Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00461/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00461-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NANCY HABIBI, Civil No. 08-cv-0461-JLS (POR)

Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S CROSS

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[Document No. 13]

[Document No. 16]

v.

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 12, 2008, Plaintiff Nancy Habibi (“Plainitff”) filed a complaint pursuant to section

205(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) requesting judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) regarding

the denial of Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits. 

(Doc. 1.) On December 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment regarding her

205(g) claim. (Doc. 13.) Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in (1) determining she could return to her

past relevant work, and (2) in rejecting Plaintiff’s treating physicians’ opinions of her limitation. 

(Id.) On February 10, 2009, Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 16) and

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 17.) On February 28, 2009, Plaintiff

filed her opposition to Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 19.)

//

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Administrative Record, hereinafter “AR.”

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The Court finds the motions appropriate for submission on the papers and without oral

argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court recommends

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13) be DENIED and Defendant’s cross motion for

summary judgment be GRANTED. (Doc. 16.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 14, 2005, Plaintiff filed an initial application for Disability Insurance Benefits. 

(Administrative Record1 15.) After a June 10, 2005 denial at the initial determination (AR 31) and

an October 6, 2005, denial on reconsideration (AR 37), Plaintiff filed a timely request for hearing

before an administrative law judge (hereinafter “ALJ”) on December 8, 2005. (AR 42.) On

December 5, 2006, Plaintiff, represented by Mary Mitchell, Esq., appeared and testified at an

administrative hearing before an ALJ. (AR 326-346.) Victor Schorn, M.D., provided expert

medical testimony, and Bonnie SinClair, M.S., provided expert vocational testimony. (Id.) On

March 15, 2007, the ALJ denied Plaintiff benefits. (AR 15-27.) The decision of the Social Security

Administration (hereinafter “SSA”) became final when the Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s

findings by decision dated January 15, 2008. (AR 4-6.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant action

in Federal Court on March 12, 2008. (Doc. 1.) 

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on March 28, 1963. (AR 74, 329.) Plaintiff graduated high school in

Mexico and emigrated to the United States in the early 1980's. (AR 329-330.) Plaintiff became a

United States citizen in March, 1994. (AR 330.) Plaintiff can read and speak the English language. 

(AR 84, 220.) 

From November, 1992 through January, 1993, Plaintiff worked as an assistant sales clerk at

See’s Candies. (AR 94, 330-331.) From September, 1993 through June, 2001, Plaintiff worked as a

child care aid for a children’s hospital. (Id.) From July, 2001 through March, 2002, Plaintiff

worked as a file clerk for the same children’s hospital. (Id.)

At the December 5, 2006 hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified she suffers from pain in

her right shoulder and lower back. (AR 331, 333.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges disability based

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upon lumbar spine disorder, right shoulder impairment with tendinitis, and right shoulder rotator

cuff strain. (AR 18.) At the hearing, Plaintiff testified she cannot raise her right arm above her

head. (AR 336.) She also testified she drives a car three-four times a week, does house chores,

takes care of a small dog, and walks for fifteen-twenty minutes every day. (333-335.) 

Dr. Schorn, the medical expert, testified Plaintiff has mild right shoulder impingement

syndrome, with tendinitis, and mild degenerative disc disease. (AR 338-340.) He stated Plaintiff

has the functional capacity to lift 20 pounds on occasion and 10 pounds frequently. (AR 340.) He

further testified Plaintiff could use her right upper extremity 70 percent of the time. (Id.) 

Ms. SinClair, the vocational expert, testified a hypothetical person of the age, education, and

work experience of Plaintiff, with the capacity to lift 20 pounds occasionally, and 10 pounds

frequently, who can sit and stand 6 out of 8 hours, and who is limited to shoulder-high activity, can

perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work of file clerk and associate. (AR 344.) Ms. SinClair further

testified a hypothetical person with the same characteristics as the previous hypothetical, with the

exception of a capacity to lift a maximum of 10 pounds rather than 20 pounds with the right upper

extremity, would be limited to sedentary work. (Id.) She noted sedentary work includes the job of

stuffer, assembler, and folder. (AR 345.) 

After consideration of all the evidence, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had not been under

disability within the meaning of the SSA since her alleged disability onset of March 23, 2003. (AR

16.) The ALJ found: (1) Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 23,

2003; (2) Plaintiff has the severe impairments of mild degenerative lumbar disc disease and mild

right shoulder impairment with tendinitis; (3) Plaintiff’s impairments have not met or equaled the

requirements of any listing of the Listing of Impairments; (4) Since March 23, 2003, Plaintiff has

had a residual functional capacity to lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally, lift/carry 10 pounds

frequently, stand/walk for 6 hours of an 8 hour day, and sit for 6 hours of an 8 hour day with no

above the shoulder activity with her dominant right arm; and (5) Plaintiff is able to perform her past

relevant work as a file clerk and sales clerk. (AR 17-27.) 

In determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ considered opinion evidence,

Plaintiff’s symptoms, and the extent to which Plaintiff’s symptoms were consistent with the

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 These physicians include Dr. McSweeney, Dr. Murphy, Dr. Previte, Dr. Sabourin, Dr. Abbott, Dr. Stover, Dr.

Meek, and Dr. Do.

