Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03557/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03557-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1401 Education: Handicapped Child Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Z.A., a minor, by and through her parents, K.A.

and S.A.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ST. HELENA UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 09-03557 JSW

ORDER DENYING DISTRICT’S

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON

THE PLEADINGS; DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

STRIKE; AND GRANTING

DISTRICT’S MOTION TO

DISQUALIFY GUARDIANS

Now before the Court are several motions: (1) the motion for judgment on the pleadings

filed by St. Helena Unified School District (the “District”); (2) Plaintiff’s motion to strike the

District’s prayer for attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs from the cross-complaint and answer;

and (3) the District’s motion to disqualify the parents as guardians ad litem. These motions are

now fully briefed and ripe for decision. The Court finds that these matters are appropriate for

disposition without oral argument and the matters are deemed submitted. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-

1(b). Accordingly, the hearing set for January 29, 2010 is HEREBY VACATED. Having

carefully reviewed the parties’ papers and the relevant legal authority, the Court DENIES the

District’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike the prayer 

Case 3:09-cv-03557-JSW Document 46 Filed 01/25/10 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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for fees; and GRANTS the District’s motion to disqualify the guardians ad litem.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a fourteen-year-old child eligible for special education services under the

Individuals With Disability Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Plaintiff 

partially attended sixth and seventh grade at the District’s Robert Louis Stevenson Middle

School (“RLS”) from March 17, 2008 through November 2, 2008. Prior to attending RLS,

Plaintiff attended Pathways, an independent study, home-based charter school. 

When Plaintiff enrolled in the District, her individualized education program (“IEP”)

team convened on six occasions to discuss her program, placement and services within the

District. However, dissatisfied with the District’s program, on October 17, 2008, Plaintiff’s

parents informed the District that they would unilaterally be placing their daughter at the STAR

Academy, a certified nonpublic school, beginning on November 3, 2008, for the remainder of

the 2008-2009 school year.

Due to disputes over the Plaintiff’s education program, on November 7, 2008, the

District filed a due process complaint with the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) to

implement and defend its offered program to satisfy the IDEA’s requirement that the District

provide Plaintiff with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). 

Shortly thereafter, on November 17, 2008, Plaintiff’s parents filed a due process

complaint against the District alleging that the District had denied their daughter a FAPE during

the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years. The OAH consolidated the two due process

complaints on November 26, 2008.

Prior to the hearing before the OAH, the District submitted to Plaintiff’s parents a 10-

day statutory offer of settlement (“10-day offer”) under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D). 

Regardless, the parties proceeded to hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) over

nine days in 2009. The ALJ issued her Decision on May 15, 2009, mostly in the District’s

favor.

Plaintiff filed the complaint in this Court alleging three claims: (1) declaratory relief

(based on the 10-day offer); (2) appeal from the OAH Decision; and (3) breach of 10-day offer

Case 3:09-cv-03557-JSW Document 46 Filed 01/25/10 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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of settlement. The District filed a counterclaim challenging one aspect of the OAH Decision, its

finding that one class period for a few days before the unilateral placement was inappropriate

because the ALJ found it was not the least restrictive environment.

Additional facts will be addressed as necessary in the remainder of this Order. 

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards.

1. Legal Standard on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

 Motions for judgment on the pleadings challenge the legal sufficiency of the claims

asserted in the complaint. “For purposes of the motion, the allegations of the non-moving party

must be accepted as true .... Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly

establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and

that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner

and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990). However, “[t]he court need not ... accept as

true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice....” Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

While, as a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the

pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, a “court may consider facts that are contained in

materials of which the court may take judicial notice.” Heliotrope General, Inc. v. Ford Motor

Co., 189 F.3d 971, 981 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A court may

also consider documents attached to the complaint or “documents whose contents are alleged in

a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to

the [plaintiff’s] pleading.” In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d 970, 986

(9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2. Legal Standard on Motion to Strike.

“The court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous material.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (12)(f). Immaterial 

matter “is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the

defenses being pleaded.” Cal. Dept. of Toxic Substance Control v. ALCO Pacific, Inc., 217 F.

Case 3:09-cv-03557-JSW Document 46 Filed 01/25/10 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Impertinent

material “consists of statements that do not pertain, or are not necessary to the issues in

question.” Id. Motions to strike are regarded with disfavor because they are often used as

delaying tactics and because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice. 

Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Where there is

any doubt as to the relevance of the challenged allegations, courts generally err on the side

permitting the allegations to stand, particularly where the moving party shows no prejudice

therefrom and if granting the motion will not make the trial less complicated or otherwise

streamline the ultimate resolution of the action. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1528

(9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534-34 (1994). 

Given their disfavored status, courts often require a showing of prejudice by the moving party

before granting a motion to strike. Id. The possibility that issues will be unnecessarily

complicated or that superfluous pleadings will cause the trier of fact to draw unwarranted

inferences at trial is the type of prejudice that is sufficient to support the granting of a motion to

strike. Cal. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control, 217 F. Supp. at 1028. “Even when the defense

presents a purely legal question, ... courts are very reluctant to determine disputed or substantial

issues of law on a motion to strike; these questions quite properly are viewed as determinable

only after discovery and a hearing on the merits.” Id. (quoting 5 Charles Wright & Arthur

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1381, at 800-01).

