Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01735/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01735-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARONTA LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY of FAIRFIELD, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-CV-1735-DMC-P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 

means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 

1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 

Case 2:19-cv-01735-JAM-DMC Document 13 Filed 02/14/20 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 

claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) City of Fairfield, (2) County of 

Solano, (3) Thomas Ferrara, (4) Castillo, (5) Ramirez, (6) Nagar, and (7) Clemente. Plaintiff

raises three claims for relief, summarized below.

Claim I

Plaintiff alleges in Claim I that defendants violated his rights under the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (ADA) and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. See ECF No. 1, pg. 4. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was excluded from access to programs, services, and extra 

credit because he was isolated from the general population. See ECF No. 1, pg. 4. Although 

plaintiff never makes it express, from the context of his complaint it appears that plaintiff utilizes 

a wheel chair for mobility. Id. At some point around 2018, plaintiff made a request to be 

transferred to housing in general population. Id. However, this request was denied by 

Classification Officer Clemente. Id. Allegedly, Clemente denied the transfer because of fears that 

plaintiff’s wheelchair could be used as a weapon. Id. Plaintiff doubts the sincerity of this response 

and states that other similarly heavy metal objects are allowed in general population. Id. After 

plaintiff complained of this denial to Clemente, Clemente told plaintiff to “take it up” with his 

supervisor, Sergeant Ramirez. Id. After this, plaintiff filed a complaint to Ramirez. Id. Ramirez 

took 3 days past the response deadline to discuss this request with plaintiff. Id. During this 

discussion, plaintiff expressed his grievances, but Ramirez left and never responded to the 

complaint. Id. As a result of this action, plaintiff was denied time out of his cell to interact with 

other inmates and participate in prison-run programs. Id.

Case 2:19-cv-01735-JAM-DMC Document 13 Filed 02/14/20 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Claim II

Plaintiff alleges in Claim II that defendants violated his rights to procedural due 

process and adequate medical care. See ECF No. 1, pg. 5. 

On June 2, 2017, upon arriving to jail from Northbay Medical Hospital, plaintiff 

was left in his holding cell for over 12 hours. See ECF No. 1, pg. 5. He suffered pain and was 

only given Naproxen as treatment. Id. Also, his cell was in deplorable condition, with feces, 

urine, and food-based trash all over his cell. Id. Plaintiff informed Officer Bottoms and Officer 

Finnegan of these concerns, however his request to have the cell sanitized was denied. Id. Dr. 

Nagar, of the medical ward, “did nothing” to address plaintiff’s concerns. Id.

 Medical employee Nick cleaned up pus oozing out of plaintiff’s wound, but Dr. 

Nagar never visited plaintiff during his time in the cell. Id. After this, plaintiff caused a “verbal 

ruckus” and Bottoms told Sgt. Donna of plaintiff’s conduct. Id. Donna told Dr. Nagar and 

plaintiff was taken out of his medical bed and placed in a wheel chair in Stanton Correctional AdSeg Unit 2450 from September 2017 to October 2018. Id. As a result of this confinement, 

plaintiff was denied “. . . credits, help, [and] services.” Id.

Claim III

In Claim III, plaintiff alleges defendants denied him adequate medical care. See

ECF No. 1, pg. 6. 

At Dr. Nagar’s discretion, plaintiff was denied pain medication prescribed by a 

surgeon who participated in treating plaintiff’s gunshot wound. See ECF No. 1, pg. 6. As a result 

of this denial, plaintiff suffered severe pain around his neck and chest gunshot wounds. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Nagar intentionally denied plaintiff medical treatment, demonstrating a 

“callous disregard” for his rights as a medical patient. Id.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:19-cv-01735-JAM-DMC Document 13 Filed 02/14/20 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

II. DISCUSSION

As submitted, plaintiff’s sole cognizable claim is his Eighth Amendment claim 

against defendant Nagar. As to defendants City of Fairfield and County of Solano, plaintiff has 

failed to alleged misconduct on the part of the municipality as opposed to its employees or 

officials. As to defendants Thomas Ferrara and Castillo, plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient 

facts to establish a causal connection between their conduct and an alleged wrong. As to 

defendants Ramirez and Clemente, plaintiff has failed to allege facts which may establish a 

violation of the equal protection clause. Lastly, as to plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim 

against defendant Nager, plaintiff has failed to identify a valid liberty or property interest that 

would give rise to a due process claim. 

1. Municipal Liability (Defendants City of Fairfield and County of Solano)

Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against either the City of Fairfield or 

the County of Solano.

Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to 

whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 

Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 

691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local 

government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials 

under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 

397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of 

the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the 

plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or 

custom of the municipality. See id. A claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is sufficient to 

withstand dismissal even if it is based on nothing more than bare allegations that an individual 

defendant’s conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice. See Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988).

