Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-02238/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-02238-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOSE R. ORTIZ-CALDERON,

Petitioner, 

v. 

T. HOLT, Warden, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 15-02238 EJD (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY; DIRECTIONS TO 

CLERK 

 Petitioner has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

challenging his state conviction. Respondent filed an answer on the merits. Petitioner did not file 

a traverse although given an opportunity to do so. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition for 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In 2013, Petitioner was charged in Sonoma County Superior Court with the following 

violations of the California Penal Code: two counts of forcible sexual penetration (§ 289(a)(1)) 

(counts 1 and 2); assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245(a)(1)) 

(count 3); and felony false imprisonment (§ 236) (count 4). (Ans. at 1.) Petitioner was convicted 

by a jury of all counts except count 2. Petitioner was sentenced to six years in state prison. (Id.) 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 1 of 25
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on January 20, 2015. (Ex. 7.) On 

April 15, 2015, the state high court summarily denied review. (Ex. 9.) 

 Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on May 19, 2015. 

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

 The following facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal on direct 

appeal1

: 

In late June 2011, defendant and Megan Differding [FN2] had been dating 

for about three months. They lived a few houses down the street from each other. 

FN2. Differding was originally identified as Jane Doe in the information. 

She later expressly requested that she be referred to by her given name, as 

reflected in the Amended Information. 

Differding spent the evening of June 22, 2011, with defendant, first at his 

house, where they watched television and smoked marijuana, and then at the 

home of one of defendant’s friends, where Differding drank a 24-ounce bottle of 

beer and smoked more marijuana. Defendant drank beer. 

Differding’s Testimony 

 

Differding and defendant returned to defendant’s house around 2:00 a.m. 

Differding wanted to go back to her own home to sleep because she had to work 

the next day. Defendant became angry with her and accused her of sleeping with 

other men. They argued, and defendant insisted on keeping Differding’s car keys 

and cell phone so she could not use them to go out with another man that evening. 

Differding left her keys and cell phone behind and walked home. 

About 8:00 a.m. that morning, Differding walked back to defendant’s 

house to retrieve her belongings. A man she did not know opened the door and 

let her in. She went into defendant’s bedroom, where he again accused her of 

going out with another man. They continued arguing, and defendant refused to 

return her cell phone and car keys. She started to cry and went into the bathroom 

to get away from defendant and for some privacy. 

Defendant entered the bathroom “in a rage.” He screamed insults at her, 

calling her a “slut,” a “whore,” and “bitch.” He slapped her face repeatedly and 

pushed her to the floor. She yelled at him to stop, but he lay on top of her and 

pinned her down. He reached inside her shorts and “shov[ed]” his fingers so far 

 

1

This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 2 of 25
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

into her vagina that it “felt like [they were] in [her] stomach.” She could tell it 

was more than one finger “[b]ecause it hurt so bad.” He withdrew his fingers 

after a few seconds and held his hand up to her face, ordering her to smell his 

fingers. He slapped her face again. 

Differding testified that she was eventually able to get up, but defendant 

pushed her again. She fell backwards into the bathtub and hit her head on the 

faucet, which caused the water to turn on. She struggled to stand up, and 

defendant pinned her against the wall with his arm across her throat. Differding 

resisted, but defendant pulled off her shorts and then ripped her underwear. She 

was having trouble breathing because of the pressure against her throat. While he 

had her pinned against the wall with his forearm across her neck, defendant again 

pushed his fingers into her vagina. Differding was screaming, “‘Stop, stop, stop, 

stop,’” and he “finally stopped.” She was on the bathroom floor, trying to protect 

herself, and he was standing over her, breathing hard, as though “he was so tired 

he couldn’t hit me anymore, or struggle with me.” 

Differding grabbed her keys and phone, ran out the front door, and drove 

her car, which had been parked in front of defendant’s house, back over to her 

house. She told her mother defendant had beaten her up. Differding threw up in 

the sink and had to lie down because her head and neck hurt so badly. 

Differding’s mother called the police. 

Differding testified that it hurt to go the bathroom for about a week, and 

that her entire upper body was sore for several months. She lost her job because 

she could not lift anything weighing more than 10 pounds. 

On cross-examination, Differding acknowledged that she testified she had 

nothing to drink at defendant’s friend’s house when, in fact, she drank a 24-ounce 

bottle of beer. She also acknowledged that she had used cocaine some 30 hours 

before the assault. Differding admitted that she had given conflicting statements 

as to the number of times that defendant had penetrated her vagina with his 

fingers. Shortly after the incident, she told a sheriff’s deputy she had been 

penetrated two or three times. At the preliminary hearing, she first estimated 

three or four times, and later stated, “‘[p]robably more than five times.’” 

Differding also admitted that in 2005, when she was in the eighth grade, 

she told her mother that she had been kidnapped by two men, but that this was a 

lie; she “had ditched school that day” and did not want to get in trouble. When 

the police questioned [] her about the allegation at the time, she admitted she had 

not been kidnapped. 

Differding also acknowledged that she stole a bottle of tequila from a 

market in September 2012. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 3 of 25
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Other Prosecution Witnesses 

Differding’s mother, Gayle Differding, testified that Differding seemed 

irritated about having to pick up her keys and cell phone at defendant’s house on 

the morning of the incident. When Differding returned home a short time later, 

she was crying hysterically and her clothes were wet. She told her mother, “‘He 

beat me up.’” Gayle Differding called 911. She could hear her daughter vomiting 

in the bathroom, and she later saw vomit in the toilet bowl. She heard her 

daughter tell paramedics that defendant “had pushed her into the bathtub, and that 

he had held her down, that he had pushed her shorts aside, and had rammed his 

hand up her vagina.” 

Sonoma County Sheriff’s Deputy Blake Hulquist testified that Differding 

was bleeding from the mouth, had injuries to her chest, and was crying and 

hyperventilating when he arrived at the house in response to a dispatch call. 

