Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02259/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02259-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 Upon screening, the Court dismissed ten Defendants (Doc. #11). Two other

Defendants—Wilber and Smith—were dismissed voluntarily and on summary judgment

respectively (Doc. #97). And McVicker, Ireland, and Sabbah were dismissed for failure to

serve (Doc. #100). 

JDN

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rex Jeffrey Walls, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-2259-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Plaintiff Rex Jeffrey Walls brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against various officials from the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC): ADC Director

Schriro; Sr. Chaplains Henderson and Becker; Chaplains Mason and Powers; Deputy Warden

Kimble; and Correctional Officers (CO) Curran, Beginski, and Sauceda (Doc. #7).1

 Before

the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. #189, 194, 197). 

The Court will grant summary judgment for Plaintiff on one claim under the Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (RLUIPA), and issue

a permanent injunction allowing Plaintiff to wear his religious hairstyle. Summary judgment

will be granted against Plaintiff on all other claims.

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2

 The Court dismissed those claims in Count II that concerned the possession of

certain religious items because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies (Doc. #42).

The claim within Count II regarding the religious hairstyle was reinstated by the Court (Doc.

#97).

3

 This injunctive relief remains in effect pending the relief granted in this Order (Docs.

#97, 125).

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I. Background

A. First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s action concerns his religious exercise rights as a member of the Hare

Krishna faith. In Count I of his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was

denied a proper religious diet (Doc. #7 at 4). He asserted that his meals must be handled only

by Hare Krishna devotees (id.). Count II alleged that Defendants denied Plaintiff a religious

hairstyle in accordance with the Hare Krishna faith (id. at 5).2

 The Court granted Plaintiff’s

subsequent request for a preliminary injunction permitting him to wear the religious hairstyle

called a sikha—a shaved head except for a lock of hair at the base of the skull (Doc. #97).3

And in Count III, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants denied him religious services and

visitations (Doc. #7 at 6). In each count, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants’ actions violated

(1) his RLUIPA rights, (2) his First Amendment free exercise rights, and (3) his Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection rights (see Doc. #11). 

B. Defendants’ First Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the RLUIPA claims within each count

(Doc. #158). The Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part; the RLUIPA claim

in Count III was dismissed, as well as the RLUIPA claims for damages within Counts I and

II on qualified immunity grounds (Doc. #185). The remaining claims were the First and

Fourteenth Amendment claims within all three counts and the RLUIPA claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief in Counts I and II (id.). 

After Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, new Ninth Circuit case

law was issued relevant to Plaintiff’s claims and the applicable evidentiary standards.

Therefore, the Court set a new dispositive-motions deadline (id. at 23). Each party filed a

summary judgment motion.

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4

 In a footnote, Defendants state that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied because he

failed to submit supporting documents or affidavits with his motion as required under the

Local Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. #197 at 3 n. 4). But in his motion (and in his

opposition to Defendants’ motion), Plaintiff incorporates evidence already on the record (see

Doc.#189, 203). Nonetheless, despite any procedural deficiencies, the Court will consider

Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.

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C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff argues that under Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 998-1000 (9th Cir.

2005), he is entitled to summary judgment on his religious diet claim (Count I) and his

religious hairstyle claim (Count II) (Doc. #189). Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence

that a Hare Krishna diet would affect prison security and discipline or upset institutional

operation and costs (id. at 2). He further contends that despite wearing his Hare Krishna

hairstyle for over a year, there is no evidence that he has been threatened or in any danger,

including when he was temporarily confined at the Maricopa County Jail where known gang

members are housed (id. at 1-2). Plaintiff states that gang activity is not a factor in his

current housing unit, and he notes that Defendants have already exempted an Orthodox

Jewish inmate from the grooming policy (id. at 2). 

Defendants respond and cross-move for summary judgment on Count II (Doc. #197).4

They argue that because Plaintiff has failed to establish or even allege that he has a sincerely

held belief that a sikha hairstyle is necessary for him to exercise his Hare Krishna faith, he

has failed to state a claim under the First Amendment (id.). They point out that Plaintiff did

not have the sikha during his incarceration from 1999 through early 2006 yet he was able to

exercise his religion (id. at 3). 

As to the RLUIPA claim in Count II, Defendants argue that there is no evidence that

a sikha hairstyle is mandated by Plaintiff’s religious beliefs; thus, denial of the hairstyle is

not a substantial burden under RLUIPA (id. at 4-5). They contend that under Ninth Circuit

precedent, the RLUIPA analysis requires that the courts consider whether particular religious

conduct is mandated (id. at 4). Defendants further argue that Plaintiff presents no argument

or evidence that would support summary judgment on Counts I and II (id. at 5). 

