Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01559/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01559-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY IVAN COGSWELL,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11CV1559-MMA (WVG)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE;

[Doc. No. 60]

OVERRULING PETITIONER’S

OBJECTIONS;

[Doc. No. 64]

DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS WITH

PREJUDICE;

[Doc. No. 43]

DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR A CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY

[Doc. No. 65]

vs.

DR. JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary, 

Respondent.

Petitioner Henry Ivan Cogswell, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a

first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (“petition”) pursuant to Title 28 of

the United States Code, section 2254, challenging his 2006 conviction and sentence

for, inter alia, multiple counts of forcible rape. See Doc. No. 43. Petitioner raises

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eleven separate grounds for relief. Respondent answered the petition, arguing that

the Court should deny all of Petitioner’s claims and dismiss the petition with

prejudice. See Doc. No. 53. Petitioner filed a traverse. See Doc. No. 59. 

The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo

for preparation of a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and Civil Local Rule HC.2. Judge Gallo has issued a detailed and well-reasoned

report recommending that the Court deny Petitioner’s claims for relief without an

evidentiary hearing and dismiss the petition with prejudice. See Doc. No. 60. 

Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation on multiple grounds. See Doc.

No. 64. For the reasons set forth below, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s

objections and ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation in its entirety.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1), the Court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir.

1989). 

2. Analysis

 Petitioner objects to Judge Gallo’s findings and recommendations as to all

eleven claims raised in his petition. Petitioner’s objections are primarily based on

the arguments raised in his traverse. Judge Gallo thoroughly addresses those

arguments in the Report and Recommendation. After conducting a de novo review

of the entire record, the Court finds that Petitioner’s objections are without merit.

Further discussion is warranted only with respect to the issues raised in Claim 1 of

the petition. 

In his first claim, Petitioner asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment

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confrontation rights when the trial court admitted the transcript of the victim’s

preliminary hearing testimony in lieu of her live testimony at trial. The victim,

referred to as “Lorene,” was living in Colorado at the time. Petitioner argues that the

prosecution failed to make a good faith effort to secure her attendance at trial. 

Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968). Petitioner presented this claim on

direct appeal from his conviction. 

The California Court of Appeal analyzed the issue within the context of the

Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in

Criminal Cases (“the Act”), Cal. Pen. Code § 1334 et seq. One of the means

available under the Act for securing a witness’s attendance at trial is taking the

witness into immediate custody and delivering the witness to a California officer. 

See Doc. No. 14-2, Lodgment No. 2 at 14. As noted by the appellate court, “when a

party knows of the out-of-state location of a witness and does not attempt to secure

their presence by means of the Uniform Act, a witness is not unavailable” under

California’s rules of evidence. Id. The appellate court determined that despite

Lorene’s status as a victim of sexual assault, the custody and delivery provisions of

the Act were available for use by the prosecution to secure her attendance at trial. 

Id. at 16. The court acknowledged the California Legislature’s “strong intent to

protect victims of sexual assault from additional psychological trauma,” but found

that the Act did not prohibit taking a sexual assault victim into custody in order to

fulfill the victim’s obligation to appear in court. Id. at 16-19. Because the custody

and delivery provisions were available but not used, the appellate court concluded

that the prosecution failed to exercise the necessary diligence in securing Lorene’s

attendance at Petitioner’s trial. The Court of Appeal determined that the admission

of Lorene’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial was prejudicial error and ordered

the judgment of conviction reversed. Id. at 21. 

The Attorney General petitioned the California Supreme Court for review of

the appellate court’s decision, arguing that even though the custody and delivery

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provisions of the Act were available the prosecution was not required to invoke

those provisions in order to demonstrate Lorene’s unavailability as a witness at

Petitioner’s trial. See Doc. No. 14-3, Lodgment No. 3 at 9. The California Supreme

Court agreed and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The high court held

that the prosecution exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to secure Lorene’s

presence at trial. The court noted that taking a material witness into custody to

ensure that witness’s attendance at trial is an extreme measure, such that the

prosecution’s decision not to take such measures can be – and in this case was –

reasonable. Id. at 12. 

