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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-1780 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

ex rel. LUANN ZIEBELL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

FOX VALLEY WORKFORCE 

DEVELOPMENT BOARD, INC., and

WORKFORCE ECONOMICS, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 10 C 436 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 9, 2015 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 25, 2015 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and ANDREA R. 

WOOD, District Judge.

*

 

* Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

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2 No. 14-1780 

SYKES, Circuit Judge. In 2003 LuAnn Ziebell began working at the Fox Valley Workforce Development Board, Inc., a 

state job-training agency serving central Wisconsin with 

funding from the federal government. She was fired in 2008. 

Almost two years later, she filed a qui tam action alleging 

that the Board violated the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 

§§ 3729 et seq., by improperly contracting services through a 

subsidiary corporation. As best we can tell, her claim relies 

on a theory known as “false certification”; she alleges that 

the Board made false certifications of regulatory compliance 

as a predicate to receiving federal funds. She also alleges that 

she was fired in retaliation for engaging in activity protected 

by the Act. The district court found both claims factually 

deficient and entered summary judgment for the Board. 

Ziebell’s qui tam claim faces a jurisdictional hurdle. To 

prevent parasitic lawsuits, the False Claims Act blocks 

jurisdiction over qui tam claims that are based on information already in the public domain. Here, the alleged 

improprieties by the Board were revealed in a routine audit 

performed by its supervising state agency, which counts as a 

“public disclosure” under the Act. An exception applies if 

Ziebell can show that she was the “original source” of the 

information. She has not done so. Accordingly, we dismiss 

Ziebell’s qui tam claim for lack of jurisdiction. On the retaliation claim, we affirm the judgment for the Board. There’s no 

evidence that Ziebell was fired in retaliation for engaging in 

protected activity. 

I. Background 

The Fox Valley Workforce Development Board was 

formed in 2000 under the auspices of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 2801 et seq., a federal jobCase: 14-1780 Document: 36 Filed: 11/25/2015 Pages: 12
No. 14-1780 3 

training program that provides funding to state-level investment boards, which in turn channel funds to areadesignated workforce “development boards.” The development boards are multi-stakeholder bodies whose representatives are appointed by local elected officials. 

During the time period relevant here, the Fox Valley 

Board provided job-training services in the Wisconsin 

counties of Calumet, Fond du Lac, Green Lake, Outagamie, 

Waupaca, Waushara, and Winnebago. Ziebell was hired as 

an executive assistant in 2003 and the following year was 

promoted to finance director. During Ziebell’s entire tenure 

with the Board, she reported to its executive director, Cheryl 

Welch. 

Development boards provide services through subcontractors selected via a competitive bidding process. The Fox 

Valley Board contracted out a particular basket of services—

called Adult and Dislocated Worker Services—to a firm 

known as Career Pros. That company dissolved in the 

summer of 2004. The Board responded to this event by 

creating its own subsidiary, Workforce Economics, Inc., 

which subsumed the former Career Pros staff. This had the 

desirable effect of maintaining continuity of service, but it 

took the agency out of regulatory compliance. Under federal 

rules implementing the Workforce Investment Act, development boards are not supposed to directly provide services. 

In September 2007 the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development (“DWD”), the state agency responsible 

for overseeing the area development boards, conducted a 

routine audit of the Board’s activities. The audit report 

criticized the Board for providing services through its own 

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subsidiary and recommended an end to the practice. In a 

letter dated February 1, 2008, Welch acknowledged the 

problem and advised DWD that the Board would return to 

competitive bidding for Adult and Dislocated Worker Services. The letter also stated that Workforce Economics would 

not bid on services for the remainder of 2008 or for 2009. 

The Board thereafter solicited bids but received only two. 

Of those two, one covered only four of the counties in the 

Board’s service area, while the other bidder was deemed too 

inexperienced to competently provide the required services. 

