Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01125/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01125-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON ALEXANDER 

FERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2: 11-cv-1125 MCE KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding through counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that he received inadequate medical care in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment.

Pending before the court is defendant Pomazal’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF 

No. 67.) Defendant argues, in part, that he is entitled to qualified immunity. For the following 

reasons, the undersigned recommends that defendant’s motion be granted.1

 

1

 Defendant did not notice his motion for hearing. In his opposition, plaintiff requests that the 

court set a hearing. After reviewing the relevant papers, and in light of the fact that the court 

heard oral argument on defendant’s motion to dismiss, the undersigned has determined that oral 

argument would not be of material assistance in resolving the pending motion. 

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Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in 

Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56 is met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 

portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c).) “Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving 

party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s 

case.” Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 

627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56 Advisory Committee Notes to 2010 Amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not 

have the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial 

burden cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact”). Indeed, summary 

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party 

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 

U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 

party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

Consequently, if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to 

the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 

allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a 

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dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party 

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences 

are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual 

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. 

Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).

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Legal Standard for Eighth Amendment Claims

To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim predicated on the denial of medical care, a 

plaintiff must establish that he had a serious medical need and that the defendant’s response to 

that need was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see 

also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A serious medical need exists if the failure to 

treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may be shown by the denial, 

delay or intentional interference with medical treatment or by the way in which medical care is 

provided. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). To act with deliberate 

indifference, a prison official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, a defendant is liable if he knows that plaintiff faces 

“a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures 

to abate it.” Id. at 847. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his 

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. 

A physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate that inmate’s 

Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A 

failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some treatment is prescribed, may 

constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id. 

It is well established that mere differences of opinion concerning the appropriate treatment 

cannot be the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 

(9th Cir. 1996); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Legal Standard for Qualified Immunity

In analyzing a claim of qualified immunity, a court must examine: (1) whether the facts 

as alleged, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, show that the defendant’s conduct 

violated a constitutional right; and (2) if a constitutional right was violated, whether, “in light of 

the specific context of the case,” the constitutional right was so clearly established that a 

reasonable official would understand that what he or she was doing violated that right. See

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Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001). If no constitutional right was violated, the inquiry 

ends and the defendant prevails. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

To meet the “clearly established” requirement, “[t]he contours of the right must be 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 

right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). This requires defining the right 

allegedly violated in a “particularized” sense that is “relevant” to the actual facts alleged. Id.

“Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, 

reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.” Brosseau v. 

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).

Courts are not required to address the two inquiries in any particular order. Rather, courts 

may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 

immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at 

hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009).

Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

This action is proceeding on the second amended complaint filed April 17, 2013. (ECF 

No. 34.) The undersigned herein sets forth plaintiff’s relevant factual allegations.

In June 2009, plaintiff was housed at the California Correctional Center (“CCC”). (Id. at 

3.) Defendant Pomazal is the Chief Medical Officer (“CMO”) at CCC.2 On June 7, 2009, 

plaintiff injured his left ring finger while playing basketball on the CCC yard. (Id.) Plaintiff 

attempted to seek medical attention for his finger but was told by CCC yard medical staff that 

they were closed for the day and to “come back tomorrow.” (Id.)

On Monday June 8, 2009, plaintiff arrived at the medical window and explained his 

problem to defendant Doe 1, an over-weight, white male Medical Technical Assistant (“MTA”). 

(Id.) The MTA told plaintiff that he had to fill out a Medical Request Form 7362. (Id.) Plaintiff 

filed out the form and was told to wait in the waiting room. (Id.) Plaintiff waited all day but was 

eventually told that he would not be seen and to go back to his building and wait for a “Medical 

 

2

 The second amended complaint incorrectly states that defendant Pomazal is the Chief Medical 

Officer at High Desert State Prison. (Id.) 

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Ducat.” (Id.)

After 11 days without a response, plaintiff returned to the medical window and was 

informed by medical staff that they had lost the Medical Request Form 7362 he had filed on June 

8, 2009. (Id.) Plaintiff filled out a new Form 7362 and was again told to wait for a medical 

ducat. (Id.) 

On plaintiff’s second Form 7362, prepared June 19, 2009, no one documented the date 

and time received and no one identified who the form was received by as required in Part II of the 

form. (Id.) Defendant Doe 2, who received the form, failed to acknowledge receipt, as required 

on the form. (Id.) Defendant Doe 3 “processed” the form by erroneously marking the “routine” 

box, indicating the issue could be dealt with within 14 calendar days, despite plaintiff stating on 

the form that he was in severe pain and had likely suffered a broken finger. (Id. at 3-4.) 

Defendant Doe 3 also failed to complete any of the substantive information to be completed by 

the triage nurse. (Id. at 4.) Either Defendant Doe 3 or another unknown prison employee later 

wrote “7-9” on Part II of the form, indicating that plaintiff would not be scheduled to see a doctor 

until July 9, 2009. (Id.)

Two weeks later, plaintiff was ducated for medical treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff was 

informed that he had not been ducated earlier because the staff marked the Medical Request as 

“routine” and because they felt his injury was not “life threatening.” (Id.)

