Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01303/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01303-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Amos Beverett, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV 13-01303-TUC-DCB (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to Tile 

28, United States Code, Section 2254, filed by Petitioner, Amos Beverett, an inmate 

confined at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Yuma-Cibola, in San Luis, AZ. (Doc. 1)1

Respondents have filed an answer to the petition (Answer). (Doc. 13.) Petitioner has filed 

a reply (Reply). (Doc. 14.) 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 4.) 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court enter an order denying and dismissing the Petition. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. Trial Court Proceedings 

 This case arises from the prosecution of Petitioner in Arizona Superior Court, 

Pima County, on the charges of sale or transfer of a narcotic drug based on his 

 

1

 “Doc.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. 

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involvement in the sale and/or transfer of cocaine to an undercover officer on three 

different occasions. See generally, Ex. G, BB. The appellate court summarized the facts 

of the case as follows: 

[O]n three occasions in January 2009, Beverett led undercover Tucson 

Police Officer Gilbert Martinez into an apartment complex in a “high-crime 

area” where crack cocaine sales reportedly had been taking place. On each 

occasion, Edward Byrd was waiting inside the apartment; Martinez gave 

money to Beverett, who returned with cocaine; and either Byrd handed 

Martinez a portion of the cocaine or, as was the case during the last sale, 

Beverett himself “ripped the bag [of crack cocaine] open on the kitchen 

counter” with Byrd nearby. 

(Ex. G at 2.)2

 

 Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress arguing that the government 

obtained evidence in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when law enforcement 

officers obtained his identity by approaching his residence with a false report of a noise 

disturbance. (Ex. Z.) The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, found the 

investigation technique used by the officers was consensual, and denied Petitioner’s 

motion and set the case for jury trial. (Ex. AA.) On September 29, 2010, Petitioner was 

convicted of all three counts of sale and/or transfer of a narcotic drug (cocaine base). (Ex. 

A.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 15.75 

years. (Ex. B.) 

B. Appeal 

 On April 20, 2010, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a direct appeal raising three 

issues: (1) the admission of police officers’ testimony about their background and 

 

2

 Statements drawn from the state appellate court’s decision are afforded a presumption of correctness that may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)(“In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court, a 

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426 (1985)(state court’s 

findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness); State v. Runningeagle, 686 F.3d 

758, 762, n.1 (9th Cir. 2012)(statement of facts drawn from the state appellate court’s decision is afforded a presumption of correctness that may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2009)(same). 

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investigation of him was fundamental and prejudicial error; (2) prosecutorial misconduct 

deprived him of his rights to due process and a fair trial; and (3) the jury instruction on 

accomplice liability was erroneous. (Ex. D.) On December 14, 2011, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals found that these arguments had not been raised in the trial court, and, 

reviewing them for fundamental and prejudicial error only, affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. (Ex. G.) 

 The Arizona Supreme Court dismissed the matter on March 5, 2012, when 

Petitioner failed to timely file a petition for review. (Ex. H.) 

C. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

 On January 18, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (PCR) 

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Ex. I.) The trial court 

appointed counsel (Ex. J) but subsequently, at Petitioner’s request (Ex. K) relieved 

counsel from any further obligations and ordered that Petitioner file the PCR petition 

within 60 days of receiving the record, but no later than May 4, 2012. (Ex. L.) 

 Petitioner timely filed his PCR petition on March 7, 2012, arguing that his trial 

counsel had been ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained 

by the police following a tip from an anonymous source or object to the officer’s 

testimony about the tip at trial. (Ex. M.) The trial court discerned four arguments in the 

PCR: 1) that his trial counsel had been ineffective because he failed to object to the police 

use of an anonymous source for commencing their investigation; 2) that his trial counsel 

had been ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the 

police from the anonymous source or object to the officer’s testimony about it at trial; 3) 

that his right to confront the witnesses against him had been violated because his attorney 

did not subpoena the anonymous source; and 4) that all the evidence obtained as a result 

of the anonymous tip should have been excluded. (Ex. N, at 1-2.) The trial court 

summarily dismissed all of these claims. (Ex. N.) 

