Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01083/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01083-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

VERNA LEWIS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CITY OF FT. COLLINS; ) 

BARBARA LIEBLER, ) 

) 

Defendants, ) 

) 

LARRY ESTRADA, Mayor; STEVEN ) 

BURKETT; RICHARD SHANNON; ) 

KELLY OHLSON; BARBARA ) 

RUTSTEIN; JERRY HORAK; ED ) 

STONER; SUSAN KIRKPATRICK, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

No. 89-1083 

FI LED 

Unir~d States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

M:~Y 14 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

NO. 87-C-1564 

Susan M. Lach of Frey, Lach & Michaels, P.C., Fort Collins, 

Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Kent N. Campbell of Anderson, Sommermeyer, Wich & Dow, Fort 

Collins, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants. 

Before*TACBA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER, District 

Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable G. Thomas Van Bebber, United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1083 Document: 010110296357 Date Filed: 05/14/1990 Page: 1
Appellants appeal the order of the United States District 

Court for the District of Colorado denying their motion for 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 

Plaintiff-appellee Verna Lewis, a former Assistant City 

Manager of the City of Fort Collins, Colorado (the "City''), 

brought this action alleging employment discrimination against the 

City of Fort Collins and against appellants: several present and 

former City Council members, the present City Manager and the 

former Acting City Manager. Lewis, an Hispanic female over forty 

years of age, alleges in her complaint that she was wrongfully 

demoted from her position as Assistant City Manager and thereafter 

not considered for other upper level positions in City government 

on the basis of her age, sex and race in violation of the Age 

Discrimination In Employment Act ("ADEA"}, 29 UoS.C. § 621 et. 

~, the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Title VII, 42 u.s.c. 

§ 2000(e), the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, respectively, 

and that she was deprived of due process and equal 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

protection in 

United States 

Lewis began a long career as an employee of the City in 1964 

and thereafter served in the capacities of clerk, secretary and 

city clerk. In 1980, Lewis was named Assistant City Manager, with 

primary responsibility as liaison between the City Council and the 

citizens of Fort Collins. 

the City Manager's 

In 1985, Lewis was 

office and given 

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reassigned within 

duties ielated to 

Appellate Case: 89-1083 Document: 010110296357 Date Filed: 05/14/1990 Page: 2
intergovernmental relations and lobbying _effortso In August 1986, 

four months after defendant Steven Burkett assumed the position of 

City Manager, Lewis was informed that the position of Assistant 

City Manager was to be abolished. Accordingly, Lewis was 

effectively laid off as Assistant City Manager November 1, 1986, 

and she accepted a transfer to the position of Health and Safety 

Manager. 

In her complaint, Lewis alleges that between April and August 

1986 appellants met "to discuss the creation and implementation of 

a policy •.• to remove older, more senior employees from within 

the City Manager's office and other high level positions within 

the city government and replace those employees with younger male 

caucasian individuals." Lewis further alleges that she was 

demoted from her position and then not considered for other vacant 

high-level positions within City government in furtherance of this 

"policy." 

Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment based on 

qualified immunity before the commencement of discovery. The 

district court heard the parties' arguments and denied appellants' 

motion in a ruling from the bench on March 2, 1989: 

Well, the Court's of the view that there are 

sufficient indications in this record of disputes of 

material facts, and sufficient questions of how those 

facts affect the qualified immunity defense as well as 

other defenses, so that it would be error at this point 

in the case to grant summary judgment. 

Furthermore, it seems too early to grant summary 

judgment because there hasn't been adequate opportunity 

for discovery to even establish what the facts are and 

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put people under oath and see what they say under oath 

subject to the 10-year penalty for perjury, is what they 

have said on affidavits prepared by somebody else for 

them. 

So the motion for summary judgment of the city is 

denied. 

Similarly, the government official, defendants' 

motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, 

is denied, but without prejudice to renew. The existent 

fact, it's clear that there are no real disputes as to 

the facts, it appears to me on the face of it there are 

likely to be disputes and there are disputes as to 

material facts. 

Appellants thereafter filed this appeal asserting that the 

district court improperly ordered discovery and that the district 

court erroneously determined that issues of material fact exist 

relative to appellants' entitlement to qualified immunity. We 

agree with appellants and reverse. 

I. JURISDICTION 

At the threshold, we must address whether the district 

court's denial, without prejudice to renew, of appellants' motion 

for summary judgment based on qualified immunity constitutes an 

appealable decision under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. 

This court has previously determined that appellate 

jurisdiction is invoked when a defendant asserting qualified 

immunity is faced with discovery that "exceed[s] that 'narrowly 

tailored' to the question of qualified immunity." Maxey v. 

