Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00541/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00541-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSE COLLINS,

Petitioner,

v.

DERRAL ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-00541 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 16]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is currently in custody pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of

California, County of Kern on July 18, 1997, for possession of cocaine in violation of California

Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years to

life. (Lodged Doc. 1.) 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. (Lodged Doc. 2.) Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court on February 1, 1999. (Lodged Doc. 3.) The petition was denied on March 9,

1999. (Lodged Doc. 4.) 

Petitioner filed two post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim, both petitions for writs of habeas corpus. The first petition was filed with the

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Fifth District Court of Appeal on December 10, 2003, and was denied on December 19, 2003,

without comment. (Lodged Docs. 5-6.) The second petition was filed with the California

Supreme Court on January 29, 2004, and was denied on December 1, 2004, without comment. 

(Lodged Docs. 7-8.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed outside the one year

limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the face

of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the

district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

the state’s procedural rules. See e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) th

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review th

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F.

Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in

procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state

procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review

Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

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corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 th

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on May 29, 2003, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, the Petitioner was convicted on July 18, 1997. The California

Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on March 9, 1999. The time to seek direct

review concluded upon the expiration of the 90-day period following denial of review in which

Petitioner had to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, i.e. 

June 7, 1999. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1

1159 (9 Cir. 199) (concluding period of “direct review” includes the period within which one th

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can file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court). Petitioner had one

year until June 7, 2000, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus. Petitioner did not file his federal petition until April 22, 2005, almost five years

after the limitations period expired. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is

tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled

during the intervals between one state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a

habeas petition at the next level of the state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). th

Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if

the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was timely or was filed within a

reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis,

___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 846 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or determined by the federal

courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the requirements for statutory tolling.

Id.

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on June 7, 1999, and expired on

June 7, 2000. As previously stated, Petitioner filed two state post-conviction petitions. The first

was filed in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District on December 10, 2003, and

denied on December 19, 2003, without comment. The second petition was filed in the California

Supreme Court on January 29, 2004, and denied on December 1, 2004, without comment.

Because both petitions were filed after the expiration of the limitations period, they have no

statutory tolling consequences. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir.2000) (Petitioner is

th

not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v. Moore,

199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). Therefore,

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the instant petition remains untimely. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The Supreme Court has held that in order for a petitioner to be entitled to equitable

tolling he bears the burden of establishing “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v.

U.S. Dist. Ct (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 ((th Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States,

107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). th

“[A] ‘putative habeas petitioner’s mental incompetency [is] a condition that is, obviously,

an extraordinary circumstance beyond the prisoner’s control,’ so ‘mental incompetency justifies

equitable tolling’ of the AEDPA statute of limitations. Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th

Cir. 2003) (citing Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d at 541.) The Ninth Circuit

has also noted that “‘[t]he firmly entrenched common law right to competence persisting beyond

trial is a strong indicator of a constitutional due process right’ to competency in postconviction

proceedings or to a stay of proceedings until competence is regained.” Laws, 351 F.3d at 923

(citing Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 813 (9 Cir. 2003). Equitable tolling is th

available, however, only where a petitioner’s alleged mental incompetence somehow made filing

a timely petition impossible. Laws, 351 F.3d at 922-23; Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th

Cir. 2003). 

In Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 801 (9 Cir. 2001) (reversed en banc on other grounds th

295 F.3d 1046 (2002)), the Ninth Circuit concluded that a petitioner “must show that the

‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the but-for and proximate cause of his untimeliness.” The

Ninth Circuit recently affirmed this rule in Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021,

1026 (9 Cir. 2005). There, the Court pointed out that the determination vis-a-vis equitable th

tolling is “highly fact-dependent” and that the petitioner “bears the burden of showing that

equitable tolling is appropriate.” Id. 

In his opposition, Petitioner contends that his petition filed in the California Supreme

Court was “timely” filed and was therefore pending for purposes of the AEDPA’s tolling

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provisions. (Opposition, at 2-3.) Petitioner further contends that due to his lack of knowledge

and “mental disorders ranging from cocaine dependence, paranoia, hearing voices to very

depressed as he was classified as meeting the Mental Health criteria,” he was unable to timely

file a petition. (Opposition, at 4.) Petitioner contends that he was taking psychotropic

medication for his mental health problems throughout the trial and sentencing up and until 2004,

when he was discharged from the mental health treatment. 

Initially, Petitioner’s claim that because the petition filed in the California Supreme Court

was denied on the merits and for lack of diligence, it was deemed timely filed, is without merit. 

