Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06613/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06613-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 625
Nature of Suit: Drug Related Seizure of Property
Cause of Action: 21:881 Forfeiture Property - Real Estate

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

REAL PROPERTY LOCATED IN )

MERCED COUNTY, COMMONLY KNOWN )

AS 10382 EAST GERARD, PLANADA,)

CALIFORNIA, APN: 053-270-019; )

Including Appurtenances and )

Improvements Thereto, )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:03-cv-6613-AWI-SMS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE:

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT JESUS ANDRADE

(DOC. 28)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE:

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT

JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT JESUS

ANDRADE (DOC. 28)

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action for forfeiture

in rem in this Court. The matter has been referred to the

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules

72-302(c)(3) and (19) and 72-303. 

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motions, filed on

February 25, 2008, 1) to strike the answer to the complaint filed

by potential claimant Jesus Andrade on January 15, 2004, and 2)

for entry of a default judgment against potential claimant Jesus

Andrade and against all other persons. The motions were

accompanied by a supporting memorandum of points and authorities

and the declaration of Stephanie Hamilton Borchers, with

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exhibits. The motions were not served on any defendant or

claimant. No opposition has been filed by the potential claimant.

By separate order, the Court has vacated the hearing on this

motion and has ordered the matter submitted for decision.

I. Motion to Strike Answer 

A. Legal Standards

The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub.

L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202, 106 Cong. (2000), was signed into th

law on April 25, 2000. Section 21 of the Act provides that the

amendments made by the Act apply to any forfeiture proceeding

commenced on or after the effective date of the Act, that is, 120

days after the date of enactment. The instant case postdates

enactment of the statute, and thus, CAFRA applies to the present

proceeding.

With respect to proceedings that are in rem actions for

forfeiture, both the general Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims

(Supp. R.) apply. Supp. R. A(1)(B); United States v. Real

Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1315 (9 Cir. 1998). However, the latter th

rules prevail if there is an inconsistency. Supp. R. A(2). Supp.

R. C applies to in rem actions in general. Supp. R. G(1)

provides:

1) Scope. This rule governs a forfeiture action in

rem arising from a federal statute. To the extent

that this rule does not address an issue, Supplemental

Rules C and E and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

also apply. 

With respect to the motion to strike, Plaintiff moves to

strike the answer pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for

Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions, Rule

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G(8)(c)(i)(A). Rule G(8)(c)(i) provides:

At any time before trial, the government may move

to strike a claim or answer:

(A) for failing to comply with Rule G(5) or (6), or

(B) because the claimant lacks standing.

The Court notes that more generally, it is established that

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), a Court may strike a document

that does not conform to the formal requirements of the pertinent

rules of court. Transamerican Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins.

Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 143 F.R.D. 189, 191 (N.D. Ill. 1992).

The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid the costs

that arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with

those issues prior to trial. Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co.,

697 F.2d 880, 885 (9 Cir.1983). Immaterial matter is defined as th

matter that “has no essential or important relationship to the

claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Fantasy, Inc. v.

Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9 Cir. 1993) (quoting 5 Charles A. th

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382,

at 706-07 (1990)), rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994).

Immaterial portions of a pleading that do not give fair notice of

a claim or defense may be stricken by the Court sua sponte or

upon motion. Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86-87 (2 Cir. nd

1995). Impertinent matter is defined as “statements that do not

pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” 

Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527.

With respect to forfeitures of real property, 18 U.S.C. §

985(a) provides that notwithstanding any other provision of law,

all civil forfeitures of real property and interests in real

property shall proceed as judicial forfeitures. Section 985(f)

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provides that the section applies only to civil forfeitures of

real property and interests in real property.

Supp. R. G(3) provides:

a) Real Property. If the defendant is real property,

the government must proceed under 18 U.S.C. § 985.

B. Analysis

1. Duty to Respond

Plaintiff has established that in initiating and carrying

the action forward, Plaintiff gave the required notice in order

to cause the claimant’s obligation to respond to arise.

With respect to Jesus Andrade, or any other person who is an

owner of the property, Title 18 U.S.C. § 985(c)(1) specifically

provides:

(c)(1) The Government shall initiate a civil forfeiture

action against real property by--

(A) filing a complaint for forfeiture;

(B) posting a notice of the complaint on the property;

and

(C) serving notice on the property owner, along with a copy

of the complaint.

