Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05053/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05053-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 1, 2002 Decided June 21, 2002

Nos. 02-5052 & 02-5053

Timothy C. Pigford, et al.,

Appellees

v.

Ann M. Veneman, Secretary,

United States Department of Agriculture,

Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01978)

(No. 98cv01693)

Howard S. Scher, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were

Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Robert M. Loeb,

Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice.

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Jason A. Levine argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the brief were Anthony Herman and Alexander J.

Pires, Jr.

Before: Sentelle, Randolph and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: The question presented in this appeal concerns a district court's authority to interpret or

modify a consent decree--here, the settlement of a class

action brought by over 20,000 African-American farmers

charging the United States Department of Agriculture with

racial discrimination in lending practices. Due to class counsel's failure--"bordering on legal malpractice," the district

court called it--to meet critical consent decree deadlines, the

district court interpreted the decree to allow extension of

such deadlines "so long as justice requires." Although we

find that the district court exceeded its interpretive authority

under the decree, we hold that class counsel's conduct justifies modifying the decree under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). But because the order does not satisfy the

"tailor[ing]" requirement for a Rule 60(b)(5) modification, see

Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383

(1992), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Proceeding under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15

U.S.C. ss 1691-1691f, three African-American farmers filed

this class action against the United States Department of

Agriculture alleging racial discrimination in the administration of federally funded credit and benefit programs. The

class ultimately included 22,000 similarly situated farmers

from fifteen states. Shortly before the farmers filed suit, the

Department released a report commissioned by thenSecretary Dan Glickman "to address [the agency's] longstanding civil rights problems," documented since the 1960s

by numerous federal government "[s]tudies, reports, and task

forces." Civil Rights Action Team, USDA, Civil Rights at

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the United States Department of Agriculture 2-3 (1997),

available at http://www.usda.gov/news/civil/cr_next.htm. Examining the "painful history" of its dealings with AfricanAmerican farmers, the Department concluded that local credit and loan agencies responsible for administering Department programs often discriminated against the farmers. Id.

at 6. According to the Glickman report, Department officials

had "effectively dismantled" the Office for Civil Rights Enforcement--the very office charged with addressing discrimination complaints. Id. at 47-48 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). "[O]ften mak[ing] matters worse," the

"complaints processing system" was a "bureaucratic nightmare" that "processed [complaints] slowly, if at all," resulting

in a huge "backlog," while at the same time the agency

"proceed[ed] with farm foreclosures--even where discrimination may have contributed to the farmers' plight." Id. at 22-

25. "Minority farmers," the report concluded, "lost significant amounts of land and potential farm income as a result of

discrimination by [USDA] programs." Id. at 30.

After Congress intervened to preserve the farmers' claims

by tolling the Equal Credit Opportunity Act's two-year statute of limitations, see Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 88-

89 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing 15 U.S.C. s 1691e(f)), the parties

entered into a consent decree. Designed to "ensur[e] that in

their dealings with USDA, all class members receive full and

fair treatment that is the same as the treatment accorded to

similarly situated white persons," the decree establishes procedures for resolving class members' individual claims. Consent Decree at 2. Specifically, the decree allows class members to choose between two claims procedures, known as

Tracks A and B. In recognition of the fact that "most ...

[class] members ... had little in the way of documentation or

proof" of either discriminatory treatment or damages suffered, Track A awards $50,000 to those farmers able to "meet

only a minimal burden of proof." Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 103.

Track B--the mechanism at issue here--imposes no cap on

damages, but requires farmers who choose this track, after

limited discovery consisting "essentially [of] an exchange of

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lists of witnesses and exhibits and depositions of the opposing

side's witnesses," to prove their claims by a preponderance of

the evidence in one-day mini-trials before an arbitrator. Id.

at 106. Set forth in paragraph 10 of the decree, Track B

establishes strict time frames: the arbitrator sends a hearing

notice within 10 days of receiving a Track B claim and holds a

hearing no more than 150 days later; at least 90 days before

the hearing, the Department and claimant file and serve on

each other witness lists, summaries of direct testimony, and

copies of all exhibits; discovery ends no later than 45 days

before the hearing; and no fewer than 21 days before the

hearing, both sides list witnesses they intend to crossexamine and file summaries of all legal and factual issues.

