Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05997/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05997-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1335 Interpleader Action

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICO FINANCIAL LIFE AND CASE NO. CV-F-04-5997 LJO

ANNUITY INS. CO., 

ORDER ON AMERICO’S 

Plaintiff, MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE

ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY

vs. JUDGMENT (Doc. 49, 50)

THOMAS KELLY, et al,

Defendants.

 /

AND RELATED CROSS -ACTION

__________________________________/

On September 14, 2005, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Americo Financial Life and Annuity Ins.

Co. (“Americo”) filed a notice of motion for: (1) judgment on the pleadings against counter claimant

Thomas Kelly, and (2) motion for summary judgment. Thomas Kelly filed an opposition on September

29, 2005 and a supplement on October 12, 2005. Americo filed a reply brief on October 7, 2005.

Pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(h), this matter is submitted on the pleadings without oral argument.

Therefore, the hearing set for October 14, 2005 is vacated. Having considered the moving, opposition,

and reply papers, as well as the arguments of counsel and the Court’s file, the Court issues the following

order.

/////

/////

Case 1:04-cv-05997-LJO Document 72 Filed 10/13/05 Page 1 of 12
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case is an interpleader action filed by Americo Financial Life and Annuity Ins. arising from

the proceeds of an annuity issued to Virginia Kelly. Virginia Kelly is identified as the joint owner of

the contract, with defendant/counter claimant Thomas Kelly (“Thomas”) as the other joint owner and

sole beneficiary. The net value of the contract, as of July 15, 2004, is $292,857.00. Thomas Kelly is

Virginia Kelly’s stepson. Co-defendant, Clara Lucas, is Virginia Kelly’s sister. Co-defendants, Carlene

Lucas, Diane Seifuddin, and Arlene Beale, are adult children of Clara Lucas and nieces of Virginia

Kelly.

Virginia Kelly died on January 9, 2004. On May 15, 2004, Thomas submitted the Application

for Proceeds and Claimant’s Statement to Americo for payment of all net proceeds of the contract. 

This motion involves the complaint in interpleader. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Clara M.

Lucas, Carlene Lucas, Diane Seifuddin, and Arlene Beale (collectively “Clara Lucas”) claim all or a

portion of the Annuity Proceeds because Thomas Kelly engaged in undue influence and /or fraud in

having himself named as beneficiary. Complaint 5-8. Americo alleges that the “claims of defendant

are adverse and conflicting. Plaintiff is without knowledge of the respective rights of the defendants in

and to the Annuity Proceeds . . .” Complaint 10. This motion also involves the counter complaint.

Counter claimant Thomas Kelly has two claims against Americo: one for breach of contract and another

claim for invasion of privacy. 

ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

A. Standards for Review

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings

Plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings.

A Rule 12(c) motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party's pleadings.

Ludgment on the pleadings is appropriate when, even if all material facts in the pleading under attack

are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). The court must assume the truthfulness of the

material facts alleged in the complaint. Moreover, all inferences reasonably drawn from these facts must

be construed in favor of the responding party. General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v.

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Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989).

2. Summary Judgment 

Initially, it is the moving party's burden to establish that there is "no genuine issue of material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); British

Airways Board v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978). Rule 56(e) requires the party against

whom the motion is made to “set for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Absent

such a showing, a properly supported motion for summary judgment may be granted if the court finds

it appropriate.” Nelson, Robbins, et al v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988). 

To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material

issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to

require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First National Bank

of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968); T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors,

809 F.2d 626, 631 (th Cir. 1987). The opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead

a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”Matasushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations omitted). The opposing

party’s evidence is to be believed and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242 255 (1986). The court must not weigh the evidence and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of the nonmoving party. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.1997). 

The court, however, has no duty to search the record, sua sponte, for some genuine issue of

material fact; the court may rely entirely on the evidence of the moving party. Guarino v. Brookfield

Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1992). If the motion is based on deposition testimony,

the court may rely exclusively on portions highlighted by the moving party and need not comb the

deposition to discover conflicting testimony. Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, supra, 980 F.2d

at 403. The court is not obligated to consider matters not specifically brought to its attention. Thus, it

is immaterial that helpful evidence may be located somewhere in the record. The opposition must

designate and reference specific triable facts. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby (DC Cir. 1988) 863 F.2d

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1029, 1034. Inferences drawn from the evidence, however, must be viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456

(1992).

