Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00863/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00863-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KANT MUCHHALA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

1:05-CV-0863 OWW

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 9, 2004, Jay David Muchhala, a twenty-seven year old

man, climbed a high voltage power pole in Yosemite National Park

(“Yosemite”). He was electrocuted and died, either as a result

of the electrocution or from the resulting fall. Plaintiffs, Jay

Muchhala’s parents, filed suit against the United States of

America, which owns and operates the Park as well as the high

voltage electric pole at which the accident occurred. Brought

under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq., the

complaint alleges (1) negligence and (2) dangerous condition of

public property. (Doc. 1, June 30, 2005.) 

On August 4, 2006, Magistrate Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill

granted the United States’ motion for summary judgment with

respect to the issue of negligence per se, but denied the motion

as to all other issues. (Doc. 36.) Evidence was taken during a

three day bench trial on September 21-23, 2006. (Docs. 69-71.) 

The parties presented oral summations at the close of evidence.

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The parties were also invited to submit proposed findings of fact

and conclusions of law, and did so. (Docs. 73, 74.) Having

considered all submissions and the arguments of the parties, the

following findings of fact and conclusions of law are entered.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Overview of the Accident.

1. On May 9, 2004, Jay David Muchhala climbed a 30-foot, 

galvanized steel utility pole (the “accident pole”) adjacent to

the Four Mile Trail in Yosemite National Park (“Yosemite”). 

(Agreed Statement of Facts (“ASF”) #3 (Joint Exhibit (“JE”) 13.))

2. Jay Muchhala paid admission and was lawfully on the

premises of Yosemite. (ASF #1.)

3. While climbing the accident pole, Jay Muchhala was

electrocuted and died, either as a result of the electrocution,

or from the fall from the pole. (Coroner’s Report, Plaintiffs’

Exhibit (“PE”) 180.) Jay Muchhala’s head wounds were “also

lethal in extent.” (Id.) 

4. Shortly before the accident, Jay Muchhala wrote in his

journal “[c]limbed two electricity towers and am just below the

third.” (Journal Entry, PE 176.) 

5. Mr. Muchhala was 27 years old at the time of the

accident. (ASF #7.)

B. The Accident Pole and the Glacier Point Line.

6. The accident pole is one of ten steel poles that form a

high voltage electrical distribution line within Yosemite,

referred to as the Glacier Point Line. (ASF #2.) 

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7. The Glacier Point Line is one of four high voltage

power lines operated and maintained by Defendant United States of

America within Yosemite. (ASF #2; Testimony of Kent Summers.) 

8. Witnesses testified that the accident pole is located

anywhere from 20 to 200 feet from the Four Mile trail. 

(Testimony of Kent Summers (100-200 feet), Keith Guy (20 feet),

Deposition Testimony of Susan Whittier (25-30 feet).)

9. To access the accident pole from the trail, one must

scramble down some boulders in a boulder field. (Testimony of

Keith Guy, Kent Summers.) 

10. The trail is visible from the base of the pole. 

(Testimony of Keith Guy.) However, the lines and pole are not

particularly noticeable from the trail. Stephen Whittier, a

witness to part of the accident, did not notice the power line

until he and his family heard a snapping noise and saw Jay

Muchhala fall from the pole. (Deposition Testimony of Stephen

Whittier.) Susan Whittier, who also witnessed the accident,

noticed the power lines on her way up the trail, but didn’t take

particular note of them until the accident. (Id.)

11. The accident pole is 30 feet tall and made of

galvanized steel. The accident pole has two cross arms close to

the top. The lower cross arm, which was not in use at the time

of the accident, may have previously been used to carry

communication wires. Located approximately four feet above the

lower cross arm was the upper cross arm, on which run four lines,

three conductor lines that each carry 12,000 volt current and a

“static line.” (Testimony of Kent Summers.) 

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12. As each conductor line approaches the pole, it meets

insulators, one on each side of the pole, which keep the electric

current from being conducted through the pole to the ground. A

“jumper cable” or “jumper” bypasses the insulators, carrying

electricity from the outside of the insulator on one side of the

pole to the outside of the insulator on the other side of the

pole. (Testimony of Kent Summers.) 

13. Nine of the ten poles in the Glacier Point Line are

substantially identical to the accident pole. The remaining pole

(“Pole #1”), which is located at the bottom of the valley,

differs in construction. It is a “riser” pole, where the high

voltage power line is transferred from below ground to above

ground. (Testimony of Kent Summers.) 

14. There were no warning signs on the accident pole at the

time of the accident. (ASF #4.) Nor was there physical evidence

indicating a sign had previously been located on the pole. 

(Testimony of Kent Summers, Steven Yu.)

15. At the time of the accident, a number of other poles on

the Glacier Point Line also did not have high voltage warning

signs. (Testimony of Kent Summers, Robert Armstrong.)

16. The riser pole had high voltage markings on the top

cross arm on the date of the incident. (JE. 8 & 9; Testimony of

Kent Summers & Paul Laymon.) After the accident, a yellow high

voltage warning sticker was also placed near the base of the

riser pole. Two years later, in 2006, a picture taken of that

sticker reveals that the yellow warning sticker had begun to peel

off the pole. (Testimony of Kent Summers.)

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17. All of the poles on the Glacier Point Line have

removable steel pegs. (Testimony of Kent Summers.) The

removable pegs attach to the pole by screwing or bolting into

steel flanges. These flanges are also known as “saddles.”

(Testimony of Kent Summers.)

18. At the time of the accident, the lowest climbing peg on

the accident pole was located approximately four feet above

ground level. Three additional pegs were located lower than 7'6"

feet above ground level. Every pole in the Glacier Point Line,

with the exception of the riser pole, had climbing pegs at the

same heights. (Testimony of Kent Summers.)

19. Even with the pegs removed below at 7'6", a climber

could climb the pole by climbing the flanges that support the

pegs. (Testimony of Keith Guy.)

20. However, climbing the pole without the pegs in place is

difficult. Some of the workers had difficulty accessing the pole

without the assistance of an “aid,” even with the pegs installed. 

(Testimony of Kent Summers, Testimony of Keith Guy).

21. At the time of the accident, the subject pole had a

sticker attached to bearing the words “Proud to Be an American.” 

(PE 148). At the time of the accident, the sticker was not new,

and had partially peeled off of the pole. (Testimony of Kent

Summers.) The sticker was located just above the “flange” on the

pole, approximately half way up the pole, at a height of fifteen

or sixteen feet. (PE 148; Testimony of Kent Summers & Steven

Yu.) 

22. The sticker had not been seen by a park employee prior

to the incident. (Testimony of Kent Summers).

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23. There is no evidence that the pole was dangerous or

defective, and it was implemented for its intended use. 

C. Relevant Regulations & Standards.

24. State of California Rules of Overhead Electric Line

Construction prescribed by the Public Utilities Commission of the

State of California, General Order 95 (“GO 95”) became effective

on July 1, 1942. (PE 179, GO 95, at 3.) 

25. GO 95 provides that every high voltage power pole be

marked with high voltage signs located no more than 40 inches

below the lowest line conductors; that the lowest climbing peg on

any high voltage pole should be no lower than 7'6" feet from

ground level; and that latticed towers located near frequently

traveled trails should be “guarded” to prevent easy climbing of

the towers by young persons who do not realize the danger of

contact with live conductors. GO 95 contains no provisions

regarding the guarding of non-latticed electric poles. (GO 95,

Rules 51.6 & 51.7.) 

