Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-35738/USCOURTS-ca9-15-35738-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

J. E. F.M., a minor, by and

through his Next Friend, Bob

Ekblad; J. F.M., a minor, by and

through his Next Friend Bob

Ekblad; D. G. F.M., a minor, by

and through her Next Friend,

Bob Ekblad; F. L.B., a minor, by

and through his Next Friend,

Casey Trupin; G. D.S., a minor,

by and through his mother and

Next Friend, Ana Maria

Ruvalcaba; M. A.M., a minor, by

and through his mother and Next

Friend, Rose Pedro; J. E. V.G.;

A. E. G.E.; G. J. C.P.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees/

Cross-Appellants,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General; JUAN P. OSUNA,

Director, Executive Office for

Immigration Review; JEH

JOHNSON, Secretary, Homeland

Security; THOMAS S.

WINKOWSKI, Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary, U.S.

Immigration and Customs

Nos. 15-35738

15-35739

D.C. No.

2:14-cv-01026-TSZ

OPINION

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 1 of 31
2 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

Enforcement; NATHALIE R.

ASHER, Field Office Director,

ICE ERO; KENNETH HAMILTON,

AAFOD, ERO; SYLVIA M.

BURWELL, Secretary, Health and

Human Services; ESKINDER

NEGASH, Director, Office of

Refugee Resettlement,

Defendants-Appellants

Cross-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 7, 2016

Seattle, Washington

Filed September 20, 2016

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown;

Concurrence by Judge McKeown;

Concurrence by Judge Kleinfeld

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 2 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 3

SUMMARY*

Immigration

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s jurisdictional determinations in a class action brought

by indigent minor immigrants alleging that they have due

process and statutory rights to appointed counsel at

government expense in immigration proceedings.

The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack

of jurisdiction of the minors' statutory claims for

court-appointed counsel. The panel held that because the

right-to-counsel claims “arise from" removal proceedings,

they must be raised through the administrative petition for

review process pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and

1252(a)(5).

The panel reversed the district court's determination that

it had jurisdiction over the minors’ constitutional claims. The

panel held that the district court erred in finding that an

exception to the Immigration and Nationality Act’s exclusive

review process provided jurisdiction over the due process

right-to-counsel claims. The panel held that the district court

incorrectly found that the claims challenged a policy or

practice collateral to the substance of removal proceedings,

and that because an Immigration Judge was unlikely to

conduct the requisite due process balancing the administrative

record would not provide meaningful judicial review.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 3 of 31
4 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

Specially concurring, Judge McKeown, joined by Judge

M. Smith, wrote to highlight the plight of unrepresented

children in immigration proceedings, and to underscore that

the Executive and Congress have the power to address this

crisis without judicial intervention.

Specially concurring, Judge Kleinfeld agreed that it is

unlikely that children or even adults can protect all their

rights in deportation proceedings without a lawyer. Judge

Kleinfeld wrote that solving the representation problem is a

highly controversial political matter, and that advocating for

a particular reform is unnecessary and better left to the

political process.

COUNSEL

Erez Reuveni (argued), Senior Litigation Counsel; Leon

Fresco, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Benjamin C.

Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Civil

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C.; for Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Ahilan Thevanesan Arulanantham (argued), ACLU

Immigrants’ Rights Project, ACLU of Southern California,

Los Angeles, California; Heidi Craig Garcia, Todd Nunn, and

Theodore J. Angelis, K&L Gates LLP, Seattle, Washington;

Glenda M. Aldana Madrid and Matt Adams, Northwest

Immigrant Rights Project, Seattle, Washington; Cecillia

Wang and Stephen Kang, ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project,

San Francisco, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees/CrossAppellants.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 4 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 5

Marsha Chien, Assistant Attorney General; Colleen Melody,

Civil Rights Unit Chief; Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney

General; Office of the AttorneyGeneral, Seattle,Washington;

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney

General, Sacramento, California; for Amici Curiae States of

Washington and California.

Charles G. Wentworth, The Law Office of Lofgren &

Wentworth P.C., Glen Ellyn, Illinois; Charles Roth, National

Immigrant Justice Center, Chicago, Illinois; for Amici Curiae

National Immigrant Justice Center; American Immigration

Lawyers Association; Ayuda; Capital Area Immigrants’

Rights Coalition; Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc;

Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto; Diocesan

Migrant & Refugee Services, Inc; First Focus; Florence

Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project; Hebrew Immigrant

Aid Society—Pennsylvania; Human Rights Initiative of

North Texas; Immigrant Defenders Law Center; Immigrant

Law Center of Minnesota; National Immigration Law Center;

National Justice for Our Neighbors; Pangea Legal Services;

Pennsylvania Immigrant Resource Center; Puentes:

Advocacy, Counseling & Education; Refugee and Immigrant

Center for Education and Legal Services; the Advocates for

Human Rights; Unlocal, Inc.; and U.s. Committee for

Immigrants and Refugees.

Paul W. Rodney, Holly E. Sterrett, and R. Reeves Anderson,

Arnold & Porter LLP, Denver, Colorado; SallyL. Pei, Arnold

& Porter LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Former

Federal Immigration Judges.

Elisa S. Solomon, Covington & Burling LLP, New York,

New York; Risa E. Kaufman, Human Rights Institute,

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 5 of 31
6 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

Columbia Law School, New York, New York; for Amicus

Curiae Human Rights Watch.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

This interlocutory appeal requires us to answer a single

question: does a district court have jurisdiction over a claim

that indigent minor immigrants without counsel have a right

to government-appointed counsel in removal proceedings?

