Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02328/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02328-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Although entitled “Traverse to Petition,” the document directly responds to the arguments set

forth by Respondent in the Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the Court construes Petitioner’s filing as an

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY LEON PEAVY, Civil No. 09-cv-2328-JLS (POR)

Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THAT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS BE DENIED

[Doc. 7]

v.

JOHN MARSHALL, Warden,

Respondent.

On October 19, 2009, Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. 1.] On December 14, 2009, Respondent

filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for failure to exhaust certain claims in state court. [Doc. 7.] 

On February 18, 2010, Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.1

 [Doc. 12.] In

accordance with Local Rule 72.1(d), this Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss be DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 2, 2006, a jury in San Diego County Superior Court convicted Petitioner of

possession of heroin for sale, possession of heroin, possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine,

possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of cocaine base for sale. [Lodg. 1 at 1-5, 41-46,

245-47.] On February 5, 2007, the Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to state prison for five years

and eight months. Id. at 207-08, 258-60. Petitioner appealed, but the California Court of Appeal

Case 3:09-cv-02328-JLS-DHB Document 15 Filed 07/12/10 Page 1 of 8
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affirmed his conviction on March 21, 2008. [Lodg. 5.] Petitioner did not file a petition for review

with the California Supreme Court.

On January 6, 2009, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court (“CSC

Pet. #1")[Lodg. 6], which was denied on February 11, 2009 [Lodg. 7]. In this state petition,

Petitioner asserted the following grounds for relief:

(1) Insufficient evidence to support conviction for possession of the handgun and

narcotics in violation of Fourteenth Amendment right to due process;

(2) The reasonable doubt instruction (to the jury) deprived him of Fourteenth

Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process; and

(3) Trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences without a factual

finding by the jury.

Also on January 6, 2009, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal

[Lodg. 8], which was denied on February 23, 2009 [Lodg. 9].

On April 29, 2009, Petitioner filed a further habeas petition in the California Supreme Court

(“CSC Pet. #2")[Lodg. 10], which was denied on August 19, 2009 [Lodg. 11]. In this state petition,

Petitioner asserted the following ground for relief:

(1) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to win suppression motion,

investigate and present alibi witnesses, file motions, attack veracity of

warrant, request a continuance, and interview the prosecution’s witnesses.

On May 29, 2009, Petitioner filed another habeas petition in the California Supreme Court

(“CSC Pet. #3)[Lodg. 12], which was denied on August 19, 2009 [Lodg. 13]. In this state petition,

Petitioner asserted the following grounds for relief:

(1) Prosecution failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence, and trial counsel

was ineffective for failure to review the file and investigate leads;

(2) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to investigate, pursue

exculpatory evidence, raise suppression issue, and review “Frank Puglia’s

conflict of interest in this matter;”

(3) Prosecution introduced false evidence in violation of Petitioner’s due process

rights; and

(4) Newly discovered evidence of video tape surveillance of the crime scene and

photographs taken by Petitioner’s wife and daughter.

On October 19, 2009, Petitioner filed his federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28

Case 3:09-cv-02328-JLS-DHB Document 15 Filed 07/12/10 Page 2 of 8
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U.S.C. § 2254 [Doc. 1], in which he asserts the following claims:

(1) Insufficient evidence to sustain conviction for possession of the handgun and

narcotics found in “bedroom one;”

(2) Jury instruction as to reasonable doubt was constitutionally deficient;

(3) The trial court improperly “imposed consecutive sentences without a factual

finding by the jury;”

(4) Ineffective assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing;

(5) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate and present alibi

witnesses, file motions, attack the “veracity of the warrant affidavit,”and visit

the crime scene;

(6) Prosecution’s failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence;

(7) Violation of Due Process where prosecutor presented false evidence;

(8) Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to “raise meritorious

Fourth Amendment suppression issues” and “review Frank Puglia’s conflict

of interest in this matter;” and

(9) Newly discovered evidence of video tape and photographs depicting the crime

scene.

On December 14, 2009, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for failure to exhaust

certain claims in state court. [Doc. 7.] On February 18, 2010, Petitioner filed an Opposition to the

Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 12.]