Deputy Tim Rountree testified that he spoke with Differding while the 

paramedics were getting her ready to be taken to the hospital. Differding told 

Rountree that defendant had taken her keys the night before because he suspected 

her of sleeping with other men. Differding went back to defendant’s house earlier 

that morning to get her keys, and defendant attacked her in the bathroom. She 

told Deputy Rountree that defendant slapped her, then pushed her into the 

bathroom, ripped off her shorts, and inserted his fingers into her vagina. He 

smelled his fingers and “asked her who she had been fucking.” Differding said 

defendant “smashed her head into the bathtub, and again assaulted her, slapped 

her some more.” 

A firefighter paramedic who responded to the scene testified that 

Differding was crying and upset. She told him that she had been assaulted by her 

boyfriend. She said defendant struck her in the head and pushed her down, and 

she hit her head and neck in the bathtub. She also “reported that he ripped off her 

underwear and stuck his fingers into her vagina.” Differding complained of back 

and neck pain from having hit her head during the fall. She was taken by 

ambulance to the hospital. En route, her blood pressure was elevated and the 

paramedic administered morphine for pain. 

Differding was examined by an emergency room physician and a sexual 

assault response team (SART) nurse. She complained of hoarseness and pain to 

her head, neck, throat, arm, and vaginal area. A CAT scan and x-rays revealed no 

broken bones or serious injuries, but there was bruising to her throat, voice box, 

and thyroid cartilage, and nerve injury to her arm. The examining doctor opined 

that her symptoms were “anatomically consistent” with her description of what 

had happened; it “made sense physiologically.” 

The SART nurse saw multiple bruises on Differding’s neck and arms, a 

two-inch abrasion on the back of her leg, and “a pretty significant abrasion” on 

her scalp. The nurse also saw signs of trauma to Differding’s vaginal region that 

were consistent with repeated penetration by a hard object. The nurse noted a 

laceration with abrasion, torn skin, and petechiae (bleeding underneath the skin) 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 4 of 25
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

on the left and right labia minora. The nurse could not say whether Differding’s 

vaginal injuries were the result of consensual or non-consensual sexual activity. 

(Differding testified that she and defendant had consensual sexual intercourse 

while dating; the most recent time before the assault might have been two nights 

earlier.) 

Defendant’s Arrest and Statement to Law Enforcement 

After speaking with Differding, Deputy Hulquist walked to defendant’s 

house. Defendant was not there. While searching the house, Hulquist saw 

women’s underwear in a trash can in the bathroom. Hulquist waited outside the 

front of the house for a couple of hours. He went back inside the house when he 

heard some dogs barking in the back, and caught a glimpse of defendant entering 

a bedroom and going into a closet. Hulquist opened the closet door and found 

defendant. After a brief struggle, Hulquist arrested him. 

Sheriff’s Detective Matthew North questioned defendant later that day. 

The interview was videotaped. After reading defendant his Miranda [FN3] rights 

and obtaining his waiver, Defendant North asked defendant if he had “any idea 

why you’re here?” Defendant responded, “Yeah, I’m pretty sure I do.” 

Defendant told North that he and Differding had been out drinking the night 

before and got back around 3:30 a.m. He took her keys so she would not drive 

while drunk. Differding left defendant’s house and returned around 7:00 a.m. to 

get her car keys. Defendant said he was still “really drunk,” and they got into an 

argument in the bathroom. She started calling him names and he “flipped out” 

and “overreacted.” Defendant was upset because he suspected Differding was 

having sex with other people. Defendant admitted pulling off Differding’s 

underwear, saying it happened when she fell in the bathtub. He repeatedly 

admitted penetrating her vagina, and admitted at one point that he knew it was 

wrong. He also repeatedly stated that he was drunk at the time. Several times 

during the interview, defendant claimed that he grabbed Differding accidentally 

when one or both of them slipped on the wet bathroom floor. 

 FN3. Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 

Both Detective North and the deputy who collected evidence from under 

defendant’s fingernails noticed scratches and some redness on defendant’s face 

and arms. DNA analysis of scrapings form under defendant’s fingernails showed 

Differding’s DNA. A blood sample from defendant tested negative for alcohol. 

Defense Witnesses 

Clifton Jordan, a friend of defendant’s brother Juan, testified that he spent 

the night of June 22, 2011, on the couch at defendant’s house. Jordan let 

Differding into the house the next morning, and she and defendant immediately 

started arguing in Spanish. They went into defendant’s room and Jordan could 

hear them arguing. It sounded like a typical “petty argument.” He heard doors 

opening and slamming, and heard Differding say, “stop.” He went to the closed 

bathroom door and “asked if everything was okay.” Defendant and Differding 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 5 of 25
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

both became quiet and defendant answered, “‘Everything’s fine. Don’t worry 

about it.’” Shortly thereafter, Jordan went out on the back porch to smoke a 

cigarette and heard the front door close. When he came back inside, defendant 

was in the living room and Differding was gone. A short time later, defendant left 

the house. The police arrived a few minutes later. 

A Department of Justice criminalist testified that Differding’s June 23, 

2011, urine sample tested positive for marijuana, cocaine and a cocaine 

metabolite, and Vicodin/hydrocodone. The presence of cocaine itself strongly 

suggested that Differding had ingested cocaine within 12 hours, and not more 

than 24 hours, of giving the urine sample. 

The Verdict and Sentence 

On February 26, 2013, a jury found defendant guilty on counts 1 (forcible 

sexual penetration), 3 (assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily 

injury) and 4 (false imprisonment), and not guilty on count 2 (forcible sexual 

penetration). 

The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of six years in 

state prison, comprising the middle term of six years for count 1 as the base term, 

and middle terms of three years for count 3 and two years for count 4 (false 

imprisonment) to run concurrently. 

