Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06310/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06310-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 BRIGETTE TAYLOR,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

BOSCO CREDIT, LLC, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-06310-JSC

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 55

Plaintiff Brigette Taylor brings this action challenging the wrongful foreclosure of her 

home. Defendants Bosco Credit, LLC and Franklin Credit moved to dismiss the action for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1 The Court previously held that Plaintiff’s 

claims were inadequately pled and dismissed them with leave to amend. Following amendment of 

the complaint, Defendants again moved to dismiss. (Dk. No. 55.) The Court granted the motion

to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim with prejudice and ordered 

Defendants to show cause as to whether there was diversity jurisdiction or whether the Court 

should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remand the remaining state law claims to 

state court. (Dkt. No. 68.) Having reviewed Defendants’ response, the Court concludes that there 

is diversity jurisdiction, DISCHARGES the order to show cause, and GRANTS the motion to 

dismiss the state law claims with prejudice.

//

 

1 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 8, 12, & 16.) 

Case 3:18-cv-06310-JSC Document 70 Filed 08/05/19 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

BACKGROUND

The Court incorporates the discussion of the factual and procedural background from its 

Order granting the motion to dismiss the TILA claim by reference. (Dkt. No. 68.)

DISCUSSION

Defendants Franklin and Bosco (hereafter “Defendants”) jointly move to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s state law claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In 

addition, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim as barred by the statute 

of limitations. 

A. Breach of Contract Claim

Plaintiff again alleges that Defendants breached the Deed of Trust, and specifically Section 

6 of the Adjustable Rate Rider, by failing to send her periodic statements after April 2010 

identifying, among other things, the minimum payment due. (SAC ¶ 24.) A claim for breach of 

contract exists when there is: “(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for 

nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom.” Wall Street 

Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Company, 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178 (2008). “If the action is 

based on an alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of 

the complaint or a copy of the written instrument must be attached and incorporated by reference.” 

Otworth v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 459 (1985). 

The Court previously dismissed the breach of contract claim because Plaintiff had not 

plausibly alleged that her obligation under the Deed of Trust had been performed or that 

performance was excused. (Dkt. No. 23 at 5.) In particular, Plaintiff alleged that even before she 

stopped receiving monthly statements she had $35,595.84 in past due payments, which establishes 

that Plaintiff had failed to perform on the Deed of Trust separate and apart from Defendants’ 

subsequent alleged failure to provide the periodic statements. (Id.) 

In her SAC Plaintiff again conclusorily alleges she performed her obligations under the 

Deed of Trust (SAC ¶ 23) notwithstanding also continuing to allege that as of April 2010 her past 

due payments totaled $35,595.84. (SAC ¶ 10.) She adds no new allegations regarding her 

performance, having only added a paragraph alleging that Defendants breached the requirement in 

the Adjustable Rate Rider that it send periodic statements to Plaintiff as long as any balance was 

Case 3:18-cv-06310-JSC Document 70 Filed 08/05/19 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

owed on the lien. (SAC ¶ 26.) But she never explains why the subsequent failure to send periodic 

statements would excuse her previous non-performance under the Deed of Trust. Because the 

SAC includes no new allegations that plausibly support an inference that she performed her 

obligations under the Deed of Trust or that she was somehow excused from performing those 

obligations, the breach of contract claim still fails. 

Defendants also insist that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is barred by the four-year 

statute of limitations for breach of contract claims. (Dkt. 55-1 at 6.) Claims based on a written 

contract have a four-year statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337; Kaufman v. Mut. Life 

Ins. Co. of New York, 108 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1997). Defendants reason that as the statute begins 

to run upon the breach, and here the alleged breach occurred shortly after April 2010 when 

Plaintiff stopped receiving periodic statements, the statute ran long before this action was filed.

See Cochran v. Cochran, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1115, 1120 (1997). 

