Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01209/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Alejandro Mora Rolon, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-01209-PHX-DJH (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Alejandro Mora Rolon has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents assert that the Petition should be 

dismissed as untimely under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(AEDPA), which provides the statute of limitations applicable to state prisoners seeking 

federal habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 11 at 15-22.) Alternatively, Respondents argue that 

federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is procedurally barred. (Id. at 22-26.) 

Petitioner has not filed a reply in support of his Petition and the time to do so has passed. 

(Doc. 8.) For the reasons below, the Court finds the Petition untimely, recommends that 

it be dismissed, and does not consider Respondents’ alternative arguments. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 On July 30, 1997, Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court 

on one count of kidnapping (Count One), one count of molestation of a child (Count 

Two), and one count of sexual conduct with a minor (Count Three). (Doc. 11, Ex. D.) 

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On September 26, 2000, a jury acquitted Petitioner on the kidnapping count, but found 

him guilty on the remaining two counts. (Doc. 11, Ex. E.) On November 1, 2000, the 

trial court found that Petitioner had a predicate felony conviction, and subsequently 

sentenced him to consecutive terms of thirty-three years’ imprisonment on Count Two, 

and thirty-five years’ imprisonment on Count Three. (Doc. 11, Ex. F.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 On November 7, 2000, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 11, Ex. H.) In his opening brief, Petitioner argued that the trial court 

violated the Due Process Clauses of the United States and the Arizona Constitutions by 

admitting evidence of sexual propensity, and that he was denied a fair trial due to 

prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. 11, Ex. I.) On June 13, 2002, the appellate court 

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 11, Ex. M.) 

 On July 15, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court. (Doc. 11, Ex. O.) On October 29, 2002, the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review. (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) 

C. Post-Conviction Review 

 1. Withdrawn Notices of Post-Conviction Relief 

 On November 16, 2000, Petitioner filed a pro se notice of post-conviction relief in 

the trial court pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. G.) Because Petitioner had previously filed a direct appeal, which was still pending, 

on June 8, 2001, he moved to withdraw that notice. (Doc. 11, Ex. K.) The court granted 

that motion. (Doc. 11, Ex. L.) 

 On July 2, 2002, Petitioner filed another pro se notice of post-conviction relief in 

the trial court. (Doc. 11, Ex. N.) On September 16, 2002, Petitioner moved to dismiss 

the notice of post-conviction relief without prejudice because direct review was still 

pending. (Doc. 11, Ex. Q.) The court granted Petitioner’s motion. (Doc. 11, Ex. R.) 

/ / / 

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 2. First Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On January 7, 2003, Petitioner filed a third notice of post-conviction relief to 

commence what the state court considered his first Rule 32 proceeding. (Doc. 11, Exs. T, 

BB.) On October 6, 2003, post-conviction counsel advised the court that she had 

reviewed the record and found no claim to raise in a Rule 32 petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. U.) 

On counsel’s motion, the court granted Petitioner until December 20, 2003 to file a pro se 

petition. (Doc. 11, Exs. U, V.) 

 On December 16, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. W.) Petitioner submitted his petition on a form and checked boxes 

indicating that illegally obtained evidence was introduced at trial, his right against selfincrimination was violated, he was denied representation by a competent lawyer at every 

critical stage of the criminal proceeding, the state suppressed evidence and used perjured 

testimony, the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated, newly discovered evidence existed 

that would require the court to vacate his convictions or sentences, his sentences were 

improper, and he was being held beyond the expiration of his sentences. (Id.) On May 7, 

2004, the trial court summarily denied post-conviction relief because Petitioner’s 

allegations were conclusory and did not state a colorable claim. (Doc. 11, Ex. Y.) The 

record does not include any evidence that Petitioner filed a petition for review in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 11, Exs. A, B, C.) 

 3. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On April 17, 2007, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

Pinal County Superior Court. (Doc. 11, Ex. Z.) On June 15, 2007, the Pinal County 

Superior Court construed the filing as a Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief and 

transferred it to the Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 11, Ex. AA.) After the case 

was transferred, on August 8, 2008, the trial court found Petitioner’s claims precluded 

under Rule 32.2(a) because they either were or should have been raised on direct appeal, 

and dismissed the petition because it did not include any claims that could be raised in a 

successive petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. BB (citing Rule 32.2, 32.4(a).) The record contains no 

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evidence that Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Doc. 11, Exs. A, B, C.) 

 4. Third Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On April 9, 2012, Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief arguing 

that he was actually innocent of the crimes of conviction. (Doc. 11, Ex. CC.) On April 

18, 2012, the court denied the petition because it was untimely and successive, and 

Petitioner had not presented any claims that could be raised in an untimely or successive 

Rule 32 proceeding. (Id.) 

