Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00965/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00965-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAVID LEE PUTNAM, )

AIS #155060X, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

) CASE NO. 1:11-CV-965-WHA

)

TONY PATTERSON, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

I. INTRODUCTION

This cause of action is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas

corpus relief filed by David Lee Putnam, a state inmate and habitual felony offender, on

November 8, 2011. Putnam is presently incarcerated pursuant to a conviction for the

2

unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance in the first degree imposed upon him by

the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama on February 10, 2005.

3

All exhibits and accompanying page numbers referenced herein are those assigned by this court in the

1

docketing process.

The law is well settled that a pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison

2

officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-

41 (11 Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11 Cir. 1993). The petition indicates Putnam submitted

th th

the petition for mailing on November 8, 2011. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief - Doc. No. 1 at 8. In light

of the foregoing and for purposes of the proceedings herein, the court considers November 8, 2011 as the date of

filing. 

Under Alabama law, “[u]nlawful manufacture of a controlled substance in the first degree is a Class A

3

felony.” Ala. Code § 13A-12-218(b). 

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 1 of 32
At the time of Putnam's controlled substance conviction, the trial court had before

it three prior felony convictions, none of which was a Class A felony, for purposes of

sentence enhancement under the provisions of the Alabama Habitual Felony Offender Act

("HFOA"), Ala. Code § 15-5-9, et seq., as amended; Respondents' Exhibit A (Part 3) -

Court Doc. No. 5-3 at 81. Thus, in its discretion, the trial court could impose a sentence

of "imprisonment for life or life without parole." Ala. Code § 13A-5-9(c)(3); Respondents'

Exhibit A (Part 3) - Court Doc. No. 5-3 at 86 ("There are only two sentences available to

this Court, one is life and the other is life without parole."). Based on Putnam's criminal

record "that goes all the way back to 1988" and includes over twenty prior felony

convictions, the trial court exercised its discretion and imposed a sentence of life without

parole. Id. at 86-87.

II. STATUTORY HISTORY

Prior to the 2000 amendment of the HFOA and under the circumstances present in

Putnam's case, a state court wasrequired to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without

parole. However, effective May 25, 2000, the legislature amended § 13A-5-9(c)(3) to

4

allow punishment of such offenders either to "imprisonment for life or life without

possibility of parole, in the discretion of the trial court." Since Putnam was sentenced on

Before the 2000 amendment, Ala. Code § 13A-5-9(c)(3) provided that: “In all cases when it is shown that

4

a criminal defendant has been previously convicted of any three felonies and after such convictions has committed

... a Class A felony, he must be punished by imprisonment for life without parole.” 

2

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 2 of 32
March 11, 2005, he received the benefit of the amendment to § 13A-5-9(c)(3) allowing for

imposition of a life sentence. The Alabama legislature again amended the HFOA on

December 1, 2001 by adding § 13A-5-9.1. This statute granted trial judges the authority

to consider retroactively sentences of life imprisonment for non-violent, Class A convicted

offenders with three or more felony convictions, none of which were Class A felonies, who

had been convicted prior to the May 25, 2000, amendment to the Act and were sentenced

to life imprisonment without parole. Section 13A-5-9.1 directs that "[t]he provisions of

Section 13A-5-9 [as amended] shall be applied retroactively by the sentencing judge or, if

the sentencing judge is no longer in office, by any other circuit judge appointed by the

presiding judge, for consideration of early parole of each nonviolent convicted offender

based on evaluations performed by the Department of Corrections and approved by the

Board of Pardons and Paroles and submitted to the court." The Alabama Supreme Court

has determined:

Section 13A-5-9.1 directs the sentencing judge or [properly

appointed circuit judge] to apply the provisions of § 13A-5-9 retroactively,

thereby making the benefits of the 2000 amendment to the HFOAavailable

to inmates who were sentenced pursuant to the HFOA before it was

amended in 2000. Section 13A-5-9(c)(3), as amended in 2000, allows a

sentencing judge to decide in certain circumstances whether a sentence of

life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is

appropriate for a particular inmate [sentenced prior to the 2000 amendment

to the HFOA]. In making that decision, the sentencing judge does not have

the power to decide the secondary issue -- whether the defendant will be

granted parole should the judge sentence him or her to "straight" life

imprisonment. Under § 13A-5-9.1, a judge applying § 13A-5-9(c)(3) to a

3

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 3 of 32
previously sentenced defendant merely has the authority to conduct a new

sentencing hearing, and in the judge's discretion, to modify a previous

sentence under which a defendant would never have been eligible for parole

to a sentence of "straight" life imprisonment, under which a defendant might

thereafter become eligible for parole, depending upon the factors then

established by the Parole Board....

The clear reference in § 13A-5-9.1 to the provisions of § 13A-5-9

makes it obviousthat the trial court's only authority is to modify the sentence

of an inmate who is not eligible for parole under the sentence imposed

pursuant to the HFOA before its amendment in 2000, sentencing that

inmate instead to a sentence under which he or she may become eligible for

parole.

