Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01807/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01807-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SALADIN RUSHDAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. GONZALES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01807-DLB PC

ORDER FINDING CONGNIZABLE 

CLAIMS AND DISMISSING REMAINING 

CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff Saladin Rushdan (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action on November 17, 2014. The action was transferred to this 

Court on November 19, 2014. Pursuant to Court order, he filed a First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”) on May 4, 2015. Plaintiff names J. Gonzales, J. Arnett, T. Hood, Officer Casas, A. 

Guzman, T. Marsh, Sgt. Macias, M. Sexton and John Doe as Defendants.

1

 

On October 28, 2015, the Court screened Plaintiff’s FAC and found that it stated (1) an 

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendants Arnett, Hood, Guzman, Casas and 

Doe; and (2) a due process claim against Defendant Sexton. The Court ordered Plaintiff to either file 

an amended complaint, or notify the Court of his willingness to proceed only on these cognizable 

 

1

Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on January 15, 2015.

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claims. On November 6, 2015, Plaintiff informed the Court that he was willing to proceed only on 

the cognizable claims.2 

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

To state a claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights. Id. at 1949. This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient 

to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

 

2

In his filing, Plaintiff asks why the Court did not address his claim of “unreasonable force” on page 15 of his FAC. The 

Court will address it in this order.

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B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison in Corcoran, California, where the 

events at issue occurred. 

Sometime in June 2013, after Plaintiff arrived at Corcoran, he appeared before a 

Classification Committee and made it clear that he would refuse to be double-celled. Defendant 

Marsh, the 3A-Yard Lieutenant, therefore had knowledge of “the intended reaction of Plaintiff.” 

ECF No. 11, at 16. Plaintiff contends that by signing off on the documents that were subsequently 

falsified, Defendant Marsh “lent tacit support to the other defendants.” ECF No. 11, at 17. 

On June 30, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Arnett and Hood walked Plaintiff to see 

Defendant Gonzales, the yard sergeant who was directly responsible for ordering all events. 

Defendant Gonzales asked Plaintiff the same question over and over. Plaintiff stated, “I have an out 

of court settlement with CDC and I’m not supposed to be housed at Corcoran and I’m supposed to 

be single-cell status. Take me to the hole, I refuse to be double-celled.” ECF No. 11, at 11-12. 

Defendant Gonzales then ordered Plaintiff to be placed in a double cell. Plaintiff tried to “resist 

peacefully by stopping,” but Defendants Arnett and Hood bent his elbows above his head. ECF No. 

11, at 12. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Gonzales was responsible for ordering the use of illegal 

force, and was responsible for Plaintiff’s safety. 

Defendant Guzman then walked up and asked Plaintiff what the problem was, and Plaintiff 

said he had repeated it over and over. Defendant Guzman told Plaintiff that he had not told him of a 

problem, so Plaintiff repeated that he had an out of court settlement. Defendant Guzman again asked 

Plaintiff if he had any safety concerns. 

Plaintiff alleges that the hold by Defendants Arnett and Hood was excruciatingly painful and 

exacerbated various injuries. They “bodily carried” Plaintiff up a flight of stairs, and then tried to 

toss Plaintiff face first into cell #230 with another prisoner (Inmate Cain). ECF No. 11, at 12. 

When Plaintiff tried to resist and break his fall by grabbing onto the cell door, Defendants 

Arnett, Hood, Guzman, Casas and Doe assaulted him on the orders of Defendant Gonzales. They 

began kicking and kneeing Plaintiff in an attempt to get him to double cell, and they laughed and 

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joked about it. ECF No. 11, at 12-13. Defendant Arnett then punched Plaintiff in the chest and 

knocked him onto his back. By the time Plaintiff got to his feet, Defendant Arnett “cowardly ran out 

of the cell and slammed the door.” ECF No. 11, at 13. Plaintiff states that he was already 

restrained, handcuffed and in a secure holding area at the time force was used. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Marsh did not physically touch Plaintiff, but he was “present 

in the building during the attack and did nothing to stop it.” ECF No. 11, at 17.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Casas was the “spark that ignited the entire situation.” ECF 

No. 11, at 13-14. Defendants Casas and Doe handcuffed Plaintiff initially on June 30, 2013, and 

placed him in the locked shower area, which is often used as a holding cage. Plaintiff “peaceably” 

told Defendant Casas that he was refusing to double cell with Inmate Cain and he assumed that 

“standard procedure” after a refusal would be followed and he’d go to the hole. ECF No. 11, at 14. 

