Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02235/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02235-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Because Harvey’s Petition is not consecutively paginated,

the Court will cite to it using the page numbers assigned by the

electronic case filing system.

1 10cv02235 JAH(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL ALONZO HARVEY, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

F. GONZALES et al.,

Respondents. 

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Case No. 10cv02235 JAH(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [ECF No. 1]

Petitioner Michael Alonzo Harvey, Jr., a state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus on October 27, 2010, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

[ECF Nos. 1, 3].1 First, Petitioner contends that relief is

warranted because the trial court erred in admitting evidence of

Harvey’s parole status. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) Second, Harvey

argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his

kidnapping for robbery conviction on the theory presented to the

jury. (Id. at 9-10.) Harvey also names Warden F. Gonzales and

Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, Jr. as Respondents. (Id. at 1.)

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On January 5, 2011, Respondent’s Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus was filed, including a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities and a Notice of Lodgment [ECF No. 6]. The Attorney

General of the State of California asserts that it is not a proper

respondent and should therefore be dismissed. (Answer 1 n.1, ECF

No. 6.) Warden Gonzales alleges that Harvey’s claim for

evidentiary error in ground one fails because it is unexhausted and

does not present a federal question. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

2.) The warden also asserts that ground two should be denied

because there was sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s

kidnapping conviction, and the state courts’ rejection of his claim

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal

law. (Id. at 3.) 

Harvey filed a Traverse on February 17, 2011 [ECF No. 7]. 

There, Petitioner concedes that he failed to exhaust the

allegations in ground one, but asks the Court to still consider the

merits of ground one or, in the alternative, stay his Petition so

he may exhaust his state remedies. (Traverse 1-3, ECF No. 7.) 

Petitioner continues to assert that he is entitled to habeas relief

for his claim in ground two. (Id.) 

The Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and

lodgments, and Harvey’s Traverse. For the reasons discussed below,

the Petition should be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In March 2008, Virginia Rodgers, an escort, advertised her

services on Craig’s list. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. Appeal vol.

4, 199-200, Nov. 18, 2008.) At approximately 2:30 a.m., on March

11, 2008, Rodgers received a phone call from a man who said his

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name was, “Chris.” (Id. at 201.) Rodgers later identified him as

Michael Harvey. (Id. at 211.) Harvey attempted to set up a date

with Rodgers, and he asked her to meet him at an apartment in El

Cajon, California. (Id. at 201-02.) Rodgers agreed. (Id. at

202.) 

Rodgers called her boyfriend, Marcel Crowel, to get a ride to

the apartment complex. (Id. at 203-04.) Crowel did not know that

Rodgers was a prostitute and claims that he was unaware that he was

driving her to a date. (Id. at 204.) Rodgers called Harvey a

couple of times to let him know she was on the way. (Id. at 202-

03.) After arriving, Crowel parked his truck in the parking lot of

the complex; Rodgers had a difficult time locating Harvey’s

apartment, so she called Harvey again, and he told her to meet him

by the pool area. (Id. at 205.) Harvey arrived at the pool a few

minutes after Rodgers. (Id.) As the two of them walked toward the

apartment, Harvey said, “You thought I was a trick. I’m a pimp and

you know what this is.” (Id. at 206.) While Harvey said this, he

pulled out a gun, pointed it at Rodgers, and demanded money. (Id.) 

When Rodgers told Harvey that she did not have any money, Harvey

replied, “Well, it’s going to be a long night and we could go for a

ride. It’d be a pimp with a dead ho on their hands.” (Id. at

207.) 

As the two of them approached apartment 128, Rodgers stopped

because she was afraid what might happen if she went inside

Harvey’s apartment. (Id. at 208.) She told Harvey that she had

some money in her car; they both began walking towards the parking

lot where Crowel was waiting in his truck for Rodgers, even though

Rodgers did not have any money in her vehicle. (Id. at 208-09.) 

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While they were walking, Rodgers asked Harvey why he was so angry

and Harvey replied, “cause bitches like [Rodgers] disrespect the

game. We don’t know what we are doing because we are independent.” 

(Id. at 210.) When Rodgers reached the sidewalk, she ran towards

Crowel’s car in an attempt to escape, but Harvey shot Rodgers as

she ran, hitting the right side of her face. (Id. at 210-11.) 

Despite being shot, Rodgers continued towards Crowel’s truck. (Id.

at 212.)

Once Rodgers got into Crowel’s truck, Crowel drove away. 

(Id.) Rodgers told Crowel to drop her off at a gas station because

she did not want to get him in trouble, as he was on parole. (Id.) 

Crowel dropped Rodgers off next to a Shell gas station, where

Rodgers told the gas station attendant, Roy Purcell, that she had

been shot and needed help. (Id. at 175, 213.) Purcell noticed a

large distortion on the right side of Rodgers’s face and he called

an ambulance. (Id.) 

As a result of the gunshot wound, Rodgers sustained a

fractured jaw and her jaw was wired shut for two months. (Id. at

215.) On April 17, 2008, Rodgers positively identified Harvey in a

photo lineup. (Id. at 220-21.) On the same day, Officer Bueno met

Rodgers at the apartment, and Bueno measured the distance from the

pool to apartment 128 as well as from the apartment to where

Rodgers was shot. (Id. at 231-33.) The distance from where Harvey

pulled a gun on Rodgers and where the shooting occurred was 689

feet, and the distance from where Harvey and Rodgers met by the

pool to the parking lot was 697 feet. (Id. vol. 5, 319, Nov. 19,

2008.)