3

 These physicians include Dr. Previte, Dr. Greenwald, and Dr. Kiddy. 

4

 Dr. Previte’s complete opinions are set forth in pgs.5-6.

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objective medical evidence and other evidence. (AR 19-26.) The ALJ cited various physicians2

who claimed Plaintiff was solely restricted from heavy lifting and repetitive overhead work with her

right shoulder. (AR 20.) Although other physicians3

 concluded Plaintiff had more severe

limitations, the ALJ concluded their opinions of Plaintiff’s disability status were not entitled to

controlling weight for the following reasons: (1) Dr. Previte failed to provide a diagnosis or cite

medical findings in his work status reports and physician’s progress reports, in which he found

Plaintiff disabled for periods of 4-6 weeks;4

 (2) Dr. Greenwald only saw Plaintiff once; (3) Dr.

Kiddy, a chiropractor, is not an acceptable medical source; (4) these physicians’ opinions are

inconsistent with other assessments of Plaintiff’s disability; and (5) the opinions are inconsistent

with the weight of the record as a whole and therefore entitled to reduced weight. (AR 22-24.) 

In determining Plaintiff’s ability to perform her past relevant work, the ALJ relied on Ms.

SinClair’s conclusion an individual with Plaintiff’s characteristics would be able to work as a file

clerk and sales clerk. (AR 27.) The ALJ further concluded Plaintiff was unable to perform her past

relevant work as a child care provider because its requirements for medium exertion were in excess

of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. (Id.) 

1. Medical Evidence

On September 7, 2001, Plaintiff felt her arm “crack” while attempting to pull a file from a

cabinet while working as a file clerk in the Children’s Hospital Radiology Department. (AR 138.) 

On September 20, 2001, while filing folders at work, Plaintiff fell backwards off a stool, landing on

her buttocks and back. (AR 174.) 

a. Treating Provider Evidence

Shortly after suffering injury to her shoulder and back, Plaintiff received treatment through

her employer’s Occupational Health unit. (AR 120-140.) On September 21, 2001, Plaintiff saw

Lisa Sheehan, a Nurse Practitioner. (AR 138.) Plaintiff told Ms. Sheehan she felt pain following

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her September 7, 2001 injury and saw her private health care provider on September 10, 2001. (AR

138.) The private health care provider took x-rays, determined she had not suffered a fracture, and

advised her to take over the counter Tylenol or Advil and use ice/heat. (Id.) On September 28,

2001, at a follow-up visit, Ms. Sheehan diagnosed Plaintiff with rotator cuff tendinitis and advised

Plaintiff to limit her weight lifting to 20 pounds and restricted above-the-shoulder lifting with her

right arm. (AR 131.) On October 9, 2001, Plaintiff told Ms. Sheehan her shoulder felt 30 percent

improved. (AR 129.) Ms. Sheehan recommended physical therapy two to three times per week for

two to three weeks and advised Plaintiff to continue her modified duty, which included a weight

lifting restriction of 20 pounds and no above-the-shoulder lifting. (Id.) 

On October 16, 2001, Dr. Munday noted Plaintiff was not complaining of any pain, although

she did report some numbness in her right shoulder. (AR 125.) Dr. Munday recommended no

lifting over 25 pounds and he anticipated that once she had physical therapy, Plaintiff would be able

to return to regular work. (Id.) On December 6, 2001, Ms. Sheehan noted Plaintiff stated she was at

85 percent in regard to resolution of her symptoms, even though she continued to feel right shoulder

pain after 25 minutes of use. (AR 122.) Ms. Sheehan recommended continued modified duty, with

a weight lifting restriction of 30 pounds. (Id.) 

On March 11, 2003, Dr. Previte completed an Initial Complex Orthopaedic Evaluation of

Plaintiff. (AR 213-222.) Plaintiff complained of right shoulder pain, low back pain, and

development of left shoulder pain. (AR 213.) Dr. Previte diagnosed Plaintiff with low back strain

with persistent lumbalgia and a right shoulder strain with residual rotator cuff syndrome. (AR 221.) 

He opined Plaintiff was capable of continuing modified duties with the avoidance of heavy lifting

and overhead work. (AR 222.) 

On August 7, 2003, Dr. Previte completed a Primary Treating Physician’s Permanent and

Stationary Evaluation. (AR 200-206.) Dr. Previte diagnosed Plaintiff with impingement syndrome

in the right shoulder, but noted Plaintiff was not interested in surgical treatment. (AR 204.) He

further stated “additional temporary total disability ha[d] been incurred on the basis of her inability

to perform her normal work activities.” (AR 205.) Due to his belief Plaintiff experienced

intermittent/moderate shoulder pain when performing overhead work or forceful function, Dr.

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 A review of the record indicates Plaintiff never underwent right shoulder surgery. (AR 1-346.)

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Previte precluded Plaintiff from “forceful use of the right upper extremity below shoulder level and

from overhead work with the right upper extremity.” (AR 205.) 

Dr. Previte completed physician’s progress reports for Plaintiff on April 15, 2003 (212, 324);

May 1, 2003 (AR 211, 323); May 29, 2003 (AR 210, 322); June 19, 2003 (AR 209, 321); July 7,

2003 (AR 320); August 7, 2003 (AR 319); August 22, 2003 (AR 318); September 11, 2003 (AR

317); September 25, 2003 (AR 316); October 21, 2003 (AR 315); November 6, 2003 (AR 314);

December 9, 2003 (AR 313); and January 22, 2004 (AR 199, 312.) In these reports, Dr. Previte

deemed Plaintiff temporarily disabled for periods of four-six weeks. 