Consent Decree p 10(a)-(e). Track A and B decisions are

final, except that the losing side may petition for review by a

court-appointed monitor. Id. p p 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 10(i),

12(b)(iii).

Following notice to the class and a hearing, the district

court approved the consent decree as "fair, adequate, and

reasonable," pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 113. According to the district court,

the decree represents an "historical first step toward righting

the wrongs visited upon thousands of African-American farmers for decades by the [USDA]." Pigford v. Veneman, 127

F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.D.C. 2001). Our opinion affirming the

district court's approval of the decree noted its importance for

both the farmers and the government: the "United States is

likely to provide an estimated $2 billion in debt relief and

monetary payments in consideration for the dismissal of the

class'[s] complaint." Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212, 1214

(D.C. Cir. 2000). Ultimately, 21,546 claims were accepted for

review--21,358 under Track A and 188 under Track B.

The decree provided for class counsel to receive an advance

payment of $1 million in fees to cover decree "implementation." Consent Decree p 14(b). The decree entitled counsel

to seek additional fees under the Equal Credit Opportunity

Act, 15 U.S.C. s 1691e(d), for their work in connection with

filing the action and implementing the decree, Consent Decree p 14(a). One year into the implementation process, the

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district court "took the extraordinary step of awarding a

second advance"--this time for $7 million. Order of the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia at 2

(Mar. 8, 2001) (No. 97cv01978). The Department and class

counsel eventually settled all fee claims for $14.9 million.

Attorneys and firms sharing the fees were: Alexander J.

Pires, Jr., of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan, Pires & Leavy; Phillip

L. Fraas, of Tuttle, Taylor & Heron; J.L. Chestnut, of

Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway; T. Roe Frazer, of

Langston, Frazer, Sweet & Freese; Hubbard Saunders IV, of

The Terney Firm; Othello Cross, of Cross, Kearney &

McKissic; Gerard Lear, of Speiser Krause; and William J.

Smith.

Several months after class counsel received their second fee

advance and just two weeks prior to the deadline for filing

petitions for monitor review for the "vast majority of claimants [in both tracks]," class counsel filed an emergency

motion seeking an extension of time. Order of the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia at 2 (Nov.

8, 2000) (No. 97cv01978). Counsel revealed that they had

filed only a small fraction of the total petitions requested by

the farmers. Concerned that "counsel's failings ... not be

visited on their clients," id. at 3, and relying on "explicit

assurances" by counsel as to the work load they could realistically shoulder into the future, Pigford v. Veneman, 141

F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2001), the district court permitted

counsel to file pro forma petitions by the original deadline and

then to either file supporting materials or to withdraw the

petitions at the rate of at least 400 petitions per month, see

Order of the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia at 5-6 (Nov. 8, 2000) (No. 97cv01978).

A few months later, the district court observed "a very

disturbing trend": class counsel had failed to meet their

monthly quota "even once." Pigford, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 62.

Worse still, counsel had "drastically cut its staff, bring[ing]

Class Counsel's ability to represent the [farmers] into serious

question." Id. "[A]larmed by Class Counsel's consistent

failure" to meet decree timelines, the district court noted

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tic expectation of meeting" agreed-upon or court-ordered

deadlines for the monitor review process. Order of the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia at

2-3 (Apr. 27, 2001) (No. 97cv01978). The court described

counsel's performance as "dismal"--"border[ing] on legal malpractice"--and "wonder[ed]" whether class counsel would

have been in such a predicament had they not filed "three

new sister class actions" against the Department. Id. at 2-3

& n.1, 5.

The district court eventually imposed a series of escalating

daily fines on class counsel for untimely monitor review

filings. Pigford v. Veneman, 143 F. Supp. 2d 28, 32 (D.D.C.

2001). Instead of simply submitting materials in support of

their clients' petitions in a more timely fashion, however,

counsel drastically increased the rate at which they withdrew

petitions for monitor review--from 19% to 48%--"once again"

leading the district court to "question Class Counsel's fidelity

to their clients." Pigford v. Veneman, 148 F. Supp. 2d 31, 33

& n.1 (D.D.C. 2001).