Our answer to this jurisdictional query is no. We underscore

that we address only the jurisdictional issue, not the merits of

the claims. Congress has clearly provided that all

claims—whether statutory or constitutional—that “aris[e]

from” immigration removal proceedings can only be brought

through the petition for review process in the federal courts

of appeals. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5) & (b)(9). Despite the

gravity of their claims, the minors cannot bypass the

immigration courts and proceed directly to district court. 

Instead, they must exhaust the administrative process before

they can access the federal courts.

BACKGROUND

The appellees (collectively the “minors” or “children”)

are immigrant minors, aged three to seventeen, who have

been placed in administrative removal proceedings. The

children are at various stages of the removal process: some

are waiting to have their first removal hearing, some have

already had a hearing, and some have been ordered removed

in absentia. None of the children can afford an attorney, and

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 6 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 7

each has tried and failed to obtain pro bono counsel for

removal proceedings.

The children, suing on behalf of themselves and a class,

claim a due process1and statutory right to appointed counsel

at government expense in immigration proceedings.2 They

claim that, as minors, they “lack the intellectual and

emotional capacity of adults,” yet are “force[d] . . . to appear

unrepresented in complex, adversarial court proceedings

against trained [government] attorneys.” According to the

complaint, this lack of representation “ensure[s] that [they

and] thousands of children [are] deprived of a full and fair

opportunity to identify defenses or seek relief for which they

qualify” in immigration court.

The children acknowledge that, generally, an immigrant

who has been placed in removal proceedings can challenge

those proceedings only after exhausting administrative

remedies and filing a petition for review (PFR) in a federal

court of appeals. But they argue that this case falls outside

the general rule because, in light of the complex nature of

removal proceedings and the appeals process, minors cannot

1

Immigration proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature. Thus, the

right-to-counsel claims invoke the Fifth Amendment’s due process

requirement, nottheSixthAmendment’sright-to-counsel provision, which

is reserved for criminal proceedings.

2 This appeal was taken from the district court’s order dismissing the

second amended complaint, which was brought on behalf of all minors

without counsel. The district court denied the government’s motion to stay

the proceedings pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. After the

briefs were filed in this case, the minors filed a third amended complaint,

redefined the proposed class to include an indigency limitation, and

dismissed some of the named plaintiffs. None of this activity affects our

analysis.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 7 of 31
8 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

effectively raise right-to-counsel claims through the PFR

process. As a result, they conclude, they would be denied

meaningful judicial review of their right-to-counsel claims if

the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.

The government moved to dismiss the complaint on

multiple grounds, including ripeness (because in some cases

the removal proceedings had not commenced and in others

they had not concluded at the time the complaint was filed)

and jurisdiction (because the Immigration and NationalityAct

(INA) channels judicial review of claims arising out of

removal proceedings through the PFR process. 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1252(a)(5) & (b)(9)). The district court granted the

government’s motion in part and denied it in part. As to

ripeness, the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the

named parties “against whom removal proceedings have not

yet been initiated,” reasoning that “[r]emoval proceedings

might never be commenced.” The other children’s claims

were ripe because the agency did not have authority to

appoint counsel or to declare a statute barring governmentfunded counsel unconstitutional, and “[e]xhaustion is not

required to make a claim ripe when the agency lacks authority

to grant relief.”

The district court then turned to the government’s

jurisdictional challenge. The court recognized that the INA’s

judicial review mechanism, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5) and

1252(b)(9), “is broad in scope” and was “designed to

consolidate and channel review of all legal and factual

questions that arise from the removal of an alien into the

administrative process, with judicial review of those

decisions vested exclusively in the courts of appeal.” 

(quoting Aguilar v. ICE, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007)

(emphasis in original)).

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 8 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 9

Despite the statutorystrictures, the district court identified

an exception to the INA’s exclusive review process and

concluded that it had jurisdiction over the minors’ due

process right-to-counsel claims. Citing McNary v. Haitian

Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991), and City of Rialto

v. West Coast Loading Corporation, 581 F.3d 865 (9th Cir.

2009), the court explained that the due process claims

challenged a procedure or policy collateral to the substance

of removal proceedings and, in light of the fact that “an

immigration judge is unlikely to conduct the requisite [due

process] balancing, the administrative record would be

insufficient to provide a basis for meaningful judicial

review.” Conversely, the district court held that it lacked

jurisdiction over the statutory right-to-counsel claims, in part

because “the [constitutional] balancing standard does not

apply and . . . concerns about the adequacy of the

administrative record are not warranted.”

The government filed this interlocutory appeal,

challenging the district court’s determination that it had

jurisdiction over the constitutional claims. The minors crossappealed, disputing, among other issues, the district court’s

dismissal of the statutory claims.

ANALYSIS

I. The Immigration and Nationality Act Provides

Exclusive Judicial Review through the Petition for

Review Process.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 9 of 31
10 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

This appeal turns on our interpretation of two provisions

of the INA, so we begin with the statute.3 The section titled

“Exclusive means of review,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5),

prescribes the vehicle for judicial review: “[A] petition for

review . . . shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial

review of an order of removal . . . .” Lest there be any

question about the scope of judicial review, § 1252(b)(9)

mandates that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and

fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional

and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or

proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States

. . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order

. . . .”

