Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-06-02334/USCOURTS-ca4-06-02334-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FILED: 12/20/2007

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-2334

LARRY MILLER; 11TH SENATORIAL DISTRICT

REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

versus

JEAN CUNNINGHAM, in his official capacity as

Chairman of the Virginia State Board of

Elections; HAROLD PYON, in her official

capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Virginia

State Board of Elections; NANCY RODRIQUES, in

her official capacity as Secretary of the

Virginia State Board of Elections,

Defendants - Appellants,

---------------------------------------------

REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA,

Amicus Curiae.

No. 07-1002

LARRY MILLER; 11TH SENATORIAL DISTRICT

REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

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JEAN CUNNINGHAM, in her official capacity as

Chairman of the Virginia State Board of

Elections; HAROLD PYON, in his official

capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Virginia

State Board of Elections; NANCY RODRIQUES, in

her official capacity as Secretary of the

Virginia State Board of Elections,

Defendants - Appellees,

---------------------------------------------

REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA,

Amicus Curiae.

ORDER

Appellants/cross-appellees filed a petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc. Appellees/cross-appellants filed a response in

opposition to the petition.

A member of the Court requested a poll on the petition for

rehearing en banc. The poll failed to produce a majority of the

judges in active service in favor of rehearing en banc. Judges

Wilkinson and Shedd voted to grant rehearing en banc. Chief Judge

Williams and Judges Niemeyer, Michael, Motz, Traxler, King, and

Duncan voted to deny rehearing en banc. Judge Gregory did not

participate in any consideration of this case.

The Court denies the petition for rehearing and rehearing en

banc. Judge Wilkinson filed an opinion dissenting from the denial

of rehearing en banc.

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Entered at the direction of Senior Judge Wilkins for the

Court.

FOR THE COURT,

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

___________________________

 CLERK

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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of the

petition for rehearing en banc:

The panel opinion is by its own admission narrow. It declares

Virginia’s open primary law unconstitutional solely “‘as applied to

the narrow facts of this case.’” See Miller v. Brown, 503 F.3d

360, 368 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Miller v. Brown, 465 F. Supp. 2d

584, 595 (E.D. Va. 2006)). Appellee contends these facts are “very

specific” -- constitutional infirmity exists only when, as here,

“an incumbent legislator has exercised his prerogative to select an

open primary . . . against the wishes of his local party as a

whole.” Brief in Opposition to Reh’g at 3. This means, argues the

appellee, that the panel opinion will not apply “in elections with

no incumbent, in elections where the incumbent chooses a method of

renomination other than primary, and in elections where the local

party and the incumbent agree on the method of renomination.” Id.

at 4. Presumably, the panel opinion will also not apply in

elections where the incumbent declines to exercise the power to

select the method of renomination.

I respect the panel’s desire to write narrowly. Narrow

rulings have much to commend them as a general matter, particularly

in the constitutional context. They ensure that broad judicial

decisions do not over-constitutionalize the most fundamental and

difficult questions facing our society, leaving these “issues open

for democratic deliberation.” Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court,

1995 Term -- Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev.

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4, 7 (1996). Narrow rulings are therefore seldom reason for this

circuit to convene en banc. See Brief in Opposition to Reh’g at 4

(“Simply put, given the very limited fact scenario to which the

challenged portion of the panel’s decision applies, this is not a

case of exceptional importance.”).

But in the area of election law, a narrow ruling can sometimes

be a real mistake. Political campaigns require substantial

planning, and participants in the political process must be able to

rely on firmly established legal standards. See Sunstein, supra,

at 29 (arguing that decisional minimalism may be a “large mistake”

when planning is necessary). The very least courts owe those who

hold and seek public office is a clear understanding of the ground

rules by which they must compete. Courts, of course, do not

establish all of these ground rules, but to the degree we set forth

constitutional standards we must not create uncertainty. 

Notwithstanding its thoughtful decision in this case, the

panel risks leaving Virginia election law in limbo for some time by

declining to address what I believe are two fairly presented and

important issues: (1) the constitutionality of Virginia’s incumbent

selection provision, Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-509(B) (2006), and (2)

the constitutionality of open primaries, when not selected by an

incumbent, see id. § 24.2-530. While the majority winks and nods

at these broader questions, by its own terms it leaves them

unaddressed. This is a mistake. These questions must assuredly be

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litigated and it is not right to kick the can down the road when

those seeking elective office deserve explicit guidance from the

courts on electoral conduct.

I.

A.

