Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07072/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07072-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 23, 2014 Decided January 13, 2015

No. 13-7072

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

v.

RELIABLE LIMOUSINE SERVICE, LLC AND 

PAUL BENJAMIN RODBERG,

APPELLANTS

Consolidated with 13-7161

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-00576)

Elyse L. Strickland argued the cause for the appellants. 

Maurice B. VerStandig was with her on brief.

Jeffrey M. Lehmann argued the cause for the appellee. 

William S. Morrow Jr., was with him on brief. 

Before: HENDERSON and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:

The Wise do at once what the Fool does at last.

— Baltasar Gracián

The Art of Worldly Wisdom, cclxviii

Paul Rodberg operated a limousine business in the District of 

Columbia metropolitan area (District) for many years without 

authorization from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Commission (WMATC). WMATC eventually sued Rodberg 

and his company in district court, seeking an injunction to

shut down his illegal limousine operation. After Rodberg

failed to participate in discovery, the district court entered

default judgment against him. Not to be outfoxed, Rodberg 

ignored the default judgment and continued operating his 

limousine business under a different name. The district court 

issued yet another order, making perfectly clear that all of 

Rodberg’s companies were enjoined from transporting 

passengers in the District without a license. Rodberg now 

appeals the default judgment and the subsequent order. We 

affirm the district court’s default judgment and lack 

jurisdiction to consider the subsequent order.

I. BACKGROUND

Rodberg is in the limousine business. He has owned 

several iterations of a company providing limousine service in 

the District. From 1996 to 2009, Rodberg operated Reliable 

Limousine, Inc. (RLI). RLI repeatedly failed to pay its 

federal taxes. The Internal Revenue Service eventually 

caught up with Rodberg but, instead of paying the taxes owed, 

Rodberg shifted his limousine business to a new company:

Reliable Limousine Service, LLC (RLS). RLS operated from 

2009 to 2011 but it too failed to pay taxes. The IRS again 

pursued and Rodberg again shifted his business to a new 

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company: Reliable Limousine and Bus Service, LLC (RLBS). 

The United States sued Rodberg, RLI, RLS and RLBS in the 

District of Maryland, seeking injunctive relief to force their 

compliance with the tax laws. At one point in the litigation, 

the district court held Rodberg in contempt for “willfully and 

deliberately” refusing to participate in discovery. See Order 

of Contempt at 1, United States v. Reliable Limo. Serv., LLC, 

No. 8:11-cv-03383 (D. Md. Oct. 22, 2012). Rodberg and the 

United States ultimately settled.

Rodberg’s legal woes did not end there. His limousine 

companies not only failed to pay their taxes but also 

transported passengers within the District without a license. 

In April 2012, WMATC sued Rodberg and RLS in the district 

court here, seeking an injunction to shut down Rodberg’s

limousine operation. (Notably, RLBS was not a party to the

lawsuit.) The district court originally set the discovery 

deadline for November 2012. In October 2012, WMATC 

served Rodberg with interrogatories and document requests. 

Rodberg never responded. In December, the district court 

ordered Rodberg to participate in discovery, extended the 

discovery deadline to January 2013 and set the case for trial in 

March 2013. Rodberg remained non-compliant. He claimed 

he was not participating in discovery because he was at that 

point applying for a WMATC license.

1

 In February 2013, the 

district court rejected Rodberg’s excuse and sanctioned him

by awarding WMATC a default judgment. See WMATC v. 

Reliable Limo. Serv., LLC, No. 1:12-cv-00576, 2013 WL 

 1 WMATC ultimately rejected Rodberg’s application and the Fourth 

Circuit affirmed its decision. See In re Reliable Limo. & Bus Serv., LLC, 

Nos. AP-2012-183, AP-2012-184, Order No. 13,775 (WMATC Feb. 28, 

2013), aff’d sub nom. Reliable Limo. & Bus Serv., LLC v. WMATC, 553 F. 

App’x 343 (4th Cir. 2014). The Fourth Circuit, like this Court, has 

jurisdiction to review WMATC orders. See Pub. L. No. 101–505, tit. II, 

art. XIII, § 5(a), 104 Stat. 1300, 1311–12.

