Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02373/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02373-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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- 1 - 07cv2373 WQH (CAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHAD MCKINNEY, an individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv2373 WQH (CAB)

ORDER

vs.

APOLLO GROUP, INC.; et al.,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the (1) Motion to Dismiss by Apollo Group, Inc. (Doc.

# 91), (2) Motion to Dismiss by University of Phoenix (Doc. # 92), (3) Motion to Dismiss by

April Alcorn (Doc. # 93), (4) Motion to Dismiss by Mechelle Bonilla, Kyan Flynn, Carlyn

Lindsten (Doc. # 94), (5) Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Motion to Amend

by Chad McKinney (Doc. # 96), (6) Motion for Leave to Amend Original Complaint by Chad

McKinney (Doc. # 97), (7) Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Motion to Amend

by Chad McKinney (Doc. # 99), (8) Motion for Leave to Amend Original Complaint by Chad

McKinney (Doc. # 100), and (9) Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 108). 

Background

On December 19, 2007, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing the Complaint (Doc. #

1). The Complaint alleges that on August 7, 2006, Plaintiff was hired as an Enrollment

Counselor for Defendant University of Phoenix. Complaint, p. 5. The Complaint alleges that

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during his interview for the position, Plaintiff was told that the job was a salary position, and

“there was no mention to the Plaintiff that his salary would decrease if the Plaintiff did not

meet the quotas for new applicants.” Id. The Complaint alleges that after two months of

employment, “Plaintiff discovered that his salary was based on enrollment quotas.” Id. at 6.

The Complaint alleges that “after discovering that the Higher Education Act prohibits

universities from using sales quotas from enrollment counselors, [Plaintiff] mentioned this

concern to his manager, and direct supervisor, [Defendant] Michelle Bonilla,” the Enrollment

Manager of the University of Phoenix. Id. The Complaint alleges that despite this

conversation with Bonilla, “[i]t was often communicated to the Plaintiff that sales quotas were

required,” and that “his tuition reimbursement would be revoked if he failed to meet the ‘goal’

of enrolling at least four students per month.” Id. 

The Complaint alleges that beginning in February 2007, Plaintiff began to receive

harassing emails from Defendant Carlyn Lindsten, the Associate Director of Enrollment at the

University of Phoenix, which threatened reduction in Plaintiff’s pay if he failed to meet

enrollment quotas. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff applied for a position as an Academic

Counselor in the Academic department because he felt that “the enrollment practices of this

company presented an ethical dilemma.” Id. at 7. The Complaint alleges that Lindsten

transferred Plaintiff from the Kearny Mesa campus to the downtown San Diego campus after

again “voic[ing] concerns to Ms. Lindsten of the legality of the quota system.” Id. The

Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was not selected for the position of Academic Counselor. 

The Complaint alleges that in March 2007, Plaintiff again “questioned the legality of

the university’s enrollment practices” with Bonilla. Id. at 9. The Complaint alleges that

thereafter, Bonilla reduced the number of students in his data base available for contact, which

limited Plaintiff’s ability to meet his enrollment quotas. The Complaint also alleges that

Lindsten changed Plaintiff’s work schedule without Plaintiff’s consultation and reduced

Plaintiff’s salary. 

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The Complaint alleges that in June 2007, Plaintiff submitted evidence to Defendant

April Alcorn, the Human Resources Manager of the University of Phoenix, “that the San Diego

office was using harassment and intimidation to get the plaintiff to quit employment or accept

the sales quota system.” Id. at 10. The Complaint alleges that the “university continued to

create a hostile work environment for Plaintiff even after he demanded to [Human Resources]

that it cease and desist.” Id. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was harassed with emails

threatening termination, and was reprimanded for his attire on a casual Friday in a

discriminatory and retaliatory manner. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s stress over the

situation increased, and “Plaintiff began grinding his teeth, vomiting, and receiving stomach

pains in response to the hostile work environment.” Id. at 12. 

