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Daryl Davis’s § 1983 claims alleging

due process violations in connection with his prolonged incarceration after he was

ordered released. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

In December of 1997, a jury convicted Daryl Davis of stealing $150 or more,

a class C felony under Missouri law. The Missouri state court sentenced Davis as a

prior offender and pronounced a seven-year term of imprisonment. He was

transferred from county custody to the custody of the Missouri Department of

Corrections to serve out his sentence at the Missouri state correctional facility, Fulton

Reception & Diagnostic Center (“Fulton”). However, in March of 1999, the Missouri

Court of Appeals reversed Davis’s conviction and granted him a new trial. He

entered into plea negotiations with the state prosecutor and agreed to enter an Alford

plea to the stealing charge.2 The Missouri Department of Corrections received the

Court of Appeals mandate and, therefore, had knowledge that Davis’s conviction had

been reversed and that he was to remain incarcerated pending a new trial. When

Davis’s conviction was reversed, he acquired pre-trial detainee status.

At the prosecuting attorney’s request, the state court judge issued a writ to the

Fulton facility to effectuate Davis’s court appearance in order to enter a plea and to

receive his new sentence. The writ commanded the superintendent of Fulton to bring

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Davis to the St. Louis County courthouse on April 22, 1999 and stated, “Be it further

ordered that after said proceeding the defendant shall be returned forthwith to your

custody.” 

The Department of Justice Services is a county agency and was charged with

transporting Davis to the St. Louis County Courthouse. Davis was delivered without

incident and, on April 22, 1999, entered an Alford plea. The judge imposed a oneyear sentence with credit for time served. At this point, Davis had served

approximately one and one-half years, and there were no other warrants or holds on

him. The judge ordered that Davis be immediately released. The Judgment and

Sentence Order stated, “Defendant is to receive credit for all time served. Defendant

is to be discharged from custody immediately.” The form that accompanied Davis

when he was transported from Fulton to the courthouse anticipated the possibility of

his release and indicated that, in the event of escape or release, Fulton officials were

to be notified immediately. 

Despite the judge’s order that Davis was to be released immediately, county

officials placed Davis back into county jail to await transport back to Fulton.

Meanwhile, Department of Justice Services employee/defendant Jacqueline Young

completed a “Release Approval Report” on Davis. She entered the following notation

on the report: “1 YR DJS [Department of Justice Services]. DEFT IS TO RECEIVE

CREDIT FOR ALL TIME SERVED-DISCHGD PER MEMO.” Young was

responsible for handling prisoners’ paperwork and filed Davis’s Judgment and

Sentence Order in the county’s files. She did not provide the Missouri Department

of Corrections with a copy. Nor did she make an attempt to ensure that the

Department of Justice Services returned a copy of the report to Fulton. Davis,

however, personally retained a copy.

Davis remained incarcerated in the St. Louis County jail for four days before

being transported back to Fulton. When the Department of Justice Services’

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transportation unit brought Davis back to Fulton, officers completed a “Certificate of

Delivery” form. This form listed all the prisoners who were transported from

Department of Justice Services custody to Fulton and provided blank spaces to list

the prisoners’ names and the sentences imposed. On the day that Davis was

transported to Fulton, the Certificate of Delivery listed ten prisoners. Sentences were

recorded for seven of those ten prisoners; Davis’s sentence was not listed. 

Moreover, by way of their stamped signatures, state employees/defendants

Patricia Roll and Bryan Goeke attested to the following: 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the above named prisoners were delivered

this 26th day of April, 99, and were accompanied by the above named

officer(s) and guard(s), together with a certified copy of the Judgment

and Sentence in each case, stating the offense and number of years of

commitment to the Department of Corrections, as set opposite their

respective names.

(emphasis added). Similarly, by statute, a certified copy of Davis’s Judgment and

Sentence Order should have been delivered to Fulton officials. See Mo. Rev. Stat.

217.305(2) (“Appropriate information relating to the offender shall be provided to the

department in a written or electronic format, at or before the time the offender is

delivered to the department, including, but not limited to: (1) A certified copy of the

sentence from the clerk of the sentencing court . . . .”); cf. id. § 546.600 (“Whenever

a sentence of imprisonment in a county jail shall be pronounced upon any person

convicted of any offense, the clerk of the court shall, as soon as may be, make out and

deliver to the sheriff of the county a transcript of the entry of such conviction, and of

the sentence thereupon, duly certified by such clerk, which shall be sufficient

authority to such sheriff to execute such sentence, and he shall execute the same

accordingly.”). Nevertheless, no one at Fulton ever received a copy of Davis’s

Judgment and Sentence Order.

