Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01179/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01179-42/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LASER DESIGN INTERNATIONAL, LLC;

NORWOOD OPERATING COMPANY,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

BJ CRYSTAL, INC, a California corporation;

CASHMAN PHOTO ENTERPRISES OF

NEVADA, a Nevada corporation; CRYSTAL

MAGIC, INC., a Florida Corporation; U.C.

LASER, INC., a New Jersey corporation;

VITRO LASER GROUP U.S.A., INC., a

Nevada corporation; JIMAC MARKETING

INC., a Canadian corporation; CONCORD

INDUSTRIES, INC., a Connecticut

corporation; C. STIEFELMAYER GMBH &

Co. KG, a German limited partnership;

CERION GMBH, a German limited liability

company; CRYSTAL CAPTURE INC., a

Texas corporation; CRYSTAL CAPTURE

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, a Nevada limited

liability company; G.W. PARTNERS

INTERNATIONAL, INC., a California

corporation; HIRSCH GIFT INC., a Texas

corporation; VISIONS IN CRYSTAL, INC., a

California corporation; VITRO LASER

GMBH, a German limited liability company,

Defendants. 

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS 

 /

Lead Case No. C 03-1179 JSW

Consolidated with No. C 03-3905 JSW

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; (2)

GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO STRIKE; AND (3)

DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE

REBUTTAL EXPERT REPORT

Now before the Court are plaintiff Laser Design International, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”)

motions for summary adjudication and to strike and defendant Crystal Magic, Inc.’s (“Crystal 

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 On March 1, 2007, the Court issued an order in which it found that Plaintiff’s

motions for summary judgment and to strike and Crystal Magic’s motion for leave to serve

an expert rebuttal report were appropriate for disposition without oral argument and thus

vacated the hearing set for March 2, 2007 on these matters. Hearings are not mandatory. 

Rather, the decision of whether or not to hold a hearing on noticed motions is within the

Court’s discretion. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Nevertheless, both parties used the order vacating

the hearing as an opportunity to submit additional evidence and argument regarding the

pending motions. “[O]nce a reply is filed, no additional memoranda, papers, or letters may

be filed without prior Court approval.” See Civ. L.R. 7-3(d). 

Plaintiff seeks to submit excerpts from the transcript of Dr. Eric Van Stryland’s

deposition taken on February 23, 2007. The transcript did not become available until

February 28, 2007. Although Plaintiff has a justification for not providing the transcript

sooner, the Court declines to consider such additional evidence. Because the Court is

striking Dr. Van Stryland’s declaration and not allowing Crystal Magic to serve his expert

report, the Court need not consider his deposition testimony with respect to Plaintiff’s

motion for summary adjudication on infringement. Because the Court finds that there is a

question of fact with respect to Crystal Magic’s affirmative defense of intervening rights,

considering additional evidence would not alter the Court’s conclusion on this issue. 

In addition to excerpts from Dr. Van Stryland’s deposition, Crystal Magic seeks to

provide excerpts from the deposition of Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Robert Clement taken in early

February. Crystal Magic does not provide any explanation as to why it did not move sooner

to submit such additional evidence. Furthermore, review of such evidence indicates that it

would not alter the Court’s decision on the parties’ motions. Accordingly, the Court declines

to provide leave to file such evidence. The Court HEREBY DENIES the administrative

motions by both Plaintiff and Crystal Magic.

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Magic”) motion for leave. Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments and relevant

legal authority, the Court: (1) grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary

adjudication; (2) grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s motion to strike; and (3) denies

Crystal Magic’s motion for leave.1

BACKGROUND

The U.S. Patent No. 5,206,496 (the “‘496 patent”) relates to a method and apparatus for

making sub-surface marks inside a transparent object. (‘496 patent at Abstract). Plaintiff is

moving for summary adjudication that defendant Crystal Magic, Inc. (“Crystal Magic”) is

practicing the invention of claims 5, 23, 29, 45, 51 of the ‘496 patent and that Crystal Magic is

not entitled to the defense of intervening rights.

The original ‘496 patent was issued on April 27, 1993. On March 25, 1997, plaintiff

Laser Design International, LLC and two other entities filed suit in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of California, entitled Laser Design International, LLC, et al. v.

Scanova Limited, et al., No C 97-20274 (“1997 litigation”). Judge Ronald M. Whyte issued an

order on claims construction of the ‘496 patent and on summary judgment in which Judge

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 Rule 37 provides in pertinent part: “A party that without substantial justification

fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response

to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to

use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so

disclosed.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37(c)(1).

