Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-01689/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-01689-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SCOTT JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRYANT OTTER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-01689-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 

ROPER’S MOTION TO DISMISS

CLAIM 1 FOR LACK OF SUBJECTMATTER JURISDICTION; 

EXERCISING SUPPLEMENTAL 

JURISDICTION

[Re: ECF 23]

Before the Court is Defendant Thomas Roper’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Mot., ECF 23. Roper 

argues that Plaintiff Scott Johnson’s only federal claim—brought under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §12101, et seq.—is moot because Roper has ceased 

all business operations and permanently vacated the premises at issue. The Court agrees with 

Roper that the ADA claim is moot, and for the following reasons GRANTS Roper’s motion to 

dismiss the ADA claim. However, the Court chooses to EXERCISE supplemental jurisdiction

over the remaining state law claim so long as Johnson’s nearly identical federal claims remain 

pending against Defendant Bryant Otter.

I. BACKGROUND

Johnson is a level C-5 quadriplegic who relies on a wheelchair for mobility. Compl. ¶ 1, 

ECF 1. He also has significant manual dexterity impairments. Id. Johnson alleges that in July 

2016, January 2017, February 2017, March 2017, and May 2017, he visited the Relax VIP Spa 

located at 999 W. San Carlos St., San Jose, California. Id. ¶¶ 2–13, 18, 39–43. During these 

visits, Johnson observed that the spa lacked a compliant, accessible parking space. Id. ¶¶ 18–31. 

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Johnson also observed that the spa did not provide an accessible path of travel from the parking lot 

to the business office entrance. Id. ¶¶ 32–34. Johnson alleges that Defendant Bryant Otter

(against whom default was entered on May 2, 2018, ECF 10) owns the real property on which the 

spa is located and that Roper owns the spa. Id. ¶¶ 2–14. Johnson filed this action against Otter 

and Roper on March 19, 2018, alleging violations of the ADA and the California Unruh Civil 

Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51–53. See generally Compl. For his ADA claim, he seeks only 

injunctive relief to remove the alleged barriers to access. See Compl. ¶ 64; Compl., Prayer ¶ 1.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts can adjudicate only those cases which the Constitution and Congress 

authorize them to adjudicate: those involving diversity of citizenship or a federal question, or 

those to which the United States is a party. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 376–

77 (2012); see also Chen-Cheng Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1415 

(9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal courts have no power to consider claims for which they lack subjectmatter jurisdiction.”). The Court has a continuing obligation to ensure that it has subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A defendant may raise the defense of lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction by motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian 

Life Ins., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 

A jurisdictional challenge may be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the attack is facial, the Court determines whether the 

allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction, 

accepting all material allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in favor of the party 

asserting jurisdiction. Id.; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Where the attack is 

factual, however, “the court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Safe 

Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual dispute as to the existence of subject 

matter jurisdiction, the Court may review extrinsic evidence beyond the complaint without 

converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Id. Once the moving party has 

made a factual challenge by offering affidavits or other evidence to dispute the allegations in the 

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complaint, the party opposing the motion must “present affidavits or any other evidence necessary 

to satisfy its burden of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses subject matter jurisdiction.” 

St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Savage v. Glendale Union 

High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).

“Jurisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federal-question jurisdiction are 

exceptional, and must satisfy the requirements specified in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S. Ct. 

773, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946).” Sun Valley Gas., Inc. v. Ernst Enters., 711 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 

1983). The Supreme Court has determined that jurisdictional dismissals are warranted “where the 

alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statues clearly appears to be immaterial and made 

solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such claim is wholly insubstantial 

and frivolous.” Bell, 327 U.S. at 682–83.

III. DISCUSSION

A. General Order 56

As a threshold matter, Johnson argues that Roper’s motion violates this District’s General 

Order 56 and should be denied on that basis. General Order 56 states in relevant part: “All other 

discovery and proceedings are STAYED unless the assigned judge orders otherwise.” Johnson

asserts that “Defendant’s motion is premature as the motion was filed in violation of General 

Order 56’s stay on all proceedings.” Opp. at 2, ECF 27. 

The Court disagrees. General Order 56 does not stay all proceedings in an ADA case, but 

instead stays only discovery and similar proceedings, and merely “dictates an early case 

management process that has been tailored to ADA access cases filed in this district.” Johnson v. 