 On May 25, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing of the April 18, 2012 

ruling. (Doc. 11, Ex. EE.) On June 12, 2012, the trial court denied the motion as 

untimely under Rule 32.9(a). (Doc. 11, Ex. FF.) On June 20, 2012, Petitioner filed a 

petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 11, Ex. GG.) On September 

11, 2013, the appellate court granted review, but denied relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. HH.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review, and the appellate court issued its mandate on 

November 4, 2013. (Id.) 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On June 30, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner raises the following claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective 

for (a) failing to devote sufficient time to prepare a defense, (b) failing to secure an 

independent mental examination to determine Petitioner’s competency, and (c) failing to 

explore the possibility of a plea agreement (Ground One); (2) the trial court abused its 

discretion and the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when (a) the trial court admitted 

evidence of Petitioner’s prior bad acts, (b) the prosecutor repeatedly asked the victim if 

she bled after the alleged sexual conduct, and (c) the court’s and the prosecutor’s actions 

led the jury to believe that Petitioner was a repeat offender (Ground Two); and 

(3) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because he was not arraigned on the 

criminal charges and was not asked how he wanted to plead during his initial appearance 

(Ground Three). (Doc. 1 at 6-8.) 

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 Respondents assert that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely. (Doc. 11.) 

Alternatively, Respondents argue that federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims 

is procedurally barred. (Id.) For the reasons below, the Court finds the Petition untimely, 

recommends that it be dismissed, and does not consider Respondents’ alternative 

arguments. 

II. Statute of Limitations 

 A. Commencement of the Limitations Period 

The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The 

limitations period generally commences on “the date on which the judgment became final 

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1

 Therefore, to assess the timeliness of the Petition, the Court 

determines the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became “final by the conclusion of 

direct review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

 After his trial and sentencing, Petitioner pursued direct review in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 11, Exs. H, M, O, S.) The 

Arizona Supreme Court denied review on October 29, 2002. (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction became final ninety days later, on January 27, 2003, 

upon the expiration of the time for Petitioner to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the 

United States Supreme Court. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

2010) (stating that “[w]hen, on direct appeal, review is sought in the state’s highest court 

but no petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is filed, direct review is 

considered to be final when the certiorari petition would have been due, which is 90 days 

after the decision of the state’s highest court.”); see also Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 

1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (the time for seeking direct review under § 2244(d)(1)(A) “includes 

the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the 

 

1

 The statute of limitations commences on the latest of the dates determined by applying §§ 2244(d)(1)(A) through (D). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Petitioner 

does not argue that subsections (B), (C), or (D) should apply. 

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United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a 

petition”); see also Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (a petition for writ of certiorari to review a judgment 

entered by a state’s highest court must be filed in the United States Supreme Court with 

ninety days after entry of the judgment). 

 Therefore, the one-year limitations period commenced the next day, January 28, 

2003, and expired one year later, on January 27, 2004. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 

F.3d 1243, 1245-47 (9th Cir. 2001) (the AEDPA limitations period begins to run on the 

day after the triggering event pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). Because Petitioner did not 

file his Petition until June 30, 2015, it is untimely unless statutory tolling, equitable 

tolling, or an exception to the statute of limitations applies. 

B. Statutory Tolling 

 Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time 

that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). 

 While direct review was pending, Petitioner filed and voluntarily dismissed two 

notices of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Exs. G, L, N, R.) Those notices did not 

impact the limitations period because they were withdrawn and dismissed while direct 

review was pending and before the limitations period commenced. 

 On January 7, 2003, Petitioner filed a third notice of post-conviction relief, which 

commenced his first post-conviction proceeding.2

 (Doc. 11, Ex. T.) Therefore, the 

limitations period, which commenced on January 28, 2003, was immediately tolled by 

the earlier-filed application for post-conviction relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Isley 

 

2

 The notice of post-conviction relief was signed and dated December 31, 2002. (Doc. 11, Ex. T.) Respondents state that the notice was timely filed. (Doc. 11 at 18.) 

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v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrs., 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (in Arizona, statutory 

tolling begins when a Rule 32 notice of post-conviction relief is properly filed). The 

statute of limitations remained tolled while this post-conviction proceeding was pending 

in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). On May 7, 2004, the trial court dismissed the 

post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 11, Ex. Y.) Petitioner did not seek review in the 

appellate court. Accordingly, the statute of limitations began running on May 8, 2004 

and expired one year later on May 8, 2005. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 

1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that the petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief tolled 

the AEDPA limitation period only up to the date that the trial court summarily dismissed 

the post-conviction action for petitioner’s failure to timely file a petition for review). 

 After Petitioner’s first Rule 32 proceeding was dismissed, starting in 2007, he 

commenced several other post-conviction proceedings. (Doc. 11, Exs. Z, AA, CC.) 

