Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08226/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08226-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DAVID ALAN DUNLAP, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 10-08226 PCT FJM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, TERRY GODDARD, ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FRANK J. MARTONE:

On or about November 19, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 9) on March 3, 2011.

Petitioner filed a traverse and a memorandum of points and

authorities on April 8, 2011. See Doc. 12 & Doc. 13. 

I Procedural History

On February 15, 2001, a Mohave County grand jury

returned an indictment charging Petitioner with one count of

first-degree premeditated murder. Answer, Exh. A. The

indictment alleged that Petitioner caused the death of Maja

Kensey on or about January 29, 2001. Petitioner’s first jury

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1

 The victim’s roommate testified that the victim left her

apartment on the evening of January 28, 2001, to go gambling with

Petitioner in Laughlin, Nevada. Her roommate observed her leaving the

apartment with Petitioner. The victim did not report for work, nor

did her roommate see her, on January 29, 2001. The roommate reported

the victim missing on January 30, 2001. Petitioner’s father testified

that Petitioner was in possession of a van owned by Petitioner’s

parents on the night in question. Petitioner first told the police

he last saw the victim when he drove her home on the morning of

January 29, 2001, and he then told the police he had dropped the

victim off at a different house where she intended to buy drugs. The

victim’s body was discovered near the shore of Lake Havasu on January

31, 2001. An autopsy revealed the victim was stabbed twenty-nine

times and a forensic scientist testified that her blood was found on

the van owned by Petitioner’s parents and driven by Petitioner on the

night of January 28, 2001.

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trial ended in a hung jury on May 21, 2002. Id., Exh. A.1

Petitioner’s second trial began November 4, 2002.

Petitioner did not testify at his trial and presented a

misidentification defense, endeavoring to shift suspicion to

other persons, including the victim’s roommate. On November 14,

2002, after deliberating for approximately four hours, the trial

concluded with the second jury finding Petitioner guilty as

charged. Id., Exh. A. 

Petitioner was sentenced on December 13, 2002. Id.,

Exh. L. The trial court sentenced Petitioner pursuant to

Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-703. Id., Exh. L. Although the

court found Petitioner’s lack of prior felony convictions in

mitigation, it found in aggravation the fact that Petitioner

committed the crime in a heinous, depraved, and cruel manner.

Petitioner was sentenced to prison for a term of “natural life,”

i.e., a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole. 

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Petitioner initiated a timely direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence on October 27, 2003, raising nine

arguments on appeal. On June 24, 2004, prior to the date

Petitioner’s direct appeal was decided, the United States

Supreme Court issued its decision in Blakely v. Washington. On

July 26, 2004, Petitioner filed: (1) a motion to supplement his

opening brief to raise a Blakely claim and (2) a supplemental

opening brief challenging his natural life sentence on the

ground that the trial court, not a jury, had found the

aggravating circumstance of the heinous, depraved, or cruel

manner of the murder. Id., Exh. P. 

On July 29, 2004, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted

Petitioner’s motion to consider the impact of Blakely on his

sentence and ordered the parties to brief the issue. In a

lengthy memorandum decision issued February 22, 2005, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and

sentence. Id., Exh. A. On March 28, 2005, Petitioner

petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review. Id., Exh. T.

On October 24, 2005, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied

review of the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. U. 

Petitioner initiated a timely state action for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, asserting that his trial counsel’s performance was

unconstitutionally ineffective. Petitioner was appointed

counsel to represent him in his Rule 32 action, who notified the

court that they could find no meritorious issue to raise on

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Petitioner’s behalf. On February 22, 2007, Petitioner filed a

pro per petition for post-conviction relief alleging numerous

instances of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The state trial court considering Petitioner’s Rule 32

action ordered an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of

determining whether Petitioner’s trial counsel “refused to

allow” Petitioner to testify at his second trial. At the

hearing Petitioner’s trial counsel averred that Petitioner made

the decision not to testify, based on counsel’s advice. Counsel

denied ever telling Petitioner, as he alleged, “We’ve discussed

this already. You are not taking the stand. You have too much of

a past.” At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court

ruled that Petitioner had not carried his burden of establishing

his trial counsel improperly prohibited Petitioner from

testifying at his trial, and denied post-conviction relief on

this ineffectiveness claim and the other ineffective assistance

of counsel claims presented in his pro per Rule 32 petition.

Id., Exh. X.

Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s decision

denying Rule 32 relief. On September 18, 2009, the Arizona

Court of Appeals summarily denied review. Id., Exh. Z.

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which

summarily denied review on December 29, 2009. Id., Exh. AA &

Exh. BB.

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts:

1. The trial court’s jury instruction defining the

element of premeditation was unconstitutionally vague because it

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failed to provide a meaningful distinction between first-degree

murder and second-degree murder.

2. The State failed to present sufficient evidence to

prove the element of premeditation on the charge of first-degree

murder.

3. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth,

and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present a defense and to due

process of law by precluding his proffered third-party

culpability evidence.

4. The prosecutor impermissibly vouched for the State’s

case, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

to due process and a fair trial.

5. The prosecutor shifted the burden of proof to the

defense, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments, when he argued that Petitioner had not presented any

evidence to support his theory that someone else murdered the

victim.

6. The trial court’s instruction on reasonable doubt

impermissibly lowered the State’s burden of proof, in violation

of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

 7. The trial court violated the Sixth Amendment’s

guarantee of a trial by jury by sentencing Petitioner to prison

for natural life, based upon the trial court’s finding that he

committed the charged murder in a heinous, depraved, or cruel

manner.

8. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of

counsel at his trial and sentencing, in violation of the Sixth

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2

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2010). 

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Amendment right to counsel and the Due Process Clauses of the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Respondents allow that the petition was timely filed

and that Petitioner has exhausted his first six claims for

relief. Respondents assert that the state courts’ decisions

denying relief on the first six claims were not clearly contrary

to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).2

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

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3 A petitioner must present to the state courts the

“substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513-14 (1971);

Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair

presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his

claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal

constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the

petitioner to relief. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th

Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007).

Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the

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test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D.

Ariz. 2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.3 

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federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state courts,

Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78, 92 S. Ct. at 512-13, they must do more

than present the facts necessary to support the federal claim. See

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

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A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2010). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

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(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

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default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595

(1982). See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16

(9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir.

2004). 

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To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll, 137 F.3d at 1415-16. Establishing prejudice requires

a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d

1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123

n.10.

D. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

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of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

E. Adequate and independent state-law basis

To constitute an adequate and independent state

procedural ground sufficient to support a state court’s finding

of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s

purported default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203

(9th Cir. 2001). A state rule is considered consistently

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in

the “vast majority of cases.” Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1221

n.6 (1989). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that

“federal courts should not insist upon a petitioner, as a

procedural prerequisite to obtaining federal relief, comply[]

with a rule the state itself does not consistently enforce.”

Id., 567 F.3d at 581-82, quoting Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d

1308, 1318 (9th Cir. 1994). It is Respondents’ burden to prove

the rule cited and relied upon by the state court in denying

relief was clear, consistently applied, and well-established at

the time the rule was applied to Petitioner’s case. Id. 

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Additionally, for the proffered state procedural bar to

preclude the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court

must actually have relied on the procedural bar as an

independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Caldwell v.

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638-39 (1985).

See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261-62, 109 S. Ct. 1038,

1042 (1989); Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir.

2009); Scott, 567 F.3d at 581-82.

F. Standard of review 

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2010); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal

court is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding instituted by an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be

correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”);

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325

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(2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct.

1029, 1041 (2003); Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th

Cir. 2010); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir.

2007); Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006).

The “presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a

state appellate court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes

the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S.

Ct. 1303, 1304-05 (1982). 

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544

U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v.

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004). 

A state court decision is contrary to clearly

established federal law if it arrives at a

conclusion of law opposite to that of the

Supreme Court or reaches a result different

from the Supreme Court on materially

indistinguishable facts. Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). A

state court decision involves an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal

law if it correctly identifies a governing

rule but applies it to a new set of facts in

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if

it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly

established legal principle to a new set of

facts in a way that is objectively

unreasonable. Id. An unreasonable

application of federal law is different from

an incorrect application of federal law. Id.

McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.

denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3727 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-10109). 

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4

 “That test is an objective one and does not permit a court

to grant relief simply because the state court might have incorrectly

applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v.

Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2011).

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For example, a state court’s decision is considered

contrary to federal law if the state court erroneously applied

the wrong standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim.

See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009); Wright

v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47

(2008); Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2010),

cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1557 (2011). See also Frantz v. Hazey,

533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008); Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d

1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009). 

