Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05331/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05331-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL L. KEPHART, individually

and doing business as KEPHART

BAIL BONDS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, a local

governmental entity; CHIEF OF

POLICE ERIC MATLOCK, an

individual; DETECTIVE SCOTT E.

CARVEL, an individual; DETECTIVE

GREGG M. BENDER, an individual;

and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

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1:03-cv-05331 OWW TAG

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN

THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants CITY OF BAKERSFIELD (“CITY”), CHIEF OF POLICE

ERIC MATLOCK (“MATLOCK”), DETECTIVE SCOTT E. CARVEL (“CARVEL”),

and DETECTIVE GREGG M. BENDER (“BENDER”) move for summary

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and in

the alternative for summary adjudication pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(d). (Doc. 39-3, Def.’s Mem.) Plaintiff

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MICHAEL L. KEPHART (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion. (Doc. 42,

Pl.’s Opp.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on March 17, 2003. 

(Doc. 1, Compl.) Plaintiff’s original complaint contained two

causes of action: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

deprivation of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments;

and (2) request for declaratory and injunctive relief. 

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s original complaint on

October 29, 2003. (Doc. 14, Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss) Defendants’

motion to dismiss was granted with leave to amend. (Doc. 20,

Order) Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on January 20,

2004. (Doc. 21, First Am. Compl.) The First Amended Complaint

is the operative complaint and brings three causes of action

against Defendants: (1) violation 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

individual Defendants; (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

the CITY; and (3) preliminary and permanent injunctive relief

against all Defendants. Plaintiff’s § 1983 causes of action are

based on alleged deprivation of his rights under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff’s claims include destructive

search, false arrest, conspiracy to violate civil rights, and

deprivation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal

protection clause for selective enforcement. Plaintiff also

alleges municipal liability based on an official capacity claim

against MATLOCK (for ratification and supervisory liability) and

against the CITY for an unconstitutional policy or practice.

Defendants answered the First Amended Complaint on January

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1 Defendants argue in their reply that Plaintiff is

precluded from being heard at oral argument because Plaintiff

filed his opposition three days late in violation of the Local

Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff

electronically filed and served his opposition fourteen days

before the hearing date. Even if Plaintiff’s filing was late,

Plaintiff would not be “precluded” from being heard during oral

argument, as Defendant argues. The rule states that a party will

not be “entitled” to be heard at oral argument if its opposition

is late, which leaves the ultimate determination to the court. 

3

20, 2004. (Doc. 23, Answer) Defendants moved for summary

judgment on April 27, 2005. (Doc. 39, Def.’s Mem.) Defendants

submitted a statement of undisputed facts in support of their

motion, which is titled “Separate Statement of Uncontroverted

Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication Pursuant to

FRCP 56(a).” (Doc. 39-2, Def.’s SUF) Plaintiff opposes

Defendants’ motion. (Doc. 42, Pl.’s Opp.) Plaintiff submitted

objections to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts and his

own separate statement of “disputed” facts titled “Plaintiff’s

Separate Statement of Disputed Facts in Support of Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication Pursuant to FRCP

56(a).” (Doc. 43, Pl.’s SUF) Defendants replied to Plaintiff’s

opposition. (Doc. 48, Def.’s Reply) Defendants did not formally

object to Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts. Defendants

state in their reply that “PLAINTIFF’S statement of disputed

material facts is largely predicated on evidence that does not

support the statement of disputed facts. Specific material

disputed facts as set forth by PLAINTIFF will be discussed at

oral argument.” (Id. at 5)

Oral argument was originally scheduled for June 6, 2005, but

was rescheduled and ultimately heard on June 27, 2005.1

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Local Rule 78-230(c). Defendants argue, in conclusory fashion,

that they were prejudiced by Plaintiff’s “delay.” However,

Defendants have made no showing they were prejudiced by receiving

Plaintiff’s opposition via e-mail seven days before their reply

was due as opposed to ten days via e-mail before their reply was

due. Here, the interests of justice are better served by

allowing all parties a full opportunity to be heard on summary

judgment motion that could result in a final judgment on the

merits. 

4

Jacob J. Rivas, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendants. 

David J. Frankenberger, Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

This action arises out of a bail bondsman’s claim that the

Bakersfield Police Department and Bakersfield police officers

deprived him of his civil rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments through unlawful searches and seizures and under the

equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through

selective enforcement.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege specific facts or

events giving rise to his civil rights claims. Likewise,

Plaintiff’s opposition is scattered and lacks a coherent

explanation of the course of events giving rise to his claims. 

The facts and events were pieced together as far as was possible

based on each party’s submissions and on the representations of 

counsel during oral argument. The starting point was Plaintiff’s

list of eleven separate bases for liability asserted in his

opposition: (1) an allegedly unlawful search of Plaintiff’s

//

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2 Plaintiff asserts that there were four ways in which the

search was unlawful: (a) BENDER obtained search warrant by lying

(i.e, judicial deception); (b) the search warrant was overbroad;

(c) BENDER and CARVEL conducted a destructive search; (d) BENDER

and CARVEL exceeded scope of warrant.

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apartment on March 7, 2002;2 (2) false arrest arising from

Plaintiff’s March 7, 2002 arrest for burglary and fraudulent use

of a credit card; (3) false arrest based on a March 21, 2002

arrest warrant for Plaintiff for possession of a bottle of

steroids that was found during the March 7, 2002 search;

(4) false arrest arising from Plaintiff’s July 26, 2002 arrest

for disorderly conduct and public drunkenness by unidentified

officers; (5) BENDER and CARVEL’s conspiracy to violate

Plaintiff’s civil rights in connection with the March 7, 2002

search of Plaintiff’s apartment; (6) false arrest by unidentified

officers for Plaintiff’s various convictions of traffic

violations; (7) false arrest for Plaintiff’s arrest by

unidentified officers for an alleged violation of a restraining

order relating to Andrea Thomas; (8) BENDER’s intentional

interference with Plaintiff’s efforts to apprehend a fugitive;

(9) selective enforcement by Defendants targeting Plaintiff

because Plaintiff is a bail bondsman; (10) municipal liability of

the CITY based on (a) Chief MATLOCK’s ratification of the

officers’ purported unconstitutional conduct in targeting and

arresting Plaintiff and (b) MATLOCK’s alleged failure to

adequately train and instruct subordinates; and (11) municipal

liability for an unconstitutional policy and/or custom or

practice. 

//

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A. The Parties.

Plaintiff Michael Kephart, doing business as “Kephart Bail

Bonds,” is a resident of Kern County, California. Plaintiff does

business in Kern County. 

Defendant MATLOCK was the Chief of Police of the Bakersfield

Police Department at all times relevant to this litigation. 

(Doc. 39-6, Matlock Decl. ¶ 1) MATLOCK is now retired and is no

longer employed with the Bakersfield Police Department. (Id. at

¶ 2)

Defendant CARVEL was employed by the Bakersfield Police

Department for over thirty years before his retirement in 2005. 

(Doc. 39-7, Carvel Decl. ¶ 1) At the time of his retirement,

CARVEL held the rank of Detective in the Narcotics/Vice Division. 

(Id. at ¶ 2) 

Defendant BENDER was employed by the Bakersfield Police

Department for over thirty years before he retired in 2004. 

(Doc. 39-5, Bender Decl. ¶ 1) At the time he retired, BENDER was

a Detective assigned to the Narcotics Division. (Id. at ¶ 2) 

Defendant CITY is a municipality located in Kern County,

California.

B. March 7, 2002: Search of Plaintiff’s Residence and

Plaintiff’s Subsequent Arrests.

On March 7, 2002, BENDER and CARVEL, with other members of

the Bakersfield Police Department, entered Plaintiff’s residence

pursuant to a search warrant issued with respect to Plaintiff’s

roommate. On the same day, CARVEL arrested Plaintiff for

burglary and fraudulent use of a credit card. Plaintiff claims

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his civil rights were violated in a number of different ways

during the course of events leading up to and following March 7,

2002. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the following: (1) BENDER

lied to the magistrate judge in obtaining the search warrant to

search Plaintiff’s residence; (2) BENDER and CARVEL conducted a

destructive search, including damaging and/or destroying some of

Plaintiff’s personal property; (3) BENDER and CARVEL exceeded the

scope of the search warrant by searching beyond Plaintiff’s

roommate’s person and things; (4) CARVEL arrested Plaintiff for

burglary and fraudulent use of a stolen credit card without

probable cause and/or based on illegally-obtained evidence;

(5) unidentified Bakersfield police officers arrested Plaintiff

for possession of a controlled substance based on evidence seized

during an unlawful search; and (6) BENDER and CARVEL conspired to

violate Plaintiff’s civil rights in conducting the March 7, 2000

search.

1. The Search Warrant and Supporting Affidavit.

BENDER drafted and signed the probable cause affidavit upon

which issuance of the search warrant for Plaintiff’s residence

issued. Plaintiff’s residence was located at 1921 “K” Street,

Bakersfield, California. Plaintiff lived at that address with a

person named Santino Medina (“Medina”). The search warrant was

issued to BENDER to search the following:

[R]esidence at 1921 “K” Street in Bakersfield,

California; the person of Santino Medina, 24 years of

age, date of birth 9/30/77, 5'11", 172 lbs, brown hair,

hazel eyes, CDL #B4953090; cocaine and derivatives of

the same, paraphernalia associated with the preparation

of cocaine for sale and the sale of cocaine, large

amounts of currency, and paraphernalia associated with

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cocaine.

(Doc. 43, Def.’s UF No. 3) The search warrant also authorized

search of a “vehicle described as a silver 2001 Toyota truck,

having Bill Wright Toyota paper plates.” (See Doc. 39-5, Bender

Decl. Ex. B) Neither BENDER’s probable cause affidavit nor the

search warrant mention Plaintiff or any authorization to conduct

a search relating to Plaintiff. (See id. at Exs. A, B) 

Plaintiff refers to two affidavits, one of which was the final

draft and the other which was an earlier draft. (See Doc. 44,

Frankenberger Decl. at Ex. C, Bender Dep. 37:3-12) The first

draft included a reference to Plaintiff and the second (and

final) draft omitted any reference to Plaintiff. Plaintiff

provides no citation to the earlier draft in his brief and did

not indicate whether he attached it to any of his submissions. 

