Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01211/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01211-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MORRIS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1211 LKK GGH P

vs.

EDWARD ALAMEIDA, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an action

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initially filed this action as one pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that his due process rights under both the federal and state constitutions

and his liberty interest in parole were violated because a California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation (CDCR) counselor is unauthorized to assess or predict the degree of threat an

inmate may pose to the general public if released and contending that there is no statutory or

regulatory authority which allows for such assessments. Plaintiff, as petitioner, did not challenge

any particular parole denial. As relief, he asked that the CDCR, and Board of Prison Terms (now

Board of Parole Hearings-BPH) be ordered to desist from mandating that a correctional

counselor predict the level of threat or danger to the public an inmate would pose if released. He

asked that the statements of Correctional Counselor Macias-Gram (concerning threat level) be

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 Plaintiff’s amended complaint had been filed as a new case because plaintiff had failed 1

to include the case number on the filing. The court’s December 20, 2006, findings and

recommendations recommending dismissal of the action for failure to respond to the September

27, 2006, order, were vacated. See Order, filed on February 14, 2007.

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excised from her evaluation report, or she be directed to retract the statements, and that the BPH

be ordered to delete that evaluation report from petitioner’s prison files and that a new BPH

hearing be held within 30 days under the guidelines he sets forth. By order filed September 27,

2006, plaintiff’s purported habeas petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, was dismissed with

leave to file an amended complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed on January 5, 2007, was dismissed with 1

leave to amend, setting forth, inter alia, the following: 

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: H . Macias, P. Buch,

O. F. Acuna, D.K. Butler, N. Grannis, E. Alameida. He alleges

that CDCR correction counselors [] act without authority when

they assess the degree of threat an inmate may pose to the general

public upon release from prison. 

The “minimum requirements of due process” in the parole context

have long been established by the United States Supreme Court

and include notice to the inmate of the hearing, an opportunity to

be heard, hearing by a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body, and a

written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied in

rendering a decision. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92

S.Ct. 2593, 2604 (1972). While Morrissey specifically addressed

parole revocation hearings, the process applies to any hearings

arising in the parole context and the Supreme Court emphasized

that the requirements for such a hearing in no equate to the process

due in a criminal prosecution but rather recognized it “is a narrow

inquiry” which “should be flexible enough to consider evidence

including letters, affidavits and other material that would not be

admissible in an adversary criminal trial.” Id. 

Finding that California inmates have a protected liberty interest in

parole eligibility matters, the Ninth Circuit has stated that due

process in the context of parole suitability hearings affords

prisoners entitlement “to be present at the hearing, speak and offer

evidence on their own behalf,” and if serving a life sentence, to

counsel at the hearing. Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915 (9th

Cir. 2003). A Board’s decision to deny parole must rest on some

evidence. Id., at 916-17. In his claim that correctional counselors

are not authorized to predict the level of dangerousness of an

inmate upon release on parole, plaintiff does not set forth a

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 Plaintiff’s reference in his second amended complaint to two unpublished and 2

unreported decisions by a Los Angeles County Superior Court does not frame a federal due

process claim. 

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constitutional deprivation because he has not thereby made a

showing that he has been deprived of the process that is due at a

parole hearing. The amended complaint will be dismissed but

plaintiff will be granted leave to amend. 

Order, filed on April 12, 2007, pp. 2-3.

Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint wherein he seeks to reinstate this

action as a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. However, he continues to challenge the

authority of BPH and CDCR to include risk assessments by CDCR caseworkers as part of the

parole consideration process and does not challenge any particular parole decision. Plaintiff has

been previously informed, inter alia, that:

In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1248

(2005), the Supreme Court found that where petitioners sought

relief that would “render invalid the state procedures used to deny

parole eligibility ... and parole suitability....,” their claims did “not

fall within the implicit habeas exception.” Here, petitioner’s

challenge is to the constitutionality of an alleged policy whereby

the CDCR and/or BPT [BPH] requires that a correctional counselor

assess or predict the threat level of an inmate should he be released

from confinement. He does not challenge a particular parole

decision or seek immediate release from custody. Should

petitioner be granted the relief he seeks, at most, as in Wilkinson,

supra, a parole application by petitioner would receive a speedier

consideration. Therefore, the petition will be dismissed and

petitioner will be granted leave to file an amended complaint,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Order, filed on September 27, 2007, pp. 2-3.

Further, as noted above, plaintiff had been informed that he did not set forth a

constitutional deprivation because he not made a showing in his first amended complaint that he 

had been deprived of the process that is due at a parole hearing. By his second amended filing, 2

plaintiff has made it evident that he is unable to cure the defects of his complaint. The court will

now recommend dismissal of this action. Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d

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789, 799 (9 Cir. 2001), quoting Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir.1999) (Liberality

th

in granting a plaintiff leave to amend “is subject to the qualification that the amendment not

cause undue prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and is not futile.”) “Under

Ninth Circuit case law, district courts are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can

possibly be saved. Courts are not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit

entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). See also, Smith v. Pacific

Properties and Development Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004), citing Doe v. United

States, 58 F.3d 494, 497(9th Cir.1995) (“a district court should grant leave to amend even if no

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not be

cured by the allegation of other facts.”) 

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 10/23/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

morr1211.fr

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