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987,

994 (9th Cir. 2010); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th

Cir. 2008). However, the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g.,

Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). An unreasonable

application of law is different from an incorrect one. See

Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077,

1080 (9th Cir. 2005).4

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A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief

so long as “fairminded jurists could

disagree” on the correctness of the state

court’s decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, []

(2004). And as this Court has explained,

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s

specificity. The more general the rule, the

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes

in case-by-case determinations.” Ibid. “[I]t

is not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law for a state court to

decline to apply a specific legal rule that

has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, [] 129 S. Ct.

1411, 1413–14, [] (2009) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).

The phrase “clearly established Federal law”

refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the

dicta,” of the Supreme Court’s decisions “as

of the time of the relevant state-court

decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412, 120 S. Ct. 1495 [] (2000). A state

court’s decision is “contrary to” this body

of law if it applies a rule that contradicts

the governing law articulated by the Supreme

Court or arrives at a result different than

that reached by the Supreme Court in a case

with materially indistinguishable facts. Id.

at 405-06, 120 S. Ct. 1495.

 A decision involves an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal

law if it “identifies the correct governing

legal principle ... but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. 1495. The

Supreme Court has emphasized that “an

unreasonable application of federal law is

different from an incorrect application of

federal law.” Id. at 410, 120 S. Ct. 1495.

Accordingly, “a federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that

the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly.” Id. at 411, 120 S. Ct. 1495.

Instead, the court must determine whether the

state court’s application of Supreme Court

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precedents was objectively unreasonable. Id.

at 409, 120 S. Ct. 1495. Although the Supreme

Court’s decisions are the focus of the

unreasonable-application inquiry, we may look

to Ninth Circuit case law as “persuasive

authority for purposes of determining whether

a particular state court decision is an

‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court

law.” Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600

(9th Cir. 2000).

Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2010).

Additionally, the United States Supreme Court recently

held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits in

the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the

claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

1398 (2011).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise

requires. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953-54, 127

S. Ct. 2842, 2858-59 (2007); Greenway v. Schriro, ___ F.3d ___,

2011 WL 3195310, at *14 (9th Cir.); Norris, 622 F.3d at 1286;

Howard, 608 F.3d at 568.

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G. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner asserts the trial court’s jury

instruction defining the element of premeditation was

unconstitutionally vague because it failed to provide a

meaningful distinction between first-degree murder and

second-degree murder.

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal. The

Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on the merits of the

claim. The Court of Appeals applied harmless error analysis in

addressing Petitioner’s argument that the challenged jury

instruction allowed the jury to find premeditation based “solely

on the passage of time.” The Court of Appeals concluded, after

a thorough review of the record, that any error in the

instruction was harmless because the element of premeditation

was not at issue in the case, i.e., Petitioner’s defense was

that there was insufficient evidence that he committed the

crime, not the manner in which the crime was committed. The

appellate court also determined the prosecution had presented

sufficient evidence that the crime was premeditated, including

the infliction of multiple wounds, the fact that the victim was

killed in a remote location, and that her body was dragged from

where she was killed into bushes to conceal the crime. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was not clearly

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Due

process guarantees “the fundamental elements of fairness in a

criminal trial.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70, 112 S.

Ct. 475, 481, quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563–64, 87

S. Ct. 648, 653 (1967). When reviewing a claim that an

incorrect jury instruction resulted in a constitutional

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violation, the reviewing court must decide “whether the ailing

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S.

at 72-73, 112 S. Ct. at 482. 

Jury instructions are subject to the harmless error

analysis of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710

(1993). See Byrd v. Lewis 566 F.3d 855, 861-67 (9th Cir. 2009),

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2103 (2010). Under this standard,

“errors are harmless if they do not have a ‘substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.’” Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir.

2005), quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S. Ct. at 1721-22.

See also Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855, 863 (9th Cir. 2009)

(explaining the distinction between jury instruction subject to

structural error review and jury instruction subject to harmless

error review), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2103 (2010), citing

Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 60, 129 S. Ct. 530, 532 (2008).

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying this

claim was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of federal law. The appellate court reviewed the

entire record of the trial and properly considered whether the

challenged instruction was “harmless” in the jury’s

determination of guilt. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled

to federal habeas relief on this claim.

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5

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we may

grant habeas relief only if “no rational trier of

fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Viriginia, 443

U.S. 307, 324, 99 S. Ct. 2781 [](1979); see also

McDaniel v. Brown, [], 130 S. Ct. 665, 673

(2010).... Furthermore, “[a]fter AEDPA, we apply

the standards of Jackson with an additional layer

of deference” to state court findings. Juan H. v.

Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005).

Ngo v. Giurbino, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2675808, at *2 (9th Cir.).

-20-

2. Petitioner contends the state failed to present

sufficient evidence to prove the premeditation element of

first-degree murder.

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal. The

Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on the merits of the

claim. The appellate court’s decision was not clearly contrary

to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

A due process claim based on insufficiency of the

evidence can only succeed when, viewing all the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 324, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). When undertaking habeas

review of a state court decision rejecting a claim of

insufficiency of the evidence, the Court’s inquiry is very

limited; the Court may ask only whether the state court’s

decision was contrary to or reflected an unreasonable

application of Jackson to the facts of a particular case. See

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2005).5

A federal habeas court can only set aside a

state-court decision as “an unreasonable

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application of ... clearly established

Federal law,” § 2254(d)(1), if the state

court’s application of that law is

“objectively unreasonable,” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S. Ct. 1495,

[] (2000). And Jackson requires a reviewing

court to review the evidence “in the light

most favorable to the prosecution.” 443 U.S.,

at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781. Expressed more fully,

this means a reviewing court “faced with a

record of historical facts that supports

conflicting inferences must presume-even if

it does not affirmatively appear in the

record-that the trier of fact resolved any

such conflicts in favor of the prosecution,

and must defer to that resolution.” Id., at

326, 99 S. Ct. 2781 ....

McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2010). 

Insufficient evidence claims are reviewed by looking at

the elements of the offense under state law and, in determining

whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, federal

courts are bound by a state court’s interpretation of state law.

See Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2011).

Additionally, circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from

it are sufficient to sustain a conviction. See, e.g., Ngo v.

Giurbino, ___ F.3d ____, 2011 WL 2675808, at *2 (9th Cir.);

Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995).

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that there was

sufficient evidence presented at Petitioner’s trial to support

the jury’s verdict of premeditated murder was not clearly

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Jackson. The

victim was last seen in the company of Petitioner, and

Petitioner did not dispute that he and the victim were in

possession of a van, in which the victim’s blood was found. 

The victim had been stabbed twenty-nine times and her body

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dragged from where she was murdered into bushes some distance

away. The location where the victim’s body was found was near

a muddy dirt road and mud was found on the tires and interior of

the van driven by Petitioner on the night of the murder. The

victim’s body was partially clothed when found. Petitioner gave

conflicting stories to the police about where and when he had

last scene the victim. Accordingly, there was sufficient

circumstantial and physical evidence to support a jury verdict

of first degree premeditated murder and Petitioner is not

entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

3. Petitioner asserts the trial court violated his

Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present a

defense and to due process by precluding his proffered

third-party culpability evidence.

It is arguable whether Petitioner properly exhausted

this claim in the state courts as a federal constitutional

claim. When raising the claim of error in his direct appeal

Petitioner made only passing reference to the Sixth Amendment

and his federal constitutional right to due process of law. In

his brief in his direct appeal the discussion regarding this

claim of error focused on the impropriety of the trial court’s

decision on a motion in limine based on state law and state

rules. The state trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals

found the evidence that Petitioner sought to introduce

irrelevant and therefore inadmissible under state evidentiary

rules. Regardless of any failure to properly exhaust this claim

in the state courts, the claim may be rejected on the merits.

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To the extent that Petitioner asks the Court to review

the correctness of the Arizona court’s application of Arizona

Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403, “[i]t is not the province

of a federal court to reexamine state court determinations of

state law questions.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Walters v.

McCormick, 122 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1997).

Additionally, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection

of Petitioner’s claim that the trial court improperly excluded

evidence that the victim’s roommate had a past history of

domestic violence, was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. See Clark v.

Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 770, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2731-32 (2006)

(“While the Constitution ... prohibits the exclusion of defense

evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that

are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to

promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges

to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by

certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or potential to mislead the jury.”); Montana v.

Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2017 (1996) (“The

accused does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence]

that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under

standard rules of evidence.”).

The exclusion of evidence of third-party culpability,

absent substantial evidence tending to directly connect the

third person with the actual commission of the subject offense,

or the exclusion of tangential evidence of something that may

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have happened at a different time and place, does not constitute

a due process violation. See Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 978

(9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that state trial court did not

infringe the defendant’s constitutional rights by excluding

speculative third-party culpability evidence); Walters, 122 F.3d

at 1177. Compare Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319,

326–27, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1732 (2006).

