Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01443/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01443-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES GLENN NORMAN, JR, No. CIV S-07-1443-FCD-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JOHN DOVER, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondents’ motion to

dismiss the petition as having been filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations (Doc. 18). 

Petitioner has not filed an opposition. 

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced on August 23, 2001. The California Court

of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence on May 28, 2003. The California Supreme Court

denied direct review on August 27, 2003. Petitioner then filed four state post-conviction actions

as follows:

First Action Sacramento County Superior Court

Filed September 15, 2005

Denied October 17, 2005

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Second Action California Court of Appeal

Filed December 27, 2005

Denied January 5, 2006

Third Action California Supreme Court

Filed March 1, 2006

Denied October 25, 2006

Fourth Action Sacramento County Superior Court

Filed March 14, 2006

Denied April 25, 2006

The instant federal petition was signed on July 17, 2007, and filed on July 19, 2007. 

Federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year from the later of: (1)

the date the state court judgment became final; (2) the date on which an impediment to filing

created by state action is removed; (3) the date on which a constitutional right is newlyrecognized and made retroactive on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Typically, the statute of limitations will begin to run when the state court

judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek direct

review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Where a petition for review by the California Supreme Court is filed and no

petition for certiorari is filed in the United States Supreme Court, the one-year limitations period

begins running the day after expiration of the 90-day time within which to seek review by the

U.S. Supreme Court. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Where no

petition for review by the California Supreme Court is filed, the conviction becomes final 40

days following the Court of Appeal’s decision, and the limitations period begins running the

following day. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002). If no appeal is filed in the

Court of Appeal, the conviction becomes final 60 days after conclusion of proceedings in the

state trial court, and the limitations period begins running the following day. If the conviction

became final before April 24, 1996 – the effective date of the statute of limitations – the one-year

period begins to run the day after the effective date, or April 25, 1996. See Miles v. Prunty, 187

F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999).

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The limitations period is tolled, however, for the time a properly filed application

for post-conviction relief is pending in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To be

“properly filed,” the application must be authorized by, and in compliance with, state law. See

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000); see also Allen v. Siebert, ___ U.S. ___ (Nov. 5, 2007); Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (holding that, regardless of whether there are exceptions to

a state’s timeliness bar, time limits for filing a state post-conviction petition are filing conditions

and the failure to comply with those time limits precludes a finding that the state petition is

properly filed). A state court application for post-conviction relief is “pending”during all the

time the petitioner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to present his

claims. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). It is not, however, considered

“pending” after the state post-conviction process is concluded. See Lawrence v. Florida, ___

U.S. ___ (2007) (holding that federal habeas petition not tolled for time during which certiorari

petition to the Supreme Court was pending). Where the petitioner unreasonably delays between

state court applications, however, there is no tolling for that period of time. See Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214 (2002). If the state court does not explicitly deny a post-conviction application as

untimely, the federal court must independently determine whether there was undue delay. See id.

at 226-27. 

There is no tolling for the interval of time between post-conviction applications

where the petitioner is not moving to the next higher appellate level of review. See Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006-07; see also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). There is also no

tolling for the period between different sets of post-conviction applications. See Biggs v.

Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the period between the conclusion of direct

review and the filing of a state post-conviction application does not toll the limitations period. 

See Nino, 1983 F.3d at 1006-07. 

/ / /

/ / /

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Given this conclusion, the court need not address respondents’ argument that 1

petitioner’s claim are also unexhausted. 

4

In this case, petitioner did not seek review by the United States Supreme Court. 

Therefore, the conviction and sentence became final 90 days after the California Supreme Court

denied review and the limitations period began to run the following day – November 26, 2003. 

Because none of petitioner’s state post-conviction actions were filed within the limitations period

(i.e., before November 26, 2003), petitioner is not entitled to tolling for any of the time those

actions were pending or the intervals between. Thus, the limitations period ended one year after

November 26, 2003, or on November 25, 2004. Because the instant federal petition was not filed

until 2007, it is untimely and must be dismissed.1

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 18) be granted;

2. This action be dismissed; and

3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and close this file. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 16, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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