 On October 5, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court’s 

summary dismissal of his PCR claims. (Ex. P.) Petitioner asserted that the police 

investigation prompted by information obtained from a confidential informant violated 

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his Fourth Amendment rights, a police officer’s testimony about that information 

constituted inadmissible hearsay in violation of Petitioner’s right to confrontation, and his 

trial attorney was ineffective for failing to raise these arguments at trial. (Ex. Q.)3

 The 

Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s ruling on these issues and granted 

review, but denied relief. (Id. at 3.) Additionally, the appellate court declined to review 

the argument that the violation of his confrontation rights based on the admission of 

hearsay evidence warrants a new trial under the fundamental error doctrine, finding that, 

because this argument could have been raised on appeal, it was precluded. (Id.)(citing 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3), (c)). 

 No petition for review was filed, and, on May 28, 2013, the mandate issued. (Ex. 

R.) 

D. Special Actions/Further Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief 

 On May 9, 2013, the trial court issued an order stating it had received a notice of 

post-conviction relief that day from Petitioner in which he asserted that the trial court had 

lacked jurisdiction because the indictment was defective. (Ex. S.) The document 

Petitioner had submitted to the court was entitled “Statutory Petition for Special Action” 

and was attached to the court’s ruling. (Id.) The trial court found that Petitioner’s claim 

was precluded because he could have raised the issue of the defective indictment on 

appeal or in his prior Rule 32 proceeding. (Id.) 

 The same document that the trial court had treated like a successive Rule 32 notice 

and petition was also filed by the superior court as a civil action on May 24, 2013. (Ex. 

W.) On May 31, 2013, the trial court dismissed the civil action for lack of jurisdiction, 

noting that the claim raised was “similar to the factual basis of Defendant’s most recent 

Rule 32 petition” but apparently not realizing that it was the same document. (Ex. X.) 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review with the court of appeals. (Ex. T.) On October 

22, 2013, the court of appeals noted that the trial court had treated Petitioner’s “Statutory 

Petition for Special Action” as a successive PCR notice and petition, found no error in the 

 

3

 Respondent’s Exhibit Q, supplemented at the direction of this Court, can be 

found in this Court’s docket at Doc. 20-1. 

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trial court’s denial of relief, and likewise denied relief. (Ex. U.) Petitioner also submitted 

a copy of the trial court’s ruling on the civil action as a supplement to his petition for 

review to the court of appeals. (Ex. Y.) The appellate court declined to consider the 

supplement, finding that the “civil matter is not properly before this court, and we will 

not consider that filing.” (Ex. U, at 4, n.2.) (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)). Petitioner 

did not file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court. (Ex. V.) 

E. Federal Proceedings 

 On October 4, 2013, Petitioner filed this federal habeas corpus petition. (Doc. 1.) 

Petitioner raises seven grounds for relief: (1) that defense counsel was ineffective in 

failing to object to testimonial hearsay at trial; (2) that defense counsel was ineffective in 

failing to file a motion to suppress statements made by an anonymous informant; (3) that 

defense counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress evidence; (4) that 

defense counsel was ineffective in failing to tell Petitioner that the case involved an 

anonymous informant; (5) that testimonial hearsay was admitted at trial in violation of 

Petitioner’s rights to due process, confrontation, and a fair trial under the United States 

and Arizona Constitutions; (6) that testimonial hearsay was admitted at trial in violation 

of Petitioner’s rights to due process, confrontation, and a fair trial under the United States 

and Arizona Constitutions; and (7) that the Indictment was defective, resulting in 

violations of Petitioner’s rights to due process and a fair trial under the United States and 

Arizona Constitutions. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 Because Beverett filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

(“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997) (holding that AEDPA 

governs federal habeas petitions filed after the date of its enactment, April 24, 1996). 

