Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01923/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01923-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 07CV1923

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENDA L. MARSH,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07CV1923 JLS (AJB)

ORDER: 1) GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 2)

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN

THE ENTIRETY

(Doc. Nos. 39, 41.)

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, and JAY S.

COULTER,

Defendants.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Brenda L. Marsh’s motion for summary judgment

(Doc. No. 39 (Plaintiff’s MSJ)) and Defendants Jay S. Coulter and County of San Diego’s motion

for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 41 (Defendants’ MSJ).) Also before the Court are the

associated oppositions and replies. After consideration, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monell, and California Civil Code § 52.1 claims. 

And having dismissed those claims, this Court DECLINES supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state claims and DISMISSES them WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment is DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY. 

For nearly three decades, the San Diego community has witnessed the legal drama

surrounding the Marsh family. In 1983, two-year-old Phillip Buell died while in the care of

Kenneth M. Marsh. The state prosecuted Mr. Marsh for Phillip’s death and obtained a seconddegree murder conviction. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Mr. Marsh went to prison. 

Many years passed. 

Case 3:07-cv-01923-JLS-AJB Document 55 Filed 02/11/11 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 07CV1923

In 2003, Mr. Marsh filed his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The San Diego

County Superior Court granted the petition at the request of the San Diego District Attorney,

whose recently consulted expert could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Phillip was a

victim of child abuse. The Superior Court set aside Mr. Marsh’s conviction, and he was released. 

By then, he had spent nearly twenty-one years in prison. 

Not long after his release, Mr. Marsh filed a federal action against the County of San Diego

and the medical personnel involved in Phillip’s autopsy. From that case comes the factual basis

for this action. 

As part of Mr. Marsh’s case, his attorneys deposed Jay S. Coulter, the San Diego Deputy

District Attorney who tried Mr. Marsh’s criminal prosecution. Coulter testified that, during his

tenure as Deputy District Attorney, he photocopied sixteen autopsy photos taken of Phillip’s

corpse. Coulter further testified that, in February 2006—after his retirement from the District

Attorney’s Office—he had disseminated at least one such photo to a newspaper and television

station. 

Based on this testimony, Brenda L. Marsh—Mr. Marsh’s wife and Phillip’s mother—filed

the present action. After three years of litigation and two rounds of Rule 12 motions, five causes

of action remain: 

(1) A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Coulter for conduct occurring while Coulter was

employed by the County as deputy district attorney. 

(2) A Monell claim against the County of San Diego for conduct occurring while Coulter

was employed by the County as deputy district attorney.

(3) An intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Coulter and the County.

(4) A negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against Coulter and the County.

(5) Claims for violating California Civil Code §§ 43 and 52.1 against Coulter and the

County.

///

///

///

Case 3:07-cv-01923-JLS-AJB Document 55 Filed 02/11/11 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 07CV1923

The parties cross motion for summary judgment on every claim. After consideration, the

Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the § 1983, Monell, and California

Civil Code § 52.1 claims. With those claims dismissed, the Court declines supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. They are dismissed without prejudice. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a court to grant summary judgment where the

moving party demonstrates (1) the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and (2) entitlement

to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “Material,”

for purposes of Rule 56, means that the fact, under governing substantive law, could affect the

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Freeman v.

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). For a dispute to be “genuine,” a reasonable jury must

be able to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls on the

moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant can carry his burden in two ways: (1) by

presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by

demonstrating that the nonmoving party “failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential

element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Id. at 322–23. “Disputes

over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

Once the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing that a genuine issue of disputed

fact remains. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmoving party cannot oppose a properly supported

summary judgment motion by “rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view all

inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

///

///

Case 3:07-cv-01923-JLS-AJB Document 55 Filed 02/11/11 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 07CV1923

ANALYSIS

The dueling motions for summary judgment aim to resolve every cause of action. But the

Court discusses only three causes of action here: the § 1983 claim against Coulter, the County’s

Monell liability, and violation of California Civil Code § 52.1. The Court finds that Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on each of those claims. And having resolved the federal causes

of action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims

and will not discuss them as a result.

