Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_20-cv-00134/USCOURTS-azd-4_20-cv-00134-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Medical Malpractice

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jodi Cross,

Plaintiff,

v. 

United Stated of America, 

Defendant.

No. CV-20-00134-TUC-JGZ

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 

for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, did 

not file a response. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss.

Discussion

Defendant filed the instant motion on April 1, 2020. (Doc. 8.) On April 3, 2020,

the Court entered an order informing Plaintiff that under LRCiv 7.2(i),

1 Plaintiff’s failure 

to respond to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on or before May 4, 2020 may be treated as 

her consent to the granting of Defendant’s motion without further notice, and judgment 

may be entered dismissing the action. (Doc. 11; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(1)(C) 

(computing time); LRCiv. 12.1(b), 56.1(b) (setting forth time for responding to motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction)). The response time for Defendant’s motion 

1 LRCiv 7.2(i) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the U.S. District Court for 

the District of Arizona provides that if a party “does not serve and file the required 

answering memoranda [to a motion], ... such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to 

the denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.”

Case 4:20-cv-00134-JGZ Document 12 Filed 05/14/20 Page 1 of 3
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

has passed. Plaintiff did not file a response. In light of Plaintiff’s failure to respond, this 

action is subject to summary dismissal under LR Civ. 7.2(i). See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 

F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal pursuant to local rule similar to LRCiv 

7.2(i) where the pro se plaintiff failed to file an opposition to motion to dismiss, and stating 

“[p]ro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure”); see also King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 

565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that 

govern other litigants.”), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 

F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012). 

To determine whether dismissal is warranted, the Court must “weigh several factors: 

(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 

manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 

disposition of cases of their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” 

Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The first two factors 

favor dismissal as a sanction in most cases, while the fourth factor cuts against it. Wanderer 

v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990). Therefore, “[t]he key factors are prejudice 

and the availability of lesser sanctions.” Id.

Here, the first three factors favor dismissal of this case. Plaintiff has made no effort 

to continue with this action as evidenced by her failure to oppose Defendant’s motion. The 

Court notes that Plaintiff has made no filings in this case since it was removed to this Court 

in March 2020. Plaintiff’s inaction has brought this case to a standstill. Likewise, 

Plaintiff’s failure to respond results in prejudice to Defendant by impairing Defendant’s

ability to proceed to resolution of this action. See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 

642 (9th Cir. 2002) (“a defendant must establish that plaintiff’s actions impaired 

defendant’s ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision of 

the case); Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976) (a presumption of 

prejudice arises when a plaintiff unreasonably delays the prosecution of an action). The 

fourth factor, as always, weighs against dismissal. The fifth factor requires the Court to 

consider whether a less drastic alternative is available. The Court has previously informed 

Case 4:20-cv-00134-JGZ Document 12 Filed 05/14/20 Page 2 of 3
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff of the consequences of her failure to respond. (See Doc. 11.) The Court finds that 

only one less drastic sanction is realistically available. Rule 41(b) provides that a dismissal 

for failure to prosecute operates as an adjudication upon the merits “[u]nless the court in 

its order for dismissal otherwise specifies.” In this case, the Court finds that a dismissal 

with prejudice would be unnecessarily harsh. This action will therefore be dismissed 

without prejudice. 

For the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is GRANTED and 

this action is dismissed without prejudice.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and to close its file in 

this action.

Dated this 13th day of May, 2020.

Case 4:20-cv-00134-JGZ Document 12 Filed 05/14/20 Page 3 of 3