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

People v. Ortiz-Calderon, No. A138987, slip op. at 2-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2015) (hereinafter 

“Op.”). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose 

v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that 

was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 6 of 25
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). The only definitive 

source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed 

to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 

412; Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). While circuit law may be “persuasive 

authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the 

state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 

1062, 1069 (9th Cir.), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 

 “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 

529 U.S. at 413. “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, . . . a federal habeas 

court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that 

the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or 

incorrectly.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry 

should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively 

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. The federal habeas court must presume correct any determination of a 

factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by 

clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

 Here, as noted, the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petitions for 

review. (See Ex. 9.) The California Court of Appeal, in its opinion on direct review, addressed 

the claims Petitioner raises in the instant petition. (See Ex. 7.) The Court of Appeal thus was the 

highest court to have reviewed those claims in a reasoned decision, and, as to those claims, it is the 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 7 of 25
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Court of Appeal’s decision that this Court reviews herein. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 The Supreme Court has vigorously and repeatedly affirmed that under AEDPA, there is a 

heightened level of deference a federal habeas court must give to state court decisions. See Hardy 

v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 491 (2011) (per curiam); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783-85 

(2011); Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305 (2011) (per curiam). As the Court explained: “[o]n 

federal habeas review, AEDPA ‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court 

rulings’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Id. at 1307 

(citation omitted). With these principles in mind regarding the standard and limited scope of 

review in which this Court may engage in federal habeas proceedings, the Court addresses 

Petitioner’s claims. 

B. Claims and Analysis 

 Petitioner asserts the following grounds for relief: (1) the trial court improperly denied his 

requested jury instruction regarding the specific intent element of forcible sexual penetration, (Pet. 

at 3); (2) the appellate court erred in denying his claims of instructional error because it applied 

the incorrect standard of review, (id. at 3 and 5); (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury 

that according to CALCRIM 1045 the intent to sexually “abuse” under section 289 of the 

California Penal Code may be satisfied by the intent to cause mere “discomfort,” (id., at 5); (4) the 

trial court improperly instructed the jury with CALCRIM 372 which “conflicts with the statute 

authorizing instruction regarding flight,” (id.); (5) cumulative error; and (6) insufficient evidence 

to support the conviction for felony false imprisonment, (id. at 5-6). 

1. Instructional Errors (Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) 

 Petitioner’s claims 1 through 5 involve alleged errors in jury instructions. To obtain 

federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing 

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. 

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 78 (1991); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see 

also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (“‘[I]t must be established not merely 

that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it violated 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 8 of 25
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

some [constitutional right].’”). The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must 

be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 72. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall 

charge to the jury and as a component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 

152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)); Prantil v. California, 843 

F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988); see, e.g., Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 434-35 (2004) (per 

curiam) (no reasonable likelihood that jury misled by single contrary instruction on imperfect selfdefense defining “imminent peril” where three other instructions correctly stated the law). 

The relevant inquiry is “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied 

the challenged instruction in a manner that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant 

evidence.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). A determination that there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the 

Constitution establishes only that an error has occurred. See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 

146 (1998). If an error is found, the Court also must then determine that the error had a substantial 

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict, see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993), before granting relief in habeas proceedings. See Calderon, 525 U.S. at 

146-47. 

a. Denial of Proposed Instruction on Specific Intent (Claim 1) 

Petitioner’s first claim is that the trial court improperly denied his requested jury 

instructions regarding the specific intent element of forcible sexual penetration, which deprived 

him of the right to a jury determination of every element of the offense. 

The California Court of Appeal reviewed the applicable law for reviewing claims of 

instructional error: 

We apply the de novo standard of review to claims of instructional error. 

(People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581; People v. Posey (2004) 32 

Cal.4th 193, 218.) “‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined 

from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an 

instruction or from a particular instruction. [Citations.].... “The absence of an 

essential element in one instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light 

of the instructions as a whole.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 

18 Cal.4th 297, 328.) “Jurors are presumed able to understand and correlate 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 9 of 25
10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

instructions and are further presumed to have followed the court’s instructions.” 

(People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.) A claim that the jury was 

incorrectly or incompletely instructed required the reviewing court to determine 

from the entire charge whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 

misconstrued or misapplied the instruction. (People v. Letner (2010) 50 Cal.4th 

99, 192.) “‘Instructions should be interpreted, if possible, to as to support the 

judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such 

interpretation.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 

1088.) 

Further, we examine the jury instructions as a whole, in light of the trial 

record, to determine whether it is reasonably likely the jury understood the 

challenged instruction in a way that undermined the presumption of innocence or 

tended to light the prosecution’s burden of proving each element of each offense 

beyond a reasonably doubt. (See People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 958, 

overruled on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cla.4th 390, 421, fn. 

22.) 

The state appellate court then reviewed and rejected Petitioner’s first claim: 

Defense counsel requested the following special instruction based on 

People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 776: “To be guilty of Count I and 

Count II, both alleging sexual penetration by force, fear or threats, the defendant 

must possess a certain specific intent at the time of the alleged commission of the 

act. At the time of the alleged act of penetration, the defendant’s specific intent 

must be the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.” (Emphasis 

added.) 

The trial court agreed with defense counsel that forcible sexual penetration 

is a specific intent crime. However, the court declined to give defendant’s 

requested instruction because “between [CALCRIM] instructions 252 and 1045, 

that, those concepts that he’s requesting on the issue of specific intent are 

included and discussed.” 

The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 252, in relevant part, as 

follows: “The following crimes require a specific intent or mental state. And that 

would be Counts I and II, which is penetration by force, fear, or violence. For 

you to find a person guilty of this crime as charged in Counts I and II, that person 

must not only intentionally commit the prohibited act, but must do so with a 

specific intent. The act and specific intent required are explained in the 

instruction for that crime.” (Emphasis added.) 

The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1045, in relevant 

part, as follows: “The defendant is charged in Counts I and II with sexual 

penetration by force, in violation of Penal Code Section 289. To prove that the 

defendant is guilty of this crime, the People have to prove four elements: [¶] One, 

the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with another person; [¶] 

Two, the penetration was accomplished by using a foreign object; [¶] Three, the 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 10 of 25
11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

other person did not consent to the act, and [¶] Four, the defendant accomplished 

the act by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful 

bodily injury to another person. [¶] Sexual penetration means penetration, 

however slight, of the genital or anal opening of the other person for the purpose 

[] of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.... Penetration for sexual abuse means 

penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.” (Emphasis 

added.) 

