Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00618/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00618-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TODD HOFFMAN, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

KEVIN GIBSON, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:17-cv-00618-H-BLM 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. No. 6] 

On March 28, 2017, Plaintiff Todd Hoffman (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against 

Defendant Kevin Gibson (“Defendant”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 

Defendant violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment on account of 

an unreasonable seizure. (Doc. No. 1.) On June 26, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to 

dismiss Defendant’s complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 6.) On 

July 31, 2017, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 

9.) Defendant filed a reply on August 7, 2017. (Doc. No. 10.) 

BACKGROUND 

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court accepts as true all facts alleged and draws 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the claimant. See Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. 

of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court may also 

“take judicial notice of matters of public record,” including documents filed in other court 

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proceedings, as long as they are not “subject to reasonable dispute.” Intri-Plex Tech.. 

Inc. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). The following facts are 

taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. No. 1), as well undisputed matters of public 

record. 

On February 19, 2015, Plaintiff was riding his motorcycle to work. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 

9.) During the ride, Plaintiff was cut off by a motorist driving a Toyota 4 Runner (the 

“Motorist”). (Id.) After Plaintiff attempted to warn the Motorist to be more careful, the 

Motorist drove her car into Plaintiff’s motorcycle and drove off. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff 

pursued the Motorist with the intent of effectuating a citizen’s arrest. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff 

followed the Motorist until she stopped at a 7-Eleven where he proceeded to restrain the 

Motorist and ask someone to call the police. (Id. ¶ 11-12.) 

When the police arrived at the 7-Eleven, they inspected the vehicles, reviewed 

video from Plaintiff’s helmet camera, and ultimately arrested the Motorist. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

Following the arrest, Defendant, a detective, assumed responsibility for the investigation. 

(Id. ¶14.) Defendant released the Motorist from custody and arrested Plaintiff on charges 

of felony false imprisonment and misdemeanor battery. (Id.) Plaintiff pled not guilty to 

the two charges and, when the case went to trial, the jury hung. (Id. ¶ 15.) After a 

mistrial was declared, Plaintiff pled guilty to the charges pursuant to an agreement that 

“upon completion of 24 hours of [community service] and 8 hours of anger managed, 

[Plaintiff] can withdraw his plea and the case will be dismissed. (Doc. No. 6-4 at 2, 

People v. Todd Hoffman, SCS283170, Plea of Guilty/No Contest – Misdemeanor.) 

Plaintiff complied with the agreement and his case was dismissed. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 15; 

Doc. No. 6-5 at 2.) 

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DISCUSSION 

I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD 

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint if the claimant has 

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Conservation Force v. 

Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011). A complaint will survive a motion to 

dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A 

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of 

a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a 

complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Accordingly, dismissal for 

failure to state a claim is proper where the claim “lacks a cognizable legal theory or 

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. 

Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true 

all facts alleged in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

claimant. See Retail Prop. Trust, 768 F.3d at 945. A court may consider documents 

incorporated into the complaint by reference, as well as items that are proper subjects of 

judicial notice. See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). 

II. ANALYSIS 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed on account of the 

underlying criminal case and Plaintiff’s plea agreement. (See Doc. No. 6.) First, 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim must fail because collateral estoppel prevents him 

from now arguing that there was no probable cause to arrest him. (Id. at 5-8.) Second, 

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Defendant argues that any § 1983 relief is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 

(1994). 

Following Plaintiff’s arrest, a California Superior Court held a preliminary hearing 

and found there was probable cause for the charges against Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 6-3, 

Preliminary Hearing Transc.) “[W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been 

determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the 

same parties in any future lawsuit.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). “State 

law governs the application of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion to a state court 

judgment in a federal civil rights action.” Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 

1270 (9th Cir. 1990). In California, collateral estoppel will apply where (1) the issue is 

identical to that decided in a prior proceeding, (2) the issue was actually litigated in the 

proceeding, (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, (4) the decision 

in the prior proceeding was final and on the merits, and (5) the estopped party was in 

privity with the party in the prior proceeding.” People v. Garcia, 39 Cal.4th 1070, 1077 

(2006). 

