Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00353/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00353-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KAM WONG,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALAMEDA COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-00353-JST 

ORDER SCREENING FOURTH 

AMENDED COMPLAINT; ORDERING 

SERVICE ON DEFENDANT MILLER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner at Glenn Dyer Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. His fourth amended complaint (ECF No. 62) is now before the Court for review 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review 

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 

(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 

necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 

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Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations [in order to state a complaint], . . 

. a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . 

. . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must

proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Complaint

1. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that on September 9, 2017, he was housed at Santa Rita Jail (“SRJ”). On 

that day, in retaliation for informing deputies that if they used force to transfer him, he would file 

lawsuits against them for use of excessive force, Plaintiff was transferred to Housing Unit No. 2, 

F-Pod, which is unfit for habitation, and housed with mentally ill inmates, despite not being 

mentally ill.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on September 9, 2017, when he refused to move to 

Housing Unit No. 6, F-Pod, he was placed in Housing Unit No. 6’s isolation cell. Named 

defendant Deputy Dominguez summoned Deputy Rasendez to Plaintiff’s isolation cell. Deputy 

Rasendez, without provocation, threatened to send five to six deputies to forcibly transfer Plaintiff 

to F-Pod. Plaintiff responded that if the deputies roughed him up, he would file a lawsuit against 

them for use of excessive force. In response to the threat of litigation, Defendant Domingeuz 

falsely informed named defendant SRJ Deputy Miller that Plaintiff had threatened to fight jail 

deputies. In response to Plaintiff’s threat of litigation, Defendant Miller then informed named 

defendant Deputy McBride of Defendant Dominguez’s false accusation, and also falsely stated 

that he had spoken with Plaintiff soon after learning of Plaintiff’s alleged threat to fight 

correctional officials. Immediately after, named defendant SRJ Deputy McBride escorted Plaintiff 

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United States District Court

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out of Housing Unit No. 6, stating that he had heard that Plaintiff had threatened to fight deputies 

and informing Plaintiff that he was no longer going to F-Pod in Housing Unit No. 6, but would 

now be transferred to F-Pod in Housing Unit No. 2. Housing Unit No. 2 is the administrative 

segregation unit, and F-Pod is set aside to house mentally ill inmates assigned to administrative 

segregation. Defendant McBride informed Plaintiff that Housing Unit No. 2, F-Pod was covered 

in feces. Upon arriving at Housing No. 2, Defendant McBride was informed that there were 

vacant cells available in B-Pod and C-Pod, but Defendant McBride insisted on housing Plaintiff in 

F-Pod. ECF No. 62 at 4–7.

Plaintiff was assigned to F-Pod, Cell 13. When Plaintiff and Defendant McBride arrived at 

F-Pod, water with feces flooded cells 10 through 14. Prior to placing Plaintiff in the cell, Deputy 

McBride inspected the cell. Dried feces were clumped and smeared on the desktop and walls; a 

puddle of urine was on the floor; urine and saliva stained the toilet seat; dried blood was smeared

on the floor and walls; dried water feces spotted the edges of the bunkbed; dried feces were 

smeared under the top bunkbed; and there were dried and wet feces in the gap between the cell 

door and the floor. The outtake ventilation did not work. From September 9 to September 18, 

2017, Plaintiff was forced to sleep and eat next to feces. These unsanitary conditions exposed 

Plaintiff to deadly diseases such as Hepatitis C. In addition, Plaintiff was subjected to constant 

and excessive noise caused by mentally ill inmates who continually screamed, and kicked and 

banged on their cell doors and walls. ECF No. 62 at 6‒7.

Plaintiff has no mental or psychological issues that require him to be housed amongst the 

mentally ill. Plaintiff was not found guilty of any rule violation related to this administrative 

segregation confinement. The rules violation report dated September 8, 2017, which was later 

dismissed, does not allege that Plaintiff threatened to assault deputies; rather, it states that he was 

making, and in possession of an intoxicant, and interfered with the proper running of a facility. 

Defendant McBride housed Plaintiff in Housing Unit No. 2, F-Pod, in retaliation for Plaintiff’s 

threats of litigation against Defendants Dominguez and Miller. ECF No. 62 at 7–8. Plaintiff did 

not receive written notice prior to his administrative segregation confinement and was unable to 

challenge his placement in administrative segregation. ECF No. 62 at 9. 

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Conditions in administrative segregation are punitive. Inmates housed in administrative 

segregation are only allowed out of their cells for one hour every forty-eight hours; are only 

allowed two to three hours of out-of-cell recreational time weekly; and must be handcuffed and 

shackled whenever they are out-of-cell. These harsh living conditions have caused Plaintiff to 

suffer from depression, anxiety, and paranoia, conditions that Plaintiff did not have previously. 

ECF No. 62 at 11–12. 

On September 12, 2017, Plaintiff submitted grievance number 17-1744 to SRJ Deputy 

Plunkett, alleging that the living conditions in Housing Unit No. 2, F-Pod, Cell 13, were 

inhumane. Deputy Plunkett failed to address Plaintiff’s living conditions. ECF No. 62 at 12.

