Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00689/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00689-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANE DOE, Civil No. 12-cv-0689-MMA (DHB)

Plaintiff,

ORDER RESOLVING JOINT

MOTION FOR DETERMINATION

OF DISCOVERY DISPUTE

REGARDING VARIOUS ISSUES

[ECF No. 115]

v.

THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

Defendants.

On June 3, 2013, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery

Dispute Regarding Various Issues (“Joint Motion”). (ECF No. 115.) After a thorough

review of the parties’ arguments and evidence, the Court issues the following Order to

resolve the issues in dispute.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s allegations in this case are well-known to the Court and the parties. 

Therefore, they will not be summarized at length in this Order. Suffice it to say that Plaintiff

seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages from the City of San Diego, its police

department and several current and former police officers based on a March 8, 2011 sexual

assault committed by one of the former officers, Defendant Anthony Arevalos. In November

2011, Defendant Arevalos was convicted of multiple felony and misdemeanor counts arising

out of on-duty sexual assaults of various female victims, including Plaintiff. Defendant

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Arevalos was sentenced to more than eight years in state prison, and he is currently

incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison in

Corcoran, California. Defendant Arevalos has appealed his criminal convictions and the

appeal remains pending before the California Court of Appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Further Deposition Testimony of Jane Doe and Brad T.

Defendants seek to re-open the depositions of Plaintiff and a percipient witness, Brad

T., in order to ask questions “regarding the nature of any sexual relationship, the existence

of any past or current sexual relationship between them, and the effect that the subject

incident may have had on their sexual relationship.” (ECF No. 115 at 2:17-19.) Defendant

contends these topics are “highly relevant to Plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress.” (Id. at

2:23.)

1. Parties’ Arguments

Defendants assert several arguments in support of their request to re-open the

depositions of Plaintiff and Brad T. First, Defendants contend good cause exists to permit

the depositions of Plaintiff and Brad T. to exceed the seven hour limit imposed by Rule

30(d)(1) “because defense counsel was prevented from thoroughly examining these

witnesses by Plaintiff’s counsel” (id. at 3:13-15), and that “Plaintiff’s counsel incessantly

coached, lectured and intimidated the witnesses.” (Id. at 3:22-23.) Second, Defendants

contend they should be permitted to inquire into Plaintiff’s sexual history and current

romantic relationship(s) given that Plaintiff is seeking to recover emotional distress damages. 

(Id. at 5:1-11.) Defendants maintain that Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence “permits

discovery regarding an alleged sexual assault victim’s past sexual history or predisposition

in cases involving sexual offenses if certain conditions are met, including relevancy and a

showing that the information cannot be obtained except through discovery.” (Id. at 5:14-17.) 

Third, Defendants assert they are not seeking to discover evidence of Plaintiff’s sexual

history for purposes generally prohibited by Rule 412 (i.e., to prove Plaintiff engaged in

other sexual behavior or to prove her sexual predisposition); rather, Defendants seek this

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evidence to “test Plaintiff’s credibility or to prove the extent of her damages.” (Id. at 5:18-

6:1.) Fourth, Defendants claim that because Plaintiff has placed her mental and emotional

state at issue in this case, they are entitled to inquire whether the sexual assault by Defendant

Arevalos “impacted her ability to trust people and to be intimate and interact socially” and

whether any prior traumatic sexual assault exists that would contribute towards her current

mental and emotional state. (Id. at 6:3-22.)

