Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-00788/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-00788-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHERRISH CASTANEDA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 

et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:24-cv-0788 DC SCR PS 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action, which was accordingly referred to the 

undersigned by Local Rule 302(c)(21). Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”) and submitted the affidavit required by that statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). 

The motion to proceed IFP, ECF No. 3, will be granted. However, in screening Plaintiff’s 

Complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to 

state a claim. As explained below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s claim under 18 

U.S.C. § 241 and § 242 and against Defendant State of California, Department of Motor Vehicles 

(“DMV”) be dismissed with prejudice, and that Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against Defendant Gordon and Doe 

Defendants 1-1000 be dismissed with leave to amend. The undersigned further recommends that 

Case 2:24-cv-00788-DC-SCR Document 6 Filed 12/16/24 Page 1 of 14
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Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 2, be denied. 

I. SCREENING 

A. Legal Standard

The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In 

reviewing the complaint, the Court is guided by the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available online at www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/current-rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civil-procedure. 

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and 

plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this 

court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled 

to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief 

sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint in 

the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), 

Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 

court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 

are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. 

The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 

states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court 

must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must 

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 

less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

(1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 

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inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 

624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice 

to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678.  A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity 

to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar v. 

Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012). 

B. The Complaint 

Plaintiff’s Complaint names several defendants: (1) DMV; (2) Steve Gordon, Director of 

DMV, and (3) Doe Defendants 1-1000. ECF No. 1 at 1.1 The Complaint does not explicitly 

assert a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Id. However, because Plaintiff and Defendant DMV 

are both alleged to be citizens of the State of California, id. at 2-3, there is no basis for diversity 

of citizenship jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Additionally, by alleging Defendants violated 

1

 On March 14, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this case by filing several documents with the Court. 

Because of potential confusion about which of those documents are relevant to which portions of 

the analysis below, the Court briefly explains its understanding here. Plaintiff filed the following: 

(1) ECF No. 1, a document with the word “CLAIM” in the caption, the word “COMPLAINT” as 

the first and only section title, the words “INJUNCTION FOR TEMPORARY ORDER; 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION” in the footer, and an attached letter from the U.S. Equal 

Employment Opportunity Office; (2) ECF No. 1-1, “DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF 

CHERRISH CASTANEDA 15 YEARS STATE EMPLOYEE DMV MOTION FOR ISSUANCE 

OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO REINSTATE PLAINTIFF TO HER JOB UNTIL A 

HEARING ON THE MATTER,” which includes “DECLARATION OF FACTS” in the footer, 

and is followed by another two-page document entitled “DECLARATION OF CHERRISH 

CASTANEDA”; (3) ECF No. 2, “NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION,” followed by “Memorandum of Points and Authorities; and (4) ECF No. 2-1, a 

proposed order for preliminary injunction. Despite the confusing title in the footer of ECF No. 1, 

the Court construes ECF No. 1 as the Complaint and all other documents, including ECF No. 1-1, 

as part of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See ECF No. 2 (referring to Plaintiff’s 

declarations, presumably ECF No. 1-1, as support for the motion for preliminary injunction). 

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her rights under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,2 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, id. at 4, Plaintiff in substance 

alleges federal question jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 1331. 

 Although difficult to piece together, the following allegations appear to be the basis for 

Plaintiff’s claims: Defendants “interfered or attempted to interfere with plaintiff’s rights by the 

use of threats, intimidation and/or coercion, in that defendants demanded “Consent to ‘Mandated’ 

Covid-19 testing through STATE contracted Companies” who collected Personal Identification 

Information (“PII”) to market and research; Defendants conduct was ongoing for about two years 

and there were seven specific dates within those two years in which “noticeable” incidents 

occurred; “the acts that are subject of this complaint occurred on or about JUNE 24th, 2020, in 