26. The stated purpose of GO 95 is to “formulate, for the

State of California, uniform requirements for overhead electrical

line construction, the application of which will insure adequate

service and secure safety to persons engaged in the construction,

maintenance, operation or use of overhead electrical lines and to

the public in general.” (GO 95 Rule 11.) 

27. General Order 95 only formally applies to poles

constructed after its effective date, 1941. (Testimony of Robert

Armstrong; GO 95 Rule 12.3.)

28. The accident pole was erected in approximately 1928 and

has not been reconstructed or altered since that date. 

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The safety factor requirements referenced in Rule 12.2 1

concern “allowable ratios of ultimate strengths of materials to

the maximum working stresses...,” as set forth in Rule 44, et

seq. These safety factor requirements have nothing to do with

peg height, warning signs, or guarding.

7

(Testimony of Kent Summers, Testimony of Paul Laymon, Defendant’s

Exhibits (“DE”) 209 and 210.)

29. A new riser pole (Pole one) was installed in

approximately 1997 at the lowest point of the Glacier Point Line. 

The riser pole was constructed in accordance with a Project

Manual, which required that all climbing pegs below ten feet be

removable pegs. (PE 175 at 16372-6.)

30. Robert Armstrong testified that it was the intent of GO

95 that all pre-existing poles should eventually be brought into

conformity with its provisions. Armstrong appears to have been

making reference to the following language in Decision No. 34884

before the Railroad Commission of the State of California, which

adopted GO 95: 

Under the terms of the new general order, existing

facilities lawfully erected in accordance with earlier

general orders, are permitted to be maintained

according to the rules effective when such facilities

were constructed or reconstructed, except as to certain

safety factor requirements specified in Rule 12.2; but 1

any lines constructed or reconstructed after the new

general order becomes effective, must comply with the

rules therein contained. In other words, the new

general order does not require a complete and immediate

reconstruction of existing lines installed prior to its

effective date. Such an order would be unreasonable to

operator and to the public alike. The new order, like

its predecessors, is part of a long-range progressive

program designed to eventually bring all lines up to

the standards required in new construction. Completion

of that program is not economically feasible within a

short period and, in fact, the revision of the order at

this time clearly indicates that no program may be

considered completed and static. There is another

phase to the adoption of rules such as these, in that

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the rules must not only be practical, from a physical

point of view, but likewise they must be within

reasonable economic limits; otherwise costs to serve

and consumer rates may be adversely and unreasonably

affected. Having in mind these considerations, Rule

12.3 in the new general order permits prior

construction to remain in service and provides as

follows:

“12.3 Lines Constructed Prior to This Order

The requirements of this Order, other than

the safety factor requirements specified in Rule

12.2, do not apply to lines or portions of lines

constructed or reconstructed prior to the

effective date of this Order. In all other

particulars, such lines or portions of lines shall

conform to the requirements of the rules in effect

at the time of their construction or

reconstruction.”

(PE 179 at 15-16.)

31. Robert Armstrong also testified that GO 95 required

guarding (i.e. fencing or placing a barrier around) any “readily

climbable pole,” but GO 95 does not utilize this terminology. 

Rather, GO 95 Rule 51.6(B) provides: 

Where the pole or structure is of latticed metal or of

similar construction and supports supply conductors in

excess of 750 volts and is located in urban districts,

or in rural areas adjacent to schools, dwellings,

permanent or seasonal camps, or in orchards, or near

roads, or trails which are frequently traveled, a

barrier shall be so located on the pole or structure as

to prevent easy climbing.

Note: It is the intent of Rule 51.6–B to require such

guarding as will prevent easy climbing of these poles

or structures by young persons who do not realize the

danger of contact with live conductors supported

thereon. It is not intended that such guarding will be

required in sparsely settled districts, mountainous and

desert areas, and similar locations.

(PE 179 (emphasis added).) 

32. Prior to the adoption of GO 95, the applicable

standards in California were the Rules for Overhead Electric Line

Construction prescribed by the Railroad Commission of the State

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of California, General Order 64 (“GO 64”). GO 64 generally

requires that lines be maintained in a condition which insures

the safety of utility personnel and the public, but contained no

provisions regarding “guarding” or fencing of electric poles. GO

64 also required that pegs be no lower than 7'6" and that a high

voltage warning sign be located on the cross arms of any high

voltage pole. (Testimony of Robert Armstrong). 

33. Robert Armstrong opined that it would have been good

practice to have guarding around this pole, although it was not

actually required by GO 95. GO 95 Rule 13 provides that poles

should be maintained in accordance with good practice for local

conditions. (Testimony of Robert Armstrong.) 

34. The National Electric Code is not followed by high

voltage electricians in California. (Testimony of Robert

Armstrong.)

D. Maintenance and Operation of the Glacier Point Line.

35. The Government’s High Voltage Electric Operations Shop

(“High Voltage Operations Shop”), located in Yosemite Valley,

operates and maintains the Glacier Point Line. (Testimony of

Kent Summers.) 

36. The government electricians referenced GO 95 for

guidance in operating the high voltage electrical system. 

(Testimony of Paul Laymon; Kent Summers.) For example, although

he believed that GO 95 was generally a “construction document,”

Kent Summers, an electrician who works in the High Voltage

Operations Shop, used GO 95 as a reference “for various issues

that might come up.” (Testimony of Kent Summers.)

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37. In response to requests for production of documents,

the United States produced a copy of GO 95, representing that it

was “used as guidance by the National Park Service at Yosemite.” 

(PE 179.)

38. Robert Armstrong, Plaintiffs’ expert, opined that the

knowledge of government electricians regarding applicable

maintenance standards was “minimal.” (Testimony of Robert

Armstrong.) 

39. Kent Summers testified that, prior to the accident, he

may not have been aware of the high voltage marking requirement

contained in GO 95. (Testimony of Kent Summers.) 

40. Paul Laymon, who now oversees the High Voltage

Operations Shop and worked in it from 1987 to 1997, believed that

GO 95 required a yellow sign to be posted on the cross arms of

any high voltage pole. He also believed that GO 95 required that

there be no pegs below four feet. He recalls that during the

early part of his career, which began in the late 1970s, he

inspected all of the lines in the Park and removed any pegs that

were below four feet. (Testimony of Paul Laymon.) 

41. Donald Coon, Supervisor of the High Voltage Operations

Shop, directed that his employees should comply with GO 95 to the

extent possible in order to keep the system safe. (Testimony of

Donald Coon.)

42. Although there were no warning signs on the subject

pole on the date of the incident, it was the normal custom and

practice of the High Voltage Operations Shop to have warning

signs on the poles. At the time of the accident, there was a

warning sign on the crossarms of at least one other pole in the

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Glacier Point Line, the riser pole. (Testimony of Kent Summers,

Keith Guy, and Paul Laymon.)

43. Warning signs would generally be placed at “about eye

level” on a steel pole. The signs used on steel poles were

yellow stickers with black lettering, which were approximately

four inches wide by approximately twelve inches high. (Testimony

of Kent Summers.) 