However, those proceedings were commenced after the limitations period had expired. 

Therefore, even if those applications for post-conviction relief were properly filed, they 

could not toll the already expired limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”). 

Therefore, the statute of limitations expired on May 8, 2005. 

 Moreover, even if the limitations period remained tolled during all of Petitioner’s 

post-conviction proceedings, the Petition would still be untimely. In Petitioner’s final 

post-conviction proceeding, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied 

relief on September 11, 2013. (Doc. 11, Ex. HH.) Petitioner did not seek further review 

and the appellate court issued its mandate on November 4, 2013. (Id.) The postconviction proceeding was no longer “pending” under § 2244(d)(2), and thus could no 

longer toll the AEDPA statute of limitations, when the court of appeals issued its 

mandate. See Celaya v. Stewart, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1055 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d 497 

Fed. App’x 744 (9th Cir. 2012) (under Arizona law, an appellate court decision is 

pending until the mandate issues); Baker v. Ryan, 2015 WL 997801, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 

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6, 2015) (“In Arizona, when the court of appeals grants review of a petition, but denies 

the petition, direct review is not final until the mandate has issued.”); Washington v. 

Ryan, 2015 WL 274151, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2015) (same); Elem v. Ryan, 2013 WL 

5434579, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2013) (same). Accordingly, under this alternative 

calculation of the limitations period, the limitations period was tolled until November 4, 

2013 when the appellate court issued its mandate concluding the state post-conviction 

proceedings. Thus, the limitations period expired one year later on November 5, 2014. 

Petitioner did not file his Petition until June 30, 2015. (Doc. 1.) Thus, under either 

calculation of the limitations period, the Petition is untimely unless Petitioner establishes 

that equitable tolling or an exception to the limitations period applies. 

C. Equitable Tolling

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). “The diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply 

the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). “When 

considering whether to apply equitable tolling, the Supreme Court has emphasized the 

need for ‘flexibility’ and for ‘avoiding mechanical rules.’” Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 

777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 650). 

 Petitioner argues that equitable tolling applies because he is a layman in the law. 

(Doc. 1 at 11.) Petitioner's lack of familiarity with the law and lack of legal assistance do 

not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations period. “[I]t is 

well established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, 

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generally does not excuse prompt filing.’” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th 

Cir. 2000) (quoting Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 1999)). Petitioner’s 

ignorance of the law and indigent status do not distinguish him from the great majority of 

inmates pursuing habeas corpus relief. Such circumstances are not extraordinary and do 

not justify tolling the limitations period. “If limited resources, lack of legal knowledge, 

and the difficulties of prison life were an excuse for not complying with the limitation 

period, the AEDPA’s limitation period would be meaningless since virtually all 

incarcerated prisoners have these same problems in common.” Bolanos v. Kirkland, 

2008 WL 928252, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008); see also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of equitable tolling because neither the 

district court’s failure to advise the petitioner of the right to amend his petition to include 

unexhausted claims nor petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the limitations period 

were extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling). 

D. Exception to the Statute of Limitations

Petitioner also argues that his untimely filing should be excused because he has 

“colorable issues that need to be addressed.” (Doc. 1 at 11.) Thus, he arguably asserts 

that failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Petitioner, however, has not established that he has a credible claim of actual innocence 

that constitutes an equitable exception to the one-year statute of limitations. In 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924, (2013), the Supreme Court 

recognized an exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations for a claim of actual 

innocence. The Court adopted the actual innocence gateway previously recognized in 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), for excusing the bar to federal habeas 

corpus review of procedurally defaulted claims. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 937-38). 

 The rule announced in McQuiggin does not provide for an extension of the time 

statutorily prescribed, but instead is an equitable exception to § 2244(d)(1). McQuiggin, 

133 S. Ct. at 1931. Actual innocence, if proven, merely allows a federal court to address 

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the merits of a petitioner’s otherwise time-barred constitutional claims; the Supreme 

Court has not yet addressed whether “a freestanding claim of actual innocence” provides 

a separate basis for granting habeas relief. Id. 

 To pass through the Schlup gateway, a “petitioner must show that it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Schlup requires a petitioner ‘to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that 

was not presented at trial.’” Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). Petitioner has not presented new evidence and has not shown 

that failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

(Doc. 1.) Thus, he has not met Schlup’s high standard and this exception does not excuse 

his untimely filing. 

III. Conclusion 

 Petitioner did not file the pending habeas petition until after the statute of 

limitations had expired and, therefore, the Petition is untimely. As set forth above, 

Petitioner is not entitled equitable tolling, and has not established that an exception to the 

limitations period should apply. Accordingly, the Petition should be denied as untimely. 

Therefore the Court does not consider Respondents’ alternative grounds for denying 

habeas corpus relief. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days within which 

to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 29th day of October, 2015. 

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