Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00532/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00532-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PATRICIA BAUERLE, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et

al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 12-532-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc.

98) filed by Northwest Hospital ("NH"), the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 99) filed by University

Medical Center ("UMC"), the Motion for Joinder (Doc. 100) filed by UMC, the Motion to

Dismiss Case (Doc. 101) filed by Sonora Behavioral Health Hospital ("SBHH"), the Motion

to Dismiss Case (Doc. 102) filed by Corondelet Health Network ("CHN"), the Motion to

Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 117) filed by Community Partnership of Southern

Arizona ("CPSA"), and the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 123) filed

by the State of Arizona ("the State"), the Arizona Department of Health Services ("ADHS"),

the Office of Administrative Hearings ("AOAH"), and the Pima County Superior Court

("Superior Court") (collectively, "State Defendants"). Also pending before the Court are the

Motions for Extension of Time (Docs. 114 and 119) filed by Plaintiff Patricia Bauerle

(“Bauerle”). Oral argument has been requested. Bauerle objects to the Court setting this

matter for oral argument. The Court declines to set this matter for oral argument.

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 1 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

I. Procedural Background

On July 16, 2012, Bauerle filed a Complaint alleging civil rights claims. While issues

were pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, this matter was reassigned to this

Court. 

On October 24, 2012, Bauerle filed an Amended Complaint in this action. Following

the issuance of a mandate by the appellate court on June 19, 2013, Defendants filed motions

to dismiss. On December 18, 2013, this Court dismissed with prejudice the Federal

Defendants from this action, dismissed with prejudice the State Defendants Superior Court,

and AOAH from this action, dismissed with prejudice the § 1983 claims against the ADHS,

dismissed with leave to amend the ADA claims against State Defendant ADHS, dismissed

with prejudice the § 1983 claims against CPSA, UMC, NH, SBHH, and CHN, and dismissed

with leave to amend the ADA claims against CPSA, UMC, NH, SBHH, and CHN.

On January 16, 2014, Bauerle filed an Objection to parts of the Court's December 18,

2013, Order (Doc. 93) and filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") (Doc. 94). Bauerle

alleges claims against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("USHHS"), the

ADHS, the CPSA, the University Physicians Hospital at Kino Campus (now known as UMCSouth Campus), NH, SBHH, CHN, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ("Ninth Circuit"), the

Office of the U.S. Attorney General ("USAG"), the Federal District Court, the Superior

Court, the AOAH, CODAC Behavioral Services ("CODAC"), and Federal District Judge

Cynthia K. Jorgenson.

Defendants have filed motions to dismiss. 

II. Naming of Federal District Judge Cynthia K. Jorgenson as a Defendant

The Court accepts this as Bauerle naming this Court, the Hon. Cindy K. Jorgenson,

as a Defendant. Bauerle alleges the Federal District Court under Judge Jorgenson acted

egregiously in 04CV00479-CKJ by giving Bauerle limited time to respond to the Court's

consideration of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, ruled against Bauerle even though the

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 2 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

28 U.S.C. § 455 is a self-enforcing statute. United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864,

867–68 (9th Cir. 1980). Section 455 contains no procedural requirement and is directed at

the judge, not the parties. Id. at 867. Thus, under section 455, the decision regarding

whether recusal is warranted rests with the presiding judge. See id. at 868.

- 3 -

appellate court agreed the doctrine did not apply, required an unnecessary hearing, and

contacted and waited for opposing counsel to appear at the hearing. Bauerle further alleges

that, in this case, the Court ordered Bauerle to neither include nor refer to any previous

averments in any SAC.

Because Bauerle has named this Court as a defendant, the Court finds it appropriate

to consider whether recusal is appropriate.1

 Recusal is appropriate under the circumstances

set forth in 28 U.S.C. 455; see also 28 U.S.C. § 144. 28 U.S.C. § 455 requires that a judge

recuse herself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

A recusal is appropriate where a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would

conclude that a judge's impartiality might reasonable be questioned. Yagman v. Republic

Ins., 987 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th

Cir.1997) (the standard for disqualification is the same under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and

455). Moreover, just as the Court has a duty to recuse itself when appropriate, the Court has

a duty not to recuse itself if it is not appropriate. United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065

(10th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Sierra Pacific Ind., 759 F.Supp.2d 1198 (E.D.Cal.