44. It was the normal custom and practice to inspect the

poles and lines on an annual basis. Any inspections of the

overhead power lines by Government electricians are performed by

“walking the line,” i.e., walking below the line and using

binoculars to look for equipment in need of repair. Workers

would specifically look to see that warning signs are in place. 

(Testimony of Kent Summers.)

45. The accident pole is located in an area where the

weather conditions are harsh, including heavy snow, rain, and

rockfall. (ASF #7.)

46. The Four Mile Trail is closed and the pole is largely

inaccessible during the winter. The trail opens for hiking in

the early spring, depending on the weather conditions and whether

there is snow remaining on the trail. (ASF #7.) 

47. As of the date of the incident, May 9, 2004, the High

Voltage Operations Shop had not yet been able to access the poles

on the Glacier Point Line to check on the status of the signs,

which often erode or fall off during the harsh winter. 

(Testimony of Kent Summers, Donald Coon.) 

48. The High Voltage Operations Shop usually waited until

the Glacier Point Road was open, so that they could drive to the

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top of the line, where they would have easy access to their gear. 

This would permit them to perform an inspection working from the

highest point on the line down to the valley. (Testimony of Kent

Summers.) 

49. The High Voltage Operations Shop did not maintain a log

or other form of record of when each line was inspected. 

(Testimony of Kent Summers.)

50. Other than the evidence that it was the High Voltage

Operations Shop’s normal practice to inspect each line every

year, there is no evidence that the Glacier Point Line had been

inspected at any time after 2002. Any such inspection would have

been performed by one of the high voltage electricians. In 2003,

this would have been either Donald Coon, Howard Keith, Kent

Summers or Keith Guy. Mr. Coon testified that he was last on the

Glacier Point Line in 1997; Howard Keith started with the High

Voltage Operations Shop in the fall of 2003 (after the accident);

and neither Mr. Summers nor Mr. Guy specifically remembers

inspecting the line in 2003. (Depositions of Donald Coon &

Howard Keith, Testimony of Keith Guy, Kent Summers.)

51. Paul Laymon, Facility Manager for Utilities, has seen 

numerous items, including bandanas and signs, ten to twelve feet

up on power poles in Yosemite over the time he has been working

there. This indicated to him that poles may have been climbed by

park visitors or that these items had been hoisted up the poles. 

But, most of these items were on wood poles down in Yosemite

Valley, not on remote poles like those on the Glacier Point Line. 

Moreover, none of these items were located up near the wires. 

(Testimony of Paul Laymon.) 

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52. Warning signs located near the crossarms of poles were 

observed to go missing on occasion by Government electricians.

53. Kent Summers testified that he and other High Voltage

Operations Shop personnel thought either theft or weather might

explain why some warning signs went missing. He did not

specifically associate theft with those signs that went missing

from the crossarms. Rather, he mentioned theft in the context of

testimony regarding the sticker warning signs, normally placed at

eye level. (Testimony of Kent Summers.)

54. There are over 3.5 million visitors a year to Yosemite.

There are over 200 search and rescues a year in Yosemite.

(Testimony of Steve Yu.) There has never been an injury or death

in Yosemite from climbing an electric power pole, even though the

subject pole has been unchanged in the same location for over 70

years. (Testimony of Steve Yu, Kent Summers, Paul Laymon, Keith

Guy; DE 209 & 210.)

55. No witness ever saw any individual, other than a

utility worker, climbing the utility poles. (Testimony of Steve

Yu, Kent Summers, Paul Laymon, Keith Guy; Deposition Testimony of

Donald Coon, Edward Visnovske.)

56. Following the accident, the High Voltage Operations

Shop removed pegs lower than 7'6" from all the poles on the

Glacier Point Line. (Testimony of Paul Laymon, Kent Summers.) 

57. Also following the accident, there was some discussion

among the employees of the High Voltage Operations Shop as to

whether removing the pegs would serve any purpose, as some

believed the saddles affixed to the poles could be climbed

without the pegs in place. (Testimony of Kent Summers.) 

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58. No one considered removing the saddles to make the pole

less climbable, as this would have made them too hard to

maintain. (Testimony of Kent Summers.)

59. Following the accident, the High Voltage Operations

Shop ensured that warning signs were placed on all high voltage

power poles in Yosemite, including the poles on the Glacier Point

Line. At least some of the poles on the other high voltage lines

already had warning signs. Weather causes considerable damage to

the signs. (Deposition testimony of Howard Keith.) 

E. Additional Circumstances of the Accident.

60. Mr. Muchhala began his hike at the Four Mile trailhead.

61. There are two gates on the Four Mile Trail. The lower

of these two gates, which lies within a few hundred yards of the

start of the trail, was open. The trail was open from there to

at least the second gate, which is located approximately three

quarters of the way up the trail, well past the accident scene. 

(Testimony of Steven Yu.) 

62. The sign at the trailhead states “dangerous to stray

from trail.” (Testimony of Steven Yu, Joint Ex. 11).

63. Under most circumstances, however, including along the

Four Mile trail, it is permissible to leave designated trails. 

(Testimony of Steven Yu.) 

64. Mr. Muchhala went off the four mile trail at the first

hairpin turn. 

65. If a person walked off of the trail at the first

hairpin turn and looked left (downhill), they would see the riser

pole (Pole #1). If the person looked right instead (uphill),

they would see two more electrical poles (Poles #2 & #3). 

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66. There is a field of boulders used by climbers for

recreational purposes at the base of the Four Mile Trail, but the

boulders under the Glacier Point Line are not part of any

established bouldering area. (Testimony of Steven Yu.)

67. Mr. Muchhala was wearing climbing shoes when he climbed

the electricity towers. He had changed into them after leaving

the Four Mile Trail. (Testimony of Steven Yu; PE 176.)

68. Mr. Muchhala’s backpack and other personal effects were

found on the ground between pole three and pole four. (Testimony

of Steven Yu.)

69. Before climbing the subject pole, Mr. Muchhala wrote

“At the first hairpin turn up the 4 mile hike in Yosemite Valley.

[sic] I slingshot off into the boulders then roll down the

hillside. Swapped to my climbing shoes and was agile as a

gazelle! Doing prince of Persia moves, jumping from rock to

rock. Having a backpack and a bag of painting supplies really

slows me down. Can do maybe 1/3 of the moves. Climbed 2

electricity towers and am just below the third....” (PE 176)

70. Mr. Muchhala was standing on the lower cross arms and

resting his hips on or near the upper cross arms when he was

shocked. (Testimony of Robert Armstrong, Mark Rhodes.)

71. The two primary contact points were his left hip and

left foot. There were no burns on his hands, indicating he did

not touch or grab the conductor lines with his hands. Instead,

the current arced from the jumper into his left hip prior to

physical contact between his body and the jumper. (Testimony of

Steven Yu, Robert Armstrong, and Mark Rhodes.)

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72. After the accident, there was a burn mark on the lower

cross arm. There was also burned nylon or melted nylon on one of

the jumper cables on the upper cross arm on the trail side of the

pole. (Testimony of Kent Summers.) 

73. There were no broken or down lines after the accident. 

(Testimony of Kent Summers.) 

74. Mr. Muchhala was approximately 30 feet up on the pole

when he fell from it. (Testimony of Robert Armstrong, Mark

Rhodes.)

75. Mr. Muchhala was not using any fall protection when he

fell from the pole. (Testimony of Mark Rhodes, Steven Yu.)

