Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01512/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01512-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332pl Diversity-Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHRISTINE KAY, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 

CALIFORNIA, et al, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 17CV1512-MMA (KSC)

ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING 

ACTION TO STATE COURT 

 On June 9, 2017, Plaintiff Christine Kay filed this action in the Superior Court of 

the State of California, County of San Diego, against Defendants Regents of the 

University of California, University of California San Diego Medical Center, Richard 

Todd Allen, M.D., Benjamin John Drinkwine, M.D., University of California San Diego 

Medical Group, Point Loma Convalescent Hospital, Noli Cava, M.D., Cook Group, Inc., 

Cook Medical Inc. a/k/a Cook Medical, Inc., Cook Medical, LLC, Cook Inc., Medical 

Engineering and Development Institute, Inc., Cook Medical Technologies, Cook 

Denmark International APS, Cook Denmark Holding APS, Cook Group Europe APS, 

Cook Nederland BV, and William Cook Europe APS. See Doc. No. 1-2. Plaintiff asserts 

product liability claims against some defendants, and medical malpractice claims against 

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others. On July 26, 2017, Defendants Cook Group Inc., Cook Medical LLC, f/k/a Cook 

Medical Inc., Cook Inc., Cook Research Inc., and Cook Medical Technologies LLC (the 

“removing Defendants”) removed this action to this Court. The parties now jointly move 

the Court to sever Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims, and remand those claims to 

state court. See Doc. No. 11. Having reviewed the parties’ joint motion, as well as 

Defendants’ Notice of Removal, the Court finds it does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction over this action and that the removal is procedurally defective. The Court 

therefore sua sponte REMANDS this action to San Diego County Superior Court. 

DISCUSSION

Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 

479 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). They possess only that power authorized by the 

Constitution or a statute. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 

(1986). Federal district courts are constitutionally required to raise issues related to 

federal subject matter jurisdiction, and may do so sua sponte. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998); see Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 

F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990). Removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, 

et seq. Section 1441(a), provides for removal of a civil action from state to federal court 

only if the case could have originated in federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 

U.S. 386, 392, (1987); Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). Courts 

construe section 1441(a) strictly against removal, and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be 

rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. 

Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Specifically, for an action to be removed on the basis of federal question 

jurisdiction, the complaint must establish either that federal law creates the cause of 

action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of 

substantial questions of federal law. Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction 

Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1983). Additionally, a 

federal court also has jurisdiction over an action involving citizens of different states 

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where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “[C]omplete 

diversity of citizenship” is required, meaning each plaintiff must be diverse from each 

defendant. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 67-68 (1996). If a matter is removable 

solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332, the action may not be 

removed if any defendant is a citizen of the forum state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 

Here, the parties admit that, as citizens of California, diversity does not exist 

between Plaintiff and Defendants Regents of the University of California, University of 

San Diego Medical Center, Richard Todd Allen, M.D., Benjamin John Drinkwine, M.D., 

University of California San Diego Medical Group, Point Loma Convalescent Hospital, 

and Noli Cava, M.D. See Doc. No. 11.1

 Accordingly, complete diversity does not exist, 

and some of the defendants are citizens of the forum state. Further, the Court is 

unpersuaded by the removing Defendants’ argument that the Court should disregard the 

non-diverse Defendants for the purposes of removal pursuant to the doctrine of 

“fraudulent misjoinder.” See Doc. Nos. 1, 11. It is unclear whether that doctrine is 

viable in this Circuit,2

 and regardless, it would not provide for removal in these 

circumstances. “Essentially, fraudulent misjoinder examines the facts to determine 

whether claims against one defendant arise out of the same transaction, occurrence or 

series of transactions or occurrences or have any real connection” to the facts underlying 

the claims between diverse parties. See Blasco v. Atrium Med. Corp., No. C 14-03285 

EDL, 2014 WL 12691051, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014) (internal alterations and 

quotations omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s product liability claims against allegedly diverse 

defendants arise out of the same facts as her medical malpractice claims against nondiverse defendants. Based on the foregoing, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action. 

// 

                                                                

1

 The lack of diversity is also apparent from the Notice of Removal. See Doc. No. 1. 

2

 While the Ninth Circuit recognizes the separate, similarly named doctrine of fraudulent joinder, “the 

weight of authority among California district courts is that the [] fraudulent misjoinder doctrine is not 

applicable in the Ninth Circuit.” See Blasco v. Atrium Med. Corp., No. C 14-03285 EDL, 2014 WL 

12691051, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014). 

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CONCLUSION

 Having carefully reviewed the Notice of Removal and the accompanying 

documents, the Court finds and concludes that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction 

over this action and the removal is procedurally defective. Accordingly, the above 

captioned case is REMANDED to the Superior Court for the County of San Diego, case 

no. 37-2017-00020876-CU-MM-CTL. 

 The Clerk of Court is instructed to return the case to state court forthwith, 

terminate any pending motions, and close this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 22, 2017

 _____________________________ 

 Hon. Michael M. Anello 

United States District Judge 

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