Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05893/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05893-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN K. TOSCANO, 

Plaintiff,

v.

G. LEWIS; et al., 

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-12-5893 EMC (pr)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket No. 188)

I. INTRODUCTION

This pro se prisoner’s civil rights action is now before the Court for consideration of a

defense motion for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be denied

in part and granted in part. Specifically, the motion for summary judgment will be denied as to the

claim that Defendants Eberly and Thompson used excessive force on Plaintiff, and granted in all

other respects. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

In the order of service and partial dismissal (Docket # 19), the Court determined that Mr.

Toscano had stated a claim upon which relief may be granted for the following events and

omissions. First, the Court found the following cognizable deliberate indifference to safety claims:

(a) against defendants Lewis, Barneburg, Ruff, Schoening, Rothchild, and Kennedy for releasing

Mr. Toscano from the security housing unit to general population on March 28, 2011; (b) against

defendant Basso for his acts on and after April 15, 2011 that caused Mr. Toscano not to be sent to a

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 This order runneth over with acronyms. Here, in one place, they are:

Ad-seg administrative segregation

C/C correctional counselor

CDCR-114D Notice of placement in administrative housing form

CDCR-128 a memorandum, also known as a chrono

CDCR-602 an inmate appeal form

CDCR-1030 a confidential information disclosure form

C/O correctional officer

CSR Classification Staff Representative

DRB Department Review Board

GP general population

ICC Institutional Classification Committee

OCS Office of Correctional Safety

PBSP Pelican Bay State Prison

SHU Security Housing Unit

SNY Sensitive Needs Yard

THU Transitional Housing Unit at Kern Valley

TPU Transitional Program Unit at Pelican Bay

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sensitive needs yard (SNY); (c) against defendants Bustamante, Garza, Eberly and Thompson for

their actions on June 23 through 27, 2011 that caused Mr. Toscano to be moved to a housing unit

other than the SNY and to be placed in a cell with Ramirez; (d) against Defendants Melton,

Soderlund, Wilber, Flowers, Evert, Basso, Pepiot, Perez, Kelley, Still, Cruse, and Bradbury for their

refusals to put him in the SNY; and (e) against Defendants Hubbard, Speer, Schoening, Alkire, and

Davis for their role in the DRB proceedings and that caused Mr. Toscano to be transferred to the

security housing unit at Corcoran. Second, the Court found a cognizable claim for the use of

excessive force by Defendants Eberly and Thompson on June 27, 2011. Third, the Court found

cognizable retaliation claims against Defendants Basso, Clower, Bustamante, Garza, Eberly,

Thompson, Melton, Soderlund, Wilber, Flowers, Evert, Perez, Kelley, Still, Cruse, Bradbury,

Hubbard, Speer, Schoening, Alkire, and Davis. The Court dismissed several other claims for the

reasons stated in the order of service and partial dismissal. 

B. Statement of Facts1

The events and omissions giving rise to this action occurred from February 2011 through

October 2012 (“the relevant time”). Mr. Toscano had been in the Pelican Bay State Prison security

housing unit (SHU) for many years after having been validated as an associate of the Northern

Structure prison gang. This action is based on events and omissions occurring after he was

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determined in 2010 to be an inactive gang associate and was released from the Pelican Bay SHU. 

Before describing the lengthy series of events for Mr. Toscano’s case, it is necessary to provide

several pages of background information about prison operations, including some information about

Hispanic gangs, the categorization and procedures for handling gang members and associates

(collectively called “gang affiliates”) and some special housing units. 

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted:

1. Gang Affiliates, Inactive Inmates and Debriefing

“Prison gang activity poses one of the greatest threats to institutional security in California

prisons.” Docket # 189 (Barneburg Decl.) at 7. Barneburg described the Hispanic gangs and their

connection to the non-gang Hispanic prison population:

[T]here are two major Hispanic prison gangs, the Mexican Mafia and

the Nuestra Familia. The Nuestra Familia also has close ties to a third

Hispanic prison gang, the Northern Structure (also called Nuestra

Raza). The Northern Structure grew out of the Nuestra Familia and is

subservient to the Nuestra Familia. The Northern Structure and its

members and associates are responsible for carrying out criminal

activities for the Nuestra Familia. Nuestra Familia members are often

pulled from the ranks of the Northern Structure. These two factions

(the Mexican Mafia/Southerners and the Nuestra Familia/Northern

Structure/Northerners) are enemies and cycle between periods of

violence and peace on the general population, depending on direction

from the gang’s hierarchy.’ 

In prison, all Hispanic inmates are expected by Hispanic prison

gangs to identify as a “Southerner” or a “Northerner,” even if those

inmates are not involved in gang activity. During an incident such as

a prison riot, Northerners are expected to assist other Northerners and

the Nuestra Familia/Northern Structure and fight against Southerners

and the Mexican Mafia. Similarly, Southerners are expected to assist

other Southerners or affiliates of the Mexican Mafia against

Northerners, the Nuestra Familia, and the Northern Structure. [¶]

“Sureno” is the term for a Southern Hispanic street gang member, and

“Norteno” is the term for a Northern Hispanic street gang member. In

Spanish, these words mean “Southerner” and “Northerner.” Hispanic

street gangs in California identify as either Southern or Northern. This

distinction arose in the late 1960s in California prisons, when Hispanic

inmates from the Los Angeles area came into conflict with Hispanic

inmates from Northern California rural areas. 

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 Mr. Toscano has a different interpretation of the Hispanic prison population, as well as his

status and that of Mr. Ramirez, who was his cellmate for a few hours. Mr. Toscano states that Mr.

Ramirez “was an active gang member. (All Northern Hispanic Inmates functioning/programming

on G.P./Ad-seg/SHU’s, are active gang members of the northern gang.) . . . [S]ince CDC started to

use the term ‘inactive,’ active inmates will ask you, if your active or not, if you say your not, you

become a target for assault/murder by the active inmates who are still actively functioning as a

group.” Docket # 226 at 1-2 (emphasis, parentheses, grammatical errors and spelling errors in

original); see also Docket # 227 at 96-97 (Rios Decl. describing “Northern Structure” as a

misnomer); Docket # 222 at 2. Mr. Toscano has not demonstrated that he has personal knowledge

of the alleged facts to which he asserts, i.e., he shows no foundation for his opinion that Mr. Ramirez

was an active gang member, or that all Northern Hispanic inmates “functioning/programming” –

whatever that term means – are active gang members, or that there is a “northern gang.” More

importantly, the inmate’s view of how gangs work and how inmate factions align does not speak to

how prison officials viewed prison gangs and inmate factions.

Mr. Toscano has failed to show a triable issue that Mr. Ramirez was an active gang member

in a prison gang, that all Northern Hispanic inmates are in a gang, or that there is a prison gang

called the “northern gang.”

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 “A member is an inmate/parolee or any person who has been accepted into membership by

a gang.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3378(c)(3) (2011). “An associate is an inmate/parolee or any

person who is involved periodically or regularly with members or associates of a gang.” Id. at §

3378(c)(4). See also Docket # 189 at 8. None of Plaintiff’s claims are based on any difference in

the treatment of the two groups.

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Docket # 189 at 8 (emphasis added).2

Active gang affiliates, inactive gang affiliates and gang dropouts are three different types of

inmates and are treated differently. The term “gang affiliates” refers to gang members as well as

gang associates. Docket # 189 at 7.3 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(CDCR) has procedures to house gang members and associates in the SHU. The process of

determining whether an inmate should be placed in the SHU includes “validating” him as a gang

member or associate. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3378(c)(6) (2011). The CDCR also has

procedures to consider for release from the SHU inmates who are no longer active in a prison gang. 

The process of determining whether the inmate is no longer active includes validating him as an 

“inactive” gang member or associate. See id. at § 3378(d), (e), and (g) (2011). The CDCR also has

a procedure for determining that an active or inactive gang member or associate has further

distanced himself from the gang by debriefing and becoming a gang dropout. See id. at §

3341.5(c)(4), § 3378(c)(5) (2011).

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Being validated as inactive in a gang is not the same as being deemed a dropout from a gang. 

Inmates whom the Office of Correctional Safety (OCS) “validates as inactive gang associates or

members are released to the general population. They are not automatically sent to a sensitive needs

yard. The regulation generally calls for inactive gang affiliates to be sent to general population in a

Level IV facility upon release from the SHU. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3341.5(c)(5) (2011)

(“Inmates categorized as inactive who are suitable for SHU release shall be transferred to the general

population of a Level IV facility for a period of observation that shall be no greater than 12

months.”); see also Docket # 227-3 at 55 (“Notice of Conditions of Inactive Validation” form states,

“Based on your newly designated inactive status, the DRB may elect to conditionally release you

from a Security Housing Unit (SHU) to a general population facility,” and then describes behavioral

expectations for inmate). 

To be housed in a sensitive needs yard, the validated inactive gang associate must complete

the debriefing process. See Docket # 194 (Basso Decl.) at 5. “The debriefing program is a lengthy

process that consists of two phases (assessment/interview and observation)” that can take up to two

years to complete. Docket # 189 at 10. During the first phase, the Institutional Gang Investigator

interviews the inmate and determines whether he is sincere in his desire to dissociate from a gang

and not trying to gain access to an SNY to attack inmates who have debriefed. Id. at 10-11. The

inmate then is asked to write an autobiography about gang activity. Id. at 11. Once the assessment

is complete, an OCS agent reviews the autobiography, identifies areas for follow-up, and does an indepth interview of the inmate that may last several days. Id. at 11. The OCS agent then assembles a

debriefing report (which may be over 200 pages long), which the inmate must review for accuracy

and sign. Id. During the second phase of the debriefing process, the inmate is housed at the

Transitional Housing Unit at Kern Valley State Prison, where he is observed. Inmates who

successfully complete both phases of the debriefing program are then validated as gang “dropouts”

by the OCS. Id.; see also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3378.1 (2011) (describing debriefing process). 

2. Housing Units

There are several kinds of special housing units in the California prison system. Docket #

192 (Soderlund Decl.) at 2. Most important to the present dispute is the sensitive needs yard

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(“SNY”). An SNY is a yard reserved for inmates who have specific, verified safety concerns, and

for inmates who have completed the gang debriefing process and are in need of protective housing. 

Id. The Protective Housing Unit (PHU) mentioned in Title 15 § 3341.5 of the California Code of

Regulations, as it existed in 2011, describes an SNY. See Docket # 192 at 2. 

The Transitional Program Unit (“TPU”) is a housing unit at Pelican Bay in which inmates

who have been endorsed for housing in an SNY are housed while they await transfer to a prison with

an SNY. The TPU houses gang debriefers, and also may house inmates with high notoriety, specific

safety concerns, sex offenses (especially against children), or other factors that require placement in

a sensitive needs yard. Id. Pelican Bay’s TPU has the same program as an SNY, and the inmates in

both the TPU and SNY have the same routine and privileges they would have in general population. 

(The TPU is different from the Transitional Housing Unit (THU), which is located only at Kern

Valley State Prison and used for inmates in the final phase of the gang debriefing program, i.e.,

inmates who have repudiated their gang affiliation. Id.)

Inactive gang members and associates who have not debriefed and have not been designated

as gang dropouts generally cannot be placed in an SNY. On February 14, 2012, a memorandum was

issued by the director of the CDCR’s Division of Adult Institutions regarding SNY placement

consideration for validated prison gang dropouts that “reaffirm[ed] the direction provided” in a

February 19, 2002 memorandum.” Docket # 192-1. “Specifically, inmates validated as active or

inactive prison gang members or associates by the Office of Correctional Safety (OCS) are ineligible

for SNY placement. Only those validated inmates whose status has been changed to “dropout” by

OCS may be considered for SNY placement.” Docket # 192-1 at 2. Soderlund explained the

importance of this policy mentioned in the February 14, 2012 memorandum:

This policy is essential to safeguard inmates housed in sensitive needs

yards, including debriefers, inmates who have committed sex crimes,

and high notoriety inmates. Defendants have to ensure that inmates

who are housed in these yards will not commit violent acts upon other

inmates, are sincere in their desire to refrain from gang activity, and

are willing to program. [¶] As CDCR memoranda recognize, there is a

very real danger that “sleeper” inmates who are still participating in

gang activity will try to gain access to sensitive needs yards to carry

out assaults on debriefers on behalf of prison gangs. Gangs consider

debriefers to be “snitches.” CDCR must ensure that “sleeper” inmates

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do not get transferred to sensitive needs yards, because they will harm

if not kill inmates there who have debriefed.

