Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01902/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01902-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brian K. Clem, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-1902-PCT-JAT

ORDER

On August 3, 2006, Petitioner filed the currently pending Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. #1). On July 25, 2007, the magistrate judge issued a Report and

Recommendation recommending that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice

(“R&R”) (Doc. #17). Petitioner has filed pro se objections to the Report and

Recommendation (Doc. #20).

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“the court

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation] to

which objection is made.”). Because Petitioner filed objections in this case, the Court will

review the objected-to portions of the R&R de novo. 

Case 3:06-cv-01902-JAT Document 21 Filed 11/01/07 Page 1 of 5
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The Petition in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner is

incarcerated based on a state conviction. With respect to any claims that Petitioner exhausted

before the state courts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must deny the

Petition on those claims unless “a state court decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003).

Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings

regarding a petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936

(9th Cir. 1998).

In this case, Petitioner raised two claims. Petitioner objected to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation in regards to one of the claims. The procedural history of Petitioner’s case

is recounted in the R&R. R&R at 1-3. The objections add additional information to those

facts, but the Court finds the objections do not materially alter the facts and hereby accepts

the factual and procedural history as recounted in the R&R. 

Claim 1 - Violation of the Eighth Amendment

In his Petition (Doc. #1) Petitioner asserted, without explanation, a violation of the

Eighth Amendment. The magistrate judge found this claim to be procedurally defaulted.

R&R at 3-4. In Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. #20), he appears to abandon the Eighth

Amendment claim, clarifying that he intended to present only “a broad single ground in

support of his request for relief.” (Doc. #20, p. 1). Whether or not Petitioner intended to

abandon this claim, he failed to object to the conclusion of the magistrate judge. The Court

therefore accepts the legal analysis as set forth in the R&R and dismisses any claim under

the Eighth Amendment. R&R at 3-4. 

Claim 2 - Improper Imposition of Consecutive Sentences

A. Standard of Review

The legal standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), is set forth in the R&R. R&R at 4-5. This Court adopts the

conclusions of the magistrate judge in regards to this standard.

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B. Review on the Merits

Petitioner argues that his five consecutive sentences for manslaughter and aggravated

assault, which total 22 years in prison, violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the

Constitution. Petitioner claims that under the same-elements test set forth in Blockburger v.

United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the trial court was precluded from imposing consecutive

sentences when multiple charges involving multiple victims resulted from a single act. (Doc.

#1, p. 6). The magistrate judge found that imposition of such sentences does not violate the

Double Jeopardy Clause because the state of Arizona has authorized consecutive sentences

for a single act involving multiple victims. R&R at 5.

Because Petitioner objected to the findings of the magistrate judge in this respect, the

Court will review each of Petitioner’s claims de novo.

i. Double Jeopardy Clause

In his objections, Petitioner argues that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the

Double Jeopardy Clause - that it “applies only to courts and prosecutors, and not legislatures”

- renders the constitutional guarantee meaningless, and should be revisited on that basis.

(Doc. #20, p. 2). The magistrate judge correctly characterized existing law to say “[w]ith

respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does

no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the

legislature intended.” R&R at 5 (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)); see

also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980) (“[W]here two statutory provisions

proscribe the ‘same offense,’ they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in

the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.”). The magistrate judge goes

on to cite a number of cases in which Arizona courts have interpreted Arizona law to

authorize consecutive sentences when one act causes harm to more than one person. R&R

at 6. The Arizona Legislature, by failing to take action to the contrary, has condoned the

Arizona courts’ interpretation of the statute. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has upheld consecutive sentences when a single act of drunk driving caused

multiple deaths. R&R at 6. 

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The Petitioner does not object to this characterization of the law, and it is therefore

adopted by this Court. The Petitioner does, however, seek to have this line of Supreme Court

cases revisited. This Court does not have the authority to reconsider Supreme Court

precedent, and accordingly, Petitioner’s requested relief will be denied. However, Petitioner

may attempt to advocate for this change in the law on appeal. 

ii. Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of “An Act”

The Petitioner further objected to the state courts’ interpretation of the phrase “an act”

as found in A.R.S. §13-116. He asserts that the courts improperly construed “an act” to

mean “the result of the act.” As stated in the R&R, this Court is bound by a state court’s

interpretation of its own statute. R&R at 6. After de novo review, this Court adopts the

findings of the magistrate judge in regards to statutory interpretation. R&R at 6-7. 

iii. Rule of Lenity 

Finally, the Petitioner objects that the magistrate judge failed to consider the Rule of

Lenity in his R&R. This Court will consider it now. The Rule of Lenity is the doctrine that

ambiguity or uncertainty in a criminal statute must be construed in favor of the defendant.

73 AM.JUR. 2d §197. It is well established that this rule “is only an aid to construction and

cannot be invoked until the statute is shown to be ambiguous or uncertain as applied to the

particular defendant.” Id. (quoting California v. Alday, 515 P.2d 1169, 1169 (Cal. 1973))

(emphasis added). 

In this case, the Petitioner has first failed to show that the Rule of Lenity is a

constitutional right that can give rise to habeas relief. Even assuming that it could rise to the

level of a constitutional right, the Arizona courts have consistently upheld consecutive

sentences for a single act with multiple victims, and the Arizona Legislature has not

superceded this interpretation of the statute. R&R at 6. The Petitioner has ultimately failed

to show that the Arizona courts’ construction of Arizona law violates any constitutional right

that may arise under the Rule of Lenity because he has failed to show that the Arizona courts

have interpreted this statute inconsistent with the Arizona legislature’s intent as would be

required under federal law. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983). 

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C. Conclusion

Based on the Court’s determination that Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim is

procedurally defaulted, and that the claims regarding imposition of consecutive sentences fail

on their merits, this petition is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. #17) is accepted and

adopted as specified above, the objections (Doc. #20) are overruled; the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus is denied, with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly. 

DATED this 1st day of November, 2007.

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