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:19-cv-01735-JAM-DMC Document 13 Filed 02/14/20 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Here, plaintiff’s complaint makes no particular factual allegations against either 

the City of Fairfield or the County of Solano. Plaintiff’s claims appear to stem from the alleged 

misconduct of both defendant’s employees. There are no allegations that plaintiff suffered a 

constitutional deprivation as the result of either municipality’s policies or customs. Therefore, 

plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against either defendant. 

2. Causal Connection (Defendants Thomas Ferrara and Castillo)

Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against either defendant Thomas 

Ferrara or Castillo.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 

specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

Here, plaintiff’s makes no specific factual allegation against either defendant in his 

complaint. The only reference plaintiff makes to Castillo is in his attached exhibits. It appears that 

Lieutenant Castillo denied plaintiff’s appeal of his administrative grievance on July 20, 2018. See

ECF No. 1, pg. 8. Similarly, plaintiff’s only reference to Ferrara is in an attached demand letter 

sent to defendant Nagar. In the letter plaintiff states that, “. . . Dr. Nagar conspires with Facility 

Sherriff Thomas Ferrerara [sic].” ECF No. 1, pg. 23. Plaintiff has not established a causal 

connection between either defendant’s individual conduct and a constitutional deprivation. 

Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against either defendant. 

/ / /

Case 2:19-cv-01735-JAM-DMC Document 13 Filed 02/14/20 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

3. Equal Protection (Defendants Ramirez and Clemente)

Plaintiff has failed to state cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claims against 

defendants Ramirez and Clemente based on disability discrimination. Equal protection claims 

arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are treated differently without a 

rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 

411 U.S. 1 (1972). Strict scrutiny applies to equal protection claims alleging race-based or 

religious discrimination (i.e., where the plaintiff is member of a “protected class”); minimal 

scrutiny applies to all other equal protection claims, including disability claims. See Lee v. City 

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-88 (9th Cir. 2001). Minimal scrutiny requires only that “any 

reasonably conceivable state of facts [] could provide a rational basis for the [difference in 

treatment].” People v. Dunley, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1438, 1450 (2016) (citations omitted). Here, 

plaintiff’s own complaint states that his request to transfer to general population was turned down 

because defendants feared his “. . . wheelchair ADA-equipment can be used as a weapon . . .” 

ECF No. 1, pg. 4. Therefore, plaintiff’s complaint demonstrates that his request was denied 

because of safety concerns. Thus, a connection between the alleged disparate treatment and a 

rational basis is evident. 

4. Defendant Dr. Nagar

A. Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff has stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Nagar 

based on an alleged deprivation of medical care. Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious 

illness or injury, or risks of serious injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth 

Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official 

violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the 

official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted 

unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable 

mind.” See id.

Case 2:19-cv-01735-JAM-DMC Document 13 Filed 02/14/20 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 Here, plaintiff alleges that Nagar intentionally denied plaintiff medical treatment

despite plaintiff suffering from a gun shot wound. See ECF No. 1, pg. 6. Also, plaintiff alleges 

that Nagar failed to visit him while confined to his holding cell despite suffering from immense 

pain and pus oozing out of plaintiff’s wounds. See ECF No. 1, pg. 5. Therefore, at this stage, 

plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make out a valid claim of deliberate indifference against 

defendant Nagar. 

B. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff has failed to state a valid procedural due process claim against defendant 

Nagar. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being 

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 

539, 556 (1974). The procedural guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s due 

process clause apply only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. 

See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).

From plaintiff’s complaint, it is unclear what connection there is between Nagar’s 

conduct and the deprivation of a liberty or property interest. Plaintiff states that he, “. . . cause[d] 

a verbal ruckus and officer Mrs. Stacy Bottoms told Sgt. Donna who spoke to Doctor Nagar to 

take me out [sic] medical bed to wheel chair cell in Stanton Correctional Ad-Seg Unit 2450 Clay 

Bank Rd. from Sept. 2017 or so until Oct. 2018.” ECF No. 1, pg. 5. To the extent plaintiff’s due 

process claims stems from his placement in administrative segregation, it should be noted that the 

Supreme Court has concluded that the Constitution itself provides no liberty interest in remaining 

in the general population. see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-86 (1995). In the statement of 

facts regarding his due process claim, plaintiff generally contends that Nagar failed to provide 

him with adequate medical care. At most, plaintiff’s allegations against Nagar describe a 

deprivation of medical care which are best resolved through his 8th Amendment claim, not due 

process. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:19-cv-01735-JAM-DMC Document 13 Filed 02/14/20 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 

amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the 

prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 

amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 

complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the court will issue findings and 

recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 

further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a first amended 

complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

Dated: February 13, 2020

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:19-cv-01735-JAM-DMC Document 13 Filed 02/14/20 Page 8 of 8