A brief overview is in order. Virginia law allows political

parties to nominate their candidates not only by primary, but also

by “methods other than a primary.” Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-510

(2006). These other methods “include (but are not limited to) a

party convention; a mass meeting, also known as a ‘caucus’; and a

party canvass or unassembled caucus, also called a ‘firehouse

primary.’” Miller v. Brown, 503 F.3d 360, 362 (4th Cir. 2007)

(internal citation omitted). Primaries are conducted and paid for

by the state, see id., and must comport with Virginia’s “open

primary” law, which provides: “All persons qualified to vote . . .

may vote at the primary. No person shall vote for the candidates

of more than one party.” Va. Code Ann. at § 24.2-530 (2006).

Political parties must conduct and fund the other nomination

procedures themselves, see Miller, 503 F.3d at 362, and are allowed

to limit participation, so long as they do so constitutionally.

See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 

Virginia law vests the power to decide “the method” of making

party nominations with the “duly constituted authorities of [a]

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 This statutory provision reads in full: 1

Notwithstanding [the party’s authority to select the

method of renomination], the following provisions shall

apply to the determination of the method of making party

nominations. A party shall nominate its candidate for

election for a General Assembly district where there is

only one incumbent of that party for the district by the

method designated by that incumbent, or absent any

designation by him by the method of nomination determined

by the party. A party shall nominate its candidates for

election for a General Assembly district where there is

more than one incumbent of that party for the district by

a primary unless all the incumbents consent to a

different method of nomination. A party, whose candidate

at the immediately preceding election for a particular

office other than the General Assembly (i) was nominated

by a primary or filed for a primary but was not opposed

and (ii) was elected at the general election, shall

nominate a candidate for the next election for that

office by a primary unless all incumbents of that party

for that office consent to a different method.

When, under any of the foregoing provisions, no

incumbents offer as candidates for reelection to the same

office, the method of nomination shall be determined by

the political party.

For the purposes of this subsection, any

officeholder who offers for reelection to the same office

shall be deemed an incumbent notwithstanding that the

district which he represents differs in part from that

for which he offers for election. 

Va. Code. Ann. § 24.2-509(B) (2006).

7

political party.” Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-509(A) (2006). However,

there is an exception to this rule: certain incumbent

officeholders, including incumbent state legislators -- and not the

leadership of the party they represent -- are allowed to select the

method of nomination for their seats. Id. § 24.2-509(B); see also 1

Miller, 503 F.3d at 362 (noting that “an incumbent state legislator

is entitled to select the method of nomination for his seat”). 

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B.

In this case, Stephen Martin, a Republican representing the

11th District in the Senate of Virginia, exercised his statutory

authority under § 24.2-509(B) to designate a state-funded primary

as the method of nomination for his seat. Senator Martin’s

selection conflicted, however, with the plans of the 11th District

Republican Committee (“Committee”). Contrary to the dictate of

Virginia’s open primary law, the Committee wanted to exclude voters

from the nomination process who had voted in recent Democratic

primaries. The Committee thus filed a § 1983 suit in federal

court, arguing that Virginia’s open primary law violated the

Committee’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free

association.

Affirming the district court, a panel of this court agreed

with the Committee. Confining its decision to “‘the narrow facts

of this case,’” Miller, 503 F.3d at 368 (citing Miller v. Brown,

465 F. Supp. 2d 584, 595 (E.D. Va. 2006)), the panel declared

Virginia’s open primary law, § 24.2-530, unconstitutional, but only

“as applied” to the situation in which an incumbent elects to hold

an open primary against his party’s wishes, Miller, 503 F.3d at

371. 

In reaching its decision, the panel declined to consider two

properly presented questions: the constitutionality of Virginia’s

incumbent selection provision, § 24.2-509(B), and the

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constitutionality of Virginia’s open primary law, § 24.2-530, when

not selected by an incumbent. For the reasons mentioned earlier in

this opinion, I think it was error for the panel to leave

unanswered these two questions of exceptional importance. The

basic thing judges with life tenure owe elected officials of

periodic tenure is clarity on the rules of their contest. I cannot

predict whether my distinguished colleagues on this court will or

will not adopt at some later point the specific views expressed

herein. But I am of firm conviction that two issues critical to

Virginia election law are clearly presented by this case, and that

it is the solemn obligation of the court to address them. 

II.

The first important issue not addressed by the panel opinion

is the constitutionality of Virginia’s incumbent selection

provision, Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-509(B) (2006). To me, the

unconstitutionality of this provision is clear. I fully recognize

that governance is an immensely complicated business and that the

ability of parties to re-nominate and electorates to re-elect

incumbent officeholders is essential to the fund of experience and

expertise that enables a large Commonwealth such as Virginia to be

well-run. Notwithstanding the benefits that length of service

confers upon the public welfare, the incumbent selection provision

at issue here facially discriminates in favor of incumbents,

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shutting down the political process and violating the most

essential requirements of equal protection. Moreover, the

provision also contravenes the First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights of political parties to free association. 