2010). 

Additionally, the source of any alleged bias must be extrajudicial. Liteky v. United

States, 510 U.S. 540, 544–56 (1994). Judicial bias or prejudice formed during current or

prior proceedings is an insufficient basis for recusal unless the judge's actions "display a

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Id. at 541.

Judicial rulings will support a motion for recusal only "in the rarest of circumstances." Id.

at 555; United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.1994); see also, United States

v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1985) (a judge's prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 3 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 4 -

for recusal). 

Here, it appears this Court's rulings are the basis for being named as a defendant. The

Court finds there is no judicial bias or prejudice that displays a deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible, let alone any judicial bias or

prejudice. Recusal is not appropriate. Studley.

As to any claims against this Court, "[j]udges are immune from damage actions for

judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts." Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072

(9th Cir. 1986); see also Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 830–31 (9th Cir.1995) (in §

1983 case, noting that there is judicial immunity from damages for judicial acts, i.e.,

functions normally performed by a judge). This is to assure that judges may exercise their

functions with independence and without fear of consequences. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80

U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 (1868).

However, a "judge lacks immunity where he acts in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction' or

performs an act that is not 'judicial' in nature. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075, citations omitted.

Judicial immunity attaches even if the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly,

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), or of making grave errors of law or procedure,

Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988).

In determining whether a judge acted within his jurisdiction, "courts focus on whether

the judge was acting clearly beyond the scope of subject matter jurisdiction in contrast to

personal jurisdiction." Id. at 1076. "Where not clearly lacking subject matter jurisdiction,

a judge is entitled to immunity even if there was no personal jurisdiction over the

complaining party." Id. This Court was acting with the scope of subject matter jurisdiction

and performing acts that are judicial in nature. The Court finds Bauerle's claims against

undersigned are precluded by judicial immunity. The claims against this Court will be

dismissed from this action.

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 4 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 5 -

III. Bauerle's Motions for Extensions of Time (Docs. 114 and 119) 

Bauerle requests additional time to file responses. Bauerle has submitted her

responses. The Court will grant the requests and considers Bauerle's responses herein.

IV. Short and Plain Statement Pleader is Entitled to Relief

In its December 18, 2013, Order, the Court advised Bauerle of the requirements of a

complaint, including that it is to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]" Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), and that conclusory statements do

not adequately state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Bauerle was

advised that a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (factual allegations must

raise a right to relief above the speculative level); see also Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d

1157, 1166 (9th Cir.1990) (Kozinski, J. dissenting) (majority opinion rev'd 501 U.S. 775

(1991)) (“To state a federal claim, it is not enough to invoke a constitutional provision or to

come up with a catalogue of federal statutes allegedly implicated. Rather, as the Supreme

Court has repeatedly admonished, it is necessary to state a claim that is substantial.”); Moss

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) (for a complaint to survive a motion to

dismiss, the non-conclusory “factual content,” and reasonable inferences from that content,

must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief). 

The Court also advised Bauerle that the Court is not to serve as an advocate of a pro

se litigant, Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), in attempting to decipher

a complaint. See e.g., Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no

obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants” because this would undermine

district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.). 

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 5 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The Court accepts the joinders filed by CHN and UMC and will grant the Motion for

Joinder filed by UMC. The Court accepts this motion as also filed on behalf of UMC and CHN.

- 6 -

V. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by NH (Doc. 98)2

NH requests the SAC be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be

granted. Additionally, NH requests, if the Court permits Bauerle to file a Third Amended

Complaint, this motion be treated as a Motion for More Definite Statement.

