Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00551/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00551-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Adam Arthur Borja, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00551-PHX-SPL (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Adam Arthur Borja has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) On July 27, 2105, Respondents filed an answer 

asserting that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal 

habeas corpus review. (Doc. 9.) Although the Court granted Petitioner several 

extensions of time to file a reply in support of his Petition, he did not file a reply. 

(Docs. 15, 19, 21.) However, on January 4, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the 

Petition without prejudice, or to stay the proceeding and hold the Petition in abeyance 

while he presents his claims to the state courts. (Doc. 22.) Respondents oppose the 

motion. (Doc. 24.) Petitioner has filed a reply and a “supplemental exhibit” in support of 

his motion to dismiss or to stay. (Docs. 25, 26.) As set forth below, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review and 

recommends that the Petition and the motion to stay be denied. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 On August 7, 2006, Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior 

Court on one count of first-degree murder (Count One), one count of first-degree 

burglary (Count Two), and one count of arson of an occupied structure (Count Three), all 

domestic violence offenses. (Doc. 9, Ex. A.) In March 2008, a jury convicted Petitioner 

as charged. (Doc. 9, Ex. C.) On April 9, 2008, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 

concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest of which was life without the possibility of 

parole until Petitioner had served twenty-five years. (Doc. 9, Exs. B, D at 2.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. E.) Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), stating that she could not find any colorable claims to present on appeal. 

(Id.) The court granted Petitioner permission to file a pro se brief, and counsel notified 

Petitioner in writing of the deadline for filing his brief. (Doc. 9, Exs. B, G.) Petitioner, 

however, did not do so. (Doc. 9, Ex. B at 1.) After searching “the entire record for 

reversible error,” the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences. (Doc. 9, Ex. B.) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. F.) 

C. Post-Conviction Review 

 On August 12, 2009, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 9, Ex. H.) The trial court 

appointed counsel to represent Petitioner. (Doc. 9, Ex. I.) Counsel later filed a notice 

stating that he had reviewed the record and could not find any issue or claim to raise on 

post-conviction review. (Id.) On September 21, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se petition 

for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 9, Ex. J.) The petition raised several claims challenging 

the admissibility and reliability of evidence. (Id.) Petitioner also argued that trial counsel 

was ineffective for stipulating to the admission of certain evidence. (Id.; Doc. 9, Ex. N at 

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4.) On October 3, 2012, the trial court denied post-conviction relief. (Doc. 9, Ex. L.) 

The court found that Petitioner’s claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a). (Id.) The 

trial court, however, did not specifically address Petitioner’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (Id.) 

 On October 24, 2012, Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Petitioner did not present any specific claims in his petition for review. (Doc. 9, Ex. M.) 

Rather, he asked the appellate court to review the “Rule 32 pro se brief” in its entirety. 

(Id. at 2.) On January 28, 2014, the appellate court granted review, but denied relief. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. N.) With the exception of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that review of Petitioner’s 

claims was precluded because he had not raised them on direct appeal. (Doc. 9, Ex. N.) 

 The appellate court found that post-conviction review of Petitioner’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel was not precluded by Rule 32.2(a) because Petitioner 

could not have presented that claim on direct review. (Id.) However, the court found that 

Petitioner had waived review of that claim. The court explained that Petitioner did not 

specifically argue his claim of ineffective assistance in his petition for review and the 

general reference to his petition for post-conviction relief was insufficient to satisfy Rule 

32.9(c)(1), which provides that the petition for review itself must contain reasons why 

relief should be granted. (Id.) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court; 

the court denied review on May 21, 2014.1

 

 

1

 In the Petition, Petitioner indicates that he filed a “second petition” in the state court. (Doc. 1 at 3.) However, because Petitioner also states that he filed a “petition for review” in the Arizona Court of Appeals on October 22, 2012 and it was denied on 

January 28, 2014, Petitioner appears to refer to the petition for review he filed in the 

appellate court after the denial of his first post-conviction proceeding, as opposed to a second post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 1 at 3-4; Doc. 9, Exs. M, N.) 

Petitioner also indicates that he filed a “third petition.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) However, because Petitioner also states that he filed that petition in the Arizona Supreme Court on March 11, 2014 and it was denied on May 21, 2014, it appears that he is referring to the petition for review he filed in the Arizona Supreme Court, not a third petition for post- conviction relief. (Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 9, Ex. O.) 