The Complaint alleges that, having received no response with regard to his complaints,

Plaintiff decided to take a ten-day non-paid vacation, beginning on July 16, 2007, “in order to

provide [Defendants] with enough time to rectify the situation.” Id. at 14-15. The Complaint

alleges that while on leave, Plaintiff received three overnight Federal Express packages: the

first was a letter stating he needed to return to work no later than July 19, 2007; the second was

letter, dated July 19, 2007, stating that “the Company has chosen to separate your employment

effective July 19, 2007” for failure to report to work at the designated date and time; and the

third was a letter, dated July 19, 2007, stating that Defendants reviewed Plaintiff’s concerns,

and “find no evidence to support any findings of the San Diego Enrollment Department

violating Company policies or procedures as outlined by your allegations.” Id. at 15-16. 

The Complaint alleges claims against the following Defendants: Apollo Group, Inc.;

the University of Phoenix (collectively referred to as the “Corporate Defendants”); Bonilla;

Lindsten; Alcorn; and Kyan Flynn, Director of Enrollment at the University of Phoenix

(collectively referred to as the “Individual Defendants”). The Complaint alleges the following

causes of action: (1) Retaliation, in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. section

3730(h) (the “FCA”), (2) Retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the 1965 Civil Rights Act

(“Title VII”), (3) Wrongful Termination, (4) False Imprisonment, (5) Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress, (6) Defamation, and (7) Equal Pay. 

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On July 23, 2008, the Court issued an Order quashing service of process upon each

Defendant, and granting Plaintiff leave to either properly serve each Defendant in accordance

with applicable law or file a waiver of service (Doc. # 87). On August 25, 2008 and August

26, 2008, Plaintiff filed executed summonses for Apollo Group, Inc. (Docs. # 88, 89), and on

August 26, 2008, Plaintiff filed an executed summons for University of Phoenix (Doc. # 90).

Plaintiff has not filed an executed summons for any of the Individual Defendants.

On September 9, 2008, each Corporate Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. On

September 9, 2008, Individual Defendant April Alcorn filed a Motion to Dismiss, and

Individual Defendants Mechelle Bonilla, Kyan Flynn, and Carlyn Lindsten filed a Motion to

Dismiss. On October 6, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Apollo Group, Inc.’s

and University of Phoenix’s Motions to Dismiss (Doc. # 95). On October 6, 2008, Plaintiff

filed two Ex Parte Motions to Shorten Time for Hearing on Motion to Amend, and two

Motions for Leave to Amend Original Complaint. On October 10, 2008, Apollo Group, Inc.

and the University of Phoenix filed Replies to the Response in Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss (Docs. # 101, 102). On October 13, 2008, Apollo Group, Inc. and the University of

Phoenix filed Responses in Opposition to the Motions for Leave to Amend Original Complaint

(Docs. # 103, 104). On October 16, 2008, Plaintiff filed the Motion for Extension of Time to

File Responses to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. On October 22, 2008, Plaintiff filed

Responses in Opposition to the Individual Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. # 110, 113).

On October 24, 2008, the Individual Defendants filed Replies to the Responses in Opposition

to their Motions to Dismiss (Docs. # 114, 117). On October 24, 2008, the Individual

Defendants also filed Responses in Opposition to the Motion for Extension of Time to File

Responses (Docs. # 115, 116). 

Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests

the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. See De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir.

1978). A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) where

the factual allegations do not raise the right to relief above the speculative level. See Bell

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Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). Conversely, a complaint may not be

dismissed for failure to state a claim where the allegations plausibly show that the pleader is

entitled to relief. See id. (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In ruling on a motion pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), a court must construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and

must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as any reasonable

inferences to be drawn therefrom. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003);

see also Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1996). “Courts have a duty to construe pro se

pleadings liberally, including pro se motions as well as complaints.” Bernhardt v. Los Angeles

County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Analysis

I. The Individual Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

The Individual Defendants state that Plaintiff “simply mailed a copy of the Complaint

to the Individual Defendants’ place of work with a blank proof of service document.” (Doc.