Dr. Previte completed Work Status Reports on April 15, 2003 (AR 275); May 29, 2003 (AR

274); June 19, 2003 (AR 273); September 25, 2003 (AR 272); October 21, 2003 (AR 271); and

January 22, 2004 (AR 311.) In these reports, Dr. Previte reported Plaintiff to be unable to work for

periods of four-six weeks.

On May 15, 2004, Dr. Previte noted Plaintiff complained of persistent right shoulder

symptoms and sought authorization to perform surgery. (AR 196.) Dr. Previte stated that after

surgery, Plaintiff would return to temporary total disability status for three-four weeks and then

return to modified duties. (Id.) He also stated he anticipated Plaintiff would return to permanent

and stationary status within 3 months of undergoing right shoulder surgery. (Id.)

5

 

b. Examining Physician Evidence

On February 21, 2002, John Miles, M.D., diagnosed Plaintiff with mild right shoulder

impingement syndrome, which he indicated had not yet failed nonsurgical management. (AR 146.) 

He recommended an additional two weeks of physical therapy and suggested Plaintiff remain on

modified duty with weightlifting restrictions of 10 pounds and no overhead lifting or reaching with

the right arm. (AR 147.) On April 23, 2002, Dr. Miles reported Plaintiff indicated she was

somewhat better. (AR 144.) Since her symptoms were improved, Dr. Miles recommended she

return to regular work status as of April 23, 2002. (Id.) On May 24, 2002, Dr. Miles prepared a

Permanent and Stationary Report, in which he diagnosed mild right shoulder impingement

syndrome. (AR 142.) Dr. Miles noted despite Plaintiff’s intermittent slight pain affecting her right

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shoulder, there were no permanent work restrictions for her in the open labor market. (Id.) 

Regarding future medical care, Dr. Miles noted Plaintiff’s symptom’s were not severe enough to

justify surgical intervention at that time. (Id.)

On November 12, 2002, James McSweeney, M.D., performed a Qualified Medical

Examination, in which he noted Plaintiff continued her regular duties and reported difficulty with

overhead lifting. (AR 156.) Plaintiff reported she took 3-4 Motrin per day and was not under a

physician’s care. (Id.) Plaintiff indicated she did not want to undergo surgery and stated her

symptoms were “tolerable” as long as she did not have to perform overhead lifting. (AR 159.) 

Although Dr. McSweeney agreed with Dr. Miles that Plaintiff was permanent and stationary, he

disagreed with his opinion that work restrictions were not needed. (Id.) Accordingly, Dr.

McSweeney found Plaintiff was precluded from very heavy lifting and repetitive overhead work. 

(Id.) 

On November 4, 2003, Jeffrey Kiddy, D.C., a chiropractor, diagnosed Plaintiff with spinal

sublux, lumbar IVD disorder with myelopathy, and internal derangement-shoulder. (AR 280.) He

recommended Plaintiff remain off work per Dr. Previte’s orders. (Id.) On December 12, 2003, Dr.

Kiddy recommended Plaintiff remain off work for 45 days. (AR 279.) On January 21, 2004, Dr.

Kiddy recommended Plaintiff remain off work an additional 45 days. (AR 278.) On February 10,

2004, Plaintiff recommended Plaintiff remain off work per Dr. Previte’s orders. (AR 277.) 

On December 22, 2003, Eric Korsh, M.D., performed an Orthopedic Spine Surgery

Consultation. (AR 164-171.) Plaintiff complained primarily of pain in her low back and right

shoulder as a result of an incident at work. (AR 165.) Plaintiff reported she could live with the pain

at the current level and did not require more aggressive intervention. (AR 169.) 

On March 9, 2004, Paul Murphy, M.D., provided an Agreed Medical Examiner’s Report. 

(AR 173-193.) Dr. Murphy stated he would preclude Plaintiff from very heavy work and very

forceful activities above her shoulder. (AR 179, 190.) Dr. Murphy further opined Plaintiff has lost

approximately 25 percent of her pre-injury capacity for performing such activities as bending,

stooping, lifting, pushing, pulling, and climbing and other activities involving comparable physical

effort. (AR 179.) Dr. Murphy concluded Plaintiff had received the maximum benefits of medical

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treatment. (Id.) 

On May 16, 2005, Thomas Sabourin, M.D., performed an Orthopaedic Consultation. (AR

225-229.) He concluded Plaintiff could lift or carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds

frequently and that she could stand, walk and sit six hours of an eight hour workday. (AR 229.)

On June 2, 2005, John Meek, M.D., provided a Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

(AR 231-237.) Dr. Meek concluded Plaintiff should avoid frequent overhead reaching with her right

hand. (AR 234.) State agency physician Thu Do reviewed the medical evidence and affirmed Dr.

Meek’s assessment. (AR 238.) 

On September 20, 2005, Christopher Abbott, M.D., provided a Complete Internal Medicine

Evaluation at the request of the SSA. (AR 241-246.) Dr. Abbott concluded Plaintiff could carry or

lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and that she had no postural, manipulative,

visual, communicative, or environmental limitations. (AR 245.) 