Defendant was charged with a violation of section 289, subdivision (a)(1), 

which provides in pertinent part, “Any person who commits an act of sexual 

penetration when the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by means of 

force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury 

on the victim or another person shall be punished by imprisonment....” Section 

289, subdivision (k)(1) defines “‘sexual penetration’” as “the act of causing the 

penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of any person or 

causing another person to so penetrate the defendant’s or another person’s genital 

or anal opening for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse by any 

foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or by any unknown object.” 

Defendant argues the denial of the requested instruction deprived him of 

his right to present his defense theory that his penetration of Differding’s genitals 

was accidental or that he otherwise did not act with the required specific intent. 

We disagree. 

Pursuant to CALCRIM Nos. 252 and 1045, the trial court properly 

instructed the jury that sexual penetration is a specific intent crime, meaning that 

the “person must not only commit the prohibited act, but must do so with a 

specific intent,” (CALCRIM No. 252) and that the nature of that intent would be 

explained in the instruction on forcible sexual penetration. Thereafter, the jury 

was also told that sexual penetration required a finding that defendant had 

penetrated Differding “for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.” 

(CALCRIM No. 1045, emphasis added.) We discern no material difference 

between committing an act with a specific intent and committing an act for a 

particular purpose. Together these instructions sufficiently advised the jury of the 

specific intent required to be convicted of forcible sexual penetration. 

Defendant’s requested instruction, although legally correct, was duplicative of 

other instructions, and the trial court had no duty to give it. (See People v. Lucas

(2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 285 [“A court may refuse a proposed instruction if it is 

duplicative of other instructions.”].) 

Moreover, both parties clarified the specific intent requirement in closing 

argument. The prosecutor argued that defendant’s statement to the deputies, “I 

know it was wrong,” was evidence that he intended to abuse Differding. “And 

that’s our theory of the case: That he was trying to degrade and humiliate her, 

cause her pain, because he felt that she was unfaithful to him.” The prosecutor 

continued, “He’s so angry with her that morning, he’s so angry, because he so 

believes that she’s cheating on him that, when she’s crying in the bathroom, 

because she can’t get her keys and she needs to go to work, he comes in, and he 

assaults her, and he violates her....” 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 11 of 25
12 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

In turn, defense counsel argued in closing that the specific intent element 

had not been proven. Setting aside sexual arousal or gratification as inapplicable 

to this case, defense counsel focused on the intent to sexually abuse: “Well, what 

is penetration for sexual abuse? What is that? He has to have specific intent, 

when he does this thing, penetration for sexual abuse means penetration for the 

purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort. That’s the definition in Instruction 

[CALCRIM No.] 1045. The specific intent that [defendant] would have had to 

have had is that he performed this penetration for the purpose of causing pain, 

injury, or discomfort.” Based on evidence that defendant had been drinking, 

defense counsel posited: “What if your sole focus, irrational though it may be, is 

that you’re performing your own exam to prove to this person that you’re mad at 

that she cheated on you? And what if this stupid decision is made because, in 

part, you’re drunk, and you think she’s cheating on you, and you want to 

demonstrate it? So you try to get some evidence of it. And you therefore, 

because of your concern about her being unfaithful, exam or not, and your level of 

intoxication, you have not formed the intent to cause pain, injury, or discomfort, 

in part due to voluntary intoxication.” [FN4] 

FN4. Consistent with defendant’s theory of the case, the jury was also 

instructed based on CALCRIM No. 3526, that it could consider 

defendant’s voluntary intoxication in deciding whether he “acted with the 

intent to do the act required.” 

Finally, even if we were to agree with defendant that the requested special 

instruction should have been given, we conclude the error was harmless. 

Defendant argues we must apply the federal standard of harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt in assessing his claim because not giving the requested 

instruction lightened the prosecution’s burden of proving every element of the 

charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 

U.S. 18, 24) We disagree. If any error occurred, it consisted of failing to give a 

legally correct but duplicative instruction. Based on the evidence and arguments 

of counsel in connection with defendant’s claim that he lacked the specific intent 

for forcible sexual penetration, there is no reasonable probability that the jury 

would have reached a result more favorable to defendant had the trial court given 

the requested duplicative instruction. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 

836 (Watson); see also People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490 [applying 

Watson standard to instructional error that does not amount to federal 

constitutional error].) 

Op. at 9-12. 

 A state trial court’s refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground cognizable 

in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 

1988). The error must so infect the trial that the defendant was deprived of the fair trial 

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Also, the omission of an instruction is less 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 12 of 25
13 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d at 475-76 

(citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 155). Thus, a habeas petitioner whose claim involves a 

failure to give a particular instruction bears an “‘especially heavy burden.’” Villafuerte v. Stewart, 

111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977)). The 

significance of the omission of such an instruction may be evaluated by comparison with the 

instructions that were given. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

Henderson, 431 U.S. at 156); see id. at 972 (due process violation found in capital case where 

petitioner demonstrated that application of the wrong statute at his sentencing infected the 

proceeding with the jury’s potential confusion regarding its discretion to impose a life or death 

sentence). 

