Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03260/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03260-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

FREDERICK SCHIFF, ET AL., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, ET 

AL., 

Defendants.

CASE NO. 19-cv-03260-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

CERTAIN CLAIMS; SETTING CASE 

MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE 

Dkt. No. 15 

The motion of defendants City and County of San Francisco et al., to dismiss certain 

claims from plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED on the grounds stated, with leave to 

amend limited as stated herein. 

Plaintiffs are twelve white, male San Francisco Police Department officers and one white, 

female officer who allege they were passed over for promotions in favor of lower-scoring minority 

and female candidates in a biased promotional process employing a version of “banding.”1 (First 

Amended Complaint, “FAC” ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs allege seven claims against various combinations of 

defendants, only some of which defendants now move to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

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 The City’s promotional policies and use of “banding” have been the subject of prior 

litigation by plaintiffs here and others. “The City originally used the banding method to comply 

with a consent decree arising from a 1973 class action, Officers for Justice v. Civil Service 

Commission of the City and County of San Francisco, C 73–0657. In that case an association of 

[minority] police officers sued City officials, alleging race and sex discrimination in connection 

with SFPD’s hiring and promotion procedures. The litigation resulted in a consent decree which 

ended in 1998.” Hofmann v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 870 F.Supp.2d 799, 801 (N.D. Cal. 

2012) (granting with leave to amend motion to dismiss claims against the City by white officers 

alleging that the City’s “banding” promotional system was discriminatory); see also Schiff v. City 

& Cty. of San Francisco, 816 F. Supp. 2d 798, 819 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff'd, 528 F. App'x 743 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (granting summary judgment in favor of the City and against plaintiff Schiff and 

finding that Schiff failed to offer evidence that “banding” was used as a pretext to discriminate in 

connection with making promotions off the 2005 Lieutenant eligible list). 

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 

I. DISCUSSION 

A. Claims Against Defendants Breed, Farrell, Suhr, and Scott in Their Official 

Capacities 

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims against Breed, Farrell, Suhr, and Scott in their 

official capacities are duplicative of their claims against the City. Moreover, the “official 

capacity” claims brought against defendants Suhr and Farrell, the former police chief and mayor 

respectively, should be dismissed because as former City officials they no longer have “official 

capacity” status. Plaintiffs respond only that official capacity claims are authorized under Monell 

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

Official-capacity claims pursuant to section 1983 “generally represent only another way of 

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Id. at 690 n.55. “As long as 

the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in 

all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 166 (1985). “When both a municipal officer and a local government entity are named, 

and the officer is named only in an official capacity, the court may dismiss the officer as a 

redundant defendant.” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff Dep't, 533 

F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Here, each claim brought against Breed, Farrell, Suhr, and Scott in their official capacities 

is also brought against the City. Therefore, the motion to dismiss Breed, Farrell, Suhr, and Scott 

in their official capacities is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

B. All Claims Against Entities Other Than the City 

In response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs have agreed to dismiss their claims against 

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 The motion does not seek dismissal of the following claims in the FAC:  First Cause of Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against defendants Scott and Suhr in their 

individual capacities  Second Cause of Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Scott and Suhr in their 

individual capacities 

 Fourth Cause of Action under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)) against the City 

 Fifth Cause of Action under California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Cal. Gov’t Code § 

12940) against the City 

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all entities named in the FAC other than the City and County of San Francisco. 

C. Claims Under Sections 1981 and 1983 (First and Second Causes of Action) 

Against Defendant City and Against Defendants Breed and Farrell in their Individual 

Capacities 

In response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs have agreed to dismiss their claims under 

42 U.S.C. section 1981 and 1983 against individual defendants Breed and Farrell. 

D. Claim Under Section 1985 (Third Cause of Action) Against All Defendants 

In response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs agree that they must amend the complaint 

and request leave to do so. 

E. California Constitutional Claim under Proposition 209 (Sixth Cause of Action) 

Defendants next seek to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for violation of Article I, Section 31 of 

the California Constitution, sometimes referred to as “Proposition 209” due to the ballot measure 

that enacted it. Defendants contend Proposition 209 affords no avenue of relief to plaintiffs since 

it prohibits discrimination or preferential treatment in programs such as affirmative action plans 

which expressly consider race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, but does not apply to raceneutral policies like the one at issue here. See American Civ. Rights Found. (ACRF) v. Berkeley 

Unified Sch. Dist., 172 Cal.App.4th 207, 222 (2009) (“decision makers remain free to recognize 

that our society is composed of multiple races with different histories, to gather information 

concerning geographic distribution of the races, and to adopt race-neutral policies in an effort to 

achieve a fair allocation of resources”). A facial challenge to a policy must establish that “no set 

of circumstances exists under which the [policy] would be valid . . . [i.e., that the policy would] 

inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict” with the California Constitution. Id. at 220 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiffs concede that no reported authorities have 

upheld the use of Proposition 209 to attack a facially neutral policy. 

Defendants are correct that plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to state a facial 

challenge to the City’s policies under Proposition 209. Likewise, plaintiffs’ complaint does not 

allege facts establishing that the policy was applied to them in a manner that would violate 

Proposition 209. The motion to dismiss this claim is therefore GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO 

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AMEND to allege facts supporting an as-applied challenge pursuant to Proposition 209. 

F. Claim for Declaratory Relief 

Finally, defendants seek to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action for declaratory relief 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C sections 2201 and 2202. Defendants argue that the only declaration 

plaintiffs seek is one finding defendants’ promotional practices violate their rights under section 

1981, Title VII, FEHA, and Proposition 209, and therefore the Seventh Cause of Action seeks no 

relief independent of the preceding causes of action themselves. In opposition to the motion, 

plaintiffs concede the declaratory relief they seek can be obtained through their other causes of 

action, and that sections 2201 and 2202 do not grant them an independent cause of action but only 

a form of relief. In light thereof, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the Seventh Cause of 

Action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND plaintiffs’ prayer for relief as necessary. 

II. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, 

(1) The motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to all claims 

against entities other than the City, against defendants Breed, Farrell, Suhr, and Scott in their 

official capacities, and against defendants Breed and Farrell in their individual capacities as to the 

claim for violation of section 1981 and 1983 (First and Second Causes of Action). 

(2) The motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to allege a cognizable 

basis for a section 1985 claim (Third Cause of Action) and an as-applied challenge under 

Proposition 209 (Sixth Cause of Action) to the extent these claims can be pleaded consistent with 

plaintiffs’ obligations under Rule 11. 

(3) The motion to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action for declaratory relief is GRANTED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ONLY the prayer for relief. 

Plaintiffs shall file their amended complaint no later than January 24, 2020. No new 

claims or parties may be added without leave of court or stipulation of the defendants. 

Defendants shall file their response within 21 days thereafter. Defendants may not raise 

new objections not encompassed in this motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g), (h); Aetna 

Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Med. Servs., Inc., 855 F.2d 1470, 1475 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (generally 

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successive Rule 12 motions on different grounds not permitted); Albany Ins. Co. v. Almacenadora 

Somex, S.A., 5 F.3d 907, 909 (5th Cir. 1993) (same). 

The Court hereby SETS an initial case management conference for Monday, March 2, 

2020, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom One, Federal District Courthouse, 1301 Clay Street, Oakland, 

California. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 8, 2020 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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