Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-02016/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-02016-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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28 1 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ernest Valencia Gonzales, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-99-2016-PHX-SMM

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Competency Determination and to Stay

Proceedings. (Dkt. 102.)1

 For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

On November 15, 1999, Petitioner, an Arizona inmate sentenced to death, commenced

these proceedings by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Dkt. 1.) The Court

appointed the Federal Public Defender’s Office to represent Petitioner. (Dkt. 8.) On

December 21, 1999, the Court issued a case management order setting a deadline for the

filing of an amended petition. (Dkt. 17.) Citing Rule 2 of the Rules Governing § 2254

Cases, the order required the amended petition to “include every known constitutional error

or deprivation entitling Petitioner to habeas relief” and to “set forth, in a clear and concise

fashion, the legal and factual basis for each ground for relief. The factual basis shall include

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full citations to the appropriate portions of the record.” (Id.) On July 17, 2000, Petitioner

filed a 237-page first amended petition raising sixty claims. (Dkt. 28.) Petitioner

subsequently withdrew thirteen unexhausted claims from the amended petition so that he

could pursue them in state court. (Dkt. 43.) The parties thereafter completed briefing on the

procedural status of the remaining claims. (See Dkts. 47,48, 54, 59.) 

On January 12, 2006, the Court entered its order regarding the procedural status of the

claims submitted in the amended petition. (Dkt. 97.) The Court dismissed certain claims and

established a deadline for Petitioner to submit briefing on the merits of the remaining claims.

(Id.) On February 23, 2006, prior to the deadline for filing his merits brief, counsel for

Petitioner moved to stay this action pursuant to Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d

803 (9th Cir. 2003), contending that Petitioner was no longer capable of rationally

communicating with or assisting habeas counsel. (Dkt. 102.) The motion indicated that

since October 2003 Petitioner had refused some twenty-six attempted visits from habeas

counsel and support staff, who wished to “discuss these upcoming proceedings, including

merits briefing and requests for evidentiary development.” (Id. at 5-6.) Counsel indicated

that they needed Petitioner’s assistance in order to brief the merits of a number of claims.

(Dkts. 102, 108.) Following Petitioner’s Rohan motion, and based upon the Court’s initial

review of the allegations and evidence concerning Petitioner’s mental state, the Court

allowed an evaluation of Petitioner’s competence to proceed, and each party enlisted a

mental health expert. (Dkt. 111.) 

The parties’ experts, both psychiatrists, reached conflicting conclusions.

Respondents’ expert, Dr. Anna Scherzer, performed an independent psychiatric consultation,

which included an eight-hour interview and the administration of a number of assessment

instruments, and prepared a detailed thirty-page report. (Dkt. 124.) Dr. Scherzer concluded

to a reasonable degree of medical/psychiatric certainty that Petitioner “has the capacity to

understand his legal position” and “has the capacity to communicate in a comprehensible

manner.” (Id. at 1.) She noted that “[a]s the interview progressed, Mr. Gonzales

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demonstrated periods of reflection, normal speech pattern, conversationally appropriate

amplitude and logical appreciation of the reality of his circumstances, . . . demonstrat[ing]

awareness of the central issue of when the government would carry out the already imposed

death penalty.” (Id. at 29.) Dr. Scherzer also explained that the results of the instruments

she administered were “consistent with volitional feigning and malingered exaggeration of

symptom [sic] of mental illness” and “were not consistent with expected patterns of known

psychiatric disorders.” (Id. at 2-3.) Furthermore, according to Dr. Scherzer, Petitioner

acknowledged that “he has volitionally chosen not to communicate with his attorney,” and

“he verbalized his desire to be found incompetent, (and thereby delay or avoid death by lethal

gas).” (Dkt.124 at 2.) However, while in Dr. Scherzer’s professional opinion Petitioner “is

knowingly choosing to present himself as severely mentally ill, this does not exclude the

presence of a psychiatric disorder.” (Id. at 29.) Dr. Scherzer recommended a period of

“locked mental health observation” to determine if Petitioner’s symptoms were indeed

feigned and, if the symptoms persisted, treatment with “atypical neuroleptics and mood

stabilizing psychotropic medication.” (Id. at 30.)

Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Raphael Morris, after conducting a two-hour “psychiatric

interview” and reviewing various records, diagnosed Petitioner with Schizophrenia,

Disorganized Type and concluded that he “lacks the capacity to rationally communicate with

counsel due to a disorganized thought process and a pressured and non-redirectable pattern

of speech. In addition his current grandiose delusions interfere with his capacity to

appreciate his current legal predicament.” (Dkt. 125 at 2, 10.) Dr. Morris found, contrary

to Dr. Scherzer, that Petitioner “is unable to have a coherent discussion about even the most

benign topics much less provide input towards the defense team’s investigations.” (Id. at 10.)