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Apparently, Plaintiff has communicated with Linderman, the ADC Administrator of

Pastoral Activities, about this religious services/visitation issue (Doc. #200 at 3).

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In his reply, Plaintiff asserts that he is still receiving a diet that violates his religious

dietary laws (Doc. #200). He also disputes that he ever declared himself Catholic or any

other religion besides Hare Krishna (id. at 3-4). Finally, he requests that the Court dismiss

Count III—the religious services claim—because he is “having trouble in getting visits” (id.

at 3).5

D. Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants move for summary judgment on the remaining claims in Count I (First

Amendment claim, Fourteenth Amendment claim, and RLUIPA claim for declaratory and

injunctive relief) and Count III (First Amendment claim and Fourteenth Amendment claim)

(Doc. #194). 

Defendants argue on Count I that Plaintiff’s inconsistent claims concerning both his

religious affiliation and his religious diet requests suggest that his Hare Krishna beliefs are

neither authentic nor truly held (Doc. #194 at 16-18). They further argue that even if an

authentic religious request was at issue, the diet provided to Plaintiff does not pose a

substantial burden on his free exercise of religion (id. at 17). Finally, Defendants contend

that, assuming there is a substantial burden, there is a compelling governmental interest under

RLUIPA not to serve Plaintiff the individualized meal he requests; namely, insufficient

resources and security concerns (id. at 18-20). 

With regard to the First Amendment claim in Count I, Defendants submit that (1)

there is a logical connection between the regulation and the legitimate governmental interest,

(2) Plaintiff has alterative means to practice his religion, (3) the accommodation would have

a significant adverse impact on others and prison resources, and (4) no alternatives exist (id.

at 21-23). 

And as to the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff has not shown that any other inmate or small group of inmates receive customized

religious meals; thus, his discrimination claim fails (id. at 24). 

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6

 To the extent that Plaintiff moves for sanctions (Doc. #203 at 8), his request is

denied.

7

 In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff referred to his religion as “Hare

Krishna/Hindu” (Doc. #7 at 4).

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On Count III, Defendants maintain that for a colorable First Amendment claim, there

must be a policy or practice that affects Plaintiff’s religious exercise (id. at 24). They argue

that there is no such policy; rather, ADC policy provides for religious visitations and prison

officials took many steps to accommodate a religious visit requested by Plaintiff (id.). 

In response to the Count I arguments, Plaintiff disputes whether Defendants’ claims

regarding the additional personnel and security needed to bring in outside food are accurate;

he asserts that no x-rays or drug-sniffing dogs are used to inspect the food coming in from

the current contracted provider (Doc. #203). Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ assertion

that the Temple preparing a Hare Krishna diet could place drugs or contraband within the

meals is unreasonable and libelous (id. at 7). He argues that such a defamatory assertion by

defense counsel is both disrespectful and unprofessional, and he asks that the Court sanction

counsel (id. at 8).6

 And with respect to his inconsistent diet requests, Plaintiff clarifies that

after filing this suit, he learned of the kosher vegetarian diet and believes that this diet—with

a few items removed—would meet his religious needs. He states that he therefore tried to

work out a compromise with Defendants and counsel to resolve the diet issue (id. at 9). 

Although Defendants did not address Count II in their summary judgment motion,

Plaintiff argues that he has a sincerely held belief in the Hare Krishna faith and the sikha

hairstyle (Doc. #203 at 2-3). He explains that up until 2006, he practiced his faith without

the sikha because he was not preparing to be a monk but now he apparently is and that

preparation calls for a celibate student life and a sikha hairstyle as a sign of renunciation and

surrender (id. at 2, 5). He also states that Hindu and Hare Krishna are “one of the same,”7

but regardless, even if he was previously a different religion, he now holds a sincere belief

in the Hare Krishna faith and makes his religious requests pursuant to his beliefs (id. 5). 

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Plaintiff explains that he did not respond to Defendants’ arguments pertaining to

Count III because he seeks to dismiss that count (id. at 8). 

Defendants did not file a reply memorandum.

II. Voluntary Dismissal

Plaintiff seeks to voluntarily dismiss Count III of his Amended Complaint (Doc. #200

at 3-4). Defendants do not object to this request. Count III will therefore be dismissed in its

entirety with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), as the parties

have litigated this claim on the merits before Plaintiff elected to dismiss it. 

Consequently, the summary judgment analysis will address only the claims in Counts

I and II.

III. Legal Standards 

A. Summary Judgment

A court must grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under summary judgment

practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion

and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, that it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323;

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 

If the moving party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden

then shifts to the opposing party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue

for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995);

see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Conclusory allegations,

unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposing party must, by

affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts that show there is a

genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. The

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opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is

sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). 

