Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-01275/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-01275-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES EDWARD WALLACE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ACOSTA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:21-cv-01275-DAD-EPG

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE 

PROCEED ONLY ON PLAINTIFF’S

EXCESSIVE-FORCE AND MEDICALNEEDS CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT 

ACOSTA

(ECF No. 9)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 

TWENTY-ONE DAYS

Plaintiff James Edward Wallace is a pretrial detainee and proceeds pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 3, 9). This 

matter is before the Court for screening of Plaintiff’s first amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on August 23, 2021, bringing excessive force, 

medical needs, and due process claims against the Lemoore Police Department and Lemoore 

Police Officer Acosta. (ECF No. 1). On September 28, 2021, the Court entered a screening 

order, concluding that Plaintiff stated an excessive-force claim against Defendant Acosta but 

that no other claims should proceed past the screening stage. (ECF No. 8). The screening order 

gave Plaintiff thirty days to either file a first amended complaint, notify the Court in writing 

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that he did not want to file an amended complaint and instead wanted to proceed only on his 

excessive-force claim against Defendant Acosta, or notify the Court in writing that he wanted

to stand on his complaint. On October 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, 

which is now before the Court for screening.

For the reasons given below, the Court will recommend that this case proceed on 

Plaintiff’s excessive-force and medical-needs claims against Defendant Acosta and that the

claims against Defendant Lemoore Police Department be dismissed for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has twenty-one days from the date of service of 

these findings and recommendations to file his objections.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court also screens the complaint under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 4). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that 

may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the 

action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts 

“are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 

677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a 

plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 

pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).

III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

In his first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges as follows. On July 28, 2021, after 

Plaintiff “was already detained and in cuffs [and] apprehended by authorities,” Acosta and 

other officers “pinned Plaintiff to the floor while another peace officer tazed [him].”1(ECF No. 

9, p. 5). “This incident left Plaintiff in excruciating pain which caused his asthma to spike.” (Id.

at 5-6). “Plaintiff was also slammed and suffered injuries to his face bleeding and shoulder.” 

(Id. at 6). 

“All officer[s] at the scene ignored [Plaintiff’s] injuries.” (Id.). Plaintiff asked “Acosta 

to take [him] to the hospital” because he was “bleeding and . . . could not breath[e].” (Id.). 

Plaintiff’s asthma spiked because of “[t]he shock from the tazer.” (Id.). However, no officers 

did anything except place him in a police car and Acosta took him to the Lemoore Police 

Department, “ignoring [his] medical problems.” (Id.). 

Based on these allegations, the Court concludes that Plaintiff intends to bring claims of 

excessive force and denial of treatment for his medical needs.

IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

A. Section 1983

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 

1 Minor alterations, such as omitting punctuation and correcting misspellings, have been made to quoted 

portions of Plaintiff’s first amended complaint without indicating each specific change.

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to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 

provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 

490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see 

also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los 

Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 

2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006); see also Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 

“under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the 

meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal 

connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which 

the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional 

harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 

causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 

Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 

of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual 

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have 

been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 

691, 695 (1978). 

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B. Excessive Force

Because the circumstances of the complaint indicate that Plaintiff was being arrested

around the time of the use-of-force incident, the Fourth Amendment provides the relevant

standard for Plaintiff’s excessive-force claim. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (“Where, as here, the

excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it

is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment,

which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . .

seizures’ of the person.”); see also Pierce v. Multnomah County, Oregon, 76 F.3d 1032, 1042

(9th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the Fourth Amendment continues to protect an arrestee during the

second custodial stage, post-arrest but pre-arraignment”).

Such excessive-force claims are “properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s

‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. “Determining whether the

force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a

careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396

(internal quotation marks and internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned that

this reasonableness inquiry should not be approached mechanically but “its proper application

requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Id. As for the objective component of the inquiry, “the question is whether the officers’

actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,

without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397.

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Acosta and other officers pinned him to

the floor “while another peace officer tazed [him].”2(ECF No. 9, p. 5). Plaintiff alleges he “was

also slammed and suffered injuries,” to his shoulder and his face, including bleeding. (Id. at 6).

2 Although Plaintiff mentions other officers in his complaint, Acosta is the only officer that Plaintiff 

named as a Defendant and Plaintiff has not asserted any claims against any other officers.

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Such allegations sufficiently state, for purposes of screening, an excessive-force claim against

Officer Acosta.