I believe that the constitutionality of § 24.2-509(B) is

properly presented in this case: the parties are treating it as

such, and the panel necessarily considered the provision in

reaching its holding. However, failure to address the

constitutionality of this provision can only mean more litigation

down the road. I see no reason to refrain from striking down a

provision that plainly runs afoul of our most fundamental

constitutional rights. 

A.

I start my analysis of Virginia’s incumbent selection

provision with a very simple proposition: if there is going to be

election law, it will be written and enacted by incumbents. Both

the United States and Virginia Constitutions explicitly grant the

legislative branch the authority to regulate elections. The

Federal Constitution states that “Congress may at any time make or

alter . . . regulations” governing “the times, places, and manner

of holding elections for Senators and Representatives,” U.S. Const.

art. I, § 4, while the Virginia Constitution grants Virginia’s

legislature broad powers to control nearly all facets of the

electoral process: 

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 Of course, the Supreme Court has struck down election laws 2

for other reasons. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479

(2006) (striking down Vermont’s campaign finance laws for violating

the First Amendment right to free speech); Harper v. Va. Bd. of

Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (striking down Virginia’s poll

tax for unconstitutionally conditioning the fundamental right to

vote on “the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee”); Smith

v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down a law that allowed

the state Democratic Party to enforce its rule requiring all voters

in a primary to be white). 

In reaching these decisions, the Court has, at times,

discussed the fact that election laws may serve to insulate

incumbents from competition. See, e.g., Randall, 126 S. Ct. at

2492 (“That is because contribution limits that are too low can

also harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from

mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders,

thereby reducing democratic accountability.”). In these cases,

however, the Court was discussing the self-interested nature of the

11

The General Assembly shall provide for the nomination of

candidates, shall regulate the time, place, manner,

conduct, and administration of primary, general, and

special elections, and shall have the power to make any

other law regulating elections not inconsistent with this

Constitution. 

Va. Const. art. II, § 4. 

Given this, there is certainly nothing unconstitutional per se

about incumbents shaping the electoral process to their advantage.

This is merely a feature of American politics. The Framers were

surely aware of the desire of those who hold elective office to

retain elective office, yet they were clearly comfortable giving

incumbents the authority to write election law. Judicial

intervention into the electoral process, merely for the purpose of

rooting out self-interested political behavior, would therefore be

an “substantial” incursion into textually and traditionally

legislative prerogatives. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 2

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election law in the context of otherwise unconstitutional behavior,

not as the primary reason for striking the legislative action. 

12

306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Furthermore,

elections are “pervasively regulated,” Richard H. Pildes, The

Supreme Court, 2003 Term -- Foreword: The Constitutionalization of

Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 28, 51 (2004), and

aggressive review of legislative motivation in this area would

leave the federal judiciary time to do little else but analyze

election laws. The Supreme Court has therefore been appropriately

reluctant to police enactments in the election law context, even

while explicitly recognizing that self-interest may be a partial

driver of legislative action in this area. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at

298, 305 (plurality opinion) (holding political gerrymandering to

be non-justiciable for lack of a judicially manageable standard

despite the fact that redistricting is always conducted with an

intent to gain “political advantage”).

Nonetheless, there are limits to this deference. As the

Supreme Court suggested in the famous fourth footnote of United

States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the judiciary

has a basic obligation to keep the political process open and wellfunctioning. See id. at 152 n.4. “The first instinct of power is

the retention of power,” and those who hold public office can be

expected to attempt to insulate themselves from meaningful

electoral review. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003)

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(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is

therefore necessary for an independent and co-equal branch of

government -- the judiciary -- to ensure that incumbents are unable

to create a system where the “ins . . . will stay in and the outs

will stay out.” John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 103 (1980);

see also Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The

Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491, 497-502 (1997). 

This is because any political system that lacks

accountability, “democracy’s essential minimal condition,” Pildes,

supra, at 44, does not conform with even the barest requirements of

equal protection, which demand, at a minimum, that the majority is

not systematically frustrated in enacting its policies into law.

See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 753-54

(1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that legislative action

which causes “systematic frustration” of the majority will does not

meet the “basic” requirements of equal protection); see also

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (stating that “[f]ull

and effective participation by all citizens in state government

requires . . . that each citizen have an equally effective voice in

the election of members of his state legislature”); Baker v. Carr,

369 U.S. 186, 261-62 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring). 

At the very least, therefore, the need to “clear the channels

of political change,” see Ely, supra, at 105-34, requires the

judiciary to presume that election laws that facially discriminate

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 Laws may, of course, facially benefit incumbents without 3

posing constitutional problems. For example, laws that enable

state legislators to provide constituent services -- e.g., hire

staff, see Va. Code Ann. § 30-19.4 (2004), or pay office expenses,

see id. at § 30-19.14 –- are clearly constitutional, despite the

fact that these statutes may provide resources that produce a

de facto advantage for legislators in campaigning for reelection.