# 93, p. 7; Doc. # 94, p. 5). The Individual Defendants state that Plaintiff “did not attempt to

personally serve the Complaint upon [the Individual Defendants] and hence failed to comply

with the requirements for service under both federal and California law.” Id. The Individual

Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not obtain a waiver of service from any of the Individual

Defendants. The Individual Defendants move to dismiss on grounds that Plaintiff failed to

serve the Individual Defendants in compliance with Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. 

Plaintiff contends that he properly served the Individual Defendants by mailing a copy

of the summons and the Complaint to the Individual Defendants. (Doc. # 110, p. 9; Doc. #

113, p. 7). Plaintiff contends that service was effected on August 26, 2008, when the summons

and Complaint arrived at the Individual Defendants’ usual place of business. Id. Plaintiff

contends that the documents were signed for and accepted. See Doc. # 113, Exhibits A-D.

Plaintiff further contends that the Individual Defendants admit that they received a copy of the

summons and their complaint in their work mailboxes. See id., Exhibits E-G. Plaintiff

contends that in light of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have been properly served

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in accordance with federal and California law. 

“Without a proper basis for jurisdiction, or in the absence of service of process, the

district court has no power to render any judgment against the defendant’s person or property

unless the defendant has consented to jurisdiction or waived the lack of process.” S.E.C. v.

Ross, 504 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2007). “A federal court is without personal jurisdiction over a

defendant unless the defendant has been served in accordance” with Rule 4 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1130. Once service is challenged, the plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing sufficiency of process. Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir.

2004). Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs service of process. Although

Rule 4 is a flexible rule that should be liberally construed, “neither actual notice nor simply

naming the defendant in the complaint will provide personal jurisdiction absent ‘substantial

compliance with Rule 4.” Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Rule 4(e) governs service on individuals within a judicial district of the United States.

Rule 4(e) provides that a plaintiff may serve an individual by:

(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of

general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where

service is made; or

(2) doing any of the following:

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the

individual personally; or

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of

abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or

(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or

by law to receive service of process.

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e). California state law allows for service upon an individual by delivering

a copy of the summons and complaint by “personal delivery or any authorized agent for

service 

of process;” “[s]ubstitute service coupled with mailing after a good faith effort at personal

service has been attempted;” or “[s]ervice by publication.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 415.10,

415.20, 415.30, 415.50. 

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1 The Motions to Dismiss filed by the Individual Defendants raise the same arguments

as the Motions to Dismiss filed by the Corporate Defendants with respect to the Complaint’s

failure to state a claim. However, as previously discussed, Plaintiff’s claims against the

Individual Defendants are dismissed on jurisdictional grounds for failure to effect service of

process. Unlike the Individual Defendants, the Corporate Defendants do not assert that

Plaintiff failed to properly serve them. 

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Plaintiff does not assert that he personally served any of the Individual Defendants; that

he left a copy of the summons and Complaint at the dwelling or usual place of above of any

of the Individual Defendants with someone of suitable discretion and age who resides there;

that he delivered a copy of the summons and Complaint to an agent authorized to receive such

service of process on behalf of the Individual Defendants; or that he attempted to serve the

Individual Defendants by publication. Although Plaintiff asserts that the summons and

Complaint were mailed to the Individual Defendants’ usual place of business and signed for

and accepted at the Individual Defendants’ usual place of business, this is insufficient to

properly effect service of process. Even if Plaintiff effected substitute service, Plaintiff does

not assert that he made a good faith effort to effect personal service on the Individual

Defendants. Plaintiff does not assert that he personally delivered the summons and Complaint

to an authorized agent for service of process on the Individual Defendants. In light of the

foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating

that he substantially complied with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court

dismisses the Complaint as to the Individual Defendants on grounds that Plaintiff failed to

properly effect service of process. 