After comparing the omitted instruction with the instructions that were given, id., the Court 

finds that the state appellate court’s rejection of this claim was not unreasonable. As discussed by 

the state appellate court, the trial court declined to give Petitioner’s requested instruction because 

CALCRIM Nos. 252 and 1045 already discussed specific intent such that the requested 

instructions would merely be duplicative. See supra at 10-11. CALCRIM No. 252 clearly set 

forth that Counts I and II require “a specific intent or mental state” which is “penetration by force, 

fear or violence,” and that Petitioner “must not only intentionally commit the prohibited act, but 

must do so with a specific intent.” Id. at 10. CALCRIM No. 1045 stated that “[s]exual 

penetration means penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of the other person 

for the purpose[] of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.... Penetration for sexual abuse means 

penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.” Id. The state appellate court 

reasonably concluded that “[t]ogether these instructions sufficiently advised the jury of the 

specific intent required to be convicted of forcible sexual penetration.” Id. at 11. Defendant’s 

requested instructions that “At the time of the alleged act of penetration, the defendant’s specific 

intent must be the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse,” (id. at 10), is merely a rewording of CALCRIM No. 1045. Therefore, in the context of the instructions as a whole and the 

overall charge to the jury, the Court is not persuaded that the failure to give the requested 

instruction so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. See 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 13 of 25
14 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Frady, 456 U.S. at 169. 

Furthermore, even if it was error to deny the requested instruction, the error did not have a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 

U.S. at 637; Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146-47. The state appellate court reasonably found that the 

error was harmless when it concluded the following: “Based on the evidence and arguments of 

counsel in connection with defendant’s claim that he lacked the specific intent for forcible sexual 

penetration, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a result more 

favorable to defendant had the trial court given the requested duplicative instruction.” See supra at 

12. The Court agrees. The requested instructions included the following: “At the time of the 

alleged act of penetration, the defendant’s specific intent must be the purpose of sexual arousal, 

gratification, or abuse.” See supra at 10. As discussed above, the given instructions stated that 

specific intent was a necessary requirement, and that the specific intent for forcible sexual 

penetration means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort. Id. at 13. 

Because the given instructions and the requested instructions were duplicative, it cannot be said 

that the jury would have reached a different verdict had they been given the requested instructions 

as well. Accordingly, the Court finds that the failure to give the requested instructions did not 

have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 637. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on harmless error. See Calderon, 

525 U.S. at 146-47. 

Based on the foregoing, the state courts’ rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on this claim. 

b. State Appellate Court’s Review of Claim 1 (Claim 2) 

Petitioner’s second claim is that the appellate court erred in denying his first claim of 

instructional error because it applied the incorrect standard of review. Petitioner is entitled to 

federal habeas relief based on such an error only if it “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 14 of 25
15 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As discussed in the previous section, 

the state appellate court’s rejection of Petitioner’s first claim was not an unreasonable application 

of Supreme Court precedent. Even if the state appellate court applied an incorrect standard of 

review in rejecting Petitioner’s first claim, it did not result in a decision that was contrary to 

clearly established Federal law because Petitioner’s underlying claim had no merit. Accordingly, 

there is no merit to this claim, and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief thereon. 

c. Instruction Defining Sexual Abuse (Claim 3) 

Petitioner’s third claim is that the trial court deprived him of due process and a fair trial 

when it instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1045 which provided that sexual abuse under 

section 289 may be satisfied by the intent to cause mere “discomfort.” (Pet. at 5.) Petitioner claims 

that the intent to cause “discomfort” is not sufficient to constitute “abuse” under section 289. 

(Docket No. 5 at 25.) The state appellate court reviewed and rejected this claim: 

Defendant contends the trial judge erred by instructing the jury with 

CALCRIM No. 1045 because it incorrectly defines “[p]enetration for sexual 

abuse” as “penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.” 

(Emphasis added in second quote.) Defendant contends the intent to cause 

“discomfort” is insufficient to constitute “abuse” under section 289, and thus the 

jury was misinstructed on the specific intent element of this offense. The error 

was prejudicial and likely affected the verdict, according to defendant, in light of 

the weakness of the prosecution evidence that defendant intended to cause 

Differding significant pain or injury. 

The jury instruction given in this case – CALCRIM No. 1045 – was based 

on language and analysis in People v. White (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193 (White). 

In White, the defendant was convicted of violating section 289, subdivision (a), 

forcible penetration of the anus by a foreign object for the purpose of sexual 

arousal, gratification, or abuse. At trial, White testified that he became upset 

when changing the diaper of his girlfriend’s 17-month-old daughter. He claimed 

he did nothing sexual in angrily spanking her, possibly penetrating her anus. The 

prosecutor argued that, even if defendant’s testimony were true, his angry 

penetration of the child’s anus constituted sexual abuse under section 289. (Id. at 

pp. 197, 203-204.) 

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that “sexual abuse” under section 

289, as distinguished from sexual arousal and sexual gratification, does not 

require a sexually motivated intent. (White, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at pp. 204-

206.) Rather, the court found that sexual abuse applies more broadly to conduct 

involving a victim’s “sexual or ‘private’ parts” where the intent is “‘in fact to 

“abuse,” i.e., to hurt, cause pain or injure.’” (Id. at pp. 205.) The court explicitly 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 15 of 25
16 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

agreed with respondent in White that “‘when a penetration is accomplished for the 

purpose of causing pain, injury or discomfort, it becomes sexual abuse, even 

though the perpetrator may not necessarily achieve any sexual arousal or 

gratification whatsoever.’ (Fn. omitted.) [¶] We are persuaded that respondent’s 

view of the law is correct and that it is the only interpretation of ‘sexual abuse’ 

that is reasonable.” (Ibid.) 

Defendant argues that, in quoting from respondent’s arguments in its 

opinion, the White court intended to agree with the Attorney General that “the 

‘sexual’ character of the abuse comes from the body part involved, not a lewd 

intent,” but did not intend to endorse a broad definition of abuse as encompassing 

the intent to cause mere “discomfort.” Defendant seizes on White’s use of the 

phrase “injure or hurt badly” (White, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 205) in another 

part of the opinion to argue that the term “abuse” requires substantial adverse 

impact on the victim. Defendant also relies on dictionary definitions of the terms 

“abuse” and “discomfort” to bolster its argument; “abuse” typically means “‘to 

injury, hurt or damage,’” while “discomfort” commonly describes a “‘trivial or 

minor experience of being ‘uncomfortable or uneasy.’” 