Because the Arizona state trial courts’ decision

precluding the evidence did not violate Petitioner’s federal

constitutional rights, Petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on the merits of this claim regardless of any

failure to exhaust the claim in the state courts.

4. Petitioner contends the prosecutor impermissibly

vouched for the state’s case, in violation of his Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and his right to a

fair trial.

In his habeas petition Petitioner alleges the

prosecutor erred when he stated during closing argument that the

police “knew their job” and that the police would have pursued

any evidence that led to other persons. Petitioner also

contends the prosecutor violated Petitioner’s constitutional

rights by stating, during closing argument, that Petitioner was

the person who left a bloody hand-print on the rear door of the

van Petitioner had borrowed from his parents the night of the

crime to provide transportation for the victim. 

Petitioner has exhausted these claims in the state

courts. In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted that the

prosecution improperly vouched for the credibility of the police

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and the police investigation into the murder during closing

argument. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief, noting

that Petitioner had not contemporaneously objected to the

prosecutor’s statements, but instead had claimed error in a

motion for a new trial. The Arizona Court of Appeals applied

fundamental error review because it concluded that, as a matter

of state law, Petitioner had failed to preserve the issue for

appeal. Additionally, after considering the prosecutor’s

challenged statements in the context of the entire case, the

appellate court determined that the statements were not

improper. The Arizona Court of Appeals noted that the jury had

been instructed that closing argument was not evidence.

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that

Petitioner’s rights were not violated by the prosecutor’s

statements was not clearly contrary to federal law.

Petitioner’s claim regarding prosecutorial misconduct in the

context of closing argument may be denied on the merits.

A habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief on a

claim that a prosecutor’s comments violated their right to due

process of law unless they can establish that the prosecutor’s

comments “‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2471 (1986),

quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S. Ct.

1868, 1871 (1974) (“it is not enough that prosecutors’ remarks

were undesirable or even universally condemned....”). See also

Towery v. Schriro, 641 F.3d 300, 310-11 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating

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that harmless error applies to claims of prosecutorial

misconduct), petition for cert. filed, May 19, 2011 (No.

10-10686, 10A891); Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 778 (6th

Cir. 2006). An improper statement made at closing argument

warrants habeas relief only if the reviewing court concludes

that the statements had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence on the jury’s verdict. See Turner v. Calderon, 281

F.3d 851, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Under this standard, a defendant’s right to due process

of law is violated, for instance, if the prosecutor’s statements

give personal assurances of any witness’s veracity or suggest

that the prosecutor has information, outside of the evidence

introduced at trial, that supported the witness’s credibility.

See United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.

2005); United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.

1993); United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir.

1999); Johnson v. Bell, 525 F.3d 466, 482 (6th Cir. 2008). A

prosecutor’s comments cannot be considered a violation of the

defendant’s right to due process when, for instance, the

prosecutor properly and in good faith asks the jury to draw

reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Shaw v. Terhune,

380 F.3d 473, 480 (9th Cir. 2004).

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the

statements which Petitioner asserts violated his right to due

process were not improper vouching is not clearly contrary to

federal law. The Arizona Court of Appeals properly considered

whether, in light of the entire proceedings, the challenged

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statements had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury’s

verdict and determined the statements did not violate

Petitioner’s right to due process of law. Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the basis of his

assertion that the prosecutor denied him his right to due

process of law by improperly vouching for witnesses or the

state’s case.

5. Petitioner argues the prosecutor improperly shifted

the burden of proof to the defense, in violation of the Fifth,

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, when he argued that Petitioner

had not presented any evidence to support the theory that

someone else murdered the victim.

In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted the trial

court erred by denying his motion for a new trial, which was

predicated, inter alia, on an argument that the prosecutor

improperly commented on the defense’s failure to present

evidence in support of the theory that someone other than

Petitioner committed the crime. The Arizona Court of Appeals

concluded that the prosecutor had properly commented on the

defense’s failure to present evidence without infringing on

Petitioner’s right to remain silent. The Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision denying relief on this claim was not an

unreasonable application of federal law.

Prosecutors may comment on the failure of the

defense to produce evidence to support an

affirmative defense so long as it does not

directly comment on the defendant’s failure

to testify. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.

