Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00004/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00004-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981cv Civil Rights

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3 ClfeRK, U.S. DISTRICT DOUR f

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CAUFORFIA

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°-V' busty

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 CHASE HAYES, Case No.: 3:17-cv-00004-BEN-WVG

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER:

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(1) DENYING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 14 NASSCO,

15 Defendant.

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL; 16

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(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 18

19 [Docket Nos. 1-3]

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On January 6, 2017, PlaintiffChase Hayes filed a civil Complaint, a Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), and a Motion for Appointment ofCounsel. (Docket

Nos. 1-3.) For the reasons stated below, the Motions to Proceed IFP and for

Appointment ofCounsel are DENIED, and the Complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

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1 Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action in a district court must pay a filing fee. 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to prepay the entire

fee only ifthe plaintiffis granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1),

any court ofthe United States may authorize the

commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or

proceeding ... without prepayment offees or security therefor,

by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement

of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to

pay such fees or give security therefor.

I.

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Plaintiffstated he receives approximately $1,250 a month in employment income

and disability benefits. (Docket No. 2 at 11.) He indicates he does not pay any monthly

expenses. {Id. at 8.) The Court finds Plaintiff has not sufficiently stated that he cannot

afford to pay the filing fee. The Motion is therefore DENIED. However, Plaintiffis

granted leave to file a new motion to proceed informapauperis explaining why he

cannot pay the filing fees.

Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiffhas moved for the appointment of counsel, on the sole grounds that he

cannot represent himselfbecause he is not an attorney. (Docket No. 3.)

Courts have discretion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (1996), to appoint

counsel for indigent civil litigants upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. “A

finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation ofboth the likelihood of

success on the merits and the ability ofthe petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in

light ofthe complexity ofthe legal issues involved.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015,

1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). “Neither ofthese factors is dispositive

and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (internal citations

omitted).

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this time, the Court cannot say there is any likelihood ofsuccess on the merits.

Moreover, Plaintifffails to demonstrate an inability to represent himself beyond the

ordinary burdens encountered by plaintiffs representing themselvespro se, or that he has

even attempted to obtain counsel to represent him. See Garcia v. Smith, No. 10-cv-l 187,

2012 WL 2499003, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (“Merely alleging indigence is

insufficient to entitle him to appointed counsel; he must also demonstrate that he made a

good faith effort, but was unable, to obtain counsel.”). Therefore, the Court finds that the

exceptional circumstances required for the appointment of counsel are not present.

Plaintiffs Motion is DENIED.

Section 1915 Screening

A. Legal Standard

Under section 1915(e) oftitle 28 ofthe United States Code, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious,

fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)). “[T]he provisions ofsection 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001).

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679; see Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that section 1915(e)(2)

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i As will be described in further detail below, Plaintiffs Complaint does not contain

sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. 28

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“parallels the language ofFederal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]... a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on itsjudicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The “mere possibility ofmisconduct” falls short ofmeeting this

plausibility standard. Id; see also Moss v. U.S. SecretServ., 512 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

2009).

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While a plaintiffs factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doelv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an

obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler,

627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.l

(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially

pled.” Ivey v. Bd. ofRegents ofthe Univ. of Alaska, 613 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Discussion

Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which

reliefmay be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiffs Complaint, which includes a

single request for relief of “reinstate job [sic],” is literally devoid of any factual

allegations. (Docket No. 1 at 3.) Instead, Plaintiff directs the Court to “See Right to Sue

Letter,” which he attached as Exhibit A to his Complaint. (Id. at 2.) However, Exhibit A

appears to consist of:

(1) a letter dated December 20, 2016, from the U.S. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) giving Plaintiffnotice ofhis right to sue;

(2) a letter dated November 9, 2016, from the EEOC requesting documentation

regarding his alleged employment discrimination claims;

(3) a letter dated June 2, 2016, from Plaintiffs physician stating Plaintiffmay

return to work immediately without restrictions; and

(4) a letter dated May 17, 2000, from the U.S. Department ofLabor, Employment

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Standards Administration, verifying Plaintiffis receiving benefits for an

unidentified work related injury.

Even construing the documents liberally, the Court finds Plaintiffhas failed to state a

claim for discrimination. The EEOC documents refer to Plaintiffs allegations of

employment discrimination, but do not contain any facts regarding who, what, where and

how Plaintiffwas discriminated against by NAASCO. The other two letters from

Plaintiffs physician and the U.S. Depart ofLabor similarly lack any facts regarding any

claims of discrimination.

In short, Plaintiffs Complaint falls well below the requirement to include “a short

and plain statement ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, the Complaint is DISMISSED. However, the Court grants

Plaintiffleave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies noted above.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs Motions to Proceed IFP and for Appointment ofCounsel are DENIED.

The Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim. Plaintiff

is granted thirty (30) days from the date ofthis Order to file a new motion to proceed

IFP. IfPlaintiff chooses to file a new motion to proceed IFP, he must also file his

proposed first amended complaint with said motion. Ifthe Court grants Plaintiffs second

motion to proceed IFP, it will then consider whether Plaintiffs proposed first amended

complaint sufficiently states a claim upon which reliefmay be granted. IfPlaintiff does

not file a new motion to proceed IFP and proposed first amended complaint, this action

shall remain closed without further Order ofthe Court.

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23 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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tTbenitez

25 DATED: January 017

HON,

United Stages District Judge 26

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