Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00186/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00186-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT 

DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICHARD W. COREY, in his official 

capacity as Executive Officer of the 

California Air Resources Board, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-CV-00186-MCE-AC

ORDER

Plaintiffs Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. (“OOIDA”), along 

with a number of individual truck owner-operators (collectively “Plaintiffs”), initiated this 

action challenging California’s enforcement of the “Regulation to Reduce Emissions of 

Diesel Particulate Matter, Oxides of Nitrogen and Other Criteria Pollutants, from In-Use 

Heavy-Duty Diesel-Fueled Vehicles” (the “Regulation”). See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, 

§ 2025. Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 42) filed by 

Defendants Richard W. Corey, in his official capacity as Executive Officer of California’s 

Air Resources Board (“ARB”), Mary D. Nichols, in her official capacity as Chairman of 

the ARB, and Matt Rodriquez, in his official capacity as Secretary of the California 

///

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Environmental Protection Agency1 (collectively “Defendants”). For the reasons that 

follow, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part.

2

BACKGROUND3

A. Implementation of the Regulation

The Regulation became effective January 1, 2012, and applies to both intrastate

and interstate owner-operators. Essentially, the Regulation requires 1996-2006 model 

year vehicles weighing over 14,000 pounds to be either replaced or retrofitted with new 

technology to comply with state emissions reduction standards. The ARB implemented 

the Regulation as part of its State Implementation Plan (“SIP”), which is a set of 

measures intended to enable the state to attain and maintain national ambient air quality 

standards promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) by the federal 

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 42, at 3-4 (citing 

42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a), 7410(a); Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. Metro. 

Transp. Comm’n, 366 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2004)). States are required to submit their 

SIPs to the EPA for review and approval. Id. In May 2011, the ARB submitted the 

Regulation to the EPA to be added to California’s SIP. Id. at 5 (citing 76 Fed. Reg. at 

40653). Two months later, the EPA proposed approving the regulation, stating, among 

other things, “[W]e know of no obstacle under Federal or State law in [ARB]’s ability to 

implement the regulations.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 40658. The EPA issued its final rule 

approving the Regulation on April 4, 2012. Defs.’ Mot. at 5 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 20308 

(April 4, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52)).

 1 Plaintiffs erroneously sued Defendant Matt Rodriquez as Matt “Rodriguez.” 

2 Having determined that oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered 

this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

3 Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are taken, largely verbatim, from Plaintiffs’ First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 41.

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B. The instant action

OOIDA is a non-profit organization comprised of approximately 150,000 truckers 

residing throughout the United States. Among its members are owner-operators who 

reside and/or operate trucking businesses primarily outside of the State of California, but 

who also conduct some business within the state and are thus required to comply with 

the Regulation. According to OOIDA, out of 8,621,853 registered trucks, approximately

6,208,000 are not compliant with the Regulation and must be retrofitted with particulate 

matter filters to meet California’s emissions standards. Older trucks that have not been 

retrofitted are prohibited from operating on public roadways until they are compliant, and 

steep fines are imposed on anyone operating in violation of the Regulation.

Plaintiffs aver that bringing their vehicles into compliance with the Regulation

would be cost prohibitive, costing tens of thousands of dollars per truck. OOIDA’s

members, as with the individual Plaintiffs, made long-term investments (typically at least 

$150,000 per truck) in equipment that met the then-applicable standards with the 

expectation they would be able to use those trucks for many years. Because trucks are 

purchased with the intent that they be used for decades, many owner-operators have 

lengthy mortgages on their vehicles. If interstate owner-operators do not comply with 

the retrofitting mandates, the resale value of their existing trucks will diminish. On the 

other hand, the cost of compliance is so high that, for many, their only other alternative 

will be to discontinue conducting business in California.

As a result, Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 6, 2013, alleging the

Regulation is unconstitutional because it discriminates against out-of-state truckers in

violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Defendants answered the Complaint on

April 11, 2014, and filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“MJOP”) on May 15, 

2014, which the Court granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs then filed the operative 

FAC, adding new factual allegations and a fourth cause of action regarding Defendants’ 

subsequent enforcement of the Regulation against Plaintiff Jack Cody, d/b/a Cody 

Transportation. On approximately October 7, 2014, Cody was issued a citation 

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penalizing him up to $1,500 per month per vehicle for violating the Regulation. To clear 

the violation, Cody must pay the penalty and prove his vehicle or fleet has been brought 

into compliance. Absent compliance, Defendants purportedly may refuse to register or 

may seize Cody’s vehicle(s). 

