Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00010/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00010-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT TWYMAN, JR., #147435, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:14-CV-10-TMH

) [WO]

)

KIM THOMAS, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Robert

Twyman, Jr. [“Twyman”], an indigent state inmate presently incarcerated at the Kilby

Correctional Facility. In the instant complaint, Twyman alleges that correctional officials

have improperly calculated his release date. Specifically, Twyman maintains that he is

entitled to credit on his sentence for time served on parole from issuance of a declaration

of delinquency by the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles in June of 1998 until his

return to the custody of Alabama officials for parole revocation proceedings in March of

2004 - a period of 6 years, 6 months and 2 days. In support of his claim, Twyman argues

1

In a prior federal civil rights action, Twyman advised that the 1998 parole delinquency issued because

1

of new criminal chargeslodged against himfor offenses committed inCobbCounty, Georgia on March 27, 1998.

Twyman v. Hill, et al., 2:04-CV-702-MEF-CSC (M.D. Ala. 2004) - Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 3. Twyman also

alleged that these criminal charges “were settled in the SuperiorCourt ofCobbCounty, Georgia on September 15,

1998” with that court making no decision with respect to “violating plaintiff’s Alabama parole.” Id. at 3-5.

Case 2:14-cv-00010-TMH-CSC Document 3 Filed 01/27/14 Page 1 of 6
that the Alabama Department of Correctionsimproperly considersthistime as “dead time”

- time for which a prisoner does not receive credit towards his sentence - in determining

his release date.

2

II. DISCUSSION

When he filed this case, Twyman also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of FeesCourt Doc. No. 2. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) directs that a prisoner is not allowed to

bring a civil action or proceed on appeal in forma pauperis if he “has, on 3 or more

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a

court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under

The law relevant to “dead time” is set forth in Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a). Under this section, once the

2

parole board declares “the prisoner to be delinquent, ... [the] time owed [on the relevantsentence]shall date from

the delinquency.... The delinquent parolee shall be deemed to have begun serving the balance of the time

required on the date of his or her rearrest as a delinquent parolee.” (emphasis added). “This allows a parolee

credit for time served against [the controlling sentence for which he is on parole only] when he is rearrested as a

delinquent parolee.” Ex parte Upshaw, 2013 WL 1777716, *4 (Ala. 2013). At the time of his Georgia arrest,

Twyman “was not rearrested as a delinquent parolee. Instead, [Twyman] was arrested on new chargesin Georgia

and was [thereafter] declared delinquent [by the Alabama parole board] because by committing the offenses that

resulted in those newcriminal charges[Twyman] had violated the terms of his parole.... However, hisliberty was

not restrained [for purposes of the parole violation] until he wasrearrested by Alabama authorities.... That is, his

liberty was not restrained in connection with his delinquency until he was subsequently arrested by Alabama

authorities as a delinquent parolee.” Id. Under the facts relevant to Twyman’s parole delinquency, i.e., the

Alabama parole board declared Twyman delinquent in June of 1998 due to new Georgia criminal charges and he

was not rearrested as a delinquent parolee until sometime in March of 2004, it appears that § 15-22-32 does not

permit the provision of sentence credit to Twyman for the time period sought in this complaint.

2

Case 2:14-cv-00010-TMH-CSC Document 3 Filed 01/27/14 Page 2 of 6
imminent danger of serious physical injury.”

3

The records of the federal courts located in the State of Alabama establish that

Twyman, while incarcerated or detained, has on at least three occasions had civil actions

or appeals dismissed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as frivolous,

malicious, for failure to state a claim and/or for asserting claims against defendants

immune from suit. The cases on which this court relies in finding a violation of § 1915(g)

by the plaintiff are: (1) Twyman v. Zeek, et al., Case No. 5:90-CV-1772-ELN-RRA (N.D.

Ala. 1992) (appeal frivolous); (2) Twyman v. Evans, Case No. 2:91-CV-1369-WHA-CSC

(M.D. Ala. 1994) (civil action frivolous); and (3) Twyman v. Hill, et al., Case No. 2:04-

CV-702-MEF-CSC (M.D. Ala. 2005) (civil action and appeal frivolous).