Section 1252(b)(9) is, as the First Circuit noted,

“breathtaking” in scope and “vise-like” in grip and therefore

swallows up virtually all claims that are tied to removal 

proceedings. See Aguilar v. ICE, 510 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.

2007). Taken together, § 1252(a)(5) and § 1252(b)(9) mean

that any issue—whether legal or factual—arising from any

removal-related activity can be reviewed only through the

PFR process. See Viloria v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 764, 767 (9th

Cir. 2015) (“It is well established that this court’s jurisdiction

over removal proceedings is limited to review of final orders

of removal.”); cf. Bibiano v. Lynch, — F.3d —, 2016 WL

4409351, at *5 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(2)’s venue provision is not jurisdictional, but

contrasting the venue statute with other statutes in the INA

that use the terms “judicial review” or “jurisdiction”).

3 Section 1252(b)(9) encompasses both the statutory and

constitutional claims, which the parties acknowledge stand or fall together.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 10 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 11

Although §§ 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9) might seem

draconian at first glance, they have two mechanisms that

ensure immigrants receive their “day in court.” Singh v.

Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 2007). First, while

these sections limit how immigrants can challenge their

removal proceedings, they are not jurisdiction-stripping

statutes that, by their terms, foreclose all judicial review of

agency actions. Instead, the provisions channel judicial

review over final orders of removal to the courts of appeals. 

See Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2132 (2012)

(explaining that heightened scrutiny is not appropriate where

Congress channels judicial review of constitutional questions

to a particular court but does not deny all judicial review of

those questions). The Supreme Court has thus characterized

§ 1252(b)(9) as a “‘zipper’ clause,”4 Reno v. Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. (AAADC), 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999),

explaining that the statute’s purpose “is to consolidate

‘judicial review’ of immigration proceedings into one action

in the court of appeals[.]” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313

& n.37 (2001).

Second, and equallyimportantly, § 1252(b)(9) has built-in

limits. By channeling only those questions “arising from any

action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien,” the

statute excludes from the PFR process any claim that does not

arise from removal proceedings. Accordingly, claims that are

independent of or collateral to the removal process do not fall

4

 “The term ‘zipper clause’ comes from labor law, where it refers to

a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that prohibits further

collective bargaining during the term of the agreement or, more generally,

that limits the agreement of the parties to the four corners of the contract.” 

Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996

Immigration Act, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1963, 1984–85 (2000).

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 11 of 31
12 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

within the scope of § 1252(b)(9). See Torres-Tristan v.

Holder, 656 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Ancillary

determinations made outside the context of a removal

proceeding, however, are not subject to direct review.”);

Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11 (reading “arising from” “to exclude

claims that are independent of, or wholly collateral to, the

removal process”); see also City of Rialto, 581 F.3d at 874

(recognizing that McNary allowed the petitioners to challenge

a policy that was collateral to their substantive eligibility for

relief).

Thus, we have distinguished between claims that “arise

from” removal proceedings under § 1252(b)(9)—which must

be channeled through the PFR process—and claims that are

collateral to, or independent of, the removal process. See

Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11; Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d

1069, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2006); Singh, 499 F.3d at 979. For

example, in Nadarajah v. Gonzales, we held that an

immigrant could challenge his five-year administrative

detention by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

district court, notwithstanding § 1252(b)(9). 443 F.3d at

1075–76. Nadarajah had “prevailed at every administrative

level of review,” had been granted asylum, and had “never

been charged with any crime,” yet was being held in

detention “without any established timeline for a decision on

when he may be released from detention.” Id. at 1071, 1075. 

We explained that § 1252(b)(9) “does not apply to federal

habeas corpus provisions that do not involve final orders of

removal.” Id. at 1075. Because “Nadarajah ha[d] prevailed

at every administrative level” and been granted asylum, his

petition did not involve a final order of removal, and

§ 1252(b)(9) did not channel jurisdiction to the courts of

appeals. Id. at 1076.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 12 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 13

Similarly, in the unique situation in Singh v. Gonzales, we

recognized that the district court had jurisdiction over the

petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that arose

after his attorney failed to file a timely PFR. 499 F.3d at 980. 

We noted that Singh’s claim could not have been raised

before the agency because it arose after a final order of

removal was entered and, absent habeas review, Singh would

have had no legal avenue to obtain judicial review of this

claim. We therefore concluded that his petition did not

challenge a final order of removal under § 1252(b)(9). Id. at

979. We did not, however, allow Singh to raise a different

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that arose before a

final order of removal entered and that could and should have

been brought before the agency. Id. at 974; cf. Skurtu v.

Mukasey, 552 F.3d 651, 658 (8th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing

Singh and holding that a right-to-counsel claim must be

brought through the PFR process because the claim is a

“direct result of the removal proceedings”).

In contrast, in Martinez v. Napolitano, we held in the

context of a district court challenge under the Administrative

Procedure Act that “[w]hen a claim by an alien, however it is

framed, challenges the procedure and substance of an agency

determination that is ‘inextricably linked’ to the order of

removal, it is prohibited by section 1252(a)(5).” 704 F.3d

620, 623 (9th Cir. 2012).