BENDER asserts he did not make any misrepresentations or

omissions of material information on the affidavit. (Doc. 43,

Def.’s UF No. 5) Plaintiff contends BENDER misled the magistrate

by omitting from his probable cause affidavit that two persons

lived in the apartment and that they had separate bedrooms. 

Plaintiff also contends BENDER misled the magistrate by omitting

that one of BENDER’s informants was Plaintiff’s “direct business

competitor.” (Id. at Pl.’s Response to Def.’s UF No. 5) 

The parties do not dispute that “[v]arious items enumerated

in the warrant, including methamphetamine, were actually located

within the residence during the search on 3/7/02.” (Doc. 43,

Def.’s UF No. 6) It should be noted that methamphetamine was not

mentioned in the search warrant; only cocaine and cocaine

paraphernalia were mentioned. (See Doc. 39-5, Bender Decl. at

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Ex. B) However, Medina admitted in his deposition that both

methamphetamine and cocaine were found in his apartment and car. 

(Doc. 39-8, Rivas Decl. at Ex. M, Medina Dep. 58:1-13) Medina

was not arrested on March 7, 2002, although Defendants’ counsel

stated during oral argument that Medina was later arrested,

tried, and convicted and served time in prison for drug-related

crimes.

2. Plaintiff’s Arrest for Burglary and Fraudulent Use

of a Stolen Credit Card.

BENDER and CARVEL were both present at the March 7, 2002

search. BENDER was a detective in the Narcotics Division at the

time. BENDER conducted the search to investigate, search, and

arrest a suspected narcotics trafficker, i.e., Medina. (Id. at

No. 11; see also Doc. 39-5, Bender Decl. ¶ 15) Plaintiff

disputes BENDER’s motive to conduct the search and states that

BENDER also sought to investigate, search and arrest Plaintiff. 

(Doc. 43, Pl.’s Response to Def.’s UF No. 11; Doc. 44,

Frankenberger Decl. at Ex. B, Carvel Dep. 28:5 to 29:8)

At the time of his retirement in 2005, CARVEL was a

detective in the “Narcotics/Vice” Division. (See Doc. 39-7,

Carvel Decl. ¶ 2) Plaintiff claims CARVEL was not in the

Narcotics Division at the time of the search. Defendants do not

clarify what the “Narcotics/Vice” Division is, i.e., whether it

is a single department, whether it is an overlapping department,

or whether “Narcotics” and “Vice” are separate departments. 

Plaintiff’s counsel asserted during oral argument that CARVEL was

in a “different” department from BENDER. Before his retirement,

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he was assigned to “numerous details, including robbery, fraud,

forgery, theft, and burglary.” (Id.) Since January 2002, CARVEL

had been assigned to investigate fraud, forgery, and theftrelated crimes. (Doc. 43, Def.’s UF No. 17) As to his presence

at and role in the search, CARVEL states the following:

My presence on the premises of 1921 “K” Street in

Bakersfield, California was motivated out of legitimate

police objectives of investigating theft and fraudulent

uses of credit cards. Although I did not actively

participate in the search on 3/7/02, I was present to

monitor the search and to discern if any items located

on the premises were the fruits of the suspected crimes

committed by KEPHART in violation of California Penal

Code sections 460(a) and 484g [sic].

(Doc. 39-7, Carvel Decl. ¶¶ 20-21)

CARVEL arrested Plaintiff on March 7, 2002 for burglary and

fraudulent use of a credit card. CARVEL states in his

declaration that he arrested Plaintiff after having located, in

plain view, a pair of gray size 10 Nike Cortez tennis shoes. 

(Doc. 39-7, Carvel Decl. ¶¶ 14, 26) CARVEL asserts that he had

probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had attempted to

purchase the same shoes at a Footlocker store with a stolen

credit card. (See id. at ¶¶ 8-14) Specifically, a man named

Brian Porter reported to CARVEL on January 29, 2002, that his

credit card and wallet had been stolen from the Red Lion Inn on

December 31, 2001. Mr. Porter also reported to CARVEL that he

had observed Plaintiff at the Red Lion Inn on the same date. 

(Id. ¶ 8) CARVEL confirmed that Mr. Porter’s credit card company

recorded an attempted charge to Mr. Porter’s credit card on

January 1, 2002 that was declined at Footlocker. (Id. at ¶ 10) 

In addition, CARVEL learned from personnel at the Red Lion Inn

that a room had been registered to Colleen Kephart on December

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31, 2001, the same date as the alleged theft. (Id. at ¶ 13) 

Neither party clarifies Plaintiff’s relationship to Colleen

Kephart.

Prior to March 7, 2002, CARVEL also administered a

photographic lineup to Footlocker employees Mr./Ms. Tovar

(“Tovar”) and Anthony Martinez (“Martinez”), who identified

Plaintiff and stated that he was one of the individuals who

attempted to purchase a pair of gray size 10 Nike Cortez tennis

shoes. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 15) Tovar and Martinez also stated that

after the credit card was declined, Plaintiff purchased the

tennis shoes with cash. 

CARVEL asserts that Mr. Porter’s reported theft of his

wallet, the identification of Plaintiff by the Footlocker

employees, and the “plain view” sighting of the gray size 10 Nike

tennis shoes in Plaintiff’s residence created probable cause for

Kephart’s arrest on March 7, 2002, for fraudulent use of a stolen

credit card.

3. The Allegedly Destructive Search of Plaintiff’s

Residence.

Plaintiff asserts that the on March 7, 2002 search was

destructive. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants damaged and/or

destroyed several items of Plaintiff’s personal property,

including CDs, a Michael Jordan rookie basketball card, Texaco

collector planes, photographs, and a photo album. (Doc. 43,

Pl.’s Response to Def.’s UF No. 7; Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl.

at Ex. A, Kephart Dep. 54:17-21) BENDER and CARVEL both assert

in their declarations that “the search was not destructive.” 

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(Doc. 39-5, Bender Decl. ¶ 11; Doc. 39-7, Carvel Decl. ¶ 7) The

parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s roommate Medina does not

recall whether the search was destructive. (Doc. 43, Def.’s UF

No. 57) 

Plaintiff was not present in the apartment at the time of

the search. Plaintiff asserts he was kept outside the residence

by the police officers while the search was being conducted. 

Plaintiff was arrested and taken to jail on the day of the

search. (See Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl., Ex. A., Kephart Dep.

42:14-25) Plaintiff testified during his deposition that he

spent approximately six to eight hours in jail and that when he

returned to his apartment, it was in “disarray.” (Id.) 

4. BENDER and CARVEL’s purported conspiracy to

violate Plaintiff’s civil rights.

Plaintiff asserts that BENDER targeted Plaintiff for arrest;

that BENDER and CARVEL conspired to arrest Plaintiff; and that

BENDER and CARVEL conspired to use the March 7, 2002 search as a

pretext for violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

(Doc. 43, Pl.’s Response to Def.’s UF Nos. 14-16) Plaintiff

cites to the following deposition testimony of CARVEL in support

of his allegations of conspiracy:

Q. Did you have any involvement in the investigation

of Mr. Kephart’s roommate, Santino Medina, in

terms of a possible narcotics offense?

A. I was contacted by Detective Bender of our

narcotics unit and advised that a search warrant

was going to be conducted at Mr. Kephart’s

residence. I know now, but I don’t know when I

found this out, and it wasn’t before I went there,

that the actual search warrant was for Mr.

Kephart’s roommate. I don’t believe I was ever

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told that prior to going there. 

I was asked to accompany Detective Bender to the 

-- on the search warrant for two reasons. One,

Detective Bender was aware that I was

investigating Mr. Kephart as a possible suspect in

a theft, and I also have expertise in the vice

investigations of the Deja Vu nightclub, and there

was, I guess, some information that Mr. Kephart or

his roommate or his girlfriend were tied to the

possible use of narcotics at the Deja Vu. 

I went with Detective Bender on the search warrant

as an observer and consultant to anything that

needed to be asked about the Deja Vu or that might

tie into an investigation that I would open at the

Deja Vu.

(Doc. 39-8, J. Rivas Decl., Ex. A Carvel Dep. 28:21-25; 29:1-15)

Plaintiff cites the following deposition testimony of BENDER

in support of his allegations of conspiracy:

Q. Detective Carvel testified this morning, in

essence, that you contacted him prior to service

of the search warrant, Exhibit 4, and to

essentially invite him to observe the execution of

that search warrant.

Do you recall things differently?

A. I did have contact with him and tell him he was --

that I was serving the search warrant. I am aware

of that. I don’t know if I invited him or he

asked to come along. I don’t know which way that

went.

Q. Why did you contact Detective Carvel at that time?

A. Because at some point prior to the execution of

the search warrant, I learned or Detective Carvel

learned -- I don’t know who determined what --

but that there was an active investigation. 

Carvel had an active theft investigation on both

individuals.

Q. And that would be Kephart and Medina?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall if it was Detective Carvel who

informed you that he had an active investigation

regarding Kephart rather than you learning that

from some source other than Detective Carvel?

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A. I don’t -- I’m trying to think here. I’m not real

sure how that came about, how Carvel -- how I knew

Carvel was the one. I’m not sure.

(Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl. at Ex. C, Bender Dep. 39:13 to

40:12)

Defendants cite the following statement from CARVEL’s

declaration in support of their contention that there was no

agreement or conspiracy between CARVEL and BENDER to violate

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights:

I did not enter into an agreement with any other

individuals, including BENDER, to violate KEPHART’s

constitutional rights in performing any of the acts

that I did as they relate to my interactions with

KEPHART. At no time was there ever any discussion

between myself and any third person to use the search

warrant of 3/7/02 as a pretext for violating KEPHART’s

constitutional rights.

