Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-16-01562/USCOURTS-ca2-16-01562-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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16‐1562‐cv                                    

Carmichael v. Chappius

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit ________

AUGUST TERM 2016

No. 16‐1562‐cv

BRIAN CARMICHAEL,

Petitioner‐Appellee,

v.

SUPERINTENDENT PAUL CHAPPIUS, JR.,

ELMIRA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Respondent‐Appellant.

________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

________

   

ARGUED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2016

DECIDED: FEBRUARY 17, 2017

________

Before: WINTER, CABRANES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge.

*

                                                     

* Judge Jane A. Restani, of the United States Court of International Trade,

sitting by designation.

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________

The Superintendent of the Elmira Correctional Facility, Paul

Chappius, Jr., appeals from the April 21, 2016 Order of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York

(Katherine Polk Failla, Judge) granting Brian Carmichael’s petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Carmichael

sought the writ, in part, on grounds that the Supreme Court of the

State of New York misapplied the decision by the Supreme Court of

the United States in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when it

found that Carmichael failed to make a prima facie showing of race

discrimination during jury selection. In granting Carmichael the

writ, the District Court held that the New York State Appellate

Division’s judgment affirming the state trial court’s denial of

Carmichael’s Batson challenge was an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court precedent.  

We hold that the District Court incorrectly applied the

standard for evaluating a state court’s rulings set forth in the Anti‐

Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). We further hold that the Appellate Division’s order

affirming the state trial court’s denial of petitioner’s Batson challenge

was not an unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Accordingly, we VACATE the District Court’s Order granting

petitioner the writ of habeas corpus and REMAND for such further

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proceedings as may be appropriate and consistent with this

Opinion.  

________

SARA GURWITCH (Richard M. Greenberg, on the

brief), Office of the Appellate Defender, New

York, NY, for Defendant‐Appellant.

DEBORAH L. MORSE, Assistant District Attorney

(Christopher P. Marinelli, Assistant District

Attorney, on the brief) for Cyrus R. Vance, Jr.,

District Attorney, New York County, New York,

NY, for Plaintiff‐Appellee.

________

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

Respondent‐Appellant Paul Chappius, Jr., Superintendent of

the Elmira Correctional Facility, appeals from the April 21, 2016

Order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York (Katherine Polk Failla, Judge) granting Petitioner‐

Appellee Brian Carmichael’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 The Order granting the writ, stayed

pending this appeal, would invalidate Carmichael’s custody

imposed pursuant to a December 10, 2007 judgment of the Supreme

                                                     

1 Carmichael v. Chappius, 182 F. Supp. 3d 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).

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Court of the State of New York, New York County (Robert H.

Straus, Justice), following a jury trial and conviction.2  

After an unsuccessful direct appeal of his conviction,3 as well

as a failed motion to vacate his conviction based on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel,4 Carmichael sought a writ of habeas

corpus in federal court on grounds (1) that the state trial court

misapplied the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States

in Batson v. Kentucky,

5 and (2) that Carmichael received ineffective

assistance of counsel. On July 17, 2015, Magistrate Judge Andrew J.

Peck filed a Report and Recommendation proposing that the District

                                                     

2 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear Carmichael’s habeas petition

because Carmichael was convicted in a state court within the geographic

boundary of the Southern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (“Where

an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under

the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or more

Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court . . .

within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him . . . .”).

3 People v. Carmichael, 73 A.D.3d 622 (1st Dep’t 2010) (affirming

Carmichael’s conviction on direct appeal); see also People v. Carmichael, 16 N.Y.3d

797 (2011) (denying Carmichael leave to appeal), cert. denied sub nom. Carmichael

v. New York, 132 S. Ct. 199 (2011) (Mem.).

4 People v. Carmichael, 118 A.D.3d 603 (1st Dep’t 2014) (affirming denial of

Carmichael’s motion to vacate judgment of conviction); see also People v.