In light of §§ 1252(b)(9) and 1252(a)(5) and our

precedent, the children’s right-to-counsel claims must be

raised through the PFR process because they “arise from”

removal proceedings. The counsel claims are not

independent or ancillary to the removal proceedings. Rather,

these claims are bound up in and an inextricable part of the

administrative process. The First Circuit was the first court

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 13 of 31
14 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

to consider whether a right-to-counsel claim falls outside the

scope of § 1252(b)(9). The court unequivocally said no. 

Thus, we agree with the court’s analysis in Aguilarthat, “[b]y

any realistic measure, the alien’s right to counsel is part and

parcel of the removal proceeding itself. . . . [A]n alien’s right

to counsel possesses a direct link to, and is inextricably

intertwined with, the administrative process that Congress so

painstakingly fashioned.” Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13.

Right-to-counsel claims are routinely raised in petitions

for review filed with a federal court of appeals. See, e.g.,

Ram v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2008)

(holding that the petitioner did not knowingly and voluntarily

waive the right to counsel); Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741

F.2d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the INS’s

deportation of an immigrant without notice to counsel

violated the immigrant’s statutory right to counsel). In part,

this is because immigration judges have an obligation to ask

whether a petitioner wants counsel: “Although [immigration

judges] may not be required to undertake Herculean efforts to

afford the right to counsel, at a minimum they must inquire

whether the petitioner wishes counsel, determine a reasonable

period for obtaining counsel, and assess whether any waiver

of counsel is knowing and voluntary.” Biwot v. Gonzales,

403 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 2005). An immigration judge’s

failure to inquire into whether the petitioner wants (or can

knowingly waive) counsel is grounds for reversal. See id. As

we discuss below, special protections are provided to minors

who are unrepresented. See infra at pp. 21–22.

The legislative history of the INA, as well as amendments

to § 1252(b)(9), confirm that Congress intended to channel all

claims arising from removal proceedings, including right-tocounsel claims, to the federal courts of appeals and bypass the

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 14 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 15

district courts. Consolidation of the review process for 

immigration orders of removal began in 1961, when Congress

amended the INA to channel immigrants’ challenges to their

removal proceedings to the courts of appeals via the PFR.5

H.R. Rep. No. 87-1086, at 22 (1961), as reprinted in 1961

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2966; see also Magana-Pizano v. INS,

152 F.3d 1213, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing 1961

changes to INA), vacated on other grounds, 526 U.S. 1001

(1999) (mem.). The change was intended to “create a single,

separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative

orders for the [removal] of aliens from the United States” and

to shorten the time frame for judicial review of deportation

orders by “eliminat[ing] . . . a suit in a District Court.” H.R.

Rep. No. 109-72, at 172 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in

2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 297–301 (citations omitted).

Congress continued to streamline judicial review of

immigration proceedings in 1996, when it enacted the Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3546 (1996). 

IIRIRA “repealed the old judicial-review scheme . . . and

instituted a new (and significantly more restrictive) one in

5 The text of the 1961 statute differs from the text of §§ 1252(a)(5)

and 1252(b)(9). It reads: “[The petition for review process] shall apply to,

and shall be the exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final

orders of deportation . . . made against aliens within the United States

pursuant to administrative proceedings . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1964). 

As we explained in Magana-Pizano, the statute was subject to various

“interim measures” from 1961 to 1996. 152 F.3d at 1220. In 1996,

Congress repealed § 1105a(a) and enacted § 1252(b)(9). AAADC,

525 U.S. at 475. It enacted § 1252(a)(5) in 2005 as part of the REAL ID

Act. Singh, 499 F.3d at 977. In each of these amendments, Congress has

consistently sought to channel judicial review ofimmigration proceedings

through the PFR process.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 15 of 31
16 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

8 U.S.C. § 1252.” AAADC, 525 U.S. at 475. The new

judicial review provisions were designed to make perfectly

clear “that only courts of appeals—and not district

courts—could review a final removal order,” that “review of

a final removal order is the only mechanism for reviewing

any issue raised in a removal proceeding,” and that the statute

was “intended to preclude all district court review of any

issue raised in a removal proceeding.”6 H.R. Rep. No. 109-

72, at 173.

When it enacted § 1252(b)(9) in 1996, Congress was

legislating against the backdrop of recent Supreme Court law. 

In 1991, in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, the Court

offered a blueprint for how Congress could draft a

jurisdiction-channeling statute that would cover not only

individual challenges to agency decisions, but also broader

challenges to agency policies and practices. A group of

immigrants, who applied unsuccessfully for amnesty under

the special agricultural workers (SAW) program (or thought

they would be unsuccessful in the future), filed an action in

district court, alleging injuries caused by “unlawful practices

6

In the REAL ID ACT of 2005, Congress amended § 1252(b)(9) to

clarify that federal courts lack habeas jurisdiction over orders of removal. 

The statute nowcontains an additional sentence on habeas jurisdiction, but

the operative jurisdiction-channeling language has not changed from1996. 

The 2005 amendment provides that: “Except as otherwise provided in this

section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section

2241 of Title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or

1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or

nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of law or fact.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Congress amended the statute in response to St.