But these laws are clearly passed for a legitimate purpose, unlike

election laws passed solely to entrench incumbents in office. 

14

in favor of incumbents are unconstitutional. Two reasons support 3

this conclusion. First, election laws that facially discriminate

in favor of existing officeholders simply go “too far”: if

incumbents are allowed to pass laws explicitly and exclusively for

their own benefit, there would be no end to the advantages they

could provide themselves. Incumbents could therefore diminish the

possibility for change and competition in American politics to a

degree never envisioned by the Constitution. Second, the problems

presented by judicial intervention into the political process are

not nearly as pronounced when the courts are faced with laws that

facially favor incumbents. Facially neutral laws, like legislative

redistricting schemes, may produce a de facto advantage for

incumbents, but uncovering whether that advantage reaches

unconstitutional limits requires an intrusive -- and potentially

error-prone -- inquiry into legislative motive. The biases of

facially discriminatory laws, on the other hand, are readily

apparent. 

Given the foregoing, Virginia’s incumbent selection statute,

Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-509(B) (2006), is plainly unconstitutional,

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15

at least when state legislators are passing laws dealing with their

own re-election prospects. The statute facially discriminates in

favor of existing officeholders, by compelling political parties to

“nominate [their] candidate[s] for election . . . by the method[s]

designated” by incumbents. In doing so, the law leaves no doubt as

to who its purported beneficiaries are -- the incumbents in

Virginia’s General Assembly. These incumbent legislators already

possess numerous structural advantages over their electoral

competition: money, name-recognition, staff, etc. To this preexisting array of de facto advantages, Virginia’s incumbent

selection provision now adds the de jure advantage that the

incumbent can dictate his or her recommended preference as to

renomination procedures over a party’s express wishes. Such an

explicit advantage given to existing officeholders surely threatens

to entrench Virginia’s incumbents to an unconstitutional extent.

In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837-38

(1995), the Supreme Court held that a state cannot place terms

limits on its United States Congressmen. Thornton, however, left

intact the option of states to impose term limits on state

legislators. Virginia has declined to impose such limits, and it

may well be wise and correct in declining to do so. Nonetheless,

the basic quid pro quo implied by Thornton maintains its force: the

federal courts will ensure that constitutionally qualified

candidates are not prevented from seeking office, so long as those

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candidates do not shut down the political process and entrench

themselves once they are elected. By facially favoring current

officeholders, Virginia’s incumbent selection provision violates

the mandate of this quid pro quo, and threatens the “fundamental

principle of our representative democracy,” that “‘the people

should choose whom they please to govern them.’” Powell v.

McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (quoting 2 Elliot’s Debates 257

(A. Hamilton, New York)). 

B.

The constitutional infirmity of Virginia’s incumbent selection

provision does not end with its explicit discrimination in favor of

existing officeholders. While this alone is sufficient to render

Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-509(B) unconstitutional, the provision

additionally contravenes the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights

of political parties to free association. 

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First Amendment

protects “the freedom to join together in furtherance of common

political beliefs.” Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,

479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986). A fundamental and necessary element of

this freedom is the ability of a political party to make its own

decisions: “‘Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee

if associations could not limit control over their decisions to

those who share the interests and persuasions that underlie the

association’s being.’” Democratic Party of United States v.

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Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 n.22 (1981)

(quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 791

(1978)). Of particular importance are a political party’s

decisions surrounding the process of selecting its nominee, for a

“party’s choice of a candidate is the most effective way in which

that party can communicate to the voters what the party represents

and, thereby, attract voter interest and support.” Timmons v. Twin

Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 372 (1997) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting). 

In allowing the views of a single individual to override the

wishes of an entire political party, Virginia’s incumbent selection

mechanism fails to abide by even these basic First Amendment

requirements. As the panel correctly recognized, the incumbent is

not the party, nor even the designated representative of the party.

Miller v. Brown, 503 F.3d 360, 368-70 (4th Cir. 2007). In fact,

the incumbent and the party face very different incentives with

regard to the selection of nominating procedures. Id. at 369; see

also Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S.

214, 225 n.15 (1989) (“Simply because a legislator belongs to a

political party does not make her at all times a representative of

party interests.”). The incumbent will focus primarily on his or

her chances for re-election, while the party may have multi-faceted

goals that are not necessarily best achieved by maximizing a

particular individual’s re-electability. Allowing the incumbent to

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bind a party despite these differences –- without the party’s

explicit or implicit consent –- is the very definition of an

unconstitutional burden on the party’s associative rights, and a

sufficient reason, in and of itself, to declare Va. Code Ann. §

24.2-509(B) unconstitutional. 

C.