Here, Plaintiff has demonstrated that the complaint was

filed on November 17, 2003. By the Marshal’s return of service

filed on January 16, 2004, Plaintiff has demonstrated that on

December 24, 2003, Plaintiff posted notice of the complaint on

the property. By the Marshal’s return of service filed on March

15, 2004, Plaintiff established that potential claimant Jesus

Andrade was personally served on December 24, 2003, with the

complaint, notice of complaint, writ of entry, and related court

forms. Further, Plaintiff has established that copies of the

documents were also served upon potential claimant Jesus Andrade

by certified mail received and signed for by S. Franco at the

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Fresno County Jail on November 21, 2003. (Decl. of Borchers ¶ 4,

Ex. A.) The notice of complaint expressly stated that a civil

complaint for forfeiture had been filed; it set forth the time

within which a claim was required to be filed and noted the

requirement of an answer and the time period for filing an

answer. 

Further, attorney Stephen J. Estey, who stated he was acting

on behalf of “the Andrades,” wrote a letter dated December 2,

2003, to Plaintiff confirming a thirty-day extension of time

granted for filing claims in response to the complaint. (Decl.,

Ex. B.)

It therefore appears that potential claimant Jesus Andrade

received actual notice of the pendency of the action and of the

time within which to file a claim. Further, this notice complied

with 18 U.S.C. § 985 and Supp. Rule G(4)(b), which requires that

any person who reasonably appears to be a potential claimant on

the facts known to the government before the end of the time for

filing a claim be advised of the date of the notice, the deadline

for filing a claim and an answer, and the name of the government

attorney to be served with the claim and answer. (Notice of

Complaint, p. 2.)

2. Failure to File a Claim 

The docket and the declaration of Borchers establish that

although claims were filed by Gabriel and Leticia Andrade, no

claim was filed by potential claimant Jesus Andrade. Jesus

Andrade admits in the stipulation for final judgment of

forfeiture executed by him on January 16, 2008, and filed on

February 25, 2008, that an answer was filed on his behalf, but no

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claim was filed. (Stip. pp. 2, 9.) An answer was filed by

attorney Stephen J. Estey on behalf of claimants Gabriel and

Leticia Madrigal and “Claimant” Jesus Andrade on January 15,

2004. The answer referred to a verified claim having been filed,

denied the allegations of the complaint, and prayed for relief.

It was not verified, but it was signed by the claimant’s counsel.

Granting a motion to strike an answer is appropriate for one

who does not file a claim in compliance with the pertinent rules.

United States v. $38,570 U.S. Currency, 950 F.2d 1108, 1112-15

(5 Cir. 1992) (upholding the granting of a motion to strike th

under former Supplemental Rules where the claimant had

constructive notice that the time for filing a claim had begun to

run, and he filed an answer and then an untimely claim); United

States v. $50,200.00 in U. S. Currency, 76 F.Supp.2d 1247 (D.Wyo.

1999) (granting a motion to strike an answer where the claimants

had failed to file a timely verified claim contrary to the

express requirements of the rules and where there were no

mitigating factors, good faith attempt to file a timely claim,

detrimental reliance on misinformation from a governmental

agency, or expenditure of considerable resources in preparing the

case for trial). In the Ninth Circuit, several policies support

the requirement of strict compliance with the Supplemental Rules

in filing a claim, including the need to inform the Court that

there is a claimant to the property who wants it back and intends

to defend it, to avoid waste or unnecessary expenditure of

judicial resources, and to further the important interest in the

finality of judgments ultimately entered. See, United States v.

Real Property, 135 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9 Cir. 1998). th

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28 The Court notes that claimants Leticia and Gabriel Madrigal did enter in to the stipulation regarding final 1

judgment of forfeiture that has been previously detailed. 

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Here, the claimant was given appropriate notice regarding

filing a claim. There has been no compliance with the

requirements of the governing Supplemental Rules. Further, it is

alleged and established by the government that potential claimant

Jesus Andrade signed on January 16, 2008, a stipulation for final

judgment of forfeiture in this action in which he and claimants

Leticia and Gabriel Andrade agreed alternatively to file

$10,000.00 as a substitute res within forty-five days of signing

the stipulation for final judgment of forfeiture, or if the

$10,000.00 were not timely paid, then the parties stipulated to

forfeiture of all right, title, and interest in the Defendant

real property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). (Stip. p. 3.) 

