Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00148/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00148-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Plaintiff is a federal prisoner and alleges violations of his constitutional rights by

employees of the private prison in which he was confined at the time of the incidents which

form the basis for his Complaint. Because Plaintiff is a federal prisoner, his claims are more

appropriately brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). “Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical

save for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.”

Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406,

409 (9th Cir. 1991)).

WO KM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dwayne McKaney, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles Keeton, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 12-148-PHX-GMS (LOA)

ORDER

On January 23, 2012, Plaintiff Dwayne McKaney, who is confined in the Federal

Correctional Institution-Terminal Island, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 19831

 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a February 28, 2012

Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint because

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Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended

complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

On March 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). The Court

will dismiss the First Amended Complaint and this action.

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

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Plaintiff has not listed Defendant Belloc as a Defendant in the First Amended

Complaint. However, because it appears that he intended to name her as a Defendant, the

Court will consider Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Belloc as if she had been named.

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Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

II. First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff names Warden Charles Keeton and Dr. Osteene as Defendants in the First

Amended Complaint. Plaintiff raises four claims for relief.

In Count I, Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by

overcrowded conditions. Plaintiff alleges that an inmate in his unit contracted a mysterious

disease that caused the inmate to break out in sores all over his body. Plaintiff contends that

because of the overcrowded conditions, he and other inmates “started to get bumps all over

them that itch day and night.” Plaintiff claims that Defendant Keeton was advised by

Plaintiff and other inmates through inmate letters that there was an ill inmate in the unit.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Keeton controls policy and “should have made sure there

was proper screening of incom[ing] inmates for contagious disease such as . . . what inmate

Begay had that made the Plaintiff’s condition of confinement oppressive.” Finally, Plaintiff

contends that Defendant Keeton and subordinates failed to act “and could have to stop this

dangerous condition.”

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated when he

and other inmates submitted “informal resolutions” for which they received no response.

Plaintiff claims that he then spoke with Defendant Belloc.2

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant

Belloc “told Plaintiff and others no she was not going to give . . .grievance form[s], reg. or

emergency, she stated medical knows now so you can’t grieve the issue.” Plaintiff claims

that the denial of forms prevented him from filing grievances and resulted in delayed medical

treatment.

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In Count III, Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when

Defendant Osteene failed to provide him with adequate and timely medical care for the

“mysterious disease.” Plaintiff claims that Defendant Osteene “disregarded that risk [to

Plaintiff’s health] when he first saw [inmate Begay] then went on a 4 week vacation and

fail[ed] to advise other medical personnel about the mysterious medical condition . . . and

then once he did come back from vacation it still took 2 to 3 weeks for Defendant to realize

this dangerous condition was out of control.” 

In Count IV, Plaintiff claims that he was denied meaningful access to the courts

because he is denied access to an adequate law library or assistance from someone trained

in the law.

III. Discussion

A. Eighth Amendment Claims–Count I and III

Plaintiff is a federal prisoner seeking relief against individual employees of a private

prison. The Supreme Court recently addressed the application of Bivens to such claims and

concluded:

[W]here . . . a federal prisoner seeks damages from privately employed

personnel working at a privately operated federal prison, where the conduct

allegedly amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and where that

conduct is of a kind that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort

law (such as the conduct involving improper medical care at issue here), the

prisoner must seek a remedy under state tort law. We cannot imply a Bivens

remedy in such a case. 

Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S.Ct. 617, 626 (2012). 

As in Minneci, Plaintiff in this case has raised Eighth Amendment claims challenging

conduct that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law. Accordingly,

Plaintiff cannot maintain an Eighth Amendment Bivens claims against Defendants Keeton

and Osteene. The Court will dismiss Counts I and III for failure to state a claim.

B. First Amendment Claims–Counts II and IV

While Minneci bars Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against individual

employees of a private prison, it remains unclear whether Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims

are of the type which fall within the scope of traditional tort law. Id. at 626 (“[W]e can

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Moreover, it is unclear whether Plaintiff could state an access to courts claim based

on his inability to complete the grievance process. Although Plaintiff is required to exhaust

administrative remedies to obtain relief federal court, under Minneci, federal relief is not

available to Plaintiff for his Eighth Amendment medical claims. Accordingly, it appears that

Plaintiff would be unable to demonstrate an actual injury, as required for an access to courts

claim.

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decide whether to imply a Bivens action in a case where an Eighth Amendment claim or state

law differs significantly from those at issue here when and if such a case arises. The

possibility of such a different future case does not provide sufficient grounds for reaching a

different conclusion here.”). Accordingly, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s First

Amendment claims on their merits.

1. Count II-Grievance Process

An inmate has no free-standing constitutional right to a grievance process. In Mann

v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit held that a prisoner does not

have a protected liberty interest in prison grievance procedures. 

Plaintiff’s facts demonstrate that Defendant Belloc failed to adhere to the established

grievance procedure, but do not demonstrate that Plaintiff was denied the ability to present

grievances or complaints to prison officials. Plaintiff explicitly alleges in Count II that he

filed multiple “informal resolutions,” the first step in the grievance process. Plaintiff’s

allegations further make clear that Plaintiff presented multiple verbal complaints and requests

for action to Defendants and other prison staff. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to show that

he was denied his First Amendment right to redress of grievances.3

2. Count IV-Access to Courts

The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits officials from actively

interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare or file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 350 (1996). The right of access to the courts is only a right to bring petitions or

complaints to federal court and not a right to discover such claims or even to ligate them

effectively once filed with a court. Id. at 354. The right “guarantees no particular

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methodology but rather the conferral of a capability–the capability of bringing contemplated

challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.” Id. at 356. 

As a matter of standing, for an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must show that he

suffered an “actual injury” with respect to contemplated litigation. Id. at 349. To show

actual injury with respect to contemplated litigation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the

defendants’ conduct frustrated or impeded him from bringing to court a nonfrivolous claim

that he wished to present. Id. at 352-53.

“[T]he injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim.”

Id. at 354. The right of access to the courts “does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to

transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder

derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.” Id. at 355. The nonfrivolous claim must be a

direct or collateral attack on the inmate’s sentence or a challenge to the conditions of his

confinement. Id. “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental

(and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id. (emphasis

in original).

Plaintiff has not alleged that he was prevented from bringing to court a non-frivolous

claims that he wished to present. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in

Count IV.

IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in his First Amended Complaint, the Court

will dismiss the First Amended Complaint. “Leave to amend need not be given if a

complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc.,

885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims cannot be cured

by further amendment. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint without leave to amend.

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) and this action are dismissed

for failure to state a claim, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

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(2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the dismissal

for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

(3) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of this

decision would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 15th day of May, 2012.

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