Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00618/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00618-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Alejandro Ortega-Lopez, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondent.

No. CV 11-0618-TUC-JGZ (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

On September 28, 2012, Petitioner, Alejandro Ortega-Lopez, an inmate confined 

in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence in Douglas, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 

2254. (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.) An Amended Petition was filed on (“Amended Petition”) 

December 1, 2011. (Doc. 6.) Respondents have filed an answer to the Amended Petition 

(“Answer”) with exhibits A through H attached. (Doc. 14.) Petitioner filed a reply 

(“Reply”) on May 17, 2012. (Doc. 16.) Petitioner also filed a motion to supplement, with 

exhibits A through C attached, which the Magistrate Judge granted on May 15, 2013. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, these matters were referred to 

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 25.) 

For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 1 of 24
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 6) be 

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Trial Court Proceedings 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the procedural background of the state 

court proceeding in its memorandum decision affirming Petitioner’s convictions: 

After a jury trial, appellant Alejandro Lopez was convicted of attempted 

theft by control, theft of means of transportation, and two counts of thirddegree burglary. The trial court found he had two historical prior felony 

convictions and sentenced him to presumptive, concurrent prison terms, the 

longest of which is 11.25 years.1

 

Answer, Ex. A at ¶2. 

B. Appeal 

 On August 31, 2010, the state appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on 

direct appeal. (Answer, Ex. A.) The appellate court addressed Petitioner’s arguments, 

raised in his pro se brief, rejecting Petitioner’s contentions that the trial court abused its 

discretion in (1) finding Petitioner should wear jail garb to trial; and (2) neglecting to find 

just cause existed to have appointed, effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages 

of the proceeding. (Answer, Exs. A, D.) Petitioner also asserted that the trial court was 

biased and prejudiced towards Petitioner. Id. 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, which was 

 

1

 The trial court’s sentencing minute entry characterized Petitioner’s offenses as non-repetitive. The appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions, but upon review of the sentencing transcripts, directed the trial court to correct the minute entry to reflect that Petitioners’ convictions were for repetitive offenses. Answer, Ex. A, at 2, n. 2. 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 2 of 24
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

denied on September 6, 2011. (Answer, Ex. C.) 

C. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Other Requested Post-Trial Relief 

It does not appear from the record before this Court that any petition for postconviction relief (“PCR”) was filed. See Answer (Factual and Procedural Background). 

Petitioner does assert that he filed a motion to vacate the judgment before the trial 

court, two special actions in the appellate court, and a habeas corpus petition with the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Amended Petition, at 3-5.) Petitioner asserts that the first 

special action was dismissed, and the court of appeals declined to accept jurisdiction of 

the second. Id. at 4. Petitioner states that the date he filed the first special action, alleging 

due process violations in relation to preliminary examinations, is unknown, and that the 

second special action, alleging excessive bail, and the habeas corpus, alleging due 

process and equal protection violations, were filed in 2008. Id. at 4-5. Petitioner states 

that the habeas corpus petition was denied for failure to exhaust. Id. at 5. 

D. Federal Habeas Petition 

 The Amended Petition raises four grounds for relief. (Amended Petition, at 6-9.) 

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his federal due process 

rights by compelling Petitioner to appear at trial in jail attire. In Ground Two, Petitioner 

alleges that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the ineffective 

assistance of counsel. In Ground Three, he alleges that his federal due process rights were 

violated by the trial court’s refusal to recuse based on bias and prejudice. In his Fourth 

Ground for relief, Petitioner asserts that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 3 of 24
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

were violated by the trial court’s refusal to grant his motion to vacate judgment. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review 

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

(“AEDPA”). 

B. Statute of Limitations 

 Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review[.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

C. Exhaustion of State Remedies 

 A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has 

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must “fairly 

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state's highest 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277–

78 (1971). If a habeas claim includes new factual allegations not presented to the state 

court, it may be considered unexhausted if the new facts “fundamentally alter” the legal 

claim presented and considered in state court. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 4 of 24
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(1986). 

 In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners 

to exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. Rule 32 of 

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a 

petitioner is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or 

in a prior PCR petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a) 

may be avoided only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d) through 

(h) of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a prior 

petition or not presented in a timely manner. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(b), 

32.4(a). 