B. The Petition is timely. 

 Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

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conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review[.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). “The time during which a properly filed application for state 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner had until one year after his conviction and sentence became final to file 

his federal petition. Respondents do not contest the timeliness of the Petition. Upon 

review of the state-court record, the Magistrate Judge finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, 

the Petition is timely. 

 C. Cognizable Claims 

 Respondents argue that, to the extent Petitioner is attempting to assert a violation 

of his Arizona Constitutional rights with respect to his claims, this Court should 

summarily dismiss any such claim. A federal habeas petition must be founded upon 

assertions that the petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. While all seven of Petitioner’s claims 

assert violations of federal law, the claims also assert that he is in custody in violation of 

the Arizona Constitution. These claims are not cognizable in this federal habeas petition; 

“it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations 

on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). Accordingly, to 

the extent Petitioner asserts a violation of his Arizona Constitutional rights with respect 

to any of his claims, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny these 

claims as non-cognizable on federal habeas review. 

 D. Procedural Default 

Petitioner asserts four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) 

(Grounds One through Four), two claims that testimonial hearsay was admitted at trial in 

violation of Petitioner’s rights to due process, confrontation, and a fair trial under the 

United States and Arizona Constitutions (Grounds Five and Six) and one claim that the 

Indictment was defective, resulting in violations of Petitioner’s rights to due process and 

a fair trial under the United States Constitution (Ground Seven). Respondents assert that 

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Ground One is the only claim that has been fairly presented to the state courts, arguing 

that all other grounds for relief are procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 13, at 10-13.) The 

undersigned agrees with Respondents in part, and finds that Grounds One through Three 

of the Petition are exhausted and should be addressed on the merits, and Grounds Four 

through Seven are procedurally defaulted. 

A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has 

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must “fairly 

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state's highest 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277–

78 (1971). 

 “To exhaust one’s state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the 

claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 

1994). The failure to exhaust subjects the petitioner to dismissal. Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 

F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1983). 

 A habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways. 

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in 

state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 729–30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed 

to present it in state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the district court must consider whether the claim 

could be pursued by any presently available state remedy). If no remedies are currently 

available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is “technically” exhausted but procedurally 

defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n. 1; see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 

152, 161-62 (1996). 

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 In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on either direct 

appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because any attempt 

to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the claims fit into a narrow 

range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) (precluding claims not raised 

on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) 

(petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). Because 

these rules have been found to be consistently and regularly followed, and because they 

are independent of federal law, either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona 

court, or their operation to preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will 

procedurally bar subsequent review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas 

court. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931–32 (finding 

Rule 32.2(a)(3) regularly followed and adequate). 

 Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, 

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. 

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). However, the Court will not review the merits of a 

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the 

failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged 

constitutional violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if 

the claim were not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

 Cause is defined as a "legitimate excuse for the default," and prejudice is defined 

as "actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (a 

showing of cause requires a petitioner to show that "some objective factor external to the 

defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule"). Prejudice 

need not be addressed if a petitioner fails to show cause. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. 

To bring himself within the narrow class of cases that implicate a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, a petitioner "must come forward with sufficient proof of his actual 

innocence" Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted), which can be shown when "a petitioner ‘presents 

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evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of 

the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless 

constitutional error.'" Id. at 673 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). 

1. Ground One 

Petitioner asserts in Ground One of the Petition that his trial counsel was 

ineffective by refusing, or failing to object, to Officer Martinez’s testimony that he had 

received information from an anonymous informant. (Doc. 1, at 6.) Respondents concede 

that Petitioner presented that claim to the trial court in his first PCR petition and to the 

appellate court in his subsequent petition for review, and thus, Petitioner has fairly 

presented a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the 

admission of hearsay testimony. (Doc. 13, at 10) (citing Ex. M, at 6–7; Ex. P, at 5–7.) 