(Doc. 39-7, Carvel Decl. ¶¶ 23-4)

Defendants cite to the following statement from BENDER’s

declaration in support of their contention that there was no

agreement with any other individuals, including CARVEL, to

violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights:

My decision to investigate, search, and seize property

located on the premises at 1921 “K” Street was unrelated to

KEPHART residing on the premises. I did not enter into an

agreement with any other individuals, including CARVEL, to

violate KEPHART’s constitutional rights in performing any of

the acts that I did as they relate to my interactions with

KEPHART. At no time was there ever any discussion between

myself and any third person to use the search warrant on

3/7/02 as a pretext for violating KEPHART’s constitutional

rights.

(Doc. 39-5, Bender Decl. ¶¶ 18-20)

//

//

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5. The March 21, 2002 Arrest Warrant for Plaintiff

for Possession of a Controlled Substance. 

During the search of Plaintiff’s residence, steroids were

located in Plaintiff’s bedroom. (Doc. 43, Def.’s UF No. 44) 

Plaintiff testified he has never taken or sold steroids:

Q. Do you know if any steroids were found on the

premises [i.e., in your apartment]?

A. That’s what they alleged were found in my bedroom.

Q. Were you, in fact, in possession of any steroids

on that day?

A. I’ve never taken steroids.

Q. Ever sold them?

A. Never sold steroids. I was not aware of the

steroids being in my possession until seven days

after that arrest of the burglary.

Q. How was it that you became aware of the steroids?

A. Internal Affairs contacted me after I went and

complained about getting some of my property back

that was....

(Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl. at Ex. A, Kephart Dep. 47:13-25) 

BENDER testified in his deposition that the steroids were found

in Plaintiff’s bedroom behind a brick that was removed from a

wall. (Doc. 39-8, Rivas Decl. at Ex. B, Bender Dep. 46:21-25 to

47:1) Defendants assert that a March 21, 2002 arrest warrant for

Plaintiff issued for alleged possession of this bottle of

steroids. (See Doc. 39-3, Def.’s Mem. 3) Plaintiff’s counsel

indicated during oral argument that the case against Plaintiff

was dismissed for failure of the state prosecutor to produce

discovery. CARVEL and BENDER assert they were not involved in

Plaintiff’s arrest for possession of a controlled substance. 

(Doc. 39-5, Bender Decl. ¶ 12; Doc. 39-7, Carvel Decl. ¶ 17)

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C. Plaintiff’s July 26, 2002 Arrest for Disorderly Conduct

and Public Drunkenness.

Defendants assert that Plaintiff was arrested for disorderly

conduct and public drunkenness and was taken to the

detoxification center at the Kern County Jail. (Doc. 39-3,

Def.’s Mem. 3) Defendants assert that no charges were filed and

Plaintiff was not required to appear in court. Neither

Defendants nor Plaintiff provide any evidence regarding the

circumstances surrounding this incident. However, Defendants’

counsel stated during oral argument that Officers McBride, Alred,

and Youngblood were the arresting officers and that none of these

individuals were deposed during discovery.

D. Plaintiff’s Alleged Traffic and Parking Violations.

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff was charged with the

following traffic citations:

(1) January 6, 2002 -- unsafe lane change, no proof of

insurance, broken tail lamp;

(2) February 22, 2002 -- broken tail lamp and no proof of

insurance;

(3) April 10, 2002 -- use of scooter on highway with no

lighting equipment and/or helmet; and 

(4) June 12, 2002 -- speeding.

(Doc. 39-3, Def.’s Mem. 3)

Defendants assert that Plaintiff was found guilty of the

following traffic violations:

(1) January 6, 2002 -- unsafe lane change and no proof

of insurance (Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 21658A, 60285A); and 

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(2) June 12, 2002 -- speeding (Cal. Vehicle Code

§ 22350).

It is undisputed that neither BENDER nor CARVEL ever

investigated, detained, cited, or arrested Plaintiff in

connection with any of these traffic or parking citations. (Doc.

43, Def.’s UF Nos. 46, 47) Neither Defendants nor Plaintiff

provide any evidence regarding the specific circumstances

surrounding the traffic and/or parking incidents. Plaintiff does

not dispute Defendants’ contentions.

E. Plaintiff’s Alleged Violation of a Temporary

Restraining Order.

Defendants assert that Plaintiff “has had contact with the

Bakersfield Police Department arising out of incidents with

Andrea Thomas, who has complained to the Bakersfield Police

Department about harassment by KEPHART in violation of an

operative temporary restraining order.” (Doc. 39-3, Def.’s Mem.

3) Plaintiff construes this “contact” as his “[c]laim of false

arrest for violation of restraining order and/or domestic

violence.” (Doc. 42, Pl.’s Opp. 16) Neither party clarifies

whether Plaintiff was ever actually arrested for violation of the

restraining order. There is no dispute that neither BENDER nor

CARVEL was involved in this arrest/incident concerning Plaintiff

and Andrea Thomas.

F. BENDER’s Alleged Interference with Plaintiff’s

Apprehension of a Fugitive.

Plaintiff asserts in his opposition that “BENDER, based upon

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his personal distain [sic] for PLAINTIFF, intentionally

interfered with PLAINTIFF’s efforts to apprehend international

fugitive Adam Scott Gallegos, causing PLAINTIFF to be liable for

the $30,000.00 bond issued in connection with the initial arrest

of Mr. Gallegos.” (Doc. 42, Pl.’s Opp. 16) Defendants dispute

that a police officer’s “assist[ance] in the extradition of an

international fugitive” can form the basis of a constitutional

violation.” (Doc. 48, Def.’s Reply 5) In support of his

argument, Plaintiff cites to approximately ten pages of BENDER’s

deposition testimony without a summary of the course of events. 

(Doc. 43, Pl.’s DF Nos 67, 68; Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl. at

Ex. C, Bender Dep. 14:5 to 25:8)

During oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel explained that the 

§ 1983 claim is based in part on BENDER’s refusal to arrest a

fugitive who fled to Costa Rica and for whom Plaintiff had posted

$30,000.00 bond. Plaintiff’s counsel asserted that BENDER’s

refusal to have Mr. Gallegos arrested was because BENDER knew

that Plaintiff posted bond for Mr. Gallegos and would forfeit

that money if Mr. Gallegos never returned. Plaintiff’s theory

presupposes that BENDER had a duty to arrest the alleged fugitive

on Plaintiff’s report. Plaintiff does not claim he made a

citizens’ arrest of the fugitive.

G. Defendants’ Alleged Animus Toward Plaintiff.

Plaintiff claims that BENDER has admitted he harbors animus

towards Plaintiff and that BENDER took offense to some of

Plaintiff’s business methods, including Plaintiff’s distribution

of T-shirts reading “CRIME PAYS.” (Id.) To support his

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contention that BENDER harbors animus towards Plaintiff,

Plaintiff cites to BENDER’s deposition testimony that “I have

known bail bondsmen all my life, and every one of them has been a

decent guy, but I’ll be honest with you. I wouldn’t go so far

with Mr. Kephart.” (Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl., Ex. C Bender

Dep. 60:12-15) To support his contention that Defendants,

including BENDER, took offense at Plaintiff’s “Crime Pays” Tshirts, Plaintiff cites to the following deposition testimony of

his roommate, Medina:

A. It was a white “crime pays” shirt.

Q. Do you recall the officers asking you about that

T-shirt?

A. I think they laughed about it, now that you

mention it. That’s about it, though.

(Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl. at Ex. I, Medina Dep. 65:22-25 to

66:1) 

H. Allegations of Municipal Liability.

Plaintiff asserts that MATLOCK participated in all of

Plaintiff’s arrests by ratifying his subordinates’ actions and/or

by failing to adequately train his subordinates. (Id. at Pl.’s

Response to Def.’s UF No. 39) In support, Plaintiff cites to the

following deposition testimony of John Thomas Pryor, whom

Plaintiff does not identify:

Q. And you would have had to -- in essence, you or

Roark would have had to ratify that deal before it

was offered to Mr. Medina?

A. Or the conversation could have occurred and then

Detective Bender would come brief either Sergeant

Roark or myself on that and we would either

approve it or reject it.

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***

Q. Would it be fair to say, try to kind of sum this

up a little bit, let’s use Detective Bender as a

hypothetical here. Detective Bender comes to you

with a report on a case and you can either agree

with his approach or disagree with is approach?

A. Yes.

Q. So if you’re agreeing with his approach, you’re

essentially ratifying his activity?

A. Correct. 

***

Q. Now, at the time of this incident, March 7, 2002,

who was your direct supervisor?

A. Lieutenant Melvin Scott.

Q. And Lieutenant Scott would report to a captain,

correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know who that captain was at the time?

A. It could have been either Dave Jackson or Neal

Mahan. There was a retirement around that time

frame and I’m not sure exactly where that occurred

in relationship to this investigation.

Q. And at the time of this incidence, again March 7,

2002, Eric Matlock was the chief of police, correct? 

A. Yes.

Q. Did Chief Matlock have an assistant chief at that

time?

A. I believe it would have been Bill Rector.

(Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl. at Ex. G, Pryor Dep. 23:24 to 24:5;

30:17-25; 32:12 to 33:3) Plaintiff provides no explanation as to

the respective roles that the individuals referred to in the

above testimony played in this case. Plaintiff asserted during

oral argument that this testimony and other uncited testimony

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establishes that MATLOCK deferred to the police captains who, in

turn, deferred to their subordinates.

Plaintiff also cites to the following testimony of MATLOCK:

Q. Be fair to say that the captain has a role that is

almost all publc relations, administrative and

supervisory as opposed to anything really handson?

A. Yes. The lieutenants report directly to the

captain, so that’s where he would become directly

engaged in supervision.

Q. So if the lieutenant was to have a question about

an investigation or a question brought to the

lieutenant by a detective, the lieutenants could

go to his captain, kind of get the final say

within the division at least as to how to proceed

in a certain instance?

A. Generally speaking, I’d say that’s the case.

(Id. at Ex. E Matlock Dep. 12:1-13) 

No allegation is made that the chief is involved in the case

review or approval process.