 A habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways. 

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in 

state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 729–30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed 

to present it in state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the district court must consider whether the claim 

could be pursued by any presently available state remedy). If no remedies are currently 

available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is “technically” exhausted but procedurally 

defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n. 1; see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 5 of 24
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

152, 161-62 (1996). 

 Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, 

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. 

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). However, the Court will not review the merits of a 

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the 

failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged 

constitutional violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if 

the claim were not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Cause is defined as a "legitimate excuse for the default," and prejudice is defined 

as "actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (a 

showing of cause requires a petitioner to show that "some objective factor external to the 

defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule"). Prejudice 

need not be addressed if a petitioner fails to show cause. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. 

To bring himself within the narrow class of cases that implicate a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, a petitioner "must come forward with sufficient proof of his actual 

innocence" Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted), which can be shown when "a petitioner ‘presents 

evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of 

the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless 

constitutional error.'" Id. at 673 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 6 of 24
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

D. Standard of Review: Merits 

Petitioner's habeas claims are governed by the applicable provisions of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for habeas 

relief” with the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state 

and federal criminal sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 475 (2007) 

(quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA's “‘highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' ... demands that state-court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7). 

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim 

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision 

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 

(9th Cir. 2005). 

 “The threshold question under AEDPA [is] whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 7 of 24
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became 

final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under 

subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if 

any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” 

federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's state 

court conviction became final. Id. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); 

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). Habeas relief cannot be granted if the Supreme 

Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle advanced by 

a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76-77; Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 

2004). Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is binding, circuit court 

precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law is clearly established and 

whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069. 

 The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 

2254(d)(1). The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the 

Supreme Court's clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set 

of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405–06; see Early v. Packer,

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 8 of 24
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In characterizing the claims subject to analysis under 

the “contrary to” prong, the Court has observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court 

decision applying the correct legal rule to the facts of the prisoner's case would not fit 

comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)'s ‘contrary to’ clause.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 

406; see Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas 

court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from 

[the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... 

case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a 

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to 

a new context where it should apply.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal 

court to find a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the 

petitioner must show that the state court decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, 

but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Visciotti, 537 

U.S. at 25. 

 In conducting review under § 2254(d)(1), this Court “is limited to the record that 

was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 

–––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398–99 (2011). 

 Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the 

state court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller–El 

v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller–El II ). A state court decision “based on a 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 9 of 24
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively 

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller–El,

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) ( Miller–El I ); see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th

Cir. 2004). In considering a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual 

determinations are presumed to be correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting 

this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan,

550 U.S. at 473–74; Miller–El II, 545 U.S. at 240. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Timeliness 

Petitioner had until one year after his conviction and sentence became final to file 

his federal petition. Respondents concede (Answer at 3) and the Magistrate Judge finds, 

that pursuant to the AEDPA the Petition is timely. 

B. Ground One 

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his federal due 

process rights by compelling Petitioner to appear at trial in jail garb. (Amended Petition, 

at 6.) Respondents assert the state appellate court did not unreasonably apply controlling 

Supreme Court precedent in rejecting this claim. (Answer, at 6-9.) The Magistrate Judge 

finds Petitioner has failed to satisfy the standard for habeas relief, and recommends that 

the claim in Ground One be denied. 

i. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

 Respondents concede that Petitioner exhausted Ground One in the state courts. See 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 10 of 24
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Answer, at 3, 5)(asserting only one of Petitioner’s claims, Ground Three, is procedurally 

defaulted). A review of the state court proceedings demonstrates that Petitioner has 

exhausted this claim. Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of the claim below. 

ii. Merits	

 Petitioner contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s conduct which 

compelled Petitioner to appear at trial wearing jail garb. Respondents argue that the state 

appellate court correctly found that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a constitutional 

violation because Petitioner did not object to appearing before the jury in prison attire. 

See (Answer, at 7-8.) 

 Clearly established federal law does not prohibit the State from trying a defendant 

in prison clothing. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-06 (1976). Rather, the State 

may not force a defendant to appear in such attire. In Williams, the Supreme Court held 

that, “although the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an 

accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes, the failure 

to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever reason, is 

sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional 

violation.” Id. at 512-513 (emphasis added). 

