Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05325/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05325-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARK A. CANDLER, 

 

 Petitioner, 

 

 v. 

AMY MILLER, Warden, 

 Respondent. 

________________________________/ 

No. C 13-05325 CW 

ORDER DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

 Petitioner Mark A. Candler, a state prisoner, filed this 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

challenging his state criminal conviction. He asserts claims for 

ineffective assistance of counsel based on appellate counsel’s 

failure to challenge on appeal (1) the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support his conviction for attempted murder; and (2) the trial 

court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence gathered by 

wiretap. Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of 

points and authorities in support thereof and Petitioner has filed 

a traverse. Petitioner moves for an evidentiary hearing. For the 

reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the motion for an 

evidentiary hearing and DENIES the petition. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Procedural History 

 On August 5, 2010, an Alameda County jury found Petitioner 

guilty of one count of attempted murder, one count of shooting at 

an inhabited dwelling, three counts of being a felon in possession 

of a firearm, and one count of possession of an assault weapon. 

Each charge was accompanied by an allegation that Petitioner 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 1 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

committed it in association with a criminal street gang. These 

enhancement allegations were also found to be true. On October 

29, 2010, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to forty-eight 

years to life. Represented by counsel, Petitioner filed a direct 

appeal to the California Court of Appeal, raising six grounds: 

(1) that the admission of a large volume of evidence related to 

gangs was inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial; (2) that the 

trial court wrongly allowed the State’s gang expert to opine that 

he shot the victim; (3) insufficiency of the evidence with respect 

to the felon in possession counts; (4) sentencing error with 

respect to the felon in possession counts; and (5) erroneous 

denial of the motion to sever his trial from his co-defendants. 

On May 22, 2012, the Court of Appeal affirmed, except as to the 

claim of sentencing error. On August 22, 2012, the California 

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the 

denial of his direct appeal. 

 On September 20, 2012, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a 

state habeas petition raising three grounds for relief: 

(1) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; (2) violation of 

his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on the 

misapplication of case law regarding the suppression of wiretap 

evidence; and (3) insufficiency of the evidence based on reliance 

on unsworn, out-of-court statements. The California Supreme Court 

denied the petition on December 12, 2012. 

 On September 13, 2013, Petitioner filed a second habeas 

petition in the California Court of Appeal, raising the same 

grounds as those contained in his September 20, 2012 petition “for 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 2 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the purpose of federalizing all claims.” The California Court of 

Appeal denied the petition on October 4, 2013. 

 Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on November 15, 

2013. 

II. Statement of Facts 

A. The 2006 shooting 

According to trial testimony, gangs from the Acorn and Ghost 

Town neighborhoods in West Oakland had a strong alliance in the 

period leading up to June 30, 2006. On June 30, 2006, a funeral 

took place on Filbert Street for a Ghost Town resident named Sean. 

At the end of the funeral, Aaron Burrell and Marquis Burton got 

into a dispute after Burrell accused Burton of stealing his car. 

Although Mr. Burrell was a Ghost Town resident and Burton was an 

Acorn resident, they were close and Burrell referred to Burton as 

his god-brother. When Mr. Burrell threatened to fight Burton, 

another Acorn resident, Wendell Stevenson, threatened to fight 

back against him. Another Ghost Town resident, Jermel Holloway, 

threatened to join the fight on Mr. Burrell’s side. Mr. Stevenson 

and Mr. Holloway were members of the Acorn and Ghost Town gangs, 

respectively. 

 After the funeral, mourners gathered on Martin Luther King 

(MLK) Way near 31st Street, in Ghost Town, for a candlelight 

vigil. Close to fifty people were there. Among them were JoyNequia Brooks, Dashawna Ross, Mr. Burrell and Mr. Holloway. At 

approximately 4:50 PM, nearby police officers heard more than 

thirty gunshots in rapid succession. One officer, Ouseng Saepern, 

saw a white Dodge Magnum leaving the scene and driving very fast. 

Officer Saepern followed the Magnum but lost sight of the vehicle 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 3 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

within a few blocks. Shortly thereafter, another officer, Anthony 

Tedesco, arrived at the intersection of 31st Street and MLK. He 

saw many people looking south on MLK and testified that he began 

collecting shell casings because they were in a busy intersection. 

He recovered thirty-two 7.62 caliber casings associated with 

automatic assault rifles and eight .40 caliber casings from a 

handgun. Later analysis showed that the casings came from an SKStype rifle, an AK-type rifle and a handgun. Residents of several 

nearby homes testified that they heard gun fire and found bullet 

holes in their homes. Mr. Holloway was shot three times in the 

buttocks and legs during the incident. He was not interviewed by 

the police at the time of the shooting. No one at the scene was 

willing to talk to the police officers. 

B. The witnesses 

Two years later, Sergeant Tony Jones was investigating a 

separate March 31, 2008 murder of Kevin McKenzie, a Ghost Town 

resident. Sergeant Jones learned that Mr. Burrell had been 

sitting in the driver’s seat of the car that Mr. McKenzie was next 

to when he was shot. Accordingly, Sergeant Jones requested that 

Mr. Burrell be brought to the station for questioning. Sergeant 

Jones testified that Mr. Burrell told him that he believed the 

person who killed Mr. McKenzie intended to shoot Mr. Burrell. 