Sacramento, California”; “[a]t that time and place, defendants retaliated against [Plaintiff], 

causing loss of the exercise and enjoyment of plaintiff’s civil rights as guaranteed by the First 

amendment of the U.S. [sic] Constitution”; defendants’ actions culminated in Plaintiff’s 

resignation on March 15, 2022; and “defendants knew or should have known that their actions 

were likely to injure plaintiff” and “intended to cause injury to plaintiff and acted with a willful 

and conscious disregard of plaintiff’s rights as secured in the 1st amendment of the U.s [sic] 

constitution.” ECF No. 1 at 3-5. Because the Complaint is difficult to read and appears 

incomplete, see id. at 3-5 (incomplete sentences ending with commas, and several clauses with 

brackets suggesting information was meant to be replaced before filing but was not (e.g., 

“[citation of state statute]” and “[specification of conduct]”)), the Court is unable to discern with 

certainty Plaintiff’s claims and the basis for them. However, considering all of the statements in 

the Complaint and citations to various laws, and the attached “Determination and Notice of 

2

 The Complaint indicates that Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 214, but this appears to be a 

typographical mistake. Section 214 concerns an offer for procurement of Federal Reserve bank 

loan and discount of commercial paper, which is not at issue in the Complaint. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 214. Because the Complaint alleges that Defendants “interfered/attempted to interfere with the 

exercise and enjoyment of plaintiff’s civil rights” and “interfered or attempted to interfere with 

plaintiff’s rights by use of threats, intimidation and/or coercion,” the undersigned construes 

Plaintiff’s claim as a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which concerns a conspiracy to “injure, 

oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or 

privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having 

so exercised the same.” See 18 U.S.C. § 241. 

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Rights” from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, id. at 7, it appears Plaintiff is 

attempting to put forth claims under (1) 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

alleged First Amendment violations; and (3) some employment-based statute for hostile work 

environment and constructive discharge. 

 For relief, Plaintiff seeks: (1) general damages, special damages, and reasonable 

attorney’s fees according to proof; (2) statutory penalties and punitive damages under California 

Civil Code § 3294; (3) a preliminary and permanent injunction against Defendants; (4) costs of 

suit and lost wages and benefits; (5) “[c]ompensation for emotional distress, physical pain, and/or 

loss of professional reputation”; and (6) “[s]uch other and further relief as the court deems just 

and proper.” Id. at 5-6. 

C. Analysis

1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 Claims 

 Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 because these statutes do 

not provide a private right of action. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 241); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 

1092, (9th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242). Because no 

additional facts could cure this fatal defect the undersigned recommends that these claims be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims 

 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant DMV is barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment. See Krainski v. Nev. Ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. Of Higher Educ., 

616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its 

agencies for all types of relief); Banks v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles for Cal., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 

1193-94 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (identifying the DMV as a state agency and holding that Eleventh 

Amendment immunity applies). Additionally, Plaintiff cannot sue Defendant DMV under § 1983 

because only “person[s]” may be sued for depriving someone of their civil rights and states and 

their agencies are not “person[s] within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. State Dep’t of 

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant DMV 

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should be dismissed with prejudice. 

Although the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the state and state agencies like 

Defendant DMV, it does not preclude all suits against state officials like Defendant Gordon. 

While an official capacity claim against a state official is merely another way of pleading an 

action against the entity of which the defendant is an officer, Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. 155, 162 

(2017), the Eleventh Amendment only bars suits for damages against state official in their official 

capacity. It does not bar suits against state officials in their official capacity for prospective 

declaratory or injunctive relief. See Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 891 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2018); Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10. Moreover, a plaintiff may seek monetary damages under § 

1983 against state officials in their personal or individual capacities. See Mitchell v. Washington, 

818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for damages 

against state officials in their personal capacities); Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 

2022) (state officials sued in their personal capacity are persons for purposes of § 1983 and can be 

sued for monetary damages). However, for the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Plaintiff 

has not stated cognizable § 1983 claims against Defendant Gordon or Doe Defendants 1-1000 in 

their individual or official capacities and recommends dismissal with leave to amend. 