* * *

... Reading § 13A-5-9.1 in conjunction with § 13A-5-9, it is clear that

a sentencing judge or [judge assigned for resentencing] can resentence only

two narrowly defined classes of habitual offenders: those who had been

sentenced [prior to the 2000 amendment] to life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole under the mandatory provisions of the HFOA upon

conviction of a Class A felony with no prior Class A felony convictions; and

those who had been sentenced to life imprisonment under the mandatory

provisions of the HFOA upon conviction of a Class B felony. Moreover, of

those habitual offenders, the judge can resentence only those who are

nonviolent offenders.

Kirby v. State, 899 So.2d 968, 973-974 (Ala. 2004) (emphasis added). "There are three

requirements for eligibility to have a sentence reconsidered under § 13A-5-9.1: (1) the

inmate was sentenced before May 25, 2000, the date the 2000 amendment to the HFOA

became effective;(2)the inmate wassentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility

of parole pursuant to § 13A-5-9(c)(3) and had no prior Class A felony convictions or was

sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to § 13A-5-9(c)(2) ...; and (3) the inmate is a

'nonviolent convicted offender.' An inmate must satisfy all three requirements before he

4

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 4 of 32
... is eligible for reconsideration of sentence under § 13A-5-9.1. If a circuit court

determines that an inmate is eligible for reconsideration of his or her sentence, the court

then has the authority pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1 to resentence the inmate, within the bounds

of § 13A-5-9(c)(2) or § 13A-5-9(c)(3), as amended, if it so chooses." Holt v. State, 960

So.2d 726 at 734-735 (Ala.Cr.App. 2006), writ quashed, 960 So.2d 740 (Ala. 2006).

Consequently, both the Alabama Supreme Court and Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

have ruled that onlyinmatessentenced before May 25, 2000 are eligible for reconsideration

of their sentence under § 13A-5-9.1. Kirby, 899 So.2d at 973; Holt, 960 So.2d at 734-735.

It islikewise wellsettled that "a circuit court is not required to resentence an inmate

merely because it determines that the inmate is eligible for reconsideration of his or her

sentence." Holt, 960 So.2d at 735, n.3. In addition, although trial courts have subjectmatter jurisdiction oversuccessive motionsfor reconsideration, there is nothing "requiring

the trial courts to consider second or successive motions for reconsideration under § 13A5-9.1...." Ex parte Gunn, 993 So.2d 433, 437 n.6 (Ala. 2007). Neither § 13A-5-9.1 nor

case law interpreting its provisions "prohibit[s] a circuit court from denying a motion for

sentence reconsideration solely on the basis that it is a successive motion [after

consideration of the merits of a previous motion filed by an eligible inmate]. The intent

of the legislature in enacting § 13A-5-9.1 was to afford nonviolent inmates sentenced

before the 2000 amendment to [§ 13A-5-9(c)(2) and § 13A-5-9(c)(3) of] the Habitual

5

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 5 of 32
Felony Offender Act the opportunity to receive the benefits of that amendment, i.e., to

afford those nonviolent inmates the opportunity for the circuit court to exercise its

discretion in determining the sentence to be imposed, discretion that was not available

before the amendment." Ashford v. State, 12 So.3d 160, 162 (Ala.Cr.App. 2008)(emphasis

in original).

On November 18, 2008, Putnam filed a motion for relief from sentence seeking

reconsideration of his sentence under Ala. Code § 13A-5-9.1. In this motion, Putnam

argued that he should be allowed to seek reconsideration of his sentence in the same

manner as inmates sentenced prior to amendment of the HFOA and requested that the trial

court "(a) determine that it has jurisdiction to consider his application for re-sentencing;

(b) direct the Parole Board and/or the Department of Corrections to submit a report

regarding the Defendant's behavior while incarcerated; (c) set a hearing to consider this

application for re-sentencing; and (d) enter an order after hearing granting the relief

requested and re-sentencing the Defendant to life in prison with the possibility of parole."

Respondents' Exhibit Z - Doc. No. 5-28 at 11 (emphasis in original).

The trial court issued an order on October 30, 2009, denying the motion for relief

from sentence. Respondents' Exhibit Z - Doc. No. 5-28 at 42-44. In its order, the court

referenced the three eligibility requirements necessary for reconsideration of an inmate's

sentence under the provisions Ala. Code § 13A-5-9.1 and noted that "Putnam does not

6

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 6 of 32
appear to meet the eligibility requirements for reconsideration under Section 13A-5-9.1"

because he "was convicted [on] February 10, 2005 and [therefore] sentenced under the

amended habitual felony offender act." Id. at 42-43. Consequently, "[t]his Court had the

option of sentencing Defendant Putnam to life or life without the possibility of parole."

Id. at 43. "Defendant argues that he is denied equal protection if he cannot avail himself

of a sentence reconsideration under Section 13A-5-9.1. However, this argument is

misplaced. When the legislature amended the habitual offender act the changes were made

prospective [and therefore applied to Putnamat hissentencing]. However, because [those]

criminal defendants who were sentenced prior to the effective date of the act [were

excluded from eligibility for consideration of the more lenient sentencing terms], the

legislature saw fit to allow these defendants reconsideration of [their] sentences by

applying the amendments retroactively pursuant to Section 13A-5-9.1." Id. at 44.

