Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01971/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01971-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

FRAY MARCELINO LOPEZ RODRIGUEZ, 

et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

SGLC, INC., et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

This action for unpaid wages, breach of contract, violation 

of California labor and housing laws, unfair competition and 

fraud proceeds on Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 

filed against, among others, Defendants SGLC, Inc. (“SGLC”) and 

Vino Farms, Inc. (“Vino Farms”). 

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Presently before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 

No. 138) filed by Vino Farms and a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 139) 

filed by three Plaintiffs, Demetrio Montes Gaitan (“Gaitan”), 

Rigoberto Preciado Sandoval (“Sandoval”) and Armando Zunigas 

Arias (“Arias”) (collectively, “Moving Plaintiffs”). 1 For the 

following reasons, Vino Farms’ Motion for Summary Judgment is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Moving Plaintiffs’ Motion 

to Dismiss is DENIED as moot.2 

BACKGROUND 

The parties’ dispute in this case arises out of allegations 

by a number of farm workers (“Plaintiffs”) admitted to the United 

States from Mexico through the federal H-2 visa program. 

Plaintiffs take the position that SGLC, a labor contractor, 

promised them six months of work at one hundred dollars per day. 

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1

 In addition to Vino Farms’ instant Motion, which is four 

(4) pages long, Defendant has since, on April 12, 2012, filed two 

additional summary judgment motions (ECF Nos. 160, 168) that are 

each sixteen (16) pages long. On January 14, 2011, however, this 

Court issued an Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order that, absent an 

order of this Court to the contrary, limits initial moving papers 

pertaining to dispositive motions to twenty (20) pages each. 

Vino Farms has exceeded that limit, and the Court finds no record 

that it ever granted Vino Farms permission to do so. 

Accordingly, not later than two (2) days following the date this 

Memorandum and Order is electronically filed, Vino Farms is 

directed to advise this Court in writing as to which of its two 

remaining Motions it prefers to have this Court consider. 

2

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D. 

Cal. Local Rule 230(g). 

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The remaining Defendants, agricultural growers and producers, 

purportedly acted in concert with SGLC in making those 

representations and also allegedly jointly employed Plaintiffs. 

According to Plaintiffs, while traveling from Mexico to 

their California work sites, Plaintiffs allegedly paid for, among 

other things, their own transportation and living expenses. 

Plaintiffs were also charged for meals provided by Defendants. 

Plaintiffs aver that these expenses constituted de facto 

deductions from their earnings and served to reduce their pay to 

below the minimum wage. Plaintiffs further contend that the 

living conditions at the work sites did not meet applicable state 

and federal standards. 

Plaintiffs thus initiated this action in August of 2008 and 

subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint and the operative 

SAC. Vino Farms propounded Requests for Admissions (“RFAs”) upon 

Plaintiffs on December 6, 2010. Per its RFAs, Vino Farms sought 

to have Plaintiffs admit, among other things, that: 

Vino Farms did not “employ” [Plaintiffs]; 

[Plaintiffs] had no written contract with Vino Farms; 

[Plaintiffs] had no oral contract with Vino Farms; 

Vino Farms was not a party to the contract that 

[Plaintiffs] allege in the Second Cause of Action of 

the SAC; 

[N]o Vino Farms employee or agent recruited 

[Plaintiffs] to come to California to work under the 

H-2A program; 

[N]o Vino Farms employee or agent made any false 

statements of material fact to [Plaintiffs] in Mexico 

before [they] traveled to California under the H-2A 

program; and 

 

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Vino Farms made no promises to [Plaintiffs] to induce 

[them] to come to California to work under the H-2A 

program.

Declaration of Brandon R. McKelvey, ¶ 2, Exh. A (Vino Farms’ 

RFAs), Nos. 3, 10-12, 37-39. 

Plaintiffs’ responses were originally due on January 10, 

2011, but Plaintiffs thereafter requested and were granted 

multiple extensions of time to respond to the RFAs. Eventually, 

Vino Farms offered Plaintiffs an extension until April 18, 2011, 

if Plaintiffs’ counsel would agree to dismiss those Plaintiffs 

who had not responded by that date. That deadline was then 

extended to April 22, 2011. 

Approximately nine months later, in January of 2012, Vino 

Farms filed its instant Motion since Moving Plaintiffs still had 

neither responded to the RFAs nor been voluntarily dismissed. By 

its Motion, Vino Farms now seeks to have judgment entered as to 

each of these Plaintiffs on the basis that each of their failures 

to respond to the RFAs constitutes an admission of all material 

facts entitling Vino Farms to judgment. 