Upon review of the state-court record, the Magistrate Judge finds that this claim was 

properly exhausted and addresses the merits of the claim in the Merits section, below. 

 2. Grounds Two and Three 

In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for refusing or 

failing to file a motion to suppress any statements made by the anonymous informant. 

(Doc. 1, at 7.) Respondents argue that while Petitioner arguably presented this claim to 

the trial court in his first PCR, he did not present this claim to the court of appeals in his 

subsequent petition for review. (Doc. 13, at 10) (citing Ex. M at 1, 9-10; Ex. P.) Thus, 

Respondents assert, Ground Two is procedurally defaulted. 

In a similar claim, Petitioner argues in Ground Three that his right to effective 

assistance of counsel was violated because his trial counsel failed to file a motion to 

suppress “any evidence obtained unconstitutionally.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Respondents assert 

that Petitioner failed to fairly present and exhaust this claim and cannot now return to 

state court to properly exhaust this claim, thus, Ground Three is technically exhausted but 

procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 13, at 11.) 

The Magistrate Judge disagrees with the State’s procedural analysis of Grounds 

Two and Three, agreeing that Petitioner did not clearly raise these issues to the appellate 

court in his petition for review, but finding the claims exhausted as a result of the 

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appellate court’s consideration of the claims and adoption of the trial court’s ruling. See 

(Ex. Q.) 

Petitioner argued in his PCR that trial counsel was ineffective because he refused 

to file a motion to suppress the anonymous informant’s statements, asserting that this 

violated his right to confront the witness against him under the Sixth Amendment and 

also violated Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights. (Ex. M at 9-10.) Petitioner also 

argued that his attorney was ineffective for “... not filing a motion to suppress the 

anonymous information” because the “alleged drug evidence would have been excluded 

according to the United States Constitution” which “forbids the use of alleged evidence 

obtained in violation of a person’s constitutional rights & then excludes all alleged 

evidence resulting therefrom out of jury trial as, fruit of the poisonous tree.” (Ex. M, at 

9.) 

The trial court identified the claims presented in Petitioner’s PCR as follows: 

“Petitioner states ‘hearsay is strictly forbidden in jury trails by the Constitution of the 

United States.’ Therefore, Petitioner argues, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

file a motion to suppress the evidence, obtained by Officer Martinez, because TPD [the 

Tucson Police Department] began an investigation based on an anonymous source.” (Ex. 

M at 1.) The trial court summarily denied the claim, concluding that “[n]o anonymous 

source’s hearsay statements were used in stopping or seizing the Petitioner. The 

Petitioner volunteered that evidence himself when conducting transactions with Officer 

Martinez. ... [T]rial counsel’s failure to raise an objection based on the anonymous 

informant does not meet either prong of the Strickland[4

] test.” (Ex. M at 2.) The trial 

court also ruled that Petitioner’s argument that any evidence stemming from the 

investigation should be excluded because the undercover operation began with 

information provided by an anonymous source is without merit because the evidence that 

was used to convict the Petitioner was admissible, and the court would not “find 

ineffective assistance when counsel does not raise irrelevant objections to admissible 

 

4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668 (1984). 

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evidence.” (Ex. M, at 3.) While Respondents correctly assert that Petitioner did not 

clearly raise this claim to the court of appeals (see Ex. M), the court of appeals noted that 

the trial court “summarily denied relief, concluding there had been no basis to file a 

motion to suppress” and that “[o]n review, [Petitioner] repeats his claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, insisting the fact the police investigation was prompted by 

information from a confidential informant violated his Fourth Amendment rights” and 

concluded that “the trial court correctly resolved [Petitioner’s] claims in a thorough and 

well-reasoned minute entry” and adopted the trial court’s ruling.” (Ex. Q5 at 2-3.) Even if 

Petitioner did not clearly present a claim to the court of appeals that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for refusing to file motions to suppress evidence or the informant’s 

statements, the appellate court’s consideration of the issue effectively exhausted it. See 

Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376-77 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that trial court’s 

express consideration of federal claim that was not fairly presented precludes any 

exhaustion defense); Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless 

of whether or how a petitioner has presented a claim, however, that claim has been 

exhausted if the state courts have in fact ruled on its merits.”). Thus, the Magistrate Judge 

finds that, although Grounds Two and Three may not have been “fairly presented” to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, the appellate court considered these claims and adopted the 

trial court’s ruling in denying the claims, thus rendering these claims exhausted. The 

Magistrate Judge addresses the merits of Grounds Two and Three in the Merits section, 

below. 

 3. Ground Four 

Petitioner asserts in Ground Four that his right to effective assistance of counsel 

was violated because his trial counsel failed to apprise Petitioner “that [the] present case 

involved an informant.”6

 (Doc. 1 at 9.) Respondents correctly assert that Petitioner failed 

 

5

 Exhibit Q in its entirety can be found filed at Document 20 of this Court’s 

docket. 

6

 To the extent Ground Four raises an issue that trial counsel failed to file a motion 

to suppress the informant’s statements, this issue is addressed in this Court’s analysis of 

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to fairly present and exhaust this claim and cannot now return to state court to properly 

exhaust this claim, thus, Ground Three is technically exhausted but procedurally 

defaulted. (Doc. 13, at 11.) 

Petitioner did not present this claim to the state courts in his PCR proceedings. 

(Exs. M, P.) Thus, Petitioner has failed to fairly present and exhaust this claim. See 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“To exhaust his claim, Castillo must have presented his federal, constitutional 

issue before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate 

briefing.”). Petitioner cannot return to state court and properly exhaust any such claim. 

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2, 32.4(a); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050–52 (Ariz. 1996). 

Accordingly, Ground Four of the Petition is technically exhausted but procedurally 

defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. 

Petitioner asserts that this default should be excused because a procedural default 

will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or 

counsel in that proceeding was ineffective. (Doc. 14, at 7) (citing Martinez v. Ryan, ___ 

U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012).) 

A state criminal defendant does not have a federal constitutional right to the 

effective assistance of counsel during state post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., 

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Graves v. McEwen, 731 F.3d 876, 878 

(9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the general rule is that errors of counsel during a state postconviction action cannot constitute “cause” to excuse the procedural default of a federal 

habeas claim. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752; Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 374 

(9th Cir. 2014). However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Martinez, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 

established a limited exception to this general rule, which exception applies only to Sixth 

Amendment IAC claims. Martinez held that inadequate assistance of post-conviction 

counsel or lack of counsel “at initial-review collateral review proceedings may establish 

cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 

 Ground Two. 

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1315; Trevino v. Thaler, ___U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (“cause” under 

Martinez consists of there being “no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the 

state collateral review proceeding), citing Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318–19, 1320–21. 

Thus, Petitioner can seek habeas corpus relief in federal court based on an 

unexhausted ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim under Martinez only if he can 

show either he had no counsel in his first PCR proceeding or counsel in his first postconviction relief proceeding was ineffective. Id. In this case, Petitioner represented 

himself during state initial-collateral review proceedings. See (Ex. M). This was not a 

result of appointed counsel’s refusal to file a petition or counsel’s abandonment of 

Petitioner altogether, see Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012), but rather because 

Petitioner did not want the court to appoint a lawyer and requested that he be allowed to 

represent himself. (Ex. I, at 2; Ex. K; Ex. L.) Having expressly refused the appointment 

of counsel, Petitioner cannot now argue that either a lack of counsel, or his own failure to 

raise his claims, constitutes cause for the default. Accordingly, the undersigned 

determines that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause for his failure to exhaust 

Ground Four. 