Putnam appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from sentence. On

June 18, 2010, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial

court in an unpublished memorandum opinion. Respondents' Exhibit DD - Doc. No. 5-32.

The appellate court's opinion, as is relevant to the claims raised in the instant habeas

petition, reads as follows:

David Lee Putnam appealsfrom the denial of his motion to reconsider

his sentence filed pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, ("Kirby

Motion"). Kirby v. State, 899 So. 2d 968 (Ala. 2004). On February 10,

2005, Putnam was convicted of first-degree unlawful manufacture of a

7

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 7 of 32
controlled substance, a violation of § 13A-12-218, Ala. Code 1975. On

March 11, 2005, he was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to life in

prison without the possibility of parole.

On November 18, 2008, Putnam filed his Kirby motion seeking

sentence reconsideration. On October 30, 2009, the circuit court denied

Putnam's motion holding that Putnam was sentenced after the effective date

of § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975. [As set forth by prior case law, there are

three elements an inmate must establish to gain eligibility for reconsideration

of his sentence under § 13A-5-9.1. One of these eligibility criteria requires

that the sentence at issue wasimposed upon the inmate before May 25, 2000,

the effective date of the amendment to the Habitual Felony Offender Act.]

On October 30, 2009, the circuit court denied Putnam's motion holding that

Putnam was sentenced after the effective date[s] of [both the amendment to

§ 13A-5-9(c)(3) and] § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975. Putnam acknowledges

in [his] brief that he was sentenced after the effective date of [each statute];

however, he urges this Court to hold that § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, as

applied to him, is unconstitutional due to equal protection and due process

violations.

I.

Putnam first asserts § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, as interpreted by

Alabama's appellate courts, runs afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment's

guarantee of equal protection. Specifically, Putnamassertsthat § 13A-5-9.1,

Ala. Code 1975, creates a system that adversely impacts non-violent

offenders sentenced after May 25, 2000, relative to those non-violent

offenders who were sentenced before May 25, 2000. The adverse impact

Putnam asserts is related to his inability to bring a Kirby Motion for

reconsideration of his 2005 sentence. Putnam, however, lacks the standing

necessary to bring an equal protection claim against this statute.

Prior to 2000, an offender such as Putnam with three or more prior

felony convictions [none of which constituted a Class A felony] would have

received a mandatory term of life in prison without parole upon conviction

of a Class A felony. See § 13A-5-9(c)(3), Ala. Code 1975 (1994) (amended

2000). As amended in 2000, § 13A-5-9(c)(3), Ala. Code 1975, provided the

circuit court with the discretion to sentence an offender such as Putnam to

8

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 8 of 32
life in prison or life in prison without the possibility of parole. Section 13A5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, is a statute that calls for the retroactive application of

§ 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975, allowing the sentencing judge the discretion to

reconsider the sentence of a non-violent habitual felon sentenced prior to the

effective date of the 2000 amendment in light of the new sentencing scheme.

In other words, the purpose of § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, is to confer the

benefit of the 2000 amendment to the HFOA to those convicted prior to the

amendment.

Putnam apparently desires the ability to have his sentence

reconsidered. However, Putnam ignoresthe fact that when he wassentenced

in 2005, the sentencing judge already possessed the discretion to decide

between a sentence of life in prison and life in prison without parole. Thus,

§ 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, does not adversely impact Putnam because he

has already been conferred the benefit of the 2000 amendment to the HFOA,

i.e., the new level of discretion vested with the sentencing judge. "'"A party

has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it

has an adverse impact on his own rights."'" Express Enterprise, Inc. v.

Waites, 979 So.2d 754, 755 (Ala. 2007) (quoting State v. Woodruff, 460

So.2d 325, 328 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (quoting in turn Bland v. State, 395

So.2d 164, 166 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981)). Because the statute does not

adversely impact Putnam, he lacksstanding to challenge its constitutionality.

II.

Putnam also claims § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, is unconstitutional

because it violates due process.... [F]or the reasoning supplied in the

previous section, Putnam lacks the standing to challenge this statute [on due

process grounds].

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Respondents' Exhibit DD - Doc. No. 5-32 at 2-5 (footnotes omitted).

Putnam filed an application for rehearing, Respondents' Exhibit EE - Doc. No. 5-33,

which the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals overruled on July 16, 2010. Respondents'

9

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 9 of 32
Exhibit FF - Doc. No. 5-34 Putnam then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the

Alabama Supreme Court. Respondents’ Exhibit GG - Doc. No. 5-35. The Alabama

Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari and issued the certificate of

judgment on November 19, 2010. Respondents’ Exhibit II - Doc. No. 5-37.

In the instant habeas petition, Putnam challenges the constitutionality of Ala. Code

§ 13A-5-9.1 and the holdings of the state courts with respect to the identification of

inmates eligible for sentence reconsideration. Putnam acknowledges that § 13A-5-9.1

specifically addresses the retroactive application of the 2000 amendment to § 13A-5-9.