Dr. Morris recommended a course of anti-psychotic medication but characterized Petitioner’s

“prognosis for restoration of competency” as “guarded at best.” (Id. at 2-3, 12).

After receiving the reports from Drs. Scherzer and Morris, the Court scheduled an

evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 131.) Prior to the hearing, however, Respondents filed a motion

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2 According to Dr. Seward, “full benefit from antipsychotic medication is

expected within four to six weeks after initiation of treatment.” Petitioner took Aripiprazole

for approximately three weeks before discontinuing treatment. (Dkt. 160 at 3.) 

Dr. Seward noted that in his most recent session with Petitioner, possibly as a result

of the antipsychotic medication, Petitioner “demonstrated more capacity for rational thought

than he has in our previous meetings.” (Id.) “For the first 30 minutes of this contact he

primarily related in a socially appropriate, rational, and coherent manner, with minimal

disorganized and illogical thoughts.” (Id. at 2.) However, for reasons Dr. Seward cannot

explain, Petitioner then became hostile and irrational. (Id.) 

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requesting that Petitioner be transferred to the Arizona State Hospital (“ASH”) for an

extended mental health assessment; the Court granted the motion. (Dkts. 138, 147.) On

October 10, 2007, at the end of the ninety-day assessment period, the supervising

psychologist, Dr. James Seward, submitted a final report. Dr. Seward indicated that he

“continue[d] to have reservations concerning the veracity of Mr. Gonzales’s symptoms” and

that “malingering cannot be ruled out.” (Dkt. 160 at 1, 3.) Nevertheless, he concluded that

Petitioner has a “genuine psychotic disorder” and is “currently unable to communicate

rationally for any extended period of time, such as would be required by a legal proceeding.”

(Id. at 2). Dr. Seward became persuaded that Petitioner’s symptoms were genuine after

observing an improvement in Petitioner’s capacity for rational thought during the brief period

when Petitioner was compliant with a regimen of the antipsychotic medication, Aripiprazole,

which was prescribed by his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Qureshi. (Id. at 2-3.) Despite the

observations of Drs. Seward and Qureshi, and Petitioner’s self-report that he had experienced

“some benefit . . . regarding his thought processes,” Petitioner asked to be taken off the

medication, complaining of side effects such as back pain and restlessness.2

 (Id. at 2.) Upon

receiving Dr. Seward’s report and being informed that Petitioner had discontinued treatment

with this potentially beneficial medication, the Court ordered briefing on the issue of

involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. (Dkt. 164.)

On October 15 and December 3, 2007, the Court held status hearings to address these

latest developments. At the hearings, the discussion focused on the holdings in two cases.

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In Rohan, 334 F.3d at 819, the Ninth Circuit held that capital habeas proceedings must be

stayed, “pending restoration of competence,” where a petitioner is unable to communicate

rationally with counsel regarding claims that could benefit from such communication. In Sell

v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003), the Supreme Court addressed the question

“whether the Constitution permits the Government to administer antipsychotic drugs

involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant – in order to render that defendant

competent to stand trial for serious, but nonviolent, crimes.” The Court held that in limited

circumstances forcible medication was permissible and established the analytical framework

under which such determinations are made. Id. 

In briefing completed prior to the December 3 status conference, Petitioner maintained

that he was incompetent under Rohan and that, pursuant to the criteria set forth in Sell, he

could not be restored to competency through involuntary medication. (Dkt. 177.) Noting

that the issue involved – whether a habeas petitioner, convicted of a violent crime, could

prevent action on his own petition by refusing to be restored to competence – was one of first

impression, the Court ordered additional briefing on a number of questions. (Dkt. 180.) The

initial question asked Petitioner to identify the specific claims and types of assistance

“needed from Petitioner – beyond that already provided and submitted as part of the

Amended Petition – to complete preparation of the merits brief and any requests for

evidentiary development,” explaining that such “information is necessary for any

determination regarding Petitioner’s ability to communicate rationally with counsel as

required under Rohan.” (Id. at 2.) That briefing has been completed. (Dkts. 184, 185, 186.)

DISCUSSION

I. Rohan holding

As noted above, the Ninth Circuit in Rohan determined that a prisoner “has a statutory

right to competence in his federal habeas proceedings.” 334 F.3d at 817. The “relevant

question” in determining competence in the federal habeas context is “whether [the

petitioner] now has the capacity to understand his position and to communicate rationally

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with counsel.” Id. at 819. Thus, “where an incompetent capital habeas petitioner raises

claims that could benefit from his ability to communicate rationally, refusing to stay

proceedings pending restoration of competence denies him his statutory right to assistance

of counsel, whether or not counsel can identify with precision the information sought.” Id.