In the instant complaint, Twyman challengesthe calculation of hisrelease date. The

factual allegations presented herein utterlyand completelyfail to demonstrate that Twyman

was “under imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time he filed this cause of

action as is required to meet the exception to application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11 Cir. 1999) (A prisoner who has filed at least

th

In Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 978, 119 S.Ct. 27 (1998), the Court

3

determined that the “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which requires frequent filer prisoner

indigents to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider their cases and appeals, “does not

violate the First Amendment right to accessthe courts; the separation of judicial and legislative powers; the Fifth

Amendment right to due process of law; or the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, as incorporated

through the Fifth Amendment.” In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007), the Supreme Court

abrogated Rivera but only to the extent it compelled an inmate to plead exhaustion of remedies in his complaint

as “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA ... and inmates are not required to specifically

plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” 549 U.S. at 216, 127 S.Ct. at 921.

3

Case 2:14-cv-00010-TMH-CSC Document 3 Filed 01/27/14 Page 3 of 6
three frivolous lawsuits or appeals and seeks to proceed in forma pauperis must allege a

present “imminent danger” to circumvent application of the “three strikes” provision of

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).). Based on the foregoing, the court concludesthat Twyman’s motion

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is due to be denied and this case dismissed without

prejudice as Twyman failed to pay the requisite filing fee upon initiation of this cause of

action. Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11 Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)

th

(“[T]he proper procedure is for the district court to [summarily] dismiss the complaint

without prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant

to the provisions of § 1915(g)” because the prisoner “must pay the filing fee at the time he

initiates the suit.”).

4

The plaintiff is advised that even were he to submit the requisite filing fee, well established federal law

4

would prohibit this court fromconsidering challengesto the duration of his confinement in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983

as habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for such claims. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994)

(“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his

confinement..., even though such a claimmay come within the literal terms of § 1983.”); Edwards v. Balisok, 520

U.S. 641, 648 (1997)(Aprisoner’srequestfor either declaratoryrelief ormonetarydamages arising froman action

impacting the duration of his confinement that necessarily implies the invalidity of the action taken against the

prisoner “is not cognizable under § 1983” unless the adverse action has previously been overturned in an

appropriate proceeding.);Calderon v.Ashmus, 523U.S. 740, 746-747, 118S.Ct. 1694, 1699 (1998)(“[A]nyclaim

by a prisoner attacking the validity or duration of his confinement must be brought under the habeas sections of

Title 28 of the United States Code. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1841-1842, 36

L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).”). Consequently, Twyman “cannot seek to accomplish by a section 1983 declaratory

judgment what he must accomplish solely through a writ of habeas corpus.” Jones v. Watkins, 945 F.Supp. 1143,

1151 (N.D.Ill. 1996); Miller v.Indiana Dept. ofCorrections, 75 F.3d 330, 331 (7 Cir. 1996)(Under Heck, “[t]he

th

[determinative]issue ... is not the reliefsought, butthe ground ofthe challenge.”). Moreover, itis wellsettled “that

a claim either is cognizable under § 1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be

dismissed.” Balisok, 520 U.S. at 649.

4

Case 2:14-cv-00010-TMH-CSC Document 3 Filed 01/27/14 Page 4 of 6
III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by the

plaintiff (Doc. No. 2) be and is hereby DENIED.

Additionally, it isthe RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case

be dismissed without prejudice for the plaintiff’s failure to pay the full filing fee upon the

initiation of this case. It is further

ORDERED that on or before February 10, 2014, the parties may file objections

to the Recommendation. Any objectionsfiled mustspecifically identify the findingsin the

Magistrate Judge’sRecommendation to which the partyis objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

5

Case 2:14-cv-00010-TMH-CSC Document 3 Filed 01/27/14 Page 5 of 6
33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 27 day of January, 2014.

th

/s/Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

6

Case 2:14-cv-00010-TMH-CSC Document 3 Filed 01/27/14 Page 6 of 6