Fulton, 890 F.2d 279, 283 (10th Cir. 1989). As the Supreme Court 

explained in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), the 

doctrine of qualified immunity not only protects government 

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officials from the costs ~ssociated with trial, but also from "the 

other burdens of litigation," which include "'the burdens of broad 

reaching discovery~''' 472 U.S. at 526 (quoting Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is not 

a shield from all discovery. Maxey, 890 F.2d at 282. In some 

cases, discovery may be necessary to determine whether the 

defendants' challenged conduct violated clearly established law 

and thus, whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

However, until the threshold immunity question is determined, 

discovery shall be limited to resolving that issue alone. Id. at 

283; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818. 

Based on the record before us, the order of the district 

court does not limit discovery to the resolution of the qualified 

immunity issue. As such, defendants have been denied their 

entitlement to be free from the burden of overbroad discovery. 

Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Objective Reasonableness 

Government officials performing discretionary functions are 

entitled to qualified immunity insofar as their conduct does not 

violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818. Harlow crafted this "objective 

reasonableness" standard for determining the availability of the 

qualified immunity defense in order to "avoid excessive disruption 

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of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial 

claims on summary judgment." Id. However in some cases, the 

determination of the "objective'' reasonableness of an official's 

conduct rests on establishing whether the defendant acted with an 

impermissible motive or intent a highly "subjective" factual 

element. Such is the case here. For Lewis to succeed with any of 

her statutory claims of age, race and sex discrimination and with 

her constitutional equal protection claim brought under§ 1983, 

she must ultimately prove the essential element of intentional 

discrimination. 1 Absent a discriminatory motive or intent, 

appellants' challenged conduct 

established law. 

would not violate clearly 

Where a defendant's subjective intent is an element of 

plaintiff's claim and the defendant moves for summary judgment 

based on qualified immunity, the defendant must make a prima facie 

showing of the "objective reasonableness" of the challenged 

conduct. Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 

1 To prove intentional discrimination under the ADEA, the 

plaintiff must show that age was a "determinative factor" in the 

defendant employer's action toward the plaintiff. Lucas v. Dover 

Corp., Norris Div., 857 F.2d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir. 1988); Cooper 

v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1988). 

"Proof of discriminatory motive is critical" to prevailing in a 

disparate treatment action brought under§ 703(a) of Title VII, 42 

u.s.c. § 2000e-2(a). International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 

United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 

F.2d 1037, 1044 (10th Cir. 1981). A§ 1981 claim always requires 

purposeful discrimination. General Bldg. Contractors Assoc. v. 

Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1982). Finally, the 

requirements for establishing a§ 1983 claim are the same as those 

for establishing the underlying constitutional or statutory 

violations, Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 144 n.3 (1979), 

and purposeful discrimination is an essential element of an equal 

protection violation. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986). 

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F.2d 642, _649 (10th Cir. 1988); Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police 

·Dept., 812 F.2d 1425, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In this regard, we 

have emphasized that the moving party has no burden to disprove 

any unsupported claims of his opponent, especially where, as here, 

"'the reasons for swiftly terminating insubstantial lawsuits are 

particularly strong.''' Losavio, 847 F.2d at 649 (quoting Martin, 

812 F.2d at 1434). 

In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants 

have submitted affidavits and attachments for the pqrpose of 

establishing the objective reasonableness of the decision to 

eliminate Ms. Lewis' former position of Assistant City Manager. 

Again, in light of the statutory and constitutional discrimination 

claims asserted, appellants' challenged course of conduct would be 

objectively reasonable if it was carried out for nondiscriminatory purposes. The affidavit of City Manager Steven 

Burkett states that the City reorganized its staff and eliminated 

Ms. Lewis' position because the City faced a budget crisis in 

1986. Burkett's affidavit sets forth the following description of 

the reorganization process and the decisions driving the changes 

made: 

Upon my arrival as city manager in April, 1986, I 

was made aware that the city faced a severe financial 

crisis due to expenditures exceeding revenues, and a 

corresponding reduction in general fund reserves. 

Further study by city financial staffers revealed 

that, due to accounting discrepancies, the projected 

shortfall in revenues was not as large as initially 

projected, however, it was recognized and brought to my 

attention that the city had incurred additional 

expenditures, particularly long-term expenditures, that 

were initially not taken in consideration in the 

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projected budgets, including approximately $400,000.00 

annual bond financing for the next several years to 

retire the debt on the city's golf course and 

approximately $300,000.00 annual debt reduction in 

connection with the Downtown Development Authority. The 

projected additional long-term debts essentially 

canceled the additional revenues. 