Putnam further acknowledgesthat the state courts have limited the application of § 13A-5-

9.1 to prisonerssentenced prior to May 25, 2000. Kirby, 899 So.2d at 973; Holt, 960 So.2d

at 734-735. Putnam argues, however, that this court should overrule the statute and the

decisions of the state courts "as violative of Due Process and Equal Protection."

Attachment to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief - Doc. No. 1-1 at 15. Specifically,

Putnam asserts "that to exclude him from presenting the changes in his status as an

Alabama prisoner, futuristically to the sentencing court just like those prisoners sentenced

prior to May 25, 2000 is a violation of his Equal Protection and Due Process protections

under the United States Constitution.... The appellate courts of the State of Alabama

interpretations of § 13A-5-9.1 have combined to make [the statute] unconstitutional as an

impermissible violation of the equal protection and due process provisions provided to

10

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 10 of 32
David Lee Putnam and other ... non-violent offenders[sentenced after May 25, 2000]." Id.

at 18-19.

The respondents filed answers in which they argue that Putnam is entitled to no

relief as he does not challenge the constitutionality of the basis for his current custody

which is a required element for a federal habeas petition. Respondents' Answer - Doc. No.

5 at 14-17; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added) ("[A] district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws ... of the United States."). Consequently, the respondents argue,

Putnam fails to meet the requisite elements for proceeding before this court on a habeas

corpus application and, to the extent he invokes habeas as a remedy, this case is due to be

summarily dismissed.

Assuming arguendo that the claims presented in the petition are properly before the

court for review, the respondents argue that Putnam is procedurally defaulted on his due

process claim, as he failed to present it to the state courts in accordance with the state's

procedural rules and the laststate court to rule on the claim, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals, deemed it defaulted. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144

L.Ed.2d 1 (1999); Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1140-1146 (11 Cir. 2001), cert. denied,

th

534 U.S. 1136, 122 S.Ct. 1081, 151 L.Ed.2d 982 (2002); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d

11

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 11 of 32
1043, 1065 (11 Cir. 2002); Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1254 n. 9 (11 Cir.), cert

th th

denied, 531 U.S. 1017 (2000); Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11 Cir. 1999);

th

Collier v. Jones, 901 F.2d 770, 773 (11 Cir. 1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

th

The respondents further assert that the appellate court's alternative ruling on the merits of

the due process claim does not negate the procedural default. "[A]state court need not fear

reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding. Through its very definition,

the adequate and independent state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a

state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court's judgment, even when the state

court also relies on federal law." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989) (emphasis

in original);see also Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1549-51 (11 Cir.) (where a Georgia

th

habeas corpus court found that the petitioner's claims were procedurally barred as

successive, but also noted that the claimslacked merit based on the evidence, "[t]hisruling

in the alternative did not have the effect ... of blurring the clear determination by the

[Georgia habeas corpus] court that the allegation was procedurally barred"), cert. denied,

513 U.S. 1061, 115 S.Ct. 673, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994).

With respect to Putnam's equal protection claim, the respondents contend that he is

entitled to no relief from this court as the state courts properly adjudicated this claim when

they determined Putnam had not been adversely impacted by the statue and, therefore,

lacked standing to challenge the statute. Respondents' Supplemental Answer - Doc. No.

12

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 12 of 32
8 at 6-9; Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 1852 (2003) ("A habeas

petitioner whose claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court is not entitled to relief

in federal court unless he meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)."); Williams v.

Taylor,529 U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518 (2000).

The respondents similarly assert that Putnam has failed to establish a violation of

his equal protection rights. "Putnam was originally sentenced under the current (post-2000

amendment) version of the HFOA. Thus, unlike those defendants who were sentenced to

mandatory terms of life without parole for class A felonies with three prior convictions

under the pre-2000 amendment version of the HFOA, Putnam could have been sentenced

to life or life without parole, within the discretion of the trial court, at his original

sentencing. Because Putnam wassentenced under the amended version of the HFOA [and

thereby given the benefit of its terms allowing for either a sentence of life or life without

parole], he is not in the class of persons who are eligible [under state law] to seek

reconsideration of his sentence under § 13A-5-9.1." Respondents' Supplemental Answer -

Doc. No. 8 at 8 (internal citations omitted).

The court provided Putnam an opportunity to file a response to the answers of the

respondents. In his response, Putnam requests that this court certify the issues presented

herein to the Alabama Supreme Court "for a guiding opinion." Petitioner's Response -

Doc. No. 10 at 4. Putnam argues that "to exclude all prisoners from seeking sentence

13

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 13 of 32
review pursuant to Ala. Code § 13A-5-9.1 solely on the fact their sentence occurred after

May 25th 2000 is a ground that rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of

the State's objective in decreasing prison population." Id. at 8. Putnam also arguesthat the

"underinclusiveness of himself and others similarly situated [constitutes] a suspect class,

[which] manifests a prima facie violation of the equal protection requirements." Id.

Upon review of the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, the answers of the respondents,

Putnam'sresponse to the answers, the state court record, opinionsissued by the state courts

and applicable federal law, this court finds that no evidentiary hearing is required, Rule

8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, and concludes

that the petition is due to be denied.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Due Process

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, "a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States." (emphasis added). The state courts have determined that

Putnam is not eligible for reconsideration of his sentence under Ala. Code § 13A-5-9.1 as

he was sentenced after the effective date of this code section and, therefore, received the

benefit of the original amendment to Ala. Code § 13A-5-9(c)(3) at the time of his

14

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 14 of 32
sentencing.

