Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01567/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01567-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

William Jackson Kitchens,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Margaret Mims, et al.,

Defendants. 

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 CV-05-1567-DCB P

ORDER

Before the Court are the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

Defendant Mims’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment1 or in the alternative

Summary Adjudication.

On March 25, 2010, this Court entered an Order and Judgment granting

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and denying Plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed and the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals, on January 14, 2014, affirmed this Court’s ruling with reference

to Defendant’s Johnson and the Transportation Defendants, but reversed

on the Mims’ ruling, specifically, as follows:

Kitchens’ detention in Isolation reveals conditions that are

substantially worse than those of the criminal detainees in

administrative segregation, giving rise to a presumption of

1This motion was filed during the pendency of the appeal. After the

Mandate issued, this Court entered an Order requiring Defendant to file

a response to the pending motion. Defendant Mims also filed a cross

motion. This Court then entered the appropriate pro se warning order.

Case 1:05-cv-01567-DCB Document 153 Filed 01/26/15 Page 1 of 19
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punishment. The County Defendants failed to rebut this

presumption because they have proffered only generalized jail

management concerns for support...Because the County

Defendants failed to proffer evidence to rebut the presumption

of punishment, summary judgment in their favor was improper. 

They may produce additional evidence to rebut the presumption

on remand.” 

(Appeal No. 10-15737 at 78-3.) In addition, 

Because no policy from “higher authority” specified how SVPs

housed in Isolation or the Hole must be treated, a question of

material fact exists as to Mims’ authority to effect the

conditions afforded to SVPs in those locations. In

particular, the issue is whether in the absence of a policy,

Mims, as the person who “oversaw jail operations:” and “in

charge of the Fresno County Jail,” had the authority to ensure

the SVPs would be afforded better conditions than others

housed in Isolation or the Hole. A reasonable trier of fact

could conclude that she controlled Kitchens’ circumstances of

confinement and is thus potentially liable under a supervisor

theory of liability.

(Appeal No. 10-15737 at 78-4-5.)

This Court will now address these remaining issue with reference to

the remaining Defendant, Mims. All other issues2 have been resolved and

will not be addressed in this Order. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court will adopt the Defendants’ recitation of the procedural

background in part, as follows:

Plaintiff, a civil detainee appearing in propria persona,

filed his initial complaint on December 5,2005. Doc. No. 1. In

the complaint, Plaintiff set forth civil rights claims

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on his stay at the Fresno

County Jail (“Jail”) between August 25, 2005, and October 11,

2005.

Plaintiff alleges that as a pre-trial civil detainee pursuant

to California’s Sexually Violent Predator(“SVP”) laws, he was

improperly classified and housed at the Jail. Plaintiff also

alleges he was subjected to an improper visual body cavity

search, denied access to the Jail’s law library, and was

denied mental health treatment.

2Plaintiff attempts to reassert the following issues that have

previously been resolved: library access, treatment access, strip search,

conditions of transport.

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On August 5, 2008, Plaintiff filed his First Amended

Complaint. Doc. No. 75. On August 26, 2008, Defendant Mims

filed her Answer. Doc. No. 78. On March 9, 2009, Plaintiff

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. No. 90. On June 15,

2009, Defendant Mims filed her Motion for Summary Judgment.

Doc. Nos. 99, 101. On the same day, Defendant Mims filed her

opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc.

No. 95.

On July 3, 2009, Defendant Mims was served with a brief in

opposition to her Motion for Summary Judgment. However, the

brief was not filed with the court. On July 6, 2009, Plaintiff

filed a reply to Defendant Mims’ opposition to his Motion for

Summary Judgment. Doc. No. 110. The next day, this Court

issued an order directing Plaintiff to file an opposition to

Defendant Mims’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. No. 111. On

July 13, 2009, an order was issued directing Plaintiff to

supplement his Motion for Summary Judgment with missing

exhibits. Doc. No. 114. On the same day, Plaintiff was ordered

to file an opposition to Defendant Mims’ Motion for Summary

Judgment by August 7, 2009. Doc. No. 115.