“As a general rule, each of [the collateral estoppel] requirements will be met when 

courts are asked to give preclusive effect to preliminary hearing probable cause findings 

in subsequent civil actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution.” Wige v. City of 

Los Angeles, 713 F.3d 1183, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013); see also McCutchen v. City of 

Montclair, 73 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147 (1999) (“a prior judicial determination at a 

preliminary hearing that there was sufficient evidence to hold the plaintiff over for trial 

may, in some situations, preclude the plaintiff from relitigating the issue of probable 

cause to arrest in a subsequent civil suit”); Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 288 (9th Cir. 

1994); Forest v. City of Ft. Bragg, 520 Fed.Appx. 616 (9th Cir. 2013). There are two 

exceptions to the general rule. First, collateral estoppel will not apply “[i]f the evidence 

known to the arresting officer is materially different from the evidence presented at the 

preliminary hearing.” Wige, 713 F.3d at 1185. Second, it will not apply “where the 

plaintiff alleges that the arresting officer lied or fabricated evidence presented at the 

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preliminary hearing. Id. at 1186 (quoting McCutchen, 73 Cal.App.4th at 1147). Nothing 

before the Court suggests there is reason to deviate from the general rule. 

Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing was held on February 2, 2015, before Judge 

Stephanie Sontag. (Doc. No. 6-3 at 2.) Plaintiff appeared at the hearing and was 

represented by counsel. (Id.) Judge Sontag heard testimony from Defendant Gibson, 

testifying as the investigating officer, and Plaintiff. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff had the 

opportunity to cross-examine Defendant Gibson at that time. (Id. at 15-28.) The judge 

also reviewed video evidence from the incident between Plaintiff and the Motorist, 

including video recorded by Plaintiff on his helmet camera and surveillance video from 

the 7-Eleven. (Id. at 4.) At the conclusion of evidence, counsel for both sides had the 

opportunity to argue their case to the judge. (Id. at 59-63.) These proceedings offered 

Plaintiff a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue of probable cause and he took 

full advantage of it. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 

2004). 

Plaintiff argues that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue 

of probable cause because the state did not call the Motorist to testify at the preliminary 

hearing. (Doc. No. 9 at 6-7.) But Plaintiff cites to no legal support for this proposition 

and the Court can find none. Plaintiff had the opportunity to call witnesses at the 

preliminary hearing but offers no explanation for why he did not call the Motorist. See 

Cal. Pen. Code § 866(a). And a failure to take advantage of the opportunity to litigate an 

issue will not preclude collateral estoppel. See Forest, 2011 WL 13143893, *6 

(“Plaintiff, however, chose not to present Mr. Soria’s testimony . . . . Plaintiff having 

made that choice cannot now claim that he did not have the opportunity”). 

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s reliance on Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto, 157 

Cal.App.4th 728 (2007), is unavailing. In Schmidlin, a California Court of Appeal 

disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Haupt, as well as the previous California 

Court of Appeal ruling in McCutchen, and held that “a preliminary hearing [n]either 

raises the issue of, or provides an adequate opportunity to litigate, the legality of an 

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arrest.” Id. at 767. Certainly, Schmidlin supports Plaintiff’s argument. However, 

because the California Courts of Appeal are divided on the issue and the California 

Supreme Court has yet to weigh in, the Court will follow Ninth Circuit precedent on 

point. And the Ninth Circuit has clearly rejected Schmidlin, in favor of McCutchen. 

Wige, 713 F.3d at 1185 (“As a general rule, each of [the collateral estoppel] requirements 

will be met when courts are asked to give preclusive effect to preliminary hearing 

probable cause findings in subsequent civil actions for false arrest and malicious 

prosecution.”); Beckway, 717 F.Supp.2d at 919 (“This Court will therefore follow Haupt 

and McCutchen, and not Schmidlin, on this issue.”). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is collaterally 

estopped from arguing there was no probable cause to arrest him. As such, his only claim 

for false arrest necessarily fails. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 

2010) (“The existence of probable cause is dispositive as to false arrest and excessive 

force claims.”); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(“To prevail on his § 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment, Cabrera would have 

to demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest him.”). Accordingly, the Court 

grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 10, 2017 

 Hon. Marilyn L. Huff 

 United States District Judge 

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