Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-02136/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-02136-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PATRICK NOAH NORMAN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

TRACEY C. NORMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

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CV 12-J-2136-S

Memorandum Opinion

Pending before the court is defendant Captain D. Gregg Rector’s motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint (doc. 83), brief in support ofsaid motion (doc.

84), and plaintiff’s response in opposition (doc. 86). Having considered the

foregoing, the court finds as follows:

Factual Background1

This action involves the alleged actions of defendant Detective Lennie Sams,

Jr., a detective employed by the Hoover Police Department, and defendant Tracey C.

Norman. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 6 & 8 (doc. 61). Gregg Rector is a Captain

employed by the Hoover Police Department. Id. at ¶ 10.

Captain Rector is named as a defendant to Counts XVII and XVIII of the

Amended Complaint pp. 31-37 (doc. 61). Count XVII is titled “Negligent and

Inadequate Training and Supervision by Defendants Derzis, Neill and Rector.” Id. at

“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the 1

factual allegations contained in the complaint,” therefore, the facts presented here, unless

otherwise noted, are taken from the Amended Complaint (doc. 61). See Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

FILED

 2013 Apr-22 PM 04:07

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:12-cv-02136-IPJ Document 94 Filed 04/22/13 Page 1 of 10
31. Count XVIII is titled “Deliberate Indifference Through Custom by Defendants

Derzis, Neill and Rector.” Id. at 34. 

Count XVII states Captain Rector is sued “individually and in [his] capacit[y]

as [a] supervising police officer[].” Id. at p. 31. Count XVIII alleges that “[t]he

standard disciplinary review process in the Hoover Police Department is so

inadequate and subjective in nature that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the

rights of citizens with whom the Defendants come into contact.” Id. at 37.

Standard of Review

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When considering a motion

to dismiss, the court must “accept the allegations of the complaint as true and

construe them ‘in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Simmons v. Sonyika, 394

F.3d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir.

2003)). Rule 8 does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). “In order for the plaintiff to satisfy his

‘obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief,’ he must allege more

than ‘labels and conclusions’; his complaint must include ‘[f]actual allegations

[adequate] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Financial Sec.

Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly,

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127 S.Ct. at 1964-65).

Legal Analysis

Plaintiff’s amended complaint names defendant Rector in his official and

individual capacity. Defendant has moved to be dismissed from this suit because

plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon which relief can be

granted. Plaintiff responds that the complaint is sufficient to state a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendant in his official and individual capacity. 

The court previously granted a motion to dismiss, (doc. 81), with respect to

Count XVII and XVIII against defendant Chief NicholasC. Derzis both in his official

and individual capacity. Memorandum Opinion dated March 13, 2013 (doc. 80). The

court also dismissed Count XVII with respect to defendant Captain Neill in her

official and individual capacity and dismissed Count XVIII against Captain Neill in

her official capacity. Id.

I. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

defendant Rector in his official capacity.

Defendant correctly assertsthatsuits against municipal officials in their official

capacity are the functional equivalent of suits against a municipality itself. Busby v.

City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). Defendant further asserts that

this court’s previous dismissal of the City of Hoover also necessarily dismissed all 2

The court previously dismissed the City of Hoover in an order providing:

2

Pending before the court is defendant City of Hoover's motion to dismiss(doc. 3), to

which the court allowed the plaintiff twenty-one days to respond. The deadline for

such a response having passed, and no response having been received, the court takes

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official capacity claims, because those claims are the same. See Benefield v. City of

Albertville, Ala., 2013 WL 28051, at *1 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (“The official capacity

claims against individuals were dismissed because they are the same as being against

the City of Albertville.”); Johnson v. City of Canton, Ala., 2005 WL 1618557, at *2

(M.D. Ala. 2005) (dismissing all claims against the City of Canton and holding that

“all remaining claims against [the individual defendants] in their official capacities

are hereby dismissed with prejudice as such claims are in fact claims against the City

of Canton”) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff responds that the dismissal of the City

of Hoover was not a dismissal based on the merits of the case and therefore cannot

be a dismissal in favor of defendant Rector in his official capacity.