In view of these projected losses, I implemented, 

at the direction of City Council, a plan to reduce 

expenditures and balance the budget which included, 

among other steps, a reorganization of the city's 

organizational structure; the effect of this 

reorganization was to consolidate departments of city 

government to reduce the span of control of the city 

manager and to put related functions together to promote 

efficiencies and cooperative effort. The reorganization 

was also necessary to reduce the number of department 

heads reporting to the city manager and otherwise 

streamline and make more efficient the operation of city 

government by eliminating unnecessary positions. In 

addition to implementing the reorganization, the city 

(a) refinanced $30 million in debt; (b) initiated an 

early retirement program; (c) transferred street 

lighting from the general fund to the light and power 

fund; and (d) ordered all city departments to reduce 

their 1986 budgets by five percent and their 1987 

budgets by an additional five percent. 

As documentary support, the attachments to Mr. Burkett's affidavit 

include the City's organizational charts both before and after the 

reorganization and a list of the ten employees laid off during the 

reorganization. Of these ten employees, five were male, eight 

were Caucasian and four were under the age of 40. 

Burkett's affidavit also asserts that, prior to instituting 

the layoffs, Burkett met with all city department heads to 

determine the job classifications "which least affected the direct 

provision of service to the citizens of Fort Collins in an effort 

to target those positions which would be subject to elimination." 

The occurrence and purpose of these meetings is supported by 

various affidavits of other defendants and other affiants. As a 

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result of the meetings, Burkett "concluded that the role of 

assistant city manager was somewhat undefined and that its 

elimination would not unacceptably detrimentally impact upon the 

direct provision of service to the citizens, and accordingly 

decided that the position should be eliminated." 

To demonstrate the City's financial condition as of March 

1986, defendants also present the affidavit of Alan Krcmarik, the 

present Director of Finance for the City, and the Director of 

Budget and Research for the City in February 1986. In his former 

position, Krcmarik was in charge of preparing budgets for the City 

and doing research and analysis of the City's financial situation. 

Krcmarik's affidavit tends to support Burkett's description of the 

City's need to reduce costs. His affidavit and the attachments 

thereto assert that in the Spring of 1986, the City "faced serious 

long-term budget problems." For the year 1985, Krcmarik's figures 

showed a deficit of approximately $600,000 in the City's general 

fund, and as of March 1986, projected deficits in the general fund 

of approximately $1.5 million for 1986, $2.9 million for 1987 and 

$2.5 million in 1988. 

Ms. Lewis, through her affidavit and attachments, has 

attempted to rebut appellants' above proffered justifications for 

the elimination of her position. As to whether the City faced a 

budget crisis in 1986, Ms. Lewis presents newspaper clippings from 

1988 showing that the City had received income in 1988 from 

"unexpected" sources. This evidence simply is not relevant to the 

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question of whether the City officials believed the City to be 

facing a budgetary crisis in Spring 1986. The projections of the 

City in 1986 may have been inaccurate for failing to foresee a 

revenue windfall in 1988, but the appellants have demonstrated 

that the figures relied upon in Spring 1986 projected substantial 

deficits for the general fund over the next three years. Ms. 

Lewis has produced nothing to rebut this contention. 

Additionally, she has produced no evidence to rebut the contention 

of appellants that the functions of her former position made that 

position a prime candidate for elimination during the 

reorganization. 

Appellants have also submitted affidavits with attachments 

for the purpose of showing the objective reasonableness of their 

actions in not appointing Ms. Lewis to other top-level positions 

after her demotion. Mr. Burkett asserts that because of Ms. 

Lewis' long history of service to the City, he attempted to find 

some other satisfactory employment for her within City government. 

In the letter Burkett sent to advise Lewis of her layoff, he also 

offered her the position of Health and Safety Manager, a position 

that she accepted and currently performs. Burkett maintains that 

he personally considered Lewis for many of the higher-level 

openings mentioned in Lewis' complaint. To that end, Burkett 

spoke to then Mayor and City Councilman Kelly Ohlson and council 

members Gerald Horak, Lawrence Estrada, Ed Stoner and Barbara 

Rutstein, and other various members of city staff and department 

heads concerning Lewis' qualifications. As a result of his 

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discussions, Burkett concluded: 

I was made aware that although Ms. Lewis had performed 

satisfactorily as a clerk, then secretary and later as 

city clerk, she was perceived as not having performed 

very well as council liaison and as assistant city 

manager, due to a perceived attitude problem and 

weakness in communications and interpersonal skills in 

dealing with City Council and city staff. In 

particular, I was told that Ms. Lewis had a tendency to 

"talk down" to or "tell off" City Council members if 

they asked· what appeared to Ms. Lewis to be too many 

questions or expressed views not consistent with her own 

and that the quality of her work did not meet expected 

standards. 