About fifteen minutes later, Defendant Casas returned and told Plaintiff, “Let’s go!” While still 

handcuffed, Plaintiff turned towards the front door, assuming he was going to the hole. Instead, 

Defendants Casas and Doe tried to force Plaintiff up the stairs. Defendant Casas told Plaintiff that 

unless he had safety concerns, he was going into that cell. Plaintiff was shocked and “planted his 

feet and loudly proclaimed: ‘I have an out of court settlement and I am not supposed to be housed at 

Corcoran period. An [sic] I’m supposed to be single-celled.” ECF No. 11, at 14. Defendant Casas 

kept asking Plaintiff if he had safety concerns and Plaintiff responded with “the same answer each 

time.” ECF No. 11, at 14. Defendant Casas again said, “Let’s go,” and then swung Plaintiff towards 

the wall, pushing his head and trying to smash his face into the wall. ECF No. 11, at 14. At the last 

moment, Plaintiff blocked the majority of the force with his foot and knee. 

Prior to the assault, Plaintiff contends that he told Defendants that he was refusing to doublecell and why. Plaintiff states that after the assault, several Defendants were guilty of “threats and 

falsifying documentation.” ECF No. 11, at 9. He contends that Defendants conspired to disavow the 

incident. Defendants never made a verbal or written report, and lied to make it appear as though 

Plaintiff requested protective custody. 

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Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot say that they were just doing their job because they 

do not have a right to force an inmate to double-cell. If a prisoner refuses an order, guards can 

handcuff him. However, kicking and punching is not appropriate. 

After the incident, Defendant Guzman asked Plaintiff to sign a statement indicating that he 

had safety and security concerns. Plaintiff refused, and told him “I thought you were a straight up

man, you know I never made any statement like that. I’m not signing that.” ECF No. 11, at 15. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Guzman falsified the document and later added a false addendum. 

Plaintiff contends that these statements placed his life at risk, as Corcoran staff gave inmates access 

to other prisoners’ reports and information. Plaintiff argues that this implicated a liberty interest in 

“maintaining truth, his reputation and continued daily existence.” ECF No. 11, at 16. He believes 

that his medical condition and prior settlement places him “outside the normal operation of prison 

and in itself created a new liberty interest.” ECF No. 11, at 16. He contends that attacking him and 

forcing him to double cell-with mentally ill prisoners, gang members or other prisoners involved in 

activities detrimental to his health was an atypical hardship.

Plaintiff further believes that placing him in a double cell creates an unreasonable risk to his 

health because it aggravates his medical condition. He alleges that he “exudes a malodorous smell 

from his infections” and had been single-celled in the past because of this. ECF No. 11, at 18. 

Plaintiff contends that he cannot get up at 2 a.m. to tend to his wounds without a substantial risk of 

fighting his cell mate. He also believes that he has a liberty interest in being single-celled. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Macias attempted to intimidate him prior to his 

Classification Committee meeting in an attempt to “subvert justice.” ECF No. 11, at 19. He 

believes that this was in retaliation for his charges of assault against Corcoran staff. Defendant 

Macias told Plaintiff that he would not be allowed to make “all sorts of accusations against Corcoran 

prison guards concerning their attack on him.” ECF No. 11, at 19. Plaintiff contends that only a 

counselor can perform pre-interviews prior to classification, and that Defendant Macias, a sergeant, 

had no authority to do so. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Macias was part of the conspiracy to hide

the assault, and that she retaliated against him and violated his right to free speech.

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Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sexton, Chief Deputy Warden, was at his 

Classification Committee hearing. Defendant Sexton refused to allow Plaintiff to introduce pertinent 

case information so that he could respond to the false charges that he supposedly had safety and 

security concerns. He alleges that Defendant Sexton made himself part of the conspiracy to cover up 

the assault. Defendant Sexton also refused to hear any case factors relating to Plaintiff’s medical 

needs. Plaintiff believes that his actions were retaliatory “for said guards to protect their lies.” ECF 

No. 11, at 20.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments.

C. ANALYSIS

1. Eighth Amendment- Excessive Force

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 

Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992) 

(citations omitted). For claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the issue is 

“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (per 

curiam) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 

F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013). The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is 

contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency, Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted), and although de minimis uses of force do not violate the Constitution, 

the malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of 

decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident, Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-8, 130 

S.Ct. at 1178 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10) (quotation marks omitted); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 

623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002). 

a. Use of Force in Cell- Defendants Arnett, Hood, Guzman, Casas and Doe

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Arnett, Hood, Guzman, Casas and Doe kicked and kneed 

him while he was handcuffed, though admittedly trying to resist being placed into a double cell. At 

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the screening stage, and considering the number of Defendants allegedly involved, the Court finds 

that this states a claim against Defendants Arnett, Hood, Guzman, Casas and Doe.3

b. Other Allegations of Use of Force 

i. Defendant Casas

Plaintiff contends that he was handcuffed by Defendants Casas and Doe after he refused to 

be double celled. He alleges that they tried to force him up the stairs, and Defendant Casas told him 

that unless he had a safety concern, he would be double celled. In response, Plaintiff “planted his 

feet and loudly proclaimed: ‘I have an out of court settlement and I am not supposed to be housed at 

Corcoran period. An [sic] I’m supposed to be single-celled.’” ECF No. 11, at 14. Defendant Casas 

kept asking Plaintiff if he had safety concerns and Plaintiff kept responding with the same answer. 

