Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00300/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00300-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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This information was derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s response to the petition.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VAATAUSILI MARK ALAIMALO, )

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Petitioner, )

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v. )

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PAUL SCHULTZ, Warden, )

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Respondent. )

 )

1:05-CV-0300 REC SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 2241

Petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an application for a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in custody of the Bureau of Prisons at the United States Penitentiary

located in Atwater, California, pursuant to a judgment of the United States District Court for the

District of Guam entered on October 8, 1997, following his conviction on the following counts: 1)

Two counts of importing methamphetamine into Guam from the United States mainland; 2) One

count of attempting to import methamphetamine; and 3) Three counts of possession of

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U.S . District Court

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methamphetamine with intent to distribute. See Attachment 1, Respondent’s Response to Petition

(hereinafter “Response”). On October 28, 1997, Petitioner was sentenced to a life term plus a

concurrent term of 360 months. Id.

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He claimed that

there were no exigencies that justified the warrantless entry of his home, that his consent to the

search was not voluntary, and that the district court erred in its determination of the quantity of drugs

he imported and distributed. See United States v. Alaimalo, C.A. No. 97-10454 (9th Cir., Dec. 2,

1998). On December 2, 1998, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment. Id.

On December 2, 1999, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Alaimalo v. United States, C.A. No. 99-00106 (9th Cir., Feb. 15,

2000). Petitioner claimed that “the failure of both his trial lawyer and his appellate lawyer to

challenge the warrantless entry into his home as being without probable cause constituted ineffective

assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. On February 15, 2000, the motion

was denied. Id. Petitioner appealed the denial to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. United States v.

Alaimalo, 313 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir.2002). On December 20, 2002, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the

District Court’s denial. Id. 

On May 12, 2004, Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a second or successive § 2255

motion in the Ninth Circuit. See Alaimalo v. United States, C.A. No. 04-72369 (9th Cir., July 20,

2004). The motion was denied. Id.

On March 1, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging

his conviction and sentence. Petitioner argues that his three convictions for importation pursuant to

21 U.S.C. § 952(a), and his sentences thereon, are constitutionally invalid in light of the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622 (9th Cir.2003).

Following a preliminary review of the petition, on April 7, 2005, the Court tentatively found

it had subject matter jurisdiction over the petition, because it appeared the § 2241 petition qualified

under the savings clause of § 2255 in that Petitioner may not have had an “unobstructed procedural

shot” at presenting his claim. Respondent was directed to file an answer to the petition, and the

Court granted the parties leave to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

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U.S . District Court

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On July 6, 2005, Respondent filed a response to the petition in which Respondent contests

this Court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter in the petition.

On August 8, 2005, Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent’s response.

JURISDICTION

A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or constitutionality of his conviction

or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28

U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.1988); Thompson v. Smith, 719

F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir.1983); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3rd 1997); Broussard v. Lippman,

643 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir.1981). In such cases, only the sentencing court has jurisdiction. 

Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1163. A prisoner may not collaterally attack a federal conviction or sentence by

way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Grady v. United States,

929 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir.1991); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162; see also United States v. Flores, 616

F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir.1980). 

In contrast, a federal prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that

sentence's execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Brown

v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990); Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th

Cir. 1998); United States v. Tubwell, 37 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1994); Kingsley v. Bureau of

Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-94 (6th Cir.

1991); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3rd Cir. 1991); United States v. Hutchings, 835

F.2d 185, 186-87 (8th Cir. 1987). 

In this case, Petitioner is challenging the validity and constitutionality of his sentence rather

than an error in the administration of his sentence. Therefore, the appropriate procedure would be to

file a motion pursuant to § 2255 and not a habeas petition pursuant to § 2241. Petitioner concedes

this fact. Petitioner admits bringing this petition as a § 2241 petition instead of a § 2255, because he

has already sought relief by way of § 2255. However, a petition contending Petitioner's sentence is

invalid is still a § 2255 petition regardless of what Petitioner calls the petition. See Brown, 610 F.2d

at 677.

In rare situations, a federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under § 2255 may seek relief

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U.S . District Court

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under § 2241 if he can show the remedy available under § 2255 to be "inadequate or ineffective to

test the validity of his detention." United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting §

2255). Although there is little guidance from any court on when § 2255 is an inadequate or

ineffective remedy, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that it is a very narrow exception. Ivy v.

Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir.2003); Pirro, 104 F.3d at 299; Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5

(1964) (a court’s denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate.); 

Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (9th Cir.1988) (a petitioner's fears of bias or unequal treatment do not

render a § 2255 petition inadequate); Williams v. Heritage, 250 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.1957); Hildebrandt

v. Swope, 229 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1956). The Ninth Circuit has provided little guidance on what

constitutes “inadequate and ineffective” in relation to the savings clause. It has acknowledged that

“[other] circuits, however, have held that § 2255 provides an "inadequate or ineffective" remedy (and

thus that the petitioner may proceed under § 2241) when the petitioner claims to be: (1) factually

innocent of the crime for which he has been convicted; and, (2) has never had an "unobstructed

procedural shot" at presenting this claim.” Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1059-60, citing, Lorentsen v. Hood, 223

F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). The burden is on the petitioner to show that

the remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963). 

In the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner claims that § 2255 is inadequate and

ineffective. Petitioner first claims he is innocent of the crime. In United States v. Cabbacang, 332

F.3d 622, 637 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit held that transport of drugs on a nonstop flight from

California to Guam does not constitute importation. Here, Petitioner was convicted of importation

within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) for having received an express mail package containing

200 grams of methamphetamine in Guam which had been shipped from California. See United

States v. Alaimalo, 313 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir.2002). Thus, Petitioner is legally innocent of importation. 

Next, Petitioner argues he has never had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting this

claim because Cabbacang was decided on June 6, 2003, and Petitioner’s first § 2255 motion had

been denied by the District Court over three years earlier on February 15, 2000. The Court tentatively

found jurisdiction based on Petitioner’s showing; however, Respondent has submitted additional

arguments and evidence which demonstrates that Petitioner did in fact have several unobstructed

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U.S . District Court

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procedural opportunities to present his claim. 

Respondent submits that while Cabbacang was not decided until after Petitioner’s § 2255

motion had been denied, the basis for such a challenge was readily available well before the § 2255

motion was initially filed. Respondent’s argument is persuasive. In United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer,

82 F.3d 1131 (1st Cir.1996) (en banc), the First Circuit held in 1996 - one year before Petitioner was

sentenced - that a defendant’s conduct in transporting drugs from one location within the United

States to another, despite traveling over international waters, did not constitute “importation” within

the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). Petitioner was convicted and sentenced under the same section,

and the basis for his challenge was the same. While it is true the Ninth Circuit had twice previously

held to the contrary, the issue was available and could have been raised to the district court and on

appeal. Petitioner’s argument that raising the issue would have been futile does not excuse his failure

to do so. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130, n.35, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)

("[F]utility cannot constitute cause if it means simply that a claim was 'unacceptable to that particular

court at that particular time."). The defendants in Cabbacang, for instance, raised the issue in a brief

filed on December 20, 1999, which was during the pendency of Petitioner’s first § 2255 motion. See

Attachment 3, Response. Petitioner could have included the claim at any time prior to the denial of

the § 2255 motion on February 15, 2000. In addition, he could have included the claim on appeal to

the Ninth Circuit. As pointed out by Respondent, Petitioner was represented on appeal by the same

attorney, Sarah Courageous, who represented Roy Toves Cabbacang in United States v. Cabbacang,

332 F.3d 622, 637 (9th Cir.2003), which was the very same case that ultimately led to the Ninth

Circuit’s redefining “importation” in 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). As noted above, the opening brief in

Cabbacang was filed on December 20, 1999; the opening brief in Petitioner’s own § 2255 appeal

was filed on April 27, 2001. See Attachment 4, Response. Nothing prevented Petitioner’s attorney

from also raising the claim in his appeal. The claim certainly was available, and as demonstrated by

Cabbacang, would have been successful. Even if Petitioner had not raised the challenge in the

district court, he could have raised it for the first time on appeal and been successful. The defendants

in Cabbacang did so and were successful.

Therefore, it is clear Petitioner has not demonstrated that § 2255 provides an "inadequate or

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ineffective" remedy. The basis for Petitioner’s claim was available prior to his first § 2255 motion,

and Petitioner had multiple unobstructed opportunities to present it to the district court and to the

Ninth Circuit. The petition should be dismissed.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DISMISSED because the petition does not allege grounds that would entitle petitioner to relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Robert E. Coyle,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall

be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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