Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01321/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01321-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1321

___________

Katharina Holland, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Sam’s Club, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: January 9, 2007

Filed: May 25, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Katharina Holland (Holland) appeals the district court’s1

 order granting Sam’s

Club’s motion for summary judgment on five claims: (1) a hostile work environment

claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e–2000e-17; (2) a hostile work environment claim under the Missouri Human

Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.010–213.137; (3) a gender discrimination

Appellate Case: 06-1321 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/25/2007 Entry ID: 3313141
2

The district court also granted summary judgment on a retaliation claim

Holland never alleged in the complaint. Because Holland never alleged a retaliation

claim in the complaint and does not expressly argue a retaliation claim on appeal, the

retaliation claim is not properly before us and we will not consider it. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a); United States v. Paz, 411 F.3d 906, 910 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating we will

not consider issues that have been abandoned). 

-2-

claim under Title VII; (4) a gender discrimination claim under the MHRA; and (5) a

claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).2

 We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Holland began working at Sam’s Club in July 1996, and was transferred to

Independence, Missouri, in approximately October 2001. Holland worked as a forklift

driver in the warehouse from 2002 until June 2003. This dispute concerns the timeperiod Holland worked as a forklift driver and Holland’s subsequent transfer. 

On June 3, 2003, after Sam’s Club had previously reprimanded Holland for

hitting and damaging a water pipe while operating a forklift, Holland damaged a

freezer door frame, again while operating the forklift. The next day, Sam’s Club

transferred Holland to the electronics department as a stocker. After working for a

period of time as a stocker in electronics, Holland took medical leave. Upon returning

to work on August 29, 2003, Sam’s Club assigned Holland as a door greeter.

Holland’s hourly wage and other benefits did not decrease due to her changes in

position. On September 30, 2003, Holland was involved in an unfortunate incident

with a customer. The customer filed a written complaint, and on October 6, 2003,

Sam’s Club terminated Holland for gross misconduct. 

On January 2, 2004, Holland filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Missouri Commission on

Human Rights. The EEOC issued Holland a right-to-sue letter, and Holland filed suit.

Appellate Case: 06-1321 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/25/2007 Entry ID: 3313141
3

The State of Missouri created the Missouri Commission on Human Rights to

hear employment discrimination claims. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.030. 

-3-

The district court granted Sam’s Club’s motion for summary judgment on all of

Holland’s claims. This appeal followed. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo a grant of a motion for summary judgment, viewing the

evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and granting the motion only if no genuine issue of material fact

exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Libel v.

Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2007). 

A. Timely Filing a Charge of Discrimination

Sam’s Club argues Holland’s hostile work environment claims under Title VII

and the MHRA, and her gender discrimination claim under the MHRA are untimely.

Holland must file a charge of discrimination within 300 days of the occurrence under

Title VII and within 180 days under MHRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)

(requiring a charge of discrimination to be filed within 300 days of the occurrence of

an alleged unlawful employment practice);3

 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.075(1) (same except

180 days); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002);

Williams v. Jackson County Dep’t of Corr., 23 F. App’x 619, 620 (8th Cir. 2001) (per

curiam) (unpublished). Because Holland filed her charge of discrimination on January

2, 2004, only those acts occurring within 300 days of January 2, 2004, that is, after

March 8, 2003, are actionable under Title VII, Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, and only

those acts occurring within 180 days of January 2, 2004, that is, after July 6, 2003, are

actionable under the MHRA. Therefore, because all of the facts constituting

Holland’s alleged hostile work environment claim occurred before March 8, 2003, and

the alleged adverse employment action (Holland’s transfer to the electronics

Appellate Case: 06-1321 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/25/2007 Entry ID: 3313141
4

Holland’s counsel stated in a letter to the EEOC, “[Holland] does not claim and

never has claimed that she was discharged from her employment on the basis of her

sex,” and her claim is instead “hostile workplace.” Holland also testified in her

deposition she is not claiming she was fired because of her gender. 

5

In Holland’s Suggestion in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Holland’s continuing violations argument, in its entirety, stated, “there

were many acts, thereafter, and inactions, as well, that were a part of the continuing

pattern of a hostile work environment” and “[t]he entire record must be considered

and that record creates many disputed issues of material fact about the last act of

discrimination, the hostile work environment, and the retaliation claim, precluding

summary judgment on each of those claims.” Such general, conclusory, and cursory

statements are not sufficient. 

