Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01172/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01172-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM ANDERSON,

CDCR No. AT-8924

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; RICHARD J. 

DONOVAN CORRECTIONAL 

FACILITY; O'DELL; P. CORTEZ; G. 

STRATTON; PARAMO; C. YORK; E. 

AUKERMAN,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01172-LAB-JLB

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM AND 

FOR SEEKING MONETARY 

DAMAGES AGAINST IMMUNE 

DEFENDANTS

I. Procedural History

On May 13, 2016, William Anderson (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate currently 

incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights 

complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff did not 

prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his Complaint; 

instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915(a) (Doc. No. 3). 

On June 20, 2016, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but 

simultaneously dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted and for seeking monetary damages against immune defendants. (Doc. 

No. 4). Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint to correct the 

deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. Id. at 7-8. On June 24, 2016, 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. No. 8).

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires the Court to review 

complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are 

“incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated 

delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, 

pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte 

dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint, which is frivolous, malicious, fails 

to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

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the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and 

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations” are simply not 

“sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

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that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Improper Defendant

Despite the Court’s previous ruling dismissing these Defendants, Plaintiff once 

again names the State of California and the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility 

(“RJD”) as Defendants. (See FAC at 1-2.) However, his claims must be dismissed sua 

sponte pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim 

and for seeking damages against a defendant who is immune. The State of California’s 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and any state prison, like RJD, correctional 

agency, sub-division, or department under its jurisdiction, are not “persons” subject to 

suit under § 1983. Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(holding that a state department of corrections is an arm of the state, and thus, not a 

“person” within the meaning of § 1983). In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to

sue the State of California itself for monetary damages, his claims are clearly barred by 

the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) 

(“There can be no doubt . . . that [a] suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless [the State] has consented to the filing of such 

a suit.”). 

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against RJD or against 

the State of California, these claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2) without leave to amend.

D. Fourteenth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated when he was housed in 

disciplinary segregation from November 11, 2015 to December 17, 2015. (See FAC at 

6.) The Due Process Clause protects prisoners against deprivation or restraint of “a 

protected liberty interest” and “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 

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to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 

2003) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Although the level of the hardship must be determined in a case-by-case 

determination, courts look to:

1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed 

upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus 

comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; 2) the duration of the 

condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3) whether the state’s 

action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence.

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87). Only if an inmate has 

alleged facts sufficient to show a protected liberty interest does the court next consider 

“whether the procedures used to deprive that liberty satisfied Due Process.” Ramirez, 334 

F.3d at 860.

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to allege facts which show that the 

conditions in ad-seg subjected him to any “atypical and significant hardship in relation to 

the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 584. While Plaintiff refers 

to having depression, Plaintiff does not compare the conditions of his confinement before 

or after his placement in ad-seg. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s pleading contains no “factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that Defendants’ actions 

“presented a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [Plaintiff’s] indeterminate 

sentence,” or caused him to suffer an “atypical” or “significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 

U.S. at 584-85; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a Fourteenth 

Amendment due process claim.

E. Eighth Amendment claims

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Plaintiff also suggests that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he 

gave Defendants “information about safety concerns.” (FAC at 4.) Plaintiff does not 

clearly identify those concerns in his FAC. 

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety and well-being of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–

33 (1994); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). To state an Eighth 

Amendment failure to protect claim, however, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to 

plausibly show that (1) he faced conditions posing a “substantial risk of serious harm” to 

his health or safety, and (2) the individual prison officials he seeks to hold liable were 

“deliberately indifferent” to those risks. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 

F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). To demonstrate deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must 

show that the defendant both knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm 

to his health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, Plaintiff must allege “the official 

[was] both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exist[ed], and [that] he . . . also dr[e]w that inference.” Id.

There are no facts from which the Court could conclude that any Defendant acted 

with “deliberate indifference” to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. Here, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff fails to allege that any Defendant was aware of any facts demonstrating an 

“obvious” risk and failed to take any action. Farmer, 511 U.S. 842; see also Lolli v. 

County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Much like recklessness in 

criminal law, deliberate indifference . . . may be shown by circumstantial evidence when 

the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a risk of harm.”).

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a plausible claim for relief under 

§ 1983, and must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 

§ 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

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III. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim 

and for seeking monetary damages against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date 

of this Order in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of 

pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without 

reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in 

the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal 

Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 

896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not 

re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

2. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending. 

Dated: July 29, 2016

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

United States District Judge

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