One who does not file a verified claim pursuant to the

Supplemental Rules lacks standing in the forfeiture action.

United States v. Real Property, 135 F.2d 1312, 1316-1318 (9 Cir. th

1998) (citing additional authority from the First, Fifth, Second,

and Eighth circuits). Accordingly, the answer is immaterial and

impertinent, and should be stricken. 

II. Motion for Default Judgment

Plaintiff seeks the entry of a default judgment against the

interest of potential claimant Jesus Madrigal in the subject

property as well as entry of a final judgment of forfeiture that

vests in the United States of America all right, title, and

interest in the Defendant real property. There has been no

appearance by any person with an interest in the Defendant

property or any claimant with respect to the motion.1

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This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1345 (proceeding commenced by the United States) and

1355 (forfeiture).

A. Legal Standards regarding Default Judgment

A court has the discretion to enter a default judgment

against one who is not an infant, incompetent, or member of the

armed services where the claim is for an amount that is not

certain on the face of the claim and where 1) the defendant has

been served with the claim; 2) the defendant’s default has been

entered for failure to appear; 3) if the defendant has appeared

in the action, the defendant has been served with written notice

of the application for judgment at least three days before the

hearing on the application; and 4) the court has undertaken any

necessary and proper investigation or hearing in order to enter

judgment or carry it into effect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); Alan

Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th

Cir. 1988). Factors that may be considered by courts in

exercising discretion as to the entry of a default judgment

include the nature and extent of the delay, Draper v. Coombs, 792

F.2d 915, 924-925 (9 Cir. 1986); the possibility of prejudice to th

the plaintiff, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th

Cir.1986); the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim, id.;

the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint to support

judgment, Alan Neuman Productions, Inc., 862 F.2d at 1392; the

amount in controversy, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d at 1471-1472;

the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, id.;

whether the default was due to excusable neglect, id.; and the

strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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28 Plaintiff does not claim any exception or qualification under the rule with respect to the number of times 2

publication was required.

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that favors decisions on the merits, id.

 A default judgment generally bars the defaulting party from

disputing the facts alleged in the complaint, but the defaulting

party may argue that the facts as alleged do not state a claim.

Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392.

Thus, well pleaded factual allegations, except as to damages, are

taken as true; however, necessary facts not contained in the

pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not

established by default. Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of North America,

980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9 Cir. 1992); TeleVideo Systems, Inc. v. th

Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9 Cir. 1987). th

B. Notice

In addition to the facts recited above in connection with

the motion to strike the answer, the government filed a notice of

recording of a lis pendens in Merced County on November 20, 2003.

Further, the Court notes that a proof of publication filed on

March 29, 2004, reflects publication in a newspaper of general

circulation on February 5, 2004, pursuant to the Court’s order of

January 20, 2004. This publication contained the required

information but does not meet the requirements of present Rule

G(4)(a)(iii), which generally requires publication once a week

for three consecutive weeks. However, the effective date of Rule 2

G was 2006. (Advisory Comm. Note to 2006 Adoption.) The

publication complied with the Court’s publication order as well

as the governing rules at the time, namely, Supp. Rule C(4) and

Local Rule A-530. Therefore, the Court finds that the publication

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was sufficient.

With respect to notice of this motion, Local Rule A-540(d)

provides that upon a showing that no one has appeared to claim

the property and give security, and that due notice of the action

and arrest of the property has been given, a party may move for

judgment at any time after the time for answer has expired; if no

one has appeared, the party may have an ex parte hearing before

the Court and judgment without further notice. Potential claimant

Jesus Madrigal has not appeared in the action. Although claimants

Leticia and Gabriel Andrade have appeared, they have executed a

stipulation for final judgment of forfeiture. It does not appear

that $10,000.00 has been deposited with respect to this action to

function as a substitute res pursuant to the stipulation. Thus,

it appears that pursuant to the terms of the stipulation,

claimants Leticia and Gabriel Andrade have agreed to the

forfeiture of all right, title and interest in the Defendant real

property. (Stip. p. 3.)

Therefore, the Court concludes that adequate notice has been

given.

C. Sufficiency of the Complaint

Supp. Rule G(2) requires that the complaint in a forfeiture

action in rem arising from a federal statute be verified; state

the grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction

over the Defendant property, and venue; describe the property

with reasonable particularity; identify the statute under which

the forfeiture action is brought; and state sufficiently detailed

facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be

able to meet its burden of proof at trial.