 4. Grounds Five and Six

Petitioner argues in Ground Five that “the unconstitutional usage of testimonial 

hearsay in violation of [] Petitioner’s right to due process, confrontation and a fair trial 

under the United States [] Constitution.” (Doc. 1, at 10.) In a similar argument, Petitioner 

asserts in Ground Six that “the confrontation right of [] Petitioner was disregarded by the 

State, in violation of his right to due process, confrontation, and a fair trial under the 

United States [] Constitution.” (Doc. 1, at 11.) Respondents argue that these claims are 

indistinguishable, and that the appellate court applied a procedural bar to Petitioner’s 

claim that the admission of the alleged hearsay violated his right under the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution to confront the witnesses against him. 

(Doc. 13, at 12) (citing Ex. M, at 6-8; P, at 7.). 

The state appellate court’s decision is the last reasoned decision on the claim and it 

explicitly imposes a procedural bar. Accordingly, to the extent this is the claim Petitioner 

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is attempting to raise in Grounds Five or Six of the Petition, any such claim is 

procedurally defaulted. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802 (1991); see also Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Bennett Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner argues that the claims should not be precluded because appellate 

counsel refused to argue any hearsay and confrontation clause violations despite 

Petitioner’s request that these claims be raised. (Doc. 14, at 7.) Petitioner did not raise 

this issue in his initial collateral-review proceeding in state court, stating that he was 

“[f]aced with the unenviable choice of filing an ineffective assistance claim against trial 

or appellate counsel” and he chose to file against trial counsel. (Doc. 14, at 2.) Petitioner 

cites no law that would dictate that Petitioner can only bring IAC claims against trial 

counsel or appellate counsel, but not both, in his PCR. The undersigned is aware of no 

such restriction, and accordingly finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause for 

the procedural default of these claims. 

 5. Ground Seven 

 Petitioner argues in Ground Seven that a “defective indictment” violated his 

constitutional rights. (Doc. 1, at 12.) This is the claim Petitioner raised in his “statutory 

petition for special action,” treated by the state courts as a second Rule 32 proceeding. 

(Exs. S, U.) The trial court found that this claim was precluded because it could have 

been raised in a prior proceeding. (Ex. S.) The court of appeals found that the trial court 

“did not err in finding this claim precluded.” (Ex. U, at 4.) Thus, the Court of Appeals’ 

decision is the last reasoned decision on the claim and it explicitly imposes a procedural 

bar. Accordingly, Ground Seven in the instant Petition is procedurally defaulted. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802; see also Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10 (1989); Bennett, 322 

F.3d at 580. 

 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court dismiss 

Grounds Four through Seven of the Petition as procedurally defaulted. Petitioner’s 

argument that the special action filed was not a successive Rule 32, and thus the claim 

should not be precluded is not persuasive. Even if the state court improperly ruled that the 

claim was procedurally barred, the fact remains that the claim would be nonetheless 

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defaulted for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust the issue on direct review. 

 D. Merits. 

The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold” for habeas relief with 

the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal 

criminal sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 475 (2007) (citations 

omitted). The AEDPA's “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' ... 

demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7). 

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim 

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision 

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803–04); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 

2005). Where the last reasoned state court decision adopted or substantially incorporated 

the reasoning from a previous decision, it is permissible to look at both decisions to fully 

ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093; see Weaver v. 

Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 963 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 

(9th Cir. 2004); Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals substantially incorporated the reasoning from the trial court’s ruling on 

the IAC claims in Beverett’s PCR. See (Ex. Q). Accordingly, the Court looks to the trial 

court’s ruling (Ex. N) to ascertain whether the decision was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, or resulted in a decision that 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

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presented in the State court proceeding. 

 “The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a 

rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became 

final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under 

subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if 

any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” 

federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's 

state-court conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 

549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled 

on other grounds Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). Habeas relief cannot be 

granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional 

principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76-77; Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 

896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is binding, 

circuit court precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law is clearly 

established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 

1069. 