Plaintiff opposes Defendants request to re-open the depositions of Plaintiff and Brad

T. in order to inquire into Plaintiff’s sexual history. First, Plaintiff contends that she has

already answered invasive questioning regarding the sexual assault and her emotional

distress damages allegation, including that she suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder

and major depressive disorder. (Id. at 9:27-5.) Second, Plaintiff argues Defendant has failed

to adequately meet and confer prior to moving to compel the additional depositions. (Id. at

10:12-21.) Third, Plaintiff claims Defendants are seeking to degrade, humiliate and

intimidate her, her friends and her family.1

 (Id. at 10:22-25.) Fourth, Plaintiff argues Rule

412 “stands as a shield against the expansion of the single-session seven-hour time limit for

the type of sexually intrusive questioning sought by the defendants.” (Id. at 11:22-24.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff argues the policies underlying Rule 412 must be considered in

determining whether to allow any discovery into her sexual history and behavior, and that 

Defendants have “not sufficiently articulated what relevant and admissible evidence might

be garnered from second depositions sessions that would substantially outweigh the dangers

of harm to the victim, or justify the privacy intrusion upon a possible current and/or past

lover. Nor has the CITY established that it cannot obtain this evidence through other less

intrusive, less burdensome, and less humiliating means – as for instance, written interrogato1 The Court does not view defense counsel’s efforts to inquiry into Plaintiff’s sexual practices to be made in bad faith. Nor is defense counsel attempting to engage in improper voyeurism or a “prurient romp” through Plaintiff’s sexual behavior. (ECF No.

115 at 13:23-14:11 see also ECF No. 115-3 at 13:4-7 (accusing defense counsel of engaging in “medieval” and “dark ages” deposition questioning.) Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s counsel’s continual personal attacks on defense counsel to be excessive

and improper. The Court cautions all counsel to keep in mind the high standards of

professionalism that is expected for practitioners in this Court. See Local Civil Rule

83.4. 

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ries.” (Id. at 11:25-13:16.)

2. Applicable Rules

Litigants “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant

to any party’s claim or defense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). In addition, “[f]or good cause,

the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the

action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. The relevance

standard is thus commonly recognized as one that is necessarily broad in scope in order “to

encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could

bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437

U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)). However

broadly defined, relevancy is not without “ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Hickman,

329 U.S. at 507. Accordingly, district courts have broad discretion to determine relevancy

for discovery purposes. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 permits a court, for good cause, to “issue an order

to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden

or expense, including one or more of the following: (A) forbidding the disclosure or

discovery; . . . (C) prescribing a discovery method other than one selected by the party

seeking discovery; [and] (D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope

of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A), (C) and (D).

Federal Rule of Evidence 412 provides that “[t]he following evidence is not

admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct: (1)

evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence

offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.” FED.R.EVID.412(a). However, Rule 412

contains express exceptions to this exclusionary rule, including: “In a civil case, the court

may admit evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual behavior or sexual predisposition if

its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair

prejudice to any party. The court may admit evidence of a victim’s reputation only if the

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victim has placed it in controversy.” ” FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).

The advisory committee notes to the 1994 amendments to Rule 412 provide insight

into the purpose of the Rule and its applicability to discovery:

[Rule 412] aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into

the factfinding process. By affording victims protection in most instances, the rule also encourages victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders.

Rule 412 seeks to achieve these objectives by barring evidence relating to the alleged victim’s sexual behavior or alleged sexual predisposition, whether offered as substantive evidence or for impeachment, except in designated circumstances in which the probative value of the evidence significantly outweighs possible harm to the victim.

. . .

Past sexual activities connotes all activities that involve actual physical conduct, i.e. sexual intercourse or sexual contact. [Citations.]

. . .

[Rule 412] also exclude[s] all other evidence relating to an alleged victim of sexual misconduct that is offered to prove a sexual predisposition. This amendment is designed to exclude evidence that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder. Admission of such evidence would contravene

Rule 412’s objectives of shielding the alleged victim from potential embarrass- ment and safeguarding the victim against stereotypical thinking. Consequently, unless the (b)(2) exception is satisfied, evidence such as that relating to the alleged victim’s mode of dress, speech, or life-style will not be admissible.

. . .