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D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On March 20, 2015, Petitioner filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

this Court.2

 (Docs. 1, 1-1.) The Petition raises the following forty-six grounds for relief:3

 (1) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment 

because the State did not inform him that Detective Richard Michael Polk was under 

investigation for committing multiple acts of sexual exploitation of a minor (Doc. 1 at 6-

7); 

 (2) trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating that Petitioner’s computer was 

in use at 10:45 a.m. on the morning of the alleged murder (Doc. 1 at 7-11); 

 (3) trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating that Petitioner’s computer was 

in use at 10:48 a.m. on the morning of the crime instead of calling computer expert 

Lonnie Dworkin to testify that Detective Ed Baranowski erred when analyzing 

Petitioner’s computer (Id. at 12-16); 

 (4) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the prosecutor elicited false testimony from Detective Polk (Id. at 16-20); 

 (5) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the trial court allowed the State to enter into evidence a text message written by Reno 

Montoya and to read the text message to the jury as if it were the words of Ms. Lynn (the 

victim) (Id. at 20-26); 

 (6) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State destroyed the victim’s cell phone, then presented Crime Scene Specialist Anna 

Lucero’s testimony that Petitioner had stolen a SIM card out of the phone (Id. at 26-29); 

 

2

 Applying the mailbox rule, the petition is deemed filed the date Petitioner 

delivered it to prison officials for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 

(1988) (a legal document is deemed filed on the date a petitioner delivers it to the prison authorities for filing by mail). (Doc. 1-1 at 48.) 

3

 The Petition, including the attachments, exceeds 500 pages. (Doc. 1.) The 

Court cites the CM/ECF docket and page numbers for ease of reference. 

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 (7) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State argued that he had committed arson using the gas can seized from his vehicle 

(Id. at 29-30); 

 (8) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State lost a gasoline sample taken from the gas can that police seized from his vehicle 

(Id. at 31-32); 

 (9) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment based 

on the cumulative impact of the errors alleged in Grounds One, Two, Three, Five, Six, 

Seven, and Eight (Id. at 32-35); 

 (10) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Gloria Archuleta with 

her prior inconsistent statement to police (Id. at 35-37); 

 (11) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the court allowed Archuleta “to testify to words she claims she heard Ms. Lynn say to 

[Petitioner]” (Id. at 37-38); 

 (12) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Liliana Aguilar’s 

hearsay statements (Id. at 39-40); 

 (13) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State failed to disclose Amanda Sears’ pretrial statements (Id. at 41-42); 

 (14) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State admitted hearsay testimony of Amanda Sears without laying a proper 

foundation for her testimony (Id. at 42-42); 

 (15) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to depose Amanda Sears before trial 

and for failing to cross-examine her at trial (Id. at 44-45); 

 (16) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State failed to disclose Deborah Hall’s pretrial statements (Id. at 45-46); 

 (17) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment “when 

the court allowed Deborah Hall to testify about the hearsay statements of [Petitioner]” 

(Id. at 46-47); 

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 (18) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross examine Hall (Id. at 47-40); 

 (19) the cumulative impact of Grounds Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Fourteen, Fifteen, 

Seventeen, and Eighteen denied Petitioner due process under the Fourteenth Amendment 

(Id. at 48-51); 

 (20) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of 

Petitioner’s letters into evidence (Id. at 51-52); 

 (21) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State introduced into evidence Petitioner’s artwork and letters he had written to 

previous girlfriends (Id. at 52-53); 

 (22) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State selectively read letters that Petitioner had written to previous girlfriends to 

mislead the jury into believing that he had written them to Ms. Lynn (Id. at 53-56); 

 (23) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State compelled him to testify against himself by its selective reading of his letters 

(Id. at 56-57); 

 (24) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission into 

evidence of trial exhibits 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, and 185, which included 

notebooks found in a backpack seized from Petitioner’s bedroom (Id. at 57-59); 

 (25) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State introduced into evidence eight notebooks of Petitioner’s writings that were 

found in a backpack in his room (Id. at 59-60); 

 (26) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State selectively read rap lyrics and introduced an artistic portrayal of the name 

“Ashley,” to mislead the jury into believing that Petitioner had written the lyrics to 

Ms. Lynn (Id. at 60-62); 

 (27) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State compelled him to testify against himself by selectively reading his rap lyrics (Id.

at 63-65); 

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 (28) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State submitted eleven different exhibits of Petitioner’s writings, then selectively read 

twenty-three excerpts from them and inserted opinions to prejudice the jury against 