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Whyte addressed additional claim construction issues of the ‘496 patent. (Declaration of Elaine

Stracker in Support of Summary Adjudication (“Stracker Decl. I”), Exs. 5, 6.) The 1997

Litigation settled before trial pursuant to a Consent Judgment filed on September 8, 1999. (Id.,

Ex. 7.) 

The Patent Office subsequently issued a Reexamination Certificate on the ‘496 patent. 

(Id., Ex. 9-11.) The Court will address the additional specific facts as required in the analysis.

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and Crystal Magic’s Motion for Leave.

Plaintiff moves pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 37(c)(1) (“Rule 37”) to strike the

declarations of Crystal Magic’s president, Steven M. Rhodes, and Crystal Magic’s expert, Dr.

Eric Van Stryland, submitted by Crystal Magic in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary

adjudication in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) (“Rule 26”). Plaintiff argues

that such declarations were submitted after the deadline for submitting expert reports and thus

should be stricken. Crystal Magic moves for leave to serve a expert report by Dr. Eric Van

Stryland after the deadline for such reports has expired. 

Rule 26 requires parties to disclose the identity of their expert witnesses “accompanied

by a written report prepared and signed by the witness.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Parties

are required to serve their opening and expert rebuttal reports “at the times and in the sequence

directed by the court.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26 (a)(2)(c). “Rule 37(c)(1) gives teeth to these

requirements by forbidding the use at trial of any information required to be disclosed by Rule

26(a) that is not properly disclosed.”2

 Yetti by Molly Ltd v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d

1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). This rule excludes untimely expert witness testimony, unless the

“parties’ failure to disclose the required information is substantially justified or harmless.” Id.;

see also Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 2003 WL 22038700, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2003)

(“Excluding expert evidence as a sanction for failure to disclose expert witnesses in a timely

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fashion is automatic and mandatory unless the party can show the violation is either justified or

harmless.”) (internal quotes and citation omitted). Crystal Magic bears the burden of

demonstrating its failure was either substantially justified or harmless. Yetti by Molly, 259 F.3d

at 1107.

1. Expert Versus Lay Testimony.

Crystal Magic argues that the declarations of Dr. Van Stryland and Mr. Rhodes do not

provide expert testimony. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 701, lay witnesses may testify

based upon their experience, but they may not provide opinions “based on scientific, technical,

or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701; see also

United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that opinion by

lay witness on observations that were not “common” but required demonstrable expertise was

improper). The purpose of this limitation is “to eliminate the risk that the reliability

requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an

expert in lay witness clothing.” Fed. R. Evid. 701 Advisory Committee Notes (2000

Amendment). Thus, “[t]he mere percipience of a witness to the facts on which he wishes to

tender an opinion does not trump Rule 702.” Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1246.

With respect to Dr. Van Stryland, the Court finds Crystal Magic’s position is

disingenuous considering that it seeks leave to submit substantially the same information as an

expert rebuttal report in its motion for leave. (Compare Declaration of Eric Van Stryland, Ph.

D. (“Van Stryland Decl.”) at ¶¶ 2-8 with proposed Expert Report of Eric Van Stryland, Ph. D.,

attached as Ex. 1 to the Declaration of Scott Eads re Reply in Support of Motion for Leave, at

¶¶ 12-18.) In his declaration, Dr. Van Stryland states that he has been retained as an expert in

the field of optics and lasers by Crystal Magic and describes his findings regarding magnified

photographs of marks in glass blocks provided by Mr. Rhodes. (Van Stryland Decl. at ¶¶ 1-8.) 

Dr. Van Stryland explained that he examined one of the glass blocks “under a Zeiss Axiolab

microscope.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) He “used a 5x (DIN 0.10 Edmonds) objective which when printed on

[his] computer resulted in a magnification of -170x.” (Id.) His photographs show “different

damage sites, as viewed from the 60mm x 60mm face. According to Dr. Van Stryland:

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the damage sites appear to be between -2x to 4x longer in the z-dimension than

they are in the x-dimension . ... the deviation in the central position of the damage

sites in the z-direction is quite large on the 0.44mm scale. Overall, the variability

among the individual laser damage marks ... appear to demonstrate a significant

degree of randomness and lack of control in the z-dimension, as compared to the

x-dimension.

Id. at ¶ 7; see also Id. at ¶ 8 (“the glass blocks in Exhibits B and C appear to exhibit a

significant degree of randomness and lack of control in the z-dimension, as compared to the xdimension”).

The Court finds that Dr. Van Stryland’s declaration is based on scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge and contains observations that required demonstrable expertise. 