On December 28, 2006, at the request of the SSA, Kenneth Stover, M.D. examined Plaintiff

and provided a Neurological Evaluation. (AR 250-259.) Dr. Stover concluded Plaintiff was not

restricted, from a neurological standpoint, in exertional, postural, or manipulative functions. (AR

253.) 

On January 10, 2007, Steven Greenwald, M.D., completed a Medical Assessment Form of

Ability to do Work-Related Activities. (AR 260-270.) Dr. Greenwald declared Plaintiff totally

disabled based on the subjective factors of disability. (AR 269.)

IV. DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard Regarding Review of Denial of Disability Claim

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, applicants must show two

things: (1) They suffer from a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to last for a

continuous period of twelve months or more, or would result in death; and (2) the impairment

renders applicants incapable of performing the work they previously performed or any other

substantially gainful employment that exists in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§

423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A) (West Supp. 2008). An applicant must meet both requirements to be classified

as “disabled.” Id.

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Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act allow applicants whose claims

have been denied by the SSA to seek judicial review of the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (West Supp. 2008). The Court should affirm the decision unless

“it is based upon legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427

F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)).

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support [the ALJ’s] conclusion[,]” considering the record as a whole. Webb v. Barnhart,

433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It

means “‘more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance[]’” of the evidence. Bayliss, 427

F.3d at 1214 n.1 (quoting Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601). “‘[T]he court must consider both evidence that

supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion . . . .’” Frost v. Barnhart, 314

F.3d 359, 366-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985).

To determine whether a claimant is “disabled,” the Social Security regulations use a five-step

process outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2008). If an applicant is found to be “disabled” or “not

disabled” at any step, there is no need to proceed further. Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1003

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Schneider v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir.

2000)). Although the ALJ must assist the applicant in developing a record, the applicant bears the

burden of proof during the first four steps. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 & n.3 (9th Cir.

1999). If the fifth step is reached, however, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id. at 1098. The

steps for evaluating a claim are as follows:

Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? 

If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security

Act and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant is not working

in a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step

one and the evaluation proceeds to step two.

Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is “not

disabled” and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant’s

impairment is severe, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step two and the

evaluation proceeds to step three.

Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific

impairments described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” and

therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant’s impairment

neither meets nor equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations, then the

claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the evaluation proceeds to step

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four.

Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has done in the

past? If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the past, then

the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step four and the evaluation proceeds to the

fifth and final step.

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, then the claimant is

“disabled” and therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant is

able to do other work, then the Commissioner must establish that there are a

significant number of jobs in the national economy that claimant can do. There are

two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of showing that there is other

work in “significant numbers” in the national economy that claimant can do: (1) by

the testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this

burden, the claimant is “not disabled” and therefore not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is

“disabled” and therefore entitled to disability benefits.

Id. at 1098-99 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949,

954 (9th Cir. 2001) (giving an abbreviated version of the five steps).

Section 405(g) permits this Court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the

Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). The matter may also be remanded to the Social

Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. After a case is remanded and an additional

hearing is held, the Commissioner may modify or affirm the original findings of fact or the decision. 

Id. 

“If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the Secretary’s

conclusion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary.” Flaten v. Sec’y

Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court must uphold the denial of

benefits if the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports

the ALJ’s decision. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Finally, the court will not

reverse an ALJ's decision for harmless error, which exists when it is clear from the record that “the

ALJ's error was ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’ ” Robbins v. Soc.

Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454

F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir.2006)).

2. Step Four of the Disability Analysis: Past Relevant Work

The ALJ found in favor of Plaintiff at Steps 1-3 of the disability analysis. (AR 15-19.) 

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However, the ALJ found Plaintiff failed to meet her burden at Step 4 and determined she could

return to her past relevant work. (AR 26-27.) 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred at Step 4 in determining she could return to her past relevant

work. (Doc. 139-17.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends the evidence failed to establish her activity

selling chocolate for See’s Candy qualified as substantial gainful activity because: (1) the activity

was too brief; (2) she did not earn enough money; and (3) the ALJ decision failed to provide a

detailed factual finding explaining his conclusion that Plaintiff’s position as a sales clerk was

substantial gainful activity and past relevant work. (Doc 13 at 10-13.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends

the ALJ’s determination Plaintiff could return to her positions as sales clerk and file clerk was not

supported by the evidence. (Doc. 13 at 12-17.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s decision

failed toascertain the specific demands of Plaintiff’s past work as a sales clerk and file clerk. (Doc.

13 at 14.) 

Defendant contends the ALJ appropriately found Plaintiff’s employment as a sales clerk met

the regulatory definition of substantial gainful activity and that she maintained the capacity to

perform work as a sales clerk and as a file clerk. (Doc. 16 at 6-7.)