76. An inherent risk of climbing a 30 foot structure

without adequate fall protection is falling and suffering injury. 

(Testimony of Steve Yu, Mark Rhodes.)

77. An inherent risk of climbing an “electricity tower” is

electrocution. (Testimony of Mark Rhodes.)

78. Mr. Muchhala climbed the utility pole for “enjoyment or

thrill,” not because he was lost or disoriented. 

79. Susan Whittier, who along with her husband and son

witnessed Mr. Muchalla falling to the ground, initially thought

Mr. Muchhala fell from the cliffs above as she could not believe

anyone would climb a power pole. (Deposition Testimony of Susan

Whittier.)

80. Mr. Muchhala’s death was deemed an accident. He did

not commit suicide. (Testimony of Steven Yu.) 

81. Mark Rhodes, an expert on the biomechanics of

electrocution, testified that it was likely that Mr. Muchhala

died as a result of the fall, not the electric shock. He

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explained that strong shocks can sometimes be less deadly than

shocks of lesser intensity. He also opined that the fact that

one of the first responders indicated that Jay Muchhala was

exhibiting pulseless electrical activity (PEA) after the accident

is evidence that the electrocution did not stop the electric

activity of his heart. Moreover, the path the current took was

through the lower body. However, the electric shock may have

caused him to lose control of his muscles, leading to the almost

involuntary reflux of pushing away from the source of the shock.

(Testimony of Mark Rhodes.) 

F. Other Evidence Regarding Common Knowledge & Dangers of High

Voltage Power Lines.

82. Robert Armstrong testified that, in his experience,

laypersons do not commonly understand that electricity can arc

away from a high voltage line and shock a person before that

person even touches the line. (Testimony of Robert Armstrong.)

83. Robert Armstrong also testified that having knowledge

that a pole was an electric pole does not necessarily equate to

having a full understanding of the dangers associated with a high

voltage electric pole. The purpose of high voltage warning signs

is to put persons on notice that they are not just dealing with

electricity, but with high voltage electricity. (Testimony of

Robert Armstrong.)

84. Steven Yu testified about the effectiveness of warning

signs. Specifically, the National Park Service (“NPS”) maintains

warning signs at the top of every major waterfall in the

Yosemite, warning people not to swim at the top of the waterfall. 

Yet, people frequently disregard the warnings, sometimes with

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tragic results. Steve Yu indicated that the purpose of warning

signs in the Park is to warn people about hazards they are not

used to encountering (animals, waterfalls, etc.). (Testimony of

Steven Yu.)

G. Decedent’s Relationship With His Family & Friends.

85. Plaintiff Kant Muchhala, Decedent’s father, was 62 as

of the date of the death of his son.

86. Plaintiff Carolyn Muchhala, Decedent’s mother, was 60

as of the date of the death of her son.

87. Jay Muchhala had no alcohol or drugs in his system at

the time of his fall. (Agreed Statement of Facts, No. 11.)

88. Jay Muchhala was in excellent health at the time of his 

death.

89. Jay Muchhala maintained an extremely close and loving

relationship with his parents, other members of his family, and

friends. It is undisputed that his death was a tragic and

excruciating loss to all of them. (Testimony of Hedi Leinz, Kant

Muchhala, Carolyn Muchhala.)

90. At the time of his death, Jay Muchhala was residing and

employed in San Francisco, California. His parents were

residents of Wisconsin. 

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Federal Tort Claims Act.

1. This action is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

federal question jurisdiction, under the Federal Tort Claims Act

(“FTCA”). The FTCA waives the federal government’s immunity as

to torts committed by government employees in the scope of their

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employment, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and makes the government liable

“in the same manner and to the same extent as a private

individual under like circumstances.” Id. § 2674. 

2. Here, even though the relevant events took place within

the boundaries of Yosemite National Park, an exclusive federal

enclave, 16 U.S.C. § 57, it is undisputed that California tort

law provides the applicable substantive law with respect to the

underlying tort claim.

3. The FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity

which preserves the immunity of the United States from tort

liability in a number of circumstances. One such circumstance is

covered by the “discretionary function exception,” which provides

that the United States will not be liable for “[a]ny claim...

based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise

or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a

federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not

the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 

Defendant asserts that the discretionary function exception

applies here. 

4. A court must apply a two-part test to determine whether

the discretionary function exception applies. The first inquiry

is whether the challenged conduct is “discretionary-that is, it

must involve an element of judgment or choice.” Kelly v. United

States, 241 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Berkovitz v.

United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).) If the decision concerns “a

federal statute, regulation, or policy [that] specifically

prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow,” the

exception does not apply. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. The

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second inquiry is whether the judgment is “of the kind that the

discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Id. 

Decisions about the implementation of safety considerations have

been protected by the exception where “circumstances clearly

showed [the decisions] were the result of a judgment grounded in

social, economic and political policy.” Soldano v. United

States, 453 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006). The government

bears the burden of proving both elements. Kelly, 241 F.3d at

760. 

5. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to follow

standard electrical power industry practices with respect to the

poles on the Glacier Point Line. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant failed to post proper high voltage warning signs

on the poles, failed to remove climbing pegs situated below 7'6"

from ground level, and failed to erect a guard fence around the

pole. Although industry standards arguably required such

protective measures, no law, rule or regulation required that the

United States take these precautions. Accordingly, the extent to

which any such precautionary measures are taken involves an

element of discretion. 

6. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that this type of

decision is not “of the kind that the discretionary function

exception was designed to shield.” For example, in Seyler v.

United States, 832 F.2d 120 (1987), the plaintiff claimed that

the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) was negligent in failing to

erect a speed limit sign on a particular road. The Ninth Circuit

held that the BIA’s failure was not “grounded in social, economic

or political policy.” Id. at 123. The Ninth Circuit also

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The government also argues that the “decision” not to 2

guard the pole (with a fence or other obstruction) concerns

policy matters that must be balanced, such as resource

allocation, visitor experience in the park, and the impact of

man-made structures in wilderness. There is some merit to this

argument. However, in this case, the guarding provisions

contained within GO 95 and GO 64 are inapplicable, as they apply

only to latticed poles.

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“doubt[ed] that any decision not to provide signs would be of the

nature and quality that Congress indented to shield from tort

liability.” Id. Similarly, in ARA Leisure Services v. United

States, 931 F.2d 193, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit

examined two situations in which NPS was accused of negligence in

connection with road construction and maintenance in Denali

National Park. The Ninth Circuit found that NPS’s decision to

design and construct a road without guardrails was shielded by

the discretionary function exception because the choice was

grounded in policy considerations such as esthetics and minimal

impact construction. Id. However, NPS’s failure to maintain a

different road in a safe condition was not the kind of decision

Congress intended to be shielded by the discretionary function

exemption. Id.

7. Here, the “decision” not to post warning signs or

remove pegs below a certain height is not shielded by the

discretionary function exception. First, the government has

offered absolutely no evidence to suggest that any decisionmaking of a policy nature was involved. NPS’s alleged failures

in this case are more like failing to properly maintain a road,

to which the discretionary function exception was not applied in

ARA Leisure.

2

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8. Defendant does not suggest the government’s decisions

at issue in this case -- to place warning signs, to remove

climbing pegs, or to otherwise guard against climbing by

unauthorized persons –- have any political significance, as no

such significance could attach to such decisions. 