586, 595, 98 S. Ct. 2954, [] (1978) (allowing

comments concerning opportunity to call

witnesses where defense focused on potential

testimony). In this case, the prosecutor’s

comment was aimed at attacking the

credibility of [a witness’] testimony

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concerning the believability of [the

defendant’s] alibi defense. At most, the

prosecutor’s comment is a reference to [the

defendant’s] statements to [the witness]

while in jail together, not a direct comment

on [the defendant’s] failure to testify. ....

The Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of

this comment was not objectively

unreasonable; therefore, there was no Griffin

error.

Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal

citation omitted).

Having reviewed the transcripts provided to the Court

and the pleadings of both Petitioner and Respondents, the

Magistrate Judge concludes that the Arizona Court of Appeals’

decision denying relief on this claim was not contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. The prosecutor’s

statement did not violate Petitioner’s federal constitutional

rights by noting for the jury that Petitioner had not presented

evidence of third-party culpability without commenting on the

fact that Petitioner had remained silent at trial. Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the basis

of this claim for relief.

6. Petitioner asserts the trial court’s instruction on

reasonable doubt impermissibly lowered the state’s burden of

proof, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments.

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal and

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied the claim on the merits.

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was not contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of federal law.

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6 The Arizona state courts have repeatedly rejected the

argument that a reasonable doubt instruction that comports with

Portillo violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to the

requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Sixth Amendment

right to a jury trial, and the right to due process of law guaranteed

by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Arizona v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, 66–67, 163 P.3d 1006, 1016–17 (2007); Arizona v.

Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 133, 140 P.3d 899, 916 (2006).

-29-

 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is

a requirement of due process, but the

Constitution neither prohibits trial courts

from defining reasonable doubt nor requires

them to do so as a matter of course. Indeed,

so long as the court instructs the jury on

the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be

proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the

Constitution does not require that any

particular form of words be used in advising

the jury of the government’s burden of proof.

Rather, “taken as a whole, the instructions

[must] correctly conve[y] the concept of

reasonable doubt to the jury.” Holland v.

United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct.

127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954).

***

The constitutional question in the present

cases, therefore, is whether there is a

reasonable likelihood that the jury

understood the instructions to allow

conviction based on proof insufficient to

meet the Winship standard. ...

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5-6, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243

(1994). See also Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 821 (9th Cir.

2004) (“Although the Constitution does not require jury

instructions to contain any specific language, the instructions

must convey both that a defendant is presumed innocent until

proven guilty and that he may only be convicted upon a showing

of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

The jury instruction given in this matter, mandated in

Arizona by Arizona v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 898 P.2d 970

(1995),6 is a nearly a verbatim copy of the pattern jury

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instruction on reasonable doubt adopted by the Federal Judicial

Center. Cf. Arizona v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 418, 984 P.2d

16, 26 (1999) (noting instruction based on FJC instruction).

The Ninth Circuit has upheld language that is identical or

substantially similar to the FJC’s pattern instruction. See

Himes v. Thompson, 336. F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

Accordingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying this

claim was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of federal law and Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on the basis of this claim.

7. Petitioner maintains that the trial court violated

his right to a jury trial by sentencing Petitioner to prison for

natural life based upon the trial court’s finding that he

committed the charged murder in a heinous, depraved, or cruel

manner.

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal

through supplemental pleading allowed after the United States

Supreme Court issued its decision in Blakely v. Washington

during the pendency of that appeal. The Arizona Court of

Appeals denied relief, concluding that a sentence of natural

life resulting from a conviction for first-degree murder did not

violate Petitioner’s right to a jury trial or the decision in

Blakely. This conclusion was not clearly contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law.

The Blakely opinion arose from a previous decision of

the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey. See

530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The Supreme Court held in

Apprendi that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

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legislatively-prescribed “statutory maximum” must be submitted

to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at

488-90, 120 S. Ct. at 2361-63. The Supreme Court concluded

that, otherwise, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have a

jury determine their guilt was violated. The federal courts

interpreted Apprendi to mean that a sentencing judge may not

aggravate a sentence beyond the “statutory maximum” proscribed

by the state legislature. 

In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court clarified

that the term “statutory maximum,” as used in Apprendi, was to

be interpreted as the presumptive sentence, or the presumptive

sentence given the facts as found by the jury or admitted by the

defendant, rather than the maximum statutory sentence allowed

after judicial fact-finding. See 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S. Ct.

at 2537; Allen v. Reed, 427 F.3d 767, 772 (10th Cir. 2005) (“In

other words, [after Blakely,] the relevant ‘statutory maximum’

is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding

additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any

additional findings.”).