Accordingly, it is not admissible as lay witness testimony and thus, the Court will address

whether the failure to disclose his expert testimony was substantially justified or harmless.

The declaration of Mr. Rhodes presents a closer question with respect to whether the

testimony is lay or expert testimony. While lay witnesses may be allowed to testify as to their

personal knowledge of a particular invention or prior art, they may not “provide specialized

explanations or interpretations that an untrained layman could not make if perceiving the same

acts or events.” Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Inter., Inc., 2006 WL 1330002,

*3 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2006) (quoting U.S. v. Conn., 297 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 2002)). Upon

review of Mr. Rhodes’ declaration, the Court finds that he merely describes how the images

were produced and does not provide specialized explanations or interpretations of the images. 

Accordingly, the Court holds that his declaration is permissible as lay witness testimony and

thus DENIES the motion to strike as to the Rhodes declaration as improper expert testimony.

2. Whether the Failure to Disclose Dr. Van Stryland’s Testimony was

Substantially Justified or Harmless.

A failure to disclose testimony is not substantially justified, where, as here, the need for

such testimony could reasonably have been anticipated. See Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of

Calif., 410 F.3d 1052, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court’s deadline to serve opening expert

reports was May 17, 2006 and the deadline to serve rebuttal expert reports was August 15,

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2006. (Docket No. 346.) Expert discovery was set to close on September 15, 2006, but was

extended to February 25, 2007 due to the injury of Plaintiff’s expert. (Docket No. 466.) 

On February 7, 2005, the Court issued its order on the claims construction and construed

the term “the mark is three dimensional” to mean “the mark is controlled in the x-, y-, and zdimensions.” (Docket No. 196.) On May 8, 2006, Plaintiff served its opening expert report on

infringement in which Dr. Robert Marc Clement opined that “the shape [of the infringing

product] can be controlled in the x-, y-, and z-dimensions, i.e., it is three dimensional.” (Docket

No. 408 (Expert Report of Dr. Clement) at 5-6.) On August 2, 2005, almost two weeks before

the deadline for submitting expert rebuttal reports, Plaintiff filed a copy of Dr. Clement’s expert

rebuttal report. (Docket No. 381.) In his rebuttal report, Dr. Clement opined that prior art did

not meet all the elements of the ‘496 patent because it was not controlled in the z-dimension. 

(Id.) Plaintiff then formally served a copy of its expert rebuttal report on Crystal Magic on

August 15, 2006, over seven months ago. (Declaration of Scott Eads in Support of Opp. to

Mot. to Strike, Ex. 6.) Notably, in the 1997 litigation over the original ‘496 patent, Dr. Clement

and Dr. Van Stryland were the experts for the plaintiffs and the defendants, respectively. In

1998, Dr. Clement took the same position that he is taking in this case – that the prior art does

not meet all the elements of the claims at issue because the marks are not controlled in the zdirection. (Declaration of Elaine Stracker in Support of Opp. to Mot. to Strike (“Stracker Decl.

II”), Ex. 1.) Plaintiff represents that the discovery from the 1997 litigation was provided to

Crystal Magic as part of the fact discovery in this case, which closed in March 2006. (Opp. to

Mot. for Leave at 5.)

Based on the above described facts, the Court finds that Crystal Magic has been on

notice for quite some time that having control in all three dimensions is an element of the claims

at issue and is a significant issue in this litigation. Even if Crystal Magic could have convinced

the Court that it could not have been aware of this issue until it received Dr. Clement’s rebuttal

report in August, which it has not, Crystal Magic has not provided any justification as to why it

waited until after Plaintiff filed a motion for summary adjudication to seek to introduce

evidence by Dr. Van Stryland in response and waited even longer to seek leave to serve his

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expert report. The Court thus concludes that Crystal Magic has not demonstrated that its failure

to disclose the proffered testimony by Dr. Van Stryland was substantially justified.

Nor does the Court find that Crystal Magic has shown that its failure to disclose was

harmless. Crystal Magic did not file Dr. Van Stryland’s testimony until after Plaintiff filed its

motion for summary adjudication. The deadline to file dispositive motions, as well as the

deadline to conduct both fact and expert discovery, have all expired. Although Plaintiff was

able to depose Dr. Van Stryland two days before the expert discovery period closed, the

deposition occurred after the briefing on Plaintiff’s motion was complete. 