Based on this information Sergeant Jones asked Mr. Burrell to 

explain the history of the conflict between the Acorn and Ghost 

Town gangs. Mr. Burrell relayed the story of the June 2006 

funeral dispute and the shooting that took place later that 

afternoon. Based on the information gathered from Mr. Burrell, 

Sergeant Jones also questioned Joy-Nequia Brooks, Dashawna Ross 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 4 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and Jermel Holloway. Petitioner and Elijah Thomas were then 

charged with the 2006 shooting. Each of the 2008 statements and 

the witnesses’ trial testimony are summarized below. 

 1. Petitioner 

 At trial, Petitioner testified that, on the day of the 2006 

shooting, he received a phone call regarding the altercation 

between Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Holloway outside the funeral home on 

Filbert Street. Petitioner further testified that he went to see 

Stevenson to find out what happened. Mr. Stevenson told 

Petitioner about the gathering at MLK and 31st but said he did not 

want to go there because he heard Mr. Holloway was high. 

Petitioner testified that he went to the vigil both to try to talk 

to Mr. Holloway and to pay his respects. Petitioner drove to the 

vigil in a red two-tone Buick and looked for Mr. Holloway. When 

he arrived he saw about sixty people at the intersection. He 

located Mr. Holloway and began walking towards him and calling his 

name from about twelve feet away. Petitioner saw Mr. Holloway 

“whip out” but testified that he could not tell at first “if it 

was a fake gun or some type of joke.” RT 2356-57.1 Petitioner 

testified that he could see Mr. Holloway pointing at him with 

whatever was in his hand and he heard gun shots. Once he heard 

the gun shots, Petitioner began running toward his car. As he 

ran, Petitioner heard automatic gunfire coming from a different 

direction. 

 1 In this Order, RT stands for Reporter’s Transcript; CT for 

Clerk’s Transcript; RAT for Reporter’s Augmented Transcript, and 

CST for Clerk’s Supplemental Transcript. 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 5 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Petitioner testified that he fell to the ground and began 

crawling toward his car when he heard the automatic gunfire. At 

some point, he looked up and saw Mr. Stevenson standing near a 

white Dodge Magnum, firing an automatic rifle into the air. After 

shooting two bursts of gunfire, Mr. Stevenson got into his white 

Dodge Magnum and drove south on MLK. Petitioner testified that he 

saw Mr. Holloway run into the intersection of 31st Street and MLK 

and then get into the backseat of a different white Dodge Magnum 

that also drove south on MLK. After approximately a minute, 

Petitioner got in his car and drove to Kaiser Hospital in Oakland 

to pick up his son’s mother from work. 

 2. Jermel Holloway 

Mr. Holloway, the victim of the 2006 shooting, was killed in 

a separate incident in November 2009 and, hence, was not available 

to testify at trial. At the 2008 preliminary hearing, while he 

discussed the injuries he sustained as a result of the 2006 

shooting, he denied that either Petitioner or his co-defendant, 

Elijah Thomas, shot him in 2006. He stated that he and the mother 

of his child were present at the funeral, but denied that there 

had been any argument. He stated that he heard shots, realized he 

was hit, and then ran into a nearby store. He further stated that 

a stranger drove him to the hospital. 

Prior to the preliminary hearing, Mr. Holloway, incarcerated 

in prison, had spoken to Sergeant Jones. He had refused to allow 

the conversation to be recorded, but Sergeant Jones took notes and 

testified as to their conversation. Sergeant Jones testified that 

Mr. Holloway told him that, prior to the shooting, the Ghost Town 

and Acorn gangs got along. He told him that the argument at the 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 6 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

funeral was a result of Mr. Burton taking Mr. Burrell’s car. He 

said that he then got involved in the argument, and told Mr. 

Stevenson that if he fought Mr. Burton, then he would fight Mr. 

Stevenson. Mr. Stevenson then drove away, saying that he was not 

interested in fighting. Mr. Holloway told Sergeant Jones that he 

had a feeling the Ghost Town gang members were going to come back 

and retaliate. 

Sergeant Jones testified that Mr. Holloway told him that on 

the day of the 2006 shooting, he saw Petitioner and Mr. Thomas 

drive from 31st Street and get out of a white Dodge Magnum with a 

“long chopper.” RT 2063. Sergeant Jones testified that a 

“chopper” is common street terminology for an assault rifle. RT 

2078. Next, he heard shots being fired behind him and got hit in 

the back of the legs. He went on to tell Sergeant Jones that he 

turned around and saw Petitioner shooting at him. 

3. Joy-Nequia Brooks 

 At trial, Joy-Nequia Brooks testified that she was present at 

MLK and 31st Street at the time of the 2006 shooting. She 

testified that she froze for five to ten seconds and then started 

running, so she did not see who was shooting. At trial, Ms. 