The appellate court, applying Williams, found that Petitioner failed to show he was 

compelled to appear in jail attire when he did not object to doing so, nor did Petitioner 

expressly ask to appear in his own clothing or explain why he was “incapable of 

acquiring” it. (Answer, Ex. A, at ¶¶ 10-13.) 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 11 of 24
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Having reviewed the record, the Magistrate Judge finds that the state court did not 

unreasonably apply Williams. Petitioner does not argue that the state court applied a rule 

that contradicts the governing law as set forth in Williams. Nor does the Petitioner argue 

that the appellate court reached a different result upon confrontation of a set of facts that 

is materially indistinguishable from the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams. Petitioner 

does argue that, contrary to the appellate court’s factual finding that Petitioner failed to 

raise an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, he did in fact object. 

(Motion to Supplement Reply (Doc. 21), at 1-3.) Thus, this Court analyzes the claim 

under the “unreasonable application” prong of §2254(d)(2). Accordingly, the Petitioner 

bears the burden of rebutting the presumption that he failed to raise an objection to the 

trial court regarding his appearance in jail attire, by “clear and convincing evidence.” 

 The record supports the appellate court’s conclusion, and nothing in the record, 

including the exhibits attached to Petitioner’s supplemental reply, demonstrates 

Petitioner’s compulsion, over objection, to appearing in prison attire before the jury. As 

Respondents correctly assert, Petitioner not only failed to object, but he did not indicate 

that he did not want to appear before the jury in prison attire. The day before trial, the 

trial court told Petitioner that he could “appear [at trial] in any way that you want. You 

can appear in street clothes or you can appear in jailhouse clothes.” (Answer, Ex. E. Tr. 

6/23/08, at 25.) The trial court then asked Petitioner “What are your plans on that, sir,” 

and Petitioner replied “I’m completely incapable of acquiring clothing for the trial, so I 

don’t know how to appear other than in jail garb at the time.” (Id.) Petitioner then 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 12 of 24
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

changed topics and did not raise any further issue regarding jail attire. (Id.) The next 

day—the first day of trial— the trial court again raised the issue, stating “Allright. Mr. 

Lopez, you’re here in your jail uniform. Is that how you wish to proceed, sir?” (Answer, 

Ex. F, Tr. 6/24/08, at 21.) Petitioner responded “At this point I have no choice, I guess,” 

and he did not pursue the matter further. (Id.) During the settling of jury instructions, 

Petitioner indicated he did not wish to have an instruction informing the jury that they 

were to draw no inferences of Petitioner’s guilt or innocence based on Petitioner’s 

clothing, based on “the likelihood of prejudicial thought associated with appearing in ... 

trial in jail garb” but did not object to proceeding to trial in jail attire. (Motion to 

Supplement Clarification, Ex. A, at 7-8.) The record demonstrates that Petitioner failed to 

object to appearing at trial in jail attire. Although Petitioner submits that he requested 

clothing from counsel well in advance of trial, a request for clothing to Petitioner’s 

counsel does not alert the trial court that an objection is being made to proceeding to trial 

in jail attire. Petitioner fired his advisory counsel, who was under no obligation to 

Petitioner aside from remaining on call throughout the trial in case the court recalled him 

to assist Petitioner with trial. See Answer, Ex. F, Tr. 6/24/03, at 15-16. Furthermore, the 

trial court is not to be faulted for not asking if a defendant is deliberately going to trial in 

jail clothes. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. at 512 (refusing to “rewrite the duties of 

trial judges” to impose a burden on the trial judge to ask respondent whether he is 

deliberately going to trial in jail clothes). At no point did Petitioner make known to the 

trial court that he objected to his appearance in jail attire, nor did Petitioner make a 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 13 of 24
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

request to the judge presiding over his trial that he wished to appear in civilian clothing. 

See id. at 512, n.9 (“[R]espondents silence precludes any suggestion of compulsion.”) In 

view of the foregoing, the appellate court reasonably concluded that Petitioner was not 

forced to wear prison attire. Petitioner's failure to object to being tried in prison attire is 

sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional 

violation. Id. 

