Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_11-cv-00883/USCOURTS-alnd-4_11-cv-00883-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

EDWARD R. LANE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUSAN BURROW, in her official

capacity as Acting President of Central

Alabama Community College,

Defendant.

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 Case No.: 4:11-cv-00883-KOB

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

This matter is before the court on the “Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment for

Lack of Jurisdiction.” (Doc. 80). 

This lawsuit centers on Plaintiff Edward R. Lane’s allegations that he was terminated

from his position at Central Alabama Community College in retaliation for exercising his First

Amendment rights. This case has a lengthy procedural history, with appeals to both the Eleventh

Circuit and to the United States Supreme Court. The only claim remaining before the court today

is Lane’s claim against Susan Burrow, in her official capacity as president of Central Alabama

Community College, seeking equitable relief for the alleged violation of Lane’s First

Amendment rights. 

As will be set out in greater detail in this Opinion, the court finds that Defendant Burrow

is incapable of providing Lane with meaningful relief. Therefore, a justiciable case or

controversy no longer exists, and the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this

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FILED

 2016 Jun-14 PM 03:50

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:11-cv-00883-KOB Document 86 Filed 06/14/16 Page 1 of 12
dispute. Accordingly, the court will GRANT Burrow’s Motion for Summary Judgment and will

DISMISS Lane’s claim against her.

II. Standard of Review

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment allows a trial court to decide cases when no genuine issues of

material fact are present and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56. When a district court reviews a motion for summary judgment, it must determine

two things: (1) whether any genuine issues of material fact exist; and if not, (2) whether the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56).

Once the moving party meets its burden of showing the district court that no genuine

issues of material fact exist, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce sufficient

favorable evidence “to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes

summary judgment.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “If the

evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable, or is not significantly

probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

249–50 (1986) (internal citations omitted). 

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court should view all evidence and 

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inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

See Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). The evidence of

the non-moving party “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its]

favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising

from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,

121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This

standard exists because “the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,

not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). 

After both parties have addressed the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant

the motion only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The court may consider a challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction at any time during

the litigation. See Williams v. Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir.

2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). “Jurisdiction is power to declare

the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of

announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868); see

also Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[O]nce a federal

court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to

continue.”).

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For subject matter jurisdiction to vest in a court, Article III of the United States

Constitution requires that “a justiciable case or controversy must remain extant at all stages of

review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S.

932, 936 (2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Otherwise, “[a] case becomes moot .

. . when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”

Knox v. Serv. Emp.’s Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) (internal quotations

and citations omitted); see also Aslin v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., 704 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir.

2013) (“Mootness commonly arises where a federal court becomes unable to award meaningful

relief in the case.”). A moot suit “cannot present an Article III case or controversy and the federal

courts lack subject matter to entertain it.” Coral Springs Street Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371

F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Al Najjar v. Aschcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir.

2001) (per curiam)).

III. Statement of Facts

On September 26, 2006, Plaintiff Edward R. Lane was hired by Central Alabama

Community College (“CACC”) as the Director of the Community Intensive Training for Youth

Program (“CITY”), a program for at-risk youth. While working as Director of CITY, Lane

discovered that then state representative Suzanne Schmitz was listed on CITY’s payroll but was

not reporting for work. Lane later terminated Schmitz’s employment with CITY. After she was

terminated, the FBI began investigating Schmitz and contacted Lane for information. Lane then

testified before a federal grand jury and, pursuant to a subpoena, testified at Schmitz’s August

2008 federal criminal trial for mail fraud and fraud involving a program receiving federal funds.

In January 2009, Dr. Steve Franks, then president of CACC, terminated Lane from his

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position with CITY. Lane alleges that Franks terminated him in retaliation for testifying against

Schmitz, in violation of his First Amendment rights.

In September 2009, the Alabama state legislature stopped funding the CITY program, and

the program was terminated. Franks has now retired from his position as president of CACC, and

Susan Burrow has replaced him as his successor, leaving the remaining claims against Franks in

his official capacity as claims against Susan Burrow in her official capacity. 

IV. Procedural History

Lane originally brought this suit in January 2011 in the Middle District of Alabama

against Central Alabama Community College and Dr. Steve Franks. Lane asserted three counts in

his Complaint: (1) a violation of the State Employee Protection Act under Ala. Code §36-26A-3

by Franks; (2) retaliation for the exercise of protected First Amendment speech by Franks and

CACC; and (3) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for conspiring to injure him because he had

testified by Franks. The case was transferred to this court in March 2011.

Relying on existing Eleventh Circuit case law, this court dismissed Lane’s conspiracy

claim and granted the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Lane’s remaining claims,

finding that (1) the Eleventh Amendment barred Lane’s claim against CACC; (2) the Eleventh

Amendment barred Lane’s claims against Franks in his official capacity as president of CACC;

and (3) the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of qualified immunity barred Lane’s claims

against Franks in his individual capacity.