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461355, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2013). The default judgment 

included a permanent injunction that prohibited Rodberg and 

RLS from transporting passengers for hire in the District.

2

But WMATC’s victory was short-lived. It soon 

discovered what the IRS knew all too well: pursuing Rodberg 

was like playing whack-a-mole. Rodberg continued to 

provide limousine service in the District via RLBS, not RLS. 

This prompted WMATC to return to district court to seek a 

contempt citation. Instead, the district court decided to 

“clarify” its February injunction. WMATC v. Reliable Limo.

Serv., LLC, 985 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31–32 (D.D.C. 2013). In 

October 2013, it issued an order expressly placing RLBS 

under the February 2013 injunction’s prohibition on 

transporting passengers for hire.

3

 2 The February 2013 injunction provides, in relevant part:

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendants 

Rodberg and Reliable Limousine Service, LLC, are 

permanently enjoined from transporting passengers for hire 

between points within the Metropolitan District unless and until 

properly authorized by the Washington Metropolitan Area 

Transit Commission (“WMATC”) . . . .

Order and Default Judgment at 1, WMATC v. Reliable Limo. Serv., LLC, 

No. 1:12-cv-00576 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2013).

3 The October 2013 order states, in full:

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum 

Opinion, the Court clarifies the scope of its February 6, 2013 

Order. It is hereby:

ORDERED AND DECREED that because Reliable 

Limousine and Bus Service, LLC (“RLBS”) is “in privity” with 

defendant Paul Rodberg, RLBS is also permanently enjoined 

from transporting passengers for hire between points within the 

Metropolitan District unless and until properly authorized by 

the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission 

(“WMATC”). RLBS must comply with this Order by Friday, 

November 8, 2013; it is further

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Rodberg4 appealed both the February injunction and the

October order. We ex mero motu consolidated Rodberg’s two 

appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Although Rodberg’s appeals are consolidated, we analyze 

them separately. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(b) advisory 

committee’s note (1998) (“consolidated appeals . . . do not 

merge into one”); D.C. CIRCUIT HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND 

INTERNAL PROCEDURES 24 (2013) (“Each [consolidated] case 

retains some of its individual identity . . . .”). In Case No. 13-

7072, Rodberg challenges the February 2013 injunction, 

which the district court issued via the default judgment. In 

Case No. 13-7161, Rodberg challenges the district court’s 

October 2013 order, which expressly made RLBS subject to

the February 2013 injunction.

 

ORDERED that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), 

Rodberg’s agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, as well 

as any other persons or entities who are in active concert or 

participation with Rodberg or anyone described above, are 

permanently enjoined from transporting passengers for hire 

between points within the Metropolitan District unless and until 

properly authorized by the WMATC; and it is further

ORDERED that, subject to the limitations of Rule 65(d), 

any entity created or controlled, directly or indirectly, by 

Rodberg, now or in the future, is permanently enjoined from 

transporting passengers for hire between points within the 

Metropolitan District unless and until properly authorized by 

the WMATC.

Order at 1–2, WMATC v. Reliable Limo. Serv., LLC, No. 1:12-cv-00576

(D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2013).

4 For convenience, we refer to appellants Rodberg and RLS collectively as 

“Rodberg.”

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A. Case No. 13-7072

(Default Judgment/Injunction)

Rodberg contests the district court’s entry of default 

judgment as a sanction for his discovery lapse. Although he

does not dispute that his conduct was sanctionable, Rodberg

argues that the punishment does not fit the crime.

We review the district court’s imposition of discovery 

sanctions, including a default judgment award, for abuse of 

discretion. See NHL v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 

639, 642 (1976); Webb v. Dist. of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 

971 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The abuse-of-discretion standard, 

however, is “a verbal coat of many colors.” Henry J. 

Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 

763 (1982) (internal alteration omitted). “[D]efining the 

proper scope of review . . . requires considering in each 

situation the benefits of closer appellate scrutiny as compared 

to those of greater deference.” Id. at 756. With a default 

judgment, our review is more “thorough” because the

“drastic” sanction “deprives a party completely of its day in 

court.” Webb, 146 F.3d at 971. Moreover, there are

limitations on the district court’s ability to enter default 

judgment as a discovery sanction. A default judgment is 

inappropriate unless the litigant’s misconduct is accompanied 

by “willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Founding Church of 

Scientology v. Webster, 802 F.2d 1448, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 

(internal alterations omitted). The district court also has a 

“duty to explain” its decision to award default judgment 

instead of a lesser sanction. Webb, 146 F.3d at 971. We then 

conduct an independent review to determine whether the 

district court abused its discretion. See id. at 972. Because 

the parties do not dispute Rodberg’s willfulness, we turn to 

the district court’s choice of sanction.

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To determine whether the district court abused its 

discretion by entering default judgment as a discovery 

sanction, we evaluate the following factors: (1) prejudice to 

the opposing party, (2) prejudice to the judicial system and (3) 

the need for punishment and deterrence. See Shea v. Donohoe 

Constr. Co., 795 F.2d 1071, 1074–79 (D.C. Cir. 1986). These 

factors are non-exhaustive and we must consider “all the 

relevant circumstances” surrounding the entry of default 

judgment. Bristol Petrol. Corp. v. Harris, 901 F.2d 165, 167 

(D.C. Cir. 1990) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.). Still, we pay “great 

deference” to the district court’s decision because it has “a 

better ‘feel’ . . . for the litigation and the remedial actions 

most appropriate under the circumstances presented.” 

Founding Church of Scientology, 802 F.2d at 1457; see also

Bristol Petrol. Corp., 901 F.2d at 167 (appellate court should 

be “hesitant to type the exercise of a district court’s dismissal 

authority as an abuse of discretion” because district court has

“front-line responsibility for operating the judicial system”

(citations omitted)). After a careful review of the Shea 

factors, we are convinced that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion by entering default judgment against Rodberg.

Prejudice to the Opposing Party: Rodberg’s

recalcitrance prejudiced WMATC in a direct and obvious 

manner. Each day of delay was another day that Rodberg 

illegally operated his limousine business. Granted, delay that 

merely prolongs litigation “is not a sufficient basis for 

establishing prejudice.” Berthelsen v. Kane, 907 F.2d 617, 

621 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 

916 (2d Cir. 1983)). But, here, there was more: in

transporting passengers in the District without a license, 

Rodberg jeopardized the public safety. See generally Pub. L. 

No. 101–505, tit. II, art. XI, 104 Stat. 1300, 1304–09

(outlining requirements WMATC licensees must follow); see 

also New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2005) 

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(finding prejudice from delay that “endanger[ed] the public 

health and safety”). The first Shea factor weighs in favor of 

the district court’s decision.

Prejudice to the Judicial System: Rodberg also interfered 

with the district court’s ability to manage its docket. In

February 2013—one month before trial—Rodberg had not 

responded to any of WMATC’s requested discovery. The 

district court was thus faced with a choice: enter default 

judgment or postpone the trial. We have described such a 

choice as “intolerable.” Shea, 795 F.2d at 1075; see also

Bristol Petrol. Corp., 901 F.2d at 168 n.5 (“[I]n several cases 

affirming pre-trial dismissals, courts have featured the fact 

that the party’s delay occurred close to the time of trial and 

threatened to upset the court’s carefully planned calendar.”). 

Litigants do not exist in a vacuum; misconduct like Rodberg’s 

can reverberate throughout the judicial system. See Perkinson 

v. Gilbert/Robinson, Inc., 821 F.2d 686, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 

(“Litigants who are willful in halting the discovery process . . 

. in this era of crowded dockets . . . deprive other litigants of 

an opportunity to use the courts as a serious disputesettlement mechanism.”). This is not a case in which the 

district court could have addressed Rodberg’s misconduct by 

simply granting a continuance. Cf. Webb, 146 F.3d at 974–

75. The district court had already moved the discovery 

deadline twice—first, from November to December and, then,

from December to January. The district court had no reason 

to expect that, if it granted yet another continuance, Rodberg 

would meet his discovery responsibilities. See Automated 

Datatron, Inc. v. Woodcock, 659 F.2d 1168, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 

1981) (“[I]t was not an abuse of discretion to rule that two 

weeks short of trial was too late [to take certain action] . . . 

when the court had directed the litigant to take that action half 

a year earlier.”); Lee v. Max Int’l, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1321 

(10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]hree strikes are more than enough to 

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allow the district court to call a litigant out.”). Accordingly, 

the second Shea factor also weighs in favor of the district 

court’s decision.