As a further result of this investigation, I was 

informed that Ms. Lewis lacked credibility with 

department heads and City Council members. 

Based upon the information available to me through 

my numerous conversations •••. I decided that Ms. Lewis' 

qualifications and weaknesses were not appropriate for 

the positions of Director of Administrative Services, 

Director of Utility Services and Deputy City Manager. 

It was on this basis and none other that I decided 

not to extend an offer to Ms. Lewis to fill any of those 

positions requiring extensive interpersonal dealings, 

supervision of staff, and, in the case of Deputy City 

Manager, extensive interaction with City Council. 

The content of Burkett's discussions with the former mayor and 

city council members is corroborated by the affidavits of all the 

persons named by Burkett. Former Mayor Kelly Ohlson's affidavit 

states that he "found [Lewis'] work performance to be inadequate'' 

when Lewis served as council liaison: 

The position of council liaison was a key position and 

constituted the main point of public contact between the 

city council and the citizens of Fort Collins. Ms. 

Lewis' job involved handling inquiries and complaints 

from the citizens and preparing responses on behalf of 

city council and the mayor. Her responses were often 

incomplete, inaccurate, grammatically incorrect, and 

even at times insensitive to citizen concerns. Ms. 

Lewis often seemed "put-out" that some requests had been 

made of her by city council. 

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I was also not pleased with Ms. Lewis' performance 

as a lobbyist in handling intergovernmental relations 

when she was transferred from the position of council 

liaison to one of responsibility for intergovernmental 

relations and lobbying efforts. 

The affidavits of Rutstein and Horak strike a similar chord of 

dissatisfaction with regard to the quality of Lewis' performance 

in the positions of council liaison and Assistant City Manager. 

Additionally, the affidavits of Estrada and Stoner state that, 

although they did not take negative positions regarding Lewis' 

work when approached by Burkett, they were aware that other 

council members were dissatisfied with her job performance. 

Again, Lewis' affidavit attempts to rebut appellants' 

showing. Specifically, she contests appellants' position that her 

previous work in high-level positions (as Assistant City Manager 

and council liaison) was unsatisfactory. In this regard, Lewis' 

affidavit and the attachments thereto fall short of the mark. For 

example, Ms. Lewis provides volumes of documentation relating to 

various performance evaluations and pay raises throughout her 

career. However, most of the favorable evaluations relate to 

periods before Lewis rose to the Assistant City Manager position. 

Based on all the foregoing, we conclude that appellants have 

made a prima facie showing of the objective reasonableness of 

their challenged actions and have produced enough evidence to 

require plaintiff to demonstrate that summary judgment based on 

qualified immunity is inappropriate. 

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B. Additional Discovery 

Once a showing of objective reasonableness is produced, "the 

plaintiff may avoid summary judgment only by pointing to specific 

evidence that the official's actions were improperly motivated," 

LO$avio, 847 F.2d at 649, thereby establishing the existence of a 

genuine issue of fact for trial. See also, Polenz v. Parrott, 883 

F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1989) ("at the summary judgment or 

directed verdict stage ••• the court must determine whether the 

plaintiff has factually supported the allegations as to the state 

of mind element.") In the alternative, a district court may defer 

a ruling on summary judgment pending additional discovery when the 

affidavits of the party opposing the motion indicate that "the 

party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 

essential to justify the party's opposition." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56 ( f) • 

Accordingly, we must first decide whether the district court 

correctly concluded that it was "too early to grant summary 

judgment because there hasn't been adequate opportunity for 

discovery." A district court has discretion to determine whether 

to allow additional discovery following the filing of a Rule 56(f) 

affidavit and the Rule 56(f) affidavit "should be treated 

liberally unless dilatory or lacking in merit." Patty Precision 

v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 1984). 

However, the district court's discretion is not without bounds, 

particularly when the summary judgment motion is grounded on a 

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claim of qualified immunity: 

Rule 56(f) discretion must be limited when a summary 

judgment motion is based on qualified immunity because 

insubstantial lawsuits 'against government officials 

[should] be resolved prior to discovery and on summary 

judgment if possible.' Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 

635, 640 n. 2 ( 1987) ( emphasis added); . • • • Liberal 

application of rule 56(f) should not be allowed to 

subvert the goals of Harlow and its progeny. 