Putnam asserts that he has been denied due process by the decisions of the state

courts deeming him ineligible for reconsideration of his sentence, and seeks entitlement

to eligibility for sentence reconsideration. However, determination of which inmates are

eligible to seek a sentence reduction under §§ 13A-5-9(c)(3) and 13A-5-9.1 "is purely a

question of state law, and, as such, provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief. See

Carrizales [v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1055 ((11 Cir.1983)]." Curry v. Culliver, 141

th

Fed.Appx. 832, 834 ((11 Cir. 2005).

th

B. Equal Protection - Adjudication by the State Court

The instant petition for federal habeas relief is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as

amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ["AEDPA"]. "A habeas

petitioner whose claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court is not entitled to relief

in federal court unless he meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)." Price, 538 U.S.

634, 638, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 1852; Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518. Under

the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in

state court, federal habeas relief from a state court judgment may not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

15

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 15 of 32
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

In Williams, the Supreme Court held:

Under the "contrary to" clause a federal court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable

application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court identifiesthe correct governing legal principle

from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

529 U.S. at 412-413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523.

It is clear that "§ 2254(d)(1)'s 'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses

have independent meaning. 529 U.S., at 404–405, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A federal habeas court

may issue the writ under the 'contrary to' clause if the state court applies a rule different

from the governing law set forth in [United States Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides

a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Id., at 405–406, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The [district] court may grant

relief under the 'unreasonable application' clause if the state court correctly identifies the

governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to

the facts of the particular case. Id., at 407–408, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The focus of the latter

inquiry is on whether the state courts application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams that an unreasonable application is

16

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 16 of 32
different from an incorrect one. Id., at 409–410, 120 S.Ct. 1495. See also id., at 411, 120

S.Ct. 1495 (a federal habeas court may not issue a writ under the unreasonable application

clause 'simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly')."

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002); Windom v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 578

F.3d 1227 (11 Cir. 2009) ("A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal

th

law if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases

or confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court

precedent and arrives at a result opposite to the Court's.") (quotation and other marks

omitted); Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1522 ("Under § 2254(d)(1)'s

'unreasonable application' clause, ... a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable."); Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11 Cir.

th

2001) ("A state court conducts an 'unreasonable application' of clearly established federal

law if it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably

applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case.").

The Supreme Court has held "that a decision by a state court is 'contrary to' ...

clearly established [Supreme Court] law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing

17

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 17 of 32
law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless

arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.' Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed. 2d 389 (2000)." Price, 538 U.S. at 640, 123 S.Ct.

at 1853. Additionally, federal review in a habeas action "is limited to whether the state

court's decision was objectively unreasonable in the light of clearly established federal law.

Williams, [529 U.S. at 409],120 S.Ct. at 1521." Hawkins v. Alabama, 318 F.3d 1302, 1310

(11 Cir. 2003); Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835 (11 Cir. 2001), citing Williams,supra

th th

("[F]ederal habeas relief [is] available under the 'unreasonable application' standard only

if the state court's application of clearly established federal law was 'objectively

unreasonable.'"). Thus, a federal court is not to decide "the correctness per se ... of the

state court decision" but only the "objective reasonableness" of such decision. Brown v.

Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11 Cir. 2001). Moreover, "an unreasonable application of

th

federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Williams, 529 U.S.

at 410, 120 S.Ct. at 1522 (emphasisin original). "Clearly established federal law is not the

law of the lower federal courts, including this court. Instead, in the habeas context, clearly

established federal law 'refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme

Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state court decision.' Williams, 529 U.S.

at 412, 120 S.Ct. at 1523." Putman, 268 F.3d at 1241 (emphasis in original, quoting

18

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 18 of 32
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412). The reviewing court "must determine what arguments or

theories supported or ... could have supported[] the state court's decision; and then it must

ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories

are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). "In order to merit AEDPA deference the state

court need not expressly identify Supreme Court precedent, nor make a perfect statement

of the applicable rule of law, nor provide a detailed opinion covering each aspect of the

petitioner's argument." Smith v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 572 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11

th

Cir. 2009). Habeas relief is granted sparingly, reserved for "'extreme malfunctions in the

state criminal justice systems'" and "not as a means of error correction." Greene v. Fisher,

__ U.S.__, __, 132 S.Ct. 38, 43 (2011) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct. at

786.) "The usual 'presumption that state courts know and follow the law' is even stronger

in the AEDPA context because §2254(d)'s'highly deferentialstandard for evaluating statecourt rulings ... demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.' 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 360, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002)

(internal citation omitted)." Allen v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 611 F.3d

740, 748 (11 Cir. 2010). Asthe Supreme Court has reminded courts, "[i]t bears repeating

th

that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was

unreasonable.... [Section 2254(d)] preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where

19

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 19 of 32
there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision

conflicts with this Court's precedents. It goes no farther." Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___,

131 S.Ct. at 786.

Federal district courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court

based its findings on "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court's

determinations of fact shall be "presumed to be correct," and the habeas petitioner "shall

have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). However, even when the state court addresses a

question of law, this court is not authorized "to evaluate [a petitioner's] claim de novo

rather than through the lens of § 2254(d)." Price, 538 U.S. at 639, 123 S.Ct. at 1852. The

Supreme Court admonishes that such de novo evaluation "exceeds the limits imposed on

federal habeas review by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)...." 538 U.S. at 636, 123 S.Ct. at 1851.

