Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00474/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00474-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD MANUEL BURGOS,

Plaintiff,

v.

K. DOMINGO, et al., 

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:12-cv-00474-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF NO. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN

THIRTY (30) DAYS 

SCREENING ORDER

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Richard Manuel Burgos, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis filed this civil rights action on March 29, 2012 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Compl., ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint is now before the Court for screening. 

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II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that ... the action or appeal ... fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia

Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not

itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal

rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff suffers from permanent nerve damage and severe pain in his right foot, ankle,

leg, hip and lower back. (Compl. at 10.) When he was transferred from California State

Prison-Solano (CSPS) to Pleasant Valley State Prison (PVSP) on April 6, 2011 (Id. at 5),

Defendant Domingo, per the CDC Operations Manual, confiscated a pair of orthopaedic

boots and other personal property. (Id. at 5-7.) Shortly thereafter the medical staff at PVSP

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Consisting of a breathing machine attachment, typewriter, storage box, headphone extension 1

cable, extension cord, antenna, adaptor, earbuds, clock, bowl, body oils. (Compl. at 7.) 

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removed him from the Disability Placement Plan he had been on at CSPS. (Id. at 5.) As a

result, Plaintiff suffered pain to his right foot, ankle, leg, hip and lower back. (Id. at 7, 10.)

He filed a prison appeal. Defendants Carr and Pineda improperly denied the first level

appeal; Defendants Morgan, Trimble and Martinez improperly denied the second level

appeal; Defendants Allen and Foston improperly denied the third level appeal. (Id. at 6-9.) 

Plaintiff claims the following Defendants deprived him of his property, were indifferent

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to his medical needs and improperly denied his appeal in violation of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments: (1) K. Domingo, Correctional Officer at PVSP, Receiving and

Release, (2) B. Carr, Correctional Sergeant at PVSP, Receiving and Release, (3) A. Pineda,

Associate Warden at PVSP, Central Operations, (4) J. Morgan, Correctional Officer at PVSP

and Appeals Coordinator, (5) Robert H. Trimble, Warden at PVSP, (6) H. Martinez, Health

Care Appeals Coordinator at the Office of Appeals, California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR), (7) K. J. Allen, Correctional Appeals Examiner at CDCR, (8) D.

Foston, Chief Office of Appeals at CDCR. (Id. at 3-4.)

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of a transfer back to CSPS, a protective

order regarding retaliation, return of his orthopaedic boots, general, special and punitive

damages and attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 13.)

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Pleading Requirements Generally

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that

Plaintiff also asserts an allegedly timely supplemental state tort claim regarding the property 2

deprivation based upon a California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board claim that was

rejected on November 30, 2011. (Compl. at 9, 11.) 

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a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.

1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief ....“ Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set

forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its

face.’“ Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant

committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions

are not. Id. at 1949–50.

B. Inadequate Medical Care 

Plaintiff claims that he received inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment,

an inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439

F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The

two prong test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical

need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further

significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant's

response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)). Deliberate indifference is shown by “a

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purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need, and harm

caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). In

order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege sufficient

facts to support a claim that the named defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to [plaintiff's] health ....” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ confiscation of orthopaedic boots prescribed at CSPS

was with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. However, Plaintiff also alleges

the boots were confiscated in accordance with Department of Corrections policy because

Plaintiff had another pair and was “only allowed one pair.” (Compl. at 6.)

Plaintiff has alleged no facts to plausibly suggest that depriving Plaintiff of one of two

sets of medically prescribed boots could constitute an act of indifference to Plaintiff’s medical

needs or cause Plaintiff any harm. Plaintiff fails to state a claim in this regard. 

Given the facts alleged, it is difficult to imagine that Plaintiff could amend to assert a

viable claim in this regard. Nevertheless, the Court will give Plaintiff one opportunity to

amend and insert true facts, if any there are, to show how Defendants’ acts demonstrated

a deliberately indifferent response to a serious medical need.

C. Inmate Appeal

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants improperly denied his inmate appeal(s). Defendants'

actions in responding to Plaintiff's appeals alone cannot give rise to any claims for relief

under § 1983 for violation of due process. “[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural

right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997

F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.Ill. 1982));

see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in

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processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); see also 

Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure

confers no liberty interest on prisoner); accord Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

1988). “[The grievance procedure] does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring

the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez, 568 F.Supp.

at 10; accord Spencer v. Moore, 638 F.Supp. 315, 316 (E.D.Mo. 1986). Actions in reviewing

a prisoner's administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983 claim.

Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495.