On July 21, 2009, Plaintiff filed a separate statement of

material facts in opposition to Defendant Mims’ Motion for

Summary Judgment. Doc. No. 116. However, the brief served on

Defendant Mims was not filed. On August 13, 2009, Defendant

Mims filed her reply papers. Doc. No. 122. Attached to Defense

counsel’s declaration was a copy of Plaintiff’s unfiled

opposition brief. The matter was taken under submission

without a hearing.

On March 25, 2010, this Court issued a single order on the

three pending motions for summary judgment. Doc. No. 124.

Defendant Mims’ Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, as

was the motion of former co-defendants Transcor America.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. Plaintiff

timely filed an appeal of the Court’s order.

(DMSJ at 4.)

On June 14, 2013, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the

district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendant Johnson and the

Transportation Defendants and reversed the district court’s summary

judgment with respect to Defendant Mims. (Memorandum, No.10-15737.) On

January 14, 2014, the Ninth Circuit panel voted to deny the petition for

panel rehearing (2-1)(Judge Wallace dissented and recommended an en banc

rehearing on the issue of Defendant Mims). (Order Amending Memorandum,

10-15737). An Amended Memorandum was filed January 14, 2014 and the

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Mandate issued February 4, 2014. The Ninth Circuit, reversed the Court’s

order granting Defendant Mims’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds

“[a] reasonable trier of fact could conclude that she controlled

[Plaintiff’s] circumstances of confinement and is thus potentially liable

under a supervisor theory of liability.” Kitchens v. Pierce, 2014 WL

812896, *5 (9th Cir. 2014). In particular, the issue was whether

Defendant Mims possessed final policy making authority over the policies

and/or procedures governing the privileges provided to SVP detainees at

the Jail. The Ninth Circuit also held that Defendant Mims could produce

additional evidence to rebut the presumption of punishment on remand. Id.

at *5. 

While the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, on July 30, 2013,

Plaintiff filed another motion for summary judgment (PMSJ). (Doc. 136.)

On April 14, 2014, after the Ninth Circuit issued its decision, this

Court ordered Defendant Mims to respond to Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment by May 29, 2014. On May 29, 2014, Defendant Mims filed an

Opposition (Doc. 145) and a Request for Judicial Notice (Doc. 146). On

May 30, 2014, Defendant Mims filed a cross motion for summary judgment

(DMSJ). (Doc. 147.) This Court then entered the requisite pro se warning

order. (Doc. 148.) Plaintiff filed an Opposition and a Reply on July 11,

2014. (Doc. 149, 150.) On July 14, 2014, Defendand Mims filed an

Opposition and on July 31, 2014, Defendant Mims filed a Reply. (Docs.

151, 152) and a request to strike Plaintiff’s reply.

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 12, 2005, Fresno County Superior Court issued an order to

transport Plaintiff from Atascadero State Hospital to Gresno County Jail

for a court hearing regarding Plaintiff’s legal status as a SVP. On

August 25, 2005, Plaintiff was transported to Fresno County Jail. On

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August 26, 2005, Plaintiff was classified and housed in MSEGAJIA - 45-man

open dormitory area. On August 29, 2005, Plaintiff made an appearance

in Superior Court, where the judge ordered in continued detention as a

SVP. On September 5, 2005, Plaintiff was reclassified and placed in

Isolation. On September 18, 2005, Plaintiff was again reclassified and

placed in a two man cell. Plaintiff was returned to Atascadero Hospital

on October 11, 2005. During this time, Defendant Mims was an Assistant

Sheriff assigned to Fresno County Jail. It is Plaintiff’s time in

Isolation from September 5 - 18, 2005 (14 days) that raises the question

of punishment. And, the treatment of SVPs while housed in Isolation is

the question with reference to Defendant Mims authority to control the

conditions in Isolation: Did Mims have the authority to ensure that

SVP’s would be afforded better conditions than others housed in

Isolation?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears the

initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, that

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the

nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd.

v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the

movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the

nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the

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fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d

1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material

issue of fact conclusively in its favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v.

Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, it must “come

forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1).

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis,

the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw all inferences

in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the

cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment.

Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the summary judgment

standard, but instead simply require the court to determine whether

either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the facts

that are not disputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

 DISCUSSION

A. Punishment

“‘[W]hen a SVPA detainee is confined in conditions identical to,

similar to, or more restrictive that those in which his criminal

counterparts are held, we presume that the detainee is being subjected

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to “punishment.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.2d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004).

Second, ‘when an individual awaiting SVPA adjudication is detained under

conditions more restrictive than those the individual would face

following SVPA commitment, we presume the treatment is punitive.’ Id.,

at 933. To rebut these presumptions, Defendants may establish that

retaining Plaintiff in T-Sep served legitimate, non-punitive

justifications. Id. However, Defendants also have the burden of showing

that retaining Plaintiff in T-Sep was not excessive in relation to the

legitimate, non-punitive objective and why this purpose could not have

been met by alternative and less harsh methods. Id., at 934-35.”

Cerniglia v. County of Sacramento, 2008 WL 1787855, *8 (E.D. Cal. 2008).

Here, Plaintiff was previously adjudicated a SVP.

1. Classification and Housing at Fresno County Jail

On August 26, 2005, Plaintiff was classified and housed in MSEGAJ1A, a 45-man open dormitory area at the annex jail that contained

detainees who had been charged or were being prosecuted for sex offenses.

UMF No. 27-28.

3 At the time, no one at the Jail knew that Plaintiff was

a civil detainee. UMF No. 29. MSEG-AJ1A contained bunk beds, television,

coffee, a telephone area, and access to an exercise area. UMF No. 30.

It was the policy and practice of the Jail to keep SVP’s housed

separately from pre-trial detainees. UMF No. 31. Plaintiff’s initial

classification was based on the classification unit’s lack of sufficient

information related to Plaintiff’s SVP status. UMF No. 32. At the time

Plaintiff was classified, the classification officer did not have

information that Plaintiff was a pre-trial SVP. UMF Nos. 33-38.

Plaintiff’s initial classification and housing in MSEG-AJ1A was not

done for a punitive purpose. UMF No. 39. Plaintiff had more privileges

3Defendant’s undisputed material facts (UMF). (Doc. 145-1.)

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in MSEG-AJ1A than he had when he was properly housed as an SVP. UMF No.

40. 

2. Plaintiff’s Re-Classification

On August 29, 2005, Plaintiff appeared in front of Superior Court

Judge Gary Austin, who denied his writ of habeas corpus without

prejudice, and ordered that Plaintiff be housed pursuant to Penal Code

§§4002(b) and 1610. UMF No. 41. There is no evidence that the Jail

classification unit found out about Plaintiff’s SVP status until

September 5, 2005. UMF No. 42. On September 5, 2005, after the

classification unit received knowledge of Plaintiff’s SVP status,

Plaintiff was re-classified from MSEGAJ1A to Isolation. UMF No. 43.

The Fresno County Jail did not have a separate housing unit for

individuals civilly committed as SVP’s and/or individuals awaiting civil

commitment as SVP’s. UMF No. 44. The Jail had a housing unit for ordinary

civil detainees; however, pursuant to California law, it was the policy

of the Jail not to house SVP’s with ordinary civil detainees. UMF No. 45.

Pursuant to the laws of the State of California individuals civilly

committed as SVP’s and/or individuals awaiting civil commitment as SVP’s

were not housed together with, or permitted to be in the same room as,

criminal inmates or inmates awaiting criminal process and/or civil

detainees at the Fresno County Jail. UMF No. 46

The Fresno County Jail did not have a separate area, facility or

location where individuals civilly committed as SVP’s and/or individuals

awaiting civil commitment as SVP’s could safely and in compliance with

the laws of the State of California receive the same privileges provided

to civil detainees or criminal inmates housed in general population. UMF

No. 47. Due to budgetary constraints, the Fresno County Jail did not

have additional staffing available to provide civilly committed SVP’s

and/or individuals awaiting civil commitment as SVP’s with the same

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privileges provided to civil detainees or criminal inmates housed in

general population. UMF No. 48.