Petitioner (Id. at 65-67; Doc. 1-1 at 1); 

 (29) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the court allowed the State to play the video of his in-custody interview with Detective 

Polk (Doc. 1-1 at 1-4); 

 (30) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to evidence of Petitioner’s 

in-custody interview on the ground that the State did show that the interview contained a 

valid waiver of Petitioner’s Miranda rights (Id. at 4-9); 

 (31) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State presented the video of his in-custody interview without showing that it 

contained a valid waiver of Petitioner’s Miranda rights (Id. at 9-12); 

 (32) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State showed the jury an improperly redacted video of his in-custody interview with 

Detective Polk (Id. at 12-13); 

 (33) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Petitioner’s statements 

about his prior drug possession charge coming into evidence through his in-custody 

interview (Id. at 13-14); 

 (34) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment “when 

the State failed to investigate, interview, or call [his] sister, Cindy Rodriguez, to testify so 

the State could dispute [Petitioner’s] alibi defense as unverifiable” (Id. at 15-18); 

 (35) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State called attention to the absence of Rodriguez’s testimony and argued that she was 

sitting in the courtroom, but the defense did not call her as a witness (Id. at 18-20); 

 (36) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence that 

Petitioner’s vehicle was malfunctioning (Id. at 20-21); 

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 (37) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence that 

Petitioner’s vehicle had been stolen from the police impound lot and for failing to 

suppress evidence relating to the operation of his vehicle (Id. at 21-23); 

 (38) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State argued that Petitioner’s testimony was less credible because he was “on trial for 

murder” (Doc. 1-1 at 24-25); 

 (39) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Orlando Rodriguez to testify 

and for failing to argue that the window to Ms. Lynn’s room was broken when the 

Phoenix Fire Department arrived on the scene (Id. at 25-28); 

 (40) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State misstated the testimony of Reno Montoya to strengthen its argument that 

Ms. Lynn didn’t have any problems with a co-worker (Id. at 28-30); 

 (41) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State argued facts that were not in evidence, inserted opinions, and testified about 

Ms. Lynn’s frame of mind (Id. at 30-31); 

 (42) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State argued that Petitioner knew about and was jealous of the relationship between 

Ms. Lynn and Reno Montoya (Id. at 31-35); 

 (43) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when 

the State gave its opinion of Petitioner by drawing comparisons between him and Reno 

Montoya (Id. at 35-37); 

 (44) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment “when 

the State argued that [Petitioner’s] parents knew that [he] murdered Ms. Lynn, and were 

conspiring with [him] to help him get away with murder” (Id. at 37-45); 

 (45) appellate counsel was ineffective for advising Petitioner that he was not 

required to file a supplemental brief on direct appeal (Id. at 45-46); and 

 (46) Petitioner was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by the 

cumulative impact of the State’s misconduct at his trial. (Id. at 46-47.) 

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 Respondents argue that federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is 

procedurally barred. (Doc. 9 at 12-14.) Petitioner disputes that assertion. (Doc. 25.) As 

discussed below, the Court finds review of Petitioner’s claims procedurally barred. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner.4

 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 

31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

 

4

 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

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(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

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mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims are Procedurally Barred

 Petitioner asserts that with the exception of Grounds Four, Twenty-Nine, ThirtyEight, and Forty-One, he presented all of his claims in “the lower courts.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) 

However, as Respondents argue, Petitioner did not properly present to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals any of the claims presented in the Petition and they are barred from federal 

habeas corpus review. 

 Petitioner did not present any of his claims on direct review.5

 Appellate counsel 

filed an Anders brief. (Doc. 9, Ex. E.) Although Petitioner had the opportunity to file a 

supplemental brief, and counsel specifically notified Petitioner of that opportunity, he did 

not file a supplemental brief. (Doc. 9, Exs. B, G.) Petitioner, however, presented several 

claims in a petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied on the ground 

 

5

 As the Arizona Court of Appeals noted, Petitioner could not have presented any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. (Doc. 9, Ex. N.) 

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that Petitioner’s claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a) because he had failed to raise 

them on direct appeal. (Doc. 9, Ex. L.) 

 Petitioner then sought appellate review of the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief. (Doc. 9, Ex. M.) Petitioner argued that he did not knowingly waive the 

claims asserted in his petition for post-conviction relief, but that appellate counsel had 

advised him that he was not obligated to file a supplement to the Anders brief. (Id. at 2.) 

