Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02488/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02488-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard Woods, a single man, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF SCOTTSDALE, a municipal 

corporation; OFFICER KEITH ENGLISH, 

official and individual capacity; JANE DOE 

ENGLISH, marital community, OFFICER J. 

SEMORA, official and individual capacity, 

JOHN DOE SEMORA, marital community; 

JESSIE LEE JAMES, official & individual 

capacity; JANE DOE JAMES, marital 

community; JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE 

DOES 1-10, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT 

OF MOTOR VEHICLES; and ARIZONA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 

 Defendants. 

No. CV-11-2488-PHX-JAT 

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court are Defendants’ City of Scottsdale, Officer Keith 

English, Officer Janice Semora, Jane Doe English, and John Doe Semora (collectively 

“City Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) and Defendants’ Jessie Lee James and 

Jane Doe James (collectively “State Defendants”)1

 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20). 

 1

 Defendants ARIZONA DEPT. OF MOTOR VEHICLES (“DMV”) and ARIZONA 

DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION (“DOT”) were voluntarily dismissed from the claim by 

Plaintiff. (Doc. 21). 

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 Plaintiff, Richard Woods, is representing himself pro se and has filed a Response 

to City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27) and a Response to State Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24). City Defendants have filed a Reply (Doc. 28) and State 

Defendants have filed a Reply (Doc. 25). 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On December 17, 2010, Plaintiff was driving his car in Scottsdale, Arizona, when 

he was stopped by Defendant Officer Keith English (“Officer English”) of the Scottsdale 

Police Department. (Doc. 15 at 1). Officer English stopped Plaintiff’s car because 

Officer English ran a Motor Vehicle Department (“MVD”) check of Plaintiff’s license 

plate as he was driving behind Plaintiff and the MVD return indicated that the sole 

registered owner of the car had an indefinitely cancelled driver’s license and identification 

card. (Id.) 

 After stopping Plaintiff on the side of the street, Officer English asked Plaintiff for 

his driver’s license, registration, and insurance. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff handed Officer 

English the registration for the car, proof of insurance, and a “Mexican driver’s license.” 

(Id.) Officer English asked Plaintiff if he knew that the driver’s license on file with the 

MVD under his name was expired. (Doc. 15-1 at 7). Plaintiff told Officer English his 

driver’s license was not expired. (Id.) Officer English then asked Plaintiff if he was the 

“Richard Woods” that the car was registered to and Plaintiff admitted that he was. (Id.) 

 Officer English went back to his car and used the MVD computer system to check 

the image of the registered owner. (Id.) Officer English confirmed the registered owner 

was the man in the car that Officer English had pulled over. (Id.) At that point, Officer 

Jan Semora (“Officer Semora”) of the Scottsdale Police Department arrived at the scene to 

function as a backup officer. (Id.) Officer English returned to Plaintiff’s car and arrested 

Plaintiff for driving with a cancelled license under Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) § 

28-3151(A) (no valid driver’s license) and A.R.S. § 28-3473(A) (driving with a cancelled 

license). (Id.) 

 Following Plaintiff’s arrest, Plaintiff’s car was impounded pursuant to A.R.S. § 

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28-3511. (Id.) During an inventory of Plaintiff’s car subsequent to impoundment Officers 

English and Semora found marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the car. (Id. at 7, 8). 

Other property that was impounded with Plaintiff’s car included a laptop computer. (Id. at 

2). 

 On July 27, 2011, in the Scottsdale Municipal Court, Plaintiff was found guilty of 

driving on a cancelled license in violation of A.R.S. § 28-3473(A) and not guilty of 

driving without a valid driver license under A.R.S. § 28-3151(A). (Doc. 15-1 at 19). 

Later that day, Plaintiff appealed the conviction to the Maricopa County Superior Court. 

(Id.) On January 3, 2012, the Maricopa County Superior Court affirmed Plaintiff’s 

conviction for driving with a cancelled driver’s license. (Id. at 21). Plaintiff did not 

appeal his conviction any further. (Doc. 15 at 3). 

 While Plaintiff’s appeal was pending before the Maricopa County Superior Court, 

Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court on December 16, 2011. (Doc. 1). The City 

Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on May 7, 2012. (Doc. 15). The State 

Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on July 5, 2012. (Doc. 20). 