Accordingly, in such a situation, federal habeas proceedings “must be stayed until [the

petitioner] is competent.” Id. Finally, the Ninth Circuit was careful to note that “the mere

fact that [a petitioner] does not communicate rationally does not mean that he is incapable

of doing so.” Id.

Other circuits have acknowledged the holding in Rohan, but have not been called

upon to approve or reject it. See Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 2007); Mines

v. Dretke, 118 Fed.Appx. 806, 812-13 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Clayton v. Roper, 515 F.3d

784, 790 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008). These cases distinguish between claims for which a petitioner’s

personal input may be beneficial and those that are “record-based or non-factual,” Rohan,

334 F.3d at 819 n.11, or are otherwise not susceptible to the contributions of a lay person.

In Rohan, for example, the Ninth Circuit noted that an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, which “depends in large measure on facts outside the record,” could “potentially

benefit from [the petitioner’s] assistance.” 334 F.3d at 818. The court specifically noted that

ineffective assistance claims challenging counsel’s performance with respect to a defendant’s

competence to stand trial or the gathering of mitigating evidence may be supported by

information in the petitioner’s “private knowledge” or from his “personal history.” Id.; see

Hill v. Ayers, No. 4-94-CV-641-CW, 2008 WL 683422 (N.D. Cal Mar. 10, 2008) (noting that

the petitioner “has ‘raised claims that could benefit from his ability to communicate

rationally,’ such as claims of innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel in presenting

mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of his trial”) (quoting Rohan, 334 F.3d at 818). In

Holmes, the Seventh Circuit drew a similar distinction between claims requiring a

petitioner’s input and those for which his assistance is unnecessary:

Federal habeas corpus happens to be one of the most complex areas of

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3 “ROA” refers to the four-volume record on appeal from trial, including minute

entries (“ME”), prepared for Petitioner’s direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court (Case

No. CR-92-0154-AP). “RT” refers to the court reporter’s transcript. The original trial

transcripts, a certified copy of the record on appeal, and a set of appellate briefs were

provided to this Court by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Dkt. 23.)

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American law. With respect to many of the issues that arise in habeas corpus

cases, a lay person has nothing to contribute to his lawyer’s strategy. But it can

be different with respect to other issues, several presented in this case, notably

prosecutorial misconduct at trial and ineffective assistance by trial counsel.

The petitioner was at his trial; his current lawyers were not. He may – if

mentally competent – be able to convey to his lawyers a better sense of the

alleged misbehavior of the prosecutor and of defense counsel than the trial

transcript and other documentation provide.

506 F.3d at 579-80. 

II. Claims to which Petitioner contends Rohan applies

Petitioner argues that Claims 9, 13, 17, 29, 30, and 34 may potentially benefit from

his ability to communicate rationally with counsel because each are based on extra-record

information that is within his personal knowledge. (Dkt. 184 at 10-15.) Petitioner also

contends that there are unexhausted claims, including the thirteen claims withdrawn from his

amended habeas petition (see Dkt. 43), as well as potential new claims that are not presently

before this Court, for which his ability to assist habeas counsel is required. (Dkt. 184 at 8-9,

15-16.)

Claim 9

Petitioner alleges that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

because the trial judge, who was openly hostile toward Petitioner, refused to recuse himself.

(Dkt. 28 at 62-64.) 

Background

Petitioner’s first trial ended in a hung jury. Before his second trial, Petitioner, acting

pro se, moved to disqualify the trial judge, Judge Joseph Howe, arguing that he was biased

and prejudiced against Petitioner. (ROA 104, 105.)3

 Petitioner cited adverse rulings issued

by Judge Howe, particularly the denial of expert assistance on the issue of eyewitness

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identification and on-the-record comments made to Petitioner by the judge. (ROA 105.)

Judge Howe initially denied the motions (RT 3/25/91 at 7, 9) but thereafter vacated his ruling

(ME 3/25/91). The matter was then assigned to Judge Rufus Coulter, who held a hearing at

which Petitioner explained his position:

[Judge Howe] is prejudicing me in a lot of motions that I bring forward.

He just keeps denying all my motions. And I just feel there is going to be a big

effect in this next trial because he was present, and he made a lot of decisions

in my last trial. And there was a lot of prejudicial remarks that he has stated

to me in court on previous hearings on my motions, and he just – he just keeps

determining to just take me to trial in front of him. He has stated this to me,

that he will not let me go to no other judge, just in front of him. And I’ve

made many attempts to get a change of judge, but he just calls me a fool. He

don’t want to listen to me, whatever I have to present to him. He says I’m just

a stubborn brat. And I’m just being prejudiced. There ain’t no way I’m going

to get a fair trial with Judge Howe anymore.