At step four, claimants have the burden of showing they can no longer perform past relevant

work. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001). “Although the burden of proof lies

with the claimant at step four, the ALJ still has a duty to make the requisite factual findings to

support this conclusion. SSR 82-62; See 20 C.F.R. sections 404.1571. This is done by looking at

the “residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands” of the claimant’s past

relevant work. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 844-45. Residual functional capacity is the most a claimant can

do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R. section 404.1545. The RFC assessment must be based on all

of the relevant evidence in the record. Id. An ALJ’s determination of a claimant’s RFC will be

affirmed if the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and the decision is supported by substantial

evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1271 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

To determine whether the claimant has the capacity to perform past relevant work, the ALJ

must assess whether the claimant can perform: (1) The actual functional demands and job duties of a

particular past relevant job; or (2) the functional demands and job duties of the occupation as

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generally required by employers throughout the national economy. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. “Social

Security Regulations name two sources of information that may be used to define a claimant’s past

relevant work as actually performed: a properly completed vocational report, and the claimant’s own

testimony.” Id. at 845. Past relevant work as generally performed is determined by referring to the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Id. at 845. 

In order to constitute work experience, a claimant’s past work must have been substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. section 404.1565(a). Substantial work activity is work activity that

involves doing significant physical or mental activities. “Work may be substantial even if it is done

on a part-time basis or if you do less, get paid less, or have less responsibility than when you worked

before.” 20 C.F.R. section 404.1572(a). “Work activity is gainful if it is the kind of work usually

done for profit, whether or not a profit is realized.” 20 C.F.R. section 404.1572(b). Moreover, the

length of time during which the person gained experience “should have been sufficient for the

worker to have learned the techniques, acquired information, and developed the facility needed for

average performance in the job situation. The length of time this would take depends on the nature

and complexity of the work.” Social Security Ruling 82-62. Working for a period less than 3

months will be considered substantial gainful activity, unless the claimants’ impairment forced them

to stop working or to reduce the amount of work they do. See 20 C.F.R. section 404.1574©). 

Here, the Court finds the ALJ properly found Plaintiff capable of performing her past

relevant work as a file clerk and sales clerk. (AR 26.) First, after careful consideration of the entire

record, the ALJ properly found Plaintiff has a residual functional capacity (RFC) to lift/carry 20

pounds occasionally, lift/carry 10 pounds frequently, stand/walk for 6 hours of an 8 hour day, and sit

for 6 hours of an 8 hour day with no above-the-shoulder activity with the dominant right arm. (AR

189.) In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ stated he “considered all symptoms and the extent to

which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence

and other evidence.” Additionally, the ALJ stated he considered opinion evidence in making his

RFC determination. (Id.)

Specifically, in his decision, the ALJ cited eight physicians’ conclusions to support his

determination regarding Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. (AR 20-21.) First, the ALJ

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considered Dr. McSweeney’s description on November 12, 2002 of Plaintiff’s condition as

permanent and stationary, as well as his assessment that Plaintiff’s sole restriction be preclusion

from heavy lifting and repetitive overhead work with her dominant right shoulder. (AR 20, 159.) 

Second, the ALJ noted Dr. Murphy’s March 9, 2004 diagnosis, which only precluded Plaintiff from

very heavy work and very forceful above-the-shoulder activities. (AR 20, 179, 190). Third, the ALJ

considered Dr. Previte’s conclusion from March 11, 2003 that Plaintiff was capable of heavy lifting

and repetitive bending/stooping while avoiding overhead work with her right arm. (AR 21, 222.) 

The ALJ also considered Dr. Previte’s August 7, 2003 permanent and stationary report, which

described Plaintiff to be precluded from forceful use of the right upper extremity below shoulder

level and from overhead work with the right upper extremity. (AR 21.) Further, the ALJ considered

Dr. Previte’s March 2, 2004 permanent and stationary report, in which Dr. Previte reported Plaintiff

was precluded from very heavy work. (AR 21.)

Fourth, the ALJ considered Dr. Sabourin’s May 16, 2005 assessment that Plaintiff had a RFC

to lift/carry 50 pounds occasionally, lift/carry 10 pounds frequently, stand/walk for six-to eight

hours, and sit for six-to-eight hours of an eight hour day. (AR 21.) Fifth, the ALJ noted Dr.

Abbott’s September 20, 2005 assessment, which stated Plaintiff has a RFC to lift/carry 20 pounds

occasionally, lift/carry 10 pounds frequently, stand/walk for six-to eight hours, and sit for six-toeight hours of an eight hour day. (AR 21.) Sixth, the ALJ considered Dr. Stover’s December 28,

2006 opinion, which assessed Plaintiff with a RFC of unlimited lifting, carrying, standing, walking,

sitting, and pushing/pulling with a limitation to frequent climbing, balancing, kneeling, crouching,

crawling, and stooping. (AR 21.) Finally, the ALJ considered two state agency consultants, Dr.

Meek and Dr. Do, who assessed claimant with less severe limitation than some physicians cited

above. (AR 21.) Dr. Meek assessed Plaintiff with a RFC to lift/carry 50 pounds occasionally,

lift/carry 25 pounds frequently, stand/walk for six-to eight hours, and sit for six-to-eight hours of an

eight hour day with a limitation to frequent overhead reaching with the right hand. (AR 21.) 

Although the ALJ noted Dr. Previte, Dr. Kiddy, and Dr. Greenwood concluded Plaintiff had

more severe limitations than determined by other physicians, he provided 15 reasons why their

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6 The reasons the ALJ afforded Dr. Previte, Dr. Kiddy, and Dr. Greenwood’s opinions little weight will be discussed

at length in the following section. It should be noted the ALJ relied on both Dr. Previte and Dr. Greenwood’s opinions in

determining Plaintiff’s RFC, even though he ultimately rejected their opinions regarding Plaintiff’s disability status.