Asis clear fromthe foregoing, a federal "district court'sreview ... [of claims decided

by the state courts] is greatly circumscribed and highly deferential to the state courts."

Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11 Cir. 2007). The AEDPA "modified a federal

th

habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal

habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent

possible under law." Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.

20

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 20 of 32
Putnam maintains that the state courts' interpretation of Ala. Code § 13A-5-9.1 that

only non-violent inmates convicted prior to May 25, 2000 are permitted to file motions for

reconsideration have rendered the statute "unconstitutional as applied to Putnam" because

due to the date of his conviction he has been denied the right to seek reconsideration of his

sentence. Attachment to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief - Doc. No. 1-1 at

3-5. Putnam asserts that the holdings of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and

Alabama Supreme Court authorizing "non-violent inmatessentenced before May 25, 2000,

to submit successive petitions under § 13A-5-9.1 for review of their life sentences," while

denying this opportunity to inmates sentenced after May 25, 2000, "have set up a system

which treats a class of non-violent inmateslike Putnam, who are also serving a life without

possibility of parole, differently based on nothing more than the date on which they were

sentenced." Id. at 3-4. The state courts "have set up a procedure which allows one class

of convicted nonviolent offendersto (a) petition the trial court numeroustimesfor a review

of theirsentences and (b) to have their post-conviction prison behavior considered as a part

of that review; whereas another class, to which Putnam belongs, may not." Id. at 4. The

"interpretation[s] of the statute have made it become an unconstitutional violation of the

equal protection and due process provisions" of the Constitution. Id. at 5.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Putnam lacked standing

to challenge the constitutionality of § 13A-5-9.1 as the statute had no adverse impact on

21

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 21 of 32
him "because he has already been conferred the benefit of the 2000 amendment to the

HFOA." Respondents' Exhibit DD - Doc. No. 5-32 at 4-5. The clearly established federal

law addressing standing to challenge the constitutionality of a stature isset forth in County

Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). In Allen, the Court determined

that "[a] party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it

has an adverse impact on his own rights. " Id. at 154-155. With respect to claims attacking

criminalsentencing statutes, "a defendant does not have standing to mount a constitutional

challenge to the application of a statute, if that application did not adversely affect his

sentence -- that is, cause his sentencing outcome...." United States v. Ramos, 695 F.3d

1035, 1047 (10 Cir. 2012); United States v. Mendes, 912 F.2d 434, 438 (10 Cir. 1990)

th th

(where alleged facts utilized to attack sentencing statute did not reflect facts of defendant's

case he "lack[ed]standing to challenge the facial validity of" the sentencing statute at issue

because purported constitutional defect in statute did not adversely impact his own rights);

United States v. Gray, 577 F.3d 947, 950-951 (8 Cir. 2009) (Where defendant's sentence

th

is unaffected by sentencing statute under attack, defendant "lacksstanding to challenge the

constitutionality of the statute."); United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 122 (1 Cir.

st

2001) ("The principal problem with the appellant's thesis is that she lacks standing to

mount the challenge. Her sentence was not premised on the [challenged sentencing

provision]...."; United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9 Cir. 1989) (Defendants

th

22

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 22 of 32
not affected by the provision of the statute at issue "lack standing to challenge that aspect

of [the statute]."); United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 705 (8 Cir. 2010) ("Because [the

th

defendant's] sentence was unaffected by [challenged sentencing provision], ... [he] lacks

standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.").

1. Facially DiscrminatoryNature of the Statute. Section 13A-5-9.1 of the Alabama

Code, by its very terms, permits only retroactive application of the amended provisions of

Ala. Code §13A-5-9. Putnam argues that the statute's categorical exclusion of inmates

sentenced after enactment of the HFOA from eligibility for sentence reduction violates his

equal protection rights.

Section 13A-5-9.1 does not apply to a suspect or quasi-suspect class, nor does it

involve a fundamental right. United States v. Speed, 656 F.3d 714, 720 (7 Cir. 2011) (no

th

fundamental right or suspect class at issue where petitioner challenged differentiation of

sentences provided to inmates based on the date of their sentences, i.e. those sentenced

before enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act and those sentenced after its enactment);

Foster v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 878 F.2d 1233, 1235 (9

th

1989) ("There is no denial of equal protection in having persons sentenced under one

system for crimes committed before [the effective date of a change in sentencing

parameters] and another class of persons sentenced under a different system. See Frazier

v. Manson, 703 F.2d 30, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 934, 104 S.Ct. 339, 78 L.Ed.2d

23

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 23 of 32
308 (1983). The standard is of a rational relationship to governmental purpose. Schweiker

v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1080, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981)."). Putnam

"has not alleged a denial of equal protection based upon his membership in any suspect

class; he has alleged denial based upon his membership in the class consisting of

[Alabama]state prisonerssentenced [afterthe effective date ofthe sentencing amendment].