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The defense theory at trial was that Crowel shot Rodgers, not

Harvey, and that Crowel later cleaned his truck to hide the

evidence. (Id. at 225-26; id. vol. 6, 610-11, Nov. 20 & 21, 2008.) 

Defense counsel implied that Crowel was, in fact, Rodgers’s pimp

and that Crowel shot her because she did not return to the truck

with his money. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6, 615.) The

trial court instructed the jury on the consent element of

kidnapping for robbery, but did not include a specific instruction

explaining withdrawn consent. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1,

69-70.) 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 21, 2009, a jury found Harvey guilty of

premeditated attempted murder, kidnapping for robbery, and

attempted robbery. (Id. at 79-85.) Harvey was sentenced to state

prison for two life terms with the possibility of parole, plus

fifty years-to-life, and five years. (Id. at 183-86.) 

Harvey filed a notice of appeal on January 20, 2009. (Id. at

187.) The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

Division One, upheld Harvey’s kidnapping for robbery and attempted

robbery convictions, but reversed his attempted murder conviction

because of an erroneous jury instruction. (Lodgment No. 5, People

v. Harvey, No. D054498, slip op. at 17 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 24,

2009).)

Harvey appealed to the California Supreme Court on October 29,

2009. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Harvey, No. S177443 (Cal. filed

Oct. 29, 2009) (petition for review at 1).) There, Harvey

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of

aggravated kidnapping for robbery based on the instruction given to

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the jury. (Id. at 5.) The California Supreme Court denied review

without opinion on December 2, 2009. (Lodgment No. 7, People v.

Harvey, No. S177443, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Dec. 2, 2009).) On

October 27, 2010, Harvey filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus [ECF No. 1]. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Harvey’s Petition is subject to the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 because it was filed

after April 24, 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006); Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991).

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege his conviction was obtained in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C.A §

2254(a). In other words, a petitioner must allege the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhald

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

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application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding federal courts have no authority to review a state’s

application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas relief

only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation).

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended section 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgement of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A § 2254(d).

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under section 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). A federal

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court is therefore not required to review the state court decision

de novo, but may proceed directly to the reasonableness analysis

under § 2254(d)(1). Id.

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis in original

deleted). Section 2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies only the

Supreme Court as the font of ‘clearly established’ rules.” (Id.) 

“[A] state court decision may not be overturned on habeas corpus

review, for example, because of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based

law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may issue only when the

state court decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of,’ an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court.” 

Id. (citing Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1224-26 (5th Cir.

1997); Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996); see

Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgement of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

IV. DISCUSSION

In his Petition, Harvey raises two grounds for relief. In

ground one, he claims that the trial court erred in admitting

evidence of his parole status. (Pet. 6-8, ECF No. 1.) In ground

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two, the Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence

to convict him of aggravated kidnapping for robbery under the

theory presented to the jury. (Id. at 9-12.) 

A. Respondent Edmund G. Brown, Jr.

Harvey names both Warden Gonzales and former-Attorney General

Edmund G. Brown, Jr. as Respondents. (Pet. 1, ECF No. 1.) 

Respondent Gonzales argues that the Attorney General for the State

of California is an improper party and should be dismissed. 

(Answer 1 n.1, ECF No. 6.) 

On federal habeas review, a prisoner must name as respondent

the state officer who has custody of him. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez,

81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C.A.

foll. § 2254). Federal courts lack personal jurisdiction when the

petitioner fails to name a proper respondent. See id. Although

the warden is the typical respondent, “the rules following section

2254 do not specify the warden.” Id. “[T]he ‘state officer having

custody’ may be ‘either the warden of the institution in which the

petitioner is incarcerated . . . or the chief officer in charge of

state penal institutions.’” Id. (citation omitted). Nonetheless,

if a petitioner is in custody due to a state conviction he is

challenging, he must name the state officer who has official

custody of him as the respondent. Id. (quotation omitted).

“[A] petitioner may not seek [a writ of] habeas corpus against

the State under . . . [whose] authority . . . the petitioner is in

custody. The actual person who is [the] custodian [of the

petitioner] must be the respondent.” Ashley v. Washington, 394

F.2d 125, 126 (9th Cir. 1968). This requirement exists because a

writ of habeas corpus acts upon the custodian of the state

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prisoner, the person who will produce “the body” if directed to do

so by the court. “Both the warden of a California prison and the

Director of Corrections for California have the power to produce

the prisoner.” Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 895.

Here, Harvey names Warden Gonzales, who is a proper

Respondent. Former-Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, however, is

not a proper Respondent and should be DISMISSED with prejudice for

the reasons stated above.

B. Ground One: Evidentiary Error

The Petitioner alleges in ground one that the trial court

erred in admitting evidence that Harvey was on parole at the time

of the charged crimes, in violation of his due process right to a

fair trial. (Pet. 6, ECF No.1.) In particular, Harvey’s parole

agent at the time the crimes were committed was permitted to

testify at trial regarding whether Petitioner owned the telephone

that was used to call Rodgers. (See id. at 6-7.) Because the

word, “parole,” is inflammatory and prejudicial, Harvey contends

that the evidentiary error violates his federal constitutional

right to due process of law. (Id. at 6.) 

In his Answer, Respondent Gonzales asserts that Harvey failed

to exhaust the claim because although he presented it on direct

appeal to the court of appeal, he did not raise the issue in his

petition to the California Supreme Court. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 2, ECF No. 6.) Even if the Court considered the merits of

ground one, Respondent alleges, the claim fails because it does not

present a federal question. (Id.) 