1. Sixteen Autopsy Photos

Before getting to the main analysis, the Court resolves a small point of contention. Perhaps

due to miscommunication, the parties dispute which autopsy photos are at issue in this case. 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges unauthorized copying of sixteen autopsy photos. (Doc.

No. 21 (FAC) ¶ 10.) But Defendants’ motion for summary judgment focuses on just one. (See

Defendants’ MSJ at 5–9.) Doing so drew Plaintiff’s ire. (See Doc. No. 45 at 4–7.) Ultimately,

however, this is a non-issue. Defendants state that their motion for summary judgment applies to

all sixteen photos. (Doc. No. 47 at 4.) The Court agrees. The parties’ motions for summary

judgment and the Court’s Order on the matter concern all sixteen photos. 

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim Against Coulter

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is the core of her complaint and the basis for federal jurisdiction. 

Its fate affects not only Coulter, but also the Monell claim against the County. 

Before embarking on the analysis, it is important to clarify which of Coulter’s actions are

at issue in this claim. Pursuant to the Court’s May 6, 2009 Order, Plaintiff’s § 1983 cause of

action exists to the extent it is “based on Coulter’s liability for copying of the photos during his

employment as a Deputy District Attorney.” (Doc. No. 26 at 4.) Not at issue are allegations of

reproducing the photos for dissemination, or the dissemination itself. (Id.)

A. Legal Standard

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under color of state

law, deprives another of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws

of the United States. Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights but merely a method for

Case 3:07-cv-01923-JLS-AJB Document 55 Filed 02/11/11 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 07CV1923

vindicating federal rights established elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94

(1989). To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or the laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was

committed by a person acting under color of State law.” Long v. Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178,

1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

B. Discussion

There are two necessary prongs for § 1983 liability: (1) the violation of a right protected by

the Constitution or the laws of the United States (2) committed by a person acting under color of

state law. Long, 442 F.3d at 1185. Coulter conceded that he was acting under the color of state

law while employed as a prosecutor. (Doc. 6 at 6; Doc. 20 at 8.) Still at issue, however, is

whether copying autopsy photos constitutes a violation of a right protected by the Constitution or

the laws of the United States.

Plaintiff argues two ways that Coulter’s photocopying violated a right protected by the

Constitution or United States law. First, Plaintiff argues that reproduction of autopsy photos

directly violates a right protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 

Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that California Code of Civil Procedure § 129 creates a right

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The Court considers each path in

turn.

The first path—that reproduction of autopsy photos directly violates a right protected by

the Constitution or laws of the United States—is not fruitful. The Court discusses the violation of

a constitutional right first. 

Plaintiff argues that Coulter’s copying violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy. 

(FAC ¶ 18; Plaintiff’s MSJ at 3, 6; Doc. No. 45 at 6, 9, 12.) The Supreme Court has held that the

right to privacy is implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution as part of the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, see Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684

(1997), or as one of the “penumbral” rights formed by the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut,

381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965). The right is limited, however. It protects “a person’s most basic

decisions about family and parenthood . . . as well as bodily integrity.” California v. F.C.C., 75

Case 3:07-cv-01923-JLS-AJB Document 55 Filed 02/11/11 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 07CV1923

F.3d 1350, 1361 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)). 

And to the extent the right exists, it has been held to encompass and protect “the personal

intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing.” Paris

Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65–66 (1973) (citing a panoply of cases). See also

California v. F.C.C., 75 F.3d at 1361, n.12. 

Given the case law, the Court finds that copying the autopsy photos did not violate

Plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy. That right does not encompass a relative’s interest in a

decedent’s autopsy photos. As crass as it may seem, Plaintiff’s interest in the autopsy photos does

not fall within the class of most basic decisions about family, parenthood, or bodily integrity. 

Plaintiff’s argument that Coulter’s reproduction of the photos directly violated a constitutional

right fails as a matter of law. 

Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the copying violated a right protected by United States

law. Plaintiff asserts that the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), codifies a statutory

right to privacy in “the body and death images of the deceased.” (Doc. 45 at 12–13.) And on

some level, the Supreme Court has stated this much. Nat’l Archives and Records Admin. v.

Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170–71 (2004).

The basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act is “to open agency action to the light

of public scrutiny.” Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976). Each agency is

charged with making its records available to the public. Balanced against this freedom of

information are several exceptions preventing the release of certain information. One exception

prevents the release of information that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Another protects items

“specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.” § 552(b)(3). And another protects “personnel

and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy.” § 552(b)(6). These exceptions form the basis of Plaintiff’s privacyinterest argument. 

But any privacy interest formed out of the FOIA exceptions is formed in the FOIA context. 

And to determine whether the stated privacy interest applies for § 1983 purposes, a relevant

Case 3:07-cv-01923-JLS-AJB Document 55 Filed 02/11/11 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 07CV1923

inquiry is whether the statutory “provision in question was intended to benefit the putative

plaintiff.” Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (internal

formatting omitted).

With this in mind, this Court finds it inappropriate to extend a privacy interest found in the

FOIA context into the present circumstances. It is not apparent that FOIA exceptions, preventing

agencies from releasing certain categories of information, were meant to apply to Plaintiff and the

autopsy photos. Coulter’s photocopying is not comparable to a FOIA request. And as a state

employee, Coulter is not even under FOIA’s purview. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot establish a

violation of a right protected by the laws of the United States through FOIA. 

At this juncture, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the remaining § 1983 prong on the grounds that

reproducing autopsy photos directly violates a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. The Court now considers the alternative path to establishing the remaining § 1983

prong.

Plaintiff argues that California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) § 129 creates a liberty

interest protected by the Due Process Clause. (FAC ¶ 15; Plaintiff’s MSJ at 6, 9; Doc. No. 45 at

15.) And assuming Coulter violated § 129, Plaintiff contends Coulter also ran afoul of the

Constitution in a manner satisfying the remaining § 1983 prong.

Section 129 creates a process for reproducing images made of a deceased person. The

Court provides an abbreviated discussion of the statute here. As a starting point, § 129 prevents

the reproduction of any photographs or video recordings “of the body, or any portion of the body,

of a deceased person.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 129. There are several exceptions, however. For

instance, an image can be reproduced “for use in a criminal action . . . that relates to the death of

that person.” Id. It can also be reproduced after a request to a state court has been granted. Id. 

The parties assume that § 129 creates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process

Clause. They focus their energy discussing whether § 129 applies to the photos Coulter copied. 

Defendants hope to establish that § 129 does not apply to the sixteen photos. By doing so, copying

the photos could not violate § 129 and would not amount to a constitutional violation. Plaintiff

argues the opposite. Upon entering the fray, however, the Court finds it necessary to challenge the

Case 3:07-cv-01923-JLS-AJB Document 55 Filed 02/11/11 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 07CV1923

assumption that § 129 creates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.

“State law may bear upon a claim under the Due Process Clause when the property

interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are created by state law.” Davis v. Scherer, 468

U.S. 183, 193, n.11 (1984). But this doctrine “was recently limited . . . to a certain core of

prisoners’ rights.” Campbell v. Burt, 141 F.3d 927, 930–31 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995)). And that limitation forecloses the use of § 129 as grounds

for a due process claim. This case, § 129, and the photos at issue are not related to prisoners’

rights.

To the extent the doctrine extends beyond prisoners’ rights and captures the situation at

hand, the Court nonetheless finds that § 129 does not create a right protected by the Due Process

Clause. “To create a right protected by the Due Process clause, the state law must provide more

than merely procedure; it must protect some substantive end.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815,

842 (9th Cir. 1995). Section 129 does not protect a substantive end; at most it provides a

procedure. Indeed, § 129 fails to mention, explicitly or implicitly, whom it is intended to benefit. 