As a result, by the time the full Board met on May 15, 2008, 

Welch had decided to continue providing services through 

Workforce Economics. 

Ziebell attended the May 15 meeting with copies of the 

DWD audit report and Welch’s responsive letter in hand. She 

did not ask to speak but instead “tried to create a disturbance” by speaking to other board members while the meeting was in progress. She hoped that by disrupting the meeting she would prompt someone to inquire about the documents she brought with her, at which point she would 

expose Welch’s plot to stick with Workforce Economics, the 

Board’s in-house service provider. Things didn’t unfold that 

way. Rather, Welch explained the problem with the bids and 

suggested that the Board allow Workforce Economics to bid 

to provide the necessary services. The board members and 

local elected officials agreed. Ziebell had no influence on the 

decision. 

Four days later Welch and the Board’s Chief Operating 

Officer called Ziebell to a meeting and fired her. Welch read 

from a script listing the reasons for the termination decision. 

These included (among other reasons): (1) Ziebell had 

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No. 14-1780 5 

admitted to skipping work to play golf; (2) she had disrupted the May 15 board meeting; (3) she chose not to further her 

formal education; and (4) she submitted mileagereimbursement forms that contained some irregularities. 

After reading the script, Welch asked Ziebell if she preferred 

to resign. Ziebell rejected that suggestion, saying, “[t]here is 

no way in Hell I am going to resign. If you want to terminate 

me, you will have to pay the consequences.” 

In July Ziebell filed a complaint with DWD alleging unlawful retaliation for engaging in activity protected by the 

False Claims Act. Almost two years later she brought this qui 

tam action on behalf of herself and the United States alleging 

that the Board violated the Act. She also alleged that the 

Board fired her in retaliation for activity protected under the 

Act. The United States declined to participate in the qui tam 

claim. While the suit was pending, the U.S. Department of 

Labor conducted its own review of Wisconsin’s workforce 

development programs and found various compliance 

deficiencies by a number of area workforce development 

boards. There were no findings of fraud. The Labor Department reported its findings to the DWD, which has since been 

working with federal authorities to alleviate the remaining 

concerns. 

The district court granted summary judgment for the 

Board, concluding that Ziebell’s claims lacked factual support. This appeal followed. 

II. Analysis 

The False Claims Act prohibits the submission of a false 

or fraudulent claim for payment to the government. 

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). Under the Act, private citizens may file 

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civil actions on behalf of the United States to recover money 

the government paid because of a false or fraudulent claim. 

Id. § 3730(b)(1). The Act incentivizes these qui tam suits by 

allowing prevailing “relators” (the citizen plaintiffs) to 

recover a share of the enhanced recovery allowed under the 

statute. Id. § 3729(a) (providing for treble damages and other 

penalties); id. § 3730(d)(1)–(2) (providing for an award to 

prevailing qui tam plaintiffs). 

Ziebell focuses on the Board’s regulatory noncompliance—its use of an in-house service provider—but she hasn’t 

clearly articulated a false-claims theory of her case. She 

appears to be trying to invoke a theory known as “false 

certification,” which derives from § 3729(a)(1)(B). That 

section imposes liability against any person who “knowingly 

makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or 

statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.” Id. To 

prevail on a claim of false certification, the relator must 

prove that: (1) the defendant certified its compliance with 

particular statutory or regulatory requirements that were 

“conditions of, or prerequisites to, government payment”; 

(2) the defendant “did not actually comply with those conditions; and (3) the defendant “knew it had failed to comply 

with those conditions.” United States ex rel. Absher v. Momence 

Nursing Center, Inc., 764 F.3d 699, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(citing United States ex rel. Gross v. AIDS Research AllianceChi., 415 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 2005)). 

Ziebell identifies three documents that she claims were 

false or misleading certifications—a 2000 “Consortium 

Agreement,” a “Local Plan” for the years 2005–2007, and 

Welch’s February 1, 2008 response to the DWD audit. 