-4-

department)4

 occurred on June 4, 2003, these claims are untimely unless the timeperiod for filing was tolled. 

Holland argues the district court erred by not applying the continuing violations

doctrine to her hostile work environment claims. See generally Morgan, 536 U.S. at

117 (“Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period,

the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the

purposes of determining liability.”). In the district court proceedings, Holland never

designated the specific facts supporting the application of the continuing violations

doctrine.5

 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court “is not

obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts which

might support the nonmoving party’s claim,” rather the nonmoving party must

designate the specific genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.

Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1069 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Even though on appeal Holland designated the specific facts

supporting the application of the continuing violations doctrine, Holland waived this

argument by not presenting it to the district court. See Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

297 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Ordinarily, we do not consider an argument raised

for the first time on appeal.”). Holland’s hostile work environment claims under Title

Appellate Case: 06-1321 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/25/2007 Entry ID: 3313141
-5-

VII and the MHRA, and Holland’s gender discrimination claim under the MHRA are

untimely. 

B. Gender Discrimination under Title VII

Holland concedes no direct evidence supports her gender discrimination claim.

Thus, we analyze the claim under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973), burden-shifting framework. See Wells v. SCI Mgmt., L.P., 469 F.3d 697,

700 (8th Cir. 2006). To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, Holland

must establish (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for her

job, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) there are facts that give

rise to an inference of gender discrimination. Id. The district court concluded

Holland had not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination because

Holland’s transfer to the position of a stocker in the electronics department did not

constitute an adverse employment action. “An adverse employment action is a

tangible change in working conditions that produces a material employment

disadvantage.” Wedow v. City of Kan. City, Mo., 442 F.3d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 2006)

(quotation omitted). 

Because Holland’s transfer from operating a forklift in the warehouse to being

a stocker in electronics involved no change in pay or benefits and only minor changes

in Holland’s working conditions, Holland’s transfer did not constitute an adverse

employment action. See Zhuang v. Datacard Corp., 414 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2005)

(stating “a transfer involving only minor changes in working conditions and no

reduction in pay or benefits does not constitute an adverse employment action”)

(alterations omitted). Holland actually received a pay raise within weeks of her

Appellate Case: 06-1321 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/25/2007 Entry ID: 3313141
6

As the district court reasoned, Holland testified by deposition she enjoyed her

stocker position, describing her stocker job as free from stress and responsibility, and

as fun. 

7

The exhibit describes the other employees’ positions as Associate,

Associate/Team Lead, Associate/Manager, Team Leader/Manager, Team Lead, or

Department Manager. The exhibit does not identify or explain job duties and

responsibilities, educational and skill levels required, or working conditions involved.

-6-

transfer to the stocker position.6

 Holland failed to establish a prima facie case of

gender discrimination. 

C. The Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act prohibits discrimination “between employees on the basis

of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which [the

employer] pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the

performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are

performed under similar working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). “Application

of the Equal Pay Act depends not on job titles or classifications but on the actual

requirements and performance of the job.” Simpson v. Merchs. & Planters Bank, 441

F.3d 572, 578 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting EEOC v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 653

F.2d 1243, 1245 (8th Cir. 1981)). To survive a motion for summary judgment,

Holland must present at least some evidence showing she and the other employees

performed equal work under similar conditions. See id.; Tenkku v. Normandy Bank,

348 F.3d 737, 741 n.2 (8th Cir. 2003). 

The district court granted Sam’s Club’s motion for summary judgment on

Holland’s Equal Pay Act claim because Holland presented insufficient evidence to

indicate a violation of the Act. Holland’s only evidence, a document identifying job

titles,7

 which uses vague and unexplained titles to describe the employees’ positions,

fails to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether men and women

Appellate Case: 06-1321 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/25/2007 Entry ID: 3313141
-7-

performed equal work under similar conditions. Holland clearly failed to offer

sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act. 

III. CONCLUSION

Holland’s remaining arguments are without merit. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We

affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-1321 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/25/2007 Entry ID: 3313141