B. Interpleader

The parties argue that state interpleader law applies. 

An state interpleader action may be filed by:

“Any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity against whom

double or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more

persons which are such that they may give rise to double or multiple

liability, may bring an action against the claimants to compel them to

interplead and litigate their several claims.” Cal.Code Civ.Proc. § 386.

Section 386(b) further provides:

“The action of interpleader may be maintained although the claims have

not a common origin, are not identical but are adverse to and independent

of one another, or the claims are unliquidated and no liability on the part

of the party bringing the action or filing the cross-complaint has arisen.

. .” 

Cal.Code Civ.Proc. § 386.

Federal statutory interpleader, however, authorizes interpleader in federal court when:

“Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in

subsection (a) or (d) of section 1332 of this title, are claiming or may

claim to be entitled to such money or property, or to any one or more of

the benefits arising by virtue of any note, bond, certificate, policy or other

instrument, or arising by virtue of any such obligation . . .”

28 U.S.C.A. § 1335(a)(1).

The parties assume that the state interpleader action applies. 

C. Motion to Dismiss - Right to Cross-Claim

Americo argues that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because, as a matter of law,

Thomas cannot sustain a cross-claim against plaintiff. 

Americo argues that in federal interpleader actions, the state substantive law applies. Equitable

Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. McKay, 837 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1988) (in a life insurance interpleader to

determine the beneficiary of two life insurance policies, the court stated, “Because this action is an

interpleader action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, the federal district court was required to apply the

substantive law that a court of the forum state would apply.”); Bluff Creek Oil Co. v. Green, 257 F.2d

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83, 85 (5th Cir. 1958) (statutory interpretation is substantive); Amoco Transport Co. v. Dietze, Inc., 582

F.Supp. 804, 806 (S.D.N.Y.) 1984) ("[F]ederal interpleader actions, premised upon diversity of

citizenship of the claimants, are no different than [sic] ordinary diversity actions in that state substantive

law is to be applied. In particular, the substantive law of the forum state should be applied to determine

whether interest is due.")

Americo did not cite, and merely assumes, that the right to file cross-claims is substantive and

not procedural. 

Under state law, defendants in an interpleader action may cross-complain against each other, but

no cross-complaint lies against the stakeholder. Unless the stakeholder waives this limitation (e.g., by

failure to object), the only relief available to a defendant against the stakeholder is to have the

interpleader action dismissed. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pietak, 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 613, 109

Cal.Rptr.2d 256, 265 (2001). The Pietak court acknowledged that several Courts of Appeal had allowed

the parties to litigate other claims as cross-actions to an interpleader, but noted that in each of the cases,

the cross-action had not been challenged. "[B]ecause the remedy is for the benefit of the stakeholder,

presumably the stakeholder may waive it. Thus, if a stakeholder does not object to an independent claim

raised by a claimant, there is no reason to believe it cannot be considered in the interpleader action. In

effect, the stakeholder has chosen to forgo the remedy and to resolve the independent claim in the same

action." Id. at p. 614. As against the stakeholder, claimants may raise only matters which go to whether

the suit is properly one for interpleader, i.e., whether the elements of an interpleader action are present.

Connor v. Bank of Bakersfield, 183 Cal. 199 (1920); See Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp., 4 Cal.App.4th

857, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 (1992) (conduct of savings and loan association, its former president, and its

attorneys in bringing interpleader action was authorized by interpleader statute; therefore, association,

former president, and attorneys could not incur tort liability for naming someone as potential claimant

when filing interpleader action.)

Under federal law, a stakeholder may face compulsory counterclaims. See Minnesota Mut. Life

Ins. Co. v. Ensley, 174 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 1999) (summary judgment was granted to the insurer

against certain counterclaims based on the unique facts of the case, not simply because the insurer filed

a cross complaint against the interpleader); Libby, McNeill, and Libby v. City Nat. Bank, 592 F.2d 504,

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Thomas cites Bank of America National trust & Sav. v. Mamakos, 57 F.R.D. 198 (N.D. Cal. 1972), a

disinterested stakeholder can be subjected to at least a compulsory counterclaim.

In Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. Mamakos, the issue before the Court was whether the stockholder

was entitled to its request for attorneys fees and costs upon discharge. One of the competing claimants was the Government

for tax liens. The Government's lien for taxes was in excess of amount of taxpayers' funds held by bank. The court held that

in United States tax cases, at least, the attorneys' fees and costs are tied to the fund. If the government gets the whole fund,

the fundholder takes nothing from it for attorney's fees and costs. the bank which filed an interpleader action was not entitled

to attorneys' fees and costs. 57 F.R.D. 198. The case does not stand for the proposition that a cross-complaint may be

maintained against the stakeholder.

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507 (9th Cir. 1978) (The modern trend has been to the contrary, and it "now seems to be settled that

(Fed.R.Civ.P.) Rule 13 which provides for compulsory and permissive counterclaims is applicable to

interpleader suits."); Wayzata Bank & Trust Co. v. A & B Farms, 855 F.2d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1988)

(compulsory counterclaim against stakeholder for breach of fiduciary duty permitted.)1

The inference the Court must draw is that the law on interpleader is substantive based upon the

state court decisions and the grounds stated. Under California state law, counter claims against the

stakeholder are not permitted. Therefore, the motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted.

D. Breach of Contract Cause of Action

Even if the motion for judgment on the pleadings were denied, the motion for summary judgment

would be granted.

Thomas argues that failure to pay the Annuity to him and instituting this interpleader is a breach

of contract. Thomas argues that plaintiff improperly instituted this interpleader because Americo was

not truly threatened with multiple litigation. Clara Lucas had no ownership interest in the annuity, no

legal action pending against Americo, and Americo no reason to believe the there would be “vexatious”

litigation against. 

In an interpleader action, the adverse interest necessary need not be concrete. "The right to the

remedy by interpleader is founded, however, not on the consideration that a [person] may be subjected

to double liability, but on the fact that he is threatened with double vexation in respect to one liability."

City of Morgan Hill v. Brown, 71 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 361, 365 - 366 (1999). The

purpose of federal interpleader is to protect the stakeholder against the possibility of multiple liability

on the same debt, even where only one claim is pending. See Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ensley, 174

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F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1999). Actual claims need not have been filed against the stakeholder, nor

reduced to judgment. It is sufficient if the stakeholder can demonstrate a real and reasonable fear of

multiple liability. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 US 523, 87 S.Ct. 1199 (1967). Thus,

under either state or federal statute, when a person may be subject to conflicting claims for money or

property, the stake holder may bring an interpleader action to compel the claimants to litigate their

claims among themselves. 

The determining factor is whether there was a good faith belief by the stakeholder that it faced

the possibility of multiple claims. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ensley, 174 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir.

1999). The issue is one of good-faith doubt before commencing an interpleader action. Hancock Oil Co.

v. Hopkins, 24 Cal.2d 497, 150 P.2d 463 (1944). “But the [plaintiff] may not maintain such a suit upon

the mere pretext or suspicion of double vexation; he must allege facts showing a reasonable probability

of double vexation.” 24 Cal.2d at 510.

The parties have not cited to any authority on the issue of plaintiff’s good-faith doubt is a

question of law or a question of fact in an interpleader action. Regardless of whether it is an issue of law

or fact, the facts are not in dispute that Americo had a good faith belief that it may face multiple claims.

Thomas raises the issue because Americo provided the forms on which Clara Lucas submitted

the claim for the Annuity. Thomas points to the claim forms submitted by Clara Lucas (Exh. A, B, C,

and D. to declaration of David Sullivan). On or about March 12, 2004, Americo received written claims

from Clara on claim forms, presumably, provided by Americo to Clara Lucas for such purpose. (See

Thomas Kelly’s Disputed Facts, Doc. 62, Part 4, Facts #3-6.) The evidence submitted by Americo does

not state what was the initial contact from Clara Lucas, whether Americo was contacted by telephone

or by letter. (An undated letter in Exh. A to Decl. Of David Sullivan, bates stamped 000372, Doc.

Provides information about the Clara Lucas.) There is no evidence, however, for the inference that

Thomas argues: that it was Americo who initiated contact with Clara Lucas and somehow “stirred up”

conflicting claimants.

