Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01051/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01051-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TARA GARLICK; MERRI SILVA; CHRIS 

SILVA; MINORS MAKEYLA L. SILVA, 

CHELSEA J. SILVA, CATELYN R. SILVA, 

AND ELI Z. SILVA, INDIVIDUALLY AS 

SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST TO DAVID 

S. SILVA, BY AND THROUGH THEIR 

GUARDIAN AD LITEM, JUDY SILVA; 

AND, MINOR JADE SILVA, 

INDIVIDUALLY AS SUCCESSOR IN 

INTEREST TO DAVID S. SILVA, 

DECEASED, BY AND THROUGH HER 

GUARDIAN AD LITEM ADRIANE 

DOMINGUEZ, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF KERN, IN ITS OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY; SERGEANT DOUGLAS 

SWORD, DEPUTIES JEFFREY KELLY, 

LUIS ALMANZA, RYAN BROCK, DAVID 

STEPHENS, TANNER MILLER, RYAN 

GREER, AND CHP OFFICERS MICHAEL 

PHILLIPS AND MICHAEL BRIGHT, EACH 

IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-CV-01051-LJO-JLT

ORDER ON THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS IN 

LIMINE.

(Docs. 168-185)

Plaintiffs Tara Garlick, Merri Silva, Chris Silva, and minors Makeyla L. Silva, Chelsea J. 

Silva, Catelyn R. Silva, and Jade Silva (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring the instant civil rights action 

against Defendants County of Kern, Sergeant Douglas Sword, Deputies Jeffrey Kelly, Luis Almanza, 

Ryan Brock, David Stephens, Tanner Miller, Ryan Greer, and California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) 

Officers Michael Phillips and Michael Bright (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging excessive force 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). The case arises from the in-custody death of David S. Silva 

(“Silva” or “the Decedent”) in the course of an encounter with County of Kern Sherriff’s Deputies 

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

and California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) Officers on May 7, 2013. Plaintiffs claim that the officers’

use of force violated Decedent’s Fourth and Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants 

counter that their use of force was reasonable. The facts are otherwise known to the parties and 

need not be repeated here. See Doc. 157, Order on Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment; 

see also Doc. 161, Pretrial Order. Pending before the Court are the parties’ motions in limine (Docs. 

168-185), which the Court deem appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See E.D. Cal. 

Civ. L.R. 230(g). For the reasons explained below, the Court decides the motions as follows. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A party may use a motion in limine as a procedural mechanism to exclude inadmissible or 

prejudicial testimony or evidence in a particular area before it is introduced at trial. See Luce v. 

United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n. 2 (1984); see also United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 

(9th Cir. 2009). Such motions allow parties to resolve evidentiary disputes before trial and avoid 

potentially prejudicial evidence being presented in front of the jury, thereby relieving the trial judge 

from the formidable task of neutralizing the taint of prejudicial evidence. Brodit v. Cambra, 350 

F.3d 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2003). Pretrial motions such as motions in limine “are useful tools to 

resolve issues which would otherwise clutter up the trial.” Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 

1409, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Jonasson v. Lutheran Child and Family Services, 115 F.3d 

436,440 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[A] motion in limine is an important tool available to the trial judge to 

ensure the expeditious and evenhanded management of the trial proceedings.”).

Motions in limine that exclude broad categories of evidence are disfavored, and such issues 

are better dealt with during trial as the admissibility of evidence arises. See, e.g., Brown v. 

Kavanaugh, No. 1:08-CV-01764-LJO, 2013 WL 1124301, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (citing 

Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975); see also In re 

Homestore.com, Inc., No. CV 01-11115 RSWL CWX, 2011 WL 291176, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 

2011) (holding that motions in limine should “rarely seek to exclude broad categories of evidence, 

as the court is almost always better situated to rule on evidentiary issues in their factual context 

during trial”); Cf. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2012 WL 1189898, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012) (concluding that “a broad categorical exclusion” was unwarranted). 

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Additionally, some evidentiary issues are not accurately and efficiently evaluated by the 

trial judge in a motion in limine, and it is within the district court’s discretion to defer ruling until 

trial when the trial judge can better estimate the impact of the evidence on the jury. See, e.g., United 

States v. Amaro, 613 F. App’x 600, 602 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Stewart-Hanson v. United 

States, 136 S. Ct. 276 (2015); see also Jonasson, 115 F.3d at 440.