NH asserts the only claim that Bauerle appears to be making against Northwest is a

§1983 claim. As the Court ordered Bauerle's § 1983 claims dismissed with prejudice, NH

asserts the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars Bauerle from pursuing this

claim against NH. In its December 18, 2013, Order, the Court determined that Bauerle’s

claims that NH (and other Defendants) violated her constitutional rights did not allege NH

performed functions that are traditionally and exclusively governmental. Villegas v. Gilroy

Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2008); Lee v. Katz, 276 FF.3d 550 (9th Cir.

2002) (private individual or group may be state actor when they perform function that is

traditionally and exclusively governmental); Johnson v. Grays Harbor Community Hospital,

385 Fed.Appx. 647 (9th Cir. 2010) (non-profit status of hospital did not make it a state actor

for purposes of § 1983). 

"Res judicata applies where there is (1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on

the merits, and (3) identity or privity between parties." Tritz v. U.S. Postal Service, 721 F.3d

1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2013). NH relies on In re Marino, 181 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1999), for

the assertion that a dismissal with prejudice has the same effect as a final judgment. The

Ninth Circuit has stated that a res judicata effect may occur in such circumstances if the

result is not unfair. Marin v. HEW, Health Care Financing Agency, 769 F.2d 590,593 (9th

Cir. 1985). Here, Baurele's argument to dispute the Court's ruling is simply stating the

standard for a state actor in a different way. The Court finds, therefore, it is not unfair to

provide a res judicata effect to the dismissal with prejudice of the claims.

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 6 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

A court may take judicial notice of documents available on government websites.

Laborers' Pension Fund v. Blackmore Sewer Constr., Inc., 298 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir.2002)

(taking judicial notice of information from FDIC's official website); Molina v. Wash. Mut. Bank,

No. 09-CV-00894-IEG (AJB), 2010 WL 431439, at *3-4 (S.D.Cal. Jan.29, 2010) (taking judicial

- 7 -

However, the Court will also address Bauerle's argument. Bauerle asserts a private

actor can be considered as having acted under the color of law for suit under § 1983 if that

private actor has invoked state action or state law. Lugar v. Edmondson, 457 U.S. 922

(1982). However, the Lugar Court also stated that, "[i]f the challenged conduct . . .

constitutes state action as delimited by our prior decisions, then that conduct was also action

under color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983." 457 U.S. at 935.

Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated:

To constitute state action, “the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some

right or privilege created by the State ... or by a person for whom the State is

responsible,” and “the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may

fairly be said to be a state actor.” [Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937]. 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). The Court also considers that "private hospitals do

not act under color of state law for purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Section 1983),

and are subject to the provisions of the Act only if their activities are significantly affected

with state involvement, or only if the state is significantly involved with a specific hospital

activity that is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint." 14A C.J.S. Civil Rights §399 (June

2014), footnotes omitted. 

Here, Bauerle has not alleged any basis for this Court to conclude that either NH,

CHN or UMC are fairly said to be state actors. Compare, Abney v. University Medical

Center of of Southern Nevada, No. 2:09-cv-02418-RLH-PAL, 2010 WL 1439106 (D.Nev.

April 8, 2010) (UMC was county hospital pursuant to state statute); Taylor v. University

Medical Center, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:03CV-502-H, 2005 WL 1026190 (W.D.Ky. April 26,

2005) (where plaintiff alleged UMC was a private corporation that received governmental

funds, insufficient allegations that UMC was a state actor). Indeed, a review of the website

of the Arizona Corporation Commission3

 indicates NH is incorporated in Delaware,

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 7 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

notice of same OTS Order and P & A Agreement as in instant case); United States ex rel. Dingle

v. BioPort Corp., 270 F.Supp.2d 968, 972 (W.D.Mich.2003) (“Public records and government

documents are generally considered not to be subject to reasonable dispute.... This includes

public records and government documents available from reliable sources on the Internet.”)

(citation omitted). 