The alleged constitutional inequality derives from the necessarily bifurcated nature of [the

State's]sentencing systemfollowing enactment of the [amendment to the HFOA]. [Federal

courts] apply the rational-basis review to this type of equal-protection claim." McQueary

v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834, n.6 (9 Cir. 1991).

th

Under these circumstances,

the question of whether the [challenged statute] violates equal protection is

subject to rational basis review. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S.

450, 457-58, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 2487, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988). Rational basis

review in equal protection analysis "is not a license for courts to judge the

wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." FCC v. Beach Commc'ns,

Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2100-01, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993);

see also Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11 Cir. 1995). Nor does

th

it authorize "the judiciary [to] sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom

or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither

affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines." City of New

Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511

(1976). Policy determinations "cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection

Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment

and some legitimate governmental purpose." .... [T]he policy determination

"must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably

conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the

classification." Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. at 2101. For

these reasons the [statute] is accorded a strong presumption of validity.

24

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 24 of 32
Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1363 (11 Cir. 2008).

th

Section 13A-5-9.1 allows a trial court, in its discretion, "to decide in certain

circumstances whether a sentence of life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole [imposed prior to the 2000 amendment to the HFOA] is appropriate

for a particular inmate." Kirby, 899 So.2d at 973. This authority is accorded the state's

trial judges by the legislature in an effort to determine whether a sentence of life or life

without parole is unduly harsh under the circumstances relevant to the eligible inmate's

underlying conviction. "If a circuit court determines that an inmate is eligible for

reconsideration of his or her sentence, the court then hasthe authority pursuant to § 13A-5-

9.1 to resentence the inmate, within the bounds of § 13A-5-9(c)(2) or § 13A-5-9(c)(3), as

amended, if itso chooses. If, on the other hand, the circuit court determinesthat the inmate

fails to meet any or all of the eligibility requirements, then the circuit court must deny the

inmate's § 13A-5-9.1 motion because a circuit court has jurisdiction to resentence only

those inmates who meet [all of] the eligibility requirements of § 13A-5-9.1...." Holt, 960

So.2d at 735.

The eligibility requirements attendant to sentence reduction are rationally related to

the state'sinterest of ensuring equitable sentencesforthose nonviolent offenderssentenced

before the May 25, 2000, amendment to the HFOA who received mandatory sentences of

either life imprisonment upon conviction of a Class B felony or life imprisonment without

25

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 25 of 32
parole upon conviction of a Class A felony. Disparity of treatment among inmates based

on the date of imposition of sentence occurring due to an intervening change in the law

with respect to available sentences "is plainly rational, as 'discrepancies among prisoners

who committed similar crimes are inescapable whenever [the legislature] raises or lowers

the penalties for an offense.' United States v. Goncalves, 642 F.3d 245, 253 (1 Cir.

st

2011)." Speed, 656 F.3d at 720; Foster, 878 F.2d at 1235 ("Improvement in sentencing is

rational governmental purpose. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647,

102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989)."). Consequently, the statute's denial of eligibility for sentence

reductions to convicted habitual felons like Putnam who received the benefit of the 2000

amendment to the HFOA at the time of sentencing does not violate the Equal Protection

Clause. Houston, 547 F.3d at 1364; Foster, 878 F.2d at 1235; McQueary, 924 F.2d at 834.

Moreover, it is clear that § 13A-5-9.1 did not have any adverse impact on the sentence

imposed upon Putnam as the trial judge specifically stated that he chose to sentence

Putnam to life imprisonment without parole due to Putnam's extensive criminal history.

Respondents' Exhibit A (Part 3) - Court Doc. No. 5-3 at 86-87.

2. Application of the Statute as Violating Equal Protection."There are three

requirements for eligibility to have a sentence reconsidered under § 13A-5-9.1: (1) the

inmate was sentenced before May 25, 2000, the date the 2000 amendment to the HFOA

became effective;(2) the inmate wassentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility

26

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 26 of 32
of parole pursuant to § 13A-5-9(c)(3) and had no prior Class A felony convictions or was

sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to § 13A-5-9(c)(2)...; and (3) the inmate is a

'nonviolent convicted offender.' An inmate must satisfy all three requirements before he

or she is eligible for reconsideration of sentence under § 13A-5-9.1." Holt v. State, 960

So.2d 726, 734-735 (Ala.Crim.App. 2006). Putnam contends that he is a non-violent

offender and denying him eligibility to seek reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 deprives

him of equal protection because non-violent offenders sentenced prior to May 25, 2000,

are permitted to seek reconsideration of their sentences, whereas he is not provided this

opportunity.