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff is required to plead that (1) a defendant acting 

under color of state law, (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal 

statutes. See Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). It is 

unclear in what manner Plaintiff believes her First Amendment rights were violated, however, it 

is clear she is asserting such violation. See ECF No. 1 at 4 (two references to violations of 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights). 

To prevail on a § 1983 claim of First Amendment retaliation, a public employee must 

establish: “(1) that he or she engaged in protected speech; (2) that the employer took ‘adverse 

employment action’; and (3) that his or her speech was a ‘substantial or motivating factor for the 

adverse employment action.” Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). To 

constitute “protected speech,” the speech must address a matter of public concern. Connick v. 

Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public 

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concern is a pure question of law that must be determined ‘by the content, form, and context of a 

given statement, as revealed by the whole record.’” Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 678 F.3d 

1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 & n.7). 

Content is the most important factor. Id. “[S]peech that deals with ‘individual personnel 

disputes and grievances’ and that would be of ‘no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the 

performance of governmental agencies’ is generally not of ‘public concern.’” Id. (quoting 

Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973). In contrast, “[s]peech involves a matter of public concern when it 

can fairly be considered to relate to ‘any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 

community.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Multnomah Cnty, 48 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146)). 

The Complaint does not allege what “protected speech” Plaintiff was engaged in, much 

less how its content, form, and context involve a matter of public concern. Plaintiff’s declaration 

in support of her motion for preliminary injunction, however, suggests that the “protected speech” 

concerned DMV’s Covid-19 policies and/or failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s request in light of 

Covid-19, and that Plaintiff communicated these concerns to “other agencies from the DMV 

Director to Governor Newsome [sic] and others in between.” See ECF No. 1-1 at 2. Although 

these additional facts are helpful in understanding Plaintiff’s claims, the Court is still unable to 

assess whether Plaintiff was engaged in protected speech. For example, it is still unclear whether 

the issues complained about simply concerned personal grievances regarding Plaintiff’s unique 

requests for accommodations during the Covid-19 pandemic or concerned information “members 

of society” need “to make informed decisions about the operation of their government.” 

For the Court to conduct definitive analysis, Plaintiff must include facts concerning all the 

elements of a First Amendment claim, as discussed above, including what speech she engaged in 

and why the speech she engaged in is “protected speech.” Because additional facts conceivably 

could cure these deficiencies, the undersigned recommends the District Judge grant Plaintiff leave 

to amend her § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim. 

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3. Claims under Title I of the ADA 

 Although not clear from the Complaint alone, Plaintiff’s declaration in support of her 

motion for preliminary injunction suggest she is attempting to allege discrimination, hostile work 

environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation under Title I of the ADA, and that Plaintiff 

seeks monetary and injunctive relief. See ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3. As with Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, 

the Court first addresses who Plaintiff can sue under Title I and for what relief, and second, 

whether Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief under Title I. 

As with the § 1983 claims, Title I claims against Defendant DMV are barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); 

Thomas v. Nakatani, 309 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 2002) (Congress did not validly abrogate the 

state’s sovereign immunity under Title I of the ADA); In re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 1189, 

1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (sovereign immunity extends to state agencies). By the same token, as with 

the § 1983 claims, sovereign immunity does not bar Title I claims against state officials in their 

official capacities for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief. Walsh v. Nevada Dep’t of 

Human Resources, 471 F.3d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original) (citing Garrett, 

531 U.S. at 374 n.9, and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); see also Mohsin v. California 

Dep’t of Water Res., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1006, 1012 (E.D. Cal. 2014). However, unlike § 1983, Title I 

does not permit claims against state officials in their personal or individual capacities. Walsh, 

471 F.3d at 1038 (“individual defendants cannot be held personally liable for violations of the 

ADA”). For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Title I claims against 

Defendant DMV and against Defendant Gordon and Doe Defendants 1-1000 (in their individual 

capacities) be dismissed with prejudice. If Plaintiff can state a Title I ADA claim against 

Defendant Gordon or another state official in their official capacity, Plaintiff may only seek 

prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. 