Carmichael, 24 N.Y.3d 1042 (2014) (denying Carmichael leave to appeal Appellate

Division’s denial of his motion to vacate judgment of conviction).

5 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

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Court reject both of Carmichael’s arguments and deny his petition.6

The District Court declined the recommendations of Magistrate

Judge Peck and granted Carmichael’s petition, holding that the New

York State Appellate Division, First Department, had unreasonably

applied Batson and its progeny when it affirmed the state trial

court’s finding that Carmichael failed to make a prima facie case

showing that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges in a

discriminatory manner.7  

We hold that the District Court incorrectly applied the

standard for evaluating a state court’s rulings set forth in the Anti‐

Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the “AEDPA”),

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We further hold that the Appellate Division’s

order affirming the trial court’s denial of Carmichael’s Batson

challenge was not an unreasonable application of “clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States.”8

Accordingly, we VACATE the District Court’s April 21, 2016

Order granting Carmichael the writ of habeas corpus and REMAND

the cause to the District Court for such further proceedings as may

be appropriate and consistent with this Opinion.  

                                                     

6 Carmichael v. Chappius, No. 14 Civ. 10012 (KPF)(AJP), 2015 WL 4385765,

at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2015).

7 Carmichael, 182 F. Supp. 3d. at 90–93.

8 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. Jury Selection in Carmichael’s Trial

   On September 17, 2007, jury selection began in Brian

Carmichael’s criminal trial before Justice Robert H. Straus of the

Supreme Court of the State of New York.9 The Court tasked the

parties with selecting a twelve‐person jury from three separate

panels, each composed of twenty‐six venirepersons. Both

Carmichael and the People of the State of New York, represented by

the New York County District Attorney’s Office (“the State”),

received twenty peremptory challenges for use during jury selection.

The parties could use their peremptory challenges to remove

potential jurors from the venire. Both parties also received six

additional peremptory challenges, which they could use only to

strike potential alternate jurors. This appeal concerns the State’s use

of its peremptory challenges during the process of jury selection.

After questioning of the twenty‐six venirepersons on the first

panel concluded, the Court asked the parties if they wished to

exercise any of their peremptory challenges against the first twelve

potential jurors. The State exercised five peremptory challenges and

counsel for Carmichael exercised three. Then, the Court asked the

parties to consider the next twelve venirepersons. When the State

                                                     

9 A grand jury in New York County had filed an indictment against

Carmichael charging him with various narcotics offenses.

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struck four more potential jurors, defense counsel raised his first

Batson challenge.10     

Defense counsel told the Court that he “fe[lt] compelled to

make a Batson challenge” because “we [ ] had two African

Americans in the jury pool and [the State] has challenged both of

them.”11 Specifically, the State used two of its peremptory challenges

to strike Shackwanna Boiken and Charmaine Hamilton, both black

females. The Court denied defense counsel’s challenge finding that

the removal of two black jurors “by itself does not constitute [a]

prima facie showing of a pattern of use of strike[s] in a

discriminatory way.”12  

Following the denial of defense counsel’s first Batson

challenge, the State declined to use any more strikes on

venirepersons in the first panel. Defense counsel, however, struck all

six of the remaining potential jurors.  

The parties next considered the second panel of twenty‐six

potential jurors. The State and defense counsel combined to strike

                                                     

10 A party raises a “Batson challenge” when he or she believes the

opposing party has struck a potential juror from the venire based on

impermissible factors such as the potential juror’s race. See Galarza v. Keane, 252

F.3d 630, 635–36 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing the three‐part test trial courts use to

determine “whether a party exercised a peremptory challenge in a

discriminatory manner” set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).

11 Joint Appendix (“JA”) 181–82.

12 Id. at 182.

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eleven of the first sixteen individuals in this group. Notably, neither

party struck Bettina Boyd, a black woman.13 During consideration of

the next five venirepersons, however, the State struck Dina Grant,

another black female. This strike prompted defense counsel to raise

his second Batson challenge.  