On July 10, 2009, three weeks after he had filed his second Form 7362, plaintiff saw a 

doctor for the first time. (Id.) Noting that plaintiff’s finger looked swollen and suspecting 

something was definitely wrong with it, the doctor scheduled plaintiff for x-rays. (Id.)

On July 15, 2009, plaintiff’s finger was x-rayed, showing a fresh break in the finger that 

had partially healed. (Id.) The doctor informed plaintiff that the finger had already begun to heal 

and that because of the delay in treatment, there was nothing the doctor could do to help the 

finger heal correctly. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to suffer severe pain and requested pain 

medication. (Id.) The doctor denied plaintiff’s request, and told plaintiff he would send him to 

an orthopedist for further examination. (Id.)

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On July 28, 2009, plaintiff was sent to the CCC “Sierra” yard for an Ortho consultation. 

(Id.) The orthopedist informed him that he may need surgery and that he would send plaintiff to a 

specialist in Reno, Nevada. (Id.) Again, plaintiff was denied pain medication and received no 

splint, wiring or cast to immobilize his finger. (Id.)

On August 27, 2009, after receiving no updates regarding his treatment, plaintiff filed a 

third Form 7362 asking for the status of his treatment. (Id.) Defendant Doe indicated “08/28/09,” 

but no time in the “Date/Time Received” section of the form. (Id.) Defendant Doe further failed 

to complete any substantive information to be completed by the triage nurse, and simply marked 

the “routine” box on the form. (Id. at 5.)

Subsequently, plaintiff was transferred to High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”) where he 

received treatment for his finger and medicine for pain management. (Id.) On October 27, 2009, 

plaintiff saw a doctor who told him his finger could not be operated on because of how it healed. 

(Id.) Plaintiff also learned that his finger would be permanently disfigured. (Id.)

Clarification of Plaintiff’s Legal Claims Against Defendant Pomazal

The undersigned herein clarifies plaintiff’s legal claims against defendant Pomazal. 

Because these claims are not a model of clarity, a lengthy discussion of the case history is 

required. 

On April 27, 2011, plaintiff filed the original complaint in pro se. (ECF No. 1.) On 

September 27, 2011, the complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. (ECF No. 5.) On July 

13, 2011, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a first amended complaint. (ECF No. 8.) The 

allegations in the first amended complaint are similar to those contained in the second amended 

complaint. On January 3, 2012, the court ordered service on defendants Barnes, Cate and 

Pomazal. (ECF No. 9.)

On April 9, 2012, defendants Barnes, Cate and Pomazal filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF 

No. 16.) In relevant part, defendants argued that plaintiff had not stated a colorable Eighth 

Amendment claim against defendants Cate and Barnes because he did not adequately allege their 

personal involvement. (ECF No. 16-1 at 2.) Defendants also moved to dismiss plaintiff’s request 

for damages against defendants in their official capacities. (Id.)

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On January 24, 2013, Magistrate Judge Moulds recommended that defendants’ motion be 

granted. (ECF No. 26.) Judge Moulds recommended that defendants Barnes and Cate be 

dismissed because plaintiff had failed to allege their involvement under theories of direct or 

supervisory liability. (Id.) Judge Moulds also recommended that plaintiff’s request for damages 

against defendants in their official capacities be dismissed. (Id.)

On January 28, 2013, Judge Moulds appointed present counsel to represent plaintiff. 

(ECF No. 27.) 

On March 28, 2013, the Honorable Morrison C. England adopted the January 24, 2013 

findings and recommendations, but granted plaintiff leave to amend as to his claims against 

defendants Cate and Barnes. (ECF No. 33.) 

On April 17, 2013, plaintiff, proceeding through counsel, filed the second amended 

complaint. (ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff’s second amended complaint contains two causes of action 

against defendant Pomazal. In the first cause of action, plaintiff alleges that defendant Pomazal 

acted with deliberate indifference to his serous medical needs by not allowing him to see a 

physician until more than one month after he suffered an injury to his finger, “despite having filed 

three separate 7362 Requests for consultation shortly after he suffered the injury.” (Id. at 5.) 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is labeled “Supervisory Liability.” (Id. at 6.) This 

cause of action also includes claims against previously dismissed defendants Cate and Barnes:

28. Defendants Cate, Barnes and Pomazal were acting under color 

of law when their actions resulted in the denial and delay of 

adequate medical care for Plaintiff.

29. Defendants were liable under the doctrine of supervisory 

liability when they failed to provide Plaintiff with proper medical 

care, resulting in a violation of Plaintiff’s U.S. Constitutional right 

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants knew or 

reasonably should have known that medical staff at CCC were not 

providing adequate medical care and that this would deprive 

Plaintiff of his Eighth Amendment rights yet did nothing to cure the 

problem.

30. Defendant Cate, as Director of CDCR, was responsible for the 

operations of CDCR and for the welfare of all inmates.