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The Certificate of Delivery and the absence of Davis’s Judgment and Sentence

Order were not the only mishandled pieces of information. A “court return form”

should have accompanied Davis back to Fulton but did not. State

employee/defendant Rebecca Atterberry, who was responsible for handling prisoners’

paperwork at Fulton, testified that only 75-90% of prisoners who go out to court on

writs come back with a court return form, notwithstanding the form’s explicit

directive to return the form with the prisoner. Specifically, the court return form

provides: 

REQUIRED INFORMATION WHEN RETURNING AN OFFENDER

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS MUST BE ADVISED OF

THE PROCEEDINGS OR DISPOSITION OF ALL COURT CASES

WHEN OFFENDERS ARE RETURNED FROM COURT ON WRITS

OF HABEAS CORPUS AD PROSEQUENDUM. PLEASE PROVIDE

AND RETURN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WITH THE

OFFENDER . . . . NOTE: The top portion of this form is to be

completed by the institution before the offender is released to the

transporting authority. The bottom portion is to be completed by the

court or county official before returning the offender to the designated

institution.

After returning to Fulton, Davis repeatedly protested his continued

incarceration but was ignored, met by indifference, or admonished for refusing to

accept responsibility for his crime. On May 11, 1999, for example, Fulton transferred

Davis to Farmington Treatment Center (“Farmington”) to complete a behavior

modification program designed to enable prisoners to integrate into society upon

release. His offender management team at Farmington consisted of state

employees/defendants Susan Martin, Stacy Breedon, and John Prier. Davis showed

Martin his Judgment and Sentence Order when he arrived at Farmington. She asked

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Davis for a copy, but he refused to give his only copy to her, because it was the only

proof he had that he was to be released. 

Martin’s treatment notes also reflect that Davis demanded to be released on

several occasions. After several such demands, Davis’s management team held a

meeting with state employee/defendant Travis Clyburn, who was a probation officer.

He attended the meeting in order to explain Davis’s sentence to him, but he did not

address Davis’s concerns. Nor did he check Davis’s records or ask to see the

Judgment and Sentence Order. In fact, no one at the meeting asked to see the order

even though Davis previously had shown it to Martin. Instead, Martin’s notes reflect

that the management team scolded Davis for his “criminal thinking” in continuing to

demand release. At least in part because of his insistence that he be released, Davis’s

management team dismissed him from the treatment program and returned him to

Fulton.

Back at Fulton, Davis’s protests fell on deaf ears. On June 10, 1999, Davis

wrote a letter to Fulton officials. In the letter, he stated that he had a judge’s order

commanding his release, and he complained that it had been nearly two months since

he was ordered set free. State employee/defendant Barbara Knell, a records officer

at Fulton, “responded” to Davis’s letter by informing Davis, “You were sent to the

Farmington Treatment Center on 5-28-99. On 6-4-99, you were returned here as a

Treatment Center failure. Since you failed that program, your status is now [parole

violator]. You will now be classified and transferred to your permanent institution

to complete your sentence.” 

On June 17, 1999, Davis met with Darren Vaughn, a parole officer at Fulton.

For the first time since being re-sentenced in April, someone listened to Davis’s story,

learned the truth, and properly handled the situation. Davis was released the

following day, fifty-seven days after he had been ordered released. 

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II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Davis filed suit in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming

that his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had been

violated. He also pleaded false imprisonment and failure to supervise claims under

state law. Davis named four St. Louis County defendants (“county defendants”)—St.

Louis County itself, Calzona Hall, Robert Meacham, and Jacqueline Young. Hall is

the Director of the Department of Justice Services; Meacham is a former Department

of Justice Services officer who accompanied Davis to court when he was re-sentenced

in April of 1999; and Young is the records officer who completed Davis’s Release

Form and filed his Judgment and Sentence Order in the county files without

providing the Missouri Department of Corrections with a copy. 

Davis also named ten Missouri Department of Corrections defendants (“state

defendants”)—Dora Schriro, Brian Goeke, Larry Wilson, Susan Martin, Stacy

Breedon, John Prier, Travis Clyburn, Barbara Knell, Rebecca Atterberry, and Pat

Roll. Schriro is the Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections; Goeke was

the Superintendent of Fulton until April 20, 1999; Wilson is the current

Superintendent of Fulton; Martin and Breedon were members of Davis’s management

team at Farmington and are substance abuse counselors there; Prier was also a

member of Davis’s management team at Farmington and is a correctional officer;

Clyburn is a probation officer at Farmington; Knell is a clerk/records officer at

Fulton; Atterberry is a clerk/typist at Fulton; and Roll is Atterberry’s supervisor.

Davis named all the individual defendants in their individual capacities and

further named Hall in his official capacity. Davis characterized the defendants as

either “county defendants” or “state defendants” and further categorized them into

three sub-groups: (1) “defendants directly involved”—Meacham, Young, Martin,

Breedon, Prier, Clyburn, Knell, Atterberry, and Roll; (2) “defendants responsible for

policies and customs”—Hall, Schriro, Goeke, Wilson, and Roll; and (3) “defendant

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3

Davis sued Hall in both his official and individual capacities. The district

court noted that neither qualified nor absolute immunity is available to Hall in his

official capacity, e.g., Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir.