Defense counsel stated, “[a]lthough [the State] has allowed

Ms. Bo[yd] to remain on the jury, the lone black juror selected so far

. . . I believe out of the four African American jurors we have

considered on the panel[,] [the State] has challenged three of

them.”14 The Court responded by noting that Ms. Boyd, a black

female, remained on the jury, and that defense counsel struck

another venireperson, Yalira Velarde, whom the Court believed to

be a black female. A disagreement then ensued between defense

counsel and the Court over whether Ms. Velarde was “Hispanic” or

“African‐American.”15  Specifically, the Court told defense counsel,

“I am not saying you are right and I am wrong or the opposite. I am

only making a record as to race because it’s sometimes necessary to

do so when there’s a Batson challenge.”16 Ultimately, the Court

                                                     

13 Although Ms. Boyd’s name appears as “Bode” in the transcript of the

voir dire, the parties refer to her as “Boyd” in their briefs on appeal.  

14 JA 322–23.  

15 Cf. Vill. of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 602–06 (2d Cir. 2016)

(discussing the confusing use of the term “Hispanic” to identify an individual’s

race).

16 JA 324.

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denied defense counsel’s challenge, holding again that “the

statistical basis is not sufficient alone to raise a discriminatory use of

a free peremptory challenge under New York law.”17   

   The parties resumed their consideration of the remaining

venirepersons on panel two. Defense counsel used one peremptory

challenge and the State used two. One of the two venirepersons

struck by the State was Jessica Simmons, a black female. In response,

defense counsel raised his third Batson challenge.   

Defense counsel argued that, “Ms. Simmons is African

American and it’s now four out of five. . . . We’ve had probably 140

people that we’ve considered in two days, only five African

Americans have come before us in this case.”18 The Court calculated

that four out of six black potential jurors had been struck, including

Ms. Velarde. The Court also repeated its prior refrain that challenges

based on statistical evidence, such as defense counsel’s challenges,

“are generally not sufficient to raise or create an inference or create a

prima facie case of discriminatory use of p[ere]mptory challenges.”19

Defense counsel responded that he could not “see any potential

basis [for a Batson challenge] . . . other than the numbers.”20

                                                     

17 Id. at 325.

18 Id. at 327.

19 Id. at 328.

20 Id.

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Accordingly, the Court denied defense counsel’s third Batson

challenge.

After the State struck the last remaining venireperson in panel

two, the parties considered the potential jurors in the third and final

panel. At this point, the parties had selected nine jurors and were

aiming to fill only three outstanding seats before choosing

alternates. The State struck the first venireperson in the third panel,

but the parties accepted the second and third individuals as jurors.

Diana Duggins, a black female, was one of the two persons thus

selected for the jury. The parties filled the final open seat with the

sixth individual on the third panel. Ultimately, two black women—

Ms. Boyd and Ms. Duggins—were seated on the jury.

With the jury of twelve selected, the parties turned their

attention to picking alternate jurors. Each side had six peremptory

challenges to use during this part of the process. The State began by

striking three potential alternates, two of whom were black.

Consequently, defense counsel raised his fourth and final Batson

challenge.   

Defense Counsel explained his position as follows:

It seems again that [the State] is exercising [its]

challenges to exclude African Americans. I do note that

as we proceeded with selection [the State] did not

challenge Ms. Duggins who was the sixth in my view

African American that we have considered . . . but when

we got to the alternates he challenged Ms. Sanders[,] a

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black female[,] and now he’s also challenging Mr. Pratt

who is a male black, so I see a clear pattern of

challenging African Americans, your Honor. I make my

Batson challenge on that basis. Four of the six we have

considered have been challenged. We have been

through three panels so approximately 210 have come

into this courtroom. . . .  [W]e have considered in total

eight African Americans and six of those have been

challenged by [the State] in my view.21

The Court denied defense counsel’s final Batson challenge. It

reiterated that “the statistical analysis by itself does not provide for

this court that level of challenge, doesn’t create a prima facie case

requiring us to go on to step two of the analysis so the challenge

must be denied.”22 As a result, the Court did not require the State to

articulate any nondiscriminatory reasons for its use of the

challenged peremptory strikes. The parties then selected the final

alternate juror and Carmichael’s case proceeded to trial.      

