Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02273/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02273-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ALATORRE-ESPINOZA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 12-cv-2273 – IEG

Related Case: 12-cr-1781 – IEG

ORDER:

(1) DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR TIME REDUCTION

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255

[Doc. No. 29 in 12-cr-1781]; and

(2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Petitioner Jose Alatorre- Espinoza (“Petitioner”), a federal inmate proceeding

pro se, submitted a motion for a time reduction of his sentence pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255. [Doc. No. 29 in 12-cr-1781.] He seeks relief on the grounds that,

due to his alien status, he is ineligible for a one-year reduction of sentence through a

drug program, an early release to a halfway house, and a Unicor job. [Id. at 2.] 

Petitioner argues that the availability of these programs to U.S. citizens, but not to

aliens, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the “Equal Right Act.” [Id. at 2-3.]

Having considered Petitioner’s arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, the

Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion for time reduction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

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BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged with, and ultimately pled guilty to, violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1326 for attempted reentry of removed alien. [Doc. No. 28, Judgment at

1.] As part of his Plea Agreement, Petitioner expressly “waive[d], to the full extent

of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence,

except a post-conviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, unless the Court impose[d] a custodial sentence above the greater of the

high end of the guideline range recommended by the Government pursuant to this

agreement at the time of sentencing.” [Doc. No. 13, Plea Agreement at 10.] On

August 28, 2012, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 18 months in federal custody,

which is significantly lower than the 30 to 37 months guidelines range

recommended by the Government [Doc. No. 18, Sentencing Summary Chart], and

supervised release for a term of two years. [Doc. No. 28, Judgment.] 

DISCUSSION

Section 2255(a) authorizes the Court to “vacate, set aside or correct” a

sentence of a federal prisoner that “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States.” Claims for relief under § 2255 must be based on some

constitutional error, jurisdictional defect, or an error resulting in a “complete

miscarriage of justice” or in a proceeding “inconsistent with the rudimentary

demands of fair procedure.” United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84

(1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the record clearly indicates that a

petitioner does not have a claim or that he has asserted “no more than conclusory

allegations, unsupported by facts and refuted by the record,” a district court may

deny a § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Quan, 789

F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1986).

I. Waiver

Petitioner under the plea agreement waived his rights to collaterally attack his

sentence. “A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable if (1) the

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language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised, and

(2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.” United States v. Rahman, 642

F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). In the present case, as part of his

plea agreement, Petitioner expressly waived “any right to appeal or to collaterally

attack the conviction and sentence, except a post-conviction collateral attack based

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, unless the Court impose[d] a

custodial sentence above the greater of the high end of the guideline range

recommended by the Government pursuant to this agreement at the time of

sentencing.” [Doc. No. 13, Plea Agreement at 10.]

At sentencing, the Court imposed a sentence of 18 months, which is

significantly lower than the Government’s recommended guideline range of 30 to

37 months. [Doc. No. 18, Sentencing Summary Chart.] Because the Court did not

impose a sentence above the high end of the guidelines range recommended by the

Government, waiver applies. Nor is there any indication that Petitioner’s waiver

was not knowingly or voluntarily made. Further, Petitioner does not assert a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, Petitioner’s valid waiver

precludes collateral attack on his sentence. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d

1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d

318, 321-22 (9th Cir. 1990) (public policy supports plea agreements because, inter

alia, of the finality that results). 

II. Merits

Even assuming Petitioner did not waive the right to collaterally attack his

sentence, his claims fail on the merits. 

A. Equal Protection

Aliens present in the United States illegally are entitled to the full protections

of the Equal Protection Clause. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982). 

Nonetheless, to state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the

plaintiff must allege that he was treated differently from other similarly situated

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persons. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 

Unless a suspect classification is present, the unequal treatment must

only be “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. at 440. The Supreme

Court has ruled that undocumented aliens are not a suspect class, Plyler, 457 U.S. at

223, and therefore, rational basis review applies, which “accords a strong

presumption of validity.” McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir.

1999).

As other courts have concluded, deportable aliens are not “similarly situated”

to U.S. citizens with respect to the benefits that Petitioner seeks. See, e.g., AguilarMarroquin v. United States, 2011 WL 1344251, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2011);

Rendon-Inzunza v. United States, 2010 WL 3076271, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6,

2010); Santos v. United States, 940 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Haw. Aug. 16, 1996). 

Because United States citizen inmates must re-enter domestic society upon

completion of their sentences, they have a strong incentive to comply with

community-based placement. On the other hand, non-citizen inmates subject to

deportation upon completion of their sentences may have an opposite incentive to

flee from the community-based placement. Accordingly, “[i]t is not an equal

protection violation to allow United States citizen-inmates, who must re-enter

domestic society, to participate in rehabilitative or other programs while denying

that privilege to deportable inmates.” Rendon-Inzunza, 2010 WL 3076271, at *1. 

Because the two groups are not “similarly situated” for purposes of relief that

Petitioner seeks, there is no equal protection violation. See City of Cleburne, 473

U.S. at 439; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003) (“Congress may

make rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”).

Furthermore, the policy precluding deportable aliens from participating in

certain community-based programs does not violate equal protection because it is

rationally related to the government’s interest in preventing those individuals from

fleeing. See McLean, 173 F.3d at 1184 (the exclusion of deportable aliens from

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participating in a community-based treatment program was rationally-based, and

therefore constitutional, seeing as “prisoners with detainers pose a flight risk during

the community-based treatment phase because they are subject to possible

deportation upon release from custody, and therefore have reason to flee a halfway

house”). Accordingly, Defendant fails to state a claim for an equal protection

violation.

B. Due Process

Defendant also fails to state a claim for a due process violation. “A due

process claim is cognizable only if there is a recognized liberty or property interest

at stake.” Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth

Circuit has held that a prisoner does not have a recognized liberty interest in

sentence reduction. See McLean, 173 F.3d at 1184-85 (citing Jacks v. Crabtree, 114

F.3d 983, 986 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997)). Jacks held that the denial of a one-year

reduction does not violate due process because it does not “impose atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life;” rather, it “merely means that the inmate will have to serve out his sentence as

expected.” McLean, 173 F.3d at 1185 (quoting Jacks, 114 F.3d at 986 n.4). 

Accordingly, Defendant’s claim that his denial of a sentence reduction is a due

process violation fails.

C. “Equal Right Act”

Finally, Petitioner’s claim that his ineligibility violates the “Equal Right Act”

fails. Petitioner claims that he is treated differently based on his status as an alien,

which is encompassed by his equal protection claim. See Cabanillas-Garcia v.

United States, 2012 WL 5928154, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2012). As discussed

above, Petitioner’s equal protection claim fails. Accordingly, the result is the same

for his “Equal Right Act” claim, and thus this claim also fails. 

CONCLUSION

Because Petitioner’s collateral attack is precluded by a valid waiver, the

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Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion for sentence reduction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

The Court also denies a certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not “made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). The clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 2, 2013 ________________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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