Defendants have now moved to dismiss the FAC on, among other grounds, the 

same bases raised in their MJOP. For the following reasons, Defendants’ instant Motion 

is GRANTED without leave to amend as to Plaintiffs first through third causes of action. 

Defendants Motion is also GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, 

but that claim is not dismissed, and it is instead transferred to the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals for adjudication. 

STANDARD4

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)5

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and are presumptively without 

jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). “[T]he burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction.” Id. Because subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s power to hear a 

case, it can never be forfeited or waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 

(2002). Accordingly, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by either party at 

any point during the litigation, through a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also Int’l Union of Operating 

Eng’rs v. Cnty. of Plumas, 559 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2009).

 4 Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, but since the motion is jurisdictional it could 

be construed as having been brought under Rule 12(b)(1). Accordingly, both standards are set forth here. 

The outcome in this case will be the same under either standard, and, regardless of the procedural 

mechanism by which Defendants have presented their challenge, this Court is obligated to dismiss the 

action if at any time it determines it lacks jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

5 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted.

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Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may also be raised by the district court sua 

sponte. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Indeed, 

“courts . . . have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter 

jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh, 

546 U.S. at 514; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss the action if 

subject matter jurisdiction is lacking).

There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: a 

facial attack and a factual attack. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, a party may either make an attack on the

allegations of jurisdiction contained in the nonmoving party’s complaint, or may

challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, despite the formal 

sufficiency of the pleadings. Id. When a party makes a facial attack on a complaint, the 

attack is unaccompanied by supporting evidence, and it challenges jurisdiction based 

solely on the pleadings. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

2004). If the motion to dismiss constitutes a facial attack, the Court must consider the 

factual allegations of the complaint to be true, and determine whether they establish 

subject matter jurisdiction. Savage v. Glendale High Union Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 

1036, 1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). In the case of a facial attack, the motion to dismiss is 

granted only if the nonmoving party fails to allege an element necessary for subject 

matter jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039.

In the case of a factual attack, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s

allegations.” Thornill, 594 F.2d at 733 (internal citation omitted). The party opposing the

motion has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction does exist, and must

present any necessary evidence to satisfy this burden. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 

F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). If the plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdictional facts are

challenged by the adversary in the appropriate manner, the plaintiff cannot rest on the

mere assertion that factual issues may exist. Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Ind.,

Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Touche

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Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1976)). Furthermore, the district court may

review any evidence necessary, including affidavits and testimony, in order to determine

whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560

(9th Cir. 1988); Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. If the nonmoving party fails to meet its

burden and the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must

dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), all 

allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 

(9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of 

what the . . .claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A 

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual 

allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to 

relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading must 

contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a 

legally cognizable right of action.”)). 

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and 

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quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 

to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 

the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). A pleading must contain “only enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the

“plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, 

their complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may 

proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, 

and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

C. Leave to Amend

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v.

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing 

party . . . carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. Dismissal 

without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved 

by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs contend that the Regulation violates the Dormant Commerce Clause

because it discriminates against those owner-operators who reside and/or conduct

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business primarily outside of the State of California. According to Defendants, however,

Plaintiffs’ action fails at the threshold level because: (1) the court of appeals has 

exclusive jurisdiction over this action; and (2) this suit cannot proceed absent joinder of 

the EPA, a necessary and indispensable party. In its prior order granting Defendants’ 

MJOP, this Court agreed based on the Court’s reasoning in the materially 

indistinguishable case, California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Nichols, 924 F. Supp. 2d 

1126 (E.D. Cal. 2012).

6

 ECF No. 40. The only relevant difference between the FAC and 

the original Complaint is that the FAC now sets forth what Plaintiffs term Cody’s “asapplied” challenge (the fourth cause of action), along with all of the original “facial” 

challenges (the first through third causes of action). Accordingly, for all of the reasons 

set forth in the Court’s prior order, which is hereby incorporated by reference in its 

entirety, Defendants’ instant Motion is again granted as to each of Plaintiffs’ “facial” 

claims. Those claims must still be brought initially in the court of appeals, and the EPA 

continues to be a necessary and indispensable party. See also Cal. Dump Truck 

Owners Ass’n v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Plaintiffs make no real effort to convince the Court otherwise and instead 

concentrate their opposition efforts on the addition of Cody’s “as-applied” claim. 