   On October 17, 2007, the jury convicted Carmichael on three

counts of second degree criminal sale of a controlled substance. Two

                                                     

21 JA 425.

22 Id. at 426.

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months later, Justice Straus sentenced Carmichael to three

concurrent seventeen‐year terms of imprisonment.23

II. Procedural History

On September 30, 2009, Carmichael appealed his conviction to

the New York State Appellate Division, First Department. One of the

grounds for Carmichael’s direct appeal is relevant here: his claim

that the trial court erred in finding that he failed to establish a prima

facie case that the State used its peremptory challenges in a racially

discriminatory manner. The crux of Carmichael’s argument on

direct appeal was that the trial court had misinterpreted the New

York Court of Appeals’ decision in People v. Brown, 97 N.Y.2d 500

(N.Y. 2002), by concluding that statistical evidence of a

discriminatory pattern in the use of peremptory strikes is never

sufficient to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. The

Appellate Division affirmed the judgments of the state trial court,

holding that:

[t]he [trial] court properly denied defendant’s

applications made pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky (476

U.S. 79 [1986]). Viewing jury selection as a whole, we

conclude that defendant did not meet his burden at step

                                                     

23 At sentencing, Justice Straus noted that the State was seeking maximum

consecutive sentences for each of Carmichael’s three counts of second degree

criminal sale of a controlled substance, while defense counsel was seeking a

minimum concurrent sentence of eight years. Justice Straus ultimately sentenced

Carmichael to concurrent seventeen‐year terms of imprisonment, in part, because

of his long criminal history.  

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one of the inquiry. Defendant did not produce

“evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an

inference that discrimination ha[d] occurred” in the

exercise of peremptory challenges (Johnson v. California,

545 U.S. 162, 170 [2005]). While numerical evidence may

suffice, in this case it did not warrant an inference of

discrimination.24

After the New York Court of Appeals denied Carmichael

leave to appeal25 and after the Supreme Court of the United States

denied Carmichael’s petition for a writ of certiorari,

26 Carmichael

filed a motion to vacate his judgment of conviction in the state trial

court on grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.27

Justice Roger S. Hayes denied Carmichael’s motion.28 Carmichael

appealed Justice Hayes’s order to the Appellate Division, First

                                                     

24 Carmichael, 73 A.D.3d at 622.

25 Carmichael, 16 N.Y.3d at 797.

26 Carmichael, 132 S. Ct. at 199.  

27 See Carmichael, 118 A.D.3d at 604.

28 Id.

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Department, which affirmed the denial.29 The New York Court of

Appeals denied Carmichael leave to appeal.30

       Thereafter, Carmichael filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the District Court. He raised two claims: (1) the jury

selection process violated his rights as set forth in Batson and its

progeny, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because his attorney lacked knowledge of the standard for

establishing a prima facie Batson case under New York law. On April

21, 2016, the District Court declined the recommendations of the

magistrate judge and granted Carmichael’s petition.  

The District Court reviewed the Appellate Division’s

judgment affirming the state trial court’s denial of Carmichael’s

Batson challenge because it was the last reasoned state‐court decision

to address Carmichael’s claim.31 It then concluded that the Appellate

Division had unreasonably applied Batson and its progeny when it

affirmed the state trial court’s finding that Carmichael did not make

out a prima facie showing that the State used its peremptory

                                                     

29 Id.

30 Carmichael, 24 N.Y.3d at 1042.  

31 Carmichael, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 86 (citing Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct.

1088, 1094 n.1 (2013) (suggesting that a federal court charged with examining a

state court conviction should review the last reasoned state‐court decision to

address the asserted grounds for habeas relief)).  