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The complaint filed in this action was verified; the bases

for jurisdiction and venue are stated; the property is described 

by address, parcel number, and legal description by means of

references to lots and maps. In the complaint, it is alleged that

the action is brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 985 and 21 U.S.C. §

881(a)(7) to forfeit real property used to facilitate the

commission of a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). (Cmplt. p. 1.) 

Title 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) provides that all real property,

including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold

interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any

appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be

used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the

commission of, a violation of the subchapter punishable by more

than one year’s imprisonment is subject to forfeiture to the

United States, and no property right shall exist in them.

Here, the complaint alleges that the Defendant real property

was used or intended to be used to commit or facilitate the

commission of a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and thus is

subject to forfeiture to the Plaintiff pursuant to § 881(a)(7).

(Cmplt. p. 5.) Various facts in support of this conclusion are

alleged, including use of the property to store and distribute

three pounds each of methamphetamine and marijuana in July 2001,

as well as the presence of cash in an amount over $3,000.00,

during a time that Jesus and Gabriel Andrade lived on the

property. (Id. at 2-5.) Further, potential claimant Jesus Andrade

and the claimants have stipulated that there was reasonable cause

for the posting of Defendant real property, and that the Court

may enter a certificate of reasonable cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2465. (Stip. p. 7.) 

The Court therefore concludes that the complaint was legally

sufficient to state a claim for forfeiture of the Defendant real

property.

D. Default

The Court has ordered the answer of potential claimant Jesus

Andrade stricken. Accordingly, the Court concludes that should

Jesus Andrade’s lack of standing be overlooked and he be

considered a party, he is in default because he did not file an

appropriate responsive pleading within the required period of

time. 

The Clerk entered the default of potential claimant Jesus

Andrade on September 21, 2007. However, at that time, the answer

of Jesus Andrade was on file. Therefore, the Court concludes that

the entry of default was unauthorized and premature. However, the

Court has now recommended that the answer of potential claimant

Jesus Andrade be stricken. To recommend that the default entered

on September 18, 2007, be vacated and then re-entered would be

unnecessary in light of the Court’s finding concerning the

default of Jesus Andrade. 

E. Discretionary Factors

No one other than the claimants who have previously entered

into a stipulation for judgment has claimed an interest in the

Defendant property or otherwise responded to the complaint

despite adequate notice. It does not appear that there is any

risk of mistake or excusable neglect on the part of anyone with a

potential interest in the property or of a dispute as to a

material fact essential to the government’s case. No just cause

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for delay appears. It is apparent from the declaration of Elisa

M. Maguire filed in connection with the request for entry of

default against Defendant Jesus Andrade and submitted to the

Court that none of the claimants or potential claimants is an

infant, incompetent, or member of the armed services. There does

not appear to be any reason why the general policy in favor of a

decision on the merits would warrant refusing to enter the

requested default judgment. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown its

entitlement to a default judgment of forfeiture with respect to

the Defendant real property. With respect to the form of the

judgment, Plaintiff has established that it is entitled to a

judgment against the property, Waterloo Distilling Corp. v. U.S.,

282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931), affecting the interests of all persons

in the property, Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958).

III. Recommendations

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that

1) Plaintiff’s motion to strike the answer of potential

claimant Jesus Andrade BE GRANTED; and

2) The Clerk BE DIRECTED to strike the answer filed on

January 15, 2004, with respect to potential claimant Jesus

Andrade only; and

3) Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment BE GRANTED; and

4) Plaintiff IS ENTITLED to, and the Clerk SHOULD ENTER, a

judgment that 

a) The interest/s of claimants Gabriel Andrade and

Leticia Andrade, and potential claimant Jesus Andrade in the

Defendant property are condemned and forfeited to the United

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States of America; and

b) The right, title, and interest of claimants Gabriel

Andrade and Leticia Andrade, and potential claimant Jesus Andrade

in the Defendant property are forfeited to the United States of

America pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), and are vested in the

United States; and

c) All persons claiming any right, title, or interest

in or to the Defendant property have defaulted and no longer have

any right, title, or interest in the Defendant property

whatsoever; and

5) The Clerk ENTER final judgment of forfeiture for

Plaintiff United States that vests in the United States of

America all right, title, and interest in the Defendant real

property.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

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appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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