DISCUSSION

I. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Plaintiffs bring six motions in limine (“MIL”), which the Court addresses in turn.

1. to Exclude Facts Not Known to the Individual Defendants at the Time of the Incident

(Doc. 180, Plaintiffs’ MIL No. 1).

Plaintiff seeks to exclude any and all evidence regarding information not known to the 

Defendant officers at the time of the incident. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to exclude evidence 

related to: any prior drug use by Silva; any prior drug use by any other member of Silva’s family, 

including Tara Garlick (“Garlick”); any reference to drugs; any reference to a post-mortem 

toxicology test; and, any reference to argument or fights between Silva and Garlick. Plaintiffs argue

such information is irrelevant because Defendants were unaware of them at the time they used force 

against Silva. See Fed. R. Evid. 401). Plaintiffs also contend that any argument that Silva was 

engaged in any specific conduct based solely on his prior behavior would involve an improper 

inference based on his character. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). Third, Plaintiffs argue that any 

reference to this information would be “dangerously” prejudicial at trial and would necessitate 

mini-trials about prior incidents which are irrelevant to the central question of whether the officers’

conduct was objectively reasonable. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

The Court DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion, as follows. As 

to Silva’s drug use, the Court DENIES the motion in substance, conditioned on a representation 

from Defendants’ counsel that there exist timely designated experts to explain the physical cause 

and effect of the drug and alcohol use in regards to demeanor, cause of death, longevity, and quality 

of life. Absent such representation by counsel, the motion is GRANTED. Under no circumstances 

may any potential testimony be used as character or propensity evidence, and to that extent the 

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Court GRANTS the motion. Upon review of the Rule1403 issues, the Court concludes that 

preclusion on this ground is not appropriate. As to evidence of domestic disputes between Silva and 

Garlick, such evidence may be used, if appropriate and established, for impeachment purposes and 

may also be used on the issue of damages, and in that way the Court DENIES the motion. 

2. to Exclude Garlick’s Prior Drug History (Doc. 181, Plaintiffs’ MIL No. 2)

Plaintiff seeks to exclude any and all evidence regarding Garlick’s drug history, including 

that she temporarily lost custody of her children subsequent to Silva’s death due to her drug history 

arguing that it is irrelevant, impermissible character evidence, and is more prejudicial than 

probative. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403, 404.

The Court concludes that any and all evidence about Garlick’s drug history is precluded as 

impermissible character evidence. However, as it relates to damages, the Rule 403 analysis weighs

in favor of admission rather than preclusion. For that reason, the Court DENIES the motion

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This is not to say that such evidence will be admitted. Rather, this

ruling simply means the matter will not be precluded pre-trial. In sum, the foundation for such 

expert opinions on this topic must first be established before any such opinions are solicited and/or 

expressed. 

3. to Exclude Facts that One of Garlick’s Neighbors Molested Silva’s Two Youngest 

Children Subsequent to His Death (Doc. 182, Plaintiffs’ MIL No. 3).

Plaintiffs seek to exclude any and all evidence related to the alleged molestation, subsequent 

to Silva’s death, of Silva’s two youngest daughters on grounds that the allegation is irrelevant, 

constitutes hearsay, lacks foundation, and is more prejudicial than probative. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 

802, 602, 403.

The Court finds that evidence related to the alleged molestation by one of Garlick’s 

neighbors of Silva’s two youngest daughters is probative for two reasons. First, it goes to witness 

Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s credibility. Second, it is relevant to the calculation of Plaintiffs’ damages where 

two minor Plaintiffs may have suffered emotional harm separate from the loss of their father. The 

probative value outweighs any risk of prejudice, jury confusion, or undue consumption of time. If 

 

1 Hereinafter, references to the “Rules” or “Rule” indicate the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

counsel offers admissible evidence that the alleged event(s) actually happened AND expert 

evidence that it is probable that it caused emotional trauma that is being blamed for the death, then 

it is relevant. The motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

4. to Exclude Opinions and Testimony of Harold L. Seymour, Ph.D. (Doc. 183, Plaintiffs’

MIL No. 4).

Plaintiffs make a Daubert motion to exclude the expert testimony and opinions of Harold L. 

