Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02170/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02170-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard L. O’Neil, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-11-02170-PHX-ROS

ORDER

On November 4, 2011, Petitioner Richard L. O’Neil filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus. (Doc. 1). On November 20, 2012, Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan issued a

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the petition be denied as untimely.

Petitioner filed objections to the R&R. (Doc. 15).

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Where any party has

filed timely objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations, the district

court’s review of the part objected to is to be de novo. Id. Here, Petitioner has objected to

“the entirety” of the R&R. (Doc. 15 at 2). Generally, objections must be specific. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(2). And “general, non-specific objections” are not sufficient to require the

District Court “conduct de novo review of the entire R & R.” Sullivan v. Schriro, 2006 WL

1516005 (D. Ariz.). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to de novo review. In an abundance of

caution, however, the Court has overlooked the insufficient nature of the objections and

Case 2:11-cv-02170-ROS Document 16 Filed 01/31/13 Page 1 of 3
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reviewed the issues de novo. Based on that review, Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 

A “petition for writ of habeas corpus ordinarily must be filed within one year after the

state court judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the

time to seek direct review.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010). This oneyear clock is subject to statutory and equitable tolling. Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826,

1831 (2012). As explained in the R&R, Petitioner’s conviction became final on September

28, 2008. Thus, Petitioner should have filed his petition no later than September 28, 2009.

Petitioner, however, waited until November 4, 2011 to file his petition. Absent statutory or

equitable tolling, the petition is well outside the permissible time frame.

The application of statutory tolling is straightforward. Petitioner did not have any

form of request for post-conviction relief pending in state court between September 2008 and

2010. Petitioner did seek post-conviction relief in 2010, but that was well after the one-year

period had expired and that untimely attempt does not revive the federal limitations period.

Accordingly, there is no basis for statutory tolling of the deadline.

In an attempt to establish equitable tolling, Petitioner argues he is actually innocent

of the crimes at issue. Petitioner appears to have voluntarily dismissed his “actual

innocence” claim earlier in this case but even assuming Petitioner has presented such a claim,

it is not meritorious. (Doc. 7, 13). The arguments Petitioner makes regarding “actual

innocence” were presented and rejected during trial and on direct appeal. They remain

unconvincing and cannot serve as a basis for equitable tolling.

Neither statutory nor equitable tolling applies, meaning this petition is untimely.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 14) is ADOPTED. The

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. Dismissal

of the petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the

ruling debatable.

DATED this 30th day of January, 2013.

Case 2:11-cv-02170-ROS Document 16 Filed 01/31/13 Page 3 of 3