Brooks further testified that she had never seen Petitioner or Mr. 

Thomas before. 

In Ms. Brooks’s 2008 statement, she admitted to knowing 

Petitioner as a member of the Acorn gang, knowing his real name 

and having seen him often. Ms. Brooks stated that the argument 

between Mr. Burrell, Mr. Holloway, Mr. Burton and Mr. Stevenson 

could have turned into a fight, “but they wanted to go get guns 

and they came back with guns . . . ” CST 2498. She stated that 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 7 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

as she stood on the corner of 31st Street and MLK, she saw 

Petitioner and Mr. Thomas drive up in a Jaguar to the middle of 

the block on MLK between 31st and 32nd Streets. She stated that 

she saw Mr. Thomas stop the car in the middle of the block, 

Petitioner exit the passenger side, shoot Mr. Holloway, get back 

in the car and leave. She stated that Petitioner used a “big ass 

gun . . . that was like a[n] army gun.” CST 2503. She stated 

that Mr. Stevenson also drove up in a red “scraper car.” CST 

2499. Ms. Brooks stated that Mr. Stevenson got out of his car, 

but Ms. Brooks did not see him shoot at anybody. Ms. Brooks also 

observed a third car drive up at the same time, but she could not 

remember what kind of car it was. 

 3. Aaron Burrell 

 After invoking his Fifth Amendment rights at trial, Mr. 

Burrell was granted immunity as to any testimony given. RT 533. 

 At trial, Mr. Burrell testified that prior to the 2006 

shooting, there were no problems between the Acorn and Ghost Town 

gangs. A month or two prior to the 2006 shooting, Mr. Burrell’s 

car, a Buick with chrome rims, was stolen. After the car was 

stolen, Mr. Burrell saw parts of what he believed to be his car, 

specifically his rims, in other cars in the Acorn neighborhood. 

Mr. Burrell was affiliated with the Ghost Town neighborhood. He 

testified that he believed his god-brother, subsequently 

identified as Marquis Burton, also known as “Flip,” had the car 

because Mr. Burton had a master key used by car thieves to steal 

cars. RT 826. 

 Mr. Burrell testified that, on the day of the 2006 shooting, 

he and his cousin, Dashawna Ross, were at the funeral for Sean, a 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 8 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Ghost Town resident. He stated that, after the funeral, he saw 

Mr. Burton and they began to argue about Mr. Burrell’s stolen car. 

Mr. Burrell stated that Mr. Holloway was with him and that Mr. 

Stevenson, also known as “Weezy,” came to Mr. Burton’s defense. 

During the argument, after Mr. Burrell indicated that he wanted to 

fight Mr. Burton, Mr. Stevenson said that if Mr. Burrell fought 

Mr. Burton, then Mr. Stevenson would fight Mr. Burrell. Mr. 

Holloway jumped in, saying that if Mr. Stevenson fought Mr. 

Burrell, then Mr. Holloway would fight Mr. Stevenson. Mr. Burrell 

stated that after this exchange, Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Burton 

drove off together, while he and Mr. Holloway drove off together. 

 Mr. Burrell testified that, after the funeral, a group of 

people gathered at 31st and MLK, which was in the Acorn 

neighborhood. He arrived at the intersection in a car with Mr. 

Holloway. Then Mr. Holloway parked the car and Mr. Burrell got 

high by smoking marijuana and drinking “syrup,” a form of 

Robitussin with codeine. RT 842. 

 Mr. Burrell testified that, right before the shooting began, 

he noticed several cars, including a white car, but did not see 

any people coming out of the cars. Mr. Burrell stated that he was 

sitting in his friend’s car (which was the same car in which he 

and Mr. Holloway left Sean’s funeral) when the shots were fired 

from behind where he was parked. As the shots were being fired, 

he ran on foot to the backyard of a home and, when the shooting 

stopped, he got back into the car. He testified that he did not 

see who was doing the shooting or who was shot. He further 

testified that he, his friend, and two other people drove away to 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 9 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

East Oakland. Mr. Burrell stated that, later that day, he saw Mr. 

Holloway. 

 At trial, after Mr. Burrell testified as described above, the 

prosecutor played a recording of a conversation between Mr. 

Burrell and Sergeant Jones made after the 2008 shooting that left 

Mr. Burrell’s friend, Mr. McKenzie, dead. Mr. Burrell testified 

that whatever he said that was recorded during that conversation, 

he was telling Sergeant Jones “whatever he wanted to hear to get 

out of there.” RT 864. The prosecutor presented a diagram of the 

area, a diagram to which Mr. Burrell and Sergeant Jones refer in 

the recording. Mr. Burrell told Sergeant Jones that he was “by 

the dead end” of 31st Street during the shooting, looking towards 

32nd Street. CST 2517. He stated that he saw Petitioner get out 

of a white Dodge Magnum and that he saw Mr. Thomas get out of a 

blue BMW SUV. He then told Sergeant Jones that Mr. Thomas was the 

first to start shooting. He told Sergeant Jones, “They start 

shooting. M-A2 had bounced out. He had shot, but he was shooting 

-– he shot hella houses and sh-t.” RT 882. He also told Sergeant 

Jones that Petitioner had an assault rifle that he used to do the 

shooting. In the recording, Mr. Burrell is heard picking 

Petitioner out of a photo array. 