Deterrence and Punishment: Discovery sanctions serve 

two purposes: punishing disobedient parties and deterring 

others from emulating their behavior. See NHL, 427 U.S. at 

643; Jankins v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 21 F.3d 436, 445 (D.C. 

Cir. 1994). On the spectrum of discovery misconduct, 

Rodberg’s behavior was egregious. See NHL, 427 U.S. at 643 

(approving default judgment where litigant exhibited “flagrant 

bad faith” and “callous disregard” of discovery obligations); 

Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 

(“default judgments were designed to handle[] a totally 

unresponsive party”). His refusal to participate in discovery 

was not only willful but appeared to be a calculated move to 

delay for the sake of delay. See Butera v. Dist. of Columbia, 

235 F.3d 637, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[Discovery sanctions] 

ensure that a party will not be able to profit from its own 

failure to comply with the rules.”); H.F. Livermore Corp. v. 

Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. 

Cir. 1970) (“[T]he possibility of a default is a deterrent to 

those parties who choose delay as part of their litigative 

strategy.”). This factor weighs most strongly in favor of the 

district court’s decision.

Notably, Rodberg has yet to offer a plausible excuse for 

his failure to participate in discovery. He claimed in district 

court that he was not participating because he first wanted to 

hear from WMATC about his license application. The district 

court correctly rejected this excuse. Litigants cannot pick and 

choose the legal proceedings they want to participate in at any 

given time. See Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 

547 (7th Cir. 2006) (“the pendency of [other] cases . . . did 

not justify the [litigant’s] failure to respond to . . . written 

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discovery requests throughout the discovery period”). 

Rodberg’s non-excuse suggests that his motivation was far 

from bona fide and thus deserving of harsh sanctions. See 

Bristol Petrol. Corp., 901 F.2d at 168 (affirming default 

judgment because litigant exhibited “lack of any effort to 

comply with the court’s order” and offered “no colorable 

explanation”); Automated Datatron, 659 F.2d at 1170 

(affirming default judgment because litigant exhibited 

“prolonged” and “conspicuous disregard of the trial court’s 

order” and provided “[n]o special circumstances” to explain 

misconduct); Hughes v. Holland, 320 F.2d 781, 782 (D.C. 

Cir. 1963) (affirming default judgment because litigant made 

“no showing of diligence” and “offered no adequate legal 

excuse for her neglect”).

In addition, Rodberg is a discovery repeat offender. In 

2012, the District of Maryland held Rodberg in contempt for 

deliberately ignoring the IRS’s discovery requests. Rodberg’s

history of discovery misconduct indicates that his lawlessness 

needs the harshest sanction to make him comply. See

Johnson v. CIR, 289 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 2002) 

(“[D]ogged good-faith persistence in bad conduct becomes 

sanctionable once [the guilty party] learns or should have 

learned that it is sanctionable.”); Moody v. Miller, 864 F.2d 

1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[M]indful of [the litigant’s] past

history with the federal courts, the imposition of [dismissal as 

a] sanction[] was a valid exercise of the court’s discretion.”). 

Moreover, Rodberg ignored his discovery obligations in the 

IRS litigation while he was represented by different counsel, 

manifesting that Rodberg himself is the person responsible for 

his discovery delicts. This is not a case in which “an 

unwitting litigant [is] made to suffer for the sins of her 

attorney.” Bristol Petrol. Corp., 901 F.2d at 167; cf. also

Shea, 795 F.2d at 1078 (“We look disfavorably upon 

dismissals as sanctions for attorney misconduct or delay 

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unless the client himself has been made aware of the problem, 

usually through notice from the trial court.” (emphasis in 

original)). Rodberg’s history of self-directed discovery 

misconduct plainly supports the district court’s sanction of 

default judgment in this case.

Rodberg offers two responses, both unpersuasive. He 

claims that the district court violated two hard-and-fast rules

in entering default judgment against him. Neither “rule,” 

however, exists under our case law.