And in doing so, the Court finds that the statute does not create or protect a substantive end that

Plaintiff can assert. Violating the statute cannot, therefore, form the basis for a § 1983 violation. 

Section 129 does not create a right protected by the Due Process Clause. Thus, even

assuming § 129 applies to the autopsy photos, and even assuming Coulter violated § 129, such a

violation could not establish the remaining prong of the § 1983 claim.

Both paths to establishing a violation of a right protected by the Constitution or federal law

are blocked. Plaintiff is unable to establish the last prong necessary for § 1983 liability; Coulter’s

actions do not violate a right protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. As a

result, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

C. Conclusion

Plaintiff asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action against Coulter for his copying of

autopsy photos while employed as a Deputy District Attorney. The claim fails because Plaintiff

cannot establish that Coulter’s actions amounted to a violation of a right protected by the

Constitution or the laws of the United States. First, photocopying autopsy photographs does not

Case 3:07-cv-01923-JLS-AJB Document 55 Filed 02/11/11 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 07CV1923

violate the constitutional right to privacy. Second, the Freedom of Information Act does not create

a right to privacy relevant to this situation. And finally, California Code of Civil Procedure § 129

does not create an interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. 

3. Monell Claim Against the County of San Diego

Plaintiff’s Monell claim is a § 1983 claim against the County of San Diego. Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). And a necessary component of a § 1983 claim

is a violation of a right protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Long, 442

F.3d at 1185. Unfortunately, Plaintiff’s claim against the County is also predicated on Coulter’s

copying of the autopsy photos. (Doc. No. 26 at 4.) And as discussed above, these acts cannot

establish a § 1983 claim. Thus, even assuming all the allegations were true, Plaintiff’s Monell

claim fails. Summary judgment on this claim is appropriate in favor of Defendants. 

4. California Civil Code 52.1

Plaintiff also asserts claims for violations of California Civil Code §§ 43 and 52.1. The

Court discusses the § 52.1 claim only. 

Civil Code § 52.1 provides an individual whose exercise or enjoyment of state or federal

rights have been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, with a private cause of action. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. To make a claim, Plaintiff must establish an attempted or completed act of

interference, accompanied by threats, intimidation, or coercion. City and Cnty. of S.F. v. Ballard,

136 Cal. App. 4th 381, 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). See also Cal. Civ. Code 52.1(a).

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing this cause of action. And here, Plaintiff has failed

to do so. There is no evidence of acts perpetrated by Coulter that could be construed as threats,

violence, or intimidation. Even assuming Coulter attempted or completed an act of interference,

the lack of threats, violence, or intimidation is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim. Summary judgment on

this claim is appropriate in Defendants’ favor.

5. Conclusion

Both parties moved for summary judgment on all causes of action. But the Court found it

suitable to consider only three: the § 1983 claim, the Monell claim, and the California Civil Code

Case 3:07-cv-01923-JLS-AJB Document 55 Filed 02/11/11 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 07CV1923

§ 52.1 claim. Plaintiff failed to establish a legal basis for the argument that copying autopsy

photographs violated a right protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Thus,

Plaintiff failed to make out a necessary element of her § 1983 claim against Coulter and the

County of San Diego. Moreover, California Civil Code § 52.1 requires Plaintiff to show the

presence of threats, intimidation, or coercion. Plaintiff failed to do so. The Court grants summary

judgment in favor of Defendants on all three claims. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment in the entirety. Summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, the Monell claim, and the

California Civil Code § 52.1 claim is GRANTED in favor of Defendants. Having resolved the

federal causes of action, the Court DECLINES supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims. Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional

distress, and California Civil Code § 43 claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice (Doc. Nos. 45-5, 46-5) and supplemental

objections and motion to strike (Doc. Nos. 45-3, 46-3) are unnecessary to the disposition of these

matters. The Court DISMISSES both AS MOOT.

This order concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk SHALL close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 11, 2011

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-01923-JLS-AJB Document 55 Filed 02/11/11 Page 10 of 10