- 8 -

http://starpas.azcc.gov/scripts/cgiip.exe/WService=wsbroker1/names-detail.p?name-id=R

08702602&type=FOREIGN%20L.L.C, and that UMC is a non-profit corporation. See

http://starpas.azcc.gov/scripts/cgiip.exe/WService=wsbroker1/names-detail.p?name-id=0

5112646&type=CORPORATION. Similarly, University Physicians Healthcare is a nonprofit corporation. See http://starpas.azcc.gov/scripts/cgiip.exe/Wservice=wsbroker1/

names-detail.p?name-id=05101800&type=CORPORATION. Further, Bauerle has not

alleged that their activities are significantly affected with state involvement or that the state

is significantly involved with NH, CHN or UMC activity that is at issue herein. The Court

will dismiss with prejudice the §1983 claims against NH, CHN, and UMC as precluded by

the doctrine of res judicata and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Bauerle also alleges Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act

("ADA"). In its December 18, 2013, Order, the Court discussed what allegations would

constitute an ADA claim. However, the only specific allegation Bauerle includes in her SAC

is that CHN held her in the hospital for more than 60 days in violation of the least restrictive

environment under the ADA and the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). The SAC does not specify

what portion of either the ADA or the FHA may provide a basis for this claim. While there

may be other bases for such a claim, see 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mentally Impaired Persons § 92

(May 2014) (discussing inquiry by court in commitment proceedings), the Court is not aware

of such a basis pursuant to either the ADA or the FHA. The Court finds Bauerle has failed

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court will dismiss these claims

without prejudice.

To the extent Bauerle alleges NH and UMC (as University Physicians Hospital)

violated her constitutional right to have her medical power of attorney take effect, dismissal

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 8 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over "civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." U.S.C. § 28-1331. Additionally, this

Court has "supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the

action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy

under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, this

Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over other claims, i.e., state law

claims, where the other claims "substantially predominate[] over the claim or claims over

which the district court has original jurisdiction[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

5

The Court accepts the joinder filed by CHN and accepts this motion as also filed on

behalf of CHN. Additionally, the Court will not re-discuss those issues addressed in discussing

NH's Motion to Dismiss as joined by UMC.

- 9 -

of this claim is appropriate also because Bauerle's allegations fail to establish the named

Defendants are state actors. Moreover, Bauerle has not stated on what basis her

constitutional right was violated. Rather, it appears such a claim would be made as an

informed consent claim or a medical battery claim. See 61 Causes of Action 2d 561 (July

2014). "A health care provider commits common law battery when a medical procedure is

performed on a patient without that patient's consent." Bailey-Null v. ValueOptions, 221

Ariz. 63, 70, 209 P.3d 1059, 1066 (App. 2009). Even though the Court advised Bauerle of

the possible statement of a claim pursuant to Arizona tort law in its December 18, 2013,

Order, the allegations in the SAC do not appear to seek to state such a claim. Even if the

Court were to accept Bauerle's allegations as stating a claim for medical battery against NH

and UMC, only a claim based on state law would then be pending against these Defendants.

The Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.4

 The Court will

dismiss the constitutional claim with prejudice. However, the Court will dismiss any

medical battery claim without prejudice.

VI. Motion to Dismiss Filed by UMC (Doc. 99)5

UMC requests Bauerle's claim of obstruction of justice be dismissed as there is not

authority recognizing a civil cause of action for obstruction of justice in Arizona. Bauerle

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 9 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

The Court accepts the joinder filed by CHN and accepts this motion as also filed on

behalf of CHN.

7

The Court will not re-discuss those issues addressed in discussing NH's, UMC's, or

SBHH's Motions to Dismiss as joined by CHN.

- 10 -

has not responded to this argument. Where a party does not respond to an argument, such

failure to respond may be deemed a consent to granting the request. LRCiv 7.2(i). The

Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss on this basis as to NH and CHN.

VII. Motion to Dismiss Filed by SBHH (Doc. 101)6

SBHH argues dismissal is appropriate because this Court dismissed the constitutional

claims with prejudice. For the reasons stated when addressing NH's Motion to Dismiss, the

Court finds dismissal on such a basis is appropriate. Moreover, SBHH's Corporate

Disclosure Statement, Doc. 22, indicates SBHH is a nongovernmental corporate party. 