Regardless of whether Cody’s individual claim is couched as “facial” or “as-applied,”

however, it raises substantively identical arguments as those raised in Plaintiff’s original 

causes of action. Accordingly, like the original Plaintiffs, Cody directly challenges the 

Regulation and consequently the viability of the SIP. It follows that Cody’s claims, like 

those previously dismissed, must also be brought in the court of appeals.

In asking the Court to reach a contrary decision, Plaintiffs argue that: (1) this 

Court has original jurisdiction over Cody’s constitutional claim; (2) Cody’s claim is not 

time-barred; (3) Cody’s claim was not ripe until he was cited and fined; (4) the EPA could 

///

 6 The Court’s decision in California Dump Truck was affirmed on appeal. Cal. Dump Truck 

Owners Assoc. v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2015). 

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not “federalize” a violation of the Commerce Clause;7 and (5) requiring Cody to file suit in 

the court of appeal will immunize ARB entirely from any as-applied constitutional 

challenge. These arguments are not persuasive. 

First, while it is unremarkable that the Court typically has jurisdiction over a 

constitutional claims, in this instance “the practical objective of the [Plaintiffs’] suit is to 

nullify the SIP and challenge the EPA's legal determination regarding its validity. Thus, it 

is the type of action to which § 307(b)(1) [of the Clean Air Act] applies.” Cal. Dump 

Truck Owners Assoc., 784 F.3d at 510. Since section 307(b)(1) applies, original 

jurisdiction is in the court of appeals. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Second, the issues of 

whether Plaintiffs’ suit is barred by the 60-day limits set forth in section 307(b)(1) or 

when any of those claims became ripe are not before the Court. The dispositive issue 

before the Court is where this suit should be brought, not whether Plaintiffs’ claims will 

be deemed timely when filed in the correct venue. Third, even if Plaintiffs prove correct 

that the EPA was without the power to approve and implement a regulation that violated 

the Commerce Clause, that argument goes to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, and is thus 

beyond the scope of the instant motion. Finally, Plaintiffs’ argument that dismissal will 

essentially result in immunizing ARB from enforcement suits is flawed because it 

assumes a 60-day time bar. This Court expressly refuses to reach the question of 

whether Plaintiffs’ claims are timely and simply requires that the timeliness question, 

along with all others, be presented to the appropriate body. Cody’s claims, like the 

original claims belonging to the other Plaintiffs, should be been initiated in the court of 

appeal.

That said, Plaintiffs’ argument that this matter should be transferred as opposed 

to dismissed, is well taken, at least in part. See Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass’n, 

784 F.3d at 513 n.13 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1631). Section 1631 states: 

 7 As to this argument, Plaintiffs primarily appear to be arguing that the EPA lacks authority to 

approve violations of the commerce clause. This argument is discussed below. To the extent Plaintiffs’ 

argument can be interpreted to challenge whether the SIP has the force and effect of federal law, 

however, that argument has been considered and rejected by the Ninth Circuit. Cal. Dump Truck Owners 

Assoc., 784 F.3d at 505 n.6. 

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Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 

610 of this title or an appeal, including a petition for review of 

administrative action, is noticed for or filed with such a court 

and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the 

court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action 

or appeal to any other such court in which the action or 

appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or 

noticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had 

been filed in or noticed for the court to which it is transferred 

on the date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for 

the court from which it is transferred. 

Plaintiffs’ original claims must be dismissed because they present challenges to 

the final action of the EPA filed more than 60 days after the agency issued its decision, 

and thus jurisdiction would not lie in the appellate court. See Cal. Dump Truck Owners 

Ass’n, 784 F.3d at 504 (noting it had dismissed the parties’ petition for review “because it 

was not filed within 60 days of the EPA’s notice of final rule, as required by [42 U.S.C. 