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opinions were given little weight.6 (AR 21-24.) The ALJ gave greater weight to the opinions of Dr.

Abbott, Dr. Korsh, Dr. Maywood, Dr. McSweeney, Dr. Miles, Dr. Murphy, Dr. Sabourin, and Dr.

Stover than Dr. Previte, Dr. Kiddy or Dr. Greenwood because the opinions of the former physicians

was more “consistent with the totality of the evidence, better supported by the medically acceptable

diagnostic techniques,” and consistent with the points cited in Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (AR

24.) Therefore, the ALJ properly determined the most Plaintiff could do, despite her limitations, by

considering all the evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. section 404.1545. 

Furthermore, based on the evidence, the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff’s allegations of

disabling limitations were not credible. (AR 24.) First, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s treatment

reflected a conservative approach since her alleged disability onset date. (AR 24.) Second, the ALJ

considered the fact that the record did not show Plaintiff required any special accommodations to

relieve her alleged pain or other symptoms. (AR 24.) Third, the ALJ found the record does not

show Plaintiff’s medications were ineffective or that they caused her debilitating side effects. (AR

24.) 

Fourth, despite Plaintiff’s complaints of physical weakness, the ALJ noted that Dr.

McSweeney, Dr. Previte, Dr. Maywood, Dr. Kiddy, Dr. Korsh, Dr. Abbott, and Dr. Stover found

Plaintiff to have normal upper and lower extremity strength. (AR 24-25.) Fifth, the ALJ cited

reports from Dr. Previte, Dr. Kiddy, Dr. Korsh, Dr. Sabourin, Dr. Abbott, and Dr. Stover to refute

Plaintiff’s claims of difficulty with standing and walking and disabling leg pain. (AR 25.) Sixth,

the ALJ considered Dr. Miles, Dr. Previte, Dr. Kiddy, Dr. Sabourin, and Dr. Abbott’s reports to

conclude the “totality of the evidence does not support [Plaintiff’s] claims of disabling shoulder and

arm pain. (AR 25.) Seventh, based on Dr. McSweeney, Dr. Kiddy, Dr. Previte, and Dr. Abbott’s

reports, the ALJ concluded the evidence contradicted Plaintiff’s assertions of disabling back pain. 

(AR 25.) Eighth, the ALJ cited Dr. Maywood, Dr. Murphy, Dr. Sabourin, and Dr. Stover to refute

Plaintff’s claims of disabling hand pain. (AR 25.) Ninth, the ALJ cited Dr. Previte, Dr. Kiddy, Dr.

Sabourin, and Dr. Abbott to refute Plaintiff’s claims of disabling neck pain. (AR 25.) Tenth, the

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ALJ noted the Plaintiff looked for work at Wal-Mart and Costco only three months before the

hearing, which he concluded was inconsistent with her claim of disability. (AR 25.) Thus, the ALJ

properly determined Plaintiff’s allegations were not credible to establish a more restrictive RFC. 

(AR 25.)

Additionally, based on Plaintiff’s RFC, Plaintiff’s testimony, the vocational report, and the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff could perform her

past relevant work of sales clerk and file clerk as actually and generally performed. See Pinto 249

F.3d at 845. First, the ALJ utilized the appropriate sources of information– the Plaintiff’s own

testimony and a properly completed vocational report– to determine Plaintiff could perform the

actual functional demands and job duties of her past relevant work. Id. In determining Plaintiff’s

RFC, the ALJ specifically referenced Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her attempt to attain work at

Wal-Mart and Costco only three months before the hearing. (AR 26, 332-333.) The ALJ concluded

Plaintiff’s effort to obtain employment was inconsistent with her claim of disability. (AR 26.) 

Further, the ALJ considered Ms. SinClair’s expert testimony at the hearing in concluding Plaintiff

was able to sustain her past relevant work as a file clerk and sales clerk. (AR 26.) Specifically, the

ALJ considered Ms. SinClair’s conclusion that an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC and past relevant

work experience could perform and sustain Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a file clerk and sales

clerk. (AR 27.) Thus, based on the DOT numbers, the ALJ correctly concluded Plaintiff could

actually perform the past relevant work of a sales clerk and file clerk.

Further, the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff could perform the functional demands and job

duties of the occupation as generally required by employers throughout the national economy. See

Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. The ALJ thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff’s past relevant work DOT numbers. 

(AR 26.) The ALJ noted Ms. SinClair identified Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a file clerk and

sales clerk as semi-skilled requiring light work, and her past relevant work as a child care provider

as semi-skilled requiring medium work. (AR 27.) Based on the DOT numbers and his previous

determination regarding Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s previous work as a sales

clerk and file clerk was consistent with her RFC, whereas her previous work as a child care provider

was not. (AR 27.) Thus, the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff could generally perform the past

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relevant work of a sales clerk and file clerk. 