 4. Dashawna Ross (testifying as Raylon Bell) 

 At trial, Ms. Bell testified that she did not know 

Petitioner. She testified that on the day of the shooting, she 

went looking for her son at a funeral being held at Baker’s 

Funeral Home on Filbert Street in the Acorn neighborhood. She 

 2 “M-A” or “M-A-C” are Petitioner’s street names. 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 10 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

stated that she did not find her son in the crowd, so she left the 

area after five or ten minutes. Next, she went to 32nd and MLK, 

again looking for her son. Ms. Bell testified that she doubleparked her car, because there were no parking spots, and looked 

for her son in the crowd. She went on to testify that she did not 

know about Mr. Burrell’s stolen car nor did she see Petitioner 

outside of the funeral home on the date of the shooting. She 

stated that she did not see a shooting. 

 In her 2008 statement to Sergeant Jones, Ms. Bell stated that 

she knew Petitioner from having seen him around the neighborhood, 

and that they had had a two and a half hour conversation at a 

birthday party. She stated that the car which started the 

argument at the funeral was stolen from in front of her home. She 

was at the funeral that day, and had seen and heard the argument 

over the car. After the funeral, Ms. Bell, accompanied by two 

other people, including Ms. Brooks, drove from Ghost Town to 31st 

Street and MLK in the Acorn neighborhood. She told Sergeant Jones 

that, between two and three o’clock in the afternoon that day, she 

saw Petitioner and Mr. Thomas driving down the street. Someone 

yelled that the men were coming, and then “MAC . . . jumped out, 

started shooting.” CST 2536. She also told Sergeant Jones that 

Petitioner had “a chopper, . . . a hundred rounder or something,” 

CST 2537, and that even though she was on the ground, she could 

see Petitioner shooting as she looked under a car. 

 C. The wiretap 

On April 22, 2008, the Oakland Police Department (OPD) 

obtained a warrant authorizing a wiretap on three phone numbers 

associated with members of the Acorn gang. The order was issued 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 11 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 12 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

upon an application by the Alameda County District Attorney, an 

approval by the OPD Chief Wayne Tucker, and an affidavit by OPD 

Officer Steve Valle. The operation focused on three individuals 

named in the application, as well as other “Target Subjects,” 

including Petitioner. The individuals were targeted because OPD 

believed that they were involved in crimes associated with a 

street gang. The wiretap was authorized for thirty days. 

After the initial wiretap was authorized, Officer Valle 

submitted a new affidavit supporting a request to modify the 

original wiretap to include an authorization to tap Petitioner’s 

cellphone, the number of which OPD had recently discovered. 

Neither the District Attorney nor the Chief of Police signed the 

modification request. On May 5, 2008, Alameda County Superior 

Court Judge Jon Rolefson executed a modified order authorizing the 

tapping of Petitioner’s phone. The order acknowledged the 

previous application by the District Attorney, and the approval by 

Chief Tucker. 

A few weeks later, the District Attorney submitted an 

application requesting a thirty day extension of the modified 

wiretap, supported by Officer Valle’s affidavit and OPD Assistant 

Chief Howard Jordan’s approval on behalf of Chief Tucker. On May 

20, 2008, Judge Rolefson authorized an extension of the wiretap 

operation for an additional thirty days. The extension order 

acknowledged the past approval of Chief Tucker. The evidence 

gained from the wiretap was used to establish the 2008 firearms 

charges against Petitioner and Mr. Thomas. 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 12 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 13 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state 

prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, a district court may not grant habeas 

relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: 

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court 

authority, that is, falls under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), 

only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that 

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the 

state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court 

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 412-

13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” 

Supreme Court authority, that is, under the second clause of 

§ 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal 

principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. 

at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ 

“simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment 

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 13 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 14 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the 

application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting 

the writ. Id. at 409. Under AEDPA, the writ may be granted only 

“where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree 

that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s 

precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 

 If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted 

only if the error had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 638 (1993)). 

 When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state 

court to consider the petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the 

last reasoned opinion of the highest court to analyze whether the 

state judgment was erroneous under the standard of § 2254(d). 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). In the present 

case, the highest court to issue a reasoned decision on 

Petitioner’s first claim is the California Court of Appeal, while 

the highest court to state a reasoned decision on his second claim 

is the Superior Court of Alameda County. If no state court has 

adjudicated a federal claim on the merits, the federal court must 

review the claim de novo. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009); 

see also Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(holding that de novo standard of review rather than the 

deferential standard of § 2254(d) applies where state courts never 

reached merits of habeas claim). As discussed below, there is no 

reasoned state court decision for Petitioner’s first claim; hence, 

the Court reviews that claim de novo. 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 14 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 15 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

DISCUSSION 

 Petitioner claims that he was denied the effective assistance 

of counsel on appeal because appellate counsel did not challenge 

(1) the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the attempted 

murder charge or (2) the admission of the wiretap evidence. 

