Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02157/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02157-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 05:552 Freedom of Information Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN D. JACKSON,

Plaintiff, No. 2:06 CV 02157 RRB KJM PS

vs.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

 /

Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment came on regularly for

hearing January 23, 2008. John D. Jackson appeared in propria persona. Yoshinori H.T. Himel

appeared for the defendants. Upon hearing the arguments of plaintiff and counsel, upon

reviewing the documents in support and opposition, and supplemental material submitted by

plaintiff at the hearing and the reply thereto, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT

FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

Plaintiff filed this action relating to the reduction of his Federal Employees

Compensation Act (FECA) benefits. Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. For any claims not dismissed, defendants seek

summary judgment, contending there are no material issues of fact and they are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

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Plaintiff John D. Jackson was employed by the National Guard as the Heavy

Mobile Equipment Mechanic Supervisor at the Stockton Combined Support Maintenance Shop. 

In more common terms, he was the “superintendent of the shop.” Tr. of Hr’g Held July 17, 2001

(Defs.’ Ex. E-12 at 9-10). Plaintiff’s position was “dual-status,” meaning that while he was

employed in a civilian capacity, he was required to maintain concurrent military service.

In April 1999, plaintiff injured his back during physical training. He filed a

disability claim with the Department of Labor, Office of Worker’s Compensation Programs

(OWCP), which was accepted. In May 1999, plaintiff stopped working, citing his back injury. 

As a disabled federal employee, plaintiff was entitled to and received FECA benefits based on

the value of his pre-disability salary. ECAB Decision and Order issued Apr. 8, 2004 (Defs.’ Ex. 

B-9 at 1-2).

In February 2000, the California National Guard offered to restore plaintiff to his

position, with modifications to his duties to account for his physical limitations. Position

Amendment dated Feb. 15, 2000 (Defs.’ Ex. B-2). The Guard also informed him that should he

refuse the job offer, and should OWCP find he was capable of performing the job, his FECA

benefits could be terminated. Letter dated Feb. 14, 2000, Stuard to Jackson (Defs.’ Ex. E-2 at

1-2). Plaintiff disputed that he was able to perform the job even as modified. A statement was

added to his case file indicating that the California National Guard had offered him a position

that was within his medical restrictions, a conclusion plaintiff strongly contests. See OWCP

Statement of Accepted Facts (Defs.’ Ex. B-4 at 1). Plaintiff’s benefits were not reduced at this

time for refusing this job offer. Shortly after, in May 2000, a medical review board found him

physically unfit for service, and he was honorably discharged from military service. Mem. dated

May 1, 2000, Guerin to Jackson (Defs.’ Ex. E-10 at 1). As a result, plaintiff’s dual-status

position was terminated. Mem. dated Aug. 24, 2000, Stuard to Jackson (Defs.’ Ex. E-11 at 1). 

Almost two years later, in February 2002, OWCP notified plaintiff of its intent to

reduce his disability benefits. This reduction was proposed because OWCP had determined that

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plaintiff was only partially disabled and could perform the job of a budget officer, a sedentary

and entry-level position paying significantly less than his former position. Had plaintiff found

work as a budget officer, OWCP would have continued to provide him benefits based on the

differential between the lower salary received and his former salary with the National Guard.

Because plaintiff did not accept or find such employment, his benefits were reduced on July 2,

2002 relative to the constructive salary he would have received had he been employed as a

budget officer. Compensation Reduction Decision dated July 2, 2002 (Defs.’ Ex. B-6 at 1).

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter pro se. Liberally construed, the complaint can be

read to raise claims for constitutional torts in violation of due process, equal protection, and

freedom of speech; discrimination by age or handicap in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and

the ADEA; violations of the Privacy Act; and violations of the Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA). He names as defendants the Department of Labor, and Elaine Chao as the Secretary of

Labor (“labor defendants”); the Department of the Army, including the National Guard Bureau,

and Pete Geren as the Secretary of the Army; and Majors General Paul Monroe and William

Wade II, along with Colonel William Weir in their official capacities with the California Military

Department (“military defendants”).

I. Constitutional Torts

The complaint can be construed to allege constitutional torts against plaintiff’s

due process, equal protection, and first amendment rights. At the hearing on this matter, plaintiff

conceded that he was not pursuing such claims. Because plaintiff is not asserting constitutional

tort claims, defendants’ motion to dismiss on these claims is moot.