In assessing whether a party has met its burden, the court views the evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052,

1056 (9th Cir. 1995). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmovant.

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002). On cross-motions for

summary judgment, the court must consider each motion separately to determine whether

either party has met its burden with the facts construed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Fair Hous. Council of Riverside County, Inc. v.

Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). 

B. RLUIPA

RLUIPA provides in relevant part that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial

burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . , even

if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the government establishes

that the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and does so by the “least

restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)(2). The Ninth Circuit has stated that a

substantial burden is one that is “‘oppressive’ to a ‘significantly great’ extent. That is, a

‘substantial burden’ on ‘religious exercise’ must impose a significantly great restriction or

onus upon such exercise.” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995 (citation omitted). The burden need

not concern a religious practice that is compelled by, or central to, a system of religious

belief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). But the burden must be more than an inconvenience;

it must prevent the plaintiff “from engaging in [religious] conduct or having a religious

experience.” Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service, 479 F.3d 1024, 1042 (9th Cir.

2007) (internal citations omitted).

Under RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie

claim that the challenged state action constitutes a “substantial burden” on his “religious

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exercise.” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994; see also Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1033. Once the

plaintiff establishes a substantial burden, the defendants must prove that the burden both

furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving

that interest. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995. RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor of

the inmate. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). At the same time, RLUIPA is to be applied with

due deference to prison officials and their need to maintain order and security. Cutter v.

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005). Any accommodation “must be measured so that it

does not override other significant interests.” Id. at 722.

C. First Amendment 

The First Amendment provides that the government shall not prohibit the free exercise

of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I. This right applies to prisoners, who must be afforded

reasonable opportunities to exercise their religious freedom. Cruz. v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,

322 n. 2 (1972). For example, prisoners have a right to be provided with food sufficient to

sustain them in good health and that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion. See McElyea

v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). But free exercise rights are limited

due to the fact of incarceration and for security reasons. Id. at 197. Thus, the penological

interest in a simplified food service has been held sufficient to allow a prison to provide

Orthodox Jewish inmates with a pork-free diet instead of a completely kosher diet. See Ward

v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877-79 (9th Cir. 1993). 

To show a violation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a

prison regulation that impinges on his religious exercise is not reasonably related to a

legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). That

demonstration requires consideration of the four Turner factors: (1) whether there is a “valid

rational connection” between the regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put

forward to justify it; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the right remain open to the

prisoner; (3) the impact the accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards, other

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 inmates, and the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) whether there are ready

alternatives. Id. at 89-90. The absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the

reasonableness of a prison regulation. Id. at 90.

D. Fourteenth Amendment 

The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all

similarly situated people equally and entitles each prisoner to “a reasonable opportunity of

pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to

conventional religious precepts.” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008)

(internal citation omitted). To show a violation under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that the defendant acted with a discriminatory intent or purpose that was

based upon the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d

1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). He “‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue’ as to whether he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith as compared

to prisoners of other faiths” and that “officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory

manner.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds

by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. Taking from the Turner test set forth above, the Court must

consider whether “the difference between the defendants’ treatment of [Plaintiff] and their

treatment of [other] inmates is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”

Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891 (citing DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 61 (3rd Cir. 2000)).

IV. Count I—Religious Diet 

A. RLUIPA Claim

1. Parties’ Contentions

Defendants assert that the lacto-vegetarian diet provided to Plaintiff has not changed

since 1999; thus, there is no evidence that this diet—which did not burden Plaintiff’s

religious exercise for years—substantially burdens his religious exercise now (Doc. #194 at

18). They argue that even assuming that there now exists a substantial burden, the lactovegetarian diet is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest

given the cost of providing the customized diet Plaintiff requests (id.). 

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In support, Defendants proffer the declaration of Malinda L. Strom, the Contracts

Monitor for the ADC Commissary/Food Division (Doc. #195, Ex. B, Strom Decl. ¶ 1).

Strom avers that regular and lacto-vegetarian meals cost $1.34 per inmate and kosher meals

cost $2.26 per inmate (id. ¶¶ 4-5). To compare these prices to the price of the meals Plaintiff

requests, Defendants submit the declaration of Sharon Cooksey, President of the Tucson

Temple for the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), which is the

Temple Plaintiff identifies and the only in-state facility that can provide customized meals

according to Hare Krishna diet requirements (id., Ex. N, Cooksey Decl. ¶ 3). According to

Cooksey, the restaurant at the Temple would be able to prepare lunch and dinner meals for

the prison at a cost of $6.00 per meal, not including a beverage (id. ¶ 7). Cooksey states that

the restaurant does not have the ability to deliver meals; they would have to be picked up by

ADC on a weekly basis (id. ¶ 9). 