1999) (“Qualified immunity is not a defense available to governmental entities, but

only to government employees sued in their individual capacity.”) and granted him

qualified immunity on Davis’s individual-capacity claims against Hall. 

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principals”—Meacham, Young, Schriro, Goeke, and Wilson. In total, Davis pleaded

sixteen counts against the various defendants and sought compensatory and punitive

damages.

Pertinent to this appeal, the individual state and county defendants brought

motions for summary judgment on the ground that each individual defendant was

entitled to qualified immunity for his or her involvement in the case. The district

court granted the county defendants’ motion, finding that they were entitled to

qualified immunity.3

 Moreover, the court entered judgment as a matter of law on

Davis’s claim against St. Louis County and on Davis’s official-capacity claim against

Hall. The court determined that Davis had failed to generate a trial-worthy issue as

to the existence of a municipal custom or policy to which officials were deliberately

indifferent. Having disposed of all of the § 1983 claims against the county

defendants on summary judgment, the court further declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Davis’s state law claims against these defendants and dismissed the

state law claims against the county defendants without prejudice.

As to the state defendants, the court rejected their contention that they were

entitled to qualified immunity protection. Even so, the court granted Schriro, Roll,

Wilson, and Goeke’s summary judgment motion on the merits because they had no

direct involvement in the allegedly unconstitutional acts in this case and because

Davis had not alleged facts sufficient to hold them liable for their supervisory rolls.

After the court’s disposition of the state defendants’ summary judgment motion,

Atterberry, Knell, Martin, Breedon, Prier, and Clyburn remained. The court further

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found that, even as to the counts alleged against these remaining state defendants,

there was insufficient evidence to support Davis’s punitive damages claims and,

consequently, dismissed them.

With regard to Davis’s state law claims against the state defendants, the district

court found that the official immunity doctrine protected them from Davis’s false

imprisonment claim and entered judgment in their favor. The court also entered

judgment in favor of Schriro, Goeke, and Wilson on Davis’s state law “failure to train

and supervise” claim, and Davis has not pursued an appeal of that ruling. After the

summary judgment rulings were complete, only Davis’s claim for compensatory

damages under § 1983 against the state defendants with direct involvement remained

to proceed to trial. These defendants—Martin, Breedon, Prier, Clyburn, Atterberry,

and Knell—filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity protection. Davis moved for certification under § 1292(b), and the district

court granted his request. He, too, has appealed the district court’s order of the

adverse rulings against him.

III. JURISDICTION

Although three appeals with three different case numbers are before us, they

are based on the same record and the same evidence. We have consolidated the three

appeals for decisional purposes. We have jurisdiction to consider the state

defendants’ interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity

under the collateral order doctrine. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 312 (1995);

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). Davis has also appealed on the

ground that the district court should not have entered summary judgment in favor of

the county defendants on the ground of qualified immunity. However, “[t]he

collateral order doctrine does not apply . . . when a party complains that the district

court should not have granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity.”

Coleman v. Parkman, 349 F.3d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 2003). 

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4

The district court also denied qualified immunity to the other four state

defendants, Schriro, Goeke, Wilson, and Roll. These defendants, however, did not

appeal this ruling, presumably because the district court dismissed the claims against

them on the merits. Therefore, while we use the term “state defendants” throughout

the remainder of this opinion for the sake of convenience, we refer only to the

appellant-defendants, Martin, Breedon, Prier, Clyburn, Knell, and Atterberry.

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Jurisdiction over the other aspects of Davis’s appeal is possible under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b). When the district court is willing to certify that an otherwise

unappealable order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the

order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” we may

exercise jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). “The certification by the district judge

that a controlling question is involved is not binding on the court of appeals, which

must exercise its own discretion in determining whether to accept an interlocutory

appeal under § 1292(b).” 16A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and

Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d § 3951, at 278 n.20 (1999) (citing S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th

Cong., 2d Sess., accompanying H.R. 6238 (Aug. 18, 1958), quoted in 1958

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5257); accord 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (“The Court of Appeals

which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of [an order that the district court certified

under § 1292(b)] may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from

such order . . . .”). In this instance, we decline to exercise jurisdiction over appeal

number 03-1343. Thus, the only issue before us today is whether the district court

properly denied qualified immunity to state defendants Martin, Breedon, Prier,

Clyburn, Knell, and Atterberry.4

IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

We review a district court’s qualified immunity determination on summary

judgment de novo. E.g., Collins v. Bellinghausen, 153 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 1998)

(applying traditional de novo standard of review to summary judgment decisions

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resting on qualified immunity). This standard of review requires us to view the

summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Davis,

and to afford him all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that record. Tlamka v.

Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 2001). Entry of summary judgment resting on

qualified immunity is appropriate if, viewed through this lens, no genuine issue of

material facts exists regarding whether the officials’ actions, even if unlawful, were

objectively reasonable “in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the

time [the actions were] taken.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)

(internal citation omitted). 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes civil liability upon any individual “who, under color

of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution and laws.” Nevertheless, “[q]ualified immunity shields

government officials from suit unless their conduct violated a clearly established

constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Yowell v. Combs, 89 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996); accord Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We therefore hold that government officials performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.”). “What this means in practice is

that ‘whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally

liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the ‘objective legal

reasonableness’ of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly

established’ at the time it was taken.’” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)

(quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639). The Supreme Court has generously construed

qualified immunity protection to shield “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “Officials

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are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright

lines.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992).

Courts employ a two-part inquiry to determine whether a lawsuit against a

public official can proceed in the face of the official’s assertion of qualified

immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Coleman, 349 F.3d at 537

(describing qualified immunity inquiry as a two-part test); Tuggle v. Mangan, 348

F.3d 714, 720 (8th Cir. 2003) (same); Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 848-49 (8th

Cir. 2002) (same); Ware v. Morrison, 276 F.3d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 2002) (same);

Washington v. Normandy Fire Prot. Dist., 272 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2001) (same).

This inquiry must be undertaken in the “proper sequence.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200.

First, courts must consider whether, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right.” Id. at 201. The “existence or nonexistence of a constitutional

right” is, therefore, the threshold question. Id. 

If the answer to this first inquiry is no, courts do not delve further into the

qualified immunity inquiry. See id. Instead, the defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity, and the suit is not permitted to proceed. See id. However, if a

constitutional right may have been violated, the second step requires courts “to ask

whether the right was clearly established.” Id. This is a fact-intensive inquiry and

“must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition.” Id. 

In Davis’s case, the district court denied qualified immunity to each of the ten

state defendants: Schriro, Goeke, Wilson, Martin, Breedon, Prier, Clyburn, Knell,

Atterberry, and Roll. The court first determined that Davis alleged that these

defendants’ actions violated his substantive due process right to be released from

detention pursuant to a court order and at the expiration of his sentence. The court

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5

The district court also found that Davis had alleged an Eighth Amendment

violation, but Davis does not pursue that claim on appeal. Instead, he rests his case

on the alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due

process.

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next determined that this substantive due process right was clearly established.5

 The

state defendants who have appealed challenge both of these conclusions.

For the reasons discussed below, we find that Davis alleged deprivation of a

recognized constitutional right, that this right was clearly established, and that

outstanding questions of fact preclude summary judgment on the ground of qualified

immunity as to state defendants Knell, Martin, Breedon, Prier, and Clyburn. We find,

however, that qualified immunity shields state defendant Atterberry from suit.

A. Deprivation of a Constitutional Right

1. Constitutionally Protected Interest

The state defendants seek to characterize Davis’s claim as one alleging a

constitutional violation for their failure to investigate. We understand Davis’s

complaint as alleging a violation of his liberty interest when he was detained for fiftyseven days after a judge ordered his release. We have recognized a protected liberty

interest in being free from wrongful, prolonged incarceration. In Young v. City of

Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2001), we sustained a jury verdict in favor of an

unlawfully detained § 1983 plaintiff. The plaintiff in Young was arrested on a

Saturday afternoon when a warrant check showed she was wanted for failing to

comply with conditions of her probation. Id. at 732. The plaintiff’s sister-in-law,

however, was the wanted individual and had used the plaintiff’s name on occasion as

an alias. Id. Due to several egregious missteps on the part of the arresting officer and

the police communications officer, the misidentification was not immediately

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discovered. Id. After arriving at the county jail, the arresting officer soon discovered

the mistake and attempted to rectify it, but his superiors concluded that the situation

would have to be resolved by a judge on the following Monday. Id. At the plaintiff’s

probable cause hearing, the judge ordered that Young be released. Id. However,

instead of releasing her, county jail officials put her in a holding cell for thirty

minutes before chaining her to other prisoners, transporting her back to the county

jail, strip searching her, and ultimately releasing her. Id. at 732-33. 

Her § 1983 claim against the city proceeded to trial. Id. at 733. Young alleged

that her post-hearing detention deprived her of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment. Id. By special verdict form, the jury returned a verdict in her favor on

two separate periods of incarceration. Id. The first period consisted solely of the

thirty minutes she was detained in the holding cell after the judge ordered her

released. Id. The second period consisted of the time Young spent back at the county

jail where she was strip searched. Id. We sustained both verdicts, rejecting the city’s

contention, among others, that the plaintiff was not deprived of a constitutional right

during the first period. Id. 

