Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00234/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00234-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 245
Nature of Suit: Real Property Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

BRET UNDERHILL, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 06-234 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R 

)

THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY, )

an Ohio corporation; et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

This matter arises out of a product liability suit originally

filed in the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County by

Plaintiff Bret Underhill on November 2, 2005. Notice (doc. # 1),

Ex. A at 18. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint in the

state court on November 7, 2005. Id. at 25. On January 18, 2006,

Defendants Sherwin-Williams Automotive Finishes Corporation, The

Sherwin-Williams Company, Dupli-Color Products Company, and

Diversified Brands (collectively "Sherwin-Williams" or the

"Sherwin-Williams defendants") filed a timely Notice of Removal

(doc. # 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 and 1446. Currently

pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (doc. # 8) 

Case 2:06-cv-00234-RCB Document 17 Filed 08/25/06 Page 1 of 7
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filed on February 1, 2006. In addition, Plaintiff requests an

award of fees and costs for researching and briefing the Motion to

Remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Mot. (doc. # 8) at 6. 

Defendants filed their response (doc. # 10) on February 21, 2006,

and Plaintiff filed his reply (doc. # 12) on March 2, 2006. Having

carefully considered the arguments raised, the Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he was injured when a can of aerosol

paint exploded in his right hand upon being shaken as directed. 

Notice (doc. # 1), Ex. A at 26-27. Plaintiff filed his First

Amended Complaint in the state court on November 7, 2005, alleging

negligence, strict products liability, and breach of the implied

warranty of merchantability. Notice (doc. # 1), Ex. A at 25. 

Defendants Autozone, Inc., Autozone Stores, Inc., Autozone

Development Corporation, Inc., Autozone West and Autozone Parts,

Inc. (collectively "Autozone" or the "Autozone defendants") were

apparently served on December 14, 2005. Mot. (doc. # 8) at 2. The

Sherwin-Williams defendants were apparently served on December 19

and December 27, 2005. Id.; see also Notice (doc. # 1), Ex. A. at

2-12, 14-16.

On January 18, 2006, the Sherwin-Williams defendants removed

the action to this Court on the basis of diversity and removal

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 and 1446. Notice (doc. # 1). 

The removal petition was not joined by Autozone, but simply averred

that "[t]he Autozone Defendants consent to the removal of this

action." Id. ¶ 9.

On February 1, 2006, Plaintiff filed a timely Motion to

Remand, arguing that the Sherwin-Williams defendants' Notice of

Case 2:06-cv-00234-RCB Document 17 Filed 08/25/06 Page 2 of 7
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Removal (doc. # 1) was untimely filed and procedurally defective

for lack of unanimity among the defendants. Mot. (doc. # 8). Mot.

(doc. # 8) at 3-5. Defendants responded on February 21, 2006. 

Resp. (doc. # 10). Along with their response, Defendants filed an

Amended Notice of Removal of Action indicating that "Autozone's

counsel has given Sherwin-Williams' counsel express authority to

consent to removal on behalf of the Autozone defendants." Resp.

(doc. # 10), Ex. 2 ¶ 9. This authorization was not reflected in

Sherwin-Williams' original petition. See Notice (doc. # 1).

II. MOTION TO REMAND

Plaintiff contends that Sherwin-Williams' Notice of Removal

(doc. # 1) is procedurally defective for lack of joinder by the

Autozone defendants and for untimeliness. Because the removal

petition is procedurally defective for lack of unanimity among the

defendants, as explained below, the Court need not address the

question of timeliness.

Proper removal generally requires unanimity of all defendants,

otherwise the action cannot be removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Chi.,

Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900);

Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2006);

Schwartz v. FHP Int'l Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1354, 1362 (D. Ariz.

1996).

The Fifth Circuit, in a case cited by Defendants, has

interpreted the unanimity rule as requiring "some timely filed

written indication from each served defendant, or from some person

or entity purporting to formally act on its behalf in this respect

and to have authority to do so, that it has actually consented to

[removal] . . . ." Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d

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1254, 1262 (5th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). According to

Defendants, "Getty demonstrates that the unanimity requirement can

be satisfied absent written consent from the non-removing defendant

provided that the removing defendant has authority to consent on

the non-removing defendant's behalf." Resp. (doc. # 10) at 6. 

However, Getty actually held that an unsupported allegation that a

non-removing defendant consents to removal is procedurally

inadequate unless accompanied by an allegation that the nonremoving defendant has authorized the removing defendant to make

such representations to the court on its behalf. See Getty Oil

Corp., 841 F.2d at 1262; accord Hammonds v. Youth for Christ USA,

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32383 (W.D. Tex. 2005) at *5-10. The Court

finds the Fifth Circuit authority cited by Defendants persuasive. 

Absent a clear indication that the removing defendant is "formally

act[ing]" on behalf of the non-removing defendant and "ha[s]

authority to do so," the record would be insufficient "to 'bind'

the allegedly consenting defendant." Getty Oil Corp., 841 F.2d at

1262.