 The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 

2254(d)(1). The Court has explained that a state-court decision is “contrary to” the 

Supreme Court's clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set 

of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 

8 (2002) (per curiam). In characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary 

to” prong, the Court has observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the 

correct legal rule [] to the facts of a prisoner's case would not fit comfortably within § 

2254(d)(1)'s ‘contrary to’ clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert, 393 F.3d at 

974. 

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 Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas 

court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from 

[the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... 

case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a 

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to 

a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to 

find a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the petitioner 

must show that the state-court decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but 

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 

25. In conducting review under § 2254(d)(1), this Court “is limited to the record that was 

before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, –––

U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398–99 (2011). 

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the 

state-court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller–El 

v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller–El II ). A state-court decision “based on a 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively 

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller–El,

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) ( Miller–El I ); see Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999. In considering a 

challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state-court factual determinations are presumed to be 

correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and 

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473–74; Miller–El 

II, 545 U.S. at 240. 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must satisfy 

two separate requirements: he must (1) show that counsel’s performance fell below 

objective standards of reasonableness and “outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance”, and (2) establish that counsel’s performance prejudiced Petitioner 

by creating “a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have 

had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–94 

(1984); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 390; Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 

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(1986). Strickland is the clearly established law for ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims. See Harrington v. Richter, 556 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 780 (2011). 

In the context of a habeas petition, a petitioner must do more than demonstrate to 

the federal court that the State court applied Strickland incorrectly. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 

685, 698-99 (2002). Rather, a petitioner must show the State court “applied Strickland to 

the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. Because the standards 

created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential,” review under both 

standards in tandem is even more deferential. Richter, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 788 

(citations omitted); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (citing Yarborough 

v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2004)(per curiam)). The petitioner bears the burden of 

proving his case, and must convince the district court by a preponderance of evidence of 

the facts underlying the alleged constitutional error. See Lambert, 393 F.3d at 970 n.16 

(citing McKenzie v. McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415, 1418-19 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals did not expressly rely on Strickland in its 

Memorandum Decision; however, it expressly affirmed the trial court's findings which 

did rely on Strickland. The court of appeals adopted the trial courts findings and analysis 

of Petitioner’s claims, and concluded that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the 

trial court abused its discretion in summarily denying Petitioner’s PCR. (Ex. Q, at 

3)(citing State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993).) The trial court applied the 

Strickland standard in addressing Beverett’s IAC claims. (Ex. N, at 2-3.) Having 

reviewed the record, the Magistrate Judge finds that the state court did not unreasonably 

apply Strickland. 

 1. Grounds One and Two7

 Petitioner asserts in Grounds One and Two of the Petition that his trial counsel 

was ineffective by failing to file a motion to suppress any statement made by the alleged 

anonymous informant, or by failing to object to Officer Martinez’s testimony at trial 

 

7

 The Magistrate Judge acknowledges Respondents’ request to file a supplemental answer addressing the merits of any claim that the Court finds is not procedurally defaulted. In light of the undersigned’s recommendation, however, the Magistrate Judge declines this request. 

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about what an anonymous informant had told him, arguing that the statement was 

inadmissible hearsay. (Doc. 1, at 6-7.) Officer Martinez testified at trial that he had 

“received anonymous information that a suspect by the name of Edward Byrd was selling 

crack cocaine out of an apartment there.” (Ex. BB, Reporter’s Transcripts, Jury Trial, 

Day One, September 28, 2010, at 110). The police officer testified he then called a 

telephone number provided by the informant and eventually spoke to “Ed” and set up a 

drug buy. (Id. at 110–11.) When the officer went to the apartment, he met with Petitioner 

and Edward Byrd and gave them money in exchange for cocaine. (Id. at 113–16.) The 

undercover officer conducted two more drug buys with Petitioner and Byrd. (Id. at 124–

28, 140–52.) 

 In Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding, the trial court found that the evidence was 

admissible and therefore that Petitioner’s trial counsel’s “failure to raise an objection 

based on the anonymous informant does not meet either prong of the Strickland test.” 