II. The Corporate Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss1

A. Plaintiff’s Claim under the False Claims Act

The Corporate Defendants contend that the Complaint does not allege sufficient facts

to invoke whistle blower provision under the FCA, which protects employees who assist the

government in the investigation and prosecution of violations of the FCA. The Corporate

Defendants contend that aside from the Complaint’s allegation that “[t]he Plaintiff, after

discovering that the Higher Education Act prohibits universities from using sales quotas for

enrollment counselors, mentioned this concern to his manager,” the Complaint is devoid of any

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facts supporting any “investigation for, initiating of, testimony for, or assistance in” an action

filed under the FCA. (Docs. # 102, p. 4; 101, p. 4) (quoting Complaint, ¶ 6). The Corporate

Defendants contend that Plaintiff does not allege any facts indicating that Plaintiff “has

performed lawful acts in furtherance of an existing ‘action’ under the FCA.” (Doc. # 91, p.

6; Doc. # 92, p. 4). The Corporate Defendants further assert that Plaintiff’s claim under the

FCA is barred because the Corporate Defendants “are already involved in a qui tam action with

the government regarding the identical facts that McKinney asserts regarding incentive pay for

enrollment counselors.” (Doc. # 102, p. 5; 101, p. 5). For these reasons, the Corporate

Defendants contend that the Complaint fails to state a claim under the FCA. 

Plaintiff contends that the FCA prohibits an employer from harassing or retaliating

against an employee for attempting to uncover or report fraud on the federal government.

Plaintiff contends that the alleged conduct of Defendants is “in direct violation of FCA §

3729(a)(3) because [Defendants] conspired to defraud the Government by getting a false or

fraudulent claim allowed or paid.” (Doc. # 95, p. 9). Plaintiff contends that the Complaint

alleges facts to demonstrate that an action brought by either the Attorney General or in the

name of the United States Government exists through allegations that “Plaintiff believed

[Defendants’] business practices were in violation of the Higher Education Act.” Id., at 7-8.

Plaintiff contends that the FCA “applies to the Plaintiff because he asserts that he was

retaliated against, and terminated by Apollo for bringing his workplace concerns to the

attention of the company.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff further contends that the Complaint alleges that

he performed lawful acts in furtherance of an existing action under the FCA through

allegations that he notified his employer and “initiated an investigation into the company’s

alleged illegal activities.” Id. Plaintiff finally contends that he has direct and independent

knowledge of which his allegations are based, and therefore is an original source of

information. 

///

///

///

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31 U.S.C. section 3730(h) is the FCA’s whistle blower provision. Section 3730(h)

provides that an employee who 

is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner

discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or her

employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the

employee or others in furtherance of an action under this section . . . may bring

an action in the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief

provided in this subsection.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). “Mere dissatisfaction with one’s treatment on the job is not, of course,

enough [to state a claim under section 3730(h)]. Nor is an employee’s investigation of nothing

more than his employer’s non-compliance with federal or state regulations.” United States ex

rel. Yesudian v. Howard University, 153 F.3d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. section 3730(b), a private person may bring a civil action for

violation of the FCA “for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall

be brought in the name of the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). Section 3730(c) governs

the rights of the parties to qui tam actions, and provides: “If the Government proceeds with the

action, it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be

bound by an act of the person bringing the action. Such person shall have the right to continue

as a party to the action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c). Section 3730(e) provides that “[i]n no event

may a person bring an action under subsection (b) which is based upon allegations or

transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty

proceeding in which the Government is already a party.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e). 

The Corporate Defendants are involved in a qui tam action, which is ongoing and was

filed in 2004. See United States of America, ex rel. Mary Hendow and Julie Albertson v.