In addition to the added meal costs, Defendants contend that ADC policy does not

permit inmates to purchase food from outside sources due to security concerns (Doc. #194

at 20). Starlet Whitney, the Chief of Security at Eyman Complex, avers that there is a risk

that outside food may be shipped with contraband or drugs (Doc. #195, Ex. O, Whitney Decl.

¶¶ 3-6). She explains that this risk increases when the outside food is shipped for receipt by

a specific inmate; it would require that each meal be individually inspected by use of x-rays

and drug-sniffing dogs (id. ¶¶ 7-8, 10(a)). Whitney explains that this same risk does not arise

with the current ADC food-vendor meals because those meals are delivered sealed and are

not provided to a specific inmate (id. ¶ 8). And she notes that any outside food delivery

would require additional personnel to transport and inspect the meals (id. ¶ 9). This would

subject ADC to additional costs for employees, gas, and a vehicle equipped with a

freezer/refrigerator unit to make the 130-mile round trip between the Eyman Complex and

the ISKCON Temple every week (id. ¶ 10(a-b)). 

Lastly, Defendants submit that short of expending these considerable resources, there

exists no less restrictive means for accommodating Plaintiff’s religious meal request (Doc.

#194 at 21). They conclude that these financial and administrative burdens, along with the

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security concerns, evince a compelling state interest in not providing the specialized Hare

Krishna meal plan.

Plaintiff rejects Defendants’ claims that additional personnel and security would be

necessary or that there is a risk of contraband in the meals prepared by the Temple (Doc.

#203). He suggests that the current food vendor, Canteen Corporation, could deliver his

meals because they work with an ADC facility near Tucson (id. at 7). Plaintiff also argues

that Whitney’s declaration fails to address how the overall prison inmate population would

be affected (id. at 8). And he contends that Defendants do not address “the issue of the

forbid[d]en food of onions, garlic, vinegar salad dressing, caffeine” that are included in the

lacto-vegetarian diet (Doc. #200 at 3). 

2. Analysis

a. Substantial Burden

Plaintiff bears the initial burden of producing evidence to demonstrate a prima

facie claim that Defendants’ refusal to provide him with meals that are prepared according

to the Hare Krishna dietary laws amounts to a substantial burden on his religious exercise.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). 

As Defendants point out, Plaintiff’s recent claim that the lacto-vegetarian diet burdens

his religious practice appears insincere given his acceptance of that diet from 1999 until the

events giving rise to this suit in 2005. But in his opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff

indicates that he is becoming more serious in his religious studies and training as a monk

(Doc. #203 at 2, 5). More serious religious studies can enlighten a follower to certain

religious practices that he may have previously been unfamiliar with. 

Regardless, the Court already found that (1) Plaintiff demonstrated a sincere belief

that eating food prepared by a member of his religion is consistent with his faith and (2) that

the current lacto-vegetarian diet included food items that violate Plaintiff’s religious dietary

laws (Doc. #185 at 9). Requiring Plaintiff to eat food that is prohibited by his religion’s 

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8

 For comparison purposes, this analysis applies the price of the more expensive prison

meal provided to inmates (see Doc. #195, Ex. B, Strom Decl. ¶ 4 (regular meal price is $1.34

and kosher meal price is $2.26)).

9

Defendants note that Plaintiff, who is 42 years old, is serving a sentence set to expire

in 2092 (Doc. #194 at 20). 

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dietary regimen may constitute a substantial burden on his religious practice. See Ward, 1

F.3d at 878-79. Defendants present nothing that causes the Court to alter its prior

determination that there is a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religious exercise.

 b. Compelling Governmental Interest/Least Restrictive Means

The burden shifts to Defendants to show that the current provision of the lactovegetarian diet is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.

When applying this compelling governmental interest standard, “context matters.” Cutter,

544 U.S. at 723. Here, context includes consideration of (1) the available resources and (2)

the regulations and procedures necessary to facilitate feeding large numbers of prisoners

while maintaining security and discipline. See id. 

Defendants’ evidence includes declarations from the ADC Food Division Contracts

Manager and the President of the ISKCON Temple that show a substantial cost difference

between the meals currently provided to prisoners and the meals that Plaintiff desires (Doc.

#195, Ex. B, Strom Decl.; Ex. N, Cooksey Decl.). The difference—$2.26 versus $6.00 per

meal8

—would amount to $2,730 added cost per year and over $100,000 added cost for the

next 40 years (Doc. #194 at 20).9

 This does not even include the accompanying expenses for

gas, transportation, delivery, inspection, and extra personnel for these duties (Doc. #195, Ex.