Because the official capacity claim against defendant is the same as a claim

against the City of Hoover, see Busby, 931 F.2d at 776, the question is whether the

court’s order granting the City of Hoover’s 12(b)(6) motion and dismissing the City

from this action was with, or without, prejudice. [T]he Supreme Court has clearly

stated that ‘[t]he dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) is a judgment on the merits.’” N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555,

1560 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,

399 n. 3 (1981). There was nothing in the courts order indicating that it was not with

the same as tacit agreement by the plaintiff that said motion is due to be granted. It

is therefore ORDERED by the court that the City of Hoover's motion to dismiss be

and hereby is GRANTED. Said defendant is DISMISSED from this action.

DONE and ORDERED this the 16th day of July, 2012.

(doc. 5) (emphasis in original).

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prejudice. The claims against defendant Rector in his official capacity are therefore

foreclosed under Busby and defendants motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

against Rector in his official capacity is due to be granted.

Plaintiff next discusses the doctrine ofres judicata, contending that the official

capacity claims against Captain Rector are not due to be dismissed by virtue of this

doctrine. (See doc. 86, pp. 1-6). Plaintiff asserts, both in his brief and in a motion for

reconsideration, (see doc. 87), that defendant failed to assert res judicata in a

responsive pleading and therefore waived this defense under Federal Rule of

Procedure 8(c). (doc. 86, p. 2). To support this assertion, plaintiff points to

defendant’s motions to dismiss the original complaint. See doc. 35 & 42. These

motions were found moot because plaintiff filed an amended complaint. See doc. 58

& 60. 

Res judicata has no applicability here, as it is “a doctrine of claim preclusion

which operates to prevent litigation of matters that were raised or should have been

raised in an earlier suit.” Maldonado v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 664 F.3d 1369, 1377 (11th

Cir. 2011) (quoting McKinnon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 935 F.2d 1187,

1192 (11th Cir. 1991)). In the instant matter, there is no “earlier suit,” id., and the

doctrine of res judicata was never mentioned during any prior briefing. The doctrine

has absolutely no bearing on the propriety of this court’s earlier dismissal of the City

of Hoover, the official capacity claims brought against Chief Derzis and Captain

Neill, or defendant’s motion to dismiss Captain Rector.

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Plaintiff’s argument appears to be that while the City of Hoover’s dismissal

was with prejudice, it was not a dismissal on the merits, and therefore this court

should ignore controlling federal law precedent and allow him to bring official

capacity claims in his Amended Complaint. The court dismissed the City of Hoover

for plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s unequivocal order and respond to the

City’s 12(b)(6) motion. (doc. 5). The court then denied Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration of that dismissal. (doc. 9). This court was well within its discretion

to dismiss the City of Hoover for plaintiff’s failure to comply with its order and

timely respond to the City’s 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Bell v. Florida Highway

Patrol, 476 F. App’x 856 (11th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s argument is nothing more than

a belated attempt to convince this court that he deserves a second bite at the apple

with respect to suing the City of Hoover. 

Plaintiff’s response fails to set forth any cogent legal argument as to why the

official capacity claims against Captain Rector should not be dismissed for the same

grounds already set forth in this court’s earlier memorandum opinion disposing of

those claims against both Chief Derzis and Captain Neill. (doc. 81, pp. 3-5). The

official capacity claims against Captain Rector are therefore due to be dismissed.

II. Count XVII is not a Cognizable Claim under Alabama Law.

Count XVII is due to be dismissed as against Captain Rector, in his individual

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capacity, because it is not a cognizable claim under Alabama law. In Smith v. City 3

of Sumiton the court stated:

Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Burnett for negligent retention,

training and supervision are due to be dismissed because Alabama does

not recognize a cause of action for a supervisor’s negligent training or

supervision of a subordinate. See e.g., Doe v. City of Demopolis, 799 F.

Supp. 2d 1300, 1312 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (“Alabama law does not

recognize a cause of action against a supervisor or municipality for

negligent training or supervision.”); Ott v. City of Mobile, 169 F. Supp.

2d 1301, 1314–15 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (dismissing a negligent retention,

training, and supervision claimagainst a municipality because “Alabama

recognizes no cause of action against a supervisor for negligent failure

to supervise or train a subordinate....”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims

for negligent retention, training, and supervision fail to state claim upon

which relief can be granted and those claims are due to be dismissed. 

