Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06366/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06366-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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[PROPOSED] TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKPAC, OAKLAND )

METROPOLITAN CHAMBER OF )

COMMERCE, an unincorporated )

association, OAKLAND )

METROPOLITAN CHAMBER OF )

COMMERCE INDEPENDENT )

EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE (“OAK- )

IE-PAC”), an unincorporated association; )

MICHAEL COLBRUNO, an individual; )

and SCOTT B. PETERSON, an )

individual; )

 )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. )

 )

THE CITY OF OAKLAND; THE CITY )

OF OAKLAND PUBLIC ETHICS )

COMMISSION; DOES 1 )

through 10. )

 )

Defendants. )

__________________________________)

 

Case No. C 06-6366

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER

The application of Plaintiffs OakPAC, Oakland Metropolitan Chamber of

Commerce (“OakPAC”), Oakland Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce Independent

Expenditure Committee (“Oak-IE-PAC”), Michael Colbruno, and Scott Peterson for a

Temporary Restraining Order to prevent Defendants the City of Oakland (“City”) and the

City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission (“Commission”) during the pendency of this

litigation from enforcing its ordinance restricting contributions to persons and broad

Case 3:06-cv-06366-WHA Document 21 Filed 10/19/06 Page 1 of 5
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[PROPOSED] TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

based committees making independent expenditures and thereby infringing their First

Amendment rights of speech and association has duly been considered by this Court. 

Proper notice pursuant to Local Rule 65-1(b) was provided to Defendants. The Court

reviewed pleadings submitted by the parties, and all parties were heard at the hearing. 

Having considered all the arguments, and good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiffs’ Temporary Restraining Order and Defendants are accordingly enjoined from

enforcing the limitations set forth in Oakland Municipal Code (“OMC”) sections

3.12.050(C-E) and 3.12.060 (C-E).

The Court’s conclusion is based on the following findings: 

1. Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits

of their First Amendment challenge to OMC sections 3.12.050(C-E) and 3.12.060(C-E). 

By law, independent expenditures can not be coordinated with candidates benefitting

from the expenditures. (California Government Code [“GC”]) sections 82031 and

85500.) Under these restrictions, when making independent expenditures, Plaintiffs can

not consult with, interact with, or otherwise coordinate its independent expenditure

communications with the benefitting candidate and/or his or her agents. 

2. OCRA’s limits on contributions to independent political committees are

triggered only by the content of the speech conducted by the committee, i.e., speech

expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. (See OMC sections

3.12.050(C) & 3.12.060(C); Cal. Govt. Code section 82031.) By limiting the source of

funds available for political committees to conduct independent expenditures, OCRA’s

challenged provisions act as both a limit on contributions to the committee and as a limit

on its expenditures. See Lincoln Club v. City of Irvine, 292 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2002).

3. As both the Ninth Circuit and this District have recognized, expenditure

regulations impinge upon the “quantity of expression” that the Supreme Court sought to

protect in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976). The City’s ordinance thus has the

effect of “restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and

Case 3:06-cv-06366-WHA Document 21 Filed 10/19/06 Page 2 of 5
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[PROPOSED] TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

the size of the audience reached.” Id. at 19. In such instances, courts apply strict scrutiny

to assess the constitutionality of the regulation. See Lincoln Club, 292 F.3d at 937-939. 

The City, however, argues that pursuant to footnote 48 in McConnell v. Federal Election

Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 152 n.48 (2003), which discussed California Medical

Association v. Federal Election Commission, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), the Court should

apply a lesser level of scrutiny. The Court, however, is unpersuaded by the City’s reading

of these decisions and finds no basis in the language the City cites to support application

of a lesser level of scrutiny. Particularly, the Court finds McConnell distinguishable, in

that, the contribution regulations at issue in that case did not impinge on core First

Amendment interests, like the municipal ordinances at issue here. Moreover, the focus in

McConnell was on contribution limits and the connection between contributors, national

party committees receiving contributions, and those holding federal office. On this

record, there is no evidence of such a nexus between the Plaintiffs and their expenditures

and the municipal candidates. The Court therefore concludes that the appropriate

standard of review for the City’s ordinance is strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the City’s

ordinance must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 

4. Under strict scrutiny, OMC sections 3.12.050(C-E) and 3.12.060(C-E) do not

serve a compelling governmental interest. The only government interest proffered by

Defendant is preventing the corruption of candidates for public office, or the appearance

of corruption. However, because independent expenditures must be conducted without

the input or knowledge of the benefitting candidate, the Court finds no basis in the record

before it to support limits on contributions to independent expenditure committees under

the anti-corruption rationale.

5. Based on the arguments presented by the parties, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to secure the rights to speech secured to them

by the First Amendment. Unless this court enjoins Defendants from enforcing OMC

sections 3.12.050(C-E) and 3.12.060(C-E), Plaintiffs and other persons who desire to

Case 3:06-cv-06366-WHA Document 21 Filed 10/19/06 Page 3 of 5
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exercise their rights of speech and association in the November 7, 2006 election, but are

limited in doing so, will be irreparably damaged. In fact, “the loss of First Amendment

freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable

injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).

5. Because OMC sections 3.12.050(C-E) and 3.12.060(C-E) have the practical

effect of limiting the amount of independent expenditures that can be made and

interfering with the ability of like-minded persons to support their political views, these

harms to Plaintiffs’ expressive and associational freedoms far outweigh any potential

harm to the City. 

For these reasons, the Court finds granting Plaintiffs’ Request for a Temporary

Restraining Order appropriate. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), parties

seeking injunctive relief are required to post bond with the Court, “in such sum as the

court deems proper.” “In noncommercial cases, however, courts should consider the

hardship a bond requirement would impose on the party seeking the injunction in addition

to the expenses the enjoined party may incur as a result of the injunction.” Cupolo v. Bay

Area Rapid Transit, 5 F. Supp.2d 1078, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1997).) The Court may waive

the bond requirement altogether when “the balance of equities weighs overwhelmingly in

favor of the party seeking the injunction.” Id. This is a non-commercial case posing

absolutely no risk of any added expense for the City as a result of the injunction. In

contrast, the financial hardship imposed on Plaintiffs by a bond requirement is severe. 

Here, any bond requirement would only further impede Plaintiffs’ ability to conduct the

political advocacy forming the basis for their request for injunctive relief. Because a

bond requirement would present an severe financial burden, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiffs’ request that the Court exercise its discretion to waive such a requirement. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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[PROPOSED] TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

In sum, this Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Application for a Temporary Restraining

Order. Together with its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those

persons in active concert or participating with them who receive actual notice of this

Order, Defendants the City and the Commission are hereby enjoined from enforcing

OMC sections 3.12.050(C-E) and 3.12.060(C-E). This Temporary Restraining Order

shall remain in effect until November 2, 2006, or until dissolved by further order of this

Court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/19/2006 By: _______________________________

Martin J. Jenkins

United States District Judge 

Case 3:06-cv-06366-WHA Document 21 Filed 10/19/06 Page 5 of 5