 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees 

a criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his 

first appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 

(1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are 

also reviewed according to the standard set out in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 

285 (2000). First, the petitioner must show that counsel’s 

performance was objectively unreasonable, which in the appellate 

context requires the petitioner to demonstrate that counsel acted 

unreasonably in failing to discover and brief a meritorious issue. 

Id. Second, the petitioner must show prejudice, which in this 

context means that the petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable 

probability that, but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the 

issue, the petitioner would have prevailed in his appeal. Id. 

Appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise 

every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant. Jones v. 

Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983). The weeding out of weaker 

issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective 

appellate advocacy. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Appellate counsel therefore will frequently remain 

above an objective standard of competence and have caused his 

client no prejudice for the same reason —— because he declined to 

raise a weak issue. Id. 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 15 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 16 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

I. First Ground for Relief: Sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the attempted murder conviction 

 Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was deficient 

because he failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the attempted murder charge. Specifically, Petitioner 

argues that the evidence presented that he shot at Mr. Holloway 

came through four unsworn, out-of-court statements that were later 

recanted. 

 The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against 

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” 

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who 

alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction 

cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a 

rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 

states a constitutional claim, which, if proven, entitles him to 

federal habeas relief. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321, 

324 (1979). 

 A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court 

conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the 

evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. 

Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). Nor does a federal 

habeas court in general question a jury’s credibility 

determinations, which are entitled to near-total deference. 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. If confronted by a record that supports 

conflicting inferences, a federal habeas court “must presume —— 

even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record —— that the 

trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 16 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 17 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. The federal 

court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have 

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may the writ be 

granted. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. The Supreme Court has 

recently emphasized that “Jackson claims face a high bar in 

federal habeas proceedings. . . .” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 

2060, 2062 (2012) (per curiam). 

 After AEDPA, a federal habeas court applies the standards of 

Jackson with an additional layer of deference. Juan H. v. Allen, 

408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). To grant relief, a federal 

habeas court must conclude that “the state court’s determination 

that a rational jury could have found that there was sufficient 

evidence of guilt, i.e., that each required element was proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt, was objectively unreasonable.” Boyer 

v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2011). 

 Petitioner’s claim that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient to support an attempted murder conviction is premised 

on the prosecution’s reliance on four out-of-court witness 

statements, all of which were later recanted at trial. Petitioner 

argues that these statements were the “only evidence produced at 

trial,” they were not reliable or substantial, and thus fail the 

substantial evidence test. 

 “A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the 

light most favorable to the judgment and upholds it if the record 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 17 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 18 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

contains reasonable, credible evidence of solid value upon which a 

reasonable trier of fact could have relied in reaching the 

conclusion in question. Once such evidence is found, the 

substantial evidence test is satisfied.” People v. Barnwell, 41 

Cal. 4th 1038, 1052 (2007); see also People v. Banks, 59 Cal. 4th 

1113, 1156 (2014) (“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence, we review the whole record to determine whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt”). 

Accordingly, to find that Petitioner’s counsel was objectively 

unreasonable in failing to raise the sufficiency of evidence issue 

on appeal, Petitioner must show that the out-of-court statements 

at issue are not reasonable, credible evidence of solid value upon 

which a jury could find him guilty of attempted murder. 

Both Petitioner and the State rely on People v. Cuevas, 12 

Cal. 4th 252, 267 (1995), to support their arguments as to the 

sufficiency of the four out-of-court statements. In Cuevas, the 

defendant was convicted of assault with a firearm based on the 

out-of-court identifications by two witnesses, both of whom 

recanted their testimony at trial. Id. The California Supreme 

Court held that the probative value of a subsequently recanted 

out-of-court identification depends on “many varied circumstances” 

including, “(1) the identifying witness’s prior familiarity with 

the defendant; (2) the witness’s opportunity to observe the 

perpetrator during the commission of the crime; (3) whether the 

witness has a motive to falsely implicate the defendant; and 

(4) the level of detail given by the witness in the out-of-court 

identification and any accompanying description of the crime.” 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 18 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 19 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that there was “no logic 

to requiring corroboration of out-of-court identifications, but 

not of other types of hearsay that might be offered as evidence of 

guilt.” Id. at 265. It also agreed with other courts that “an 

out-of-court identification can be sufficient by itself to support 

a conviction even in the absence of other evidence connecting the 

defendant to the crime.” Id. at 266-67. Thus, the Court held 

that out-of-court statements need not be corroborated to be 

considered sufficient evidence upon which to base a conviction. 

After considering the Cuevas factors, this Court, in its de 

novo review, finds that the out-of-court statements had sufficient 

probative value to support the attempted murder conviction. 