31. Defendant Cate had direct knowledge that prisons were 

overcrowded and that this overcrowding led to inmates not being 

seen by medical staff in a timely manner and that inmates suffered 

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injuries as a result of this delay in treatment. Defendant Cate knew 

that CDCR medical system was not providing adequate medical 

care and that this was depriving inmates of their Eighth 

Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment yet he did 

nothing to fix the system.

32. An October 2009 audit of CCC’s medical care system 

conducted by the Office of the Inspector General revealed some 

deficiencies in how the facility handled inmate medical requests. 

The extent of Plaintiff’s injuries was directly caused by the delay in 

his treatment.

33. An August 2012 audit conducted by the Inspector General 

showed that CCC had remedied these deficiencies and had now 

reached full compliance. If Plaintiff had been seen in a timely 

manner, he could have received the treatment he needed and his 

finger would not be permanently disfigured. 

34. Defendant Barnes, as Warden of CCC, was responsible for the 

operations of CCC and for the welfare of the inmates in CCC.

35. Defendant Barnes, by not overseeing a competent medical staff 

or implementing a medical scheduling system that guaranteed 

inmates receive medical care in a timely manner, failed to provide a 

facility that could provide adequate medical care to its inmates and 

set into motion a series of acts that he knew or reasonably should 

have known would result in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment rights.

36. Defendant Pomazal, as CMO, is responsible for the 

authorization and scheduling of inmate health care request forms 

and for medical care at Susanville prisons.

37. Under the program implemented by Defendant Barnes for 

medical scheduling, Defendant Pomazal had the authority to 

approve or deny requests for medical consultation. As Plaintiff was 

forced to wait for Defendant Pomazal’s approval, his initial 7362 

Request was lost and it took another two weeks after Plaintiff filed 

a new 7362 Request for him to finally get approval to see a doctor 

and an additional week after that for him to actually see a doctor.

(ECF No. 34 at 6-7 (emphasis added).)

On March 13, 2013, defendants Barnes, Cate and Pomazal filed an answer to the second 

amended complaint. (ECF No. 34.)

On May 29, 2013, defendants Barnes and Cate filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 37.) Defendants argued 

that plaintiff failed to allege their personal involvement in any alleged deprivation and failed to 

state colorable Eighth Amendment claims against them. (ECF No. 37-1.) 

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On July 31, 2013, the undersigned recommended that defendants’ motion to dismiss be 

granted. (ECF No. 45.) On September 3, 2013, Judge England adopted the findings and 

recommendations. (ECF No. 48.) 

On December 9, 2013, non-party California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”) filed a motion to quash subpoenas issued by plaintiff which sought the production of, 

inter alia, 602 inmate appeals forms related to the processing of medical forms. (ECF No. 52.) 

Plaintiff argued that the forms were relevant to his second amended complaint against defendant 

Pomazal because his “legal theory rests on establishing that the procedures instigated to process 

7362 forms were so flawed that it created significant delay in his receiving medical care.” (ECF 

No. 56 at 4 (emphasis added).) On February 27, 2014, the undersigned issued an order granting 

the motion to quash. (ECF No. 59.) In that regard, the undersigned found that the documents 

plaintiff sought were not relevant to the subject matter of this action:

Contrary to plaintiff’s position, the court finds that the second 

amended complaint does not allege that defendant Pomazal “failed 

to administer an efficient medical system” or established 

“procedures instigated to process 7362 forms.” Opposition at 3, 4. 

The second amended complaint alleges that defendant Barnes, “by 

not overseeing a competent medical staff or implementing a 

medical scheduling system that guaranteed inmates receive medical 

care in a timely manner, failed to provide a facility that could 

provide adequate medical care to its inmates.” Second Amended 

Complaint, para. 35. However, the claims against defendant Barnes 

were dismissed by the court. ECF Nos. 45, 48. With regard to 

defendant Pomazal, plaintiff merely claims that he is responsible 

for the authorization and scheduling of inmate health care request 

forms “[u]nder the program implemented by defendant Barnes.” 

[Second Amended Complaint] Para. 36-37. Here, plaintiff’s claims 

against defendant Pomazal rest on whether defendant Pomazal was 

indifferent to his serious medical needs and whether he failed to 

timely authorize plaintiff’s medical examination.

Considering the nature of the action, inmate grievances regarding 

improperly filled out or lost medical request forms would not serve 

to establish that defendant Pomazal should be held liable to 

plaintiff because he was indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical 

needs or that he failed to timely authorize and schedule plaintiff’s 

medical examination. 

Id. at 6 (emphasis added).

On March 6, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint in order 

to clarify the factual basis supporting his supervisory claims against Pomazal. (ECF No. 60.) 

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Plaintiff contended that the order quashing the subpoenas was the first indication to plaintiff that 

the pleadings, as stated, were insufficient to support a supervisory claim against defendant 

Pomazal. (Id. at 4.) The proposed third amended complaint included the following new 

allegations in support of the supervisory liability claim against defendant Pomazal:

27. Defendant was liable under the doctrine of supervisory 

liability when he failed to provide Plaintiff with proper medical 

care, resulting in a violation of Plaintiff’s U.S. Constitutional right 

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant knew or 

reasonably should have known that the medical staff under his 

supervision and control at CCC were not providing adequate 

medical care to inmates during the year of 2009 and Defendant 

failed to take action to correct these failures in medical treatment 

provided at CCC.