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998) 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. First, an

issue is “genuine” when the non-moving party produces evidence on

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which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor when

viewing the record as a whole and in light of the evidentiary

burden the law places on the non-moving party. Triton Energy

Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). 

Second, facts are “material” if they “might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782

(quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248) Whether a factual issue

is material is determined by the substantive law. Liberty Lobby,

477 U.S. at 248. 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263

F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, “the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th

Cir. 2000). However, if the non-moving party has the burden of

proof at trial, then the moving party’s initial burden is only to

show “that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

325 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden of proof,

the non-moving party must produce evidence on which a reasonable

trier of fact could find in its favor when viewing the record as

a whole and in light of the evidentiary burden the law places on

the non-moving party. Triton Energy Corp., 68 F.3d at 1221. The

non-moving party cannot simply rest on its allegations without

any significant probative evidence tending to support the

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complaint. Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076.

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry

of summary judgment, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to the party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be

“no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a

complete failure of proof concerning an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

“In order to show that a genuine issue of material fact

exists, the nonmoving party must introduce some ‘significant

probative evidence tending to support the complaint.’” Rivera v.

AMTRAK, 331 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249). If the moving party can meet his burden

of production, the non-moving party “must produce evidence in

response.... [H]e cannot defeat summary judgment with

allegations in the complaint, or with unsupported conjecture or

conclusory statements.” Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 343

F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). “Conclusory allegations

unsupported by factual data cannot defeat summary judgment.” 

Rivera, 331 F.3d at 1078 (citing Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley

Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)).

The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

non-moving party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to

avoid summary judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless,

“[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.” Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on summary judgment is

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not to weigh evidence or resolve issues; rather, it is to find

genuine factual issues:

[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is

not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the

truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trail. ... [T]here is no issue for

trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that

party.

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249 (internal citations omitted); see

also Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir.

1996).

B. Summary Adjudication Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

The purpose of Rule 56(d) is to salvage some results from

the judicial effort involved in evaluating a summary judgment

motion and to frame narrow triable issues if the court finds that

the order would be helpful with the progress of litigation. 

National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. L.E. Myers Co., Inc., 937

F. Supp. 276, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). An order under Rule 56(d)

narrows the issues and enables the parties to recognize more full

their rights, yet it permits the court to retain full power to

completely adjudicate all aspects of the case when the proper

time arrives. See 10B WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2737 (3d ed. 1998).

The procedure under Rule 56(d) is designed to be ancillary

to a summary judgment motion. Unlike Rule 56(c), which allows

for interlocutory judgment on a question of liability, Rule 56(d)

does not authorize the entry of a judgment on part of a claim or

the granting of partial relief. Id. at § 2737.

The obligation imposed on the court by Rule 56(d) to specify

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3 Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,

except that in any action brought against a judicial

officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be

granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or

declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of

this section, any Act of Congress applicable

exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be

considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 

25

the uncontroverted material facts is technically compulsory. See

Woods v. Mertes, 9 F.R.D. 318, 320 (D. Del. 1949). However, if

the court determines that identifying indisputable facts through

partial summary judgment would not materially expedite the

adjudicative process, it may decline to do so. See WRIGHT & MILLER

at § 2737.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Section 1983 provides for liability against any person

acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’

of the United States.”3 S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana,

336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

//

//

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4 “There is certainly no constitutional impediment to

municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a

federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment.’”

Monell, 436 U.S. 691 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,

291 (1977)). There is no “basis for concluding that the Eleventh

Amendment is a bar to municipal liability.” Id. (citing

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); Lincoln County

v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)).

26

1. Suits Against Local Governments: The Monell

Doctrine.

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4 Haugen v.

Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 55 (1978)). “[T]he

legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the

conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other

local government units to be included among those persons to whom

§ 1983 applies.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Local governments can

be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where

such suits arise out of unconstitutional actions that implement

or execute a “policy statement, ordinance, or decision officially 

adopted and promulgated by that body's officers....” Id. at 690-

1. If no official policy exists, “customs and usages” may

fulfill this element of a § 1983 claim against a local

government. Id. 

A local government’s liability is limited, however. 

Although a local government can be held liable for its official

policies or customs, it will not be held liable for an employee’s

actions outside of the scope of these policies or customs. “A

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municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held

liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell,

436 U.S. at 691. “A local government may not be sued under

§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. 

Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,

whether made by its law-makers or by those whose edicts or acts

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the

injury that the government as an entity is responsible under

§ 1983.” Id. at 694.

To prevail on a § 1983 complaint against a local government

under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test: 

(1) The local government official(s) must have

intentionally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights;

(2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and

may not be an isolated incident; and

(3) A nexus must link the specific policy or custom to the

plaintiff’s injury.

See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-92.

2. Suits Against Governmental Officials

(a) Official-Capacity Suits

“[Section] 1983 claims against government officials in their

official capacities are really suits against the governmental

employer because the employer must pay any damages awarded.” 

Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)); see also Doe v.

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Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997)

(finding that “a suit against a state official in his official

capacity is no different from a suit against the [official’s

office or the] State itself”) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). “As the Supreme Court

has stated, ‘official-capacity suits...generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent.’” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles,

167 F.3d 514, 524 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S.

at 165). “‘As long as the government entity receives notice and

an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.’” Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at 524 n.3 (quoting Graham,

473 U.S. at 166.). 

(b) Personal-Capacity Suits

“‘Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability

upon a government official for actions he takes under color of

state law.’” Dittman v. Cal., 191 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir.

1999) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 165); see also Hafer v. Melo, 

502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (finding that “[p]ersonal capacity suits

seek to impose liability on state officials for acts taken under

color of state law”); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 749 (9th

Cir. 1995). In setting forth the distinctions between personal

and official capacity suits, the Supreme Court said: 

Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal

liability upon a government official for actions he

takes under color of state law. See, e.g., Scheuer

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-238 (1974).

Official-capacity suits, in contrast, “generally

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5 Immunity is not absolute, as the Ninth Circuit has

explained: 

This court has held that, when a public official acts

in reliance on a duly enacted statute or ordinance,

that official ordinarily is entitled to qualified

immunity. See Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d

1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “an officer

who reasonably relies on the legislature’s 

determination that a statute is constitutional should

be shielded from personal liability”). The existence

of an authorizing statute is not dispositive,

however. Qualified immunity does not extend to a

public official who enforces a statute that is

“patently violative of fundamental constitutional

principles.” Id. at 1209.

Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027.

29

represent only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”

Monell[], 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55 []. As long as the

government entity receives notice and an opportunity

to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit

against the entity. Brandon, 469 U.S., at 471-472.

It is not a suit against the official personally, for

the real party in interest is the entity. Thus,

while an award of damages against an official in his

personal capacity can be executed only against the

official’s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to

recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity

suit must look to the government entity itself.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).

“While the plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not

establish a connection to governmental ‘policy or custom,’

officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in

their official capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses

such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law.”5 Pena

v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Graham,

473 U.S. at 166-167). Individuals are not immune under the

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doctrine of qualified immunity if they violated “clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “A victory in such a suit is a

‘victory against the individual defendant, rather than against

the entity that employs him.’” Cerrato v. San Francisco

Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 1994)

(quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67).

C. Summary Judgment in a Qualified Immunity Case.

Defendants BENDER and CARVEL assert the defense of qualified

immunity. A court must apply a two-step analysis in determining

whether a defendant is entitled to the protection of qualified

immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). First, a

court must ask whether a constitutional violation occurred at

all. Id. If the answer to this question is yes, the court must

then determine whether the right violated was “clearly

established” by asking whether a reasonable officer could believe

that the defendant’s actions were lawful. Id.

It is clear that the traditional summary judgment approach

should be used in analyzing the first step of the Saucier

analysis: 

A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity

issue must consider, then, this threshold question:

Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?

Where the facts are disputed, their resolution and

determinations of credibility are manifestly the

province of a jury.

Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1110-1 (2004) (internal

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citations and quotations omitted).

In the second step of the Saucier analysis, the court must

ask whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted. Although this

inquiry is primarily a legal one, where the reasonableness of the

officer’s belief “depends on the resolution of disputed issues of

fact...summary judgment is not appropriate.” Wilkins v. City of

Oakland, 364 F.3d 949, 1110-11 (9th. Cir. 2003) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). 

VI. ANALYSIS

A. Whether Defendants BENDER and CARVEL are entitled to

Qualified Immunity as to the Unlawful Search and

Seizure Claims.

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for violation of his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures is

based upon four separate asserted violations: (1) BENDER

obtained the search warrant by misleading the magistrate; (2) the

search warrant was overbroad in that it did not adequately

describe the premises to be searched and/or the items to be

seized; (3) BENDER and CARVEL conducted an unconstitutionally

destructive search of Plaintiff’s residence in violation of the

Fourth Amendment; and (4) BENDER and CARVEL’s search of

Plaintiff’s residence exceeded the scope of the search warrant. 

Defendants argue qualified immunity as to only two of these

claims. First, Defendants argue that BENDER is entitled to

qualified immunity as to the judicial deception claim because

there is no evidence that BENDER misled the magistrate. (See

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Doc. 39-3, Def.’s Mem. 7-9) Plaintiff responds that BENDER did

mislead the magistrate by omitting stating in his affidavit that

two individuals lived at the apartment in separate bedrooms and

that one of the confidential informants was another bail bondsman

and Plaintiff’s competitor. Second, Defendants argue that CARVEL

is entitled to qualified immunity because he conducted his search

in reliance on his fellow officer’s representation that the

search warrant was valid. (Id.) Plaintiff responds that neither

BENDER nor CARVEL is entitled to qualified immunity because they

exceeded the scope of the warrant in conducting their search. 

Although Defendants do not formulate their arguments regarding

Plaintiff’s two other claims in terms of qualified immunity,

Defendants’ arguments will nevertheless be construed as such. 

See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (qualified

immunity should be determined at the “earliest possible stage in

litigation”); accord Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200.

Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial;

that is, it is an immunity from suit rather than a defense on the

merits. Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 2002). 