Moving Plaintiffs responded to Vino Farms’ Motion by filing 

a Motion to Dismiss the Moving Plaintiffs without prejudice 

because, despite diligent efforts, Plaintiffs’ counsel had been 

unable to locate or communicate with the non-responding parties. 

By the time Plaintiffs opposed Vino Farms’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment a few weeks later, however, Plaintiffs’ counsel had 

located Sandoval and served Vino Farms with his RFA responses 

(“Responses”).3 

 

3

 Vino Farms asks that the Court strike Moving Plaintiffs’ 

Opposition as untimely. However, given that the Opposition was 

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Sandoval thus argues that the request as to him is now moot. As 

to the remaining Moving Plaintiffs, counsel consented to the 

granting of summary judgment as to Arias, but requested that 

summary judgment as to Gaitan be denied and that his case be 

dismissed without prejudice instead. For the following reasons, 

Vino Farms’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part, and Moving Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss is 

DENIED as moot. 

ANALYSIS 

A. Armando Z. Arias 

Plaintiffs agree that summary judgment should be granted as 

to Arias. Accordingly, Vino Farms’ Motion is GRANTED as to 

Arias, and Moving Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Arias is DENIED 

as moot. 

B. Rigoberto Preciado Sandoval 

According to Vino Farms, it is entitled to summary judgment 

as to Sandoval because, by failing to timely respond to Vino 

Farms’ RFAs, Sandoval admitted all matters therein and thus all 

material facts supporting judgment in that Defendant’s favor have 

been conclusively established. 

/// 

 

timely based on the continued hearing date, the Court declines to 

do so. 

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In his Opposition, Sandoval does not dispute Vino Farms’ 

contention that, in light of his admissions, Vino Farms is 

entitled to judgment. Instead, Sandoval argues that since he has 

now served his Responses, Vino Farms’ Motion is moot. Construing 

Sandoval’s Opposition as a Motion to Withdraw admissions under 

Rule 36(b), in the interest of judicial economy, the Court finds 

Sandoval’s argument persuasive. See Whitsitt v. Club Resource 

Group, 357 F. App’x 877, 878 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding it was not 

an abuse of discretion for a district court to construe an 

opposition to a motion for summary judgment as a motion to 

withdraw admissions and to deny that motion); Zavala v. Chrones, 

2012 WL 1978343, *1 (construing the late filing of responses to 

requests for admission as a motion to withdraw). 

Vino Farms is correct that under the Federal Rules, “[a] 

matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the 

party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting 

party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and 

signed by the party or its attorney.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). 

“A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established 

unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be 

withdrawn or amended.” Id., Rule 36(b). “[T]he court may permit 

withdrawal or amendment if it would promote the presentation of 

the merits of the action and if the court is not persuaded that 

it would prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or 

defending the action on the merits.” Id. 

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Because Sandoval’s admissions undermine his entire action, and 

because Vino Farms will suffer little prejudice if those 

admissions are withdrawn, withdrawal will be permitted here.4 

“The first half of the test in Rule 36(b) is satisfied when 

upholding the admissions would practically eliminate any 

presentation of the merits of the case.” Hadley v. United 

States, 45 F.3d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). In this case, due to 

Sandoval’s failure to respond to the RFAs, Vino Farms has moved 

for summary judgment as to Sandoval’s claims in their entirety 

based solely on those matters deemed admitted as a matter of law. 

That fact alone is probative of the impact upholding Sandoval’s 

admissions would have on “the presentation of the merits of [his] 

action.” By failing to respond to the RFA’s, Sandoval had 

effectively admitted that no contract exists and no 

misrepresentations were made on which liability can be based. 

Absent some ability to prove that Sandoval had any sort of 

contact with either Vino Farms or its agent or that either Vino 

Farms or its agent made the promises to Sandoval that he alleges 

in the SAC, each of Sandoval’s causes of action is almost 

certainly doomed. The Court thus finds that the first prong of 

the Rule 36 test has been met. 

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4

The Court is cognizant that the Ninth Circuit has advised 

district courts “to be cautious in exercising their discretion to 

permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission.” 999 v. C.I.T. 

Corp., 776 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1985). “This seems an 

appropriate admonition in cases such as C.I.T. Corp., where the 

defendant moved to withdraw an admission in the middle of trial.” 

Lintz v. Potter, 2011 WL 5241259, *3 n.6 (E.D. Cal.). 