B. District’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

The District moves for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s first cause of action for

declaratory relief and third cause of action for relief based on the alleged breach of a 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(D)-(F) settlement agreement. The District argues that Plaintiff may not maintain

either related cause of action because there was no settlement agreement reached, and even if

there were, it was not enforceable as a matter of law as the Board did not ratify the alleged

agreement.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The District contends that the facts as alleged in the complaint fail to support the

existence of a valid contract – an actual settlement agreement – that would be the underlying

basis for the claims for declaratory relief or for breach. The District argues there was no

meeting of the minds or mutual consent, by virtue of which an offer and acceptance would have

been manifest. The District contends that the Plaintiff’s condition for acceptance, that is the

drafting of an actual settlement agreement by 5:00 p.m. the next day, created an additional

material term and constitutes a counteroffer. The District also argues that there was no meeting

of the minds or mutual assent because Plaintiff failed to meet “the letter or spirit of the 10-day

offer as it relates to attorney’s fees.” (Motion at 6.) Plaintiff contests the factual veracity of

these contentions and contends that the complaint sets out that a contract was entered into and

improperly rescinded by the District. The Court finds these arguments rest on the resolution of

disputed facts and, at this procedural stage and as presented to the Court, are not appropriate for

disposition on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Second, the District argues that, even if there were a settlement agreement, it was not

enforceable as it required Board approval. See Santa Monica Unified School District v. Persh,

5 Cal. App. 3d 945, 952 (1970) (“A contract which has not been approved or ratified pursuant

to Education Code section 15961 does not comply with the required formalities, and is

unenforceable against the District.”). The District argues that its Board never approved the 10-

day offer and therefore, regardless of whether Plaintiff may have accepted the offer, there was

no valid contract without Board ratification under the California Education Code. The District

seeks judicial notice of the Board’s meeting notes for the relevant time period, indicating that

no approval of the offer to Plaintiff was ever made. (See Request for Judicial Notice, Exs. AG.) Plaintiff contends that she does not have discovery to ascertain whether or when Board

approval was sought or acquired and further, that such approval was a mere technicality in any

case. Further, after additional briefing on the issue as requested by the Court, Plaintiff contends

that the agreement as made was valid because it was ratified by the School Superintendent as

well as the District’s legal counsel, both with apparent authority to ratify the District’s

contractual offer, and it made no mention of requiring further approval. Because the Court

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 There is some disagreement over whether the District was properly served with the

motion to appoint the guardian ad litem in this matter. The Court granted the unopposed

motion to appoint the parents as guardians on October 9, 2009. However, at this stage, the

service issue is irrelevant and the Court reviews the propriety of the appointment on the

merits.

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finds that there are issues of fact with regard to whether or how the Board may or may not have

ratified or needed to have ratified the agreement, at this procedural stage and as presented to the

Court, this issue is not appropriate for disposition on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

C. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike.

 Plaintiff moves to strike the District’s prayer for attorneys’ fees and costs in its

counterclaim. Plaintiff contends that attorneys’ fees are not permissible by statute and the

prayer should therefore be stricken. However, both parties agree that attorneys’ fees and costs

are recoverable where it is shown that the “complaint or subsequent cause of action is frivolous,

unreasonable, or without foundation” or if the case continues after “the litigation clearly became

frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation,” or if “the complaint or subsequent cause of

action was presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay,

or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III).

In order to recover fees, the District would have to make a showing that this case was

frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation or by showing that Plaintiff’s conduct was

presented for an improper purpose such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly

increase the cost of litigation. At this procedural juncture, the Court cannot determine whether

such a showing can be made. Because the claim for fees and costs has a basis in law, the Court

will not strike the prayer prematurely. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to strike is DENIED.

D. District’s Motion to Disqualify the Guardians Ad Litem.

The District contends that the parents are improperly designated as Plaintiff’s guardians

ad litem because the father is a member of the Board for the District and the mother stands to

profit by the father’s compensation from the District. The District claims the appointment of

the parents in this context creates an impermissible conflict of interest and that a new guardian

ad litem should be appointed.1

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, the District contends that the 10-day

offer could not be valid because, as a Board member, father had a conflict. However, the

Court finds this fact, although beyond the scope of the pleadings, irrelevant to the analysis. 

The 10-day offer was made prior to the father’s election to the Board.

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After the 10-day offer was made by the District, Plaintiff’s father was elected to the

District’s governing board.2

 As a Board member, the father must act to protect the District’s

interests and as Plaintiff’s guardian ad litem, he is charged with representing the interests of his

minor daughter in litigation against the District. Although the father declares that this does not

present a conflict of interest and represents that he will absent himself from the Board’s

litigation strategy sessions, the Court finds that the father’s dual role creates an impermissible

conflict of interest. See Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 1171 (1996)

(citation omitted) (“[T]he common law doctrine against conflicts of interest ... prohibits public

officials from placing themselves in a position where their private, personal interests may

conflict with their official duties.”).

In addition, the Court finds that the mother’s appointment as guardian ad litem is fraught

with conflict as well. See Bhatia v. Corrigan, 2007 WL 1455908, *1 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding

that, due to conflict of interest, father was not appropriate guardian and mother was similarly

conflicted out by virtue of marital relationship). The mother suffers from the same personal

conflict of receiving remuneration from the District for her husband’s service as a Board

member as well as representing her daughter’s interest against the District.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the District’s motion to disqualify the guardians ad

litem. In her opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff’s parents

represented that they can provide an appropriate alternative guardian ad litem for this Court’s

approval. Within ten days of this Order, Plaintiff shall submit a suitable alternative guardian ad

litem for the Court’s review and approval.

///

///

///

Case 3:09-cv-03557-JSW Document 46 Filed 01/25/10 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the District’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings; DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike the prayer for fees; and GRANTS the District’s

motion to disqualify the guardians ad litem.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 25, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-03557-JSW Document 46 Filed 01/25/10 Page 8 of 8