Seymour, Ph.D. on the basis that he never interviewed the Silva children or members of the Silva 

family, and never conducted any psychological testing of the children. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend 

that Dr. Seymour has never testified with respect to psychological trauma in a case involving a 

minor child where he had not interviewed the child. Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Seymour’s opinions 

lack foundation and should be excluded under the rule in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 

Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993) and Rule 702, or in the alternative, Rule 403. 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ arguments go to weight, not admissibility. The Court finds 

that, as Defendants contend (see Doc. 203), Dr. Seymour’s review of Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s report, 

interview notes, and test results may provide sufficient foundation, consistent with the requirements 

under Rule 702 and Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92, to allow Dr. Seymour to opine as to Dr. KaserBoyd’s methodology and to rebut her opinions. However, the proper foundation must be laid for 

such testimony to be admissible. The motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

5. to Exclude Defense Expert Steven Karch, M.D., Theodore Chan, M.D., and Frank 

Sheridan M.D. from Testifying (Doc. 185, MIL No. 5).

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have retained three expert witnesses who will testify that 

“during the encounter with the individual defendants (in which Silva was struck with batons, bitten 

by a dog, restrained, hogtied, and compressed for as long as 10 minutes with multiple defendants’

weight on his back) he spontaneously died of unrelated or natural causes.” Doc. 185 at 3:6-10. 

Plaintiff contends that these opinions are “junky.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 

137, 159 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring). About these experts—Dr. Theodore Chan, Dr. Frank 

Sheridan, and Dr. Steven Karch—Plaintiffs contend that, under Daubert, testimony should be 

precluded. First, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Chan’s studies were funded by the City of San Diego in 

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

preparation for litigation and are unreliable under 702 and Daubert principles. See Daubert, 509 

U.S. at 594-95. Plaintiffs posit that reliability is determined by assessing “whether the reasoning or 

methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid,” whereas relevance depends upon 

“whether [that] reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. at 592–

593. Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Chan’s opinions should be excluded because he has not “reliably 

applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Rule 702. Moreover, Plaintiffs aver that 

the three experts opine that it is not possible to diagnose compressional asphyxia without petechial 

hemorrhages, but no medical literature suggests that these two phenomena are perfectly correlated. 

In other words, Drs. Chan, Sheridan, and Karch’s opinions that it is impossible for one to happen 

without the other are incorrect and should be excluded under Daubert. In sum, Plaintiffs argue that 

because “there is no scientific, forensic, medical, or other evidence that Silva died from any cause 

other than his encounter with law enforcement,” the three expert opinions are offered “to confuse 

and mislead the jury,” and should be excluded under either 702 or Daubert. Doc. 185 at 11:23-26. 

To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to preclude Drs. Chan, Sheridan, and Karch from 

testifying, the motion is DENIED. The Court finds that the three defense witnesses offered are 

designated experts with seemingly appropriate credentials. Plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of total 

preclusion of the doctors’ testimony go to factual disagreement, bias, and weight, but not their 

actual qualifications or an absence of the basis for opinions. However, there appears to be a 

Daubert issue regarding testimony that petechial hemorrhage is perfectly correlated to asphyxiation 

where no expert pointed to foundation to support the proposition. The motion in this limited way is 

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court does not preclude such testimony at this stage, but 

reminds counsel that the foundation for such expert opinions on this topic must first be established 

before any such opinions are solicited and/or expressed. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & 

Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 993-94 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“the party presenting the expert must 

show that the expert’s findings are based on sound science, and this will require some objective, 

independent validation of the expert’s methodology”) (citing Daubert). Finally, Plaintiffs argue 

specifically about Dr. Karch that he has neither reviewed the Decedent’s medical records, nor any 

of the statements or depositions of the involved officers, thus his testimony should be precluded.

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Plaintiffs’ argument turns on admissibility, not preclusion. That the Court has denied the motion 

does not relieve Defendants from establishing background, qualifications, and/or foundational basis 

for each opinion offered.

6. to Exclude Cumulative Defense Experts (Doc. 184, Plaintiffs’ MIL No. 6).