The city argued on appeal that some time must be allowed to carry out an order

of release in order to perform “out-processing.” Id. at 735. The city also argued that

the judge’s order was ambiguous, because the judge used the phrase “show her

released.” Id. at 736. In addition, the city claimed that it was impractical to release

Young immediately after the probable cause hearing because she was wearing prison

garb (an orange jumpsuit) and did not have a change of clothes with her. Id. We held

that the jury might have accepted these arguments but that it was not obligated to.

See id. Upholding the substantial verdicts, we stated:

We grant that the amounts are high, but they are not so excessive as to

be shocking. The liberty of the individual is at stake here. A citizen had

been arrested, erroneously as it turned out, and a court had ordered her

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released. The court’s order had not been followed. Instead, a process

of administrative foot-dragging took place, characterized by gross

indignities.

Id.

Thus, as to the first period of detention in Young, we held that even a thirtyminute detention after being ordered released could work a violation of a prisoner’s

constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Similarly, in Slone

v. Herman, 983 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1993), we stated that an inmate had a clearly

established right to be released from prison once a judge’s order suspending his

sentence became final, because at that point, “the state lost its lawful authority to hold

Slone. Therefore, any continued detention unlawfully deprived Slone of his liberty,

and a person’s liberty is protected from unlawful state deprivation by the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 110 (emphasis added). Accordingly,

we denied qualified immunity protection to the prison officials/defendants. Id. at

109-11.

As in Young and Slone, Davis has alleged that the defendants deprived him of

a protected liberty interest by continuing to confine him after he completed his

sentence and was ordered immediately released. Other circuits have recognized this

right as well. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“Moreover, ‘[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that an individual has a liberty

interest in being free from incarceration absent a criminal conviction.’” (quoting

Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992))); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152

F.3d 564, 576 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the Due Process Clause guards against

prolonged detentions without an appearance when a detainee complains of

confinement following arrest pursuant to valid warrant); Alexander v. Perrill, 916

F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[P]rison officials who are under a duty to

investigate claims of computational errors in the calculation of prison sentences may

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be liable for their failure to do so when a reasonable request is made.”); Golson v.

Dep’t of Corrections, 914 F.2d 1491, 1990 WL 141470, **1 (4th Cir. Oct. 2, 1990)

(unpublished table decision) (“Incarceration beyond the termination of one’s sentence

may state a claim under the due process clause and the eighth amendment.”); Douthit

v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding claim based on continued

confinement without valid judicial order was cognizable under § 1983 as a

deprivation of due process); cf. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir. 1993)

(“Subjecting a prisoner to detention beyond the termination of his sentence has been

held to violate the eighth amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. . . . [W]e did find that an eighth amendment violation occurred when an

inmate was imprisoned nine months and eight days after the expiration of his

sentence.”); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989) (“We think there

can be no doubt that imprisonment beyond one’s term constitutes punishment within

the meaning of the eighth amendment.”). For instance, the Eleventh Circuit has held

that prisoners have a “constitutional right to be free from continued detention after

it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release” and, in a

misidentification case, cited cases from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits that also

specifically recognized this right. Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th

Cir. 1993) (citing Sivard v. Pulaski County, 959 F.2d 662 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding

continued detention where sheriff knew it was wrongful states claim under § 1983 for

due process violation), unrelated modification on rehearing, 15 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir.

1994) (per curiam); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding

failure to release after officer knew or should have known that plaintiff had been

misidentified gives rise to cause of action under § 1983)). 

The state defendants primarily rely on Scull v. New Mexico, 236 F.3d 588

(10th Cir. 2000) for the proposition that they did not have a duty to investigate

Davis’s claim of wrongful incarceration. In Scull, an Ohio inmate, Timothy Reed,

was paroled and ordered not to leave the state. Id. at 592. Fearing for his life, Reed

fled Ohio and settled in New Mexico. Id. When he failed to appear after being

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charged with “terroristic threatening,” Ohio officials issued a warrant for his arrest.

Id. In Taos County, New Mexico, Reed was arrested as a fugitive but obtained a writ

of habeas corpus to avoid extradition back to Ohio. Id. The Taos County judge

ordered that he be released from the custody of Taos County. Id. State prosecutors

appealed. Id.

Nearly two years later, Reed was involved in a minor traffic accident in

Bernalillo County, New Mexico and was arrested when officers ran a routine warrant

check on him that revealed Reed was wanted in Ohio. Id. Unbeknownst to the

arresting officers, the Ohio warrant was the same warrant at issue in the Taos County

case on appeal. Id. Reed immediately contacted his lawyers, who provided

Bernalillo County officials with a copy of the writ and demanded Reed’s release. Id.

