Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02524/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02524-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jerry Smith, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-11-2524-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

On January 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees 

pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Doc. 32. The EAJA provides: 

A court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees 

and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than 

cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of 

agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having 

jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the 

United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances 

made an award unjust. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). A party seeking an award of fees and other 

expenses must submit to the court an application “within thirty days of final judgment in 

the action.” Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Final judgment “means a judgment that is final and not 

appealable.” Id. § 2412(d)(1)(G). Plaintiff is a prevailing party because this matter was 

remanded pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

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Plaintiff appropriately applied for attorney’s fees within thirty days after the appeal 

period closed. Doc. 32 at 3.1

 

 These conditions being met, the EAJA creates a presumption that a court will 

award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party. Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citing Thomas v. Peterson, 841 F.2d 332, 335 (9th Cir. 1988)). However, 

attorney’s fees are not available if the position of the United States is “substantially 

justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Supreme Court has explained that the 

government is substantially justified if its position has a “reasonable basis both in law and 

fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has clarified 

the inquiry as whether the commissioner has shown that “his position with respect to the 

issue on which the district court based its remand was substantially justified.” Lewis v. 

Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 

1053 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the “government’s position at each stage must be 

‘substantially justified’”). The Commissioner's defense of “basic and fundamental 

errors” will often lack substantial justification. Id.

This Court found that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erroneously rejected 

the medical opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Levy, which showed that 

Plaintiff was incapable of work. Doc. 29 at 5. The ALJ is required to make “‘findings 

setting forth specific legitimate reasons for [rejecting the treating physician’s testimony] 

that are based on substantial evidence in the record.’” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 

947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th 

Cir.1989)) (emphasis added). The ALJ rejected Dr. Levy’s 2008 medical opinion 

 

1

 District Courts may remand under “sentence four” or “sentence six” of section 

405(g). Only sentence four remands—those in which the District Court “makes a 

determination as to the correctness of the Secretary's position”—qualify plaintiffs as “prevailing parties” for an award of attorneys' fees. Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 568 

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993)); see also Gutierrez v. 

Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party . . . if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded 

regardless of whether disability benefits ultimately are awarded.”). In this case the Court 

issued a remand under sentence four. Doc. 29 at 17–18. 

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because: (1) Plaintiff’s course of treatment was conservative and therefore inconsistent 

with allegations of disabling pain; (2) Dr. Levy based his opinion on Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints; (3) There was other medical evidence that conflicted with Dr. Levy’s 

findings; (4) Dr. Levy’s later assessment, in 2010, suggested Plaintiff was capable of 

working. Doc. 29 at 5–12. 

This Court found that these reasons were insufficient for rejecting Dr. Levy’s 2008 

opinion. Id. at 10. Moreover, this Court now finds that the government was not 

substantially justified in its position in this case. First, while the ALJ may consider 

evidence of a course of treatment that was inconsistent with allegations of disabling pain, 

this evidence is not enough to constitute “substantial evidence” for rejecting Dr. Levy’s 

opinion. Id. at 8. Second, the ALJ was unreasonable in finding that Dr. Levy’s reliance 

on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints invalidated his medical opinion. Dr. Levy was 

permitted to rely on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints in forming his medical opinion, 

particularly when he also conducted clinical tests. Id. Third, the ALJ was unreasonable 

in giving preference to the opinions of non-treating physicians and failing to explain why 

those opinions were more reliable than Dr. Levy’s. Id. at 10. Finally, the ALJ was 

unreasonable in interpreting Dr. Levy’s 2010 opinion as saying that Plaintiff was capable 

of working. Dr. Levy’s 2010 opinion indicated that Plaintiff suffered pain that interfered 

with his ability to work, as did the 2008 opinion, and a vocational expert affirmed that 

based on this opinion Plaintiff would not be able to work. Id. at 11. In light of these 

findings, Defendant was not substantially justified in defending the ALJ’s decision that 

Dr. Levy’s medical opinion, as Plaintiff’s treating physician, should be rejected.2

 

 

2

 Because the issue of the acceptability of Dr. Levy’s medical opinion was “the issue on which the district court based its remand,” Lewis, 281 F.3d at 1083, and the 

“government’s position at each stage must be ‘substantially justified,’” Corbin, 149 F.3d 

at 1053, the Court need not address whether the government was substantially justified in arguing that Plaintiff’s symptom testimony was not credible. 

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Plaintiff's counsel, Mark Caldwell, has filed an affidavit (Doc. 33) and an itemized 

statement of fees (Doc. 33-1) showing that he worked on this case 3.2 hours in 2011 and 

40.1 hours in 2012, and that the fees total $7,945.46 ($180.59 for 2011 hours, and 

$183.73 for 2012 hours). Defendant argues that much of Plaintiff’s work was duplicative 

and unnecessary because many of the arguments presented in Plaintiff’s opening brief 

were also made in the memorandum presented to the Social Security Appeals Council. 

Doc. 34 at 6. Defendant therefore requests that the hours for 2012 be reduced from 40.1 

to 30. Id. at 7. 

“By and large, the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional 

judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case.” Moreno v. City of 

Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). While some of Plaintiff’s arguments 

may have duplicated arguments from earlier memoranda, such duplication is often 

inevitable and necessary. Id. The requested hours are not outside the scope of what is 

normal for a case of this nature.3

 Therefore, having reviewed the affidavit and the 

statement of fees, and having considered the relevant fee award factors, see Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–30 & n. 3 (1983), the Court finds that the amount of the 

requested fee award is reasonable. 

IT IS ORDERED

1. Plaintiff’s motion for award of attorney’s fees of $7,945.46 (Doc. 31) is 

granted.

2. Pursuant to the contractual agreement between Plaintiff and his attorney 

Mark Caldwell (Doc. 32-1), the Court also grants Mr. Caldwell’s request 

 

 

3 See, e.g., Alexander v. As true, No. CV11-2465-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 5989450 

(D. Ariz. Nov. 29, 2012) (awarding $6,870.90); Sharp v. As true, No. CV-09-1841-PHXDGC, 2010 WL 1759287 (D. Ariz. Apr. 30, 2010) (awarding $8,577.55).

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that the attorney’s fees, payable to Plaintiff, be sent to Mr. Caldwell’s law 

offices. 

 Dated this 27th day of February, 2013. 

Case 2:11-cv-02524-DGC Document 36 Filed 02/27/13 Page 5 of 5