Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02877/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02877-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES AUSTIN PARKS, No. CIV S-06-2877-FCD-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DAVID L. RUNNELS, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges a prison disciplinary

proceeding. Pending before the court are petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc.

1), respondents’ answer (Doc. 19), and petitioner’s reply (Doc. 20).

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was issued a rules violation report on the charge of delaying a peace

officer in the performance of his duty. According to the rules violation report, in April 2005,

correctional officers responded to a fire alarm and observed water flooding the tier. The water

was coming from cell 127, which was occupied at the time by petitioner. Petitioner was the sole

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occupant of cell 127. While correctional officers were investigating the water problem,

petitioner yelled from his cell “That’s what you get bitch.” Petitioner was removed from cell 127

and placed in a holding area while a cell search was conducted. As petitioner was being

escorted, he stated: “Put me in another cell and I’ll break that sprinkler too.” Correctional

officers searched cell 127 and recovered sprinkler parts from the toilet. Petitioner was then

removed from the holding cell and placed in cell 128 without further incident. Correctional

officers reported that petitioner was placed in cell 128 because maintenance staff were unable to

fix the sprinkler in cell 127. Re-housing petitioner required “several housing bed moves to create

a vacant cell,” which correctional officers state “delayed the unit program for approximately 2

hours.” 

At the time petitioner entered his plea to the rules violation, he stated: 

I did not delay a Peace Officer, and if you want to charge me for the

broken sprinkler you should have written me up for destruction of state

property. You can’t charge me because you did not write me up for that. 

You can find me guilty of delaying a Peace Officer if you want. But I ain’t

paying for something that I did not get written up for.

Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the charged rules violation. Petitioner was provided a

copy of the rules violation report and did not request any witnesses at his disciplinary hearing. 

Petitioner was found guilty of delaying a peace officer and assessed a loss of 90 days good-time

credits. He was also restricted from yard access for ten days and denied canteen privileges for 90

days. Petitioner was assessed a $125.00 fine for the cost of the destroyed property. It does not

appear, however, that petitioner was ever charged with destruction of state property. With

respect to a staff assistant, the hearing decision noted:

The Senior Hearing Officer determined that inmate PARKS speaks

English, is literate, the issues are not complex, and a confidential

relationship is not required. Inmate PARKS, therefore, did not meet the

criteria for assignment of a Staff Assistant pursuant to CCR, Section

3315(d)(2). However, inmate PARKS has been identified as a

Developmental Disability Program (DDP) inmate, and required a Staff

Assistant pursuant to the Clark Decision. . . . Officer Miller was assigned

as a Staff Assistant for inmate PARKS and was present during this

hearing. 

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Inmate PARKS stated during this hearing that he could read and represent

himself and did not want or need a Staff Assistant. Officer Miller

remained present through the conclusion of this hearing. 

Petitioner challenged the disciplinary proceeding in a habeas corpus petition filed

in the Lassen County Superior Court, which denied relief on June 19, 2006. The state court

concluded:

. . . The petition reflects no violation of due process: the petitioner

argues that his destruction of a sprinkler head in his cell, flooding it and

delaying the unit program for 2 hours, was not a violation of 15 C.F.R. 

§ 3005(a) and that assessing him a charge of $125.00 for repairs was

improper. The court disagrees. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is

denied. 

The California Court of Appeal denied habeas relief on September 14, 2006, without comment or

citation. The California Supreme Court denied habeas relief on November 1, 2006, with only a

citation to In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921 (1979). Respondents concede petitioner’s claim is

exhausted. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach

petitioner’s claim under its “re-litigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

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perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

Where AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is

not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F. 3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus,

under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is available where the state court’s decision is “contrary to”

or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. Under both standards,

“clearly established law” means only those holdings of the United States Supreme Court as of the

time of the relevant state court decision. See Carey v. Musladin, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653-54 (2006). 

“What matters are the holdings of the Supreme Court, not the holdings of lower federal courts.” 

Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2008) (en banc). 

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a

majority of the Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A

state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by

the Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently

than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

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governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 293 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See id.; see also Wiggins v. Smith,

123 S.Ct. 252 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams,

suggested that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court

either unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an erroneous

or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct.

1166, 1175 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot necessarily be

found even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly

erroneous. See Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. This is because “. . . the gloss of clear error fails to

give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Id. As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal

law, where a state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal

habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn,

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283 F.3d at 1052 n.6. 

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

On pages five and six of the court’s pre-printed form habeas corpus petition,

petitioner lists the following claims: (1) he was improperly denied a staff assistant; (2) there was

a conflict of interest; and (3) the fine for destruction of property was not related to the charged

violation. However, in the attached hand-written portion of the petition, petitioner discusses only

his contention that he was improperly denied a staff assistant. Therefore, the court finds that this

is the only issue properly raised by petitioner. 

With respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, due process requires prison

officials to provide the inmate with: (1) a written statement at least 24 hours before the

disciplinary hearing that includes the charges, a description of the evidence against the inmate,

and an explanation for the disciplinary action taken; (2) an opportunity to present documentary

evidence and call witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security;

and (3) legal assistance where the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974). Due process is satisfied where these minimum

requirements have been met, see Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), and

where there is “some evidence” in the record as a whole which supports the decision of the

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hearing officer, see Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). The “some evidence”

standard is not particularly stringent and is satisfied where “there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion reached.” Id. at 455-56. A violation of prison regulations does

not give rise to a due process claim as long as these minimum protections have been provided. 

See Walker, 14 F.3d at 1419-20. 

In light of these standards, the court concludes that petitioner’s claim is frivolous. 

First, the record reflects that, at the time of the hearing, petitioner explicitly refused the assistance

of any staff personnel. Second, even if he had not refused staff assistance, he would not have

been entitled to one. Under Wolff, staff assistance is limited to legal assistance, and only where

the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. In this case, there is no indication that

petitioner is illiterate. To the contrary, he stated at the hearing that he could read. Further, the

charge was not complex. Finally, petitioner states in his petition that he wanted an assistant to

help him with an investigation. Such an assistant would not have been necessary because there

was nothing which required investigation. 

Because petitioner’s claim is limited to procedural protections, the court need not

address whether there was “some evidence” to support the guilty finding. 

Accordingly, the court concludes that the state court’s denial of petitioner’s claim

was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the Wolff requirements. The court

also concludes that the state court’s decision was not objectively unreasonable. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be denied; and

2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and close this file. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 11, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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