Docket # 192 at 4-5.

Pelican Bay has an operating procedure regarding double-celling that requires inmates to

accept inmate housing assignments as directed by staff and states the expectation that all inmates

will be double-celled. Id. at 6. An inmate may be subject to disciplinary action for refusing a lawful

order to double-cell. Id. Pelican Bay also uses a form entitled “Involuntary Double Celling,” which

is “filled out by a lieutenant when inmates are involuntarily double-celled, after the inmates have

been unsuccessful in finding a compatible cellmate.” Id. According to Soderlund, the doublecelling form is not completed every time an inmate is given a cellmate, however, and often new

inmates arriving at Pelican Bay from a reception center will be double-celled with other general

population inmates without either inmate approving of the double-celling. Id. at 6. Mr. Toscano has

not shown that he has any personal knowledge to support his conclusory assertion that the doublecelling form is uniformly used when inmates are double-celled. In fact, Mr. Toscano had not even

been put in a double cell for about a decade, and therefore had no recent experience on which to

base his assertion. 

Inmates can request new cellmates for a variety of reasons, such as an age difference

between cellmates, the cellmates dislike each other, one cellmate has canteen money and the other

does not, or an inmate wants to move to facilitate getting a new inmate-created tattoo. Docket # 197

at 4. Some officers will not move inmates to new cells simply for these kinds of “convenience

moves” or “accommodation moves.” Id. Inmates also can seek to change cells for safety reasons. 

And inmates also can seek to change cells for more nefarious reasons, such as to accomplish tasks

for a gang. Id. Inmates also can seek to change cells for safety reasons. 

3. Mr. Toscano

Mr. Toscano had been housed in the SHU since 2000 due to his validation as an associate of

the Northern Structure prison gang. In late 2010, the OCS validated Mr. Toscano as an inactive

gang associate. Docket # 20 (First Amended Complaint) at 13. To prison officials, that meant that

Mr. Toscano once had been an active associate of the Northern Structure and that the OCS

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 A CDCR-1030 summarily describes confidential information that has been obtained by

prison officials and is used by prison officials to let the prisoner know that something from a

confidential source has been used in a decision about him; the form states why it is considered

reliable information, and describes the item in general terms without identifying, for example, the

name of the inmate-informant. 

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designated him as inactive in 2010 because there was no evidence that he had participated in any

gang activity for the last six years. Mr. Toscano and inmates like him are referred to as validated

inactive gang associates. Docket # 189 at 9. 

Mr. Toscano has not debriefed and has not been designated as a gang dropout. Id. at 10; see

also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3378.1 (2011) (describing debriefing process). 

4. Housing Leading Up To The Fight With Mr. Ramirez

After Mr. Toscano was validated as an inactive gang associate in late 2010, the DRB

reviewed Mr. Toscano’s case on February 10, 2011 and decided to release him from the SHU and

approved his transfer to Pelican Bay’s Level IV general population. See Docket # 199-3 at 27-28. 

Mr. Toscano refused to attend the DRB hearing. Id. at 28. The DRB’s February 10, 2011 memo

noted the following about potential safety concerns based on a couple of old documents: 

• [O]ne confidential memorandum and one confidential CDCR 128-B

were discovered, which indicated Inmate Toscano may have safety

concerns with the NS/Nuestra Familia (NF). A confidential CDCR

128-B dated 8-06-02, indicated a mini note was discovered that

identified Inmate Toscano was targeted for assault. The author of this

mini note was unknown. However, the CDCR 128-B went on and

clarified that recent intercepted confidential information between a

validated NS member and a validated NF member verified Inmate

Toscano was on good terms with the NS/NF prison gangs. A

confidential memorandum dated 5-24-04, indicated Inmate Toscano

was sharing NF material without authority and that this behavior could

target him for reprisal from the NS/NF. However, it did not say he

was targeted for assault. There is no current information in Inmate

Toscano’s central file that places him on any ‘hit list’ or shows he is

targeted for assault. CDCR 1030s4

 were issued to Inmate Toscano for

the two confidential documents.

• On 12-02-10, PBSP staff interviewed Inmate Mr. Toscano regarding

possible safety concerns. He stated that was “old news,” and he would

have no problems programming on a GP facility. The custody staff

also indicated he has no problems with other NS members or

associates in his housing unit.

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 The DRB memo stated that Mr. Toscano’s disciplinary history included rules violation

reports for: slashing assault of an inmate in 1993; mutual combat in 1996, 1998, and 1999;

possession of a weapon in 1997 and 1998; possession of dangerous contraband in 2002; and

possession of a deadly weapon in 2003. Docket # 199-3 at 27. 

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 The transcript of Mr. Toscano’s March 20, 2014 deposition is found at Docket # 199-1. As

his is the only deposition transcript in the record, all references to an “RT” followed by a page

number are to pages in the reporter’s transcript of Mr. Toscano’s deposition.

Mr. Toscano argues that the deposition transcript “is not accurate,” that he intends to sue the

stenographer, and until then the transcript “should be deemed false, unauthorized, and stricken from

the records and misconduct charges should be filed” against defense counsel for presenting it. 

Docket # 217 at 4. Mr. Toscano has not identified a single inaccuracy in the very lengthy deposition

transcript, nor has he given any plausible explanation for why the deposition transcript would be

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Docket # 199-3 at 27. The DRB memo also noted that the classification services unit had noted that

“Toscano’s safety concerns seem to have been resolved and would not preclude his release to the

GP, noting positive programming with other NS inmates.” Id. at 28. The DRB memo also noted

Mr. Toscano’s lengthy (albeit old) disciplinary history involving violence and weapons. Id.5

 

By the time he was being considered for release from the SHU, Mr. Toscano had long

believed that he was on a no-good list. In his deposition, Mr. Toscano stated that he was put on a

no-good list in 2002 by the Northern Structure prison gang because he cut his ties with the gang and

said he would do his own program. See RT 42, 79-80; see also Docket # 220 at 8. After that, the

gang affiliates just left him alone. RT 80. The no-good list – which Mr. Toscano describes as a

gang’s “hit list” for assault and murder – has thousands of names on it. RT 79. He knew he was on

the list since about 2002. RT 105, 108, 117. 

Mr. Toscano was released to the Pelican Bay general population on or about March 28, 2011. 

Toscano did not object to his release to the general population. RT 133-134. At the time, he had a

plan to attack a Northerner once he was released from the SHU and then ask for protective custody. 

He apparently had no one in particular in mind, and simply wanted to hurt one of the Northerners

before he started his new life in an SNY. He testified at his deposition: “My initial thought, my

initial plan was, you know, I was still young, I was still, you know, I was just going to retaliate first

then I was just going to lock it up. I was going to get one of them first then I was gonna say, all

right, I’m done. Lock it up, go SNY.” Docket # 199-1, Toscano Depo., Reporter’s Transcript (RT)

107-108; see also RT 285-287.6

 Once he reached general population, however, Mr. Toscano saw

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false. A great number of the statements he made in the deposition are entirely consistent with

statements he has made in other documents, thereby showing the absurdity of the idea that the whole

transcript should be deemed false. 

Mr. Toscano’s argument about the deposition transcript is the same kind of heated assertion

as the “he’s a liar,” “she is lying,” “documents are fabricated,” and “people fabricated things”

arguments that permeate Mr. Toscano’s presentations throughout this action and his opposition to

the motion for summary judgment. In almost every instance, Mr. Toscano has failed to provide any

fact to support his allegations of lies and fabrications. Merely stating over and over that an opponent

is lying or that documents have been fabricated – without presenting any explanation of what portion

of a statement or document is false and without offering an explanation of one’s view of the true

state of events – is insufficient to raise a triable issue. “When the nonmoving party relies only on its

own affidavits to oppose summary judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported

by factual data to create an issue of material fact.” Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th

Cir. 1993); see, e.g., United States v. 1 Parcel of Real Property, 904 F.2d 487, 489, 492 & n.3 (9th

Cir. 1990) (claimant “offered a detailed declaration painting a picture entirely different from that

described by the government” regarding how a drug transaction had not involved the house; had his

declaration only to “set forth conclusory allegations, this case would be different” because

conclusory allegations do not raise a triable issue); Marks v. United States, 578 F.2d 261, 262 (9th

Cir. 1978) (FOIA plaintiff’s contention that relevant documents could have been destroyed or

removed, “assumes, without the slightest factual basis, that records were either destroyed or

secreted. Such a conclusory allegation does not raise a genuine issue for trial”). 

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about a dozen Northerners and realized there were “too many to handle,” so he abandoned his plan

to attack one of them and instead asked to go to an SNY. RT 107-108, 112, 113, 120. Mr. Toscano

believed prison officials had no choice but to put him in an SNY if he had safety issues. RT 109 (if

you have “safety issues, they can’t put you nowhere, they got no choice but to send you to SNY”). 

Mr. Toscano was in general population for 7-10 days, during which time Northerners asked

for his paperwork, i.e., the documents of his case that would allow the reader to figure out his

background. Toscano told them he did not have his paperwork. RT 122-123. 

On April 6, 2011, Mr. Toscano asked correctional counselor (“C/C”) Webster to put him

“into protected custody and sen[d him] to a sensitive needs yard (SNY), as plaintiff was targeted for

assault/murder.” Docket # 20 at 13. C/C Webster told Mr. Toscano that he would have a lieutenant

talk to Mr. Toscano. Id. “A padlock was placed on his door for his safety.” Id. (This apparently

was not that uncommon, as Mr. Toscano testified all the Northerners had padlocks on their doors

because of disputes with the Southerners. RT 60.) C/C Webster wrote a chrono dated April 6, 2011

in which he noted that Mr. Toscano had said “that upon being released from SHU he intended to

come to the yard and deal with a situation and it would be over. However, it did not work out that

way and now he feels that he has safety concerns.” Docket # 196-1. Webster thought the

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 Mr. Toscano states that he made this statement to lieutenant Strain rather than C/C

Webster. RT 126-27. The dispute as to which of the two correctional officials heard the statement

Mr. Toscano admittedly made is not a material dispute. 

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“situation” to which Mr. Toscano referred may have been gang-related. Docket # 196 (Webster

Decl.) at 2.7

On April 7, 2011, Mr. Toscano was taken to the program office to speak to lieutenant Strain. 

Mr. Toscano provided information about Northern inmates in his section who had asked for his

name and other information. Docket # 20 at 13-14. Lieutenant Strain wrote a CDC-114D notice

putting Mr. Toscano into administrative segregation, and that form was approved by captain Bell. 

Docket # 199–3 at 33. The CDC-114D notice does not mention protective custody, although it does

state that he was being put in ad-seg because Mr. Toscano had “expressed concerns regarding your

safety and the safety of others,” that would be investigated by sergeant Basso. Id.

The next day, April 8, 2011, prison officials searched the cell(s) of the two Northern inmates

as to whom Mr. Toscano had provided information. RT 129. There is no evidence those inmates

knew why their cell was searched. Mr. Toscano speculates that the search the day after he talked to

lieutenant Strain made it “obvious” to the inmates that the search was due to information Mr.

Toscano provided to prison officials, Docket # 20 at 14, yet admits that the officers did not tell the

inmates why they were conducting a cell search, RT 151, and thought that there normally were three

cell searches per day in general population. RT 151.

An Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) hearing was held on April 13, 2011 to

review Mr. Toscano’s ad-seg placement. See Docket # 199-3 at 4. The report for the ICC hearing

stated that sergeant Basso was conducting an investigation into Mr. Toscano’s self-expressed safety

concerns and that Mr. Toscano would remain in ad-seg pending completion of that investigation. 

Id. 

In preparation for his interview of Mr. Toscano, sergeant Basso looked at Mr. Toscano’s

central file and saw several items of confidential information. There was an August 15, 2000

memorandum “describing a Northern Structure/Nuestra Familia gang roster of inmates in good

standings and a ‘hit-list’ of inmates in bad standing with the gang (also called a ‘bad news list’). 