II. DISCUSSION 

 In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges five claims against the City and State 

Defendants. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff appears to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) as the 

general basis for all of his claims. (Doc. 1 at 2 ¶ 7). Section 1983 is not a source of 

substantive rights on its own. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-394 (1989). Section 

1983 “merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Id. 

at 394 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). “To make out a cause 

of action under section 1983, plaintiffs must plead that (1) the defendants acting under 

color of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal 

statutes.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Smith v. 

Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962)). “The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit” is “to 

isolate the precise constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged.” Baker, 

443 U.S. at 140. 

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 In their Motions to Dismiss, the City and State Defendants have both moved to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for 

failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 15 at 3); (Doc. 20 at 5). 

 The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for two reasons: 1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or 2) 

insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 

749 F.2d 530, 533–34 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

 To survive a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet 

the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a 

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so 

that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

 Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed 

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The factual 

allegations of the complaint must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above a speculative 

level. Id. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of 

entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see 

how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the 

nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 C. Wright 

& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1202, pp. 94-95 (3d ed. 2004)). 

 Rule 8’s pleading standard demands more than “an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that offers nothing more than naked assertions 

will not suffice. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

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factual matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its 

face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility 

requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a 

complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

 In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the 

facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint 

and the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. 

United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, courts do not have to 

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 

U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 

A. Count 1 

 In Count One, Plaintiff makes a federal claim under § 1983 against Officers 

English and Semora. (Doc. 1 at 3-4). Plaintiff also makes a state law claim alleging 

Officers English and Semora violated A.R.S. § 28-3511 by invalidly impounding 

Plaintiff’s car. (Id.) 

 1. § 1983 Claim in Count 1 

 a. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claim Fails to Plead a Cognizable Legal 

 Theory 

 Plaintiff claims Officers English and Semora, acting under color of state law, 

“deprived [Plaintiff] of his Constitutionally protected right to due process of law.” (Id. at 

4 ¶ 21). Plaintiff has fulfilled his first requirement for a § 1983 claim by alleging Officers 

English and Semora were acting under color of state law. (Id.) 

 The Court must now determine if Plaintiff has alleged a “cognizable legal theory” 

and enough “factual matter” to show Officers English and Semora “plausibly” deprived 

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Plaintiff of his Constitutional rights. Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

“The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit” is “to isolate the precise constitutional violation with 

which [the defendant] is charged.” Baker, 443 U.S. at 140. Plaintiff’s claim invokes only 

his “right to due process of law.” (Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 21). This is a broad allegation and could 

invoke any number of constitutional violations, none of which Plaintiff has identified to 

enable the Court to isolate the precise constitutional violation Plaintiff alleges. 

 First, there are two places in the Constitution where people’s rights are protected 

by due process of law—the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If Plaintiff’s claim is 

based on the Fifth Amendment it automatically fails. The due process protection of the 

Fifth Amendment is inapplicable in § 1983 claims because it protects people from the 

federal government and those acting under federal law from depriving a person of 

property without due process of law; while § 1983 claims vindicate people from those 

acting under color of state law. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . 

be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”), with U.S. CONST. 

amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 

without due process of law”). 

 This leaves the Court to examine the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to establish a basis for Plaintiff’s claim. If Plaintiff’s intent in Count One 

was to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment his claim also fails for being too vague. The 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is frequently invoked in § 1983 claims 

because it protects people’s rights from State intrusion in multiple ways. On its face, the 

Fourteenth Amendment provides that no “State” shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, 

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process Clause, however, does more than protect people from being 

deprived of property by the State without due process of law. “[C]ertain fundamental 

rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action, [are] also 

safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (quoting Grosjean v. 

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American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-244 (1936)). Among the fundamental rights 

safeguarded by the first eight amendments and subsequently safeguarded against state 

action by the Fourteenth Amendment is “the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. at 342 (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-

28 (1949)). As a result, Plaintiff’s allegations in Count One claiming Officers English and 

Semora “deprived [Plaintiff] of his Constitutionally protected right to due process of law” 

posits multiple theories for relief that Plaintiff leaves Defendants and the Court to choose 

for him. The Court finds this does not meet the standard set in Twombly or Iqbal. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (The defendant must have “fair notice of what the . . . claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests.”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (Rule 8’s pleading standard 

demands more than “an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). 

