Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00255/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00255-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODERICK BRYAN RUSSELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. K. TOOR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00255-SAB-PC

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, 

FOR FAILURE TO ACTION FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c).1 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff‟s second amended complaint, filed on March 22, 

2016. (ECF No. 13.)

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 

that “seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

 

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Plaintiff filed a consent to proceed before a magistrate judge on March 2, 2015. (ECF No. 4.) 

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1915(e)(2)(B).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s rights. Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.2002). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)(citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff‟s claims must be 

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are „merely consistent with‟ a defendant‟s 

liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969. 

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff, formerly incarcerated at Valley State Prison, brings this action against 

Defendants Dr. Toor, Dr. Woodward, Dr. Malakkla, an Dr. Shwe, physicians employed by the 

CDCR at Valley State Prison. 

In the March 22, 2016, second amended complaint, Plaintiff fails to cure the defects 

identified by the Court in the order dismissing the first amended complaint. The second 

amended complaint is more vague than the first amended complaint. The only allegation as to 

Dr. Toor is Plaintiff‟s conclusory statement that Dr. Toor “violated my civil rights by being 

deliberately indifferent by removing me from my then pain medication which provided much 

relief for my injuries on record.” (ECF No. 13 at p. 4.) 

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Plaintiff similarly fails to allege specific facts regarding Defendant Woodward‟s conduct. 

Plaintiff asserts the conclusory allegation that Defendant Woodward violated Plaintiff‟s civil 

rights by “delaying, denying, and deterring from properly diagnosing my injuries.” (Id.) In the 

January 20, 2016, order dismissing the first amended complaint, Plaintiff was specifically 

advised that he failed to allege any facts indicating a complete refusal to treat Plaintiff. There 

were no facts alleged indicating that a medical professional diagnosed Plaintiff with further 

injury as a result of a failure to treat Plaintiff. (ECF No. 10 at 5:13-14.) Plaintiff fails to correct 

this deficiency. 

As to Dr. Malakkla, Plaintiff alleges that he violated Plaintiff‟s rights by not enforcing 

the Plata court order.2 Individual suits for injunctive and equitable relief from alleged 

unconstitutional prison conditions cannot be brought where there is a pending class action suit 

involving the same subject matter. McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165 (9th Cir. 1991); 

Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc). “Individual members of 

the class and other prisoners may assert any equitable or declaratory claims they have, but they 

must do so by urging further actions through the class representative and attorney, including 

contempt proceedings, or by intervention in the class action.” Id. Any asserted requests for 

injunctive relief are therefore dismissed. If Plaintiff wants to complaint about a perceived failure 

to comply with the order in Plata, he may contact the plaintiff‟s class counsel.3

As to Dr. Shwe, Plaintiff alleges generally that he violated Plaintiff‟s civil rights by 

failing to provide “transcripts of medical documentation” in order for the orthopedic specialist to 

properly diagnose him. (ECF No. 13, p. 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Shwe “denied me any 

type of further treatment such as submission of a chronic care evaluation to receive pain 

medication and physical therapy due to my upcoming parole release date being so short.” 

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts indicating that Dr. Shwe knew of and disregarded an objectively 

serious medical condition of Plaintiff‟s. Further, it appears that Dr. Shwe‟s conduct occurred 

 

2 The Court assumes Plaintiff is referring to the rulings under Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 01-1351 THE, a class 

action concerning medical care in California‟s prisons. 

3 Counsel for the plaintiff class in Plata is Donald H. Specter at the Prison Law Office, General Delivery, San 

Quentin, CA, 94964.

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after the filing of the complaint in this action. As will be noted below, Plaintiff could not have 

exhausted such claims through the administrative grievance process prior to filing suit.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment 

A prisoner‟s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of 

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2006)(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two part test for deliberate 

indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a „serious medical need‟ by demonstrating that failure 

to treat a prisoner‟s condition could result in further significant injury or the „unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,‟” and (2) “the defendant‟s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent 

manner unless the defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal 

standard,” Simmons v. Navajo County Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. 