Class counsel's failure to cope with their responsibilities

extended to the Track B process. Consider the case of Earl

Kitchen, a farmer from Arkansas who filed a Track B claim.

Kitchen was initially represented by Jesse L. Kearney, a

member of one of the firms sharing in the fee award, Cross,

Kearney & McKissic. During the course of representing

Kitchen, Kearney obtained extensions of several paragraph 10

deadlines either with consent or over the Department's objection. Around the time the Department agreed to pay class

counsel $14.9 million, Kearney missed the deadline (already

extended by mutual consent) to submit written direct testimony. Kearney's failure could have drastic consequences, for

absent submission of testimony, Kitchen's claim will "be

extinguished." Appellees' Br. at 12; see also Consent Decree

p 10(g) (putting the burden of proof on the claimant).

In the meantime, the district court, deeply concerned about

the decree's viability, asked the American Bar Association

Committee on Pro Bono and Public Services to "assemble a

team of pro bono lawyers to assist Class Counsel on an

emergency basis." Order of the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia at 7 (Apr. 27, 2001) (No.

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97cv01978). In response, lawyers from the Pro Bono Committee and the firms of Arnold & Porter and Crowell &

Moring recruited some of Washington's largest law firms:

Covington & Burling; Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood; Steptoe & Johnson; Swidler, Berlin, Shereff & Friedman; and

Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering. The district court, recognizing the competing demands on class counsel arising out of

their representation of multiple claimants in both tracks and

at various stages of the claims resolution process, hoped that

this added assistance would lift the "heavy burden of Track B

litigation from the shoulders of Class Counsel," enabling them

to "focus on the petition [for monitor review] process." Pigford, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 30 n.1.

Pro bono counsel took over the representation of Earl

Kitchen and asked the Department to extend the time for

filing written direct testimony. The Department refused. As

a result and because class counsel had apparently missed

deadlines in other Track B cases, pro bono counsel filed a

"motion to endow," asking the district court "to interpret (and

if necessary, to modify) the Consent Decree, so that Arbitrators have discretion to extend deadlines when strict compliance with the original scheduling framework would defeat the

Decree's overarching remedial purposes." Pls.' Mot. to Endow at 1. Granting the motion, the district court found it

"implicit" in the Decree's terms that arbitrators have such

discretion. Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F. Supp. 2d 50, 53

(D.D.C. 2002).

The Department appeals. At its request, we entered a stay

pending appeal.

II.

District courts possess two types of authority over consent

decrees. First, they may interpret and enforce a decree to

the extent authorized either by the decree or by the related

order. See Bd. of Trustees of Hotel & Rest. Employees Local

25 v. Madison Hotel, Inc., 97 F.3d 1479, 1484 n.8 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (observing that a district court retains enforcement

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jurisdiction over a settlement if litigants so provide in their

stipulation of dismissal or the dismissal order incorporates

the settlement terms). Second, they may modify a decree

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). See

Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378-79 (holding that the Rule 60(b)(5)

standard for modifying judgments applies to consent decrees). These two sources of authority reflect a consent

decree's hybrid character, having qualities of both contracts

and court orders. See id. at 378 (explaining that a consent

decree "is contractual in nature" but also "an agreement that

the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be

enforceable as, a judicial decree").

The farmers based their "motion to endow" on both sources

of authority. In granting the motion, the district court

explained that it was exercising its "authority to enforce and

to interpret an approved Consent Decree." Pigford, 182

F. Supp. 2d at 51. Although the court thus never addressed

the question of its Rule 60(b)(5) authority, the farmers maintain that we may affirm the order on either ground. We

consider each in turn.

Interpretation and Enforcement

Reasoning that the decree "explicitly allows for its construction in a liberal manner," and that paragraph 10 "delegate[s]" the district court's authority over Track B claims to

arbitrators, the district court found it "implicit in the terms of

the Consent Decree" that arbitrators "have essentially the

same authority over Track B hearings that a trial judge

would have over a trial or related pre-trial proceedings,"

including "discretion to allow for revision of certain deadlines,

even after the deadlines have passed, so long as justice

requires the revisions and provided that the burden on the

defendant is not so great as to outweigh the interest of the

claimant in fully presenting his or her claim." Id. at 51-53.