As a result, the doctrine of qualified immunity safeguards all

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law. Id.; Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-1. 

Qualified immunity grows out of the policy concern that few

individuals would enter public service if they risked personal

liability for their official decisions. Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 339 (1986). The immunity “spare[s] a defendant not

only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily

imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit.” Siegert

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v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). 

In a summary judgment motion, to overcome the qualified

immunity defense, a plaintiff must establish (1) a constitutional

right was violated and (2) the right was “clearly-established.” 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014,

1021 (9th Cir. 2002). 

1. Plaintiff’s assertion that BENDER misled the

magistrate.

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is based in part on his assertion

that BENDER misled the magistrate in obtaining the search

warrant. There is a “presumption of validity with respect to [a]

search warrant.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1975). 

An officer loses the “shield of qualified immunity” if he

“submitted an affidavit that contained statements he knew to be

false or would have known to be false had he not recklessly

disregarded the truth.” Butler, 281 F.3d 1024 (quoting Hervey v.

Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 788-9) (9th Cir. 1995)). 

On a summary judgment motion in a judicial deception case,

the standard is as follows:

The plaintiff alleging judicial deception must make a

substantial showing of deliberate falsehood or reckless

disregard for the truth and establish that but for the

dishonesty, the challenged action would not have

occurred. If the matter survives the summary judgment

phase, the matter should go to trial.

Id. (quoting Hervey, 65 F.3d at 788-9)).

In the Ninth Circuit, the case law “effectively

intertwine[s]” the constitutional violation question with the

question of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the

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truth:

This merger is ultimately appropriate because...no

reasonable officer could believe that it is

constitutional to act dishonestly or recklessly with

regard to the basis for probable cause in seeking a

warrant. ... If [the officer] was reckless or

deceitful in preparing the warrant affidavit, then he

both violated [the plaintiff’s] rights and is not

entitled to qualified immunity.

Id.

In sum, search warrants are presumed valid and Defendants’

initial burden is only to show that there is an absence of

evidence that BENDER misled the magistrate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

325. To overcome a qualified immunity defense on a summary

judgment motion in a judicial deception case, a plaintiff must

make (1) a substantial showing of deliberate falsehood or

reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) establish that but for

the dishonesty, the magistrate would not have issued the warrant. 

Id.; see also Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117 (9th

Cir. 1997). 

Here, BENDER drafted and signed a probable cause affidavit

to obtain the search warrant for the search conducted of

Plaintiff’s residence on March 7, 2002. Defendants assert that

there is no evidence that BENDER misled the magistrate. 

Plaintiff argues that BENDER mislead the magistrate by (1)

omitting to disclose that two individuals resided in the

apartment, in two separate bedrooms; and (2) that one of BENDER’s

confidential informants was Plaintiff’s “direct business

competitor.” (Doc. 43, Pl.’s Response to UF No. 5)

First, Plaintiff has made no showing that BENDER’s omission

to disclose that two individuals lived in the apartment was the

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result of a deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth or

what difference it could have made. Plaintiff has made no

showing that the magistrate judge would not have issued the

search warrant if that information had been included. Plaintiff

does not dispute that probable cause existed to search his

roommate Medina for drugs and drug paraphernalia, and Plaintiff

does not argue that BENDER’s affidavit contained any falsehoods

or omissions regarding the information about Medina. (Doc. 43,

Def.’s UF Nos. 3-5) 

BENDER’s omission from his affidavit that two persons lived

at the apartment (if BENDER knew that to be the fact), in no way

affects the existence of probable cause to search the residence

for drugs, drug paraphernalia, and large amounts of currency with

respect to Medina, which Plaintiff also does not dispute were

actually present in the apartment. (See Doc. 43, Def.’s UF No.

3)

Second, Plaintiff has made no showing that BENDER’s omission

to disclose that one of BENDER’s confidential informants was

Plaintiff’s “direct business competitor” was a deliberate

falsehood or was made in reckless disregard for the truth. As a

preliminary matter, Plaintiff cites to deposition testimony of an

individual named Joseph Aldana as support, but provides no

foundation explaining who Joseph Aldana is or what role he played

in the Medina and/or Kephart investigations and arrests. Even if

this testimony is considered, it does not establish that the

confidential informant was Plaintiff’s “direct business

competitor” -- Mr. Aldana, whoever he is, only identifies the

informant as another bail bondsman who was working in

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6 Mr. Aldana’s testimony is as follows:

Q. Are you familiar with Mr. Kephart?

A. Yes.

Q. How are you familiar with him?

A. Well, before Detective Bender started this

investigation, I had received information on Mr.

Kephart.

Q. What type of information did you receive?

A. That he was involved in the sale of narcotics.

Q. And you’re talking about a time period before

March of 2002 --

A. Yes.

Q. -- when you first heard that?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall approximately when that was that you

first heard that about Mr. Kephart?

A. I would say within a two-year time period before

the execution of the search warrant.

Q. Do you know how you first acquired that

information?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. How did you acquire it?

***

A. I won’t give the name, it was just another bail

bondsman who, on occasion, we’d utilized as an

informant.

Q. That would be a bail bondsman who, at least at one

point in time, was working as such in the City of

Bakersfield?

A. Yes.

Q. Without giving up that person’s name, do you

recall generally what that person told you about

Mr. Kephart? Was it anything more than he might

be selling narcotics, for example?

A. I just remember that this other bail bondsman had

said Mr. Kephart was selling narcotics, and I

can’t remember what kind or what type or where

from.

(Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl. at Ex. D, Aldana Dep. 13:5 to

14:19)

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Bakersfield.6 (Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl. at Ex. D, Aldana

Dep. 14:9-12) In short, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that

the interests of the confidential informant, who was also in the

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bail bond business, were so contrary to Plaintiff’s so as to

create doubt regarding the reliability of the information. That

someone is a business competitor of a person who is not the

direct focus of a search warrant application, is not per se

information that must be disclosed to a magistrate. That

informant was independently reliable and provided accurate

information to furnish probable cause as to Medina and the

residence.

For example, in Lombardi, the Ninth Circuit held that the

plaintiff made a substantial showing that the confidential

informants had reasons for disliking the plaintiff where the

informants were the plaintiff’s former girlfriend and her son. 

117 F.3d at 1126. The court held that omitting the information

about the relationship the informants had with the plaintiff was

misleading and that the plaintiff had met his burden as to the

first prong, i.e., to establish the officer’s deliberate

falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. 

Here, however, omitting that one of the informants was

another bail bondsman in Bakersfield, without more, is not

misleading. BENDER stated in his affidavit that his basis for

relying on information provided by the two informants (referred

to as “CRI #1” and CRI #2”) is that “[d]uring the last six

months, the informants have furnished me with information which,

through investigation, has led to the arrest of at least two

persons, each, for narcotic and dangerous drug violations and the

seizure of narcotics.” (Doc. 39-5, Bender Decl. at Ex. A

“Probable Cause Affidavit” at Page 3) Omitting that one of the

informants was another bail bondsman who may have been familiar

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with Kephart is not misleading. Informants must have some

familiarity with the person about whom they provide information. 

The search warrant in dispute was issued as to Medina, not as to

Plaintiff. Plaintiff cannot litigate the rights or interests of

his roommate; he can only litigate his own interests. Coalition

of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush, 310 F. 3d 1153, 1163

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-4

(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-9 (1975)). 

To the extent Plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim on an

allegation of judicial deception, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Adjudication is GRANTED. BENDER is immune from suit as to

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for unlawful search and seizure insofar

as it is based on a theory of judicial deception.

2. Plaintiff’s assertion that CARVEL and BENDER

conducted a search outside the scope of the

warrant.

As stated above, on a summary judgment motion, to overcome

the qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must establish (1) a

constitutional right was violated and (2) the right was “clearlyestablished.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see also Butler,

281 F.3d at 1021. “The scope of a lawful search is ‘defined by

the object of the search....’” United States v. Ewain, 88 F.3d

689, 692 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S.

79, 84 (1987). A plaintiff can establish a Fourth Amendment

constitutional violation if officers conduct a search or seize

evidence outside the scope of a search warrant. See id.

Plaintiff asserts that CARVEL and BENDER exceeded the scope

of the search warrant by searching for and seizing evidence not

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7 Although Plaintiff referred to his shoes as “Action”

tennis shoes in his deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel did not

dispute in his papers or during oral argument that the shoes

seized from his apartment were different than the “gray size 10

Nike Cortez tennis shoes” identified by Defendants in their

papers.

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included in or defined by the search warrant. First, Plaintiff

asserts that BENDER’s seizure of Plaintiff’s guns and a

flashlight exceeded the scope of the warrant. Second, Plaintiff

asserts that (a) CARVEL’s presence at the search and (b) CARVEL’s

seizure of the tennis shoes were both outside the scope of the

warrant. The determination whether Defendants exceeded the scope

of the warrant is a mixed question of law and fact.

(a) Whether BENDER exceeded the scope of the

warrant.

First, there is no evidence that BENDER conducted a general

search of Plaintiff’s belongings or that he searched for items

relating to Plaintiff. Plaintiff cannot maintain a Fourth

Amendment claim against BENDER based on an unlawful search. 

There is no dispute that BENDER searched the residence for drugs

in the course of his investigation of Medina’s alleged drug

trafficking activities. 

There is a dispute, however, as to whether BENDER seized

items outside the scope of the warrant and whether Plaintiff can

maintain a Fourth Amendment claim against BENDER for an unlawful

seizure. Plaintiff claims that the following items were taken

from his apartment but never returned to him: guns, flashlight,

“red and gray Action tennis shoes.”7 Plaintiff’s counsel stated

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during oral argument that Plaintiff testified during his

deposition that he saw BENDER carry two garbage bags of things

out of his apartment. However, this portion of Plaintiff’s

testimony was not attached to Plaintiff’s summary judgment

submissions. Plaintiff provided no evidence of a police

inventory although Plaintiff’s counsel indicated during oral

argument that a police report was prepared after the search. 