 While the United States Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to liberally 

construe the “inartful pleading” of pro se litigants, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 

365 (1982), it is not enough to simply mention a clause in the Constitution. “To state a 

federal claim, it is not enough to invoke a constitutional provision or to come up with a 

catalogue of federal statutes allegedly implicated. Rather, as the Supreme Court has 

repeatedly admonished, it is necessary to state a claim that is substantial.” Noatak v. 

Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added) (Kozinski, J. dissenting) 

(majority opinion rev’d 501 U.S. 775 (1991)); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n. 3; see 

also Buntrock v. SEC, 347 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that “a frivolous suit does 

not engage the jurisdiction of the district court”); Crowley Cutlery Co. v. U.S., 849 F.2d 

273, 276-78 (7th Cir. 1988) (same). 

 The Court notes this standard does not require Plaintiff to be a scholar in 

Constitutional law to have validly stated this claim. Indeed, Plaintiff displayed his 

understanding of the Constitution and how to state claims under § 1983 by citing the 

specific amendments that apply to his claims in Counts Two, Three, Four, and Five. (Doc. 

1 at 4-6). Further, Plaintiff expressly invoked the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment in both Counts Three and Five. (Id.) Why Plaintiff failed to articulate his 

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claim in Count One is unknown. “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable 

legal theory.” Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699. 

 b. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claim Fails as a Fourth Amendment 

 Claim 

 Even if the Court were to liberally construe Count One and determine Plaintiff 

expressed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights secured by the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff’s claim would still fail.2

 Plaintiff claims that 

Officers English and Semora violated his Constitutional rights by impounding his vehicle 

as a result of the traffic stop. (Doc. 1 at 3-4). To survive a motion to dismiss Plaintiff 

must allege enough facts to show the impoundment was unconstitutional. 

 Plaintiff’s car was impounded subsequent to his arrest for driving with a cancelled 

driver’s license in violation of A.R.S. § 3473(A). (Doc. 15-1 at 7, 29). Plaintiff was 

convicted of driving with a cancelled driver’s license by the Scottsdale Municipal Court. 

(Id. at 19). Plaintiff’s conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Maricopa County Superior 

Court. (Id. at 21). Plaintiff’s claim that the impoundment was an unconstitutional 

violation of due process necessarily implies the invalidity of his arrest, conviction, and the 

affirmation of his conviction by the appellate court. “[W]hen a [plaintiff] seeks damages 

in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the 

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, 

the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or 

sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 

Plaintiff has made no showing in this case that the decisions of both the Scottsdale 

Municipal Court and the Maricopa County Superior Court were invalidated. Therefore, 

the Court finds Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for the unconstitutional impoundment of his car is 

barred by Heck v. Humphrey until his conviction is overturned or otherwise invalidated. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the § 1983 claim in Count One. 

 2

 The Court notes that Plaintiff cited § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 

as the basis for “this action” in general on page 2 of the Complaint. (Doc. 1 at 2 ¶ 7). 

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 2. Arizona State Law Claim in Count 1 

 Plaintiff’s Complaint makes a state law claim in addition to the § 1983 claim in 

Count One. Plaintiff claims Officers English and Semora unlawfully seized Plaintiff’s car 

in violation of A.R.S. § 28-3511. (Id. at 3). This claim, however, is barred by A.R.S. § 

12-821.01, which requires a claimant to provide notice of claim to a public entity or public 

employee within one hundred eighty (180) days after the cause of action accrues.3

 Claims 

that do not comply with this statute are barred and no action may be maintained. A.R.S. § 

12-821.01(A). The action for Plaintiff’s claim accrued on December 17, 2010. Plaintiff 

did not file his Complaint until December 16, 2011. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law 

claim is barred by Arizona law and the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s state law claim in 

Count One. 

B. Count 2 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff appears to make a § 1983 claim against Defendants John 

Does 1-10 and Jane Does 1-10. (Doc. 1 at 4-5). Count Two of the Complaint states in its 

entirety, 

23. Plaintiff also had a laptop computer which appears to 

have had its contents downloaded and searched. A computer 

expert examined the laptop after it was returned and 

determined that it was missing a screw on the harddrive [sic]. 

24. Plaintiffs [sic] computer was searched by John Does 1-10 

and Jane Does 1-10 without probable cause under color of 

State law, in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected 

right under the Fourth Amendment, and right to privacy under 

the Fourth and Ninth Amendments. 3

 A.R.S. § 12-821.01. 