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have retained three expert witnesses who will testify about 

police practices: Curtis Jefferey Cope (police practices), David Reaver (police practices and dogs), 

and Clarence Chapman (police practices); and four medical experts offering the same or similar 

testimony about the medical issue of cause of death: Steven B. Karch (medical – cause of death), 

Theodore Chan (medical – cause of death), Frank P. Sheridan (medical – cause of death), and 

Eugene Carpenter (medical examiner – cause of death). Plaintiffs contend that these various 

duplicative experts are a “needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Therefore, Defendants 

should be limited to one police practices expert, one medical expert regarding the Decedent’s cause 

of death, and one expert on the psychological harm suffered by Plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

The Court finds that while there is clear crossover of the police practices experts on content 

(e.g., force), each expert is limited to opinions on the conduct of different officers (e.g., deputies or 

CHP), and one expert relates only to the actions of a police dog. As to the police practices experts, 

the Court DENIES the motion. Defendants retained four medical experts, including Dr. Karch, 

M.D., FFLM, FFSoc. and with a background in cardiac pathology, to review microscopic slides of 

various tissues taken during Silva’s autopsy and to focus on reviewing the pathological condition of 

Silva’s heart. In contrast, Defendants retained Dr. Chan, M.D., for his background in forensic 

pathology and experience studying respiratory functions related to positional or restraint asphyxia. 

Defendants retained Dr. Sheridan, M.D., to conduct an independent review of Silva’s cause of 

death by reviewing the autopsy report and other investigative reports, whereas Dr. Carpenter is the 

original medical examiner. While the four medical experts have overlapping opinions concerning 

the cause of death, each has a different background from the others and arrives at conclusions from 

the formation of different processes. As to the medical experts, the Court DENIES the motion.

II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Defendants bring 23 motions in limine, which the Court addresses in turn.

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

1. to Preclude Evidence of Indemnification of Any or All of the Individually Named 

Defendants by Their Employers and Vicarious Liability of County of Kern (Doc. 179, 

Defendants’ MIL No. 1). 

Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiffs, their counsel and through them any witnesses from 

soliciting testimony, or presenting evidence, regarding the individual defendants Sergeant Douglas 

Sword and Deputies Jeffrey Kelly, Luis Almanza, Ryan Brock, David Stephens, Tanner Miller, and 

Ryan Greer’s indemnification for damages by Defendant County of Kern and CHP Officers 

Michael Phillips and Michael Bright’s indemnification for damages by the State of California. 

Defendants argue that introduction of any such evidence would be more prejudicial than probative. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 403.

The Court GRANTS the motion. That said, if a judgment is rendered and the Plaintiffs wish 

a cautionary instruction that the jury may not consider who does or does not pay, Plaintiffs should 

submit such instruction with neutral language after meeting and conferring with defense counsel. In 

sum, if there is a judgment rendered, it is not an issue for the jury who does or does not satisfy it. 

2. to Preclude Use of Non-Authenticated and Non-Certified Transcripts of the Audio 

Statements Taken from Percipient Witnesses as part of the County of Kern Sheriff’s 

Office Incident/Investigation Report, Case No. SR13-12817 (Doc. 179, Defendants’ 

MIL No. 2). 

Defendants seek to preclude any and all testimony or evidence regarding the nonauthenticated and non-certified transcripts of audio interviews conducted during Kern County 

Sheriff’s Department’s in-custody death investigation of the subject incident. Apart from each such 

transcript being prepared from an audio recording without the certification of a certified court 

reporter to verify the accuracy of the transcripts, there is also no indication of who prepared each of 

the transcripts or when they were prepared, making it nearly impossible to lay the appropriate 

foundation. See Fed. R. Evid. 901. Furthermore, such transcripts constitute hearsay and often 

contain multiple layers of hearsay.

The Court concludes that if the transcripts cannot be agreed upon as to accuracy, the 

videotapes themselves will be played. If that occurs, it is the obligation of the parties to be ready 

with the exact segments a party wishes to play. The Court will not waste time in front of the jury. 

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

This is pretrial preparation. For preparation purposes, the parties are required to give the opposing 

parties notice of the segments selected for use trial. In this way, the Court DENIES the motion. 

3. to Preclude Any Analogies, Comparison, or References to Hitler, Nazis, World War II 

Bunker Complexes, etc., in Relation to “Adlerhorst International, Inc.” or Defense 

Expert David Reaver (Doc. 179, Defendants’ MIL No. 3). 