N, Cooksey Decl. ¶ 9; Ex. O, Whitney Decl. ¶¶ 8-10(a-b)). And the Court cannot discount

the security concerns raised by a single prisoner receiving individually prepared meals from

an outside source 65 miles from his prison facility. While there is a risk of contraband being

added to these meals during preparation, the risk is greater during delivery, arrival, and

storage at the prison. As explained by Whitney, all other meals provided to prisoners arrive

sealed and are distributed among 5 different prison units (id., Whitney Decl. ¶¶ 7-8). 

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Religious accommodations should not override a prison’s significant interests in

maintaining order and security consistent with the available resources. See Cutter, 544 U.S.

at 722. If an inmate’s request for an accommodation is excessive or jeopardizes the effective

functioning of the prison, the accommodation need not be met. Id. at 726. The evidence

demonstrates that there would be significant financial, administrative, and security effects

on the prison if it were required to provide Plaintiff specially prepared Hare Krishna meals

from the ISKCON Temple. Thus, Defendants have met their burden to set forth specific

facts and evidence showing that in this case, providing Plaintiff with customized religious

meals would adversely impact prison operations. See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 1000 (“prison

officials must set forth detailed evidence, tailored to the situation, . . . that identifies the

failings in the alternatives advanced by the prisoner”) (citation omitted). Further, because

Plaintiff specifically seeks a diet prepared by Hare Krishna devotees, which encompasses the

associated costs, there is no less restrictive means available to meet his request for a special

diet. 

Plaintiff’s assertions that there would be no added costs or security concerns are not

supported by any specific facts or evidence. As such, Plaintiff’s request for summary

judgment on this claim will be denied. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual

material, are also insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). When construing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, he fails to

show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Summary judgment

will be granted to Defendants on the RLUIPA claim for declaratory and injunctive relief in

Count I.

B. First Amendment Claim

As stated, to prevail on his First Amendment free exercise claim Plaintiff must show

that Defendants’ meal policy, which does not provide specialized Hare Krishna meals, is not

reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The Court

has found that Defendants’ denial of customized Hare Krishna meals serves a compelling

governmental interest and that there is no less restrictive means of accommodating Plaintiff’s

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request. Because Defendants have satisfied the more stringent test under RLUIPA, they are

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim within Count I. 

C. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

To succeed in his equal protection claim, Plaintiff must show that officials

intentionally acted in a discriminatory manner; he must set forth specific facts showing there

is genuine issue whether Defendants denied him a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith

as compared to other prisoners and that Defendants’ conduct was intentional. Freeman, 125

F.3d at 737. Conclusory allegations by themselves do not establish an equal protection

violation without further proof of invidious discriminatory intent. See Village of Arlington

Heights v. Metropolitan Hous Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not shown (1) what religious group is receiving

different treatment, (2) that any other single prisoner or groups of prisoners receive

customized religious meals, or (3) that the denial of a Hare Krishna customized meal plan

is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests (Doc. #194 at 23-24). 

Although Plaintiff specifically refers to an Orthodox Jewish inmate who is treated

differently with respect to the prison grooming policy (Doc. #189 at 2), nowhere in his

summary judgment briefing does he mention that another prisoner or religious group is

treated differently concerning religious meals (see Docs. #189, 200, 203). The only reference

to another religious group is in his First Amended Complaint where he alleged that he was

given a lacto-vegetarian Sikhs’ diet, rather than a diet tailored to the Hare Krishna faith (Doc.

#7 at 4-5). 

Defendants’ evidence includes excerpts from the ADC Diet Reference Manual, which

describes the religious diets available to prisoners (Doc. #195, Ex. F at 34). None of the

these diets are religion specific (id.). Thus, there is no separate diet prepared specifically for

Sikhs or any other religion. Defendants demonstrate that there are approximately 57

different religious affiliations represented in the prison system (id., Ex. A, Linderman Decl.

¶ 17). Given the number of different religions, customized meals for individual religious

groups are not feasible (id.). As a result, religious diet requests are generally limited to those

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set out in the Diet Reference Manual (Ex. F at 14 (“[o]nly the approved list of religious diet

menus will be assigned unless otherwise approved by the Director of Pastoral Services”)).