First, Rodberg argues that the district court had a duty to 

impose a lesser sanction before opting for default judgment. 

We have repeatedly rejected this proposition. See, e.g., Webb, 

146 F.3d at 971 (“we do not require a district court . . . to 

exhaust lesser sanctions before turning to default”); Shepherd 

v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 

(“[A] district court need not exhaust other options before . . . 

imposing a default judgment.”); Founding Church of 

Scientology, 802 F.2d at 1459 n.15 (“Prior resort to lesser 

remedies is not . . . required regardless of the circumstances 

presented.”). Although the district court must explain why a 

lesser sanction is inadequate, it has no duty to impose it first, 

entering default judgment only after the lesser sanction fails.

Second, Rodberg contends that the district court 

erroneously entered default judgment based on a single

violation of the discovery rules. Rodberg is mistaken, both 

legally and factually. We have never held that a district court 

cannot enter default judgment based on a single discovery 

violation. Granted, we have said that “under certain 

circumstances, dismissal may be an unduly severe sanction 

for a single episode of misconduct.” Bristol Petrol. Corp., 

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901 F.2d at 167.

5

 But we have also affirmed a dismissal

based on “a single incident of misconduct” if a “disruption of 

the judicial system” or “clear client responsibility for the 

misconduct” occurred. Ripalda v. Am. Operations Corp., 977 

F.2d 1464, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing, as examples,

Automated Datatron, 659 F.2d 1168 and Bristol Petrol.

Corp., 901 F.2d 165). As noted, both factors—disruption of 

the judicial system and clear client responsibility—are present 

here. See supra pp. 8, 10–11.

In any event, Rodberg wrongly argues that he has 

committed only one discovery violation. Rodberg violated 

the discovery rules in January 2013 when he ignored the 

district court’s order compelling discovery. See FED. R. CIV.

P. 37(b)(2). Two months earlier, however, Rodberg also 

violated the discovery rules by failing to respond to 

WMATC’s interrogatories. See FED. R. CIV. P.

37(d)(1)(A)(ii). A litigant can be sanctioned for failing to

respond to interrogatories even without a court order. See

Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 

Indeed, we have emphasized the heightened need for a 

sanction that bites in this context:

If parties are allowed to flout their [discovery] 

obligations, choosing to wait to make a response [to 

interrogatories] until a trial court has lost patience 

with them, the effect will be to embroil trial judges 

in day-to-day supervision of discovery, a result 

 5 We once said that “a single act of misconduct seldom if ever can justify 

dismissal.” Camps v. C & P Tel. Co., 692 F.2d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 

(emphasis added). But that statement—to the extent that it may articulate 

a rule—is dictum. See Trakas v. Quality Brands, Inc., 759 F.2d 185, 190 

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The expansive dictum in Camps

. . . is plainly an exaggeration insofar as the ‘if ever’ is concerned.”).

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directly contrary to the overall scheme of the federal 

discovery rules.

Id. at 235–36. Additionally, as noted, Rodberg previously 

committed discovery violations in the IRS litigation. The 

district court properly took his earlier misconduct into 

account, even though it occurred in a different case and in a 

different federal court. See Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 

F.2d 239, 246 (1st Cir. 1992) (“The totality of the 

circumstances [when reviewing discovery sanctions] can 

include events which did not occur in the case proper but 

occurred in other cases and are, by their nature, relevant to the 

pending controversy.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory 

committee’s note (1993) (in considering sanctions, court can 

weigh “whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in 

other litigation”).

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion when it entered default judgment 

against Rodberg as a sanction for his total discovery lapse. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s February 2013 order 

awarding permanent injunctive relief.

B. Case No. 13-7161

(Clarification Order)

Rodberg next challenges the district court’s October 2013 

order, which detailed the scope of its February 2013 

injunction. Originally, the parties did not contest our 

jurisdiction but we must nonetheless assure ourselves that we 

have it. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 

(2006). And, after asking them to address our jurisdiction at 

oral argument, WMATC now challenges it. We are 

convinced that we lack jurisdiction in Case No. 13-7161 and 

therefore do not reach the merits of Rodberg’s challenges to 

the October 2013 order. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

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Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Jurisdiction is power to 

declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function 

remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and 

dismissing the cause.” (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 

506, 514 (1868))).