(RT 5/15/91 at 3.) The prosecutor acknowledged that “there is some type of attitude problem

between Judge Howe and the defendant. I’m not sure why it started, how it started or what

effect it has had on this trial. Every time we appear in court, they snap and snarl at each

other. And I have no position, nor do I have any indication as to whether or not that behavior

will deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” (Id. at 4.) Judge Coulter denied the motion,

explaining, “I snap and snarl at a lot of attorneys, but I simply don’t – it doesn’t mean it’s

prejudice. Based on what has been presented, it will be ordered denying the disqualification

of Judge Howe.” (Id.)

After his conviction in the second trial, and prior to sentencing, Petitioner filed

another pro se motion seeking to disqualify Judge Howe. (ROA 150.) Petitioner again cited

adverse rulings and the judge’s disparaging courtroom comments; in addition to these

criticisms, Petitioner noted that he had now filed a complaint against Judge Howe with the

Judicial Conduct Commission. (ROA 150.) Judge Ronald Reinstein denied the motion,

finding that the previous allegations of bias had been ruled on and that the filing of a

complaint against a judge is not a basis for removal. (ME 10/1/91.)

On direct appeal, Petitioner’s appellate counsel raised the issue of judicial bias,

alleging that “[t]hroughout the proceedings in this matter, the trial judge’s impartiality [sic]

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4 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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and bias were apparent” and citing a number of testy courtroom exchanges between Judge

Howe and Petitioner. (Opening Br. at 56.) The Arizona Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s

claim, finding that the reported exchanges between Petitioner and Judge Howe did not

indicate bias:

Gonzales points to several exchanges that he claims demonstrate the

judge’s animosity toward him, and argues that he was denied a fair trial and

sentencing. But Gonzales was a difficult litigant, and while the judge

understandably became impatient with him, particularly while he was acting

pro per, none of the exchanges would support Gonzales’s claim of bias. Nor

did any of the exchanges take place in front of the jury. Other than pointing

to the motions the judge denied and the sentence he imposed, Gonzales has not

shown how he was prejudiced. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, ----,

114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (“Not establishing bias or

partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance,

and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women

. . . sometimes display.”) We find that Judge Coulter properly denied

Gonzales’s motion for disqualification of Judge Howe.

State v. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 511-12, 892 P.2d 838, 847-48 (1995).

Analysis

In support of his contention that Claim 9 is subject to Rohan because it could benefit

from his ability to communicate rationally with counsel, Petitioner asserts that his

“substantive judicial bias claim depends on facts [outside] the record, to wit, the interaction

between Petitioner and the trial court and Petitioner’s observations of the trial court’s

interactions with others.” (Dkt. 184 at 11.) The Court disagrees.

Under the AEPDA,4

 Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief on Claim 9 only if the

Arizona Supreme Court’s rejection of the claim constituted an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law, or if it was “based upon an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d);

see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000).

The record regarding this claim is complete. It includes all of the comments made by

Judge Howe that Petitioner contended, in his trial motions for disqualification and on direct

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5 As the Arizona Supreme Court noted, the record also reveals that Petitioner

was a contentious, even manipulative, litigant. It further shows, despite the verbal jousting

between Petitioner and the court, that Judge Howe demonstrated impartiality and concern for

the fairness of the trial, both in his rulings, including his decision that Petitioner’s confession

was inadmissible (RT 1/16/91 at 83), and in many of his comments to Petitioner reiterating

the perils of proceeding without counsel. At the conclusion of a three-day hearing on

Petitioner’s pro se motion for a new trial, Judge Howe praised Petitioner for his thoroughlyresearched and well-organized presentation. (RT 12/17/91 at 128.)

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appeal, were indicative of judicial bias. Nevertheless, habeas counsel contend that Petitioner

is entitled to further development of this claim, for which Petitioner’s input is required. The

Court disagrees. The state court record, which details the litigation of the judicial bias claim,

contains no suggestion that additional incidents occurred in which Petitioner made personal

observations of the judge’s behavior; Petitioner’s recusal motions cited only judicial rulings

and on-the-record comments that are present in the trial transcript.5

In an attempt to demonstrate that he was diligent in developing the factual basis of this

claim in state court (and thus is entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing on the claim),

Petitioner directs the Court’s attention to a supplemental petition filed during state postconviction (“PCR”) proceedings. (ROA-PCR 500.) In this document, Petitioner now

contends, PCR counsel “alleged that there were additional facts not of record that required

development with respect to a claim of judicial bias, and he requested an evidentiary

hearing.” (Dkt. 184 at 10.) 