Plaintiff counters that the claim is not time-barred because (1) under the continuing harm 

doctrine, Defendants’ breach persisted through January 2019 such that the statute of limitations 

had not yet run when Plaintiff filed her claim, and (2) even if this were not the case, she did not 

discover the breach of the Adjustable Rate Rider until August 2015 when she received the Notice 

of Default. (Dkt. No. 60 at 7.) Plaintiff also raised the continuing harm doctrine for her TILA 

claim; however, with the TILA claim, each failure to provide Plaintiff with a periodic statement 

constituted a breach of 12 C.F.R. § 1026.7, as Defendants had an ongoing legal obligation to 

provide Plaintiff with the statements until Plaintiff received Notice of Default in March 2015. In 

contrast, with Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, it is the Adjustable Rate Rider which allegedly 

gives rise to Plaintiff’s right to periodic statements. Defendants breached this agreement when 

they stopped sending her periodic statements beginning in April 2010. Plaintiff has not advanced 

a theory—let alone a plausible theory—which would suggest that the contract was revived after 

this date such that Defendants would owe her an ongoing obligation to provide periodic 

statements. The continuing harm doctrine thus does not apply.

Plaintiff’s second theory—that the rule of discovery tolls the statute of limitations—is no 

more availing. “[A] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred 

without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and 

Case 3:18-cv-06310-JSC Document 70 Filed 08/05/19 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable 

diligence.” Beasley v. Conagra Brands, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 3d 869, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (internal 

citation omitted) (quoting McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 151, 160 (1999)). 

Plaintiff argues that she only discovered she was entitled to receive periodic statements when she 

received the Notice of Default in August 2015 because she had reasonable belief that the loan had 

been forgiven until this date based on Defendants’ failure to send her periodic statements. (Dkt. 

No. 60 at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that prior to this date she believed her loan had been forgiven based 

on her receipt of a HAMP modification of her Wells Fargo loan and she believed this also applied 

to her loan with Bosco/Franklin. (SAC ¶ 11.) The fatal flaw in Plaintiff’s argument is that the 

loan modification allegedly took place in September 2011, but the monthly statements stopped in 

August 2010. (Id. at ¶ ¶ 10, 11.) Plaintiff has thus not plausibly alleged that she believed the 

monthly statements stopped based on a loan modification which occurred over a year later or that 

she used reasonable diligence to determine why they periodic statements stopped such that the 

discovery rule would apply.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is dismissed for failure to plausibly allege 

that she performed under the contract or that her contract was excused and, in the alternative, as 

barred by the four-year statute of limitations. 

C. Unfair Business Practices Claim

To state a claim for unfair business practices pursuant to California Business and 

Professions Code § 17200, a plaintiff must allege an “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act 

or practice” or “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 

17200. To have standing to bring suit pursuant to § 17200, a plaintiff must “make a twofold 

showing: he or she must demonstrate injury in fact and a loss of money or property caused by 

unfair competition.” Peterson v. Cellco Partnership, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1590 (2008). The 

UCL’s “‘lost money or property’ requirement ... requires a plaintiff to demonstrate ‘some form of 

economic injury’ as a result of his transactions with the defendant.’” Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 

F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310, 320 

(2011)).

Case 3:18-cv-06310-JSC Document 70 Filed 08/05/19 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Here, Plaintiff ties her unfair competition claim to Franklin’s alleged violations of the 

TILA Consumer Finance Regulations as well as to her breach of contract claim. (SAC ¶ 31, 32.) 

However, the Court dismissed the Consumer Finance Regulation claim with prejudice and as 

explained above Plaintiff has again failed to plead a plausible claim for breach of contract. 

“[W]here the same conduct alleged to be unfair under the UCL is also alleged to be a violation of 

another law, the UCL claim rises or falls with the other claims.” Hicks v. PGA Tour, Inc., 165 F. 

Supp.3d 898, 911 (2016), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 897 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 

2018). As Plaintiff’s TILA and breach of contract claims have been dismissed, the Section 17200

claim must be dismissed as well. 

