Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01088/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:1355 Petition for Return of Property

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

AbdulKhabir Wahid, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

United States Department of Justice, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-15-01088-PHX-JJT (BSB)

REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION 

 This matter is before the Court on its own review. As set forth below, the Court 

recommends that the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 28) be dismissed and that Plaintiff 

be given leave to amend. 

I. Background 

 On June 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for return of property against the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff’s motion concerned the confiscation of his 

property during a search executed by the FBI on June 10, 2015. Because there was no 

pending criminal proceeding, the Court construed the motion as a civil complaint. 

(Doc. 6.) On April 6, 2016, the FBI moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 17.) Rather than 

responding to that motion, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend requesting to change his 

motion for return of property into a complaint entitled “Demand to Unseal Affidavit for 

Probable Cause.” (Doc. 19.) 

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 Based on evidence that the property at issue was returned to Plaintiff, on 

September 8, 2016, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Rule 41(g) motion as moot. 

(Doc. 27 at 3.) The Court also denied FBI’s motion to dismiss the Complaint as moot. 

(Id.) The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend because he was not required 

to seek leave to amend his pleading as it was filed within twenty-one days of service of 

the FBI’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion. (Id.) The Court then screened the one-page “Demand” 

(Doc. 19), which the Court treated as an amended complaint. (Doc. 27 at 4-5.) 

 The “Demand” stated that Plaintiff seeks to have the affidavit that supported the 

search warrant unsealed pursuant to Rule 5.2(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

which provides that if a filing is made under seal, the court may later unseal it. 

(Doc. 19 at 4-5.) However, as the Court advised Plaintiff, Rule 5.2(d) does not provide a 

basis for an independent cause of action. (Id. at 5.) Therefore, the Court dismissed the 

amended complaint or “Demand” for failure to state a claim. (Id.) The Court instructed 

Plaintiff on the elements of a claim for judicial deception under the Fourth Amendment. 

(Id.) The Court granted Plaintiff thirty days from the date of its September 8, 2016 Order 

to file a First Amended Complaint and stated that he must “present more than conclusory 

allegations or recital of the elements for a claim of judicial deception.” (Id. at 6.) 

II. First Amended Complaint 

 On September 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint alleging two 

counts under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 

U.S. 388 (1971). (Doc. 28.) The First Amended Complaint does not clearly identify the 

defendants. (Id.) The caption of the First Amended Complaint identifies Todd Kopcha 

and the FBI as Defendants. (Id. at 1.) Although page two, Section B, of the First 

Amended Complaint is labeled “Defendants,” it does not identify any defendant. (Id. at 

2.) On September 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a notice of “corrective action” stating that he 

accidentally omitted Kopcha’s name from Section B. (Doc. 29 at 1.) He filed a corrected 

page two of the First Amended Complaint that identifies Todd Kopcha as the only 

Defendant. (Id. at 3.) The allegations in the First Amended Complaint concern Kopcha’s 

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alleged false statements. (Doc. 28.) Therefore, it appears Plaintiff intended to name 

Kopcha as the only defendant, and the Court construes the First Amended Complaint in 

this manner and reviews it under § 1915. 

III. Legal Standards 

 A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

 Because the Court has granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, the Court reviews 

the First Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and must dismiss this matter 

if the Court “determines that the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant 

who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not demand 

detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” The court must construe pro se filings liberally. See Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.2d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

B. Judicial Deception 

 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts that (1) the conduct 

about which he complains was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and 

(2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v. 

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). Additionally, a plaintiff must allege 

(1) that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant, 

and (2) an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). To state a Bivens claim, a plaintiff 

must allege that persons acting under color of federal law violated his constitutional 

rights. Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Van Strum v. Lawn, 

940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991)). A Bivens action is identical to one brought pursuant 

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to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 with a 

federal actor under Bivens. Id. 