We have jurisdiction to hear appeals from “final 

decisions” of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A “final” 

order under section 1291 “terminates the litigation between 

the parties on the merits of the case, and leaves nothing to be 

done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.” 

United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d 839, 846 

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting St. Louis, IM & S. Ry. Co. v. S.

Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1883)). Applying this 

description, we conclude that the October 2013 order is not a 

final, independently appealable order. The district court did 

not hold Rodberg in contempt, as WMATC requested, and 

plainly did not “terminate[] the litigation . . . on the merits.” 

See id.; accord Mamma Mia’s Trattoria, Inc. v. Original 

Brooklyn Water Bagel Co., 768 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 

2014).

To allow us to consider Rodberg’s challenges to the 

October 2013 order, he must identify an exception to section 

1291’s finality requirement.6 Only one exception is relevant 

here. Section 1292(a)(1) gives us jurisdiction over appeals of

“[i]nterlocutory orders . . . modifying . . . injunctions.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We construe this exception “narrowly,” 

lest we “turn the barrier against piecemeal appeals into Swiss 

 6 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (certification by district court); id. § 1651 

(writ of mandamus); FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (partial final judgment in multi–

claim/party proceeding); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 

541, 546 (1949) (collateral order doctrine); Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 

1128, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (criminal contempt).

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cheese.” Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. Dist. of Columbia, 671 

F.3d 1258, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2012). An order that merely 

clarifies an injunction does not “modify[]” it under section 

1292(a)(1). See Philip Morris, 686 F.3d at 844–45. To 

distinguish between a clarification and a modification, we 

look at the “actual effect” of the order, not its “form.” Id. at 

844; see also United States v. W. Elec. Co., 777 F.2d 23, 29 

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (because “clarification and modification may 

be virtually indistinguishable . . . appealability depends not on 

terminology but on the substantive effect of the order” 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). An order 

“modifies” an injunction only if it “actually changes the legal 

relationship of the parties.” Philip Morris, 686 F.3d at 844.

Here, the February 2013 injunction originally prohibited

Rodberg and RLS from transporting passengers for hire in the 

District without a license. The October 2013 order expressly 

included RLBS in that prohibition. Thus, the clarificationversus-modification question turns on whether RLBS was 

already bound by the February injunction.

7

 If so, the October 

order is a clarification because it did not “actually change[] 

the legal relationship of the parties.” Philip Morris, 686 F.3d 

at 844.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), an 

injunction automatically applies to “(A) the parties; (B) the

parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; 

and (C) other persons who are in active concert or 

participation with . . . (A) or (B).” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2). 

An injunction covers these persons/entities even if they are 

not expressly mentioned in the text of the order. See 11A 

 7 We need not tarry over the rest of the October 2013 order. The other 

provisions merely incorporate the language of Rule 65(d)(2). See supra

note 3.

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WRIGHT & MILLER § 2956 (3d ed. 2014). Rule 65(d)(2)

incorporates the common-law principle that an injunction “not 

only binds the parties defendant but also those identified with 

them in interest, in ‘privity’ with them, represented by them 

or subject to their control.” Golden State Bottling Co. v. 

NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 179 (1973); see also 11A WRIGHT &

MILLER § 2956 (Rule 65(d) does not expand or contract the 

pre-1938 practice in the courts of equity). The Rule ensures

that a defendant cannot “nullify” an injunction “by carrying 

out prohibited acts through aiders and abettors” who “were 

not parties to the original proceeding.” Regal Knitwear Co. v. 

NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945).

Rodberg contends that he is merely RLBS’s employee or 

agent. Cf. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Reinert & Duree, P.C., 

191 F.3d 297, 304 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he mere fact of 

an employer/employee . . . or principal/agent relationship, 

without more, does not necessarily satisfy [Rule 65(d)(2)], at 

least where the consequence would be to extend the 

injunction to cover the dominant party.” (emphasis added)). 

He invokes the Wizard-of-Oz defense, hoping we “pay no 

attention to that man behind the curtain.” THE WIZARD OF OZ

(Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939). But Rule 65 requires us, like 

Toto, to pull back the curtain to expose the reality. Once we 

do, it is plain that Rodberg and RLBS are so related that an 

injunction binding the former also binds the latter.

