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Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 2006 Decided December 1, 2006

No. 05-5200

MARY T. MAJANO,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv00201)

David C. Gray argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. Craig

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Michael J. Ryan, Assistant

U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: RANDOLPH and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Appellant Mary T. Majano seeks

damages for injuries she suffered when Jeanny Kim, a fellow

employee at the Smithsonian Institution, allegedly assaulted her

at work. Under the terms of the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679(d)(1), federal employees are immune from state tort

lawsuits for money damages if their tortious conduct occurred

while they were acting within the scope of their employment.

Haddon v. United States, 68 F.3d 1420, 1422-23 (D.C. Cir.

1995). The United States is the only proper defendant against

such actions. But the United States has retained its sovereign

immunity against assault claims. Therefore, Majano’s sole hope

of success requires that she show Kim’s assault was not within

the scope of her employment, such that the Westfall Act would

not render Kim immune from suit. The issue presented by this

appeal is whether the district court in granting summary

judgment against Majano correctly concluded that no reasonable

jury could find that Kim’s assault was outside the scope of her

employment. We disagree and so reverse the district court. 

I.

Many of the facts recounted here are disputed by the

Government, but because we are reviewing a grant of summary

judgment against appellant Majano, we must view the evidence

“as favorably to [her] as reason will permit.” Aka v. Wash.

Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting

Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990)). On

the afternoon of June 17, 2003, Majano, a custodial worker at

the Smithsonian’s Victor Building, arrived at work. She entered

the building through an unmonitored secure door in the parking

structure. As she proceeded through the door, she heard

someone calling to her. She turned and saw Kim, a senior

manager at the Smithsonian whom she did not know,

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approaching the door. Majano had been instructed by her

supervisors not to let persons enter the building if they were

unknown to her unless they provided official identification

showing they were entitled to entry. Without allowing Kim to

pass through the door, Majano asked to see Kim’s identification.

Instead of showing Majano her identification, Kim pushed

Majano out of the doorway and forced her way into the building.

After they were both inside the building, Majano proceeded

down a thirty-foot hallway that led to a bay of elevators. Kim

followed closely, muttering obscenities and calling Majano

“stupid.” Upon reaching the elevators, Kim grabbed the lanyard

around Majano’s neck by the attached access card and

repeatedly yanked it. The force of Kim’s action snapped

Majano’s access card in two. When the elevator arrived,

Majano entered first. Kim followed. Once in the elevator, the

two neither spoke to nor touched each other, and parted without

further incident. In the weeks following the assault, Majano

experienced continual pain and discomfort. A physician

diagnosed a herniated disk in her neck that he attributed to the

trauma from Kim forcefully and repeatedly pulling the lanyard.

The pain in Majano’s neck required surgery and forced her to

quit work at the Smithsonian. She remains disabled and unable

to work. 

Majano brought tort claims against Kim in D.C. Superior

Court seeking damages for her injuries. Pursuant to the Westfall

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2), the Attorney General of the United

States certified that Kim’s conduct was within the scope of her

federal employment, the United States was automatically

substituted as the sole defendant, and the matter was removed to

federal district court. The Government moved to dismiss,

arguing that even if the facts alleged in Majano’s complaint

were true, her claims would fail as a matter of law because no

reasonable jury could find that Kim was acting outside the scope

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of her employment. Majano filed a motion in opposition and

moved for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. The district

court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss and granted

Majano’s motion for discovery. After discovery was completed,

the Government filed a motion for summary judgment, which

the district court granted, concluding as a matter of law that the

Government had established that Kim was acting within the

scope of her employment. 

II.

We affirm summary judgment when “there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). “Put

another way, a party is entitled to summary judgment only if no

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”

United States ex rel. Bettis v. Odebrecht Contractors, 393 F.3d

1321, 1325-26 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The non-moving party is

“granted [] the benefit of all reasonable evidentiary inferences

that can be drawn in his favor.” Toney v. Bergland, 645 F.2d

1063, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1981). We review the district court’s

grant of summary judgment de novo. Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v.

Babbitt, 202 F.3d 349, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

The narrow question presented in this appeal is whether

there was sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to

conclude that Kim was acting outside the scope of her

employment when she assaulted Majano. At the outset, we note

that scope of employment questions are generally viewed as

questions of fact best resolved by a jury. See Jordan v. Medley,

711 F.2d 211, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Before examining the

evidence on this point, we may note that the District of

Columbia courts have considered it to be the general rule that

scope of employment presents a jury question.”); Lyon v. Carey,

533 F.2d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“It is, then, a question of

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fact for the trier of fact, rather than a question of law for the

court, whether the assault stemmed from purely and solely

personal sources or arose out of the conduct of the employer’s

business . . . .”); Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560,

562 (D.C. 1984) (“As a general rule, whether an employee is

acting ‘within the scope of employment’ is a question of fact for

the jury.”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27, 31

(D.C. 1979) (“Whether an assault which was the proximate

cause of the injury was within the scope of [] employment . . . as

a general rule, has been held to be a question of fact for the jury

to determine.”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

On the infrequent occasions when courts have resolved scope of

employment questions as a matter of law, either by summary

judgment or directed verdict, it has generally been to hold that

the employee’s action was not within the scope of her

employment and thus to absolve the employer of any liability.