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challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.32 According to the

District Court, evidence of the discriminatory use of peremptory

challenges was so abundant—for example, the State “struck twice

the number of black jurors than one would expect, and two‐thirds to

three‐quarters of the black jurors under consideration”33—that it had

no choice but to conclude “that the Appellate Division [had] applied

Batson and its progeny in an unreasonable manner.”34 Having

determined that the Appellate Division erred in affirming the trial

court’s Batson finding, the District Court did not reach Carmichael’s

ineffective‐assistance‐of‐counsel claim. The State timely filed a

notice of appeal as of right and the District Court granted the State’s

application for a stay pending this appeal.  

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review  

We review de novo a district court’s order granting a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus.

35 Section 2254 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code,

as amended by the AEDPA, prohibits federal courts from granting a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding “unless the

                                                     

32 Id. at 90–93.  

33 Id. at 90.

34 Id.

35 Overton v. Newton, 295 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2002).  

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adjudication [of the claim] resulted in a decision (1) that was

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States,’ or (2) that was ‘based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.’”36 In this case, we are concerned only with

the first of the two enumerated bases for granting habeas relief.37    

The Supreme Court has instructed that section 2254(d)(1)’s

“contrary to” and “unreasonable application of” clauses have

independent meaning.38 A state court decision is “contrary to . . .

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court” when “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state

court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.”39 An “unreasonable

application” of Supreme Court precedent, on the other hand, occurs

when a state court “identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”40 The District Court here

                                                     

36 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).  

37 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

38 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404–05 (2000).

39 Id. at 412–13.

40 Id. at 413.  

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concluded that the Appellate Division had applied Supreme Court

precedent to the facts of Carmichael’s case in “an unreasonable

manner.”41

To merit federal habeas relief under the “unreasonable

application” prong of section 2254(d)(1), a petitioner “must show

that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal

court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement.”42 In other words, a federal

court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus “simply because that

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state‐

court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.”43 In

determining whether a particular state court application is

“reasonable” under the circumstances presented, “a habeas court

must be guided by the level of specificity of the relevant precedent’s

holding.”44 When the applicable rule is “more general,” state courts

                                                     

41 Carmichael, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 90.

42 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

43 Williams, 529 U.S. at 411 (emphasis added).

44 Contreras v. Artus, 778 F.3d 97, 110 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Fuentes v. T.

Griffin, 829 F.3d 233, 245 (2d Cir. 2016).

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will have “more leeway . . . in reaching outcomes in case‐by‐case

determinations.”45  

Ultimately, this represents a “highly deferential standard for

evaluating state‐court rulings, which demands that state‐court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”46

II. The Batson Standard  

The Supreme Court precedent relevant here is, of course,

Batson v. Kentucky. In Batson, the Supreme Court established “a

three‐step burden‐shifting framework for the evidentiary inquiry

into whether a peremptory challenge is race‐based.”47 In the first

step, the objecting party must set forth a prima facie showing “that

the circumstances give rise to an inference that a member of the

venire was struck because of his or her race.”48 If the objecting party

makes the requisite showing, “the burden shifts to the [party

striking the potential juror] to come forward with a neutral

explanation” for its peremptory challenge.49 Finally, if the party

                                                     

45 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).

46 Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

47 McKinney v. Artuz, 326 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2003); see Batson, 476 U.S. at

96–98.

48 Overton, 295 F.3d at 276; see Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.

49 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.