In addition, Defendants have shown that there are compelling reasons for denying

Plaintiff a customized Hare Krishna diet. Plaintiff cannot succeed on this claim because any

difference between Defendants’ treatment of him and their treatment of Sikhs (or another

religious group) is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Shakur, 514 F.3d

at 891 (internal citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that Sikhs are provided customized diets and he is

not is insufficient to establish an equal protection violation. He submits no other specific

facts or evidence that suggests discriminatory intent on the part of Defendants. As such, the

Court will grant summary judgment to Defendants on the equal protection claim in Count I.

In light of the Court’s determination that Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on the RLUIPA claim, the First Amendment claim, and the Fourteenth Amendment

claim in Count I, Defendants’ motion will be granted on Count I, and Plaintiff’s motion will

be denied on this count.

V. Count II—Religious Hair Style

A. RLUIPA Claim

Defendants argue that there is no evidence that the sikha hairstyle is “conduct

mandated by religious belief” (Doc. #197 at 4). They point to Plaintiff’s previous

contentions that the hairstyle may be worn “whenever practical,” which demonstrates that

it is not mandatory (id.). And because it is not mandated conduct, the denial of this hairstyle

does not rise to a substantial burden (id. at 5). Defendants acknowledge that in Shakur, the

Ninth Circuit found that a First Amendment claim need not examine whether conduct is

mandated; however, they contend that this requirement has not been removed from the

RLUIPA analysis.

In fact, the Ninth Circuit has found that “conduct mandated by religious belief” is

defined within the statute by the term “religious exercise,” and that definition is “any exercise

of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Alvarez

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v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-5(7)(A)). Plaintiff explains that he is moving towards training as a monk and

wearing the sikha is an important sign of renunciation and “surrender to Krishna” (Doc. #203

at 2, 5). Thus, even though the sikha hairstyle may not be required by the Hare Krishna faith,

it does constitute an exercise of religion within Plaintiff’s system of religious belief. The

Court finds that wearing the sikha is “religious exercise” as defined by RLUIPA. 

A grooming policy that either requires a prisoner to abandon his religious beliefs by

cutting his hair or puts significant pressure on him to do so, imposes a substantial burden on

religious practice. See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994, 996. Therefore, Plaintiff has met his

burden of showing that Defendants’ grooming policy prohibiting his religious hairstyle is a

substantial burden on his religious exercise. The burden shifts to Defendants to prove that

the imposition of the substantial burden furthers a compelling interest by the least restrictive

means. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). 

Defendants do not present any argument going to whether there exists a compelling

governmental interest. As a result, they fail to meet their burden and their cross-motion for

summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim in Count II will be denied.

In his attempt to show that there exists no material fact that Defendants’ grooming

policy violates his rights under RLUIPA, Plaintiff relies on the Ninth Circuit decision in

Warsoldier. The Native American prisoner-plaintiff in Warsoldier sought to maintain his

long hair in keeping with his Cahuilla tribe’s cultural and religious tenets. 418 F.3d at 991-

92. The circuit court held that although prison security was a compelling governmental

interest, the California Department of Corrections’ grooming policy was not the least

restrictive means necessary to ensure prison security and that the plaintiff was likely to

prevail on the merits of his RLIUPA claim. Id. at 998, 1002. 

In his motion, Plaintiff argues that there is no proof of safety or security problems

related to his religious hairstyle (Doc. #189 at 1). He states that he has worn the sikha since

October 2006, and has not been threatened by other inmates or subject to dangerous

conditions (id. at 1-2). In response to earlier claims by Defendants that Plaintiff’s hairstyle

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would make him a target for gang members, Plaintiff asserts that gang activity is not an issue

in his housing unit. He also states that he was housed in the county jail during June 2007,

and despite his hairstyle and the known gang activity in the jails, he did not experience any

problems (id. at 1). Finally, Plaintiff recites the ADC grooming policy in his opposition to

Defendants’ motion; it reflects that a variety of hairstyles are allowed (Doc. #203 at 4-5).

As stated, Defendants did not raise a compelling governmental interest or least

restrictive means argument, and they did not respond to Plaintiff’s claims that his hairstyle

did not present a security concern (see Doc. #197). On this record, Plaintiff has met his

burden to show no material fact that the grooming policy prohibiting his religious hairstyle

substantially burdens his religious exercise, that there are no compelling interests that justify

the prohibition, and that there are no less restrictive alternatives. The Court will grant

Plaintiff summary judgment on his RLUIPA claim for declaratory and injunctive relief in

Count II. The injunction issued on October 5, 2006, will be made permanent.

B. First Amendment Claim

1. Sincere Belief

As stated, to establish a First Amendment free exercise violation, Plaintiff must show

that the religious practice at issue satisfies two criteria: (1) the “proffered belief must be

sincerely held” and (2) “the claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in ‘purely secular’

philosophical concerns.” Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal

citations omitted); Shakur, 514 F.3d at 885.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to establish that he has a sincerely held belief that

a sikha hairstyle is consistent with his faith (Doc. #197 at 2). See Malik, 16 F.3d at 333.