Bauerle has not sufficiently alleged that SBHH's activities are significantly affected with

state involvement or that the state is significantly involved with SBHH activity that is at issue

herein. The Court will dismiss the §1983 claims against SBHH.

Bauerle also alleges SBHH violated the ADA. Bauerle makes no specific allegation

regarding this claim as to SBHH. The Court finds Bauerle has failed to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. The Court will dismiss this claim without prejudice.

As to Bauerle's claim that SBHH violated her constitutional right to have her medical

power of attorney take effect, this claim will be dismissed for the reasons stated when

addressing NH's Motion to Dismiss.

VIII. Motion to Dismiss Case Filed by CHN (Doc. 102)7

CHN seeks dismissal of the constitutional claims against it because the doctrine of res

judicata and the judgment entered in 4:07-cv-00196-FRZ bar the claims. In that case,

Baurele alleged claims regarding CHN employees that occurred in April 2005. Additionally,

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 10 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

The SAC states 2997-2008. The Court accepts the allegation as stating 2007-2008.

- 11 -

Bauerle alleged CHN had unconstitutional polices, customs, and/or practices and alleged

CHN fraudulently declared Bauerle was a danger to herself or others on May 11, 2007,

physically and chemically restrained Bauerle without sufficient cause on May 11, 2007,

forcibly injected Bauerle with medication when no emergency existed on May 11, 2007, and

provided fraudulent, false, and/or misleading information in records and at a hearing in June

2007. These claims do not appear to be repeated in this case. However, to any extent these

claims are repeated, the Court will grant the request to dismiss claims duplicated from the

4:07-cv-00196-FRZ case. Tritz v. U.S. Postal Service, 721 F.3d at 1143 ("Res judicata

applies where there is (1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3)

identity or privity between parties.").

In the instant case, Bauerle alleges the claims against CHN occurred in 2007-2008.8

Bauerle asserts the statute of limitations was tolled because of the appeal filed another case.

Bauerle alleges CHN violated her First Amendment rights in January and February 2008 by

limited her phone calls and her right to file written grievances. In her Response to CHN's

Motion to Dismiss, Bauerle does not respond to CHN's argument that the prior lawsuit

(including its appeal) does not toll the statute of limitations. Where a party does not respond

to an argument, such failure to respond may be deemed a consent to granting the request.

LRCiv 7.2(i). 

Further, Bauerle's constitutional claims are subject to a two year statute of limitations.

TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.1999). Similarly, Bauerle's ADA claim is

subject to a two year statute of limitations. See Payne v. Arizona, No. CV 09–01195–

PHX–NVW, 2012 WL 1151957 *10 (D.Ariz. April 5, 2012) (applying two year statute of

limitations to ADA claims), citing Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, 293 F.3d 1133, 1137

n. 2 (9th Cir. 2002). Prior pending litigation, i.e., an appeal of other claims, does not toll the

statute of limitations. See Seven Arts Filmed Entertainment Ltd. v. Content Media Corp.

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 11 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Bauerle asserts CPSA is a Regional Behavioral Health Authority. See A.R.S. § 36-3401

et seq. 

- 12 -

PLC, 733 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2013); Thompson v. Paul, 657 F.Supp.2d 1113 (D.Ariz. 2009).

The Court finds dismissal of the constitutional and ADA claims against CHN is appropriate.

IX. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Filed by CPSA (Doc. 117)

CPSA argues the doctrine of res judicata bars Bauerle's constitutional claims against

CPSA. Although Bauerle has not sufficiently alleged in her SAC that CPSA's activities are

significantly affected with state involvement or that the state is significantly involved with

CPSA activity that is at issue herein, Bauerle includes such an argument in Response to

CPSA's Motion to Dismiss.9

 However, the Court's December 18, 2013, Order clearly advised

Bauerle that sufficient allegations must be included in any SAC. Although Bauerle has been

afforded an opportunity to amend her claims to sufficiently allege claims upon which relief

can be granted and Bauerle has failed to do so, it appears that a more carefully drafted

complaint may state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because of this, the Court

finds a res judicata effect in these circumstances is unfair. Marin, 769 F.2d at 593. 