§ 7607(b)]”). As such, Plaintiffs’ first through third causes of action are DISMISSED 

without leave to amend. The Court nonetheless considers whether transfer of Plaintiffs’ 

fourth cause of action is warranted.8

Cody’s claims do not necessarily appear to be time-barred by the 60-day limit in

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) since the FAC adding his claims was filed approximately 42 days 

after Cody was cited. See Pls.’ Opp., ECF No. 46, at 19 (citing § 7607(b) for the 

proposition that “if [a] petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, 

then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days after 

such grounds arise.”)). Accordingly, the only question that remains is whether transfer is 

 8 The Court is cognizant that authorities are split as to whether individual claims as opposed to an 

entire action may be transferred. See Johnson v. Mitchell, No. 2:10-cv-1968-GEB-GGH-PS, 2012 WL 

2446098, *6 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2012) (discussing circuit split). The Ninth Circuit has yet to expressly 

weigh in, although it has implicitly permitted partial transfers. See id. (citing Baeta v. Sonchik, 273 F.3d 

1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2001); Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 642 (9th Cir. 1983)). Technically, here, 

because the remainder of Plaintiffs’ causes of action have already been dismissed with prejudice, the 

Court is not really considering the transfer of individual claims. To the contrary, it is considering the 

transfer of the entire “action” that remains before it. However, to the extent the Court’s resolution could be 

viewed as a partial transfer, it hereby agrees with those courts that have allowed transfer of individual 

causes of actions. See United States v. County of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“It 

would indeed be a curious result that a district court could transfer an action under § 1631 containing a 

single claim over which it lacked jurisdiction but could not transfer that claim if the claimant made an 

additional claim in his action over which the court did have jurisdiction.”). Moreover, “in the event a Rule 

21 severance is technically required before transfer of individual claims so as to result in the transfer of an 

‘action,’ the court has no difficulty doing so here.” Johnson, 2012 WL 2446098, at *6.

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in the interest of justice. “When determining whether transfer is in the interest of justice, 

courts have considered whether the failure to transfer would prejudice the litigant, 

whether the litigant filed the original action in good faith, and other equitable factors.” 

Cruz-Aguilera v. INS, 245 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). “[N]ormally transfer will be in 

the interest of justice because . . . dismissal of an action that could be brought elsewhere 

is time-consuming and justice defeating.” Baeta v. Sonchik, 273 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 

(9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). This principle is all the more 

applicable if a claim will be time-barred upon dismissal. Id. 

Justice will be served by transfer here, not only because Cody’s claim would likely 

be time-barred if dismissed, but also because the complicated interplay of state and 

federal law raised unique jurisdictional questions in this procedural posture. The Court is 

highly sympathetic to the position in which many of OOIDA’s members find themselves, 

where they, primarily small business owners, are being required to expend thousands of 

dollars just to continue operating in California. Dismissal of Cody’s claim would thus 

likely leave him without recourse to challenge the Regulation at great prejudice. 

Moreover, the unusual circumstances leading to his instant challenge (i.e., enforcement 

by a state agency of a federalized state regulation) make his choice of court reasonable, 

even if improper. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ first through third causes of action (i.e., their 

“facial” claims) are DISMISSED without leave to amend, and Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of 

action (i.e., Cody’s “as-applied” claim) is TRANSFERRED to the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals.9 

 9 Plaintiffs request that the case be transferred to the District of Columbia Circuit because 

California’s Regulation has “nationwide effects.” Pls.’ Opp. at 18. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b), 

petitions for review “which [are] locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the United States Court

of Appeals for the appropriate circuit,” while “a petition for review of any action . . . may be filed only in the 

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia if such action is based on a determination of 

nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and publishes that such 

action is based on such a determination.” Plaintiff’s argument improperly focuses on the “nationwide 

effects” language and ignores the requirement that the Administrator must find and publish such a 

determination. In this case, the Administrator did not publish such a finding. Instead, it directed that 

“[u]nder section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, petitions for judicial review of this action must be filed in the 

United States Court of appeals for the appropriate circuit,” as opposed to in the District of Columbia Circuit 

only. 77 Fed. Reg. 20308-01, 20313. Plaintiffs’ argument is thus rejected. 

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CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 42) is GRANTED without leave to 

amend as to Plaintiffs’ first, second and third causes of action. The remainder of this 

case is TRANSFERRED to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for adjudication of 

Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, and the Clerk of the Court is thereafter directed to close 

this matter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 8, 2015

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