 A. Persons who have claims against a public entity or a public employee shall file 

claims with the person or persons authorized to accept service for the public entity or 

public employee as set forth in the Arizona rules of civil procedure within one hundred 

eighty days after the cause of action accrues. The claim shall contain facts sufficient to 

permit the public entity or public employee to understand the basis upon which liability is 

claimed. The claim shall also contain a specific amount for which the claim can be settled 

and the facts supporting that amount. Any claim which is not filed within one hundred 

eighty days after the cause of action accrues is barred and no action may be maintained 

thereon. 

 B. For purposes of this section, a cause of action accrues when the damaged party 

realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, 

source, act, event, instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage. 

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(Id. at 5 ¶¶ 23-24). 

 Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff has met the requirements of a § 1983 claim—

by pleading Defendants were acting under color of state law and violated rights protected 

by the Constitution—the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege enough facts to raise 

Count Two from the realm of possible to the realm of plausible as required by the United 

States Supreme Court in Iqbal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts 

that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between 

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

557). 

 The only factual allegations Plaintiff makes in Count Two are in paragraph 23. 

All Plaintiff alleges is that a computer expert determined a screw was missing on the hard 

drive and his hard drive “appears” to have been downloaded and searched. (Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 

23). Based on this factual allegation, Plaintiff makes the conclusory statement that John 

and Jane Does 1-10 unlawfully searched his computer. (Id. at 5 ¶ 24). Even assuming 

Plaintiff’s two factual allegations are true—a screw was missing on the hard drive when a 

computer expert examined the computer and the computer appears to have been searched 

because of this missing screw—these facts alone do not make it more than a sheer 

possibility that Defendants acted unlawfully. This is not enough to survive dismissal 

under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the Court grants the City Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Count Two. 

C. Count 3 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff appears to make § 1983 claims against Defendant City of 

Scottsdale and Defendant Jessie Lee James. (Id. at 5). 

 1. Count 3 Claim Against Defendant City of Scottsdale 

 Plaintiff alleges that the City of Scottsdale, as a municipal entity, is liable under 

the doctrine of respondeat superior because it employs Officers English and Semora and 

for its alleged failure to train, supervise, and discipline. (Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 25). Plaintiff does 

not mention § 1983 in Count Three, but construing the Complaint in the light most 

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favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff did invoke § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments on page two of the Complaint as the basis for “this action” in general. (Id. 

at 2 ¶ 7). 

 Plaintiff’s claim against the City of Scottsdale is based on the doctrine of 

respondeat superior. It appears Plaintiff is basing this claim on the alleged failure to 

adequately train, supervise, and discipline Officers English and Semora. The United 

States Supreme Court has explicitly held “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 

1983 on a respondeat superior theory” “solely because [the municipality] employs a 

tortfeasor.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 

Therefore, simply because the City of Scottsdale employs Officers English and Semora it 

cannot be held liable under respondeat superior. Municipalities, however, can be sued 

under § 1983 “for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ 

even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official 

decision making channels.” Id. at 690-691; see also Oviatt By & Through Waugh v. 

Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[O]nly deprivations visited pursuant to 

municipal ‘custom’ or ‘policy’ . . . lead to municipal liability.”) (quoting City of Okla. City 

v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 (1985)). 

 In order for the City of Scottsdale to be liable under § 1983 for its policies and 

customs, Plaintiff “must establish: (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he 

was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to 

deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the 

‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1474 (quoting 

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)). The Court finds Plaintiff’s 

allegations in Count Three are wholly inadequate to meet these requirements and therefore 

insufficient to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). See 

supra Section II. 

 Plaintiff has not alleged a single fact against the City of Scottsdale. Plaintiff has 

merely made the conclusory statement that the City has “a policy of failing to adequately 

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train, supervise, and discipline, its employees.” (Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 25). In addition to failing 

to explain what constitutional right Plaintiff had that was deprived by the City’s policy, 

Plaintiff has not alleged what the policy actually is, has not explained how such a policy 

amounts to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, nor has Plaintiff 

explained or alleged any facts to show how the policy was the moving force behind any 

constitutional violation. Plaintiff merely cites a case where Officer English was 

previously sued. Plaintiff does not say what Officer English was sued for, whether Officer 

English was found guilty, or how this relates to Officer Semora. Even if Plaintiff did 

make these connections, Plaintiff has alleged no facts whatsoever about the officer’s 

training or supervision, nor does Plaintiff specify in what way any such training was 

deficient. The questions raised by Plaintiff’s accusation are whether any such training 

Officers English and Semora received was deficient, and, if so, whether the Defendant 

supervisors were responsible for that deficiency. Plaintiff has alleged no facts that would 

demonstrate either. Consequently, Plaintiff’s allegations against the City of Scottsdale do 

not meet the standard set by Iqbal and Twombly. See supra Section II. The Court grants 

City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the City of Scottsdale from Count Three. 