2013 WL 122627, at *5 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (Proctor, J.). Count XVII is therefore due

to be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

III. Count XVIII is sufficient to state a claim against Rector in his

individual capacity.

Count XVIII, istitled “Deliberate Indifference Through Customby Defendants

Derzis, Neill and Rector.” Amended Complaint at 34 (doc. 61). Count XVIII

repeatedly references alleged “policies,” “practices” and “customs” of the Hoover

Police Department. (See, e.g., Id. at ¶¶ 136 & 137.) The plaintiff alleges Rector

“tolerated, institutionalized and ratified the misconduct of Detective Sams by” failing

Plaintiff concedes that Count XVII is due to be dismissed “in so much as the 3

court interprets it to pertain to the defendant’s individual capacity.” (Doc. 86, p.6.)

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to properly train and supervise him, and by failing to perform an investigation of the

plaintiff’s alleged complaints. Id. at ¶¶ 138 & 139.

“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable

under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360

(11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)).

Rather, supervisory liability under § 1983 only attaches “either when the supervisor

personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is causal

connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged

constitutional deprivation.” Id.

A causal connection for purposes of supervisory § 1983 liability may be

established in three ways:

A causal connection may be established when: (1) a “history of

widespread abuse” putsthe responsible supervisor on notice of the need

to correct the alleged deprivation, and he or she fails to do so; (2) a

supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to

constitutionalrights; or (3) facts support an inference that the supervisor

directed subordinatesto act unlawfully or knew thatsubordinates would

act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.

Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff has alleged that

On or about October 7, 2010, Mr. Norman met with Neill’s superior

officer, Captain Rector, and notified him in writing of Mr. Norman’s

claims of inappropriate behavior on the part of Detective Sams and

again requested an investigation. Mr. Norman further provided Rector

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with information which did or should have given Rector reasonable

cause to believe that Detective Sams was having an inappropriate

relationship withMrs.Norman and/or that his relationship had otherwise

become unprofessional. Mr. Norman alleges that on or about October

11, 2010, Rector refused to conduct an investigation, refused to speak

to Mr. Norman’s witness or to the Assistant District Attorney

prosecuting Mrs. Norman, and refused to look at any further evidence

against Detective Sams. Rector demonstrated complete and total

indifference to Detective Sams behavior and to whether such behavior

even occurred.

Amended Complaint at ¶ 23 (doc. 61). Plaintiff further alleges that Rector “conspired

to conceal [his] actions and inactions from the Plaintiff, and further attempted to

intimidate the Plaintiff from pursuing any claims against Detective Sams.” Id. At this

stage, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allege a causal connection or that Rector

personally participated in the unconstitutional conduct, therefore, plaintiff’s Count

XVIII claim against Rector is not subject to dismissal. See also Bd of Cnty. Comm ‘rs

of Bryan Cnty, Okla v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997) (deliberate indifference

exists when supervisor disregards a known or obvious consequence of his action). 

Rector asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s section

1983 claims. “To invoke qualified immunity, an official must first show that he was

acting within his discretionary authority when the alleged violation occurred.”

Depalis-Lachaud v. Noel, 2013 WL 336359, at *3 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Courson

v. McMillan, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991)). “An official may show that an

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act was within his discretionary authority merely by showing that the acts “(1) ‘were

undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties,’ and (2) were ‘within the scope

of his authority.’” Hardy v. Town of Hayneville, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1189 (M.D.

Ala. 1999) (quoting Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994)). Assuming

that plaintiff’s allegation of conspiring to conceal actions and intimidation are true,

as the court must in a motion to dismiss, defendant Rector has not established that he

was acting within his discretionary authority. Rector is therefore not entitled to

qualified immunity at this stage. 

Conclusion

Defendant’s motion is due to be granted with respect to Captain D. Gregg

Rector in his official capacity and Count XVII is dismissed against Captain Rector.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count XVIII against Captain Rector in his individual

capacity is due to be denied. The court shall so order by Separate Order.

DONE and ORDERED this 22 day of April 2013.

nd

 

INGE PRYTZ JOHNSON

SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

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