Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00990/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00990-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Efrin Osuna-Chavez, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-00990-PHX-JAT (MEA)

ORDER 

Pending before this Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“Petition”). The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 

recommending that the Petition be denied and dismissed because it is barred by the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) statute of limitations. (Doc. 11 

at 9). The R&R further recommended that a Certificate of Appealability be denied. (Id. at 

10). 

I. REVIEW OF AN R&R 

 This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original). District courts are not 

required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an 

objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added); see also 28 

Case 2:14-cv-00990-JAT Document 13 Filed 09/02/14 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of 

the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made”). In this case, Petitioner 

filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 12), and the Court will review 

those objections de novo. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 The R&R summarized the factual and procedural history and neither party 

objected to this history. (Doc. 11 at 1–4). Therefore, the Court adopts that portion of the 

R&R in this case. That history is as follows: 

[A] grand jury indictment returned against Petitioner 

and several co-defendants on November 19, 2007, in 

Maricopa County Superior Court, charged Petitioner with 

three counts of kidnapping, each classified as a class 2 

dangerous felony (Counts 1–3); one count of aggravated 

assault, alleged as a class 3 dangerous felony (Count 4); three 

counts of theft by extortion, each classified as a class 2 

dangerous felony (Counts5–7); one count of smuggling, a 

class 4 felony (Count 8); and misconduct involving weapons, 

a class 4 felony (Count 9). See Answer, Exh. A. The charges 

were related to Petitioner’s involvement in operating what is 

known as a “drop house” for illegal migrants in the Phoenix, 

Arizona, metropolitan area. 

At the conclusion of a jury trial, Petitioner was found 

guilty as charged on Counts 1 through 8. Id., Exh. C at 2-4 & 

Exh. B at 6-7. The jury could not reach a unanimous decision 

on Count 9, and, as a result, the state dismissed that count 

against Petitioner. Id., Exh. B at 7-8. The trial court 

subsequently sentenced Petitioner to various consecutive and 

concurrent sentences of seven and five years imprisonment, 

comprising an aggregate sentence of twenty-six years 

imprisonment. Id., Exh. D. 

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his 

convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner’s appointed 

counsel submitted an Anders brief to the court, averring he 

could not find any arguable claim to raise on Petitioner’s 

behalf. Id., Exh. F at 2. Petitioner “was afforded the 

opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona,” 

but did not file such a brief. Id., Exh. F. On March 2, 2010, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision 

affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences, while 

Case 2:14-cv-00990-JAT Document 13 Filed 09/02/14 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

correcting a discrepancy in the record. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner 

did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme 

Court. Id., Exh. G. 

On September 15, 2011, Petitioner docketed a notice 

of intent to seek state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 

32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. H. The 

state trial court noted that Petitioner’s notice was not timely 

but, nonetheless, the court appointed counsel to “investigate 

the potential claims that may entitle [Petitioner] to postconviction relief.” Id., Exh. I at 2. Petitioner’s appointed postconviction counsel reviewed the record and averred to the 

court he could not find any colorable claims to raise on 

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. J at 1-2. Petitioner filed a pro se 

petition in his Rule 32 action, asserting he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel in his trial proceedings. Id., 

Exh. K. Petitioner subsequent[ly] sought to amend his Rule 

32 pleading, asserting he had failed to include “2 additional 

grounds that were omitted along with 2 exhibits.” Id., Exh. M 

at 1. Petitioner also asserted that he wanted to raise a newlydiscovered-evidence claim under Rule 32.1(e) and that his 

failure to timely file his Rule 32 action was not due to his 

own error, citing Rule 32.1(f). Id., Exh. M at 2. 

In a decision entered August 23, 2012, the state trial 

court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 action as both untimely 

and for failing to state a colorable claim for relief. Id., Exh. N. 

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court 

of Appeals, which granted review and denied relief in a 

decision entered December 23, 2013. Id., Exh. P. The 

appellate court concluded that the petition was not timely and, 

as a result, that Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel were precluded. Id., Exh. P at 3-5. The appellate 

court also concluded that Petitioner had abandoned his claim 

of newly discovered evidence, and further found that a claim 

under Rule 32.1(f) was not cognizable because Petitioner was 

not a “pleading defendant.” Id., Exh. P at 4 & n.2. 

