Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-02173/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-02173-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

FRANCHERYL LATRICE UNDERWOOD,

Plaintiff,

v.

TYRONE POLK, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:15-cv-02173-JHE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1

Plaintiff Francheryl Latrice Underwood initiated this action in the Circuit Court of 

Jefferson County, Alabama, against Defendants Tyrone Polk, the City of Birmingham (“the 

City”), and the City of Birmingham Police Department (“the BPD”), asserting a claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and claims for malicious 

prosecution; false arrest; abuse of process; negligence; wantonness; negligent or wanton hiring, 

training, and supervision; assault and battery; and excessive force. (Doc. 1-1 at 8-23). On 

November 30, 2015, the three defendants removed the case to this Court. (Doc. 1). The next 

day, Polk answered, and the City moved to dismiss the BPD and for partial dismissal of the 

claims against itself. (Docs. 3, 4, & 5). Underwood responded in opposition, (doc. 9); the City 

replied, (doc. 10); and Underwood filed a sur-reply, (doc. 11). The motions are fully briefed and 

ripe for review. For the reasons stated more fully below, the City’s motion to dismiss the BPD is

GRANTED, and the City’s motion for partial dismissal is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 

IN PART.

 

1

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge 

conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 16).

FILED

 2016 Aug-19 PM 03:18

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:15-cv-02173-JHE Document 37 Filed 08/19/16 Page 1 of 8
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I. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “[T]he pleading standard 

Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. 

Ct. 1955 (2007)). Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action” are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked 

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 

557, 127 S. Ct. 1955). Additionally, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). A complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The complaint must establish “more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 

127 S. Ct. at 1965 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.”). Ultimately, this inquiry is a “context-specific task that requires the 

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reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 

129 S. Ct. at 1950.

The court accepts all factual allegations as true on a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6). See, e.g., Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000). 

However, legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations are not entitled to that assumption 

of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.

II. Analysis

A. The BPD’s Motion to Dismiss

The City moves to dismiss all claims against the BPD on the grounds it is not a separate 

legal entity or agency operating under the authority and control of the City but is merely an 

administrative division or department, which is not subject to suit in its own capacity. (Doc. 4). 

Underwood does not respond to these arguments. (See doc. 9) (referring only to “Defendant City 

of Birmingham’s Motion to Dismiss Counts in Plaintiff’s Complaint” and failing to respond to 

the arguments about the BPD).

This failure alone is sufficient to warrant dismissal for abandonment. See See Coalition 

for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir.

2000) (“The appellants’ failure to brief and argue this issue during the proceedings before the 

district court is grounds for finding that the issue has been abandoned.”); Bush v. J.P. Morgan 

Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2:15-CV-00769-JEO, 2016 WL 324993, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 27, 2016); 

Boyd v. Daniels, No. 2:13-CV-354-MEF, 2014 WL 1245885, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 24, 2014)

(dismissing claims on motion to dismiss for failure to respond); Joseph ex rel. Joseph v. Allen, 

No. CV-13-S-695-NE, 2013 WL 3712334, at *5 (N.D. Ala. July 12, 2013) (dismissing claims on 

motion to dismiss for failure to respond); Hooper v. City of Montgomery, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 

Case 2:15-cv-02173-JHE Document 37 Filed 08/19/16 Page 3 of 8
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1334 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (same) (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 

(11th Cir. 1995) (dismissing undefended claims on summary judgment)); Hudson v. Norfolk S. 

Ry. Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“When a party fails to respond to an 

argument or otherwise address a claim, the Court deems such argument or claim abandoned.”).

In any event, the City is also correct in asserting the BPD is not separately subject to suit. 