Finally, I note that it is entirely proper for us to consider

the constitutionality of the incumbent selection provision in this

litigation. For three reasons, I think this question is squarely

presented.

First, the parties are treating it as such. The state has

vigorously argued that the incumbent is the party, placing the

incumbent selection provision directly in front of this court. See

Miller, 503 F.3d at 368-70 (noting that the Board’s challenge to

the district court ruling rested on an argument that the

incumbent’s selection of an open primary did not burden the

Republican Party’s interests). Indeed, the panel discussed Va.

Code Ann. § 24.2-509(B) at length in its opinion. See id. at 369-

70. It is difficult to see how judicial economy is served by a

court considering such an obviously unconstitutional provision

without ruling on its constitutionality. 

Second, it is impossible to consider Virginia’s open primary

law on the facts of this case without also evaluating the incumbent

selection provision. The constitutionality of an open primary --

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19

or any other nomination option -- is inextricably linked to the

manner in which a state designates those options may be chosen.

Therefore, we must consider the two provisions in concert. Indeed,

as the panel recognized in limiting its decision to the “specific”

circumstance where “an incumbent legislator has exercised his

prerogative to select an open primary . . . against the wishes of

his local party as a whole,” Brief in Opposition to Reh’g at 3,

one cannot consider what was chosen without asking how and by whom

it was chosen. 

Third, leaving the incumbent selection provision largely

intact almost certainly ensures further litigation down the road.

The minute an incumbent chooses to run, for example, a convention

or closed primary against his or her party’s wishes, the party will

challenge the law, claiming that its associative rights have been

violated. To repeat: clarity is a critical component of election

law -- a particularly litigious field -- and this question should

simply not be left hanging. It is not a matter for another day. 

III.

The second important issue not addressed by the panel is the

constitutionality of Virginia’s open primary law, Va. Code Ann. §

24.2-530 (2006), when it is not triggered by the incumbent

selection mechanism. The panel explicitly reserves this question

in its opinion: “we do not decide whether the open primary statute,

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20

viewed in isolation, impermissibly burdens a political party’s

associational rights.” Miller v. Brown, 503 F.3d. 360, 366 n.6

(4th Cir. 2007). Later, to emphasize its point, the panel

explicitly reserves the question again: “[h]ere, we need not decide

whether Virginia’s open primary statute, viewed in isolation,

impermissibly burdens a political party’s right to associate with

those who share its beliefs.” Id. at 367. Reading the panel’s

rejection of the Committee’s facial challenge to open primaries,

one may conclude that state-mandated open primaries are

constitutional. Id. at 364-68. Conversely, in striking Virginia’s

open primary law as applied to an incumbent-selected primary, the

panel sets up a most peculiar system in which an incumbent is free

to impose on his party any nomination mechanism he chooses --

convention, caucus, firehouse primary, closed primary -- except

that he cannot choose a state-funded open primary over his party’s

veto. Id. at 368-71. This decision may be construed as mandating

a constitutional preference for closed primaries –- a dramatic step

certainly not dictated by Supreme Court precedent. 

To repeat once more: clarity in election law is critically

important, and the implications of the panel’s decision are not

clear. The consequences of this lack of clarity are considerable

in this case: to the extent the panel calls into question the

constitutionality of open primaries, the panel not only discourages

state legislatures from making a choice that they are perfectly

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21

entitled to make, but it also nudges Virginia down the road to

party registration, something the state has yet to adopt. Thus,

the panel opinion threatens to remove legitimate options as to

party nomination mechanisms from the people themselves and enshrine

a principle of political polarization in constitutional law. The

panel could and should have made clear that a state law mandating

open primaries, through something other than an incumbent selection

provision, is perfectly constitutional. To say that this question

must await further litigation is to do the Commonwealth a

considerable disservice. 

A.

A mandatory open primary should indeed be a constitutional

choice for states to make. Not the only choice by any means, or

necessarily the best, but a permissible one. 

In Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La

Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 120-24 (1981), the Court invalidated

Wisconsin’s selection of its presidential delegation by open

primary because it conflicted with the national Democratic Party’s

rules for seating delegates and thus infringed the national party’s

associational rights. The Court did not consider the

constitutionality of state open primaries generally -- except to

observe that “the Wisconsin Supreme Court may well [have] be[en]

correct” to uphold the Wisconsin open primary law as

constitutionally valid. Id. at 121. 

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In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208,

225 (1986), the Supreme Court invalidated a state-imposed closed

primary that disallowed participation of registered independents,

where such a primary conflicted with party rules. The Supreme

Court noted, “[t]he relative merits of closed and open primaries

have been the subject of substantial debate since the beginning of

this century, and no consensus has as yet emerged.” Id. at 222.