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striking the juror tenders a “neutral explanation,” the trial court has

“the duty to determine if the [objecting party] has established

purposeful discrimination.”50  

An objecting party can establish a prima facie case of

discrimination “by offering a wide variety of evidence, so long as

the sum of the proffered facts gives ‘rise to an inference of

discriminatory purpose.’”51 For example, in Batson, the Supreme

Court explained that “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors

included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of

discrimination.”52 In addition, “the prosecutor’s questions and

statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his

challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory

purpose.”53 As we have had occasion to note in the past, the

Supreme Court has not “provided a more particularized view of

what constitutes a prima facie showing of discrimination under

Batson.”54 We have held, however, that statistical evidence alone

may, in some circumstances, suffice to establish a prima facie case of

                                                     

50 Id. at 98.

51 Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 169 (2005) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at

94); see Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (“In deciding whether the defendant has made the

requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances.”).

52 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.

53 Id.  

54 Overton, 295 F.3d at 278.

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discrimination during jury selection.55 Ultimately, the Supreme

Court has expressed confidence in the ability of trial judges to be

able to determine whether “the circumstances concerning the

prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case

of discrimination against [ ] jurors [from a protected class].”56

III. Application

The specific issue in this appeal concerns the first step of the

Batson framework. In granting Carmichael the writ of habeas corpus,

the District Court held that it was unreasonable for the Appellate

Division to conclude that Carmichael failed to make a prima facie

showing of discrimination given the high percentage of black

members of the venire removed during jury selection.57 On appeal,

the State contends that the District Court failed to give the Appellate

Division’s ruling the level of deference required by the AEDPA. We

agree. While statistical evidence alone may, in some circumstances,

suffice to establish a prima facie case of discrimination during jury

selection,58 the Appellate Division did not apply Batson and its

progeny in an unreasonable manner when it concluded that, in the

circumstances presented, the statistical evidence did not warrant an

inference of discrimination.   

                                                     

55 See id.  

56 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.

57 Carmichael, 182 F. Supp. 3d. at 88.

58 See Overton, 295 F.3d at 278.  

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Carmichael made four separate Batson applications during the

jury selection process. He based each of his applications on

numerical evidence alone, i.e., the number of peremptory challenges

used against black members of the venire compared to the total

population of blacks in the venire. The trial court denied each

application on the basis that Carmichael had failed to make a prima

facie showing of racial discrimination. In denying Carmichael’s

fourth and final challenge, the state trial court declared that “the

statistical analysis by itself does not . . . create a prima facie case

requiring us to go on to step two . . . .”59   

Carmichael’s argument on appeal focuses almost entirely on

his contention that the state trial court incorrectly held him to a

heightened evidentiary standard when it concluded “the statistical

basis is not sufficient alone to raise a discriminatory use of a free

peremptory challenge under New York law.”60 Indeed, the District

Court concluded that the trial court acted “contrary to” clearly

established Supreme Court precedent in denying Carmichael’s

Batson applications because the trial court applied New York law in

a way that increased Carmichael’s evidentiary burden at step one of

the Batson framework.61 However, because the Appellate Division

                                                     

59 JA 426.

60 Id. at 325.

61 Carmichael, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 84; see Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (explaining

that “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire

might give rise to an inference of discrimination”).

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considered Carmichael’s Batson challenge on the merits and affirmed

the trial court’s denial, the District Court rightly based its

consideration of Carmichael’s habeas petition on whether the

Appellate Division’s ruling on the Batson challenges was “contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.”62 For that reason, our review concerns only the District

Court’s conclusion that the Appellate Division applied Batson

unreasonably when it affirmed the trial court’s ruling.63   

On direct appeal of Carmichael’s conviction, the Appellate

Division held that Carmichael “did not meet his burden at step one

of the [Batson] inquiry” because he “did not produce evidence

sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that

discrimination ha[d] occurred in the exercise of peremptory

challenges.”64 It noted that “numerical evidence may suffice,” but

concluded that “in this case it did not warrant an inference of

discrimination.”65 The District Court correctly gave the Appellate

Division’s ruling the “benefit of the doubt” by concluding that it did

not apply law “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent when, in

contrast to the state trial court, the Appellate Division treated

                                                     

62 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

63 See Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 394 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The habeas court

looks to the last state court decision rendering a judgment on the petitioner’s

federal claim.”).  