Defendant Casas then swung Plaintiff towards the wall, pushing his head and trying to smash his 

face into the wall. At the last minute, Plaintiff blocked the majority of force with his foot and knee.

For claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the issue is “whether force was 

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to 

cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (per curiam) (citing 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028 

(9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff again admits that he refused an order to double cell, and then resisted 

Defendant Casas’ apparent attempts to move him after he was handcuffed. Plaintiff also contends 

that he “blocked” the majority of force. Under this scenario, which involves only one Defendant, the 

Court finds that this does not state a claim for relief. 

ii. Defendant Guzman

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Guzman approached him and asked what the problem was. 

Plaintiff again told him about the settlement, but Defendant Guzman asked if Plaintiff had any safety 

concerns. There is nothing about this encounter that suggests the use of any force.

 

3

 Plaintiff’s claim that the “assault” was ordered by Defendant Gonzales will be discussed below. 

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iii. Defendants Hood and Arnett

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Hood and Arnett walked him to see Defendant Gonzales. 

After Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Gonzales, Defendant Gonzales ordered Plaintiff to a double cell 

and Defendants Hood and Arnett began to take him back across the yard. Plaintiff admits that he 

tried to “resist peacefully by stopping,” but Defendants Hood and Arnett bent his elbows above his 

head. ECF No. 11, at 12. Plaintiff contends that the arm hold was painful. Again, however, 

Plaintiff has admitted that he was resisting attempts to move him across the yard. Under this 

scenario, even though the arm hold may have caused pain, the facts do not suggest that Defendants 

Hood and Arnett used force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. He therefore fails to state 

claim against them based on this incident.

iv. Defendant Gonzales

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Gonzales ordered the assault. However, Plaintiff’s

allegations are based solely on speculation. Defendant Gonzales asked Plaintiff if he had any safety 

concerns and, despite Plaintiff’s explanation about his prior settlement, ordered that he be taken to a 

double cell. These facts do no suggest, in any way, that Defendant Gonzales ordered that any action 

be taken against Plaintiff other than his placement in a double cell. 

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant Gonzales for the use of excessive 

force.

v. Defendant Marsh

Plaintiff makes a vague allegation that Defendant Marsh was in the building during the 

attack, but failed to stop it. While a failure to protect can support an Eighth Amendment claim, 

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to do so here.

 The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates may rise to 

the level of an Eighth Amendment violation where prison officials know of and disregard a 

substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 

1040. 

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Here, Plaintiff simply states that Defendant Marsh was “present in the building” during the 

attack, but this does not establish that Defendant Marsh knew of the attack, or had a reasonable 

opportunity to prevent the attack. 

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant Marsh.

2. Eighth Amendment- Deliberate Indifference

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical 

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate indifference 

to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th 

Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat 

[his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). Deliberate indifference is shown by 

“(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm 

caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The 

requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of 

due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference appears to be based on his contention that forcing 

him to double-cell will cause future harm to his health. However, Plaintiff cannot base a claim on a 

future event, which may or may not happen. Such allegations are speculative and do not support a 

claim for relief.

3. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty without the 

procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 

221, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005). To state a claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at stake. 

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause or from state 

law. Id. 

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a. False Documentation

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding more 

adverse conditions of confinement and an independent right to an accurate prison record, grounded 

in the Due Process Clause, has not been recognized. Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1319 

(9th Cir. 1987). Under state law, liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to 

freedom from restraint which imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to 

the ordinary incidents of prison life, and Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his prison record do not 

support a claim for relief. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 

115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff argues that the documents placed his life in danger because Corcoran staff gave 

inmates access to prisoners’ information. He also suggests that he had a liberty interest in 

“maintaining truth, his reputation and continued daily existence.” ECF No. 11, at 16. Plaintiff does 

not support this with any facts, however, and there is no indication that this constitutes an atypical 

hardship. He therefore fails to state a claim against Defendants Marsh and Guzman based on 

falsification of documents.

Plaintiff also suggests that his medical condition would make it an atypical hardship to place 

him in a double cell, and that he has a liberty interest in being single-celled. Contrary to his belief, 

he has no liberty interest in single cell housing, regardless of his medical conditions.