Petitioner did not raise any specific claims for relief in his petition for review, but 

requested that the appellate court consider his Rule 32 petition in its “entirety.” (Id.) 

 The appellate court noted that, on post-conviction review, Petitioner had raised 

“multiple claims of trial error and a claim that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by entering into an evidentiary stipulation.” (Doc. 9, Ex N at 2.) The appellate 

court affirmed the trial court’s finding that post-conviction review of Petitioner’s claims 

of trial error was precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3). (Id. at 4.) The appellate court rejected 

Petitioner’s assertion that appellate counsel was responsible for his failure to raise his 

claims in a supplemental appellate brief. (Id.) The court also stated that, to the extent 

that Petitioner’s argument could be construed as asserting a claim of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel, that claim lacked merit. (Id. at 3 n.2.) 

 The appellate court next noted that Petitioner had presented to the trial court a 

single claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel related to counsel’s decision to 

stipulate to the admission of certain evidence. (Id. at 4.) The appellate court found that 

Rule 32.2(a)(3) did not preclude post-conviction review of that claim because Petitioner 

could not have raised a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. 

(Id.) However, the court found that Petitioner had waived review of that claim because it 

was not specifically presented in the petition for review and Petitioner’s general reference 

to his “Rule 32 pro se brief in its entirety” did not satisfy Rule 32.9(c)(1), which requires 

that the petition for review itself must contain reasons why relief should be granted. (Id.) 

Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that Petitioner had waived review of his claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) 

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 The Court finds that federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is 

procedurally barred because he either did not present his claims to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals and state law would preclude review of those claims, or the appellate court 

found review of Petitioner’s claims precluded by an adequate and independent state rule. 

 To the extent that Petitioner did not present his claims to the state courts, they are 

technically exhausted and procedurally barred because it would be futile for Petitioner to 

return to the state courts to try to exhaust his claims because a successive petition for 

post-conviction relief would be untimely under Rule 32.4, and his claims would be 

precluded from Rule 32 review because they could have been raised in Petitioner’s prior 

post-conviction proceeding. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-99; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a); see also State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (“As a general 

rule, when [claims] are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction 

proceeding, subsequent claims [] will be deemed waived and precluded.”) (internal 

quotation omitted). 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s claims do not satisfy any of the exceptions to the 

timeliness or preclusion rules in Rule 32.4(a) and Rule 32.2, including being held in 

custody after the imposed sentence expired, the presentation of newly discovered material 

facts that probably would have changed the verdict or sentence, the failure to file a timely 

notice of post-conviction relief or a notice of appeal that was not the defendant’s fault, a 

change in the law, or the petitioner’s actual innocence. See Rule 32.2(b) (citing Rule 

32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h).) 

 Ground Forty-Five includes a claim that could be construed as implicating an 

exception to Arizona’s rules of preclusion, Rule 32.1(f), as applied to Petitioner’s claims 

that were not presented on direct appeal. However, Petitioner does not satisfy Rule 

32.1(f), which provides that a claim is not precluded from review in a successive petition 

for post-conviction relief if the “failure to file a . . . notice of appeal within the prescribed 

time was without fault on the defendant’s part.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(f). In Ground 

Forty-Five, Petitioner alleges that appellate counsel failed to inform him that he could file 

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a supplemental appellate brief. (Doc. 1 at 45-46.) On post-conviction review, Petitioner 

argued in his brief to the appellate court that appellate counsel was to blame for his 

failure to raise on appeal the issues he presented for the first time in his Rule 32 petition. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. N at 3.) 

 The appellate court rejected this argument based on evidence that counsel had 

asked Petitioner to notify her in writing of any issues he thought should be raised on 

appeal, notified Petitioner in writing that if she determined there were no arguable issues 

to raise, she would file an Anders brief, and advised him that he could raise his issues in a 

supplemental brief. (Id.) Additionally, in a subsequent letter, counsel notified Petitioner 

that she had found no viable issues to present on appeal and would file an Anders brief. 

(Id.) She also explained that she had requested additional time for Petitioner to file a 

supplemental brief and provided him with the record. (Id.) After the court set a due date 

for the supplemental brief, counsel informed Petitioner of the date and informed him that 

he had the option of filing a supplemental brief raising “additional points for the court to 

consider.” (Id.) Petitioner does not dispute the appellate court’s description of these 

communications with appellate counsel. (Doc. 25.) 