Defendants seek to preclude any and all testimony or evidence involving any analogies, 

comparisons, or references to Hitler, Nazis, World War II bunker complexes, in relation to 

“Adlerhorst International, Inc.” or defense expert David Reaver on the grounds that it is irrelevant 

to Mr. Reaver’s qualifications as an expert or whether or not the actions of the individual 

defendants were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and are also inaccurate. See 

Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 702, 703. 

The issue is remote, at best, and balancing probative versus consumption of time, the time 

concern prevails. The Court GRANTS the motion under Rule 403.

4. to Preclude Evidence, Testimony, or Argument Concerning Any Lawsuits which 

Defense Expert David Reaver and/or His Business Adlerhorst International, Inc. Were 

and/or Are Named as Defendants (Doc. 179, Defendants’ MIL No. 4). 

Defendants seek to preclude any and all evidence or testimony concerning any lawsuits 

which defense expert David Reaver and/or his business Adlerhorst International, Inc. were and/or 

are named as defendants, or inferring that Mr. Reaver is currently or in the past has been a party to 

any lawsuit, on the grounds that it is irrelevant, constitutes improper character evidence, and is 

more prejudicial than probative. See Fed. R. Evid. Rules 401, 402, 403, 404(b).

The Court finds that potential bias questions are appropriate. For example, those related to: 

any business affiliation Mr. Reaver has with a party to this litigation; that he has testified hundreds 

of times in police dog cases and never conceded a bad bite; or, that he receives compensation for 

his work as an expert (including what percentage of his income that produces). However, the filing 

of other lawsuits, no matter how many, is irrelevant. Eliciting evidence about the results of these 

lawsuits, from either side of this litigation, is a time issue and is precluded under Rule 403. In these

ways, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion. 

//

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

5. to Preclude Evidence, Testimony, or Argument Concerning Dogs Being Used for 

Purposes of Torture or Inferring that the Involved K-9 Was Used to Torture Silva

(Doc. 179, Defendants’ MIL No. 5). 

Defendants seek to preclude any and all evidence and testimony concerning dogs being used 

for purposes of torture or inferring that officers used the involved K-9 to torture Silva on the 

grounds that it is irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. See Fed. R. Evid. 401-403.

To the extent of the testimony as set forth in Plaintiffs’ objections (Doc. 206 at 14:7-11), the 

Court GRANTS the motion. 

6. to Preclude Plaintiffs’ Retained Expert Ron O’Halloran, M.D., from Offering 

Opinions or Testimony Regarding Restraint Asphyxia and Silva’s Cause of Death 

(Doc. 179, Defendants’ MIL No. 6). 

Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiffs’ retained expert Ronald Louis O’Halloran, M.D.,

from offering expert opinions or testimony concerning any alleged restraint asphyxia, that any 

particular deputy or officer’s restraint of Silva caused his death, or that any deputy or officer’s 

failure to recognize earlier and address promptly Silva’s respiratory distress or subsequent loss of 

consciousness was a cause of death, under Rule 702 and/or the principles in Daubert v. Merrell 

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 

This argument is spurious. The testimony sought to be excluded is in the realm of factual 

dispute and is well within the province of a decision by the trier of fact. The Court DENIES the 

motion.

7. to Exclude Inflammatory Evidence (Doc. 168, Defendants’ MIL No. 7).

Defendants seek to exclude items of “inflammatory” evidence, testimony, or argument, 

specifically: testimony, reference, or argument that any Defendant officers “murdered” Silva; and, 

testimony, reference, or argument that Silva was “beaten to death” or suffered a “beating death” by 

police. Defendants argue that these terms call for improper legal and/or medical conclusions of lay 

witnesses and are more prejudicial than probative value. See Fed. R. Evid. 103, 401, 403, 701.

The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART. The target phrases may not be 

used by any non-expert, unless it is to describe an individual’s feelings as those feelings relate to 

the issue of damages. The target phrases may be used in opening statement to describe feelings 

leading to damages and may be used in closing arguments. 

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

8. to Exclude Witness Opinions that Decedent’s Father Died of a “Broken Heart” (Doc. 

169, Defendants’ MIL No. 8).

Defendants seek to exclude any and all testimony or evidence that Silva’s father, Salvatore 

Silva, died of a “broken heart” on the grounds that it lacks foundation, calls for improper legal 

conclusions of lay witnesses, are irrelevant to any matter at issue, and is more prejudicial than 

probative. See Fed. R. Evid. 103, 401, 403, 701, 702. Plaintiffs did not file an opposition. 