Plaintiff argues that to properly rebut the new evidence submitted by the Dr. Van

Stryland Declaration and proposed expert report, it would need to have fact and expert

discovery reopened so it “could determine all the parameters used to generate the marks in the

products, exactly how the measurements were made, and whether other measurements were

made, such as for example, in the y direction to determine the damage in that direction, and then

compare these methods to those used by Crystal Magic in its commercial operations. [Plaintiff]

would need to have its expert review the marked products and make its own measurements to

verify the accuracy of the measurements provided.” (Reply to Mot. to Strike at 7.) After such

discovery and investigation, it is likely that Plaintiff would need to depose Dr. Van Stryland

again based on the new information and desire an opportunity incorporate such new information

in its motion for summary adjudication. The Court thus finds admitting Dr. Van Stryland’s

untimely expert testimony at this stage in the litigation would not be harmless to Plaintiff. See

Quevedo v. Trans-Pacific Shipping, Inc., 143 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding

exclusion of untimely statements and report by expert submitted in opposition to motion for

summary judgment); Carson Harbor, 2003 WL 22038700, * 3 (finding that allowing untimely

expert evidence submitted in opposition to summary judgment would substantially prejudice

defendants because “they would incur significant expense and suffer prolonged proceedings if

[the motions for summary judgment] were prolonged to permit discovery and the preparation of

appropriate expert rebuttal”).

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Moreover, the pretrial conference is scheduled for April 23, 2007, less than seven weeks

away, and the trial is scheduled for May 21, 2007. If the Court were to admit Dr. Van

Stryland’s testimony, the Court would need to reopen fact and expert discovery, allow

additional motions for summary judgment, and continue the scheduled pretrial conference and

trial in this four-year old case. Disruption of the schedule of the Court and Plaintiff “is not

harmless.” See Wong, 410 F.3d 1052 at 1062 (finding untimely disclosure of expert witness

was not harmless, “even though the ultimate trial date was still some months away” where the

deadlines for completing discovery and for filing motions for summary judgment had expired);

see also Chime v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (upholding finding of

prejudice where admission of untimely expert evidence would have “undermined, if not negated

[opposing party’s] motion for summary judgment and disrupted the scheduled trial”). 

Crystal Magic’s argument that a finding of bad faith must be found, because striking Dr.

Van Stryland’s declaration and prohibiting a late report by him would be akin to a dismissal or

default judgment, is unavailing. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Yetti by Molly, cases

requiring a finding of willfulness, fault, or bad faith do not apply to sanctions pursuant to Rule

37(c)(1) where, as here, “although onerous, [is] less than a dismissal.” See Yetti by Molly, 259

F.3d at 1106 (upholding the exclusion of an expert that “made it much more difficult, perhaps

almost impossible” for the defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s damages calculations and noting

that courts have upheld sanctions under Rule 37 even where a litigant’s entire claim or defense

has been precluded). Notably, as discussed below, the Court is not granting Plaintiff’s motion

for summary adjudication in full. Despite the exclusion of Dr. Van Stryland’s testimony,

Crystal Magic is able defend this infringement action based on its assertion of intervening

rights. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike as to Dr. Van Stryland’s

declaration and DENIES Crystal Magic’s motion for leave to serve his untimely expert report.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication.

1. Applicable Legal Standards.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Union States Gypsum Co. v.

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 Although the Court did not strike the declaration of Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Rhodes does

not discuss the length of the marks in the z-dimension, let alone opine as to whether such

marks are controlled or random in this dimension. Thus, this declaration does not provide

supporting evidence to defeat summary adjudication on infringement.

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Nat’l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The burden of demonstrating the

absence of any genuine issue of material fact rests with the moving party. SRI Int’l v.

Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In order to defeat summary

judgment, the non-moving party must do “more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, the non-moving party must set forth “specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(2); Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 587. 

2. Crystal Magic’s Infringement of Claims 5, 23, 29, 45 and 51.

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication on the issue of infringement of claims 5, 23,

29, 45 and 51 of the ‘496 patent. Plaintiff submits evidence demonstrating that Crystal Magic’s

products and methods of making such products practice the invention of these claims and meet

all of the elements of these claims. (Stracker Decl. I, Exs. 1, 12-16.) Crystal Magic’s only

argument in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion as to infringement is that the laser marks in Crystal

Magic’s accused products exhibit random and uncontrolled elongations in the z-dimension. 

(Opp. to Motion for Summary Judgment at 2.) However, the Court struck the evidence Crystal

Magic submitted in support of this argument.3

 Due to the absence of any evidence to create a

question of fact as to whether Crystal Magic’s products meet all the elements of the claims at

issue, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication as to infringement.