On collateral review, this Court’s duty is to determine whether the California

Supreme Court’s reasoned decision involved an objectively unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This is a highly

deferential standard of review. Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U. S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct.

1305, 179 L. Ed. 2d 374, 378 (2011). 

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of an

out-of-court testimonial statement at a criminal trial unless the witness is unavailable

to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross examination. Crawford

v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). A witness is not unavailable “‘unless the

prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain [the witness’s]

presence at trial.’” Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 493 (2011), quoting Barber v.

Page, 390 U.S. at 724-25. As the Supreme Court recently explained, “the

deferential standard of review set out in 28 U. S. C. §2254(d) does not permit a

federal court to overturn a state court’s decision on the question of unavailability

merely because the federal court identifies additional steps that might have been

taken. Under AEDPA, if the state court decision was reasonable, it cannot be

disturbed.” Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 495 (2011). 

Here, the California Supreme Court’s finding that the prosecution exercised

reasonable diligence in attempting to secure Lorene’s attendance at Petitioner’s trial

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was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of relevant Supreme Court

precedent.1

 The state court properly focused its analysis on the reasonableness of

the prosecution’s actions, and thus its interpretation of California state law was

compatible with applicable federal law. 

Within the context of his first claim for relief, Petitioner also argues that he

did not have an adequate opportunity to cross examine the victim at the preliminary

hearing. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73 (requiring there to have been an adequate

opportunity for cross-examination before a transcript will be admitted in lieu of live

testimony). Petitioner asserts that a preliminary hearing is “a much less searching

exploration into the merits of a case than trial,” and therefore the cross examination

at the hearing was not sufficient to protect his Sixth Amendment rights. See Doc.

No. 64 at 5, quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. at 725. However, “no inquiry into

[the] ‘effectiveness’” of a cross-examination is required. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73

n.12. The Constitution affords the accused “only an opportunity for effective

cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to

whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739

(1987) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Petitioner had the

opportunity to cross examine Lorene at the preliminary hearing, an opportunity of

which he took full advantage. As such, the state court’s ultimate adjudication of the

matter was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. 

For the reasons set forth in the Report and Recommendation, and discussed

1 Although not relevant for purposes of AEDPA review, the Court notes that the

California Supreme Court’s holding in this case is consistent with Ninth Circuit law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (defining “clearly established federal law” to be law “as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”). In Dres v. Campoy, 784 F.2d

996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1986), a pre-AEDPA case, the circuit court held that a prosecutor made a good faith effort to obtain a witness even though the Uniform Act was not utilized. The court emphasized that using the custody and delivery provisions of the

Act could potentially run afoul of California’s state constitution, which prohibits the unreasonable detention of witnesses. Id., citing Cal. Const., art. I, § 10. In light of both “tactical” and constitutional considerations, the circuit court found that “the prosecutor acted in good faith when he decided to use means other than the Uniform Act for

procuring [the witness’s] attendance at trial.” Id. 

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herein, the Court denies Petitioner’s claims for relief.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner moves for the issuance of a certificate of appealability as to Claims

1-10 in the petition. A district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability

when it enters a final order adverse to a petitioner. Rule 11(a) of the RULES

GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES. Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals from

the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention complained of arises

out of process issued by a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). A certificate of appealability may issue only if

the applicant makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Petitioner has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly,

the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability as to any claims or issues

raised in his petition. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the Report and

Recommendation in its entirety and DISMISSES Petitioner’s First Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with prejudice. The Court DENIES Petitioner’s

motion for a certificate of appealability and DECLINES to issue a Certificate of

Appealability. 

The Clerk of Court shall terminate this case and enter judgment in favor of

Respondent. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 21, 2014

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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