We reject defendant’s constricted reading of White and his contention that 

the trial court misinstructed the jury by giving a legally incorrect statement of the 

specific intent required by section 289. White’s definition of sexual abuse to 

include causing “discomfort” (White, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 205) was 

incorporated into CALJIC No, 10.30 [FN5] shortly after White was decided, and 

thereafter into CALCRIM No. 1045. Defendant has brought to our attention no 

case law criticizing White or either form instruction on this point since White was 

decided 29 years ago. Moreover, “discomfort,” commonly defined as “an 

uncomfortable or painful feeling in the body,” is not necessarily trivial or minor. 

(http://www/Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary/discomfort.) Nor are dictionary 

definitions of abuse limited to acts that cause injury or substantial pain. The 

common definitions of abuse include “to put to a bad use,” “take unfair or undue 

advantage of,” “to use or treat so as to injure, hurt, or damage,” “maltreat,” and 

“treat in a harsh or harmful way.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 8; 

http:///www.Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary/abuse.) 

FN5. CALJIC No. 10.30 provides, in pertinent part: “The ‘specific intent 

to cause sexual abuse,’ as used in this instruction, means a purpose to 

injure, hurt, cause pain or cause discomfort. 

Dictionary definitions aside, in our view, the term “[p]enetration for 

sexual abuse” as defined in CALCRIM No. 1045 appropriately includes the 

“purpose of causing... discomfort” in addition to the purpose of causing pain or 

the purpose of causing injury. In White, the court distinguished sexual penetration 

that would not violate the statute because it was done for a permissible purpose 

and not to arouse, gratify or abuse, such as “insertion of a thermometer or a 

suppository or other medicine.” (White, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 205.) The 

range of such permissible purposes for sexual penetration would seem to narrow. 

We decline to read “[p]enetration for sexual abuse” under White or section 289 as 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 16 of 25
17 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

requiring a heightened intent to cause substantial harm to the victim in the form of 

pain or injury. 

In any event, any instructional error was harmless under any standard. 

(Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 

at p. 836.) Differding testified that when defendant put his fingers inside her 

vagina, he seemed to reach all the way up to her stomach and that her pain was 

“so bad.” Differding felt pain in her vagina for a week after the incident, and it 

“hurt to go to the bathroom.” We find the evidence was overwhelming in support 

of the jury’s finding of “penetration for the purpose of causing pain [or] injury” 

(CALCRIM No. 1045), and not merely “discomfort.” Under any reasonable 

definition of abuse, defendant’s conduct was abusive. 

Op. at 12-15. 

 In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the state appellate court rejected his reading of section 289 

and the state case law of People v. White, 179 Cal.App.3d 193. A state court’s interpretation of 

state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal 

court sitting in habeas corpus. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 

U.S. 624, 629 (1988). The state’s highest court is the final authority on the law of that state. 

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516-17 (1979). Even a determination of state law made by 

an intermediate appellate court must be followed and may not be “‘disregarded by a federal court 

unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide 

otherwise.’” Hicks, 485 U.S. at 630 n.3 (quoting West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 

311 U.S. 223, 237-38 (1940)). Here, the state supreme court summarily denied review, indicating 

no disagreement with the state appellate court’s ruling. Accordingly, we are bound by the state 

appellate court’s interpretation of state law. Id. And to the extent that Petitioner is challenging the 

state appellate court’s interpretation of state law, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 

federal habeas writ is unavailable for violations of state law or for alleged error in the 

interpretation or application thereof. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861-62 (2011); 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982); Peltier 

v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1082 

(9th Cir. 2006) (claim that state supreme court misapplied state law or departed from its earlier 

decisions does not provide a ground for habeas relief). 

 Even if we assume there was an unconstitutional error, the Court agrees with the state 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 17 of 25
18 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

appellate court that any such error was harmless. According to the victim’s testimony, Petitioner 

“reached inside her shorts and ‘shov[ed]’ his fingers so far into her vagina that it ‘felt like [they 

were] in [her] stomach,’” and “[s]he could tell it was more than one finger ‘[b]ecause it hurt so 

bad.’” See supra at 3. The victim also testified that she had pain in her vagina for about a week, 

and that it hurt to go the bathroom. Id. Accordingly, even if the ailing instructions had not 

included “discomfort,” there was certainly sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding “of 

‘penetration for the purpose of causing pain [or] injury’ (CALCRIM No. 1045).” See supra at 17. 

Therefore, it cannot be said that the ailing instruction had a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The state courts’ 

rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

d. Instruction on Flight (Claim 4)

Petitioner’s fourth claim is that CALCRIM No. 372 is “argumentative under the standard 

defined by this Court in “Wright,” and giving it deprived [him] of due process.” (Pet. at 5.) The 

state appellate court reviewed and rejected this claim: 

Defendant argues his convictions must be reversed because the trial judge 

gave a jury instruction regarding evidence of flight that was argumentative and 

favored the prosecution. Defendant contends the instruction invited the jury to 

consider whether evidence of flight reflected consciousness of guilt, but without 

reference to defendant’s possible innocence. Defendant contends the instruction 

lightened the prosecution’s burden of proving each element of each offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus violated his right to a fair trial. This 

argument is meritless. 

Section 1127c provides: “In any criminal trial or proceeding where 

evidence of flight of a defendant is relied upon as tending to show guilt, the court 

shall instruct the jury substantially as follows: [¶] The flight of a person 

immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime that 

has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact 

which, if proved, the jury may consider in deciding his guilt or innocence. The 

weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine. 

[¶] No further instruction on the subject of flight need be given.” 

The jury instruction at issue – CALCRIM No. 372 – is based on section 

1127c. The trial court instructed the jury as follows: “If the defendant fled or 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 18 of 25
19 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

tried to flee immediately after the crime was committed, that conduct may show 

that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant fled or tried to 

flee, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct. 

However, evidence that the defendant fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by 

itself.” 

A trial court must refuse an argumentative jury instruction. (People v. 

Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437.) “A jury instruction is argumentative when it 

is ‘“of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of 

the parties from specified items of evidence.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People 

v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 380.) 