The only evidence regarding the items that were taken, then,

is Plaintiff’s testimony that they were taken and BENDER’s

testimony that “the search was not destructive.” (Doc. 39-5,

Bender Decl. ¶ 11) Defendants produced no evidence to contradict

Plaintiff’s claim that the guns and the flashlight were seized. 

The question here is whether seizure of the guns and flashlight

constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. Although the scope of a

search warrant is “defined by the object of the search,” and

therefore seizures of objects not defined in a warrant ordinarily

constitute unlawful seizures under the Fourth Amendment, there is

an exception to this rule. Ewain, 88 F.3d at 692. Under the

plain view doctrine, an officer may seize an item that is not

described in the warrant if (1) the initial intrusion is lawful

and (2) its incriminating nature is immediately apparent. Ewain,

88 F.3d at 695 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136

(1990)). 

The first element of the plain view test is fulfilled

because, as discussed above, BENDER’s presence in the apartment

was lawful since it was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant. 

The second element is fulfilled as well. First, the

incriminating nature of guns during a narcotics search is

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8 Plaintiff cites Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61

(1992), in support of his contention that the act of seizing

unrelated personal property alone is in and of itself a Fourth

Amendment violation. (Doc. 42, Pl.’s Opp. 11) Soldal, however,

does not help Plaintiff’s case. Soldal defined a “seizure” as

“meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interest

in that property.” The court held that defendant officers who

lifted Plaintiff’s mobile home and took it to another location

were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that

such a seizure implicated the Fourth Amendment, although it did

not hold that such a seizure was per se unreasonable because that

issue was not before the court. Id. (“Whether the [Fourth]

Amendment was in fact violated is, of course, a different

question that requires determining whether the seizure was

reasonable. That inquiry entails the weighing of various factors

and is not before us.”) 

The Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be

unreasonable to constitute a violation. U.S. Const. Fourth Am.

(“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated....”) (emphasis added). Seizure of guns

and a flashlight during a narcotics search, even if not

specifically identified in a warrant, is not unreasonable, where

Plaintiff fails to offer any evidence about the circumstances

under which they were found. 

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immediately apparent, if in plain view. See Horton, 496 U.S. at

142. Plaintiff has not provided evidence that the gun was in a

place where the officers would not be entitled to search for

drugs or in a location outside the scope of the warrant. There

is no evidence regarding where the guns or the flashlight were

found. Plaintiff cannot base a Fourth Amendment claim against

BENDER based on the seizure of the guns. 

Second, the incriminating nature of the flashlight is also

immediately apparent in the context of a drug search. Drugs

and/or drug paraphernalia could be hidden in the flashlight or,

depending on its size, a flashlight could be used as a weapon.8

BENDER is entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s

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9 To the extent that Plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim on the

allegation that the guns and flashlight have not been returned to

him in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Defendants’ motion for

summary adjudication is DENIED. Plaintiff’s counsel stated

during oral argument that Plaintiff has filed a government claim

for the return of his property. If this is the case, Plaintiff

may have a claim against BENDER and the CITY for converting

personal property under color of state law. Whether Plaintiff

actually has such a claim depends on various other factors and

questions not currently at issue.

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§ 1983 claim to the extent it is based on his claim that seizure

of the guns and flashlight was outside the scope of the warrant.9

There is no evidence that BENDER was involved in the seizure

of the tennis shoes. The motion for summary adjudication as to

BENDER for alleged unlawful seizure, except as to the guns and

flashlight is GRANTED. The Fourth Amendment clause relating to

seizure of the tennis shoes relates only to CARVEL.

(b) Whether CARVEL exceeded the scope of the

warrant.

Plaintiff alleges that CARVEL exceeded the scope of the

warrant in two ways: (1) CARVEL’s presence at the search to

assist in an unrelated investigation was unlawful in and of

itself; and (2) CARVEL’s seizure of the tennis shoes was

unlawful.

First, the evidence shows that CARVEL was present at the

search for two purposes: (1) “to monitor the search and to

discern if any items located on the premises were the fruits of

the suspected crimes committed by Kephart,” i.e., burglary and

fraudulent use of a credit card; and/or (2) to explore the

possibility of opening an investigation regarding Plaintiff’s

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involvement in drug trafficking at a nightclub. Ultimately, the

undisputed facts show that CARVEL did not exceed the scope of the

warrant by his presence at the search. As discussed above with

respect to BENDER, actively searching for information or evidence

relating to CARVEL’s investigation of Plaintiff would fall

outside the scope of the warrant issued as to Medina. However,

CARVEL testified in his declaration that he “did not actively

participate in the search on 3/7/02.” (Doc. 39-7, Carvel Decl.

¶ 21) Plaintiff has provided no evidence to the contrary. 

Plaintiff also attempts to argue that the Medina warrant was

used as a pretext for CARVEL to search Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s

things. That CARVEL was present at the search in the context of

an investigation unrelated or marginally related to the subject

of the search warrant is not determinative. “[S]uch factors as

inviting someone along[] may be evidence that the search exceeded

the scope of the warrant,” although inviting another officer

along on a search “is not ipso facto improper.” Ewain, at 694. 

There is no “inadvertent” discovery limitation on the plain view

exception. Id. (“If a police officer has a valid warrant for one

item, and ‘fully expects’ to find another, based on a

‘suspicion...whether or not it amounts to probable cause,’ the

suspicion or expectation does not defeat the lawfulness of the

seizure.”) (quoting Horton, 397 U.S. at 138-9). The officer’s

subjective intent in inviting another officer along does not

alone show the search was beyond the scope:

[I]t no longer matters that the invited-along officer

was looking for what he found, which thing was not

described in the warrant. What matters is whether the

officers looked in places or in ways not permitted by

the warrant. That the officer invited along, and not

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the officer to whom the warrant was issued, has

expertise which makes it ‘immediately apparent’ to him

that objects in plain view are evidence of a crime,

does not establish that the search went beyond the

scope of the warrant.

Id. at 695. Plaintiff provides no evidence that CARVEL looked in

any place or used any search method not authorized by law or

generally recognized police practices. There is a failure of

proof on this claim.

Second, Plaintiff argues that CARVEL exceeded the scope of

the warrant by seizing the gray size 10 Nike Cortez tennis shoes. 

CARVEL testified that he saw the shoes in plain view, and that he

knew that the shoes fit the same description given by the

Footlocker employees. The plain view doctrine holds that, during

the course of a lawful search for one thing, police officers may

seize a different item that is in plain view if its incriminating

nature is immediately apparent. Ewain, 88 F.3d at 695 (citing

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990)). As stated

above, discovery of the thing not described need not be

inadvertent. Id.

Here, CARVEL’s presence at the search was lawful and the

incriminating nature of the tennis shoes was immediately apparent

to him based on his knowledge from the Kephart Footlocker

investigation. His seizure of the tennis shoes falls within the

plain view exception and there is nothing unreasonable about his

seizure conduct to defeat entitlement to qualified immunity for

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim insofar as it is based on his claim

CARVEL exceeded the scope of the warrant. At oral argument,

counsel asserted that the Nike tennis shoes were located in a big

pile of shoes in the living room that had to be rummaged through. 

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10 Defendants argue that CARVEL is immune from suit because

he relied on a valid search warrant and that he did not know at

the time that the scope of the search only related to Plaintiff’s

roommate and not to Plaintiff. Defendants’ argument has no

application here. 

In support of their argument that CARVEL is entitled to

qualified immunity, Defendants cite Morris v. County of Tehama,

795 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1986) and Brant v. County of Stanislaus,

1 F.3d 1246, 1993 WL 285905 (9th Cir. 1993). First, Brant is an

unpublished opinion and is cited in violation of Ninth Circuit

Court Rule 36-3(a). Brant is not citable authority and will not

be considered. Second, Morris is distinguishable. The Ninth

Circuit held in Morris that “an officer is entitled to assume the

validity of a search warrant secured by fellow officers.” 795

F.2d at 795 (emphasis omitted) (citing Whiteley v. Warden,

Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971)). The

Morris court did not hold that an officer is entitled to assume

the content and scope of the search warrant.

Indeed, Defendants imply by their very argument that CARVEL

did exceed the scope of the warrant, particularly considering

CARVEL’s statement in his deposition that he did not know that

the warrant related only to Medina and not to Kephart after the

March 7, 2002 search. Nevertheless, there is still insufficient

evidence to create a genuine issue regarding CARVEL’s sworn

statement in his declaration that he did not actively search for

the evidence relating to Kephart. Pursuant to the plain view

doctrine, which has no inadvertent discovery limitation, CARVEL

45

No evidence of this was submitted. Even if this assertion were

true, there is no prohibition against the officer looking through

the pile of shoes for narcotics. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence to support

his claim of a constitutional violation, CARVEL and BENDER are

entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

insofar as it is based the claim that CARVEL’s and BENDER’s

searches exceeded the scope of the warrant. Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Adjudication as to CARVEL and BENDER’s qualified

immunity as to this issue is GRANTED.

10

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is entitled to qualified immunity under the facts as presented

here.

46

3. Plaintiff’s assertion that the search warrant was

overbroad.

Plaintiff asserts in his opposition that BENDER is not

entitled to qualified immunity because the search warrant did not

adequately and specifically describe the premises to be searched

and/or the items to be seized and is therefore overbroad. (Doc.

42, Pl.’s Opp. 20) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the

search warrant did not specify that there were more than two

people living at the residence and that one of the bedrooms

belonged to the suspect Medina’s roommate (i.e., Plaintiff). 

Defendants, however, did not argue in their motion that BENDER is

entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s claim that the

search warrant was overbroad. Defendants also do not address

Plaintiff’s arguments in their reply. 

It should be noted, however, that the only case Plaintiff

cites in support of his argument, Navarro v. Barthel, 952 F.2d

331, 333 (9th Cir. 1991), is not applicable. This case holds

that there is a clearly-established constitutional right to be

free from searches of the wrong place, even if the search is

conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. This case is

distinguishable because it involved the question whether an

officer acted reasonably in describing the house to be searched

as “the second house on the right” without clarifying which

houses were to be considered in determining which house was the

second house. Id. Here, there is no dispute that the apartment

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described was the right place to be searched. 