The Court went on to enumerate the states that mandated open

primaries by statute. Id. at 222 n.11. These observations hardly

suggest that the open primary option is constitutionally

foreclosed. To the contrary, they suggest that the “relative

merits” of open primaries are a matter for each state to consider.

In California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586

(2000), the Supreme Court invalidated California’s mandatory

blanket primary. The blanket primary placed all the candidates on

one ballot and allowed all registered voters, regardless of their

party registration, to vote for any candidate in any race, such

that one individual could cast votes for candidates from different

parties in different races. Id. at 570. The top vote-getter of

each party became the nominee of that party for the general

election. Id. The Court invalidated the California system. In

doing so, however, it expressly observed that “the blanket primary

. . . may be constitutionally distinct from the open primary.” Id.

at 577 n.8. The Supreme Court distinguished open primaries in

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Jones for one simple reason: open primaries do not impose an

impermissible burden on parties’ constitutional rights. 

Unlike the blanket primary in Jones, an open primary does not

force a party to allow nonmembers to participate. See id. at 577,

581. Instead, an open primary creates an affiliation between voter

and party on the day of the election, when the voter chooses to

participate in one party’s primary to the exclusion of all others.

In this respect, it is much more akin to a constitutionally

permissible closed primary than an unconstitutional blanket

primary. In Jones, the Court said a closed primary is

“qualitatively different” from a blanket primary. Id. at 577.

“Under [a closed primary] system, even when it is made quite easy

for a voter to change his party affiliation the day of the primary,

and thus, in some sense, to ‘cross over,’ at least he must formally

become a member of the party; and once he does so, he is limited to

voting for candidates of that party.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 

But this seems no “qualitatively different” from what an open

primary does: it allows voters to change their party affiliation on

the day of the election and limits each voter’s participation to

one party’s primary. Just as in some closed party systems, members

can affiliate with the party as late as the day of the election.

And, as in closed primaries, an important sign of affiliation is

voting exclusively in one party’s primary. Constitutionally

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It is no objection that Virginia law allows the state, 4

rather than the party, to decide who is a “member” of the party for

purposes of the primary. Practically every primary system gives

the state some say over who is a “member” for purposes of voting in

a state-run primary. For example, the state may require party

24

speaking, an open primary functions the same way as a closed

primary with same-day registration. See id.

It is no answer to say that a closed primary requires formal

party registration and an open primary does not. The act of voting

exclusively in one party’s primary is itself an act of affiliation.

As the Court noted in Jones, “[t]he act of voting in the [party]

primary fairly can be described as an act of affiliation with the

[party].” Id. at 577 n.8 (quoting La Follette, 450 U.S. at 130 n.2

(Powell, J., dissenting)). 

The importance of voting as an act of affiliation is only

underscored in Virginia, where the act of voting is the only act of

affiliation recognized by state law. Virginia law, as noted, does

not provide a mechanism for party registration. Presenting oneself

on election day and asking for a particular party’s ballot is thus

not just a declaration of affiliation -- it is the only declaration

of affiliation contemplated by Virginia law. In this, Virginia has

chosen to recognize that “[t]he act of casting a ballot in a given

primary may, for both the voter and the party, constitute a form of

association that is at least as important as the act of

registering.” Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 601 (2005)

(O’Connor, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).4

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registration for a reasonable period of time before a primary

election. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760 (1973)

(eleven month waiting period for nonpresidential primary

reasonable). Under such a system, the party cannot choose to allow

“members” who have been registered for a shorter period to vote in

the primary, no matter how much the party may desire it.

Alternatively, the state may allow party registration on the very

day of the election, see Jones, 530 U.S. at 577, and the party may

not turn away those who follow the law. If this poses any

associational burden at all on the wishes of the party, the Court

suggested in Jones that it is not an unconstitutional one. See id.

It is far from clear to me that the Virginia open primary poses any

more of an associational burden than a system such as this.

25

In Jones, the Court showed keen awareness of such electoral

nuances. It characterized its holding as striking a primary that

was open “to persons wholly unaffiliated with the party,” 530 U.S.

at 581 (emphasis added), to “those who, at best, have refused to

affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated

with a rival,” id. at 577. It distinguished between the California

blanket primary -- which allowed voters who were formally

registered with other parties to vote in any party’s primary in

each individual race -- and open and closed primaries, which

require exclusive party affiliation. Id. at 577 & n.8. 

Thus an open primary imposes no unconstitutionally severe

burden on parties’ associational rights. In rejecting a facial

challenge to Virginia’s open primary law, the panel may be

suggesting exactly this: that state-mandated open primaries are

constitutional. See Miller, 503 F.3d at 364-68. In deciding the

as-applied challenge, the panel might be taken to imply just the

opposite: that closed primaries are constitutionally permissible

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choices and open primaries are not. Id. at 368-71. Any such

implication is a grave one: it may discourage state legislators

from mandating open primaries –- a constitutional option –- and it

may make the Virginia legislature feel more compelled to require

party registration. While such a step may or may not be desirable,

it is not constitutionally required. To repeat: clarity is

exceptionally important in election law, and the panel opinion’s

lack of clarity on this critically important point may throw into

question the right of the people of Virginia and other states to

exercise the option of encouraging open political party nomination

contests that may attract new voters to a party. This is a shame.

