Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00900/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00900-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JEFFREY WAYNE TAYLOR, #216752, )

)

 Petitioner, )

)

 v. ) CASE NO. 2:09-CV-900-WKW

) [WO]

)

LOUIS BOYD, et al., )

)

 Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief

filed by Jeffrey Wayne Taylor [“Taylor”], a state inmate, on September 20, 2009. In this 1

petition, Taylor challenges convictions for second degree burglary, second degree theft of

property (3 counts), unlawful breaking and entering a vehicle (2 counts), third degree

burglary and third degree theft of property imposed upon him on April 17, 2007 in case

number CC-07-76 by the Circuit Court of Elmore County, Alabama. Taylor did not appeal 2

The Clerk stamped the petition “received” on September 22, 2009. However, the law is well settled 1

that a pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston

v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999);

Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1993). Taylor certified he placed the petition in the prison

mailing system on September 20, 2009. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief (Doc. No. 1) at 15. In light

of the foregoing and for purposes of the proceedings herein, the court considers September 20, 2009 as the

date of filing.

In the response filed on October 28, 2009 (Doc. No. 9), Taylor clarifies all of the convictions 2

challenged in this federal habeas action appear under Elmore County criminal case number CC-07-76. 

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any of these convictions and the convictions therefore became final by operation of law on

May 29, 2007.

Pursuant to the orders of this court, the respondents filed an answer in which they

argue the instant federal habeas petition is barred by the one-year period of limitation

applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The respondents contend 3

that because Taylor’s burglary, theft and unlawful breaking/entering convictions became

final in 2007 -- after the effective date of the statute of limitations -- Taylor must have filed

his § 2254 petition within a year of the convictions becoming final, exclusive of the time that

any properly filed state post-conviction action related to the convictions remained pending

in the state courts. The respondents acknowledge Taylor filed a state post-conviction petition

in the Circuit Court of Elmore County, Alabama on March 22, 2009. However, they argue 4

this state petition did not toll the one-year period of limitation because it was filed after

expiration of the federal limitation period and, hence, was not “pending” as required by the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for purposes of tolling the requisite time period. 

Subsection (d) was added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the 3

“AEDPA”). This Act became effective on April 24, 1996.

The Rule 32 petition establishes that Taylor certified execution of the petition on March 22, 2009. 

4

Resp’t’s Ex. J(Doc. No. 7-11) at 9. As previously noted, a pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed in federal

cases the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston, 487 U.S. at 271-72. “Alabama courts

have [adopted the mailbox rule and] held that a pro se incarcerated petitioner/appellant is considered to have

‘filed’ a Rule 32 petition, a notice of appeal, or a petition for a writ of certiorari when those documents are

given to prison officials for mailing.” Ex parte Allen, 825 So.2d 271, 272 (Ala. 2002); Holland v. State, 621

So.2d 373, 375 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (“[A] pro se incarcerated petitioner ‘files’ a Rule 32 petition when

he hands the petition over to prison authorities for mailing.”). Consequently, the prison mailbox rule applies

to pro se Rule 32 petitions filed in the state courts of Alabama and March 22, 2009 is therefore the

appropriate date of filing for Taylor’s Rule 32 petition. 

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Resp’ts’ Answer (Doc. No. 7) at 5-6; Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.

2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991 (2000) (“[E]ven ‘properly filed’ state-court petitions must

be ‘pending’ [during the one-year period of limitation] in order to toll the limitations period. 

A state court petition . . . that is filed following the expiration of the limitations period cannot

toll that period because there is no period remaining to be tolled.”); Moore v. Crosby, 321

F.3d 1377, 1381 (11th Cir. 2003) (“While a ‘properly filed’ application for post-conviction

relief tolls the statute of limitations, it does not reset or restart the statute of limitations once

the limitations period has expired. In other words, the tolling provision does not operate to

revive the one-year limitations period if such period has expired.”); Tinker v. Moore, 255

F.3d 1331, 1335 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A] properly filed petition in state court only tolls the

time remaining within the federal limitation period.”). Thus, the respondentsmaintain Taylor

had until May 30, 2008 “- one year after his time for taking a direct appeal from [the]

judgment[s] lapsed - to file a § 2254 habeas petition . . . [and] because Taylor did not file the

petition until September 20, 2009, nearly sixteen months after his time for filing expired, his

petition is untimely . . . .” Resp’t’s Answer (Doc. No. 7) at 4. 