28. An October 2009 audit of CCC’s medical care system 

conducted by the Office of the Inspector General revealed 

deficiencies in how the facility provided medical care throughout 

the year of 2009. Medical forms were routinely improperly filled 

out or lost. The extent of Plaintiff’s injury was directly caused by 

the delay in his medical treatment, due to the improper processing 

of his medical request forms. These improper processing 

procedures were known or should have been known to defendant 

Pomazal and he failed to take action to correct them prior to the 

OIG report of October 2009.

29. An August 2012 audit conducted by the Inspector General 

showed that CCC had remedied these deficiencies and had now 

reached full compliance. If Plaintiff had been seen in a timely 

manner, he could have received the treatments he needed and his 

finger would not be permanently disfigured.

30. Defendant Pomazal, as CMF and HCM, was responsible for the 

training and supervision, and control of the health care system at 

California Correctional Center. He knew or reasonably should have 

known about the pattern of improper medical treatment being 

provided in 2009 and did not take steps to end this program.

31. Under the program implemented at CCC for medical treatment 

scheduling, Defendant Pomazal had the authority to approve or 

deny requests for medical consultation. As plaintiff was forced to 

wait for Defendant Pomazal’s approval, his initial 7362 Request 

was lost and it took another two weeks after Plaintiff filed a new 

7362 Request for him to finally get approval to see a doctor and an 

additional week after that for him to actually see a doctor. 

(ECF No. 60-1 at 6-7.)

On April 9, 2014, the undersigned recommended that plaintiff’s motion to amend be 

denied. (ECF No. 65.) The findings and recommendations discuss plaintiff’s prior claims against 

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defendant Pomazal:

While plaintiff argues that he was only recently informed that the 

pleadings were insufficient, as noted above, “carelessness is not 

compatible with a finding of diligence.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 

Here, the court notes that plaintiff was put on notice of defendants’ 

characterization of his allegations against defendant in his first 

motion to dismiss, filed on April 9, 2012. (ECF No. 16-1.) 

Therein, defendant summarized plaintiff’s allegations as follows:

Pomazal was responsible for making sure that Health Care 

Services Request forms were processed. (FAC, ECF No. 8 

at 8.) Pomazal lost Fernandez’s first Health Care Services 

Request Form. (FAC, ECF No. 8 at 8.) Pomazal 

purposefully, but for unknown reasons, delayed the 

processing of Fernandez’s second Health Care Services 

Request form for weeks. (FAC, ECF No. 8 at 8.) Because 

of Pomazal’s actions, Fernandez did not receive immediate 

medical attention and Fernandez became disfigured and 

suffered extreme pain. (FAC, ECF No. 8 at 8.)

Id. at 4. The motion to dismiss sought dismissal of, inter alia, 

plaintiff’s supervisory claims against defendants Barnes and Cate. 

In its findings and recommendations in the first motion to dismiss, 

the court stated that plaintiff claims defendant Pomazal “was 

directly responsible for ensuring that plaintiff’s medical request 

forms were processed and not lost.” (ECF No. 26 at 2.) The court 

recommended dismissal of plaintiff’s supervisory claims against 

defendants Barnes and Cate. Id. The district judge assigned to the 

action adopted the findings and recommendations and plaintiff was 

granted final leave to amend his allegations against defendants 

Barnes and Cate. (ECF No. 33.) Plaintiff filed an amended 

complaint on April 17, 2013. With regard to defendant Pomazal, 

the allegations in the second amended complaint are similar to 

those in the first amended complaint, but with some elaboration on 

defendant’s responsibility for the processing of medical forms 

under the program implemented by defendant Barnes. Compare

ECF No. 8 at 8 (alleging that defendant was directly responsible for 

making sure medical forms were processed), with, ECF No. 34 at 5, 

7 (“Under the program implemented by Defendant Barnes for 

medical treatment scheduling, Defendant Pomazal had the 

authority to approve or deny requests for medical consultation.”) 

Now, plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to include the 

allegation that defendant Pomazal “was responsible for the training, 

supervision and control of medical care at CCC.” (ECF No. 60-1 at 

2-3.)

(ECF No. 65 at 6 (emphasis added).) 

The undersigned found that plaintiff lacked the requisite diligence in seeking to amend his 

complaint. (Id. at 7.) On July 9, 2014, Judge England adopted the findings and recommendations 

recommending that plaintiff’s motion to amend be denied. (ECF No. 70.) 

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The discussion above makes clear that plaintiff’s second cause of action is really no 

different than his first cause of action. In both, plaintiff alleges that defendant Pomazal failed to 

timely authorize and schedule plaintiff’s requests for medical consultations in June and July 2009. 