(Doc. 11 at 14). 

III. R&R 

As indicated above, on July 10, 2014, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R 

recommending that the Petition be denied as barred by the AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. (Id. at 19). As explained by the Magistrate Judge, the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 

Case 2:14-cv-00990-JAT Document 13 Filed 09/02/14 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

§ 2241(d)(1), provides a one year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. (Id. at 4 (citing Espinoza Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 

(9th Cir. 2002))). That period generally commences on “the date on which the judgment 

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review.” (Id. at 4 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A))). Examining Petitioner’s 

procedural history in state court, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner’s 

conviction became final on April 2, 2010. (Id. at 5). That is when Petitioner’s time to 

seek review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ March 2, 2010 decision affirming his 

convictions and sentences in his direct appeal expired. (Id. at 45). The Magistrate Judge 

determined that this is when the one-year statute of limitations began to run, thus expiring 

on April 2, 2011, absent any statutory tolling. (Id. at 5). 

In regard to statutory tolling, the Magistrate Judge explained that “a petitioner is 

entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a ‘properly-filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim.’” (Id. at 4 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2)). Petitioner’s state 

Rule 32 action, however, was filed in September, 2011, after the limitations period for his 

federal habeas petitions expired. (Id. at 5). The Magistrate Judge concluded that, 

accordingly, this action “could not and did not restart the statute of limitations with 

regard to Petitioner’s action for federal habeas relief.” (Id.). 

Turning to equitable tolling, the Magistrate Judge explained that a petitioner 

seeking equitable tolling of the limitations period “must establish two elements: ‘(1) that 

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances 

stood in his way.’” (Id. (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). The 

Magistrate Judge determined that Petitioner did not state “an adequate basis for equitable 

tolling of the statute of limitations.” (Id. at 7). The Magistrate Judge explained that 

Petitioner failed the second prong of this test because the circumstances that Petitioner 

claims previously impeded his pursuit of his rights are not “‘extraordinary’ circumstances 

Case 2:14-cv-00990-JAT Document 13 Filed 09/02/14 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that make it impossible to file a timely habeas petition.” (Id. at 8). 

Finally, regarding a claim of actual innocence, the Magistrate Judge noted that a 

credible showing of Petitioner’s actual innocence of the crimes of conviction would 

entitle him to an equitable exception to the statute of limitations. (Id. (citing Lee v. 

Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc))). To qualify for such an exception, 

a “petitioner must show ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in light of the new evidence.’” (Id. (quoting Lee, 653 F.3d at 938)). The 

Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner made no showing of actual innocence and is 

therefore not entitled to any such exception to the statute of limitations based on an actual 

innocence theory. (Id.). 

Based on Petitioner’s failure to file his habeas action within the statute of 

limitations and the finding that Petitioner failed to state a sufficient basis for statutory or 

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the Magistrate Judge determined that he 

need not consider the merits of Petitioner’s claims. (Id.). 

IV. PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS 

Petitioner does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s application of the AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations to his procedural history and the Court adopts those 

recommendations. Rather, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the 

AEDPA one-year statute of limitations expired because Petitioner failed to establish that 

statutory and equitable tolling should apply. (Doc. 12 at 2, 6). 

A. Statutory Tolling 

Petitioner argues that he is entitled statutory tolling of the AEDPA statute of 

limitations during the time that his notice of intent to seek post-conviction relief and 

subsequent Rule 32 petition were pending in state courts. (Id. at 6). In support of this 

contention, Petitioner puts forth arguments in an attempt to establish that the notice of 

intent to seek post-conviction relief was properly filed. (Id. at 36). For example, 

Petitioner argues that his filing of the notice was timely and that both the Arizona 

Superior Court and the Arizona Court of Appeals erred in holding to the contrary. (Id. at 

Case 2:14-cv-00990-JAT Document 13 Filed 09/02/14 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

36). Petitioner further argues that the Arizona appellate court erred when it ruled that his 

claim pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(f) was not cognizable 

because Petitioner is not a pleading defendant. (Id. at 34). Petitioner contends that the 

Magistrate Judge erroneously “relies” on these state court findings in the R&R. (Id. at 3). 