 As stated above, the state court has already concluded that Rule 32.1(f) would not 

permit review of an untimely or successive Rule 32 petition based on the allegations in 

Ground Forty-Five. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims that were not presented to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals are technically exhausted and procedurally barred from federal 

habeas corpus review. See McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 913 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(finding claims procedurally defaulted because petitioner was barred from exhausting his 

claims in the first instance by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a)); see also Boerckel, 526 U.S. 

at 848. 

 Federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is also barred because, to the 

extent that Petitioner presented his claims to the appellate court on post-conviction 

review, the appellate court found review of those claims precluded under Rules 32.2(a)(3) 

and 32.9(c). (Doc. 9, Ex. N); see Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

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32.9(c)(1) (stating that a petition for review must include all reasons why the petition 

should be granted and shall not incorporate any document by reference); Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.2(a)(3) (a petitioner is precluded from relief based on any ground waived in a 

previous collateral proceeding). The appellate court’s ruling based on Rules 32.9(c) and 

32.2(a)(3) did not depend on federal law or an examination of the merits of Petitioner’s 

claims, and thus, the ruling was “independent” of federal law. (Doc. 9, Ex. N); see 

Nitschke v. Belleque, 680 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing requirement that 

state procedural rule must rest on an “independent” state law ground). 

 Additionally, Rules 32.9(c) and 32.2(a)(3) are “adequate” because Arizona’s 

procedural rules are regularly followed. See Simmons v. Schriro, 187 Fed. App’x. 753, 

754 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that Arizona’s procedural rules are “clear” and “wellestablished”); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding Rule 32.2(a)(3) 

regularly followed and adequate); Miloni v. Schriro, 2006 WL 1652578, *5 (D. Ariz. Jun. 

7, 2006) (concluding that a procedural ruling based on Rule 32.9(c) is adequate); State v. 

Carriger, 692 P.2d 991, 995 (Ariz. 1984) (observing that “[p]etitioners must strictly 

comply with Rule 32 or be denied relief”); State v. French, 7 P.3d 128, 131 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 2000) (summarily rejecting claims for failure to comply with Rule 32.9), 

disapproved of on other grounds by Stewart v. Smith, 46 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2002). 

IV. Petitioner has not Established a Basis to Overcome the Procedural Bar

 Because Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, federal habeas corpus 

review is unavailable unless Petitioner establishes a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

or “cause and prejudice” to overcome the procedural bar. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749. 

For the reasons below, the Court finds that Petitioner has not established a basis to 

overcome the procedural bar. 

A. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

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“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 327. Petitioner does not argue that failure to consider his claims will result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Doc. 1, Doc. 1-1; Doc. 25.) Additionally, Petitioner 

has not presented new evidence and has not shown that failure to consider his 

procedurally defaulted claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Thus, 

he has not met Schlup’s high standard and this exception does not excuse the procedural 

bar. 

B. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) 

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(emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 Liberally construing the Petition, to establish case Petitioner argues that appellate 

counsel was ineffective because she misadvised Petitioner that he was not required to file 

a supplement brief on direct appeal. (Doc. 1-1 at 46.) Petitioner also argues that he was 

not aware of the issues presented in Grounds Four, Twenty-Nine, Thirty-Eight, and 

Forty-One until he was “drafting this Habeas Petition.” (Doc. 1 at 19; Doc. 1-1 at 4, 25, 

48.) As discussed below, these assertions do not establish cause. 

 1. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 

 In certain circumstances, the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may 

constitute cause to excuse procedural default, however, “a claim of ineffective assistance 

must be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to 

establish cause for a procedural default.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89; see also Edwards 

v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-53 (2000) (“ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

asserted as cause for the procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally 

defaulted”); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). 

 In Ground Forty-Five, Petitioner asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for 

advising him that he was not required to file a supplemental petition on direct appeal. 

(Doc. 1 at 45-56.) Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim of ineffective assistance 

of appellate counsel in the state courts. (Doc. 9, Exs. M, N). On post-conviction review, 

Petitioner argued that appellate counsel was to blame for his failure to raise his claims on 

direct appeal. (Doc. 9, Ex. N at 3.) However, he did not specially argue that appellate 

counsel was ineffective. (Id.) In a footnote, the appellate court stated, that “to the extent 

this argument could be read as a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,” it 

failed because it was conclusory. (Id. at n .2.) The appellate court, however, did not 

conclude that Petitioner had raised a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

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(Id.) Thus, Petitioner did not present a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel to the state courts. 