 The remaining issue is whether Plaintiff’s has stated cognizable Title I ADA claims 

against Defendant Gordon and Doe Defendants 1-1000 in their official capacity for 

discrimination, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation. For the reasons 

stated below, the undersigned recommends these claims be dismissed with leave to amend. 

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 To state a Title I ADA discrimination claim, Plaintiff must allege that she is (1) disabled 

under the ADA, (2) a “qualified individual with a disability”, and (3) discriminated against 

“because of” the disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate 

against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application, procedures, 

the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 

other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 

F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2007). The ADA defines disability with respect to an induvial as (1) “a 

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 

individual”; (2) “a record of such an impairment”; or (3) “being regarded as having such an 

impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not establish, as required to state 

a claim under the ADA, that she is a person with a disability. 

 To state a Title I ADA hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff “must allege that [s]he 

was subjected to harassment because of [her] disability, and that the harassing ‘conduct was 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive 

work environment.” Mattoida v. Nelson, 98 F.4th 1164, 1174 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Mannatt v. 

Bank of Am., N.A., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003)). As noted above, Plaintiff fails to allege 

she is disabled under the ADA. Additionally, beside Plaintiff’s reference to “acts that are the 

subject of this complaint” that occurred on seven dates over a two-year span, all we know is that 

she was allegedly required to consent to Covid-19 testing with two contracted companies that 

collected her PII for marketing and research. Without more, it is unclear how any of these 

allegations could support a hostile work environment claim. 

 To state a Title I ADA constructive discharge claim, Plaintiff must allege that “working 

conditions deteriorate[d], as a result of the discrimination, to the point that they bec[a]me 

sufficiently extraordinary and egregious.” E.E.O.C. v. Placer ARC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1062 

(E.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(citations omitted)). Having failed to state a Title I ADA claim for hostile work environment, 

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for constructive discharge. See Brooks, 229 F.3d 917 (“Where 

a plaintiff fails to demonstrate the severe or pervasive harassment necessary to support a hostile 

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work environment claim, it will be impossible for her to meet the higher standard of constructive 

discharge: conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would leave the job.”). 

 To state a Title I ADA retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege “(1) involvement in a 

protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the two.” 

Coons v. Secretary of United States Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(quoting Brown v. City of Tuscon, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003)). Under Title I, the 

“protected activity” must involve the employee seeking a disability-related accommodation. In 

short, to state a claim, a plaintiff must “establish a link between his request for a reasonable 

accommodation and his demotion.” Id. Plaintiff’s Complaint hints at an adverse employment 

outcome—forced resignation—but does not plead facts showing that she has a disability, what 

concrete adverse action Defendants took against her, what accommodation she may have 

requested, or a link between any accommodation and any adverse action. 

 Although Plaintiff fails to state any type of Title I ADA claim against Defendant Gordon 

or Doe Defendants 1-1000, rather than recommend dismissal, the undersigned recommends that 

Plaintiff be given leave to amend these claims to the extent she only seeks prospective declaratory 

or injunctive relief. 

4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8 

In addition to failing to state a claim, as described above, the Complaint does not comply 

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1)-(2) as it does not provide a short, plain statement 

showing Plaintiff is entitled to relief. As noted on multiple occasions, the exact nature of 

Plaintiff’s claims is unclear from the Complaint, and only by reading the declarations that are part 

of Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is the Court able to somewhat decipher what 

claims the Plaintiff might be pursuing. And even with the additional information in the 

declarations, these are just the Court’s best guesses as to what Plaintiff’s claims are and what they 

are based on. 

Accordingly, as it stands now, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted and fails to comply with Rule 8. Because amendment could potentially cure the 

deficiencies of some of Plaintiff’s claims, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff be granted 

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leave to amend her First Amendment retaliation claim and her Title I ADA claims against 

Defendant Gordon and Doe Defendants 1-1000. All other claims should be dismissed with 

prejudice. 

II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

 According to Plaintiff, the motion for preliminary injunction is based upon the 

memorandum of points and authorities and Plaintiff’s declarations, which were filed concurrently. 