The Court finds that such testimony constitutes inadmissible lay opinions and for that 

reason GRANTS the unopposed motion.

9. to Exclude Lay Witness Opinions from Viewing Video Excerpts of the Subject Incident 

Where Such Witnesses Were Not Present at the Scene During the Incident (Doc. 170, 

Defendants’ MIL No. 9).

Defendants seek to exclude opinions or observations by lay witnesses who viewed video 

excerpts of the subject incident but who were not physically present at the scene to witness it, on 

the grounds that such testimony lacks foundation, invades the province of the jury, is irrelevant, and 

is more prejudicial than probative. See Fed. R. Evid. 103, 403, 701.

The motion does not extend to expert witnesses. The Court acknowledges that there are 

issues in this case about whether video footage exists, the alleged seizure and/or destruction of it. 

Defendant the County of Kern, which allegedly seized the footage, wishes to preclude testimony of 

witnesses who saw the content of the video footage before the alleged seizure. Unless the videos 

are at the trial and there is no contention about alteration, the witnesses may say what they saw on 

the videos—without conclusory language. In this limited way, the Court DENIES the motion. 

However, there is an enormous evidentiary difference between saying the officer’s right fist struck 

the person’s facial area ten times, versus saying the officer was beating the person. The former is 

fine, but the latter is precluded. In this way, the Court GRANTS the motion.

10. to Exclude Gruesome, Gory, and Bloody Photographs of Decedent (Doc. 171, 

Defendants’ MIL No. 10).

Defendants seek to exclude all gruesome, gory and bloody photographs, including autopsy 

photographs and gruesome photographs of the subject scene on the grounds that the items are 

irrelevant and are more prejudicial than probative. See Fed. R. Evid. 103, 401, 403.

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

The photos are relevant. But that is not the primary objection. Rather, the primary objection 

is under Rule 403. The overly broad description of the photos makes it impossible for the Court to 

rule. Until such time as Plaintiffs actually seek to introduce such evidence to the jury, the Court 

DEFERS ruling on the motion.

11. to Exclude Other Civil Lawsuits, Citizen Complaints, and/or Settlements or Verdicts 

Involving Any of the Defendants (Doc. 172, Defendants’ MIL No. 11).

Defendants seek to exclude the following evidence, including whether: (1) one or more of 

the individual Defendants may have been named as a defendant in a previous civil lawsuit, or the 

facts underlying any other such lawsuit; (2) one or more of the individual Defendants may have 

been the subject of a citizen complaint and/or tort claim concerning the use of excessive force or 

failure to provide medical attention; (3) any other use of force incidents involving one or more of 

the individual Defendants; as well as, (4) the total number of excessive force lawsuits involving the 

Kern County Sheriff’s Department; and, (5) verdicts awarded or settlements reached in police 

misconduct cases against the Kern County Sheriff’s Department or any other law enforcement 

agency; on the grounds that such evidence is irrelevant, lacks probative value, is more prejudicial 

than probative, and constitutes inadmissible character evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403, 404.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion only on the limited grounds that Defendants may open the door 

to such testimony or evidence at trial. See Doc. 210 at 3:1-3. 

The Court therefore conditionally GRANTS the motion, as follows: such evidence is 

excluded, unless Defendants broach these subjects in the course of trial. In that event, the issue is 

subject to a motion outside the presence of the jury, for impeachment purposes only. 

12. to Exclude Evidence of Past Bad Acts of Any Individual Defendant and/or Any Other 

Lawsuits Against the County of Kern, or Any Law Enforcement Witness (Doc. 173,2

Defendants’ MIL No. 12).

Defendants County of Kern, Deputies Ryan Brock, David Stephens, tanner Miller, and Ryan 

Greer, similarly seek to exclude evidence regarding prior bad acts or involvement with prior incustody deaths, specifically related to Lucero v. Kern County et al., on the grounds that such 

 

2 Counsel is again directed to use the Court’s preferred font (Times New Roman, 12 point), and follow the other pleading 

paper instructions found at http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/assets/File/Pleading%20paper%20instructions.pdf

(last visited April 13, 2016). See MIL Nos. 12-16 (Docs. 173-177).

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

evidence is irrelevant, lacks probative value, is more prejudicial than probative, and constitutes 

inadmissible character evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403, 404.