This claim cannot be cured by amendment.

b. Classification Hearing

With respect to placement in administrative segregation, due process requires only that 

prison officials hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner is 

segregated, inform the prisoner of the charges against him or the reasons for considering segregation, 

and allow the prisoner to present his views. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds, Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995); accord Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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Prisoners are not entitled to detailed written notice of charges, representation by counsel or 

counsel substitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, or a written decision describing the reasons 

for placing the prisoner in administrative segregation. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100-01 (quotation 

marks omitted). Further, due process does not require disclosure of the identity of any person 

providing information leading to the placement of a prisoner in administrative segregation. Id. 

(quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff complains of a denial of due process in connection with a classification hearing. 

Specifically, he contends that Defendant Macias attempted to intimidate him prior to the hearing and 

dictate what Plaintiff could or could not say. He also alleges that Defendant Macias did so using a 

“pre-inquisition style” interview, which is not provided for in CDCR policy. That Defendant Macias 

may have intimidated him, or tried to tell him that he could not make certain allegations, however, 

does not violate the Due Process Clause. Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant Sexton, not 

Defendant Macias, prevented Plaintiff from defending against the charges at the hearing.

In that regard, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Sexton refused to allow him to defend 

himself “by responding to the ‘false charge’ that Plaintiff supposedly said he had safety concerns.” 

ECF No. 11, at 20. Defendant Sexton also refused to hear about Plaintiff’s medical needs. As 

explained above, the Due Process Clause requires that Plaintiff be permitted to present his views, 

and this would include Plaintiff’s refutation of the reason why he was being placed in Ad-Seg. 

Plaintiff therefore states a due process claim against Defendant Sexton. 

4. First Amendment

a. Retaliation

“Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and to be 

free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)). “Within the prison context, a viable claim 

of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took 

some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that 

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

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reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Macias tried to intimidate him prior to his 

Classification Hearing in retaliation for filing a complaint against Corcoran staff. Even assuming 

that telling Plaintiff that he cannot “make all sorts of accusations against Corcoran staff concerning 

their attack” is adverse action, he speculates that she did this because of his complaint. Moreover, 

there is no indication that any of his First Amendment rights were chilled because of her alleged 

intimidation. Plaintiff’s alleged issues at the hearing are related to Defendant Sexton, not Defendant

Macias. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a retaliation claim against her.

Turning to Defendant Sexton, Plaintiff believes that he retaliated against him by not 

permitting him to discuss certain issues at his Classification Committee hearing. Other than citing 

his own belief, however, Plaintiff does not provide any facts to support a finding that Defendant 

Sexton’s actions were taken because of Plaintiff’s grievance. He therefore fails to state a retaliation 

claim against Defendant Sexton.

b. Freedom of Speech

The free speech standard is diminished in prisons, as compared to the nation at large, because 

it must yield to the need for creating a climate of consistency and control. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 

U.S. 223, 229 (2001). Thus, “an inmate retains those First Amendment rights not inconsistent with 

his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” 

Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' 

Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The question is 

whether officials’ disciplinary decisions were commiserate with their authority to control the prison 

climate.

Plaintiff’s claim is vague, but appears to be related to his contention that he was not 

permitted to speak on certain issues at his Classification Committee hearing. Given the deference 

afforded to prison authorities, and the fact that this claim is cognizable under the Due Process clause, 

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the Court will not find a right to freedom of speech during a classification hearing. This claim 

cannot be cured by amendment.

5. Fourth Amendment

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim is based the same set of facts that underlie his Eighth 

Amendment excessive force claim. However, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 

excessive force applies to non-prisoners, i.e., individuals during an arrest. When prison officials use 

excessive force against prisoners, they violate the inmates’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment.

6. Conspiracy

Insofar as Plaintiff alleges a general conspiracy, he fails to adequately allege the existence of 

a conspiracy. In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant to section 1983, such a complaint 

must “allege [some] facts to support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.” Buckey 

v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police 

Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must allege that defendants conspired or 

acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sykes v. 

State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting the existence of a conspiracy, i.e., the existence 

of an agreement or a meeting of the minds, between Defendants. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 

(9th Cir. 2010); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001). He therefore fails to state a 

conspiracy claim.

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D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

This action shall proceed on the following claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment excessive force 

claim against Defendants Arnett, Hood, Guzman, Casas and Doe; and (2) a due process claim 

against Defendant Sexton. All remaining claims and Defendants Gonzales, Macias and Marsh are 

DISMISSED from this action for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 10, 2015 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-01807-DLB Document 14 Filed 11/12/15 Page 14 of 14