64 Carmichael, 73 A.D.3d at 622 (internal quotation marks omitted).

65 Id. (emphasis added).  

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numerical evidence as capable of satisfying step one of the Batson

framework.66 Nevertheless, the District Court held that the Appellate

Division “applied Batson and its progeny in an unreasonable

manner” because it concluded that the numerical evidence

presented by Carmichael did not warrant an inference of

discrimination.67 We disagree.

Out of approximately 210 individuals considered for the jury

only eight were black.68 And of those eight, the State removed six

from the venire with peremptory challenges. As the District Court

noted, the eight black potential jurors accounted for 14 to 16 percent

of the total number of individuals questioned during jury selection

who were not removed for cause. Yet, the State used six of its

twenty‐one peremptory challenges on black venirepersons, or close

to 29 percent of its available strikes, to remove 75 percent of them

from the potential jury.    

The first step in the Batson framework, which the Appellate

Division was charged with applying in Carmichael’s case, is a

                                                     

66 See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181.

67 Carmichael, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 90.

68 The parties dispute whether one of the potential jurors removed by

defense counsel, Ms. Velarde, was black. We agree with the District Court that “it

is not necessary to determine Ms. Velarde’s race in order to resolve

[Carmichael’s] Petition.” Id. at 87 n.4. Accordingly, for purposes of this opinion,

we adopt Carmichael’s version of the facts and do not include Ms. Velarde in our

calculation of black venirepersons.  

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paradigmatic “general standard.”69 Courts must rely on their own

judgment and experience to determine whether the objecting party

has established a prima facie showing “that the circumstances give

rise to an inference that a member of the venire was struck because

of his or her race.”70 For that reason, we must afford the Appellate

Division’s ruling “more leeway” on habeas review.71  

As we have previously explained, “[c]ases involving

successful challenges to exclusion rates have typically included

patterns in which members of the racial group are completely or

almost completely excluded from participating on the jury.”72

Whether the 75 percent exclusion rate at issue here meets that high

                                                     

69 Cf. Rosario v. Ercole, 601 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (characterizing the

holding in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) as a “general standard”

for purposes of habeas review because “its application to a specific case requires

‘a substantial element of judgment’ on the part of the state court” (quoting

Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664)).  

70 Overton, 295 F.3d at 276; see Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (“We have confidence

that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the

circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges creates

a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors.”).

71 Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664 (explaining that when a habeas court reviews a

trial court decision, the habeas court should afford the trial court “more leeway

. . . in reaching outcomes in case‐by‐case determinations” if the rule being

applied by the trial court was “more general”).

72 Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2009). The term “exclusion rate”

refers to the percentage of members of a particular racial group that one party

strikes from the venire. See id.  

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threshold is a matter on which “fairminded jurists could disagree.”73

For that reason alone, the District Court’s conclusion that the

Appellate Division’s ruling was an “unreasonable” application of

Batson and its progeny warrants vacatur.74  

That said, it bears noting that there was other evidence in the

record supporting the Appellate Division’s reasonable conclusion

that the prosecutor’s 75‐percent exclusion rate did not warrant an

inference of discrimination. For example, during his third attempt at

a Batson challenge, Carmichael’s counsel admitted to the trial court

that he did not “see any potential basis . . . other than the numbers”

for his Batson challenge.75 In addition, although defendants of any

                                                     

73 Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664).   

74 In his reply brief submitted to the District Court, Carmichael clarified

that his Batson claim was based on the State’s “exclusion rate,” not its “challenge

rate.” However, even if Carmichael’s Batson claim was based on the State’s

“challenge rate”—“the percentage of a party’s total strikes used against a

cognizable racial group,” Jones, 555 F.3d at 98—the fact that the State’s “challenge

rate” was nearly double the percentage of blacks in the venire would permit a

court to find that Carmichael had made a prima facie showing of race

discrimination, see United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1991), but

would not require a court to reach that conclusion, see Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d

163, 174 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is one thing to conclude that a pattern of strikes is

prima facie evidence of discrimination; it is a very different thing to hold that the

contrary conclusion would be an unreasonable application of Batson.”).