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown where there was “a purposeful act or 

failure to respond to a prisoner‟s pain or possible medical need” and the indifference caused 

harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a 

prisoner‟s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be 

substantial. Mere „indifference,‟ „negligence,‟ or „medical malpractice‟ will not support this 

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980)(citing 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106). “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing 

or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the 

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 

45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate 

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indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 

1990). Additionally, a prisoner‟s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not 

support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

In the order dismissing the first amended complaint, the Court noted that Plaintiff had

failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff‟s central grievance was that, in 

his view, he should have been given physical therapy. Plaintiff also disagreed with the pain 

medication that he was prescribed. There were no facts alleged indicating a complete refusal to 

treat Plaintiff. There were no facts alleged indicating that a medical professional diagnosed 

Plaintiff with further injury as a result of a failure to treat Plaintiff. The second amended 

complaint is more vague and confusing than the first amended complaint. In the January 20, 

2016, order dismissing the first amended complaint, Plaintiff was specifically advised that an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and must be complete in and of itself 

without reference to the prior or superseded pleading. (ECF No. 10 at 7:5.) The Court cannot 

consider allegations in the first amended complaint in order to make sense of the second 

amended complaint. Because the second amended complaint is more vague than the first 

amended complaint, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

Plaintiff will, however, be granted an opportunity to file a third amended complaint.

B. Exhaustion

In the order dismissing the original complaint, the Court noted that Plaintiff appeared to 

allege conduct that occurred after the filing of the complaint. Pursuant to the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act of 1996, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 

U.S.C. § 1983], or any other federal law by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners are required to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior 

to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 49 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 

1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner 

and regardless of the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), 

and the exhaustion requirement applies to all suits relating to prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 435 

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U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has an 

administrative grievance system for prisoners to appeal any departmental decision, action, 

condition, or policy having an adverse effect on prisoners‟ welfare. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 

3084.1. Prior to 2011, the process was initiated by submitting a CDC Form 602 describing the 

problem and the action requested, tit. 15, §3084.2(a), and the appeal had to be submitted within 

fifteen working days of the event being appealed or of the receipt of the unacceptable lower level 

decision, tit. 15, §3084.6(c). Up to four levels of appeal may be involved, including the informal 

level, first formal level, second formal level, and third formal level, also known as the Director‟s 

Level. Tit. 15, §3084.5. In order to satisfy section 1997e(a), California state prisoners are 

required to use this process to exhaust their claims prior to filing suit. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U.S. 81, 85-86 (2006); McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201. On January 28, 2011, the inmate 

appeals process was modified and limited to three levels of review with provisions allowing the 

first level to be by bypassed under specific circumstances. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7.

Because of requirements of the administrative appeals process, it is impossible for 

Plaintiff to bring a civil rights action for any conduct that occurred after the filing of the 

complaint. Plaintiff was specifically advised that any amended complaint must confine itself to 

the claims that Plaintiff has exhausted through the administrative appeals process described 

above. (Id. at 6:14.) The March 22, 2016, second amended complaint consists mostly of 

allegations of conduct that occurred after the filing of the complaint in this action. As noted 

above, it is impossible for Plaintiff to bring a civil rights action for any conduct that occurred 

after the filing of the complaint. Plaintiff‟s claims for any conduct that occurred after the filing 

of the complaint should therefore be dismissed for Plaintiff‟s failure to exhaust his available 

administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff was previously notified of the applicable legal standard and the deficiencies in 

his pleading, and despite guidance from the Court, Plaintiff‟s second amended complaint is more 

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vague than the first amended complaint. For the reasons stated, the second amended complaint 

should therefore be dismissed for Plaintiff‟s failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. The 

Court will, however, grant Plaintiff a final opportunity to file a third amended complaint that 

clearly sets out his claims, and the factual allegations in support of claims. Plaintiff need not, 

however, set forth legal arguments in support of his claims. In order to hold an individual 

defendant liable, Plaintiff must name the individual defendant, describe where that defendant is 

employed and in what capacity, and explain how that defendant acted under color of state law. 

Plaintiff should state clearly, in his or her own words, what happened. Plaintiff must describe 

what each defendant, by name, did to violate the particular right described by Plaintiff. In this 

case, Plaintiff must allege how each Defendant knew of and disregarded a serious medical 

condition of Plaintiff‟s. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) 

days. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the 

nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 

507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)(no “buckshot” complaints).

Plaintiff‟s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what 

each defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s constitutional or other federal rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the 

duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to 

have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is again advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, 

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 

567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in and of itself without reference to the prior or 

superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. “All causes of action alleged in an original complaint 

which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to 

London v. Coopers Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 

1474. The Court will not refer to any other pleading to make Plaintiff‟s third amended 

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complaint complete. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk‟s Office shall send to Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff‟s second amended complaint, filed March 25, 2016, is dismissed for 

failure to state a claim;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

third amended complaint; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the 

Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and to 

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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