Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00666/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00666-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

LARRY GWEN COKER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 4:15-cv-666-LSC-TMP

)

CHRISTOPHER GORDY, )

Warden, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The magistrate judge filed his Report and Recommendation in this matter on 

March 17, 2016, recommending that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be 

denied and dismissed with prejudice as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In

doing so, the magistrate judge noted that “petitioner has neither argued that he is 

entitled to equitable tolling nor asserted any facts that might give rise to the 

application of equitable tolling.” (Doc. 18, p. 7). The magistrate judge also noted 

that, even if not time-barred, the claims in the petition are procedurally defaulted 

because petitioner did not seek review in the Alabama Supreme Court, as required 

by O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999). 

(Doc. 18, at fn. 5). On March 29, 2016, the petitioner, Larry Gwen Coker, filed his 

FILED

 2016 Apr-20 AM 10:07

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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timely objections to the report and recommendation, contending that he is entitled 

to equitable tolling of the one-year time limitation because he suffered a serious 

illness during a portion of that time. On April 6, 2016, petitioner filed 

“supplemental discovery,” which will be treated by the court as supplementing his 

objections to the report and recommendation.

Petitioner does not appear to dispute the magistrate judge’s account of the 

procedural history of the conviction at issue. The magistrate judge reported:

On June 26, 2008, petitioner, who was previously convicted of a sex 

crime, was convicted after a jury trial in the Circuit Court of St. Clair 

County, Alabama, on one count of violation of Alabama's Community 

Notification Act, one count of failure to register as a sex offender with 

the St. Clair County Sheriff, and one count of possession of a motor 

vehicle with an obscured VIN number. [(Doc. 8-1)].

1

 He was 

sentenced as a habitual felony offender on October 14, 2008, to 

concurrent terms of 25 years in prison. He appealed, and the Alabama 

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction by unpublished 

memorandum opinion dated July 31, 2009. He did not seek rehearing 

and did not seek review in the Alabama Supreme Court. The 

appellate court issued a certificate of judgment on August 19, 2009. 

On July 29, 2010, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. (Doc. 8-6). The 

trial court denied the petition on September 22, 2010, and he did not 

appeal. 

The magistrate judge pointed out that petitioner’s conviction became final on 

August 19, 2009, as he was not entitled to additional time to seek review in the 

 

1 There was a typographical error in the report and recommendation that referred to 

“Doc. 801,” when it should have read “Doc. 8-1.”

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United States Supreme Court because he failed to seek review in the state court of 

last resort, the Alabama Supreme Court. See Pugh v. Smith, 465 F.3d 1295, 1299 

(11th Cir. 2006), Spencer v. Price, 2008 WL 2476764 (S.D. Ala. June 18, 2008). 

He observed that when petitioner filed his first Rule 32 petition on July 29, 2010, 

tolling the running of the one-year limitation at that time, there were only 21 days 

remaining in the period. The § 2244(d) limitation began running again on 

September 23, 2010, after the state trial court denied the Rule 32 petition and 

petitioner did not appeal from the denial. When the remaining 21 days expired, the 

federal habeas petition became time-barred on October 13, 2010.

Petitioner’s objections argue that the magistrate judge erred by not giving 

the petitioner the benefit of equitable tolling of the one-year limitation. The 

Supreme Court recognizes that the time limitation of § 2244(d) can be equitably 

tolled. The Court has explained: “We have previously made clear that a 

‘petitioner’ is ‘entitled to equitable tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood 

in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 

130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562, 177 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2010), citing Pace [v. DiGuglielmo], 

544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 161 L. Ed. 2d 669 (2005); see also Cadet v. 

Florida Dep't of Corr., 742 F.3d 473, 477 (11th Cir. 2014). As explained below, 

there are at least three reasons why equitable tolling is not available to petitioner in 

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this case.

First, petitioner did not raise or argue the question of equitable tolling before 

the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge correctly pointed out that, despite 

respondents’ explicit reliance on the time bar, petitioner did not attempt to argue 

his illness (or anything else) as the basis for equitable tolling. The court declines 

to address an argument not made to the magistrate judge. See Williams v. McNeil, 

557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A] district court has discretion to decline 

to consider a party's argument when that argument was not first presented to the 

magistrate judge.’).

Second, even if the court were to consider the petitioner’s equitable tolling 

argument, it fails both requirements of the Holland test. As to the first 

requirement, Petitioner was not diligent in pursuing his claims, as indicated by 

both his failure to seek certiorari review on direct appeal and his failure to appeal 

the denial of his Rule 32 petition. Not only were these procedural defaults, which 

of themselves bar consideration of the merits of the petition, they demonstrate a 

lack of diligence during time periods for which petitioner offers no excuse. To be 

diligent in pursuing his rights, Petitioner was required to follow through on the 

opportunities presented to him for litigating these claims. He did not do so.

Third, although petitioner’s illness was an extraordinary circumstance

beyond his control, it did not prevent him from timely filing his habeas petition. 

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According to the medical records submitted by petitioner as an exhibit to his 

objections, he had a routine physical in April 2010, which uncovered an elevated 

PSA (Prostate Specific Antigen), sometimes indicative of prostate cancer. On 

October 25, 2010, petitioner underwent a prostate biopsy. He developed an 

infection from the biopsy that resulted in his being hospitalized on November 16, 

2010, in grave condition with severe sepsis, shock, and acute renal failure. He 

recovered with treatment and was returned to the infirmary at Limestone 

Correctional Facility on November 24, 2010, where he remained for two more 

weeks. In February 2011, petitioner had cryosurgery to remove the cancer from 

his prostate.

It is obvious from this timeline that the one-year deadline for filing a habeas

petition expired before plaintiff suffered the sepsis and renal failure, which the 

court agrees were clearly extraordinary circumstances beyond his control. But the 

circumstances of his illness did not prevent him from filing a timely petition, 

which should have been filed by no later than October 13, 2010. If petitioner was 

going to file a timely habeas petition, he had to do so by October 13, a date well 

before he even had the prostate biopsy on October 25, much less the date it 

developed into a serious and debilitating infection on November 16, 2010. In 

short, the infection—serious as it was—occurred after the time deadline for filing 

his habeas expired and, therefore, did not “prevent[] timely filing” of the petition. 

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Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562, 177 L. Ed. 2d 130 

(2010).

Because petitioner is not shown entitlement to equitable tolling of the time 

period mandated by § 2244(d), the court will enter a separate order overruling his 

objections and adopting and accepting the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation. His petition will be dismissed as time-barred.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of the foregoing to the petitioner.

DONE and ORDERED on April 20, 2016.

_____________________________

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

160704

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