Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02211/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02211-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DANTO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—No. C-04-02211 RMW

SPT

E-FILED on 3/19/07

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

QUEDILLIS RICARDO WALKER, 

MYRTLE VIVIAN WALKER, and 

WILLIAM BERKELEY WALKER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, GERALD

EGGE, GAIL LEWIS, EARL PENNINGTON,

JOHN SCHON, RANDY DANTO, and DOES

1 to 100, 

Defendants.

No. C-04-02211 RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

DANTO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[Re Docket No. 102, 103, 112]

Defendant Randy Danto ("Danto") moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs Quedillas

Ricardo Walker's ("Walker"), Myrtle Vivian Walker's, and William Berkeley Walker's (collectively,

"plaintiffs") 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that Danto conspired with the prosecution to suborn false

testimony from a witness. Plaintiffs oppose defendant's motion. The court has read the moving and

responding papers and considered the arguments of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the

court GRANTS Danto's motion for summary judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

John Schon ("Schon") served as the Deputy District Attorney who prosecuted Walker for the

January 10, 1991 murder of Lisa Hopewell ("Hopewell"). Rahsson Bowers was Walker's coCase 5:04-cv-02211-RMW Document 148 Filed 03/19/07 Page 1 of 7
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DANTO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—No. C-04-02211 RMW

SPT 2

defendant. Bowers's fingerprints were found on the duct tape at the murder scene, and Bowers had

also confessed. There was no physical evidence linking Walker to the crime scene. Id. Bowers told

sheriff deputies that he participated in the murder out of fear of Walker. Defendant Danto, a public

defender at the time, represented Bowers. 

The parties do not dispute that prior to trial and continuing into trial, Danto vigorously tried

to get Schon to agree to a plea deal for her client, Bowers, in exchange for his testimony against

Walker. Shortly after trial commenced, Schon did agree that he would allow Bowers to plead to

second degree murder in exchange for his testimony. This agreement was kept secret until shortly

before Bowers testified at the end of the prosecution's case-in-chief. 

Sarah Dunbar ("Dunbar") testified as a prosecution witness at the preliminary examination in

the state's case against Walker and Bowers and at the trial. She was interviewed by Schon and

sheriff deputy Gerald Egge on July 23, 1991. At the time she was awaiting sentencing on unrelated

drug charges. Dunbar did not have information about the murder, but was acquainted with both

Walker and Hopewell. She testified at the preliminary hearing on August 5, 1991 and on August 7,

1991. On August 9, 1991 her motion for release on her own recognizance was granted without

opposition from the district attorney's office. She also testified at the jury trial which ended on

December 10, 1991 in a finding that Walker was guilty of murder. The court sentenced him to a

term of 26 years to life.

On June 11, 2003 Walker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus based upon newly

discovered evidence showing his factual innocence. On June 20, 2003 the Santa Clara County

Superior Court found Walker factually innocent, granted his petition and vacated his conviction. 

At issue in this motion are plaintiffs' first and fourth claims directed against Danto for her

alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 by conspiring with district attorney Schon to elicit testimony

against Walker which Danto knew was perjured. Plaintiffs allege that Danto was able to present

false testimony from Dunbar that was significant to the state's case, but could not otherwise be

brought in by the state. This testimony came out during Danto's extensive cross-examination of

Dunbar concerning Walker's character, including his alleged bad temper, evil streak, and propensity

for violence. 

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1 As noted in the Background section, the only issue raised by Danto's motion for

summary judgment is whether Danto and Schon conspired to knowingly suborn Dunbar's false

testimony at trial, not whether Walker's constitutional rights were violated by joint action between

Schon and Danto for Danto to solicit character evidence against Walker that was significant for the

state's case but could not otherwise be brought in by the state at trial.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DANTO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—No. C-04-02211 RMW

SPT 3

Plaintiffs acknowledged at oral argument that they are not pursuing a claim against Danto

based upon any allegation that in exchange for a favorable deal for her client, Bowers, she violated

Walker's civil rights by conspiring with Schon to keep the deal she made on behalf of Bowers silent

or by presenting testimony from Dunbar about Walker's character that the prosecution could not

otherwise have offered. Plaintiffs are only pursuing the claim that Danto agreed to put on perjured

testimony from Dunbar.

In January of 2005 Dunbar testified that she does not recall what was fact or fiction from her

prior testimony, but that she was willing to do anything to get out of custody and had assumed

Schon was helping her out. 

II. ANALYSIS

The issue presented by defendant Danto's motion for summary judgment is "whether or not

[Danto] violated [Walker's] constitutional right to due process by conspiring with the prosecutor

during trial to suborn perjury from [Dunbar]."1

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show that there is

"no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving

party. Id. In a motion for summary judgment, the court draws all reasonable inferences that may be

taken from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DANTO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—No. C-04-02211 RMW

SPT 4

B. Under Color of State Law

Defendant Danto argues that summary judgment is warranted because there is no evidence

that she acted under color of state law. Public defenders are deemed private actors for purposes of

§ 1983 claims. A § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate that the private individual acted under color of

state law. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). "'In the typical case

raising a state-action issue, a private party has taken the decisive step that caused the harm to the

plaintiff, and the question is whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive

conduct as state action. This may occur . . . sometimes if [the State] knowingly accepts the benefits

derived from unconstitutional behavior.'" Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988)). 