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No. 14-1780 7 

We note for starters that the Consortium Agreement predates the formation of the Board; it also contains only a 

generic promise to “conform to all the fiscal requirements of 

all applicable laws.” The Local Plan, too, contains only a 

boilerplate general promise of future regulatory compliance. 

Welch’s letter is only somewhat more specific. In it she states 

that Workforce Economics—the Board’s in-house service 

provider—would not be bidding to provide services for the 

rest of 2008 or for 2009. She also states more generally that 

the Board would be “reviewing procedures” to “ensure 

[Workforce Investment Act] rules are followed.” 

Promises of future compliance can be false or fraudulent 

only if made with intent not to perform. As we’ve explained 

before in this context, “fraud requires more than breach of 

promise: fraud entails making a false representation, such as 

a statement that the speaker will do something it plans not to 

do.” United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 

914, 917 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Ziebell has adduced no evidence suggesting that any of these statements 

was made with fraudulent intent. Ziebell’s false-certification 

theory runs into further trouble in that none of these documents has any apparent nexus to federal payments. 

But aside from these factual infirmities, there’s an antecedent question of our jurisdiction over Ziebell’s claim. The 

False Claims Act generally bars qui tam actions that are 

based on information already in the public domain. At the 

time period in question here, the so-called “public disclosure” bar stated as follows (it has since been amended): 

No court shall have jurisdiction over an action 

under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a crimCase: 14-1780 Document: 36 Filed: 11/25/2015 Pages: 12
8 No. 14-1780 

inal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government 

Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the 

action is brought by the Attorney General or 

the person bringing the action is an original 

source of the information. 

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 

This language clearly withdraws jurisdiction over qui 

tam actions that are based on publicly disclosed information 

unless the relator is an “original source” of the information. 

See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 468 

(2007); Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 

912 (7th Cir. 2009). The point of the jurisdictional bar is to 

“deter parasitic qui tam actions.” United States ex rel. Gear v. 

Emergency Med. Assocs. of Ill., Inc., 436 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 

2006). Once information is public, “only the Attorney General and a relator who is an ‘original source’ of the information may represent the United States.” Id. (quoting United 

States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 97 F.3d 937, 941 (7th 

Cir. 1996)). 

Our cases establish a three-step inquiry to determine 

whether a qui tam claim falls within the public-disclosure 

bar. We ask (1) have the relator’s allegations been publicly 

disclosed; (2) if so, is the lawsuit “based upon” those publicly disclosed allegations; and (3) if it is, was the relator the 

original source of the information? Glaser, 570 F.3d at 913. 

The relator bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. 

Absher, 764 F.3d at 707; Glaser, 570 F.3d at 913 (“At each stage 

of the jurisdictional analysis, the plaintiff bears the burden of 

proof.”). 

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No. 14-1780 9 

Information is publicly disclosed if “the critical elements 

exposing the transaction as fraudulent are placed in the 

public domain.” United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar 

Fed., Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2003). Disclosure by 

units of state and local governments count as public disclosures. See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. 

United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 301 (2010) (“Today’s 

ruling ... confirms that disclosures made in one type of 

context—a state or local report, audit, or investigation—may 

trigger the public disclosure bar.”). “[A] relator’s [qui tam] 

complaint is ‘based upon’ publicly disclosed allegations or 

transactions when the allegations in the relator’s complaint 

are substantially similar to publicly disclosed allegations.” 

Glaser, 570 F.3d at 920 (emphasis added). 

Ziebell’s claim rests on the Board’s improper practice of 

provided services directly through Workforce Economics. 

That’s precisely what DWD found in its audit, so her qui tam 

claim is plainly “based on” the DWD’s public disclosure of 

this information. Ziebell doesn’t argue otherwise. Instead, 

she tries to bring herself within the original-source exception. “The original-source exception requires relators to 

establish that they have (1) ‘direct’ knowledge of fraudulent 

activity; (2) ‘independent’ knowledge of fraudulent activity; 

and (3) voluntarily provided their information to the government before filing a qui tam action.” Id. at 917 (quoting 

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)). 