Plaintiff is not proceeding on theories that defendant Pomazal was responsible for the training, 

supervision and control of medical care at CCC. 

Undisputed Facts

Defendant does not appear to dispute the factual allegations set forth in the second 

amended complaint regarding plaintiff’s injuries and the processing of his 7362. Defendant’s 

statement of undisputed facts focuses on the CCC policies regarding his job duties as well as the 

CCC policies for the processing of 7362 Forms. The undersigned sets forth those undisputed 

facts herein. To the extent there are material disputes, the undersigned notes them below. 

In June 2009, defendant Pomazal was the CMO at CCC. (ECF No. 67-12 at 7.) As the 

CMO, defendant Pomazal provided clinical management, supervision and leadership to other 

medical clinicians at CCC, and supervised the delivery of health care to inmates housed at CCC. 

(Id.) 

Defendant Pomazal did not treat plaintiff in a clinical setting for any complaints related to 

his fractured left ring finger. (Id. at 10.)

Defendant Pomazal was not presented with a CDCR form 7362 Health Care Request 

Form concerning plaintiff in June or July 2009. (Id. at 9.) 

Defendant Pomazal’s direct involvement in plaintiff’s care was limited to approving 

medical appointments with orthopedic specialists at Reno Orthopedics. (Id. at 10.) On 

September 25, 2009, defendant Pomazal approved an appointment for plaintiff with an orthopedic 

specialist at Reno Orthopedics for October 26, 2009. (Id.) On November 23, 2009, defendant 

Pomazal approved an appointment for plaintiff with an orthopedic specialist at Reno Orthopedics 

scheduled for January 15, 2010. (Id.) Defendant Pomazal did not deny any Requests for Services 

concerning plaintiff. (Id.)

As of June 1, 2009, a procedure existed at CCC for an inmate at CCC to obtain primary 

medical care. (Id. at 1.) This procedure required the inmate to complete a CDCR form 7362 

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Health Care Services Request (“Request”) and to submit the request at a designated location at 

CCC. 3(Id. at 1-2.) 

A member of the health care staff at CCC would collect the Requests each day and deliver 

them to the clinic at CCC, which was staffed during normal working hours by a Registered Nurse 

(“RN”), an MTA, and one Physician and Surgeon or a Nurse Practitioner.4 (Id. at 7-8.) The 

procedure was for either the RN or MTA to initial and date each Request upon receipt. (Id. at 8.) 

The parties dispute the amount of time in which the Requests were to be reviewed. 

According to defendant, each request was to be reviewed each regular business day by the RN to 

establish medical priorities on an emergent or non-emergent basis. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff has 

submitted the deposition of Nurse Ladista, who states that her training indicated that she had 48 

hours to respond to a Request. (ECF No. 71-3 at 8.) 

During normal working hours, inmates with an emergent request would be seen 

immediately by an RN, mental health clinician, or dentist, as appropriate, in order to determine 

the next level of care to be provided. (ECF No. 67-2 at 2.) 

An inmate with a non-emergent request would be seen by an RN by the end of the 

following business day for a face-to-face triage examination.5 (Id.) During the face-to-face 

 

3

 Plaintiff disputes that the request had to be submitted at one location because defendant 

Pomazal testified at his deposition that there were “boxes” indicating more than one location. It 

does not appear to the undersigned that defendant is claiming, in the statement of undisputed 

facts, that there was only one location for the forms to be submitted.

4

 Plaintiff alleges that at his deposition, defendant Pomazal testified that after normal business 

hours during the week, as well as on weekends and holidays, the physician would not actually be 

present but would be “on call.”

 

5

 Plaintiff disputes this undisputed fact, and cites defendant Pomazal’s deposition testimony 

where he stated that “it would depend upon the extent of the non-emergent complaint” and that 

“it’s difficult to put black and white time frames on these” because “medicine is not black and 

white.” (Plaintiff’s opposition, ECF No. 71-1 at 4 citing Pomazal deposition at 54: 22-23; 55: 9.) 

The undersigned has reviewed the portion of defendant Pomazal’s deposition transcript cited by 

plaintiff. While plaintiff appears to suggest that defendant Pomazal testified that he could not 

give a time frame for when non-emergent complaints would be reviewed, he actually testified that 

an inmate with non-emergent complaints that an RN feels is of high concern may actually be seen 

sooner. (ECF No. 71-4 at 16-17.) For this reason, defendant Pomazal testified that medicine is 

not “black and white.” 

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triage, the RN then would determine if a physician referral was necessary, and the time frame in 

which the inmate was to be seen by the physician. (Id. at 2-3.) 

An inmate determined to have a medical emergency would be seen by a physician 

immediately, an inmate with an urgent medical condition would be seen by a physician within 

twenty-four hours, and an inmate with a routine medical condition would be seen by a physician 

within fourteen days. (Id. at 3.) 

On weekends and holidays, the CCC procedure was for the RN to review the Request and 

would contact the physician, mental health clinician or dentist on call concerning an inmate with 

an emergent or urgent request. (Id.) On weekends and holidays, the CCC procedure was for 

inmates with routine health care needs to be seen by an RN on the next business day. (Id.)