75 JA 328; see Batson 476 U.S. at 97 (recognizing that “the prosecutorʹs

questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his

challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose”

(emphasis added)).

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race may assert Batson challenges,76 it is not entirely irrelevant that

Carmichael himself was not black. Nor was there any indication in

the record at the time of the Batson challenges that racial sympathy

or antipathy would play any role in his trial. Finally, two black

venirepersons ultimately were seated on Carmichael’s jury, which

(as the District Court noted) represented 17 percent of all sworn

jurors—one to three percentage points higher than the percentage of

blacks in the venire.77 Although the District Court explained why it

did not find these countervailing factors persuasive, a rational

person considering all of the “relevant circumstances” presented

could reasonably conclude that there was insufficient evidence of

discrimination.78    

                                                     

76 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) (“The emphasis in Batson on

racial identity between the defendant and the excused prospective juror is not

inconsistent with our holding today that race is irrelevant to a defendant’s

standing to object to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.”).

77 While it is true that “[a] prosecutor may not avoid the Batson obligation

to provide race‐neutral explanations for what appears to be a statistically

significant pattern of racial peremptory challenges simply by forgoing the

opportunity to use all of his challenges against minorities,” Alvarado, 923 F.2d at

256, the fact that two black venirepersons were seated is, as the District Court

itself admitted, “compelling” evidence supporting the Appellate Division’s

conclusion that there was no evidence of racial discrimination, Carmichael, 182 F.

Supp. 3d at 89–90.

78 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97 (“In deciding whether the defendant has

made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant

circumstances.” (emphasis added)).  

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Had we been presiding over jury selection in Carmichael’s

case in the first instance, we might very well have concluded that

Carmichael made out a prima facie showing of race discrimination.79

However, as we have had occasion to observe before, the fact that

numerical evidence may have permitted an inference of

discrimination does not establish that a contrary conclusion must be

an unreasonable application of Batson and its progeny.80 The AEDPA

establishes a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state‐court

rulings:”81 a state court’s error must be “beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement” if it is to warrant reversal on a habeas

petition in federal court.82 Deference to state courts is especially

important when reviewing habeas claims predicated on a violation of

the first step of the Batson framework because Batson and its progeny

                                                     

79 It is, however, important to note that the State’s 75 percent exclusion

rate is based on a small sample size: the removal of six out of eight black

venirepersons. As the Supreme Court has observed in the context of Title VII

discrimination claims, “[c]onsiderations such as small sample size may, of

course, detract from the value of [statistical] evidence.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v.

United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339, n.20 (1977); see also Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educ.

Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 620–21 (1974) (noting, in the context of a

discrimination claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause, that the district

court was properly skeptical of statistical evidence derived from a small sample

size).  

80 See Sorto, 497 F.3d at 174.  

81 Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181.

82 Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.

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provide state courts with limited guidance on what constitutes a

prima facie case of discrimination.83  

The Appellate Division’s conclusion that there was

insufficient evidence of discrimination was simply not unreasonable

under the circumstances presented. The District Court erroneously

applied too stringent a standard on habeas review. Accordingly, on

these facts, we are required to vacate the District Court’s Order

granting Carmichael the writ of habeas corpus.  

CONCLUSION

To summarize: we hold that the District Court incorrectly

applied the standard for evaluating a state court’s rulings set forth in

the AEDPA when it concluded that the Appellate Division’s order

affirming the denial of Carmichael’s Batson challenge was an

“unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent.

For the reasons set out above, we VACATE the District

Court’s April 21, 2016 Order granting Carmichael the writ of habeas

corpus and we REMAND the cause to the District Court for such

further proceedings as may be appropriate and consistent with this

Opinion.

                                                     

83 See Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664; Overton, 295 F.3d at 278.

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