 Moreover, even if Petitioner properly presented Ground Forty-Five to the 

appellate court on post-conviction review, doing so was insufficient to exhaust that claim. 

The submission of a claim for the first time to an appellate court on discretionary review 

does not constitute fair presentation to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Castille v. 

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1989); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915-919 (9th Cir. 

2004). Under Arizona law, the Arizona Court of Appeals has only discretionary 

jurisdiction over petitions for review from the denial of post-conviction relief. See Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.9(f)(stating that the “appellate court may, in its discretion, grant review 

and order oral argument if deemed necessary . . . .”) Accordingly, Petitioner did not 

properly exhaust Ground Forty-Five and, therefore, the ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel alleged in Ground Forty-Five does not establish cause to overcome the 

procedural bar to habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims. 

 However, in Maples v. Thomas, ___ U.S. ___ 132 S. Ct. 912, 923-24 (2012), the 

Supreme Court recognized a limited exception to the general rule that to constitute cause, 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be an independent constitutional 

violation. In Maples, the Supreme Court held that cause could be shown when postconviction counsel was not merely negligent (and under the law of agency, that 

negligence being chargeable to the petitioner), but had abandoned the representation 

without notice to the petitioner, resulting in the loss of his state remedies. 

 Assuming that Maples applies to appellate counsel in the context of direct review, 

Petitioner has not shown that appellate counsel abandoned him. Petitioner does not 

allege that appellate counsel committed egregious professional misconduct, failed to 

communicate with him, or failed to respond to his inquiries with respect to preparation of 

a petition for review. Petitioner was not left without functioning counsel, as occurred in 

Maples. Instead, after reviewing the record, appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, and 

Petitioner was permitted to file a supplemental brief, but did not do so. (Doc. 9, Ex. B.) 

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Appellate counsel initially requested that Petitioner notify him in writing of any issues he 

thought should be raised on appeal. (Doc. 1-2 at 88.) She advised Petitioner that the 

issues he suggested would help guide her review of the record. (Id.) Appellate counsel 

further stated that if she determined that there were no arguable issues to present on 

appeal, she would file an Anders brief, and Petitioner would have “an opportunity to raise 

[his] issues in a supplemental brief.” (Id.) Counsel subsequently filed an Anders brief 

and requested additional time for Petitioner to file a supplemental brief. (Doc. 9, Ex. G.) 

When the court set a due date for the supplemental brief, counsel notified Petitioner of 

that date and stated that a supplemental brief was “optional,” but if Petitioner wished to 

raise additional points for the court to consider, he could do so. (Id.) She provided 

Petitioner with the record in his case. (Id.) 

 As set forth above, the record reflects that appellate counsel properly explained to 

Petitioner that she found no arguable issue to present on appeal and filed an Anders brief, 

but that Petitioner was permitted to file a supplemental brief. See State v. Clark, 2 P.3d 

89, 96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that when appellate counsel files an Anders brief, 

the defendant has the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief). Despite this 

information, Petitioner did not file a supplemental brief and did not file a motion for 

reconsideration even when invited to do so by the appellate court. (Doc. 9, Ex. B at 3 

(stating that Petitioner had thirty days from the date of the appellate court’s decision to 

file a pro per motion for reconsideration or a petition for review).) Thus, Petitioner has 

not shown that appellate counsel abandoned him or that her conduct constitutes cause to 

excuse the procedural bar to review of his claims.6

 

 2. Petitioner’s Lack of Awareness of Claims 

 To establish cause to excuse the procedural bar to habeas corpus review of 

Grounds Four, Twenty-Nine, Thirty-Eight, and Forty-One, Petitioner asserts, without 

further explanation, that he “became aware of [those] issue[s] while drafting this Habeas 

 

6

 Additionally, based on this same evidence, Petitioner has not established that 

appellate counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 

and his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel lacks merit. 

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Petition.” (Doc. 1 at 19; Doc. 1-1 at 4, 25, 48.) Petitioner, however, does not argue that 

he was unaware of the facts underlying those claims or that the legal basis for those 

claims was not reasonably available until he was drafting his Petition. See Murray, 477 

U.S. at 488. 

 Ground Four asserts that Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the 

prosecutor elicited perjured testimony from Detective Polk. (Doc. 1 at 16.) Petitioner 

asserts that Detective Polk falsely testified that he did not have any direct knowledge 

regarding when anything was uploaded or downloaded on Petitioner’s computer. (Id.) 