They point out that Plaintiff successfully exercised his religion for years without this

religious hairstyle (id. at 3). Thus, they maintain that because he has not specifically stated

that he believes a sikha is “necessary for him to practice his religion,” he does not meet the

threshold burden for a free exercise claim (id. at 3-4). 

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As mentioned above, Plaintiff indicates his present desire to enter into Hare Krishna

monkhood, which calls for more intense religious practice, and he explains the purpose of

wearing a sikha (Doc. #203 at 2, 5). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that “‘[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question

the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’

interpretations of those creeds.’” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884 (quoting Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490

U.S. 680, 699 (1989)). Instead, a court must apply a subjective or “sincerity test”—if the

prisoner has a “sincerely held” belief that is consistent with his faith and “rooted in religious

belief,” the Free Exercise Clause is implicated. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85 (internal citations

omitted). The constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion “is not limited to beliefs

which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of

Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).

The Court previously found that Plaintiff met his burden to show that the policy

forbidding him to wear a religious hairstyle was a substantial burden on his free exercise

rights (Doc. #97 at 9). Nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff’s beliefs have changed

or are not “sincerely held.” The fact that Plaintiff did not wear the hairstyle for years does

not undermine his claim that his present belief in its importance is sincere; he was forbidden

from wearing the sikha for those years, and when he did try to wear it in 2006, he was forced

to shave it off after two months (Doc. #197 at 3). The Court again finds that Plaintiff has a

sincere belief that he should wear a sikha; therefore, Defendants’ grooming policy

prohibiting it implicates the First Amendment.

2. Turner Factors

Next, the Court must apply the four Turner factors to determine whether there is a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s claim. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 885.

The first factor looks at whether there is a legitimate penological interest that is rationally

related to the grooming policy. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. Plaintiff argues that his

experience wearing the sikha for the past 18 months—namely, no threats or danger from

gangs or any other inmates—demonstrates that there is no security or safety reason for the

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prohibition of the sikha (Doc. #189). He also argues that there is no evidence that wearing

his hairstyle has prompted any other requests for religious hairstyles or encouraged any

lawsuits about religious hairstyles (id. at 1-2). Defendants do not rebut these arguments nor

do they present a legitimate penological interest supporting the grooming policy (see Doc.

#197 at 2-4). Thus, the first factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. 

The second factor concerns whether there are alternative ways for Plaintiff to exercise

the right on which the policy impinges. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Plaintiff implies that the

purposes of wearing the sikha—to show renunciation and surrender to Krishna and for

cleanliness and simplicity—are unique compared to other types of religious practice (Doc.

#203 at 5). Defendants proffer no potential alternative for Plaintiff to exercise this right. The

second factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.

In failing to rebut Plaintiff’s assertions about the lack of security problems or any

other hairstyle requests or lawsuits, there is no evidence that allowing the sikha would

adversely impact guards, other inmates, or prison resources. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.

Consequently, the third Turner factors weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. 

The final factor looks at whether there are ready alternatives to Defendants’ current

grooming policy. Id. Plaintiff sets forth the current ADC grooming policy, which provides

for a variety of hairstyles and head gear to be worn be by prisoners (Doc. #203 at 4-5). The

policy is not so strict that a sikha hairstyle could not be an alternative. Plaintiff also argues,

and Defendants do not dispute, that another inmate has been granted an exemption from the

policy; therefore, alternatives to the policy appear to exist. On this record, the fourth factor

also weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. 

For the purposes of Defendants’ cross-motion (Doc. #197), construing the allegations

in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ policy prohibiting the sikha

hairstyle violates Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 

3. Qualified Immunity

But this determination does not end the inquiry on the First Amendment claim. In

both their Answer and their first Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants raise the

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affirmative defense of qualified immunity (Docs. #32, 158). Qualified immunity should be

addressed as early as possible in litigation. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). The

Court will therefore examine the issue of qualified immunity as applied to Plaintiff’s free

exercise claim in Count II. See Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 845-46 n.

23 (9th Cir. 2003) (addressing qualified immunity issue sua sponte because the defendants

asserted the defense in their answer), abrogated on other grounds by U.S. v. Lopez, 482 F.3d

1067 (9th Cir. 2007); Sonoda v. Cabrera, 255 F.3d 1035, 1040 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001)

(reviewing a district court’s sua sponte grant of qualified immunity where the defendants

raised a qualified immunity defense in their answer). 

