Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01033/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01033-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Kenneth G. Johnson,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 01-1033 FCD PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Cal A. Terhune, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner without counsel prosecuting a

civil rights action. 

Presently before the court are cross-motions for summary

judgment between plaintiff and defendants Correctional Managed

Care Medical Corporation (CMCMC or Corporation), Nurse Massetti

(aka Marretti) and Nurse Chapman (hereinafter defendants). 

Pending summary judgment motions as to other defendants will be

addressed separately.

The action proceeds on the May 24, 2001, verified complaint. 

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Plaintiff alleges correctional officers at California Medical

Facility - Vacaville (CMF) brutally beat him, breaking a bone in

his ankle. For 16 days he did not receive any medical care for

this broken bone or other injuries caused by the beating. 

With respect to defendants who are parties to the pending

motions, plaintiff alleges he arrived at Madera County Jail after

11:00 p.m. and was taken inside in a wheelchair. Defendant

Chapman, a medical assistant employed by CMCMC, told plaintiff

she had his medication for Hepatitis C and he would receive it in

the morning. Plaintiff asked to see a doctor for his broken

bone, and to change clothes because he was soaked in pepper

spray. Chapman refused the requests and failed to examine

plaintiff. Throughout the night plaintiff’s pleas for help were

ignored. In the morning defendant Massetti (aka Marretti), a

CMCMC medical assistant, gave plaintiff Hepatitis C medicine but

refused further aid. Massetti wrote a report stating plaintiff

had abrasions and bruising on his face and said he was “stomped

on” by officers. Massetti x-rayed plaintiff’s foot and ankle. 

Plaintiff then was removed from Madera County Jail and taken

to court for an appearance, and returned to custody at CMF. Many

days later, while in custody of the California Department of

Corrections (CDC), plaintiff received extensive care for his

broken bone. The bone had to be re-set because it was “healing

funny” due to the delay in medical treatment.

Standard on Summary Judgment

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

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for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to

support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on an

issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the “‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

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admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id., at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

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affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.,3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no motion to

strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United States

Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979) (incompetent

medical evidence).

Analysis

The complaint alleges defendants violated plaintiff’s civil

rights by failing to provide constitutionally adequate medical

care under the Eighth Amendment and by CMCMC’s failure to train,

supervise and discipline its employees. The pleading also

alleges pendent state law claims involving the question of

whether defendants committed the tort of medical negligence by

failing to meet the requisite “standard of care.” 

“The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon

incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a

violation of the Eighth Amendment . . . .” McGuckin v. Smith,

974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991). A violation of the Eighth

Amendment occurs when prison officials deliberately are

indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs. Id. The threshold

for a medical claim under the Eighth Amendment is extremely high:

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A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference .

. . only if [he] knows of and disregards an excessive

risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of

Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under

this standard, the prison official must not only “be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but

that person “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was

not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290

F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). This “subjective

approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental

attitude actually was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. 

“Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s

Eighth Amendment rights. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059

(alteration and citation omitted).

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (footnote

omitted).

“Deliberate indifference to medical needs may be shown by

circumstantial evidence when the facts are sufficient to

demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a risk of harm.” 

Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted); see also Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197

(acknowledging a plaintiff may demonstrate that officers “must

have known” of a risk of harm by showing the medical need was

obvious and extreme). Delay in medical treatment can amount to

deliberate indifference if (1) the delay seriously affected the

medical condition for which plaintiff was seeking treatment, and

(2) defendants were aware the delay would cause serious harm. 

Shapley v. Nevada Board of State Prison Commissioners, 766 F.2d

404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985).

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In seeking summary judgment, defendants fail to address

Eighth Amendment standards at all. They offer no evidence

pertaining to whether plaintiff’s medical needs posed a

substantial risk of serious harm or whether they were aware of

that risk and consciously disregarded it. Nor does plaintiff

establish defendants are liable, as a matter of law, on his

Eighth Amendment or state law claims. The parties’ declarations

of medical experts create rather than erase factual disputes. 

Defendant Massetti alone is entitled to summary judgment. 

It is undisputed Massetti first learned of plaintiff’s presence

in the jail some time after 8:00 a.m. on June 2, 2000. She

learned plaintiff was on prescribed medications for treatment of

the Hepatitis C Virus and lower back pain problems, and provided

medicine to him. She completed progress notes stating plaintiff

complained of being “stomped on” by officers and complained of

left ankle pain. She noted in the file plaintiff’s leg was

swollen above the ankle and he could wiggle his toes but “refused

to move” his ankle. At approximately 9:15 a.m. Massetti x-rayed

plaintiff’s ankle and wrapped plaintiff’s left foot and ankle

with an Ace bandage. Massetti did not contact a doctor. She

entered progress notes stating she advised plaintiff to keep his

ankle elevated as much as possible and someone would “re-evaluate

after x-ray report [comes] back.” Plaintiff left the jail in a

wheelchair at 9:25 a.m. and did not return. See Defendants’

December 2, 2004, Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed

and Undisputed Facts, numbers 352-76. The x-ray results were

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negative. 

These undisputed facts show Massetti was not deliberately

indifferent to plaintiff’s medical condition. She gave a

transient prisoner his medicine (including pain medicine), heard

he was in a fight with a deputy, took an x-ray, and wrapped

plaintiff’s foot and ankle in an Ace bandage. Perhaps she could

have rendered more care, but she clearly met the constitutional

threshold.

Massetti is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

state tort claims involving negligence as well. To prevail on

these claims plaintiff must show Massetti’s conduct caused him

harm. Here, the x-ray results were negative and thus Massetti’s

failure to ensure proper follow up and re-evaluation after return

of the x-ray report (assuming it was within her power to do so)

did not cause plaintiff harm. 

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends that:

1. Defendants’ September 20, 2004, motion for summary

judgment be granted as to defendant Massetti and denied as to

other moving parties; and

2. Plaintiff’s November 15, 2004, cross-motion for summary

judgment as to defendants Correctional Managed Care Medical

Corporation, Nurse Massetti and Nurse Chapman be denied. 

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 10 days of service of these findings and

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recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: August 30, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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