1. Prior familiarity with Petitioner 

Petitioner admits that “all four witnesses were familiar or 

very familiar” with him. Traverse, 35. In her 2008 statement to 

Sergeant Jones, Ms. Bell stated that she and Petitioner had a two 

and a half hour conversation at a recent birthday party. Ms. 

Brooks admitted, in 2008, to knowing Petitioner, his gang 

affiliation, and his real name and to having seen him often. 

2. Opportunity to observe Petitioner during the crime 

At trial, Mr. Burrell, Ms. Brooks and Ms. Bell denied seeing 

Petitioner at the scene of the crime. However, in their 2008 

pretrial statements, each placed Petitioner at the scene and 

stated they were in a position to see the crime as it was 

committed. Ms. Bell stated that, even though she was on the 

ground when the shots were fired, from her spot under the car, she 

could see Petitioner shooting. Ms. Brooks stated that she was 

near the shooting and described the gun Petitioner carried. Mr. 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 19 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 20 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Burrell stated that from his car, parked at the “dead end” of 31st 

Street, he saw Petitioner exit a white Dodge Magnum and start 

shooting. 

3. Motive to falsely implicate Petitioner 

Petitioner argues that because the witnesses are each 

affiliated with Ghost Town, they have a motive to lie about him, 

as a member of the rival Acorn gang. Yet, this fact could also be 

interpreted against Petitioner. It is unlikely that witnesses 

seeking to frame Petitioner would recant the very statements that 

implicate him in this crime. 

4. Level of detail given by the witnesses and any 

accompanying description of the crime 

Petitioner placed himself at the scene of the shooting, as 

did all of the witnesses in their out-of-court statements. Ms. 

Brooks stated that she was privy to the argument at the funeral 

home, and gave a detailed description of the shooting, including 

seeing Petitioner with a gun, and a description of the gun 

Petitioner carried. Ms. Bell gave a similar description of the 

gun, provided details about the car stolen from in front of her 

house and stated details about what was said during the shooting, 

what time it took place and identified Petitioner as a shooter. 

Mr. Burrell also gave details about Petitioner’s car, the 

direction from which the cars came before the shooting, and 

corroborated Ms. Brooks’s and Ms. Bell’s statement about seeing 

Petitioner fire his gun and the type of gun Petitioner used in the 

shooting. The statements about the type of gun used were 

corroborated by the assault-rifle-caliber bullet holes found in 

the surrounding houses. 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 20 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 21 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

On balance, each of the Cuevas factors for evaluating out-ofcourt statements weighs heavily in favor of finding the out-ofcourt statements to be credible evidence of solid value. All of 

the witnesses were familiar with Petitioner, making it likely that 

they would be able to identify him as the shooter. They all admit 

to being present at the scene when the shooting took place and, by 

recanting, eliminate the suggestion that they were trying to 

implicate Petitioner falsely. Lastly, all four witnesses provided 

detailed accounts of the shooting, and their stories corroborate 

each other. 

Furthermore, in Cuevas, the California Supreme Court set out 

a number of factors for evaluating the significance of a failure 

to make an in-court identification: 

(1) whether the identifying witness admits, denies, or fails 

to remember making the out-of-court identification; 

(2) whether the witness remembers the underlying events of 

the crime but no longer believes in the accuracy of the outof-court identification; (3) whether, if the witness claims 

the identification was false or erroneous, the witness offers 

an explanation for making a false or erroneous 

identification; [and] (4) whether, if the witness claims a 

failure of recollection, there are reasons supporting the 

loss of memory; (5) whether there is evidence that the 

witness’s failure to confirm the identification in court 

resulted from the witness’s appreciation that doing so would 

result in the defendant’s conviction; or (6) whether there is 

evidence that . . . the witness’s failure to confirm the 

identification arises from fear or intimidation. 

12 Cal. 4th at 267-268. The most relevant here is that of 

evidence that a witness’s recantation is due to fear of 

retaliation. 

In her 2008 statement to Sergeant Jones, Ms. Ross stated that 

she was afraid of retaliation and did not want to go to court 

because of events that occurred the last time she was in court. 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 21 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 22 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

She explained, “I done got threatened and chased down and people 

want to kill me behind going to court.” CST 2529. Sergeant Jones 

then asked Ms. Ross if the reason she did not want to testify was 

that she was “afraid of something happening to” her. Id. She 

replied, “Exactly. Exactly.” Id. Accordingly, Ms. Ross’s fear 

of retaliation can explain why her trial testimony was different 

from her statements to the police. Likewise, Ms. Brooks stated in 

her pretrial statement that after the 2006 shooting, she had 

attempted to keep her distance from Petitioner, CST 2903, implying 

that she was afraid of Petitioner. 

Thus, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the 

out-of-court statements made by the witnesses meet the substantial 

evidence test, in spite of the subsequent recantations. Hence, 

appellate counsel could have reasonably concluded that, given that 

the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, there was 

no merit to bringing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge on 

appeal. 

Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown, as required under 

Strickland, “that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” Medley, 506 F.3d at 861. The Ninth Circuit applies 

Strickland to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See 

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We review 

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel according to 

the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

(1984)). Under Strickland, a showing of prejudice means 

Petitioner “must show that counsel’s advice fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness, . . . and that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 22 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 23 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

errors, [Petitioner] would have prevailed on appeal.” Miller, 882 

F.2d at 1434. 

 As discussed above, a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence likely would not have succeeded. Hence, even assuming 

his counsel’s performance was unreasonable, Petitioner has not 

shown that he suffered prejudice. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

request for habeas relief on this ground is DENIED. 

II. Second Ground for Relief: Motion to Suppress Wiretap Evidence 

 Petitioner next argues that appellate counsel was ineffective 

in failing to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the 

wiretap evidence used to support his firearms convictions.3 

The original wiretap authorization, signed by the District 

Attorney, the Chief of Police, and accompanied by an affidavit 

from Officer Valle, allowed for the monitoring of three target 

telephones. For the modification, Officer Valle asked Judge 

Rolefson to add a fourth telephone line, specifically, that of 

Petitioner. Chief Tucker was unavailable to sign the modified 

application and the District Attorney also did not sign. In the 

 3 Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted to 

the extent he argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in 

failing to raise a Fourth Amendment argument regarding the wiretap 

evidence. However, Respondent also appears to acknowledge that 

Petitioner has exhausted both of his claims. See Docket No. 15 at 

19. Even if Petitioner were making a Fourth Amendment claim, it 

would fail for the reasons discussed herein. A habeas claim can 

be denied even if it is unexhausted. See Pimpton v. Carey, 216 F. 

App’x 696, 697 (9th Cir. 2007) (“§ 2254(b)(2) permits denial of a 

federal habeas petition on the merits, notwithstanding the 

applicant’s failure to exhaust, only where ‘it is perfectly clear 

that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal 

claim’”) (quoting Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th 

Cir. 2005)). 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 23 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 24 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

place of the Police Chief, however, the Assistant Chief of Police, 

Howard Johnson, signed the application. 

California law requires that “[e]ach application for an order 

authorizing the interception of a wire or electronic communication 

shall be made in writing upon the personal oath or affirmation of 

the Attorney General. . . or [of] a district attorney, or the 

person designated to act as district attorney in the district 

attorney’s absence . . . to the presiding judge of the superior 

court or one other judge designated by the presiding judge.” Cal. 

Penal Code § 629.50(a). 

California courts look to federal as well as California law 

in applying the California wiretap statute. People v. Jackson, 

129 Cal. App. 4th 129, 147 (2005). The Jackson court noted that 

the United States Supreme Court held that “exclusion of wiretap 

evidence is required under Title III only when there is a failure 

to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and 

substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the 

use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling 

for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device.” 

Id. at 149 (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 506 

(1974)). 

In Jackson, the California Court of Appeal explained the 

proper analysis of a motion to suppress wiretap evidence: 

(1) Has the defendant established a violation of a provision 

of the wiretap law? If not, the motion is denied. (2) If a 

wiretap violation has been established was the provision 

violated one which “was intended to play a central role in 

the statutory scheme[?]” If the provision was not intended 

to “play a central role,” failing to comply with it will not 

render interceptions under the wiretap order unlawful and the 

motion is denied. (3) If the provision violated was central 

to the legislative scheme was the purpose of the provision 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 24 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 25 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

achieved in spite of the error? If the purpose was achieved, 

the motion is denied. If the purpose was not achieved, the 

motion is granted. 

Id. The Jackson court relied on federal law, the Ninth Circuit’s 

opinion in United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 592 (9th Cir. 

1974). See Jackson, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 150 n.38 (“This test is 

drawn from United States v. Chun. . . . The Chun test, or one 

substantially like it, has been followed in most other circuits”). 

Here, the Superior Court interpreted the facts surrounding 

this wiretap in the light of the California statute and Jackson. 

With regard to the first and second Jackson questions, the 

Superior Court stated, 

It’s clear in reading the statute that the statute requires 

the authorization of the District Attorney and the head of 

the police agency for any order or modification. I don’t 

know how it could be any clearer. So that’s my view of the 

first question. Second question is does that . . . 

authorization play a central role. . . Chavez would suggest 

it does play a central role. . . . Even when we are talking 

about a modification, because that seems to me that the 

statute is contemplating, as I’ve already indicated in answer 

to the first question, that the request to modify these 

things, to the extent that they may include additional 

persons or additional numbers, should also be authorized by 

the enforcement officer, . . . in our case, the District 

Attorney and the chief of police. 

RAT 38-40. 

 On the last Jackson question, however, the trial court 

stated, 

Was the purpose of the provision achieved in spite of the 

error. And it seems to me in reading all of the documents 

that it was achieved. And that was what was originally 

approved by Mr. Orloff [the District Attorney] and the chief 

of police was a request to allow the wiretap of three target 

telephones, 1, 2 and 3; however, what’s clear from all the 

documents is the context of the investigation, the fact that 

additional phones were at that point, phone numbers not 

known, that from my reading of the documents, there was no 

greater target of the investigation than Mr. Candler, seems 

to me, have been the chief target of this investigation. All 

the information before me in these dockets, what has alleged 

to have been Mr. Candler’s role and the organization that he 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 25 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 26 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

is alleged to have been the chief executive officer of, was 

the target of the investigation, and the purpose of the 

initial request or the limitation of the initial request for 

those first three phone numbers is because that’s all that 

were known at the time. 