Since he has neither a liberty interest nor a substantive right to the procedures

involved in inmate appeals, Plaintiff fails to state a claim in this regard. Amendment of this

claim would be futile. Leave to amend will not be granted.

D. Property Deprivation

Plaintiff alleges that his property was intentionally taken pursuant to prison Operating

Procedures and underlying regulations. 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without

due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Prisoners have a

protected interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir.

1974). 

An authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process

Clause. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985).3

An authorized deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, 3

regulations, or statutes. Logan, 455 U.S. at 436; Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985);

see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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Authorized deprivations of property are permissible if carried out pursuant to a regulation that

is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89

(1987). Plaintiff has not alleged, and nothing before the Court plausibly suggests that the

regulations, procedures and policies underlying confiscation of his property are other than

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Nor has he alleged denial of postdeprivation remedies available within the prison system. SeeShabazz v. Odum, 591 F.Supp.

1513, 1517 (D.C.Pa. 1994) (seizure of contraband radio without prior hearing proper where

right to possession outweighed by governmental interest in prison safety and where postdeprivation remedies in prison system available); see also Kunze v. Bertsch, 477 F.Supp.2d

1038, 1053 (D.N.D. 2007) (inmate has no protectable property interest in contraband or right

to keep contraband in his cell). Plaintiff did grieve the deprivation through the prison appeal

system. Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim for authorized intentional deprivation of

property.

Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that he lacks a meaningful state tort remedy for

any unauthorized property deprivation (i.e., a deprivation not authorized by properly adopted

regulations, procedures and policies). Plaintiff does have an adequate post-deprivation

remedy under California law and therefore, any attempt to pursue a claim under federal law

for unauthorized taking of his property fails as a matter of law. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d

813, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810– 895). The Court will not address

the viability of Plaintiff's state law claims at this time because it will not exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims unless Plaintiff is able to state a cognizable federal claim.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th

Cir. 2001).

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Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deprivation of property in violation of his

Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

The Court will allow leave to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must set forth

sufficient facts plausibly claiming an authorized confiscation not reasonably related to a

legitimate penological interest or a valid state tort claim relating to an unauthorized

deprivation subject to supplemental jurisdiction.

E. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of a transfer back to CSPS and a protective

order against retaliation.

Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy, never awarded as of right.” Winter v.

Natural Res. Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary

injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his

favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S.

674, 689–90 (2008)).

In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that any preliminary injunction “be narrowly drawn,

extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary

relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he will succeed on the merits of his case. His

Complaint fails to state any cognizable claim.

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Nothing in the Complaint suggests real and immediate threat of injury. See City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–102 (1983) (plaintiff must show “real and immediate”

threat of injury, and “past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case

or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present,

adverse effects.”).

Plaintiff does not address the third or fourth elements, i.e., the balancing of equities

and public interest concerns. First, absent a showing sufficient to find harm to Plaintiff, there

is nothing to tip the balance of equities in Plaintiff's favor. Second, while the public has an

interest in providing the best practical prisoner care, the record before the Court does not

justify the Court substituting its judgment in these matters for that of the prison staff.

The various criteria not having been met, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. 

The Court will allow leave to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must set forth

sufficient facts showing the above noted elements.

F. Mental and Emotional Damages

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be

brought by a prisoner confined in jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental and

emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The physical injury “need not be significant but must be more than de

minimis.” See Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 627–29 (9th Cir.2002) (allegations of severe

and lasting back and leg pain, a painful canker sore, and unspecified injuries sustained in

a fight not more than de minimis ). The physical injury requirement applies only to claims for

mental or emotional injuries and does not bar claims for compensatory, nominal, or punitive

damages. Id. at 630.

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If Plaintiff chooses to amend and brings a claim for mental or emotional injury he

should include sufficient facts complying with the physical injury requirement.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff's Complaint does not state a claim for relief under § 1983. The Court will grant

Plaintiff one opportunity to file an amended complaint. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130

(9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987).

If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts resulted in a

deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948–49. Plaintiff must set forth

“sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’”Id. at 1949 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.) Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each named Defendant

personally participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934.

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is

not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.

2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing the

deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir.

1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended

complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended Complaint” refer to the

appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's

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amended complaint should be brief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Although accepted as true, the

“[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level

....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended

complaint form and (2) a copy of his Complaint, filed March 29, 2012,

2. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted,

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from service of

this order, and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this

action shall be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and failure

to prosecute, subject to the “three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g). Silva v. Di Vittorio 658 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2012 /s/Michael J. Seng 

ci4d6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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