In order to comply with the laws of the State of California

individuals civilly committed as SVP’s and/or individuals awaiting civil

commitment as SVP’s could only be housed in isolation or administrative

segregation at the Fresno County Jail. UMF No. 49. Isolation is not a

disciplinary cell area at the Jail, but merely a housing location for

house alone/program alone inmates/detainees. UMF No. 50. Plaintiff’s reclassification from MSEG-AJ1A to isolation was not done for a punitive

purpose. UMF No. 51.

Individuals civilly committed as SVP’s and/or individuals awaiting

civil commitment as SVP’s housed in isolation were provided with the same

privileges as all individuals being housed in the isolation unit. UMF No.

52. Plaintiff was housed in administrative segregation in order to comply

with the laws of the State of California requiring that individuals

awaiting civil commitment as sexually violent predators cannot be housed

and/or in the same room as criminal inmates, inmates awaiting criminal

process and/or civil detainees. UMF No. 53. Plaintiff’s housing in

isolation was the only option available at the time. UMF No. 54.

3. Plaintiff’s Second Re-Classification

On September 18, 2005, Plaintiff was re-classified from Isolation

to MSEG-MJ3A4, a two-man cell. UMF Nos. 55-56. Plaintiff’s reclassification was based on the fact that the classification unit found

another SVP with whom Plaintiff was familiar (Rick Horn) that could be

housed with Plaintiff. UMF No. 57. Plaintiff had no objection to this

arrangement. UMF No. 58. Plaintiff remained housed with Mr. Horn in MSEG

until he left the Jail and returned to Atascadero. UMF No. 59. At no time

was Plaintiff housed in the general population of the Jail. UMF No. 60.

Plaintiff was housed in administrative segregation in order to comply

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with the laws of the State of California requiring that individuals

awaiting civil commitment as sexually violent predators cannot be housed

and/or in the same room as criminal inmates, inmates awaiting criminal

process and/or civil detainees. UMF No. 61. Plaintiff was not housed in

administrative segregation for a punitive purpose. UMF No. 62. Plaintiff

was provided the same privileges as all of the individuals housed in

administrative segregation. UMF No. 63.

It is undisputed that the Jail, in compliance with the laws of the

State of California had a policy of not housing SVP detainees, such as

Plaintiff, with criminal or non-SVP civil detainees. UMF Nos. 44-46. As

a result of this policy, on September 5, 2005, Plaintiff was reclassified and placed in the isolation housing unit with house

alone/program alone inmates/detainees. UMF No. 43. On September 18, 2005,

Plaintiff was re-classified from isolation to administrative segregation

and housed with another SVP. UMF Nos. 55-59. Plaintiff’s housing

assignments were not punitive but rather were necessary based on the

existing conditions at the Jail. UMF Nos. 39; 61-63; Cal. Penal Code

§4002(a)-(b); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d at 934-935.

At the time, there were no “alternative and less harsh methods” that

reasonably could have been employed. The Jail did not have an additional

facility or location where Plaintiff could have been held safely and in

compliance with the laws of the State of California and receive the same

privileges provided to civil detainees or criminal detainees housed in

general population. UMF Nos. 44; 47; 48; 61-63. Even if the Jail had an

additional area, facility or location, due to budgetary restraints, the

Jail did not have additional staff to provide private or individualized

security which would have been necessary to ensure Plaintiff’s safety and

as required by the laws of the State of California to prevent his

interaction with criminal and/or civil detainees. UMF No. 48; Peralta v.

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Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2014). Instead, the only locations

available to house and safely provide SVP detainees with privileges was

either isolation for a single SVP detainee or administrative segregation

for two SVP detainees. UMF Nos. 44; 47; 49; 54. By law Plaintiff could

not have been housed with ordinary civil detainees. UMF No. 45; Hubbart

v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1168-70 (1999); see also People v.