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1. Exhaustion

Before a federal court may grant habeas relief on a claim, a

petitioner must exhaust all available state judicial remedies. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273-74

(2005). A claim is exhausted only when a petitioner has fairly

presented it to the state courts. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

365 (1995) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). To

meet the fair presentation requirement, the petitioner must “alert

the state courts to the fact that he [is] asserting a claim under

the United States Constitution.” Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098,

1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66). The

petitioner must “provide the state courts with a ‘fair opportunity’

to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his

constitutional claim.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)

(citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 276-77). By giving state

courts the “‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights,” comity is promoted,

and disruption of state judicial proceedings is prevented. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365 (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 275); see also Rose,

455 U.S. at 518; Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th

Cir. 2005).

Constitutional claims raised in federal proceedings must be

presented to the state courts first. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.

27, 31-32 (2004). A petitioner must provide the highest state

court with a fair opportunity to consider the factual and legal

bases of his claims before presenting them to the federal court.

Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Picard, 404 U.S. at 276; Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th

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Cir. 1996); see also Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365; Scott v. Schriro, 567

F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1008

(9th Cir. 2008). A claim is not exhausted if it is pending before

the state’s highest court. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 515 (“[A]s a

matter of comity, federal courts should not consider a claim in a

habeas corpus petition until after the state courts have had an

opportunity to act . . . .”); Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027,

1036 (9th Cir. 2004) (“AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement entitles a

state to pass on a prisoner’s federal claims before the federal

courts do so.”). “It follows, of course, that once the federal

claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied.” Picard, 404 U.S. at 275. 

In his Traverse, Harvey concedes that he did not exhaust his

state court remedies as to ground one. (Traverse 1-2, ECF No. 7.) 

Nonetheless, Petitioner urges the Court to consider the claim on

the merits and grant him habeas corpus relief. (Id.)

Alternatively, he requests that the Court give him leave to exhaust

the evidentiary error claim. (Id. at 2.) Gonzales and Harvey

therefore agree that Harvey failed to exhaust his evidentiary claim

for ground one because he did not raise the issue in his petition

to the California Supreme Court. 

On January 20, 2009, the Petitioner filed a notice of appeal

with the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.

vol. 1, 187.) In his appeal, Harvey argued that the trial court

erred in admitting evidence of his parol status, that there is

insufficient evidence to uphold Harvey’s kidnapping for robbery

conviction on the theory presented to the jury, and that the court

gave improper jury instructions for attempted murder. (Lodgment

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No. 3, Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1-2, People v. Harvey, No.

D054498 (Cal. Ct. App. filed May 26, 2009).) The court of appeal

reversed the attempted murder conviction, but upheld the other

convictions. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Harvey, No. D054498, slip

op. at 17.)

Harvey then appealed to the California Supreme Court on

October 29, 2010. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Harvey, No. S177443

(petition for review at 1).) There, Harvey alleged that his

kidnapping-for-robbery conviction should be reversed because there

was insufficient evidence and that the trial court failed to

provide the jury with an instruction on withdrawn consent. (Id. at

5.) Harvey did not raise the evidentiary error claim regarding the

trial court’s decision to permit the admission of evidence of

Harvey’s parole status. The Petitioner failed to exhaust the

evidentiary error claim because he did not raise the issue with the

California Supreme Court, as required. See Weaver, 197 F.3d at

364. 

Nevertheless, the Court may deny an application for habeas

relief on the merits even if the petitioner has not yet exhausted

his state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2). “[A]

federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on the merits only

when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a

colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-24

(9th Cir. 2005). To that end, this Court will consider the merits

of ground one.

2. Whether ground one should be denied on the merits

Harvey’s allegation is that the trial court erred when it

allowed the introduction of evidence that Petitioner was on parole

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at the time of the charged crimes because the word, “parole,” is

prejudicial. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) Harvey maintains that during

the prosecutor’s opening statement, the district attorney used the

word “parole” repeatedly. (Id. at 7.) Also, when Petitioner’s

parole agent at the time, Parole Agent Fonte, was ready to testify,

the attorneys discussed with the trial court whether Fonte should

be permitted to introduce himself as Harvey’s then-parole agent. 

(See id.) Harvey alleges that the trial judge agreed that the term

“parole” was inflammatory, but when the district attorney told the

judge about Fonte’s limited availability, the judge allowed Fonte

to inform the jury that he was Harvey’s parole agent because it

gave Fonte’s testimony credibility. (Id.) Thus, even if the judge

did not permit Fonte to reveal that he was a parole agent, the jury

was still tainted by the prosecutor’s use of the word, “parole,”

during opening statements. (Id.) 

Further, Harvey posits the people already had sufficient proof

that the calls placed to Rodgers on the night of the incident were

made from Harvey’s telephone. (Id.) Fonte’s testimony was

therefore cumulative because Petitioner had the phone on his person

when he was arrested, and the people had an interrogation video in

which Harvey and the interrogating officer discuss the phone

because it kept ringing during the interrogation. (Id.) 

Petitioner asserts that if the jurors were not informed of Harvey’s

parole status, the outcome would have been different. (See id. at

6-8.) Petitioner insists that he was deprived of his

constitutional right to a fair trial. (Id. at 6.)

The warden argues in his Answer that even if the Court

considers the merits of Petitioner’s unexhausted claim, the

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allegation should be denied because it does not raise a federal

question. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2-3, ECF No. 6.) 

Respondent asserts that Harvey is challenging the state courts’

application of the California Evidence Code, and Petitioner fails

to reference the Constitution or any federal law. (Id. at 3

(citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)).) 