 It’s clearly indicated from the documents that the 

officers did not know particular phone numbers associated 

with Mr. Candler. They believe Mr. Candler changed his phone 

number quite often. That was consistent with their 

experience in similar investigations. Indeed, all the 

information that was obtained was in regard to target phone 

number, phone Number 4, was that it was only used by Mr. 

Candler and not indeed in his name. 

 So that also was, to my mind, consistent with the 

difficulty from the standpoint of the police at the time they 

presented these documents to Judge Rolefson and consistent 

with their representations about the difficulty of the 

investigation, the difficulty of finding out information what 

would be particular to Mr. Candler and while the requirement 

of the authorization of Mr. Orloff and the chief of police is 

both a statutory and seems to me to be one central to the 

statutory scheme, it seems to me that their review and their 

authorization of this investigation and its goals, which is 

what the point is, was accomplished. 

Petitioner argues that the trial court misapplied the 

California wiretap statute and that appellate counsel was 

ineffective for not raising this issue on appeal. To succeed on 

this claim, Petitioner must show that the appellate court, had 

this issue been raised, would have ruled in his favor and found 

that the purpose of the violated provision was not achieved due to 

the absence of key signatures on the wiretap modification 

application. Jackson, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 149. 

 Petitioner relies on United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 

(1974), and United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974). 

Petitioner’s application of the principles discussed in both cases 

is misplaced. 

In Giordano, 

it developed at the hearings that the applications for 

interception authority presented to the District Court had 

inaccurately described the official who had authorized the 

applications and that neither the initial application for the 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 26 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 27 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

October 16 order nor the application for the November 6 

extension order had been approved and authorized by Assistant 

Attorney General Will Wilson, as the applications had 

indicated. 

416 U.S. at 509-510. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled, “We 

are confident that the provision for pre-application approval was 

intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme and that 

suppression must follow when it is shown that this statutory 

requirement has been ignored.” Id. at 528. In Giordano, however, 

“neither the initial application . . . nor the application for the 

. . . extension” contained the required signatures. Here, the 

original wiretap was authorized and signed by both the District 

Attorney and the Chief of Police. 

In Chavez, the Supreme Court held, “Under § 2515, suppression 

is not mandated for every violation of Title III, but only if 

‘disclosure’ of the contents of intercepted communications, or 

derivative evidence, would be in violation of Title III.” 416 

U.S. at 574-575. In Chavez, the Court declined to require 

suppression of wiretap evidence where the Assistant Attorney 

General was misidentified as giving authorization when “the 

Attorney General himself has actually given the approval.” 416 

U.S. at 569. Here, the District Attorney and the Chief of Police 

authorized the initial wiretap. The trial court also found that, 

at the time of the initial application, Petitioner was “the chief 

target of th[e] investigation.” Docket No. 1-1 at 24. 

 Thus, Petitioner has not satisfied his burden of showing that 

the trial court’s admission of the wiretap evidence was such that 

the appellate court would likely have found that the trial court 

erred. 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 27 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 28 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Moreover, Petitioner has not shown, as required under 

Strickland, “that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” Medley, 506 F.3d at 861. As discussed above, even if 

appellate counsel were to have raised this issue on appeal, the 

appellate court could have reasonably agreed with the trial court. 

Hence, Petitioner has not satisfied his burden that appellate 

counsel unreasonably failed to bring a challenge on this ground. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for habeas relief on this ground 

is DENIED. 

III. Evidentiary Hearing 

A habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on 

disputed facts where his allegations, if proven, would entitle him 

to relief. Perez v. Rosario, 459 F.3d 943, 954 n.5 (9th Cir. 

2006); Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he 

has failed to present any allegations which, if proven, would 

entitle him to relief. 

IV. Certificate of Appealability 

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state 

prisoners require a district court that denies a habeas petition 

to grant or deny a certificate of appealability in the ruling. 

Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 

 A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas 

corpus proceeding without first obtaining a certificate of 

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A 

judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 28 of 29
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

 29 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The certificate 

must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(3). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to 

satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 

wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 The Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find its 

ruling on any of Petitioner’s claims debatable or wrong. 

Therefore, a certificate of appealability is denied. 

 Petitioner may not appeal the denial of a certificate of 

appealability in this Court but may seek a certificate from the 

Court of Appeals under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows: 

 1. The request for an evidentiary hearing is denied. 

2. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. 

 3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter a separate judgment, 

terminate all pending motions and close the file. 

 4. A certificate of appealability is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 13, 2015 

CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge 

Case 4:13-cv-05325-CW Document 34 Filed 02/13/15 Page 29 of 29