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity from damages for

civil liability if his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982). In a qualified immunity analysis, the court must make two distinct inquires, the

“constitutional inquiry” and the “qualified immunity inquiry.” See Estate of Ford v.

Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002). The “constitutional inquiry” asks

whether, when taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the facts alleged

show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201 (2001). If so, a court turns to the “qualified immunity inquiry” and asks if the right

was clearly established at the relevant time. Id. at 201-02. This second inquiry “must be

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”

Id. at 201.

As discussed supra, the Court has determined that the disputed facts, viewed in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, create a triable issue of fact regarding whether Defendants

violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights in Count II. The second step of the Saucier

analysis looks at whether the right to a sikha religious hairstyle was clearly established

statutory law. A right is clearly established if its contours are “sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Kennedy v.

City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

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730, 739 (2002)). It is not necessary that there be a prior case with the identical facts

showing that a right is clearly established; it is enough that there is preexisting law that

provides a defendant “fair warning” that his conduct was unlawful. Kennedy, 439 F.3d at

1065. 

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in July 2005 (Doc. #1). The year before, the Ninth

Circuit upheld a California prison grooming policy against a First Amendment challenge; the

policy prohibited male inmates from wearing long hair and made no religious exceptions.

Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 711, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2004). This decision was

consistent with other circuit court holdings at the time. Taylor v. Johnson, 257 F.3d 470,

472-73 (5th Cir. 2001) (failure to make a religious exception to the prison grooming policy

did not violate inmate’s free exercise rights); Hines v. South Carolina Dep’t of Corrs., 148

F.3d 353, 357-59 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that prison grooming policy did not violate First

Amendment free exercise clause despite the claimed incidental effect on some inmates’

religious practice). In 2001, the Sixth Circuit found that a prisoner’s First Amendment right

to wear a Hasidic Jewish hairstyle was not sufficiently clear; thus, prison officials were

granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d

475, 483 (6th Cir. 2001). Little other precedent, particularly within the Ninth Circuit, was

available during the relevant time to provide Defendants guidance on free exercise rights

applied to prison grooming policies.

Given the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Henderson in 2004 and the lack of any contrary

precedent, the Court finds that Defendants would not have had “fair warning” that denying

a religious exemption from their grooming policy was unlawful. Defendants are therefore

entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim in Count II. Plaintiff’s request

for summary judgment on this claim will be denied and the claim for damages will be

dismissed.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

The remaining claim is Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim in

Count II. He alleges that an Orthodox Jewish inmate has been exempted from the grooming

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policy (Doc. #189 at 2). But Plaintiff does not provide any other facts supporting this claim.

Again, conclusory allegations alone do not establish an equal protection violation without

further proof of invidious discriminatory intent. See Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.

at 265. Plaintiff presents no argument regarding discrimination and he fails to present any

specific facts suggesting that Defendants acted with discriminatory intent or purpose that

stemmed from Plaintiff’s religion. Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1082. Accepting all Plaintiff’s

allegations as true, he cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief on his

equal protection claim. Consequently, Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment on this

claim will be denied. And because there exists no genuine issue of material fact whether

Defendants’ violated Plaintiff’s equal protection rights in Count II, Defendants will be

granted summary judgment on this claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) Plaintiff’s request to dismiss Count III (within Doc. #200) is granted and Count

III is dismissed with prejudice.

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #189) is granted in part and

denied in part as follows:

(a) the motion is granted as to the RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief in Count

II; declaratory relief is unnecessary in light of the grant of injunctive relief;

(b) the motion is otherwise denied.

(3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #194) is granted in part and

denied in part as follows:

(a) the motion is granted as to all claims in Count I;

(b) the motion is denied as moot with respect to Count III.

(4) Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #197) is granted in part

and denied in part as follows:

(a) the cross-motion is granted on qualified immunity grounds for the First

Amendment claim in Count II;

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(b) the cross-motion is granted as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim in

Count II;

(c) the cross-motion is otherwise denied.

(5) Defendants are permanently enjoined as follows:

(a) Defendants may not prohibit Plaintiff from wearing the sikha hairstyle. 

(b) Defendants may not impose any form of discipline on Plaintiff for wearing

the sikha for religious purposes.

(c) this relief extends no further than necessary to correct the threat to

Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA; it is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive

means necessary to correct the harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1).

(6) The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment as follows:

(a) Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on the

RLUIPA claim in Count II; Defendants are permanently enjoined from

prohibiting Plaintiff from wearing the sikha hairstyle and from imposing any

form of discipline on Plaintiff for wearing the sikha for religious purposes.

(b) Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants on all other claims, and

Plaintiff shall take nothing on all other claims in this action. 

The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

Dated: June 12, 2008.

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