Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00156/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00156-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Amy Ann Thomas,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin,

Defendant.

No. CV-15-00156-TUC-RCC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) prepared by 

Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman. In the R & R, Magistrate Judge Bowman 

recommends that the Court remand Plaintiff Amy Thomas’s disability insurance benefits 

claim back to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Doc. 22. 

Thomas has filed an objection to the R & R. Doc. 23. Defendant has filed a response to 

the objection. Doc. 24. For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall overrule the objections 

and accept and adopt the R & R.

I. Background 

The factual and procedural background in this case is thoroughly detailed in 

Magistrate Judge Bowman’s R & R (Doc. 22). This Court fully incorporates the 

“Procedural History” section of the R & R into this Order. 

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II. Discussion

The duties of the district court in connection with a R & R are set forth in 

Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district 

court may “accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further 

evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Where the parties object to an R & R, “[a] judge of the [district] court shall make a 

de novo determination of those portions of the [R & R] to which objection is made.” 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). Under a de novo

review, this Court reviews the Administration's decision to determine if the decision is 

free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence. See Brewes v. Commissioner of 

Social Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence” is more 

than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 

1009 (9th Cir. 2014).1To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, “a 

court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and 

evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 

F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). As a result, “[i]f the 

evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the ALJ's conclusion, [a 

court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006).

Here, Thomas “does not know whether the Magistrate Judge explicitly or 

implicitly recommended that the Court affirm, in part, the Administrative Law Judge’s 

(“ALJ”) decision” Doc. 23 at 3. Thus, Thomas “objects to any explicit or implicit 

recommendation to affirm, in part, that decision.” Id. Specifically, Thomas argues that 

the ALJ’s credibility finding and the ALJ’s rejection of her treating physicians’ opinions 

 

1 Although not material to Magistrate Judge Bowman’s ultimate recommendation 

of remanding for further proceedings, this Court notes that the R & R mistakenly applies 

the clear and convincing standard. See Doc. 22 at 4. The Court notes that the applicable 

standard for this case is substantial evidence. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1009-10.

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should not be affirmed. Lastly, Thomas argues that she actually satisfies the Garrison 

requirements for a finding of disability. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021-22. Defendant 

concedes that Thomas’s claim should be remanded for further evaluation of: (1) the 

weight that should be given lay witness opinions, “(2) [Thomas’s] diagnosis of 

arachnoiditis at step two, (3) [Thomas’s] residual functional capacity, and (4) whether 

[Thomas] can perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy.” 

Doc. 24 at 2. 

The Court overrules Thomas’s objections. For the ALJ’s credibility findings, the 

ALJ provided substantial evidence for discounting Thomas’s pain allegations. For 

example, Thomas disputed her firing and argued that she was able to continue working as 

a building inspector with the only qualification being that she could not lift the 50-pound 

ladder. Tr. At 378. The ALJ also notes that Thomas claimed she periodically used a cane 

since 2011, but multiple treatment providers reported that she ambulated normally. Tr. 

30. Thomas also collected unemployment benefits from April 2011 to September 2012. 

Tr. 283-288. While collecting benefits, Thomas verified that she was able to work and 

was looking for work. Tr. 289-364. Thomas’s receipt of unemployment benefits is not 

consistent with a claim of disability. The Court is mindful that a claimant’s receipt of 

unemployment benefits could be a legally sufficient reason on which the ALJ could 

properly rely in support of his adverse credibility determination. See, e.g., Plummer v. 

Colvin, 2014 WL 7150682, at *16 (D. Ariz. 2014). Thomas also later asserted that she 

knew she could not work while receiving unemployment benefits. Tr. 30. Because there 

is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that Thomas was not a credible 

witness, the Court affirms the ALJ’s finding. 

Thomas also argues that the ALJ should have given her treating physicians’ 

opinions more than limited weight. The ALJ noted that both medical doctors, Annabi and 

Farr, relied on Thomas’s allegations of disabling pain when formulating their disability 

opinions. Further, Dr. Annabi’s opinion letter was written approximately two years after 

he last examined Thomas. At the previous examination, Dr. Annabi opined that Thomas 

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was able to work. Tr. 32. As for Dr. Farr’s opinions, the ALJ also provided specific 

reasons for discounting his opinions. Specifically, the ALJ discounted Dr. Farr’s opinion 

because he stated that Thomas cannot work on a full-time basis yet more recent MRI 

studies revealed only mild degenerative changes. Thus, there is substantial evidence 

supporting the ALJ’s finding that Thomas’s treating physicians’ opinions should be 

discounted.

Lastly, Thomas reargues that Thomas satisfies the Garrison test and thus the Court 

should remand for payment of benefits. Doc. 23 at 7. As Magistrate Judge Bowman 

thoroughly and correctly analyzed, Thomas does not meet the requirements of the 

Garrison test.

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Amy Thomas’s objections are 

overruled. Doc. 24.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Leslie Bowman’s Report 

and Recommendation is accepted and adopted. Doc. 22.

Dated this 1st day of April, 2016.

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