However, although the R&R does make reference to the state court findings that 

Petitioner disputes, it does so only in the context of setting out the factual and procedural 

background of the case. (Doc. 11 at 34). The Magistrate Judge did not rely on these 

findings in determining that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. (Id. at 5). The 

Magistrate Judge points out that “Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final on 

April 2, 2010, when the time expired to seek review of the Court of Appeals’ decision 

denying relief in Petitioner’s direct appeal.” (Id. (citing Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1557, 

1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999). “Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run on April 

2, 2010, and expired on April 2, 2011.” (Id.). Petitioner did not file his notice of intent to 

seek post-conviction relief until September 2011, several months past the expiration of 

the statute of limitations. (Id.). Therefore, the Magistrate Judge made no determination as 

to whether Petitioner’s notice and subsequent petition for post-conviction relief were 

properly filedand thus served as grounds for statutory tollingbecause the AEDPA 

statute of limitations expired prior to either of those filings. (Id.). Even if valid, a state 

filing made after the statute of limitations expired cannot restart the statute of limitations 

with regard to a petitioner’s action for federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Pace, 544 U.S. at 

417; United States v. Buckles, 647 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, Petitioner 

has not made sufficient allegations to qualify for statutory tolling of the statute of 

limitations. 

B. Equitable Tolling 

Petitioner also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute 

of limitations and objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding to the contrary in the R&R. 

(Doc. 12 at 2, 6). In support of this objection, Petitioner relies on the same arguments he 

puts forth his objection to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that statutory tolling does not 

Case 2:14-cv-00990-JAT Document 13 Filed 09/02/14 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

apply, including that the state courts’ erred in finding his notice of intent to file for postconviction relief was untimely. (Id. at 36). Petitioner further argues that the only reason 

that he filed his notice of intent late was that Petitioner’s appointed counsel failed to file 

it despite his requests for her to do so (Id. at 3, 5). Petitioner contends that his counsel’s 

failure was thus beyond his control and entitles Petitioner to equitable tolling of the 

AEDPA statute of limitations. (Id. at 3, 56). 

As stated above, in order for Petitioner to qualify for equitable tolling, he must 

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. The Supreme 

Court has held that there is no right to legal assistance in seeking any type of postconviction relief, and, as a result, lack of legal assistance in seeking post-conviction relief 

cannot form the basis for equitable tolling. Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1085 

(2007) (“Attorney miscalculation is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, 

particularly in the post[-]conviction context where prisoners have no constitutional right 

to counsel.”). Petitioner’s counsel’s alleged failure thus cannot qualify as the 

“extraordinary circumstances” that made it “impossible to file a petition on time.” Porter 

v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Furthermore, even if Petitioner’s counsel did fail to follow his request to file the 

notice, this argument does not explain why well more than a year passed by before 

Petitioner filed the notice with the Superior Court. Petitioner filed the notice of intent to 

seek post-conviction relief in September 2011, whereas the Court of Appeals issued the 

mandate affirming Petitioner’s conviction and sentencing issued in April 2010. (Doc. 11 

at 23). Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish that “he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. As the Magistrate Judge stated in the R&R, “A 

petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of legal representation during the 

applicable filing period do not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling 

because such circumstances are not ‘extraordinary.’” (Doc. 11 at 8 (citing Chaffer v. 

Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 104849 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 

Case 2:14-cv-00990-JAT Document 13 Filed 09/02/14 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

F.3d 1008, 101114 (9th Cir. 2006); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 

2006); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004)). Thus, Petitioner has not 

made sufficient allegations regarding extraordinary circumstances or his diligence to 

qualify for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, Petitioner is not 

entitled to equitable tolling based on his trial counsel’s alleged failure to file his notice 

for post-conviction relief when he so requested. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 11) is accepted and 

adopted; the objections (Doc. 12) are overruled. The petition is denied with prejudice, 

and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a 

certificate of appealability, because dismissal of the Petition is based on a plain 

procedural bar, and jurists of reason would not find this Court’s procedural ruling 

debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Further, Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). 

Dated this 29th day of August, 2014. 

Case 2:14-cv-00990-JAT Document 13 Filed 09/02/14 Page 8 of 8