As of June 1, 2009, the CCC procedure was that an inmate with an urgent/emergent health 

care request, which is a request for medical attention based on the inmate’s belief that a medical 

condition, symptom, or sign requiring immediate medical attention, could request medical 

attention from any CDCR employee, who was required to notify medical staff. (Id.) The inmate 

then would be brought to a medical clinic, or a Triage and Treatment Area (“TTA”), or would be 

put into contact with a physician or nurse for a telephone triage. (Id.) If the inmate was 

physically present at the clinic or TTA, a nurse or physician on duty would either examine the 

inmate, or would instruct an MTA to obtain vital signs and other clinical data from an inmate, and 

to report back with this information. (Id.) The nurse or physician on duty then would review the 

information, and personally examine the inmate. (Id.) On evenings and weekends, the physician 

on call would attend to the patient in person or determine through telephone contact with nursing 

staff the level of care to be provided. (Id.) The inmate might be taken to a community hospital, 

or an appointment with a primary care physician would be scheduled, if appropriate. (Id.)

An inmate could also proceed directly to a medical clinic or TTA with an urgent/emergent 

medical health care request. (Id.) A nurse or physician on duty would either examine the inmate, 

or instruct an MTA to obtain vital signs and other clinical data from the inmate, and to report 

back this information. (Id.) The nurse or physician on duty then would review the information 

and personally examine the inmate to determine the next level of care to be provided. (Id.) An 

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appointment with a primary care physician would be scheduled if appropriate. (Id.)

In cases where the triage examination was conducted by an RN, the Physician and 

Surgeon relied on the medical judgment of the RN as to whether an inmate had an emergency, 

urgent or routine medical condition. (Id. at 4.) 

At CCC, the procedure was for when a physician examined an inmate and believed that a 

referral to a specialist was appropriate, the physician would fill out a Physician Request for 

Services form CDC 7243, which is distinct and different from the Health Care Services Request 

Form CDC 7263. (Id.) The form 7243 filled out by the attending physician would go to the 

Chief Physician and Surgeon, Chief Medical Executive or designee for review to authorize the 

requested service or deny the request if there was no apparent medical necessity for the requested 

service. (Id.) The treating physician/requesting physician is notified when his/her request for 

services is denied after evaluation by the Chief Physician or designee. (Id.) The 

treating/requesting physician may respond in a number of ways. (Id.) First, he/she may 

acknowledge the wisdom of the denial and inform the patient why a requested service will not be 

done at this time. (Id.) Second, the physician may resubmit the request and/or discuss the request 

with the Chief Physician and provide a more detailed explanation as to why he/she believes the 

service is necessary. (Id.) Third, the physician can ask his/her colleagues to consider the matter 

in a committee meeting, usually the Medical Authorization Review (“MAR”) Committee. (Id.) 

In any case, the determination as to whether or not to let the denial stand is made by the Primary 

Care Physician. (Id.)

As of June 1, 2009, defendant Pomazal was unaware of any situations where an inmate at 

CCC had presented a Health Care Service Request form 7362 to a member of the health care staff 

at CCC and claimed that the health care staff had lost the request. (Id.) 

Discussion

Defendant makes the following arguments in support of his motion for summary 

judgment: 1) he did not personally participate in any deprivation of medical services for plaintiff; 

2) he cannot be held vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat superior; 3) he is not liable 

under a supervisory theory; 4) he is entitled to qualified immunity; and 5) in the alternative, he is 

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entitled to summary judgment concerning the prayer for punitive damages. 

As discussed above, although plaintiff’s second amended complaint includes claims 

alleging personal and supervisory liability, in both claims plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to 

timely authorize and schedule his requests for medical consultations. The section of defendant’s

summary judgment motion alleging that defendant did not personally participate in any alleged 

deprivation addresses this claim:

Fernandez erroneously contends that Dr. Pomazal failed to approve 

treatment for Fernandez when Fernandez initially submitted a 

CDCR form 7362, Health Care Service Request, causing the form 

to be lost. Under the system in place at CCC as of June 1, 2009, 

Dr. Pomazal’s approval as the CMO at CCC was not required for an 

inmate to be examined by a primary care physician. (DUF Nos. 7, 

8 and 9.) Rather, appointments with a primary care physician at 

CCC were scheduled after a triage examination conducted by a 

nurse or a physician on duty. (DUF Nos. 7, 8 and 9.) Dr. Pomazal 

was not presented with a CDCR form 7362, Health Care Service 

Request concerning inmate Fernandez in June 2009 or July 2009, 

and did not take any steps to deny or delay medical care for inmate 

Fernandez. (DUF No. 5.)

As Dr. Pomazal did not personally participate in a violation of 

Fernandez’s constitutional rights, Dr. Pomazal cannot be held liable 

under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 

(ECF No. 67-1 at 7.)