Ultimately, BENDER is entitled to qualified immunity as to

the claim that the search warrant is overbroad. A search warrant

is not overbroad “if the description is such that the officer can

with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended”

to be searched. Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031, 1036

(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84

(1987)). Here, the search warrant was issued for narcotics and

narcotics paraphernalia with respect to an apartment and a truck

that were described in unambiguous detail. Medina could easily

have hidden such items in Plaintiff’s room. This case is not

like Mena, where a number of people lived in rooms of a house

that they kept locked with padlocks. The apartment was not a

“multi-dwelling” unit because Medina could have hidden drugs in

his roommate’s bedroom. There is no evidence the door to

Kephart’s bedroom was kept locked. BENDER had probable cause to

obtain a warrant for the entire premises, and under the authority

of the search warrant that specified the entire apartment was

authorized to search the entire premises. Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Adjudication on this issue is GRANTED.

4. Whether the March 7, 2002 Search was

Unconstitutionally Destructive.

Defendants do not argue that BENDER and CARVEL are entitled

to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s claim the search was

destructive. However, their arguments regarding the merits of

the question whether the search was destructive can be construed

as an argument for qualified immunity. If the Defendants can

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establish there is no genuine issue that the search was

reasonably destructive, then there is no constitutional violation

and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to this

claim as well. 

Plaintiff asserts that CARVEL and BENDER and other

unidentified officers damaged and/or destroyed several items of

Plaintiff’s personal property, including CDs, a Michael Jordan

rookie basketball card, Texaco collector planes, photographs, and

a photo album. (Doc. 43, Pl.’s Response to Def.’s UF No. 7;

Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl. at Ex. A, Kephart Dep. 54:17-21) In

addition, Plaintiff testified during his deposition that, after

spending approximately six to eight hours in jail on March 7,

2002, he returned to his apartment to find it in “disarray.” 

(Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl. at Ex. A Kephart Dep. 42:14-25) 

Defendants do not dispute that the identified items were damaged

and/or destroyed. Instead, Defendants offer only the conclusory

assertion that “the search was not destructive.” (See Doc. 43,

Def.’s UF Nos. 7, 21)

Destruction of personal property during a search does not

necessarily result in a constitutional violation:

[O]fficers executing a search warrant occasionally must

damage property in order to perform their duty. 

Therefore, the destruction of property during a search

does not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. 

Rather, only unnecessarily destructive behavior, beyond

that necessary to execute a warrant effectively,

violates the Fourth Amendment.

Mena, 226 F.3d at 1041 (internal quotations and citations

omitted); see also Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258

(1979). Furthermore, “[t]he test of what is necessary to execute

a warrant effectively is reasonableness.” San Jose Charter of

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the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d

962, 971 (9th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Becker,

292 F.2d 442, 446 (9th Cir. 1991). “Whether a search is

unreasonable because of its intolerable intensity must be

determined by the particular facts of each case.” Becker, 292

F.2d at 446.

Plaintiff has met his burden to establish a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the search was unreasonably

destructive. The only evidence Defendants have offered in

support of their contention that the search did not violate

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights consists of two conclusory

statements in BENDER and CARVEL’s declarations that “the search

was not destructive.” Plaintiff has countered these conclusions

with testimony that specific items of his personal property were

destroyed, including CDs, basketball cards, collector planes,

photographs, and a photo album, for which there is no explanation

of the need for destruction. There is no case law holding that

the destruction of such items of personal property during a

narcotics search alone, without any explanation as to the need

for the dstruction, is not unreasonable. Defendants have failed

to meet their burden to show how and why destruction of such

items is objectively reasonable in the context of a search for

drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash. Neither BENDER nor CARVEL

is entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication as to

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim insofar as it is based on Plaintiff’s

claim that the search was unconstitutionally destructive of his

personal property is DENIED. 

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50

C. Whether CARVEL is Entitled to Qualified Immunity as to 

Plaintiff’s Claims for False Arrest for Burglary and

Fraudulent Use of a Stolen Credit Card.

Plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim in part on the assertions

that CARVEL arrested him for burglary and fraudulent use of a

stolen credit card (1) without probable cause; and (2) based on

illegally-obtained evidence. 

1. Probable Cause.

Freedom from arrest without probable clause is a clearlyestablished constitutional right. Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354

F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (“That a police officer may

arrest a suspect only if he has probable cause to believe a crime

has been committed is a bedrock Fourth Amendment precept.”); see

also Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 438 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Probable cause exists if, “under the totality of circumstances

known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have

concluded that there was a fair probability that [the defendant]

had committed a crime.” Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d at

1065 (quoting Grant v. City of Long Beach, 315 F.3d 1081, 1085

(9th Cir. 2002)); see also Franklin, 312 F.3d at 438 (“Probable

cause exists when police have knowledge at the moment of arrest

of facts and circumstances based on reasonably trustworthy

information that would warrant a belief by a reasonably prudent

person that the person arrested has committed a criminal

offense.”); Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The

question is “whether the [officers] acted reasonably under

settled law in the circumstances.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.

224, 228 (1991).

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Defendants assert that no constitutional violation occurred

because probable cause existed for Plaintiff’s arrest or, in the

alternative, that CARVEL reasonably believed that probable cause

existed. The proper inquiry where officers are claiming

qualified immunity for a false arrest claim is “whether a

reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause

existed to arrest the plaintiff.” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 437. 

The qualified immunity question does not depend on whether

probable cause actually existed.

The following was known to CARVEL at the time of Plaintiff’s

arrest: 

(1) Mr. Porter reported to CARVEL on January 29, 2002 that

Mr. Porter’s credit card and wallet had been stolen

from the Red Lion Inn on December 31, 2001; 

(2) Mr. Porter observed Plaintiff present at the Red Lion

Inn on December 31, 2001; 

(3) CARVEL confirmed with Red Lion Inn personnel that a

room had been registered to “Colleen Kephart” on

December 31, 2001; 

(4) CARVEL confirmed with Mr. Porter’s credit card company

that, on January 1, 2002 an attempted charge was made

to Mr. Porter’s credit card at a Footlocker store; 

(5) Footlocker employees Tovar and Martinez identified

Plaintiff from a photographic lineup and informed

CARVEL that Plaintiff had attempted to purchase a pair

of gray size 10 Nike Cortez tennis shoes with a credit

card on January 1, 2002; and 

(6) Mr./Ms. Tovar and Mr. Martinez also informed CARVEL

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that Plaintiff’s attempted credit card charge was

declined and Plaintiff then purchased the shoes with

cash. 

Finally, CARVEL asserts that he arrested Plaintiff when he

saw the gray size 10 Nike Cortez tennis shoes in plain view at

Plaintiff’s residence during the search on March 7, 2002.

Plaintiff has produced no evidence to dispute these facts. 

Plaintiff has produced no evidence that there was any reason to

doubt his positive identification by the eyewitnesses. Plaintiff

also has not shown that the information from Mr. Porter’s credit

card company was unreliable or untrustworthy. Plaintiff has

produced no evidence to show that CARVEL did not actually possess

the above information at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest. 

Plaintiff only denies that he committed burglary or attempted to

use a stolen credit card. (Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl. at Ex.

A, Kephart Dep. 31:19-20) However, his denial does not create a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether CARVEL had an

objectively reasonable belief that probable cause existed to

arrest Plaintiff for committing those crimes. A police officer

may arrest a suspect without a warrant if the suspect commits a

misdemeanor in the officer’s presence or the officer has probable

cause to believe the suspect is guilty of a felony not committed

in the officer’s presence. Cal. Penal Code § 836(a).

Burglary, as defined by Cal. Penal Code § 459, is committed

by: “[e]very person who enters any house, room, apartment...with

intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty

//

//

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11 Cal. Penal Code § 460(a) defines burglary of the first

degree as: “[e]very burglary of an inhabited dwelling house,

vessel..., or trailer coach...or the inhabited portion of any

other building....”

53

of burglary.”11 Burglary is a felony. Cal. Penal Code §§ 17,

461.

Theft by fraudulent use of a credit card, as defined by Cal.

Penal Code § 484g, is committed by: “[e]very person who, with

the intent to defraud, (a) uses, for the purpose of obtaining

money, goods, services, or anything else of value, an access

card..., or (b) obtains money, goods, services, or anything else

of value by representing without the consent of the cardholder

that he or she is the holder of an access card and the card has

not in fact been issued....” Theft by fraudulent use of a credit

card is a felony. Cal. Penal Code §§ 17, 489, 490.

Based on the elements of the crimes of burglary and

fraudulent use of a credit card, Plaintiff has failed to produce

evidence to establish that CARVEL did not reasonably believe he

had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for burglary and

fraudulent use of a credit card based on information provided by

a reliable citizen informant and evidence in plain view. The law

is clear that where probable cause exists, the officer’s

subjective state of mind is irrelevant. CARVEL is entitled to

qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

insofar as it is based on claims of false arrest for burglary and

fraudulent use of a credit card for lack of probable cause. 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication on this issue is

GRANTED.

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2. Whether Plaintiff can establish a constitutional

violation for false arrest based on illegally

obtained evidence.

As discussed above, CARVEL did not seize the tennis shoes

unlawfully in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff has failed to establish a constitutional violation for

false arrest based on illegally obtained evidence. CARVEL was

present in the apartment pursuant to a valid search warrant to

search for narcotics and related evidence of drug trafficking. 

The evidence was not obtained illegally. CARVEL is entitled to

qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

insofar as it is based on a claim of false arrest for burglary

and fraudulent use of a stolen credit card based on illegally

obtained evidence. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication

on this issue is GRANTED.