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This list showed that Toscano was in good standings with the gang and was not on the ‘bad news

list’.” Docket # 194 at 6. There were over 260 names on the “bad news list.” Id. Basso noted that

“[i]t is not CDCR’s policy to place all inmates listed on such lists in a sensitive needs yard.” Id.

There also was an August 6, 2002 chrono “indicating that gang investigators intercepted

communication between gang associates stating that Toscano was still in good standings with the

gang and was trying to be moved to be housed with another gang member.” Id. There also was a

“confidential memorandum from 2002, which stated that Toscano possessed the Nuestra Familia

Constitution for recruiting purposes.” Id. There also was a memorandum “documenting a note

found by correctional officers in 2004 that stated that Toscano was deemed ‘no good’ by the

Northern Structure prison gang, because he was sharing gang materials without authority.” Id.

Basso also reviewed a December 2010 confidential memorandum by C/C Nealy regarding the 2002

and 2004 information, as well as her interview with Toscano about his safety concerns during which

Toscano said he knew about the 2002 and 2004 information “but it is old news,” and that he “would

have no problems programming on any general population yard at any prison.” Id. 

Sergeant Basso interviewed Mr. Toscano in an office on April 16, 2011 and thereafter wrote

a memorandum to Facility B captain R. Bell. Docket # 194 at 3. During the interview, Mr. Toscano

said that upon his release to general population, he realized his life was in danger. Id. Mr. Toscano

also stated that he had dissociated from the Northern Structure gang in 2000 or 2001, and wanted to

start the gang debriefing process. Id. Sergeant Basso further states that he asked Mr. Toscano

numerous questions, and that Mr. Toscano “gave [him] very little information, and nearly no

confidential information.” Id. Basso asked Mr. Toscano to compose a handwritten biography

regarding his association with the Northern Structure gang, but Mr. Toscano never completed a

biography. Id. “Based on Toscano’s responses” during the April 16, 2011 interview, sergeant Basso

wrote in his memorandum that he “believed Toscano was ‘telling just the minimum amount of truth

and facts in order to get to a Sensitive Needs Program (SNY)’ and ‘that Toscano is providing staff

with limited information and is not fully disclosing all pertinent information to gain access to [a

sensitive needs yard] where he can proceed with his unknown agenda.’” Docket # 194 at 4

(alteration in source). Basso states that, at the end of the interview, he told Mr. Toscano that he

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would “write up a confidential memorandum regarding the interview and that he would be seen by

the institutional classification committee regarding his housing placement.” Id. (Mr. Toscano

disputes this and states that Basso said that Mr. Toscano “would go to (SNY) 2-3 weeks following

his reports.” Docket # 221 at 2.) 

A few weeks later, Mr. Toscano told sergeant Basso that a committee was waiting for the

results of his investigation. Sergeant Basso then checked Mr. Toscano’s central file and saw that the

memorandum he had written regarding the interview was not in his file. Sergeant Basso handdelivered a second copy of the report to the records department for placement in Mr. Toscano’s file,

told the counselor he had done so, and told Mr. Toscano that he had fixed the problem. 

Mr. Toscano filed an inmate grievance against sergeant Basso claiming that sergeant Basso

said he could stop the report and address his grievance or, if Mr. Toscano would let him finish

typing his report, he would get Mr. Toscano sent to a transitional program unit for an SNY. Docket

# 20 at 14. Sergeant Basso denies that he said any of these things, and states that he told Mr.

Toscano he would complete a memo for the ICC to review. Docket # 194 at 8. It is undisputed that

sergeant Basso had no authority to send Mr. Toscano to an SNY. Id. On or about April 17, 2011,

sergeant Countess told Mr. Toscano he would be in ad-seg from six to twelve months before being

sent to an SNY. Mr. Toscano remained in ad-seg through June 2011. 

In anticipation of an ICC hearing regarding Mr. Toscano’s housing, C/C Clower talked to

Mr. Toscano on June 21, 2011 at his cell-front in ad-seg. Docket # 198 (Clower Decl.) at 2. Mr.

Toscano states that C/C Clower remembered him from the SHU and was hostile to him because Mr.

Toscano had filed an appeal about a false validation years ago and did not withdraw it. Docket # 20

at 14. The parties agree that C/C Clower told Mr. Toscano he was scheduled for an ICC hearing and

that Mr. Toscano refused to attend it. Id. at 15; RT 180-181. The parties disagree as to what else

was said. Mr. Toscano states that he told Clower he wanted to go to an SNY, as he had been

promised by sergeant Basso. Amend. Compl. at 14-15; RT 185; but see RT 180-181 (Mr. Toscano

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 Clower’s version of the statement is different. Clower declares that Mr. Toscano stated,

“‘I just want to be released to GP. I can go to any GP except Pelican Bay.’” Clower Decl., p. 2. 

When asked why he could not be released to Pelican Bay’s GP, Mr. Toscano stated that Pelican Bay

GP didn’t have “‘any programs and [he didn’t] want to be where there is no program.’” Id. Clower

understood Mr. Toscano’s use of “program” to mean programs for inmates such as job assignments,

education or vocational training. Id. Clower also declares that Mr. Toscano said that he had no

safety concerns, did not want to go to an SNY, and that “‘all these investigations and

documentations about my safety concerns are all made up and not true.” Id. When asked, Mr.

Toscano denied that he had any enemy concerns in the prison system.

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testifying that he does not recall what they said).8

 Clower wrote in a chrono for the meeting that Mr.

Toscano said he had no safety concerns and “‘all these investigations and documentations about my

safety concerns are all made up and not true, and no I don’t want to go to a SNY. Sgt. Basso lied

about me. It is a bogus investigation.’” Docket # 199-3 at 3. 

Mr. Toscano argues that C/C Clower’s statements are “not true,” and that he told her he

wanted to go to an SNY. Docket # 217 at 4. Interestingly, however, Mr. Toscano’s statements in an

inmate appeal dated April 17, 2011 closely track what C/C Clower wrote. In his inmate appeal, Mr.

Toscano wrote: “Look I want out of this unlawful confinement ad/seg immediately transferred to a

mainline that going to fit my needs. As I mentioned I’m not here for ‘disciplinary reasons’ & this

continued unnecessary bogus investigation on (2) documents that were investigated 7-9 yrs. ago is a

constitutional violation, as I should be transferred immediately with my mainline status.” Docket #

227-1 at 4. 

An ICC hearing was held on June 23, 2011, at which prison officials decided to release Mr.

Toscano from ad-seg to “FAC-B only” and to remove his single-cell designation. Docket # 199-3 at

3. Mr. Toscano chose not to appear at the ICC hearing where he could have told the committee of

his disagreement with C/C Clower’s report. RT 186-187. Mr. Toscano “rarely go[es]” to

committees because he does not trust them. RT 187.

On June 24, 2011, Mr. Toscano was told by two correctional officers to pack up and that he

would be moved. Mr. Toscano smuggled with him a razor that he had found to use as a weapon. 

RT 165, 208. He was taken to the general population unit of B-6, rather than the TPU/SNY unit of

B-3, where he had expected to be taken. Mr. Toscano informed C/O Bustamante and C/O Garza that

he could not be housed in B-6 because he had “‘locked it up’ for protected custody” and was

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“targeted for assault/murder.” Docket # 20 at 15. Mr. Toscano further states that he explained that

he had done an interview with lieutenant Strain on April 7 and sergeant Basso on April 16 in which

he provided information, “thus making plaintiff an informant, and targeted for assault/murder.” 

Docket # 224 at 2. C/Os Bustamante and Garza told him “they were given orders to house plaintiff

there.” Id. C/O Bustamante declares that he doesn’t recall the events involving Mr. Toscano in June

2011 but doubts that they are true because, if Mr. Toscano had said these things, his normal practice

would have been to immediately contact his supervisor, the sergeant, and (if he believed Mr.

Toscano was facing a real, known threat), he would have moved Mr. Toscano to a holding cell while

discussing the matter with the sergeant. Docket # 193 (Bustamante Decl.) at 2. C/O Garza declares

that he did not meet Mr. Toscano until June 27, 2011. Docket # 197 (Garza Decl.) at 2. It is

undisputed, however, that the safety concerns Mr. Toscano reportedly voiced were the same

concerns that had just been investigated and considered by the ICC, which one day earlier had

directed his transfer to the facility to which he was being sent.

Mr. Toscano was single-celled in the B-6 housing unit for a few days until June 27, 2011,

when Mr. Ramirez was moved into the cell with him. Docket # 20 at 15. Mr. Toscano was not asked

and did not consent to Mr. Ramirez’s placement in his cell. According to Mr. Toscano, Mr. Ramirez

did not want to assault Mr. Toscano when he first arrived because he did not know about Mr.

Toscano. RT 197. In fact, Mr. Ramirez thought Mr. Toscano was White, and did not realize

otherwise until Mr. Toscano told Mr. Ramirez, “I was half Mexican, so I was from up North, so they

labeled me as a Northerner.” RT 89. Mr. Ramirez told Mr. Toscano he was active, and Mr.

Toscano told Mr. Ramirez he was not active. RT 37. Mr. Toscano believes that Mr. Ramirez did

not have a weapon when he arrived in the cell and instead obtained it from a Northerner in an upper

tier cell at shower time. RT 45. Mr. Toscano contemplated attacking Mr. Ramirez upon his arrival

in the cell, and could have stabbed him with the razor Mr. Toscano had smuggled with him from adseg. RT 87-90. 

The parties agree that Mr. Toscano requested to be moved on June 27, 2011, but disagree

somewhat as to what he said. Mr. Toscano stated that he told C/Os Bustamante and Garza “that

plaintiff could not live with I/M Ramirez because he was an active gang member and plaintiff was

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 Mr. Toscano states that “do what we [got] to do to separate” meant the inmates were to

fight. Mr. Toscano does not, however, state that anyone actually told the inmates to fight, and his

strained interpretation of the meaning of the statement is not competent evidence that any

correctional officer directed him to engage in a fight with his cellmate. Without more, the inference

he seeks to draw is not reasonable. 

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protected custody (SNY).” Docket # 20 at 15; Docket # 222 at 2. But cf. RT 67 (Toscano testifying

that, with regard to alerting C/O Eberly, “I couldn’t tell him I was protective custody cause my

cellee probably would have got me from behind in the cell.”) Mr. Toscano states that “[o]fficials”

“told plaintiff to send a request to the lieutenant, if we want to separate, or do what we go to do to

separate” and walked away. Docket # 20 at 16 (error in source).9

 C/O Garza describes the events of

June 27 somewhat differently, and recalls that “Toscano told me that Ramirez was a ‘Northerner’

and that Toscano was a ‘nonaffiliate.’ Mr. Toscano did not tell me he needed to get out of his cell or

express any urgency or safety concerns to me.” Docket # 197 at 2. C/O Garza told Mr. Toscano

that he would pass along the information and check into accommodating a cell move. Id. C/O

Garza states that “nothing about the situation made me believe that Toscano had an urgent need to

change cells,” and he did not perceive that either of the inmates posed a threat to each other. Id. at

2-3. 

C/O Garza checked the bed cards in the program office in the unit, which included

information as to “whether an inmate identifies himself as a Northern or Southern Hispanic inmate. 

Both Toscano and his cellmate Ramirez were identified as Northerners.” Id. at 3. As a floor officer,

C/O Garza would not have had authority to override a classification committee’s determination that

Mr. Toscano was categorized as a Northerner for housing purposes. Id. During a shift change on

June 27, C/O Garza told an officer on third watch that Mr. Toscano informed him that he was

nonaffiliated and his cellmate was a Northerner. That third watch officer also verified that the bed

cards indicated both inmates were identified as Northerners. Id. As of that date, neither Mr.

Toscano nor Mr. Ramirez was validated as an active member or associate of any prison gang. Id. 