B. Negligence Per Se.

9. California Evidence Code § 669 provides that a

rebuttable presumption of a defendant’s negligence is created if

“(1) [defendant] violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of

a public entity; (2) [t]he violation proximately caused death or

injury to person or property; (3) [t]he death or injury resulted

from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or

regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) [t]he person

suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was

one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute,

ordinance, or regulation was adopted.” 

10. The magistrate judge previously ruled that the doctrine

of negligence per se may not be asserted against the United

States in this case because the regulations that were allegedly

violated were not applicable to the federal government entity at

the time of the alleged negligence. (Doc. 36, Order on Mot. for

Sum. J., at 9.) NPS representatives testified at trial they

endeavor to follow GO 95, making GO 95 and its predecessor, GO

64, otherwise relevant. However, there was no proof that these

rules were binding on the United States. There is no reason to

disturb the magistrate judge’s decision. 

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C. Primary Assumption of Risk. 

11. The doctrine of primary assumption of risk is a

complete defense to a negligence claim. “Where, by virtue of the

nature of the activity and the parties’ relationship to the

activity, defendant owed no legal duty to protect plaintiff from

the particular risk of harm that caused the injury (so-called

'primary assumption of the risk'), plaintiff is completely barred

from recovery.” Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 308-309,

(1992). 

12. Defendant asserts that the primary assumption of the

risk doctrine should bar recovery in this case because decedent

assumed the risk of electrocution. 

13. A key factor in determining whether the doctrine of

primary assumption of the risk applies is the nature of the

activity and the role of defendant whose conduct is at issue. 

Id. at 313. 

14. Whether defendant owes a duty of care is a legal

question “which depends on the nature of the sport or activity in

question and on the parties’ general relationship to the

activity....” Id. “In general, the doctrine applies to

activities or sports where ‘conditions or conduct that otherwise

might be viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the

sport itself.’” Saville v. Sierra College, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 515,

521 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2005)(quoting Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315).

15. For the most part, the primary assumption of the risk

doctrine is applied to cases involving sporting activities (or

other related forms of recreation). For example, the Knight

court discussed skiing as an example of a circumstance in which

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the primary assumption of the risk doctrine might apply,

reasoning that “although moguls on a ski run pose a risk of harm

to skiers that might not exist were these configurations removed,

the challenge and risks posed by the moguls are part of the sport

of skiing, and a ski resort has no duty to eliminate them.” 

Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315. “In these types of activities, the

integral conditions of the sport or the inherent risks of

careless conduct by others render the possibility of injury

obvious, and negate the duty of care usually owed by the

defendant for those particular risks of harm. A duty imposed in

those situations would significantly change the very purpose or

nature of the activity.” Seville, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 522. 

16. “While Commercial sponsors and operators of a sporting

activity have a duty not to increase the risks inherent in the

activity, the overriding consideration in the application of

primary assumption of risk is to avoid imposing a duty which

might chill vigorous participation in the implicated activity and

thereby alter its fundamental nature.” Regents of the Univ. of

Calif. v. Roettgen, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1040, 1046 (1996) (emphasis

added). 

17. Cases similar to the skiing example given in Knight are

myriad. See Saville, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 525 (applying primary

assumption of the risk doctrine to bar recovery by a student

injured practicing arrest and control techniques during a peace

officer training course); Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories, 32 Cal.

App. 4th 248, 253 (1995)(primary assumption of the risk doctrine

barred recovery by individual injured while whitewater rafting

when head struck metal frame of raft; owner of the rafting

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company did not increase the inherent risks of the sport);

Roettgen, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1046-47 (primary assumption of the

risk barred recovery by individual injured during rock climbing

class; “risk of harm was not beyond that inherent in any top rope

climbing activity.”); see also Moser v. Ratinoff, 105 Cal. App.

4th 1211 (2003) (long distance bicycle race); Peart v. Ferro, 13

Cal. Rptr. 3d 885 (2004) (minor operating a motor craft); Calhoon

v. Lewis, 81 Cal. App. 4th 108, 115 (2000) (skateboarding); Vine

v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 577 (2004)

(snowboarding); Lackner v. North, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863 (2006)

(skier struck by snowboarder); Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp.,

138 Cal. App. 4th 262 (2006) (child skier's collision with

plainly visible aluminum snowmaking hydrant); Kahn v. East Side

Union High School Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990 (2003) (high school

student injured at swim meet).

18. Defendant correctly asserts that the doctrine of

assumption of the risk is not limited in application only to

“sports” but also applies more broadly to some types of

“activities” that resemble sports. Rostai v. Neste Enterprises,

138 Cal. App. 4th 326, 329 (2006). Specifically, an “activity”

may qualify as a “sport” for purposes of the primary assumption

of the risk doctrine if the activity is done for enjoyment or

thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of skill,

and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury. 

Record v. Reason, 73 Cal. App.4th 472, 482 (1999). For example,

in Record, the activity of “tubing” –- riding behind a motorboat

on an inner tube –- was found to be subject to primary assumption

of risk because it involved physical exertion, elements of skill,

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and is done for enjoyment or thrill. Similarly in Rostai,

working out in a gym with a personal fitness trainer was deemed

an activity subject to the primary assumption of risk doctrine. 

19. The underlying purpose of the primary assumption of the

risk doctrine is “to avoid imposing a duty which might chill

vigorous participation in the implicated activity and thereby

alter its fundamental nature.” Roettgen, 41 Cal. App. 4th at

1046. Here, unlike with tubing, working out in a gym, skiing, or

even rock climbing, the activity in which Jay Muchhala engaged,

climbing a high voltage electric pole, is not an activity the

vigorous participation in which should be encouraged. To the

contrary, the numerous regulatory provisions discussed in this

case, which require warning signs and discourage access to

electric poles impose duties of care designed, at least in part,

to prevent the activity from taking place. The risks raised by

electric pole climbing, falling and electrocution, are not ones

that have any value as “sport” nor is such activity deserving of

encouragement. The primary assumption of the risk doctrine does

not apply here. 

D. Overview of California Negligence Principles.

20. California Civil Code § 1714 provides: “Everyone is

responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts,

but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want

of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her

property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or

by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or

herself. The design, distribution, or marketing of firearms and

ammunition is not exempt from the duty to use ordinary care and

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skill that is required by this section.” This statutory

provision “serves as the foundation” of California’s negligence

law. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113 (1968),

superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Perez v.

Southern Pac. Tansp. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 462, 467 (1990). 

21. A plaintiff in a negligence action must establish “[1]

that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, [2] that the

defendant breached the duty, and [3] that the breach was a

proximate or legal cause of his or her injuries.” Ambriz v.

Kelegian, --- Cal. Rptr. 3d ---, 2007 WL 172015, *6 (Cal. App. 4

Dist.).

22. The existence of a legal duty on the part of a person

in the defendant’s situation to the class of persons of which

plaintiff is a member is a question of law for the court, while

issues of due care, causation, and contributary fault are

questions of fact for the jury. 6 Witkin, Summary 10th, Ch. IX,

Torts, § 860 (2005).

E. The Existence of a Legal Duty.

23. The question of whether the defendant owes the

plaintiff a duty of care is usually treated as a threshold

question. Whether a duty exists is an “expression of the sum

total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say

that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.” Dillon

v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 734 (1968). 