D. Plaintiff’s Claims for False Arrest for Possession of a

Controlled Substance; Disorderly Conduct and Public

Drunkenness; Violation of Restraining Order; and

Traffic Violations.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to meet their

burden to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as

to whether Plaintiff’s arrests for possession of a controlled

substance, disorderly conduct, violation of a restraining order,

and traffic violations lacked probable cause. Plaintiff’s

argument is based on a misapplication of the summary judgment

burdens. When the plaintiff carries the burden of proof, as

here, it is true that it is the defendant’s burden to establish

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 325. However, the defendant can establish the lack of a

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12 Although Plaintiff cannot base his § 1983 claim on

allegations of false arrest for these crimes, this ruling does

not preclude the admissibility of evidence relating to the

55

genuine issue by demonstrating an absence of evidence that

supports the plaintiff’s case. Id. The burden then shifts to

the plaintiff to produce evidence that supports the existence of

a genuine issue. Id. Here, Plaintiff has provided no evidence

regarding the facts surrounding his arrests, let alone evidence

that he was arrested without probable cause. 

It is undisputed that neither BENDER nor CARVEL was involved

in Plaintiff’s arrests for possession of a controlled substance,

disorderly conduct and public drunkenness, violation of a

restraining order, and traffic violations. Neither BENDER nor

CARVEL can be held liable for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim insofar as

it is based on Plaintiff’s assertions of false arrests by other

law enforcement officers for these crimes. 

Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation as to

his claim for false arrest for possession of a controlled

substance based on illegally obtained evidence for an additional

reason. The steroids found in Plaintiff’s room were discovered

during a search for narcotics. Plaintiff has not cited evidence

that establishes the location and seizure of the steroids was

unreasonable. 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication with respect to

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on false arrest for possession of

a controlled substance, disorderly conduct, violation of a

restraining order, and traffic violations for lack of probable

cause is GRANTED.

12

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circumstances surrounding these arrests to support, for example,

Plaintiff’s allegations of animus.

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E. Plaintiff’s Claim against BENDER and CARVEL for

Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights.

Plaintiff claims BENDER and CARVEL conspired to violate

Plaintiff’s civil rights. Defendants argue they “are able to

offer affirmative proof” that the elements of conspiracy have not

been fulfilled. (Doc. 39-3, Def.’s Mem. 17)

To prove a conspiracy between CARVEL and BENDER, Plaintiff

must show “an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate

constitutional rights.” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539,

1540-1 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted). 

Furthermore, “[t]o be liable, each participant in the conspiracy

need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant

must at least share the common objective of conspiracy.” Id. 

Plaintiff alleges generally that BENDER and CARVEL conspired

to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by investigating him

for crimes he did not commit. (Doc. 42, Pl.’s Opp. 7) This is a

legal conclusion. Plaintiff has not submitted evidence to

support any but one of his alleged constitutional violations,

i.e., the destructive search claim. Since as to the objectives

which are not actionable, BENDER and CARVEL are entitled to

qualified immunity; no conspiracy claim can survive related to

all such alleged constitutional violations, except the

destructive search claim. See id.

While CARVEL and BENDER both testified in their declarations

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that they did not enter into an agreement with any other

individuals, including one another, to violate Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights, Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to

the contrary, to create a genuine issue of material fact. 

Plaintiff cites to the deposition testimony of CARVEL and BENDER,

which, if true, would show that BENDER contacted CARVEL before

the search to tell him about the search warrant, and that BENDER

asked CARVEL to come along (or alternately that CARVEL asked to

come along) in order to determine what additional information he

could find about Plaintiff, knowing he did not have a search

warrant for Plaintiff. (Doc. 44, Frankenberger Decl. at Ex. A,

Carvel Dep. 28:21-25; 29:1-15; Ex. C, Bender Dep. 39:13 to 40:12)

While this testimony does not definitively establish a

meeting of the minds between CARVEL and BENDER to destroy

Plaintiff’s personal property, it does create a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether CARVEL and BENDER had a meeting of

the minds to use the narcotics search warrant as a pretext to

violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The standard for a

conspiracy claim does not require that “each participant in the

conspiracy [] know the exact details of the plan,” but instead

requires only that the conspirators share the same objective. 

Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steelworkers, 865 F.2d

at 1540-1) (internal quotations omitted). Conspiracy may be

inferred if sufficient facts are alleged. See Delew v. Wagner,

143 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 156-7 (1970)).

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication with respect to

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for conspiracy is DENIED. 

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F. Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim.

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or

purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon

membership in a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). The purpose of the equal

protection clause is to “secure every person within the State’s

jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,

whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its

improper execution through duly constituted agents.” Village of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)

(quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,

445 (1923)). 

A successful equal protection claim may be brought by a

“class of one,” where the plaintiff alleges that he has been

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated. 

Id. at 563. Plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim in part on the

theory that “DEFENDANTS have singled him out for punishment

because of his work as a bail bondsman....” (Doc. 42, Pl.’s Opp.

10) Plaintiff has provided no evidence that he was treated

differently from other bail bondsmen who were similarly situated

but were not investigated, searched, or arrested, where probable

cause existed.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication with respect to

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for alleged violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s equal protection clause is GRANTED.

//

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59

G. Plaintiff’s Municipal Liability Claims.

Defendants argue that the CITY is not subject to municipal

liability because (1) there is no evidence of an unconstitutional

policy or practice pursuant to which Plaintiff was deprived of

his civil rights; (2) there is no evidence that MATLOCK ratified

the allegedly unconstitutional conduct in question; and (3) there

is no evidence that MATLOCK failed to properly train or supervise

his subordinates. (Doc. 39-3, Def.’s Mem. 18-21; Doc. 48, Def.’s

Reply 3-4)

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haugen,

339 F.3d at 854. The CITY, as a local government, is therefore

subject to suit under § 1983. However, local governments can

only be sued where the claims arise out of unconstitutional

actions by their employees who implement or execute a “policy

statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body’s officers....” Monell, 436 U.S. at

690-1. In other words, a municipality cannot be held liable for

an employee’s actions outside the scope of implementation of the

policies or customs on a respondeat superior theory. Id. There

is no evidence of MATLOCK’s personal knowledge of or involvement

in the investigations, arrests, and other events surrounding

Plaintiff. To the extent Plaintiff attempts to prove a personal

liability claim against MATLOCK, there is no evidence of

MATLOCK’s participation or knowledge.

A municipality can, however, be held liable for the acts of

one of its employees acting in an “official” capacity. 

“‘[O]fficial-capacity suits...generally represent only another

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way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer

is an agent.’” Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at 524 n. 3 (quoting Graham,

473 U.S. at 165). 

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to provide any

evidence to support his assertions of municipal liability. The

only evidence Plaintiff cites in support of any of the municipal

claims is the deposition testimony of John Thomas Pryor, whose

identity is not made clear, and the deposition testimony of Chief

MATLOCK. Furthermore, Mr. Pryor’s testimony does not discuss

MATLOCK, other than stating that he was the chief of police on

March 7, 2002 and that his assistant chief was an individual

named Bill Rector. Chief MATLOCK’s testimony does not establish

that he knew anything about BENDER and CARVEL’s investigations or

searches, let alone that he ratified them or had any

participation in them.

By citing this testimony, Plaintiff attempts to establish

that MATLOCK deferred to his captains to review case work by

detectives and is using Pryor’s testimony to establish a chain of

command. (See Pl.’s DF No. 70) Plaintiff makes no attempt to

identify the individuals in the chain of command who made any

decisions or approvals of the actions in dispute, nor does he

attempt to explain how the structure of the chain had any

causative effect on this case. None of the testimony cited by

Plaintiff addresses MATLOCK’s supervisory or training activities. 

There is also no evidence of a custom or practice for which the

CITY can be held liable.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication as to

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the CITY and MATLOCK is GRANTED.

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H. Plaintiff’s Assertion that his Civil Rights Were

Violated by BENDER’s Alleged Interference With

Plaintiff’s Apprehension of an “International

Fugitive.”

Plaintiff offers no legal or factual basis upon which he can

sustain a § 1983 action based on the allegation that a police

officer “interfered” with Plaintiff’s capture of an alleged

international fugitive, Scott Gallegos. Not only does Plaintiff

fail to explain or describe the facts surrounding this incident

(other than that he lost approximately $30,000.00 in bond money

posted for the “fugitive”), Plaintiff’s arguments consist of

nothing more than conclusory statements, without any citation to

facts or controlling law. (See Doc. 42, Pl.’s Mem. 16) BENDER’s

purported refusal to arrest Gallegos cannot give rise to BENDER’s

civil liability to Plaintiff. Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Adjudication as to this issue is GRANTED. This holding does not

preclude the possible admissibility of evidence relating to the

Gallegos incident as evidence of animus.

I. Plaintiff’s Assertions of First Amendment Retaliation.

To the extent Plaintiff attempts, in his opposition, to

assert a § 1983 claim based on a claim of retaliation for

exercising his First Amendment right to free speech and his

“constitutionally protected rights to employment,” Plaintiff’s

claim fails. Plaintiff’s basis for the retaliation claim is

difficult to discern from the language of his opposition, but he

appears to base this claim on Defendants’ alleged disdain for

Plaintiff’s T-shirts with the slogan “CRIME PAYS” printed on the

front. Although the described incident may evidence disagreement

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with Plaintiff’s T-shirt mottos there is doubtful causitive

relation with First Amendment retaliation. However, it is not

necessary or appropriate to decide that issue as it was not

properly raised. Defendants are correct that Plaintiff’s claim

of retaliation is not pled in the operative complaint. This may

be anecdotal evidence of animus but is not a standalone claim. 

Plaintiff’s alleged First Amendment retaliation claim is not

before the Court.

VII. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, BENDER and CARVEL’s

Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED on qualified

immunity grounds as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim to the

extent it is based on Plaintiff’s allegations of

judicial deception; exceeding the scope of the warrant;

overbreadth of the warrant; false arrest; and selective

enforcement (Fourteenth Amendment); and

BENDER and CARVEL’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is

DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims for destructive search

and conspiracy to violate civil rights.

The CITY and MATLOCK’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED. 

Defendants shall submit an order consistent with this

decision within five (5) days following service by the

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clerk of this decision.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 16, 2005. 

___/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER___

 Oliver W. Wanger 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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