Green, 79 Cal.App.4th 921, 924-927 (2000). As such, it is undisputed that

there was nothing punitive about Plaintiff’s housing in isolation and/or

administrative segregation.4

The Court finds that the uncontradicted material facts support a

finding that Defendant has rebutted the presumption of a punitive purpose

and Plaintiff’s treatment was not excessive in relation to Defendant’s

legitimate, non-punitive objectives.

B. Mims’ Supervisory and Policy Making Roll

1. Rules, Regulations and Policies 

At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant Mims was the

Assistant Sheriff responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Jail.

UMF No. 5. Prior to this lawsuit being filed, Defendant Mims had no

knowledge that Plaintiff was housed at the Fresno County Jail. UMF No.

6. Further, Defendant Mims had no direct or indirect involvement with any

decisions regarding Plaintiff’s stay at the Jail. UMF Nos. 7-15. This

included where Plaintiff was housed; Plaintiff’s privileges; or

4Plaintiff also contends that he should have been housed at a

different type of facility where the conditions of confinement are

generally more pleasant than a jail. However, Plaintiff ignores the fact

that he was ordered by the Fresno County Superior Court to be housed at

the Jail. The law recognizes that SVPs will be housed at jails for

limited periods of time while SVP proceedings are taking place. Halbert

v. Herbert, 2008 WL 4460213, *7 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Plaintiff’s remedy in

this situation was to petition the Superior Court for an order changing

his confinement. Cal. Penal Code § 4002(b). He did not do so.

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Plaintiff’s classification. Ibid.

In 2005 and at all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant Mims

did not possess final policy making authority over any of the policies

and/or procedures governing the Fresno County Jail. UMF No. 16. Plaintiff

has conceded that the Sheriff of the County of Fresno, not Defendant Mims

was the policymaker at the relevant times. UMF No. 17.

At the relevant times, Defendant Mims was responsible only for

implementing and enforcing the policies and procedures that were set

forth by the Sheriff. UMF No. 18. Failure to implement and/or enforce the

policies and procedure set forth by the Sheriff could result in either

Defendant Mims’ demotion or termination. UMF No. 19.

In 2005 and at all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant Mims

did not possess final policy making authority over any of the following:

(1) policies and/or procedures referring and/or relating to the housing

of inmates awaiting criminal process, criminally convicted inmates, civil

detainees, civil detainees awaiting commitment as SVP’s and/or civil

detainees committed as SVP’s at the Fresno County Jail (UMF No. 20); (2)

policies and/or procedures referring and/or relating to the privileges

provided to inmates awaiting criminal process, criminally convicted

inmates, civil detainees, civil detainees awaiting commitment as SVP’s

and/or civil detainees committed as SVP’s at the Fresno County Jail (UMF

No. 21); (3) policies and/or procedures referring and/or relating to the

privileges not provided to inmates awaiting criminal process, criminally

convicted inmates, civil detainees, civil detainees awaiting commitment

as SVP’s and/or civil detainees committed as SVP’s at the Fresno County

Jail (UMF No. 22).

Pursuant to the laws of the State of California, the duly elected

Sheriff of the County of Fresno was the only individual who possessed

final policy making authority over the following: (1) policies and/or

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procedures governing the Fresno County Jail (UMF No. 23); (2) policies

and/or procedures referring and/or relating to the housing of inmates

awaiting criminal process, criminally convicted inmates, civil detainees,

civil detainees awaiting commitment as SVP’s and civil detainees

committed as SVP’s at the Fresno County Jail (UMF No. 24); (3) policies

and/or procedures referring and/or relating to the privileges provided

to inmates awaiting criminal process, criminally convicted inmates, civil

detainees, civil detainees awaiting commitment as SVP’s and civil

detainees committed as SVP’s at the Fresno County Jail (UMF No. 25); (4)

policies and/or procedures referring and/or relating to the privileges

not provided to inmates awaiting criminal process, criminally convicted

inmates, civil detainees, civil detainees awaiting commitment as SVP’s

and civil detainees committed as SVP’s at the Fresno County Jail. UMF No.

26.