(Ex. N, at 2–3.) The court of appeals adopted this ruling. (Ex. Q, at 3.) The state court did 

not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law or unreasonably determine the 

facts in rejecting this claim. 

 The Court need not address both components of the test if petitioner makes an 

insufficient showing on one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Thus, a court need not 

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining whether 

prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 

n.14. (2000) (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack 

of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be 

followed.”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). For reasons explained below, the 

Magistrate Judge finds that it is only necessary to address the prejudice prong to resolve 

Petitioner’s IAC claim. 

 To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is “a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “That requires a ‘substantial,’ not 

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just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, 

131 S.Ct. at 1403 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 791). The state court 

reasonably held that trial counsel’s alleged failure to suppress or object to the confidential 

informant’s statements at trial did not result in prejudice to Petitioner. 

 The evidence establishing Petitioner’s guilt was provided, voluntarily, by 

Petitioner and sufficient on its own to establish that he had committed the offenses for 

which he was charged. That the investigation began as a result of an anonymous tip is 

irrelevant to the ultimate determination of Petitioner’s guilt. As the appellate court 

explained in its memorandum decision affirming Petitioner’s conviction: 

[T]he undisputed evidence showed that Beverett escorted Martinez to the 

apartment, delivered the cocaine that Martinez purchased, accepted money 

for the purchase from Martinez, and addressed questions regarding future 

purchases and the quantity of cocaine delivered. 

(Ex. G, at 5.) Even if Petitioner had successfully suppressed the informant’s statement, 

there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. Petitioner 

has presented nothing to show that the state court’s decision regarding his ineffective 

assistance claim is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Supreme Court law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

 2. Ground Three 

 Petitioner asserts in Ground Three that trial counsel was ineffective in for failing 

to file a motion to suppress any evidence obtained in violation of Petitioner’s 

constitutional rights, “knowing before trial the alleged anonymous informant would not 

appear or testify to corroborate the testimonial hearsay of Officer Martinez.” (Doc. 1, at 

8.) In Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding, the trial court reasoned that anonymous 

information did not implicate Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections; that 

Petitioner invited narcotics customers into his residence and consensually and voluntarily 

provided the evidence to the TPD undercover officer, and that TPD officers acted on this 

evidence to arrest Petitioner. (Ex. N, at 2.) The evidence was admissible and therefore 

Petitioner’s trial counsel’s “failure to raise an objection based on the anonymous 

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informant does not meet either prong of the Strickland test.” (Ex. N, at 2–3.) The court of 

appeals adopted this ruling. (Ex. Q, at 3.) The state court did not unreasonably apply 

clearly established federal law or unreasonably determine the facts in rejecting this claim. 

 Again, for reasons explained below, the Magistrate Judge finds that it is only 

necessary to address the prejudice prong to resolve Petitioner’s IAC claim. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286 n.14. “Where defense counsel's 

failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of 

ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is 

meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 

different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.” 

Morrison, 477 U.S. at 375. Petitioner has failed to show that there was an illegal seizure 

of evidence in this case. 

 The state court reasonably held that trial counsel’s alleged failure to suppress or 

object to the confidential informant’s statements at trial did not result in prejudice to 

Petitioner because Petitioner was not arrested based on information provided by the 

confidential informant, rather, the evidence establishing probable cause to arrest 

Petitioner was provided by the Petitioner. Neither did the information from the 

confidential informant provide probable cause for a search warrant obtained or for any 

evidence seized from Petitioner. In fact, the evidence was not “seized” at all but provided 

voluntarily by Petitioner. 

 Petitioner has presented nothing to show that the state court’s decision regarding 

his ineffective assistance claim is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established Supreme Court law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Accordingly, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related thereto is without merit 

and must be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

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 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id. If 

objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 13-1303-TUCDCB. 

 If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 10th day of December, 2014. 

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