A private individual's actions may amount to state action based on "joint action" with a state

actor. Id. at 445. Under the joint action test, "courts examine whether state officials and private

parties have acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights." Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "A plaintiff may demonstrate joint action by

proving the existence of a conspiracy or by showing that the private party was a willful participant

in joint action with the State or its agents." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To

be liable as a co-conspirator, Danto "need not [have known] the exact details of the plan," but must

"[have shared] the common objective of violating Walker's constitutional rights." Id. However,

plaintiffs must demonstrate "a substantial degree of cooperation" in order to establish that Danto, as

a private actor, engaged in state action. Id. 

Plaintiffs argue that Danto and Schon conspired to violate Walker's constitutional rights by

knowingly allowing Dunbar to testify falsely at trial. In support, plaintiffs point to: (1) Danto's

testimony that she knew Bowers' testimony alone was insufficient to convict Walker under

California law; (2) Danto's testimony that, prior to trial, she sent a written letter to Schon indicating

that Bowers' testimony alone was insufficient to secure a conviction against Walker; (3) Danto's

testimony that, shortly after trial commenced, she entered into a plea deal for a reduced sentence and

charge for Bowers and kept it a secret for some time from Walker and the court; (4) Schon's

testimony that, shortly after trial commenced, Schon entered into the secret plea deal for Bowers and

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DANTO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—No. C-04-02211 RMW

SPT 5

also kept it secret; and (5) Dunbar testified against Walker at trial and Danto solicited evidence of

Walker's character from Dunbar. Plaintiffs argue that Dunbar's testimony was necessary to

corroborate Bowers' testimony to support the state's case against Walker, but that Danto's crossexamination of Dunbar was legally and logically unnecessary for Bowers' defense since he already

had a guaranteed plea deal. 

The record is sufficient to establish a material issue of fact as to whether Danto acted under

color of state law when she cross-examined Dunbar, if evidence exists from which it could

reasonably be inferred that Danto knew she was presenting false testimony.

C. False Testimony

Plaintiffs allege that the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that Schon and

Danto conspired to violate Walker's constitutional rights by knowingly soliciting Dunbar's perjured

testimony. Danto submits that no such inference can be drawn. Danto argues that Dunbar has not

admitted she lied during her trial testimony. At most, Dunbar has no recollection whether she was

telling the truth or not during her testimony because her recollection is impaired by her heavy abuse

of drugs and alcohol. There is, however, some evidence that Dunbar's testimony at trial was in part,

false. For example, Dunbar has admitted that her practice at the time was not necessarily to be

truthful: "I don't remember if any of it was true." Harris Aff., Ex. G at 67:23. 

Second, Danto submits that even assuming Dunbar committed perjury, there is no evidence

that Danto knew the testimony was false. Here, plaintiffs must show that (1) the testimony (or

evidence) was actually false, (2) Danto knew or should have known that the testimony was actually

false, and (3) that the false testimony was material. See United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886,

889 (9th Cir. 2003). The evidence shows that the first time Danto ever met Dunbar was during

Dunbar's testimony at the preliminary hearing on August 5, 1991. Although she typically personally

interviews key witnesses like Dunbar, Danto does not recall that she interviewed Dunbar prior to

trial. Further, although she usually has her own investigator speak with the witnesses, her

investigator was unable to locate Dunbar so she relied only on the transcript of the July 23, 1991

interview of Dunbar conducted by Schon and sheriff deputy Gerald Egge and the preliminary

hearing testimony. Danto denies that she knew whether Dunbar lied during her testimony or

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DANTO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—No. C-04-02211 RMW

SPT 6

otherwise had any agreement with Schon to testify falsely. Schon similarly denies that he told

Dunbar to testify falsely or that he knew that she was providing false testimony. Finally, Danto

points out that parts of Dunbar's testimony were factually consistent with evidence obtained by the

police and prosecution through other sources. 

In opposition, plaintiffs argue that (1) Schon arranged for Dunbar to be released on her own

recognizance on her unrelated drug charges following her preliminary hearing testimony, (2) Dunbar

was a drug addict desperate to be released from custody to get her next hit and easily manipulated,

and (3) Schon essentially told Dunbar what to say in her testimony. However, even if these facts

support an inference that Schon knew parts of Dunbar's testimony were a product of his purported

manipulation of her during his pretrial interview of her, these facts do not support an inference that

Danto knew any part of Dunbar's testimony was false. Although the evidence does show that Danto

did not interview and investigate Dunbar as she usually would do of such a witness, the fact that

Danto did not do so does not give rise to an inference that Danto knew that Dunbar was intending to

or did give false testimony. 

III. ORDER

 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Danto's motion for summary judgment with

respect to plaintiffs' claim that Danto conspired with the prosecution to suborn perjury which is the

only claim plaintiffs are pursuing in this action. 

DATED: 3/19/07

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT DANTO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT—No. C-04-02211 RMW

SPT 7

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff(s):

Matthew D. Davis mdavis@walkuplawoffice.com 

Erik T. Atkisson eatkisson@reedsmith.com 

Richard H. Schoenberger rschoenberger@walkuplawoffice.com 

Counsel for Defendant(s):

Aryn Paige Harris aryn_harris@cco.co.scl.ca.us 

Gregory J. Sebastinelli gregory.sebastinelli@cco.co.scl.ca.us 

My-Le Jacqueline Duong Jacqueline.duong@cco.sccgov.org 

Winifred Botha winifred_botha@mail.cco.co.santa-clara.ca.us 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 3/19/07 SPT

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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