Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01078/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01078-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kevin Fuciarelli, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Aaron B. Good, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-01078-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Scottsdale’s Motion to Dismiss 

Count Three of Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 30.) For the following reasons, the Motion is 

denied. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Kevin Fuciarelli alleges that Scottsdale Police Department Officers Aaron 

B. Good and Edward A. Chrisman restrained him without any reason or provocation and 

caused him severe injury. Defendant City of Scottsdale (“Scottsdale”) brings the current 

Motion, claiming that Fuciarelli failed to provide adequate notice, in his required Notice 

of Claim (“Notice”) under Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 12-821.01(A), of the facts needed to 

support a negligence claim for failure to use reasonable care in hiring, training, and 

supervising Defendants Good and Chrisman. Fuciarelli, in his Response, contends that 

the current Motion should be considered a motion for summary judgment instead of a 

motion to dismiss, that his Notice was sufficient, and that Scottsdale waived its right to 

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raise the issue of an insufficient Notice.1

DISCUSSION 

I. Form of the Motion 

Fuciarreli first claims that the current Motion should have been brought as a 

motion for summary judgment and not as a motion to dismiss. The few Arizona courts 

that have addressed this issue support Fuciarelli’s contention that a Notice of Claim “is a 

document outside the pleadings,” which should be addressed in a motion for summary 

judgment. Jones v. Cochise Cnty., 218 Ariz. 372, 375, 187 P.3d 97, 100 (Ct. App. 2008) 

(“The trial court granted the motion, properly regarding it as a motion for summary 

judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P.”); Vasquez v. State, 220 Ariz. 304, 308, 

206 P.3d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Because the court considered ‘matters outside the 

pleading,’ it should have treated the motion as one for summary judgment.”). To convert 

a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, the “parties must be given a 

reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(d). However, the parties here have already briefed the relevant issue and have 

no need to provide further factual support because all facts relevant to the current Motion 

are undisputed and contained in the Notice. Thus, the Court will simply treat the current 

motion as one for summary judgment. 

II. Legal Standard 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). Because there are no disputes as to any material facts regarding the Notice, the 

sole issue to be decided is whether the Notice was sufficient as a matter of law under 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 12-821.01(A). 

 

1

 Because, as discussed below, Fuciarelli’s Notice was adequate under the statute, the issue of whether Scottsdale waived this defense becomes moot and is not addressed in 

this Order. 

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III. Analysis

 Section 12-821.01(A) states that a plaintiff bringing a claim against a public entity 

or public employee must provide a Notice, which “shall contain facts sufficient to permit 

the public entity or public employee to understand the basis on which liability is 

claimed.” Arizona courts have held that plaintiffs who do not strictly comply with section 

12-821.01(A) are barred from bringing suit. Salerno v. Espinoza, 210 Ariz. 586, 588, 115 

P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2005); Harris v. Cochise Health Sys., 215 Ariz. 344, 351, 160 

P.3d 223, 230 (Ct. App. 2007). However, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that (1) 

section 12-821.01(A) “does not require a claimant to provide an exhaustive list of facts” 

and (2) “courts should not scrutinize the claimant’s description of facts to determine the 

‘sufficiency’ of the factual disclosure.” Backus v. State, 220 Ariz. 101, 107, 203 P.3d 

499, 505 (2009).2

 Other courts have held that the factual showing required in the Notice 

is minimal and that a plaintiff’s failure to state a specific theory of liability will not bar 

the claim so long as the facts in the Notice allow the public entity to anticipate the claim. 

See Yollin v. City of Glendale, 219 Ariz. 24, 32, 191 P.3d 1040, 1048 (Ct. App. 2008) 

(“The claim statute anticipates that government entities will investigate claims, and the 

supporting facts requirement is intended to be a relatively light burden on claimants, just 

enough to facilitate the government's investigation.”); Mitchell v. City of Flagstaff, No. 

CV 11-8140-PCT-FJM, 2011 WL 5826014, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 18, 2011) (“Although a 

notice of claim must apprise the public entity of the basis of liability, it need not satisfy 

the pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal.”) 

 

2

 The court in Backus held this in relation to another portion of 12-821.01(A), 

which requires a plaintiff to state in the Notice the specific amount of damages that it claims and also requires, similar to the factual burden at issue here, “facts supporting that amount.” Other courts have considered this factual burden for the amount of damages under section 12-821.01(A) to be sufficiently analogous to the factual burden for a plaintiff’s claims in section 12-821.01(A) that they have applied the holding in Backus to 

both factual burdens. See Picht v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist. No. 11 of Maricopa Cnty., 641 F. Supp. 2d 888, 896 (D. Ariz. 2009). 

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 In Mitchell, the court held that a plaintiff’s Notice sufficiently alerted the City of 

Flagstaff to a negligent training and supervision claim stemming from the conduct of one 

of its police officers though the notice of claim did not separately identify negligent 

training and/or supervision by the city. Mitchell, 2011 WL 5826014 at *2-3. The Notice 

identified the officer as belonging to the city police department and provided specific 

details of the officer’s “actions and movements from the moment that he arrived at 

[Mitchell’s] apartment.” Id. 

 Similar to the city in Mitchell, in the present case, Scottsdale contends that 

Fuciarelli has provided no facts in his Notice from which it could have anticipated a 

direct claim for negligence—as opposed to a vicarious liability claim—based on failure 

to use reasonable care in hiring, training, and supervising Defendants Good and 

Chrisman. However, as with the Notice in Mitchell, the Notice here identifies Officers 

Good and Chrisman as officers of the Scottsdale Police Department and provides a 

detailed account of their interactions with Fuciarelli. (Doc. 30, Ex. 1.) For example, the 

Notice states that Officers Good and Chrisman held Fuciarelli and his father under 

“investigative detention” without any reason and that, after this, “[s]uddenly, without 

provocation or warning, Officer Good grabbed [Fuciarelli] from behind, placed him in a 

chokehold, threw Claimant to the ground, and handcuffed him.” (Id.) The Notice also 

states that Officer Chrisman assisted in restraining Fuciarelli and in taking him down. 

(Id.) Further, the Notice states that neither Officer Good nor Officer Chrisman assisted 

Fuciarelli despite him “complaining that he was injured,” and that he was only given 

medical assistance with the arrival of a third officer. (Id.) Just as the Notice in Mitchell 

made the city aware of a negligence claim, Fuciarelli’s Notice was “sufficient to place the 

City on alert that its training or supervision” of the officers involved “might have been 

negligent.” Mitchell, 2011 WL 5826014 at *3. Fuciarelli’s failure to specifically state his 

theory of liability as one of negligence in the Notice does not alter this conclusion. 

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CONCLUSION 

 Fuciarelli’s Notice was sufficient to alert Scottsdale to a potential negligence 

claim for failure to use reasonable care in hiring, training, and supervising Defendants 

Good and Chrisman. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant City of Scottsdale’s Motion to 

Dismiss Count Three of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 30) is DENIED. 

 Dated this 27th day of January, 2015. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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