II. ADEA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against because of his age (51 at the

time) and disability (his back condition). From the exhibits provided by the defense, in particular

plaintiff’s deposition testimony, it appears that plaintiff claims the National Guard failed to

accommodate his injury by reclassifying his job to no longer require military status, a

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reclassification that is prohibited by current federal law. See National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 1996 § 513, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186. Plaintiff also claims defendants

failed to accommodate him by refusing to provide for his retraining as a school psychologist in a

four-year program from the University of the Pacific. Tr. Of Hr’g Held July 17, 2001, Ex. E-12.

Defendants attack the ADEA and Rehabilitation claims in three ways. First, they

correctly contend Majors General Monroe and Wade and Colonel Weir are not proper defendants

because they are not heads of agencies. Second, the defendants contend the respective statutes of

limitations have run. Finally, defendants contend the plaintiff’s claims are precluded by a valid

settlement agreement; if plaintiff is alleging a violation of the settlement agreement then, by its

terms, his remedy is with the Equal Employment Office.

As a threshold matter, the claims against Monroe, Wade, and Weir must be

dismissed because they are not the heads of their agencies and are thus improper defendants. 

Romain v. Shear, 799 F.2d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1986) (ADEA); Johnston v. Horne, 875 F.2d

1415, 1418-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (Rehabilitation Act), overruled on other grounds, Irwin v. Dep’t of

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). Furthermore, the ADEA and Rehabilitation Act claims

against the remaining military defendants must be dismissed because plaintiff executed a valid

settlement agreement with the California National Guard in exchange for a lump sum of $15,000

and $55,000 in attorney’s fees. There is nothing in the complaint to suggest any defect in that

agreement. By its terms, “Jackson hereby withdraws his EEO complaint and . . . agrees not to

file any other EEO claims related to his civilian employment with the Guard up to his separation

on September 29, 2000." Settlement Agreement Dated Mar. 19, 2003 (Defs.’ Ex. E-15). Because

plaintiff’s discrimination claims against the military defendants all are based on injuries alleged

during his employment, his claims against the remaining military defendants, the Department of

the Army and Secretary Geren, are precluded. Cf. Botefur v. City of Eagle Point, 7 F.3d 152,

157-58 (9th Cir. 1993) (§1983 claim precluded by release agreement).

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The discrimination claims also are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 

See Baker v. Bd. of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 631-632 (10th Cir. 1993) (Rehabilitation Act claims

fall under state personal injury statutes of limitations); Cal. Civil Code Proc. § 335.1 (two year

period for personal injury claims); Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891 F.2d 216, 221 (9th Cir. 1989)

(applying 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) six-year catch-all statute of limitations to ADEA claims). Plaintiff

was terminated from his position on September 29, 2000 and did not file his complaint until

September 29, 2006. Thus, the statute has long since run on the Rehabilitation Act claims. 

However, plaintiff’s claims would be within the statutory period for any ADEA injuries suffered

on or after September 29, 2000. It is unclear on the face of the amended complaint whether

plaintiff is asserting an ADEA claim arising out of conduct occurring within the statute of

limitations. However, as explained below, dismissal should be granted for the remaining

defendants on any such claim.

Plaintiff’s interactions with the Department of Labor, through the OWCP,

extended well into the statutory period, and ADEA claims arising from those interactions have

not expired. It appears that the crux of plaintiff’s complaint against the Labor defendants is that

the OWCP reduced his benefits based on information in the Statement of Accepted Facts

(SOAF), which he alleges was incorrect, and specifically a notation that “Recently, however, the

[California National Guard] was able to offer [plaintiff] his job back with several modification

[sic] to the hours and duties that are within his medical restrictions.” See, e.g., Decl. Of

Raymond E. Mitten, Jr. (Defs.’ Ex. A-1) (emphasis added). However, it is undisputed that

plaintiff’s OWCP benefits were reduced because of his failure to take a budget officer position in

2002, not the re-employment offer by the National Guard in 2000 referred to in the SOAF. 

Compensation Reduction Decision Dated July 2, 2002 (Defs.’ Ex. B-6). Plaintiff offers no

contravening evidence. Thus, even if leave to amend were granted, such amendment would be

futile.

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Plaintiff further asserts a conspiracy to reduce his benefits and suggests retaliatory

actions were taken against him because of his efforts to amend the SOAF and to notify officials

of fraud and waste. Am. Compl. at 5:12-15. Plaintiff offers no more than conclusory allegations,

which are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “A plaintiff's obligation

to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-1965 (2007). Plaintiff’s ADEA

and Rehabilitation Act claims against the remaining defendants, therefore, should be dismissed

for failure to state a claim, and leave to amend should not be granted as further amendment

would be futile. 