To support this claim, Petitioner cites Detective Baranowski’s report, which indicates that 

Detective Polk contacted Detective Baranowski to analyze Petitioner’s computer and that 

Detective Polk discussed the findings of that analysis with Detective Baranowski. 

(Doc. 1 at 17-19, Exs. 27, 30; Doc. 1-3 at 13-23; Doc. 1-3 at 75; Doc. 1-4 at 1.) Thus, 

Petitioner may argue that he was unaware of Detective Polk’s alleged false testimony 

until he reviewed Detective Baranowski’s reports. 

 The record reflects that Detective Baranowski’s reports are from May 2007 and 

indicate that, on defense counsel’s request, Detective Polk contacted Detective 

Baranowski and requested that Petitioner’s computer be analyzed to determine whether 

he was buying music on line at the time of the alleged murder. (Doc. 1-3 at 17.) 

Petitioner does not state when he obtained Detective Baranowski’s reports. However, 

because defense counsel requested the analysis of Petitioner’s computer in 2007, 

Petitioner could have discovered the reports at the time of trial. Additionally, the record 

reflects that appellate counsel gave Petitioner the record of his case in February 2009, 

before the March 23, 2009 deadline for Petitioner to file a supplemental appellate brief. 

(Doc. 1-3 at 1-2) Therefore, the facts underlying Ground Four were available to 

Petitioner at the time of trial or before the deadline for filing a pro se appellate brief. 

Additionally, Ground Four is based on an alleged violation of due process generally and 

thus, the legal basis of this claim was also available at the time of trial. Accordingly, 

Petitioner has not shown that some objective factor external to him impeded his efforts to 

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comply with the state’s procedural rules, see Teague, 489 U.S. at 298, and therefore, has 

not shown cause for his failure to present Ground Four to the state courts on direct or 

post-conviction review. 

 Ground Twenty-Nine alleges that Petitioner was denied his right to due process 

when the trial court ruled that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), did not 

preclude the admission into evidence of the videotape of Petitioner’s in-custody interview 

with Detective Polk. (Doc. 1-1 at 1-3.) To support this claim, Petitioner states that 

pursuant to Crawford, defense counsel objected to the videotaped interview being played 

in its entirety because defense counsel had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, 

Petitioner, due to his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (Id. at 1.) 

Petitioner states that the trial court ruled that Crawford did not apply and that the 

videotaped interview was admissible. (Id.) The facts underlying Ground Twenty-Nine 

were available to Petitioner at the time of trial. 

 Additionally, Ground Twenty-Nine is based on an alleged violation of due process 

generally and thus, the legal basis of this claim was also available at the time of trial. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that some objective factor external to him impeded 

his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules, see Teague, 489 U.S. at 298, and 

therefore, has not shown cause for his failure to present this ground for relief to the state 

courts on direct or post-conviction review. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 535 (“the mere fact 

that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the 

claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural default.”). 

 Grounds Thirty-Eight and Forty-One allege due process violations based on the 

prosecutor’s closing argument. (Doc. 1-1 at 24, 30.) Ground Thirty-Eight is based on the 

prosecutor’s argument that Petitioner was less credible than other witness because he was 

on trial for murder. (Doc. 1-1 at 24.) In Ground Forty-One, Petitioner asserts that the 

prosecutor argued facts not in evidence and inserted opinions into the closing argument. 

(Doc. 1-1 at 30) The facts underlying these grounds are based on events that occurred 

during closing argument and, therefore, were known to Petitioner at the time of trial. 

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 Additionally, these grounds are based on alleged violations of due process 

generally and, thus, the legal basis of these claims was also available at the time of trial. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that some objective factor external to him impeded 

his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

Therefore, Petitioner has not shown cause for his failure to present Grounds Thirty-Eight 

and Forty-One to the state courts on direct or post-conviction review. Petitioner’s failure 

to recognize these claims earlier does not constitute cause. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 535. 

 3. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, Petitioner has not shown that appellate counsel’s abandonment 

or ineffective assistance constitutes cause to excuse the procedural default of his claims. 

