Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03425/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03425-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1,

2005, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal

Code § 5075(a).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KOUNG H. CHINN,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-3425 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Koung Chinn, proceeding pro se, has filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to title 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, challenging as a violation of his constitutional rights the

denial of parole by the California Board of Parole Hearings

(Board).1 Respondent Anthony Kane has filed an answer. Petitioner

has filed a traverse. Having considered all of the papers filed by

the parties, the Court DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

On April 11, 1992, Petitioner went to the apartment of Bopha

Kim, his child’s mother. Kim’s brother testified that he heard

Petitioner and Kim arguing in her bedroom and that Petitioner was

demanding to see his child. The brother heard two small pops and

went to the bedroom. He saw Petitioner holding a small pistol. He

saw Petitioner try to shoot Kim again, but he believed the gun

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jammed or was empty because he heard a click. Petitioner fled the

scene and was later arrested in New York. An autopsy report showed

that Kim was killed by two gunshot wounds to her head. 

Petitioner plead guilty to second-degree murder and was

sentenced to fifteen years to life. The court also found that

Petitioner was armed during the commission of the crime but stayed

the four year arming enhancement. Petitioner started serving his

sentence on December 1, 1992, and his minimum eligible parole date

was July 10, 2002. 

Since his incarceration, Petitioner has had a primarily

positive record. His only two disciplinary infractions were a

rules violation report in April, 1993 for an identification

incident and a counseling memorandum in July, 1996 for failing to

report to work. He completed a vocational landscaping course in

1996, an entrepreneur development course and a fatherhood class in

2000, and a self-help “Impact Workshop” in 2002. Petitioner worked

as a dental technician in 2001 and received a laudatory chrono for

his work in May, 2001. At the time of the hearing he was working

in the vocational print shop and completing a graphic arts course. 

On May, 25, 2004, Petitioner attended his second parole

suitability hearing before the Board. In addition to Petitioner’s

prison record, the Board considered the following evidence. 

Petitioner had one prior arrest and conviction for carrying a

loaded firearm. He was sentenced to twelve months of probation. 

Petitioner had no juvenile record but admitted to being involved

with a gang prior to 1989. Prior to his conviction, Petitioner had

graduated from high school and completed two and a half years of

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college. However, Petitioner scored at a 5.2 grade level on a test

administered at the prison. 

The Board considered a report by Petitioner’s correctional

counselor, who opined that Petitioner would pose a moderate to low

degree of threat to the public if released from prison. The

counselor found that, although Petitioner “remained disciplinary

free for the last ten years” and “has programmed well at work,” the

commitment crime “remains vicious and appears to be a crime of

passion.” Respondent’s Exhibit 5 at 3. 

A 2001 mental health evaluation noted that Petitioner was

“genuinely remorseful and repentant” and opined that he “would be

considered of less than average violence potential within a

controlled setting” and in the community, “his violence potential,

since he has no history of any other violent crimes, is estimated

to be no more than the average citizen in the community.” 

Respondent’s Exhibit 6 at 4. The evaluation also predicted that

Petitioner “is going to need support within the community” and

suggested that he “receive ongoing supportive therapy to assist him

in integrating his guilt about the commitment offense.” Id. 

The Board also read an April, 2003 letter from Petitioner’s

sister, Jennifer Chinn, who said that he would be welcome to stay

with her family in Los Angeles. The letter stated, in part, “My

husband and I will support you, everything, place to stay, a car,

food, and my husband will help you find a job or a living.” 

Respondent’s Exhibit 4 at 20. The Board noted that Petitioner did

not have any job offers in Los Angeles. Further, Petitioner

conceded that he likely would be deported to Cambodia if released

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on parole. Petitioner presented two letters dated December 25,

2002, from his uncle and cousin in Cambodia, stating that they

would employ him at the restaurant they owned because they needed

somebody who spoke English. The Commissioner discredited the

letter, telling Petitioner that he needed to know “an address [and]

the name of the restaurant.” Id. at 25. Further, the Commissioner

noted that the letter was two years old and did not explicitly

offer Petitioner a place to live. Petitioner informed the

Commissioner that he had given a more recent letter with the

address and a telephone number to his corrections counselor. 