The reason for extending Rule 412 to civil cases is equally obvious. The need to protect alleged victims against invasions of privacy, potential embarrassment, and unwarranted sexual stereotyping, and the wish to encourage victims to come forward when they have been sexually molested do not disappear because the context has shifted from a criminal prosecution to a claim for damages or injunctive relief. There is a strong social policy in not only punishing those who engage in sexual misconduct, but in also providing relief to the victim. Thus, Rule 412 applies in any civil case in which a person claims to be the victim of sexual misconduct, such as actions for sexual battery or sexual harassment.

FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s notes.

Although Rule 412 governs the admissibility of sexual behavior evidence rather than

its discoverability, the policies underlying the Rule must be considered. See Barsamian v.

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City of Kingsburg, No. 1:07-cv-00316 OWW GSA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44777, at *12-13

(E.D. Cal. May 22, 2008) (quoting Blackmon v. Buckner, 932 F. Supp. 1126, 1127-28 (S.D.

Ind. 1996)) (“To avoid undermining Rule 412, the court must ‘consider precisely the

potential relevance of such evidence and . . . prevent its use for purposes of exploiting

stereotypes or subjecting a party or witness to gratuitous embarrassment and invasion of

privacy.’”); Herron v. Eastern Indus., Inc., No. 5:07cv35/RH/EMT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

69339, at *7-8 (N.D. Fl. Sept. 19, 2007) (citing numerous cases to support the conclusion

“that the majority of district courts that have addressed whether Rule 412 is applicable to

discovery have held that it is relevant in the resolution of a discovery dispute.”) (“The

relevance standard in Rule 26 is the governing standard for discovery, but the court must

determine whether the information sought should be subject to discovery in light of the

policy underlying Rule 412 that protects victims of sexual misconduct from undue

embarrassment and intrusion into their private affairs.”); Gibbons v. Food Lion, Inc., No. 98-

1197-Civ-T-23F, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23576, at *6 (M.D. Fl. Feb. 19, 1998) (“[W]hile

relevance rather than admissibility is the governing standard for discovery, the Court must

determine whether the information requested should be ordered disclosed in light of ‘the

policy underlying Rule 412 that protects victims of sexual misconduct from undue

embarrassment and intrusion into their private affairs.’”) (quoting Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166

F.R.D. 500, 502 (D. N.M. 1996)); Miller v. Sweetheart Cup Co., Inc., No. 1:96:cv111, 1997

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24298, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 1997) (“The standard is still that

articulated in Rule 26 -- that is, whether the matter is reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence. Thus, whether [the information sought] contain[s]

material protected by Rule 412 is not determinative of the issue of discovery.”); Giron v.

Corrections Corp. of Am., 981 F. Supp. 1406, 1407 (D. N.M. 1997) (“Although Rule 412

controls the admissibility of evidence rather than its discoverability, it must inform the

proper scope of discovery in this case.”) (citing Barta v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 169

F.R.D. 132 (D. Hawaii 1996)); Barta, 169 F.R.D. at 135 (“Although Rule 412 is a rule

controlling the admissibility of evidence rather than its discoverability, Rule 412 must inform

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the proper scope of discovery.”).

3. Analysis

As noted above, Defendants claim the additional information they seek from Plaintiff

and Brad T. is relevant to “test Plaintiff’s credibility or prove the extent of her damages.” 

(ECF No. 115 at 6:1.) However, with respect to credibility, the Court is not persuaded

Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that the probative value of the

information they seek substantially outweighs the harm Plaintiff would experience if her

sexual behavior were to be discussed in a deposition setting. See J.W. v. City of Oxnard, No.

CV 07-6191-CAS (SHx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91366, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2008)

(“The probative value of her sexual behavior to help determine whether plaintiff is credible

does not substantially outweigh the danger of harm to plaintiff. Plaintiff’s credibility can be

addressed in other ways, such as through her inconsistent statements regarding the incident

itself.”); Macklin, 257 F.R.D. at 605 (concluding that “Defendants’ arguments as to the need

to explore Plaintiff’s past sexual conduct for purposes of impeachment is unpersuasive. . .