Sebanc, No. 18-cv-00585-DMR, 2018 WL 3159699, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2018); see also 

Johnson v. Winchester Campbell Props., LLC, No. 18-cv-04153-VKD, 2018 WL 661994, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2018). In particular, judges in this District (including this Court) have 

concluded that General Order 56 does not bar the filing of a motion challenging the pleadings or 

the court’s jurisdiction. Johnson v. 1082 El Camino Real, L.P., No. 5:17-cv-01391-EJD, 2018 

WL 1091267, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2018); Moralez v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 

2d 987, 993 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that the cited language “plainly refers to discovery 

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issues, and does not bar a defendant from moving to dismiss on res judicata grounds”); Che v. San 

Jose/Evergreen Cmty. College District Found., et al., No. 17-381-BLF, Dkt. No. 34 at 2 (N.D. 

Cal. May 26, 2017) (“[T]he Court concludes that the language imposing a stay on ‘[a]ll other 

discovery and proceedings’ does not clearly encompass the filing of an answer or motion in 

response to a complaint.” (alteration in original)).

As such, this Court holds that General Order 56 does not bar Roper from bringing the 

instant motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion

1. ADA claim

The ADA’s anti-discrimination provision applies to “any person who owns, leases (or 

leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The parties do 

not dispute that the spa qualifies as a place of public accommodation under section 12182(a). 

Roper brings a factual challenge to the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that he

cannot be liable for an ADA violation because the spa terminated its occupancy and permanently 

vacated the premises in December 2017, meaning that Roper no longer owns or leases the spa or 

the real property on which it is located. Mot. at 2; Roper Decl. ISO Mot. ¶¶ 2, 3. He also avers 

that the spa does not plan to resume operations and that he does not have any other interest in the 

spa or the real property, which is currently for sale. Roper Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5. Roper “does not have 

control over the property or any ability or authority to make any changes to the alleged 

architectural barriers at the property.” Mot. at 3 (citing Roper Decl. ¶ 6).

Johnson does not offer any contrary evidence to meet his burden to establish subject matter 

jurisdiction in the face of this evidence from Roper. See St. Clair, 880 F.2d at 201; Savage, 343 

F.3d at 1040 n.2. Johnson argues that Roper’s evidence of the spa’s closure is insufficient because 

Roper’s declaration is “self-serving” and inadequate to support his argument that the case against 

him is moot. Opp. at 2. Johnson also argues that Roper has not shown that he has permanently 

ceased operations at the spa and suggests that the Court infer that Roper will resume operations 

because he “only closed his business after being sued.” Id. at 3–5 (emphasis in original).

The Court need not consider Roper’s purported motivations for ceasing to operate the spa. 

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The uncontroverted evidence shows that Roper does not have an interest in the real property or the 

spa, and that the spa has permanently vacated the property. And the Ninth Circuit has recognized 

that affidavits are perfectly appropriate evidence for determining whether the Court has subjectmatter jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Savage, 343 F.3d at 

1039 n.2).

A claim may become moot if (1) subsequent events have made it absolutely clear that the 

allegedly wrongful behavior cannot reasonably be expected to recur, and (2) interim relief or 

events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. NormanBloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1274 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. 

Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968); Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. Of 

Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1985)). In Kohler v. Southland Foods, Inc., the Ninth 

Circuit held that the plaintiff’s “[ADA] claims for prospective injunctive relief became moot once 

the restaurant ceased operation.” 459 F. App’x 617 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); see also

Johnson v. Lake Tahoe Partners, No. CIV. S-13-2534 KJM, 2014 WL 2548830, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 

June 5, 2014) (“Courts have found ADA cases to be moot when the challenged premises have 

closed with no plans to reopen or lease to new tenants.” (citing cases)). This is precisely the 

scenario here. In view of the record before the Court, Johnson cannot plausibly expect to 

encounter any of the alleged barriers in the future because the spa is no longer in operation and the 

property is for sale. Moore, 708 F. App’x at 485; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 

95, 111 (1983). The Court finds Johnson’s ADA claim moot and on that basis grants Roper’s

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

2. California Unruh Act claim

The Court has dismissed Johnson’s only federal law claim against Roper, such that only 

the state law Unruh Act claim remains against Roper. However, an identical ADA claim and an 

identical Unruh Act claim remain in this case against Defendant Otter, against whom default has 

been entered. ECF 10. If the Court were to remand Roper’s state law claims, two nearly identical 

law suits would proceed in separate venues. Such a result is neither convenient, economical, nor 

fair, and thus weighs in favor of the Court exercising jurisdiction over the state law claim against 

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Roper. See Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While 28 U.S.C. § 1367 grants 

federal courts supplemental jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court has held that district 

courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims in the interest of 

judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity.”). As such, the Court exercises supplemental 

jurisdiction over the state law claim against Roper, at least until the ADA claim against Otter is 

resolved, at which point the Court may reconsider whether supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate 

over the remaining state law claim against Roper.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Roper’s motion to dismiss Johnson’s ADA 

claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The Court EXERCISES

supplemental jurisdiction over Johnson’s Unruh Act claim. 

IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2019

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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