Appellate courts have upheld the constitutionality of CALCRIM No. 372, 

finding it an unbiased statement of the law that does not unduly favor the 

prosecution. (People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26 (Paysinger); 

People v. Rios (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154 (Rios).) In both Paysinger and Rios, 

the defendants claimed that CALCRIM No. 372 presumed the defendant’s guilt, 

lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof, and deprived the defendant of a jury 

verdict. In rejecting the contention that CALCRIM No. 372 impermissibly invites 

the jury to infer guilt, the Paysinger court explained: “It has long been accepted 

that if flight is significant at all, it is significant because it may reflect 

consciousness of guilt, which in turn tends to support a finding of guilt. [Citation.] 

That CALCRIM No. 372 tells the jury this does not in any way make the 

instructions unconstitutional.” (Paysinger, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 31-32.) 

The Rios court relied on California Supreme Court precedent upholding the 

constitutionality of section 1127c and the predecessor flight instruction, CALJIC 

No. 2.52. [FN6] (Rios, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1158-1159; see People v. 

Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 502; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 

179.) Our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected similar challenges to CALJIC 

No. 2.52. (See, e.g., People v Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 691, and cases cited 

therein.) The court’s reasoning in these cases applies equally to this challenge to 

CALCRIM No. 372. 

FN6. CALJIC No. 2.52 provides: “The [flight] [attempted flight] [escape] 

[attempted escape] [from custody] of a person [immediately] after the 

commission of a crime, or after [he] [she] is accused of a crime, is not 

sufficient in itself to establish [his] [her] guilt, but is a fact which, if 

proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in 

deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty. The weight to which 

this circumstance is entitled is a matter for you to decide.” 

Defendant’s argument focuses entirely on the deficiencies in the first 

sentence of CALCRIM No. 372, but the propriety of jury instructions is 

determined from “‘the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts 

of an instruction or from a particular instruction.’” (People v. Jeffries (2000) 83 

Cal.App.4th 15, 22.) The first sentence of the instruction refers to an inference 

that flight “may show” that the defendant was “aware of his guilt.” However, the 

instruction does not presume a defendant’s guilt. Nor does it require the jury to 

find that a defendant in fact fled the scene or direct that a particular inference be 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 19 of 25
20 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

drawn. Rather, the instruction is phrased in permissive and conditional, not 

mandatory terms, such as “[i]f the defendant fled,” “[i]f you conclude,” and “it is 

up to you to decide....” (CALCRIM No. 372.) The instruction informed the jury 

that it could consider evidence of flight along with all the other evidence, and 

should give the evidence whatever meaning and weight the jury deemed 

appropriate. (See People v. Carter, (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1182-1183.) The 

instruction also emphasized that evidence of flight was not alone sufficient to 

establish guilt: “The cautionary nature of the [flight] instruction[] benefits the 

defense, admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence that might 

otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory.” (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 

Cal.4th 1164, 1224.) 

The trial court also gave standard instructions on the presumption of 

innocence, direct and circumstantial evidence, the prosecution’s burden of proof, 

and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in addition to CALCRIM 

No. 200, which cautioned the jurors: “Pay careful attention to all of these 

instructions and consider them together.... [¶]...[¶]... Do not assume just because 

I give a particular instruction that I am suggesting anything about the facts.” 

These instructions ensured that the flight instruction did not undermine the 

presumption of innocence or lower the prosecution’s burden to prove each 

element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Defendant attempts to distinguish CALCRIM No. 372 from CALJIC No. 

2.52 on the basis that, in only identifying the inference favorable to the 

prosecution, CALCRIM No. 372 strays too far from the language of section 

1127c. Defendant contends CALJIC No. 2.52 is unobjectionable because it refers 

to flight as evidence that a jury could consider in deciding “guilty or not guilty.” 

We disagree. There is no material difference between CALJIC No. 2.52 and 

CALCRIM No. 372. Both instructions identify the permissible inference that 

could be drawn if the jury were to find the defendant fled the scene, inform the 

jury that the meaning and weight to accord the evidence of flight is for the jury to 

decide; and make clear that evidence of flight without more is insufficient to 

establish a defendant’s guilt. The flight instruction given in this case was not 

argumentative. 

 

Op. at 15-18. 

 The state court’s rejection of this claim was not unreasonable. In order to show a due 

process violation, the defendant must show both ambiguity and a “reasonable likelihood” that the 

jury applied the instruction in a way that violates the Constitution, such as relieving the state of its 

burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 

179, 190-191 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A “meager ‘possibility’” that the 

jury misapplied the instruction is not enough. Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 643 (2016) (quoting 

Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380). Such is the case here, where taking the instructions as a whole, there is 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 20 of 25
21 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have applied the instructions regarding flight in a 

manner that favored the prosecution. As the state appellate court pointed out, CALCRIM No. 372 

was phrased “in permissive and conditional, not mandatory terms”: “If you conclude that the 

defendant fled or tried to flee, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that 

conduct.” See supra at 18 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the instructions also clearly stated that 

“evidence that the defendant fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself.” Id. Considering the 

“flight” instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury, which including instructions 

on the presumption of innocence, direct and circumstantial evidence, the prosecution’s burden of 

proof, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, “in addition to CALCRIM No. 200, 

which cautioned the jurors: ‘Pay careful attention to all of these instructions and consider them 

together,’” see supra at 20, the Court is not convinced CALCRIM No. 372 so infected the entire 

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, 78; Frady, 456 

U.S. at 169. The state courts’ rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief 

on this claim. 

e. Cumulative Error (Claim 5) 

Petitioner claims that the cumulative prejudice of the above instructional errors (Claims 1 

through 4) entitles him to relief. (Pet. at 5.) The state appellate court rejected this claim of 

cumulative error: “We have rejected each claim of instructional error and found them harmless 

when considered separately. Considered together, we find no prejudice and reject the claim. 

(People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 567-568.).” Op. at 18. 