24. In California, the general rule is that all persons

have a duty “to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured

as the result of their conduct....” Rowland, 69 Cal.2d at 112;

Cal Civ. Code § 1714. 

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25. A specific line of cases concerning operators of power

lines holds that such operators have a duty to “make [their]

wires ‘safe under all the exigencies created by the surrounding

circumstances.’ Thus, [the operator] has a choice ‘either to

insulate the wires or to locate them to make them comparatively

harmless.’” Scally v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 23 Cal. App.3d

806, 815-16 (1972). 

26. Where, as in this case, a line is not insulated, the

operator has a duty to locate the line in such a way as to make

it “comparatively harmless.” Id.

27. However, courts do depart from general duty rules under

certain circumstances. A number of considerations are relevant

to a court’s determination of whether a departure from the

general rule is appropriate: “[1] the foreseeability of harm to

the plaintiff, [2] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff

suffered injury, [3] the closeness of the connection between the

defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [4] the moral blame

attached to the defendant's conduct, [5] the policy of preventing

future harm, [6] the extent of the burden to the defendant and

consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care

with resulting liability for breach, and [7] the availability,

cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” 

Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 113. 

28. The foreseeability of a particular kind of harm is

particularly critical to the analysis. Dillon, 68 Cal.2d at 739. 

It is error, however, for a court to only consider foreseeability

when analyzing whether any duty is owed to Plaintiff. All the

Rowland factors must be considered. Henderson v. United States,

846 F.2d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1988).

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“The existence of a duty of care is a separate issue 3

from the question whether (on the basis of forseeability among

other factors) a particular defendant breached that duty of care,

which is an essentially factual matter.” Kockelman v. Segal, 61

Cal. App. 4th 491, 498 (1998) (emphasis added). Foreseeability

is relevant to both inquiries: the existence of a duty of care;

and, if a duty of care is found to exist, whether that duty has

been breached. See 6 Witkin, Ch. IX, § 868 (citing Bilyeu v.

Standard Freight Lines, 182 Cal. App. 2d 536, 542, (1960) (“Many

of the circumstances involved in a consideration of the

foreseeability of an occurrence which will determine the

existence of a duty to exercise due care toward a particular

person may...be equally pertinent in considering the test of

foreseeability of an injury to determine whether a precedent act

of negligence proximately caused that injury.”)).

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 1. Foreseeability.

29. The most important Rowland factor is foreseeability. 

“[T]he obligation to refrain from...particular conduct is owed

only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and

only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made

the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Duty, in other words, is

measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct

foreseeably entails.” Dillon, 68 Cal.2d at 739 (quoting 2 Harper

& James, The Law of Torts (1956), at 1018).3

30. “The degree of foreseeability necessary to warrant the

finding of a duty will...vary from case to case. For example, in

cases where the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high

degree of foreseeability may be required. On the other hand, in

cases where there are strong policy reasons for preventing the

harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser

degree of foreseeability may be required.” Romito v. Red Plastic

Co., 38 Cal. App. 4th 59, 66 (1995). 

31. California courts have drawn lines around the various

roles the court and jury would usually play in this forseeability

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analysis: “[A] court's task-in determining ‘duty’ - is not to

decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably

foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but

rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of

negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in

the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be

imposed on the negligent party.” Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d

564, 572 n.6 (1986). If reasonable factfinders could differ as

to foreseeability of the harm, this issue would be left for the

jury to decide. See Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d

49, 56 (1983). The jury would then consider “the likelihood or

foreseeability of injury in determining whether, in fact, the

particular defendant's conduct was negligent....” Ballard, 41

Cal. 3d at 572 n.6.

32. Here, however, where the court is the finder of both

fact and law, it is appropriate for the court to determine

whether, under the facts and circumstances of this case, it is

reasonable to impose a duty on the United States to prevent the

harm that occurred here. See, e.g., Henderson, 846 F.2d 1233

(affirming district court finding that no duty was owed after

bench trial in FTCA case).

33. Some general guidance can be taken from California

cases which have discussed foreseeability when determining

whether a legal duty exists. For example, in Robison v. Six

Flags Theme Parks Inc., 64 Cal. App. 4th 1294 (1998), the owners

of the Magic Mountain theme park maintained a flat grassy area

with tables for picnickers within a large, paved parking lot. 

The picnic area was in line with the traffic flow (which was

subject to a 25 mile per hour speed limit), but was uncurbed. 

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Plaintiffs, who were picnicking at a table, were injured when a

car drove over the word “stop” painted on the pavement and

crossed 40 feet of grass before striking their table. The car,

which had a malfunctioning starter motor, had been push-started

and had, at the wheel, a developmentally disabled woman who had

never driven a car before. The California Court of Appeal,

Second District, held that the unique circumstances of the

accident did not absolve Magic Mountain of liability, concluding

that “it was open to simple observation that Magic Mountain had

aimed a heavily traveled parking lane...directly at the picnic

table with no separation other than 40 feet of flat grass, and

that a car traveling at a speed no higher than Magic Mountain's

own speed limit would cover this distance in less than 2

seconds.... When such an observable danger ripens into an

accident, the accident is foreseeable for purposes of duty

analysis.” Id. at 1301. 

34. Hence, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether it

was reasonably foreseeable, in view of all the circumstances,

including the location of Pole Four, the use of the Four Mile

Trial, and other observable evidence, that an adult might climb

the thirty-foot accident pole and be injured as a result.

35. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Henderson, 864 F.2d

1233, provides some guidance in this analysis.

a. In Henderson, two individuals were injured trying

to steal copper wire from a power pole near a water tank on an

abandoned military installation. The two trespassed through a

breach in a fence, past signs that warned “Government Property No

Trespassing.” One of the two, Harmon, climbed a thirty three

foot power pole with the assistance of spiked shoes and a safety

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belt. As he attempted to cut copper cable from the pole, Harmon

touched an exposed live wire. His partner, Henderson, who was

standing on the ground, saw a flash and saw Harmon’s body lurch

backwards. Henderson climbed the pole in an effort to provide

aid to Harmon, but Henderson also contacted a live wire, received

a shock, and fell to the ground. His fall left him permanently

paralyzed. Henderson, 827 F.3d 1233, 1234 (9th Cir.

1986)(opinion withdrawn and superceded in part by Henderson, 846

F.2d 1233). 

b. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district

court’s conclusion that the accident was not foreseeable. 

Specifically, although there was some indication that members of

the public entered the facility to “sightsee, picnic, drink beer,

have parties, spray paint graffiti, commit vandalism, and take

copper wiring and other material” in a nearby area within the

abandoned military installation, “[t]here was no evidence of

tampering with pole lines which reasonably should have put

cognizant employees of the United States on notice that members

of the public might enter the facility and climb the poles to

remove or tamper with conductors.” 846 F.2d at 123. This latter

fact, the Ninth Circuit found to be adequate to support the

district court’s conclusion that the accident was not

foreseeable. Id. 

c. “Despite the presence of picknickers and vandals,

the government had little reason to foresee that thieves might

climb the power poles to steal copper wires.” Id. at 1235. The

Ninth Circuit rejected Henderson’s argument that a few references

in the record to “cut tail-ends and dangling wires...should have

put the government on notice that thieves were active in the

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area....” 