This contention is not well taken. First, the claim raised in the supplemental PCR

petition alleged that Arizona law failed to provide Petitioner the means of proving a claim

of judicial bias through voir dire of the judge (ROA-PCR 500 at 2-5), an allegation he reurges in habeas Claim 41 (Dkt. 28 at 129-30). Second, in supporting the claim in state court

Petitioner did not, as he now asserts, “allege[] that there were additional facts not of record

that required development with respect to a claim of judicial bias.” (Dkt. 184 at 10.) Instead,

Petitioner cited, as he did in all his previous judicial bias motions, on-the-record comments

indicating antagonism between Petitioner and the judge, as well as the fact that Judge Howe

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6 The claim was denied, without an evidentiary hearing, on the grounds that

“Arizona law does provide such an effective means, which was used by this defendant,

including the opportunity, not used, of ‘voir dire’ of the judge in front of another judge who

holds, and in this case held, a hearing on the claim.” (ME 4/21/98 at 10.) 

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presided over the first trial and might therefore have been biased against Petitioner on retrial.

(ROA-PCR 500 at 4.) To the extent that Petitioner alleged the existence of additional

supporting evidence, it was not information gleaned from his alleged private observations

of or interactions with the judge, but rather Judge Howe’s feelings toward Petitioner; that is

why the claim alleged a violation of Petitioner’s rights based upon the lack of an opportunity

to voir dire Judge Howe.6

 Under these circumstances, Petitioner was not diligent in

developing this claim in state court. See Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2002)

(lack of diligence because petitioner knew of and raised claims of judicial bias in state court,

but failed to investigate all the factual grounds for such claims). 

Petitioner’s consistent failure to allege the existence of additional facts in support of

his judicial bias claim, despite adequate opportunities to do so, convinces the Court that the

record is fully developed and that additional, relevant facts do not exist that are within

Petitioner’s private knowledge. In any event, due to the lack of diligence in state court,

Petitioner is not entitled to further development of the factual basis of this claim. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(2); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000).

The Court therefore concludes that this claim cannot potentially benefit from

Petitioner’s ability to communicate rationally and is not subject to the holding in Rohan.

Habeas counsel are in a position to argues the merits of this claim without further input from

Petitioner.

Claims 13 and 17

Claim 13 alleges that Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

were violated by Deborah Wagner’s presence in the courtroom during jury selection and after

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7 Ms. Wagner was present when her husband was stabbed to death. She was

seriously injured while struggling with the assailant in the courtyard of the couple’s

townhouse. 

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her testimony.7 (Dkt. 28 at 70-71.) Claim 17 alleges that his rights were violated by the

admission of Ms. Wagner’s in-court identification of Petitioner, which Petitioner claims was

tainted by her exposure to him during the first trial. (Id. at 76-78.) In support of his

argument that further input from Petitioner is necessary regarding these claims, Petitioner

indicates only that “[i]f evidence is taken at an evidentiary hearing on Mrs. Wagner’s

courtroom behavior, Petitioner’s presence and competence will be required because he was

an eyewitness to her presence in the courtroom and to her reactions toward him and her

interactions with others there. Petitioner must be competent to perform that role.” (Dkt. 184

at 13.) 

Claim 13

At Petitioner’s second trial, Ms. Wagner was present for voir dire, seated in the back

of the courtroom. (See 5/28/91 at 8 .) Subsequently, after the jury had been selected, defense

counsel asked the court to inquire of the jurors whether they had been tainted by their

exposure to Ms. Wagner’s presence. (Id.) The court declined, explaining that asking such

questions would “do more damage” than good and finding that there was no evidence of

misconduct and that Ms. Wagner had a right under the Arizona Constitution to be present.

(Id. at 8, 11.) The prosecutor indicated that, with respect to the remainder of the proceedings,

Ms. Wagner, who had relocated to Colorado, intended to be present only for the opening

statements and her own testimony – and that she would be the State’s first witness. (Id. at

10.) Over the prosecutor’s objection, however, the court did bar Ms. Wagner from the

courtroom during opening statements but ruled that she could be present after her testimony.

(Id. at 13.)

Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. (Opening Br. at 54.) The claim was

based upon the assumption that Ms. Wagner was present in the courtroom after her testimony

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8 Prior to trial, the court held a so-called Desserault hearing and determined that

Ms. Wagner’s exposure to a newspaper photograph was insufficient to taint her in-court

identification of Petitioner. (RT 1/15/91 at 22-27.)