Mr. Toscano states that he also informed C/O Thompson that he “could not live with I/M

Ramirez because he was an active gang member.” Docket # 226 at 1. C/O Thompson recalls that

Mr. Toscano and Mr. Ramirez told him “together that they weren’t getting along and that they

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would like a bed move.” Docket # 191 (Thompson Decl.) at 2. C/O Thompson told the inmates that

he would tell the Floor 1 Officers “to see what they could do about getting them a bed move”

because Floor 2 Officers like him did not make cell moves because they did not work in the unit all

the time. Id. 

Mr. Toscano states that he also informed C/O Eberly on June 27 that he “could not live with

I/M Ramirez because he was an active Northern inmate and plaintiff was not active and was not

suppose to be house here.” Docket # 227 at 1 (errors in source). Mr. Toscano again requested a cell

change when C/O Eberly was passing out mail, and C/O Eberly said “no” in what appeared to Mr.

Toscano to be an angry manner. Id. at 2. After the mail was handed out and the inmate count was

completed, C/O Eberly called the program office and told an officer that Mr. Toscano “said he was

not getting along with his cellmate. That officer told [C/O Eberly] that Facility B staff from second

watch (the 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. shift) was already looking into the possibility of a cell move for

Toscano.” Docket # 190 (Eberly Decl.) at 4. Thus, even if it appeared to Mr. Toscano that his

requests were falling on deaf ears, prison officials did take steps in response to those requests – two

different officers checked his bed card and they were looking into the possibility of a cell change. 

But their actions had not proceeded very far before the fight occurred just a few hours after Mr.

Martinez was moved into the cell. 

5. The Cellmates Fight And Force Is Used By Correctional Staff

Mr. Toscano and Mr. Ramirez were let out of their cell to take showers on June 27, 2011. In

their housing unit, there was one shower upstairs and one shower downstairs, and each inmate

normally would go into a different shower. On June 27, Mr. Toscano knew Mr. Ramirez would be

going upstairs to borrow shower shoes. RT 46-48. Nonetheless, when let out of their cell to shower,

Messrs. Ramirez and Toscano both went upstairs. RT 48. Before either reached the shower, Mr.

Ramirez attacked Mr. Toscano by hitting him several times in the face. The inmates then fought and

the control booth operator sounded the alarm.

The parties disagree as to whether Mr. Ramirez used a weapon and stabbed Mr. Toscano

during the fight. Although Mr. Toscano states that he was stabbed in the shoulder by Mr. Ramirez,

the responding officers state that they saw no weapon being used during the fight or stab wounds,

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the medical report lists no wounds or punctures, and Mr. Toscano never saw the weapon or sought

care for any stab wound. Compare Docket # 20 at 16 with Docket # 190 at 5, Docket # 191 at 5; and

RT 206. The photographic evidence supports defendants’ view and undermines plaintiff’s statement

that he was stabbed. An inmate-made weapon later was found in the holding cell in which Mr.

Ramirez was placed after the fight. See Docket # 189-3 at 12 (photo of weapon shows a wrapped

pen-sized object with a needle or pin point). Mr. Ramirez received a rule violation report charging

him with assault with a weapon, but was found guilty of only possession of a weapon due to the

absence of evidence that Mr. Ramirez had been stabbed, the absence of any evidence that a weapon

had been seen during the fight, and the fact that the weapon had been found in the holding cell rather

than at the site of the fight. 

C/Os Eberly and Thompson responded to try to stop the fight. The parties disagree as to the

amount of force used by C/Os Eberly and Thompson. 

Mr. Toscano’s version: While fighting with Mr. Ramirez, Mr. Toscano was assaulted

by C/O Eberly and C/O Thompson, “who began beating plaintiff with their batons and pepper

sprayed in the eyes/face.” Docket # 20 at 16. Defendants “began hitting plaintiff in the head and

ears with the batons causing plaintiff’s head and ears to swell up . . . [and] also began kicking

plaintiff in the back – ribs, arm, causing serious injuries to plaintiff.” Docket # 217 (verified

opposition) at 18. After the fight ended, Mr. Toscano “was then placed in restraints behind his back,

picked up half ways, then deliberately dropped face first on the ground, causing more pain and

injuries.” Docket # 20 at 16; see also Docket # 217 at 17 (“plaintiff was put in restraints pick up

about (4) feet and dropped causing injuries, swelling to plaintiff’s left knee, chest, lip.” (errors in

source)). Mr. Toscano also states that, had the fight occurred in the cell, Mr. Ramirez would have

fared worse: “I would have got him first. I would have beat him up first, beat him, cut him with the

razor I had.” RT 208. 

Defendants’ Version: Defendants describe a much more limited use of force and

deny that Mr. Toscano was dropped on the floor. See Docket # 190 at 4-5; Docket # 191 at 4. C/O

Eberly and C/O Thompson were at different locations in the housing unit when each heard the

control booth officer yell, “Get Down!” and saw the two inmates on the second-tier floor fighting. 

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C/O Eberly approached them, ordered the inmates to stop fighting, and sprayed Mr. Ramirez with a

short burst of pepper spray from about seven feet away. C/O Thompson ran past C/O Eberly and

used his expandable baton to strike Mr. Toscano – who was then on top of Mr. Ramirez and

struggling with Mr. Ramirez – once in the area of his buttocks. Mr. Ramirez and Mr. Toscano

continued to fight and disregarded commands to stop, so C/O Eberly sprayed Mr. Toscano with a

short burst of pepper spray from approximately seven feet away, and the spray hit Mr. Toscano in

the face. Docket # 190 at 4. Mr. Toscano started to lie flat on his stomach, but Mr. Ramirez

continued to swing at Mr. Toscano, so C/O Eberly sprayed Mr. Ramirez a second time with a short

burst of pepper spray from approximately six feet away, and the spray hit the left side of Mr.

Ramirez’s face. At this point, Mr. Ramirez laid down on his stomach and the fighting stopped. The

inmates were separated and handcuffed. C/O Thompson handcuffed Mr. Ramirez and C/O Eberly

focused on Mr. Toscano. C/O Eberly “handcuffed Toscano on the ground and then helped him to a

standing position. Though the ground was slippery with pepper spray, Toscano did not fall.” 

Docket # 190 at 5. Eberly led Mr. Toscano downstairs to be medically evaluated, and “did not drop”

him. Id.

Photos taken of Mr. Toscano after the fight show only redness and slight abrasions. 

See Docket # 142 at 74-87; Docket # 189-3 at 1-12. The nurse who examined Mr. Toscano after the

fight documented the injuries as consisting of only pepper spray to the eyes, and abrasions/scratches

to the ear, back of the head, left arm and knees. Docket # 189-2 at 22. The nurse noted on the form

that Mr. Toscano was released back to custody at “1832,” which was less than a half-hour after the

fight started. 

6. Housing After The Fight

On June 27, 2011, lieutenant Barneburg and captain Bell issued a CDC-114D notice to Mr.

Toscano putting him in ad-seg due to the fight. Docket # 20 at 16. 

After the fight with Mr. Ramirez, Mr. Toscano requested SNY placement. In early July

2011, Mr. Toscano signed a CDC128-B requesting SNY placement. 

Prison officials thereafter considered his case repeatedly and often came to different

decisions because there was mixed information about Mr. Toscano and a disagreement among prison

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officials as to the requirements for entry to an SNY. It is undisputed that the DRB is the highest

authority in the CDCR on housing matters. 

Mr. Toscano was endorsed for placement at Kern Valley’s SNY on August 3, 2011 by a

classification staff representative (CSR). Docket # 199-3 at 22. The CSR wrote that Mr. Toscano’s

retention in ad-seg was approved pending the transfer, and that the “transfer approval expired

12/1/2011.” Id. On August 31, 2011, at an ICC hearing Mr. Toscano refused to attend, the ICC

released Mr. Toscano to the Pelican Bay TPU to await his transfer to the Kern Valley SNY. Docket

# 199-3 at 21.

On December 1, 2011, while Mr. Toscano was still housed in the TPU, his endorsement for

SNY housing expired. C/C Soderlund was responsible for reviewing the case to recommend

whether to extend Mr. Toscano’s endorsement to an SNY, and realized that Mr. Toscano should not

have been housed in the TPU because he had not debriefed, and CDCR policy prohibited housing

inactive gang associates in the SNY without debriefing. Thus, Mr. Toscano was not eligible to be

housed in the TPU. C/C Soderlund sent to Mr. Toscano a CDC-114D notice that he was being

moved to ad-seg. The notice stated: “Based upon CDCR policy, your current SNY endorsement is

not appropriate, as you have not completed the debriefing process and/or have not been reviewed by

DRB for SNY placement.” Docket # 199-3 at 31. The CDC-114D notice further informed Mr.

Toscano that he would be kept in ad-seg pending an ICC review and a review of his future housing

and program needs. Id. 

At a hearing on December 14, 2011, the ICC referred Mr. Toscano to a CSR and again

recommended that the CSR approve him for placement in an SNY. Docket # 199-3 at 18. In

January 2012, a CSR referred Mr. Toscano’s case to the chief deputy warden for further

consideration because, although the ICC had recommended SNY placement based on safety

concerns, “SNY placement is inappropriate without the inmate first completing the debriefing

process and is inconsistent with departmental policy. The inmate’s safety concerns support [ad-seg]

placement until he has completed the debriefing process or until the safety issues are resolved.” 

Docket # 199-3 at 19. The ICC held a hearing on January 20, 2012, noted that the CSR had not

identified the source of the supposed policy requiring debriefing before SNY placement, and

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referred the matter to a CSR with a recommendation of SNY placement. Docket # 199-3 at 16. In

response, a CSR memo dated February 15, 2012, described several documents written in 2000,

2002, and 2003 that “document[ed] where the policy was written” that an inactive gang affiliate had

to debrief to be placed into an SNY. Docket # 199-3 at 15. The CSR referred the matter to the chief

deputy warden. Id.

The ICC held a hearing on May 23, 2012, and decided to retain Mr. Toscano in ad-seg

pending DRB review, and referred the case to the DRB with a recommendation that Mr. Toscano be

sent to Pelican Bay SHU or Corcoran SHU “based on prison gang validation as an ‘inactive’

associate of the Northern Structure prison gang, safety concerns, and refusal to debrief as required

per departmental policy prior to SNY housing.” Docket # 199-3 at 13. The ICC memorandum

noted that CDCR policy required an inmate to complete the debriefing process and be validated as a

“dropout” prior to SNY placement, and that Mr. Toscano said he was not interested in debriefing

and preferred to go before the DRB. Id. 

The DRB held a hearing on October 24, 2012 that Mr. Toscano refused to attend. Docket #

199-3 at 11. The DRB memo stated that the DRB reviewed the case and chose to “approve inmate

Toscano for transfer to California State Prison, Corcoran SHU on indeterminate status due to selfexpressed safety concerns.” Id. The DRB memo further stated that the DRB retained “transfer

control” and that a permanent transfer from the Corcoran SHU required prior DRB approval. Id. 

The importance of this “transfer control” is that it prevents him “from being given future housing

placements that could endanger his safety.” Docket # 195 (Hubbard Decl.) at 3-4. “At the Corcoran

SHU, Toscano would be surrounded by other inmates in a 180-degree design facility, like a general

population housing unit, but there would be fewer opportunities for other inmates to have physical

contact with Toscano compared to the general population. Housing Toscano in the Corcoran SHU

addressed Toscano’s safety concerns, because it allowed for less physical contact with other inmate

than in the general population.” Id. at 3. The Corcoran SHU is less restrictive than the Pelican Bay

SHU; for example, the cells have windows to the outside, inmates can see and speak to dozens of

other inmates in the unit, and the inmates “exercise alongside dozens of other inmates in small

management yards (fenced areas where other inmates are visible and audible).” Id. There is no

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evidence that Mr. Toscano was harmed after the June 27, 2011 fight or since his placement in the

Corcoran SHU. 

III. VENUE AND JURISDICTION

Venue is proper in the Northern District of California because a substantial part of the events

or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred at Pelican Bay State Prison in Del Norte County,

which is located within the Northern District. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1391(b). The Court has federal

question jurisdiction over this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment “against a party who

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of

proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is material if it

might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law, and a dispute about such a material

fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Generally, as is the situation with Defendants’ challenge to the Eighth Amendment and

retaliation claims, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the

record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. The burden then shifts

to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the

‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

Where, as is the situation with Defendants’ qualified immunity defense, the moving party

bears the burden of proof at trial, he must come forward with evidence which would entitle him to a

directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. See Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532,

1536 (9th Cir. 1992). He must establish the absence of a genuine dispute of fact on each issue

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material to his affirmative defense. Id. at 1537; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at

248. When the defendant-movant has come forward with this evidence, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine dispute of fact on the defense.