Ziebell hasn’t come close to satisfying these requirements. Although it may be reasonable to infer that she had 

direct knowledge of the Board’s relationship with Workforce 

Economics as a general matter, she hasn’t shown that she 

had direct and independent knowledge—apart from the DWD 

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audit report—that this relationship created a problem of 

regulatory compliance. More to the point, she hasn’t shown 

that she had direct and independent knowledge of any 

fraudulent-claims activity by the Board. Finally, it’s clear that 

Ziebell did not voluntarily provide any information about 

her allegations to the federal government before filing suit. 

Indeed, she admitted in her deposition that it was the DWD 

report that “started some of the ball rolling” regarding the 

regulatory dilemma created by the use of an in-house service 

provider and that she talked to “no one” in the federal 

government about this until after she filed suit. Ziebell’s qui 

tam claim clearly falls within the public-disclosure bar and 

must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

Ziebell’s retaliation claim fails on the merits. The False 

Claims Act provides a cause of action to any employee who 

is “discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, 

or [otherwise] discriminated against ... because of lawful 

acts” undertaken “in furtherance of” a qui tam action. 

31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1). To prevail on a retaliation claim 

requires proof that “(a) [the plaintiff’s] actions were taken ‘in 

furtherance’ of [a False Claims Act] enforcement action and 

were therefore protected by the statute; (b) his employer had 

knowledge that he was engaged in this protected conduct; 

and (c) his discharge was motivated, at least in part, by the 

protected conduct.” Fanslow v. Chi. Mfg. Ctr., Inc., 384 F.3d 

469, 479 (7th Cir. 2004). 

Ziebell has satisfied none of these elements. First, as 

we’ve already noted, the record doesn’t show any fraudulent-claims activity; at most it shows regulatory noncompliance. As Fanslow explains, “there is an objective component 

to the test for a [retaliation] claim under § 3730(h), as well as 

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No. 14-1780 11 

a subjective one.” Id. at 479–80. In other works, it’s not 

enough for Ziebell to think she’s enforcing the False Claims 

Act; a reasonable employee in the same position must be 

able to think the same thing. Id. at 480 (“We agree with 

several of our sister circuits, which have held that the relevant inquiry to determine whether an employee’s actions are 

protected under § 3730(h) is whether: ‘(1) the employee in 

good faith believes, and (2) a reasonable employee in the 

same or similar circumstances might believe, that the employer is committing fraud against the government.’” (quoting Moore v. Cal. Inst. of Tech. Jet Propulsion Lab., 275 F.3d 838, 

845 (9th Cir. 2002))). Because Ziebell’s qui tam claim lacks 

factual support, no reasonable employee in similar circumstances would believe that the Board was committing fraud 

against the federal government. 

Moreover, there’s no evidence that Ziebell took any action toward a qui tam claim before she was fired. Nor is 

there anything in the record to suggest that the Board had 

any idea that she was even contemplating a qui tam claim. 

Finally, Ziebell was fired for a variety of reasons ranging 

from truancy to causing a disruption at the May 2008 board 

meeting. Nothing suggests that the decision was motivated 

in part by protected activity. Ziebell offers no evidence that 

the reasons given for her firing were pretexual. Nor could 

she; Ziebell gave her superiors no indication she was taking 

steps toward a False Claims Act enforcement action. Although her disruption of the May 2008 board meeting was 

related to the improper subcontract with Workforce 

Economics, disrupting a meeting hardly qualifies as protected activity absent something more. The retaliation claim is 

woefully lacking in factual support. 

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12 No. 14-1780 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS the 

qui tam claim for lack of jurisdiction. In other respects the 

judgment is AFFIRMED. 

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