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– an assumption that, Petitioner conceded, was supported by nothing in the record. (Id. at

n.19.) The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the claim:

Gonzales argues that Deborah [Wagner’s] presence in the courtroom

during jury selection and her possible presence during trial after she testified

prejudiced him and denied him the right to a fair trial. This argument is

without merit. Deborah had a constitutional right to attend all criminal

proceedings that Gonzales had the right to attend. Ariz. Const. art. 2, §

2.1(A)(3); Rule 9.3(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. Deborah, on her own initiative,

attended jury selection. She sat in the back row of the courtroom, and neither

the court nor counsel knew she was there until several days later. Nor is there

any evidence that prospective jurors noticed Deborah or knew who she was

during jury selection. Gonzales has not shown that Deborah’s presence during

jury selection was prejudicial. There is no evidence that Deborah intended to

or did remain in the courtroom after she testified, and therefore we consider

the matter no further. State v. Ethington, 121 Ariz. 572, 574, 592 P.2d 768,

770 (1979).

Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 512, 892 P.2d at 848.

Petitioner is entitled to relief on Claim 13 only if the Arizona Supreme Court’s

rejection of the claim was contrary to or based on an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law or was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It is not apparent what

information Petitioner could potentially provide that would be relevant to this determination.

His personal input is not necessary to determine whether Ms. Wagner in fact continued to

attend the second trial after giving her testimony, or to describe her conduct during voir dire.

The record indicates, for example, that at the time of the defense request to question the jury,

neither the court nor the parties, all of whom were aware of Ms. Wagner’s presence during

voir dire, suggested that her behavior was inappropriate. 

Claim 17

At Petitioner’s first trial, Ms. Wagner testified on direct examination that she thought

her attacker was in the courtroom and pointed out Petitioner.8

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9 Biggers and Brathwaite establish the framework for evaluating whether an incourt identification has been irreparably tainted by a pretrial encounter between a witness and

an accused. A court must determine whether the challenged pretrial encounter was

suggestive and then examine the totality of the circumstances, including several specific

factors, to determine whether the witness’s in-court identification is nonetheless reliable.

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200).

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examination, however, she suggested that her identification of Petitioner had become more

certain, explaining, “I didn’t get any kind of feelings until I come into this courtroom

yesterday and looked at the man you’re trying to defend.” (RT 1/22/91 at 23.) On redirect

examination, Ms. Wagner did not hesitate when asked how certain she was that Petitioner

was the attacker: “That man is the man that was in our house and killed us (sic).” (Id. at 28.)

The first trial ended in a hung jury. Prior to the second trial, defense counsel moved to

dismiss the charges, citing the change in the strength of Ms. Wagner’s identification of

Petitioner during the first trial and his concern that she was “obviously going to identify

[Petitioner] as the perpetrator” at the next trial. (RT 3/25/91 at 3-4.) The court denied the

motion. (Id. at 8.) During her testimony at Petitioner’s retrial, Ms. Wagner positively

identified Petitioner. (RT 5/28/91 at 59.) 

Petitioner raised the allegations contained in Claim 17 on direct appeal, citing Neil v.

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).9

 (Opening

Br. at 25-26.) The Arizona Supreme Court held that the claim was waived because Petitioner

did not object prior to trial and finding, in the alternative, that the fact that Petitioner sat at

the defense table during the prior trial was not “unduly suggestive.” Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at

510, 892 P.2d at 846. 

This is a record-based claim centering on the reasonableness of the Arizona Supreme

Court’s decision. Petitioner does not explain how his proposed input – i.e., his personal

observations of Ms. Wagner’s courtroom behavior – is relevant to this Court’s assessment

of the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of the principles announced in Biggers and

Brathwaite. 

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10 Under Brady v. Maryland, a defendant’s due process rights are violated if the

prosecution fails to disclose evidence that is “material either to guilt or to punishment.” 373

U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 

11 The claims also assert that Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated

because the factors were found by the court rather than a jury. (See Dkt. 28 at 101-03.) That

challenge is foreclosed by Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004). 

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Petitioner now speculates, however, that a Brady violation occurred, with the withheld

information explaining why Ms. Wagner was able to positively identify Petitioner at the

second trial.10 (Dkt. 184 at 12-13.) This contention is meritless. First, as already noted, Ms.

Wagner ultimately made a positive courtroom identification of Petitioner during the first trial

(RT 1/22/91 at 28), so any contention that her testimony changed from the first trial to the

second is factually inaccurate. Next, Claim 17, as properly exhausted, alleges only that Ms.