Moreover, Thomas does not dispute that Clara Lucas actually asserts a right to the annuity.

Thomas’ Disputed Facts state that it is “undisputed” that Clara Lucas asserts a right to the Annuity

proceeds. (See Thomas Kelly’s Disputed Facts, Doc. 62, Part 4, Facts #7.) Thomas acknowledges that

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Clara Lucas asserts a claim to the annuity and that Clara also disputes that Thomas is entitled to the

Annuity. (See Thomas Kelly’s Disputed Facts, Doc. 62, Part 4, Facts #9.) Moreover, Thomas does not

dispute that Americo received Thomas’ claim for the Annuity proceeds after Clara Lucas had submitted

her claim. (See Thomas Kelly’s Disputed Facts, Doc. 62, Part 4, Facts #9.) Thus, without dispute,

Americo faced conflicting claims for the same fund of money. Americo instituted the interpleader action

only after receiving all the conflicting claims.

Accordingly, it is undisputed that Americo acted in good faith. The interpleader action was

instituted after all of conflicting claims had been received by Americo. There is no dispute that there

are adverse claimants to the same fund of money held by Americo, now deposited into the Court. As

a matter of law, Americo satisfied its obligation under the contract by instituting the interpleader action.

Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ensley, 174 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 1999).

E. Privacy Cause of Action

Thomas claims that his right to privacy was violated when Americo provided information about

the Annuity to Clara Lucas.

Thomas’ privacy claim is based on Article I, Section I, of the California Constitution, which

provides: "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are

enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and

obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." 

 In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal.4th 1, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633

(1994), the court set out the elements of a cause of action for invasion of the right to privacy guaranteed

by the California Constitution. Id. at 32-37, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834. The court stated that a plaintiff must

show (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (3) a serious

invasion of the privacy interest. Id. at 35-37, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834. Whether a legally protected privacy

interest exists is a question of law. Id. at 40, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834. The second and third elements of the

privacy claim--reasonable expectation of privacy and serious invasion--involve mixed questions of law

and fact. Tom v. City and County of San Francisco, 120 Cal.App.4th 674, 679, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 13, 17

(2004). 

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 Contrary to Thomas’ argument, the letters never identified the amount of the Annuity.

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1. Legally protected privacy interest

As the California Supreme Court explained in Hill, there are two general classes of legally

recognized privacy interests: (1) interests in precluding dissemination or misuse of sensitive and

confidential information or "informational privacy"; and (2) interests in making intimate personal

decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference or "autonomy

privacy." Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal.4th at p. 35, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834. The privacy

right at issue in this case is the “informational privacy.”

The communications that are at issue in this claim, are the letters from Kiley Sieb of Americo

to the Clara Lucas claimants, dated April 7, 2004, June 4, 2004 and July 8, 2004. The April 7, 2004

letter from Seib to Clara Lucas informed her that Americo received the claimants’ forms and that the

primary beneficiary to the Annuity is Thomas Kelly. The letter also identified the policy number and

identified the Annuitant (Virginia Kelly). (Exh. A to Seib Decl.) The June 4, 2004 letter was addressed

to Thomas with copies to Diane Seifuddin. The letter informs Thomas that other claims have been made

to the Annuity and that Americo’s intended to commence an interpleader action. (Exh. C to Seib Decl.)

In terms of potentially confidential information, the June 4, 2004 letter discloses that Thomas made a

claim to the Annuity policy, the policy number and identified the Annuitant (Virginia Kelly). The July

8, 2004 letter was sent to Thomas and advised him that Americo would file an interpleader. A copy of

the letter was sent to Clara Lucas. (Exh. D to Seib Decl.) The letter also identified the policy number

and identified the Annuitant (Virginia Kelly). 

Thus, the dissemination of the annuity policy number and the identification of Thomas as a

claimant are the potential violations of privacy. 

Thomas has not cited on point authority for the proposition that he has a legally protectible

interest against the disclosure of the annuity policy number or his identification.

Thomas argues that mere discussion of the annuity contract, and the disclosure of its number and

amount (described in the various communications between Seib and the Lucas claimants)2 is a violation

of his financial privacy. He argues Cal. Civ. Code §1798 et seq describes the right to privacy in all

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information pertaining to him, which included financial matters. §1798.3(a).