As explained in regards to motion in limine No. 11, supra, and for the same reasons, the 

Court GRANTS the motion, subject to a motion for impeachment purposes only, outside the 

presence of the jury. 

13. to Exclude Evidence that is Protected by California Penal Code §§ 832.7 and 832.8 and 

California Evidence Code §§ 1040 and 1043, and the Officers’ Right to Privacy (Doc. 

174, Defendants’ MIL No. 13).

The individual Defendants seek to exclude any questioning and/or testimony regarding their 

personnel matters, prior complaints concerning job performance, or prior disciplinary issues on the 

grounds that such evidence is statutorily protected under state law, and is irrelevant, more 

prejudicial than probative, and constitutes inadmissible character evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 

403, 404.

As explained in regards to motion in limine Nos. 11 and 12, supra, and for the same 

reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion, subject to a motion outside the presence of the jury for 

impeachment purposes only. 

14. to Exclude Testimony Regarding Opinions as to What David Silva Was Feeling During 

the Incident (Doc. 175, Defendants’ MIL No. 14).

Defendants seek to exclude opinion testimony from percipient witnesses as to what Silva 

was feeling during the subject incident on the grounds that it is speculation and improper lay 

witness opinion. See Fed. R. Evid. 701.

The words and/or sounds heard or overheard are admissible. So too are the observations 

seen by witnesses. However, because interpreting them is the work of the jury and not the witness,

to that extent, the Court GRANTS the motion. 

15. to Preclude Plaintiffs and Other Non-Percipient Witnesses from Providing Speculative 

Testimony Regarding What Happened to David Silva during the Incident (Doc. 176, 

Defendants’ MIL No. 15).

The Court finds the motion unnecessary. All officers of the Court have an obligation not to 

request answers calling for speculation and to tell witnesses only to be responsive.

//

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

16. to Preclude Testimony or Arguments Regarding the Alleged Deletion of Videos from 

Witness Maria Melendez’s Cell Phone (Doc. 177, Defendants’ MIL No. 16).

The Court in a minute order has requested additional briefing on this issue. Defendants are 

directed to respond to the Court’s inquiry (see Doc. 218) on or before Friday, April 15, 2016 at 

3pm, to which Plaintiffs shall file their response on or before Monday, April 18, 2016 at 3pm.

17. to Exclude Evidence or Witnesses Not Previously Disclosed to Defendants during 

Discovery (Doc. 178, Defendants’ MIL No. 17).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(a) or (e), unless used for impeachment, 

Defendants seek to exclude all evidence or witnesses not previously disclosed to them during 

discovery, including: Item 53, “funeral pictures” (Doc. 158 at 42:6); Item 129 “Christopher Silva’s 

birth certificate” (id. at 44:26); and, witness “David Delgado” (id. at 30:19). 

The Court cautions the parties that trial is not to be a continued part of discovery. Rule 26 

has its requirements, and noncompliance is not forgiven unless the opposing side shows harm or 

prejudice. The Court GRANTS the motion, and the undisclosed funeral photos as well as the

undisclosed witness, David Delgado, are excluded. However, the birth certificate, a legal document 

that cannot be changed and which has limited relevant information—none of which is surprising to 

Defendants—will be allowed. To that limited extent, the Court DENIES the motion. 

18. to Preclude Plaintiffs’ Retained Experts from Testifying at Trial as to Ultimate Facts, 

the Credibility of Witnesses, Legal Conclusions, Past Experiences, or Claims of 

Success (Doc. 178, Defendants’ MIL No. 18).

To the extent that the issue is properly outlined in Plaintiffs’ opposition that their expert is 

“simply stating that the officers’ actions, based on his training and experience, appear to be 

objectively unnecessary and unreasonable, as those words are used in common parlance,” Doc. 197 

at 3, and he does not offer an improper legal conclusion that Defendant officers violated Silva’s 

Fourth Amendment rights, the Court DENIES the motion. Otherwise, as to the broader context of 

the motion pursuant to Rules 702 and 704 about which Plaintiffs apparently do not object, the Court 

GRANTS the motion. 

//

//

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

19. to Exclude All Video Recordings of the Incident Made by Francisco Arrieta (Doc. 178, 

Defendants’ MIL No. 19).