A defendant convicted of first-degree murder in the

State of Arizona may be sentenced to a term of natural life or

a term of 25 years to life imprisonment, i.e., a sentence of

life imprisonment but with the possibility of parole after

serving 25 years. The Arizona courts have determined that a

sentencing court may impose a sentence of natural life for

first-degree murder based solely on the facts reflected in the

jury’s guilty verdict, i.e., the elements of that crime. E.g.,

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7

Neither the statute nor case law requires a

sentencing judge to enter factual findings on the

aggravating or mitigating factors in this

context. Compare § 13-703 (containing no

language requiring findings of fact on

circumstances judge considers in imposing prison

term of natural life or life with the possibility

of parole) with § 13-702(B) (requiring factual

findings on aggravating or mitigating factors);

And, we find both unsupported and unpersuasive

[the defendant’s] suggestion that a life term of

imprisonment with the possibility of parole is

the “presumptive” prison term in this context or

the “statutory maximum” for purposes of Blakely

and that a natural life term is tantamount to an

aggravated, upward adjustment from that

presumptive term.

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Arizona v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 554, 558-60, 115 P.3d 594, 598-600

(2005)(en banc). The Arizona courts have reasoned that,

because there is no requirement that any aggravating factor be

found before natural life may be imposed, a trial court does not

unreasonably apply clearly established federal law, i.e.,

Blakely, in sentencing a defendant convicted of first-degree

murder to natural life without a jury determination of

aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., 210

Ariz. at 560, 115 P.3d at 600 (“We therefore conclude that the

Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury find an aggravating

circumstance before a natural life sentence can be imposed”);

Arizona v. Williams, 220 Ariz. 331, 333, 206 P.3d 780, 782 (Ct.

App. 2008) (“Our supreme court ruled in Fell that neither before

nor after the legislature amended the statutes in 2003 was a

trial court required to make any specific finding before

imposing a natural life sentence.”). See also Arizona v. Fell,

209 Ariz. 77, 86, 97 P.3d 902, 910-11 (Ct. App. 2004).7

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209 Ariz. 77, 86, 97 P.3d 902, 910-11 (Ct. App. 2004).

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In Fell, the en banc Arizona Supreme Court held that

Arizona’s non-capital murder sentencing scheme does not offend

Apprendi or Blakely because “nothing in § 13-703 require[s] the

finding of any fact beyond those reflected in the jury’s verdict

of guilt as a prerequisite to the imposition of a natural life

sentence.” 210 Ariz. at 558-59, 115 P.3d at 598-99. The court

rejected the argument that a sentence of life with the

possibility of parole is the “presumptive” sentence and,

accordingly, that a sentence of natural life constitutes an

“aggravated” sentence for first-degree murder. Id. “Had the

legislature intended to require a specific finding be made

before a natural life sentence could be imposed, it surely would

have said so specifically, as it did in the statutes governing

sentencing for felonies other than first-degree murder.” Id.,

210 Ariz. at 559, 115 P.3d at 599. 

 The Arizona courts have interpreted the law applicable

at the time of Petitioner’s sentencing as allowing an individual

convicted of first-degree murder to be sentenced to natural life

“based solely on the jury’s guilty verdict, without additional

findings.” Fell, 209 Ariz. at 85, 97 P.3d at 910. This

interpretation of state law is binding on this Court. The

Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that a state court’s

interpretation of state law ... binds a federal court sitting in

habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 126 S. Ct.

602, 604 (2005). Because, as a matter of law, the jury’s

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verdict of guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, without

further findings, provided a sufficient factual basis for the

sentence imposed on Petitioner, he is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on the merits of his Blakely claim.

Additionally, in Arizona v. Martinez the Arizona Court

of Appeals denied a Blakely claim and affirmed a defendant’s

sentencing in accordance with Viramontes, concluding:

In Blakely, the Court specifically

distinguished the situation where judicial

sentencing factors merely impact the minimum

punishment available from that where they

increase the maximum punishment above that

authorized by the verdict. [ ] It is only in

the latter case that a defendant’s due

process right to trial by jury is implicated.

See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,

567, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524[ ]

(2002)[ ]. Because a guilty verdict for

first-degree murder authorizes the court to

impose a life sentence either with or without

the possibility of release, the court may

properly consider the statutory sentencing

factors, without the need for jury findings

regarding those factors, in deciding whether

to allow the possibility of release. See ... State v. Fell, 209 Ariz. 77, 86, ¶ 29, 97

P.3d 902, 911 (App. 2004) (“Blakely does not

apply to a trial court’s decision whether to

sentence a defendant convicted of

first-degree murder to a term of natural life

imprisonment or life with the possibility of

parole.”).