The Eleventh Circuit has previously acknowledged that “police departments are not usually 

considered legal entities subject to suit,” Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992),

and the Alabama Supreme Court implicitly approved the City of Montgomery responding on 

behalf of the Montgomery Police Department, when it simply noted that fact and stated:

Generally, the departments and subordinate entities of municipalities, counties, 

and towns that are not separate legal entities or bodies do not have the capacity to 

sue or be sued in the absence of specific statutory authority. Among subordinate 

entities generally lacking the capacity to sue or be sued separately are police 

departments.

Ex parte Dixon, 55 So. 3d 1171, 1172 n.1 (Ala. 2010) (quoting 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal 

Corporations § 787 (2000)) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). Accordingly, the 

claims against the BPD are DISMISSED.

B. The City’s Motion for Partial Dismissal

The City also moves on two grounds for dismissal of certain counts against it: (1) that 

Underwood did not file a notice of claim with the clerk within the time allowed by statute, and 

(2) vicarious liability against municipalities is limited to negligence-based claims only. (Doc. 5).

1. Notice of Claim

The City contends Ala. Code §§ 11-47-23 and 11-47-192 require a notice of claim be 

filed with the “clerk” within a certain period of time or the plaintiff’s claims are barred. 

(Doc. 5 at 1-2). It asserts Underwood did not file a notice of claim within the six months 

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required by the statutes for tort claims. (Id. at 3). Underwood contends she filed her notice of 

claim on April 24, 2014, (doc. 9 at 1 & 4-5), and the City responds that she actually filed her 

notice with the municipal court, which is the wrong city department, so it was not, in fact, filed 

within the six months allowed, (doc. 10 at 2). In response, Underwood asserts her notice “is 

clearly addressed to the City Clerk of the City of Birmingham” and “the stamp accepting the 

Notice of Claim referenc[ing] the ‘Birmingham Municipal Court’ . . . is not dispositive of the 

issue.” (Doc. 11 at 1). She does not then say what is dispositive of the issue. Lastly, she also 

contends § 1983 claims are not subject to a State’s notice-of-claim statutes. (Id. at 1).

First, whether a § 1983 claim is subject to the notice-of-claim statutes is a non-issue 

because the City does not seek to have the § 1983 claims dismissed in its motion. (See doc. 5 at 

3) (seeking to dismiss only Counts II- VIII).

Regardless, the issue of whether a notice of claim was filed is not properly considered on

a motion to dismiss. The notice-of-claim statutes under Ala. Code §§ 11-47-23 and 11-47-192 

are not statutes of limitation but of non-claims. City of Birmingham v. Davis, 613 So. 2d 1222, 

1224 (Ala. 1992). This means compliance with them need not be alleged in the complaint.

See Hamilton v. Anniston, 109 So. 2d 728, 732 (1959) (holding compliance with non-claims 

statutes “need not be averred in the complaint”); Maise v. Gadsden, 166 So. 795, 796 (1936) 

(holding that non-claims statutes “have been construed as not requiring an affirmative averment 

of compliance in the complaint”); Huntsville v. Goodenrath, 68 So. 676, 679 (1915) (holding that 

“it was not necessary for the complaint in this case to allege a filing of a statement of the demand 

sued on with the city authorities before bringing suit”). “Rather than being a threshold 

jurisdictional matter or component of plaintiff’s tort claim against a municipality, the non-claims 

statutes provide a municipal defense to such claims. Thus, the question of whether plaintiff 

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complied with the non-claims statute is a matter to be decided at summary judgment, but not on a 

motion to dismiss.” Crutcher v. Vickers, No. CV-10-S-01176-NE, 2012 WL 3860557, at *7 

(N.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2012). Because the notice-of-claim defense must be proven or disproven on 

the evidence instead of the face of the pleadings, the City’s motion to dismiss Counts II-VIII on 

this ground is DENIED.

2

2. Municipal Vicarious Liability Limitation

The City next contends Ala. Code § 11-47-190 limits vicarious liability of municipalities 

to negligence of employees acting in the line of their duties and, therefore, all of the counts 

requiring intentional or reckless conduct are barred. (Doc. 5 at 3-5). Underwood responds that 

she has pled facts to support negligence, she does not have the information necessary to properly 

respond until discovery has been conducted, and immunity under § 11-47-190 cannot be 

determined on the face of the complaint. (Doc. 11 at 1-2).