However, Plaintiff fails to state an excessive force claim against the only other

Defendant named in the complaint, the Lemoore Police Department. A county or other local 

governmental entity may be liable for a constitutional deprivation where the plaintiff can 

“satisfy the requirements for municipality liability established by Monell and its progeny.” 

Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2016). Under Monell, an entity 

defendant cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation solely because it employs a 

tortfeasor. 436 U.S. at 691. An entity defendant can only be held liable for injuries caused by 

the execution of its policy or custom or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 

represent official policy. Id. at 694. “In addition, a local governmental entity may be liable if it 

has a ‘policy of inaction and such inaction amounts to a failure to protect constitutional 

rights.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Oviatt v. 

Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Since Iqbal, courts have repeatedly rejected 

conclusory Monell allegations that lack factual content from which one could plausibly infer 

Monell liability.” See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Modesto, 535 Fed. App’x 643, 646 (9th Cir. 

2013) (affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim based only on conclusory allegations 

and lacking factual support).

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendant Lemoore Police 

Department because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Lemoore Police Department had

any policy or custom that led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Taylor v. W. 

Sacramento Police Dep’t, No. CIV S-11-0502 EFB P, 2011 WL 2144486, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 

31, 2011) (dismissing claim against a police department where “Plaintiff ha[d] not alleged that 

he was unconstitutionally arrested pursuant to an official policy or custom”).

C. Medical Needs

The Ninth Circuit concluded in Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco that the 

Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee to receive objectively reasonable care. See Tatum, 441 

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F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Just as the Fourth Amendment does not require a police 

officer to use the least intrusive method of arrest, neither does it require an officer to provide 

what hindsight reveals to be the most effective medical care for an arrested suspect.”) (internal 

citation omitted). While the Ninth Circuit has not defined exactly what constitutes objectively 

reasonable medical care, it has concluded that “police officers [must] seek the necessary 

medical attention for a detainee when he or she has been injured while being apprehended by 

either promptly summoning the necessary medical help or by taking the injured detainee to a 

hospital.” Id. at 1099 (quoting Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th 

Cir.1986)). A district court has summarized as follows what is, at a minimum, required under 

Tatum:

The critical holding of that case, therefore, is that when an arresting officer 

realizes that an arrestee requires medical attention, he is not required “to provide 

what hindsight reveals to be the most effective medical care,” but he is required 

to promptly summon some sort of appropriate care. Failure to do anything is a 

violation of the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights—evidence “that the officers 

ignored [an arrestee’s] deteriorating medical condition” is reason to deny 

qualified immunity. 

B.P. v. Cty. of San Bernardino, No. EDCV 19-1243-JGB-SPX, 2019 WL 7865177, at *3 (C.D. 

Cal. Nov. 14, 2019) (alteration in original and internal citations to Tatum omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff states that all officers at the scene “ignored [his] injuries.” (ECF No. 9, p. 

6). Specifically, he asked “Acosta to take him to hospital [as he] was bleeding and . . . could not 

breath.” (Id.). Plaintiff’s asthma spiked because of the “shock from the tazer.” (Id.). However, 

Acosta ignored Plaintiff’s medical problems and took Plaintiff to the Lemoore Police 

Department. (Id.). Such allegations sufficiently state, for purposes of screening, a medicalneeds claim against Officer Acosta.

However, like his first claim, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against 

Defendant Lemoore Police Department because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant 

Lemoore Police Department had any policy or custom that led to a deprivation of his 

constitutional rights. See Taylor, 2011 WL 2144486, at *2.

///

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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOOMENDATIONS

The Court has screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and finds that the following 

claims should proceed past screening: Plaintiff’s excessive-force and medical-needs claims

against Defendant Acosta. However, the claims against Defendant Lemoore Police Department

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The Court previously explained to Plaintiff the deficiencies in his initial complaint, 

provided Plaintiff with relevant legal standards, and provided Plaintiff an opportunity to amend 

his complaint. As Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint with the benefit of the information 

provided by the Court, it appears that further leave to amend would be futile.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. This case proceed on Plaintiff’s excessive-force and medical-needs claims 

against Defendant Acosta;

2. All claims against Defendant Lemoore Police Department be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and 

3. The Clerk of Court be directed to terminate Defendant Lemoore Police 

Department be from the docket; 

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 

twenty-one (21) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff 

may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 

(9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 12, 2021 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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