On September 19, 2017, Plaintiff was released from Housing Unit No. 2, F-Pod. However, 

he remained in administrative segregation isolation. On October 18, 2017, Plaintiff was 

transferred to Glenn Dyer Jail (“GDJ”). On November 18, 2017, he was transferred back to Santa 

Rita Jail. On December 15, 2017, Plaintiff was transferred back to Glenn Dyer Jail. Throughout 

these transfers, Plaintiff remained housed in administrative segregation. Plaintiff alleges that 

throughout these transfers, Defendant McBride and named defendants GDJ Classification Unit 

Deputy Almeria and GDJ Classification Unit Deputy Walters had numerous opportunities to 

release him back into general population but failed to conduct meaningful reviews of Plaintiff’s 

housing placement. ECF No. 62 at 12–13. 

Plaintiff alleges that Alameda County, Alameda County Sheriff Ahern, SRJ Classification 

Unit Sergeant Calegari, SRJ Classification Unit Sergeant Hattaway, and GDJ Classification Unit 

Sergeant Griffits have failed to supervise their subordinates, thereby allowing them to deviate 

from established departmental rules that prohibit indefinite detention in administrative 

segregation; and allowing them to establish the following customs and practice: housing inmates 

in administrative segregation without affording procedural due process protections; housing 

inmates indefinitely in administrative segregation; and housing inmates in administrative 

segregation even though the disciplinary finding does not require such housing. ECF No. 62 at 

14–17. 

/ / /

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2. Legal Claims 

Plaintiff has stated the following cognizable claims. 

Plaintiff’s allegations that, in retaliation for Plaintiff stating that he would sue prison 

officers if they used excessive force to force a cell move, Defendant Dominguez falsified a 

disciplinary report against him and caused him to be placed in administrative segregation, 

Defendant Miller falsely told Defendant McBride that he had confirmed Defendant Dominguez’s 

report, and Defendant McBride housed Plaintiff in a feces-covered cell amongst mentally ill 

inmates, state cognizable First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Dominguez, 

Miller and McBride. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Within the 

prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”)

(footnote omitted). 

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant McBride housed him in Housing Unit No. 2, F-Pod, 

Cell 13, knowing that the cell was covered in feces and otherwise uninhabitable, and that 

Defendant Plunkett refused to address these living conditions despite Plaintiff’s request state 

cognizable Eighth Amendment claims. Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.) 

(“[A] lack of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can constitute an infliction of pain within the 

meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”), amended, 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff’s allegations that he was not provided with written notice or a hearing prior to 

being housed in administrative segregation; that he did not receive notice of the disciplinary 

infraction authored by Defendant Dominguez until he was notified that it was dismissed; that 

Defendants McBride, Almeria, and Walters failed to provide meaningful review of his placement 

and retention in administrative segregation; and that he has not received written notice of any 

disciplinary violation pursuant to which he is being retained in administrative segregation state 

cognizable due process claims against Defendants McBride, Dominguez, Almeria and Walters. 

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (essential due process principle is 

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that deprivation of life, liberty or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 

appropriate to nature of case); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 

F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (suggesting that conditions of confinement which violate Eighth 

Amendment constitute atypical and significant hardship triggering right to procedural due 

process). 

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Alameda County, Ahern, Calegari, Hattaway, and 

Griffits failed to supervise their subordinates and allowed for the following customs or practice 

which violate due process — violation of departmental rules prohibiting indefinite detention in 

administrative segregation; housing inmates in administrative segregation without affording 

procedural due process protections; housing inmates indefinitely in administrative segregation; 

and housing inmates in administrative segregation when not required — state cognizable due 

process claims. Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 

1984) (supervisor can be held liable under § 1983 where constitutional deprivation resulted from 

supervisor’s failure to properly train or supervise personnel or from custom or policy for which 

supervisor was responsible); Plumeau v. School Dist. # 40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 

(9th Cir. 1997) (“To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional 

rights plaintiff must show: (1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he 

was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate 

indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force 

behind the constitutional violation.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders as follows:

1. The fourth amended complaint states cognizable First Amendment claims against 

Santa Rita Jail Officers Dominguez, Miller, and McBride; cognizable Eighth Amendment claims 

against McBride and Santa Rita Jail Deputy Plunkett; a cognizable due process claim against 

McBride; Dominguez, Glenn Dyer Jail Classification Unit Deputy Almeria, Glenn Dyer Jail 

Classification Unit Deputy Walters, Santa Rita Jail Classification Unit Sergeant Calegari, Santa 

Rita Jail Classification Unit Sergeant Hattaway, Glenn Dyer Jail Classification Unit Sergeant 

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Griffits, Alameda County Sheriff Ahern, and Alameda County. 

2. All defendants but Santa Rita Jail Officer Miller have been served. The Clerk shall 

therefore issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without prepayment of fees, 

the summons, a copy of the fourth amended complaint with all attachments (ECF No. 62), and a 

copy of this Order on Santa Rita Jail Officer Miller at Santa Rita Jail, 5325 Broder Blvd, Dublin, 

CA 94568.

3. The briefing schedule remains unchanged. Defendants shall file their dispositive 

motion by April 26, 2019. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive 

motion must be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants no later than 28 days from the 

date the motion is filed. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 14, 2019

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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