. [T]o the extent Defendants attempt to use this avenue of questioning to discover evidence

for impeachment that they do not currently have, the effort suggests something in the nature

of a fishing expedition.”). 

However, with respect to damages, the Court is persuaded that inquiry into Plaintiff’s

sexual history and behavior is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence. Plaintiff has alleged that the sexual assault perpetrated by Defendant Arevalos has

caused her to suffer emotional distress, among other things. (See, e.g., Third Amended

Complaint, ECF No. 95 at ¶ 49 (alleging Plaintiff “suffered physical harm, serious and

severe emotional distress, anxiety, depression, humiliation, shame, loss of sleep, fear and

rage”).) The nature and extent of Plaintiff’s emotional distress, and the manner in which it

is manifested, is therefore relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses. Thus, to the extent

Plaintiff’s sexual behavior, relationships, etc. have been impacted as a result of the subject

sexual assault, that information is relevant to her claims. See Doe v. Willets Unified School

Dist., No. C-09-03655-JSW (DMR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. June

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23, 2010) (“[A]nother guiding principle here is that defendants have a right to conduct

discovery to understand plaintiff’s claims and to prepare their defense. Plaintiff cannot use

[Rule] 412 as both a shield and a sword. If plaintiff intends to make affirmative use of

evidence regarding her sexual conduct, then defendants should be given an opportunity to

test that information through discovery. Stated another way, plaintiff cannot use at trial any

evidence that she does not allow defendants to discover.”).

However, given the exclusionary nature and underlying policies of Rule 412, the

question becomes whether the discovery should be precluded under Rule 26, notwithstanding

its relevance. See Macklin v. Mendenhall, 257 F.R.D. 596, 604 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Given the

sensitive and potentially embarrassing nature of the information sought from Plaintiff, the

fact that she is alleged to be a victim in a civil action involving sexual harassment, and the

policies voiced in the Advisory Comments to Fed. R. Evid. 412, the Court concludes that the

fact that the information sought by Defendants from Plaintiff might be discoverable under

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b) does not limit or absolve the Court of its responsibility to consider

and fashion appropriate protective orders under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(c).”). 

Upon careful consideration of the policies underlying Rule 412 and the facts of this

case, the Court finds that additional deposition testimony of Plaintiff and Brad T. is not

warranted. Such testimony on the topics proposed by Defendants would be unduly intrusive

and embarrassing. Moreover, as Plaintiff recognizes, the information can be sought through

less intrusive means such as written interrogatories. (ECF No. 115 at 13:13-16.) Additional

sources from which the information could be sought include Dr. Clark R. Clipson, Ph.D., and 

Plaintiff’s therapist, Dr. Kay Defrancesca.

Accordingly, Defendants’ request that the depositions of Plaintiff and Brad T. be reopened is DENIED.

B. Deposition of Gerald Sanders

Plaintiff seeks to compel the deposition of Gerald Sanders, the former police chief and

mayor of the City of San Diego. On April 9, 2013, Plaintiff served Mr. Sanders with a Rule

45 deposition subpoena requiring his attendance at a videotaped deposition noticed for May

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29, 2013. (ECF No. 115 at 14:16-19; ECF No. 115-6 at 2.) Plaintiff contends Mr. Sanders

is a “potentially significant witness” (ECF No. 115 at 15:5) and that she “is entitled to

question Mr. Sanders regarding his knowledge of the [City’s] hiring, supervising, reporting

and documentation policies and procedures” and “about his knowledge of any instances of

sexual misconduct during his tenure as Chief of Police and Mayor of the City of San Diego.” 

(Id. at 16:26-17:3.) In fact, Plaintiff recently filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint

to add two new defendants, including Mr. Sanders. (ECF No. 121.) The district judge took

that motion under submission on July 24, 2013. (ECF No. 129.)