Although the record does contain references to cut

tail-ends and dangling wires-items that Henderson

argues should have put the government on notice that

thieves were active in the area-we have found no

evidence in the record that these cut tail-ends or

dangling wires were cut and dangling prior to

Henderson's accident. The sole exception, one reference

to wires cut by the government prior to the accident,

does not support Henderson's claim. Wires cut by the

government before the accident could not have notified

the government of the presence of thieves.

Henderson's attorney attempted to prove at trial that

some wires left dangling after the accident were in

fact dangling prior to the accident, and that these

wires had been left in that state by Harmon on his

previous trip to the facility. However, Henderson

himself testified that he did not notice any dangling

wires before the accident. In light of the

uncontradicted testimony at trial that no wires were

dangling before the accident, the district court did

not commit clear error by concluding that no telltale

signs reasonably afforded the government notice of

tampering before the accident.

The only evidence of prior thefts proved at trial that

might have put the government on notice was the absence

of the wires stolen by Harmon on his previous trip to

the site. However, in the vast area that the government

had to patrol, with a tangle of wires overhead, we

cannot say that the government should have noticed the

absence of a few wires. Thus, the district court's

finding that the accident was not foreseeable was

supported by the record because no evidence of

tampering prior to the accident was so apparent that

the government should have recognized the potential for

Henderson's injury.

Id. at 1235-36.

36. Here, even when viewed with the benefit of hindsight,

and considering any evidence that suggests the partial climbing

of electric poles by visitors was foreseeable, there is no

evidence suggesting that anyone person had previously climbed an

electric pole in Yosemite to the height of the electric wires,

other than authorized NPS maintenance personnel.

a. Paul Laymon, who was supervisor of the High

Voltage Operations Shop for ten years and presently oversees its

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operations, testified that he had seen items up on the poles in

Yosemite valley on occasion. For example, he had seen a bandana

tied ten feet up a pole in the valley and he had seen sticker on

a metal pole once. He specifically acknowledged that none of

these items were ever found in the wires. 

b. At the time of the accident, there was, in fact, a

sticker placed half way (fifteen or sixteen feet) up the accident

pole. 

c. The subject pole was approximately 50 feet from

the Four Mile Trail, which is frequently hiked by park visitors,

although a boulder field had to be traversed to reach the pole

from the trail.

d. Donald Coon, in deposition testimony entered into

evidence, testified that some metal high voltage warning signs

that had been located up in the wires occasionally went missing.

i. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that Donald Coon’s

deposition testimony suggested that these signs had been stolen,

but Mr. Coon made no such assertion, expressly or impliedly. He

merely stated that some signs located up in the wires went

missing. Kent Summers testified that he and other High Voltage

Operations Shop personnel thought either theft or weather might

explain why some warning signs went missing. But, Mr. Summers

did not specifically associate theft with signs that went missing

from the crossarms. Rather, he mentioned theft in the context of

testimony regarding the sticker warning signs, normally placed at

eye level. Other witnesses talked about the destructive effect

of harsh weather on signs and stickers. 

37. The weight of the evidence suggests that an adult

climbing one of the Glacier Point Line poles was not a reasonably

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foreseeable event:

a. No witness had ever seen a member of the public

climb or attempt to climb an electric pole in the Park. 

b. No other person in the preceding seventy-five

years since the accident pole was erected has ever climbed a high

voltage electric pole and been injured in the Park.

c. Yosemite National Park is a popular place for rock

climbing and hiking, offering numerous places to climb for

enjoyment or thrill, other than power poles. 

d. The accident pole was located in a fairly remote

area, at least twenty feet off of a trail, and was accessible

only by scrambling over a boulder field. 

e. The accident pole was not located in a campground,

picnic area, parking lot, or other area frequented by families or

unsupervised children.

f. Susan Whittier, a witness to the accident,

believed at first that Jay Muchhala had fallen from a cliff,

because she thought it so unlikely that he had climbed the power

pole. 

38. Although Jay Muchhala may not have known that the lines

held up by the accident pole carried high voltage electricity, it

is undisputed that he knew he was climbing thirty foot high

electric poles.

39. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it was

not foreseeable that an adult would have climbed the accident

pole to the height of the wires. 

40. As in Henderson, there was no evidence here which

reasonably should have put cognizant employees of the United

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States on notice that adult members of the public might

intentionally climb up into the wires.

41. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that

neither the court nor the parties have located a single case in

which a duty was found to be owed to an adult who intentionally

climbed an electric pole, whether high voltage or not. 

42. Numerous cases have examined the duties of care owed by

operators of power lines to various types of individuals who

might come into contact with uninsulated wires or electrical

current: 

a. The vast majority of such cases concern children.

For example, a long line of cases have sustained findings of

negligence against electric companies where children are injured

by coming into contact with electrical wires while climbing

trees, when the risk of such harm was foreseeable. Baltimore Gas

and Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680 (1998)(citing numerous

cases, including Dolata v. Ohio Edison Co., 2 Ohio App. 3d 293

(1981) (evidence sufficient to support finding that power company

was negligent where a child was electrocuted when he came in

contact with a power line while climbing a tree located on his

family's property; the power line ran in close proximity to tree;

the tree had not been trimmed by the power company for several

years and was easily climbable with large outreaching branches);

Petroski v. Northern Indiana Pub. Service Co., 171 Ind. App. 14

(1976) (power company owed duty to boy injured while climbing a

tree that electric company failed to trim where high voltage

wires ran through the tree and the possibility of injury was

foreseeable); Alabama Power Co. v. Taylor, 293 Ala. 484 (1975)

(defendant electric company was liable where child was injured

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while attempting to climb a tree with low branches that had not

been trimmed in seven years and grew beside a public alley in a

residential neighborhood occupied by numerous small children)).

b. Other cases concern adults who came into contact

with power lines indirectly and unintentionally. For example, in

Polk v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 519, 526 (1945), the

default standard of care -- that wires be insulated or located so

as to be comparatively harmless -- applied in a case where a tree

trimmer was electrocuted by wires passing through the tree on

which he was working. The municipality maintaining the wires

should have anticipated that property owners would need to trim

those trees. Similarly, in Sulphur Springs Valley Electric

Cooperative, Inc. v. Beltran, 13 Ariz. App. 513 (1970), a power

company was found to owe a duty of care to an individual who was

electrocuted when an antenna he was attaching to the side of a

house fell and touched a 28-foot-high bare electric wire. The

court pointed out that the electric company was “required to know

there is a certain amount of negligence in the world,” and was

required to anticipate that “some human beings will fail on

occasion to behave as a reasonable man would behave.” Id. at

515.

43. Still other cases concern children who have

intentionally climbed electricity poles or towers. C.f., Arroyo

v. Chicago Transit Auth., 643 N.E. 2d 1322, 1328 (Ill.

1994)(finding no liability under attractive nuisance doctrine

where there was no evidence that owner elevated train tower with

electric third rail knew or should have known that children

frequented the premisis). But, “[e]ven without [] express

warnings [on a pole or tower], anyone as old as [fourteen] is

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charged with the knowledge that electric wires are ordinarily

dangerous; that they should be avoided wherever possible...and

that it is dangerous to come in close proximity to them.” Texas

Utilities Elec. Co. v. Timmons, 947 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex.