A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is

based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v.

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff’s verified complaint as

opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746,

plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, and allegations were not

based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). Mr. Toscano’s amended complaint

(Docket # 20) and his opposition (Docket # 217) are made under penalty of perjury and the factual

statements therein are considered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 

The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec.

Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and inferences to be drawn from the facts

also must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631.

V. DISCUSSION

A. Deliberate Indifference To Safety

1. Eighth Amendment

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane

ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Deliberate indifference to an inmate’s

health or safety may violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively,

sufficiently serious, i.e., “the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a

substantial risk of serious harm,” and (2) the official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the

substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

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The focus in this case is the second, or deliberate indifference, prong. Under the deliberate

indifference standard, the prison “official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 

Id. at 837. The prisoner “need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that

harm would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “Whether a prison official had the

requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual

ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison

official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. (citation

omitted). 

When prison officials actually know of a substantial risk to inmate safety, they “may be

found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not

averted. A prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure “‘reasonable safety,’” a

standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials’ “unenviable task of keeping dangerous

men in safe custody under humane conditions. Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate

indifference, prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45 (citations omitted). 

When, as here, the choices confronting prison officials involve competing safety concerns,

prison officials may consider the safety of other inmates. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457 (9th

Cir. 1986). There, the plaintiff alleged that a prison official ordered him “to report to a ‘tier porter

job’ in the protective custody unit” and, when plaintiff complained that doing so would endanger his

life, responded by “threaten[ing] him with disciplinary action if he refused to report to the site.” Id.

at 458. The plaintiff was beaten and raped at the job site by his cellmate about an hour later. Id.

The court held that the allegations had stated a cause of action and summary judgment should not

have been granted to defendant who presented no evidence to refute them. Id. at 461. Although it

allowed the case to proceed, the Berg court recognized that evidence might be developed providing

a fuller picture of prison officials’ decision-making, e.g., considerations of safety to other inmates or

choosing the best means of protecting the plaintiff. See id. at 461. The court discussed the

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consideration that must be given in light of the difficult choices for prison officials in matters of

inmate safety, and that the choices made “may implicate ‘competing institutional concerns for the

safety of prison staff or other inmates.’ Removing a prisoner from a hostile or vengeful inmate may

protect the prisoner, but the move may endanger others–particularly if the prisoner is himself

dangerous.” Id. (citation omitted). The court further discussed how these considerations impacted

the Eighth Amendment analysis. 

We believe that in applying the “deliberate indifference” standard in

this particular context, the trier of fact (judge or jury) must take into

account the foregoing considerations. Specifically, the trier must

consider whether, in allegedly exposing the prisoner to danger, the

defendant prison official(s) were guided by considerations of safety to

other inmates, whether the official(s) took “prophylactic or preventive

measures” to protect the prisoner, Whitley [v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

322 (1986)], and whether less dangerous alternatives were in fact

available. More generally, the legal standard must not be applied to an

idealized vision of prison life, but to the prison as it exists, and as

prison official(s) are realistically capable of influencing. In short, the

trier must consider context, as well as consequences. If the evidence

only involves a “dispute over the . . . existence of arguably superior

alternatives,” id., then the Supreme Court has indicated that the

plaintiff has not met his burden and the case should not be presented to

a jury. 

Berg, 794 F.2d at 462 (ellipses in original); see also Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr & Rehab.,

726 F.3d 1062, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (on deliberate indifference prong, plaintiff must demonstrate

that prison officials were aware of the substantial risk and “must show that there was no reasonable

justification for exposing the inmates to the risk”). 

a. Mr. Toscano Is Released To General Population in March 2011

In February 10, 2011, the DRB decided to release Mr. Toscano to general population. This

decision comported with the normal statewide policy to release to general population an inmate who

had been validated as an inactive gang affiliate. CDCR also had a policy that an inactive gang

affiliate could not be sent to an SNY until he had debriefed and was considered a dropout from the

gang. Mr. Toscano indisputably had not debriefed and was not considered a dropout from the

Northern Structure gang. It is undisputed that, when the DRB made its decision, it took into account

a report that Mr. Toscano had said he would not attend the hearing, did not care as to which

institution he was released, and had to be released because he was inactive. On the evidence in the

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record, no reasonable juror could find that defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial

risk of harm to Mr. Toscano in their housing decisions because they conducted a reasonable

investigation into his circumstances before deciding to release Mr. Toscano to the general

population in March 2011. 

It also is undisputed that the DRB considered documents that had mixed information about

Mr. Toscano. There was conflicting information from 2002: one message indicated Mr. Toscano

was targeted for assault, while another message verified that he was still on good terms with the

Northern Structure and Nuestra Familia prison gangs. There was information from 2004 that Mr.

Toscano was sharing NF material without authority and that this could result in him being targeted

for assault, although the document did not say he was targeted for assault. There was no current

information in his central file that put him on any “hit list,” showed that he was currently targeted

for assault, or that he had any run-ins with the Northern Structure or Nuestra Familia prison gangs. 

The DRB also had a report that, when asked in December 2010 about possible safety concerns based

on the 2002 and 2004 information, Mr. Toscano said this was “old news” and that he would have no

problems programming on a general population facility. Mr. Toscano admitted that he did not ask

for protective custody before he was first released to the general population in 2011 because he

wanted to first attack a Northerner and then ask for protective custody. RT 108, 133-134. Mr.

Toscano has failed to prove or raise a triable issue that any defendant was deliberately indifferent to

his safety in connection with the decision to release him from the SHU to the general population in

March 2011. 

b. Safety Concerns Voiced And Investigated In April 2011

Mr. Toscano fails to prove or show a triable issue that defendants acted with deliberate

indifference in failing to put him in the SNY in response to the safety concerns he voiced in April

2011. When Mr. Toscano expressed safety concerns shortly after his arrival in the general

population, prison officials moved him to ad-seg for protection while they investigated his reported

safety concerns in April 2011. Defendants did a thorough investigation and released him back to

general population in June 2011. Mr. Toscano fails to prove or show a triable issue that defendants

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acted with deliberate indifference in failing to put him in the SNY in response to the safety concerns

he voiced in April 2011. 

It is undisputed that Sergeant Basso thought Mr. Toscano was less-than-candid about gang

information and was concerned about the danger Mr. Toscano potentially posed if allowed into an

SNY. Sergeant Basso worried that Mr. Toscano wanted to gain access to the SNY to “proceed with

his unknown agenda.” Docket # 194 at 4. In reviewing Mr. Toscano’s case, Basso considered

confidential information in Mr. Toscano’s file that presented the same mixed information about Mr.

Toscano from 2002 and 2004 that was considered by the DRB in February 2011, was aware that Mr.

Toscano had admitted intending to attack someone less than a month earlier, and was aware that Mr.

Toscano was not a gang dropout. 

Prison officials reasonably could and did take into consideration the potential risk to other

inmates in the SNY in evaluating Mr. Toscano’s request to go there for purported safety concerns. 

See Berg, 794 F.2d at 462. CDCR officials had long been concerned with “sleeper” inmates getting

access to the SNY and attacking informants in the SNY, and CDCR policy was that the inmate had

to debrief and be a dropout – rather than just be an inactive gang affiliate – to be considered for SNY

placement. Mr. Toscano was only a validated inactive gang associate, not a gang “dropout,” and his

status did not generally warrant placement in the SNY. 

Mr. Toscano urges that the February 14, 2012 memorandum that mentioned the debriefing

requirement for SHU placements was fabricated to retaliate against him for not withdrawing his

inmate appeals, but he offers no competent evidence to support his speculation. See Docket # 217

at 12, 16, 21. A jury could not draw a reasonable inference by latching onto Mr. Toscano’s

speculative theory, especially when the memorandum applied statewide throughout the CDCR,

“reaffirm[ed]” a policy memorandum written a decade earlier, and made no mention of Mr. Toscano. 

Mr. Toscano has failed to show a triable issue that the February 14, 2012 memorandum was

fabricated, retaliatory or otherwise did not reflect longstanding CDCR policy. 

According to Mr. Toscano, he spoke privately to lieutenant Strain and provided information

about Northerners in his section who had asked for his name and other information, and the next day

those two inmates’ cell was searched. Cell searches were common – perhaps three a day – and there

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is nothing in the record to suggest that those two inmates were aware that Mr. Toscano’s information

had led to their cell being searched. More importantly, there is nothing to suggest the searches were

intended to instigate hostility by the two inmates against Mr. Toscano or that prison officials were

aware of risk to Mr. Toscano’s safety resulting from the searches. 

Mr. Toscano argues that he was told first that he would soon go to the SNY, and later was

told that he would be in ad-seg for many months before going to an SNY. Regardless of whether

someone told him that, such a statement does not demonstrate deliberate indifference in failing to

send him to an SNY because he did not meet the established criteria for such placement.

On the evidence in the record, no reasonable jury could find that defendants were

deliberately indifferent to Mr. Toscano’s safety needs in connection with the safety concerns he

expressed in April 2011. 

c. Mr. Toscano’s Housing During June 23-27, 2011

Mr. Toscano has failed to raise a triable issue on his claim that defendants were deliberately

indifferent in moving him back to general population on June 23, 2011. It is undisputed that, when

prison officials moved Mr. Toscano back to general population, it was only after they had

investigated the concerns Mr. Toscano raised in April 2011 and determined that he should be housed

in general population and did not belong in the SNY. 

Mr. Toscano was scheduled for an ICC hearing on June 23. In anticipation of that hearing,

C/C Clower came to speak to Mr. Toscano. The parties agree that Mr. Toscano told C/C Clower

that he refused to attend the ICC hearing. The parties disagree as to what else was said. Mr.

Toscano states that he expressed his desire to go to the SNY; C/C Clower states that Mr. Toscano

said he wanted to go to general population at any prison other than Pelican Bay because Pelican

Bay’s general population did not have programs. Their disagreement as to what was said does not

raise a triable issue because, even if Mr. Toscano had said he wanted to go to the SNY, he was only

reiterating a request that prison officials had just investigated and rejected, such rejection being

consistent with existing policy. 

On June 23, the ICC decided to release Mr. Toscano from ad-seg to the general population. 

Even if the ICC wanted to exclude Mr. Toscano from the policy that inactive inmates were not to be

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assigned to an SNY without first debriefing, there were no specific, corroborated threats to Mr.

Toscano’s safety supporting his transfer to an SNY. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3341.5(a)(8)

(2011) (one of the criteria making an inmate eligible for SNY placement is a verification “that the

inmate is in present danger of great bodily harm. The inmate’s uncorroborated personal report, the

nature of the commitment offense or a record of prior protective custody housing shall not be the

sole basis for protective housing unit placement.”) The ICC considered the mixed information about

Mr. Toscano’s relationship with the Northern Structure gang in 2002 and 2004, as well as Mr.

Toscano’s view that any threats were “old news,” in concluding that he did not have any specific

safety concerns on the general population. When Mr. Toscano was escorted to general population

on June 24 after the ICC hearing, he continued to state that he was supposed to be in protective

custody, but prison officials had just investigated and rejected that request. He was then singlecelled until June 27. On the evidence in the record even viewed in Mr. Toscano’s favor, no

reasonable jury could conclude that defendants were deliberately indifferent in returning him to

general population on June 24, 2011. 

On June 27, 2011, Mr. Ramirez was moved into Mr. Toscano’s cell. Mr. Toscano concedes

that Mr. Ramirez did not arrive with an intent to attack him and that Mr. Ramirez attacked him only

after receiving an order from another inmate to do so – an order Mr. Toscano thinks was issued after

both inmates had left their cell to shower and were already on the second tier of the housing unit. 