Further, although CPSA also argues the law of the case precludes Bauerle's

constitutional claims, the Court disagrees with CPSA. The law of the case doctrine, which

is a judicial invention designed to aid in the efficient operation of court affairs[,]" Milgard

Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Cir 1990), provides that the

decisions on legal issues made in a case "should be followed unless there is substantially

different evidence . . . new controlling authority, or the prior decision was clearly erroneous

and would result in injustice." Handi Investment Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 653 F.2d 391, 392

(9th Cir. 1981). Although Bauerle did not file a motion for reconsideration, she did file an

Objection to the Court's December 13, 2013, Order. Because (1) the parties have not fully

briefed whether a Regional Behavioral Health Authority is a state actor and (2) the Court is not

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 12 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10Specifically, a more carefully drafted complaint may include factual allegations

regarding CPSA's actions as a Regional Behavioral Health Authority that warrants finding CPSA

was a state actor.

11Bauerle asserts State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is untimely. However, State

Defendants have not filed an Answer to the SAC and Bauerle did not seek default judgment

when a timely Answer was not filed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(4) and (h)(2).

- 13 -

aware of any controlling precedent that establishes whether CPSA is a state actor, the Court

cannot say that a manifest error of law occurred warranting reconsideration. See Harsco

Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986).

However, because it is not clear that the constitutional claims against CPSA could not be

saved by any amendment, Moss, 572 F.3d at 972, an injustice could result without affording

Bauerle an opportunity to state constitutional claims against CPSA in a Third Amended

Complaint.10

Bauerle also alleges CPSA violated the ADA. Bauerle makes no specific allegation

regarding this claim as to CPSA. The Court finds Bauerle has failed to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. The Court will dismiss this claim without prejudice.

CPSA also asserts Bauerle has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

regarding any common law tort claim. Any such claim will be dismissed for the reasons

stated when addressing NH's Motion to Dismiss.

X. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Filed by State Defendants (Doc. 123)11

State Defendants argue Bauerle's suit against the State and ADHS must be dismissed

as sovereign immunity prohibits the claims. U.S. Const. Amend. XI; Gilbreath v. Cutter

Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991). Although State Defendants

acknowledge sovereign immunity may not prohibit some ADA claims, State Defendants

argue a sufficient ADA claim has not been alleged. Bauerle asserts that the Eleventh

Amendment does not prohibit all claims. For example, Bauerle argues that the Eleventh

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 13 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 14 -

Amendment does not prohibit prospective relief and that civil rights legislation was enacted

to provide remedies for state violations of federal constitutional and statutory provisions. 

A state or state agency may not be sued in federal court without its consent.

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Furthermore, section 1983 “creates a cause of action for

violations of the federal Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d

1385, 1391 (9th Cir.1997), internal quotations omitted. “[A] state is not a ‘person’ for

purposes of section 1983. Likewise ‘arms of the State’ such as the Arizona Department of

Corrections are not ‘persons' under section 1983.” Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931

F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir.1991), citation omitted. Moreover, while state officials, sued in

their office capacity, may be subject to prospective relief, Bauerle has not presented any

authority that the State or a state agency is subject to prospective relief. United Mexican

States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir.1997) (“[I]f the suit involves an injunction

seeking a prospective remedy for a continuing violation of federal law, a federal court may

enjoin state officials from continuing such activity.”), citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123

(1908). 

Bauerle alleges the State has repeatedly discriminated against her because of her

mental disability even though she has not been found to be a danger to herself or others.

Bauerle alleges she has being repeatedly involuntarily hospitalized because of her disability.