University of Phoenix, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28990 (E.D. Cal., May 19, 2004); reversed and

remanded, 461 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006 (the “Hendow action”). The United States is a party

to the Hendow action, and the Hendow action alleges identical facts to those alleged by

Plaintiff with respect to incentive pay for enrollment counselors. The Court also notes that

Plaintiff does not assert that he brought this action in the name of the United States

Government, as required by section 3730(b). The Court concludes that section 3730(e) bars

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Plaintiff from bringing this action under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) for violation of the FCA. 

Plaintiff asserts that the Complaint has stated a claim under the FCA through Plaintiff’s

initiation of an investigation into Defendants’ alleged non-compliance with federal law.

However, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was retaliated against for investigating

Defendants’ alleged non-compliance with federal or state regulations, which is insufficient to

state a claim under section 3730(h). Furthermore, the Complaint is devoid of allegations that

Plaintiff assisted the government in, or otherwise performed lawful acts in furtherance of an

existing action under the FCA. Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) for

violation of the FCA’s whistle blower provision. 

B. Plaintiff’s Claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

The Corporate Defendants contend that in order to state a disparate treatment claim

under Title VII, the plaintiff must allege that he is a member of a protected class, and in order

to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must allege that he engaged in

protected conduct. The Corporate Defendants contend that the Complaint does not allege that

Plaintiff engaged in conduct protected by Title VII or that he was a member of a protected

class. For these reasons, the Corporate Defendants contend that the Complaint fails to state

a claim under Title VII.

Plaintiff responds:

The Plaintiff believes he has made it abundantly clear that he notified [the

Corporate Defendants] and its employees that he was opposed to, and initiated

an investigation into, the unlawful practices of the company. As a result of this,

the Plaintiff believes that he has suffered discrimination, harassment, and

retaliation leading to his eventual wrongful termination by [the Corporate

Defendants]. It should be evidence to any reasonable person that the Plaintiff

felt he was protected under the auspices of SEC. 2000e-3 (section 704) of Title

VII from what he believed to be discriminatory, nefarious acts by a company

and its employees.

Id. at 11.

Title VII makes it unlawful for covered employers to hire or discharge any individual,

or otherwise discriminate against any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or

national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. To state a retaliation claim under Title VII, the

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plaintiff must allege that he (1) engaged in some conduct protected by Title VII, (2) suffered

an adverse employment action, and (3) the adverse employment action was taken against him

because of the protected activity. Trent v. Elect. Assoc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994). To

establish the first element, the plaintiff must show that he had a “reasonable belief that the

employment practice [he] protested was prohibited under Title VII.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted). To state a claim for discriminatory treatment under Title VII, the plaintiff must

allege that he (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was capable of performing his job, and

(3) was treated differently because of his protected class status. Pejic v. Hughs Helicopters,

Inc., 840 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The Complaint alleges that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff based on his

investigation into the legality of Defendants’ employment practice of requiring employees to

meet enrollment quotas. However, the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff was a member

of a class protected under Title VII, or that the employment practice about which Plaintiff

complained was protected under Title VII, which prohibits discrimination against employees

on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The Complaint is devoid of any

allegations that Defendants actions were taken on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or

national origin. The Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim for violation of

Title VII because the Complaint not allege that Plaintiff’s conduct was protected under Title

VII or that Plaintiff was a member of a protected class. 

C. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims

The Corporate Defendants contend that “[t]o the extent [Plaintiff] is asserting these or

any other claims against [the Corporate Defendants] (which is, itself, unclear from the wording

of the Complaint), [Plaintiff] has failed to describe these claims with any specificity or to set

forth the required elements of those claims.” (Doc. # 91, p. 8; Doc. # 92, p. 6). The Corporate

Defendants further contend that they are unable to determine which of the remaining claims

are being asserted against them. The Corporate Defendants contend that the Complaint fails

to state a claim for wrongful termination, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, defamation, or equal pay. 