After brief deliberation, the Board panel concluded that

Petitioner was not suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety

if released and issued a two-year denial of parole. In support of

its decision, the Board stated that the commitment offense “was

carried out in an especially violent and cruel manner” and noted

that the crime left Petitioner’s daughter without a mother. 

Further, the Board found that Petitioner “lack[ed] realistic parole

plans” citing the perceived deficiencies in the letters regarding

his plans in Cambodia. Id. at 33-34. 

The Board also found that “it is not reasonable to expect that

parole would be granted at a hearing during the following two

years.” Id. In the interim, the Board suggested that Petitioner

seek “additional self-help to discuss, understand, and cope with

stress in a non-destructive manner” and to clarify his parole

plans. Id. 

On September 15, 2004, Petitioner filed in Los Angeles County

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Superior Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging

the Board's decision and asserting that the denial of parole

violated his plea agreement. In its reasoned opinion, the court

denied the petition, finding that some evidence supported the

Board's denial of parole. However, it held that no evidence

supported the Board's finding that the commitment offense was

especially violent and cruel because it was carried out in a

dispassionate and calculated manner. The court also found that

“Petitioner entered into an indeterminate plea agreement, to which

the Board was not a party, that provided for a minimum sentence of

fifteen years and a maximum of life.” Respondent’s Exhibit 7 at 2

(emphasis in original). Therefore, the court found that

Petitioner’s claim based on his plea agreement was without merit. 

After the court of appeal and California Supreme Court denied his

petition summarily, Petitioner brought a federal habeas petition in

this Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge

to a State parole eligibility decision, the applicable standard is

contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir.

2002). Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief

unless the State court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

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facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412 (2000). A federal court must presume the correctness of

the State court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Respondent concedes that Petitioner has exhausted his State

remedies by filing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. Where, as here, the highest State court

to reach the merits issued a summary opinion which does not

explain the rationale of its decision, federal court review under

§ 2254(d) is of the last State court opinion to reach the merits.

Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In

this case, the last State court opinion to address the merits of

Petitioner’s claim is the opinion of the Los Angeles County

Superior Court. 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Respondent argues that the Court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction because State parole matters do not constitute a

federal question on the grounds that denial of parole does not

affect a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Respondent

relies on In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), for the

proposition that California prisoners have no liberty interest in

parole and thus have no federal due process rights in connection

with parole eligibility. However, the Ninth Circuit has rejected

this contention. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the Court has subject

matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to decide whether

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Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was

violated by the Board's determination that he was not suitable for

parole. 

II. Due Process Claim

Petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated

by the Board's decision because no evidence supports its finding

that he is unsuitable for parole. Because California prisoners

have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in release on

parole, they cannot be denied a parole date without the procedural

protections necessary to satisfy due process. McQuillion, 306

F.3d at 902. A parole board's decision must be supported by “some

evidence” to satisfy the requirements of due process. 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); McQuillion, 306

F.3d at 904; Morales v. California Dep't of Corrections, 16 F.3d

1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 499

(1995). The evidence underlying the board's decision must have

some indicia of reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek

v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The California court rejected the Board’s finding that

Petitioner’s commitment crime was especially violent and cruel. 

Nonetheless, the court noted that the facts of the crime “were

enough to establish more than the minimum necessary for a

conviction of second-degree murder.” Respondent’s Exhibit 7 at 1. 

Further, the court found support for the Board’s conclusion that

Petitioner “lacks realistic parole plans,” because the letters

from his family in Cambodia “were two years old and not specific

regarding potential living arrangements.” Id. at 2. Based on

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these findings, the court found that there was “‘some evidence’ to

support the Board’s conclusion.” Id. 

Petitioner argues that the Board’s finding that the nature of

his offense outweighed the positive aspects of his profile was not

supported by the evidence. Petitioner cites Biggs v. Terhune, 334

F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003), in support of his argument that

“given his over six years of disciplinary free prison performance

and his on-going positive programming, the gravity of his offense

and his previous criminal history can no longer provide the some

evidence needed to support a parole denial decision." Petition at

11. 