In order to establish a claim cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause, "a

prisoner must[at a minimum] demonstrate that (1) he issimilarly situated to other prisoners

who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious

discrimination against him based on race, religion, national origin, or some other

constitutionally protected basis. Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11 Cir. 2001);

th

Damiano v. Florida Parole and Prob. Comm'n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11 Cir. 1986)."

th

Sweet v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-1319 (11 Cir. 2006).

th

[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in

a ... disproportionate impact.... Proof of ... discriminatory intent or purpose

is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Discriminatory purpose ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as

awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker ... selected ...

a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite

27

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 27 of 32
of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.

Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote

and citation omitted); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991).

Evidence which merely indicates disparity of treatment or even arbitrary administration of

state powers, rather than instances of purposeful or invidious discrimination, isinsufficient

to show discriminatory intent. McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95

L.Ed.2d 262 (1987).

Putnam argues that because habitual offenders with no prior Class A felonies

sentenced to life imprisonment without parole before enactment of the May 25, 2000,

amendment to the HFOA are allowed to seek reconsideration of their sentences the denial

of eligibility to him for this same treatment is violative of his equal protection rights.

However, Putnam is not similarly situated to persons sentenced under the old provisions

of the HFOA. Murray v. Crowley, 913 F.2d 832, 834 (10 Cir. 1990) (An inmate convicted

th

under statute effective at the time of his offense "is not similarly situated to persons

convicted under" a different statute in effect at the time of their offenses.); United States

ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Parole & Pardon Board, 669 F.2d 1185 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 459 th

U.S. 1048, 103 S.Ct. 468, 74 L.Ed.2d 617 (1982) ("States are certainly free to amend their

sentencing laws and, having done so, they are not required to apply them retroactively to

persons who have been validly sentenced under the law as it previously existed.... Having

28

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 28 of 32
been properly sentenced under the law as it existed at the time of his conviction, [the

inmate] is not entitled to modification at thistime."); Ex parte Zimmerman, 838 So.2d 408,

411 (Ala. 2002) ("[T]he amendatory act, by mandating that its benefits apply only to those

whose sentences were not final on May 25, 2000, created two classes, thereby negating any

possibility of its subjects being persons in like situations"). Thus, "[Putnam's] equal

protection claim necessarily fails first because he has not shown that he was treated

differently from other, similarly situated prisoners." Sweet, 467 F.3d at 1319.

Moreover, Putnam concedes that the differential treatment is based on the date of

his sentence, not on any constitutionally protected interest. Putnam's claim of an equal

protection violation regarding application of the Habitual Felony Offender Act therefore

likewise

fails because he has not alleged, let alone established, that he was treated

differently on account of some form of invidious discrimination tied to a

constitutionally protected interest. He has not even claimed that he was

treated differently from others because of race, religion, or national origin

[and actually concedes such is not the case]. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321

U.S. 1, 8, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944) ("The unlawful administration

... of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to

those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection

unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or

purposeful discrimination."); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835 (9

th

Cir.1991) (rejecting a claim that a state prisoner's equal protection rights

were violated because he received a longer sentence than some other

prisoners and holding that "a mere demonstration of inequality is not enough;

the Constitution does not require identical treatment. There must be an

allegation of invidiousness or illegitimacy in the statutory scheme before a

cognizable claim arises: it is a settled rule that the Fourteenth Amendment

29

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 29 of 32
guarantees equal laws, not equal results." (internal quotation marks

omitted)); see also Cruz v. Skelton, 543 F.2d 86, 92-93 (5 Cir.1976)

th

(affirming dismissal of prisoner's equal protection claim because there was

no allegation of "'invidious discrimination' based on such considerations as

race, religion, national origin, or poverty"). Simply put, [Putnam] has not

established that he was treated differently from similarly situated prisoners

or that he was treated differently on account of invidious discrimination.

Sweet, 467 F.3d at 1319 (emphasisin original). Putnamhastherefore not been denied equal

protection of the law with respect his lack of eligibility for sentence reconsideration under

Ala. Code § 13A-5-9.1. In addition, as the court previously observed, supra at 26, the

statute at issue did not have any impact, adverse or otherwise, on the sentence imposed

upon Putnam.

3. State Court Determinations. This court has undertaken a thorough review of the

opinions issued by the state courts and controlling federal law. After such review, it is

clear that the state courts did not decide Putnam's equal protection claim "differently than

[the Supreme] Court has [in a case based] on a set a of materially indistinguishable facts"

nor did the state courts apply a rule that contradicts governing federal law. Williams, 362

U.S. at 412. Consequently, the state courts' rejection of Putnam's challenge based on an

alleged violation of his equal protection rights was not contrary to actual Supreme Court

decisions or violative of clearly established federal law. In addition, under the

circumstances of this case, it is clear that the decisions issued by the state courts were

objectively reasonable and constituted a reasonable determination of the facts in light of

30

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 30 of 32
the evidence before the courts. Thus, Putnam is not entitled to federal habeasrelief for any

purported violation of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief filed by David Lee

Putnam be DENIED.

2. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before October 16, 2014 the parties may file objectionsto the

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’sRecommendation to which the partyis objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

31

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 31 of 32
Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

th

33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en

th th

banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 2nd day of October, 2014.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

32

Case 1:11-cv-00965-WHA-SRW Document 13 Filed 10/02/14 Page 32 of 32