It has been held that in some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial 

to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several errors may still prejudice a defendant so much 

that his conviction must be overturned. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 

2003) (reversing conviction where multiple constitutional errors hindered defendant’s efforts to 

challenge every important element of proof offered by prosecution). Where there is no single 

constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation. See 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 21 of 25
22 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011); Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th 

Cir. 2002); Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1999); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

The Court has found that none of the above claims of instructional error have merit. See 

supra at 14-15, 18. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show cumulative prejudice to warrant 

federal habeas relief. See Hayes, 632 F.3d at 524. The state court’s rejection of this claim was not 

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

2. Insufficient Evidence (Claim 6) 

 Petitioner’s last claim is that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for 

felony false imprisonment. (Pet. at 6.) The state appellate court rejected this claim: 

Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of 

false imprisonment because there was no evidence that Differding was prevented 

from leaving the bathroom. We disagree. 

We view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to 

determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid 

value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690.) We presume 

in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could 

reasonably deduce from the evidence. (Id. at p. 690.) We do not reweigh the 

evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 

Cal.4th 616, 638.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s 

findings, reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances might also 

reasonably justify a contrary finding. (Id. at p. 639.) 

“False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of 

another.” (§ 236.) “[T]he essential element of false imprisonment is restraint of 

the person. Any exercise of express or implied force which compels another 

person to remain where he does not wish to remain, or to go where he does not 

wish to go, is false imprisonment. (People v. Fernandez (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 

710, 717.)” (People v. Bamba (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1123.) “‘“‘The wrong 

may be committed by acts or words, or both, and by merely operating upon the 

will of the individual or by personal violence, or both....’”’” (People v. 

Fernandez, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.) “False imprisonment is a felony if it 

is effected by violence or menace. (§ 237.)” (People v. Bamba, supra, 58 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1123; People v. Dominguez (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1351, 

1360.) 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 22 of 25
23 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Here, there is substantial evidence that defendant’s conduct in pinning 

Differding down on the floor and against the wall in the bathroom compelled her 

to remain where she did not wish to remain. Defendant followed Differding into 

the bathroom shouting obscenities at her, pushed her to the floor, and slapped her 

face several times. Differding struggled and screamed at him to stop, but he lay 

on top of her, pinning her down. When she was able to get up, defendant pushed 

her into the bathtub and then pinned her against the wall with a forearm across her 

throat. Differding resisted him, screaming, “Stop, stop, stop, stop.” Eventually, 

defendant lowered his arm and stood in the bathroom panting. Differding left the 

bathroom, found her keys and phone, and left the house. This is sufficient 

evidence that defendant made Differding stay in the bathroom against her will. 

Defendant argues that Differding voluntarily entered the bathroom and 

never testified that she was unable to leave the bathroom or even that she wished 

to do so. Defendant acknowledges Differding’s testimony that she struggled 

against defendant as he pinned her down twice and forcibly penetrated her vagina 

twice, but contends that she “would not have exited the bathroom even absent that 

restraint.” The argument is meritless. It is apparently based on Differding’s 

testimony that when defendant finally stopped struggling with her and stood there 

panting, she remained on the bathroom floor, “like I was trying to protect myself, 

if he was going to come at me again,” before she left the bathroom. It makes no 

difference that Differding went into the bathroom of her own volition. Nor does it 

matter that Differding briefly remained in the bathroom after defendant let go of 

her throat. The circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s finding that Differding 

did not remain in the bathroom by choice after defendant came in yelling and 

physically abusing her. (See People v. Dominguez (1997) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 

421.) 

Op. at 18-20. 

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Supreme Court has emphasized that 

sufficiency of the evidence types of “claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings . . .” 

Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (per curiam) (finding that the Third Circuit 

“unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder” and failed to apply the deferential standard of 

Jackson [v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979)] when it engaged in “fine-grained factual parsing” 

to find that the evidence was insufficient to support petitioner’s conviction). A federal court 

reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the 

evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 

1992); see, e.g., Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 2065 (“the only question under Jackson is whether [the 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 23 of 25
24 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

jury’s finding of guilt] was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality”). 

The federal court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 

has there been a due process violation. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court finds that 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements for felony false imprisonment 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne, 982 F.2d at 338. In California, the “essential element” of false 

imprisonment is “restraint of the person” and “[a]ny exercise of express or implied force which 

compels another person to remain where he does not wish to remain... is false imprisonment,” 

which is a felony if effected by violence or menace. See supra at 22. The victim’s testimony 

clearly supports the conclusion that she was “restrained” and violently so: after the victim entered 

the bathroom, Petitioner followed her, screaming insults at her; Petitioner slapped her face 

repeatedly and pushed her to the floor; the victim struggled and screamed at him to stop, but he lay 

on top of her and pinned her down; when the victim was eventually able to get up, Petitioner 

pushed her again, causing her to fall into the bathtub; when she struggled to stand up, Petitioner 

pinned her against the wall with a forearm across her throat; the victim resisted him, screaming, 

“Stop, stop, stop, stop”; Petitioner finally stopped, lowered his arm and stood in the bathroom 

panting while standing over the victim; only then did the victim leave the bathroom, find her keys 

and phone, and leave the house. See supra at 2-3. This is sufficient evidence that Petitioner made 

the victim stay in the bathroom against her will using violence. Petitioner has failed to show that 

no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on this 

evidence. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. The state court’s rejection of this claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

/// 

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 24 of 25
25 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

IV. CONCLUSION 

 After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the Court concludes that the Petition 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus must be DENIED. 

 Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated that “reasonable 

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not appeal the denial of a Certificate 

of Appealability in this Court but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals under Rule 22 

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases. 

The Clerk shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment in favor of Respondent, 

and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: ________________________ 

EDWARD J. DAVILA 

United States District Judge 

P:\PRO-SE\EJD\HC.15\02238Ortiz-Calderon_denyHC 

8/15/2016

Case 5:15-cv-02238-EJD Document 20 Filed 08/15/16 Page 25 of 25