In November 2012, Lane appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, abandoning all of his claims

except for his claims against Franks in his individual and official capacity seeking equitable relief

for an alleged violation of the First Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this court’s

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decision as to those claims. See Lane v. Cent. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709 (11th Cir. 2013)

(per curiam). The Eleventh Circuit explained that, although this court had couched its decision in

terms of qualified immunity, it found that Lane’s speech was made pursuant to his official duties

as CITY’s Director, not as a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern. The Eleventh Circuit

agreed that Lane was not entitled to First Amendment Protection because his speech was not

made as a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern. The Eleventh Circuit also concluded

that even if a constitutional violation had occurred, Franks would be entitled to qualified

immunity because that right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Lane then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court affirmed

in part and reversed and remanded in part. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014). The

Supreme Court found that Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’s trial was speech as a citizen on a matter

of public concern and was therefore entitled to First Amendment protection, but that Franks was

nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity from the claim against him in his individual capacity

because Lane’s First Amendment right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal of Lane’s

claim against Franks in his individual capacity. The Supreme Court, however, reversed and

remanded the Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal of the claims against Franks in his official capacity.

This court had dismissed those claims as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the Eleventh

Circuit had declined to consider them on appeal, finding that, because Lane had failed to

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, it did not need to decide whether Franks was entitled to

sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit for further

consideration of the claim against Franks in his official capacity.

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On remand, the Eleventh Circuit found that Lane’s claim against Franks in his official

capacity was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it sought prospective equitable

relief in the form of reinstatement of his employment. See Lane v. Cent. Ala. Comm. Coll., 772

F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to this court to

determine the equitable relief available to Lane. The Eleventh Circuit noted that “it might be

necessary for the district court to engage in additional factfinding on this issue to determine what

form of equitable relief is available to Lane.” Id. at 1352 n. 3.

While Lane’s appeals were pending, Franks retired from his position as president of

CACC, and Susan Burrow replaced him as his successor. Accordingly, the court substituted

Susan Burrow as a Defendant, and Lane’s claims against Franks in his official capacity are now

claims against Susan Burrow in her official capacity. The only claim remaining before this court

on remand is Lane’s claim against Susan Burrow, in her official capacity, seeking equitable relief

for the termination that allegedly violated Lane’s First Amendment rights. 

The court held a status conference in this case on January 7, 2015, and gave the parties

until February 23, 2015 to engage in additional discovery on the issue of the appropriate

equitable remedy. 

On February 20, 2015, near the end of discovery, Lane moved to amend his Complaint to

add a new Defendant. Lane argued that the CITY program was reorganized as the SPAN

program, under the direction of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) and requested leave to

add as a Defendant the Executive Director of the DYS, Steven P. Lefreniere, in his official

capacity. The court denied Lane’s Motion, finding his request to be untimely because it was filed

more than three years after the court’s deadline for joining additional parties. The court

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additionally found that Lane had not shown good cause for his delay because Lane’s argument

that DYS was the successor to CACC was based on a report that was publicly available in 2009,

two years before Lane had even filed suit. Lane then filed a Motion to Reconsider, which the

court also denied.

In January of this year, Susan Burrow filed the Motion for Summary Judgment that is the

subject of this Opinion.

V. Discussion

The only remaining Defendant in this action, Susan Burrow, has moved for summary

judgment on the basis that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute because a

justiciable case or controversy no longer exists. Burrow contends that she is incapable of

providing Lane with the equitable relief he seeks. The parties agree that Lane cannot be

reinstated to a position with CITY because that program no longer exists.

Lane, however, has argued that the CITY program was reorganized as the SPAN

program. Burrow contends that she is also incapable of reinstating Lane to a position with the

SPAN program because it is overseen by DYS, and Burrow, as president of CACC, has no

control over the SPAN program.1

In furtherance of his position that the CITY program had been reorganized as SPAN,

Lane sought to amend his Complaint to add the Executive Director of DYS as a Defendant. In his

1

 In his Response to Burrow’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Lane suggests in a

footnote that, because CACC and DYS are both arms of the state that are represented by the state

Attorney General, Burrow may be able reinstate Lane to a position with SPAN, even though it is

part of another state agency. Lane provides no support for this position and has failed to

demonstrate that Burrow has the authority to reinstate Lane to a position with SPAN. Therefore,

the court finds that this argument lacks merit. 

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Motion for Leave to Amend, Lane stated that “the Executive Director of DYS (who is presently

Steven P. Lefreniere), in his official capacity, will need to be named as a party Defendant

herein.” (Doc. 69, ¶ 8). Lane further said, “In the instant action, complete relief cannot be

accorded without the addition of the successor to Susan Burrow insofar as the continuance of the

C.I.T.Y. program is concerned (now renamed SPAN).” (Id., ¶ 9). Lane argued that he should be

given leave to add Lefreniere as a Defendant because he “would be the only official that could

effectuate the appropriate equitable remedy of reinstatement . . . .” (Id., ¶ 12). The court,

however, denied Lane’s Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint, as set out above.