D. Cancellation of Instrument Claim

Plaintiff also repleads her claim for cancellation of instrument against Bosco, alleging that 

Bosco’s Deed Upon Sale is void because it was recorded in violation of California and Federal 

law. (SAC ¶ 38.) Under California Civil Code § 3412, “[a] written instrument, in respect to 

which there is a reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury to a 

person against whom it is void or voidable, may, upon his application, be so adjudged, and order 

to be delivered up or canceled.” 

Bosco insists that Plaintiff’s cancellation claim fails because Plaintiff has not offered to 

restore to Defendants the amount she received from the loan, less her damages. According to 

Bosco, Plaintiff’s failure to show she can tender the amount due on her loan precludes her from 

stating a claim for cancellation of instrument. (Dkt. No. 55-1 at 10 (citing Karlsen v. American 

Sav. & Loan Assn, 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 118 (1971) (quoting Horan v. Harrington, 130 Cal. 142, 

143 (1900) (internal quotation marks omitted.)). 

Plaintiff counters that tender is not required because the sale was void as opposed to 

voidable. For this argument, Plaintiffs relies on Menan v. U.S. Bank National Assn., in which 

plaintiff Menan entered into a forbearance agreement with defendant U.S. Bank, and made the 

first forbearance payment on time, but still had his property foreclosed upon. Menan v. U.S. Bank 

National Assn., 924 F.Supp.2d 1151, 1153 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2013). U.S. Bank failed to cancel 

the Notice of Default and sold Menan’s property at auction. (Id.) The court held that the law does 

not require a plaintiff to tender the loan amount to a trustee who has no right to sell the property in 

Case 3:18-cv-06310-JSC Document 70 Filed 08/05/19 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the first place. Id. at 1160. Plaintiff’s argument that as in Menan, the sale of her property never 

should have occurred such that tender is not required is unavailing. In Menan, the court found that 

a forbearance agreement existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, and that the plaintiff 

properly made a payment pursuant to that agreement shortly before their property was foreclosed 

upon. Menan, 924 F.Supp.2d at 1157. Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff alleges that the sale was 

void because it was done in violation of state and federal law. (SAC ¶ 38.) However, Plaintiff has 

failed to plead a viable claim under state or federal law. Thus, Menan is inapposite as the sale 

here was voidable rather than void. 

Generally, where a claim is voidable rather than void, the plaintiff must offer equity. See

Mangindin v. Washington Mut. Bank, 637 F. Supp. 2d 700, 712 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting citation 

omitted)). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that she offered equity in support of her cancellation 

claim. The claim must therefore be dismissed. Perhaps recognizing the flaw in her claim, Plaintiff 

requests leave to amend this claim to plead allegations regarding tender. But given that the Court 

has concluded that Plaintiff has not even plausibly alleged that sale is voidable due to the stopping 

of the periodic statements, granting leave to amend to allege the ability to tender would be futile.

E. Declaratory Relief Claim

Although Plaintiff’s SAC also included a declaratory relief claim against Bosco, Plaintiff’s 

opposition brief states that she is dismissing this claim. (Dkt. No. 60 at 2 n.1.) The motion to 

dismiss the declaratory relief claim is therefore moot. 

CONCLUSION

When Plaintiff initially filed this action she alleged that Franklin’s foreclosure of a second 

lien on her home was unlawful because Franklin participated in the HAMP program and thus was 

required to extinguish its second lien when Wells Fargo forgave much of the first lien loan. 

Having learned that Franklin was not a HAMP participant, Plaintiff amended her claims against 

Franklin to emphasize that Franklin’s failure to send her periodic statements regarding her loan 

after April 2010 was itself a basis for voiding her second lien loan. Accepting Plaintiff’s 

allegations regarding the failure to send periodic statements as true, her claims against Franklin 

and Bosco still fail for the reasons stated above. As she has already been granted leave to amend 

and was unable to correct the complaint’s deficiencies, and as she has not identified any new 

Case 3:18-cv-06310-JSC Document 70 Filed 08/05/19 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

allegations that she could make to plausibly state a claim, the dismissal is with prejudice.

This Order disposes of Docket No. 55. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2019

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:18-cv-06310-JSC Document 70 Filed 08/05/19 Page 7 of 7