The Department argues that the consent decree gives the

district court no such authority. According to the Department, the district court's only authority either to interpret or

enforce the consent decree comes from paragraph 13, which

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"concern[s] ... alleged violation[s] of any provision of th[e]

... Decree," and directs "[t]he person seeking enforcement of

a provision of th[e] ... Decree" to attempt to resolve any

problems without court intervention and then to seek enforcement through contempt proceedings. Consent Decree p 13;

see also id. p 21 (retaining the court's authority to enforce the

decree through contempt proceedings). Since the farmers

neither alleged a violation nor invoked the procedures for

"seeking enforcement," the Department contends that the

district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the "motion to

endow." Defending the district court's order and relying on

our statement in Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n that it is a

"well-established principle that a trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce its consent decrees," 995 F.2d 280, 286 (D.C.

Cir. 1993), the farmers argue that the order was "properly

grounded on jurisdiction 'ancillary' to that explicitly conferred

by paragraph 13," Appellees' Br. at 21. Pursuant to this

"ancillary jurisdiction," the farmers contend, the district court

properly "enforce[d]" the decree's "overarching remedial purposes." Id. at 20. The farmers also argue that quite apart

from paragraph 13, the district court had "inherent" authority

to interpret the decree. Id. at 21.

We agree with the Department. In Kokkonen v. Guardian

Life Insurance Co. of America, the Supreme Court held that

a district court lacked "ancillary jurisdiction" to enforce a

consent decree because neither the decree nor the order

dismissing the case expressly retained jurisdiction to do so.

511 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1994). Although Kokkonen differs from

the situation here--the consent decree in this case does retain

certain enforcement jurisdiction--the decision teaches that

district courts enjoy no free-ranging "ancillary" jurisdiction to

enforce consent decrees, but are instead constrained by the

terms of the decree and related order. See id. at 381

(explaining that if the dismissal order had retained jurisdiction or incorporated the settlement, then "a breach of the

agreement would be a violation of the order, and ancillary

jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist").

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Accordingly, an enforcement clause limited by its plain language, as is paragraph 13, to situations involving decree

violations confers no ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the

decree's "overarching ... purposes." Indeed, when the district court approved the decree, it observed that the parties

added the enforcement provision because the original version

"appeared to prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction in

the event that the USDA did not comply with [its] terms,"

Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 110, bolstering our view that the

enforcement provision means what it says.

Beckett does not warrant a different result. Not only did

the Beckett decree preserve the district court's "jurisdiction

over [the] case to enforce the terms of [the] ... decree," 995

F.2d at 286, but the party seeking enforcement in Beckett--

unlike the farmers here--alleged that the other party had

violated the decree's terms, id. at 281.

Equally unpersuasive is the farmers' argument that we

need not worry about paragraph 13's limitations because the

district court possesses "inherent" interpretive power over

the decree "whether or not for explicit enforcement purposes." Appellees' Br. at 21. For one thing, we see no way

the district court's interpretive authority can be unhinged

from its enforcement authority. If the district court lacks

paragraph 13 enforcement authority (because the farmers

alleged no violation), then the farmers gain nothing from an

interpretation that arbitrators may adjust paragraph 13 deadlines. Furthermore, none of the appellate cases cited by the

farmers supports their assertion that "many cases ... have

recognized the 'inherent' jurisdiction of courts to interpret

consent decrees," id., apart from any enforcement power.

Two of the cases involved decree modifications, not interpretations. See Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc. v. Dayton, 132 F.3d

1142, 1146 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1997); Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 46

F.3d 1347, 1365 (5th Cir. 1995). The third upheld, as a valid

consent decree interpretation, a district court's imposition of

interim deadlines not specified in the decree. See Juan F.

By and Through Lynch v. Weicker, 37 F.3d 874 (2d Cir.

1997). The order in that case, however--unlike the one

here--provided for court intervention "when plaintiffs showed

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tional deadlines represented a permissible interpretation because they served to "ensur[e] compliance." Id. at 879.