As Respondent submits in his reply, the California Supreme Court denied the petition without

comment or citation. (Lodged Doc. 8.) In Evans v. Chavis, the Supreme Court held that when

the state court denies the habeas petition without any explanation or indication as to timeliness,

the federal court must decide, in the first instance, whether the state habeas petition was filed

within a “reasonable” time. The Supreme Court also stated that even if a state court denies a

habeas petition on the merits, this does not prove that the court thought the petition was timely. 

126 S.Ct. at 850. 

In any event, the petition was filed on January 29, 2004, over three and one half years

after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Thus, a petition filed after the expiration of the

limitations period does not restart the clock at zero or otherwise save a claim from being timebarred. Because the limitations period had already expired, the collateral challenges have no

tolling consequence. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not

entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199

F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). Once the

statute has run, a collateral action cannot revive it. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner’s vague and conclusory claim that his ignorance of the law entitles him to

equitable tolling, is too without merit. The Ninth Circuit has held that claims of ignorance of the

law and illiteracy are insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See e.g. Hughes v. Idaho State Bd.

of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9 Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of th 

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knowledge of law unfortunate but insufficient to establish cause); Kibler v. Walters, 220 F.3d

1151, 1153 (9 Cir. 2000) (lack of knowledge of state law not cause); see also Marsh v. Soares, th

223 F.2d 1217, 1220 (10 Cir. 2000); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5 Cir. 1999); Rose v. th th

Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1991). 

With regard to Petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to equitable tolling due to his mental

condition, it is likewise unpersuasive. Petitioner’s claim is in essence that due to his mental

condition and prescribed medications, he was not able to function at his full capacity and his

thinking was unclear. Petitioner indicates that he was prescribed eleven different medications

including, “Mellaril, Thorazin, Trazadone, [and] Colotapin.” (Opposition, at 5.) In reviewing

the evidence Petitioner has submitted in support of his assertion for equitable tolling, pages nine

through twenty cover periods of time ranging from 1997 to 1998, which was before the statute of

limitations started to run. (Opposition, at 9-20.) Pages twenty-one through twenty-seven covers

the period of time ranging from June 1999 to 2003, which is the time period in which the statute

of limitations started to run and Petitioner filed the first state habeas corpus petition. 

(Opposition, at 21-27.) 

As previously stated, the statute of limitations started to run on June 7, 1999, and

Petitioner did not file the first state petition until December 10, 2003. Thus, this is the relevant

time period for determining whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. As Respondent

correctly submits, the medical reports dated February 17, 2000, and May 4, 2000, reflect that

Petitioner was in remission and free of psychotropic medication since April 22, 1999. 

(Opposition, at 23-24.) These same reports further indicate that Petitioner was discharged from

the mental health treatment population on April 22, 2000. (Opposition, at 23-24.) Petitioner

then remained free from the mental health treatment population until March 22, 2001. 

(Opposition, at 25.) Although it appears that Petitioner was subsequently placed into mental

health services, in March 2001, and May, 2002, as of May 25, 2003, Petitioner was again in

remission and free of psychotropic medication, and was ultimately discharged on May 25, 2004. 

(Opposition, at 25-27.) 

Simply stated, the evidence before the Court does not support a finding that Petitioner

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 Further factual development of the record is unwarranted since Respondent has filed a reply to

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Petitioner’s opposition, specifically addressing Petitioner’s claim of mental incompetence, and the Court granted

Petitioner the opportunity to expand the record by submitting any further evidence he may have in support of his

claim of mental incompetency, which he did not do. (Court Doc. 24.) Compare Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d

1146 (9 Cir. 2000) (remanded case back to district court for further factual development because neither respondent th

nor petitioner were given opportunity to address claim of equitable tolling; Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919 (9 Cir. th

2003) (remanded case back to district court for further factual development because neither respondent nor petitioner

submitted evidence in the form of medical records to determine petitioner’s claim for equitable tolling based on

incompetency.) 

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was mentally incompetent or that it would have been impossible for him to file a federal petition

before the limitations period expired. Moreover, even if Petitioner suffered from some form of 2

mental illness, Petitioner has failed to provide any specifics regarding how the alleged mental

condition caused the substantial delay, of over three years, in filing the instant petition. As of

April 22, 1999, Petitioner was in remission and free of psychotropic medication, and was

released from the mental health population on April 22, 2000. (Opposition, at 24.) Petitioner

remained free until March 22, 2001. (Opposition, at 25.) Thus, there was a substantial period of

time in which Petitioner was free of his mental health condition and medication, and Petitioner

failed to act diligently during this time, and has offered no justification otherwise. As such,

Petitioner has not established a “but-for” connection between any alleged mental health condition

and the untimely filing of the instant petition. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for Petitioner’s

failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

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service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 28, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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