II. DISCUSSION

State courts must be given the first opportunity to decide a state prisoner’s habeas corpus

claims. In general, a federal court shall not grant a state prisoner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus

“unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the court of the State.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)(emphasis added). Petitioners satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

“fairly present[ing] their federal claims to the highest state court” before bringing these claims in

federal court. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002)(quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365 (1995)). A federal claim is fairly presented if the petitioner has stated the “operative

facts and the federal legal theory upon which his claim is based.” Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir.2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir.

2007); see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005,

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1009 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to exhaust Ground Six, Ground Seven, and

Ground Nine of the Petition. Thus, the Court will address each of these grounds in turn.

A. Ground Six – Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Ground Six of the federal Petition asserts the

prosecution failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence, including: (a) identity of those arrested

at 5232 Trinidad Way, Petitioner’s residence, on May 23, 2005; (b) detective’s interview with the

manager of the apartment complex; (c) informant Darrell Bradshaw’s identification of other

individuals visiting the Trinidad Way residence with Visine bottles containing heroin; (d) repeated

arrests of Alvin Anderson for possession of heroin in Visine bottles; (e) the presence of Anthony

Diamond and his cousin at the Trinidad Way residence; and (f) the “mail to Darrell Bradshaw and

clothes at 5232 Trinidad Way.” (Pet. at 11.) By comparison, in his state habeas petition, under a

heading entitled “Prosecution’s Failure to Disclose Material Exculpatory Evidence,” Petitioner

identified each item of evidence listed above, except the “mail to Darrell Bradshaw and clothes at

5232 Trinidad Way.” (CSC Pet. #3 [Lodg. 12] at 7.) Thus, the issue becomes whether the addition

of the alleged “mail” and “clothes” to the federal Petition compels this Court to find that Petitioner

failed to exhaust Ground Six in state court.

A federal habeas claim is unexhausted if it contains new factual allegations that

“fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts.” Lopez v. Schriro, 491

F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986)). However,

exhaustion “does not require that a habeas petitioner . . . present to the state courts every piece of

evidence supporting his federal claims in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.” Davis v.

Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008)(emphasis in original). Rather, the allegation of a new

fact does not render a claim unexhausted unless the fact “substantially improves the [claim’s]

evidentiary basis.” Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir.1988). Here, the majority of

Petitioner’s Brady claim consists of each of the factual allegations set forth by his state habeas

petition. These allegations include the withholding of (i) a police interview of the manager of the

apartment complex; (ii) the identities of potential witnesses, and (iii) an informant’s identification of

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other people and automobiles possessing heroin. Even though Petitioner supplements these

allegations with a cursory reference to “mail” and “clothes,” the new evidence does not

“substantially improve” his claim. First, the mail appears to be associated with Darrell Bradshaw,

the informant listed above, who provided information to police, the same informant that Petitioner

identified in his state habeas petition. Thus, “[t]he state court[] [was] given a sufficient opportunity

to hear [the] issue” of whether the prosecution improperly withheld statements made by Darrell

Bradshaw. Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Duncan, 513 U.S. at

365). Second, it is not clear how the withholding of clothes, under the circumstances of Petitioner’s

underlying conviction, supports a Brady claim. Accordingly, the new allegation neither

“fundamentally alters” nor “substantially improves” the claim. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 260; Aiken,

841 F.2d at 883. 

In sum, the Court finds that Petitioner presented “the substance of [Ground Six] to the state

courts, and thus properly exhausted his claim within the meaning of § 2254(b)(1).” Weaver, 197

F.3d at 365. Therefore, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court find this claim exhausted and

DENY Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as to Ground Six of the Petition.

B. Ground Seven – False Evidence

Ground Seven of the Petition asserts that the prosecution deprived Petitioner of his right to

due process by “allow[ing] false evidence to stand uncorrected.” (Pet. at 12.) Specifically,

Petitioner alleges that three detectives gave false and misleading testimony at trial, and the

prosecutor failed to correct the testimony. Id. In his state habeas petition, Petitioner asserted the

same violation of his right to due process. (CSC Pet. #3 [Lodg. 12] at 16.) In fact, the heading of

the federal claim is identical to the heading of the state claim: “Denial of Right to Due Process[:]

Prosecutor Allowed False Evidence to Stand Uncorrected.” Compare (CSC Pet. #3 at 16) with (Pet.

at 12). However, Respondent argues that Petitioner “suggested [to the state court that] the false

testimony was the result of his trial attorney’s failure to ‘review the case file.’” (Resp.’s Br. at

6)(quoting CSC Pet. #3 at 16.) Respondent contends “the California Supreme Court may have

treated this claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel, . . . [and as a result] the claim is

unexhausted. . . .” Id. The Court does not find Respondent’s argument persuasive.