Mr. Toscano’s lack of a sense of danger from Mr. Ramirez is evident from his decision to go

upstairs at the same time Mr. Ramirez was going upstairs to shower, rather than to go to the lower

shower to lock himself in or going to a correctional officer to seek immediate protection. 

In the few short hours they were cellmates, Mr. Toscano did ask several times to move away

from Mr. Ramirez. Mr. Toscano’s requests were cast in terms of his cellmate’s allegedly different

status and not because Mr. Ramirez had said or done anything threatening to him. And Mr. Toscano

was using categorizations that were different from those used by prison officials, which may have

led to some confusion. For example, Mr. Toscano told a guard that Mr. Ramirez was an active gang

member because Mr. Toscano thought all Northern Hispanic inmates in general population were in a

gang if they were, in his words, “functioning/programming.” Mr. Toscano provides no competent

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evidence to support his belief, and his belief leaves no room for the large group of inmates who are

not involved in any gang and does not take into account the fact that Northerners were not a gang. 

Thus, when Mr. Toscano said Mr. Ramirez was “active” and he was “non-affiliated,” Mr. Toscano

was using terms differently than prison officials used those terms because Mr. Ramirez indisputably

was not known to prison officials to be an active gang affiliate, and Mr. Toscano was “inactive” but

no prison official had designated him as “non-affiliated.” When prison officials checked the bed

cards for the inmates after Mr. Toscano protested being celled with Mr. Ramirez, they saw that Mr.

Ramirez and Mr. Toscano were both classified as Northerners. Mr. Toscano spoke to prison

officials about his desire to move away from Mr. Ramirez, but provides no evidence that he

expressed any urgency or imminent danger when he requested the move, and fails to show that any

defendant was deliberately indifferent to his safety in the few hours that Mr. Ramirez and Mr.

Toscano were cellmates before they fought moments after their release from the cell. 

Mr. Toscano states that he told C/O Bustamante and Garza that he could not live with Mr.

Ramirez because Mr. Ramirez was an active gang member and Mr. Toscano was protected custody

SNY – neither of which was correct. Garza recalls the conversation as being that Mr. Toscano said

Mr. Ramirez was a Northerner and Mr. Toscano was a nonaffiliate. Even accepting Mr. Toscano’s

version of what he said as true, it is undisputed that Garza checked their bed cards in the program

unit and saw that both Mr. Toscano and Mr. Ramirez were identified as Northerners. And it is

undisputed that Garza also told another officer of Mr. Toscano’s comment, and the other officer also

verified that both inmates were Northerners. There is no evidence that prison officials viewed the

“Northerner” label as meaning that the inmate was in a prison gang. Nor is there any evidence

(other than Mr. Toscano’s assertion) that Mr. Ramirez was in fact an active gang member. Far from

reacting with deliberate indifference, prison officials checked into Mr. Toscano’s claims and

determined that the cellmates had the same status and did not need to be separated for that reason.

Mr. Toscano also argues that Mr. Ramirez should not have been celled with him because the

inmates had not signed a double-celling chrono agreeing to be double-celled with each other. Mr.

Toscano has failed to provide competent evidence to dispute defendants’ evidence that the doublecelling chrono is not used every time an inmate is given a cellmate. Inmates, like Mr. Ramirez, who

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arrived at Pelican Bay from a reception center would often be double-celled without either inmate

signing the form. 

Mr. Toscano’s case is analogous to the case of Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714

F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2013). In Labatad, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of

prison officials against a deliberate indifference claim from an inmate who was assaulted by a

member of a rival prison gang with whom he was temporarily assigned to share a cell in a prison

that did not house rival gangs separately. Id. at 1157. The plaintiff in Labatad was a gang member

and fought with a member of another gang, after which both combatants told prison investigators

that the fight was not gang related and that they had no further issues. Id. Plaintiff then was put in

ad-seg and assigned to share a cell with another inmate from the same gang as the inmate with

whom plaintiff had just fought. Id. There had been no difficulties with the new cellmate during the

extended period both had been in general population, there had been no threats from the new

cellmate, and the new cellmate was not identified as an enemy or risk to the plaintiff. Id. Three

days after moving in, the new cellmate assaulted the plaintiff. Id. The attacking cellmate later said

that he assaulted plaintiff because they were from different gangs and thought he (the cellmate)

would be attacked unless he did so first. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the evidence did not

preclude summary judgment on the claim that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a

substantial risk that the new cellmate would assault plaintiff if the two were housed in the same cell.

Id. at 1161. The court noted the absence of prior conflict between plaintiff and the new cellmate

and the assurances that the earlier fight was not gang related. Id. at 1161. The court rejected the

plaintiff’s argument that his “evidence that he told [a prison] officer that he should not be housed

with [the new cellmate]” was sufficient to defeat summary judgment; plaintiff had not specified who

he told or what he told them to raise a triable issue “that the defendants knew of facts supporting an

inference and drew the inference of a substantial risk to [plaintiff] if he was placed in a cell with” the

new cellmate. Id. 

Mr. Toscano’s case is like Labatad in that there was no evidence of prior conflict between

Mr. Toscano and Northerners in general or with Mr. Ramirez in particular, there was no evidence of

recent threats to Mr. Toscano, and Mr. Ramirez had not been listed as an enemy of Mr. Toscano. 

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They also were not members of rival gangs. There was no obvious basis for prison officials to

anticipate the likelihood of tension and conflict between the two. Unlike Labatad, what Mr.

Toscano said when he asked to be moved away from Mr. Ramirez is not sufficient to raise a triable

issue “that the defendants knew of facts supporting an inference and drew the inference of a

substantial risk to [Toscano] if he was placed in a cell with” Mr. Ramirez. Id.

Analysis of the present case also is guided also by the dissimilarities between Mr. Toscano’s

facts and those in Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2015), a case in which the Ninth Circuit

reversed the grant of summary judgment on a deliberate indifference claim from an inmate who was

attacked by two fellow inmates while all three were being escorted through a dangerous part of the

prison by a single guard. In Cortez, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of deliberate

indifference by the defendant who had attempted to escort the three inmates single-handedly: there

was evidence that the officer knew about the hostility between the inmates based on the inmates’

harassing conversation, evidence that the officer was aware of the plaintiff’s protective custody

status, and evidence that the officer knew prison policy required leg restraints for these inmates

during escort but did not put them in leg restraints. See id. at 1052-53. By contrast, in Mr.

Toscano’s case, there were no comparable facts to make the defendants aware of the risk: there was

no evidence of likely tension that anyone engaged in harassing conversation with Mr. Toscano or

otherwise expressed hostility toward him before Mr. Ramirez and Mr. Toscano exited their cell at

shower time on June 27, that Toscano was a protected custody inmate, or that defendants knew of a

policy contrary to the steps they took.

Even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Toscano, and inferences

therefrom drawn in his favor, a reasonable jury could not find that defendants were deliberately

indifferent to a known risk to Mr. Toscano’s safety. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in

their favor because Mr. Toscano has not established a genuine issue for trial as to whether any of the

defendants were deliberately indifferent to a risk to his safety. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324

(The fight between Mr. Ramirez and Mr. Toscano, as well as the use of force by C/Os

Thompson and Eberly are discussed later, in Section B.) 

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10 The Court occasionally refers to the TPU/SNY together because they had the same

function. The TPU, or Transitional Program Unit, was the name of the housing unit at Pelican Bay

in which inmates who have been endorsed for housing in an SNY are housed while they await

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d. Mr. Toscano’s Housing After The Fight

After the June 27, 2011 fight, prison officials put Mr. Toscano into ad-seg and then, upon

Mr. Toscano’s request, put him in the TPU/SNY.10 Prison officials thereafter considered Mr.

Toscano’s case several times and often came to different conclusions because of the mixed

information about him as well as disagreement about CDCR housing policies. Ultimately, the

highest authority on housing matters, the DRB, decided not to place him in an SNY. Mr. Toscano

has failed to raise a triable issue in support of his claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent

in their housing decisions that led to his removal from the TPU/SNY and eventual transfer to

Corcoran’s SHU. 

The evidence shows that Mr. Toscano was endorsed for SNY housing and placed in the TPU

to wait for transfer to a prison with an SNY. When the endorsement for an SNY expired in

December 2011, C/C Soderlund looked at his case and realized that Mr. Toscano actually was not

supposed to be in the SNY under the CDCR’s policy because he had not debriefed. To Mr.

Toscano’s dismay, C/C Soderlund caused him to be moved back to ad-seg to wait for an ICC to

review his case. Thereafter, the ICC recommended SNY placement, and the CSR disagreed with

that recommendation and sent the case to the chief deputy warden, and eventually Mr. Toscano’s

case was referred to the DRB, which was the ultimate housing authority in the CDCR. At the DRB

hearing on October 24, 2012, the DRB determined that Mr. Toscano should be transferred to the

Corcoran SHU after considering information that Mr. Toscano was inactive, did not wish to debrief,

did not wish to be housed in general population, and had entered the general population in March

2011 with a plan to attack a Northerner before seeking protective custody. The DRB reasonably

considered Mr. Toscano’s safety as well as the safety of other inmates, especially given Mr.

Toscano’s previous admission that he planned to attack another inmate in general population.

See Berg, 794 F.2d at 462. There is simply no evidence to support Mr. Toscano’s speculation that

the DRB or any of the other decisionmakers were trying to set him up for assault/murder. 

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The disagreement among the classification committees, classification staff representatives

and counselors in the TPU regarding Mr. Toscano’s housing does not support a reasonable inference

that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety. There was confusion as to what the

CDCR policy was, as is evidenced by, for example, by the January 19, 2012 ICC memo stating that

the CSR had not identified the source of the supposed policy requiring debriefing before SNY

placement, which was followed by a CSR’s response with a description of the documents that

showed the written policy. See Docket # 199-3 at 15, 16. Mr. Toscano’s case presented some

conflicting facts. On the one hand, he had been attacked by Mr. Ramirez and had asked for SNY

placement. On the other hand, the information about potential safety concerns was mixed

information and was at least seven years old, Mr. Toscano had admitted intending to attack an

inmate upon his release in March 2011, Mr. Toscano had not debriefed and Mr. Toscano had a

notable (albeit old) disciplinary history involving violence and weapons. See footnote 3, supra. 

Prison officials thus faced a choice that implicated competing institutional concerns for the safety of

prison staff or other inmates. Berg, 794 F.2d at 461. Due to disagreement between the ICC and CSR

about his housing, Mr. Toscano’s case was referred to the DRB. The decision-making process

reflects Defendants’ attempts to reconcile CDCR policy with Mr. Toscano’s repeated assertion that

he belonged on an SNY. On the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury could not conclude that

prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Mr. Toscano when they

made the challenged decisions. 

Mr. Toscano argues that, as of about May 2012, prison officials knew he wanted to be

transferred to an out-of-state or federal facility, but fails to explain how defendants’ failure to accede

to that demand reflected deliberate indifference to his safety. Prison officials had a place for him in

the California prison system in the Corcoran SHU, and Mr. Toscano has not demonstrated that such

a placement was in deliberate indifference to his safety. The Eighth Amendment does not entitle an

inmate to any particular housing unit and instead commands that prison officials not inflict cruel and

unusual punishment which, in the present context, requires that they not be deliberately indifferent

to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. Prison officials have many ways to address safety

concerns, and the Eighth Amendment does not specify the particular methods they employ to keep

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their charges safe. Prison officials chose the Corcoran SHU for Mr. Toscano, and there is no

evidence that he has been harmed at that facility. 

Finally, Mr. Toscano’s damages claims regarding the housing decisions after June 27, 2011

fail for a separate reason. “[P]laintiffs alleging deliberate indifference must also demonstrate that

the defendants’ actions were both an actual and proximate cause of their injuries.” Lemire v.

California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013). Mr. Toscano presents

no evidence that he suffered any harm as a result of his placement in the housing units in which he

was placed after the June 27, 2011 fight or as a result of his transfer to the Corcoran SHU, and

therefore cannot recover damages on his deliberate indifference claim with respect to those

decisions. 