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8

As to the second prong, this court “should focus on the 

prejudice that the nonmoving party would suffer at trial.” 

Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 2007). “The 

prejudice contemplated by Rule 36(b) is not simply that the party 

who obtained the admission will now have to convince the 

factfinder of its truth. Rather, it relates to the difficulty a 

party may face in proving its case, e.g., caused by the 

unavailability of key witnesses, because of the sudden need to 

obtain evidence with respect to the questions previously deemed 

admitted.” Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1348 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). The Court finds Vino Farms will not suffer 

that kind of prejudice contemplated by Rule 36 if Sandoval is 

permitted to withdraw his admissions. To the contrary, even with 

Sandoval’s admissions, Vino Farms would still have to defend 

against nearly identical claims dependent on both Vino Farms’ 

alleged misrepresentations and the existence of a contractual 

relationship, claims still being prosecuted by Sandoval’s 

numerous co-Plaintiffs. The issues and the underlying facts 

overlap so dramatically that this Court finds Vino Farms will 

suffer no real burden in having to persuade a trier of fact that, 

like the remaining Plaintiffs, Sandoval had no contract with Vino 

Farms or that Vino Farms is not responsible for any 

misrepresentations that allegedly induced Sandoval to agree to 

work in California. While Vino Farms will, as a practical 

matter, be prejudiced by having to prove those matters previously 

deemed admitted, pursuant to the relevant authority, and 

especially under the facts of this case, that type of prejudice 

is simply insufficient to justify denial of Sandoval’s Motion. 

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The Court thus finds that, for purposes of Rule 36, Vino Farms 

will not be prejudiced by Sandoval’s withdrawal of his 

admissions. 

Given the direct impact Sandoval’s admissions have on the 

viability of his action, and the fact that Vino Farms will suffer 

relatively little prejudice if withdrawal of those admissions is 

permitted, the Court now holds that Sandoval will be permitted to 

withdraw his admissions. Since Vino Farms’ entire Motion for 

Summary Judgment turns on the viability of those admissions, Vino 

Farms’ own Motion is thus DENIED as moot. Moving Plaintiffs’ 

Motion to Dismiss Sandoval is DENIED as moot as well. 

C. Demitrio Montes Gaitan 

Contrary to Arias and Sandoval, Gaitan has neither provided 

RFAs nor consented to the granting of Vino Farms’ Motion. The 

parties do not dispute that Gaitan cannot succeed in his suit 

against Vino Farms given that his non-responses to Vino Farms’ 

RFAs are deemed admissions as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

36(a)(3). Moving Plaintiffs merely ask that Gaitan be dismissed 

without prejudice. Plaintiffs’ request is rejected, but this 

Court nonetheless declines to grant summary judgment in favor of 

Vino Farms as well. 

Instead, the Court finds dismissal for failure to prosecute 

under Rule 41(b) is proper here. Plaintiff has had ample time to 

respond to discovery requests, but has failed to do so. He has 

apparently failed to keep in contact with his counsel or to 

provide any substantive opposition to the instant Motion. 

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Given that Gaitan’s own counsel cannot find him, even after 

conducting its own thorough search, the Court finds that Gaitan 

has abandoned his suit. See Collins v. Mendoza-Powers, 

2009 WL 4810663, *2 (E.D. Cal.). Generally, this Court would 

warn a plaintiff prior to dismissing his case pursuant to Rule 

41(b). Gaitan, however, has had constructive notice that his 

case was subject to dismissal since Vino Farms filed its Motion 

for Summary Judgment in January. Issuing any additional warning 

would be an exercise in futility given counsel’s inability to 

locate Gaitan even in the face of that other already-pending 

dispositive motion. See Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 

(1962) (“[W]hen circumstances make such action appropriate, a 

District Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute 

even without affording notice of its intention to do so or 

providing an adversary hearing before acting.”). Accordingly, 

both Vino Farms’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs’ 

Motion to Dismiss are DENIED as moot. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons just stated, Vino Farms’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment (ECF No. 138) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and 

Moving Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 139) is DENIED as 

moot. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Plaintiffs 

Armando Z. Arias and Demetrio Montes Gaitan from this case. 

/// 

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/// 

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Not later than two (2) days following the date this Memorandum 

and Order is electronically filed, Vino Farms is directed to 

advise the Court which of its two remaining Motions for Summary 

Judgment (ECF Nos. 160 and 168) it prefers to have the Court 

consider. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 23, 2012 

__________________________________ 

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

DE AC _S ig na tu re -E ND: 

c4d6b0d3 

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