In his Traverse, Petitioner clarifies that his federal due

process right to a fair trial was violated when the trial court

allowed evidence of his parole status at trial. (Traverse 1, ECF

No. 7.) Harvey maintains that the Court should consider the merits

of his claim and grant him relief or stay his Petition so that he

can exhaust his state remedies. (Id. at 1-2.)

“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws or

treaties of the United States.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68; 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). Habeas relief is not available for an alleged

error in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle,

502 U.S. at 67-68; Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th

Cir. 1991); O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1990). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, a petitioner must allege a

deprivation of federal rights. Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d

1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986). “[F]ailure to comply with the state’s

rules of evidence is neither necessary nor a sufficient basis for

granting habeas relief.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919.

Indeed, if Harvey merely challenged the state court’s

application of state rules of evidence, he would not have alleged a

deprivation of federal rights. Yet, Petitioner explicitly asserts

that the admission of evidence indicating that he was on parole at

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the time of the incident deprived him of due process, which is a

cognizable claim under § 2254. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1 (arguing that

the evidentiary ruling violated his “rights ‘to a fair and proper

trial.’”)); see Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir.

1983). Therefore, the Court’s inquiry is whether the state courts’

rejection of Harvey’s due process claim regarding the admission of

evidence of his parole status was objectively unreasonable.

“The Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of

fairness in a criminal trial.” Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,

563-64 (1967). “Denial of due process in a criminal trial ‘is the

failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very

concept of justice . . . . we must find that the absence of that

fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be

of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’” 

Kealohapauole, 800 F.2d at 1466 (citation omitted). “The admission

of evidence does not provide a basis for habeas relief unless it

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due

process.” Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68); see Karis v. Calderon, 283

F.3d 1117, 1129 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Lopes v. Campbell,

408 F. App’x 13, 16 (9th Cir. 2010). Consequently, a habeas

petitioner “bears a heavy burden in showing a due process violation

based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159,

1172 (9th Cir. 2005). 

AEDPA further restricts this standard. In Holley v.

Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit

determined:

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Under AEDPA, even clearly erroneous admissions of

evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not

permit the grant of federal habeas corpus relief if not

forbidden by “clearly established Federal law,” as laid

out by the Supreme Court. In cases where the Supreme

Court has not adequately addressed a claim, this court

cannot use its own precedent to find a state court ruling

unreasonable.

The Supreme Court has made very few rulings

regarding the admission of evidence as a violation of due

process. Although the Court has been clear that a writ

should be issued when constitutional errors have rendered

the trial fundamentally unfair, it has not yet made a

clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly

prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation

sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ. Absent such

“clearly established Federal law,” we cannot conclude

that the state court’s ruling was an “unreasonable

application.” 

Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101 (internal citations omitted); see also

Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2008).

When reviewing a state court decision, federal courts must

look to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the

judgment. Polk v. Sandoval, 503 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 880 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Because Harvey did not present the evidentiary error claim to the

state supreme court, as discussed, this Court will look to the

appellate court’s decision to determine whether it was “contrary

to” or an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal

law. See id.; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13

(2000).

“A state court decision is contrary to clearly established

federal law if the state court either applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth by the Supreme Court or

arrives at a different result when confronted by a set of facts

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the

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Supreme Court.” Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.

2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06); see also Butler, 528

F.3d at 640. A state court decision is an unreasonable application

of federal law when it applies Supreme Court precedent in an

objectively unreasonable manner, or unreasonably fails to extend

the legal principles of a Supreme Court decision to situations

which it should have controlled. Sims, 414 F.3d at 1152 (citing

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005); Ramdass v. Angelone, 530

U.S. 156, 166 (2000)); see also Butler, 528 F.3d at 640.

When ruling on Harvey’s direct appeal, the California Court of

Appeal recited the following relevant facts:

After his arrest, Harvey told investigators that he

knew nothing about the shooting. When investigators

confronted Harvey with cell phone records showing that

calls had been placed to Rodgers before the crime from

his cell phone, he gave a variety of explanations,

including that his cell phone had been lost or stolen. 

Before trial, the prosecutor informed the trial court

that he intended to introduce Rodgers’s and Harvey’s cell

phone records to prove that Harvey had spoken to Rodgers

before the crime. To undercut Harvey’s defense that his

cell phone had been lost or stolen, the prosecutor sought

to introduce evidence from Harvey’s parole agent, Mark

Fonte, linking Harvey to the cell phone number used in

the crime.

When the prosecutor inquired whether he could

disclose to the jury that Harvey was on parole when the

shooting occurred, the trial court indicated that the

relationship between Fonte and Harvey gave credibility to

the exchange, but that it would consider a limiting

instruction telling the jury not to speculate why Harvey

was on parole. Defense counsel argued that he would not

challenge the credibility of Fonte’s testimony, and

suggested that the jury be told that Fonte was employed

by the State of California. Although the trial court

found that the word “parole” was inflammatory, it

concluded that “sanitiz[ing]” the information removed its

credibility. The trial court concluded that the

probative value of the information outweighed any

prejudice, but agreed to provide the jury with a limiting

instruction.

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When the prosecution called Fonte as a witness,

defense counsel objected on relevance and Evidence Code

section 352 grounds. The trial court again concluded

that the word “parole” added credibility and was not so

inflammatory that it needed to be excluded. Although

defense counsel offered to work out a stipulation, and

the trial court suggested taking the witness out of order

to allow counsel the time to prepare a stipulation, the

prosecutor rejected the suggestion because Fonte was

ready to testify and had another appointment that day. 