 In Counts One and Two, Plaintiff alleges Fourth Amendment violations based on 

the issuance and execution of a “warrant.” (Doc. 28 at 4-5.) The Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 

cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” A government investigator may be 

liable for violating the Fourth Amendment if he or she submits false and material 

information in an affidavit supporting a warrant. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 

307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1024-26 

(9th Cir. 2002); see also Chism v. Washington, 661 F.3d 380, 393 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating 

a plaintiff has “a constitutional right to not be searched . . . as a result of judicial 

deception”). To state a claim for judicial deception in obtaining a warrant, a plaintiff 

must allege facts showing (1) that the defendant deliberately or recklessly made false 

statements or omissions in the affidavit, and (2) that the falsifications were material to the 

finding of probable cause. Galbraith, 307 F.3d at 1126. 

IV. Analysis 

 A. Failure to State a Claim for Judicial Deception 

In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that Kopcha violated the Fourth Amendment by 

deliberately making false statements in “his affidavit concerning [Plaintiff’s] person.” 

(Doc. 28 at 4.) He alleges that “without the falsifications Mr. Kopcha had no probable 

cause.” (Id.) He asserts that “because of [those] false statements in the affidavit [his] 

safety was threatened by the FBI due to the assault.” (Id.) In Count Two, Plaintiff 

alleges that “[b]ecause of Todd Kopcha’s statements in the affidavit [he] was intruded on 

by the FBI and [his] right to privacy was violated.” (Id. at 5.) 

 These allegations do not state sufficient facts to state a claim of judicial deception 

against Defendant Kopcha. The First Amended Complaint lacks sufficient factual 

allegations to make Plaintiff’s claim of judicial deception plausible on its face. For 

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example, Plaintiff does not describe the false statements that Kopcha included in the 

affidavit, when Defendant allegedly made these false statements, or provide any details 

about the alleged assault. Thus, even under a liberal construction, Plaintiff fails to allege 

sufficient facts to substantiate his claim that Defendant Kopcha “deliberately made false 

statements in [the] affidavit” or to show that the falsifications were material to the finding 

of probable cause. See Galbraith, 307 F.3d at 1126. Plaintiff must do more than recite 

“the elements of [judicial deception], supported by mere conclusory statements” to state a 

claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, the Court considers whether Plaintiff 

should be given leave to amend his complaint.

 B. Leave to Amend 

“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is 

absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 

Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, any 

amended complaint must comply with the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and the Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona to avoid 

dismissal with prejudice. See Futch v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2013 WL 

6050767, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 15, 2013). 

 Rule 8(a) provides that a complaint “must contain (1) a short and plain statement 

of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a). These pleading requirements must be set forth in separate and discrete 

paragraphs. Rule 8(d) provides that each such paragraph “must be simple, concise, and 

direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rule 8(a) requires a “short and plain statement of the 

claim,” which means that the plaintiff must designate a cause of action and assert 

sufficient factual allegations to make the claim plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78. 

A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

at 678.

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Thus, if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint asserting constitutional 

violations by federal officials, his pleading should include short, plain statements 

explaining (1) what constitutional rights Plaintiff believes were violated, (2) the name of 

each individual who violated Plaintiff’s rights, (3) exactly what the individual did or did 

not do, (4) how the individual’s conduct is specifically connected to violation of 

Plaintiff’s rights, and (5) the specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of the individual’s 

conduct. See, e.g., Bishop v. Reyes, 2016 WL 2932093, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 19, 2016) 

(citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377). If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or files an 

amended complaint that fails to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 

action may be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and Rule 

41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

V. Conclusion 

 Plaintiff has failed to allege specific factual allegations to make his claim of 

judicial deception plausible on its face. However, it is not absolutely clear that Plaintiff 

cannot cure the deficiencies by amendment. Therefore, the Court recommends that the 

First Amended Complaint be dismissed without prejudice. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 28) be 

dismissed without prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be granted leave to file a 

second amended complaint.

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days within which 

to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

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Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 21st day of October, 2016. 

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