3. Crystal Magic’s Affirmative Defense of Intervening Rights.

Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication of Crystal Magic’s affirmative defense of

intervening rights pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 252 (“section 252”). Section 252 provides:

The surrender of the original patent shall take effect upon the issue of the reissued

patent, and every reissued patent shall have the same effect and operation in law,

on the trial of actions for causes thereafter arising, as if the same had been

originally granted in such amended form, but in so far as the claims of the original

and reissued patents are substantially identical, such surrender shall not affect any

action then pending nor abate any cause of action then existing, and the reissued

patent, to the extent that its claims are substantially identical with the original

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patent, shall constitute a continuation thereof and have effect continuously from

the date of the original patent.

A reissued patent shall not abridge or affect the right of any person or that

person’s successors in business who, prior to the grant of a reissue, made,

purchased, offered to sell, or used ... anything patented by the reissued patent, to

continue the use of, to offer to sell, or to sell to others to be used ... the specific

thing so made, purchased, offered for sale, [or] used ... unless the making, using,

offering for sale, or selling of such thing infringes a valid claim of the reissued

patent which was in the original patent. The court before which such matter is in

question may provide for the continued manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale of

the thing made, purchased, offered for sale, [or] used ... as specified, or for the

manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale ... of which substantial preparation was

made before the grant of the reissue, and the court may also provide for the

continued practice of any process patented by the reissue that is practiced, or for

the practice of which substantial preparation was made, before the grant of the

reissue, to the extent and under such terms as the court deems equitable for the

protection of investments made or business commenced before the grant of the

reissue.

35 U.S.C. § 252 (emphasis added). The intervening rights provided by section 252 also applies

to reexamined patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 307(b); see also Fortel Corp. v. Phone-Mate, Inc., 825

F.2d 1577, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“the reexamination statute, section 307, incorporates both

paragraphs of section 252”).

“Identical” pursuant to section 252 means “without substantive change.” Seattle Box

Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packaging, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 827-28 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“identical”

means “at most without substantive change”) (emphasis in original). “[I]t is the scope of the

claim that must be identical, not that the identical words must be used.” Slimfold Mfg. Co. v.

Kindead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1115 (Fed Cir. 1987). As the Federal Circuit explained,

the key to determining if the defense of intervening rights applies is “whether a particular

change to the claims is substantive, such that the scope of the claims is no longer substantially

identical.” Id. at 1116. The applicable standard is a “reasonable” one, because that implements

the purpose of the statute while enabling application to the facts to ensure that justice will be

served. Id. Thus, pursuant to the defense of intervening rights, if a patent has been reissued or

reexamined such that the scope of the claims in the reissued or reexamined patent are

substantively changed from those in the original patent, an infringer of the reissued or

reexamined patent is protected from liability if the infringing acts occurred prior grant of the

reissue or reexamination. 

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The Federal Circuit has made clear that “[w]hen claims are amended during

reexamination following a rejection based on prior art, the claims are not deemed substantively

changed as a matter of law.” Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 952 F.2d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir.

1991). The court rejected a per se rule and instead held that “[t]o determine whether a claim

change is substantive, it is necessary to analyze the claims of the original and the reexamined

patents in light of the particular facts, including the prior art, the prosecution history, other

claims, and any other pertinent information.” Id. at 1362-63. The court explained that a

rejection on prior art during the course of reexamination was not a PTO decision of

unpatentability. Id. at 1361. Rather, a rejection is merely “part of the prosecution history and

its significance depends on the particular facts and circumstances. The reasons for a change in

claim language must be considered in determining its estoppel effect.” Id. 

Here, both parties have submitted evidence pertinent to the determination of whether the

changes to the claims were substantive, including the prosecution history regarding the patent

holder’s amendment of the claims to overcome a rejection based on prior art, a district court’s

construction of relevant terms in the original patent, and the inventor’s declaration opining on

the scope of the changes. The Court concludes such evidence creates a genuine question of

material fact as to the scope changes which precludes summary adjudication on the validity of

the intervening rights affirmative defense. Accordingly the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion

for summary adjudication as to Crystal Magic’s affirmative defense of intervening rights.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court (1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike as to Dr.

Van Stryland’s declaration and DENIES it as to Mr. Rhodes’ declaration; (2) DENIES Crystal

Magic’s motion for leave to serve rebuttal expert report; and (3) GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion

for summary adjudication as to infringement and DENIES it as to Crystal Magic’s affirmative

defense of intervening rights.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Case 3:03-cv-01179-JSW Document 483 Filed 03/07/07 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Dated: March 7, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:03-cv-01179-JSW Document 483 Filed 03/07/07 Page 12 of 12