Jones v. City and County of Denver, Colo., 854 F.2d 1206, 1211 

(10th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, in response to a summary judgment 

motion based on qualified immunity, a plaintiff's 56(f} affidavit 

must demonstrate "how discovery will enable them to rebut a 

defendant's showing of objective reasonableness" or, stated 

alternatively, demonstrate a "connection between the information 

he would seek in discovery and the validity of the [defendant's] 

qualified immunity assertion." Id. (emphasis added}. To that 

end, it is insufficient for the party opposing the motion to 

merely assert that additional discovery is required to demonstrate 

a factual dispute or "that evidence supporting a party's 

allegation is in the opposing party's hands.~ 

Precision, 742 F.2d at 1264. 

Patty 

Plaintiff here has failed in her brief or affidavits in 

response to defendants motion for summary judgment to demonstrate 

how discovery will raise a genuine fact issue as to appellants' 

qualified immunity claim. In her brief in response to the motion 

for summary judgment, plaintiff asserts that there has been 

"insufficient time for discovery" and that "[t]he parties have not 

begun the discovery process." Thus, plaintiff argued that 

appellants' motion for summary judgment was "premature" and 

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"improper." Within the affidavit itself, plaintiff repeatedly 

asserts that she ''will be able to show" certain facts relative to 

her claims of discriminatory animus on the party of City 

officials. These inspecific references are simply insufficient to 

meet Rule 56(f) muster when defendants' claim of qualified 

immunity is at issue. Plaintiff has not attempted to 

particularize her request for discovery. She has not explained 

how any specific documents or depositions will aid in rebutting 

defendants' showing of objective reasonableness. Rule 56(f) is 

not a license for a fishing expedition, especially when summary 

judgment is urged based on a claim of qualified immunity. Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in 

deferring a final ruling on defendants qualified immunity claim 

pending discovery. 

C. Summary Judgment. 

As we stated earlier, once a showing of objective 

reasonableness has been made and further discovery is denied, 

plaintiff may avoid summary judgment only by producing specific 

evidence that appellants' actions were tainted by a discriminatory 

motive. Losavio, 847 F.2d at 649. In reviewing a summary 

judgment determination, we apply the same standard employed by the 

trial court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 2 Osgood v. State Farm 

2 Rule 56(c} reads, in pertinent part: 

The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 

serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 

rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 

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Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). When a 

properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the party 

opposing the motion "must set forth specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ .. P. 56(c). 

"[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material 

fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

In response to defendants' showing of objective 

reasonableness, Ms. Lewis has produced an affidavit with a great 

number of attachments. However, despite the volume of information 

produced, Ms. Lewis has failed to produce any specific evidence of 

a discriminatory motive on the part of appellants in eliminating 

her former position or in not appointing her to other high-level 

positions. The affidavit's statements regarding discrimination 

can only be characterized as conclusory allegations. Repeating 

the allegations of the complaint, Ms. Lewis asserts that: 

Mr. Burkett was hired by the City Council ••• because of 

his reputation as a manager who gets rid of older, more 

senior employees from within the city government, 

thereby saving money. He then replaces those employees 

with younger, male caucasian individuals who are 

compatible with his philosophical concepts and the 

concepts of the City Council .... I was involved in 

many discussions, both formally and informally, about 

this philosophy. 

The City Council members named as defendants in 

this matter all agreed with that philosophy and were the 

decision makers in hiring Mr. Burkett and giving him the 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law. 

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full power and authority to implement 

discriminatory policy, in cooperation with 

Richard Shannon, acting City Manager. 

a clearly 

Defendant 

Lewis does not direct the court to any specific evidence to 

support these allegations. The only evidence relevant to Lewis' 

claims of discrimination is the circumstantial fact that many of 

the available higher-level positions were eventually filled by 

white males under the age of forty. (At least two high level 

positions were eventually filled by a Black female and a Caucasian 

female.) However, the burden placed upon the nonmoving party at 

the summary judgment stage to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact 

goes beyond the burden of producing "some evidence." A reasonable 

jury could not find discriminatory purpose based on this evidence 

alone. 

Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff has failed to produce 

specific evidence of discriminatory purpose on the part of 

appellants sufficient to survive summary judgment. We therefore 

REVERSE the determination of the district court and grant 

appellants' summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity as 

to all of plaintiff's statutory discrimination claims and as to 

her§ 1983 equal protection claim. 

Plaintiff has also alleged a due process violation in the 

complaint. Although the contours of plaintiff's due process claim 

are not · readily apparent to this court, we find no indication in 

the record that appellants have moved to dismiss this claim and 

find no mention of the due process claim in appellants' motion for 

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summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Accordingly, we 

take no action relative to the due process claim and REMAND for 

further proceedings related thereto. 

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