Bernalillo County officials engaged in negotiations with Reed’s lawyers but refused

to release him because the writ was specifically directed to Taos County, not

Bernalillo County. Id. at 593-94. Reed remained incarcerated for thirty days in

Bernalillo County until a state judge ordered that the Taos County writ was binding

on Bernalillo County officials. Id. at 594. 

Reed brought suit under § 1983 and several other state and federal statutes for

his wrongful incarceration. Id. at 590-91. Pertinent to Davis’s case and the state

defendants’ arguments on appeal, Reed sued the director of the Bernalillo County jail,

a Bernalillo County jail caseworker, and a lieutenant at the Bernalillo County jail. Id.

at 591. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s entry of

summary judgment in favor of these county defendants, agreeing that they were

protected by qualified immunity for two reasons. Id. at 597. First, the writ ordering

Reed’s release was specifically directed to Taos County. See id. The court found

that, given the strict terms of the Taos County judge’s order, Reed did not have either

a constitutional or statutory right to be released from Bernalillo County custody. Id.

Second, the Scull court rejected Reed’s contention that, when faced with the writ

directed to Taos County, Bernalillo County officials, at the very least, should have

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investigated the matter. Id. The court disapproved of the county officials’ handling

of the matter but concluded that the Bernalillo County defendants “were not required

by either the Constitution or statute to investigate independently Mr. Reed’s claim

that he should be released within this time frame.” Id. at 598. Because Reed had not

articulated a constitutional right alleged to have been violated, qualified immunity

shielded the county officials from suit. See id.

The Scull decision is inapposite for two reasons. First, the state defendants’

attempt to analogize the relationship between Taos County and Bernalillo County to

the Department of Justice Services and the Missouri Department of Corrections is

unavailing. In Scull, Taos County and Bernalillo County were not acting in concert.

They were two separate governmental entities that both happened to apprehend and

detain Reed. In Davis’s case, the Judgment and Sentence Order specified “1 YR

DJS,” but Davis had been incarcerated at Fulton on a charge arising out of St. Louis

County all along. Moreover, Fulton officials received a copy of the Court of Appeals

mandate reversing his conviction. The Missouri Department of Corrections arranged

Davis’s transportation and sent him to St. Louis County pursuant to that mandate and

the ensuing writ. The state defendants cannot claim ignorance as to what happened

in St. Louis County simply because the Judgment and Sentence Order said “1 YR

DJS,” as opposed to “1 year Department of Corrections.” The same cannot be said

of the Bernalillo County defendants who played no role in the Taos County litigation

in Scull.

Second, the unequivocal terms of the writ at issue in Scull commanded that

Reed be released from Taos County custody. Given that, as noted above, Bernalillo

County and Taos County did not have the sort of reciprocal relationship that St. Louis

County and the Missouri Department of Corrections had in Davis’s case, Bernalillo

County officials lacked actual knowledge that Reed should not have been detained.

Conversely, Davis had documentary evidence that he was entitled to be released,

informed at least one person in writing (Knell) that he had a court order, showed at

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least one person the order (Martin), and a jury could reasonably conclude that Martin

informed state defendants Breedon, Prier, and Clyburn of the order’s existence. In

other words, because Davis possessed the order and because there is evidence that he

told the state defendants of its existence and showed it to Martin, no “independent

investigation” within the meaning of Scull was necessary. The clear terms of the

Judgment and Sentence Order commanded Davis’s release. 

Even if we were to accept the state defendants’ position that this is a case about

the duty to investigate prisoners’ claims, Scull is not dispositive. In fact, many

circuits recognize the necessity of investigation under certain circumstances. The

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that prison officials cannot “stand by

idly after an inmate has raised the prospect that he is being unlawfully incarcerated

and has provided documentary evidence in support of his claim.” Alexander, 916

F.2d at 1398. Citing the Alexander case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

commented that, in the context of a § 1983 claim alleging the deprivation of Eighth

Amendment rights for prolonged incarceration, “[d]eliberate indifference has been

demonstrated . . . where prison officials were put on notice and then simply refused

to investigate a prisoner’s claim of sentence miscalculation.” Moore, 986 F.2d at 686.

Thus, decisional law does not support the defendants’ contention that there is never

a duty to investigate a prisoner’s claim that he is entitled to be released. 

In any event, “whatever haziness obscures the exact contours of a duty to

investigate burns off once the authorities know that they have no basis for detention.”

Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 974 (7th Cir. 1994) (Cudahy, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part); accord Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 792 (5th Cir.

1968) (“[U]nlike his prisoner, the jailer has the means, the freedom, and the duty to

make necessary inquiries. While not a surety for the legal correctness of a prisoner’s

commitment, he is most certainly under an obligation, often statutory, to carry out the

functions of his office. Those functions include not only the duty to protect a

prisoner, but also the duty to effect his timely release.”) (emphasis added) (internal

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citations omitted) (footnote omitted). Here, the evidence in the light most favorable

to Davis shows that at least some of the state defendants were on notice that Davis

was entitled to be released.