Defendants seek a protective order preventing the deposition of Mr. Sanders on

grounds that the deposition would be “harassing and unduly burdensome because, at least

in his capacity as former Mayor and Chief of Police, Mr. Sanders is unlikely to contribute

anything relevant to this case.” (Id. at 7:6-8.) Defendants further contend “there is no

evidence linking [Mr. Sanders] to any of the alleged misconduct involving Mr. Arevalos.” 

(Id. at 7:10-11.) Defendants finally contend that in light of Plaintiff’s pending motion to

amend the complaint to add Mr. Sanders as a named defendant, his “deposition is premature. 

As a potential defendant, Mr. Sanders is entitled to answer the allegations asserted against

him and prepare for his deposition as a party, not a (potentially) percipient witness.” (Id. at

7:18-21.)

“A party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave

of court except as provided in Rule 30(a)(2). The deponent’s attendance may be compelled

by subpoena under Rule 45.” FED.R.CIV. P. 30(a)(1). However, the Court is authorized to

issue a protective order, upon a showing of good cause, “to protect a party or person from

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P.

26(c)(1). Such a protective order may include, among other limitations expressed in Rule

26(c)(1), an order “forbidding the disclosure or discovery [or] specifying the terms, including

time and place, for the disclosure or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A)-(B). 

Here, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that “Mr. Sanders is unlikely to

contribute anything relevant to this case.” (ECF No. 115 at 7:8.) Based on the evidence

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provided by Plaintiff in support of the instant joint motion and in support of her pending

motion for leave to amend the complaint, the Court is satisfied that Mr. Sanders’ testimony

is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P.

26(b)(1). Indeed, to the extent Mr. Sanders became aware of sexual misconduct by

Defendant Arevalos or other police officers while Mr. Sanders served as police chief and/or

mayor, Plaintiff should be permitted discovery into this knowledge and any actions taken in

response to such misconduct. Moreover, to the extent Mr. Sanders was never made aware

of Defendant Arevalos’ misconduct, Plaintiff should be entitled to such testimony. Either

way, Mr. Sanders’ deposition is proper.

That being said, given that Mr. Sanders’ status as either a percipient witness or a

named defendant awaits the district judge’s ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend,

the Court is persuaded that a protective order postponing Mr. Sanders’ deposition is

appropriate. Mr. Sanders is entitled to answer questions during his deposition when he

knows whether he is a defendant in this case. 

Accordingly, the Court issues a protective order preventing the deposition of Mr.

Sanders from going forward until after the district judge rules on the motion to amend. The

parties are ORDERED to meet and confer in good faith following the district judge’s ruling

to schedule the deposition.

C. Expert Designation of Lori Adams

Defendants contend “Plaintiff has improperly designated current San Diego Police

Detective Lori Adams as a non-retained expert.” (ECF No. 115 at 7:24-25.) Defendants

argue: (1) because Detective Adams is a current employee of the City of San Diego, any

expert testimony she provides creates an inherent conflict of interest; (2) Detective Adams

did not consent to being an expert witness for Plaintiff; and (3) Plaintiff failed to include a

reasonable summary of Detective Adams’ testimony or the normal rates she charges for

deposition and trial testimony, in violation of this Court’s Scheduling Order. (Id. at 8:1-7.) 

Defendants request that the Court “strike Plaintiff’s designation of Detective Lori Adams and

preclude Plaintiff’s from attempting to solicit expert testimony from her during her

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deposition and at the time of trial.” (Id. at 8:8-10.) Plaintiff objects to Defendants’

arguments on the basis that Defendants failed to adequately meet and confer and that

Defendants’ “request is baseless and should be summarily denied.” (Id. at 18:4-7.) 

Rule 26 requires the parties to “disclose to the other parties the identity of any witness

it may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.” 