 Petitioner has failed to overcome, with clear and convincing evidence, the 

presumption of correctness given the appellate court’s finding that Petitioner failed to 

object to his appearance at trial in jail attire. Thus, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 

that the Arizona Court of Appeals decision was based upon an objectively unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Neither has Petitioner demonstrated that the Court of Appeals’ 

decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme 

Court precedent. Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy the standard for habeas relief, the 

court will recommend that the claim in Ground One be denied. 

C. Ground Two 

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment 

right to the effective assistance of counsel at the trial and appellate stages of his criminal 

case. 

i. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

 Respondents concede that Petitioner exhausted Ground Two in the state courts. 

See Answer, at 9 (Asserting only one of Petitioner’s claims, Ground Three, is 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 14 of 24
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

procedurally defaulted). A review of the state court proceedings demonstrates that 

Petitioner has exhausted this claim. Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of the 

claim below. 

ii. Merits	

 Petitioner’s second claim is that the trial court abused its discretion by denying 

Petitioner effective assistance of counsel, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel. The record shows that Petitioner waived his right to counsel under Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and that he thereafter “fired” four advisory counsel 

before the trial court refused to appoint a fifth one. (Exhibit A, at ¶¶ 14–15; Exhibit B, at 

¶¶ 11–14; Exhibit G: Waiver of Counsel; Exhibit H: Waiver of Counsel Minute Entry.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a violation of clearly 

established federal law. 

Petitioner supplies no supporting facts for his argument in his Amended Petition. 

Though under no obligation to do so, the Court will review the appellate court’s ruling on 

this issue, in light of the claim presented by Petitioner to that court. Petitioner argued in 

his appellate brief that he was entitled to the “absolute right of counsel of one’s own 

choice.” Appellant’s Brief, Answer, Ex. D, at 10 (citing Farretta, 422 U.S. 806; and 

Crooker v. California, 35 U.S. 433 (1958)). 

Petitioner’s argument finds no support in controlling Supreme Court precedent. In 

Farretta, the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel encompasses the right of the 

accused to waive counsel and represent himself at trial. 422 U.S. at 834-35. In fact, where 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 15 of 24
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

a competent defendant clearly and unequivocally declares to the trial judge his intention 

to represent himself, and does not want counsel, the trial court lacks discretion to deny 

the request so long as it is knowing and voluntary. Id. at 835. This is precisely what 

occurred in Petitioner’s case. The trial court conducted a hearing and determined that 

Petitioner “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.” See

(Answer, Ex. H.) Petitioner does not contend that the trial court erred, factually or 

legally, in making this finding. Thus, to the extent Petitioner had a Sixth Amendment 

right to appointed counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Petitioner 

waived his right and did not challenge this waiver in the state court proceedings. 

The court next appointed advisory counsel to assist Petitioner. See (Answer, Ex. 

H.) Three weeks before trial Petitioner moved, for the second time, to dismiss what was 

by then his fourth appointed advisory counsel. See (Answer, Ex. A, at 2.) The day before 

trial the court confirmed that it was the Petitioner’s intention to proceed on his own, 

without advisory counsel. See Answer, Ex. E, Tr. 6/23/03, at 15. On the day of trial, the 

trial court informed Petitioner that, if his motion to withdraw was granted there was no 

time to appoint new advisory counsel, and that Petitioner would be proceeding to trial 

without advisory counsel if he chose to proceed with his motion to dismiss. Although 

Petitioner noted that he felt that the circumstances compelled his decision, Petitioner’s 

request to proceed without advisory counsel was unequivocal. Answer, Ex. F, Tr. 6/24/03 

at 8. See United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 714 (9th Cir.1990) (“The fact that some 

of [defendant’s] statements of his preference to proceed pro se were accompanied by 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 16 of 24
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

expressions of his feeling ‘forced’ to do so does not render those statements 

unequivocal.”) The court granted Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and ordered Petitioner’s 

former advisory counsel to remain “on call” in the event Petitioner changed his mind. Id. 

at 15-16. 

The Supreme Court has never required or indicated that before a trial court may 

accept a waiver of counsel from a criminal defendant desiring to proceed pro se, it must 

initiate or conduct an inquiry sufficient to determine whether defendant is alleging that he 

is being forced to choose between incompetent counsel and proceeding pro se. Cf. Cook 

v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying the AEDPA and noting that the 

Supreme Court has never held that a trial court has a duty to inquire into a defendant's 

relationship with counsel when he invokes his constitutional right of self-representation). 