Wagner’s identification of Petitioner was tainted and unreliable “[b]ecause of the suggestive

position of [Petitioner] during the first trial, seated next to defense counsel” (Dkt. 28 at 77);

it does not assert that the real explanation for Ms. Wagner’s courtroom identification of

Petitioner in the second trial is contained in material withheld by the State in violation of

Brady. There is no Brady claim before the Court. Finally, even if, contrary to the legal and

factual bases upon which Claim 17 relies, the Court were to agree that the claim somehow

incorporates an allegation of a Brady violation, there is no indication that Petitioner’s

participation is required to identify or locate exculpatory material related to this issue.

Therefore, the claim would not potentially benefit from Petitioner’s competence.

Claims 29, 30, and 34

Claims 29 and 30 challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the two

aggravating factors – grave risk of harm to others and pecuniary gain – found by the trial

court and affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court.11 (Dkt. 28 at 100-03.) These are clearly

record-based claims. Further evidence, including personal input from Petitioner, is not

necessary because there is nothing that can be added to the facts upon which the state courts’

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findings were based. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (articulating standard

for habeas review of state court’s application of aggravating factor – i.e., whether any

rational factfinder could have determined that the factor was proved); Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 319, 322 (1979) (this type of claim almost never necessitates an evidentiary

hearing); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Whether the evidence was

sufficient . . . must be determined from a review of the evidence in the record in the state

proceedings. No evidentiary hearing was required.”). 

Claim 34, which asserts that Arizona’s statutory death penalty scheme

unconstitutionally precludes the sentencer from considering all mitigating evidence, consists

of an exclusively legal issue, for which input from a layperson is not potentially beneficial.

(Id. at 108-09.)

Unexhausted claims and claims not yet raised

Petitioner contends that the Court, in considering whether to stay the case based on

Petitioner’s incompetence under Rohan, should take into account Petitioner’s capacity to

assist counsel with the thirteen unexhausted claims withdrawn from his amended petition as

well as potential and unnamed new claims. The Court disagrees.

Background

After Petitioner voluntarily withdrew the unexhausted claims from his habeas petition,

he returned to state court and initiated successive PCR proceedings. The state court

appointed counsel to represent Petitioner; however, before a petition was filed, Petitioner,

acting pro se, requested that his second state PCR proceeding be withdrawn and his counsel

dismissed so that he could proceed pro se in federal court. The state court ordered a mental

health examination to determine whether Petitioner was competent to waive counsel. (See

Dkt. 102, Ex. 3.) The court-appointed expert, Dr. Jack Potts, examined Petitioner and

concluded that he was paranoid and delusional and incompetent to waive counsel. (Id., Ex.

4 at 3.) Dr. Potts also reported that Petitioner refused to cooperate with him; had Petitioner

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cooperated, Dr. Potts’s “opinion would quite possibly have been different.” (Id.) Based on

Dr. Potts’s conclusions, the court found Petitioner incompetent to waive counsel and

represent himself. (Id., Ex. 9.)

On the day Petitioner’s successive PCR petition was due, counsel filed a motion to

hold the case in abeyance until Petitioner became competent to assist counsel in the

successive PCR proceeding. (Dkt. 102, Ex. 11.) The court denied the motion, finding that

there was no right to a competency determination, that the claim of legal incompetency at the

time of trial and sentencing was not “cognizable in a second PCR proceeding in this

particular case” under Rules 32.1(e) and (h) and 32.2(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, and that even if the claim was cognizable, counsel had not set forth “sufficient

reasons for not raising the claim in a previous petition or in a timely manner or demonstrated

why defendant’s competency is essential to filing the prospective second Rule 32

proceeding.” (Id., Ex. 12.)

Despite this ruling, in February 2002 counsel for Petitioner filed a successive PCR

petition asserting four claims, including claims that Petitioner had a right to assist counsel

in a second PCR proceeding, that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine his

current competency, and that he was incompetent at the time of trial and sentencing. (Dkt.

108, Ex. 1.) Counsel did not raise any of the claims withdrawn from the amended habeas

petition. (Id.) The state court again denied the petition, explaining, with respect to the third

claim, that Petitioner had failed to present a “colorable claim . . . that newly discovered

evidence shows defendant was incompetent to stand trial.” (Id., Ex. 3.) Counsel filed a

petition for review, which the Arizona Supreme Court denied. (Id., Ex. 6.) 

Analysis

As an initial matter, it is clear that a number of the thirteen withdrawn claims are

record-based and resolvable as a matter of law, while others, like Claims 37, 56, and 58, are

plainly meritless or non-cognizable. All of the claims, including those to which a Rohan

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12 The Court notes that Petitioner has not moved to amend his habeas petition to

include the withdrawn claims or the new claims raised in his successive PCR proceedings.