Arizona v. Martinez, 209 Ariz. 280, 283-84, 100 P.3d 30, 33-34

(Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1044, 126 S. Ct. 762

(2005).

Had the Arizona courts erred in their interpretation of

Blakely, the United States Supreme Court could have accepted

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8

 The Magistrate Judge reached a similar conclusion in a

Report and Recommendation in another section 2254 matter, Williams v.

Perkins, available at 2007 WL 433575. The Honorable Earl H. Carroll

adopted the Report and Recommendation in that matter, which decision

was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, see 399 Fed. App.

210 (Oct. 06, 2010), and the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari in the matter on March 21, 2011. See 131 S. Ct. 1681

(2011). 

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certiorari in Martinez to consider the issue.8 Because Blakely

is not applicable to Petitioner’s sentence for first-degree

murder, and the United States Supreme Court has indicated that

Arizona’s sentencing scheme does not violate the doctrine of

Blakely, the Arizona appellate court did not err by concluding

that Petitioner was not entitled to relief based on a claim that

his sentence violated the doctrine of Blakely. Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

claim. 

8. Petitioner alleges that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel at his trial and sentencing.

Petitioner raised several claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel in his Rule 32 action. The state trial

court held an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of addressing

whether Petitioner’s counsel had “prevented” him from testifying

at his trial. The state trial court concluded that Petitioner

had not been denied his federal constitutional right to the

effective assistance of counsel with regard to the claims stated

in Petitioner’s Rule 32 action. The Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed this decision. The state court’s decision denying

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims was not

clearly contrary to federal law.

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To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a habeas petitioner must show both that his attorney’s

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the

petitioner’s defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was

within the range of reasonable professional assistance required

of attorneys in that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687,

104 S. Ct. at 2064. To establish prejudice, the petitioner must

establish that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.

Ct. at 2068. See also, e.g., Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-88.

Counsel’s performance will be held constitutionally deficient

only if the defendant proves thier actions “fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness,” as measured by

“prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,

104 S. Ct. 2052. See also Cheney, 614 F.3d at 994-95.

 To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. See also, e.g., Cheney, 614 F.3d at 994. Therefore, to

succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance was deficient

because counsel failed to raise a particular argument, either in

his trial proceedings or in his appeals, the petitioner must

establish the argument was likely to be successful, thereby

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establishing that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s omission.

See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007);

Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). “It is

not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. Accordingly,

prejudice from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance is less

likely when the case against the defendant is strong. See,

e.g., Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 390-91 (2009); Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2002); Godwin v. Johnson,

632 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2011). It is Petitioner’s burden to

establish both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and

that he was prejudiced thereby. See, e.g., Wong, 130 S. Ct. at

384-85 (2009).

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy

task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010),

quoted in Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788. However, the Court

must apply an extremely deferential standard of review with

regard to Strickland claims presented by a state habeas

petitioner. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (“A state court

must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in

operation when the case involves review under the Strickland

standard itself.”).

Establishing that a state court’s application

of Strickland was unreasonable under §

2254(d) is all the more difficult. The

standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d)

are both “highly deferential,” id., at 689,

104 S.Ct. 2052; Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 333, n.7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d

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481 (1997), and when the two apply in tandem,

review is “doubly” so, Knowles, 556 U.S., at

––––, 129 S.Ct. at 1420. The Strickland

standard is a general one, so the range of

reasonable applications is substantial. 556

U.S., at ––––, 129 S. Ct. at 1420 . Federal

habeas courts must guard against the danger

of equating unreasonableness under Strickland

with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When

§ 2254(d) applies, the question is not

whether counsel’s actions were reasonable.

The question is whether there is any

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard.

Id. at 788.

Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this matter,

the Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner has not

established that any alleged error by trial or sentencing

counsel was incompetent or prejudicial. Accordingly, the

Arizona state courts’ decisions that Petitioner had not been

denied the effective assistance of counsel was not clearly

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law and

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the basis of this

claim.

III Conclusion

Petitioner properly exhausted all but one of his

federal habeas claims in the state courts. The Arizona courts’

conclusions that Petitioner had not been denied his federal

constitutional rights were not clearly contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. 

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Dunlap’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 11th day of August, 2011.

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