A trial “court only has a duty to inquire into the relationship between defendant and 

counsel ‘once a defendant has made a motion or request for substitute counsel.’” Id. at 

1016 (citation omitted). No such motion was made by Petitioner. Furthermore, “there is 

no authority for the proposition that [a defendant] is entitled to an absolutely 

unconditional choice between exercising his right to counsel and his right to selfrepresentation.” Robinson, 913 F.2d at 715. In Robinson, the Ninth Circuit addressed a 

defendant's argument on direct appeal of his conviction that he was coerced into selfrepresentation “as a result of ... being faced with the implicit choice of retaining [an] 

attorney ..., with whom he had apparently had some tactical and strategy disagreements, 

and proceeding pro se.” Id. at 715–16. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “limitations on 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 17 of 24
- 18 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the range of a defendant's free choice with regard to appointed or retained counsel are not 

constitutionally offensive and do not render a subsequent election of pro se status 

involuntary.” Id. at 716. 

The crux of Petitioner’s argument to the state appellate court was that the trial 

court erred in failing to “intervene with remedial measures to aid [Petitioner] by 

appointing new counsel”. (Answer, Ex. D, at ¶ 28.) To the extent Petitioner asserts that 

the failure to appoint a fifth advisory counsel was a violation of his Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel, Petitioner fails to demonstrate clearly established federal law entitling 

Petitioner to advisory counsel. See Locks v. Summer, 703 F.2d 403, 407-408 (9th Cir. 

1983)(appointment of advisory counsel not constitutional right). Petitioner has not cited 

this court to a United States Supreme Court decision, nor any federal law for that matter, 

establishing the right of a pro se defendant in a non-capital case to advisory counsel. 

Accordingly, he has failed to establish that the state court's rejection of his argument in 

this regard is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law, as required for the granting of habeas relief under AEDPA. See Moses v. Payne, 555 

F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009); Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If no 

Supreme Court precedent creates clearly established federal law relating to the legal issue 

the habeas petitioner raised in state court, the state court's decision cannot be contrary to 

or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law”). 

 Petitioner waived his right under the Sixth Amendment to appointed counsel, and 

did not challenge this waiver in the state court proceedings, and does not challenge this 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 18 of 24
- 19 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

waiver in the Amended Petition. After Petitioner’s fourth advisory counsel was 

dismissed, at Petitioner’s insistence, the appellate court correctly determined that 

Petitioner had no constitutional right to advisory counsel. This determination was neither 

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Two. 

D. Ground Three 

In Ground Three, Petitioner contends that his federal due process rights were 

violated by the trial court’s refusal to recuse based on bias and prejudice. 

i. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

Respondents argue that by raising this claim as a violation of state procedural law 

only, Petitioner failed to preserve the federal basis of this claim. The undersigned agrees. 

In making this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals Petitioner did not assert a federal 

basis; instead, he rested his argument entirely on Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

10.1. (Exhibit D: Appellant’s Opening Brief, at 12–13.) The cases cited by Petitioner 

involved a defendant’s right to a peremptory application for a change of judge under 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Proceeding, see State v. Neil, 102 Ariz. 110 (1967) 

(addressing the timeliness of the filing of the affidavit for change of judge); Hickox v. 

Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 19 Ariz.App. 195 (1973)(addressing the 

issue of a motion to withdraw a peremptory challenge); King v. Superior Court In and 

For Maricopa County, 108 Ariz. 492 (1972)(addressing right to a change of judge after 

mistrial)), or some other ancillary legal argument, see State v. Puckett, 92 Ariz. 407 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 19 of 24
- 20 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(1963) (addressing the issue of jeopardy when judge disqualifies himself), but not 

directly raising any issue of constitutional due process rights related to a trial court’s 

refusal to recuse based on bias and prejudice. Petitioner’s due process claim was not 

raised in his direct appeal. The court of appeals found his judicial bias claim untimely, 

and moot, and reviewed only for fundamental error. (Answer, Ex. A, at ¶¶ 16–17.) The 

fundamental error review conducted by the appellate court did not exhaust any claim, or 

aspect thereof, that was not fairly presented by Petitioner. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002)(The state court’s fundamental error review does not excuse a 

petitioner’s failure to raise a petitioner’s federal claims explicitly.). 