The City is correct that, under Alabama law, “a city is liable for negligent acts of its 

employees within the scope of their employment, but not intentional torts of its employees.” 

Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 743 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing, inter alia, Ala. 

Code § 11-47-190; Ex parte City of Gadsden, 718 So. 2d 716, 721 (Ala. 1998) (“Section 

11-47-190 . . . absolves a city from liability for an intentional tort committed by one of its 

agents . . . .”)). However, the City’s request for dismissal sweeps too broadly because the 

Alabama Supreme Court has held “in the context of claims for assault and battery, false 

imprisonment and false arrest, that ‘where a plaintiff alleges a factual pattern that demonstrates 

 

2 Underwood included a copy of the notice with her response, (doc. 9 at 4-5), but, 

because it is not “central to the plaintiff’s claim,” the Court may not consider it on a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See Day v. 

Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2005). Neither party has requested such conversion, 

and, in light of the as-yet-unaddressed factual issues surrounding the document, the Court finds 

conversion is not appropriate at this time.

Case 2:15-cv-02173-JHE Document 37 Filed 08/19/16 Page 6 of 8
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“neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness” the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under Ala. 

Code § 11-47-190.’” Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d 1168, 1183 (Ala. 2003) (quoting 

Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670 So. 2d 848, 852 (Ala. 1995)).

While Underwood alleges claims requiring wanton or malicious conduct, she has also 

alternatively alleged negligence-based claims. (Doc. 1-1 at 14-23). The City has not argued how 

any of the claims that could be supported by either negligence or wantonness and malice have 

been solely alleged to be wanton or malicious. (See doc. 5 at 3-5; doc. 10 at 2-3). As a result, 

only the claims the City seeks to dismiss that require intent greater than negligence are due to be 

DISMISSED, i.e., Count II for malicious prosecution, see Franklin, 670 So. 2d at 852 (holding 

municipalities immune from such claims); Count IV for abuse of process, see Willis v. Parker, 

814 So. 2d 857, 865 (Ala. 2001) (requiring a showing of malice); and Count VI for wantonness 

and Count VII to the extent it asserts wanton hiring, training, and supervision, see Norris v. City 

of Montgomery, 821 So. 2d 149, 157 (Ala. 2001) (noting wantonness claims against a 

municipality are precluded by § 11-47-190).

The claims the City seeks to dismiss that may be established on a showing of negligence 

or unskillfulness will not be dismissed at this time, i.e., Count III for false arrest, see Franklin, 

670 So. 2d at 852 (reversing dismissal of false-arrest claim based on negligence); and Count VIII 

for assault and battery, see id. (finding an assault-and-battery claim against a police officer based 

on excessive force “is the equivalent of asserting an assault and battery not measured or 

patterned for the circumstances, or an unskilled response” and “[a]n assault and battery 

committed under either circumstance, because ‘unskilled,’ would be a negligent assault and 

battery because it would fall below that response which a skilled or proficient officer would 

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exercise in similar circumstances”) (quoting City of Birmingham v. Thompson, 404 So. 2d 589, 

592 (Ala. 1981)).

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED:

1. The City’s motion to dismiss the BPD, (doc. 4), is GRANTED, and all claims against the 

BPD are DISMISSED as against an entity not subject to suit;

2. The City’s motion to dismiss certain counts of Underwood’s complaint, (doc. 5), is 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, Count II for malicious 

prosecution, Count IV for abuse of process, Count VI for wantonness, and Count VII to 

the extent it asserts wanton hiring, training, and supervision are DISMISSED as failing 

to state a claim under Ala. Code § 11-47-190. The remaining counts remain pending.

DONE this 19th day of August 2016.

_______________________________

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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