Cyr, in which the Supreme Court held that the pre-2005 version of

§ 1252(b)(9) did not clearly strip the courts of habeas jurisdiction over

immigrants who had committed crimes. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at

173.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 16 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 17

and policies adopted by the INS in its administration of the

SAW program.” 498 U.S. at 487. The Court held that, under

the governing statute, the district court had jurisdiction to

hear a challenge to INS practices and policies because the

statute channeled only individual—not wider policy—claims

through the PFR process.7

Of significance to our analysis, the Court explained that

Congress could have crafted language to channel challenges

to agency policies through the PFR process if it had chosen

to do so:

[H]ad Congress intended the limited review

provisions of § 210(e) . . . to encompass

challenges to INS procedures and practices, it

could easily have used broader statutory

language. Congress could, for example, have

. . . channel[ed] into the Reform Act’s special

review procedures “all causes . . . arising

under any of the provisions” of the

legalization program. It moreover could have

. . . referr[ed] to review “on all questions of

law and fact” under the SAW legalization

program.

Id. at 494 (citations omitted).

In McNary, the Court did everything but write the future

statute and so it makes sense to presume that Congress was

aware of this precedent when it amended the INA in 1996. 

7 The operative language in the statute at issue in McNary provided

that “judicial review of a determination respecting an application for

adjustment of status” must be brought through a PFR. Id. at 486, 491.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 17 of 31
18 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 495 (1997) (“[W]e

presume that Congress expects its statutes to be read in

conformity with [the Supreme Court’s] precedents. . . .”). 

With this presumption in mind, we note that § 1252(b)(9)

neatly tracks the policy and practice jurisdiction-channeling

language suggested in McNary: the amended section channels

review of “all questions of law and fact” to the courts of

appeals for all claims “arising from any action taken or

proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United

States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Thus, the legislative history

and chronology of amendments to § 1252(b)(9) confirm the

plain meaning of the statute. We conclude that §§ 1252(a)(5)

and 1252(b)(9) channel review of all claims, including

policies-and-practices challenges, through the PFR process

whenever they “arise from” removal proceedings. Because

the children’s right-to-counsel claims arise from their

removal proceedings, they can only raise those claims

through the PFR process. Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 13.

II. The Minors Have Not Been Denied All Forms of

Meaningful Judicial Review.

The minors do not seriously dispute that the plain text of

§ 1252(b)(9) prohibits them from filing a complaint in federal

district court. Instead, they attempt to get around the statute

by claiming that they have been (or will be) denied

meaningful judicial review in light of their juvenile status. In

other words, they argue that § 1252(b)(9), as applied in this

context, creates a Catch-22 that effectively bars all judicial

review of their claims.

The argument goes as follows: Minors who obtain

counsel in their immigration proceedings will be unable to

raise right-to-counsel claims because they have no such

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 18 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 19

claim. As a practical matter, children who lack counsel will

be unable to reach federal court to raise a right-to-counsel

claim because they are subject to the same exhaustion

requirements and filing deadlines that apply to adults. Even

if an unrepresented child were able to navigate the PFR

process, the child would still be deprived of meaningful

judicial review, because the record on appeal would be

insufficient to sustain review. Because, according to the

minors, their right-to-counsel claims will never see the light

of day through the PFR process, the panel should construe

§ 1252(b)(9) as not covering these claims.

The assertion that the minors will be denied meaningful

judicial review stems from dicta in McNary. In McNary, the

Court noted that the SAW regime imposed several practical

impediments to judicial review. Most importantly, SAW

procedures “d[id] not allow applicants to assemble adequate

records” for review.8498 U.S. at 496. Agency interviews

were neither recorded nor transcribed, and SAW applicants

had “inadequate opportunity” to present evidence and

witnesses on their own behalf. Id. Because the

administrative record was minimal, the courts of appeals

“[had] no complete or meaningful basis upon which to review

application determinations.” Id. As a result, if the workers

were “not allowed to pursue their claims in the District Court,

[they] would not as a practical matter be able to obtain

meaningful judicial review of their application denials or of

8 The Court cited two other aspects of the SAW program that were

problematic but are not pertinent here: first, under the statute, judicial

review was available only if immigrants voluntarily surrendered

themselves for deportation after being denied relief, and second, the

plaintiffs “adduced a substantial amount of evidence, most of which would

have been irrelevant in the processing of a particular individual

application.” 498 U.S. at 496–97.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 19 of 31
20 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

their objections to INS procedures.” Id. Citing the “wellsettled presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that

allow judicial review of administrative action,” the Court

concluded that it is “most unlikely that Congress intended to

foreclose all forms of meaningful judicial review.” Id.

The difficulty with the minors’ argument is that McNary

was, at its core, a statutory interpretation case involving a

completely different statute.

9

See Shalala v. Ill. Council on

Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 14 (2000) (declining to

apply McNary because it “turned on the different language of

that different statute,” and noting that “the Court suggested

that statutory language similar to the language at issue

here—any claim ‘arising under’ . . . —would have led it to a

different legal conclusion”). The point in McNary was that

Congress used language (“a determination respecting an

application” for SAW status) that did not encompass the

constitutional pattern and practice claims urged by the

workers. As a consequence, their claims fell outside of the

narrow channeling provisions of the statute.

9 Because this case turns on the interpretation of the statute, the

district court’s reliance on cases involving different statutes is misplaced. 