2. No Admissible Evidence Establishing Supervisor Liability

Plaintiff has brought suit against Defendant Mims in her individual

capacity as supervisor at the Jail. Doc. No. 75. As such, the central

issue currently before the Court is whether Plaintiff presented

sufficient undisputed material facts and admissible evidence to establish

a valid claim of supervisor liability against Defendant Mims.

“[V]icarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”

Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal v.

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). In order to plead an individual capacity

claim against Defendant Mims pursuant to § 1983, Plaintiff must establish

either (1) Defendant Mims was “personally involved in a constitutional

violation, or (2) there was a ‘sufficient causal connection’ between

[her] wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Lacey v.

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Maricopa County, 649 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff must prove that Defendant Mims personally participated in

the alleged constitutional violations. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633

(9th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002).

“[P]ersonal involvement could include ‘culpable action or inaction in the

training, supervision, or control of ... subordinates, ... acquiescence

in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made, or

conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of

others.” Lacey, 649 F.3d at 1136. “[A] policy is a deliberate choice to

follow a course of action‘made from among various alternatives by the

official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with

respect to the subject matter in question.’” Pembaur v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986).

Here, the subject matter in question is privileges afforded SVP’s

at the Jail. “The identification of policymaking officials is a question

of state law.” St. Louis v. Paprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988). In the

State of California, the county sheriff is responsible for administering

and operating all county jails. Brandt v. Board of Supervisors, 84

Cal.App.3d 598, 601 (1978), County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 68

Cal.App.4th 1166, 1175-76 (1998) and Bougere v. County of Los Angeles,

141 Cal.App.4th 237, 242 (2006)). The Legislature has provided county

sheriffs with broad authority to manage county jails. Cortez v. County

of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002).

Also, pursuant to statute, the county sheriff is the sole and

exclusive authority to administer/operate the county jail. Id.; Cal. Gov.

Code §§ 26605 & 26610 and Cal. Pen. Code § 4000. California Code of

Regulations, Title 15, which governs the Jail, defines the

facility/system administrator as “the sheriff, chief of police, chief

probation officer, or other official charged by law with the

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administration of a local detention facility/system.” Cal. Code Regs.

Tit. 15 §§ 1006 & 1010. As administrator, the county sheriff is

responsible for creating and implementing all policies regarding inmate

housing and segregation. Cortez, 294 F.3d at 1190; Cal. Code Regs. Tit.

15 §§ 1050 & 1053. This also includes policies regarding segregating

inmates whose safety may be at risk. Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15 §§ 1052

&1053.

In addition to housing, Title 15 governs the creation of policies

and procedures regarding privileges at a county jail. Pursuant to Title

15, the county sheriff is responsible for creating and implementing all

policies regarding privileges. Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15 §§ 1061-1072.

Also, the county sheriff is responsible for developing and publishing a

policies and procedures manual addressing all of the requirements of

Title 15; which shall be made available to all employees. Cal. Code Regs.

Tit. 15 § 1029. The Ninth Circuit has long recognized and enforced these

statutes and precedent. Cortez, 294 F.3d at 1190.

Thus, pursuant to California law and binding precedent, the Sheriff,

not Defendant Mims, was the only individual who possessed final policy

making authority regarding the housing of Plaintiff at the Jail. UMF Nos.

16-26. Also, the Sheriff, not Defendant Mims, was the sole individual

with final policy making authority regarding policies and/or procedures

governing the privileges provided to or not provided to Plaintiff while

he was staying at the Jail. Ibid. Therefore, the undisputed material

facts establish that Defendant Mims did not create nor have any final

policy making authority regarding the policies and/or procedures

governing Plaintiff’s housing and/or privileges at the Jail.