 Petitioner failed to fairly present Ground Three as a federal claim in state court. If 

Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate this claim it would be found waived 

and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). This claim is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. 

Petitioner presents no cause for the default. Petitioner’s conclusory claim that failure to 

consider this defaulted claim would result in a “genuine miscarriage of justice”, (see 

Reply, at 3-4), is not supported by the evidence or argument he presents, as he makes no 

attempt to assert, much less demonstrate “sufficient proof of his actual innocence" See 

Sistrunk , 292 F.3d at 672-73. Accordingly, this claim is properly dismissed. 

 F. Ground Four 

 i. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 20 of 24
- 21 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Petitioner argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to cite legal 

authority in its denial of Petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment. This claim was not 

presented to the state appellate court, and is thus unexhausted. Petitioner cannot return to 

state court to raise this claim because it would be time-barred and waived under Rules 

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because it does not fall 

within an exception to preclusion. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Petitioner’s claim 

is thus technically exhausted. See Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 

2002). Although such technically exhausted claims may also be procedurally defaulted, 

see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n. 1; Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 

2007) (en banc), the government did not raise the issue of procedural default before the 

district court and has thus forfeited the issue, see Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1229–31; Vang v. 

Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2003)(Procedural default is an affirmative defense.); 

Nardi v. Stewart, 354 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004)(abrogated on other grounds by, 

Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 98 (2006)). 

 ii. Merits 

 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge reviews the claim de novo. See Scott v. Ryan, 

686 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012)(where there is no state court decision on the merits, 

the district court reviews the merits de novo). Petitioner argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion by its “failure to cite [legal support or authority] or fully address with legal 

support or authority” in its denial of Petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment. Petitioner 

further asserts that neither the Arizona Court of Appeals, nor the Arizona Supreme Court 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 21 of 24
- 22 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

addressed the matter of the motion to vacate judgment, in violation of the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Amended Petition, at 8.) 

 Petitioner provides no additional facts to explain this claim, nor does he assert that 

he suffered prejudice from any of these alleged deficiencies. These minimal conclusory 

allegations are insufficient for habeas relief. See Rule 2, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 

28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (requiring petition to state the facts in support of each claim); 

Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Petitioner's] cursory and vague 

claim cannot support habeas relief.”); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(“It is well-settled that conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of 

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”) (punctuation modified); Shah v. United 

States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that vague and conclusory 

allegations of ineffective assistance do not warrant habeas relief). Thus, this claim is 

subject to dismissal. 

Further, “[t]he threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks 

to apply a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction 

became final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 390. Petitioner’s Ground Four is not 

cognizable under 28 U.S.C. §2254 because Petitioner’s allegation that the trial court 

abused its discretion by denying a motion without citing relevant authority does not 

address a federal or constitutional issue on which the Supreme Court has “broken 

sufficient legal ground” and is thus not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Petitioner submits that the Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 22 of 24
- 23 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

violated his constitutional rights by failing to address the motion to vacate judgment. 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate clearly established federal law entitling Petitioner to a 

review of the trial court’s denial of a motion when Petitioner fails to raise the claim 

before the appellate courts. Petitioner has not cited this court to a United States Supreme 

Court decision, nor any federal law for that matter, establishing such a right of review of 

trial court decisions absent a failure to raise the issue on appeal, or in post-trial 

proceedings. Accordingly, he has failed to establish that the state court's failure to reach 

this argument is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 

law, as required for the granting of habeas relief under AEDPA. See Moses, 555 F.3d at 

754; Brewer, 378 F.3d at 955 (“If no Supreme Court precedent creates clearly established 

federal law relating to the legal issue the habeas petitioner raised in state court, the state 

court's decision cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law”). 

 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its 

independent review, summarily dismiss Ground Four as vague and conclusory, and for 

failure to raise a cognizable federal claim. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 6) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 23 of 24
- 24 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id. If 

objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 11-618-TUCJGZ. 

 If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 6th day of January, 2014. 

Case 4:11-cv-00618-JGZ Document 26 Filed 01/06/14 Page 24 of 24