Our conclusion that the district court's interpretive and

enforcement authority depends on the terms of the decree

and related court order, rather than on some "ancillary" or

"inherent" power, comports with a consent decree's contractual character. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378. In this case, for

example, the farmers and the Department bargained over

Track B's time frames. Track B's "abbreviated and unambiguous deadlines," the Department candidly tells us, serve its

interests by "limit[ing] the number of class members who ...

opt for the Track B process and ... enhanc[ing] the government's ability to defend against [those] claims." Appellant's

Br. at 24-25. The parties also bargained over paragraph 13,

agreeing to limit district court enforcement authority to situations where the decree is violated. To now hold that the

district court, through either some "ancillary" authority to

enforce the decree absent a violation or "inherent" authority

to interpret it, may permit extensions of Track B deadlines

would not only deny the Department the benefit of its bargain, but would also discourage settlements. Who would sign

a consent decree if district courts had free-ranging interpretive or enforcement authority untethered from the decree's

negotiated terms?

Modification

The farmers argue that even if the district court lacked

authority to interpret the decree to allow extension of Track

B deadlines, we may still affirm the order as a proper

modification pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). This rule permits

courts, "upon such terms as are just," to "relieve a party or a

party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or

proceeding ... [if] it is no longer equitable that the judgment

should have prospective application." "[A] significant change

in circumstances," the Supreme Court has held, may "warrant[ ] revision of [a] decree." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383. Such

changed circumstances include "unforeseen obstacles" that

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make a decree "unworkable." Id. at 384. Any modification

must be "suitably tailored to the changed circumstances." Id.

at 383.

According to the farmers, two "significant change[d] ...

circumstances" make the consent decree "unworkable." They

first point to a "dramatic and unexpected expansion in class

size"--from 2000 (the number originally estimated) to 22,000

(the final number). Appellees' Br. at 31. As the Department

points out, however, at the time the district court approved

the decree, the parties realized the class already had between

"15,000 and 20,000" members. Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 94.

Although this may well suggest that the actual increase was

not "significant" enough to justify modification, we decline to

resolve that issue, for the district court did not rely on the

larger class size as a basis for the order at issue here.

Class counsel's "inability to represent all Track B claimants

adequately," Pigford, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 52, the farmers next

argue, also provides a basis for a Rule 60(b)(5) modification.

The Department concedes not only that counsel for "Kitchen

and a number of other class members" committed "what

appears to be malpractice," but also that this represents a

"relevant new fact." Appellant's Br. at 28. Even so, the

Department insists, the farmers' remedy is not to deny the

Department the benefit of its bargained-for Track B deadlines, but rather to sue class counsel for malpractice.

" '[C]lients must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys.' " Id. at 29 (quoting Pioneer Inv.

Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 396-97 (1993)).

As a general matter, the Department is correct. In Link v.

Wabash Railroad Co., the case on which the Department

primarily relies, the Supreme Court held that the failure of

plaintiff's lawyer to attend a pretrial conference justified

dismissing the case for want of prosecution. 370 U.S. 626,

633 (1962). Because plaintiff "voluntarily chose [his] attorney

as his representative," the Court held, he could "[ ]not ...

avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely

selected agent." Id. at 633-34.

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Neither Link nor any other case the Department cites,

however, was a class action. In this case, except for the three

named plaintiffs, not one of the thousands of class members

"voluntarily chose" class counsel. Quite to the contrary, by

certifying the class, the district court effectively appointed

counsel for the farmers. Under Rule 23(a)(4), moreover, the

district court, as a condition of class certification, had to find

that class counsel would "adequately protect the interests of

the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); see also McCarthy v.

Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1411 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting

that Rule 23's requirement of adequate representation encompasses "concerns about the competency of class counsel"

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Exercising

this responsibility, the district court found that "Mr. Alexander Pires and Mr. Phillip Fraas as lead counsel and Mr. J.L.

Chestnut, Mr. Othello Cross, Mr. T. Roe Frazer, Mr. Hubbard T. Saunders, IV, Mr. Gerald Lear and Mr. James Myart,

Jr., all serving as of counsel ... demonstrated that they will

advocate vigorously for the interests of the class" and therefore "adequately will represent the interests of the class."

Pigford v. Veneman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 350 (D.D.C. 1998).