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial after Fonte

testified that he was a parole agent. When the trial

court denied the motion, defense counsel did not ask for

a limiting instruction and the trial court did not

provide one. Fonte testified that one of his duties as a

parole agent was to supervise Harvey, and that Harvey had

given him a cell phone number sometime within a couple of

weeks before the shooting that matched the number used to

call Rodgers.

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Harvey, No. D054498, slip op. at 3-5.)

The appellate court conceded that information regarding

Harvey’s parole status was prejudicial because it informed the jury

that Harvey had been incarcerated at some point for an unknown

crime. (Id. at 5.) Even so, the court found no error, stating the

following:

While we may have handled the matter differently,

such as encouraging the parties to work out a stipulation

in the time they had before trial commenced, we cannot

conclude that the trial court’s ruling amounted to an

abuse of discretion. Harvey’s status as a parolee, while

prejudicial, did not tend to evoke an emotional bias

against him as an individual apart from what the facts

proved. Although the prejudicial impact of this evidence

could have been minimized by a limiting instruction,

defense counsel neglected to remind the court to give

such an instruction. (Evid. Code, § 355 [“the court upon

request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope

and instruct the jury accordingly”].)

Finally, although the general thrust of Fonte’s

testimony was cumulative of the testimony regarding the

cell phone records, it provided additional context to

assist the jury in understanding and evaluating the cell

phone record testimony. Moreover, Fonte’s testimony was

brief and did not unduly consume time.

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Even assuming the trial court erred by permitting

Fonte’s testimony regarding Harvey’s parole status, we

conclude that reversal is not required since it is not

reasonably probable that, absent the introduction of the

challenged testimony, Harvey would have received a more

favorable result. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d

818, 836; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 440.) 

Evidence of Harvey’s connection to the incident was

overwhelming. Rodgers picked Harvey out of a

photographic lineup and later identified him at trial. 

The cell phone records also corroborated her testimony

regarding what transpired. Although Harvey denied

knowing Rodgers, he repeatedly called her a “hooker” or

“prostitute” when police interviewed him. He admitted to

police that he lived in the same apartment complex that

Rodgers’s caller had directed her to on the morning of

the shooting.

Defense counsel tried to take advantage of Rodgers’s

admission that she initially lied to the police about

Crowel’s involvement to suggest that Crowel had fired the

shot that injured Rodgers from inside his truck. The

police, however, interviewed Crowel, impounded the truck

he used to drive Rodgers, and presumably ruled him out as

a suspect. Rodgers also testified that Crowel did not

shoot her. It is not reasonably probable Harvey would

have obtained a more favorable result if the court had

excluded the evidence regarding his parole status.

(Id. at 6-7.)

Because Harvey asserts that his right to a fair trial was

violated, the Court must consider whether the admission of evidence

that Petitioner was on parole at the time of the incident rendered

the trial “fundamentally unfair.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. AEDPA

requires federal courts to defer to a state court’s decision when

the Supreme Court does not “‘squarely address[] the issue in th[e]

case’ or establish a legal principle that ‘clearly extend[s]’ to a

new context to the extent required by the Supreme Court . . . .” 

Moses, 555 F.3d at 754. As discussed, the United States Supreme

Court has not explicitly held that the admission of irrelevant and

prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation warranting

federal habeas relief. See Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101; Ochoa v.

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Harrington, No. CV 09-8649-JHN(JEM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131909,

at *39 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011). Nor has the Supreme Court

expressed an opinion on whether a state law violates due process if

it permits the introduction of prior crimes evidence to show a

defendant’s propensity to commit the charged offense. Estelle, 502

U.S. at 75 n.5. For this reason alone, it therefore cannot be said

that the appellate court’s ruling was an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. 

 Moreover, the evidence was relevant, and there were

permissible inferences the jury could have drawn from Fonte’s

testimony. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. “Only if there are no

permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its

admission violate due process. Even then, the evidence must ‘be of

such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’” Id. (citation

omitted). The prosecution introduced Officer Fonte’s testimony to

show that the phone number from which the calls to Rodgers were

placed on the night of the incident matched Harvey’s phone number. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. Appeal vol. 5, 314-18, Nov. 19, 2008.) 

Fonte’s testimony was necessary because during a police

interrogation, Harvey denied making the phone calls and claimed

that someone must have used his phone; he later said his phone was

stolen. (Id. at 387.) The trial court determined that evidence

that Fonte was Harvey’s parole agent was necessary because it

affected the credibility of Fonte’s testimony. (Id. vol. 3, 111,

Nov. 17, 2008.) The evidence also established how Detective Kale

was able to identify and locate Harvey to place him in a photo

lineup, which led to the positive identification by the victim. 

(Id. at 110-111.) While Fonte’s testimony may have been

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cumulative, it gave context to the phone records and helped dispel

any doubt as to the identity of the caller. 

During his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury

that Harvey had a “parole agent,” and they would hear from “the

parole agent, Mark Fonte, in regards to phone information that he

got from the Defendant.” (Id. vol. 2, 203, 205, Nov. 18, 2008.) 

Defense counsel did not object. (See id.) Even if this evidence

was improperly admitted, Petitioner has not shown that the evidence

had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict so as

to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Plascencia v. Alameida,

467 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2006); Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 

Finally, the appellate court’s rejection of Harvey’s claim

challenging the failure to give a limiting instruction was also not

objectively unreasonable. “Instructional error will not support a

petition for federal habeas relief unless it is shown not merely

that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally

condemned, but that by itself the instruction so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” 

Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d at 1132 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Harvey has not demonstrated that the court’s failure to

give a limiting instruction and tell the jury not to draw any

inference from the references to Petitioner’s parole status

rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair. See id. Harvey’s

parole status was not admitted to prove he had the propensity to

commit the current crime, and the court did not allow the

prosecutor to discuss the prior conviction which led to Harvey’s

parole. The evidence against Petitioner was substantial. Rodgers

identified him during a photographic lineup, and her testimony was

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corroborated by cell phone records. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr.