 2. Count 3 Claim Against Defendant Jessie Lee James 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Detective Jessie Lee 

James (“James”) deprived Plaintiff of his rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 5)4

. Plaintiff, however, does not make it clear 

whether Count Three is against the Arizona DMV and Arizona DOT for failure to 

inadequately train, supervise, and discipline James, or whether Count Three is against 

 4

 The parts of Count Three that apply to James are ¶¶ 27-30. These allegations read: 

27) Detective Jesse [sic] James had previously resolved the issue of a “cancelled license” 

on October 23, 2007. Yet, he neglected his duty to make such correction to the Arizona 

Department of Motor Vehicles records. 

28) Detective Jesse [sic] James had previously stated that the evidence did not match up 

with DMV records. 

29) Detective Jesse [sic] James, acting under color of State law, deprived Mr. Woods of 

his constitutionally protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment to due process of law 

[sic]. 

30) A public records request of 12/22/10 to DMV shows that for the past 5 years “no prior 

license information on record as of 12/22/10. [sic] 

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James himself. If Count Three is intended to implicate the Arizona DMV and Arizona 

DOT then the claim fails because those parties have already been voluntarily dismissed by 

Plaintiff. (Doc. 21). If Count Three is intended to implicate James in his official and 

individual capacity, Plaintiff has not articulated who James is guilty of inadequately 

training, supervising, and disciplining. 

 Even if the Court were to try and construe Plaintiff’s allegations to state a § 1983 

claim against James on their own, the claim would still fail. First, Plaintiff’s claim against 

James is barred by the state statute of limitations. “State law governs the statute of 

limitations period for § 1983 suits.” Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999)). “For actions brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Federal courts apply the statute of limitations for personal 

injury actions of the state in which the claim arises.” Myers v. Ariz. Health Care Cost 

Containment Sys. (AHCCS), 984 F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (D. Ariz. 1996) aff’d sub nom. 

Myers v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 131 F.3d 147 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 

Krug v. Imbordino, 896 F.2d 395, 396–97 (9th Cir.1990)). For personal injury actions 

“[i]n Arizona, the applicable statute provides for a limitations period of two years from the 

date the cause of action accrues.” Id. (citing A.R.S. § 12–542). “Although state law 

determines the period of limitations, federal law determines when the cause of action 

arises.” Id. (citing Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1991)). “Under 

federal law, a cause of action generally accrues when a plaintiff ‘knows or has reason to 

know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’” Id. (quoting Bagley v. CMC Real 

Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992)). 

 It appears from the Complaint that Plaintiff alleges James neglected to update 

DMV records in October 2007. (Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 27). Plaintiff’s claim was brought on 

December 16, 2011, over four years later. Plaintiff has alleged no facts showing that he 

found out about James’ alleged neglect any later, thus tolling the statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, the applicable two year statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim 

against James. 

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 Even if Plaintiff’s claim against James was not barred by the statute of limitations, 

Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. Plaintiff merely claims James previously resolved the issue of a “cancelled 

license” and James “neglected his duty to make” a correction to DMV records. (Doc. 1 at 

5 ¶ 27). Plaintiff does not explain what this allegation means, much less how it 

establishes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is unclear whether Plaintiff is 

stating Plaintiff did not have a cancelled license and James erroneously entered into DMV 

records that Plaintiff did. The Court notes Plaintiff was convicted of having a cancelled 

license by the municipal court and that decision was upheld on appeal. If Plaintiff is 

stating his license was unconstitutionally cancelled, Plaintiff is necessarily implying the 

invalidity of his conviction. Under Heck v. Humphrey, “the district court must consider 

whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed.” 512 U.S. at 487. If 

this is not what Plaintiff is stating in his allegations against James, Plaintiff must plead 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff has failed to do this in 

Count Three against James. Accordingly, for the myriad reasons discussed the Court 

dismisses Count Three against James for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. 