He also has not shown that his failure to recognize the issues presented in Grounds Four, 

Twenty-Nine, Thirty-Eight, and Forty-One until he was “drafting this Habeas Petition” 

constitutes cause. (Doc. 1 at 19; Doc. 1-1 at 4, 25, 48.) Furthermore, Petitioner’s status 

as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge, and limited legal resources do not establish cause 

to excuse the procedural bar to review of his claims. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of 

Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal 

assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 

862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not 

constitute cause). Accordingly, the Court does not consider whether Petitioner can 

establish prejudice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986) (stating that the court 

does not need to consider prejudice when the petitioner does not demonstrate cause). 

Thus, Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome the procedural bar to federal 

habeas corpus review of his claims. 

V. Motion to Dismiss or to Stay and hold Petition in Abeyance 

 Petitioner has filed a motion to dismiss the Petition without prejudice, or to stay 

the proceedings and hold the Petition in abeyance while he presents his claims in the state 

courts. (Doc. 22.) Habeas corpus relief is unavailable “unless the applicant has 

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” See 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 2254(b)(1)(A). In Rose v. Lundy, the Supreme Court held that “a district court must 

dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.” 455 U.S. 

509, 522 (1982). However, after the Rose decision, the AEDPA was enacted and it 

imposed a one-year statute of limitations for filing federal habeas corpus petitions. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court then recognized that if a petitioner filed a 

mixed petition (a petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims) in federal 

court, the combined effect of Rose and the AEDPA could result in the loss of all claims, 

including those already exhausted, because the limitations period could expire while a 

petitioner returned to state court to present his unexhausted claims. Pliler v. Ford, 542 

U.S. 225, 230-31 (2004). Thus, in Rhines v. Weber, the Supreme Court held that the 

district court has limited discretion to hold in abeyance a habeas petition containing both 

exhausted and unexhausted claims to permit a petitioner to return to state court to exhaust 

additional claims while the federal proceedings are stayed. 544 U.S. 269, 276-77 (2005). 

 The stay-and-abeyance procedure is only appropriate when the district court 

determines that (1) there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims 

in state court, (2) the unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless,” and (3) there is no 

indication that the petitioner has engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. 

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. In Rhines, the Court cautioned that the stay-and-abeyance 

procedure “should be available only in limited circumstances,” and should be applied 

consistently with the AEDPA’s twin purposes of “reduc[ing] delays in the execution of 

state and federal criminal sentences” and encouraging “petitioners to seek relief from 

state courts in the first instance.” Id. at 277. 

 The stay and abeyance procedure is not available in this case because the Petition 

is not mixed. Rather, all of Petitioner’s claims are technically exhausted and 

procedurally barred from review because Petitioner no longer has state remedies 

available to consider his claims. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621, n.5 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citation omitted) (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in 

state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies 

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any longer ‘available’ to him.”); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(stating that a petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement if: (1) he has fairly 

presented his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it; or 

(2) no state remedies remain available). 

 Petitioner may argue that Ground Forty-Five is unexhausted. However, Ground 

Forty-Five is plainly meritless as discussed in Section IV.B.1. Accordingly, the stay-andabeyance procedure is not appropriate in this case. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78; 

Felder v. Hickman, 2007 WL 2265146, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007) (when a claim is 

procedurally barred and no state remedies remain, it is exhausted and the stay and 

abeyance procedure does not apply); Greer v. Ariz. Attorney General, 2006 WL 2553403, 

at *7 n.8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 1, 2006) (when claim is procedurally barred under state law it 

would be futile for a petitioner to return to state court to attempt to exhaust her claims 

and the stay and abeyance procedure does not apply).

 Petitioner alternatively asks the Court to dismiss the Petition without prejudice so 

he may file “a successive untimely petition for writ of habeas corpus.” (Docs. 22, 25 at 

2.) As previously stated, Arizona law would preclude a successive petition for postconviction relief. Therefore, dismissing the Petition without prejudice would be futile. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that the motion to dismiss without prejudice or to 

stay and hold in abeyance be denied. 

VI. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because federal 

habeas corpus review of his claims is procedurally barred and Petitioner has not 

established a basis to overcome that bar. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the 

Petition be denied. In addition, the stay-and-abeyance procedure is not available in this 

case, and dismissing the Petition without prejudice would be futile. Therefore, the Court 

recommends that the motion to dismiss without prejudice or to stay and hold in abeyance 

be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

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IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss without 

prejudice or to stay and hold the Petition in abeyance (Doc. 22) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. The parties have fourteen days within which to file 

a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s acceptance of the Report 

and Recommendation without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 8th day of March, 2016. 

 

Case 2:15-cv-00551-SPL Document 27 Filed 03/08/16 Page 25 of 25