13 Petitioner has not raised an actual innocence claim. Given the facts of the case,

which include Petitioner’s suppressed confession, eyewitness accounts of the attack and of

his presence near the Wagner home, and circumstantial evidence of guilt, including physical

evidence linking him to the crime scene and reports that, in the immediate aftermath of the

attack, Petitioner returned home with various injuries and in possession of a purse matching

Ms. Wagner’s, the potential for successfully bringing such a claim is minimal. Similarly,

taking into account the volume of the record, the nearly decade-long period between the trial

and Petitioner’s claims of incompetence, and the thoroughness of the amended petition, the

Court views with skepticism the possible existence of undiscovered constitutional violations.

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analysis may be applicable – e.g., Claim 52, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at

sentencing – remain unexhausted because they have never been presented to the state court.

Petitioner argues, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B), that Arizona’s “corrective

process proved to be futile because of Petitioner’s incompetence in that forum and the state

court’s failure to stay the proceedings until Petitioner was restored,” and that his

“incompetence should serve to forgive the failure to exhaust in state court and permit

Petitioner to supplement the amended petition with the withdrawn claims.”12 (Dkts. 184 at

4, 186 at 15.) The Court disagrees.

Petitioner was not prevented from raising in state court the thirteen claims withdrawn

from his habeas petition. He noticed the claims but then failed to raise them in his second

PCR petition, which instead set forth a different set of claims. Thus, counsel could have

pursued and exhausted the withdrawn claims during Petitioner’s successive PCR

proceedings. At this point, in addition to being unexhausted, the claims are no longer before

this Court. Consequently, Petitioner’s competency to assist counsel with the claims is

irrelevant.

Finally, counsel for Petitioner speculate that unknown evidence exists that might

“support[] a colorable claim of actual innocence.”13 (Dkt. 184 at 16.) In support of this

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assertion, they argue that Rohan stands for the proposition that habeas proceedings must be

stayed whenever a petitioner is incompetent, because a competent petitioner might have

information in support of a claim of actual innocence. (Id.) The Court rejects this reading,

which is inconsistent with the holdings of both Rohan, 334 F.3d at 819, and Holmes v. Buss,

506 F.3d at 579-80, each of which conditions the right to competence on the presence of

claims that can benefit from the petitioner’s ability to communicate rationally. This

analytical framework would be a nullity under the interpretation advanced by Petitioner’s

counsel because any habeas petitioner found to be incompetent would be entitled to a stay,

no matter the nature of his claims, simply by asserting that additional, hypothetical

information exists that the petitioner is presently unable to share with counsel.

CONCLUSION

Claims 9, 13, 17, 29, 30, and 34 are distinguishable from the claims discussed in

Rohan in that their presentation in these habeas proceedings cannot benefit from Petitioner’s

personal input. Petitioner’s properly-exhausted claims are record-based and/or resolvable as

a matter of law, irrespective of Petitioner’s capacity for rational communication with counsel.

In addition, as Respondents note, this case is different from Rohan in that Petitioner’s

claim of incompetence arose several years after he had filed his amended petition, which set

forth the factual bases for all of his claims; it is also, unlike Rohan, a post-AEDPA case, so

that Petitioner’s claims are subject to a “substantially higher threshold for habeas relief.”

Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40 (2007). While these factors are not

dispositive, see Hill v. Ayers, 2008 WL 683422, the Court believes that they support its

decision not to stay these proceedings. 

Finally, while the Court has found it unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner is

unable, as opposed to unwilling, to communicate rationally with counsel, the Court notes that

its review of the record, including the reports from Petitioner’s recent stay at ASH, shows

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14 While Petitioner refused to meet with counsel in order to facilitate the progress

of these proceedings, he did agree to meet with mental health experts in support of his motion

to determine competency and stay the proceedings. As discussed above, Petitioner was at

times able to communicate rationally with Drs. Scherzer and Seward.

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that Petitioner possesses at least a limited capacity for rational communication.14 Further, the

likelihood exists that this capacity can be maximized through the use of anti-psychotic

medication. Petitioner at one point availed himself of the opportunity to enhance his capacity

for rational thought and communication through the use of such medication. He may choose

to do so again. A contrary decision will not, however, for the reasons set forth above,

forestall these proceedings.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Competency Determination

and to Stay Proceedings (Dkt. 102) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner shall file his Merits Memorandum (see

Dkt. 97) no later than June 20, 2008.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(g), Petitioner or

Respondents file a Motion for Reconsideration of this Order, such motion shall be filed

within fifteen (15) days of the filing of this Order. The filing and disposition of such motion

does not toll the time for the filing of the Merits Memorandum.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2008.

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