Defendant goes on to argue that he is entitled to summary judgment under a supervisory 

theory:

To state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory 

liability, a plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that a 

defendant either (1) personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; (2) knew of the alleged

violations and failed to act to prevent them; or (3) promulgated or 

“implemented a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 

repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the 

constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). An individual’s general 

responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison is 

insufficient to establish personal involvement for purposes of 

asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wesley v. Davis, 333 

F.Supp.2d 888, 892 (C.D. Cal. 2004.)

In this case, there is no evidence that Dr. Pomazal personally 

participated in any deprivation of Fernandez’s constitutional rights, 

as Dr. Pomazal did not treat Fernandez in a clinical setting and 

promptly approved all requests for consultations with outside 

orthopedists. (DUF Nos. 4, 5 and 6.) Additionally, Dr. Pomazal 

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was unaware of any other prior instances where an inmate at CCC 

had presented a HealthCare Service Request form 7362 to a 

member of a health care staff at CCC and claimed that the health 

care staff had lost the Request. (DUF No. 12.) Finally, a policy 

and procedure was in place at CCC as of June 1, 2009, to provide 

medical care to inmates which, if properly utilized by the health 

care staff at CCC, would ensure that medical complaints submitted 

by inmates were promptly and appropriately evaluated. (DUF Nos. 

7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.) As noted above, Fernandez’s complaints 

concerning the evaluation of his injury, such as losing a CDCR 

form 7362, Health Care Service Request, or not properly 

completing the form, actually involve alleged negligence by other 

health care personnel responsible for implementing the policies and 

procedures at CCC, rather than a failure of policies and procedures 

themselves. Therefore, Dr. Pomazal cannot be held liable under 42 

U.S.C section 1983 as the CMO at CCC under a theory of 

supervisory liability.

(Id. at 7-8.) 

In the opposition, plaintiff states that he is not alleging that defendant personally 

participated in any deprivation of medical services or is liable based on the theory of respondeat 

superior. (ECF No. 71 at 3-4.) Plaintiff does not dispute that defendant did not treat him in a 

clinical setting for any complaints regarding his fractured finger. Plaintiff also does not dispute 

that defendant was not presented with a CDCR form 7362 Health Care Request Form for plaintiff 

in June or July 2009. Plaintiff also does not allege that defendant, as the CMO, was involved in 

the initial processing of the CDCR form 7362 Health Care Request Forms. Instead, in the 

opposition, plaintiff alleges that he is basing defendant’s liability on a theory of supervisory 

liability. Plaintiff argues:

There is strong circumstantial evidence of Pomazal’s deliberate 

indifference to the lack of timeliness in prisoners obtaining medical 

care prior to June 2009. Pomazal was aware of problems in the 

timeliness that patients were being seen and claims he worked to 

correct those problems prior to June 2009. However, he was not 

successful in making effective changes as evidence by the audit 

results of just over 65 % of clinical services. 

Pomazal protested that the OIG was wrong to characterize him as 

being responsible for CCC’s entire health care program. Pomazal 

depo. at 100.

I wish in the bureaucracy that that were true. There are so many 

people from headquarters and throughout the entire organization 

that have input into the functioning of our institution, but that 

somewhat waters down that statement.

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Id. at 100. Unlike Harry Truman, the buck “did not stop on 

[Pomazal’s] desk,” according to Pomazal. Id. at 101. “[T]he 

headquarters people, especially in the nursing program, would run 

the nurses and all their programs.” Id. Pomazal testified that he 

never had the authority to terminate or reassign people “and over 

nursing staff it was extremely limited.” Id. at 102. He said that he 

would try to correct situations such as what happened to Plaintiff “if 

I knew about them. And that would be through negotiation with 

nursing staff and other staff members and with headquarters.” Id. at 

101-02.

It started out as I had a bit more authority over the nurses. But as 

headquarters took over more of that responsibility, I had less and 

less authority over the nurses. 

Id. at 103. If any nurses were disciplined during Pomazal’s time at 

CCC he was not aware of it. Id. at 105-06.

Pomazal identified for the first time at his deposition “Jane 

Robinson out of headquarters” who was either the Northern 

Regional Nursing Administrator or the Chief Nurse and Glen Thiel, 

Northern Regional Medical Director, as individuals who had 

authority and therefore direct responsibility over the nurses. Id. at 

102-04.

This information suggests that “headquarters” was taking over 

responsibility over nursing care for Pomazal, which is 

circumstantial evidence that his supervision of the nursing staff was 

inadequate. This is further circumstantial evidence of the state of 

mind required for supervisory liability in this situation, creating a 

disputed material fact issue regarding Pomazal’s liability.

(ECF No. 71 at 5-6.) 

As noted above, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third amended 

complaint including allegations that defendant Pomazal “was responsible for the training, 

supervision and control of medical care at CCC.” (ECF No. 60-1 at 2-3 (proposed third amended 

complaint.) In his opposition to defendant’s summary judgment motion, plaintiff argues that 

defendant Pomazal is liable based on his alleged inadequate supervision, training and control of 

medical care at CCC. Because plaintiff’s request to proceed on this theory of liability was 

denied, these arguments are disregarded. 