Plaintiff, however, contends her previous work as a sales clerk does not qualify as past

relevant work because (1) she did not earn enough money, and (2) it was too brief. Plaintiff

correctly asserts the ALJ failed to address whether Plaintiff’s previous work as a sales clerk

constituted substantial gainful activity. The ALJ did not address the fact that Plaintiff was paid

$6.50 per hour at See’s Candies, and that she therefore engaged in substantial gainful activity. (AR

94-95.); See 20 C.F.R. section 404.1572(a). Further, the ALJ failed to address Plaintiff’s statement

in her work history report that she had to use machines, tools, or equipment while she was an

employee at See’s Candies. (AR 95.) The ALJ therefore never concluded Plaintiff had sufficient

time to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average

performance on the job. See Social Security Ruling 82-62.

Nonetheless, Plaintiff never asserts her past relevant work as a files clerk does not constitute

substantial gainful activity. Based on the record, the ALJ properly found Plaintiff could perform her

past relevant work as a files clerk. Therefore, any error the ALJ made in finding Plaintiff could do

her past relevant work of a sales clerk was harmless, and the court will not reverse an ALJ's decision

for harmless error, which exists when it is clear from the record that “the ALJ's error was

inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination. ” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 885.

Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to perform her past

relevant work as a file clerk is supported by substantial evidence and not based on legal error. Thus,

the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s

cross-motion for summary judgment be GRANTED as to this issue.

3. Treating Physician

Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly rejected Plaintiff’s treating physicians’ opinions of her

limitations without specific and legitimate reasons and based upon insubstantial evidence in the

record. (AR 17-26.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred in affording reduced weight to Dr.

Previte’s work status reports and his March 2, 2004 report. (Doc. 13 at 18-19, 22-23.) Second,

Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of Dr. Kiddy, a chiropractor. (Doc. 13 at

20-21.) Third, Plaintiff contends the ALJ inappropriately considered the opinions of Dr. Miles and

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Dr. McSweeney because their reports predated the alleged onset date of Plaintiff’s disability. (Doc.

13 at 21.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ could not consider the opinions of Dr. Greenwald, Dr.

Sabourin, Dr. Abbott, and Dr. Stover after rejecting them. (Doc. 13 at 21, 23-25.) 

Defendant contends the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial

evidence for rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. (Doc. 16 at 8-9.) 

“Cases in [the Ninth Circuit] distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: 

(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the

claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant

(nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The opinions of treating doctors are generally given more weight than the opinions of nontreating

doctors. Id. (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). A treating physician’s

opinion must be accorded controlling weight if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical

and laboratory diagnostic techniques and . . . not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in

[the] case record . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2008). 

Opinions of treating physicians may only be rejected under certain circumstances. See

Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). “[W]here the treating

doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for ‘clear and

convincing’ reasons.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th

Cir. 1991)); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). “Even if the treating

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner may not reject this opinion

without providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record .

. . .” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

Moreover, the opinion of an examining doctor is entitled to greater weight than that of a

nonexamining doctor. Id. (citing Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v.

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1984)). However, “[t]he findings of a nontreating, nonexamining

physician can amount to substantial evidence, so long as other evidence in the record supports those

findings.” Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonexamining physician’s

opinion must be “supported by other evidence in the record and [be] consistent with it.” Morgan,

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7

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169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999.)

“In addition, the regulations give more weight to opinions that are explained than to those

that are not . . . and to the opinions of specialists concerning matters relating to their specialty over

that of nonspecialists . . . .” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), (5)). “[A]n ALJ may discredit treating physicians’ opinions that are

conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole . . . or by objective medical findings

. . . .” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (citing Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992);

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001)). The ALJ is not required to discuss each

item of evidence, but the record should indicate that all evidence presented was considered. Craig v.

Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000); Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996). 

The reviewing court must “consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and

evidence that detracts from the Secretary’s conclusion.” Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.

1993). 

Here, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence for

rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physicians in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ

determined Plaintiff has a RFC to lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, to

stand and walk for 6 hours, and to sit for six hours, with no above-the-shoulder activity with the

dominant right arm.7 (AR 19.) In arriving at his RFC determination, the ALJ stated he gave greater

weight to the opinions of Dr. Abbott (AR 241-246), Dr. Korsh (164-171), Dr. Maywood (298-302),

Dr. McSweeney (AR 155-161), Dr. Miles (AR 141-145), Dr. Sabourin (AR 225-229), and Dr.

Stover (AR 250-259). The ALJ concluded the opinions of these examining physicians were “more

consistent with the totality of the evidence, better supported by the medically acceptable diagnostic

techniques,” and consistent with his assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (AR 24.)

Dr. Previte assessed the Plaintiff with limitations against repetitive bending, repetitive

stooping, pushing/ pulling with the right arm, and repetitive grasping with the right arm in a March

11, 2003 work status report. (AR 21, 213-222.) Dr. Previte completed physician’s progress reports

from April 15, 2003 through January 22, 2004, describing Plaintiff to be temporarily totally disabled

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for periods of approximately four to six weeks. (22.) Also, Dr. Previte reported Plaintiff was unable

to work for periods of four to six weeks in work status reports from October 21, 2003 through

January 22, 2004. (AR 22.) On October 22, 2003, Dr. Kiddy reported Plaintiff was unable to

perform her usual work but he expected her to return to her normal work in ninety days. (AR 22.) 

Dr. Kiddy also concluded Plaintiff should remain off work for forty-five days on December 12, 2003

and January 21, 2004. (AR 22, 280, 278.) On January 10, 2007, Dr. Greenwald declared Plaintiff to

be totally disabled “based on the subjective factors of disability.” (AR 22, 260-270.) 