Plaintiff was required to present sufficient affirmative evidence

that would allow a rational finder of fact to find in his favor by a

preponderance of the evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Mt. Healthy

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City Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287

(1977). Bald assertions, argument and theories are insufficient. Galen

v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007); British

Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff

failed to meet this burden. Plaintiff bore the burden of demonstrating

that the undisputed material facts establish that Defendant Mims

possessed final policy making authority and that she created the specific

policy which resulted in the alleged constitutional violation. Pembaur,

475 U.S. at 483-84; Edgerly v. City and County of San Francisco, 599 F.3d

946, 961-62 (9th Cir. 2010). As discussed above, Defendant Mims by law

did not possess final policy making authority at the Jail. UMF. Nos. 16-

26. Also, the record is wholly devoid of any admissible evidence negating

the statutory mandate that the duly elected Sheriff of the County of

Fresno was the only individual with final policy making authority at the

jail. Ibid. In fact, Plaintiff previously conceded this issue. UMF. No.

17.

Plaintiff failed to present sufficient affirmative admissible

evidence that would allow a rational finder of fact to find by a

preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Mims possessed final policy

making authority regarding the privileges provided to or not provided to

Plaintiff at the Jail. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has long held that

a supervising law enforcement officer cannot be held liable as a

policymaker pursuant to section 1983 for merely being familiar with

policies and procedures, and implementing said policies as required by

their supervisor. Edgerly, 599 F.3d at 961-62. Thus, a plaintiff is

required to present sufficient affirmative evidence establishing that the

constitutional violation was the result of an official policy created by

a policymaker who possessed final authority to create the policy.

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84; Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d

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707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010).

Under the controlling law, a county sheriff is the final policymaker

when acting in their role as administrator/operator of a county jail.

Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 564-65 (9th Cir. 2001);

Cortez, 294 F.3d at 1189-90; Brandt, 84 Cal.App.3d at 601; County of Los

Angeles, 68 Cal.App.4th at 1175-76; Bougere, 141 Cal.App.4th at 242; Cal.

Gov. Code § 26605; Cal. Pen. Code § 4000. Also, a county sheriff is

required by law to create all policies regarding privileges at a county

jail. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 §§ 1006 &1061-1072.

Defendant Mims by law did not possess any policy making authority;

rather, she was required to enforce the policies and procedures regarding

housing and/or privileges set forth by the Sheriff. UMF. Nos. 16-19.

Defendant Mims was responsible only for the day-to-day operations of the

Jail. UMF No. 5. Also, failure to implement and/or enforce the policies

and procedures created by the Sheriff could have resulted in Defendant

Mims being demoted or terminated. UMF. No. 19. Therefore, she cannot be

held liable pursuant to section 1983 for merely enforcing or implementing

the Sheriff’s required policies and/or procedures. Edgerly, 599 F.3d at

961-62. 

In a government-operated bureaucratic institution, such as a county

jail, there is no underlying basis to make the assumption that the

assistant sheriff could unilaterally implement an internal jail policy

of treating SVPs housed in Isolation differently from other inmates

housed in Isolation. Absent a specific directive or policy from her

superiors, it is unreasonable to hold the assistant sheriff charged with

overseeing the day-to-day operations of a county jail as capable of

ensuring that SVPs are afforded better conditions than others housed in

Isolation. There is no such policy that exists in this instance and an

assistant sheriff is not a policy maker. 

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CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the Court finds that there are no material

questions of fact precluding entry of summary judgment on either the

issue of punishment or Mims’ supervisory liability. In both cases, a

resolution requires attention to the applicable state and federal laws.

In addition, Plaintiff offers no admissible evidence that can be

presented to a trier of fact. Plaintiff only offers speculation and

innuendo, which is not a substitute for admissible evidence warranting

a trial. There is no evidence to raise the question that Mims may have

had policy-making authority and there is no legal basis for finding

liability based on respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

676 (2009). There is uncontradicted evidence that Mims did not possess

final policy making authority over any policies and/or procedures

governing Plaintiff’s housing or privileges while at the Jail. Further,

Plaintiff was classified and housed at the Fresno County Jail according

to applicable law and policy that Mims was not involved in creating.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

136) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Mims’ Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 147) is GRANTED; Defendant’s request for judicial notice

(Doc. 146) is GRANTED; and, Defendant’s request to strike (Doc. 151) is

DENIED.

//

//

//

//

//

//

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office shall file a separate

Final Judgment in conformance with this Order and terminate this action.

DATED this 26th day of January, 2015.

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