Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01548/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01548-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN PARK; MICHELLE PARK,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 10 CV 1548 MMA (AJB)

ORDER:

DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION

[Doc. No. 25]

DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED

COMPLAINT

[Doc. No. 25-1]

vs.

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, et al.,

Defendants.

Currently before the Court are: (1) Plaintiffs Sean Park and Michelle Park’s motion for

reconsideration of the Court’s October 26, 2010 Order dismissing Defendants JPMorgan Chase

Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan”) (erroneously sued as Washington Mutual Bank FSB/JP Morgan Chase

Home Finance LLC) and California Reconveyance Company (“CRC”); and (2) Plaintiffs’ motion

for leave to file a first amended complaint. [Doc. No. 25.] For the reasons set forth below, the

Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, and DENIES Plaintiffs’ request to file an

amended complaint. 

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-01548-MMA-MDD Document 36 Filed 02/14/11 Page 1 of 7
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 While the caption on the Complaint erroneously indicates Plaintiffs assert 15 causes of action,

the body of the Complaint asserts only 13 claims.

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BACKGROUND

This action arises from foreclosure related events affecting Plaintiffs’ real property located

at 7419 Draper Avenue, La Jolla, California 92037 (the “Property”). On July 26, 2010, Plaintiffs

filed a complaint alleging thirteen causes of action against several named defendants, including

JPMorgan and CRC. [Doc. No. 1.]1 On August 19, Plaintiffs filed several un-executed

summonses. [Doc. Nos. 3-7.] On August 20, Plaintiffs requested the Clerk of Court enter a

default as to JPMorgan and CRC, among others. [Doc. No. 8.] Because Plaintiffs had not

properly served Defendants, default was not entered. [Id.] On August 24, 2010, Plaintiffs

returned executed summonses as to several defendants, including JPMorgan and CRC. [Doc. Nos.

12-13.] 

On September 13, 2010, Defendants JPMorgan and CRC timely moved to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. [Doc. No. 17.] Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the

motion. On October 26, 2010, the Court granted JPMorgan and CRC’s motion to dismiss and the

Clerk terminated these two defendants from the case. [Doc. No. 20.] On December 14, 2010,

Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s October 26 Order dismissing JPMorgan

and CRC, and a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. [Doc. No. 25.] 

I. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

LEGAL STANDARD

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly allow motions for

reconsideration, a party may seek relief from an order under Rule 60(b). A motion brought

pursuant to Rule 60(b) is specifically limited to instances where the movant demonstrates the

existence of one or more of the following: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in

time to move for a new trial under rule 59(b); (3) fraud . . . misrepresentation, or other misconduct

of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) . . . [that] applying [the judgment] prospectively

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2

 Plaintiffs’ declaration offered in support of their motion for reconsideration is unavailing

because it merely details the course of events leading up to the filing of the complaint on July 26,

2010; no information is provided regarding events that occurred after July 26, 2010. [See Doc. No.

25-2.]

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is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Sch.

Dist. 1J v. ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Rule 60(b)(6) “is used sparingly as an

equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary

circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous

judgment.” Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs assert reconsideration is appropriate under Rule 60(b)(2) because they possess

newly discovered evidence. [Doc. No. 25, p.4.] “Where a party seeks relief from judgment under

Rule 60(b)(2) on the basis of newly discovered evidence, it must show that it exercised due

diligence in discovering the evidence, and also that the newly discovered evidence is of such

magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to change the disposition of the

case.” Daghlian v. Devry Univ., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1252-53 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (internal

marks and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs provide no information regarding what specific

evidence has been discovered, when it was discovered, or why the evidence could not have been

discovered earlier through due diligence. Instead, Plaintiffs assert generally that, “additional

discovery . . . has come to light since plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on July 26, 2010[,] . .

. [including] recent violations by all named defendants and new expert witness testimony of

forensic auditors which by reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered earlier by

Plaintiffs . . . .” [Id. a p.3-4.] Plaintiffs’ vague statements do not satisfy the requirements of Rule

60(b)(2). See, Gomez v. California, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11881 *8-10 (E.D. Cal.).2

 Without

any detail regarding the purported evidence that Plaintiffs recently discovered and the

circumstances surrounding its discovery, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs are now in

possession of “newly discovered evidence” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(2). 

In addition, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration does not address why they failed to

oppose Defendants JPMorgan and CRC’s motion to dismiss. Even if Plaintiffs discovered

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 Plaintiffs have several similar actions pending before the Southern District regarding various

other properties, including case numbers 3:10cv1546; 3:10cv1547; and 3:10cv1737.

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evidence after they filed their Complaint in July, this fact has no bearing on their complete failure

to oppose Defendants’ motion. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to establish

grounds for reconsideration of the Court’s October 26, 2010 Order based on the existence of newly

discovered evidence. 

In their reply brief Plaintiffs assert, for the first time, that they did not oppose Defendants’

motion to dismiss because they “confused this case with another matter.” [Doc. No. 32, p.2.] 