In his opposition, plaintiff also references the 2009 OIG report, discussed by defendant in 

the section of his motion arguing for qualified immunity. Plaintiff argues that this report 

demonstrated that defendant was aware in June 2009 of deficiencies in the delivery of health care 

of the type suffered by plaintiff. As noted above, plaintiff is not proceeding on a theory that 

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defendant Pomazal failed to administer an efficient medical system or established procedures 

instigated to process 7362 forms. While the second amended complaint made these claims 

against defendant Barnes, these claims were dismissed. (See ECF No. 56 (order addressing 

motion to quash).) Consequently, the OIG report addressing deficiencies in the delivery of health 

care is not relevant to the theories on which this action is proceeding against defendant Pomazal.6

In the opposition, plaintiff indicates that he is not proceeding on the legal theory on which 

the undersigned has found, in several orders, that this action is proceeding, i.e., defendant failed 

to timely authorize and schedule plaintiff’s requests for medical consultations. Instead, plaintiff’s 

opposition focuses on legal theories on which this action is not proceeding, i.e., defendant was 

responsible for the training, supervision and control of medical care at CCC.7 Because plaintiff, 

in essence, concedes that defendant is not liable on the theory on which this action is proceeding, 

defendant should be granted summary judgment. Because the undersigned finds that defendant is 

entitled to summary judgment as to the merits of plaintiff’s claims, the undersigned does not 

address defendant’s remaining arguments that he is entitled to summary judgment based on 

qualified immunity and concerning the prayer for punitive damages.8

 

6

 Plaintiff argues that the OIG report gave CCC a weighted score of 65.9% for clinical services, 

the category that relates to the timeliness of seeing patients and processing sick call requests like 

the 7362 forms that were a major problem in plaintiff obtaining proper and timely medical care. 

(ECF No. 71 at 3.) A copy of the OIG report is attached as an exhibit to plaintiff’s opposition. 

(ECF No. 71-6.) Plaintiff is correct that Clinical Services received an overall score of 65.9 %. 

(Id. at 4.) A closer review of the report reveals that several sub sections of the Clinical Services 

survey addressing the processing of inmate health care requests received higher individual scores. 

For example, the question of whether an inmate’s request for health care got reviewed the same 

day it was received was given a score of 80%. (Id. at 12.) The question of whether the RN 

completed the face to face triage within one business day after the form 7362 was reviewed was 

given a score of 84 %. (Id.) The question of whether the RN’s plan included an adequate strategy 

to address the problems identified during the face-to-face triage was given a score of 89.5 %. 

(Id.) 

7

 Because plaintiff’s second claim for relief is labeled “supervisory liability,” the undersigned 

understands why defendant moved for summary judgment on this legal theory, although it was 

previously clarified that plaintiff was not proceeding on such a claim.

 

8

 As to the “doe” defendants whom plaintiff alleges misplaced his first 7362 Form and checked 

the non-urgent box on his later submitted 7362 form, plaintiff states at most a claim for 

negligence. (See ECF No. 67-1 at 7-8.) Negligence or a negligent act by a person acting under 

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Motion to Amend

In his August 4, 2014 opposition, plaintiff requests leave to file a third amended complaint 

naming as new defendants Chief Nurse Jane Robinson and Glen Thiel, Northern Regional 

Medical Director. Plaintiff alleges that at his July 1, 2014 deposition, defendant identified these 

individuals who had authority and therefore direct responsibility over the nurses who allegedly 

failed to properly process his 7362 forms. Plaintiff alleges that neither Robinson nor Thiel were 

identified in response to plaintiff’s previous discovery requests. 

In the reply to plaintiff’s opposition, defendant opposes plaintiff’s request for leave to 

amend. 

Significantly, plaintiff did not and has not filed a motion for leave to amend or a proposed 

amended complaint. Plaintiff does not indicate why he has not done so. Moreover, plaintiff’s 

counsel does not seem to recognize that the time for pleadings and discovery has closed. Instead, 

plaintiff seems to take the position that the court should give an advisory ruling regarding his 

request for leave to amend in these findings and recommendation addressing defendant’s 

summary judgment motion. Plaintiff indicates that he will file an amended complaint only if the 

court grants defendant’s summary judgment motion. 

In light of the foregoing, the undersigned hereby ORDERS that plaintiff may file a motion 

to amend and proposed amended complaint during the time allotted to file objections to these 

findings and recommendations, including addressing his failure to do so previously, and how such 

allegations could establish Constitutional violations. Moreover, by allowing such a filing the 

undersigned does not mean to indicate whether or not he will allow such an amendment. 

Defendant shall not file a response to the motion to amend and proposed amended complaint 

unless and until ordered by the court.9 

////

 

color of law however, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Daniels v. Williams, 

474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).

9

 It appears that plaintiff’s claims against proposed defendants Robinson and Thiel would have 

the same problems as those against defendant Pomazal addressed above. 

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And IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant Pomazal’s motion for summary 

judgment (ECF No. 67) be granted;

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 23, 2015

Fern125.sj(2)

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