D. Count 4 

 In Count Four, Plaintiff appears to make a § 1983 claim against unnamed 

defendants. (Doc. 1 at 6 ¶ 31). Plaintiff makes a claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress under his Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his person because, 

while in custody, he was deprived of his medications and as a result suffered physical 

withdrawal and emotional distress. (Id.) 

 In analyzing Plaintiff’s allegation in Count Four under the rubric of a § 1983 

claim, the Court finds Count Four fails to state a claim under § 1983 upon which relief can 

be granted. As an initial matter, Plaintiff alleges his Fourth Amendment right to be secure 

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in his person was violated because he was deprived of medications, then Plaintiff labels 

this as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff’s claims do not 

implicate the Fourth Amendment. While rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are 

guaranteed to not be infringed by the States under the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, “[t]he Fourth Amendment states: ‘The right of the people to be 

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures, shall not be violated . . . .’” City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2627 

(2010). Plaintiff’s claim of denial of medical attention in Count Four does not involve an 

unreasonable search and seizure. Further, it is unclear how Plaintiff expected the Fourth 

Amendment to protect against intentional infliction of emotional distress, which is a state 

law tort. In order to properly address Count Four as a § 1983 claim without dismissing it 

outright, the Court will liberally construe Count Four to allege a wrongful denial of 

medical attention while Plaintiff was in pretrial custody in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause itself. 

 Plaintiff’s claim is properly brought under the Fourteenth Amendment because he 

had not been convicted of a crime at the time of the allegation in Count Four, he had only 

been arrested, therefore, his rights derive from the due process clause rather than the 

Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Gibson v. Cnty. of 

Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 

535 n. 16 (1979); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Carnell v. Grimm, 

74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996)). “With regard to medical needs, the due process clause 

imposes, at a minimum, the same duty the Eighth Amendment imposes: ‘persons in 

custody ha[ve] the established right to not have officials remain deliberately indifferent to 

their serious medical needs.’” Id. (quoting Carnell, 74 F.3d at 979). Deliberate 

indifference can be “manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs 

or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or 

intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 104–105 (1976). In order to establish a plausible claim for failure to provide medical 

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treatment, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to permit the Court to infer that (1) Plaintiff 

had a “serious medical need,” and that (2) individual Defendants were “deliberately 

indifferent” to that need. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); cf. Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994). 

 Plaintiff can satisfy the “serious medical need” prong by demonstrating that 

“failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary 

and wonton infliction of pain.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (internal citations and quotations 

omitted); Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). Examples of such serious 

medical needs include “the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual’s daily activities, or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court finds Plaintiff alleged sufficient 

facts to make a plausible showing that his medical need was serious. Plaintiff alleged he 

is a diabetic and he suffered physical withdrawal reactions and emotional distress from not 

taking his medication. (Doc. 1 at 6 ¶ 31). The Court recognizes that such symptoms 

affected Plaintiff’s daily activities and caused Plaintiff sufficient pain to satisfy the 

requirement for a serious medical need. 

 Next, the Court turns to whether Plaintiff has established that Defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. In Farmer, the United States 

Supreme Court explained in detail the “deliberate indifference” standard. See Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 837. Specifically, individual Defendants are not liable under the Fourteenth 

Amendment for their part in allegedly denying necessary medical care unless they knew 

“of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s] health and safety.” Id. (emphasis 

added); Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187–88. Deliberate indifference contains both an objective 

and subjective component: “the official must both be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

draw that inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “If a person should have been aware of 

the risk, but was not,” then the standard of deliberate indifference is not satisfied “no 

matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (citing Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 

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895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

 “The indifference to medical needs must be substantial; a constitutional violation 

is not established by negligence or ‘an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical 

care.’” Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Estelle, 

429 U.S. at 105–06). Generally, defendants are “deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s 

serious medical needs when they deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical 

treatment.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002). “Yet, an ‘inadvertent 

[or negligent] failure to provide adequate medical care’ alone does not state a claim under 

§ 1983.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 

Cir. 1991)). “If the harm is an ‘isolated exception’ to the defendant’s ‘overall treatment of 

the prisoner [it] ordinarily militates against a finding of deliberate indifference.’” Jett, 

439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). Further, a mere delay in 

receiving medical treatment, without more, does not constitute “deliberate indifference,” 

unless the plaintiff can show that the delay caused serious harm to the plaintiff. Wood v. 