Legislators, candidates, and voters in Virginia deserve more than

unanswered questions. 

B.

The panel does imply that a mandatory open primary may be

constitutionally problematic by dismissing the state’s asserted

interests in support of it. See Miller, 503 F.3d at 370-71. The

panel may believe it rejects these interests on the basis of Jones,

but applying language from Jones to a type of primary that Jones

expressly distinguished is a complete transposition of context. A

state interest that may be insufficient to uphold one type of

primary may be sufficient with regard to an entirely different type

where the burden on parties’ associative interests is concededly

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27

less severe. The panel regrettably gives short shrift to important

state interests that underlie the open primary tradition. 

First, by not requiring formal party registration, Virginia

has made an administrative choice squarely within its power over

its election process. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,

433 (1992); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760 (1973). The

state may make the reasonable decision not to track party

affiliations as part of the voter registration process for any

number of reasons, the least of which is simple ease and

efficiency. Conversely, political parties do not have a

constitutional right to demand that the state require formal party

declarations of all registered voters. To accommodate the

Republican Party’s demands, as expounded here, would appear to

entail striking and replacing portions of Virginia’s neutrally

formulated voter registration apparatus. 

Second, by not requiring formal and public declarations of

party affiliation, the state has chosen to protect its voters’

privacy interests. While the Supreme Court in Jones suggested that

this interest might not in all cases be compelling, it remains a

permissible interest, and in some cases a compelling one.

Meanwhile, adoption of the Republican Party Plan, at least the

proposal set forth in this case, would run roughshod over voters’

privacy interests, requiring either the Party or the state to

inquire into voters’ five-year voting histories. 

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Relatedly, Virginia may also choose to protect its voters’

ability to change party affiliations with minimal interference from

the state. This is not an instance of the state impermissibly

privileging a “nonmember’s desire to participate in [a] party’s

affairs” over the “right of the party to determine its own

membership qualifications.” Jones, 530 U.S. at 583 (quoting

Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215 n.6). It is an instance of the state

protecting voters’ ability to become members of the party to whose

views they sincerely ascribe. 

The Supreme Court has held that states may within

constitutional limits make it more difficult for individuals to

change party affiliation. See Rosario, 410 U.S. at 760 (state

requiring party registration eleven months before nonpresidential

primary reasonable). But it has never held that a state may not

make party affiliation easier. In fact, it has struck some state

impediments to party affiliation as impermissibly infringing

voters’ “constitutional freedom to associate with the political

party of their choice.” See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 61

(1973) (state law requiring party registration twenty-three months

before primary infringed voters’ constitutional freedom). As noted

in Jones, a state that requires formal party registration may

constitutionally allow changes in registration on the day of the

election, see 530 U.S. at 577, thus achieving the same protection

of voters’ interests as Virginia’s system. Given issues of war and

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29

peace, economic up and downturns, tax policy and spending

priorities, not to mention issues with intense appeal to particular

groups of citizens, voters may well want to rethink their party

affiliations. The Virginia system gives them a chance to do so.

Finally, Virginia’s open primary law promotes the state’s

interest in encouraging voter participation. An open primary in

this sense reflects a century of efforts among states -- not always

willingly undertaken -- to expand the franchise and ballot access.

The Court has recognized that “[t]he right to vote freely for the

candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic

society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of

representative government.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555

(1964). It has taken states to task for policies that limited the

choices voters had in casting their ballots. See, e.g., Bullock v.

Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23

(1968); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). These

decisions suggest that states labor under a duty to expand

participation, not to restrict it. 

C.

I emphasize these points not merely in defense of the

constitutionality of Virginia’s open primary law, but because the

implications of proscribing all states from ever prescribing open

primaries could not be more profound. To the extent the panel’s

position is interpreted to draw into question open primaries, it

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30

threatens to push American politics into a one-size-fits-all

direction. If the panel’s rejection of the Committee’s facial

challenge to open primaries is taken to be its holding, that will

be all to the good. If the panel’s as applied holding is taken to

imply that a mandatory open primary law would impose a severe

burden on a party’s associational rights, that will be a loss. In

fact, a constitutional ban on open primary laws such as Virginia’s

would be just one more small step in making ours an ever more

divided country. 