The state defendants also rely on the Supreme Court decision, Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), in support of their contention that Davis has not

alleged the existence of a right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, thus

entitling them to prevail on their qualified immunity defense. In Baker, police

arrested Linnie McCollan after stopping him for a minor traffic violation and running

a routine warrant check. Id. at 141. This check revealed that he was wanted for

skipping bail. Id. McCollan protested his arrest and detention, arguing that the

police had the wrong person. Id. In fact, police did have the wrong person.

McCollan’s brother, Leonard, had masqueraded as Linnie McCollan and was the

subject of the warrant. Id. at 140-41. McCollan remained incarcerated for eight days

before the police compared his appearance to a photograph on file from Leonard

McCollan’s arrest. Id. He was subsequently released and filed suit under § 1983.

See id.

McCollan did not challenge the issuance of the warrant. See id. at 143.

Instead, he simply maintained that the sheriff’s “‘intentional failure to investigate and

determine that the wrong man was imprisoned’” was wrongful. Id. (quoting

respondent’s brief). The Supreme Court found that, “[w]hatever claims this situation

might give rise to under state tort law, we think it gives rise to no claim under the

United States Constitution.” Id. at 144. The Court reasoned,

[W]e do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required by the

Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence,

whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack

of requisite intent.

. . . . 

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Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the

Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.

Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under

traditional tort-law principles. Just as “[m]edical malpractice does not

become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a

prisoner,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.

Ed. 2d 251 (1976), false imprisonment does not become a violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state

official.

Id. at 145-46. Because McCollan did not allege the deprivation of a constitutional

right, § 1983 was not a proper vehicle to seek redress for his injuries. Id. at 146-47.

While Baker provides some guidance, we do not think it precludes Davis’s case

from going forward for two reasons. First, again, despite the defendants’ attempt to

characterize Davis’s case as one hinging on a constitutional right of investigation,

Davis, not the defendants, is the master of his complaint. Davis has not alleged that

he had a constitutionally protected interest in the defendants’ investigation of his

claim that he was entitled to release. Instead, he has alleged that his prolonged

incarceration after being ordered released violated his right to liberty, which is

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law. The

defendants’ failure to investigate pertains not to the protected interest alleged by

Davis but to their state of mind, which will be discussed in greater detail below. See

infra. Second, like the Fifth Circuit in Douthit, 619 F.2d at 532, we do not believe

that Baker is controlling under the facts of this case: 

This case presents a substantially different factual context from Baker

since Douthit has alleged that the defendants imprisoned him for thirty

days beyond the sentence imposed upon him without a valid

commitment order. Detention of a prisoner thirty days beyond the

expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially valid court order

or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.

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Indeed, we have little difficulty concluding that Davis has alleged the

deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest, and the defendants’ attempt to

muddy the waters by mischaracterizing his claim does not sway us. The Baker Court

left open the possibility that prolonged wrongful detention might rise to the level of

a due process violation. The Court stated,

We may even assume, arguendo, that, depending on what procedures the

State affords defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial, mere

detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests

of innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the

accused of “liberty . . . without due process of law.”

Baker, 443 U.S. at 145 (omission in original). In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun

emphasized his understanding that the majority’s opinion did not foreclose the

possibility of “whether a more lengthy incarceration might deny due process,” but

merely “conclude[d] only that ‘every’ claim of innocence need not be investigated

independently.” Id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring). According to Justice

Blackmun, “a prisoner in respondent’s predicament might prove a due process

violation by a sheriff who deliberately and repeatedly refused to check the identity

of a complaining prisoner against readily available mug shots and fingerprints.” Id.

Since Baker, several courts have recognized that the short duration of

McCollan’s detention in Baker was crucial to the outcome of the case. For example,

the Seventh Circuit, in Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 1985),

understood Baker’s analysis to turn on “the duration of the detention and the burden

placed on state officials in providing procedural safeguards.” The Eleventh Circuit

has similarly stated that “[t]he Baker decision has not been read to preclude all § 1983

claims based on false imprisonment.” Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1562. We agree.

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2. Outstanding questions of fact

Davis’s § 1983 complaint implicates a constitutionally protected interest under

the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law, but prolonged

detention does not rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation unless the

defendants acted with the requisite state of mind. The protections of the Due Process

Clause are triggered when “the official’s conduct was conscience-shocking and

[when] the official violated one or more fundamental rights that are ‘deeply rooted

in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,

such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’” Moran v.

Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 651 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Bye, J., concurring) (internal

citation omitted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).

“The Supreme Court has taken a context[-]specific approach to determining whether

intermediate culpable states of mind, such as recklessness, support a section 1983

claim by shocking the conscience and, thus, violating due process.” Wilson v.

Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946, 956 (8th Cir. 2001). 

In this instance, Davis will have to prove that the defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his plight in order to prevail on his Fourteenth Amendment claim. See

Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 576 (“Specifically, the Court endorsed the use of the

deliberately indifferent standard for cases in which the defendants have the luxury of

forethought: ‘As the very term ‘deliberate indifference’ implies, the standard is

sensibly employed only when actual deliberation is practical . . . ’ The Court

explained that prison is the quintessential setting for the deliberately indifferent

standard because ‘in the custodial situation of a prison, forethought about an inmate’s

welfare is not only feasible but obligatory . . . ’”) (internal citations omitted) (quoting

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998)). Such proof at trial might

include evidence of the duration of Davis’s wrongful incarceration and the nature and

frequency of his protests. In addition, Davis will undoubtedly attempt to prove that

he brought the existence of his Judgment and Sentence Order to the attention of, at

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minimum, Martin and Knell, and a jury could conclude that the other members of

Davis’s Farmington management team, Breedon, Prier, and Clyburn, were also aware

of it. In the face of this knowledge, however, Davis will attempt to demonstrate that,

instead of making any inquiries, the defendants either ignored Davis or reprimanded

him for his “criminal thinking.” 

However, “whether the defendants’ conduct constituted deliberate indifference

is a classic issue for the fact finder.” Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 577. Thus, while a

deprivation of substantive due process technically requires proof of the requisite level

of culpability, for purposes of our qualified immunity analysis, we cannot find as a

matter of law that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. See id.; cf.

Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802, 806-07 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.

denied, 124 S. Ct. 2070 (2004) (“Interlocutory appeals are not available when the

appellate court is required to resolve a fact-related dispute about the pretrial record,

namely, whether or not the evidence in the pretrial record was sufficient to show a

genuine issue of fact for trial. The officials must present the appellate court with a

legal issue that does not require the court to consider the correctness of the plaintiff’s

version of the facts . . .”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). For purposes of

our qualified immunity analysis, it is enough that Davis has generated a fact question

on the issue. Therefore, we turn now to the second portion of the qualified immunity

analysis. 

B. Clearly Established

The second question that we must ask in our qualified immunity analysis is

whether the constitutional right alleged to have been violated was clearly established.

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. In order for a right to be clearly established, “the contours

of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that

what he [or she] is doing violates that right.” Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d

1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). In other words, a constitutional right

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is clearly established when “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his [or her]

conduct was unlawful in the situation he [or she] confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at

202. As we set forth above, our conclusion that the liberty interest of which Davis

alleges he was deprived was clearly established at the time of the state defendants’

actions. See McCurry v. Moore, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1178 (N.D. Fla. 2002)

(finding right to be released upon expiration of sentence is clearly established and

citing collection of cases); accord Sivard, 959 F.2d at 665-66 (continued detention

where sheriff knew it was wrongful states claim under § 1983 for due process

violation). Slone is on all fours with Davis’s case and had been the law of our circuit

for over half of a decade at the time of defendants’ actions. 

Based on Slone and the law of other circuits, see supra, we have no difficulty

concluding that Davis alleged the deprivation of a clearly established right and that

a reasonable government actor would know that failing to respond to Davis’s requests

to be released in keeping with the court order that he possessed was unlawful. The

evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Davis shows that Martin and Knell had

actual knowledge of the court order but failed to act. A reasonable jury could also

conclude that Martin informed Breedon, Prier, and Clyburn of Davis’s release order

and that a reasonable person in their positions would know that their conduct in

failing to act was unlawful. 

However, as to defendant Atterberry, Davis attempts to hold her liable for

failing to inquire about his sentencing status when he returned from St. Louis County

without the requisite “court return” form. In her deposition, Atterberry testified that

a significant percentage of prisoners who go out to court are not returned with a court

return form because sometimes the county mails the form directly to the Department

of Corrections. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that a reasonable person

in Atterberry’s shoes would know that failing to follow up on the significance of “1

YR DJS” contained on the transportation list and on the whereabouts of the court

return form were unlawful. Unlike Knell, Martin, Breedon, Prier, and Clyburn, there

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is nothing in the record to support an inference that Atterberry had actual or

constructive knowledge of Davis’s specific plight. See Garcia, 24 F.3d at 974

(Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing there may be

“haziness” as to “the exact contours of a duty to investigate” until “authorities know

that they have no basis for detention”). She, therefore, is entitled to summary

judgment. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary

judgment based on qualified immunity to state defendants Knell, Martin, Breedon,

Prier, and Clyburn. We find, however, that state defendant Atterberry is entitled to

qualified immunity protection. We, therefore, reverse the district court’s denial of

summary judgment as to her. We deny the parties’ request to exercise jurisdiction

over the other issues raised in these consolidated appeals and remand this case for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

______________________________

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