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990). Therefore, to withstand a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim and show deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must (1) 

allege enough facts to show that Defendants knew of his medical needs and then Plaintiff 

must (2) allege enough facts to show that Defendants disregarded an excessive risk to 

Plaintiff’s health and safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187–88. 

 Turning to Plaintiff’s claim, all Plaintiff alleges is that “while he was in jail, he 

was deprived of his medications.” (Doc. 1 at 6 ¶ 31). The Court finds this does not 

satisfy the requirement articulated in Farmer and Gibson. Plaintiff has not alleged any 

facts showing that Defendants knew of his condition nor has Plaintiff alleged facts to 

show how Defendants disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety. 

Plaintiff needed to show that Defendants actions were more than a mere delay in 

treatment, or more than an isolated exception to Plaintiff’s overall treatment, or more than 

an inadvertent or negligent failure to give Plaintiff his medication. Plaintiff did not even 

attempt to allege facts giving any these explanations. Therefore, the Court finds Count 

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Four does not meet the standard to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 

E. Count 5 

 In Count Five, Plaintiff makes a § 1983 claim for false arrest and unlawful 

detention. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned by 

Officers English and Semora in violation of his constitutionally protected right to due 

process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 6 ¶¶ 32-33). 

 Officers English and Semora arrested Plaintiff for, among other charges, driving 

with a cancelled driver’s license in violation of A.R.S. § 28-3473(A). (Doc. 15-1 at 29). 

Following the arrest, Plaintiff was found guilty and convicted of violating A.R.S. § 28-

3473(A) by the Scottsdale Municipal Court. (Id. at 19). Subsequently, Plaintiff appealed 

that conviction to the Maricopa County Superior Court and the Superior Court affirmed 

Plaintiff’s conviction under A.R.S. § 28-3473(A). (Id. at 21). The Plaintiff’s conviction is 

final because Plaintiff took no further appeals or special actions from the final judgment of 

the Superior Court. (Doc. 15 at 3). Thus, Plaintiff is alleging the arrest and decisions of 

two separate State courts were unconstitutional. 

 “[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must 

consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed 

unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been 

invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Plaintiff has made no showing in this case that the 

decisions of both the Scottsdale Municipal Court and the Maricopa County Superior Court 

were invalidated. A finding for Plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 

conviction. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s § 1983 false arrest and imprisonment 

claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey until his conviction is overturned or otherwise 

invalidated. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Count Five. 

III. LEAVE TO AMEND 

Plaintiff had the right to amend the Complaint as a matter of course within twentyone days after Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 15(a). Plaintiff did not exercise this right. Instead, in his Response (Doc. 27) 

to City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed over three months after City Defendants filed 

their Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15), Plaintiff demanded the Court point out the defects in 

his Complaint and allow thirty days for him to amend the Complaint. (Doc. 27 at 4). In 

his Response (Doc. 24) to State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff did not request 

leave to amend the parts of his Complaint regarding State Defendant Jessie Lee James, i.e. 

Count Three (Doc. 1 at 5). 

 Under Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent prior to the 2010 amendments to 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court would sua sponte grant leave to amend 

when granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), unless a pleading could not be 

cured by the allegation of other facts. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citing Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

However, this precedent has been called into question in light of the 2010 changes to the 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, which now allows parties twenty-one days from 

responsive pleadings and motions to dismiss to amend as of right. See id. Further, when a 

plaintiff requests leave to amend, the Court must consider the following factors: (1) undue 

delay, (2) bad faith, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5) 

whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint. Western Shoshone Nat. Council 

v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 204 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 In this case, granting leave to amend Counts One and Five against City Defendants 

would be futile. Plaintiff has asserted claims in Counts One and Five that are barred by 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey. See 512 U.S. at 487. Further, 

Plaintiff’s state law claim in Count One is barred by A.R.S. § 12-821.01. 

 With regard to Counts Two, Three, and Four of the Complaint (Doc. 1 at 4-6), the 

Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend these counts only because Plaintiff has moved to 

amend and the Court cannot conclude that any amendment of these counts would be futile. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, 

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IT IS ORDERED that City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 

20) is granted. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to amend only part of 

the Complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend Counts Two, Three, and 

Four of the Complaint. Counts One and Five of the Complaint are dismissed with 

prejudice. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days of this 

Order. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order, the Clerk of the Court shall dismiss the 

entirety of Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice. 

 Dated this 19th day of February, 2013. 

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