See Proyecto San Pablo v. INS, 189 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding

that the district court had jurisdiction to hear challenges to agency policies

under a statute that read “[t]here shall be judicial review of a [denial of an

application for adjustment of status by the agency] only in the judicial

review of an order of deportation,” 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(4)(A)); and Ortiz

v. Meissner, 179 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court

had jurisdiction to hear policies and practices challenge under 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1255a(f) and 1160(e), which provided that “[t]here shall be judicial

review ofsuch a denial only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion

or deportation[.]”). Neither case involved the zipper clause of

§ 1252(b)(9) or the “arising from” language. Both Proyecto and Ortiz

analyzed McNary only in the context of the Immigration Reform and

Control Act.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 20 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 21

In providing two alternative formulations of channeling

language, the Court more than foreshadowed what language

would be “expansive” enough to remove district court

jurisdiction. Thus, the Court’s note to Congress laid out the

language necessary to limit “challenges to INS procedures

and practices.” McNary, 498 U.S. at 494. McNary does not

provide an avenue for litigants to circumvent an unambiguous

statute.

We would be naive if we did not acknowledge that having

an unrepresented minor in immigration proceedings poses an

extremely difficult situation. But we are not convinced that

agency removal proceedings raise the same concerns that

were present in the SAW proceedings. Unlike the SAW

program, removal hearings are recorded and transcribed and

provide a basis for meaningful judicial review. Immigration

judges are both trained and required to probe the record and

to ask questions to elicit information about possible avenues

of relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (detailing immigration

judges’ obligation to “administer oaths, receive evidence, and

interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any

witnesses”). Immigration judges must “adequately explain

the hearing procedures to the alien,” Agyeman v. INS,

296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002), and where immigrants

proceed pro se, the judges have a duty to “fully develop the

record.” Id. (quoting Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 733–34

(9th Cir. 2000)). They are also required to inform immigrants

of any ability to apply for relief from removal and the right to

appeal removal orders. See United States v. UbaldoFigueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004).

Unrepresented minors receive additional special

protections in removal proceedings. Unless the child is

accompanied by “an attorney or legal representative, a near

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 21 of 31
22 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

relative, legal guardian, or friend,” the immigration judge

cannot accept the child’s admission of removability. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1240.10(c). Immigration judges also must ensure that any

waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and voluntary; on

review, we can “indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver,” United States v. Cisneros-Rodriguez,

813 F.3d 748, 756 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), and

when the petitioner is a minor, we factor “the minor’s age,

intelligence, education, information, information, and

understanding and ability to comprehend” into our analysis. 

Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Further, recognizing “a growing need for support systems the

courts can use to effectively and efficiently manage the cases

of unaccompanied minors,” in 2014, the Office of the Chief

Immigration Judge provided guidelines for “The Friend of the

Court Model for Unaccompanied Minors in Immigration

Proceedings.” Although the friend of the court does not act

as a representative, the friend’s assistance role can be critical

in monitoring the proceedings. These protections distinguish

removal proceedings from the SAW program, and the

concerns highlighted by McNary are not in play.

At argument, counsel for the children claimed that it was

essentially impossible to get the right-to-counsel claim before

a federal court. This assertion is belied by the fact that the

minors’ counsel has previously raised a right-to-counsel

claim through the PFR process. See Guzman-Heredia v.

Gonzales, No. 04-72769 (9th Cir.). In Guzman-Heredia, the

petitioner was a fourteen-year-old boy who was placed in

removal proceedings. He explained to the immigration judge

“that he had been unable to find an attorney to represent him

and requested that the Immigration Judge appoint an attorney

for him.” The judge denied the request, stating that he could

not “give people a free lawyer.” The immigration judge then

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 22 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 23

ordered the petitioner removed, and the Board of Immigration

Appeals affirmed. At this stage, the petitioner obtained pro

bono counsel, who argued in a PFR that:

Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to due

process was violated when the Immigration

Judge refused to appoint an attorney to

represent him in removal proceedings. 

Because Petitioner is an unaccompanied child

of 14 years of age, he is of limited cognitive

abilities and lacks understanding of legal

process. Due to the seriousness of the

proceedings against him and the importance

of the interest at stake, namely immigration

proceedings in which the government seeks to

remove Petitioner from his family, home and

school in the United States, the Constitution

compels that Petitioner have been afforded the

protection of appointed counsel at public

expense.

Id. Although the case ultimately settled, Guzman-Heredia

lays rest to the contention that right-to-counsel claims will

never surface through the PFR process.

The reality is that current counsel for the minors are in a

unique position to bring multiple test cases on the counsel

issue.10 The claim in this suit is that indigent minors are

10 Following discussion at oral argument, to facilitate a test case,

through December 2016 the government is providing the children’s

counsel with notice of any minor without counsel that the government is

aware of ordered removed by an immigration judge following a merits

hearing. To take the government at its word that it is willing to cooperate

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 23 of 31
24 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

entitled to government-provided counsel as a matter of

constitutional and statutory right. For accompanied minors,

a parent could make the claim or, for unaccompanied minors,

a next friend could help them do so.11 Even better, the IJ and

the government could acknowledge that absent a knowing

and voluntary waiver, a minor proceeding without counsel

has de facto requested a right to court-appointed counsel.

Under any of these scenarios, a right-to-counsel claim is

teed up for appellate review. It is true that at present neither

the immigration judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals

has authority to order court-appointed counsel. But the

question at hand is a legal one involving constitutional rights. 

Even if not raised in the proceedings below, the court of

appeals has authority to consider the issue because it falls

within the narrow exception for “constitutional challenges

that are not within the competence of administrative agencies

to decide” and for arguments that are “so entirely foreclosed

. . . that no remedies [are] available as of right” from the

agency.