Cal.Civ.Code 1798.3 (a) provides:

“The term ‘personal information’ means any information that is

maintained by an agency that identifies or describes an individual,

including, but not limited to, his or her name, . . .”

The term “agency” is defined as:

“every state office, officer, department, division, bureau, board,

commission, or other state agency . . .”

There is no evidence before the Court that Americo is an “agency” within the definition of Cal.Civ.Code

1798.3(a).

Thomas has not shown that he has a legally protected right against the disclosure of the

information in the letters of April 7, 2004, June 4, 2004 and July 8, 2004. 

2. Reasonable expectation of privacy and the serious invasion

Assuming that Thomas does have a legally protected interest against the disclosure, the other

elements in the privacy claim must be shown: a reasonable expectation of privacy and the serious

invasion of privacy.

"A 'reasonable' expectation of privacy is an objective entitlement founded on broadly based and

widely accepted community norms," and "the presence or absence of opportunities to consent voluntarily

to activities impacting privacy interests obviously affects the expectations of the participant." Hill v.

National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7Cal.4that 36.Customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding

particular activities may create or inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy. Hill v. National Collegiate

Athletic Assn., 7 Cal.4th at 36. The "community norms" aspect of the "reasonable expectation" element

of an invasion of privacy claim is this: " 'The protection afforded to the plaintiff's interest in his privacy

must be relative to the customs of the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits

of his neighbors and fellow citizens.' TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.4th 443,

450, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 155, 161 (2002).

As to the element of the seriousness of the invasion of privacy, the California Supreme Court has

stated: “No community could function if every intrusion into the realm of private action, no matter how

slight or trivial, gave rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy.” Hill, 7 Cal.4th at 36. "Complete

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privacy does not exist in this world except in a desert, and anyone who is not a hermit must expect and

endure the ordinary incidents of the community life of which he is a part." Id., quoting the Restatement

of Torts.) Actionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual

or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right.

Thus, the extent and gravity of the invasion is an indispensable consideration in assessing an alleged

invasion of privacy.” Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal.4th at 36.

As a matter of law, Thomas has not shown a serious invasion of privacy by the disclosure the

information by Americo to competing claimants. It is undisputed that the claimants were competing for

the same Annuity contract. Thus, the disclosure of the policy number was not invasion of Thomas’

privacy. Moreover, the disclosure of Thomas as the beneficiary of the Annuity is not a serious invasion

of privacy. Complete privacy cannot be expected on the subject of the Annuity against which the

claimants are competing. 

F. Award of Attorneys fees and Costs

Courts have discretion to award attorney fees to a disinterested stakeholder in an interpleader

action. Although there is no precise statutory authority, such awards are upheld under the court’s

inherent equitable powers. Abex Corp. v. Ski’s Enterprises, Inc., 748 F.2d 513, 516, (9th Cir. 1984). The

allowability and amount of fee award are in the discretion of the court. Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co.,

534 F.2d 1155, 1164 (5th Cir. 1976).

In the declaration of Stephen Drobney, Americo is entitled to fees and costs of $12,022.85 with

respect to the commencement and litigation of the interpleader. (Doc. 52, para.4). Americo incurred

$11,051.25 in fees and $971 in costs. An additional $800 is expected to be incurred for filing a reply to

this motion and for hearing on the motion.

Mr. Drobney is a member of the bar since 2002 and a graduate of Boston College Law School.

(Doc. 52, para. 4.) Since January 1, 2005, he has been billing at a rate of $160, and previously, his rate

was $150. 

Americo has failed to provide any documentary evidence to support the claim for attorneys fees.

Billing statements are not submitted and invoices for costs are not provided. While the amount

requested, of $12,000 may not be unreasonable, given the nature of the disputed interpleader, the Court

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cannot determine whether the amount of fees requested should be awarded. Accordingly the request for

an award of fees and costs is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. The motion for judgment on the pleadings by Americo Financial Life and Annuity Ins.

Co. is GRANTED.

2. In the alternative, the motion for summary judgment by Americo Financial Life and

Annuity Ins. Co. is GRANTED.

3. The request for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05997-LJO Document 72 Filed 10/13/05 Page 12 of 12