2. Qualified Immunity

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). The rule of qualified immunity “‘provides ample protection to all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991)

(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth a two-step inquiry for 

determining whether qualified immunity exists. First, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional

right?” Id. at 201. If no constitutional right was violated if the facts were as alleged, the inquiry

ends and defendants prevail. See id. If, however, “a violation could be made out on a favorable

view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established. . . . ‘The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 201-02 (quoting Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Although Saucier required courts to address the questions in

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the particular sequence set out above, courts now have the discretion to decide which prong to

address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 

The first step under Saucier is to determine whether a constitutional violation was alleged. 

As shown in the preceding discussion, the evidence in the record does not establish an Eighth

Amendment violation. Even if the evidence did establish such a violation, that would only satisfy

the first step of the Saucier analysis.

The next step under Saucier is to consider whether the contours of the right were clearly

established, an inquiry that “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a

broad general proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The law was clearly established that a

correctional officer could not disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate of which he

was aware and had a duty to protect an inmate from violence at the hands of other inmates. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. However, no case had held that inmates had a right to automatically be put

in SNY upon request. 

The Ninth Circuit clarified the qualified immunity analysis for a deliberate indifference

claim in Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). In Estate of Ford,

the court stated “it would have been clear to a reasonable prison official that if he knew about an

excessive risk to inmate safety, and inferred from the facts of which he was aware that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, he would violate the law by disregarding it.” The court explained that,

for an Eighth Amendment violation based on a condition of confinement (such as a safety risk), the

official must subjectively have a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., “‘a prison official cannot be

found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement

unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Thus, a reasonable prison official

understanding that he cannot recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm, could know all

of the facts yet mistakenly, but reasonably, perceive that the exposure in any given situation was not

that high. In these circumstances, he would be entitled to qualified immunity.” Estate of Ford, 301

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F.3d at 1050 (citations omitted). In Estate of Ford, the court explained that even though the general

rule of deliberate indifference had been expressed in Farmer, no authorities had “fleshed out ‘at

what point a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment

purposes.’” Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1051 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 n.3). Because it had

not been fleshed out in that case, “it would not be clear to a reasonable prison official when the risk

of harm from double-celling psychiatric inmates with one another changes from being a risk of some

harm to a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer left that an open issue. This necessarily informs

‘the dispositive question’ of whether it would be clear to reasonable correctional officers that their

conduct was unlawful in the circumstances that [they] confronted.” Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1051

(emphasis in original).

Estate of Ford further mandates dismissal of Mr. Toscano’s case. Before the June 27, 2011

fight, it would not have been clear to a reasonable prison official when the risk of harm from placing

Mr. Toscano in general population rather than an SNY increased from a risk of some harm to a

substantial risk of serious harm. Prison officials had an inmate with mixed information, and they

had a long-standing concern about inmates trying to gain access to the SNY to attack inmates who

had debriefed. At the time officials made their decisions before the fight with Mr. Ramirez on June

27, 2011, the circumstances prison officials faced included old information in Mr. Toscano’s

confidential file from 2002 and 2004 that suggested both that he might be a target and that he was in

good standing with the Northern Structure, the existence of information in his file that he had not

had problems with other gang affiliates, and his expressed desire in early 2011 to go to general

population. Cf. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 785 F.3d 336, 348-49 (9th Cir. 2015) (defendant

not entitled to qualified immunity for putting an intoxicated, combative stranger in a sobering cell

with bumbling drunken plaintiff who had been arrested for his own safety, without any basis to

conclude the risk of altercation was minimal; distinguishing Estate of Ford based on the latter’s

reasoned decision-making with input from the concerned parties and file review).

As for the events of June 27, 2011, when Mr. Ramirez was moved into Mr. Toscano’s cell, it

would not have been clear to a reasonable official when the risk of double-celling these inmates

increased from a risk of some harm to a substantial risk of serious harm. Prison officials understood

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Mr. Toscano to be asking for a convenience move, and not to be expressing an urgent need for a

move because he was in danger. Mr. Toscano had mentioned that Mr. Ramirez and he each had a

different status, but prison officials reasonably checked into his statements and determined that both

inmates were listed as Northerners, without either being listed as active in a prison gang. A

reasonable prison official could reasonably perceive that the inmate’s exposure to any risk of harm

was not substantial in the absence of a specific threat from Mr. Ramirez. 

Because the law and the facts here did not put defendants on notice that their conduct would be

clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate. See Saucier, 533

U.S. at 202. 

As to the housing decisions after the fight – when Mr. Toscano was not sent to general

population and was eventually refused SNY housing – a reasonable prison official would not have

thought it unlawful to refuse to put Mr. Toscano in SNY under the known circumstances. A

reasonable official could reasonably perceive that the inmate’s exposure to any risk of harm was not

substantial when there was evidence that Mr. Toscano had not debriefed, had a confidential file that

had old and mixed information as to the possibility of a threat against him, had intended in March

2011 to attack a Northern inmate, and had an old but violent disciplinary record.

Defendants met their burden of proof in their moving papers, and Mr. Toscano did not

introduce evidence to show the existence of a genuine issue of fact on the defense. Defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the qualified immunity defense to the deliberate

indifference to safety claims. 

B. Excessive Force

Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the

Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 317 (1986)). In determining whether

the use of force was for the purpose of maintaining or restoring discipline, or for the malicious and

sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court may evaluate the need for application of force, the

relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the

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threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity

of a forceful response. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; see also Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195

(9th Cir. 1979) (guards may use force only in proportion to need in each situation).

As evident in the “Background” section above, the parties’ versions of the incident differ

sharply with regard to the amount of force used on Mr. Toscano on June 27, 2011. Mr. Toscano has

shown a triable issue as to whether defendants’ use of force by C/Os Eberly and Thompson

amounted to excessive force. Mr. Toscano’s version is that he was “excessively sprayed . . . in the

face (eyes) from (1) feet away” with pepper spray, and then defendants “began hitting plaintiff in the

head and ears with the batons causing plaintiff’s head and ears to swell up . . . [and] also began

kicking plaintiff in the back–ribs, arm, causing serious injuries to plaintiff.” Docket # 217 at 18. 

According to Mr. Toscano, he was then deliberately dropped face-first onto the floor from a height

of three or four feet while he was in restraints. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Mr.

Toscano was dropped purposefully based on his evidence that he was “picked up half ways, then

deliberately dropped face first.” Docket # 20 at 16; see also Docket # 217 at 18 (“plaintiff was put

in restraints pick up about (4) feet and dropped causing injuries, swelling to plaintiff left knee, chest,

lip.” (errors in source)). The evidence that Mr. Toscano was dropped presents the strongest point for

him because, at that point, the fight had ended, and there was no need for an application of force and

no threat was reasonably perceived by the officer. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Purposefully

dropping an already handcuffed inmate who was not resisting face first onto the floor is just the sort

of malicious and sadistic use of force for the very purpose of causing harm that is prohibited by the

Eighth Amendment. See id. at 6-7. Mr. Toscano’s evidence is in marked contrast to defendants’

evidence that Mr. Toscano was squirted once with pepper spray from a distance of 7 feet, was hit

once with a baton, and was not dropped. 

If believed, Mr. Toscano’s version would lead to a conclusion that C/Os Eberly and

Thompson used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. If believed, the version of

C/Os Eberly and Thompson would permit a jury to conclude that the force used was a reasonable

and tempered response in an effort to restore order in the prison. Summary judgment is not the place

for credibility determinations. Mr. Toscano has established a “genuine issue for trial’” concerning

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11 Generation loss appears to be on display in this case in the different copies of the

document that is labeled TOSPROD000007-A. The electronically filed copy at Docket # 189-3 at 4

is perhaps the clearest (as it shows freckles and chest hairs); the color copy of that document

submitted by defendants as a courtesy copy to the Court is slightly less clear; the black and white

paper copy of that document filed by plaintiff (Docket # 228) is even less clear; and the scanned

version of that copy (Docket # 228 at 72) is the least clear.

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whether he was dropped on the floor and whether defendants repeatedly hit him with their batons

and kicked him on June 27, 2011, conduct which could constitute excessive force under certain

circumstances. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Summary

judgment therefore is not appropriate on the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against these

two defendants. 

The photos of Mr. Toscano’s injuries show only some redness and slight abrasions on Mr.

Toscano. Mr. Toscano states that he received “a mild concussion,” but there is no evidence that any

trained professional diagnosed him with a concussion. Docket # 228 at 3. Mr. Toscano accuses

defendants of submitting photos of his injuries that “are clearly altered/photoshopped,” and that the

photos he submitted on May 13, 2014 show the discrepancies. Docket # 228 at 2-3. The Court has

compared the photos filed by Mr. Toscano (i.e., Docket # 142 at 74-87) with the photos at Exhibit F

to the Barneburg Declaration (i.e., Docket # 189-3 at 1-12), and sees nothing in the latter photos

suggesting they were photoshopped or altered. A far more reasonable explanation for any

differences in the documents is that photocopy quality deteriorates with each generation of copying

– a process called generation loss – so that a copy made of a copy of an original is not as crisp as the

original, and a copy made of a copy of a copy is even less crisp.11

The parties disagree as to whether Mr. Toscano was stabbed, but that really does not matter

for purposes of liability on his excessive force claim. An inmate with a weapon or an inmate seen

stabbing another inmate might support a greater use of force to subdue fighting inmates, but here it

is undisputed that defendants saw neither a weapon nor signs of a stabbing at the time they used

force. 

The same factual disputes that preclude summary judgment on the excessive force claim

preclude summary judgment on the qualified immunity defense for C/O Eberly and Thompson. 

There is a dispute of facts as to whether a reasonable official would not have thought it lawful to

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kick, repeatedly strike with a baton, squirt pepper spray extensively under the circumstances claimed

by Mr. Toscano, and then drop a restrained inmate face-first. 

C. Retaliation

A prisoner has a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials without

being subjected to retaliation in response thereto. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.

2012). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because

of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his

First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

Defendants do not dispute that Mr. Toscano engaged in activity protected by the First

Amendment before they acted in response to Mr. Toscano’s safety concerns, housing requests and

inmate appeals about them. Instead, they argue that Mr. Toscano’s retaliation claims fail because he

cannot show a chilling effect, a causal connection or the absence of a legitimate penological purpose

for defendants’ actions.

Chilling effect: To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show a chilling effect on

his First Amendment rights. The proper inquiry is “‘whether an official’s acts would chill or silence

a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.’” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568

(quoting Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Defendants argue that Mr. Toscano did not show a chilling effect because he continued to pursue

prison grievances. The fact that Mr. Toscano continued to file inmate appeals and send letters does

not negate the existence of this element because the chilling effect need not be so great as to totally

silence the inmate. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (rejecting argument that inmate did not state a

claim for relief because he had been able to file inmate grievances and a lawsuit). 

Causal connection: A prisoner must show a “causal connection between the adverse action

and the protected conduct.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. Mere speculation that a defendant acted out

of a retaliatory motive is not enough. See Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2014)

(affirming grant of summary judgment where no evidence that defendants knew about plaintiff’s

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prior lawsuit, or that defendants’ disparaging remarks were made in reference to prior lawsuit). 

“[T]iming can properly be considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent,” although

timing alone is not enough to support a finding of retaliation. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808

(9th Cir. 1995); see, e.g., Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (summary

judgment proper against plaintiff who could only speculate that adverse employment decision was

due to his negative comments about his supervisor six or seven months earlier); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808

(error to find that the allegedly retaliatory action that preceded a television interview was caused by

the interview).

Mr. Toscano has not proven or shown a triable issue that defendants took their actions

because of his First Amendment activities. No reasonable jury could find that the decisions to not

place him in an SNY and not to accede to his housing requests were made to retaliate because of Mr.

Toscano’s inmate appeals and letters. The timing alone is insufficient to demonstrate the necessary

causal connection (particularly where there is little proximity between the protected activity and the

alleged act of retaliation). For instance: 

• Defendant Clower was hostile to Mr. Toscano on June 21, 2011 and wrote a chrono

with false information thereafter, according to Mr. Toscano. Mr. Toscano states that

Clower’s actions were in retaliation for Mr. Toscano “exercising his 1st Amend. right

to appeal and would not withdraw his false validation appeal against him and other

officials.” Docket # 20 at 15 (error in source). Mr. Toscano does not identify the

date on which his inmate appeal was filed and decided. Mr. Toscano also states that

Clower was retaliating against him “for pursuing litigation against him and other

officials.” Docket # 217 at 5, but does not identify date(s) of such litigation activity. 