Bauerle's allegations are conclusory and she does not provide any factual allegations in

support of those conclusory allegations. These conclusory allegations fail to plausibily

suggest a claim entitling Bauerle to relief. Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

Similarly, Bauerle has failed to include any factual allegations in support of her

conclusory allegations that ADHS had a custom, policy, and/or practice of violating the

rights of Bauerle and others by involuntarily medicating Bauerle in emergency rooms and

in behavioral health hospitals when there is no emergency, there is no court order, and when

the patient is not a danger to self or others. In support of these policy allegations, Bauerle

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 14 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12In 4:07-cv-00196-FRZ, Bauerle alleged policies did not afford her adequate procedural

and substantive due process rights. The court, after quoting the Ninth Circuit's decision to not

consider Bauerle's contentions regarding the constitutionality of Arizona involuntary confirment

statutes, stated, "A review of the district court’s orders in CV 02-184 TUC-JMR, CV 03-474

TUC-JMR, and CV 05-334 TUC-JMR, demonstrates that Plaintiff has either raised, or had the

opportunity to present, the issues and claims raised in this present action, and that a decision was

rendered on the issues, which are sufficiently similar and material to all the actions."

4:07-cv-00196-FRZ, doc. 115, p. 5.

- 15 -

summarizes her contacts with medical providers; Bauerle does not specify any action taken

by ADHS or any policy of ADHS. In making these allegations, Bauerle does not assert that

ADHS or the medical providers failed to follow state laws or regulations.12 It appears

Bauerle contests the constitutionality of Arizona statutes, but does not make such a claim

(presumably perceiving futility in light of prior court decisions). However, Bauerle's

conclusroy and vague allegations simply do not provide notice of what Bauerle's claims are

and the grounds on which they rest, Brazil v. United States Department of the Navy, 66 F.3d

193, 199 (9th Cir.1995), and do not state a plausible claim, Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570.

State Defendants assert Bauerle's claims against the Superior Court and the AOAH

are barred by absolute immunity. In its December 18, 2013, Order, the Court dismissed the

claims against the Superior Court and the AOAH as precluded by judicial immunity. For

those same reasons, the Court will again dismiss the claims against the Superior Court and

the AOAH.

XI. Federal Defendants, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and District Court

The Court's December 18, 2013, Order dismissed with prejudice these Defendants.

Although Bauerle has renamed these parties as Defendants, the Court will confirm the

dismissal with prejudice of these parties.

XII. Review of Claims Against CODAC

Although not named in the original Complaint or in the First Amended Complaint,

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 15 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 16 -

Bauerle names CODAC in her SAC. Bauerle alleges CODAC obstructed justice and violated

her constitutional right to have her medical power of attorney take effect. Bauerle also

alleges CODAC violated her First Amendment rights by limiting her phone calls and right

to file written grievances. Bauerle also alleges CODAC violated her Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendent rights by revoking her outpatient court-ordered treatment plan and involuntarily

hospitalizing her. Lastly, Bauerle alleges CODAC had a custom, policy, and/or practice of

committing misrepresentations in its records by stating the "guardian occurred" for every

court-ordered client, of denying clients their rights to records (specifically, Bauerle asserts

CODAC denied her access to her records for a period of time), and of not sending

correspondence to its clients' preferred mailing address. The Court finds it appropriate to

address the claims against CODAC. See Omar v. Sea–Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991

(9th Cir.1987) ("A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under [Rule] 12(b)(6). Such

a dismissal may be made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.");

Ricotta v. California, 4 F.Supp.2d 961, 968 n. 7 (S.D. Cal.1998) ("The Court can dismiss a

claim sua sponte for a Defendant who has not filed a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6)."); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1984) (a complaint that

is "obviously frivolous" does not confer federal subject matter jurisdiction and may be

dismissed sua sponte before service of process).

As to Bauerle's constitutional claims against CODAC, for the reasons stated herein

as to similar claims against Defendants NH, UMC, SBHH, and CHN, the Court finds Bauerle

has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against CODAC. Further, as the

Court is not aware of any authority providing for a civil cause of action of obstruction of

justice, the Court finds Baurle's allegations regarding obstruction of justice fail to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the claims

against CODAC with leave to amend.

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 16 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 17 -

XIII. Third Amended Complaint Rather than Dismissal of Case

After a pleading is amended as a matter of course, a court is to grant further leave to

amend “when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1) & (2). Although the policy

allowing amendments “is to be applied with extreme liberality,” Eminence Capital, LLC v.