8

 On this 

record, Rodberg completely controls RLBS: He is the 

President and sole shareholder. RLBS operates for Rodberg’s

benefit and he can cease its operation at any time. See

 8 For the same reason, Rodberg cannot plausibly claim that RLBS lacked 

“actual notice” of the injunction. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2); see Ex parte 

Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 554 (1897) (“To render a person amenable to an 

injunction, it is neither necessary that he should have been a party to the 

suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have been actually served 

with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have had actual notice.”).

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Jefferson Sch. of Soc. Sci. v. Subversive Activities Control 

Bd., 331 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (finding privity between 

two entities where one was “substantially dominated, directed 

and controlled” by other and “operate[d] primarily to achieve 

[its] objectives”); Drier v. Tarpon Oil Co., 522 F.2d 199, 200 

(5th Cir. 1975) (“president and major stockholder” who made 

“ultimate decisions” for corporation in privity with it). 

Moreover, RLBS simply carries on the business of the nowdefunct RLS—an entity expressly named in the February 

injunction. See Regal Knitwear, 324 U.S. at 14 (injunctions 

also bind “successors and assigns who operate as ‘merely a 

disguised continuance of the old employer’ . . . whether [the 

business was transferred] as a means of evading the judgment 

or for other reasons” (citations omitted)); Vacco v. Operation

Rescue Nat’l, 80 F.3d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding successor 

organization bound by injunction because its leadership, goals 

and activities were identical to enjoined predecessor). Given 

the identity of interest among Rodberg and his limousine 

companies, the February injunction forbad RLBS—and any 

similar company that Rodberg creates—from operating a 

limousine business in the District without a license. See G. & 

C. Merriam Co. v. Webster Dictionary Co., 639 F.2d 29, 38 

(1st Cir. 1980) (if “the same person continu[es] to do 

essentially the same thing with the same high degree of 

practical control, discretion and responsibility, before and 

after the injunction, with knowledge of the injunction, and 

after participating in the enjoined firm’s corporate 

decisionmaking regarding its position in the injunction 

proceedings,” then “corporations founded by him are also 

subject to it”).

Rodberg asks us to respect the separate corporate identity

of RLBS. But identity—of the corporate or the flesh-andblood variety—is not determinative under Rule 65(d)(2). See 

Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund v. Gary’s Elec. Serv. Co., 

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340 F.3d 373, 386 (6th Cir. 2003) (piercing corporate veil is 

not required to apply Rule 65(d)(2)). The Rule plainly 

contemplates that an injunction against one person can bind 

entirely separate persons. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(C) 

(injunction automatically binds “persons who are in active 

concert or participation” with enjoined party); see also Roe v. 

Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 871 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The 

law does not permit the instigator of contemptuous conduct to 

absolve himself of contempt liability by leaving the physical 

performance of the forbidden conduct to others.”). In 

essence, Rodberg wants to use RLBS to do indirectly—

operate without a license—what he is enjoined from doing 

directly. “The bald statement of this contention is its own 

refutation.” United States v. Schine, 260 F.2d 552, 556 (2d 

Cir. 1958); see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 

974 (3d Cir. 1996) (Rosenn, J.) (“Formalism is often the last 

refuge of scoundrels . . . .”).

We conclude that the district court’s October 2013 order 

did not modify the February 2013 injunction because RLBS 

was already bound by the earlier order as a matter of law. See

Pimentel & Sons Guitar Makers, Inc. v. Pimentel, 477 F.3d 

1151, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2007) (order clarified, rather than 

modified, earlier injunction because it “was nothing more 

than . . . an explanation of its application to [an additional 

party] within the parameters of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure”). Accordingly, we are without

jurisdiction to review the October 2013 order.

9

 9 That we lack jurisdiction to consider the October 2013 order does not 

mean that Rodberg is free to violate it. Our holding necessarily moots 

Rodberg’s challenges to the October 2013 order because, as we have 

determined, the February 2013 injunction already bound RLBS.

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

entry of default judgment in Case No. 13-7072 and dismiss 

Case No. 13-7161 for want of jurisdiction.

So ordered.

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