Burrow argues that Lane’s statements demonstrate that no meaningful relief is available

to him because only Lefreniere, as Executive Director of DYS, could provide Lane with such

relief by reinstating him to a position with SPAN. Burrow suggests that, because no meaningful

relief is available to Lane, a justiciable case or controversy no longer exists, and the court does

not have subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2287 (2012)

(explaining that “[a] case becomes moot . . . when it is impossible for a court to grant any

effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The court agrees. Lane has previously represented to the court that the Executive Director

of DYS is the only individual who could provide him with meaningful relief. Lane may not

change his position and now argue the opposite. Because the Executive Director of DYS is not a

party to this suit, no meaningful relief is available to Lane, and no justiciable case or controversy

exists.

Lane nonetheless argues that, his previous representations aside, meaningful relief is

available to him because the court could order Burrow to reinstate him to a comparable position

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with CACC, even though his prior position with the CITY program no longer exists. Assuming

arguendo that Lane were not bound to his previous representations, the court agrees that it could

order reinstatement to a comparable position if such a comparable position existed. See, e.g.,

Sennello v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 667 F. Supp. 1498, 1522 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (ordering

reinstatement to a position that was “comparable to that which she held prior to her wrongful

demotion and subsequent firing some seven years ago.”).

Lane, however, has failed to demonstrate that any comparable positions exist at Central

Alabama Community College. Lane states, “It is simply apparent from a cursory review of the

Central Alabama Community College website that Ms. Burrow has comparable positions to that

which Mr. Lane held at the time of his termination.” (Doc. 82, at 7). In support of this statement,

Lane attaches a screenshot from CACC’s website with information on the “Achieving Student

Success” Program, a program focused on helping low-income and other high-risk students to

achieve academic success. (Doc. 82-1). The screenshot offered by Lane clearly states, however,

that the Achieving Student Success program is funded by a five year Title III Department of

Education grant that began October 1, 2011 and will end on September 30, 2016. (Id.).

Institutions that receive these grants are not eligible to receive another grant of this type “until 2

years after the date on which the 5-year grant period terminates.” 29 U.S.C. § 1059. Therefore,

the grant for CACC’s Achieving Student Success Program will end on September 30, 2016, and

will not be extended. Lane has offered no evidence to show that a potential position within the

Achieving Student Success program would exist in any capacity past the program’s September

30, 2016 end date.

Further, despite being given time to engage in additional discovery on the issue of the

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appropriate equitable remedy, Lane has offered no evidence, except for the screenshot of the

webpage for the Achieving Student Success program, to show that positions exist within the

Achieving Student Success program, or within any other program at Central Alabama

Community College, that would be comparable to the position he held with the CITY program. 

Lane’s mere suggestion that comparable positions exist at CACC within Burrow’s control

is insufficient to establish that such positions actually exist. Lane must do more than suggest that

comparable positions exist; he must offer concrete evidence demonstrating the existence of those

positions. See Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A mere ‘scintilla’ of

evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a

showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.”) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly

probative, summary judgment may be granted)). Lane has failed to offer sufficient evidence.

Accordingly, the court finds that Lane has not shown that a comparable position is

available to which he could be reinstated by Susan Burrow.

Lane additionally argues that this case is not moot because the Eleventh Circuit remanded

the case with the knowledge that Lane’s former position no longer existed. The court finds that

this argument lacks merit. In its Opinion remanding the case to this court, the Eleventh Circuit

stated:

We acknowledge that the C.I.T.Y. Program for which Lane served as

Director is no longer in existence. We are unconvinced that this fact,

in and of itself, renders Lane’s request for reinstatement moot,

particularly where Lane has alleged that the program was merely

reorganized and renamed. But, should the district court determine that

a constitutional violation occurred, we suggest that it might be

necessary for the district court to engage in additional factfinding on

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this issue to determine what form of equitable relief is available to

Lane.

Lane, 772 F.3d at 1352 n. 3.

In this statement, the Eleventh Circuit did not present any opinion as to whether the case

would be moot given the facts now before the court. The Eleventh Circuit simply found that the

case was not moot based on the facts before it at that time, and that the district court may need to

engage in additional factfinding to determine what, if any, form of equitable relief was available

to Lane. Having now allowed the parties to engage in additional discovery to present additional

facts to the court, the court finds that Burrow is unable to provide Lane with any form of

equitable relief, and, therefore, the case is moot.

IV. Conclusion

Because Lane cannot demonstrate that Defendant Burrow can afford him any meaningful

relief, no justiciable case or controversy exists, and the court no longer has subject matter

jurisdiction over this dispute.

Therefore, the court will GRANT Burrow’s Motion for Summary Judgment and will

DISMISS this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with costs taxed as paid.

The court will enter a separate final Order along with this Opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of June, 2016.

 ____________________________________

 KARON OWEN BOWDRE

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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