III. Whistleblower Claim

Plaintiff’s allegations of retaliatory firing may be read as a claim under the

Whistleblower Protection Act. 5 U.S.C. § 2302. However, that Act requires that administrative

remedies be exhausted prior to filing suit. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Plaintiff offers no proof that

he has pursued any administrative process. Accordingly, the claim should be dismissed.

IV. Privacy Act Claim

The majority of plaintiff’s amended complaint is devoted to his contention that the

Privacy Act was violated by the OWCP in failing to amend the SOAF discussed above. He

points to the Act’s requirement that agencies

maintain all records which are used by the agency in making any

determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance,

timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure

fairness to the individual in the determination.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5). The Act further allows for a civil suit in a federal district court if an

agency “makes a determination . . . not to amend an individual's record in accordance with his

request, or fails to make such review in conformity with [the Act].” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A).

Defendants correctly argue that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

review OWCP’s benefits determinations. The Privacy Act provides a mechanism by which an

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 While the federal courts are not precluded by FECA from hearing genuine constitutional 1

claims, the plaintiff has failed to establish any. Although he invokes due process, equal

protection, and free speech, his complaint has not established a deprivation of any of those rights. 

See Rodrigues v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Congress’s intent was that

the courts not be burdened by a flood of small claims challenging the merits of compensation

decisions . . . . We do not read the statute to take the extraordinary step of foreclosing

jurisdiction over constitutional claims. . . . a mere allegation of a constitutional violation would

not be sufficient to avoid the effect of a statutory finality provision.”) (citations omitted). 

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individual may gain access to and seek amendment of agency records. The Act was not intended

to allow plaintiffs to re-litigate otherwise final administrative determinations. OWCP

determinations of FECA benefits are one such example. FECA contains a strongly-worded doorclosing provision: benefit determinations by OWCP are “final and conclusive for all purposes . . .

and not subject to review by . . . a Court by mandamus or otherwise.” 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b). As

one court put it, the Privacy Act “may not be employed as a skeleton key for reopening

consideration of unfavorable federal agency decisions.” Rogers v. United States Dep’t of Labor,

607 F.Supp. 697, 699 (N.D. Cal. 1985). Plaintiff’s Privacy Act claim is an improper collateral

attack and must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1

V. Freedom of Information Act Claim

Finally, plaintiff raises a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) challenge. Prior to

this action, plaintiff requested internet access to his OWCP case file and copies of any meeting

notes for February 1st, 2000. A representative of OWCP provided him with both a paper copy of

his file and a copy on CD-ROM, but stated that internet access was not available to the public,

nor were there any plans to make it so. He also informed plaintiff that no notes from that

meeting appeared to exist. See Decl. Of Andrew Tharp (Defs.’ Ex. C ¶ 4 (describing search for

notes)). Plaintiff seeks production of the meeting notes and internet access to his case file.

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 The OWCP is not required to pursue any records that may exist and be in possession of 2

a retired employee. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 145 (1989)

(“the agency must be in control of the requested materials at the time the FOIA request is

made.”); Blanton v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 182 F. Supp 2d 81, 85 (D.D.C. 2002) (“the

FOIA does not impose an obligation on defendant to contact former employees to determine

whether they know of the whereabouts of records that might be responsive to a FOIA request.”).

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Defendants argue that plaintiff is entitled to neither. The FOIA provision cited by

plaintiff requires an agency to “provide the [requested] record in any form of format requested by

the person if the record is readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(3)(B). Because OWCP has not developed a system to provide public online access, the

records requested are not readily reproducible in that format.

The request for meeting notes, the defense asserts, has been properly handled. 

The FOIA requires a reasonable search in good faith. Defendants have provided a declaration of

the OWCP official who handled the FOIA request. His search for the records consisted of

polling the attendees of the meeting and asking whether they retained any notes, with the

exception of one attendee who had since retired. “As this was an informal, internal meeting to 2

discuss case processing, there was no requirement for written notes or a conference

memorandum.” Decl. Of Andrew Tharp (Defs.’ Ex. C ¶ 4). With both of plaintiff’s requests, the

OWCP has met the requirements of the Act. The agency produced plaintiff’s case file in both

paper and electronic formats. It conducted a reasonable search for documents responsive to

plaintiff’s request. It only refused to create an entirely new system of public access to internal

documents. TPS, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 330 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003)

(the FOIA does not require “a significant expenditure of resources, [beyond] a business as usual

approach”). The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the FOIA claims.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be granted as to the Freedom of Information Act claims and that the

defendants’ motions to dismiss the remaining claims be granted.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

"Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 22, 2008.

jackson.57

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