In the present case, Sherwin-Williams' original Notice of

Removal merely alleged that "[t]he Autozone Defendants consent to

the removal of this action." Notice (doc. # 1) ¶ 9. In accord

with the line of cases discussed by Defendants in their response,

the Court finds that this unsupported allegation fails to convey

Autozone's affirmative and unambiguous desire to proceed in federal

court. Because a sufficient explanation of the Autozone

defendants' lack of joinder in Sherwin-Williams' Notice of Removal

(doc. # 1) was not provided within thirty days of their service as

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1

 Although the briefing of Plaintiff's motion has revealed that

the Autozone defendants may have privately authorized SherwinWilliams' counsel to express their consent to removal, see Resp.

(doc. # 10), Ex. 1 ¶¶ 3-5, the unanimity rule requires Defendants to

fully inform the Court of their authority to do so when seeking

removal. For reasons the parties will surely appreciate, the Court

cannot simply proceed on such casual and familiar terms as to allow

counsel for one party to make representations on behalf of other

represented parties. Cf. Creekmore v. Food Lion, Inc., 797 F. Supp.

505, 509 (E.D. Va. 1992) ("To allow one party, through counsel, to

bind or represent the position of other parties without their express

consent to be so bound would have serious adverse repercussions, not

only in removal situations but in any incident of litigation.").

2

 It is possible that Defendants assumed entitlement to an

amendment as a matter of right. Supposing that a motion to remand is

not a "responsive pleading" for purposes of Rule 15(a), and thus

implying that a removal petition is a pleading "to which no

responsive pleading is permitted, Defendants' amended notice in this

case was still submitted well after 20 days of the original removal

petition. Therefore, Defendants should have moved for leave to

amend, or obtained Plaintiff's written consent to the amended removal

petition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

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required under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), remand is appropriate.1

In a belated effort to cure the defect of the original removal

petition, Defendants have submitted an Amended Notice of Removal of

Action indicating that "Autozone's counsel has given SherwinWilliams' counsel express authority to consent to removal on behalf

of the Autozone defendants." Resp. (doc. # 10), Ex. 2 ¶ 9. 

Defendants submitted their amended petition on February 21, 2006 as

an exhibit to their response to Plaintiff's motion to remand.2

Resp. (doc. # 10), Ex. 1. However, they have not sought leave to

amend their original petition. Morever, even if they had moved for

leave to amend, Defendants' manner of presenting the proposed

amendment as an exhibit to their response, without "indicat[ing] in

what respect it differs from" the original petition does not comply

with the Local Rules of Practice. See LRCiv 15(a)(1)-(2). In view

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of the original petition's defect, and Defendants' failure to cure

by way of a timely and properly amended petition, Plaintiff's

Motion to Remand (doc. # 8) will be granted.

III. MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)

Plaintiff also requests an award of fees and costs incurred in

researching and briefing his Motion to Remand pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1447(c). Mot. (doc. # 8) at 6. Plaintiff urges the Court

that an award of fees would be proper in light of defense counsel's

refusal to stipulate to remand when confronted with the allegedly

defective removal procedure. Id.; Reply (doc. # 12) at 5. 

Defendants resist, noting their good faith in seeking removal only

after determining that complete diversity of citizenship existed, a

point which Plaintiff does not dispute. Resp. (doc. # 10) at 10.

The Supreme Court decided last term that, "[a]bsent unusual

circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees under § 1447(c)

only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable

basis for seeking removal." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 126

S. Ct. 704, 711, 163 L. Ed. 2d 547, 555 (2005) (Roberts, C.J.). In

exercising its discretion to award fees under § 1447(c), a court

must consider "the desire to deter removals sought for the purpose

of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the opposing party,

while not undermining Congress' basic decision to afford defendants

a right to remove as a general matter, when the statutory criteria

are satisfied." See id. at 711.

The Court is reluctant to read Martin as precluding an award

of fees as a matter of law whenever remand is based purely on

procedural defects of the removal petition. In the instant case,

however, the fact that diversity jurisdiction would apparently have

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existed weighs heavily against an award of fees, particularly where

the procedural issues involved raise such close questions under the

law of the Circuit. See, e.g., United Computer Sys. v. AT&T Info.

Sys., 298 F.3d 756, 763 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (expressing no opinion

on the propriety of the first-served defendant rule for determining

the timeliness of a removal petition). Given Sherwin-Williams'

objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal, and the closeness

of the procedural questions involved, the Court will not penalize

Defendants for refusing to capitulate to Plaintiff's demands for a

stipulation to remand. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for fees

will be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand

(doc. # 8) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. This case is

remanded to the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's request for fees and

costs pursuant to U.S.C. § 1447(c) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to send

the file in this Case to the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa

County.

DATED this 24th day of August, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record

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