Defendants seek to exclude all video recordings of the subject incident made by Francisco 

Arrieta due to the spoken commentary contemporaneously recorded, on the grounds that it is 

irrelevant, more prejudicial than probative, improper lay opinion, and hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 

401, 403, 701, 703, 802. 

The video recording may be shown if the proper foundation is laid. To that extent, the Court 

DEFERS ruling on the motion until such time as Defendant actually seeks to introduce such 

evidence to the jury. Francisco Arrieta, the photographer/witness, may be asked questions about 

what he saw or heard, and he may use the audio to refresh his recollection (outside the jury’s 

presence). He may use the transcript to refresh his recollection, assuming one has been prepared 

and agreed upon by the parties. Other than that, only appropriate questions that would be allowed 

are to be asked and answered by the witness. The commentary and speculation contained in the 

audio is not possible to parse without violating the time consumption issue found in Rule 403.

20. to Preclude Plaintiff Jade Silva from Introducing Any Evidence Required to Be 

Disclosed as Part of Her Initial Disclosures or Pretrial Disclosures, and from 

Introducing Any Expert Testimony Due to Her Failure to Serve Any Required 

Disclosures (Doc. 178, Defendants’ MIL No. 20). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(a), Defendants seek to exclude Plaintiff 

Jade Silva’s undisclosed evidence or witnesses, specifically, 26 pictures of the Decedent and Jade 

Silva; a copy of a birthday card from Decedent to Jade Silva, dated 2003; three pictures of Jade 

Silva; and one picture of a “Justice for David Silva” prayer box. 

The Court GRANTS the motion to the extent that Plaintiff Jade Silva may not testify to 

anything not previously provided to the defense under oath (either by Jade Silva’s declaration, her 

deposition, or her answers to interrogatories). It appears that the case has been defended all along 

with the understanding that Jade Silva was, and is, a Plaintiff. Therefore, in all other respects, the 

Court DENIES the motion. 

//

//

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

21. to Preclude Plaintiffs and their Expert Witnesses from Using, Introducing, or 

Referring to Training Materials or Bulletins by the Los Angeles Police Department 

(“LAPD”) or Any Other Non-Involved Law Enforcement Agency (Doc. 178, 

Defendants’ MIL No. 21). 

These materials shall be excluded, unless there is expert testimony and a basis to say that 

the LAPD training materials or bulletins establish the standard of care, and therefore that the 

materials were directly or indirectly known by the individual Defendants, or that the Defendants 

were exposed, in some manner, to the materials. To that extent, the Court GRANTS the motion.

22. to Preclude the Use of the CHP MVARS Recording of the Subject Incident (Doc. 178, 

Defendants’ MIL No. 22). 

Defendants Phillips and Bright anticipate displaying at trial an audio/visual recording of the 

subject incident as captured by the Mobile Visual Audio Recording System (MVARS) installed in 

their CHP patrol vehicle and request that the terms of the Protective Order (Doc. 96 at 7-8) govern 

the display and distribution of the recording at trial. 

There is no absolute privilege in existence simply because of a “confidential” designation in 

a discovery protective order or elsewhere. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion. Of course, 

counsel must lay a foundation before the recording is admitted. 

23. to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Expert Witness Scott DeFoe from Offering Any Opinions Except 

Those Included in His Expert Report and that He Testified to at His Deposition (Doc. 

178, Defendants’ MIL No. 23). 

Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiffs’ witness, Scott DeFoe, from testifying outside the 

scope of his expert report or deposition, under Rule 26(a), as to five specific opinions. Plaintiffs 

concede that of the five expert opinions in contention, four are irrelevant to this case in its current 

status. See Doc. 201 at 3:12-14. Therefore, as to the four opinions specified by the parties, the Court 

GRANTS the motion and these four opinions are excluded on relevance grounds. 

Thus, the only issue remaining before the Court in the instant motion is whether DeFoe’s 

fifth opinion—that “It is doubtful that the hobble was necessary during the incident” —should be 

precluded. Based on the representations of counsel it appears that, with the reasonable drawing of 

inferences, DeFoe included this fifth opinion at proper times in proper designations. This issue will 

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

be left to counsel for impeachment during trial, and ultimately for the jury to make a factual 

determination. As to this fifth opinion by DeFoe, the Court DENIES the motion. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties’ motions in limine

are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as set forth above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 14, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-01051-LJO-JLT Document 219 Filed 04/14/16 Page 17 of 17