See ECF No. 2 at 2; see also ECF No. 1-1 (Plaintiff’s two declarations in support of Plaintiff’s 

motion for preliminary injunction). The Court notes that the memorandum and points of 

authority is even more confusing than the Complaint and cites to inapplicable law and rules.3

Plaintiff’s declarations, however, shed some light on the basis for her request for injunctive relief. 

 Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction because she lost her job at the DMV as a result of 

the pandemic, which involved her “los[ing] her life support system as a civil servant.” ECF No. 2 

at 3. She seeks reinstatement at the DMV and three years of lost wages or “equivalent payment 

of lost wages for 20 years, plus retirement, medical vision and dental for self and family for the 

reminding [sic] life expectancy of 80 years with average cost of increase included.” Id. at 4. 

Plaintiff also seeks approximately $3.3 million dollars to make her whole. Id. 

Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction should be denied. “A preliminary 

injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must generally 

establish all four of the following elements: (1) likely success on the merits of his underlying 

case; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance 

of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 

786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). A plaintiff may also prevail by showing serious questions 

going to the merits, irreparable harm, and a balance of equities that tips strongly in the plaintiff’s 

favor. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011). At a 

3

 Plaintiff’s motion incorrectly cites to California Code of Civil Procedure § 526(a) and Superior 

Court of California, County of Sacramento’s Local Rule 1.06. The correct citations for a 

preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California are Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a), and Eastern District Local Rule 231. 

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minimum, Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction because he cannot state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. Failure to state a claim categorically dooms a motion for a 

preliminary injunction. See Arc of Cal. v. Douglas, 757 F.3d 975, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

E & J Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir.2006)). 

III. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT 

 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, the amended complaint must contain a short 

and plain statement of Plaintiff’s claims. The allegations of the complaint must be set forth in 

sequentially numbered paragraphs, with each paragraph number being one greater than the one 

before, each paragraph having its own number, and no paragraph number being repeated 

anywhere in the complaint. Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of circumstances” 

where possible. Rule 10(b). As noted above, forms are available to help plaintiffs organize their 

complaint in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor 

(Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 

 The amended complaint must not force the Court and the Defendants to guess at what is 

being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally guessing as to what 

facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain defendants”). The amended 

complaint should contain specific allegations as to the actions of each named Defendant and 

allege facts to support each individual claim. 

 Also, the amended complaint must not refer to a prior pleading to make Plaintiff’s 

amended complaint complete. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without 

reference to any prior pleading. Local Rule 220. This is because, as a general rule, an amended 

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline 

Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 456 n.4 (2009) (“[n]ormally, an amended complaint 

supersedes the original complaint”) (citing 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & 

Procedure § 1476, pp. 556-57 (2d ed. 1990)). Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged.

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IV. PRO SE PLAINTIFF SUMMARY 

 The magistrate judge is recommending that your case be dismissed because some claims 

cannot be brought by you (18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242), you cannot sue certain defendants 

(Defendant DMV), or you have not sufficiently alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Title I 

of the ADA. However, because you could potentially provide additional facts to state claims 

under § 1983 and Title I, the undersigned is recommending that you be granted leave to amend 

those claims. The undersigned is also recommending that your motion for preliminary injunction 

be denied. 

You can object to these recommendations in writing within 14 days. The District Judge 

will consider your objections and make a final decision. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP 

(ECF No. 3) be GRANTED. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 242 be DISMISSED 

with prejudice; 

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant DMV be DISMISSED with prejudice; 

3. Plaintiff’s § 1983 and Title I ADA claims against Defendant Gordon and Doe Defendants 

1-1000 be DISMISSED without prejudice; 

4. Plaintiff be granted leave to amend her § 1983 and Title I ADA claims against Defendant 

Gordon and Doe Defendants 1-1000. 

5. Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 2) be DENIED. 

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written 

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” The plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 

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specified time may result in waiver of the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: December 16, 2024 

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