In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit found that parole denial based

solely on the gravity of the commitment offense can initially

satisfy due process requirements, and that the "some evidence"

standard could be satisfied by the Board's consideration of the

gravity of the offense. However, in dicta, the Biggs court held

that courts may also consider the parole board’s decision-making

process over time: “The Parole Board’s decision is one of

‘equity’ and requires a careful balancing and assessment of the

factors considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor . . . runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals

espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process

violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. 

Nevertheless, the Board's decision at issue here does not

rise to a due process violation. Although the Ninth Circuit has

stated that, over time, continuous denial of parole based on the

commitment offense could result in denial of due process, see id.

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at 916-17, it has not specified the number of denials or the

length of time served beyond the minimum sentence that would

constitute a due process violation. District courts which have

granted habeas petitions challenging the Board's decisions

addressed situations involving more denials of parole than in the

instant case. See e.g., Irons v. Carey, 358 F. Supp. 2d 936, 947

(E.D. Cal. 2005) (finding due process violation in denial of

parole at fifth parole suitability hearing after petitioner had

served sixteen years of a seventeen-years-to-life sentence for

second degree murder with a two-year enhancement for use of

firearm where all factors indicated suitability for parole),

rev'd, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2007) (given the egregiousness of

the commitment offense, due process not violated when Board deemed

petitioner unsuitable for parole prior to expiration of his

minimum term); Johnson v. Finn, 2006 WL 195159, *12 (E.D. Cal.)

(finding due process violation in denial of parole at twelfth

parole suitability hearing after petitioner had served twenty-four

years of sentence of life with the possibility of parole for first

degree murder where all factors indicated suitability for parole).

Further, the Board also found that Petitioner lacked a

realistic parole plan. Petitioner does not challenge this

finding, which also provides some evidence to support the Board's

denial. Instead, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to parole

“if he either has developed marketable skills while in prison or

has acceptable parole plans.” Traverse at 21. However,

Petitioner misinterprets California Code of Regulations title 15,

§ 2402(d), which simply provides examples of circumstances that

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“tend to show that the prisoner is suitable for release.” The

provision makes clear that the examples “are set forth as general

guidelines” and “the importance attached to any circumstance or

combination of circumstances in a particular case is left to the

judgment of the panel.” Id. 

Accordingly, the superior court's finding that some evidence

supported the Board's finding that Petitioner was unsuitable for

parole was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. However, if Petitioner

establishes a realistic parole plan and continues his positive

behavior in prison and the Board continues to deny parole based

solely upon unchanging facts such as the nature of the crime, the

Board's decision may eventually amount to a due process violation. 

See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17.

II. Violation of the Plea Agreement

Petitioner also argues that he was "unconstitutionally denied

[an] owed reciprocal benefit from his plea agreement." Petition

at 14. He argues that denial of parole denied him "his owed

'reciprocal benefit' of 'lessened punishment.'" Id. at 15. 

However, Petitioner has not demonstrated that any promise in his

plea agreement was breached. 

Petitioner cites People v. Collins, 21 Cal. 3d 208 (1978),

for the proposition that when accepting a plea bargain, "the

defendant agrees to plead guilty in order to obtain a reciprocal

benefit, generally consisting of a less severe punishment than

that which could result if he were convicted of all offenses

charged." Id. at 214 (quoting People v. Orin, 13 Cal.3d 937, 942

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(1975)). However, Petitioner does not allege that the sentence he

received was the same as or greater than the sentence he would

have received if convicted at trial, nor would this be the proper

forum for raising that challenge. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the denial of parole

after he served less than twelve years of his fifteen-year-to-life

sentence breached any promise made in his plea agreement. 

Further, Petitioner does not allege any constitutional

violation that would support the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. 

III. Bias 

Finally, Petitioner alleges that the Board’s decision to deny

him parole was based on unlawful bias against those convicted of

murder. Petitioner did not raise this claim in his state habeas

petition. Therefore, it is unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 

It is denied as without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/14/ 07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHINN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

KANE et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-03425 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on June 14, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Elizabeth S. Kim

State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Koung H. Chinn H-57280

CTF -Soledad

P.O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Dated: June 14, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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