1997)(finding no liability).

44. A closely analogous unpublished case, Gonzalez v.

Puerto Rico Elecric Power Authority, 36 F.3d 1089 (1st Cir. 1994)

(Table), is instructive. In Gonzalez, a twenty year old man

climbed up a guy wire supporting two electric poles at an

electrical equipment site maintained by the defendant power

company. 1993 WL 525644. He climbed so high that his head came

into contact with the high voltage power line suspended from the

pole. 36 F.3d 1089 at *1. The site was not fenced off, nor was

there any sign prohibiting access to the site. 1993 WL 525644 

The First Circuit agreed with the district court’s reasoning that

“defendant could not have foreseen that a twenty year-old would

climb 23 to 24 feet on a guy wire to amuse himself... [Defendant]

could not reasonably have foreseen the situation...[which] was

too fortuitous to require the electric company to guard against

it.” 

We agree. While anything is possible, there must be a

limit in a practical world to what conduct must

reasonably be foreseen. Small children could not be

expected to climb a wire to that height; a man of

twenty ought to know the difference between a slack,

supporting guy wire openly touchable at ground level,

and an electric power line, and that electricity is

dangerous. Hence there was no duty to either one to

provide a more complex structure.

36 F.3d 1089 at *1.

45. Gonzalez, 36 F.3d 1089, and Timmons, 947 S.W.2d at 194,

persuasively reason that a twenty-seven year old man should know

that coming close to electric wires and climbing to a height of

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thirty feet without any form of fall protection are potentially

life-threatening activities. In Gonzalez, there were no warning

signs and, although there were warning signs present in Timmons,

the court specifically noted that the absence of such signs would

not have altered the finding of no liability in that case.

46. The Ninth Circuit in Henderson, although acknowledging

that foreseeability is the primary factor, makes it clear that a

finding of no duty must be based on a complete analysis of all of

the Rowland factors. 846 F.2d at 1236 (affirming the district

court’s finding of no duty based on only the foreseeability

because no other factor weighed strongly in favor of finding a

duty). The remaining Rowland factors are:

[2] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered

injury, [3] the closeness of the connection between the

defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [4] the

moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, [5]

the policy of preventing future harm, [6] the extent of

the burden to the defendant and consequences to the

community of imposing a duty to exercise care with

resulting liability for breach, and [7] the

availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the

risk involved.

Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 113. 

a. For the obvious reason that Jay Muchhala was

killed either by electrocution or by the subsequent fall, the

second factor, degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered

injury, weighs in favor of finding a duty. However, even though

the Plaintiff in Henderson was injured, the Ninth Circuit did not

give this factor controlling. See 846 F.2d at 1236.

b. The third factor, the closeness of the connection

between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, raises

questions as to whether the presence of a warning sign and/or the

removal climbing pegs below seven and a half feet would have

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dissuaded the decedent from climbing the pole.

i. With respect to the presence of absence of a 

warning sign, Robert Armstrong testified that having knowledge

that a pole was an electric pole does not necessarily equate to

having a full understanding of the dangers associated with a high

voltage electric pole. He opined that the purpose of high

voltage warning signs is to put persons on notice that they are

not just dealing with electricity, but with high voltage

electricity. However, Ranger Yu testified that warning signs

posted by the NPS are routinely ignored. For example, NPS

maintains warning signs at the top of every major waterfall in

the Park, warning of the dangers posed by swimming at the top of

the a waterfall. Yet, people routinely disregard these warnings,

with tragic results. In the final analysis, on this record,

which lacks any competent expert evidence regarding the

effectiveness of warning signs, it cannot be found with

reasonable certainty that a warning sign would have dissuaded Jay

Muchhala from climbing the accident pole.

ii. The evidence as to climbing pegs is

inconclusive. On the one hand, Keith Guy suggests that removal

of pegs below seven foot six inches would likely have had little

or no effect on the pole’s climbability by Jay Muchalla. He

testified that it would have been possible for Jay Muchhala, who

was over six feet tall and wearing climbing shoes at the time of

the accident, could have climbed the pole even with all pegs

below seven foot six inches removed. However, Kent Summers

testified that, without an aid device, it is difficult, although

possible, to climb the pole with the pegs at four feet. 

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For example, although not directly on point, the most 4

relevant language is found within the section of GO 95 regarding

guarding. GO 95 Rule 52.6(B). A note to that section provides:

 

Note: It is the intent of Rule 51.6–B to require such

guarding as will prevent easy climbing of these poles

or structures by young persons who do not realize the

danger of contact with live conductors supported

thereon. It is not intended that such guarding will be

required in sparsely settled districts, mountainous and

desert areas, and similar locations.

41

iii. The evidence relevant to the third factor --

the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct

and the injury suffered -- does not weigh strongly in either

direction. 

c. As to the moral blame attached to the defendant's

conduct, there was no evidence suggesting either party acted with

any moral culpability, although Plaintiff’s conduct could support

a finding of recklessness. 

d. With respect to the policy of preventing future

harm, it is clear that the regulations followed by the NPS

personnel, including GO 64 and GO 95, embody the general goal of

preventing inadvertent contact with electric wires, high voltage

or otherwise. However, there is no indication that the

regulations are designed to address the kind of intentional act

by an adult at issue in this case. This conclusion is supported 4

by the absence of any cases imposing liability upon the owner or

operator of an electric facility under like circumstances.

e. The next factor is the extent of the potential

burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of

imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for

breach. On the one hand, one result of imposing a duty in this

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case might be to encourage the government to conform more closely

to industry standards regarding the maintenance and operation of

high voltage power lines. There is indirect evidence that the

resulting financial and/or logistical burdens that would be borne

by the government would be modest. The pegs, in fact, have

already been removed and additional efforts have been undertaken

to ensure that warning signs are maintained on every high voltage

pole. On the other hand, the consequences to the community of

imposing a duty here are not insignificant. The public (either

the taxpayer or the fee-paying users of Yosemite National Park)

would ultimately bear the cost of an injury caused by the

unforeseeable, intentional act of grown man. These two

conflicting considerations counsel against giving this factor

considerable weight. 

f. No relevant evidence was submitted on the

availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk

involved. This factor is neutral.

47. Other than foreseeability, the remaining Rowland

factors do not weigh strongly in either direction, giving the

court little reason to disregard the primacy of the

foreseeability factor. 

48. Here, because Jay Muchhala’s intentional act of

climbing the electric pole was unforeseeable under the totality

of the circumstances, the United States owed him no duty of care.

49. Based on this finding, is not appropriate to reach the

question of whether the United States breached any industry

standard of care by either failing to post adequate warning signs

or by failing to remove pegs below a particular height.

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50. No evidence established any dangerous condition of

public property, as the pole was not defective or in disrepair.

51. This case arises out of an undeniably tragic loss for

Jay Muchhala’s family and friends. However, the case cannot be

decided based on sympathy. The unforseeablity of the event under

all the circumstances bars imposing liability upon the United

States, as its negligence was not the cause of Jay Muchhala’s

death.

CONCLUSION

The United States is not liable in negligence or for

dangerous condition of public property, as the Government owed

Jay Muchhala no duty of care under the unforeseeable

circumstances and there was no evidence to support a dangerous

condition of public property claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b2e55c UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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