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Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenet C1TCU1t 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DEBRA MEIKLEHAM, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 

AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a 

Colorado Corporation, d/b/a 

U.S. WEST COMMUNICATIONS and 

U.S. WEST, INC., a Colorado 

Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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SEP O 9 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-1056 

(D.C. No. 89-C-832) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Debra Meikleham brought this action against her former 

employer, Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 

alleging that the termination of her employment violated the 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1056 Document: 010110089463 Date Filed: 09/09/1991 Page: 1 
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collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union 

representing her. Although the union was not named as a 

defendant, Meikleham also asserted that the union failed to pursue 

a grievance on her behalf, in violation of its duty of fair 

representation. - The district court granted defendant's motion for 

summary judgment, concluding that the suit was barred by the 

applicable six-month statute of limitations. We affirm. 

The Supreme Court has held that the proper limitation period 

for hybrid cases is the six-month period set out in section lO(b) 

of the National Labor Relations Act, 27 u.s.c. § 160(b)(l988). 

See Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 

154-55 (1983). This period applies to both the employee and the 

union. Id. at 55. In Lucas v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 909 

F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1990), we considered what events trigger the 

running of the six-month time period, and observed that courts 

"generally have held that the limitation period begins to run when 

an employee knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence 

should have known or discovered the acts constituting the ••. 

alleged violations." Id. at 420-21. 

In this case, Meikleham chose to sue only her employer, and 

not the union. If this suit is considered to be in the nature of 

a hybrid action, Meikleham was required to establish a breach of 

duty by the union in order to succeed in her claim against the 

employer. See Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 164-65. Accordingly, 

under Lucas, Meikleham's six-month period began to run, at the 

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Appellate Case: 91-1056 Document: 010110089463 Date Filed: 09/09/1991 Page: 2 
latest, when she knew or should have known of the union's 

rejection or abandonment of her claim. 909 F.2d at 421. 

Meikleham was discharged on June 14, 1988. She did not file 

suit until May 15, 1989. The collective bargaining agreement in 

this case clearly stated that a written grievance had to be filed 

within thirty days after the events complained of, and it is 

undisputed that Meikleham knew of this thirty-day requirement. 

See App. at 24 (Meikleham depo. at 248). Thus Meikleham knew or 

should have known of the union's alleged unfair representation 

when the thirty-day period expired without the filing of a 

grievance by the union. Even assuming that the six-month period 

was tolled until July 31, 1988, due to Meikleham's mental 

condition, her suit would still not be timely. 

However, the collective bargaining agreement in this case 

allowed an employee to pursue a grievance directly with the 

employer by presenting a grievance to the company in accordance 

with the contract through regular company administrative channels. 

See App. at 44 (Section 8.7 of collective bargaining agreement). 

It is therefore arguable that the union's conduct in dealing with 

Meikleham's grievance is irrelevant to the accrual of her cause of 

action. Meikleham is nonetheless required to attempt to exhaust 

any grievance remedies provided in the collective bargaining 

agreement before she may bring suit against her employer for 

breach of that agreement. See Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 163. 

Accordingly, to satisfy her exhaustion obligation by going to the 

company directly, Meikleham had to present a grievance "in 

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accordance with the contract" i.e., in writing and within 

thirty days of the event that is the subject of the grievance. 

Meikleham relies on a letter she wrote on July 24, 1988. We have 

examined that letter, and it contains no indication that Meikleham 

was challenging the grounds for her. discharge. Even if we assume 

that her obligation to exhaust was tolled by her mental condition 

until July 31, 1988, our careful review of the record in this case 

reveals no evidence of any written notification from Meikleham to 

the company within thirty days of July 31, 1988, apprising it of 

her desire to challenge the fact of her discharge, as opposed to 

disputing some of the economic results of the discharge. To the 

extent Meikleham raises an estoppel argument on appeal based on 

the company's consideration of her untimely complaint, she did not 

present this argument below. We therefore decline to consider it. 

Accordingly, Meikleham's suit is barred either because she 

failed to timely file, or because she did not properly exhaust the 

remedies provided by the collective bargaining agreement. The 

mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 91-1056 Document: 010110089463 Date Filed: 09/09/1991 Page: 4