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A). “[I]f the witness is one retained or specially employed to

provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party’s employee regularly

involve giving expert testimony,” the party’s disclosure of the witness must be accompanied

by the witness’ written report. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Thus, Rule 26 draws a

distinction between retained experts and non-retained experts. See Downey v. Bob’s

Discount Furniture Holdings, Inc., 633 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2011) (“In order to give the phrase

‘retained or specially employed’ any real meaning, a court must acknowledge the difference

between a percipient witness who happens to be an expert and an expert who without prior

knowledge of the facts giving rise to litigation is recruited to provide expert opinion

testimony.”) (“[W]here . . . the expert is part of the ongoing sequence of events and arrives

at his causation opinion during treatment, his opinion testimony is not that of a retained or

specially employed expert.”); Fielden v. CSX Transp., Inc., 482 F.3d 866, 869 (6th Cir.

2007) (characterizing non-retained expert witness as “an actor with regard to the occurrences

from which the tapestry of the lawsuit was woven.”). Only the former is required to provide

a written expert report under Rule 26. However, as to the latter, the disclosure must include

“(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal

Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and (ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the

witness is expected to testify.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(i)-(ii). Expert disclosures must

be made “at the times and in the sequence that the court orders.” FED.R.CIV.P. 26(a)(2)(D). 

“Rule 37 ‘gives teeth’ to Rule 26’s disclosure requirements by forbidding the use at

trial of any information that is not properly disclosed.” Goodman v. Staples The Office

Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 827 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers

Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Rule 37(c)(1) is a ‘self-executing,’

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‘automatic’ sanction designed to provide a strong inducement for disclosure.” Id. (quoting

FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (1993)). Moreover, because of the automatic

nature of this sanction, courts are not required to make a finding of willfulness or bad faith

prior to excluding expert testimony at trial. See Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc.,

541 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008). “When a party fails to make the disclosures required

by Rule 26(a), the party is not allowed to use the witness to supply evidence at trial unless

it establishes that the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Goodman, 644 F.3d

at 826 (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 37(c)(1); Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1212-13

(9th Cir. 2008)). “The burden to prove harmlessness is on the party seeking to avoid Rule

37’s exclusionary sanction.” Id. at 827 (citing Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1107). 

“[P]articularly wide latitude [is given] to the district court’s discretion to issue

sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).” Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1106 (citing Ortiz-Lopez v.

Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico, 248 F.3d 29, 34 (1st

Cir. 2001)). Despite the severity of this exclusionary sanction, it may be appropriate “even

when a litigant’s entire cause of action or defense has been precluded.” Id. (citing OrtizLopez, 248 F.3d at 35).

The Ninth Circuit has established a five-factor test for determining whether sanctions

are appropriate in these circumstances: “1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of

litigation; 2) the court’s need to manage its docket; 3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants;

4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; [and] 5) the availability of

less drastic sanctions.” Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 1997).

Here, Plaintiff designated Detective Adams as a non-retained expert. (See ECF No.

115-7 at 3:18.) The Court rejects Defendants’ initial argument that Plaintiff’s designation

of Detective Adams is improper because it creates an inherent conflict of interest in light of

her current employment status with the City. Not only is Detective Adams a percipient

witness to the facts underlying Plaintiff’s claims, but, according to Plaintiff, Detective

Adams’ 2011 sex crimes report contains her opinions regarding Defendant Arevalos’ sexual

misconduct. Plaintiff contends that in light of the expert opinions contained in Detective

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Adams’ report, Plaintiff was required to list Detective Adams as a non-retained expert whom

Plaintiff intends to call as a witness to introduce expert evidence. The Court agrees. It

matters not that Detective Adams is an employee of the City of San Diego. If, during her

investigation of Defendant Arevalos’ sexual misconduct, she formed expert opinions based

on her “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” FED.R. EVID. 702, Plaintiff is

entitled to seek to introduce those opinions at trial.2

 But in order to do so, Plaintiff must first

comply with Rule 26’s expert disclosure requirements.

