Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01683/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01683-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RICHARD SKAGGS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-01683 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

DIRECTOR OF THE ARIZONA ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )

) 

 Respondent. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

On or about August 22, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Petitioner filed an amended petition on January 12,

2009. See Docket No. 10. Respondents filed an Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 13) on

March 10, 2009. Respondents contend the action for habeas

relief may be denied and dismissed because Petitioner failed to

file his action within the applicable statute of limitations.

I Procedural History

In 2004 a jury found Petitioner guilty of one count of

theft of a credit card, one count of trafficking in stolen

property and one count of theft of property. Answer, Exh. B.

After a hearing, on February 18, 2004, Petitioner was sentenced

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1

 Petitioner was later convicted of the first-degree murder

of the victim of the theft crimes challenged in this habeas action.

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to a total of 46 years imprisonment pursuant to these

convictions.1 

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences and was appointed counsel to represent him in his

direct appeal. Id., Exh. A. In his direct appeal Petitioner

asserted that the imposition of aggravated sentences violated

his Sixth Amendment rights pursuant to the United States Supreme

Court’s opinion in Blakely v. Washington. Id., Exh. A. The

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences in a decision issued July 28, 2005. Id., Exh. B.

Respondents allow that Petitioner sought review of this decision

by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review on March 9,

2006. Id. at 2 & n.2; Docket No. 10 at 3.

Prior to the date that the Arizona Supreme Court denied

review, on or about September 7, 2005, Petitioner initiated an

action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. D. Counsel was

appointed to represent Petitioner in his Rule 32 action. Id.,

Exh. E. Petitioner’s counsel informed the state trial court

that he could find no meritorious issue to raise on Petitioner’s

behalf. Id., Exh. F. 

Petitioner was given several extensions of the time

allowed to file a pro per petition seeking state post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32. Id., Exh. G & Exh. H. On November

22, 2006, Petitioner’s Rule 32 action was dismissed for his

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failure to file a petition specifying his claims for relief.

Id., Exh. I. 

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts he is

entitled to relief because his rights pursuant to the Sixth,

Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated.

Respondents, characterizing the petition as “virtually

incomprehensible,” argue that the petition was not timely filed.

II Analysis

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on prisoners

seeking federal habeas relief from their state convictions.

See, e.g., Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002).

The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to tolling of

the statute of limitations during the pendency of a “properly

filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 & Supp. 2008). See also Artuz v.

Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v.

Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.

397 (2008). 

Using the most generous possible interpretation of the

AEDPA, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final on

June 9, 2006, when the time expired for seeking certiorari by

the United States Supreme Court in his direct appeal. See

Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 2001); Bowen v.

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Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Compare Hemmerle v.

Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007); Riddle v. Kemna,

523 F.3d 850, 855 (8th Cir. 2008). At that time, Petitioner had

an action for state post-conviction relief pending, which tolled

the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.

Again applying the most generous interpretation of the

precedent of the federal courts, the statute of limitations

began to run on December 22, 2006, when the time expired for

Petitioner to seek review of the Arizona trial court’s dismissal

of his Rule 32 action. See Douglas v. Horn, 359 F.3d 257, 261

(3d Cir. 2004); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 420-24 (3d Cir.

2000) (holding that, because a judgment is not final until the

time for seeking review expires, the word “pending” includes

that time period, whether or not such review is sought, and

collecting cases so holding). See also Lookingbill v. Cockrell,

293 F.3d 256, 266 (5th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases so holding).

Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations regarding

Petitioner’s federal habeas action expired on December 22, 2007.

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas action until August

22, 2008, approximately eight months after the statute of

limitations expired. 

Respondents argue that state prisoners are not entitled

to equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently stated that the

Court should still determine whether a section 2254 petitioner

is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

See Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 & n.2 (9th

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Cir. 2009). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling of the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations must establish two elements: “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15 (2005).

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Harris, 515 F.3d at 1054-55 & n.4; Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified on other

grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See Jones

v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219

F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy is

“typically applied sparingly”). The petitioner must establish

a causal connection between the alleged roadblock to their

timely filing of their federal habeas petition and the actual

failure to file the petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at

1034; Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir.

2005). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to

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equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Petitioner has

not filed any reply to the response to his habeas petition.

III Conclusion

The federal habeas petition was not filed within the

one-year statute of limitations and Petitioner has not provided

a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Skaggs’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

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of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 14th day of April, 2009.

 

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