In so distinguishing Link, we do not mean to suggest that

the presumption of client accountability for attorney conduct

has no applicability in class actions. Certainly a contrary rule

would make class action settlements problematic. Moreover,

the Rule 23(a)(4) finding of class counsel adequacy may

partially substitute for the free choice found in conventional

non-class litigation. Like most presumptions, however, this

one is rebuttable. And in litigation involving a class--defined

from the outset by its numerosity--where counsel is not in

fact freely chosen by class members, it is logical that the

presumption should be more easily overcome than if the

clients had in fact freely chosen their attorneys.

At oral argument, the Department pointed out that even

though the farmers may not have "freely selected" class

counsel to pursue the underlying litigation, the decree permits them to choose other lawyers for Track A or B representation. Accordingly, the Department argues, holding the

farmers accountable for their lawyers' dismal performance is

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perfectly appropriate. We disagree. Although the decree

technically permits class members to retain other lawyers, we

think the circumstances of this case, together with the terms

of the decree itself, make such choices unlikely. For one

thing, the decree prohibits lawyers from charging for their

work in claims proceedings, see Consent Decree p 5(e), so

lawyers desiring payment must seek fees pursuant to the

Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. s 1691e(d). Class

counsel, however, received an advance fee award to provide

such services. Class counsel also benefit from the district

court's Rule 23 seal of approval. No wonder Earl Kitchen

(the only claimant for whom the record contains relevant

information) was represented by Jesse Kearney, a member of

one of the firms that shared in the fee advance and ultimately

the $14.9 million settlement. Because Kitchen did not "voluntarily cho[o]se" Kearney in the usual sense, we see no basis

for holding Kitchen responsible for Kearney's failure to file

direct testimony on time.

Contrary to the Department's argument, we see nothing

unfair about this result. Although we have no doubt that the

Department expected Track B's tight deadlines to discourage

claims--even to make them less winnable--the Department

never counted on class counsel's virtual malpractice. Indeed,

the decree itself assumes competent representation for the

farmers. The decree's express purpose is to "ensur[e] that in

their dealings with USDA, all class members receive full and

fair treatment," Consent Decree at 2, and its "main accomplishment was the establishment of a process to adjudicate

individual claims." Opinion and Order of the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia at 8 (Mar. 8, 2001)

(No. 97cv01978) (emphasis added). Unless the farmers have

competent counsel, we cannot imagine how they could ever

obtain "full and fair treatment" in a claims process where (as

in Kitchen's case) missing a single deadline could be fatal.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that class counsel's

failure to meet critical Track B deadlines amounts to an

"unforeseen obstacle" that makes the decree "unworkable."

Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384. To hold otherwise would sanction the

farmers' double betrayal: first by the Department, see Civil

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Rights at the United States Department of Agriculture 2-30,

and then by their own lawyers.

Having said all this, however, we cannot affirm the challenged order as a proper Rule 60(b)(5) modification because

of Rufo's second requirement--that the modification be "suitably tailored to the changed circumstances." 502 U.S. at 391.

Because the district court viewed its order as an interpretation, not a modification, it had no occasion to consider the

tailoring requirement. In our view, the order, vesting arbitrators with generic authority to revise deadlines "so long as

justice requires," Pigford, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 52-53, is far too

broad. Although the order restores the farmers to the

position in which they would have been but for counsel's

dismal performance (it may even, as the Department argues,

put them in a better position), the order potentially deprives

the Department of all Track B deadlines. By contrast, a

"suitably tailored" order would return both parties as nearly

as possible to where they would have been absent counsel's

failures. In Kitchen's case, a properly "tailored" remedy

would, for example, reset the Track B clock at the point in

the process where Kearney dropped the ball, establishing a

new deadline for submitting direct testimony and leaving

subsequent deadlines unchanged. Whatever tailoring method

the district court ultimately adopts, see United States v.

Western Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 1198, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (recognizing a district court's "considerable discretion" in fashioning

a Rule 60(b)(5) modification), it must preserve the essence of

the parties' bargain: for the farmers, an opportunity to have

their individual claims pursued by competent counsel; and for

the Department, the benefit of the consent decree's tight

deadlines.

III.

We reverse the district court's order and remand the case

for proceedings consistent with this opinion, Rule 60(b)(5),

and Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367,

377 (1992). See 28 U.S.C. s 2106 (authorizing federal appellate courts to "remand the cause and ... require such further

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proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances").

So ordered.

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