In Jordan, writing for this Court, then-Judge Scalia explained

why it would be unusual to find, as a matter of law, that an

employee was acting within the scope of her employment when

she committed an intentional tort: “A directed verdict against

the employer would be particularly rare in the case of an

intentional tort, which by its nature is willful and thus more

readily suggests personal motivation.” 711 F.2d at 215. The

same principle holds true for summary judgment. Richardson

by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 828

n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that “the standard for direction of

a verdict mirrors the standard for summary judgment”).

Against this backdrop, we consider whether this is one of

those unusual cases in which a reasonable jury would have to

find the employee’s conduct within the scope of her

employment. We find that it is not. Scope of employment

questions are governed by the law of the place where the

employment relationship exists. Kimbro v. Velten, 30 F.3d

1501, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In this case that is the District of

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Columbia. We look to the decisions of the Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia for our guidance on the local law. See

e.g., Lyon, 533 F.2d at 655 (applying case law of the Court of

Appeals of the District of Columbia for a scope of employment

question); Jordan, 711 F.2d at 213-14 (same). “As its

framework for determining whether an employee acted within

the scope of employment, the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia looks to the Restatement (Second) of Agency

(1957).” Haddon, 68 F.3d at 1423. Under the Restatement, an

employee’s conduct falls within the scope of employment if: 1)

it is of the kind of conduct he is employed to perform; 2) it

occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;

3) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master;

and 4) if force is intentionally used by the servant against

another, the use of force is not unexpected by the master.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957). If the

employees’ conduct is different in kind from that authorized, far

beyond time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose

to serve the master, then the conduct is not within the scope of

employment. Id. 

Majano makes two arguments in support of her contention

that Kim’s conduct was outside the scope of her employment.

First, she argues that Kim’s assault in front of the elevators does

not meet the third Restatement factor because it was not

“actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the

[Smithsonian].” Second, she argues that Kim’s use of force was

not expected by the Smithsonian. Because we believe that a

reasonable jury could conclude that Kim was not motivated by

a desire to serve the Smithsonian when she yanked Majano’s

lanyard, we do not need to reach this second argument. As to

her first argument, under the law of the District of Columbia,

“the moment the agent turns aside from the business of the

principal and commits an independent trespass, the principal is

not liable. The agent is not then acting within the scope of his

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authority in the business of the principal, but in the furtherance

of his own ends.” Schecter v. Merch. Home Delivery, Inc., 892

A.2d 415, 427 (D.C. 2006) (citation omitted). The key inquiry

is the employee’s intent at the moment the tort occurred.

Our opinion in M.J. Uline v. Cashdan, 171 F.2d 132 (D.C.

Cir. 1949), illustrates this point nicely. Uline involved a hockey

player who, while trying to strike an opposing player with his

stick, mistakenly hit a spectator. The trial court judge instructed

the jury that the player was acting within the scope of his

employment when the tortious conduct occurred. We found

error in the instruction and held that “the [hockey player] may

have been, at the moment he struck the blow, completely

indifferent to the work he was employed to do and actuated

only by anger or hostility toward the man he tried to injure.” Id.

at 134. We concluded that the jury should have been allowed to

determine the player’s intent when he struck the blow. Even

though the hockey player was playing hockey, the conduct for

which he was employed, and was doing so at the time and place

he was employed to play, still we found that a reasonable jury

could yet determine that he was not acting out of a desire to

serve his employer when he struck the blow and was thus not

acting within the scope of his employment.

The nature of the attack also informs the intent analysis. In

Penn Central, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

held that a railroad worker was not acting within the scope of his

employment but was instead motivated by purely personal

reasons when he kicked a taxicab driver on his way from one

worksite to another. The court reached this conclusion in part

because of the “violent and unprovoked” nature of the attack.

Penn Central, 398 A.2d at 32. In Jordan, we held that the

nature of the alleged tort “permits the imputation of a purely

personal motivation,” and quoted language from the Penn

Central court. 711 F.2d at 216. “The outrageous quality of an

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employe’s [sic] act may well be persuasive in considering

whether his motivation was purely personal.” Id. (quoting Penn

Central, 398 A.2d at 31) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Kim had a duty to report to work. Her forcible entry into

the building appears to be motivated, at least in part, by her

desire to fulfill that duty. But once she gained access to the

building, Kim’s assault of Majano has all the markings of an

independent trespass. The assault was violent and unprovoked

and took place after Kim had walked approximately 30-feet

down a hallway well inside the building. We think that a

reasonable jury could look at these facts and conclude that when

Kim assaulted Majano, she had turned away from her purpose

to gain entry to the building and instead was acting “solely for

the accomplishment of [her] independent malicious or

mischievous purposes.” Penn Central, 398 A.2d at 32 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

 Accordingly, we reverse and remand. 

So ordered.

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