Based on the foregoing, the court entered an order advising Taylor he failed to file his

federal habeas petition within the one-year limitation period established by 28 U.S.C. §

2241(d)(1). Order of October 29, 2009 (Doc. No. 10). This order also provided Taylor an

opportunity to show cause why his habeas petition should not be barred from review by this

court as untimely filed. Id. at 5. In response to this order, Taylor asserts he is entitled to

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equitable tolling due to his use of prescription medication which has adversely affected his

mental competency. Pet’r’s December 3, 2009 Resp. (Doc. No. 11) at 1. 

Upon review of the pleadings filed by the parties, the undisputed state court record

and applicable federal law, the court determines no evidentiaryhearing is required, Rule 8(a),

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, and concludes the

present habeas petition is due to be denied as Taylor failed to file the petition within the

applicable one-year period of limitation. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Federal Period of Limitation

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 became effective on

April 24, 1996 and amended the habeas corpus statute to include a one-year period of

limitation on petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This limitation period is codified

at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and provides that:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under

this subsection.

The statute clearly directs that the limitation period for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition begins to run at the conclusion of direct review or upon expiration of the time for

seeking direct review, whichever is later. Where a petitioner preserves his right to file a 

petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, the statute of limitations

is tolled during the ninety-day period in which such action may be undertaken. Coates v.

Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A judgment does not become ‘final by the conclusion

of direct review or by the expiration of the time for seeking such review,’ see 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A), until the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to review the case or the time

for seeking review has expired.”). Accordingly, a state court judgment of conviction

becomes final under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 when the Supreme Court denies certiorari or the time

to apply for certiorari expires. Id.

On April 17, 2007, Taylor entered guilty pleas before the Circuit Court of Elmore

County, Alabama to second degree burglary, second degree theft of property (3 counts),

unlawful breaking and entering a vehicle (2 counts), third degree burglary and third degree

theft of property. Resp’ts’ Ex. A (Doc. No. 7-1) at 2. The court immediately imposed

sentences upon Taylor for these convictions. Id. Taylor did not file a direct appeal. Since

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Taylor failed to undertake the direct appeal process in accordance with applicable procedural

rules, he could not petition the United States Supreme Court for review of his convictions. 

By operation of law, the challenged Elmore County convictions became final on May 29,

2007 -- forty-two (42) days after imposition of the convictions as this is the date on which

Taylor’s time to seek direct review expired. Ala. R. App. P. 4(b)(1). The one-year limitation

period contained in section 2244(d)(1)(A) therefore began to run on May 30, 2007. 

5

B. Statutory Tolling

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

section.” It is undisputed that Taylor failed to properly file any application for postconviction relief or collateral review in the state courts challenging his convictions for 

second degree burglary, second degree theft of property (3 counts), unlawful breaking and

entering a vehicle (2 counts), third degree burglary and third degree theft of property. Thus,

Taylor is not entitled to statutory tolling of the limitation period.

C. Equitable Tolling

Case law directs that the limitation period “may be equitably tolled” on grounds apart

from those specified in the habeas statute “when a movant untimely files because of

In computing the federal period of limitation, “exclude the day of the event that triggers the 5

period[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(A). 

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extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable with

diligence.” Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Steed

v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000); Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11th

Cir. 2002). “Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will

only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it

impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. United States District Court, 128 F.3d

1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997). Such tolling applies only in truly extraordinary circumstances. 

Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (11th Cir. 2002); Drew v. Dep’t of Corr., 297

F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002). “The burden of establishing entitlement to this

extraordinary remedy plainly rests with the petitioner.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286; see Helton

v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535

U.S. 1080 (2002).