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With respect to the Complaint’s claim for wrongful termination, Plaintiff states: “The

Plaintiff believes he was wrongfully terminated,” and Defendants may therefore be responsible

for statutory penalties and damages. (Doc. # 95, p. 12). With respect to the claim for false

imprisonment, Plaintiff states: “The Plaintiff believes that he was falsely imprisoned. A person

falsely imprisoned may sue the offender for damages.” Id. Plaintiff contends that he has stated

a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because “California has long recognized

the right to recover damages for the intentional and unreasonable infliction of mental or

emotional distress which results in foreseeable physical injury to plaintiff.” Id. at 12-13. With

respect to the remaining claims: “The Plaintiff also believes that he is entitled to relief under

his claim that he suffered Defamation as a result of the actions taken against him by all

Defendant parties. He also believes that [Defendants] violated his rights under the Equal Pay

Act, and he is entitled to relief under this cause of action as well.” Id. at 13. 

i. Wrongful Termination

To state a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, a plaintiff must

establish that there was an employer-employee relationship; a termination of employment or

other adverse employment action; that the termination was a violation of public policy; and

that the termination was the legal cause of plaintiff’s damage and that the plaintiff suffered

damage. City of Moorpark v. Super. Ct., 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 1159 (1998). Aside from the

conclusory assertion that Defendants are liable for wrongful termination, Plaintiff does not

allege that any of the Defendants violated public policy or otherwise articulate facts supporting

a claim for wrongful termination. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the

Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim for wrongful termination.

ii. False Imprisonment

To state a claim for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must allege that he was

intentionally confined without consent, without lawful privilege, and for an appreciable period

of time. Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496 (2000). The Complaint is

devoid of any facts alleging that Plaintiff was confined without his consent, or that any

confinement was intentionally effectuated by any of the Defendants. The Court concludes that

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the Complaint fails to state a claim or false imprisonment. 

iii. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege:

“(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering

severe or extreme emotional distress; (3) and actual and proximate causation of the emotional

distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d

579, 593 (1979). The Complaint does not allege that Defendants’ conduct was extreme or

outrageous; that Defendants acted with the requisite intent to cause Plaintiff emotional distress;

or that Plaintiff has suffered severe or extreme emotional distress as a result of Defendants’

outrageous or extreme conduct. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the

Complaint fails to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

iv. Defamation

To state a claim for defamation, the plaintiff must establish “the intentional publication

of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which

causes special damage.” Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal. App. 4th 637, 645 (1999). The

Complaint does not allege that Defendants published any statement of fact about Plaintiff, or

that Defendants intentionally published any statement that was unprivileged, had a natural

tendency to injure or which caused special damage to Plaintiff. The Court concludes that the

Complaint fails to state a claim for defamation. 

v. Equal Pay

Plaintiff’s grounds for relief under the seventh cause of action are unclear because the

cause of action conclusorily alleges: “Equal Pay.” Complaint, p. 17. However, assuming the

Complaint is seeking to state a claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, such a claim fails

because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis

of his status as a member of a protected class by paying him lower wages. 

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Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the (1) Motion to Dismiss by Apollo Group, Inc. (Doc.

# 91), (2) Motion to Dismiss by University of Phoenix (Doc. # 92), (3) Motion to Dismiss by

April Alcorn (Doc. # 93), (4) Motion to Dismiss by Mechelle Bonilla, Kyan Flynn, Carlyn

Lindsten (Doc. # 94), and (5) Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 108) are GRANTED. The above-captioned action is DISMISSED

with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint no later than Monday,

January 12, 2009. It is further ordered that the (6) Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time for

Hearing on Motion to Amend by Chad McKinney (Doc. # 96), (7) Motion for Leave to Amend

Original Complaint by Chad McKinney (Doc. # 97), (8) Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time for

Hearing on Motion to Amend by Chad McKinney (Doc. # 99), and (9) Motion for Leave to

Amend Original Complaint by Chad McKinney (Doc. # 100) are DENIED as moot.

DATED: December 10, 2008

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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