12 Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.

2004) (first quotation); Alvarado v. Holder, 759 F.3d 1121,

with counsel, the government should continue such notice.

11 The Friend of the Court Model for Unaccompanied Minors can

provide an avenue for counsel to play a role in individual proceedings. 

For example, one of the children’s counsel appeared as a friend in an

individual immigration proceeding in July 2016 and stated that although

he did not represent the child, “for whatever value it has in the record that

[the minor] does I know want appointed counsel.” See Attachment to

Government’s Letter to the Court, dated August 18, 2016.

12 Under the statute, immigrants in removal proceedings have “the

privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by

counsel of the alien’s choosing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A). Agency

regulations recognize the same privilege. 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2).

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 24 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 25

1128 (9th Cir. 2014) (second quotation; quotation marks and

citation omitted, first alteration in original); see also, e.g.,

Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (per

curiam) (recognizing exception to exhaustion requirement for

constitutional challenges to agencyprocedures and the statute

the agency administers).

We recognize that a class remedy arguablymight be more

efficient than requiring each applicant to file a PFR, but that

is not a ground for ignoring the jurisdictional statute. Indeed,

should a court determine that the statute barring payment for

counsel does not mean what it says—a position taken by the

minors—that statute would be “infirm across the circuit and

in every case.” Naranjo-Aguilera v. INS, 30 F.3d 1106, 1114

(9th Cir. 1994). We also recognize that there are limited—

and already more than stretched—pro bono resources

available to help unaccompanied minors navigate the removal

process. But these considerations cannot overcome a clear

statutory prescription against district court review. Relief is

through review in the court of appeals or executive or

congressional action.

In sum, the minors’ claim that they are entitled to courtappointed counsel “arises from” their removal proceedings

and §§ 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9) provide petitions for review

of a removal order as the exclusive avenue for judicial

review. The district court lacks jurisdiction over the minors’

claims.13

13 Because the district court lacks jurisdiction, we do not reach the

other issues the minors raise on cross-appeal.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 25 of 31
26 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

AFFIRMED as to the statutory claim; REVERSED as

to the constitutional claim. The parties shall each bear

their own costs on appeal.

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, with whom M. SMITH, Circuit

Judge, joins, specially concurring:

Jurisdictional rulings have an anodyne character that may

suggest insensitivity to the plight of the parties, particularly

in a case involving immigrant children whose treatment,

according to former Attorney General Eric Holder, raises

serious policy and moral questions.1 But we must heed the

Supreme Court’s admonition that “[f]ederal courts are courts

of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be

expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). 

We did not reach the merits here because we hewed to the

statute channeling federal court jurisdiction. That said, I

cannot let the occasion pass without highlighting the plight of

unrepresented children who find themselves in immigration

proceedings. While I do not take a position on the merits of

the children’s constitutional and statutory claims, I write to

underscore that the Executive and Congress have the power

to address this crisis without judicial intervention. What is

missing here? Money and resolve—political solutions that

fall outside the purview of the courts.

1 AttorneyGeneral Eric Holder, Remarks at the Hispanic National Bar

Association 39th Annual Convention (Sept. 12, 2014), available at

https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-attorney-general-eric-holderhispanic-national-bar-association-39th-annual.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 26 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 27

In fiscal year 2014, more than 60,000 unaccompanied

minors made their way to the United States,2prompting the

Department of Homeland Security to declare a crisis at our

southern border.3 Although the numbers dropped in fiscal

year 2015, the surge has now reappeared. According to the

Pew Research Center, “[t]he number of apprehensions of

unaccompanied children shot up by 78%” during the first six

months of fiscal year 2016.4Indeed, earlier “some Members

of Congress as well as the Administration characterized the

issue as a humanitarian crisis.”5 The border crisis created

what has been called a “perfect storm” in immigration courts,

as children wend their way from border crossings to

immigration proceedings.6 The storm has battered

immigration “courtrooms crowded with young defendants but

2 William Kandel, Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview,

Congressional Research Service, 1 (May 11, 2016), available at

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43599.pdf.

3

Julia Preston, U.S. Setting Up Emergency Shelter in Texas as Youths

Cross Border Alone, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2014, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/us/us-sets-up-crisis-shelter-aschildren-flow-across-border-alone.html?_r=0.

4

Jens Krogstad, U.S. Border Apprehensions of Families and

UnaccompaniedChildren Jump Dramatically, PewResearchCenter, May

4, 2016, available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/04/us-border-apprehensions-of-families-and-unaccompanied-children-jumpdramatically/.

5

See Kandel, supra note 2, at 1.

6 ABA Commission on Immigration, A Humanitarian Call to Action:

Unaccompanied Children in Removal Proceedings Present a Critical

Need for Legal Representation, 1 (June 3, 2015), available at

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/immigrati

on/UACSstatement.authcheckdam.pdf(internal quotationmarks omitted).