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Under clearly established law, “petitions [for writ of habeas corpus] must be read in context

and understood based on the particular words used.” Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir.

2008)(quoting Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc))(emphasis added). 

Furthermore, “pro se habeas petitions are held to a more lenient standard than counseled petitions.” 

Id. (internal citations omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, these principles apply with equal force to the

underlying state habeas petitions. For example, in Davis, the “question [was] . . . whether Davis’

state habeas petition provided the California Supreme Court with all the facts necessary” to exhaust

the claim. Id. In particular, the petitioner did not provide a clear narrative of facts, but rather, stated

he “‘was denied his due process rights under Wolff . . . to a witness,’ cite[d] a case, a statute, and a

regulation, and note[d] that he was charged with the battery of a non-inmate.” Id. at 1010 (quoting

the state petition). The Ninth Circuit observed that by “simply cite checking Davis’ petition, the

state court would have had all the [necessary] facts.” Id. Furthermore, the court held the claim

exhausted, stating, “if the state court had . . . read those sources in conjunction with the rest of his

state habeas petition, the legal theory and operative facts would have become clear.” Id. at 1011.

As instructed by the Davis decision, this Court liberally construes Petitioner’s state petition

and charges the state court with making reasonable inferences in evaluating the state petition. First,

the heading of the relevant claim in Petitioner’s state petition clearly alleged a due process violation

based on the prosecution’s introduction of false evidence. (CSC Pet. #3 at 16.) Second, in the

statement of facts supporting this claim, Petitioner asserted “[t]he prosecutor and all the

representatives of the state all knew that it was perjurerious [sic] testimony.” Id. Third, Petitioner

concluded his claim with citations to Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), Giglio v. United

States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and United States v. Young, 17 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 1994). Id. at 17. 

Each case was properly cited and directly addresses how the introduction of false evidence by the

prosecutor gives rise to a due process violation. Thus, “[b]y reading [Petitioner’s] pro se state

petition generously, as Circuit precedent demands, and by checking the sources cited in his petition,

as the logic of Supreme Court precedent dictates, the legal theory and factual basis of Petitioner’s

state petition is clear:” an alleged due process violation arising from the prosecution’s introduction

of false evidence. Davis, 511 F.3d at 1011. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court

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2

 In addition, Respondent argues Petitioner failed “to explain how this newly discovered

evidence resulted in a violation [of] any federal right.” (Resp.’s Br. at 6.) However, this argument

relates to the merits of the claim. Pursuant to the Court’s Order of October 23, 2009 [Doc. 5 at 2], the

Court shall address the merits of the Petition after Respondent files an Answer to the Petition. 

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hold that Petitioner exhausted the false evidence claim in state court and DENY Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss as to Ground Seven. 

C. Ground Nine – Newly Discovered Evidence

Ground Nine of the Petition is entitled, “Newly Discovered Evidence.” (Pet. at 14.) 

Specifically, Petitioner identifies the following “new” evidence: (1) video tape surveillance “of the

crime scene” and (2) photographs taken by Petitioner’s wife and daughter. Id. Respondent asserts

that “Peavy [Petitioner] never presented this claim to the state courts.” (Resp.’s Br. at 6.)2

However, a review of the record reveals that Petitioner presented this exact claim to the California

Supreme Court in his state habeas petition. (CSC Pet. #3 at 24.) Therefore, IT IS

RECOMMENDED that the Court find this claim exhausted and DENY Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss as to Ground Nine.

III. CONCLUSION

After a thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing analysis, this

Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be DENIED in its entirety. This

Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, the Honorable Janis L. Sammartino, pursuant to the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2007) and Local Rule 72.1(d).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than July 26, 2010, any party may file and serve

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

//

//

//

//

//

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// 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and served no

later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 12, 2010

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

all parties 

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