Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04756/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04756-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 896
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Arbitration
Cause of Action: 9:9 Motion to Confirm Arbitration Loan

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leslie E. Orman,

Petitioner,

v. 

Central Loan Administration & Reporting, 

et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-04756-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Leslie Orman’s motion for reconsideration 

and motion to seal her motion for reconsideration. (Docs. 55, 56.) She seeks 

reconsideration of the Court’s February 26, 2020 order that she pay $9,709.54 in sanctions 

to Respondent Central Loan Administration & Reporting (“Cenlar”) and pay $17,065.95 

in sanctions to Respondent CitiMortgage Inc. (“Citi,” and collectively, “Respondents”). 

(Doc. 54 at 14.) Specifically, Orman claims she is unable to satisfy the sanctions order due 

to her limited income and inability to pay. (Doc. 56 at 1-2.) For the following reasons, the 

Court will grant the motion to seal in part and deny the motion for reconsideration. 

The factual and legal background of this case is detailed in the Court’s December 

16, 2020 order. (Doc. 39.) In a nutshell, Orman sought confirmation of a $10.3 million 

arbitration award that was based on a legally nonexistent contract. Because the arbitration 

“agreement” had never been agreed to, the Court vacated the award. (Id. at 8-9.) The 

Court also determined that Orman’s motion to confirm had been filed in bad faith and, as 

a result, sanctions were appropriate. (Id. at 9-13.) The Court determined that Orman would 

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be responsible for 90% of Respondents’ attorneys fees and directed Respondents to file an 

itemized statement of the legal services provided in this case within 14 days. (Id. at 12-

14.) 

On December 30, 2020, Respondents submitted their fee request. (Doc. 42.) After 

considering their itemized statements and Orman’s objections thereto (Doc. 46), the Court 

awarded $9,709.54 to Cenlar and $17,065.95. (Doc. 54 at 14.) Orman now seeks 

reconsideration of that award, arguing that she in unable to pay and that “the Court misread 

its own order” in determining the due date for Respondents’ fee submission. (Doc. 56.)

I. Motion To Seal

As an initial matter, Orman seeks to seal her motion for reconsideration because it 

contains her Social Security number. (Doc. 55.) Under Rule 5.2(a) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, a party filing a motion containing a Social Security number ordinarily 

should submit an unsealed, redacted version of that document, rather than filing an 

unredacted version and seeking to seal it. However, in the interest of expediency, the Court 

will grant the motion in part. The entire document need not be sealed—only the portion 

that contains Orman’s Social Security number. Accordingly, the Court will order that 

Exhibit 1 of Doc. 56 be filed under seal, and the rest of the document will remain unsealed. 

II. Motion For Reconsideration

Under LRCiv. 7.2, the Court will grant a motion for reconsideration if: (1) “[t]here 

are material differences in fact or law from that presented to the Court” that the moving 

party could not have known at the time of the Court’s decision; (2) “[t]here are new material 

facts that happened after the Court’s decision”; (3) there was a change in law after the 

Court’s decision; or (4) the moving party makes a “convincing showing that the Court 

failed to consider material facts presented to the Court.” Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Western 

Support Group, 2013 WL 2369919, *1-2 (D. Ariz. 2013)

Orman primarily argues that the Court should reconsider its fee award because she 

is unable to pay the sanctions levied against her. (Doc. 56 at 1-2.) She has limited income 

derived from Social Security and the sanctions imposed exceed her annual income. (Id.) 

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In fact, she argues, the sanctions imposed exceed her total assets. (Id.)

The trouble is that Orman’s financial situation and the amount of fees sought by 

Respondents are not information that Orman couldn’t have known at the time she filed her 

objections to Respondents’ fee request. Nor are they new facts that occurred after the Court 

entered its order. Honeywell Int’l, 2013 WL 2369919 at *1-2. At the time the Court was 

considering Respondents’ fee request, Orman knew both how much they were seeking and 

whether she had the ability to pay. Additionally, before Orman’s objections were due, the 

Court issued an order that specifically noted that the sanctioned parties could raise 

“inability to pay” as a defense. (Doc. 45 at 3.) It therefore fell on Orman to bring her 

inability to pay to the Court’s attention in her objections. Gaskell v. Weir, 10 F.3d 626, 

629 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he sanctioned party has the burden to produce evidence of inability 

to pay.”). After all, “the sanctioned party knows best his or her financial situation.” Id.

As a result, reconsideration is not warranted on this point—Orman had an opportunity to 

present this information to the Court. That opportunity has passed.

Orman also argues that the “Court misread its own order” and incorrectly considered 

Respondents’ fee submission because it was filed after the due date, which Orman argues 

was 14 days from when the order was signed. The Court considered and rejected this 

argument in its order awarding sanctions. (Doc. 56 at 7.) An order becomes effective at, 

and due dates run from, the time an order is entered on the civil docket. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 

58(c). See also Cannella v. Lentz, 396 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 

Finally, Orman asserts that she did not receive Respondents’ supporting 

documentation until January 4, 2020, which meant that it was late no matter what. (Doc. 

56 at 3.) This argument is unavailing. If Orman thought the documentation was late no 

matter what, she could have so argued in her original objection. She did not. (Doc. 46.)

In fact, in that objection, Orman states that “Respondent’s (sic) spreadsheets were emailed 

to . . . Orman . . . four (4) days after the time specified in the Court’s order.” (Id. at 2.) 

Because Orman believed the due date was December 26, 2019, four days after was 

December 30, 2019. (Id.) In other words, Orman has already admitted that she timely 

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received Respondents’ supporting documentation. Respondents have also represented that 

they timely provided this information to Orman twice. (Doc. 47 at 3-4.) 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) Orman’s motion to seal (Doc. 55) is granted in part. The Clerk of the Court 

is directed to file Exhibit 1 of Doc. 56 under seal; and

(2) Orman’s motion for reconsideration is denied. 

Dated this 13th day of March, 2020.

Cc: Jeremy Claridge

 1405 W. 16th Street, Suite G

 Yuma, AZ 85364

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