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 27 of 31
28 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

lacking lawyers and judges to handle the sheer volume of

cases.”7

The net result is that thousands of children8are left to

thread their way alone through the labyrinthine maze of

immigration laws, which, without hyperbole, “have been

termed second only to the Internal Revenue Code in

complexity.” Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312

(9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004)

(emphasizing the complexity of immigration laws and noting

that lawyers may be the only ones capable of navigating

through it). This reality prompted the Chief Immigration

Judge to acknowledge that “[t]he demands placed on the

[immigration] courts are increasing due to the unprecedented

numbers of unaccompanied minors being placed in

immigration proceedings. As a result there is a growing need

for support systems the [immigration] courts can use to

effectively and efficiently manage the cases of

unaccompanied minors.”9

7 Liz Robbins, Immigration Crisis Shifts from Border to Courts,

N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/

2015/08/24/nyregion/border-crisis-shifts-as-undocumented-childrenscases-overwhelm-courts.html.

8 According to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at

Syracuse University, between 2011 and 2014, the number of juvenile

cases in immigration courts leaped from 6,425 in 2011 to 59,394 in 2014. 

As of September 2015, children in more than 32,700 pending immigration

cases were unrepresented.

9

 Memorandum from the Executive Office for Immigration Review,

The Friend ofthe Court Model for Unaccompanied Minors in Immigration

Proceedings (Sept. 10, 2014).

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 28 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 29

Given the onslaught of cases involving unaccompanied

minors, there is only so much even the most dedicated and

judicious immigration judges (and, on appeal, members of the

Board of Immigration Appeals) can do. See Amicus Curiae

Brief of Former Federal Immigration Judges at 7. 

Immigration judges are constrained by “extremely limited

time and resources.” Id. at 4. Indeed, those judges may

sometimes hear as many as 50 to 70 petitions in a three-tofour hour period, id., leaving scant time to delve deeply into

the particular circumstances of a child’s case.

In light of all this, it is no surprise that then-Attorney

General Holder took the position in 2014 that “[t]hough these

children may not have a Constitutional right to a lawyer, we

have policy reasons and a moral obligation to ensure the

presence of counsel.”10 But Congress has clearly—and

repeatedly—indicated that these policy and moral concerns

may not be addressed in the district court. Rather, these

issues come initially within the Executive’s purview as part

of the administrative removal process, with review available

in the Courts of Appeals through the petition for review

process.11 See Maj. Op. at 14–17.

To its credit, the Executive has taken some steps within

this process to address the difficulties confronting

unaccompanied and unrepresented minors. Through the

10 See supra note 1.

11 As discussed in the majority opinion, under the current statutory

scheme, Congress has recognized the “privilege of being represented, at

no expense to the Government, by counsel.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A). 

Implementing regulations enacted by the Executive recognize the same

limited privilege. See 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2).

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 29 of 31
30 J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH

Justice AmeriCorps program, the government awarded $1.8

million to support living allowances for 100 legal fellows

who will represent children in removal proceedings.12 The

government has also partnered with the United States

Conference of Catholic Bishops and the United States

Committee for Refugees and Immigrants to provide legal

representation to unaccompanied children.13 The Executive

Office for Immigration Review offers legal orientations for

custodians of unaccompanied children in removal

proceedings and it launched a pilot program to provide legal

services to unaccompanied minors.14

Yet these programs, while laudable, are a drop in the

bucket in relation to the magnitude of the problem—tens of

thousands of children will remain unrepresented. A

meritorious application for asylum, refuge, withholding of

removal or other relief may fall through the cracks, despite

the best efforts of immigration agencies and the best interests

of the child. Additional policy and funding initiatives aimed

at securing representation for minors are important to ensure

12 See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department and

CNCS Announce $1.8 Million in Grants to Enhance Immigration Court

Proceedings and Provide Assistance to Unaccompanied Children (Sept.

12, 2014), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentand-cncs-announce-18-million-grants-enhance-immigration-courtproceedings.

13 See Announcement of Award of Two Single-Source Program

Expansion Supplement Grants To Support Legal Services to Refugees

Under the Unaccompanied Alien Children’s Program, 79 Fed. Reg.

62,159–01 (Oct. 16, 2014).

14 See Press Release, Department of Justice, EOIR Expands Legal

Orientation Program Sites (Oct. 22, 2014), available at

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/eoir-expands-legal-orientation-programs.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 30 of 31
J.E. F.M. V. LYNCH 31

the smooth functioning of our immigration system and the

fair and proper application of our immigration laws.

Eventually, an appeal asserting a right to governmentfunded counsel will find its way from the immigration courts

to a Court of Appeals through the petition for review process. 

It would be both inappropriate and premature to comment on

the legal merits of such a claim. But, no matter the ultimate

outcome of such an appeal, Congress and the Executive

should not simply wait for a judicial determination before

taking up the “policy reasons and . . . moral obligation” to

respond to the dilemma of the thousands of children left to

serve as their own advocates in the immigration courts in the

meantime. The stakes are too high. To give meaning to

“Equal Justice Under Law,” the tag line engraved on the U.S.

Supreme Court building, to ensure the fair and effective

administration of our immigration system, and to protect the

interests of children who must struggle through that system,

the problem demands action now.

KLEINFELD, Senior Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

I agree with my colleagues that a child (or for that matter,

an adult) is unlikely to be able to protect all his rights in a

deportation proceeding unless he has a lawyer. Many

advocacy groups are deeply involved in immigration issues,

including the ones who provided counsel in this one, and

because the solution to the representation problem is a highly

controversial political matter, I think our own advocacy of

some particular reform measure is unnecessaryand the matter

is better left to the political process.

 Case: 15-35738, 09/20/2016, ID: 10129075, DktEntry: 100-1, Page 31 of 31