Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08031/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08031-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Chip E. Leonard, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn Colvin, Commissioner of Social

Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-12-08031-PCT-FJM

ORDER

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on October 23, 2008. The

claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Following a hearing on April 5, 2010,

the administrative law judge ("ALJ") issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act, and denying benefits. The Appeals Council

denied plaintiff's request for review on December 19, 2011, rendering the ALJ's decision

final. Thereafter, plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). We have before us plaintiff's opening brief (doc. 18), defendant's answering brief

(doc. 19), plaintiff's reply brief (doc. 20), and the administrative record (doc. 15). 

I

A district court may set aside a denial of benefits “only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954

(9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence which, considering the record as

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a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Where the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the

ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Id. (citation omitted).

The ALJ followed the Social Security Act's five-step procedure to determine whether

plaintiff is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). First, the ALJ determined that plaintiff

meets the status requirements of the Social Security Act and has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since the date of alleged onset. Tr. 19. At step two, the ALJ found that

plaintiff suffered "severe" impairments including post total colectomy, construction of a new

ileoanal J-pouch with rectal cuff mucosectomy, and ileostomy takedown with resection and

reanastomosis. Id. At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff's impairments do not meet the

criteria listed in the regulations. Tr. 19. Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has the

residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). Tr. 20. At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's RFC

prevents him from performing his past relevant work. Tr. 22. At step five, however, the ALJ

concluded that plaintiff is not disabled because his RFC does not preclude him from

performing other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 23.

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision arguing that the ALJ erred by rejecting his

symptom testimony and formulating a defective RFC. Plaintiff urges that we remand for

administrative proceedings to clarify the plaintiff’s RFC. 

II

Plaintiff arguesthat the ALJfailed to properly evaluate the credibility of hissymptom

testimony. Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, an ALJ must give clear and

convincing reasons in order to reject the plaintiff's symptom testimony. Molina v. Astrue,

674 F.3d 1104, 1112-1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). However, the ALJ is not

“required to believe every allegation of disabling pain." Id. When weighing a plaintiff's

credibility, "the ALJ may consider his reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in

his testimony or between his testimony and his conduct, his daily activities, his work record,

and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect

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of the symptoms of which he complains." Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792

(9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The ALJ may also consider the dosage and effectiveness

of any treatment or pain medication for relief of pain. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346

(9th Cir. 1991). "If the ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the

record, we may not engage in second-guessing." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.

Plaintiff asserted that he is not able to work because of abdominal pains and frequent

bowel movements. Tr. 21. The ALJ cited clear and convincing reasons to support his

conclusion that plaintiff's testimony regarding the extent to which his impairment prevented

him from working is not entirely credible. Tr. 21-22. Specifically, the ALJ noted that

although the surgery plaintiff had in February 2009 suggests that his abdominal symptoms

were genuine, the record reflects that it was generally successful in relieving the symptoms.

Tr. 22. Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s finding. As the ALJ noted,

examination notes dated February 16, 2009, from Dr. Robert A. Campbell (“Dr. Campbell”),

one of plaintiff’s treating physicians, state that plaintiff is “doing well,” denies “significant

abdominal pain,” and “is having about five to seven bowel movements per day.” Tr. 22, 286.

The ALJ also noted that office visit notes by Dr. Charles W. Welly (“Dr. Welly”) from May

2009 and February 2010 do not specify any complaints supporting plaintiff’s symptom

testimony. Tr. 21, 293-94. Plaintiff argues that because Dr. Welly referred plaintiff back to

Dr. Campbell six weeks before the hearing, the ALJ should have requested updated treatment

records from the doctors. However, it was not incumbent upon the ALJ to request those

records. Plaintiff has the burden of submitting evidence to support his disability claim. 

The ALJ also noted that plaintiff’s hearing testimony concerning his physical

limitations was not entirely consistent with Dr. Campbell’s office notes. Specifically,

plaintiff testified that he did not recall ever having less than ten to twelve bowel movements

in a 24-hour period, post-surgery. In contrast, Dr. Campbell’s notes state that plaintiff had

five to seven bowel movements per day. Plaintiff argues that the discrepancy in his

testimony and his treating physician’s notes is due to inaccurate medical records. Yet Dr.

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Campbell recorded the same number of bowel movements twice – the day plaintiff was

discharged from the hospital, and one week after his surgery. Tr. 275, 286. Although

plausible, it is unlikely that the medical records were inaccurate. Moreover, our role is not

to second guess an ALJ's finding where, as here, it is supported by substantial evidence in

the record. See Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff arguesthatJanetRichmond, plaintiff’s girlfriend, corroborated his testimony

regarding bowel movements and that the ALJ erred in finding her statement lacked

credibility. “The ALJ may reject a third party's testimony upon giving a reason germane to

that witness.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ gave several

germane reasons for giving less weight to Janet’s statement, including that she is not

medically trained to make exacting observations about symptoms, and that her testimony was

biased by virtue of her personal relationship with plaintiff. Therefore, we find the ALJ did

not err in finding Janet’s testimony was not entirely credible. See Greger v. Barnhart, 464

F.3d 968, 972 ( Cir. 2006) (finding ALJ did not err in rejecting lay witness testimony that

was possibly influenced by close relationship with plaintiff). 

The ALJ noted that the lack of treatment following plaintiff’s surgery suggests the

symptoms may not have been as serious as alleged. Tr. 21. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s

adverse inference from the absence of regular and continuing medical care is not legally

warranted or valid. We disagree. “[U]nexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek

treatment may be the basis for an adverse credibility finding unless one of a number of good

reasons for not doing so applies.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation

and internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff contends that he told the ALJ that medications had

not been effective in relieving gas pain symptoms. However, he does not explain why he did

not seek alternative treatment. Indeed, plaintiff concedes that there is nothing in the record

showing that he received postsurgical treatment. It was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude

that the lack of postsurgical treatment was inconsistent with the plaintiff’s level of

complaints. See e.g. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Evidence that plaintiff’s symptoms improved after his 2009 surgery, inconsistencies

in plaintiff's testimony, and the lack of evidence of postsurgery treatment together constitute

clear and convincing reasons in support of the ALJ's credibility determination.

III

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing plaintiff's RFC by adopting only part

of Dr. Terry’s assessment, and ignoring the finding that plaintiff needed to make “frequent

trips to the bathroom.” Dr. Terry’s notes state:

The claimant’s colon cancer and polyps do not meet or equal listing severity.

He would expected [sic] to improve to his baseline and should be limited to

lifting 10 lbs frequently and 20 lbs occasionally due to history of multiple

abdominal surgeries with recurrent SBO’s and painful adhesions. He should

also limit climbing scaffolds to occas [sic] due to need for frequent trips to the

bathroom. Tr. 251.

These limitations were included in the ALJ’s RFC assessment, which stated that plaintiff “is

able to lift up to twenty pounds occasionally, and up to ten pounds frequently . . . [and] has

postural limitations that preclude more than occasional use of ladders, ropes and scaffolds.”

Tr. 20. The ALJ did not, as plaintiff contends, fail to consider plaintiff’s need for frequent

trips to the bathroom. In fact, as discussed above, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s claim

regarding the frequency of his bowel movements is not credible to the extent alleged. The

ALJ’s conclusion that after completing his treatment plaintiff had the ability to perform a full

range of light work is rational and supported by substantial evidence in the record. Tr. 23.

V

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports

the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff is not disabled. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED 

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AFFIRMING the decision oftheCommissioner denying disability benefits. The clerk shall

enter final judgment.

DATED this 7th day of May, 2013.

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