Appeal vol. 5, 377, 383, Nov. 19, 2008.) Although Harvey denied

knowing Rodgers, when the police interviewed him, he repeatedly

called her a “hooker” or “prostitute” and admitted that he lived in

the same complex where she was shot. (Id. at 385, 388.) Although

a limiting instruction would have been proper, it was not required

to preserve Harvey’s due process rights. See Basurto v. Luna, 291

F. App’x 41, 43 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s

evidentiary error claim in ground one was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and

was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Even though it is unexhausted, ground one

does not warrant federal habeas relief and should be DENIED on the

merits.

C. Ground Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Harvey was convicted of kidnapping for robbery with an

enhancement for the personal use of a firearm resulting in great

bodily injury. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 81); see Cal.

Penal Code §§ 209(b), 12022.53(d) (West 2012). The Petitioner

argues in ground two that his due process rights were violated

because there was insufficient evidence to uphold his kidnappingfor-robbery conviction. (Pet. 11, ECF No. 1.) Harvey contends

that this theory of kidnapping would have required the jury to find

he used force or fear after Rodgers withdrew her consent. (Id. at

10.) Petitioner challenges the trial court’s failure to give the

jury the last bracketed paragraph of CALCRIM No. 1203, which would

have instructed them on withdrawn consent. (Id.)

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According to Harvey, there was insufficient evidence that he

used force or fear to move Rodgers because she initiated the

movement from the pool area to the apartment, as well as from the

apartment to the vehicle. (See id. at 9-11.) Not once did Rodgers

state that she went to the apartment because she was threatened or

went there against her will, and her statement that she did not

want to go inside the apartment does not indicate that she withdrew

her consent to the movement. (Id. at 9-10.) Petitioner alleges

that if Rodgers withdrew her consent, she did not do so until they

reached the apartment and she stopped walking; a jury could not

have concluded otherwise. (Id. at 9, 11.) Therefore, Harvey urges

that his due process rights were violated because there was

insufficient evidence to convict him based on a theory that was

never presented to the jury. (Id. at 10.) 

In response, Gonzales argues that the appellate court

conducted a lengthy and detailed analysis of California law as to

the elements to support a conviction of kidnapping for robbery. 

(Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 6.) Additionally,

Respondent contends that the court of appeal’s reasoning is amply

supported by the record. (Id.) Thus, Harvey cannot demonstrate

the appellate court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, federal law. (Id.)

In his Traverse, Harvey argues that if no threat was made and

the victim consented to the movement, Petitioner’s conduct was

merely robbery, but not kidnapping. (Traverse 3, ECF No. 7.) He

points out that not once did the victim attempt to escape. (Id. at

4.) Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to find

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two of the elements of the

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crime – using force or fear to cause the other to move, and lack of

consent. (Id. at 4-5.) Harvey reiterates that he never threatened

Rodgers with force to get her to accompany him, demanded that she

do so, or make her feel compelled to walk any distance; therefore,

her movement could not be attributed to force or fear. (Id.) 

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” 

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The primary inquiry in a

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is whether a rational trier of

fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 290 (1992); Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 324 (1979); Mikes v. Borg, 947 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir.

1991). In making this determination, the court is not authorized

“to ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Jackson, 443 U.S.

at 318-19 (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966).) The

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution and must presume the trier of fact resolved conflicting

evidence in the prosecution’s favor. Wright, 505 U.S. at 296;

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Taylor v. Stainer, 31 F.3d 907, 908-

09 (9th Cir. 1994). A state court’s finding of sufficient evidence

is given deference under AEDPA. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262,

1274-75 (9th Cir. 2005).

1. Force or fear

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). The

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California Supreme Court denied review without opinion on December

2, 2009. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Harvey, No. S177443, slip op.

at 1.) Therefore, the last reasoned state court opinion addressing

the force or fear issue was rendered by the California Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Harvey, No. D054498, slip op.

at 10.) There, the court stated:

Harvey claims that his conviction of kidnapping for

robbery must be reversed because there was insufficient

evidence that Rodgers’s movement from the pool area to

the apartment, or from the apartment to the parking lot,

was the product of force or fear. He argues that, based

on Rodgers’s own testimony, she voluntarily took a few

steps to the apartment before he displayed the gun and

there is no evidence of lack of consent for this

movement. He also claims there is no evidence that he

used force or fear to move Rodgers from the apartment to

the parking lot because she initiated that movement.

Harvey notes that the court did not instruct on

withdrawal of consent and argues that the judgment cannot

be affirmed on a theory for which the jury received no

instructions. We disagree.

As a threshold matter, Harvey challenges only the

force or fear element of kidnapping for robbery. 

Accordingly, we do not discuss the evidence supporting

the remaining elements of the crime.