Thus, it appears Plaintiffs also seek reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(1) due to “mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Plaintiffs explain they were confused because the

caption on Defendants’ motion to dismiss erroneously indicated the action was filed on April 28,

2009, instead of July 26, 2010. [Id.; see also Doc. No. 17.] Plaintiffs, however, provide no

explanation why this confusion caused them not to file any opposition. Although the “action

filed” date on the caption is in error, the remaining information on the caption is correct and

should have given Plaintiffs sufficient notice of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The caption

includes the correct case name, case number, contact information for defense counsel, as well as

the November 8, 2010 motion hearing date. Plaintiffs do not explain why they disregarded this

information on the caption, and instead, chose not to take any action with respect to the motion. 

Plaintiffs also do not indicate which steps they took, if any, to remedy their confusion until

more than three months after Defendants filed and served their motion to dismiss, and nearly two

months after the Court granted Defendants’ motion. Further, Plaintiffs’ inaction is not an adequate

ground for reconsideration because Plaintiffs were on notice that one of their complaints was

subject to dismissal,3

 yet Plaintiffs do not assert they took any action to oppose the dismissal. The

docket reflects that Defendants served Plaintiffs with a copy of their motion to dismiss on

September 13, 2010, by mail at the P.O. Box address Plaintiffs provided on the caption of their

complaint. [Doc. No. 17, p.27-28 (proof of service).] Plaintiffs do not assert they did not receive

notice of Defendants’ motion. Similarly, the Clerk mailed a copy of the Court’s October 26 Order

to Plaintiffs’ P.O. Box the day it was entered, and Plaintiffs do not allege they did not receive this

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notice. [Doc. No. 20.] Because Plaintiffs are responsible for moving this case toward a

disposition on the merits, and their non-responsive behavior prevented progress in that direction,

the Court appropriately granted JPMorgan and CRC’s unopposed motion to dismiss. See In re

Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, without more, Plaintiffs’ asserted

confusion caused by filing multiple complaints is not sufficient to demonstrate reconsideration is

appropriate under Rule 60(b)(1).

The Court recognizes it has a duty to construe Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration

liberally because they are proceeding pro se. See, Wootten v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12249 *8-9 (N.D. Cal.) (citation omitted). However, the Court cannot

infer facts that are not alleged in the motion. (Id.) All plaintiffs, including those who are

proceeding pro se, must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate they are entitled to the relief

requested. Here, Plaintiffs do not allege facts that indicate they are entitled to relief under Rule

60(b). Accordingly, their motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may amend its

complaint (i) within 21 days after serving it; (ii) within 21 days after a responsive pleading has

been served; or (iii) with leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Granting leave to amend rests in

the sound discretion of the district court, and should be granted freely when justice so requires. 

Id.; Pisciotta v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996). Although the rule

should be interpreted with extreme liberality, leave to amend is not to be granted automatically. 

Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Typically, five

factors are taken into account to assess the propriety of a motion for leave to amend: (1) bad faith,

(2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5) whether the

plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th

Cir. 2004). 

Here, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to add new facts and claims they discovered after

filing the Complaint on July 26, 2010. [Doc. No. 25-1.] However, Plaintiffs do not identify the

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new facts or claims they desire to include. Nor do Plaintiffs explain how or when they acquired

the allegedly new information, or why they did not seek leave to amend earlier. Rather, Plaintiffs

offer conclusory statements that their request satisfies Rule 15’s liberal standard, and they entirely

fail to articulate a clear reason why leave to amend is appropriate. 

For example, Plaintiffs summarily state that “defendants have stipulated to Plaintiffs’

motion to Amend, and has [sic] therefore demonstrated that it [sic] will not be prejudiced by the

proposed amendment.” [Id. at p.3.] Not only is Plaintiffs’ conclusory statement insufficient to

demonstrate the absence of prejudice, Plaintiffs’ statement is contradicted by assertions made later

in their motion. Plaintiffs indicate they attempted to contact counsel for at least three of the

defendants to inform them that Plaintiffs intended to file a motion for leave to amend. According

to Plaintiffs, counsel of record for JPMorgan and CRC’s did not respond, counsel for Chicago

Title Company indicated they would not object to Plaintiffs’ anticipated motion, and counsel for

Tyona Rensen indicated he would object. [Id. at p.5.] Based on this information, it is clear

Defendants did not stipulate to Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment. 

In addition, none of the Defendants that appear to be the subject of Plaintiffs’ motion for

leave to amend are still parties to this action. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendants Chicago

Title Company and Tyona Rensen on February 2, 2011 and January 10, 2011 respectively, and

because the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, JPMorgan and CRC remain

terminated. [See Doc. Nos. 29, 35.] A review of the docket reflects that Universal Business

Services is the only remaining defendant that may have been served, and Plaintiffs do not allege

any new facts or claims they have discovered with respect to this defendant. Accordingly, the

Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

/ / /

/ / /

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration

of its October 26, 2010 Order [Doc. No. 25] and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an

amended complaint [Doc. No. 25-1.] 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 14, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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