Aspeon, 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003), internal quotation marks omitted, there are

several factors that weigh against granting successive amendments: “undue delay, bad faith

or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

allowance of the amendment [or] futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,

182 (1962). 

In this case, the Court clearly explained to Bauerle the requirements for stating claims

for relief. Nonetheless, Bauerle has failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

However, the Court cannot say that further amendment may be futile. For example, although

the Court is not aware of any factually comparable Ninth Circuit precedent that would

support a determination that CPSA or CODAC are state actors, sufficient allegations by

Bauerle may clarify such a determination. The Court finds dismissal with leave to amend

against CPSA and CODAC is appropriate.

However, as to the other Defendants, the Court finds the further amendment would

be futile. Therefore, the claims against USHHS, ADHS, UMC, NH, SBHH, CHN, the Ninth

Circuit, the USAG, the Federal District Court, the Superior Court, the AOAH, and the

undersigned judge will be dismissed with prejudice. No further amended claims against

those Defendants will be permitted. The Court will permit Bauerle to file a Third Amended

Complaint against CPSA and CODAC. However, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court

to reject any Third Amended Complaint that purports to state a claim against USHHS,

ADHS, UMC, NH, SBHH, CHN, the Ninth Circuit, the USAG, the Federal District Court,

the Superior Court, the AOAH, and/or the undersigned judge.

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 17 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 18 -

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The claims against the undersigned judge are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

2. Bauerle's Motions for Extension of Time (Docs. 114 and 119) are GRANTED.

3. Northwest Hospital's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 98)

is GRANTED. The claims against it and Northwest Hospital are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE from this action.

4. University Medical Center's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 99) is GRANTED. The

claims against it and University Medical Center are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from

this action.

5. University Medical Center's Motion for Joinder (Doc. 100) is GRANTED.

6. Sonora Behavioral Health Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Case (Doc. 101) is

GRANTED. The claims against it and Sonora Behavioral Health Hospital are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE from this action.

7. Corondelet Health Network's Motion to Dismiss Case (Doc. 102) is

GRANTED. The claims against it and Corondelet Health Network are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE from this action.

8. Community Partnership of Southern Arizona's Motion to Dismiss for Failure

to State a Claim (Doc. 117) is GRANTED IN PART. The constitutional claims against

Community Partnership of Southern Arizona are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

All other claims against Community Partnership of Southern Arizona are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

9. State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 123)

is GRANTED. The claims against it and State Defendants are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE from this action.

10. The claims against CODAC Behavioral Services are DISMISSED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND.

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 18 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13This waiver would not preclude the future review by an appellate of the Court’s

dismissal of claims as discussed herein.

- 19 -

11. Bauerle shall file any Third Amended Complaint within 30 days of the date of

this Order. Any Third Amended Complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety and

may not incorporate any part of the prior complaints or subsequent pleadings by reference.

All causes of action alleged in the original or amended complaints which are not alleged in

any Third Amended Complaint will be waived. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co.,

896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) ("an amended pleading supersedes the original"); King

v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1987).13 Any Third Amended Complaint submitted by

Bauerle shall be clearly designated as a Third Amended Complaint on the face of the

document. Any Third Amended Complaint shall comply with the requirements of

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), 10(a), and 11(a).

12. The Clerk of Court shall REJECT, shall not file, and shall return to Bauerle any

Third Amended Complaint submitted by Bauerle that includes any claim against the U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services, the Arizona Department of Health Services,

University Medical Center, Northwest Hospital, Carondelet Health Network, the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals, the Office of the U.S. Attorney General, the Federal District Court,

the Superior Court, the Office of Administrative Hearings. and/or undersigned. 

13. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter a judgment of dismissal, without

prejudice, without further notice to Bauerle, if Bauerle fails to file a compliant Third

Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of the filing date of this Order. See Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir.) (district court may dismiss action for failure to comply

with any order of the Court), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992).

DATED this 22nd day of July, 2014.

Case 4:12-cv-00532-CKJ Document 127 Filed 07/23/14 Page 19 of 19