Harvey correctly notes that the prosecutor did not

divide the movement into two discrete segments. Rather,

the prosecutor argued that the asportation element of

kidnapping was the movement from the pool area where

Harvey drew his gun to where Rodgers was shot, a distance

of over 600 feet. Here, the attempted robbery and the

kidnapping began after Harvey displayed his gun, demanded

money and stated, “Well, it’s going to be a long night

and we could go for a ride. It’d be a pimp with a dead ho

on their hands.” (People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808,

814 [Even if “‘the victim has at first willingly

accompanied the accused, the latter may nevertheless be

guilty of [kidnapping] if he subsequently restrains his

victim’s liberty by force and compels the victim to

accompany him further.’”]; People v. Trawick (1947) 78

Cal.App.2d 604, 606 [“It is not necessary that the

original accompaniment of the abductor be involuntary, if

subsequently there is an enforced restraint of

liberty”].)

Harvey’s action and statements were sufficient to

put a person in fear for her personal safety. A 

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reasonable jury could infer that any movement Rodgers

made after Harvey displayed his gun was based on his

implied threat of force. The reasonableness of such an

inference is supported by Harvey’s use of potentially

deadly force as soon as Rodgers attempted to escape.

. . . . 

When all of the facts and circumstances are viewed

together and in the light most favorable to the judgment,

there is more than enough evidence from which a jury

could find Harvey guilty of kidnapping for purposes of

robbery.

(Id. at 9-10.)

In California, kidnapping for robbery consists of the

following elements: (1) The defendant intended to commit the

robbery; (2) with that intent, the defendant used force or

instilled a reasonable fear to take or detain another person; (3)

using that force or fear, the defendant made the other person move

a substantial distance; (4) the other person was made to move a

distance beyond that merely incidental to the commission of the

robbery; and (5) the other person did not consent to the movement;

(6) the defendant did not reasonably believe that the other person

consented to the movement. See People v. Curry, 158 Cal. App. 4th

766, 781, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257, 270 (2007); see also Cal. Penal

Code § 209(b)(1).

Kidnapping generally must be against the victim’s will. 

People v. Hill, 23 Cal. 4th 853, 855, 3 P.3d 898, 899, 98 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 254, 255 (2000). “[A] general act of kidnap[p]ing . . .

can only be accomplished by the use or threat of force.” People v.

Rhoden, 6 Cal. 3d 519, 527, 492 P.2d 1143, 1148, 99 Cal. Rptr. 751,

756 (1972). Even if a victim’s cooperation is first obtained

without force or threat of force, a defendant has committed

kidnapping if he “subsequently restrains his victim’s liberty by

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force and compels the victim to accompany him further.” People v.

Hovarter, 44 Cal. 4th 983, 1017, 189 P.3d 300, 325, 81 Cal. Rptr.

3d 299, 330 (2008); see People v. Trawick, 78 Cal. App. 2d 604,

606, 178 P.2d 45, 47 (Cal. App. 1947) (explaining that initially

accompanying of the abductor need not be involuntary, so long as

there is “an enforced restraint of liberty[]”). “[M]ovement is

forcible where it is accomplished through the giving of orders

which the victim feels compelled to obey because he or she fears

harm or injury from the accused and such apprehension is not

unreasonable under the circumstances.” Hovarter, 44 Cal. 4th at

1017, 189 P.3d at 325, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 330.

Here, the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Harvey’s

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The

evidence indicates that the kidnapping began once Harvey brandished

his weapon, demanded money, and said to Rodgers, “Well, it’s going

to be a long night and we could go for a ride. It’d be a pimp with

a dead ho on their hands.” (See Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. Appeal

vol. 4, 207); Trawick, 78 Cal. App. 2d at 606, 178 P.2d at 47. 

Rodgers testified that Harvey was slightly in front of her and that

both she and he walked from the pool area toward the apartment

together before Harvey pulled out the gun. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Tr. Appeal vol. 4, 242-43.) 

While Rodgers did move from the pool area toward the apartment

before Harvey pulled his weapon, her continuing movement to the

apartment was due to fear and the implied threat to keep moving. A

reasonable person would not feel free to stop or deviate from the

original course after Harvey brandished his weapon and made the

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threat. See Hovarter, 44 Cal. 4th at 1017, 189 P.3d at 325, 81

Cal. Rptr. 3d at 330. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have

found that Rodgers’s continued movement toward Harvey’s chosen

location – the apartment – was due to force or fear. 

Likewise, the movement from the apartment to the parking lot

occurred under the same implied threat of force. Although Rodgers

initiated the movement to the parking lot, the record reflects that

she did so on Harvey’s directive to produce money or else they

would “go for a ride” and there would be “a dead ho on [Harvey’s]

hands.” (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. Appeal vol. 4, 207.) Rodgers

only moved to the parking lot because of Harvey’s threat to produce

money or be shot. (Id. at 207-10.) The fact that Rodgers did not

attempt to escape is not conclusive evidence that she consented to

stay; fear that Harvey would shoot her while walking to the

apartment or parking lot is a reasonable explanation for not

attempting to flee.

For all of these reasons, a rational trier of fact could have

found Harvey guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of kidnapping for

robbery. See Wright, 505 U.S. at 290; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324;

Mikes, 947 F.2d at 356. The court of appeal’s rejection of

Harvey’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was therefore not

contrary to clearly established federal law. Moreover, the state

court decision was based on a reasonable determination of the

evidence.

2. Withdrawn consent

Petitioner also argues that the jury could not have based the

verdict on the fact that Rodgers did not consent to the movement

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because the jury was never given a withdrawn consent instruction. 

(Pet. 10, ECF No. 1; see Traverse 3-4, ECF No. 7.)

At trial, the jury was given the following instructions for

kidnapping for robbery:

The defendant is charged in Count Two with

kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, in violation of

Penal Code section 209(b)(1).