Similarly, the fact that Detective Adams has not consented to be an expert for the

Plaintiff does not justify Defendants’ request that the Court strike Plaintiff’s designation or

preclude Plaintiff from attempting to solicit expert testimony from Detective Adams during

her deposition or at trial. Plaintiff has not sought to designate Detective Adams as a retained

expert.3

 Rather, she is designated as a non-retained expert based on her role as a percipient

witness to certain facts of this case and the opinions she formed during her investigation into

police misconduct. See Britz Fertilizers, Inc. v. Bayer Corp., No. 1:06cv287 OWW DLB,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57947, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. June 17, 2009) (“[P]ercipient witness

testimony is based on the first hand experience of the witness, i.e., the observations of the

witness and the process by which decisions were made. The risk of surprise is not as great

[as with retained expert witnesses] because the parameters of the witness’s opinion, as it

relates to actions he or she took in the past, are generally already known to the parties.”). In

this respect she appears more closely analogous to the prototypical non-retained expert

witness, the treating physician, who does not generally consent to being listed as a nonretained expert.

Finally, although Plaintiff was not required to provide a written expert report from

Detective Adams because she is not a retained expert, Plaintiff’s expert disclosure was

2 The Court takes no position regarding whether Detective Adams qualifies as an expert or whether her testimony will be admissible at trial. Such issues are more

appropriately addressed to the district judge as this case nears trial.

3 Defendants’ argument regarding an inherent conflict would have been appropriate had Plaintiff sought to retain Detective Adams to provide expert testimony.

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required to provide “(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present

evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and (ii) a summary of the facts

and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify.” FED.R.CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(i)-(ii). 

However, Plaintiff failed to do so. Instead, Plaintiff only listed Detective Adams’ contact

information and stated that she is “[n]ot retained as a testifying expert.” (ECF No. 115-7 at

3:18.) Thus, Plaintiff has not fully complied with the expert disclosure requirements of Rule

26.

The question now becomes whether Plaintiff’s non-compliance was substantially

justified or harmless, and whether sanctions are appropriate. As to the first prong, the Court

finds Plaintiff has not established substantial justification for her failure to identify the

subject matter on which Detective Adams is expected to testify or provide a summary of the

facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify. Indeed, Plaintiff makes no

effort to explain her failure.

However, as to the second prong, the Court finds Plaintiff’s failure can be easily

remedied and that there is no harm to Defendants. Indeed, Defendants are well aware of

Detective Adams’ role in this case and the opinions she set forth in her 2011 sex crimes

report. In fact, Plaintiff obtained the report from Defendants during discovery. Moreover,

discovery is still open. The parties have until September 1, 2013 to complete discovery. In

addition, Defendants (other than Defendant Arevalos) are in the unique position of having

unfettered access to Detective Adams. Defendants’ ability to prepare for a defense is

therefore not affected by Plaintiff’s technical failure. Neither is the Court’s schedule. 

Accordingly, the Court declines to sanction Plaintiff. Nonetheless, deficiencies remain in

Plaintiff’s expert designation. Accordingly, on or before August 9, 2013, Plaintiff shall

serve Defendants with an amended expert designation that includes the information required

by Rule 26(a)(2)(C).4

4 Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s expert designation violates the Court’s Scheduling Order because it does not include the normal rates Detective Adams charges for deposition and trial testimony. However, in light of the circumstances of this case, the Court excuses Plaintiff from this requirement. If the City of San Diego desires this

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ request that the depositions of Plaintiff and Brad T. be re-opened

is DENIED.

2. The deposition of Gerald Sanders shall not go forward until after the district

judge issues a ruling on Plaintiff’s pending motion to amend the complaint. 

Following that ruling, the parties shall meet and confer in good faith to

schedule Mr. Sanders’ deposition.

3. Defendants’ request that the Court sanction Plaintiff by striking her expert

designation of Detective Lori Adams is DENIED.

4. On or before August 9, 2013, Plaintiff shall serve Defendants with an amended

expert designation that includes the information required by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 1, 2013

DAVID H. BARTICK

United States Magistrate Judge

information, its attorneys can ask Detective Adams directly.

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