In an effort to secure equitable tolling, Taylor alleges he is not mentally competent

because of prescription medication utilized in the treatment of his mental health. Pet’r’s

December 3, 2009 Resp. (Doc. No. 11) at 1. This claim, however, does not justify equitable

tolling of the limitation period as Taylor has failed to present any evidence of actual

incompetence nor has he established a causal connection between his alleged mental

incompetence and his ability to file a timely federal habeas petition. Lawrence v. Florida,

421 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005); Bilbrey v. Douglas, 124 F. App’x. 971, 973 (6th Cir.

2005) (equitable tolling not applicable because petitioner “failed to establish a causal

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connection between her mental condition and her ability to file a timely petition”); Green v.

Hinsley, 116 F. App’x. 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (equitable tolling did not apply because

petitioner failed to submit evidence of how his low IQ would render him incompetent or

prevent himfromtimely filing his petition); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1145 (10th Cir.

2001) (petitioner’s mere allegations of incompetency did not suffice to warrant equitable

tolling of the limitations period). A petitioner must make a threshold showing of

incompetence, see Calderon v. United States District Court for the Central District of

California, 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and demonstrate that the asserted

incompetence affected his ability to file a timely habeas petition. Miller v. New Jersey State

Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998). Thus, the mere fact Taylor complains he

suffers from a mental impairment, without more, is insufficient to justify equitable tolling. 

Lawrence, 421 F.3d at 1227; Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 371 (3d Cir. 2000) (mental

incompetence, standing alone, not sufficient reason to toll limitation period). 

Other than his suppositious and wholly self-serving allegation of mental

incompetence, Taylor presents nothing to this court which indicates that his use of

prescription medication rendered himincompetent orincapable of preparing a habeas petition

at any time during the running of the limitation period; rather, the evidentiary materials filed

herein demonstrate otherwise. Specifically, the records of this court demonstrate that Taylor

filed both a state post-conviction petition challenging his Elmore Countyconvictions and this

federal habeas petition each while proceeding pro se. In light of the foregoing, the court

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concludes Taylor has failed to demonstrate that his mental health status in any way adversely

affected his ability to file a timely federal habeas petition. Consequently, equitable tolling

is not warranted due to Taylor’s alleged mental incompetence.

To the extent Taylor argues equitable tolling should be awarded to him because of his

pro se status and lack of legal knowledge, he is entitled to no relief from this court. The law

is well settled that an inmate’s lack of legal knowledge, his failure to understand legal

principles and/or the inability to recognize potential claims for relief at an earlier juncture,

do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling of the

federal limitation period. United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004) (pro se

status and ignorance of the law do not justify equitable tolling); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231

F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 863 (2001) (lack of legal knowledge

or legal resources, even in a case involving a pro se inmate, does not warrant equitable

tolling); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1194

(2001) (petitioner’s pro se status and ignorance of the law are insufficient to support

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations); Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir.

1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000) (ignorance of the law and pro se status do not

constitute “rare and exceptional” circumstances justifying equitable tolling); Smith v.

McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000) (petitioner’s pro se

status throughout majority of limitation period does not merit equitable tolling); Turner v.

Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007 (1999) (unfamiliaritywith

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the legal process during the applicable filing period did not merit equitable tolling);

Wakefield v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 131 F.3d 967, 969 (11th Cir. 1997) (an individual’s ignorance of

the law “is not a factor that can warrant equitable tolling.”). 

D. Expiration of the Limitation Period

Based on the foregoing analyses, the court concludes that Taylor has failed to present

any credible basis for either statutory or equitable tolling of the one-year federal period of

limitation. The limitation period therefore began to run on May 30, 2007 and ran

uninterrupted without either statutory or equitable tolling until its expiration on May 30,

2008. Taylor filed the instant petition for federal habeas relief on September 20, 2009, over

a year and three months after expiration of the federal limitation period. Taylor has failed

to demonstrate that this federal habeas petition should not be dismissed as untimely filed. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The petition for habeas relief filed by JeffreyWayne Taylor on September 20, 2009

be denied as it was not filed within the one-year period of limitation mandated by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1); and 

2. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before December 2, 2011, the parties may file objections to the

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Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that

this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33

(11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en

banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).

Done this 18th day of November, 2011.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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