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime,

the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intended to commit robbery;

2. Acting with that intent, the defendant took,

held, or detained another person by using force or by

instilling a reasonable fear;

3. Using that force or fear, the defendant moved

the other person or made the other person move a

substantial distance;

4. The other person was moved or made to move a

distance beyond that merely incidental to the commission

of a robbery;

5. When that movement began, the defendant already

intended to commit robbery; [¶] AND

6. The other person did not consent to the

movement.

As used here, substantial distance means more than a

slight or trivial distance. The movement must have

substantially increased the risk of physical or

psychological harm to the person beyond that necessarily

present in the robbery. In deciding whether the movement

was sufficient, consider all the circumstances relating

to the movement.

To be guilty of kidnapping for the purpose of

robbery, the defendant does not actually have to commit

the robbery.

To decide whether the defendant intended to commit

robbery, please refer to the separate instructions that I

will give you on that crime.

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. Vol. 1, at 69-70.)

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Harvey contends that the trial court should have included an

additional instruction for withdrawn consent. (Pet. 10, ECF No. 1

(citing CALCRIM No. 1203).) CALCRIM No. 1203 provides:

Consent may be withdrawn. If, at first, a person agreed

to go with defendant, that consent ended if the person

changed his or her mind and no longer freely and

voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the

defendant. The defendant is guilty of kidnapping if

after the other person withdrew consent, the defendant

committed the crime as I have defined it.

Judicial Council of Cal., 1 Judicial Council of California Criminal

Instructions 1076, 1078 (Summer 2011 ed.) (CALCRIM No. 1203).

Because the California Supreme Court denied review without

opinion, the last reasoned state court opinion addressing issue was

that of the California Court of Appeal. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. 

When considering Harvey’s arguments as to withdrawn consent, the

appellate court stated:

The trial court properly instructed the jury with

CALCRIM No. 1203 addressing the elements of kidnapping

for robbery, including that requirement that the victim

“did not consent to the movement.” Notably, Harvey does

not argue on appeal that the trial court refused defense

counsel’s request for an instruction on the defense of

consent or that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to

instruct on this defense. (People v. Felix (2001) 92

Cal.App.4th 905, 911 [trial court has a sua sponte duty

to instruct on the defense of consent if there is

sufficient evidence to support it].) Because the trial

court did not instruct on consent, there was no need for

the prosecution to ask for an instruction on withdrawal

of consent.

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Harvey, No. D054498, slip op. at 10.)

“Courts have a duty to instruct on the defense’s theory of the

case ‘if the theory is legally sound and evidence in the case makes

it applicable.’” Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 577 (9th

Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see Matthews v. United States, 485

U.S. 58, 63 (1988). Even so, a criminal defendant has an

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obligation to raise defenses on his own behalf. See United States

v. Echeverry, 759 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1985). A defendant’s

right to due process is protected when the trial judge gives jury

instructions that convey the defendant’s theory of the case. 

United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quotation omitted). Instructional error will not warrant federal

habeas relief unless it is shown that, by itself, the error so

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process. Karis, 283 F.3d at 1132; see Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72

(noting that the instructional error must be considered in the

context of the trial record and the instructions as a whole). 

In California, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on

a defense “if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a

defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a

defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s

theory of the case.” People v. Maury, 30 Cal. 4th 342, 424, 68

P.3d 1, 60, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561, 631 (2003); People v. Felix, 92

Cal. App. 4th 905, 911, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 311, 316 (2001). Because

consent may be a defense to kidnapping for robbery, CALCRIM No.

1203 includes optional paragraphs to instruct on the withdrawal of

consent. For withdrawn consent, the court will “[o]n request, if

supported by the evidence, also give the bracketed paragraph that

begins with ‘Consent may be withdrawn.’” Judicial Council of Cal.,

1 Judicial Council of California Criminal Instructions 1076, 1078

(CALCRIM No. 1203) (emphasis added).

At trial, the defense theory was that Harvey was not the

shooter. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. Appeal vol. 5, 225-26.) 

Harvey’s attorney inferred that Rodgers’s boyfriend, Crowel, was

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her pimp and shot Rodgers for failing to return from the date with

money. (Id. at 615.) Petitioner does not contend that although he

requested a withdrawn consent jury instruction, the court denied

his request. Nor does he allege that he presented the consent

defense at trial, and the court therefore had a duty to sua sponte

instruct on withdrawn consent. Because Harvey did not raise a

withdrawn consent defense, the court did not have a duty to sua

sponte instruct on withdrawn consent. Even if the court erred, it

is not reasonably probable that Harvey would have obtained a more

favorable outcome had the error not occurred. 

The state court of appeal rejected Harvey’s claim that his

conviction could not be based on Rodgers’s failure to consent to

her movement at the complex. The court’s decision was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. Therefore, habeas relief on the basis stated in ground

two should be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

As discussed above, the former-attorney general is not a

proper Respondent and should be DISMISSED from the lawsuit.

Harvey’s evidentiary error allegation in ground one of the

Petition was not presented to the California Supreme Court and is

therefore unexhausted. Even so, the district court should DENY the

claim on the merits because the admission of evidence regarding

Harvey’s parole status as trial did not render the entire

proceedings fundamentally unfair. Although the Petitioner

exhausted the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim in ground two, the

district court should also DENY this claim. A rational trier of

fact could have found that Harvey moved the victim by force or

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fear, and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on

withdrawn consent did not render the entire trial fundamentally

unfair. The state courts’ rejection of both claims was not

contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to United

States District Court Judge John A. Houston, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties or before

March 16, 2012. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be

served and filed on or before March 29, 2012. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez

v. Yslt, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 16, 2012 ____________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Houston

 All Parties of Record

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