However, the ALJ properly cited 15 legitimate and specific reasons why he gave little weight

to the opinions of Dr. Greenwald, Dr. Kiddy, and Dr. Previte (hereinafter “treating physicians”). 

(AR 22-24.) First, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Previte’s work status reports because they were

devoid of diagnosis and citations to supporting medical findings. (AR 22; 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(2) (2008).) Second, the ALJ properly afforded Dr. Greenwald’s opinion little weight

because he only saw Plaintiff on the day of the examination, and the weight given to even a treating

physician’s opinion is directly proportional to the length of the relationship between the physician

and the Plaintiff and the frequency of the examinations. (AR 22, 20 CFR section 404.1527(d).) 

Third, the ALJ correctly refused to grant Dr. Kiddy’s opinion controlling weight, because

controlling weight can be given only to treating sources, which do not include chiropractors such as

Dr. Kiddy. (AR 22-23; 20 CFR section 404.1513(d)(1).) Further, the ALJ correctly noted Dr.

Kiddy’s opinion would be examined, even if it was not granted controlling weight. (Id.)

Further, based on the inconsistency between Plaintiff’s physicians’ opinions and substantial

evidence in the record, the ALJ properly refused to grant Plaintiff’s treating physicians controlling

weight. See 20 C.F.R. section 404.1527(d)(2). The ALJ’s fourth reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s

treating physicians’ opinions was that they were inconsistent with Dr. Miles’ May 24, 2002 report,

in which Dr. Miles concluded Plaintiff had no objective factors of disability and no permanent work

restrictions. (AR 23.) Fifth, the ALJ noted the treating physicians’ opinions were also inconsistent

with Dr. Greenwald’s own finding that Plaintiff had a normal motor examination on January 10,

2007. Sixth, the ALJ concluded the treating physicians’ opinions were refuted by the repeated

findings that Plaintiff had normal 5/5 motor strength by Dr. Previte, Dr. Maywood, Dr. Korsh, Dr.

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Abbott, and Dr. Stover. (AR 23.) Seventh, the ALJ concluded the treating physicians’ opinions

were rebutted by the repeated observations Plaintiff has a normal gait by Dr. Previte, Dr. Korsh, Dr.

Sabourin, Dr. Abbott, and Dr. Stover. (AR 23.) 

Similarly, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s treating physicians’ opinions were inconsistent with: (1)

Dr. McSweeney’s assessment she should only be precluded from very heavy lifting and repetitive

overhead work with her dominant right shoulder; (2) Dr. Murphy’s March 9, 2004 report Plaintiff

should be precluded only from very heavy work and very forceful above-the-shoulder activities; (3)

Dr. Previte’s own reports of March 11, 2003, August 7, 2003, and March 2, 2004, in which he solely

precludes Plaintiff from heavy or very heavy lifting as well as repetitive bending/stooping and/or

overhead work with the right arm; (4) Dr. Sabourin’s May 16, 2005 report concluding Plaintiff had a

RFC for medium exertion; (5) Dr. Abbott’s September 20, 2005 report that Plaintiff has a RFC to

lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, stand/walk for 6 hours, and sit for 6 hour;

and (6) Dr. Stover’s December 28, 2006 assessment of Plaintiff with a RFC with unlimited lifting,

carrying, standing, walking, sitting, and pushing/pulling with a limitation to frequent climbing,

balancing, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and stooping. (AR 23.) Ultimately, the ALJ properly

concluded the treating physicians’ opinions were entitled to reduced weight in light of their

inconsistency with the weight of the record. (AR 24.)

Although Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly considered the opinions of Dr. Miles and Dr.

McSweeney because their reports predated the alleged onset date of Plaintiff’s disability, their

opinions are relevant evidence which were appropriately considered by the ALJ. “Evidence is

anything... that relates to[a] claim,” including medical history, opinions, and statements about

treatment received. 20 C.F.R. section 404.1512(b)(2). Both Dr. Miles and Dr. McSweeney

performed examinations directly related to Plaintiff’s September 2001 injury, which Plaintiff alleges

led to her disability. (AR 144-147; 156-159.) Therefore, it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider

their opinions in rejected Plaintiff’s treating physicians’ opinions.

Further, the ALJ properly considered the opinions of Dr. Greenwald, Dr. Sabourin, Dr.

Abbott, and Dr. Stover in rejecting Plaintiff’s treating physicians’ opinions, even after disapproving

of their opinions with regard to Plaintiff’s RFC and disability. Although Plaintiff asserts the ALJ

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should be “estopped” from considering the findings of physicians who the ALJ earlier rejected in

determining Plaintiff’s RFC and disability, it is not necessary to believe everything a physician says

in order to credit testimony as substantial evidence. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 757 (9th

Cir. 1989.) 

The Court finds the ALJ did not commit legal error by rejecting the opinion evidence of

Plaintiff’s treating physicians and the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment be DENIED

and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment be GRANTED as to this issue.

V. CONCLUSION

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) (2007) and Local Rule 72.1(d).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than September 1, 2009, any party may file and

serve written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and served no

later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. Martinez v. Y1st, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 7, 2009

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

all parties

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