Mr. Toscano further states that Clower acted adversely to him “in retaliation because

plaintiff told G. D. Lewis (warden), sgt. R. Basso, Lt. Manion, Lt. D. Strain, (AW)

P.T. Smith, (AW) M. A. Cook, Capt. R. Bell, R. Clower, J. Rush, L. Webster and

Does 1-20, numerous times that plaintiff would testify against them if they were

fabricating reports.” Docket # 20 at 16. Mr. Toscano does not provide the dates on

which his First Amendment activities occurred.

• Defendant Basso wrote a report that caused Mr. Toscano to be sent to ad-seg on or

about January 10, 2012. This was done to retaliate against Mr. Toscano “for filing

complaints and telling officials and sgt. Basso he would testify against them if they

were fabricating their reports.” Docket # 221 at 3. Mr. Toscano does not provide the

dates on which his First Amendment activities occurred. 

• Defendants Bustamante, Garza, and Eberly allowed Ramirez to be put in Mr.

Toscano’s cell on June 27, 2011, and defendant Eberly and Thompson used excessive

force on Mr. Toscano on that date. All this allegedly was “in retaliation because

plaintiff told G. D. Lewis (warden), sgt. R. Basso, Lt. Manion, Lt. D. Strain, (AW)

P.T. Smith, (AW) M. A. Cook, Capt. R. Bell, R. Clower, J. Rush, L. Webster and

Does 1-20, numerous times that plaintiff would testify against them if they were

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fabricating reports.” Docket # 20 at 16. Mr. Toscano does not provide the dates on

which he made his statements. 

• Defendants Soderlund, Melton and Wilber caused Mr. Toscano to be sent to ad-seg

on or about December 9, 2011 after Mr. Toscano declined to withdraw grievances

and appeals as they requested. Docket # 20 at 19. Mr. Toscano does not identify the

grievances and appeals to which he refers. Id. 

• Defendant Basso also allegedly told Mr. Toscano on December 31, 2011, that “he can

withdraw his appeal or go back to ad seg.” Docket # 20 at 20. It would appear that

this pertained to a pending inmate appeal, although there may have been several

pending at the time.

• Defendants involved in the May 23, 2012 ICC (i.e., Defendants Perez, Still, Cruse,

and Bradbury) decided to retain Mr. Toscano in ad-seg. And Defendant Perez issued

a CDC-114D notice two days earlier, on May 21, 2012, that Mr. Toscano was being

retained in ad-seg and referred to the DRB. Docket # 20 at 24. Mr. Toscano states

that their actions were in retaliation for his refusal to withdraw his appeals and

because he told numerous prison officials he would testify against officials if they

were fabricating reports. Docket # 217 at 21. 

• Defendants on the October 24, 2012 DRB (comprised of Defendants Hubbard, Speer,

Schoening, Alkire and Davis) decided to rescind Mr. Toscano’s SNY status and

transfer him to the Corcoran SHU. This allegedly was “in retaliation” “because

plaintiff has expressed to officials the things going on, on the (SNY) yards in which

officials allow new prison gangs to form & function etc.” Docket # 12 at 1. Mr.

Toscano attached to his supplemental complaint an October 18, 2012 letter addressed

to the DRB that indicated it was his tenth letter to the DRB about his concerns. Id. at

6-7. He also attached an October 18, 2012 letter to the office of internal affairs

requesting an investigation of the CDCR and its departments. 

Only three of these events had anything other than timing to support Mr. Toscano’s claim

that Defendants retaliated against him. Defendants made statements that arguably show a retaliatory

animus and are suggestive of a causal connection in three instances.

The first instance concerns an interaction with sergeant Basso on April 20, 2011 (described

at pp. 13-14 of this order). Sergeant Basso interviewed Mr. Toscano on April 15, 2011, and

allegedly told Mr. Toscano that Mr. Toscano would go to an SNY in 2-3 weeks after sergeant

Basso’s report; two days later, Mr. Toscano filed an inmate appeal about sergeant Basso’s interview

because another correctional officer told Mr. Toscano that he would not be sent to an SNY for 6-12

months. On April 20, sergeant Basso came to talk to Mr. Toscano about the appeal, “stating he can

stop his report and address the appeal, or let him finish typing his report. Then he’ll get plaintiff

sent to” TPU for SNY. Docket # 20 at 14. Mr. Toscano did not trust sergeant Basso so he sent his

inmate appeal back to sergeant Basso, apparently to go forward with the appeal. Eventually,

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12 There is no evidence that sergeant Basso had the authority to decide where Mr. Toscano

would be housed. See Docket # 194 at 8. Rather, sergeant Basso wrote a memorandum that was

reviewed by other decision-makers.

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sergeant Basso issued a memorandum dated May 5, 2011 that allegedly led to Mr. Toscano not

being sent to an SNY.12 The evidence is undisputed, however, that the May 5 memorandum was a

“shortened, final version” of an April 16 memorandum sergeant Basso had written expressing the

same worry that Mr. Toscano was providing just the minimum amount of information to get to the

SNY to proceed with an “unknown agenda.” Docket # 194 at 4. A reasonable jury could not infer

that Mr. Toscano’s April 17 inmate appeal caused sergeant Basso to write the adverse May 5

memorandum because sergeant Basso already had written that same information in a draft

memorandum on April 16, a day before Mr. Toscano wrote his inmate appeal. 

The second instance where a statement suggestive of retaliatory intent was made was on or

about December 9, 2011, when Defendants Melton and Soderlund allegedly told Mr. Toscano he

could stay in the TPU if he withdrew his “failure to protect/staff complaint appeal etc.” and, if not,

he would be taken off protected custody and placed in ad-seg. Docket # 20 at 19. Defendant Wilber

expressed the same sentiment “sometime after that.” Id. Mr. Toscano decline both offers, and filed

an inmate appeal on December 13, 2011. Mr. Toscano apparently was in ad-seg for not more than

five days (i.e., from December 9 through December 14, 2011). Id. at 20. Even accepting as true that

Defendants made the statements Mr. Toscano attributes to them, this retaliation claim fails because

Defendants’ actions of putting Mr. Toscano ad-seg were in furtherance of a legitimate correctional

goal: as an inmate who had not debriefed, Mr. Toscano did not belong in the SNY. See Docket #

199-3 at 31 (December 9, 2011 CDC-114D for ad-seg placement served by Soderlund, and signed

by Wilber stated: “Based upon CDCR policy, your current SNY endorsement is not appropriate, as

you have not completed the debriefing process and/or have not been reviewed by DRB for SNY

placement.”)

The third instance was on December 31, 2011, when sergeant Basso allegedly “told plaintiff

he can withdraw his appeal or go back to ad seg. Plaintiff declined to withdraw his appeal.” Docket

# 20 at 20. Mr. Toscano was sent back to ad-seg on January 10, 2012. Id. Even accepting as true

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that sergeant Basso made the statement Mr. Toscano attributes to him, this retaliation claim fails

because (a) there is no evidence that sergeant Basso thereafter took an adverse action against Mr.

Toscano, i.e., there is no evidence that sergeant Basso took part in any decision to send Mr. Toscano

back to ad-seg on or after December 31, 2011, and (b) the decision that later was made by other

prison officials to return Mr. Toscano to ad-seg was in furtherance of a legitimate correctional goal:

as an inmate who had not debriefed, he did not belong in the SNY. See Docket # 199-3 at 29

(January 10, 2012 CDC-114D for ad-seg placement stated: “Based upon CDCR policy, an SNY

endorsement is not appropriate, as you have not completed the debriefing process and/or have not

been reviewed by DRB for SNY placement.”)

Retaliation is not established simply by showing adverse activity by a defendant after

protected speech; rather, a plaintiff must show a nexus between the two. See Huskey, 204 F.3d at

899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest on the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc,

i.e., “after this, therefore because of this”); see, e.g., id. (summary judgment proper against plaintiff

who could only speculate that adverse employment decision was due to his negative comments

about his supervisor six or seven months earlier). The retaliation claims fail due to the absence of

evidence of a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse actions.

With regard to the use of force by defendants Eberly and Thompson, no reasonable jury

could find that their actions were due to Mr. Toscano’s First Amendment activity. Mr. Toscano has

offered absolutely no evidence that their spur-of-the-moment response to an inmate fight in which

Mr. Toscano was involved was done to retaliate against him for his First Amendment activities. The

complete absence of a causal connection between First Amendment activities and the use of force by

these defendants is fatal to the retaliation claim against them.

Legitimate correctional goals: The prisoner bears the burden of pleading and proving

absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains. Pratt, 65 F.3d at

806. At that point, the burden shifts to the prison official to show, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the retaliatory action was narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate penological purpose. 

See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1995) (defendants had qualified

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immunity against retaliation claim based on their decision to transfer prisoner to preserve internal

order and discipline and maintain institutional security).

Here, Mr. Toscano has failed to prove or raise a triable issue of fact that prison officials’

actions did not advance a legitimate correctional goal. As discussed at length in Section A above,

prison officials examined the facts in Mr. Toscano’s case and made their decisions in compliance

with a CDCR policy against SNY housing for inactive gang associates who had not debriefed, and

that policy existed for the protection of inmates who properly were in the SNY. See Dietrich v. John

Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no retaliation where plaintiff

presented no evidence that defendants gave her a traffic citation after reading a newspaper article

about her First Amendment activities, rather than because she drove past a police barricade with a

“road closed” sign on it). Mr. Toscano has not shown a genuine dispute that the perceived threat a

non-debriefing inmate posed in an SNY was fabricated or not intended to serve a legitimate

penological purpose. Prison officials disagreed with Mr. Toscano’s views that he should be placed

in an SNY, but all the record evidence establishes is that the disagreement was based on prison

policy rather than animus due to his First Amendment activities. 

Viewing the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Mr.

Toscano, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Toscano’s claim that they

retaliated against Mr. Toscano for his First Amendment activity. Defendants also are entitled to

qualified immunity against this claim because they prevail on both prongs of the Saucier analysis,

i.e., there was no constitutional violation, and reasonable officials in defendants’ place would not

have thought refusing to move Mr. Toscano to the SNY was unlawful under the circumstances. 

D. Doe Defendants

The order of service and partial dismissal noted a significant Doe defendant problem in the

amended complaint and stated that “[a]ny Doe defendant whose true name and identity has not been

provided to the Court by Mr. Toscano by the date scheduled in this order for defendants to file their

dispositive motion will be dismissed without prejudice to Mr. Toscano filing a new action against

such a person.” Docket # 19 at 13-14. Mr. Toscano never provided the name of any Doe

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defendants; therefore, all Doe defendants are dismissed without prejudice to Mr. Toscano filing a

new action against them if he ever learns their identities.

E. Referral To Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program

The Court has determined that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all claims

except the claim that C/O Eberly and C/O Thompson used excessive force on Mr. Toscano on June

27, 2011. Therefore, the only claim that remains for adjudication is Mr. Toscano’s excessive force

claim against defendants Eberly and Thompson. In light of the narrow dispute remaining, this case

appears to be a good candidate for the Court’s pro se prisoner mediation program and will be

referred to that program. Lest there be any doubt as to the importance and mandatory nature of the

mediation proceedings, the parties are hereby ordered to attend the mediation proceedings and take

part in them. Plaintiff is now cautioned that failure to attend or take part in the mediation

proceedings will result in the dismissal of this action. 

VI. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART. (Docket # 188.) Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on all claims, except that

defendants Eberly and Thompson are not entitled to judgment in their favor on the excessive force

claim. 

Good cause appearing therefor, this case is now referred to Magistrate Judge Vadas for

mediation proceedings pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program. The proceedings will

take place within one hundred and twenty days of the date this order is filed. Magistrate Judge

Vadas will coordinate a time and date for a mediation proceeding with all interested parties and/or 

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their representatives and, within seven days after the conclusion of the mediation proceedings, file

with the Court a report of the proceedings. The Clerk will send to Magistrate Judge Vadas a copy of

this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 19, 2015

_________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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