The truth is there is much to be said for a variety of models

of party registration and primary organization. Our federal system

protects this flexibility. It reposes in state legislatures a

traditional and historical power to choose between forms of

primaries, between voter registration by party and not. Options

are indicative of the diversity of American politics in which one

size does not fit all, and in which state electoral laws (on voter

registration, primary dates, third-party ballot eligibility, etc.)

have never been thought to constrict the ongoing experimentation

that is American democracy.

Traditionally, states have been able to shape the details of

their own democratic experiment. They could, for example, choose

to require party registration eleven months prior to an election,

or thirty days prior, or not at all. See, e.g., Rosario, 410 U.S.

at 760. By requiring advance registration and restricting primary

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participation to such voters, states may adopt a model of candidate

selection which maximizes the power of a party’s core adherents or

“base.” Base politics has much to commend it. It develops core

principles and crystallizes issues, and it can serve to clarify

differences and sharpen the edges of partisan debate. And party

partisanship is hardly a bad thing; indeed it underlies the vigor

and vitality of our political life.

But the model of base politics is not the only one, nor has

the American political tradition ever declared that it is. A state

may conclude that the nominating process should leave room for less

fervently committed partisans to have some say. A state may

conclude that an open primary leads to a more participatory

election. A state may conclude that an open primary leads

candidates to make more moderate and broad-based appeals. A state

may conclude that an open primary better serves the needs of its

voters, who may respond to the ever-changing political scene with

a sincere desire to change their party affiliation. An open

primary encourages parties to be evolutionary instruments, rather

than static ones. And it encourages potential voters to look at

parties anew. 

There is no one answer to this closed versus open primary

debate, and the Constitution should not seek to impose one now and

for all time. Rather, there are good reasons to leave our state

legislatures with this flexibility. Elections are events of public

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import and do not warrant the exclusion of the judgment of elected

representatives. State legislators, moreover, represent the

political parties themselves, and there is no danger they will

leave party politics, the very soil that has nurtured them, to

wither on the vine. 

Virginia’s preference for state-funded open primaries is not

unique. A number of states mandate open primaries. See, e.g.,

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 12-31; Idaho Code §§ 34-402, 34-404, 34-904;

Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.576; Minn. Stat. § 204D.08; Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 115.397; Mont. Code Ann. § 13-10-301; N.D. Cent. Code §

16.1-11-22; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2363; Wis. Stat. §§ 5.37,

6.80. Still other states conduct primaries with some attributes of

open primaries. And even if the number of open primary states had

been far fewer, the respect due and owing them would be no less.

Nebraska has bucked the national consensus on bicameralism, see

Neb. Const. art. III, § 1; Kentucky, New Jersey, and Virginia elect

their governors in odd numbered years, see Ky. Const. § 95; N.J.

Const. art. XI, § 3; Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-210 (2006). If our

federal system stands for anything, it is that the contrarian

spirit of a state must be respected. 

If the panel decision should ever be interpreted to call into

question the variety of systems at work in our fifty states, its

threat to political life as we know it would be severe. Whether

the panel intended to take the matter of open primaries out of

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legislators’ hands and place it wholly in those of unelected party

officials and unelected judges is unclear, as its disposition of

the different challenges before it point in different directions.

But if it intended to do so, this would be movement in the wrong

direction. This would make our public life less democratic; not

more.

Any reinvention of the right of association to disturb the

historic balance and interplay between state laws and party rules,

and to undermine the historic diversity of state systems would be

unfortunate. The outcome will be the replacement of the diverse

electoral systems of our states with a court-dictated approach.

The choice between open and closed nominating processes has always

been deemed a permissible one for states to make. What now in our

present Constitution makes it different today? 

In undermining our nation’s political diversity, a flat

constitutional ban on open primaries would paradoxically risk our

unity and give freer rein to polarizing trends in our political

life. I do not intend to elaborate on the gerrymandered districts,

non-ending election cycles, criminalization of political

differences, etc., that observers beyond number have indicated are

making common ground less easy to find and fracturing our wholeness

as a nation. Such concerns may be alarmist, and yet it would be

error to dismiss them out of hand. But these structural

developments have at least occurred within the political process

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itself, and the political process may in time be counted upon to

supply a corrective. However, by throwing open primaries into

constitutional question, judges are threatening to

constitutionalize polarization, for which by definition there is no

political remedy. This would enshrine in our founding document a

divisive principle for a nation that has suffered too much division

already. 

 The essence of our constitutionalism is that one size does

not invariably fit all. That is the whole point of our federal

system –- to keep different approaches to democratic governance

alive. There is no one right answer. At a minimum, courts should

not use the American Constitution to weaken the centrist impulses

in American politics. It should be clear that an open primary,

where candidates must compete for votes beyond their party’s core

adherents, is a permissible choice for a state to make. To use our

unelected powers to foreclose this electoral option would prove the

worst of self-inflicted wounds.

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